the tenure of kings and magistrates proving that it is lawfull, and hath been held so through all ages, for any who have the power, to call to account a tyrant, or wicked king, and after due conviction, to depose and put the author, j.m. milton, john, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing m ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing m estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the tenure of kings and magistrates proving that it is lawfull, and hath been held so through all ages, for any who have the power, to call to account a tyrant, or wicked king, and after due conviction, to depose and put the author, j.m. milton, john, - . [ ], p. printed by matthew simmons ..., london : . attributed to john milton. cf. halkett and laing ( nd ed.). reproduction of original in huntington library. eng political science -- early works to . divine right of kings. a r (wing m ). civilwar no the tenure of kings and magistrates: proving, that it is lawfull, and hath been held so through all ages, for any, who have the power, to ca milton, john b the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the b category of texts with fewer than defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the tenure of kings and magistrates : proving , that it is lawfull , and hath been held so through all ages , for any , who have the power , to call to account a tyrant , or wicked king , and after due conviction , to depose , and put him to death ; if the ordinary magistrate have neglected , or deny'd to doe it . and that they , who of late , so much blame deposing , are the men that did it themselves . the author , j. m. london , printed by matthew simmons , at the gilded lyon in aldersgate street , . the tenure of kings and magistrates . if men within themselves would be govern'd by reason , and not generally give up their understanding to a double tyrannie , of custome from without , and blind affections within , they would discerne better what it is to favour and uphold the tyrant of a nation . but being slaves within doores , no wonder that they strive so much to have the public state conformably govern'd to the inward vitious rule , by which they govern themselves . for indeed none can love freedom heartilie , but good men ; the rest love not freedom , but licence ; which never hath more scope or more indulgence then under tyrants . hence is it that tyrants are not oft offended , nor stand much in doubt of bad men , as being all naturally servile ; but in whom vertue and true worth most is eminent , them they feare in earnest , as by right their masters , against them lies all their hatred and suspicion . consequentlie neither doe bad men hate tirants , but have been alwaies readiest with the falsifi'd names of loyalty and obedience , to colour over their base compliances . and although sometimes for shame , and when it comes to their owne grievances , of purse especially , they would seeme good patriots , and side with the better cause , yet when others for the deliverance of their countrie , endu'd with fortitude and heroick vertue , to feare nothing but the curse written against those that doe the worke of the lord negligently , would goe on to remove , not onely the calamities and thraldomes of a people , but the roots and causes whence they spring , streight these men , and sure helpers at need , as if they hated onely the miseries but not the mischiefes , after they have juggl'd and palter'd with the world , bandied and borne armes against their king , devested him , disanointed him , nay curs'd him all over in thir pulpits , and their pamphlets , to the ingaging of sincere and reall men , beyond what is possible or honest to retreat from , not onely turne revolters from those principles , which onely could at first move them , but lay the staine of disloyaltie , and worse , on those proceedings , which are the necessarie consequences of their owne former actions ; nor disllik'd by themselves , were they manag'd to the intire advantages of their owne faction ; not considering the while that he toward whom they boasted their new fidelitie , counted them accessory , and by those statutes and laws which they so impotently brandish against others , would have doom'd them to a traytors death for what they have done alreadie . 't is true , that most men are apt anough to civill wars and commotions as a noveltie , and for a flash , hot and active ; but through sloth or inconstancie , and weakness of spirit either fainting , ere their owne pretences , though never so just , be halfe attain'd , or through an inbred falshood and wickednesse , betray oft times to destruction with themselves , men of noblest temper join'd with them for causes which they in their rash undertakings were not capable of . if god and a good cause give them victory , the prosecution whereof for the most part , inevitably drawes after it the alteration of lawes , change of government , downfall of princes with their families ; then comes the task to those worthies which are the soule of that enterprize , to bee swett and labour'd out amidst the throng and noises of vulgar and irrationall men . some contesting for privileges , customes , formes , and that old intanglement of iniquitie , their gibrish lawes , though the badge of their ancient slavery . others who have been fiercest against their prince , under the notion of a tyrant , and no meane incendiaries of the warre against him , when god out of his providence and high disposall hath deliver'd him into the hand of their brethren , on a suddaine and in a new garbe of allegiance , which their doings have long since cancell'd ; they plead for him , pity him , extoll him , protest against those that talke of bringing him to the tryall of justice , which is the sword of god , superiour to all mortall things , in whose hand soever by apparent signes his testified wil is to put it . but certainely , if we consider who and what they are , on a suddaine growne so pitifull , wee may conclude , their pity can be no true and christian commiseration , but either levitie and shallownesse of minde , or else a carnall admiring of that worldly pompe and greatness , from whence they see him fall'n ; or rather lastly a dissembl'd and seditious pity , fain'd of industry to beget new commotions . as for mercy , if it bee to a tyrant , under which name they themselves have cited him so oft in the hearing of god , of angels , and the holy church assembl'd , and there charg'd him with the spilling of more innocent blood by farre , then ever nero did , undoubtedly the mercy which they pretend , is the mercy of wicked men ; and their mercies , wee read , are cruelties ; hazarding the welfare of a whole nation , to have sav'd one , whom so oft they have tearm'd agag , and villifying the blood of many jonathans that have sav'd israel ; insisting with much nicenesse on the unnecessariest clause of their covnant ; wherein the feare of change , and the absurd contradiction of a flattering hostilitie had hamperd them , but not scrupling to give away for complements , to an implacable revenge , the heads of many thousand christians more . another sort there is , who comming in the course of these affaires , to have thir share in great actions above the forme of law or custome , at least to give thir voice and approbation , begin to swerve and almost shiver at the majesty and grandeur of som noble deed , as if they were newly enter'd into a great sin ; disputing presidents , formes , & circumstances , when the common wealth nigh perishes for want of deeds in substance , don with just and faithfull expedition . to these i wish better instruction , and vertue equall to their calling ; the former of which , that is to say instruction , i shall indeavour , as my dutie is , to bestow on them ; and exhort them not to startle from the just and pious resolution of adhering with all their assistance to the present parlament and army , in the glorious way wherein justice and victorie hath set them ; the onely warrants through all ages , next under immediate revelation , to exercise supreame power ; in those proceedings which hitherto appeare equall to what hath been don in any age or nation heretofore , justly or magnanimouslie . nor let them be discourag'd or deterr'd by any new apostate scar crowes , who under show of giving counsell , send out their barking monitories and momento's , emptie of ought else but the spleene of a frustrated faction . for how can that pretended counsell , bee either sound or faithfull , when they that give it , see not for madnesse and vexation of their ends lost , that those statutes and scriptures which both falsly and scandalously , they wrest against their friends and associates , would by sentence of the common adversarie , fall first and heaviest upon their owne heads . neither let milde and tender dispositions be foolishly softn'd from their dutie and perseverance with the unmasculine rhetorick of any puling priest or chaplain , sent as a friendly letter of advice , for fashion sake in private , and forthwith publish't by the sender himselfe , that wee may know how much of friend there was in it , to cast an odious envie upon them , to whom it was pretended to be sent in charitie . nor let any man bee deluded by either the ignorance or the notorious hypocrisie and selfe-repugnance of our dancing divines , who have the conscience and the boldnesse , to come with scripture in their mouthes , gloss'd and fitted for thir turnes with a double contradictory sense , transforming the sacred veritie of god , to an idol with two faces , looking at once two several ways ; and with the same quotations to charge others , which in the same case they made serve to justifie themselves . for while the hope to bee made classic and provinciall lords led them on , while pluralities greas'd them thick and deepe , to the shame and scandall of religion , more then all the sects and heresies they exclaime against , then to fight against the kings person , and no lesse a party of his lords and commons , or to put force upon both the houses was good , was lawfull , was no resisting of superiour powers ; they onely were powers not to be resisted , who countenanc'd the good and punish't the evill . but now that thir censorious domineering is not suffer'd to be universall , truth and conscience to be freed , tithes and pluralities to be no more , though competent allowance provided , and the warme experience of large gifts , and they so good at taking them ; yet now to exclude and seize on impeach't members , to bring delinquents without exemption to a faire tribunall by the common nationall law against murder , is now to be no lesse then corah , dathan , and abiram . he who but erewhile in the pulpits was a cursed tyrant , an enemie to god and saints , laden with all the innocent blood split in three kingdomes , and so to bee sought against , is now though nothing penitent or alter'd from his first principles , a lawfull magistrate , a sovrane lord , the lords annointed , not to bee touch'd , though by themselves imprison'd . as if this onely were obedience , to preserve the meere uselesse bulke of his person , and that onely in prison , not in the field , and to disobey his commands , denie him his dignitie and office , every where to resist his power but where they thinke it onely surviving in thir owne faction . but who in particular is a tyrant cannot be determind in a generall discourse , otherwise then by supposition ; his particular charge , and the sufficient proofe of it must determine that : which i leave to magistrates , at least to the uprighter sort of them , and of the people , though in number lesse by many , in whom faction least hath prevaild above the law of nature and right reason , to judge as they finde cause . but this i dare owne as part of my faith , that if such a one there be , by whose commission , whole massacres have been committed on his faithfull subjects , his provinces offerd to pawne or alienation , as the hire of those whom he had sollicited to come in and destroy whole cities and countries ; be hee king , or tyrant , or emperour , the sword of justice is above him ; in whose hand soever is found sufficient power to avenge the effusion , and so great a deluge of inuocent blood . for if all humane power to execute , not accidentally but intendedly , the wrath of god upon evill doers without exception , be of god ; then that power , whether ordinary , or if that faile , extraordinary so executing that intent of god , is lawfull , and not to be resisted . but to unfold more at large this whole question , though with all expedient brevity , i shall here set downe , from first beginning , the originall of kings ; how and wherefore exalted to that dignitie above their brethren ; and from thence shall prove , that turning to tyranny they may bee as lawfully deposd and punishd , as they were at first elected : this i shall doe by autorities and reasons , not learnt in corners among schismes and herisies , as our doubling divines are ready to calumniate , but fetch 't out of the midst of choicest and most authentic learning , and no prohibited authors , nor many heathen , but mosaical , christian , orthodoxal , and which must needs be more convincing to our adversaries , presbyterial . no man who knows ought , can be so stupid to deny that all men naturally were borne free , being the image and resemblance of god himselfe , and were by privilege above all the creatures , borne to command and not to obey : and that they livd so , till from the root of adams transgression , falling among themselves to doe wrong and violence , and foreseeing that such courses must needs tend to the destruction of them all , they agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual injury , and joyntly to defend themselves against any that gave disturbance or opposition to such agreement . hence came citties , townes and common-wealths . and because no faith in all was found sufficiently binding , they saw it needfull to ordaine some authoritie , that might restraine by force and punishment what was violated against peace and common right : this autoritie and power of self-defence and preservation being originally and naturally in every one of them , and unitedly in them all , for ease , for order , and least each man should be his owne partial judge , they communicated and deriv'd either to one , whom for the eminence of his wisdom and integritie they chose above the rest , or to more then one whom they thought of equal deserving : the first was calld a king ; the other magistrates . not to be thir lords and maisters ( though afterward those names in som places were giv'n voluntarily to such as had bin authors of inestimable good to the people ) but , to be thir deputies and commissioners , to execute , by vertue of thir intrusted power , that justice which else every man by the bond of nature and of cov'nant must have executed for himselfe , and for one another . and to him that shall consider well why among free persons , one man by civill right should beare autority and jurisdiction over another , no other end or reason can be imaginable . these for a while governd well , and with much equitie decided all things at thir owne arbitrement : till the temptation of such a power left absolute in thir hands , perverted them at length to injustice and partialitie . then did they who now by tryall had found the danger and inconveniences of committing arbitrary power to any , invent lawes either fram'd or consented to by all , that should confine and limit the autority of whom they chose to govern them : that so man of whose failing they had proof , might no more rule over them , but law and reason abstracted as much as might be from personal errors and frailties . when this would nor serve , but that the law was either not executed , or misapply'd , they were constraind from that time , the onely remedy left them , to put conditions and take oaths from all kings and magistrates at their first instalment to doe impartial justice by law : who upon those termes and no other , receav'd allegeance from the people , that is to say , bond or covnant to obey them in execution of those lawes which they the people had themselves made or assented to . and this oft times with express warning , that if the king or magistrate prov'd unfaithfull to his trust , the people would be disingag'd . they added also counselors and parlaments , not to be onely at his beck , but with him or without him , at set times , or at all times , when any danger threatn●d to have care of the public safety . therefore saith claudius sesell a french statesman , the parlament was set as a bridle to the king ; which i instance rather , because that monarchy is granted by all to be a farre more absolute then ours . that this and the rest of what hath hitherto been spok'n is most true , might be copiously made appeare throughout all stories heathen and christian ; eev'n of those nations where kings and emperours have sought meanes to abolish all ancient memory of the peoples right by their encroachments and usurpations . but i spare long insertions , appealing to the german , french , italian , arragonian , english , and not least the scottish histories : not forgetting this onely by the way , that vvilliam the norman though a conqueror , and not unsworne at his coronation , was compelld a second time to take oath at s. albanes , ere the people would be brought to yeild obedience . it being thus manifest that the power of kings and magistrates is nothing else , but what is onely derivative , transferrd and committed to them in trust from the people to the common good of them all , in whom the power yet remaines fundamentally , and cannot be tak'n from them , without a violation of thir natural birthright , and seeing that from hence aristotle and the best of political writers have defin'd a king , him who governs to the good and profit of his people , and not for his owne ends , it follows from necessary causes that the titles of sovran lord , naturall lord , and the like , are either arrogancies , or flatteries , not admitted by emperors and kings of best note , and dislikt by the church both of jews , isai. . . and ancient christians as appears by tertullian and others . although generally the people of asia and with them the jews also , especially since the time they chose a king , against the advice and counsel of god , are noted by wise authors much inclinable to slavery . secondly , that to say , as is usual , the king hath as good right to his crown and dignitie , as any man to his inheritance , is to make the subject no better then the kings slave , his chattell , or his possession that may be bought and sould , and doubtless if hereditary title were sufficiently inquir'd , the best foundation of it would be found but either in courtesie or convenience . but suppose it to be of right hereditarie , what can be more just and legal , if a subject for certaine crimes be to forfet by law from himselfe and posterity , all his inheritance to the king , then that a king for crimes proportionall , should forfet all his title and inheritance to the people : unless the people must be thought created all for him , he not for them , and they all in one body inferior to him single , which were a kinde of treason against the dignity of mankind to affirm . thirdly it followes , that to say kings are accountable to none but god , is the overturning of all law and goverment . for if they may refuse to give account , then all covnants made with them at coronation ; all oathes are in vaine , and meer mockeries , all lawes which they sweare to keep , made to no purpose ; for if the king feare not god , as how many of them doe not ? we hold then our lives and estates , by the tenure of his meer grace and mercy , as from a god , not a mortall magistrate , a position that none but court parasites or men besotted would maintain . and no christian prince not drunk with high mind , and prouder then those pagan caesars , that deifi'd themselves , would arrogate so unreasonably above human condition , or derogate so basely from a whole nation of men his brethren , as if for him onely subsisting , and to serve his glory , valuing them in comparison of his owne brute will and pleasure no more then so many beasts , or vermine under his feet , not to be reasond with , but to be injurd ; among whom there might be found so many thousand men for wisdome , vertue , nobleness of mind and all other respects , but the fortune of his dignity , farr above him . yet some would perswade us that this absurd opinion was king davids ; because in the psalm he cries out to god , against thee onely have i sinn'd ; as if david had imagind that to murder uriah and adulterate his wife , had bin no sinne against his neighbor , when as that law of moses was to the king expresly , deut. . not to think so highly of himself above his brethren . david therefore by those words could mean no other , then either that the depth of his guiltiness was known to god onely , or to so few as had not the will or power to question him , or that the sin against god was greater beyond compare then against uriah . what ever his meaning were , any wise man will see that the patheticall words of a psalme can be no certaine decision to a point that hath abundantly more certaine rules to goe by . how much more rationally spake the heathen king . demophoon in a tragedy of euripides then these interpret●s would put upon king david , i rule not my people by tyranny , as if they were barbarians , but am my self liable , if i doe unjustly to suffer justly not unlike was the speech of traian the worthy emperor , to one whom he made general of his praetorian forces . take this drawne sword , saith he , to use for me , if i reigne well , if not , to use against me . thus dion relates . and not traian onely , but theodosius the younger a christian emperor and one of the best , causd it to be enacted as a rule undenyable and fit to be acknowledgd by all kings and emperors , that a prince is bound to the laws ; that on the autority of law the autority of a prince depends , & to the laws ought submit . which edict of his remaines yet unrepeald in the code of justinian . l. . tit. . as a sacred constitution to all the succeeding emperors . how then can any king in europe maintaine and write himselfe accountable to none but god , when emperors in thir owne imperiall statutes have writt'n and decreed themselves accountable to law . and indeed where such account is not fear'd , he that bids a man reigne over him above law , may bid as well a savage beast . it follows lastly , that since the king or magistrate holds his autoritie of the people , both originally and naturally for their good in the first place , and not his owne , then may the people as oft as they shall judge it for the best , either choose him or reject him , retaine him or depose him though no tyrant , meerly by the libertie and right of free born men to be govern'd as seems to them best . this , though it cannot but stand with plaine reason , shall be made good also by scripture , deut. . . vvhen thou art come into the land which the lord thy god giveth thee , and shalt say i will set a king over mee , like as all the nations about mee these words confirme us that the right of choosing , yea of changing thir owne goverment is by the grant of god him self in the people . and therefore when they desit'd a king , though then under another forme of goverment , and though thir changing displeasd him , yet he that was himself thir king , and rejected by them , would not be a hindrance to what they inended , furder then by perswasion , but that they might doe therein as they saw good , sam. . onely he reserv'd to himself the nomination of who should reigne over them . neither did that exempt the king as if hee were to god onely accountable , though by his especiall command anointed . therefore david first made a covnant with the elders of israel , and so was by them anointed king , chron. . and jehoiada the priest making jehoash king , made a cov'nant between him and the people , kings . . therefore when roboam at his comming to the crowne , rejected those conditions which the israelites brought him , heare what they answer him , what portion have we in david , or inheritance in the son of jesse . see to thine own house david . and for the like conditions not perform'd , all israel before that time deposd samuell ; not for his own default , but for the misgovement of his sons . but som will say to both these examples , it was evilly don . i answer , that not the latter , because it was expressely allow'd them in the law to set up a king if they pleas'd ; and god himself joynd with them in the work ; though in some sort it was at that time displeasing to him , in respect of old samuell who had governd them uprightly . as livy praises the romans who took occasion from tarquinius a wicked prince to gaine their libertie , which to have extorted , saith hee , from numa or any of the good kings before , had not bin seasonable . nor was it in the former example don unlawfully ; for when roboam had prepar'd a huge army to reduce the israelites , he was forbidd'n by the profet , kings . . thus saith the lord yee shall not goe up , nor fight against your brethren , for this thing is from me . he calls them thir brethren , not rebels , and forbidds to be proceeded against them , owning the thing himselfe , not by single providence , but by approbation , and that not onely of the act , as in the former example , but of the fitt season also ; he had not otherwise forbidd to molest them . and those grave and wise counsellors whom rehoboam first advis'd with , spake no such thing , as our old gray headed flatterers now are wont , stand upon your birth-right , scorne to capitulate , you hold of god , and not of them ; for they knew no such matter , unless conditionally , but gave him politic counsel , as in a civil transaction . therefore kingdom and magistracy , whether supreme or subordinat is calld a human ordinance , pet. . . &c. which we are there taught is the will of god wee should submitt to , so farr as for the punishment of evill doers , and the encouragement of them that doe well . submitt saith he , as free men . and there is no power but of god , saith paul , rom. . as much as to say , god put it into mans heart to find out that way at first for common peace and preservation , approving the exercise therof ; els it contradicts peter who calls the same autority an ordinance of man . it must be also understood of lawfull and just power , els we read of great power in the affaires and kingdomes of the world permitted to the devill : for saith he to christ , luke . . all this power will i give thee and the glory of them , for it is deliverd to me , and to whomsoever i will , i give it : neither did hee ly , or christ gainsay what hee affirm'd : for in the thirteenth of the revelation wee read how the dragon gave to the beast his power , his seat , and great autority : which beast so autoriz'd most expound to be the tyrannical powers and kingdomes of the earth . therfore saint paul in the forecited chapter tells us that such magistrates hee meanes ' , as are , not a terror to the good but to the evill , such as beare not the sword in vaine , but to punish offenders , and to encourage the good . if such onely be mentiond here as powers to be obeyd , and our submission to them onely requird , then doubtless those powers that doe the contrary , are no powers ordaind of god , and by consequence no obligation laid upon us to obey or not to resist them . and it may be well observd that both these apostles , whenever they give this precept , express it in termes not concret but abstract , as logicians are wont to speake , that is , they mention the ordinance , the power , the autoritie before the persons that execute it , and what that power is , lest we should be deceavd , they describe exactly . so that if the power be not such , or the person execute not such power , neither the one nor the other is of god , but of the devill , and by consequence to bee resisted . from this exposition chrysostome also on the same place dissents not ; explaining that these words were not writt'n in behalf of a tyrant . and this is verify'd by david , himself a king , and likeliest to bee author of the psalm . . which saith , shall the throne of iniquity have fellowship with thee . and it were worth the knowing , since kings , and that by scripture boast the justness of thir title , by holding it immediately of god , yet cannot show the t●me when god ever set on the throne them or thir forefathers , but onely when the people chose them ; why by the same reason , since god ascribes as oft to himself the casting down of princes from the throne , it should not be thought as lawful , and as much from god when none are seen to do it but the people , and that for just causes . for if it needs must be a sin in them to depose , it may as likely be a sin to have elected . and contrary if the peoples act in election be pleaded by a king , as the act of god , and the most just title to enthrone him , why may not the peoples act of rejection , be as well pleaded by the people as the act of god , and the most just reason to depose him ? so that we see the title and just right of reigning or deposing in reference to god , is found in scripture to be all one ; visible onely in the people , and depending meerly upon justice and demerit . thus farr hath bin considerd briefly the power of kings and magistrates ; how it was , and is originally the peoples , and by them conferrd in trust onely to bee imployd to the common peace and benefit ; with libertie therfore and right remaining in them to reassume it to themselves , if by kings or magistrats it be abus'd ; or to dispose of it by any alteration , as they shall judge most conducing to the public good . wee may from hence with more ease , and force of argument determin what a tyrant is , and what the people may doe against him . a tyrant whether by wrong or by right comming to the crowne , is he who regarding neither law nor the common good , reigns onely for himself and his faction : thus st. basil among others defines him . and because his power is great , his will boundless and exorbitant , the fulfilling whereof is for the most part accompanied with innumerable wrongs and oppressions of the people , murders , massacres , rapes , adulteries , desolation , and subversion of citties and whole provinces ; look how great a good and happiness a just king is , so great a mischeife is a tyrant ; as hee the public father of his countrie , so this the common enemie . against whom what the people lawfully may doe , as against a common pest , and destroyer of mankinde , i suppose no man of cleare judgement need goe surder to be guided then by the very principles of nature in him . but because it is the vulgar folly of men to desert thir owne reason , and shutting thir eyes to think they see best with other mens , i shall shew by such examples as ought to have most waight with us , what hath bin don is this case heretofore . the greeks and romans as thir prime authors witness held it not onely lawfull , but a glorious and heroic deed , rewarded publicly with statues and garlands , to kill an infamous tyrant at any time without tryal ; and but reason , that he who trod down all law , should not bee voutsaf'd the benefit of law . insomuch that seneca the tragedian brings in hercules the grand suppressor of tyrants , thus speaking , — victima haud ulla amplior potest , magisque opima mactari jovi quam rex iniquus — — there can be slaine no sacrifice to god more accetable then an unjust and wicked king — but of these i name no more , lest it bee objected they were heathen ; and come to produce another sort of men that had the knowledge of true religion . among the jews this custome of tyrant-killing was not unusual . first ehud , a man whom god had raysd to deliver israel from eglon king of moab , who had conquerd and rul'd over them eighteene yeares , being sent to him as an ambassador with a present slew him in his owne house . but hee was a forren prince , an enemie , and ehud besides had special warrant from god . to the first i answer , it imports not whether forren or native : for no prince so native but professes to hold by law ; which when he himselfe overturnes , breaking all the covnants and oaths that gave him title to his dignity , and were the bond and alliance between him and his people , what differs he from an outlandish king or from an enemie ? for looke how much right the king of spaine hath to govern us at all , so much right hath the king of england to govern us tyrannically . if he , though not bound to us by any league , comming from spaine in person to subdue us or to destroy us , might lawfully by the people of england either bee slaine in fight , or put to death in captivity , what hath a native king to plead , bound by so many covnants , benefits and honours to the welfare of his people , why he through the contempt of all laws and parlaments , the onely tie of our obedience to him , for his owne wills sake , and a boasted praerogative unaccountable , after sev'n years warring and destroying of his best subjects , overcom , and yeilded prisoner , should think to scape unquestionable , as a thing divine , in respect of whom so many thousand christians destroy'd should lye unaccounted for , polluting with thir slaughterd carcasses all the land over , and crying for vengeance against the living that should have righted them . who knows not that there is a mutual bond of amity and brotherhood between man and man over all the world , neither is it the english sea that can sever us from that duty and relation : a straiter bond yet there is between fellow-subjects , neighbours , and friends ; but when any of these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to another so as hostility 〈…〉 doth the law decree less against them , then oepn enemies and invaders ? or if the law be not present , or too weake , what doth it warrant us to less then single defence or civil warr ? and from that time forward the law of civill defensive warr differs nothing from the law of forren hostility . nor is it distance of place that makes enmitie , but enmity that makes distance . he therefore that keeps peace with me neer or remote of whatsoever nation , is to mee as farr as all civil and human offices an englishman and a nighbour : but if an englishman forgetting all laws , human , civil and religious offend against life and libertie , to him offended and to the law in his behalf , though born in the same womb , he is no better then a turk , a sarasin , a heathen . this is gospel , and this was ever law among equals ; how much rather then in force against any king whatsoever , who in respect of the people is coufessd inferior and not equal : to distinguish therfore of a tyrant by outlandish , or domestic is a weak evasion . to the second that he was an enemie , i answer , what tyrant is not ? yet eglon by the jewes had bin acknowledgd as thir sovran , they had servd him eighteen yeares , as long almost as wee our vvilliam the conqueror , in all which time he could not be so unwise a statesman but to have tak'n of them oaths of fealty and allegeance by which they made themselves his proper subjects , as thir homage and present sent by ehud testifyd . to the third , that he had special warrant to kill eglon in that manner , it cannot bee granted , because not expressd ; t is plain that he was raysd by god to be a deliverer , and went on just principles , such as were then and ever held allowable , to deale so by a tyrant that could no otherwise be dealt with . neither did samuell though a profet , with his owne hand abstain from agag ; a forren enemie no doubt ; but mark the reason , as thy sword hath made women childless ; a cause that by the sentence of law it selfe nullifies all relations . and as the law is between brother and brother , father and son , maister and servant , wherfore not between king or rather tyrant and people ? and whereas jehu had special command to slay jehoram a successive and hereditarie tyrant , it seemes not the less imitable for that ; for where a thing grounded so much on naturall reason hath the addition of a command from god , what does it but establish the lawfulness of such an act . nor is it likely that god who had so many wayes of punishing the house of ahab would have sent a subject against his prince , if the fact in it selfe as don to a tyrant had bin of bad example . and if david refus'd to lift his hand against the lords anointed , the matter between them was not tyranny , but private enmity , and david as a private person had bin his own revenger , not so much the peoples ; but when any tyrant at this day can shew to be the lords anointed , the onely mention'd reason why david with held his hand , he may then but not till then presume on the same privilege . we may pass therfore hence to christian times . and first our saviour himself , how much he favourd tyrants and how much intended they should be found or honourd among christians , declares his minde not obscurely ; accounting thir absolute autoritie no better then gentilisme , yea though they flourishd it over with the splendid name of benefactors ; charging those that would be his disciples to usurp no such dominion ; but that they who were to bee of most autoritie among them , should esteem themselves ministers and servants to the public . matt. . . the princes of the gentiles exercise lordship over them , and mark . . they that seem to rule , saith he , either slighting or accounting them no lawful rulers , but yee shall not be so , but the greatest among you shall be your servant . and although hee himself were the meekest , and came on earth to be so , yet to a tyrant we hear him not voutsafe an humble word : but tell that fox , luc. . and wherfore did his mother the virgin mary give such praise to god in her profetic song , that he had now by the comming of christ cutt down dynasta's or proud monarchs from the throne , if the church , when god manifests his power in them to doe so , should rather choose all miserie and vassalage to serve them , and let them still sit on thir potent seats to bee ador'd for doing mischiefe . surely it is not for nothing that tyrants by a kind of natural instinct both hate and feare none more then the true church and saints of god , as the most dangerous enemies and subverters of monarchy , though indeed of tyranny ; hath not this bin the perpetual cry of courtiers , and court prelates ? whereof no likelier cause can be alleg'd , but that they well discern'd the mind and principles of most devout and zealous men , and indeed the very discipline of church , tending to the dissolution of all tyranny . no marvel then if since the faith of christ receav'd , in purer or impurer times , to depose a king and put him to death for tyranny hath bin accounted so just and requisit , that neighbour kings have both upheld and tak'n part with subjects in the action . and ludovicus pius , himself an emperor , and sonne of charles the great , being made judge , du haillan is my author , between milegast king of the vul●zes and his subjects who had depos'd him , gave his verdit for the subjects , and for him whom they had chos'n in his room . note here that the right of electing whom they please is by the impartial testimony of an emperor in the people . for , said he , a just prince ought to be prefer'd before an unjust , and the end of government before the prerogative . and constantinus leo , another emperor in the byzantine laws saith , that the end of a king is for the general good , which he not performing is but the counterfet of a king . and to prove that some of our owne monarchs have acknowledg'd that thir high office exempted them not from punishment , they had the sword of st. edward born before them by an officer who was calld earle of the palace eev'n at the times of thir highest pomp and solemnitie , to mind them , saith matthew paris , the best of our historians , that if they errd , the sword had power to restraine them . and what restraint the sword comes to at length , having both edge and point , if any sceptic will needs doubt , let him feel . it is also affirm'd from diligent search made in our ancient books of law , that the peers and barons of england had a legall right to judge the king : which was the cause most likely , for it could be no slight cause , that they were call'd his peers , or equals . this however may stand immovable , so long as man hath to deale with no better then man ; that if our law judge all men to the lowest by thir peers , it should in all equity ascend also , and judge the highest . and so much i find both in our own and forren storie , that dukes , earles , and marqueses were at first not hereditary , not empty and vain titles , but names of trust and office , and with the office ceasing , as induces me to be of opinion , that every worthy man in parlament , for the word baron imports no more , might for the public good be thought a fit peer and judge of the king ; without regard had to petty caveats , and circumstances , the chief impediment in high affaires , and ever stood upon most by circumstantial men . whence doubtless our ancestors who were not ignorant with what rights either nature or ancient constitution had endowd them , when oaths both at coronation , and renewd in parlament would not serve , thought it no way illegal to depose and put to death thir tyrannous kings . insomuch that the parlament drew up a charge against richard the second , and the commons requested to have judgement decree'd against him , that the realme might not bee endangerd . and peter martyr a divine of formost rank , on the third of judges approves thir doings . sir thomas smith also a protestant and a statesman in his commonwealth of england putting the question whether it be lawful to rise against a tyrant , answers that the vulgar judge of it according to the event , and the learned according to the purpose of them that do it . but far before those days gildas the most ancient of all our historians , speaking of those times wherein the roman empire decaying quitted and relinquishd what right they had by conquest to this iland , and resign'd it all into the peoples hands , testifies that the people thus re-invested with thir own original right , about the year , both elected them kings , whō they thought best ( the first christian brittish kings that ever raign'd heer since the romans ) and by the same right , when they apprehended cause , usually deposd and put them to death . this is the most fundamental and ancient tenure that any king of england can produce or pretend to ; in comparison of which , all other titles and pleas are but of yesterday . if any object that gildas condemns the britanes for so doing , the answer is as ready ; that he condemns them no more for so doing , then hee did before for choosing such , for saith he , they anointed them kings , not of god , but such as were more bloody then therest . next hee condemns them not at all for deposing or putting them to death , but for doing it over hastily , without tryal or well examining the cause , and for electing others worse in thir room . thus we have here both domestic and most ancient examples that the people of britain have deposd and put to death thir kings in those primitive christian times . and to couple reason with example , if the church in all ages , primitive , romish , or protestant held it ever no less thir duty then the power of thir keyes , though without express warrant of scripture , to bring indifferently both king and peasant under the utmost rigor of thir canons and censures ecclesiastical , eev'n to the smiting him with a final excommunion , if he persist impenitent , what hinders but that the temporal law both may and ought , though without a special text or president , extend with like indifference the civil sword , to the cutting off without exemption him that capitally offends . seeing that justice and religion are from the same god , and works of justice ofttimes more acceptable . yet because that some lately with the tongues and arguments of malignant backsliders have writt'n that the proceedings now in parlament against the king , are without president from any protestant state or kingdom , the examples which follow shall be all protestant and chiefly presbyterian . in the yeare . the duke of saxonie , lantgrave of hessen , and the whole protestant league raysd open warr against charles the fifth thir emperor , sent him a defiance , renounc'd all faith and allegeance toward him , and debated long in counsell whether they should give him so much as the title of caesar . sleidan . l. . let all men judge what this wanted of deposing or of killing , but the power to doe it . in the yeare . the scotch protestants claiming promise of thir queen regent for libertie of conscience , she answering that promises were not to be claim'd of princes beyond what was commodious for them to grant , told her to her face in the parlament then at sterling , that if it were so , they renounc'd thir obedience ; and soone after betooke them to armes . buchanan hist. l. . certainely when allegeance is renounc'd , that very hour the king or queen is in effect depos'd . in the yeare . john kn●x a most famous divine and the reformer of scotland to the presbyterian discipline , at a generall assembly maintaind op'nly in a dispute against lethington the secretary of state , that subjects might and ought execute gods judgements upon thir king ; that the fact of jehu and others against thir king having the ground of gods ordinary command to put such and such offenders to death was not extraordinary , but to bee imitated of all that prefer'd the honour of god to the affection of flesh and wicked princes , that kings , if they offend , have no privilege to be exempted from the punishments of law more then any other subject ; so that if the king be a murderer , adulterer , or idolater , he should suffer not as a king , but as an offender ; and this position hee repeates againe and againe before them . answerable was the opinion of john craig another learned divine , and that lawes made by the tyranny of princes , or the negligence of people , thir posterity might abrogate , and reform all things according to the original institution of common-wealths , and knox being commanded by the nobilitie to write to calvin and other learned men for thir judgements in that question refus'd ; alleging that both himselfe was fully resolv'd in conscience , and had heard thir judgements , and had the same opinion under hand-writing of many the most godly and most learned that he knew in europe ; that if he should move the question to them againe , what should he doe but shew his owne forgetfulness or inconstancy . all this is farr more largely in the ecclesiastic history of scotland l. . with many other passages to this effect all the book over ; set out with diligence by scotchmen of best repute among them at the beginning of these troubles , as if they labourd to inform us what wee were to doe and what they intended upon the like occasion . and to let the world know that the whole church and protestant state of scotland in those purest times of reformation were of the same belief , three years after , they met in the feild mary thir lawful and hereditary queen , took her prisoner yeilding before fight , kept her in prison and the same yeare deposd her . buchan . hist. l. . and four years after that , the scots in justification of thir deposing queen mary , sent embassadors to queen elizabeth , and in a writt'n declaration alleag'd that they had us'd towards her more lenity then shee deservd ; that thir ancestors had heretofore punishd thir kings by death or banishment ; that the scots were a free nation , made king whom they freely chose , and with the same freedome un-kingd him if they saw cause , by right of ancient laws and ceremonies yet remaining , and old customers yet among the high-landers in choosing the head of thir clanns , or families ; all which with many other arguments bore witness that regal power was nothing else but a mutuall covnant or stipulation between king and people . buch. hist. l. . these were scotchmen and presbyterians ; but what measure then have they lately offerd , to think such liberty less beseeming us then themselves , presuming to put him upon us for a maister whom thir law scarce allows to be thir own equall ? if now then we heare them in another straine then heretofore in the purest times of thir church , we may be confident it is the voice of faction speaking in them , not of truth and reformation . in the yeare . the states of holland in a general assembly at the hague , abjur'd all obedience and subjection to philip king of spaine ; and in a declaration justifie thir so doing ; for that by his tyrannous goverment against faith so oft'n giv'n and brok'n he had lost his right to all the belgic provinces ; that therfore they deposd him and declar'd it lawful to choose another in his stead . thuan. l. . from that time , to this no state or kingdom in the world hath equally prosperd : but let them remember not to look with an evil and prejudicial eye upon thir neighbours walking by the same rule . but what need these examples to presbyterians , i meane to those who now of late would seem so much to abhorr deposing , whenas they to all christendom have giv'n the latest and the liveliest example of doing it themselves . i question not the lawfulness of raising warr against a tyrant in defence of religion , or civil libertie ; for no protestant church from the first waldenses of lyons , and languedoc to this day but have don it round , and maintaind it lawfull . but this i doubt not to affirme , that the presbyterians , who now so much condemn deposing , were the men themselves that deposd the king , and cannot with all thir shifting and relapsing , wash off the guiltiness from thir owne hands . for they themselves , by these thir late doings have made it guiltiness , and turnd thir owne warrantable actions into rebellion . there is nothing that so actually makes a king of england , as righful possession and supremacy in all causes both civil and ecclesiastical : and nothing that so actually makes a subject of england , as those two oaths of allegeance and supremacy observd without equivocating , or any mental reservation . out of doubt then when the king shall command things already constituted in church , or state , obedience is the true essence of a subject , either to doe , if it be lawful , or if he hold the thing unlawful , to submit to that penaltie which the law imposes , so long as he intends to remaine a subject . therefore when the people or any part of them shall rise against the king and his autority executing the law in any thing establishd civil or ecclesiastical , i doe nor say it is rebellion , if the thing commanded though establishd be unlawfull , and that they sought first all due means of redress ( and no man is furder bound to law ) but i say it is an absolute renouncing both of supremacy and allegeance , which in one word is an actual and total deposing of the king , and the setting up of another supreme autority over them . and whether the presbyterians have not don all this and much more , they will not put mee , i suppose , to reck'n up a seven yeares story fresh in the memory of all men . have they not utterly broke the oath of allegeance , rejecting the kings command and autority sent them from any part of the kingdom whether in things lawful or unlawful ? have they not abjur'd the oath of supremacy by setting up the parlament without the king , supreme to all thir obedience , and though thir vow and covnant bound them in general to the parlament , yet somtimes adhering to the lesser part of lords and commons that remaind faithful as they terme it , and eev'n of them , one while to the commons without the lords , another while to the lords without the commons ? have they not still declar'd thir meaning , whatever their oath were , to hold them onely for supreme whom they found at any time most yeilding to what they petitiond ? both these oaths which were the straitest bond of an english subject in reference to the king , being thus broke and made voide , it follows undeniably that the king from that time was by them in fact absolutely deposd , and they no longer in reality to be thought his subjects , notwithstanding thir fine clause in the covnant to preserve his person , crown , and dignitie , set there by som dodging casuist with more craft then sinceritie to mitigate the matter in case of ill success , and not tak'n i suppose by any honest man , but as a condition subordinate to every the least particle that might more concern religion , liberty , or the public peace . to prove it yet more plainly that they are the men who have deposd the king , i thus argue . we know that king and subject are relatives , and relatives have no longer being then in the relation ; the relatiō between king and subject can be no other then regal autority and subjection . hence i inferr past their defending , that if the subject who is one relative , takes away the relation , of force he takes away also the other relative ; but the presbyterians who were one relative , that is to say subjects , have for this sev'n years tak'n away the relation , that is to say the kings autoritie , and thir subjection to it , therfore the presbyterians for these sev'n yeares have removd and extinguish the other relative , that is to say the king , or to speake more in brief have depos'd him ; not onely by depriving him the execution of his autoritie , but by conferring it upon others . if then thir oathes of subjection brok'n , new ` supremacy obey'd , new oaths and covnants tak'n , notwitstanding frivolous evasions , have in plaine tearmes unking'd the king , much more then hath thir sev'n yeares warr not depos'd him onely , but outlawd him , and defi'd him as an alien , a rebell to law , and enemie to the state . it must needs be cleare to any man not averse from reason , that hostilitie and subjection are two direct and positive contraries ; and can no more in one subject stand together in respect of the same king , then one person at the same time can be in two remote places . against whom therfore the subject is in act of hostility we may be confident that to him he is in no subjection : and in whom hostility takes place of subjection , for they can by no meanes consist together , to him the king can bee not onely no king , but an enemie . so that from hence wee shall not need dispute whether they have depos'd him , or what they have defaulted towards him as no king , but shew manifestly how much they have don toward the killing him . have they not levied all these warrs against him whether offensive or defensive ( for defence in warr equally offends , and most prudently before hand ) and giv'n commission to slay where they knew his person could not bee exempt from danger ? and if chance or flight had not sav'd him , how oft'n had they killd him , directing thir artillery without blame or prohibition to the very place where they saw him stand ? have they not converted his revenue to other uses , and detain'd from him all meanes of livelyhood , so that for them long since he might have perisht , or have starv'd ? have they not hunted and pursu'd him round about the kingdom with sword and fire ? have they not formerly deny'd to treat with him , and thir now recanting ministers preach'd against him , as a reprobate incurable , an enemy to god and his church markt for destruction , and therfore not to bee treated with ? have they not beseig'd him and to thir power forbid him water and fire , save what they shot against him to the hazard of his life ? yet while they thus assaulted and endangerd it with hostile deeds , they swore in words to defend it with his crown and dignity ; not in order , as it seems now , to a firm and lasting peace , or to his repentance after all this blood ; but simply , without regard , without remorse or any comparable value of all the miseries and calamities sufferd by the poore people , or to suffer hereafter through his obstinacy or impenitence . no understanding man can bee ignorant that covnants are ever made according to the present state of persons and of things ; and have ever the more general laws of nature and of reason included in them , though not express'd . if i make a voluntary covnant as with a man to doe him good , and hee prove afterward a monster to me , i should conceave a disobligement . if i covnant , not to hurt an enemie , in favor of him and forbearance , and hope of his amendment , and he , after that , shall doe me tenfould injury and mischief to what hee had don when i so covnanted , and stil be plotting what may tend to my destruction , i question not but that his after actions release me ; nor know i covnant so sacred that withholds mee from demanding justice on him . howbeit , had not thir distrust in a good cause , and the fast and loos of our prevaricating divines oversway'd , it had bin doubtless better , not to have inserted in a covnant unnecessary obligations , and words not works of a supererogating allegeance to thir enemy ; no way advantageous to themselves , had the king prevail'd , as to thir cost many would have felt ; but full of snare and distraction to our friends , usefull onely , as we now find , to our adversaries , who under such a latitude and shelter of ambiguous interpretation have ever since been plotting and contriving new opportunities to trouble all againe . how much better had it bin , and more becomming an undaunted vertue to have declard op'nly and boldly whom and what power the people were to hold supreme , as on the like occasion protestants have don before , and many conscientious men now in these times have more then once besought the parlament to doe , that they might go on upon a sure foundation , and not with a ridling covnant in thir mouthes , seeming to sweare counter almost in the same breath allegeance and no allegeance ; which doubtless had drawn off all the minds of sincere men from siding with them , had they not discern'd thir actions farr more deposing him then thir words upholding him ; which words made now the subject of cavillous interpretations , stood ever in the covnant by judgement of the more discerning sort an evidence of thir feare not of thir fidelity . what should i return to speak on , of those attempts for which the king himself hath oft'n charg'd the presbyterians of seeking his life , whenas in the due estimation of things they might without a fallacy be sayd to have don the deed outright . who knows not that the king is a name of dignity and office , not of person : who therfore kils a king , must kill him while he is a king . then they certainly who by deposing him have long since tak'n from him the life of a king , his office and his dignity , they in the truest sence may bee said to have killd the king : nor onely by thir deposing and waging warr against him , which besides the danger to his personal life , set him in the fardest opposite point from any vital function of a king , but by thir holding him in prison vanquishd and yeilded into thir absolute and despotic power , which brought him to the lowest degradement and incapacity of the regal name . i say not whose matchless valour next under god , lest the story of thir ingratitude thereupon carry me from the purpose in hand , which is to convince them that they , which i repeat againe , were the men who in the truest sense killd the king , not onely as is provd before , but by depressing him thir king farr below the rank of a subject to the condition of a captive , without intention to restore him , as the chancellour of scotland in a speech told him plainly at newcastle , unless hee granted fully all thir demands , which they knew he never meant . nor did they treat or think of treating with him , till thir hatred to the army that deliverd them , not thir love or duty to the king , joyn'd them secretly with men sentencd so oft for reprobates in thir owne mouthes , by whose suttle inspiring they grew madd upon a most tardy and improper treaty . whereas if the whole bent of thir actions had not bin against the king himselfe , but against his evill councel , as they faind , and publishd , wherefore did they not restore him all that while to the true life of a king , his office , crown , and dignity , when he was in thir power , and they themselves his neerest counselers . the truth therefore is , both that they would not , and that indeed they could not without thir own certaine destruction , having reduc'd him to such a final pass , as was the very death and burial of all in him rhat was regal , and from whence never king of england yet revivd , but by the new re inforcement of his own party , which was a kind of resurrection to him . thus having quitc extinguisht all that could be in him of a king , and from a total privation clad him over like another specifical thing with formes and habitudes destructive to the former , they left in his person dead as to law and all the civil right either of king or subject the life onely of a prilner , a captive and a malefactor . whom the equal and impartial hand of justice finding , was no more to spare then another ordnary man ; not onely made obnoxious to the doome of law by a charge more then once drawn up against him , and his owne confession to the first article at newport , but summond and arraignd in the sight of god and his people , cutst and devoted to perdition worse then any ahab , or antiochus , with exhortation to curse all those in the name of god that made not warr against him , as bitterly as meroz was to be curs'd , that went not out against a canaanitish king , almost in all the sermons , prayers , and fulminations that have bin utterd this sev'n yeares by those clov'n tongues of falshood and dissention , who now , to the stirring up of new discord , acquitt him ; and against thir owne discipline , which they boast to be the throne and scepter of christ , absolve him , unconfound him , though unconverted , unrepentant , unsensible of all thir pretious saints and martyrs whose blood they have so oft layd upon his head : and now againe with a new sovran anointment can wash it all off , as if it were as vile , and no more to be reckn'd for then the blood of so many dogs in a time of pestilence : giving the most opprobrious lye to all the acted zeale that for these many yeares hath filld thir bellies , and fed them fatt upon the foolish people . ministers of sedition , not of the gospell , who while they saw it manifestly tend to civil warr and bloodshed , never ceasd exasperating the people against him ; and now that they see it likely to breed new commotion , cease not to incite others against the people that have savd them from him , as if sedition were thir onely aime whether against him or for him . but god as we have cause to trust , wil put other thoughts into the people , and turn them from looking after these firebrands , of whose fury , and sals prophecies we have anough experience ; and from the murmurs of new discord will incline them to heark'n rather with erected minds to the voice of our supreme magistracy , calling us to liberty and the flourishing deeds of a reformed common-wealth ; with this hope that as god was heretofore angry with the jews who rejected him and his forme of government to choose a king , so that he will bless us , and be propitious to us who reject a king to make him onely our leader , and supreme governour in the conformity as neer as may be of his own ancient government ; if we have at least but so much worth in us to entertaine the sense of our future happiness , and the courage to receave what god voutsafes us : wherin we have the honour to precede other nations who are now labouring to be our followers . for as to this question in hand what the people by thir just right may doe in change of government , or of governour , we see it cleerd sufsiciently ; besides other ample autority eev'n from the mouths of princes themselves . and surely they that shall boast , as we doe , to be a free nation , and not have in themselves the power to remove , or to abolish any governour supreme , or subordinate with the government it self upon urgent causes , may please thir fancy with a ridiculous and painted freedom , fit to coz'n babies ; but are indeed under tyranny and servitude ; as wanting that power , which is the root and sourse of all liberty , to dispose and oeconomize in the land which god hath giv'n them , as maisters of family in thir own house and free inheritance . without which natural and essential power of a free nation , though bearing high thir heads , they can in due esteem be thought no better then slaves and vassals born , in the tenure and occupation of another inheriting lord . whose government , though not illegal , or intolerable , hangs over them as a lotdly scourge , not as a free goverment ; and therfore to be abrogated . how much more justly then may they fling off tyranny , or tyrants ? who being once depos'd can be no more then privat men , as subject to the reach of justice and arraignment as any other transgressors . and certainly if men , not to speak of heathen , both wise and religious have don justice upon tyrants what way they could soonest , how much more mild and human then is it to give them faire and op'n tryall ? to teach lawless kings and all that so much adore them , that not mortal man , or his imperious will , but justice is the onely true sovran and supreme majesty upon earth . let men cease therfore out of faction and hypocrisie to make outcrys & horrid things of things so just and honorable . and if the parlament and military councel do what they doe without president , if it appeare thir duty , it argues the more wisdom , vertue , and magnanimity , that they know themselves able to be a president to others . who perhaps in future ages , if they prove not too degenerat , will look up with honour and aspire toward these exemplary , and matchless deeds of thir ancestors , as to the highest top of thir civil glory and emulation . which heretofore in the persuance of fame and forren dominion spent it self vain-gloriously abroad ; but henceforth may learn a better fortitude to dare execute highest justice on them that shall by force of armes endeavour the oppressing and bereaving ofreligion and thir liberty at home : that no unbridl'd potentate or tyrant , but to his sorrow for the future , may presume such high and irresponsible licence over mankind to havock and turn upside-down whole kingdoms of men as though they were no more in respect of his perverse will then a nation of pismires . as for the party calld presbyterian , of whom i beleive very many to be good & faithful christians , though misled by som of turbulent spirit , i wish them earnestly and calmly not to fall off from thir first principles ; nor to affect rigor and superiority over men not under them ; not to compell unforcible things in religion especially , which if not voluntary , becomes a sin ; nor to assist the clamor and malicious drifts of men whom they themselves have judg'd to be the worst of men , the obdurat enemies of god and his church : nor to dart against the actions of thir brethren , for want of other argument those wrested lawes and scriptures thrown by prelats and malignants against thir own sides , which though they hurt not otherwise , yet tak'n up by them to the condemnation of thir owne doings give scandal to all men and discover in themselves either extreame passion or apostacy . let them not oppose thir best friends and associats who molest them not at all , infringe not the least of thir liberties ; unless they call it thir liberty to bind other mens consciences , but are still secking to live at peace with them and brotherly accord . let them beware an old and perfet enemy , who though he hope by sowing discord to make them his instruments , yet cannot forbeare a minute the op'n threatning of his destind revenge upon them when they have servd his purposes . let them feare therefore , if they bee wise , rather what they have don already , then what remaines to doe , and be warn'd in time they put no confidence in princes whom they have provokd , lest they be added to the examples of those that miserably have tasted the event . stories can inform them how christiern the second , king of denmark not much above a hundred yeares past , driv'n out by his subjects , and receavd againe upon new oaths and conditions , broke through them all to his most bloody revenge ; slaying his chief opposers when he saw his time , both them and thir children invited to a feast for that purpose . how maximilian dealt with those of bruges , though by mediation of the german princes reconcil'd to them by solem and public writings drawn and seald . how the massacre at paris was the effect of that credulous peace which the french protestants made with charles the ninth thir king : and that the main visible cause which to this day hath sav'd the netherlands from utter ruine , was thir finall not belei●ing the perfidious cruelty which as a constant maxim of state hath bin us'd by the spanish kings on thir subjects that have tak'n armes and after trusted them ; as no later age but can testifie , heretofore in belgia it self , and this very yeare in naples . and to conclude with one past exception , though farr more ancient , david after once hee had tak'n armes , never after that trusted saul , though with tears and much relenting he twise promis'd not to hurt him . these instances , few of many , might admonish them both english and scotch not to let thir owne ends , and the driving on of a faction betray them blindly into the snare of those enemies whose revenge looks on them as the men who first begun , fomented and carri'd on beyond the cure of any sonnd or safe accommodation all the evil which hath since unavoidably befall'n them and thir king . i have something also to the divines , though brief to what were needfull ; not to be disturbers of the civil affairs , being in hands better able and more belonging to manage them ; but to study harder and to attend the office of good pastors , knowing that he whose flock is least among them hath a dreadfull charge , not performd by mounting twise into the chair with a formal preachment huddl'd up at the od hours of a whole lazy week , but by incessant pains and watching in season and out of season , from house to house over the soules of whom they have to feed . which if they ever well considerd , how little leasure would they find to be the most pragmatical sidesmen of every popular tumult and sedition ? and all this while are to learne what the true end and reason is of the gospel which they teach ; and what a world it differs from the censorious and supercilious lording over conscience . it would be good also they liv'd so as might perswade the people they hated covetousness , which worse then heresie , is idolatry ; hated pluralities and all kind of simony ; left rambling from benefice to benefice , iike ravnous wolves seeking where they may devour the biggest . of which if som , well and warmely seated from the beginning , be not guilty , t were good they held not conversation with such as are : let them be sorry that being call'd to assemble about reforming the church , they fell to progging and solliciting the parlament , though they had renouncd the name of priests , for a new setling of thir tithes and oblations ; and double lin'd themselves with spiritual places of commoditie beyond the possible discharge of thir duty . let them assemble in consistory with thir elders and deacons , according to ancient ecclesiastical rule , to the preserving of church discipline each in his several charge , and not a pack of clergie men by themselves to belly cheare in thir presumptuous sion , or to promote designes , abuse and gull the simple laity , and stirr up tumult , as the prelats did , for the maintenance of thir pride and avarice . these things if they observe and waite with patience , no doubt but all things will goe well without their importunities or exclamations : and the printed letters which they send subscrib'd with the ostentation of great characters and little moment , would be more considerable then now they are . but if they be the ministers of mammon instead of christ , and scandalize his church with the filty love of gaine , aspiring also to sit the closest and the heaviest of all tyrants , upon the conscience , and fall notoriously into the same sins , whereof so lately and so loud they accus'd the prelates , as god rooted out those immediately before , so will he root out them thir imitators : and to vindicate his own glory and religion , will uncover thir hypocrisie to the open world ; and visit upon thir own heads that curse ye meroz , the very motto of thir pulpits , wherwith so frequently , not as meroz , but more like atheists they have mock'd the vengeance of god , and the zeale of his people . the end . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a e- jer. . . prov. . . the secrets of government and misteries of state plainly laid open, in all the several forms of government in the christian world / published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing r estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the secrets of government and misteries of state plainly laid open, in all the several forms of government in the christian world / published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . milton, john, - . [ ], p. s.n.], [london : . written by walter raleigh. cf. nuc pre- . first published in as: the cabinet-council: containing the cheif arts of empire, and mysteries of state. place of publication from wing. advertisement: p. [ ]. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . monarchy -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread - tcp staff (michigan) text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the secrets of government , and misteries of state , plainly laid open , in all the several forms of government in the christian world . published by john milton , esq printed in the year , . to the reader . having had the manuscript of this treatise , written by sir walter raleigh , many years in my hands , and finding it lately by chance among other books and papers , upon reading thereof , i thought it a kind of injury to withhold longer the work of so eminent an author from the publick ; it being both answerable in 〈◊〉 to other works of his already extant , as far as the subject would permit , and given me for a true copy by a learned man at his death , who had collected several such pieces . john milton . the principal contents . chap. i. the desinition and division of publick weales and sovereign states , according to their several species or kinds page chap. . of sovereign or monarchick government , with its essential marks and specifical differences p. chap. . of monarchies seignioril , exemplisied in the turkish and west-indian empire p. chap. . of monarchies royal , with the means to maintain them p. chap. . of monarchies tyrannical p. chap. . of new-found monarchies and principalities , with the means to 〈◊〉 them p. chap. . of councils and counsellors in general p. chap. . of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties and democraties p. chap. . of officers and commissioners , with their respective distinctions p. chap. . of magistrates , their qualifications and elections p. chap. . observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure and war p. chap. . extrinsick observations , shewing how to deal with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designs , and decypher their intendments p. chap. . observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor p. chap. . of the princes intimate counsellors and ministers of state , with their several requisites p. chap. . the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment p. chap. of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated p. chap. . of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained p. chap. . of conspiracy and treason ; with the causes , and ways of prevention or discovery p. chap. . of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it p. chap. . of diffidence and dissimulation in the management of state affairs p. chap. . of war defensive and invasive ; with iustructions touching laws of arms , soldiers and military discipline p. chap. . of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions p. chap. . of councils in war , and directions tactick and stratagematick ; with advice how to make an honorable peace p. chap. . of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof p. chap. . a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen , and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events p. chap. . maxims of state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policy in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narrations , and historical parallels p. advertisement . the excellent woman described by her true characters , and their opposites . printed for j. watts . the secrets of government , and misteries of state , plainly laid open . chap. i. the definition and division of publick weales and sovereign states , according to their several species or kinds . a common-wealth is a certain sovereign govornment of many families , with those things that are common among them . all common-wealths are either monarchies , aristocraties , or democraties . a monarchy is that state where the sovereignty resteth in the person of one only prince . an aristocraty , is where some small part of the people have in them as a body corporate , the sovereignty and supreme power of the whole state. a democraty , is where all the people have power and authority sovereign . so doth it appear , that the place and person where the sovereignty resteth , doth cause the state to be either a monarchy , an aristocraty , or popular government . chap. ii. of sovereign of monarchick government , with its essential marks , and specifical differences . sovereignty is an absolute and perpetual power in every publick state , and he is properly and only a sovereign , that acknowledgeth no superior or equal , nor holdeth of any other prince , person or power , but god and his own sword. the first mark of sovereignty , is absolute power and authority to command all subjects in general , and every of them in particular , without consent of any other person or persons , either greater or inferior to himself . the second mark of majesty is authority to make war , and conclude peace at his pleasure . the third is power to beslow all honors and chief offices at his pleasure . the fourth mark of sovereignty is appellation . the fifth mark and last , is power to pardon all subjects by rigor of law or otherwise , condemned in life , lands , goods or honors . these powers are not to be imparted to any officer , deputy or other magistrate , but in the prince's absence , and for some urgent occasion . monarchies are of three sorts , signioril , royal and tyrannical . the diversity of monarchies doth not proceed from the nature of the state , but the diverse proceedings of those princes that govern ; for great difference there may be between the nature of the commonwealth and the government thereof . that prince that giveth the magistracies honors and offices without respect of nobility , riches or vertue , may be said to govern popularly . and that monarchy may be said to be governed aristocratically , when the monarch imparteth the principal honors and offices to the noble and rich men only . the same difference there is to be sound in states aristocratical and popular ; for the one and the other may be both signioril or tyrannical . a monarch signioril is he who by force of arms and just war , is made owner of mens bodies and goods , and governeth them as a master of a family governeth base servants and slaves . a monarch royal , is he whose subjects are obedient unto his laws , of god and nature , suffering every subject to enjoy liberty natural , with property in lands and goods , governing as a father governeth his children . a monarch tyrannical , is he who without regard to the law of god or nature , commandeth free-men as slaves and useth their lands and goods as his own . chap. iii. of monarchy signioril , exemplisied in the turkisn and west-indian empire . all people subject to princes , are governed as free-men by their prince , and certain other particular lords of lands and liberties ; who not by the princes commission , but by ancient 〈◊〉 or custom , have inheritance and tenements ; or else they are by one prince and his ministers commanded , which ministers have not by law or ordinance , any authority or interest of themselves , but being like to the people ( base men and slaves ) they command only by commission in the princes name ; and the authority of those ministers doth cease at the princes pleasure , so that the people do not acknowledge any superior but the prince , nor owe any service to other mean lords : so as all the people stand without property in lands or goods ; for example , the empire of turky and the west-indies . the provinces of this monarchy are allotted to sundry magistrates or ministers , and they altered and removed at the princes pleasure ; but it is otherwise in a monarchy royal , because the monarch is there accompanied with many mean lords . and albeit those mean lords are subjects unto the prince , yet have they particular tenants , who may not , without just cause , be dispossessed by the prince ; and those people having had dependency of their lords and their ancestors , do ever beare unto them a certain natural love and dutiful respect ; whoso therefore compareth these principalities , shall perceive , that to conquer a state signioril there is great difficulty , but being conquered , it may easily be maintained ; for the difficulty to conquer such a state , proceedeth from the lack of mean lords to call in and assist the prince that doth invade : who therefore desireth to subdue a nation thus governed , must of force assault all the people , and rather trust in his own strength than the aid of the country . but if he can prevail , then one only fear remaineth , which is the prince's posterity , which necessarily must be extinguished , because the prince's race only hath interest both in the people and soldiers . but to enter a monarchy royal , is an enterprise of no great difficulty , when he that doth enter , hath the friendship and aid of some mean lords to take his part , and prepare the place where he is to arrive . chap. iv. of monarchies royal , with the means to maintain them . monarchies royal are for the most part ancient and hereditary , and consequently easie to be governed . for it is sufficient for the prince to maintain the old laws , and on occasion temporize with those accidents that happen : such a state cannot be taken from the prince without excessive force , and if it be , it shall be soon recovered . example , england and france . but if a monarchy newly conquered , be annexed unto an old , and not properly ancient , then it is with much more difficulty maintained . first , for that men naturally inclined to variation , are easily induced to take arms against him that newly governeth . secondly , every new prince is forced to exact as well upon those subjects that joyned with him , as those that did resist him , and therefore shall offend both . example , ireland annexed to the crown of england , sicilia and naples to spain . the means to maintain such a monarchy , is , first , to extinguish the race of him that was anciently prince . secondly , to continue all laws and customs in the former force ; for so shall the subject find nothing altered but the prince , and therefore will soon rest contented ; and the rather if that new monarchy , and the ancient dominion of the prince , be of one language : but if the people be of a contrary language and humor , then to hold it , there needeth great industry and fortune ; in that case the best way is , that the prince should inhabit there , as well to incounter all inconveniences proceeding from the subject , as to preserve the people from oppression of his own ministers . another way is , to send thither certain colonies , and plant them in fit places , or else to settle some garisons both of horse and foot ; but colonies are less chargeable to the prince . as for the people inhabitant ( who must necessarily remove , they being a small number and dispossessed ) they cannot have power to offend ; for in that case , this rule or maxim shall be found true , that men must be either kindly intreated , or with all extremity oppressed ; because of light injuries they may be revenged , but of utter oppression they cannot . a third way to hold a conquered dominion , is , to cherish and defend the neighbors of little power , and oppress or keep under those that are most potent ; and above all , to take order that no forreign prince or power do enter ; for it is ever to be looked for , that so many of the nation as are discontented , either for ambition or fear , will be ever ready to bring in strangers : and to conclude this matter of principality annexed , i say it behoveth every prince possessed of such a state , never to increase the power of any potent nighbor , never to oppress those that are of small power , never to permit any forreign potentate to enter , but ever to plant colonies and garisons , or else to make that dominion his chief habitation . chap. v. of monarchies tyrannical . tyrannical princes are not advanced by favor , neither do they trust unto fortune , but by degrees of war , or else by some other indirect means do aspire unto greatness ; and therein do maintain themselves by all ways either honest or dishonest , without respect of justice , conscience or law either of nations or nature : a prince by such impious means aspired , and desiring to hold that he hath gained , will take order that the cruelties he committeth may be done roundly , suddenly , and as it were at an instant ; for if they be executed at leisure and by piece-meal , then will the prince's fears continue long , and the terror in subjects take deeper impression , whose nature is such , that either they must be bound by benefits , or by cruelty made sure from offending : example , dionysius and agathocles . chap. vi. of new found monarchies and principalities , with the means to perpetuate them . some other princes there are , that from private estate have aspired to sovereignty , not by unnatural or impious proceedings as the former , but by vertue and fortune , and being aspired , have found no great difficulty to be maintained ; for such a prince having no other dominion , is forced to settle himself where he is become a prince : but here is to be noted , that albeit such a man be vertuous , yet wanting fortune , his vertue proveth to small purpose , and fortune without vertue doth seldom work any great effect . howsoever it be , a prince being aspired , both by the aid of the one and of the other , shall notwithstanding find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten ; because he is forced to introduce new laws and new orders of government differing from the old , as well for his own security , as confirmation of the government ; for avoiding of which dangers , he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compel his subjects to obey , or must pray in aid of others : if he can do the first , he needeth not doubt , but being driven to the other , his greatness cannot long continu ; for albeit a matter of no difficulty , it is to perswade a people ; yet to make them constant , is a work well near impossible . example , theseus , cyrus , romulus . the second sort of new princes are such as be aspired by favor or corruption , or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends : a prince by any or all these means advanced , and desirous to hold his estate , must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other ; which may be done by this means : first , to assure all enemies from offending . secondly , to win the love and friendship of so many neighbors as possibly he may . thirdly , to compass all designs tending to his honor or profit , and bring them to pass either by fraud or force . fourthly , to make himself honored and followed of captains and soldiers . fifthly , to oppress all those that would or can offend . sixthly , to be obsequious and liberal to friends , magnanimous and terrible to foes . seventhly , to cass all old and unfaithful bands , and entertain new . eighthly , to hold such amity with kings and princes , as they ought reasonably to favor him , or else they would offend ; easily they cannot . example , giovannio , torrigiani , caesar , borgi . the third and last means whereby private persons do aspire to principalities , is not force and violence , but meer good will and favor of men. the cause or occasion thereof , is only vertue or fortune , or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness , because he aspireth either by favor of the people , or by favor of the nobility ; for these contrary humors are in all common-wealths to be found . and the reason thereof is , that the great men do ever endeavor to oppress the people , and the people do labor not to be oppressed by them . of these divers appetites one of these three effects do proceed , viz. principality , liberty , or licentious life . principality may come either by love of the multitude , or of the great men ; for when any of these factions do find it self oppressed , then do they soon consent to make one a prince , hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended . example , francesco sforza , alessandro de medici . a prince in this sort aspired , to maintain his estate , must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced ; for if by favor of great men he be aspired , then must he meet with many difficulties ; for having about him divers persons of great quality , and such as were but lately his equals , hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth : but if the prince be advanced by the people , few or none shall hardly disobey him . so it appeareth that a prince made by the multitude , is much more secure than he whom the nobility preferreth ; for common people do not desire to enjoy more than their own , and to be defended from oppression ; but great men do study not only to hold their own , but also to command and insult upon inferiors . note that all monarchies are principalities . but all principalities are not monarchies . chap. vii . of councils , and counsellors in general . a senate or council is a certain lawful assembly of counsellors , to give advice to him or them that have in the commonweale power sovereign . a counsellor is called in the latine senator ; which word signifieth in effect an old man : the grecians and romans also most commonly composed their councils of ancient and expert persons ; for if they , or the greater part of them had been young men , then might the council have more properly been called a juvenate than a senate . the chief and most necessary note required in a counsellor is to have no dependence of any other prince or commonweale ; either oath , homage , natural obligation , pention , or reward : in this point the venetians have been ever most precise , and for that reason , do not admit any cardinal or other clergy-man to be either of or at their councils , therefore when the venetian senate is assembled , the usher being ready to shut the door , cryeth aloud , fuora preti , depart priest. note also that in every state , of what quality soever , a secret or cabinet-council is mainly necessary . chap. viii . of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties , and democraties . the king of spain , for the government of his dominions hath seven councils , ( viz. ) the council of the indies , the council of spain , the council of italy and the low countries , the council of war , the council of orders , the council of inquisition , and the council royal. in france are three councils , ( viz. ) the council srivy , the council of judges , which they call presidents et conceliers de parlament , and the great council , which they call assemblies du troys estates . of councils in aristocraties . in venice , beside the senate and great council , are four councils , ( viz. ) the sages of the sea , the sages of the land , the council of tenn , the three presidents of quarantia , and the senate : all which councils do amount to one hundred and twenty persons , with the magistrates . the great council of ragusa consisteth of sixty persons , and hath another privy council of twelve . of councils in democraties . genoua hath three councils : the great council of two hundred , the senate which consisteth of sixty , and the privy council which hath twenty six counsellors : so it doth appear that in all commonwealths , be they monarchies , aristocracies , or popular states . the council-privy is most necessary , and often used ; also this difference is to be noted between the councils in monarchies , and the councils in aristocracies and states popular ; that is to say , that all deliberations fit to be published , are in a monarchy consulted and resolved upon in the council privy , and after ratified by common council ; but in optimacies or popular government the custom is contrary . here also is to be noted , that albeit the use and authority of every senate a privy council is most needful , yet hath it no authority to command but in the name of those in whom the sovereignty resteth : for if counsellors had power to command absolutely , then should they be sovereigns , and consequently all execution at their pleasure ; which may not be without detracting from majesty , which is a thing so sovereign and sacred , as no citizen or subject of what quality soever , may touch or approach thereunto . chap. ix . of officers and commissioners with their respective distinctions . an officer is a person publick , that hath charge ordinary and limited by law. a commissioner is also a person publick , but his charge is extraordinary and limited by commission . officers are of two sorts , and so be commissioners ; the one hath power to command , and are called magistrates : the other hath authority to execute : so the one and the other are persons publick : yet are not all publick persons either officers or commissioners . commissioners are ordained to govern in provinces , in war , in justice , in disposing the treasure , or some other function concerning the state ; but all commissions do spring and proceed from the sovereign , magistrates and commissioners . and here is to be noted , that every commission ceaseth if he that granted the commission doth dye , or revoke it , or if the commissioners during his commission shall aspire to office and authority equal to his that made it . chap. x. of magistrates , their qualifications and elections . a magistrate is an officer having power to command in the state ; and albeit that every magistrate be an officer , yet every officer is not a magistrate , but they only that have power to command . also in making officers of and magistrates in every commonweale , three things are specially to be observed ( viz. ) who doth make them , what men they are that should be made , and the form and manner how they are made . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to him or them in whom the sovereignty resteth ; the second also belongeth to majesty ; yet therein the laws are commonly followed , especially in aristocracies and states popular ; in the one the magistrates are chosen out of the most wealthy or most noble : in the other , elected out of the whole multitude . the form and manner of choosing magistrates in aristocracies and states popular , is either by election , by lot , or by both , and their office is to compel those that do not obey what sovereignty commandeth : for all force of commandment lieth in compulsion . commandment likewise is of two sorts ; the one may be called sovereign and absolute , above laws , above magistrates , and above people . in monarchies such command is proper to the prince only ; in aristocracies it resteth in the nobility : and in democracies the people have that power . the second commandments are subject both to sovereignty and law. here is to be noted , that every magistrate may recall his own commandment , and forbid what he did command , yet cannot revoke that which he hath judged . * also in the presence of the sovereign , all authority of magistrates ceaseth ; and in presence of great magistrates the inferior have no power ; and magistrates equal cannot do any thing but by consent , if his colleagues or fellow-magistrates be present . chap. xi . observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure and war. the first concern matter intrinsick . the second touch matter extrinsick . matters intrinsick are three . the administration of justice . the managing of the treasure . the disposing of things appertaining to war. matters extrinsick are also three . the skill how to deal with neighbors . the diligence to vent their designs . the way how to win so much confidence with some of them , as to be made partaker of whatsoever they mean to enterprise . touching administration of justice . the good and direct administration of justice , is in all places a principal part of government ; for seldom or never shall we see any people discontented and desirous of alteration , where justice is equally administred without respect of persons ; and in every state this consideration is required , but most of all in countries that do front upon other princes , or were lately 〈◊〉 hereunto the princes vigilancy and the magistrates uprightness are especially required ; for oft-tentimes the prince is deceived , and the magistrates corrupted ; it behoveth also the prince to maintain the judges and ministers of justice in their reputation , and yet to have a vigilant eye upon their proceedings , and the rather if their authority do include equity , and from their censure be no appeal ; and if their office be during life , and they are men born and dwelling in the same country ; all these things are duly to be considered of the rince ; for as to call the judges into question , is as it were to disgrace the judicial seat ; so to wink at their corruptions were matter of just discontent to the subject : in this case therefore the prince cannot do more than by his wisdom to make choice of good men ; and being chosen , to hold them in good reputation so as the ordinary course of justice may proceed ; for otherwise great disorder , contempt , and general confusion will ensue thereof . secondly , he is to keep his eye open upon their proceedings ; and lastly to reserve unto himself a supreme power of appellation . touching the treasure . the want of money is in all states very perilous , and most of all in those which are of least strength , and do confine upon nations with whom they have commonly war , or unassured peace , but most perilous of all to those governments which are remote from the prince , or place where they are to be relieved . the means to levy treasure are four. first , the customs and impositions upon all forts of merchandize and traffick is to be looked unto and advanced . secondly , the excessive eating of usury must be suppressed . thirdly , all supersluous charges and expences are to be taken away . lastly , the doings and accounts of ministers are severally to be exammed . touching the matter of custom and impost thereof , assuredly a great prosit is in every state to be raised ; chiefly where peace hath long continued , and where the country affordeth much plenty of commodities to be carried out , and where ports are to receive shipping . the moderating of interest is ever necessary , and chiefly in this age , by reason that money aboundeth in europe ; since the traffick into the indies ; for such men as have money in their hands great plenty , would in no wise imploy the same in merchandize , if lawful it were to receive the utmost usury , being a course of most profit and greatest security . the taking away of superfluous expences is no other thing than a certain wise and laudable parsimony ; which the romans and other well governed states did use . these expences consist in fees , allowances , and wages granted to ministers of little or no necessity ; also in pensions , rewards , entertainments and donaries , with small difficulty to be moderated , or easily to be suppressed . * by abridging or taking away of these needless expences a marvelous profit will be saved for the prince ; but if he continue them , and by imposing upon the people do think to increase his treasure or revenue , besides the loss of their love , he may also hazard their obedience , with many other inconveniences . touching war. whatsoever prince or common-weale is neighbour to any people which can , will , or were wont to offend , it is necessary to have not only all things prepared for defence of his person and country , but also to forecast and use every caution and other diligence : for the inconveniencies which happen to government , are sudden and unlook'd for ; yea , the providence and provision required in this case ought to be such as the expences all other ways imployed must stay to supply the necessity of war. chap xii . extrinsick observation , shewing how to deal with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designs , and decipher their intendments . this first point of matter extrinsick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good , but otherwise becometh dangerous ; for the proceeding must be divers according to the diversity of the ends which the prince or governor intendeth ; for if he desire to continue peace with his neighbors , one way is to be taken ; but otherwise he is to work that seeketh occasion to break , and to become an enemy to one or more of his neighbors . is he do desire to live peaceably withal , then he is to observe these rules ( viz ) first , to hold and continue firmly all contracts and capitulations . secondly , to shew himself resolved neither to offer nor take the least touch of wrong or injury . thirdly , with all care and favor to further commerce and reciproke traffick for the profit of the subject , and increase of the princes revenue . fourthly , covertly to win so great confidence with neighbors , as in all actions of unkindness among them he may be made umpire . fifthly , to become so well believed with them as he may remove such diffidences as grow to his own disadvantage . sixthly , not to deny protection or aid to them that are the weakest , and chiefly such as do and will endure his fortune . lastly , in favouring , aiding and protecting ( unless necessity shall otherwise so require ) to do it moderately , so as they who are to be aided , become not jealous , and consequently seek adherency elsewhere , which oft-times hath opened way to other neighbors that desire a like occasion . how to prevent their designs . this point in time of war is with great diligence to be looked unto ; also in time of peace to prevent all occasions that may kindle war is behoveful ; for to foresee what may happen to the prejudice of a princes profit or reputation , is a part of great wisdom . the means to attain the intelligence of these things are two . the first is by friends , the next by espials ; the one for the most part faithful , the other not so assured . these matters are well to be considered ; for albeit the nature of man desireth nothing more than curiously to know the doings of others , yet are those things to be handled with so great secrecy and dissimulation as the princes intent be not in any wise suspected , nor the ministers made odious ; for these sometimes to win themselves reputation , do devise causes of difference where no need is , divining of things future which prove to the prejudice of their own prince . to win confidence with neighbors . this is chiefly attained unto by being loved and honored ; for these things do work so many good effects , as daily experience sufficeth without any express example to prove them of great force . the ways to win love and trust , is in all actions to proceed justly , and sometimes to wink at wrongs , or set aside unnecessary revenges ; and if any thing be done not justifiable , or unfit to be allowed , as oftentimes it happeneth , there to lay the blame upon the minister , which must be performed with so great show of revenge and dissimulation , by reproving and punishing the minister , as the princes offended may be satisfied , and believe that the cause of unkindness proceeded from thence . now only it resteth that somewhat should be said touching provision , to the end the people may not be drawn into despair by famine , or extream dearth of victual , chiefly for want of corn , which is one principal consideration to be regarded , according to the italian proverb , pane in piazza , giustitia in palazzo , siverezza per tutto : whereunto i could wish every prince or supreme governor to be thus qualified ( viz. ) facile de audienza : non facilede credenza , desioso de spedition , essemplare in costunii proprii , & inquei de sua casa tale che vorra governare , e non esser governato da altro ; he della raggione . chap. xiii . observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor . every good and lawful principality is either elective or successive of them election seemeth the more ancient ; but succession in divers respects the better : minore discrimine sumitur princeps quam quaeritur . tac. the chief and only endeavour of every good prince , ought to be the commodity and security of the subjects , as contrariwise the tyrant seeketh his own private profit with the oppression of his people : civium non servitus sed tutela tradita est . sal. to the perfection of every good prince , two things are necessarily required ( viz. ) prudence and vertue ; the one to direct his doings , the other to govern his life : rex eris si recte feceris . hor. the second care which appertaineth to a good prince , is to make his subjects like unto himself ; for thereby he is not only honored , but they also the better governed : facile imperium in bonos . plaut . subjects are made good by two means ( viz. ) by constraint of law , and the princes example ; for in all estates , the people do imitate those conditions whereunto they see the prince enclined : quicquid faciunt principes , praecipere videantur . quintil. all vertues be required in a prince , but justice and clemency are most necessary ; for justice is a habit of doing things justly , as well to himself as others , and giving to every one so much as to him appertaineth : this is that vertue that preserveth concord among men , and whereof they be called good : jus & aequit as vincula civitatum . cic. * it is the quality of this vertue also , to proceed equally and temperately ; it informeth the prince not to surcharge the subjects with infinite laws ; for thereof proceedeth the impoverishment of the subjects and the inriching of lawyers , a kind of men which in ages more ancient , did seem of no necessity : sine causidicis satis foelices olim fuere futuraeque sunt urbes . sal. the next vertue required in princes is clemency , being an inclination of the mind to lenity and compassion , yet tempered with severity and judgment ; this quality is fit for all great personages , but chiefly princes , because their occasion to use it is most ; by it also the love of men is gained : qui vult regnare , languida regnet manu . sen. after clemency , fidelity is expected in all good princes , which is a certain performance and observation of word and promise ; this vertue seemeth to accompany justice , or is as it were the same , and therefore most fit for princes : sanctissimum generis humani bonum . liv. as fidelity followeth justice , so doth modesty accompany clemency ; modesty is a temperature of reason , whereby the mind of man is so governed , as neither in action or opinion he over-deemeth of himself , or any thing that is his ; a quality not common in fortunate folk , and most rare in princes : superbia commune nobilitatis malum . sal. this vertue doth also moderate all external demonstration of insolence , pride and arrogance , and therefore necessary to be known of princes , and all others whom favor or fortune have advanced : impone faelicitati tua fraenos , facilius illam reges . curt. but as princes are to observe the bounds of modesty , so may they not forget the majesty appertaining to their supreme honor , being a certain reverend greatness due to princely vertue and royal state ; a grace and gravity no less beseeming a prince than vertue it self ; for neither over-much famili-arity , nor too great austerity , ought to be used by princes : facilit as autoritatem , severit as amorem minuit . tac. to these vertues we may apply liberality , which doth not only adorn , but highly advance the honor due to princes ; thereby also the good will of men is gained ; for nothing is more fitting a prince's nature than bounty , the same being accompanied with judgment , and performed according to the laws of liberality : perdere multi sciunt , donare nesciunt . tac. it seemeth also that prudence is not only fit , but also , among other vertues , necessary in a prince ; for the daily use thereof is in all humane actions required , and chiesly in matters of state and government : prudentia imperant is propria & unica virtus . arist. the success of all worldly proceedings , doth shew that prudence hath compassed the prosperous event of humane actions , more than force of arms or other power : mens una 〈◊〉 plurium vincit manus . eurip. prudence is either natural , or received from others ; for whoso can counsel himself what is fit to be done , needeth not the advice of others ; but they that want such perfection , and are nevertheless capable , and are willing to know what others inform , ought to be accounted wise enough : laudatissimus est qui cuncta videbit , sed laudandus est is qui paret recte monenti hesiod . chap. xiv . of the princes intimate counsellors and ministers of state , with their several requisites . albeit the excellent spirit of some princes be such as doth justly deserve the highest commendation ; yet for that every course of life needeth the aid of men , and the mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite care appertaining to publick affairs ; it behoveth princes to be assisted : magna negotia , adjutoribus egent . tac. the assistants may be properly divided into counsellors and ministers ; the one to advise , the other to execute : without counsel , no kingdom , no state , no private house can stand ; for experience hath proved , that common-weales have prospered so long as good counsel did govern , but when favor , fear or voluptuousness entered , those nations became disordered ; and in the end subject to slavery : quiddam sacrum profecto est consultatio . plato . counsellors are men specially selected to give advice to princes or common-wealths , as well in peace as in war ; the chief qualities required in such men , are fidelity and knowledge ; which two concurring do make them both good and wise , and consequently fit for counsel : prudentis proprium munus recte consulere . arist. the election of counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among men of long experience and grave years ; for as youth is fittest for action in respect of corporal strength ; so elder folk having felt the force of every fortune , and observed the course of worldly proceedings do seem most meet for consultation : consilia senum , facta juvenum . plato . albeit we say that the excellency of wisdom should be in counsellors ; yet do we not require so quick and fiery a conceit as is more apt for innovation than orderly government : hebetiores quam acutiores melius remp. administrant . thucyd. to fidelity and experience we wish that our counsellors should be endued with piety , liberty , constancy , modesty and silence ; for as the aid and assistance of god is that which governeth all good counsels , so liberty of speech , and magnanimous uttering of what is good and fit , is necessary in counsellors . likewise to be constant and not to vary in opinion , either for fear or favor , is very commendable : also as modesty in giving counsel escheweth all offences , and gaineth good will , so secresie is the best and most secure means to govern all publick affairs : res magnae sustineri non possunt ab eo qui tacere nequit . curt. the first obstacle to good counsel is pertinacy or opiniativeness ; a condition far unfit for counsellors ; yet some men are so far in love with their own opiniastre conceits , as that they cannot patiently endure opposition . secondly , discord must from counsellors be removed , because private offence many times impeacheth publick proceedings . thirdly , affection is an enemy to counsel , the same being commonly accompanied with anger , wherewith nothing can be 〈◊〉 or considerately done . lastly , 〈◊〉 seemeth a vice worthy to be 〈◊〉 of all counsellors , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 away both fidelity and 〈◊〉 the principal pillars of all good counsel : pessimum veri affectus & judicii venenum , utilitas . tac. to good counsel other impediments there are , which square not with wisdom ; for all crafty and hazarding counsels do seem in the beginning likely to succeed ; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil event . it therefore seemeth behoveful to be wary in resolving , and bold in executing : animus vereri qui scit , scit tuto aggredi . pub. another lett to good consultation is immoderate desire , which every wise man must endeavor to restrain : 〈◊〉 pauca recte siunt , circumspectione plurima . thucyd. thirdly , haste is an enemy to good deliberation ; for whoso greedily desireth any thing , proceedeth rashly ; and rash proceeding endeth ever in repentance : scelera impetu , bona consilia mora valescunt . tac. of ministers of state. having already spoken of counsellors , somewhat is to be spoken of ministers ; i mean those that either publickly or privately serve the prince in any function ; in choice of which men , care must be had ; first , that they be persons honestly born ; for no man descended of base parentage may be admitted , unless in him be found some noble and excellent vertue : optimus quisque nobilissimus . plato . secondly , they ought to be of honest condition , and of good fame ; for that common-weale is better and more secure , where the prince is not good , than is that where his ministers are evil. it seemeth therefore that ministers should be men of good quality and blameless : emitur sola virtute potestas . claud. thirdly , consideration is to be had of their capacity and fitness , for that function wherein they are to be used ; for as some men are apt for learning , so others are naturally disposed to arms. also it is necessary that every one square with the office whereunto he is appointed , in which matter some princes have used great caution ; for as they little liked of men excellent , so they utterly detested the vitious ; the one they doubted to trust in regard of themselves , the other were thought a publick indignity to the state. wise men have therefore resolved , that those wits which are neither over-haughty and singular , nor they which be base or dull , are fittest for princes secrets and services ; howsoever we may hereof say with tacitus : nescio quomodo aulica haec comitia affectus dirigit , & fato quodam ac sorte nascendi , ut caetera , ita principum inclinatio in hos , offensio in illos est . tac. and because the course and quality of mens lives serving in court , is of all other the most uncertain and dangerous , great heed and circumspection ought therein to be used ; for whoso serveth negligently , forgetting the dutiful endeavors appertaining to the place , seemeth to take a way of no good speed : quanto quis obsequio promptior , tanto honoribus & opibus extollitur . tac. it shall also become such a man to look well unto his own profit , and behave himself rather boldly than bashfully : malus minister regii imperii pudor . sen. to be modest , and closely to handle all actions , is also a course well beseeming a courtier ; neither shall he do well to attribute any good success to his own vertue or merit , but acknowledge all to proceed from the prince's bounty and goodness , by which means envy is eschewed , and the prince not robbed of his honor : haec est conditio regum , casus tantum adversos hominibus tribuant , secundos virtuti suae . prov. emped . and to conclude these precepts summarily , i say it behoveth all ministers and servants in court to be patient , wary and of sew words : fraudum sedes aula . sen. chap. xv. the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment . to govern , is a certain skill how to command and continue subjects in due obedience , so as offend they ought not , or if they will they cannot ; wherein two special things are to be considered ( viz. ) the nature of men , and the nature of the state ; but first the condition of the vulgar must be well conceived : noscenda natura vulgi , & quibus modis temperanter habeatur . tac. the disposition of men is divers ; some are apt to anger , some are hardy , some fearful ; it therefore behoveth the prince to accommodate his government to the humor of people whom he governeth : principis est virtus maxima nosse suos . mart. likewise the nature of commonweals is mutable and subject to change , and kings are not only accompanied with fortune , but also followed with hate , which breedeth a continual diffidence , chiefly towards those that are nearest to majesty : suspectus semper invisusque dominantibus quisquis proximus destinatur . tac. moreover the vulgar sort is generally variable , rash , hardy , and void of judgment ; ex opinione multa , ex veritate pauca judicat . cic. to confirm a government , force and arms are of greatest necessity ; by force i mean the guards and arms which princes use for their defence or ornament ; miles in foro , miles in curia principem comitari debet . tac. to this may be added fortisication and strong buildings , in these days much used by new princes , and others also to whom people yield , not willing obedience . in ancient times princes planted colonies as well to suppress rebellion in conquered countries , as to front suspected neighbours : coloniae vera sedes servitutis . tac. the government of princes is also greatly increased by a virtue , which i call a commendable affection in subjects , proceeding of love and authority : these effects do grow from the princes own merit , but their being liveth in the mind of the people ; this love is gained by lenity , liberality , and mercy ; yet is every of them to be tempered : nec aut reverentiam terrore , aut amorem humilitate captibis . plin. affection is also no way sooner won then by liberality , the same being used with judgment and moderation . bellorum sociis , periculorum consortibus , sivi de te bene ac fortiter — — meritis . sen. by indulgence likewise , and pricely affability , the love of men is gain'd ; for the multitude desire no more than necessary food and liberty , to use ordinary recreations : vulgo , sicut pueris , omne ludicrum in pretio est . sen. chap. xvi . of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated . authority is a certain reverent impression in the minds of subjects and others touching the princes virtue and government ; it resteth chiefly in admiration and fear : ingenita quibusdam gentibus erga reges suos veneratio . curt. authority consisteth in three things : ( viz. ) the form of government , the strength of the kingdom , and the condition of the prince ; for in them all reputation and security resteth : majest as imperii , salutis tutela . curt. whoso desireth to govern well , it behoveth him to use severity , constancy and restraint ; for over much lenity introduceth contempt , and certain hope of impunity ; the condition of men being such as cannot be restrained by shame , yet it is to be commanded by fear : salutaris 〈◊〉 as vinicit inanem speciem 〈◊〉 cic. yet ought severity to be used with great respect and sparingly , because over great terror breedeth desparation : paena ad paucos , metus ad omnes 〈◊〉 cic. to govern constantly is nothing else but to continue the old and ancient laws in force without change or innovation unless exceeding great commodity or urgent necessity shall so require : for where extream punishments are used , reformation is always needful : nocet interdum prisucs rigor & nimia severitas . tac. also to restrain authority is a matter of great necessity and worthy a wise prince ; else he maketh others partakers of the honor and power to himself only due , the same being also dangerous : periculosum privati hominis nomen supra ( immo & juxta ) principes extolli . tac. it seemeth also perilous that great authority given to private men should belong ; for thereby oft-tentimes they are made insolent and apt to innovation : libertatis sive principatus magna custodia est , si magna imperio 〈◊〉 esse non sinas . liv. authority is also reinforced and enlarged by power , without which no prince can either take from others or defend his own : parum tuta sine viribus majestas . liv. chap. xvii . of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained . power and strength is attained by these five ways , money , arms , counsel , friends and fortune : but of these the first and most sorcible is money : nihil tam 〈◊〉 quod non expugnari pecunia possit . cic. next to money arms are of most use as well to defend as to offend ; to keep , and to conquer ; for oft-tentimes occasion is to be offered as well to take from others , as to hold what is our own : sua retinere private est domus , de 〈◊〉 certare regia laus est . tac. also of great and necessary use is counsel , to devise how arms ought to be employed or enforced : arma concilio temperanda . tac. likewise friends and consederates do greatly increase the virtue of power , the same being such as have both wit and ability to aid : in caducum parietem ne inclina . adri. the last , yet not the least part of power consisteth in fortune ; whereof daily experience may be seen ; for the success of all humane actions seem rather to proceed from fortune than virtue : omni ratione potentior fortuna . curt. to these particularities concerning power , we may add the qualities of the prince , which greatly grace his authority ; these are partly internal , and partly extenal : by the one i mean the virtues of the mind , by the other a certain seemly behavior and comely gesture of the body ; of the first kind i do suppose piety and providence to be the chief , for piety maketh a prince venerable , and like unto god : oportet principem res divinas videri curare serio & ante omnia . arist. providence is a forecast and likely conjectures of things to come , supposed to be in those princes that in their actions proceed slowly and circumspectly , it seemeth also a course of princely discretion to be retired aud not ordinarily to converse with many : autoritatem absentia tueare . suet. chap. xviii . of conspiracy and treason , with the causes and ways of prevention or discovery . conspiracy is commonly addressed to the princes person ; treasons are addressed against his government , authority , country , subjects , or places of srength . these mischiefs are easily feared , but hardly eschewed ; for albeit open enemies are openly encountred , yet fraud and subtilty are secret foes , and consequently not to be avoided : occulta pericula neque praevidere neque vitare in promptu est . salust . the danger of conspiracy proceedeth of divers causes , as avarice , infidelity of subjects , ambition in servants , and corruption in soldiers , therefore with great difficulty to be avoided : vitae tuae dominus est , quisquis suam contempsit . sen. notwithstanding it seemeth that either by inquisition , punishment , innocency , or destiny , the evil affection of men may be oft-tentimes discovered : . for whoso will curiously inquire and consider the actions and ordinary speechees of men ( i mean those that be persons of honor and reputation ) may oft-tentimes vent the myne that lurketh in the minds : quoniam rarò nisi male loqunti mali faciunt . lips. . punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the consideration thereof with the hope of reward doth often discover those dangerous intentions : cruciatu aut praemio cuncta pervia sunt . tac. but as it is wisdom in princes to give ear to informers , so are they not always to be believed ; for hope , envy , hate , or some other passion oft-tentimes draws them to speak untruly : quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit ? tac. . the third and likeliest desence against conspiracy is the princes own innocency ; sor never having injured any man , it cannot be thought there liveth any subject so lewd as will endeauor to hurt him : fidelissima custodia principis ipsius innocentia . plin. . the last and best bulward to withstand the force of this mischief we call destiny ; which proceeding from the fountain of divine providence , may be truly called the will of god ; in whose only power it resteth to protect and defend good princes : ille erit a latere tuo , & custodiet pedem tuum ne capiaris . salo. treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous persons , who preferring private prosit before fame or fidelity , do not fear to enter into any impious action : to this humor ambitious men dissentious , and all such as be desirous of innovation , are inclined : pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava struentes . hom. to these offenders no punishment is equal to their impious merit , can be devised , being persons odious as well to friends as foes : proditores etiam in quos anteponunt , invisi sunt . tac. chap. xix . of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it . having briefly touched the virtues and means whereby princes are maintained in authority and honor , let something be said of the causes from whence their ruine doth proceed ; the chief whereof seemeth to be hate and contempt : hate cometh of fear , which the more common it is , the more dangerous : nulla vis imperii tanta est , quae premente metu possit esse diuturna . cic. the causes of fear are punishments , impositions and rigor ; and therefore it behoveth a prince not only to shun them , but to eschew those actions whereby he may reasonable incur their suspision : sentias enim homines ut metuant aut oderint , non minus opinione & fama , quam certa aliqua ratione moveri . cic. yet punishment , imposition and censure are in all states necessary , although they shew and seem terrible , and consequently breed a certain desperation in subjects , unless they be discreetly and modesty used ; for extream and frequent punishments taste of cruelty ; great and many imposts favor of covetousness ; censure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences , doth seem rigour in these matters ; therefore it behoveth the prince to be moderate and 〈◊〉 chiefly in capital punishment , which must be confined within the bounds of justice : sit apud 〈◊〉 parsimonia etiam viliffimi sanguinis . sen. but if for security sake the prince be forced to 〈◊〉 let the same be done with shew of great sorrow and lothness : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 nocum tormento ad castigandum veniat . sen. let all punishments also be slowly executed ; for they that are hastily punished do seem to have been willingly condemned ; neither ought any capital punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the commonweale , and for example sake : non tam ut ipsi pareant , quam ut alios pereundo deterreant . sen. in punishing also a specil respect must be had , that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein : forma rabiei est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere . sen. also in punishing , equality must be observed , and the nature of the punishment according to the custom : nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur , alii ne appellentur quidem . cic. but in punishing publick offences wherein a multitude have part , the execution ought to be otherwise , and as it were at an instant , which may haply seem terrible , but in effect is not : frequens vindicta paucorum odium 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 at . sen. another means to satisfie a people offended is to punish the ministers of cruelty , and with their blood to wash away the common hatred . piaculares publici odii victimae . plin. by this king david did appease the gibeonites . the next cause of discontent cometh of impositions , under which word is comprehended all levies of money , a matter nothing pleasing to people , as that which they esteem equal to their own lives : pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus . plaut . first , to remove hate conceived of this cause , there is nothing better then publick expostulation of necessity : for what commonwealth or kingdom can be without tributes ? nulla quies gentium sine armis , nec arma sine stipendiis , nec stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt . tac. the second remedy against hate for impositions is to make moderate levies and rare . for as tiberius the emperor was wont to say , a sheep should be sleeced not slead : qui nimis emungit , elicit 〈◊〉 . tac. thirdly , also to eschew the offence of people , it behoveth the prince to have a vigilant eye on informers , promoters , and such fiscal ministers , whose cruelty and covetous proceedings do oft-tentimes occasion great hate ; but this mischief may be , though hardly , encountred , either by choosing honest officers , or ( proving otherwise ) not only to remain them but to use them as spunges : exprimendi post quam biberint . suet. in all impositions or taxations , no cruelty or force ought to be used , the second cause to kindle hate : and to meet with that mischief , nothing is better than to proceed moderately , and without extremity : ne boves ipsos , mox agros , postremo corpora servitio aut poenae tradant . tac. the fourth remedy is the princes own parsimony , not giving so largely to private persons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude : magnae opes non tam multa capiendo , quam haud multa perdendo , quaeruntur . maecaenas . the last help against hate is in taxation to proceed equally , indifferently , and without favor or respect ; and that the assessors of taxes may be elected of the meaner sort of people : populis maximam fidem rerum suarum habet . tac. touching censure , which we numbred amongst the causes whereof hate is conceived , much needeth not to be spoken , because the same is discontinued , or rather utterly forgotten ; yet doth it seem a thing necessary , being a certain observation and controlement of such evil manners and disorders , as were not by law corrigible ; these officers were of the romans called magistri pudoris & modestiae . livi. to the function of censures these two things are anciently subject manners , and excess ; under manners i comprehend wantonness , drunkenness , dicing , brawling , perjury , and all such lawdness as modesty condemneth . these disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of censors in all ages and sexes , to the end that idleness might be generally avoided . universa plebs habeat negotia sua , quibus a malo publico detineatur . salust . excess includeth riotousness , expence of money , prodigal house-keeping , banquetting and superfluity in apparel , which things are the mothers of many mischiefs . it also seemeth in some sort perilous to the prince that the subject should exceed either in covetize or consuming : nemo nimis excedat , sive amicorum copia , sine opum . arist. the punishment inflicted upon these sorts of offenders , were either 〈◊〉 or pecuniary punishments : censoris judicium damnato nihil affert nisi ruborem . tac. the first and chiefest means to remove these inconveniences , is the princes own example , whose life being well censured , easily reduceth others to order . vit 〈◊〉 principis censura perpetua . plin. secondly , those disorders may be taken away without danger , if the censures do proceed by degrees and leasurely ; for the nature of man may not suddenly be altered . vitia quaedam tollit facilius princeps , si eorum sit patiens . sen. these are the chiefest rules whereby to esehew hate ; but impossible it is for any prince or minister utterly to avoid it ; for being himself good , he incurreth the offence of all bad folk , if he be evil , good men will hate him ; this danger therefore wise and vertuous princes have little regarded ; because hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing : odia qui nimium timet , regnare nescit . sen. one other means to remove this error , is , to reward the good and well deserving subjects ; for no man can think him cruel , that for love to vertue useth austerity ; which will appear , when he bestoweth bountifully on the good : praemio & poena respublica continetur . solon . the other vice which indangereth the state of princes , we call contempt , being a certain base and vile conceit , which entereth into the subjects , strangers or servants , of the prince and his proccedings ; for the authority of a king may be resembled to the powers of mans mind , whereunto the pland , the feet , the eyes , do by 〈◊〉 obey : vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt . livi. the causes of contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of government , fortune , or the prince's manners ; the form of government becometh contemptible , when the prince , desiring to be thought merciful , ruleth rather pitifully than justly ; which manner of proceeding taketh away all reverence in the people , and in lieu thereof , entereth liberty , or at least a certain boldness to offend : facultas faciendi quod euilibet visum , non potest comprimere ingenitam singulis hominibus pravitatem . tac. also to be mutable , irresolute , light and inconsiderate in bestowing the honors and offices of state , maketh the prince contemptible : qui praesentibus fruitur , nec in longius consultat . arist. but if contempt be caused by fortune , or as may be said more reasonably , by destiny , and that those friends do fail , who ought in duty to defend the prince and his authority , then is there small hope to esehew contempt : fato obnoxia virius . plaut . the prince's manners do breed contempt , when he yieldeth his affections to sensuality and sloth , or if he incur the suspition of simplicity , cowardise , or any such vice , unworthy the dignity he beareth : common people do sometimes also disesteem the prince for external and light causes , as deformity of person , sickness or such like : mos vulgi est , fortuita & externa ad culpam trahere . tac. chap. xx. of dissidence and dissimulation in the management of state assairs . albeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy praise , chiesly in private persons ; yet because all men in their actions do not so proceed , it behoveth wise men and princes , above others , at occasions to semble and dissemble ; for as in all actions a prince ought to be slow and advised ; so in consent and believing , haste and facility is most dangerous ; and though credulity be rather an error than a fault , yet for princes it is both unfit and perilous . wherefore it importeth them to be desended with this caution , nihil credendo , atque omnia cavendo . cic. notwithstanding he must not shew himself diffident or distrustful utterly ; but as i wish he should not over-slightly believe all men , so ought he not for small causes distrust every man : multi fallere docuerunt , dum timent falli . sen. dissimulation is as it were begotten by dissidence , a quality in princes of so great necessity , as moved the emperor tiberius to say , nescit regnare , qui nescit dissimulare the necessity of dissimulation is chiefly to be used with strangers and enemies ; it also sheweth a certain discretion in magistrates , sometimes to disguise with friends when no offence doth thereof follow : doli non sunt doli , nisi astu colas . plaut . this kind of craft , albeit in every mans conceit not praisable , is nevertheless tolerable , and for princes and maglstrates ( the same being used to good ends ) very necessary . but those cunnings which are contrary to vertue , ought not of honest men to be used ; neither dare i commend adulation and corruption , though they be often used in court , and are of some learned writers allowed : decipere pro moribus temporum , prudentia est . plin. by great subtilty and frauds , contrary to vertue and piety , i mean perjury and injustice , which though all men in words detest , yet in deeds are used of many , perswading themselves , by cavillations and sophistications , to excuse the impiety of their false oaths ; as it is written of lysander , 〈◊〉 talis , viros jurament is circumvenire 〈◊〉 plut. chap. xxi . of war defensive and invasive ; with instructions touching laws of arms , soldiers and military discipline . the art military is of all other qualities most necessary for princes , for without it they cannot be defended ; force of men only sufficeth not , unless the same be governed by council , and martial wisdom : duo sunt quibus resp . servatur ; in hostes sortitudo , & domi 〈◊〉 . tac. military knowledge concerneth war , and every war is either forreign or domestical . touching forreign , it must be considered when it must be begun , how to continue it , and when to be ended ; to begin war , a prince is to take heed that the cause be just , and the enterprise advisedly entred into : sunt enim & belli 〈◊〉 pacis jura , justeque ea non 〈◊〉 ac 〈◊〉 gerere debes . livi. the laws of arms are in all common-weales to be duly observed ; for to enter fight rashly and without respect to reason , were beastly ; also to kill or slay would work no better effect , than that all nations should without mercy murder one another : barbaro ritu coedem coede , & sanguinem sanguine expiare . sal. no war therefore is to be made , but such as is just ; and in every just war these three things are to be looked into ( viz. ) that the author be of authority , that the cause be good , and the end just ; for in all states , the prince , or they in whom the sovereignty resteth , are the just authors of war ; others have no such authority : si quis privatim sine publico scito , pacem bejumve fecerit , capitale esto . plato . wars are of two sortt ; defensive and offensive ; the one to resist , the other to invade ; against desence nothing can be said , because it is natural and necessary . est non modo justum sed 〈◊〉 necessariam cum vi vis illat a desenditur . cic. defensive war is of two sorts , either to defend thine own , or thy friends ; for it is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth ; and therewith also by arms to defend the liberty of country , parents and friends : nullum bellum a civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro side aut pro salute . cic. the like reason leadeth us to assist and protect friends ; for the common obligation of humanc society doth so require : qui enim non obsistit si potest , injuriae , tam est in vitio , quam si parentes aut patriam , aut socios deserat . cic. invasion is also just and allowable , but not ever ; for whoso hath been robbed , or spoiled of his lands or goods , may lawfully seek repossession by force ; yet so as before any force be used , he first civilly seek restitution , wherein is justice be denied , then is the use of arms necessary : justum bellum quibus necessarium ; & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes . liv. likewise invasion is lawsul against barbarians , whose religion and impiety ought to be abhorred , chiesly if they be potent and apt to offend ; for the cause of such war is compulsion and suppression of evil : cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur , utiliter vincitur . august . finally , to conclude this matter of invasion , i say , that no revenge , no desire of honor or empire , are any lawful causes of war ; but the intent thereof ought to be directed only to defence and security : for wise men do take arms to win peace , and in hope of rest they endure travel : it a bellum suscipiatur ut nihil aliud quam pax quaesita videatur . cic. having said somewhat against unjust war , let us speak of temerity and unadvised war , an enterprise worthy discommendation : omnes bellum sumunt facile , oegerrime desinunt ; nec in ejusdem potestate initium & sinis est . sal. a wise 〈◊〉 rince theresore ought neither to undertake any unlawful invasion , nor without sober and mature deliberation enter into any war , as he that is unwilling to oftend , yet of courage enough to desend : nec provoces bellum , nec timeas . plin. to make war three things are required , money , men and arms ; and to maintain a war , provision and council , are needsul : theresore a wise prince , before he begins a war , doth carefully consider what forces and charge thereunto belongeth : diu apparandum est bellum , ut vincas melius . pub. above all other provisions , care must be had , that bread be not wanting ; for without it neither victory nor life can be looked for : qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non praeparat , vincitur sine ferro . vegetius . lastly , it behoveth a prince always to have arms in readiness , i mean , harness , horses , weapons , artillery , engines , powder , and every other thing necessary either for service on horse or foot : we may add hereunto ships , and shipping of all sorts , with every furniture of offence or defence ; for these preparations make a prince sormidable , because no man dare do or attempt injury to that king or people , where preparation is ever ready to revenge : que desider at pacem , praeparat bellum . cass. by men we mean a multitude of subjects armed , trained to desend or offend : these are of two sorts , captains and soldiers ; and soldiers are either footmen or horse-men ; the one of great use in the champion , the other in mountainous places ; also for defence or assault of towns or grounds fortisied most necessary , and consequently meet for service in all places , which moved tacitus to say , omne in pedite robur . tac. for sudden service , horses do seem most meet , and the execution of any enterprise is by them most speedily performed : nevertheless the actions of foot-men do seem most certainly executed , chiesly if they be well armed , and skilfully lead ; for so experience hath of late time proved ; besides , that they are of less expence and of greater number : in universum aestimanti plus in pedite robur . tac. having thus proved , that both horse and foot be necessary , let us remember , that unless they be serviceable , great numbers are to small purpose : manibus opus est bello , non mult is nominibus . livi. to make soldiers serviceable , consisteth in good choice and good discipline ; the one at this day little regarded : emunt militem , non legunt . livi. soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able number of bodies , and every company composed of men known one to the other ; for thereby they are made the more confident : but hereof is small heed taken , for commonly they are purgamenta urbium suarum . curt. touching discipline , it seemeth that thereof the external form , and not the certain substance , is observed : for as in former ages soldiers endeavored to be vertuous and modest , so now they rather study to excel in riot than in martial knowledge : exercitus lingua quam manu promptior , praedator est sociis , & ipsa praeda hostiam . sal. for as much as soldiers are made good by election and choice , it seemeth that the foundation and ground of service consisteth in the discretion and judgment of those that have authority to make election ; yet will we add , that they must be chosen of natural subjects , for strangers are covetous , and consequently corruptible ; they are also mutinous and cowardly : their custom likewise is to rob , burn and spoil both friends and foes , and to consume the princes treasure : ossa vides regum vacuis exsuct a medullis . juven . but the native soldier is faithful and obedient , resolute in fight , loving to his country , and loyal to his prince : gentes quae sub regibus sunt , pro deo colunt . curt. native soldiers are of two sorts , ( viz. ) they that be in continual pay , and they that are trained ready to serve , but do not withstanding attend their own private affairs , until they be called : the first are for all princes necessary : in pace decus , in bello praesidium . tac. of this sort no great number ought to be , as well to eschew disordor , as also to save expences . the second kind of foot soldiers are to be levied in villages , as people more patient of pains , and fit for the wars ; yet so judiciously disposed as the citizens : odio praesentium & non cupidine mut ationis . tac. touching the number of these extraordinary soldiers , that must be referred to discretion : bellum parare , simul & aerario parcere . to conclude , i say these numbers of ordinary and extraordinary foot ought to be according to the number of the people , not inserting any gentlemen ; for service on horse-back is to them only proper : alas rusticis non tribuo ; in nobilitatem & in divites haec a pauperibus oner a inclines . livi. the most certain notes whereby to conceive the disposition of men fit to become soldiers , are these five , the country where they are born , their age , proportion of body , their quality of mind , and their faculty . touching , first , their country , it is a thing apparently proved , that mountainous regions , or barren places , and northern habitations , do breed wits well disposed to the war : locorum asperitas hominum quoque ingenia durat . curt. secondly , the age most apt for the war , was anciently observed to be about eighteen years , and so the romans used : facilius est ad virtutem inslraere novos milites , quaem revocare praeteritos . veget. thirdly , the stature of a soldier ought to be observed : marius liked best the longest bodies ; pyrrhus preferred large and well proportioned men ; but vegetius in his choice , rather esteems strength than stature : 〈◊〉 est fortes milites esse quam grandes . veget. fourthly , the mind or spirit of a soldier ought to be considered , for that mind which is quick , nimble , bold and confident , seemeth apt for war : he is also of good hope , that loveth honor more than ease or profit : in brief , is qui nihil metuit nisi turpem famam . sal. lastly , it is to be marked in what art or faculty a man hath been bred ; for it may be presumed that fishers , fowlers , cooks , and orthers trained up in esseminate arts , are unfit for martial endeavor : and as these men were , in respect of their trade , thought unmeet , so in old time , slaves and masterless-men were repulsed from arms , as persons infamous : sed nunc tales sociantur armis quales domini habere fastidiunt . veget. how soldiers ought to be chosen , these few words we have spoken , may suffice . let us therefore say somewhat of discipline . choice findeth out soldiers , but discipline doth make and continue them fit for service : paucos viros fortes natura procrear , bona institutione plures reddat industria . veget. discipline is a certain severe confirmation of soldiers in their valor and vertue , and is performed by four means , exercise , order , compulsion and example . the two first appertain to valor , the third to vertue , the last to both : but of exercise , first , i say , that a soldier being chosen , ought to be informed in arms , and used in exercise and action ; the word 〈◊〉 importeth nothing else : exercitus dicitur , quod melius fit exercitando varro . order consisteth in dividing , disposing , and placing of men aptly on all occasions to be commanded , as the leaders shall direct : this matter requireth a large discourse , and therefore i refer it to skilful captains and writers , as polybius , vegetius , dela nonne , and others . compulsion and correction , is that which bridleth and governeth the manners of soldiers ; for no order can be observed amongst them , unless they be continent , modest and abstinent ; for continency is chiesly to be shewed in their diet , and moderate desires : degenerat a robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum . tac. the modesty of a soldier is perceived by his words , apparel and actions : for to be a vaunter , or vam-glorious boaster , is far unfit in him that professeth honor or arms , seeing true vertue is silent : viri militiae nati , factis magni , ad verborum linguaeque certamina , rudes . tac. the apparel of a soldier sheweth modesty , if therein he do not exceed ; for albeit it fitteth well the profession of arms , to be well armed and decently apparelled ; yet all superfluity savoreth of ignorance or vanity : horridum militem esse decet , non coelatum auro argentoque sed ferro . livi. abstincnce is also fit for all soldiers ; for thereby guided , they refrain from violence and insolency ; by that rule also they are informed to govern themselves civilly in the country where they ferve , and likewise in their lodgings : never taking any thing from the owner , nor committing any outrage : vivaut cum provincialibus jure civili , nec insolescat animus qui se sensit armatum . the last mark of discipline we called 〈◊〉 under which word is comprehended reward and punishment : for men are rewarded whensoever they receive for any excellent or singular service , honor or riches : and for evil , they have their due when they taste the punishment thereunto belonging : necessarium est acrius ille dimicet , quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiae & imperatoris judicium consuevit evehere . veget. likewise as gold and glory belongeth to good and well deserving soldiers ; so pumshment is due to those that be vitious and cowardly ; for nothing holdeth soldiers in obedience so much as the severity of discipline : milites imperatorum potius quam hostem metuere debent . veg. chap. xxii . of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions . of soldiers let this little suffice , we will now speak of what quality chieftains and leaders ought to be , for upon them dependeth the welfare of whole armies : militaris turba sine duce , corpus sine spiritu . curt. a chief or general in war , is either of his own authority chief , or a general that commandeth in the name of another . of the first sort are emperors , kings and princes ; of the other , be their deputies , lieutenants , colonels , and indeed all general commanders in the war : now whether it be more expedient that the prince should command in person or by deputy , divers wise men have diversly thought , therefore it may be thus distinguished ; if the war do then only concern some particular part or province , then may the same be performed by a lieutenant ; but if the whole fortune of a prince do thereupon depend , then is he to command in his own person and not otherwise : dubiis bellorum exemplis summae rerum & imperii seipsum reservat . tac. it therefore importeth the prince sometimes by his own presence , sometimes by his deputation to perform that office ; but however occasion shall require , it ever behoveth that one only commander ought to be , ( for plurality of chieftains doth rarely or never work any good effect ) yet with this caution that he be of experience , and wise : in bellica praesectura major 〈◊〉 habendus peritiae quam virtutis aut morum . arist. the qualities required in a chieftain are these , skill , vertue , providence , authority and fortune : by skill we mean he should be of great knowledge , and long experience , or to make a suffieient captain ; the information of others , or his own reading is not enough : qui norit quis ordo agminis , quae cura exploandi , quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus . cic. military vertue is a certain vigor or force both of body and mind to exercise soldiers as well in fained war as to sight with the enemy ; and summarily a captain ought to be laboriosus in negotio , fortis in periculo , industrius in agendo , celeris in conficiendo . cic. next to vertue we placed providence as necessary in great captains ; for being of such wisdom , they will not hazard nor commit more to fortune than necessity shall inforce ; yet true it is , fools and vulgar folks , that commend or discommend actions according to success , were wont to say , cunctatio servilis , statim exequi , regium est . but advised and provident captains do think , temerit as praeterquam quod stulta , est etiam infelix . livi. albeit providence be the best mean of good speed , yet some captains of that quality and in skill excelling , have been in their actions unlucky , when others of less sufficiency have marvellously prevailed ; we may therefore reasonably say with cic. quod olim maximo , marcello , scipioni , mario & ceteris magnis imperatoribus non solum propter virtutem , sed etiam propter fortunam soepius imperia mandata , atque exercitus esse commissos . cic. lastly , we wished authority to be in chieftains , for it greatly importeth what opinion or conceit the enemy hath of such a governor , and likewise how much his friends and confederates do esteem him ; but the chief and only means to maintain authority , is austerity and terror : dux authoritatem maximam severitate sumat , omnes culpas militares legibus 〈◊〉 nulli errantium credatur ignoscere . veget. also experience hath proved , that such chieftains as were affable and kind to their soldiers , were much loved , yet did they incur a contempt ; but on the other side , those that commanded severely and terribly , although they gained no good will , yet were they ever obeyed : dux sacilis inutilis . app. chap. xxiii . of councils in war , and directions tactick and stratagematick , with advice how to make an honorable peace . after men found and framed sit for the war , to small or no purpose shall they serve , unles , they be 〈◊〉 by wisdom or good council : mon minus est imperatoris consilio quam vi persicere . tac. council in war is of two sorts , direct council and indirect ; the first sheweth a plain and orderly course for proceeding , as to lay hold on occasion ; for as in all other humane actions occasion 〈◊〉 of great force : occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam virtus . veget. as occasions presented are means of good success , so fame worketh 〈◊〉 effects in the wars , therefore it 〈◊〉 a captain to be constant , and not 〈◊〉 to believe the vain rumors and report , of men : male imperatur , cum regit vulgus 〈◊〉 suos . sen. confidence is also to be eschewed , for no man is sooner surprised , than he who feareth least ; also contempt of the enemy hath been occasion of great discomfitures , therefore as a captain ought not to fear , so should he not contemn his enemy : nimia fiducia semper obnoxia . aemyl . as security , and overmuch estimation of our own vertue or valor is hurtful , so doth it import every good captain to be well informed , not only of his own forces but also of what strength the enemy is ; likewise it behoveth him to know the situation of the country , and the quality of the people , with every other circumstance . moreover , the generals honor and capacity ought to be known , with the condition and nature of the enemy : impetus acres cunctatione languescunt , aut in persidiam mutantur . tac. temerity in war is also dangerous , sor wise captains were wont not to enterprise any thing without deliberation and good opportunity , unless they were thereunto by necessity inforced : in rebus asperis & tenui spe , fortissima quaque consilia tulissima sunt . livi. some wise men , not superstitiously but discreetly , do think prodigious signs from heaven , or on earth , are not to be neglected , neither are dreams in time of war to be contemned : nam amat benignit as numinis , seu quod merentur homines , seu quod tangitur eorum affectione , his quoque rationibus prodere quae impendent . aemi . a wise captain will also wait opportunities , and spy out fit times when the enemy is wearied , or pretending fear , draw him into danger ; which advantages , with many other , are gained chiesly by observing of time : quia si in occasionis momento , cujus 〈◊〉 opportunit as , cunct at us paulum fueris , nequicquam mox omissam querare . livi. next the observation of time , the place is to be well considered , whether it be for thine advantage or thine enemies : amplius prodest locus saepe quam virtus . veget. thirdly , it importeth much , that men be well ordered , trained , and prepared for the fight ; for the want of art is cause of many disadvantages , and many times a small supply of choice soldiers on horse-back or foot , doth seem to the enemy very terrible ; likewise a sudden shout or conceit hath amazed a whole army : milites vanis & inanibus , magis quam justis formidinis causis moventur . curt. fourthly , it were to good purpose , that in ordering of men for fight , soldiers of one country or nations , should be ranged together , and above all , to foresee that the least loss of blood be among the natural subjects , and so handle the matter , that the chief slaughter light upon strangers and mercenaries : ingens victoriae decus , citra domesticum sanguinem bellanti . tac. the generals own courage and lively disposition to fight , will greatly animate the multitude of soldiers , as a contrary 〈◊〉 or appearance of fear , will exceedingly amaze and daunt : necesse estad fugam parati sint , qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare . veget. it were also for thy great advantage , that the forces should be ordered for the fight , before the enemy be prepared . first , for that thou maist the better perform , what thou thinkest fit to be done . secondly , that thereby thine own forces will thereof receive great courage , being readiest to assail the enemy , and to begin the fight : plus animi est inferenti periculum , quam propulsanti . livi. after victory it is not the best policy to execute the enemies with extream cruelty , but proceed moderately , for it shall suffice the victory is thine : clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia , & cum spei nihil est , sumit arma fermido . veget. lastly , i would advise that the general should be wary in his actions , and in every enterprise to frustrate the soldiers from spoils and pillage : saepe obstitit vincentibus pravum inter ipsos certamen , 〈◊〉 hoste spolia consectanda . tac. of direct councils , let that we have said suffice . we will now speak of councils indirect , commonly called by the greek word , stratagems or subtile practices : which manner of proceeding , hath been , in times past , of divers grave writers condemned : vir 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & clanculum velit oscidere hoslem . eurip. notwithstanding the opinion of this , and divers other writers worthy credit , it seemeth reasonable , and in piety allowable , that stratagems and subtilties may be used in the war , yet with such caution , as the same may stand with fidelity and honor ; for fraud being used , contrary to contracts and agreements made with the enemy , is mere treachery : as to poyson him or her , a murtherer to kill him , were plain impiety : faederatum injuste fallere , impium . livi. also out of the war covertly to kill a particular enemy by secret assault or practice , is not warrantable , either by faith or honor ; yet to use all crast , cunning and subtilty in open war , is both allowable and praisable ; and so is thought by christian writers : cum justum 〈◊〉 suscipitur , ut aperte pugnet quis aut ex insidiis , nihil ad justitiam interest . aug. the same is also approved by divers authors of good credit : consice sive dolo 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cominus euse . the same is also 〈◊〉 by xenophon , reipsa nihil utilius in bello dolis . thus having briefly touched what counsels are required in war , let us consider how victory is to be used , for the end of every good war is peace ; to the enjoying whereof , three things are required , wariness , mercy and modesty ; because over-great confidence may happily impeach the end of good success : res secundae negligentiam creant . livi. i also wish the victory to be handled mercifully , because all conquests are in their own nature cruel enough : and the ire of insolent soldiers , forces the conquered to become desperate : gravissime morsus irritate necessitatis . curt. to proceed modestly , is also and honorable quality in him that conquereth ; for in prosperous fortunes , men do hardly refrain covetous and proud doings ; yea , some good and great captains have in like cases forgotten what did best become them : in rebus secundis etiam 〈◊〉 duces insolescunt . tac. after victory followeth peace : for if war did ever continue , no state or government could stand : therefore how great , or how long soever the war be , the end must be peace ; the name whereof is not only sweet , but also comfortable : pax una triumphis innumeris potior . peace is not only good and profitable to him that is victorious , but also to those that are victored : pacem reduci velle victori , expedit , victo necesse est . tac. nevertheless until good and honorable peace be offered , arms may not be laid aside : wherein i wish tully's advice to be followed : bellum gerendum est ; si bellum omittemus , pace nunquam fruemur . livi. in treaty of peace , two things must be considered : first , that the conditions be honorable . to condescend to any base conditions , is unto a princely mind not only great indignity , but also intolerable : cum dignitate potius cadendum , quam cum ignominia serviendum . plut. it also importeth , the peace should be simple , true and unseigned ; for all seigned and dissembling amity is to be doubted : pace suspecta tutius est bellum . mithrid . the fittest season to speak of peace , is either when the war beginneth , or during the time that the enemies be of equal force ; for if the war continueth , it must behove the weaker to yield to necessity : not unlike the ship-master , who to save himself doth cast the greatest part of his loading into the sea : necessitati pare , quam ne dil quidem superant . livi. finally , having generously defended thy self , and performed all things required in a magnanimous captain , and finding nevertheless thy force insufficient , it cannot be dishonorable to accept peace . wherefore laying aside hatred and hope , which are but weak supporters , thou maist recommend thee and thine to the approved discretion of an honorable enemy : victores secundae res in miserationem ex ira vertunt . livi. now for as as much as every peace promiseth rest and quiet , as well to the victorious as to the victored ; we may add thereunto , that the prince victorious receiveth thereby honor , profit and security . for although his happiness may occasion hope of great success , yet in respect of fortunes mutability , it shall be good and glorious to listen to peace : decorum principi est cum victoriam prope in manibus habeat , pacem non abnuere , ut sciant omnes te & suscipere juste bellum , & finire . livi. it seemeth also the more honorable ; for who so is victorious , doth give peace and not take it : he also sheweth himself discreet by using a moderation in victory , and no extremity in spoiling , which our wise and godly writers have commended : pacem contemnentes , & gloriam appetentes , pacem perdunt & gloriam . bern. peace is also profitable for the victorious , because continual war breedeth weariness , and of violent proceeding desparation and peril cometh : maximi & mortiferi morsus esse solent morientium bestiarum . sen. likewise peace is more assured than any victory . hope of the one is in thine own power ; the other in the hand of god : add thereunto the force of fortune , which hath great power in all humane actions : in rebus secundis nihil in quenquam superbe ac violenter consulere decet , nec praesenti credere fortunae , cum quid vesper seral , incertus sis . sen. also conditions of peace ought to be reasonably and freely bestowed : for no people can live contented under such a law as forceth them to loath the state wherein they are . misera pax bello bene mutatur . sen. chap. xxiv . of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof . the greatest and most grievous calamity that can come to any state is civil war ; for therein subjects take arms against their prince or among themselves , whereof followeth a misery more lamentable than can be described . non aet as , non dignit as quenquam protegit , quo minus stupra caedibus , & caedes stupris misceantur . tac. the first cause of civil war proceedeth of destiny , for god in his own divine providence foreseeth many years before , that great and mighty empires shall be ruined . in se magna 〈◊〉 laetis hinc numinarebus crescendi posuere modum / s - / lucan . the second cause is , excess , riot , and dissolute life ; for nothing breedeth civil fury so soon as over great happiness ; also pompous apparel , banquetting and prodigal spending consumeth riches , and plenty is turned into poverty ; for by these means are men brought into desperation . rapacissimo cuique ac perditiffimo , non agri aut 〈◊〉 sed sola instrumenta vitiorum manebunt . tac. now to consider how destiny might be eschewed , were in vain : for such a remedy no wit or wisdom can devise , being the decree of god , no doubt it is inevitable . ita fato placuit , nullius rei eodem semper loco stare fortunam . sen. there is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation ; the earth , heavens , and whole world is thereunto subject . 〈◊〉 eunt cuncta temporibus ; nasci debent , crescere , extingui . sen. touching the second causes of civil war some remedies may be used , because it proceedeth of faction , sedition or tyranny . i call faction a certain association of divers persons combined to the offence of others . it proceedeth often of private or publick displeasure , and more often of ambition . nemo eorum qui in rep. versantur , quos vincat , sed a quibus vincatur , aspicis . sen. . factions are of two sorts ; for either they consist of many or of few persons : both be dangerous , but the former more apt to take arms ; and that party which proveth weakest , prayeth arms of foreign forces . . the other faction wherein are fewer partakers , be commonly great personages or men of more importance than ordinary people ; and that proveth most perilous and bloody . nobilium factiones trahunt ad se , & in partes , universum etiam populum . arist. albeit some wise men have held opinion that factions are necessary , yet cannot that conceipt be reasonably maintained , unless it be upon consines , and in such places where conspiracy is feared , which cato in his private family used . semper contentiunculas 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 inter servos callide serebat , suspectum habens nimiam concordiam orum , metuensque . plut. factions against the nobility , are sometimes suppressed by forbidding colors , or unknown bagdes to be worn , also to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is necessary , which was mecaenas counsel to augustus ; and aristotle thinketh it fit that laws should be made against the factions of noblemen . nobilium contentiones & partes etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari . arist. another cause of civil war , we call sedition , which is a sudden commotion or assembly of common people against their prince or his magistrates : the original of which disorders may proceed of divers causes , but chiefly of oppression . imminentium periculocum remedium , ipsa pericula arbitrari . arist. again , fear may be the occasion of sedition , as well in him that hath done injury , as in him that looketh to be injured , and is desirous to prevent it before it cometh . it may proceed also of over great mildness in government . non miseriis licentia sed licentia , tantum concitum turbarum , lascivire magis plebem quam saevire . livi. sedition many times ariseth of poverty , or of the artificers , whose arts are grown out of use , and consequently no means whereof they can live . semper in civitate , quibus opes nullae sunt , bonis invidem , vetera odere , nova expetunt , odio rerum suarum mutari omnia student . sab. lastly , sedition cometh of tyranny , insolency , or mutinous disposition of certain captains , cavaliers , or ring-leaders of the people ; for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation , yet doth it stand firm , until some first mover taketh the matter in hand . multitudo omnis , sicut mare , per se immobilis . livi. of these movers some are ambitious , who wanting other means to aspire , hope by practice of sedition , to compass their designs ; or else they are unthrifts , who having consumed their own , seek by violence to possess themselves of other mens : or else they are vain and light persons , that without cause or reason , attempt innovation , themselves know not for what . non tam praemiis periculorum , quam ipsis periculis loeti , pro certis & olim partis , nova , ambiguae ancipitia maelunt . thus having told the causes of sedition , i wish the remedies were prepared . omne malum nascens facile opprimitur , inveteratum fit plerumque robustius . cic. the first way to suppress sedition , is eloquence and excellent perswasion , which oft-tentimes worketh great effects among the multitude ; chiesly when it proceedeth from some reverend and grave person , for his wisdom and integrity of life honored : for the prince himself is not to take office in hand , unless necessity so inforce : integra autorit as principis majoribus remediis servetur . tac. if perswasion cannot prevail , then force must compel : but before such violent proceedings , use , art and cunning , either to appease the people , or at least to disunite them ; and rather if the prince do offer fair and promise plausibly . verba apud populum plurimum valent . tac. it is lawful also in such cases for princes to use subtilty ; and the same not prevailing , to wash away the stain thereof with clemency : for when arms laid down , and every one yielded , general punishment were needless . omnium culpa fuit , paucorum sit poena . tac. the last cause of sedition we named tyranny , which is a certain violent government , exceediug the laws of god and nature . the difference between kings and tyrants is this ; the one imployeth arms in defence of peace , the other useth them to terrific those of whom his cruelty hath deserved hate . auferre , trucidare , rapere , falsis nominibus imperium , atque ubi solitudinem fecerint , pacem appellant . tac. the quality of tyrants is to esteem promoters more then good ministers , because those men are the scourge of infinite others . they are also protectors of impious persons , and stand in daily doubt of noble and virtuous men. nobilitas , opes , amissi gestique honores , pro crimine : et ob virtutes certissimum exitium . tac. tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of letters and civil life , to the end all arts should be exiled , and barbarism introduced . pellunt sapientiae professores , & omnes bonas artes in exilium agant . tac. these and such like , be the conditions of tyrants , who for the most part are deposed and slain ; for as kings live long and deliver their doininions to their children and postority : so tyrants being feared and hated of all men , cannot continue in their estate . adgenerum cereris sine coede & vulnere pauci descendunt reges & sicca morte tyranni . juvin . the remedies of these mischiefs which proceed from the violence of sach a prince , are persecution or patience . many generous spirits have used the first ; perswading themselves rather to dye , than endure the sight of a tyrant . also the grecians did think it a service acceptable to murther the person of such an impious prince . graeci homines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui tyrannos necaverunt . cic. nevertheless , in christian consideration , the other course is to be taken : let patience therefore incounter this mischief ; for seeing all kings , as well the bad as the good be sent by god , they must be indured . res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem . homer . persecution is not only perilous , but for the most part infortunate : for therefore present revenge is taken by that prince that succeedeth . facinotis ejus ultor est , quisquis successerit . tac. the murther of tyrants is also followed with many inconveniences worse than civil war it self . principes bont , votis expetendi , qualescunque tolerandi . tac. for as fire , floods , and other inevitable plagues are necessarily to be suffered : so evil princes in their covetousness and cruelty ought to be patiently indured , because their office is to command , and subjects must obey . indigna , digna habenda sunt , rex quae facit . sen. and as it is the use of vulgar people to find faults in the long reign of princes ; so the ambition of great subjects is desirous of novelty . proesens imperium subditis semper grave . thucyd. to conclude , we say that the best remedy against tyranny , is patience : for so long as men are , so long will vices be . regum ingenia toleranda , neque usui crebrae mutationes . tac. chap. xxv . a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events . to the perfections of men , three things are necessarily required ; nature , nurture and use : the first giveth capacity , aptness and understanding ; which are graces from above . nurture , is learning , knowledge , art , or order . use , is practice , experience , and orderly observation ; whereof may be conceived , that nature alone susficeth not ; nor can nurture work any good effect , where natural aptness wanteth ; and they can frame no perfection , unless experience be also conjoined . nemo nascitur sapiens , sed fit . sen. ambassadors , negotiants , and generally all other ministers of mean fortune , in conversation with princes and superiors , must use great respect , shewing themselves rather ceremonious than presumptuous , and acknowledge their obligation great , for the favor and grace , they find in those which might command them . it is no wisdom ever to commend or discommend the actions of men by their success ; for oft-tentimes some enterprises attempted by good counsel , end unsortnately ; and others unadvisedly taken in hand , have happy success . who so then commendeth inconsiderate counsels for their fortunate event , thereby encourageth men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know , and by experience have proved . in actions publick , and every other matter of great moment , the beginning is well to be considered : for afterwards it lieth not in our power , without dishonor to abandon what was begun . the time doth not always serve , nor is apt occasion always offered to enterprise what would ; yer who so doth expect every opportunity , shall either attempt nothing at all , or if he do , the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvantage . when any resolution is taken , either with over great haste , or too much affection , seldom it receiveth good success : for he that doth the one , hath no leisure to consider ; the other transporteth the mind so as it cannot conceive more than that which presently presseth . to these we add others , i mean some of them that have leisure , and are void of affection , yet for want of natural capacity , or for continual negligence in their doings , never bring any thing well to pass . who so desireth to be beloved in a commonwealth , must rest content with that which men do give , and the laws allow him to take : so shall he neither incur danger nor envy : for indeed , that which is taken or extorted from others , and not that which is given , doth make men hated . arms , laws and religion , may not in any well governed state be disjoined ; every one of them in particular maintaineth them all united . in actions of war , courage and conduct are of great necessity ; yet all good government consisteth in using the virtues moral ; and in handling the matter of martial policy , it is fit to imitate the proceedings of ancient and approved captains . among mortal men , there is nothing more common than to believe the estate of one man to be better than another ; for hereof it cometh , that every one endeavoreth rather to take from others with travel , than to enjoy his own with rest . the state of princes is good , being well used ; so is the fortune of private men , if therewith they be contented . the rich man liveth happily , so long as he useth his riches temperately ; and the poor man that patiently endureth his wants , is rich enough . whensoever a man is so dangerously distressed , as either proceeding or standing , he liveth in like peril , then doth it behove him in any wise , to resolve upon action . the reason is , that so long as nothing is done , the same accidents that caused his dangers , do still remain in their former force ; but if he endeavor to enterprise somewhat , either he may meet with means to make him secure , or at the hardest , shew himself of so great courage and wit , as he dare and can attempt a way to do it . it seemeth a thing of great difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince or magistrate to eschew the evil speech and bad report of men ; for if they be good and virtuous , then they incur the backbiting of lewd persons ; if evil , then will all good men exclaim against them . all commonwealths ought to desire peace , yet it is necessary ever to be prepared for the war ; because peace disarmed is weak , and without reputation : therefore the poets feign , that pallas the goddess of wisdom did always appear armed . every prince ( well advised ) ought to govern his subjects and servants in such sort , that by his affability and virtue they may be induced rather to serve voluntarily , then for pay or hope of preferment . for otherwise doing , whensoever the prince shall want means to pay , the subjects likewise will fail of good will to serve . but he that faithfully loveth , doth neither in prosperity become arrogant , nor in contrary fortune retire , or complain of the small favor he findeth : for ( till death ) love and life remain at the princes commandment . where poor men find justice , evil men are punish'd , measures and weights be just , youth well nurtured , and old folk free from avarice , there is the commonwealth good and perfect . in war between neighbors , neutrality is commendable ; for by that means we eschew many troubles and great expences , so long as the forces of either side be so equal in strength , as we need not to fear the victory of any : for so long their discord is our security , and oft-tentimes offereth us means to increase our own state and reputation . the chief reasons to move war , are , the sustice of the cause , the facillity of success and the profit of the victory . in all humane actions it behoveth to accommodate the council of men unto present necessity , and never to expose security to manifest peril , nor hope of that which without great difficulty or impossibility cannot be obtained . it is the nature of men , having escaped one extreme , which by force they were constrained long to endure , to run headlong into the other extreme , forgetting that vertue doth always consist in the mean. the multitude is inclined to innovation , and easily induced by false perswasion , and consequently easily transported by seditious leaders . men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten danger and terror ; yet unless these perils , by some new accident , be daily revived , that fear by little and little vanisheth , and security recovereth the place . whoso findeth himself contemned , or not respected , becometh discontent ; which humor in generous minds , breedeth oftentimes adventerous imaginations , whereof audacious attempts have followed , chiefly in persons of authority and reputation ; for he that hopeth no good , feareth no evil : yet true it is , that dangerous enterprises , the more they be thought upon , the less hope they give of good success , for which reason conspiracies not suddenly executed , are for the most part revealed or abandoned . all people do naturally imitate the manners of their prince , and observing his proceedings , resolve to hate or love him : but if they happen once to hate the prince , then his doings , good or evil , are afterwards not good ; but if at the beginning he gained the love of the people , then every bad action is reputed a vertue ; as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good cause or reason . greatly are princes deceived , if in the election of ministers , they more respect their own particular affection , than the sufficiency of the person elected . a prince having conquered any new dominion , is thereby rather incumbered than strengthened , unless the same be after well governed ; and seldom is it seen , that a principality , by ill means gotten , hath been long enjoyed . as to the perfection of the whole body , soundness of head only sufficeth not , unless the other members also do their office ; even so it is not enough that a prince be faultless , but it behoveth also that the magistrates and ministers should perform their duty . great princes rarely resist their appetites , as for the most part private men can ; for they being always honored and obeyed , do seldom with patience indure the want of any thing reasonable , as being perswaded that what they desire is just , and that their commandment hath power to remove all difficulties . all men are naturally good , when no respect of profit or pleasure draws them to become evil. but this worlds corruption , and our frailty is such , as easily and often for our particular interest we incline to the worst ; which was the cause that wise law-makers found out reward and punishment ; the one to incite men to good , the other to fear them from being evil. a tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his estate by three means . first , he practiseth to hold all subjects in extreme awe , and to be basely minded , to the end they should want courage to take arms against him . secondly , he kindleth diffidence and discord among the great men ; thereby to remove occasion of conspiracy and combination . lastly , he holdeth them disarmed and idle , so as they neither know nor can attempt any thing against him . to govern , is nothing else but to hold subjects in love and obedience ; for in respect of the end , they ought not , and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the governor's will and their duty . the laws and ordinances of a common-weale made at the beginning thereof when men were good , do often prove unprofitable when they are become evil ; and therefore new laws are made according to the accidents which happen . the discontent and disorder of people is ever occasioned by the inequality of their goods , because the poorer sort would be made equal to the rich ; but the offence that grows among great men is the desire of honor ; for they being equal , do endeavor to aspire to equal authority . a prince that desireth , by means of his ambassador , to deceive any other price , must first abuse his own ambassador , to the end he should do and speak with more earnestenss , being indeed perswaded that the intent and meaning of his master is simple , which happily would not , were he privy that his prince's meaning were to dissemble . this course is also commonly holden by those , that by imployment of a third person , would perswade any thing feigned or false . for the performance of conditions of treaty of peace , or league of amity , the promises , vows and oaths of princes are of great effect ; and because fidelity in a man is not ever certain , and time doth daily offer occasions of variation , there is no assurance so secure and good , as to stand so prepared , as the enemy may want able means how to offend . to resolve in matters doubtful , or answer requests which we are not willing to grant , the least offensive way is not to use direct denial , but by delays prolong the time , and so in effect , afford good expectation . the old proverb faith , magistratus virum ostendit ; which is no less true than ancient ; for men in such fortune , are occasioned not only to make proof of their sufficiency , but also to discover their affections ; and the more their greatness is , the less respect they have to contain those passions which are natural . albeit great troubles and continual adversity seem insupportable , yet is there nothing more dangerous , than overmuch prosperity ; and being pressed by new appetites , they disturb their own security . in speaking of occurrents doubtful , it is always wisdom to feign ignorance , or at least alledge that we believe them not ; for most commonly they are utterly untrue , or far other than vulgarly is believed . the actions of men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good success ; attributing that to council which sometimes is due to fortune . the multitude of men were wont to be more pleased with sudden than slow resolutions ; and many times account those enterprises generous , which are rashly and inconsiderately attempted . great difference there is between subjects desperate , and others which are only discontented ; for the one desire nothing but present alteration , which they endeavor with all hazard ; the other wish for innovation , inciting any motion or practice , because their intent is to attend time , and that occasion may present it self . a benefit bestowed on him who thinketh himself greatly injured , doth not suffice to raze the same out of his memory , chiefly if the benefit be given at such time as no mere motion , but necessity may seem the occasion thereof . that peace ought to be desired , which removed suspition , which assureth us from peril , which bringeth quiet certain , and acquitteth us of expences ; but when it worketh contrary effects , it may be called a dangerous war , covered with the name of deceitful trust , not unlike a perilous poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsome medicine . the effect of things , and not external show , or seeming , ought to be regarded ; yet it is credible what great grace is gained by courteous speech and affability ; the reason whereof is , as i suppose , that every man believeth he doth merit more than indeed he is worthy , and consequently holdeth himself injured , whensoever he findeth men not to afford him like estimation . men ought in any wise , to refrain to do or say any thing which may offend , for which respect it were great folly , either in presence or absence , to utter displeasing speech , unless necessity inforceth . the matters whereof counsellors are chiesly to consider , are five , the prince's revenue , peace and war , defence , traffick , and what laws are to be made . in giving council divers things are to be observed ; but amongst them are two of most importance : first , it behoveth , that he who is counselled should be wise ; for seeing counsel is nothing else but a certain considerate discourse of things to be done or not done , if he who is to take counsel be not of discretion , then will he refuse all good advice offered , and rather incline to that which his own fancy affecteth , because the want of judgment draweth him to take i leasure in vain things ; and as one incapable of what is good and true , will follow that which is evil and false : so on the other side , if he that giveth counsel be not faithful , then will he a thousand ways disguise and dissemble the truth , and consequently miscarry the mind of him that is counselled ; yea in the end utterly abuse him . the affairs and proceedings of the world , are so variable , and accompanied with so many chances and changes , as impossible it seemeth to judge what is best ; therefore experience informeth , that the conjectures of the most wise , prove vain and uncertain . i therefore mislike the judgment of those men , that will let slip opportunity of present good ( though it be small ) for fear of a future evil , notwithstanding it be greater unless the evil be very near at hand , or certain . for if that do not follow which is feared , then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was desired . whensoever a general opinion is conceived , of the singular vertue and knowledge of any man , although he be indeed ignorant , and far unworthy that account , yet it is hard to remove such a settled conceit : the reason is , that men having at the first given credit to common report , do make thereof so deep an impression , as afterwards , without great difficulty , cannot be removed . the bodies of men , munition and money , may justly be called the sinews of war , yet of them the two first are more necessary , for men and arms have means to find money and meat ; but money and meat cannot so easily find soldiers and swords . one wise general having but a thousand men , is more to be feared and esteemed , than twenty commanders of equal authority ; for they being commonly of divers humors , or judging diversly , do never , or very rarely , what is to be done , and consequently lose much time before any resolution can be taken . a prince of mean force , ought not in any wise to adventure his estate upon one days fight ; for if he be victorious he gaineth nothing but glory ; but if he lose , he is utterly ruined . the most part of men are delighted with histories , for the variety of accidents therein contained ; yet are there few that will imitate what they read , and find done by others ; being perswaded that imitation is not only hard but impossible , as though the heavens and men were changed in their motion , or order and power , which they anciently had . the nature of men is such , as will not endeavor any thing good , unless they be forced thereunto ; for where liberty aboundeth , there confusion and disorder follow . it is therefore supposed , that hunger and poverty make men industrious ; but good laws inforce them to be honest ; for if men were of themselves good , then laws were needless . there are two kinds of adulation : the first proceedeth from a subtle malice : the second cometh by an ordinary use of conversation ; the one tendeth to profit and deceiving ; the other hath no farther design , than a respect or fear to offend ; whereunto the most honest are in some sort bound . whoso bindeth himself to flattery , doth thereby bewray his intent , either to gain , or not to lose that he hath . for the person slattered , is always superior to him that doth flatter , or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead . it may therefore be inferred , that only men of base and miserable condition , and such as cannot help or hurt , be free from flatterers . and contrariwise , magnanimous and fortunate folk , proud men , and such as content themselves with their present estate , are seldom found to be flatterers . every wise prince doth presuppose , that times of trouble may come , and that all such occasions he shall be forced to use the service of men diversly qualified . his study therefore is , in the mean time so to entertain them , as when those storms arise , he may rest assured to command them ; for whosoever perswades himself , by present benefits , to gain the good will of men , when perils are at hand , shall be deceived . in ancient times princes and governors were wont , when peace and security were most like to continue , to find or feign occasions to draw their subjects to fear , to the end that doubt might move them to be more careful of their own well-doing ; for well they knew it a general defect in men , to be reachless , and never willing to use industry ; unless by necessity they were constrained . all histories do shew , and wise politicians do hold it necessary , that for the well governing of every common-weal , it behoveth to presuppose that all men are evil , and will declare themselves so to be , when occasion is offered ; for albeit some inconvenience doth lye hid for a time , it proceedeth from a covert occasion , which for want of experience , was not found , until time the mother of truth discover it . neutrality is always a thing dangerous and disallowable , because it offendeth all parties : he that is strong looketh to be assisted in his greatness ; and he that is weak , not being defended , holdeth himself offended ; the one is not assured from foes , and the other holdeth no friends . albeit neutrality procure present quiet and security , during the troubles of others ; yet after the same falleth out a disadvantage , because it entertaineth a certain falseness , and so in short space will be perceived ; not unlike those men that borrow upon usury ; for albeit they enjoy a certain time , without trouble or charge , yet the same being 〈◊〉 and the day of payment come , they then feel the great danger which their short pleasure hath purchased . whoso examineth all humane actions shall find , that in eschewing one inconvenience , we presently incur another . as for example , if we endeavor to make our dominions mighty , it behoveth to have the same fully replenished with people , and well armed , and so being , they are not easily governed . on the other side , if our country be not well peopled , or disarmed , then it is easily holden in obedience ; yet therewith so weak , that it can neither increase the bounds thereof , nor defend it self . it is therefore necessary , in all our deliberations , to consider what inconvenience is least , and choose that as the best ; for to find all perfect , void and secure of suspect or imperfection , is impossible . a prince being instantly required to take part with other princes , the one being in arms against the other , is he deny both , incurreth suspicion of both , and may be thought to have secret intelligences with one or both of them ; so as either of them shall account him an enemy , and consequently he that proves victorious will be revenged ; and the other holding him suspected , will not acknowledge his friendship . it is the use of men to presume much upon their own merit , and seeing the success of some others to be such , as without cause or desert , are aspired to dignity thereby encouraged , they promised to themselves the like : nevertheless being entred into the course of their design , and finding many crosses and impeachments they do not a little repent their overweening and presumption , but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised enterprize ; neither can i think , that the vertue or sufficiency of any man without the favor of the heavens , can advance him ; for as the poet saith , nec velle juvat , potiusve nocet , si fat a repugnant . whoso serveth a prince far from his presence , shall with great difficulty content him . for if he commit any error , it shall be aggravated : besides that , the instructions sent unto him cannot be particularly conceived , because the state of wordly things doth daily alter . also to serve aloof , is a thing full of danger and far from reward ; which inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his prince's person . let no man that cometh to serve in court , assure himself by his wisdom to be advanced or eschew all encounters . neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to fortune , but be perswaded that this worldly life is like to a voiage by sea ; wherein albeit art with the favor of the wind may do much , yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the haven appointed ; for daily experience doth shew , that some strange ships in the calmest weather , are drowned or impeached by the way , when others much weaker and disarmed pass securely . among men worthy of commendations , those have merited best that first planted true religion : next they that framed kingdoms and commonwealths ; the third place is due to such as have augmented or enlarged their dominions ; lastly , learned men deserve fame and memory : and as every of these are worthy of fame and honor ; so ought they to be accompted infamous that introduce atheism , or the subversion of kingdoms , or are become enemies to learning and virtue . whosoever taketh in hand to govern a multitude either by way of liberty , or principality , and cannot assure himself of those persons that are enimies to that enterprise , doth frame a state of short perseverance : yet true it is that such princes be infortunate , as for their own security are inforced to hold a course extraordinary , and have the multitude their enemy ; for he that hath few foes may with small dishonor be assured ; but he that is generally hated can by no means live assured ; and the more cruelty he useth , the weaker his principality proveth . in commending another man , great moderation is to be used ; for as contumely offendeth him against whom , it is used ; so great praise , besides that it is uttered with danger to his judgment that speaketh it , the same doth oft-tentimes offend him that heareth it . for self-love which commonly possesseth men , causes the good or evil we hear , to be measured with our own . and consequently every man that is touched with like deserts and defects , doth grow offended that his commendation is not set forth , and feareth lest his imperfection should be discovered . it is often , or rather ever seen , that the force of leagues not used in their first heat , becomes cold ; because suspition soon entereth , which in short space will destroy whatsoever was concluded , and may not without long time be rejoined . the power of ambition which possesseth the minds of men , is such , as rarely or never suffereth them to rest : the reason thereof is , that nature hath framed in them a certain disposition to desire all things , but not to obtain them ; so as our desires being greater than our power , therefore following discontenr and evil satisfaction . hereof also proceedeth the variation of fortune ; for some men desiring to get , and others fearing to lose that they had gotten , do occasion one man to injure another , and consequently publick wars do follow ; by means whereof , one country is ruined , and another inlarged . princes of great power , and chiesly those that are inhabitants of the north , having many children , were wont to be much inclined to the wars , as well to win unto themselves honor , as also to get possessions for their sons ; which manner of proceedings did oft-tentimes remove such disturbance as the plurality of brethren bringeth . these and other reasons induced princes to attempt war against those kingdoms , which in cheir opinion seemed easily conquered , or whereunto they can pretend little ; for by colour thereof they may the rather justifie their proceedings . when a prince deferreth to answer an ambassador , it proceedeth from some of these respects ; either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat whereof he doubteth , or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded , or that he esteemeth not the prince that doth demand , or that he disdaineth the person by whom the demand is made , or else that he intendeth to hear from his own ministers to be better resolved : wherefore a discreet negotiator ought in such cases to consider which of these reasons move the prince where he is employed , to entertain him with delays , and make his dispatch accordingly . the sufficiency of good counsellors consistetd in fonr things . first , they ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their affairs , directing all doings to publick commodity . secondly , to be just in their proceedings , giving to every one that which to him appertaineth . thirdly , to be stout , and void both of partial respects and fear . and lastly , to be temperate and moderate in their desires . whoso desireth to govern well and securely , it behoveth him to have a vigilant eye to the proceedings of great princes , and to consider seriously of their designs : for it is matter of small difficulty to live in peace with him who desireth our amity , and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us . the intelligences that princes study to attain , are procured by divers means : some are brought by report , some vented by conversation and sounding , some by means of espials ; but the most sure and credibe occurrents , are those which come from ambassadors , chiesly those that either for the greatness of their prince , or their own virtue , be of most reputation . for those men conversing daily with great personages , and pondering diligently their manners , words , wisdom , and the order of each man's troceedings , yea , of the prince himself , may with commodity attain unto matters of great importance sooner than they that are writers of rumors , or that take upon them to conjecture of things to come . whensoever a people is induced to commit so great an error , as to give reputation to one only man , to the end he should oppress all those great men whom they hate , they thereby give him opportunity to become their prince ; and so being assisted with their favor and aid , he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the nobility ; and they being extirpated , he will also endeavor to tyrannize over the people , by whose help he aspired . so many as are not consenting to the tyranny , rest enemies to the person of the tyrant , who can by no means gain the love of all . for impossible it is , that the riches of any tyrant should be so great , and the honors he can give so many as may satisfie all . hereof it cometh , that those tyrants that are favored of the people , and disfavored of the nobles , are most secure ; because their tyranny is supported with a greater strength ( having the multitude their friends ) then is the tyrant whom the humor of the nobles only hath advanced . a dangerous thing it is in all commonwealths by continual punishing , to hold the minds of subjects in suspition ; for men ever fearing their ruine , will ( without respect ) determine to save them selves , and as men desperate , attempt innovation . all capital executions ought therefore to be executed suddenly , and as it were at one instant , so to assure the minds of men from furher molestations . the intent of every wise prince that maketh war , either by election or ambition , is to gain and hold what is gotten : also to use the matter so as thereby he may inrich himself , and not impoverish his own people or country . he that inlargeth his dominions , doth not always increase his power ; but he that increaseth in force as well as in dominion , shall thereby grow great ; otherwise he gained no more than is shortly to be lost , and consequently he ruineth himself : for who spends more in the war , than he gains by victory , loseth both labor and cost . every prince and commonwealth must above all things take heed , that no necessity how great soever , do perswade him to bring into his dominion any auxiliary soldiers ; because the hardest conditions the enemy can offer , are more easie than is such a resolution . a prince sheweth his ruine at hand , whensoever he beginneth to break the , laws and customs , which are 〈◊〉 have been long time obeyed by the to people of his dominion . that prince which careth to keep himself secure from conspiracy , ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great favors , than them whom he hath much injured : for these want opportunities , the other do not ; and both their desires are as one ; because the appetite of commanding , is always as much or more than the desire of revenge . whensoever a prince discovers a conspiracy , he must well consider the quality thereof , measuring the force of the conspirators with his own ; and finding them many and mighty , the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled , until the princes power be prepared to oppose them ; otherwise he hazardeth his own security . it hath been by long experience found better to send one general to an army , though he be of mean sufficiency , than to give the same authority to two or more excellent personages with equal commission . he that coveteth to be over-much loved , oft-tentimes becomes contemptible ; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared , is ever hated : and to hold the mean between them , cannot be exactly done , because nature will not so permit . whoso aspireth to any dignity , must resolve himself to endure the envy of men , and never to be moved for any offence conceived against him , though they that be offended , be his dear friends : neither shall he for the first affront or encounter , relinquish his hope ; for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of fortune , shall after with facility arrive where he designed . in giving council to a prince or commonwealth , and therefore desiring to eschew danger and offence , no other mean is to be taken than that the counsellor shall without passion or perswasion pronounce his opinion , and never to affirm any thing as a resolution , but with modesty to defend that he speaketh ; so as the prince which follows his advice , may seem to do it voluntarily , and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the counsel . a discreet captain being in the field against the enemy , of whose virtue he hath had no proof , ought first by light skirmishes to feel of what virtue he is ; and not to enterprise any general adventnre , to the end that terror or fame should not daunt nor discourage his own soldiers . albeit fraud be in all actions detested , yet is the same in martial enter prises commendible and glorious : for that captain who compasseth his designs by wit or stratagem , is no less commended than he that vanquisheth the enemy by violence and force . in times of extremity , when resolution must be taken for the having or utter loss of the state , then no regard is to be had of justice or injustice , mercy or cruelty , honor or ignominy , but rather setting aside all respects , that course is to be followed which defended the lives and liberties of men. whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter , let him think of that is past ; for the world hath ever been in a circular revolution : whatsoever is now , was heretofore , and things past or present are no other than such as shall be again : redit orbis in orbem . a prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another , must if it be possible urge a sudden answer , and lay before him that is moved , a necessity to resolve presently , giving him to understand that denial or delays may breed a perilous and sudden indignation . there is nothing more difficult , doubtful and dangerous than to attempt innovation : for he that taketh in hand an enterprize of such quality , maketh all those his enemies which lived well under the old order , and findeth them cold defenders that affect his novelties , which coldness proceedeth chiefly of incredulity ; for men are not easily induced to believe a new thing till experience hath proved it to be good . there is no art nor knowledge so seemly and necessary for a prince as the art military with theordinances and discipline thereof : for that is the only skill required in him that commandeth , and such a virtue as doth not only maintain them that are born princes , but often advanceth private men to that dignity . the deep impressions which old injuries make in the minds of great men cannot with new benefits be razed out ; it is also to be remembred that injuries be done all together : for they offend the less , and will be forgotten the sooner ; but benefits should by little and little be bestowed , so shall the memory of them long continue . a small pleasure or displeasure presently done , doth move more than a great good turn bestowed in times past ; for the taste of things present doth make a deeper impression in the minds of men , than doth the memory of things past , or expectation of things to come . it is a matter of small difficulty to sound the discontentment of other men. for every one doth willingly tell the well and ill deserving of friends , and likewise how much or how little foes can do , if we have patience to hear , which patience is the beginning of all good speed ; but he that delighteth to speak much , and hear little , shall ever inform others more than himself can learn. among other dangers which a prince incurreth by being disarmed , the greatest is , that thereby he becometh contemptible ; for no comparison there is between men armed and them that are disarmed : and no reason there is that he that is armed should yield obedience to him that is disarmed , neither is it like that a prince disarmed can be secure from his own subjects armed . a prince ignorant of martial knowledge , among other misfortunes cannot be esteemed or trusted of his own soldiers ; it behoveth him therefore as well in time of peace as war to exercise arms , which may be done by two means ; the one by action of body , the other by contemplation of mind . the body may be exercised in hunting , hawking , and such like pastimes ; thereby to be made apt to endure travel : his mind likewise may be informed by reading of histories , and the consideration of actions performed by excellent captains , observing the occasion of their victories or losses , to the end he may imitate the one , and eschew the other . he that doth not as other men do , but endeavoureth that which ought to be done , shall thereby rather incur peril than preservation ; for whoso laboureth to be sincerely perfect and good , shall necessarily perish , living among men that are generally evil. a prince that useth liberality to his prejudice , ought not to regard the infamy of miserable , because his parsimony will in time enable him to be liberal , and so may declare himself to be , having by parsimony increased his power , and therefore without imposing upon the people , may defend himself from all such as will make war ; so shall he use liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing , who are infinite ; and use miserliness to those only to whom he giveth , who are but few . there is nothing that consumeth it self like to librality ; for if it be long used , it taketh away the means to continue it , and consequently doth make men poor and basely minded : or else to eschew poverty , they shall be forced to extortion and become odious . it is better to incur the name of covetous ( which is a scandal without hate ) then with desire to be accounted liberal , deserve the infamy of opperession ( an ignominy accompanied with hatred . ) a prince ought to be slow in believing , and advised in proceeding ; he should also beware not to make himself over much feared , but in all his actions shew great wisdom tempered with curtesie ; so shall not over much considence induce him to be careless , nor over much diffidence render him intolerable . whoso observeth , shall see that man offended , less respect him whom they love , than him whom they fear . for love is maintained by a certain reciproque obligation , which because men are evil , useth to be by every occasion of profit broken . but fear is continued by a certain dread of punishment which never faileth . a prince that holdeth in the field an army wherein are great numbers of soldiers , ought not to care though he be accompted cruel : for without such an opinion conceived , he cannot keep his forces united , nor apt to attempt any enterprize . men for the most , do use rather to judge by their eyes , than by their hands , for every one may see , but few can certainly know . every one seeth what thou seemest to be , but few can understand what thou art indeed ; and these few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of many which have the majesty of estate to defend them . also in the actions of all men , and chiefly princes , from whom is no appellation , the end is ever observed . machiavel . a prince being forced to use the condition of beasts , must among them make choice of the fox and the lyon ; for the lyon cannot take heed of snares , and the fox is easily overcome by the wolves : it behoveth him therefore to be a fox to discover the snares , and a lyon to terrifie the wolves . a prince newly advanced cannot observe those rules , which are the cause that men be accounted good ; be being many times constrained for defence of his state to proceed contrary to promise , contrary to charity , and all vertue ; and consequently it behoveth him to have a mind apt to alteration , as the wind and variation of fortune shall direct ; yet ought he not to abandon the good , if so he can , but be ready to use what is evil , if so he shall be inforced . every prince ought to have two ears , the one intrinsick , in respect of subjects ; the other extrinsick , in respect of forreign potentates , from whom he may be defended with good arms , and good friends : also matters intrinsick will ever stand well , so long as all things abroad rest firm . a prince that is favoured of the multitude , need not to doubt conspiracy ; but contrary wise , where the people is generally discontented and hareth the prince , then may he reasonably doubt every thing , and every person ; for no man is so poor , that wanteth a weapon wherewith to offend . when any occasion is presented to have that thou desirest , fail not to lay hold thereof ; for these worldly things do vary , and that so suddenly , as hard it is to assure our selves of any thing , unless the same be already in hand : on the other side , if any trouble threaten thee , defer it so long as thou mayest ; for time may occasion some accident to remove all dangers . the prince that doubteth the fidelity of his subjects , must of force build fortresses ; but he that feareth foreign force more than his own people , were better to leave them unbuilt . howsoever it be , that prince that desireth generally to be respected and esteemed , must perform some notable enterprise , and give testimony of great vertue and valour . a prince shall do well at all times to be counselled so as no man do presume to give counsel but when the prince doth ask it . it is also to be noted , that he who is not of himself wise , cannot be well counselled of others , unless happily he yield to some wise men the government of his whole affairs . for good counsels from whomsoever they proceed , shall be thought to come from the prince , and not the wisdom of the prince to proceed from the counsel of others . he that taketh delight to be employed in publick affairs , must by all means endeavour to continue in such services : for oft one business dependeth on another , whereunto the florentine proverb may be applied , di cosa , nasae cosa , & it tempole governa . some men have not only desired , but also compassed honour and profit ; yet being in possession of both , were not therewith so satisfied , as they hoped to be ; which being believed , would happily extinguish the immeasurable ambition wherewith many men are possessed . by experience i have learned , that great folly it is to account that ours which we have not , or spend presently in hope of suture gain . therefore merchants , during the adventure of their goods , do not increase domestical expences , but fearing the worst assure what is in hand . for such men as have gained unto themselves reputation and are accounted vertuous , to maintain that conceit , and 〈◊〉 envy , there is nothing better than a life retired from daily conversation , and chiefly of the multitude . fugiat sapiens commercia 〈◊〉 the end that moveth a prince to make war , is to enrich himself , and impoverish the euemy : neither is victory desired for other purpose than thereby to become the more mighty , and make the enemy weak : consequently wheresoever thy victory doth impoverish thee , or thy gain therein doth weaken thee , it followeth that either thou pass or undergo that 〈◊〉 whereunto the intention of war was directed . and that prince is by victory 〈◊〉 that can 〈◊〉 the enemies power , and become master of his goods and possessions . and that prince is by victory impoverished when the enemy , notwithstanding he be victored , can still maintain himself , and the spolis and possessions are not taken to the use of the prince victorious , but imparted unto his soldiers . for then may he be thought in his own losing infortunate , and in victory unhappy ; for if he be vanquished , then must he endure the osfence by foes : and being victorious shall be 〈◊〉 to abide the wrong offered by friends ; which as they be less reasonable , so are they also less supportable , because he is still by impositions forced to burthen the subjects , whereof may be inferred . that the prince , having in him any generosity , cannot justly rejoyce at that victory which causeth the subject to lament . who so desireth to obtain any thing , hopeth to compass his desire , either by intreaty , presents , or threatning ; for so shall he , to whom the request is made , be moved either with compassion , profit , or fear : nevertheless , with covetous and cruel men , and such as are in their opinion mighty , none of these can prevail . and consequently in vain do they labour , that go about by suit to stir them to pity , by gifts to gain them , or by threats to fear them . who so is persuaded that any common-weal can continue disunited , doth greatly deceive himself : true it is , that some divisions do maintain the estate , but other do indamage the same . they which do harm , are such as with sects and partakings be accompanied ; they which help without sects and partakings , be maintained . a wise governour therefore , albeit he cannot so exactly foresee but some enemies will arise in the state , yet may he take order that no factions may thereby grow . it is therefore to be noted , that the citizens of every estate , may aspire to reputation , either by private or publick means . reputation by publick means , is gained chiefly in the war , either by obtaining victory in some battle , or surprising of some city ; or else by performing some ambassage deligently , prosperously : but private reputation is gotten by doing favour to this or that man , and protecting them from magistrates , giving them mony , advancing them unworthily to honour and office ; and by great feasts , entertaining the multitude ; of which manner of proceeding , sects , factions and partakings do grow : and as reputation thus gained is dangerous , so the other without faction is profitable ; because the same is founded on common welfare , and no private profit : and albeit among citizens of this sort , will oft arise great hate , yet wanting followers for their particular profit , the state shall not be indangered , but rather strengthned ; for every man endeavouring to deserve well , will hold himself within the bounds of civil life , and by vertuous merits labout to be advanced . to persuade or dissuade particular persons , is a matter of no difficulty : for if words suffice not , yet authority will prevail : but hard and perilous it is to remove a false opinion conceived by a whole multitude , for therein fair speech and no compulsion must be used . the best means which wise captains can use to make their soldiers resolute , is to take from them all hope ; which resolution may also be increased with the love of our country and confidence in the captain : for confidence groweth by the valour of men , and discipline in former victories , and trust reposed in the leader . the love of our country is natural , but the affection we bear to the captain , proceedeth rather from his vertue , than the benefits he hath bestowed . necessity also may do much , and chiefly that where no choice is left , but either overcome by arms or dye in desperation . there is nothing of so great force to hold an army united , as the reputation os the captain , which proceedeth only from his vertue ; for neither dignity nor authority without valour can work that effect . the first care that a captain must have , is to hold his soldiers well punished and paid ; for where payment faileth , punishment ought not to be inflicted : and consequently no reason it is to punish him for robbery , whom want of pay enforceth to shift ; but where the soldier is paid , and not punished ( offending ) then will he , without respect , become insolent towards his captain ; whereof ensue mutinies , discord , and utter ruin. it is a custom , very honourable , not to promise more than thou wilt assuredly perform : yet true it is , that whosoever is denied ( though justly ) doth rest ill-contented ; for men indeed are . not governed by reason : otherwise it is for him that promiseth ; and so good promises shall stand in stead of performance : besides that , he may find excuse enough , because the most part of men are so simple , that fair words alone have power to abuse them , chiefly when they proceed from a person of reputation and authority . the best way , therefore , is not to promise precisely , but entertain the suitors with answers . general , and full of good hope : yet not such as shall directly and absolutely bind . the greatest and most material displeasures that use to arise between the nobility and people , are caused by the diversity of humours , the one labouring to command , the other endeavouring not to obey ; so as all troubles and disorders in every common-weal , do thereof receive nutriment . the city which is maintained rather by factions than laws , so soon as one faction is become strong , and without opposition , the same of necessity must be divided in it self : for those particular causes which were at the first taken , are not of force enough to maintain it . it is the nature of men not to endure any discommodity , unless necessity do thereunto enforce them : which may apparently be perceived by their habitations ; for as the fear of war draweth them to places of strength ( for their defence ) so that peril being past , they do for the most part remove themselves to inhabit countries of more commodity and profit . it may seem strange , and no even measure ( yet approved by experience ) that where many offend , few are punished . also petty errors are severely corrected , but great and grievous crimes be rewarded . in like manner , where many receive wrong , few seek revenge . for injurics universal , are with more patience than particular offences endured . all , or the greatest part of men that have aspired to riches or power , have attained thereunto either by force or fraud : and without they have by craft or cruelty gained , to cover the foulness of their fact , they call purchase as a name more honest . howsoever he , that for want of will or wit useth not those means , must rest in servitude and poverty . the reason thereof is , that as nature hath laid before men the chief of all fortunes , so she disposes them rather to rapine than honest industry , and more subject to bad than good endeavours : hereof it cometh , that one man eateth another , and he that is weakest must always go to the worst . where necessity forceth , boldness is reputed wisdom , and in great enterprises peril is not to be made accompt of . for those attempts that begin with danger , always end with honour , or reward ; also from one peril there is no way to escape , but by entring into another . a wise man ought not to desire to inhabit that country where men have more authority than laws : for indeed that country deserves to be desired where every one may securely enjoy his own ; not that , where with facility it may be taken away ; and that friends for fear to lose their own , are inforced to forsake them . some magistrates either by over great zeal or ignorance take a course of rigour , which being for the present favoured , they are ever the more imployed , as men meet to extirpate inconveniences . but thereby the subjects are often drawn into desperation , and consequently have recourse unto arms , as their uttermost refuge . in this case a wise prince for appeasing the people is sorc'd to disallow his ministers , and sometimes also to inflict publick punishment . a prince naturally suspicious , and having about him persons inclined to envy , is easily induced to mistrust those men that have served him with most sufficiency : which danger they cannot eschew , because they who are worthiest commendation are oftentimes envied by such persons as have access unto the prince . who so cannot endure both envy and hate , must refrain to enterprise great matters : for great honours being desired of many , it behoveth him that aspireth unto them , to be for his dignity envied , and for his authority hated ; which authority , albeit the same be well used , yet they who hate or envy ( persuading themselves it might be better handled ) endeavour to oppress that power , as fearing it will be worse . among other things which worketh the inconveniences of common weals , ambition and desperation are chief ; of both , desperation is worst : for ambition may attend occasion , desperation will not , as that cannot endure delays . historians desiring to write the actions of men , onght to set down the simple truth , and not say any thing for love or hatred : also to chuse such an opportunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will , and write what they think , which is a rare happiness of the time. in commending or disallowing the actions of men , it is a course very requisite to consider the beginning , the proceeding , and end : so shall we see the reasons and causes of things , and not their bare events only ; which for the most part are governed by fortune . it is a matter of much necessity , that every man , and chiefly a prince should in his first actions , give some testimony of vertue ; for falling at first into obloquie , do he well or ill , all isill-taken . the custom of the common people is to judge rather by their eyes than by their ears : which is the cause they allow more of external shew than inward vertue : and true it is , where excellency of mind , and beauty of body concur , the commendation due to such a person is far the greater . gratior est pulchro veniens e corpore virtus . a prince or great personage that constantly endureth adversity , deserveth great praise : yet greater commendation is due to him that beareth himself modestly in his happiness . for miseries are ost born with patience , but felicity corrupteth . to be descended of princes , or great personages , is a matter of meer fortune , and so to be esteemed : but adoption proceedeth from the judgment of men , therefore seemeth incorrupt , and seldom abused . it hath been long observed , and is a rule which rarely faileth , that he shall be ever suspected of the prince in possession , whom men account worthy to be a prince in reversion . it hath been a use very ancient to give credit to astrologers , and other such persons , who by their star-learning or blind divination , take upon them to tell of things to come . the reason thereof is , that the most part of men believe that soonest which they least understand ; and if they see the event of a prediction , though it happeneth by meer chance to fall out according to that was premised , thereupon they settle so firm an impression , as albeit many other fail , yet the good conceipt of their cunning cannot be removed . liberality is a vertue which gaineth love , but much are they deceived whom riot in lieu thereof abuseth . to cast away and consume is soon learned , but to give in good order few have the skill . in time of sudden mutiny , conspiracy , and offence of people , the wisest resolution is not to oppose force to prevent fury , but rather give space for the bad to amend , and the good to consent : for treasons prevail on the sudden , but good council gathers forces by leisure . mature deliberation ought ever to be used ; but when arms are to determine , speedy execution is the best : because no delay in that euterprise is sit which cannot be commended before it be ended . who so is pleased to observe the proceedings of men in authority , shall observe that some of them hold a plain course without respect ; others projecting for time to come , do forecast how to hold their present good fortune or at least to escape danger : for they mistrusting present prosperity and fearing a change , prepare beforehand some private friends to oppose against publick hatred : whereof may be inferred , that no care is taken of innocency , but every one studieth how to pass without punishment . in captains and all military commanders , three things are required , vertue , discipline , and authority ; but in private soldiers obedience and courage only sufficeth ; for by due obeying , and no curious scanning the leaders directions are maintained ; and the army in danger is alwaies most valiant , which before the danger is most quiet . let the soldier therefore be well armed and valiantly minded . to advise and direct must be the captains care . it is a matter of no great moment , yet always worthy the noting , that any exterior behaviour , or garment presenting pride or greatness , chiefly in persons lately advanced , though no man be thereby interessed or injured , doth move in others a certain offence : for the nature of man is such , as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye , and wisheth a moderation of fortune no where so much as in those we have known in equal degree with our selves . in all enterprises of war ( if present necessity doth not otherwise require ) leisure and deliberation ought to be used ; for often it sufficeth in lieu of wisdom , to take the advantage of other mens solly . all men that are to consider of great actions , ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken be profitable for the commonweal , honourable to themselves , and easie to be effected ; or at least not greatly difficult . also he that persuadeth , is to be examined whether besides bare words and counsel , he will 〈◊〉 his own peril ; and if fortune favour the attempt , to whom the principal glory shall redound . the perils which accompany private enterprises , are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to principality . for in private attempts a man may pause or proceed as he will : but to him that aspires to empire there remains no middle course , but either by victory to triumph as a prince ; or being vanquished to endure death as a traytor . let no man in his prosperity , give much credit to common applause or service , assured by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience ; for the base people are learned in no lesson , only without difference of truth or falshood to slatter men in authority , and with shouts and words of great rejoycing make shew of great affection . as overmuch haste is dangerous , so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvantagious ; for albeit consultation ought to forego action , yet to dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side , or take a middle course ( which in cases of doubt and danger is worst ) was ever accompted great diseretion . there is no course more comely , nor any resolution so well beseeming a wise man , having made prcos of his own vertue ( and finding in age no fortune due to such effect ) as to retire himself from the court and company ; for so shall he shun the inconveniences of contempt and the discommodity of travel ( jucunda senectuti otia ) yet true it is , that whoso hath lived a prince or governed as a publick person , cannot expect security in a private estate . whensoever danger draweth near , and terror is at hand , all men look about , but none willingly adventure : for in such cases every man will give council , but few will take part of the peril . in common-wealths where sects or partialities be , the leader of any side is able to kindle civil war ; yet is he unable to moderate the victory : for to stir up dissentions and troubles , the worst man most commonly bears the stroke ; but peace and quietness are not established but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue . it may seem strange and contrary both to courtesie and christian profession , that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them , than of benefits received by them . the reason thereof is , that thankfulness is accompted a burden , but revenge is sweet , and reckoned a great gain . of reconciled foes , and such as know that our harms were caused by their means , we oft-times expect favour , as persuaded that new friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure : but the matter doth seldom so fall out ; for the quality of man's nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt , and love them whom he hath made beholding . quos laeserunt oderunt . tac. to common persons and such as are ignorant in matters of state , every taxation and imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous ; yet the wiser sort know , that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm people in peace , and peace cannot be maintained without arms , nor arms without pay , nor pay without impositions . as fortunate folk are envied , so are the poor contemned ; which rule reacheth also to princes : the one lives in plenty with war , the other in poverty with peace . for 〈◊〉 is it seen , that those people are assaulted where nothing is to be gained , and whose base beings afford no other spoils than blood and beggery . wisemen have observed that in matter of state , and the managing thereof , three things are especially to be looked unto : the. first is , occasion ; the second , the intentions of other men ; the third , our own affection . for there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as occasion , nothing so difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth ; nor any thing more 〈◊〉 than our own immoderate 〈◊〉 it hath been ever a course observed by wise princes , but much more by arislocracies and popular states , against force and fury of the multitude , to desend themselves with silver and gold. how much more it importeth all princes to lead a vertuous life , and give daily example of piety and justice , appears apparently in the proceedings of the roman bishops ; who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first , became greatly honoured ; but afterwards they became contemptible : for the reverence which men did bear to the sanctity of their lives failing , it was impossible of so contrary manners and examples to look for like effects . the success of the war chiefly dependeth on the reputation of the prince , which declining , the vertue also of the soldiers faileth : likewise the sidelity of the people decayeth , and their mony to maintain the war , ceaseth ; contrarywise , the courage of the enemy is increased , they that stood doubtful become resolved , and every difficulty augmenteth . the authority which princes give , is chiefly in respect of wisdom and valour : yet true it is , that for the most part they account them the wisest men that can best accommodate themselves to their humour . the greatest distress and difficulty which can come to any army , doth proceed of these causes : want of mony , scarcity of victuals , hatred of people , discord of captains , disobedience of soldiers , and their flying to the enemy , either of necessity or free-will . a prince or great magistrate having long maintained the reputation of wisdom and vertue , must take heed that no rash or dangerous resolution do taint the honourable fame of his former life : for to be transported with anger against his own profit , is lightness ; and to esteem small dangers more than great , is want of judgment . a prince or person of great estate , must be wary not to inure the conceit of double dealing : for little sincerity and trust is looked in his actions , of whom there is an opinion of crast and falshood conceived . experience hath always proved , that whatsoever the most part of men desire , rarely cometh to pass : the reason hereof is , that the effects of human actions commonly depend on the will of a few ; and their intentions ever differing from the greater number , the end and success cannot be other than as pleaseth the few that are to direct them . there is nothing more dangerous than to enterprise a war , or other actions of importance upon popular persuasion ; for such expectations are vain , and such designs fallible : also the fury of the multitude is great , when danger is little or far off ; but perils growing great and near , their courage quaileth , as they whose passions have no rule or measure . it is strange to see how apt men are to doubt displeasure threatned by enemies , chiefly when they draw near ; for the people do naturally over-much fear dangers at hand , and esteem less than is fit of things present : also to make small account of those that are far from them , because divers remedies may be hoped as well by time , as other accidents . the offensive words or answers of indignation , proceeding from great princes , ought never to admit displeasure into the minds of them against whom they are spoken : for having by speech uttered a great part of choler , the edge of their deeds becomes the calmer , and more easily appeased : such is the condition of noble and generous spirits . to judge right of other mens merit , seems of great difficulty ; for time and tryal is thereto required : also it is not easie to answer the expectation of men , but ost-times inconsiderate , and not measured in due proportion . it is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of affairs and vacations : for as it sitteth well a prince or person of dignity in times of audience and judgment , to be grave , heedsul , and austere : so those offices performed , all shew of authority and sad looks ought to be set apart ; for by that means , neither courteous behaviour shall detract from the reverence due to his place , nor severity diminish the love which to his behaviour appertaineth . magistrates must look into all things , but not exact all things to rigor . light faults may be pardoned , but great offences severely 〈◊〉 yet not always proceeding to punishing , but ost contented with repentance . to be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a magistrate , shewing himself sowre to the bad , and sweet to the good ; framing both countenance and condition according to the merit of men , and be persuaded that it is more honest to offend , than to hate . soldiers must be encouraged in all fortunes to stand resolved , and not to be daunted with any passed misadvantage ; ever attending a time and opportunity of revenge ; which commonly cometh to pass where mens minds are united : for common danger must be repelled with union and concord . among other reasons wherewith soldiers are encouraged , necessity and distress doth oft inforce them : for as men of vertue perform the actions of arms for honour , so the coward must do them for his security . all enterprises attempted by arms , are honourable ; but those that are done in countries remote , are more praiseable : for the less they be in knowledge , the greater is the glory to atchieve them . to be truly and faithfully loved , is a thing greatly to be desired ; for terror and fear are weak works of affection : for they being taken away , he that ceaseth to fear , will soon begin to hate ; and as they that by force are kept under , obey with ill will ; so they that govern without line justly , rule against right . some men either deserving to be accounted of excellent wisdom , or singular in that skill whereof they make profession , do ordinarily love the proceedings of others ; taking that advantage of their ill success : yet sure it is , that disaster and unhappy event of some actions , proceed not of disorder , for human imperfection , but from a certain fatal fury , which neither counsel nor constancy of men can withstand . it is a matter of much difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince to maintain the law , civil or military , without severity : for where men hope to be easily pardoned , there are they apt to offend . contrarily , where mens actions are precisely sitted , there do they live in over-great aw , and hatred doth always accompany such severity . the best course therefore is to punish offences severely , and reward vertuous merits liberally ; so shall fear be converted to reverend respect , and none have cause to complain : for as it lies in each man's power to shun offending , so is it in their power also to deserve well , and merit reward . whosoever , aster mature deliberation , hath resolved what course to hold in the action he hath in hand , must not after repent , or fear any difficulty : for such thoughts would break the vigour of the mind , and impeach the proceedings of that which was resolved . and albeit some differences do happily arise , yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater impediments . young men for the warmness of their blood , and for not having before-time been deceived by fortune , more willingly enterprise actions rather honourable than severe . but old men as well for that their heat is cooled , as also for having attempted many things in vain , make choice of enterprises severe , rather than those that are followed with fame and glory . the greatness of one prince is nothing else but the ruin and distress of another : likewise his strength is the weakness and oppression of others . some conquests are of such quality , as albeit a victorious captain merit triumphal honour ; yet a modest resusal becomes his greater glory . the dignity of magistrates is not assured without arms ; for when obedience faileth , no other means is left to continue a people united . as willing obedience in subjects is the prince's strength , so is the same their own security : for as by the princes authority the people are governed , so by their consent he is maintained . three things men covet with immoderate desire , lands , riches , and honours ; but as seldom they compass their full content , so are they for the most part to endure a destiny far other than they wished . strange it is , yet by experience proved true , that in time of danger , fortune ( or rather destiny ) so much amazeth the judgment of wise men , as seldom they conceive what resolution is best to be taken . no great free-city can long continue quiet , unless the same be used to foreign assaults : for wanting foes without , some inward enmity will arise , not unlike to strange bodies of men , which being secure from external injury , are nevertheless by their own poise oppressed . as every pilot of ordinary skill knoweth in calm and quiet seas to direct the course of his ship ; so every governor of capacity doth understand how the affairs of state are in peaceable times to be handled : but when tempests are , and subjects bent to sedition ; the one requires an excellent sailer , the other the aid of some excellent wisdom . it oft happens , that publick duty is opposite to private friendship ; so as we are either forced to omit the offices due to our country , or draw our dearest friends into danger : in which case we are to prefer publick respect , before particular obligation . the nature of base people is such , as either they obey slavishly , or command insolently : for liberty being the mark whereat they aim , is by them of that quality , neither moderately desired nor discreetly continued ; and always there are some seditious leaders to be found , who of disorder are inclined to kindle the ire and offence of ignorant people . dux rebus motis , facile invenitur . salust . experience hath oft proved , that men in best fortune , and such as esteem themselves most secure , even then fall soonest into disadventure , because those dangers unfeared be as it were contemned , and not regarded . to enter needless dangers , was ever accounted madness ; yet in times of extream peril and apparent distress , bold and hazardous attempts are greatest security . the divers adventures which happen to men , may well inform , that much better it is , chiefly in arms , to be governed by reason than by fortune . a certain peace is ever accounted better security than victory hoped or expected melior tutiorque certa pax quam sperata victoria . liv. if to our prosperity god were pleased to add the grace of 〈◊〉 we should thereby judge not only of what is past , but also of all that can succeed hereafter . rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings , unless first we have felt the deceits of fortune . discord or dissention in any state or city , offers opportunity to such men as are ambitious to work their will : for the humor of sects and partialities is such , as the weaker faction doth ever chuse 〈◊〉 to call for aid of strangers , than yield to the dominion of an adverse party . ancient customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away . fortune which altereth all things , will by little and little wear them out of use . to be oft in fight , and converse much with men , breedeth a kinde of satiery : therefore it behoveth persons of great estate and authority to be retired , lest over-much familiarity should detract from the reverence due to honorable estate . the natures of men not content to live according to their fortune and birth , are of all others most prone to envy ; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in estimation above them . great heed is to be taken , that no citizen or subject , be suffered to aspire to such greatness , as cannot be forced to obey the laws ; and no order there is of more necessity , than that every man of what quality soever , may be without respect accused and judged . for conservation of particular greatness and dignity , there is nothing more noble and glorious , than to have felt the force of every fortune . it is the quality of wise men only , to know how to use prosperity , and never to trust too much to the favors of present happiness . a man well advised in his prosperity , beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent ; nor must he believe in his own present felicity , for the day knows not what the night bringeth : he only is to be reputed a man , whose mind cannot be puft up by prosperity , nor dejected by any adverse fortune . men of cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent speeches , but wise men laugh them to scorn . the way whereby a prince eschues the hate of subjects , is , not to take from them their lands or goods ; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted , unless the same be accompanied with confiscation ( which a prince is rarely forced to use ) it seldom causeth him to become odious . a rule most cerain it is that he who commands any thing unpleasing , must by severe means cause it to be observed ; and who desireth to be obeyed , must know how to command : and he only knows how to command , that doth compare his own force with those that are to obey ; wherein finding a proportion , then he may boldly proceed , otherwise forbear . in actions of difficulty great courage is to be used , and who so compasseth any thing by violence , cannot maintain it by mildness , nor command by affability : he therefore that is of nature soft , should do best to refrain all extraordinary commands . and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his mild spirit ; because ordinary punishments are not imputed to the prince or his magistrates , but to the laws and ordinances of state. when necessity presseth , desperation is deemed wisdom , and generous minds do not account of danger , because those attempts which begin with peril , do for the most part end with glory . he that endeavours to be good among many that are evil , or will uphold that which those labour to pull down of force , worketh his own undoing . all common-wealths alter from order to disorder , from disorder to order again ; for nature having made all worldly things variable , so soon as they have attained their utmost perfection and height , they must descend ; so from good they fall back to evil ; and from evil they return to good . war begets quiet , quiet idleness , idleness disorder , disorder ruin ; likewise ruin order , order vertue , vertue glory and good fortune . wise men have observed that arms were before learning , and captains before philosophers ; for good and well regulated armies having gained victory , established rest and security , whereof the study of letters and liberal sciences ensued . that country deserveth to be loved of all men , which loves all men indifferently , and not that country which respecting the best part , advanceth a few : no man therefore is to be blamed , if for such cause he desire rather to abandon than embrace his country . common wealths are bodies mixt , yet have they of bodies simple some resemblance : and as in these , many infirmities grow , which without violent medicines cannot be cured ; so in the other many mischiefs arise , which a good and godly patient should offend to leave uncured , though therein he use both force and fire . those wars be most just which are most necessary ; and those arms are most merciful where no hope of help remains but in them only . in actions which promise either publick glory , or private honour , men may be reasonably persuaded to adventure life and living , because great hope there is to die with reputation , or live to recover that peace which war hath consumed : but where men are no less oppressed by insolency of commanders , than by insolency of foes , there is the calamity doubled , and of two evils the danger of war seemeth least ; for that hath end , the other is infinite . who so persuades himself to be no less esteemed in evil than good fortune , is deceived : for promises made , during distress , are rarely persormed , unless the same necessity continue . the intent of every prince , or other state that makes war , is to enrich himself , and impoverish the enemy : neither is victory for other occasions sought , nor the possessions of the enemy to other end desir'd , than to make themselves mighty , and their enemy weak . it sollows then , that so oft as the victory impoverishes them , or the gains weaken them , either they pass or come short of that mark whereat the war was aimed . ancient and well-governed common-wealths were wont by their conquests to fill the treasuries with gold and silver , to give reward to soldiers , to spare the people from tributes , to make triumphs and publick feasts : but in later times the wars have used , first , to consume the treasure , and after impoverish the people without assuring them from their enemies . a prince or state that leaves promises unperformed , by reason of unexpected impediments , and for no ill intent , ought not to be blamed : neither are such accidents any just cause or colour why friends should abandon their confederates . where magistrates govern justly , subjects obey dutifully ; where private persons grow rich , and princes enlarge their empire ; there is the common-wealth blessed , and the people fortunate . chap. xxvi . maxims of state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policy in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narrations and historical parallels . all cities and towns of state are builded either by people dwelling in or about the place where they are builded , or else they are made by strangers : of the first are athens and venice , of the other alexandria and florence . the fortune of every city builded , and vertue of the builder , appeareth by choice of the place , and quality of laws : for as fertile places occasion men to be slothful , unless by good laws they be forced to labour , so barrenness compels them to industry ; which reason induceth wise men to plant habitations in either : examples of the first are ferrara and rome , of the second ragusa and genoa . all laws whereby commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent man , and at an instant ; or else they were ordained at sundry times , according to such accidents as befel . example , the laws of sparta made at the beginnig by lycurgus , the laws of rome at sundry times . the government of every city in time becomes corrupt ; principality changeth into tyranny : the optimacy is made the government of the people ; and the popular estate turns to licentious disorder ; which instability or alteration moved some law-makers to take order that in the government of their city there should be a mixture of all three , and was the cause that the policy of sparta continued years , when the popular state of athens endured not one hundred . example , the laws of sparta made by lycurgus , and the laws of athens by solon . whoso taketh in hand to frame any state or government , ought to presuppose that all men are evil , and at occasions will shew themselves so to be . example , the envy of the people of rome to the nobles , and their insolency towards them appeared not so long as the kings governed ; but the tarquins being banished , opportunity was thereby offered , that the malice of the one and the other became discovered . the divers honours of the nobility and people , the one desiring to command , the other not to obey , are the cause of continual troubles , unless some third mean there be of more authority than either , to bridle the force of both . example , the kings in rome expulsed , forthwith arose much mutiny , and could not be suppress'd till the tribum plebis were created ; whose authority wrought the same effect which the kings had done . some states endeavour to enlarge their dominions , and some others labor only to maintain that estate they antiently possessed . example of the first was the city of rome , of the second sparta . all states desiring to live at liberty , think fit that every man should be permitted to accuse any citizen that offendeth , which manner of proceeding works two excellent effects : first , that the people should not dare for fear of accusing to attempt ought against the state ; or if they do , they shall be presently and without respect punished . secondly , by liberty of accusing , every man hath means to utter the offence wherewith he can charge others , which he could not ; unless it were lawful to take such an ordinary course , and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary , particular revenge , or calling in foreign forces . example , coriolanus and appius , claudius at rome , lucanncve at chinsi , francisco valeri in florence . as accusations are in every state necessary , so slanders are dangerous , and worthy of punishment ; the difference betwixt accusations and slanders , is , that the one is publickly performed before magistrates , with good proofs and witnesles to maintain the truth of the accusation ; but slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret , and places of repair , without witness and justification , so as every man may be slandered , but few are orderly accused . example , appius claudius accused by l. virginius ; furius camillus , slandered by manlius capitolinus . the only means to suppress slander is , to give authority to some persons of repute , to compel every slanderer to become an accuser ; and if the accusation prove true , then to reward the accuser , or at least not to punish him . example , manlius the slanderer of camillus for his untrue information punished . a rule most certain and assured it is , that every kingdom and state at the first well framed , or after well informed , doth take the perfection thereof from the wisdom of some excellent man , who ought not to be blind though in a matter of great moment he happily useth some extraordinary violence or proceedings ; for he that employeth force to mend and not to mar , deserves commendation . example , romulus , lycurgus , cleomenes . there lives no man so simple or wise , so wicked or well-disposed , but prefers those persons that are praiseable before those that are blameable : not withstanding for that well-near all men are beguil'd in discerning what indeed is good , deeming that honourable which in truth is otherwise ; they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a course which merits rather infamy than commendation . example , every man wisheth himself timoleon , or agesilaus , rather than dionysius or phalaris ; rather a titus or trajan , than caligula or vitellius . who reads histories treating of great actions shall perceive that good princes indeed are more secure and better defended by the love of the people , and fidelity of counsellors , than were they that entertained many legions and men of war. example , of all those emperours which reigned after caesar until maximiinus , the greatest number were for their vices taken and slain , only galba and pertinax excepted , who were good emperours . a prince of great knowledge both in arms and wisdom , so firmly setleth the foundation of government , as albeit his successor be of the less vertue , yet may he be maintained even by the memory of his predecessor : but if it happen that the third prince prove not more like the first than the second , then all that is past goeth to ruine . example , the martial valour of romulus was the cause that numa might govern safely in peace : which tullus could not have done , had he been unlike to romulus ; nor should bajazet emperour of turky have enjoyed the state of his father mahomet , and left the same to his posterity , if selim his son had not been more like to his grand - father than to bajazet his father . the succession of two excellent princes , chiefly if they be of long life , works wondrous effects : the like is seen in optimacies and popular states , where the governours successively elected be men of great vertue and understanding . example , the first appeared in philip of macedon , and alexander his son , the second in the consuls of rome . in every state , where soldiers are not , the fault thereof proceeds from the governours . wise princes were therefore wont even in times of peace to cause warlike exercises to be used ; for without them the most warlike nations become not only ignorant in martial knowledge , but also effeminate . example , pelopidas & epaminondas in thebes , and king tullus in rome as well in peaceable as troublesome times used the exercise of arms. no prince or state well advised , hazards his whole estate upon the valour of some few persons , nor ought to strength of strait places , where the enemy is to pass . example , tully king of rome , and metius king of alba , condescended that three of their nobility for either side , chosen should enter combate , and that nation which was victorious should command the other . francis the french king going to recover lombardy , was by the switzers attended into two or three places in the mountains , hoping there to repulse him , but the king taking another way , passed securely and prevailed . every state well governed doth reward men of good merit , and punish all offenders ; and if any person of good desert shall wilfully be a delinquent , the same man ought not withstanding his former service , be punisht . example , the same horatto that in combat gained the victory against the albani , having insolently slain his own sister , was notwithstanding his egregious act and the fresh memory thereof , called into trial of his life , and with great difficulty obtained pardon : and manlius who had with great glory saved the capitol , for moving sedition in rome , was after from the same cast down headlong . every wise man having performed any great service to his prince or country , ought to be content with such recompence as it shall please the prince or country to bestow : measuring the same according to the power of the giver , and not the merit of him that receiveth . example , horatius cocles for having lost his hand in defence of the bridge of rome , and mutius scaevola suffering his hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill king porsenna , were rewarded with a small portion of land ; and manlius that defended the capitol from the galleys , had no greater reward than a little measure of meal . ingratitude is a vice so natural and common , as not only private persons , but princes and states also either through covetousness or suspition are there with infected . example , vespasian proclaimed emperor , was chiefly aided by antonius primus , and by his help prevailed against vitellius , in reward of which service vespasian removed him from the command of his army , and gave that honour to mutianus . consalvo ferranoe having taken the kingdom of naples from the french , was first removed from his command of the castles and soldiers , and in the end brought into spain , where in disgrace he ended his life . collatinus tarquinius who with the aid of brutus suppressed the tarquins of rome , and with him pub. valerius were banish'd for no other cause but for being of the name of tarquin , the other because he 〈◊〉 a house upon mount caelio . all errors that great captains commit , are either wilful or ignorant , towards the one and the other of which offenders to use greater lenity than the quality of their offences deserves , seemeth necessary : for men of honour suffer nought by the infamy which evil service doth bring . it is also to be considered that a great captain being cumbred with many cares , cannot proceed in his actions couragiously , if he stand in daily doubt to be punish'd for every error that hapneth . example , sergius and virginius were before veio , the one part of the army on the one side of the city , the other not far from the place . sergius being assaulted by the falisci was not aided by virginius , neither would he require his help , such was the envy the one bare to the other ; and consequently their offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment . likewise when varro by his ignorance , received an overthrow by hannibal at cannae , he was nevertheless pardoned and honourably welcomed home by the whole senate . whensoever an inconvenience ariseth within or without the state , it seems a resolution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof , than to seek by sudden violence to suppress it . example , cosmo de medioes having gained extraordinary reputation in florence , the citizens imagined , that to suffer the same to increase was dangerous , and therefore they banished him : which extream proceeding , so offended the friends of cosme , being the stronger , as they sorced the citizens to revoke him , and make him prince of that city . the like hapned in rome , where caesar for his vertue , much admired and followed , became afterwards to be feared ; and they that feared , not considering their force to be inferior to the power of caesar , endeavouring to oppress him , were the occasion of his greater glory . in every republick , an excessive authority given to one or two persons for long time , proveth dangerous , chiefly when the same is not restrained . example , the dictatorship given to caesar for life , was an occasion to oppress the liberties of the romans . the same effect was before that time like to follow the decemvirate , by suffering appius claudius to prolong the time of his dignity . the ambition of men is such , as rarely they will obey when formerly they have commanded ; neither do they willingly accept of mean office , having before sate in higher place : yet the citizens of well-governed states , did not refuse as well to obey as command . example , the victory the romans obtained against the veienti , q. fabius was slain , having the year before been consul : nevertheless he then served in meaner place under c. manilius , and m. fabius his own brother then consul . there is nothing more strange , yet by experience proved true , that men in adverse fortune be much grieved , and in prosperity also discontented ; which is the reason , that not being forced to fight for necessity , they will nevertheless contend for ambition ; and that humour doth as well possess those that live aloft , as others whom fortune holdeth down . example , the people of rome having by the authority of the tribunes obtained to make themselves secure from oppression of the nobility , forthwith required , that the honour and office of state might be also imparted unto them . the like ambition moved them to have their part of lands by force of lex agaria , which was at last the overthrow of the roman liberty . it seemeth that people displeased with some innovations hapned in the state , do sometime without just reasons complain of those that govern : not unlike to a sick man , who deemeth that the physician , not the fever , is the cause of his grief . example , the people of rome were persuaded that the ambition of consuls was the cause of continual war , therefore required that no more consuls should be ; yet they were content that certain tribunes should command with like authority ; so was nothing altered in the government , but the governors title , which alone did courent them . nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man so much , or so soon as the immoderate desire of honour ; in so much as men of honest minds and vertuous inclinations are sometimes by ambition , drawn to abuse that goodness whereunto they are inclined . example , appius claudius having lived long an enemy to the multitude , hoping by their aid to continue his authority of the decemviri in rome , became their friend , and disfavoured the factions of great men. likewise q. fabius a man of singular vertue , being also called to that dignity by appius's self , adulterated his nature and became like unto him . seldom or never is any people discontented without just cause ; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth , many times for want of some fit man to pronounce their grief , they stand silent . example , the romans at the death of virginia , were gathered together armed upon mount sacro , and being asked by the senate , for what cause they so did ? no answer was made ; until virginio father of the virgin had procured , that twenty of the tribunes might be made to be as head of the people , and confer with the senate . a great folly or rather meer madness it seemeth to desire any thing , and tell before-hand that the end purpose of the desire is evil ; for thereby he sheweth reason why it ought not to be granted . example , the romans required of the senate that appius and the rest of the decemviri should be delivered into their hands , being determined to burn them all alive . the first part of their request seemed reasonable , but the end thereof unreasonable . a course very dangerons it is in all states , by continual accusing and punishing , to hold the subject in doubt and daily fear : for he that stands always looking for some trouble , becometh careless and apt to attempt innovation . example , the decemviri being opprest , the tribunes authorized in their place , endeavoured daily to call in question the most part of the decemviri , and many other citizens also , whereof great inconveniences arose , and much danger would have ensued , had not a decree propounded by m. duillius been made , that for one year no roman citizen should be accused . strange it is to see how men in seeking their own security , lay the injuries which they fear , upon other men ; as though it were necessary , either to offend or to be offended . example , the romans among themselves , united and strong , always endeavoured to offend the nobles ; and the nobles likewise being persuaded they were strong , laboured to oppress the people : which humours were the cause of continual troubles . to make estimation and choice of men fit to govern , the best course is to consider in particular ; otherwise it might be imagined , that among the multitude or meaner people , they being the greatest numbers , might be found some persons of more perfection . example , the people of rome desiring that the consulship might be given among them as men of most merit , did by all means endeavour to obtain that honour ; but being come to election , and every mans vertue particularly considered , there could not be among the multitude only one found fit for so great a place ; and therefore the people themselves consented , that the dignity should still remain as it was . to persuade a multitude to any enterprise , is easie , if that which is persuaded , doth promise either profit or honour ; yet oft under that external apparence lies hid loss or disadvantage . example , the romans persuading themselves that the slow proceeding of fabius maximus in the war , was both chargeable and cowardly , required , that the general of the horse might direct the war ; which course had ruined rome , if the wisdom of fabius had not been . likewise , when hannibal had divers years reigned in italy , one m. centenius penuta , a man of base birth , yet a soldier of some repute , undertook that if he with such voluntiers as would follow him , might have authority to fight , he would within few days deliver hannibal either alive or dead : which offer was by the senate accounted rash , yet for fear to offend the people , granted ; and penula with his soldiers was cut in pieces . to appease a mutiny or tumult in any camp or city , there is no means more speedy or successful , than if some person of great quality and respect , present himself to the people , and by his wisdom lay before them the damage of their discords , persuading them to peace and patience . example , the faction of the frateschi and arratiati in florence ; the one ready to assault the other . franciso soderini , bishop of voterra , in his episcopal habit , went between the parties and appeased them : also count egremont , by the authority of his wisdom and presence , supprest a great mutiny in autwerp , between the martinists and papists . a people corrupted , do rarely or never observe any order or ordinance , unless by force of some prince's power they be thereto inforced ; but where the multitude is incorrupt and religious , all things are done justly , and without compulsion . example , camillus at the victory against the vrienti , vowed that the tenth part of the pillage should be offered to apollo ; but the senate supposing that the people would not consent to so great a contribution , studied to dispense with that vow , and to please apollo and the people also by some other means : whereat the people shewed themselves openly offended , and willingly gave no less than the sum formerly decreed . when the free-cities of germany are occasioned to make mony for any publick service , the magistrates impose one or two in the hundred on every city , which done , every one is sworn to lay down so much as in his own conscience he is able ; and he with his own hand , no other witness being present , casteth the mony into a coffer prepared for the purpose ; which he would not , if his own conscience did not inforce him . when any extraordinary occasion happens to a city or province , some prodigious voice is heard , or some marvelous sights are seen . before t. gracchus general of the roman army was betraid by flavius lucanus , the aruspices discovered two serpents eating the entrails of the beasts sacrificed ; which done , they vanish'd : which vision , as they divined , prognosticated the general 's death : likewise f. savanarola foretold the coming of king charles viii . into italy : and m. sedigitus , when the gauls first came towards rome , informed the senate he heard a voice much louder than any man's , crying aloud , galli veniunt . the multitude of base people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation ; yet unless they be directed by some persons of reputation and wisdom , rarely do they joyn in any action of great import . example , the romans , when their city was taken and sack'd by the gauls , went to veio with determination to dwell there : the senate informed thereof , commanded , that upon great pain every citizen should return to rome , whereat the people at first mocked ; but when every man particularly within himself considered his own peril , all in general determined to obey the magistrates . in the employment of men for service , neither age nor fortune ought so much to be regarded as vertue ; for young men having made trial of their valour , soon become aged , and thereby either unapt or unable to serve : therefore well governed commonwealths , preferred military vertue before any other respect . example , valerius corvinus , with others , made consul the three and twentieth year of his age , and pompey triumphed in his youth . no wise or well-advised prince or other state will undertake without excessive forces to invade the dominions of any other prince , unless he assure himself of some friends there to be a mean , and as it were a gate to prepare his passage . example , the romans by aid of the saguntines . entred spain , the aetoli called them into greece , the hediai into france : likewise the palaeologi incited the turk to come into thrace ; and ludovicus 〈◊〉 occasioned charles the french king to come into italy . a republick desirous to extend the bounds thereof , must endeavour to be fully furnish'd with inhabitants , which may be done both by love and force : love is gained by suffering strangers to inhabit the city securely ; and force compels people to come thither , when other cities and towns near at hand be demolished or desaced : and impossible it is without this order of proceeding . to enlarge any city or make the same of greater power . example , the romans to enlarge their city demolished alba , and many other towns , and therewith also entertained all strangers courtcously : so as rome grew to such greatness , that the city only could arm six hundred and forty thousand men ; but sparta or athens could never exceed twenty thousand , for that lycurgus had inhibited the access of strangers . a commonwealth that consumes more treasure in the war , than it profits in victory , seems to have rather hindred than honoured or inriched the state. a wise captain therefore in his actions , ought as well to profit the republick , as to gain to himself glory . example , the consuls of rome did seldom desire triumph , unless they returned from the war loaden with gold , silver and other rich spoils fit to be delivered into the common treasury . all foreign war 's with princes or other states taken in hand , be either for ambition or desire of glory , or else for necessity . example , the romans for their ambition conquered many nations , with intent only to have the obedience of the people ; yet did they suffer them to hold possession of their houses , and sometimes they were permitted to live only with their old laws . likewise alexander the great endeavoured to suppress many princes for his glory , but did not dispossess the people , nor kill them . otherwise it is where a whole nation inforced by famine or fury of war , abandon their own dwellings , and are forced to inhabit elswhere . example , the goths and other people of the north invaded the roman empire , and many other provinces , whereof their alteration of names did ensue ; as illyria , now called slavonia , england formerly named britain . a common conceit and saying it is , that mony makes the war strong , and is the force and sinews thereof ; as though he who hath most treasure , be also most mighty ; but experience hath apparently shewed the contrary . example , after the death of alexander king of macedon , a multitude of gauls went into greece , and being there arrived , sent certain ambassadors to the king , who supposing to make them afraid of his power , shewed them his treasure , which wrought a contrary effect ; for the gauls , before desirous of peace , resolved then to continue the war , in hope to win that mighty mass of mony. likewise darius should have vanquished alexander , and the greeks might have conquered the romans , if the richer prince might ever by his mony have prevailed . every league made with a prince or republick remote , is weak and rather aideth us with fame than effect , and consequently deceiveth all those that in such amity repose confidence . example , the florentines being assaulted by the king of naples and the pope , prayed aid of the french king ; who being far distant , could not in time succour them : and the cedicini desiring aid of the capuani against the samnites , a people of no force , were deceived . a prince whose people is well arm'd and train'd , shall do better to attend his enemy at home , than by invasion to assault his country : but such princes whose subjects are disarmed , had need to hold the enemy aloof . example , the romans , and in this age the swisses , being well armed , may attend the war at home ; but the carthaginians and italians being not so well furnished , did ever use to seek the enemy . the plurality of commanders in equal authority , is for the most part occasion of slow proceeding in the war. example , there was at one time in rome created four tribuni militares with authority of consuls , viz. t. quintus after his consulship , cajus furius , m. posthumus , and a. cornelius cassius , amongst whom arose so much diversity and contrariety of opinion , as nothing could be done till their authority ceased , and m. aemylius made dictator . a victory obtained by any great captain with the authority of his prince's commission , 〈◊〉 and directions , ought ever to be imputed rather to the wisdom of the prince , than the valour of the captain : which made the emperors of rome to permit no captains ( how great soever his victories were ) to triumph , as before that time the consuls had done ; and even in those days a modest refusal of triumph was commended . example , m. fulvius having gained a great victory against the tuscans , was both by the consent of the senate and people of rome , admitted to triumph ; but the 〈◊〉 of that honour proved his great glory . all they that from private estate have aspired to principality , either by force or fraud be come thereunto , unless the same be given , or by inheritance descended : yet it is rarely seen , that force alone prevaileth , but fraud without force oft-times sufficeth . example , agathocles by such means became prince of 〈◊〉 john galeazzo by abusing his uncle barnabas , gained the dominion of lombardy ; and cyrus circumvented cyaxares his mothers brother , and by that craft aspired to greatness . sudden resolutions are always dangerous ; and no less peril ensueth of slow and doubtful delays . example , when hieron prince of syracuse died , the war even then being in great heat between the romans and carthaginians , they of syracusa consulted , whether it were better to follow the fortune of rome or carthage . in which doubt they continued until apollonides , a chief captain of syracusa , laid before them , that so long delay would make them hated both of romans and carthaginians . likewise the florentines being by lewis the twelfth required to give his army passage towards naples , mused so long upon an answer , that he became their enemy , and they forced to recover his favour full dearly . to govern a state is nothing else but to take such order as the subjects may not , or ought not to offend ; which may be done , either by removing from them all means to disobey , or by affording them so great favours , as reasonably they ought not to change their fortune ; for the mean course proveth dangerous . example , the latins being by the valour of camillus overcome , yielded themselves to endure what punishment it pleased the romans to inflict . an ingenious and magnanimous answer being made unto wise magistrates , doth oft obtain both pardon and grace . example , when the privernates had rebelled , and were by force constrained to return to the obedience of the romans , they sent certain of the city unto rome , to desire pardon ; who being brought before the senate , one of the senators asked the privernates , what punishment themselves did think they had deserved : the same , quoth they , which men living in freedom , think they are worthy of . whereto the consul thus replied , quid si poenam remittimus ? qualem nos pacem vobiscum habituros speremus ? the privernates answered , si bonam dederitis , & fidelem & perpetuam : si malam , haud diuturnam . which answer was thought to proceed from generous men , and therefore they were not only pardoned , but also honoured and received into the number of the roman citizens . all castles , forcresses , and places of strength , be made for defence , either against the enemy or subject : in the first case they are not necessary , in the second dangerous . for thereby the prince may at his pleasure take occasion to insult upon the subject , when much more seemly he might settle his estate upon the love and good affection of men. example , the castle of millan made by duke francisco sforza , incited his heirs to become insolent ; and consequently they became odious ; which was also the cause that so soon as that city was assaulted , the enemy with facility did possess it . that prince or potentate which builds his severity rather upon the trust he hath in fortresses , than the love of men , shall be deceived : for no place is so strong , as can long defend it self , unless by the love and aid of men it be in time of necessity succoured . example , pope julio having drawn the bentivoli out of bologm , built there a strong castle ; the governor thereof robbed the people , and they there with grieved , in a short time took the castle from him . so after the revolt of genoa , lewis the twelsth came to the recovery thereof , and builded there the strongest fortification of italy , as well for sight as the circumstances inexpugnable . nevertheless the citizens rebelled , and within sixteen months the french were sorced to yield the castle and government to octavio fragosa . to build forts upon places of strength , either for defence of our own , or to hold that which is taken from others , hath ever proved to small purpose . example , the romans having supprest the rebellion of the latins and privernates , albeit they were people warlike , and lovers of liberty ; yet to keep them subject , built there no castle , nor other places fortified : and the lacedemonians did not only forbear to fortifie the towns they conquered , but also left their chief city of sparta unwalled . the necessity or use of fortification is only upon frontiers , or such principal places where princes make their habitation ; to the end the fury of sudden assaults may be staid , and time for succor entertained : otherwise , example , the castle of millan being made to hold the state in obedience , could not so do either for the house of sforza or france . guido ubaldo , duke of velin , driven from his dominion by caesar borgia , so soon as he recovered his country , caused all the forts to be demolished : for by experience be found the love of men was the surest defence , and that fortifications prevailed no less against him than for him . the causes of division and faction in every commonweal proceed most commonly of idleness and peace , and that which unieth , is fear war. example , the 〈◊〉 and elinsci having intelligence of great contention between the nobility and people of rome , thought that a sit opportunity to oppress the one and the other : but the romans informed of such an intention , appeased all do mestick anger , and by the valour of their arms , conducted by gn. manlius and m. fabius defeated the enemies forces . the means to usurp an estate 〈◊〉 is , first before arms be taken , to become , as it were , an arbitrator or a friend indifferent ; and after arms be taken , then to send moderate aid to the weak side , as well to entertain the war between the factions , as also to consume the strength both of the one , and the other ; yet in no wise to employ any great forces , for thereby either party may discover the intents to suppress them . example , the city of pistoia fallen into division , the florentines took occasion sometimes to favor the one , and sometimes the other , that in the end both sides weary of the war , voluntarily yielded to their devotion . philippo viscount , hoping sundry times by occasion of faction to oppress the florentines , did often assault them with great forces , which was the cause that they became reunited ; and consequently the duke deceived of his expectation . a great wisdom it is to resrain opprobrious and injurious speech : for as neither the one nor the other can any whit decrease the enemies force , so doth it move him to greater hate , and more desire to offend . example , gabides , a general of the persians having long besieged amida , became weary , and preparing to abandon the enterprise , raised his camp , which they of the city beholding , began to revile the persians , and from the walls reproved them of cowardise ; which undiscreet words so highly 〈◊〉 gabides , as thereupon he resolved to continue the siege , and within 〈◊〉 days won the city . tiberius gracchus appointed captain of certain bands of men , whom for want of other soldiers the romans entertained , proclaimed in his camp , that no man , upon pain of death , should contumeliously call any soldier slave , either in earnest or jest. nam facetiae asperae quando nimium ex vero traxere , acrem suimem riam 〈◊〉 likewise alexander the great having conquered well near all the east , brought his forces before tyre , they fearing alexander's fury , offered upon honourable considerations to yeild him obedience , only requiring , that neither he nor any of his forces should enter the city , which motion after four months alexander accepted , and so signified by his ambassador , who arriving at tyre was by the proud citizens slain , whereat alexander grew into choler , and being ready to forsake the siege , staid his forces , and in the end sacked the city and put the people to the sword. a prince or any other state being assaulted by an enemy of far more puissance than himself , ought not to refuse any honourable compositions , chiefly when they are offered ; for no conditions can be so base , but shall in some 〈◊〉 turn to advantage and honour of him that accepts them . example , 〈◊〉 . certain florentines procured great forces of spaniards to come thither , as well to reposess the medici then banish'd , as also to sack the city ; promising that so soon as the army of spain did come into the florentine dominion , the faction of medici would be ready armed to receive them . but the spaniards being come , found no forces at all to joyn with them ; and therefore wanting victual , offered composition . the florentines finding the enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace , whereof followed the loss of prato , and many other inconveniences . the like happened to them of tyre , as before . the denial or delay of justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered , is a thing very dangerous to every prince or other state ; for that the party injured doth oft by indirect means , though with hazard of his country and himself , seek satisfaction : example , the complaint which the galli made against the fabii who sent ambassadors in favour of the tossani , not being heard , nor any punishment inflicted upon them for fighting against the law of nations , was the cause that the galli were offended with the states , whereof followed the sack of rome ; and the delay of justice in philip of macedon , for not revenging the incestuous oppression of attalus to pausanias , was the motive to murther that king. whoso endeavours the alteration of any state must of necessity proceed with all severity , and leave some memorable example to those that shall impugn the ordinance of government newly setled . example , when junius brutus had by his great valour banish'd the traquins , and sworn the people that no king should ever reign in rome ; within short time after , many young nobles , among whom was brutus's son , impatient of the equality of the new government , conspired to recall the tarquins ; but brutus thereof informed , caused his own son not only to be condemned to death , but was himself present at the execution . as health and soundness of the hands . legs , and other outward members cannot continue life , unless the heart and vital spirits within be strong and sirm ; so fortifications and frontier-desences do not prevail , unless the whole corps of the kingdom and people be well armed : example , when the emperor came into italy , and had with some difficulty past the confines of the venetians well near without resistance ; his army march'd to venice , and might doubtless have possest the city , had it not been defended with water . likewise the english in their assault of france , excepting a few encounters on the frontiers , found no puissant resistance within the realm . and anno . they forced all that state , and the king himself to tremble , as ost before they had done ; but contrariwise the romans knowing that life lay in the heart , ever held the body of their state strongest : for the nearer the enemy approach'd rome , the better they found the country armed and defended . the desire to command sovereignly is of so great force , as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of principality , but also in them that have no title at all . example , this appetite moved the wife of tarquinius priscus contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own father servius , and possess his kingdom , as being persuaded it were much more honourable to be a queen than to be the daughter of a king. the violation of ancient laws , orders and customs , under which people have long time lived , is the chief and only cause whereby princes hazard their estate and royal dignity . example , albeit the deflowring of lucrece was the occasion , yet was it not the cause that moved the romans to take arms against tarquin ; for he having before that fact of sextus his son , governed tyrannically , and taken from the senate all authority , was become odious both to the senate , nobility and people , who finding themselves well-governed , never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration . a prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy , hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over-great riches and honors , than those whom he hath greatly injured ; because they want means to offend ; the other have many opportunities to do it : example , perrenius the prime favorite of commodus the emperor , conspired his death . plautianus did the like to severus , and sejanus to tiberius ; for being advanced to so great honors , riches and offices , as nothing remained desirable but the imperial title , they conspired against the persons of their sovereigns in hope of the dignity ; but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth . an army which wants experience , albeit the captain be expert , is not greatly to be feared ; neither ought an army of well-train'd soldiers to be much esteemed , whose captain is ignorant . example , caesar going into africa against afranius and petraeus whose army was full of old soldiers , said he feared them little , quia 〈◊〉 ad exercitum sine duce . contrariwise , when he went to pharsalia to encounter pompey , he said , ibo ad ducem sine exercitu . a captain general commanding an army ought rather to govern with curtesie and mildness , than with over-much austerity and severity . example , q. and appius claudius being consuls , were appointed to govern the war. to q. was allotted one army which served very dutifully ; but appius commanding the other with great cruelty , was by his soldiers unwillingly obeyed . nevertheless tacitus seems of contrary opinion , saying , plus poena quam obsequium valet . therefore to reconcile these different conceits , i say , that a general having power to command men , either they are confederates or subjects : if confederates or voluntaries , he may not proceed to extream punishment ; if subjects , and his power absolute , they may be governed otherwise ; yet with such respect , as the insolence of the general inforce not the soldiers to hate him . honour may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory . every man knoweth glory is due to the victor , and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished , being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default . neither is it dishonourable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of war inforceth . and forced promises which concern a whole state , are not binding , and rarely or ever kept , nor is the breaker thereby to receive disgrace . example , posthumus the consul having made a dishonourable peace with the samnites , was by them with his whole army sent home disarmed . being arrived at rome , the consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto ; albeit , he and those few that promised , were bound to perform them . the senate thereupon concluded to send him prisoner to samno , where he constantly protested the fault to be only his own ; wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonour at all : and fortune so much favoured posthumus , as the samnites were content presently to return him to rome ; where he became more glorious for losing the victory , than was pontius at samno for having won the victory . wise men have long observed , that who so will know what shall be , must consider what is past ; for all worldly things hold the same course they had at first . the reason is , that as long as men are possest with the same passions with former ages , consequently of these doings the same effects ensue . example , the almains and french have ever been noted for their avarice , pride , fury and infidelity , and so in divers ages , experience hath proved even to this present : for perfidious dealing the french have given sufficient proof , not only in ancient times , but also in the time of charles viii . who promised to render to the florentines the forts of pisa , but having divers times received mony , held them not with standing in possession . the florentines found the like in the almains ; for in the wars of the visconti , dukes of milan , they prayed aid of the emperor , who promised them great forces ; in consideration whereof , he was to receive of the florentines one hundred thousand crowns in hand , and as much more when his army was arrived in italy , both which payments were performed ; but as soon as the emperor came to verona he devised cavillations of unkindness whereupon he returned home . a prince desirous to obtain any thing of another , must if occasion so permit , urge his demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present answer , as he who is prest may not have leisure to consider how to excuse himself in denial . example , pope julio endeavoured to drive out of bologna all the bentivoli , in which action he thought the aid of the french recessary , and that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neutial ; and by divers 〈◊〉 did 〈◊〉 them to that 〈◊〉 but not 〈◊〉 any resolute an 〈◊〉 he though 〈◊〉 with those sew 〈◊〉 he had to take his journey to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on the venetians 〈◊〉 him they would remain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the french king forthwith sent 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as searing the popes 〈◊〉 likewise the tuscans having for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aid of the samnites against the romens , took arms suddenly and 〈◊〉 their request which the samnites 〈◊〉 before denied . when a multitude 〈◊〉 all may not be 〈◊〉 because they are too many : to punish part and leave the rest 〈◊〉 were injury to the suflerers ; and to those that escape , an encouragement to offend again ; therefore to eshew all extremity , mean courses have been anciently used . example , when all the wives of the romans conspired to poyson their husbands , a convenient number of them wero punisht , and the rest suffered to pass likewise at the conspiracy of the bacchanals in the time of the macedonian war , wherein many thousands men and women had part , every tenth person only was put to death by lot , although the ossence were general ; by which manner of punishing , he that suffered , complain'd on his fortune ; and he that escaped , was put in fear , that offending again , the same punishment might light upon himself , and therefore would no more offend . a battel or great action in arms ought not to be enterprised without special commission or command from the prince ; otherwise the general incurs great danger . example , 〈◊〉 the dictator punisht the general of the horse in the roman army , for having sought without his 〈◊〉 adthough he had in battle slain enemies without loss of of his own : and caesar commended his captain 〈◊〉 for having refrain'd to fight , though with great advantage he might . also count egmont hazarded the favor of the king his master for giving battel to marshall de thermes , albeit he were victorious : for upon the success of that action the loss or safety of all the low countries depended . to govern without council is not only dangerous in aristocracies and popular states , but unto independent princes an occasion of utter ruin . example , hieron the first king of sicily in all his proceedings used the advice of counsels , and lived fifty years prosperously in peace ; but his grand-child succeeding , refusing all counsel lost his kingdom , and was with all his kinsfolk and friends cruelly slain . in all monarchies the senate or privy-council is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity , or men of approved wisdom and understanding . example , in polonia no man is counsellor unless he be a palatine , a bishop , a castellan , a captain , or such a one as hath been ambassador : and in turky the title of counsellor is not given but only to the four bassaes. the two cadelesquires , the twelve beglerbegs , and kings son , who in his fathers absence , is as it were a president of the divano or senate . many princes ancient and modern have used to select out of their council , two or three , or four at most , to whom only they did impart their affairs . example , the emperor augustus had maecenas and agrippa ; julius caesar , q. paedius and cor. balbus , whom he only trusted with his cipher and secrets , being counsellors of the cabinet ( as we now call them . ) the alteration of old laws , or introduction of new , are in all states very dangerous , notwithstanding any appearance of profit or publick utility , which moved wise governours to decree , that ancient laws once established might never be called in question . example , the athenians decreed that no law should be propounded to the people without the consent of the senate : the like use is observed in venice , where no petition is preferred to the senate but by advice of the sages ; and among the loerians the custom was , that whosoever presented any new law to be confirmed , should come with a halter about his neck , and be therewith hanged if his request were rejected ; also lycurgus to prevent the alteration of his laws , did swear the people of sparta to observe them untilhis return , and thereupon retired himself into voluntary exile , with intent never to return . when necessity or good reason moves innovation or abolition of laws , a course more secure it is to do it rather by degrees than suddenly . example , the romans finding the laws of the twelve tables unprofitable , suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion , but would not publickly suppress them for fear of calling other laws into contempt : so did they continue years , and were then cassed by ebutius the tribune . but agis king of lacedemon desirous to revive the laws of lycurgus , long discontinued , 〈◊〉 all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled , to the end a new partition of lands and goods might be made ; which suddain and violent proceeding proved so 〈◊〉 that it moved a dangerous sedition , wherein he was disposed and with his mother and friends put to death ; which example haply moved the 〈◊〉 not to attempt any thing against the authority of augustino barberino their duke . but after his death , and 〈◊〉 the election of 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 new ordinances 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the ducal authority . whoso hath won to himself so great love and affection , as thereby to become master of the forces , and at his pleasure commands the subjects apt for arms , may also without right or title assure himself of the whole estate . example , hugh capat a subject to the crown of france , being greatly honoured by the soldiers , sound means thereby to prevent charles duke of lorrain of the crown , being right heir by descent from charlemain . and albeit the families of the paleologi , ebrami and turcan . be of the blood royal and right 〈◊〉 to the 〈◊〉 empire , when the 〈◊〉 line shall fail ; yet it is like that 〈◊〉 chief bassa having the love of the 〈◊〉 will usurp the state , because the paleologi and other competitors be far from the turks person , poor and without means to purchase the soldiers favor . a commander general in arms , ought upon pain of great punishment be enjoyned , not to imploy or retain any forces longer than the time of his commission . example , the dictators of rome were in this point so precise , as never any of them dared to transgress the time prefixed , till caesar obtained that dignity should continue in him for life ; which was the cause of his usurpation of the state. also the thebans commanded , that if the general of their army did hold his forces one day longer than the time prefixt , he should thereby incur danger of death : which justice was executed upon epaminondas and pelopidas . banishment of great lords , or citizens of great reputation , hath been in divers places diversly used : for in the one , they were inforced only to absent themselves without further infliction ; in the other , banishment was accompanied with consiscation , a course of great danger . example , in argos , athens , ephesus , and other cities of greece , the citizens puissant in friends , vertue or riches , were many times banish'd for envy or fear , but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer than ten years ; and that without loss of goods , which was the cause that never any of them warred against the country : but dion being banish'd syracusa by dionysius junior , and coriolanus from rome , did make mighty wars against their own country . the like was done by the medici in florence . honourable and magnanimous men were wont not only to enterprise great acts , but also to suffer patiently all injuries which foes or fortune could expose them to : as resolved , that no calamity was so great as to make their minds abject , or to forget the dignity appertaining to persons vertuous : example , after the defeat of the roman army upon the river allia , the 〈◊〉 persued the victory even to 〈◊〉 walls : whither being come , and finding the gates open , without any sign of resistance they entred the streets , where all honourable palaces were also unshut , which caused the galli greatly to doubt . nevertheless looking into the houses , they found in every of them a senator set in a chair of state , and in his hand a rod of ivory ; his person was also vested with robes of dignity , which majestick spectacle did marvelously amate the galli , not having before that time seen any such reverend sight ; and therefore did not only refrain to osfer violence , but highly admired the roman courage , chiesly in that fortune . nevertheless at length a rude gall hapned with his hand to touch the white beard of m. papyrius , whereat he taking 〈◊〉 disdain struck him with his rod , in requital whereof the barbarian slew papyrius , and by that example all the other senators and persons of dignity were also slain . albeit the knowledge and study of letters be both commendable and necesssary in all well regulated states ; yet if under so honest pretence , idleness enter , such abuses most seasonably be soreseen and rernoved . example , when deognis and 〈◊〉 two excellent philosophers , were sent ambassadors from athens to the rommans , many of the nobility that besore disposed themselves to arms , allured with their eloquence and marvelous wisdom , began with great admiration to follow them : and in lieu of arms , turned their endeavours to the study of letters , which the wise cato discerning , procured the senate to decree that ( to eschew all inconveniences which so honest idleness might breed ) no philosophers should from thenceforth be received into rome . the honour due to magistrates was anciently much regarded , and contrariwise all irreverent and undutisul behaviour with great severity punish'd . example , the censors of rome degraded a citizen only for having yawned loud in their presence : and another called vectius was slain in the field , for not doing due reverence to a tribune when he past by him . it is also observed , that the son of fab. maximus when he was censor , meeting his father on horseback , and seeing the sarjeans assraid to speak to him to dismount , did himself command him so to do , which command the father cheerfully and willingly obeyed , saying , domestick power must give place to publick authority . tyrannous princes having incurred the universal hate of people , sound no means so meet to preserve them from popular fury , as to execute or deliver into their hands their own chief minions and intimate counsellors . example , tiberius delivered to the people his favourite seianus : nero , tigellinus . henry king of swede committed to their fury his best beloved servant george 〈◊〉 caracalla caused all his flatterers to be slain that had persuaded him to kill his brother . the like was done by caligula , whereby he escaped himself . a prince that rewards or pardons a person that kills another prince , albeit by that means he is aspired to soveraignty , shall thereby both incur great danger and hate , and encourage men therein to attempt the like against 〈◊〉 therefore wise princes have not only lest such services quite 〈◊〉 but also most severely punished them . example , the emperor severus put all those to death that consented to the murder of pertinax ; and alexander the great executed him that slew darius , as abhorring that subject that would lay violent hands on his prince , not withstanding he were an enemy . likewise vitellius put to death all the murderers and conspirators against galba ; and domitian executed his secretary epaphroditus for the murder of nero , although he instantly desired his aid . the vertuous and vitious examples of princes incite subjects to imitate the same qualities ; which rule never or very rarely fails . example , francis the first king of france , and other princes in divers ages and places , had great esteem of learned men ; and forthwith all the princes , nobles , nobility and clergy , disposed themselves so earnestly to study , as before that time had not been seen so many and so great a number of learned men , as well in tongues as sciences . contrariwise , alexander the great , otherwise a prince of great vertue , by his immoderate use of drinking , did draw the greatest number of his court and people also to delight in drunkenness the like effect followed the excessive intemperance of mithridates , king of amasia . the last and not the least considerable , is , to observe how great effects devotion and contempt of human glory worketh in the minds not only of private persons , but of kings and princes also , who have oft abandoned worldly profit , honour and pleasure , to embrace the con templative retired life . example , ramirus king of aragon , verecundus king of spain , charlemain son of carolus martellus , matilda queen of france , amurath king of turbay , with many others . imperio maximus , exemplo major . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * commissions determine in presence of him that granted them . * so henry the fourth of france by putting his courtiers to board-wages was said to make money with his teeth . * the author of the epistle dedicatory to the dutchess of suffolk , prefix'd to mr. latimer's sermons , saith , that lawyers covetousness hath almost devoured england . discipline . tam bene quam male facta praemunt . mart. the politicks of france by monsieur p.h. ... ; with reflections on the th and th chapters, wherein he censures the roman clergy and the hugonots, by the sr. l'ormegreny. traitté de la politique de france. english du chastelet, paul hay, marquis, b. ca. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing h b estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the politicks of france by monsieur p.h. ... ; with reflections on the th and th chapters, wherein he censures the roman clergy and the hugonots, by the sr. l'ormegreny. traitté de la politique de france. english du chastelet, paul hay, marquis, b. ca. . du moulin, peter, - . reflections on the fourth chapter of the politicks of france. the second edition. [ ], , [ ], - p., [ ] leaf of plates : port. printed for thomas basset ..., london : . translation of author's traitté de la politique de france. "reflections on the fourth chapter of the politics of france" has special t.p. sr. l'ormegregny is pseudonyum of peter du moulin. engraved frontispiece of king louis xiv opposite t.p. reproduction of original in the huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng louis -- xiv, -- king of france, - . political science -- early works to . france -- politics and government -- - . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - robyn anspach sampled and proofread - robyn anspach text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion pour mounsieur de c. sur son traitte de , la politique francoise . sixain , si donner de moyens au plus grand roy du monde , d'estre maistre absolu sur la terre & sur l'onde , c'est marque d'un esprit , & rare & marveilleux ; je puis dire en d'epit de toute la critique , que ce traitte de politique , ne fut dicte que par les dieux . to this effect . if that to give the great french king in hand , the means to sway o're all , both seas , and land ; if this be wit , ( which none can well deny ) then to the teeth of all critiques , i 'll maintain these politiques are wit , above the sky . louis xiv roy de france ▪ et de navarre . the politicks of france . by monsieur p. h. marquis of c. with reflections on the th and th chapters ; wherein he censures the roman clergy , and the hugonots ; by the sr. l'ormegregny . the second edition . london , printed for thomas basset , at the george in fleetstreet , . sr. richard newdigate of arbury in the county of warwick baronet the authors epistle to the french king . sir , all the nations of the earth wait with impatience for the oracles which your majesties high wisdom disposeth it self to pronounce : and the whole vniverse , by submitting to the laws which you are about to give this kingdom , will declare , that you alone deserve to command all men . if the delphique priestess scrupled not to style lycurgus a god , for his having setled the spartans in order ; what must not fame say , when it shall publish your majesties august name ? future ages , sir , shall proclaim aloud what you perform in yours ; and report the splendour of your heroick virtue . happy the people who already find the effects of it ; but a thousand times happy they of your majesties subjects , whom you permit to offer at your feet some token of their admiration . you have often done me the honour to grant me this precious favour ; and i beseech with lowest respect , that you further please to accept the piece i now present you. it satisfies not the greatness of my zeal , that during the course of my life , i incessently speak of the passion i have for your service ; my writings must inform posterity of it after my death ; and the whole world ever know to what degree i am , sir , your majesties most humble , most obedient , and most faithful subject and servant , p. h. d. c. the preface . the bookseller will needs have a preface to encourage the sale of the book . now , for my part , i think there needs no other recommendation than its title ; for those that will not be induced to buy it , because 't is french , will not fail to have it for the sake of its politick's ; yet , if any should scruple laying out their money only on the credit of the title page , their scruple ( i doubt not ) will be removed , when they are told that the author of the growth of popery , says ; that this book is the measure of the french kings designs , and i 'm sure there 's none of us all that will be-grudge two shillings to be made privy to his councels . but if neither of these things , nor the credit it had in its native language , will cause the book to sell , i cann't imagine how a preface should do it ; for i know few ( if any ) that read the preface of a book they intend not to read also ; i have known some , indeed , read the book , and omit the preface , which i doubt would be the fate of this , should i make it long , i shall therefore only tell you how this scheme of the vast designs of the french king became publick , and so conclude . the author was a person bred up under mr. colebert , and to shew his abilities , he writ this treatise , and in manuscript presented it to the french king , which was favourably received ; but afterward , vanity prompting him to publish it in print , the king lookt upon him as one that had discovered his secrets , and turned his favour into frowns , caused him to be imprisoned in the bastile , where he continued a long time , and was not deliver'd thence , but to banishment , which , to those that read the preface , affords one encouragement more to read the book , since it discovers a secret which most men seek more after , and delight more in than wisdom or truth . the politicks of france . chap. i. . what the politicks are . . what their object , end , and means . . the different sorts of governments . . that monarchy is the best . the politicks are the art of governing states . the ancients have call'd 'em a royal and a most divine science , surpassing in excellency , and superior to all others . they have allow'd them the same precedence in practical learning , which the metaphysicks and theologie , have among the speculative . the means which the politicks prescribe , are comprised under the heads of an exact observance of religion , a doing justice in all cases ; a providing that the people be protected in the times of peace and war ; and a preserving the state in a just and laudable mediocrity , by exterminating the extremes of poverty and of riches . the politicks have three principal branches : namely , the three sorts of regular governments , in which men live under the authority of laws . the first is monarchy , in which one only prince doth command for the publick good . the second is aristocracy ; in which the honestest and wisest persons , being elected out of all the subjects , have the direction and administration of publick affairs . the third is democracy , in which all deliberations and orders are held , and do pass by the agency and vote of the people . the principal end to which a democracy tendeth , is liberty . that of an aristocracy , is riches and virtue . the end of a monarchy , is , the glory , the virtue , the riches , and the liberty of the country . a tyranny , the most dangerous of all vicious and unlawful governments , stands in direct opposition unto monarchy . a tyrant commandeth meerly for his own personal , not the publick profit : a king does the contrary . tyranny is destructive to the glory , the virtue , the riches , and the liberty of the people . an aristocracy often falls into an oligarchy ; and this happens when a determinate number of persons is no longer chosen out of the whole to govern , and the choice is made of the rich and noble only ; not generally out of all the citizens . sometimes there riseth up oligarchy , even within oligarchy ; and this comes to pass , when the magistrates are chosen of the noblest and richest of some preferred families , not of all the rich gentry . an aristocracy is in some sort an oligarchy , but much better than that which is simply such : forasmuch as in an aristocracy , justice is administred to persons of all ranks , according to desert ; which in an oligarchique state is not done . a well-temper'd aristocracy is of long duration , and seldom comes into the danger of suffering any change. an oligarchy , on the contrary , such as was the government of the decem-viri , or ten , at rome , and of the thirty at athens , is easily corrupted . for the persons who are in command , do frequently usurp a soveraign authority . such usurpation is not stiled a tyranny ; ( for this is of one alone ) but strictly a dynastie ; that is , a potentacy or power , violently assumed and retained , contrary to the disposition of the laws . the greeks ( whose the word dynastie is , ) do take it in this case , in an ill sense . an aristocracy and an oligarchy are dissolved , when some one among the rich , the noble , or the brave , does attain to an overgrown height . thus caesar became master of rome . the aristocracy is also in danger , when they that govern , come into contempt with the multitude , or are hated by them , so that the inferiors grow factious , and mutiny against them , as hapned at rome , when the tribunes of the people were first created . the apprehensions which the more than ordinary virtue of some excellent persons , gave the people of greece , caused the introducing of ostracisme among the athenians , and of petalisme at syracuse : punishments , but glorious for such as were condemn'd to them . a democracy likewise , sometimes , turns into an oligarchy . and that is , when the dregs of the ignorant people , seduced by evil orators , ( whom the greeks call demagogues , or , leaders of the people ) do dispose of affairs tumultuously , with uproar and violence , without respect to law or equity . thus the athenians seduced by their speakers , did put to death aristogenes , and other captains who had fought in company with thrasibulus , and gain'd a notable victory upon the lacedomonians , their enemies . obligarchies are the means sometimes that people lose their liberty : and fall into servitude . pisistratius became tyrant of athens that way , and dionysius of the syracusians . there are as various monarchies , aristocracies , and democracies , as there are different manners of men . but i have discours'd all this only cursorily ; and i design not any further to engage my self in these matters , my purpose being to speak precisely of the concerns of the french monarchy . there are two sorts of monarchy , unto which all regal governments , of whatever quality imaginable , are reduced ; whether elective , hereditary , barbarous , despotical , or any other . the first of these is entituled , the lacedemonian ; in which the king hath but a limited authority . the second aeconomical ; in which the king hath a sovereign and absolute power in his kingdom , as the father of a family hath in his house . 't is no longer a question , whether monarchy be the best government , the case having been often debated by politicians , and still decided for regality . and indeed it is of greatest antiquity , least susceptible of change ; most conform unto the government of god himself ; and not only represents the authority which a father exerciseth in his house , but it also necessarily occurs in an aristocracy , and in democracy it self . for , both in the one and the other of these states , the sovereignty is entirely one ; so that no single person can possess any the least parcel of it . in an aristocracy , no one of the senators is a sovereign ; but the whole senate being united of one accord , is king. in a democracy , no one of himself hath power to make the least ordinance ; the people assembled are the monarch . thus every where appears an indivisible sovereignty ; so conform to the laws of nature is monarchy . in fine , it may be said , that there never was aristocracy , but founded upon the corruptions and ruins of some monarchy : moreover , that tyranny , it 's direct contrary , is the worst of all governments . now from all that i have said , it follows by a necessary consequence , that the monarchique state is better than any other . chap. ii. . of the true good and happiness of states . . of the true good and happiness of a king. . how felicity may be acquired . things reckon'd under the notion of good , are of three sorts . corporal , as health , beauty , strength , agility , and the like . external , which we commonly call goods of fortune ; as birth , riches , dignities , reputation , friends , and such others . the third sort are those of the soul : these are simply and absolutely good , that is , good of themselves ; and so they can be no other but virtue alone . things accounted good are no further such indeed , than as they promote our felicity , and bring us to it ; corporal and external things are not instruments to effect this . but the good of the soul is the true happiness . felicity is not a simple habit ; otherwise a man asleep would be happy : but it consisteth in action , which is the true use of virtue . the soul makes us capable of living happily : for happiness is measured by virtue ▪ nor can we be counted happy , but proportionably as we are counted good . the intention of political science is , to bring to pass , that men lead their lives happily ; as i have observ'd in the precedent chapter . 't is therefore certain , that it requires they be actually virtuous . all that i have been discoursing is of constant and confesseth truth . whence clearly results , that the politicks consider virtue in a much more noble manner than ethicks do ; for these , confining themselves to the forming of idle speculations , can produce but an imperfect felicity , which the schools do call theoretical . the politicks on the contrary go further , and causing us to exercise virtue , do give us a practical , that is , solid and perfect felicity . in fine , it is not doubted , but the act is preferrable to the habit . besides , the ethical or moral discourses of virtue , can have no other aim , but at most , the welfare of particular persons ; which does not always produce that of the publick : and the politicks , regarding the welfare of an whole state , provide at once for that of each particular ; as a good pilot , in endeavouring the safety of his ship , procures necessarily , the safety of all that are embarqued in it . also , the care of the welfare of particular persons , seems to be beneath the politicks , except so far as it is necessary for the publick good . yet sometimes particular men must of force suffer for the publick good ; as when a malefactor is punished , and when some houses are pull'd down to save a town from fire , and from enemies . the happiness of a state is of the same quality with that of particular persons . for as we say , a man is happy when he hath strength , riches , and virtue ; in like manner we say a common-wealth is happy when it is potent , rich , and justly governed . a monarch is , in reference to his state , what the soul is to man. there is no doubt therefore , but that the proper goods of a king are those of the soul : and that he can possess no other . fortune being beneath a true soveraign , and extrinsick to him , cannot give him ought of that kind from gold or glory : all that he hath doth arise from his own virtue , his power , his treasures , and the various effects of beneficence which he holdeth in his hand , do not constitute his happiness : as god himself is not blessed by external blessings , but only confers them as a distribution made to his creatures , and that he may cause them by sensible means to experiment his goodness . the magnificence of a man renders him considerable , if his spirit in it be great and heroick . but it is not enough to have spoken of that which constitutes felicity , we must take some account of the means which conduce unto it . nature , constancy and reason , do contribute to endue us with virtue . the two former do enrich the mind , and dispose it to receive virtue ; then reason being cleared by the light of precepts , makes it spring up , and cultivates it . of all precepts , those of greatest efficacy are the political , which being indeed laws , do command and oblige men to obey , in a manner , blindly : necessitating and constraining us to live well , whether we will or no. 't is upon this ground it hath been said , that there lies no servitude at all in submitting to the power of the law ; and that it 's the proper act of men truly free , to reduce their inclinations , and subject their practice to the same : forasmuch as the conforming of life and manners to the impulses of virtue , which is always right , always uncorrupt , is in truth a setting our our selves at full liberty , and an enfranchisement from the empire of importunate and irregular passions . but of these general theses enough . it is time at length to enter upon the subject which occasion'd my taking up the design of this present treatise . chap. iii. . of the french monarchy . . of the situation and quality of france . . of the nature of the french. the monarchick government doth not more excell other governments , than the french monarchy doth all other monarchies on earth . it is hereditary , and for twelve whole ages there hath been seen reigning from male to male , upon the throne of france , the august posterity of meroue of charlemagne , and of hugh capet . for it is exactly proved , that these three races of our kings , are branches issued out of the same stock . this very succession , so legitimate as it hath been , and so long continued , makes at present the surest foundation of the welfare of the state ; and carries in it splendor , reputation and majesty . indeed to how many ills are elective kingdoms exposed ? how many cabals ? how many complottings ; and in truth , wars , are kept on foot by so many different agitations ? the one and the other roman empire , and the kingdom of the poles , do administer sensible proofs of this opinion . if the spartans heretofore did draw so great an advantage from the honour they had to be commanded by princes of the blood of hercules : the french have far greater cause to glory ; since in the catalogue of his majesties triumphant ancestors , there may be counted an hundred heroes greater than hercules himself . is there a monarch in the world , whose just power is more absolute , than that of our king ? and by consequent , is there a monarchy comparable to the french monarchy ? it is necessary that the power of a good king be not confin'd within other bounds than reason and equity do prescribe : otherwise there will ever be division between princes and people , to the ruin of them both . what a disorder would it be in man , if the eye or hand should fail of following the impulses of the soul ? this disobeying and rebellious member would prove dead , or seized with a palsie . if then the whole body should fall into an universal revolt against the spirit of man , all the symmetry , the order and oeconomy would be utterly defaced . thus the subjects in a monarchy , once ceasing to yield their king a full obedience , and the king ceasing to exercise his soveraign authority over them , the political ligatures are broken , the government is dissolved , by little and little all is reduced to extream calamities , and oft-times to anarchy , and an annihilation . such are the inconveniencies that occur in royalties of the lacedemonian kind , where the prince hath but a limited authority ; and if all that england suffer'd in the late times were pourtray'd here , it would be easie to observe of what importance it is unto the felicity of a monarchy , that the prince do in it command without restriction . in fine , the obedience of instrumental parts , as those of organical bodies , and the subjects of a state , is of so indispensible a necessity , that the common good and conservation of that whole , which they compose , depends upon it . in democracies , even the most tumultuous and disorderly , all must bow under the will of the multitude , though blind , ignorant and seduced : in like manner , the parts of the bodies of brutes must act by their motions , though they be in rage and madness . and the reason of this necessity is , that the body and the soul , which is the form thereof , are but one indivisible whole ; so a king and subjects are together but one whole , that is , one state. in fine , the french monarchy is accompanied with all the mixture that can be desired for a compleat and perfect government . the counsellors of state do compose an excellent oligarchy in it ; the parliaments , and other officers of judicature do form an aristocracy ; the provosts of merchants , the mayors , the consuls , and the general estates do represent rarely well limited democracy ; so that all the different modes of governing by laws , being united in the monarchy , do render it as excellent and consummate , as reason can propose . the regality of france is therefore of the oeconomick kind ; in which the king hath an absolute power in his state , as the father of a family in his house ; and though he govern at his pleasure , and without contradiction , it is always for the good of his kingdom : even as the master of an house does rule it with an entire authority , and incessantly provides for the accommodating of this family . there is nothing despotical nor barbarous in france , as in the states of the moscovites and turks . in short , our laws are holy and equitable , to a greater degree than in any common-wealth that ever was ; and they are conceived with so much prudence and judgement , that they are apt to make the people happy in the gentle times of peace , and enable them to triumph in the occasions of war. the situation and compactness of france are known to all the world ; so that it would be a needless labour , should i here expatiate , to shew the beauty and richness of our grounds and of our rivers : or declare how we abound in wine , in corn , in silk , in wools , in cloth , in wood , in cattle , in salt , in mines , and in money ; how necessary we are to our neighbours ; and to what degree we may forego their succors and their merchandise . i might justly be accus'd of a fondness for superfluous discourse , if i should particularly consider all these great advantages ; and as much , if i should speak of the pureness of the air , and the incredible number of inhabitants : the most ignorant having a full and an assured knowledge of ' em . i shall only say , that it need not be wondred at , if men whom fortune brings forth , and breeds up in so excellent a climate , be capable of handsomly contriving , and successfully executing the haughtiest enterprizes . in fine , it s an unspeakable satisfaction to a man that sets himself to treat of the politicks of france , that he may know the french , of all the people upon earth , are the most susceptible of learning , of policy , and of government . for if one consider the situation of the country , he may be assured , that the constellations of heaven are eminently favourable to it . the experience and skill of the ancients do inform us , that the situation of regions is the prime cause of the temperature of the men in 'em ; as it is of the quality of the plants and fruits which they produce . the laws of this state being so judicious as they are , do argue the wisdom of those that enacted them ; and of the people that accepted them ; whereof the long duration of the monarchy is a second proof . on the other hand , the great acts of the french do speak their valour . they serve in our age , for examples to all nations in matter of execution ; and not only so , but are as eminent likewise for their counsels : and they have choice of the best generals on earth to lead armies , as well as of the best soldiers . that heat and impetuosity which is taken to be visible in all their attempts , is an effect of their high courage ; and the confidence they shew , with somewhat less of restraint and respect than prudence could wish , can be imputed to nothing but their fearlesness : in fine , the emperor charles the fifth , declared with very much judgment , that the french seem'd to be fools , but were really wise . now , since we know what france is , let us examine what may most conduce to the well-governing of it , to the conserving it in plenty , and in reputation ; in what it may be augmented , and how its interests with the neighboring states ought to be secured . in a word , let us see what way may be taken to maintain the parts that compose it , in so regular an harmony , that they may all incessantly contribute to the weal of the monarchy . chap. iv. . of the clergy . . vseful means to obstruct frauds in beneficiary cases . . of the monastick religious of each seu. our ancestors have ever been great observers of religion . long before the coming of jesus christ , the druids were their priests , and had an entire direction , not only of affairs relating to the service of their false gods , but of those too which concern'd distributive justice ; even in the general assemblies held by all the gauls , whether for confirmation of peace , or for reconciliation of disagreeing parties , who might embroil the republiques , or whether the making of some common national enterprises was in question , still there was no resolution formed , but by their advice . no wonder then , if since the truth of the gospel appeared , and made known the holiness of christianity , the prelates have conserv'd so many prerogatives and considerations . they have been called to the royal counsels ; they have assisted at the decision of the most important affairs , they have every where hold the first rank ; much hath been attributed to their judgments , and the respect had for their character and dignity , hath gotten them great and signal priviledges , which have exempted them from contributing to the burthens of the state ; though at the same time wealth was heap'd upon them by alms and foundations . but as church-men , after the mode of the court of rome , use to convert whatever is freely granted them into a point of religion ; in such manner , that by little and little , they engage the tender consciences of the faithful in vain scruples , and possesses them with a superstitious fear of offending ; they have not been wanting to assert and maintain , that these exemptions and privileges were not liberally given them ; that kings did but settle them in possession of an advantage which was by divine right inseperable from their profession : that they , while men of war fought for the glory and liberty of their country , sufficiently did their part , in lifting up , as as was anciently done , their eyes and hands to god , to impetrate his powerful protection : that their arms were prayers , oblations , and penitence , which they never forbore to use for the publick safety ; that from the caves and deserts whither they retired , they sent up meterials to the highest heavens , which formed into thunder there , might fall back upon , and beat down the enemies of the french name . in fine , that if gentlemen gave their blood , and the people their sweat and labours for the welfare of the kingdom , they day and night did pour out tears at the feet of altars to disarm the wrath of god. upon such reasonings as these the ecclesiasticks have founded their pretences for possessing those goods , of which , publick and private piety had made them proprietors , without concerning themselves for what success the general affairs of the state might have . but this is not all , they have tried by divers reiterated attempts , to make themselves masters of all the temporal jurisdiction , and draw civil causes unto their tribunal : nor have they forgotten any pretext which they thought might promote this dangerous enterprise ; sometimes they have pleaded , that the church alone having right to judge of the validity of marriages , as being ▪ a sacrament , all that depended on 'em ought to be handled before ecclesiastick judges . sometimes again , that christians binding themselves in their contracts by an oath , the cognisance appertain'd to them . such kings as perceived that these attempts did tend to the overthrow of their authority , withstood them with a right kingly vigour . but what difficulties were there not of necessity to be overcome for a full attainment of their end ? and what resistance did not the church-men make to maintain themselves in so unreasonable an usurpation ? our history affords us examples of it , which i cannot call to mind without grief and wonder . their obstinacy hath gone so very far , that they have forced our kings to grant them declarations upon unequitable and disadvantageous conditions ; and so capitulate with them both for the tenths and acknowledgments of the lands which they possess ; as also for the rights of mortmain and indemnity . i cannot tell by what name i should call these proceedings . our sirs of the clergy could not doubt , but that being born subjects of the crown , nothing could release them of this duty ; and that the privileges which they have , or rather which they have invaded , being founded upon the holiness of their character , could not extend to these temporal goods , which always are the states . yet the old error is so potent , and their imagination so strongly prepossess'd for these immunities , that they can scarce acknowledge the kings sovereignty to this day . what clamour did they not raise about the arrest of the last commission of oyer in auvergne ? with what fervour did they charge their deputies to remonstrate to his majesty concerning it ? yet this arrest innovateth nothing ; but is , in all respects , conform to the prescript , and pursuant to the use of charles the viii . his pragmatique sanction , kings and emperors , never practis'd otherwise in such cases . nor can it be deny'd , but that religion coming , among others , under a political consideration ; and kings being protectors of the church , of its doctrine , and of its canons , it 's a part of their office to notifie to men the laws of god. the tables were consigned to the hands of moses , not to the hands of aaron ; and in the temple of god , the law of god was often heard by the people , from the mouth of their kings . 't is upon this account that melchisedec was both king and priest ; and 't is from this intention that the emperors confirmed the first synods , that they sometimes gave judgments contrary to sydonical decisions ; and that other christian princes have had liberty to receive , or not receive councils , though legitimate and universal . nothing is more consentaneous to perfect equity , than that the gentlemen of the clergy be obliged to contribute to the publick charges : they receive vast sums from the state ; and what they pay to the king out of 'em , amouts not to a sixth part of what they duly ought to pay . but to reduce them gently to reason , approaches must be made by degrees ; and in ways that may be to them unperceivable . first , they may be calmly told of the right of mortmain , which being part of the ancient inheritance of the crown cannot be alienated . they may ever and anon be put in mind , that residence is of divine right ; that it is unbecoming a prelate , or an ecclesiastick , to keep a great table , to have a multitude of pages , horses , dogs ; intimation may be made them , that the king intends to restore the ancient law of fiefs ; by which all sorts of persons concerned , are obliged to set forth , at any time , a certain number of soldiers , equipped and paid at their charge . in fine , they may be required to make a new valuation of ordinary rents . for what pretext will they have to complain , or be discontented ? can they find any fault at all in it if his majesty doth put things in their primitive state ; which is the foundation of all publick order and discipline ? other insinuative means may be set on work , which shall make no shew at first , yet may prove in the sequel , of incredible advantage to the king's affairs . while i speak here of the clergy , i pretend not to speak of any but bishops , canons , parish-priests , and chappellans . i know well , that taking the word clerus in its ancient latitude , it may be said to comprehend all christians : but i extend it not so much as to monasticks , who in truth were , at their rise , so far from having particular and conventual churches , as now they have , that they were reckoned laicks , that is , of the people , and had their places separate from the priests . whatever care kings hitherto could possibly take to hinder frauds in beneficiary matters , they have not been able to find means effectual for it : their prudence hath been still surmounted by the pravity of men , which never wanteh artifice and expedients in occasions that concern their profit . however , these frauds are of such a quality , and so important , in reference to the salvation of all christians , that the charitable sagacity of the laws ought to be indefatigably exercised about them : neither pains nor authority should be spared , in a design whose accomplishment is so necessary . and indeed , what mischief doth not follow ; for example , when a wicked man , by intrusion , gets possession of some benefice with cure of souls , all his sacerdotal functions are so many sacriledges ; ( for he is a suspended person , ipso facto ) all the absolutions he gives are null ; the fruits of the benefice cannot be his , because he is not the lawful guardian of it ; and so his appropriating them to his use , is a continued larceny ; for which he is indispensibly bound to make restitution . but be it a bishop that commits this act of intrusion ; and all the consecrations of priests which he shall solemnize are null , whence will result a nullity of all the absolutions those pretended priests shall give . what a concatenation of crimes ? what a dreadful series of evils , simonies , confidences , and other bad means which are used to finger benefices , do tend to the same consequences . sure , the cure of this malady , mortal to so many thousands of souls , is an atchievement worthy of a king. i am of opinion then , that to cut up the root of all these disorders , the king might create a secretary in his council of conscience ; and when this officer is in possession of his charge , a declaration of his majesties should come forth ; by which , to obviate the great abuses that have crept int-beneficiary matters , it should be ordained that all the benefices in the kingdom be registred by the said secretary of that council , and no dispatch there made until the deeds , upon which a benefice is claimed , have been seen and signed , and placed in the register by the same secretary , upon pain of the nullity of all that may have been petition'd for , and granted ; cognizance of all causes arising in consequence of this declaration , must be given to the grand council , and this addition of jurisdiction would facilitate the verification of it . this declaration would produce several advantages . one is , that there could be no more fraud used , in order to demissions , or to resignations ; and the bankers of the court of rome would no longer have means to promote the cheats of pretenders to benefices . another is , that the king would exactly know all that the church does possess in france ; which is a matter of extreme necessity , both for the regulating of the tenths , and also for other considerations . a third advantage would be , that in process of time this secretary of conscience might make a bank in the roman court , which is , to the king , of unspeakable consequence : for by this means , all the money that goes into italy out of france would be known ; and upon such knowledge it would be more easie for him to take his measures with the pope and colledge of cardinals . a fourth advantage is , that the king , by degrees , might become master of all the benefices of the kingdom , in the same manner as the pope is master of the bishopricks and abbies ; which would augment the royal authority . that i may explain my self , i will resume the thing from its original . in the first age of christianity , the first bishopricks were conferred without any bulls from the pope at all . afterward he bethought him , to send or write unto the chapters , who then chose the bishops , and recommended to them , to respect the merit of such or such a one , when they should proceed to the election . i think that alexander the iii. was the first inventer of these kind of letters ; and they were called bulls , because they were seal'd up with the pope's seal , ( bulla being latin for a seal . ) at the beginning , these letters which the popes thus sent , were but simple letters of favour and recommendation : but it hapning that the chapters reverenced them , and that here and there , at least , one , who had obtained them , was chosen ; all pretenders to bishopricks came to believe , that it was necessary to obtain them . thus , what was at first but , as hath been said , a recommendation , became at length a point of right and duty . such was its rise . now this being certain , there may be use made of the example : and thus , when a considerable benefice should be vacant , the king might order , that a letter be written to the patron , and some person recommended to his nomination . there is no cause to doubt , but the patron will nominate whom his majesty hath thus recommended ; so that insensibly it will grow a custom , to take the king's recommendations , as otherwhile persons did those of the popes ; and as the bulls became at length necessary for bishopricks and abbies , so the king's letters shall become necessary for all sorts of benefices , and he render himself master of all church-men . the king , in this , will have sufficient reason , because he being protector of religion , which is the prime pillar of every state , it is his interest to know whether they that shall be provided of benefices , be orthodox , and of good life ; lest they spread some bad doctrine among the people ; for heresies and scandals do cause division in the common-wealth , as well as schisms in the church . besides , it concerns the tranquillity of the state , that curates , who have the direction of consciences , be well-inclin'd for the good of the kingdom , and ready to keep particulr persons in their duty . to descend now unto the case of the monastick religious , and find out a way ( for rendring them useful to the state ) to take them off from that laziness and loathsome beggery in which they live , as also reduce them to such a number as may be proportionate to other ranks of men in the kingdom . it is to be noted , that there are three sorts of monasticks . the first is made up of the orders of s. augustin , s. benedict , s. bernard , and premonstrey . these are they that possess the bulkie riches of the church ; i mean the abbies and priories . the second sort comprehends the carthusians , the minimes , the coelestins , the feuillans , and some others , who possess goods with propriety , and beg not but by toleration . the third kind , is that of the meer mendicants , who subsist by alms , as do the jacobins , the cordeliers , the carmelites , and their branches , that is , the reform'd , as they term 'em , who are issued from them . these , notwithstanding their vow of monastick poverty , yet are not destitute of some foundations : but they plead for themselves , that the pope is proprietor of the goods , they do but take the profits ; which certainly is a vain and frivolous subtilty . the female religious being comprised under these three kinds , there is no need to make of them a separate article . there are too to many monks . it s an abuse so prejudicial to the kingdom , that the king can no longer dissemble it : it is time to take it seriously and effectually in hand . for monks live in single state , they raise no families , get no children , and so are barren grounds that bring forth no fruit to the crown . beside , the blind obedience by which they are tyed to the pleasure of the pope , doth form a foreign monarchy in the very bowels of france ; and into it they train along the credulous people , which is a thing of very great consequence . this politie is founded on the abusive and pernicious maxims of rome ; which too are purely political . for , that the obedience which monasticks give the pope , is religious , there is no colour to pretend : nor is there a christian but sees what his duty binds him to in this case ; and is altogether subject to his holiness in doctrinals , without need of making particular vows to oblige him . the name of religion in the matter , is but a phantasm , and a false pretext which the court of rome assumeth , to augment its temporal power , and to have its creatures in all quarters . by consequence the abuses ought to be retrenched , as was done by charlemagne in his time , and sundry other great kings . but for the effecting of this i should not at all advise , that the attempt be openly made . for that would be to draw upon the undertakers , the importune clamours of all the monks , and their zealots ; nay , to draw rome upon their backs , which might cost them some trouble . in fine , it would be to draw on them the people ; who are ever fond of novelties that surprise them , or are prejudicial to them , and always averse to those which they have foreseen , and are profitable for them . 't is therefore by-ways that must be taken . the first which seems to me fit to be pitcht upon , would be , to require of the monastick communities , that they dispatch missions unto america , and the indies , to convert the salvages , and administer the holy sacraments to christians . the monks , who are commonly imprudent , will strain to set forth the greatest number of their fraternity they possibly may , in hope to make considerable establishments ; thus there will be forwardness enough to embarque . the present juncture is advantageous for this design . for they are charged with more persons than they are able to maintain ; charity being evidently cooled toward them . a second means may be , to debar them the conversation of women . it is scandalous to see religious men receive visits from them in churches ; and there , in presence of the holy sacrament , spend whole afternoons with them . for remedy it might be ordained , that they should have parlours , where women might go to consult them . the thing is a point of deceney ; and parlours , the carthusian friars , and all nuns , generally have . the third means might be , that the fathers of such as enter into religion , should pay an annual pension to the order , by way of alms , during their sons life ; which is the practice in spain . this pension , some will say , causeth in spain an huge multiplication of monks . but 't is not the pension that fills the cloisters in that country ; 't is the licence the monks have to do what they please . in france they are not upon such terms . a fourth means , is to oblige the monasticks to abide in their convents , and not go abroad but very rarely , and for urgent affairs : so do the carthusians . a fifth , to embroil the monks with the bishops ; for which they are sufficiently disposed . a sixth , to prohibit that children of sixteen ( when as yet they know not what they do ) bind not themselves by vows , which engage them for the whole remainder of their lives : but remit that ceremony till their d . year of age. the seventh means would be to suppress that congregation , as they call it , among monastick persons , ( as for instance , there are the congregations of s. maur , ) and command , that the religious who make profession in an house , do there fix ; not coursing from lower britannie , for example , unto paris ; nor incessantly changing , as their wont is , unless some indispensible necessity does oblige to such changes . the carthusians keep in their houses , and run not from place to place : nuns do the same . the voyages of monks , and all their transmigrations , have no other end , but to get an universal acquaintance . beyond all this , it may be declared to the monks , ( at least its a thing that should be done in its season ) how that the king understands not their monastick profession does exempt them from his jurisdiction . thus the orders being purged from their impurities , will resume their ancient iustre , and be true seminaries of doctrine and sanctity . in fine , no person will doubt , but the king may take cognisance of all that concerns the external policy of the church ; because this is in such sort annexed to the government of states , that not a patriarch , nor even the pope himself , can make any regulation of it without his majesties consent . that reason of state which presseth for a retrenching of the number of monks , does also reflect upon nuns ; and that with the more justice , because the greatest part of young women , who become votaries , are driven thereunto by the violence of their kindred . there will never want just means to hinder this abuse from having a longer course . as for instance , young women may be declared incapable of making vows before years of age at the least . it may be enacted , that they never shall be professed , [ i. e. setled of the order ] in the convent where they have had their education , either as pensionaries or novices . this would be well enacted . for oft-times the nuns , in hope to the gainers by their portions , do flatter the silly maidens , and persuade 'em to live with them . all kind of humane iuducements must be remov'd , and the inspirations of the holy ghost , left to their full operation . it may again be ordained , that recluses do take no money , as a portion , but only simple pensions yearly for life , and those likewise cautiously limited . a law too may be made , that the goods which might fall to a daughter from her parents , and her collateral kindred , should at their decease , fall to the state , and the king by representation , be invested with the same right to the goods of the deceased as this daughter had had , to recompence the publick for the loss sustained by a recluse , being incapacitated to raise a family . further , a general regulation might ▪ be made of all marriages of young women , with due respect had to the quality of each of 'em in particular ; and it might be ordered , that in case any of them would take up a religious life , they should carry as much with them into religion , as into the married state . for if the order was ▪ that daughters becoming votaries , should have less portions than those that married , fathers , so hugely covetous they are , would compell them to the cloister . but when they shall find no profit in taking this course , they will rather chuse to dispose of them in marriage , and make alliances by that means . this subject inclines me to say summarily , that the moderating of portions is a piece of the ancient civil law of the french , and of divers other nacions , in which daughters had nothing at all . thence it is as we see in the customs , that a nobleman is licensed to marry his daughter with a nosegay of roses , and she becomes disabled to pretend to any other portion , provided the match be suitable and fitting . this moderation is necessary : forasmuch , as the vast wealth which is given to daughters in marriage , does incommode the richest houses . moreover , gentlemen themselves would no more contract undue alliances ; and so the nobility recover their ancient esteem . young womens birth , their beauty , their discretion , their virtue , and their ability in the management of domestick affairs , would be to them instead of wealth . they would make it their care to lay up a rich stock of so many precious things , that perhaps it may one day come to pass , that men will , as heretofore they did , give money to have wives ; whereas at present , women do so to purchase husbands . i have spoken here of marriages occasionally ; i am well aware , that the matter ought to be reserved for another chapter . to conclude , it s a great ingredient of the glory of a king , to honour the holy see ; to love and protect the bishops , to maintain the gallican church in its liberties ; never suffer that any propositions be advanced any way , that may wound the authority of the canons ; and employ all the rigor of his ordinances a gainst persons , who shall have the rashness to publish a suspected or erroneous doctrine . additions to chap. iv. . that bishops ought to be near the king. . of the pension to be paid the order for a monk enter'd . . monasticks cannot alienate ; therefore neither sell a rent-charge . . they shall not have power to purchase . i have affirmed chap. . that bishops are obliged by command of god , unto residence . this is true : yet forasmuch as they are also the kings subjects , and royal dignity requireth , that his majesty have bishops about him , as the roman emperors after constantine had ; it is fit to ordain , that each bishop be at court three months every year , attending his majesty , to honour him ; during which time they may negotiote their affairs ; and the rest of the year abide fix'd in their diocesses ; the king assigning to each of them the months in which their presence will be needful . in the same chapter , i have said , that to prevent the vast number of monks it should be ordained , that the parents of such as enter into an order , should pay an annual pension to that order during the persons lives . the effect of this law would be , that such a pension being a monachal right in form of clericature given by act of state ; they that would have revenue enough to be monasticks , would have enough to be secular priests . and so persons , whose devotion should incline them to take orders , and consecrate themselves unto god , would rather chuse to remain seculars , than shut themselves up in a cloister all the remainder of their lives . now the more to fortifie this law , it should be added , that bishops make no more priests upon the title of poverty , upon penalty of maintaining them : the reason against it , as to secular priests , being as strong in reference to regulars ; because it is no less a disparagement to the clergy , that a priest monk do beg , and fall into extream poverty , ( which may happen ) than that one of the other rank do so . it is manifest , that monastick communities have no power to alienate any thing ; and that monks do daily re-enter into their estates , which they possessed heretofore . hence it follows , that neither can they charge them with any rents for money taken up : forasmuch as by these kind of contracts , they mortgage their lands : but to engage an estate in such a manner , is to make a kind of alienation . 't is a fetch of the benedictine monks to take up money for rent to be paid by them ; that so they may appear always poor , and have pretexts to solicite the liberality of devout people : also that they may have protectors , for the greater number of their creditors is , the greater is the number of persons interessed in their conservation . yet there is nothing more unjust than this custom : for there are monastick communities that owe more than all their goods , moveable and immoveable are worth . the monks care not though their house be ruin'd , nor though they ruine some of their creditors , provided themselves subsist . for by passing from one convent to another , they are quitted of all the debts they have created . it greatly concerns the publick to prohibit these kind of contracts , that monasticks may be kept from defrauding any man for the future ; and to decree , that the contractor shall pay the rents contracted for , and they bound to do it , both all in common , and each of them in particular : then , that the notaries be fined and declared incapable of bearing any office : or if insolvent , condemned to the gallies for years : moreover , that the purchasers of such rents shall , for their part , pay a mulct of livres to his majesty , and the principal money be converted to his use . besides , it would be very fit to require all notaries , all creditors of monasticks and the monasticks themselves to make declaration of the sums and rents charged upon them , bring in the contracts for the same before commissioners nominated by the king to be registred , and this within a time expresly limited : which being once pass'd , no more shall be received ; and all contracts not registred , remain null , and as if they were cleared . this course would be very severe , but excellent to reduce the folk of the cloister to reason . there is an important observation to be made too , namely , that all the contracts which church men have made , are utterly null , unless their creditors can make it appear , that the money they lent did turn to the profit of the church , and that there was an authentick permission to make such contracts . this doctrine is a point of law ; for the church is ever a minor , and all that it possesseth hath come from the liberality of particular persons ; without whose consent , or at least the magistrates , and such as are capable of it , the ecclesiasticks can make no alterations in the estates they have received . so that the king may not only forbid contracts for the future ; but also declare those to be dissolved , which have been made heretofore , and discharge the monasteries of them . debts have been annulled for less reasons often . it must likewise be prohibited to monks , and to the church , to purchase any estate in land , or high-rents , upon pain of such contracts being null and void in law ; and the sellers and notaries incurring the forementioned penalties . our lords the prelates have lately bethought them , and resolved to compell such gentlemen as have chappels in their houses , where the sacrifice of the mass hath been at any time performed , to profane the said chappels , or endow them with land for the maintenance of a priest . this would be a means to gain the church more than two hundred thousand livres of rent at one blow ; wherefore it will be fit to ordain , that this enterprize of the bishops do not take effect ; except in case of chapels built hereafter , and built for other persons . chap. v. . of the hugonots ; and whether it be for the good of the state to put them out of france . . politick means to extirpate their heresie . . of their ancient confession of faith. a king cannot have a more illustrious object of his cares and application , than the preserving of that religion which he hath received from his ancestors in the states he governs : because diversity of belief of divine service , and of ceremony , doth divide his subjects , and breeds animosities among them : whence arise contentions , war , and in the end an universal defiance . unity of belief , on the contrary , knits men together ; and 't is seldom seen , but that fellow-subjects who call upon god in one and the same temple , and offer at the same altars , do also fight with the same arms , or under the same banners . if this maxim be generally true in christian politicks , and the religion we profess the only one , as it is , that we can savingly embrace , the princes are obliged to maintain it with all their might , and employ that soveraign power for the glory of the true god , which they hold of his goodness . the pagans , whose particular conduct was so prudent and just , and who have left us so many examples of wisdom and virtue , made it their principle , not to suffer in their republicks any novelty that thwarted the common and popular belief ; and they adher'd so peremptorily unto it , that they would not so much as permit any man to undeceive them of their errors . the books of numa pompilius , which had been found near his grave , and contained the ancient religion of rome , the senate caused to be burnt ; because the praetor rutilius , who had been commission'd to read them , affirmed upon oath , that the contents of e'm tended to subvert the religion which the people observed at that time . they refus'd , even to open their eyes unto the light of truth , though known to them , when they apprehended it would be novel to the people . they rather chose to stick to fables , which length of years had consecrated among them , and the multitude was through custom addicted to . thus too the athenians thought they did an act of necessary justice in condemning socrates to death , for having taken on him to persuade the people that there was but one only god. they knew however , that in truth this philosopher was the wonder of his time , the honour of the city , and of all greece : the discerning men amongst them were convinc'd of the solidity of this doctrine , and the sect of the stoicks made profession of it ; so that it must be confess'd , the fall of gentilism , and subversion of idols , is an effect of the hand of god , who alone can work miracles of grace and omnipotence . the kings , his majesties predecessors , have set themselves with unwearied diligence to preserve the catholick religion inviolable : they have never failed to be protectors of the apostolick see , and the church . they expelled the arrians ; they turned their arms , and exposed their lives against the albigenses ; they vanquish'd e'm ; they destroy'd e'm ; they punish'd the poor men of lions : in fine , they have provided that christianity receive no harm in any places unto which their authority extended . the last age produced a new monster to oppose the church . france saw him born in her bosom , and unhappily bred him up , with several complices of his impiety and revolt . history will tell posterity how much blood was shed during the course of well nigh fourscore years to quell this dangerous sect : and the world well know , that the zeal there was to reduce hereticks to their duty , did take up the reigns of six of our kings ; the glory of cutting off the last head of this hydra , being reserved for his present majesty . but it is expedient to see what weapons must be used for an execution so long expected . there is no cause to doubt , but that upon the principles of christianity , and maxims of policy , its necessary to reduce all the kings subjects to one and the same belief : and though they that make profession of the pretended reformed religion , be now without arms , without strong-holds , without treasure , without an head , and without allies ; yet they are not out of case to be feared . they still retain a remembrance of their boldness , and by-pass'd rebellions : they look back on the towns they once seized , and out of which they could not be driven but by force of arms , as if they were their proper inheritance , and had been unjustly pluck'd out of their hands ; they bear in their hearts the same aversion for order and discipline , that they ever had ; and their minds are always inclining to revolt , and to confusion and anarchy ▪ it disquiets them not to think who shall head them ; they have soldiers of their own number , whom they can advance to be captains by giving them authority to command e'm . they persuade themselves , that if they were in arms , they should want neither money nor friends . they believe , that the glory of the king attracts as much envy on him as admiration ; and that his virtue raiseth in his neighbours no less anger than terrour . in short , there is ground to think , that he will have more than an hundred thousand men of his enemies in the heart of his state , while there are huguenots in france ; they too , perhaps , do but wait an occasion to make their musters . thus they are perpetual obstacles to the designs that might be formed ; and though weak , may nothwithstanding be dreaded . 't is true , the honest men of their communion do well know , that they cannot be in a calmer repose than they now enjoy by the grace of the king , and under the security of his edicts ▪ but in these matters the multitude carries it . these are a torrent , that by its rapidity , overturns rocks which seems unmoveable . it will be said , that the good treatment which the huguenots receive , doth preserve the friendship of the german princes for france ; and if favourable justice should be no longer done them , the king would lose the most potent and most considerable of his allies . this discourse is but a found , and void of all substance of reason : for , beside that the princes of germany are not of the religion of our hereticks ; they need not the kings protection for maintaining the huguenots in their pretended liberty of conscience : but the french arms securing them against the power of austria , and principally of the emperor , who hath divers pretensions upon them ; they cannot recede from the alliance they have made with his majesty ; nor will they do it , though the last man of the huguenots was brought to the scaffold : nay , forasmuch as the kings forces are so useful to all those protestants , it will would be their interest not at all to arm themselves for the huguenots preservation , but far otherwise , even to promote their expulsion out of france : and the reason is , because if this party were in a condition to raise stirs , the king would have his hands full of work to repress them : and so his forces being dissipated , the emperor might take his time to enlarge his domination : the thing that charles the fifth did , when francis the first was not in a possibility to succour the princes . it being therefore certain , that the liberty of germany hath its support and prop in the arms of the king ; they are not sollicitous there for the affairs of the huguenots in france : and since the protestants ▪ of the empire are knit to his majesty by other engagements than those of religion , they will continue the same deportment ; and his majesty on his part , will always have the same reasons to succour them , though the time should come that he should have no more huguenots in his kingdom . no succour neither may they hope for from england ; that 's a state too weak to make any trial of strength against france : all the english there are must pass the sea ; and the isle be disfurnish'd of soldiers and provisions ; yet this all would be nothing to purpose : mean time their affairs would lie expos'd to the levity and lunacy of the people . holland and swedeland are of like consideration ; and they both have other interests to negotiate with the king , than those of the huguenots . denmark is defective in power . the calvinists mount unto a strain of policy above ordinary , when they would have us believe , that whatever is not of the roman communion is of the opinion of charenton : the lutherans of germany , notwithstanding , sympathize with them less than with us . thus the king hath nothing to be afraid of from the pretended allies of the huguenots . yet these men , as i have already said , are to be feared ; and they would be seen stoutly to bestir themselves , if some extraordinary commotion should happen in france , as a civil war , or some great invasion by foreign enemies ; in such a juncture they would do as they did in the war of paris : they took up arms , and respectively protested they were for the kings service ; but if the peace had not been soon made , they would not have forborn to think themselves necessary ; and to make all the propositions that they could imagine advantageous to their party . they would have re-demanded their places of security ; they would have press'd for a restoring of their temples , for an augmentation of their pretended priviledges , and for a free exercise of their religion : and , according to their good old custom , have uttered complaints and menaces . but if by ill chance a victorious army of strangers , whether catholicks or religionaries , should enter the kingdom , the king must resolve to see the hereticks declare against him , or else content them in all their pretensions , which would prove an engaging of his state in like calamities , as our fathers in their time saw . it ought to be ordained , that they shall exactly follow their ancient confession of faith which was permitted them in france ; and that such as vary from it , shall be no longer reckon'd in the number of those of the protestant reformed religion , who have liberty of conscience given them . these huguenots have no ground at all to plead the edict of nantes so loudly and bravingly as they do : they extorted it by violence , and with sword in hand : yet was it but an interim , an order taken , until they should inform themselves of the truth ; which they have had time enough to do . but did they not violate it themselves by the war of languedock , that other of sevennes ; and again by that of rochelle ? nay , they call'd the enemies of the state unto their succour , and took a course to bring fire and sword into all parts of the kingdom . shortly , in matter of government , that which is good at one time , is frequently not so at another ; all things must be accommodated to the general rule of policy , which is , that the good of states be incessantly procured . when the edict of pacification was accorded , there was provision made for the welfare of france : if that welfare does now require that the edict be revoked , there is no remedy , revoked it must be , or neglected . from all this which i have said it follows , that the king hath most just cause to secure himself from the professors of the protestant reformed religion , and put them into such a state , as he may have nothing to apprehend from their particular . perhaps it will be said , that 't is expedient there be huguenots in france , because they oblige the church-men to study , and to live with the greater circumspection , and a more exact observance of the rules of their profession . but this consideration is not worth the considering . the church of god will never be supported by these humane means . he is in the midst of it , and governs it himself by his holy spirit , which animateth and filleth it . at whatever time there shall be no more huguenots in france , there will be fewer bad , and a greater number of good men ; which the king should particularly desire ; since states are always sustained by people that love virtue , &c. it passeth therefore for certain , that it is fit the king do disable the religionaties , as to their doing any harm , and as to their giving cause of suspicion . it remaineth to examine what way may most readily and most commodiously lead unto this end . i would not advise that these people of the other religion should be compell'd to depart out of france , as the moors were out of spain ; which proved in the sequel , so prejudicial to the whole country . 't would be a piece of inhumanity to drive the huguenots in that manner : they are christians , though separated from the body of the church : besides , this course would deprive the state of not a few good families , and put the unhappy numbers of e'm out of all hope of conversion and salvation : so that the king , in this concern , should do well as seems to me , to imitate the church , the common parent of all christians ; who , in the remedies she prepareth , ever mingleth mildness and mercy , with justice , and compassion with correction . the first means then which the king might employ , should be to provide , that the huguenots might frequent the coversation of the catholicks with more familiarity than they do . for by this coversation they would , in time , be undeceiv'd of the opinion with which they are pre-possess'd , that we hate them ; they would put off the aversion they have for us ; they would know our deportment ; and be informed of our doctrine in the points that offend them ; because they understand not the mysteries of them ; which would induce them to confess , as st. augustin did on the like occasion , that the church does not teach things as they once thought it did . nothing is to my understanding , or can be , more effectual for the conversion of the hereticks , than this frequent conversation ; it is not possible , but that at length , the spirit of men should yield unto impression ; the plumage of the eagle , 't is said , consumes that of other birds ; light dissipates darkness , truth triumphs over falshood . the second means should be , to confer a recompence of honour upon converts ; and to make a stock for this purpose , which might never fail . i should think it would be none of the best course to exclude the huguenots from all employments ; they must enter into lesser offices , though not at all into the greater . the reason is , because if they be put off from all kind of publick business , they will accustom themselves to tarry at home idle , and their ambition will be extinguish'd in such sort , as perhaps they will make it a point of religion to do nothing ; whereas being taken to ordinary offices , they will habituate themselves to a living among catholicks , and their ambition will awaken , when they shall compare themselves with their superiours . the third means i offer is , to select some particular men , and create them such business referring to religion , as may constrain them to attend the council , and keep following the court. business of that kind may be started to gentlemen , upon the exercise they have in their houses . there is not one of them but is obnoxious to a process in that case ; and the bishops will , with joy , be the prosecutors . besides , the king's procureur ( or attorney ) general is concern'd to know , whether marriages , baptisms , and burials , be solemniz'd with due accurateness in these private houses ; and whether good and faithful registers of them be kept or no : great defects herein being easily supposeable , the same will be just matter of complaint against the owners , as negligent in observing the concession made them , of having exercise in their castles . the like may be done , if others , contrary to the edict , be admitted to these preachings beside the domesticks . a fourth means would be , to oblige the religionists to put again in due state the ancient chappels of their houses , which they have demolish'd or prophan'd ; the pursuance whereof ought to be by the diligence of each bishop in his diocess . there must not be made a common affair of it to all the huguenots in general , but divers particulars only be fix'd upon . and the thing it self is as reasonable as any . for they had no right to destroy temples that had been all along destin'd to divine service , according to the religion of the king , receiv'd by all the kingdom , and also profess'd by our progenitors . the fifth means is , that when an affair of such quality as i mention'd , comes before the council , the deputies which the huguenots have at court in the name of them all , be not permitted to intervene in it . there are reasons for the putting by of these interventions : the first is , that the huguenots cannot constitute a body in france , nor assemble without the kings express permission . the second , that private and particular affairs ought not to be set up in the rank of those that are general and publick . the third , that the king will do justice without their intervention . the deputation should not be all at once abrogated out-right ; but no regard must be had to what the deputies represent in the name of all the party . the sixth means should be , that the king do take effectual order the huguenots may no longer have their dwellings , nor their exercise in places not royal ; at least such as have any lords of the protestant reformed religion for proprietors . as for example , vitrey in bretannie , belongs to monsieur the prince de tarante , who is of that religion ; and it belongs to him by a demise made him of it by monsieur de la tremouille . the huguenots have there a temple and a religious exercise : this town they must exchange , and have another for it given them ; reasons will not be wanting to colour such permutations : there is nothing that may contribute more to their conversion . for it will be an incredible displeasure to them to live among people with whom they have no acquaintance , nor any union , either by interest or blood. a seventh means is , to suppress by natural death , all huguenot counsellors . the chambers of the edict are now of no more use . the eighth is , to give them for their synods catholick commissaries ; such as are somewhat vers'd in the controversies , and have the skill to favour the wranglings that are continually among them . these commissaries were heretofore all of them catholicks . particular synods , when petition'd for , must not be deny'd them ; but national ones should never be granted : and at the close of all their sydonal assemblies , money should be demanded of the ministers for the king's affairs , by way of loan or of tenths , or under some other pretexts . the ninth means is , to get them prosecuted for their common debts , and so cause them to sell , by decree , some of their temples , which sure cannot be judged to be in mortmain , or un-alienable . a tenth is , to prohibit that any subject go out of the kingdom without the king's permission . for the huguenots must not depart out of france ; and they will be compris'd under a general prohibition . the eleventh is , to take order the confessors may intimate to the poorer sort of catholicks , that it is a point of conscience to serve huguenots . the twelfth is , to oblige them on a political account , unto an abstinence from flesh , upon those days which the catholicks do so observe , in like manner as they are already obliged to heed the festivals , out of respect to the publick religion : then hereupon , severely punish such as shall transgress in the one or the other of these two things . the thirteenth means is , to endeavour the marrying of catholicks to the huguenots , and cause the children issuing from such marriages , to be educated in the roman religion . a fourteenth may be , to hinder the huguenots from selling any estate they have in land : for this kind of possession does tye them to the interests of the state. the fifteenth and last , is , to change the place of that academy which they have at saumur , and fix it in some other town , as vange , or beaufort . there is a president for such a change in the translation of the like academy from montauban to pullaurens . the pretext for drawing them out of saumur is , that this town being a pass on the loire , and maintaining the communication of divers great provinces , the king cannot be too well secured of it : beside , this planting an academy at saumur , is an usurpation ; the huguenots having never had a patent for it . it would signifie nothing , should the huguenots alledge , that they have it for a place of security : for they are now as the king 's other subjects be , who do not at all demand any . what would come of it , if all collective bodies should demand places of security ? 't is a madness . further yet , it might be declared , that proponents , who aspire to the office of ministers , should be obliged to teach a course of philosophy , or two years in theology . thus there would be fewer ministers than there are ; and at length , their number being diminished , the number of huguenots would infallibly diminish also . the king might likewise ordain , that the proponents should be examin'd in presence of such commissioners as he should please to appoint ; to the end they might undergo a rigorous trial. for his majesty is concern'd , that these ministers be perfectly well studied , left they prove promoters of sedition , and not pastors . at the time of their examination , the same proponents should be oblig'd to answer all the catholick doctors in any controversial questions they should think fit to move . the huguenots cannot refuse this proposition ; because their proponents ought to be prepared in all matters : and since the huguenots affirm , that their ministers are their bishops , there must no person be a minister who hath not attained to the age of twenty seven years at least . these are summarily the humane means that seem to me most conducible to the conversion of the professors of the protestant reformed religion . chap. vi. . what nobility is . . of the nobles of france , of their degrees , and the ranks of gentlemen . . of the orders of knighthood . . in what respects gentlemen may be useful to the king. having examined what relates to the clergy , the first of the three orders that compose the body politick of france ; it is time to speak of the second , which is that of the nobility : nobility is a quality that renders the possessors of it generous , and secretly disly disposeth their soul unto an affection for honourable things . the virtue of ancestors does make this excellent impression of nobility upon persons ; and there is in seminal matter , i know not what spirituous and energetical principle , that transmitteth and propagateth the inclinations of parents unto their descendants : as is obvious to remark ; not only in men , and in all the animals , which have a natural generation ; but also in plants , and in things evidently most inanimate . this ancestral virtue , verily , gives us the first tincture in order to a right noble accomplishment ; and every man issued from great and illustrious bersonages , does continually feel a kind of elastick impulse in the secret recesses of his heart , which thrusts him on to imitate them ▪ and their memory spurs him on to glory , and brave actions : but if through negligence , or the degeneracy of an ill nature , it so comes to pass , that he answers not the hope which the grandeur of his progenitors gave ground to conceive of his deportment ; in this case , all the lustre of their ancient reputation which environ'd him from the instant of his birth , and whether he will or no , accompany'd him all along the course of his life , it does , i say , by making him be noted , for ( nobilitas a noscendo dicitur ) but promote his shame , and the more conspicuously shew his defects unto the augmenting and justifying a contempt of his person . thus an actual virtue is necessary for gentlemen , that they may be able to bear up the weight of their condition , which otherwise presseth them quite down . the greater the rank and honor of their house is , the greater their dishonor ; and so much the deeper that precipice into which their dissoluteness doth cast them . there are usually noted three kinds of nobility . the first is a nobleness of blood : when the source of a great extraction is hidden in the obscurity of a long succession of years , and cannot now be discovered . this kind is in greatest esteem among men : and indeed we call things that are left us of this quality , venerable , and do bear a sort of religious respect to them : we are generally possess'd too with a perswasion , that whatever is unknown , is full full of mysteries ; hence objects of such a nature are apt to surprise us ; and we hereupon are awed at them , and do admire them . such effects , the greatness of an unsearchable high-descending pedigree does produce . nor need we much scruple to affirm , that this kind is the only proper and genuine nobility ; and that the two others are only nobilitations . what difference is made between a person noble , and one ennobled , is familiarly known . this first kind of nobility is thought to require a possession of the virtue of ancestors , and withal , a possession of their wealth ; this too in so essential a manner , that if each of them be not joyntly possess'd , the nobility is extinct . we daily see proofs that evince the justice and the truth of this notion . be it intimated by the way , that the virtue here mention'd is the military art. the second kind of nobility , is that which takes its rise from offices and eminent employments , unto which the laws have annexed this mark of honour . the third is acquir'd by the prince's letters , which are called letters of nobilitation . it is a right peculiar to the kind to give such letters ; as the roman panegyrist once said to the emperor trajan . it belongs not but to caesar to create a nobility . it is for none but the king to honour brave aud valiant subjects with this quality . this third and last kind is least considered : because the person who acquires it , hath not the virtue of ancestors for a foundation and caution of his own . yet it is sometimes more considerable than either of the two others ; and marius in salust had great reason to tell the gentlemen of rome ; that he had rather begin the nobility of his race , than faintly continue it , or unworthily lose it ; and that it was more glorious for him to transmit to his posterity a sparkling virtue , hard to be follow'd , than plod slowly on upon the slight , and almost effaced tracks of a common virtue which his ancestors had left him . in all these three kinds of nobility , there must be the personal virtue of the person invested with 'em : for when all is done , it is but virtue that confers effective worth . all nations have had a particular esteem for nobility , nor can any well-order'd common-wealth be named , which hath not invented some singular mark of honour to make it conspicuous . the french in this point , have surpass'd and out-done all people upon earth ; as for the first , antiquity , caesar observes , that the nobles , that is , the gentlemen , had among the gauls , as much power over the plebeians , as masters at rome had over their slaves . after gaul was reduced to the state of a province , nobility preserved its ancient prerogatives ; and the emperors knowing , that the nobles loved glory , and sought it above all things , stiled them honorati , and gave them an absolute precedency in all assemblies of the gauls . for the romans had thought it necessary to weaken the authority of the druids . in the time of christianity the same order was continued ; and the nobility gave their suffrage apart in the election of bishops , expresly before the people ; yea , even before the clergy themselves . upon the declining of the empire , the gentlemen did , in france , judge the causes of their equals ; and hence , without doubt , came into use the parliaments , courts and assemblies , which our kings held of their peers and barons ; that is , of the qualify'd gentlemen of their kingdom , when a case of some peer or grandee of the state was to be tried . the nobles were distinguish'd anciently from plebeians , by their hair , which they wore long , for a mark of their ancient liberty ; and when any one of them committed a fault that was unbeseeming his birth , the rest sentenc'd him to depart the country , or cut off his hair ; this was therefore a no less punishment than exile . in charlemagne's time , the gentlemen of france named themselves franks , by way of excellence . in fine , the french nobility hath alwavs had such an high degree of excellency , and so great a pre-eminence , that it was preferr'd in all cases ; as when vacant bishopricks or abbies were to be provided for ; or when the principal magistracy and seats of judicature were to be fill'd up , or the government of important places , warlike imployment , and the leading of armies , were to be dispoled of . to conclude this matter , it may be affirm'd , that kings did take the gentlemen into a partnership with themselves , as i may term it , in the regality ; they honour'd them with part of their power , by conferring on them fiefs , and by entrusting them with the charge of doing justice , and of commissioning officers to that end . hereupon it was necessary to put a gradual difference between gentlemen themselves : nor is it indeed sufficient that they all have so many excellent prerogatives above the vulgar , or common sort , as we call them . for nature is alike in every man , and all men are born equal . fortune on the contrary , and virtue , distinguish one from another . but natural reason requires there be order in all things . 't is order that makes the beauty and symmetry of the universe . now as a musical consort doth not make a perfect harmony , but by a diversity of notes ; so a political state can be neither comely nor compleat , unless there be a difference between the parts that compose it . i know that nobility , being as philosophers call it , an inherent quality , does lodge with its whole essence , in each of its subjects : as the quality of a soldier is , for its essence , in the person of a corporal , as well as of a captain or general officer . yet there is a great distance , and many intervening degrees , between a general and the meanest musquetier in an army . thus the meanest gentleman in the kingdom is noble ; and to speak after the common proverb , is noble as well as the king ; but the one is severed from the other by an immense graduation . so , though all gentlemen be equal in nobility , yet they are not so in riches , in lands , in alliance , in friends , in offices , in authority , in age , and in reputation . again , they are not equal in spirit , in knowledge , in experience , nor in wisdom ; therefore it hath been with much prudence ordered , that they should have some external marks of these differences ; and for this end , there have been created princes , dukes , counts , marquesses , barons , knights , batchelers , esquires ; leave hath been given them to bear helmets and crowns upon their armories : in short , no pains have been spared to find out things that might any way adorn their quality ; and their valour hath been publickly rewarded , for an excitement of others to a generous emulation . here , i cannot forbear to blame those gentlemen who give themselves the title of knights , of marquesses , or of counts , by their own private authority . this is a shameful usurpation ; and so far from heightening the luster of nobility , that it injures them . for a gentleman who takes upon him the quality of a marquess , and well knows he is none , makes a perpetual lye , a thing directly contrary to his honour , and to the profession he makes , of being a devoted constant defender of truth . beside , this huge number of marquesses , lords and knights , does bring those qualities into contempt ; and is a cause , that true marquesses are not considered now , as they of right ought to be . 't is therefore extreamly important , that provision be speedily made in the case . for this confusion destroys the usefulness of those dignities , they being such as his majesty should keep in his own hand , and husband them with deliberation and frugality ; that they might be distributed on occasion , to men of honour , and such as have evidenced a zeal for his service , and for the good of his kingdom ; that the persons also to whom they are granted , might fully enjoy them , with all the advantages and prerogatives that are by custom annexed to them . i will not omit , that it is necessary to give the nolity the greatest respect that may be ; to the end , that citizens may conceive the greater desire to become gentlemen ; which should be granted them , when they have rais'd themselves to a worthiness of it , either by just acquiring a remarkable estate , or doing some illustrious exploit in war. the whole constitution of the nobility is military : nevertheless there have been instituted in france , particular orders of knighthood , of which , the king is grand master himself ; and into which he admitteth such gentlemen as he accounts most worthy of it . such are the orders of the holy ghost , and of st. michael . there are others , of which the king is barely protector ; the order of s. lazarus is of that nature . but this is of no great advantage to the state : because all beneficences , all favours , all honours and employments , should come directly and immediately from the hand and bounty of the king. for the continuation therefore of this order of s. lazarus , his majesty might unite the grand mastership of it to the regality , as the king of spain does . chap. vii . . of the third estate . . of the husbandmen . . of artificers . . of merchants . my beginning to treat of the three orders of the body politick of france , as the clergy and the nobility , leaving the third estate to be last spoken of , is a method like theirs , who having some edifice to examine , do begin at the top ; and settle to consider the upper stories , before they look on the foundations . in truth , the people are the basis upon which all republiques have their standing . 't is they that manure the ground , and cause it to bear fruit. 't is they that pay the subsidies ; that breed workmen , and furnish the merchants . yet that which we call the third estate , does not consist of peasants , or the meer rural sort ; 't is principally the freemen , and communalties of towns , and officers of justice , that compose it . this third estate was not called to the general assemblies of the gauls , either in the time of the romans , or during the first and second race of our kings ; it was well forward in the third before they had that priviledge . i believe , not until the reign of philip the fair. but it is not upon this matter that i am now to insist . however , in speaking of the third estate , the whole popular body is to be consider'd ; and it may be divided into three parties of men ; namely , husbandmen , artificers , and merchants . of the officers of justice we will speak in the next chapter . the least-infected , and best party of the people , is the husband-men that daily labour ; which takes up their heads and hands , all the year long without intermission , keeps them in simplicity and obedience . there cannot be too great a number of 'em ; especially not in france , by reason of the fertility of the country ; and our corn being transported into foreign parts , we ought to make great stores of it , and have as much as may be in a readiness . exact care must be taken , that these men may always be in a condition to take pains : and that they have but little converse with townsmen , whose little labour , and other manners , might corrupt their innocence . and , that ease and plenty do not render them insolent . for there is nothing more dangerous and insufferable , than a sort of rich peasants . no less care must be taken , that an extream penury do not reduce them to extream misery . for too great poverty lying on them , they no longer have either men or cattle : they are ty'd up to ill diet , lodge on the ground : suffer hunger and cold : their children perish for want of food ; there are epidemical diseases bred among them ; they are not succour'd ; they dye away : by this means the country is dispeopled ; and being void of inhabitants , the grounds are unhusbanded , and abandoned . when i shall come to discourse of the finances ▪ i will point out a way to preserve country-people in a moderately-commodious estate : at present i will only say , that it would be to very good purpose to create a superintendant of husbandry ; who should have his eye on those affairs , and see , that the grounds be cultivated , vineyards well kept , and meadows fitly ordered : in like manner as there are masters of waters , and forests , who take care that the woods be not damnifi'd ; and surveyors for the high-ways ; and in fine , jurats for every craft . the second party of the popular order , is the handicrafts-men , or artificers ; these are no less useful to the state than any other . for , besides that manufactures do keep men at work , and engage them ; they are the cause that the silk , the wool , the skins , the flax , the timber , and the other commodities that grow in france , are made use of ; and that country people have the means to barter these things , and put them off ; especially being wrought into wares not made in foreign parts , we shall grow to be further principal manufacturers , as we already are of hats for spain , and stuffs for all europe : which is a matter of exceeding great consequence : and in process of time , when the work is once on foot , things will pass from hand to hand , and oft-times go out of the kingdom . all this quickens trade , and makes money pass to and fro : which promoteth the publick , and therewithall at once , every ones private welfare . 't is not enough to have husband-men and artificers in a kingdom ▪ there must of necessity be merchants also : for without their industry , the artificers shops would be stores never emptied ; the granaries would remain full of corn ; and the cellars , of wines ; and nothing be gone . we will more largely treat of this , when we come to the article of commerce . chap. viii . . of officers of justice . . of parliments , and other supreme courts . . of presidial courts . . of the king's council . . vseful means for the good of the state , in relation to officers of justice . . of sollicitations . if men were entirely just to one another , and each of 'em ( in the phrase of one of the greatest greek philosophers ) a law unto himself ; there would need neither law nor magistrate to keep them in perfect tranquility . but nature being corrupted , we no longer consult that original righteousness , which is inseparable from reason , and which without intermission , inwardly presseth us to render to all their due , as exactly , as we would should be done to ourselves . always self-love , often necessity , sometimes hatred , avarice , or one passion or other , does blind us , and induce us to violate this eminently holy and equitable law ; in such sort also , that we suffer ourselves to be transported unto excesses hard to be believed . we equally use fraud and force to content our injustice and irregular desires . whereupon it hath been commodiously done by wise men , to form , as may be said , a new reason , which they called law. but because laws are of no use , except they be armed with correction to punish such as despise them ; and have some soul , and living principle ; therefore magistrates have been created ▪ who are to pronounce the oracles which those laws inspire , to put the laws in execution , and maintain the authority of them . these officers are chosen of the best and most intelligent men in a state ; and if common-wealths be duly regulated ; ordinarily the rich are preferred before the poor , and nobles before plebeians ; because 't is supposed they have a greater measure of knowledge and virtue ; and by consequence are less capable of certain mean things , in which a necessitous condition , and a mean extraction , might engage them . thus ministers of justice in france , call'd men of the robe , are in truth necessary in publick society . for if there was no evil-doer , laws and magistrates would be of no more use , than joyners , and the doors they make for the security of houses , if there were no thieves : whereas , should not a man in a whole kingdom ever swerve from right reason and pure equity ; there must nevertheless be priests for religion ; soldiers for defence against foreign invasions that might happen ; and people who may some of 'em till the ground ; others apply themselves to trades and manufactures , that men cannot be without . so that these three sorts of persons are inseparable from a common-wealth ; and they make up the three estates we have spoken of , which have been receiv'd without any contest . yet it seems , that of late , the parliaments have sought to infuse into some green heads , that they compos'd a fourth order in the kingdom ; and the same , not only distinct from the other three , but altogether superiour to them , by reason of their sovereignty , and of the power they have to deliberate upon the pleasure and edicts of the king. if they should not be brought off from this opinion , perhaps they would draw the other sovereign courts and officers of judicature into the same error ; an union of them all not being deniable : because otherwise the affair of justice would in france , form two bodies ; which may not be . but from allowing this fourth body in the state , namely that of justice , a ridiculous inconvenience would follow ; to wit , that a sergeant ( or catchpole ) of a village , would be a member of a body superior to that of the nobility ; and by consequence , in some sort , superior to a marquis . for in matter of hierarchy , the last of a more excellent order , is greater than the first of a less excellent one : as the lowest of the arch-angels , is greater than the highest of the angels . but to clear the difficulty before us , it must be remembred , that heretofore in france , the estates which were called parliaments , did assemble twice a year for two considerations : one was , to judge of appeals , that were made from judgments pass'd by inferior officers . the other , to give the king counsel when he demanded their opinion about government of the state. for alway , during the first and second race , the king 's did dispose of publick affairs , as of peace and war ; and this is so much a truth , that if those ancient parliaments had had the disposing of the state , they would never have suffered , that the children of lewis , when they had divided the kingdom among them , should have fallen to make war one upon another ; which could tend to nothing but a publick desolation . they would as little have permitted the enmities of brize , haudet , and fredegonde . in like manner under the second race , they would not have endured that the sons of lewis the mild , should act such outrages on their father , that charles the bald should have given neustria to the normans . in the third race , that lewis the gross should have ruin'd so many great lords ; who made up the greatest-part of the parliaments : that lewis the younger should have yielded up guienne by the divorce of eleanore : that the count of burgundy , and the duke of britannie , and some others , should have leagu'd together against queen blanche . in fine , there are thousand and a thousand examples in history , which ▪ do evidence that these kings always had the free and sovereign administration of their state : nor will there one be found to prove , that the parliaments ever contradicted them . they presented themselves at the feet of their princes , with petitions , and humble remonstrances : they made no resistance , nor exercis'd authority . so that our king 's have been king's indeed , always absolute masters ▪ and for proof hereof , it will be sufficient to look into all the statutes ; there it may be seen how they spake , and what part the estates had in them . the principal end of parliaments therefore was , to the end the law-suits of particular persons ; and people perceiving that appeals brought to them were received , and sentences invalidated ; many , to try opinions in their cases once again , became appellants : by this means affairs were multiply'd ; and that contesting parties might not have the trouble to come up from the remotest parts of the kingdom , deputies of the general parliament were appointed , they also stiled parliaments , and to be ambulatory . the commission they had , was sometimes for three months , sometimes for six , according to exigence of state ; but alway by the command and letters of the king. these parliaments went into the provinces , to judge the causes that were brought them ; almost in like manner as we now see done at the extraordinary sessions : which instead of diminishing the number of causes to be dispatch'd , as had been conceiv'd , really augmented them . philip the fair saw cause to make such a parliament sedentary at paris , another at rouen , a third at thoulouse ; and succeeding kings establish'd others in other cities , as they are at present . from this faithful account it resulteth , that the parliaments are not a fourth body in the state ; but be extracted out of the three ancient orders ; at first they were taken out of the clergy and nobility only : because the commons at that time were not considerable afterwards , these also were received in . other sovereign societies are but images of these parliaments . as to the sovereignty of the parliaments themselves , it neither is , nor ever was other , than an emination of the sovereignty of the king , in whom that quality is natural , and indivisible . the parliaments can pretend to no more than his majesty may please to impart to them . the sale of offices of judicature having been introduc'd , there follow'd divers creations of new officers , both in matter of the revenue , and also in that of justice : among others , those of presidial courts were instituted : which perhaps was done , only out of a pecuniary interest ; a needless degree of jarisdiction being thereby set up , and such a one as tendeth to the involving and oppression of the kings subjects . these courts are so many petty parliaments , in judging supreamly , and finally in some cases : yet by the trick of petty-fogging practice , ways are found to get appeals from judgment pass'd , to be received , and new processes begun , to the vexation and undoing of the parties concern'd . there have been in all times , chief judges in towns ; as bailiffs and seneschals ; a thing of indispensible necessity for keeping the people in order : all the fault that can be found in it , is by reason of their number , which certainly is excessive . 't is not enough that the king hath parliaments and other officers to determinate differenamong his subjects : there must also be a counsel about his majesty ; by whose advice , he may correct all ill administration of justice ; may reverse all sentences given against the mind and intention of the statutes ; and maintain order through the whole extent of his state. this counsel is the sacrarium of the monarchy : and the persons admitted into it , who may justly be stiled the eyes , the ears and hands of the prince ) ought to have a profound knowledge in affairs , acquired by long and approved experiences : they must love the kingdom , the kingly power , and the king's person . they are the seminary , whence are taken intendants of provinces , ambassadors and ministers for negotiations with strangers . the counsel is compos'd at present of gownmen only . it would not be much amiss , nay , on the contrary , it would be very well done : if the king pleased to communicate this honour unto other professions , when there were found persons capable of it : because this preference gives the gentlemen of the long robe too much authority ; whereas there is need of retrenching what they have already ; much rather , than of conferring any new advantage upon them , as we shall shew hereafter . as for the royal privy council , in which secret affairs are debated , and which ought to be of very few persons , that matters may be kept in silence , and not untimously divulged ; i will not speak of it in this place ; nor say , in what manner it ought to be composed : because this depends upon the pleasure of the master of it ; and each king takes a different course in it . there have been princes who committed the principal care of all affairs to one single person : and france hath seen , for instance , the cardinals of amboise and richlieu . others have parted employments , and shared them among as many persons as there were different affairs . so did king henry the fourth . this , in my opinion , was the more wisely done ; for that in matter of government , the great secret is to divide authority , and hold the ballance even between a plurality of persons . history teacheth us of what consequence it was to our kings of the first race ; that they had but one maire of the palace ; and how dear it cost their posterity . upon a like reason of state the roman emperors divided the charge of the praetorian prefect . but ministers , whatever for number , must for qualification , be men of virtue and approved sufficiency : they likewise , after the manner of the aegyptians , ought to be reprehended and punish'd for all that the king does amiss , and contrary to law. the incredible number of the ministers of justices in france , is in truth , somewhat monstrous ; neither is there any disorder in the state , more pressing , or requiring a more speedy application of the royal authority . the truth is , if a man consider this multitude of magistrates , will he not have ground to say , that the french are extream hard to be governed , seeing so many great personages are employed in governing them ? again , it may be said , that this nation , so ▪ illustrious by the glory of its actions , and by so many victories wherewith its arms have been honoured , is yet incapable of virtuous inclinations ; since there is need of force to reduce them to the rule of the laws : though god never gave men a more precious present . on the other hand , can it be affirmed , that our legislators wanted wisdom , or did not sufficiently shew it in making the laws ? yet if reflection be made upon the multitude of law-suits , whereof the vexation is a grievance to the kingdom , may not a man perswade himself , that equity is banish'd thence , and upright dealing utterly discarded ? should it then hereupon be taken for granted , that the private sort in france are not good condition'd people ; can it be imagin'd that the publick government is any thing reasonable and proper for its due ends ? but if a man proceed to penetrate further into the internals of the state , and there behold what a desolation the corrupting of justice hath made , loosning and breaking the most sacred ties of friendship ; in fine , if he observe how the monarchy hath often been in danger of subversion , will he not wonder that the publick fortune hath held out , and families been born up in the storms that have so many times turmoild them ? the excessively great multitude of officers , being the principal cause whence so many mischiefs take their rise ; the remedy must be first apply'd thereto . and this remedy is nothing else , but such a retrenchment as is expedient , or , to say better , necessary to be made . the fewer officers of justice there are , the more soldiers and artificers , and merchants , and the fewer litigious actions will be . for it is manifest that business of that kind has ever multiply'd , as the number of officers hath been augmented : in like manner , as the more physicians , the more patients . to arrive at the end propos'd , it would be convenient , that after mature deliberation upon the estate of france , the number of its inhabitants , and the quantity of law-business , it be advisedly stated in the king's council , what number of officers were fit to be reserved , and of what quality they should be ; then that the rest be suppress'd gradually , as the persons dye away , or at once by a declaration . what , in my opinion , might particularly be done , is as follows . first , the presidial courts being compos'd of officers that are needless to the state , a charge unto the people ; having also but a novel interloping jurisdiction , the fruit of an evil counsel given to king henry ii. and a mere invention to get money ; the extinction of them is not to be doubted of ; but effected by a substraction of the officers annuities . by this means the king will save that pay , which amounts unto a sum considerable to the state ; and the royal jurisdictions , each in its precinct , may do what those presidials , upon which they depend , are wont to do . the presidial clerks place , its being engaged , ( or bound for security to one or other ) as is usual , should not hinder the execution of this . aflair : and when by decease there are no more officers left , care shall be taken of the concern of those to whom the places were engaged , the regulating whereof will by that time have no difficulty in it . secondly , of sergeants , two thirds wholly must be suppress'd . in the third place , all proctors , that are not advocates ; and a certain number of advocates should be appointed in each parliament and jurisdiction , who might do the office of proctors . this is not incompatible . for the thing is already in use many parts of france . the benefit of this regulation is manifest ; in that the proctors are very ignorant that have but a slight tincture of practice ; yet out of covetousness they often draw up writings for their clients , and make them pay as dear for 'em , as if the best advocate had taken the pains . mean time these writings , for the most part , are nothing worth ; and the poor suitors frequently lose good causes , through the naughtiness of their proctors , and for want of being well defended . again , such an order taken , another advantage would accrue , namely , that advocates being proctors , they will be obliged to follow what the judges shall prescribe them ; whereas at present they make a jest of it , and will not plead but when they please . there cannot be a regulation made in france more profitable in matter of justice ; and if the king , in a necessity of state , would make a money matter of it , which might at any time be done , there would be rais'd out of it , for all france , more than millions . but it had need be gone about with a great deal of address . a third advantage by this regulation is , that all advocates being proctors , there would no more slip into the court a sort of young men , who shelter their ignorance and idleness under a lawyers gown and a square cap. in the fourth place , all the masters of requests belonging to the palace , or court ( of justice ) of france , should be supprest . and the truth is , it seems to me a contradiction , that these officers should be counsellors of supreme courts , yet not impowred to judge any thing supreamly . but that the commoners of the king's houshold and other priviledged persons , may not be depriv'd of the benefit of the committimus , power must be given them by special priviledge , to commence their actions , and prosecute them in a chamber of enquests . i say , by special priviledge , because i know the parliaments take no cognizance ordinarily , save of appeals : but in the case now expres'd , this special priviledge shall superadd to them this new kind of jurisdiction . and it will be highly advantageous to those commoners and priviledg'd persons ; for by this ▪ expedient they would get a decree speedily upon one trial , and finally end their business . it is to be noted here , that the first stating of cases , in order to an hearing , is not so incompetent to parliaments , but that they do the thing for substance , upon demands incidentally made . yet this is meant only in behalf of priviledged persons , and all such as claim the right of a committimus . fifthly , the judges provosts of towns are to be suppress'd , and they laid to the seneschalsies and bayliwicks . for , what are so many different officers in one and the same town good for ? in a sixth place , all the courts of the aids should be united to the parliaments ; and this done , when the officers of the supream court in each kind , have been reduc'd to the number which it s judged meet to retain . i will say more of this in the chapter of the finances . seventhly , all the elections are to be suppress'd , and the assessing of parishes , done by the treasurers of france ; of the seneschalsies , by the lieutenant of the province . i shall speak more plainly of it in the chapter of the finances and taxes . where also the suppression of store-houses of salt , and of the gabells , shall be treated of in the article of gabells . besides , the chamber of the treasury , and the court of moneys , should be joyned to the chamber of accompts ; and half of all the chambers be suppress'd likewise . for thirty officers may do all that the chamber of accompts , the treasury , and the court of monies now do , in fine , it is for the king's service , and the good of the state , that all the presidents places be suppress'd , as well those of superior courts , as of others : and the office of presidents be discharged by commission . 't is to be consider'd ▪ that this new order would much augment the king's authority . for what will not counsellors do to obtain a commission to preside ? and having obtained it , what will they not further do to keep and confirm themselves in it ? 't is pertinent to recall to mind here , that the mighty prince philip the fair , at his making the parliament sedentary , made the count of burgundy first president of it . and that anciently , the first president of the chamber of accompts was the chief butler of france : likewise , that at that time , and long after , the chancellors of france were of the church , or of the sword ; and great dignities not given to men of the robe privatively . which being done since , without doubt gives them too much credit , and leaves the nobility too little . it is important that the thing be not continued , but on the contrary , all restored to primitive order . as for country courts , 't is fit they be narrowly limited , and brought to be meerly predial and dominial ; that is , for rents and the fealties of lordships : not capable of determining an inventory , or receiving a suit between parties , for more than three livres . to conclude , the shortning of proceedings in law , would much conduce to the reduction of officers . let it not be objected , that this reduction of officers , and such a multitude of suppressions , will ruin a multitude of families . for though it were so , yet should not the thing be stuck at ; the reformation of a state being concern'd : nor is the ill of particular persons to be put to accompt , when the weal of the publick is in question , god himself , who is king of kings , and eternally just , how many men did he destroy by that universal deluge for the reformation of the universe ? how many isralites did he cut off in the wilderness , to save the gross of the people ? there is plenty of examples in this kind , and soveraigns have a right to do like things with like justice , when the general welfare of their subjects is concern'd . kings are eagles , to whom god gives his thunder-bolts to carry : the strokes that come from their hands do come from the hand of god , whose images and instruments they are . to conclude , it 's a thing which cannot be dissembled , that the parliaments , constituting an aristocratick government in part , as they do , are quite contrary to monarchick government . aristocracy is adverse to regality ; because of all governments it comes nearest to it . as , to use the very terms of hesiod , a potter envies , and is against a potter . be it remembred here briefly , that theopompus king of sparta having created the ephori , at last after a great deal of time , cleomenes was fain to put them to death ; when they had slain king agis . the senate becoming too potent , overthrew the first roman monarchy , and in one word , what hath our age seen in the trial of chenailles ? and what did a former in that of chancellor poyet ? a second source from which the evils of litigious suits do arise , is the sale of magistracies . the emperor alexander severus sound this mischief in his empire ; it having been introduced by domician . s. lewis saw cause to weed the abuse out of his kingdom ; it having got in through the confusion and trouble of some precedent reigns . it will be glorious for the king to do in his state what the emperour severus and s. lewis did in theirs , with greatest glory to their memory . but as policy requires , that in such enterprises , way be made by degrees , and greatest events brought on by small beginnings : so it is necessary here , to proceed leisurely , and with measured steps . the fixation of offices hath been much advanced already : for though what hath been done seemed to signifie an authorizing the sale of them : yet in truth , there hath been ground gotten . to continue the work , and bring it to perfection , there must a decree pass , or a declaration be made , and publish'd at the seal , by which the king declares , that he purposeth no longer to admit any opposition in matter of title to offices . this is just ; for the king ought to be ever master , and have the liberty to bestow the charges of his kingdom on whom he pleaseth , and thinks worthy of ' em . thus no one will be alarm'd : but this declaration will extend unto the price it self , by a consequence easily deducible ; namely , since the principal and essential right to offices consisteth in the title , and the price is but an accessory , as they term it : 't is reasonable , that the price alway follow the law of the title : as the title to a benefice brings in the revenue of it ; and as in marriage , the validity of the sacrament makes the validity of the contract , and of the civil effects . thus receiving no more opposition at the seal for the title ; there neither will be any in reference to the price : and hence it will come to pass , in tract of time , that offices will be no longer security for money ; which will diminish the price of them , and insensibly bring it to nothing . but it is very just too , that the mortgaging of offices , as hath been done hitherto , be obstructed for the future . for the officer may dye before he hath paid the paulette ; whereby his office is extinct ; or if of grace the king revives it , the value of what ariseth from the casualty , is much less than the sum for which the thing was engag'd : so that there must loss certainly accrue . but if the king make a new creation of an officer , all engagements are gone : for 't is then no longer the office that formerly it was . let it not be said , that without the sale of offices , the casualties will be worth the king nothing . for the contrary is true : and if the casualties be worth him two millions , by reason of that sale of them , his majesty will make four millions of 'em , if they be no longer saleable . forasmuch as in this case , they will be no longer hereditary ; and being no more hereditary , they will revert to the king upon the decease of every titulary : and so the king may dispose of 'em in favour of the person that is most acceptable to him , and if it please his majesty , the new admitted officer may fine to the coffers of his treasury royal , as the officers of gentlemen do to the profit of the monasticks . as to the objection , that by such suppression of officers and jurisdictions , and taking away the sale of offices , the king will lose the revenue of many of his clerks places , and of the paulette ; the answer is easie ; for as to the clerks places suppress'd , the king will be recompenc'd by the greater value of those that shall remain ; and as for the paulette , the retrenchment of the wages of the officers suppress'd , will be much more considerable . a third cause of vexatious law-driving is , that offices of judicature are gainful to those that execute them . an evil this , the dangerousest of any that can affect a state ; for all becomes suspected , all becomes corrupt where profit is to be made ; avarice and ambition creep in ; justice , uprightness , and truth , depart : whereupon we may conclude with the ancient proverb , that money doth many things which the devil cannot do . for an entrance upon a reformation in this matter , it would be good to ordain , first , that judges not the kings , should take no more spices . secondly , that judges in the royal courts should not decree executions for their attendance against the parties that are in contest . thirdly , that if spices , ( or fees upon sentence obtained ) be allowed , the parties shall give what they will , as the former custom was , and not be compelled . fourthly , that there be no more transacting by commissaries in sovereign courts . judges should be forbidden to admit any sollicitation from parties at law , even though it be but to let them know the difficulties of their affairs , and put them in a way to clear the same . for a judge ought not to be prayed to do his office , in favour of a man whose case is good , much less of one whose case is bad . chap. ix . . of some general orders in government . . of punishment and recompence . . of royal virtues . in the chapters now dispatch'd , i have inserted many things which may be of use for the kings service , for the general good of his state , and of every of his subjects in particular . in the chapters that are to follow , others very considerable shall be added . however , i judge it not amiss to make here a distinct chapter of some important points , which i cannot easily rank any other where . it hath been long in dispute , whether it be good to alter publick laws ? and upon debate of the question to and fro , 't is concluded , that there is oft-times so pressing a necessity , that it cannot be forborn : but withal , that such alterations must be insensible to the people , who hardly come off from old customs ; and cannot be brought to any new observance , but by a long circumference , and ways to them unknown . legislators are physicians of common-wealths , and in this case ought to imitate the ordinary artists of that profession , who seeing the whole habit of a body out of order , and that to preserve the patient from perishing , 't is necessary to change it , do prescribe remedies , which the more slowly they operate , the surer their effect . now the first law , which in my opinion might be made , or rather renewed in france , is to banish thence all usuries , of whatever quality , except among merchants ; and those should be expresly prohibited , which arise from personal obligations , under pretence of damages and interests ; even interests adjudged by sentence not excluded ; this pretence being but a means to authorize usury , and defraud the law , which forbids it . usury was strictly prohibited among the ancient inhabitants of candie : but the coveting of riches , to elude the severity of this statute , disposed the borrower , that he should seem to have stollen the money he had need of , and which in reality was lent him . by this artifice the debtor was constrained to pay the interests ; which were not adjudged to the creditor on the account of any loan , but in hatred of robbery , which he said had been committed upon him . this means cannot be used in france ; for that theft is there a capital crime , both in religion and in policy . but the spirit of man being unbounded , and having more craft when bent to transgress , than the law hath prudence to hinder evil doing , the taking of damages and interests hath been introduced amongst us ; which is an equivalent to the cretan expedient . for the feigning a detension of money against the owners will , as is done in france , and the debtor thereupon condemn'd to pay the interests , can be no other thing for substance , than the feigning a robbery , as was done in candie . there is not any nation of note , in which usurious contracts have not been prohibited among the subjects . 't is known what the law of the church in this behalf is , and what that of the old testament , so often repeated in scripture , was . usury sure , hath caused the greatest disorders that have hitherto troubled the tranquility of states . the athenians , the spartans , and the romans , did not forbid it only ; but were also forced to abolish debts contracted ; and for publick benefit , rescin'd the compacts and promises that private men had made , though they seemed inviolable , as having been made under the authority of the laws , and upon the security of general custom , which they were not wont to over-rule . an act of very particular consequence all usurious contracts should be annulled , yea the culpable and complices as to the crime of usury , put to death ; the usurer in plato's opinion , being worse than the thief . the second law should be , to permit contracts for annual rent out of land : yet with charge , that they be publish'd for publick security ; as i have said elsewhere , when i treated of the shortning of law-suits . withall , regulating to a denier , the arrearages , which are a kind of usury , but the most tolerable of any seeing there is an alienation of the land ; and it is a fiction prudently hit upon by the popes calixtus the third , and martin the fifth . as for the declaration in form of an edict which is to be made herein ; contracts , even the formerly made , should be reduced to the thirtieth denier . the romans limited use to the hundredth , afterwards to the two hundredth , and at length abolish'd it altogether . a third law should be , that no sum lent to any son of a family , or to others under years of age , without the consent and authority of their relations , do produce any action ; no not thought the contracts be ratified by the debtors , after they come of age . vespasian made a like ordinance ; and there is nothing more effectual to repress the greediness of usurers , or the debauch of young people : whereupon they would set themselves to labour , to exercises and study . the profit which these laws would yield the state , beside their stopping the course of great evils , would be , that persons who are alway concern'd , and impatient to be getting , seeing they could not put out their money at interest easily , and that the interest of their contracts would be at too low a rate , must of force apply themselves to two things , each of which is eminently advantageous to the kingdom . for they would addict themselves to trades and husbandry ▪ or put their money in the hands of merchants to make benefit of it , if not enter into partnership with them , which they should be permitted to do . for usury in matter of commerce , was never forbidden , and is the secret that the hollanders have found , to make all their people merchants . on the other hand , the genoeses have engaged themselves in traffick , upon observing the profit it yielded . the fourth law might be , that gentlemen be disabled to sell their fiefs or inheritances , until they have made declaration of their poverty in open court. among the israelites , lands engaged reverted to their ancient owners at the jubilee . the spartans lands were not divided at all ; i mean those portions which lycurgus had lotted out . the locrians in like manner sold not their estates : the same is observed in flanders . the fiefs of the great houses of bretanie are never parted out . substitution of heirs in france doth hinder the alienation of lands . in spain gentlemen cannor sell their estates : and lastly , the demesne of the crown in france , is in-alienable , which may prescribe a law for all noble families . this ordinance would make gentlemen good husbands . when the jews , the lacedemonians , the syracusians , the romans , and all civilized-people , made a partition of their lands , they consider'd the benefit that might thence redound to their states , and very wisely provided , that all such as possess'd inheritances should fix in the country : having an estate there which they could not carry away , they would love the places where they had their subsistance ; and every one defending his own possession , all would jointly defend the common-wealth , and fight for the publick interests . the fifth law should be , that a gentleman being ruin'd , and having acknowledged his poverty in court , should be no longer noble ; there being no estate so shameful , as that of a man of quality reduc'd to an extream misery . on the contrary , that a plebeian , when he hath rais'd himself an advantageous fortune , which might be limited at crowns , should be ennobled ; provided always , that the profit had been made by laudable and lawful means . a sixth law should be , to hinder the publick begging of the poor , by appointing the greatest penalties upon it ; and ordain , for that end , that every parish both in town and country , do maintain their own poor , not suffering them to wander ; punish all that make a trade of it ; send the stoutest of them to the gallies , and set all the rest on work according to their ability . this is a means to fetch out that idleness which is among the meaner sort . the seventh law might be , to render fathers responsible , as to civil interests , for all the faults and crimes their children should commit while they depend on them , and under years of age ; or , however , whilst they dwell in their fathers house . the mulct to be allowed for afterwards in the patrimony of those faulty children ; this law is in force in bretanie , and was so at rome . masters , in like manner , for the faults of their houshold-servants ; and paying an arbitrary fine besides , because they ought to correct them . in the third place , provost marshals and their officers , for all robberies and murthers committed on the high-ways , burglaries , counterfeit coin , and other the like crimes within their district , if they took not up the malefactors , and brought them to their trial. this law would hinder well-nigh all mischiefs of this nature ; it being , as may be said , of publick notoriety , that provosts hold intelligence with all persons of ill life . again , all lieutenants criminal and judges , for the crimes committed in their towns , by the same reason . masters of inns , and houses of entertainment , for the crimes committed by their guests , while they are in their houses . owners of houses , for the crimes committed by their tenants during their term ; because they ought to know , and answer for the good abearing of such as they entertain . captains and officers for the crimes of their soldiers ; the inhabitants of an house for those committed in it . this is done in spain . in the turkish towns , the townsmen of each street are responsible for what is done there ; and if a man be slain , the townsman before whose door he falls , is sentenced to pay for his blood. this order is excellent . for assoon as there is a noise in the street , all run thither , and the authors of the fact , whatever it be , are seized , brought before the judge , and forthwith punish'd according to the quality of the crime . in paralel to this rule of government in turkie , severest penalties must be imposed upon such as transgress the laws , and especially the laws that relate to publick order and policy ; those penalties also speedily inflicted ; otherwise the said laws will be of no use . for example , 't is ordained in france , that no lackey wear a sword ; that no towns-man have arms ; or that bakers make their bread of a certain weight , or other things of like nature . they that obey not , must be instantly punished , the rich by pecuniary fines , the poor by corporal penalties . the turks cause offenders who have not money to pay their fines , to be beaten with a lath. an eighth law , all printers and booksellers must be forbidden , and that upon pain of death , to print , sell , disperse , set to sale , or keep any book of what quality or subject soever , without its having been approved , and licence given them under seal in due manner ; after which may nothing be added to the book . but as it is just to punish bad subjects , so it is reasonable to reward the good : and them that out of love to their country , employ themselves in advancing its reputation and glory . the king ought to be the sole master and arbiter of all rewards ; and confer them himself , so as they that receive any beneficence of his , may be convinc'd they owe it to his bounty . this would be an infallible means to attract to him the hope of his subjects , and together with it , their respect , whereupon every one would strive to please him , in doing of his duty , and no body promise himself any grace or advantage , but by his merit , his services and diligence . there are several kinds of rewards with which his majesty may honour his subjects ; i say , honour them ; because a subject , in receiving a benefit from the hand of the king , receives withal , a mark of the esteem which is had of his person , and of the satisfaction he hath given in his conduct . nothing can be more glorious to a man of worth ; nothing can yield him a truer contentment . a gift from an ordinary hand is many times somewhat shameful to him that takes it ; and hence comes the adage , that it is better to give than to receive . but when a king is the donor , the dignity of the royal hand doth add to the gift a new quality , which augmenteth the worth and excellency of it : whence it is , in such a case no less praise to receive than to give . this now which i have affirmed , cannot be doubted of : yet it may be taken for evident , that of these rewards , there are some purely honourable , others only profitable ; and a last sort , both honourable and profitable too . the reward purely honorary is , when the king confers upon a subject some dignity which he had not afore ; as upon a plebeian , the quality of gentleman , upon a gentleman that of knight , or marquess , &c. and permits him to carry fleurdelizes in his coat of arms , or some other ▪ memorial of a great action : or grants him the privilege to wear a crown in his crest , or the like . this kind of reward is unlimited , because sovereignty is a source from whence new honours and dignities incessantly flow ; as projections of light do every moment issue from the sun , without exhausting its secondity ; and on the contrary , the more rays that it emitteth , the more resplendent is it in it self ; so the more honours a king confers , the greater lustre he adds to his own royal majesty . the romans , of any people upon earth , did most abound in conferring rewards of this nature : and on that account , brought into use crowns , triumphs , statues , rings , inscriptions , publick praises ; and stuck not to grant deifications , temples and sacrifices : such a love they had for virtue ; and so ingenious were they to inhance the merit of their fellow-citizens : thus inciting them to worthy persormances , and principally to an advancing the power of the common-wealth . for any man that hath a noble spirit , and is virtuously dispos'd , does more to merit a just reward , than he would to gain the empire of the world : because in the issue , 't is always virtue that triumphs ; and oft-times but fortune that rules . in conformity to this example , which both antiquity , and the authors of it , and experience , do render illustrious , the king may honour such as serve him best , with honourable titles ; but ought to punish all those , who , without his permission , dare assume and usurp them . 't is necessary that there be a difference of rank between persons ; and the distinguishing of them by their merit , is to be preferr'd far before all discrimination made by their wealth . it would also be very commodious , that as the honour of knighthood is purely personal , so the king should make the dignity of baron , of marquess , of count , &c. personal likewise ; not real , or annexed to estates ; the said dignities to become extinct by decease of the persons invested with them . this expedient , to recompence men of worth , being well managed , would produce a marvellous effect ; and an whole race , thereby become men of merit . for , what would not the son of one of these personal marquesses do , to prevent falling from that degree of honour which his father had ? and how could he choose but press vigorously on in the court of honour that has been thus mark'd out to him ? but in this case , there is one thing to be further done , which might much profit the state , by laying a more express obligation on the nobility to serve the king : and that is , that the king do give his letters for personal marquessates , in such form as they may be verified in the parisian chamber of accompts , and the persons honoured with them , do homage to his majesty thereupon . such kind of homages have been done heretofore for officers , and even for pensions , though but of two hundred livres . the emperour in germany hath , in this manner , made gentlemen , and counts of the empire , as for example , the late count de guimene ; who had not a foot of land within the emperours jurisdiction . the king of england creates a gentleman , baron , and earl of a barony , or county , in which the gentleman possesseth nothing . the second kind of gratifications and rewards , is of those that are purely gainful and pecuniary ; as pensions , tickets for money , acquittances by patent , ransoms , confiscations of deceasing strangers goods , and the like . these however , carry a great deal of honour with them , as i said afore . the third kind , is of those that are at once both gainful an honourable , as great offices , governments , &c. upon this matter of rewards , there is this further reflection to be made ; namely , that a king never be inform'd of a good action , but he gratifie the actor , either with praises , or with benefits . in fine , all these favours must be regulated by consideration of his service , and the welfare of his state. god , in giving princes a sovereign power , inspires into them affection for their people . but his will is , that it be a paternal affection ; that a king do open his bosom to his subjects , as his very children ; and that all his counsels and designs be levell'd at their felicity ; without which , himself cannot be happy . 't is principally for this great and glorious effect , that kings are images of god , and be fortified with his spirit . i have said , that monarchs are in their kingdoms , what the soul is in the body of man , that external goods cannot enrich them ; that virtue alone is their proper portion , as it is of god himself . it now remaineth i should say what kind of virtue it ought to be . 't is necessary that a great prince have piety , to give his subjects an example of it ; and bettering of them in this , is the security of his state. he must be just to govern them . a government never is of long duration without justice . this queen of virtues comprehends , ( as aristotle judiciously noted ) all the rest . a king i say must be just , to render unto every one , and unto himself , what is respectively due . the third virtue of a prince , is prudence , to foresee of himself what may betide his states . thus a wise pilot hath the skill to foresee calms and storms : he knows by secret notices , whether the winds will be favourable , or contrary to his voyage . the fourth virtue is magnanimity ; a weight this , that keeps the soul always in the same position , and gives it so setled a firmness , that neither good nor bad successes can put it out of place ; and a king appears unalterable : he thus bears up the hope of his subjects ; they look upon him as an assured succour against fortune , and persuade themselves , there is somewhat of divine quality in his person . of royal virtues , a fifth is clemency ; it pertains to the greatness of a king , that he be benign , and do commiserate the weaknesses of his subjects ; who are men as he is . mischances are pardonable , and it seems to me , 't is too much rigor to punish a poor wretch for a crime committed out of imprudence , or by necessity ; and of which he is less guilty , if i may say it , than his ill destiny , 't is to criminals of this kind , that grace should not be deny'd : and when a king gives one of his subjects his life , who hath been condemn'd to death , he should rejoyce more at the feeling in the secret of his heart a will to pardon : than at the having in his hand the power to punish . to give a man his life , is in some sort to create him ; and the preserving of his being , is a giving of it . it would be , 't is true , a great fault , to stop the course of justice , in case of publick crimes , and such as have disturb'd the peoples peace : yet in sum it is noble , that a king be inclin'd to compassion and mercy . 't is an action appropriated unto god , to disarm his anger : upon this ground the roman poet said , that those thunderbolts which jupiter throws , might be diverted . the sixth royal virtue is liberality . one of the ancients pronounced , that it was less disadvantageous for a king to be overcome by arms , than by liberality . a poet introduceth mark anthony excellently saying , that he had nothing left him but the benefits he had conferred . and to say true , a great prince never enjoys his wealth , but when he hath given it . liberality enricheth him , and makes him purchases of inestimable value . for thereby 't is , that he wins the love of his own people , and becomes admired of all others . when i say liberality , i mean a judicious liberality , such as is a virtue , not an exorbitant profuseness ; a liberality alway exercis'd with advantage , and with glory . to conclude in short ; when i consider other virtues , i do not find any one of them all improper for a king ; but it is impossible a king should have those which i have mention'd , without having every one of the rest ; since they are inseparable companions , and must be united to make a virtuous man. chap. x. . of finances , or a princes treasure . . means to make the subjects more numerous . . of the officers that manage the king's treasure . . of the king's demesnes . . means to recover the demesnes . . of taxes . . means to ease the people . . of the free cities . . of the gabells . . means to augment the receipt of the gabells , and ease the people . . of the salt-free country . . of the countries of state , and free gifts . . of the expending of money . . of the reserving it . the art of finances , or the treasury , is a principal part of the politicks ; and so much the more necessary in a state , in that money is the soul of all affairs . a common-wealth is no further powerful , than proportionably to the richness of its publick treasury , and the greatness of the yearly income that maintain it . this the french name plainly importeth ; for finance is an old word , signifying power , and comes from the ancient verb finer , which is to be able , to may or can . three particulars are here to be considered . first , just and easie means to make money . secondly , the prudent expending it . thirdly , the keeping it in , and laying it up for necessities that may happen ; as famine , pestilence , war , fire , shipwrack , and such like . we have in france three general means to make money ; the king's demesnes . impositions on the people , merchandises , &c. of this last i will speak in the chapter of commerce . i will say nothing here of conquests ; which may come in for a fourth means of getting ; i will treat of them elsewhere . before any further advance into this matter , it will be pertinent to observe , that the fundamental wealth of a state consists in the multitude and plenty of subjects . for 't is men that till the ground ; that produce manufactures ; that manage trade ; that go to war ; that people colonies ; and in one word , that bring in money . to make way in france for multiplying of men , and oblige them to marry , the king may at once do two things , after the example of the emperor augustus . first , he may decree priviledges and advantages in favour of such as shall have divers children ; exempting them from guardianships , from being collectors , from commissions to look to the fruits of sequestred lands , and other burthensom offices : he may discharge them from subsidies , and even give them some estate . secondly , he might impose penalties upon those that marry not before a certain age : and take part in the successions of all sorts of persons , who in contempt of law and wedlock , live single , not having impediment by any natural infirmity . 't is upon a like consideration , that i said in a former chapter , the king , to restrain parents from compelling their daughters into cloisters , might declare , that the right of all recluses in any succession , was vested in himself : and 't is for the very same reason that the ancient earls of flanders were heirs to all the priests that were their subjects . now to that which augustus did for the inducing of his subjects to marry , the king might add two particulars : one is , that the first year a man taxable did marry the first time , being under years of age , he should be exempt from all subsidies and impositions , and publick charges , even quartering of soldiers , in case he kept house apart , and was setled in a dwelling of his own . if the newly married be the king's officer , his office should not fall into the king's hand , if he died within the year . commanders also , and soldiers should be dispens'd with , as to their serving for that time , unless on urgent necessity , or some important occasion . the other partilar which in france had need to be added to augustus's ordinances , is , to take effectual order , that persons once married , be not so easily separated again as they are . for 't is to no purpose to contract marriages , if they be not stuck to , and the coupled parties cohabit not . a strange abuse in this matter of separation hath crept in of late , nor know i how the officials have become so favourable in it , or how the parliaments have suffer'd it . now-a-days , a woman that would have , as they say , her swing , and without controul , practice all that her giddy , witless , and oft times wanton humour prompts her to , raiseth stirs in the house , at length tires out her husbands patience ; hereupon , she complains of his vices , hath servants suborned for her purpose ; a divorce comes to be adjudged upon their depositions , the husband is sentenced to yield her up her goods , and not only do that , but also to let her have possession of her dower , or of a good part of it ; at least to allow her a great pension . then this woman reties , takes an house , and lives after her own fashion , which is not alway the most commendable in the world ; her husband the while , sinking under the whole weight of his houshold affairs . had she counted upon nothing else , but that of necessity she must live with her husband , and in his house , she would have formed her self to it , and not have play'd her vexatious pranks ; so she had promoted the happiness of her husband , and of the children , and together with it , her own . for application therfore of a remedy in this case , it must be a law that a wife shall not sue for a separation ' as to person or habitation , but by the advice ' of four of her nearest kindred ; men of known integrity : and that a separation being ordered , either by sentence in court , or by accommodation between the parties , she shall be bound to enter a monastery , without egress again ; nor suffered to admit a visit from any man there ; it being contrary to publick decency , that a woman who hath lost her husband , ( for to be separated from him , is to lose him ) should appear openly , and maintain commerce with other men. on the other hand , her sex , and all seemliness requiring , that in this estate she hide her self , and hide withal her ill fortune , and her grief for it . i would too that a very slender pension be adjudged her . and since husbands will be found in fault on their part likewise , and discover their ill husbandry , it would be very just , that the disposal of their estates be not left to them , nor the possession of more than a part of 'em : as is the case of wives : and that supposing they have children , the money arising from the remainder , should be received , employed , and administred by a guardian : he to accompt for it to the said children in due time . if there be none , the revenue exceeding the pension should be laid out on hospitals , and other necessities of the state. this law should extend to separations already made . and such rigour being practis'd in matter of divorces , there would be no more of ' em . husbands and wives would be under a reciprocal obligation , to live together , and to live together discreetly : so they would breed up a family that might prove the contentment of their life , the comfort of their elder years ; and be beneficial to the whole kingdom . there is a further consideration to be made in the matter of the finances ; and it is this , namely , that it is expedient the king should declare , that for the future he will be creditor , and donotary to his receivers and accomptable officers , fot their wives dotal money , and marriage settlements , and for their childrens portions and donatives : then explaining the late ordinances to take away all difficulty , declare further , the crime of misemploying the publick money to be punishable by death ; and ordain , that the interests , amends , and civil reparations adjudged against criminals of that kind , should fall upon their heirs or legatees . this law is rigorous ; yet it is just and necessary : forasmuch as it will strike terror on the financiers : who having no hope to escape justice , could not entertain a thought of committing a fault that would ruine all that is dearest to them . beside , the romans punish'd even with death , the very friends of those whom they condemn'd for crimes against the state ; the history of sejanus affords unquestionable proof of it . that which we call the demesne of the king , and of the crown , cannot be alienated , nor is it liable to any charge or encumbrance . this law is fundamental in all kind of common-wealths , as well as in france . but here things are judged to belong to the crown three manner of ways from all antiquity : as the soveraignty , the power of war , subsidies , and the like . by declaration ; when the king , by his letters , declares some particular united to the crown . by confession , when for the continued space of ten years , the receivers have accompted for it to the chamber . there are many questions proposable in reference to the demesne ; but it is not our business to state them . chopin may be consulted , who hath learnedly written of this subject . in necessities of the state , divers things have been engaged by the king to the use of private private persons , who have paid in sums thereupon . yet these persons cannot hinder , but that the things may be recovered . and there are two equitable ways to effect this . the first is , by making a principal of what is due to those creditors , and assigning them rents upon the town hall of paris , or some other place ; of which there are examples . for when the king had sold , or rather engaged some rights of his unto particular men , they have been resum'd by contracts for a rent-charge . now those rights were demesne , upon which , to recover the demesne , rents were charged . the same course then may be taken again . nor could the engagees have any cause to complain ; for the engagements made to 'em , are but to secure their due , and give them not any propriety : their security therefore will be as great when they have contracts for rent . for the one and the other pertains to the demesne still . and such kind of impositions in like manner , the power to impose them being royal and dominical , the engagees concerned will by this means have security for security , and rent for rent . but that the king may reap advantage from this exchange , it is necessary to settle a stock for the raising of these new rents ; and to that end , a new imposition must be laid upon the clergy , the countries of state , cities , commonalties , companies , colledges , merchants , and other members of the kingdom , the engagees themselves paying their proportions . there is in this no inconvenience at all : because the demesne having been engaged for the preservation and defence of all the corporations in the kingdom , it is natural , that they all contribute to free it again . the second way to disengage the demesne , would be , by giving ready money instead of rents , and making an imposition for this end , which might be more easie . a reimbursement should be compleated in five or six years . mean time , and before all things , the engagees must be put out of possession , and order given , that the receivers of the demesne do take up the profits . for if any condition be propos'd while the said engagees are in possession , they will make a thousand difficulties at it ; and on the contrary , if they no longer possess , they will readily consent . but that the matter may be transacted with less noise , it ought to be expedited in each parliament apart : or at least the receivers commanded , by virtue of a decree of the kings council , to receive all the profits , and even those of the engaged demesnes . if there be not made a new imposition , in order to recover those demesnes , the affair will not be of advantage to the king ; and there may one be very justly made for the reasons now alledged , and for the putting of things again in order , let us pass unto the art of the tallies . the imposition of the tallies [ or taxes ] is a kind of subsidy or aid laid upon the people . under it , ( in france ) are comprehended the tallion , and the subsistance ; as they term them . the tallie is hugely equitable ; it is ancient ; it is necessary ; and in use all the world over . for there never was people that paid not to defray the publick expences . in france it is so moderate , and may be so easily paid , that it hath been known to be higher than now it is : because the sums that make it up are receiv'd without much trouble : yet at present , though it be considerably diminish'd , the people are scarce able to pay it , and the country extreamly incommodated by it . the prime cause of this is , that the ratable persons considered , the rates are not duely proportion'd ; the rich peasants , the justicers of the villages , the gentlemens farmers , the eleus , and other persons of power , are so eased , that they pay almost nothing , and the poorest of all do bear all . a second cause of the mischief is , that they who are commission'd to receive the tallies , do so run up the charges , that they far exceed the principal , and thus draw money out of the peoples hands , which they can part with but once . when the sergeants of villages need a cow , or corn , or some piece of houshould-stuff , they go to the peasants houses where they know the same is to be had ; there they make seizures , and then sales at what price they please . they seize and sell whatever they find , to the very household-loaf of bread that hath been cut , and is in use : upon this , the poor rustick hath nothing left to help himself , but is utterly distressed , and can no longer do his work . the greatest part of these officers must be suppress'd ; the more there are of them in the matter of the finances , the more disorder and oppression there is . for all of them look for profit ; and they spoil all by their avarice and ignorance . to remedy the two evils that have been mention'd , effectual order must be taken that the peasants may pay equally ; that is , in proportion to the estate they have ; and pay without charges superadded . first , all the taxes should be made real , as they are in languedoc , that every one may pay . secondly , the tax should be levied in kind of the fruits that are receiv'd from the lands and tenements , as wine , sider , beer , corn , cattle , and the like ; the quantity that is to be taken being stinted and fix'd , for example , to a tenth part . a peasant that might have ten bushels of corn , would very willingly pay one to the king , and might do it without inconvenience . but when for payment of forty sous in money , which he hath not , the sergeants and collectors seize upon , and sell the ten bushels of corn , which too are priz'd at an extream low rate , and all is spent in charges , doth he not really , instead of forty sous , pay twenty livres ? this turns not at all to the profit of the king , and tends to the undoing of his people . under the name of lands and tenements this tenth might be extended unto houses in cities , towns and villages , and they ordered to pay a tenth part of the money they might be let out for ; which should be very low rated . in like manner a tenth or twentieth part might be taken upon contracts for a rent-charge . for these are stocks , and a real estate . the ecclesiasticks , who have sure been wary men , have taken their rents in kind , and these sorts of rents are now infinitely augmented . the greatest part of the revenues of the romans and aegyptians themselves , was paid in fruits . they paid their armies and officers with them . many kings have taken a tenth of estates , oft-times a fifth , sometimes a third . it is not necessary that the people have money ; but they must have fruits for sustenance of life . the king might have farmers of this tenth in each parish , or in each election , who might let out under ▪ farms of it to the peasants , as is done in the tyths of the church . if it be thought fit to take things in kind , there must be magazines in cities , as there are store-houses for salt : in them the receivers should sell the fruits , or reserve them , as joseph did in aegypt . the king will need them for armies , for fleets , for victualling places of strength , for transportation into foreign parts ; especially in case of a famine . this is practis'd in many countries abroad , and particularly in italy . what is done in a petty state , may be done in a great kingdom . it is not to be doubted , but that if the tallie were thus rais'd , it would go further than it does , and the people suffer no incommodity by it at all . but one thing which presseth more at present , is , the putting of the country in case again . for this end , the rich must be permitted to give cows , sheep , and other cattle , upon terms , to the poor peasants . this is done in very many places , yea , in the greatest part of the kingdom . the too severe , and over-scrupulous parish priests prohibit it ; but they will not any longer be able to do so , when the thing is publickly permitted . it seems unreasonable , that some certain cities should , upon imaginary privileges , be for ever exempted from the charges of the state ; and mean time , the country bear the whole weight of them . the pretext of these franchises hath induced divers of the peasants to retire to these places . order must be taken in the case , and all these cities obliged to contribute to the expences of the kingdom , which they are so considerable a part of . they may then be brought to pay , under colour of subsistance or loan . there should be garisons sent them , or soldiers quartered upon them ▪ that all the beams of the state may bear their part in publick affairs , and so the weight be more easie to them , whereas one alone would be over-charg'd , and break under it . the third means the king hath to bring him in money , consists in the gabells . some have said , that the gabells are not of the nature of the kings demesne : and their reason is , because the ordinances for the first imposition of them do import , that it was not the kings intention they should so be . the contrary might be true . for , beside that the salt-pits did heretofore belong to the emperour , as goods of the empire , the sums that are raised out of them ▪ are raised by publick authority , and turn to the profit of the whole kingdom : as hath been done for many ages . but however that be ▪ not to enter into a dispute , which can be of no consequence here , i will consider the gabells according to the present state of things . i will not say when this kind of imposition did commence in france ; nor upon what examples of antiquity our kings did ground themselves . not will i explain , how , beside the gabells of france , which are call'd the grand party , there are the gabells of provence , dauphine , languedoc , and lionnois ; because the thing is known , and makes not to our purpose . the gabells are paid in france by two different means . first by impositions ; so in places neighbouring on the salt-free countries . there , for fear the subjects would not take salt at the kings garners , the officers see how many minots each parish ought to take : then a rate is made in the parishes , for it , as for the tallie . the second means is without imposition : this is the use in places remote from the salt-free countries . there , because prohibited salt cannot be brought in , every one fetcheth from the garners at the price currant . the king receives a great deal of money from these gaballs ; but the people pay excessively beyond what comes into his coffers . the infinite number of officers belonging to a store-house , the receivers , the commissioners , the archers , the charges , the portage , the fees of officers , to whom presents are also made , do swallow up huge sums , which the king fingers not , and the people do pay . for there is not a petty gabeller but lives handsomely by his employment : not a commissioner but makes him a fortune , and grows rich upon it , making good chear , and great expences . 't is of very much importance that a remedy be apply'd to the malady ; and in truth , the vexations which the king's subjects do suffer under pretext of the gabelle , are not to be comprehended . the archers enter into houses , to search ( they say ) for concealed salt : in obedience to authority the doors are open'd to them ; mean time themselves covertly convey in some bags : hereupon they form a process ; and the master of the house is excessively fin'd : nor do they depart till they have pillag'd all they can lay hands on . if entrance be deny'd them , they force the house , and act all hostilities : nor dares any one complain ; all are at their mercy ; and thus they ruine the poor persons whom they single out . this is no way beneficial to the king's affairs , nor is it his intention , that his subjects should be so ill treated . but it is easie to break them of this course . first of all , it must be debated in the kings council of the finances , what sum is fit to be taken for the salt ; this sum being determin'd at ten or twelve millions ; for example , two several parts of it shall be set out , to be yearly paid : one for the country-parishes , another for the cities . each of these allotted parts shall be sent into each generality , and thence to the places where there is a store-house of salt. the allotment for the country shall be divided by the parishes , as is now done for the tallie , the subjects among themselves rating every one's proportion . the gentlemen , the church ▪ men , the monasticks , and others , must be engaged in it , and bear their part : because they are charged by reason salt is so dear as now it is ; and by consequence , the king making a change to the profit of all , all ought to be taxed , to recompence the diminution that will follow in the finances . the second sum allotted for the cities , shall in like manner be sent to the generalties , and salt-garners , that such rents as the towns are to pay the king may be divided ; the houses may be measured by the perch , and the rents assessed accordingly ; much like to what is done for cleansing the strrets at paris . the cities that claim a freedom , as anger 's , orleans , and paris , shall enter into this contribution , for the same reason that the ecclesiasticks and gentlemen do ; inasmuch as they will notably profit by the suppression of the gabells , and abatement of the price of salt. for it is to be observed , that that measure which now costs at paris five and forty livres , might amount not to two crowns , and so proportionably in other cities . now the number of perches in each city being known , ( having been taken by commissioners of the kings , who might be citizens ) it will be very easie , on any necessity , toraise an aid from the city , upon the proportion of the said perches , by way of loan or subvention , or under some other title . and that the citizens may not oppose the kings intentions in the matter , permission must be given to each city , to treat every year with what merchants they please ; and agree a price for the salt that shall be there sold through the whole year ; he to sell it , who will oblige himself to afford it best cheap ; ( except the citizens had rather leave it free for all merchants that would , to bring in , ) always understood , that there be no power to compell any one to buy . the like may be done in every village ; the gentleman causing salt to be sold in a servant's name , and making the profit of it . this course , will , without doubt , be gain to the people ; and salt being sold in such manner , it may be brought to pass , that the commodity it self shall pay the rents which shall be due to the king , and they the while , buy it at much a lower rate than they do . so that clearly , all sorts will receive such a proposal with applause . to augment the cheapness of salt , it should be ordained , that it be free from paying to lordships , and by the load , and from imposts . the thing being resolved in the council , the king shall make a declaration in form of an edict , by which his majesty shall take off the impositions upon salt , on condition the towns and parishes will pay him yearly the sums he shall resolve upon in his council : and that until the declaration be executed , the gabell shall continue its course . it would be needful to ordain , that these sums be paid into the hands of the receivers of the tallies . for there would be no more need of a receiver of a salt-garner . what are so many receivers good for , but to consume all ? in this case , the receivers of salt must be otherwise dispos'd of . this declaration would include a suppression of all the officers of the gabells ; for when salt should be freely sold , the king would have no more use of ' em . as for their re-imbursement , provision might be made , either by continuing their wages during their lives , or by assigning them rents , which might be redeemed for little and little ; or by giving them ready money . the people too might be charged with this re-imbursement , in favour of the suppression of the gabells . this affair might be worth the king a great deal , and can never fail of being beneficial : the people will gain six millions by it , beside the quiet it will yield them . it being put in execution , the king may purchase the salt-pits , upon the greatest part of which , he would-previously have the tenth part of the salt , if he took the tenth of all revenues , as i said afore . again , in doing as hath been shewed , he would have an army ready raised : for all the gabellers must be led into the field . there are in their companies notable stout men , who also have been in action . as for the salt-free countries which have bought out their freedom , no one durst touch them hitherto , by reason of the strength of the huguenots , the civil and forraign wars , and other considerations , as the minority of kings , &c. but now that the king is master , and in a condition to make himself be obeyed ; 't is reasonable , that he do oblige so many great and rich provinces to bear a part of the burthens of the state , in proportion to their ability , for the easing the rest of france . and to this end , one of the three following propositions may be made them . first , to take a reimbursement of the sums paid by them ; which re-imbursement shall be made , by granting them a diminution of the tallies , without putting hand in purse other ways . hereto may be subjoyn'd , that the king may not wholly discharge them : because such a discharge tendeth to the oppressing of his other subjects : that a king may indeed augment and diminish subsidies , as seemeth him good , but not extinguish them ; it not being possible , that a kingdom should subsist without publick incoms : that it must be remembred on this occasion , how nero proposing to take off all the imposts that were paid at rome , the senate oppos'd it , as a thing that would be the ruine of the empire . the second proposition might be , that these provinces be obliged to pay the king a yearly rent , by way of supplement , and in confirmation of their ancient treaty . the third , that the tallie , and other impositions on them , be augmented , to even the ballance , which cannot be done any other way . there are certain means to maintain the finances ; among others , the free gifts that are presented to the king by the people of those provinces , which are called countries of state. no other order need be taken with them , but to hinder as much as may be , that the principal members of these states be not in the offices they bear , unjust at the publick cost . yet they must make their advantages in them , otherwise the states would come to nothing ; which would occasion no small confusion , and a retardment of the king's affairs . his majesty might make himself master of the deputations , and gainful commissions , which are given to the states : as for example , in bretannie , monsieur the late mareschal de la milleray , nominated alone , or rather , caus'd to be nominated whom he pleas'd , and there was no more deliberating after he had given order ; 't was one way he had to gratifie his friends . monsieur the duke mazarin , does the same still ; which may , in his person , succeed well : but the king may cause whom he will to be nominated , and the liberty of the states will not suffer by it any prejudice , or innovation at all : for such is the condition of things in these places . i will not speak here of the farms of iron , nor of others of like value . these things run in ordinary course . but having spoken of the bringing in of money , i must speak of a due laying out , and a like due laying up thereof . the advantage of an exchequer doth not consist in the bare getting in of money ; but also in a meet expending of it : and there is no less profit in giving of it forth , than in receiving of it . 't is necessary the king should spend to maintain his revenues . for if all the sums that come into his coffers should not issue thence again , no one , in the end , would be able to pay him any thing . the kings of aegypt , who took a third part of their subjects estates , caus'd the labyrinth to be built , the pyramids to be erected , the lake of meotis to be dug up , and other fabricks raised , which are incredible to posterity . their design was to disperse among people , the treasure they received from them ; and withal , banish sloth and idleness out of their states . these two vices , so dangerous in kingdoms , the aegyptian laws did so strictly provide against , that there were particular magistrates appointed , unto whom every private man was obliged to give an account every year of all that he had done throughout the year ; which was executed with so much exactness and rigor , that if any one had taken an ill course to live , or not preserv'd his estate , he was severely punish'd for it . the same thing was done at athens , and the romans had censors , who took the like care ; they had it in charge , to make a review of all the people every fisth year , and inform the senate of all that was amiss in the commonwealth . i have often wondred , that there is no such officer in france : and that each ones estate is not precisely known , which 'tis hugely important , it should be ; because in difficult times , when the kingdom perceives it ▪ self involv'd in urgent necessities , succor must be drawn from every one in proportion to his interest in the publick fortune , that is , in proportion to what he possesseth in the kingdom . expence must be made with good husbandry ; and a judicious parcimony observed in it ; that it run not out to a profusion on one hand , nor sink into a sordid avarice on the other : if measure and rule be not kept in the issuing out of money , all the gold of asia will be but a small matter . caligula found the way to consume in his debauches in one year , the immense treasures which his predecessor had been heaping up all along the whole course of his empire . thus it is expedient , that a king do cause the sums to be paid which are charged upon the receipt of his finances ; and also that he give liberally ; but always so order the matter by his prudence , that nothing go out of , or be kept in his hand , but for the preservation and prosperity of his subjects . i said in a former chapter , that there were too many officers in france ; that the wages they draw from the king were unprofitable , nay , prejudicial to the state. since the sale of offices was introduced , divers new creations have been made . all these edicts were meerly to get money in some pressing occurrences ; and nothing but the conjunctures of the time rendred them tolerable . now that those occurrences are over , and the conjunctures pass'd , things must be reduc'd to due order , by suppressing all those new officers . i noted , that wherever magistracy brought gain , disorders would creep in ; the reason of which is very clear , and very natural . for it is infallibly certain , that judges will augment the number of suits , while those suits will bring them in profit . consequently , useless officers being suppress'd , and provision made in the case by a due reduction , sufficient salaries must be allowed them , and they forbidden to take any thing of the plaintiff or defendant , upon the penalties express'd in the ancient statutes . and that the king might make a stock to raise those salaries , without charging his finances , it should be ordained , that such as go to law shall , when they commence their suit , deposite a certain sum into the hands of the clerks : this , to be done in all the royal jurisdictions . as for other judges , they ought to take nothing at all : the proprietary lords must defray the charge of their courts , if they will keep up the power to hold them : they having it of the king upon this condition , from the first grant of the fiefs . in matter of the finances , it is not sufficient to have the secret of getting money , and the skill of duly expending it : but there must be also a right course taken to make reserves of it . the romans had a publick treasury , where every year they laid up certain sums for the necessities of the commonwealth . other nations were no less provident . history tells us of the stores of david , of croesus , of midas , and many others . the king having setled an order in his finances , both as to expences and receipt , it will be very prudently done of him , to limit what he shall think fit to reserve : and this reservation should make the first article in his finances , and be continued until he hath in his coffers , in some secret place , the fourth part at least of all the coin in the kingdom : the rest ( if well us'd ) may be sufficent for all the people to maintain commerce , and pay the king's revenues i say , this reserve should be in a secret place , and known only to persons of approved fidelity . for if many had notice of it , such a store might occasion seditions , and civil wars . now a fourth part of the money being once laid up apart in the king's coffers , some addition to it shall be made continually from year to year , in proportion to what comes in anew . yet liberty must be left to persons , for some time , to have gold and silver plate : yea , it would do well , to augment the use and mode of having it , if it may be ; and that for three reasons . first , because the goldsmiths perceiving hope of gain , will not want inventions and industries to get into france as much mettal as possibly they may , either in ingots , or barrs , or coyned pieces . secondly , because by this means riches will be kept in the kingdom , and when a season for it comes , all they that are owners of such plate , may be commanded to carry it to the mint , and there receive the price of it . the third reason is , because the goldsmiths having wrought up , and made plate , contrary to the direction of the statute , ( which undoubtedly they will do ) a search may be made in the case , if affairs require ; a search highly just , and no less advantageous . two regulations must be made for the goldsmiths , and they enjoyned to observe them , upon pain of forfeiting life and goods ; and so strict an hand held over them , that of all who trangress , not a man be pardoned . the first is , to prohibit their working upon any piece of gold , or silver coyn. the second , that they do not change the form of any prohibited plate : rectifie and mend it they may . at the same time , all persons that have any such and would put it off , must be commanded upon great penalties , to carry it to the mint , where ready money shall be paid them for it , at the currant price ; they making proof that they are the true owners ; and this to avoid thieveries which may have been committed . these two regulations will oblige the goldsmiths to make use of new silver , or foreign coyns , and thus they would cause a very considerable quantity of either to enter into france . the state would receive no small profit by taking a due order in matter of coyn. it should be ordained therefore in the first place ; that no more be made any where but at paris ; and all other mints , and their officers , suppress'd as useless . the romans , who had so much money , had but one place to make it in , which was a temple of juno's at rome . charlemain forbad any money to be made otherwhere than in his palace . and the truth is , should all the money of france pass through paris , the king would much better know what quantity of it was in his kingdom . secondly , the court des monnoyes must be suppress'd , and united to the chamber of accompts , as i have said heretofore . in the third place , the value of brass money must be abated ; this kind of coyn being the ruine of the state. it cannot be believ'd how many liarts and sous the hollanders have brought into france . it would be convenient to set the sous at two liarts a-piece , the liarts at a denier , and the doubles at an obole , ( half a denier : ) but this should be done by little and little , and the fall made by degrees , that the people be not ruin'd : mean time , silver pieces of six blanks , others of a sous in value , and of twelve deniers , are to be stamped . brasiers , and workers in mettal , must be forbidden to melt up any sous , liarts , or doubles ; or otherwise use them in work . for after the reduction , a sous , a liart , and a double , would be worth more in work than in money ; and that quantity of them which is in the kingdom being preserv'd , would suffice for commerce in small wares ; they also being less ▪ worth in money than otherwise , foreigners would bring in no more of them . in the fourth place , 't is fit that a gold-coyn be made of the value of the leuis's ; this coyn to have on the front a sun , the face thereof representing the king , with these words about it , nec pluribus impar , and the year it is made in : on the reverse , a cross charged or cantoned with fleurdelizes ; and the ordinary motto , christvs vincit , regnat & im●e●at . of this coyn there should be half and quarter pieces made , as there are half crowns of gold. this new money should be called suns , and all gold louises made in france , forbidden . as likewise all cravens of or sol , and crowns of the queen . new silver-coyn also should be made ; the pieces called monarques , or dieudonnes , or some other names ; in them the figure of the king crowned after the manner of antiquity , with the title ludovicus xiv . franciae rex : on the reverse , a cross with fleurdelizes , and the ordinary inscription . of these pieces there must be some of twelve deniers , others of two sous , six deniers : others of five sous , of ten sous , of twenty , of forty . and to have matter for them , all loueses of sixty must be forthwith prohibited : because a multitude of false ones go abroad . afterward , the loueses of thirty sous , made any where but at paris , shall be call'd in ; and there must the new coyns be also made . they will be well received by the people ; for that every one hath an extream affection for the king ; and because in france we account by livres , or franks , and have no such money ; the quardecues being no longer current . this new coyning of money is likely to bring a great deal into the kings coffers . gold and silver must be held in france at an higher rate than they bear among strangers ; that we may draw it hither ▪ nothing hath brought us so much gold from spain , italy , and other countries , as the permission sometime grantéd , that light pieces should pass . the same thing should be done awhile , for once again : it would cause all foreigners to come and take off our wines , our linnen , and our corn. i should not forget to say , as i put an end to this chapter , that the masters of accompts , the correctors and auditors , having wages of the king , ought not to take any other salary for any thing they do , that directly refers to his majesties service ; i mean , for the accompts of the treasurers of the reserve , and other accomptable officers : for they are paid for this by their wages : practising in the manner they do , they take , as the saying is , two tolls of one grist . i said , that it was not at all just , that the masters of accounts , auditors , and correctors , take fees for the accounts they examine , forasmuch as they receive wages and privileges from the king : also this custom was anciently practis'd , and this would be to reduce things to the primitive state. i well know , that the pretence of these fees is founded upon the creation of some chamber of accouuts , where those payments are made that never go to the chamber ; but this pretext is frivolous ; for the chambers of accompts in montpellier , and elsewhere , ought not in like mauner to take any money for examining the accounts of the king : so these new chambers take away no money from that at paris , that peradventure takes from them the homages , and the verification of gifts ; but in this the clerks only are the loosers , and the master auditors and correctors are not concern'd . addition . of the fine gross farms . i said but a word by the way of fine gross farms , which is one of the projects to raise money by ; the fine gross farms are let upon the merchandise , and upon the receipt of the kings rights ; to avoid the charge of all these , an agreement might be concluded with all the merchants , to pay every year a certain sum to the king at paris ; and upon their doing this , they should not be molested in their passage on the rivers , or by land , for any toll or custom . chap. xi . . of peace and war. of sciences , of arts , of laws , of publick edifices , and shews . . of arms , of arsenals , artilleries , of fortified places and governors . . of armies , of conquests ; how a conquered country should be preserved . either calm or storm , if perpetual , would alike unfit the sea for navigation . the waves must not rage , and swallow up the vessels they should bear : but there must be wind enough to fill the sails , and give convenient motion ; nay some little tempests are of use to quicken the pilots skill ; whom continual fair weather would entice into a dangerous idleness . just so is it necessary , that there still be , in a great state , especially in nations of the french temper , some moderate agitation , and that the noise of arms produce an effect upon them , like that of the winds upon the sea. peace , by general consent , is that at which all politicians do aim ; nor can it be deny'd to be preferrable to war , being natural , as liberty is . yet war hath its peculiar advantages ; and those to such a degree , that we may account it to be of divine right . to say true , what other right did god give his people against the kings of canaan ? in short , war makes the peace of kingdoms the more firm , as a storm causeth the air to resume a more setled serenity . the prudence of laws therefore should have provided expedients for the preservation of states in each of these seasons : and the wisdom of legislators hath been justly taxed , in that they have not sufficiently thought upon this provision . the poet , upon this ground , gives his vlysses all along , the company of minerva , and disguiseth her a great many ways , that she might not be parted from him . in sum , the mythologists representing this goddess armed , and bearing both the shield and thunder-bolt of jupiter her father , do therein let us know , that the wisdom of a good king ought to serve him both for peace and war. and such was the manner of teaching , in deepest and most remote antiquity : philosophy then but growing up , and bashful , durst not shew her full lustre unto deprav'd and ignorant men , to whom she was yet very much a stranger . she accosted them veiled with the shadows of fable ; and went softly and secretly about the preparing of their reason to receive her illuminations and instructions . but to return to our similitude ; a storm doth not reach to the whole extent of the ocean ; and whatever tumults be in some part of a kingdom , yet the whole doth not so feel the shock of war , but that in others , peace subsists ; so as the glory of arms , and the contentments of a full tranquility , may be had together . nevertheless , since these two different times do require like different cares ; each of which were enough to take up the whole application of an excellent king ; it is expedient to consider them severally . peace is undoubtedly proper for the cultivation of arts and sciences . knowing men there must be in a common-wealth ; it being necessary that there should be good men. for knowledge 't is that enlightens our soul , shews us virtue , and inflames us with desire to possess it . i joyn sciences here and arts ; it being impossible that men should have the one without the other . for as they are images of god , they are mov'd by a natural propension , to produce one thing or other ; so that having acquired general speculative principles , they necessarily descend to practical operations , which are perform'd by particular rules , from whence arts take their rise . this is done during a calm ; then the soul , not interrupted by any violent agitation , enjoys , and by reflections , which by its leisure and repose permit it to make , views its self . 't is in these precious hours that it may come to know the dignity of its original , and be assured of its immortality . at such a time , having and keeping its faculties united , it gathers the fruit of a solid wisdom ; which is unto the soul , as the sun is to the eyes of the body ; and being of all goods the greatest , communicates its self in precepts ; whereof law is the abstract and consummation , giving the same spirit to all the people . to proceed : it is important , that cities be enrich'd with publick buildings , as temples , palaces , and other sumptuous edifices ; because people have , by that means , the more affection for their country . the trojans regretting their defeat , were griev'd more for the ruine of troy , than the subversion of its empire . and the jews in babylon lamented the demolishing of the temple , where they had offered their sacrifices , more than they did the loss of their liberty . this affection of people for their country , is likewise augmented by the contentment they receive in it ; and this maxim was a principal reason why the greeks and romans exhibited to their subjects publick shews . 't is in a time of peace that a prince should prepare his forces for war : yea , he ought to be always in arms , they being the ornament of his royal majesty , and support of the laws . a people not armed does degenerate ; and we see , that nations heretofore eminently redoubtable , are now bankrupt as to valour and reputation . croesus after his defeat , counselled cyrus his conqueror , in recompence for the favour which had been shewed him , to disarm the lydians , and promote among them musick , good cheer , and pleasures : so they would never revolt , nor fail of obeying his command . this counsel of croesus was really good : for by that means the inhabitants of lydia lost their former love for war , and forgat their ancient virtue . yet it is not expedient that arms , which are the kings , ( for he hath the power of the sword ) should be in the hands of all private persons alike : and the difference between a citizen and a gentleman , a soldier and a country-labourer , not be discern'd : arms therefore must be in their hands whom the king intends for that employment : and he being every ones protector , securing all by his authority , all others must be expresly forbidden to bear any , without his permission , upon pretence of hunting , or journey , or enemies : and this upon pain of being fined , and in case of reiterated offence , sent to the gallies . these penalties too must not be meerly comminatory , but as they term it , legal , and of indispensible necessity . not that gentlemen should all be depriv'd of the liberty to wear a sword : on the contrary , 't is fit to be injoyn'd them , that they never neglect to do it ; because it is the mark of their quality , and continually minds them of the virtue of their ancestors . it may be prohibited them to carry fire-arms ; yet 't is convenient to permit them to keep in their houses musquers , fire-locks , pistols , and other arms ; for that they naturally are defenders of the state , and by consequence ought to be furnish'd for any occasion that may be offered . for the same reason 't is meet that gentlemen be enjoyn'd to keep their stables stor'd with good horses , to breed up and manage a number of them for their service in war. but to this end , the use of german horses for the coach , must be forbidden , and none of them suffered to come into france : but mares only for breed . lawyers , ecclesiasticks , citizens , merchants , artificers , husbandmen , should never wear a sword , because 't is not their profession ; and i would as much approve a gentleman's fancying to wear a lawyers gown , or a priests cassock . but that no such person do abuse this honourable mark , it must be ordained as a fundamental law of honour , that whoever strikes with a sword , a man , who , ( not being of such profession ) has none , shall be declared actually fallen from all honour , and as a very plebeian , yea villain , ( to use the old word ) deprav'd from all gentility , and reduc'd to the rank of a labourer . since arms are the kings , as i said , it is expedient that there be magazines in divers parts of the kingdom : they , committed to the custody of safe hands , and persons of unquestionable fidelity : in them a store of all sorts of arms offensive and defensive ; ready fix'd , to arm men. there should be equipage for horses , boots , spurrs ; one of these magazines should be plac'd at paris , to cover picardy , champagne and normandy . one at lion , for any occasion that might happen on the side of the mediterranean of italy , of swisserland , or the franche comte . one at tholouse , or some other city of languedoc , for all that might be apprehended from spain , or the sea of guyenne . and one at anger 's , to secure the coasts of bretagne , and poictou . there need be beside these , two arsenals for the sea ; which i shall speak of in their place . it will be necessary to have in the magazines a good number of cannon for battery , and of field-pieces ready mounted with powder , ball , and equipage for the horses of the train . the king should have , for the security of his state , several fortified places in his kingdom . 't is an ill piece of policy to neglect them ; and good heed had need be taken , that he that may chance to win a battel , and become master of the field , do not at the same time become master of the cities also . it is known what revolutions england hath suffer'd by it . and on the contrary , flanders clearly shews what a countrey thick set with fortresses is . yet excess being every where vicious-i would observe a mediocrity here . but , above all , there must be left no fortifications in towns or castles , which belong to particular lords : except the king places in them other governors than the proprietors . these kind of places embolden persons of quality that possess them , to declare themselves , and make parties in a time of civil war : what pass'd at tailebourg in the last troubles , is an example fully authorizing what i have propos'd . i will say more of strong places and garisons in the chapter of the education of children . it is not sufficient to have such strong places , and them well furnished with garisons and brave soldiers ; unless there be given them captains fit to command them , and to be their governors . in each place then there must be four sorts of officers . the governor , the king's lieutenant , the governor's lieutenant , and the major . these all having their commissions from his majesty , it is expedient , that , as far as is possible , their bearing office be limited to a certain time ; to the end , that the continuing of 'em longer may be in nature of a recompence for their services . and they thus attending with the greater diligence to their duty ; i should also wish , that being continued in employment , they should change place . as for example , that a person who hath been the king's lieutenant three years at dunkirk , should go serve as lieutenant-governor at peronne , or elsewhere . not that such a change were fit to pass upon all the officers of a place at the same time . but let their commissions last three years , and every year one be changed , that they may serve together one year only . it is meet to , after the manner of the turks , that their commissions expired , they be kept a year without employment , to see whether there be any complaint against them . these alterations would work two effects equally advantagious to the king's service . the first is , that every one would stick to his duty . the second , that the king always having such kind of employments to give , there would be more persons to hope for them ; which would much more strongly engage them to well-doing . the same usage should be introduc'd , if it be possible , in reference to governors , the king's lieutenants . there is a concluding observation to be made ; namely , that it being the custom for governors to have some companies of carabines , which they call their guards ; they give them cassocks of their own livery . i would have this order changed ; and that the king should every year send each governor a troop of horse to serve about him for a guard ; they having the king's cassocks as a badge of their commission ; and their officers carrying the staff in presence of their governor during their year of service . this would be a means to augment the authority of the king , and not diminish that of the governors . as to armies , it cannot be precisely said of what number of men they should consist ; nor whether they ought to be strongest in horse or in foot. this wholly depends upon the enterprizes that are made , upon the quality of the country , and nature of the enemy . i should advise , that a great king do keep troops on foot , even during peace , nothing is so necessary to a state as old soldiers . augustus , after his victories , did not cashier the forty roman legions ; which prov'd to be the safety of the empire . constantine , on the contrary , disbanded them ; and thence came , in the issue , the dissolution of the power of the romans augustus however , and the other caesars , committed a great fault in keeping the pretorians in a body , for the grandeur of their persons ; and history tells us what lamentable changes they made in the succession of the emperors . the turks have fallen into like disasters by following the like usage . i should therefore judge it expedient to divide the troops into several quarters , and keep them in far distant garisons . the ancient kings of aegypt had a great many soldiers perpetually in pay , and were always apprehensive of their instructions : but found a way to secure themselves from all such seditions of their armies . dividing them into bodies , according to the diversity of nations , they gave them different ensigns ; as for instance , to some a crocodile ; to others a dog ; to a third sort a cat ; and so the rest . now the aegyptians being hugely superstitious , they were easily induced to believe , that their tutelary deities were included in the figure of those beasts which were given them for ensigns ; and that they had the same antipathies among them in heaven , which those beasts that represented them , had to one another upon earth . thus under a veil of religion , those people were possess'd with an aversion for each other , like those animals which they had been ordered to carry in their banners ; yet all were close united , and perfectly at accord for the common defence of the state : so nothing could be executed against the intentions of the prince ; because as soon as any should begin to stir , the rest would immediately have opposed them . upon this example the king might divide all his troops by provinces ; and though there should be no engaging of religion in the case , yet much advantage would , without fail , be drawn from thence . for the nations would strive to out-vie one another , with more zeal and ardor than the regiments now do . these regiments themselves might have names given them from the arms of their provinces ; as that of the bretons might be called the regiment of the ermine ; that of the normans the regiment of the leopards , &c. jutius caesar raised a new legion among the gauls , and gave it the name of the lark . but what i say in this particular , is but the giving my opinion . for i am not of the mind , that the order of the militia should be changed , or regiments disbanded , which consist of the best and most war-like troops that are in the world. 't is ordinarily a great question ; of what soldiers an army should be composed . we have subjects and forreigners . the subjects are gentlemen and plebeians . the plebeians are citizens and rusticks . on the other hand , of forreigners , some are the auxiliary troops of allies , which serve at the cost of their own princes : as when the king sent succors into germany , and unto the hollanders : others are troops that serve at the cost of the state which employs them . the ancients termed them mercinaries . such at this time are the suissers , and not a few germans . all these different sorts of soldiers may be used , as necessity and the conjuncture of affairs requires . the romans did so . it is true , by their treaties of alliance they always obliged their allies to send them a certain number of soldiers ; but these were not incorporated with their legions ; and it is clear , that subjects are ever best ; of subjects , gentlemen have ordinarily more courage than others . of plebeians , those of the country are to be preferred before the inhabitants of cities ; because peasants are more accustomed to labour and hardship than townsmen are . auxiliary troops serve but for a time ; and often , when some continuation of service is demanded of them , they impose hard conditions . mercenaries will have money , and care not if a state be ruin'd , so themselves are paid . in fine , strangers may on the suddain change interests and party ; so of friends becoming enemies ; and that in occasions of greatest importance . mercenaries above all , do serve without affection , and seldom stand it out in fight unto the utmost . they push on a victory indeed , but scarce ever win a battel . in short , strangers should be as little made use of as possible : and scarce for any other cause , but that enemies might be deprived of their aid . when strangers only are taken into service , the subjects grow less war-like , and the most considerable of them despise war , as is done in spain ; and extreamly ill done . the carthaginians were ruined principally by the fault they committed in employing numidian troops and other strangers ; and not sending out their own citizens in their armies . i will not here speak of the art of war ; 't is a matter that deserves a chapter apart . yet i will say cursorily , that the rules of it change as time and seasons do . we neither attack places nor defend them , in the very manner that the ancients did . there is also a great deal of difference between their way of fighting and ours ; so that they had not the arms which we now use . all of precept for the leading of an army , that faileth not nor changeth , is , that discipline be exercised ; wherein commanders should never be remiss . the only school of war , is war it self : and twenty years experience will better make a great captain than an hundred years reading . not but that we have examples of general command given to persons , who never were in armies afore . there are elevated spirits , to whom nothing is impossible ; but the instances are rare ; and 't is too too hazardous a course to rely upon them . for a captain must have , not only spirit and courage , but also credit with his soldiers ; which cannot be gotten but by service . in fine , it is necessary for a great state to keep war on foot , and men of quality must be employed in it : to the end there may always be a stock of good soldiers , and a breed of generals . these two things give a nation marvellous advantages and esteem among foreigners . though france now be a most powerful monarchy , by means of its extent , of its scituation , the fruitfulness of the soil , the number of its inhabitants ; and though greatest states have not always most strength , as biggest men are not always stoutest ; yet were it to be wish'd , that the king did add unto his kingdom , first all the low countrys to the rhyne . this conquest would re-settle him in possession of the ancient demain of his predecessors , giving france gain its primitive limits . it would make him master of the northern seas , and by consequence , arbitrator between the crowns of sweden and denmark , poland , &c. conquest must be aspired to out of a thirst of empire , being an unjust thing , ( if we believe aristotle : for i would not determine , but that the right of war were a very lawful right , consonant to what i have said in the beginning of this chapter ; ) but the desire of conquest should principally be for the doing of good to all men ; which is the end why god gave them laws . the more subjects and power a just prince hath , the better will it be for the world. secondly , it were convenient that the king had strasbourg , to keep all germany quiet . in the third place , he need have the franche county , to lay a restraint upon the suisses , least dividing themselves between the empire and france , or serving spain in a war there , they strengthen his enemies . in the fourth place , milan is necessary in respect of italy , to give the lesser sovereigns and republiques protection , and ballance the power which the king of spain hath usurp'd there . in the fifth place , genoa and all its territory , pertains to the king : nor would the genoese have revolted , had it not been for the bad counsel given to francis the first , to discontent doria. genoa would make the king master of the mediteranean sea ; beside , those two acquisitions would keep the duke of savoy lock'd up within french territories : so he would never depart from the king's service , being entirely his dependant . we must re-enter the isle of elba , and into portolongone , and piombino , on the continent , to drive the spaniards out of italy . here our nearness would keep the duke of florence , the dukes of parma , of modena , and of mantua , and even the state of the pope , in a submission for france . corsica would not stand out after the reduction of genoa ; and then sardinia would be no difficult conquest . this would strongly favour any stirs on the account of liberty or discontent that might be raised in the kingdoms of sicily and naples : nor would it be an hard matter to raise them in time . on the coast of bayonne there would be need of fuentaravia ; and those parts of the kingdom of navarr which the spaniards have in possession , might be justly re-demanded . the king might also carry his arms into catalonia : we have ancient pretensions there ; and the conquests of it would be no less easily atchieved than it was in the time of the last war. majorca and minorca would follow without trouble . thus the king would be absolute umpire of the mediterranean , and of all the fortune of the spaniards . if it should happen one day that the queen , or her descendants , should have an hereditary right there , the king would be in a condition to do himself reason in these matters . the means of making these conquests severally , cannot be shewed without particular discourses . mean time , what i have said is not , in truth , to be done in a day : it would be an enterprise of many years . yet there is nothing of meer fancy it it . i propose no conquest to be made but what hath really been made , except that of the isles of the mediterranean , which our kings never minded ; for that before charles the eighth they never were in case to strengthen themselves at sea. bretagnie was separted from the kingdom , the wars of italy took up every reign unto henry the second . then follow'd the affairs of religion , which put a stop to all the designs that might have been formed in this behalf . here one thing i suggested in the precedent chapter , is to be remembred ; namely , that conquests do afford a state one expedient to get money . in this the roman captains are to be imitated ; who made it a point of glory to lay up extraordinary sums in the publick treasury ; and their triumphs were as illustrious by the wealth they brought home with them , as by the enemies they had defeated in their expeditions . it would be very material therefore , that generals should account it a glory to them , to bring the spoils of their enemies unto the profit of the king and kingdom ; or at least make the conquered countrys maintain and pay their armies . but the difficulty is not to make conquests ; the arms of the french will be victorious wherever they appear . all the trouble is to find out the secret how to keep what hath been gotten . it is fit to say something on this particular . the means to preserve conquer'd countrys which the ancients used , and that with good success , are in a manner these . transportations , and shiftings of the people . as when the chaldeans led away the jews to babylon . the taking away of their money , of their richest goods , their antiquities , their holy things and things of religion ; as was done with the ancient idol-gods , and as the ark of the covenant , the tables of moses , and the israelites holy writings , were dealt withall . the same for substance might be done among us , by shifting of saints reliques and consecrated images . the leading away of the ablest men , and such as have greatest credit with the people . so did the romans when they carried some of the greeks out of their country to rome , and treated them there with all possible kindness and civility . in like manner as to artificers : the turks drew at one time work-men out of persia . the romans , out of their enemies whom they had vanquish'd and taken in war , reserved those whom they thought stoutest , and made them fight on the theatre , the people being spectators , destroying them by that means . christianity suffers not such inhumanity . slavery was alway practis'd in the case of prisoners of war , and the ransom we make them pay , is an image of that old custom . some people to this day stay their prisoners , or send them away to punishment , after the fashion of the ancients . to proceed , other means in reference to conquer'd countrys are , the mixing of the old and new subjects by marriage , the conquerors accommodating themselves to the manners of the conquered , taking up their modes , eating with them , as alexander demeaned himself towards the persians . then again , the ruining the fortifications of their towns ; the taking hostages of them : the taking away their arms , and keeping them weak ; the abstaining from their wives ; the giving them no jealousie in matter of love. to have little converse with them , especially in their houses ; and when any is , to see it be with seriousness and decency ; to honour them ; to do them a pleasure on occasion ; not play with them ; not pick any quarrel with them : not touch their liberty , nor the goods that have been left them : not disquiet them for matters of religion . to do them justice , maintain them in their laws and customs , and in their manner of government , as the romans did ; who permitted the people whom they had subdued , to have their accustomed laws to be diffedent of them , and shew a confiderde in them . to appear not desirous of their secrets : not interrupt them in their pleasures : make them pay the tribute agreed upon with them exactly , not at all augmenting it . to keep word with them in all things , seldom meddle in their affairs , except it be to accord them : to lend them no money ; but owe them some , and punctually pay the interests of it : not let them know the true state of affairs ; not give them entrance into strong holds ; which must always be well furnish'd with men and provisions ▪ that the governor never come among them without being strongest , or having hostages . to prevent their assembling , and hinder as much as may be their having commerce with neighbours that are under another prince's dominion : to keep off all kind strangers from houses , and severely punish such of 'em as shall cause the least trouble , or any motion that may tend to sedition . if our conquerors had practis'd in this manner , italy and sicily would have been french to this day . chap. xii . of the sea , and its usefulness . . means to augment the kings power there . . of commerce . . of colonies . the water of the sea are wholly obnoxious to the humorousness of fortune ; and the wind that governs them turneth and changeth with as much inconstancy as that blind goddess . yet it is certain , that those states whose renown is greatest in story , did not establish their supreme dominion , but upon the power they attained to at sea : as if virtue , stout and undaunted , had resolv'd to combat and conquer her enemy in the very seat of her empire . the romans are one instance , ( whose example is ever to be follow'd with as peculiar a diligence , as their conduct of matters was with singular wisdom , and hard to be imitated : ) they imposed not upon the world their laws , till they had forced the seas to receive and acknowledge them . had they not set out war-like fleets , they had never accomplished their glorious designs ; they had never extended their frontier beyond italy ; never brought down the pride of carthage ; nor triumphed over all the crowns on earth . the aegyptians , the persians , and the grecians , considered the sea as the principal support of their domination . xerxes having caus'd the h●li●spout to be to punish'd ( as he termed it ) with stripes , accounted his vanity satisfy'd in the sight of all asia , which he drew after him into greece , with so much magnificence and pomp , that it seemed as if jupiter himself was come down from heaven . the venetians still renew every year their alliance with this element , by an old fond superstitious custom , casting into the sea a ring , as if they espoused it : perhaps by this use they would inform all the particular subjects of their common wealth , that they should be content with the inconstancy and infidelity of their women , since the state of espousing the sea , espouseth inconstancy and infidelity it self . the riches of tunis , of algier , of holland , and england , plainly prove the necessity there is for princes to be strong at sea , and do shew the profit which does thence accrue . these are petty states , yet dare measure their forces with those of the greatest monarchs . the former of them are turkish slaves , the others revolted burghers ; and how insolent soever the english are , they must confess , that all the brittish isles laid together , do not equal the half of our continent , either in extent , or in fruitfulness of ground , or for commodiousness of scituation , or in number of men ; in wealth , in valour , industry , and understanding ; yet they fear not to affirm themselves sovereigns of the sea. had they cast up the wracks they have suffered , and the battles they have lost ; had they well examin'd our ports and havens : in fine , had they compar'd the coasts of france with those of england , they would condemn their vanity , as canutus , one of their ancient kings , did . 't is true , all states are not disposed unto navigation : either because they are too far up in midland countries , or because the temper of the people suits not with it ; or because they want subjects : but 't is so far , that any of these obstacles should hinder the french from addicting themselves unto it ; that on the contrary , all things conspire to raise desire of it in them ; and to give them hope of advantageous success . the work however is such as must be leisurably carried on , and perfected by little and little ; so great a design continually allarming europe , asia , africa , and america , friends and foes . a precipitation of it would be its ruine . i say not what number of vessels would be fit for france to put to sea. but i affirm that the king may keep an hundred gallies , and an hundred ships on the mediterranean ; and a fleet of two hundred sail upon the ocean . the more vessels he shall have , the more enabled he will be to recover the expence made about ' em . as to the building of such numbers six or ten years of time may be allotted for it : and there is timber in france , there is cordage , there are sails ; there is iron and brass ; there are victuals and workmen ; so that the king's subjects will gain the money which is laid out in ' em . is it not far better for the king of france to build ships for the employing and enriching of his subjects , than it was for the kings of aegypt to build their useless pyramids ? there need be no anxious enquiry whence a stock should rise for this advance ; every year will bring in money ; and the vessels once made , and their guns mounted , it will not cost the king a quardecu for other equippings . 't will be but to give the captains places in the ships and gallies , on condition to fit them out ; and there will more persons come to take them , than there will be offices and places to be bestowed . 't is true , fleets being out , there will need vast sums to maintain them : but the sea will yield a maintenance for the sea , either by commerce or by war. neither will it be always proper to keep so many vessels in service . on the other hand , it will not be necessary to have so many troops at land as are at present . for spain or italy will not dare to disfurnish themselves of their men ; so there will be no need of a land-army but towards germany . the number of rowers will be made up by bringing men from canada , and the american islands : or by buying negroes at cape verde : or by sending all malefactors to the gallies . and when things have taken their course , seamen will be had ; time , and the profit that will accrue , will afford store , and bring them in from all parts of the world. hereupon the corsairs of algiers , tunis and tripoli ; will not be able to keep at sea ; and the french being continually on their coasts , they will be constrain'd to tarry at home for the guarding of their towns : so not in a condition to send out troops for collecting the tribute which they exact of the arabs , and princes who lye further up in africa ; the tributaries will , without fail , revolt : and the king may in the sequel , treat with them for their recovering their liberty , and take them into his protection , there is no cause to fear the power of the ottoman port in this particular . for beside that the turks are no good seamen , the grand signior doth make no such account of the pyrats of algier , as that their fortune is considerable to him. the friendship of the french is more necessary for him , both in point of commerce , and in reference to other interests . the fleets which the king might keep upon the ocean , would make him master of all the powers and trade of the north. yea , though the english and hollanders should unite against france , they could not avoid their ruin in the end . for how should the one and the other make good their commerce , which is all they have to trust to , if they were forced to maintain great armada's to continue it ? the point of bretannie is the gate to enter into , and go out of the channel . fifty ships of war at brest would keep this gate fast shut ; and they should not open it but by the king's command . spain and portugal would not be able to attempt any thing but by his permission , if there were kept a fleet on the coast of guyenne . thus there would need no war almost to be made for all these things ; nor his majesties forces hazarded . it would be sufficient to give his order to forreiners . nor will it be difficult to cut them out work in their own countries , and by this means stay their arms at home , and make them spend their strength there . i shall something of this in its place hereafter . there is one further excellent means to strengthen the king at sea : and it is the taking order that no more of his subjects go to malta . to do this , there must be given in fee to the french knights of st. john of jerusalem , some isle in the mediterranean , as for instance , the isle du levant , for which they should pay an acknowledgment to the king , as they do for malta to the king of spain . there might be given them too on the same condition , an isle in the ocean , as besle-isle , l'isle-dieu , or the isle of ree : so that the french knights fighting not but against the enemies of their country , they would make war upon the english as upon turks ; and keep the islands at their own charge , whereas the king is fain to keep great garisons , and be at vast expence to do it . there is no cause to fear that they will ever give the king any trouble : for being french , they cannot fail of affection or obedience : and their kindred , together with the wealth they have in france , will be perpetual hostages to the king , and caution for their fidelity . this project is just : for of ten parts of the knights of malta , no less than eight do come from the commanderies of france ; and it is easie to be put in execution ; for there need be only a stopping the income of the commanderies to effect it . the order in general will find its advantages in it ; both in that there will be an addition made it of two considerable islands : and that the king will receive the knights into a more particular protection than he hath done hitherto . the number of commanderies may also be augmented , by giving them some maladeries , ( or hospitals for the diseased ) which are always usurped by people that have no right to them at all . be it observed in the last place , that it is very requisite the office of admiral , and powers of the admiralty , should be united to the crown . it hath been an ill policy in france , and a diminution of the king's authority , to communicate unto a subject so much of his soveraignty at sea as hath been done . he must resume it to himself , and be every way supreme alone : then he may appoint a select number , whose charge may be to give him advice of the state of maritime concerns ; and hold a council from time to time upon them in his majesties presence , if he please to assist . these officers shall in this council judge of prizes , and other sea-affairs ; and when its necessary , be commission'd , some of them , to visit the ships , and make report , or send their acts in writing concerning them . other officers for the marine shall be military : they , to execute the king's orders , and have the conduct of designs and enterprizes in the usual manner . it is important to the king's service , that the captains of ships and gallies , be honoured with dignities and rewards . there may be created mareschals of france for armies at sea : as there are for those at land , with the same honours and prerogatives . the romans decreed a triumph for captains who had been victorious at sea , and called it a naval triumph . they gave also naval crowns , as well as mural and civical . these honours would eminently promote the king's intention as to the marine . there must be two arsenals erected : one in provence , in some town upon the rhosen , for what relates to naval expeditions on the mediterranean : another upon the river loire , for all occasions on the ocean . by means of these two rivers , it will be easie to bring out to sea all the vessels that are builded : and all necessary provisions and tackling whatever . nor need it be feared that any enemy should get up these rivers : they too may be shut up by bridges , or by chains , or by forts . his majesties power thus strongly setled on each sea , it will be easie to secure commerce in france , and even draw the merchants thither from all parts . i say secure commerce : for till all this be done , it will ever be uncertain and dangerous . now 't is unnecessary to expatiate here , in proving what profit commerce brings in to most potent states ; the thing is generally known , and all men convinc'd of it . again , i know not why it hath been said , that trading is contrary to virtue ; except it be , for that merchants are incessantly busied in studying inventions to get money , and be in a sort , servants to the publick . the romans , the thebans , and the spartans admitted not any citizen of theirs unto the administration of affairs , unless he had for ten whole years sorborn merchandizing : because they would not have their principal magistrates accustomed to gain , and expert in the means to do it . these kind of inclinations being blameable in persons , who being destined to great employments , ought to be above all considerations of private interest . commerce in every common-wealth ought to take its measure from the temper of the people , from their strength , their wealth , the fertility of their grounds , and the situation of their country . therefore order must be taken , that things traded in be useful , and in a manner , necessary . for it is a rule in oeconomie , that a man spend not his money in what is pleasing , though he needs it , but only in what is absolutely necessary . but necessity is stated by the birth , the dignity , and the estate of persons ; as for example , noble furniture is necessary for a great lord ; not so , for every meaner gentleman : and thus in othes cases , proportionably still to the rank and fortune of men. it must be studiously prevented , that commerce introduce not into a state , superfluity , excess and luxury ; which are often followed with ambition , avarice , and a dangerous corruption of manners . and forasmuch as it is not sufficient to commerce , that there be people to sell , but merchants must be had to buy , otherwise no wares can go off ; in which all the advantage of trade doth consist : it is meet , that traders furnish themselve , with necessaries , rather than with things that meerly tend to ease , or magnificence . among necessaries , those make up the first rank , which do sustain life it self ; the second is of them that are for convenience ; others are also necessary to preservation from diseases , the injuries of time and violence of enemies , as medicinals , dwelling , arms. there is every where a twofold commerce , which is visible in france , more than in any other part of the world. the first is for things ordinarily found in the country , some of which are spent by the inhabitants themselves , and others transported . the second , for foreign merchandises . we have in france , wines , corn , linnen and salt , in so great a quantity , that we send them into the neighbor kingdoms ; and the quality of them is so excellent , that strangers cannot forbear to come and carry them out of our ports . we have cattle , skins , wooll , tallow , oils , and other things necessary for man , of which foreiners export very little , but our selves do in a manner spend them all : and this is the great wealthiness of france , that we have enough to serve our turn without foreign merchandises ; but forreigners cannot do well without ours . we receive from other countries , minerals , pearls , precious stones , silks , spices , and what seems to be matter of luxury . order should be given , that in france , the commodities we have be made use of , before any foreign merchandises be employed : because this order followed would bring in the people money , and take off their commodities ; which would incline every one to fall to the work of his calling , and the whole kingdom be thereby hugely benefited . it hath been a question offer'd to debate , whether traffique in france should be managed by the subjects , or by forreigners ? many reasons might be produced in the case , upon each hand : but to make a short decision ; 't is evident , that foreigners must be allowed to gain by our merchandises , if we would have them take them off . for if we carry them home into their ports , we shall make less sales , and be at greater cost , than if they came to fetch them . yet that our merchants may share in the profit , they may enter into partnership with them , or be their commissioners here , or freight them themselves , provided , they sell at somewhat cheaper rates , and so be content with moderate gain ; or take in payment , and exchange , the foreign commodities . by means of commerce , as well as by war , there may be french colonies planted abroad , and so the dominion of the king extended , even to far distant countries . all the nations of the earth are intermix'd , and may be termed colonies , some of one people , some of another : of as many as are known , few can be affirmed to be originally of the places they inhabit . but to plant colonies out of danger , they must be seated in as much nearness still as is possible : for if they be separated at too great a distance , it will be difficult to relieve them : and perhaps they may revolt , or some one or other make himself master of them ; and so the state will be in danger to lose its subjects . secondly , it is necessary , that colonies be placed in such countrys as are able to maintain the families , that are design'd to make them up : otherwise provisions , and money it self , must be carried to them , which would cause loss and damage to the common wealths that send ' em . in the third place , the country should bear things that may yield profit to the state , which erects the colony . fourthly , the scituation should be such , as the state may have succour , and forces from them , both for war , and for commerce . in the fifth place , the country should not be so fertile , and so much profit to be there made , that the ancient subjects should be drawn thither , and the state drein'd of people , as hath happen'd to spain , by means of the west-indies . in fine , for prevention of the inconveniences , i have mention'd , means must be used to have always hostages from those of the colonies , that they may be kept in their duty , and in the greater adherence to the interest of the state. chap. xiii . . of the education of children . . at what age it is expedient to marry them . nature gives us the first fundamental dispositions for arts , and all sorts of prosessions ; and we feel a certain propension leading us to one kind of life , rather than another . some say , this impression comes from the power of the stars , which by secret , influences from our temper ; others affirm , that we derive our inclinations from our ancestors . however it be , 't is certain , we have movings , the principles whereof are in our selves ; we bring them into the world with us , and cannot quit them : 't is true , rules may be applied to them , and they corrected , when faulty , but to change the quality of them , is impossible this regulation , or amendment , is effected by discipline ; which can only give an after perfection to the works of nature , keeping to her foregoing draughts , and designs , and compleating what she hath begun . a principal point then , in reference to children , is to know their genius , that they may not be put out of their natural order , but employ'd in things to which they are originally bent . the philosophers , to make known the difference of capacities , have told us , that as for souls , some are of gold , others of silver , other of iron ; and that as a good essayor must not mistake himself , in distinguishing these three metals ; so a good politician should not fail , in the judgment he makes , of the children that are in the state : it 's a piece of his profession to discern , what each of them will be proper for , that the intentions of nature may be sortify'd , and polished by precepts . there are no common-wealths , but have in them priests , judges , counsellors of state , soldiers , sea men , merchants , artificers , husbandmen ; children must be educated for these different professions , and timely enabled to discharge them . 't is fit , that in the case of the younger sort , three ages be distinguished . the first , from their birth , to the end of the seventh year . the second , from that seventh year to the fourteenth . the third , from fourteen unto one and twenty . childrens first five years should be spent in their nursing up ; and they not disquieted with any higher documents . 't is good , to put them upon some gentle exercise , as they are growing , and cause them to endure cold ; they will have the more vigour , by that means . there are some nations , that plunge their children into running water , and give them slight clothing in the midst of winter : so the ancient gauls are noted-to have done . the bodies of children must be plyed to the acting of all kind of postures , and motions ; this will get them a facility and dexterousness for any thing . after the age of five years , unto seven , 't is convenient to tell them stories , that may raise in them a desire to do well in that profession to which they shall be destinated . from seven years , unto fourteen , those that are intended to be given to the church , or to the affairs of justice , or those of the state , should learn latin , and greek , because in those languages , they have the source of all the doctrine they will be obliged to profess : as likewise after fourteen , unto one and twenty , they shall be taught rhetorique , philosophy , theology , law , or politicks : which must be continued also , after that age in the usual manner . it is very necessary that seminaries for priests be erected in every diocess , and our lords the bishops ought to take all possible care in it . the young persons , that are intended for the wars , may be taught italian , spanish , and high dutch : they that are design'd for trade , should know somewhat in those three languages : but such as are thought on for commerce , in further distant countrys , ought to learn the arabic , or the sclavonian ▪ or some other of the general tongues that are current in asia , or in africa , as the latin is in europe . there must be publick professors for these languages , as there are for latin , and masters places endowed at the publick charge . after fourteen or sixteen years of age , the youths should be dispos'd of unto places , where they may learn the art of traffick . as for those that are destin'd to the wars , whether gentlemen , or plebeians , they should be sent at fifteen or sixteen years unto garisons , and the skill of serving on horseback or on foot , there taught them ; and they exercised once a weak constantly ; which would most conveniently be done on sundays and holy-days . they shall be taught to handle the pike and the musket , the use of the sword , the halbard , partisan , broad-sword , and other arms ; they shall be put to run , and leap , and wrestle . the lacedemonians ordinarily exercis'd their young people ; which was very providently done of them . for strength and expertness is not attained but by long and daily exercise . in the garisons shall be taught fortification , the mathematicks , dancing , vaulting , ridiug ; and it would do well , to take away academies and masters of exercise , from places not garison'd , that the garisons may be the academies , as i may term them , where these things are learnt . yea , to the end , that all sorts of persons might betake themselves to the garisons , it should be ordained , that no private masters shall take any apprentices , but in garison'd places ; and that no one keep a shop , or exercise any trade , in any city of the kingdom , without a testimonial from the governor , that he hath serv'd his apprentiship in a garison town : as we see , that no physicians , or advocates , are admitted to practise , but such as have studied in some university . order must be given , that masters cause their lacquies to learn a trade , and that for this , they give them , after four years service , livres , and a suit of cloaths : or if they serve less time , a sum proportionable after that rate . nor must it be suffered , that lacquies have wages given them as is done ; because they are ill husbands , and lay up nothing . their reward-money must be put in a publick purse , or into some merchant's hands , who will be responsible for it . the share of lacquies that die , will serve for other youths that shall be chosen . this would prove an excellent means , for the having of soldiers : for the apprentices would serve in their turn , on military occasions : they would go upon the guard , &c. nor would this take them off from perfecting their skill in the calling they had chosen . it would too , be profitable , that poor soldiers have skill in one handicraft or other , and be made to work at it , whenever they are not on the guard ; by this means , they would avoid idling , and get money for a subsistance . the parishes both in town , and country , might be obliged to set forth and maintain each of them a soldier or two in garison , giving also a sum for their being taught a trade at the same time . there would be parishes able to maintain a man and half , others half a man , the rest in proportion to the number of communicants in each of them . so the king would have men well-nigh in garison , and a nursery of soldiers , without its costing him a quardecu ; for none must have pay , but old soldiers : it s by taking this course , that the turks raise their janizaries , and they become their best men , and most warlike . when the young men have been a while in garison , that is , two or three years , they shall be sent to the army , if there be war on foot : and all recruits shall be rais'd out of the garisons : by this means they will be rais'd without any expence at all : for instance , if there need a recruit of men , each of the governors shall be ordered to send , one an hundred , another two hundred : and the men being drawn out of the garisons , new supplies shall be put in , taken out of the parishes , which sent the former . thus the armies would be alway compos'd of none , but expert soldiers ; which is a matter of exceeding great consequence . i will not prescribe , in what towns , or in how many places , it is fit to settle garisons ; because this depends on the kings will and pleasure : and towns , to be chosen for this purpose , need not be nominated ; the most commodious , and best scituated are known . as to those that should be destin'd for sea-service , they might be taken out of the same garisons ; and should be taught principally navigation : but it would be better , to breed them up in the ships themselves , that they might be accustomed to the sea. it is fit that they should understand all the practise of mariners ; and also be handicrafts men , as well as soldiers : it would be very good , that some of the number were carpenters , or at least each of them somewhat skilled in use of the axe and adice . if soldiers both at sea and on land were artificers , their captains , or others might cause them to work . they should be paid for what they made , and the person that employed them might fell their work , either in gross or by retail : as garments , shooes , cloth , hatts , gloves ; and this would prove hugely beneficial ; all the soldiers would find content in it , & hardly one of them fall into debauch . when the youngsters have been some time in garison , and are not needed for recruits , they should be sent home with their discharge and certificate . hereupon they may set up the trade they have learned , or addict themselves to husbandry , as they should think most commodious for them . the country youth , not chosen by the king's commissioners for the garisons , should abide in their parishes , to learn the art of husbandry , and be exercised in it . a like course , as is to be taken with young men , should also be taken with young women . there must be school-mistresses in every city , publickly pay'd , who may teach them all kind of works : the maids giving them too , something for a reward . it would do well to use means , that women , and even those of highest rank , might count it a shame to be unskilfull : work would notably fix their thoughts , and busy them to excellent good purpose . of women i had not yet spoken ; nor will i say , of them , ought more : herein i shall imitate lycurgus , and besides him aristotle ; who both conceiv'd it not possible , to give them any rules , and that their temper was so imperious , that they could not endure to be restrained by law : this is more to be excused in french women than in others : 't is their due to be mistresses ; since they may glory , upon better title than the lacedemonian dames , that they give birth to men , who are capable of rendring themselves , by their valour , conquerors of all the earth it seems to me a fault , that maids should be suffer'd to marry at twelve , and males at fourteen , at which ages the too too indulgent laws have fixed the puberty of the sexes . for , as to nature , it is not possible but persons of those years only must extremely prejudice their health by marriage , and spend their strength before they have attain'd it . 't is the making of young trees bear fruit before the time : the children are without doubt the less vigorous for it . how can the parents give them , what they as yet have not themselves ? again , morality and the laws are concerned in the case : the truth is , when a girl is put so young into the possession of a husband , she hath the less of bashfulness and modesty ; nor is virtue so well secured for her . besides , at this age , neither man nor woman is of understanding to know their duty : and hence it comes , that the marriages of persons so young are ordinarily attended with no very sure felicity and success . finally , how can the one or the other , take care of the affairs of an house , being altogether unexperienced ? or duly govern their children , needing government themselves , and having not , by allowance of the laws , power to dispose of any thing ? so that it must be ordained , they shall not be capable of making a valid contract of marriage till they have attained , females , the age of eighteen years compleat , and males of twenty . chap. xiv . . how france should act with forreign princes , and first with the king of spain , and king of portugal . . with the pope , with venice , with the princes of italy . . with the swisses , with england . . with the emperor and princes of germany . . with the hollanders , the crowns of denmark , sweden and poland . . with the turks , and king of persia . . with the kings of the coast of barbary , and the king of morocco . . with all remote princes ; as the emperor of the negroes , prestor john , the great mogul . the other kings of the indies , of china , and of tartary . having treated in the precedent ceapters , of things internal to the state : i think it reasonable to speak of externals and what course is to be taken in them . for to promote the happiness of people , and govern them discreetly , 't is not enough , that you regulate their lives , and their comportment at home , but their ease and well-being must be secur'd against strangers abroad , and principally against their neighbors . now interest being the prime motive unto all states , we ought to consider other nations , either in quality of friends , or in that of enemies ; ever accounting of them , according to the advantage we may receive from them , or the damage they may do us . as they on their part take no thought of us , but in proportion to what they fear , or to what they hope for from our arms. besides , to treat safely with forreigners , it is necessary that we know their designs , their strength , their alliances , their temper , and their country . forasmuch then as spain shareth with us , at this time , the concerns of all europe ; and there is not a power in christendom , but hath alliance with the one or the other of these two crowns , it is meet we examine in the first place , what measures we are to observe with the spaniards . the council of spain proceeds with a great deal of slowness ; but always with a great deal of evenness : and since the house of austria put it in their head to get the dominion over all europe : the said council hath continually steered the same course . the end which these states-men have propos'd to themselves , has been tyrannical and unjust ; and the means they have made use of to attain it , bad , destrustive , and ill-adjusted , which the declining of their affairs doth evidently demonstrate . our enemies are always allies of theirs , either covertly , or openly and declared ; just in like manner , as they who chuse the king's protection , and to be interessed with france , will be enemies of spain . the emperor is leagu'd with the catholick king by consanguinity , and moreover , by reasons of state. for we are cause of fear to the empire on the north , and towards germany , as we are to spain on the south , and towards italy . of all the other princes , the duke of bavaria , seems fastest knit to the house of austria ; and the pope would , perhaps , be of the party , did not his dignity , of being the common father of christians , withhold him ; and if he , as a temporal prince , did not also apprehend some irruption on our part . spain is a country yielding little increase ; either for that the ground is barren ; or because the inhabitants neglect to cultivate it . the discovery of the west-indies , and the expulsion of the moors have dispeopled it . flanders , and the places in italy are a charge to spain , in time of war : and what is rais'd there doth scarce suffice to maintain the armies and garisons . their government is hard , and ill to be endured ; because they are inflexibly severe ; and the monks , ( whose depravation is there at the highest pitch ) and inquisitors , do under pretext of religion , exercise incredible grievances . the spaniards are valiant for their persons : but men of quality despise the military profession , as heretofore the carthaginians did : and the name of soldier is , in a manner , ignominious with them . they are idlers , and prefer pleasure , and a gallantry , before any thing , be it ever so important , or of greatest consequence . the king of spain hath little money , and much expense to defray . the vanity of the viceroys and governors of his places , doth spend him above measure . the spaniards are presumptuous , haughty , and provided there be honour done them , you may treat advantageously with them . charles v. had reason to say , that the spaniards seem to be wise ; but are not . their forces are not at all to be feared ; we ruin'd them in the late war ; and the affairs of portugal have hindred their recovering them . the minority of their king , the discontent of don john , and the pretensions of some lords upon the particular kingdoms , which compose the spanish monarchy , augment its weakness . sicily might easily make insurrection . the neapolitans upon a pretext of liberty , such a darling in italy , would set up for themselves , if they had succors ; and perhaps a new pope would favour our designs there , if he were made to see , that it would be no impossibility for him to make some person of his family king of naples , or joyn that kingdom to the state of the church , of which he is possess'd already . if ever the spaniards be attacked , it must be done with force , and all at once , in flanders , in italy , in spain it self , on the sea , and on the coast of portugal . this is the best method for the french. such a general effort would produce two effects . the first is , that the spanish partisans would be astonish'd , having no forces ready to make resistance . the second , that all their enemies would resume vigor , and might set on foot again their pretensions against them . if a through conquest be intended , we must not do as was done in the last war : must not make it our business to take all their fortifi'd places , one after another , or to keep them when taken . but this is a matter fit to be discours'd of by it self . as for portugal , it 's a state , yet under age , and not throughly setled : to us , a perpetual instrument for weakning the spaniard . france hath nothing to fear on that side . it would do well , to convey covertly some troops , or sums into the country : and above all , give secretly great hopes unto the french , that are in service there , if they made any important enterprises upon spain , which would divert their forces . it would , i say , do very well to order some soldiers thither , and 't were to be wish'd , there were so many french in portugal , that the partisans might not dare to make a peace with spain , for fear of having those same french for enemies . the queen of portugal , who is french , both by birth , and by affection , may bear up this interest ; and she may be told , that there is a necessity of it on her part , and that her fortune depends upon it . it must be accounted on in all treating with the spaniards , that they are every whit as foolish as they seem to be . the pope , the venetians , and all the princes of italy , are of one and the same temper . the italians are wise and circumspect : nor should we , but very seldom , enter into negotiation with them . to reduce them to our intentions , we must work by down-right force , they are weak , and ( as i have said ) wise : they are people for pleasure ; their country is the beautifullest , and best in the world ; consequently they love it , and know their interest ; they are able to foresee , and fear the ill that may betide them . the pope will ever consider france , by reason of the county of avignon , of the consequences of the concordat of . and because of the jansenists . the venetians are weakned by their war with the turk ; the dukes of mantua , of modena , and of florence , and the genoese can do nothing that 's considerable . the duke of savoy must never separate from france . we have the entrance into his estates : and a war with us , but of months , would utterly ruin him : he may be induc'd to hope , that he shall be reinstated in the principality of geneva . if war be made in italy , the italians must not have time given them to look about them . as they are the wisest , so when inur'd to war , they are the bravest upon earth . in one word , they are the masters of the universe . the swisses are mercenaries , who will alway serve the king for his money . as for matter of the english , they have not any friends : themselves be a sort of people without faith , without religion , without honesty , without any justice at all , of the greatest levity that can be , cruel , impatient , gluttonous , proud , audacious , covetous , fit for handy strokes , and a sudden execution ; but unable to carry on a war with judgment . their country is good enough for sustenance of life , but not rich enough to afford them means for issuing forth and making any conquest : accordingly , they never conquered any thing but ireland , whose inhabitants are weak , and ill soldiers . on the contrary , the romans conquer'd them ; then the danes , and the normans ; in such a manner too , that their present kings are the heirs of a conqueror . they hate one another , and are in continual division , either about religion , or about the government . a war of france for three or four years upon them , would totally ruin them . so , it seems reasonable that we should make no peace with them , but upon conditions of greatest advantage for us ; unless the king think meet to defer the execution of this project to another time ; or that his majesty , press'd with the love he hath for his own people , do incline to prefer their ease , before so fair hopes . one had need be a monarch , to know what it is to love subjects ; as be a father , to know how children are loved . in fine , if we had a mind to ruin the english , we need but oblige them to keep an army on foot : and there is no fear that they should make any invasion upon france ; that would be their undoubted ruin , if they be not call'd in by some rebels . now if they have an army , they will infallibly make war upon one another , and so ruin themselves . you must put them upon making great expences ; and for this end , raise a jealousie in them for the isles of jersey and guernsey , of wight and man , for the cinque-ports , and ireland : and by that means , oblige them to keep strong garisons in all those places : this will create a belief in the people that the king formeth great projects against their pretended liberty ; and while he is in arms , his subjects will hate him. they must be wrought to distrusts of one another , by writing letters in cypher to some particular persons , and causing them to be intercepted . for ( being suspicious and imprudent ) they will soon be perswaded , that the letters were seriously written . some forces should be landed in ireland , and in other parts . the irish may be induced to revolt , as having a mortal hatred for the english . the scots also will not neglect to set themselves at liberty . factions must be rais'd , and the sects favoured against one another ; especially the catholicks , among whom , the benedictine monks in particular , should be secretly promis'd , on the king of england's behalf ( wherein it will be easie to deceive them ) that they shall be restored to all the estates , which they once possessed in the island , according to the monasticon there printed . upon this , the monks will move heaven and earth , and the catholicks declare themselves . the rumor , which hath already gone abroad , that the king of england is a catholick , must be fortifi'd , and so all will fall into utter confusion , and the english monarchy be in case to be divided . on the other hand , our league with the hollanders should be renew'd , and they put into a belief , that we will give them all the trade still : because they have a through knowledge of it , and are proper for it ; whereas the french have no inclination that way , and nature cannot be forced . they must be told , that now they are come to the happy time for advancing their affairs , and ruining their competitors in the sovereignty of the northen seas . beside these particulars , if the king give belle-isle , or l'isle dieu , or the isle of ree , to the knights of malta , as i have said before , these knights will make irreconcilable war upon the english , redemand the commanderies of their order , and by their courses , and piracies , oblige them to keep great fleets at sea ; which will ruine them , by ruining the profit of their trade . mean time , the king shall increase his strength at sea ; and then finding his enemies weakned , consummate their depression , and subversion . it is not difficult , to make defence against any enterprises of the emperor ; for he cannot make war upon france , though he would : such a war would be too costly for him ; and and to make any progress in it , he must needs bring into the field excessive great armies . but if he armed him so potently , the princes of germany would grow jealous of him , and make levies to oppose him , and to hinder his passage through their territories : beside , his hereditary countrys would be disfurnish'd of men , and so expos'd to the inroads of the turks : so that there is no cause to apprehend any thing on the part of the emperor . on the contrary , he hath intentions to give the king content ; because he may receive great succors from him , in wars with the turk , as happen'd of late years . the princes of germany , whether catholicks or protestants , have an equal interest to keep themselves in the king's protection : for the reasons i noted afore in the chapter of the huguenots ; so that they will always oppose the emperors growing greater , on the side of france : as it may be , they would oppose the designs of the king ; if he should carry his arms too far up into germany . 't is the interest of lesser states , that the kings their neighbours be equal in power , that the one may maintain them against the others . to conclude : the king hath no allies , whom he should so highly esteem , as the germans ; there is not a braver nation , a nation more open , more honest . their original is also ours ; they have no vices ; are just and faithfull : there is among them an inexhaustible seminary of good soldiers : their generosity put alexander the great into admiration for 'em ; and wrought affection and confidence in 'em , in the first caesars ; who by committin● their persons to the virtue of these people entrusted them with the quiet of the universe . the hollanders will never attempt any thing against france ; but keep themselves in our alliance , as much as possibly they may . they are rich , and interessed as merchants commonly are . if the king had relinquish'd them , the●… state would have sunk . ( which yet by the rules of policy , cannot last long ; democracie● being subject to changes . ) it would be expedient , that the king do interpose in their affairs and some division be raised among them . we can hope for little from their armies ; and they would always be a charge , and expence to us . the king of denmark is a prince , whose state is but of small extent ; his whole strength consists in the king's protection , who upholds him against the suedes his enemies . sueden will never break off from the interest of france . it 's a country unfertile except in soldiers ; but there being little money in sueden , and they far of , they can of themselves make no considerable war : they are feared and hated in germany . so , we ought to consider them , as instruments , which for our money , we may make use of , to avenge our quarrels , either against the emperor , or the german princes ; or to divert the english and the holland forces , when his majesty makes any enterprise which pleaseth them not . poland and muscovy are of almost no use to 〈…〉 , except it be to serve us in stopping the en●erprises of the emperour . furs may be had ●om them ; and cloth , and silk-stuffs sent ●hem . the friendship of the turks is good for ●rance , to be made use of on occasion against ●he emperor ; and that of the king of persia , to ●e made use of against the turks . the one and ●he other may favour our commerce . there must be no reliance upon the promises of the kings of tripoly , tunis , and algier ; they ●re pirates , that take a pride in breaking their words , and have no faith at all . whenever ●ccasion serves , war must be made upon them , ●nd they attacqued home to their own doors in ●heir harbours , but with considerable forces ▪ they may be ruin'd in time , by hindring their courses at sea , and by causing the tributary princes to rise against them by land : as i have observed asore . upon this , the king , as the carthaginians did , might employ the numidian troops , so much magnified by the ancients . the emperor of fez and morocco is a potent prince , who 's alliance may be useful to the king against the spaniards , and for commerce . he is a mahometan ; and i would not have too much trust put in his oaths . in fine , when occasions for it are offered , we must not fail to compliment the african kings , as the emperors of the negros , and of the abyssins , then the great mogol , and the other kings of the indies , of china , of tartary and japan ▪ letting them know by presents , the virtue , the greatness and magnificence of the king. the conclusion . such are the political maxims , by which i have judged , that the subjects of this ( french ) monarchy might attain to the possession of a true , and stable felicity ; and so , the heroick labours of the king be crowned with immortal glory , and france enjoy in all its parts the highly beneficial virtue of its incomparable monarch . finis . reflections on the fourth chapter of the politicks of france , which treats of the clergy . london , printed for thomas basset , at the george , in fleetstreet , . to monsieur p. h. marquess of c. sir , i took so great satisfaction in the reading of those your reflections upon the roman clergy , that i have thought i could not better employ my time , than illustrating them with a large comment ; and though sometimes i improvs upon your judgement , and make bold to push on somewhat farther than you are pleased to go , yet shall you not find that i have gloss'd upon your discourse , as some monks have done on the bible , for i have faithfully confirm'd your opinion by the history of our france , and by the wise sayings of the best authors . and if by their help i let you see that your maxims carry you to much higher enterprises than your counsels aim at , this is not to contradict , but to assist you , and per adventure to say for rou ; what you would have been content to have said your self . after having thus fought under your banners , the interest of my party , which in your fifth chapter you are so hard upon , obliges me to engage in their defence . and i know you are too generous , sir , to take this ill . but i bestow not above a third part of this discourse on that subject , that you may clearly perceive i have more than double the pleasure in following your steps , than i find in opposing you . to return then to my chief design , which is , to espouse your quarrel , and take your part against the vsurpations of rome , i will shew you what more remains to be said on that occasion , there is a pretty book called an examination of the powers of cardinal chigi , then when he came in the quality of leg at to his majesty . a book furnish'd with invincible reasons , and a profound knowledge of antiquity , especially for what concerns our france . and from thence i acknowledge to have received some of the authorities that i alledge . as in those two chapters , where you speak against two contrary parties , you consider not religion otherwise than as it affects the policy of france , i likewise have confin'd my self within the same bounds , and have not examin'd this , or the other religion , and the professors , farther than the state has or may have damage or benefit by them in temporals . i shall throughout this discourse forbear to say what i now only mention at parting , viz. that the interest of god ought to be dearer to us than that of the state ; and that these two interests accord so well , that where truth and piety reign , peace , justice , and the state can never fail to flourish . god of his goodness grant such happy times to france , this is the prayer of your most humble , and most obedient servant , de l'ormegeigny . reflections on the fourth chapter of the politicks of france , which treats of the clergy . france is much oblig'd to my lord the marquess of c. for having mark'd the many vsurpations of the court of rome , upon the rights of our kings . he has wisely observ'd , that the churchmen have attempted , on several occasions , to render themselves masters of all the temporal jurisdiction . that their obstinacy has proceeded so far , that making advantage of trouble some times , they have forced our kings to declare in their favour upon very unjust conditions , and to yield to them the rights of mortmain and indemnity for the lands they possess . whereby the state is so much the weaker as they grow in strength , and that the conceipt of these priviledges is so full in their heads , that to this day they can hardly acknowledge the king's sovereignty . that the multitude of monks is an abuse of so sensible , that the king can dissemble it no longer , and that 't is high time seriously and effectually to apply some remedy . that their blind subjection and dependance on the pope's will , makes a foreign monarchy even in the very bosom of france . and that they seduce the silly credulous people , which is a matter of pernicious consequence . that this policy is founded on the abusive and destructive maxims of rome , which are meerly politick . that those particular vows of obedience to the pope , and the name of religion in this case , is only a bugg and vain pretence laid hold on by the court of rome , for promoting their temporal power , and making their creatures in every corner . that the shiftings of the monks , and their rambles from one end of france to the other , serve only to debauch them with an universal acquaintance . all these observations are true and judicious . but the fear that my lord marquess shews of offending the court of rome , or at least , the complement he had made , that it is the glory of a king to honour the holy see , hinders him from sounding the bottom of the evil , and from presenting the necessary remedy . for it may be said of the wholsome rules that he prescribes for reducing the clergy to their duty , and for preventing of fraud in matters of benefices , that this comes to no more , than the paring a man's nails when his skull is broken , and ought to be trepann'd . the great honour , and the great interest of the king indeed , would be to think of a way , how he may roundly shake off this infamous and tyrannical yoke of the roman court , which my lord marquess calls the holy see. and deliver himself from this buzzard superstition which rides even our very statesmen , viz. that there can be no religion catholick , but in submitting to the spiritual jurisdiction of the holy. see. is it because the pope is the vicar of jesus christ , his majesty has a number of bishops within his realm , who , if they understand , and do their duty , are the vicars of jesus christ ? so that we need not travail over the alps to seek one . instead then of providing a french secretary of conscience , who may make a bank in the court of rome , by which means we might know what money passes from france to italy , which is the advice of mouns . the marquess , he should rather break the bank in france , and give order that no more money pass out of france into italy ; for this bank is a continual pump which draws away the fairest cash of france , which fattens a stranger with our kingdoms treasure , which carries much away , but returns nothing . i know all these tributes and respects are paid to the pope , because he is suppos'd to be the head of the church ; and his flatterers tell us , that the church can no more subsist without the pope than the body without the head. but that great chancellor of the university of paris , john gerson was not of this opinion , for he writ a book expresly de auferribilitate papa ab ecclesia . that is to say , to prove that this same head might very well be quite taken away , and the church yet be never the worse , nor take any harm . the cardinals have sometimes continued more than two years before they could agree about their choice of a pope . during all which time the body of the church was without a head. the churches of france and germany did not at all feel the want of it , and matters went still on there as they were wont . which puts me in mind of the man of wood , that being mounted on horse-back , and coming under a tree , a bough struck off his head to the ground , yet the heart of oak kept the saddle , and trotted on with the company nothing dismaid , for that the head was not essential to the rest of the body . it is too soft an expression to call the pope an unprofitable head of the church , he is absolutely pernicious to it . i pass by the spirituals , suiting my self herein with the humour of mouns . the marquess , who considers the catholick religion little farther than as it makes for the interest of france . but what greater mischief can the pope do to the church , than to render the power of the church suspected to sovereign princes , as a pure politick device to invade their rights , grind their subjects , and form even an empire within their empire . the marquess endeavours with great reason to make the king jealous of the popes temporal monarchy over his subjects . he might with as good reason have mov'd him to be jealous of that spiritual monarchy , which is in effect purely temporal . for he has well observ'd , that the name of religion is a false pretence us'd by the court of rome to advance his temporal power . and that the popes having begun with letters of recommendation to the chapters , to have an eye on such an ones mirit to be chosen bishop . have after in process of time turn'd these letters recommendatory to bulls and decrres to dispose of the bishopricks of france at their pleasure ; which is a tyranical invasion of the rights of the king , and of those of the church . glaber , who liv'd in the times of hugh capet , relates lib. . cap. . how pope john sent a cardinal into france to found and consecrate a monastery within the diocess of tours ; and that the prelates of france and hugh archbishop of tours opposed him , and said roundly , that the bishop of rome having a diocess to himself , ought not to meddle with the affairs of another diocess , nor send his commands to their bishops , who are his fellow bishops and colleagues . the doctors of the sorbon in their rescriptum publish'd at the time of the appeal , concerning the abuse about the breviary of anjou , by the bishop of e●gers , and his injunction to the church of the trinity , to use that of rheims , amongst other propositions declare , that the other bishops have the power of government and ordination within their diocess , as fully as the bishop of rome has within his . therefore in the time of st. cyprian , and even in st. angustin's days , the popes did write ad coepiscopos galliae & collegas . now collegue imports equality of power . and if the bishops of rome have not any power over the bishops of france , they can much less pretend to any over our kings . pope leo vi. promised lotharius , dist . . c. . can . . to obey his edicts both at present and for the future . pope pelagius to the like effect to childebert , the holy scriptures , ( says he ) command us to obey kings , and to be subject to them . the popes were always humble subjects of the roman emperors so long as that empire continued . and 't is but the other day that they got free from the emperors of germany ▪ onuphrius de varia creatione pontif l. . testifies , that even then when they were look'd upon as the successors of st. peter , their authority reached no farther , but only to maintain and defend the truth of the doctrines of faith. and for the rest were wholly subject to the emperors , who ordered all things according to their wills , and were wont to create the popes . it is a notable observation the marquess has made , that the tables were put into the hands of moses , and not into the hands of aaron , and that it is the part of secular princes , that the people be instructed in the laws of god. he was entrusted with the first table as well as with the second , to teach us that the care of the service of god belongs as much to the authority of the prince , as that of justice and civil government . those expressions of the marquess , that secular princes are the protectors of the church , of its doctrine , and of its canons , are intended by him in a more liberal and ingenious sense , than they meant , from whom he takes them ▪ for they are the ordinary terms of those who make the king subject to the pope , and who own not the king for the sovereign of the church , but only for its protector , and to execute the commands of his holiness , and for that his canons be observed . this is the stile of my lord bishop of montauban . peter bertier in his remonstrance made to the king in the city of rheims , june th , . where after he had term'd his sovereign power a true resemblance of the deity , he sinks it again not only below the pope , but even below the bishops , who are the kings subjects , saying , that the bishops are the head to govern , and the mouth of the church to speak , but that the king is its arm , and its right hand to execute its decrees and ordinances . this scholar of the jesuits speaks like his masters ; for all the jesuits harp on the same string , which becanus in pref. ad reg. jac. kings are only to execute the popes commands . what is the duty of kings ( says he ) in relation to the church and to religion ? i will tell you in one word ; they ought to guard and defendit , not as lords but as servants , not as judges but as executioners . and why , i pray , has not the king the same sovereignty in france , that the emperor constantine , and the emperor charlemaigne enjoy'd ? under whom the canons of the synods were none other than counsel and advice , till these emperors had examin'd and authoriz'd them . did not these sovereigns altogether call and dissolve those synods of bishops at pleasure ? and wherefore shall our kings be rob'd of that power ? our great king who surpasses all his predecessors in glory and magnanimity , shall he suffer a stranger bishop to snatch from his crown this essential right , of governing the church of his kingdom , and he of a king become a serjeant to put in execution the commands of that bishop , and those of the bishops his subjects . the world is well chang'd since pope adrian in his letters , inserted in the second council of nice , express'd himself to the emperor constantine to this effect , we beseech your clemency with ardour of spirit , and as though we were present , we cast our selves at your knees , and lie at your feet , i with my brethren . then it was that popes kissed the feet of emperors , whereas now emperors kiss the popes toe . in the year . the pope agathon pray'd the emperor constantine to discharge the tribute which the bishops of rome pay'd ordinarily to the emperor for their conservation . very far from compelling the emperors , the day of their conservation , to lay a sum of money at the popes feet for tribute , as a token of subjection , which afterwards the emperors of germany have been oblig'd to do . gregory the first gave a good example for our popes at this day , how they should demean themselves towards the emperor , for he speaks thus to the emperor , l. . ep. . i am the unworthy servant of your pity . and in the same epistle , whilst i speak thus before my masters , what am i other than dust and a worm . and l. . ep. . i am subject to your commands . i might bring many examples how anciently the christian emperors , and the kings of italy created and depos'd the popes , commanding them , and deposing them at their pleasure . not to go farther than our france , there we may see what power our kings of the first line exercis'd in the government of the church . the history of gregory of tours may furnish us with many examples , l. . c. . king glotharius speaks thus to the inhabitants of tours , have not i commanded that the priest cato be made a bishop ? why are my commands slighted ? and chap. . pascentius is made bishop of paris , ex jussu regis chariberti , by the command of king heribert . the same king being provok'd , because emerius had been turn'd out of the bishoprick of xaintes , caused him to be beaten , who came to signifie to him that deposition , and made him be drawn upon a cart loaden with thorns , into banishment , and restor'd emerius to his place from whence he had been cast out , l. . c. . felix bishop of xaintes being deceas'd , nonnichius consobrinus rege ordinante successit . his cousin nonnichius succeeded him by the king's order , c. . king guntram created sulpitius bishop of bourges , rejecting the presents offered him for promoting another , and saying , it is not our custom to sell the priesthood for the price of money , l. . c. . are these words , then the king commanded that gundegesil be made a bishop , which was done accordingly . and c. . evantius bishop of vienna died , and in his place was substituted vitus a priest , the king chusing him . in all these passages we find no mention of the pope , nor of annates , nor of letters of investiture . for in those days the bishops of rome meddl'd not at all with the election of the bishops of france . above all is memorable the francique synod , to be found in the third tome of the councils of the edition of cologne , pag. . where carloman , who stiles himself duke and prince of the french , thus speaks , by the advice of my priests , and of the chief of the realm , we have appointed bishops for the towns , and have set over them boniface archbishop . pope adrian the first , by a council , made this law to pass , that charlemain should have the right and power to choose the pope , and to govern the roman see. which constitution is inserted in the roman decretal . the council of mayence held under charlemain , an . . dist . . can. hadrians , begins thus , to charles august , rector of the true religion , and defendor of the holy church of god ▪ and the second council of mayence , under lewis the debonnaire , to lewis the most soveraign rector of the true religion . at this day these titles would be counted wicked . now for all that charlemain and lewis the debonnaire have advanc'd the pope out of measure , yet his authority , even in spirituals , was no better than precarious , and suject to those kings that were emperors . for proof of this , hincmar relates l. . c. . that the emperor charlemain did convoke a general synod in france , whereby the worshipping of images was condemn'd ; and the second council of nice which defended them , was rejected as a false synod , thô the pope had approv'd it . and thô at this synod , convoked by charlemain , the authority of the pope was admitted . for the history of those times teaches us , that charlemain , who had advanced the pope , made use of the authority given him , to his own advantage , even against the pope himself , when he had a mind . insomuch that he was not content to make the popes opinion be condemn'd in this synod assembled ( pro forma at least ) by order of the pope ; but he sent to the pope a book , which he writ against the second council of nice , and against images , which we have still to this day . after that charlemain had rais'd the pope , in giving him a good share of the country , which he had taken from the lombards , the popes began to be puft up extreamly , and by little and little made themselves formidable , taking upon them the figure of judges and correctors of the actions of princes throughout christendom , by excommunications , interdictions , and finally , by the deposition of their crowns . now 't is very remarkable , that whereas , by their imaginary arms they have laid at their feet the emperors of germany and and the kings of england , and brought their estates into a miserable confusion , yet had they never the like success against france , they never have been able to depose our kings ▪ never could prevail to have any interdict receiv'd in their kingdoms , which so often as they attempted , they were mock'd , their officers beaten , and their partisans ruin'd . but alas , the submission which henry the great made to the pope ( the only instance that we can be reproacht withal ) is a cooling cast in our way . under lewis the debonnaire was held at paris a council against images , that is to say , against the pope who maintain'd them . of which council we have all the acts entire . and in the beginning of his reign claudius bishop of turin broke down all the images he could find within his diocess , and listed himself against the bishop of rome , who stood for their adoration , and writ a book against images , and the pope durst not be angry , because this bishop was supported by the authority of lewis . great troubles being stirr'd in france , gregory the fourth confederates with the sons of this lewis , too debonnaire , who had engag'd in a wicked conspiracy against their own father . sigebert about an . . testifies , that pope gregory came into france , and took part against the emperor with his sons . and the annals written at the same time , bochel . decret ▪ eccl. gall. l. . tit . . and the continuer of aimoinus , a religious of st. benet , writes , that the resolution of the french bishops was , that they would by no means yield to his will , and that if he came to excommunicate them , they would excommunicate him again . after this , pope nicholas the first excommunicated king lotharius , ( for in those days deposing was not talkt on ) to make him leave waldrade , and take again thetherge his former wife . whereupon , the articles drawn up by the french , and which may be seen in hinemar archbishop of bheims import , that the bishops hold that as the king ought not to be excommunicated by his bishops , so can he not be judged by other bishops : because he ought to be subject to the empire of god alone , who alone could establish him in his kingdom . then also , the clergy of france writ to the pope letters full of hard words , related by aventin in his annals of bavaria , insomuch as to call him thief , wolf , and tyrant . the popes growing in insolence , adrian ii. took upon him to command king charles the bald to leave the kingdom of lotharius entirely to his son lewis . the same hincmar , a man of great authority in his time , writ several letters to him , containing many remonstrances on this occasion , and amongst ▪ other matters , informs him , that the church-men and the seculars of the realm assembled at rheims , have said , and say by way of reproach , that never was such a command sent from that see to any of our predecessors . he adds , that bishops and secular lords us'd threatnings against the pope , which he dares not repeat . and for the king's part , see how little he valued the pope's commands ; amongst the epistles of the said hincmar , are to be found the letters of charles the bald to pope adrian , wherein , after having charg'd him with pride and usurpation , he adds , what pit of hell has vomited out this preposterous law ? what infernal gulf has disgorg'd it from the black and dismal dungeons , quite contrary to the way that is set before us by the holy scripture . and he forbids the pope to send any more such commands to him or to his bishops , unless he would be content to meet with contempt and dishonor . pope vrban excommunicated philip the first , and set his kingdom under an interdict . innocent the third did as much to philip the august . but nether of their thunderbolts had any effect , and were only receiv'd with mockery . which agrees with the relation of mat. paris , that after the pope had declar'd to philip the august by the cardinal d'anagnia , that he would set his land under an interdict , unless he would reconcile himself with the king of england ; the king answered , that he was not at all afraid of his sentence , seeing that it was not founded upon any just cause : adding moreover , that it belong'd not to the church of rome , to pronounce sentence against the king of france , the which du tillet , clerk of the parliament , tells us , was done by the advice of his barons . but what was ever more memorable in history than the truly royal courage of philip the fair an . ? boniface viii . that monster of pride , was irritated against him , because he held prisoner the bishop of pamiers , who had spoken defamatory words against him : and moreover , for that he assum'd to himself the collation of benefices . the pope then commands him to release the bishop , and writ him the following letter . fear god , and keep his commandments : we will that thou take notice , that thou art subject to us in spirituals and temporals ; that no collation of benefices and prebends belongs to thee ; that if thou hast the keeping of any that are vacant , thou reserve the profits for the successors ; if thou goest about to make any such collations , we decree them void , and so far as in fact they are executed , we revoke . those who shall believe otherwise , we shall count hereticks . a legate came to paris with these fine letters , which were torn from him by the king's people , and thrown into the fire by the count of artois . the answer of philip to the pope was this : philip , by the grace of god , king of the french , to boniface , that calls himself sovereign pontifex , wisheth little health , or rather none at all . may thy great sottishness know , that in temporals we are subject unto none , that the collation of churches and prebends belongs to us by our right of royalty ; and also to take to our selves the profits during the vacancies . that the collations made by us , and to be made , shall be strong and good , and that by vertue thereof we will defend those in possession courageously . those who believe otherwise we count fools and mad-men , the pope thus provok'd , excommunicates the king , but no body durst publish the excommunication , nor be the bearer of it . nevertheless the king assembles at paris , his knights , barons , and prelates , and demanded of them , of whom they held their fiefs , and their church-temporalties . they answered , that they hold them of the king , and not of the pope , whom they accus'd of heresie , murder , and of other crimes . in the mean while , the pope made it his business to stir up germany and the low countrys against france . but the king sent into italy , william de nogaret , who , assisted with the advice of sciarra a polander , took the pope at anagnia , and having mounted him upon an hurdle , carried him prisoner to rome , where he died of grief and anger . observe , that this pope who thundered against kings , had so little power at rome , and so little love of the people , that not a roman stirr'd a foot to deliver the bishop of rome , so rudely treated even in rome it self . for all this the king had immediately from the successors of boniface rare bulls , for abolishing the memory of all these transactions ; as may be seen in the extravaganta meruit of clement v. where this king is prais'd as a religious prince , who had deserv'd well of the holy see. for the popes are of the nature of spaniards , who will lick their masters feet when they have soundly bang'd them . in the year . pope benedict xiii . angry because charles vi. had express'd the exactions and pilferings of the popes court , which drain'd france , sends into france a bull of excommunication against the king and his princes . the university of paris order'd , that these bulls be torn in pieces , and that the pope benedict , whom they call'd peter de luna , be declar'd heretick and schismatick , and disturber of the peace . and these bulls were torn by the sentence of the court , june . . and ten days after , the court being risen , at eleven a clock in the morning , two bullbearers , who had brought this excommunication , made their honourable amends upon the stairs of the palace , and after were carried back to the lovre in the same manner they had been brought ( being drawn on two sledges , adorn'd with coats of painted canvas , and miters of paper on their heads ) with the sound of trumpets , and the publick laughter . so little did they care for the popes thunder . and what would they have done , if these bulls had brought the sentence of deposition against the king ? charles de moulin in his treatise against the perites dates , relates a pretty sentence of the court against the pope under charles vi. from the same vigor of the french , to defend the dignity of the crown of their kings , are risen these customs which have been observ'd many ages , that a legate of the pope is not receiv'd in france , nor any rescript , nor command of the pope , without the kings leave , and without that the legate communicate his powers to the kings procurator-general , and that they be view'd and verified in the court of parliament , who modifie and and restrain them to masters that do not derogate from the rights of the king , the liberties of the church , nor the ordinances royal. against which ancient form cardinal balui being come into france an . . and there acting as a legate without the kings permission , the court , at the request of the procurator-general , decreed a commission for an information to be brought against him by two counsellors of the court , and did forbid him to use farther any faculty or legantine power , on pain of being declared rebel . an. . the gallican-church being assembled at tours , it was concluded , that the king lewis xii . might with a good conscience dispise the abusive bulls and unjust censures of pope julius ii. and might by arms oppose his usurpations , though the pope should go on to excommunicate , or to depose him . which is more , by a council held at pisa , he declar'd himself fallen from the papacy , and caus'd money to be coin'd with this inscription around it . perdam nomen babylonis . there is some reason to believe he would have made good his word , had he been years younger . and we hope that god has reserv'd this glory for another lewis in our days , who with the vigour of a flourishing youth , has the prudence of an old cato ; as also the courage and fortune of an alexander . when lewis xii . and his adherents were depos'd , john d'albert , king of navarre , was entangl'd with the same misfortune , whose kingdom by this pope julius ii. was given to ferdinand king of arragon . and this is all the right the spaniard has to that our great kings hereditary kingdom . in the year . on friday th of december , master john tanquerel , a batchelor of divinity , was condemn'd by a sentence of the court to make confession publickly , that he had indiscreetly and rashly held this proposition ; that the pope is vicar of christ , having power spiritual and secular , and that he may deprive of their dignities the princes that rebel against his commands . and notwithstanding that tanquerel protested , that he had propos'd this doctrin aliter tantum & non juridice ; that is to say , not for affirming it as true , but as a subject for dispute in the schools , was he compell'd to make this acknowledgment . during the wars of the league an . . were sent from rome bulls monitory of pope gregory xiv . by the which king henry the great was declar'd uncapable of the crown of france , as an heretick , and a relapser ; and his kingdom was exposed to prey . whereupon the court of parliament assembled at tours , made this decree . the court having regard to the conclusions of the kings procurator-general , have declared , and do declare the bulls monitory given at rome the first of march . null , abusive , damnable , full of impiety , and impostures , contrary to the holy decretals , rights , franchises , and liberties of the gallican-church . do order that the copies sealed with the seal of marsilius landrianus , under-seal'd septilius lamprius , be torn by the executioner of high-justice , and burnt in a fire which shall be kindled for this occasion , before the great gate of the palace , &c. which was executed august th of the same year . i verily believe that many good freuch men read not these examples with pleasure , and reckon it no glory that the pope has never set his foot on the neck of a king of france , as pope alexander the third did to the emperor frederick , nor kick'd off his crown with his foot , as celestine ii. to the emperor henry vi. nor brought our kings to yield homage to the pope for their kingdom , as other kings have done , and do to this day . without doubt they will laugh at the just punishment which boniface viii . had for his insolence from the officers of the generous king philip the fair , and to see how after this treatment the popes successors of boniface , did compliment him with a many commendations , and apostolick benedictions . without doubt also these good french-men are well satisfied with the pragmatick sanctions whereby our kings have repress'd the exactions of the court of rome , and have appropriated the collation of a number of benefices ; and think we are well helpt up in that the king , the magistrates , and the sorbonne will own no other superior to the king but god , for what concerns temporals . but i pray to what end is all this briskness in our kings , in our parliaments , and in the sorbon against the usurpations of the pope in temporals , but to yield him the spirituals , and to confirm his pretensions even in temporals ? grant him the spiritual power , and he will be master of the temporal without contradiction , and he shall bring under his jurisdiction all secular causes under the colour of a sacrament , of an oath , of charitable uses , or of matters of conscience . the concords of our kings with rome , and their pragmatick sanctions about the collations of benefices , what have they come to ? is not this to come in for a share with the robbers , who had seiz'd the royalties , and by solemn articles to make them a title , which they had no pretence to before their invasions ? and what other do our kings , in acknowledging the spiritual power of the pope , but own themselves his subjects in temporals ? for the one hooks in the other of necessity . the experience of six ages has prov'd this truth . 't is the voluntary subjection of emperors and kings to the spiritual power of the pope , that has given him the liberty to excommunicate them , for this belongs to the spiritual jurisdiction . and the very same jurisdiction has authoris'd him to exempt their subjects from the oath of fidelity , for the keeping of an oath is a duty of religion : so that if the pope be obey'd by a discontented and factious people , you see an emperor or king is depos'd by the spiritual jurisdiction : and the pope may spare the other power that he pretends to over the temporalties of kings , seeing that his spiritual power all alone is sufficient to ruine the poor prince . and if that the christian princes , that are of his communion , own him for the vicar of jesus christ ; let the kings understand it in what sense they please , he will make them know , when-ever their weakness shall give him an opportunity , that he takes himself for the vicar of the secular power of jesus christ , as well as of the spiritual : and that to him , as to christ whom he represents , all power is given in heaven and on earth . this is what the last council of lateran attributes to him , and applies to him that prophesie of psalm . particular to jesus christ . all kings shall be prostrate before him , and all nations shall serve him the kings that prostrate themselves the most humbly before him , are those he throws at his feet . witness the treatment he gave our good king henry the third , who ador'd him : and yet he thundered upon him , and persecuted him even to death , and beyond death . for after he was assassinated , in pursuance of his excommunication and deposition , by his creatures of the league , and particularly of the house of guise that he favour'd : he would not at all suffer any obits or services to be made for him at rome , as if he had a mind to have him damn'd , after he had caus'd him to be murder'd . particularly he extoll'd , in a publick harangue , the execrable parricide jacob clement , and compares his fact to the mystery of the incarnation of the son of god. the design of this persecution drawn out so at length against the king , the princes of the blood , and against all the kingdom , is to be seen in the memoirs of the advocate david , intercepted at lions , an. . as he was upon his return from rome , where he had been secretary to the bishop of paris , the king's ambassador with the pope . this bishop of paris , a creature of the duke of guise , being at rome , an. . instead of serving the interests of the king his master , who had sent him to make an excuse , by reason of the necessity of the king's affairs , for the peace he had made with the duke alenzon his brother , and with the princes of the blood that were protestants ; he apply'd himself wholly to the interests of the duke of guise and the pope , who had then complotted together their devilish design of the league . for the pope , whose custom it is to build his greatness upon the weakness of kings , and the troubles of their states , seeing the royal-house declining , despis'd , and drawing to an end , and france harassed with civil wars ; was easily wrought upon to favour the house of guise , which aspir'd manifestly to the crown by the exclusion of the princes of the blood. so upon the whole matter , the duke of guise , a prince well made , and of high undertaking , powerful in friends , lov'd and ador'd by the people , promised to give him all the soveraignty in france , which he counts himself debarr'd of , by the pragmatick sanctions , and by the liberties of the gallicane-church . then during the stay of this ambassador at rome , an. . an agreement was drawn between the pope and duke of guise , whereby the pope declares , that hugh capet had seiz'd the crown of france , which of right belong'd to the house of charlemaign . that he and his race had render'd the french refractory and disobedient to the holy see , by that damnable error which they call the liberties of the gallicane-church , which is none other , ( says he ) but the doctrine of the valdenses , albigenses , the poor of lyons , lutherans and calvinists . that it is this error which makes the arms of the kings of france , in defence of the holy church , unfortunate , and that they never will prosper , so long as the crown shall continue in this line . in order thereunto , an opportunity was now offer'd by reason of the present divisions , to labour in good earnest the restoration of the crown to the true successors of charlemaign who had always constantly obey'd the commands of the holy see. and who had in effect shew'd themselves the lawful heirs of the apostolick benediction upon that crown , though depriv'd of their inheritance by fraud and violence . that 't is plain , the race of the capets are wholly deliver'd over to a reprobate sense ; some being possess'd with a spirit of mopishness , stupid , and of no valour . others rejected by god and men for their heresie , proscribed and shut out from the communion of the holy church . whereas the branches of charlemaign are fresh and flourishing , lovers of virtue , vigorous of body and in mind , for the execution of high and laudable enterprizes . he goes on and prophesies for them , that as war bad been the means whereby they lost their degree , so peace shall do them the service to restore them to their ancient heritage of the kingdom , with the good will , the consent and the choice of all the people . afterwards follows a lesson of the conclave , for the execution of this design , well worthy to be read . for it is the whole plot and project of the league , which was exactly observ'd all along , even to the very last act with the states of blois , when the theatre on a suddain fell upon the actors heads , and that the tragical death of two of the principals broke the great design ready to be accomplisht ; which was to shut the king in a monastery , and the queen in another , and to put to death all the princes of the blood , to make way for monsieur the duke of guise , to whom immediately the crown was to be given . for the conclusion of this accord , his holiness requires of the duke of guise , that he shall cause to be acknowledg'd the power of the holy see , by the states of the realm , without any restriction or modification : abolishing the priviledges and the liberties of the gallican-church , the which he shall promise and swear to do before he take the crown . the pope enrag'd to see his great design quash'd , that he had laboured and push'd on with so much artifice , by the execution made by the king upon the persons of the duke of guise , and of the cardinal his brother , excommunicates and deposes the king , who , for all that , lost not his crown , till he lost his life ; also , being assassinated by james clement , a dominican-monk : who being immediately kill'd by the king's servants there present , had undoubtedly been canoniz'd by his holiness for his heroick act , if the business of the league had prosper'd : for we have have seen and read with horror the legend of st. james clement , printed and dispersed through france : and his execrable paracide has been defended as a just and meritorious action by the jesuit guignard , who has written a book expresly on that subject . even bellarmine condemns highly those that kill'd the monk who murdered his king , because , ( says he ) they kill'd sacratum virum , a man consecrated , accounting this detestable monk more sacred and more inviolable , than the sacred majesty of the king , henry the great having inherited the crown of henry the third , the pope prosecutes the league against him with a re-doubled zeal . so that besides the open war , there followed three several attempts upon his person , by villains instructed , and posted in convenient places for their design by the jesuits , who for this reason , were banish'd out of france , and a pyramid was erected close by the palace , with an inscription which declar'd the cause of their banishment . now , for all that his majesty professed the roman catholick religion , yet would not the pope of a long time receive him into the bosom of the church , because as yet his party was but weak . but when his holiness saw that the interests of the league declin'd , and that good cities and whole provinces treated with the king , then the holy spirit suggested to him , that he might receive into his fold of the church this straying sheep ; out of fear , least france , provoked too far , should , in the end , come to do what has been often threatned , that is , to make a patriarch of the gallicane-church . and yet in this reconciliation , the pope made appear so much pride and rancor , this great king could not but in the person of his ambassador , lying on the ground at the pope's feet , receive a bitter cup of repentance . never had a king of france made the pope the like submission . the pope has taught our kings a lesson to take advantage in their turn of his necessities , to make him bend or break . and i am full of hope that our great and glorious king will have a deep resentment of so great an indignity done to his heroick grandfather . especially might his majesty be pleas'd to consider , that the court of rome , notwithstanding that reconciliation , never pardon'd him ; keeping near his persons confessors that conspir'd against his life , causing seditious sermons to be preacht in paris , and censuring at rome in full consistory the sentence of the court of parliament against john castel , executed for having struck with a knife at this great king , in order to cut his throat . and this censure was made at rome four months before that this excellent king was kill'd , to prepare their spirits for this execrable assassination . thereupon , when ravaillac , who perform'd what the other martyrs of the pope had attempted , was examin'd , and asked why he undertook this detestable parricide , he answered , that there needed no more than to have heard the sermons preached in paris the last lent , to inform any body of the motives ; for the rest that the king was preparing to make war against god , in that he would make war against the pope , and that the pope is god. in short , one might find in this wretch the sparks of that fiery zeal , and blind devotion for his holiness , and the desperate spirit of the league , which the pope , by the means of the jesuits , industriously fomented in france , to produce this horrible and dire effect . when it was represented to these bigot parricides , that the king having been excommunicated , was afterwards absolv'd and reconcil'd to the pope ; they answer'd , that his conversion was feign'd . and they who attempted against his person , before this reconciliation , might shield themselves with the canon excommunicatorum of pope vrban , which speaks thus , we count them not murderers , who shall happen to kill any excommunicated persons , out of an ardour of zeal , for the catholick church their mother . observe then , that all they whom the pope taxes for heresie , they that appeal from the pope to a future council , and they that levy taxes upon the clergy , are excommunicated by the bull de coena domini , which the pope pronounces every thursday absolutely : a many kings and princes are involv'd in this excommunication , and the kings of france amongst the rest : no heresie being more criminal at rome , than the asserting of the liberties of the gallicane-church , and the not owning the terrestrial empire of his holiness . it concerns then those to make good provision for the securing of their lives , who are by this canon expos'd to all those who shall be pusht on to kill them by an ardor of zeal for the catholick church . he was much deceiv'd , who thought that the pope , and the jesuits , his emissaries , take it very ill any should represent to the world , that by the doctrine , and by the censures of rome , subjects are instructed to kill their kings , as often and as many as it shall please the pope to excommunicate ; and that the murder of our two last henries ensued thereupon . i think the quite contrary , they are well content that in laying to their charge these furious executions , which have plung'd our france in a gulph of miseries , we serve their design , which is to scare our kings and princes , and render them tame slaves to the court of rome , by the fear of excommunication , deposition , rebellion , knife and poison . but this is not to be fear'd save where the people are bigotted with a sottish zeal , and believe in the pope , instead of believing in god , and obeying the king. france at this time is pretty well purg'd of this zeal . and by the grace of god , and the wise conduct of his majesty , there is no longer now any ambitious prince within the kingdom to rob him of his peoples affection , or that may dare to make any alliance with the pope , to tumble him from his throne , and share the crown . we have this good fortune , that we may set out to the life the ill aspect of rome upon our kings , and that dangerous vigilance over france , without any danger of abating the courage of our great king ; but on the contrary , were his truly royal courage capable of an increase , it would yet swell the higher , from the consideration of the evils that rome has done , and will yet do to france , if he do not heartily oppose the usurpations she exercises , with impunity in all the parts of his kingdom . the honest french men that have the honour to be near his person , might represent to him the danger of this doctrine maintain'd by the popelings of his kingdom , that jesus christ committed to st. peter , as well the earthly as the heavenly empire , which are the very words of pope nicolas . therefore cardinal bellarmine , ch. . against barclay , holds absolutely , that the pope may dispose of all the temporals of the world. i affirm ( says he ) with confidence , that our lord jesus christ , the time he was mortal , might dispose of all temporal things , and deprive the kings and the princes of their kingdoms and dominions , and that without doubt he has left the same power to his vicar , to be employ'd , when he shall judge it necessary for the good of souls . the pope pius v. displays this power with great ostentation , in his bull against queen elizabeth of england ; wherein after that he calls himself servant of servants , he declares , that god has establisht the bishop of rome prince over all nations and kingdoms , to take , destroy , disperse , consume , plant and build , and in the power hereof he does anathemize , degrade , and depose this queen , absolves all her subjects from the oath of fidelity that they had made her , and forbids them absolutely to give her obedience . gregory xiv . set out such another bull against our great henry , declaring him uncapable of the crown , and exposing his kingdom to prey . but both this and the other bull were torn and cast into the fire by the hands of the hangman . observe that the pope exerciseth this power over the temporalties of kings for the good of souls , and as a spiritual prince . so that our french statesmen may cease to have their eyes wilfully seal'd up by that distinction of spiritual power , which they allow him , and temporal power that they deny him . for that it is by virtue of the spiritual power , that he exerciseth the temporal . see what cardinal bellarmin says , de pont . rom. l. . c. . the pope may change the kingdoms , take them from one , and give them to another , as a sovereign spiritual prince , when it shall be necessary for the good of souls . and of this necessity he shall be the only judge , as the sovereign spiritual prince . for 't is thus the cardinal argues , apol. pro garnet p. . if the church ( that is to say the pope ) had not the power to dispose of temporal things , she would not be perfect , and would want the power that is necessary for the attaining her end : for ( says he ) the wicked might entertain hereticks , and go scot-free , and so religion , be turn'd upside down . this reason charges imperfection on the church in the apostles time , for that had no power over the temporals . these horrible principles so strongly maintain'd by the court of rome , were of fresh memory found so prejudicial , both to the safety of our kings , and to the peace of france , that those ▪ of the third state an . . were mov'd to propose to the general states an article , containing the means to dispossess , the people of that opinion , that the king might be depos'd by the pope , and that by the killing of kings one might gain the crown of martyrdom . cardinal du perron , in the name of the clergy , oppos'd this article , and employ'd all the strength of his eloquence and learning in two fair speeches , the one before the nobility , the other before the third state , to perswade them that our kings may be depos'd by the pope , offering himself to suffer martyrdom in defence of this truth . the lords of the nobility , to their great shame , joyn'd with the clergy , for the putting their kings crown under the miter of the pope , much degenerating from the vertue of their ancestors , those french banons , by whose advice philip the august declar'd to the cardinal d'anagnia , the popes legat , that threatned him , that it did not at all belong to the church of rome to pronounce sentence against the king of france . but the third state held firm to their article that maintain'd the dignity of their king , and the safety of his person ; and could never be won by promises , nor affrighted by threatnings to depart from it , shewing themselves in this more noble than the nobility . it is no wonder in this case that the third state shew'd more affection to their king than the clergy , seeing that the clerks hold , that they are not the king's subjects ; for in effect they acknowledge another sovereign out of the kingdom . and who can think it strange if they labour to heighten that monarchy of which they make a party ? but that the nobility , the kings right arm , that they should be so base to strike their head , and lay it at the feet of an italian bishop ; this is that which after ages will reflect upon with astonishment and indignation , and which historians shall blush to relate , and be vex'd that they cannot let pass in silence . so the nobility being joyn'd with the clergy , the article of the third state was censur'd and rejected . whereupon the pope writ triumphant letters to the clergy and the nobility , who had been faithful to him in this cause , glorying in his victory , and exalting the magnanimity of these genero●s nobles . but in truth , the deputies of these generous nobles deserv'd to have been degraded from their nobility , and they of the third state to have receiv'd their titles . the minority of the late king , and the easiness of the queen-mother , render'd them expos'd to these injuries , and apt to be circumvented ; insomuch that this harangue made to the third state was printed , with the priviledge of the king , and the pope gain'd his point . the false dealing of the cardinal , who made this speech , is remarkable ; namely , that he had a long time followed king henry the great , even then when he was of a contrary religion , and depos'd by the pope : and that a little before , in an assembly held at the jacobins in paris , he had resisted the popes nuncio , who would that this doctrine of the temporal sovereignty of the pope might be held for an article of faith. but in these two harangues , the cardinal made a kind of a recantation , and pronounc'd himself his own condemnation . ungrateful wretch ! to have thus abus'd the tender age of the son of his king , and his great benefactor : and to have basely betray'd the rights of the king , to oblige the court of rome . but this may not seem so strange , if one consider , that he got the best part of his preferment for certain services of pleasure , that do not much bind the conscience of him that receives them , nor that of him who is recompens'd for them . and in truth , those diverting services that he and monsieur de la ravenne render'd to king henry the great , deserve that posterity should erect for them statues crown'd with myrtle . god be thank'd that france now has a king vigorous both in age and in virtue , who is the terrour of rome , having shewn himself sensible of its usurpations upon france , beyond all his predecessors ; and of whom we have good occasion to hope that he will shake off this italian yoke , and banish all foreign jurisdiction out of his kingdom . we also ought to bless god , for that the french nobility at this day is much of a different temper from that which in the full states submitted the crown and life of their king to the popes tyranny years ago . and that is ready to cover their fathers faults by generously assisting their king , to make him the only king within his kingdom . to effect this , above all things , those pretended immunities and exemptions must be taken from the clergy , which indeed are revolts from the kings authority to that of the popes . 't is in truth very reasonable , that they who have the charge of souls , should be discharg'd from many publick services , by reason they are vow'd and reserv'd to the service of god : but however , not that they and their lands should no longer depend on the king , and be subject to another sovereign . this is what was represented to king henry the great , by that illustrious personage achilles de harley , first president of his court of parliament at paris , in a speech he made to him , to disswade him from recalling the jesuits , he remonstrates to him , that according to their doctrine , he who has taken the lowest orders of the church , could not be guilty of high treason , whatever crime he committed , for that the clergy are no longer the kings subjects , nor belonging to his jurisdiction . in such manner that the church-men ( if one would believe them ) are exempt from secular powers , and may , without punishment , attempt against kings with their bloody-hands ; and that this doctrine they maintain in their publish'd books , thuanus l. . ad an . . to this effect , the jesuit emanuel sa holds , that the rebellion of a clerk against the prince is not the crime laesae majestatis , because he is not a subject of the prince . words that have been left out in the edition of paris , but remain in that of cologne , and that of antwerp . bellarmin , that has not been purged , says the same thing . he affirms , de cl. c. . that a clerk cannot be punished by the civil judges , or in any wise brought before the judicial seat of a secular magistrate . he likewise says , that the sovereign pontifex having deliver'd the clerks from the subjection of princes , kings are no more the superiors of clerks . the pope then by his reckoning is the king of kings , if he can deliver whom he pleases from their subjection due to their princes by their birth , by making them clerks ; and it will be in his power not to leave in france any subject to the king , if all his subjects will but accept of the meanest orders . this body of the clergy has its judges and officers apart , and prisons apart . their causes will not bide the trial before the kings judges , but fly to the rota , or to the consistory at rome . there may be found an incredible number of persons in france , who , under the title of the clergy , have shaken off the yoke of the kings authority ; and a third part of the land of the kingdom is in the church-mens hands , for which they will neither render homage nor service to the king. and though the lots and vents , the quints , requints , and other rights of lordship belong to the king ; all these rights are lost after that the moveable goods are enter'd into the possession of the clergy . the king also loses his rights d'aubanir , of confiscation , and of deforence , the clergy being a body that never dies , yet mortifies the inheritances ; new donations falling to them every day , but none goes from them . a famous writer said pleasantly , that as the arms and thighs dwindle when the belly swels to excess ; so in the body of a state the nobility and people that are as the arms and legs of a commonweal , are impair'd by the fatning of the clergy . i am of those who wish the clergy may have those means , and that dignity which may lift them above contempt and oppression , and render them respected even of kings . but because i love them , i wish their riches may not be so excessive , as to create in kings a jealousie , that may cause them to be taken away , as has happen'd in england , and in other places . 't is therefore a great imprudence of our lords , the clergy of france , who possess the best part , and the fat of the kingdom , enough to cause jealousie in the seculars , and the avarice of sacriledge ; to add , yet this unjust pretension of immunity from all charges , both for their persons and for their goods ; and defend themselves with the popes authority , which exempts them . which , in effect , is to tell the king , that they are another kings subjects , who has power to command him , to dispose of the lands , under his obedience , and to limit his authority over the persons of the native french. if for this they alledge a long custom , we may say , that the popes to settle their usurpations in france , have ever embroil'd our kings in troubles , and oblig'd them to think of somewhat else , besides the repelling the blind encroachments of a stranger kingdom that crept into their realm ; and that they had to do with weak princes , or such as had their hands full other ways . but now that god has given france a king , wise , powerful , flourishing , and who has leisure to have an eye or all his interests , will these gentlemen expect that he will suffer long that a third of his kingdom lie unprofitable to him , and even that it be reserv'd to fortifie a foreign monarchy ? and though natural reason requires that they who live at ease should comfort those who fight for their preservation ; all this while that the nobles and the third state oppose the invasion of strangers , all this while that the king is fortifying his frontiers , entertaining garisons , setling officers both for the state and for the war , why do not the church-men , who are thereby maintain'd in the quiet enjoyment of so great plenty , contribute one mite towards the defraying of publick charges ? why shall their increase be a diminution to the strength of the king , who is kept waking for their repose and preservation ? shall not the king who is so clear-sighted , see what an impoverishment it is to his kingdom , that france be tributary to a stranger , under the title of annates , offerings , dispensations , absolutions , and causes matrimonial ? against these depredations , our ancient kings had provided some remedy by the pragmatick sanctions , vext to see the fairest revenue of the kingdom pass over the alps by a religious spoil , and go into the purses of those who laugh at our simplicity . but what reason is there that they who pay so willingly tribute to the pope , should make so great difficulty in paying to the king ? is it not because they believe they owe all to the pope , and nought to the king ? st. paul teaches them to pay tribute to the higher powers , inasmuch as they are ministess of god. and st. chrysostom commenting upon this text , tells them who are these higher powers . if ( says he ) the apostle has establisht this law whilst the princes were pagans , how much more ought this to be done under princes that are believers ? and he had said before , the apostle commands this to all , even to the priests , which is more , he adds , though thou art an apostle , though thou art an evangelist , or a prophet , or what ever else thou art . from st. ambrose we have the same lesson in his oration of delivering the temples , if tribute be demanded , refuse it not , the lands of the church pay tribute . even pope vrban and the roman decretal say , that the church pays tribute of its exterior goods . also , that tribute must be paid to the emperors , in acknowledgment of the peace and repose , in which they ought to maintain and defend us . the right of kings and truth must needs be very strong , that could draw from the pope and his canonistical doctors this acknowledgment . for the canon law was not founded for any other end , but to supplant the civil laws , and establish the popes jurisdiction throughout . this is a body of foreign laws , that have their tribunal apart , and that depends on a foreign prince , and where the king has nothing to do but look on ; i mean till such time as he shall please to take cognizance of so unreasonable an usurpation . and forbid that any cause be judged in france by other authority than his , and much less any cause commenc'd in france , be appeal'd to rome . and , in truth , he is but a king by halfs , till he alone possess all the jurisdiction exercis'd within his kingdom . this is what charles du moulin said in an epistle to henry ii. where he writes freely against the empire that the pope has set up within our france , where the pope has subjects that submit not to the laws of the king , but to those of the pope , which are the canon-law , and the constitutions that come from rome . but ( some may object ) would you have the king judge in spirituals ? i answer , that if the king ought not to be judge , it does not follow that the pope must . the king has his bishops that may and ought to judge of matters purely spiritual ; but of nought without being authoriz'd by the king : and there is no need of an authority out of the kingdom for this . i will say more , that the ecclesiastical government is a part of the office of a king. for so it was in the kingdom of israel . and who would believe that in this age , and in spain , where the inquisition reigns , king philip iv. assum'd to himself the soveraign power of churches within his dominions ? for this purpose he apply'd that excellent passage of isodore , which is attributed also to the council of paris , that the secular princes should know , that they ought to give an account of the charge of the church committed to them by jesus christ ; for whether that the peace or the discipline receive improvement by believing princes , or that they are impair'd : he who committed the church to their power , will demand an account . o the excellent passage ! o the holy lesson ! god give all christian kings the grace so well to learn it , that they may never leave this charge of the church which jesus christ has committed to them upon the hands of strangers ; and when they have taken it into their own hands , to acquit themselves worthily , and render a good account . alas ! alas ! have kings eyes to see their rights , and have they no hands to maintain them ? are they quick-sighted enough to perceive that the government of the church is committed to them , and that they are to render an account to god ; and have they not the courage to rescue them from unjust and strange hands that snatch them away ? think they to acquit themselves of this great account , of the government of the church of their kingdoms , by saying , that the holy father has discharg'd them of it , when they have in their hands the power to discharge him from his usurpations ? in truth , they will never be in condition to govern the church committed to them ; they will never be but kings by halfs , till they have banisht from their territories this pretended spiritual jurisdiction , which destroys the civil , and which will draw under its cognizance all sorts of causes , there being none , wherein there is not some matter of conscience , or some kind of transgression of gods commandments , and that by consequence belongs not to the jurisdiction of the pope , if he must be own'd the soveraign spiritual judge in france . the popes themselves inform our kings of their right to govern the church . leo iv. writing to lewis and to lotharius , did not he own that the investiture of the bishop comes from the emperor , and the pope has only the consecration ? did not he beseech the emperor to invest a person he had recommended ? and does he not acknowledge , that the metropolitan dares not consecrate him , without the emperors consent ? and pope john x. in his epistle to hereiman of cologue , about the business of heldwin of tongres ; does he not observe , that the old custom has this force , that none ought to confer a bishoprick upon any clerk , save the king , to whom the scepter has been given of god. the council held at thionvil , under lewis the debonnair , an. . gives us this good maxim , that the pope ought to be call'd pope and brother , not father and pontifex : and that lewis had more power in the government of the gallicane-church , than the bishop of rome , as agobard bishop of lions has it in his treatise of the co●●●●…ison of the two governments , related by bossellus in his decretals . gregory turonensis does furnish us with more than ten examples of the right of investiture belonging to our kings before the empire fell into their hands . in the times of clovis they held the royal right of the investiture of bishops . they had also a right which they call'd regal , which was the power of enjoying vacant bishopricks and prebends , and the moveables of bishops dying without a will. and it is very easie to prove , that under the first line of our kings , and a long while under the second , the kings of france were the soveraigns as well in spirituals as in temporals . and though they had lost their soveraignty about the end of the second line , and under the third by their negligence , and by the cunning of the popes , watchful for their advantage ; nevertheless an infinite of persons , in those times , both of the clergy and of the law , took notice of , and taxed the usurpations of the popes upon the rights of our kings . amongst others , aegydius romanus , archbishop of bourges , in the time of philip the fair , this archbishop , for the reasons registred in the court of parliament , remonstrates , that the gallicane-church has that right , and that liberty to provide for its occasions by synods of the bishops of the country , without that the pope ought to meddle , unless by way of exhortation . cardinal d'offat ( letter to the king ) shews , that the pope ought not to meddle at all with the election of t●● french bishops , and this he proves by the ordinance of orleans , an. , and saith , that since the popes have reserv'd to themselves the provision of bishopricks , they have been very ill serv'd . the excellent archbishop of paris , peter de marca , in his agreement of empire and the priesthood , has wisely and boldly remonstrated ; that since the pope would hold the same degree in france , that the soveraign sacrificer held in the synagogue , he ought not to pretend to more authority in our france , than the soveraign sacrificer had in the kingdom of israel , where he was the kings subject : his person , his jurisdiction , the affairs of the church , the order of ceremonies were within the kings jurisdiction : who depos'd the sacrificer , and set another in his place , out of his pure and full authority . god be prais'd for that in these later times , where the throne of iniquity , the papal see is so much adored , he has rais'd up such brave assertors of our christian liberty , which would bear up again , and for which we want only to shake off the yoak . what is alledg'd the most specious for the necessity of a pope to superintend the christian kingdom , is , that the kings need an arbiter of their differences , that may be generally respected , and whose dignity and sanctity may oblige them to submission and veneration . but if this general arbiter , instead of making peace amongst princes , foment their differences , and embroil their affairs , to fish in troubl'd waters , they shall do wisely to let him alone , and yet more wisely to rid themselves of him . there 's no question but that when a general peace is for the advantage of the pope , that then he will set himself seriously about it . but it rarely happens otherwise , then that the good of one party shall be disadvantageous to the pope , and then 't is ill trusting to his arbitrement . france has more reason to stand upon its guard than any other nation , for the court of rome has always sought its ruin : has favour'd its enemies , or rais'd them up anew . when the english made war against us , rome abetted their quarrel , and aided them with spiritual weapons . i cannot let pass the ridiculous assistance sent to henry v. of england , when he levied an army to go into france : this was a ship loaden with consecrated apples , which were distributed to all who would list themselves for this war : and they listed themselves with a good will , having scrambl'd for the apples with greediness and devotion , and were well satisfied in conscience of the justice of this expedition by these apples apostolical . the pope employ'd more powerful means against us , when france was weak , and the spaniard powerful , whom he assisted with all his forces spiritual and temporal . what a strong league did he make to destroy both king and kingdom ? what evils did he heap on france ? and after the injury done us , how much praying did he require before he would be appeas'd ? thomas campanella speaks thus of this judge of differences , who shall carefully read history , shall find that the popes have made more wars amongst christians , than they have quieted . let france mark what he adds , so far have the popes been from opposing himself , hispanis imperiorum helluonibus , to the spainiards unsatiable devourers of empire , that the pontifical authority has lent pretences to their voracity : witness navarre and france in the times of henry iii. for this last hundred years , all the popes ( except vrban the viii . ) have favour'd the spaniard . and what reason can we have to expect better from them , seeing that the greatest part of the cardinals are born subjects to spain , in the principalities of milan , of naples , and of sicily ; and that the court of rome is inclos'd within these principalities ? judge what confidence we can have in such arbiters . france loses plainly both money and pains ' sending ambassadors to these gentlemen , courting them , and enriching them , when they are assembled for the election of a pope . the fear they have of france's power , may gain some respect , but it is a respect without friendship ; and when france has gain'd it , i do not see what france has gain'd . they have reason to fear the king , knowing that this great prince is sensible of their usurpations ; and they have no great reason to love his subjects , because they are no great purchasers of indulgences . and the less the king cares for them , the more will they fawn upon him ; but we may assure our selves , they employ all their strength , and set to work all their art and subtilty to put a stop to his progress , and to pull down his greatness . that agreement of the pope with the duke of guise ought never to be forgotten . what rancour did he testifie against the royal line that reigns at this day ? what pains did he take to disinherit and destroy it ? into what combustion did he cast the poor kingdom , that he might have a king of his own choice , who might abolish the liberties of the gallican-church , and make france a fief of the court of rome . let us for our experience learn the truth of that character given by aeneus sylvius , who was afterwards pope pius ii. that there was never any great slaughter in christendom , nor any great calamity happen'd either of church or state , whereof the bishops of rome were not the authors . hist . austria . and as much is said by machaivel in his history of florence . and if we consider that the great evils done by the pope to kings , were done under the colour of com-promise ; we shall find that 't is the surest way to decline his kindess , and to have nought to do with him ; and that he always comes better off that affronts him , than he that flatters him . the marquess after he has wisely consider'd , that the name of religion is a false pretext laid hold on by the court of rome , thereby to encrease their temporal power , and raise them creatures every where , the abuses he would have retrench'd after the example of charlemaign , and of many more great kings . but to compass this , it is not adviseable to appear in it barefac'd , for ( says he ) that would be to bring upon us the clamours and importunity of all the monks and their followers ; this would be to bring rome upon our back , which might give us trouble . i confess that no good can be acquir'd without trouble . but i cannot conceive that it would be much trouble to deliver france from the usurpations and the exactions of rome . to forbid that there be in france no more courts depending on the pope ; nor money carried from france to rome , or any cause removed thither by appeal . and that no provision of benefices be receiv'd from thence . this , in truth , would be to bring rome on our backs ; but not one sword would be drawn in the cause either within the kingdom or without . should the emperor do the same within his principalities , our king would not stir ; nor would the emperor any more be concern'd if the king should set back the jurisdiction of the pope to beyond the alps. when king henry viii . of england did the same in his kingdom , what prince undertook the quarrel against him : how easily would the people accustom themselves to be free from the papal exactions : and how vain and idle were the attempts of the popes partisans in england to restore his authority ? that prince hack'd and harass'd what he had a mind to in the ecclesiastick estate , and the clamours of the monks , which the marquess is affraid on , frighted not him , though he treated them coursely . nor are we at all to fear least the monks take up arms , as the chiefs of the league forc'd them to do ; which would serve only to make them be laught at , and gave a subject to the painters for those antick and ridiculous portracts that they have left us . or if any little broil should be rais'd by some of the bigots , how soon must it fall before a great king who is never without an army . who shall read over all the book of the marquiss , shall find that he proposes reformations in the state far more hand to be effected , than the banishing of the canon-law and papal jurisdiction out of the kingdom . for he would perfectly melt down the justice and policy , and cast them all anew . he has truly made it appear , that he understands the malady of the state , and yet his projects to remedy them cannot be put in execution , without bringing to ruine and despair many active spirits that live on their prosessions , which is very dangerous to attempt in a state. whereas the expulsion of the canon-law out of france , and the reduction of all causes thereon depending to the civil magistrate , and of all persons acknowledging the pope to the obedience of the king , would not at all be any dangerous innovation . to discontent the regular ecclesiasticks that are unactive , as bred up in the shade , and in contemplation , or in idleness , can be no great danger : especially leaving them their revenues , at least for life . i neither have the wit nor the presumption to give a model of what orders should be prescrib'd the church after the papal jurisdiction is banisht the kingdom . and i shall go no farther than to say , that i see no vigour in the roman jurisdiction , and their partisans in france , that may hinder the king from cashiering them absolutely , and making himself master at home . even the excommunications and interdicts that would follow , would strengthen him , being of no other effect but to provoke the parliaments , and to animate the people against the pope . the greatest part of the clergy would submit to the king , and would cast off all foreign domination : and the dissenting clergy would be inconsiderable , would be disperst , and vanish before the rays of the authority royal. and , i pray , a king of england , could he accomplish this work , to free himself from the papal-yoke , though carried thereunto more by passion than prudence ? and our great king , so vigorous , so powerful , so wise , shall not he dare to undertake it , for fear of vexing the pope and the monks ? shall he be scar'd with an imaginary monarchy , that has neither force nor foundation , save in the opinion of those that fear it , and establish it by their sottish fear ? what is most considerable in this example , is , that the pope continues banisht out of england . for though restor'd by queen mary , and his power own'd for the space of five years ; queen elizabeth , and the kings her successors , found themselves so much at ease in being deliver'd from the roman-yoke , and in being acknowledged supreme , under god , in all causes , and over all persons , as well ecclesiastical as civil ; that they have maintain'd , and do yet maintain this authority essential to their crown . this authority is no less essential to the crown of our great king ; and 't is this that the good prince , james king of england , represents to all kings and princes of christendom , in the remonstrance he has made them , touching the rights of their crowns . they have not hitherto been so happy to listen to it , but let us hear what he says to them . if you that are the most powerful , come to consider in earnest with your selves , that well-nigh a third of your people and of your lands belong to the church ; will not the thoughts of so great a loss move you , which withdraws from your jurisdiction so many men , and so much of your lands in such manner , that every where they plant colonies and provinces for the pope ? what thorns and thistles suffer you to grow in the country under your subjection , so long as so powerful a faction flourishes and spreads over so much good soil within your kingdoms , openly maintaining that they are exempt from your power , and that they are by no right subject to your laws , and to your judgments ? insomuch , that whereas formerly the clerks desir'd no more but their tiths , and liv'd thereon content ; at this day the pope , chief of the clerks , is not content with less than a third part of your subjects , and of your lands . these words of a king , our neighbour , happily enjoying a sovereignty independant of the pope , of which his ancestor robb'd this robber an hundred and forty years ago , ought to move in our kings a virtuous emulation to recover , and after to maintain the rights proper to their crown . and the example of so flourishing a success ought to encourage them to so just and so noble an undertaking . from this great and principal acquisition , that the king shall be the only sovereign in his kingdom , other advantages will arise . these stranger courts being put down ( that are the mills whither every one brings , and where the moulture goes all to rome , or to their creatures ) the money they drain from the kings subjects shall stay in france ; and seeing that this employs a great number of officers , that only do harm to the state ; when this gate shall be shut , the young men will seek out other ways to make themselves valued by , and the arts and commerce of the kingdom will be more considerable . we shall likewise save the treasure , that is spent unprofitably in the embassies to rome , and in courting the good graces of the cardinals at the elections of popes , and in the reception of legates and nuncio's ; by all which france does nought else but prosess and encrease her slavery , without the return of the least advantage . for what-ever compliments , what-ever expence france may make , yet the catholick king is the minion of rome ; and the subjects of spain are the chapmen that but most of their wares , and that have most blind devotion for the holy see. and in truth , seeing that the politicks of france ( by the marquess ) and monfieur silhon , and before them cardinal d'ossat , have testified their little satisfaction with rome , and publish'd her cheats , in so far that as we know that rome does not at all love us ; in like manner rome well knows , that we care not for her : and i cannot understand to what end serve all our civilities to the court of rome , but to puff them up the more , and provoke the gentlemen to laughter , who without doubt receive a wonderful pleasure in seeing their professed enemies come to kiss their feet . 't is true , that so long as france suffers rome to dispose of many benefices , we must always have occasion to deal with them ; and as the pope , to preserve his credit , amuses the princes with com-promises and treaties which he draws out at length , deporting himself as the judge of differences , whereas he creates more than he decides . so very often princes contribute to his inclination by their delays , and in setting before his council-board affairs that they have no intention should be concluded . and whatever their inclination be at the bottom , he is courted and caress'd as the arbiter , which pleases him extremely . and why should it not please him to have at his court the ambassadors of the empire , of france , of spain , of poland , of portugal , and other princes that bring him authority by their difference , and bring gain to his court and his citizens , by their liberalities , and by their expences , suitable to the dignity of their masters ? the great men and the sages of council to his majesty may , when they please , consider what good comes to our kings , by their keeping the pope in this humour , of his being their judge , and in letting him enjoy his pretended rights in france . and whether it is not better , and a shorter way , for france to do its own business without him , and to take from him what does not at all belong to him in our kingdom , that we may have no more to do with him . the king has been pleas'd to declare , that he desir'd to re-unite his subjects in their religion . this so christian and royal design cannot be executed , so long as the pope shall have any power in france ; for this re-union cannot be made , unless the parties mutually yield some matters either in the doctrine or in the discipline ; 't is certain that the pope will never consent , at least not to be own'd the vicar of jesus christ , that has all the power which jesus christ had upon earth ; and that on the other hand , the protestants who have quite another opinion of him , and such an one as all know ( though they make it not an article of their faith ) they can never submit to his authority . but if that france were not govern'd in spirituals , save by the king and his bishops , an half of the way to this great work were already over ; it being most certain , that most of the points in difference are not maintain'd by the theologians , vow'd to the popes service , farther than as they serve his interests . reflections upon the fifth chapter of the politicks of france , which treats of the huguenots . i have treated my lord , the marquess of c. with all the respect that was possible for me in my reflections upon his chapter of the clergy . i could not do more to comply with him and serve him , than by approving his judgment , and confirming it with authorities , adding only what he durst not venture , and ( may be ) had a mind to say . upon his chapter of the huguenots i shall keep my self within the same respect . but i would hope from his ingenuity , that after i have taken some pains in commending and defending the judgment he has made on the roman clergy , he in recompence would give me the liberty to oppose that which he has given , upon those he calls huguenots , and to complain of the treatment he would have dealt to them . but because i take great delight in according with him as far as is possible , i embrace the advice he gives at the entrance , that a king cannot have a more noble object of his care , than to preserve in his states the religion he has receiv'd from his ancestors . for though this proposition be not universally true , i will understand it in his senle , supposing that he means the true christian religion . and 't is that his majesty he receiv'd of his ancestors ; the which i presume he will not limit to two or three descents of his next predecessors ; but as he has drawn from three stocks the lawful succession of our last kings , and affirms , that they are branches sprung from the same root , he cannot take it ill that we go back to the first and second race , to find the religion that his majesty has receiv'd of his ancestors . therefore as the noble marquess in his second chapter , speaking of the pretended exemptions of the clergy , appeals for that matter to the old kings and emperors , who own'd no such thing , and says , that the clergy cannot take it amiss if his majesty reduce things to their primitive state . in like manner the marquess cannot take it amiss , that religion be reduc'd to its primitive state , at least to the state it was left in at the time when our kings were emperors . now i have shew'd in the foregoing chapter , that the emperor charlemaign , one of his majesties ancestors , convok'd a synod , in which the worship of images was condemned , and that he himself made a book against the second council of nice , and against images , which we have preserv'd to this day ; and that under lewis the mild , his son , another synod was held at paris against images , all the acts of which we have entire . this doctrine is a principal point of the religion that our kings receiv'd from their ancestors , and which we profess . and as much may be said in point of the holy sacrament , of which so much noise is made at this day , that we willingly refer our selves to what was believ'd in the times of his majesties ancestors . i should stray from my subject , should i enter upon controversie ; the marquess obliges me to stand upon another guard , employing his eloquence in treating us as rebels and enemies of the state. i am far from justifying the evil actions of our party . but since we are to deal with men of such a spirit , that display the evil and suppress the good , that insult over us for actions forc'd by the despair of a few , and protested against by the greater party ; and that will not acknowledge the signal services we have done for the crown , which ought never to have been forgotten , so long as the race of henry the great shall sit upon the throne . i think my self oblig'd to represent truly what is most considerable in their condition , and in their actions since the last return of the purity of the gospel into france . i say the last return , because that it has been , and has flourisht there two or three hundred years before , and the professors , remain'd there skulking , and yet in great numbers , after long and cruel persecutions . for we dissemble not , but own that this holy doctrine came to us , and was planted by the remains of those poor valdenses and albigenses , the destruction of whom is rank'd by the noble marquess , amongst the good works of the first rates . the character that reinerius , their cruel inquisitor , gave them , is very remarkable , and may satisfie those who ask , where was our religion before luther , c. . contra valdenses . this , says he , of all sects , is the most pernicious , for three reasons . first , because of its long duration , for some say , that it has continu'd since the time of pope sylvester ; others hold , that it began even in the apostles time . secondly , because of all sects , this is the most general , there scarce being any country where this sect has not taken root . in the third place , by reason that all contrary to other sects that become abominable , by the enormity of their blasphemies against god , these people seem very godly , for they live justly before men have a sound belief in all things , and of god , and of all the articles contain'd in the apostles creed : only this , they blaspheme against rome . an admirable testimony from the pen of a mortal enemy , that deserves to be writ in letters of gold. let us joyn hereunto that of good king lewis xii . the father of the people ; he was much importun'd by those of the clergy , who pray'd him to root out the inhabitants of the cabrieres , and of merindol in provence , that were of this profession , and some remainders of the albigenses . but this just king , afore he would grant that bloody request , would see their confession of faith , which having read , he swore they were better christians than he and his people , and preserv'd them from the rage of their enemies . but these enemies obtain'd what they desir'd of king francis the first , and made an horrible slaughter of those poor christians . if these albigenses be hereticks , because they blaspheme against rome , is not the marquess one , and all the men of politicks in france , who declaim so openly , and so generously against the pope's usurpations , that makes of religion a pretence thereby to invade the rights of the king , and make himself universal monarch of all the world ? these gentlemen would abate much of the hatred they bear us ; would they be pleas'd to consider that the pope and roman clergy hate us , for a cause that is common to us both . for it is not upon the account of any controversies about the holy sacrament , the invocation of saints , and the prayers for the dead ; but it is because we oppose boldly the usurpations of rome ; it is because we blaspheme against rome , as the albigenses in reinerius's days , that we are call'd ( as he calls us ) a pernicious sect. this is the great heresie for which we have been made objects of the publick hatred , and for which the devotion of the people is made to consist in a bloody zeal to burn us , and massacre us . in the year . the light of the gospel shin'd throughout all the parts of france . and the queen of navarre , sister of king francis i. who was enlighten'd therewith , was a great rampire against the fury of the roman clergy , that labour'd to extinguish this holy light by persecution : however , she could not hinder , but that much cruelty was exercised . but after her decease the persecution grew hot again , and continued during the reign of francis i. and henry ii. for the space of forty years , those that were converted , maintain'd their holy profession , by a constancy in their sufferings , in imitation of the christians of the primitive church . notwithstanding this vigor , many of the princes , and of the best families of france , as the princes of the blood of the house of bourbon , embrac'd the reform'd religion . under the reign of francis ii. the princes of the blood , debarr'd of their rights by those of the house of guise , the queens uncles , form'd the design at ambois , to banish those from the king's person , that held them at distance . this attempt failing , was call'd a crime of high treason , and charg'd on them of the reform'd religion , though renaudy the chief of the plot , was a roman catholick , and this party was compos'd of noblemen and gentry of both the perswasions . whoso understands the priviledges of the princes of the blood in france , will never accuse these undertakers of the rebellion . thuanus testifies in their favour , hist . l. . that not one of them was prov'd to have attempted against the king , or against the queen , but only against strangers that govern'd all at court in a tyrannical way : for then the house of guise was still lookt upon as a stranger in france . francis ii. being dead , his successor charles ix . being a minor , the princes of the blood had more right than afore to be admitted to the management of publick affairs , at least joyntly with the queen-mother . but when they saw themselves excluded , and their persons in danger , they levy'd forces for their preservation . when the king came of age , the princes seeing him much incens'd against them , and that he was of a dangerous and implacable nature , they retir'd , and stood upon their guard. the several affronts they receiv'd , and the frequent massacres , occasion'd two or three little wars . to rid himself of them all at one blow , the king set his sister for a bait , to draw in and to destroy the whole party of the princes , giving her in marriage to the prince of navarre , who was afterwards our henry the great . he and his cousin germain the prince of conde were imprison'd , and the principals of their party slain in their beds , having danc'd at a ball the evening before . never were dancers at such a wedding . pope gregory xii . had a hand in this execrable action , his predecessor pius v. refused to consent to this marriage , because ( said he ) the prince of navarre is an heretick . but when the cardinal of lorrain told his successor gregory xii . that this marriage was a trap to catch the hereticks , he then dispatcht the dispensation , and encourag'd the design . the prince of navarre having sav'd himself at rochel , was immediately assisted by a great party that had escap'd the massacre , and the war broke out afresh . thereupon was form'd that faction of the league , to destroy the princes of the blood , under the colour of religion , and particularly , to destroy the king henry iii. as appear'd afterwards . during these long troubles , what refuge found the king of navarre , whom god reserv'd for the crown of france , but amongst these of the reform'd religion ? these were they that aided , that defended , and even nourisht him in his long and cruel adversities . and after , in the end , when the league had pull'd off the mask , and had driven the king from paris , and besieg'd him at tours , came not they to his relief under their brave chieftain , and did they not deliver him from the utmost danger , though he had sent his armies against them , to extirpate them ? i would gladly ask the noble marquess , where were then the honest french ? and where were the rebels ? would he find the honest french amongst the fiery zealots and bigots of the league , who have shed so much blood to beat down this dangerous sect , as he is pleas'd to brand us ? with your good leave , noble marquess , which of the two is this dangerous sect , that which teaches that the persons of kings are inviolable , and that exposes their lives to defend those kings that had persecuted them ; or that which holds , that a king excommunicated by the pope , may be justly kill'd by any body ; and which out of zeal for religion , plunge their bloody hands into the bowels of their soveraign , as st. jacob clement did , and as john castrel and peter bar●iere attempted , and as ravaillac perform'd ? where is the huguenot that ever offer'd any thing of this nature , during all the persecutions of their party ? or where is the minister that ever broacht such doctrine to his flock , to kill their king , which your spiritual fathers have so often done ? i would also ask the marquess , where he finds that term of near fourscorce years spent in quelling this dengerous sect , which is the title he is pleased to give us ? would he take in to these years , the after the death of francis ii. till the peace of amiens , in which time the reformed party were the constant , and the only support of the great henry for near years ? will he venture to say , that those arms which defended the hope of after ages , and the fortune of france , were unjust ? let him also say if he please , whether by the zeal that has been to reduce the hereticks to their duty , he means that butchery of the st. bartholomews , and the massacres in every town of france , at that time and before , which are reductions of a strange nature . and because he may object , that their defence of the princes of the blood was only a pretence for the huguenots taking up arms , and their unjust resistance against their sovereign . it will suffice to answer , that their arms were necessary for the preservation of that great prince , whom god reserv'd for the blessing of france ; and that when he came to the crown , they were judg'd worthy of a reward . i would beseech also all indifferent persons to consider them simply as men , that are neither angels nor devils , and to tell us , if they think it strange that men , the relicks of fires and slaughters ( which were the only arguments employ'd for their conversion for so many years ) take the course at length that nature teaches them , to defend themselves against force with force . this to take it at the worst , is all the rebellion can be objected against them in all that past age , till the quiet settlement of henry the great . but the good providence of god has well clear'd them from the necessity of that excuse , having set them out an employment so just , and so fortunate for their arms , that all who love , and who shall for future ages love the prosperity of france , and the greatness of the royal family , will have perpetual reason to bless the timely succour of this party , and to praise god , who rais'd them for the everlasting good of the kingdom . let us come to their condition , after that henry the great was establish'd on his throne . the king being turn'd roman catholick , and seeing his party of the reformed religion discontent , and in trouble , as expos'd afresh to what they had afore tried , gave them places of security for about twenty years . this was the ground-work of all their miseries , and i am much inclin'd to believe that this was procur'd for them by those who projected their ruine . for their enemies might well think , that a king that understands his interest , would not long sufler in the heart of his kingdom places assign'd for protection , against himself in effect , and to make resistance , in case he kept not all his promises . that these places would be retreats for all discontented persons , and incendiaries that would trouble the state. that strangers seeing in france a party strengthen'd with garisons , and holding themselves in perpetual defiance , would never leave bidding them to cock up , and fomenting their discontents . that this thorn in the foot of france would always hinder it from advancing ; and after all , that this would be a kind of dangerous discipline in a state ; to accustom subjects to represent their grievances with sword in hand . on the other hand , they might well fore-see , that the reform'd being seiz'd of these places , would not quit them at the end of the term assign'd , imagining that the enjoyment of their religion , of their goods , and of their lives , depended all on their keeping of these places ; and that by their refusal , they would oblige the king to win them by force ; which would make them criminals , odious , and objects of the justice and vegeance of an incens'd master . and even so it happen'd . for their term for holding these places being expir'd , the king demands them again , and having at their instant request prolong'd their term for three or four years , at length wisely resolv'd to force them ; this gave occasion for the assembly of rochel , where most imprudently , and contrary to their duty to god and the king , they resolv'd to hold the places by force ; a resolution of despair ill-grounded . for though the king shew'd himself favourable to his subjects of the religion , after he had taken these places by his arms , he would have been yet more favourable to them , had they render'd the places humbly and peaceably at his demand . when the assembly of rochel began , was held the national synod of alaix , in which the famous du moulin was president . in that country where many of these places of security were , he apply'd himself seriously to consider the posture of the affairs of his party , to sound their inclinations , and to give them good counsel . and he found that the greatest and the best part was dispos'd to render their places to the king , and did not at all approve of the proceedings of the assembly of rochel , of which matter he thought himself oblig'd to inform that assembly ; and having return'd home , he writ them an excellent letter , a copy whereof i have procur'd , which is as follows : sirs , i write not to you , to pour my sorrows into your bosoms , or entertain you with my partcular afflictions . i need no consolation on that account , thinking my self greatly honour'd , that in the publick affliction of the church , it pleases god to set me the foremost . i should account my self very happy , if all the storm might fall on my head. so that i might be the only sufferer , and the church of god continue in peace and prosperity . one care more pressing , has mov'd me to write to you , and has forc'd nature , which was ever averse from medling with publick affairs , and acting beyond my calling . for seeing the church generally in eminent danger , and upon the brink of a precipice , it was impossible for me to hold from speaking . nor can i be silent in this urgent necessity , without making my self guilty of insensibility , and of cruelty towards the church of god. and , i hope , in speaking my thoughts about publick affairs , my domestick affliction will deliver me from jealousie in your opinion . and if i be not believ'd , at least i may be excus'd . i confess indeed , it does not become me to give counsel to an assembly of persons , chosen out of all the kingdom , to bear the weight of publick affairs in a time so full of difficulty ; but i think it for your advantage to be inform'd rightly what is the opinion , and what the disposition of our churches , from persons that have a particular knowledge of them . the question then being , whether you ought to break up your assembly , in obedience to his majesty , or continue to hold together , in order to provide for the affairs of the churches ; i am bound to tell you , that it is the general desire of our churches , that it might please god we may continue in peace , by obeying his majesty . and that seeing the king resolv'd to make himself obey'd by force of arms , they assure themselves , that you will to your power endeavour to avoid this tempest , and rather yield to necessity , than engage them in a war that will most certainly ruin the greatest part of our churches , and will plunge us in troubles , whereof we well see the beginning , but know not at all the end . by obeying the king , you will take away their pretence , who incense his majesty to persecute us . and if we are to be persecuted , all they who fear god , desire that this may be for the profession of the gospel , and that our persecution may truly be the cross of christ . in a word , sirs , i can assure you , that the greatest and the best part of our churches desire your assembly may break up , if it can be done with safety to your persons : and even many of the roman church , love that publick peace are continually about us , praying and exhorting us , that we may not , by throwing our selves down the precipice , involve them in our ruin . on this occasion i need not represent to you the general consternation of our poor flocks , who cast their eyes upon you as persons that may procure their quiet ; and by yielding to necessity , may divert that storm so ready to break upon their heads . many already have forsaken the conntry , many have quitted their religion , from whence you may judge what a distraction there will be , should these troubles go on farther . nor need i more recommend to you , to have a tender care for the preservation of our poor churches , knowing that you will rather chuse death , than draw upon you the reproach , that you have hasten'd on the persecution of the church , and destroy'd that which the zeal of our fathers had planted , and brought this state into confusion . i am not ignorant that many reasons are alledg'd to perswade you to hold on your assembly . as that the king has permitted it ; but for this permission you have not any warrant , nor any declaration in writing ; without which , all promises are but words in the air. for kings believe they have power to forbid what they have permitted , and to revoke what they have offer'd , when they judge it expedient for the good of their affairs . and there is none of you that having sent his servant any whither , or given him leave to go , does not think you have power to call him back again . above all , sovereign princes keep not willingly their promises , when they have been extorted from th●m . there are also represented to you many grievances and controventions to the kings edicts ; which complaints to our great sorrow , are but too true : yet , without alledging that we our selves have given the occasion of many of these evils ; the difficulty lies not in representing our grievances , but in finding redress . consider then , whether the continuance of your assembly may heal these maladies , whether your session may put our churches under shelter , provide necessaries for a war where the parties are so unequal , levy forces and make a fond for payment ; if all the good your session is capable to produce , shall be equivalent to the loss of so many churches that lye naked , and expos'd to the wrath of their enemies ; whether when they are beaten down , you can raise them again ; whether in the manifest division that is amongst us , you have the power to bring together all the scatter'd parts of this divided body , which were it well united , would yet be too weak to maintain it self on the defensive . pardon me , sirs , if i tell you , that you will not find all those of our religion dispos'd to obey your resolutions ; and that the fire being kindl'd all about you , you will remain feeble spectators of the ruin that you have made to tumble upon your heads . besides , you cannot be ignorant that many amongst us , of the best quality , and most capable to defend us , condemn openly your actions , imagining and expressing that to suffer for this cause , is not to suffer for the cause of god. these making no kind of resistance , and opening the gates of their places , and joyning their arms to those of the king , you may easily gather what the loss will be , and what a weakning of your party . how many persons of our nobility will forsake you , some by treachery , others through weakness ? even they that in an assembly are the most vehement , and that to appear zealous , are altogether for violent courses , are most commonly those that revolt , and that betray their brethren . they hurry our poor churches into the greatest danger , and there leave them , and run away after that they have set the house on fire . if a fight , or the siege of a town should happen , whatever might be the event of the fight or siege , it would prove a difficult thing to contain the people animated against us , and to hinder them from falling upon our churches , that have neither defence or retreat . and whatever orders the magistrates of the contrary religion should give , it will be impossible for them to take effect . i might also represent to you many reasons arising from the state of our churches , both within and out of the kingdom , to let you see that this commotion is altogether ill-tim'd ▪ , and that it is to sail against wind and tide . but you are wise enough to see and consider the posture of our neighbours , and from whence you may hope for succor , and whether amongst you the virtue and the good agreement , and the quality of your chiefs is augmented or diminish'd . certainly this is not the time when the troubling of that pool will bring us a cure. and it is plain , that if any thing can help us amidst so much weakness , it must be the zeal of religon , the which , in our fathers time , did support us , when we had less strength and more virtue . but in this cause you will find that zeal very cool , because the most part of our people believes that this evil might have been prevented , without making a breach in the conscience . assure your selves , there will always be divisions amongst us , when we shall stir upon civil accounts , and not directly for the cause of the gospel . against all this , 't is objected , that our enemies have resolv'd our ruin . that they undermine us by little and little , and that we had better begin presently , than attend longer . 't is very true , he must want common sense , that doubts of their ill-will mean time , when i reflect on our several losses , as that of letoure , of privas , and of bearn ; i find that our selves have contributed thereto : and we are not at all to wonder if our enemies are not much in pain to set us right , and if they joyn with us to undo us . but herein it does not follow , that we should throw the helve after the hatchet , and set fire to our own house , because others are resolv'd to burn it , or undertake to remedy particular evils by means weak for that end , but strong and effectual for the general ruin . god , who so often has diverted the counsels taken for our destruction , has not lost his power , neither has he chang'd his will. we shall find that he is always the same , if we have the grace to wait his assistance , and do not cast our selves headlong , through our impatience , and dash upon impossibilities . take this for certain , that though our enemies seek our ruin , they will never attempt it openly , and will lay hold on some other pretence , more plausible than that of religion , which we never ought to give them . if we contain our selves in the obedience that subjects owe to their soveraign , we shall see that whilst our enemies hope in vain , that we shall make our selves criminals by some disobedience . god will cut them out some other work , and furnish us with occasious to testifie to his majesty , that we are a body profitable to his state , and thereby put him in mind of the signal services our churches have paid to the late king of glorious memory . but if we are so unfortunate , that whilst we keep to our duty , the calamnies of our enemies prevail ; at the least , we shall have this satisfaction , that we have been just on our side , and that we have testified , that we love the peace of the state. notwithstanding all this , sirs , you can , and you ought to give order for the security of your persons . for his majesty and his council having said often , that if you will separate , he will leave to our churches the enjoyment of peace , and of the benefit of his edicts ; it is not reasonable that your separation should be made with danger to your persons . and when you shall require that you may separate with safety , i make no doubt but you will easily obtain your desires , provided that you insist upon what is possible , and such things as the misery of the times , and the present necessity may admit . it remains , that whilst you are together , you advise what ought to be done , in case you may be opprest , notwithstanding your separation . it concerns your prudence to give order , and is not my part to suggest . if in proposing these things to you , i have slipt beyond the bounds of discretion , impute it , if you please , to my zeal for the good and the preservation of the church . and if this my advice be rejected , as unworthy your consideration , i shall have this comfort , that i have discharg'd my conscience , and retiring into a strange country , i shall there finish the few days that remain for me to live , lamenting the ruin of the church , and the destruction of the temple ; for the building of which , i have labour'd with more courage and fidelity , than with success . the lord turn his wrath from us , guide your assembly , and preserve your persons . i am , &c. when this letter was read in the assembly , which did not at all approve it , some arose immediately , went from the assembly , and never return'd more ; and all found in the end , that the advertisements of this holy person were prophesies . it appears then , that notwithstanding the great temptations of fear and despair , that mov'd this assembly to resist the king , their resistance was disavow'd by the best and the greatest party of the reform'd churches of france , and that they were exhorted to obey the king by their divines , who , in matters of conscience , are the representative body of the church , when they are solemnly assembl'd . now this was the sense of the national synod , of which this eminent person came from being the president . 't is then wrongfully that the noble marquess taxes all our party with rebellion , when as our theologians declar'd themselves so strongly against it ; the most of those that held these places of security , open'd their gates to the king ; and more than three fourths of his subjects of the reform'd religion kept in their obedience . i cannot omit , that in the greatest heat of those who resisted , there yet remained many glances of loyaly and love for their king. i shall observe two : at the siege of montaubon , the most obstinately defended of all the other sieges , the king and his court passed before the walls , from whence they were shooting most furiously : but when the besieged beheld his majesty , they left off shooting , and cry'd out with a great force , long live the king. the instance of rochel is more remarkable , and it is very memorable . the rochellers besieg'd , implored the assistance of england , which was offer'd them ; but the duke of buckingham came late , so that the rochellers after they had eaten the horses , were now eating their saddles . in this great extremity the duke told their deputies , that if they would deliver the town to the king of england , they should be assisted effectually . the deputies refus'd , and the rochellers resolv'd to undergo all the rigours that their king , provok'd , would exercise upon them , rather than deliver the town to a stranger . this just king had notice thereof , and treated them the more mildly at the surrender , overcoming , like a christian , evil with good . the noble marquess does the quite contrary , for he studies to overcome good with evil ; displaying our faults , with all the aggravation , and concealing our services . he says , that the spirit of the huguenots is always ready for revolts , for confusion and anarchy . that there will be more than an hundred thousand men of the kings enemies in the bowels of his kingdom , so long as there shall be huguenots in france ; and that perhaps they wait only an occasion to rise up in arms. he pretends even to know their hearts , saying , that they have in their hearts the same hatred they had ; which are words flung out with more animosity than reason . for 't is but ill logick , that they are all rebels , because about a six part of their number took up arms , in their defence , to keep some places of safety ; and that because they have sin'd they never have repented . if all they who have been engag'd in the troubles of the state , within these last forty years , are to be thought the kings enemies for ever ; his majesty would find few persons in his kingdom whom he might trust ; and now forty years are past since the war for those places of safety , was ended . when the body is in a fever , the good humors are stir'd as well as the bad , and all settle again when the disease is over . the same is in the body of a state ; it is subject to hot fits that enflame both good and bad ; but all grow cool and quiet in time , by the wisdom of the sovereign , and by the repentance of those that are honest good men . to upbraid them as rebells and enemies , that took up arms against their duty , and laid them down again forty years ago ; this is to violate the laws of amnesty , without which no state could subsist . kings being the lieutenants of god , ought to deal with their subjects as god does with his . he forgives and forgets offences ; and makes them faithful that were disobedient , through his benefits . the protestants of languedoc stay'd not for the kings benefits , till they testifi'd their fidelity , and their oblivion of what they had suffer'd in the reduction of the places that they had held , than when their wounds were yet bleeding . this was when the duke of montmorency in longuedoc , where he was governor , made a party against the king , hoping to find the protestants , who are in great numbers in that province , ready for an insurrection from the resentment of their late sufferings . but he found the quite contrary ; for they all joyn'd as one man with the kings forces , and did him excellent service in a battel where the duke was defeated and taken , and a bishop with him . the old marshall de la force , who had scap'd the massacre of st. barth olomew , by hiding himself under the carkasses of his brothers , whose throats were cut , was one of the principal commanders in this action . that marquess confesses , that in the wars at paris , they put themselves in arms , and with great respect protested , that they were at the kings service ; and their actions would have justify'd their protestations , if his majesty had had occasion for their service . i will not loose time and pains in making reflections upon the fourteen ways he proposes to torment us , and make us weary of our religion , of our country , and our lives . ways enough are found out , without his proposing . and now , because the king , of late years , has had much to do with the court of rome , it has been a part of the policy of france , whilst they affront the pope , at the same time to treat us with some extraordinary severity , to prevent the suspicion of heresie . we humble our selves under the powerfull hand of god , and under that of our sovereign ; confessing that we are justly chastis'd for our sins . for the rest , we know in whom we have trusted , and shelter our selves under the hand that strikes us ; assuring our selves , that it will protect us , and that we shall find jesus christ our redeemer , and his spirit our comforter , both in this life and in that which is to come . as the marquess is very exact in giving instructions to ruine us , he does the same towards the end of his book for england ; counting it a nation that is good for nothing but to be ruin'd . we cannot take the advantage of these instructions given against us , to defend our selves against them , for we are a body meerly passive , expos'd , and submitted to all that god and the king will do with us . but for the english , when he has disoblig'd them by the most odious character that his malice could furnish his eloquence withall ; he obliges them , in publishing all those ways that must be taken to destroy them ; for it is likely , that being told of them , they will look to themselves . mean time , his readers will say of him , that they who tell aforehand of their cunning , are not very cunning . because that the noble marquess terms us rebels and enemies of the state , after the humble confession of our faults , which i have neither cloak'd nor dissembl'd ; i will take the boldness to compare them with those of some of the gentlemen of the roman clergy , especially of the jesuits and their disciples : and that they that are not pre-possest with passion may judge , whether to them rather , or to us , belongs the title , of enemies of the state , let us consider the actions and the doctrine of the one and the other , for the actions , the horrible attempts against the sacred persons of our kings , by ecclesiasticks and scholars of the jesuits , and all the enormities of the league , to destroy our kings , our laws , and our monarchy , and to transfer it to a stranger ; carry away without dispute the prize of villany , from those who being possest with a fear ill-grounded , have with arms defended the places that were lent to them by edict , for the security of their religion , of their goods , and of their lives . add hereto , that they had their hearts big with the sense of their incomparable service to the crown , and believ'd they well deserv'd what these endeavour'd to keep . and as for the doctrine , these never read lectures of rebellion and parricide . and the resistance some of the party made against the king , was condemn'd by their divines , whose writings are full of lessons of obedience , and of fidelity to their sovereigns . whereas those of the jesuits , and their disciples , teach the people to cast off and kill their king , so often as it may please the pope to excommucate him . france has felt the effects of this doctrine during the long wars of the league ; and it was the books and the sermons that made the sword be drawn , and that sharpen'd the daggers for the murder of our kings , whilst the protestants expos'd their lives for their preservation . now i am content to let pass what is past , provided the same may be done to us . let us fix upon the present . whom ought you to esteem the enemies of the state , those who subject the crown of our kings absolutely to the papal mitre , and who acknowledge another sovereign than the king ; or they who own him their only sovereign , and maintain that his crown depends not save on god alone ? what , in conscience , is the true ground of the great hatred that is born us ? is it not for that , if we are to be believ'd , there would not in france be any french-man that is not the kings subject , causes beneficial and matrimonial would not be carried to rome , nor the kingdom be tributary under the shadow of annates , and the like impositions . and on this subject , the testimony of cardinal perron for us , in his harangue to the third state , is very considerable ; whe● he says , the doctrine of the deposition of kings , by the pope , has been held in france until calvin . whereby he tacitely acknowledges , that our kings had been ill serv'd before ; and that those he calls hereticks having brought to light the holy scripture , have made the right of kings be known , which had been kept supprest . shall they be said friends of the state , who owning themselves subjects of a stranger soveraign , dare endeavour to make themselves masters of all the temporal jurisdiction ? of which the marquess complains loudly , and with good cause ; and of the great resistance they have made to maintain themselves in an usurpation so unreasonable . in this kind , those of the church of the reform'd religion could never be accus'd , in the towns where we have had some power . our religion is hated , because it combats the pride , the avarice , and the usur pations of the court of rome , and their substitutes in the kingdom ; and because we have shewn to the world that sordid bank of spiritual graces they have planted in the church , and how they have drawn to themselves a third of the lands of france , for fear of purgatory , from silly people , mop'd with a blind devotion , and from robbers and extortioners , who have thought to make peace with god by letting these share in the booty . 't is an advice very suitable to the politicks of france , to examine well the controversies that are most gainful to the clergy , as this of purgatory , concerning which an old poet said the truth , in his way of drollery . but if it be so , that no more souls shall go to old purgatory , then the pope will gain nought by the story . it would be wisely done to examine what necessity there is for so many begging-fryers , that suck out the blood and marrow of devout people ; and for so many markets of pardons in honour of a number of saints of a new edition ; and for what design are made so many controversies . and whether it would not be a great treasure for the kings subjects to teach them to work out their salvation , and put their consciences in quiet at a cheaper rate . god , justly provok'd , by the great sins of france , gives us not yet the grace of that gospel-truth , st. john , ch. . know the truth , and the truth will set you free . and though it shines out so clear , to let us see the usurpation of the popes upon the temporals of the king , and upon the spirituals of the church ; yet see we not clearly enough to discover all the mystery of iniquity , and to resolve to shake off the yoak . for this great design , no other war need be made by the pope , but only take from him all jurisdiction in france , all annates , and all evocation of causes to rome . this would hardly produce any other stirrs , but the complaints and murmuring of them that are loosers . and the condition , truly royal , that the king at present is in , will sufficiently secure him from insurrections at home , and invasions from abroad . or should any happen , behold , more than an hundred thousand huguenots , that the noble marquess has sound him , in the heart of his state , whom he is pleas'd to call his enemies , but who on all occasions , and on this especially would do his majesty a hearty and faithful service . the two main interests of france , being to weaken the house of austria , the princes of which enclose him on both sides ; and to throw off the yoake of rome , which holds a monarchy within the french monarchy ; 't is easie to judge that amongst the kings subjects , the protestants are absolutely the most proper to serve him on both these occasions . i know that amongst the roman catholicks , as well ecclesiasticks as seculars , there are excellent instruments to serve the king in both these interests . but there is need of great caution to well assure him , by reason of the multitude of jesuits scholars , with whom these fathers have industriously fill'd all professions of the state and church ; and it is for no other end that they have so many colledges . they who have been too good scholars of these masters , are contrary to both these interests , being so great catholicks , that they espouse the interest of the catholick king , to advance that of his holiness . but to find amongst the protestants trusty instruments for both these accounts , he need not try them ; they are fitted and form'd , by their education , for these two uses , so necessary to france . the marquess assures his majesty , with good reason of the friendship of the protestant princes of germany , which they would never testifie so freely , as in serving him to ruin the power of the pope , who savours that of the house of austria . for thereby they would kill two birds with one stone . not to mention our other neighbours , who have broken with rome , and being disquieted by its secret practises , will be ready to contribute to its destruction . who shall well consider the scheme of the affairs of christendem , shall judge , that all things invite his majesty to shut out the jurisdiction of rome beyond the mountains ; right , honour , profit , liberty , facility , his duty to his crown , to his subjects , and to his royal posterity ; and that many aids smile upon him , both within , and out of his kingdom , for so fair and so just an enterprize . this is the warm desire of the honest french-men . and none there are who better deserve that title , than they , who , with the most indignation , resent that their kings should kiss the feet of that prelate , who ought of right to kiss their feet , for having receiv'd his principalities from kings of france ; and who , in recompence of their good deeds , have plotted , and plot continually their ruin . when the king shall have deliver'd himself and his people , from this strange yoak , he will find the enmity amongst his subjects , for matter of religon , greatly diminisht ; and the way open to a re-union . and were the difficulties about the doctrine overcome , the protestants would not stick much at the discipline . god , who is the father of kings , and the king of glory , protect and strengthen our great king , to accomplsh the designs that turn to the general good of his church , to the greatness , and to the respect of his sacred person , and to the peace and prosperity of his state. finis . the modern states-man. by g.w. esq wither, george, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing w ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing w estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the modern states-man. by g.w. esq wither, george, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed, by henry hills, and are to be sold at his house at the sign of sir john old castle in py-corner, london : mdcliii. [ ] g.w. = george wither. includes a table of contents. reproduction of the original in the british library. eng political science -- early works to . great britain -- politics and government -- - -- early works to . a r (wing w ). civilwar no the modern states-man. by g.w. esq; wither, george f the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the f category of texts with or more defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the modern states-man . by g. w. esq {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . plutarch . in hac ruina rerum stetit una integra atque immobilis virtus populi romani . haec omnia strata humi erexit , ac sustulit . livie . london , printed , by henry hills , and are to be sold at his house at the sign of sir john old castle in py-corner , mdcliii . to the reader . reader , i here present thee with a few conceptions and observations hudled together during my confinement to my chamber by an arrest from heaven ; my nobler part being then unwilling to ly idle , when the other was denyed the liberty of action : if i have not observed so exact a methode as thou mightst expect , let the distraction of my mind by bodily pains and weakness plead my excuse . thou mayest wonder perhaps to meet me walking abroad without a support , which was not from any overweening confidence in my own ability , but because i was ignorant where to find such an one as might lend me an hand ; and this , not that i could not have pick'd out one sufficient in my own apprehension , but in thine : for when i considered our divisions , what animosities , what parties , what factions are amongst us , i knew not where to elect the man might please all , and so rather would have none , than one that might creat a prejudice , or hinder any from looking into this little treatise of so publick concernment . we are all passengers in the publick vessel , therefore as wise mariners diligently observe the heavens , that they may not be taken unprovided by tempests : so ought we to enquire what may betide the publike , whereon our private quiet , and happiness depends . foresight is an half-prevention , and though it may not totally defend , yet will it take off the edge so far , that the evil shall not be able to pierce to the heart : let this then suffice to move thee to read on , whereby thou shalt be enabled to make a perfect judgement , whether happiness , or calamity attends the nation wherof thou art a member . sol et homo generant hominem , say the naturalists , and providence , and vertue concur in the begetting of a perfect and durable commonwealth , for divine influence , and humane activity are equally necessary to the generation of the politick , as well as natural body , and heaven and earth must join to make up an absolute compositum . observe then both god , and man , the actings of providence towards , and of vertue in a nation , and thou mayest foretell whether it will be well or ill with them , without going to a conjuror , or any star-gazing mountebank . farewell . the contents . chap . that there is by nature in all men an inquisitive desire after the knowledge of futurity ▪ the reason of this ; the means by which they have attempted it . chap. . that there is a way leads to this knowledge , and what it is . chap. . this may confirmed by reason and examples . chap. . an admonition to some amongst us . chap. . how england became a commonwealth , and what may be expected from such a beginning . chap. . the beginning of the commonwealth of rome , and the causes of its growth . chap. . a parallel . chap. . of providence , and vertue , and the concurrence of second causes . chap. . of the roman piety , the evil and danger of mock thansgivings . chap. . piety and valour not inconsistent ; piety rewarded in heathens , impiety punished . chap. . religion ingrafted in mans heart by nature . chap. . the outward means to be used ; ministers incouraged and maintained ; the christian magistrates duty . chap. . religion not to be made a stalking horse to ambition or avarice . chap. . the benefit of humane learning , and some objections answered . chap. . an answer to some objections in a book entituled , the saints guide . chap. . the abuse of learning no argument against the use of it . chap. . the mischief of ignorance . chap. . of moral vertue in general . chap. . of probity , and the practice of it among the romans . chap. . of prudence . chap. . of natural parts , experience , learning , and travel . chap. . of the prudence of the romans . chap. . of justice , and the roman practice of it . chap. . of laws , and the english laws . chap. . of fortitude . chap. . of temperance . the modern states-man . chap. i. that there is by nature in all men an inquisitive desire after the knowledge of futurity ; the reason of this ; the means by which they have attempted to attain this in all ages . there is , and hath alwayes been , in the generality of mankind , an itching desire , and ●ankering after the knowledge of future events , the sonnes of adam reaching out their hands to the forbidden tree , and catching at the fruit of it ; yea , this off-spring of eve longing for the greenest apples , the precocious knowledge of events , before they come to their just ripeness and maturity . and to say truth , the tree of knowledge is fair to the eye , and pleasant to the taste ; for as all notional dainties are delightful , so especially these prenotions and anticipations of things are the more sweet and delicious to the palates of men , because most of their being is treasured up in their future condition . they can find no satisfaction , no sabbath , no quiet in their present state , and therefore they would fain know what the next day , what the next year , what the next age will bring forth ; in the highest prosperity they fear a mutation , in the lowest adversity they are impatient for a change ; and hence it comes to passe , that futurity is the mark at which all levell the arrows of their counsels , their endeavours , their hopes , their desires , and their prayers . this hath caused them in all ages to have a sacred esteem of those who pretended skil in divination , as the honour conferred upon joseph by pharaoh , and the advancement of daniel by the chaldean and persian monarchs recorded in sacred writ undoubtedly makesout , to let passe the honours which the magi enjoyed among them , which are set down by those that wrote their histories . thus the jews who had the vrim and thummim , and prophets from god to enquire of , yet ranne a madding after wizzards , and such as had familiar spirits , had their false prophets by hundreds , yea , and sent to baalzebub the god of ekron , an oracle of the devils , to enquire , as in the life of ahaziah will appear . with how frequent , and costly sacrifices did the graecians adore their oracle-giving deities , purchasing an answer with a hecatomb , and with the bloud of a hundred dumb beasts conjuring their dumb devils , before the sullen fiends would vouchsafe to answer them ? and of what esteem were the sybills books among the romans , who with all other heathens were so inquisitive after the future , that they left no stone unrol'd to attain the knowledge of their fates ? there could not a bird chatter , but there was an augur to comment on , and expound its language . there could not a bird flye , but there was an auspex to watch it ; nor light , but he was ready to observe , and by its motions in the ayr interpret the revolutions of states and persons . there could not a sacrifice fall , but there was an aruspex to behold the posture of it , and by the quietnesse or strugling of the sensitive creature , to foretell the facilities or reluctancies in the affairs of rational beings ; and an exspex to consult the entrails , and by the colour of the inwards tell the complexion of outward affairs . there could not a line seem to be scribled on the hand , but there was a chiromancer to read them , and with his interlineary glosses expound them , giving a short synopsis of the future passages of this present life out of that enchiridion ( as they would have it ) of natures penning . the interpreter of dreames was set to judge in the horny and ivory gates of fancy , and as if the day were to receive light from the night , to regulate its walking motions , by th others slumbring intimations . to passe by those severall kinds of the same madnesse expressed in geomancy , by circles in the earth ; pyromancy , by fire ; hydromancy , by water ; necromancy , by the ghosts of the dead , &c. of which the nations were enamoured , the heaven it self could not escape them , but the astrologer with his key was to unlock the starry charracters , and out of them spell the fate of sublunary things . and here let me not be mistaken , for i am not of opinion that those glorious bodies were created only to twinckle in a clear night , i do believe them to have an influence on sublunary bodies , and see the moon empire it over the waters , & the humors increase , and decrease , as it fills , or is in the wane , yet are they not , i conceiv , so easie to be read as some pretend , if certainly to be known by any ; for i find the prince of the power of the air himself at loss in his conjectures , which made him so cautelous in his oraculous responsals , as plutarch in many places observes . and aquinas will have the crows , cranes , & swallows , those flying almanacks , more happy and successeful in their predictions , than our anni specula , which become often crack't & broken in their guessings at the weather and truly the giving such unequal representations of things most obvious , is a very bad into create a belief of their ability to foretell things far more imperceptible , and immaterial , that depend upon the will and decrees of god , and upon the motions of most free and indifferent agents ; yea , such as are confessed on all hands so able to oppose , that they cannot be compelled , for sapiens dominabitur astris , & it is related of socrates , that of a crabbed and dissolute disposition by nature , he became the most accomplished in his time by philosophy . but i shall not set bounds to other mens knowledge , nor circumscribe them within the circle of my own ignorance , they may have dawnings where i perceive no star-light ; yet take this along with you , that god often in text-hand declares his mind , in a comet , a blazing-star , and other fiery apparitions , as he did before the last destruction of jerusalem . and as the jews and heathens , so many christians have been tampering about futurities , how lawfully i cannot say , for i am persuaded we ought to acquiesc in gods revealed will ; god will have his children in some sense in diem vivere entertain fortune by the day , and he doth choose gradually and leasurely {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , to discover the thoughts he hath concerning them , that he might keep them in a waiting and obedient posture , in a posture of dependance , and expectation ; not that i would have them with anacreon cry out , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , give me to day , let who will take care for to morrow ; or with the stoicks lazily expect the blind-stroak of a conceited unavoidable fate ; but using all lawful and probable means , endeavour their countries , and in it their own future good . i confesse with that kingly prophet , that gods wayes are unsearchable , and his paths past finding out , that is in the hidden and secret bringing of things about , yet in his out-goings he will be observed , that his glory , his power , his justice , and his mercy may be made manifest unto the children of men ; thus we find his mighty works of creation , and redemption , of preservation , and castigation , all along recorded in the sacred registers of the old and new testaments ; and that for the comfort as well as instruction of his people ; in the writings of those glorious stars , the sacred pen-men , may the saints read their fortunes , and with comfort apply unto themselves the divine dispensations of god to his people . hath god brought england through a red sea of war out of egyptian bondage , and will he not perfect his work ? is the mighty hand of omnipotencie shortned that it cannot save ? or the loving kindnesse of the immutable deity changed that he will not save ? though the murmurers ( those repiners at gods hand , who would upon beds of down , with all ease and plenty be carried through the wildernesse ) may be cut off , and those low soules whom the height of the sons of anak hath caused to rebell against the most high be consumed ; and who knows whether for their sakes he hath not deferred to settle us in the promised land ? yet shal the caleb's and joshua's who have followed god fully be brought into it , and their seed shal possesse it ; though god may defer his mercies because of some mens infidelity , yet in his good time he will accomplish them , if his people walk worthy of them . let us not then despair , nor be impatient , but endeavour to fit our selves to receive them ; for the wise god , and our merciful father knows better what is good for us than our selves , his time is best , but let us from the bottom of our hearts eccho to that petition in the gospel , thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven . but i shal not insist further in applying scripture , and i could wish some ( i am persuaded godly persons ) had not been ( i fear ) to adventurous in misapplying it ; for surely if we warily look into those prophecies in daniel , we shall hardly find them calculated for the meridian of great britain , and ireland ; were not some peremptorily concerning the return of the jews out of the babylonish captivity , as in . chap. . verse ! the comming of christ , and the destruction of jerusalem , as in , , . &c. verses others concerning the four monarchies in . chap. the division of alexanders kingdome , in . chap. and the empire of rome , in the . chap. so if we behold the book of the apocalyps , it rather seems to hold forth the actions of a world than an island , and the great concernments of the rational species than of a few english individuums . i hope i shal be allowed liberty of conscience in so intricate a case , especialy being no fundamental point of salvation , and if god shal be pleased to use england as the primary instrument in my dayes for the destruction of that romish kingdome of antichrist , and the exaltation of the lord jesus blessed for ever on the throne , i shal endeavor to praise him both in word and deed , and humbly to prostrate my life and fortunes at his feet , as ready to wait upon him in what part of that work he shall be pleased to make me though never so meanly instrumental . chap. ii. that there is a way which leads to this knowledge , and what it is . and now setting aside the before rehearsed follies of the besotted world , i shall attempt by a new way of conjecture to guesse at the fortune of the common-wealth ; reason shal be the jacobs-staff by which i shall take its height , and in that true glasse shew you its futureface , that i may have few , and those inconsiderable opponents . i know that discourse which is most filled with reason must needs be most victorious and triumphant , the weapons of it are general , and there is none of the sonnes of men able to oppose its force , the unjust infidel must believe it , or deny his essence , and the atheist must subscribe upon perill of his being , for the creator , or as they , nature it self gave it an imprimatur & {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} the eternal being graved it on immortal soules , as philo very excellently declares , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . it is essential , & so must be universal to the species of mankind ; and as aristotle saith , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , what soever is natural , is immovable , and perpetually in the same manner energetical ; it constantly and continually commands obedience , and none but a monster , an heteroclite in nature , as the philosopher speaks {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , will dare to resist it ; but to our purpose . there is not , i confesse , enough light in any c●eated reason to give a bright displaying of fate , nor is there vigour enough in any created eye to pierce into the marrow and pith , into the depth and secresie of the eternal decree ; yet can it discover such objects as are within its own sphere with a sufficient certainty . the actings of providence are so fairly printed , and the letters of it so visible , and capital , that we may read them , though some perverse beings , unworthy the name of men , slight all its workings , upon this account , that they are rolling , and fluctuating ; who with the old scepticks by a kind of strange hypocrisie , and in an unusual way of affectation , pretend to more ignorance than they have , nay than they are capable of , or with socrates cry , hoc tantum scire , se nihil scire ; he only knows this , that he knoweth nothing ; and with the academicks {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . i cannot comprehend . but let me tel such dubious , if not lazy , gentlemen , that it is an error very derogatory to the plenitude and exuberancy of the divine actings , which stream out in a clear cognoscibility , and no lesse injurious to their own natural capacities , which were not made so streight and narrow-mouth'd , as not to receive those lessons that continually drop from providence upon the world . it is an unquestionable rule , omne quod est , quando est , necesse est esse , a contingency , when 't is extra suas causas , when it is actually produced , having a determinatum esse , it may then also have a determinate cognoscibility ; for entity is the root and bottome of intelligibility ; a common-wealth in its growth is uncertain , and the means whereby it shal acquire strength lie hid in the eternal decree , until by the working of providence they are presented to publick view , and then we know how it attained to maturity , chap , iii. this way confirmed by reason , and examples . now this ordinary working of providence hath so often shown it selfe in the adadvancement of states , that with a little industry we may track it , and by its leadings may conjecture how good a progress such or such a state shall have ; for matters in fact are as certain in being and reality , as demonstrations . and this may be enlightned by a simile fetch 't from vegetables , which we see thrive by the alternat help of heat and moisture , moderately and in their seasons shining , and showring down upon them ; yet either of these in excesse , much enfeebles , or totally destroys them : hence without a witch wil your countrey man foretel plenty or scarcity , and indeed all such effects as lurk in probable causes , that seem to promise very fairly , may be known also in an answerable , and proportionable manner , by strong , and shrewd conjectures : thus the physician knows the disease , the mariner forsees a storm , & the shepherd provides for the security of his flock . thus by an intermingled influence of peace and war , nations have grown renowned , whereas , either alone depresses or extinguishes them ; and for this we can give good reason . for warre files off that rust that is apt to canker and eat into the bowels of states ; it opens the veins , purifies the bloud , and makes it lively , and generous ; it raiseth and quickneth the spirits , and makes the members active and prompt for the highest and noblest atchievments . and peace it fills the barns , is the nurse of trade , from whence grow the golden sinnews that strengthen the arms , and makes them able to wield their weapons in the time of war ; is the patronesse of learning , the mistresse of art , the parent of good and wholesome laws ; needs then must that nation vigorously encrease , on which both these have a joynt and happy influence . but if any should ask how it is possible to enjoy both ? let them go and see how one spring is made happy by both show'rs and sun-shine ; nay they may be both at once , there may be a forein war , yet peace at home , it may rain and shine , and that together . yet let the drums bellow too long , and people will eccho to them , and become brutish , savage and barbarous ; let war break in on all sides , and like a deluge it sweeps all before it , and if any thing be left , it is but mud and dirt . or let a long calm come what sloath , what luxury , what effeminatness and cowardice doth it create ? how doth it enervate the members , clog the spirits , cause the blood to putrifie , and corrupt , and beget that lazy and scurvy disease which makes the whole body to draw a faint , sickly , inglorious , yea , a noisom breath ? thus we see the standing waters to corrupt , and naturall bodies craz'd , and resolv'd to their first earth , as much by plurisies as consumptions , by surfeits as famine ; and soules as oft forced by a disease to take their flight , as a sword , and by an inward malady not seldomer than an outward enemie compell'd to quit their beloved mansions . and as reason , so examples , and those in all ages , may be brought to back our assertions . the assyrian , caldaean , and persian monarchies by arms got footing , and became powerfull , by a mixt peace , they grew into a form of government , & whilst these walked hand in hand , they continued both formidable , and lovely , and to use the scripture expression , they were fair as the moon , bright as the sun , and terrible as an army with banners . this temperature of beauty and terror , order and strength , is the happy crasis of a state ; these in their true proportions make up the perfect symetry , and from these discords springs the sweetest harmony in state musick . and now , when all their sayls were fill'd with the prosperous gales of fortune , and there was none but vail'd and stoopt unto them , on a sudden being becalm'd , an effeminate sardanapalus , a drunken belshazzar , and a luxurious darius , put a period to their greatnesss ; so easie it is to tumble down hill . thus the roman monarchy fell to pieces , and became a prey to barbarous nations , yet out of its ashes arose a phenix , a maiden cōmon-wealth , which hath preserv'd her beauty as well as virginity for twelve hundred years without wrinckle or blemish , and hath so often foild the ottoman forces , to whom the grecian empire became a prey with little difficulty ; so potent is vertue even in the least bodies , and of such advantage is situation , and bad neighbours too sometimes which will not suffer her antient vertue to be cankered , or eaten with rust . thus a few fisher-towns among the batavers became a common-wealth in despight of spain , and flanders to boot , and from poor distressed states are grown hogen-mogens with the help of england , for which they have since well rewarded us . but let them take heed lest their high and mightinesses be not brought as low as their situation , being grown resty with their former little successes , peace , and plenty , and by their treacherous ingratitude made their best friend their enemy , to whom they are as much inferior in true valour , as they surpasse in pride , arrogancy , trechery , and cruelty . yea , to come home , how illustrious , and famous did this nation grow in the dayes of queen elizabeth ? what noble acts ? what generous spirits did it bring forth ? what supplies did it afford the netherlands ? what an help was it to france , and what a scourge and terror to the usurping spaniards ? whose armado stiled invincible it not onely sent home wel beaten , but with fire and sword took revenge in their havens and on their coasts ; and yet into how contemptible a condition it did relapse by a long sloath , and how it hath been undervalued , our own eyes can witnesse unto us , if we look a little back , even to the sadning of our friends , and rejoycing of our enemies . thus the best made clocks by long being unwound up gather rust , and become unfit for the least motion . and this that politick law-giver perceiving , gave it in command to the spartans , not to wage war often with one and the same enemy ; which when agesilaus one of their kings had neglected to their losse , and his own smart , he was flouted , returning wounded , by antalcidas , with , the thebans have well rewarded thee , o king , whom , unwilling and ignorant , thou hast compeld and taught to conquer . chap. iiii. an admonition to many amongst us . what then may we think of some lately appearing amongst us , who neither minding their own good , not their masters businesse , have been bold in the sight of the sun to upbraid those in power with these latter wars , as fomented and raised for their lusts , and our pressure , which by the good hand of providence hitherto have turned to our honour , and advantage , and it may be have been a means to prevent our ruin ; the common enemy keeping us from quarrelling among our selves , and as it were binding up our hands from intestine slaughter : for so many and so great divisions there were amongst us , such animosities and heart-burnings in one party against the other , as in that unsetled estate we were in at first , in sua victrices vertentes viscera dextras , might have turned our weapons into our own bowels , had not heaven in mercy cut out work for us elsewhere , until we were a little ▪ better come to our selves what means then the bleatings , and lowings of these cattel , which are driven like beasts to the slaughter ? for alas fond youths , though your noddles are not full enough to render you suspected of design , yet undoubtedly have you been set a going by some well practiz'd in the art of sedition , and whose concernments and inclinations prodigiously meet in that fatal point , to whom it may seem as natural to live in the fire of contention , as profitable to fish in troubled waters ; consider but the bottom , and you will abhor the broachers of this design , who under the pretence of crying down forein , would stir up a civill war ; and of advancing peace , and freedom , raise rebellion and confusion , which would inevitably ruin your selves , trades , and countrey . let not any of these flie sinons make you break down your own walls , to bring in so fatal an engine , a second trojan-horse , which will powrforth armed tyrants in the dead of night upon you , whose understandings they have charmd asleep with their false & counterfeit pretences . timete danaos et dona ferentes : you cannot be too mistrustfull of your old enemy , of whom this design smels rank ; take heed , i say , you lose not your liberty in the noise you make for freedom , and whil'st you crowd out authority , you bring not tyranny in on pick-back ; which your enemies of themselves despair ever to accomplish . thus have i seen full-grown fruit which hath withstood the assaults of outward storms , rot with superfluity of innate moysture , and the double-armed nut resolv'd to dust by a worm bred in its own kernel . or what shall we say to a second sort , those sons of sloath , those dregs of a lazy and luxurious peace , who as if their souls lay in their bellies , find no content but in ease and riot ? whose whole note is , where are those golden dayes we once had ? where are our court-revellings and masques ? where our lord-maiors feasts and shews , and all those joviall sports gone , in which england was wont to pride herself and triumph ? not a wake , not a morrice-dance now to be feen , are these the effects of a parliament ? and is this that we have got by fighting ? alas poor souls ! you dream't ( i 'le warrant ) a parliament would have made the thames flow custard , and turn'd the pebbles on the shore into garoway-comfits ; have caused bag-pudding to grow on every bush , and each pond abound with beef and brewis ; have commanded the conduits to run sack and clarret , and the rivers and brooks ale and strong beer ; and welladay , your houses are not wall'd with hasty pudding , neither do pigs ready roasted come and cry come eat me ; lubberland is as far off now as ever , and you deceived of all your goodly expectations ; but peace , put fingers out of neyes , and i will tell you what ; yea , what your countrey , your mammee ( if she be not ashamed to own you ) hath got ; she hath gained her freedom , and regain'd her reputation ; of a baffel'd , scorn'd , and despised kingdom , she is become a victorious , dreadfull , and renowned common-wealth ; she that was contemned by a spain , cudgel'd by b france , brav'd by c holland , affronted by d irelād , & baffe'ld by e scotla . hath made those with whom she hath grappell'd feel the force of her arms , and taught the rest to observe their due distance ; yea she hath done more in four years , than your monarchs could do in four hundred ; having quell'd ireland , subdued scotland , cudgel'd holland , and with a navy of near two hundred sayl scoured her narrow seas , and swept her enemies coasts , notwithstanding her strugglings at home with such undutifull sons as your selves , who have layd all the stumbling-blocks in her way they either could or durst . but your purses pay for this you cry , i warrant you , and so they did for the puppets and pageants , the hobby-horses and bells , and all the rest of the trumperies your souls so much delighted in ; as i conceive too you were wont to pay subsidies for your charters , and your petition of right , which you hung by and gaz'd on with as much benefit to your selves then , as now on your scotch covenant ; as also ship-mony , knighthood-mony , coat and conduct-mony , and now and then you received a privy-seal ; your carts now and then did attend the court , and your oxen , sheep , horses , hay , straw , oats , &c. were taken up at the kings price , and that payd too , when you could get it ; there were slavish tenures , and a court of wards , a star-chamber , and an high-commission court with its appurtenances in each diocesse ; justices in eire , and forrest laws , &c. which cost you something ; but you will be wiser upon second thoughts , put on your considering caps than , for you know not what you may come too ; what though you are out of hopes of being courtiers you may be patriots , and instead of being slaves to flattery , become patrones of liberty ; what though you cannot buy knight-hoods , and lordships , yet may you purchase never-dying honour to your names by faithfully serving your god , and countrey . act then vertuously , and let posterity find your names in the van of good common-wealths-men , among the first ranks of the assertors of liberty . which of you , were you to choose , would not rather be read in history a brutus , than a tarquin ; an aristogiton , than a pisistratus ; a pelopidas , than an archas ; a timoleon , than a dionysius ? whether doth the name of lancaster , or gaveston , hereford , or spencer , make the pleasinger found in english ears ? and which were accounted martyrs , which traitor , in the thoughts of your generous ancestors ? and if all this will not prevail with you , if duty and honour appear small in your eyes , yet profit sure will do much ; it is the way to thrive ; for it is more than probable that the common-wealth will survive its enemies , and there are certain symptomes of its welfare . that providence which hath hitherto brooded upon it , and hatcht it into this perfection , that hand of omnipotency which hath given assured tokens of assistance from heaven , hath in text-letters written its fortune on its forehead , so that the least read in physiognomy may spell it out . the schoolmen observe , divina voluntas , licet simpliciter libera sit ad extra , ex suppositione tamen unius actus liberi , potest necessitari ad alium . we shall not go so high , but this we shall say , that where god hath so visibly owned a nation , he will never draw back his hand unlesse upon some notorious provocation . lift up your eyes then , os homini sublime dedit , coelumque videre jussit , & erectos ad sidera tollere vultus , which were given you to this end , and contemplate the works of your gracious creator , it is your duty so to do , and he expects it at your hands ; be not rebels to nature , nor make frustrate the admirable frame of your creation , wch wil argue you not only ingrate , but worse than brutish , yea put you in the lower form , to the beasts that perish , for as the heathen satyrist , sensum è coelesti demissum traximus arce , cujus egent prona , & terram spectantia ; mundi principio indulsit communis conditor illis tantùm animas , nobis animum quoque . but lest there should be some so ignorant that they cannot , others so lazy that they will not take the pains to read this hand-writing from heaven , i will endeavour so plainly to set it before them , that fronaque si spectent animalia , if they look but downwards , will they , nill they , they shal perceive it , unles they blindfold themselves , and wink out of design ; and for such moles , let them enjoy their dark caverns , and there delve and dig untill they have laid themselves as low as they desire , or deserve ; let their affected shades envelope them , and not the smallest star disturb their cimmaerian enjoyments ; let the nights black quiristers , ravens and scrich-owls , sing anthems and requiems to their souls , and no sun arise to disturb the musick , and dissolve the lucky consort . chap. v. how england became a common-wealth , and what may be expected from such a beginning . the english nation by a long and bloody civill war being awak't out of that sleep which had almost brought a lethargy upon her , ( like an angry lion rows'd and enrag'd with the smart of his wounds ) resolutely , and with a courage not unworthy the nobility of her stock , sets upon the foe that had so gall'd her , and soon brought him under her feet ; then disdaining to wear the fetters of a conquered enemy , assumes the power god then , and nature at first had invested her with , and assumes her pristine freedom . thus bellona was the midwife which brought england to bed of the common-wealth , which was no sooner born , but she swadled her in ensigns torn from her proudest foes , and adorned her cradle with trophies of victory ! o sacred and happy birth ! what triumphs attend thy youth , and what lawrells shall encircle thy manly front ? thou that hast strangled serpents in thy cradle , givest us hopes , that the seaven-headed hydra shall fall by thee when thou hast attained thy full strength ; and who hast made it as it were thy sport to pull down petty tyrants , wilt make it thy businesse to destroy the grand impostor ; that as with thy fist thou hast given him a box on the ear , so with thy sword thou wilt divide his head from his shoulders ; for what lesse than a triple crown can attend thy chariot , whose go-cart is lackied on by crowns in couples ? for great , even for so great things sure hath providence reserv'd thee , whom she hath so carefully tended in thy infancy ; for though she hath suffered thine enemies to rise against thee , yet so tender a regard hath she had of thy youth , that she put hooks as it were in their nostrils , and restrained them from uniting , whom single she knew thee able to grapple with ; so that their malice hath augmented thy glory , and by their endeavouring to ruin thee , they have encreased thy power , making themselves but touchstones to convince the world of the purity of thy metal , and on their own shoulders advancing thee above an ordinary height , that the world might take notice of thy growth , and stature ; and as with thee , so hath she done with others , even with all all those whom she intended to advance ; examples of which , both divine , and humane histories abundantly offer to our veiw . thus was it with israel in their conquering the promised land , sihon king of the amorites first sets upon them , then og king of baashan came out against them , &c. thus we find it with divers others in other authors , which to avoid prolixity i shall passe by , instancing in one and that so well known , that few , if any therebe , but have heard thereof , and that the common-wealth of rome , which from a small beginning grew up into so vast a body , that her eagles-wings spread over the greatest part of the then known world . chap. vi . the beginning of the common-wealth of rome , and the causes of its growth . this city , or rather town of rome , being founded by romulus , and inhabitants gathered together from divers places , was no sooner built , but it was threatned with ruin in its very infancy , and the best it could expect was but an ages duration ; for the greatest part of the inhabitants being single , all hope of issue was cut off , which onely could afford it a longer life : wives thus wanting , and none to be obtained by consent , so contemptible were they in the eyes of their neighbours , they attempt what craft and force would do ; and their plot succeeded to their minds ; for having proclaimed publick plays , and invited their neighbours , they suddenly provided themselves wives of the sabine virgins , which came with their parents to be spectators . yet this remedy seemed as dangerous as the disease ; for the sabines were a great and war-like nation , and a colony of the spartans , after whose manner they lived in towns without walls , reputing themselves safe in their own valour , and the romans could not but expect they would resent the affront . but see how fortune ( which we christians truly tearm providence ) gave them assistance , by giving let to the conjunction of their enemies , though of one nation , and alike interessed in the quarrell . first , the caeninenses come against them , whose king being slain by romulus in fight hand to hand , and their army defeated , were compelled to leave their old habitations , and go and dwell at rome by the conqueror , who by this means encreased his strength as well as reputation , and became the better able to deal with the rest . this war done , the fidenates , crustimini and antenates begin another , and run the same fortune , and likewise being incorporated with the victors still encrease the roman stock . the rest grown wise by these examples unite , and put the romans to such a plunge , that it was easie to conjecture what have would have been the issue , had they taken this course at first ; but by the intercession of the women running in between the armies , a peace was made , and both nations joyned in one , the city keeping its old name of rome from romulus , the people being called quirites from the chief tribe of the sabines , the roman and sabine kings jointly reigning . now could the wisest among the sons of mē have judged that a rape should have begot an union ? but there is an hand above disposes of things above our suppositions , which continued its favour till rome grew of perfect strength . this was he that withdrew porsenna , and changed his enmity into love , and admiration ; that restrained any warlike marcian or lucan , any mulius , silo , or telesinus with the joint forces of italy from falling upon her , untill she was able to bear the storm ; that out supplies off from hannibal when he had almost born down all before him , and made the envy of his own citizens instrumental to their own ruin ; that made antiochus sit still until philip was brought under , and tigranes look on until mithridates was beaten out of his kingdom , yea that provided work by the sarmatians for mithridates till the marsian war was over ; that divided the cimbri and teutones so , that marius when he had overthrown one party , had time to joyn with the other consull to help destroy the other , and suffered not three hundred thousand fighting men in one body to attempt italy ; and in like manner the slaves , and fencers , giving crassus opportunity to defeat them , who had ranged italy , and oft put the roman armies to rout ; that by a few geese saved the capitol , and caused the unjust banishment of camillus to be a means to preserve rome . chap. vii . a parallel . and hath not providence in the same manner dealt with this common-wealth ? which was no sooner established in england , but it was threatned from ireland , where dublin , derry , and a few forces under generall monk were onely left us , two being besieged , and the third in an incapacity to afford them relief ; when things were thus desperate , god divided the rebels , and made o neal instrumental in the relief of derry , neither could they be pieced untill ormond was totally broke , and the other party under the popish bishop of clogher , fought and routed . the irish cloud almost dissolved , a scotch storm threatens us , which yet came not on so suddenly , but that we had time to provide shelter , ( providence causing them to trifle away much time in their treaties , and other mockeries ) insomuch that the greatest part of it fell in their own nation , the tayl only besprinkling some parts of this , where it totally vanished . and here we can never sufficiently admire gods goodnesse to this common-wealth , who when the enemy had given our army the slip , and left them so far behind them , suffered them not to march up to london , but to empound themselves at worcester , and so over-ruled the hearts of this nation , that notwithstanding the malice and hatred of many to the present government , yet not any considerable person , or number , joyned with the enemy , even marching through the most discontented and disaffected counties . the north being cleared , the dutch jealous of our encrease , who have found the sweetnesse of a state government , endeavour to clip our wings , and to usurp our long held soveraignty of the seas , having undermined our trading a long while before ; but they may put what they have got by it in their eyes without any danger , unlesse of making themselves weep , notwithstanding their treacherous and base attempt upon a small squadron with one of our generals in the time of ttreaty , and before denouncing a war , and that even upon our own coast ; whilst we besides the honour , and repute gained abroad , are grown more potent at sea in one year , than we had like to have been in many ages , had they let us been at quiet ; and even thus the carthaginians compell'd the romans to become masters at sea , by their injuries provoking that stout nation to adventure a sea fight , though so ignorant , that the consull taught them to row by sitting , and beating poles on the sand ; and truely little better sea-men were our redcoats at first . chap. viii . of providence , and vertue , and the concurrence of second causes . and sure now no christian but will acknowledge a divine hand over-ruling in these actings for englands preservation , which even the heathen observ'd by their dim light , in romes advancement . thus we find that ingenuous moralist plutarch affirming , that though there hath been a great and continual war , and feud between fortune and vertue , yet it is probable , they made a truce , and united their forces for romes assistance . again , as they report venus passing over the river eurotas laid aside her looking-glasse , attire , and girdle , and took a spear and a shield to accompany lyeurgus ; so fortune having deserted the assyrians , and persians , hovered over macedon , suddenly shook off alexander , view'd egypt and syria , seemingly advanc'd carthage , at last past tiber , laid aside her wings , and set up her residence in the capitol . and as he , so the romans themselves were sensible of this divine aid , as the multitude of temples dedicated to fortune may demonstrate ; there was the temple of fortunae virilis : fortunae muliebris : fortunae primogeniae & obsequentis : fortunae privatae & viscatricis : fortunae virginis : fortunae bonae spei : fortunae masculae : fortis fortunae , &c. yet did they not attribute all to fortune , and neglect vertue , of which they were as great admirers , and honourers , as they were adorers of the other ; and plutarch gives it a due place : rome was ( saith he ) conducted and encompassed with whole troops of citizens , brandishing bloody weapons , enobled with scars received before , bedewed with blood and sweat , and leaning on half-broken trophies , such as her fabricii , cimilli , cincinnati , fabii , aemillii , marcelli , scipiones , &c. and let us but consider , and we shall see that providence works by instruments , and god expects the use of means ; we cannot suppose a victory without a fight ; lying still , and wishing will do nothing , d●i munerasua laboribus vendunt , it was not hid from the heathen , that the active onely were to expect a blessing ; the hand of the diligent makes rich , and vertuous actions advance states and persons to honour and dignity . for though scientia dei , the knowledg of god be the cause of things , yet being but the remote cause it takes not away contingency : god himself perceives that some things will evenire contingenter , for he doth not onely cognoscere res , sed ordinem et modum rerum , know things , but the order and manner how they shall come to passe ; he knows there are causae intermediae , which are impedibiles et defectibiles ( as the schoolmen say ) and from the wavering of these second causes the whole rise of contingency flowes ; thus in a syllogism , let the major be necessary , if the minor be contingent , the conclusion will be so too ; though the first cause be certain , yet if there be obstructions in the second , no man can assure himself what will be the effect ; though the spring of motion cannot fail , yet if the wheels break , the progresse will be very uncertain to all but god , who knows whether they will break or no ; he knows whether such a nation will use the means or no ; whether it will improve his blessings , or abuse them ; whether it will imploy the peace , plenty , wealth , power , and strength it hath received for his glory , and the common good , or for pride , luxury , and riot : so that we only are in the dark ; yet not altogether are we blind , but where we see vertue on the throne in a nation , there we may foretel a blessing to that people , and where vice predominant , that its attendant ruin is not far off ; and for this the before-mentioned common-wealth of rome affords us an example in both kinds ; which as it grew up by vertue to an unparallel'd height , so by vice was its strength broken , and its renown turned into shame , that dalilah betraying this mighty sampson into the hands of his enemies , who have fettered him , and pulled out his eyes : it will not therefore i suppose be a work unworthy our labour to take a veiw of those vertues , by which , that , as other nations have become renowned , and set them for our example ; for though heathens , they attained to a great height of morality , yea such an one as may put most that wear the stile of christians to the blush . chap. ix . of the piety of the romans , the evill and danger of mock-thanksgivings . and first let us behold their piety , which is not onely the cheif , but the file-leader , and indeed the ground of all the rest ; this is that which bridles the most unruly , and strikes an aw where reason cannot persuade ; let this be taken away , and with it all fidelity , justice , purity vanish , yea humane society cannot subsist without it , as cicero observes in his first book de nat. deor. never did they begin any businesse without frequent supplications . civitas religiosa in principiis maximè novornm bellorum , supplicationibus habitis , & obsecratione circa omnia pulvinaria facta , ludos jovi , donumqui vovere consulem jussit . livie dec . . l. . supplicatio ▪ à consulibus in triduum ex senatus-consulto indicta est , obsecratique circa omnia pulvinaria dii , quod bellum populus jussisset , id bene , ac foeliciter eviniret . idem in eodem . never did they obtain a victory , or receive a deliverance , but publick thanksgivings were decreed , and those for one , three , or more dayes , according to the greatnesse of the benefit ; magna victoria loetitiaque romae fuit literis allatis , supplicatio in triduum decreta est , & . majores hostiae immiolari juss● . livy . thus when hannibal was forced to leave italy after sixteen years war , they no sooner heard of it , but they ordered solemn and publick thanks . decretum ut quinque dies circa omnia pulvinaria supplicaretur , victimaeque majores immolarentur centum & viginti . never shall we find them mocking heaven , giving thanks for a victory , when they had received a losse . a practice so superlatively impious , that any lesse than an atheist must tremble but to think on ; for what is this but to abuse god , that man may be deceived , making the divine power ( may it be spoken with reverence ) as it were a stalking-horse to drive the befool'd people into their nets ? what is this other than a profest declaration that their sole confidence is in the arm of flesh , not caring how they undervalew gods glory , so they may maintain their own reputation , how they provoke him , so they may but keep up the spirits of their own party ? flectere si nequeunt superos acheronta monebunt , sith god hath forsaken them , they will try what the devill will do ; sith heaven refuses , they will try what help hel will afford them ; poor wretches , not at all considering , that whilst they endeavour to rally , and patch together a poor , routed and broken party of frail men , they make omnipotency their foe , defying the almighty himself in so publick a manner , that he is engaged by that which is most dear to him , his own glory , to revenge the affront ; it is evident then how good a match they are like to have of it . neither doth their wickednesse stop here ; t is not against god only they sin , but men also ; they are not only traytours against the majesty of heaven , but their trust on earth , betraying their own poor people which repose their confidence in them , by rendring them obstinate and proud upon hopes of false successe , which knew they but the truth , and their own weakness , might make their peace to the preservation of many of their lives , and much of their fortunes ; and drawing the blood and miseries of their neighbour-nations upon their own heads , falsely seduced to embarque with them in their ill-thriving quarrel , wherein unawares they often are opprest when they foolishly supposed all cock-sure . yet hath this impious and treacherous piece of policy been acted again and again in our eyes , with horrour and amazement may we speak it , even by those who would be thought christians : yea may not this clothe many of the oxford-thanksgiving dayes in red , and put our dutch foes , if they have any ingenuity , to the blush , who not coutent by their emissaries abroad to abuse all europe with brags and lyes , have of late ordered a day of publick thanksgiving at home to gull their own people into conceit of victory , not without a piaculum , which may cost them dear before it be expiated . for he that is high and mighty indeed , neither can be deceived , nor will be out-faced by any impudency whatsoever , and they had best consider whether they are able to engage with him too , whom they dare affront in the sight of angels and men . courage then brave englishmen , you see what shifts your enemies are put to , you have beaten them out of their confidence in the rock of ages , and forced them to make lyes their refuge , a wretched defence , and such as cannot long protect thē ; behold what low-spirited foes you have to deal with , even such as dare not take notice of a losse ; alas how far short come these of the roman fortitude as well as piety , whom you shall see according to that of their own virgil , tu ne cede malis , sed contrà audentior ito , so far from being basely dejected by losses , though comming one on the back of another , that their courage rather encreased , being prick't on with shame and a desire to regain their lost honour , which stil buoied them up when in greatest danger of sinking ? this is that true sober valour grounded on a right sense of honour , and due love to the publick , which needed neither gunpowder nor brand-wine to make them fight lustick ; this is that which rendred them victorious and triumphant , and which will enable , you if you imbrace it . but we shall have occasion to speak of this more hereafter ; let us return therfore to our generous romans , whom we find ( i say ) so far from this impious mocking of heaven , that on the contrary , upon the least sense or apprehension of their gods displeasure , they sought by all humble and publick addresses to pacifie and appease their incensed dieties : for this we may see their frequent lustrations and deprecations , the first to purge and cleanse themselves , the second to avert and turn away their gods anger . horum prodigiorum causa decemviri libris adire jussi , et novēdiale sacrum factum , & supplicatio indicta est , atque urbs lustrata . liv. dec. . l. . lastly , besieging an enemies city , they would invoke the gods of that place , imploring their aid , and deprecating their anger , by inviting them to go with them to rome with the promise of more magnificent temples , and a more splendid adoration : so great a care had they not to provoke heaven , and so fearfull were they to engage against it . chap. x. piety and valour not inconsistent ' piety rewarded in heathens , and impiety punished . and here by the way may be observed , that piety and valour are not inconsistent , and that religion maketh not men cowards . what nation ever was more valiant , and what more religious than the roman ? who were so strict in their divine worship , that they would choose rather to lay themselves open to their enemies arms , than by omitting the least part of it , to their gods displeasure : an eminent example of which we have in that war of the gauls which succeeded the first punick , in which when flaminius and furius the consuls were gone against the enemy with great forces , the augurs having found that some things were omitted in their election , they were commanded by letters from the senate to return presently and abjure their offices , which letters flaminius not opening until he had fought and routed the enemy , and made a memorable invasion of their countrey , though he returned crowned with victory , and laden with spoil , not one went out to meet him , nay he had much ado to obtain a triumph , ( which was no sooner past , but both he and his collegue were constrained to lay aside their consulships ) because he seemed to have contemned & made slight of their holy rites ; they esteeming it more conducing to the common safety that their gods should be observed , than their enemies overcome , and rather choosing to leave their armies without commanders , though in a war reputed so dangerous as that of the gauls , in which their priests were not exempted from bearing arms , than omit the least punctilio in their worship , so zealous and tender were they in matters concerning their religion . thus when they were besieged by the gauls in the capitol , and the day approached wherein their solemn sacrifice was to be performed in colle quirinali , the hill so called , rather than to omit their duty to heaven , they ventured through the very midst of their enemies camp , and having performed their rites , returned with safety , their enemies either being amazed at the boldnesse of the attempt , or mooved with respect to religion , which present death could not deter them from performing . and though their religion were idolatrous , yet according to their light being zealous they reaped the reward of a temporal prosperity : which some among them despising , smarted for to the purpose , in their own ruin reaping the reward of their impiety and contempt of religion : thus we shall see crassus who slighting the curses and execrations of the tribune ateius , would make war upon the parthians , where he lost his own and his sons life , with most of his army , the poor remainder escaping by a dishonourable flight : and thus pompey the great , who would , notwithstanding the intreaties and diswafions of the high-priest , enter the holy of holies in the temple of jerusalem , in his comming out fell down , and never after prospered , but being overthrown by caesar , and flying into aegypt , lost his head , his body being left unburied on the sands : and though he were no jew , yet being a roman by religion he was bound to reverence all deities , as the {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} the temple of all the gods at rome may demonstrate . neither need we wonder to see even a superstitious and idolatrous worship in the heathens who knew no better , rewarded with outward blessings : sith whatsoever is lovely in nature is acceptable even to god himself , for 't is a print of himself , and he doth proportion some temporal rewards unto it ; the courage of romulus , the devotion of numa , the integrity of fabritius , the temperance , and justice , and publick spiritednesse of the rest , had all some rewards scatter'd amongst them , and can we think their piety had no share ? which is so agreeable to nature , and so deeply imprinted by it on mans heart , that man , even the stubbornest , and most unwilling otherwise to submit , yet will fall down and worship a stock or stone rather than be without a deity , will devise a religion rather than be without one ; but more of this in the next . chap. xi . religion ingrafted in mans haart by nature . vve hear the philosopher thus reasoning , do not the imperfect serve the more perfect , as the elements mixt bodies , mixt bodies plants , plants living creatures , living creatures and all the rest man , nay hath not the soul a master like rule over the body , and the understanding an empire over the appetite , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , and now when by nature it is thought convenient for the inferiour to serve the superiour , ought not man to judge it best for him to serve the most wise and good god ? cicero saith we cannot be just , unlesse we be religious , fietas justitia quaedam est adversus deos , lib. . de nat. deor. epictetus , if i were a nightingale , i would do as a nightingale , but being a man what shall i do ? i will praise god ; and that without ceasing . nay epicurus himself though he taught that god {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ; neither did any thing himself , nor commanded others to do , yet affirmed that his nature was so excellent and glorious , that it alone was sufficient to allure a wiseman to adore him . could the heathen grope thus far , and shall we that have the name to be christians lagge behind them , could they perceive thus much by the glimmering light of nature , and shall we be blind in the glorious sun-shine of the gospel ? for shame let us open our eyes , lest they rise in judgement , and condemn us , and it be more tollerable for them than us in that great day , when the lord shall appear with thousands and ten thousands of saints and angels . behold o england to be religious is the way to thrive , godlinesse will be thy gain both here and hereafter . chap. xii . the outward means to be used ; ministers to be incouraged , and maintained ; the christian magistrates duty . now that we may be so , we are to use all means god hath appointed for the obtaining the true knowledge of him , and his will , which is the ground of religion ; for as our knowledge is true or false , so will our religion be too ; and the ordinary means are the reading and hearing of the sacred scriptures , for faith comes by hearing , and how shall we hear unlesse we are taught , and how shall we be taught without a teacher ? in the first place therefore as we ought to have a holy esteem of his word , so ought we to have a reverent esteem of the faithfull and able dispencers of it , giving them all due incouragement and maintenance , that they may be the better enabled cheerfully to follow that work whereunto they are called , of winning souls unto christ . and this is a duty incumbent on the christian magistrate , who is to use all lawful means to promote religion , and to restrain prophanesse , for he beareth not the sword in vain , but for terrour of evill doers , and encouragement of those that do well . and here let me not be mistaken , for though i believe it is their duty to punish those grand traytours against the majesty of heaven , blasphemers i mean , and all other publick disturbers of the civill peace and quiet of the nation ; yet on the otherside to force all men to submit to one form , or to be of such or such a general received opinion in every tittle , under penalty of censures civil and ecclesiastical , i conceive a tyranny as little to be suffered by the magistrate , as it had been for saul to have suffered nahash the ammonite to put out the right eyes of the gilcadites , for indeed this were to put out both our eyes . for it is god and none but god that can assure us of his own mind , though he do reveal his mind by a creature , there wil be some tremblings , and waverings in the soul , unlesse he doth withall satisfie the soul that such a creature doth communicate his mind truely and really as it is , so that ultimately the certainty is resolved into the voice of god , who is onely to rule his church {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , by a determining and legislative power ; men that are fitted by god are to guide and direct {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , in way of subserviency to him , and by an explication of his mind , yet so that every one may judge of this {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , by acts of their own understanding illuminated by the spirit of god , for there are no representatives in spirituals , men may represent the bodies of others in civil and temporal affairs , and thus a bodily obedience is due to a just authority , but there is none can alwayes represent the mind and judgement of another in the vitals and inwards of religion ; for as a late bishop of our own , ad nudam praescriptionem , aut determinationem alterius sine lumine privati judicii nemo est qui credere potest etiamsi cupiat maximè ; no man let him desire it never so much can believe the bare determination of another unlesse his own judgement concur ; a truth that condemns the antichristian practices of the rest that were of that order , and mirandula gives the reason of it , for says he , nemo credit aliquid verum praecisè quia vult credere illud esse verum , non est enim in potentia hominis facere aliquid apparere intellectui suo verum , quando ipse voluerit : no man believes a thing because he will believe it , for it is not in the power of man to make a thing appear what he wil to his understanding ; and indeed , before there can be faith there must not only be a knowledg of the thing to be believed ; but an inclination also of the understanding to assent to it when known ; should we not judge that man a tyrant that should command us to renounce our sense , to believe that to be white that we see to be black , to believe that to be sweeter than honey , that we taste to be bitterer than gaul ? what are those then that would force us to disclaim our understandings , and make us believe that to be true , wch we conceive or know to be false ? and yet what cruelty in this kind hath been practized by the papists ? what by the prelates ? what by some that succeeded them , and yet de-cryed it in them ? yea what by some of those who will cry out for liberty of conscience too ? chap. xiii . religion not to be made a stalking-horse to ambition , or avarice . if any shall but question in the least , these mens jus divinum , presently they are hereticks , schismaticks , sectaries , &c. if any man shall not have the same whirligiggs in their pates as the other , or will not assent in an instant to what ever chymaera their rambling fancies produce , let them be what they will , parliament or city , magistrates or private persons , teachers or hearers , presently pray them down , purge them , they are self-seekers , tyrants , enemies to the saints , antichristian , and baals priests , and what not , yea such as are to be destroyed . yet by yout leave furious saint , you must excuse our diffidence of your tenents , yea and of your saint-ship too , until we perceive more ground for thē , and find a better temper in you ; our lord and master i am sure hath given us ground to doubt you , and i hope the servant is not above the lord , it will be best for us then to observe him , when his disciples would have had fire commanded from heaven , he tels them , ye know not what manner of spirit you are of , for the son of man is not come to destroy souls but to save them ; we know who is abaddon , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , the destroyer , and it is his badg to be spitting of fire ; why is it not as lawfull for us to question an opinion though it have your stamp and superscription upon it , as it was for the bereans to bring even apostolical words to the touch-stone ? yet were they rewarded by saint paul with the title of {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , more noble , an epithite we canot find in your catalogue . but you will say , they believed , they did indeed , but not hand over head , and so may we when we find the same spirit bearing witnesse to your doctrine which did to the apostles . but through all your cantinglanguage we do discover your aimes , indeed out of the abundance of the heart your tongues tell us , you would be popular , great and powerfull , and injoy the fat things of the earth , these only belong to you and your tribe , you are to rule the nations , to bind their kings in chains , and their nobles with fetters of iron ; the old itch of temporal lordship is wretchedly broke out upon you , your hands are the hands of esau , though your voice be the voice of jacob , your practices are unchristian , though yout profession be sanctity ; christ he promises to make his disciples fishers of men , but you fish for honour , worldly power , and riches for your followers , a bewitching bait to catch poor mortals : we read of the devil tempting our head with the kingdoms of the world , and the glory of them , but from whom have you commission thus to tempt his members ? who gave you authority to dispose of worldly powers ? is your masters kingdom of this world ? if it be , we must rank you with those antichristian usurpers , who arrogate to themselves a power above all that is called god : what more doth that man of rome ? whom we find bestowing the kingdoms of the world on those that will bow down and worship him , but cursing , deposing , and turning out of office all that refuse to subscribe to his fopperies . thus we see mahomet not with this loadstone drawing men , but with his sword conquering them , he drawes his sword , bids them deliver up their souls , and upon this condition he will spare their lives : signailla quae tyrannis et latronibus non desunt , what more do tyrants and thieves ? but sure the christian religion stands not in need of such helps , whose principles in themselves are attractive and magnetical , enamouring souls , and leading them captive in the silken bonds of love with the cords of a man . chap. xiv . the benefit of humane learning , with an answer to some objections made against it . another sort there is wriggled in amongst us , who even in print and pulpits publickly bray against learning , endeavouring to seduce people into a belief that humane learning as they call it , is in no measure to be tolerated in a gospel-teacher , most wretchedly wresting scripture to apply those texts against preaching themselves to overthrow it ; a fallacie so base that they had need to cry up ignorance lest the cheat should be descried : as if learning and preaching themselves were termini convertibiles , the one necessarily implying the other ; whereas it is commonly quite contrary ; it is your sciolist , your fellow that hath scarce wet his lips in that sacred fountain , who will be dabling and patching that he may be thought a scholer , when as the most learned men , who are conscious of their own sufficiency , seldome or never , unless upon just , and necessary occasions make the least shew of it in their publick teaching . the truth of this is verified dayly in our eyes by the continual practice of many learned men amongst us . where shall we find more powerfull plainness , than in the works of the learned bolton , to omit the names of the rest , which are so well known to all ? thus shall we see your coward , the common braggadochio , and those the greatest boasters who have the least in them ; for such being conscious off their own baseness , endeavour to make others believe them to be brave fellows , which they know themselves not to be , and to make up in shew what they want in reality ; whereas your valiant man is still silent , and lets his acts speak for him , knowing according to the proverb , that good wine needs no bush , and that worth will be taken notice of without proclaiming it at the market cross . . but the apostles were poor fishrmen , and the like , altogether unlearned , and therefore the gospel ministers ought to be so too . o horrid , jesuitical , nay diabolical sophistry ! we acknowledge that the only wise god in the carrying on of his great and glorious works usually makes use of such instruments , as seem despicable , and contemptible in the eyes of men , yea such as are altogether unable and unfit to hatch and carry on defigns of their own , the more to manifest that it is his work , and to shew his strength in their weakness , which , unless supported by omnipotency , would sink under it , as also to leave the obstinate without excuse : but though these may seem weak , yet are they made mighty through the power of god that strengthens them , and are abundantly supplyed from above with what gifts and graces soever are necessary for them : thus the apostles being poor unlearned fishermen , and the like , once called , and invested with the apostleship , were endued from above , had the gift of tongues , immediately were taught by the holy ghost : and who dares affirm them unlearned then ? or deny skill in the tongues necessary for the office of a teacher , which god , who doth nothing in vain , by miracle bestowed upon them ? and what now though they wanted acquired learning , so they had it infused ? and god was pleased in that extraordinary time , in an extraordinary manner to endow them , must we therefore now neglect the ordinary means , and tempt god to work a miracle to be able to answer a gainsayer ? but let us but consider how faithful an handmaid learning hath been to religion ; how the armor-bearer hath helped jonathan to destroy the philistimes ; how necessary it hath been to maintain religion , and oppose idolatry ; by the help of learning have the ministery of england been enabled to defend the truth , and oppose errour , to ward off , and put by the blowes and thrusts of their antichristian adversaries , and to strike with the edge , and give them the true point , to the wounding & destroying of their superstitious tenents . thus we see the learned whitacre disarm their goliah , confute their bellarmine , foyl their chosen champion , unwind the subtil jesuite , trace him through all his maeanders , meet him at every turn , beat him from outwork to out-work , from sconce to sconce , till he hath driven him out of all his strengths , and left him not a lurking hole to hide his head in ; when the most that we could expect from a dean of dunstable could be bellarmine thou lyest , neither shewing sense or reason , but his say so . but it may be said , thank a good cause : yet may the best cause be spoiled by an evil mannaging , and the most bright and shining truths be obscured in a dark lanthorn , yea let them be whiter than snow , they may be sullied by dirty fingers , and more transparent than glass , yet may be cracked when clumsie fists shall come to handle them . this the jesuites know , which hath been the cause of this strange attempt , for it is most plain by the poyson now vomited , that some of those serpents are wriggled in amongst us ; they have tryed our weapons , and to their smart know the sharpness of them , no marvel then they endeavour to disarm us ; learning hath kept them out , no wonder then they attempt to introduce ignorance the mother , which could they effect , they are assured popish devotion the daughter would not be long kept out . neither can this seem strange unto us , if we but consider their practice in the lutheran church , where it hath been usual with the iesuites to seem to become proselites , to heighten and continue the division between them and the calvinists ; or what a late author of our own , who seems not to be unacquainted of their practices , writes of them , the jesuit reckons it in the number of his merits , if he may by any sinister wayes ruffle and disorder heretical kingdomes ( so he calls them ) encourage weak and unstable minds to slight magistracy , irritate divisions , tumults , rebellions , absolve from oaths , and all sacred tyes ; so that its hard to find any tragical scene , or bloody theatre , into which the jesuite hath not intruded , and been as busie as davus in the comedy , contributing in a very high measure to every fanatick insolence , justifying the old lemma of loyola's picture , cavete vobis principes : these are the firebrands of europe , the forge , and bellows of sedition , infernal emissaries , the pests of the age , men that live as if huge sins would merit heaven by an antiperistasis . concutiunt populos , vexant regna , solicitant bella , diruunt ecclesias . and it is for certain written from beyond the seas , that the english colleges are emptyed , and all those emissaries sent abroad , whither , unless amongst ●s ? chap. xv . an answer to some objections against learning , in a book entituled , the saints guide . and the same author goes on , nor is any nation without some turbulent spirits of its own , the dishonour of the gown , and pulpit , the shame , and sometimes ruin of their countrey ; one of which hath late started this question , whether or not all that much magnifyed natural reason ( which we think dignifieth us above , and distinguisheth us from brutes ) and all that humane learning ( which we conceive exalts and rectifyeth reason ) be the fruit of the forbidden tree , and is a spurious and adventious faculty , which man wanted in his innocency , and was instilled into him by satan in the fall ? a quaery satan himself might blush to put , and yet the book stuffed with this and the like doctrine , is cloathed with the specious title of the saints guide ; the wolf adorns himself with the lambs skinne , the fiend transforms himself into an angel of light : it is not amisse to mark the phrase he reproaches learning in , then how he coucheth his doctrine , lastly his divinity in these words , which man wanted in his innocency . indeed the old serpent told eve that the fruit of the forbidden tree would encrease their knowledge , but except him , and this disciple of his , i never found any affirming that man wanted any thing in his innocency : but suppose this diabolical doctrine true , if man wanted learning before , he much more wāts it since the fall ; the author of such stuff may well cry out against reason and learning . but to the question , that reason was depraved and darkned by the fall , we allow , and that by the help of learning it is in some measure restored , we affirm , and so consequently that there had been no need of acquired learning had man stood , no more would there of repentance : but doth it follow therefore , that now vve are fallen , vve should not labour for repentance ? let this fellow go and try whether he can perswade a man that is fallen into a pit not to endeavour to get out , because getting out is a fruit , and effect of his falling in . truly such arguing is instilled by satan , and such sophistry is a bastardly faculty which ingenuity , much more innocency , is so far from wanting , that it abhors and detests it . the fellow seems to be a scholer , i shall ask him therefore one question . is not reason the specifical difference of a man from a beast ? and was man distinguished from a beast by the fall , or the creation ? did the devil or god make him a rational creature ? behold then the horrid blasphemy couched in this query , which would insinuate the rational soul to be the product of the devil ; if this be not a doctrine of devils i know not what is . then for his parenthesis , ( which we think dignifieth us above , and distinguisheth us from brutes ) if reason doth not , what doth ? shape cannot , for so one beast differs from another : neither is it grace , for then all but beasts must have grace : and for his other ( which we conceive exalts , and rectifies reason ) hath not learning exalted and rectified his reason so far as to enable him from such and such premisses to draw such a and such a conclusion , to frame his syllogisms , to write and utter these words , positions , consectaries , quaeries , responsions , cognition , which his illiterate auditors and readers understand no more , than they do him and his drifts ? what but learning hath set his understanding above theirs , and enabled him to talk at a rate his ignorant followers onely can admire ? behold then you misled wretches what a guide you have got , who when all his sophistry , and abuse of his own reason and learning , all his logick and syllogisms are unable to overthrow reason and learning , goes about by his queries to undermine them ; who , when all his impudency dares not affirm , and all his ability cannot prove , endeavors by way off doubt to instill his poison , upon hopes that you will swallow & take for granted whatever drops from him : what is it you admire in this fellow , is it his railing against learning in others ? doth he not make use of it himself ? he disputes syllogistically , he is frequent in division , abounds in subtill and sophistical distinctions , talks hard words , rattles out latine , nay there is not one arrow in his quiver but is feathered with feathers plucked from learnings wing , nor is he able to speak or write , or you to read or understand one syllable , word or sentence against learning , but by its assistance . could you have read , could you have wrote , could you have understood one word had you not been taught ? why these are degrees of learning ; awake and behold the cheat , which would make you enemies even to that image of god which is imprinted on you , level you with brutes nay make you such : you see it is reason that distinguisheth a man from a beast , it is learning that improves reason , be not afraid of being rational ; this caytiff would deprive you of your humanity , that he might the easier destroy your christianity ; rob you of your reason , to bob you of your religion : for if he be not a very jesuite , yet is he the likest one that ever i met with ; if the tree may be judged by the fruits , his acts will a loud proclaim him a notorious juggler : and first behold how he cheats you in stating the question , for it is not whether by the help of humane learning a man may attain a saving knowledge to himself , whether he can save his own soul ; but whether he may not attain to such a knowledge as may enable him to hold out the way of salvation unto others : and that a man may do this , not only too too frequent examples do make out , but the apostle himself tells us in the cor. . . but i keep under my body , and keep it in subjection ; lest that by any means , when i have preached unto others , i my self should be a cast away ; a man may preach to others , and yet be himself a cast away : for this wretch dares not affirm that the apostle inspired by the spirit of god would suppose an impossibility : and the example of iudas clearly shewes that a man may have an outward call to teach , and yet be a reprobate ; was not he one of the twelve that was sent to preach the kingdome of god , and to heal the sick ? luk. . , . also the apostle in the tim. . . speaks of some , having a form of godliness , creeping into houses , leading captive silly women laden with infirmities : these hypocrites by the help of learning and parts could pray as devoutly , talk as holily , wrest the scriptures as dexterously , cogging the dy , making the word speak what they list , craftily applying it , having all the arts and methodes of consenage , even as he himself ; yet were they not taught of god ; it is cleer therfore that learning and parts perse ex propria natura can understand and so apprehend the mystery of the gospel , as to hold it out so to others , that the hearers cannot discern by the teaching an hypocrite from a true believer , notwithstanding all his positions . you may behold also how finely the holy text is wrested by him to no purpose in his following arguments , for unless he prove that a man by the help of learning cannot attain to such a knowledge as to be able to make an outward profession , he proves nothing . and that this sophistry is malicious , not ignorant , his answering two objections will fully clear . object . . that though humane learning be an enemy to the law of god while it is in an unsanctified heart , yet when the heart is truly turned to god , then it becomes a sanctifyed instrument , and a good hundmaid to theology . solution . to this he answers , that though the heart be truly sanctified , in which humane learning doth inhere as in its subject , yet doth it not follow that learning it self is , no more than sin can be said to be sanctified , though the heart of a sinful man may be truly said to be sanctifyed : for acquired learning of it self , and of its own nature , is nothing else but sin , and therefore remains so still , and cannot be truly nor properly said to be sanctifyed , no more than sin . but if by being sanctified , they mean that the providential wisdome of god doth order it , or make use of it for the good of his people , i oppose it not , so that it be understood , that that good flowes not from the nature of acquired knowledge it self , but from the wisdome and goodness of the spirit of god , who maketh all things work together for the benefit of those that love him , who are called according to his purpose , and so no more can properly in this respect be predicated of it than of sin it self , which in that case ( though not as an entity , for non entia ad modum entium concipiuntur ) is said also to work for the good of gods saints . first to this we say , that the habit of sin is destroyed , there is a mortification of sin , as well as a vivification of grace , as rom. . . how shall we that are dead to sin , live any longer therein ? and ephes. . . you hath he quickned who were dead in trespasses and sins . now the habit of learning is not in the least diminished , much less destroyed . secondly , that the whole man with all his endowments is sanctified , as thes. . , . and the very god of peace sanctify you wholly , and i pray god your whole spirit , and soul , and body , be preserved blameless unto the comming of our lord jesus christ . faithful is he that calleth you , who also will do it . now then , either learning must be sanctified , or something remains unsanctified . thirdly , that acquired learning , of it self , and of its own nature is not sin , for sin is a transgression of the law , iohn . . verse , for sin is the transgression of the law , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . now what law forbiddeth learning ? where is it written thou shalt not be learned ? and sure were learning either in it self sin , or left unsanctified in a sanctified heart , we should not find the ●●●stle paul giving thanks for it in cor. . . i thank my god i speak with tongues more than you all : and the holy ghost describing apollos leaves him upon record to be an eloquent man {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , the word usually is taken for a learned man ; and see what followes , he helped them much which believed , for he mightily convinced the iewes , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , which the learned beza in his annotations renders , magna cum contentione , and he gives the reason of it , vti volui hac perphrasi ut graeci vocabuli emphasin servarem , quo significatur eloquentem hunc hominem omnes ( quod aiunt ) nervos revincendis iudaeis contendisse , i have used this periphrasis , that i might preserve the emphasis of the greek word , by ●●ich is signified that this eloquent man employed the utmost of his abilities to convince the jews . behold then what divinity your doctor teaches , who is not onely content to bely learning , but sanctification , making the holy spirit work by halves ; and as he plaies the knave here , so in the latter part he plaies the fool , fighting with his own shadow , and keeping a coil about nothing , for the very objection , as he himself hath put it , asserts the good to flow from the sanctification of learning , not from its own nature , it makes it a handmaid , and so does he ; untill he comes to his conclusion , which how true it is , as it sufficiently appears by what is said , yet will be more manifest if we consider learning in it self to be indifferent either good or evil , according as it is used or abused , now is sin so ? suppose a man shall make the glory of god his onely end in his attaining learning , that thereby he may be better enabled to read , converse , dispute , and speak concerning the mysteries of salvation ( for could he have written or spoken as he doth without it , unless by help of a miracle ? ) will he affirm this learning to be sin ? is the physical act sinful , or doth the moral circumstance cloath it with good or evil ? something more then may be predicated of learning than of sinne , which cannot be conceived in any other notion than of sin . object . . again , if it be objected , that though learning be not effectual to the understanding of the mystery of the gospel , yet it is prealent to the compleating of the literal and historical knowledge thereof : take this here , that these objections are of his own cloathing , the terms are his own . solution . to this he answers . though it may conduce to the gaining of literal , and historicall knowledge , yet this is not ad idem , because it profiteth nothing ; for truth it self bears record , it is the spirit that quickneth , the flesh profitteth nothing ; and men are made able ministers of the new testament , not of the letter , but of the spirit ; for the letter killeth , but the spirit giveth life . so that all literal and historical knowledge gained by mans power , is but like the principle from whence it slowed , fleshly , earthly , deadly , and destructive . to this we say , that what he saith here against learning , may as well be said against reading , teaching , and hearing , there must be fit and outward organs , there must be eyes , a tongue , and eares , and these must have a body to subsist ; is all reading , hearing , and teaching therefore like the principle from whence they flow , fleshly , earthly , deadly , and destructive ? behold then whether these scriptures are wrested or no ? do you think they are to be understood to condemn all outward means , or onely to shew that outward means without the inward assistance and operation of the spirit cooperating with them were unable to beget saving grace in a soul ? do you conceive the spirit of god in them disallowes all reading , teaching , hearing , or only forbid to put such a confidence in them as to esteem them able in themselves to confer eternal life upon us ? besides , i that place in the corinths , the letter signifies the law , of which moses was a minister , the spirit the gospell , which christ brought and delivered to his apostles and ministers ; for look but into the chapter and you shall see the scope of the apostle is to advance the ministery of the gospel above the ministery of the law : was not this rightly applied then against learning ? can you imagine he himself can th●●k them to mean what he puts upon them ? but i leave him , and so i hope will you ; yet i could wish some able pen would take him task , and 〈…〉 the impostor . chap. xvi . the abuse of learning no argument against the use of it . but as this fellow cries down , so are there others which too much cry up learning , who will entail the ●ift of teaching upon it , and allow none to teach but an vniversity graduate ; which is no other than put bounds to god , to limit the holy spirit , hither and no farther shalt thou go ; but because these men idolize it , must we execrate and abhor it ? because the persians adored the sun , must we christians refuse the comfort of its light and heat ? in thus doing we run as far out of the way on the one hand , as they do on the other . let them consider how many under the light of the gospel furnish'd with the helps of humane learning are strangely unacquainted with the knowledg of christ crucified ; a plain experienced christian ( notwithstanding their auxiliary forces ) only by the help of a bible , will put a whole army to flight ; surgunt indocti et rapiunt coelum , when they in the mean time do but , as he speaks , ornare diabolum ; they become learned spoiles , sapienter descendunt in infernum , they go cunningly to hell . and then on the other side let not us be so silly and malicious as to put the fault in learning , whereas there is no greater vicinity than between truth and goodness ; heaven is full of knowledge , as it is of holiness ; and it is brimfull of both : if some will not make a right use , or will abuse their learning , must learning suffer ? can there be a more gross abuse than , as , isocrates speaks , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , to lay the blame on the thing , not the man ? some men with weapons commit murders and outrages , shall not others therefore have any for their own necessary and just defence ? some make themselves drunk , may not others therefore drink to maintain life , and to comfort and chear the heart ? noah was drunk with wine , shall not timothy therefore drink a little for his stomachs sake , and his often infirmities ? tim. . . a subtil jesuiticall knave wrests scripture , may not a minister of the gospel therefore quote it ? the first abuses his learning to pervert , and destroy , shall not the second make use of his to instruct , and edifie ? upon this account all things might be condemned , even profession it self , and all religious duties , which have been by some abused , and prophaned . chap. xvii . the mischief of ignorance . these things thus weighed , will not the improvement of nature beautified & adorned with supernatural grace make men more serviceable , and instrumental for gods glory ? when the strength of learning , and the power of godliness unite and concentricate their forces , will they not make up the finest and purest complexion , the soundest and bravest constitution , like a sparkling and vigorous soul , quickning and informing a beautiful body ? can religion desire to shine with greater gloss and lustre , can it desire to ride among men in greater pomp and solemnity , in a more tryumphant charriot than in a soul of vast intellectualls ? let us but consider our poor ignorant and unlearned ancestors , with yellings , and howlings , with the horrid noise of brazen and copper pans and bazons hammered on and beaten , endeavouring to help the moon in the ecclipse , whom they thought they did great service to ; and whence proceeded this but from ignorance of the natural cause ? what prayers , what sacrifices did an ecclipse of the sun produce ? all presently supposing he hid his face for anger , as the poets report he did at atreus his banquet , — verterit cursus licet sibi ipse titan , obvium ducens iter , tenebrisque facinus obruit tetrum novis , nox missa ab ort u tempore alieno gravis . seneca , thyestes , and they in danger of an eternal night , and not only be , as one speaks notably of the suns adorers , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , without their god by night , but for ever : and indeed what advantage did the devill make of ignorance in the time of popery ? what a quarter did he keep with his hobgoblins , and fairies ? o , darkness is his delight in the understanding as well as in the air , and doth it not lay men more open to his temptations ? what a tryumph would the prince of darkness lead could he get us all into his livery ? this plutarch an heathen could perceive , knowledge , saith he , frees men from that superstition , which frights , disturbs , and entangles with sinister conceits of the deity , others , who are ignorant of the natural causes of things , and in its place induces a secure piety , and holy confidence in the divine power ; and he instances in the head of a ram with one horn growing in the midst of the front brought to pericles , which when the southsayers converted to an omen , anaxagoras the philosopher dissecting the scull shewed it empty on the sides , and the brains lying in the midst in an oval form just where the horn took root , cleerly convincing them of the natural cause . let us consider how a poor bishop was degraded by a whole council , and the popes infallible worship too boot , for writing and maintaining that there were antipodes , people inhabiting the other side of the worldly globe , a thing known to every ship-boy in wapping : and what will nothign serve our turns but a herd of such teachers ? a drove of such doctors that may bring us in one age to a degree above bleating to be as far from understanding , as they from being able to speak sense ? when a dutch sophister with this doughty fallacy , the scripture commands us to reverence and obey our elders , but the dutch state is the elder state , therefore the scripture commands the english state to reverence and obey the dutch ; or , asses have eares , englishmen have eares , therefore englishmen are asses , shall puzzle our whole nation , and none be able to answer him , unless by down-right telling him he lyes , & so instead of confuting , confirm him in his wild assertions . lastly , let us consider with what impatience we would hear a man that went about to perswade us to burn our ships , break our guns , destroy all our arms and weapons , and lay our selves naked to the invasion and rapine of any forein enemy ; and shall we not with the same disdain and abhorrency behold these pedling truckers under satan , who would disarm our souls , prostitute our understandings to the lust of every subtill sophister , make us like to the horse and mule which want understanding , ready to take the bit into our mouths to be rid by each deceiver , and to crowch down under the burdens which every sly and cunning knave shall please to load us with ? do we so much detest the slavery of our bodies , and shall we not abhor to see our souls led captive , our understandings drawn in shackles after the triumphant chariot of every impostor ? our lord and savior teaches us , that though a man both strong and armed keep the house , yet if a stronger than he come , he will enter and take possession ; these imps of the destroyer suggest , that the lame and blind are only fit garrison souldiers for the strong holds of the new jerusalem , as if religion were the capitol that onely geese must defend ; alas , had there not been a manlius and other valiant and armed romans , the gauls could not have been kept out by their cackling . thus much for learning , as it is useful in religion , what advantage it is of to the civil state shall be discoursed of hereafter in its proper place . chap. xviii . of moral vertue in general . before we proceed further , it will not be amiss to consider moral vertue in the general , as of good conducement to our better understanding of the particular vertues which follow in order to be treated of in our subsequent discourse , and to our easier attaining and imbracing them in our future practice . and first of the name ; the greeks according to some denominated it {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , from mars their god of war , because in war the efficacy of vertue seemed most perspicuous . others fetch its derivation {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , from choosing , because vertue is above all things to be chosen . the latines called it virtus a vir which antiently was solie applyed to a valiant man ; thus cicero in offic. nomen virtutis , inquit , antiquitus solius fuit fortitudinis , vertue , saith he , was the badge heretofore onely of fortitude . but since experience teaching that man was not only to strive with man , to combate the common enemy , but also with his own disorderly affections easily misled by the allurements of riches , delights , and preferment , it became the tryumphant ornament of those that were victorious over themselves and these temptations , which indeed is the more noble conquest , and most manly , as performed by the force of reason , the weapon only man can use . lastly there are some , who not unpleasantly alluding will have it tearmed virtus , quasi viri artus , as it were the joints and lineaments of the mind . now , as the name hath been diversly derived , so hath the thing been variously applyed . as first , to signify in general the power and perfection of any thing , hence we often meet with these and the like phrases in english , by vertue of gods power , wisdome , omniscience ; by vertue of the soul , of the heavens , of the elements , of such or such a plant , mineral , or living creature . secondly , to denote promiscuously all habits as well infused as acquired , thus we say by vertue of grace , faith , &c. thirdly , it is taken for a natural inclination or disposition : thus aristotle in ethic. cap. ult. we possess vertue by nature , and by nature we are temperate and valiant . lastly , it is most properly taken for an habit of the mind , acquired by use and frequent exercise , and thus we are to accept it as an habit ruling the will and appetite of man , and conforming and composing his manners for the help and ornament of humane society . and now having viewed it in the gross , let us a little descend to take it in pieces , wherby the true nature of it will be more plainly understood . the nus is an habit , and we prove its lineage by its coat armour . plutarch de virtut . moral . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . there are , saith he , three things in the mind , the faculty , the affection , and the habit ; the faculty is the principle and matter of the affection ; the affection is a certain motion of the faculty : but the habit is the strength and conformity of the faculty gotten by custome . now vertue being to be reduced under one of these heads , we must examin to which it doth conform it self . by vertue men are accounted good , as by vice bad ; but by the faculties which are natural and bear themselves in an indifferent posture to this or that ; and by the affections by which we are only moved , and become not , neither are accounted such or such , we can neither be termed good or bad ; it remains then that the habit gives the denomination , and that vertue is an habit , and so aristotle l. . ethike. . cap. . defines it to be {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . the difference must be fetched from the matter and form ; now the matter is the subject and object , for no other ▪ matter can be attributed to accidents ; the subject is the will and appetite , the internal object , are the affections , and actions springing from those affections ; the external objects are the persons toward which , and the things in which vertue is exercised . the form is a mediocrity or mean to be observed in all our affections and actions which exces renders violent , defect lame and imperfect . now vertue consists in indivisibili medio , in an individual mediocrity ; {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . for there is but one path leads to vertue , but to vice many . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} for good is single , evill of many shapes ; yet is this indivisibility not to be taken in a mathematical , but a moral construction , which admits of some latitude , for its the prudent admonition of some eminent moralists , parum deflectere à medio in excedendo , vel deficiendo , non est vitium semper existimandum ; cum medii quaedam sit latitudo , intra quamse continentes bene agunt , a small declining from the mean either on the right or left is not alwaies to be accounted vice , sith there is a certain latitude in mediocritie , within the limits of which , men containing themselves act well . thus a valiant man by the smart and sight of his wounds may be transported with anger and thirst of revenge , yet it being in the lawfull and just defence of himself and countrey , a resolute and eager charge will be no excess from true fortitude , and for the other extreme we have a noble example in the roman consul catulus , who when he could not perswade the greatest part of his army to abide in their camp , being terrified with the approach of the cimbrians , commanded the eagle , the roman standart , to be advanced , and marcht away himself in the head of them , that they might appear rather to follow than desert their general . here he forsook his camp , and those resolute souldiers that staid to defend it , for fear lest the body of his army who would go should be utterly disheartned , and being publickly branded with deserting the consul , might set light by their fame already blasted , and so the commonwealth then threatned might be greatly endangered by the loss of such an army , which would either have disbanded , or fought untowardly . and to come closer , vertue is not {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , an absolute calm without the least perturbation , but {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a symmetry of the affections regulated by measure , squared by the golden rule of mediocrity . and as there is a latiude to be considered , so is the proportion which is geometrical , not arithmetical ; it is medium rationis , non rei : for vertue doth not equally differ from its extremes , as six doth from two and ten , as for example , liberality comes nearer to prodigality than covetousness . yet the attaining this mediocrity being a thing of the greatest difficulty , for as it is easie to be angry , so is it hard to be angry with these necessary circumstances , with whom , how far , when , wherefore , and in what manner we ought , it will much avail us to take these helps , laid down by all or the most experienced moralists . first , let us endeavour to shun that extreme which seems most contrary to vertue ; yet here must be care taken lest by endeavouring to avoid one we run into the other extremity according to that , dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria currunt . and , incidit in scyllam cupiens vitare charybdim . thus as the nymph calypso instructs vlisses being to sail between scylla and charybdis , two dangerous rocks in the sicilian sea , rather to avoid charybdis as the more dangerous , but yet still to have an eye to scylla : homer . odyss. so we must avoid that extreme which is most opposit to vertue as more destructive , yet with care of the other too : superstition is liker piety than atheism , we had better therefore be a little too tender , than to make no scruple , a little too formal , than openly prophane , here the excess is less contrary ; but here again the defect , for abstemionsness altogether to forbear wine is more like temperance then drunkennes , and this our reason will instruct us to judge of . yet the prudent perswade for the most part to avoid the excess , as of more difficulty to be shaken off : and indeed it would be more facile to bring an abstemious person to a moderate use of wine for his health sake , than to disswade a drunkard from his tipple though his health , nay life lay at stake ; and of this opinion is cicero in i ▪ de orat suus cuique modus est , inquit , tamen magis offendit nimium , quam parum . there is a measure to be had in every thing , saith he , yet excess is the greater offender of the two : and where we find one voluntarily starving himself , we shall meet with thousands destroyed by surfetting . secondly , let us strive to avoid that extreme which we are most enclined to by our natural temper ; as if we are covetously enclind , let us endeavour rather to be a little too profuse , and so by degrees we may become liberal . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . this aristotle illustrates by an apt simile of streightning a stick : for he that will make a stick streight must do it by bending it to the contrary side . thirdly , we must in every action be very suspicious of that which seems to entice with the alluring bait of pleasure , and this aristotle confirms by an argument drawn from the pernicious effect of pleasure . and thus cicero in catone . impedit consilium volupt as rationi inimica et mentis oculos perstringit . pleasure , saith he , that foe to reason , lays a bar in judgements way , and dazzles the eye of the understanding : and again in . lib. offic. voluptates blandissimae dominae saepe majores partes animae à virtute detorquent ; those flattering mistresses , pleasures , do often enveagle and draw the nobler parts of the soul from the practise of vertue , and seneca in epist. . quis hostis in quenquam ita contumeliosus fuit , quam in quosdam voluptates suae ? no professed enemy hath been so injurious and spitefull , hath wrought a man so much disgrace , as their own pleasures , their bosom delights have done too many , one dalilah hath been more powerful to captivate a sampson , than all the lords , than all the thousands among the philistimes . and as a help we shall adde this , that proposing the most sublime , and heroical patterns of vertue for our imitation , we shall the less square our actions by the crooked and deceitful rule of pleasure . he that shall make cicero his example shall never become a cataline : nor shall the admirer of a studious and contemplative athenian , of a couragious and active lacaedemonian , incur the infamy and effeminacie of a delicate sybarite , or a dissolved persian : thus when the glory of miltiades once disturbed the sleep of themistocles , when his victory at marathon had made a conquest also over the others debauchery at athens ; you see how soon he broke those silken cords of pleasure , wherein he was noos'd , and the sense of honour having set an edge upon his affections , he soon cut that gordion knot , whereby he became first victorious over himself , and after over asia ; i mean the numerous persian with the strength of asia then invading greece , and of a dissolute young man , became the most famous captain in his time greece could boast of ; of such efficacy is a noble example . whereas on the contrary , as cicero in laelio , nihilaltum , nihil magnificum , nihil divinum suscipere possunt , qui suas cogitationes abjecerunt in rem humilem et abjectam . the latter phrase is very emphatical ; he that trifles away his thoughts in a low , and abject contemplation , shall never come to be fit for any high , any noble , any heroick undertaking . thus the muck worm that pores upon the ground continually will never arrive to the liberal science of astronomy ; and we cannot but suppose that he shall shoot neerer heaven who takes his aim at a star , than he that levels at a gloworm . the efficient cause of vertue is custome ; which is the genuine parent of an habit ; thus when we see a man wallow in vice , we say he is habituated to it , yet have there been some who have endeavoured to alter this pedegree , and to engraft this excellent cien on another stock . gallen a physician , would bring it under his cure , and place it within the verge of his art , and could he do it , it would be no smal addition to his calling , both in respect of honour , and profit ; which would abound in admirers , and never want patients : how necessary would the physician be to the body politick as well as natural , could he rectify and purge the manners , as well as the humours , and not only help men to live , but to live well ? o the sacred power of that physick , which could purge out vice , and be a cordiall to vertue ! thou hast a fragrancy beyond the ointment of the apothecary ; whose shop alas cannot be the cradle of vertue , neither can all his compounds compose the affections , all his distillations instill vertue , all his essences and spirits quicken that noble heat in the soul , it is beyond the power of chymistry to extract this habit , or to resolve corrupted nature into its first principle of purity . shew me that doctor that can by his physiek make the cholerike man meek , the coward , valiant , or the corrupt , just ; and let him enjoy the deity of aesculapius , and his ruined shrines be repaired for his service . i confess they can make the miser open his fist , and scatter his angells , when he is terrifyed with the dreadful apparition of death . this wretch , contrary to all others , who hold fastest when in danger of drowning , unclutching his gripe when he is sinking into the grave , and parting with his mammon , his beloved deity so long adored by him , when the devil appears ready to ceize him . but this is but like the cowards winking and laying about him when there is no remedy but fight or dy , like damaetas in the noble and ingenuous sydney , who when the sea would let him run no further , turnd , & had the hap to have his adversary cry quarter first ; and the one is as far from being liberal , as the other valiant . thus it seems , making for his profession , gallen attempts to cry up his own diana , and on nature beget a sire for vertue , for he will have it spring from a temperament of the body ; but though this may encline , yet doth it not necessarily draw men to vertue . . for we often see manners changed , the temperament remaining the same , as in the example of themistocles ; and the temper changed , the manners continuing , for in the life of marius we read , that though he was both old , gross , and corpulent , yet did he daily in publick exercise himself in arms among the young men , endeavoring to make his body active and nimble whether nature would or no : yea so fiery and young was his ambition that the i hill froast of age which had made his head hoary could not nip it , and such a thirst after honour burned within him , that six consulships adorn'd with the most-splendid tryumphs could not quench it , but his aspiring soul would have drawn his unweldie body craz'd with age , and loaden with honour , after it into pontus , whether he eagerly sought to be sent commander in chief against mithridates ; yea upon his death bed when he was light headed , fancying he was warring against mithridates , he would often use such postures , and motions of the body , as became a general , backed with a loud , and military clamour : alas poor man ! as if one sprig of laurel could have given thee content , which in a whole grove thou couldst not find , though springing from thine own conquests . . again the temper is not in our power , manners are , for if they were not , to what purpose would deliberation , counsel , exhortation , praise , reproof , laws , rewards , punishments be ? it is evident then that the temperament is not the proximate and chief cause of vertue . secondly , and as gallen , so the stoicks make nature the cause of vertue , which they hold born with man , but vice contrary to nature and acquired by evil custom . so that they themselves will have custome the cause of the acquired habit of vice , which grants our tenent , for having proved vertue to be a habit acquired , not an innate faculty , it must be the product of custome . besides , whatever is natural is immoveable , but manners are mutable , as in the before recited example of themistocles , and how often have our eyes seen young men of very promising beginnings debauched by evil company , to fall from that bright orb of vertue , in which had they been placed by nature they would have been fixed stars ? thirdly , some there are that ascribe vertues original to education , and breeding , and indeed this is very much conducing to beget the first acts of vertue , and to put youth in the right road to come to it , but it is not of force to creat the habit : for how many do we behold excellently initiated in this sacred mystery by a good tutorage , which when they come to have the reigns layd in their necks , gallop down hill , and break the neck of all those goodly expectations ? for the best instilled precepts though they may sometimes check , yet are they not of force to stop the carreer of the headstrong affections , and many are there , who can give good counsel to others , which they cannot or will not follow themselves . but let me not be misunderstood , for though we do not allow education to be the proximate and adaequate , yet shall we not deny it to be a remote cause , which by entering men in vertues path , which gon on in will bring to the habit , may be said to lay the foundation to this glorious fabrick . and thus though we cannot in justice conferre the crown as to have reached the goal , yet let it carry the prize for the first start ; though we must deny it the tryumph due to an absolute victory , yet shall we put the murall crown on its head , for having first mounted the wall , and first erected vertues ensign upon the battlements . let it then not be neglected , but of all receive its due esteem , as the most excellent trayner up of youth , the most noble file-leader , who well followed conducts to victory , that happy victory which will render us invincible , place us above the reach of any enemy , carry us out of fortunes gun-shot . now the rest enjoying what is their own , let us give custom its due , which is to be the efficient cause of vertue , enabling men by an often repetition of such or such a vertuous action , to a ready and unperturbed performing it upon occasion ; for to descend a little in a simile , how come your artificers to become excellent , unless by often practice , or your souldier to be expert , but by exercise ? and it is a maxim amongst military men , that a man never so well versed in speculation , who hath all the arts and stratagems of the most renowned captains at his fingers ends , yet at the first skirmish will be to seek ; and can we think the repugnancies within are less disturbing than enemies without , and require not a mind as well experienced to resist and quell them ? to sum up all the etymon of the word {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} moral , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , derived from the word which signifieth custome , may confirm us that it hath its original from the thing from whose name it derives its denomination . for it would be no more a soloecism in speech to call the son of van trump an english man , than that moral or customary vertue , which is sprung from the loins of temperament , nature or education . but now to prescribe a set number , to tell how many acts go to the making up an habit , is impossible ; for . fewer or more are requisite , accordingly as the mind is less or more enclin'd to vertue . . some acts are more powerful , others less valid . . attention makes large amends for number , whose worth , by way of exchange , may viewith hundreds , and , when put in the scale , far outweigh them . neither let any of us fear to overdo , to act vertuously too often . the external causes of vertue are the examples of others , as in the before-named example of miltiades and themistocles ; and rewards and punishments , as we shall shew more fully in their proper-place . the end of vertue , is bonum civile , the common good , the general interest of mankind , and this must needs be lovely in all our eyes , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , saith the philosopher , it is honourable to do good to one , to a nation heroical ; it is neer of kin to divinity for a man to be able to contribute towards the welfare of his whole species : and magistrates , men in publick place , of whom it is spoken , i have said ye are gods , are placed by god for the common good ; those that are set to rule , like the sun should be full of light , and heat , visible in example , and powerful influence . chap. xix . of probity , and the practice of it among the romans . the external object , as it relates to the persons towards whom vertue bends its eie , delivers it janus-like , looking forward by piety upon god , backward by probity upon man , providing a well-being both for soul and body , and directing us for the benefit of our selves and others . of the first , piety , we have aready spoken , the other , probity , is therefore that which remains for the subject of our persent discourse , and this meets us well accompanyed , noblie followed , as having all those vertues in her train , which are necessary to enable us in performing our duties as we stand in all relations . for its denomination , we find it termed by the greeks {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , and by the latines honestas , from honos honour ; so ingenuously provident were the antients that it might not be so much as mentioned without its due , honour . and indeed it is the very abstract of the other vertues ; it is the ci●cle from whence those noble lines are drawn , and the center in which they meet ; it is the salt that seasons them , and the soul that informs them , that bestowes their glorious being . without this , prudence would be but cunning . justice , in execution , but a more specious and reserved kind of revenge ; in distribution , but a keeping of credit to maintain our trade ; in rewarding , but a bribery to gain affection , and encrease our dependancies . fortitude , but a brutish audacity , and daring rashness to render our selves terrible , and gain domination . temperance , but a kind of senslesnes and stupidity , a stoical piece of tyranny over our bodies . hence grew its esteem among the moralists , which generally make the other vertues spring from the pregnant womb of probitie ; and hence came it to be honored among the romans , which they beheld blessed with so glorious and numerous a progeny , attended by so beautifull a company of daughters . this was it set numa on the throne , and made them with one consent call him from a private country life to govern rome , passing by the most noble among both romans and sabines . it was this fetched serranus from the plough , and adorned him with the absolute & uncontrollable power of dictator . this encouraged them to elect cato to be censor , and pass by the noblest competitors , when instead of courting the people , he seemed to threaten them , proclaming , that by choosing him and valerius flaccus , whom they also made his collegue , the city might be purged of its new corruptions , and antient probity of manners restored . this made fabritius , when the physician sent him word , that if he pleased he would poison pyrrhus , return the letter to pyrrhus with this exprobration , that he was most unfortunate in his choice of friends , as well as enemies ; which when pyrrhus had received , and hanging his physician , returned the roman captives without ransom , fabritius sent as many captives of his with this admonition , that he discovered the treason not for any favour or respect he bore to him , but to let him know that the romans abhorred by treachery to destroy their enemies . pyrrhus had then invaded italy , had overthrown the consul laevinus , and was grown numerous by the revolt of many of the people of italy who lackied to his fortune ; his physician unsought to , even of his own accord , offers to rid them of this danger , yet so great was their love to honesty , they chose to undergo any hazard , rather than to connive at a dishonest act , or in the least to bear with it though in a stranger . behold o matchivilian , this is that which truly establishes a state , when thy unworthy policies , though they may be prosperous for a while , are never long-lived , and thy rotten props will in the close fail thee , and bury thee in the ruins of that thou buildest upon them . produce me an example , where although prosperity might lead the van , reproach and ruine did not bring up the rear ? where thy villanies flourishing for a day , were not frost-nipt at night ? where though they might bud in the morning , and blow at noon , they were not blasted in the evening , and their purple changed into sables , their rosie-tinctured mantles into nights black livery , double dy'd in infamy and horror ? whereas vertuous honesty renders states and persons stable like it self , whose glorious edifices in the roughest and most boysterous storms stand unshaken like their foundation : yea and alwaies cloathes them with the tryumphant roabs of success , who in its armour of proof have combated their foes . this was it set rome aloft in spight of all opposition , and raised her on her feet , when ready to be trampled on by her fiercest foes . this was it upheld her courage in the midst of the greatest losses , and made her enemies tremble in the height of their victories , as accounting her invincible in her vertue , which would make all force stoop and vaile bonnet in the end . thus may we see pyrrhus even reeking with a bloody victory , dispatch away his ambassadour , and stretch out his victorious arms to implore a peace , whilest the beaten roman disdains to treat , and can hardly be brought to give any terms to the conqueror ▪ rejecting his profered friendship , as much as his gold and bribes . for his ambassadour could not fasten the least gift on any private person , nor obtain any other answer from the senate , than a command to leave italy , and that the consul was comming , and in the head of the roman legions should deliver their terms . this made fabritius contemn his profered gold , deride his stratagem of the elephant , which was suddenly brought upon him to try if they could terrifie him ; refuse his profer of being next the king ▪ if he would continue with him ; and return this brief answer , i am no more moved at your beast , than i was with your gold , and for me to live with thee would be perillous , o king , for should thy subjects once come to know me , they would choose rather to serve me than thee ; account fabritius more worthy of the throne , than pyrrhus . this was it carried cato the elder through the greatest oppositions of the roman nobility , and set him above the reach of their envy and malice : this gave him the suffrages from all his competitors , the antient and noblest roman bloud backt with all its factions and dependancies being unable to stand in competition with a plebeian probitie , or the whole patrician order to put stop to his being chosen censor , yea and whom he pleased to be joined with him . this was it , not affection or money , yea that in despight of favour and bribery brought him off in all his accusations ; so that he never was once condemned though fifty times impeached , but in every action had the day ; yea this gave him the confidence to demand his greatest adversary to be judge at his last tryal , who also gave sentence for him . so potent is honesty , that malice it self cannot but yield , and either openly acknowledge , or tacitly confess , that her roughest and best-edg'd files can't touch it . who would not then imbrace this so potent , and excellen vertue ? which even wrests encomiums out of the mouths of enemies : which could make pyrrhus with admiration cry out , that it was easier to turn the sun from its course , than fabritius from his integrity . and his ambassadour cyneas return this answer , when askt what he though of rome . that it was a city of kings , and a senate of gods ; every private person vertuously commanding his affections , and the magistrates divinely influential for the publike honor and safety . and now comming to handle the particular vertues , we shall follow cicero l. . offic. in his division of them into prudence , justice , portitude , and temperance , under which all necessary honest actions may be reduced ; and these are commonly called the cardinal vertues . prudence that directs our reason , the other govern our appetites , as fortitude and temperance in adverse and prosperous affairs concerning our selves , justice in that which pertains to others . chap. xx . of prudence . this vertue is called by the greeks {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , from the mind , whose chief ornament it is : by the latines prudentia , quasi providentia à providendo , it foreseeing what is to be avoided , what to be chosen , as most apposit for the wel-being of our selves and others , it being also its special employment to provide for the future , and we are only to look upon it in its politick capacity , as it is reduced under moral philosophy : for though it may be accounted an intellectual vertue in regard of its subject and efficient cause , as having its dependancy on the understanding and judgement : yet in respect of its object and end it becomes also moral , as which leads not only to contemplative but practical felicity , and beholds civil good as its most lovely object . and indeed prudence is {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} the master workman , the principal agent in the raising and composing of the noble frame of vertue , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : for as this directs , so do the vertues , and vertuous men act : this draws the lines of election , in whose rectitude the main force of vertue lies ; this squares and contrives by deliberation , making the timbers fit , and the whole structure decent and usefull : yea so necessary an ingredient is it in morality , that aristotle and with him all the moralists have concluded , first , that a man cannot be vertuous , unless he be prudent ; {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : for vertue is not only an habit consonant to , but joined with right reason . secondly , that a man cannot be prudent , unless he be vertuous : for he must have a right end in all his actions , which is inconsistent with crooked manners . qualis vita , finis ita , may be well enough apply'd here ; besides , vice perverts the judgement , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , and like a cheating trades-man shews colors by a false light . it is therefore affirmed on all hands , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , that by prudence and vertue , every work is made absolute , vertue setting up a right end , and prudence making choice of apt means to bring us to that end . prudence thus comming within our verge , let us inquire what it is : and first we find cicero in l. ● . de invent . thus telling us , that prudence is an exact knowledge of what is both good and evill , prudentia est rerum bonarum , malarum , utrarumque peritia . and lipsius makes it , notitia rerum eventuumque , et judicium in iis rectum , an ability in knowing , and judging a right of things and events . aristotle defines it , l. . eth. c. . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , an habit conjoined with right reason , conversant and operative in those things which bring good or evil unto man . and now having viewed its essence , let us a little consider its operation , and we find its employment to consist in a solid deliberation of those things which are good and profitable , not particularly onely to health & strength , but which generally conduce to a vertuous and happy life , lib. . ethike. . e. . and this not by deliberating of the general precepts , and lawes of living , which are certainly defined , but by consulting how to square each single act by the streight rule of vertue ; for in the variety of circumstances upon which the rectitude or pravity of action depends consists the obscurity , and in this consultation is solely requisite : and now counsel being taken , prudence decrees that good is to be chosen before evil , the greater good before the lesser , and the lesser evil before the greater ; yet this onely in malo tristi , non turpi ; for the prudent man alwaies shuns the least baseness ; therefore the philosopher tells us that there are some things which are to be abhorr'd above torments , or death it self ; thus pericles being intreated by a friend to give a false testimony , returned this answer , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , i 'm only to help my friends in such things as offend not the gods ; and the french history affords a memorable example of this in the prince of conde , who being trecherously surprised by charles the th . and word sent him that he must choose either to go to mass , to dy , or to be perpetually imprisoned , nobly answered , for the first , by gods assistance , i will never do it , for the other two let the king do as he please , yet i doubt not but god by his fatherly providence will turn all to the best : he refuses the crime , neither would be choose the punishment , lest he might seem to disavow his own innocency : whereas david , convinced of his guilt in numbering the people , by choosing the pestilence , before sword or famine , as a more mild and fatherly punishment , acted the part of a prudent man , sam. . chap. xxi . of the causes of prudence , natural parts , experience , learning , travel , &c. the chief causes of prudence may be reduced under three heads , nature , vse , learning . first , there must be some foundation in nature , some ground whereon to build , ex quovis ligno non fit mercurius , every block will not make a mercury , it is in vain to wash an aethiopian , and though a fool be brayed in a morter he will never become wise : therefore the moralists generally hold these three things requisite to the acquiring of prudence , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a cleer judgement , a quick apprehension , and a strong memory ; the two first being necessary to a right judging , and readily applying apt means for gaining our end . thus thucydides in lib. . gives us an eminent example in the person of themistocles , who without long warning or tedious consultation , by the very acuteness of his understanding gave the best counsel : in future things he could exactly conjecture what would happen ; in present affairs he was quick of dispatch ; he was most dexterous at discovery in unknown , and in obscure things above all men could foresee what might be for the better , and what for the worse : to sum up all , what by the strength of nature , and help of deliberation , he became so exact , as he seldome or never missed his mark . and livie in . dec . lib. . shews another in cato major , in hoc viro tanta vis animi , ingeniique fuit , ut quocunque loco natus esset , fortunam sibi ipse facturus fuisse videretur : nulla ars neque privatae , neque publicae rei gerendae ei defuit , urbanas , rusticasque res pariter callebat : ad summos honores alios scientia juris , alios eloquentia , alios gloria militaris provexit ; huic versatile ingenium sic pariter ad omnia fuit , ut natum ad id unum diceres , quodcunque ageret . the last which is memorie furnishes us with examples and presidents by which we are taught both by other mens losses or advantages , what course , and how we should steer in all our affairs . thus the philosopher in his little book of the vertues stiles memory the cause , and that known verse , usus me genuit , mater peperit memoria , makes vse the father , and memory the mother of prudence . demosthenes saith it is required in a prudent man to remember what is past , to dispatch and mind what 's present , and to provide for what may happen . and isocrates gives this rule , that when we deliberate , we ought to consider of past examples , for by calling to mind things that are gone , we shall be better enabled to make provision for things that are to come . we shall sum up this with that of strada in his prolus. academ. qui memoria prae aliis valet , glorietur tanquam excellenti vitae bono , tanquam thesauro , et penu disciplinarum , germana literaturae , musarum parente , altrice sapientiae , insigni demum argumento divinitatis ; as was observably eminent in those prudent men homer , aristotle , seneca , and especially julius caesar , who is reported never to have forgotten any thing , but an injury . the second help is use or experience , which furnish us with an insight in single actions , which are most necessary the prudent mans knowledge ; natural abilities , and learning do often make men opiniative , and to presume themselves knowing and wise : but it is experience that brings solidity . the greatest clerks are not alwaies the wisest men ; therfore theognis concludes {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , opinion to be of evil consequence , but use of the best concernment ; to which lipsius assents , especially in those that are are to sit at the helm in a state : indeed this is it which in every art makes a man his crafts-master ; and there is both a civill and military art requisite to the well-governing of a state : therefore your experienced soldier is chosen to command , and men most versed in state affairs held fittest for counsel , and government . suppose we were to perform a far voyage , or to enter an unknown and dangerous harbour , would we not choose him for a pilot who had oftenest steered it , who was best acquainted with the passage ? truly let us consider and we shall find a common-wealth may properly enough be likened to a ship , and the mannagement of affairs to steerage ; thus horace ode . o navis , referent in mare te novi fluctus : and the ingenuous and learned johnson in his catiline brings cato thus speaking to the then chosen consul cicero . — each petty hand can steer a ship becalm'd : but he that will govern , and carry her to her ends , must know his tides , his currents , how to shift his sails ; what she will bear in foul , what in fair weather ; where her springs are , her leaks and how to stop them ; what sands , what shelves , what rocks do threaten her , the forces , and the natures of all winds , gusts , storms , and tempests . when her keel ploughs hell , and deck knocks heaven , then to mannage her becomes the name , and office of a pilot. thus the prudent man must not onely be well acquainted with his own strengths , the ability of the means he hath chosen as fit to bring him to his proposed end , but with the vigor and force of whatsoever is likely to oppose him : he must provide for open assaults , and countermine against underhand practices , for should he depend onely upon his own power , he will be at loss upon every opposition ; he will bowl short of his mark , unless he allow for rubs , which may be in the way . and hence it is that the moralists generally exclude young men as incapable of prudence , who by the natural heat and vigor of youth are too fiery , apt to presume and run headlong into action without any deliberation ; whereas grave men , through use , and experience are made wary and provident ; they will look before they leap , consider whether they shall be able to carry on such or such a design , maugre all opposition , before they imbark themselves in it : therefore homer being to present a prudent counseller under the person of nestor , makes him years of age ; a man of the greatest experience , who had waded through the employments of three ages . the third help is learning ; for there being so great a variety , such nooks , and corners in action , that light is necessary on all sides to further us in our search , it will be need full for us that would be prudent to fly to learning for aid , which can afford us noble and copious assistance . as first history , which is as it were another use , but of a more vigorous capacity . man clog'd with matter can move but slowly , and by his birth and outward concernments is commonly circumscribed within some narrow nook or angle of the world , where he is constrain'd to spend that shorttime of life which nature allowes : so that let him employ his utmost diligence in observation , and most strictly take notes , his knowledge can arrive but to the half of one ages experience , and that too but of a few nations actions ; whereas history layes before us all mankind in all ages acting in whatever as yet hath happened , and providing for ▪ and against whatever could fall under humane consideration , so that we shall not meet with any affair which may not be paralleld , and which we may not find mannaged by others , even to our hands , in the large volume of history . this is that which can make a young man prudent , and exalt his experience above the oldest he that shall stand on tip to upon his own observation : this is that upon whose shoulders a dwarf in years setting his feet , shall see further than a nestor , than the tallest gyant standing on the ground of his own experience . this is that , which not only enriches the memory with variety and plenty of actions and examples , but also enobles the mind with excellent and choise precepts , with good and wholsome admonitions ; for wise and prudent men generally being the penmen to history , have flourished her about , and embroidered the edges of her garments with rich and precious maxims , costly and curious observations of their own . we will conclude histories character with heinsius , est certissima divinae erga homines benignitatis obses , veritatis mater , vitae norma , actionum propagatrix vera , prudentiae ( ut quidam apud graecos loquitur ) metropolis . haec aetatem nostram cum aetate aequat universi ; haec imaginem , non corporis , sed vitae , sed consiliorum , sed animi ad posteros transfundit , et expressam non in aere , aut ferro , non picturae beneficio aut plasticae , immortali rerum ac verborum copia delineatam omnibus spectandam exhibet . and it is reported of lucius lucullus , who conquered two great kings , mithridates and tigranes , that by history he was trayned up to that skill in martial affairs , which rendred him both an able and victorious general , one who with foot , and horse , besieged the great city tigranocerta , and beat tigranes comming to relieve it with darts and slings , foot , and horse , of which were armed cappa●pe . secondly , as history , so philosophy , as first moral , confers much help in attaining of prudence . as . in teaching those peculiar rules of life , and canons , according to which the prudent man governs his counsels ▪ and actions ; besides , it is generally held that a man cannot be prudent unless he be vertuous , now the readiest way to become so is to know what vertue is , and wherein it consists , which moral philosophy teaches , together with the means to attain it . to sum up all , prudence it self , with all its precepts , and rules , is here handled ; whether then should we go for water but to the fountain , where it is most pleasant , dulcius ex ipso fonte bibuntur aquae , most abundant , and most easie to come by ? secondly , speculative philosophy is a great help ; this confers sapience , a dear friend , and support to prudence , upon whose precepts prudence builds , and laies the foundation of its rules ; as for example , upon the doctrine of the rational soul , the doctrine of the will , and of the affections : neither can any man be prudent , unless he be able to discern those various circumstances of persons , places , and times , all which are distinctly handled in speculative philosophy . thus aristotle affirms sapience to be marvellously profitable for the solid understanding of humane felicity , ( which is the end prudence proposes ) both because the operations of the will have their dependency upon the operations of the understanding , for we will after the same rate as we understand ; as also because many arguments may be drawn from speculative philosophy which may much conduce to the exercise of vertue ; as an insight into the temper of our bodies may perswade us to temperance . and lipsius commends both moral and speculative philosophy ; duae istae partes formant hominis animum , vel ad virtutis amorem , & pretium , vel ad notitiam caelestium , & terrestrium , è quibus magnitudo animi oritur , & simul modestia , collatione utrorumque , because both of them create in the mind of man as well a love and esteem of vertue , as a knowledge of the nature of caelestial and earthly things , from which springs magnanimity , and modesty too by comparing each with other . to sum up all with that known saying of divine plato , then commonwealths shall become happy , when philosophers are made magistrates , or magistrates addict themselves to the study of philosophy . thirdly , philology , a skill in languages is of much importance to a prudent man , by which he is made able not onely to converse with , but to dive into the actions of foreiners ; indeed all commerce , all correspondences , all leagues are beholding to this , without which nation could not discourse with nation but by signs , by mopping and mowing as monkies do : and it would be as possible for us to understand the cats wawling in our gutters , as an ambassadour , or merchant which could not speak english . lastly , both geometry , and geography are of no small use to advance prudence ; and aristotle is bold to affirm it impossible for a young man to be prudent without skill in the mathematikes , . eth. . c. but to these three , to wit , natural parts , vse , learning , we may adde as instrumental causes both a careful observation of examples , and also travail ; thus we shall find demosthenes affirming {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : and terence , hoc vero est sapere , in aliorum vitam tanquam in speculum intueri , et ex illis exemplum capere tibi quod ex usu siet . the wise man dresses himself in the glass of other mens actions , in which he may discover what is comely and fit for him : and homer gives travail for a chief cause of prudence in his vlysses , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . and now i shall sum up all with a few examples , which are held by many more prevalent in perswasion than advice or instruction . and first , solon the athenian law-maker was not onely endowed with parts , exercised in affairs , improved by travail , but excellently learned , as many of his writings testify ; yea so desirous was he of knowledge , that upon his death-bed being visited by some friends , he lifted up his head , and listned to their discourse , and when asked for what end he was so attentive , returned this answer , that knowing this , i may dy more learned . thus epimanondas , the glory of thebes , is reported by thucydides to have studied much , but {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , without effeminacy . thus philip , thus alexander , thus philopomen , cato the younger , julius and augustus caesar were learned , the latter of which discharged a consular legat , as rude , unlearned , and unfit for imployment , because he had writen ixi for ipsi . thus marcus antonius the good emperor was called the philosopher , and that famous lady isabella of spain , and the incomparable elizabeth of england were studious and learned . chap. xxii . of the prudence of the romans . this victorious and fortunate common-wealth was so sensible of the necessity of this vertue to the wel-being of a state , that they took the greatest care to provide that able and prudent persons should only be admitted to the mannagement of affairs : as for example , they had their lex annalis , the law that provided , that none should bear office before such and such an age , because they would not have unexperienced , rash and imprudent young men trusted at the helm of state . thus latinus pacatus in laudat . theodosii . annorum , inquit , ita cura fuit majoribus , ut non solum in amplissimis magistratibus adipiscendis , sed in praeturis quoque aut aedilitatibus capessendis aetas sit spectanda petitorum ; neque quisquam tantum valuerit nobilitate , vel gratia , qui annos comitiali lege praescriptos , festinatis honoribus occuparit . thus cicero philip . . legibus annalibus cum grandiorem aetatem ad consulatam constituebant , temeritatem adolescentiae verebantur . thus ovid . fast . — finitaque certis legibus est aetas , unde petatur honos . and we find that those that set the fewest will have years of age the time wherin the first office to wit of quaestor could be born ; for that of aedilis , and tribune or . for praetor . for consul , or . as cicero plainly tells us in phil. . quid alexander macedo , qui cum ab ineunte aetate res maximas gerère caepisset , trigesimo tertio anno mortem obiit ? quae aetas nostris legibus decem annis minor quam consularis . and though this law might now and then be dispensed with in some extraordinary danger , and for some more than ordinary worth and vertue in some single person , as scipio africanus , scipio aemilianus , and pompeius magnus : as there can be no general rule but may admit of some exception , especially where the reason of the law pleads against the letter , which taken strictly would deprive the state of the service of such eminent citizens when her dangers would admit of no delay : yet for the general it was inviolably observed until the unruly and tyrannous monarchs turned this topsie turvy , together with all other their most sacred laws and liberties . thus also we shall find lycurgus that wise lawgiver among the spartans , ( who so long as they observed his rules were the most eminent state among the greeks ) would admit none into the senate , unless he were sixty years of age . but we shall conclude this with some few examples which may convince us throughly of the benefit of prudence . cato the elder being consul , had spain alotted for his province , which was then near to a total revolt ; coming thither the celtiberians , a warlike and populous nation , offered to aid him for talents ; this proposition was generally disliked by the romans , as a thing unworthy the roman magnaminity , by money to buy aid or friendship , until the consul convinc'd them how small a thing the celtiberians demanded , without whose aid there was no hopes of victory ; for should we overcome by their assistance , we will pay them out of the enemies spoils , said he , but should we and they be beaten , neither will they be alive to demand , nor shall we be left to pay . scipio africanus , being about to invade afrike , and carry the war to the gates of carthage , prudently seeing that a state which warred by mercinaries , would be weakest at home , selected able and resolute young men out of the roman legions , whom he kept about him , none knowing to what end , and being arrived in sicily , he commanded of the noblest and wealthiest sicilian young gentlemen to appear such a day with their horse and arms . the time being come , he demanded whether they were willing to go with him , or no ? for he had rather they should now tell the truth , than afterwards be unprofitable , and unactive , as such would be . wherupon one of them answered , that if he were put to his choice he should rather stay at home ; scipio commending him for his ingenuity , and calling one of the hundred roman young men , this youth , saith he , shall serve in your stead upon condition you will furnish him with horse and arms , and take him home , and exercise and teach him ; which he joyfully consenting to , all the rest presently desired a dismission upon the same terms : thus raised he a gallant troop , which did him great service , without charge to the common-wealth , whose treasury was emptyed by a long and chargeable war : and obliged the sicilians and their friends , by dismissing their persons from a dangerous war upon so small and inconsiderable a condition as that seemed to them , who would have given far more had they been put to their own choice . and indeed it is not so much the tax , as the manner of laying and levying it , that begets distastes , tumults , insurrections , and revolts . had scipio laid this charge of providing horse and arms , &c. upon these sicilian gentlemen , without any other circumstance , what mutterings would there have been ? why should we above all others be thus used ? and what hatred would it have procured him ? whereas doing as he did , first he seem'd to have a great confidence in their worth and valour , to choose them out of the thousands of sicily ; then a great regard of and civility to their persons , by enquiring whether they were willing to serve or no ; lastly a greater respect to their contentment than his own , by so gentle and easie a dismission of them whom he had honoured above others , and who by refusing to engage with him , disappointed his hopes , & made void the great expectations he had of them : and so by this means imposed an obligation upon them , who in another way would have looked on it as a great discourtesie . and as we find the benefit of prudence in these , so may we see the mischiefs which improvident rashness wrought in other examples . as in coriolanus , who by his stubborn and harsh carriage brought banishment on himself , a miserable war and disgrace upon his countrey , which at last caused his death . thus terentius varro by rashness and imprudency had almost ruined his country in that fatal and bloody battail at cannae . and multitudes of other examples we shall meet with in all histories , yea and in our own dayly experience and observation . chap. xxiii . of justice , and the roman practice of it . it would be a thing of the smallest concernment both to know and choose what is good and to accomodate our actions to the exact circumstances of place , time , and persons , unless we should acknowledge our selves obliged to vertuous actions , and to a total obedience of all her lawes , which is justices part to teach , whose praise were more proper for a prolix oration than the narrow limits of our discourse . aristotle in brief calls it , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , the best of the vertues , and plato {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , that neither the morning nor evening star are so admirable . cicero in l. . offic. justitia est virtus excellentissima , & splendidissima , omnium virtutum regina , ac domina . and scalig. exercit. . sect. . justitia est conservatrix conjunctionis humanae , quae conjunctio ad beatitudinem magna v●a est . indeed it is the use of other vertues towards others ; {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . for as the philosopher , there are many that can be vertuous for their own concernment , who in other mens will faulter . therefore as cicero , justitia foras spectat , totamque se ad alienas utilitates porrigit ▪ atque explicat . justice will teach them to act vertuously towards others . it is {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a good to others , and indeed the most beautiful , perfect , and best vertue . for he is the most vertuous {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , who is good to others ; here lies the point ; hic labor hoc opus est , to make profit , pleasure , revenge , &c. give the way to vertue , to right and equity . it is called by the greeks {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , by the latines justitia , and it is either general which consists in a vertuous obedience of all lawes tending to the preservation of humane society , and this is {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} an universall vertue , according to that of the proverb , — {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} or particular , which is a keeping a mean and aequality in all those things in which adversity or prosperity hath to do , or wherein fortune rules ; to give the definition of both according to aristotle , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , it is an habit apting men to just actions , whereby they are enabled to do , and will just things . nowfor to handle this at large , i suppose would be to little purpose , there being none that perceive not that it is the chief duty , as being of general concernment , of the magistrate to look well to the exercise of this vertue : i shall onely therefore hint in some cases which are essentiall to the welbeing of a state . as first in cases of publick danger , the particular members of a state are bound in justice to help the publick with their private stocks , thus we shall find in the roman state ▪ liv. dec . . l. . they brought in all their gold , silver , and coined brass , reserving only enough for an ornament of distinction , and for the publick service of their gods , into the common treasury , and you shall have a motive , respublicaincolumis & privatas res facile salvas praestet : publica prodendo tua nequicquam serves . secondly , the magistrate , after the danger is past , is in justice bound to see these publick debts sati●fyed , there being nothing more to be preserved inviolable than the publick faith : besides prudence teaches this , for if the people perceive them negligent in their publick trust , it will make them refractory , and careless in their private duties . we shall instance no further than in trading , a man once breaking his word , will never be trusted upon his bond , and it would be a sad plunge to put a state to get another state to be bound for them , and an impossibilty to find any private security for such large sums . the third thing required by justice is , that the magistrate ought not in the least to incroach upon the right of particular persons , further than the common necessity or good requires : thus in the beforementioned place we shall find , that first the consuls , then the senate , then the roman knights brought in their gold , &c. they were examples to the people , not exactors upon them . and to say the truth , the magistrate is intrusted for the publick good , and it is not in his power to do a private injury , they are gods substitutes , whose glorious attribute it is , that he cannot do injustice and the peoples trustees , to rule for their good : now grant that they may extrajudicially take away one mans right , and it will follow that they may take away any mans , and all mens . the fourth thing is , inviolably to observe all leagues , treaties , and publick promises with foreiners : this will make them be believ'd , lov'd , and honored abroad . thus we shall see that the romans in defence of , and revenge for their allyes of saguntum , undertook that long , bloody , and almost fatal second punick war ; nay and when hannibal was in the heart of italy , yet sent they armies into spain , and upon the first opportunity restored that city , gathered the scattered inhabitants , bought those that were slaves , and took a sharp revenge upō their borderers , even to the final ruin of the nation which had been instrumental in their miseries . thus shall we see them restore the kingdom of egypt to ptolomy their ally , when driven out by a popular insurrection , nay and preserve it in his sons , whom he by will left to their protection , in spight of the force and ambition of the great antiochus . thus made them honourable , and procured them fast friends , and so it will any state that practises after their copy . the fifth thing is , to have a sacred respect to the persons of ambassadours , and agents ; who are indeed the ministers of peace ; and indeed there can be nothing more brutish , and lesse manly , than to affront and violate these doves which bring olive branches in their mouthes , whom the law of nations gives protection to : thus shall we find the romans taking no where so sharp a revenge as upon corinth , which had abused their ambassadors : and when they for respect to ambustius ( who being an ambassador to the gauls , had contrary to the law of nations taken arms and fought against them ) denyed to deliver him up as the faeciales their heralds a arms had counsel'd , in the sack of their city they paid the reward of slighting this sacred law , and had neer lost all by the unjust endeavoring to preserve one offender from justice . the sixth thing is , to endeavour first by fair means for satisfaction , and if these will not prevail , then to send them a publick defiance : this the romans constantly practised , as to instance once for all , liv. d. . l. . consul deinde m. acilius ex s. c. ad collegium faecialium retulit , ipsine utique regi antiocho indiceretur bellum ? an satis esset ad praesidium aliquod ejus nunciare ? et num aetolis quoque separatim indici juberunt bellum ? et num prius societas eis et amicitia renuncianda esset , quam bellum indicendum ? faeciales responderunt , jam ante sese , cum de philippo consulerentur , decrevisse nihil referre ipsi coram an ad praesidium nunciaretur , amicitiam renunciatam videri , cum legatis toties repetentibus res , nec reddi , nec satisfieri aequum censuissent ; aetolos ultro sibi bellum indixisse , cum demetriadem sociorum urbem per vim occupassent , &c. the seventh is , honourably to reward their own citizens who deserve well . and there can be ●o greater spur to vertue , nor a better way to propagate and increase it . thus we shall see what tryumphs , what ovations , what crowns were conferred on victorious generalls , and valiant souldiers ; as he that preserved the life of a citizen had an oaken crown , and he that first gain'd the top of the wall , a mural one , by the roman state . the eight is , duly and justly to pay those that serve them . and this will render them well-beloved , and well followed ; and though they make use onely of their own citizens , yet ought these to be well paid who gallantly venture their lives ; shall they be liberal of their blood , and shall others be niggardly of their purses ? besides , they leave their callings , and all other means of providing maintenance . thus was their a constant provision of lands among the romans for those that had fulfilled their time of warfare , neither shall we ever find a mutiny for want of pay ; and our saviour tells us , no man goeth to a warfare on his own charge . the ninth is , to have a tender regard of their widdowes and orphans , who have nobly lost their lives in their countrey's defence . shall we enjoy rest , and abundance , & see theirs perishing for want by whose valour we have been preserved ? besides , it is a great discouragement to others to venture their lives for us , when they shall see such a calamity in their deaths ready to cease the dearest pledges of their souls . thus the romans provided them portions out of the publick stock . the tenth is , to have the like regard of such men and their families , who have liberally layd out their own estates in the publick service , or have been so publickly minded , as that they have not regarded their private benefit . thus did the romans often bury great and noble captains , who di'd poor , on the public charge , and bestow their daughters according to their qualities . the eleventh is , to crown the memories of those who had done publick service , with statues , and tryumphant arches , which was every where to be seen in that noble and grateful city of rome . and as these are just , necessary , of good concernment for the nourishing of noble spirits , and producing brave actions , so on the other side it will be the same . twelfly , severely to punish all incendaries , seditious , trayterous , and cowardly persons , and that first to amend such , secondly to keep the publick authority from contempt , thirdly to terrifie others by their examples . thus seneca , ni mia enim licentia adversus malos , crudelitas est adversus bonos . and cicero , quare ita probanda est mansuetudo , ut adhibeatur reipublicae causa severitas , sine qua administrari civitas non potest . and indeed obsta principiis , to nip such practices in the bud , is the safest way , which by connivency may grow to such an height as it will be hard to resist : a small spark unregarded may kindle a flame that shall burn a city : and the romans were so careful in this , that the greatest services , and noblest extraction could not turn the scale of justice , as in manlius capitolinus , saturninus , tiberius and caius gracchus , catiline , lentulus , cethegus , &c. lastly , to take an exact account of those that shall embeazle or purloin the publick treasure ; tyrannize and oppresse the people under their charge . for connivency in such cases will be of very bad consequence , both in keeping the publick poor and behind-hand , in making officers knaves , and wicked , and in undoing , disheartning and enraging the people : therefore we shall find the romans very strict in this point , often calling to account and condemning , even some very eminent for other deserts , as in scipio asiaticus , marcellus , and those noble orations of tully against verres . and indeed this is the onely means to preserve peace and plenty ; for a poor people will be alwaies busling , and an oppressed careless to gather , or play the good husbands , not knowing how long they shall enjoy their own . therefore boaetius excellently saies , annuum bonum , non tam de magnis fructibus , quam de juste regnantibus existimandum , the one will quickly be devoured without the other . chap. xxiv . of laws , and the english laws . it followes now therefore , offenders being to be restrained , to shew what that is which must do it , and that is law , which is the proper medicine for a commonwealth in time of peace , in war there must be a sharper and quicker course taken : and indeed this is so necessary , that as livy saith , multitudo coalescere in vuius populi corpus , nulla re , quam legibus , potest , there can be no communion , no society without laws ; these preserve property , and encourage industry , whereas should men be left at uncertainties , they would like wild and ravenous beasts , wander , ceasing upon their prey where they met with any weaker than themselves : but this general assertion is taken for granted on all hands , we shall only therefore endeavor to give our thoughts in some paticulars , which seem to concern the laws of england . as first that our generous and knowing ancestors plainly perceiving that there could be no liberty where there was no law , were very careful to bring all things to a certainty , so that the very judges are obliged to take notice of it as well as the people , and are bound up to observe the law as much as plantiff or defendant : and this , because to set up arbitrary courts or judges were to leave the people to their will , and in a mist to grope after surmizes what such or such persons would determine ; and indeed until men were omniscient , or could prophetically foretel the imaginations of the rulers or judges hearts , it were the highest piece of injustice to call men to account for a thing committed against no law , and a thing not to be named to condemn them . what could a man call his own , unless there were tenures warranted and confirmed by law ? and to bring a criminal process for a thing no where declared a crime , would be a tyranny our monarchs in the worst ages would have blusht at . but it may be said , what need there so many ? these engender but strife and vexation ; truly for strife it s the effect of peoples perverseness , not the law : and should those actions of battery , actions upon the case for words , and actions of trespass be taken away , we should quickly see the people make themselves judges , and by revenging themselves fall together by the ears : our wise ancestors being aware of such a mischief thought it better to let them vent their petty animosities in a sute where some small matter of money might be thrown away , and spend their spleen in opening each others purse , than to fall into deadly fewds , wherein kinred on both fides would engage , and so print their revenges in murder and ruin , as we have heard practised in the northern parts of this island , and our forefathers saw , and provided against . for let us assure our selves , to provide no remedy by law against these injuries , which are the main beginnings of all quarrels , would not only make mem more ready to provoke , but others as apt to revenge themselves being provoked , and of what consequence this will be to the endangering the civil peace , good , and quiet of a nation , i leave to the world to judge . to conclude , as the law of england gives rules , and teaches men their duties , so is it the most careful and provident for their tryals ; it so abhors arbitrariness ( as the enemy of liberty , and father of injustice ) that it will not trust the matter of fact , and of law in one hand , but sets twelve men of the neighbourhood to give their verdict for fact ; against whom it allowes an attaint , and being found guilty inflicts on them a dreadful punishment ; so careful is it of the lives and liberties of particular persons , and so provident that justice should be impartially administred ; and now if any by his living in turky is become enamoured of slavery , let him choose arbitrary courts , for my part i desire a rule to teach me what may be an offence , and iudges who are bound by oath to observe that rule to give sentence , and twelve of the neighbourhood to enquire of the fact , and against whom their lies an attaint , and upon eviction a dreadful punishment , before an arbitrary court , though never so carefully picked , and so i am sure do all understanding english men , who any whit prize and value their liberties . another objection there is against the iudges , that they are for life ; and that such a continuance may make them remiss and sloathful , and that by a continual use they become less reverent of justice , as a work which dayly use makes tedious and clogging : not omitting that it may create faction and combination , as livy notes of the carthaginians , qui unum ejus ordinis , idem adversos omnes habebat ; as lastly that it may beget corruption by taking away fear of calling to account : and therefore the romans decurias iudicum scribebant , ex honestissimis , & ex censu ( ne paupertas ad culpam impelleret ) : sed non eas omnes assidue judicare vole bant , duntaxat quotannis certum & necessarium numerum sorte legebant , reliquis tunc feriatis . all this we allow in arbitrary judges , who cannot be too short a time limitted ; but where there are lawes according to which they are to judge , there they ought to have experience and knowledge , which must of necessity encrease by practice and continuance . thus the romans whilest they were poor and in continual war , there was no great cause of strife , wealth being wanting , and the war employing them and keeping them busie , so that they had little leisure for private brawls : but when they began to enjoy peace and plenty , they had their decemviri , which were of continuance , and still provided by new lawes to bridle new enormities . so that take away law and continuance will be as dangerous , as the loss of liberty and right will be inevitable ; for we must hold all at will , and have no rule to call judges to account by , whose will must be our final determination , and as they think so must the bell tink . chap. xxv . of fortitude , and the roman practice of it . this vertue by the greeks is stiled {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , from a man , because it is peculiar to that sex , and is seldome found in women , and that in regard of the temperament , which must be hot and dry , and in a heart which is well compact , solid , and full of spirit : therefore cicero . tuscul. viri propria maximè est fortitudo , cujus munera duo sunt , nempe mortis & doloris contemptio . we find it defined by the philosopher , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , to be a vertue keeping a mean in fear and confidence . and it is divided into publick and private . private is a noble and patient undergoing of adversity , as cicero . tuscul. fortitudo est scientia perferendarum rerum , vel affectio animi in patiendo , et ferendo , summae legi parens sine timore : et in l. . offic. fortis & constantis animi est , non perturbari in rebus asperis , nec tumultuantem dejici de gradu , ut dicitur , sed praesenti animo uti , et nec à consilio , nec à ratione discedere ; and horace l. . od. . rebus angustis animosus , atque fortis apparet — publick is a fearless under taking , and constant wading through such perils , wherein our deeds and examples may bring benefit to our countrey , and honour and renown to our selves ; and this where , when , and how we ought , as l. eth. c. . by this then we may behold , first ▪ that self murder is no fortitude , for as curtius saith , non fortium virorum est odisse vitam , sed contemnere mortem , but rather a cowardice that makes them fling themselves into the arms of death to avoid some more threatning evil . besides , they are injurious to the common wealth , which they deprive of a member ; yet here for a sea captain to blow up his ship rather than let her be taken by the enemy , is no point of self-murder ; for the aiming at his countreys good , and her enemies loss and ruine , acts the part of a valiant and faithful citizen . secondly , that duels are no effect of true valour , they being injurious to the common wealth . thirdly , sturdy theeves or robbers , which are not only injurious , and mischievous , but such as fight directly against the laws of humane society ▪ and they are so far from being truly valiant , that they are wicked and impudent : and therefore we shall find some of the antients define fortitude {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ; fear of reproof ▪ and dread of infamy ; and it is commonly seen that those that most dread the lawes , least fear the enemy , and who are most quiet in peace , are most valiant in war , as plutarch in the life of agis , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . they are least fearful of suffering , who stand most in aw of doing evil . much more might be said of this manly vertue , which for brevity we omit , and shall refer those that desire further information , to that masculine discourse of aristotle in l. . eth. cap. . for the roman practice of this vertue , it is so obvious in their histories , as we shall hardly find the least foot-step of cowardice in that gallant and victorious commonwealth , whose noble citizens in all occasions were most ready to devote their lives for their countrie , and sacrifise their rags of mortality , to immortal fame and renown . and indeed the love of our countrey , and noble thirst after honour , are the great agents in this glorious production : for what man that is fully perswaded of his duty to the first , and the reward he shall receive from the last , can be faint-hearted or cowardly ? — fax mentis honestae gloria , saith the poet , and as velleius , nec potest quidquam abjectum , & humile cogitare , qui scit de se semper loquendum , a man will hardly be brought to act basely , who shall consider he shall stand on record , either infamous or renowned ; yea such a record , as time every day more and more publishes , as lipsius , vt sol in aurora tenuior , assurgit , & inclarescit ; sic ex virtute , & meritis fama cum aevo ipso augetur , & crescit . what man in flight comming to a bridge , and remembring horatius cocles , would not make a noble stand , and either live with him , or dying live his equal in history ? i shall sum up all with that of polybius , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , riches are common , but bravery of mind , and the glory and renown that springs from it , is peculiar to the gods , or such men as come neer them . chap. xxvi . of temperance , and he roman practice of it . this vertue by the greeks is called {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , quasi {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , as it were the preserver of prudence : for pleasure and grief corrupt {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , those faculties which are to consider of action : and a mind taken up with either of these cannot well intend the end for which {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , all things ought to be chosen or dore . now temperance moderating these passions keeps the mind undisturbed , and deservedly is stiled , the conservatrix of prudence . we shall define it , a vertue preserving a just decorum in the desiring and enjoying sensual delights : for grief , which comes within its verge , that only arises from want of fruition . it is therefore the duty of a temperat man to abhor dishonest , moderately to desire , and enjoy lawful pleasures , and not immoderately to grieve when deprived of them . now lawful-pleasures are such as first {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , conduce to bodily health , or as {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , exceed not our estates , and misbecom the rank and quality we live in . and of what avail this vertue is to the preservation and growth of a state , history and observation every where , and every day , may clearly make out unto us . this was it set rome upon her legs ; this is it that made her citizens able of body , both to fight , and endure the field ; this made her captains contemn bribes ; and her generals in the height of , military heat , and success , slight pleasure , and constantly keep the publick good , and their own honour in their eye . thus shall we see the noble curius , when the conquered samnites profered him gold , shew them his dinner ( for he was at their coming cooking it himself ) which was a few rape roots in a pipkin , telling them there was no great need of gold to furnish his table , and that he had rather command over such as had gold , than possess it himself . and when some complained that he had assigned too little of the conquered lands to private men , and too much to the publick , he told them , he hoped that there was never a roman citizen which would count that land too little which was sufficient to maintain him . thus shall we see scipio africanus , when the souldiers brought him a most beautiful damosel , taken in the sack of new carthage in spain , and hearing she was betroathed to allucius a young prince of the celtiberians , he sent for him , and not only bestowed on him his beautiful bride , but a great sum of gold as her portion , which her parents brought for her ransome . let us behold the event , this young prince goes home rapt with joy , filling every place with the praise and merit of scipio , telling his countrymen , venisse diis simillimum juvenem , vincentem omnia cum armis , tum benignitate , ac beneficiis , there was a godlike young man arrived , conquering all both by force and bounty : and within a few daies returned with horse to scipio's camp . thus by his temperance he advanced the roman cause , which he prefer'd above all private pleasure , and gave carthage a greater blow in this victory over himself , than in that other of taking their city , though the most considerable they had in spain ▪ i shall conclude all with that speech of asdruball surnamed the kid , the carthaginian legat to the roman senate , raro simul hominibus bonam fortunam , bonamque mentem dari : populum romanum eo invictum esse quod in secundis rebus sapere , & consulere meminerit : & hercle mirandum fuisse , si aliter facerent : ex insolentia , quibus nova bona fortuna sit , impotentes laetitiae insauire : populo romano usitate , ac prope jam obsoleta ex victoria gaudia esse , ac plus pene parcendo victis , quam vincendo imperium auxisse . god hath given england her share of success , we have not of late known what it is to be conquered , but as if we had been the adopted sons of victory , she hath perch'd upon our conquering ensigns , and pitch'd her pavilion among our tents . o let us then endeavour not to be transported with any unbecoming passions , which may force this glorious virgin to blush , to hide her head , and be ashamed to keep us company any further ; but as we increase in power , let us grow in vertue ; thus shall we be established , and to our wreaths of palm and laurel shall the olive chaplet be added , and we enjoy the pleasant fruits of peace at home as well as honourable esteem of valour abroad . — sic , sic juvat ire — per altos virtutum gradus patet ascensus ad aeternitatem . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a e- a gales . b ree . c the downs . d rebellion . e the first invasion . the prince, or, maxims of state written by sir walter ravvley ... raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing r ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing r estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; :e , no ) the prince, or, maxims of state written by sir walter ravvley ... raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . [ ], p. [s.n.] london : . reproduction of original in thomason collection, british library. eng political science -- early works to . a r (wing r ). civilwar no the prince, or maxims of state· written by sir walter ravvley, and presented to prince henry: raleigh, walter, sir d the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the d category of texts with between and defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread - tcp staff (michigan) text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the true and liuely portraiture of the honourable and learned knight sr walter ralegh . the prince , or maxims of state . written by sir walter ravvley , and presented to prince henry . sapere & silere . london , printed , mdcxlii . the contents . of government . of policy . of monarchy . of aristocraty , or senatory state . of free state , or popular state . of tyranny . of olygarchy , or the government of a few . of a common-wealth . of causes of states , and common-wealths in generall . of founding a state . of causes preserving a state or common-wealth . of mysteries or sophismes . of axioms or rules of preserving a state . rules for preserving of a kingdome . hereditary . conquered . kingdomes hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering of a prince . kingdomes new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by . rules . rules politique of tyrants . sophismes of a barbarous and professed tyranny . sophismes of the sophisticall , or subtill tyrant to hould up his state . of preservation of an aristocraty . of preservation of an olygarchy , by sophismes . rules . of conversion of states in generall . causes of conversions of states are of two sorts : generall and particular . particular causes of conversion of state , are of two sorts . of sedition . causes of sedition are of two sorts . of alteration without violence . a method , how to make use of the booke before , in the reading of story . old age is not ever unfit for publique government . example of the like practise in charles the fif● . of observation for the affirmative and the negative . of defence for david in marrying abishag . politicall nobility . of adoniah aspiring to the kingdome . observations . of wayes of such as aspire to the kingdome , and marke● to discerne them . of government . government is of two sorts . . private of himselfe . sobriety . of his family ; called oec●nomy . . publique of the common-wealth ; called policy . a man must first governe himselfe , ere he be fit to governe a family : and his family , ere hee bee fit to beare the governement in the common-wealth . of policy . policy is an art of government of a common-wealth , and some part of it according to that state , or form● of government wherein it is setled for the publique good . state , is the frame or set order of a common-wealth , or of the governours that rule the same , specially of the chiefe and soveraigne governour that commands the rest . the state or soveraignty consisteth in . points . . making or annulling of lawes . . creating and disposing of magistrates . . power over life and death . . making of warre , or peace . . highest or last appeale . where these . a●e , either in one or in more , there is the state . these . points of state rest either in ; . one monarchy or kingdome . . some few chiefe of men for vertue and wisedome , called an aristocra●y . . many , called a free state or a popular state . these three sorts of government have respect to the common good , and therefore are iust and lawfull states . these . degenerate into . other governements . . monarchy . . aristocraty . . popular estate . into . tyrany . . oligarchy , or government of a few , rich or able . . common-wealth or government of all the common & baser sort , and therefore called a common wealth , by an vsurped nickname . these all respect there owne , and not the publique good , and therefore are called bastard governements . . monarchy . a monarchy , or kingdome , is the governement of a state by one head , or chiefe , tending to the common benefit of all . monarchies or kingdomes are of . sorts touching the right or possession of them ; viz. . hereditary , by discent , as the english , french , &c. . elective , by suffrage of the other orders , or some of them , as the p●l●nian . . mixt , or of both kinds ; viz , by discent yet not tyed to the next of bloud , as the ancient jewish state . monarchies are of . sorts touching their power or ●uthority : viz. . intier . where the whole power of ordering all state matters , both in peace and warre , doth by law and custome appertaine to the prince , as in the english kingdome , where the prince hath power to make lawes , league and warre , to create magistrates ; to pardon life : of appeale , &c. though to give a contentment to the other degrees , they have a sufferage in making lawes ; yet ever subject to the princes pleasure , nor negative will . . limited , or restrained that hath no full power in all the points or matters of state , as the military king that hath not the soveraignty in time of peace , as the making of lawes &c. but in warre onely as the poloni●● kings . . aristocraty or senatory state . an aristocraty is the government of a common-wealth by some competent number of the better sort , preferred for wisedome and other vertues for the publique good . aristocraties are of . sorts , viz , where the senators are chosen , for . vertue , riches , and the common good , as the venetian . . vertue and the publique good without respect of wealth , as sometimes the roman when some of the senatours , were fetched from the plough , and some from the schooles . . vertue and wealth , more respecting their private , then the publique good which inclineth towards an oligarchy , or the government of the richer or nobler sort , as in rome towards the end . . free state or popular state . the popular state is the government of a state by the choiser sort of people , tending to the publique good of all sorts ; viz. with due respect of the better , nobler , and richer sort . in every iust state , some part of the government is , or ought to bee imparted to the people ; as in a kingdome , a voice or sufferage in making lawes ; and sometimes also , in levying of armes ( if the charge bee great , and the prince forced to borrow helpe of his subjects ) the matter rightly may bee propounded to a parliament , that the taxe may seeme to have proceeded from themselves . so consultations , and some proceedings in judiciall matters may in part bee referred to them . the reason , least seeing themselves to be in no number , nor of reckoning , they mislike the state or kind of government : and where the multitude is discontented , there must needs bee many enemies to the present state . for which cause , tyrants ( which allow the people , no manner of dealing in state matters ) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons , and all other meanes , whereby they may resist , or amend themselves , as in rusheland , turkey , &c. . tyranny . a tyranny is the swarving , or distorting of a monarchy , or the government of one tending not to the publique good , but the private benefit of himselfe , and his followers . as in the russe and turkish government , where the state and wealth of other orders are employed onely to the uphoulding of the greatnesse of the king , or emperour . this is the worst of all the bastard states , because it is the perverting of the best regiment , to wit , of a monarchy , which resembleth the soveraigne government of god himselfe . . obligarchy , or the government of a few . an oligarchy is the swarving , or the corruption of an aristocraty ; or the government of some few that are of the wealthier or nobler sort , without any respect of the publique good . the chiefe end of these governours is their owne greatnesse and enriching . and therefore there manner is to prepare fit meanes to uphold their estates . this state is not wholly so bad , as is the tyra●nny , and yet worse then the common-wealth , because it respecteth the good of a few . . common-wealth . a common-wealth is the swarving or depravation of a free or popular state , or the government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort , without respect of the other orders . these two states , to wit ; the oligarchy and common-wealth , are very adverse the one to the other , and have many bickerings and dissentions betweene them . for that the richer or nober sort suppose a right of superiority to appertaine unto them in every respect , because they are superiour , but in some respects onely , to wit , in riches , birth , parentage , &c. on the other side , the common people suppose , there ought to bee an equality in all other things , and some state matters ; because they are equall with the rich or noble , touching their liberty , whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equall or superiour as touching government and fitnes thereunto , because they are such , to wit , because they are rich● noble , free , &c. but because they are wise , vertuous valiant &c. and so have fit parts to governe a state . these severall states are sometimes mixed and interwrought one with the other , yet ever so , as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other , as in the humours and complections of the body . so in the roman state , the people had their plaebiscita , and gave the sufferage in the election of magistrates : yet the senate ( as the state stood ) for the most part swayed the state , and bare the chiefe rule . so in the venetian state , the duke seemeth to represent a monarch , and , the senate to bee his councell : yet the duke hath no power in state matters , but is like a head set on by art that beareth no braine . and so that state is senatoricall or , aristocraticall . causes of states and common-wealths in generall . causes of states or of common-wealths are of . sorts , viz. . founding or setling a state where to bee considered . . preserving a state . . changing and alltering a state . . measure . . parts and their qualities . founding a state . in founding a state are to bee considered . things . . proportion . . parts . proportion is a just measure or mediocrity of the state , whereby it is framed and kept in that order , as that neither it exceed nor bee defective in his kind ; to wit , so that a monarch bee not to monarchicall , nor strict , or absolute , as the russe kings ; nor aristocraticall , that is over-mated ; or ecclipsed by the nobility , as the scottish kingdome ; but ever respective to the other degrees . that an aristocraty bee not to magnificent nor intier to it selfe , but communicate with the people some commodities of state or government as the venetian , and sometimes the roman allowed the people to elect certaine magistrates out of themselves , to have a tribune , to make plaebiscita &c. so a free state or common-wealth that it bee not over popular , viz. that it depresse not to much the richer , wiser , nor learneder sort ; but admit them to offices with a caution out of the rules and misteries of that state . that they seeke no alteration of the present state . the reason , because the moderate states in their severall kindes ( as all other things that observe the meane ) are best framed for their continuance , because they give lesse cause of grudge , envy , and affecting the wealth , honour , and liberty which they see in others , that governe the state ; and so are lesse subject to stirres , and commotions , and easiest kept in their present state wherein they are set . parts . the parts of the state , or those magistrates that beare place or sway in the publique government . parts or partakers of publique government , are . counsell or senate , which consulteth of all matters pertaining to warre and peace , magistrates , &c. in admitting of whom there ought to bee a more speciall care that they bee men expect in matter of policy , because it is their trade and vocation , as men use to choose pilots and masters of shippes such as know the art of navigation , and not husbandmen &c. and so the contrary . . magistrates and officers which are to bee executioners of that which is consulted and found to bee expedient for the common-wealth , wherein are to bee observed the kinds of magistrates , that they bee such as fit that kind of government ; the time of their continuance , and the manner of their election or appointing , by whom , out of whom , and in what manner they be choosen . . iudges ; to determine in civill and criminall matters , where are to bee observed , out of whom they are to bee chosen ; what kinds are necessary , and the manner of judgement and judiciall proceeding . i● magistrates are to be observed , . kindes of magistrates , as . civill . . ecclesiasticall . . superiour , which are to bee such and of that kind as agree with the state ; as consuls for a yeare , and not perpetuall dictatours in a senatory state . preators and censors that oversee manners and orders of the people . for a kingdome lieutenants of shires , marshals , masters of horse , admirals , &c. inferiour , as conservatours of peace , constables , &c. overseers of youth , that take care of their education for civill and warlike exercise . clarkes of the market that provide for the quantity and prize of victuall . ediles for buildings , streets , bounds . quaestours or treasurours to keepe and despence the publique treasury . actuaries or recorders , which keepe the publique records . gaolers , to keepe prisons , and prisoners . surveyours of woods and fields , &c. as bishops , or pastours , elders , wardens . . time of magistrates , whereof some are perpetuall , some for a time , viz. , for more yeares ; a yeare , halfe a yeare , according to the necessity of the common-wealth , and not perpetuall ; or at least not hereditary in a kingdome . yearely in an aristocracy , or halfe yearely in a free state . . manner of choise , by whom and how to bee chosen , where especially they are to bee chosen by sufferage , and not by lot . causes preserving a state or common-wealth . in preserving of states , two things required . . misteries or sophis●es . . generall to all states . . particular for every severall state . . rules or actioms . . generall for all states . . particular for every state . mysteries or sophismes . mysteries or sophismes of state , are certain● secret practizes , either for the avoiding of danger ; or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present state , as it is set or founded . state mysteries are of . sorts . . generall : that pertaine to all states ; as first , to provide by all meanes , that the same degree or part of the common-wealth doe not exceed both in quantity and quality . in quantity as that the number of the nobility , or of great persons , be not more then the state or common-wealth can-beare . in quality , as that none grow in wealth , liberty , honours , &c. more then that is meet for that degree ; for as in weights , the heavier weights beare downe the skale ; so in common-wealths , that part or degree that excelleth the rest in qu●lity and quantity , overswayeth the rest after it , whereof follow alterations and conversions of state . secondly , to provide by all meanes , that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreames ( viz. ) of nobility and gentry , and the base , rascall and beggerly sort . for this maketh the state constant and firme , when both the extreames are tied together by a middle sort , as it were with a band , as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggerly sort together , it is not to bee feared . to these two points , the particular rules or sophismes of every common-wealth are to bee applied . . particular : that serve for preservation of every common-wealth in that forme of state , wherein it is setled as in a kingdome . that the nobility may bee accustomed to beare the government of the prince , especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the princes eye , it is expedient to call them up at certaine times to the princes court under pretence of doing them honour , or being desirous to see and enjoy their presence ; and to have their children , especially their eldest , to bee attendant upon the prince , as of speciall favour towards them and theirs , that so they may bee trained up in duty and obedience towards the prince , and bee as hostages for the good behaviour and faithfull dealing of their parents , especially if they bee of any suspected note . to that end , serves the persian practize in having a band or traine of the satrapaes children ; and other nobles to attend the court which was well imited by our traine of henchm●n , if they were of the nobler sort . againe , sometimes to borrow smale summes of his subjects , and to pay them againe , that hee may after borrow greater summes and never pay : so in an oligarchy , least it decline to a popular state , they deceive the people with this and the like sophismes ( viz. ) they compell their owne sort , to wit , the rich men by great penalties to frequent their assemblies for choosing of magistrates , for provision of armour , warlike exercise , making an execution of lawes , &c. by that meanes seeming to beare a hard hand over the richer ; but to suffer the poorer and meaner sort to bee absent , and to neglect those assemblies under pretence , that they will no● draw them from their businesse and private earnings : yet withall to cite thither some few of them ( viz. ) so many as are easily over-matched by the richer sort , to make a shew , that they would have the people , or poorer sort partakers likewise of those matters , yet terrifying those that come to their assemblies with the tediousnesse of consultations , greatnesse of fines , if they should mi●doc . to the end to make them unwilling to come againe , or to have to doe with those consultations ; by which meanes the richer sort doe still governe the state with the people● liking and good contentment . axioms . axioms or rules of preserving the state , are . generall , that serve for all common-wealths . . particular , that serve for every severall state . generall rules . . the first and principall rule of policy to bee observed in all states is to professe , and practize , and maintaine the true worship and religion of almighty god , prescribed unto us in his word , which is the chiefe end of all government . the axiom , that god bee obeyed simply without exception , though hee command that which seemeth unreasonable , and absurd to humane policy , as in the iewes common-wealth , that all the men should repaire yearely to one place to worship god foure times , leaving none to defend their coast ; though being beset with many enemies . not to sow the seventh yeare , but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or feare of famine , &c. . to avoid the causes of conversions , whereby states are overthrowne that are set downe in the title of conversions ; for that common-wealths ( as naturall bodies ) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and state thereof , and are so cured by contrary medicines . . to take heed , that no magistrate bee created or continued contrary to the lawes and policy of that state . as that in a senate , there bee not created a perpetuall dictator , as caesar in rome . in a kingdome , that there bee no senate or convention of equall power with the prince , in state matters ; as in poland . . to create such magistrates as love the state as it is setled , and take heed of the contrary practize , as to advance popular persons in a kingdome , or aristocraty . and secondly , to advance such as have skill to discerne what doth preserve , and what hurteth or altereth the present state . . to that end to have certaine officers to pry abroad , and to observe such as doe not live and behave ●hemselves in fit sort , agreeable to the present state ; but desire rather to bee under some other forme or kind of government . . to take heed that magistracies bee not sold for money , nor bribe in their offices , which is specially to bee observed in that common-wealth which is governed by a few of the richer sort : for if the magistrate gaine nothing but his common fees , the common sort and such as want honour take in good part , that they bee not preferred , and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private businesse . but if the magistrate ●uy and sell matters , the common people are do●bly grieved , both because they are debarred of those preferments and of that gaine which they see to grow by them , which is the cause that the germaine olygarchies continue ●o firme , for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth , and the richer sort are by that meanes freed , and secured from being under the poore . . to take heed that the state as it is setled and maintained bee not over strict , nor exceed in his kind ; ( viz. ) that a kingdome be not too monarchicall ; nor a popular state bee too popular : for which cause it is good , that the magistrates sometimes yeeld of his right touching honour , and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts , though inferiour for place and office ; and sometimes popularly with the common people , which is the cause that some common-wealths , though they bee very simply and unskilfully set ; yet continue firme , because the magistrates behave themselves wisely , and with due respect towards the rest that are without honour ; and therefore , some kind of moderate popularity , is to bee used in every common-wealth . . to take heed of small beginnings , and to meet with them even at the first , as well touching the breaking and altering of lawes , as of other rules which concerne the continuance of every severall state . for the disease and alteration of a common-wealth doth not happen all at once but growes by degrees , which every common wit cannot discerne , but men expert in policy . . to provide , that that part bee ever the greater in number and power which favours the state , as now it stands . this is to bee observed as a very oracle in all common-wealths . . to observe a meane in all the degrees , and to suffer no part to exceed ; or decay overmuch . as first for pre●erments , to provide that they bee rather small and short , then great and long ; and if any bee growne to overmuch greatnesse , to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour . where the sophismes are to bee practized ( viz. ) to doe it by parts and degrees ; to doe it by occasion or colour of law , and not all at once . and if that way serve not , to advance some other , of whose vertue and faithfulnesse , wee are fully assured , to as high a degree , or to greater honour : and to bee the friends and followers of him that excelleth , above that which is meet . as touching wealth , to provide , that tho●e of the middle sort ( as before was said ) bee more in number ; and if any grow high , and overcharged with wealth , to use the sophismes of a popular state ; ( viz. ) to send him on embās●ages , and forram● negotiations , or employ him in some office that hath great charges and litle honour , &c. to which end the edelishi● served in some common-wealths . . to suppresse the factions and quarrels of the nobles , and to keepe other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and factions . . to encrease or remit the common taxes and contributions , according to the wealth , or want of the people and common-wealth . if the people bee increased in wealth , the taxes and subsidies may bee increased . if they bee poore , and their wealth diminish , specially by dearth , want of traffique , &c. to forbeare taxes and impositions , or to take litle . otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow . the sophismes that serve for impositions are these , and other of like sort , to pretend businesse of great charge , as warre , building of ships , making of havens , castles , fortifications , &c. for the common defence ; sometimes by lotteries and like devises , wherein some part may bee bestowed , the rest reserved for other expences ; but princely dealing needs no pretences . . to provide that the discipline and training of youth of the better sort bee such as agreeth with that common-wealth : as that in a kingdome , the sonnes of noble-men to bee attendant at the court , that they may bee accustomed to obedience towards the prince : in the senatory state , that the sonnes of the senatours bee not idly , no● over daintily brought up , but well instructed and trained up in learning tongues and martiall exercise ; that they may bee able to beare that place in the common-wealth , which their father held , and contrary wise in a popular state . . to take heed , least their sophismes , or secret practizes for the continuance and maintenance of that state bee not discovered , least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves , but wisely used and with great secreflie . particuler rules . rules and axiomes for preserving of a kingdome ; hereditary . conquered . kingdomes hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering . . himselfe ; ( viz. ) by the tempering and moderation of the princes power , and prerogative . for the lesse and more temperate , their power and state is ; the more firme , and stable is their kingdome and government , because they seeme to be further off from a master-like and tyrannicall empire ; and lesse unequall in condition to the next degree ; to wit , the nobility , and so lesse subject to grudge and envy . . nobility ; ( viz. ) by keeping that degree and due proportion , that neither they exceed not in number more then the realme or state can beare , as the scottish kingdome , and sometime the english , when the realme was overcharged with the numbers of dukes , earles , and other nobles ; whereby the authority of the prince was ecclipsed , and the realme troubled with their factions and ambitions . nor that any one excell in honour , power or wealth , as that hee resemble another king within the kingdome ; as the house of lancaster within this realme . to that end not to load any with too much honour or preferrement , because it is hard even for the best and worthiest men to beare their greatnesse and high fortune temperately , as appeareth by infinite examples in all states . the sophismes for preventing or reforming this inconvenience , are to bee used with great caution and wisedome . if any great person bee to bee abated , not to deale with him by calumniation , or forged matter , and so to cut him off without desert , especially if hee bee gratious among the people after the machivilian policy , which besides the injustice , is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the prince . nor to withdraw their honour all at once , which maketh a desperate discontentment in the party , and a commiseration in the people , and so greater love , if hee bee gratious for his vertue and publique service . nor to banish him into forraine countries , where hee may have oportunity of practizing with forraine states , whereof great danger may ensue , as in the examples of coriolanus , henry the fourth , and such like . but to use these , and the like sophismes : ( viz. ) to abate their greatnesse by degrees , as david , ioabs , iustinian , bellisarius , &c. to advance some other men to as great or greater honour , to shadow or over-mate the greatnesse of the other . to draw from him by degrees his friends and followers , by preferrements , rewards , and other good and lawfull meanes ; especially , to bee provided that these great men bee not employed in great or powerfull affaires of the common-wealth , whereby they may have more oportunity , to sway the state . . people : ( viz. ) so to order and behave himselfe , that hee bee loved and reverenced of the people . for that the prince need not greatly feare home-conspiracies , or forraine invasion , if hee bee firmely loved of his owne people . the reason , for that the rebell can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise ; no● any refuge being discovered and put to flight , if the multitude affect their prince : but the common people being once offended hath cause to feare every moving , both at home and abroad . this may bee effected by the prince , if hee use meanes and art of getting the favour of the people , and avoid those things that breed hatred and contempt : ( viz. ) if hee s●●me as a ●utor , or a father to love the people and to protect them , if hee maintaine the peace of his kingdome ; for that nothing is more popular , nor more pleasing to the people then is peace . . if hee shew himselfe oftentimes gratiously , yet with state , and majesty to his people , and receive complaints of his suppliants , and such like . . if hee sit himselfe sometimes in open courts and place of justice , that hee may seeme to have a 〈◊〉 of justice among his people . if hee bestow many benefits and graces upon that city which hee maketh the seat of his empire , and so make it sure and faithfull unto him , which is fit to bee in the middle of his kingdome , as the heart in the middle of the body , or the sunne in the middle of heaven , both to divide himselfe more easily into all the parts of his dominions ; and least the furthest parts at one end move , whilest the prince is in the other . if hee goe in progresse many times to see his provinces , especially those that are remote . . if hee gratifie his courtiers and attendants in that sort , and by such meanes as that hee may seeme not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people , as with monopolies , and such like . . if hee commit the handling of such thing● as procure envy , or seeme grievous to his ministers , but reserve those things which are gratefull and well pleasing to himselfe , as the french kings , who for that purpose● as may seeme , have erected their court at paris , which 〈◊〉 the prince from grudge and envy , both with the nobles and the people . . if hee borrowes sometimes summes of money of his people , though hee have no need , and pay the same 〈◊〉 without defalcation of any part by his exchequer or other officers . . if hee avoid all such things as may breed hatred or contempt of his person , which may bee done , if hee shew himselfe not too light , inconstant , hard , cruell , e●●eminate , fearefull , and dastardly , &c. but contrariwise , religious grave , just , valiant , &c. whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the machivilian policy ; with feare , the better meanes , to keepe the people in obedience , then love , and reverence of the people towards the prince . . if the prince bee well furnished with warlike provision , which is to bee rumored and made knowne abroad : if it bee knowne , that hee is revereneed and obeyed by his people at home . . if hee provide so much as lieth in him , that his neighbour kingdomes grow not overmuch in power and dominion ; which if it happen , hee is to joyne speedily with other princes , which are in like danger to abare that greatnesse , and to strengthen himselfe and the rest against it . an overfight of the christian princes towards the king of spaine . . if hee get him intelligencers by reward , or other meanes , to detect or hinder the de●ignes of that prince , with whom hee hath differences , if any thing bee intent●ed against his state . or at least have some of his owne lydging abroad about that princes court , under colour of embassage , or some other pretence ; which must bee men of skill and dexterity to serve for that turne . . to observe the lawes of his conntrey and not to encounter them with his prerogative , nor to use it at all where there is a law , for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts , especially if it tender to take from them their commodities , and to bestow them upon other of his courtiers and ministers . . to provide especially that that part which favoureth the state as it standeth● bee more potent , then the other that favoureth it not , or desireth a change . . to make specially choyce of good and sound men to beare the place of magistrates , especiall of such as assist the prince in his councels , and policies , and not to leane overmuch to his owne advise , contrary to the rule of machivill , who teacheth that a prince can have no good councell except it bee in himselfe ; his reason , because if hee use the councell of some one ; hee is in danger to bee overwrought and supplanted by him : and if hee councell with more , then hee shall bee distracted with the differences in opinion . as if a prince of great , or meane wisedome could not take the judgement of all his counsellours in any point of policy , or of so many as himselfe thinketh good , and to take it either by word or in wr●ting ; and himselfe then in private peruse them all , and so after good 〈◊〉 mature deliberation make choice of the best , without any destraction or binding himselfe to the direction of one . for the proverbe is true , that two eyes see more then one ; and therefore , the advises and consultations of a senatory state is compared by some to a feast , or dinner , where many contribute towards the shot , by which meanes they have more variety of dishes , and so better fare : and yet every man may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his health and appetite . . the prince himselfe is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice , and to give an experiment of his wisedome and equity , whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten , as in the example of solomen ; which may seeme the reason , why our kings of england had their kings bench in place of publique iustice , after the manner of the ancient kings that sate in the gate ; where for better performing of this princely duty , some speciall causes may bee selected , which may throughly bee debated and considered upon by the prince in private , with the helpe and advise of his learned counsell , and so bee decided publiquely , as before is said , by the prince himselfe ; at least the prince is to take accompt of every minister of publique iustice , that it may bee knowne , that hee hath a care of iustice , and doing right to his people , which makes the iusticers also to bee more carefull in performing of their d●ties . . to bee moderate in his taxes , and impositions ; and when need doth require to use the subjects purse , to doe it by parliaments , and with their consents , making the cause apparant unto them , and shewing his unwillingnesse in charging them . finally , ●o to use it , that it may seeme rather an offer from his subjects , then an exaction by him . . to stop small beginnings , unto this end to compound the dissentious that arise amongst the nobles , with caution that such as are free , bee not drawne into parts , whereby many times the prince is endangered , and the whole common-wealth set in a combustion ; as in the example of the barons warres , and the late warres of france , which grew from a quarrell betwixt the guision faction and the other nobility . . to stirre up the people , if they grow secure and negligent of armour and other provision for the common-wealth , by some rumour or feare of danger at-home , to make them more ready when occasion requireth . but this seldome to bee used least it bee supposed a false alarme , when there is need indeed . . to have speciall care , that his children , especially the heire apparent , have such bringing up as is meet for a king ( viz. ) in learning , specially of matters pertaining to state , and in marshall exercise , contrary to the practize of many princes , who suffer their children to bee brought up in pleasure , and to spend their time in hunting &c. which by reason o● their defects afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of state . . kingdomes new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by these meanes . . first , if they have beene subjects before to his ancestours , or have the same tongue , manners , or fashions as have his owne countrey , it is an easie matter to retaine such countries within their obedience , in case the princes bloud of the said countrey bee wholly extinct . for men of the same quality , tongue , and condition , doe easily shole and combine themselves together , so much the rather if the people of that countrey have served before and were not accustomed to their owne liberty , wherein specially is to bee observed , that the lawes and customes of that purchased countrey bee not altered nor innovated , or at least it bee done by litle and litle . so the burgundians and acquitaines were annexed to france . the rea●on● because partly they have bin accustomed to serve ; and partly , for that they will not easily agree about any other to bee their prince , if the blo●d royall bee once extinguished . as for the invasion of a forraine countrey , whereunto the prince hath no right , or whereof the right heir is living ; it is not the part of a ju●t civill prince , much lesse a prince christian to enforce such a countrey ; and therefore , the machivilian practizes in this case to make sure worke by extinguishing wholly the bloud royall i● le●d , and impertinent : the like is to bee said , of murthering the natives , or the greatest part of them , to the end hee may hold the rest in sure possession . a thing not onely against christian religion : but inhumane iustice , cruell , and barbarous . . the safest way is , ( supposing a right ) that some good part of the natives bee transplanted into some other place , and our colonies consisting of so many as shall bee thought meet be planted there in some part of the province , castles , forts , and havens , seised upon , and more provided in fit places , as the manner was of the babylonian monarch which transplanted . tribes of the iewes : and of the romans in france , germany , britany , and other places . the reason : . for that otherwise forces of horse and foote , are to bee maintained within the province which cannot bee done without great charge . . for that the whole province is troubled and grieved , with removing and supplying the army with victuals , carriages , &c. . for that collonies are more sure and faithfull then the rest . as for the natives that are removed from their former seates , they have no meanes to hurt , and the rest of the natives being free from the inconvenience , and fearing that themselves may bee so served , if they attempt any thing rashly , are content to bee quiet . the turkes practize in asia , where the chiefe grounds and dwellings are possessed by the souldiours , whom they call timariotae . that the prince have his seat and his residence in his new purchase , especially for a time , till things bee well setled ; especially if the province bee great and large , as the turke in greece . the reasons : . because the presence of the prince availeth much to keepe things in order , and get the good will of his new subjects . . they conceive that they have ref●ge by the princes presence , if they bee oppressed by the lieutenants and inferiour governours : where it will bee convenient for the winning the peoples hearts , that some examples bee made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression . . because being present hee seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted ; and so may quickly give remedy to it , which being absent , hee cannot doe , or not doe in time . . if the prince himselfe cannot bee present to reside , then , to take heed that the charge of governing , on new purchases bee committed to such as bee sure men , and of other meet quality , that depend wholly upon the princes favour ; and not to natives , or other of their owne subjects , that are gratious there for their nobility , or vertue ; especially if the province bee great , and somewhat farre distant , which may soone seduce the unsetled affections of those new subjects . as for such governours as depend wholly upon the princes favour being not bor●● , but created noble , they will not so easily suffer themselves to bee wonne from their du●y ; and in case they would revolt , yet they are not able to make any great strength , for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers to keepe them in subjection , and not for any good will . . to have the children of the chiefe noble men , and of greatest authority , hostages with them in safe keeping ; the more the better : for that no bound is stronger , then that of nature to containe the parents and allies in obedience , and they the rest . . to alter the lawes , but by degrees one after another , and to make other that are more behovefull for the establishing of the present government . . to keepe the people quiet and peaceable and well affected so much as may bee , that they may seeme , by being conquered , to have gotten a protectour , rather then a tyrant ; for the common-people if they enjoy peace , and bee not distracted , nor drawne from their businesse , nor exacted upon beyond measure are easily contained under obedience● yet notwithstanding , they are to bee dis-used from the practise of armes , and other exercises which encrease conrage , and bee weakened of armour , that they have neither spirit nor will to rebell . . if there bee any faction in the countrey , to take to him the defence of the better , and stronger part , and to combine with it , as caesar in france . . to looke well to the borders and confining provinces , and if any rule there of great , or equall power to himselfe , to joyne league with some other borderers , though of lesse strength to hinder the attempts ( if any should bee ) by such neighbour prince . for it happeneth often , that a countrey insested by one neighbour prince calleth in another of as great or greater power to assist , and rescue it from the other that invadeth it ; so the romans were called into greece by the aet●lians ; the saxons by the britaines , the danes by the saxons . . to leave their titles and dignities to the natives , but the command and authority wholly to his owne . . not to put much trust , nor to practise to often the sophisimes of policy , especially those that appertaine to a tyrannicall state , which are soone detected by men of judgement , and so bring discredit to the prince , and his policy among the wiser and better sort of his subjects , whereof must needs follow very evill effects . the sophisimes of tyrants , are rather to bee knowne , then practized , ( which are for the supporting of their tyrannicall states , ) by wise and good princes , and are these , and such like as follow . rules politique of tyrants . rvles practised by tyrants are of . sorts : viz. . barbarous and professed , which is proper to those that have got head , and have power sufficient of themselves without others helpes , as in the turkish and russe government . . sophisticall and dissembled ; as in some s●tes , that are reputed for good and lawfull monarchies , but inclining to tyrannies , proper to those which are not yet setled nor have power sufficient of themselves ; but must use the power and helpe of others , and so are forced to bee politique sophisters . . sophisimes of a barbarous and professed tyranny . . to expell and banish out of his countrey all honest meanes , whereby his people may attaine to learning , wisedome , valour , and other vertues , that they might bee fit for that estate and servile condition . for that in these two , learning , and martiall exer●ise , effect two things most dangerous to a tyranny : ( viz. ) wisedome and valour . for that men of spirit and understanding can hardly endure a servile state . to this end to forbid learning of liberall arts , and martiall exercise ; as in the russe governement , so iulian the apostata dealt with the christians . contrarywise , to use his people to base occupations , and mechanicall arts , to keepe them from idlenesse , and to put away from them all high thoughts , and manly conceits , and to give them a liberty of drinking drunke , and of other base and lewd conditions that they may bee sotted , and so made unfit for great enterprizes . so the aegyptian kings dealt with the hebrewes ; so the russe emperour with his russe people● and charles the fifth with the netherlanders , when hee purposed to enclose their priviledges , and to bring them under his absolute government . . to make sure to him and his state , his military men by reward , liberty , and other meanes , especially his guard , or praetorian band ; that being partakers of the spoile and benefit , they make like that state , and continue firme to it ; as the turke his ianizaries , the russe his boyarent , &c. . to unarme his people of weapons , money , and all meanes , whereby they may resist his power ; and to end , to have his set & ordinary exactions , viz. once in two , three , or foure yeares ; and sometimes yearely , as the turke , and russe ; who is wont to say , that his people must bee used as his flock of sheep : viz. their fleece taken from them , least it overlade them , and grow too heavy ; that they are like to his beard , that the more it was shaven , the thicker it would grow . and if there bee any of extraordinary-wealth to borrow of them in the meane while , till the taxe come about , or upon some devised matter to con●iscate their goods , as the common practise is of the russe and turke . . to bee still in warres , to the end , his people may need a captaine ; and that his forces may be kept in practise , as the russe doth yearely against the tartar , polonian , and sweden , &c. . to cut off such as excell the rest in wealth , favour , or nobility , or bee of a pregnant , or spiring wit , and so are fearefull to a tyrant , and to suffer none to hold office , or any honour , but onely of him ; as the turke his bashaes , and the russe his r●ezzes . . to forbid guilds , brotherhoods , feastings , and other assemblies among the people , that they have no meanes or oportunity to conspire or conferre together of publique ma●ters , or to maintaine love amongst themselves , which is very dangerous to a tyrant , the russes practise . . to have their beagl●s , or listners in every corner , and parts of the realme , especially in places that are more suspect , to learne what every man saith , or thinketh , that they may prevent all attempts , and take away such as mislike their state . . to make schisme and division among his subjects , ( viz. ) to set one noble man against another , and one rich man against another , that through faction and disagreement among themselves , they may bee weakened , and attempt nothing against him ; and by this meanes entertaining whisperings and complaints , hee may know the secrets of both parts , and have matter against them both , when need requireth . so the russe made the faction of the zemsky and the oppress●ie . . to have strangers for his guard , and to entertaine parasites , and other base and servile fellowes , not too wise , but yet subtill , that will bee ready for reward to doe and execute what hee commandeth , though never so wicked and unjust . for that good men cannot flatter , and wise men cannot serve a tyrant . all these practises and such like , may bee contracted into one or two , ( viz. ) to bereave his subjects of will and power to doe him hurt , or to alter the present state . the use is caution , not imitation . . sophismes of the sophisticall , or subtill tyrant to h●ld up his state . . to make a shew of a good king by observing a temper and mediocrity in his government , and whole course of life ; to which end it is necessary , that this subtill tyrant bee a cunning polititian , or a machivilian at the least , and that hee bee taken so to bee , for that it maketh him more to bee feared and regarded , and is thought thereby not not unworthy for to governe others . . to make shew not of severity , but of gravity , by seeming reverent , and not terrible in his speech , and gesture , habite , and other demeanour . . to pretend care of the common-wealth ; and to that end to seeme loath to exact tributes and other charges ; and yet to make necessity of it , where none is , to that end to procure such warre as can bring no danger towards his state , and that might easily bee compounded , or some other chargeable businesse ; and to continue it on , that hee may continue his exaction and contribution so long as hee list . and thereof to employ some part in his publique service , the rest to hoord up in his treasury , which is sometimes practised even by lawfull princes ; as edward the fourth in his warres against . france , when having levied a great summe of money throughout his realme , especially of the londoners , hee went over seas , and returned without any thing doing . . sometimes to give an accompt by open speech and publique writing of the expense of such taxes and impositions as hee hath received of his subjects , that hee may so seeme to bee a good husband , and frugall , and not a robber of the common-wealth . . to that end , to bestow some cost upon publique buildings ; or some other worke for the common good , especially upon the ports , forts , and chiefe cities of his realme , that so hee may seeme a benefactour , and to have a delight in the adorning of his countrey , or doing some good for it . . to forbid feastings and other meetings , which increase love , and give oportunity to conferre together of publique matters , under pretence of sparing cost for better uses . to that end , the curfieu bell was first ordained by william the conquerour to give men warning to repaire home at a certaine houre . . to take heed , that no one grow to bee over great , but rather many-equall great , that they may envy and contend one with another ; and if hee resolve to weaken any of this sort , to doe it warily and by degrees , if quite to wrack him and to have his life , yet to give him a lawfull triall after the manner of his countrey ; and if hee proceed so farre with any of great power and estimation as to doe him contumely or disgrace , not to suffer him to escape , because contumely and disgrace are things contrary unto honour , which great spirits doe most desire , and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace , then to any thankfulnesse , or acknowledging the princes favour for their pardon or dismission ; true in athiests , but not in true christian nobility . . to unarme his people , and store up their weapons under pretence of keeping them safe , and having them ready when service requireth , and then to arme with them , such and so many as hee shall thinke meet , and to commit them to such as are sure men . . to make scisme or division under hand among his nobility , and betwixt the nobility and the people , and to set one rich man against another , that they combine not together , and that himselfe by hearing the griefes and complaints may know the secrets of both parts , and so have matter against them both , when it listeth him to call them to an accompt . . to offer no man any contumely or wrong , specially about womens matters , by attempting the chastity of their wives or daughters , which hath beene the ●●●e of many tyrants , and conversion of their states . as of tarquinius , by brutus , appius , by virginius , pisistratus , by harmodius , alexander medices duke of florence , aloisus of placentia , rode●icus king of spaine , &c. . to that end to bee moderate in his pleasures , or to use them closely that hee bee not seene ; for that men sober or watchfull , or such as seeme so , are not lightly subject to contempt , or conspiracies● of their owne . . to reward such as achieve some great or commendable enterprize , or doe any speciall action for the common-wealth in that manner as it may seeme , they could not bee better regarded , in case they lived in a free state . . all rewards and things gratefull to come from himselfe but all punishments , exaction● and 〈…〉 gs ; ungratefull to come from his officers and publique ministers ; and when hee hath effected what hee would by them , if hee see his people discontented withall , to make them a sacrifice to pacifie his subjects . . to pretend great cure of religion and of serving of god , ( which hath beene the manner of the wickedest tyrants ) for that people doe lesse feare any hurt from those , whom they thinke vertuous and religious , nor attempt lightely to doe them hurt , for that they thinke that god protects them . . to have a strong and sure guard of forraine souldiours , and to bind them by good turnes , that they having at least , profit , may depend upon him , and the present state ; as caligula , the german guard , where the nobility are many and mighty . the like is practifed by lawfuls kings , as by the french king . . to procure that other great persons bee in the same fault , or case with them , that for that cause● they bee forced to desend the tyrant , for their owne safety . . to take part , and to joyne himselfe with the stronger part ; if the common people , and meane degree bee the stronger to joyne with them ; if the rich and noble , to joyne with them . for so that part with his owne strength will bee ever able to over match the other . . so to frame his manners and whole behaviour , as that hee may seeme , if not perfectly good , yet tollerably evill , or somewhat good , somewhat bad . these rules of hipocriticall tyrants are to be known , that they may bee avoided and meet withall , and no drawne into imitation . preservation of an aristocraty . rvles to preserve a se●atory state , are partly taken from the common axioms , and partly from those that 〈◊〉 a kingdome . preservation of an olygarchy ; by sophisimes . rules . . in consultations and assemblies abo●● publique affaires so to order the matter , that all may have liberty to frequent their common assemblies and councels : but to impose a fine upon the richer sort if they omit that duty . on the other side to pardon the people , if they absent themselves , and to beare with them under pretence , that they may the better intend their occupations , and not bee hindred in their trades and earnings . . in election of magistrates and officers : to suffer the po●●er sort to vow and abjure the bearing of office under colour of sparing them ; or to enjoyne some great charge as incident to the office , which the poore cannot beare . but to impose some great fine upon those that bee rich , if they refuse to beare office , being elect unto it . . in judiciall matters : in like manner to order that the people may be absent from publique trials , under pretence of following their , businesse . but the richer to bee present , and to compell them by fines to frequent the court . . in warlike exercise and armes , that the poore bee not forced to have armour , horse , &c. under pretence of sparing their cost , nor to bee drawne from their trades by ma●tiall exercises ; but to compell the richer sort to ke●pe their proportion of armour , horse , &c. by excessive fines , and to exercise themselves in warlike matters , &c. . to have speciall care of instructing their children in liberall arts , policy , and warlike exercise , and to observe good order and discipline . for as popular states are preserved by the frequency and liberty of the people , so this government of the richer is preserved by discipline and good order of governours . . to provide good store of warlike furniture , especially of horse , and horsemen ; and of armed men , viz. ●●ke , &c. which are proper to the gentry ; as shot and light furniture are for a popular company . . to put in practise some points of a popular state , viz. to lade no one man with too much preferrement ; to make yearely or halfe yeares magistrates , &c. for that the people are pleased with such things , and they are better secured by this meanes from the rule of one . and if any grow to too much greatnesse , to abate him by the sophis●●● fit for this state . . to commit the offices and magistracies , to those that are best able to beare the greatest charges for publique matters , which both tendeth to the conservation of this state , and pleaseth the people , for that they ●●ape some releife and benefit by it . . to the same end to contract marriages among themselves , the rich with the rich , &c. . in some things which concerne not the points and matters of state as electing magistrates making lawes , &c. to give an equality , or sometimes a preferment to the common-people , and not to doe , as in some olygarchies they were wont , viz. to sweare against the people , to su●presse and bridle them ; but rather contrary , to minister an oath at their admission , that they shall doe no wrong to any of the people ; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the commons , to shew some example of servere punishment . for other axioms that preserve this state , they are to bee borrowed , from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a popular and tyrannicall state ; for the strict kind of olygarchy is kinne to a tyranny . preservation of a popular state ; sophismes . rules or axioms . . in publique assemblies and consultations , about matters of state , creating of magistrates , publique justice , and exercise of armes , to practise the contrary to the former kind of government , to wit , an olygarchy . for in popular states , the commons and meaner sort are to bee drawne to those assemblies , magistracies , offices , warlike exercises , &c. by mulcts and rewards , and the richer sort are to bee spared , and not to be forced , by fine , or otherwise , to frequent these exercises . . to make shew honouring and reverencing the richer men , and not to sweare against them , as the manner hath beene in some popular states ; but rather to preferre them in all other matters , that concerne not the state and publique government . . to elect magistrates from among the commons , by lot , or ballating , and not to choose any for their wealths sake . . to take heed , that no man beare office twice , except it bee military , where the pay , and salery , &c. is to bee reserved in their owne hands , to bee disposed of by a common councell , &c. and to see that do man bee to highly preferred . . that no magistracy bee perpetuall , but as short , as may bee , to wit , for a yeare , halfe yeare , &c. . to compell magistrates , when their time expireth to give an accompt of their behaviour and government , and that publiquely before the commons . . to have publique saleries and allowance for their magistrates , judges , &c. and yearely dividence for the common-people , and such as have most need among them . . to make iudges of all matters , out of all sorts , so they have some aptnes to performe that duty . . to provide that publique iudgements and trials , bee not frequent ; and to that end to inflict great fines and other punishments upon pettifoggers and dilatours , as the law of requitall ; &c. because for the most part the richer and nobler , and not the commons are indited and accused in this common-wealth , which causeth the rich to conspire against the state ; whereby , many times , the popular state is turned into an olygarchy , or some other government . hereto tendeth that art of civill law , made against accusers and calumniatours : ad senatos consultum turpilianu● , lib. . di calumniatoribus . . in such free states as are popular , and have no revenue , to provide that publique assemblies bee not after : because they want salery for pleaders and oratours ; and if they bee rich ; yet to bee wa●y . that all the revenew bee not divided amongst the commons . for , that this distribution of the common revenue among the multitude is like a purse or barrell without a bottom . but to provide , that a sufficient part of the revenue bee stored up for the publique affaires . . if the number of the poore encrease too much in this kind of state , to send some abroad out of the cities into the next country places , and to provide , above all , that none doe live idly , but bee set to their trades . to this end , to provide that the richer men place in their farmes and coppiholds , such decayed citizens . . to bee well advised what is good for this state , and not to suppose that to bee fit for a popular state , that seemeth most popular ; but that which is best for the continuance thereof . and to that end , not to lay into the exchequer , or common treasury , such goods as are confiscate , but to store them up as holy and consecrate things , which except it bee practised , confiscations , and fines of the common people would bee frequent , and so this state would decay by weakening the people . conversion of states in generall . conversion of a state , is the declining of the common-wealth , either to some other forme of government , or to his full and last period appointed by god . causes of conversions of states , are of two sorts : generall and particular . generall , ( viz. ) . want of religion ●viz . of the true knowledge , and worship of god , prescribed in his word ; and notable sinnes that proceed from thence in prince and people , as in the examples of saul , vzziah , the iewish 〈◊〉 ; the foure monarchies , and all other . . want of wisedome , and good councell , to keepe the state , the prince , nobles and people in good temper , and d●● proportion , according to their severall orders and degrees . . want of iustice , either in administration ( as ill lawes , o● ill magistrates ) or in the execution , as rewards not given where they should bee , or there bestowed where they should not be , or punishments not inflicted where they should be . . want of power and sufficiency 〈◊〉 maintaine and defend it selfe ; viz of provision , as armour , money , captaines , souldiours , &c. execution when the mea●es or provision is not used , or ill used . . particular : to bee noted and collected 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the contraries of those rules that are prescribed for the preservation of the common-wealths . particular causes of conversion of state , are of two sorts . . forraine : by the overgreatnesse of invasion of some forraine kingdome , or other state of meane power , having a part within our owne , which are to bee prevented by the providence of the chiefe , and rules of policy for the preserving of every state . this falleth out very seldome for the great difficulty to overthrow a forraine state . . domestique : sedition or open violence by the stronger part . alteration without violence . sedition . sedition is a power of inferiours opposing it selfe with , force of armes against the superiour power , quasi diti● secedens . causes of sedition are of two sorts . . generall . liberty .   riches . vvhen they , that are of equall quality in a common-wealth , or doe take themselves so to bee , are not regarded equally in all , or in any of these . or when they are so unequall in quality , or take themselves so to be , are regarded but equally , or with lesse respect , then those that bee of lesse defect in these . things , or in any of them . honour .   . in the chiefe : covetuousnesse or oppression , by the magistrate or higher power , ( viz. ) when the magistrates , especially the chiefe encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure , either with the publique or ( private calamity , whereby the governours grow to quarrell among themselves as in olygarchies ) or the other degrees conspire together , and make quarrell against the chiefe , as in kingdomes : the examples of wat tyler , iarke straw , &c. . in the chiefe : injury , when great spirits , and of great power are greatly wronged and dishonoured , or take themselves so to bee , as coriolanus , cyrus minor , earle of warwick . in which cases the best way is to decide the wrong . . preferment , or want of preferment ; wherein some have overmuch , and so wax proud and aspire higher : or have more or lesse , they deserve as they suppose ; and so in envy , and disdaine seeke innovation by open faction , so caesar ; &c. . some great necessity or calamity ; so xerxes after the foile of his great army . and senacheris after the losse of . in one night . . p●rticular . . envy , when the chiefe exceed the medio●●ity before mentioned , and so provoketh the nobility , and other degrees , to conspire against him ; as brutus cassius , &c. against caesar . . feare , viz. of danger , when one or more dispatch the prince , by secret practise or force to prevent his owne danger , as artabanus did xerxes . . lust or lec●ery , as tarquinius superbus , by brutus ; pisistratinde , by armodius , appius by virginius . chiefe . . contempt ; for vile quality and base behaviour , as sardanapalus , by arbaces ; dionisiu● the younger by dion . other degrees . . contumely ; when some great disgrace is done to some of great spirit who standeth upon his honour and reputation , as caligula , by chaereas . other degrees . . hope of advancement , or some great profit , as mithidrates , an●barsanes . alteration without violence . causes of alteration without violence are ; . excesse of the state ; when by degrees , the state groweth from that temper and mediocrity , wherein it was , or should have bee setled , and exceedeth in power , riches and absolutnes in his kind , by the ambition & covetousnesse of the chiefes , immoderate taxes , and impositions , &c. applying all to his owne benefit without respect of other degrees , and so in the end changeth it selfe into another state or forme of government , as a kingdome into a tyranny , an olygarchy into an aristocraty . . excesse , of some one or more in the common-wealth ; viz. when some one , or more , in a common-wealth grow to an excellency or excesse above the rest , either in honour , wealth , or vertue ; and so by permission and popular favour , are advanced to the soveraignty : by which meanes , popular states grow into olygarchies ; and olygarchies , and aristocraties into monarchies . for which cause , the athenians and some other free states made their lawes of ostrocismos to banish any for a time that should excell , though it were in vertue , to prevent the alteration of their state ; which because it is an unjust law , t' is better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the meanes , that none should grow to that hight and excellency , then to use so sharp and unjust a remedy . finis . a method , how to make use of the booke before , in the reading of story . david being seventy yeares of age , was of wisedome , memory , &c. sufficient to governe his kingdome ; . reg. chap. . old age is not ever unfit for publique government . david being of great yeares , and so having ● cold , dry , and impotent body , married with abishag a faire maide of the best complection through his whole realme , to revive his body and prolong his life● . reg. chap. . verse . example of the like practise in charles the fifth . david being old and impotent of body by the 〈◊〉 of his nobles and phisitions , married a young maide called abishag , to warme and preserve , his old body . observation . vvhether david did well in marrying a maide ; and whether it bee lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man to marry a young woman ; or on the other side , for an old-worne , and decrepite woman to marry a young and lusty man . for the affirmative . arg. the end of marriage is society and mutuall comfort ; but there may bee society and mutuall comfort in a marriage betwixt an old , and young party . ergo 't is lawfull . answ. society and comfort is an use and effect of marriage ; but none of the principall end is of marriage , which are : . procreation of children , and so , the continuance of mankind . . the avoiding of ●ornication . as for comfort and society , they may bee betwixt man and man , women and women where no marriage is● and therefore no proper ends of marriage . the negative . arg. . that conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends , for which marriage was ordained by god , is no lawfull marriage . but the conjunction betwixt an old impotent , and young party hath no respect to the right end , for which marriage , was ordained by god . therefore it is no lawfull marriage . . no contract , wherein the party contracting , bindeth himselfe to an impossible condition , or to doe that which hee cannot doe , is good , or lawfull . but the contract of marriage by an impotent person with a young party bindeth him to an impossible condition to doe , that which hee cannot doe ( viz. ) to performe the duties of marriage ; therefore it is unlawfull . for the same ca●se , the civill law determineth a nullity in these marriages , except the woman know before the infirmity of the man , in which case she can have no wrong , being a thing done with her owne knowledge and consent , because volenti ne fit injuria : — in legem iulian . de adulteriis leg. si uxor &c. it provideth further for the more certainty of the infirmity , that three yeares bee expired before the dissolution of the marriage , because that men , that have beene infirme at the first , by reason of sicknesse , or some other accident , afterwards proved to bee sufficient : de repudiis leg. in causis . defence for david in marrying abishag . . it was rather a medicine then a marriage , without any evill or disordered affection . . it was by the perswasion of his nobles and phisitians . . it was for the publique good to prolong the life of a worthy prince . . it was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid , who was made acquainted with the kings infirmity , and to what end shee was married unto him ; who if shee did it for the common good , and for duties sake , having withall the guift of continency , shee is to bee commended ; if for ambition , or some vaine respect , it is her owne , and not davids fault . politicall nobility . adoniah aspiring to the kingdome . first , tooke the advantage of davids affection and kindnesse towards him , and made him secure of any ill dealing . secondly , of his age and infirmities , disabling his father as unfit for government . thirdly , blazed his title , and right to the crowne . fourthly , got him chariots , horsemen , and footemen , and a guard to make shew of state . fiftly , being a comly and goodly person , made a popular shew of himselfe , and his qualities . sixtly , joyned to himselfe in faction ioab , the generall of the army , who was in displeasure for murdering of abner and amasa , and feared that david would supply benajah into his place , and so was discontented . and abiather the high priest , that was likewise discontented with david , for the preferrement of zadoch . seventhly , had meetings with them , and other his confederates , under a pretence of a vow and offering at the fountaine of raguell , in the confines of iudaea . eightly , made a shew of religion by sacrificing ; &c. ninthly , made himselfe familiar with the nobles and people , and entertained them with feasting . tenthly , drew into his part the chiefe officers of the court , and servants to the king , by rewards , familiarity , &c. elevently , disgraced and abased the competitour , and such as hee knew , would take part with him , and concealeth his ambition , and purpose from them . twelftly , had ionathan a favorite of the court , and neere about the king to give him intelligence , if any thing were discovered , and moved at the court , whilest himselfe was in hand about his practize . observations . wayes of such as aspire to the kingdome , and markes to discerne them . first , they wind into the princes favour , by service , officiousnesse , flattery , &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyalty and faithfulnesse , thereby to make him secure of their practises . . they take advantage of the princes infirmities , age , impotency , negligence , sexe , &c. and worke upon that by disabling the prince , and secret detracting of his person and government . . they blaze their title , and claime to the crowne , ( if they have any ) with their friends , and favourers . . they provide them in secret of extraordinary forces and furniture for the warres , make much of good souldiours , and have a pretence ( if it bee espied ) of some other end , as for the kings honour , or service , and to bee in readines against forraine enemies , &c. . they make open shew of their best qualities and comlines of their person ( which though it bee vaine as a dumbe shew , it is very effectuall to winne the liking of the popular sort , which according to the rule of the election of kings , in the bees common-wealth ; thinke that fo●ma est digna imperare ) activity , nobility , ancestry ; &c. . to have their blazers abroad to set out their vertues , and to prepare their friends in every province . . to draw into their part , and make sure unto them , of the chiefe peeres , & men of best quality , such as are mightiest , and most gratious with the souldiours , and the military men , and most subtill and politique , especially such as bee ambitious , and discontent with the state . . to have meetings f●r conference under some pretence of some ordinary ●a●●er in some convenient place , not to● neere , nor too farre of , but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition . . to take up a shew and pretence of religion more then before , and beyond the practise of their former life . . they use popular curtesie ( which in a great person is very effectuall ) feasting , liberality , gaming , &c. . to bee over liberall , and winne to them by guifts , familiarity , &c. the chiefe officers of the court , and governours of shires . . to have some neere about the prince , to keepe them in credite , and remove suspition , if any rise . . to disgrace such as they know to bee sure and faithfull to the prince , and present state , or to the competitour , and to bring them into contempt by slander , detraction , and all meanes they can , and to conceal● the designes from them , least they bee discovered before they bee ripe . . to have some spie neere about the prince , to advertise them if any inckling of suspition arise whilest themselves are practising . note the practises of absolon : . sam. chap. . and of cyrus minor , in xenophon : {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} cap. . politicall prince . david being a most worthy and excellent prince for wisedome , valour , religion , and justice , and so highly deserving of the common-wealth , yet growne into age , grew withall into contempt , ●nd had many , both of his nobles and common-people , that fell from him ; first with absolon , then with adoniah , who affected the kingdome and rebelled against him : for remedy whereof , hee stirred up himselfe to publique actions which might shew his vigour and sufficiency to mannage the affaires of his kingdome . . after the victory against absolon , hee forced himselfe to forbeare mourning , and shewed himselfe to his discontented army , when all were like to fall from him , for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his sonne . . after the victory , hee caused a generall convention to bee assembled of the whole nation , to bring him home with honour to ierusalem , which was a renewing and re-establishing of him ; . sam. . . . hee gave an experiment of his power and authority , by deposing a person of great authority and estimation , to wit , ioab , generall captaine of the army , and advancing amasa to his place . . hee sent kind messengers to ierusalem , and to other chiefe and head townes , and speciall men of iude● , his contributes , putting them of their alliance with him , with these words , that they were of his owne flesh and bloud , with protestation of his speciall love and affection towards them , to provoke them with like kindnesse and affection towards him . . hee assembled a parliament of his whole realme , and tooke occasion upon the designing of his successour , to commend unto them the succession of his house , and the continuance and maintenance of gods true worship and religion , then established , and gave a grave and publique charge to his successour , now designed , touching the manner of his government , and maintaining o● religion , . chron. . . . hee shewed his bounty and magnificence in congesting matter for the building of the temple , as gold , silver , brasse , &c. and caused it to bee published and made known to the parliament and whole nation , . chron. . . . hee revived the church government , and set it in a right order , assigning to every church officers his place and function . . hee suppressed the faction of adoniah , and ordained solomon his successour ; . reg. . . by these meanes . hee retained his majesty and authority in his old age , as appeareth by th'effect ; for that being bedred , hee suppressed the faction of adoniah , ( which was growne mighty , and was set on foote ) with his bare commandement , and signification of his pleasure , and so hee died in peace . finis . the beginning, continuance, and decay of estates vvherein are handled many notable questions concerning the establishment of empires and monarchies. written in french by r. de lusing, l. of alymes: and translated into english by i.f. de la naissance, durée et cheute des estats. english lucinge, rené de, sieur des alymes, -ca. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a stc estc s this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the beginning, continuance, and decay of estates vvherein are handled many notable questions concerning the establishment of empires and monarchies. written in french by r. de lusing, l. of alymes: and translated into english by i.f. de la naissance, durée et cheute des estats. english lucinge, rené de, sieur des alymes, -ca. . finet, john, sir, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed [at eliot's court press] for iohn bill, london : . a translation of: de la naissance, durée, et cheute des estats. translator's dedication signed: iohn finet. identification of printer from stc. reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic 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proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the beginning , continvance , and decay of estates : vvherein are handled many notable questions concerning the establishment of empires and monarchies . written in french by r. de lusing , l. of alymes : and translated into english by i. f. london , printed for iohn bill . . to the most reverend father in god , richard , lord archbishop of canterbury his grace , primate and metropolitane of all england , and one of his maiesties most honorable priuie councell , &c. most reuerend father , it pleased your graces right woorthy predecessor , to vouchsafe my vnwoorthy letters sent him in my trauailes , a gracious acceptance . the greatest trouble they put him to , was to peruse them ; so were the proofes he gaue of his vertue , and the signes of his loue towards me , the onely end and vse i euer had or made of them . your grace hath had the happines , with the merit , to succeed him in his dignities : his vertues were already yours in proprietie . of his loue i may say , as of your graces ; that i then did , as i now doe , rather desire to deserue it , then deseruing it , desire to make bold vse of it . loue that descends on vs from men of vertue and eminencie , is it selfe both hope and reward , hire and paiment . that to-boote which we call doing good , or a benefit , as it is an effect that true loue matched with ability , will euen striue to produce , so is it then most welcome when it cōmeth sooner imparted then expected . with this freedome of minde , and dutie of respect , i present to your grace this new apparelled discourse : it hath alreadie put on the habit of three seuerall languages , and if my iudgement erre not , our english fashion will not ill become it . i met with it in my wandrings , and brought it along with me , with an intent , for my priuate exercise of that tongue it first spake in , to translate it : that performed , my determination to recommend it to your graces patronage , fell to be at this late dangerous time , when the diuell ( arch-enemie of trueth ) and his execrable ministers held their generall counsaile how they might make but one fire-worke of our whole estate : but the consideration of your graces most iust imployments in so weightie a businesse , withheld me with a reuerend feare of their disturbance , till i weighed that euen this subiects handling might perhaps doe good to some bad that had a head , if not a hand ( for so great a clock could not strike without many wheeles ) in so damnable a proiect : since if they will needs out-strip former ages , or forreine countries in strange plots of ruining kingdomes and cōmon wealths , they may by this discourse be drawen to practise them vpon the common enemie of christendome , and not vpon vs that acknowledge with them one iesus , one bible , one baptisme . your grace seeth the reasons and scope of these my well intended endeuours , which subiect their allowance or disallowance to your graces most graue censure , so doth my vnworthy seruice with my selfe , to your much desired imployment , as your graces most seruiceably deuoted , iohn finet . the epistle dedicatorie of the author to the duke of sauoy . of all we admire in these times there is nothing comparable to the fortune of the ottomans , and the increase of their greatnesse ; if we examine their beginning and meanes , for they are by nation tartarians , sprung from the most base and remote parts of asia , in former times as vnknowen as vnworthy : if we consider their conditions , they bewray no feeling of ciuility or curtesie : if we regard the parts of their minde , where shall we see ought more rude , and rough hewen then the spirit of that people ? what haue beene the souldiours they haue had through whose valor they haue aduantaged themselues by so many memorable victories ? no better then slaues haled in their infancy from the breasts and laps of their mothers , children of tribute tythed euery yeere from amongst the miserable christians ouer whom they command and domineere . yet we see that with these feeble meanes they haue , in lesse then three hundred yeeres , conquered asia as far as tigris , and the gulfe of persia , possest themselues of aegypt , numidia , and all the red sea . more , hauing atchieued these glorious cōquests they haue beene seene to march , as they say , with colours flying thorow europe , to ouerrun large countries , seaze themselues of kingdomes and most puissant estates , finally to become monarches of greece , and to haue caried the empire of constantinople ; whose neighbours haue not bene exempt from the hauocke of their forces , so many armies ouerthrowen , so many princes ruined , so many rich cities and townes sackt and rased . their power , ouerflowing in happinesse , is at this day the scourge of the east and the terror of the west : in sum , they are feareful to the whole world . but the greater is the astonishment , when we consider , that naked and vnarmed , they haue marched victorious ouer the bellies of the most warlicke nations vnder the heauens , the best prouided of forces and all munition necessary for the wars , that such a people as they vnskilled in nauigation should become masters almost of all the seas . many haue gone about to search out the cause of this thriuing greatnesse , and i amongst others haue for my part with no small diligence perused such authors as haue written their history ; but when i haue narrowly sifted all they haue said of that matter , i finde not this my honest appetite and curiosity as i would contented ; rather as one ill satisfied with the diuersity and negligence of their historiographers , all of them nothing neere approching the course and knowledge of the first and essentiall cause of this their so raised fortunes , i haue sought to please my selfe with setting down as i haue , the many acts and obseruations i haue thereof collected , and which well deserue to be published : not that i so far forget my selfe as to thinke my selfe able to flie a higher pitch then others whom i much honour and esteeme ; but because i haue taken cleane an other way ; with this hope neuerthelesse , that huely representing and distinguishing by order as i doe , the establishment of this monarchy ( answerable to what may be vnderstoode thereof ) the apparence and truth of my discourse wil somwhat inlighten this subiect & affoord me an honest excuse vpon the defects which may be discouered in my opinion . the argument then of this book consisteth of three points , whereunto the order of the whole discourse hath reference : in the first place i summarily handle the meanes they haue practised for their aduancement and greatnesse ; secondly with what cunning and deceit they maintaine what they haue gotten : and lastly how we may be able to assaile them , and turne the chance of their victories and powers . this my trauaile ( most mighty prince ) taketh his flight straight to your highnesse to range it selfe vnder the shelter of your protection , armed with the allowable opinion , that your aighnesse as a generous prince cannot but take especiall pleasure to heare , see , & waigh such speculations . to say the truth , the ordinary discourses of your highnesse table are no other but sundry questions , which it pleaseth your highnesse vsually to propound to all those noble spirits that attend you ; but aboue all , when any one awaketh matter cōcerning either estate affaires , or the atchieuement of deedes of armes ; then is the time your highnesse lendeth an attentiue eare to such as discourse thereof , and to all mens admiration resolueth the most difficult points of the matter in handling , wherein you discouer a iudgment so far beyonde the vulgar and surpassing your age , as we cannot but confesse that the propositions you make are so many proofes and resolutions which you deliuer , and please to draw from out the capacity of your seruants . which considering often with my selfe , i finde forthwith allaied in me the heat of the intention i had to dedicate this my booke to your highnesse , but at the same instant finding represented before mine eies ; the excellency of your iudgment , together with your noble and gentle disposition , which knoweth how to accommodate your greatnesse to the honest designes of your subiects , such especially as reuerence you like me , feare immediatly vanisheth and my desire gathereth strength , with assurance that you wil be so gratious , as , though i be the least of your seruants , you will not spare to entertaine and honour this my little labour with your iudgment : practising vpon me what the sunne ( common father of generation ) doth on the earth , bestowing his beames indifferently as well vpon the low plants as high trees . it may please your highnesse then to vouchsafe to receiue this treatise with the like coūtenance as you would ought else especially labored , in imitation of the diuine maiesty ( only idea of all perfection ) which as well excepteth the offering of the poore widow , as the presents of great princes . againe , it may please your highnes not to thinke amisse so farforth to protect the whole discourse , that it may , supported by your authority , passe with that credit as i wish among men , and remaine free from the many censures of such as take no other delight then in reprehending other mens inuentions . this assurance will make me lift my head higher then otherwise i would , for two causes : the one for the honour and particular contentment i shall receiue hauing performed ought pleasing to your highnesse , the other for the testimony i shall heereby haue of the participation of your fauour beyond my merit and expectation : for which i offer vp my selfe not to die vngratefull , as your highnesse most humble subiect and vassall , r. de lvsing . to the reader . the world had neuer more bookes , bookes neuer lesse woorthy matter : learned , vnlearned , all will be writing , and of these the most affecting the glorious names of authors , become the authors of their inglorious names . pro captu lectoris habent sua fata libelli . the readers skill , makes bookes thriue well or ill . but the true life of a worke , and sound discretion of the writer , appeere not more in the well handling , then wise choice of a subiect . i know diuers courses may meete with one end , as many waies leade to one citie , so may one theame entertaine a world of inuentions ; but of these ( like the same meate serued in in seuerall fashions ) some few onely shall carry the true pleasing relish and temper ; the rest ( as knots in names ) stand rather for ornaments or flourishing differences , then matters regardable or of consequence : well may the will or appetite for a time transport vs , but reason as soueraigne must in the end controle and checke vs. in the compasse of my obseruations , i haue seene discourses and stiles , otherwise hollow and vnsound , sway euen the best iudgements , not alone to allowance , but imitation . whether this were the infection of ignorance , that seasing the most might spread to the best ; or the tyrannie of fashion , which must , howsoeuer monstrous , ( if our selues will not seeme monstrous ) be followed , i know not : one thing i am sure of ; time hath discouered their weaknesse , and trueth his concealed daughter is come to light , when such light owles liue ( or to say better ) die confined to perpetuall obscuritie . this worke seemes to haue passed the pikes of such dangers ; it hath for a sufficient time vndergone the view and censure of the best discerning nations of europe : it hath beene taught to speake both their and the old roman language : if england should not now affoord it kind entertainment , i should thinke it in an error ( not to say of iudgement ) of custom , as being not yet cleere of the imputation it carries of harshnesse towards euen woorthy strangers ; but since i finde ( as doe themselues that suffer ) that this discourteous fault is laid vpon the common sort , and the contrary extolled in the gentrie & persons of more eminent quality , vilia miretur vulgus : we will appeale from their ignorance , to the more generous and better bredde vnderstandings . and to awake these , let me tell them , they shall finde it a discourse not faint or languishing , but such as like a wel breathed runner , gathers more strength towards the end of the race , then was bewraied in the beginning . now to others which shal perhaps obiect , that the scope hereof lying out of our distance , asketh as small heede , as it smally concerneth vs ; i answere , that then the gout or gangrene is not to be regarded because the great toe onely hath it . time and sinne may one day ( which god turne from vs ) make vs more sensible , and this subiects debating more necessary : such as it now is , or may prooue ( reader ) i heere expose it to thy view and censure . i know some acquainted with me and my courses , will expect rather matter of mine owne , then others inuention . they haue reason in this , howsoeuer i haue abilitie : but i cannot yet forget an honest learned physician i once obserued , who ( it seemes ) to spare others , so spent his owne spirits in the personall practise of his medicinall conclusions , as his bodie yet suffers the iniuries of such selfe-offered violence . i am not so charitable ; neither hold i him the vnwisest , that out of others triall frameth his owne confirming . it is time that begets iudgement and assurance . and to this purpose i will close with a saying of that euer most reuerenced master of moralitie seneca , non ignoro etiam quae in speciem laborant , dignitatem dico & eloquentiae famam , & quicquid ad alienum suffragium venit , mora conualescere . i. f. the table of the chapters of the first booke . the turke hath applied his thoughts wholly to the warres . chap. . he hath alwaie● sought to make offensiue war. chap. . he hath made no account of fortresses . chap. . he hath trained vp his souldiours to valour and hardinesse . chap. . he hath maintained his souldiours in military discipline . chap. . he hath made no reckning of other forces then his owne . chap. . he hath to power ioyned cunning and deceit . chap. . he hath beene alwaies serued in his warre by good and valiant captaines . chap. . he hath made no skip in his enterprises . chap. . he hath not spent time vpon enterprises of small importance . chap. . he hath laide hold on occasion . chap. . he hath behaued himselfe with nimblenesse and celerity vpon his occasions . chap. . he hath gone himselfe in person to the warre . chap. . he hath euermore gone well appointed to the wars . chap. . he hath neuer fought out of season . chap. . he hath neuer diuided his forces . chap. . he hath not long held warre with one alone . chap. . the table of the chapters of the second booke . of religion . chap. . of the direct dependency of the turkes subiects vpon their soueraigne . chap. . how he hath depriued his subiects of strength . chap. . the causes that may moue a people to fury . chap. . the common remedy applied by the turke against the force and fury of the people . chap. . how the turke curbeth the power of the great men of his estate . chap. . how he confoundeth the practises of forraine princes his neighbours . chap. . the table of the chapters of the third booke . the causes of the fall and ruine of estates . chap. . from what coniectures the continuance of estates may be gathered . chap. . that the monarchy of the turke is comprehended within the number of great estates . chap. . whether the empire of the turkes draw towards an end . chap. . by what kinde of causes the empire of the turke might most easily faile . chap. . that it is not an impossible thing for the christians with open force to vanquish the turke . chap. . why the leagues amongst christian princes are commonly of small effect . chap. . the defects which may be obserued in the leagues of the yeeres . and . chap. . a league which may be treated without danger of the former defects . chap. . wherein consisteth the greatest forces of the turke . chap. . where the turke might be most easily assailed to ouercome him , either by sea or by land . chap. . of the inward causes whereby the empire of the turke may come to ruine . chap. . of the mixt causes . chap. . how particular persons may be gained . chap. . how the people of the turke may be wrought from his obedience . chap. . considerations vpon the greatnesse of the turkish empire . wherein are handled the manner how it is become so great , the meanes whereby it is maintained , and how it would be easie to bring it to ruine . the summe of this discourse . the diuision thereof into . principall parts . the argument of the first booke . steps to the turkish greatnesse . first : my purpose is to examine in this treatise how the empire of the turke is growne to that height and greatnesse . : and the better to effect it i will diuide the whole discourse into three principall parts . the first , what way he hath taken to attaine to the top of such a raised greatnesse as his now is . the second , with what meanes and arre he behaueth and maintaineth himselfe therein ; and finally i will declare how the pride of this tyrant may be abated ; his greatnesse diminished , and his empire ruined . : the subiect then of the first booke shall be to examine what haue beene his courses in his conquests ; and though they haue beene without any order , reason or faith : yet will it be no hard matter to discerne , by the successe of such counsailes as he hath put in practise in his most difficult enterprises , the good from the bad , and also to separate in the course of his actions all whatsoeuer hath beene profitable ; from what hath beene hurtfull and ill vndertaken : heerin imitating the bee which from bitter herbes sucks most sweete hony . these are in my opinion the steps and dessignes he hath followed to attaine to his greatnesse , wherby as by degrees he hath built his strange fortune which makes vs at this day so much to feare him . first he hath applied himselfe wholy to the wars . his war hath beene alwaies offensiue . he hath made slender account of fortresses . he hath fashioned his wisdome to valour and hardnesse . he hath maintained his great and mighty armies in military discipline and policy . he hath made no reckoning of other forces then of his owne . he hath to power ioyned cunning and deceipt . he hath beene serued by excellent captaines . he hath not made any skip in his enterprises . he hath not spent time vpon matters of small importance . he hath laid hold on occasions . he hath speedily put in execution his dessignes . he hath gone in person to the war. well appointed . in a fit season . he hath not diuided his forces . he hath not long continued war with one alone . chap. i. that he hath applied his thoughts wholly to the wars . bookes held by the gothes a let to armes . charles the . his expedition to naples . christians held vnfit for wars , because so intent to studie . the turkes wholly addicted to the wars . the romans most martiall . barbarous nations most warlike and prompt in their attempts . the turks despisers of liberall arts . they inuade italy . their military vertues . whether liberall artes disable their followers for the wars . the vse of history and the mathematikes . letters and armes fitly maried together . learning and valour necessary in a commander , obedience in a souldier . at the time that the gothes made a most fearefull sacke of greece , and as a violent streame ouerflowed her fruitfull plaines , ransacking her many cities and rich townes ; amongst other spoiles there fel into their hands a great number of bookes of all sorts of professions ; wherewith not knowing what to doe , as vnprofitable stuffe , they would haue burnt them , if one amongst the rest had not opposed himselfe : who stepping foorth cried out ; it was requisite they should carefully preserue them , and leaue ( quoth he ) this poison amongst the grecians , since in time they will bereaue them of all martiall courage , as ordinarily they do all such as apply themselues too much to the like learning and knowledge , making them become tender , effeminate , and altogether vnfit for the vse of armes ; so as failing of courage they will prooue more easily the pray of our fortunate conquest . when charles the eight of france with so smal an army made his way thorough italy , and that without vnsheathing his sword or couching his lance , he became master of the kingdome of naples , and of the greater part of thoseany ; the french nobilitie reasoning among themselues whence such a base cowardlinesse , as they had founde amongst the italians , should proceed , imputed the cause thereof to the studie of learning , as that which softeneth the courage , and is not fit for ought but to make a man fearefull , vnapt , and of a weake resolution for the wars . heeretofore and at this day , the turkes haue and doe esteeme the christians of little valour in martiall affaires , becaus of the varietie of arts whereunto they vsually addict themselues ; and though a man be so smally durable as he cannot attaine to perfection in diuers sciences , nor so inable himselfe to the attention of sundry matters as hee may game the mastery for which he striueth ; yet all men will busie themselues about knowledge , and intermeddle with all arts and practises , not heeding that in stead of forwarding themselues , they recoile from that perfect knowledge which is requisite for them , and so remaine vnfurnished , or but weakely grounded in one onely profession . on the contrarie , the turkes fashion their whole dessignes to the war , and bend all their thoughts and studies to the exercise of armes , reiecting all other courses , and pleasing themselues onely in what may stand them in stead for that profession . there is nothing more true ( and we finde it in histories ) then that the romanes were most excellent souldiers , but especially before they opened their gates to arts and sciences presented them by the greeks , and that they gaue themselues ouer to the pleasures of the east . then were they at the best for true cariage of marshall affaires when their consuls scorned not to hold the plough ; when physicians , surgeons , & men of such like profession were in no credit amongst them . and to say the truth , we finde that if afterward they did atchieue any worthy enterprise , it was not by meanes of any valour which was remaining with them , but by the reputation & strength they had formerly gotten . for proofe heereof we may plainly perceiue that as soone as they had giuen entertainement to forraine sciences , made tender by study , they receiued notable and dishonorable ouerthrowes , as well at the hands of iugurtha , mithridates , the cimbrians , numantins , spartans , the parthians , as of others . for confirmation whereof we obserue in ancient histories , that the most warlike people , & withal such as haue performed the memorablest acts , haue beene the most grosse , rude and inured to paine and hardnesse , far from all ciuility ; free from such delicacy and wantonnesse as is corruptly stept in amongst vs ; such as had no learning or taste of any knowledge or action which might allay or neuer so litle shake their couragious resolutions and warlike dessignes . of this composition were long since and are at this daie the scythians , who sometimes made their worthy armes resound as far as the most remote parts of the east , as far as the danow and the bankes of nilus . it is not long since that they , conducted by quingus their king , ouerran all the east , harrowed the plaine country , and replenished all with misery and desolation . the memory of the famous acts of great tamberlane is yet fresh , who only hitherto may vaunt that he hath in a ranged battel vanquished the turkish armies , & led their cōmander captiue , making him serue as his footstoole . in our time the mogores , a grosse and ignorant people sprung out of scythus ( or to say better ) out of tartaria , haue atchieued great conquests towards india . euery man also knowes that the great cham , as rude & rough hewen as these , is neuerthelesse one of the most mighty potentates of the world , ruling ouer a people of the least ciuilitie that can be imagined . but not to wander out of europe , let vs behold the swizzers , & we shall finde that for knowledge and ciuility they are no better then these , yet haue they performed many worthy exploits as well at nancy , dijon , nouare , marignan , dreux , as else where : in such sort as , not infected with our vanity , they giue ( as a man may say ) the law to the mightiest princes that seeke their assistance . now the turks aboue all nations haue euer profest to follow this course of life so barbarous and rude , and euen at this day they contemne all knowledge and profession of whatsoeuer arte , be it neuer so noble or industrious ; among the rest they abhor painting and ingrauing , neither make they any account of architecture : and in very deede we see that they haue euer held it an especiall offence towards god , to ingraue or paint him . as for learning they recken it as meere foolery : in a word , there are none amongst them so slenderly esteemed as men learned and seene in any kinde of knowledge . in their garments they affect not stuffes wrought , imbroidered or curiously cut and fashioned , but such as are whole and lasting ; laces , fringes and other ornaments are by them reiected : beaten and massie gold is only in request amongst them . in the wars they seeke rather to appeere fearce and terrible , then gallantly set forth and apparelled : their whole delight is set vpon war and armes ; insomuch as it is hard to finde any one of them who will not manifest by his fashion of liuing that he is rather borne for the wars then ought else : so as when there is any leuying of souldiours , such as are left at home hold themselues highly iniured ; so honorably doe they esteeme of the life of a souldier . whence it proceedeth , that they are so feared in all their attempts , either for beseeging , battering , or forcing of places of greatest strength ; for skirmishing on foote or on horsebacke , in set battailes by sea or by land , or for fortifying and defending . whereof they gaue sufficient proofe when hauing gotten ottranto they valiantly made it good against the forces of all italy ; euen till the death of their master mahomet the . leauing behinde them , trenches , bulwarkes , ramparts and all other sorts of fortifications , so well contriued and disposed , as they haue serued since for patterns and models to our commanders of christendome . such is their laborious vertue in the wars , as there is no place so strong , or enterprise so difficult which will not prooue easie at the enforcing of their powers . returning now to that i said concerning knowledge : i expect that some one should say : and what i praie , is learning a let to military vertue , or a meanes to hinder a man from becomming a perfect souldier ? surely no : i am of a contrary opinion , and i ground it in part vpon the experience of such captaines as i will heere reckon . alexander the great and caesar who were of the principall most aduenturous , and politicke masters of the wars were most excellently seene in all sorts of knowledge ; for my owne part i hold it very difficult for any without the aide of historie or the mathematiques , to deserue the name of a great captaine and sage conductor of armies : since historie by the variety of examples both of good and bad successe furnisheth a man with heedfulnesse and discretion , with resolution and aduice in all occurrents , and makes him more considerate in what he vndertaketh ; like as the mathematikes refine his knowledge and iudgement , as well in engines of war as in fortifying . in conclusion , it is not to be denied but that learning is most proper to mould and perfectly fashion a heart and courage borne and disposed to armes : for this cause they would in old time , that pallas armed should signifie vnto vs the marrying of letters with armes . now to come againe to the turkes rudenesse , we shall finde ( examining some of their princes ) that somewhat must be abated . let vs consider what were mahomet the . and selim and soliman his sonnes ( the most valiant princes of the race of the ottomans ) and we shall see that they delighted in reading histories , and in studying the mathematikes : so as though nature dispose a man to hardinesse and magnanimitie , it is sure that if he be wholy vnfurnished of artes and learning , he will be of a disposition doubtfull , vnassured , vnresolued and without any true stomacke or valour ; parts especially required in a souldier . this hath beene seene in those of the ottomans which wanted the vertues of the three aboue named ; and amongst others baiazet the second and corcas his sonne can witnesse it . these indeed had in some measure the knowledge of good letters , but these performed no valiant act , because they had not hearts and courages borne to the wars . whence it followeth that the study of learning auaileth much to the forming of a wise and discreet captaine , and to helpe him to attaine to the perfection worthy his name ; nature withall disposing him to valour and generositie . as for the priuat souldier i hold that he needes not know more then to obey it , not being necessary he should be instructed in so excellent an vnderstanding of matters as the commander , considering that humaine sciences and the liberall arts in an vnsetled minde make it embrace ciuility , wantonnesse and ease in stead of trauell ; make vs loue quietnesse ; feare death , flie hunger and thirst , with other paines and periles of the wars : in sum , they imprint in a man rather a desire to husband his life then to lauish it for the glory and good of his country , and for his particular honour : which is more dangerous in a souldier then in a man of any other profession : for this reason such an one neede know no more then to obey , goe well armed , and valiantly defend himselfe against his enemy . chap. ii. that he hath alwaies sought to make offensiue war. of offensiue and defensiue war. the authors opinion thereof . others opinions . reasons in behalfe of the offensiue , and inconueniences of the defensiue war. commodities of the offensiue war. spoiles in our enemies or our owne countrie : their difference . machiauel confuted . the chiefe cause of the turkish greatnesse hath beene the christians idlenesse . the war vpon the turke must be offensiue . examples of good successe in that kind . it is a doubt often disputed , and not yet resolued , whether it be better to assaile the enemy at his own home , or to attend till he assaile vs : the lord of langei , machiauell , and others of our times haue discoursed heereof to the full . for my part i am of opinion ( as also the worthiest captaines haue beene ) that it is alwaies better to assaile , then stay till we be assailed : alexander the great , hannibal , scipio , caesar , and many other romans serue to approue it ; and all these would haue laughed at such as should haue otherwise counselled them . yet some there are in our times which haue endeuored to proue the contrarie by demonstrations subtill enough ( but vnsound ) and to this very purpose of the turke , to wit , that it were better to attend him then to seeke him out vpon his owne dunghill : these are counsailes more curious then well grounded , whereof consequently ensue few effects of moment : we may couple such men with those vaunting ingenours or artists , who discoursing vpon some worke of their inuention promise of it wondrous effects , and set foorth some simple module which serueth but for demonstration only ; but when it commeth ( as they say ) to the push , and that they must put their instrument to his true triall and vse , then is it that they are far to seeke , and that they confesse the difference betweene an essentiall effect and a superficiall flourish , such as their first module afforded . iust in this manner these contemplatiue state-philosophers will attend the turke at their owne home , whom they dare scarce looke in the face neither in nor out of his country . it is most certaine that hee which assaileth hath alwaies more resolution and courage then he that attendeth . for he hath already formed his determination and prouision when the other goeth by heeresaie and likelihoods : moreouer in assailing , the war is vndertaken with more aduantage , and commodity then otherwise it would be ; and he which mindeth to force a country or prouince may make his vse of all such aduantages and commodities as he findeth may serue his turne in the country he intendeth to conquer . as among others , if he haue set on foote some practise , or hatched some treason in the minds of two or three , such of the subiects of the prince he assaileth as he knoweth offended or malecontent . or if he haue plotted some matter of purpose for an vniuersall rebellion . all which incountring with the dessignes of the supposed conquerour , he makes them serue his turne with more aduantage in going to seeke out the enemy ; then he should doe in staying for him at his owne home . by these meanes charles the eight king of france found the way open to the conquest of naples ; and lewes the . possest himselfe of the estate of milan : by the like occasion also the empire of the mamelucks subiected their neckes to the yoake of selim the first . but of all this we may collect a more sure proofe of my proposition then when the enemy is at our doores , and that the astonishment surpriseth vs , ouerthroweth and confoundeth all counsaile and courage ; at such a time vnexpected disorders hem vs in on euery side ; necessitie presseth vs ; all things become suspected and difficult , so as most commonly we know not to what saint to recommend vs ; nor what course were best to be taken ; for since we must haue an eie , misdoubt , make prouisions in sundry places , bestowe garrisons where most need requireth ; we shall finde that applying remedies on the one side our affaires will grow desperate on the other . moreouer by distributing garrisons in this sort , it must needs follow that we so much the more weaken the body of our armie , and that through this constraint we quit the field to the more strong ; which disaduantage commonly drawes with it the ruine of our whole estate . if contrariwise we will preserue all our forces in one bodie , we leaue to the assailer many passages and places where he may set downe and fortifie himselfe there to hold vs play and traine vs on at his pleasure ; but if it should so happen that the assailer were encountred by him which attendeth with equall force , with as braue a countenance , and like courage , the retraict and defence rest at his election , so he be a captaine wise , and aduised , such as was solyman when he marched into hungarie , and when the emperour charles the . went couragiously to meet him . and because the disastrous chance of war may sometimes light vpon the assailer be he neuer so warie and valiant ; it is to be presupposed ( that being granted ) that he will sell his skin at so deare a rate , as the forces of the assailed shall remaine thereby so disordred , as he will not be able to offend the vanquished , or disturbe his affaires , notwithstanding that his countrey be farre distant from the countrey assailed : this may be seene by the example of the ouerthrow the french receiued , and the taking of their king prisoner before pauye insomuch as that losse ( besides that of their prince ) did not afford ought to the victorious whereby he might aduantage himselfe vpon the kingdome of france . also it is much more easie to set a foote againe an armie discomfited , abroad then at home ; because if fortune haue shewed her selfe aduerse and our foe at our home , then is the time that such as are malecontents and mutinous lift vp their heades , and that our people stand amazed and for the most part vntractable . then must we trauaile amaine to put our men in hart , then must we make much of those few good men , the remaines of a battell to bestowe in our townes and trust them with the gouernment thereof . on the other side if these losses betide vs far from our home and in another country , the feare and the stonishment will be the lesse amongst our subiects , and they more pliable and forward to succour vs , were it but to keepe the danger aloofe from themselues . me thinkes machiauel much abuseth himselfe when he so opiniatiuely mainteineth , that if the romans had receiued out of italy the blowes hannibal gaue them by the ouerthrow of * three armies , that they had neuer beene able more to haue held vp their head or re-established their affaires as they did : machiauel laieth this ground ; that they had neuer found meanes againe to set a foote so soone as they did the residue of their forces , had it beene out of italy . marke i praie how he erreth ; for it is well knowen that the ouerthrowes they had in their owne country made them lose , besides their souldiours , many good townes , and bred reuolt in their colonies which followed the fortunes of the victorious , with diuers other accidents that shooke their estate ; all , which had not succeeded with such disaster if the losse had befell them far from italy : for in this case both heart and meanes had serued them more abundantly then they did , to assemble new forces and as great as they had lost . it is also certaine that if hannibal had knowen how to make good vse of his victory the romans had beene vtterly ouerthrowen . it must needes be , that their meanes and power were very great , and that god had an especiall hand in their affaires , seeing that in such disorder they should recouer themselues ; & that with such corage , as they refused to serue their turns with those which had by flight escaped from their ouerthrows , neither made they any account of redeeming those which were taken prisoners , nay rather in stead of doing this they depriued some of them of all honour and confined others into sicily . it seemeth to me that these reasons may serue to confute those of machiauel , and that it is high time we returne to that principall point concerning the fortune of the turke . we will say then that the faint-hearted slacknesse of the christians hath made way to the turke for the inlarging of his limits , so as they abut almost of all sides vpon europe , and hath beene a meanes that he can now not only attend the enemie ( as machiauel saith ) but goe to rowse him at his owne home . it is the course he hath obserued and taken ; to ruine his neighbours round about him , and increase his power , which he hath so doone as he hath cleane bereaued vs of all stomacke to assaile him , yea or once to dare to attempt it . for though there be princes enow which hold it necessary for the good of christendome to set vpon him at his home , yet to this day we see none that will begin to strike the first stroake , or set first hand to the breaking of this ice . but if euer god gaue vs the courage vertuously to attempt this enterprise in reuenge of the oppression and wrongs christendome hath endured at his hands ; we must not thinke to vndertake it by other meanes then those he hath himselfe put in practise against vs , & that is to seeke him out at his owne home and nobly to embrace the dessignes himselfe hath obserued ; which doing , and hauing god to guide , we shall doubtlesse obtaine those victories of him which he hath had of vs. admit he haue beene for a time our schoole-master , and that we haue learned of him to our cost , it is now high time that wee shew how we haue profited by his instructions , and that we know how to put them in practise and pay the interests of our damages . now to make it appeere that it is not a matter of that difficultie and danger that some imagine , let vs note these examples which are in a maner familiar vnto vs. had not andrew dorea the courage with a small number of ships to enter into greece where he got patras and coron ? don iohn of austria , did he not affoord a notable proofe hereof in the yeare . when being generall of the league , he sought the enemie out in the inmost parts of the leuant where he gaue him battaile with that courage , that though he were inrferior to him in men & galleies , yet failed he not ( assisted by god ) to ouerthrow the most puissant & great armie that the ottomans euer set foorth by sea against the christians : there is nothing the turke so much feareth , as to be set vpon by the christians , both because he knowes they haue valor in them , as also for the iealousie he conceiueth of the great number of them vnder his obedience : all which would without question rise in armes if they might but once see the christians coulours flying , and so accompanied , as that they might to some purpose make head against the ottamans . chap. iii. that he hath made no account of fortresses . we must endeuour as well to keepe as conquer . the reason and vse of colonies amongst the ancient . their discommodities . the causes of rebellions . an other discommoditie of colonies . the portugals manner of planting colonies . their benefite . fortresses the second meanes of preseruing an estate . their vse and necessitie . machiauels vaine opinion confuted . forces euer in readinesse , the third meanes of preseruing an estate . whether is better to maintaine fortresses vpon the borders , or to haue an armie euer ready . how the turks cuntries liue in peace by means of the latter . in keeping the second meanes , in getting the third is most approoued . whence the power of the turke doth grow . wars abroad beget peace at home . princes generally striue by all meanes to preserue not onely their own estates , but such prouinces also as they haue conquered ; obseruing what the time , the humour of the people , and their meanes will permit . but because each one takes a different course , and of this difference hapneth both good and euill , i iudge it necessarie to say somwhat thereof by way of discourse : i will spare to meddle with the forme each one keepeth in the politicke gouernment of his dominions or principalities ; and will draw my selfe within compasse of handling , in three seuerall points , all that may be said or alleaged vpon this subiect . first then we will speake of colonies , next of fortresses , and last of armies , entertained for the defence of the countrey . colonies haue beene one of the meanes which the ancients haue most ordinarily obserued ; and at this day they are practised to mainteine a subdued people vnder the obedience of a new soueraigntie . such then as allowed of this manner of preseruing estates , by way of colonies bestowed the lands of those they had conquered vpon their naturall subiects , equally distributing them according to their merits ; supposing that in so doing , they should sowe the countrey conquered with new men , which might behaue themselues with a like deuotion and dutifull obseruance towards them , as vassals performe toward their soueraigne . the grecians vsed them first ; and then the romanes : but this manner of assurance is not so commendable , as many may suppose , insomuch as it draweth after it these two dangerous consequents . the first is , that when a prince depriueth such of their goods as are naturall owners thereof , to bestow them vpon his owne subiects , it winneth him and his immortall hatred , accompanied with an euerlasting thirst of reuenge , and of regaining their libertie , for though such as are so despoiled of their goods be but few in number in regard of the colony , yet it is to be imagined that they haue many kinsfolkes and friends interessed in their miseries , and that there need but three or foure men of resolution to draw all the rest to a mutinie and reuolt . if this be held a difficult matter , yet is it a thing naturall to become wise by anothers mishaps , and to feare and be prouident lest we fall into the like inconuenience as our neighbours . the apprehension of which calamitie makes vs ofttimes conceiue worse of the euill then it deserueth , especially when the actions of the conquering prince are grounded rather vpon force then reason , as ordinarily they are . most commonly the rebellions and insurrections of people and cities , happen not so much for the outrage done to a whole communaltie , as for the iniuries particularly receiued by some of those which haue reuolted : but howsoeuer , such wounds alwaies breed the vniuersall destruction of a common weale . to this purpose we may alledge the example of roderick king of spaine , who hauing rauished cuba the daughter of count iulian , the indignity of the fact entred so far into the harts of al the nobles of the country , as euery one took the wrong to be his , and hauing thereupon taken armes to aide the father in his reuenge , it grew to a worse matter ; for hereby they gaue the moores entrance into the estate who put to death their king : and were themselues beholders of the spoile of their country by persecuting vengeance vpon so infamous an act performed by the disordinat lust of him who ought to haue reproued and chastised it in others . the other discommodity which they meete who will settle the establishment of their fortunes vpon the erections of colonies is , that in succession of time those men so remoued from their owne country into another newly subdued , fashion themselues vnto the climat , humors , and complexions , and to the same minde of preseruing their estate , as those amongst whom they are sent to inhabit . and hauing thither transported their goods and begotten children , they thenceforth make more reckoning of the country whither they are come as colonies , then of their naturall country whence they were displaced : like trees which planted in an other soile change much both of their nature and taste . this the more easily happeneth to colonies by how much the more remote they are from their natiue place of abode . for proofe , finde we not that euen the neighbour colonies of italy during the time of the second punicke war would not in any wise contribute to the necessities of rome their originall mother ? the portugals obseruing these inconueniences haue to assure the indies , practised a manner of colonies much more sure , tolerable , and lesse enuied ; which is thus : they plant their colonies not all at once , but few at a time by carauans or companies according as neede requireth , to inhabite the countries by them newly discouered ; yet not throughly to people them , but after as they shall see they thriue , and so accordingly they by little and little replenish the colonie . goa is the best prouided of all they haue established , and there they contract alliances with the ancient inhabitants , and take and giue their daughters in mariages : by this meanes ( which is as i haue said the more plausible ) they liue free from violence , assured of the good wils of the first inhabitants who inrich themselues greatly by their trafficke and commodities . in this manner they multiply and are scarcely perceiued how , growing to such a multitude of people as they serue to inlarge and establish the name and gouernment of the portugals . from yeare to yeare they ad to this increase which serueth them instead of a fortresse amongst such as they subdue , and in such prouinces as they will people and accustome to their fashions and rule . time and experience make it plainly appeare , that these formes of colonies are more tollerable and sure then any heeretofore practised , for in these the naturall inhabitants are so farre from being thrust out of their houses , as on the contrarie , they are therein maintained and more confirmed in the peaceable inoying o● their goods . moreouer the vnion and commixture of blood one with another softning their naturall roughnesse , retaineth and redoubleth the affection as well of the auncient inhabitants , as of those of the colony . the spaniards do the like in the west indies that which i finde most notable heerein , is , that the one and the other rest not satisfied onely with establishing colonies , but further they conuert and instruct the indians in the christian faith , to gods glorie and theirs : it is that which the king of spaine performeth and continueth by meanes of such religious orders as he hath planted among them : for not being able to store so many and so large countries as those are with naturall spaniards and portugals , they by this conuersion and baptisme , make those people become portugals and spaniards . hauing discoursed of the forme of colonies , and how the conquering prince may profit himselfe by them , it is now time that we come to the second thing which may afford assurance to an estate . the meanes are many , but the christians most vsually make choise of fortifications , as seeming to them most strong bridles to raine in and curbe both the auncient and newly subdued prouinces . there they appoint their magazins for munition and other prouision for the wars ; there they bestow garisons of souldiers for their defence ; some places they fortifie vpon the frontiers , where they constitute for gouernors and officers , creatures of their owne fashioning , the better to containe all vnder the obedience of the victorious . yet is it that which machiauell reproueth and reiecteth as vnprofitable : but because they are reasons or opininions so weake as that like spyders cobwebs , they are easily broken , i will not spend time farther to confute them ; onely i will say thus much , that alfonso king of naples , a most iudicious prince , whose authoritie should carrie credit , alwaies esteemed this practise of fortification most necessarie and profitable , especially in a countrey newly conquered , and not to leaue it open and consequently subiect to iniurie and reuolt . the proceedings in this kinde , of francis sforce duke of milan , of the emperor charles the . and of so many other princes and captaines which haue woone reputation and renowne amongst men , are such as who well considereth them will laugh at the opinion of machiauel . without seeking any further , haue we not the french for example ? who made no account of erecting cittadels in the i le of sicily : but after they had conquered it , they assoone lost it not without a most lamentable slaughter executed on them by the inhabitants ; but contrariwise deriuing their wisdome from their owne miserie , after they once tooke in hand to make fortresses in sundry places of italy , there was no meanes but by peace to dislodge them . the mamelucks who were in the same error of not trusting to fortresses , found themselues in lesse then two daies depriued by selim of the most part of their liues , estate , and powers . the spaniard imbracing the indifferency of this opinion , and desirous to gratifie the flemings whom they thought to appease by this moderation , returned into their hands the strong holdes of their prouinces : which they had no sooner done , but they were neere-hand expelled the low-countries . and though all these examples are but too sufficient to confute the opinion of machiauel , yet will i bring him once more vpon the stage , and sift him a little better : see heere the substance of what he saith : either thou art able ( saith he ) to bring sufficient store of men into the field ( in which case fortresses are not any waies necessarie ) or thou hast not meanes to leauie such forces as are requisite to defend and warrant thy estate , and then they are vnprofitable . marke , i praie , the wrong course he taketh , walking as he doth in extreames , without keeping the meane , most necessarie in these propositions : to say the truth , he is much mistaken ; since this matter as others , should be distinguished by the portions and qualities thereof , the better and more easily to vnderstand it . in my opinion then ( which i deliuer not to exclude others ) we must say thus : either a prince hath meanes to leuie men out of hand by an ordinarie continuance of armes , or else he must haue time to doe it , be it either by leuying a sufficient number of his subiects trained vp to armes , and by the assistance of friends and associats , or of neighbours , which in regard of their particular interest , will willingly ioyne with him , that he may protect them from the same iniurie he may himselfe receiue . in these two first cases , fortresses would prooue more profitable then necessarie : or else a prince is of that power as he is able at once to assemble so manie men as he will keepe or winne the field from the enemie , or will be able , at least , commodiously to succour the place besieged . in these two respects , cittadels are necessarie though not much profitable , because they by their constant defence , stoppe and intertaine the enemie , affoord by such temporising , meanes and leasure to order matters ; for ( as the venetians say ) chi ha tempo , ha vita , who hath time , hath life . the third meanes for a prince to preserue his estate , is that which those allow of , who not trusting to fortresses , and making no account of colonies , doe ordinarily intertaine strong companies of horse and foote , and in such numbers , as they may alwaies containe their subiects in naturall obedience , hinder rebellions , and which most importeth , repell , and oppose the enemy , and as occasion requireth , visit him at his owne home . in time passed the mamelucks practised this forme of gouernment ; and the turkes at this day obserue it in all points . the visconti sometime lords of milan , vsed this forme of preseruing their estates , and amongst others azzo-visconti ordinarily gaue intertainment ( yea euen in time of peace ) to . horse , and they did him no small seruice . a man may yet put one doubt more of this matter , the resolution whereof shall fit very well for the course and concluding of the discourse . that is , which is best either to erect cittadels or alwaies to maintaine a great army . experience ( our common mistres ) teacheth vs that for the conseruation of great princes estate sortresses are the best ; because they doe not so much incumber nor dislike the subiect as doth an army , whose troupes dispersed in diuers parts of the country waste and disorder all : on the other side souldiours shut vp in a fortresse are not so insolent and licentious as those commonly are which keepe the field , yea and that oft-times with more hauocke then if the enemy himselfe had ransaked and ouerrun it . the liberty which armies dispersed thorowout an estate challenge and assume to themselues , is such as makes them forget all policy and military discipline : the example of the milanois heerein will not be beside the purpose . they neuer complained of the garrison of the castle , but when it came to that that lewes the . would haue lodged his horse within the towne they presently reuolted ; whereupon ensued the losse of the estate . what was it that wrought the reuolt of the flemings ? was it not the obstinate mutining of only . spaniards , who crying after their paie ouerran and made spoile of all the country ? the selfe same spanish nation disquieted the estate of milan vnder the marques of guasto and the i le of sicily vnder ferdinand gonzaga . the sorians and the egyptians no sooner saw selims standards displaced but they rebelled against the mamelucks , whose armies had maruellously oppressed them , they hauing beene constrained to maintaine them at their owne charges . whereto i know may be replied , that the turke neuerthelesse peaceably holdeth his estate after the same manner we speake of , his forces being euermore on foote and in a readinesse : it is true , and so is it that to cleere this , two principall reasons may be alledged . the one that he hath depriued such his subiects as are christians and of a different law , of all vse of armes ; and that he hath brought them to this passe that they cannot vant to hold any thing in propriety : which was not practised towards the aboue mentioned ; moreouer all assemblies vpon whatsoeuer cause are expresly forbidden them : he keeps them vnder and makes no more reckning of them then of sheepe pend vp in a fould vsing them like brute beasts , not once vouchsafing to imploy them in the wars . the other reason is that they haue no power of themselues to oppose the turkes so mighty forces ; and ( which is worst of all ) they neuer haue had any forraine succour to incourage them to such an enterprise . i will forbeare to diue any deeper into this subiect ; me thinkes we may see sufficiently by this how much more supportable are cittadels , then armies ordinarily intertained . but if we speake of conquering , i allow that armies are more to be preferred before fortresses , considering that we thereby inioy meanes to embrace all occasions offered , and at an instant to execute both the will and designe of a prince so prouided . . to say the truth it is that which the ottamans haue practised , to aduance their empire to such greatnesse as at this day we see it ; it is that which hath heaped on them the honors of so many victories , and which hath endowed them with authoritie , reputation and meanes . they haue alwaies had ( as they yet haue ) their armies in a readinesse , and haue fought with their neighbours in a manner with as much aduantage as a man armed against one that is naked . some i know will maruell how such a number of people so armed , can containe themselues from reuolting . i am of opinion , that if they were not ordinarily imploied as they are , in attempts of warre , that in the end their multitudes growen ranke with quiet , would easily be drawen to rebellion or mutinies ; which the souldiers of alexander the great can witnesse , for whilest the enemy kept them in doings , who were then they more hardy and valerous ? but after their victories , who more insolent and vnsufferable ? the roman armies , how fortunate were they whilest they had continuall warre , atchieuing all their interprises in a manner as they could wish ? but after their conquest they became so turbulent and vnquiet , as they assumed to themselues the authoritie of creating emperors , and for the most part so licentiously , as euery armie made his particular choise , so as there was no remedie but to trie by fight who should carie it ; which occasioned the ouerthrow of the state . the french , haue they not euermore faithfully serued their king against strangers ? but so soone as they had peace with the english , and after with the spaniard , they filled euery corner of their country with sedition , sackings , cruelties , and slaughters ; and that with such obstinate persisting , as the contagion thereof hath not beene able for . yeeres space to be remooued . but that which is most to be lamented , is the scandall they haue brought vpon the church . this selfe thing may be appropriated to the flemings , and the cause may be imputed to idlenesse , and the exceeding plentie wherein they liued . the example of bajazet the second shall serue to close vp this discourse , for he being giuen ouer to his ease ; the soldiours , who could not brooke such idlenesse , so awaked the courage of his two sonnes , selim and acomath , as all the forces of the empire ( which had established the turkish scepter ) were diuided into two , and it lacked not much of being vtterly ouerthrowne , euery one for his part seconding the rebellions of the sonnes against the father . chap. iiii. that he hath trained vp his soldiours to valour and hardinesse . why the armies of these daies consist not of so good souldiers as in former times . principall causes of victories . what care is to be had in leuying of good souldiers : and this to be wrought by a fourefould meanes . by election . exercise . honors and profit . the turkes proceeding heerein . it is seldome seene that the armies of these times consist of good souldiours , for the more we vary from the course our forefathers tooke to bring them to perfection , by so much the more are we depriued of that happinesse which were to be desired and seriously sought after by princes , and those which as commanders would reape honor and profite by the wars . victory ( which dependeth of the diuine will ) deriueth her successe and principall ground from the multitude of men , but especially from the wisdome of the commanders and from the valour and generositie of the souldiour . it is requisite then that we looke more narrowlie then we doe vnto their choice , and that they be such as we may honour and profit our selues by them : now we must deliuer how we may light vpon , or make good and hardy souldiours , which is doone in my opinion by a foure fold meanes , by election , exercise , honor , and profit . by election , because all those which we leuie for the wars haue not that naturall inclination to valour and courage , nor a constitution of bodie fit to indure the trauailes and dangers incident thereunto . moreouer a gallant fashion and spirite are not found in euery one , much lesse a resolution to attend , defie , and assaile the enemy ; also euery mans hart will not serue him to enter the trenches , throw himselfe desperatly into the dike , scall the wals , offer himselfe valiantly , to make good a breach in despite of the cannon , of stones , of wilde-fire , and of death it selfe : their complexions perhaps will not brooke that they should spend the whole day in continuall turmoiles without eating , and the night without rest , so as where some make account that antwerpe is able to make . men , venice . gant . paris . all fit and able to beare armes , me thinkes they should be vnderstood that they are such as haue the age required , but not the disposition proper to such a profession . for proofe hereof haue we not of late seene that the prince of parma hath ranged vnder the obedience of the king of spaine euen with small forces those of gant & antwerp which had formerly together with those of the low countries rebelled against their soueraigne ? the romans held in such esteeme this manner of making choise of their souldiours as when they would expresse a leuy of men they termed it delectum agere vel habere to make a choise . in our times no man hath beene more carefull and circumspect in the choise of his souldiours ( at the least of the captaines of italy ) then cosmo de medici duke of florence ; and indeede he was prouided of the best and most approued souldiours of his time . to election we are to adde exercise , without the which there is no forwardnesse or constitution of body be it neuer so strong , able to attaine to the perfection requisite to execute and accomplish , as appertaineth to a good , braue , and noble souldiour . but if the generall be so wise as to ioine to exercise profit and honor , then is it that there is no danger or difficulty be it neuer so great which his souldiours will not ouercome ; no incounter which they will not force ; no enterprise which they will not happily compasse . as for a prince there is no mony better bestowed then that wherewith his captaines whet and intertaine the courage of the souldiour . this was the cause why the romans beside the ordinarie pay of their armies , ordained crownes for them which had in the wars saued the life of a citizen , first entred the breach , or boorded a ship : these were termed coronae ciuicae , murales , & nauales . the turkes , to our confusion , are not inserior to the romans , be it either for the choice they make of their souldiours , or for rewarding them . for they chuse from among the nations vnder their obedience , the most warlike , and take of them but the flower and such as are most proper for the wars , sparing not afterwards to recompence them at the full . it is a thing incredible with what continuall excercise they inure their souldiours , in so much that euen from the cradle ( if a man may so say ) they traine them vp vnto the wars . the intertainment the turke giueth them is sufficient ; but as for the rewards , honours , and commodities he shareth among them , it is hardly to be expressed : there is not any prince at this day liuing that may in this regard bee compared to him ; and which is more , the meanest of his souldiers vpon his vertuous behauiour in armes is capable of attaining to the most eminent charges and dignities of his estate , and of inriching himselfe with inestimable treasure . to confirme this , the goods which meehmet bassa left behinde him , ( who of a christian apostate aspired to that greatnesse ) were valued at two millians of crownes . in a word they are sure that rewarde waiteth alwaies vpon valour . moreouer the prowesse of the priuate souldiours cannot be smothered amongst them , it is rather immediatly discouered and notice taken thereof . of all the ottoman princes mahomet the second was the most bountifull , for he gaue beyond measure , so as sometime he increased the souldiours pay a thousand fould . selim the first did the like ; and it is worth the noting , that as those two surpassed the residue in liberality , so did they in honourable and triumphant victory . chap. v. that he hath maintained his souldiers in military discipline . a very great army may be easily ouerthrowne by a meane army . the cause hereof , and benefit of the latter . care is to be had that an army be not ouercharged with baggage . a generall-with more ease may command a meane , then too great an army . souldiers are animated by the perswasion and presents of their chiefe commander . they are in seruice to be well acquainted with one an other . the incumbrance of huge and ouer great armies . how it commeth to passe that the turkes so great numbers of men proue victorious . defects in christian armies . obedience of the turkes . battailes lost through disobedience of the souldiours . the military discipline of the turkes notable . the happy successe of battailes by those of ancient times with such wisdome atchiued , makes it most apparent vnto vs that most commonly the meane armies haue ouercome the great . alexander the great , diuers grecian captaines , amongst others miltiades and themistocles , and among the romans lucullus , scylla , pompey and caesar alwaies assailed and vanquished the barbarous people rather with vnequall then equall numbers , if we respect the multitude ; but they went far beyond them if we consider their militarie vertue . in these latter times the commanders of the emperour charles the . and of king philip his sonne haue likewise gained the victory of many armies greater then this . to such as demaund the reason of it , i wil answere that it was because the principall strength and sinew of an army consisteth , in affection , in military discipline , and in a well disposed order in the day of battell : without which parts an army is as fraile as glasse . a few may be more easily and orderly ranged then many . vertue vnited is alwaies more powerfull then separated and disiointed . hence is it that bodies of an indifferent stature are for the most part more vigorous then such as are ouer great and huge , which the poet ( speaking of fidaeus ) expresly signifieth in these words . maior in exiguo regnabat corpore virtus . great vertue in a little body raignd . and virgil alluding to the bees saith , ingentes animi angusto in corpore versantur . in slender bodies they haue mighty mindes : questionlesse a meane army must needes be more stable and vnited then a great , because multitude is naturally accompanied with confusion , commonly waited vpon by disorder . moreouer , it is a thing of high consideration to be able to take such order that a campe be not incombred with baggage : rather that it be free and manageable , so as it may be euery where commodiously cōducted , ranged and euer in a readinesse to gaine and make good dangerous & difficult straites and passages ; that it be not tired and discouraged for the long marches it must often vndertake ; that it doe not faint for such accidents as diuersly chance , nor for any exploits or executions which present themselues vnexpected . all which a meane campe will be more proper to performe then a great : for it shall not neede so great a quantity of victuals , nor so great an incombrance of baggage or cariage as the other . moreouer seeing it is more profitable and necessary that an army be conducted & gouerned by one only generall ; and that it depend of no other then him ; it will be more easily effected in a meane then a great army , especially compounded of diuers nations . and this dependance shall be better ordered if the generall can content himselfe with small store of luggage and that well trussed vp . the multitude of meane causes slacketh alwaies the course of the efficient , and keepeth backe the fruite thereof . a little army hath not neede of so much luggage as a great . and it is much better that the captaine himselfe know his souldiours and they him ; then to rely vpon the credit and report of such as are vnder his charge ; for the souldiour that shall heare himselfe named by his captaine aduanceth himselfe so much the more , and becommeth more desirous of honor . whereas if he see himselfe forgotten and vntespected of him which commandeth , he groweth distasted and out of heart , and almost carelesse how matters haue their procedings . who doubteth that the presence of the captaine or generall of an army doth not serue as a motiue to the souldiour to make him diligently preserue his reputation , and to shunne the reproch of cowardise ? which he will not so carefully performe , if he finde himselfe out of the presence of his commander , or that his commander make as if he did not see him . it is good also that the souldiers frequent brotherly together , for that assureth them more , and maketh them trust to one anothers assistance in time of the most crosse fortunes . all these parts incounter and are intertained more easily in a meane , then in a great armie . which is often attended vpon by more inconuenienences then the other , as by famine , plagues , contagious mutinies and dissentions . there is yet another dangerous inconuenience which is most vsually the companion of a multitude ; that is , that they forme to themselues a confidence of their owne forces greater then they ought : of this confidence followeth a contempt of the aduerse power , of this contempt a presumption , author of infinite mischiefes . but how happeneth it then ( will some say ) that the turkes haue euery where gained the victorie by multitude ? would you know how ? because they haue betimes trained vp and instructed their great armies , to keepe so good an order , as well in execution , iudgement , military discipline , readinesse , as disposition to armes , that they are become as tractable , and easie to manage as ours though meane and few in number . on the other side we haue suffered our armies to slide into such insolencie and libertie , as we can hardly rule and conduct them without so many dangers , confusions and luggage , as it were enough to trouble captaines of great policie and experience ; and to say the trueth , see wee not that the turke more easily furnisheth an hundred thousand men with vittailes , then we fiftie thousand ? for besides that his souldiers make not , as ours , any account of the diuersitie of vittailes , of delicacie or of toothsome morsels , they drinke no wine nor beere , which importeth the consideration of almost the one halfe of our munition and charge . what need i speake of obedience , nurse of the order obserued amongst them ? since it was neuer seene that the turkes euer lost battaile through disorder , much lesse left off pursuing any attempt for their souldiers mutinies . whereas almost all the battailes we haue bid them , had not beene lost , but by the meere disorder and disobedience of our men . whereto may we impute the miserable losse of nicapolie , but to the disordinate rashnesse of the french , who serued at that time in the armie ? sigismond king of bohemia ( afterward emperour ) seeing that contrary to his will and commandement they aduanced themselues as couragiously as vnaduisedly . what shall we speake of the ouerthrowe of the same sigismond which hapned some few yeeres after ? came it not to passe by meanes of the disordering of his infantery ? which being not yet fully set in battaile array were couered with a cloud of arrowes , let flie by the enemy so to the purpose as they were all hewen in peeces euen vnder the noses of his horse ; which seeing themselues destitute of foote were strooke with such a feare as they betooke themselues to flight not without the losse of many good souldiours and worthy captaines , all to the shame and confusion of the christians . ladislaus king of polonia , was he not ouercome at varna through the disorders of the bishops of strigonia and varadin ? who to the end to chace inconsideratly the enemy , shaken and flying in one part of his army , forsooke their rankes to pursue them , so making way for them : who laying hold on the occasion came with the rest of their army to charge them there where they lay most open , in such sort as they wan the victory most miserably slaughtering the christians . at buda , at exechium , at gerba , and in sundry other places where we haue bene ouercome , it proceeded rather of our disorders then of the turkish forces . so as we must acknowledge that the turke excelleth vs both in number of good souldiours and in all other military discipline : he is followed with such numbers of men as it seemeth he relieth wholy on their multitude , but it is in so good a manner as if he respected nought but order & military discipline , parts ( to our dishonor ) far from vs. chap. vi. that he hath made no reckning of other forces then his owne . the wars are to be maintained by our owne strength , neither must we rely vpon forraine powers . the good and ill that resulteth of both these . conditions of confederate forces . other inconueniences which arise from assistance of forraine powers . examples of leagues against the turkes . their defects , hindrances of their successe . the turkes not accustomed to make leagues with any , but vsing their owne forces , haue ouerthrowne many armies confederates . with whom they might well haue ioyned in league to their aduantage . all high enterprises either for preseruation of an estate , or for denouncing of warre , haue beene ill plotted and as ill caried when they haue relied vpon the assistance and fauour of a third power , and not of our owne ; seeing that from hopes and proiects so ill grounded we neuer come to inioy the fruits which such a succour , the desseigne of him that enterpriseth , & his extraordinary preparation promised vs ; rather they are infallibly attended on by some lamentable accident which vtterly ouerthroweth them . since oftentimes it falleth out that the expectation of such succour promised , serueth rather to slacke the course of our endeauours , and lessen the preparation of the enterprise , then otherwise to forward or better them ; were it not for the confidence of such succour he that attempteth would prepare his forces proportionable to his proiect , and not trust to outward helpes either of friend or confederat . who doubteth , when we so repose our selues vpon an others forces , and that he is at charge for our loues sake , that he doth not make vs more backward to prouide and disburse of oure owne store ? but this is not all : the worst is , that while we thus expect , time wasteth vnprofitably , and occasion ( which once escaped cannot be laid hold on ) is let slip and lost without recouery : for whilst we so attend our assistants our practises are discouered . and who will beleeue that a friend or associat will embrace the desseign of him he assisteth , or wish his good fortune with such harty affection , as he wil not be ready vpon the least occasion he shall desire to finde , to leaue him in the lurch ? and without question this occasion will offer it selfe at any time whensoeuer he hath a purpose to dissolue the league and couenants agreed vpon betweene them ; especially if he be the stronger and more mighty , and finde not himselfe interessed in the successe of the enterprise , for which he tooke armes and became confederate . we may also adde another defect and imperfection ; & that is , if the succour we attend be to be assembled from diuers places , or , that the windes ( if it be by sea ) or some vnlooked for accident ( if by land ) hinder by so many meanes the preparations for the war and intended voiage , as that the season fit for execution escapeth him that enterpriseth ; so as before he begin to march or set forward to the rendeuous his opportunities of attempting or atchieuing any memorable act , vtterly faile him in a matter which he had before discreetely enough plotted and disposed : moreouer he cannot beare swaie as master of the confederate forces , insomuch as he which sendeth succours may vnderhand deliuer to his commanders memorials and instructions more strict and limited , then the necessitie of the vndertaken affaire would permit . also the least distaste either of the prince which assisteth , or of the captaine which conducteth such succours , serueth oft-times to dismisse the promised forces , deceiue the others expectation , and bring all he vndertaketh to nothing : so as he remaineth not onely more weake by this disappointment , but his owne forces also become vnprofitable , and consequently himselfe exposed to all wrong and ruine : for as if one only wheele of a clocke be out of temper , it sufficeth to disorder the whole motion ; so where the vndertaker faileth but of one part of his promised troupes , the effects , which in part depend thereon , likewise faile , and the course of his warlike designes remaine crossed and peruerted . i will not forget also to say that a campe consisting of such borrowed peeces , hath necessarily need of many heads to command it , and an armie compounded of so manie heads ( because of the diuersity of opinions and affections ) will most commonly haue the woorse when it commeth to handie blowes . we may illustrate these discommodities with examples that touch vs neere , and are familiar vnto vs , and were not long since practised ; for this cause i will more willingly , then otherwise i would , heere produce them . in our time we haue seene two most memorable leagues between the pope , the king of spaine , and the venetians , consenting and vnited to vndertake one warre against the turke : the one was vnder pope paul the third , and the other in the life time of pius quintus . the first was caried with an excessiue charge , yet without any effect woorthy so great an assembly : the cause in my opinion proceeded of the difficulty that was found to ioyn in one body the confederat forces , and draw them together at the rendeuous in due season : for they met not till the end of september . although an other inconuenience may be alledged to this purpose , which ouerthrew , the good successe of such a holy and christian attempt ; yet it may appeere that to auoide the shame and dishonour that followed thereof , it had beene easie to haue performed somewhat of more memorable consequence , then was the taking of castle-nouo , if we had knowen how to husband the times and occasions fit for the imployment of so combined a power . concerning the second , which was ( as i said ) in the time of pius quintus , the army of the venetians , very gallant and strong , spent all the sommer in attending the galleis of spaine which were to conuoy succours into the i le of cypres then attempted by the turke ; so as this slacknesse of assembling the galleyes was a cause that the army became almost quite vnfurnished of good souldiours drawen together to their great costs by reason of the plague which had made a most pitifull hauocke amonge them . notwithstanding all this they forbeare not to make towards cypres so late , as by the way they receiued the newes of the lamentable taking of nicosia : which made them imagine that the turkes had , vpon that commodity , most strongly manned their galleys ( as it was likely enough ) with land souldiours , and that therefore there was more appearance of danger thē of good successe in assailing them : vpon which consideration they held it best to turne their course homeward and refer that businesse to an other time ; hauing then thus dishonorably behaued themselues : returning they incountred so many misfortunes , as well weather beaten by reason of the winter then approching , they at length arriued at their home sorely brused and spoiled . the yeare following the army of the consederats met , notwithstanding all this very late , yet vndertooke they to incounter the enemy , of whome they got that so renowned victory in the yeare . if god had permitted vs to reape thereby those worthy fruits that we had reason to expect . now for all this cypres was not recouered but remained to the infidell as the reward and wages of his valour . the third yeare of the league the king of spaine , in stead of pursuing his enterprise against the turke as he had determined , caused don iohn of austria admirall of his fleete to stay at messina , because he then doubted that the french would assaile flanders , with such forces as they had that yeare rather suffered to take breath then wholy cased and dismissed : so as the whole season was spent vnprofitably without attempting ought worthy such preparation , as the confederates had in due time set forth . this was an occasion of excessiue charge , and that the armies did not once stirre till it was too late , attending what their neighbours would do , who , as i haue said , seemed to threaten the king of spaine with some attempt vpon his country of flanders . in the meane time the venetians , tired with the charge and trouble they were at to no purpose , treated a peace with the turke . who will make any question now ( those things well weighed and considered ) that if the leagues ( both the first and second ) had beene well caried without these crossings , iealousies and suspitions which accompanied them , ( though vainly and vpon no ground ) but that they would haue brought foorth some woorthie and honorable fruite , to the glory and honour of god , the peace of his church , the encrease and establishment of the christian common-wealth ? this may be enough to prooue that forces compounded of diuers nations , depending of many and different heads , are in marching more slowe , and at a time of need lesse effectuall then others . it may appeere to some that i heereby inferre , that leagues betweene princes are vnprofitable , and therefore not to be made : so farre is it from me to maintaine that opinion , as i rather willingly embrace the contrarie : but i reserue a time to handle how and in what manner it would be good to make such a league , ( especially against the turke ) when i shall arriue at the place appointed for this purpose , to the end i may discourse of it at full . now let vs returne to the argument of discourse in handling . the ottomans neuer made league , either offensiue or defensiue with any : and neuer had helpe of strangers : on the contrarie , they haue alwaies had to doe with armies compounded of different nations confederate , and conducted by sundrie commanders , all which ( as ill vnited , not vnderstanding one another ) they haue euermore vanquished . moreouer we haue ordinarily seene them more forward and deliuer about their enterprises being alone , then accompanied ; and consequently more vnited in their force , more nimble in execution , and ( it must needes follow ) more renowned and fortunately victorious . yet they had no lacke of whom where with to practise their associations ( if they had approoued them as good & necessarie ) as among other with the soldan of caito , with the kings of carmania and of persia , and with many other great princes al of their owne sect and religion , who would not ( as it is to be supposed ) haue set light by their league and amitie ; especially then when they saw them so increase in power and greatnesse . but they haue euer made verie slender account of such practizes and confederacies , esteeming them vnprofitable for him , who of himselfe hath a high courage , and forces answerable wherewithal to goe thorough with a conquest , which they iudge will admit no sharing or diuision , since the ambition of rule striues to be alone and brookes no fellowship , no not betweene brothers ; as little betweene father and sonne . it is true , the turkes haue sometime taken to their seruice some few troopes of allarbs paied as mercenaries , in like manner as now a daies the french entertaine the switzers and other forreigne nations ; but they neuer termed them , as they now vse , confederates or associates , titles inuented purposely to giue colour and applause to such leuies . chap. vii . that he hath to power ioyned cunning and deceit . machiauels peruerse opinion of not obseruing faith , reiected . the ground of a princes authoritie and estimation laide by the obseruation of his faith . confutation of machiauels opinion . breach of faith a heinous crime . other mischiefes that spring out of machiauels position . to obserue faith is godly , honest , and profitable . what we are to conceiue of the turkes falshood and periury : machiauel amongst other vertues wherewith hee would adorne his imagined prince , woonderfully commendeth disloyaltie in a great person , affirming that he ought not to make reckoning to obserue his treaties of peace or ought else he vndertaketh , at the least when his game is faire : and that he may at such a time without scruple of conscience , or other honest respect , violate his faith , breake the lawes of nations , and his oath . a thing questionlesse vnbefitting a magnanimous spirit , and which ought neuer to haue place among the actions of a christian prince , to the end he may not by so foule and dishonest a staine disgrace the residue of his vertuous operations . this makes me esteem this axiom so lewd and detestable , that we should blush , so much as to imagine it , much lesse to propound it as a precept for princes ; who are not to professe other then iustice and generositie . it is good for none but those whose case is desperate , and who respect not that their posteritie condemne them for men of foule and cauterized soules . to say the trueth , no man can with reason gainsay , renowne and a good reputation , as well at home as abroad , to be the most firme foundation of all principalitie . and what reputation can a prince haue either among his owne people or strangers , if he be noted for a disloyall , vnfaithfull , and periurde person , one that stands neither to his word nor agreement ? machiauel to conceale the fault he not ignorantly committeth , saith , that this is sometimes most requisite for the good of princes affaires , since occasion once passed is irrecouerable . what more meere folly could he discouer to his confusion , then in thus concluding , that a prince is not to regard the bond of his faith , if the good of his estate present an occasion to violate it ? truely none at all : neither were it necessarie according to gods lawes , or the carriage of humane affaires , that christian princes were of that minde ; for it would prooue the direct course neuer to see but fire and sword amongst vs. such as are good detest these opinions , as did heretofore frances the first ; who professing faith and honour , reiected such counsaile when the emperour charles the . about the establishment of the affaires of flanders , passed thorow france , and vpon the kings word , crossing his country came to paris . that word this noble prince preferred before the greatest good that could betide his estate , if he would haue retained the emperour , and constrained him to forgoe the places and estates he held in lombardy and italy , whereto the king pretended a right , which he often vnprofitably disputed , as did also henry the second . by the same reason a man may also say that sometimes it is well done to ransacke churches , robbe altars , oppresse innocents , and succour the wicked : for there is not any vice so detestable , or crime so hainous that sometime carrieth not with it a shew and colour of good , and proueth not profitable to him which in due season performeth it ; were it for nought else but because he attaineth the effects of his corrupt will. if that were not , should wee haue so many murtherers , falsifiers , sacrilegious persons and men giuen ouer to all reprochfull vices ? if thereby they did not reape some temporall commodity ? i will yet adde further , and maintaine it to the end , that for a man to keepe his promised faith , and be so accounted of by the world , is a worke of god and without comparison much better then to violate it and embrace such a damnable opinion as that of machiauel , yea though the profit were immediat and such as might afford wherewithall to ballance his breach of faith and promise : not to keepe touch with one is enough to incurre the suspition and ill conceit of all ; neither is there any which will not thinke he doth god good seruice in performing the like towards all such princes as shall take such courses ; which will yet farther administer matter for an other repentance , to see that when they shall tell or meane truth no man will beleeue or trust them . i could illustrate this proposition with infinite examples but i will content my selfe with that one of duke valentine sonne of pope alexander the . cited by machiauel , as a perfect captaine ; who without respect of truth , his oath , reuerence of religion , or honour , which is so charily to be preserued amongst men ordinarily , abandoned himselfe to all disloialty , breach of faith , and whatsoeuer other wicked and traiterous courses ; so they caried with them some shew of present commodity . this man during the life of his father went thorow with certaine his designes , borne out rather by the popes authority then any fortunate successe of his mischieuous attempts . after the death of his father it was quickly seene how smally durable are all such estates as are founded vpon deceit . for he found himselfe immediatly forsaken of his friends and pursued by his enimies ; so as more liuely to expresse what he came to , after he had most maliciously hatched & atchiued so high enterprises , he serued ( as they say ) but for a cipher , and was as one that had no being , leauing nought behind him but only the footsteps and a cursed memory of his wickednesse , which made his life and name infamous to all posterity . some one will tell me that the turkes haue done the like , and haue vsed all sortes of cunning , deceit and trechery , towards their neighbours , and that neuerthelesse they haue thriued by it . it is true , but the causes are different , and yet we see that the most disloiall amongst them were not the most assured in the forces of their trecheries . amurath the second , mahymeth the second , baiazeth the second , selim the second , were held the most subtile princes of their race ; but we must grant that if those their wicked procedings thriued for a time , it was more through the coldnesse and dissentions of the christians when they should haue reuenged and repelled their iniuries , then that we should therefore beleeue that it is well done to proue periured and disloiall . amurath the second made proofe of it to his cost , and hauing receiued an ouerthrow at the handes of ladislaus king of polonia , he speedily made peace with him and turned his forces against caramania , where whilest he was busied , ladislaus iudging ( so perswaded and backt by pope eugenius ) that hee should not doe amisse to falsifie his faith with a barbarous turke of so insolent a nature , and so capital an enimie of christendome as all breach of peace might seeme as a true performance thereof ; resolued to make war vpon him on the sodaine , which proued so dangerous as amurath was neere tumbling from the top of an high and glorious fortune to the lowest degree of misery ; so as his estate was neuer more shaken and endangered ; if the christian army ( which followed their victory ) had not , as i haue said , disordered thēselues : whereupon the glory and triumph fell to the infidels to the great misery and confusion of the christians . selim the second , hauing vnlooked for , attempted vpon the venetians to the preiudice of his vowed faith pulled vpon his necke the forces of the league , & had too late repented himselfe if god in regard of our sinnes had not in such sort sealed vp the eies of the christians as they could not see nor make their benefit of the gate his diuine maiesty had set open to a more high enterprise then the losse they receiued at lepanto . soliman that was held the most wise prince of all the ottomans ( if wisdome be able to shine where there is no light of true faith and christian beleefe ) hauing vnderstood at such time as he caused his army by sea to fall downe towards ottranto the yeare . that mercurin de gatinaro and the citizens of castro were made prisoners after they had surrendred the place contrary to promise , hee foorthwith commanded that they should be released , saying that disloialtie to violate their faith and word once passed , was not the meanes to win the hearts and likings of strange nations . chap. viii . that he hath beene alwaies serued in his wars by good and valiant captaines . whether an experienced commander and rawe souldiers : or experienced souldiers and an vnskilfull commander be the better . the first best allowed and the reasons . examples heereof . it is ordinarily disputed amongst souldiers and martiall men , which is the better , a good captaine emploied about the conducting of an armie consisting of raw souldiers , or an armie of old souldiers committed to the command of a raw and vnexperienced captaine . as for me ( if my opinion may carie credit amongst so many , sufficient to decide this question ) i hold it better that a worthy and valiant captaine should haue the charge of an armie of vntrained men without experience , then that an armie of old souldiers trained and beaten to the wars , should be recommended to a captaine , yet a nouice and vnskild in the profession of armes . the reasons proper for the maintaining of this proposition are so plaine to such as without being obstinate or passionate , in behalfe of either party , will entertaine them , as they are not to be gainsaid : for is it not much more fit and easie that a good captaine make and fashion a campe of rawe souldiers , then that good and experienced souldiers prepare and fashion their captaine to the conduct of an armie ? who can without shame denie that an armie doth not rather obey the voice and command of their captaine , then the captaine of his armie ? otherwise it were as they say , to set the cart before the horse . now we must come to such examples as may instruct and make cleere the truth of my proposition . if we will as we ought , examine how many times the christians haue beene ouerthrowne by the turkes , we shall vndoubtedly finde , that it hath euermore hapned rather through want of experience , courage , sufferance , concord , and authoritie in the commanders ; then for any other default . so at the battailes of nicepolis , for that such like captaines did set light by the turkes forces , and tooke not a sufficient suruey of them , they receiued a most shamefull ouerthrow , a woorthy reward of their weake experience , in not knowing how to fight with those barbarous nations , whom they might well thinke wanted neither skill nor valour . did not lewes king of hungary by meanes of the bishop of tomerea ( who brought him almost to the slaughter ) indure the like disgrace , at the battaile of mogoria , for want of experience in matter of warre , and of iudgement sufficiently to discouer the enemies forces , and the passages of the countrey where he was to buckle with him ? in like sort was not the vnskilfulnesse of the italians cause of that victorie the turkes gained at grado , who had then for their leader homarbay , generall of the turkish armie ? also the yeare . at exechium ( mahomet iahiaoglis being gouernour vnder soliman of belgrad and the frontiers of hungarie in the time of king iohn ) the great caziauer losing his courage , did he not abandone to spoile , death , and ruine a faire and strong armie , which he commanded for the princes of germany and italy , some one troupe excepted , which dishonorably togither with him saued themselues by flight ? also before this heauie losse , did not anthony grimani generall of the venetian armie faile of courage when with great aduantage he might haue charged the turkes , and put them to the woorse ? the very like want of experience and valour was seene in an other venetian generall , who shamefully left the i le of negropont to the spoile of the enemy . to conclude , haue not the christians beene so many times put to the woorse neere about buda , for want of valiant and experienced captaines , as it cannot without griefe be related ? on the contrarie , the ottomans haue neuer suffered misfortune of warre ; at the least for lacke of authoritie , command , or wisedome in managing their armies : for they themselues haue in person conducted them , and beene present at all their high exploits and important enterprises by them atchieued . they haue likewise euermore committed the charge of their difficult actions and affaires of warre to the most valiant and experienced captaines amongst them , whom they had formerly well knowen , trained vp , and exercised to such charges by infinite proofes of their courage and wisdome in most dangerous and difficult occasions . in summe , experience is that which perfecteth valor . the turkish emperors haue alwaies giuen to their captaines ample power & commission freely to dispose of their most important affaires , wherin they haue bene thus happy that we cannot finde that euer such captaines lost battaile for lacke of command or obedience ; or that they euer for want of courage or experience in the arte military , made stay or question of their proceedings . of all the bashas that euer had the managing of matters of importance , & had greatest hand in the affaires of their masters , acomet was the chiefe ( who serued mahomet the . and added much to his greatnes by obteining many glorious victories ) insomuch as he was no lesse feared then his soueraign . to him sinam may be ioyned who liued vnder selim the first , and being slaine at the battaile of matarea ( wherein he wan the victorie for his master ) selim said of him that the death of so worthy a man as he , was cause of such great griefe vnto him as it equalled the ioy he conceiued for so happy a victory : such also was barbarossa that famous pirat , who for his many warlike acts wan the renowne of a valiant captaine , and was most highly reputed of his master soliman , for whom he performed many memorable enterprises as wel by sea as by land . hence we may gather that vndoubtedly a great prince cannot doe worse then commit the charges of his wars , the dignities and conducts of his armies , to them which inioy his fauour but vnworthily : he should consider the deserts of others , & especially of such as with more sufficiencie would render an honorable account of so worthy an imploiment . we see it fall out oftentimes that for default of wel measured elections a prince plungeth himselfe and his estate in a thousand dangers and confusions through the insufficiency of his vnskilful ministers : the examples of such infortunate euents would fill this volume if i would stand to relate all such as my memory presenteth vnto me . but omitting all i will only put you in minde of the emperour charles the fifth well knowen for most iudicious in all his elections , meruellous in his actions , mighty for the great number of his excellent captaines bredde and trained vp vnder him ; all which can witnesse the care he had in his choice , and in very deede they did him such seruice as by their meanes he enlarged his dominions with many rich prouinces , adorned his scepter with most memorable victories , and his house with triumphes to his immortall glory . chap. ix . that he hath made no skippe in his enterprises . vnited vertue strongest . the strength of kingdomes by their situation . what it is to skippe in an enterprise . kingdomes preserued by the coniunction of their subiect prouinces . confirmation of the roman empire . the meanes of establishing an empire by confederacies . the french as quicke in losing as in conquering countries . we are not to indeauor so much to conquer as to keepe . the portugals and spaniards distracted gouernment . industrie of the ottomans in conquering . an admonition to christians . horror of the turkes . nothing would be so strong as a poinct , if it were to bee found in nature ; at the least if the rules of the mathematiques be true as they be held , because being most simple , it cannot be corrupted either by inward beginnings , or outward causes ; so is a body more induring and powerfull , the neerer it approcheth to the resemblance of a poinct , that is to say , the more it is vnited and compact in it selfe . and in very deede as nature vnable to bring to passe that all the world should be one only body , made it continued and ioining one part vpon another ; and as to preserue this continuation , she in all she may opposeth vacuum , which is onely able to corrupt and destroy her : so estates become more durable , and of greater abilitie to maintaine themselues when they are ( as i may say ) sowed , linked , and bound together , the one helping to entertaine and preserue the other . hence we may gather that such prouinces as haue their situation trussed vp together in a round forme , are more strong and mightie then such as extend themselues in length : as for example , one may say of france in comparison of italy , because this latter resembling a legge stretched out is lesse fit to defend it selfe then france , which is round , as her prouinces lie and are situate : whereby she is consequently not only more vnited in her forces then italy , but also more nimble and able to maintaine herselfe then the other . now let vs come to our discourse and make it appeare what it is we vnderstand by this discontinuation , and that which we tearme to skip in our enterprises . it is properly when we regard not the contiguity ( if i may so say ) or neere adioyning of our estates ; and that happeneth as often as we leaue an enimy behind vs , at one side of vs , or otherwise , in such sort , as he may crosse , cut off , beseege , or inclose vs when we so inconsideratly skip or stride ; we may likewise saie that he truly skips who crosseth from one country to another so far distant , as by that time he hath finished his voiage , his strength failes him and his troopes proue so out of heart and tired , as they become vtterly vnprofitable . we may alledge for example that which befell the emperours of germany , the king of france and of england in their voiages of the holy land , for the length of the iourny , the far distance of the country , the diuersity of the climate , the change of the aire , and many other such like inconueniences , so tired and discouraged them by reason of the trauailes and miseries they had suffered vpon the way , as they could not attempt any matter of importance , or goe thorow with their enterprise according to their proiect : not vnlike a ball which stirreth not from the place where it is once setled , through want of that moouing power which should tosse and raise it . so if these princes at the first arriuall did affoord any proofe of their courage , valour , and likelihood of good fortune ; the languishing of the principall motiue suddenly made them lose their aduantages , and reduced the whole to tearmes vnwoorthy the merit of their holy intentions and trauels . we must then allow that it is requisite for the preseruation of estates , either that their prouinces touch and intertaine the one the other , or that their forces be of ability to maintaine themselues of themselues : for this continuation hath of it selfe such force and efficacie for the lasting and preseruation of estates , as we see that common-weales and meane kingdomes haue thereby longer maintained themselues then great and rich monarchies . wee may alledge for example the common-weales of sparta and of venice ; of the kingdomes of persia and france , whose rule hath much longer endured then that of the sarazins , of the mamelucks , or of other more mighty empires . the cause proceedeth , as i haue said , of the vnion of that entertainment and coniunction of prouinces , abutting the one vpon the other , which is of such vertue and efficacie to giue strength and continuance to a monarchie , as it almost exceedeth conceit and imagination . the romans which saw wel enough that the inlarging of their empires limits , trained after it a consequence of a necessary dispersing of their forces , endeuored by al means possible to reunite this body , augmented and made huge by their aduantageous conquests ; reducing to their obedience and rule , all they got both by maintaining sufficient forces vpon the frontiers of their empire or garrisons in places of importance , as also by establishing colonies , and infranchising many strong townes , with bestowing on them the like liberties as the people of rome enioyed , by them tearmed municipia . in other places also they instituted certaine fraternities and assemblies of people , with prerogatiues of the romanes priuiledges , which they named conuentus : moreouer , they committed estates and intire kingdoms to the gouernment of certaine princes held and esteemed as friends of the people of rome . by these meanes ioyning them to their loue as well by gratifying them with their liberty and bounty , as with other priuiledges , honours and dignities , whereof they did partake in their towne as in right of citizens : they tearmed these townes and people their confederates , and the kings their friends . as for example in africke they had massinissa , and iuba ; in asia , eumenes , prusias and the king of egypt . in europe those of marseilles , autum , auerg●●● , rennes and others ; making account more to auaile themselues by such confederacies and amities then by meanes more strickt and seuere : so then power is established and continued either by our owne forces , or by annexing of the forces of our friends which serue vs as a continued rampart and conducteth vs out of danger euen into the country which we intend to inuade , and that with so much the greater aduantage , when vpon some part it confineth with the country of our confederates . but because we are neuer able with good assurance ( especially princes amongst whom this is a tickle point ) to maintaine so good intelligence , it is requisite if we will make this vse of an other , to make him confident either through the hope of participation in our conquests , or else by intimating vnto him ( if he be our inferiour ) an euident assurance in our proceedings , and such a plainnesse and integrity in all our other actions , as euen that may rid him of the distrust he might conceiue of being one day praied vpon and brought vnder by that insolencie which accompanieth the prosperitie of fortune , and may serue to stretch the conscience of a conquering prince . after we haue in this manner framed an impression of our integritie in the heart of our neighbour , we may march in his countrey as securely as in our owne , and rest assured that we shall by him be furthered and assisted . the french could neuer keepe any countrey by them conquered abroad , vnlesse it were piemont and sauoy : for it one day they had gained a foote of land , they were enforced to forgoe it the next , no sooner winning it , but they lost it . we commonly say , that there is no lesse vertue in him that keepeth them in him that getteth . i affirme that there is neede of more dexterity in keeping then in getting , for an amazement of the people we inuade , a rebellion in our behalfe , or any other such like sturre makes vs easily masters of that whereto we aspire ; but to preserue what we get , we must maintaine a continuall counsaile which must haue all the parts thereto appertaining , as grauity of iudgment , ripe deliberation , nimblenesse to dissemble , industry ioyned with a daily heedefulnesse and patience to attend occasions . the french ( which are reputed the most warlike nation vnder the sunne , ) are but too sodaine , open , impatient and of too stirring a nature ; for proofe you shall obserue that what they atchieue not when they first attempt , they almost neuer compasse it : all their boilling heat is soone exhaled and spent by the sodaine feruencie of their courage , which most commonly transports them beyond all moderation and aduice most requisite in what wee vndertake , without heeding the end for which they begā . this negligence together with their impatience hath made way to all the misfortunes which out of their countrie they haue induced : the voyage of the terseras and certaine other attempts vpon the portugales haue not long since confirmed this opinion , and made the wound of their vnhappines bleede a fresh . lews the eleuenth , a prince of an approued wisdome and cleare sighted in matters of estate , would neuer lend any eare to the perswasions of sending an army into italie or other remote parts ; reiecting all such practises , as well for the reason formerly alledged , as because of the infidelitie which he thought to be in the italians , and particularly in them of genoa . if charles the . his sonne , lewes the . francis the first , and henry his sonne had inherited this their predecessors opinion , they had not with such excessiue charge , mishap , and misery attempted italy . heere some one will obiect that neuerthelesse the dominion of the portugals is of . yeares continuance or thereabout in the indies , so far distant from the first spring and originall . the like appeareth in the gouernment of philip king of spaine spread and diuided in so many places aswell in europe as in india . surely it is not possible to imagine a greater distance then from lisbon to ormus , goa , malaca , and ternate , so as from portugale to their farthest conquests , there are no lesse then twentie thousand miles ; and although they endeuour to ioyne these estates so seuered , by the neerenesse of sundry fortresses heere and there bestowed in the midway ( as zofala , mohambique , melinde , which belongeth to a certaine king their ally , besides other like meanes ) yet all these are but weake sinewes long to sustaine the vnion of so far separated members . but it is gods pleasure that by how much the foundations of this rule are more feeble and subiect to be shaken , by so much the more we should admire the omnipotency of his diuine maiesty , whereby they are maintained , fortified , and protected . the dominion likewise of the king of spaine is spread into so many parts of asia ( especially by meanes of annexing the crowne of portugale ) of afrike , of europe , and of the new found world , as there appeareth in this preseruation a greater miracle then counsail or humane prouidence , for in very deed to rule so many and so seuered nations differing in religion , manners and tongues without stirring from home , is it not a worke of heauen rather then of humane policy or discourse ? god therefore which hath of his goodnesse made him owner of so many and so goodly countries , hath not denied him wisedome and counsaile to know how to order and maintaine them , as he doth , vnder his obedience . the ottomans haue ordinarily behaued themselues more iudiciously in this one part of conquering ( without inconsiderat skipping ) then in any other of their actions . for neither couetousnesse of inriching or inlarging their estate , nor the easinesse of attempting , nor the inticements of peoples insurrections , nor the thirst of reuenge ( which commonly makes princes mighty in men and mony , forget themselues when the maintenance of their authority & credit is called in question , especially perceiuing the law in their hands to execute more readily then can particular persons ) nor any such like motiues haue beene able , as i said , to induce the turkes indiscreetly to skip or to ingage themselues in any enterprise far from home . rather on the contrary they haue marched faire and soft from country to country , and deuoured ( as they continue still to doe ) all such as confine and are neighbours vnto them . hence hath growen the consequence of so many happie victories , the benefite of so great and rich conquests ; the course of so easily preseruing what they haue gotten . i haue said that for the most part they haue not inconsideratly skipped or strid in their enterprises , as the christians doe and haue done : and as we see , when any of them haue taken such waies to greatnesse , the fruits and effects haue not prooued answerable to their proiect and promised fortunes . this vnhappinesse , common with the error founded vpon the reasons formerly alledged , ought hencefoorth to serue as an instruction to make vs become more wise and regardfull then we yet are , to the end that after we haue by an holy and vniuersall amendment appeased the wrath of god , we may war against them with the same policies and aduantages as they haue practised in raising themselues to our cost and confusion . these examples also should admonish vs of what is to be feared , to wit , least failing to chastice & humble our selues , his diuine maiesty inflict vpon vs a more seuere punishment , then that we haue hitherto indured , and for this cause open a more large gate to those infidels vtterly to ruine and destroy vs. now lest any one should thinke i haue against reason held that the turkes haue not , as we , forgotten thus inconsideratly to skip , i will recite certaine examples to that purpose . the first then that did it , was mahomet the second , which vnfortunatly attempted italy , soliman performed the like against the same country , after the interprise of diu in the indies , which was vndertaken the yeare . then that of the yeare . that of ormus . and finally vpon good grounds the attempting of malta which was so valiantly defended by the knights of the order , as ( next the honour due vnto the diuine maiestie ) all those braue gentlemen , who with their grand master parisot , made it good against the infidels , deserue to be consecrated to all praise , and to a most glorious and eternall memory . chap. x. that he hath not spent time vpon enterprises of small importance . get the greater , the lesse will follow . the besieging of some small holde , may be the hinderance of the whole expedition , this exemplified . the turkes discretion in their expeditions and sieges . the best course is , to become masters of the field . error in the siege of malta . _nature as wise and prouident , doth not busie her-selfe about the birth of euerie particular thing , but rather setteth her hand to the generation of the substance , which without any further paine , is afterward attended on by the accidents euery where inseparably accompanying her . in like sort a good and discreet captaine in the carriage of his enterprises , should not aime at ought else but to conquer the places of importance ; for of their consequence other inferior parts of the estate come tumbling in ( as it were ) of themselues , which as vnseparable accidents or qualities , vndoubtedly follow the first examples of greater moment , whereon dependeth and subsisteth the others being . we haue often seene , that a paltrie sconce ( either because of the naturall strength of the situation , thicknesse of the wall , goodnesse of the matter , couragious obstinacy of the defenders , or some other accident not foreseene or dreampt of , hath stopt the proceeding of a royall armie , and hath prooued it selfe as able to withstand the force thereof , as a citie greater , richer , and more peopled . and though we become after masters of such blocke-houses and small fortes , yet that is no furtherance to a more important conquest ; or helpe to the enterprise begun . we finde written that the emperour maximilian , because he to no purpose spent so much time about asola ( which he striued to subdue by the way , for the reputation and credit of the armie , he conducted to milan ) inconsiderately lost the occasion offered him to become lord of that dukedome ; and performed not any thing after to the good of his affaires . the french also , after they had passed the alpes in the time of lewes the . thriued not in their attempts of the kingdome of naples ; hauing vpon an ill ground vndertaken rocca-secea , where they engaged both their honors and liues ; for hauing besieged it certaine daies , and giuen the assault in vaine , they lent leasure and courage to the spaniards , to bethinke themselues : made their powers lesse valued for so badde a beginning , and discouraged the people for euer attempting any thing in their behalfe , as no doubt they had done if they might haue seene a fortunate and better digested proceeding then theirs was , the name of the spaniard being then odious amongst them . this fault made the spaniards so bold as to say , that the rest of the kingdome was reserued for them , and not for the other , who had so ill husbanded their opportunities . in the yere . holding on the said designe for the conquest of naples , did they not vainely spend time , money , their forces , and paines at ciuitella , to the ruine of that goodly armie which henry the . of france sent thither vnder the command of the duke of guyse : who was neuerthelesse a valiant and discreet captaine , and who had perhaps done better if his particular interest , or the ouermuch trust he reposed in the popes nephewes , had not blinded him : other reasons may be alleaged for the small good this armie did the king , who had conceiued of it great and honorable hopes ; but i will referre them to such as write that historie . the spaniards also haue thrice attempted the i le of gerbes , and euerie time lost a goodly and florishing armie , able to haue performed a farre greater matter then they could hope for by getting the henroust ( if i may so tearme it . ) the yeare after the battell of lepanto the armie of the confederates , which was then in the leuant , hauing their forces augmented by the arriuall of don iohn , made ochiallo generall of the turkish armie , retire to modon , as fearing those of whom he had made triall the yeere before . if they had put him to it as they should haue done , no doubt but they had found him dismaide , and hardly bestead how to defend as well the fortresses as his armie by sea : for he had not left aboue . gallies , to garde the hauen , and had bestowed the rest of his forces one yeare . but when he sawe they went to besiege nauaria neere modon , and that they had no saying to him at his landing , as he feared they would , he tooke heart at grasse , and after made a iest of the designes of the christians armie , which he in such sort held plaie and entertained , as it performed nothing woorthie such a power assembled immediately vpon the good successe of a former victory . the turkes in what concerneth the ordering , commoditie , and assurance , in their enterprises , surpasse ( to say the very trueth ) all other nations for well managing of warlike affaires : for they neuer attempted place that the designe thereof was not farre more woorth then the paine they emploied about it ; or that the enterprise did not deserue the like or more expence : carying themselues thus , they are by the effect of their enterprises growne mightie , for force and meanes , and haue opened the way to the encrease of their greatnesse and successe of their affaires : which in such sort assuring ( wherein they haue aimed principally at profit ) they haue more and more weakened our forces , not without an euident consequence of extreame danger : when they tooke in hand the conquest of cypres , they were wise enough not to bestow time in taking cerynes a fortres almost impregnable . they foresaw that it was of small moment , at the least not to import much in that they intended to compasse , but they rather directed their course and indeuours against nicosia , as against the principall place of all the iland , whereabouts they so well imploied their paines as they caried it . by which conquest it was found that cerynes soone followed , ( as of a necessary consequence ) the disaster of their capitall towne . in all the executions of their hardy dessignes they haue alwaies at the very first beene masters of the field , which hath so furthered them as thereby the strongest holds of the country , which they could not otherwise haue gotten but by force of armes , haue beene surrendred vp vnto them . such fortresses being vnable long to hold out when all hope of succour is cast off by the opposition of so strong and mighty armies as theirs are . at the war of malta it seemeth god did dull them , ouerthrowing the policies and practises which are ordinary with them . for the bassa ( who would needes begin with s. hermes because it seemed commodious to stop vp the hauen and after to get the suburbs where the knights made their aboade ) consumed much time about it , and lost the better part of his best souldiours . in the meane space the season of the yeare spent so fast , and the resolutions and valour of them in the towne prooued such , as in the end he grew confounded , perceiuing too late how flenderly he had preuailed , and that he must necessarilie begin a new with the principall place , which he should haue at the first attempted , if god ( as i said ) for the good of christendome , had not blinded him in his enterprise . dorgut raiz vice-roy of argiers , who was to second this basha in all his warre , and to whom he was commanded to communicate his designes assoone as he should arriue , ( which he did some few weekes after his first setting downe and beginning to batter ) soone discouered his error , and could vpbraid him with it , telling him he shuld haue gone right on to the fountaine , without stooping to the shallow streames . so as after the taking of s. hermes , they did not performe or attempt any matter of importance , but as men tired and discouraged , they trust vp bagge and baggage to be gone assoone as the succour appeared before malta ; these leauing behinde them the memorie and testimonie of their shame , and ill grounded aduise , and the knights of their honour and valour . chap. xi . that he hath laid hold on occasions . occasion pourtraied . it is to be obserued . examples of the ottomans diligence in laying hold on occasions offered by the christians . the difficulties of a defensiue and offensiue league . the false guesse of the selfe-ruine of the turkish empire . the weaker princes are easily subdued by the mightier . other occasions offered by the christians to forward the turkish greatnesse . the ancient romans signified vnto vs by the picture of occasion ( whom they adored as a goddesse , putting wings to her feete , supported with a bowle , behinde bald , and before hairie ) that we must bee diligent to apprehend her when shee presenteth her-selfe , and not in any case to let her slippe : considering that if she once escape vs , she leaueth vs nought but a vaine and vexing repentance . and to say the truth , in all a mans actions . there is nothing more commendable then to be able to make the best vse of occasion and especially in mater of war. in as much as he that knoweth his aduantage , how to take it and to carry the time before him is furnished with the principall adorning vertue of a captaine , occasion being no other thing , then an opportunity that the time more by accident then prouidence offereth vnto vs , for the well performing of what we haue in hand , and for the abstaining and well comming off from a dessine vnsesonably attempted , as the euent of the aboue mentioned interprise may sufficiently witnesse . this is that these infidels haue studied at such times as god hath made them his instruments to afflict and chastice vs , and this is that we ought to doe against them , for the glorifying of gods diuine maiesty , not yet for ought i see pleased with vs. in a word all such as haue inlarged their estates haue either inioyed or hammered out some notable occasion which they wisely laid hold on , and haue consequently reaped the fruites of an vnusuall aduancement . the grecian and romane histories can teach vs this , but i omit them as too far from vs , to betake my selfe to such as are more familiar and neere vnto vs. pepin and charlemaine were by the romish church called into italy : the like was charles of aniou into the kingdome of naples . those of aragon were inuited to sicily by the people and to the conquest of the kingdome of naples by queene ione the second : the house of austria is at this day inriched with many goodly kingdomes brought them by their alliance and mariages : one whereof subiected vnto them the lowe countries , the other gaue them spaine with her apurtenances , the third for a perfect raising of this howses gretnesse , annexed vnto it the crowne of portugale and the east indies , so as if we neerely consider humaine casualties , we shall finde that force without occasion is fruitlesse or smally auaileable . the ottomans haue not attained to the height of so mightie an empire but by such occasions as we haue too carelesly , vnworthily , and as of our free bounty , presented vnto them . the first sprang from the negligence and cowardice of the emperors of greece , who through their extreame lasciuiousnesse and sloath ( sardanapalus and heliogabalus like ) became deformed monsters of all loosenes and riot : so as abandoning themselues to all voluptuousnesse and excesse , that martiall vigor which had till then honored and preserued them , began by little and little to decline amongst them , and next amongst their people , ( these framing their manners after their gouernours ) which prepared meanes and occasions for the turke to set foote one while into some inferiour prouince , and ere long into a mighty kingdome . the second occasion which shewed it selfe fauorable and proper for the turkes , was , when the grecians vpon a malicious enuy began to disfauour and oppose the dessignes of the christian princes which had by league vnited themselues for the conquest of the holy land , and so ill aduised they were as insteade of seconding them they crossed them in all they might , to the end to stop the fortunat proceeding of their woorthy armies , not heeding poore soules that they thereby befriended the turke ; who did but watch his opportunities . for they well obseruing this fault , and temporising the occasion which after appeared , failed not to spie when they might surprise them ( as they did ) all beaten , tired , and disunited in force and meanes , whereupon it finally insued that the christians were vtterly expelled iury , by the turkes , who after turned their armies against the greekes themselues and bereaued them of their empire . these were mischiefes and wounds by them well deserued , neither are they to be pittied , but so far forth , as they haue bread the calamities and ruines which haue and doe still continue to afflict christendome . the iarres and diuisions of the princes of greece ministred the third time an occasion to the turkish thriuing greatnesse : this hapned at such time as the emperour of constantinople was so ill aduised , as to craue the aide of amurath the first to defend him . this prince which lay still in waite , willingly sent his troupes , not to succour , but to discouer the country for the better aduancement of his designes ; and in very deed the souldiers returning from that voiage , deliuered so aduantageous reports of the riches , pleasantnesse , and fruitfulnesse of that country , painting it out vnto him so abounding in all commodities necessarie for the life of man , as he foorthwith resolued to attempt it , so as not long after without bidding , he in person passed the streight , and so well husbanded the occasion to settle himselfe in europe , as since his successors haue there made the principall seate of their empire . the diuorce and separation of the greeke church from the romaine , prepared a large way for the fourth occasion , embraced by the turks , more aduantageously to ouertop vs : since this diuision was a meane to distaste and allay the courage of the princes of either partie , neither hath it euer since beene possible to reconcile or vnite them by any good or firme intelligence , so as remaining in this sort diuided , they haue neuer beene able to enterprise ought woorthy christian pietie , or the greatnesse of their powers and monarchies ; thereby to cut off and ouerthrow ( as they might and ought ) the proceeding of the common enemie of christendome ; who getting by his negligence , scope and libertie , is growne greater to our vniuersall hurt , which those princes haue euermore fostered ; a disease now by their obstinate diuision growen remedilesse . this euill hath prooued the more lamentable because of the discord amongst other christian princes which refuse to make their benefit of others calamities , or to acknowledge them as corrections comming from the hand of god. this mischief grew greater at such time as some potentates of italy inconsiderately called the turke to their succour , shewing him the way into our seas farther then was conuenient . in this regard our portes stood open vnto them , they entred and conuersed with vs as with friends and associats , a thing most abhominable before god and man , and of most dangerous consequence . and to the end i be not held an outlasher , i will reckon some of those that haue so ouershot themselues . alfonso the second king of naples , and lodouick sforsa duke of milan , were those that brought in baiazet the second : that against the french , this against the venetians . isabell queene of hungarie craued aide likewise of soliman , against ferdinand king of the romans . francis the first of france , and henry the second that succeeded him , d●d not onely let in the turkish power into our seas , but suffered them also to land at nice and in corsica , leading captiue at their returne , an infinite multitude of poore christians , ( without respect of amitie , age , or sexe , which they snatched vp in those places and along the adriatick coasts . the sixt occasion obserued and embraced by the turkes , may be said in my opinion to proceed from the consideration they haue had of the pluralitie of christian princes , supposing ( as it is true ) that it could not be without that iealousie and suspicion which ech man particularly conceiueth of his owne estate , ranke , and dignitie , and and so the whole being deuided into diuers gouernments , it must follow the parts should be more feeble and scanted of meanes to vndertake against him : since ( as we haue saide ) vertue vnited in one entire body , is alwaies more strong then separated into many parcels . that which is woorse , is , that in this diuision of monarchies , the ambitious thirst of greatnesse , hath taken dangerous footing amongst princes , and hath bred ( as by a necessarie consequence ) discord , separation of willes , diuersitie of designes , and varietie of pretences , of all which partialities , hath sprung suspition , the common plague amongst princes . this suspicion like a canker hath contaminated the vnion and rid the meanes how to knit and establish a holy league and confidence amongst them for a defensiue or offensiue war. now to make a defensiue league against the turke is in these daies a hard matter in so much as the princes of christendome are so far from one another , and some especially from the enemy , as like men out of danger they weigh it not esteeming themselues most assured : and to vndertake to establish an offensiue league is no lesse difficult seeing the profit of their conquest cannot be drawne to a proportionable equality , it may be also euery man feares the greatnesse of his companion ( although neuer so much his partner for aide and common association ) but aboue all he that hath the most commodious hauens or his prouinces most proper for the mannaging of the war. or else he who can better maintaine his conquests would proue the most suspected and maligned . these considerations hinder them from vniting and assembling themselues as they ought for the common good . moreouer euery one flattereth himselfe that time and the worlds ordinarie change will breede ruine and alteration in the estate of the ottomans , and settle their affaires without being constrained to expose themselues to danger , trauell , and charge . another reason and inconuenience may yet be alledged that each of these princes being weake in respect of the other they cānot so couragiously resolue to vndertake what were profitable and necessary for them ; whence it groweth that the feeblenesse of their strength is yet made more feeble by this irresolution ; so as a mighty power charging them they shal remain subiect to the discretion of the indiscreet enemy : by these means the lords of the seueral parts of lombardy became the pray of the venetians who subdued them with as much facility as resolution ; but had the repulse when they attempted the state of milan , vtmost limit of their power , dominion , and conquests . after the same sort also the french in time past brought vnder all the prouinces of gaull , but when they would enter the confines of spain , the opposition of that neighbour-greatnesse stopped their course and was a rampart to defend them from further proceedings . in the very like manner the turkes hauing deuoured all the princes of greece , macedonia , bulgaria , and seruia attempting the inuasion of hungaria , they had their hands full , since the valour of these kings and people ( so fashioned , hardned and enured , of a long time to the wars , as they were the better able to make head against them ) discouered it selfe to be greater then the consideration of their indifferent estate could well beare , as witnesse the exploits of ladislaus and mathias coruin , who found the turkes play to their cost . but so soone as those kings and people did forgoe this first valour and suffered the exercise of armes to degenerat , soliman ouercame them both at belgrade and at mogacia . after the turks had gone thus far , they met with that bar of the house of austria seconded by the german forces , and supported by the power of the king of spaine ; who shewed himselfe alwaies fearelesse of the turkish forces : as for the venetians they haue euermore ( backt with the popes and the spaniards power ) behaued themselues most honorably : one happinesse there is that those places of christendome which border neerest vpon the turke were neuer in more mighty hands , nor had euer so few princes to rule them , as at this day : whence groweth an infallible consequent that they are more easily defended and maintained , especially hauing that particular coniunction of the power of spaine , which is such as the turke cannot stur without incurring an apparant danger ; it being manifest that besides that the king of spaine is of ability without feare to resist him , he can also with his owne forces curbe him and bring him to reason . so as the turke awed by so mighty a king , will not , as he was wont , so so one bend his forces against the christians his neighbours . the muscouit on the one side , and the kings of polonia and persia on the other , are of such power and courage , as they will alwaies make the fame of their particular forces , to be both respected and feared . the diuersitie of opinions in matter of religion , haue made way to the seuenth occasion , haue disunited the courages , spent the forces of the christians , & haue made them rise vp in armes one against an other . in the meane time the turke getteth footing , groweth great in sight of all men , and is become a terror to christian princes . disloyall and traiterous renegades or apostates , are those which haue discouered to the turkes the christians secrets , haue acquainted them with the aduantages of landing and inuading , haue beene guides to their armies into the very hearts of our richest countries , and haue opened the doore of the eight occasion . but for the ninth , let vs consider what subtilties they haue practized , and whereon that hath beene principally grounded . i am of opinion , that the better to order their affaires , and seize vpon the christians with more security , their leagues , treaties of peace , and suspensions of armes , passed betweene them and our princes , haue beene their greatest furtherances : for the turkes neuer warred with anie christian prince or infidel either to defend their owne estate , or with hostilitie to assaile an others , but they first of all made their countrey sure against the power of their neighbours , but aboue all , such as ( seeing them elsewhere busied ) had meanes to disquiet their affaires , inuade their territories , and assaile them at vnawares . the peace they haue so long maintained , with the polonians can testifie as much : againe the quiet they haue suffered the venetians to inioy for these many yeares sufficiently bewraieth with what care they handle this businesse . the continued peace they keepe with the french teacheth vs likewise with what prouidence and wisdome their matters are caried ; to the end not to receiue any incombrance or interruption by meanes of strange enmities , at such time as they proceed in their enterprises ; they take truce with the emperour alwaies to their aduantage ; and lately intending to war vpon persia they dealt for a suspension of armes with the king of spaine , so as making all sure on one side they in a trice assaile the other , heereby so well playing their parts , as hauing the law in their hands they remaine as arbitrators of peace and war , pursuing alwaies the course of their dessines with an aduantage too great vnworthy and preiudicious to the princes of christendome ; whose greater part is so awed by their forces , as they haue often chosen to enter into conditions of a dishonest peace or truce though neuer so vnassured , rather then to expose themselues to the danger of their mighty armies : not heeding that thereby they haue lost many faire occasions of doing good vpon them : whereof we neede not seeke farther for examples then now that the king of persia keepeth them in continuall war ( at least if such newes as comes thence be true ) and that he hath lately giuen them an ouerthrow neere taurijs of aboue foure score thousand men . which if it be so , what better occasion can you desire ( ô ye princes of christendome ) to set vpon them and reuenge the dishonour of our passed iniuries ? can it be otherwise but that in their former incounters and in this last they must haue lost the flower of their captaines and choice souldiours , and is it possible that the swelling pride of their command and greatnesse should not shortly vndergoe some change and decrease if you will intertain the occasion which god offereth you ? ô but you sleepe and are altogether vnprouided to assaile them . they are our sins that hinder vs and haue bred the disorders of ciuill wars which disquiet france and the low countries , with such obstinacie and cruelty as these princes haue worke enough to order their owne affaires : their neighbours in the meane time hauing their eares filled with the noice thereof , looking what will become of such sturs and fearing lest the fire which so cruelly burneth their neighbours house , should fasten vpon theirs , which makes them stand vpon their guard to keepe out such broiles & disorders . in the mean time the turke wanteth no time to recouer his losses ; and to laugh at oure inconsiderate follies ; follies indeede for vs , but wisdome for him . it is a maruelous matter to consider with what succes and aduice he hath quieted his neighbours , in such sort as he hath beene neuer knowen to haue had two quarrels in hand at one time . imitating heerein the wisdome of the romans who had an especiall care not to haue two enemies to deale with at once , but if they assailed one , they tooke order by deuice and friendly meanes that the other were lookers on , or associats in their trauailes . selim the first , which warred with the persians , so ordered the rest of his estate , as during all the time he was imploied that way , the souldan of egvpt neuer disturbed him : his sonne amurath continuing the same enterprise , neuer receiued let of any christian potentate . the dessignes of the princes of europe , & the wars they haue so long and so wilfully maintained one against the other , haue affoorded the turks a large passage for the tenth occasion to benefit themselues by their obstinacies & diuisions ; neither haue they omitted nimbly to lay holde on it to some purpose for the good of their affaires . what enmities were euermore cruelly exercised with fire and sword then those our ancestors and we our selues haue seene betweene france and spaine ? what malice was euer more deepely rooted then that of the two kings ? what nations are there in the world more mighty or more valiant then these are ; and hence let vs consider what profit , what comfort would haue redounded to christendome , and what fearefull ruine to the turke , if by some holy league they had beene vnited ; such vndoubtedly as there should haue beene no memory of them , whereas they are now most mighty , and most dreadfull . if we will descend to particulars , was there euer prince that had better meanes to conquer the turke then charles the fifth ? for besides his valour , inuincible courage , and other notable parts which shined in him , he had sufficient force to execute his enterprises : he was followed by captaines of incomparable vertue , his souldiers were most resolute , his people and prouinces were all most desirous of so holy a war , he had hauens and roades fit wherein to harbour his ships , and in a word he had whatsoeuer was necessary , but how ? he was alwaies constrained to haue an eie behinde him , to stand vpon his gard , because of his neighbours who spared not to molest him as soone as he did but once aime at so holy an interprise . king philip his sonne hath met with the like incombrances : so as we may well say our sinnes haue ministred occasions enowe to the turkes to assaile vs with such aduantage , as it hath beene an increase and establishing to his estate , we alwaies shrinking at the cruell shocke of his mighty forces . amongst all the ottomans amurath the first was the most diligent to hunt after , and embrace occasions , who ( as we haue already deliuered ) sent his supplies to the emperour of constantinople , passed the straights in person and got into his hands the two castles . baiazet the first , his sonne shewed himselfe nolesse politicke and prompt to discouer his aduantages , patient to attend his occasions , and diligent to gather the fruits wherewith his hopes presented him . chap. xii . that he hath behaued himselfe with nimblenesse and celeritie vpon his occasions . the fortune of warre consisteth not in discerning but in the vse of occasion . celeritie in wars most expedient . the turkes readinesse and wisdome in that kinde . furtherance of this celeritie . impediments of the christians in their expeditions . treasure requisite . exact obedience in captaines and souldiers and an obseruation of militarie discipline . strength and abilitie of men and horse . examples of the turkes celerity . in their sea-actions and their order : defects of the christians shipping . because this chapter , in regard of the continuance of the matter in handling , is but as one dependencie and coniunction with the former , we will still make vse of this word occasion , heeretofore discoursed vpon , as of a table wherein is represented all whatsoeuer our forefathers haue conceited of it ; and what we ought to admit thereof : following this path we are to remember that who in time laieth not hold on occasion , shall neuer more inioy a like time to recouer it with the like commoditie of wel doing as he once had , if he had knowne how to entertaine it as hee ought . to discouer then the opportunitie of affaires , is not al that is required : that which most importeth , is to serue our turnes with it at an instant , when it presenteth it selfe , to guide our intentions to that perfection we aime at . celeritie is an especiall matter in all affaires of importance , but aboue all in the warres , wherein it is more necessarie then in any our actions . because ( as saide selim the first ) the least delay we therin vse , turneth to a grosse error , especially since it bereaues vs of the commoditie and aduantage offered to put in execution , what we had wisely and with studie determined : hannibal a woorthy and renowned captaine , was noted of slownesse , not in resoluing but in embracing his occasions of victory which might haue assuredly established his affaires . that great pompey was likewise subiect to the same imperfection , which did vtterly vndoe him . in a word , no motion wanting speedinesse , can be of much force , or produce woorthy effects : violent agitations loose alike their force with their swiftnesse , but such as are naturall attaine it , and fortifie themselues in it . this is that the turkes know well enough how to practise , fashioning themselues to quicknesse , nimblenesse , habilitie , and to a certaine store of whatsoeuer may seeme necessarie to that purpose , so as their promptnesse and forecast hath neuer omitted the occasions presented vnto them without reaping the fruites and glory thereof . but some one will say , that it is requisite for the suddainnesse of occasion that many things relie in the power of him that will follow this course . i grant it , for they indeed who will fitly make vse of such aduantage , must be alwaies in armes , and heerein also the turke surpasseth vs , for he continually entertaineth so many souldiers , as it were hard to take him vnprouided , or to finde him ( when need requireth ) without a mightie army , which serueth to hearten him , and to awake his courage : but aboue all , he hath so great a number of horse ordinarily in a readinesse , as that is but too sufficient to make him proudly humour his owne will ; so as thought and execution are in a manner one with him . this is yet farther accompanied with a powerfull commoditie which addeth facillititie to his promptnesse ; and this is , that his horse and foot are lightly armed , and without incombrance of luggage , so as by this meanes he more easily assembleth his troups , ordreth them , and conducteth them wheresoeuer he pleaseth , without distinction of time . againe , sobrietie and sparing ( familiar among his souldiers ) make much to the aduancement of his enterprises , contenting themselues , as they do to drinke water and eat rice and salted flesh , which they reduce into powder , so as euery one carrieth with him his prouision almost for a moneth , and when that faileth , they liue by the bloud of their horses , which they salt themselues , like as doe the muscouites and tartars . on the other side , when our souldiers march , they must haue such store of munition follow them , to their so strange confusion and hinderance , as they are neuer able to goe thorow speedily with any notable attempt . this bringeth a twofold let to their enterprises . the first in their prouision , which in the vnmeasurablenesse thereof is neuer made in due time . the second , in the conuoy thereof , neuer so well ordered as it ought , whereof the euent of the enterprise of exechium , is but too true a testimonie , the souldiers then suffering more in regard of the famine and difficultie of conueying victuals vnto them , then of-the enemies forces . whose attempt had beene vnprofitable if the campe had not beene disordered by this inconuenience , whereby the souldiers became halfe dead for hunger , and grew so feeble , as the courage to defend themselues vtterly failed them . which the general of the turkish armie foreseeing , waited till such time , as the famine had brought them low , and made them strengthlesse , that he might vpon their enforced retrait assaile them behinde , and so wearie them with continuall skirmishing as they should at length chace and ouerthrow themselues , as indeed it came to passe . i remember i haue heard one worthie to be credited , say to this purpose ; that when emanuel philibert duke of sauoy , deceassed , was generall of the armie in flanders , he found no difficultie in the wars more important then the discommoditie of proportioning and carriage of necessarie prouision as he had oftentimes approoued . on the contrarie , it may be said to the christians shame and confusion , that neuer any of the turkish armies were knowen , through such default , to suffer extreamitie or to be disordered . let vs now come to the point of sodaine execution , and to the instruments thereof , and let vs dwell somewhat thereupon . i finde the most necessarie and profitable is to haue alwaies store of money in our coffers : and that is a hard matter , especially for such as are not prouident , and that in all things so pamper themselues as the christians doe ; but not for the turke , for he hath ( when and what he will ) in store to serue his need for the warres , and for whatsoeuer belongeth thereto . this is the sinew of warre , and the onely meanes to hasten forward occasion , and attaine ( as he doth ) to a happie end of his enterprises , but at his returne home , he obserueth a barbarous and insolent course of remboursing his charge : after he hath performed what he vndertooke , he repaieth himselfe by new impositions , whereto he enforceth his subiects to contribute : this to him is easie : but to vs the most difficult materiall point is the procuring of money : for the greater part of christian princes are so bad husbands and of so small forecaste , that they haue scarce one crosse in store : and are alwaies at the borrowing hand , or enforced to pawne their lands and demaines . and though the christians be not so couetous as the turkes , yet they are of so good a hold fast , as no small time will serue to draw money from them , so as while that is doing , occasion hath alreadie turned her backe and left vs nought , but the shame and sorrow of our enterprises ill successe and effect . and if it chance that we hold on our courses , it is with such headlong rashnesse and ill aduice in all we doe , but particularly in prouiding of armes , horse , munition , and other necessaries , as all being performed out of season , there is neither the forwardnesse , the array , the election , the aboundance , the resolution , nor the well disposing of matters which would otherwise haue beene , and which we see to be in our aduersaries . there is another thing which addeth much assurance to the turkes designes , and makes them more easily to execute : and this is the incredible obedience of the captaines towards their generall , and of the souldiours towards their captaines and such is the loue amongst them as there is no danger or difficulty ( be it neuer so great ) which they will not easily ouercome , so willingly they performe what is inioyned them . it was neuer heard that any reuolt or mutiny stopt or slacked the course of their conquest . they haue yet another most considerable aduantage and that is the strong constitution of their men , spirit and speed of their horse . where on the contrary our forces dare scarce bouge vnlesse they be backed and strengthned by forrain succors either almines or switzers , people faint and of little courage vpon a sodaine and vnexpected action , as being framed of a dull and slow mettall seruing for nought but to make good the intire body of a battaile , and be vnto it as a solide and vnmoueable rampart . the incounters they haue had with the turke at buda and elsewhere haue taught vs how vnprofitable they are & of how slender effect for the speedy and happy aduancement of the affaires of christendome in those parts : moreouer the turkes horse are of more speede and strength then ours : the spanish genet is indeede nimble and full of spirit , but wanteth strength and breath : contrariwise the horse of germany is able and strong but tender withall and not ready vpon the hand , so as he is more proper to make a stand and defend then to assaile , skirmish , or giue the chace . the napolitane is good and strong but of such a nimblenesse as is not held for perfect speede , on the other side the enemy hath the hungarian good for seruice , the barbary horse of incredible swiftnesse , the valachian , the turkish , and the moore almost hard for induring of trauaile and well breathed , so as we may conclude that he inioyeth whatsoeuer is necessary for the war , better , more redy , and in greater aboundance then we , and that this is it which makes him speedily and with aduantage , to serue his turne with all occasions which present themselues . there are so many examples of this aduantageous celerity in their actions as they are almost innumerable ; but i will only note two or three which may seeme in a manner prodigious so admirable hath beene their successe . amurath the second hauing intelligence of the great forces leauied by ladislaus king of hungary ( with whom he had formerly concluded a peace ) with an intent to ouerrunne him , being then busie in the wars of caramania ; he sodainly quitted that interprise , and with such maruelous speed crossed all the helespont as in seuen daies he ariued at varna with fower score thousand men , in like manner scheder bassa imploied by baiazet the second to diuert the attempt of the venetians vpon milan , came with such extraordinary speed as he appeered in the territory of treuiso before they could haue newes so much as of his departure , lesse of his arriuall in those parts . selim the first marched so speedily from cesaria to aleppo , crossing the mountaine aman with his army and artillery , as he came vpon the souldan before he dreampt of him supposing him to be as then rather vpon his way to encounter the persian then to attempt him . this particular dilligence of the ottomans is not to be limited all only with their land wars : they haue performed as much by sea , so vigilant and wary haue they shewed themselues in exalting the honour of their names , and of their great estate , by them maintained euen vnto this day : and since they are so incredibly nimble and aduised in maritine exploits , i hold it not from the purpose to touch briefly the order they obserue in assembling their forces . they reiect the vessels and ships of great burden as ouer-heauy and vnwealdy if the wind faile them , rather hindering then furthering him that conducteth them . their gallies and galliots are speedy , well manned and well appointed . wee on the contrary drag with vs a great number of ships and gallions as our best strength and choice prouision , but they are in proofe the cause of such incombrance to the seruice in hand , as we for the most part waste the season vnprofitably and spend our opertunities in rigging and attending them ; being also oft times enforced to disorder our gallies , to the end these great cartes may keepe with vs. hence groweth yet another discommodity , and that is , that hauing placed a kinde of hope in our ships , we in forgoing them , finde our selues too weake and failing of courage to assaile the enemy ; who is not to be forced to fight but when he please , hauing too open a field to flie and espy his occasion , as it hapned at preueza the yeare . and at the battaile of lepanto which was the yeare . for then the ships of the league remained behind with a good number of souldiours vnprofitable for that action , in regard they could not ariue there time enough . the yeare after they encountred the like discommodity : since for the very same cause the army of the league , goodly and mighty fought not at all , neither performed ought worthy so great a preparation . and when the gallies of the pope and venetians met , and that they attended don iohn ( who aboade still at missina , because of the then beginning troubles of flanders ) the army of the turk being then commanded by oechially , he once presented battaile , but because of the aduantage of the winde which without other helpes draue our ships , and fearing the incounter of our round vessels , he made his escape by meanes of a certaine stratagem , which for the strangenesse thereof put the counsailes and iudgments of our army to a plunge . in verie deede it is worthy the noting : for seeing the whole strength of our ships vnited with such confederat gallies as were then there , make towards him , he gaue commandement that in euery one of his gallies they should put fire to a barrell of powder and row backewards ( not making for al this any shew of flight , the prowes of their gallies still appeering towards them ) and as soone as the smoake had couered his fleete he halled on a maine , and in an instant hoissing vp al his sailes shaped his course to napolis in romania , our ships not daring to follow him . in regarde he had gotten the aduantage of them they bearing but their mizen sailes , and knowing how dangerous it was for them being ignorant of his designes , to breake company : eight daies after we comming neere together there followed some light skirmishes , but so soone as they perceiued vs to faint , as being depriued of our ships , they charged vs with the whole army , in like sort as when we had them for succour they retired . so as it was then found by experience that the great ships serued but to keepe vs from buckling with the enemy . i haue made mention of this incountre in my commentaries of the notable occurrants of these times written in latine , and somewhat more at large then i heere deliuer , for i was present in the army during all that voiage , vnder the command of the duke de mayne . chap. xiii . that he hath gone himselfe in person to the war. a question concerning the princes presence in the wars : the first commodity is , if the prince be there in person , it ads courage to the souldiour . the second is , it causeth plenty of all things in his army . the third , it increaseth the army . the fourth , it worketh facility and speede in aduice and execution . of the power of lieutenant generalls in the wars . the fift commodity , is the princes authority and dignity . the first discommodity growing from the princes presence , is , that thereby the enemy proceedes more prouidently . the second , that his commanders vse lesse diligence in discharge of their places . the third , is emulation of the leaders , whence groweth contention . the fourth , the emulation of the lieutenant generall toward the prince . examples to this purpose pro and contra . the preposition defined by distinction . the ottomans wars in their persons haue succeeded well . exhortation to christian princes to vndertake wars against the turke . whether the prince should in person goe to the war , or else send his lieutenant , is a question often disputed with such reasons and earnestnesse by sundry graue personages , as whatsoeuer may be now deliuered to that purpose would proue but an vnprofitable repetition of what hath bene formerly digested by so many rare spirits . this then excusing me , i will referre the deciding thereof to men of more experience then my selfe ; yet will i not forbeare by way of discourse to deliuer my opinion ; and cite such examples as may helpe for the clearing of these doubts . first then we are to recken the commodities the kings presence affoordeth in his armie , and so in order of the other consequences . whereof one of the principall is , that it putteth spirit and courage into the souldiers , it so neerely presseth them as they must of force , as it were , make their valour appeare , especially when they ioine battell where the maiestie and life of the prince , yea and their owne too is in hazard . then is it that the honest desire of preseruing their masters life groweth feruent in them , and so much the more by how much it is farre more pretious then the life of a captaine or generall , either mercenary or subiect which the prince might haue sent to command them . this occasion more then any other moueth them more freely to hazard their liues and meanes for their princes seruice , which they would not so couragiously performe vnder any other that should command in his stead . they likewise expect greater and more assured rewards from him then from others . againe , the king is alwaies better followed ; he is attended on with the consequence of farre greater prouisions either of victuals , munition , money , or whatsoeuer may be necessary for the enterprise , than his lieutenant , who hath his power limited , his allowance stinted , and cannot dispose but in part of the credit and authority of his master , to whom he remaineth as countable . moreouer , the subiect fixeth his eies and affection vpon his prince , and lauisheth his life and meanes according as the businesse is , and he is addicted . francis the first , king of france , being before pauy powred money foorth ( as a man may say ) by bushels , yet odet de lautrey his lieutenant generall , lost the duchy of millan for lacke of three hundred thousand crownes that were assigned him for his charges , but were neuer deliuered him . whereupon the switzers failing of their entertainment ( whom he had till then fed with hopes of pay ) he was constrained to fight with such disaduantage as hee miscaried , and his whole army was put to flight ; which had not happened if the king had beene there in person , for either money had not failed , or else the credit and authority that accompanieth the princes presence had wrought them to patience and contained them in entire deuotion . moreouer the great train of nobility and men of quality that the prince bringeth with him is a strengthening to his army , and addeth to it life and beauty , euery man striuing to appeare more gallant then other ; which they would not vouchsafe to doe nor to subiect themselues , commanded but by an ordinary generall ; for there are alwaies about the king , by election or necessity , many great personages equall in power and dignity , and some differing too in rancke and charge , either as being princes of the bloud , or for honor and authority woon by desert , al which would perhaps doe little for the generall , but would most willingly obey and expose all for their king and master to whom they owe a duty both of nature and benefit . these great mens followers serue also to increase the army . beside these considerations the king bringeth euermore with him a resolution of his enterprises , wherein a generall most commonly proceedeth with a restraint and aduise , as fearing in his too forward attempting , to exceed his commission . in the meane while , time passeth , and occasion escapeth , most often to the princes hinderance and blot to his reputation . in this regard if the wisedome and loyalty of the captaine be approued , princes ought not too strictly to limit their charges : but if they doubt of them , it is indiscretion to put them into their hands , as we may see by these examples . don emanuel king of portugal hauing sent the duke of braganza general into africke , he fortunately wan and made sure for his prince the towne of aza azamor : but that performed hee would not take marocco ( as at that time he might haue easily done ) though he were counselled thereto by the wisest and greatest of his army , because that ( said he ) it went beyond his commission : lopez zoares generall for the same king lost in like manner the opportunity to take the city of aden , of especiall importance for the affaires of his master ( for it standeth iust in the mouth of the red sea ) though the inhabitants would haue deliuered him the keies . insomuch as hee should haue taken vpon him ( as he said ) more then his commission allowed him . the thing was of that consequence as hee might well haue forborne the obseruation of his fast , to swallow such a morsell . neither had the seruice beene one of the least , he could haue performed for his master . in conclusion we are to grant that the presence of the king bringeth with it a certaine greatnesse , and more aweth the enimy then his lieutenant ; as it was seene at the enterprise of tunise ; for barbarossa sharply tooke vp and reproued those who said that the emperour charles the fift was himselfe in person in the christian army , inferring heereby that he should then haue his hands fuller then he made account , and that nothing could be lacking in the enemies campe , when their prince was there present . this is that may be saide of the good redoundeth from the presence of the king in his army . let vs now see what may be alledged on the contrary . first it may be said that the king which goeth to the wars in person ministreth greater occasion then he would to his enemy to prouide himselfe of forces , meanes and friendes : and affordeth him matter also of pretending a more glorious victory , with the hopes whereof and of rich spoiles , he putteth courage in his men , disposing them to attempt valiantly all things be they neuer so hazardous , so hartning them to fight . it may be said likewise that the presence of the king maketh his captaines lesse heedefull and diligent at all occurrants and aduantages , because they in part relie vpon the vigilant eye of the prince , who is to carry away the whole honour of the enterprise , their valour remaining as dimmed and eclipsed . this hapned at the battaile of pauie . for the commanders relying vpon the kings presence and discreet carriage of matters , had no regard but of their pleasures in stead of diligently bethinking themselues of the duty of their seuerall charges , which in the ende turned to the ruine and dishonor both of their masters and themselues . againe an army where the king is in person , is alwaies replenished with princes and great personages , all which promising themselues great matters , seeke not but to excel one another in place and command , whence grow among them iealosies , enuies , and sundry differences breeding infinite disorders , to the ouerthrow or hinderance of their masters affaires . who is not without his part of feare to discontent some in contenting others ? this plague of ambition , is such as it will sometimes so wrest the consciences and honours of these great men , as they will not sticke to hinder the seruice of their masters only to oppose the fortune and woorth of such a one , as they see out-strippeth them in preferment ; yea oft times their ambition groweth so extreame , as for despitethey wil vtterly forsake their princes seruice : their vertue and valour being perhaps in the meane time not of the meanest , and such as if it were well imploied would gaine honour and victory to the army . there is yet another discommodity , and that is , that the king carying with him the party , whō in his absence he intendeth to constitute his lieutenant , he in the mean time repineth at his masters worthy exploites , considering how the honour should haue beene his , if alone he had the managing of the army ; againe , knowing that all such misfortunes or discomfitures , as may befall , it shall be attributed to the insufficiencie of the prince , and not to him , he the lesse regardeth it . in a word , the glory we pretend , and the iealousie we haue of our particular honors , are two especiall powers , to shake and curbe generous spirits . the emperour charles the fift , had sufficient triall of it : for some of his captaines and lieutenants could oft times with small store of money , and few men , gaine triumphant victories , as well at milan and naples as else where , which perhaps in presence of the emperour , would not haue beene so fortunately atchieued . notwithstanding all that hath beene said , the question is not yet fully determined , rather it remaineth diuersly ballancing to and fro , as appeareth by these and the following examples . charles of france , surnamed the sage , neuer set foot out of his studie to command his armies , yet knew he so well how to make the best vse of his captaines valour , and manage his affaires sutable to the time , that he finally recouered his whole kingdome , and expelled thence the english , who possessed the greater part thereof . on the contrarie , the emperour ferdinand , who warred by his captaines , himselfe not stirring out of vienna , receiued great and dangerous ouerthrowes . charles the fift , on the other side , wan more honour and victories by the valour of his captaines , then euer he did in those warres and enterprises himselfe vndertooke in person . if the attempt vpon marseilles had taken effect , it might haue beene truly said that his captaines had beene in all places victorious : witnesse pauie , the bicock , landrino , naples , coron , genoua , rome , and africk ; but where he went in person , as in saxony , at tunis , dura , and vienna , his fortune prooued indifferent betweene good and bad . but at argiers , in piemont , and at metz , he encountred on all sides such misfortune , as it deemed ( as a man may say ) the luster of his renowne and victories formerly gained . marke the effects of successe and fortune so different , as it were a hard matter to passe a sound and determined iudgement vpon this proposition : so as the more i imagine by the contrarietie of these examples to inlighten it , the more obscure me thinkes i make it ; the finall deciding thereof , may be framed thus . the king which vndertaketh the conduct of an armie , is either a discreet and aduised captaine , or else he is altogither vnskilled in the mysterie of warre . in this last case i should thinke that it were most for his good , to relie vpon an others relation and execution , especially if priuie to his owne imperfections , he want a dexteritie to make the best vse of another mans valour , wisedome and counsaile . but if so be he be capable of the gouernment , and conduct of an armie , and that he haue courage to execute , in mine opinion he cannot doe better then to vndertake the warre and attempt himselfe in person : for if in all militarie vertues he equall the most valiant of his armie , he will surpasse them in fortune , credit , and authoritie , and in all the other good parts aboue mentioned . kings compounded of these excellent parts , alwaies crowne their eminency with honourable triumphes . theodosius the emperour , charles the great , and sundrie others can witnesse this sufficiently ; lewes the . of france , hauing beene alwaies conquerour , and neuer conquered in whatsoeuer he vndertooke himselfe in person , was put besides the kingdome of naples , by means of a battaile which his captaines lost neere the riuer of garillion , for lacke of resolution and aduice ; which mischance was by that good prince so lamented , as he made a vow , thence forward to command personally in his wars ; and to say the truth , if the captaine be not discreet , valiant , and of long approoued experience , it is strange if he euer performe woorthy act : in such cases the presence of one only turnus is more auaileable then of a thousand such captaines . the turkish emperours who goe themselues to the wars , haue tasted the sweetnesse thereof by so many and so notable victories , as we are at this day their admirers . selim the first was wont to say that battailes gained in the princes absence were not to be tearmed accomplished victories , and we see that they haue scarce euer enterprised ought which hath not taken effect in the ende . yea it hath beene obserued that when their captaines haue beene ouerthrowne , if they themselues went afterward in person , they alwaies returned victorious . amurath the second went himselfe after carambeius generall of his army ( who was ouerthrowen by ladislaus king of polonia ) to war vpon that prince , whom he ouercame and cut his whol army in peeces : mezat bassa was imploied by mahomet the second in the enterprise of rhodes , which he shamefully abandoned ; but soliman going himselfe in person , caried it by plaine force , and chased thence the knights of saint iohn of ierusalem , who disquieted his estate by their ordinary excursions in the leuant . amurath captaine of the said mahomet receiued a notable ouerthrow at the hands of vsumcassan king of persia : but mahomet going after himselfe in person vanquished the enemy already victorious , and put him to a desperat plunge . the mamelucks ouerthrew querseolus and calubeius , baiazet the second commanders : selim the first after personally vndertaking them , ouercame them , and wholy rooted out both them and their empire . amurath the third now raigning hath been so many times beaten by cudabenda king of persia in person , and through the vnskilfulnesse of his commanders , that a man may well say that neuer any of the race of the ottomans receiued so notable ouerthrowes as this hath : whereto may be added , that he met with last of all before taures ; where he lost about . men together with the bassa generall of his army ; a great blot to the glory of his ancestors , yet the losse being so far off from his estate , he receiued not so great a shake as if it had beene neere him or in his country . but who will take hold of such aduantages to doe good vpon him , seeing the greatest princes of christendome are turmoiled in ciuill wars and troubles of their owne estates ? surely none : nay rather he is like to gather strength more then euer , which he would not so easily doe , if he were to incounter the christians well appointed , resolute and in a readinesse ioyntly , and with one consent to make their benifit of so goodly an occasion . chap. xiiii . that he hath euermore gone well appointed to the wars . that our deliberations may take good effect , we must proue all courses , but vndertake nothing rashly . rather superfluous then but necessary prouision is to be made of what belongeth to the wars . aduantages of errours committed in military prouision . the wisdome of the romaines and turkes in their prouision . nothing can be imagined more contenting the spirit then the happy successe of that euery one vndertaketh answerable to his condition : much more a great prince when he hath resolued vpon anie thing , espeically the war , is not to forget any one thing of what soeuer may perfect his designe , which he ought to conceale and keepe to himselfe all he may . we haue one notable example hereof yet fresh in memory , and that is of the prince of parma alexander farnese , who for a time had the managing of the troubles and wars in flanders , where he almost neuer attempted any thing which according to his intent , he did not performe : in very truth his actes were such as he deserueth to be reckoned as one of the most iudicious , wise , and aduised princes of our age , particularly in this point of making prouision of things necessary in due season . and to say the truth , who soeuer disposeth his affaires , is euermore attended on rather by shame , reproch , and repentance , then honour , glory , and contentment : that prince which once loseth his reputation by this default , hardly recouereth it , but remaineth infamous ; he is lesse feared of his neighbors , and which is more , he himselfe entreth into a certaine ill conceit , and distrust of himselfe , which in such sort accompanieth him , as in whatsoeuer he afterward a new vndertaketh , he resteth vnassured , doubtfull , confounded in all his determinations , and is vncapable of constant and resolued counsaile , carying alwaies the repentance of his former fault with a sorow which tormenteth his verie soule , so much the more strangely , by how much such a prince is the greater , or is well conceited of himselfe . this is an aduertisment which should open the eies of all such not to vndertake any thing but what is well digested , and with such order and forecast , as there be rather abundance then necessity : for when the prouision is small and that it neuer so little miscary , it depriueth the prince , not of courage but of confidence and aduice , of whose lacke insueth the want of wherwithall to warrant and shelter his reputation , vnlesse it be that he will say , i had not thought , words most dangerous in the wars where he can erre but once , and vnwoorthy euer to proceede out of the mouth of one wise and aduised , vnlesse he meane that the misse of these two vertuous partes be to be borne withall . prospero colonna a great captaine proued this to his cost at such time as he vndertooke to assaile parma without cannon or other munition of war requisite wherewith to take such to taske as were the french souldiours then in the towne . for they sent him away well laden with blowes , shame and displeasure , vnable to performe ought of what he too vnaduisedly attempted . fredericke of bossola met with the like at the same place for want of counsaile , mony , and other meanes which are not borne as pompers souldiours in striking the ground with our foot : guicciardin was then within the towne and had a command within that garrison . and though the captaine be wise , yet if the armie once discouer that their prouisions faile them , that they be far from succours , farre from places of retrait : then is it , loe that they become astonished , that feare and disobedience seiseth them , and that all these meete in one , make a foule adoe ; which the enemie perceiuing ( as it is vnpossible but he should ) will if he be wise , make his benefite of our necessitie ; which will serue him as a rampart and bridge at his pleasure to assaile and harme vs , but to preserue himselfe safe and vntouched : it is that the turkes taught our men at exechium . the romans more wary , neuer fought but in grosse and answerable to the proportion of the enterprise , their armies were either pretorian or consulary : the turke hath alwaies sent to the field mighty forces , and aduantagioussy furnished ; neither hath he euer quitted enterprise for lacke of men , munition , or money . what was his prouision of artillery at the siege of malta , but in a manner infinite . for not to reckon his other charge , he there discharged threescore thousand cannon shot . at the siege of nice , where the french were , barbarossa generall of the turkish armie , brought such store of artillerie , as the french that were at their own doores had lacke of powder to continue their portion of batterie which they had vndertaken ; and were constrained to borrow of the turkes , to whom they should rather haue lent ; since the enterprise was theirs , and they brought the other thither . chap. xv. he hath neuer fought out of season . especiall wisdome to be vsed in giuing battaile . errors of charles the . and other christian princes in their sea-fights . the turkes wisedome in that kinde . sea actions vnseasonably vndertaken . aduantages that the turke hath in such cases aboue the christians . every man is able to resolue that he wil fight with whatsoeuer force shall present it self , & with hopes of victory , or else to sel his life at a deare rate ; but to perform it against heauē and time , was neuer heard of ; for in such cases courage , wisdome , and power become danted , so as consequently there followeth a despaire rather then any honorable fruit of a labor & indeuor wel imploied . in a word , who so precipitates his enterprise without attending fit time and season , seeketh nought else but to lose his time , his pain , charge , and reputation ( which is the maine point ) to his ruine and confusion . the emperour charles the fifth might make vs wise , since hauing obstinatly vndertaken the seege of metz our of due season , and without mature aduice ; he was constrained to rise from before it with such a disorder , shame , and losse , as he afterwards hardly thriued ; not long before that , for lacke of applying himselfe to the time when he enterprised vpon algiers , how many ships and men lost he ? so many as it was a long time ere hee could recouer himselfe , learning this lesson to his cost , that earth cannot force heauen . and though the valour and policy of the turke can challenge no part in that action , yet can he make vse of the christian losses to his aduantage . now if tempests and inconstancy of weather opposed this prince both at algiers and metz , they did not lesse at such time as he attempted the voiage of tripoli in barbary : for the contrariety of windes made him waste much time at saragossa , and after by the like constraint and violence , as much at malta , during which time the most part of his souldiours died , and in the end vtterly despairing to reach tripoli in due season , the army a boade at gerbes , where it was after ouerthrowne as well by tempest as by the turkes , who knew well enough how to aduantage themselues by this disorder . the first yeere of the war of cypres , the armies of the pope and of the venetians incountred notable losses by tempest of sea , euen in the mouthes of their own hauens , and all for too late assembling themselues . the turke neuer fought , especially by sea , but when the season and opportunity would permit him . some one that may perhaps long to ouerthrow this position will alledge that the princes of christendome haue neuerthelesse in the winter attempted voiages by sea . it may be , but i should thinke it was either in regard of the hope they had , not to incounter the turke as they might , in the sommer , then for any assurance they had or might haue in the well-speeding of a voiage inconsiderately attemted . in breefe , if we must aduenture beyond reason , it were better we did it fighting against the turkes , then against the windes , with the moores then with stormes and shipwrackes . to say the very truth , our princes of christendome haue their forces and estates so far separated one from the other , that before we can reduce them to one consent and body ; time and opportunities are fled . but the turke hath his powers so limited and ranged , not depending but of one only head , as he is alwaies in a readines to repell all assaults almost before the threatning of them can be with him . in conclusion , if all these reasons suffice not to cleare the proposition , yet should they teach vs at the least to proue wise , resolute & aduised hence forward not to enterprise ought so out of season , as that we should be driuen to fight with time rather then men ; they should teach vs to gaine rather then to lose occasions ; to abound rather then want ; to seeke to be honoured and to thriue rather then to receiue dishonour and losse : but the maine point in all is to haue god on our side as our chiefe strength and most assured conductor . chap. xvi . that he hath neuer diuided his forces . wisdome of the turkes in vndertaking one , not many wars at once . diuision of forces dangerous . those few good commanders that are found in a confused multitude are not to be farre separated . the ouerthrow of one army may breed terror in the rest . prouision cannot be made at once for many expeditions . svch hath beene the wisdome and foresight of the ottomans , as they haue neuer almost had to do with two enemies at once . contrariwise they haue so well ordered their enterprises as the finishing of one hath drawen on the beginning of an other ; but when they forsooke this beaten and sure way , then loe miserie ouertooke them , as it hapned to mahomet the second , who would needes warre with three armies at one time , sending one for italy , at such time as he tooke ottranto : the other to rhodes , where his generall and armie were well beaten : the third he himselfe went to conduct against the mammoelucks , if by death he had not beene preuented . he had in these three armies aboue three hundred thousand men , besides his armie at sea , consisting of aboue fiue hundred saile . the voyages and designes ill digested , all these three armies were discomfited ; for that of italy , though it tooke ottranto , got nothing by it ; seeing that assoone as the souldiers vnderstood of their masters death , they quitted the place vpon composition . but me thinkes this proposition , whereby i maintaine that it is not good at once to set a foote diuers enterprises , may be thus impugned . that the successe of the turkes death , and the commotion it wrought amongst his people , was cause that those armies miscaried , and not the separation of them and their enterprises . i confesse as i ought , that whatsoeuer betideth vs , necessarily hapneth by way of a first or exciting cause . but to come to the ground of our principall matter ; without farther subti●●tsing this discourse , it is easily seene how hard it is for a prince to prouide sufficiently at one time for sundry enterprises , at the least vpon a sound foundation thereby to reape honorable fruites : since all diuision of forces bringeth with it a debility , and becommeth rather a subiect of iniurie then to be able to iniure others , to be beaten then to beat , to be others pray rather then to pray vpon others : for as a body diuided by parcells is not of that weight taking it seuerally , as when it is reduced to the first vnitie : in like sort the forces of a prince , when they are diuided and disunited haue not that vertue and subsistance as they would haue in their vnitie and well-ordered consunction : for proofe , who considereth that mahomet had three hundred thousand men , will say that the vnitie of such force was inuincible ; but diuided it proued not so ( though indeed each of these powers by it self ( at the least in regard of the christians ) was a most mightie army , had it had proportion squared to what it would attempt ) and if this masse of . souldiours had marched in one intire body it had beene easie for them to haue attained their purpose , one seconding another as he might haue done with that of rhodes , patros , and ottranto , which he had in this case vndoubtedly conquered . an other reason may be yet alledged , and that is , that it is hard to finde such captaines as are fit for the conduct of armies ; that in these great assemblies of forces there are few resolute souldiours ; and that they which are such being once by their diuision ( as a man may say ) diminished , it is a kinde of gelding the army of those which may serue by their example to assure and incourage the other confused multitude . moreouer when we vndertake three enterprises at once ( as mahomet , who serueth to this purpose did ) if it happen but one of them to faile , the newes of their misaduenture , maketh the rest ( vndoubtedly depending the one vpon the other ) to faile of resolution . again , as we haue before deliuered , it is necessary that the war be vndertaken in grosse , and that assay be made of our forces as soone as may be , that we may not be driuen long to entertaine a great army ( which for delay of execution doth oft times disband , breake vp and ouerthrow it selfe with it selfe , but especially with answerable prouisions the better to inioy great happinesse with smal charge ; which will neuer befall him that diuideth his forces and at once attempteth in diuers places . we will then conclude that the ottomans for the most part haue not had but one enterprise in hand at once , and that to atchieue it they haue so well prouided for it , as the victory hath remained on their side . chap. xvii . that he hath not long held warre with one alone . why the turkes haue not continued war with one alone . a long war addeth courage and experience to the enemy . it moueth neighbours out of the feare of their owne like misery to aide the oppressed . the turkes manuer of shifting his wars , and making peace at his pleasure . what more assured testimony can wee haue of a continued wisdome , or to say better of a well caried subtilty amongst the ottomans , then in that they haue alwaies come off well in concluding their wars , and haue not maintained them long against one and the selfe same enemy ? the practise of this policy hath beene most aduantageous vnto them ; such people as they haue not been able at the first to subdue , they haue left in peace , yet haue not forborn in the meane time to turne their armes elsewhere . i haue fashioned to my selfe two especiall causes of this discreet course . the first is the feare they haue euer had lest they might make good souldiours of those against whom they should wilfully maintaine a lingering war. a thing ill practised by the spaniards in flanders and the low-countries ; for continuing war many yeres together against them , they haue acquainted that people ( before soft and effeminate ) with the fearfull clashe of their armes , they haue so encouraged and imboldened them , as at this day there are few nations more industrious about their fortifications , or more resolute in the field . the other occasion which hath withheld the turke from making war long time together vpon one people , is , in mine opinion the feare he hath to incite their neighbour princes to take armes against him . for if the compassion & fire which burneth our neighbours house doc not mooue vs , the feare of the like to light on vs will make vs bestirre our selues . the turke then following these steps one while assaileth the venetians , despoiling them now of a prouince , then of a good towne or place of strength . and hauing there made vp his mouth he praieth next vpon the hungarians , doubting lest he might pull vpon his necke a generall league of the other of italy . he euermore pretendeth in shew that hee will attempt no further : rather that hee meaneth to plant the vtmost of his limits at the place by him last conquered : in the meane time he forgetteth not to be watchfull where he may sease himselfe of some other place of more importance , more easily to incroch vpon vs. after he hath gotten from the hungarians some peece of their country , he retireth himselfe before their neighbours be assembled , or that they haue meanes couragiously to reuenge themselues of their iniuries . in conclusion he so well behaueth himselfe as he hath neuer suffered vs to fasten vpon him whatsoeuer wars he hath made vpon vs , and he hath alwaies so timely made his retraite , as he hath not enforced the neighbours of the country assailed to ioyne and be in league together ; he in the meane time resting vpon his aduantages of hauing a great number of souldiours well trained and entertained in continuall wars whereby they become more experienced in all occurrents , then ours ; by these meanes attaining to the triumphes of so many crownes and estates . the end of the first booke . the second booke . chap. i. of religion . religion the principall bridle of the subiects . excellencie of the christian religion . the vainnesse and abhomination of the mahometan religion . disputation of religion forbidden amongst the turkes . the great turkes example is a confirmation of his religion . so are the calamities of the christians , and of others different from them in opinions . in like sort as by the disposing of what hath beene before handled we haue made it apparent by what wayes & meanes the turke is become great ; so are we now to deliuer the manner how he holdeth , and maintaineth what he hath already gotten . all such as haue gone about to lay the foundation of souerantie haue begun with religion , as that wherof princes must necessarily make vse , to containe their people in obedience and worship of one god true or false ; if this were not , it were impossible they should acknowledge one soueraigne in earth ▪ were they without the feare & knowledge of one supreame in heauen : we might alleage ancient histories whereby it would appeare that all such as haue gone about the establishment of a monarchy , haue had an especiall care to grounde it on the pretence of religion , by whose mysterie and ceremonies they helde in those whom they sought to range to their lawes , by this scruple making them more tractable and pliant to receiue instruction ; numa pompilius , lycurgus , sertorius , and others are sufficient proofes , whose credit grew from the communication they gaue out they had with som diuinity ; others that could not hit of the way to frame a new religion fortified themselues neuerthelesse with a pretence of it , in reforming the old , as did not long since ismael king of persia and his coosine harduellas , who performed great matters in the partes of asia by introducing a new superstition of religion . but to the purpose , we must auow that as there is no religion more true , so is there none more fauorable to princes then the christian , for the quiet and preseruation of their estate and minde . in somuch as this by way of conscience subiecteth to the king & all other superiours ( howsoeuer peruerse and vitious ) the heart , the person , & goods of the subiect ; what greater reason or instrument of state can we meete with then that which bringeth the people vnder a full and perfect obedience ? if our sauiour christ submitted himselfe to the law of the emperour and paid taxe and custom for himselfe and saint peter , who will doubt that his disciples are not to doe the like as true obseruers of his precepts ? i remember a discourse written by the iesuites of a certaine prince of a country newly dscouered in india , who as one very politicke and wise perceiming the simplicity and purity of the christian doctrine , though himselfe were an idolater , permitted that his subiects should be baptized , cathechized and instructed in our faith ; and was present at their baptisme ; furthering to his power all the actions of the iesuites ; because ( said he ) i am assured if these men obserue their law as they are bound , they will faile neither of loialty nor obedience , and will pay me my tributes and reuenues without fraude or contradiction . let vs now enter into the principall matter of the subiect which we haue vndertaken to handle . the law of mahomet is full fraught with fables and grosse absurdities , and so far from reason to maintaine them , as it would be an easie matter by way of some holy manifestation of their errors to alter the estate & gouernment of the turkish empire . what more strange impertinency can there be then that of their alcaron ? it is impossible to deuise more absurdities , dreames and cousenings , then those their law giuer mahomet hath introduced : but he perceiuing well enough that the foundation of his falfe doctrine was such as it would be easie to ouerthrow it ; knew cunningly how manie ways to remedie it . first he framed all the precepts of his law according to naturall sense , and made them sutable to the course of things base and earthly , therby to make their obseruation so much the more pleasing and easie to be admitted and maintained , as being founded vpon the pleasures of the flesh and the world ; he could neuer better charm the reason and lull asleepe the spirite of that dull and wholly illiterate nation , then to tie them to the performance of a law altogether sensuall . the other meanes he held to make his law lasting , was the expresse forbidding to enter into disputation about any one point of it , vnlesse it were with the edge of the sword : in regard whereof he tearmed it , the law of the sword . thus the prince of the turke who hath in his hand the sword & force , is also consequently the arbitrator & iudge of the doubts and controuersies which arise in his law , and determineth them as he seeth good , so as he is wise enough to suffer any newe opinion to take footing . for as soone as that hapneth he turneth his sword against the authours thereof , and that with such rigour and cruelty as he vtterly rooteth them out not leauing so much as a seed or any parcell of them . the troubles and dissentions which heresies haue brought in amongst the christians serue him for examples , he seeth such histories daily verified ; he is very well informed of them , and turneth them to the best vse beyond the experience his predecessors haue had of such fruites as spring from a new interpretation of their law . harduclles in a very small space wan such credit amongst that barbarous people , that by means of a certaine new interpretation of the points of their sect , he busied all asia , where he sowed so many troubles , as he well neere indangered the whole estate of baiazet the second . but that which maketh the law of this cursed race more durable is , that the emperour himselfe obserueth it with that deuotion , honoreth it with that reuerence , embraceth it with that religion , and preserueth it in that credit and authority ; as it is hard to imagine a man more deuout and affected towards it . againe , the misery and vexations that the turks ( depriued of all other light but that their mother sense affordeth them ) beholde other nations dispersed thorow their dominions and of a contrary beleefe to indure , wholy weddeth their dull soules to this false doctrine : neither is there that misery which that vile mahometane race make not all those to suffer who embrace not their religion , but aboue all the christians . chap. ii. of the direct dependency of the turkes subiects vpon their soueraigne . subiects must haue their eies chiefly vpon their soueraigne . tyrants strength and guard of strangers . the absolute authority of the ottomans . the princes seuour , the subiects safetie . his subiects exact obedience and the cause thereof . rebllions whence procceding . the best cement that can be made to giue long continuance to an estate , is to worke so , as that the subiects , of whatsoeuer qualitie or condition they be , may haue alwaies neede of him that is their commander , to the end they may immediatly depend vpon him and reuerence him : but because it is hard to bring all the world to this passe , especially in a great monarchy : those at the least are to be drawen to it , as farfoorth as is possible , who should be the sinewes and supporters of the princes power . this moued such tyrants as durst not assure themselues of such people as they had subdued , to haue about them captaines , souldiours , and seruants which were strangers and had neither kinsfolkes , nor friendes in that country , but relied absolutely vpon them . this heeretofore was the maner of the soldans of egypt ; and though they be courses so violent , barbarous and vnworthy of christian princes , as they should neuer be set before them , yet may they somewaies aduantage them in the consideration of their ends and aime of their intentions , applying them and appropriating them so far forth as christian policy and the interest of faith may permit . now then we will deliuer what vse the turke in these times makes of them . he to establish his empire and amplifie his greatnesse and authority , intitleth himselfe not only prince and monarch of his estates , but lord also and peaceable master of the persons , habilities , goods , houses , and possessions of his vastals ; neither is there inheritance or succession so assured , be it neuer so lawfull , but it dependeth of the disposition and free wil of the turke , so as if any aske of his subiects whose house it is wherein he dwelleth , and to whom belongeth the land he tilleth , he makes no other answeare , but that they are the great turks his master ; moreouer they all tearme themselues slaues of their prince : whence followeth that they can not any waie maintaine the quiet possession of their goods , nor account of any thing as of their owne but by his especiall fauour . much more if they aime at raising themselues to any eminent place of honour they are to beg it of the magnificence and pleasure of their prince ; meanes which serue to curbe those barbarous people , yet to be reiected of christians and abhorred of lawfull princes , who receiue and hold their monarchies of the hand of god. there are more honest precepts to be giuen , whereby they may purchase and preserue the loue and obedience of their people , without vsing such cruelties and tyrannies . but because the argument propounded requireth that i relate the meanes this barbarons race hath obserued to become great , and that i am fallen into that matter , i will continue it : yet not as approuing any such course , or as indeuoring to set them downe , by them to forme a receiuable example , or to induce christian princes to make them their paterne of gouerning their estates . by this former discourse then we haue deliuered how the turkes subiects haue neede of him , some to preserue what they haue gotten , others to attaine to dignities and places of honour . and in a word , their being and life depending indifferently vpon the prince , their principall care is to winne his fauour . thi● dependency fortifieth it selfe & increaseth by the obedience and gouernment of great personages , imploied by the turke in his seruice , and fashioned by himselfe to this end , who are from their infancy brought vp at the princes charge , and instructed euery one according as hee is naturally inclined either in the excercises of armes or any other laborious trade , so as such not knowing other father or benefactor then their soueraigne ( from whom they receiue both goods and honours ) : neuer thinke of kindred or friends , neither haue they any touch of bloud or naturall alliance , dedicating their body , minde and whole deuotion to the only goood of their masters affaires , whose creatures they acknowledge themselues to be , to whatsoeuer degree of honour they be preferred : neither is it in their power to amasse other wealth then that which is rawght them by the hands of the great turke . to make it more plaine to the reader who these are ; they are the spachi , spachioglani and ianizzars ; in these consisteth the strength and guard of the turkish empire . i hold it not amisse to discouer in a word ( as by the way ) what is the forme and condition of these bandes and companies : so to deliuer a more cleare vnderstanding of their manner and power . the spachi and spachioglani are horse men , whereof there are a thousand in number , which march at the right hand of their lord. the selactari or soluptari , are other thousand horse , which accompany the great turke on the left hand , when he marcheth , as the spaihioglani on the right ; of these two companies are chosen the gouernours of prouinces , and vpon these according to their merit , the turke bestoweth his daughters in mariage . the vlufezgi are other thousand which march after the aboue named , who in part are called out of the bands of ianizzars , as men noted for their especiall valour : or they are such as haue beene slaues , and for their notable seruice performed toward their masters , or for hauing saued the life of some bassa or beglerbee in the wars , attaine to this degree of being one of the turkes garde . the charipies are of like number as the vlufezgi , and march after them . the ianizzars follow after , who are foote , and appointed for the guard of the turke : these at their first institution were few in number , but now they amount to : in these two sorts of foote and horse , consisteth the strength of the turke , being as the seminarie of the sangiaks , bassas , and lisirs . this great number we speake of , giue no armes or any other marke of hereditary gentry , being in such sort ordained as they cannot attribute to themselues any thing in particular , nor attaine to any preheminence , but such as by their vertue they may inuite their prince to bestow vpon them . it is the onely meanes whereby the turke gaineth all the obedience and loialtie he can wish ; obedience in regard they are ( as i haue said ) trained vp vnto it from their infancie , which in them turneth to a naturall habite , placing the fruit of their labours in the assurance of such a seruitude : loyaltie , in as much as they expect from him their whole aduancement , and acknowledge to receiue more benefits of him then of any other prince ; neither hath it beene knowne that they euer committed treason of importance , vnlesse it were the reuolt of gazeles at damasco , and of acomat bassa at cairo , in the time of soliman . which was but ( as a man may say ) a fire of stubble extinguished at the very first appearance and pursute of their master . now the ianizars , and the other mentioned , who are the sinewes and principall foundation of the ottomans greatnesse , and who receiue so many commodities by this dependencie , and doe daily expect more ; haue no more deere care , then to vphold their masters safetie , and preserue the greatnesse of his estate , whereunto their owne fortune is linked . to shew by what meanes the turke maintaineth this dependencie , let me say that all dependency of the subiect vpon his master and soueraigne , may receiue an alteration either by force furie of the people : authoritie , of some great man of the country . by the support of a for●en prince . matters thus disposed ( not to enquire nicely after al sorts of inconueniences ) it resteth that we see how he remedieth these kinde of accidents , and preuenteth the causes of such like infirmities as these , which in time might weaken and ruine his empire : let vs begin then with the strength of the people . chap. iii. how he hath depriued his subiects of strength . wherein consisteth the strength of an estate . the turkish empire maintained by the vse of armes , as that of the romans . tithing of christian children by the turkes . the manner of their education : and the commodity accreweth thereby to the turkes . great assemblies amongst them forbidden . the strength of an estate consisteth in the valour of the nobilitie , loue and faithfulnesse of the subiect , reputation of armes , multitude of souldiers , and commodities of horse , which may bee therein bred or nourished . the turke then which would attaine to this poinct , onely by armes , horse , and souldiers , obserueth euermore this rule : he taketh away all vse of armes from such prouinces as he hath newly reduced to his obedience , he forbiddeth them the commoditie of horses fit for the war , & endeuoureth all he may to choake in them the springing vp of men proper for the exercises of arms ; and hath an ere that in all his dominions , not any man haue in his house weapons for the warre , no not so much as a knife , vnlesse without a point ; moreouer , he alloweth not any iewe or christian to haue or keepe any horse , imitating heerein the manner of the romanes , who obserued both the one and the other , especially at the surprises and surrenders of townes ; the principall conditions were alwaies , that they should forgoe their weapons , their horses , and deliuer hostages : hence is it that we reade so often in caesar , arma proferri , iumenta produci , obsides dari iubet . heereby depriuing the subdued people of all meanes to vndertake or maintaine a rebellion . againe , hostages gaue them a future assurance of the fidelitie and obedience of their subiects : for amongst such as they admitted , the chiefe of the counsaile and such as were valiant men at armes , were the first mentioned : but aboue all , those of whom they might conceiue any doubt or suspition . we reade that caesar hauing taken auxerra ( which was not one of the greatest not best peopled townes of france ) drew thence sixe hundred hostages : so as it is to be thought , that the rest after such an abatement , could not be of any great courage or strength to reuolt . the turke without troubling himselfe with the care how to traine after him an vnprofitable multitude of hostages , in an instant riddeth his subiects hands of their best forces , and strangely armeth and fortifieth himselfe with themselues , against themselues ; and heerein he thus proceedeth . he maintaineth in pay about two hundred commissaries , who as superintendents trauell vp and downe all the countries of his obedience , to see and ouersee all that is saide and done by the christians . these men goe throughout grecia , wallachia and bosnia , and extort by way of tenthes , the children from the bosomes of their fathers and mothers , according as they esteeme them fit and likely to be fashioned to the wars . these childrē thus culled & assembled from al cuntries of his obedience are after sent to constantinople and distributed amongst the merchants , and citizens by name , and inroulement ; to the ende they may be there instructed in the lawe of mahomet , and taught the turkish tongue : after ( when they come to the age to beare armes ) to be of the number of ianizzars . for during their youth they are trained vp to all such military exercises as may put valour in them , and make them souldiours ; and this by particular masters appointed to teach them to shoote , wrastle , leape , vault , and so to harden their bodies as the tranailes of the wars may be after held but as pleasures and naturall actions . thus the turke by this tithing of children assureth himselfe of his people in a two-folde manner ; in despoiling as he doth the prouinces of the flower of their martiall men ; and applying them to his owne strengthning both at home and abroade . hereunto he addeth the expresse forbidding his subiects all assemblies , or building of any strong houses , which may stead them in time of sedition or tumult , neither are they allowed the vse of bels , by whose sound they might call themselues together to the execution of some plotted reuolt , or mutiny . in a word , they are naked of all meanes , to fortifie , to arme , to assemble themselues or to become any waies ; fit for the wars ; no other subiect is left them to worke vpon but the tillage of the land , whereto , as to al other mechanical artes , they apply themselues ; so becomming base , abiect , and vnapt for the wars . chap. iiii. the causes that may moue a people to fury . despaire armeth the weake . how to auoid tumults and ciuill commotions . feare amongst subiects is vpheld by iustice , and plentie of thinges necessary . praise of peace and iustice . execution of iustice amongst the turkes pleasing and tollerable , though vniust . an exhortation to christian princes to administer iustice . it hath oft hapned , and in our times we haue had triall of it , that the people , though vnarmed , haue in their despaire and fury disquieted a whole estate , and brought the common-weale into an exceeding distresse and perplexity . furor arma ministrat ( saith virgil ) iamque faces & sax a volant . we haue the testimony of the romans time , in those ciuill wars which hapned in italy & in sicily , & of the mischiefes which followed those rebellions ; as much hath beene seene to happen in these times in the i le of s. domingo about the change of gouernment introduced vpon those conquered people , forced to subiect themselues to a new kinde of seruitude . in very deede that people is not weakely armed which hath a heart , a good spirite , and a nimble hand . this is the cause why the turke to preuent these popular commotions , hath depriued the people of all sorts of armes , to the end they may forget both the vse and courage to handle them , and that they may not by them take occasion to mutiny . now to prouide that so barbarous a yoake driue them not to despaire , he maintaineth a general peace and tranquillity throughout his estate : he hath a care that iustice be equally distributed : that they haue plenty of victuals , and all other vsuall commodities , the better to lull asleepe their fury . by these meanes euery one maketh the best of his fortune and liueth quietly at home , embracing that naturall desire of holding his owne , which to performe euery man emploieth whatsoeuer may proceed out of himself : moreouer this quiet and ease of minde doth so soften men , as they rest free from the thought of plotting or vndertaking sturs and rebellions : iustice , quiet , and plenty , are three things which haue for their opposites , the violence of soldiours in time of war , the corruption of iudges in time of peace , and scartsiy and famine in both . the iniustice , the abuse , and auarice of officers and magistrates , are those which procure the subuersion and vnauoidable ruine of a country . i could adde to this discourse many examples & domesticall proofes , but not to enter into too deepe a sea i will spare them , and will content my selfe to say only that all those of ancient times , and such as haue had any touch of a good minde ( either christians or infidels ) haue euermore confessed that the sincere execution of iustice is the strongest piller of all well ordered estates , as on the contrary iniustice is the ouerthrow , not alone of men and countries , but of beasts also . to returne to our matter , it is sure that when the common subiect hath wherewith to nourish , cloath , and handsomely accommodate himselfe and family ; when in the middest of armes he is safe in his owne home ; when he standeth not in feare of forged crimes , or bribery of iudges ; then is it that he falleth asleepe in securitie , and careth not but to entertaine that tranquillitie , reiecting all thought of rebellions . this is it which the turke ( who warreth continually with his neighbours ) putteth in practise to maintaine peace throughout his dominions , and to be beloued and faithfully serued of his subiects , whom he tieth to him with those strong bands , which are to say the truth ( besides iustice and tranquillitie ) most proper for preseruation . a great helpe heereunto is his continuall imploying his captaines and souldiers in the wars , especially out of his owne countrey , and to the spoile of his enemies . peace is the horne and true mother of abundance : then is it that euery man tilleth his land without disturbance , and quietly inioyeth and encreaseth his owne store , since as the poet saith , pax arua colit : iustice queene of vertues , is that which serueth as the base and most sure foundation to peace , which could not otherwise subsist , nor the lawes likewise ; then is it that they gaine strength and vigour . and though the forme of the turkish iustice be not without much vanitie and oppression , and though all matters be determined amongst them by way of witnesses , who are alike bought and sold ; and that iudgements passe as gold and siluer is stirring : yet the quicke dispatch they receiue , maketh them forget this inconuenience ; and though the sentence of such iudges be often pronounced against all order of iustice ; yet is there thus much good gotten by it ; that men consume not themselues bodie and goods in pleading and trotting after lawyers and atturnies , which haue their consciences as large as the other , who are bought more deerely : besides the delay , vexation and vncertainety of the iudgement . and though the sentence of such men be much displeasing , yet the people haue this to comfort them , that they many times see them endure most notable and exemplary punishment : for the turke sometimes vpon the least complaint brought against them , putteth them to death , be they neuer so great personages , as well to inrich himselfe with their spoiles , as to manifest himselfe to be a prince most respectiue of iustice and equity , and to giue also a manner of satisfaction to his subiects so oppressed as selim , left that example of bostand bassa . hence christian princes are to fetch an aduertisment how to be more carefull then they are in making their ministers obserue a more vpright and speedy distribution of iustice amongst their subiects : not vpon the grounds and intents of this barbarous turke ; but rather because they are one day to render an account before god , who to this ende established them in place aboue others . questionlesse the long delaying of suites is the most damnable plague to be found at this day in all estates : the abuses committed otherwise by the ministers of princes are more to lerable then these ; where the whole is in question . for this cause princes ought to looke more neerely to this then to any other thing . chap. v. the common remedy applied by the turke against the force and fury of the people . another way of preuenting popular seditions , by hauing alwaies bands of foote and horse in a readinesse . the turkes strength in his court . his other strengthes . inconueniences that grew by the romane legions : preuented by the turke . though the meanes formerly deliuered be sufficient to keepe the turkes subiects from rebelling , yet there are stronger by him practised , wholly to preuent and extinguish euen the least sparke of sedition , and to prouide against other like inconueniences . he maintaineth a great number of horse and foot alwaies armed , alwaies in pay , and distributed in garrisons thorow out his empire , especially in places most proper to resist or assaile . these curbe the people , and vpon the least shew of rebellion lay hands on them , represse their insolency , and suffer not the least apparance of sedition to take roote , remouing the causes euen at the first without respect to any . this is the reason that there hath neuer beene knowen any popular rebellion in his estate . the port of the great turke , as they tearme it ( as who would say his courte and gard ) consisteth chiesely and ordinarily of foure thousand horse , distributed into foure companies , to wit the spahioglani , who are in al a thousand besides their seruants , which march not in their rancke but apart , and of these euery one hath seauen or eight . these range themselues on the right hand of their lord wheresoeuer he become ; and the solastri ( equall in place and authority ) on the left . these two sortes are accounted as children of the great turke , and are nourished and brought vp in the sarraglio at his charge ( as hath beene said ) and there trained vp in all exercises of armes . after these , march the companies of the vlifezgi & charipici , inferiour to the other in rancke and authority . those on the right hand , these on the left , either consisting of a thousand horse . and wheresoeuer the great turke goe , they neuer forsake him . these foure thousand horse together with twelue thousand ianizzars are the strength and gard of the person and port of the turke , with these forces he is alwaies able to hold in awe and subiection a city more populous then constantinople , and not stand in feare of any attempt against his person . in other places of his empire he bestowes other great numbers of the ianizzars to be assistant to the gouernors and bassas , besides the succours they are to haue of such horse and foote as those are bound to furnish on whom the turke hath at other times bestowed such arable lands as haue beene conquered by armes , whence he draweth one man or more as the necessity of his affaires requireth , and according as is the value of what they possesse . these are called mozzellini . such as are tied to this contribution may be compared to the feudataries of our prince , towards whose seruice they are to finde a light horse or musket , and some of them two , more or lesse according to the imperiall institutions of such fees and tenures as so binde them . after all those we haue named , march the alcanzi , or aconizij , as a man would say aduenturers , which haue no wages , & are appointed to march a daies iourny before the campe , pilling , harrowing , and hauocking all before them , whereof they are to answeare the fift parte clcere to the great turke : of these there are thirty thousand , besides them there are the azapi ( of meane quality ) but such as serue his turne for gally-slaues , mariners and pioners to intrench , fill vp ditches , raise engines , and perform other such like seruill offices , their number is . ouer and aboue these vnder two beglerbees or lientenants generall , the one in europe the other in asia ; he hath neere an hundred thousand horse in ordinary intertainment . the beglerby of grecia or europ ( which is as much to say as prince of all princes ) hath his place of residency at sophia a towne of seruia . that of asia abideth at culhea a towne of galatia . each of these hath vnder his obedience many sangiacks ( as much as to say sherifes or bailifs ) the very children of the great turke which gouerne in the prouinces where they command are bound to obey them . this great multitude of horsemen are so well mounted and armed , as none can chuse or wish a more fit or direct meanes then their ordinary strength to hinder all popular reuolts or rebellions , be they neuer so great . that which hapned to gazeles after the death of selim doth sufficiently approue it ; he thought to stirre against soliman , and to moue syria to rebell ; but he was preuented by that mighty power which soliman found euen then in a readinesse , wherewith he ouerthrew him . these ordinary prouisions of war are the more terrible and effectual , in regard that all the people of his obedience are intirely disarmed of whatsoeuer offensiue weapons . the romans obserued this custome , to distribute diuers of their legions about the frontiers of germany alongst the rhene and danowb , to the same end and purpose as the turke entertaineth his horse . but it seemeth that he proceedeth therein more discreetly then did the romans , for they kept all their forces together in one place , and vnder one generall , of whom depended the absolute command of the armies : whence it fell out that to accommodate themselues , they ouerthrew the houses of particular men , ruined , and famished the countrey , as well by the hauocke they made ( which alwaies attendeth so great a multitude ) as by their large prouisions most necessary for an armie : the other prouinces farre distant were exempt from this oppression , yet not from contribution , but those which sustained the armie , were so ouerburdened , as their miserie incited them to rebell , and shake off their obedience . but contrariwise , the turke which disperseth his horse and foote into diuers prouinces , vnder the command of sixtie and six sangiacks , draweth not after him such disorder or ill satisfaction as did the romans . their great assemblie in one place was cause of seditions , debates , mutinies and other mischiefes , most difficult to be preuented . they did not perceiue how this manner of proceeding was a means that the souldiers grew too much to affect their captaines , and that the captaines found themselues by them enabled to attempt ( as they often did ) many things to the preiudice of the empire . and in very deed it oftentimes hapned that their armies made choice of their general for emperour , in despite of the senatours authoritie ; either in regard of the valour they knew to be in them , or of some pecuniarie corrupting their affections , which the senate could not remedy : and in trueth it was a very easie matter for the generall , so farre from home , and holding his forces vnited in one body , to practise the colonels , and the colonels to bargaine and buie the harts and affections of the souldiers , by them to possesse the empire , so as sometime the armie of spaine chose their generall emperour , and at the same time that of germany theirs : whereof we haue many examples , as also of the calamities and miseries which did thence accrew to the estate and subiects . it is an inconuenience whereto the turke cannot be subiect ; for keeping his troups and armies so spread abroad and disperst , they haue not the meanes to mutinie ( especially being in no place ouer strong ) nor yet grow to affect their beglerbyes or gouernours , whom they seldome see or repaire to : much lesse can the beglerbee in his owne behalfe easily winne or entice the hearts of the sangiacks , or affections of the souldiers , as he might well doe if the troupes were alwais together in time of peace , and abroad in one and the same prouince . chap. vi. how the turke represseth the power of the great men of his estate . the authoritie of a prince ( if his vertue be not eminent aboue all the great men of his kingdome ) is by their vertue obscured , whence groweth the diminution of the subiects obseruance . from whence the authoritie of the nobilitie doth proceed . the detestable crueltie of the turkish emperour against the next of his bloud . vsage of great men taken by the turkes . the vncertaine fortune and estate of the turkes officers . to the end the dependencie and authoritie whereof wee haue hitherto entreated be without alteration maintained , it is requisite that the prince haue a care , that there be none in his countrey who for their greatnesse may incourage the people , and embolden them to attempt ought , backt by their authoritie , countenance and conduct . this greatnesse may grow from three principall causes : either in regard they are princes of the bloud , or for that they are noted to be nobly descended and rich , or else for the reputation they haue gotten , and a long while preserued , either by cunning , or by their owne valour , and merit : things that winne credit and name amongst the common people . concerning the first cause , the children , brethren , and kinsmen of the turke , are great by consanguinitie . the barons of the country obtaine the second ranke , whereto the noblenesse of their family calleth them : for the third , such ministers and officers as beare a stroake and swaie in matters of the highest consequence , are accounted great . the ottaman princes , of nature barbarous and cruell , ordinarily shelter themselues from these inconueniences , with courses far from all humanity , in as much as without all respect of law , religion , or other ciuill consideration , they vpon the least scruple that may be , ridde their hands by execrable murthers , of their neerest kinsfolkes and friends , yea euen of their fathers and brethren , alone to inioy and by their death to assure to themselues the quiet possession of their kingdome . selim the first murthered two of his brethren , procured the death of all his nephewes , yea and of his father also . he would often say that there was nothing more sweet then to raigne out of the suspition and shadow of his kindred ; and that he deserued pardon for what he had committed , since it was the same play and vsage he should haue receiued , if any other but himselfe had attained to the crowne . amurath the third which now raigneth , made his entry by the death of his brother , and searched the establishing of his empire , euen in the belly of his mother , then great with childe , making for this end , one end of her & what she went withall : these cruelties are monstrous in the sight of god and man , and full of horror and infamie : yet hath it not beene knowen for all this , that euer any citie , any people , or armie , did reuolt or mutine . this inhumanitie is amongst them growne to that lawfull and ordinarie consequence , as they vsually put it in practise , without feare of blame or reproch . the examples thereof are as infinite as their memories , stinking and abhominable . in a word , this butchering is amongst them an hereditary succession , descending from one to another , which god would reuenge with our hands if we would amend our liues . as for the barons and lords of the countrey , mahomet the first , destroied their seed , expelling them out of his estate , as he did all the originarie turkish princes his allies ; and if by chance there remaine any of the ottoman race , he is so kept downe , as he traileth ( as they say ) his belly vpon the ground , liuing most poorely without all charge , and manage of affaires : so as neither valour nor riches can make him appeere or shine in the worlds eie ; rather he remaineth eclipsed amongst the vulgar sort , without honour , credit , or estimation . as for the princes and mightie men of the countrey by them subdued , they know well enough how to ridde their hands of them , in sort as we haue before declared : so as neuer empire was raised , or maintained with more execrable murthers , then this hath beene in these daies ; they neither sparing princes of their bloud , nor the chiefe potentates of their prouinces ; for they blinde them , if not kill them . now concerning the ministers and officers , who by long managing of waightie affaires , haue attained to honorable places , authority and reputation ; there is not one , be hee neuer so great , which at the least winke , wrath , and pleasure of his lord , loseth not his life immediatly . baiazet caused acomat bassa to be put to death , an excellent man of armes and a woorthy captaine , saying the too much reputation of the seruant was a cause of the too great ielousie of the master . selim likewise put many to death , and amongst others mustafa bassa , whom he caused to be strangled at prusa , and after to be cast out to the dogs . this was his recompence for fauoring him in the vsurpation of the empire against baiazet his father then liuing , and for making riddance of his two brethren acomat and corcut. he suspected it was he that had reuealed his secret ( as indeed he had ) to aladin and amarath children of his brother acomat , because contrary to his expectation he sought their death . it is in a manner an ordinary course with princes that one light offence obscureth and maketh them forget a thousand good seruices performed for the good of their affaires . for my part i am of opinion that this rage , and inhumane cruelty familiar with the house of the ottomans , is but a true and iust iudgment of god , who will by their parricid handes chastice the apostasies and wickednesse of one by another , considering the greater part of them are christians who haue denied their faith , and by that miserable act climed vp to the height of those eminent charges and dignities they possesse . as not long since his diuine maiestie permitted a poore simple souldiour to kill mahomet bassa , a man most mighty in credit and authority ; but more rich of power and meanes ; yet such a one as had beene a christian and had taken vpon him the orders of priesthood . chap. vii . how he confoundeth the practises of forraine princes his neighbours the diuorce of the greeke church from the romish confirmeth the turkish empire . what were requisite to stir vp the turkish subiects to rebellion . the greekes vtterly destitute of meanes for such proceedings . his owne subiects throughly curbed . one of the most assured meanes practised by the turke , as an infallible course of setling his estate against the intelligence which his people might hold with christian princes , is the diuorce & separation he maintaineth betweene the greeke & the romish church , supposing while this schisme shall continue amongst them , that they will neuer establish betweene them a sound amity . this made the conquest of constantinople easie vnto them ; this hath forwarded the proceeding of his victories , and as it were , put into his hands all those rich and goodly prouinces , whereof he is at this day the peaceable , but tyrannicall owner : moreouer he so narrowly obserueth our vnhappie discord , as he by a perpetuall counsaill endeuoureth all he can possibly , that the patriarkes render no obedience to the pope : neither is it long since zacharias , patriarcke of constantinople , was like to be staked for hauing admitted the new callender and the reformation of the course of the yeere , made in the time of gregorie the . now to returne to the principall point , it is to be presupposed that the proiects and carriage of popular rebellions , cannot be vndertaken without the support and direction of the mightiest for wealth , meanes , and authority , in the country which we would surprise ; and that princes will not bouge to set a foote these plots and enterprises , but by offered occasion of some fortresse which importeth the assurance and consequence of the estate , and may serue for a refuge to recouer their decaied strength : or else that their destigne relieth vpon some promised succour , or finally vpon the consideration that those who inuite them to this conquest are so strong within themselues , as they may hope for an honorable issue of their enterprise . these are all necessary particularities , but not any of them resteth now in the hands of the greekes abased by extreame seruitude , and so far from hauing any fortresse at their deuotion , as they cannot once stir without being discouered ; and though they were disposed to vndertake , they haue at their backe so great a number of men at arms , as at the least breath of a rebellion , they would cut them off before they should haue meanes once to peepe forth of their shels . the turke againe maketh them sure to him so many waies , though all barbarous and vnciuill , as he scarcely alloweth his subiects leaue to draw their breath , nor suffreth his mighty men once to hold vp their heades ; or forraine princes to be able in due time to attempt ought against him . the end of the second booke . the third booke . chap. i. the causes of the fall and ruine of estates . estates are subiect to change . some of longer , some of lesse continuance . great , small , and meane estates , and their causes of ruine ; externall , internall , and mixt . lesse estates come to their endes soonest by externall causes . the great by internall . the meane more durable , yet subiect to alteration . the order that nature obserueth in all things created doth plainly enough teach vs that whatsoeuer is borne passeth and hastneth towards death ; and that all things which haue a beginning necessarilie and interchangably roule towards their end . this proceedeth either of an ordinarie and naturall course , or of the violence and alteration of compound bodies . hence we drawe this construction , that estates change , monarchies faile , and the ruine of one serueth as the raising to the other . againe , as of humaine bodies some are more strong , vigorous , and of a better composition then others , and so are of longer continuance ; so we see the same difference in kingdomes and estates : in as much as some preserue themselues longer , either because by their nature they are more surely founded ( as for example the signory of nobles is more lasting then the popular estate , and a monarchal estate more then a common-weale , because a monarchy keepeth the causes of corruption more aloofe from her ; or is policed with better lawes ) or because of the situation which is naturally more strong then the other , as we see at this day in the signorie of venice . but because this assertion is subiect to diuers obiectiōs , we will diuide it only into two propositions . first then of principalities , some are small , some great , some indifferent , either in regard of their subsistance or first essence , or of the comparison which may be made betweene them and their neighbours : secondly , the efficient causes of the vtter ruine of estates are either inward , or outward , or mixt : the inward are to be fetched and conceiued in respect of the negligence , ignorance , and riot of princes which giue themselues ouer to all voluptuousnesse ; whereto may be added the factions , secret practises , ambitions , and desperate humors of subiects , with sundrie other occasions , all fit to bring estates to their vtter ruine . the outwad causes are the stratagemes , armes , and force of the enemie . the mixt are such as participate of both , as are the rebellions of the people , treasons of particular men , put in execution by forraine ayd and force . since then it is so that all principalities are subiect to ruine by one of these three causes ; we are now to vnfold what maladies may infect , as well great and indifferent , as small estates ; and draw all within the compasse of inward , outward , and mixt causes . now like as in naturall things naturall corruption is more tolerable then violent , so must we consider whether the alteration and impairing of estates and common weales chance by reason of age , or by the violence of some not forseene cause . returning then to our former diuision and well examining it , wee shall finde that small estates come to their ends rather by meanes of outward causes ( brought in by force and violence ) then otherwise : in as much as their power being insufficient to withstand their mighty neighbours ambitious attempts , they are at the first incounter ouerset with the storm of his conquests ; in this maner the seueral signories of lombardy fel in subiection either of the duke of milan , or of the venetiās ; the free cities of thoscany became a pray to the duke of florence : the princes of africke to the king of fez-marocco , and algiers . on the contrarie , great empires are vsually subuerted by meanes of inward causes ; either by ease & plenty , which customarily makes princes to swell with insupportable pride ; by voluptuous riot ( whereto people amidst their abundance are most prone ) or else by insolency and presumption seazing the great ones of the country when they see themselues much followed and reuerenced , all fit inticements to dispose a hart ( but indifferently generous ) to plot for his owne raising . nec quenquam iam ferre potest caesarue priorem , pompeiusue parem . then is it ( as one saith ) that caesar cannot brooke a superior , and that pompey stomaketh an equall . meane estates vndergoe danger as well as the two former , yet far lesse , since they hold the meane as the other the extreams , for they are not so vnfurnished of strength , as that it would be easie for euery one to inuade and oppresse them , neither are they of that greatnesse and wealth , as to afforde matter to particular men to grow mighty , or else abandon themselues immoderatly to delights & pleasures , or to transport themselues beyond the limits of reason . this is it that so long preserued the common weales of sparta & of venice , which euermore respectiuely intertained a meane and equality . the mixt causes of the ruine of estates are inward treacheries and outward force . treason hatched within an estate much more indammageth a great then a small or meane empire . for a monarke is not able to turne his eie vpon euery corner of his kingdome ; and sturring spirits are fortified in their attempts either with the hope of impunity ( the nourse of vices in all estates and gouernments ) or with the opinion they haue conceiued of not being discouered till such time as their proiects meete with some good successe . these things happen sooner , when the prince is far off then at hand . spaine can witnesse it , which was so vnhappily betraied by count iulian , as it thereby fell into the hands of the moores . so was the empire of the mamelucks by the treason of caierbeius possest by selim emperour of the turkes . who would search more narowly into christendome shall finde that the ciuill wars of france minister more examples for proofe of this then is necessary . thus wee see that small estates are most to stand in feare of forraine force , since they haue not wherewitheither of or in themselues to be able to resist or to take breath : that the meane estates are alwaies lesse offended by outward force then the smallest , and more free from inward treason then the greatest . chap. ii. from what coniectures the continuance of estates may be gathered . causes of the change of estates . the ruine of estates is most answearable to their beginnings . the rootes of common wealths how maintained . security especially to be auoided . i will no farther extend the discourse of the former chapter , nor diue into the other efficient causes of the ruine of estates : for should i handle what might be farther said of this matter , i should wander too far frō the propounded subiect , and perhaps racke the argument beyond his due pitch . i will then tie my selfe only to the coniectures of the continuance or fall of estates , omitting other causes , as also all that may be referred to the iudgement of the heauens , the influence of the stars , and to their vertue ; sithence this knowledge is fraught with so many obscurities and contrarieties in what is written thereof , as i will spare to search too far into it : though otherwise we are to imagine that nothing is made in vaine , and that those celestiall bodies moue not by chance , but rather by diuine order and disposition . againe , the errors of their ephimerides and the different supputation of the first masters of their profession , make the knowledge to be vncertaine and their so surely grounded maximes to afford contrarie resolutions . let vs not meddle then with the aspects of the stars , or the natiuities of estates , but regard and consider the effects of what is at our owne home without taking so high a flight . we say then that estates suffer either by the vnremoueable ordinance of god , or by the naturall course of time , wherewith in time they grow feeble , and change : or else by the wils of men , so vnstable and light , as they ordinarily breede an vniuersall alteration thorow out a whole estate and common-weale . we will only drawe our coniectures from naturall causes ( not to meddle with the iudgement of the diuine maiesty or mans inconstancy ) nakedly and simply to speake of them as neere and familiar , to the end we may not enter into the chaos of causes heauenly and most remote . so then we are to thinke that the continuance of estates is proportioned to their beginning . it is with them as with sensible creatures , which the more they hasten to arriue at the perfection of their being , the sooner also they faile and die : the contrarie is seene in those which with a slow and measured pase attaine to a more faire maturity and perfection : as for example , among beastes the horse , amongst trees the willow are of no long indurance : but those that ( as the hart and oliue ) make by degrees and slowly towards their ripenes , are likewise more lasting . we may say the like of empires and estates : for as we see them slow or swift in their increase , so are they more swift or slow in their ruine . haue not the french more then once conquered the duchy of milan and the kingdome of naples , and that as a man may say almost in a moment ? so haue they many times lost it and all in a moment : such conquests resemble torrents tumbling downe the mountaines , which in lesse then an hour , by reason of the great shoutes of waters they bring with them , become fearefull and dangerous ; when soone after in an instant , we see them fallen and shallow , so as a childe may wade thorow them without trouble or danger . now not to leaue this conquest of milan and naples , we must to this purpose by examples contrary to the former make good the ground of our proposition : which to performe , i will set before you the manner how the spaniards conquered and held these prouinces . i finde it hath been by a long course of time , and infinite trauaile accompanied with all the paines and troubles , which those who set vp their rest vpon a conquest and resolue to abide out the wars , ordinarily indure . hence their labour hath taken such roote , as nothing since hath been able to escape their hands , howsoeuer they haue been oft times galled and put to their plunges . it is requisite then that empires haue their rootes to sustaine them , which must be deepe and sound , otherwise it is impossible they should long continue . now that they may be such , there is an especiall wisedome and many yeeres required . the true rootes of an estate are the loue of the people towards their prince , the sincere and holy distribution of iustice amongst the subiects ; military discipline well policed and obserued by the souldiours ; honours , rewards , and benefits bestowed according to vertue and merit : that great men be not slightly set by , abased or contemned : that the common sort of people be intertained with all honest satisfaction : necessary prouisions for the maintenance of places of strength ; well husbanding of the treasure ; friendly intelligence with neighbour princes ; vncorrupt election of officers ; modesty in their proceedings : these are the very true rootes able to fortifie and make monarchies to flourish and raise them to eternity : which rootes can neuer proue setled spring , or send foorth worthy fruit , vnlesse they be planted in the soile of wisdome , aduice and industrie , and husbanded by the continuance of time . it is often seene that great conquests and victories attained without losse or labour , so blinde the conquerour , as they make him become like one of those long reeds or canes which carry outwardly a good apparance , but are inwardly hollow and of fraile substance . they cause him to contemne his companions , and those who assisted him in obtaining his victories , but more the subdued people , whence ordinarily followeth , that the higher is his fortune , the neerer is his fall . wee haue straied sufficiently . it is now high time to returne to our principall discourse : and as we haue heretofore made it appeare that there are three sorts of estates ; so wee are now to vnfold in what ranck of the three the turke is to be bestowed . chap. iii. that the monarchy of the turke is comprehended within the number of great estates . the substance of the ensuing chapters . greatnesse of the turkish empire . compared with the romaines . the marueilous successe thereof inwarre . from the diuision of estates deliuered by vs in the former chapter , this is to take his foundation , and by these causes wee are to make choice of that of the three which is the surest ; by what accidents or infirmities both the one and the other may vndergoe a change , either outwardly or inwardly , and in which rank of the three wee are to lodge the turke . some one perhaps will iudge this question superfluous and vnprofitable , seeing his renowne , his conquests , and his long rule doe but too much teach vs what he is : notwithstanding all this i should not thinke it besides the purpose a little to particularize the causes of his greatnesse . the estate of the turke is held without question to bee one of the greatest and mightiest , as well in regard of the large circuit it containeth , as of his power : he is great because of so many prouinces reduced to his obedience ; and though he haue not so great a share in europe as the romaines sometimes had , he hath to counteruaile this , more aduantaged himselfe in asia and africke : for when the fortune of the romaines was at the greatest , and that they had their armes most at libertie , yet went they not beyond euphrates : it is very true , that traian went farther , but all the prouinces he subdued were soone abandoned by adrian his successor . the turke hath not done so , for he hath extended his dominion as far as tigris ; he possesseth all mesopotamia , or as they terme it diarbecke . from thence he reacheth as far as balsera or the gulfe of persia , which the romans neuer saw , and the gulfe of arabia . and to say better , all is his from the red sea to the cittie aden , which is in the maine continent beyond the mouth of this sea , more then an hundred and fiftie miles : he hath also inlarged his dominions toward the south far beyond aegypt . in africk all is his , except three places of strength which the king of spaine holdeth , pegnon de veles , oran , and melila : mauritania also is his , only three fortresses excepted , which are tanger , arsilla , and mazagan , conquered by the portugall : when i name africk , i intend that country commonly termed barbary , and not ethiopia . hauing now seene the largenes of his dominions , we are next to discourse of his meanes and power . i finde that he hath better established the one and the other , then the romans euer did whē they were at their intirest greatnes , because in such a most large compasse of his country , there is no king or common weale beareth sway to distinguish his dominions : which was otherwise with the romanes , who had many such wedged in , within the continent of their empire . there is not any one of his subiects that dareth to say that the house wherein he dwelleth , or the land he tilleth , is his owne . they acknowledge to hold all they haue of him : he ordinarily intertaineth diuers great and mighty armies both by sea and by land . so as it must needes be granted that he is greater in his estates , meanes and power , then euer were the romans , for he so peaceably maintaineth what he hath conquered , as he can no waies vndergoe the troubles and wars which the romans endured at the hands of mithridate , the parthians , farnaces and others . moreouer , next europe the gaules are not his enemies . the cymbrians are his associats ; so as he fostereth such a tranquillity and obedience on all sides , as he amasseth inestimable treasure . and more , ( a thing worth the noting ) in three hundred yeeres space since he began first to reigne , he hath receiued but foure notable ouerthrowes ( that excepted which he receiued the yeere past neere tauris ) but the romaines in lesse time receiued more and greater at the only hands of the carthaginians . in sum , there is not that nation in the world which can vaunt of so many victories in so short a space , or to haue triumphed of the captiuity or death of so many kings and great princes , as the great turke ; or that haue with such happie successe and discipline so soone raised so mightie an empire as his is at this day . is it not a fearfull matter to heare it related that mahomet the second ( an infidel ) hath had such fauour of the heauens , as to haue beene able in the space of . yeeres raigne , to subdue two empires , vsurpe twelue kingdomes , and take by force two hundred cities ? that which affordeth the greatest cause of wonder , is , that all this hath succeeded in the very time when the art of military engines & fortifications were in their perfection , and wherewith we might haue armed our selues to withstand him . in conclusion , what shal we say of selim the first , who in lesse then foure yeeres space vanquished the mamelucks , subdued all syria , palestina , the red sea , a great part of arabia and all aegypt ? these are questionlesse goodly and notable tropheys of the turks greatnesse , but most dishonorable and dangerous for all christendome . chap. iiii. whether the empire of the turke draw towards an end . the ottaman empire leaneth toward ruine . the reasons are the bordering princes vpon the turkes estate , and their prouiding for their safety . made wise by others harmes they stand vpon their defensiue war. they are bridled by strong fortresses . contrary arguments . we haue discoursed as briefely as might be of the fall and ruine of estates , of their efficient causes , and vpon what coniectures a man might gather them . it is now time that we see and examine in like sort whether the empire of the turke be nere his end , and abatement of his greatnesse , according as a man may draw from coniectures it leaneth towards his declining ; and though the foundation heereof be built vpon reasons so cleere and euident as they are not to be contraried , yet will i alledge one that carrieth more apparence then all the other ; and that is , that the greatnesse of his empire is at the highest that it may be by the ruine of princes by him expelled , vanquished and made away one after an other , whilest he hath in the meane time triumphed of their estates and rich spoiles ; but now that he hath none to oppose him with hopes of so fauourable issue as had the other : his ambition , heart , and courage will grow idle and languish ; whence in time will spring the ruine of his empire ; is he not already come to that passe ? the princes that confine vpon him , though more weake then he to bid him battaile , assaile , or defend , haue neuerthelesse so ordered their affaires and meanes , as they are able at this day to sheeld themselues sufficiently from his attempts . amongst others the king of persia , doth he not so ballance his power as he hath giuen him many great ouerthrowes , and one lately ( as i haue said ) neere tauris ? the tartarians also hold him plaie and more prouoke him then he them ; and of late they got from him caffa a strong and wealthy towne ; moreouer whilest he was busied about the wars of persia the georgians took and sacked xistis ; but they were not able to hold it ; so as the turke hath repossessed himself of it . the muscouit doth not only defend himselfe from the incursions of the turks , but he oft times also skirmisheth with them , commanding as he doth aboue an hundred and fifty thousand horse . the king of polonia likewise more mighty then the muscouit , is so strong as he will not take wrong ; but is able rather at all times to repell the violence of his enemy . the house of austria together with the aid of the princes of germanie , hath wherewithall to make their party good and to oppose him : the venetians , vnited with italy and spaine ( which in such a case will not abandon them ) are likewise able enough to defend themselues and hold their owne . as for the king of spain , he is so mighty by sea and by land , both of men and mony , as he dareth vndertake himselfe to incounter the turke in battaile , much more to defend himselfe if assaulted . the king of fez is not anie way awed by him , and is more strong then he , at the least in africke ; which he approued to the common hurt of christendome by that ouerthrow and death of the king don sebastian of portugall , where so many christians miserably ended their daies . the last of those which abut vpon the turke is prester iohn , who hath hitherto behaued himselfe so honorably against him , as he hath neuer shewed any token of fearing his forces . so as being now vnable by reason of the concord & stout opposition of his neighbours , to gaine farther ground ; he must of necessity ( vnlesse god in regard of our sinnes be otherwise pleased ) begin to recoile ; and that greatnesse which he hath built vpon others ruines must decay and lessen ; since the matter which gaue the increase is on his part wanting . there is yet an other point which fortifieth this opinion , and that is : that all such princes as confine vpon the turke , are by others example made more wise , aduised and considerat , then they were before the ruine of such as serued for a pray to the ottomans ; whereby they will discreetly looke to themselues how they courageously hazzard their persons or estates at one battaile : they will rather be content to stand vpon their defence , attending while time beget some apparent occasion , roundly and to the purpose to set vpon him . againe , there are at this day so many fortresses , so strong and so well appointed , as they are in a manner impregnable , so as the turke is not like to finde the way so open as heereto fore he did to carry them : but if he should put himselfe vpon that hazardous enterprise of forcing them one by one , it were as much as to become the author of his owne ruine . neither ought any man in opposing this , alledge the losse of cypres , since it hapned not so much through the turkes power , as because of the distance of venice , which was to supply them with men and munition . a man may by a contrary argument say as much of the sauing of malta ( speaking according to humaine causes ) for it was not protected either by the forces within it selfe , or by the succor sent thither from other parts : but only because the iland was so far distant from constantinople as the army could not in due time and season receiue their prouisions and bee refreshed as was requisite , nor well imploie such as were sent thither . if it would please god that the turke might often make such voiages , he would prepare vs faire occasions to attempt the reuenge of the outrages christendome hath by him sundry waies receiued . chap. v. by what kinde of causes the empire of the turkes might most easily faile . the power of the turke not to be easily ouerthrowne by outward causes . the power of princes & estates bordering vpon the turke , as the persians , tartarians , moscouits , polonians , germans , venetians , spaniards , &c. as wee haue at large intreated in the chapters going before by what causes all estates may be brought to their last end and ruine ; so are we now to come to that of the ottomans , as one of the greatest ; and examine by what inconueniences it may vndergoe a change . i am of opinion that this their so raised greatnesse can hardly decay by vertue of outward causes ; seeing the princes bordering vpon their estate , are euery one in particular weake to assaile them , as they might well doe if they were peaceably vnited . this weakenesse presupposed , it followeth that it will proue a hard matter to ruine him by forraine force , whose strength and meanes it is requisit we examine to inlighten this opinion . first , those that confine vpon the turke next africke , are the king of fez , of marocco , and prester iohn : next asia , the sophi and the tartarians : in europe the duke of muscouy , the king of polonia , the emperour , the venetians , and the king of spaine . as for the king of fez he hath men enow , but small store of mony , so as he hath not the meanes or ability to maintaine a lasting war : againe , though i should suppose he were able to be at the charge , yet i finde him naked of other things necessarie to aduantage himselfe vpon the turke , such as are places of strength to forward his proceedings , and assure his retrait : so as he is like enough to come short of his aime : and if he should performe some worthy exploit in africk , doubtles the king of spaine his neighbour would soone be iealous of his good fortune . and in very deede this is not the point , for it is all one with christendome whether the king of fez be too strong for the turke , or the turke for the king of fez , since both are the christians enemies . as for prester iohn , all the world knoweth he hath enough to doe to defend himselfe against the turkes forces ; neither is it long since he wan from him all the hauens he had vpon the red sea , and amongst others that of archiech and mazzua : now for the sophi , if we search their histories we shall finde that the kings of persia haue alwaies had the worse of the turks , & among all other mahomet the second ouercame vsumcassan ; after him selim the first did as much to ismael whom he forced into the remotest parts of his country . tarmas also met with the like measure at solimans hands : and on the contrary we see that cudabenda hath had such a hand of amurath the third now raigning , as he hath often vanquished his armies , and now of late at tauris : and though he haue atchieued most worthy victories , yet hath he nothing aduantaged himselfe . in the turkes country , he hath not wan one fortresse of importance , or ought else that might counteruaile the charge of his wars : this hath succeeded in regard the soph●is strōg of horse , but vnprouided of foote , which should be the principal force of such as besiege or defend . moreouer , to force places of strength there is required great store of cannon & other munition , all wanting to the sophi , who may well meete the enemy in the feeld and bid him battaile , but not pursue and assaile him if he retire into his fortres ; because of the aboue said defects of foot & artillery ; & though he were prouided of them , yet wants he the skill how to vse thē like others . the example of tauris approueth this sufficiently , for after he had this last yeere vanquished the armie of the turks , and slaine an hundred thousand men , he could neuer take the cittadell wherein the turks had drawne all their munition of war , and left aboue eight thousand men ; neither is there any newes hitherto that he hath taken it & expelled them thence . the tartarians are as ill stored with foote and artillery as the persians , and except that they last got of the turke , it may be truly said that they neuer did him harme . as for the moscouit which abutteth vpon him ( as doe also the polonians ) they haue in regarde of the turke small store of men , horse and mony ; so as the most they can doe is to hold their owne . now concerning the germans , they haue lost much of their ancient reputation by the ouerthrow they receiued of the turke at exechium , buda , and sundry other places ; so as they are glad to keepe home without daring to assaile him . the venetians haue beene so vnfortunate , as they haue neuer moued war against the turke but it hath succeeded contrary to their hopes : and which is the worst of all , they neuer consented to anie treatie of peace , but they did forgoe some important member of their estate . and to say the truth mahomet the second got negropont , scutari , and groya ; baiazet tooke from them lepanto and modon , and after in a treaty of peace they made with him they parted with s. moore ; in an other treaty they left to soliman napoles of maluasia : selim the second wan by force the i le of cypres , duleme , and antiuari : and though these be heauy losses , yet in regard they were far distant from their estates they are more supportable then if they had beene neere hand , so ought they now more then euer aduise how to strengthen themselues against the turke by their braue resolution and prouision , which they may better doe now then euer , in regard their forces are more liuely , and the members of their common-weale more vnited and compact then heeretofore . now we are to come to the king of spaine . let vs say that he hath store of mony and all prouision necessary to be imploied in the wars ; that he is not without sufficient numbers of foot and horse alwaie in pay ; that hee hath the commodity extraordinarily to leuy so many men as may make the turke stand in feare of him ; that his forces by sea are good and strong , and that he can increase them at his pleasure ; that he hath store of victuals , commodity of hauens , for conuenient landing in his countries ; and in a word that he is so mighty , as that neither he standeth in awe of the turk , neither dareth the turke assaile him : yet this power and hability could neuer hitherto be imploied to the purpose against the common enemy of christendome . not for want of will or inclination thereto , but because he is hindred by the reuolt of flanders . the suspition also and feare of his neighbours armes , would neuer permit him to display an vnited and firme power against the turke : he hath rather beene enforced to wast his time and meanes vpon the particular preseruation of his estates somewhat distant one from an other , in stead of courageously exploiting them against the turkes to the good and consolation of christendome . but our sinnes are they especially which haue depriued vs of the glorious fruits and aduantages we might haue gained by so worthy a power . in conclusion , we must grant that since the empire of the turke cannot receiue any damage or alteration by outward causes ( which are wont to ruine estates ) it is necessary that inward causes either separate or mixt effect it ; yet before we discourse of these two meanes i hold it not amisse a little to examine , whether his estate may be by maine and open force ouerthrowne . chap. vi. that it is not an impossible thing for the christians with open force to vanquish the turke . the turke is not inuincible . examples of their sundry ouerthrowes . a comparison of their good and ill successe in battailes . all proofes that they may be conquered . the conclusion of the argument of the former chapter , is , that the turke cannot by way of open force receiue harme or ruine of importance ; because of the mighty power and meanes he hath of his owne . but heereby is not inferred that therefore christian princes should faile of courage or hope , to goe thorow with their affaires to his preiudice ; rather otherwise placing their confidence in the almighty , they are to hope better then euer , for the reasons i shall heereafter alledge ; by the handling wherof i hope to proue that so far is he from being inuincible , as on the contrary he may be easily vanquished as many experiences may resolue vs. we haue elsewhere said that baiazet the first was ouercome and taken aliue at the battaile he fought at mount-stella against the great tamberlain , vnder whose hands he died a captiue . carambeius bassa of amurath the second , was discomfited by ladislaus king of polonia in the valley of mount hermus : he came with an intention to reuenge himselfe of the losse and dishonor that the bassa of notalia had receiued at the hands of iohn huniades , which at one time recouered from him a part of seruia and all moldauia : but instead of performing this he became himselfe prisoner of that king , and had almost al his army put to the sword . baiazet the second sent calibeius and querscogles his sonne in law into asia against caitheus soldan of aegypt with a great army to reuenge the intertainment the soldan had giuen zizimus his brother , whom he had succored with men and mony against him : his army was ouerthrowne neere adena a towne of cilicia , where the turke receiued the most notable ouerthrow that was euer giuen him . for of an hundred thousand which presented themselues in the battaile , the third part remained not aliue ; yet those that performed this noble execution , were scarce one against sixe ; but the aduice of two italians and of the mameluckes so furthered the affaires of caytheus , as he spied a time to charge the turkes when they least expected it . soliman left the siege of vienna with losse of . men which were there slaine , hauing giuen twenty generall assaults to the towne . the yeere following he assembled an other army of . men , with intention cruelly to reuenge the harmes he had receiued ; but the emperour charles the fift went to meete him , with such forces , as the other fled so hastily as he had scarce leasure to saue his baggage . don iohn of austria naturall sone of charles the fifth in the yeere . got at lepanto that so renowned victory of the army of selim the second ; this hath since made them walke ( as they say ) with the bridle in their hands , and confesse they had passed too rash a iudgment vpon the power of the christians either by sea or by land : i omit to speake of the prowesse & noble acts of scanderbeg against the turkes , and how many times he ouerthrew the commanders of amurath the second : and valiantly recouered albania the place of his birth whereof he and his predecessors had beene depriued by that tyrant , neither will i again cite the examples of iohn huniades or mathew coruin , who in a manner with a handfull of men opposed and discomfited the turkish forces , nor of the portugals , though they haue at sundry times assailed the turk neere the red sea , barred him of passage , and rid him of the meanes of farther issuing out of the mouth of that sea . what should i speake of the tartarians , who but lately tooke from him taurica chersones ( called at this day perocopsky ) if the reports which come from those partes be credible ? such as haue beene curious in the search of the turkish history haue obserued , that in the space of two hundred and fourescore yeeres they haue fought with their neighbours thirty and sixe battailes , whereof they haue only gained eighteene and lost the rest . these are all signes and successes whereby a man may conclude that they are not inuincible , and that their fortune hath beene ballanced betweene gaine & losse , so as we may beleeue , if god for our offences did not busie the forces of christian princes elsewhere then against the turke , where he hath had the ouerthrow once , he had had it thrice : by all these foregoing examples we may collect that this proud enemy hath not his head so hard as it may not be broken , or else sorely brufed . and though christian princes are not of power sufficient apart and of themselues to take him to taske , yet may they doe it by ranging themselues to that vnion and concord , as that there be amongst them but one common fortune . this being granted ( as i presume it shall ) we are to vnfold how they may purchase his ruine . chap. vii . why the leagues among christian princes are commonly of small effect . leagues are concluded for the respect of honour and profit . the inequality of gaine bringeth a difficulty to the conclusion of leagues . christian princes the farther they are from the turke , the lesse haue they feare of dangers wherewith other more neere him are possessed . no man vainely exposeth himselfe to an apparant danger but where an euident commodity inuites him . while each striues to protect his owne frontiers from the turke , others are neglected . the inequality of aide begetteth a contention who shall command most in the wars . remedies against such difficulties and calamities . there are many respects and causes , which customarily make the leagues of christian princes altogether vneffectuall , which may appeere to some a matter of hard disgestion , and for this cause i hold it requisite particularly to cleere it . it is a receiued maxime that all the actions of princes are vndertaken for two principal causes , honor and profit : that the consideration of honor often masqueth vnder the pretence or good of their affaires : we will then only meddle with profit which we may tearme interest . now this interest ( a common maske for all faces ) cannot be a like equall betweene christian princes with one consent vndertaking the war against the turke : for they diuersly confine vpon the common enemy , and this diuersity breedeth a difference also betweene their resolutions and interests ; and though this be an inconuenience not in the case in handling to be contemned , yet the principall difficulty dependeth not heerein : it rather consisteth wholly in the concord of the treaty of the league , and this concorde is hard to be wrought for these following reasons . all these princes are not neighbours of the turke in the same equallity : some are more strong then other : this difference of strength affordeth to some a commodity to defend themselues or offend him with their owne forces : others are weake , and consequently exposed to the incursions and spoiles of the turke . it is an infallible maxime , that the farther princes are from the danger , the lesse forward are they to stir , prepare for the war , or contribute to the charge or meanes requisite for the vndertaking thereof with the like feruency and affection as they would if they saw themselues so neere to the mischiefe , and that there were apparant danger . againe , that prince which seeth no great profit or interest in such an enterprise doth lesse regard it then he whō necessity inforceth to stand vpon his garde , and feare that tyrants inuasion . moreouer , if the princes vnited to this league and combination shall once know that they shall get little or smally aduantage their estate , it is not to be expected ( when they enter into it ) that they will bring with them that courage , resolution , affection , and forwardnesse as the businesse would require . see then how the disposition of the interest makes the beginning difficult , the proceeding and issue vncertaine , by reason of the diuers alterations and varieties which accompany euery associated prince , sutable to his passion or affection ; whereupon would vndoubtedly follow an impossibilitie of establishing this league , and vnion vpon so sure foundations , as that the beginning may be good , the middle and end better : since the effect without vnion amongst many agents remaineth euermore as nothing or nothing woorth . we fall then farre short of our reckoning , vnlesse wee can minister some remedy to the diuersities of this interest and profit . this inconuenience is attended on , and counterpeized by an other of as great or greater consideration : and this is the interest and particular consequence of the neighbourhood that euery one indifferently hath with the turke ; by the which indifferency , each one according as his feare is , will desire the warre may be vndertaken to his aduantage . as for example , spaine feareth the neighbourhood of algiers ; venice of albania : hence will grow that the league taking effect , the venetians will striue that the forces of the league may be imployed in the leuant , the spaniards toward the south : so as it will not be possible to manage the enterprise to both their satisfactions . there is yet another inconuenience that our princes wil not be able by an equall portion to enter into the league , inasmuch as one wanteth meanes to contribute thereto in money more then a sixt part , another a fift part ; others that haue no money , will contribute men or ships ; others more mightie in both , will vndertake halfe or a second . these are all the portions by whose assemblie a league may be formed . of their indifferencie groweth yet another difficultie or inconuenience ( as we list to tearme it ) and that is , that whosoeuer contributeth the halfe , would likewise haue in his handes ( as the greatest and mightiest ) all the power and swaie . in which it will follow , that the other shall not vndertake or performe ought but by his aduice , direction , and assistance : if he will make a stand , they are not to go forward ; if he list to march elsewhere , then their desires carrie them , they must follow him : if his affaires presse him to alter his resolution and minde , and that hee will retyre to his home , they are constrained to doe the like , so as all their charge , paines , and holy intentions , are vtterly ouerthrowne , and they oftentimes rest exposed to the iniurie and reuenge of their dangerous neighbour , against whom they iointly rose in armes . these are , to say the trueth , considerations and inconueniences of that value and consequence ( measuring them by their parts , and not by the whole ) as we must conclude that none but god is able to tune this league to an agreeing harmony , which we are most humbly to craue at his almightie hands with a strong faith , a true amendment of life , and a more perfect charitie then this age affoordeth . chap. viii . the defects which may be obserued in the leagues of the yeere : and . the conditions , successe and errors of the league in anno . of that of . how a league may be established to auoide the formerly committed errors . continuing the matter of the former chapter , it will not be beside the purpose , by the way to touch the defects which were found in two the most memorable leagues that haue beene made in our time betweene the princes of christendome . the first resolued vpon in the time of pope paul the third , betweene him , the emperour charles the fifth , and the venetians . it was then , beside the conditions , agreed vpon that the emperour and the knightes of malta should set foorth . gallies , the venetians a like number , the pope . only . andrew doria was chosen generall of the emperours army , vincentio capelli of the venetians , and marco grimani patriarch of aquileia of the popes , hauing for his lieutenant paul iustinian ; and for the maine land seruice ferdinand gonzaga was chosen generall . moreouer it was concluded betweene the princes , that whatsoeuer they should get from the turkes with the forces of the league either in greece or dalmatia should be left to the venetians as in recompence of their so great expence and losse that they should suffer by warring vpon the turke . soliman seeing the forces of the league assembled , made hast to lanch his gallies foorth into the maine . such was his diligence as they were within a few daies in a readinesse and went for candy , where they made some hauocke , but of no great moment . after these roades barbarossa made a stay of al the army in the gulfe of larta , there to attend the christians which came onward , but so slowly as the season passed without performing ought , or without that they once met together , and that which was yet worse , our men inforced by tempest , retired themselues to corfú whence they set foorth . barbarossa followed them as far as antipaxo within an hundred miles of corfú , but perceiuing them to prepare themselues to fight he speedily retired to the gulfe of larta , so as our army was resolued for dirachium , otherwise called drazo or la velona , but that being a dangerous harbour for the gallies , they turned their force vpon castell nouo which they carried by assault : an exploit ( to say the truth ) of that small importance ( respecting their charge and prouision ) as it wan them as much dishonor as profit , the towne being won the spaniards seazed themselues of it . the venetians disputed it as a thing appertaining to them according to the articles of the league ; but it was to small purpose , wherefore quieting themselues since it was not to be remedied they tooke an occasion thereupon to shift themselues of the league . the yeere following soliman recouered castle nouo with the losse of those spaniards which kept it , who were all put to the sword , those which escaped induring a most miserable seruitude : and though the peace treated by the venetian was somewhat disaduantageous , yet they indured that more willingly , then to be otherwise dealt with then was agreed vpon : other causes might be alleaged , as the ceasing of trafficke and many other discommodities , besides the impouerishing of their estate , all which necessarily attende the intertainement of armies . the last league of the yeere . yeelded not much better fruits , for after a great charge , and the gaining of so famous a victorie , no other good redounded thence to the christians , but that the turke made an assay of their valour ; and by little and little the confederate forces diuided themselues : the venetians departing vpon occasion of almost the same iealousies , as in the former league . it will be now time to deliuer how all these inconueniences may be stopped , and the league become firme and durable , without consideration of any particular interest , to the end that euery one may voluntarily in deuotion consent thereto to the glory of god with a free heart , and an vndaunted magnanimitie : in which case , the conditions being rather free then forced on either side , we may reape thereby fruits woorthy and honorable : these two leagues heeretofore mentioned , hapned in a time so dangerous for the venetians , as it was more then necessarie that the christian princes ( though not interessed ) should vnite their forces to assist and protect the other . so the one standing in the water vp to the throat , and incompassed with danger , and the other on the contrary , free from feare of perill , they entred into the couenants and conditions of the league , not such as they ought to haue beene to make them lasting ; but such as were presented to men standing in neede of them , who inforced by necessitie , might not refuse them , to the end to cleere themselues of a neere threatning mischiefe . leagues wil then be durable when they shall be stablished at a time whē men are free and exempt from all constraint ; and not to attend as they do , till the turke affright one of the confederates , and that he be alreadie come into the field so strong both by sea and land , as the venetians or some other of the confederates are already by him assailed . at such a time to seeke a remedy by their hastie assembling , is the way to imprint a certaine feare in their people ; and make them flocke together in the fold as sheepe in presence of the woolfe . it is requisite then that the league be contracted at leisure , in a time of peace , and in a season when the associates may be inuited , not by any vrgent danger , but voluntarily , and with such an alacritie of heart , as they may vnite their persons , their meanes , their powers , and their courages all together to offend the common enemy . chap. ix . a league which may be treated without danger of the former defects . the qualities of perfect leagues . the conditions of leagues , and what each of the confederates is to attempt vpon the enemie . the commoditie of them so concluded . aduise for a generall contribution against priuate gaine . that the danger we stande in of the turke , is greater then many suppose , and that therefore those that are most remote , ought willingly to contribute . what should mooue vs to ioyne in league against the turke . now then to reape the woorthie and honorable fruits of a holie league & association , we are to remooue the defects and inconueniences which haue made the former leagues prooue abortiue : and the better to effect it , it is necessary that their treaties be voluntarie : that princes voluntarily ioyne their powers & meanes to one end , though by different courses : so as growing to capitulations , the one doe not aduantage himselfe vpon the straightning of the others affaires . this is it which equalling the conditions , will cause euery one to partake in the enterprise , without all suspect or particular iealousie : it is not enough that the defects of these leagues be discouered , if they make vs not more wise in the framing of other to come : to the end we may with all deuotion and sinceritie builde them on a strong and vnmooueable foundation ; and thus in my opinion may be the manner of our proceeding . it is not required that to establish this league and make it fructifie , the confederate forces should assemble in one place , but at one time : my meaning is , that our princes must bee readie to assaile the enemie at once in diuers places , and that euery one bende his forces towards parts which are neerest to him , so to begin the warre to some purpose : as for example , the spaniards should inuade the parts of algiers : the venetians and the pope , of albania : the gallies of sauoy , malta , and florence , should continue their ordinarie courses against the turke ; vnlesse they would ioyne with the venetians or the king of spain : the polonians should set vpon walachia : the emperour and princes of germany vpon hungary . questionlesse if each of these did in this manner assaile him , their courage and force would be the greater , as would likewise be their desire to persist in their enterprise , without any respect of paines or expence , hoping all would redound to their honour , profit , and particular securitie : which they cannot expect from the other leagues , and this is that which hath in part made them defectiue . the enemie that should be so many waies set vpon , would be constrained to diuide his forces , which consequently would become lesse able to protect him , on all sides whersoeuer he should be assailed . first , the gallies of malta assisted with some other , and scouring ( as they might ) the leuant seas , would keepe in such awe those that guarde alexandria and rhodes , as they would not dare to peepe out : againe , if spaine would inuade barbarie , the gallies of algiers would be sure to keepe home : so as the strength of venice ioyned with that of the church , would doe what they list , and would meete with no encounter by sea which they should not easily ouermatch : especially if at the same time the emperour and the king of polonia , would warre likewise vpon the turke . we haue an example of the times which verifieth our position . when soliman vndertooke the warre of hungary , against charles the . andrew doria generall of his galleies , with a very small armie troubled all the leuant , tooke by maine force coron and patras , and harrowed all those seas without controule or encounter of the enemies : whence followeth , that if the christians would as i haue saide , at one instant set vpon the turke , they would force him no doubt into a narrow straight . there is one point that would make the enterprise easie , more forcible and lasting , but it would hardly be disgested , and that is to draw all christian princes which confine not with the turke , to contribute vnto it . all these suppose themselues free from danger and make no reckning of others sufferings , in whose behalfe they thinke they should not cōtribute , as those that were like to haue but the charge and the other the profit . in a word , all catholike princes are so wedded to this particular interest , which is euer more differing and vnequall among them ( as hath beene before alledged ) as the league would neuer be thorowly concluded or of long continuance , this must of necessity be forgotten , and the only desire of the exaltation of the church of god must be that which must range them to the necessarie point , whereof they need not trauell to seeke examples out of their owne houses , which if they would but imitate all would succeed wel , to inuite them to it i wil alledge one . the principall aime of the league set on foote by godfrye of buillion , and of so many princes and nobles some greater then himselfe which accompanied him , was not placed but vpon the particular honour of the maiesty of god , whereabout euery man emploied himselfe with such zeale and deuotion , as without attending the succours or furtherance of any great king or emperour , they drew together an army of an hundred thousand horse and three hundred thousand foote , wherewith they subdued almost all the east . leauing apart all these considerations let vs come to the opinion that some haue of their being far from danger , and we shall finde peraduenture that they are neerer thereto then they are aware . when amurath came first out of asia into europe was not hungary ( which is now subiect to the turke ) farther off from the confines of the ottomans empire then are now the countries of saxony or of bauiers , then they of franconia , the swichzers and the french ? yet we see it now most in his possession . shall we then say because we haue a mountaine before vs , or a riuer betweene vs , or some estate that seemeth to shelter vs , that therefore we should hold our selues happy and in security , and not be touched with others danger and misery ? no surely . for if we be christians we ought not only to haue compassion of others calamities , but afforde them also our good and charitable assistance : moreouer he that measureth future things but by the consequence of things present , findeth himselfe oft times beguiled ; we are to haue such prouident care of what is present , & to come , that we may leaue to ours the same assurance we wish to our selues , to the end to preserue them by this prouidence from such danger as they might incur after vs. and though we should not carry that regard of our children and posterity , and that the consequence of our estate did not spur vs on to such an enterprise , shall there remaine in vs so little courage and charity , loue and deuotion to the glory of god , from whom we haue our being and of whom wee hold our powers , as that we should all forget to husband his vineyard , and expell thence such as intrude themselues into it and pollute it ? wherefore serue all those heapes of treasure which the princes of lombardy amasse , one in enuy of an other ? whereupon will those so mighty princes of germany and the imperiall townes spend their reuenues and incomparable riches ? what occasion can all of them finde more goodly then this to attaine to an immortall glory ? it is then for the inlarging the kingdome of christ that we must imploy all we haue , and for the deliuerance of those sacred places ouer which those barbarous infidels tyrannize , to redeeme so many thousand of poore christian slaues which suffer and grone vnder the yoake of that inraged dogge , to giue life to an infinite number of christians , to reuenge their wrongs , to punish the iniurires & blasphemies which that tyrant and his helhounds haue breathed out against the glory of god , his holy name and church . and if humaine appetite must needs be an actor in this theater , it would be an easie matter for great princes that send their forces , to vrge this consideration in the capitulations , that they should haue in fauour of their contributions part of the spoiles and conquests that they might happily obtaine . againe , if the loue of the seruice of god had a working in them , they might vndertake in person the generall conduct of the army , or command part of the confederat troupes . godfrey a poore prince , in comparison of those that now sway christendome , alienated the duchy of bouillion for so godly a voyage . stephen count of chartres did the like with his estate , as did also many great men , who had no other motiue thereunto then the enterprise of the holy land . charles the seuenth king of france , did he not succor the emperour of constantinople with a great number of horse which he sent him vnder the conduct of the greatest personages of his kingdome ? and must we sit idle with crossed armes whilest the cruell flames of this infidels tyranny burne and consume the houses of our neighbours ? chap. x. wherein consist the greatest forces of the turke . whether the ianizzars be the chiefe strength of the turke . that horse are more necessary in the war then foote . the progresse of the turke before and after the institution of the ianissars . victories gotten by the horse . ouerthrowes giuen by the enemies horse to the christians . conclusion that horse in seruice excell foote . it seemeth that the greatest part of such as discourse of the forces of the turke attribute his chiefe strength to the band of ianizzars , as the only sinew of his power : and amongst other reasons wherewith they striue to fortify their oppinion , this is one . it hath hapned many times that the army of the ottomans hath beene so hardly laide to , as the battaile hath been in a manner lost , yet haue they gathered strength and kept themselues on foote , yea they haue gotten the victory , and all through the vertue and valour of these legionaries . machiauel discourseth vpon this point , and as one much passionate holdeth himselfe to this argument , that foote are more necessary then horse in all exploites of war , and he laieth his principall foundation vpon the example of certaine romaine captaines , which ( saith he ) to breake into , and force the enemy on foote haue caused their men at armes to alight from their horses and fight on foote against them : it is a poore argument and of small importance , since that for once that they made their horsemen alight , an hundred occasions were offered to make them mount on horse backe if they had the commodity of horse ; he which is on horsebacke may when he please alight , but a footeman cannot get vp on horsebacke when hee will. this mony shall serue to pay machiauel whom i leaue to proceed forward . i affirme , that in a ranged battaile , and in the plaine field the forces of the turke consist and principally rely on the horse . the proofes are cleere and at hand , as the processe of this discourse shall discouer . first no man is ignorant of the great victories the turk got long time before the institution of the ianizzars . amurath the second the yeere . was he that first ordained them : yet ottoman had before that taken sebasta ( a city of importance in asia ) where he slew aboue an hundred thousand of his enemies . orcan his sonne had dispoiled the emperour of constantinople and of bithinia at seuerall worthy incounters . amurath the first had passed asia into europe , with his forces tooke gallipoli , filipoli , and andrinople ; and we may thinke that he did not obtaine those victories without dangerous and bloudy incounters : he conquered also diuers other cities and wan many other victories of the princes of seruia and bulgaria , whom he compelled to stoope vnder the yoake of his obedience . baiazet the first ouercame sigismonde king of bohemia , and put all those french to the sword which charles the . of france sent to his succour . calepin his sonne vnderstanding that sigismond had raised an army , vpon the newes of the ouerthrow giuen by tamburlaine to baiazet , to salue his losses went to meete him at salumbezza , and so valiantly incountred him , as his whole army was cut in peeces , so as it cannot be said that the victories the turke hath obtained since the institution of ianizzars haue beene either greater or more memorable then the former , rather they were the steps to these other happy atchieuements . the beginning of things containe in them the efficient vertue of the whole . this disputation might proue great and might ballance on either side , if i did not ad waight to one of the opinions . i will then say , that before the institution and seminary of ianizzars , the turks receiued but one memorable ouerthrow at mount stella at the hands of tamburlan the most strong enemy that euer they assaied , and that after their institution they receiued more and greater , as were those of vsumcassan , of iohn huniades , of mathew coruin , of the mamelucks , of the great scanderbag , of don iohn of austria , of the kings of persia and others . the second proofe which i will produce to fortifie the truth of my proposition , is , that all such as haue had the better hand of the turkes , euer had it by the meanes of their horse , wherein they did exceed the enemy in number and strength , as we haue so often saide of the persians and of the mamelucks . the great sophi ●●mael , had he not vanquished selim the second with the strength of his horse , if when he did set vpon the rier-ward , where the turke was in person , the thunder of his cannon had not so affrighted the horse , as they ran away with their masters , to the disordering of the whole armie ? the onely thing that ouerthrew the fortune which the persian had almost alreadie in his possession . cudabeuda king of persia , hath many times ouercome the turkish forces , by the onely strength of his horse , whereof he hath more and is better armed then the other . the hungarians in like sort haue many times put the turkes to the woorse by their fight on horsebacke . the third and strongest proofe of my assertion , is , that all the harmes we haue receiued of the turke , haue come by his horse , as at nicapolis , at salembezza , at varna , at the riuer of moraua , at exechium , at buda and elsewhere . and if it euer hapned that the ianizzars recouered the battaile halle lost , it is to be imputed to this , that they were reserued for the rierward ; so as it was easie for fresh men to repell those which were already weakned and tyred . but i thinke no man but will grant , that if instead of the ianizzars they had beene as many horse , they had performed as much . as on the contrarie , if the other had kept in store some fresh troupes of horse , as the turkes , they had dealt otherwise with them , and kept them well enough from bereauing them of the victorie . in conclusion , the horse are they that defeat the enemie , and become masters of the field , that prepare the way for the foote to the beseeging of townes , and giue them time and leisure to force and take them . chap. xi . where the turke might be most easily assailed to ouercome him either by sea or by land . examples of sea victories . the goodnesse of our hauens . the number of our skilfull mariners . the christians farre beyond the turkes in maritime matters . the turkes horse fearefull to the christians , vnprofitable at sea . that the turkes are easily to be ouerthrowne at sea . there were much matter for doubt and disputation vpon this question , if reason and experience did not cleere it : for experience we haue it fresh in many accidents ; which instruct vs that an attempt by sea , would be lesse difficult to vs , and more hurtfull to the turke , for the reasons and examples which i will deliuer . as often as our forces haue to some purpose put themselues into the leuant seas , they haue beene euermore victorious , as at metelin , at cafalonia , at preuesa , at scorsolari . if any one opposing me obiect the ouerthrow of our armie at gerbes , which hapned about the same time , let him read the discourse of the historie , ( as is requisite ) and he shall finde that that chanced not through the force and valour of the enemy , but rather through our owne fault ; insomuch as our armie could not take their opportunitie to dislodge in due time ; but suffered themselues to be besieged by the hardnesse of the season , and by tempests ; which so disordred them as it was easie for the enemie to force them . grimani generall of the venetians , let slippe the occasion of a woorthy victorie , when he knew not how to take his time to charge the enemie , as he might well haue done at sapienza . but on the contrarie , as often as the emperour charles the fift set foorth an armie to some purpose , the turke durst neuer looke abroad ; as when he vndertooke the voyage of tunis and of algiers , where neuerthelesse he encountred many disasters , he brought before tunis seauen hundred saile , and before algiers fiue hundred onely . thus much for experience . now we must see what reasons we haue in store to prooue that we may more easily assaile the turke by sea then by land . among others this may passe , that our seas are more frequented , and our ports more rich and safe then those of the leuant . for first ( set aside constantinople ) there is not thoroughout their obedience , any one porte that may be equalled to those of venice , lisbone , siuill , antwerp , london , amsterdam , lubec , or danske , &c. and very few also that may be compared with those of naples , genoua , villa-franca , nessina , palermo , ragusa , marsseilles , tolon , bourdeaux , new-hauen , rochelle , and rouane , &c. it is cleere then that we surmount the turke not only in numbers of portes and good harbers for the retraict and shelter of our armies , but also in mariners and men accustomed and experienced in both the seas . moreouer , there is not perhaps in the world a coast that affoordeth greater plentie of men then that of genoua , dalmatia , sclauonia , venice , candye . againe , there is not a nation to be found of more resolution or better proofe for sea affaires , then are those of marseilles . i omit to speake of the catalonian , the portugal , the biskayan , the english , the norman , the hollander , and zelander , all people marueilous skilfull in nauigation . i would willingly demaund , what it auaileth the turke to possesse a large and spacious sea bordering country , if it remaine vnhabited ; neither were it enough if it were : for the exploits of maritime warre , it is requisite they be valiant , resolute , and such as can endure trauell and paine . alongst all the coast of africke , the turke hath not one hauen of account besides algies . in all egypt hee hath only alexandria , and dalmatia , at the least which are held in any consideration . in soria , take away saffo and pamphilia , those neere tirus , ephesus , cicize , and the rest so celebrated in ancient times , remaine at this day namelesse , and buried in their owne ruines . they haue gallipoli which is of no great traffike : they haue that of constantinople , whereof they steade and vaunt themselues most of all : moreouer , all these ports are not so good or so conuenient as ours , either if we consider the forme , or the commoditie of situation , nor so well stored with artillerie as ours are . againe , fighting by sea , wee shall not need to feare their horse , whose encounter in regard of their multitude cannot be but a terror vnto vs ; relying as they doe vpon them , as the principall nerue of their forces ; but as for foote , we excell them in number and valour : for conclusion , it is most certaine , if we could once depriue the turke of the vse of the sea , he would be soone ouerthrowne by land with a sufficient number of gallies , which might be maintained in the archipelago : we should cut him off from all trafficke with egypt and soria , as also keeping certaine gallies in the straight and chanell , we should hinder the commerce of asia and constantinople , which he could not be long without , so that by continuing this manner of warring vpon him without intermission , we should by little and little heaue him out of the whole empire of greece , where there would be enough to satiate the greedie ambition of the christians . chap. xii . of the inward causes whereby the empire of the turkes may come to ruine . of inward causes by which an estate may be ouerthrowne . the occasions of the change of the turkish empire , are , a defect that may happen of the ottoman race : the hatred , contempt , and disobedience of the turkes officers and seruants : the discorde that may arise betweene his children about the succession . that it is hard now to stirre vp and maintaine dissention amongst them . another occasion may be the iannizzers libertie and insolencie towards their master : another the rebellion and reuolt of his countries and their gouernours . as we haue before deliuered by what outward causes the empire of the turks may soonest receiue an alteration , so we are now to handle the meanes whereby he may be inwardly weakened , and whether by the infirmities which are begotten in other estates , that of the ottomans may be likewise distempered and corrupted ; of the inward causes of this corruption , some concerne the heads and ministers , others are deriued from among the people . i will then produce some few examples noting the errors of such as sway a soueraigne authority , and so orderly come to the other , to collect thence what may serue to procure the turkes ruine . that which would fall most to our purpose would be if the great turke should die without heires of the true line and race of ottoman . for in such a case it is likely the beglerbyes , vizirs , bassas , sangiacks , and the greatest personages of the turkish nation , would each one for himselfe indeauour to possesse himselfe of whatsoeuer he could most easily compasse . the second cause would be , if in regard of his cruelty , or negligence , the prince should giue his subiects occasion to hate and contemne him : but the mischiefe would proue yet greater if it did arise from the cowardlinesse or sloath of the prince . for his strength consisting wholly in the great numbers of his souldiours ordinarily intertained , how could he possibly containe such mighty armies in deuotion and quietnesse ; if he did not daily busie them in the exercise of war ? and lesse how could so many nations be held within compasse of feare and obedience without the feare of ordinary armes ? it is not to be doubted then if they had a prince who were giuen ouer to idlenesse and a loose life , or that they discried him to be a coward & slothfull , but they would be forward to draw their swords against him , and thence worke their owne destruction . baiazet the second had proofe of this , for abandoning himselfe to all pleasures and resoluing vpon a priuat and retired course of life , to spend his time in reading good authors ; his sonne sought his destruction , and in the end fauored by the ianizzars depriued him of his life and kingdome . for though baiazet repressed the first violence of his sonnes ambition , yet he was at the last forced by the ianizzars not only to pardon his rebellion , but also to send him with an army against his other sonne accomat , who supposing his father ment to prefer selim before himselfe , who was the elder , caused the noses and eares of his fathers messengers most shamefully to be cut off ; the enormity of this fact ill digested , and worse interpreted was that which cancelled the greater faults of selim , to take vengeance of this last & lesse outrage ; whence it came to passe in the end that these same ianizzars possest selim of the empire , who soone after put to death his vnhappy father . amurath the third now raigning hauing withdrawne himselfe from the actions of war to liue in ease and quiet hath lost much of his souldiours and seruants ancient obedience , zeale , and obseruance , such as they were wont to carry towards their soueraignes greatnesse . the bassa of cairo who had the gouernment of aegypt , named ragusei , being summoned ( according to their emperious custome ) to make his appearance at the port , flatly refused to come thither and made his escape with a world of treasure which he had amassed by extorsions and pilling of the people , during the time of his administration . the ianizzars which were at those times appointed for the wars of persia , would not once moue a foote to march thitherward : but as halfe in a mutiny said plainly they would not any more go vpon any enterprise vnlesse the great turke their lord would vnchamber himselfe from among his concubines , and vndertake the voyage himselfe in person , so as he was constrained by vertue of giftes and increase of pay to win them to the war. moreouer of late after the ouerthrow of tauris , the turke hauing appointed a new generall for the succoring of his vanquished army , and reenforcing of such as remained within the cittadell ; all the commandements he could lay vpon him , could not preuaile so much with him as to get him to march forward , rather he grew to capitulate with him , and that finished , he made the most adoe in the world to muster vp twenty thousand men , who refused likewise to goe to that war , otherwise then vpon all the aduantages they could deuise to demand : not like subiects and slaues , but as if they had beene neighbours , allies , and confederates . these breaches already made in the obedience they were wont to render thir lord and master , may perswade vs that they will easily rebell , vpon the first occasion that shall present it selfe without respect of their princes greatnesse , or obseruation of their ancient military policy . the third occasion might befall , if there were many brethren to debate the empire after the death of their father , as it hapned between zizimus , and baiazet , sonnes of mahomet , and betwene acomat and selim , sonnes of baiazet . this baiazet was fauoured of the ianizzars against his brother . zizimus was vpheld onely by the aid of the soldan of cairo , and king of persia . selim likewise was borne by the ianizzars and bassas , and acom●nt by forraine princes : they incountred and fought cruel battailes , whose victories brought the whole estate in danger : baiazet and selim remained conquerours , each one his party by meanes of the great numbers of men that accompanied them , and of the valour of the souldiours of the old bandes which serued vnder them . notwithstanding all these opportunities which god so to the purpose prepared , not one christian prince once stirred , or so much as made offer to arme in fauour of the weaker of those which contended : which would no doubt haue entangled both of them in a long and dangerous strife , enough finally to haue ruined or much decaied the house of the ottomans , when they should haue called such an one to their succour as would haue rather blowen then quenched their fires . amongst all the princes of christendome there was none but the great master of rhodes , which sent some supplies of artillery to zizimus , and which after receiued and defended him from the hands of baiazet , when he was driuen to retire himselfe to his protection . these domestique quarrels cannot now become so strong ( especially such as might happen betweene brethren ) as then they might , considering that the mamelucks , who as neighbours might haue fomented and giuen intertainment to such differences , are now extinct and their name no more mentioned . they were in their time the only emulators of the turkes glory : rhodes hath made an exchange of her fortune , and is now in the power of this tyrant . cypres beareth the like yoake . these two ilands affoorded an especial commodity to sow dissentions among the turks , to fauour and succour one of the parties . the fourth cause would easily arise from the presumption and head-strong rashnesse of the ianizzars , likely enough to attempt and execute as much as sometime did the pretorian bands of the romans , who made slender account to fill the empire with slaughters and massacres , wherein many emperours ended their daies : they electing others at their pleasures against the authority of the senat , and the loue and reuerence they ought to haue borne towards their country . the like may we hope or expect from the ianizzars , that they will one day assume to themselues the same power and learne to performe the like , whereof they gaue an assaie at such time as they compelled baiazet the second to resigne the empire to selim his sonne . they did almost the like when soliman caused his sonne mustapha to be murthered ; for they besieged him and inuironed his tent for certaine daies space , crying out they would know the cause of that yong princes death . in the end by the deuise of the bassa and with stoore of coyne , he wan to him foure thousand of them , who disengaged him of the feare and danger wherein he was plunged . the fift cause may be fetched from the ambition or discontent of the great ones of the countrie , or of ministers swaying the supreame authority & credit in places of gouernment . gazeles gouernour of soria made way for a reuolt of the like quality , as did also acomat generall of aegypt : gazeles , assisted by the mamelucks , arabians and those of rhodes , endeuoured to set himselfe vp against the great turke : but he was discouered by cayembeius whom he had acquainted with the conspiracy . this man either for feare ( as looking into the danger of the enterprise ) or for enuy of his companions greatnesse , reuealed all to his master soliman , who presently dispatched against him faratha bassa , by whom he was vanquished in battaile . acomat had not the leasure to proceed far in his attempt , for as he did inconsideratly precipitate himselfe into the triall thereof , so was he as speedily discouered , and in an instant suppressed and slaine , without hauing thriued ought in his dessignes . chap. xiii . of the mixt causes . what are the mixt causes . how estates are ouerthrowen by mixt causes . in this third booke we haue at large discoursed how by inward and outward causes , estates may be indangered : now we must speake of causes compounded , of the one and the other , which , to discourse more intelligibly , we tearm mixt , which likewise are of power of themselues to alter an empire and to bring it , either by an vniuersall or a particular change , to a lamentable ruine . these mixt causes then are those whereby both the enemy abroad , and the subiect at home may by a common consent conspire against an estate and subuert it . one of the causes or meanes may be a popular insurrection nourished by the enemy , or else the conspiracy of some particular men set on by forraine practises ; or to tearme it better , the treasons which subiects may hatch in fauour , and by the meanes and authority of their neighbours . this hapneth in a twofold manner , when the subiect beginneth and setteth on foote the practise , or when a stranger laieth the way open vnto them vnder some coulered pretence , or else when some one particular person or all a whole communalty frame the occasion thereof in regard of some displeasure or oppression . finally , this falleth out also when the enemy abroad tempereth with one , two , or three , of the principall men to reuolt against their prince and take armes in hand to ouerturne and ruine the estate . chap. xiiii . how particular persons may be gained . how his people are to be prouoked to rebellion . how his great men and chiefe officers are to be gained . these courses at the first not succeeding , are to be oftner attempted . wary proceeding is requisite , lest those that manage the businesse incurre danger . to whom such businesses are to be committed . it resteth now that we make it appeere how such practises may be set on foote and cherished : we will then beginne with the enterprise to bee plotted by some particular person , by whose assistance it may take effect . we must presuppose that this person is either priuat or publike , the priuat persons are those which suffer themselues most often to be corrupted by mony , and with these there neede not so many ceremonies or bro●kings , but if they be publike persons of rancke and authority , either in regard of the greatnesse of their family , or managing of state affaires ; there is far greater difficulty in corrupting them then the other : yet if we may but discouer in them the stinges of ambition and desire of greatnesse , and that we propose to them the assurance of speedy succours , for the execution of the des●●gne ; then is it that we bring them to dare any thing , especially if they haue neuer so little disposition to be reuenged of some receiued indignity . it is indeed a hard matter to worke particular and priuate persons without great vncertaineties and dangers . but if we must haue to doe with the great persons of the estate , we must warily make choice of our time , sound them whether they be male content or ill affected towards their prince , either in respect that some one is aduanced to their preiudice , or for some other cause which may awake in them a longing to shake off their yoake and seaze themselues of the estate . these are the meanes and occasions , which should be chosen and diligently husbanded by our christian princes , smoothly and with dexterity to procure the ruine of the common enemy ; putting on ( as they say ) the foxes skin when the lions is wanting . the displeasure and ielousie which faratha bassa conceiued against hebraim bassa because he saw him raised by soliman to greater honour and estimation then himselfe , so depriued him of all reason , as suffering the desire of reuenge by little and little to transport him , he began to plot a rebellion , but discouered he was forthwith put to death : the selfe same occasion was the ouerthrow of pirrus and mustapha raised by soliman . in our time in the court of amurath the third now raigning , these ielousies and hart-burnings haue beene great betweene mahomet and mustapha , and since that betweene the same mustapha and cicala ( who hath outstript him ) and all for fauour of their master . if these humors and ill dispositions had beene well looked into and wisely imploied to their best vse by some great prince of christendome , they had beene fit matter to haue bred a dissention and reuolt amongst those barbarous people . now though such practises should not perhaps at the first be of sufficient power to worke that vniuersall change which we wish in that tyrants empire ; yet are we not therefore to desist as men dismaied ; remembring that most commonly the beginnings of innouations and commotions so extraordinary , are feeble , and that that wisdome sheweth it selfe like it selfe which can so diligently suckle and nourish them as they may attaine to a happy growth . i am of opinion , that when we incounter with instruments that are not without ambition , courage , and a thirst of reuenge ; after we haue felt and sounded them once , twise , or thrise , we shall in the end make a breach in their loyalty and obedience ; especially if we set before them ( be it vnder a true or false title ) the certaintie of some mightie succour , whereof they may see the preparatiues ; for so they will the more couragiously attempt against the life and estate of their prince . moreouer it is not to be forgotten , that when such practises shall be discouered by the turke , and that he shal see the christians more diligent then hitherto they haue beene , to sound the affections of his seruants and subiects : he will thereupon enter into such a distrust of them , as euen that will make him offer them some hard measure . this distrust will be enough to beget a thousand suspitions and hard conceits in his seruants , and subiects , either for the managing of affaires , or for the danger that the opinion of loyaltie incurreth , when it hath to deale with such a distrustfull and suspitious prince , as this would prooue : so as by little and little it would worke vs out some occasion fitting our purpose , especially , if whilest this practise were hatching , and on foote , the children of the turke should take armes one against the other , or that during their fathers life , they should dispute the possession of the empire : for the ice being already broken , there would be a more easie passage and better successe , then if it had not beene taken in hand at all . but because an especiall iudgement , patience , and much wisedome are requisite in such businesses , we must make choice of men furnished with all these parts , to the end they may wisely know when to take their opportunities and times , to sow these dissentions , and that there be not want of mony to distribute amongst this people , which are farther in loue therewith , then any other nation the world affoordeth . chap. xv. how the people of the turke may be wrought from his obedience . how the turkes christian subiects are to be wrought to rebellion . a place must be chosen for refuge of such as rebell . the vaine fooleries of their alkoran are to be discouered . how bookes written to that purpose may come to his subiects hands . how such bookes are to be composed . what fruites are to be hoped from their reading . exhortation to the ianizzars . the conclusion of this worke . the turke hath two sorts of people subiect to his empire ; one followeth the sect of mahomet ; the other the truth of the gospel of iesus christ . the mahometanes are quiet , as those which being of one and the same law , haue no cause to make any tumult . the christians cannot stirre , as being ouer topped and awed by a greater power then their owne , which curbeth them so , as there is no better way to moue them to rebel , then to make them handle ( as it were ) and see the assurance of an approching succour , to prouide them of armes and all other furniture for the wars : for otherwise it is impossible they should dare to make the least shew once to mooue , whilest they haue the enemie ouer them alwaies in a readinesse and armed , who would in a moment confound them , especially being as they are naked and vnprouided of armes , offensiue or defensiue . selim the second doubting the woorst , by the counsaile of occhially , caused al the christians inhabiting the sea coasts , to retire themselues farre vp into the maine land , to the end the presence of the christian forces should not incourage them against him , as it hapned at such time as andrew dorea atchieued the enterprise of patras and coron . if the christians should euer vndertake the like dissigne they ought to take especiall heede how they vnship their succours in those parts of the continent where the horse are at hand , since they were likely enough by their strength to choake at the first the reuolt of the christians , for so mighty are they in horse , and of such speed and dexterity , as they would in an instant beare downe before them whatsoeuer should oppose them . wherefore it would be better to enter by albania and by places mountanous and of difficult accesse , where the horse are not able to serue , as in the plaine . this is as much as we ment to say of such christians as are vnder the turkes dominions , all which i will imagine want not will to rebell , if the princes of christendome would furnish them of meanes . now let vs see what way were best to be taken to prouoke the mahometans to reuolt , and to fill their countries with troubles , and ciuill dissentions . if we will but consider how their religion is fraught with vntruthes , their alcoran abounding in follies , we shall finde it easie to picke matter enough out of it to set them together by the eares , especially if wee doe but disperse among them certaine bookes fit to conuert them , or make them doubt of the foolish superstitions they obserue , composing them for europe in the sclauonian tongue , and for asia in the arabian . but because it would be hard to conuey these bookes into the countries of the turkes obedience but that they would soone perceiue the deuice and speedily remedy it : it were best beginning far off , in the indies and in the parts of asia and africke held by the portugales : for because of the trafficke which is great in those parts many turkish marchants and others ariue there from all quarters . they come to mozambique in africke , to zophala and quiloe in asia . they descend also as low as the moluccas , cochien , goa , dia , ormus , and sundrie other parts appertaining to the crowne of portugale . these bookes also might be dispersed abroad in the countrie of the gentiles , which are friends and confederates of the christians , as in calicut , zailan , cambeia , and others ; and the like at oran , arzilla , and in other parts of arabia subiect to the crowne of spaine and portugall , and in all other parts of europe which border vpon the turkes . there must be a care had that the title of the booke be so coloured , as it doe not at the first discouer the intent of the author , but rather that it intice them to peruse it with a certaine curiosity and shew of pleasantnesse and delight . it is requisite also that the discourse be not fraught with any disputations or subtill point against the articles of their beleefe , but that contrariwise it be full of tales and matter fit to moue laughter ; yet with some well conueied passage which may by the way discouer or make them doubt of the fables of their alcoran . the turkish marchants or others , into whose hands this booke should light , would cōfidently reade it in those parts where the turke is not obeied . and though perhaps they durst not aduenture to carry it with them , yet the impression and substance of what they had read would remaine fixt in their mindes , so as they would after relate it as newes to their friends and families , in such sort as it would grow by little and little to be diuulged thereabout , whence would spring a longing in others which should come and goe into those countries to buy & reade them : in this manner the alcoran in processe of time would grow out of credit amongst them , and those things which with scruple and obseruation they collect thence , would turne to a iest and subiect of laughter , whence there could not but insue some schisme and diuision amongst them , for the most religious men of their sect and the most interested would oppose themselues wilfully to maintaine it . neither would it make for the purpose to make mention in any sort of our sauiour christ , much lesse to let it be knowen that the author thereof were a christian : for the immortall hatred they beare to that name would make it odious , and would bring it at the very first to be reiected . it should rather be so contriued as if it came from some other of an other sect , wherein a man might borrow the hand of the inhabitants of cambaia , of india , of arabia , or of persia . in this manner it would be better welcome and would carrie with it more estimation and authority . it were well also if there were framed and published a remonstrance to the ianizzars in the sclauoman tongue , whereby might be signified vnto them their originall , and howe in their infancy they were cruelly halled from the bosomes of their christian fathers and mothers , conueyed into turky , and there nusled vp in the sect of mahomet , not hauing iudgement as then to distinguish of good and euill ; that they are the pillers to vphold this tyrant which hath set his foote vpon the throat of their fathers liberty , and which keepeth them as slaues vnder the yoake of a dishonorable and barbarous seruitude . this would auaile much , especially if there were thereto annexed an exhortation to take better knowledge of themselues , and hence , forward like good children to imbrace and free their miserable parents , which daily lament them ; and aboue all to perswade them to returne to the deare bosome of the church wherin they were first , regeuerate and which attendeth with spread armes to receiue them , entertaine them , and saue them . these things well caried would in the end make the turke so suspitious , and vntractable , as he would offer occasions enow to his people hencefoorth to rouse vp themselues , and better aduise how to shake off that cruell and vnsupportable yoake which so mightily oppresseth them , and to fashion themselues to a more happy and secure life for the quiet of their consciences and saluation of their soules . this is that whereof the christians ought diligently to bethinke themselues ; and not to worke one an others ruine and destruction , as they spare not to doe against the expresse commandement of god , which so often recommendeth vnto vs loue and charitie towards our neighbours . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e . guicciard . li. . zingis . . . . . . . . . . . mac. disput . lib. . c. . at the riuer of trebia , where sempronius was slaine , at the lake of thrasimenus where flaminius was ouercome , and at cannas where terentius varro and l. paulus lost the field . maharbals saiing to hannibal , was , vincere seu hannibal , sed victoria vti nescis . liu. dec. . l. . . ●●●●t . lib. . c. . rer. hisp . ri● neap. l. . reg. hisp . 〈…〉 de christ ●oem . lib . lin. dec . . li. . . annal. v. c. . olymp. . dis . l. . c. . . . ap. . aemil. lib. . tuicae . . . paul. iou. lib. . de vita vir . ill . . & . veget. lib. . c. . eo enim impenditur labor & periculum aplirisque vnde emolumentum & honos speratur : t. liu. plut. lib. . c. . & . li. ● . c. . gel. lib. . cap. . . . . . . . . . vid. l. . c. . . . princ. c. . iou. lib . hist . at the mountaine hemus . at varna . . . male imperatur cum vu●gus regit duces . senec. trag . . . sabel en. . l. . . non min●r est virtus quàm quaerere , part● tueri . . . . . . . . . the christians ministred occasion to the ottamans of their owne ouerthrow the first occasion : the sloth of the emperours of greece . . occasion : enuie of the emperours of greece . about anno . . occasion : the ciuill wars of the emperors of greece . iohn paleologus . . . occasion : the separation of the greeke church from the roman . . occasion : the turkes aide called into italy . . . . . occas . the plurality of the christian princes . . . . . . occasion : the diuersity of opinions in religion . occasion : treason and disloialtie . occasion : the turkes peace with some christians , to warre with others . . . occasi●n : christian princes warring one vpon an other . . . veg. lib. . c. . . qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non praeparat vincitur sine ferro . liu. l. . c. . . . . . . antiently called nicoplu a city of epirus . . . . guic. lib. . . about . . . guicc . lib. . . . . . & . . . . iou. lib. . capienda saepius seius in malis praeceps via est . sencca . agamem . . . this was licurgus rule to the lacedemonians . p●ut . vitu . lic . notes for div a -e vid pluit in their liues . about . . iou. l. . about . notes for div a -e anno . . . . quae non prosunt singula , multa ●uuant . . . . . . . . . . alcut . . machiauels opinion for foote . . . . . . vid. . . . . maxims of state written by sir walter raleigh ; whereunto is added his instructions to his sonne, and the son's advice to his aged father. prince raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing r ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing r estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) maxims of state written by sir walter raleigh ; whereunto is added his instructions to his sonne, and the son's advice to his aged father. prince raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . [ ], p. : port. printed by w. bentley, and are to be sold by w. shears ..., london : . first published in as: the prince, or, maxims of state. reproduction of original in british library. imperfect: filmed copy lacks all after "maxims". eng political science -- early works to . political science -- quotations, maxims, etc. a r (wing r ). civilwar no maxims of state. written by sir walter raleigh. whereunto is added his instructions to his sonne; and the son's advice to his aged father. raleigh, walter, sir f the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the f category of texts with or more defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - tcp staff (oxford) sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion sr. walter ralegh kt. maxims of state . written by sir walter raleigh . whereunto is added his instructions to his sonne ; and the son's advice to his aged father . london , printed by w. bentley , and are to be sold by w. shears , at the sign of the bible , over against the north door of pauls . . the contents . page . of government . of policie . of monarchie . of aristocracie , or senatory state . of free state , or popular state . of ●yranny . of olygarchie , or the government of a few . ibid. of a common-wealth . of causes of states , and common-wealths in general . of founding a state . ibid. of causes preserving a state or common-wealth . of mysteries or sophisms . ibid. of axioms or rules of preserving a state . rules for preserving of a kingdom . hereditary . rules for preserving of a kingdom . conquered . kingdoms hereditary are preserved at home by the ordering of a prince . ibid. kingdoms new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by . rules . rules politick of tyrants . sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny . sophisms of the sophistical , or subtile tyrant , to hold up his state . of preservation of an aristocracie . of preservation of an olygarchie , by sophisms . ibid of preservation of an olygarchie , by rules . ibid of conversion of states in general . causes of conversions of states are of two sorts : general and particular . ibid. particular causes of conversion of state , are of two sorts . of sedition . causes of sedition are of two sorts . ibid. of alteration without violence . a method , how to make use of the book before● in the reading of the storie . old age is not ever unfit for publick government . ibid. example of the like practice in charls the fifth . of observation for the affirmative and the negative . ibid. of defence for david in marrying abishag . political nobility . of adoniah aspiring to the kingdom . observations . of ways of such as aspire to the kingdom , and marks to discern them . political prince . the table of the chapters contained in sir walter raleigh's instructions to his son . chap. page . virtuous persons to be made choice of for friends . i. great care to be had in the choosing of a wife . ii. wisest men have been abused by flatterers . ●v . private quarrels to be avoided . ● . three rules to be observed for the preservation of a mans estate . vi . what sort of servant● are most fit to be entertained . vii . brave rags wear soonest out of fashion . ● viii . riches not to be sough● by evil means . ibid● ix . what inconvenience happen to such as deligh● in wine . ● x. let god be thy protectour and directour in all the actions . ● maxims of state . of government . government is of two sorts . . private , of himself . sobrietie . of his family ; called o●●onomie . . publick , of the common-wealth ; called poli●ie . a man must first govern himself , e're he be fit to govern a family : and his family , e're he be fit to bear the government in the common-wealth . of policie . policie is an art of government of a common-wealth , and some part of it according to that state , or form of government wherein it is setled for the publick good . state , is the frame or set order of a common-wealth , or of the governours that rule the same , specially of the chief and sovereign governour that commandeth the rest . the state or sovereignty consisteth in . points . . making or anulling of laws . . creating and disposing of magistrates . . power over life and death . . making of war , or peace . . highest o● last appeal . where these five are , either in one or in more , there is the state . these five points of state , rest either in , . one monarchie or kingdom . . some few chief men for virtue and wisdom , called an aristocracie . . many , called a fr●e-state , or popular state . these three sorts of government have respect to the common good , and therefore are just , and lawful states . these . degenerate into . other governments . viz. . monarchie , . aristo●racie , . popular est●t , into . tyrannie . . oligarchie . . common-wealth o● government of all the common and baser sort , and therefore called a common-wealth by an usurped nick-name . these all respect their own , and not the publick good , and therefore are ●ailed bastard governments . i. monarchie . a monarchie , or kingdom , is the government of a state by one head , or chief , tending to the common benefit of all . monarchie , or kingdoms , are of three sorts touching the right , or possession of them ; viz. . hereditarie , by de●cent , as the english , french , &c. . elective , by suffrage of the other orders , or some of them , as the polonian . . mixt , or of both kinds ; viz. by descent , yet not tyed to the next of bloud , as the ancient iewish state . monarchies are of two sorts touching their power or authority ; viz. . intire . where the whole power of ordering all state matters , both in peace and war , doth by law and custom appertain to the prince , as in the english kingdom , where the prince hath power to make laws , league , and w●r ; to create magistrates ; to pardon life : of appeal , &c. though to give a contentment to the other degrees , they have a suffrage in making laws , yet ever subject to the princes pleasure , nor negative will . . limit●d or restrained , that hath no full power in all the points o● matters of state , as the military king that hath not the sovereignty in time of peace , as the making of laws , &c. but in war onely , as the polonian kings . ii. aristocracie , or senatorie state . an aristocracie is the government of a common-wealth by some competent number of the better sort , preferred for wisdom and other virtues for the publick good . aristocracies are of three sorts , viz. where the senatours are chosen , for . virtue , riches , and the common good , as the venetian . . virtue and the publick good without respect of wealth , as sometimes the roman , when some of the senatours were fetched from the plough , and some from the schools . . virtue and wealth , more respecting their private , than their publick good , which inclineth towards an oligarchie , or the government of the richer or nobler sort , as in rome towards the end . iii. free-state , or popular sta●e . the popular state is the government of a state by the choiser sort of people , tending to the publick good of all sorts ; viz. with due respect of the better , nobler , and richer sort . in every iust state , some part of the government is , or ought to be imparted to the people ; as in a kingdom , a voice or suffrage in making lawes ; and sometimes also , in levying of arms ( if the charge be great , and the prince forced to borrow help of his subjects ) the matter rightly may be propounded to a parliament , that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves . so consultations , and some proceedings in judicial matters , may in part be referred to them . the reason , least seeing themselves to be in no number , nor of reckoning , they mislike the state , or kind of government : and where the multitude is discontented , there must needs be many enemies to the present state . for which cause , tyrants , ( which allow the people , no manner of dealing in state matters ) are forced to bereave them of their wits and weapons , and all other means whereby they may resist , or amend themselves , as in a●shland , ●urk●y , &c. iv. tyranny . a tyranny is the swerving , or distort●g of a monarc●ie , or the governm●●● of one , tending not to the publick good , but the private benefit of himself , and his followers . as in the russe and turkish government , where the state and wealth of other o●●ers , are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the king or emperour . this is the worst of all the basta●d states , because it is the perverting of the best regiment , to wit , of a monarchie , which resembleth the sovereign government of god himself . v. oligarchie , or the government of a few . an oligarchie is the swerving , or the corruption of an aristocracie ; or the gov●●nment of some few , that are of the wealthier or nobler sort , without a●y respect of the publick good . the chief end of these gover●●●●s , is , their own greatness and enriching . and therefore their manner is , to prepare fi● mean● to uphold their esta●es . this st●te is not wholly so bad , as is the tyrannie , and yet worse than the commo●-wealth , because it respecteth the good of a few . vi . common-wealth . a common-wealth is the swerving or depravation of a f●ee , or popular state , or the government of the whole multitude of the base and poorer sort , without respect of the other orders . these two states , to wit ; the olig●●chie , and common-wealth , are very adve●se the one to the other , and have many b●ckerings between them . for that the richer or nobler sort , suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect , because they are superiour , but in some re●pects onely , to wit , in riches , birth , parentage , &c. on the other side , the common-people suppose , there ought to be an equality in all other things , and some state matters ; because they are equal● with the rich or noble , touching their lib●●tie , whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equal or superiour , as touching government and fitness thereunto , because they are such , to wit , because they are rich , noble , free , &c. but because they are wise , virtuous , valiant , &c. and so have fit parts to govern a state . these several states are sometimes mixed , and inter wrought one with the other , yet ever so , as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other , as in the humours and complexions of the body . so in the rom●n state , the people had their plehis●●ta , and gave the suffrage in the election of magistrates : yet the senate ( as the state stood ) for the most part swayed the state , and bare the chief rule . so in the ven●tian state , the duke seemeth to represe●● a mon●rch , and the s●nate to be his counc●l : yet the duke hath no power in state matt●rs , but is like a head set on by art , that heareth no brain . and so that state is s●natorical or aristocratical . causes of states & common-wealths in general . causes of states or of commō-wealths are of . sorts , viz. . founding , or setling a state where to be considered . . measure . . parts , & their qualities . . preserving a state . . changing , and altering a state . founding a state . in founding a state are to be considered . things . . proportion . . parts . proportion , is a just measure or mediocritie of the state , whereby it is framed and kept in that order , as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind , to wit , so that a monarch b● not too monarchical , nor strict , or absolute , as the ●usse kings ; nor aristocratical , that is over-mated or eclipsed by the nobility , as the scottish kingdom , but ever respective to the other degrees . that aristocratie be not to magnificent nor intire to it self , but communicate with the people some commodities of state or government , as the v●netian , and sometimes the roman allowed the people to elect certain magistrates out of themselves , to have a tribune , to make plebiscita , &c. so a free-state or common-wealth that it be not over popular , viz. that it depress not to much the richer , wiser , nor learneder sort ; but admit them to offices with a caution out of the rules and mysteries of that state . that they seek no alteration of the present state . the reason , because the moderate states in their several kinds ( as all other things that observe the mean ) are best framed for their continuance , because they give less cause of grudge , envy , and affecting the wealth , honour , and libertie which they see in others that govern the state ; and so are less subject to stirs and commotions , and easiest kept in their present state wherein they are set . parts . the parts of the state , or those magistrates that bear place or sway in the publick government . parts or partakers of publick government , are . councel or senate , which consul●eth of all matters pertaining to war and peace , magistrates , &c. in admitting of whom there ought to be a more special care , that they may be men expert in matter of policie , because it is their trade and vocation , as men use to chuse pilots , and masters of ships , such as know the art of navigation , and not husband-men , &c. and so the contrary . . magistrates and officers , which are to be executioners of that which is consulted , and found to be expedient for the common-vvealth , wherein are to be observed , the kinds of magistrates , that they be such as fit that kind of government ; the time of their continuance , and the manner of their election or appointing , by whom , out of whom , and in what manner they be chosen . . iudges ; to determine in civil , and criminal matters , where are to be observed , out of whom they are to be chosen ; what kinds are necessary , and the manner o●iudgement , and iudicial proceeding . in magistrates are to be observed . . kinds of magistrats as , . civil . superiour , which are to be such & of that kind as agree with the state , as consuls for a year , and not perpetual dictatours in a senatorie state . praetors , & censors , that oversee manners & orders of the people . for a kingdom lieutenant of shires , marshals , masters of horse , admirals , &c. inferiour , as conservatous of peace , constables , &c. overseers of youth , that take care for their education for civil & warlike exercise . clarks of the market that provide for the quantity , and price of victual . ediles for buildings , streets , bounds . questours , or treasurers , to keep and dispence the publick treasury . a●●uaries , or reco●ders , which keep the publick records . ga●l●rs , to keep prisons and prisoners . surveyours of woods and fields , &c. . ecclesiastical . . as bishops or pastours , elders , wardens . . time of magistrates , whereof some are perpetual , some for a time , viz. for more years , a year , half a year , according to the necessity of the common-wealth , and not perpetual ; or at least not hereditary in a kingdom . yearly in an aristocracie , or half yearly in a free-state . . manner of choise , by whom and how to be chosen , where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage , and not by lot . causes preserving a state , or common-wealth . in preserving of states , . things required . . mysteries , or sophisms . . general to all states . . particular , for every several state . . rules , or actions . . general , for all states . . particular , for every state . mysteries , or sophisms . mysteries , or sophisms of state , are certain secret practises , either for the avoyding of danger , or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the present state , as it is set or founded . state mysteries are of two sorts . . general : that pertain to all states ; as first , to provide by all means , that the same degree , or part of the common-wealth , do not exceed both in quantity and q●ality . in quantity , as that the number of the nobility , or of great persons , be not more , than the state or common-wealth can beare . in quality , as that none grow in wealth , liberty , honours , &c. more than it is meet for that degree ; for as in weights , the heavier weights bear down the scale : so in common-wealths , that part or degree that excelleth the rest in quality , and quantity , overswayeth the rest after it , whereof follow alterations , and conversions of state . secondly , to provide by all means , that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreams , ( viz. ) of nobility and ge●t●y , and the base rascal , and begarly sort . for this maketh the state constant and firm , when both the extreams are tied together by a middle sort , as it were with a band , as for any conspiracy of the rich and beggarly sort together , it is not to be feared . to these two points , the particular rules or sophisms of every common-wealth , are to be applied . . particular : that serve ●or preservation of every common-wealth , in that form of state wherein it is setled as in a kingdom . that the nobility may be accustomed to bear the government of the prince , especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the princes eye , it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the princes court , under pretence of doing them honour , or being desirous to see , and enjoy their prese●ce ; and to have their children , especially their eldest , to be attendant upon the prince , as of special favour towards them and theirs , that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the prince , and be as hostages for the good behaviour , and faithfull dealing of their parents , especially , if they be of any suspected note . to that end serves the pe●si●● practise , in having a band , or train of the s●trapa's children , and other nobles to attend the court ; which was well imitated by our train of h●n●●men , if they were of the nobler sort . again , sometimes to borrow small sums of his subjects , and to pay them again , that he may after borrow greater sums and never pay : so in an oligarchy , least it decline to a popular state , they deceive the people with this and the like sophisms , ( viz. ) they compel their own sort , to wit , the rich men , by great penalties , to frequent their assemblies for choosing of magistrates , for provision of armour , warlike exercises , making an execution of laws , &c. by that means seeming to bear a hard hand over the richer , but to suffer the poorer , and meaner sor● to be absent , and to neglect those assemblies und●r pretence , that they will not draw them from their business , and private earnings , : yet withall to cite thither some few of them , ( viz. ) so many as are easily over matched by the ●icher sort , to make a shew , that they would have the people or poorer sort , partakers likewise of those matters , yet terrifying those that come to their assemblies , with the tediousness of consultations , greatness of fines , if they should mis-do , to the end , to make them unwilling to come again , or to have to do with those consultations ; by which means , the richer sort do still govern the state , with the peoples liking , and good contentment . axioms . axioms or rules of preserving the state are , . g●neral , that serve for all common-wealths . . particular , that serve for every several state . general rules . . the first and principal rule of policie to be observed in all states , is to profess , and practise , and maintain the true worship and religion of almighty god prescribed unto us in his word , which is the chief end of all government . the axio● , that god be obeyed simply without exception , though he command that which seemeth unreasonable , and absurd to humane policy ; as in the iews common-wealth , that all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship god four times , leaving none to defend their coast , though being beset with many enemies . not to sow the seventh year , but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of famine , &c. . to avoid the causes of conversions , whereby states are over-thrown , that are set down in the title of conversions ; for that common-vvealths ( as natural bodies ) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and state thereof , a●d are so cured by contrary medicines . . to take heed , that no magistrate be created or continued contrary to the laws and policy of that stat● . as that in a s●nate , there be no● created a perpetual dict●tor , as caesar in rome . in a kingdom , that there be no senate , or convention of equal power with the prince in state matters , as in poland . . to create such magistrates as love the state as it is setled , and take heed of the contrary practise , as to advance popular persons in a kingdom , or a●istocracie . and secondly , to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve , and what hurteth or altereth the present stat● . . to that end to have certain of●icers to p●y abroad , and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in sit sort , agreeable to the present state , but de●●e rather to be under some other form , or kind of government . . to take heed that magistracies be not sold for money , nor bribe in their offices , which is specially to be observed in that common-wealth which is governed by a few of the richer sort ; for if the magistrate gain nothing but his common fees , the common sort , and such as want honour , take in good part that they be not preferred , and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business . but if the magistrate buy and sell matters , the common people are doubly grieved , both because they are debar'd of those preferments , and of that gain they see to grow by them , which is the cause that the germ●in oligarchi●s continue so firm ; for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth , and the richer sort are by that means freed , and secured from being under the poor . . to take heed that the state , as it is setled and maintained , be not overstuct , nor exceed in his kind ; ( viz. ) that a kingdom be not too monarchical , nor a popular state too popular : for which cause it is good , that the magistrates sometimes yield of his right touching honour , and behave themselves familiarly with those that are equal unto them in other parts , though inferiour for place and office ; and sometimes popula●ly with the common people , which is the cause that some common-wealths , though they be very simply , and unskilfully set , yet conti●●e ●●rm , because the magistrates behave thems●lves wi●ely , and with due re●pect towards the r●st that are without honour ; and therefore ●ome kind of modera●● popularity is to be used in every ●ommon-wealth . . to take heed of small beginnings , and to meet with them even at the first , as well touching the breaki●g and altering of lawes , as of other rules which concern the continuance of every several state . for the disease and alteration of a common-wealth , doth not happen all at once , but grows by degrees , which every common wit cannot discern , but men expert in policie . . to provide , that that part be ever the grea●er in number and power , which favours the s●ate as now ●t sta●ds . this is to be observed as a ve●y oracle in all common-weal●hs . to observe a mean in all the degrees , and to suffer no pa●t to exceed , or decay over much . as first for p●efe●ments , to provide that they be rather small and short , than great and long ; and if a●y be grown to overmuch greatness , to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour . where the sophisms are to be practised ( viz. ) to do it by parts and degrees ; to do it by occasion , or colour of law , and not all at once . and if that way serve not , to advance some other , of whose virtu● and faithfulness , we are fully assur●d , to as high a degree , or to a greater honour ; and to be the friends and followe●s of him that excelleth , above that which is meet . as touching wealth , to provide , that those of the middle sort ( as before was said ) be more in number ; and if any grow high , and overcharged with wealth , to use the so●●isms of a po●ula● state , viz. to send him on embassages , and forreign negotiations , or imploy him in some office that hath g●●at charges , and little honour , &c. to which end , the edil●ship served in some common-wealths . . to suppress the factions , and quarrels of the nobles , and to keep other that are y●● free from joyni●g with them in their partakings and factions . to increase or remit the common taxes and contributions , according to the wealth , or want of the people and common-wealt● . if the people be increased in wealth , the taxes and subsidies may be increased . if they be poor , and their wealth diminish , specially by dearth , want of traffick , &c. to forbear taxes and impositions , or to take little . otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow . the sophisms that serve for imposi●itions , are these , and other of like sort , to pretend business of great charge , as war , building of ships , making of havens , castles , fortifications , &c. for the common defence ; sometimes by lotteries and like devises , wherein some part may be bestowed , the rest reserved for other expences ; but princely dealings needs no pretences . to provide that the discipline & training of youth of the better sort be such as agreeth with that common-wealth : as that in a kingdom , the sons of noble men to be attendant at the court , that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the prince : in the senatory state , that the sons of the senatours be not idly , nor over daintily brought up , but well instructed and trained up in le●rning , tongues , and martial exercise ; that they may be able to bear that place in the common-wealth , which their father held , and contrariewise , in a popular state , . to take heed , least their sophisms , or secret practises for the continuance and maintenance of that state , be not discovered ; least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves , but wisely used , and with great secrecie . particular rules . rules and axioms , for preserving of a kingdom . hereditary . conquered . kingdoms hereditary , are preserved at home by the ordering , . himself , viz. by the tempering and moderation of the princes povver and prerogative . for the less and more temperate their povver and state is , the more firm , and stable is their kingdom and governm●nt ; because they seem to be further off from a master-like , and tyrannical empire ; and less unequal in condition to the next degree , to wit , the nobility , and so less subject to grudge and envy . . nobility ; viz. by keeping that degree and due proportion , that neither they exceed in number more than the realm , or state can bear , as the scottish kingdom , and sometime the english , when the realm was overcharged with the number of dukes , earls , and other nobles ; whereby the authori●y of the prince was eclipsed , and the realm troubled with their factions and ambitions . nor that any one excel in hono●r , power , or wealth , as that he resemble another king within the kingdom , as the house of lancaster within this realm , to that end , not to load any with too much hono●r or preferment , because it is hard even for the best , and worthiest men , to bear their greatness , and high fortune tempera●ely , as appeareth by infinite examples in all states . the sophism for preventing , or reforming this inconvenience , are to be used with great caution and wisdom . if any great person be to be abated , not to deal with him by calumniation , or forg●d matter , & so to cut him off without desert , especially if he be gratious among the people , after the machiavilian policie , which besides the injustice , is an occasion many times of greater danger towards the prince . nor to withdraw their honour all at once , which maketh a desperate discontentment in the party , and a commiseration in the peole , and so greater love , if he be gracious for his virtue , and publick service . nor to banish him into forreign countries , where he may have opportunity of practising with forr●ign states , whereof great danger may ensue , as in the example of coriolanus , henry the fourth , and such like . but to use these , and the like sophisms , viz. to abate their greatness by degrees , as david ioabs , iustinian bellisarius , &c. to advance some other men to as great , or greater honour , to shadow , or over-mate the greatness of the other . to draw from him by degrees his friends , and followers by prefe●ments , rewa●ds , and other good and lawfull means ; especially , to be pr●vided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of the common-wealth , whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the state . . people , viz. so to order and behave himself , that he be loved , and reverenced of the people . for that the prince need not greatly fear home-conspiracies , o● forreign invasion , if he be firmly loved of his own people . the reason , for that the rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise , nor any refuge , being discovered and put to flight , if the multitude affect their prince : but the common people being once offended , hath cause to fear every moving , both at home and abroad . this may be effected by the prince , if he use means and art of getting the favour of the people , and avoid those things that breed hatred & contempt ; viz. if he seem as a tutor , or a father to love the people , and to protect them , if he maintain the peace of his kingdom ; for that nothing is more popular , nor more pleasing to the people , than is peace . . if he shew himself oftentimes graciously , yet with state and majesty to his people , and receive complaints of his suppliants , and such like . . if he sit himself sometimes in open courts , and place of iustic● , that he may seem to have a care of justice among his people . if he bestow many benefits and graces upon that city , which he maketh the seat of his empire , and so make it sure and faithfull unto him , which is fit to be in the middle of his kingdom , as the hear● in the middle of the body , or the sun in the middle of heaven , both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his dominions ; and least the furthest parts● at one end move , whilest the prince is in the other . i● he go in progress many times to see his provinces , especially , those that are remote . . if he gratifie his courtiers and att●n●ants in that ●ort , and by such means , as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt and injury of his people , as with monopolies , and such like . . if he commit the handling of such things as procure envy , or seem grievous to his ministers , but reserve those things which are gratefull , and well pleasing to himself , as the french kings , who for th●t purpose , as may seem , have erected their court at paris , which acquitteh the prince from grudge and ●nvy , both with the nobles and the p●ople . . if he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people , though he have no need , and pay the same justly without defalca●ion of any part by his exchequer , or other officer . . if he avoid all such things as may breed ●atred , or contempt of his person , which may be done , if he shew himself not too light , inconstant , hard , cruel , ●sfeminate , fearfull , and dastardly , &c. but contrarywise , religious , grave , iust valiant , &c. whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the machiavilian policie , with far the betmeans to keep the people in obedience , than love , and reverence of the people towards the prince . if the prince be well furnished with warlike provision , which is to be rumoured , and made known abroad : if it be known , that he is reverenced , and obeyed by his peoples at home . . if he provide so much as lyeth in him , that his neighbour kingdoms grow not over much in power and dominion ; which if it happen , he is to joyn speedily with other princes , which are in like danger to abate that greatness , and to strengthen himself and the rest against it . an oversight of the christian princes towards the king of spain . . if he get him intelligencers by reward , or other means , to detect or hinder the designs of that prince , with whom he hath differences , if any thing be intended against his state . or at least have some of his own lydging abroad , about that princes court , under colour of embassage , or some other p●etence ; which must be men of skill and dexterity to serve for that turn . . to observe the laws of his countrey , and not to encounter them with his pr●rogative , nor to use it at all where there is a law , for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts , especially if it tender to take from them ●●●ir commodities , and to bestow them upon other of his courtiers and ministers . . to provide especially , that that part , which favoureth the state as it standeth , be more potent , than the other which favoureth it not , or desireth a change . . to make special choice of good and sound men to bear the place of magistrates , especially , of such as assist the prince in his counsels , and policies , and not to lean over much to his own advise , contrarie to the rule of machiavil , who teacheth , that a prince can have no good counsel , except it be in himself ; his reason , because if he use the counsel of some one , he is in danger to be over-wrought , and supplanted by him ; & if he counsel with more , then he shall be distracted with the differences in opinions . as if a prince of great , or mean wisdom , could not take the iudgement of all his counsellorurs in any point of policie , or of so many as the himself thinketh good , and to take it either by word , or in writing ; and himself then in private peruse them all , and so after good and mature deliberation , make choice of the best , without any distraction or binding himself to the direction of one . for the proverb is true , that two eyes see more than one ; and therefore the advises , and consultations of a senatory state , is compared by some to a feast , or dinner , where many contribute towards the shot , by which means they have more variety of dishes , and so better fare ; and yet every man may make choice of that dish , that serveth him best ●or his health and appeti●e . . the prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publique justice , and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity , whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten , as in the example of solomon , which may seem the reason , why our kings of england had their kings bench in place of publick justice , after the manner of the ancient kings that ●ate in the gate ; where for better performing of this princely duty , some special causes may be selected , which may throughly be deba●ed and considered upon by the prince in private , with the help and advise of his learned councel , and so be decided publickly , as before is said , by the prince himself ; at least , the prince is to ●ake accomp● of every minister of publick justice , that it may be known , that he hath a care of justice , and doing right to his people , which makes the justic●rs also to ●e more ●●reful in performing of their duties . . to be moderate in his taxes , and impositions ; and when need doth require to use the subjects purse , ●o do it by parliaments , and with their consents , making the cause apparent unto them , and shewing his unwillingness in charging them . finally , so to use it , that it may seem rather an offer from his subjects , than an exaction by him . . to stop small beginnings ; unto ●his end to compound the dissentions ●hat arise amongst the nobles , with caution , that such as are free be not drawn into parts , whereby many times the prince is endangered , and the whole common-wealth set in a combustion ; as in the example of the barons wars , and the late wars of france , which grew from a quarrel betwixt the guision faction , and the other nobility . . to stir up the people , if they grow secure , and negl●gent of a●mour , and other provision for the common-wealth , by some rumour or fear of danger at home , to make more ready when occasion requireth . but this seldom to be used , least it be supposed a false alarm , when there is need indeed . . to have special care , that his children , especially , the heir apparent , have such bringing up as is meet for a king , viz. in learning , specially of matters pertaining to state , and in martial exercise , contrary to the practise of many princes , who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure , and to spend their time in hunting , &c. which by reason of their defects , afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of state . ii. kingdoms new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by these means . . first , if they have been subjects before to his ancestours , or have the same tongue , manners , or fashions , as have his own countrey , it is an eas●● matter to retain such countries within their obedience , in case the princes bloud of the said countrey be wholly extinct . for men of the same quality , tongue , and condi●ion , do easily shole , and combine thems●lves together , so much the rather , if the people of that countrey have served before , and were not accustomed to their own lib●r●y , wherein specially is to be observed , that the laws and customs o● that purchased countrey be not altered nor innovated , or at least it be done by little and little . so the ●urgundians and acquitains were annexed to france . the reason , because partly they have been accustomed to serve , and partly , for that th●y will not ●asily agree about any other to be their prince , if the bloud royall be once extinguished . as for the invasion of a forreign coutrey , whereunto the prince hath no right , or whereof the right heir is living , ; it is not the part of a just civil prince , much less a prince christian to enforce such a countrey ; and therefore , the machiavilian practises in this case , to make sure work by extinguishing wholly the bloud royal , is lewd and imper●inent : the like is to be said of murthering the natives , or the greatest part of them , to the end he may hold the rest in sure posession . a thing not onely against christian religion , but it is inhumane injustice , cruel , and barbarous . . the safest way is , ( supposing a right ) that some good part of the natives be transplanted into some other place , and our colonies , consisting of so many as shall be thought meet , be planted there in some part of the province , castles , forts , and havens , seized upon and more provided in fit places , as the manner was of the babylonian monarch , which transplanted . iews : and of the romans in france , tribes of the germany , br●tany , and other places . the reason : . for that otherwise forces of horse and foot , are to be maintained within the province , which cannot be done without great charge . . for that the whole province is ●roubled and grieved with removing and supplying the army with victuals , carriages , &c. . for that colonies are more sure and faith●ul , than the rest . as for the natives that are removed from their former ●ears , they have no means to hurt , and the rest of the natives being free from the inconvenience , and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly , are content to be quiet . the turks practise in asia , where the chief grounds and dwellings are posessed by the souldiers , whom they call , timariotae . that the prince have his seat and his residence , in his new purchase , especially , for a time , till things be well setled ; especially , if the province be great and large , as the turks in greece : the reason ; . because the presence of the prince availeth much to keep things in order , and get the good will of his new subjects . . they conceive that they have refuge by the princes presence , if they be oppressed by the lieutenants , and inferiour governours : where it will be convenient for the winning the peoples hearts , that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression . . because being present , he seeth and heareth what is thought and attempted ; and so may quickly give remedy to it , which being absent , he cannot do , or not do in time . . if the prince himself cannot be present to reside , then , to take heed that the charge of governing , or new purchases be committed to such as be sure men , and of other meet quality , that depend wholly upon the princes favour , and not to natives , or other of their own subjects , that are gracious ●or their nobil●●y , or virtue ; especially , if the province be great , and somewhat far distant , which may soon seduce the unsetled affections of those new subjects . as for such governours , as depend wholly upon the princes favour , being not born , but created noble , they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty , and in case they would revolt , yet they are not able to make any great strength , for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers , to keep them in subjection , and not for any ill will . . to have the children of the ch●e● noble men , and of greatest authority , hostages with them in safe keeping , the more the better : for that no bound is stronger , than that of nature , to contain the parents and alies in obedience , and they the rest . . to alter the laws but by degrees one after another , and to make other that are more behovefull for the establishing of the present govern●ment . . to keep the people quiet and peaceable , and well affected so much as may be , that they may seem by being conquered , to have gotten a protectour , rather than a tyrant ; for the common-people , if they enjoy peace , and ●e not distracted nor drawn from their business , nor exacted upon beyond measure , are easily con●ained under obedience ; yet notwithstanding , they are to be dis●used from the practise of arms , and other exercises which increase courage , and ●e weakened of armour , that they have neither spi●it , ●or will to rebel . . if the●e be any ●action in the countrey , to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part , and to combine with it , ●as caesar in fra●●e . . to look well to the borders , and confining provinces , and if any rule there of great , or equal power to him●elf , to joyn league with some other borderers , though of less strength , to hinder the attempts ( if any should be ) by such neighbour prince . for it happeneth often , tha● a countrey in●e●ted by one neighbour p●ince , ●calleth in another , of as great , o● greater power , to assist , and rescue it from the other that invadeth it ; so the romans were called into greece , by the aetolians ; the saxons , by the britains , the danes , by the saxons . . to leave their ti●les and dignities to the natives , but the command and authority , wholly to his own . . not to put much trust , nor to practise to often the sophisms of policy , especially those that appertain to a tyrannical state , which are soon de●ected by men of judgement , and so bring discredit to the prince , and his policy among the wiser , and better sort of his subjects , whereof must needs follow very ill effects . the sophisms of tyrants , are rather to be known , than practised , ( which are for the supporting of their tyrannical states , ) by wise and good princes , and are these , and such like as follow . rules politick of tyrants . rvles practised by tyrants are of . sorts . viz. . barbarous , and pro●essed , which is proper to those that have got head , and have power sufficient of themselves , without others help , as in the tu●kish , and russe government . . so●histical , and dissembl●d ; as in some states that are repu●ed for good and lawfull monarchies , but inclining to tyrannies , proper to those which are not yet ●●tled , nor have power sufficient of themselves ; but must use the power and help of others , and so are forced to be politick soph●st●●s . i. sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny . to expel and banish ou● of his countrey all ho●est means , whereby his people may a●tain to learning , wisdom , valour , and other virtues , that they might be fit for that estate , and ●ervile condition . for that these two , learning , and martial exercise , effect two things most dangerous to a tyranny : viz. wisdom , and valour . for that men of spirit and understanding , can hardly endure a servile state . to this end , to forbid learning of li●eral arts , and martial exercise ; as in the rus●e government , so iulian the apo●tata dealt with the christians . contrarywise , to use his people to base occup●tions , and mechanical arts , to keep them from idleness , and to put away from them all high thoughts , and manly conceits , and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk , and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sotted , and so made unfit for great enterprises . so the egyptian kings dealt with the heb●ews ; so the russe emperour with his russe people : and charles the fifth with the neth●rlanders , when he purposed to enclose their priviledges , and to bring them under his absolute government . . to make sure to him , and his state , his military men by reward , liberty , and other means , especially , his guard , or praetorian ●and ; that being partakers of the spoil and benefit , they make like that state , and continue firm to it ; as the turk , his ianizaries ; the russe , his boyarens , &c. . to unarm his people of weapons , money , and all means , whereby they may resist his power ; and to that end , to have his set and ordinary exactions , viz. once in two , three , or four years , and sometimes yearly , as the turk and russe ; who is wont to say , that his people must be used as his flock of sheep , viz. their fle●c● taken from them , least it overlade them , and grow too heavy ; that t●ey are like to his beard , that the more it was shaven , the thicker it would grow . and if there be any of extraordinary wealth , to borrow of them in the mean while , till the tax come about , or upon some devised matter , to confiscate their goods , as the common practise is of the russe and tu●k . . to be still in wars , to the end , his people may need a captain ; and that his forces may be kept in practise , as the russe doth yearly against the tartar , pol●nian , and sweden , &c. . to cut off such as excel the rest in wealth , favour , or nobil●ty ; or be of a pregnant , or a spiring wit , & so are fearfull to a tyrant , and to suffer none to hold office , or any honour , but onely of him ; as the turk , his bas●●●s ; and the russe , his ●u●zzes . . to forbid guild● , brotherhoods , feastings , and other assemblies among the people , that they have no means or oportunity to conspire , or confer together of publick matters , or to maintain love amongst themselves , which is very dangerous to a tyrant , the russes practise . . to have their beagles , or listeners in every corner , and parts of the realm ; especially , in places that are more suspect , to learn what every man saith , or thinketh , that they may prevent all attempts , & take away such as mislike their state . . to make schism , and division among his subjects , viz. to set one noble man , against another , and one rich man against another , that through faction & disagreement among themselves , they may be weakened , and attempt nothing against him , and by this means entertaining whisperings , and complaints , he may know the secrets of both parts , and have matter against them both , when need requireth . so the russe made the faction of the ze●●ky , and the oppress●nie . . to have strangers for his guard , and to entertain parasites , and other base and servile fellows , not too wise , and yet subtile , that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he commandeth , though never so wicked and unjust . for that good men cannot flatter , and wise men cannot serve a tyrant . all these practises , and such like , may be contracted into one or two , viz. to bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt , or to alter the present state . the use is caution , not imitation . ii. sophisms of the sophistical , or subtile tyrant , to hold up his state . . to make shew of a good king , by observing a temper and mediocritie in his government , and whole course of life ; to which end , it is necessary , that this subtile tyrant , be a cunning polititian , or a machiavilian at the least , and that he be taken so to be , for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded , and is thought thereby , not unworthy for to govern others . . to make shew not of severity , but of gravity , by seeming reverent , and not terrible in his speech , and gesture , and habite , and other demeanour . . to pretend care of the common-wealth ; and to that end , to seem loath to exact tributes , and other charges ; and yet to make necessity of it , where none is : to that end , to procure such war as can bring no danger toward his state , and that might easily be compounded , or some other chargeable business ; and to continue it on , that he may continue his exaction and contribution so long as he list . and thereof to imploy some in his publick service , the rest to hoord up in his treasury , which is sometimes practised even by lawfull princes , as edward the fourth in his wars against france , when having levied a great sum of money throughout his ●ealm , especially of the londoners , he went over seas , and returned without any thing doing . . sometimes to give an account by open speech , and publick writing , of the expence of such taxes and impositions , as he hath rec●ived of his ●ubjects , that he may so seem to be a good husband , and frugal , and not a robber of the common-wealth . . to that end , to bestow● some cost upon publick buildings , or some other work for the common good , especially upon the ports , forts , and chief cities of his realm , that so he may seem a benenefactour , and have a delight in the adorning of his countrey , or doing some good for it . . to forbid feastings , and other meetings , which increase love , and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters , under pretence of sparing cost for better uses , to that end , the curfieu bell was first ordained by william the● conquerour , to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour . . to take heed that no one grow to be over-great , but rather , many equally great , that they may envy , and contend one with another ; and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort , to do it warily , and by degrees ; if quite to wreck him , and to have his life , yet to give him a lawfull tryal , after the manner of his countrey ; and if he proceed so far with any of great power and estimation , as to do him contumely , or disgrace , not to suffer him to escape , because contumely and disgrace , are things contrary unto honour , which great spirits do most desire , and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace , than to any thankfulness , or acknowledging the princes favour for their pardon or dismistion ; true in atheists , but not in true christian nobilitie . . to unarm his people , and store up their weapons , under pretence of keeping them safe , and having them ready when service requireth , and then to arm with them , such and so many as he shall think meet , and to commit them to such as are sure men . . to make schism or division under hand among his nobility , and betwixt the nobility and the people , and to set one rich man against another , that they combine no● together , and that himself by hearing the grieff and complaints , may know the secrets of both parts , and so have matter a●ainst them both , when it listeth him to call them to an account . . to offer no man any contumely or wrong , specially , about womens mat●ers , by attempting the chastity of their wives or daughters , which hath been he ruin of many tyrants , and conversion of their states . as of ●arquinius , by brutus , appius , by virginius , pisistratus , by harmodius , alexander medices , duke of florence , aloisus of placentia , rodericus , king of spain , &c. . to that end , to be moderate in his pleasures , or to use them closely , that he be not seen ; for that men sober , or watchfull , or such as seem so , are not lightly subject to contempt , or conspiracies of their own . . to reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize ; or do any special action ●or the common-wealth , in that manner as it may seem , they could not be better regarded , in case they lived in a free-state . . all rewards and things gratefull , to come from himself , but all punishments , exactions , and things ungratefull , to come from his officers , & publick ministers ; and when he hath effected what he would by them , if he see his people discontented withall , to make them a sacrifice to pacifie his subjects . . to pretend great care of religion , and of serving god , ( which hath been the manner of the wickedest tyrants ) for that people do less fear any hurt from those , whom they think virtuous and religious , nor attempt likely to do them hurt , for that they think that god protects them . . to have a strong & sure guard of forreign souldiers , and to bind them by good turns , that they having at least profit , may depend upon him , and the present state ; as c●ligula , the german guard , where the nobility are many and mighty . the like is practised by lawfull kings , as by the french king . . to procure that other great persons bee in the same fault , or case with them , that for that cause they be forced to defend the tyrant , for their own safetie . to take part , and to joyn himself with the stronger part ; if the common people , and mean degree be the stronger , to joyn with them ; if the rich and noble , to joyn with them . for so that part with his own strength , will be ever able to overmatch the other . . so to frame his manners & whole behaviour , as that he may seem , if not perfectly good , yet tolerably evil , or somewhat good , somewhat bad . these rules of hypocritical tyrants , are to bee known , that they may be avoyded , and met withall , and not drawn into imimitation . preservation of an aristocracie . rules to preserve a senatory state , are partly taken from the common axioms , and partly from those that preserve a kingdom . preservation of an oligarchie , by sophisms . rules . . in consultations and assemblies , about publick affairs , to order the matter , that all may have liberty to frequent their common assemblies , and councels , ; but to impose a fine upon the richer sort , if they omit that duty . on the other side , to pardon the people , if they absent themselves , and to bear with them under pretence , that they may the better intend their occupations , , and not be hindered in their trades , and earnings . . in election of magistrates , and officers : to suffer the poorer sort to vow , and abjure the bearing of office , under colour of sparing them , or to enjoyn some great charge , as incident to the office , which the poor cannot bear . but to impose some great fine upon those , that be rich , if they refuse to bear office , being elect unto it . . in judicial matters : in like manner to order , that the people may be absent from publick trials , under pretence of following their business . but the richer to be present , and to compel them by fines , to frequent the court . . in warlike exercise and arms : that the poor be not forced to have armour , horse , &c. under pretence of sparing their cost , nor to be drawn from their trades by martial exercises ; but to compel the richer sort to keep their proportion of armor , horse , &c. by excessive fines , and to exercise themselves in war-like matters , &c. . to have special care of instructing their children in liberal arts , policie , and warlike exercise , and to observe good order and discipline . for as popular states are preserved by the frequencie , and liberty of the people , so this government of the richer , is preserved by discipline , and good o●der of governours . . to provide good store of war-like furniture , especially of horse , and horse-men , and of armed men , viz. pike , &c. which are proper to the gentry , as shot , and light furniture , are for a popular companie . . to put in practise some points of a popular state ; viz. to lade no one man with too much preferment ; to make yearly , or half years magistrates , &c. for that the people are pleased with such things , and they are better secured by this means from the rule of one . and if any grow to too much greatness , to abate him by the sophisms fit for this state . . to commit the offices and magistracies , to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters , which both tendeth to the conservation of this state , and pleaseth the people , for that they reap some relief , and benefit by it . . to the same end , to contract marriages among themselves , the rich with the rich , &c. . in some things which concern not the points , and matters of state , as electing magistrates , making laws , &c. to giv● an equality , or sometimes a preferment to the common people , and not to do , as in some oligarchies they were wont ; viz. to swear against the people , to suppress and bridle them ; but rather contrary ; to minister an oath at their admission , that they shall do no wrong to any of the people ; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the commons , to shew some example of severe punishment . for other axioms that preserve this state , they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a popular , and tyrannical state ; for the strict kind of oligarchie , is kin to a tyranny . preservation of a popular state ; sophisms . rules or axioms . . in publick assemblies and consultations about matters of state , creating of magistrates , publick justice , and exercise of arms , to practise the contrary to the former kind of government , to wit , an oligarc●ie . for in popular states , the commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those assemblies , magistrates , offices , war-like exercises , &c. by mulcts and rewards , and the richer sort are to be spared , and not to be forced by fine , or otherwise , to frequent these exercises . . to make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men , and not to swear against them , as the manner hath been in some popular states ; but rather to preferre them in all other matters , that concern not the state and publick government . . to elect magistrates from among the common● by lot , or ballating , and not to choose any for their wealths sake . . to take heed , that no mā bear office twice , except it be military , where the pay , and salary , &c. is to be reserved in their own hands , to be disposed of by a common-councel , &c. and to see that no man be too highly preferred . . that no magistracy be perpetual , but as short as may be , to wit , for a a year , half year , &c. . to compel magistrates when their time expireth , to give an accompt of their behaviour and government , and that publickly before the commons . . to have publick salaries and allowance for their magistrates , judges , &c. and yearly dividents for the common people , and such as have most need among them . . to make judges of all matters out of all sorts , so they have some aptness to perform that duty . . to provide that publick judgements and trials be not frequent ; and to that end to inflict great fines and other punishments upon pettifoggers and dilators , as the law of requital , &c. because for the most part the richer and nobler , and not the commons are indited and accused in this common-wealth , which causeth the rich to conspire against the state ; whereby many times the popular state is turned into an oligarchie , or some other government . hereto tendeth that art of civil law , made against accusers and calumniatours : ad s●natus-consultum turpilianum , l. . de calumniatoribus . . in such free states as are popular , and have no revenue , to provide that publick assemblies be not after : because they want salary for pleaders and oratours ; and if they be rich ; yet to be wary , that all the revenue be not divided amongst the commons . for , that this distribution of the common revenue among the multitude , is like a purse or barrel without a bottom . but to provide , that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the publick affairs . . if the number of the poor encrease too much in this kind of state , to send some abroad out of the cities into the next countrey places , and to provide above all , that none do live idly , but be set to their trades . to this end , to provide that the richer men place in their farms and coppiholds , such decayed citizens . . to be well advised what is good for this state , and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular state , that seemeth most popular ; but that which is ●est for the continuance thereof : and to that end , not to lay into the exchequer , or common-treasurie , such goods as are confiscate , but to store them up as holy and consecrate things , which except it be practised , confiscations , and fines of the common people would be frequent , and so this state would decay by weakening the people . conversion of states in general . conversion of a state , is the declining of the common-wealth , either to some other form of government , or to his full and last period appointed by god . causes of conversions of states are of two sorts : general and particular . general , ( viz. ) . want of religion : viz. of the true knowledge and worship of god , prescribed in his word ; and notable sins that proceed from thence in prince and people , as in the examples of saul , uzziah , the jewish state ; the four monarchies●●nd all other . . want of wisdom and good councel to keep the state , the prince , nobles , and people in good temper , and due proportion , according to thei● several orders and decrees . . want of justice , either in administration ( as ill lawes , or ill magistrates ) or in the execution , as rewards not given where they should be , or there ●estowed where they should not be , or punishments not inflicted where they should be . . want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self ; viz. of provision , as armour , money , captains , souldiers , &c. execution , when the means or provision is not used , or ill used . . particular : to be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules , that are prescribed for the preservation of the common-wealths . particular causes of conversion of states , are of two sorts . . forreign : by the over-greatness of invasion of some forreign kingdom , or other state of meaner power , having a part within our own , which are to ●e prevented by the providence of the chief , and rules of policy for the preserving of every state . this ●alleth out very seldom for the great diff●cul●y to overthrow a forreign state . . domestick : sedition or open violence by the stronger part . alteration without violence . sedition . sedition is a power of inferiours opposing it self with force of arms against the superiour power , quasi ditio secedens . causes of sedition are of two sorts . . general . liberty richer when they , that are of equal quality in a commō-wealth , or do take themselves so to be , are not regarded equally in all , or in any of these three . or , when they are so unequal in quality , or take themselves so to be , are regarded but equally , or with less respect than those that be of less de●ect in these three things , or in any of them . honour . in the chief : covetousness or oppression , by the magistrate or higher power , ( viz. ) when the magistrates , especially the chief , encreaseth his substance and revenue beyond measure , either with the publick or ( private calamity , whereby the governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in olygarchies ) or the other degrees conspire together , and make quarrel against the chief , as in kingdoms : the examples of wat tyler , iack straw , &c. . in the chief : injury , when great spirits , and of great power , are greatly wronged and dishonoured , or take themselves so to be , as coriolanus , cyrus minor , earl of warwick . in which cases the best way is to decide the wrong . . preferment , or want of preferment ; wherein some have over-much , and so wax proud and aspire higher : or have more or less , than they deserve as they suppose ; & so in envy and disda● , seek innovation by open faction , so caesar , &c. . some great nec●ssity or calamity ; so xerxes after the ●oil of his great army . and sena●harib after the loss of . in one night . . particular . . envie , when the chief exceed the mediocri●y before mentioned , and so provoketh the nobility , and other degrees , to conspire against him ; as brutus cassius , &c. against caesar . . fear , viz. of danger , when one or more dispatch the prince , by secret practice or force , to prevent his own danger , as artab●nus did xerxes . . lust or lecherie , as tarquinius superbus , by brutus ; pisistratindae , by armodius ; appius by virginius . . contempt ; for vile quality & base behaviour , as sardanapalus by arbaces ; dionysius the younger by dion . . contumely ; when some great disgrace is done to some of great spirit , who standeth upon his honour and reputation , as caligula by chaereas . . hope of advancement , or some great profit , as mituridates , anobarsanes . chief . other d●gr●es . other degrees . alteration without violence . causes of alteration without violence are ; . excess of the state ; when by degrees the state groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was , or should have been setled , and exceedeth in power , riches , and absoluteness in his kind , by the ambition and covetousness of the chiefs immoderate taxes , and impositions , &c. applying all to his own benefi● , without respect of other degrees , and so in the end changeth it self into another state or form of government , as a kingdom into a tyranny , an oligarch●● into an aristocraci● . . excess , of some one or more in the common-wealth ; viz. when some one or more in a common-wealth grow to an excellency or excess above the rest , either in honour , wealth , or virtu● ; and so by permission and popular favour , are advanced to the sovereignty : by which means , popular states grow into oliga●chies ; and oligarchi●s and aristocracies into monarchi●s . for which cause the athenians and some other free states , made their laws of ostrocismos , to banish any for a time that should excel , though it were in virtue , to prevent the alteration of their state ; which because it is an unjust law , 't is better to take heed at the beginning to prevent the means , that none should grow to that heigth and excellency , than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy . finis . a method , how to make use of the book before , in the reading of the story . david being seventie years of age , was of wisdom , memorie , &c. sufficient to gouern his kingdom ; . reg. cap. . old age is not ever unfit for publick government . david being of great years , and so having a cold , drie , and impotent bodi● , married with abishag , a fair maid of the best complexion through the whole realm , to revive his bodie and prolong his life , . reg. chap. . verse . . example of the like practise in charles the fifth . david being old and impotent of bo●t● , by the advise of h●s nobles and p●isitians , marri●d a young maid call●d abishag , to warm and pres●rve his old bodi● . observation . vvh●ther david did well in m●●rying a maid ? and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man , to marrie a young woman ; or on the other side , for an old , worn , and decrepite woman , to marrie a young and lustie man ? for the affirmative . arg. the end of marriage is societie and mutual comfort ; b●● th●r● may be soci●tie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old , and young partie ; ergo , 't is lawful . answ. societie and comfort is a cause & effect of marriage ; but none of the principal ends of marriage : which are : . pr●creation of children , and so the continuance o● mankind . . the av●iding of fornication . as for comfort and societie they may be betwixt man and man , woman and woman , where no marriage is , and therefore no proper ends of marri●ge . the negative . arg. . that conjunction which hath no respect to the right and proper ends , for which marriage was ●rdained by god , is no lawfull marriage . but the conjunction betwixt an old im●otent , and young partie hath no respect t● th●●●ght end , for which marriage was ordain●d by god . there●ore it is no lawful marriage . . no contract , wherein the part●e cont●acting , bindeth himself to an impossible condition , or to do that which he cannot do , is good or lawfull . but the contract o● marriage by an impoten● person , wit● a young partie , bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot d● , viz. to perfo●m the duties of marriage ; therefore it is unlawfull . for the same cause , the civil law determineth a nullity in these m●r●iages , except the woman know before the infi●mitie of the man , in which case she ca● have no wrong , being a thing done with her own knowledge and cons●nt , because volenti non fit injuria : — in legem julian . de adulteriis leg. si uxor , &c. it provideth further , ●or the more certaintie of the infirmiti● , that three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage , because that men that have been infirm at the first , by reason of sickness , or some other accident , afterwards proved to be sufficient : de repudiis leg. in causis . defence for david , in marrying abishag . it was rather a medicine , than a marriage , without any evil , or disordered aff●ction . . it was by the perswasion of his nobles , and phisiti●ns . . it was for the publick good , to prolong the life of a worthie prince . . it was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid , who was made acquainted with the kings infirmitie , and to what end she was married unto him ; who if she did it for the common good , and for duties sake , having withall the gift of continencie , she is to be commended ; if for ambition , or some vain respect , it is ●er own , and not davids fault . political nobilitie . adoniah aspiring to the kingdom . first , took the advantage of davids affection and kindness towards him , and made him secure of any ill dealing . secondly , of his age and infirmities , disabling his father as unfit for government . thirdly , blazed his title , and right to the crown . fourthly , got him chariots , horsemen , and footmen , and a guard to make shew of state . fifthly , being a comly , and goodly person , made a popular shew of himself , and his qualities . sixtly , joyned to himself in faction , joab , the general of the armie , who was in displeasure for murthering of abner , and amaza , and feared that david would supplie benajah in his place , and so was discontented . and abiather the high priest , that was likewise discontented with david , for the preferment of zadoch . seventhly , had meetings with them , and other his confederates , under pretence of a vovv , and offering at the fountain of raguel , in the co●●ines of judea . eightly , made a shevv of religion by sacrificing , &c. ninthly , made himself familiar vvith the nobles and people , and entertai●●d them vvith feasting . tenthly , drevv into his part the chief officers of the court , and servants to the king , by revvards , familiaritie , &c. eleventhly , disgraced and abased the competitour , and such as he knevv vvould take part vvith him , and concealeth his ambition , and purpose from them . tvvelftly , had jonathan a favorite of the court , and near about the king to give him intelligence , if any thing vvere discovered , and moved at the court , whilest himself was in hand about his practise . observations . waies of such as aspire to the kingdom , & marks to discern them . first , they wind into the princes favour by service , officiousness , flatterie , &c. to plant him in a good opinion of their loyaltie and faithfulness , thereby to make him secure of their practises . . they take advantage of the princes infirmities , age , impotencie , negligence , sex , &c. and work upon that by disabling the prince , and secret detracting of his state , and government . . they blaze their title , and claim to the crown , ( if they have any ) with their friends and favourites . . they provide them in secret of extraordinarie forces , and furniture for the wars , make much of good souldiers , and have a pretence ( if it be espied ) of some other end , as for the kings honour , or service , and to be in readiness against forreign enemies , &c. . they make open shew of their best qualities , and comliness of their persons ( which though it be vain as a dumb shew , it is very effectual to win the liking of the popular sort , which according to the rul● of the election of kings , in the bees common-wealth ; think that porma est digna imperare ) activitie , nobilitie , ancestrie , &c. . to have their blazers abroad , to set out their virtues , and to prepare their friends in every province . . to draw into their part , and make sure unto the● , of the chief p●ers , and men of best qualitie , such as are mightiest and most gracious with the souldiers , and the militarie men , and most subtile and politick , especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the state . . to have meetings for con●e●rence under some pretence of some ordinari● matter in some convenient place , not too near , nor too far off , but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition . . to take up a shew , and pretence of religion , more than before , and beyond the practise of their former life . . they use popular courtesie ( which in a great person is verie effectual ) feasting , liberaliti● , gaming , &c. . to be over liberal , and win to them by gifts , familiaritie , &c. the chief officers of the court , and governours of shires . to have some near about the prince , to keep them in credite , and remove suspition , if any rise . . to disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithfull to the prince , and present state , or to the competitour , and to bring them into contempt by slander , detraction , and all means they can , and to ●onc●al the designs from them , least they be discovered before they be too ripe . . to have some spie ●●ar about the prince , to advertise them if any i●ckling of suspition arise , whilest themselves are practising . note the practises of absolom : ● sam. chap. . and of cy●us minor in xenophon ; {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . cap. . political prince . david being a most worthy and excellent prince for wisdom , valour , religion , and justice , and so highly deserving of the common-wealth , yet grown into age , grew withal into contempt , & had many , both of his nobles , & common people , that fell from him ; first with absolom , then with adoniah , who affected the kingdom , and rebelled against him : for remedy whereof , he stirred up himself to publick actions , which might shew his vigour and sufficiencie to mannage the affairs of his kingdom . . after the victorie against absolom , he forced himself to ●orbear mourning , and shewed himself to his discontented army , when all were like to fall from him , for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his son . . after the victorie , he caused a g●n●ral convention to be ass●mbled o● the whole nation , to bring him home with honour to jerusalem , which was a renewing , and re-establishing of him . sam. . . . he gave an experiment of his power and authoritie , by deposing a person of great authoritie and estimation , to wit , joab , general captain of the armie , and advancing amasa to his place . . he sent kind messengers to jerusalem , and to other chief and head towns , and speciall men of judea , his contributes , putting them of their alliance with him , with these words , that they were of his own flesh and bloud , with protestation of his special love and affection towards them , to provide them with the like kindness and affection towards him . . he assembled a parliament of his whole realm , and took occasion upon the designing of his successour , to commend unto them the succession of his house , and the continuance and maintenance o● gods tru● worship and religion then established , and gave a grave and publick ch●rge to his successour , now designed , touc●ing the manner of his gov●rnment , and maintaining of religion . . chron. . . . he shewed his bountie and magnificence in cong●sting matter for the building of the temple , as gold , silver , brass , &c. and caus●d it to be published and made known to the parliament and whole nation , . chron. . . he revived the church government , and set it in a right order , assigning to ●v●ry church , officers , his place and function . . he suppressed the faction of ado●niah , and ordained solomon his successour , reg. . . by these means , h● retained his majestie and authoritie i● his old age , as appeareth by the eff●ct ; ●o● that being bed-rid , he suppressed the fa●ction of adoniah , ( which was grow●● mightie , and vvas set on foot ) vvith h●● bare commandment , and si●nification 〈◊〉 his pleasure , and so he dyed in peace . finis . the prerogative of popular government. a politicall discourse in two books. the former containing the first præliminary of oceana, inlarged, interpreted, and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alledged against it under the notion of objections. the second concerning ordination, against dr. h. hamond, dr. l. seaman, and the authors they follow. in which two books is contained the whole commonwealth of the hebrews, or of israel, senate, people, and magistracy, both as it stood in the institution by moses, and as it came to be formed after the captivity. as also the different policies introduced into the church of christ, during the time of the apostles. by james harrington. harrington, james, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; :e [ ]) the prerogative of popular government. a politicall discourse in two books. the former containing the first præliminary of oceana, inlarged, interpreted, and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alledged against it under the notion of objections. the second concerning ordination, against dr. h. hamond, dr. l. seaman, and the authors they follow. in which two books is contained the whole commonwealth of the hebrews, or of israel, senate, people, and magistracy, both as it stood in the institution by moses, and as it came to be formed after the captivity. as also the different policies introduced into the church of christ, during the time of the apostles. by james harrington. harrington, james, - . [ ], , [ ], - , [ ], , [ ] p. printed [by g. dawson] for tho. brewster at the three bibles at the west end of pauls church-yard, london : . [i.e. ] partly a defense of his: the common-wealth of oceana. "the second book" has separate pagination and title page with "printed by g. dawson, .. " in the imprint; register is continuous. the page after first is misnumbered . annotation on thomason copy: " nouem."; in imprint date crossed out and " " written in. reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng harrington, james, - . -- common-wealth of oceana -- early works to . hammond, henry, - -- early works to . seaman, lazarus, d. -- early works to . political science -- early works to . ordination -- early works to . church and state -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - david karczynski sampled and proofread - david karczynski text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the prerogative of popular government . a politicall discourse in two books . the former containing the first praeliminary of oceana , inlarged , interpreted , and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alledged against it under the notion of objections . the second concerning ordination , against dr. h. hamond , dr. l. seaman , and the authors they follow . in which two books is contained the whole commonwealth of the hebrews , or of israel , senate , people , and magistracy , both as it stood in the institution by moses , and as it came to be formed after the captivity . as also the different policies introduced into the church of christ , during the time of the apostles . by james harrington . without counsell purposes are disappointed , but in the multitude of counsellors they are established . solomon . la multitudine è piu savia è piu costante ch'vn principe . machiavil . london , printed for tho. brewster at the three bibles at the west end of pauls church-yard , . the epistle dedicatory . i dedicate my book to the mirth and discourse of the vniversity wits or good companies , upon condition that they laugh not alwaies in the wrong place ; for if a man who can tell what he would have be ridiculous , what are such as would have they know not what ? policy is an art , art is the observation or imitation of nature , nature is the providence of god in the government of the world , whence he that proceeds according unto principles acknowledgeth government unto god , and he that proceeds in defiance of principles , attributes government unto chance , which denying the true god , or introducing a false one , is the highest point of atheisme or superstition . nullum numen abest , si sit prudentia ; sed te nos facimus , fortuna , deam , coeloque locamus . i neither do nor ever did refuse obedience unto any government , i never was nor am of any party , i go not about as some that would impose their own impertinence or absurdities upon me , endeavour to insinuate to settle a commonwealth an 't please you , which belongs not to me , but i undertake , as any man may do , to vindicate the reason of popular government . in which controversie let him that will buckle with me , i will give him a fall or he shall give me one , nor care i whether , because who ever get the fall , the good companies and the good people too of this nation will get arise in that knowledge , which if we be not like them that dwell upon the cataracts of nylus , among all this noice we have bad and are like to have of axes and hammers , is the most seasonable and necessary . but the university wits or good companies , are good at two things , at diminishing a commonwealth and at multiplying a louse . an answer to three objections against popular government , that were given me after these two books were printed . object . . monarchical government is more natural , because wee see even in commonwealths that they have recourse unto this , as lacedemon in her kings ; rome both in her consuls and dictators , and venice in her dukes . answer . government whether popular or monarchical is equally artificial ; wherefore to know which is the more natural , we must consider what piece of art cometh nearest unto nature ; as for example , whether a ship or an house be the more natural , and then it will be easie to resolve that a ship is the more natural at sea , and an house at land. in like manner where one man or a few men are the landlords , monarchy must doubtlesly be the more natural , and where the whole people are the landlords , a commonwealth ; for how can we understand that it should be natural unto a people that can live of themselves , to give away the means of their livelyhood to one or a few men that they may serve or obey ? each government is equally artificial in effect or in it self , and equally natural in the cause , or the matter upon which it is founded . a commonwealth consists of the senate proposing , the people resolving , and the magistracy executing ; so the power of the magistrates ( whether , kings as in lacedemon , consuls as in rome , or dukes as in venice ) is but barely executive , but to a monarch belongs both the result and execution too ; wherefore that there have been dukes , consuls , or kings in common wealths , which were quite of another nature , is no argument that monarchical government is for this cause the more natural . and if a man shall instance in a mixed government , as king and parliament , to say , that the king in this was more natural then the parliament , must be a strange affirmation . to argue from the roman dictator , an imperfection which ruin'd that commonwealth and was not to be found in any other , that all common-wealths have had the like recourse in exigences unto the like remedy , is quite contrary to the universal testimony of prudence or story . a man who considers that the commonwealth of venice hath stood one thousand years , which never any monarchy did , and yet shall affirm that monarchical government is more natural then popular , must affirm that a thing which is less natural may be more durable and permanent then a thing that is more natural . whether is a government of laws less natural then a government of men ? or is it more natural unto a prince to govern by laws or by will ? compare the violences and bloody rapes perpetually made upon the crown , or royal dignity in the monarchies of the hebrews and the romans , with the state of the government under either commonwealth , and tell me which was less violent or whether that which is more violent must therefore be more natural . object . . the government of heaven is a monarchy , so is the government of hell. answer . in this ( saith machiavel ) princes lose themselvesand their empire that they neither know how to be perfectly good nor intirely wicked . he might as well have said , that a prince is always subject to error and misgovernment , because he is a man , and not a god nor a divel . a shepherd unto his flock , a plough-man to his team is a better nature , and so not only an absolute prince but as it were a god. the government of a better or of a superior nature , is to a worse or inferior as the government of god. the creator is another and a better nature then the creature , the government in heaven is of the creator over his creatures that have their whole dependence upon him and subsistence in him . where the prince or the few have the whole lands , there is some what of dependence resembling this ; so the government there , must of necessity be monarchical or aristocratical ; but where the people have no such dependence , the causes of that government which is in heaven are not in earth ; for neither is the prince a distinct or better nature then the people , nor have they their subsistence by him ; and therefore there can be no such effect . if a man were good as god , there is no question but he would be not only a prince but a god , would govern by love and be not only obeyed but worshipped : or if he were ill as the divel , and had as much power to do mischief , he would be dreaded as much and so govern by fear . to which later the nature of man hath so much nearer approaches , that albeit we never saw upon earth a monarchy like that of heaven , yet it is certain the perfection of the turkish policy lies in this , that it cometh nearest to that of hell. object . . god instituted a monarchy , namely in melchizedec , before he instituted a commonwealth . answer . if melchizedec were a king so was abraham too , though one that paid him tithes , or was his subject ; for abraham made war or had the power of the sword , as the rest of the fathers of families he fought against ; so if canaan were a monarchy in those days , it was such an one as germany is in these , where the princes also have as much the right of the sword as the emperor , which comes rather ( as hath been shewn already ) to a commonwealth ; but whether it were a monarchy or a commonwealth we may see by the present state of germany , that it was of no great good example , nor was melchizedec otherwise made a king by god then the emperor ; that is as an ordinance of man. finis . epistle to the reader . who so sheddeth mans bloud , by man shall his bloud be shed ; for in the image of god made he man. if this rule hold as well in shedding the bloud of a turk as of a christian , then that wherein man is the image of god is reason . of all controversies , those of the pen are the most honourable ; for in those of force , there is more of the image of the beast ; but in those of the pen , there is more of the image of god. in the controversies of the sword , there is but too often no other reason then force ; but the controversie of the pen hath never any force but reason . of all controversies of the pen next those of religion , those of government are the most honourable , and the most useful , the true end of each , though in a different way , being that the will of god may be done in earth as it is in heaven . of all controversies of government , those in the vindication of popular government are the most noble , as that from whence all we have that is good is descended to us , and which if it had not been , mankind at this day had been but a herd of beasts . the prerogative of popular government must be in an ill hand , or is a game against which there is not a card in the whole pack , for we have the books of moses , those of the greeks and of the romans , not to omit machiavel , all for it : what have they ; what can they have against us ? a sword ; but that rusts , or must have a scabbard , and the scabbard of this kind of sword is a good frame of government . a man may be possessed of a piece of ground by force , but to make use or profit of it , he must build upon it , and till it , by reason ; whatever is not founded upon reason cannot be permanent . in reason there be two parts . invention and judgement . as to the later ; in a multitude of counsellors ( say both solomon and machiavel ) there is strength . for judgement there is not that order in art or nature that can compare with a popular assembly . the voice of the people is the voice of god. hence it is , that in all well order'd policies the people have the ultimate result : but unless there be some other to invent , a popular assembly can be of no effect at all , but confusion . invention is a solitary thing . all the physicians in the world put together invented not the circulation of the bloud , nor can invent any such thing , though in their own art ; yet this was invented by one alone , and being invented is unanimously voted and embraced by the generality of physicians . the plough and wheels were at first ( you must think ) the invention of some rare artists , but who or what shall ever be able to tear the use of them from the people ? hence , where government is at a loss , a sole legislater is of absolute necessity ; nay where it is not at a loss , if it be well modelled , as in venice , the proposers though frequently changeable , as in that case is necessary , are very few , as the counsellers , the savi the provosts . where ever a common-wealth is thus proposed to ▪ the ballance or popular assembly will doe her duty to admiration , but till then never . yet so it hath been with us of late years , that albeit in royal authority there was no more then the right of proposing , and the king himself was to stand ( legibus & consuetudinibus quas vulgus elegerit ) to the result of the people , the popular council hath been put upon invention , and they that have been the prevailing party have used means to keep the result unto themselves , quite contrary unto the nature of popular administration . let one speak and the rest judge . of what ever any one man can say or doe , mankind is the natural and competent judge , in which is contained the very reason of parliaments : through the want of this understanding came in confusion . man that is in honour and hath no understanding is like the beasts that perish . nor can we possibly return unto order but by mending the hedge where it was broken . a prudent intire and fit proposition made unto a free parliament recovers all . to them who are of the greatest eminency or authority in a commonwealth belongs naturally that part of reason which is invention , and using this , they are to propose : but what did our grandees ever invent or propose , that might shew so much as that themselves knew what they would be at ? and yet how confidently do they lay the fault upon the people and their unfitness ( forsooth ) for government : in which they are wondrous wise . for this i will boldly say where there was an aristocracy that performed their duty , there never was nor ever can be a people unfit for government ; but to the contrary , where the aristocracy have failed , the people ( being once under orders ) have held very often . but while they are not under orders if they fail it is not their fault , but the fault of the aristocracy ; for who else should model a government but men of experience ? there is not in england ( i speak it to their shame ) one grandee that hath any perfect knowledge of the orders of any one commonwealth that ever was in the world. a way with this same grave complection , this huff of wisdom maintain'd by making faces . the people cannot doe their duty consisting in judgement but by virtue of such orders as may bring them together and direct them ; but the duty of the aristocracy consisting in invention may be done by any one man and in his study ; and where is there that one man among all the grandees that studies ? they are so far from knowing their own duty , that a man for proposing that in which no man can find a flaw hath done enough to be ridiculous unto them , who are ridiculous unto the whole world in that they could never yet propose any thing that would hold . but if this amount unto a demonstration it amounts unto a cleer detection of your profound grandees , and a full proof that they are phanatical persons , state-jesuits , such as have reduced the politicks to mental reservation , and implicite faith in their nods or night-caps . god to propose his commandements to the people of israel , wrote them in two tables ; the decemviri to propose their commandements unto the people of rome , wrote them in twelve tables . the athenians proposed in writing sign'd with the name of the particular inventor , after this pattern doe the venetians ( as was said ) the same at this day . but no goose-quil , no scribling , your grandees are above this . moses who was the first writer in this kind shall be pardoned , but machiavel the first in later times that hath revived his principles , or trodden in his steps , is deservedly pelted for it by sermons . they are not for the scripture but the cabala . i will tell you a story out of bocalini . apollo having spy'd the philosopher and great master of silence harpocrates in the court of parnassus , used such importunity with him , that for once he was perswaded to speak , upon which such apparent discovery was made of the hypocrite , and the plump ignorance which he had so long harber'd under a deceitful silence , that he was forth with banished the court. were there cause i could be modest , but this virtue to the diminution of sound and wholesome principles would be none : wherefore let a grandee write and i will shew you harpocrates . thus having sufficiently defi'd sir guy , i may with the less impeachment of reputation descend unto tom thumbe . not that i hold my self a fit person to be exercised with boys-play , but that some , who should have more wit , have so little as to think this something . a good rat-catcher is not so great a blessing unto any city , as a good juggler-catcher would be unto this nation . now because i want an office , i shall shew my parts unto my countrey , and how fit i am for the white staff or long poll of so worshipful a preferment . ridiculus ne sis , esto . the first book , containing the first praeliminary of oceana , inlarged , interpreted , and vindicated from all such mistakes or slanders as have been alledged against it under the notion of objections : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a full answer to all such objections as have hitherto been made against oceana . neither the author or authors of the considerations upon oceana , nor any other have yet so much as once pretended one contradiction or one inequality to be in the whole common-wealth . now this is certain , that frame of government which is void of any contradiction or any inequality is void of all internall causes of disolution , and must for so much as it embraceth have attained unto full perfection : this by wholesayl is a full answer unto the considerations , with all other objections hetherto and will be ( with any man that comprehends the nature of government ) unto thousands of such books or meriads of such tittle tattle . nevertheless because every man is not provided with a sum ▪ in the following discourse i shal comply with them that must have things by retayl , or somewhat for their farthing . preface . it is commonly said ( and not without encouragement by some who think they have parnassus by the horns ) that the university hath lashed me : so it seems i have to do with the university , and lashing is lawful ; with both which i am contented . in moor-fields while the people are busie at their sports , they often and ridiculously lose their buttons , their ribbands , and their purses ; where , if they light , as sometimes they doe , upon the masters of that art , they fall on kicking them awhile , ( which one may call a rude charge ) and then to their work again . i know not whether i invite you to moor-fields , but ( difficile est satyram non scribere ) all the favour i desire at your hands is but this , that you would not so condemn one man for kicking , as in the same act to pardon another for cutting of purses . a gentleman that commits a fallacious argument to writing , or goes about to satisfie others with such reasons as he is not satisfied with all himself , is no more a gentleman but a pick pocket ; with this in my mind , i betake my self unto my work , or rather to draw open the curtain , and begin the play. one that hath written considerations upon oceana , speaks the prologue in this manner , i beseech you gentlemen , are not we the writers of politiques somewhat a ridiculous sort of people ? is it not a fine piece of folly for private men sitting in their cabinets to rack their brains about models of government ? certainly our labours make a very pleasant recreation for those great personages who sitting at the helm of affairs have by their large experience not onely acquired the perfect art of ruling , but have attained also unto the comprehension of the nature and foundation of government . in which egregious complement the considerer hath doft his considering cap. it was in the time of alexander the greatest prince and commander of his age , that aristotle with scarce inferiour applause and equall fame , being a private man , wrote that excellent piece of prudence in his cabinet , which is called his politicks , going upon far other principles then those of alexander's government , which it hath long out-lived : the like did titus livius in the time of augustus , sir thomas moore in the time of henry the eighth , and machiavil when italy was under princes that afforded him not the ear . these works nevertheless are all of the most esteemed and applauded in this kind ; nor have i found any man , whose like endeavours have been persecuted since plato by dionysius . i study not without great examples , nor out of my calling ; either armes or this art being the proper trade of a gentleman . a man may be intrusted with a ship and a good pilot too , yet not understand how to make sea-cards . to say that a man may not write of government , except he be a magistrate , is as absurd as to say that a man may not make a sea-card unless he be a pilot. it is known that christopher columbus made a card in his cabinet that found out the indies . the magistrate that was good at his steerage never took it ill of him , that brought him a card , seeing whether he would use it or no was at his own choice ; and if flatterers ( being the worst sort of crows ) did not pick out the eyes of the living , the ship of government at this day throughout christendome had not struck so often as she hath done . to treat of affairs ( saith machiavil ) which as to the conduct of them appertain to others , may be thought a great boldnesse ; but if i commit errors in writing , these may be known without danger , whereas if they commit errors in acting , such come not otherwise to be known , then in the ruine of the commonwealth . for which cause i presume to open the scene of my discourse , which is to change according unto the variety of these following questions . whether prudence be well distinguisht into antient and modern ? whether a commonwealth be rightly defined to be a government of laws , and not of men : and monarchy to be a government of some man , or few men , and not of laws ? whether the ballance of dominion in land be the natural cause of empire ? whether the ballance of empire be well divided into national and provincial ; and whether these two , or nations that are of distinct ballance , comming to depend upon one and the same head , such a mixture create a new ballance ? whether there be any common right or interest of mankind , distinct from the parts taken severally ; and how by the orders of a common-wealth this may best be distinguisht from private interest ? whether the senatusconsulta or decrees of the roman senate had the power of laws ? whether the ten commandements proposed by god or moses , were voted by the people of israel ? whether a commonwealth comming up to the perfection of the kind , come not up to the perfection of government , and have no flaw in it ? whether monarchy comming up to the perfection of the kind , come not short of the perfection of government and have some flaw in it ? in which is also treated of the ballance of france , of the original of a landed clergy , of armes and their kinds . whether a commonwealth that was not first broken by her self , were ever conquer'd by any monarch ? whether there be not an agrarian , or some law or laws of that nature to supply the defect of it in every commonwealth ; and whether the agrarian as it is stated in oceana be not equal and satisfactory to all interests or parties ? whether courses or rotation be necessary unto a well order'd commonwealth ? in which is contained the parembole or courses of israel before the captivity , together with an epitome of the whole commonwealth of athens , as also another of the commonwealth of venice . antient and modern prudence . chap. i. whether prudence be well distinguished into antient and modern . the considerer , where by antient prudence i understand the policy of a common-wealth , and by modern prudence that of king , lords and commons , which introduced by the goths & vandals upon the ruine of the roman empire , hath since reigned in these western countreys , till by the predominating of some one of the three parts , it be now almost universally extinguished ; thinks it enough for the confutation of this distinction , to shew out of thucidides that of monarchy to be a more antient policy than that of a commonwealth . upon which occasion , i must begin here to discover that which the farther i go will be the more manifest ; namely that there is difference between quoting authors , and saying some part of them without book : this may be done by their words , but the former no otherwise then by keeping unto their sense . now the sense of thucidides as he is translated by mr. hobbs , in the place alleaged is thus : the manner ( saith he ) of living in the most antient times of greece was thieving , the stronger going abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men , both to enrich themselves , and fetch home maintenance for the weak ; for there was neither traffick , propriety of lands , nor constant abode , till minos built a navy , and expelling the malefactors out of the islands , planted colonies of his own , by which means they who inhabited the sea coasts , becomming more addicted to riches , grew more constant to their dwellings ; of whom some grown now rich , compassed their towns about with walls . for out of desire of gain the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty ; and the mighty ( thus overballancing at home ) with their wealth , brought the lesser cities ( abroad ) into subjection . thus pelops , though he were a stranger , obtained such power in peloponesus that the countrey was called after his name ; thus atreus obtained the kingdome of mycenae , and thus kingdomes with honours limitted came to be hereditary ; and rising to power proceeded afterwards to the war against troy. after the war with troy , though with much adoe , and in a long time greece had constant rest ( and land without doubt came to propriety ) for shifting their seats no longer , at length they sent colonies abroad ; the athenians into ionia with the islands , the peloponesians into italy , sicily , and other parts . the power of greece thus improved , and the desire of money with all , their revenues ( in what ? not in money , if yet there were no usury : therefore except a man can shew that there was usury in land ) being enlarged , in most of the cities there more erected tyrannies . let us lay this place unto the former , when out of desire of gain the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty , it caused hereditary kingdomes with honours limitted , as happen'd also with us since the time of the goths and vandals . but when the people came to propriety in land , and their revenues were enlarged , such as assumed power over them , not according unto the nature of their propriety or ballance , were tyrants ; well , and what remedy ? why , then it was ( saies the considerer ) that the grecians out of an extreme aversion to that which was the cause of their present sufferings slipt into popular government , not that upon calm and mature debates they found it best , but that they might put themselves at the greatest distance ( which spirit usually accompanies all reformations ) from that with which they were grown into dislike . whereby he agrees exactly with his author in making out the true force and nature of the ballance , working even without deliberation , and whether men will or no. for the government that is natural and easie being in no other direction than that of the respective ballance , is not of choice but of necessity . the policy of king , lords and commons was not so much from the prudence of our ancestors , as from their necessity . if three hundred men held at this day the like overballance unto the whole people , it were not in the power of prudence to institute any other then the same kind of government , through the same necessity . thus the meaner sort with thucidides submitting unto the mighty , it came to kingdomes with hereditary honours ; but the people comming to be wealthy , called their kings though they knew not why , tyrants , nay and using them accordingly found out means with as little deliberation it may be as a bull takes to tosse a dog , or a hern to split an hawk ; that is , rather ( as at the long run they will ever doe in the like case ) by instinct than prudence or debate , to throw down that , which by the meer information of sense they could no longer bear , and which being thrown down they found themselves eased . but the question yet remains , and that is ( forsooth ) whether of these is to be called antient prudence . to this end , never man made a more unlucky choice then the considerer hath done for himself of this author , who in the very beginning of his book speaking of the pelopenesian war , or that between the commonwealths of athens and lacedemon , saies , that the actions which preceded this , and those again that were more antient , though the truth of them through length of time cannot by any means be clearly discovered , yet for any argument that ( looking into times far past ) he had yet light on to perswade him , he does not think they have been very great either for matter of war , or otherwise ; that is for matter of peace or government ; and lest this should not be plain enough , he calls the prudence of the three periods ( observ'd by mr. hobbs ) that from the beginning of the grecian memory to the trojan war , that of the trojan war it self , and that from thence to the present commonwealths and wars , whereof he treateth , the imbecility of antient times . wherefore certainly this prevaricator ( to give him his own fees ) hath lesse discretion then a common attorney , who will be sure to examine onely those witnesses that seem to make for the cause in which he is entertained . seeing that which he affirmeth to be antient prudence is deposed by his own witness to have been the imbecility of antient times , for which i could have so many more then i have leisure to examine , that ( to take onely of the most authentick ) as you have heard one greek , i shall add no more then one roman , and that is florus in his prologue where computing the ages of the romans , ( in the same manner thucidides did those of the greeks ) he affirmeth the time while they lived under their kings , to have been their infancy , that from the consuls until they conquer'd italy , their youth ; that from hence unto their emperors , their manly age , and the rest ( with a complement or salvo unto trajan his present lord ) their dotage . these things , though originally all government among the greeks and the romans were regall ; are no more then they who have not yet passed their novitiate in story might have known . yet says the considerer , it seems to be a defect of experience to think that the greek and the roman actions are only considerable in antiquity . but is it such a defect of experience to think them only considerable , as not to think them chiefly considerable in antiquity , or that the name of ancient prudence doth not belong unto that prudence which was chief in antiquity ? true saith he , it is very frequent with such as have been conversant with greek and roman authors to be led by them into a belief that the rest of the world was a rude inconsiderable people , and which is a term they very much delight in , altogether barbarous . this should be some fine gentleman that would have universities pulld down ; for the office of an university is no more then to preserve so much of antiquity as may keep a nation from stinking or being barbarous , which falt grew not in monarchies but in commonwealths ; or whence hath the christian world that religion and those laws which are now common , but from the hebrews and romans , or from whence have we arts but from these or the greeks ? that we have a doctor of divinity or a master of art we may thank popular government , or with what languages with what things are schollars conversant that are otherwise descended ? will they so plead their own cause as to tell us it is possible there should be a nation at this day in the world without universities , or universities without hebrew , greek and latine , and not be barbarous , that is to say , rude , unlearned , and inconsiderable ? yes , this humour even among the greeks and romans themselves was a servile addiction unto narrow principles , and a piece of very pedantical pride . what man ! the greeks and the romans that of all other would not serve , servile ! their principles , their learning , with whose scraps we set up for bachelours , masters and doctors of fine things , narrow ! their inimitable eloquence a piece of very pedantical pride ! the world can never make sense of this any otherwise then that since heads and fellows of colledges became the only greeks and romans ; the greeks and romans are become servily addicted , of narrow principles , very pedants , and prouder of those things they do not understand , then the other were of those they did ; for say they , in this question , the examples of the babylonians , persians , and egyptians ( not to omit the antient and like modern discoveries of the queen of the amazons , and of the king of china ) cannot without grosse partiality be neglected . this is pretty ; they who say nothing at all to the policy of these governments , accuse me , who have fully opened it , of negligence . the babylonian , persian , and ( for ought appears to the contrary ) the chinesse policy , is summed up , and far exceld by that at this day of turky ; and in opening this , i have opn'd them all , so far from neglect , that i everywhere give the turk his due , whose policy i assert to be the best of this kind , though not of the best kind . but they will bear me down and but with one argument ( which i beseech you mark ) that it is absolutely of the best kind ; for say they , it is of a more absolute form ( hath more of the man and less of the law in it ) then is to be met with in any kingdome of europe . i am amazed ! this is that kind of government which to hold barbarous , was in the greeks and romans pedantical pride , but would be in us who have not the same temptation of interest , downright folly . the interest of a people is not their guide but their temptation ! we that hold our land divided among us , have not the same temptation of interest that had the servile hebrews , greeks and romans , but the same that had the free people of babylon , persia and egypt , where not the people but the prince was sole landlord ! o the arts in which these men are masters ! to follow the pedantical pride of moses , lycurgus , solon , romulus , were with us downright folly ; but to follow humble and learned mahomet or ottonian , in whose only model the perfection of the babylonian , persian , egyptian policy is consummated , is antient prudence ! exquisite polititians ! egregious divines for the leading of a people into egypt or babylon ! these things considered , whether antient prudence as i have stated it be downright folly , or as they have stated it , be not downright knavery , i appeal unto any court of claims in the world , where the judges ( i mean ) have not more in their caps then in their heads , and in their sleeves then the scarlet . and whereas men love compendious works , if i gain my cause , the reader , for an answer unto the oxford book need look no farther then this chapter . for if riches and freedome be the end of government ; and these men propose nothing but slavery , beggary and turcisme , what need more words ? chap. ii. whether a commonwealth be rightly defined to be a government of laws and not of men , and a monarchy to be the government of some man or few men , and not of laws . that part of the preliminaries , which the praevaricator ( as is usual with him ) recites in this place fasly and fraudulently , is thus . relation had unto these two times ( that of antient , and that of modern prudence ) the one as is computed by janotti ending with the liberty of rome , the other beginning with the arms of caesar ( which extinguishing liberty became the translation of antient into modern prudence , introduced in the ruine of the roman empire by the goths and vandals ) government to define it ( de jure ) or according unto antient prudence , is an art whereby a civil society of men , is instituted and preserved upon the foundation of common right or interest , or ( to follow aristotle and livy ) it is an empire of laws , and not of men. and government to define it ( de facto ) or according unto modern prudence , is an art whereby some man , or some few men subject a city or a nation , and rule it according unto his or their private interest , which because the laws in such cases are made according to the interest of a man , or some few families , may be said to be an empire of men , and not of laws . hereby it is plain , whether in an empire of laws , and not of men , as a commonwealth ; or in an empire of men , and not of laws , as monarchy ; first , that law must equally proceed from will , that is either from the will of the whole people , as in a common-wealth ; from the will of one man , as in absolute , or from the will of a few men , as in regulated monarchy . secondly , that will whether of one , or more , or all , is not presumed to be , much lesse to act without a mover . thirdly , that the mover of will is interest . fourthly , that interests also being of one , of more , or of all ; those of one man , or of a few men , where laws are made accordingly , being more private , then comes duly up unto law ( the nature whereof lyeth not in partiality but in justice ) may be called the empire of men , and not of laws : and that of the whole people comming up to the publique interest ( which is none ▪ other then common right and justice , excluding all partiality or private interest ) may be truly called the empire of laws , and not of men. by all which put together , whereas it is demonstrable , that in this division of government , i do not stay at the will , which must have some motive or mover , but go unto the first and remotest notion of government in the foundation and origination of it , in which lies the credit of this division , and the definition of the several members ; that is to say , of interest whether private or publique : the praevaricator telleth me , that this division of government having ( he knows not how ) lost her credit , the definitions of the several members of it need not be considered farther then that they come not at all up to the first and remotest notion of government in the foundation and origination of it , in which lies all the difficulty , and being here neglected , there is little hope the subsequent discourse can have in it the light of probable satisfaction , much less of force of infallible demonstration . very good , interest it should seem then is not the first and remotest notion of government , but that which he will out-throw , and at this cast , by saying that the declaration of the will of the soveraign power is called law , which if it out-live the person whose will it was , it is onely because the persons who succeed in power are presumed to have the same will , unless they manifest the contrary , and that is the abrogation of the law ; so that still the government is not in the law , but in the person whose will gave a being unto that law. i might as well say , the declaration unto all men by these presents that a man oweth money is called a bond , which if it outlive the person that entred into that bond , it is only because the persons that succeed him in his estate , are presumed to have the same will , unlesse they manifest the contrary , and that is the abrogation or cancelling of the bond ; so that still the debt is not in the bond , but in his will who gave a being unto that bond. if it be alledged against this example that it is a private one , the case may be put between several princes , states , or governments , or between several states of the same principality or government , whether it be a regulated monarchy or a commonwealth ; for in like obligation of the states , ( as of the king , the lords and commons ) or parties agreeing , authoritate patrum & jussu populi , till the parties that so agreed to the obligation , shall agree to repeal or cancel it , lyeth all law , that is not meerly in the will of one man , or of one state , or party as the oligarchy . but not to dispute these things farther in this place , let the government be what it will , for the prevaricator to fetch the origination of law no farther then the will , while he knows very well that i fetcht it from interest , the antecedent of will ; and yet to boast that he hath out-thrown me , i say he is neither an honest man , nor a good bowler . no matter , he will be a better gunner ; for where i said that the magistrate upon the bench is that unto the law , which a gunner upon his platform is to his cannon ; he goes about to take better aim , and says , if the proportion of things be accurately considered , it will appear that the laden cannon answers not to the laws , but to the power of the person whose will created those laws : which if some of them , that the power of the person whose will created them , intended should be of as good stuff or carriage as the rest , do nevertheless according unto the nature of their matter or of their charge , come short or over , and others break or recoyl : sure this report of the prevaricator is not according unto the bore of my gun , but according unto the bore of such a gunner . yet again , if he be not so good a gunner , he will be a better anatomist ; for whereas i affirm , that to say , aristotle and cicero wrote not the rights or rules of their politicks , from the principles of nature , but transcribed them into their books out of the practice of their own commonwealths , is as if a man should say of famous ▪ hervey , that he transcribed his circulation of the bloud , not out of the principles of nature , but out of the anatomy of this or that body : he answers , that the whole force of this objection amounts but to this , that because hervey in his circulation , hath follow'd the principles of nature ; therefore aristotle and cicero have done so in their discourses of government . pretty ! it is said in scripture , thy word is sweet as honey ; amounts that but to this , because honey is sweet , therefore the word of god is sweet ? to say that my lord protector hath not conquer'd many nations , were as if one should say that caesar had not conquer'd many nations ; amounts that but to this , that because caesar conquer'd many nations ; therefore my lord protector hath conquer'd many nations ; what i produce as a similitude , he calls an objection , where i say as he says because ; what ingenuous man doth not detest such a cheat ! a similitude is brought to shew how a thing is or may be ; not to prove that it is so ; it is used for illustration , not as an argument ; the candle i held did not set up the post , but shew where the post was set , and yet this blind bayard hath run his head against it . nor hath he yet enough ; if he be not the better naturalist , he will be the better divine , though he make the worse sermon . my doctrine and use upon that of solomon , i have seen servants upon horses , and princes walking as servants upon the earth , discovers the true means whereby the principles of power and of authority , the goods of the mind and of the fortune may so meet and twine in the wreath or crown of empire , that the government standing upon earth , like an holy altar , and breathing perpetual incense unto heaven , in justice and piety , may be something as it were between heaven and earth , while that only which is proposed by the best , and resolved by the most becomes law ; and so the whole government an empire of laws , and not of men. this he says , is a goodly sermon ; it is honest and sense . but let any man make sense , or honesty of this doctrine , which is his own ; to say that laws doe or can govern is to amuse our selves with a form of speech , as when we say time , or age , or death does such a thing , to which indeed the phansie of poets or superstition of women may adapt a person , and give a power of action ; but wise men know they are onely expressions of such actions or qualifications as belong to things and persons . speak out , is it the word of god , or the knavery and nonsense of such preachers that ought to govern ? are we to hearken unto that of the talmud , there is more in the word of a scribe then in the words of the law , or that which christ thereupon saith unto the pharisees ; you have made the word of god of none effect by your traditions ? say , is a commonwealth to be govern'd in the word of a priest or a pharisee , or by the vote of the people , and the interest of mankind ? chap. iii. whether the ballance of dominion in land be the natural cause of empire . the doctrine of the ballance is that , though he strain at it , which choaks the prevaricator : for this of all other is that principle , which makes the politiques ( not so before the invention of the same ) to be undeniable throughout ; and ( not to meddle with the mathematicks an art i understand as little as mathematicians doe this ) the most demonstrable of any whatsoever . for this cause i shall rather take pleasure then pains to look back or tread the same path with other and perhaps plainer steps ; as thus ; if a man having one hundred pounds a year , may keep one servant , or have one man at his command , then having one hundred times so much , he may keep one hundred servants ; and this multiply'd by a thousand , he may have one hundred thousand men at his command . now that the single person , or nobility in any countrey of europe , that had but half so many men at command , would be king or prince , is that which i think no man will doubt . but ( point d'argent point de suisse ) if the money be flown , so are the men also . though riches in general have wings , and be apt to bate ; yet those in land are the most hooded and ty'd unto the pearch , whereas those in money have the least hold , and are the swiftest of flight . a bank where the money takes not wing , but to come home seased , or like a coy duck , may well be great ; but the treasure of the indies going out , and not upon returns makes no bank ; whence a bank never paid an army , or paying an army , soon became no bank. but where a prince or a nobility hath an estate in land , the revenue whereof will defray this charge ; there their men are planted , have toes that are roots , and armes that bring forth what fruit you please . thus a single person is made , or a nobility makes a king not with difficulty or any great prudence , but with ease , the rest comming home , as the oxe that not only knows his masters crib , but must starve or repair to it . nor for the same reason is government acquired with more ease then it is preserved ; that is , if the foundation of propriety be in land ; but if in money , lightly come , lightly go . the reason why a single person or the nobility that hath one hundred thousand men , or half so many at command , will have the government , is that the estate in land whereby they are able to maintain so many , in any europaean territory , must overballance the rest that remains unto the people , at least , three parts in four , by which means they are no more able to dispute the government with him or them , then your servant is with you . now for the same reason , if the people hold three parts in four of the territory , it is plain there can neither be any single person nor nobility able to dispute the government with them ; in this case therefore ( except force be interposed ) they govern themselves . so by this computation of the ballance of propriety or dominion in land , you have according unto the threefold foundation of propriety , the root or generation of the threefold kind of government or empire . if one man be sole landlord of a territory , or over-ballance the whole people , three parts in four , or thereabouts , he is grand seignior ; for so the turk not from his empire , but his propriety is called , and the empire in this case is absolute monarchy . if the few , or a nobility , or a nobility with a clergy be landlords unto such a proportion as over ballanceth the people in like manner ; they may make whom they please king , or if they be not pleased with their king , down with him , and set up whom they like better , an henry the fourth , or the seventh , a guise , a montforth , a nevil , or a porter , should they find that best for their own ends and purposes : for as not the ballance of the king , but that of the nobility in this case is the cause of the government , so not the estate or riches of the prince or captain , but his virtue or ability , or fitnesse for the ends of the nobility , acquires that command or office. this for aristocracy , or mixed monarchy . but if the whole people be landlords , or hold the land so divided among them , that no one man , or number of men within the compasse of the few or aristocracy overballance them , it is a common-wealth . such is the branch in the root , or the ballance of propriety naturally producing empire , which not confuted , no man shall be able to batter my superstructures , and which confuted , i lay down my armes . till then , if the cause necessarily praecede the effect , propriety must have a being before empire , or beginning with it , must be still first in order . propriety comes to have a being before empire or government two wayes , either by natural or violent revolution . natural revolution happeneth from within , or by commerce , as when a government erected upon one ●●●lance , that for example of a nobility or a clergy , through the decay of their estates comes to alter unto another ballance ; which alteration in the root of propriety leaves all unto confusion , or produceth a new branch or government according to the kind or nature of the roote . violent revolution happeneth from without , or by armes , as when upon conquest there followes confiscation . confiscation again is of three kindes , when the captain taking all unto himself , plants his army by way of military colonies , benefices , or timars , which was the policy of mahomet ; or when the captain hath some sharers , or a nobility that divides with him , which was the policy introduced by the goths and vandals ; or when the captain divides the inheritance by lots , or otherwise , unto the whole people ; which policy was instituted by god or moses in the commonwealth of israel . this triple distribution whether from natural or violent revolution , returns as to the generation of empire , unto the same thing that is unto the nature of the ballance already stated and demonstrated ; now let us see what the praevaricator will say , which first is this . the assertion that propriety producing empire consisteth only in land , appears too positive . a pig of my own sow ; this is no more then i told him , only there is more imply'd in what i told him , then he will see ; which therefore i shall now farther explain . the ballance in money may be as good or better then that of land in three cases . first , where there is no propriety of land yet introduced , as in greece during the time of her antient imbecility , whence ( as is noted by thucidides ) the meaner sort through desire of gain , underwent the servitude of the mighty . secondly , in cities of small territory and great trade , as holland and genoa , the land not being able to feed the people , who must live upon traffick , is overballanced by the means of that traffick ; which is money . thirdly , in a narrow countrey , where the lots are at a low scantling , as among the israelites , if care be not had of money in the regulation of the same , it will eat out the ballance of land. for which cause though an israelite might both have money , and put it forth unto usury ; ( faenerabis multis gentibus , thou shalt lend ( upon usury ) unto many nations ) yet might he not lend it upon usury unto a citizen or brother ( non faenerabis fratri tuo ) whence two things are manifest . first , that usury in it self is not unlawful . and next that usury in israel was no otherwise forbidden , then as it might come to overthrow the ballance or foundation of the government , for where a lot as to the general amounted not perhaps to four acres : a man that should have had a thousand pounds in his purse , would not have regarded such a lot in comparirison of his mony , & he that should have been half so much in debt , would have been quite eaten out . usury is of such a nature as not forbidden in like cases , must devour the government . the roman people while their territory was no bigger , and their lots ( which exceeded not two acres a man ) were yet scanter , were flead alive with it ; and if they had not helped themselves by their tumults and the institution of their tribunes , it had totally ruin'd both them and their government . in a commonwealth whose territory is very small , the ballance of the government being laid upon the land , as in lacedemon , it will not be sufficient to forbid usury ; but money it self must be forbidden ; whence lycurgns allow'd of none , or of such only as being of old , or otherwise useless iron , was little better , or ( if you will ) little worse than none . the prudence of which law appeared in the neglect of it , as when lysander general for the lacedemonians in the peloponesian war , having taken athens , and brought home the spoil of it , occasion'd the ruine of that commonwealth in her victory . the land of canaan compared with spain or england , was at the most but a yorkeshire , and laconia was lesse then canaan . now if we imagine yorkshire divided as was canaan , into six hundred thousand lots , or as was laconia into thirty thousand ; a yorkeshire man having one thousand pounds in his purse , would , i believe , have a better estate in money then in land ; wherefore in this case to make the land hold the ballance , there is no way but either that of israel , by forbidding usury , or that of lacedemon , by forbidding money . where a small summe may come to overballance a mans estate in land , there i say usury or money for the preservation of the ballance in land , must of necessity be forbidden , or the government will rather rest upon the ballance of money , then upon that of land , as in holland and genoa . but in a territory of such extent as spain , or england , the land being not to be overballanced by money , there needeth no forbidding of money or usury . in lacedemon merchandize was forbidden , in israel and rome it was not exercised ; wherefore unto these usury must have been the more destructive ; but in a countrey where merchandise is exercised , it is so far from being destructive , that it is necessary ; else that which might be of profit to the commonwealth would rust unprofitably in private purses , there being no man that will venture his money but through hope of some gain ; which if it be so regulated that the borrower may gain more by it then the lender ( as at four in the hundred , or thereabouts ) usury becomes a mighty profit unto the publique , and charity unto private men ; in which sense we may not be perswaded by them that do not observe the different causes that it is against scripture . had usury to a brother been permitted in israel that government had been overthrown : but that such a territory as england or spain cannot be overballanced by money , whether it be a scarce or a plentiful commodity , whether it be accumulated by parsimony , as in the purse of henry the th , or presented by fortune , as in the revenue of the indies , is sufficiently demonstrated , or shall be . first , by an argument ( ad hominem one ) good enough for the praevaricator , who argues thus ; the wisedom or the riches of another man can never give him a title to my obedience , nor oblige mr. harrington to give his cloaths or money to the next man he meets , wiser or richer then himself . if he had said stronger , he had spoiled all ; for the parting with a mans cloaths or money in that case cannot be helped ; now the richer as to the case in debate , is the stronger ; that is , the advantage of strength remains unto the ballance . but well ; he presumes me to have cloaths and money of mine own , let him put the same case in the people or the similitude doth not hold : but if the people have cloaths and money of their own , these must either rise ( for the bulk ) out of propriety in land , or at the least out of cultivation of the land , or the revenue of industry , which if it be dependent , they must give such part of their cloaths and money to preserve that dependence out of which the rest ariseth , to him or them upon whom they depend , as he or they shall think fit , or parting with nothing unto this end must lose all ; that is , if they be tenants , they must pay their rent or be turned out . so if they have clothes and money dependently , the ballance of land is in the landlord or landlords of the people : but if they have cloaths and money independently , then the ballance of land must of necessity be in the people themselves , in which case they neither would if there were any such , nor can because there be none such , give their money or cloaths to such as are wiser , or richer , or stronger then themselves . so it is not a mans cloaths and money , or riches , that obligeth him to acknowledge the title of his obedience unto him that is wiser or richer , but a mans no cloaths , nor money , or his poverty , with which if the praevaricator should come to want , he could not so finely praevaricate but he must serve somebody , so he were rich , no matter if less wise then himself ; wherefore seeing the people cannot be said to have cloaths and money of their own without the ballance in land , and having the ballance in land , will never give their cloaths , or money , or obedience unto a single person or a nobility , though these should be the richer in money , the praevaricator by his own argument hath evinced that in such a territory as england or spain , money can never come to overballance land. for a second demonstration of this truth , henry the seventh ( albeit he mist of the indies , in which for my part i think he hit ) was the richest in money of english princes . neverthelesse this accession of revenue did not at all praeponderate on the kings part , nor change the ballance . but while making farmes of a standard , he encreased the yeomanry ; and cutting off retainers , he abased the nobility , began that breach in the ballance of land , which proceeding hath ruin'd the nobility , and in them that government . for a third , the monarchy of spain , since the silver of potosi sailed up the guadalquivir , which in english is , since that king had the indies , stands upon the same ballance in the lands of the nobility on which it always stood . and so the learned conclusion of the praevaricator , that it is not to be doubted but a revenue sufficient to maintain a force , able ( to cry ware hornes ) or beat down all opposition , does equally conduce to empire , whether it arise from rents , lands , profits of ready money , duties , customs . &c. asks you no more then where you saw her premisses : for unless they ascended his monti , and his banks , it is not to be imagined which way they went , and with these because he is a profest zealot for monarchy ; i would wish him by no means to be montebanking or medling ; for the purse of a prince never yet made a bank ; nor till spending and trading money be all one , ever shall . the genoese ( which the king of spain could never doe with the indies ) can make you a bank out of letters of exchange , and the hollander with herrings . let him come no more here ; where there is a bank , ten to one , there is a commonwealth . a king is a souldier , or a lover ; neither of which makes a good merchant ; and without merchandize , you will have a lean bank . it is true , the family of the medice's were both merchants , and made a bank into a throne : but it was in a commonwealth of merchants , in a small territory , by great purchases in land , and rather in a meer confusion then under any settled government ; which causes if he can give them all such another meeting , may do as much for another man ; otherwise let it be agreed and resolved , that in a territory of any extent , the ballance of empire consists in land and not in money , always provided that in case a prince have occasion to run away ( as henry the third of france out of poland ) his ballance in ready money is absolutely the most proper for the carrying on of so great , and suddain an enterprize . it is an excellent way of disputing , when a man hath alledged no experience , no example , no reason to conclude with no doubt . certainly upon such occasions it is not unlawful nor unreasonable to be merry . reasons ( says one commedian ) are not so common as blackberrys . for all that ( saith another commedian ) no doubt but a revenue in taxes is as good as a revenue in fee-simple , for this , in brief , is the sense of his former particular , or that part of it , which the monti and the banks being already discharged , remains to be answer'd . yet that the rents and profits of a mans land in fee-simple or propriety , come in naturally and easily , by common consent or concernment ; that is , by virtue of the law founded upon the publick interest , and therefore voluntarily established by the whole people , is an apparent thing . so a man that will receive the rents and profits of other mens lands , must either take them by meer force , or bring the people to make a law devesting themselves of so much of their propriety ; which upon the matter is all one , because a people possest of the ballance , can no otherwise be brought to make such a law farther then they see necessary for their common defense , but by force , nor to keep it any longer then that force continues . it is true , there is not only such a thing in nature as health , but as sickness : nor do i deny that there is such a thing as a government against the ballance . but look about , seek , find where it stood , how it was ycleeped , how liked , or how long it lasted . otherwise the comical proposition comes to this , it is not to be doubted but that violence may be permanent or durable , and the blackberry for it is because nature is permanent or durable ! what other construction can be made of these words ? it is not to be doubted but a revenue sufficient to maintain a force able to beat down all opposition ( that is a force able to raise such a revenue ) doth equally ( on which word grows the blackberry ) conduce to empire : that is as much as could any natural ballance of the same ! he may stain mouths , as he hath done some , but he shall never make a politician . the earth yieldeth her natural increase without losing her heart ; but if you come once to force her , look your force continue , or she yields you nothing : and the ballance of empire consisting of earth , is of the nature of her element . divines are given to speak much of things which the considerer baulks in this place that would check them , to the end he may fly out with them in others , whereunto they do not belong , as where he saith , that government is founded either upon paternity , and the natural advantage the first father had over all the rest of mankind , who were his sons , or else from the increase of strength and power in some man or men , to whose will the rest submit , that by their submission they may avoid such mischief , as otherwise would be brought upon them . which two vagaries are to be fetched home unto this place . for the former ; if adam had lived till now , he could have seen no other then his own children , and so that he must have been king by the right of nature , was his peculiar prerogative . but whether the eldest son of his house , if the praevaricator can find him , at this time of the day . have the same right , is somewhat disputable ; because it was early when abraham and lot dividing territories , became several kings : and not long after when the sons of jacob being all patriarchs , by the appointment of god ( whose right sure was not inferiour unto that of adam though he had lived ) came under popular government . wherefore the advantage of the first father is for grave men a pleasant phancy , neverthelesse if he had lived till now , i hope they understand that the whole earth would have been his demeans , and so the ballance of his propriety must have answered unto his empire : as did that also of abraham and lot unto theirs . wherefore this way of deduction comes directly home again unto the ballance . ( pater familias latifundia possidens , & neminem aliâ lege in suas terras recipiens quam ut ditioni suae , qui recipiuntur , se subjiciant est rex ) fathers of families are of three sorts , either a sole landlord , as adam , and then he is an absolute monarch ; or a few landlords as lot and abraham with the patriarchs of those days , who if they joyned not together , were so many princes , or if they joyned , made a mixed monarchy , or as grotius believes a kind of commonwealth administred in the land of canaan by melchisedec , unto whom as king and priest abraham paid tithes of all that he had . such a magistracy was that also of jethro king and priest in the commonwealth of midian . fathers of families for the third sort , as when the multitude are landlords ( which hapned in the division of the land of canaan ) make a commonwealth ; and thus much how ever it was out of the praevaricators head in the place now reduced , he excepting no farther against the ballance , then that it might consist as well in money , as in land , had confessed before . his second vagary is in his deduction of empire from increase of strength , for which we must once more round about our coal fire . the strength wherof this effect can be expected , consists not in a pair of fists , but in an army , and an army is a beast with a great belly , which subsisteth not without very large pastures ; so if one man have sufficient pasture , he may feed such a beast , if a few have the pasture they must feed the beast , and the beast is theirs that feed it . but if the people be the sheep of their own pastures , they are not onely a flock of sheep , but an army of lyons , though by some accidents , as i confessed before , they be for a season confinable unto their dens . so the advantage or increase of strength depends also upon the ballance . there is nothing in the world to swear this principle out of countenance , but the fame of phalaris , gelon , dionysius , agathocles , nabis , &c. with which much good do them that like it . it is proper unto a government upon the ballance to take root at home and spread outwards ; and to a government against the ballance to seek a root abroad , and to spread inwards ; the former is sure , but the later never successeful . agathocles for having conquer'd affrica , took not the better root in syracusa . ( parvi sunt arma for as nisi sit consilium domi . ) to conclude this chapter , the praevaricator gives me this thank for finding out the ballance of dominion ( being as antient in nature as her self , and yet as new in art as my writings ) that i have given the world cause to complain of a great disappointment , who while at my hand that satisfaction in the principles of government was expected , which several great wits had in vain studied , have in diversifying riches in words only as propriety , dominion , agrarian , ballance , made up no more then a new lexicon expressing the same thing that was known before , seeing the opinion that riches are power is ( as antient as the first book of thucydides or the politicks of aristotle , and ) not omitted by m. hobbs , or any other politician . which is as if he had told dr. harvey , that whereas the blood is the life , was an opinion as antient as moses , and no girl ever prickt her finger , but knew it must have a course ; he had given the world cause to complain of a great disappointment in not shewing a man to be made of gingerbread , and his veins to run malmesey . chap. iiii. whether the ballance of empire be well divided into national and provincial ; and whether these two , or nations that are of distinct ballance , comming to depend upon one and the same head , such a mixture create a new ballance ? the ballance of empire that is national as it is stated in the former chapter , stands in regulated or mixed monarchy upon the propriety or native interest of the nobility , in a commonwealth , upon the propriety or native interest of the people ; so these are very natural . but the ballance of absolute monarchy partaking of force , as well as nature , is a mixed thing and not much different from the ballance of provincial empire , or the manner of holding a province or conquer'd countrey . in a province , if the native that is rich be admitted unto power , the power grows up native , and overtops the forreign ; therefore you must either ▪ not plant your citizens in your provinces , where in time they will become native , or so planting them neither trust them with power nor with armes . thus the provincial ballance comes to be contrary to the national . and as where empire is native or national the administration of it can be no otherwise then according to the national ballance ; so where empire is forreign or provincial the administration of it can be no otherwise then contrary unto the national ballance . that this may be admitted without opposition , the considerer is inclining to allow , always provided that he be satisfied in this demand , whether distinct ballances under the same head or governour , as those of castile and aragon , the power of the king ( i presume he means by the ballance of a nobility ) being greater in the one , and that of the people in the other , may not so poise one the other , as to produce a new ballance . to which i answer , that no one government whatsoever hath any more then one of two ballances ; that ( except in the cases excepted ) of land which is national , or that of armes which is provincial . wherefore if the king of spain by his war against the commons alter'd the ballance of aragon , it must have been one of two ways , either by strengthning the ballance of the nobility , and governing the aragonian people by them , in which case their ballance though alter'd , remained yet national ; or by holding both nobility and people by a provincial governour and an army , in which case his empire in that kingdome is provincial . there is no third way , nor putting the case that the ballance of castile be national , and that of aragon provincial ; doth this any more create in the monarchy of spain a third ballance of empire , then did the multiplication of associations and provinces diverse for their ballances in the commonwealth of rome . england and scotland being united in one prince , made ( if it had been rightly used ) an increase of strength , but not a third ballance ; nor do the kingdoms in spain . whether a soveraignty have many territories and provinces in subjection , or in league , it is all one as to this point ; the stronger union or league will give the stronger ballance , and the case of the present soveraignties in europe being no other ; the more nice then wise speculation of the considerer , who hath not been able to discern the ballance of a league from that of empire , is a mares nest . chap. v. whether there be any common right or interest of mankind distinct from the parts taken severally ; and how by the orders of a commonwealth it may best be distinguisht from private interest . in the next place the prevaricator does not go about to play the man , but the unlucky boy . where i say that the soul of man is mistress of two potent rivals , reason and passion ; he doth not stand to weigh the truth of the thing , or the fitness of the comparison , either of which had been fair ; but tumbles dick upon sis , the logick upon the rhetorick , the sense upon the figure , and scuds away in this manner . if i could be perswaded mr. harrington were so far in earnest , as to expect any man should be convinced by the metaphorical use of two or three words some farther consideration might be proposed . this is to use his readers , as the fox doth the dogs , when having pissed upon his tail , and flapped it in their eyes , he gets away . doth not his book deserve to be guilded and carry'd in statesmens pockets ? alasse , mine are nothing ( quis leget haec ? vel duo vel nemo ) they break the stationer . and yet let me comfort my self , whose are better ? the prevaricator seems to set every whit as light by those of hooker and grotius , at least where they favour me . the opinions of grotius ( saies he ) cannot oblige us beyond the reasons whereon they are founded ; and what are those ? he will dispute against that which he dares not repeat : that his comment may take you by the nose he hath left out the text. the words of grotius are of this sense . though it be truly said that the creatures are naturally carried forth , unto their proper utility : this ought not to be taken in too general a sense , seeing diverse of them abstain from their own profit , either in regard of those of the same kind , or at least of their young . which words , saith the prevaricator , carry a great restriction in them , and the way of producing actions in beasts is so different from the emanation of humane reason ( mark the impostor ! the author is speaking of natural affection , and he wipes out that , and puts in humane reason ) that the inferences from ( the natural affection of ) the one , to the ( degree of reason which is in the ) other , must needs be very weak . excellent ! doth it therefore follow that the eminent degree of reason , wherewith all god hath endued man , must in him deface that natural affection , and desertion in some cases of private for common good , which is apparent even in beasts ? what do reverend divines mean to cry up this infidel ? nay , is not he worse then an infidel that provideth not for his own family ? a commonwealth is but a great family ; and a family is a little commonwealth . even beasts in sparing out of their own mouths , and exposing themselves unto danger for their young , provide for their families ; and in providing for their families , provide for their whole commonwealth ; that is , forsake in some things their private good and safety , for the good of the publick or of the kind . in this case it is that even stones or heavy things ( saies hooker ) forsake their ordinary wont or center and fly upwards , to relieve the distress of nature in common . wretch that he is , shall a stone upon this occasion fly upwards , and will he have a man to go downwards ! yes , mr. hooker ' s expression ( saith he ) is altogether figurative , and it is easier to prove from thence that things wanting sense make discourses , and act by election , then that there is such a thing as a common interest of mankind . this is like the rest , hooker speaketh of the necessity that is in nature , and this gentleman translateth that sense into the word election . so because a stone is necessitated to comply with the common interest of nature , without discourse or election ; therefore it rather follows from hence that things wanting sense make discourses and act by election then that there is such a thing as a common interest of mankind . his old trick . i do not say that because it is so with the creatures , therefore it must be so with man : but as we see it is with the creatures in this part , so we find it to be with man. and that so , and more then so , we find it to be with man ( who though he le evil gives good things unto his children , will work hard , lay up , deny himself , venture his life for his little commonwealth ) is thus farther demonstrated . all civil laws acknowledge that there is a common interest of mankind , and all civil laws proceed from the nature of man ; therefore it is in the nature of man to acknowledge that there is a common interest of mankind . upon this acknowledgement of mankind , a man that steals is put to death , which certainly is none of his private interest ; nor is a man put to death for any other mans private interest ; therefore there is a common interest of mankind distinct from the parts taken severally . but this though acknowledged in part by all governments , yet through their natural frailty is nothing so well provided for in some as in others : for if the power be in one or a few men ; one or a few men ( we know ) may be thieves , and the rather because applying money that is publick , without a consideration that is publick , unto uses that are private , is thieving . but such thieves will not be hanged ; in this case therefore the government goeth not upon publick but private interest . in the frame of such a government as can go upon no other then the publick interest , consisteth that whole philosophy of the soul which concerneth policy : and this whole philosophy of the soul being throughout the commonwealth of oceana demonstrated ; for the prevaricator to insinuate that i have omitted it , is to shew what it is that he loveth more then truth . the main of this philosophy consisteth in deposing passion and advancing reason unto the throne of empire . i expected news in this place , that this were to promise more for the magistrate or the people , then hath been performed by stoicks , but two girles ( meaning no body any harm ) have provoked his wrath ( forsooth ) to such extravagancy by the way , that though in all modesty it were forbidden ( as he confesseth ) by their cheeks , which discovering the green sickness , shew'd that they were past the rod , he hath taken them up ! ( tantaene animis coelestibus ire ! ) what he may have in school divinity for so rude a charge , i do not know ; but he shall never be able to shew any maxime for this kind of discipline or philosophy of the soul either in chevalry or the politicks . the offence of the girles was no more , then that having a cake ( by gift of an uucle or an aunt , or by purchase , or such an one perhaps as was of their own making ) in common , or between them , the one had most accurately divided , and the other was about to choose ; when in comes me this rude fellow . how now gentlewomen , saies he , what dividing and choosing ! will no less serve your turn then the whole mystery of a well order'd commonwealth ? who has taught you to cast away passion ( an 't please you ) like the bran , and work up reason as pure as the flower of your cake ? are you acquainted with the author of oceana , that hath seen forraign countries , conversed with the speculativi , learnt of the most serene lady venetia to work with bobbins , makes you a magistracy like a pippin pye , and sells butterprints with s. p. q. r. ? have done as you dread ballads , fusty pamphlets , or the ostracisme of billingsgate . have done i say ; will you vy that green in your cheeks with the purple of the state ? must your mother , who was never there her self , seek you in the oven ? come , when i live to see machiavil in puff-paste , a commonwealth come out of a bakehouse , where smocks were the boulters , let me be a millhorse . — but now you must know comes the best jest of all , and i need not say that it comes from oxford ; he tells them that their cake is dough , ( let it not be lost i beseech you ) and so snatching it away , eats it ▪ for all the world as jack pudding eats the custard . did you ever see such a bestia ? but whereas either office , that of dividing or choosing , was communicable unto either of the girles , it is not indifferent in the distribution of a commonwealth , because dividing is separating one thing , one reason , one interest , or consideration from another , which they that can so discern in private affairs are called discreet , but they that can doe it in publick are prudent , and the way of this kind of dividing in the language of a commonwealth , is debating . but they that are capable of this kind of dividing or debating are few among many , that when things are thus divided and debated , are able enough to choose , which in the language of a commonwealth is to resolve . hence it is that the debate of the few because there be but few that can debate , is the wisest debate , and the result of the many ( because every man hath an interest what to choose , and that choice which suteth with every mans interest , excludeth the distinct or private interest or passion of any man , and so commeth up unto the common and publick interest or reason ) is the wisest result . unto this end , god who doth nothing in vain , hath so divided mankind into the few , or the natural aristrocacy , and the many , or the natural democracy , that there can hardly be upon any occasion , a meeting of twenty men , wherein it will not be apparant ; or in which you may not see all those lines which are requisite unto the face of a beautiful common-wealth . for example among any twenty men , occasionally met , there will be some few ( perhaps six ) excelling the fourteen in greatness of parts . these six falling into discourse of business , or giving their judgement upon persons , or things , though but by way of meer conversation , will discover their abilities ; whereupon they shall be listned unto and regarded by the fourteen ; that is , the six will acquire an authority with , and imprint a reverence upon the fourteen , which action and passion in the roman commonwealth were called authoritas patrum , & verecundia plebis ; nevertheless if the six endeavour to extend the authority which they find thus acquired to power , that is , to bring the fourteen to terms or conditions of obedience , or such as would be advantageous unto the few , but prejudicial to the many ; the fourteen will soon find that consenting they hurt not only themselves by endammaging their own interests , but hurt the six also who by this means come to lose their virtue , and so spoil their debate , which while such advantages are procurable unto themselves , will go no farther upon the common good , but their private benefit . wherefore in this case they will not consent , and not consenting they preserve not onely their own liberty but the integrity of the six also , who perceiving that they cannot impair the common interest have no other interest left but to improve it ; and neither any conversation nor any people , how dull soever and subject by fits to be deluded , but will soon see thus much , which is enough , because what is thus proposed by the authority of the six or of the senate , and resolv'd by the fourteen or by the people , is enacted by the whole , and becomes that law , then which ( though mankind be not infallible ) there can be nothing less fallible in mankind . art is the imitation of nature , by observation of such lines as these in the face of nature , a politician limbs his commonwealth . but saith the praevaricator , the parologisme lies in this , that the twenty men are first supposed to be a commonwealth , and then it is considered how they would dispose of the government : what is this ? art is the imitation of nature ; therefore art presumes nature to be art. a picture is the representation of a face ; therefore the picture-drawer presumed the face to be a picture ; and in this same , there is lying , being or squatting , a thing called a parologisme . did you ever hear such a parakeetisme ; for to speak a word without understanding , the sense of it is like a parrat . and yet i wrong the parrat in this comparison ; for she though she do not understand her self , is understood by others , whereas neither can this prevaricator tell what he means , nor any man else ; or riddle me , riddle me what is this ? the sense of want among men that are in equality of power may beget a desire of exchange , as let me have your horse , and you shall have my cow , which is the fountain of private contracts ; but it is not to be with reason imagined , that this should be enough to make a man part with a natural freedome , and put himself into the hands of a power from which he can afterward have no shield , though it should be used to his own destruction . most victorious nonsense ! for he that saies nothing , cannot be answered . it should seem if the twenty men were indeed a commonwealth , or in equality of power , ( for so he puts the case ) they might truck horses and cows , but not by any means consider or once let it enter into their heads , how by art to make good their natural freedome : that ( unlesse they set up a prince , as you shall see anon ) were to part with their natural freedome , and put themselves into the hands of a power from which ( there being no other power but themselves ) they can afterwards have no shield . to read it throughly for the understanding , as is intimated in his epistle , will be more ( i doubt ) then his book will obtain of any reader . yet is he , in his own conceit , as sure footed as any mule , & knowes the road . but mr. harrington hath not lost his way without company , ( his brother ) grotius complains , that they who treat of jus gentium do commonly mistake some part of the roman jus civile for it ▪ & even so he laments ( an 't please you ) that while men professe to consider the principles of government they fall upon notions which are the meer effects of government . but as an ape is the more ugly for being like a man ; so this praevaricator for making faces like grotius . i , who am complained of , deriving government from the true principle of the same , in the ballance or foundation , set the superstructures accordingly , and he who complains ( forsooth ) never so much as proposeth any thing like a principle or superstructure , but runs altogether upon meer notions ; as where he asks me , what security will you give , that the six in their consultations shall not rather aim at their own advantage then that of the fourteen , and so make use of the eminence of their parts to circumvent the rest ? in another place he can answer himself and say , that the fourteen or the people in this constitution have the vote and the sword too . how then should the six circumvent them ? what security hath a prince that his people will not pull him out of his throne ? why a nobility or an army ; and are not the people in a commonwealth their own army ? is this to mind principles ! on the other side , how ( says he ) shall we be satisfied that the fourteen will not soon begin to think themselves wise enough to consult too , and making use of their excesse in power pull the six off their cushions ? as if there were any experience publick or private , any sense , or reason , that men having the whole power in their own hands , would deprive themselves of counsellours , or that ever a commonwealth deposed the senate , or can depose the senate , and remain a commonwealth . the people of capua being enraged to the full height , resolved and assembled together , ( the senate , if the people will , being always in their power , ) on purpose to cut the throats of the senators , when pacuvius calavius exhorted them that ere they went upon the design , they would first make election among themselves of a new senate , which ( the throats of the old being cut ) might for the safety of the commonwealth immediately take their places ; for said he , ( senatum omnino non habere non vultis . quippe aut rex , quod abominandum , aut quod unum liberae civitatis concilium est , senatus habendus est ) you must either have a king , which i do not finde by you that you intend , or what ever become of this , you must have some other senate ; for the senate is a council of such nature ▪ as without it , no free city can subsist . by which speech of pacuvius , the people ( who thought themselves as the considerer hath it , wise enough to consult , ) being convinced , fell to work for the election of a succeeding senate out of themselves ( the praevaricator should not tell me of notions , but learn that in a commonwealth , there must be a senate is a principle ) while the people of cupua were intent upon choosing this new senate , the parties proposed seemed unto them to be so ridiculously unfit for such an office , that by this means comming to a neerer sight of themselves , they were secretly so filled with the shame of their enterprize , that slinking away they would never after be known so much as to have thought upon such a thing . nor ever went any other people so far , not the florentines themselves though addicted to innovation or changing of the senate beyond all other examples . sons of the university , brothers of the colledge : heads and points ; you love fine words ; whether tendeth to bring all things into servitude , my hypothesis , or his * hypothytes ? for saith he , i am willing to gratifie mr harrington with his partition of the twenty men into six and fourteen ; but if i had been in an humour of contradiction , it had been as free for me to have said that some one of the twenty would have excell'd all the rest in judgment , experience , courage , and height of genius , and then told him , that this had been a natural monarchy established by god himself over mankind . as if the twenty would give their cloaths or money to the next man they meet wiser or richer then themselves , which before he denied ( oportet esse memorem ) god established kings no otherwise then by election of the people ; and the twenty will neither give their cloaths nor money , how then ? why in comes a gallant with a file of musqueteers , what saies he , are you dividing and choosing here ? go to , i will have no dividing , give me all . down go the pots , and up go their heels : what is this ? why a king ! what more ? by divine right ! as he took the cake from the girles ! chap. vi. whether the senatusconsulta or decrees of the roman senate had the power of laws ? among diverse and weighty reasons why i would have that prince look well to his file of musqueteers , this is no small one , that he being upon no ballance will never be able to give law without them . for to think that he succeeds unto the senate , or that the power of the senate may serve his turn , is a presumption will fail him . the senate , as such , hath no power at all , but meer authority of proposing unto the people , who are the makers of their own laws , whence the decrees of the senate of rome are never laws nor so called , but senatusconsulta . it is true that a king comming in , the senate as there it did , to his aid and advantage may remain , so they propose not as formerly unto the people , but now unto him who comes not in upon the right of the senate , but upon that of the people ( whence saith justinian . quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem , quum lege regia quae de ejus imperio lata est , populus ei , & in eum omnes imperium suum & potestatem concedat ) thus the senatusconsultum , macedonicum , with the rest that had place allowed by justinian in the compilement of the roman laws , were not laws in that they were senatusconsulta , or proposed by the senate , but in that they were allowed by justiman or the prince , in whom was now the right of the people . wherefore the zelot for monarchy hath made a ( pas de clerc or ) foul step in his procession where he argues thus out of cujacius . it was soon agreed that the distinct decrees of the senate and people should be extended to the nature of laws ; therefore the distinct decrees of the senate are laws whether it be so a greed by the people , or by the prince , or no. for thus he hath no sooner made his prince , then he kicks him heels over head ; seeing where the decrees of the senate are laws without the king , that same is as much a king , as the praevaricator a politician . a law is that which was passed by the power of the people , or of the king. but out of the light ; in this place he takes a welsh bait , and looking back makes a muster of his victories like the busling guascon , who to shew what he had thrown out of the windows in his debauchery , made a formal repetition of the whole inventary of the house . chap. vii . whether the ten commandements were proposed by god or moses , and voted by the people of israel . one would think the guascon had done well , is he satisfied ? no , he will now throw the house out of the windows . the principal stones being already taken from the foundation , he hath a bag of certain windes wherewithall to reverse the super structures . the first wind he lets go is but a puff , where he tells me that i bring switz and holland into the enumeration of the heathen commonwealths , which if i had done , their liberties in many parts and places being more antient then the christian religion in those countries ( as is plain by tacitus where he speaks of civilis and of the customs of the germans ) i had neither wronged them nor my self : but i doe no such matter , for having enumerated the heathen commonwealths , i add that the proceedings of holland and switz ( though after a more obscure manner ) are of the like nature . the next is a storm , while reproaching me of rudeness , he brings in doctor ferne and the clergy by the head and the shoulders , who till they undertake the quarrel of monarchy , to the confusion of the common-wealth of israel , at least so far forth that there be no weight or obligation in such an example , are posted . as if for a christian commonwealth to make so much use of israel , as the roman did of athens , whose laws she transcribed , were against the interest of the clergy , which it seems , is so hostile unto popular power , that to say the laws of nature though they be the fountains of all civil law , are not the civil law , till they be the civil law ; or thus , that thou shalt not kill , thou shalt not steal ; though they be in natural equity , yet were not the laws of israel or of england , till voted by the people of israel , or the parliament of england , is to assert the people into the mighty liberty of being free from the whole moral law ; and inasmuch as to be the adviser or perswader of a thing is lesse then to be the author or commander of it ; to put an indignity upon god himself . in which fopperies , the praevaricator , boasting of principles , but minding none ; first confounds authority , and command , or power : and nextforgets that the dignity of the legislator , or ( which is all one , ) of the senate succeeding unto his office , as the sanhedrim unto moses , is the greatest dignity in a common-wealth ; and yet that the laws or orders of a common-wealth derive no otherwise , whether from the legislator ( as moses , lycurgus , solon , &c. ) or the senate ( as those of israel , lacedemon , or athens ) then from their authority received and confirmed by the vote or command of the people . it is true , that with almighty god it is otherwise then with a mortal legislator , but through another nature which unto him is peculiar , from whom as he is the cause of being , or the creator of mankind , omnipotent power is inseparable ; yet so equal is the goodnesse of this nature unto the greatnesse thereof , that as he is the cause of welbeing by way of election for example in his chosen people israel , or of redemption , as in the christian church , himself hath prefer'd before his empire , his authority or proposition . what else is the meaning of these words , or of this proceeding of his ? now therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed , and keep my covenant , ye shall be unto me a kingdom , or i will be your king ; which proposition being voted by the people in the affirmative , god proceeds to propose unto them the ten commandements in so dreadful a manner , that the people being exceedingly affrighted , say unto moses , speak thou with us , and we will hear thee ; that is , be thou henceforth our legislator or proposer , and we will resolve accordingly ; but let not god speak with us , lest we die . from whenceforth god proposeth unto the people no otherwise then by moses , whom he instructeth in this manner , these are the judgements which thou shalt propose or set before them . wherefore it is said of the book of deuteronomy containing the covenant which the lord commanded moses to make with the children of israel in the land of moab , beside the covenant which he made with them in horeb ( haec est lex quam moses proposuit ) this is the law which moses set before the children of israel . neither did god in this case make use of his omnipotent power , nor christ in the like , who also is king after the same manner in his church , and would have been in israel , where when to this end he might have muster'd up legions of angels , & been victorious with such armies , or argyraspides , as never prince could shew the like , saies no more then o jerusalem , jerusalem , how often would i have gathered thee and thy children , as an hen gathereth her chickens under her wings , and ye would not ? where it is plain that the jews rejecting christ that he should not reign over them , the law of the gospel came not to be the law of the jews ; and so if the ten commandements came to be the law of israel , it was not onely because god proposed them , seeing christ also proposed his law , which neverthelese came not to be the law of the jews , but because the people received the one , and rejected the other . it is not in the nature of religion , that it should be thought a profane saying , that if the bible be in england , or in any other government , the law or religion of the land , it is not onely because god hath proposed it , but also because the people or magistrate hath received it , or resolved upon it ; otherwise we must set lighter by a nation or government , then by a private person who can have no part nor portion in this law , unless he vote it unto himself , in his own conscience , without which , he remains in the condition he was before , and as the heathen who are a law unto themselves . thus whereas in a covenant there must be two parties , the old and new testament being in summe the old and new covenant , these are that authority and proposition of god and christ , to which they that refuse their vote or result may be under the empire of a clergy , but are none of his commonwealth . nor seeing i am gone so far , doth this at all imply free-will , but ( as is admirably observ'd by mr. hobbs ) the freedome of that which naturally precedes will , namely , deliberation or debate , in which as the scale by the weight of reason or passion comes to be turned one way or other , the will is caused , and being caused , necessitated . when god commeth thus in upon the soul of man , he gives both the will and the deed ; from which like office of the senate in a commonwealth that is from the excellency of their deliberation and debate which prudently and faithfully unfolded unto the people , doth also frequently cause and necessitate both the will and the deed , god himself hath said of the senate , that they are gods : an expression though divine yet not unknown to the heathens ( homo homini deus ) one man for the excellency of his aid , may be a god unto another ; but let the praevaricator look to it ; for he that leadeth the blind out of his way , is his divel . for the things i have of this kind , as also for what i have said upon the words chirotonia and ecclesia , the praevaricator is delighted to make me beholding underhand unto mr. hobbs , notwithstanding the open enmity which he saith i profess to his politicks . as if josephus upon that of samuel they have not rejected thee , but they have rejected me that i should not reign over them , had not said of the people 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that they unchirotonized or unvoted god of the kingdome . now if they unchirotonized or unvoted god of the kingdome , then they had chirotonized or voted him to the kingdome , and so not only the doctrine that god was king in israel by compact or covenant , but the use of the word chirotonia also in the sense i understand it , is more antient then mr. hobbs . i might add that of capellus ( deus populi judaici rex erat veluti politicus , & civilis legislator ) god was as political king and civil legislator of the jews . and for the use i have made of the word ecclesia , as no man can read such as have written of the grecian commonwealths , and misse it , so i do not remember that mr. hobbs hath spoken of it : to these things fuller satisfaction will be given in the second book which nevertheless i do not speak to the end i might wave obligation to so excellent an author in his way . it is true , i have opposed the politicks of mr. hobbs to shew him what he taught me , with as much disdain as he opposed those of the greatest authors , in whose wholesome fame and doctrine the good of mankind being concern'd ; my conscience bears me witnesse , that i have done my duty : nevertheless in most other things i firmly believe that mr. hobbs is , and will in future ages be accounted the best writer , at this day , in the world : and for his treatises of humane nature , and of liberty and necessity , they are the greatest of new lights , and those which i have followed and shall follow . chap. viii . whether a commonwealth comming up to the perfection of the kind , come not up unto the perfection of government , and have no flaw in it . what a comonwealth comming up to the perfection of the kind is , i have shewn both by the definition of an equal commonwealth , and the exemplification in all the parts . the definition is contained in the first of my preliminaries , which because it is short i shall repeat . an equall commonwealth is a government established upon an equall agrarian arising into the super structures or three orders , the senate debating and proposing , the people resolving , and the magistracy executing , by an equall rotation , or interchangeable election , through the suffrage of the people given by the ballot the exemplification is the whole commonwealth of oceana . each of which by him , who , if his doctrine of pure and absolute monarchy be observ'd can be no english man , is called an irish bog ; as in some sense it is , seeing the praevaricator hath set never a foot in it , that will stand , nor hath more to say , then that where there is one ambitious poor man , or one vicious rich man , it is impossible there should be any such government as can be secure from sedition . which first is rather to make all governments alike , then to object against any , seeing that there should not be one ambitious poor man , or one vicious rich man , is equally if not more improbable in a monarchy then in a commonwealth . secondly , that one man alone , whether he be rich or poor should without a party be able to disturbe a commonwealth with sedition , is an absurdity ; nor is such a party as may be able in some sort to disturbe the peace by robbing upon the high-way , or some such disorder always able to disturbe a government with sedition : wherefore this feat goes not so much upon the ability of any one man rich or poor , as the puissance of the party he is able to make , and this puissance of the party goes upon the nature of the government and the content or discontents thence deriving to the few , or the many . the discontents whether of the few or the many derive from that which is , or by them is thought to be some bar unto their interest , and those interests which are the causes of sedition are three ; the desire of liberty , the desire of power , and the desire of riches , nor be there any more ▪ for where the people through the want of bread , through violence offer'd unto their women , or oppression , rise up against their governours , it relates unto the desire of liberty , those also under the name of religion make not a fourth but come unto one of the three . now to speak in the first place of the many , and anon of the few , the people in an equal commonwealth , have none of these three interests . not the desire of liberty , because the whole frame of an equal commonwealth is nothing else but such a method whereby the liberty of the people is secured unto them . not of power , because the power which otherwise they could not exercise , is thus estated in them . nor of riches , because where the rich are so bounded by an agrarian that they cannot overballence ; and therefore neither oppresse the people nor exclude their industry or merit from attaining to the like estate , power , or honour , the whole people have the whole riches of the nation already equally divided among them , for that the riches of a commonwealth should not go according unto the difference of mens industry , but be distributed by the pole were unequal ; wherefore the people in an equal commonwealth having none of those interests which are the causes of sedition , can be subject unto no such effect . to affirm then with the considerer , that the whole of this libration , is reduced to the want of power to disturbe the commonwealth , must needs be mistaken , seeing in the commonwealth proposed the people have the power , but can have no such interest , and the people having no such interest , no party can have any such power , it being impossible that a party should come to overballance the people , having their arms in their own hands . the whole matter being thus reduced unto the want of power to disturbe the government ; this according to his own argument will appear to be the libration in which the power whereof the governour is possessed so vastly exceeds the power remaining with those , who are to obey ( which in case of contest must be so small a party ) that it would be desperately unreasonable for them to hope to maintain their cause . if the true method then of attaining to perfection in government be to make the governour absolute , and the people in an equal commonwealth be absolute , then there can be none in this government , that upon probable terms can dispute the power with the governour , and so this state by his own argument must be free from sedition . thus far upon occasion of the ambitious poor man objected . i have spoken of the many , and in speaking of the many , implicitely of the few ; for as in an unequal commonwealth , for example , england during the peerage or aristocracy , the many depended upon or were included in the few ; so in an equal commonwealth the few depend upon or are included in the many , as the senate of venice depends upon , or is included in great council , by which it is annually elected in the whole or in some part . so what was said in an equal commonwealth of the many or the poorer sort , is also said of the few or of the richer ; who through the virtue of the agrarian , as in oceana , or of other orders supplying the defect of an agrarian , as in venice , not able to overballance the people can never have any power to disturbe the commonwealth in case they had such an interest , nor can have any such interest in case they had such power . for example in oceana putting the case , that the few were as powerful as it is possible they should be ; that is , that the whole land were fallen into five thousand hands . the five thousand excluding , the people could get no more riches by it , because they have the whole land already , no more liberty by it , because they were in perfect liberty before ; nor any more power by it , because through the equality of the ballance or of their estates , they can be no more by themselves , then an equal commonwealth , and that they were with the people ; but would be much lesse , the power or commonwealth , in which there be five thousand equalls , being not greater but much less then the power or commonwealth wherein the whole people are equall : because the power or effect of a greater people is proportionably greater then the power or effect of a lesser people , and the few by this means would get no more then to be the lesser people . so the people being no bar unto the riches , liberty , nor power of the five thousand and the desire of liberty , riches , and power being the only causes of sedition , there could arise no sedition in this commonwealth by reason of the nobility , who have no such interest , if they had the power , nor have any such power if they had the interest , the people being equally possessed of the government , of the arms , and far superior in number . in summe , an equal commonwealth consisteth but of one hereditary order , as the people , which is by election divided into two orders as the senate and the congregation in lacedemon , or the senate and the great council in venice ; for the gentlemen of venice , as hath been often said , are the people of venice , the rest are subjects . and an unequal commonwealth consisteth of two hereditary orders , as the patritians and plebeians in rome , whereof the former only had an hereditary capacity of the senate ; whence it comes to passe that the senate and the people in an equall commonmealth having but one and the same interest , never were , nor can be at variance ; and that the senate and the people in an unequall commonwealth having two distinct interests , never did nor can agree . so an equall common-wealth cannot be seditious , and an unequall commonwealth can be no other then seditious . if a man be resolved as the considerer is , to huddle these things together , there is no making any thing of this kind of policy ; of which therefore it will be a folly to talk . for example , lacedemon is either to be considered as not taking in the helotes , and then in her self she was an equall commonwealth void of any sedition , or cause of it , how much soever she were troubled with the helotes . so the objection made by him , of her troubles by the helotes is impertinently urged , to shew that she was a seditious commonwealth . or if he will needs have it , that she took in the helots , it is undeniable that she took them in unequally , and so was unequall , whence the troubles by the helots must needs be impertinently urged against an equall commonwealth . again , when i alledge venice from piero gradenigo , that is for the space of about four hundred years from the present date , at which time the reformation yet in force began , as an example of an equall commonwealth , for him to instance in the times before , when though the common-wealth according to the intention , were as equal as now , yet being not bound by sufficient orders to give her self security of her native liberty , her dukes on the one side , did what they pleased , and the inraged people on the other side banished , condemned to death , or murthered them , who sees not the imposture ? indeed he blushes at it himself . wherefore my assertion being not yet knocked on the head , he promiseth to kill it better , first by the example of lacedemon leaving out the helots , and next by that of venice since the time of piero gradenigo . for the first you must know that once upon a time there was a quarrel between cleomenes and demaratus kings of lacedemon about succession which was determined by the ephori , that is , by a court of justice and not by the sword ; the like hapned in leotychides the known bastard of alcibiades or so confessed to be by his mother unto divers of her maids . now this is a maxime in the politicks where the differences of kings can go no farther , then a court of justice , there the government is seditious . most ridiculous ! is there a stronger argument that such a government is not seditious ? no matter give him room , much more fatall was the contest between cleonymus and his brother areus the son of acrotatus by whose war zarax was ruin'd and pyrrhus came into the game , who besieg'd the capital city : the reign of agis and cleomenes was so full of turbulency as would put a man out of breath to relate . fair , and softly was not all this after lysander , and the spoils of athens and so ruin'd lacedemon ? i affirm there can be no sedition in an equal cmmonwealth , and he to oppose me , shews that there was sedition in an unequal one ; whether doth this affirm his assertion or mine ? but for better luck in venice . this city by mr. harrington ' s own confession , is possest of several advantages . yes , i say that the commonwealth of venice , thus seated is like a man in a cittadel who thereby may be the safer from his enemies , but nere a whit the safer from diseases . what conclusion would you expect he should infer from hence ? why among these therefore there is good cause to reckon her immunity from seditions ; doth not our logician repeat faithfully and dispute honestly ? again , sir , she is like a ship ready to be boarded by pirates , hath the turk on this frontier , the pope on that , the king of spain on another . as if this were an argument every government must not be void of sedition , seeing there is none except they be islands , whose frontiers are not bounded by the territories of other princes . well , but since the last reiglement ( in english reformation ) in the time of gradenigo ; you have had three seditions in venice , that of marino boccone , that of baiamonte tiepolo , and that of marino falerio . bodin hath been long since beaten for this like stockfish , and yet our author will be serving it up for a courtly dish . bocconi would have kill'd the duke , but was hanged before he could doe it . felton kill'd a duke , that had greater power here then the other in venice , and was hang'd afterwards , therefore england was a seditions government ; for this must either be undeniable for felton's sake , or why must the other be so for bocconi's ? again , falerio and his complices would have destroyd the great council , but were hanged before they could do it . vaux and his accomplices would have blown up the parliament , but were hanged before they could doe it ; therefore england was in this relation a seditious government , else why was venice ? there passeth not a moneth but there die rogues at tiburn , is the government therefore seditious ? or is this one regard in which it is not ? where all that so invade the government are by virtue of the same brought unto that end , there the commonwealth , or the orders of it are not the cause but the cure of sedition , and so these are undeniable arguments that venice is not seditious , where since the reformation there hath not been a cut finger upon this score , save onely through the conspiracy of baiamonte , which indeed came to blows . nor for this yet , can venice be called a seditious commonwealth . you find no man accusing rome of sedition in that she had a manlius or a melius that dangerously affected monarchy , because unto these her orders , by which they suffered death assoon appli'd the remedy . but rome was a seditious commonwealth because the perpetual fewd that was between the senate & the people sprung out of her orders , and was that to which there was no remedy to apply . england was not a seditious government because it had a vaux or a felton , but because the power antiently of the nobility , and late of the people was such by the orders of the same as might at any time occasion civil war. put the case a slave or some desperate fellow have kill'd a great turk , the government for that cannot be said seditious , but in this that through the very nature of the policy , the janizaries at any time may do as much , it is undeniable seditious . baiamonte's conspiracy he will not say was of this nature . it was not a disease in the bones of the commonwealth , but a thing that no sooner appear'd , or broke out ( though it be true , there happen'd a little scratching first ) then it fell off like a scab ; such an accident may befall the best constitution , and venice never had the like but once : if he could say as much of a monarchy , he gains no advantage ; yet let him say it , and prove it , i give him all . i omit many falshoods and absurdities in the proceeding of the prevaricator , as where he intimateth the power of the dukes to have been that wherby venice gained i know not what , and yet to have been that also by which falerio had like to have spoiled all : each of which ( the duke of venice having no power at all ) is known to be false . why should ▪ i stay to put you in mind that having affirmed venice to derive her immunity from intestine discord no otherwise then a ship , that is ready to be boarded by pirates , he instanceth in such examples to the contrary , as took occasion by the hair of a forreign scalpe , while in those of boccone and tiepolo the commonwealth by her wars with the genoeses and ferrara , was put to her plunges , and in that of falerio reduced unto the last extremity . i shall onely note that if such suddain flashes as these may come under the name of sedition , he hath done a fine office for monarchy , seeing no senate is so much exposed to like blowes , as any prince . well ; but for all this it is confessed that there may be such a thing as a seditious commonwealth , in that the fewd between the senate and the people of rome could not be cured ; what security saith he will you give us , that the like may not happen in oceana , or that the whole body of the people being intrvsted with giving a vote and keeping a sword , may not by way of counsel or arms , fall to such work as levelling the five thousand , or bringing the agrarian from two to one thousand pounds a year , or less , as they phansie . to which i answer by a like question , what security will he give me that the people of any commonwealth shall not cast themselves into the sea ? a prince may be mad and doe so , but the people is naturally incapable of such madnesse : if men will boast of their knowledge in principles and yet talk of nothing but effects ; why may not a man fly as well as a bird ? but if causes may be regarded , let him once shew how the will seeing it is not free , nor moved without some object , should move the people in such a manner ; or for what , they having all the liberty and all the power that can be had , should strive ? well , that is soon done , for the land may come into the hands of five thousand , and so the booty may be great and the resistance small . good. the romans being the wisest of all people went no farther towards the remedy of their grievances then to strive for the introduction of an agrarian , in which they fainted too , even to the destruction of that government . except these , none have been so wise , and if there be any such thing familiar with the nature of the people , why appeared it but once , and then vanished without effect ? why did not the people for example under the late monarchy ( when the dominion or freehold of the nation , by greater shares , was in a smaller party , and they had not onely riches , but liverty , and power too , to whet them on ) ever so much as think of levelling three hundred men for the nobility and clergy in whom was the ballance , were no more . if it be reply'd that the people were not armed ; by whom did the barons make war with the kings ? if that they were not trusted with a vote ; what was that of the house of commons ? let dominion or freehold stand upon what ballance you will , unequal or equal , from the beginning of the world you shall never find a people turning levellers : and as reason is experience in the root , so experience is reason in the branch , which might therefore be sufficient in the case . nevertheless for clearer satisfaction in a point of such concernment , i shall endeaver to dig up and discover the root of this branch , or the reason of this experience . that which in beasts is instinct , whereof they can give no account , is in it self that wisdome of god whereby he provideth for them ; so is it with the people , they are not levellers , nor know they why , and yet it is , because to be levellers , were to destroy themselves . for seeing i must repeat , to repeat briefly . there is no territory of any extent and populousnesse where the revenue of industry is not twice as much as the dry rent . ( this hath been demonstrated in oceana . ) the revenue of industry is in those that work , that is , the people : wherefore the revenne of the people , where their industry is not obstructed , is twofold unto that of the nobility , holding the whole territory in freehold . but where their industry is obstructed , their revenue is nothing . civil war being of all other the greatest obstruction of industry , the people in taking arms must venter all they have , for that , which if they obtain , they lose two for one ; and if they obtain not , all for nothing . wherefore a people never will , nor ever can ; never did , or ever shall take arms for levelling . but they are instructed with a vote ; and therefore taking away the lands of the five thousand , or diminishing the agrarian by way of counsel , they need not obstruct their industry , but preserving the revenue of that , may bring themselves into the possession of the land too . this will they , this can they lesse do , because being in counsel they must propose something for the advantage of the commonwealth , or of themselves , as their end in such an action . but the land coming to be in the possession of five thousand , falleth not into a number that is within the compass of the few , or such an one as can be princes , either in regard of their number , or of their estates , but unto such an one as cannot consent to abolish the agrarian , because that were to consent to rob one another , nor can have any party among them , or against their common interest , strong enough to force them , or to break it , which remaining , the five thousand neither be nor can be any more then a popular state , and the ballance remaineth every whit as equal , as if the land were in never so many more hands . wherefore the commonwealth being not to be bettered by this means , the people by counsel can never go about to level nor diminish the agrarian for the good of the commonwealth . nor can they undertake it for the enrichment of themselves , because the land of oceana , as hath been demonstrated , being levell'd or divided equally among the fathers of families only , cometh not to above ten pounds a year unto each of them , whereas every footman costeth his master twenty pounds a year ; and there is not a cottager having a cow upon the common , but with his own labour , at one shilling a day , gets twenty pounds a years ; which the land being levell'd , were impossible , because there would be no body able to set a labourer on work , or to keep a servant ; wherefore neither would , nor could the people by counsel go about any such businesse . so there being no possible cause of disagreement between the few and the many , the senate and the people , there can be no such effect ; whence this is the government , which being perfectly equall , hath such a libration in the frame of it , that no man in or under it , can contract such interest or power , as should be able to disturb the commonwealth with sedition . yet after all this , the praevaricator will only tell mr. harrington ( for to deny the conclusion , is a fair way of disputing ) that this libration is of the same nature with a perpetual motion in the mechannicks . but let me tell him , that in the politicks there is nothing mechannick , or like it . this is but an ideotism of some mathematician resembling his who imagined the stream of a river to be like that of his spiggot , ( rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis , at ille labitur & labetur in omne volubilia aevum . ) the silly swain upon a river stood , in hope the rolling bottome of the flood would once unwind it self , whose liquid clue the silver thread for ever shall renew . the mathematician must not take god to be such an one as he is . is that of the sun , of the stars , of a river , a perpetual motion ? even so one generation goeth , and another cometh . nature ( saith gallen ) hath a tendency to make her creature immortal , if it were in the capacity of the matter on which she hath to work , but the people never dieth ; this motion of theirs is from the hand of a perpetual mover , even god himself , in whom we live and move , and have our being ; and to this current the politician addeth nothing but the banks , to which end , or none , the same god hath halso created humane prudence . wherefore there is not any thing that raiseth it self against god or right reason , if i say that it is in humane prudence so to apply these banks , that they may stand as long as the river runneth ; or let this considerer consider again , and tell me out of scripture or reason , why not . mathematicians , it is true , pretend to be the monopolists of demonstration ; but speak ingenuously , have they , as to the politicks , hitherto given any other demonstration , then that there is difference between seeing , and making of spectacles ? much more is that comparison of the politicks , going upon certain and demonstrable principles , unto astrologers and fortune-tellers , who have none at all vain and injurious : for as in relation to what david hath said , and experience confirmed , of the age of man , that it is threescore years and ten ; i may say , that if a man lie bed-rid , or die before threescore years and ten , of any natural infirmity , or disease , it was not through any imperfection of mankind , but of his particular constitution . so in relation unto the principles and definition of an equal commonwealth yet unshaken , nay untouched by this praevaricator , i may safely affirm , that a common-wealth is a government , which if it have been seditious , it hath not been from any imperfection in the kind , but in the particular constitution , which where the like hath hapned must have been unequal . my retrait unto these principles is called running into a bogg ; as if such as have no principles were not boggs , informis limus , stygiaeque paludes . chap. ix . whether monarchy comming up to the perfection of the kind , come not short of the perfection of government , and have some flaw in it ? in which is also treated of the ballance of france , of the original of a landed clergy ; of arms and their kinds . of monarchy i have said , that whereas it is of two kinds , the one by arms , the other by a nobility ; for that by arms , as ( to take the most perfect model ) in turkey , it is not in art , or nature to cure it of this dangerous flaw , that the janizaries have frequent interest , and perpetual power to raise sedition , or tear the magistrate in pieces . for that by a nobility , as ( to take the most perfect model ) of late in oceana , it was not in art or nature to cure it of that dangerous flaw that the nobility had frequent interest and perpetual power by their retainers and tenants to raise sedition and levy war ; whence i conclude that monarchy reaching the perfection of the kind , reacheth not the perfection of government , but must still have some dangerous flaw in it . this place ( though i did not intend by it to make work for a tinker ) could not be of lesse concernment then it proves to the prevaricator , who as if he were obliged to mend all ; falls first to patching with a monarchy by arms , then with monarchy by a nobility ; at length dispairing , throws away each , and betakes himself with egregious confidence , to make out of both a new monarchy , which is neither . by observation of these three flourishes , the present chapter may be brought into some method : the first blow of his hammer , or that whereby he intends the flaw or hole in monarchy by arms , shal henceforth be mended and tite , is this . that the guards of the kings person be not increased beyond necessity of security , that they be not suffered to stagnate at court , but be by a perpetual circulation drawn out upon service , and chiefly that they consist not of one intire body , united under the same head , but be divided into distinct parties and commands ; as we may see in france , where though ( in proportion to the : extent of their dominions ) the kings guards be more numerous then those of the roman or turkish emperours , yet being divided into distinct bodies of french , scots and switz under their several colonels and captains , they have never been the authors of any the least sedition : and in turkey of late years they begin to learn the art of poizing the janizaries by the spahy's , and so have frequently evaded the danger of their mutinies . which fine work at the first view goes upon this false ground , that the foundation of monarchy by arms is laid upon the princes guards or the court militia , whereas monarchy by arms consisteth in no other ballance , then the princes being sole landlord , which where imperfect as it was in that of the roman emperors , the empire is the most troubled , and where perfect as in turkey , the empire is lesse seditions : for that which he saith of france , it relates to monarchy by a nobility ; and therefore is not to be confounded ( according to his method ) with this , but refer'd unto the next branch . as to monarchy by arms , though it be true that the ballance of dominion in any of the three kinds may be said to be natural , in regard of the effect ; yet seeing god hath given the earth unto the sons of men , that of a sole landlord , as turkey , is not so natural in the cause or foundation , as the timars , and therefore requireth the application of some kind of force , as the janizaries , who are not the root of the government , that being planted in the earth of the timars or military farmes and colonies ( for that the janizaries are not the foundation of this empire , which was founded long before , is plain in that this order was not introduced , till by amurath the second ) but the dragon that lyeth at that root , and without which the fruit would fall into the mouths of the timariots by way of propriety ( as when the knights fees granted first for life , became afterwards hereditary in oceana ) which would cause such a fall from monarchy that it would become ( as we have seen ) the rise of popular power ( the lots in case this should happen , of the timariots , little differing from those divided by joshua unto the children of israel ) wherefore when this happens in the turkish monarchy , it is at an end : and that this doth not happen , though there be diverse other concurrent policies , i would have any man shew me , how it could be but for the janizaries : otherwise it is plain that the janizaries being a flying army , on wing at all games , and upon all occasions , are not so much the guard of the prince , as of the empire ; which ruin'd , the prey falls unto the timariots , as those that are in possession , except these be ruin'd too , who being all horse , and far greater in number then the janizaries , that are foot , would in case the awe of the prince , and the policy of the government which holds them divided , were broken , be invincible by the janizaries , who nevertheless by these aids can easily contain them . whence the sedition of the janizaries , like that of a nobility , may be dangerous to the prince , but never threatens the throne ; whereas the sedition of the timariots like that of a people would be more against the throne then the prince . these things considered , and in them the nature , constitution , or disease of monarchy by arms , we may consult the more rationally with the considerer upon the applications or remedies by him offer'd , which are three . first , that the guards of the kings person be not increased beyond the necessity of security . but of what security , that of his person , or of his empire , or of both ? for speaking of a monarchy by arms , in this later sense only it is true ; and if so , then this singular maxime of state ( frustra fit per plura , quod fieri potest per pauciora ) might have been spared ( celais'en va sans le dire come les heures de nostre curè . ) secondly , that they be not suffered to stagnate at court , but be by a perpetual circulation , drawn out upon service ; for if there be not perpetual service ( it should seem ) men might be apt to think that government was instituted for peace as well as war. i add no more then is imply'd in his words , which as to this of turkey have chanced well ; where not the stagnation of the janizaries only but of the court it self ( which by the institution should always be in exercise of arms ) is the cause of that present decay , so perceivable in this empire . but the prince sitting still or stagnating , to what the circulation of the janizaries ( whose alienation from the government , or intelligence with the timariots , must needs be of dangerous consequence ) could tend , should have been thought on ; otherwise to expose the empire to danger , for the safety of the prince , is no cure of the government . but his chief remedy remains , this court militia must not consist of one intire body united under the same head , but be divided under several colonels , captains , parties , brigades , and distributed unto several quarters . as if this were a cure , there were any army that could be mutinous ; but where he saies not united under the same head , he intimates perhaps divers generals , and divers armies ; now such are the turkish beglerbegs and the provinces under their governments . that these therefore be kept divided , so that not any two of them can lay their heads together , without having them cut off ; nor any son succeed the father in government , requires that there be always a sufficient force ( distinct from the interest of the timariots and beglerbegs ) united , and still ready upon occasion of this service , and the janizaries with the spahi's or court horse , being united , are no more then sufficient for this service : wherefore if these also were so divided as thereby to be weakened , they could not be sufficient for this service ; and their division except such as might weaken them would be of no security to the prince . that the provinces , under this awe , are lesse apt to rebel , then the court guards to mutiny , is no wonder ; but the court-guards being cured by the prescription of this physitian , of possibility of mutiny ( which without weakening them is impossible ) the provinces ( if liberty , or riches , or power , be desirable ) would never indure the yoak of this government . wherefore it being inavoidable in the empire , that either the janizaries , or the timariots may doe what they list ( in regard that whether of them be able to give law unto the other , must at the same time be able to give law unto the prince , and to bring them unto an equal ballance , were to make a civil war , or at least to sow the seed of it ) the native wound of monarchy by arms remains uncured and uncurable . what more may be done for monarchy , founded upon a nobility , comes next to be tried . in this the considerer gives his word , that there never riseth any danger unto the crown , but when either a great part of the soveraign power is put into the hands of the nobility , as in germany and poland , ( where it should seem by him , that the electors , and the gentry , do not put power into the hands of the emperor , or king , but the emperor , or king , puts power into the hands of the electors , or gentry ) or when some person or family is suffered to overtop the rest in riches , commands , and dependance , as the princes of the bloud , and lorrain , not long since , in france ; and of old the montforts and nevi●s in england . the first of these he declareth to be a vicious government , and a monarchy only in name ; the second he undertakes shall easily admit of this remedy . that the great ones be reduced ( decimo sexto ) to a lesser volume , and levelled into an equality with the rest of their order . his put-pin is pretty , the emperor puts power into the hand of the electors ; and the king of poland puts power into the hands of the gentlemen ; which governments therefore ( and all such like , as when the king of england put power into the hands of the barons , at such time as he was no longer able to keep it out of their fingers , by which means the antient and late government of king , lords , and commons was restored ) are vicious constitutions , and monarchies only in name ; such as he will not meddle with , and therefore let them go . well ; but where is the patient then ? if these be not monarchies by nobility , what do we mean by that thing ? or what government is it that we are to cure ? why such an one , where some person or family is suffered to overtop the rest in riches , commands , and dependance , as the princes of the bloud , and lorrain , not long since , in france ; and of old the montfords and the nevils in england . so then the same again ( for these are no other ) upon recollection , are those that admit of this easie cure . let the great ones be reduced to a lesser volume , and levell'd with the rest of their order . but how ? if they be the weaker party , they are not the great ones , and if they be the stronger party , how will he reduce them ? put the case a man have the gout , his physitian does not bid him reduce his overtopping toes unto the volume of the other foot , nor to levell them unto equality with the rest of their order , but prescribes his remedies , and institutes the method that should do this feat . what is the method of our aesculapius ? ( point de novelle , ) or where are we to find it ? e'en where you please . the princes of the bloud , and of lorrain in france ; the montforts , and the nevils in england , overtopped not their order , by their own riches or power , but by that of the party , which for their fidelity , courage , or conduct , intrusted them with the managing of their arms , or affairs . so the prince that would have levelled them , must have levelled their party ; which in case the controversie be upon the right , or pretended right of the nobility in the government ( which commonly makes them hang together ) may come to the whole order : what then ? why then , says he , the prince must preserve his nobility weighty enough to keep the people under , and yet not tall enough in any particular person to measure with himself : which abating , the figure is the same again ; and so i have nothing to answer but the figure . now for this , the prince himself is no otherwise tall , then by being set upon the shoulders of the nobility ; and so if they set another upon the same shoulders , ( as in henry the th . or the th . who had no titles unto the crown , nor could otherwise have measured with the prince ) be he never so low , he comes to be tall enough in his particular person to measure with the prince , and to be taller too , not only by those old examples , but others that are younger than our selves , though such ( the nobility having not of late , been weighty enough to keep the people under ) as derive from another principle , that of popular ballance . a prince therefore preserving his nobility weighty enough to keep under the people , must preserve in them the ballance of that kind of empire ; and the ballance containing the riches , which are the power , and so the arms of the nation ; this being in the nobility , the nobility , when willing , must be able to dispose of the king , or of the government . nor under a lesse weight is a nobility qualified to keep down the people , as by an argument from the contrary ; henry the th . having found the strength of his nobility , that set him in a throne to which he had no right , and fearing that the tide of their favour turning , they might do as much for another , abated the dependance of their tenants , and cut off their train of retainers , which deminution of their weight , releasing by degrees the people , hath caused that plain , or level , into which we live to see the mountain of that monarchy now sunck and swallowed ; wherefore the ballance of the nobility being such as failing that kind of monarchy comes to ruine , and not failing , the nobility , if they joyn may give law unto the king , the inherent disease of monarchy by a nobility , remains also uncured , and uncurable . these are points to which i had spoken before ; but something concerning france , and forraign guards , was mumbled by the praevaricator in a wrong place , while he was speaking of turkey , where there is no such thing . this least i be thought to have courted opposition for nothing , shall open a new scene ; while i take the occasion in this place to speak first of the ballance of the french monarchy , and next of the nature and use of forraign guards . the whole territory of france , except the crown lands , which on this account are not considerable , consisteth of three shares , or parts , whereof the church holdeth one , the nobility another , and the presidents , advocates , other officers of the parliaments , courts of justice , the citizens , merchants , tradesmen , the treasurers , receivers of the customes , aids , taxes , impositions , gabells , all which together make a vast body , hold a third ; by how equal portions i am sorry that i do not know , nor where to learn , but this is the ballance of the french monarchy , unto which the paisant holding nothing , but living ( though in one of the best countrys of the world ) in the meanest and most miserable condition of a labourer , or hiend , is of no account at all . the parties that hold the ballance in a territory are those of whom the government doth naturally consist , wherefore these are called estates ; so the clergy , the nobility , and the commons , are the three estates of france . though the third because the paisant partaking not of the ballance can ( in relation to government ) be of no account , is not called the commons , but only the third estate : whereas the yeomanry and gentry in england , having weighed as well in the ballance , as the church , and the nobility , the three estates of england , while the monarchy was in vigour , were the clergy , the nobility , and the commons . the consent of nations evinceth that the function of the clergy , or priest , except where otherwise determined of by law , appertaineth unto the magistrate . by this right noah , abraham , job , with the rest of the patriarchs , instructed their families or sacrisiced , there seemeth to have been a kind of commonwealth in canaan , while melchisedec was both king and priest ; such also was moses till he consecrated aaron , and confer'd the priesthood upon the levites , who are expresly said to succeed unto the first born , that is unto the patriarchs , who till then exercised that function . nor was it otherwise with the gentiles , where they who had the soveraign power or were in eminent magistracy , did also the priestly office ( omnino apud veteres qui rerum potiebantur , iidem auguria tenebant : ut enim sapere , sic divinare , regale ducebant , saith cicero and virgil rex anius , rex idem hominum , phoebique sacerdos ) you find the heroes , that is , princes in poets sacrificing ; the ethiopian , egyptian , lacedemonian kings did the like ; in athens constantly and in rome , when they had no kings , occasionally they elected a rex sacrorum , or king-priest . so that a free people had thus far power of electing their priests , is not deny'd by any man. this came it should seem , to be otherwise established by the law in egypt , where the priests ( whose lands joseph when he bought those of the people did not buy ) being great landlords ( it may be unto the third of the whole territory ) were one of the three estates of the realm . and it is clear in scripture that the people , till they sold their lands , became not servants unto pharaoh . while agesilaus was in egypt they deposed their king , which implies the recovery of their ballance ; but so seeing they set up another , as withall shews the ballance of the nobility to have been predominant . these particulars seem to come near unto the account of diodorus siculus , by whom the ballance of egypt should have stood thus . the whole revenue was divided into three parts , whereof the priests had the first , the king had the second , and the nobility had the third . it seems to me that the priests had theirs by their antient right and title , untouched by joseph , that the kings had all the rest by the purchase of joseph , and that in time ( as is usual in like cases ) a nobility came through the bounty of succeeding kings to share with them in one half . but however it came about , egypt by this means is the first example of a monarchy upon a nobility , at least distributed into three estates , by means of a landed clergy , which by consequence came to be the greatest counsellors of state , and fitting religion unto their uses , to bring the people to be the most superstitious in the whole world. where it not for this example , i should have said , that the indowment of a clergy or religious order with lands ▪ and the erecting of them into an estate of the realm or government , were no antienter then the goths and vandals , who introducing a like policy , which unto this day taketh place throughout the christian world , have been the cause ; first , why the clergy have been generally great counsellors unto kings , while the people are led into superstition . secondly , by planting a religious order in the earth , why religion hath been brought to serve worldly ends ; and thirdly , by rendring the mitre able to make war ; why of later ages we have had such a thing as war for religion , which till the clergy came to be a third state or landlords , was never known in the world : for that some cities of greece , taking arms upon the usurpation or violation of some temple , have called it the holy war ; such disputes having been but upon matter of fact , and not of faith ▪ ( in which every man was free ) came not to this account . moses was learned in all the learning of the egyptians , but a landed clergy introduced he not in israel : nor went the apostles about to lay any such foundation of a church . abating this one example of egypt , till the goths and vandals who brought in the third estate , a government , if it were unequal , consisted but of two estates , as that of rome , whether under the kings or the commonwealth consisted of the patritians and plebeians , or of the nobility and the people . and an equal commonwealth consisteth but of one , which is the people ; for example of this , you have lacedemon and venice , where the people being few , and having many subjects or servants , might also be called nobility , as in regard of their subjects , they are in venice , and in regard of their helots or servants , they might have been in lacedemon . that i say which introducing two estates , causeth division , or makes a commonwealth unequal , is not that she hath a nobility ( without which she is deprived of her most especial ornament , and weakned in her conduct ) but when only the nobility is capable of magistracy or of the senate , and where this is so ordered , she is unequal as rome : but where the nobility is no otherwise capable of magistracy nor of the senate , then by election of the people , the commonwealth consisteth but of one order , and is equal as lacedemon or venice . but for a polititian commend me to the considerer , he will have rome to have been an equal commonwealth , and venice to be an unequal one , which must be evinced by wyre-drawing . for having elsewhere as hath been shewn , admitted without-opposition that the ballance of empire is well divided into national and provincial , the humour now takes him to spin that wedge into such a thred as by intangling of these two , may make them both easie to be broken . hereunto he betaketh himself in this manner . as mr. harrington hath well observed ( p. . ) where there are two parties in a republique with equal power , ( as in that of rome the people had one half and the nobility had the other half ) confusion and misery are there intayled . for remedy whereof , or to avoid this , there can be no way but to make the commonwealth very unequal . in answer to this , there will need no more then to repeat the same things honestly . mr. harrington speaketh of the national ballance of empire ( p. . ) unto this sense , where the nobility holdeth half the propriety or about that proportion , and the people the other half , ( the shares of the land may be equal ; but in regard that the nobility have much among few , and the people little among many ; the few will not be contented to have authority , which is all their proper share in a commonwealth ; but will be bringing the people under power , which is not their proper share in a commonwealth ; wherefore this commonwealth must needs be unequal ; and except by altering the ballance , as the athenians did by the sisacthia , or recision of debts ; or as the romans went about to do by an agrarian , it be brought to such equality that the whole power be in the people , and there remain no more then authority unto the nobility ) where is no remedy but the one ( with perpetual fewd ) will eat out the other , as the people did the nobility in athens , and the nobility the people in rome . where the carkass is , there will be the eagles also ; where the riches are , there will be the power : so if a few be as rich as all the rest , a few will have as much power as all the rest ; in which case the commonwealth is unequal , and there can be no end of staving and tayling , till it be brought unto equality . this for the national ballance ; for the provincial , there power doth not follow propriety , but to the contrary . this the praevaricator having acknowledged , le ts slip , to the end that he may take a grip of venice ; which because the three or four thousand of which originally consisted , and now consisteth that whole government , having acquired provinces , and encrease of their city by later comers , do not admit these unto participation of power , he saith is an unequal commonwealth . he will be a mill-horse , whether the cake be dough or not ; for this is to draw in a circle ; and rome , which by his former arguments should have been equal , by this again must be unequal , seeing rome as little admitted her provinces into the body of the commonwealth as doth venice . this clash is but by way of parenthesis , to return therefore unto the businesse in present agitation . the estates , be they one , or two , or three , are such ( as was said ) by vertue of the ballance , upon which the government must naturally depend . wherefore constitutively the government of france ( and all other monarchies of like ballance ) was administred by an assembly of the three estates , and thus continued , untill that nation being vanquished by the english , charls the th . was put to such shifts , as for the recovery of himself in the greatest distresse , he could make , unto which recovery while the estates could not be legally called , he happening to attain without them , so ordered his affairs , that his successors by adding unto his inventions , came to rule without this assembly ; a way not suiting with the nature of their ballance , which therefore required some assistance by force , and other concurring policies of like nature , whereof the forraign guards of that monarchy are one ; the great baits alluring the nobility another ; and the emergent interest of the church a third . to begin with the last of those , the church , except it be in a war for religion , as when they joyned with the princes of lorrain ; and what party of the french nobility were made , or they could make , against the king of navarre , are not of themselves so hot at hand , or prompt unto arms , but the king being ( to use their word ) no heretick , through their great apprehension of the third estate , as that which is most addicted unto the protestant religion , may be confident , they will never side with the people : so by this emergent interest , or accident , he hath the church sure enough . for the nobility , which is exceeding gallant , this change hath the greatest baits ; for whereas the church being not spared , the third estate is laden , and the paisant overladen with taxes , the nobility is not only at better ease in this regard , but for the greater , or more considerable part , receiveth advantage by it ; the king having always , whether in peace , or war , a great cavalry , then which there is no better in the world for the exercise , entertainment , and profit of the nobility ; governments of cities , castles , provinces in abundance , which he rarely distributes unto any other . the greater nobility are mareschals , generals ; the lesse officers in the armies , especially of the horse , the emoluments whereof they receive also in time of peace ; and many of this order being pensioners , taste of the kings liberality , without taking pains , or having any imployment at all . by which both that france is a monarchy by a nobility , and how she holdeth her nobility is apparent . now the church and the nobility standing thus ingaged unto the king , by which means he hath two parts of the ballance to one , it is demonstrable that the government must be quiet . nor seeing the church for the reason shewn is sure enough , comes the government ( since the protestant cities and holds were demolished ) to be otherwise disquieted then by the flying out of the nobility , which whenever it happens in any party considerable , either for the number , or the interest , causeth the crown to shake ; for it seldome cometh to passe upon this occasion , but the third estate , or some part of it taketh arms immediately . in which place it is worthy to be observed , that wealth , according unto the distribution of the ballance , hath contrary motions . the third estate in france having riches , and those laden with taxes , come to have something to lose , and something to save , which keepeth them in continual fear or hope . the nobility holding unto the king , the third estate hath something to lose , which withholdeth them from arms , through fear ; but the nobility flying out , the third estate hath something to save , which precipitateth them into arms through hope ; whereas the paisant having nothing to save , or to lose , to hope , or to fear , never stirs . the case standing thus , the sufficiency of the french politician ( since the master-piece of cardinal richelieu , in demolishing those walls of the protestants , which had otherwise by this time been a refuge for the third estate , and perhaps overturned the monarchy ) lieth altogether in finding for the nobility work abroad , or ballancing them in such sort at home , that if a party flie out , there may be a stronger within to reduce it , or at least to be opposed unto it . in this case , lest the native interest of the nobility , since the assemblies of the three estates were abolished , might cool the remaining party , or make them slower in the redresse of such disorders , or discontents , then were requisite , the king is wisely provided of forraign guards ; which being always in readinesse , and not obnoxious unto the native interest , may upon like occasions be of more expedition and trust . being come thus unto forraign arms , which is the point i more especially proposed unto my self in the present discourse , one objection in relation to what hath been already said seemeth to interpose it self . seeing france , while it is not governed by the assembly of states , is yet of the same ballance it was , when governed by the assembly of states ; it may be said that a government of the same ballance may admit of divers administrations . to which i need make no other answer , then to put you in mind that while this government was natural , or administred by the assembly of states , it is celebrated by machiavel , to have been the best order'd of any monarchy in the world ; and that what it is , or hath been of later times , you may believe your own eyes or ears . there be yet , before i can come unto forraign guards , some praevious considerations ; all government as is implied by what hath been already shewn , is of these three kinds . a government of servants . a government of subjects ; or a government of citizens . the first is absolute monarchy , as that of turkey : the second aristocratical monarchy , as that of france : the third a commonwealth , as those of israel , of rome , of holland . now ( to follow machiavel in part ) of these , the government of servants is the harder to be conquer'd , and the easier to be held . the government of subjects is the easier to be conquer'd , and the harder to be held . to which i shall presume to add , that the government of citizens is both the hardest to be conquer'd , and the hardest to be held . my authors reasons why a government of servants is the hardest to be conquerd , come to this , that they are under perpetual discipline and command , void of such interests and factions , as have hands or power to lay hold upon advantages or innovation , whence he that invades the turk must trust unto his own strength , and not rely upon disorders in the government , or forces which he shall be sure enough to find united . his reason why this government , being once broken , is easily held , are , that the armies once past hope of rallying , there being no such thing as families hanging together , or nobility to stir up their dependants , unto farther reluctancy for the present , or to preserve themselves by complacence with the conquerors , for future discontents or advantages , he that hath won the garland , hath no more to doe but to extinguish the royal line , and were it ever after in security . for the people having been always slaves , are such whose condition he may better , in which case they are gainers by their conquerer , but can never make worse , and therefore they loose nothing by him . hence alexander having conquer'd the persian empire , he and his captains after him could hold it without the least dispute , except it arose among themselves . hence mahomet the second having taken constantinople , and put paleologus the greek emperor ( whose government was of like nature with the persian ) together with his whole family unto the sword , the turk hath held that empire without reluctancy . on the other side , reasons why a government of subjects is easilier conquer'd , are these . that it is supported by a nobility so antient , so powerful , and of such hold and influence upon the people , that the king without danger , if not ruine to himself or the throne ( an example whereof was given in hen. th of england ) can neither invade their priviledges , nor level their estates , which remaining , they have power upon every discontent to call in an enemy , as robert count of artois did the english , and the duke of guise the spaniard into france . the reasons why a government of subjects being so easily conquer'd , is neverthelesse the harder to be held , are these . that the nobility being soon out of countenance in such a case , and repenting themselves of such a bargain , have the same means in their hands whereby they brought in the enemy , to drive him out , as those of france did both the english and the spaniard . for the government of citizens , as it is of two kinds , an equal or an unequal commonwealth , the reasons why it is the hardest to be conquer'd , are also of two kinds ; as first the reasons why a government of citizens where the commonwealth is equal , is hardest to be conquer'd , are , that the invader of such a society must not only trust unto his own strength , in as much as the commonwealth being equal , he must needs find them united , but in regard that such citizens , being all souldiers or trained up unto their arms , which they use not for the defence of slavery but of liberty ( a condition not in this world to be better'd ) they have more especially upon this occasion the highest soul of courage , and ( if their territory be of any extent , ) the vastest body of a well disciplin'd militia , that is possible in nature ; wherefore an example of such an one overcome by the arms of a monarch , is not to be found in the world : and if some small city of this frame have happen'd to be vanquisht by a potent commonwealth , this is her prerogative , her towers are her funeral pile , and she expireth in her own flame , leaving nothing unto conquest but her ashes , as sag●ntum overwhelmed by carthage , and numantia by rome . the reasons why a government of citizens , where the commonwealth is unequal , is next the former , the hardest to be conquer'd are the same , with this difference , that albeit her peace be not perfect within , her condition is not to be better'd by any thing that is without ; wherefore rome in all her strife never call'd in an enemy ; and if an enemy upon occasion of her strife , and hopes of advantage by it , came without calling , he presented her with her most soveraign cure , who had no leisure to destroy her self , till having no enemy to find her work , she became her own . — nondum tibi defuit hostis in te verte manus — nor is there any example that a government of this kind was ever subdued by the arms of a monarch ; though some indeed may be found that have called or suffer'd forraign princes or force to come in , as holland by marriages of their princes , and genoa through her factions , as those of the fiesci and adorni . to conclude this part for the reasons why a government of citizens so acquir'd or possest as through marriage , or faction is the hardest to be held , there needs no more then that men accustomed unto their arms and their libertys will never endure the yoak ; wherefore the spaniard , though a mighty king , no sooner began in holland , a small commonwealth , to innovate or break her orders , then she threw him off with such courage and disdain , as is admirable unto the world. and somewhat of the like kind did genoa by the help of her doria in the vindication of her liberty from france . to come by this farthest way about as i think the nearest way home . arms are of two sorts , proper or improper ; that is , native or forraign . proper and native arms , are according unto the triple nature of government , of three kinds ; servants in arms , as the helots in lacedemon , the timariots and janizaries in turkey : subjects in arms , as the horse in france , and the sea-guards or forces in venice : or citizens in arms , as those upon the lexiarcha in athens , of the morae in lacedemon , and the legions in rome . improper or forraign arms are of two sorts . auxiliaries or mercenaries . auxiliaries are such as are supply'd by vertue of some league , as were those of the latines and italians unto the romans ; and those of the cantons of suisse ( except zurick ) unto the king of france ; or they may be such as are occasionally lent freely , or let forth for money by one state unto another , the later whereof differ not much from mercenaries . mercenaries are souldiers of fortune that have no other trade then their arms , and let out themselves for money ; of such consisted the greatest part of the carthaginian strength , such is the land force of venice , and notwithstanding the antient league of france with those nations , such at this day are the suisse and scottish guards ( and sometimes a good part of the foot ) in france . machiavil discourseth upon these particulars in his art of war , unto admiration : by whom i shall therefore steer . where the arms in bulk are proper , and consisting of citizens , they have other trades ; and therefore are no souldiers of fortune ; and yet because the commonwealth hath arms for her ▪ trade ( in regard she is a magistrate given for the good of mankind , and beareth not her sword in vain ) they are all educated as well in military as civil discipline , taking their turns in service of either nature according unto the occasion , and the orders of the commonwealth , as in israel , athens , lacedemon and rome , which had if their territories permitted , and sometimes ( as i may say ) whether their territories permitted or no , as in israel , the vastest the highest temper'd & the best disciplin'd militia , that is to be found in the whole compass of story . some armies of israel have consisted of three or four hundred thousand men : rome upon the rumour of a gallick tumult , armed in italy only , without forraign aid , seventy thousand horse and seven hundred thousand foot ; things in our days ( when the turk can hardly arm half so many ) not to be credited . hence that a commonwealth , which had not first broken her self , or been broken by some other common-wealth , should not be found to have been conquer'd by the armes of any monarch , is not miraculous but a natural effect of an apparent cause . in this place , or upon this text , divines whom i would desire not to be enemies of popular power , but to give machiavil his due , shall , if they please , hear him make a goodly sermon , in these words . if antient commonwealths and governments used diligence in any other order to make their people lovers of peace , faithfully unto their countrey , and having the fear of god before their eyes , they doubled it in this of their militia : for of whom should your countrey expect greater faith , then of such as have offer'd themselves to die for her ? whom should she endeavour to make greater lovers of peace , then them who only can enslave her by force ? in whom should there be greater fear of god , then in such as carry their lives in their hands ? this when lawgivers and captains rightly considered , was the cause why souldiers were esteemed honour'd , followed and imitated above all men in the world , whereas since such orders are broken , and custome is altogether deviated from the course of antient prudence ; men are come to detest the iniquity of the campe , and fly the conversation of such as are in arms , as the pestilence . where the arms in bulk are proper , but consist of subjects , they are the best next ; and but the best next as appears by all examples , antient , or modern . the arms with which pyrrhus prince of epyrus invaded the romans were of subjects , yet that prince though he were not vanquished by the romans , confessed their advantage , and gave them over . the spaniard , being a far more potent king then was pyrrhus , hath acknowledged as much unto the hollanders , though a far less commonwealth then rome : so have the princes of austria , and of burgundy , unto the switz . that the arms of subjects are nevertheless as much superior to the arms of servants , as inferior to the armes of citizens , is as plaine ; seeing as alexander , with thirty thousand subjects , vanquished darius having innumerable slaves ; so thirty thousand christians are at this day a match for any army of turks ; and we see venice , whose force by sea consists of subjects , to have made him quit that element near as fully unto her dominion or empire , as did the persian to athens . to arms , that are proper , but consist of servants , all the preheminence that can be given , is that they are better then forraign arms ; a proof whereof we have in those of selimus , whereby he conquered the mamalucks ; who being but a forraign force that held egypt in subjection , the countrey was irrecoverably lost , and ( for the reasons already shewn ) as easily kept . improper arms , whether auxiliary or mercenary , where the force of a prince or of a commonwealth consisteth , for the bulk or greater part , of no other , are the least effectual , and the most dangerous of all . for auxiliaries , or what effect hath been found of them by princes or commonwealths , it was seen in france , during the league by the spaniard ; and in holland during the reign of queen elizabeth , by the english ; but especially in the goths and vandals , who having been auxiliaries or mercenaries rely'd upon by the later emperors , came thereby to ruine the roman empire . mercenaries , who make their arms their trade , must of all other be the most pernicious ; for what can we expect lesse of such whose art is not otherwise so profitable , then that they should ( as machiavil shews ) be breakers of their faith , given up unto rapine , enemies of peace and government ? to instance in some commonwealths , that of carthage after her first war with the romans , fell through the rebellion of spendius , and matho , ring-leaders of her mercenaries , into another that was far more dangerous . of such a dilemma were the arms of this state , that if hannibal had conquered rome , he must have been king of carthage ; and not conquering rome , carthage was ruin'd . the commonwealth of milan , trusting her self unto f. sforza , and his mercenaries , became the subject of her servant , and he her duke . nor is venice , whose land forces are of the same kind , otherwise in safety , as to these , then by her situation . to give some instances of the same nature in princes . the father of f. sforza , being captain of a like mercenary army , forced joan queen of naples , whom he left disarm'd in the midst of her enemies , to lay her self at the feet of the king of aragon ; and braccio by such another treachery had plainly possessed himself of the kingdome of naples , had he not been broken at aquila , where death intercepted his design . from what hath been said , first of government and then of arms ; if a government of servants be harder to be conquer'd , and easier to be held , then in this forraign arms must needs be least necessary , and most dangerous . if a government of subjects be easier to be conquered , and harder to be held , then in this forraign arms may be more necessary , but must be lesse dangerous . but though a government of citizens be both hardest to be conquered , and hardest to be held , yet as it is , again in this regard , of two kinds , this cannot be said of each kind alike , wherefore i must distinguish . in a government of citizens , if the commonwealth be not for encrease , but preservation only , as lacedemon , carthage , venice , forraign arms are both necessary and dangerous ; but in a government of citizens , where the commonwealth is both for increase and preservation , as rome , forraign arms are neither necessary , nor dangerous . to repeat the parts of this conclusion , which being brief , is obscure , more fully and particularly . the empire of turkey is of the harder kind to be conquer'd , wherefore the turk needeth not forraign guards , to defend him , but it is of the easier to be held , wherefore let him take heed of intrusting his person with forraign guards , who having a forraign interest , may have a forraign nation to assist them ; and so the person of the prince being in their hands , they have no more to do then to extinguish the royal line , and the empire , being easily held , is their own thenceforth with security . thus the mamalucks which were at first forraign guards , extinguishing the royal line of the kings of aegypt , came to possesse , and hold that realm without opposition . who well considers this point , will never enough admire the policy of the turk , in the creation ( as it were ) of his janizaries , free from any national interest that might make them dream of , or desire liberty , and yet soevoid of all forraign interest , or knowledge , that they know not what , or who were their country or parents . hence though they have interest to murther the turk , and sometimes do accordingly , they have no farther interest in the world , but what depends upon the government ; and so the empire is safe , though the prince be in danger ; whereas if they were forraign guards , or had any native interest , not only the prince , but the empire too would be in danger , the rest being servants , and such whose condition might be bettered by a change , but could be no worse . wherefore a government of servants must by no means admit of forraign guards , or mamalucks . but the empire of france , where the nobility are not only subject to flie out , but to call in strangers , may have use of forraign guards , which not obnoxious to native interest , and factions , as those of the nobility , are the readiest and best help at this lift , yet not dangerous , though having the prince in their power , because by him they are safe from the nobility , who , were it not for the prince , would be so far from bearing or brooking forraign guards , that in case a forraigner came in upon their call , having the same means to help themselves , whereby they brought him in , they would shake the yoak , and the ends why they called him in being satisfied or repented of , drive him out again , as they did the spaniard , and the english ; but if this government being invaded or conquered , be so hard to be kept , how much harder being surprized ? wherefore in a government by subjects forraign arms may be more necessary , but must be lesse dangerous . in a commonwealth for preservation , as lacedemon , carthage , venice , forreign arms are necessary : so lacemon , though able to defend her self by her proper forces against any one city ; yet the wars in greece going much upon leagues and confederates , was forced also to make use of her confederates , and sometimes of her helots . but as anciently to carthage , so now to venice , forreign or mercenary forces are essential , because for land-service such a constitution can have no other : yet is this course extreamly dangerous , as appeared by lacedemon , who ( being ever in fear of her helots ) when she had acquir'd upon the matter the whole empire of greece , came by the rebellion of her confederates , not only to lose all , but to ruine . for carthage upon the mutiny of spendius & matho , she escaped as at other times upon like occasions , very narowly . that such an accident neither hath befallen venice nor can befall her , is to be attributed unto her situation , by which , in this regard , she is secure : neverthelesse , her progresse , or increase , which by this means either cannot be great , or being great , must render her but the more infirm , is full bard . to a commonwealth for increase , which always taketh in the whole body of the people , forraign arms ( seeing she aboundeth above all other kinds of policy , with such as are proper ) must needs be the least necessary ; and they are the most safe , because never admitting them , but for her meer convenience , and frugality in expense of native bloud , she receiveth no such charge of them as can recoyl , but must carry point blank , and as vigorously at her proper interest , very neer as her proper arms. thus did the latine and italian auxiliaries , of which joyned with the roman legions , consisted a consular army . by thus much it seemeth that an inference from the success of arms unto the perfection of government , and from the perfection of government , to the successe of arms , should be no fallacious way of disputing . but this hath been sweaty work with ▪ the considerer ; ( who loves his ease ) it is enough to argue thus . the switz , scottish , and french guards , have never been the authors of any sedition , therefore the seditiousnesse of a nobility may be mended by forraign guards ; which is , as if one should say , such a physitian hath never been the cause of the gout ; therefore the gout may be cured by such a physitian . that forraign arms may be well enough applied in the case of a seditious nobility , and have some good effects , is not denied , but is france therefore cured of her sedition , or remains she notwithstanding her forraign guards , the most sedious example in the world ? if thus she have not been , nor be , what hath he read of the princes of the bloud in former times , or heard of late from them ? but if thus she have been , and be , is it not a fine way of cure to give us an example of the disease for the remedy ? nor are her guards so void of sedition neither ; but the switz , if he want his pay , dares threaten paris ; the scot ( at least of late years ) hath not been so bold ; but if a prince flie out , the ensigns of the french guards will one way or other be captains , while souldier and officer too follows his affections or interests , which way soever they frame . i should be glad to know when a dragon fell from that court , that did not bear down stars with his train . but the prevaricator is set upon it , whereas of late years , the janizaries are known to have been far more imbrued in the bloud of their princes then ever : he gives us his honest word , that of late years in turkey , they begin to learn the art of poising the janizaries ( who are the foot of the princes guard ) by the spahyes , ( who are the horse of the same ) and so have frequently evaded the danger of their mutinies . at which rate , seeing every army consisteth of horse and foot , no army could be mutinous . if these had not been meer slights , and so intended , he might have done well to have shewn us one mutiny of the janizaries appeased by the spahyes . but all the parts of his politicks ( as was said of those in rhetorick ) consist of pronunciation . thus the wounds of monarchy , notwithstanding the former , or this last remedy of forraign guards , are still bleeding , or festering . but his courage is undaunted , ( aut viam inveniat aut faciat ) he will either mend a government , or make one , by asserting without any example , but with egregious confidence , that the perfection of monarchy is free from those flaws , which are charged upon it , and that it consists in governing by a nobility , weighty enough to keep the people under , yet not tall enough in any particular person to measure with the prince ; and by a moderate army kept under the notion of guards , and garrisons , which may be sufficient to strangle all sedition in the cradle , from which mixture , or counterpoise of a nobility and an army , ariseth the most excellent form of monarchical government . there 's for your learning now , a model which is a short horse , and a legislator that hath soon curried him . to the parts of it , consisting of a nobility , and in force , i have already spoken severally . i shall now speak unto the whole together ; that is , unto the imagined mixture or counterpoise of a nobility and an army ; and because there is nothing in nature , that hath not had a natural effect by some example . the scale of arms , or of iron , continued in the line of william the conqueror , and the scale of propiety , or gold , continued in the barons of england , and their successors . but in this , before the barons wars consisted not the perfection of the monarchy , because it preponderated too much on the side of arms ; nor after the barons wars , because the king , putting power ( which he could not keep out of their fingers ) into the hands of the nobility , it became a vicious constitution , and a monarchy only in name , ( so saith the considerer ) therefore the ballance being then only even , when neither the king could over-ballance , or get the better of the barons , nor the barons over-ballance , or get the better of the king ; the perfection of monarchy consisted in the barons wars ! lycurgus the second ! mark ; the king by all means must have a nobility weighty enough to keep down the people ; and then he must have an army to hold gold weight with his nobility ; as if the nobility in that case would keep down the people , and not fetch them up ( as did the barons ) into their scale , that so together they might weigh down the army ; which sooner or later is the infallible consequence of this phantasie ; or let it be shewn where it was ever otherwise ; to instance in france is quite contrary , where all the considerable offices , and commands being in the nobility , or the richer sort of that nation , the ballance of arms , and of propriety are not two , but one and the same . there is no way for monarchy , but to have no army , or no other then the nobility , which maketh the regulated monarchy , as in france , spain , &c. or to have an army that may weigh down nobility and people too ; that is , destroy them both , which maketh the absolute way of monarchy , as in turkey ; the wit of man never found , nor shall find a third , there being no such thing in nature . this chapter is already with the longest , and yet i must give you a ( corollary pouce de roy , or ) piece above measure ; upon a question which the greenest politician that ever brought his verjuce to the presse , hath spurr'd me . where he desires to know my opinion of the way of governing by councils , which he confesseth he hath always thought admirable ; he doth not mean such as are co-ordinate with the prince ( which have been seen in the world ) but such as those of spain , purely of advice and dispatch , with power only to inform and perswade , not limit the princes will. for almost all the weaknesses which have been thought incident to monarchy , are by this course prevented , and if there be any steadinesse and maturity in the senate of a commonwealth , this takes it all in . to give my counsel without a fee , and deal sincerely with a prevaricator : let the prince ( that is , such an one as his ) hold himself contented with his divan , or cabinet . if this be that he means , we are agreed ; but if he would have more , i can make no lesse of his words , then an hankering after such councils as i have proposed , and that these are such as he always thought admirable , such as prevent almost all the weaknesses incident to monarchy , and take in the steadinesse and maturity of a commonwealth . how may we make this agree with that other place ? where he saith that there is no frame of laws , or constitution of government , which will not decay and come to ruine , unlesse repaired by the prudence and dexterity of them that govern . now that this may not be expected from a monarch , as well as from a senate , or assembly of men , he hath not yet met with any conviction , but rather finds it reasonable to think that where debates are cleerest , the result of them most secret , and the execution suddain , ( which are the advantages of monarchy ) there the disorders of a state will soonest be discovered , and the necessary remedies best applied . in that former place he bethought himself , that the debates of rome were as clear as those of antiochus , that her results were as secret as those of philip , or perseus , and of more suddain execution then either of theirs . he doubted it might be true , which is affirmed by good authors , and commonly enough known , that for the clearnesse of debate , and secrecy of result , the world never saw any thing like the senate of venice , and that in all apparence they are for execution , as quick with the divan , as the divan can be with them . now when all this is done , to banish so generous thoughts without shewing us for what cause , and knock under the table , is sad news . but he shall find me , in any thing that is reasonable , most ready to serve him . to the question then , how such councils as i have proposed would do with a prince ? i answer , truly the best of them , i doubt , but untowardly . one , that is the popular assembly , hath no mean , but is either the wisest in nature , or hath no brains at all . when affairs go upon no other then the publick interest , this having no other interest to follow , nor eyes to see withal , is the wisest council : but such ways are destructive to a prince , and they will have no nay : the congregation of israel , when rehoboam would not hearken to their advice , deposed him : and we know what popular councils , so soon as they came to sufficient power , did in england . if a prince put a popular council from this ward , he does a great matter , and to little purpose , for they understand nothing else but themselves . wherefore the kings of france and of spain , have dissolved all such assemblies . it is true , where a prince is not strong enough to get money out of them , but by their cocsent , they are necessary , but then they are not purely of advice and dispatch , but share in the government , and he cannot be meddling with their purses , but they will be meddling with his laws . the senate is of fitter use for a prince , and yet except he have the way of tiberius , but a ticklish piece , as appears by maximinus , who was destroyed by pupienus and balbinus , captains set up against him by this order . to go unto the root . these things are not otherwise in prudence or choice then by direction of the ballance ; where this is popular no remedy , the prince must be advised by the people , which if the late king would have endured , the monarchy might have subsisted somewhat longer , but while the ballance was aristocratical , as during the great estates of the nobility and the clergy , we find not the people to have been great or wise counsellors . in sum , if a king govern by a popular council , or an house of commons , the throne will not stand long . if he governs by a senate , or an house of lords , let him never fear the throne , but have a care of himself : there is no third as i have said often enough but the divan . chap. x. whether a commonwealth that was not first broken by her self , were ever conquer'd by the arms of any monarch ? i come in this chapter to resume the discourse , where i broke off in the former , making good my assertion that a commonwealth is the goverment , which from the beginning of the world unto this day was never conquer'd by any monarch ; for if the commonwealths of greece came under the yoak of the kings of macedon , they were first broken by themselves . when i speak of a commonwealth , in relation to this point , i am no more to be argued against out of the little cities in asia , or those of ragusa , and san marino , which cannot be shewn to have had the command of any considerable army , then i argue against the praevaricator , where he asserts monarchy to consist of a mixture of arms and of a nobility , from the king of yuetot who had neither . this assertion in the judgement of any rational man ought not to be encountered , but where there was a natural possbility of defence , in regard that a city which hath no army at all , as geneva ( which yet being invaded by the duke of savoy found means to defend her self ) or such an one as is not considerable , should be subdued by some potent monarch ( if we could find the example ) concerns the government no more , then if it had been overwhelmed by some inundation , or swallowed up by some earthquake . and yet all that is opposed by the considerer , amounts not unto thus much . the testimony he brings out of pausanias comes far short ; for it is recorded ( saith the author speaking of the lucedemonians ) that being corrupted by the bounty of craesus , they were the first that contracted amity with the barbarians at the time when that king added the territories inhabited by the dorians upon the border of caria , with other commonwealths in asia unto his empire . so that craesus corrupted the lacedemonians with gifts , pausanias is express , but whether he obtain'd the asiatick cities ( likely in this case to have been easilier corrupted then the lacedemonians ) by arms or by purchase , he is not express ; and the presumption of the later , as in other regards , so in this is the stronger ; that craesus by the testimony of solon , was more potent in gold then in iron . now if it were so , ( and if otherwise let the considerer shew ) that these commonwealths , inveagled by the treasure of craesus , came first under the lydian , and fell with that under the persian empire , when craesus was subdued by cyrus ; all i can learn by this example is no more than that craesus , for ought that is perceivable , might have bought those commonwealths as cosimo of medices did florence ; of whom it is affirm'd by machiavel that there was not a considerable man in the whole city that had not received some considerable sum . so this example presumes ; but in the next ( which is of sicily ) there is not so much as a presumption in favour of the assertor , the state of sicily before that which the romans call the first carthaginian war being clear in story against his design . for that africa for the generation of monsters is not more famous then sicily for that of tyrants , they who have passed their novitiat in story are not ignorant ; nor how when timoleon had freed her of this vermine , and with liberty she had recovered some strength and virtue , she relapsed under agathocles and his horrid violation of faith , while he was trusted with the arms of her citizens : how after him pyrrhus was called in from epirus , after pyrrhus hiero usurped ; all , by the same arts , getting first into trust or charge , and then recoyling upon them that would take no warning : by which it is apparent that the common-wealths of sicily , like those of greece , were ruin'd by themselves , and their own disorders ; and no more subdu'd upon these changes by forraign arms , then was israel by the canaanites , or rome by the gauls or decemvirs . israel ( having broken her orders ) was indeed sometimes opprest by the canaanites ; rome was sacked by the gauls , and usurped by the decemvirs , but as the man that having gotten a fall in a duel throws off his adversary , recovers himself , and his sword , is not conquer'd , so neither the commonwealth ; wherefore neither holland nor genoa , though they have been under , being yet standing , can be said to be conquer'd by the arms of spain or of france , but rather to the contrary , seeing the liberty of holland ( in many cities more antient then any records or other monuments there can witness , and in it self then that of tacitus , whereby civilis born of princely bloud , is affirmed to have vindicated the batavian freedome ) is still the same ; and genoa though happy in her doria , remaineth as she was before he was born . nor did the family of the medices banished out of florence where by virtue of their prodigious wealth , and the inevitable consequence of the ballance their ancestors had been princes many years before charles the fifth was a souldier , any more by the help of his arms , those of the pope ( at that time of the same family ) and their party at home , then get into their known saddle . to insist a little more at large upon the stories of genoa & florence ( because upon these the prevanicator sets up his rest that mr , harrington must needs be afflicted ) genoa was and is an oligarchy consisting of twenty eight families making the great council or aggregation as they call it , none but these being capable of the senate or of magistracy and if ever it could be said of a commonwealth that she had broken her self , it might be said at the time related to , of genoa where not only the faction of the guelphs and gybelins , which had destroyed many cities in italy then reigned , but the few'd between the people included , and the subject excluded , was as great as ever had been between the nobility and the people in rome , besides that of the fieschi and the adorni two families , like caesar and pompey , which having many years together , as it were ingrost the magistracy of duke , were neverthelesse perpetually striving each with other , which should have it , and if one of these ( as it did ) brought in the king of france , there is nothing plainer then that this common-wealth , was subdued by her own sedition , nor is there a man knowing any thing of her affaires , that maketh any doubt of it . that of florence in deed if the praevaricator could shew it had been ever up , i should grant were down , but to relate the story of this city , i must relate that of the house of medices . from cosimo , a citizen famous throughout europe both for his wisdome and his riches , this family for the space of sixty years , exercised , under the praetext of some magistracy , very great power in florence . to cosimo succeded peter , to peter laurence a man in prudence and liberality resembling his grandfather , save that he used more absolute power in menaging the common-wealth , yet with gentlenesse , and not altogether unto the suppression of liberty . nevertheless he obtained of the siginory ( which did for the most part as he would have them ) some small guard for his person , he was a man renowned through italy , and looked upon by foreigne princes with much respect . to him succeeded his son another peter who through youth and rashness conceiving the power exercised by his predecessors to be no more than his due , took upon him the goverment as absolute lord of all , and standing most formidably upon his guard grew sottishly profuse of the publick money , committed many absurdities and violences ; by which means having incurred the hatred of the citizens , he was banished by the signiory , with cardinal john and julian his brothers . this john coming after to be pope leo the tenth , required the revocation of his brothers banishment , and the restitution of the house of medices , to which finding the prevailing party of the florentines to be refractory , he stirred up the armes of the emperor charles the fifth against them , by whose joynt ayd the city , after a long siedge , was reduced unto her old ward , and alexander of medices , nephew unto the pope and son in law unto the emperor , set in the known saddle of his ancestors . this is the action for which the praevaricator will have a common-wealth to have been conquered by the armes of a monarch , though who reades the story may very safely affirm , first that florence never attained unto any such orders as could deserve the name of a common-wealth ; and next that the purse of cosimo had done that long before , which is here attributed unto the armes of the pope and the emperour . reason and experience ( as i said ) are like the roots and the branches of plants and trees : as of branches fruits and flowers being open and obvious unto the eye , the smell , the touch , and tast every gyrle can skill ; so examples unto vulgar capacity are the best arguments . let him that saith a common-wealth hath been at any time conquer'd by a monarch , to it gain , and shew us the example . but though fruits and flowers be easily known each from other ; their rootes are latent , and not only so , but of such resemblance that to distinguish of these a man must be a gardiner or an herbalist . in this manner , the reason why a common-wealth , hath not been overcome by a monarch , hath been shewn in the distribution of armes , those of a prince consisting of subjects or servants , & those of a common-wealth rightly order'd , of citizens , which difference relates plainly unto the perfection or imperfection of the goverment . but , sayes the prevaricator this seemes intended for a tryall of our noses whether they will serve us to discover the fallacy of an inference from the prosperous successe of armes to the perfection of government . if she who should have some care of the vineyard of truth , shall lye pigging of wide bores , to grunt in this manner and fear with the tush , and i happen to ring some of them ( as i have done this marcassin for rooring ) there is nothing in my faith , why such tryall of their noses should be sin ; but for fallacions inferrences such i leave unto them whose capps are squarer then their play . for all that , great and well policyd empires ( saith he ) have been subverted by people so eloigned from the perfection of government , that we scarce know of any thing to tye them together , but the desire of booty . where , or how came he to know this ? what reason or experience doth he alledge for the proof of it ? may we not say of this , it is for the tryal of our noses , whether they will serve us to discover that a conclusion should have some premisses ? he gives us leave to go look , and all the premisses that i can finde are quite contrary . the arms of israel were alwayes victorious , till the death of josua , whereupon , the orders of that common-wealth being neglected , they came afterwards to be seldom prosperous . isocrates in his oration to the areopagites , speaks thus of athens , the lacedemonians , who when we were under oligarchy , every day commanded us something ; now while we are under popular administration , are our petitioners that we would not see them utterly ruined by the thebans . nor did lacedemon ruine till her agrarian , the foundation of her government was first broken . the arms of rome ( ever noted by historians , and clearly evinced by machiavil to have been the result of her policy ) during the popular government were at such a pitch , as if victory had known no other wings then those of her eagles : nor seeing the gothes and vandalls are the legislators from whom we derive the government of king , lords , and commons , were these when they overcame the roman empire , a people so eloigned from the perfection of government , but their policy was then farre better than that of the emperors , which having been at first founded upon a broken senate , and a few military colonies , was now come unto a cabinet , and a mercenary army . the judgement of all ages and writers upon the policy of the roman emperors , is in this place worthy , and through the pains already taken by erasmus and sleiden , easie to be inserted . o miserable and deplorable state ( saith erasmus ) the authority of the senate , the power of the law , the liberty of the people being troden under-foot ; to a prince , that got up in this manner , the whole world was a servant , while he himself was a servant unto such , as no honest man would have endured the like servants in his house ! the senate dreaded the senate dreaded the emperor , the emperor dreaded his execrable militia : the emperor gave lawes unto kings , and received them from his mercenaries . to this is added by sleiden , that the condition of these princes was so desperate , it was a wonderful thing , ambition her self could have the courage to run such a hazard ; seeing from cajus caesar slain in the senate to charles the great , there had been above thirty of them murthered , and four that had layd violent hands upon themselves ; for there was alway something in them that offended the souldiery which whether they were good or bad was equally subject to pick quarrels , upon the least occasion raised tumults , and dispatcht even such of them as they had forced to accept of that dignity , for example ▪ aelius pertinax . but , if this be true , that of the gothes and vandalls , when they subdued this empire , must have been the better government ; for so ill as this never was there any , except that only of the kings of israel , which certainly was much worse . those of the britains and the gauls , were but the dregs of this of rome , when they were overcome by the saxons and franks , who brought in the policy of the gothes and vandalls . when tamerlan overcame bajazet , the turkish policy had not attain'd unto that extent of territory , which is plainly necessary unto the nature of it , nor was the order of the janizaries yet instituted . the hollander , who under a potent prince , was but a fisherman , with the restitution of the popular government , is become the better souldier ; nor hath been matcht but by a rising common-wealth , whose policy you will say was yet worse : but then her ballance ( being that especially which produceth men ) was farre better . for vastness , for fruitfulness of territory , for bodies of men , for number , for courage , nature never made a country more potent then germany : yet this nation anciently the seminary of nations , hath of late years , meerly through the defect of her policy ( which in tending one common wealth hath made an hundred monarchies in her bowels , whose crosse interests twist her gutts ) been the theater of the saddest tragedies under the sun ; nor is she curable unless some prince alling to work with the hammer of warre , be able totally to destroy the old , and forge her a government intirely new . but , if this come to be , neither shall it be said , that a well polycy'd empire was subverted , nor by a people so eloigned from perfection of government , but theirs must be much better then the other . let me be as ridiculous as you will , the world is ( in faece romuli ) ripe for great changes which must come . and look to it , whether it be germany , spain , france , italy , or england , that comes first to fix her self upon a firm foundation of policy , she shall give law unto , and be obey'd by the rest there was never so much fighting as of late dayes to so little purpose ; arms , except they have a root in policy , are altogether fruitless . in the warre between the king and the parliament , not the nation only , but the policy of it was divided , and which part of it was upon the better foundation ? but saith he , ragusa and san marino are commended for their upright and equal frame of government , and yet have hardly extended their dominion , beyond the size of an handsom mannor . have ragusa , or san marino been conquer'd by the arms of any monarch ? for this ( i take it ) is the question ; though , if they had , these being common wealths unarmed , it were nothing to the purpose . the question of encrease is another point . lacedemon could not increase ( because her frame was of another nature ) without ruine ; yet was she not conquer'd by any monarch . come , come says he for all this . it is not the perfection of government , but the populousness of a nation , the natural valour of the inhabitants , the abundance of horses , arms , and other things necessary for equipping of an army , assisted with a good military discipline , that qualifie a people for conquest ; and where these concur , victory is intayled upon them , very fine ▪ as if these could concur any otherwise then by vertue of the policy . for example , there is no nation under heaven more populous then france . yet saith sir francis bacon , if the gentlemen be too many , the commons will be base , and not the hundredth pole fit for an helmet , as may be seen by comparison of england with france , whereof the former , though far lesse in territory and populousness ; hath been nevertheless the over-match ; in regard the middle people in england make good souldiers which the paisants in france do not . this therefore was from the policy , by which the one hath been the freest , and the other the most inslaved subject in the world , and not from populousness , in which case , france must have been the over match . the like is observable in the natural valour of the people , there being no greater courage of an infantry , then that of the middle people in england , whereas the paisant having none at all , is never used in arms. again , france hath one of the best cavalries in the world , which the english never had , yet it availed her not . victory is more especially intayl'd upon courage , and courage upon liberty , which groweth not without a root planted in the policy or foundation of the government . alexander with an handful of freermen , overcame the greatest abundance of horses , arms , and other things necessary for the equipping of an army , the hugest armies , the most vast and populous empire in the world ; and when he had done , could not by all these subdue that handful of freer men ( though he kill'd clytus with his own hand in the quarrel ) unto the servile customs of that empire . and that the best military discipline derived from the policy of the romans , i intimated before , and have shewn at large in other places . but the praevaricator neither mindes what is said , nor cares what he sayes ; to affirm that a common wealth was never conquer'd by any monarch , and that a common-wealth hath conquer'd many monarchs , or frequently led mighty kings in triumph , is to run upon the foile , the second proposition being , with him , no more then , onely the conversion of the first . as if that , rome was not conquer'd by the world ; and that the world was conquer'd by rome , were but a simple conversion . so the world having not conquer'd venice , it must follow , that venice hath conquer'd the world. do we take , or are we taken ? nor is he thus satisfied to burn his fingers , but he will blister his tongue . where i said that the common-wealth of venice , consisting of all them that first fled from the main land , unto those ▪ islands where the city is now planted , at the institution took in the whole people , he would make you believe i had said that the senate of venice at the first institution , took in the whole people . it is matter of fact , and that in which his integrity will be apparent unto every mans judgement . i pray you see the places . and yet when he hath put this — upon me , he tells me , perhaps it is not true , and this only i grant him , past peradventure is false , whether that i said it , or that the thing is possible . for how is it possible , that the senate , which is no otherwise such ▪ then as it consisteth of the aristocracy , or select part of the people should take in the whole people ? it is true , that good authours , both ancient aud modern , when they speak of the senate of rome , or of venice historically , imply the people . machiavil , speaketh of the magistracy of publilius philo as prolonged by the senate of rome , without making any mention of the people , by whom nevertheless it was granted : the like is usuall with other authours . thuanus seldom mentioneth the common wealth of venice , but by the name of the senate ; which not understood by the learned considerer , where contarini speaks in the same manner , of the courses taken by the common-wealth of venice , for withholding the subject in the city from sedition , he takes him to be speaking of the meanes , whereby the senate ( an 't please you ) keeps the people under : and so having put one trick upon me , and another upon contarini , these two are his premisses , whence he drawes this conclusion , that venice is as much as any in the world , an unequal common wealth . now the conclusion , you know no body can deny . chap. xi . whether there be not an agrarian , or some law , or lawes of that nature , to supply the defect of it in every common wealth : and whether the agrarian , as it is stated in oceana , be not equal and satisfactory unto all interests . in this chapter the praevaricator's devices , are the most well favour'd ; for whereas the agrarian of oceana , doth no more than pin the basket , which is already filled , he gets up into the tree , where the birds have long since , eaten all the cherries , and with what clouts he can rake up , makes a most ridiculous scar-crow . this pains he needed not to have taken , if he had not slighted over much , the lexicon of which , he allowes me to be the authour , yet will have it , that he understood the words before ; some of which nevertheless , his ill understanding requireth , should be farther interpreted in this place , as propriety , ballance , agrarian , and levelling . propriety is that which is every man 's own by the law of the land , and of this there is nothing stir'd , but all intirely left as it was found by the agrarian of oceana . propriety in money ( except as hath been shewen in cities that have little or no territory ) commeth not unto the present accompt : but propriety in land , according to the distribution that happeneth to be of the same , causeth the political ballance producing empire of the like nature : that is , if the propriety in lands be so diffused through the whole people , that neither one landlord , nor a few landlords over-ballance them , the empire is popular . if the propriety in lands be so ingrossed by the few , that they over-ballance the whole people , the empire is aristocraticall , or mixed monarchy ; but if propriety in lands be in one landlord ▪ to such a proportion as over-ballanceth the whole people , the empire is absolute monarchy . so the political ballance is three-fold , democratical , aristocratical , and monarchical . each of these ballances may be introduced either by the legislator , at the institution of the government ; or by civill vicissitude , alienation , or alteration of propriety under government . examples of the ballance introduced at the institution , and by the legislator ▪ are first those in israel and lacedemon , introduced by god or moses ; and lycurgus , which were democratical or popular . secondly , those in england , france and spain ▪ introduced by the gothes , vandals , saxons , and franks , which were aristocratical , or such as produced the government of king , lords and commons . thirdly , those in the east and turkey , introduced by nimrod and mahomet , or ottoman , which were purely monarchial . examples of the ballance introduced by civil vicissitude , alienation ▪ or alteration of propriety under government are in florence , where the medices attaining to excessive wealth , the ballance altered from popular , to monarchial : in greece , where the argives being lovers of equality and liberty ▪ reduced the power of their kings to so small a matter , that there remained unto the children and successors of cisus , little more than the title , where the ballance altered from monarchical to popular . in rome , about the time of crassus , the nobility having eaten the people out of their lands , the ballance alter'd from popular , first unto aristocratical , as in the triumvirs , caesar , pompey , and crassus ; and then to monarchical , as when crassus being dead , and pompey conquer'd , the whole came to caesar . in tarentum , not long after the warre with the medes , the nobility being wasted , and overcome by iapy●es , the ballance ▪ and with that the common wealth changed from aristocratical , to popular : the like of late hath discovered it self in oceana . when a ballance commeth so through civil vicissitude to be changed , that the change cannot be attributed unto humane providence , it is more peculiarly to be ascribed unto the hand of god ; and so when there happeneth to be an irresistible change of the ballance , not the old government which god hath repealed , but the new government , which he dictateth as present legislator , is of divine right . this volubility of the ballance being apparant , it belongs unto legislators to have eyes , and to occur with some prudential or legal remedy or prevention ; and the lawes that are made in this case are called agrarian . so an agrarian is a law fixing the ballance of a government , in such manner that it cannot alter . this may be done divers wayes , as by entailing the lands upon certain families , without power of alienation in any case , as in israel and lacedemon , or except with leave of the magistrate , as in spain ; but this by making some families too secure , as those in possession , and others too despairing , as those not in possession , may make the whole people lesse industrious . wherefore the other way , which by the regulation of purchases , ordains only , that a mans land shall not exceed some certain proportion ; for example , two thousand pounds a year , or exceeding such a proportion , shall divide in descending unto the children , so soon as being more than one , they shall be capable of such division , or sub-division , till the greater share exceed not two thousand pounds a year in land , lying and being within the native territory , is that which is received and established by the common wealth of oceana . by levelling , they who use the word , seem to understand , when a people rising invades the lands and estates of the richer sort , and divides them equally among themselves ; as for example , — no where in the world ; this being that both in the way , and in the end , which i have already demonstrated to be impossible . now the words of this lexicon being thus interpreted ; let us hearken what the praevaricator will say , and out it comes in this manner . to him that makes propriety , and that in lands the foundation of empire , the establishing of an agrarian is of absolute necessity , that by it the power may be fixed in those hands to whom it was at first committed . what need we then proceed any farther , while he having no where disproved the ballance in these words , gives the whole cause ? for as to that which he faith of money seeing neither the vast treasure of henry the th , altered the ballance of england , nor the revenue of the indies alters that of spain , this retrait ( except in the cases excepted ) is long since barricadoed . but he is on and off , and , any thing to the contrary notwithstanding , gives you this for certain . the examples of an agrarian are so infrequent ; that mr. harrington is constrained to wave all , but two common-wealths , and can finde in the whole extent of history only israel , and lacedemon to fasten upon . a man that hath read my writings , or is skilled in history , cannot chuse but see , how he slurs his dice , nevertheless , to make this a little more apparent , it hath seemed to some , ( sayes aristotle ) the main point of institution in government , to order riches right : whence otherwise derives all civil discord ? vpon this ground , phaleas the calcedonian legislator made it his first work to introduce equality of goods , and plato in his lawes , allowes not increase unto a possession beyond certain bounds . the argives , and the messenians had each their agrarian , after the manner of lacedemon , if a man shall translate the words ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , virtus & facultas civilis ) political virtue or faculty , where he findes them in aristotles politicks , ( as i make bold , and appeal unto the reader , whether too bold to do ) by the words politicall ballance , understood as i have stated the thing , it will give such a light unto the authour , as will go neerer than any thing alleadged ( as before by this praevaricator ) to deprive me of the honour of that invention . for example , where aristotle saith , if one man , or such a number of men , as to the capacity of government come within the compasse of the few , excel , all the rest ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) in ballance , or in such manner , that the ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) political faculties or estates of all the rest , be not able to hold weight with him or them ; they will never condiscend to share equally with the rest in power ; whom they excell in ballance ; nor is it to any purpose to give them lawes , who will be as the gods , their own lawes : and answer the people as the lions are said , by antisthenes , to have answer'd the hares , when they had concluded , that every one ought to have an equall portion . for this cause ( he adds ) cities that live under popular power , have instituted the ostracism , for the ▪ preservation of equality ; by which , if a man increase in riches , retinue , or popularity above what is safe , they can remove him ( without losse of honour or estate ) for a time . if the considerer think that i have strained courtesie with aristotle ( who indeed is not alwayes of one minde ) further then is warrantable , in relation to the ballance , be it , as he pleaseth , i who must either have the more of authority , or the lesse of competition in the point , shall lose neither way . however , it is in this place enough , that the ostracism being of like nature , was that which supplyde the defect in the grecian cities of an agrarian . to proceed then unto rome , that the people there , by striving for an agrarian , strove to save their liberty , is apparent , in that through the want of such a law , or the non-observance of it , the common wealth came plainly unto ruine . if a venetian should keep a table , or have his house furnished with retainers , he would be obnoxious unto the council of ten : and if the best of them appear with other state or equipage , then is allowed unto the meanest , he is obnoxious unto the officers of the pomp , which two orders in a common-wealth , where the gentry have but small estates in land , are as much as need be in lieu of an agrarian . but the german republicks have no more to supply the place of this law , then that estates descending , are divided among the children , which sure no man but will say , must needs be both just and pious , and we ask you no more in oceana ; where grant this , and you grant the whole agrarian . thus had i set him all the common wealths in the world before ; and so it is no fault of mine , that he will throw but at three of them , these are israel , lacedemon , & oceana . first at israel . mr. harrington ( sayes he ) thinks not upon the promise of god unto abraham ( whence the israelites derived their right unto the land of canaan ) but considers the division of the lands as a politick constitution upon which the government was founded , though in the whole history of the bible , there be not the least foot-step of such a design . what meanes the man ! the right of an israelite unto his land , derived from the promise of god unto abraham ▪ therefore the right of an oceaner unto his land , must derive from the promise of god unto abraham ? or , why else should i in speaking of oceana ( where propriety is taken as it was found , and not stirred an hair ) think on the promise to abraham ? nor matters it for the manner of division , seeing that was made , and this was found made , each according unto the law of the government . but in the whole bible ( sayes he ) there is not the least foot-step that the end of the israelitish agrarian was politicall , or that it was intended to be the foundation of the government . the foot-steps of god by the testimony of david , may be seen in the deep waters , much more by the consent of the whole bible , in land , or in the foundation of empire , unless we make the foot-steps of god to be one thing , and his wayes another , which as to government are these . god by the ballot of israel ( more fully described in the next book ) divided the land ( some respect had unto the princes and patriarchs , for the rest ) to every one his inheritance , according unto the number of names , which were drawn out of the one urne first , and the lots of land , ( the measure with the goodness of the same considered ) drawn afterwards out of the other urn unto those names . wherefore god ordaining the cause , and the cause of necessity producing the effect , god , in ordaining this ballance , intended popular government . but when the people admitting of no nay , would have a king. god thereupon commanding samuel to shew them the manner of the king , samuel declared unto the people , concerning the manner or policy of the king , saying , he will take your fields and your vineyards , and your olive-yards , even the best of them , and give unto his servants ( which kind of proceeding must needs create the ballance of a nobility ) . over and above this , he will take the tenth of your seed , and of your vineyards , and of your sheep ( by way of tax , for the maintenance of his armies ) and thus your daughters shall come to be his cooks and confectioners , and your sons to run before his chariot . there is not from the ballance to the superstructures , a more perfect description of a monarchy , by a nobility . for the third branch , the people of aegypt in time of the famine , which was very sore , come unto joseph , saying , buy us and our land for bread , and we and our land will be servants unto pharaoh . and joseph bought all the land of aegypt ( except that of the priests ) for pharaoh . so the land became pharaohs : who lest the remembrance of their former propriety by lively marks , and continual remembrancers should stir them up ( as the vandalls in africa , exuted in like manner of their propriety , and yet remaining in their ancient dwellings , were stirred up by their women ) unto sedition , removed the people thus sold , or drave them like cattle even from one end of the borders of aegypt unto the other end thereof . in which you have the ballance of a sole land-lord or absolute prince , with the miserable , and yet necessary consequence of an inslaved people . now the ballance of governments throughout the scriptures , being of these kindes , and no other , the ballance of oceana is exactly calculated unto the most approved way , and the clearest footsteps of god in the whole history of the bible : and whereas the jubile was a law instituted for preservation of the popular ballance from alteration ; so is the agrarian , in oceana . but says the praevaricator , hocus pocus , or in the name of wonder , how can this agrarian be the foundation of that government , which had subsisted more than forty five years without it ? for they were so long after the giving of this law for the division of the land , before they had the land to divide . which is as if one should say upon that other law of the like date . judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates ; hocus pocus , or in the name of wonder , how should the children of israel make them judges and officers in in their gates , before they had any gates to make them in ? fine sport to be play'd by an attorney for the clergy with scripture , where it is plain enough that the laws of a common-wealth were given by moses unto an army to be put in execution , when that army should become a common-wealth , as hapned under joshua . but no saying will serve his turn . if this agrarian were meant as fundamentall to the government , the provision ( he will have it ) was weak and not proper for attaining the end proposed , there being nothing in the nature of the agrarian to hinder , but that the whole countrey might for the space of near fifty years , that is , the time between the two jubilees , have come into the hands of one man , and so have destroyed ballance , agrarian , government , and all . this they that boast of their mathematicks might have taken the pains ( before they had been so confident ) to have demonstrated possible ; as how or by what meanes one lot could come in fifty years to be multiplied six hundred thousand times , and that without usury , which barre ( the israelites being no merchants ) was thought sufficient to be given ; or thus to call the prudence of god by their impracticable phansyes , in question , is abominable . i would have divines ( as this praevaricator perswades ) and , it should seem , hath perswaded some of them , to overthrow the common-wealth of israel ; for otherwise i will give them my word they shall never be able to touch that of oceana , which expect in the hereditary succession and dignity of the princes of the tribes , and the patriarchs , and that the senate was for life , differs not from the former : for as to the divers working up of the superstructures in divers common-wealths according unto the diversity of occasions , it comes unto no accomptable difference ; and much ( i conceive ) of this carving or finishing in israel , ( which had it been extant would perhaps have shewn a greater resemblance ) is lost . for the senates , as to their numbers , that of the in oceana , considering the bulk of the people , exceedeth not that of the seaventy in israel ; the succession and dignity of the princes of the tribes and of the patriarchs , was ordain'd for the preservation of the pedegrees , which ( christ being born ) are not any more to be of like consequence ; and that the senators were for life , derived from a former custome of such a number of elders exercising some authority in aegypt ( though not that of the senate till it was instituted by god ) from the descent of the patriarchs into that land , who being at their descent se●venty persons , and governing their families by the right of paternity ; as the people increased , and they came to dye had their successors appointed in such manner that the number of seaventy in remembrance of those patriarchs was diligently preserved . and forasmuch as the patriarchs governing their own familied ( which at first were all ) in their own right were consequently for life , this also pleased in the substitution of others . these things rightly considered , i have not varyed from the authority of israel in a tittle , there being neither any such necessaty use of pedigrees , nor uninterrupted succession of elders for life in oceana ; and unlesse a man will say , that we ought to have the like effect , where there is not the like cause ( which were absurd ) the authority of a common wealth , holdeth no otherwise then from the cause to the effect . oceana , i say , cannot be wounded but by peircing the authority of israel , with which she is armed cap , a pie . it is true ( as the praevaricator saith in another place ) that law can oblige onely those to whom it was given , and that the laws of israel were given as to the power or obligation of them onely to the children of israel . but the power ( as hath been shewn ) of a common-wealth and her authority are different things , her power extends no farther than her own people , but her authority may govern others , as that of athens did rome ; when the later writt her twelve tables by the copy of the former . in this manner , though a man or a common-wealth , writing out of antient governments have liberty to choose that which sutes best with the occasion , out of any ; yet , whether we consider the wisedome and justice of the legislator supremely good , or the excellency of the lawes ; the prerogative of authority , where the nature of the thing admitts , must needs belong unto israel . that this opinion should go sore with divines , is strange ; and yet if there be any feeling of their pulse by this their advocate or attorney , as true . for while he finds mee writing out of venice , he tells me i have wisely put my self under her protection or authority , against whom he dares not make warre , lest he should take part with the turk . but when he finds me writing out of israel , he tells me that he is not aware of any prerogative of authority belonging to the israelitish more then any other republick : which is to take part with the devill . so much for israel : now for lacedemon , but you will permitt me to shake a friend or two by the hand , as i goe . the first is aristotle , in these words . inequality is the source of all sedition , as when the riches of one or the few come to cause such an overballance as drawes the common-wealth into monarchy or oligarchy ; for prevention whereof the ostracism hath been of use in divers places , as at argos and athens . but it were better to provide in the beginning , that there be no such disease in the common wealth , then to come afterwards unto her cure. the second is plutarch , in these words . lycurgus judging that there ought to be no other inequality among citizens of the same common wealth than what derives from their vertues , divided the land so equally among the lacedemonians , that on a day beholding the harvest of their lots lying by cocks or ricks in the field , he laughing said , that it seem'd unto him they were all brothers . the third should have been the considerer , but he is at fewd with us all . the design of lycurgus ( he professes ) was not so much to attain an equality in the frame of his government , as to drive into exile riches , and the effects of them , luxury and debauchery . gentlemen , what do you say ? you have the judgement of three great philosophers , and may make your own choice ; only except he that hath but one hundred pounds a year , can have wine and women at as full command , and retainers in as great plenty , as he that hath ten thousand , i should think these advantages accrued from inequality , and that lycurgus had skill enough in a common-wealth to see as much . no , sayes the praevaricator , it appeares far otherwise , in that he admitted of no money , but old iron , a cart-load of which was worth little . well , but in israel , where silver and gold was worth enough , my gentleman would have it , that one man in the compasse of fifty years might purchase the whole land , though that countrey was much larger then this : and yet where , if the people had used money , they would have used trade , and using both , such a thing , through the straightness of the territory , might have happened , he will not conceive the like to have been possible . no , though he have an example of it in lysander , who by the spoil of athens ruined the agrarian , first by the over-ballance that a mans money came to hold unto his lot , then by eating out the lots themselves , and in those the equality of the common wealth . but these things he interpreteth pleasantly , as if the vow of voluntary poverty ( so he calls it ) being broken , the common-wealth , like a forsworn wretch , had gone and hanged her self : a phancy too rank ( i doubt ) of the cloyster , to be good at this woyk . but whereas plutarch , upon the narrowness of these lots ( which had they been larger , must have made the citizens fewer then thirty thousand , and so unable to defend the common wealth , ) and upon the use of this same old and rusty iron instead of money , observes it came by this means to passe , that there was neither fine orator , fortune-teller , bawd ▪ nor goldsmith to be found in lacedemon ; our considerer professeth , that it is to him as strange as any thing in history , that lycurgus should finde credit enough to settle a government , which carryed along with it so much want and hardship unto particular men , that the totall absence of government could scarce have put them into a worse condition , the lawes that he made , prohibiting the use of those things , which to enjoy with security , is that only to other men , that makes the yoak of lawes supportable . here he is no monke again ; i would ask him no more , than that he would hold to some thing , be it any thing . it is true , we , who have been used to our plum-pottage , are like enough to make faces ( as did the king of pontus ) at the lacedemonian black broth : but who hath opened his mouth against plum-pottage , gilded coaches , pages , lacques , fair mannor , houses , good tables , rich furniture , full purses , universities , good benefices , scarlet robes , s●u re caps , rich jewels , or said any thing that would not multip'y all this ? why ( sayes he ) you are so farre right , that the voice of lycurgusses agrarian , was , every man shall be thus poor , and that of yours is , that no man shall be more than thus rich . this is an argument ( an 't please you ) by which he thinks he hath proved , that there is no difference between the agrarian that was in lacedemon , and that which is in oceana : for , sir , whatsoever is thus and thus , is like . but the agrarian of lacedemon was thus , a man could have no money , or none that deserved that name ; and the agrarian of oceana is thus , a mans money is not confin'de : therefore the agrarian of the one , and of the other are like . was it not a great grievance in lacedemon , tro , that they had no such logick nor logician ? be this as it will , it had been impossible ( sayes he ) for lyeurgus to have setled his government , had he not wisely obtained response from the oracle at delphos , magnifying and recommending it ; after which , all resistance would have been down-right impiety and disobedience , which concerns mr. harrington very little . the bible then is not so good an oracle , as was that at delphos . but this reflection hath a tang with it , that makes me think it relates to that where he sayes , i know not how ; but mr. harrington hath taken up a very great unkindness for the clergy : he will know nothing , neither that the oracle of the scripture is , of all other , the clearest for a common wealth ; nor that the clergy being genera'ly against a common wealth , is , in this , below the priests of delphos ; who were more for lycurgus , then these are for moses . but hav ' at the agrarian of oceana , with the whole bail of dice , and at five throwes . the first throw is , that it is unjust ; for , if it be truly assorted ( in the fourth page of oceana ) that government is founded on propriety , then propriety consists in nature before government , and government is to be fitted to propriety , not propriety to government . how great a sin then would it be against the first and purest notion of justice , to bring in a government ▪ not only different from , but directly destructive unto the setled propriety of oceana , where ( in the the hundredth page ) there are confest to be three hundred persons , whose estates in land exceed the standard of two thousand pounds a year . let me not be choaked with the example of lacedemon , till mr. harrington hath shewn us the power of his perswasion with the nobility of oceana , as lyeurgus with them of lacedemon , to throw up their lands to be parcell'd by his agrarian ( as page the hundredth and thirteenth ) and when that is done , i shall cease to complain of the injustice of it . nor need any one of these three hundred be put to own a shame , for preferring his own interest before that of an whole nation ; for though when government is once fixed , it may be fit to submit private to publick utility , when the question is of chusing a government , every particular man is left unto his own native right , which cannot be prescribed against , by the interest of all the rest of mankinde . how many false dice there are in this throw , ( because you see i have little to do ) will be worth counting . whereas i no-where deny propriety to derive her being from law ; he insinuates that i presume , propriety to be in nature . one. whereas in naturall and domestick vicissitude , i assert , that empire is to follow the legall state of propriety ; he imposeth , as if i had asserted , that empire must follow the naturall state of propriety . two. whereas in violent or forrain vicissitude ( as when the israelites possessed themselves of the land of canaan the gothes and vandals of italy , the frankes of france , the saxons of england ) propriety , in order unto the government to be introduced , is alterable ; he insinuateth as if i had sayd , that , empire must alwayes follow the state of propriety , not as it may be alter'd in that relation , but as it is found . three . whereas the government of oceana is exactly fitted unto propriety , as it was settled before ; he insinuates it to be destructive unto the settled propriety . four. whereas i say , that to put it with the most , they that are proprietors of land in oceana , exceeding two thousand pounds a year , do not exceed ▪ three hundred persons : he saith , that i have confessed they be three hundred . five . whereas i shew that the nobility of lacedemon , upon perswasion of lycurgus , threw up their estates to be parcell'd by his agrarian ; but that , in oceana , it is not needfull or required that any man should part with a farthing , or throw up one shovelfull of his earth : he imposeth , as if i went about to perswade the nobility to throw up their lands . six . whereas i have shewn that no one of those within the three hundred , can have any interest against the agrarian ; he , without shewing what such an interest can be , insinuates that they have an interest against it . seven . whereas the government of oceana goes altogether upon consent , and happeneth not onely to fit private unto publick , but even publick unto private utility , by which meanes it is voyd of all objection ; he insinuates , that it is against private utility . eight . where he saith , that in choosing a government , every man is left , to his own native right . he insinuates that the agrarian , ( which doth no more than fix propriety , as she found it ) is against native right . nine . whereas god hath given the earth unto the sonnes of men , which native right ( as in case a man for hunger take so much as will feed him , and no more of any other mans meat or herd ) prescribeth against legall propriety , and is the cause why the law esteemeth not such an action to be theft ; he insinuates that there is a native right in legall propriety , which cannot be prescribed against by the interest of all the rest of mankinde . t●n . while he pleaded the case of monarchy , levelling was concluded lawfull ; in the case of a common-wealth , ( which askes no such favour ) levelling is concluded unlawfull . eleven . in the reformation , or levell as to monarchy , though propriety subsisted before that levell , yet propiety was to be fitted unto the government , and not the government unto propriety ; but in the case of a common-wealth the government is to be fitted unto propriety , and not propriety unto the government . twelve . in that , any man was bound to relinquish his native right , else how could a prince levell his nobility ; in this , no man is bound to relinquish his native right . thirteen . in that , this same native right might be prescribed against by the prince ; in this , it cannot be prescribed against by the interest of mankind . fourteen . in that , no noble man but ought to own a shame if he preferr'd his interest before that of the prince ; in this , no noble man ought to own a shame for preferring his own interest before that of an whole nation . fifteen . would you have any more ? these fifteen majors and minors , or false dice , are soopt up again , and put all into this conclusion , or box , like themselves . thus the interest of the three hundred is not ballanced with that of a whole nation , but that of some few extravagant spirits : who by making dams in the current of other mens estates , hope to derive some water to their own parched fortunes . calumniare fortiter , nihil adhaerebit . if a river have but one naturall bed or channel , what dam is made in it by this agrarian ? but if a river have had many naturall beds or channels , to which she hath forgotten to reach her brest , and whose mouthes are dryed up or obstructed ; these are dams which the agrarian doth not make , but remove : and what parched fortunes can hereby hope to be watered but theirs onely whose veines having drunk of the same blood , have a right in nature to drink of the same milk ? the law of moses allow'd ▪ the first-born but a double portion : was his an extravagant spirit ? his second throw , is , that the nature of the agrarian is such as cannot be fixed , in regard that the people being intrusted with a vote and a sword , may alter it for the lesse , or come to drown-right levelling . but as to this , in the eighth chapter i have barr'd his dice that being the place in which i thought most proper to give a full answer to this objection . at the third throw , he is extrerm awkward . for whereas the israelites ( notwithstanding the voyages of solomon , and what is said of the ships of tharsis ) during their agrarian , or while they had land , were a common-wealth of husbandmen , and not of merchants , nor came to the excercise of this trade , till they had no land ; or after their dispersion by the emperour adrian : he screws it in , after this manner ▪ as the jews who have no lands are every where great traders ; so the possession of lands being limited by this agrarian , men who are either covetous or ambitious ( as if estates were not gotten by industry , but by covetousness and ambition ) will employ themselves and their estates in forraign traffick , which being in a manner wholly ingrossed by the capitall city of oceana , that city , already too great , will immediately grow into an excess of power and riches very dangerous to the common wealth ; amsterdam being come by such meanes to exercise of late a tyranny in disposal of some publique affaires , much to the prejudice both of the liberty and interest of the rest of the union . an equal , if not greater incommodity to oceana , would be created by the agrarian , which making emporium a city of princes ; would render the countrey a common wealth of cottagers , able to dispute precedence with the beggars-bush . newes , not from tripoli , nor any other corner of the whole world but one . bate me this , and shew me in what other city encrease of houses , or new foundations was ever held a nuysance . this sure is a phancy that regards not the old folks or ancient prudence . one of the blessings that god promised unto abraham , was , that his seed should be multiplyed as the starres of heaven : and the common wealth of rome , by multiplying her seed , came to bound her territory with the ocean and her fame with the starrs of heaven . that such populousness is that without which there can be no great common-wealth , both reason and good authours are clear ; but whether it ought to begin in the countrey , or in the city , is a scruple i have not known them make . that of israel , began in the countrey ; that of rome , in the city . except there be obstruction or impediment by the law , as in turky where the countrey ; and in england ▪ where the city is forbidden to increase . where-ever there be a populous country , for example , france : it makes a populous city as paris ; and where-ever there be a populous city as rome , after the ruine of alba , and amsterdam after the ruine ( as to trade ) of antwerp ; it makes a populous territory , as was that of the rustick tribes , and is that of holland . but the wayes how a populous city comes to make a populous countrey , and how apopulous countrey comes to make a populous city are contrary ; the one fiapning through sucking , as that of the city , and the other through weining , as that of the countrey . for proof of the former , the more mouths there be in a city , the more meat of necessity must be vented by the countrey , and so there will be more corn , more cattel , and better markets , which breeding more labourers , more husbandmen , and richer farmers , bring the countrey so farre from a common wealth of cottagers , that where the blessings of god through the fruitfulness of late years with us , render'd the husbandman unable to dispute precedence with the beggars-bush , his trade thus uninterrupted , in that his markets are certain , goes on with increase of children , of servants , of corn , and of cattel ; for there is no reason why the fields adjoyning unto emporium , being but of an hard soyl , should annually produce two crops , but the populousness of the city . the country then growing more populous , and better stocked with cattel , which also increaseth manure for the land , must proportionably increase in fruitfulness . hence it is , that ( as the romans also were good at such works ) in holland , there is scarce a puddle undrained , nor a bank of sand cast up by the sea , that is not covered with earth , and made fruitful by the people ; these being so strangely , with the growth of amsterdam , increased , as comes perhaps to two parts in three : nor , the agrarian taking place in oceana , would it be longer disputed , whether she might not destroy fishes to plant men. thus a populous city makes a country milch , or populous by sucking ; and whereas some may say , that such a city may suck from forraign parts , it is true enough , and no where more apparent than in amsterdam . but a city that hath recourse unto a forraign dug , ere she had first sucked that of her proper nurse or territory dry , you shall hardly finde ; or finding , ( as in some plantation not yet weyned ) will hardly be able to make that objection hold , seeing it will not lye so much against the populousness of the place , as the contrary . but a populous countrey , makes a populous city by weining ; for when the people increase so much , that the dug of earth can no more , the over-plus must seek some other way of livelihood : which is either arms , such were those of the gothes and vandalls ; or merchandize and manufacture , for which ends it being necessary , that they lay their heads and their stock together , this makes populous cities . thus holland being a small territory , and suckt dry , hath upon the matter weined the whole people , and is thereby become , as it were one city that sucks all the world. but by this meanes ( sayes the considerer ) emporium being already too great ( while indeed amsterdam considering the narrowness of her territory , or the smallness of holland , is much more populous ) would immediately grow into an excess of power and riches , very dangerous unto liberty , an example whereof was seen in the late tyranny of that city ; as if it were not sufficiently known that amsterdam contributes , and hath contributed more unto the defence of the common wealth , or united provinces , than all the rest of the league , and had in those late actions which have been scandalized , resisted not the interest of liberty , but of a lord. that the increase of rome , which was alwayes studied by her best citizens , should make her head too great for her body , or her power dangerous unto the tribes , was never so much as imagined ; and though she were a city of princes , her rustick tribes were ever had in greatest esteem and honour ; insomuch , that a patrician would be of no other . but the authority of ancient common wealths is needless , the praevaricator by his own argumentation or might , layes himself neck and heels . for , saith he , were this agrarian once setled , emporium would be a city of princes , and the nobility so throughly plumed , that they would be just as strong of wing , as wild foul , in moulting time . there would be a city of princes , and yet no nobility . he is so fast that i have pitty on him , if i knew but which way to let him loose . he meanes perhaps , that the merchants growing rich , would be the nobility ; and the nobility growing poor , would be grasiers . but so for ought i know , it was alwayes , or worse , that is , men attained unto riches & honours by such or worse arts , & in poverty made not alwayes so honest retreats . unto all which infirmities of the state , i am deceived , if this agrarian do not apply the proper remedies . for such an agrarian maketh a common wealth for increase : the trade of a common wealth for increase , is arms , arms are not born by merchants , but by noble-men , and gentlemen . the nobility therefore having these arms in their hands , by which provinces are to be acquired , new provinces yield new estates ; so whereas the merchant hath his returns in silk or canvas , the souldier will have his return in land. he that representeth me as an enemy to the nobility , is the man he speaketh of ; for if ever the common-wealth attain unto five new provinces , ( and such a common wealth will have provinces enow ) it is certain , that ( besides honours , magistracies , and the revenues annexed ) there will be more estates in the nobility of oceana , of fourteen thousand pound land a year , then ever were , or can otherwise be of four ; and that without any the least danger unto the common wealth : for if rome had but lookt so farre to it , as to have made good her agrarian in italy , though she had neglected the rest , the wealth of her nobility might have sucked her provinces , but must have enriched the people , & so rather have water'd her roots , then starved and destroyed them as it did . in this case therefore the nobility of oceana , would not moulter like wild foul , but be strong of wing as the eagle . one argument more i have heard urged against the populousness of the capital city which is , that the rich in time of sickness forsaking the place , by which meanes the markets come to fail , the poor least they should starve , will run abroad , and infect the whole countrey . but should a man tell them at paris , or grand cairo ( in the latter whereof , the plague is more frequent and furious , then happens with us ) that they are not to build houses , nor increase so much , least they should have the plague , or that children are not to be born so fast , lest they die , they would think it strange newes . a common wealth is furnished with lawes , and power to adde such as she shall finde needful . in case a city be in that manner visited it is the duty of the country , and of the government , to provide for them by contribution . the difficulty in making the agrarian equall and steady through the rise or fall that may happen in money , which is the fourth throw of the praevaricator ; is that which it might have been for his ease to have taken notice , was long since sufficiently barrd , where it is said , that if a new survey at the present rent were taken , an agrarian ordaining that no man should thenceforth hold above so much land as is there valued at the rate , however money might alter would be equall and steddy enough . his last cast is , that the agrarian would make war against universall and immemoriall custom , which being without doubt more praevalent then that of reason , there is nothing of such difficulty as to perswade men at once , and crudely , that they and their fore-fathers have been in an errour . wise men , i see , may differ in judgement or counsell , for , saith sir francis bacon . surely every medicine is an innovation , and he that will not apply new remedyes , must expect new evills : for time is the greatest innovator : and if time of course alter things to the worse , and wisedome and counsell may not alter them to the better , what must be the end ? but the case of the agrarian receiveth equall strength from each of these counsellors or opinions ; from the latter , in that it goes upon grounds which time hath not innovated for the worse , but for the better , and so according to the former comes not to have been at once , and crudely perswaded , but introduced by custome , now grown universall and immemoriall . for who remembers the gentry of this nation to have worne the blew coates of the nobility , or the lower sort of people to have lived upon the smoak of their kitchins ? to the contrary , is it not now the universall custome for men to rely upon their own fortunes or industry , and not to put their trust in princes , seeking in their liberality or dependance the meanes of living ? the praevaricator might as well jump into his great grand-fathers old breeches , and perswade us that he is ( a la mode ) or in the new cutt , as that the wayes of our forefathers would agree with our customes . doth not every man now see , that if the kings in those dayes had settled the estates of the nobility by a law , restraining them from selling their land , such a law had been an agrarian , and yet not warring against their antient customes , but preserving them ? wherefore neither doth the agrarian proposed , taking the ballance of estates as she now finceth them , make warre against , but confirme the present customes . the onely objection that can seem in this place to lye , is , that whereas it hath been the custome of oceana that the bulke of the estate , should descend unto the eldest sonne , by the agrarian , he cannot in case he have more brothers inherit above two thousand pounds a year in land , or an equall share ▪ but neither doth this , whether you regard the parents or the children , make warre with custome . for putting the case the father have twenty thousand pounds a year in land , he goes not the lesse in his custome or way of life for the agrarian , because for this he hath no lesse : and if he have more or fewer sonnes to whom this estate descends by equall or unequall portions , neither do they go lesse in their wayes or customes of life for the agrarian , because they never had more . but , says aristotle , ( speaking of the ostracism as it supplyes the defect of an agrarian ) this course is as necessary unto kings , as unto common wealths : by this meanes the monarchyes of turky and of spaine preserve their ballance ; through the neglect of this hath that of the nobility of oceana been broken ; and this is it which the praevaricator in advising that the nobility be no farther levell'd than will serve to keep the people under , requires of his prince . so , that an agrarian is necessary to government , be it what it will , is on all hands concluded . chap. xii . whether courses or rotation be necessary unto a well-ordered common-wealth ? in which is contained the courses or pare●bole of israel before the captivivity , together , with the epitome of athens and venice . one bout more , and we have done ; this ( as reason good ) will be upon wheeles or rotation , for , as the agrarian answereth unto the equality of the foundation or root , so doth rotation unto the equality of the superstructures or branches of a common-wealth . equall rotation is equall vicissitude in , or succession unto , magistracy confer'd for equal termes , injoyning such equal vacations , as cause the government to take in the body of the people , by parts succeeding others , through free election , or suffrage of the whole . the contrary whereunto is prolongation of magistracy , which trashing the wheel of rotation , destroyes the life , or natural motion , of a common wealth . the praevaricator , what ever he hath done for himself , hath done this for me , that it will be out of doubt , whether my principles be capable of greater obligation , or confirmation , than by having objections made against them . nor have i been altogether ingrateful , or nice of my labour but gone farre ( much farther then i needed ) about , that i might return with the more valuable present , unto him that sent me on the errant ; i shall not be short of like proceeding upon the present subject , but rather over . rotation in a common wealth , is of the magistracy ; of the senate ; of the people ; of the magistracy and the people ; of the magistracy and the senate ; or of the magistracy of the senate , and of the people ; which in all , come unto six kinds . for example of rotation in the magistracy , you have the judge of israel , called in hebrew , shophet , the like magistracy after the kings ithobal and baal came in use with the tyrians , from these with their posterity the carthaginians , who also called their supreme magistrates , being in number two , and for their terme annuall , shophetim , which the latines by a softer pronunciation render suffetes . the shophet or judge of israel , was a magistrate , not that i can finde , obliged unto any certain terme , throughout the book of judges ; nevertheless , it is plain , that his election was occasional , and but for a time , after the manner of a dictator . true it is , that eli and samuel , ruled all their lives , but upon this , such impatience in the people followed through the corruption of their sonnes , as was the main cause of the succeeding monarchy . the magistrates in athens ( except the areopagites being a judicatory ) were all upon rotation . the like for lacedemon and rome , except the kings in the former , who were indeed hereditary , but had no more power than the duke in venice , where all the rest of the magistrates ( except the procuratori ; whose magistracy is but meer ornament ) are also upon rotation . for rotation of the senate you have athens , the achaeans , aetolians , lyceans , the amphictionium , and the senate of lacedemon reproved , in that it was for life , by aristotle : modern examples of like kind , are the diet of switz , but especially the senate of venice . for the rotation of the people , you have first israel , where the congregation , which the greeks call ecclesia , the latines comitia , or concio , having a twofold capacity ; first , that of an army , in which they were the constant guard of the countrey ; and secondly , that of a representative , in which they gave the vote of the people , at the creation of their lawes , or election of their magistrates , was monethly . now the children of israel after their number , to wit , the chief fathers , and captains of thousands and hundreds , and their officers that served the king in any matter of the courses which came in and went out moneth by moneth , throughout all the moneths of the year , every course , were twenty and four thousand . such a multitude there was of military age , that without inconvenience , four and twenty thousand were every moneth in arms , whose terme expiring others succeeded , and so others , by which meanes the rotation of the whole people came about in the space of one year . the tribunes , or commanders of the tribes in arms , or of the prerogative for the moneth , are named in the following part of the chapter , to the sixteenth verse ; where begins the enumeration of the princes , ( though god and ashur , for what reason i know not , be omitted ) of the tribes , remaining in their provinces , where they judged the people , and as they received orders , were to bring or send such farther enforcement or recruits , as occasion required unto the army ; after these , some other officers are mentioned . there is no question to be made , but this rotation of the people , together with their prerogative , or congregation , was preserved by the monethly election of two thousand deputies in each of the twelve tribes , which in all , came to four and twenty thousand ; or let any man shew how otherwise it was likely to be done , the nature of their office being to give the vote of the people , who therefore sure must have chosen them . by these , the vote of the people was given to their lawes , and at elections of their magistrates . unto their lawes , as where david proposeth the reduction of the ark. and david consulted with the captains of thousands and hundreds , and with every leader . and david said unto all the congregation of israel , if it seem good unto you , and it be of the lord god , let us send abroad to our brethren every where ( the princes of the tribes in their provinces ) that are left in the land of israel , and with them also to the priests and levites , which are in their cities and suburbs , that they may gather themselves unto us ; and let us bring again the ark of our god to us ; for we enquired not at it in the dayes of saul . and all the congregation ( gave their suffrage in the affirmative ) said that they would do so ; for the thing was right in the eyes of the people . ( nulla lex sibi soli conscientiam justitiae sua debet , sed et à quibus obsequium expectat ) now that the same congregation or representative gave the vote of the people also in the election of priests officers and magistrates , moreover david and the captaines of the host separated to the service of the sonnes of a●aph , and of heman , and of jeduthun , who should prophesy with harps with psalteryes & with cymballs . but upon the occasion untowhich we are more especially beholding for the preservation and discovery of this admirable order ( david having proposed the businesse in a long and pious speech , ) the congregation made solomon the sonne of david king the second time and annoynted him unto the lord to be chief , governor , and zadok to be preist . for as to the first time that solomon was made king , it happened , through the sedition of adoniae to have been done in hast and tumultuously by those onely of jerusalem ; and the reason why zadoc is here made priest is that abiathar was put out for being of the conspiracy with adonia . i may expect ( by such objections as they afford me ) it should be alleadged , that to prove an order in a common-wealth , i instance in a monarchy ; as if there were any thing in this order monarchiall , or that could , if it had not been so received from the common-wealth , have been introduced by the kings , to whom in the judgement of any sober man ( the praevaricator onely excepted , who hath been huckling about some such councill for his prince ) no lesse could have follow'd , upon the first frown of the people , then did in rehoboam , who , having used them roughly , was deposed by the congregation or the major part . it is true , that while israel was an army , the congregation , as it needed not to assemble by way of election or representative , so i believe it did not , but that by all israel assembled to this end , should be meant the whole people after they were planted upon their lots , and not their representative , which in a politicall sense is as properly so called , were absurd and impossible , nor need i go upon presumption onely , be the same never so strong , seeing it is said in scripture of the korathites , that they were keepers of the gates of the tabernacle , and their fathers being over the host of the lord , were keepers of the entry . that is ( according to the interpretation of grotius ) the korathites were now keepers of the gates , as it appears in the book of numbers , their ancestors the kohathites had been in camp , or while israel was yet an army . but our translation is lame of the right foot as to the true discovery of the antient manner of this service , which according to the septuagint and the vulgar latine was thus , they were keepers of the gates of the tabernacle ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , & familiae eorum per vices ) and their fathers by turnes or rotation . so that offices and services by courses turnes or rotation are plainly more auntient then kings in the common-wealth of israel ; though it be true that when the courses or rotation of the congregation or representative of the people were first introduced , be as hard to shew , as it would be how , after the people were once planted upon their lotts , they could be otherwise assembled . if writers argue well and lawfully from what the sanhedrim was in the institution by jehoshaphat unto what it had more auntiently been , to argue from what the congregation was in the institution by david , unto what it had more auntiently been , is sufficiently warranted . these things rightly considered , there remaines little doubt , but we have the courses of israel for the first example of rotation in a popular assembly . now to come from the hebrew unto the grecian prudence , the same is approved by aristotle , which he exemplifies in the common-wealth of thales milesius , where the people , he saith assembled ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) by turnes or rotation . nor is the roman prudence without some shadow of the like proceeding , where the prerogative ( pro tempore ) with the jure-vocatae being made by lot , gave frequently the suffrage of the whole people . but the gothick prudence in the policy of the third state , runs altogether upon the collection of a representative by the suffrage of the people , and though not so diligently regulated , by terms and vacations as to a standing assembly were necessary , by turns , rotation , parembole , or courses ; as in the election of the late house of commons , and the constitutive vicissitude of the knights and burgeses is known by sufficient experience . when the rotation of a common-wealth is both in the magistracy and the people , i reckon it to be of a fourth kinde , as in israel , where both the judge and the congregation were so elected . the fifth kinde is when the rotation of a common-wealth is in the magistracy and the senate , as in those of athens , of the achaeans , of the aetohians , of the lycians , and of venice ; upon which examples , rather for the influence each of them , at least athens , may have upon the following book , than any great necessity from the present occasion , i shall inlarge my self in this place . the common wealth of athens was thus administred . the senate of the beane being the proposing-assembly ( for that of the areopagites , called also a senate , was a judicatory ) consisted of four hundred citizens chosen by lot , which was performed with beanes , these were annually removed all at once . by which meanes athens became frustrated of the natural and necessary use of an aristocracy , while neither her senators were chosen for their parts , nor remained long enough in this function , to acquire the right understanding of their proper office. these thus elected , were subdivided by lot into four equal parts , called prytanys , each of which for one quarter of the year was in office. the prytany or prytans in office elected ten presidents , called proedri , out of which proedri or presidents , they weekly chose one provost of the council , who was called the epistata . the epistata and the proedri were the more peculiar proposers to the prytans , and to the prytans it belonged especially to prepare businesse ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) for the senate : they gave also audience unto any that would propose any thing concerning the common wealth , which if , reported by the prytans , it were approved by the senate , the party that proposed might promulgate the business , and promulgation being made , the congregation assembled , and determined of it . ( sic data concio laelio est , processit ille & graecus apud graecos , non de culpa sua dixit , sed de paena quaestus est , porrexerunt manus , psephisma natum est ) . the prytans and their magistrates , had right to assemble the senate ; and propose unto them ; and what the senate determined upon such a proposition , if forthwith to be offer'd unto the people , as in private cases , was called proboulema ; but if not to be proposed , till the people had a year's tryall of it , as was the ordinary way in order unto lawes to be enacted , it was called psephisma ; each of which words with that difference , signifies a decree . a decree of the senate in the latter sense had for one year , the power of a law , after which tryall , it belonged to the thesmothetae ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to hang it in writing upon the statues of the heroes , and assemble the congregation . these magistrates were of the number of the archons , which in all were nine , the chief more peculiarly so called ▪ was archon eponymus , he by whose name the year was reckon'd or denominated ( his magistracy being of a civil concernment ) the next was the king , a magistrate of a spirituall concernment ) the third the polemarch ( whose magistracy was of a military concernment ) : the other six were the thesmothetae , who had several functions common with the nine , others peculiar or proper to themselves , as ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to give the people ( by ply-carts ) notice when the judicatories were to assemble , that is , when the people were to assemble in that capacity , and to judge according to the law made ; or when the senate , or the people were to assemble upon an ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) a crime that was not provided against by the law , as that of alcibiades , ( the wits about that time in athens , being most of them atheists ) for laughing at ceres discovering her secrets , and shaving of the mercury's . if an archon or demagogue were guilty of such a crime , it belonged unto the cognizance of the senate , otherwise unto that of the people , whom the thesmothetae were also in like manner to warn , when they were to come unto the suffrage . these six like the electors in venice , presided at all elections of magistrates , whether made by the lott as the judges , or by suffrage , as the new archons , the strategus or generall , and most of the rest . they also had the hearing and introducing of all causes into the judicatories . but the right of assembling the ecclesia or congregation belonged to the prytans , by whom the senate proposed unto the people . the congregation consisted of all them that were upon the role of the lexiarcha , that is to say , of the whole people having right unto the city ▪ the prytans seated upon a tribunal were presidents of this assembly ; the assembly having sacrificed & made oath of fidelity unto the common-wealth ; the proedri or presidents of the prytans , proposed by authority of the senate unto the people in this manner . july the th pol●cles being archon , and the tribe of pandion in the prytaneate , demosthenes , peaneus , thought thus , or was of this opinion . the same custom whereby the first proposer subscribes his opinion or parte with his name , is at this day in venice . proposition being made , such of the people as would speak , were called to the pulpit ; they , that were fifty years of age , or upwards , were to come first , and the younger afterwards ; which custom of prating in this manner , made excellent orators or demagogs , but a bad common wealth . from this that the people had not only the result of the common wealth , but the debate also ; athens is called a democracie , and this kind of government is opposed unto that of lacedemon , which because the people there had not the power of debate , but of result only , was called aristocracy , sometimes oligarchy : thus the greeks commonly are to be understood to distinguish of these two ; while according to my principles , ( if you like them ) debate in the people maketh anarchy , and where they have the result , and no more , the rest being mannaged by a good aristocracy , it maketh that which is properly and truly to be called democracy , or popular government . neither is this opinion of mine new , but according to the judgement of some of the athenians themselves ; for saith isocrates in his oration unto the areopagites for reformation of the athenian government ; i know the main reason , why the lacedemonians flourish , to be , that their common wealth is popular . but to return . as many of the people , as would , having shewed their eloquence , and with these the demagogues , who were frequently bribed , concealed their knavery ; the epistata , or provost of the proedri , put the decree or question unto the vote , and the people gave the result of the common wealth by their chirotonia , that is , by holding up their hands ; the result thus given , was the law , or psephisma of the people . now for the functions of the congregation , they were divers ; as first , election of magistrates , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) ; namely , the archons , the strategus , or generall , the field-officers , the admiralls , with divers others , all , or the chief of them annuall , and commonly upon termes and vacations , though it be true , ( as plutarch hath it ) that phocion was strategus four years together , having that honour still put upon him by the congregation , without his seeking . the next office of this assembly , was to elect judges into five courts or judicatories , for the people being in the bulk too unweildy a body for the performance of this duty , they exercised the supreme judicature , by way of representative , into which election was made by lottery , in such manner , that five hundred one thousand , or . of them ( according to the importance of the occasion ) being above thirty yeares of age , and within the rest of the qualifications in that case provided by the law , became the soveraign judicatory , called the heliaea . in all elections , whether by lot or suffrage , the thesonothetae were presidents , and ordered the congregation . farthermore , if they would amend , alter , repeal , or make a law , this also was done by a representative , of which no man was capable , that had not been of the heliaea , for the rest elected out of the whole people : this amounting unto one thousand , was called the nomothetae or legislators . no law received by the people , could be abrogated but by the nomothetae ; by these any athenian ( having obtained leave of the senate ) might abrogate a law , provided , that withall , he put another in the place of it . these lawes the proedri of the prytans , were to put unto the suffrage . first , the old , whether it agreed with the athenian people , or not ? then the new ; and whether of these hapned to be chirotonized or voted by the nomothetae , was ratified ; according to that piece of the athenian law cited by demosthenes against timocrates ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) what hath been said of the common-wealth of athens , in relation unto the present purpose , amounts unto thus much , that not onely the senate and the magistracy in this policy was upon rotation , but even the people also , at least , as to the nomothetae , or their legislative power , and the supreme judicatory of the heliaea , each of these being a representative , constituted of one thousand or fifteen hundred cittizens . but for what followes in the second book it is necessary that i observe in this place the proceeding of certain divines , who indeavour to make use of this common-wealth for ends of their own ▪ as particularly doctor seaman ; who in his book called four propositions , argues after this manner . chirotonia ( as suidas hath it ) signifies both plebiscitum a law made by the people , and psephisma . now ( saith he ) psephisma is the ordinary word used in the attick lawes and in demosthenes , for ( senatesconsultum ) a law made by the senate ; whence he drawes this conclusion . as , when the people make a law , they are said to chirotonize ; so may the rulers in like manner , in those lawes that are made by themselves alone . these wayes with divines are too bad . the words of suidas are these ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) chirotonia is election or ratification by the many : which expresly excludeth the few or the senate from being otherwise contained by the word chirotonia , than a part is by the whole . nor hath the authour the word psephisma , or plebiscitum in the place . i would faine know what other word there is in greeke for plebiscitum but psephisma ; and yet the doctor puts it upon suidas that he distinguishteh between these two , and , taking that for granted where he findes psephisma in demosthenes and the attick laws , will have it to signifie no more then a decree of the senate . it is true that some decrees of the senate were so called , but those of the people had no other name , and when ever you find psephisma in demosthenes or the attick laws , for a law , there is nothing more certaine then that it is to be understood of the people , for to say that a law in a popular commonwealth can be made without the people , is a contradiction . the second passage , is a what think you of these words of pollux ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which the doctor having englished in this manner ; the thesmothetae do privately prescribe when judgment is to be given , and promulge publick accusations , and suffrages unto the people , askes you whose suffrages were these , if not the ruler's ? by which strange construction , where pollux having first related in what part the function of the thesmothetae , was common with that of the nine archons , comes ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to shew you what was peculiar to themselves , namely to give notice when the heliaea or other indicatoryes were to assemble ; the dr. renders it , they do privately prescribe : as if the session of a court of justice , and such an one as contained a thousand judges , being the representative of the whole people , were to be privately prescribed , then to this private prescribing of justice , he addes that they do publickly promulge ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) citations upon crimes not within the written law ; as if private prescription and publick promulgation could stand together . next whereas promulgation in the very nature of the word signifies an act before a law made , he presumes the law to be first made by the rulers , and then promulgated by the thesmothetae to the people , kim kam to the experience of all common-wealths , the nature of promulgation , and the sense of his authour , whose words as i shew'd before , declare it to have been the proper or peculiar office of the thesmothetae to give the people notice when they were to assemble for judicature , or when for giving their chirotonia or suffrage , by promulgation of the cause ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) upon which they were to determine . for the fourth passage the dr. quoting a wrong place for these words , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) that the nomothetae ( being a representative , as i shewd ▪ of the whole people , chosen by lot , and in number one thousand ) chirotonized or gave the legislative suffrage ; thence inferrs ▪ that the rulers chirotonized , voted or made lawes by themselves without the people : which is , as if one should say that the prerogative tribe in rome , or the house of commons in england , gave their vote to such or such a law , therefore it was made by the rulers alone , and not by the people of rome or of england . for the fourth passage , stevens quotes demosthenes at large in these words , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) . this the doctor interprets of an officer ; to which i shall say more , when he shews me where the sentence is , or what went before : for as yet i do not know of an officer in any common wealth , whose election was indifferently made , either by the senate , or by the people ; nor do i think the doctor hath lookt farther for this , than stephens , who hath not interpreted it . the fifth passage is , that a decree of the senate in athens , had the force of a law for one year , without the people . so had the edicts of the praetores in rome ; but i would fain know , whence the senate in athens , or the praetors in rome , originally derived this right ( which was no more then that such lawes might be probationers , and so better understood , when they came to the vote ) but from the chirotonia , or suffrage of the people . the sixth passage , stops the mouths of such as having nothing to say unto the matter of my writing , pick quarrels with the manner or freedom of it , the liberty i take in the defence of truth , seeing the doctor takes a greater liberty upon other termes , while he bids his antagonist ( one that desended the cause now in my hand ) go and consult his authours , namely , stephens and budaeus again ; for , saith he , you wrong those learned men , while you would have us believe that they were as ignorant of the greek story as your self , or that things are to be found in them , which are not . to which confidence , i have better leave to say , that the doctor should do well to take no worse counsel than he gives . but what is become of my praevaricator , i have quite lost him , else i should have intreated him to compare his notes out of my sermon , with these out of the doctors : or retract that same affectation , in saying , i know not , but mr. harrington has conceiv'd a great unkindness for the clergy . as if these their stratagems , with which they make perpetual warre against the unwary people , did not concern a man that hath undertaken the cause of popular government . the policy of the achaeans consisted of divers common-wealths under one , which was thus administred , the cities sent their deputies twice every year of course , and oftner if they were summoned by their strategus , or their demiurges , to the place appointed . the strategus was the supreme magistrate , both military and civill , and the demiurges being ten , were his council , all annuall magistrates elected by the people . this council thus constituted , was called the synarchy , and performed like duties , in relation unto the senate , consisting of the deputies sent by their peculiar soveraignties or cities , as the prytans unto that in athens . the policies of the aetolians and lycians , are so near the same again , that in one you have all ; so both the senates and the magistracy of these common wealths , were upon rotation . to conclude , with venice . the common wealth of venice , consisteth of four parts , the great council , the senate , the collegio , and the signiory . the great council is the aggregate body of the whole people , or citizens of venice , which for the paucity of their number , and the antiquity of their extraction are called gentlemen , or noble venetians ; every one of which , at five and twenty years of age hath right of session and suffrage in this council ; which right of suffrage , because throughout this common-wealth , in all debates and elections , it is given by the ballot , is called , the right of ballotting , whereby this council being the soveraign power , createth all the rest of the orders , councils , or magistracies ; hath constitutely the ultimate result , both in cases of judicature , and constitution of lawes . the senate called also the pregati , consisteth of sixty senators , properly so styled , whereof the great council electeth six on a day , beginning so long before the moneth of october , that these being all chosen by that time , then receive their magistracy ; it consisteth also of sixty more , called the juncta , which are elected by the scrutiny of the old senate , that is , by the senate proposing , and the great council resolving ; the rest of their creation , is after the same manner with the former . in the sixty of the senate , there cannot be above three of any one kinred , or family , nor in the junta so many , unless there be fewer in the former . these magistracies are all annuall , but without intervall , so that it is at the pleasure of the great council , whether a senator having finished his year , they will elect him again . the collegio is a council , consisting more especially of three orders of magistrates , called in their language saui as the saui grandi , to whose cognizance or care belong the whole affaires of sea and land ; the saui di terra ferma , to whose care and cognizance belong the affaires of the land , and the saui di mare , to whose cognizance appertain the affaires of the sea , and of the islands . these are elected by the senate , not all at once ; but for the saui grandi , who are six , by three at a time , with the interposition of three moneths ; and for the saui di terra ferma , and the saui di mare , who are each five , after the same manner ▪ save only that the first election consisteth of three , and the second of two ; each order of the saui elects weekly one provost , each of which provosts hath right in any affair belonging unto the cognizance of his order , to propose unto the collegio . audience of embassadors , and matters of forraign negotiation , belong properly unto this council . the signiory consisteth of the duke , and of his counsellors . the duke is a magistrate created by the great council for life , to whom the common wealth acknowledgeth the reverence due unto a prince , and all her acts run in his name , though without the counsellors he have no power at all while they can perform any function of the signiory without him . the counsellors , whose magistracy is annual , are elected by the scrutiny of the senate ▪ naming one out of each tribe , ( for the city is locally divided into six tribes ) and the great council approving ; so the counsellors are six , whose function in part is of the nature of masters of requests , having withall , power to grant certain priviledges : but their greatest preheminence is , that all , or any one of them , may propose unto any council in the common wealth . the signiory hath session and suffrage in the collegio , the collegio hath session and suffrage in the senate , and the senate hath session and suffrage in the great council . the signiory , or the provosts of the saui , have power to assemble the colledge , the colledge hath power to assemble the senate , and the senate hath power to assemble the great council ; the signiori , but more peculiarly the provosts of the saui , ( in their own offices and functions ) have power to propose unto the colledge , the colledge hath power to propose unto the senate , and the senate hath power to propose unto the great council : what ever is thus proposed and resolved , either by the senate ( for sometimes , through the security of this order , a proposition goes no farther ) or by the great council , is ratifide , or becomes the law of the common-wealth . over and above these orders ▪ they have three judicatories , two civill , and one criminall , in each of which , forty gentlemen elected by the great council , are judges for the terme of eight moneths ; to these judicatories , belong the avogadori and the auditori , who are magistrates , having power to hear causes apart , and , as they judge fitting , to introduce them into the courts . if a man tell me , that i omit many things , he may perceive i write an epitome , in which no more should be comprehended , then that which understood may make a man understand the rest . but of these principal parts , consisteth the whole body of admirable venice . the consiglio de dieci , or council of ten , being that which partaketh of dictatorian power ▪ is not a limb of her , but as it were a sword in her hand . this council ( in which the signiory hath also session and suffrage ) consisteth more peculiarly of ten annuall magistrates , created by the great council , who afterwards elect three of their own number by lott , which so elected are called capi de dieci , their magistracy being monethly ; again , out of the three capi , one is taken by lot , whose magistracy is weekly , this is he , who over against the tribunall in the great council , fits like another duke , and is called , the provost of the dieci . it belongs to these three magistrates , to assemble the councill of dele ten which they are obliged to do weekly of course , and oftner as they see occasion . the councill being assembled , any one of the signiory , or two of the capi may propose to it , the power which they now exercise , ( & wherin for their assistance they create three magistrates called the grand inquisitors ) consists in the punishment of certaine heynous crimes ▪ especially that of treason ; in relation whereunto they are as it were sentinells , standing upon the guard of the common-wealth : but constitutively with the addition of a junta , consisting of other fifteen together with some of the chiefe magistrates , having right in cases of important speed or secrecy unto this councill ; they had the full and absolute power of the whole common-wealth , as dictator . that venice either transcribed the whole and every part of her constitution out of athens and lacedemon ; or happeneth to be framed , as if she had so don , is most apparent . the result of this common-wealth is in the great councill , and the debate in the senate ▪ so was it in lacedemon . a decree made by the senate of athens had the power of a law for one yeare without the people , at the end whereof the people might revoke it : a decree of the senate of venice stands good without the great councill , unlesse these see reason to revoke it . the prytans , were a councill preparing businesse for the senate ; so is the collegio in venice ; the presidents of the prytans were the ten proedri ; those of the collegio are the three provosts of the saui. the archons or princes of athens being nine , had a kind of soveraigne inspection upon all the orders of the common-wealth , so hath the signiory of venice consisting of nine besides the duke . the quarancys in venice are judicatoryes of the nature of the heliaea in athens ; and as the thesmothetae heard and introduced the causes into that judicatory , so do the avogadori and the auditori into these . the consiglio de dieci in venice is not of the body but an appendix of the common-wealth ; so was the court of the ephori in lacedemon , and as these had power to put a king a magistrate or any delinquent of what degree soever unto death , so hath the consiglio de dieci . this again is wrought up with the capi di dieci , and the weekly provost , as were the prytans with the proedri , and the weekly epistata , and the ballot is lineally descended from the beane ; yet is venice in the whole , and in every part , a farre more exquisite policy than either athens or lacedemon . a politicall is like a naturall body . commonwealths resemble and differ , as men resemble and differ ; among whom you shall not see two faces , or two dispositions , that are alike . peter and thomas in all their parts are equally men , and yet peter and thomas of all men may be the most unlike ; one may have his greater strength in his armes , the other in his leggs ; one his greater beauty in his soule , the other in his body ; one may be a fool , the other wise ▪ one valiant , the other cowardly . these two which at a distance you will nor know , one from the other ; when you looke nearer , or come to be better acquainted with you will never mistake . our considerer ( who in his epistle , would make you believe , that oceana is but a meer transcription out of venice , ) hath companions like himself , and how near they look in matters of this nature , is plain , while one knoweth not jethro from moses , and the other takes a state of civill warre , to be the best modell of a civill government . let a man look near , and the shall not finde any one order in oceana ( the ballot only excepted ) that hath not as much difference from , or resemblance unto any one order in rome or venice , as any one order in rome or venice hath from , or to , any one order in athens or lacedemon : which different temper of the parts , must of necessity in the whole , yield a result , a soul or genius , altogether new in the world , as embracing the arms of rome , and the counsels of venice ; and yet neither obnoxious unto the turbulency of the one , nor the narrowness of the other . but the sum of what hath been said of venice , as to the business in hand , comes to no more , then that the senate and the magistracy of this common wealth are upon rotation . no more : nay i am well , if it come to so much . for the praevaricator catching me up , where i say , that , for all this , the greater magistracies in venice are continually wheeled through a few hands , tells me , that i have confessed it to be otherwise . i have indeed confessed , that albeit , the magistracies are all confes'd for certain termes ; yet those termes do not necessitate vacations , that is , the terme of a magistracy being expired , the party that bore it , is capable upon a new election of bearing it again without intervall or vacation ; which doth not altogether trash the rotation of the common wealth , though it render the same very imperfect . this infirmity of venice , deriveth from a complication of causes , none of which is incident unto a common wealth , consisting of the many : wherefore there lies no obligation upon me , to discover the reason in this place . but on the contrary , seeing , let me shew things never so new , they are slighted as old ; i have an obligation in this place , to try whether i may get esteem ▪ by concealing some thing . what is said , every body knew before ; this is not said ▪ who knowes it ? a riddle . riddle me , riddle me , what is this ? the magistracies in venice ( except such as are rather of ornament then of power ) are all annuall , or at most biennial . no man whose terme is expired , can hold his magistracy longer , but by a new election . the elections are most of them made in the great council , and all by the ballot , which is the most equall and impartial way of suffrage . and yet the greater magistracies are perpetually wheeled , through a few hands . if i be worthy to give advice unto a man that would study the politickes ; let him understand venice , he that ▪ understands venice right , shall go nearest to judge ( notwithstanding the difference that is in every policy ) right of any government in the world . now the assault of the considerer deriving but from some ( pique , or ) emulation , which of us should be the abler polititian ; it the councill of state had the curiosity to know either that , or who understands venice , this riddle would make the discovery ; for he that cannot easily unfold this kiddle , doth not understand her . the sixth kinde of rotation is when a common-wealth goes upon it in all her orders , senate , people , and magistracy . such an one taking in the many , and being fixed upon the foot of a steady agrarian ▪ hath attain'd un●o perfect equality . but of this , example there is none , or you must accept of oceana . the rotation of oceana is of two parts , the one of the electors which is annuall , and the other of the elected which is trienniall . speaking of electors in this sense , i mean as the great councill in venice are electors of all other orders , councills , or magistrates . but the common-wealth of oceana taking in the whole people cannot , as doth the great councill of venice ( wherein they that have right are but a few ) attain unto this capacity at one step : for which cause she taketh three steps ; one at the parishes , where every fifth elder is annually elected by the whole people ▪ ( there is no doubt but there was some such order in israel whereby the monethly rotation of her congregation or perogative , by election of two thousand in each tribe , was preserved ) . the next step she takes is at the hundred , whereby election of officers and magistrates , the troopes , chosen at the parishes , are well near formed . her third step , is at the tribe , where the whole body of her deputies are in exact forme , discipline , and function , headed by proper officers and magistrates , these altogether consisting of one fifth part of the whole people . this rotation , being in it self annuall , comes in regaurd of the body of the people to be quinquennial or such as in the space of five years gives every man his turn in the power of election . but though every man be so capable of being an electpr ▪ that he must have his turn , yet every man is not so capable of being elected into those magistracies , that are soveraigne or have the leading of the whole common-wealth , that it can be safe to lay a necessity , that every man must take his turn in these also ; but it is enough that every man , who in the judgement and conscience of his country is fit , may take his turn . wherefore upon the conscience of the electors , ( so constituted as hath been shewn ) it goes to determine , who shall partake of soveraign magistracy , or be , at the assembly of a tribe , elected into the senate or prerogative ; which assemblyes are so trienniall , that one third part of each falling every year , and another being elected , the parliament is thereby perpetuated . such was the constitution of those councills which the praevaricator hath confessed he alwayes thought admirable : but now the toy takes him to be quite of another minde ; for , saith he , that , ancient republicks have through a malitious jealously ( let them take it among them ) made it unlawful even for persons of the clearest merit to continue long in command , but have by perpetuall vicissitude substituted new men in the government is manifested enough ; but with what successe they did this , will best appear by veturius , varro , and mancinus . he is still admirable : one would wonder what he meanes , if it be that there were but three weak or unfortunate generals in the whole course of rome ; how strange is it to urge this as an argument against rotation , which is as strong an one as can be urged , for rotation ? if the romans by this way of election , having experience of an able generall , knew ever after , where to have him ; or lighting upon one they found not so fit for their purpose , could in the compasse of one year , be rid of him of course , without dishonor or reproach to him , taking thereby a warning to come no more there ; was this a proceeding to favour malice ; or such an one as removing the cause of malice , left no root for such a branch or possibility of like effect ? certainly by this assertion the praevaricator hath joled his presumptuous head ; not onely against the prudence of auntient common-wealths , but of god himself in that of israel . veturius , varro , and mancinus ( though some of them cannot be at all points excused ) by this mark upon them , may be thought hardlier of , than is needfull ; for which cause there being that also in their stories , which is neither unpleasant nor unprofitable , i shall endeavour to make the reader somewhat better acquainted with them . one of the greatest blowes rome ever received was by pontius , captain generall of the samnites , who having drawn her consulls , posthumius and veturius , by stratagem into the fastenses of caudium , a valley of narrow entrance , and shut up the mouth of it by possessing him self of the onely passage , the rest being invironed with insuperable rocks , the samnite came to have both the armyes , and so upon the matter , the whole strength ( in those dayes ) of rome inevitably at his discretion . hereupon , having leisure and being desirous ( in a matter of such moment ) of good advice he dispatcht a messenger unto his father herennius the ablest counsellor in samnium , to know what might be his best course with the romans now inavoydably at his mercy , who answered that he should open the passe , and let them return untouched . the young generall amazed at this counsell , desired farther direction ; whereupon herennius for the second time made answer that he should cut them off to a man. but the generall upon the strange disagreement of such opinions , having his fathers age ( for he was very old ) in suspition took a third course , which neither ( according to the first advice of wise herennius ) making friends ; nor ( according unto the second ) destroying enemies , became as he prophesyed the utter ruine of the common-wealth of samnium . for the romans being dismissed safe , but ignominiously , the senate upon their return , fell into the greatest streight and consternation , that had been known among them . on the one side to live and not revenge such an affront was intolerable ; on the other to revenge it , was against the faith of the consulls , whose necessity ( the losse of two armies lying upon it ) had in truth forced them to accept of a dishonourable league with the samnites . now not the armies , but the senate it self was in caudium , not a man of them could find the way out of this vale invironed with rocks , but he only that could not finde it out of the other , posthumius , who having first shewed , that neither warre nor peace could be so made , as to ingage the common wealth ( injussu populi ) without the command of the people , declared that the senate returning the consuls , with such other as had consented unto so wicked and dishonourable a peace , naked , and bound unto the samnites , were free , nor ceased till the senate ( thereunto prest by the necessity of the common wealth ) resolving accordingly , hee , veturius , and some of the tribunes , were delivered unto the samnites ; who nevertheless , to hold the romans unto their league , dismissed them with safety . the disputes on either side that arose hereupon , and comming to arms , ended with the destruction of samnium , i omit : that which as to the present occasion , is material , is , the reputation of the consuls , and veturius , though he were not the leading man , being for the rest , as deep in the action as posthumius ; the people were so farre from thinking themselves deceived in this choice , that the consuls were more honour'd in rome , for having lost , then pontius in samnium for having won the day at caudium . i do not rob graves , nor steal winding-sheets ; my controversies are not but with the living , with none of these that have not shewed themselves best able for their own defence ; nor yet with such , but in the prosecution of truths opposed by them unto the dammage of mankind ; yet the praevaricator accuseth me of rude charges , what are his then in defence of falshood , and against such as cannot bite ? or whether of these is the more noble ? for varro , who being consul of rome , lost the battail of cannae unto hanibal captain general for the carthag nians , though without cowardize , yet by rashness , he is not so excusable . but for mancinus , brought ( as was posthumous , by the samnites ) unto dishonourable condition ▪ by megera ▪ captain general of the numantines , there be excuses : as first the numantines , for their number not exceeding four thousand fighting men , were the gallantest of so many , on which the sun ever shone . fourteen years had their common-wealth held tacke with the romans , in courage , conduct , and virtue , having worsted pompey the great , and made a league with him , when she might have made an end of him , ere ever mancinus ( of whom cicero gives a fair character ) came in play : so his misfortunes having great examples , cannot want some excuse , but suppose ner ' one of them deserved any excuse , what is it at which these examples drive , against a common-wealth ? sure the samnites , the carthaginians , the numantines were as well common-wealths as the romans ; and so where-ever the advantage go , it must stay upon a common-wealth ; or if it be rotation that he would be at ( for we must guesse ) granting pontius the samnite , and megera the numantine , to have been no more upon rotation , then hannibal the carthaginian ; yet is it plain that rome upon her rotation overcame not onely , pontius , hannibal and megera ; but samnium carthage , and numantia . so much for rome , but , sayes he , no lesse appeares by the rabble of generalls often made use of by the athenians , while men of valour and conduct have layn by the walls . a rabble of generals did i never hear of before ; but not to meddle with his rhetorick , whereas each of his objections hath at least some one contradiction in it , this hath two ( one à priore , another à posteriore ) one in the snoute , another in the taile of it . for had there been formerly no rotation in athens , how should there have been men of valour and conduct to lye by the walls ? and if rotation thenceforth should have ceased , how could those men of valour and conduct have done other than lye by the walls ? so this inavoydably confesseth , that rotation was the meanes whereby athens came to be stored with persons of valour and conduct , they to be capable of imployment , and the common-wealth to imploy the whole virtue of her citizens ; and it being ( in his own words ) an argument of much imperfection in a government not to dare to employ the whole virtue of the cittizens ; this wholly routes a standing generall , for the government that dares imploy but the virtue of one , dares not employ the virtue of all . yet he jogs on . those orders must needs be against nature , which excluding persons of the best qualifications give admission unto others , who have nothing to commend them but thier art in canvasing for the suffrage of the people . he never takes notice that the ballot barrs canvasing beyond all possibility of any such thing ; but we will let that go ; canvasing , it is confest , was more frequent in rome and athens then is laudable , where neverthelesse it is the stronger argument for the integrity of popular suffrage , which being free from any aid of art , produced ▪ in those common-wealths more illustrious examples , ( if a man go no farther than plutarchs lives ) then are to be found in all the rest of story . yet ( saith he ) this law hath been as often broken as a common-wealth hath been brought into any exigence , for the hazard of trusting affaires in weak hands then appearing , no scruple hath been made to trample upon this order , for giving the power to some able man at that time rendered uncapable by the vacation , this law requires . the continuation of the consulship of marius is sufficient to be alleadged for the proofe of this , though if occasion were it might be backed by plenty of examples . his choice confutes his pretended variety , who jests with edged tooles , this example above all will cutt his fingers , for by this prolongation of magistracy , or to speak more properly of empire ( for the magistracy of the consul was civill and conferd by the people centuriatis comitiis , but his empire was military and conferrd curiatis ) rome began to drive those wheels of her rotation heavily in marius , which were quite taken off in caesar . i have heretofore in vaine , perswaded them upon this occasion , to take notice of a chapter in machiavill , so worthy of regard , that i have now inserted it at length ▪ as followeth . the proceedings of the roman common-wealth , being well considered , two things will be found to have been the causes of her dissolution . the contention that hapned through the indeavour of the people , ( alwaies oppos'd or eluded by the nobility ) to introduce an agrarian ; and the dammage that accrued from the prolongation of empire : mischiefs which had they leen foreseen in due time , the government by application of fit remedies might have been of longer life and better health . the diseases which this common-wealth , from contention about the agrarian , contracted , were acute , and tumultuous , but those being slower , and without tumult , which she got by prolongation of empire were chronicall , and went home with her , giving a warning by her example , how dangerous it is unto states that would enjoy their liberty , to suffer magistracy , how deservedly soever conferd , to remaine long in the possession of the same man. certainly if the rest of the romans , whose empire hapned to be prolonged , had been as virtuous and provident as l. quinctius , they had never run into this inconvenience . of such wholsome example was the goodnesse of this man , that the senate and the people , after one of their ordinary disputes , being come to some accord , whereas the people had prolonged the magistracy of their present tribunes , in regard they were persons more fitly opposed unto the ambition of the nobility , then by a new election they could readily have found , and hereupon the senate ( to shew they needed not be worse at this game ) would have prolouged the consulate unto quinctius , he refused his consent , saying that ill examples were to be corrected by good ones , and not encouraged by others like themselves ; nor could they stirre his resolution , by which meanes they were necessitated to make new consuls . had this wisdom and virtue ( i say ) been duly regarded , or rightly understood , it might have saved rome , which through this neglect came to ruine . the first whose empire happned to be prolonged was publilius philo , his consulate expiring at the campe before palepolis , while it seemed unto the senate that he had the victory in his hand ( actum cum tribunis plebis est ad populum , ferrent ut cum philo consulatu abijsset , proconsule rem gereret ) they sent him no successor , but prolonged his empire , by which meanes he came to be the first pro-consul . an expedient ( though introduced for the publick good ) that came in time to be the publick bane : for by how much the roman armyes marched farther off , by so much the like course seeming to be the more necessary , became the more customary ; whence ensued two pernicious consequences , the one that there being fewer generalls , and men of known ability for conduct , the art with the reputation of the same , came to be more ingrossed , and obnoxious unto ambition : the other , that a generall standing long , got such hold upon his army ; as could take them off from the senate , and hang them on himselfe . thus marius and sylla could be followed by the souldiery to the detriment of the common-wealth , and caesar to her perdition . whereas had rome never prolonged empire she might perhaps not so soon have arrived at greatnesse , or acquisition , but would have made lesse hast to destruction . all the dilemma that machiavil observes in these words is , that if a common-wealth wilt not be so slow in her acquisition as is required by rotation , she will be lesse sure then is requisite unto her preservation : but the praevaricator ( not deigning to shew us , upon what reasons or experience , he grounds his maxime ) is positive . that the dilemma into which a common-wealth is in this case brought is very dangerous , for either she must give her self a mortall blow by gaining the habit of infringing such orders as are necessary for her preservation , or receive one from without . this same is an other parakeetisme : these words are spoken by me after machiavill in relation unto dictatorian power , in which they are so far from concluding against rotation , that this in case of a dictator is more especially necessary ( maxima libertatis custodia est , ut magna imperia diuturna non sint , & temporis modus imponatur , quibus juris imponi dele non potest ) which could not be more confirmed then by him , who in the example of marius shew's that the contrary course spoild all . the romans if they had sent a successor unto publilius philo at palepolis , it may be might have let the victory slip out of his hands , it may be not ; however this had been no greater wound unto the common-wealth , then that her acquisition would have been slower , which ought not to come in competition with the safety of a government , and therefore amounts not unto a dilemma , this being a kind of argument that should not be stubb'd of one horne , but have each of equall length and danger . nor is it so certain that encrease is slower for rotation , seeing neither was this interrupted by that , nor that by this , as the greatest actions of rome , the conquest of carthage by scipio africanus , of macedon by flaminius , and of antiochus by asiaticus , are irrefragable testimonyes . i would be loath to spoil the considerers preferment , but he is not a safe counsellour for a prince ; whose providence not supplying the defect of rotation whether in civill or military affaires , with some thing of like nature , exposeth himselfe if not his empire as much unto danger as a common-wealth . thus the sons of zeruiah , joab captaine of the hoast and abishai his brother , were too strong for david ; thus the kings of israel and of juda fell most of them by their captaines or favourites , as i have elsewhere observed more particularly . thus brutus being standing captaine of the guards could cast out tarquine : thus sejanus had meanes to attempt against tiberius , otho to be the rivall of galba , casperius aelianus , of nerva ; cassius , of antoninus ; perennis , of commodus ; maximinus , of alexander ; philippus , of gordian ; aemilianus of gallus , ingebus , lollianus , aureolus , of gallienus ; magnesius of constantius ; maximus , of gratian ; arbogastes of valentinian ; ruffinus of arcadius ; stilico of honorius . goe from the west into the east , upon the death of marcianus , asparis alone , having the command of the armes , could prefer leo to the empire : phocas deprive mauritius of the same , heraclius depose phocas , leo isaurius do as much to theodosius adramyttenus ; necephorus , to irenes ; leo armenius , to michael curopalates ; romanus lagapenus , to constantine , nicephorus phocas to romanus puer ; johannes zismisces to nicephorus phocas ; isaac comnenus , to michael stratioticus ; botoniates to michael the sonne of ducas , alexius comnenus to botoniates ; which work continued in such manner till the destruction of that empire . goe from the east unto the north. gustavus attained unto the kingdom of sweden , by his power and command of an army , and thus secechus came neer to supplant bolessaus the third of poland . if wallesteine had lived , what had become of his master ? in france , the race of pharamond was extinguished by pipin , and that of pipin in like mannner , each by the major of the palace , a standing magistracy of exorbitant trust . goe to the indies : you shall find a king of pegu to have been thrust out of the realme of tangue by his captaine generall . nay goe where you will , though this be pretty well , you shall adde more than one example . but as to the praevaricator , if he were not given to make such mouths as eate up nothing else , but his own words , i needed not have brought any other testimony to absolve a common-wealth of malice in this order than his own , where he saith , that when some person over-tops the rest in commands , it is a disease of monarchy which easily admitts of this cure , that he be reduced unto a lesse volume , and levelled unto an equality with the rest of his order . now a prince can no otherwise levell a noble man , that excells the rest through command , unto equality with his order , then by causing those of the same order to take their turnes in like command . good witts have ill memoryes . but , saith he , i know not what advantage mr. harrington may foresee from the orders of this rotation , for my part i can discover no other effect of it then this , that in a common-wealth like that of oceana , taking in the many ( for in venice he confesseth it to be otherwise ) where every man will presse forward toward magistracy , this law by taking off at the end of one year some officers , and all at the end of three will keep the republick in a perpetuall minority . no man having time allow'd him to gain that experience ; which may serve to lead the common-wealth to the understanding of her true interest either at home or abroad . what i have confessed to be otherwise in venice , i have shewn already at least so far as concerneth the present occasion , the causes of that defect being incompatible with a common-wealth consisting of the many ; otherwise why was not the like found in athens or rome , where though every man pressed forward towards magistracy , yet the magistrates were , for illustrious examples , more in weight and number , than are to be found in all the rest of the world . if where elections were the most exposed to the ambition of the competitor , and the humours of the people they yet failed not to excell all others that were not popular , what greater vindication can there be of the naturall integrity of popular suffrage even at the worst ? but this , where it is given by the ballot , is at the best , and free from all that pressing for magistracy in the competitor , or faction of the people that can any wayes be layd unto the former ; or let the considerer consider again , and tell me by what meanes either of these in such a state can be dangerous or troublesome , or if at worst the orders for election in oceana must not perform that part , better then a crowd and a sheriff . well but putting the case the elections which were not quarrell'd much withall be rightly stated ; yet this law for terms and vacations by taking off at the end of one year some officers , and all at the end of three , will keep the republick in perpetuall minority , no man having time allowed him to gain that experience , which may serve to lead the common-wealth to the understanding of her true interest at home or abroad . because every man will presse forward for magistracy , therefore there ought not to be termes and vacations , least these should keep the common-wealth in perpetuall minority . i would once see an argument that might be reduced to mood and figure . the next objection is , that these orders take off at the end of one year some officers , which is true , and that at the end of three years , they take off all , which is false ; for whereas the leaders of the common-wealth are all trienniall , the orders every year take off no more then such onely as have finished their three yeares terme , which is not all but a third part . wherefore let him speak out ; three years is too short a term for acquiring that knowledge , which is necessary unto the leading of a common-wealth . to let the courses of israel which were monethly , the annuall magistracyes of athens and rome go . if three years be too short a term for this purpose , what was three moneths ? a parliament in the late government was rarely longer liv'd then three moneths , nor more frequent then once in a year , so that a man having been twelve years a parliament man in england , could not have born his magistracy above three years , though he were not necessarily subject unto any vacation . whereas a parliament-man in oceana may in twelve years have born his magistracy . fix , notwwithstanding the necessity of his vacations , which of these two are most streightned in the time necessary unto the gaining of due experience or knowledge for the leading of a common-wealth ? neverthelesse the parliament of england was seldome or never without men of sufficient skill and ability ; though the orders there were more in number , lesse in method , not written and of greater difficulty then they be in oceana : there , if not the parliament man , the parliament it self was upon termes and vacations , which unto a council of such nature is the most dangerous thing in the world , seeing dissolution , whether unto a body naturall or politicall is death . for if parliaments happened to rise again & again , this was not so much coming unto themselves , ( seeing a council of so different genius hath not been known ) as a new birth and a councill that is every year new-borne indeed must keep a common-wealth in perpetnall minority or rather infancy ; alwayes in danger of being overlaid by her nurse , or strangled by her guardian : whereas an assembly continued by succession or due rotation regulated by terms giving sufficient time for digestion , growes up , and is like a man , who though he change his flesh neither changeth his body , nor his soul . thus the senate of venice changing flesh , though not so often as in a common-wealth consisting of the many were requisite , yet oftenest of any other in the world , is , both in body and soul or genius , the most unchangeable councill under heaven . flesh must be changed or it will stink of it self ; there is a terme necessary to make a man able to lead the common-wealth unto her interest , and there is a terme that may inable a man to lead the common-wealth unto his interest . in this regaurd it is , that ( according to mamerous ) the vacations are ( mazima libertatis custodia ) the keepers of the libertyes of oceana . the three regions into which each of the leading councills , is divided , are three formes ( as i may say ) in the schoole of state , for them of the third ( though there be care in the choice ) it is no such great matter what be their skill : the ballot which they practised in the tribe being that in the performance whereof no man can be out , and this is all that is necessary unto their novitiate or first year , during which time they may be auditors : by the second , they will have seen all the scenes , or the whole rotation of the orders , so facile , and so intelligible , that at one reading a man understands them as a book , but at once acting as a play , and so methodicall , that he will remember them better . tell me then what it is that can hinder him for the second year from being a speaker ; or why for the third , should he not be a very able leader . the senate and the prerogative , or representative of the people , being each of like constitution , drop annually four hundred , which in a matter of ten yeares , amount to four thousand experienced leaders , ready upon new elections to resume their leading . another thing which i would have considered , is , whether our most eminent men found their parts in parliament , or brought them thither . for if they brought them , think you not the military orders of the youth , the discipline of the tribes , the eight years orb of the embassadors , the provincial armies of oceana , likely to breed men of as good parts , as no such matter ? nor have astronomers that familiarity with the starrs , which men without these orbs will have with such as are in them . he is very heavy , who cannot perceive that in a government of this frame , the education must be universal , or diffused throughout the whole body . another thing which is as certain , as comfortable , is that the pretended depth and difficulty in matter of state , is a meer cheat . from the beginning of the world unto this day , you never found a common wealth , where the leaders having honesty enough , wanted skill enough to lead her unto her true interest at home or abroad : that which is necessary unto this end , is not so much skill as honesty , and let the leaders of oceana be dishonest if they can . in the leading of a common-wealth aright ; this is certain , wisdom and honesty are all one , and though you shall finde defects in their vertue , those that have had the fewest , have ever been , and for ever shall be the wisest . rome never ruin'd , till her ballance being broken , the nobility forsaking their ancient vertue , abandoned themselves unto their lusts ; and the senators , who as in the case of jugurtha , were all bribed , turned knaves ; at which turn , all their skill in government , ( and in this never men had bin better skilled ) could not keep the common wealth from over-rurning . cicero ( an honest man ) labour'd might and main . pomponius atticus another , despaired : cato tore out his own bowels , the poigniards of brutus and cassius , neither considered prince nor father . but the common wealth had sprung her planks , and spilt her ballast , the world could not save her . for the close , the praevaricator , who had judged before , that there was much reason to expect , some of the clergy ( against all of whom , mr. harrington hath declared warre ) will undertake the quarrel : tells me in the last line , that there be unto whom he hath recommended the disquisition of the jewish common wealth . it is a miserable thing , to be condemned unto the perpetual budget ; once turn an honest man to me . in the mean time , that it may be farther seen , how much i am delighted in fair play , it being , so belike , that some divines are already at work with me , and i have not so fully explained my self upon that point , which with them is of the greatest concernment , that they can yet say , they have peept into my hand , or seen my game ; as i have won this trick , gentlemen , or speak , so i play them out the last card in the next book for up . finis . advertisement to the reader , or direction contained in certain quaeries , how the common-wealth of oceana may be examined or answered , by divers sorts of men , without spoiling their high dance , or cutting off any part of their elegance , or freeness of expression . to the scholar that hath passed his novitiate in story . i. whether the ballance of propriety in land comming through civill vicissitude by slow and undiscerned degrees , to alter as it did , and to stand as it doth in oceana , any other government could have been introduced ( otherwise then by the interposition of forraign arms ) that could have subsisted naturally without violence or reluctancy , or steddily without frequent changes , alterations , and plunges , save that only of the common wealth proposed ? ii. whether the ballance in land so standing as hath been shewne , the common wealth proposed , being once established , were without the immediate hand of god , as by pestilence , famine , inundation , to be alter'd or broken , and which way . to the godly man. . whether humane prudence be not a creature of god , and to what end god made this creature ? . whether the common wealth of israel in her main orders , that is to say , the senate , the people , and the magistracy , were not erected by the same rules of humane prudence , with other common wealths ? . whether jethro were not an heathen ? . whether god did not approve of the advice of jethro , in the fabrick of the common wealth of israel ? . whether the natural body of a godly man , can any otherwise be said to support and nourish it self in the ayr , or between heaven and earth , then by a figurative speech ? or whether it be any more possible for the political body of a people so to do , then for the natural body of a godly man ? to the grandee , or learned common-wealths-man . . whether a noble house-keeper have an horse-keeper , that is as well to live as himself , and whether the house-keeper , should he loose his estate , would not be an horse keeper , rather then want bread ? . whether riches and poverty ( more or lesse ) do not introduce command or obedience ( more or lesse ) as well in a publick , as in a private estate ? . whether the introduction of commandor obedience , more or lesse , either in a publick or private estate , do not form or change the genius of a man , or of a people accordingly ? or what is the reason why the paisant in france is base , and the lower people in england of an high courage ? . whether the genius of the people of oceana , have been of late years , or be devoted , or addicted unto the nobility and the clergy , as in former times ? . whether the genius of the people of oceana , not being addicted unto the nobility and clergy , as formerly can be said to be for monarchy , or against it ? . whether the people be not frequently mistaken in names , while as to things they meane otherwise ; or whether the people of oceana desiring monarchy in name , do not in truth desire a government of lawes , and not of men ? . whether for these reasons , not to know how to hold the ballance or foundation of a government steddy , nor yet to reform , or vary the orders of the same ; as the foundation comes to vary , be not to deliver a nation unto certain ruine , and destruction ? to the rationall man. . whether there be any thing in this fabrick or model , that is contradictory unto it self , unto reason , or unto truth ? . whether a common wealth can be framed intire or compleat in all her necessary orders , without any manner of contradiction to her self , to reason , or to truth , and yet be false , or insufficient ? the errors of the presse in the first book . for falt , page . l. . read salt . for of , p. . l. . r. the. for instructed , p. . l. . r. intrusted . for will say , must , p. . l. . r. will say but must . for expect , p. . l. . r. except . for famyly'd p. . l. . r. families . for ply-earts , p. . l. . r. placarts . sans comparison , if taken as english , is right enough , but if you take it for french , is to be read sans comparaison . the second book . or a politicall discourse concerning ordination . against dr. h. hammond . against dr. l. seaman . and the authors they follow . optat aprum aut fulvum descendere monte leonem . e. w. london : printed by g. dawson , for tho. brewster , and are to be sold at the three bibles in st. pauls church-yard , . advertisement to the reader . books , especially whose authors have gotten themselves names , are leaders , wherefore in case any of these err in leading , it is not only lawfull , but matter of conscience unto a man that perceives it , as far as he is able , to warn others . this were apology enough for my writing against dr. hammond , and dr. seaman ; and yet i have happened to be brought under a farther obligation unto this enterprize , their books having been sent me by way of objection against what i have formerly said of ordination , and am daily more and more confirmed i shall make good . however , there can be no great hurt in this essay , truth being like venison , not only the best quarry , but the best game . order of the discourse . to menage the present controversie with the more clearness , i have divided my discourse into five parts , or chapters . the first explaining the words chirotonia and chirothesia , paraphrastically relates the story of the perambulation made by the apostles paul and barnabas through the cities of lycaonia pisyaia , &c. by way of introduction . the second shews those cities , or most of them at the time of this perambulation to have been under popular government . in which is contained the whole administration of a romane province . the third shews the deduction of the chirotonia from popular government , and of the original right of ordination from the chirotonia . in which is contained the institution of the sanhedrin , or senate of israel by moses , and of that at rome by romulus . the fourth shews the deduction of the chirothesia from monarchical , or aristocratical government , and the second way of ordination from the chirothesia . in which is contained the common-wealth of the iews , as it stood after the captivity . the fifth debateth whether the chirotonia used in the cities mentioned were ( as is pretended by doctor hamond , dr. seaman , and the authors they follow ) the same with the chirothesia , or a far different thing . in which are contained the divers kinds of church-government introduced and exercised in the age of the apostles . i am entring into a discourse to run much for the words , upon a language not vulgar , ( which therefore i shall use no otherwise than by way of parenthesis , not obstructing the sense ) and for the things upon customes that are forreign which therefore i shall interpret as well as i can . now so to make my way into the parts of this discourse , that whereas they who have heretofore menaged it in english , might in regard of their readers have neer as well written it in greek , i may not be above the vulgar capacity ; i shall open both the names whereof , and the things whereupon we are about to dispute by way of introduction . a political discourse concerning ordination . the introduction , or first chapter . the names or words whereof we are about to dispute are greek , the one chirotonia , the other chirothesia ; the first signification of the word chirotonia in sindas , imports a certain lewd action of the hand , which seemeth also by the greek that renders it by the same word , to have been intimated by isai . . . in the second signification with suidas , it is ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) election , ( that is to say of magistrates ) or ratification , ( that is to say of laws ) by the many : which amounts both by his testimony , and that generally of antient authors unto this , that the most usual and natural signification of the word chirotonia is popular suffrage , whether given as when they speak of athens by the holding up of hands , or as when they speak ( as doth suidas in the place mentioned ) of rome , and other common-wealths , ( whose suffrage was not given with this ceremony , ) without holding up of hands . chirethesià ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) is a word that in the strict signification imports laying on of hands , and no more : but the jews using to confer their ordination most commonly by laying on of hands ; and yet sometimes by word of mouth , or by letter , the word both as it relates to the custome of the jewish common-wealth , and ordination thence transplanted into the church of christ , signifies ordination conferred by one man , or a few men , that is to say , by some distinct order from the people , whether with imposition of hands , or without it . these words thus interpreted , i shall throughout my discourse ( which else must have run altogether upon the greek ) presume as already i have done , to take for good english , and so proceed unto the things whereof we are to dispute ; first , by opening the scene of this perambulation , which will be done best by the help of erasmus a man as for his learning not inferior to any , so for his freedom not adicted unto interests , or parties . for the remainder then of this introduction , i shall begin with the nineteenth verse of the eleventh , and continue my discourse unto the end of the fourteenth chapter of the acts , interweaving the text where it is darker with the paraphrase of that excellent author for light , and his paraprase with the text , where it is clearer for brevity in manner following . they whom the heat of persecution from the death of stephen had dispersed , travelled through the cities and villages as far as phenice , and the adjacent island of cyprus ; as also through antiochia , which lyeth between phenice and cilicia , preaching the gospel received from the apostles , which nevertheless they dared not to communicate , but to such only as were of the iewish nation , not out of envy , but a kind of superstition , they believing that to do otherwise were to give the childrens bread unto doggs , which christ hath forbidden . but some of them that believed being of cyprus and cyrene , when they came unto antioch , had the boldness to speak of christ unto the greeks , preaching the lord iesus , in which they made such progress , through the blessing of god upon them and their labours , that a great number of these also believing the gospel , were turned unto the lord. the tidings of these things coming unto the ears of the church , which was at ierusalem , a man of apostolical sincerity , barnabas the levite , a cyprian born , was sent by the apostles to take a view of what was done upon the places , and if he found it to be according unto the will of god to approve of it , by authority of the apostles . so great caution in receiving the gentiles unto the gospel was not , but the thing was greatly desired by the apostles : but least it should afterwards be repeated or made void by the iews , as done rashly , or that the gentiles should rely less upon what was done , as conceiving it needed ratification by the law. wherefore barnabas so soon as he came to antioch , and found the greeks by faith , and without profession of the law , to have received the same grace of god with the iews , was very much joyed that the number of believers increased , and exhorted them to remain constant in their enterprize of adhering unto the lord. for he was a good man , and full of the holy spirit , and of faith. wherefore through his ministry it came to passe , that a multitude of other believers were added unto the former . now antioch being not far from cilicia , the neighbourhood of the place invited him to seck paul the fittest helper in this work , as chosen by christ to preach his name unto the gentiles , and kings of the earth . for when paul fled from ierusalem , the disciples had conducted him to caesarea of phenice , whence he went to tarsus , whom therefore when barnabas had found there , he brought to antioch , hoping in a city both famous and populous , ( but with a confused mixture of iews and greeks ) to receive the better fruit through the aid of an apostle more peculiarly designed unto this work . these two being conversant an whole year in the church of antioch , which by the confluence both of iews and greeks , became very numerous , so many were added by their preaching , that whereas hitherto not ▪ exposing the name of christ unto envy , they had been called disciples , they now began first at antioch from the name of their founder to be called christians . in these times certain prophets came from the city of ierusalem unto antioch , whereof one named agabus , standing up in the congregation , signified by inspiration , that there should be a great dearth through the whole world ; which came to pass under claudius caesar the successor of caligula . at this time they at ierusalem , partly because they were poor at their conversion unto the gospel , partly because they had deposited their goods in common , and partly because they had been spoiled by the priests for their profession of christ , ordained that by the contribution of such as had wherewithall , especially among the believing gentiles , money should be sent unto the relief of the christians dwelling in iudea : but so , that this contribution was not to he forced but free ; and according unto every mans ability . this money thus gathered was sent by paul and barnabas unto the elders at ierusalem to be distributed at their discretion unto such as were in need . while paul and barnabas were thus employed , king herod , the same that had beheaded iohn , and returned christ clothed through derision in white unto pilate , being grieved to see this kind of people increase , and the name of iesus king of the iews to grow famous in divers nations , became concerned to root out such a faction , and so spreading ; wherefore he stretched forth his hand to vex certain of the church , killed iames the brother of iohn with the sword , and because he saw it pleased the iews , proceeded farther to take peter also , who being imprisoned , was afterward miraculously delivered . but paul and barnabas having performed the trust committed unto them by the brethren , and delivered the contribution for relief of the poor unto the apostles , returned from ierusalem unto antioch , taking with them iohn whose surname was mark. now the church of antioch flourished in such manner , that she had some filled with the gift of prophecy , & others withthat of teaching , among whom was barnabas and simeon alias niger together with lucias a cirenian , and manaen who had been brought up with herod the tetrach , whom he left to come unto christ ; but the chief of them was saul endowed with all the gifts and graces apostolical . while ▪ all these were intent upon the ministry of the church , imploying their several gifts unto the glory of god , and in his most acceptable service , the salvation of souls with fasting and prayer , the holy ghost being stirred up by their zeal , signified his will by the prophets , saying , separate me barnabas and paul for the work whereunto i have called them , namely , to be doctors of the gentiles , that by them i may propagate the gospel . the command of the spirit was obeyed , and barnabas with paul , to the end that every one might see who were chosen , were separated from the rest ; and when the congregation had unanimously imoplored the favour of god by prayer and fasting , the most eminent in authority among them , laid their hands upon the persons so separated , and sent them wherever the spirit of god should direct them . by this impulse therefore barnabas and paul went unto selencia , being a promontory of antiochia , and thence sailed into the island of cyprus , where landed at salamis a famous city upon the eastern part of the island , they preached not humane inventions , but the word of god , nor that by stealth , but in the synagogues of the jews , whereof through the neighbourhood of syria there was store . this honour by the commandement of christ was alwaies deferd unto the jews , that the gospel should be first offerd unto them , least they being a querulous and repining nation should complaine that they were despised ; thus travelled these apostles through the whole island , till they came unto paphos , a city consecrated unto venus upon the western coast of cyprus . here they found a certain magician called bar-jesus , that is the son of jesus a jew , both by nation and religion , under which colour he falsely pretended unto the gift of prophesie . this man followed the court of sergius paulus pro-consul or governor of the island for the romans , otherwise a prudent man ; but this sort of vermine insinuateth it self into the best to choose that so their corruption may do the greater and more compendious mischief unto mankind . the proconsul nevertheless having understood the gospel to be planting throughout cyprus , not only forbore to stop the ears of others , but by sending for baruabas and paul seem'd desirous to open his own . wherefore bar-jesus endeavouring to resist the growth of the word , as an enemy to christ , and resisting the truth with falsehood , a strife arose between the true prophets , and a false one , ( for such is the interpretation of the syriack word elymas , ) whom paul at the length confuted of spiritual blindness , by taking away the eyes of his body miraculously strucken in the presence of the pro-consul , who at the same time receiving the light of the gospel , imbraced the christian faith this being done at paphos , paul embarqued there with his associates for the lesser asia , and came unto perga , being a city of pamphylia ; here john whose surname was mark left them , and returned unto jerusalem , while they when they had visited pamphylia travelled unto antiochia , a city of pisidia , where having entred a synagogue , they sat after the usual manner with the rest ●tentive unto the law and the prophets ; whereof when the parts appointed were read , and no man stood up , the rulers of the synagogue perceiving that the strangers by their habit were jews , and such as by their aspect promised more than ordinary , sent unto them , desiring that if they had any word of exhortation for the people , they would speak . whereupon paul standing up preached unto them christ ; whence came the word of lord to be divulged throughout that region , albeit the jews out of envy to the gentiles stirring up the devoutest of the matrons ( an art not unknown in these times ) and by them the chief of the city raised such sedition in it , and tumult against the apostles ; that paul and barnabas being cast out , shook off the dust from their feet against them , and went thence unto iconium a city of lycaonia . when they were come unto iconium , entring with the jews after the custome into the synagogue , they preached as they had done at antioch , the gospel of jesus christ , and with such efficacy , that multitudes both of the jews ▪ and greeks believed ; here again the envy of the jews became the author of sedition , by which means the city was divided into two parts or factions , whereof one stood for the unbelieving jews , and the other for the apostles . at length when such of the gentiles as were joyned with the jews , and the rulers of the city made an assault upon the apostles , to offer violence , and stone them ; they being aware of it , fled to lystra ( a city of lycaonia , which is a part of pamphylia ) and derbe . at lystra there was a man lame of his feet from the womb , who having listened unto paul , with great attention and zeal , was miraculously cured by the apostle ; when the people seeing what paul had done , cryed out , the gods were descended in the likeness of men : a perswasion that might gain the more easily upon the minds of the lycaonians for the fable of jupiter and mercury , said to have descended in humane shape , and been entertained by lycaon , from whom the lycaonians received their name . wherefore they called barnabas for the gravity of his aspect , jupiter , paul for his eloquence , mercury , and the priest of jupiter , who dwelt in the suburbs , brought bulls and garlands unto the gates of the house , where the apostles were , to have offered sacrifice with the people , which the apostles abhorring , vigorously disswaded . in the mean time certain jews by nation that were unbelievers coming from antioch of pisidia , and iconium , drew the people unto the other extream , who from sacrificing unto the apostles fell on stoning them ; a work which was brought so near unto an end , that paul being drawn by them out of the city was left for dead , though he soon after recovered ; and went thence with barnabas unto derbe ; when they had propagated the gospel there also , they returned unto lystra , iconium and antiochia , confirming the disciples whom they had converted . now because the propagation of the gospel required that the apostles should be moving through divers nations , they chirotonizing them elders in every congregation , or church , that is , ordaining them elders by the votes of the people in every city , left them to perform the duties of the absent apostles , and when they had fasted and prayed , commended them unto the lord. these things being brought to a conclusion , or finished at antioch in pisidia , when they had perambulated this country , they also visited pamphylia , sowing the gospel where it was not yet sown , and confirming those who already believed till they came to perga : where having ordered their affairs , they proceeded to attalia , being a maritimate city of pamphylia , and from thence they sailed back unto antioch of syria , whence first they set out with commission from the elders to preach the gospel unto the gentiles , and where by the chirothesia or imposition of hands , prayer , and fasting , they had been recommended to the grace of god , and designed unto the work now finished . in this narrative you have mention both of the chirotonia and of the chirothesia , or imposition of hands , but of the former as of ordination ; for by that such were made presbyters or church officers as were not so before , of the latter not , i think as of ordination , at least in the sense we now take it , but as of designation of persons , unto an occasional and temporary imployment , that had been ordained before , for so sure had paul at least ; howsoever , that which is offered by this narrative unto present consideration , is no more than the bare story . chap. ii. that the cities , or most of them named in the perambulation of the apostles , paul and barnabas were at that time under popular government . in which is contained the administration of a roman province . the romans of all nations under heaven were indowed , as with the highest vertues , so with the greatest humane glory ; which proceeded from this especially that they were in love with such as were in love with their libertie , as to begin with their dawn . the privernates , ( a free people , inhabiting the city and parts adjoyning , which at this day is called piperno , some fifty miles from rome , and five from s●sse ) being the second time conquered by the romans ; it was consulted in the senate what course should be taken with them ; where while some , according unto the different temper of men , shewed themselves hotter , and others cooler , one of the privernates more mindfull of the condition wherein he was born , than of that wherein he was fallen , happen'd to render all more doubtfull ; for being asked by a senator of the severer judgement , what punishment he thought the privernates might deserve , such ( sayes he ) as they deserve , that believe themselves worthy of liberty . at the courage of which answer the consul perceiving in them that had been vehement enough before against the privernates , but the greater animosity , to the end that by a gentler interrogatory he might draw forth , some softer answer , replyed , and what if we inflict no punishment at all , but pardon you ; what peace may we expect of you ? why if you give us a goodone ( said the other ) a steddy and perpetual peace , but if an ill one , not a long one. at which a certain senator falling openly upon ruffling and threatning the privernate , as if those words of his tended unto some practise or intention to stir ▪ up the cities in peace to sedition , the better part of the fathers being quite of another mind , declared , that they had heard the voice of a man , and of a freeman . for why ( said they ) should it be thought that any man or people will remain longer under such a burthen as they are not able to bear , then till they can throw it down ? there a peace is faithfull , where it is voluntary , if you will have slaves you are not to trust them , but their fetters . to this opinion the consul especially inclining , inclined others , while he openly professed , that they who had no thought but upon their liberty , could not but be thought worthy to be romans : whereupon the decree past by authority of the fathers , which was afterwards proposed unto the congregation , and ratified by the command of the people , whereby the privernates were made citizens of rome . such was the genius of the to man common-wealth , where by the way you may also observe the manner of her debate and result , ( authoritate patrum & jussu populi ) by the advice of the senate , and the chirotonia of the people . but that which in this place is more particularly offer'd unto consideration is her usual way of proceeding in case of conquest with other nations ; for albeit bearing an haughty brow towards such , as not contented to enjoy their liberty at home , would be her rivals abroad , she dealt far otherwise , as with carthage ; this case excepted , and the pilling and polling of her provinces , which hapned through the avarice and luxury of her nobility , when the ballance of popular power being broken , her empire began towards the latter end to languish and decline ; the way which she took with the privernates was that which she usually observed with others throughout the course of her victories , and was after the change of government made good at least in some part , by the roman emperors , under whom were now those cities mentioned in the present perambulation of the apostles paul and barnabas . strabo for his credit , among humane autors is equall unto any ; he lived about the time of this perambulation , and being a greek , is less likely to be partial : of that therefore which i have affirmed to have been the course of the romans in their victories , i shall make choice of this author for a witness ; first where he epitomiseth the story of athens after this manner , when the carians by sea , and the baeotians by land wasted attica , c●crops the prince , to bring the people under shelter , planted them in twelve cities , ( cecropia , tetrapolis , epacrea , decelea , eleusis , aphydna , thoricus , brauron , cytherus , sphettus , c●phissia , phalerus , ) which theseus is said to have contracted into one called athens . the government of this city had many changes , at the first , it was monarchical , then popular ; this again was usurped by the tyrants pisistratus and his sons , whence recover'd , it fell afterwards into the hands of the few , as when the four hundred once , and again the thirty tyrants were imposed by the lacedemonians , in the war of peloponesus ; which yoke the athenians ( by means of their faithful army ) shaking off , restored their popular government , and held it untill the romans attained unto the dominion of greece . now though it be true that they were not a little disturbed by the kings of macedon unto whom they were forced to yeild some kind of obedience ; they nevertheless preserved the form of their common-wealth so intire , that there be who affirm it never to have been better administred , than at such time as macedon was governed by casander ; for this prince though in other thinge more inclining towards the tyrant , having taken athens by surrender , used not the people ill , but made demetrius phalerius the disciple of theophrastus the philosopher , chief magistrate among them ; a man so far from ruining their popular state ( as in the commentaries he writ upon this kind of government is attested ) that he repaired it . nevertheless whether suspected or envied for his greatness with , or support by the macedonian , after the death of casander he fled into aegypt , while his enemies breaking down his statues ▪ ( as some say ) made homely vessels of them . but the romans having received the athenians under their popular form left them their laws and liberties untouched , till in the war with mithridates they were forced to receive such tyrants as that king was pleased to give them ; whereof aristion the greatest , when the romans had retaken the city from him , being found trampling upon the people , was put to death by sylla , and the city pardoned , which to this day ( he writ about the reign of tyberius ) not only enjoyes her liberties , but is high in honour with the romans . this is the testimony of strabo , agreeing with that of cicero , where disputing of divine providence , he saith , that to affirm the world to be governed by chance , or without god , is as if one should say that athens were not governed by ohe areopagites . nor did the romans by the deposition of the same author ( or indeed of any other ) behave themselves worse in asia , ( the scene of our present discourse , where the same paul of whom we are speaking being born at tarsus a city of cilicia , that had acquired like or greater priviledg by the same bounty , was also a citizen of rome , ) then in greece . asia is understood in three significations : first , for the third part of the world answering to europe and africa : secondly , for that part of asia , which is now called natolia . thirdly , for that part of it which attalus king of pergamum dying without heirs , bequeathed and left unto the people of rome : this contained mysia , phrygia , aeolis , jonia , caria , doris , lydia , lycaonia , pisidia , and by consequence the cities whereof we are speaking : to all these countries the romans gave their liberty , till in favour of aristonicus the bastard of eumenes , many of them taking arms , they were recovered , brought into subjection , and framed into a province . when a consul had conquered a country , and the romans intended to form it into a province , it was the custome of the senate to send ( decem legatos ) ten of their members , who with the consul had power to introduce and establish their provincial way of government . in this manner asia was formed by m. aquillius consul , afterwards so excellently reformed by scaevola , that the senate in their edicts used to propose his example unto succeeding magistrates ; and the inhabitants to celebrate a feast unto his name . nevertheless mithridates king of pontus ( all the romans in this province being massacred in one day ) came to possesse himself of it , till it was recovered at several times by sylla , murena , lucullus , and pompey . the romans in framing a country into a province , were not accustomed to deal with all the inhabitants of the same in a like manner , but differently according to their different merit . thus divers cities in this were left free by sylla , as those of the ilienses , the chians , rhodians , lycians , and magnesians , with the cizicens , though the last of these afterwards for their practises against the romans forfeited their liberty unto tiberius in whose reign , they were for this reason deprived of the same . taking asia in the first sense , that is for one third part of the world , the next province of the romans in this country was cilicia , containing pamphilia , issauria , and cilicia more peculiarly so called ; here cicero was sometimes pro-consul , in honour unto whom part of phrygia with pisidia , and lycaonia were taken from the former , and added unto this jurisdiction , by which means the cities whereof we are speaking , came to be of this province : adjoyning hereunto , was the common-wealth of the lycians , which the romans left free ; into this also the city of attalia by some is computed , but iconium both by scrabo and cicero , the latter whereof being pro-consul in his journey from laodicea , was received by the magistrates and deputies of this city : lystra and derbe being cities of lycaonia , must also have been of the same province . next unto the province of cilicia was that of syria , containing comagene , seliucia , phaenicia , caelosyria , and judea or palestine . in seleucis were the four famous cities seleucia , antiochia , apamea , the last entire in her liberty , and laodicea ; comagene and judea were under kings , and not framed into provinces , till in the time of the emperors . the fourth province of the romans in asia was that of bithymia with pontus , these were all acquir'd or confirmed by the victories of pompey the great . strabo who was a cappadocian born at amasia , relates a story worthy to be remembred in this place . from the time saith he , that the romans having conquered antiochus , became moderators of asia ; they contracted leagues of amity with divers nations ; where there were kings , the honour of addresse was deferr'd unto them , with whom the treaties that concerned their countries were concluded . but as concerning the capad cians , they treated with the whole nation , for which cause the royal line of this realm coming afterwards to fail , the romans gave the people their freedom or leave to live under their own laws : and when the people hereupon sending ambassadors unto rome , renounced their liberty , being that to them which they said was intolerable , and demanded a king ; the romans amazed there should be men that could so far despair , permitted them to chose of their own nation , whom they pleased ; so ari●barzanes was chosen , whose line again in the third generation coming to fail ; archelaus was made king by anthony , ( where you may observe in passing that , the romans imposed not monarchical government , but for that matter used to leave a people as they found them ) thus at the same time they left pontus under king mithridates , who not containing himself within his bounds , but extending them afterwards as far as cholchis and arm nia the lesse , was reduced unto his termes by pompey , who divesting him of those countries which he had usurped , distrihuted some part of them unto such princes as had assisted the romans in that war , and divided the rest into twelve common-wealths , of which added to bythynia , he made one province , when the roman emperors became monarchs , they also upon like occasions made other distributions , constituting kings , princes , and cities , some more some lesse , some wholly free , and others in subjection unto themselves .. thus came a good , if not the greater part of the cities in the lesser asia , and the other adioyning provinces to be some more , some less free , but the most of them to remain common-wealths , or to be erected into popular governments , as appears yet clearer by the intercourse of pliny , while he was praetor , or governor of bythinia , with his master the emperor trajan , a plece of which i have inserted in the letters following . pliny to trajane . sir , it is provided by pompeys laws for the bythinians that no man under thirty years of age be capable of magistracy , or of the senate : by the same it is also established , that they who have born magistracy , may be senators . now because by a latter edict of augustus , the lesser magistracies may be born by such as are above one and twenty ; there remains with me these doubts , whether he that being under thirty , hath born magistracy , may be elected by the censors into the senate ; and if he may , whether of those also that have not born magistracy , a man being above one and twenty , seeing at that age he may bear magistracy , - may not by the same interpretation be elected into the senate , though he have not born it : which is here practised and pretended to be necessary , because it is somewhat better they say , that the senate be filled with the children of good families , than with the lower sort . my opinion being asked , upon these points , by the new censors , i thought such as being under thirty have born magistracy , both by pompey ' s laws , and the edict of augustus to be capable of the senate ; seeing the edict allows a man under thirty to bear magistracy , and the law , a man that hath born magistracy , to be a senator ; but as to those that have not born magistracy , though at the age in which they may bear it ; i demurr till i may understand your majesties pleasure , unto whom i have sent the heads both of the law , and of the edict . trajane to pliny . you and i dearest pliny are of one mind , pompey ' s laws are so far qualified by the edict of augustus , that they who are not under one and twenty may bear magistracy , and they who have born magistracy may be senators in their respective cities : but for such as have not born magistracy , though they might have born it , i conceive them not eligigible into the senate , till they be thirty years of age . pliny to trajane . sir , power is granted unto the bythinian cities by powpey's law , to adopt unto themselves what citizens they please , so they be not forreigners but of the same province , by the same law it is shewn in what cases the censors may remove a man from the senate ; among which nevertheless it is not provided what is to be done in case a forreign citizen be a senator . wherefore certain of the censors have thought fit to consult me , whether they ought to remove a man that is of a forraign city for that cause our of the senate . now because the law , though it forbid the adoption of a forreigner , commandeth not that a forraigner for that cause should be removed out of the senate , and i am informed there be forreign citizens almost in every senate : so that many , not only men , but cities might suffer concussion by the restitution of the law in that part , which through a kind of consent seemeth to be now grown obsolete ; i conceive it necessary to have your majesties resolution in the case , to which end i have sent a breviate of the law annexed . trajane to pliny . vvith good cause ( dearest pliny ) have you doubted what answer to return unto the censors , enquiring whether they ought to elect a man into the senate that is of another city , though of the same province ; seeing on the one side the authority of the law , and of custome on the other to the contrary might well disorder you . to innovate nothing for the time past , i think well of this expedient : they who are already elected senators , though not according unto the law , of what city soever they be , may remain for the present , but for the future pompey ' s laws should return to their full virtue , which if we should cause to look back , might create trouble . this might serve , but there will be no hurt in being a little fuller in the discovery of provincial government . the provinces so framed as hath been shewn , were subdivided into certain circuits called diocesses , that of asia had six alabandae , sardes ( antiently the seat of craesus ) smyrna , ephesus , adramytis , pergamum . that of cilicia had also six , the pamphilian , issaurian , and cilician , the metropolis whereof was tarsus a free city ; to these were taken out of the province of asia , cibyra , sinnadae , apamea ; what were the diocesses of the other two , sigonius whom i follow doth not shew . at these in the winter , ( for the summer was spent commonly with the army , ) the people of the province assembled at set times , as at our assizes , where the roman governors did them justice . the governors or magistrates unto whose care a province was committed , were of two kinds : the first and chief was consul or praetor , which appellations differ'd not in power , but in dignity , that of consul being more honourable , who had twelve lictors , whereas the praetor had but six , if the annuall magistracy of either of these came to be prorogued , he was called pro-consul , or pro-praetor . the second kind of magistrate in a province , was the quaester , receiver or treasurer , who being also annual , was attended by lictors of his own , if he dyed within his year , the the consul , pro-consul , or praetor , might appoint one for that time in his place , who was called pro-questor . the power of the consul , pro-consul , or praetor was of two kinds , the one civil , the other military , the former called magistracy , the latter empire . the pomp of these assuming and exercising their magistracy was reverent , the consul , or pro-consul had legates , sometimes more , but never under three , appointed him by the senate ; these were in the nature of counsellors to assist him in all affairs of his province , he had tribunes , colonels , or field officers for the military part of his administration ; he had also secretaries , serjeants , heraulds , or cryers , lictors , or ensign-bearers , interpreters , messengers , divines , chamberlains , physitians , and besides these his companions , which for the most part were of the younger sort of gentlemen , or gallants that accompanied him for his ornament , and their own education . into this the somewhat-like traine of the quaestor ( who by the law was in place of a son unto the pro-consul , and to whom the pro consul was to give the regard of a father ) being cast , it made the praetorian cohort , or guard alwaies about the person of the pro-consul , who in this equipage having done his devotions at the capitol , departed the city paludatus , that is in his royal mantle of gold and purple , followed for some part of the way with the whole train of his friends , wishing him much joy , and good speed , in his province he executed his twofold office , the one of captain general , the other of the supieme magistrate ; in the former relation he had an army either received from his predecessor , or new leavied in the city ; this consisted in the one half of the legions , ( as i have elsewhere shewn ) and in the other of associates ; for the greatness of the same , it was proportion'd unto the province , or the occasion . to an ordinary province in times of peace , i believe an army amounted not to above one legion , with as many auxiliaries that is to a matter of twelve thousand foot , and twelve hundred horse . the magistracy or jurisdiction of the pro-consul , or praetor was executed at the metropolitan city of each dioecis , which upon this occasion was to furnish the praetorian cohort with lodging , salt , wood , hay , and stable-room at the charge of the country . these ( though cicero , would hardly receive any of them ) were towards the latter time of the common-wealth , extended by the provincial magistrates unto so great a burthen to the people , that it caused divers laws to be passed in rome ( de repetundis ) for restitution to be made unto the provinces , by such as had injured them . upon such laws was the prosecution of verres by cicero , when and where this kind of court was to be held , the consul , pro-consul , or praetor by proclamation gave timely notice , being assembled at the time , and the city appointed , in the town hall stood a tribunal , upon this the sella curulis , or chair of state , in which sat the consul , pro-consul , or praetor with his praetorian cohort or band about him , furnished with all manner of pomp , and officers requisite unto the ornament , or administration of so high a magistracy . the jurisdiction of this court was according unto the laws made for the administration of the province , but because they could not foresee all things , ( as appeared by the questions which pliny put upon the laws of pompey , unto trajane ) it came to pass , that much was permitted unto the edicts of the provincial praetors , as was also in use at rome with the praetors of the city : and if any man had judged otherwise in his province , then he ought to have done in the city , made an edict contrary unto the law of his province , or judged any thing otherwise than accordieg to his own edict , he was held guilty of , and questionable for an hainous crime . but what the law of this or that province ( which differ'd in each ) was , would be hard particularly to say , only in general it was for the maine very much resembling that of sicily called rupilia . lege rupilia , or by the law of rupilius , a cause between one citizen and another being of the same city , was to be tryed at home by their own laws . a cause between one provincial and another being of divers cities , was to be tryed by judges whom the praetor should appoint by lott ; what a private man claim'd of a people , or a people of a private man , was to be referr'd unto the senate of some third city . vpon what a roman claimed of a provincial , a provincial was to be appointed judge . vpon what a provincial claimed of a roman , a roman was to be appointed judge . for decision of other controversies select judges from among the romans ( not out of the praetorian cohort , but out of such romans , or other citizens free of rome as were present in the same court ) were to be given . in criminal causes as violence peculate or treason , the law , and the manner of proceeding was the same in the provinces , as in rome . for the iributes , customes , taxes , leavies of men , money , shipping , ordinary , or extraordinary for the common defence of the roman republick , and her provinces , the consuls , pro-consuls , or praetors , proceeded according unto such decrees of the senate as were in that case standing or renewed upon emergent occasions ; in gathering these say the magistracy or office of the quaestor : if the pro-consul were indisposed , or had more business than he could well turn his hand to , courts of this nature might be held by one or more of his legates . with matter of religion they medled not , every nation being so far left unto the liberty of conscience , that no violence for this cause was offer'd unto any man , by which means both jews and christians , at least , till the time of the persecuting emperors had the free exercise of their religion throughout the roman provinces . this the jews liked well for themselves , nor were they troubled at the heathens , but to the christians they alwaies grudg'd the like priviledg . thus when they could no otherwise induce pilate to put christ to death ; they accused christ of affecting monarchy , and so affrighted pilate being a mean condition'd fellow , while they threatned to let tiberius know he was not caesar's friend ; that he comply'd with their ends . but when at corinth where gallio ( a man of another temper ) was pro-consul of achaia , they would have been at this ward again , and with a great deal of tumult had brought paul before the tribunal , gallio took it not well , that they should think he had nothing else to do than to judge of words , and names , and questions of their law , for he cared no more for the disputes between the christians and the jews , than for those between the epicureans and the s●●ick● . wherefore his lictors drave them from the tribunal , and the officious corinthians to shew their love to the pro-consul fell on knocking them out of the way of other business . now though the common-wealth of the achaeans , being at this time a roman province under the pro-consul gallio , enjoyed no longer her common senate , strategus and demiurges , according unto the model shown in the former book , yet remained each particular city under her antient form of popular government so that in these , especially at corinth ; many of the greeks being of the same judgement , the jews could not dispute with the christians without tumult . of this kind was that which hapned at ephesus , where christianity growing so fast , that the silver-smiths of diana's temple began to fear they should loose their trade : the iews liking better of heathenisme than christianity , set alexander one of their pack against paul. this place ( in times when men will understand no otherwise of humane story , then makes for their ends ) is fallen happily unto my hand , seeing that which i have said of a roman province , will be thus no less than proved out of scripture . for the chancellor of ephesus perceiving the ecclesia , ( so it is in the original ) or assembly ( as in our translation ) uncalled by the senate , or the magistracy to be tumultuously gathered in the theater : their usual place ( as in syracusa and other cities ) of meeting , betakes himself to appease the people with divers arguments : among which he hath these . first , as to matter of religion , ye have brought hither ( saith he ) these men which are neither robbers of temples ( churches , our bible hath it , before there was any church to be robbed ) nor yet blasphemers of the goddesse : in which words ( seeing that they offering no scandal , but onely propagating that which was according to their own judgement were not obnoxious unto punishment ) he shews that every man had liberty of conscience . secondly asto law. if demetrius and the crafts-men which are with him have a matter against any man , the law ( saith he ) is open . thirdly , as to the matter of government which appears to be of two parts , the one provincial , the other domestick , for the former ( saith he ) there are ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) pro-consuls , ( he speaks in the plural number with relation unto the legates , by whom the pro-consul sometimes held his courts . otherwise this magistrate was but one in a province , as at this time for asia p. suilius ) and to the latter ( saith he ) if you desire any thing concerning other matters , that is such as appertain unto the government of the city , ( in ▪ which the care of the temple was included ) it shall be determined in a lawful ecclesia , or assembly of the people . by which you may see that notwithstanding the provincial government , ephesus , though she were no free city , ( for with a free city the pro-consul had nothing of this kind to do ) had ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) the government of her self , ( as those other cities mentioned in plynies epistles ) by the senate , and the people , for wherever one of these is named , as the senate by pliny , or the people by luke , the other is understood . when the chancellor had thus spoken , he dismissed the ecclesia . it is lukes own word , and so often as i have now repeated it , so often hath he used it upon the same occasion . wherefore i might henceforth expect two things of divines ; first , that it might be acknowledged that i have good authors , st. luke and the chancellor of ephesus , for the word ecclesia in this sense ; and secondly that they would not perswade us , the word ecclesia hath lost this signification , least they condemn this place of scripture to be no more understood . the manner of provincial government being thus proved , not only out of prophane authors , but out of scripture it self ; and the cities that were least free having had such power over themselves , and their territories ; why if the romans took no more of them for this protection , than was paid unto their former lords , did they not rather undertake the patronage of the world than the empire , seeing venice , and dantzig , while the one was tributary to the turk , the other to the king of poland , were nevertheless so free estates , that of a king , or a common-wealth that should have put the rest of the world into the like condition , no less in our day could have been said ? and yet that the romans , when the nature of the eastern monarchies shall be rightly considered , took far less of these cities , than their old masters , will admit of little doubt . cicero would not lye , he when he was pro-consul of cilicia , wrote in this manner concerning his circuit , to his friend servilius . two dayes i stand at la●dicea , at ap●mea five , at sinnadae three , at pilomelis five , at iconium ten , then which jurisdiction or government there is nothing more just or equall . why then had not those cities their senates , and their ecclesiae , or congregations of the people as well as that of ephesus , and those whereof pliny gives account to trajane ? corinth was in achaia , perga of pamphilia , antioch of pisidia , iconium , lystra , derbe of lycaonia , were in cilicia and with these as some reckon , attalia . ephesus , and the other antioch were in syria . achaia , cilicia , and syria were roman provinces at the time of this perambulation of the apostles . the cities under provincial administration , whether free are not free were under popular government ; whence it followeth , that corinth , ephesus , antioch of syria , antioch of pisidia , perga , iconium , lystra , ` derbe , attalia , being at this time under provincial administration , were at this time under popular government . there hath been no hurt in going about , though indeed to shew that these cities ( had quandam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) were under popular government , we needed to have gone no farther than the text , as where the chancellor of ephesus to get rid of a tumultuous ecclesia , or assembly of the people , promiseth them a lawful one . in iconium lystra , derbe and the rest , you hear not of any king , ( as where herod stretched out his hand to please the jews , and vex the church ) but of the people , of their rulers , of their assemblies , and of their tumults . the people at lystra are now agreed to give the apostles divine honours , and anon both at iconium and lystra to stone them : now to determine of divine honour , or of life and death , are acts of soveraign power . it is true , these nevertheless may happen to be usurped by a meer tumult , but that cannot be said of these congregations , which consisted as well of the magistrates and rulers , as of the people , and where the magistrates shew that they had no distinct power whereby to restraine the people , nor other means to prevail against them , than by making of parties , which passages as they prove these common-wealths on the one side to have been ill constituted , evince it on the other , that these cities were under popular government . chap. iii. the deduction of the chirotonia from popular government , and of the original right of ordination from the chirotonia . in which is contained the institution of the sanhedrin , or senate of israel by moses , and of that of rome by romulus . divines generally in their way of disputing have a byass that runs more upon words , than upon things ; so that in this place it will be necessary to give the interpretation of some other words , whereof they pretend to take a strong hold in their controversies ; the chief of these hath been spoken to already , chirotonia being a word that properly signifies the suffrage of the people , wherever it is properly used , implies power ; wherefore though the senate decree by suffrage as well as the people , yet there being no more in a decree of the senate than authority , the senate is never said to chirotonize , or very seldom and improperly , this word being peculiar unto the people : and thus much is imply'd in what went before . the next word in controversie is psephisma , which signifies a decree or law , and this alwayes implying power , alwayes implyes the suffrage of the people , that is , where it is spoken of popular government ; for though a psephisma or decree of the athenian senate was a law for a year before it came to the suffrage or chirotonia of the people , yet the law , or constitution of solon whereby the senate had this power , originally derived from the chir●tonia of the people . the third word ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) signifies to constitute , or ordain , this in the political sense of the same implyeth not power , but authority ; for a man that writeth or proposeth a decree or form of government , may be said ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to propose or constitute it , whether it be confirmed by the chirotonia of the people or not ; nay with hal●carn●ssaeus the word signifies no more than barely to call or assemble the senate ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . now if these words be sometimes otherwise taken , what words be there in any language that are not often used improperly ? but that understood politically , they must of necessity be understood as i have shewn ; or will so intangle and disorder government , that no man shall either make head or foot of it ; is that which i make little question to evince in the surest way , that is by opening the nature of the things whence they derive , and whereof they are spoken by the best authors . and because the words ( though the things they signifie were much more antient ) derive all from athens , i shall begin by this constitution to shew the proper use of them . chirotonia in athens as hath been shewn out of suidas , ( who speaking of rome relates to this ) was election of magistrates , or enacting of laws by the suffrage of the people , which because they gave by holding up their hands , came thence to be called chirotonia , which signifieth holding up of hands . the legislative assembly , or representative of the people called the nomothetae , upon occasion of repealing an old law , and enacting a new one , gave the chirotonia of the people , and yet saith the athenian law ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) let the proedrigive or make the chirotonia unto either law. the proedri as was shown in the former book were the ten presidents of the prytans , which prytans upon this occasion were presidents of the nomothetae . again , whereas it was the undoubted right and practice of the people to elect their magistrates by their chirotonia , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) it is nevertheless shewn by pollux to have been the peculiar office of the thesmothetae ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to chirotonize the mágistrates . for as the proedri were presidents of the people in their legislative capacity , so were the thesmothetae upon occasion of elections : thus the chirotonia of the proedri , or of the thesmothetae signifies nothing else but the chirotonia of the people , by which they enacted all their laws , and elected all their civil or ecclesiastical magistrates , or priests , as the rex sacrificus , and the orgeones , except some by the lot , which ordination as is observ'd by aristoile is equally popular . this whether ignorantly or wilfully unregarded , hath been as will be seen hereafter the cause of great absurdity , for who seeth not that to put the chirotonia , or soveraign power of athens upon the proedri or the thesmothetae , is to make such a thing of that government , as can no wise be understood . what the people had past by their chirotonia , was called psephisma , an act or law. and because in the nomothetae there were alwayes two laws put together unto the vote , that is to say , the old one , and that which was offered in the room of it , they that were for the old law were said ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to pronounce in the negative ; and they that were for the new ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to pronounce for the affirmative . these laws , these propositions , or this frame of government having been proposed first by solon , and then ratified or established by the chirotonia of the athenian people : aristotle saith of him ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) that he instituted or constituted the popular government with constitution , implyeth not any power in solon , who absolutely refused to be a king , and therefore the word ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) as to him implies no more than authority . i have shewed you the words in controversie , and the things together in the mint ; now whether they that as to athens introduced them both , understood either ; i leave my reader by comparing them to judge . it is true that the things expressed by these words have been in some common-wealths more , in others less antient than the greek language , but this hindreth not the greeks to apply the words unto the like constitutions or things , wherever they find them , as by following halicarnassaeus i shall exemplifie in rome . ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) romulus when he had distributed the people into tribes , and into parishes proceeded to ordain the senate ; in this manner the tribes were three , and the parishes thirty ; out of every tribe he elected three senators , and out of every parish three more , all by the suffrage of the people ; these therefore came to ninety nine chosen by the chirotonia , unto which he added one more , not chosen by the chirotonia , but by himself only ; which election we may therefore say was made by the chirothesia , for as in this chapter i am shewing that the chirotonia is election by the many , so in the next i shall shew that the chirothesia is election by one , or by the few . but to keep unto the matter in hand , the magistrate thus chosen by romulus was ( praefectus urbi , ) the protector of the common-wealth , or he who when the king was out of the nation , or the city , as upon occasion of war , had the exercise of royal power at home . in like manner with the civil magistracy were the priests created , ( though some of them not so antiently ) for the pontifex maximus , the rex sacrificus , and the flamines were all ordained by the suffrage of the people , ( pontifex tributis , rex centuri●●tis , flamines curiatis ) the latter of which being no more than parish priests , had no other ordination than by their parishes . all the laws , and all the magistrates in rome , even the kings themselves were according unto the orders of this common-wealth to be created by the chirotonia of the people , which nevertheless is by appian sometimes called ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) the chirotonia of the tribunes whether that these magistrates were presidents of the assemblies of the people , or elected by them . sic romani historici non 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 untur con●ulem qui comitia habuerit creasse ●●vos magistratu , non aliam ob causam nisi quia suffragia receperit & populum moderatus est in eligendo . what passed the chirotonia of the people , by the greeks is called psephisma , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 when the congregation of the people was to be dismissed , marcus standing up , said , your psephisma , that is , your act is exceeding good , &c. this policy , for the greater part , is that , which romulus ( as was shewn ) is said ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to have instituted , or ordained , though it be plain that he ordain'd it no otherwise than by the chirotonia of the people . thus you have another example of the three words in controversie , ( chirotonia , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , psephisma ) still applyed in the same sense , and to the same things . have i not also discovered already , the original right of ordination , whether in civil , or religious orders ? this will be scandalous . how ! derive ordination as it is in the church of christ , or asit was in the church of the jews from the religion , or rather superstition of the heathens ! i meddle not with their religion , nor yet with their superstition , but with their ordination , which was neither but a part of their policy . and why is not ordination in the church or common-wealth of christ , as well a political thing as it was in the churches , or common-wealths of the jews , or of the heathens . why is not election of officers in the church as well a political thing , as election of officers in the state ? and why may not this be as lawfully performed by the chirotonia in the one , as in the other ? that moses introduced the chirotonia , is expresly said by philo ; though he oppose it to the ballot , in which i believe he is mistaken , as not seeing that the ballot including the suffrage of the people , by that means came as properly under the denomination of the chirotonia , as the suffrage of the roman people , which though it were given by the tablet , is so called by greek authors . all ordination of magistrates , as of the senators , or elders of the sanhedrin , of the judges , or elders of inferior courts , of the judge , or suffes of israel , of the king , of the priests , of the levites , whether with the ballot , or viva voce , was performed by the chirotonia , or suffrage of the people ; in this ( especially if you admit the authority of the jewish lawyers , and divines called the talmudists ) the scripture will be clear , but their names are hard ; wherefore not to make my discourse more rough then i need , i shall here set them together ; the authors or writings i use by way of paraphrase upon the scripture are the gemara babylonia , midhar rabba , sepher si●●ri , sepher tanchuma , solomon jarchius , chiskuny , abar●inel , ajin israel , pesiktha zoertha , these and many more being for the election of the sanhedrin by the ballot . i might have spoken them more briefly , for the truth is in all that is talmudical , i am assisted by selden grotius , and their quotations out of the rabbis , having in this learning so little skil , that if i miscalled none of them , i shewed you a good part of my acquaintance with them . nor am i wedded unto grotius or selden , whom sometimes i follow , and sometimes i leave , making use of their learning , but of my own reason . as to the things in this present controversie , they were no other in athens and rome than they had been in the common-wealth of israel . when moses came to institute the senate , he asked counsel of god. and the lord said , gather unto me seventy men of the elders of israel , and moses went out and told the people the words of the lord : that is , proposed the dictate of the supream legislator unto the chirotonia of the congregation , what else can we make of these words of moses to the people ? take ye wise men , and understanding , and known among your tribes ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) and i will constitute them rulers over you . now how the people could otherwise take or chuse these rulers or magistrates thus proposed , than by their chiro oxia , let divines — shew or notwithstanding the constitution of moses , both the senate of israel , and the inferior courts were decreed by the chirotonia of the people . for the people upon this proposition resolved in the affirmative , or answered , and said , the thing which thou hast spoken is good for us to do . this then was the psephisma , or decree of the people of israel , whereupon saith moses ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) i constituted or ordained them governors . in which example you have the three words , or the three things again , nor as to the things , is it , or ever was it , otherwise in any common-wealth , whence it is admirable in our divines , who will have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 constituted , to be the word of power , that they do not see by this means they must make two powers in the same government , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or constitution of the legislator , & the chirotonia , or suffrage of the people , or else say that the common-wealth of israel was instituted by the power of the legislator , and the authority of the people , then which there is nothing more absurd . but the people staid not upon their first psephisma , or result that the thing was good for them to do , but did accordingly . the manner of their proceeding at different times was somewhat different ; for it was sometimes viva voce , sometimes by the lot , without the suffrage , and sometimes by the ballot , which consisted not of the lot only , but of the suffrage . also each of these are equally popular , ( for neither of them giveth any advantage unto any person or party ) but not equally prudent wayes of proceeding ; the lot committing too much unto for tune , except in some kinds of businesses , as first in the division of lands , whence the suffrage was properly excluded , for the civisions being made by three deputies out of each tribe , if there happened to fall some advantage or disadvantage unto any man by the lot , it was equal or impartial ; whereas if it had fallen by the suffrage , it must have bin unequal , or partial : such was the cause why the lot in the division of the land of canaan was used wthout the suffrage . in case of a crime committed by an unknown author , but among many of whom some one or more must have been guilty , as in the cases of achan and jonathan ; the lot was also used without the suffrage , somewhat after the manner of decimation in an army , when many that are guilty throw the dice , and he on whom the lot falls is punished ; yet with considerable difference , for whereas decimation is not used but for punishment where the persons are as well known as the guilt ; this use of the lot in israel was for the discovery of the unknown author of some known crime , that some one of many being put to the question ( who if either by his own confession , or other proof he were found guilty , was punished accordingly , otherwise not , ) men might have less encouragement that their crimes would be the more hidden , or less punishable for company , or the shadow of it . when the people were set upon the introduction of a new magistracy , and cared not at all who should be the man , as in the election of saul , at which time the philistines lay hard upon them , and they looked upon the ease they hoped from a king , without coveting the trouble which he was like to have ; it seemeth unto me ; that there was a third use of the lot without the suffrage . but that the common use of the lot in israel implyed also the suffrage , and was of the nature of the ballot at this day in venice is little to be doubted , or you may satisfie your self , when you have considered the manner how the senate or sanhedrin was first elected ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) or constituted by moses . upon the psephisma , or decree of the legislator and the people , the thing which thou hast spoken is good for us to do , they proceeded unto election of competitors in this manner . each of the twelve tribes ( to be hereafter as well locally , as they were yet but geneologically divided ) were to make the election , not excluding the thirteenth , nor yet nominally taking it in ; for levi though genealogically , as distinct a tribe as any of them , yet was not designed locally so to be but to have the right of promiscuous inhabiting , cohabiting , or marriage with all or any of the rest , and with right of suffrage accordingly ; for this cause , the tribes being thirteen , are reckoned but twelve . so each of the twelve tribes elected among themselves by their suffrages , six wise men , and understanding , and known among them , which being elected , were written , and being written were delivered each in a severall scroll unto moses . moses having received all the scrolls , had seventy two competitors , which caused a fraction ; for the senate , as is plain by the text , ( gather me seventy men , that they may stand with thee , ) was to consist but of seventy with moses , that is , in all , of seventy one : so moses having two competitors more than he needed , caused two vrnes to be brought , into one of which he cast the seventy two competitors , or names written in the scrolls ; and into the other seventy two scrolls of which two were blanks , and seventy were inscribed with the word presbyter , this being done , the whole congregation pray'd , and when they had prayed , gave forth their lots . the lots were given forth after this manner , first a lot was drawn out of the vrne of the magistracies , then another out of the vrne of the competitors ; the competitor unto whose name a blank was drawn departed : but he unto whose name a prize was drawn , or given forth became a magistrate . they who had thus gained magistracy were 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 by this psephisma decreed to be together of the number of the seventy elders . but whereas in the vrne of magistracies there were two blanks , two that had been written competitors must of necessity have failed of magistracy . so eldad and medad being of them that were written competitors by the tribes , yet went not up unto the tabernacle ; that is , attained not to be ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) numbred among the seventy , who were to sit in the court of the tabernacle , as afterwards they did in the pavement , or stone-chamber in the court of the temple . in this place i shall mind you but once more of the three words in controversie . moses the legislator ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) constituted , the people chirotonized ; and that which they had chirotonized , was psephisma , their decree . there be in these times that are coifed with such opinions , that to shew scripture to be reason , is to make it loose weight with them , and to talk of the talmudists is to prophane it ; of these i shall desire no more than to know how they understand that place of eldad and medad , for if they can no otherwise make sense of it , than as i have done , it is a sufficient proof , ( letting the talmudists go ) of all that i have said . what therefore hath the hierarchy , and the presbytery for their opinion that the sanhedrin was instituted by the chirothesia , or imposition of hands ? there is in the old testament no mention of laying on of hands by way of ordination , or election , but only by moses in the designation of joshua for his successor ; and in this moses did first as romulus afterwards in the election of the praefect or protector of rome ; but upon a far greater exigence , for the common-wealth of rome , when romulus did the like ; was seated or planted , but the common-wealth of israel when moses did this , was neither seated nor planted , nor indeed a common-wealth , but an army designed to be a common-wealth . now between the government that is necessary unto an army , and that which is necessary to a common-wealth , there is a vast difference . the government even of the armies of rome , when she was a common-wealth , was nevertheless monarchical : in this regard moses himself exercised a kind of dictatorian power for his life , and the common-wealth being not yet planted , nor having any ballance whereupon to weigh her self , must either have been left at his death unto the care of some man , whom he knew best able to lay her foundation , or unto extream hazard ; wherefore this ordination which was but accidental , regarding the present military condition of the people , moses most prudently distinguisheth from the other ; in that he shew'd them how they should manage their common-wealth , in this he bequeaths them the man whom he thinks the most likely to bring them to be a common-wealth ; of which judgement and undertaking of moses , joshua the next illustrious example , most worthily acquitted himself . there is in these elections another remarkable passage , but such a one as being so far from political , that it is supernatural , doth not properly appertain unto this discourse , and so i shall but point at it . when the elders , thus chosen , were set round about the tabernacle , the lord came down in a cloud , and took of the spirit of moses , and gave it unto the seventy elders , and it came to pass , that when the spirit rested upon them , they prophecied , and did not cease . so joshua was full of the spirit of wisdom , for moses had laid his hands upon him . and paul mindeth timothy , stir up the gift of god which is in thee by the laying on of my hands . but the talmudists themselves do not pretend that their ordination was farther accompanied with supernatural indowments than the first institution ; and if divines were as ingenuous , no less might be acknowledged of theirs : moses was a prophet , the like unto whom hath not been in israel , and hath there been an apostle like paul in the christian church ? every body cannot do miracles , we see they cannot . take heed how you deny sense , for then bread may be flesh . if we be not to make choice of a political institution without a miraculous test or recommendation ; either ordination was at first accompanied with supernatural gifts , and from thenceforth ( as i conceive ) neither . divines me thinks as such should not be so much concern'd in the ordination of the sanhedrin , or of joshua , who were magistrates , as the people or the magistrate , yet if these should hence infer that their election , ordination , or designation of persons conferred supernatural gifts , divines would hardly allow of it ; & why are the people , or the magistrate obliged to allow more unto that of a clergy ? to return . such as i have shewn was the ordination of the senate , or great sanhedrin , that of the lesser sanhedrin , or inferior conrts , was of like nature , for it follows ; i took the chief of your tribes , wise-men and known ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) and made them heads over you , captains of thousands , and captains of hundreds , &c. which were other magistrates than according unto our custome , we should readily expect to be intimated by such words , for they were the judges of the inferior courts , those that sat in the gates of each city , and others that appertained unto the villages , as in the next verse : and i charged your judges at that time , saying , hear the causes , and judge righteously . the next magistrate whose election comes to be considered is the dictator , or judge of israel . where it is said of this people , that the lord raised them up judges , which delivered them out of the hands of those that spoiled them , it is to be understood ( saith sigonius ) that god put it into the mind of the people to elect such magistrates , or captains over them . for example when the children of ammon made war against israrael , god raised up jephtha , whose election was after this manner : the elders went to fetch jephtha out of the land of tob , and when they had brought him unto mizpeh ( which in those dayes was the place ( where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) the congregation of israel usually assembled ) the people made him head and captain over them . now that the election of the king was as much in the chirotonia of the people , as that of the judge is past all controversie , seeing the law speaking of the people sayes thus . one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee : and accordingly when the government was changed to monarchy , it was not samuel , but the people that would have it so ; thus saul was chosen king by the lot. where the contradiction of grotius is remarkable , who in this place to shew that the lot is of popular institution , quotes aristotle ; and yet when he comes to speak of the lots that were cast at the election of mathias , says it was that it might appear not whom the multitude , but whom god had ordained ; as if the magistrate lawfully elected by the people , were not elected by god ; or that the lot which thus falleth into the lap were not at the disposing of the lord. but if the league by which the people received david into the throne , or the votes by which first the people of jerusalem , and afterwards the congregation of israel ( as was shewn in the former book ) made solomon king , were of the lord , then election by the people was of the lord , and the magistrate that was elected by the chirotonia of the people , was elected by the chirotonia of god , for as the congregation of israel is called in scripture ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) the ecclesia or congregation of god ; so the chirotonia of this congregation is called by josephus ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) the chirotonia of god , who as i noted before out of capellus , was in this common-wealth political king , or civil legislator ( sans comparison ) as solon in athens , and romulus in rome ; that is to propose unto the people , ( haec est lex quam moses proposuit , ) and whatever was proposed by god , or the lawful magistrate under him , and chirotonized or voted by the people was law in israel , and no other . nay and the people had not only power to reject any law that was thus proposed , but to repeal any law that was thus enacted : for if god intending popular government should have ordained it , otherwise he must have contradicted himself , wherefore he plainly acknowledgeth unto them this power , where ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) they rejected him ( whom they had formerly chirotonized , or chosen king ) that he should not reign over them : and elected saul . this if god had withstood by his power , he must have introduced that kind of monarchy which he had declared against , wherefore he chose rather to abandon this sottish and ingrateful people unto the most inextricable yoke of deserved slavery , telling them , when he had warn'd them , and they would not hear him , that they should cry unto him , and he would not hear them , one tittle of whose words passed not unfulfill'd . by this time i have shewn that all the civil magistrates in israel were chosen by the chirotonia of the people , or to follow josephus by the chirotonia of god , which is all one ; for the chirotonia of the president of the congregation , as i have instanced in that of the proedri of the thesmothetae of the consuls , of the tribunes , and the chirotonia of the congregation is the same thing ; and of the congregation of israel god ( except onely at the voting of a king ) was president . to come then from the civil magistrates unto the priests , and levites , these were chosen in two wayes , either by the lot , or by the chirotonia . the office and dignity of the high priest being the greatest in israel , and by the institution to be hereditory , caused great disputes in the election : to this moses by the command of god had designed aaron his brother , which designation , the command of god being at first either not so obvious , as that relation , or the ambition of others so blind that they could not , or would not see it , caused great combustion . first through the conspiracy of korah , dathan , and abiram ; and next by the murmuring of the princes of the tribes , all emulous of this honour . korah being not onely a great man , but of the tribe of levi , could not see why he was not as worthy of the priesthood , consideration had of his tribe as aaron ; and if any other tribe might pretend to it , dathan and abiram being descended from reuben were not only of the elder house , but troubled to see a younger preferr'd before them wherefore these having gained unto their party three hundred of the most powerful men of the congregation , accused moses of affecting tyranny , and doing those things which threatned the liberty of the common-wealth ; as under pretense of divination to blind the eyes of the people , preferring his brother unto the priesthood ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) without the suffrage of the congregation : of which charge moses acquitting himself in the congregation , tells the people that aaron was chosen both by god , and ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) by their suffrages , which ( korah being upon this occasion miraculously destroy'd ) were thereupon once more given by the people . nevertheless the princes of the tribes continuing still discontented , and full of murmur , god decided the controversie by a second miracle , the budding of aarons rod : ( and so 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) being thrice confirmed by the chirotonia of god , he was confirmed in that honour . now that the chirotonia of god in this place of iosephus signifies the chirotonia of the people , is plain by that in scripture , where they made solomon king , and zadock to be priest . after the captivity , as in other things , so in this power the sanhedrin came ( as i conceive ) to over-reach the people : joshua the son of josedech being thus elected high priest by the sanhedrim , and this honour thenceforth as appears by maymonides being at the disposing of this court. nor could any inferior priest serve at the altar , except he had acquired that right by the lot , as is not only delivered by the same author , and by josephus but in scripture . now the lot as was shewn giving no prerogative either unto any person or party is as popular an institution as the chirotonia . so in election of priests , the orders of israel differed not from humane prudence , nor those of other common-wealths , the priest of iupiter having been elected after the same manner in the common-wealth of syracusa , the augustales , and the vestals in that of rome ; and if the right of bearing holy magistracy , being in israel confined unto one tribe or order , may seem to make any difference , it was for some time no otherwise in athens , nor in rome , where the patritians or nobility assumed these offices , or the greatest of them to themselves , till the people in those cities disputed that custome , as introduced without their consent , which the people of israel could not fairly do , because it was introduced by their consent . to come unto the levites in their original ordination , god commanded moses saying , thou shalt bring the levites before the tabernacle of the congregation & thou shalt gather the whole assembly of the children of israel , and they shall put their hands upon the levites . this in the sound of the words may seem to imply the chirothesia , or imposition of hands , but take heed of that , divines will not allow the chirothesia to be an act of the people , but in this proceeding the whole people acted in the ordination of the levites , wherefore the levites also were ordained by the chirotonia , consent , vote , or suffrage of the whole people implyed in this action . but for the ordination of priests and levites , whatever it were , it is not unto the present purpose ; divines deriving not theirs from priests and levites , but from dukes , generals , and magistrates , from that of joshua and of the sanhedrin , alwaies provided , that this were of the same nature with the former , that is , hy the chirothesia , or imposition of hands , and not by the chirotonia of the people . however the ordination of the magistracy was certainly political ; and so in this deduction they themselves confess that their ordination also is a political constitution : yet whereas moses is commanded by god to bring aaron and his sons unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation , and having washed them there , to adorn them with the priestly robes , with the mitre , and to annoint them : whereas he is commanded ( the children of israel having first laid their hands upon the levites ) to cleanse them , and offer them for an offering ; divines of the hierarchy and the presbytery ( though it be otherwise with wallaeus , and such as acknowledge popular government ) give the congregation , or consent of the people for nothing , and put the whole ordination of the priests and levites upon the washing and cleansing or other ceremonies of their consecration : as if to put the ordination of saul up on the ceremony of annointing by samuel , ( though performed by the immediate command of god , were not absolutely contradictory to scripture , and unto the known law of israel , which speaking of the people , expresly saith , one from among thy brethren shalt thou set king over thee ; upon which place saith philo , most wise moses never intended that the royal dignity should be acquired by lot , but chose rather that the kings should be elected by the chirotonia , or suffrage of the whole people ; the congregations of the people assembled , upon this as upon other publick affairs , required a signe or confirmation from god : for as much as by his will man is to the rest of nature , as the face unto the body . whereunto agrees that of the heathens , os homini sublime dedit coelumque tueri jussit , and their divinations upon the like occasions by entrails , none of which were ever understood as destructive of the liberty of the people , or of the freedom of their chirotonia . where solomon is made king , and zadock priest by the people , albeit the ceremony of anointing was doubtlesly performed , and perhaps by the prophet nathan , it is wholly omitted in the place as not worth the speaking of . the opinion that the ordination of the priests and levites lay in the ceremonies of their consecration , is every whit as sober and agreeable unto reason , as if a man should hold the kings of england to have been made by the unction of the bishops , israel from the institution of moses to the monarchy , was a democracy , or popular government ; in popular government the consent of the people is the power of the people , and both the priests and levites were ordained by the consent of the people of israel . to bring these things unto the cities in the perambulation of the apostles , which by the former chapter i have proved to have been popular governments ; it is acknowledged by grotius unto the cities of asia , not only that they used the chirotonia , but in the strictest sense of the word , that is , to give their suffrage by the holding up of hands , & that they had the liberty of their religion , the choice of their magistrates , both civil and ecclesiastical in their ecclesiae , or congregations , hath been also undeniably evidenced ; whence it must needs follow that there were cities in asia ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) chirotonizing or ordaining them-elders , that is , magistrates and priests in every congregation ( with reverence be it spoken ) long before christ was in the flesh , or the apostles any of them were born . wherefore to sum up what in this chapter i conceive to be sufficiently proved , i may boldly conclude , that the chirotonia deriveth from popular constitution , and that there was a way of ordination by the chirotonia . chap. iv. the deduction of the chirothesia from monarchical or aristocratical government , and of the second way of ordination from the chirothesia . in which is contained the common-wealth of the iews as it stood after the captivity . what pleaseth the prince ( saith justinian ) hath the force of a law , seeing the people in his creation have devolved their whole power upon his person ? which is which the most ? but when popular government is changed into monarchical , either the whole power of the people , or a great ▪ part of it must of necessity accrue unto the king. hence saith samuel , he will appoint him captains over thousands , and captains over fifties : in which words perhaps is intimated the judges of the inserior courts , or jethonian prefectures ; so that hereby samuel tells the people they shall no more have the election of their rulers , but the king will have it : who it may be changed the nature of some of these magistracies , or added others , for when david came to reign over all israel , joab was over the host ( his strategus or general ) jehoshaphat was recorder , zadoc and abi●elec were the priests , seraiah was the scribe , and benaiah was over the pelethites , and the cerethites ; that is , was captain of his regiments of guard , called perhaps by these names , as those of romulus were called celeres . but it should seem that few or none of these officers were elected by the chirotonia , that is by the people , but by the prince , which kind of election as will be shewn anon may be called chirothesia . for the deduction of this kind of ordination , or election , we shall do well to hearken first unto doctor hammond ; who in his quaere , or discourse concerning ordination , by the imposition of hands , puts it thus . to lift up the hands was a ceremony in prayer , and accordingly to lay hands on any , ( differing no otherwise from lifting up , than by the determining that action to a peculiar object , ( the person that was prayed for ) was generally among the iews , a ceremony of benediction used first by the father to the children ; in bestowing the blessing upon them , ( and with that the succession to some part of his estate or inheritance ) as appears in iacobs blessing the children of ioseph : he stretched out his right hand and laid it upon ephraims head , and so his left hand on manasses , and so he blessed , &c. from thence it was accomodated among them to the communicating of any part of power to others as assistants , or to the deriving of any successive office from one to another . thus when moses had from heaven received , and long used his commission to be under god the ruler of the people , the seventy elders were by gods appointment assumed to assist him : it being certain from the iewish writings , though the sacred scripture have no occasion to mention it , that the succession of the seventy elders under the name of san●edrim o council was continued through all ages by their creating others in the place of those that dyed , by this ceremony of imposition of hands . to this purpose are the clear words of maimonides , moses our master created the seventy elders by imposition of hands , and the divine majesty rested on them ; and those elders imposed hands on others , and others on others , &c. so a little before the departure of moses out of his life , when a successor was to be provided for him , god commands him to take joshua , and lay his hands upon him . and moses laid his hands upon him , and gave him a charge as the lord commanded by the hand of moses : that is , derived unto him by this ceremony the authority which himself had , and constituted him his successor in that government . and so it is repeated joshua was full of the spirit of wisdom , for moses had laid his hands upon him . this is the doctors deduction of the chirothesia , or ordination by the laying on of hands from the common-wealth of israel : and ( saith he ) from the three vses of this ceremony there , that is first in praying for another , secondly , in paternall benediction ; thirdly in creating successors in power , either in whole , or in part , derive three sorts of things in the new testament , to which this ceremony of laying on of hands is accomodated ; that of prayer simply taken was of two sorts , either for the cure of diseases , or pardoning of sins . for diseases : they shall lay hands on the sick , and they shall recover . for sins ▪ they were done away also by this ceremony in the absolution of penitents , to which belongs that exhortation of paul to timothy , lay hands suddenly on no man , ( that is ) not without due examination and proof of his penitence , least thou be partaker of other mens sins . from the second , that of paternal benediction , was borrowed , first that of blessing infants , with the ceremony of imposition of hands , as it differ'd from baptisme . and secondly , that of confirming those of fuller age , that had been formerly baptized . lastly to create successors in any power , or communicating any part of power to others , as to assistants , is answerable that imposition of hands in ordination so often mentioned in the new testament , sometimes in the lower degree , as in the ordaining of deacons . elsewhere in the highest degree , setting governors over particular churches , as generally when by that laying on of hands , it is said they received the holy ghost , whereas the holy ghost contains all the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 required to the pastoral function , and so signifies power from on high ; the authority and function it self ; so it being given by imposition of hands ▪ makes the parallel exact between this of christian ordination , and that observed in the creating successors in the jewish sanhedrin . so far the doctor . now say i if the scripture be silent as to the ordination of the elders in israel : what meaneth that place : take the wise men , and understanding , and known among your tribes , and i will make them rulers over you ; once in their lives let them give us the sense of it , or of that other , where eldad and medad are of those that were written , and yet went not up unto the tabernacle : otherwise that we hear no more of these , is from the silence of divines , and not of the scripture . but if the scripture be not silent in this point , is there not a great deal of fancy in going on to cure the sick , to pardon sins , to bless infants , confirm the baptized , ordain ministers , nay , give the holy ghost , and all the graces belonging unto the pastoral function , from a place that hath no such thing in it ? for if the sanhedrim according to scripture were not ordained by the chirothesia , there is no such thing to be derived by the chirothesia from the sanhedrim . the first chirotonia indeed of the sanhedrim was accompanied with miraculous indowments , wherefore if they will derive these gifts and graces from the sanhedrim , why are they sworn enemies to the chirotonia ? again the sanhedrim was a civil court or senate , wherefore then by this title should not these gifts and graces be rather pretended unto by the civil magistrate , than by divines ? what becomes of the priest aaron and his lots ? is he left unto the civil magistrate , while divines derive themselves from general ioshua and his chirothesia ? but if the sanhedrim and inferior judicatories were otherwise ordained originally ; then no magistrate in israel was originally ordained by the chirothesia but only ioshua . it is admirable that divines should look upon god , as if in the institution of a common-wealth he had no regard at all unto humane prudence ; but were altogether fix'd upon their vain advantages . who made humane prudence ? or to what end was it made ? any man that understands the politicks , and considers that god was now proceeding according unto this art , as in his constitution of the senate , and of the people , or congregation is most obvious , must needs see that this power he indulged unto moses of making his own choice of one man could not possibly be intended , as a permanent constitution , for whereas he intended popular government , nothing is plainer then that a people not electing their own magistrates can have no popular government . how absurd is it to conceive that god having already made an express law that the people if at any time they came under monarchy , should yet have the election of their king , should now make a law that the people being under a common-wealth , should no longer have the election of their magistrates ? for who seeth not that to introduce the chirothesia as a standing ordinance , had been to bar the people of this power ? israel at this time , though designed for a common-wealth , had no land , no foundation to ballance her self upon , but was an army in a wilderness , encompassed about with enemies ; to permit unto the people in this case , the choice of all their civil magistrates was nevertheless safe enough , nay best of all , for at the election of wise men , and understanding , and known among their tribes , so far as was needful unto civil administration , their skil must needs have been at any time sufficient , but the common-wealth was yet in absolute necessity of a protector , and of dictarian power . now to know who was fittest in this case to succeed moses , required the wisdom of god , or of moses , and therefore was not yet safe to be ventur'd upon a people so new in their government . for these reasons i say moses used the chirothesia for once , and no more , or let them shew me among all the dictators , iudges , or kings , that succeeded ioshua , any one that was chosen by the chirothesia , and be all dictators . it is now above three thousand years since the institution of the sanhedrim , from which time the ambitious elders first , then the talmudists , and of latter ages divines have been perpetually striving for , or possessing themselves of this same oligarchycal invention of the chirothesia pretended to be derived from moses ; though there be neither any such precept of god or christ in the old or new testament , nor any unanimous result upon the point , either by the talmudists or divines themselves . and for the clear words quoted by the doctor out of maimonides , they are such unto which i shall in due time shew maimonides to be elsewhere of a clear contrary opinion . but in this controversie , without some clearer deduction of the chirothesia , we shall make no happy progress , in this therefore i shall follow selden the ablest talmudist of our age , or any . the common-wealth of lacedemon ( if i could stand to shew it ) hath strange resemblances to that of israel , not only in the agragrian , which is nothing to the present purpose , but in the senate , which to prevent catching another time , i do not say was a iudicatory only , but not only a senate , but a iudicatory also . for lycurgus of all other legislators was in this the likest unto god , or unto moses , that his work was so exquisitely perfected at once , and his laws so comprehensive , that if the senate had had no other function than to make or propose new laws , there being little or nothing of that wanting , they would have had little or nothing to do . now it being thus , and much more than thus in israel , the sanhedrim was not only the senate , but the supream iudicatory . and because one court in a territory of any extent is no where sufficient unto this end ; therefore the sanhedrim had divers branches distended not only unto the cities of iudea , but even unto the villages , these were called the lesser sanhedrim , or the iethronian praefectures . the great sanhedrim consisting ( as hath been shewn ) of . elders , sat first in the tabernacle , and afterwards in the court of the temple . the iethronian praefectures consisted some of three and twenty elders , and others but of three . of the former kind there were two in the gates of the temple , and one sitting in the gates of every city , of the latter there was one almost in every village . the power of the i●thronian court consisting of twenty three elders , was in matter of iudicature , equall with that of the great sanhedrin , onely in cases of difficulty they observed this precept . if there arise a matter too hard for thee in judgement between blood and blood , between plea and plea , between stroke and stroke , being matter of controversie within thy gates ; then shalt thou arise , and get thee up into the place which the lord thy god shall choose ( in the future , for the common-wealth was yet but designed , not planted ) and thou shalt come unto the priests and the levites , and unto the iudge that shall be in those dayes , and enquire , and they shall shew thee the sentence of judgement . that is , thou shalt consult the sanhedrim , or if there be no sanhedrim , the suffes or iudge of israel . the reason why the sanhedrim in this text is mentioned under the name of the priests and levites is , that these about the beginning of this common-wealth having ( as were also the egyptian priests at the same time ) been the learnedst men , whether for lawyers , or physitians , there were scarce any other chosen into the sanhedrim , though towards the latter end it happened to be far otherwise . for whereas sacrificing was feasting ▪ the priests enjoying a f●●idl●ness , became in latter times so heavy , that as to the election of the sanhedrim not only the levites of inferior rank were upon the matter wholly laid by , but the high priest himself sometimes omitted , the rest of the tribes far excelling this in learning . the power of the triumvirates , or three iudges in the villages extended no farther than to inflict stripes to a certain number , and pecuniary mulcts to a certain sum . these possibly had the same recourse upon occasion of difficulty unto the iudges in the gates , as the iudges in the gates had to the sanhedrim : but their power is not so much to the present purpose which regards onely their manner of election . this having been institutively exercised , as hath been shewn by the chirotonia , or ballot of the people , came sooner or later , ( i find no man that can resolve npon the certain time ) to the chirothesia . for though when a iudge in the gate , was dead , that court elected his successor out of their disciples , ( each court in the gates had disciples that were their constant auditors ) or out of the triumvirates ; and when an elder of the sanhedrim dyed , the sanhedrim elected his successor out of the courts in the gates , more particularly those in the gates of the temple by suffrages ; yet no man was capable of being elected into any of these courts , that was not a presbyter , nor was any man a presbyter that had not received the chirothesia : nor could any man confer the chirothesia that had not first received it , or been so ordained a presbyter himself : nor though he were so ordained , could he confer the like ordination , but in the presence of two others , whether ordain'd or not ordain'd : and no ordination could be conferr'd but either this way , or by some one of the iudicatories . the manner how this ordination was conferr'd , if the party were present , was either by laying on of hands , or by saying a verse or charme , or if he were absent , by a letter , or patent . an elder thus ordained was called rabbi , might have disciples , teach , practice , or expound the law , declare what was thereby free or forbidden ( which with them was called binding and loosing ) ordain others with the assistance mentioned , or be capable of election into some one , or any court of justice , according to the nature of his ordination , the conditions mentioned at the conferring of the same , or the gift that was in him by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery , which in some extended no farther than to shew how meat should be kill'd and dress'd , how uncleanness should be purified , what were vices of the body , what might be eaten or drunk , and what not ? in others it extended to some one or more , or all the facultys expressed ; but i am inclining to believe that a plenary ordination , used not to be conferr'd but by the great sanhedrim , or at least some one of the iethronian courts . they used also to confer this ordination some time occasionally , and for a season in this manner . receive the gift of judiciary ordination , or the right of binding and loosing , til such time as you return unto us in the city . where the christian jews still following their former customes in higher matters , as the observation of the sabbath , and of circumcision , even unto such a degree , that paul not to displease them took timothy and circumcised him , seem unto me to have followed this custom , who when the prophets at antioch had informed them that paul and barnabas were to be separated unto an extraordinary work , laid their hands upon them , and sent them away : for otherwise as to ordination paul and barnabas had that before ; at least paul by ananias , and for any such precept in the christian religion there was none . iosephus , philo , and other authors , that tell us the common-wealth of israel was an aristocracy , look no farther than the introduction of the chirothesia by the presbyterian party , which must have taken date some time after the captivity , or the restitution of the common-wealth by ezra , there heing not one sillable for it in scripture , but enough to the contrary , seeing god introduced the chirotonia . by which it is demonstrable that a presbyterian party may bring a popular government unto oligarchy ; aud deface even the work of god himself , so that it shall not be known to afer-ages ; as also that ecclesiastical writers ( for such are the talmudists ) may pretend that for many hundred years together , as divines also have done , to be in scripture , which neither is , nor ever was there . but have i yet said enough to shew that ordination especially as in this example , not of a clergy , but of a magistracy , whether by the chirotonia , or chirothesia is a political institution ? or must i rack my brains for arguments to prove that an order or a law having such influence upon the common-wealth , that being introduced or repealed , it quite alters the whole frame of the government , must needs be of a political nature , and therefore not appertain unto divines , or unto a clergy , but unto the magistrate , unless their traditions may be of force to alter the government as they please ? all is one , they can abate nothing of it , let what will come of the government , the chirothesia they must and will have . then let them have monarchy too , or tyranny , for one of these according as the ballance happeneth to stand with or against their chirothesia is the certain consequence ; either tyranny as in israel ▪ or monarchy as in the papacy , and from that or the like principle , in all gothick empires , which examples to begin with israel , well deserve the paines to be somewhat more diligently unfolded . all elections in israel , ( save those of the priests who were eligible by the lot ) being thus usurped by the presbyterian party , and the people by that means devested of their chirotonia ; some three hundred years before christ , hillel senior high priest , and archon , or prince of the sanhedrim found means to draw this power of ordination , in shew somewhat otherwise , but in effect unto himself , and his chirothesia , for by his influence upon the sanhedrim it was brought to pass , that whereas formerly any man ordain'd , might ( in the manner shewn ) have ordained his disciples ; it was now agreed that no man should be ordained without the license of the prince , and that this power should not be in tbe prince , but in the presence of the father of the sanhedrim , or speaker of the house . thus the aristocracy of israel becoming first oligarchical took ( according unto the nature of all such governments ) long steps towards monarchy , which succeeding in the asmonean family , commonly called the machabees , was for their great merit ( in vindicating the jews from the tyranny of antiochus ) confirmed unto them by the universal consent and chirotonia of the people . nevertheless unto him that understands the orders of a common-wealth , or hath read the athenian , lacedemonian , or roman story , it will be plain enough that but for their aristocracy they needed not to have been so much beholding unto , or to have stood so much in need of one family . it is true both the merit of these princes , and the manner of their free election by the people ; seem to forbid the name of tyranny unto this institution . but so it is , that let there be never so much merit in the man , or inclination of the people to the prince , or the government that is not founded upon the due ballance , the prince in that case must either govern in the nature of a common-wealth , as did those of this family , reforming the policy after the lacedemonian modell , or turn tyrant , as from their time , who lived in the age of the grecian monarchy did all their successors , till under the romans this nation became a province . from which time such endeavours and insurrections they used for the recovery of their antient policy , that under the emperor adrian , ( who perceived at what their ordination , being not of priests , but of magistrates , and of a senate , pretending unto soveraign judicature and authority seem'd to aim ) there came ( saith the talmud ) against the israelites an edict out of the kingdom of the wicked ( meaning the roman empire ) whereby whosoever should ordain , or be ordain'd , was to be put to death , and the school or city in which such an act should be done , to be destroyed ; whereupon rabbi jehuda ben baba ( least ordination should fail in israel ) went forth , and standing between two great mountains , and two great cities , and between two sabbath days journeys from osa and sephara , ordained five presbyters . for this feat the rabbi is remember'd by the talmudists under the name of ordinator ; but the same ( as it follows ) being discovered by the roman guards , they shot his body through with so many darts , as made it like a sieve , yet staid not the business here , but so obstinate continued the jew in the superstition unto which this kind of ordination was now grown , that whereas by the same it was unlawful for them to ordain in a forraign land , and at home they could not be brought to abstain , the emperor banished them all out of their own country , whence happened their total dispersion . that of a thing , which at the first was a meer delusion , such religion should come in time , and with education to be made that not onely they who had received advantage could suffer martyrdome , but they that had lost by it , would be utterly lost for it , were admirable in the case of this people , if it were not common in the case of most in the world at this day : custom may bring that to be received as an ordinance of god , for which there is no colour in scripture . for to consult maimonides a little better upon this point . whereas ( saith he ) they grant in case it should happen that in all the holy land there remained but one presbyter , that presbyter assisted by two other israelites , might ordain the seventy , or great sanhedrim , and the sanhedrim so constituted might constitute and ordain the lesser courts , i am of opinion that were there no presbyter in the land , yet if all the wise-men of israel should agree to constitute or ordain judges , they might do it lawfully enough . but if so , then how comes it to pass that our ancestors have been so solicitous , least judicature should fail in israel ? surely for no other cause than that from the time of the captivity the israelites were so dispersed that they could not upon like occasions be brought together . now i appeal whether the clear words of maimonides , where he saith that out master moses ordained the sanhedrim by the chirothesia , be not more clearly and strongly contradicted in this place , than they are affirmed in the other , since acknowledging that if the people could assemble , they might ordain the sanhedrim ; he gives it for granted , that when they did assemble , they had power to ordain it , and that moses did assemble them upon this occasion is plain in scripture . again if the power of ordination fall ultimately unto the people , there is not a stronger argument in nature , that it thence primarily derived . to conclude the chirothesia of the presbyterian party in israel is thus confessed by the author no otherwise necessaty , than through the defect of the chirotonia of the people : which ingenuity of the talmudist , for any thing that hath yet past , might be worthy the imitation of divines . in tracking the jews from the restitution of their common-wealth after the captivity to their dispersion , it seemeth that the later monarchy in israel was occasioned by the oligarchy , the oligarchy by the aristocracy , and the aristocracy by the chirothesia . but that this monarchy , though erected by magnanimous and popular princes , could be no less than tyranny deriv'd from another principle , that is , the insufficiency of the ballance . for albeit from the time of the captivity , the jubilee was no more in use , yet the virgin mary as an heiress , is affirmed by some to have been married unto ioseph , by vertue of this law , every daughter that possesseth an inheritance in any tribe of the children of israel , shall be wife unto one of the family of the tribe of her fathers , &c. by which the popular agrarian may be more than suspected to have been of greater vigour than would admit of a well ballanced monarchy . the second presbytery , which is now attained unto a well ballanced empire in the papacy , hath infinitely excelled the patern , the lands of italy being most of them in the church . this if i had leisure might be tracked by the very same steps : at first it consisted of the seventy parish priests , or presbyters of rome ; now seventy cardinals creating unto themselves an high priest , or prince of their sanhedrim , the pope , but for the superstition whereunto he hath brought religion , and continues by his chirothesia to hold it , a great and a reverend monarch , established upon a solid foundation , and governing by an exquisite policy , not only well ballanced at home , but deeply rooted in the greatest monarchies of christendom , where the clergy by vertue of their lands are one of the three states . the maxims of rome are profound , for there is no making use of princes without being necessary unto them ; nor have they any regard unto that religion which doth not regard empire . all monarchies of the golthick model , that is to say , where the clergy by vertue of their lands are a third estate , subsist by the pope , whose religon creating a reverence in the people , and bearing an awe upon the prince , preserveth the clergy , that else being unarmed , become a certain prey unto the king or the people ; and where this happeneth ( as in henry the eighth ) down goes the throne , for so much as the clergy looseth , falls out of the monarchical into the popular scale . where a clergy is a third estate , popular government wants earth and can never grow : but where they dye at the root a prince may sit a while , but is not safe ; nor is it in nature ( except he have a nobility or gentry able without a clergy to give ballance unto the people ) that he should subsist long , or peaceably : for where-ever a government is founded upon an army ( as in the kings of israel , or the emperours of rome ) there the saddest tragedies under heaven are either one the stage , or in the tiring-house . these things considered , the chirothesia being originally nothing else but a way of policy excluding the people , where it attaineth not unto a ballance that is sufficient for this purpose , bringeth forth oligarchy or tyranny , as among the jews : and where it attaineth unto a ballance sufficent unto this end , produceth monarchy as in the papacy and in all gothick kingdomes . the priests of aegypt , where ( as it is described by siculus ) their revenue came unto the third part of the realm , would , no question , have been exactly well fitted with the chirothesia pretended unto by modern divines . suppose the apostles had planted the christian religion in those parts . and the priests had been all converted , i do not think that divines will say that having altered their religion they needed to have deserted their being a third estate ; their overballance to the people , their lands , their preheminece in the government , or any part of thir policy for that : and i am as far from saying so as themselves . on the other side , as paul was a citizen of rome , let us suppose him to have been a citizen of athens , and about ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to constitute the christian religion in this gommon-wealth where any citizen might speak unto the people . imagine then he should have said thus . men of athens , that which you ignorantly seek , i bring unto you the true religion , but to receive this , you must not alter your former belief only but your ancient customes ; your political assemblies have been hitherto called , ecclesiae , this word must loose the ancient sense , and be no more understood but of spiritual consistories , and so whereas it hath been of a popular , it must henceforth be of an aristocratical , or presbyterian signification . for your christonia that also must follow the same rule insomuch as on whomsoever , one or more of the aristocracy or presbytery shall lay their hands , the same is understood by vertue of that action to be chirotonized . how well would this have sounded in aegypt , and how ill in athens ? cercainly the policy of the church of christ admits of more prudence and temperament in these things , though the apostles being jews themselves , satisfied the converted jews that were used to aristocrrcy by retaining somewhat of their constitutions , as the chirothesia yet when paul and barnabas come to constitute in popular common-wealths : they are ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) chirotonizing them elders in every congregation . chap. v. whether the chirotonia mentinoned in the fourteenth of the acts be indeed as is pretended by dr. hamond , dr. seaman and the authors they follow , the same with the chirothesia or a far different thing ; in which are contained the divers kindes of churchgovernment , introduced and exercised in the age of the apostles either i have impettinently intruded upon the politicks , or cannot be said so much to meddle in church-matters , as church-men may be said to have medled in states matters . for if the chirotonia be election by the many , and the chirothesia be election by one , or by the few , the whole difference between popular and monarchical government falls upon these two words ; and so the question will be , whether the scriptures were intended more for the advantage of a prince , of an hierarchy or presbytery , than of the people . but that god in the old testamentiinstituted the chirotonia , not only in the common-wealth as by the election of the sanhedrim , but in the monarchy as in the election of the kings is plain ; so if there remain any advantage in scripture unto kings unto the hierarchy , or presbytery , it must be in the new testament . israel was gods chosen people , and god was israels chosen king ; that god was pleased to bow the heavens , and come down unto them , was his choice , not theirs ; but in that upon his proposition , and those of his servant moses , they resolved to obey his voice , and keep his covenant , they chose him their king. in like manner the church is christs chosen people , and christ is the churches chosen king. that christ taking flesh was pleased to bow the heavens , and come down in a more familiar capacity of proposing himself unto man-kind , was his own choice , not theirs ; but in that the church upon his proposition , or those of his apostles sent by him , as he was sent by the father , resolved to obey his voice , and keep his covenant , she hath chosen him her king. whatever in nature or in grace , in church , or in state , is chosen by man according unto the will of god , is chosen by god , of whom is both the will and the deed. which things considered ; i wonder at doctor hamond , who sayes : sure the jewish and heathen cities , to whom the gospel by christs command was to be preached were not to choose their guides or teachers . christ was not chosen by them to whom he preached , for saith he , ye have not chosen me , he came from heaven , sent by his father on that errand , and happy they whom he was thus pleased to choose , to call , and preach to . and when his apostles after his example go and preach to all nations , and actually gather disciples , they chose their auditors , and not their auditors them . to make short work , i shall answer by explaining his words as they fall . a roman choosing whether he would speak unto the senate or the people , chose his auditors , & not they him : nevertheless if it were the consul they chose him , & not he them . it is onething to be a speaker unto a people , that have theliberty , when that is done , to do as they think fit , and another thing to be a guide whom the people have consented , or obliged themselves to follow , which distinction not regarded , makes the rest of his argumentation recoyl upon himself , while he proceeds thus , and they that give up their names to the obedience of the gospel , ( choose the preachers as i should think of that gospel their guides ) one branch of this obedience obligeth them ( by their own consent it seems , because before they gave up their names ) to observe those that ( being thus placed over them by their consent ) are placed over them by god , such not only are their civil magistrates ( who succeed unto their places by , and govern according to the laws which the people have chosen ) but also their pastors , whom the holy ghost either mediately ( according to the rules of church-discipline in scripture ) or immediately ( upon some such miraculous call , as the people shall judge to be no imposture ) hath set over them . from which words the doctor not considering those qualifications , i have shewn all along to be naturally inherent in them , concludes that a bishop is made by the holy ghost , and not by the people . if he would stand to this yet it were something , for if the holy ghost make a bishop , then i should think that the holy ghost ordain'd a bishop , and so that the election and ordination of a bishop were all one . but this hereafter will appear to be a more dangerous concession , than perhaps you may yet apprehend . wherefore when all is done you will not find divines , at least doctor hamond to grant that the holy ghost can ordain , he may elect indeed , and that is all , but there is no ordination without the chirothesia of the bishops , or of the presbytery . take the doctors word for it . when st. paul saith of the bishops of asia , that the holy ghost had set them overseers , i suppose that it is to be understood of their election or nomination unto those dignities , for so clement speaks of st. iohn , who constituted bishops of those that were signified by the spirit , where the spirits signification notes the election or nomination of the persons , but the constituting them was the ordination of st. iohn . god may purpose as the electors do to the great council of venice , but the power of the council , that is to resolve or ordain is in the bishop saith doctor hamond , and in the the presbytery saith doctor seaman . indeed that election and ordination be distinct things , is to divines of so great importance , that loosing this hold they loose all for as i said before whatever is chosen by man according unto the will of god , that is according unto divine law , whether natural or positive , the same whether in state or church , is chosen by god , or by the holy ghost , of whom is both the will and the deed . to evade this , and keep all in their own hands , or chirothesia , divines have invented this distinction , that election is one thing , and ordination another . god may elect , but they must constitute , that is , god may propose , but they must resolve . and yet grotius who in these things is a great champion for the clergy , hath little more to say upon this point than this . whether we consider ancient or modern times , we shall find the manner of election very different , not only in different ages and countries , but in different years of the same age , and places of the same country ; so uncertain a thing is it to determine of , that which the scripture hath left uncertain . and while men dispute not of right , but of convenience , it is wonderfull to see what probable arguments are brought on all sides . give me cyprian and his times , there is no danger in popular election . give me the nicene fathers , and let the bishops take it willingly . give me theodosius valentinian , and charls the great , then royal election there is nothing safer . upon the heels of these words treads doctor hamond in this manner . that election and ordination are several things , is sufficiently known unto every man that measures the nature of words either by usuage or dictionaries ; only for the convincing of such as think not themselves obliged to the observation of so vulgar laws , i shall propose these evidences ; in the story of the creation of the deacons of jerusalem . there are two things distinctly set down , one proposed to the multitude of disciples to be done by them : another reserved unto the apostles , that which was proposed unto the multitude , was to elect , &c. election of the persons was by the apostles permitted to them , but still the ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) constituting is reserved to the apostles . then comes doctor seaman : be it granted , as it is by protestants generally , that paul and barnabas made elders with the consent of the people , their consent is one thing , and their power another . where in the first place i for my particular ( who have had the books of doctor hamond , and doctor seaman , sent to me by way of objection , need not go a step further . all that i have inserted in my occana concerning ordination , is in these three votes acknowledged and confirmed . for the probationer , to be there sent by an university unto a cure that is vacant , may by a doctor , or the doctors of the same university already ordained , receive imposition of hands , if that be thought fit to be added , and then the election of the same probationer by the people does no hurt , nay saith grotius , is of the right of nature ; for it is naturally permitted unto every congregation to procure those things which are necessary unto their conservation , of which number is the application of function . so merchants have the right of electing of a master of their ship , travellers of a guide in their way , and a free people of their king. the merchant it seems doth not make the master of his ship , the traveller his guide , nor the free people their king , but elect them . as if van tromp had been admiral , a robber upon the high-way had been a scout , or the guide of an army , or saul a king before they were elected . the point is very nice , which instead of proving , he illustrates in the beginning of the same chapter by these three similitudes . the first is this , the power of the husband is from god , the application of this power unto a certain person is from consent , by which nevertheless the right is not given , for if this were by consent , the matrimony might be dissolv'd by consent , which cannot be . as if an apparent retraction of matrimonial consent , as when a wife consents unto another than her own husband , or committeth adultery , did not deliver a man from the bond of marriage by the judgements of christ . there is an imperfection or cruelty in those laws , which make marriage to last longer than a man in humanity may be judged to be an husband , or a woman a wife ; to think that religion destroyes humanity , or to think that there is any defending of that by religion which will not hold in justice , or natural equity , is a vast error . the second similitude is this ; imperial power is not in the princes that are electors of the empire , wherefore it is not given by them , but applyed by them unto a certain person . this is answer'd by peter , where he commandeth obedience unto every ordinance of man ( or as some neerer the original every power created by men ) whether it be unto the roman emperour as supreme , or unto the pro-consuls of asia , and phrygia , as sent by him ( for this is the sense of the greek , and thus it is interpreted by grotius ) now if the then roman emperour were a creature of man , why not the now roman emperour ? the last similitude runs thus : the power of life and death is not in the multitude , before they be a common-wealth , for no private man hath the right of revenge , yet it is applyed by them unto some man or political body of men . but if a man invade the life of another , that other whether under laws , or not under laws , hath the right to defend his own life , even by taking away that ( if there be no other probable remedy ) of the invader . so that men are so far from having been void of the power of life and death before they came under laws , that laws can never be so made as wholly to deprive them of it after they come under them ; wherfore the power of life and death is derived by the magistrate from , and conferred upon him by the consent or chirotonia of the people , whereof he is but a meer creature , that is to say an ordinance of man. thus these candles being so far from lighting the house , that they die in the socket : grotius hath been no less bountiful than to grant us that the people have as much right , ( where there is no humane creature or law to the contrary ) to elect their church-men , as merchants have to elect their sea-men , travilers their guides , or a free ▪ people their king ; which is enough a conscience . nor is doctor hamond streighter handed , election ( says he ) was permitted by the apostles unto the multitude , and therefore the same may be allowed , alwaies provided that the ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) constituting be reserved unto the pastors , or ordained doctors and preachers : and doctor seaman upon condition that the people will not say that it was done by their power , but think it fair that it was done by their consent is also very well contented ; so all stands straight with what i have heretofore proposed . let no man then say what ever followe , that i drive any ends or interest , these being already fully obtained and granted , nevertheless for truth sake i cannot leave this discourse imperfect . if a politician should say that the election and the ordination of a roman council or pontifex were not of like nature . that the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contract of the senate of rome with the people in the elelection of numa ( ut cum populus regem jussisset , id sic ratum esset , si patres authores fierent ) included or implyed the soveraign power to be in the fathers . that the consent of this people was one thing and their power another : if i say he should affirm these or the like in athens , lacedemon , or any other common-wealth , that is or hath been under the sun , there would be nothing under the sun more ridiculous than that policitian . but should men pretending unto government of any kinde be not obliged unto some consideration of these rules in nature and universal experience ; yet i wonder how the word ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to constitute with which they make such a flourish , did not lead them , otherwise than they follow , this as it was said of solon by aristotle being that which i have already shewn to be used both in the greek of the scripture , for the constitution of the sanhedrim by moses , and in other authors for that of the senate by romulus , each of which was then elected by the people ; whence it may appear plainly that this is no word as they pretend to exclude popular suffrage , but rather to imply it . and indeed that it is of no such nature , as necessarily to include power , could not have been overseen in the new testament , but voluntarily where ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) they are signified by it that conducted paul. but they have miracles ; such indeed as have neither words nor reason for them had need of miracles . and where are these same miracles ? why the apostles by the chirothesia or laying on of hands conferd the holy ghost . so they did not onely when they used that ceremony in reference to ordination , but when they used it not in that relation , as to those that were newly baptised in samaria , men , and women : now it is not probable , that these , who should seem to have been numerous , were all ordained , at lest the women ; and so the miracle is to be attributed unto the hands of the apostles , and not unto ordination in general . joshua was full of the spirit , ( not because he had been ordained by the chirothesia , for so had many of them that crucifyed christ and persecuted the apostles , but ) because moses had laid his hands upon him . would divines be contended that we should argue thus ; the chirotonia or suffrage of the people of israel at the first institution was followed with miraculous indowments , therefore who ever is elected by the people shall have the like ? or what have they to shew why the argument is more holding as to their chirothesia , seeing for above one thousand years all the hierarchy and presbytery laid together have done no more miracles than a parish clerk ? a continued miracle , as that the sea ebbs and flowes , the sun alwaies runs his admirable course , is nature . intermitted nature as that the waters of the red sea were mountains , that the sun stood still in the dial of ahaz , is a miracle . to continue the latter kinde of miracle were to destroy the former , that is , to desolve nature . wherefore this is a certain rule that no continued external act can be in the later sense miraculous . now government whether in church or state is equally a continued external act. an internal continued act may indeed be natural or supernatural as faith. a natural man being even in his own natural apprehension fearfully and wonderfully made , is by the continued miracle of nature convinced that the world had a creator , and so comes to beleeve in that which is supernatural ; whence it is that all nations have had some religion : and a spiritual man being convinced by the purity of christs doctrine , and the miracles whereby it was first planted , is brought unto the christian faith. however christ may require such continued faith or spiritual exercise of his church as is supernatural , he requireth not any such continued act or bodily exercise of his church as is supernatural . but the government of the church is a continued act or bodily exercise . it should be heeded that to delude the sense is not to do miracles , but to use imposture . now to perswade us , that monarchical , aristocratical , popular , or mixt government have not alwaies been in nature , or that there hath ever been any other in the church were to delude sense ; wherefore give me leave ( in which i am confident i shall use no manner of irreverence unto the scripture , but on the contrary make the right use of it ) to discourse upon church-government , according unto the rules of prudence . the gospel was intended by christ to be preached unto all nations , which ( princes and states being above all things exceeding tenacious of their power ) is to me a certain argument that the policy of the church must be so provided for , as not to give any of them just cause of jealousy , there being nothing more likely to obstruct the growth of religion , and truly the nearer i look unto the scripture , the more i am confirmed in this opinion . christ being taken up into heaven the first ordination that we finde was that of the apostle matthias after this manner . the aristocracy of the church , that is the apostles assembled the whole congregation of disciples or beleevers at jerusalem , being in number one hundred and twenty , where peter ( it having as it should seem been so agreed by the apostles ) was proposer , who standing up in the midst of the disciples acquainted them , that whereas judas was gone unto his place , the occasion of their present meeting was to elect another apostle in his room : whereupon proceeding unto the suffrage , they appointed two competitors , ioseph and matthias , whose names being written each in a several scroll , were put into one urne , and at the same time two other lotts whereof , one was a blank , and the other inscribed with the word apostle were put into another urne , which done they prayed and said , thou lord which knowest the hearts of all men , shew whether of these two thou hast chosen : the prayer being ended they gave forth their lotts , and the lott fell upon matthias ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) and by this psephisma ( the very popular word , and not onely so , hut being applyed unto the ballot , in the very literal and original signification ) he was added unto the eleven apostles . so you have the first way of ordination in the church after christ was taken up into heaven performed by the election or chirotomia of the whole church . now except any man can shew that matthias ever received the imposition of hands , these several things are already demonstrated . first , that the chirotonia is not onely the more ancient way of ordination in the common-wealth of israel , but in the church of christ . secondly , that the chirothesia or imposition of hands is no way necessary unto ordination in the christian church . thirdly , that the discipline of the christian church was primitively popular ( for to say that in regard of the apostles it was aristocratical , is to forget that there is no such thing , without a mixture of aristocracy , that is without the senate , as a popular government in nature . ) fourthly , that ordination in the common-wealth of oceana being exactly after this pattern , is exactly according unto the discipline of the church of christ . and fiftly , that ordination and election in this example are not two , but one and the same thing . the last of these propositions having been affirmed by mr. hobbs , dr. hamond tels him plainly , that his assertion is far from all truth : let us therefore consider the doctors reasons , which are these ; seeing the congregation ( saith he ) is affirmed by the gentleman to have ordained , and it is plain by the words of st. luke , that god elected , election and ordination by this example , must be distinct things : which in another place going about to fortifie with this argument , that it was done by lottery , and solomon saies , the lot is at the disposing of the lord , he utterly overthrows without and beyond help ; for in this solomon not denying , but rather affirming that he was chosen king by the people , plainly shewes that election by the people is election by god. where it is affirmed , that god raised up iudges in israel , it is not denied that the people elected them . the doctor is at it in maimonides more than once , that the devine majesties rested upon such as were ordained by imposition of hands . but whereas it is affirmed by maimonides more often , that when the people ( ecclesia dei ) or congregation of israel assembled then the divine majesty , or the holy ghost rested upon them : of this he never takes any notice : the people whether in israel , athens , lacedemon , or rome , never assembled for enacting of laws or election of magistrates without sacrifice and imploring the assistance of god , to whom when their work was performed they alwaies attributed the whole result or election ; and would the doctor have christians to allow him but a piece ? for whereas god electing there had in the sense both of jews and heathens , his choice of all , god electing here had in the sense of divines , but his choice of two , which were next this or none , but that indeed , where he hath not the whole he hath none at all : is that then far from all truth , which the gentleman , or that which the divine hath said , either in this part , or where he addeth , that the hundred and twenty in the text are never mentioned but once , and then it is in a parenthesis ? i will but transcribe the place . and in those daies peter stood up in the middest of the disciples , and said , ( the number of the names together were about an hundred and twenty ) , &c. are the disciples in the parenthesis , or out of it ? are they but once mentioned , and that is in a parenthesis ? or are they but once numbred , and that is in a parenthesis ? if a gentleman should do thus , what would they say ? or , what were ill enough to be said ? but to mend the text , and bring the disciple into the parenthesis , they have more waies than one ; whereas the heathen people ( while the priests were willing ) mixed these duties with devotions , divines will not suffer a christian people upon like occasions to pray , for where it is said , they prayed , it went before , they appointed two , and it follows , they gave out their lotts : which antecedent and consequent if the people prayed , must be equally understood of them , and so they could be no parenthesis . therefore pray they must not , or divines are lost ; but how will they silence them ? to shew you this art i must transcribe the heads of the chapter . the apostles being returned from mount olivet unto jerusalem , went up into an upper room , where abode both peter and james , and iohn , and andrew , iames the son of alpheus , and simon zelotes , and iudas the brother of iames. and in these daies peter stood up in the mid est of the disciples , and said ( the number of names together were about one hundred and twenty ) men and brethren . of those men which accompanied with us all the time , that the lord iesus went in and out among us . must one be ordained to be witness with us of his resurrection . and they appointed two ioseph and matthias . and they prayed and said , thou lord which knowest the hearts of all men , shew whether of these two thou hast chosen . and they gave forth their lots , and the lot fell upon mathias , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . they whom peter acquainted that one must be ordained , one would verily believe ▪ were the hundred and twenty disciples , in the midst of whom he stood up , and made the proposition , and so much the rather , because this was no more than the apostles knew before : and ( in all right understanding of government and sense ) were already agreed upon , it being the office of the aristocracy or senate in a common-wealth ( and such exactly were the apostles in the church ) upon all new orders or elections to be made ; first , to debate and determine by themselves , and then to propose unto the chirotonia or ultimate result of the people . but divines say absolutely no , which word to make good , they appointed two , and they prayed , and they gave forth their lots , being sentences that stand plainly together , or hunt in couples , must leap sheere over nine verses , peters whole oration , ( which by this means is no more than a parenthesis neither ) and over the hundred and twenty disciples ; without touching an hair of their heads , to light plumbe upon the thirteenth verse , and the eleven apostles ! never man used his grammer so since he threw it at a pear tree ! yet that chrylostome ( who understood greek ) allows of no such construction , is confessed by the learnedest of this opinion ; and whereas they flye unto the latine fathers , that retreat is wholly cut off by david blundell in his very learned treatise of the right of the people in church government , but what do we stand upon words ? are these such whereof the things unto which they relate may be interpretors ? or unto what things can they relate but the institution of the sanhedrim by moses ? that at the institution of the sanhedrim the competitors were elected by the suffrage of the people , and from thence that the ballot of israel consisted not onely of a lot but of a suffrage too , hath been already demonstrated out of scripture ; and that the election of mathias was by the ballot of israel is not less apparent in it self , than fully confessed upon the place by grotius . they that under colour of religion , in matter of government slight prudence , are mistaken or do not mean honestly . neither god nor christ ever instituted any policy whatsoever , upon any other principles than those of humane prudence . the embassadors sent from the gibeonites to ioshua , deliver their message in this manner , the elders and all the inhabitants of our country spake unto us saying go meet them , and say unto them , we are your servants , therefore now make you a league with us . they that had power to send embassadors , and to make a league with a forraign nation , had soveraign power , this soveraign power was in the elders , or senate , and in the people of gibeon ; wherefore god constituting his common-wealth for the main orders ( that is to say the senate & the people ) upon the same principles , on which the gibeonites had long before built theirs , laid his foundations upon no other than humane prudence ; so for the inferiour courts they were transcribed by moses on t of the common-wealth of midian , upon advice of jethro his father in law. according unto such patterns was israel framed , and by that of israel this first policy of the church of christ so exactly , as ( sans comparison ) any man shall shew the common-wealth of occana to have been transcribed out of rome or venice . let them that would have the government be somewhat between earth and heaven consider this place . nor is ecclesiasticall policy onely subject unto humane prudence , but unto the same vicissitudes also whereunto humane prudence is subject , both in her own nature and as she is obnoxious to the state wherein she is planted , and that inavoidably ; as i come now to demonstrate by the alterations which happened even in the age of the apostles themselves ; for this at the election of mathias being altered , the next form of ecclesiastical policy introduced in their times , is resembled by grotius unto that of athens , of which , for the better clearing of what followes , it is necessary that i first say something by way of introduction . the thesmothetae , being in number six , were magistrates of the highest dignity , power and rank in athens . these saith aristotle , were elected by the chirotonia or suffrage of the people , and saith , pollux being elected underwent the inquisition of the senate , where they were to answer to these interrogatories , whether they worshiped the god of their countries ? whether they had been dutifull unto their parents ? born arms for the common-wealth ? paid duties or taxes ? in which particulars the senate being satisfied , they were sworn and crowned with mirile : which comes to this , that the ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) or constitution being reserved unto the senate , the thesmothetae were elected by the chirotonia of the people . now though the government of athens throughout the cities of asia ( being most of them of the like model ) was most known , i will not say that the apostles wrote their orders out of athens , but seeing all political institutions must needs be according to humane prudence , and there is nothing to be written out of this but what will fall even with some other government that is or hath been , i may say as grotius hath said hefore me ) that the frame of church-government in the ensuing example was after the manner of athens . when the number of the disciples ( or believers ) was multiplied , there arose a murmuring among such of the jews as having beenbredin alexandria or other parts , were for their language ( which was greek ) partly strangers , against the hebrews or converted jews , that spoke their own language , as if these indeed used them like strangers , their widowes being neglected , or not dealt so liberally withall as those of the hebrewes in the contributions due for their constant maintenance . hereupon the twelve ayostles ( after the manner of the senate ) having without all question debated the businesse among themselves , as appears by the speech upon which they were agreed , assembled the people ( which is still senatorian ) or called the multitude of the disciples unto them , and said , it is not reason that we should leave preaching , or the word of god , to be taken up with this , though charitable , nay , seeing we have introduced community of goods , most just and necessary imployment of providing food and cloathing for every one of our fellowship or community ( the christians in these times , much after the manner of the lacedemonian convives used to eat in publick and together ) to do this as it ought to be done , were to become caterers , and be taken up in serving tables . wherefore brethren ( take the wise men and understanding , and known among you ) look out sev●nt men of honest report full of the holy ghost , and of wisdom , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) whom we may appoint over this businesse . this saying , that is , this proposition of the senate or apostles pleased the whole multitude ( like that of moses , the thing which thou hast said is good for us to do ) so they chose stephen , philip , prochorus , nicanor , timon , permenas and nicholas , whom being elected , they set before the apostles , who when they had prayed , laid their hands upon them . what fuller demonstration can be given of any thing , than that in this example , ordination and election are one and the same , and that this was conferred by the chirotonia of the people ? if there be any possible way of making this clearer , it must be by opposition . wherefore let us see what divines have to say to the contrary . grotius gives all we ask from this place , which he gives for nothing , because it concerns not the election of pastors , but of deacons . as if stephen and phillip had not onely been preachers of the gospel , but done myracles . what dr. seaman denies or grants in relation unto the same , i have endeavoured to understand , but it will not do . dr. ham●nd is so plain , that his objections may be of use . he to prove that the ordination of these deacons was not in the chirotonia of their disciples ; but in the chirothesia of the apostles hath these arguments . there be two things distinctly set down election permitted unto the poople ( and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) constituting reserved unto the apostles . to which i answer , that there were two things set down by the athenian law , election of the thesmothetae by the people , and the ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) constituting of them by the senate , yet that the ordination was in the power , and that the power was in the people of athens ; he thar makes a doubt is not resolved whether the most popular common-wealth that ever was ▪ were a democracy . but saith he , this looking out of men ( or chusing ) was permitted unto he multitude by the apostles with these three bounds . first to take seven neither more nor fewer . secondly , those men generally known and well reputed of . and thirdly , full of the spirit and of discretion or parts fit for government . to which i answer , that the election of the thesmothetae was permitted by the law unto the people of athens , with these three bounds , first to take six neither more nor fewer : secondly , those generally known and reputed of . thirdly in such estimation for their honesty and ability for government as in their consciences ( to which also they made oath ) they should judge fittest for the common-wealth ; yet is all this so far from any proof , that athens was no democracy , or that the soveraign power , whether in enacting of laws , or election of magistrates by the lott or the suffrage ( institutions equally popular ) was not in the people , that it amounts unto the strongest argument the people were soveraigne , and the common-wealth was democratical . could truth desire greater advantage than redounds from such opposition ? we have another example of the same modell , in which , because it hath been paraphrased upon already in the introduction , i shall be briefer here . in the church of antioch where the disciples were now become so numerous , that they began to be called christians , there were among them prophets , so being assembled upon occasion ( as i conceive ) of giving an extraordinary commission after the manner of the people of athens when they elected ambassadors , or ( that i may avoid strife upon a point so indifferent ) to choose two new apostles ; the holy ghost said , separate me barnabas and saul for the work wbereunto i have appointed them ; that is , ( for so it is rendred by all interpretors ) the holy ghost spake those words by the mouths of the prophets . now the prophets being well known for such , this suffrage of theirs was no sooner given than ( as one that can allow prophets to be leading men may easily think ) followed by all the rest of the congregation : so the whole multitude having fasted and prayed , the most eminent among them , or the senatorian order in that church , laid their hands upon paul and barnabas , who being thus sent forth by the holy ghost , departed unto seleucia . to evade this apparent election , or chirotonia of the whole congregation , whereby these apostles or embassadors unto the churches of the gentiles were ordained ; divines have nothing to say , but that they were elected by the holy ghost : as if the chirotonia of the people were more exclusive unto election by the holy ghost , than the chirothesia of the aristocracy , for which in the mean time they contend : but if neither of these were indeed exclusive of the holy ghost , how is it possible , in this frame ( where though of natural necessity an aristocracy must have been included , yet the aristocracy is not in the text , so much as distinguisht from the people , or once named ) that the power , and so the ordination should not have been in the people ? the council of the apostles , of the elders , and of the whole church at jerusalem , and other councils , not of apostles , nor of the whole church in other times or places , used this form in their acts , it seemeth good unto the holy ghost , and unto us : but doth this where a true , or where a pretended style exclude that act from being an act of that whole council ? or how comes it to pals that because paul and barnabas were separated by the holy ghost , they were not ordained by the chirotonia of the whole christian people at antioch ? the chirothesia can be no otherwise understood in nature , nor ever was in the common-wealth of the jews , than election by the few : and so even under the meer chirothesia , ordination and election were not two , but one and the same thing . if moses ordain'd joshua his successor by the chirothesia , he elected ioshua his successour by the chirothesia , and for what reason must it be otherwise with the chirotonia ? that a pharisee could do more with one hand , or a pair of hands , than a christian church , or congregation can do with all their hands , is a doctrine very much for the honour of the true religion , and a soveraign maxime of ecclesiastical policy . the third constitution of church government in scripture ( whether consisting of bishops or presbyters , between which at this time a man shall hardly find a difference ) runs wholly upon the aristocracy without mention of the people , and is therefore compared by grotius unto the sanhedrim of israel , as that came to be in these dayes ; from whence divines also generally and truly confess that it was taken up , to which i shall need to add no more than that it is an order for which there is no precept , either in the old testament of god , or in the new of christ : this therefore thus taken up by the apostles from the jews , is a clear demonstration that the government of the church in what purity soever of the times , nay though under the inspection of the apostles themselves , hath been obnoxious unto that of the state wherein it was planted . the sanhedrim from the institution of the chirothesia for a constant order , consisted of no other senators than such only as had been ordain'd by the imposition of hands , which came now to be conferred by the prince in the presence , or with the assistance of the sanhedrim ; the same order was observed by the jewish synagogues , of which each had her archon : nor would the jews converted unto the christian faith relinquish the law of moses , whereunto this way of ordination , among other things , though erroneously , was vulgarly attributed : whence in the church , where it consisted of converted jews , ordination was conferred by the archon , or first in order of the presbytery with the assistance of the rest . hence paul , in one place , exhorts timothy thus : neglect not the gift that is in thee , which was given thee by prophecy , with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery . and in another thus : wherefore i put thee in remembrance , that thou st●r up the gift of god which is in thee by the putting on of my hands . i grant divines , that ordination by this time was wholly in the presbytery , what say they then unto the distinction of ordination and election ? are these still two distinct things , or may we hence , at least , compute them to be one and the same ? if they say yes ; why then might they not have been so before ? if they say no ; who in this place but the presbytery elected ? why saies doctor hamond , it is plain that the spirit of prophesie elected ? but to give account of no more than is already performed , were the spirit of history rather than of prophecy , to which it appertains to tell things before they be done , as did the prophets now living in this church , that tim thy should come to be ordained , so the place is interpreted by grotius , and how it should otherwise be understood i cannot see : but putting the case some act preceded , as saul and david were elected kings by prophecy : yet did ever man say that for this soul or david were any whit the less elected kings by the people ? to the contrary in every well ordered common-wealth ( a jove principium ) the disposing of the lot and of the suffrage too , hath universally been attributed unto god. the piety of divines in perswading the people , that god elects for them , and therefore they need not trouble themselves to vote , is as if they should perswade them that god provides their daily bread , and therefore they need not trouble themselves to work . to conclude this point with doctor hamonds own words upon the same occasion ; this didinction of ordination and election is in divines the procreative mistake , or ignorance producing all the rest . the reason why paul ordained now after this manner among the jews , is unto me an irrefragable argument , that he ordained not after this manner among the gentiles ; for whereas the first ordination in the christian church , namely that of matthias , was performed by the chirotonia ; which by degrees came now in complacence with the jews unto the chirothesia ; it seems he was contented not to alter the worst of political institutions or customes , where he found them confirm'd by long and universal practice ; and if so , why should any man think that he would go about to alter or weed out the best , where they had taken like root ? that this administration of the jews was of the very worst , is clear in the nature of the politicks , there being no example of a pure aristocracy , or of a senate , such as was now the sanhedrim without a popular ballance that ever governed with justice , or was of any continuance . nor was the chiroth sia , by which means this work came to effect in israel , introduced by the prudence of god , but by the corrupt arts of men . now that the governments at the same time of the gentiles , all ballanced by the chirotonia of the people , were in their nature more excellent , and indeed more accomodated unto antient prudence , as it was introduced by god himself in the common-wealth of israel , hath been already sufficiently proved ; nevertheless to refresh your memory with one example more . crete having been ( as is affirmed by the consent of authors ) the most antient , and the most excellent common-wealth in humane story , was founded by rhadamanthus and minos , an age before the trojan war ; these were held to have learnt their arts by familiar discourse with jupiter , and from point to point to have framed their modell , according unto his direction . nor though all acknowledg minos to have been a king , did he found his government upon any other than a popular ballance , or a fundamental regard unto the liberty of the people . for the whole common-wealth was made up of these three parts , the colledge , the senate , and the people . the colledge consisted of the annual magistrates called the cosmi , these had the whole extentive power , s●me in leading forth the armies , and others in judging the people , which functions were accordingly assigned by the orders unto each in particular ; that which was common unto them all , was to propose such things as they had debated or prepared in their colledg or council unto the senate , the senate being elective for life , was the council unto which appertained the debate of what ever was to be proposed unto the congregation . the congregation or assembly of the people of crete had not the right of debate , but in enacting of laws , and election of magistrates had the ultimate result of the common-wealth , such was the copy after which lycurgus wrote himself so famous a legislator : and thus stood this frame unto the six hundred and eight year of rome ; when this people having been too favourable unto pyrates then infesting those seas , turned the arms of the romans upon themselves , and by these under the conduct of quinctus metellus , thence called creticus , crete was made a province , though the chief cities being first freed , it should seem ( by cicero's second oration against anthony ) that the whole island was at length restored unto her antient liberty . however by the manner observed by the romans ( as was shewn ) in provincial government , the gities under their magistrates ( who while the common-wealth was a province , perhaps might have exercised the office of the cosmi ) were not yet deprived of their popular assemblies , at least in their distinct cities , electing all magistrates for their ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) peculiar or domestick government ; such was the state of crete , when paul having appealed from the iews unto casar ; and being thereupon conducted by sea towards rome , touched in his way upon this island , where he left titus to constitute elders in every city . the word ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) constitate our divines will have to signifie ordain by imposition of hands , and imposition of hands fo signifie an act of power , excluding the people . but why paul , who among the jews had complyed with their customes , should enjoyn , or how titus had it been so enjoyned should accomplish this where the power was popular , they have not shewn nor considered . to introduce religion , or government there be but two ways , that is to say , either by perswasion , or by force . to perswade the people of crete , in whom was the power unto this new way of ordination ; titus must have spoken to this effect , men of crete . minos being a king could not choose but have a natural inclination unto popular power , wherefore his pretence that jupiter told him , power was to be in the people , may be suspected to have been imagined meerly for his own ends ; or this is a certain signe that jupiter is no true , but a feigned god ; seeing the true god will have it that the people should have no power at all ; but that such upon whom his embassadors shall confer power , be without all dispute obeyed . how ! are you starting at this ! are you solicitous for your common-wealth ! it is true that upon carnall principles or humane prudence , without power in the people , there can be no common-wealth : but israel was a common-wealth without power in the people ▪ where moses made all the laws by the power invested in him by god , and created all the magistrates , not by popular suffrage but by his chirotonsia . wherefore men of creet know ye that on whomsoever i lay my hands , the same is in all spiritual affairs or matter of church-government to be obeyed by you , after the sam manner that you have hitherto obeyed such magistrates or priests as have been ordained by your own election , or chirotonia . of what other nature the arguments of titus to the pretended purpose could have been ; i am not able to imagine ; nor how this should have done less than provoke the people unto a dangerous jealousie of such a doctrine . but divines to set all straight , think it enough to repeat the words of paul to titus in greek . for this cause left i thee in crete ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) that thou shouldst ordain elders in every city . it is true that demosthenes speaketh somewhat like words concerning the expedition of phillip , of macedon , in peloponesus ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) when he had ordained tyrants in every city : but then philip had an army ; what army did paul leave with titus ? or if he ordained his elders neither of these two ways , i see no other than that only by the known and legal chirotonia or suffrage of the people . but if this be clear the clergy come from crete , not upon the wings of titus , but of icarus , whose ambitious wax is dissolved by the sun. so much i conceive is now discovered concerning church-government , as may shew , that it was not of one , but of three kinds , each obnoxious unto the nature of the civil government under which it was planted , in as much as the chirotonia , or ballot of israel being first introduced pure , and without any mixture , as at the ordination of mathias , came aftewards to receive some mixture of the chirothesia , as in the ordination of stephen , and last of all by excluding the people to degenerate wholly into the chirothesia of the presbytery , as in the ordination of timothy ; all this by the testimony of scripture , and in the purest times , even the age of the apostles . whence my undertaking to shew that as christ intended his doctrine should be preached unto all nations , so he intended his discipline should be such as might sute with any government , ( as indeed if the choice of any of these three be lawful , it doth exactly ) is i hope performed . for where the government is popular , it is the same with the first , where it is aristocratical or monarchical , it agrees with the last , and where it is mixed , it is between both , and responsible unto the second . of these three in the further exercise of their natural and intended complyance with humane prudence , it may be convenient to give some fuller exemplification . that any other ordination than that of the first kinde for the original authority or practise of it whether in the common-wealth of israel or in the church of christ , and indeed for the prerogative of the same in nature should have been introduced by the apostles , where it might , much less where the nature of the civil policy would admit of no other , is neither propable by scripture nor reason ; whence it is that in the cities of lyeaonia and pisidia , the government of these being then popular , we do not find any mention at all of the chirothesia , the apostles in these places ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) chirotonizing elders in every congregation . to evade this place , our adversaries turn tails to the things , and make their whole flight at the words . in taking one of them into the disputation , i shall take in all , for they run all upon the same quotations , or with little addition . that the word chirotonizing , ( saith doctor hamond ) in this place signifies no more than ordaining by the imposition of hands , is not so generally acknowledged by late writers , but that it may be useful to give some few testimonies out of those wtiters which were nearest the times of the scripture . thus philo judaeus of joseph ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) he was ordained governour of all aegypt under the king. so again of moses ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) he was constituted their ruler . so of aarons sons ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) god constituted them priests . alexander son of antiochus epiphanes writes to jonathan ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) we ( in the regal stile ) constitute thee high priest . lucian saies of hephestion ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) that alexander made him a god when he was dead . appian ( which is added out of grotius whence most of the rest is taken ) to signifie election of magistrates made by the romane emperors uses no other word ; and later writers speak of some that were chirotonized emperors by their fathers . for the use of the word among christian writers take one place in the author of the constitutions for many ; clement after the death of linus ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) was ordained bishop of rome by peter . but what need any more , christs disciples are said ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) designed or fore-constituted by god the witnesses of his resurrection : by al which that of paul & barnabas ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) is but constituting or creating elders in every church . wherefore they that have looked so far back to the original , as to think it necessary to render the word to create by suffrages , are sure guilty of very impertinent nicety . i promise you had this been against one of our doctors , it might have been a rude charge ; but it is but against erasmus , beza , diodati , and such as took upon them to translate the switz , french , italian , belgicke , and ( till the episcopal correction ) the english bibles . and what apparent cause is there of such confidence ? what necessity is there even in the places alleadged why the word chirotonia should be understood in the sense imposed ? the people of aegypt till having sold their lands they came to loose their popular ballance , were not servants unto pharaoh , wherefore when joseph was made governour over all aegypt they were sree , now that a king should make a governour of a free people without their consent , or some advice as we say of his parliament , is altogether impropable , the rather because a protector in the absence or minority of the king hath been no otherwise made in england , nor pretendeth the present protector unto any other title than the like chirotonia . but that moses is said by the same author ( who affirmed that he introduced the chirotonia in israel ) to have been chirotonized ruler of the people , can in my judgement be no otherwise than originally and literally taken , seeing god himself was no otherwise made king in israel than by the suffrage of the people . that the like must be understood of the sons of aaron hath been already shewn . the doctor is the first hath told me , that the plural number for the royal stile is so ancient as epiphanes : sure i am it was not deriv'd from his macedonian predecessors , for in the letters to the athenians and the thebans recited by demosthenes , philip of macedon writes in the singular number . but the letter of epiphanes to jonathan must it seems import that he at single hand ( though the words carry double ) had chirotonized an high priest of the jews : who can help it ? some princes have not onely given out that their priests have been chirotonized when they were not , but that themselves have been chirotonized when there was no such matter . when a prince saies that he was chirotonized or elected by the people , to talk of rhetorique is to have none . divines in this case commonly understand it to be proper , or literally meant , for to impose a new sense is to spoil the word , and spoil the word , spoil the prince . lucian is a droll and intends a jest , but not so good an one , as that he of all other should come nearest to help up with an heirarchy . for the chirotonia or election of the roman magistrates by the suffrage of the people or of the army , every man knows that it is literal ; suidas himself interpreting the word by this very example ; where he affirms it to signifie election or ratification by the many . the quotation out of the constitutions , with those of bishop bilson , and others out of the greek fathers , and out of councils , do not onely imply the word chirotonia , but the thing , while they all relate unto that kind of ordination , which being in those churches yet administred as at the ordination of stephen , was not conferred without the consent of the people . but it is above all , that labouring to prove the chirotonia and the chirothesia , to be the same thing , they should rely most upon the place where the apostles are said ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to have been fore-chirotonized by god ; as if it were clear in this , that god ordained the apostles by the laying on of hands , for so it must be understood , or it makes no more for them , than for us . or if they mean it onely to shew that the word chirotonia or suffrage is used for some ordination that cannot be taken in our sense ; so the word chirothesia ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) or laying on of hands , where ananias being neither bishop nor ptesbyter but onely a disciple , that is a christian , layes his hands upon paul , is used for some ordination that cannot be taken in their sense ; or a man not ordained may ordain as well as they , for to say that the call was extraordinary where the like is , or is pretended , will avayl little . but there is no need that we should go so near the wind ; wherefore to give them all these places in their own sense , even till we come to the cities in question . what word in any language is not sometimes nay frequently used in some other than the proper sense ? with what elegance , if this be forbidden , can any man write or speak ? is a word like a woman that being taken with a metaphor , it can never be restored unto the original virtue ? if chirotonia have ( as divines pretend ) lost all other but their signification , how shall we understand it in isaiah or where paul speaks it of the brother ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) chirotonized , or chosen by the churches ? certainly in this one place at least it is of our sense , and in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it is but once yet in all the new testament of any other , so that if we gain the place in controversie , we have it twice of our sense in scripture for once not in theirs , but in any other ; and in humane authors , they will not so much as pretend to have it once for them of an hundred times for us ; which is pretty well for the vindication of the propriety of one word , and somewhat more perhaps than can be done for another . but in the sense of words that are sometimes properly and sometimes improperly taken , may we admit of the things whereof they are spoken for interpretors ? or if lillies and roses have been almost as often said of ladies cheeks , must we understand them no otherwise when we are speaking of gardens ? yes sayes doctor hamond , and therefore to say of the apostles paul and barnabas , that they created ●ld●rs by their own suffrages , is no w●re than to say that they joyntly did create , and indeed being but two , there could be no place for suffrages , and to affirm they did it by the suffrages of others , is not agreeable to the pretended use of the word , for where it is used of choosing by suffrages , as when the people are said to chirotonize , it is certain that their own , and not others suffrages are meant by it . it were hardly possible to have contrived a greater number of affirmations inso smal a compasse , nor to have gone farther in them from all truth . phrases as words are to be understood according unto the rule and law of speech , which is use , and thus that the apostles created elders by their own suffrage , is not said , that they did it by the suffrage of others , is necessarily implyed ; as also that the people are understood to chirotonize as well when it is said of the presidents of their assemblies , as of themselves . diruit , aedificat , mutat quadratarotundis . when a man is said to build an house , or marry a daughter , he is not understood to be the mason , of the brides-groom ; but the apostles built churches in these cities , therefore the people were not the masons . the apostles married christ unto these nations , therefore the people gave not their consent or suffrage ! what a construction were this , in-ordinary discourse or writing , and yet in the language ( as i may say ) of a common-wealth the phrase is more usuall . how often doth demosthenes speak of his laws , ( see my psephisma , peruse my law ) and those of other private men : after which copy the par●è , or laws in the common-wealth of venice , are called by the names of the proposers , as were those of rome , rupilia , cornelia , tr●bonia , in which manner we have poynings laws ▪ and some statutes bearing no other style than enacted by the kings most excellent majesty , which nevertheless are known to have been all enacted by the parliament . thus the laws of moses rhadamanthus , minos , lycurgus , s●lon , romulus , king edward , were ( leges & consuetudines quas vulgus elegerit ) such as the people had confirmed or chosen by their chirotonia . but they may say granting you this use of speech in relation unto laws , what have you of this kind for elections ? the exception is nice , but to leave none . the high sheriffs in england proposing unto their counries the names of such as stand , are said to elect parliament men . they that thus propose competitors unto the great council in venice are called electors , and said to elect the magistrates . the proedri certain magistrates to whom it belonged to put the question in the representative of the people of athens consisting of one thousand , were said ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to give or make the suffrage . the thesmothetae who were presidents at the creation of magistrates were said ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) to chirotonize the generals . josephus renders those words of god unto samuel , hearken unto the voice of the people ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) i command thee to chirotonize them a king , which authors vindicating luke for his understanding , both of the grecian customes , and propriety of speech , at each of which he was expert , come up unto the full and genuine interpretation of the place in controversie , where paul and barnabas ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) chirotonizing them elders in every congregation , can be no otherwise understood than that they here , as moses at the institution of the sanhedrim ; samuel at the election of the king ; the proedri at the passing of laws ; the thesmothetae at the creation of magistrates ; the electors in the great council of venice ; and the high sheriffs in the counties of england , were no more than presidents of that chirotonia , which was given or made by the suffrage of the people . wherefore the greek is thus rendred by these several translations of the bible . that of zurich . when they had created them elders by suffrages in every congregation . that of beza . when they had created them elders by suffrages in every congregation . the french. when by the advice of the assemblies they had established elders . the italian . when by the advice of the congregation they had constituted them elders . that of diodati . when they had ordained them in every church by the common votes of the elders . that appointed by the synod of dort. when in each church by the holding up of hands they had elected presbyters . that used in england from the time of the reformation , untill the episcopal correction of the same . when they had ordained them elders by election in every congregation . indeed the circumstance of the place forbids any other construction of the words , for if the suffrage or chirotonia , ( which were scarce sense ) related unto the apostles onely , what needed they have done that in every congregation , or church , which they might have done in any chamber or closet ? the circumstance of the action forbids any other construction , for the people were assembled upon occasion of election or creation of officers , which thing doth not use to be done in assemblies gathered for divine service ; besides these congregations were not alwayes of one mind , but sometimes for sacrificing unto the apostles , sometimes for stoning them , which are acts of power ; wherefore they were political assemblies . now these consisting also of a people that had in their cities ( quandam 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) the government , of themselves , hence ariseth the strongest circumstance of all , forbidding any interpretation of the text , that might exclude them from election of their own magistrates , priests , or ecclesiastical elders , such as had been the asiarchs , though heathen prelates , yet remembred by the scriptures as affectionate friends unto paul , or such as were those , though to a better end , now ordained by the apostles . wherefore grotius , notwithstanding all the art he useth in other places to avoid this sense , giving his note upon the text yeilds ; though chirotonizing may be said of any election made by one , or by the few : yet to the election in this place it is probable that the consent of the people was given , no lesse being implyed in the beginning of the chapter , where the multitude believed , where they were stirred up , where they were evill affected , and where part held with the iews , and part with the apostles . which shews that the people were active in the business . but sayes doctor seaman , there is difference between the consent of the people ▪ and the power of the people , which is not to understand the case in controversie , nor to take notice that the people whereof we are speaking were under popular government , for where ever the people are under popular government , between that which is done by their consent , and that which is done ( iussu populi ) by their power , there is no difference . how should the people give their consent but by their suffrage ? or what difference , where they have power , can there be between the suffrage , and the power of the people ? doctor hamond upon this point is far more quainct , where the scriprure saith that the multitude were evill affected , and where part held with the iews , and part with the apostles , he thinks it ee'n like enough . but where it is said that a great multitude of the jews , and also of the greeks believed ; he seemeth to have no opinion of it . for saith he , it is evident that believers were at first but few in every town or city , they were not whole corporations at once converted , nor consequently could they act in a common capacity : but as clemens romanus saith , they that were by the apostles constituted bishops and deacons in several cities aud regions , were constituted over those that should after believe , there were oft so few at the present . and then as fast as any did come into the faith , they readily submitted themselves to those by and under whom they did come in , and were not at all troubled ( honest men ) with the consultation or deliberation about the way of electing their teachers and guides . come away ; to leave the scripture a while , and follow clemens , be it so for discourse sake that in those dayes there was no where any such thing as a great multitude believing , much less whole states or common-wealths at once converted , whereby they might still act in a common capacity , but onely some private or gathered congregations or churches , and that in such it was the apostles paul and barnabas chirotonized : yet these as they were found , or as afterwards they came to be made , must of necessity have been corporatioos , for what can a number of men coming into a society regulated by certain laws , constitutions , or form be but a corporation ? some ecclesiastical policy or discipline they must have had : and that probably seeing the greatest legislators , even moses himself ) have written after copies , according unto some pattern , what was this pattern ? and whence came it ? why saith he , not from their heathen customes , but from the metropolis ; for it must be remembred that wheresoever the gospel was preached , it came originally from ierusalem , and then as agrippa in philo saith of that city , it was the metropolis not only of iudea , but many other regions , because of the colonies thence sent into aegypt , phenice , and both the syria's ; nay to pamphilia , celicia , and a great part of asia , as far as bythinia and pontus . so in reason the churches in lystra , iconium , and antioch , where paul and barnabas ordain'd elders were to follow the pattern at ierusalem , and there we know it was not by the suffrage of the people , that an elder was assumed into the sanhedrim , but the prince or head of the sanhedrim received him in by imposition of hands ; it will be much more reasonable to deduce the circumstances of ordaining elders from the customs familiar unto them that preached the faith unto them , than from the former usages of them , to whom it was preached , who were not to dispute , but to believe and receive the institutions as well as doctrines which were brought them . these me thinks are strange arguments ; the gospel came to us from rome , is rome therefore the metropolis of england ? it is true agrippa being a jew , and writing unto caligula in the behalf of the jews ▪ not of the christians , tells him , that ierusalem is the metropolis of the iews , and of all their colonies ; so is london of the english , and of all their colonies ; but doth it follow from hence that either jerusalem , or london is the metropolis of christendome ? but the jews ▪ had many colonies in asia , and therefore the churches of lystra , iconinm , and antioch were to follow the pattern at jerusalem . the jews indeed had synagogues in iconium and lystra , as the french have churches in england , but is this a good argument , the french have churches in england , therefore the english are to follow the orders of the french church ? the jews withstood the gospel at iconium , for saith the text , the multitude of the city was divided , and part he●d with the iews , and part with the apostles : therefore the believing iconians must have acknowledged jerusalem to be their metropolis , and were to follow the pattern of that city . and what was that ? why there we know it was not by the suffrages of the people that an elder was assumed into the sanhedrim , but the prince or head of the sanhedrim received him in by imposition of hands . the government of the iconians was popular , that of the jews was aristoeratical ; therefore the iconians receiving the christian faith , were bound to change their democracy into aristocracy . the apostles to comply with an oligarchy , had alter'd that ordination , which originally ( as at the election of mathias ) was popular unto aristocracy ; therefore being now to plant the gospel in a free state , they might not alter it from aristocracy to democracy : to please the jews they might change for the worse , therefore to please the iconians they might not change for the betrer , but must tell the people plainly that they were not to dispute , but to believe and receive the institutions as well as doctrines that were brought them from the metropolis . how would this found unto a people that understood themselves ! sic volo sic juheo stat proratione voluntas . the right temper of a metropolitan , to whom popular power is an heathen eustome , and with whom nothing will agree but princing of it in the senate . but with the apostles it was otherwise , who making no words of the chirothesia where it was needless , were glad of this occasion to chirotonize , or elect them elders in every congregation by popular fuffrage . but this ( they will say ) is not to come off from the haune , but to run still upon the people in a common or publick capacity . though the scripture speak of great multitudes believing , believe it there was no such thing ; clemens saith they were very few , their assemblies private , and very scanty things . as private as they were , by the judgement of divines they were it seems to receive from their pattern ( if that were the sanhedrim ) a form that was publick enough , and why might not they have received this from that publick from whereunto they were accustomed , rather than from a forraign policy , and one contrary to their customes ? why should they suffer such power in new and private , as they would not endure in their old and publick magistrates ? or if they received the scriptures , why should they choose that ordination which would fit them worst rather that which would fit them best ? that of timothy , rather than that of matthias ? or let their assemblies have been never so private or scanty , yet if the apostles chirotonized th●m elders in every congregation , is it not demonstrable that they did receive that of matthias , and not that of timothy ? thus much for the propagation of the pure or first kind of ecclesiastical policy unto the cities of lycaonia . the mixed or second kind into which ( the christian presbytery delighting to follow the stepps of the jewish ) the former might soon degenerate , continued in the primitive church ( to speak with the least , for wall●us brings it down to charles the great ) three hundred years after christ ; which assertion in mr. hobbs proved out of amianus marcellinus , doctor hamond hath either willingly overseen , or includes in this answer , it is most visibly void of all appearance of truth . wherefore to the quotation mentioned , i shall ad the words of platina . damasus the second by nation a bravarian surnamed bagniarius , or as some will popo ; possessed himself of the papacy by force , and without consent of the clergy and of the people . now what can be clearer than that by this place the clergy and the people had hitherto right to elect the pope ? the doctor comes near the word of defiance unto mr. hobbs , in a matter of fact so apparent unto any judgement that i need not ad what goes before in the life of clement the second , where the emperour ingageth the people of rome not to meddle with the election of the pope without his express command : nor what follows after in leo the ninth , where the whole power of election was now conserred by the emperour upon ihe clergy . again victor the second , ( saith the same author ) obtained the papacy rather by favour of the emperour , than by free suffrages of ihe clergy and the people of rome , who apprehended the power of the emperour whose displeasure they had sometime incurred by creating popes : so then the people , ( it is clear ) had hitherto created the popes . the power of election thus in the whole clergy came afterwards , as at this day , to be restrained unto the cardinals onely ; and so to devolve into the third kind of ordination exactly correspondent unto the sanhedrim and their chirothesia , as it was exereised among the converted jews , when timothy was ordained by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery . now this is that with which of all others divines are so inamoured , that they will not endure it should he said there is any other : it is also propitious above all the rest unto monarchy , as that which according unto the inherent nature or impotence of oligarchy , must have a prince at home or abroad to rest upon or become the inevitable prey of the people . herein lies the arcanum or secret of that antipathy , which is between a clergy and a popular government , and of that simpathy which is between the mitre and the crown . a prince receiving a clergy with the monopoly of their chirothesia , hath no more to do than to make a metrapolitan , by whom he governs them , and by them the people , especially if he endow them with good revenues , for so they become an estate of his realm , and a more steady pillar of his throne than his nobility themselves , who as their dependance is not so strong , are of a more stirring nature . this is the gothick model from whence we had our pattern , and in which no bishop , no king. thus for the dignity of ecclesiastical policies , whether in scripture or humane prudence , popular government you see is naturally inclin'd unto the very best , and the spiritual aristocracy unto the very worst . it is also remarkable that the political ballance extends it self unto the decision of the question about ordination . for as a people never offer'd to dispute with a well ballanced clergy , so a clergy dis-mounted never gain'd any thing by disputing with the people . as to the question of empire , or government , ( i propheti disarmati rovivano ) the apostles became all ▪ things unto all . thus beyond all measure improsperous are this divines undertakings against mr. hobbs , and the undertakings of divines upon this subject . finis . advertisement to the reader , or direction to the answerer . the answer of this book must lye in proving that the apostles at the several times and places mentioned , introduced but one way of ordination , and that the same unto which divines now pretend : or if the apostles divided , that is to say introduced divers ways of ordination , than the people or magistrate may choose . i have taken the more leisure and paines to state ( i think ) all the cases of controversie that can arise out of the common-wealth of oceana , as you have seen in these two books , to the end that i may be no more obliged to write ; and yet not omit writing upon any occasion that shall be offered , for if my principles be overthrown ( which when i see i shall most ingenuously confess with thanks unto the author ) such an acknowledgement will lye in a little room ; and this failing , i am deceived if i shall not now be able to shew any writer against me that his answer is none , within the compass of three or four sheets . this also will be the fittest way for boyes play , with which i am sure enough to he entertained by the quibling university men , i mean a certain busie ginge of them , who having publickly vanted that they would bring forty examples against the ballance , and since laid their caps together about it , have not produced one . these vaunts of theirs offering prejudice unto truth , and good principles , were the cause why they were indeed pressed to shew some of their skil ; not that they were thought fit judges of these things , but first that they had declared themselves so , and next that they may know they are not . the errors of the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for sanhedrin read sanhedrim , this error 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 place , for sindas p. . l. . r. suidas , for stand p ▪ ●l● ● . ● ▪ stayd , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 zotertha p. . l. . r. zotertha , for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. . l. . r. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , page . l. . dele also , for golthick p. . r. gothick , for christonia p. . r. chirotonia , for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. . l. . ● . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. . l. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for council p. ▪ l. . r. consul , for the p. . l. . r. ye . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e epist . arte della guer. proem . i. ii. iii. iiii. v. vi. vii . viii . ix . x. xi . xii . notes for div a -e thu. b. . p. . . . . . . consid . p. . mr. hobbs in the magire . thu. b. . p. . cousid . p. . consid . p. . . consid . p. ▪ consid . p. . consid . p. . mat. . . oceana , p. . consid . p. . deut. . . . . consid . p. . consid . p. . consid . p. . g. de jure belli , l. . c. . consid . p. . . consid . p. . in preleg . de jure b. ac . p. book . consid . p. . . consid . p. . consid . p. . consid . p. . livy . * arochet . consid . p. . . consid . p. . consid . p. . . oceana p. . consid . p. . . exod . exod. . . deut. . . deut. . . math. . . sam. . ● . in diatriba de ▪ vota iephts ▪ consid . p. . consid . p. . pausan . lacon . plut. alc. consid . p. . consid . p. . galen de usu partium . l. . consid . p. . consid . p. . consid . p. . the ballance of france . grotius de imp. sum. pot. circa sacra . c. . s. . original of a sauded cleryg . gen. . . xenop . in oatr . de agel . l. . thucyd. l. , consid . p. . . . of arms , and their kind . cuic. l. . proper and improper arms. pliny l. aemilio papo . c. a. tilio regulo cos. arte della guerra proem . consid . p. . . consid . p. . . consid . p. . consid p. . paus . messen . fazello hist . de sicil polyb. l. . decree of the states of holland apud grot. hist . . comines . p. jovius . machiavill . consid . p , . judges ch . . & . arte della guerra ▪ in his preface ▪ to suelonius . de qual . imp. consid . p. . consid . p. . essay . consid . p. . consid . p. . oceana p. . pausan : corith . arist . pol. l. . c. . consid . p. . pol. l. . c. . plut. lycur . pol. l. . c. . consid . p. . grot. ad numb . . . sam. . gen. . . . grot. ad gen. . consid . p. . in his epist . consid . p. . pol. l. . c. . plut. lycur . consid . p. . plur. lycur . consid . p. . consid . p. . confid . p. . consid . p. . consid . p. . consid . p. ▪ essay . pol. l. . c. ● . ocean . p. . grot. pol. l. . c. . chron. . grot. ad locum . chron. . gror. è. tertul. chron. . chron. . . chron. . . kings . . kings . chr. . . num. . poll. l. . c. . epitome of the athenian common wealth . petit. de leg. att. cic. pro flac. ulpian ad phil. . pollux . l. . c. . l. . c. . dem. phil. . pollux , l. . c ▪ . epitome of the common-wealth of venice . the great council . the senate . the colledge . the signiory . certain rights of the councils . consid . p. . rotation , of oceana . consid . p. . liv. l. . florus . l. . c. . consid . p. . consid . p. . consid . p. . match . discor . b. . ch. . liv. b. . consid . p. . mamercus apud . liv. l. . sam. . . arnisi . consid . p. . . consid . p. . oceana , p. . b. . . consid . p. . p. . notes for div a -e act. . . ch. . acts . . livy . lib. . ch. . strabo . . sigon . de ant jure provin . epist. plin. epist. lib. . acts . demost . contra timocr . phil. . l. . c. . l. . calv. inst . l. . cap. . §. . dion . hal. l. . philo de inst . princ . numb . . v. . . deut. . v. , , . numb . . . numb . . numb . . v. . . deut. . v. . tim. . v. . deut. . v. . ver. . judg. . . de rep. heb. judges . deur . . . arist . poll. b. . c. . de imp. s. p. c. . judges . jos . l. . josephus . l. . c. . numbers . josephus l. . chro. . . grot. ad hag. . . iosephus de iudg. l. . maymon . hal. cele hamikdasch . chap. . & . chron. . . . . . . numb : . v : , . exod. . numb . . philo de inst . principiis . di●m . c. . sam. . . sam. . . § . exod. . . gen. . . numb . . . t it sanhed . c . numb . . , . deut. . . mat. . . tim. . . mat. . . acts . . luke . . deut. . numb . . selden de syn. vide ▪ grot. ad deut. . . mikotzl misna gemara abr. zacuth . maimonides . rab. jonah . rab. nathan . maimon . tit. san. cap. . acts . . acts . . malmon . tit. san. cap. . halac . san. c. . s. . numb . . . § . § acts . . de imp. sum . pot. c. . § . § acts . of ordinat . p. . de imp. c. . pet. . . livy l. acts . . acts . first way of ordination in the church of christ . acts . § . dr. h. of imposition . § . acts . . ver. . . . . . . . . grotius . demonstration that god never ordained any policy ecclesiastical or civil , but upon the principles of humane prudence . josh . . . arist . . lib. . c. . pol. lib. . c . act. . second way of ordination in the church of cstrist . acts . acts . . third way of ordination i the church c christ . grot ad tim. . . grot. ad mat. . . tim. . . tim. . . § . § . § . epitome of the common-wealth of crete tit. . . decorond . § . joseph . an. l. . c. . l. . c. . acts . . de cor. cor. . . his own words to mr. hobbs . § . de coron . demost . cont . timocrat . pol. l. . c. . ant. l. . c. . acts . . § § . § . philo delegatitione ad cajum . acts . . § . his own words to mr. hobbs ▪ § . remains of sir walter raleigh ... selections. raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing r wing r _partial estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) remains of sir walter raleigh ... selections. raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . vaughan, robert. [ ], , [ ], p. : port. printed for william sheares, iunior ..., london : . sir walter raleigh's portrait signed: ro. vaughan. "a mere reissue of the 'maxims of state,' (wing r ), with the omission of the 'observations touching trade and commerce with the hollander,' and the addition of 'the prerogative of parliaments'"--sabin . includes the t.p. of the edition of "maxims of state." reproduction of original in british library. 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and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion ●am marti , quam mercurio . the ho. ble and learned knight sr. walter raleigh . ro : vaughan sculp . remains of s ir walter raleigh ; viz. maxims of state. advise to his son : his sons advise to his father . his sceptick . observation concerning the causes of the magnificencie and opulency of cities . his letters to divers persons of quality . with the prerogative of parliaments , being a dispute between a counsellour of state and a justice of peace . london , printed for william sheares iunior , in westminster hall. . maxims of state . with instructions to his son , and the sons advice to his aged father . whereunto is added observations touching trade and commerce with the hollander and other nations , proving that our sea and land commodities inrich and strengthen other countries against our own . by sir walter raleigh . london . printed for will. shears junior at the blue bible in bedford street in covent-garden . , the contents . of government . page of policie . of monarchie . of aristocracie , or senatorie state. of free state , or popular state. of tyrannie . of olygarchie , or the government of a few . ibid. of a common-wealth . of causes of states , and common-wealths in generall . of founding a state. ibid. of causes preserving state or common-wealth . of mysteries or sophisms . ibid. of axioms or rules of preserving a state. - rules for preserving of a kingdom hereditarie rules for preserving of a kingdom conquered kingdoms hereditarie are preserved at home by the ordering of a prince . ibid. kingdoms new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by rules . rules politick of tyrants . sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny . sophisms of the sophisticall , or subtile tyrant , to hold up his state. of preservation of an aristocracie . of preservation of an olygarchie , by sophisms ibid. of preservation of an olygarchie , by rules . ibid. of conversion of states in generall . causes of conversions of states are of two sorts : generall and particular . ibid. particular causes of conversion of state , are of two sorts . of sedition . causes of sedition are of two sorts . ibid. of alteration without violence . a method , how to make use of the book before , in the reading of the storie . old age is not ever unfit for publick gouernment , ibid. example of the like practice in charls the fifth . of observation for the affirmative and the negative . ibid. of defence for david in marrying abishag . politicall nobility . of ado●ijah aspiring to the kingdom observations . of ways of such as aspire to the kingdom , and marks to discern them . politicall prince . the table of the chapters containd in sr walter raleigh's instructions to his son . chap. page . virtuous persons to be made choice of friends . great care to be had in the choosing of a wife . wisest men have been abused by flatterers . pr●v●●e quarrels to be avoided . three rules to be observed for the preservation of a mans estate . what sort of servants are most fit to be entertained . brave rags wear soonest out of fashion . riches not to be sought by evil means . ibid. what inconveniences happen to such as delight in wine . let god be thy protectour and directour in all thy actions . the sceptick doth neither affirm , neither deny any position but doubteth of it , and proposeth his reason against that which is affirmed or denied , to justifie his not consenting . observations concerning the causes of the magnificencie and opulencie of cities . safetie for defence of the people and their goods in and near a town . causes that concern the magnificencie of a citie . that the seat of government is upheld by the two great pillars thereof , viz. civile justice , and martiall policie , which are framed out of husbandry , merchandise , and gentry of this kingdom . sir raleigh's letter to mr secretary winwood before his journey to guiana . to his wife from guiana . to sir ralph winwood . to his wife copied out of his own hand writing . to his wife after condemnation . to king james at his return from guiana . his third letter to secretary winwood . his letter to prince henry touching the modell of a ship. his speech immediately before he was beheaded . sir vvalter raleigh observations touching trade and commerce with the hollander and other nations , proving that our sea and land commodities inrich and strengthen other countreys against our own . finis . maxims of state . of government . government is of two sorts . . p rivate , of himself . sobriety . of his family ; called oeconomy . . publick , of the common-wealth , called p●licy a man must first govern himself , ere he be fit to govern a family : and his family , e're he be fit to bear the government in the common-wealth . of policie . policie is an art of government of a common-wealth , and some part of it according to that state , o● form of government , wherein it is setled for the publick good . state , is the frame or set order of common-wealth , or of the governours that rule the same , especially o● the chief and sovereign governour that commandeth the rest . the state of sovereignty consisteth in five points . . making or anulling of laws . . creating and disposing of magistrates . . power over life and death . . making of war , or peace . . highest or last appeal . where these five are , either in one or in more , there is the state. these five points of state , rest either in , . one monarchie or kingdom . . some few chief men for virtue and wisdom , called an aristocracie . . many , called a free-state , or popular state. these three sorts of government have respect to the common good , and therefore are just , and lawfull states . these . degenerate into . other governments viz. . monarchie into . tyrrannie . . aristocracie , into . oligarchie . . popular state , into . common-wealth or government of all the common and baser sort , and therefore called a common-wealth by an usurped nick-name . these all respect their own , and not the publick good , and therefore are called bastard governments . i monarchie . a monarchie , or kingdom , is the government of a state by one head , or chief , tending to the common benefit of all . monarchie , or kingdoms , are of three sorts touching the right or possession of them , viz. . hereditary , by descent , as the english french , &c. . elective , by suffrage of the other orders , of some of them , as the p●loni●● . 〈◊〉 , or of both kinds , viz. descent , yet not tied to the next bloud , as the ancient jewish state. monarchies are of two sorts touching their power , or authority , viz. . int●re . where the whole power of ordering all state matters , both peace and war , doth by law & cust●● appertain to the prince , as in the ●●●gest kingdom , where the prince hat● power to make laws league , & wa● to create magistrates ; to pardon life of appeal , &c. though to give a contentment to the other degrees , th●● have a suffrage in making laws , y●● ever subject to the princes pleasure nor negative will. . 〈◊〉 or restrained , that ha●● no full power in all the points or matters of state , as the military king that hath not the sovereignty in time peace , as the making of laws , & but in war only , as the p●loni●● kings . ii. aristocracy , or senatory state. an aristocracie is the government of a common-wealth by some ●ompetent number of the better sort , ●referred for wisdom and other virtues ●f the publick good . . aristocracie are of three sorts , viz. there the senatours are chosen , for virtu , riches , and the common good , as the venetian . . virtue , and the publick good without respect of wealth , as sometimes the roman , when some of the ●enatours were fetched from the ●ough , and some from the schools . vir●ue and wealth more respecting their private , than their publick good , which inclineth towards an oligarchie , or the government of the richer or nobler sort , as in rome towards the end . iii. free-state , or popular state. the popular state is the government of a state by the choisest sort of people , tending to the publick good of all sorts , viz. w th due respect of the better , nobler , and richer sort in every just state , some part of the government is , or ought to be imparted to the people ; as in a kingdom , a voice or suffrage in making laws ; and somtimes also , in levying of arms ( if the charge be great , and the prince forced to borrow help of his subjects ) the matter rightly may be propounded to a parliament , that the tax may seem to have proceeded from themselves . so consultations , and some proceedings in iudicial matters , may in part be referred to them . the reason , least seeing themselves to be in no number , nor of reckoning , they mislike the state , or kind of government : and where the multitude is discontented , there must needs be many enemies to the present state. for which cause , tyrants , which allow the people , no manner of ●ealing in state matters ) are forced to bereave them of their wits and wea●ons , and all other means whereby they may resist , or amend themselves , ●● in rushland , turkey , &c. iv. tyrannie . a tyrannie is the swerving , or distorting of a monarchie , or the government of one , tending not the publick good , but the private benefit of himself , & his followers . as in the russ & turkish government , where the state and wealth of other orders , are employed onely to the upholding of the greatness of the king or emperour . this is the worst of all the ●astard states because it is the pervering of the best regiment , to wit , of a monarchie , which resembleth the sovereign government of god himself . v. oligarchie , or the government of a few . an oligarchie is the swerving , or the corruption of an aristocracie ; or the government of some few , that are of the wealthier or nobler sort , without any respect of the publick good . the chief end of these governours , is their own greatness and enriching . and therefore their manner is , to prepare fit means to uphold their estate . this state is not wholly so bad , as if the tyrannie , and yet worse than the common wealth , because it respecteth the good of a few . vi. common wealth . a common-wealth is the swerving of depravation of a free , or popular state , or the government of the whole multitude of the ba●e and poorer sort , without respect of the other orders . these two states , to wit ; the oligarchie , and common-wealth , are very adverse the one to the other , and have many bickerings between them . for that the richer or nobler sort , suppose a right or superiority to appertain unto them in every respect , because they are superiour , but in some respects onely to wit , in riches , birth , parentage , &c. on the other side , the common people suppose , there ought to be an equality in all other things , and some state matters ; because they are equall with the rich or noble , touching their libertie , whereas indeed neither the one nor the other are simply equall or superiour , as touching government and fitness thereunto , because they are such , to wit , because they are rich , noble , free , &c. but because they are wise , virtuous , va●ant , &c. and so have fit parts to govern a state. the severall states are sometimes mixed , and inter-wrought one with the other , yet ever so , as that the one hath the preheminent predomination over the other , as in the humours and complexions of the body . so in the roman state , the people had their plebescita , and gave the suffrage in the election of magistrates : yet the senate ( as the state stood ) for the most part swayed the state , and bare the chief rule . so in the venetian state , the duke seemeth to represent a monarch , and the senate to be his councell : yet the duke hath no power in state matters , but is like a head set on by art , that beareth no brain . and so that state is senatorica●l or aristocraticall . causes of states and common-wealths in general . causes of states , or of common-wealths are of . sorts , viz. . founding , or setling a state where to be considered . . measure . . parts , and their qualities . . preserving a state. . changing , and altering a state. founding a state. in founding a state are to be considered . things . . proportion . . parts . proportion , is a just measure or mediocritie of the state , whereby it is framed & kept in that order , as that neither it exceed nor be defective in his kind , to wit , so that a monarch be not too monarchical , nor strict , or absolute , as the russe kings ; nor aristocratical , that is over●mated or eclipsed by the nobilitie , as the scottish kingdom , but ever respective to the other degrees . that aristocracie be not to magnificent nor intire to it self , but communicate with the people some commodities of state or government , the venetians and sometimes the ro●● allowed the people to elect certain magistrates out of themselves , to have a tribune , to make plebiscita , &c. so a free state or common-wealth that it is not over popular , viz. that it depress not too much the richer , wiser , nor leaneder sort ; but admit them to offices with a caution out of the rules and masteries of that state. that they seek no alteration of the present state. the reason , because the moderate states in their several kinds ( as all other things that observe the mean ) are best framed for their continuance , because they give less cause or grudge , envy , and affecting the wealth , honour , and 〈◊〉 , which they see in others that 〈◊〉 the state ; and so are less subject to stirs and commotions , and easiest kept in their present state wherein they are set . parts . the parts of the state , or those magistrates that bear place or sway in the publick government . parts or partakers of publick government , are . councel or senate , which consulteth of all matters pertaining to war and peace , magistrates , &c. in admi●ting of whom there ought to be a mo●● special care , that they may be men expert in matter of policie , because it i● their trade and vo●ation , as men use to chuse pilots , and masters of ships , such as know the art of navigation , and no● husband men , &c. and so the contrarie . . magistrates and officers , which are to be executioners of that which consulted , and found to be expedient for the common-wealth , wherein are to be observed , the kinds of magistrate than they be such as fit that kind of government ; the time of their continuance , and the manner of their election or appointing , by whom , out t● whom , and in what manner they be chosen . . judges ; to determine in civil and criminal matters , where are to be observed , out of whom they are to be chosen ; what kinds are necessary , and the manner of judgement and judicial proceeding . in magistrates are to be observed . . kinds of magistrates . . civil . . superiour , which are to be such & of that kind as agree with the state , as consuls for a year , and not perpetual dictatours in a senatorie state. praetors & censors , that over-see manners & orders of the people . for a kingdom lieutenant of shires , marshals , masters of horse , admirals , &c. inferiour , as conservatours of peace , constables , &c. overseers of youth that take care for their education for civil and warlike exercise . clarks of the market that provide for the quantity , and price of victual . ed●●es for buildings , streets , bounds . questours , or treasurers , to keep and dispence the publick treasury . a●u●●ies , or recorders , which keep the publick record . goalers to keep prison and prisoners . surveyours of woods and fields , &c. . as bishops or pastours , elders , wardens . . time of magistrates , whereof some are perpetual , some for a time , viz. for more years , a year , half a year , according to the necessity of the common-wealth , and not perpetual ; or at least not heredetary in a kingdom . yearly in an aristocracie , or half yearly in a free-state . . manner of choice , by whom and how to be chosen , where especially they are to be chosen by suffrage , and not by lot. . eclesiastical . causes preserving a state , or common-wealth . in preserving of states a things required . mysteries , or sophisms . general to all states . . particular for every several state. . rules , or actions . . general , for all states . . particular , for every state. mysteries , or sophisms . mysteries , or sophisms of state , are certain secret practices , either for the avoiding of danger , or averting such effects as tend to the preservation of the prefent state , as it is set or founded . state mysteries are of two sorts . . generall : that pertain to all states ; as first to provide by all means , that the same degree , or part of the common-wealth , do not exceed both in quantity and quality . in quantity , as that the number of the nobility , or of great persons , be not more , than the state or common-wealth can bear . in quality , as that none grow in wealth , liberty , honours , &c. more than it is meet for that degree ; for as in weights , the heavier weights bear down he scale : so in common-wealths , that part of degree that excelleth the rest in quality and quantity , overswayeth the rest after it , whereof follow alterations , and conversions of ●tate . secondly , to provide by all means , that the middle sort of people exceed both the extreams , ( viz. ) of nobility and gentry , and the base rascal , and beggarly sort . for this maketh the state constant and firm , when both the extreams are tied together by a middle sort , as it were with a band , as for any conspiracie of the rich and beggarly sort together , it is not to be feared . to these two points , the particular rules in sophisms of every common-wealth , are to be applied . . particular : that serve for preservation of every common wealth , in that form of state wherein it is setled as in a kingdom . that the nobility may be accustomed to bear the government of the prince , especially such as have their dwelling in remote places from the princes eye , it is expedient to call them up at certain times to the princes court , under presence of doing them honour , or being desirous to see , and enjoy their presence ; and to have their children , especially their eldest , to be attendant upon the prince , as of special favour towards them and theirs , that so they may be trained up in duty and obedience towards the prince , and be as hostages for the good hehaviour , and faithfull dealing of their parents , especially , if they be of any suspected note . to that end serves the persian practice , in having a band , or train of the satrapa's children , and other nobles to attend the court ; which was well imitated by our train of he●●●●●r , if they were of the nobler sort . again , sometimes to borrow small sums of his subjects and to pay them again , that he may after borrow greater sums and never pay : so in an oligarchie , least it decline to a popular state , they deceive the people with this and the like sophisms , ( viz. they compel their own sort , to wit , the rich men , by great penalties , to frequent their assemblie , for choosing of magistrates , for provision of armour , warlike exercises , making an execution of laws , & . by that means seemin ; to bear a hard hand over the richer , but to suffer the poorer , and meaner sort to be absent , and to neglect those assemblies under pretence , that they will not draw them from their business , and private earnings : yet withall to cite thither some few of them , ( viz. ) so many as are casily over-matched by the richer sort , to make a shew , that they would have the people or poorer sort , partakers likewise of those matters , yet terrifying those that come to their assemblies , with the tendiousnesse of consultations , greatnesse of fines , if they should mis-do , to the end , to make them unwilling to come again , or to have to do with those consultations , by which means , the richer sort do still , govern the state , with the peoples liking , and good contentment . aixoms . axioms or rules of preserving the state are , . general , that serve for all common-wealths . . particular , that serve for every several state. general rules . . the first and principal rule of policie to be observed in all states , is to profess , & practise , & maintain the true worship & religio of almighty god prescribed unto us in his word , which is the chief end of all government . the axiom , that god be obeyed simply without exception , though he command that which seemeth unreasonable , and absurb to humane policy ; as in the jews common-wealth : that all the men should repair yearly to one place to worship god four times , leaving none to defend their coast , though being beset with many enemies . not to sow the seventh year , but to suffer the ground to rest untilled without respect or fear of famine , &c. . to avoid the causes of conversion , whereby states are over thrown , that are set down in the title of conversions ; for that common wealth ( as naturall bodies ) are preserved by avoiding that which hurteth the health and state thereof , and are so cured by contrary medicines . . to take heed , that no magistrate be created or continued , contrarie to the laws and policie of that state. as that in a se●at● , there be not created a perpetual dictaetor , as caesar in rome . in a kingdom , that there be no senate , or convention of equall power with the prince in state matters , as in poland . . to create such magistrates as love the state as it is setled , and take heed of the contrarie practise , as to advance popular persons in a kingdom , or aristocracie . and secondly , to advance such as have skill to discern what doth preserve , and what hurreth or altereth the present state. . to that end to have certain officers to pay abroad , and to observe such as do not live and behave themselves in fit sort , agreeable to the present state , but desire rather to bee under some other form , or kind of government . . to take heed that magistracies be not sold for money , nor bribe in their offices , which especially to be observed in that common wealth , which is governed by a few of the richer sort ; for if the magistrate gain nothing but his common fees , the common sort , and such as want honour , take in good part that they be not preferred , and are glad rather that themselves are suffered to intend private business . but if the magistrate buy and sell matters , the common people are doubly grieved , both because they are debat'd of those preferments , and of that gain they see to grow by them , which is the cause that the german oligarchies continue to firm for both they suffer the poorer sort to grow into wealth , and the richer sort are by that means freed , and secured from being under the poor . . to take heed that the state , as it is setled and maintained , be not over-strict , nor exceed in his kind ; ( viz. ) that a kingdom be not too monarchicall , nor a p●●ul● state too p●●u●ar : for which cause it is good , that the magistrates sometimes ) yield of his right touching honour , and bahave themselves familiarly with those that are equall unto them in other parts , though inferiour for place and office ; and sometimes popularly with the common people , which is the cause that some common wealths , though they be very simply , and un kilfully set , yet continue firm , because the magistrates behave themselves wisely , and with due respect toward , the rest that are without honour ; and therefore some kind of moderate popularity is to be used in every common-wealth . . to take heed of small beginnings , and to meet with them even at the first , as well touching the breaking and altering of laws , as of other rules which concern the continuance of every severall state. for the desease and a teration of a common-wealth , doth not happen all at once , but grows by degrees , which every common wit cannot discern , but men expert in policie . . to provide , that that part be ever the greater in number and power , which favours the state as now it stands . this is to be observed as a very oracle in all common-wealths . . to observe a mean in all the degrees , and to suffer no part to exceed , or decay overmuch . as first for preferments , to provide that they be rather small and short , than great and long ; and if any be grown to overmuch greatness , to withdraw or diminish some part of his honour . where these sophisms are to be practised ( viz. ) to do it by parts and degrees ; to do it by occasion , or colour of law , and not all at once . and it that way serve not , to advance some other , of whose virtue and faithfulness , we are fully assined , to as high a degree , or to a greater honour ; and to be the friends and followers of him that excelleth , above that which is meet . as touching wealth , to provide , that those of the middle sort ( as before was said ) be more in number ; and if any grow high , and over charged with wealth , to use the sophisms of a popular state , viz to send him on embassages , and forreign negotiations , or imploy him in some office that hath great charges , and little honour , &c. to which end , the f●●●●ful served in some common-wealths . to suppress the factions , and quarrels of the nobles , and to keep other that are yet free from joyning with them in their partakings and factions . . to increase or remit the common taxes and contributions ; according to the wealth , or want of the people and commonwealth . if the people be increased in wealth , the taxes and subsidies may be increased . if they be poor , and their wealth diminish , specially by dearth , want of traffick , &c. to forbear taxes and impositions , or to take little . otherwise grudge and discontentments must needs follow . the sophisms that serve for impositions , are these , and other of like sort , to pretend business of great charge , as war , building of ships making of havens , castles , fortifications , &c. for the common defence ; sometimes by lotteries and like devises , wherein some part may be bestowed , the rest reserved for other expences ; but princely dealings needs no pretences . . to provide that the discipline & training of youth of the better sort to such as agreeth with that common-wealth : as that in a kingdom , the sons of noble men to be attendant at the court , that they may be accustomed to obedience towards the prince . in the senatory state , that the sons o● the senatours be not idly , nor over daintily brought up , but well instructed and trained up in learning , langues , and nartiall exercise that they may be able to bear that place in the common-wealth , which their father held , and c●nt any wise , in a popular state. . to take heed , least their sophisms , or secret practises for the continuance and maintenance of that state , be not discovered ; least by that means they refuse and disappoint themselves , but wisely used , and be with great secrecie . particular rules . rules and axioms , for preserving of a kingdom . hereditary . conquered . kingdoms hereditary , are preserved at home by the ordering . . himself , viz. by the tempering and moderation of the princes answer and prerogative . for the less and more temperate their power and state is the more firm , and stable is their kingdom and government ; because they seem to be further off from a master like , and tyrannte all empire ; and lesse unequall in condition to the next degree , to wit , the nobility , and so lesse subject to grudge and envy . . nobility , &c. by keeping that degree and due proportion , that neither they exceed in number more than the realm , or state can bear , as the scottish kingdom , and sometime the english , when the realm was overcharged with the number of dukes , earls , and other noble ; whereby the authority of the prince was eclipsed , and the realm troubled with their factions and ambitions . nor that any one excel in honour , power , or wealth , as that he resemble another king within the kingdom , as the house of lancaster within this realm . to that end , not to load any with too much honour or preferment , because it is hard even for the best , and worthiest men , to bear their greatnesse , and high fortune temperately , as appeareth by infinit examples in all states . the sophisms for preventing , or reforming this inconvenience , are to be used with great caution and wisdom . if any great person be to be abated , not do real with him by calumniation or forged ●atter , and so to cut him off without desert , especially if he be gratious among the people , after the ●●chiav●an place , which besides the injustice , an occasion many times of greater danger towards the prince . not to withdraw their honour all at once , which maketh a desperate 〈◊〉 in the party , and a commiseration in the people , and so greater love , he be gracious for his virtue , and publick service . not to banish him into forreign countries , where he may have opportunity of practising with forreign states , whereof great danger may ●n●e , as in the example of ●ortulanus , henry the fourth , and such like . but to use these , and the like sophisms , viz. to abate their greatnesse by degrees , as david joabs , fa●●●●a bellisarius , &c. to advance some other men to as great , or greater honour , to shadow , ●● over-mate the greatnesse of the other . to draw from him by degrees his friends , and followers by ●●vefer●●● , rewards , and other good and lawfull means ; especially , to be provided that these great men be not imployed in great or powerfull affairs of the common wealth , whereby they may have more opportunity to sway the state. . people , viz. so to order and behave himself that he be loved , and reverenced of the people . for that the prince need not greatly fear home conspirac●es , or forreign invation , she be firmly loved of this own people . that reason , for that the rebel can neither hope for any forces for so great enterprise , not any refuge , being discovered & put to flight , ●t the multitude affect their prince : but the common people being once offended , hath cause to fear every moving , both at home and abroad . this may be affected by the prince , the use means and art of getting the favour of the people , and avoid those things that breed have and contempt ; viz. if he seem as tutor , or a father to love the people and to protect them , if he maintain the peace of his kingdom ; for that nothing is more popular , nor more pleasing to the people than is peace . . if he shew himself oftentime graciously , yet with state and majestie to his people , and receive complaint of his suppliants , and such like . . if he sit himself sometimes in open courts , and place of ●ustice that he may seem to have a care of i●●stice among his people . if he bestow many benefits and graces upon that citie , which he maketh the seat of his l●●●● , and to make it sure and faithfull unto him , which is fit to be in the middle of his kingdom , as the heart in the middle of the body , or the sun in the middle of heaven , both to divide himself more easily into all the parts of his dominions ; and least the furthest parts at one end move , whilest the prince is in the other . if he go in progress many times to see his provinces , especially , those that are remite . if he gratifie his cou●tiers and ●●●●ians in that sort , and by such means , as that he may seem not to pleasure them with the hurt & injury of his people , as with m●n●●ol●es , and such like . if he commit the handling of such things as procure envy , or seem grievous to his ministers , but reserve those things which are gratefull , and well pleasing to himself , as the french kings , who for that purpose , as may seem , have erected their court at paris , which acquitteth the prince from grudge and envy , both with the nobles and the scope . . if he borrows sometimes sums of money of his people , though he have no need , and pay the same justly without defalcation of any part by his exchequer , or other officer . . if he avoid all such things as may breed h●tre● or contempt of his person which may be done , if he shew himself not too light , unconstant , hard , cruel , esteminate , fearfull , and ●asterdly , &c. but contrariwise religious , grave , just valiant , &c. whereby appeareth the false doctrine of the machiavilian policie , with far the better means to keep the people in obedience , than love , and reverence of the people towards the prince . . if the prince be well furnished with warlike provision , which is to be rumoured , and made known abroad : if it be known , that he is reverenced , and obeyed by his peoples at home . . if he provide so much as lieth in him , that his neighbour kingdoms grow not over much in power and dominior ; which if it happen , he is to joyn speedily with other princes , which are in like danger to abate that greatness , and to strengthen himself and the rest against it . an oversight of the christian princes towards the king of spain . if he get him intelligencers by reward , or other means , to detect or hinder the designs of that prince , with whom he hath differences , if any thing be intended against his state. or at least have some of his own lydging abroad about that princes court , under colour of embassage , or some other pretence ; which must be men of skill and dexterity to serve for that turn . . to observe the laws of his country , and not to encounter them with his prerogate , nor to use it at all where there is a law , for that it maketh a secret and just grudge in the peoples hearts , especially if it tender to take from them their comm●d●t●es , and to bestow them upon other of his courtiers and ministers . . to provide especially , that that part , which favoureth the state as it standeth , be more potent , than the other which favoureth it not or desireth a change . . to make speciall choise of good and sound men to bear the place of magistrates , especially of such as assist the pr●●●●● on cou●sels , and policie● , and not to lean overmuch to his own advise , contrarie to the rule of ma●li●● who teacheth , that a prince can have no good ●●●●sul , except it be in himself ; his reason , ●● use if he use the 〈…〉 is in dang●r to be over w 〈…〉 d by him ; and if he counsel with more , then he shall be 〈…〉 in opi●i●●s . as if a prince of great , or mean wisdom , could not take the judgement of all his c●nc●llours in any point of po●●●● , or of so many as he himself thinke he good , and to take it either by word , or in writing ; and himself then in private peruse them all , and so after good and mature deliberation , make choise of the best , without any distraction of binding himself to the direction of one . for the proverb is true . that two eyes see more than one ; and therefore the advises , and consultations of a senatory state is compared by some to a feast , or dinner , where many contribute towards the ●●●t , by which means they have more variety of dishes , and so better fare : and yet every mean may make choice of that dish that serveth him best for his 〈…〉 e. . the prince himself is to sit sometimes in place of publick justice , and to give an experiment of his wisdom and equity , whereby great reverence and estimation is gotten , as in the example of sol●man , which may seem the reason , why our kings of england had their kings bench in place of publick justice , after the manner of the ancient kings that sate in the gate ; where for better performing of this princely duty , some speciall causes may be selected , which may throughly be debated and considered upon by the prince in private , with the help and advice o● his learned councell , and so be decided publickly , as before is said , by the prince himself ; at least , the prince is to take accompt of every minister of publick justice , that it may be known , that he hath a care of justice , and doing right to his people , which makes the iusticers also to be more carefull in performing of their duties . . to be moderate in his taxes , and in positions ; and when need doth require to use the subjects purse , to do it by parliament , and with their consents , making the cause apparent unto them , and shewing his unwillingnesse in charging them finally , so to use it , that it may seem rather an offer from his subjects , than an exaction by him . . to stop small beginnings ; unto this end to compound the dissentions that rise amongst the nobles , with caution , that such as are free be not drawn into parts , whereby many times the prince is endangered , and the whose common-wealth set in a combustion ; as in the example of the barons , war , and the late wars of france , which grew from a quarrel betwixt the ●●●●o● faction , and the other nobility . . to stir up the people , if they grow secure , and negligent of armour , and other provision for the common-wealth , by some rumour or fear of danger at home , to make more ready when occasion requireth . but this seldom to be used , least it be supposed a false alarm , when there is need indeed . to have speciall care , that his children , especially , the heir apparent , have such bringing up as is meet for a king , viz. in learning , specially of matters pertaining to state , and in martiall exercise , contrary to the practise of many princes , who suffer their children to be brought up in pleasure , and to spend their time in hunting , &c. which by reason of their defects , afterwards is a cause of mis-government and alteration of state. ii. kingdoms new gotten , or purchased by force , are preserved by these means . first , if they have been subjects before to his ancestours , or have the same tongue , manners , or fashions , as have his own countrey , it is an easie matter to retain such countries within their obedience , in case the princes bloud of the said countrey be wholly extinct . for men of the same quality , tongue , and condition , do easily s●ole , and combine themselves together , so much the rather , if the people of that countrey have served before , and were not accustomed to their own liberty , wherein especially is to be observed , that the laws and customs of that purchased countrey be not altered nor innovated , or at least it be done by little and little . so the b●rgundians and oquitans were annexed to france . the reason , because partlty they have been accustomed to serve , and partly , for that they will not easily agree about any other to be their prince , if the bloud royall be cas● extinguished . as for the invasion of a forreign countrey , where into the prince hath no right , or whereof the right heir is living : it is not the part of a just civil prince , much less a christian prince to enforce such a countrey : and therefore , the machiavillian practises in this case , to make sure work by extiguishing wholly the bloud royall , is lewd and impertinent : the like is to be said of murthering the natives , or the greatest part of them , to the end he may hold the rest in sure possession . a thing not onely against christian religion , but it is inhumane injustice , cruel , and barbarous . . the safest way is , ( supposing a right ) that some good part of the natives be transplanted into some other place , and our colonies , consisting of so many as shall be thought meet , be planted there in some part of the province , castls , forts , and havens , seized upon , and more provided in fit places , as the manner was of the babylonian monarch , which transplanted . jews : and of the romans in france , tribes of the germany , britain , & other places . the reason : . for that otherwise forces of horse and foot , are to be maintained within the province● , which cannot be done without great charge . . for that the whole province is troubled and grieved with removing and supplying the army with victual , carriages , &c. . for that colonies are more sure and faithfull , than the rest . as for the natives that are removed from their former seats , they have no means to hurt , and the rest of the natives being free from the inconvenience , and fearing that themselves may be so served if they attempt any thing rashly , are content to be quiet . the turks practise in asia , where the chief grounds and dwellings are possessed by the souldiers , whom they call timari●tae . that the prince have his seat and his residence , in his new purchase , especially , for a time , till things be well setled ; especially if the province be great and large , as the turks in greece : the reasons ; . because the presence of the prince availeth much to keep things in order , and get the good will of his new subjects . they conceive that they have refuge by the princes presence , if they be oppressed by the lieutenants , and inferiour governours : where it will be convenient for the winning the peoples hearts , that some example be made of punishing of such as have committed any violence or oppression . . because being present , he seeth and heareth what is thought & attempted ; and so may quickly give remedy to it , which being absent he cannot do , or not do in time . . if the prince himself cannot be present to reside , then , to take heed that the charge of governing , or new purchases be committed to such as be sure men , and of other meet quality , that depend wholly upon the princes savour , and not to natives , or other of their own subjects , that are gracious for their nobility , or virtue ; especially , if the province be great , and somewhat far distant , which may soon seduce the unsetled affections of those new subjects , as for such governours , as depend wholly upon the princes savour , being not born , but created noble , they will not so easily suffer themselves to be won from their duty , and in case they would revolt , yet they are not able to make any great strength , for that the people obey them but as instruments and ministers , to keep them in subjection , and not for any ill will . to have the children of the chief noble men , and of greatest authority , hostages with them in safe keeping , the more the bettter : for that no bond is stronger , than that of nature , to contain the parents and allies in obedience , and they the rest . to alter the laws but by degrees one after another , and to make other that are more behoovefull for the establishing of the present government . . to keep the people quiet and peaceable , and well affected so much as may be , that they may seem by being conquered , to have gotten a protectour , rather than a tyrant ; for the common-people , if they enjoy peace , and be not distracted nor drawn from their businesse , nor exacted upon beyond measure , are easily contained under obedience ; yet notwithstanding , they are to be dis-used from the practise of arms , and other exercises which increase courage , and be weakened of armor , that they have neither spirit , nor will to rebell . . if there be any faction in the countrey , to take to him the defence of the better and stronger part , and to combine with it , as caes●r in fr●nce . . to look well to the borders , and confining p●ovinces , and if any rule there of great , or equall power to himself , to joyn leage with some other borde●●● , tho●gh of lesse strength , to hinder he at●empts : if any should be ) by such neighbour prince . for it happeneth , often , that a countrey infested by one neighbour prince , calleth in another , of as great , or greater power , to assist and rescue it from the other that invadeth it ; so the ●●●mans were call●d into g●●● , by the aet●●ians ; the ●●●●ns , by the britai●s , the danes , by the saxon● . . to leave their titles and dignities to the natives , but the command and authority , wholly to his own . . not to put much trust , nor to practise too often the s●p●●sm of policie , especially those that appertain to a tyrannicall state , which are soon detected by men of iudgement , and so being discredit to the prince , and his policy among the wiser , and better sort of his subjects , whereof must needs follow very ill effects . the s●●●●● of tyrants , are rather to be known , than practised , ( which are for the supporting of their tyrannicall states , ) by wise and good princes , and are these , and such like as follow . rules politick of tyrants . rules practised by tyrants are of . sorts , viz. . barbarous , and professed , which is proper to those that have got head , and have power sufficient of themselves , without others help , as in the turkish , and russe government . . sophisticall , and dissembled ; as in some states that are reputed for good and lawfull monarchies , but inclining to tyrannies , proper to those which are not yet setled , nor have power sufficient of themselves ; but must use the power and help of others , and so are forced to be politick sophisters . i. sophisms of a barbarous and professed tyranny . to expell and banish out of his countrey all honest means , where . by his people may attain to learning , wisdom , valour and other virtues , that they might be fit for that estate , and servile condition . for that these two , learning , and martiall exercise , effect two things most dangerous to a tyranny : viz wisdom , and valour . for that men of spirit and understanding , can hardly endure a servile state. to this end , to forbid learning of liberall arts , and martiall exercise ; as in the russe government so julian the apostata dealt with the christians . contrariwise , to use his people to base occupations , and mechanicall arts , to keep them from idlenesse , and to put away from them all high thoughts , and manly conceits , and to give them a liberty of drinking drunk , and of other base and lewd conditions that they may be sorted , and so made unfit for great enterprises . so the egyptian kings dealt with the hebrews ; so the russe emperour with his russe people : and charls the fifth with the netherlanders , when he purposed to enclose their priviledges , and to bring them under his absolute government . . to make sure to him , and his state , his military men by reward , liberty , and other means , especially . his guard , or praetorian band ; that being partakers of the spoil and benefit , they make like that state , and continue firm to it ; as the turk , his janizarie ; the russe , his boyarens , &c. . to unarm his people of weapons , money , and all means , whereby they may resist his power ; and to that end , to have his set and ordinary exactions &c. once in two , three , or four years , and sometimes yearly , as the ●●rk and russe ; who is wont to say , that his people must 〈…〉 ed as his flock of sheep , viz. their people taken from them , least it overlade ● , and grow too heavy ; that they are like to his beard , that the more it was shaven the thicker it would grew . and if there be any of extraordinary wealth , to borrow of them in the mean while , till the tax come about , or upon some divised matter , to confiscate their goods , as the common practise is of the ●uss● and turk . . to be still in wars , to the end , his people may need a captain ; and that his forces may be kept in practise , as the russe doth yearly against the tartar , p●lonian , and sweden , &c. . to cut off such as excell the rest in wealth , favour , or nobility ; or be of a pregnant , or aspiring wit , and so are fearfull to a tyrant ; and to suffer none to hold office , or any honour , but onely of him ; as the turk his b●shae● ; and the russe , his r●zzes . . to forbid guilds , brotherhoods , feastings and other assemblies among the people , that they have no means or opportunity to conspire , or confer together of publick matters , or to maintain love amongst themselves , which is very dangerous to a tyrant , the russes practice . . to have their beagles , or l●stener in every corner , & parts of the realm ; especially , in places that are more suspect , to learn what every man saith , or thinketh , that they may prevent all attempts , and take away such ●s mislike their s●●● . . to make schism , and division among his subjects , viz. to set one noble man against another , and one richman against another , that through fact on & disagreement among themselves they may be weakened , and attempt nothing against him , and by this means entertaining whispering , and complaints , he may know the secrets of both parts , and have matter against them both , when need requireth . so the russe made the faction of the zemsky , and the 〈◊〉 . . to have strangers for his guard , and to entertain parasites , and other base and ●ervile fellows , not too wise , and yet subtile , that will be ready for reward to do and execute what he commandeth , though never so wicked and unjust . for that good men can not flatter , and wise men cannot serve a tyrant . all these practises and such like , may be contracted into one or two , viz. to bereave his subjects of will and power to do him hurt , or to alter the present state the use is caution , not imitation . ii. sophisms of the sophillicall , or subtile tyrant , to hold up his state. . to make shew of a good king , by observing a temper and mediocrity in his government , and whole course of life ; to which end , it is necessary , that this subtile tyrant , be a cunning polititian , or a machiavilian at the least , and that he be taken so to be , for that it maketh him more to be feared and regarded , and is thought thereby : not unworthy for to govern others . . to make shew not of severity , but of gravity , by seeming reverent , and not terrible in his speech , and gesture , and habit , and other demeanour . . to pretend care of the common-wealth ; and to that end , to seem loath to exact tributes , and other charges ; and yet to make necessity of it , where none is : to that end to procure such war as can bring no danger toward his state , and that might easily be compounded , or some other chargeable business ; and to continue it on , that he may continue his exaction and contribution so long as he list . and thereof to imploy some in his publick service , the rest to hoord upon his treasury , which is sometimes practised even by lawfull princes , as edward the fourth in his wars against france , when have levied a great sum of money throughout his realm , especially of the londoners , he went over seas , and returned without any thing doing . . sometimes to give an account by open speech , and publick writing , of the expence of such taxes and impositions , as he hath received of his subjects , that he may seem to be a good husband and frugal , and not a robbe of the common-wealth . . to that end , to bestow some cost upon publick buildings , or some other work for the common good , especially upon the ports , forts , and chief cities of his realm , that so he may seem a benefactour , & have a delight in the adorning of his country , or doing some good for it . . to forbid feastings , and other meetings , which increase love , and give opportunity to confer together of publick matters , under pretence of sparing cost for better uses , to that end the curficu bell was first ordained by william the conquerour , to give men warning to repair home at a certain hour . . to take heed that no one grow to be over-great , but rather , many equally great , that they may envy , and contend one with another ; and if he resolve to weaken any of this sort , to do it warily and by degrees ; if quite to wreck him , and to have his life , yet to give him a lawfull tryal , after the manner of his country ; and if he proceed so far with any or great power and estimation , as to do him contumely , or disgrace , not to suffer him to escape , because contumely and disgrace , are things contrarie unto houour , which great spirits do most desire , and so are moved rather to a revenge for their disgrace , than to any thankfulnesse , or acknowledging the princes favour for their pardon or dismission : true in ath●ists , but not in true christian nobility . . to unarm his people , and store up their weapons , under pretence of keeping them safe , and having them ready when service requireth . and then to arm with them such , and so many as he shall think meet , and to commit them to such as are sure men . . to make schism or division under hand among his nobility , and betwixt the nobility and the people , and to set one rich man against another , that they combine not together , and that himself by hearing the griefs and complaints , may know the secrets of both parts , and so have matter against them both , when it listeth him to call them to an account . . to offer no man any contumely or wrong , specially , about womens matters , by attempting the chastity of their wives or daughters , which hath been the ruin of many tyrants , and conversion of their states . as of tarquinius , by brutus , appius , by virginius , pisistratus , by harmodius , alexander medices , duke of florence , aloisus of placen●●a , rodericus , king of spain , &c. . to that end , to be moderate in his pleasures , or to use them closely that he be not seen ; for that men sober , or watchfull , or such as seem so , are not lightly subject to contempt , or conspiracies of their own . . to reward such as atchieve some great or commendable enterprize ; or do any speciall action for the common-wealth , in that manner as it may seem , they could not be better regarded , in case they lived in a free-state . . all rewards and things gratefull , to come from himself , but all punishments , exactions , and things ungratefull , to come from his officers , and publick ministers ; and when he hath effected what he would by them , if he see his people discontented withall , to make them a sacrifice to pacifie his subjects . . to pretend great care of religion , and of serving god , ( which hath been the manner of the wickedest tyrants ) for that people do less fear any hurt from those , whom they do think virtuous and religious , nor attempt likely to do them hurt , for that they think that god protects them . . to have a strong and sure guard of forreign souldiers , and to bind them by good turns , that they having at least profit , may depend upon him and the present state ; as caeligula , the german guard , where the nobility are many and mighty . the like is practised by lawfull kings , as by the french king. . to procure that other great persons be in the same fault , or case with them , that for that cause they be forced to defend the tyrant , for their own safetie . . to take part , and to joyn himself with the stronger part ; if the common people , and mean degree be the stronger , to joyn with them ; if the rich and noble , to joyn with them . for so that part with his own strengh , will be ever able to overmatch the other . . so to frame his manners and whole behaviour , as that he may seem , if not perfectly good , yet tolerably evil , or somewhat good , somewhat bad . these rules of hypocriticall tyrants are to be known , that they may be avoided , and met withall , and not drawn into imitation . preservation of an aristocracie . rules to preserve a senatory state , are partly taken from the common axioms , and partly from those that preserve a kingdom . preservation of an oligarchie , by sophisms . rules . . in consultations and assemblies about publick affairs , to order the matter , that all may have liberty to frequent their common assemblies , and councels ; but to impose a fine upon the richer sort , if they omit that duty . on the other side , to pardon the people , if they absent themselves , and to bear with them under pretence , that they may the better intend their occupations , and not be hindered in their trades , and earnings . . in election of magistrates , and officers : to suffer the poorer sort to vow , and abjure the bearing of office , under colour of sparing them , or to enjoyn some great charge , as incident to the office , which the poor cannot bear . but to impose some great fine upon those that be rich , if they refuse to bear office , being elect unto it . . in judiciall matters : in like manner to order , that the people may be absent from publick trials , under pretence of following their businesse . but the richer to be present , and to compel them by fines , to frequent the court. . in warlike exercise and arms : that the poor be not forced to have armor , horse , &c. under pretence of sparing their cost , nor to be drawn from their trades by martiall exercises ; but to compel the richer sort to keep their proportion of armor , horse , &c. by excessive fines , and to exercise themselves in war-like matters , &c. . to have special care of instructing their children in liberal arts , policy , and warlike exercise , and to observe good order and discipline . for as popular states are preserved by the frequency , and liberty of the people , so this government of the richer , is preserved by discipline , and good order of governours . . to provide good store of warlike furniture , especially of horse & horsemen , and of armed men , viz. pike , &c. which are proper to the gentry , as shot , and light furniture are for a popular company . . to put in practise some points of a popular state ; viz. to lade no one man with too much preferment ; to make yearly or half years magistrates , &c. for that the people are pleased with such things , and they are better secured by this means from the rule of one . and if any grow to too much greatness , to abate him by the sophisms fit for this state. . to comit the offices and magistracies , to those that are best able to bear the greatest charges for publick matters , which both rendeth to the conservation of this state , and pleaseth the people , for that they reap some relief , and benefit by it . . to the same end , to contract marriages among themselves ; the rich with the rich , &c. in some things which concern not the p●i●ts , and matters of state , as electing magistrates , making laws , &c. to give an equality , or sometimes a preferment to the common people , and not to do , as in some oligarchies they were wont ; viz. to swear against the people , to suppresse and bridle them but rather contrary , to minister an oath at their admission , that they shall do no wrong to any of the people ; and if any of the richer offer wrong to any of the commons , to shew some example of severe punishment . for other atioms that preserve this state , they are to be borrowed from those other rules that tend to the preserving of a popular , and tyrannicall state ; for the strict kind of oligarchie is kin to a tyranny . preservation of a popular state ; sophisms . rules or axiom . . in publick assemblies and consultations about matters of state , creating of magistrates , publick iustice , & exercise of arms , to practise the contrary to the former kind of government , to wit , an oligarchie . for in popular states , the commons and meaner sort are to be drawn to those assemblies , magistrates , offices , warlike exercise , &c. by mulcts and rewards , and the richer sort are to be spared , and not to be forced by fine , or otherwise , to frequent these exercises . . to make shew of honouring and reverencing the richer men , and not to swear against them , as the manner hath been in some popular state ; but rather to prefer them in all other matters , that concern not the state and publick government . . to elect magistrates from among the commons by lot , or ballating , and not to choose any for their wealths sake . . to take heed , that no man bear office twice , except it be military , where the pay , & salary , &c. is to be reserved in their own hands , to be disposed of by a common councel , &c. and to see that no man be too highly preferred . . that no magistracy be perpetual , but as short as may be , to wit , for a year , half a year , &c. . to compel magistrates , when their time expireth , to give an accompt of their behaviour and government , and that publickly before the commons . . to have publick salaries and allowance of their magistrates , judges , &c. and yearly dividents for the common people , and such as have most need among them . . to make judges of all matters out of all sorts , so they have some aptness to perform that duty . . to provide that publick iudgements and trials be not frequent ; and to that end to inflict great fines and other punishments upon pettifoggers and dilators , as the law of requital , &c. because for the most part the richer and nobler , and not the commons are indited and accused in this common-wealth , which causeth the rich to conspire against the state ; whereby many times the popular state is turned into an oligarchie , or some other government . hereto tendeth that art of civil law , made against accusers and calumniatours : ad senatus-consultum tarpthanum , l. . de calumniatoribus . . in such free states as are popular , and have no revenue , to provide that publick assemblies be not after : because they want salary for pleaders and oratours ; and if they be rich ; yet to be wary , that all the revenue be not divided amongst the commons . for , that this distributions of the common revenue among the multitude , is like a purse or barrel without a bottom . but to provide , that a sufficient part of the revenue be stored up for the publick affairs . . if the number of the poor encrease too much in this kind of state , to send some abroad out of the cities into the next countrey places , and to provide above all , that none do live idely , but be set to their trades . to this end , to provide that the richer men place in their farms and coppie holds , such decayed citizens . . to be well advised what is good for this state , and not to suppose that to be fit for a popular state , that seemeth most popular ; but that which is be for the continuance thereof : and to that end , not to lay into the exchequer or common treasury , such goods as are confiscate , but to store them up as holy and consecrate things , which except it be practised , confiscations , & fines of the common people would be frequent , and so this state would decay by weakening the people . conversion of states in general . conversation of a state , is the declining of the common wealth either to some other form of government , or to his full and last period appointed by god. causes of conversions of states are of two sorts : general and particular . general , ( viz. ) . want of religion : viz. of the true knowledge and worship of god , prescribed in his word ; and notable sins that proceed from thence in prince and people , as in the examples of s●u● , ●lizz●ah , the iewish state ; the four monarchies , and all other . . want of wisdom and good councel to keep the state , the prince , nobles , and people in good temper , and due proportion , according to their several order and degrees . . want of iustice either in administration ( as ill laws , or ill magistrates ) or in the execution , as rewards not given where they should be , or there bestowed where they should not be , or punishments not inflicted where they should be . want of power and sufficiency to maintain and defend it self , viz. of provision , as armor , money , captains , souldiers , &c. execution , when the means or provision is not used , of all used . . particular : to be noted and collected out of the contraries of those rules , that are prescribed for the preservation of the common-wealth . particular causes of conversion of states , are of two sorts . . forreign : by the over greatness of invasion of some forreign kingdom or other state of meaner power , having a part within our own , which are to be prevented by the providence of the chief , and rules of policy for the preserving of every state : this falleth out very seldom for the great difficulty to overthrow a forreign state. . domestick . sedition or open violence by the stronger part . alteration without violence . sedition . sedition is a power of inferiours opposing it self with force of armes against the superiour power , quasi ditio secedens . causes of sedition are of two sorts . . general liberty . riches . when they , that are of equal qualitie in a common-wealth , or do take themselves so to be , are not regarded equally in all or in any of the these three . or , when they are so unequal in quality , or take themselves so to be , are regarded but equally , or with less respect than those that be of less defect in these three things , or in any of them . honour . . in the chief : couetousness or oppression , by the magistrate or higher power , ( viz. ) when the magistrates , especially the chief , encreaseth his substace & revenue beyond measure , either with the publick or ( private calamitie , whereby the governours grow to quarrel among themselves as in oligarchie ) or the other degrees conspite together , and make quarrel against the chief , as in kingdoms : the examples of ●at tyl●r , jack straw , &c. . in the ●●●●f : injury , when great spirits , and of great power , are greatly wronged & dishonoured , or take themselves to be , as coriolanus , cyrus minor , earl of warwick . in which cases the best way is to decide the wrong . . preferment , or want of preferment ; wherein some have over-much , and so wax proud and aspire higher or have more or lesse , than they deserve , as they suppose , and so in envy and disdain , seck innovation on by open faction , so caesar , &c. . some great necessity or calamity ; so xerxes after the foil of his great army . and senacherib after the losse of . in one night . . particular . . envy , when the chief exceed the mediocrity before mentioned , and so provoketh the nobility , and other degrees , to conspire against him ; as brutus cassius , &c. against caesar. . fear , viz. of danger when one or more dispatch the prince by secret practice or force , to prevent his own danger , as artabanus did xerxes . . lust or lechery , as tarquinius , superbus , by brutus ; pisistrati●●ae , by armoaius ; appiu● by virginiu● . . contempt , for vile quality & base behaviour , as sardana●alus , by ●●aces , dionysius the younger by dion . . contumely ; when some great disgrace is done to some of great spirit , who standeth upon his honour and reputation , as caligula by chaereas . . hope of advancement , or some great profit , as mithridates , anobar●anes alteration without violence . causes of alteration without violence are ; . excess of the state ; when by degrees the state groweth from that temper and mediocrity wherein it was , or should have been setled , and exceedeth in power , riches , and absoluteness in his kind , by the ambition & covetousness of the chiefe immoderate taxes , and impositions , &c applying all to his own benefit , without respect of other degrees & so in the end changeth it self into another state or form of government , as a kingdom into a tyrannie , an oligarchy into an aristocracy . . excess , of some one or more in the common-wealth ; viz. when some one or more in a common-wealth grow to an excellency or excesse above the rest , either in honour , wealth , or virtue ; and so by permission and popular favour , are advanced to the sovereignty : by which means , popular states grow into oligarchies ; and oligarchies and aristocracies into monarchies . for which cause the athenians and some other free states , made their laws of ostro●ismos , to banish any for a time that should excell , though it were in virtue , to prevent the alteration of their state ; which because it is an unjust law , 't is better to take heed as the beginning to prevent the means , that none should grow to that heigth and excellency , than to use so sharp and unjust a remedy . finis . a method , how to make use of the book before , in the reading of the storie . david being seventy years of age , was of wisdome , memory , &c. sufficient to govern his kingdom ; . reg. cap. . old age is not ever unfit for publick government . david being of great years , and so having a cold , dry , and impotent body , married with abishag , a fair maid , of the best complexion through the whole realm , to revive his body and prolong his life , . reg. chap. . vers . . example of the like practise in charles the fifth . david being old and impotent of bodie , by the advise of his nobles and phisitians , married a young maid called abishag , to warm and preserve his old bodie . observation . whether david did well in marrying a maid ? and whether it be lawfull for an old decayed and impotent man , to marrie a young woman ; or on the other side , for an old , worn , and decrepite woman , to marrie a young and lustie man. for the affirmative . arg. the end of marriage is society and mutual comfort ; but there may be societie and mutual comfort in a marriage betwixt an old , and young partie ergo 'tis lawful . answ. societie and comfort is a cause & effect of marriage ; but none of the principal ends of marriage : which are : . procreation of children , and so the continuance of mankind . . the avoiding of fornication . as for comfort and societie they may be betwixt man and man , woman and woman , where no marriage is , and therefore no proper ends of marriage . the negative , arg . that conjunction , which hath no respect to the right and proper ends , for which marriage was ordained by god , is no lawfull marriage . but the conjunction betwixt an old impotent , and young partie hath no respect to the right end , for which marriage was ordained by god. therefore it is no lawful marriage . . no contract , wherein the partie contracting , bindeth himself to an impossible condition , or to do that which he cannot do , is good or lawfull . but the contract of marriage by an impotent person with a young partie , bindeth him to an impossible condition to do that which he cannot do , viz. to perform the duties of marriage ; therefore it is unlawfull , for the same cause , the civil law determineth a nullity in these marriages , except the woman know before the infirmitie of the man , in which case she can have no wrong , being a thing done with her own knowledge and consent , because volenti non fit injuria : — in legem julian . de adulteriis leg . si uxor , &c. it provideth further , for the more certainty of the infirmatie , that three years be expired before the dissolution of the marriage , because that men that have been infirm at the first , by reason of sicknesse , or some other accident , afterwards proved to be sufficient : de repudiis leg , in causis . defence for david , in marrying abishag . it was rather a medicine , than a marriage , without any evil , or disordered affection . . it was by the perswasion of his nobles , and physitians . . it was for the publick good , to prolong the life of a worthy prince . . it was with the knowledge and consent of the young maid , who was made acquainted with the kings infirmity , and to what end she was married unto him ; who if she di● it for the common good , and for ●●●●tes sake , having withall the gift of continency , she is to be commended ; if for ambition , or some vain respect , it is her own , and not davids fault . politicall nobilitie . adonijah aspiring to the kingdom . first , took the advantage of davids affection and kindnesse towards him , and make him secure of any ill dealing . secondly , of his age and infirmities , disabling his father as unfit for government . thirdly , blazed his title , and right to the crown . fourthly , got him chariots , hors-men , and foot men , and a guard to make shew of state. fifthly , being a comly , and goodly person , made a popular shew of himself , and his qualities . sixtly , joyned to himself in faction joab , the generall of the army , who was in displeasure for murthering of abner , and amaza , and feared that david would supply b●najah in his place , and so was discontented . and abiather the high priest , that was likewise discontented with david , for the preferment of zadok . seventhly , bad meetings with them , and other his confederates under pretence of a vow , and offering at the fountain of raguel , in the confines of judea . eigthly , made a shew of religion by sacrificing , &c. ninthly , made himself familiar with the nobles and people , and entertained them with feasting . tenthly , drew into his part the chief officers of the court , and servants to the king , by rewards , familiarity , &c. eleventhly , disgraced and abased the competitour , and such as he knew would take part with him , and concealeth his ambition , and purpose from them . twelfthly , had ionathan a favourite of the court , and near about the king to give him intelligent , if any thing were discovered , and moved at the court , whilest himself was in hand about his practise . observations . ways of such as aspire to the kingdom , and marks to discern them . first , they wind into the princes favour by service , officiousnesse , flatterie , &c. to ●lant him in a good o●●●●on of that loyaltie and faithfulnesse , hereby to make him him secure of their practises . . they take advantage of the princes infirmities , age , impotencie , negligence , sex , &c. and work upon that be disabling the prince , and secret detracting of his state , and government . . they blaz their title , and claim to the crown , ( if they have any with their friends and favourites . . they provide them in secret of extraordinarie forces , and furniture for the wars , make much of god souldiers and have a pretence ( if it be espied ) of some other end , as for the kings honour , or service , and to be in readinesse against forreign enemies , &c. they make open shew of their best qualities , and comlinesse of their persons ( which though it be vain as a dumb shew , it is very effectuall to win the liking of the popular sort , which according to the rule of the election of kings , in the b●es common wealth ; think that forma est digna imperare ) activitie , nobilaie , ancestrie , &c. to have their blazers abroad to see out their virtues , and to prepare their friends in every province . . to draw into their part , and make sure unto them of the chief peers , and men of best quality , such as are mightiest and most gracious with the souldiers , and the militarie men , and most subtile and politick , especially such as be ambitious and discontent with the state. . to have meetings for conference under some pretence of some ordinarie matter in some convenient place , not too near , nor too far off but where friends may best resort and assemble unto them without suspition . . to take up a shew , and pretence of religion more than before , and beyond the practise of their former life . they use popular courtesie ( which in a great person is very effectuall ) feasting , liberality , gaming , &c. . to be over liberal , & win to them by gifts familiaritie , &c. the chief officers of the court , and governours of state. . to have some near about the prince , to keep them in credit , and common suspition , if any arise . . to disgrace such as they know to be sure and faithfull to the prince , & present state , or to the competitour , and to bring them into contempt by slander , detraction , and all means they can , and to conceal the designs from them , left they be discovered before they be too ripe . . to have some spie near about the prince , to advertise them if any inckling suspition arise , whilest themselves are practising . note the practises of absolom , sam. . and of cyrus minor in xenophon ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . cap. . politicall prince . david being a most worthy and excellent prince for wisdom , valour , religion , and justice , and so highly deserving of the common-wealth , yet grown into age , grew withall into contempt , & had many both of his nobles , & common people , that fell from him ; first with absolom , then with adoniiab , who affected the kingdom , and rebelled against him : for remedie whereof , he stirred up himself to publick actions , which might shew his vigour & sufficiencie to manage the affairs of his kingdom . . after the victorie against absolom , he forced himself to forbes mourning , and shewed himself to his discontented army , when all were like to fall from him , for his unreasonable sorrow and lamentation for his son. . after the victorie , he caused a general convention to be assembled of the whole nation , to bring him home with honour to jerusalem , which was a renowing , and re-establishing of him , sam. . . . he gave an experiment of his power and authoritie , by deposing a person of great author 〈…〉 estimation , to wit ioab , general captain of the armie , and advancing amasa to his place . he sent kind pssages to ierusalem , and to other chief and head towns , and special men of iudea , his contributes , puting them of their alliance with him with these word , that they were of his own flesh and bloud , with protestarian of his special love and affection towards them , 〈…〉 them with the like kindness 〈…〉 towards him . . he ●●mbled a parliament of his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and took occasion upon the ●●●●g●●ing of his successour , to commend into them he succession of his house , into the con●inuance and maintenance of gods ●●●mor in and ●●● good the established and gave a gr●ve and publick charge to his su●cessour n●w designed , ●uc●ing the manner of his government , and maintaining of religion , . chron. . . . he feared his 〈…〉 and munificence in congesting matter for building of the temple , as gold , silver , brasse , &c. and caused it to be published and mad known to the parliament and whole nation , . chron. . . . he revived the church government , and set it in a right order , assigning to every church officer his place and function . . he suppressed the faction of adonijah , and ordained solomon his successor , kings . . by these means he retained his majestie and authority in his old age , as appeareth by the effect ; for that being bed rid , he suppressed the faction of adonijah , ( which was grown mighty , and was set on foot ) with his bare commandment , and signification of his pleasure , and so be died in peace . finis . sir walter raleigh's instrvctions to his sonne : and to posteritie . corrected , & enlarged according to the authours own copie . london , printed for w. shears junior , and are to be sold at the blue bible in covent-garden . . sir walter raleigh , to his son . chap. i. virtuous persons to be made choice of for friends . there is nothing more becomming any wise man , than to make choice of friends , for by them thou shalt be judged what thou art : let them therefore be wise and virtuous , and none of those that follow thee for gain ; but make election ra● the of thy betters , than thy inferiours , shunning always such as are poore and reedy : for of thou givest twenty gifts , and refuse to do the like but once , all that thou hast done will be lost , and such men will becom thy mortal enemies : take also especial care , that thou never trust any friend or servant , with any matter that may endanget thme estate ; for so shalt thou make thy felt a bond-slave to him that thou t●●●●●● and leave thy self always , to his mercy : and be sure of this , thou shalt never find a friend in thy young years , whose conditions and qualities will please thee after thou comest to more discretion and judgement , and then all thou givest is lost , and all wherein thou shalt trust such a one , will be discovered . such therefore as are thy inferiours , will follow thee but to eate thee out , and when thou leavest to seed them , they wil hate thee ; and such kind of men , if thou preserve thy estate , will always be had : and if thy friends be of better quality than thyself , thou mayest be sure of two things : the first , that they will be more carefull to keep thy counsel , because they have more to loethen thou hast : the second , they will esteem thee for thy self , and not for that which thou doest possesse ; but if thou be subject to any great vanity or ill ( from which i hope god will blesse thee ) then therein trust no man ; for every mans folly ought to be his greatest secret and although i perswade thee to associate thy self with thy betters , or at least with thy peers , yet remember always that thou venter not thy estate with any of those great ones , that shall attempt unlawfull things , for such men labour for themselves , and not for thee ; thou shalt be sure to part with them in the danger , but not in the honour ; and to venture a sure estate in present , in hope of a better in future , is meer madnesse : and great men forget such as have done them service , when they have obtained what they would , and will rather hate thee for saying thou hast been a mean of their advancement , than acknowledge it . i could give thee a thousand examples , and i my self know it , and have tasted it in all the course of my life ; when thou shalt read and observe the stories of all nations , thou shalt find innumerable examples of the like : let thy love therefore be to the best , so long as they do well ; but take heed that thou love god , thy countrey , thy prince , and thine own estate , before all others : for the fancies of men change , and he that loves to day , hateth to morrow ; but let reason be thy school-mistresse , which shall ever guide thee aright . chap. ii. great care to be had in the choosing of a wife . the next and greatest care ought to be in the choice of a wife , and the onely danger therein , is beauty , by which all men in all ages , wise and foolish , have been betrayed . and though i know it vain to the reasons or arguments , to disswade thee from being captivated therewith there being few or none , that ever resisted that witchery ; yet i cannot ●●me to warn thee , as of other things , which may be thy ruin and destruction . for the present time , it is true , that every 〈◊〉 prefers his fantasie in that 〈…〉 before all other worldly des 〈…〉 the care of honour , credit , and safety in respect thereof ; but remember , that though these affections do not last , yet the bond of marriage dureth to the end of thy life ; and therefore better to be borne withall in a mistress , than in a wife , for when thy humour shall change , thou art yet free to chuse again ( if thou give thy self that vain liberty . ) remember secondly , that if thou marry for beauty , thou bindest thy self for all thy life for that , which perchance will neither last nor please thee one year ; and when thou hast it , it will be to thee of no price at all , for the degree dieth when it is attained , & the affection perisheth , when it is satisfied . remember , when thou wert a sucking child , that then thou didst love thy nurse , and that thou wert fond of her , after a while thou didst love thy drienurse , and didst forget the other , after that thou didst also despise her ; so will it be with thee in thy liking in elder years ; and therefore , though thou canst not forbear to love , yet forbear to link , and after a while thou shalt find an alteration in thy self , & see another far more pleasing than the first , second , or third love : yet i wish thee above all the rest , have a care thou dost not marry an uncomely woman for any respect ; for comelinesse in children is riches , if nothing else be left them . and if thou have care for the races of horses , and other beasts , value the shape and comelinesse of thy children , before alliances or riches : have care therefore of both together , for if thou have a fair wife , and a poor one , if thine own estate be not great , assure thy self that love abideth not with want ; for she is thy companion of plenty and honour , for i never yet knew a poor woman exceeding fair , that was not made dishonest by one or other in the end . this b●●●sh●●● taught her son s●lomon ; favour is de●●●tfull , and beauty is ●●an t●● : she saith further , that a wise woman ove●seeth the ways of our houshold , and cat●th use the bread of ●●lenesse have therefore ever more care , that thou be beloved of thy wife , rather than thy self besotted on her ; and thou shalt judge of her love by these two observations : first , if thou perceive she have care of thy estate , and exercise her self therein ; the other , if she study to please thee , and be sweet unto thee in conversation , without thy instruction , for love needs no teaching , nor precept . on the other side , be not sower or stern to thy wife , for cruelty engendereth no other thing than hatred : let her have equall part of thy estate whilest thou livest , it thou find her sparing and honest ; but what thou givest after thy death , remember that thou givest it to a stranger , and most times to an enemy , for he that shall marry thy wife , will despise thee , thy memory , and thine , and shall possesse the quiet of thy labours , the fruit which thou hast planted , enjoy thy love , and spend with joy and ease what thou hast spared , and gotten with care and travel : yet always remember that thou leave not thy wife to be a shame unto thee after thou art dead , but that she may live according to thy estate ; especially , if thou hast few children , and them provided for . but howsoever it be , or whatsoever thou find , leave thy wife no more than of necessity thou must , but onely during her widowhood ; for if she love again , let her not enjoy her second love in the same bed wherein she loved thee , nor fl●e to future pleasures with those feathers which death hath pulled from thy wings ; but leave thy estate to thy house and children , in which thou livest upon earth whilest it lasteth . to conclude , wives were ordained to continue the generation of men , not to transferre them , and diminish them , either in continuance or ability ; and therfore thy house and estate , which liueth in thy son , and not in thy wife , is to be preferred . let thy time of marriage be in thy young and strong years ; for believe it , ever the young wife betrayeth the old husband , and she that had thee not in thy flower , will despise thee in thy fall , and thou shalt be unto her but a captivity and sorrow . thy best time will be towards thirty , for as the younger times are unfit , either to chuse or to govern a wife and family ; so if thou stay long , thou shalt hardly see the education of thy children , which being left to strangers , are in effect lost , and better were it to be unborn , than ill bred ; for thereby thy posterity shall either perish , or remain a shame to thy name and family . furthermore , if it be late ere thou take a wife , thou shalt spend the prime and summer of thy life with harlots , destroy thy health , impoverish thy estate , and endanger thy life ; and be sure of this , that how many mistresses soever thou hast , so many enemies thou shalt purchase to thy self ; for there never was any such affection , which ended not in hatred or disdain . remember the saying of solomon , there is a way which seemeth right to a man , but the issues thereof are the wages of death ; for howsoever a lewd woman please thee for a time , thou wilt hate her in the end , and she will study to destroy thee . if thou canst not abstain from them in thy vain and unbridled times , yet remember that thou sowest on the lands & dost mingle the vital bloud with corruption , and purchasest diseases , repentance , and hatred onely . bestow therefore thy youth so , that thou mayest have comfort to remember it , when it hath forsaken thee and not sigh and grieve at the account thereof : whilest thou art young thou wile think it will never have an end ; but behold , the longest day hath his evening , and that thou shalt enjoy it but once , that it never turns again , use it therefore as the spring time , which soon departeth , and wherein thou oughtest to plant , and sow all provisions for a long and happy life . chap. iii. wisest men have been abused by flatterers . take care thou be not made a fool , by flatterers , for even the wisest men are abused by these . know therefore , that flatterers are the worst kind of traitours ; for they will strengthen thy imperfections , encourage thee in all evil , correct thee in nothing , but so shadow and paint all thy vices , and follies , as thou shalt never , by their will , discern evil from good , or vice from virtue . and because all men are apt to flatter themselves , to entertain the additions of other mens praises is most perillous . do not therefore praise thy self , except thou wile be counted a vain glorious fool , neither take delight in the praises of other men except thou deserve it , and receive it from such as are worthy and honest , and will withall warn thee of thy faults ; for flatterers have never any virtue , they are ever base , creeping , cowardly persons . a flatterer is said to be a beast that biteth smiling , it is said by isaiah in this manner : my people , they that praise thee seduce thee , and disorder th● paths of thy feet ; and david desired god to cut out the tongue of a flatterer . but it is hard to know them from friends , so are they obsequious and full of protestations ; for as a wolf resembles a dog , so doth a flatterer a friend . a flatterer is compared to an ape , who because she cannot defend the house like a dog , labour as an ox , or bear burdens as a horse , doth therefore yee play tricks , and prouoke laughter : thou mayest be sure that he that will in private tell thee thy faults , is thy friend , for he adventures thy mislike , and doth hazard thy hatred ; for there are few men that can endure it , every man for the most part delighting in self-praise , which is one of the most uniuersall follies which bewitcheth mankind . chap. iv. private quarrels to be avoided . be carefull to avoid publick disputations at feast , or at tables , among cholerick or quarrelsom persons ; and eschew evermore to be acquainted or familiar with ruffians , for thou shalt be in as much danger in contending with a brawler in a private quarrel , as in a battel , wherein thou mayest get honour to thy self and safety to thy prince and countrey ; but if thou be once engaged , carry thy self bravely , that they may fear thee after . to shun therefore private fight , be well advised in thy words and behaviour , for honour and shame is in the talk , and the tongue of a man causeth him to fall . iest not openly at those that are simple , but remember how much thou art bound to god , who hath made thee wiser . defame not any woman publickly , though thou know her to be evil ; for those that are faulty cannot endure to be taxed but will seek to be avenged of thee , and those that are not guilty cannot endure unjust reproch . and as there is nothing more shamefull and dishonest , than to do wrong , so truth it self cutteth his throat that carrieth her publikly in every place . remember the divine , saying , he that keepeth his mouth , keepeth his life . do therefore right to all men where it may profit them , and thou shalt thereby get much love , and forbear to speak evil things of men , though it be tru● ( if thou be not constrained ) and thereby thou shalt avoid malice and revenge . do not accuse any man of any crime , if it be not to save thy self , thy prince , or countrey , for there is nothing more dishonourable ( next to treason it self ) than to be an accuser notwithstanding i would not have thee for any respect loose thy reputation , or endure publick disgrace , for better it were not to live , than to live a coward , if the offence proceed not from thy selfe ; if it do , it shall be better to compound it upon good terms , than to hazard thy self ; for if thou overcome , thou art vnder the cruelty of the law , if thou art overcome , thou art dead or dishonoured . if thou therefore contend , or discourse in argument ; let it be with wise and sober men , of whom thou mayest learn by reasoning , and not with ignorant persons , for thou shalt thereby in trust those that will not thank thee , and utter , what they have learned from thee , for their own . but if thou know more that other men , utter it when it may do thee honour , and not in assemblies of ignorant and common persons . speaking much also , is a sign of vanity ; for he that is lavish in words , is a niggard in deeds ; and as solomon saith , the mouth of a wise men is in his heart , the heart of a fool is in his mouth , because what he knoweth or thinketh , he uttereth : and by thy words and discourses , men will judge thee . for as socrates saith , such as thy words are , such will thy affections be esteemed ; and such will thy deeds as thy a●●ct●●●s , and such thy life as thy deeds . therefore be advised what thou dost discourse of , what thou maintainest ; whether touching religion , state , or vanity ; for it thou erie in the first , thou shalt be accounted profane ; if in the second , dangerous ; if in the third , indiscreet and foolish : he that cannot refrain from much speaking , is like a citie without walls , and lesse pains in the world a man cannot take , than to hold his tongue ; therefore , if thou observest this rule in all assemblies , thou shalt seldom erre ; restrain thy choller , hearken much , and speak little ; for the tongue is the instrument of the greatest good and greatest evil that is done in the world . according to solomon , life and death are in the power of the tongue : and as euripide , truly affirmeth , every unbrialed tongue , in the end shall find it self unfortunate ; for in all that ever i observed in the course of worldly things , i ever found that mens fortunes are oftner made by their tongues than by their virtues , and more mens fortunes overthrown thereby also , than by their vices . and to conclude , all quarrels , mischief , hatred , and destruction , ariseth from unadvised speech , and in much speech there are many errours , out of which thy enemies shall ever take the most dangerous advantage . and as thou shalt be happy , if thou thy self observe these things , so shall it be most profitable for thee to avoid their companies that erre in that kind , and not to hearken to tale-bearers , to inquisitive persons , and such as busie themselves with other mens estates , that creep into houses as spies , to learn news which concerns them not ; for assure thy self such persons are most base and unworthy , and i never knew any of them prosper , or respected amongst worthy or wise men . take heed also that thou be not found a liar ; for a lying spirit is hatefull both to god and man. a liar is commonly a coward ; for he dares not avow truth . a liar is trusted of no man he can have no credit , neither in publick nor private ; and if there were no more arguments than thee , know that our lord in s. john saith that it is a vice proper to satan , lying being opposite to the nature of god , which consisteth in truth ; and the gain of lying is nothing else , but not to be trusted of any , nor to be believed when we say the truth . it is said in the proverbs , that god hateth false lips ; and he that speaketh lips , shall perish . thus thou mayest see and find in all the books of god , how odious and contrary to god a liar is ; and for the world , believe it , that it never did any man good ( except in the extremity of saving life ; ) for a liar is of a base , unworthy , and cowardly spirit . chap. v. three rules to be observed for the preservation of a mans estate . amongst all other things of the world , take care of thy estate , which thou shalt ever preserve , if thou observe three things ; first , that thou know what thou hast , what every thing is worth that thou hast , and to see that thou art not wasted by thy servants and officers . the second is , that thou never spend any thing before thou have it ; for borrowing is the canker and death of every mans estate . the third is , that thou suffer not thy self to be wounded for other mens faults , and scourged for other mens offences ; which is , to be surety for another ; for thereby millions of men have been beggered and destroyed , paying the reckoning of other mens riot , and the charge of other mens folly and prodigality ; if thou smart , smart for thine own sins , and above all things , be not made an ass to carry the burdens of other men : if any friend desire thee to be his surety , give him a patt of what thou hast to spare , if he press thee farther , he is not thy friend at all , for friendship rather chooseth harm to it self , than offereth it : if thou be bound for a stranger , thou art a fool ; if for a merchant , thou puttest thy estate to learn to swim : if for a church-man , he hath no inheritance : if for a lawyer , he will find an evasion by a syllable or word , to abuse thee : if for a poor man , thou must pay it thy self : if for a rich man , it need not : therefore from suretiship , as from a man slayer , or enchanter , bless thy self ; for the best profit and return wil be this , that if thou force him for whom thou art bound , to pay it himself , he will become thy enemy , if thou use to pay it thy self , thou wilt be a beggar ; and believe thy father in this , and print it in thy thought , that what virtue soever thou hast be it never so manifold , if thou be poor withall , thou , and thy qualities shall be despised : besides , poverty is oft times sent as a curse of god , it is a shame amongst men , an imprisonment of the mind , a vexation of every worthy spirit ; thou shalt neither help thy self nor others , thou shalt drown thee in all thy virtues , having no means to shew them , thou shalt be a burthen , and an eye-sore to thy friends , every man will fear thy company , thou shalt be driven basely to beg , and depend on others , to flatter unworthy men , to make dishonest shifts ; and to conclude , poverty provokes a man to do infamous and detested deeds : let no vanity therefore , or perswasion draw thee to that worst of wordly miseries . if thou be rich , it will give thee pleasure in health , comfort in sickness , keep thy mind and body free , save thee from many perils , relieve thee in thy elder years , believe the poor , and thy honest friends , and give means to thy posterity to live , and defend themselves , and thine own fame , where it is said in the proverbs , that he shall be sore vexed that is surety for a stranger , and he that hateth suretiship is sure . it is further said , the poor is hated even of his own neighbour , but the rich have many friends . lend not to him that is mightier than thy self , for if thou lendest him , count it but lost ; be not surety above thy power , for if thou be surety , think to pay it . chap. vi. what sort of servants are fittest to be entertained . let thy servants be such as thou mayest command , and entertain none about thee but yeomen , to whom thou givest wages ; for those that will serve thee without thy hire , will cost thee treble as much as they that know thy fare : if thou trust any servant with thy purse , be sure thou take his account ere thou sleep ; for if thou put it off , thou wilt then afterwards , for tediousness , neglect it . i my self have thereby lost more than i am worth . and whatsoever thy servant gaineth thereby , he will never thank thee , but laugh thy simplicity to scorn ; and besides , t is the way to make thy servants thieves , which else would be honest . chap. vii . brave rags wear soonest out of fashion . exceed not in the humour of rags and braverie ; for these will soon wear out of fashion : but money in thy purse will ever be in fashion ; and no man is esteemed for gay garments , but by fools and women . chap. viii . riches not to be sought by evil means . on the other side , take heed that thou seek not riches basely , nor attain them by evil means , destroy no man for his wealth , nor take any thing from the poor ; for the crie and complaint thereof will pierce the heavens . and it is most detestable before god , and most dishonourable before worthy men , to wrest any thing from the needy and labouring soul. god will never prosper thee in ought , if thou offend therein : but use thy poor neighbours and tenants well , pine not them and their children , to adde superfluity and needlesse expences to thy self . he that hath pitie on another mans sorrow , shall be free from it himself ; and he that delighteth ●n , and scorneth the misery of another , shall one time or other fall into it himself . remember this precept , he that hath mercy on the poor , tenact unto the lord , and the lord will recom 〈…〉 wh●●● he h●●h given . i do not understand those for poor , which are vagabonds and beggers , but those that labour to live , such as are old and cannot travell , such poor widows and fatherlesse children as are ordered to be relieved , and the poor tenants that travell to pay their rents , and are driven to poverty by mischance , and not by riot or carelesse expences ; on such have thou compassion , and god will blesse thee for it . make not the hungry soul sorrowfull , defer not thy gift to the needy , for if he curse thee in the bitternesse of his soul , his prayer shall be heard of him that made him . chap. ix . what inconveniences happen to such as delight in wine . take especiall care that thou delight not in wine , for there never was any man that came to honour or preferment that loved it ; for it transformeth a man into a beast , decayeth health , poisoneth the breath , destroyeth naturall heat , brings a mans stomach to an artificiall heat , deformeth the face , rotteth the teeth , and to conclude , maketh a man contemptible , soon old , and despised of all wise and worthy men ; hated in thy servants , in thy self and companions ; for it is a bewitching and infectious vice , and remember my words , that it were better for a man to be subject to any vice , than to it , for all other vanities and sins are recovered , but a drunkard will never shake off the delight of beastlinesse ; for the longer it possesseth a man , the more he will delight in it , and the elder he groweth , the more he shall be subject to it ; for it dulleth the spirits , and destroyeth the body , as ivie doth the old tree ; or as the worm that engendereth in the kernel of the nut. take heed therefore that such a curelesse canker possesse not thy youth , nor such a beastly infection thy old age ; for then shall all thy life be but as the life of a beast , and after thy death , thou shalt only leave a shamefull infamy to thy posterity , who shall study to forget that such a one was their father . anacharsis saith , the first draught serveth for health , the second for pleasure , the third for shame , the sourth for madnesse ; but in youth there is not so much as one draught permitted ; for it putteth fire to fire ; and wasteth the naturall heat and seed of generation . and therefore , except thou desire to hasten thine end , take this for a generall rule , that thou never add any artificiall heat to thy body by wine or spice , untill thou find that time hath decayed thy naturall heat , and the sooner thou beginne ● to help nature , the sooner she will forsake thee , and trust altogether to art : who have misfortune , saith solomon who have sorrow and grief , who have trouble wihout fighting , stripes without cause , and faintness of ey●● ? even they that sit or wine , and drain themselves to empty ca●s : plines saith , wine maketh the hand quivering , the eyes waterie , the night unquiet , lewd dreams , a stinking breath in the morning , and an utter forgetfulness of all things . whosoever loveth wine , shall not be trusted of any man ; for he cannot keep a secret . wine maketh a man not onely a beast , but a mad man ; and if thou love it , thy own wife , thy children , and thy friends will despise thee . in drink men care not what they say , what offence they give , they forget comliness , commit disorders ; and to conclude , offend all virtuous and honest company , and god most of all ; to whom we daily pray for health , and a life free from pain : and yer by drunkenness , and gluttony , ( which is the drunkenness of feeding ) we draw on , saith hesiod , a swift , hasty , untimely , cruel , and an infamous old age . and s. augustine describeth drunkenness in this manner : ebrietas est blandus doemon , dulce venenum suave peccatum ; quam , qui habet , seipsum non habet ; quam qui facit , peccatum non facit , sed ipsi est peccatum . drunkenness is a flattering devil , a sweet poison , a plea an t sin ; which whosoever hath , hath not himself , which whosoever doth commit , doth not commit sin , but he himself is wholly sin . innocentius saith , quid turpius ebrioso cut sator in ore , tremor in corpore , qui promit stulta , promit occul●a , cui mens alienatur , facies transformatur , nullum secretum ubi regnat ebrie●as , & quid non aliud designat malum , foecundi calices quem non fecere disertum ? what is filthier than a drunken man to whom there is stink in the mouth , trembling in the bodie ; which uttereth foolish things , and revealeth secret things ; whose mind is alienate , and face transformed ? whom have not plentifull cups made eloquent and talking ? when diogenes saw a house to be sold , whereof the owner was given to drink , i thought at the last , quoth diogenes , he would spue out a whole house ; sciebam inquit , quod domus tandem evomeret . chap. x. let god be thy protectour and directour in all thy actions . now for the world , i know it too well , to perswade thee to dive into the practices thereof , rather stand upon thine own guard against all that tempt thee thereunto , or may practise upon thee in thy conscience , thy reputation , or thy purse ; resolve that no man is wise or safe , but he that is honest . serve god , let him be the authour of all thy actions , commend all thy endeavours to him that must either wither or prosper them , please him with prayer , lest if he frown , ●e confound all thy fortunes and labours , like the drops of rain on the sandy ground : let my experienced advice , and fatherly instructions , sink deep into thy heart . so god direct thee in all his ways , and fill thy heart with his grace . finis . the dutifull advice of a loving son to his aged father . sir , i humbly beseech you , both in respect of the honour of god , your duty to his church , and the comfort of your own soul , that you seriously consider in what tearms you stand ; and weigh your self in a christian ballance ; taking for your counterpoise the judgements of god : take heed in time that the word tekel , written of old against belshazzar , and interpreted by daniel , be not verified in you , whose exposition was , you have been poized in the scale , and found of too light weight . remember that you are now in the waining , and the date of your pilgrimage well nigh expired , and now that it behoveth you to look towards your countrey , your forces languisheth , your senses impair , your body droops , and on every side the ruinous cottage of your faint and feeble flesh , threateneth the fall : and having so many harbirgers of death to premonish you of your end , how can you but prepare for so dreadfull a stranger . the young man may die quickly , but the old man cannot live long : the young mans life by casualty may be abridged , but the old mans by no physick can be long adjourned , and therefore if green years should sometimes think of the grave the thoughts of old age should continually dwell in the same . the prerogative of infancy is innocency ; of child-hood , reverence ; of man-hood , maturity ; and of old age , wisdom . and seeing then that the chiefest properties of wisdom , are to be mindfull of things past , carefull for things present , and provident for things to come : use now the priviledge of natures talent , to the benefit of your own soul , and procure hereafter to be wise in well doing , and watchfull in the fore-sight of future harms . to serve the world you are now unable , and though you were able , yet you have little cause to be willing , seeing that it never gave you but an unhappy welcome , a hurtfull entertainment , and now doth abandon you with an unfortunate fare-well . you have long sowed in a field of flint , which could bring nothing forth but a crop of cares , and afflictions of spirit , rewarding your labours with remorse , and affording for your gain , eternal danger . it is now more than a seasonable time to alter the course of so unthriving a husbandry , and to enter into the efild of gods church , in which , sowing the seed of repentant sorrow , and watering them with the tears of humble contrition , you may hereafter reap a more beneficial harvest , and gather the fruits of everlasting comfort remember , i pray you , that your spring is spent , your summer over-past , you are now arrived at the fall of the leaf ; yea , and winter colours have long since stained your hoary head . be not carelesse ( saith saint augustine ) though our loving lord bear long with offenders ; for the longer he stays , not finding amendment , the sorer he will scourge when be comes to iudgement : and his patience in so long forbearing , is only to lend us respite to repent , and not any wise to enlarge us leisure to sin . he that is tossed with variety of storms , and cannot come to his desired port , maketh not much way , but is much turmoyled . so , he that hath passed many years , and purchased little profit , hath a long being , but a short life : for , life is more to be measured by well doing , than by number of years ; seeing that most men by many days do but procure meny deaths , and others in short space attain to the life of infinite ages ; what is the body without the soul , but a corrupt carkasse ? and what is the soul without god , but a sepulchre of sin ? if god be the way , the life , and the truth , he that goeth without him , strayeth ; and he that liveth without him , dieth ; and he that is not taught by him , erreth . well ( saith saint augustine ) god is our true and chiefest life , from whom to revolt , is to fall ; to whom to return , is to rise ; and in whom to stay , is to stand sure . god is he , from whom to depart , is to die ; to whom to repair , is to revive ; and in whom to dwell , is life for ever . be not then of the number of those that begin not to live , till they be ready to die : and then after a foes desert , come to crave of god a friends entertainment . some there be that think to snatch heaven in a moment , which the best can scarce attain unto in the maintainance of many years ; and when they have glutted themselves with worldly delights , would jump from di●e diet to lazarus crown , from the service of satan , to the solace of a saint . but be you well assured , that god is not so penurious of friends , as to hold himself and his kingdom saleable for the refuse and reversions of their lives , who have sacrificed the principall thereof to his enemies , and their own bruitish lust ; then onely ceasing to offend , when the ability of offending is taken from them . true it is , that a thief may be saved upon the crosse and mercy found at the last gasp : but w●l ( saith s. augustine ) though it be possible , yet it is scarce credible , that he in death should find favour , whose whole life deserved death ; and that the repentance should be more excepted , that more for fear of hell , and love of himself , than for the love of god , and loathsomnesse of sin , crieth for mercy . wherefore , good sir , make no longer delays ; but being so near the breaking up of your mortall house , take time before extremity , to pacifie gods anger . though you suffer the bud to be blasted , though you permitted the fruits to be perished , and the leaves to drie up ; yea , though you let the boughs to wither , and the body of your tree to grow to decay , yet ( alas ) keep life in the root , for fear left the whole tree become fewel for hell fire ; for surely where the tree falleth , there it shall lie , whether towards the south or to the north , to heaven , or to hell ; and such sap as it bringeth forth , such fruit shall it ever bear . death hath alreadie filed from you the better part of your natural forces , and left you now to be lees , and remissalls of your wearyish and dying days . the remainder whereof , as it cannot be long , so doth it warn you speedily to ransom your former losses ; for what is age , but the calends of death ? & what importeth your present weakness , but an earnest of your approaching dissolution ? you are now imbarked in your finall voyage , and not far from the stint and period of your course . be not therefore unprovided of such appurtenances as are behooveful in so perplexed and perrilous a journey ; death it self is very fearfull , but much more terrible in respect of the judgement it summoneth us unto . if you were now laid upon departing bed , burthened with the heavie load of your former trespasses , and gored with the sting and prick of a festered conscience ; if you felt the cramp of death wresting your heart-strings , and ready to make the ruefull divorce between body and soul : if you lay panting for breath , and swimming in a cold and pale sweat , wearied with strugling against your deadly pangs , o what would you give for an hours repentance ; at what rate would you value a days contrition ? then worlds would be worth less in respect of a little respite , a short truce would seem more precious then the treasuries of an empire , nothing would be so much esteemed as a short time of truce , which now by days , and months , and years , is most lavishly misspent . oh how deeply would it wound your woefull heart when looking back into your former life , you considered many hainous and horrible offences committed , many pious works , and godly deeds omitted , and neither of both repented , your service to god promised , and not performed . oh how unconsolably were your case , your friends being fled , your senses affrighted , your thoughts amazed , your memory decayed , and your whole mind agast , and no part able to perform what it should ; but onely your guilty conscience pestered with sin , that would continually upbraid you with many bitter accusations . oh what would you think then , being stopped out of this mortall weed , and turned out both of service and house-room of this wicked world , you are forced to enter into uncouth and strange paths , and with unknown and ugly company , to be convented before a most severe judge , carrying in your conscience your inditement , written in a perfect register of all your misdeeds , when you shall fee him prepared to give sentence upon you , against whom you have so often transgressed , and the same to be your umpire , whom by so many offences you have made your enemie , when not onely the devil , but even the angels would plead against you and your own self , in despight of your self , be your own most sharp appeacher . oh what would you do in these dreadfull exigents , when you saw the ghastly dragon , and huge gulph of hell , breaking out with most fearfull flames , when you heard the weeping , wailing , and gnashing of teeth ; the rage of those hellish monsters , the horrour of the place , the terr●●● of the company , and the eternity of all those torments . would you then think them wise that mould delay into weighty matters , and idlely play away the time allotted , to prevent these intolerable calamities ? would you then count it secure , to nurse ●n your own bosom so many serpents as sins ? and to foster in your soul so many malicious accusers , as mortall and horrible offences ? would you not think one life too little to repent in for so many , and so great iniquities , every one whereof were enough to throw you into those unspeakable and intolerable torments . and why then ( alas ! ) do you not at the least devote that small remnant , and surplusage of those your later days , procuring to make an atonement with god , and to free your soul and conscience from that corruption , which by your fall hath crept into it . those very eyes that behold , and read this discourse , those very ears that are attentive to hear it , and that very understanding that considereth and conceiveth it , shall be cited as certain witnesses of these rehearsed things . in your own body shall you experience these deadly agonies , and in your soul shall you feelingly find these terrible fears ; yea , and your present estate , is in danger of the deepest harms , if you do not the sooner recover your self into that fold and family of gods faithfull servants . what have you gotten by being so long a customer to the world , but false ware , suitable to the shop of such a merchant , whose traffick is toyl , whose wealth is trash , and whose gain is miserie ? what interest have you reaped , that might equall your detriment in grace and virtue ? or what could you find in the vale of tears , that was answerable to the favour of god , with losse whereof , you were contented to but it ? you cannot now be inveigled with the passions of youth , which making a partiality of things , sets no distance between counterfeit and currant , for these are now worn out of force , by tract of time are fallen into reproof , by triall of their folly . oh let not the crazie cowardnesse of flesh and bloud , daunt the prowesse of an intelligent person , who by his wisdom cannot but discern how much more cause there is , and how much more needfull it is to serve god , than this wicked world . but if it be the ungrounded presumption of the mercy of god , and the hope of his assistance at the last plunge ( which indeed is the ordinary lure of the devil ) to reclaim sinners from the pursuit of repentance . alas , that is too palpable a collusion to mislead a found and serviceable man , howsoever it may prevail with sick and ill-affected judgements : who would rely upon eternall affairs , upon the gliding slipperinesse , and running streams of our uncertain life ? who , but one of distempered wits , would offer fraud to the decipherer of all thoughts ; with whom dissemble we may to our cost , but to deceive him , is impossible . shall we esteem it cunning to rob the time from him , and bestow it on his enemies , who keepeth tale of the least minutes , and will examine in the end how every moment hath been imployed . it is a preposterous kind of policie , in any wise conceit to fight against god , till our weapons be blunted , our forces consumed , our limbs impotent , and our best time spent ; and then when we fall for faintness , and have fought our selves almost dead , to presume on his mercy . oh! no , no , the wounds of his most sacred body , so often rubbed , and renewed by our sins and every part and parcel of our bodies so divers , and sundry ways abused , will be then as so many whet-stones and incentives , to edge and exasperate his most just revenge against us . it is a strange piece of art , and a very exorb tant course , when the ship is sound , the pylot well , the marriners strong , the gale favourable , & the sea calm ; to ly idlely at the road , burning so seasonable weather : and when the ship leaketh , the pylot sick , the marriners faint , the storms boysterous , and the seas a turmoyl of outragious surges , then to launch forth , ( hoise up sail ) and set out for a long voyage into a far countrey . yet such is the skill of these evening repenters , who though in the soundness of their health , and perfect use of their reason , they cannot resolve to cut the cables , and weigh the anchour that with-holds them from god. neverthelesse , they feed themselves with a strong perswasion , that when they are astonied , their wits distracted , the understanding dusked , and the bodies and souls wracked , and tormented with the throbs and gripes of a mortall sicknesse ; then forsooth they will begin to think of their weightiest matters , and become sudden saints , when they are scarce able to behave themselves like reasonable creatures . no , no , if neither the canon , civil , nor the common law will allow that man ( perished in judgement ) should make any testament of his temporall substance ; how can he that is animated with inward garboyls of an unsetled conscience , distrained with the wringing fits of his dying flesh , maimed in all his ability , and circled in on every side with many and strange incumberances , be thought of due discretion to dispose or his chiefest jewell , which is his soul ? and to dispatch the whole manage of all eternity , and of the treasures of heaven , in so short of spurt ? no no , they that will loyter in seed-time , and begin to sow when others reap ; they that will riot out their health , and beg●n to cast their accounts when they are scarce able to speak ; they that will slumber out the day , and enter their journey when the light doth fail them ; let them blame their own folly , if they die in debt , and be eternall beggers , and fall head-long into the lap of endlesse perdition . let such listen to s. cyprian's lesson ; let , saith he , the grievousnesse of our sore be the measure of our sorrow ; let a deep wound hive a deep and diligent cure ; let no mans contrition be lesse than his crime . finis . sir raleigh's sceptick . the sceptick doth neither affirm , neither deny any position : but doubteth of it , and opposeth his reasons against that which is affirmed , or denied , to justifie his not-consenting . his first reason ariseth , from the consideration of the great difference amongst living creatures , both in the matter and manner of their generations , and the several constitutions of their bodies . some living creatures are by copulation , and some without it : & that either by fire , as crickets in fornaces ; or corrupt water , as gnats ; or slime , as frogs ; or dirt , as worms ; or herbs , as canker-worms some of ashes , as beetles ; some of trees , as the worms psen●● bred in the wild fig-tree ; some of living creatures putrified , as bees of bulls , and wasps of horses . by copulation many creatures are brought forth alive , as man ; some in the egg , as birds some in an unshapen piece of flesh , as bears . these great differences cannot but cause a divers and contrary temperament , and qualitie in those creatures , and consequently , a great diversity in their phantasie and conceit ; so that they apprehend one and the same object , yet they must do it after a divers manner : for is it not absurd to affirm , that creatures differ so much in temperature , and yet agree in conceit concerning one and the same object ? but this will more plainly appear , if the instruments of sense in the body be observed : for we shall find , that as these instruments are affected and disposed , so doth the imagination conceit that which by them is connexed unto it . that very object which seemeth unto us white , unto them which have the iaundise seemeth pale , and red unto those whose eyes are bloud-shot . forsomuch then as living creatures have some white , some pale , some red eyes why should not one and the same object seem to some white , to some red , to some pale ? if a man rub his 〈◊〉 , the figure of that which he beholdeth seemeth long or narrow ; is it then not likely , that those creatures which have a long and slanting pupill of the eye , as goats , foxes , cats , &c. do convey the fashion of that which they behold under another form to the imagination , than those that have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 pupils do ? who knoweth not , that a glasse presenteth the outward , 〈…〉 , or greater according to the making of the glasse ? if it be hollow , the object seemeth smaller than it is , if the glasse be crooked , then the object seemeth long and narrow . and glasses there be , which present the head of him that looketh in them , downwards , and the heels upwards . now then , seeing the eye , which is the instrument of sight , in some living creatures is more outward , in some more hollow , in some plain , in some greater , in some lesse ; it is very probable , that fishes man , lions , and dogs , whose eyes so much differ , do not conceive the self same object after the same manner , but diversly , according to the diversitie of the eye , which offereth it unto the phantasie . the same reason holdeth in touching ; for seemeth it not absurd to think , that those creatures which are covered with shels , those which are covered with scales , those which are covered with hairs , and those which are smooth , should all be alike sensible in touching ? and every one of them conveigh the image , or q●ali●ie of the same object which they touch in the very same degree of heat or cold , of driness or moisture , roughness or smoothness , unto the imagination ? so might 't be shewed in hearing : for how can we think that the ear which hath a narrow passage , & the ear which hath an open & wide passage , do receive the same sound in the same degree ? or that the ear whose inside is full of hair , doth hear in the same just measure , that the ear doth whose inside is smooth ? since experience sheweth , that if we stop , or half stop our ears , the sound cometh not to us in the same manner & degree , that it doth if our ears be open . the like may be thought of smelling : for man himself abounding with fleagm , is otherwise affected in smelling , than he is , if the pu●s about the head be f●ll of bloud ; and many things afford a delightfull smell to some living creatures , which smel to other living creatures seemeth not to be so . in the tast the same reason appeareth ; for to a rough and dri-tongue , that everything seemeth bitter ( as in an aga ) which to the moister tongue seemeth not to be so , ●ivers creatures then having tongues drier , or moister , according to their severall temperatures , when they tast the same thing , must needs conceit it to be according as the instrument of their tast is affected , either bitter , or sweet , &c. for even as the hand in the striking of the harp , though the stroak be one , yet causeth a found , sometimes high , sometimes base , according to the quality of the string that is strucken : even so one and the same outward object is diversly judged of , and conceited , according to the several and divers qualities of the instrument of sense , which conveieth it to the imagination . oyntment is pleasing to man ; but beetles and bees cannot abide t. oyl to man is profitable ; but it killeth bees and wasps . cicuta feedeth quails , & henbane sows ; but both of these hurt man. if a man eat ants he is sick ; but the bear being sick , recovereth by eating them . if then one and the very same thing to the red eye seem red , to another pale , and white to another : if one and the same thing , seem not hot or cold , drie or moist , in the same degree to the severall creatures which touch it : if one and the self-same sound seem more thrill to that creature which hath a narrow ear , and more base to him that hath an open ear : if the same thing , at the same time , seem to afford a pleasant and displeasant smell to divers and severall creatures : if that seem bitter in tast to one , which to another seemeth sweet , that to one hurtfull , which to another seemeth healthfull : i may report how these things appear divers to severall creatures , and seem to produce divers effects . but what they are in their own nature , whether red or white , bitter or sweet , healthfull or hurtfull , i cannot tell . for why should i presume to profer my conceit and imagination , in affirming that a thing is thus , or thus , in its own nature , because it seemeth to me to be so , before the conceit of other living creatures , who may as well think it to be otherwise in each one nature , because it appeareth otherwise to them than it doth to me ? they are living creatures as well as i : why then should i condemn their conceit and phantasie , concerning any thing , more than they may mine ? they may be in the truth and i in errour , as well as i in truth , and they err . if my conceit must be believed before theirs , great reason that it be proved to be truer than theirs . and this proof must be either by demonstration , or without it . without it none will believe . certainly , if by demonstration , then this demonstration must seem to be true , or not seem to be true . if it seem to be true , then will it be a question , whether it be so indeed as it seemeth to be ; and to alleadge that for a certain proof , which is uncertain and questionable , seemeth absurd . if it be said , that the imagination of man judgeth riuer of outward object , than the imagination of other living creatures doth , and therefore to be credited above others , ( besides that which is already said , ) this is easily refuted by comparing of man with other creatures . it is confessed , the dog excelleth man in smell , and in hearing : and whereas there is said to be a two-fold discourse , one of the mind , another of the tongue and that of the mind is said to be exercised in chasing that which is convenient , and refusing that which is hurtfull in knowledge , justice , and thankfulnesse : this creature chuseth his food , refuseth the whip , fawneth on his master , defer dath his house , revengeth himself of these strangers that hurt him . and 〈◊〉 mentioneth are●● , the dog of u●y●ses , who knew his master , having been from home so many years , that at his return , all the people of his house had forgot him . this creature , saith chr●sipp●● , is not void of logick : for when in following any beast , he cometh to three severall ways , he smelleth to the one , and then to the second ; and if he find that the beast which he pursueth he not fled one of these ways , he presently without smelling any further to it , taketh the third way : which , saith the same philosopher , is as it he reasoned thus , the beast must be gone either this , or this , or the other way ; but neither this nor this ; eage , the third : and so away he runneth . if we consider his skill in physick , it is sufficient to help himself : if he be wounded with a dart , he useth the help of his teeth to take it out , of his tongue to cleanse the wound from corruption : he seemeth to be well acquainted with the precept of hipp●crates , who saith , that the rest of the foot is the physick of the foot , and therefore if his foot he hurt , he ho doth it up that it may rest : if he be sick , he giveth himself a vomit by eating of grasse , and recovereth himself . the dog then we see is plentifully furnished with inward discourse . now outward speech is not needfull to make a creature reasonable , else a dumb man were an unreasonable creature . and do not philosophers themselves reject this as an enemie to knowledge ? and therefore they are silent when they are instructed ; and yet even as barbarous and strange people of speech , but we understand it not , neither do we perceive any great difference in their words : but a difference there seemeth to be , and they do expresse their thoughts and meanings one to another by those words . even so those creatures , which are commonly called unreasonable , do seem to parlie one with another ; and by their speech to understand one the other . do not binds by one kind of speech call their young ones , and by another cause them to hide themselves ? do they not by their severall voices expresse their severall passions of joy , of grief , of fear in such manner , that their fellows understand them ? do they not by their voice foreshew things to come ? but we will return to that creature we first did instance in . the dog delivereth one kind of voice when he hunteth , another when he howleth , another when he is beaten , and another when he is angry . these creatures then are not void of outward speech . if then these creatures excell man in sense , and are equall to him in inward and outward discourse , why should not their conceits and imaginations conveigh the outward object in as true a manner as ours ? and if so , then seeing their imaginations are divers , and they conceit it diversly according to their divers temperaments , i may tell what the outward object seemeth to me ; but what it seemeth to other creatures , or whether it be indeed that which it seemeth to me , or any other of them , i know not . but be it granted , that the iudgement of man in this case , is to be preferred before the iudgement of beasts ; yet in men there is great difference ; both in respect of the outward shape , and also of the temperature of their bodies : for the bodie of the suth an differeth in shape from the bodie of the 〈◊〉 : the reason of it ariseth ( say the dogmaticks ) from a predominan use of humours in the one more than in the other ; and as severall humours are predominant , so are the phantasies and conceits severally framed and effected . so that our countrey-men delight in one thing , the indian not in that , but in another which we regard not . this would not be , if their conceits and ours were both a like ; for then we should like that which they do , and they would dislike that which we would dislike . it is evident also , that men differ very much in the temperature of their bodies , else why should some more easily digest bief than shel-fish ; and other be mad for the time , if they drink wine ? there was an old woman about arbeus , which drunk three drams of c●●u●● ( every dream weighin , sixtie barley corns , and eight drams to an ounce ) without hurt . ●●sis , without hurt , took four drams of popple ; and 〈◊〉 , which was gentleman-sewer to alexander , was very cold when he stood in the sun , or in a hot bath , but very hot when he stand in the shadow . al 〈…〉 felt no pain if a scorpion stung him . and the psill● ( a people in ly●●● , whole bodies are venom to serpents ) if they be stung by serpents , or asps , receive no hurt at all . the ethiopians , which inhabit the river hynaspis , do eat serpents and scorpions without danger . 〈◊〉 a chirurgian , at the smell of a sturgeon , would be for the time mad . a●dron of argos , was so little thirstie , that without want of drink , he travelled through the hot and dry countrey of lybia . tiberius caesar would see very well in the dark . aristotle mentioneth of thratius , who said , that the image of a man went always before him . if then it be so , that there be such differences in men , this must be by reason of the divers temperatures they have , and divers disposition of their conceit and imagination ; for , if one hate , and another love the very same thing , it must be that their phantasies differ , else all would love it , or all would hate it . these men then , may tell how these things seem to them good , or bad ; but what they are in their own nature they cannot tell . if we will heathen to mens opinions , concerning one and the same matter , thinking thereby to come to the knowledge of it , we shall find this to be impossible ; for , either we must believe what all men say of it , or what some men only say of it . to believe what all men say of one & the same thing , is not possible ; for then we shall believe contrarieties ; for some men say , that that very thing is pleasant , which other say is displeasant . if it be said , we must believe onely some men , then let it be shewed who those some men are ; for the platonists will believe plato , but the epicures epicurus , the phytagorians pythagoras , & other philosophers the masters of their own sects : so that it is doubtfull , to which of all these we shall give credit . if it be said , that we must credit the greatest number ; this seemeth childish : for there may be amongst other nations a greater number which denie that very point , which the greatest number with us do affirm : so that hereof nothing can certainly be affirmed . this argument seemeth to be further confirmed , if the differences of the senses of hearing , seeing , smelling , touching , and tasting be considered ; for that the senses differ , it seemeth plain . painted tables ( in which the art of slanting is used ) appear to the eye , as if the parts of them were some higher , and some lower than the other , but to the touch they seem not to be so . honey seemeth to the tongue sweet , but unpleasant to the eye : so oyntment doth recreate the smell , but it offendeth the tast. rain-water is profitable to the eyes , but it hurteth the lungs . we may tell then , how these things seem to our severall senses , but what they are in their own nature we cannot tell : for why should not a man credit any one of his senses as well as the other ? every object seemeth to be presented diversly unto the severall instruments of sense . an apple to the touch seemeth smooth , sweet to the smell , and to the eye yellow ; but whether the apple have one of these qualities onely , or more than these qualities , who can tell ? the organ hath many pipes , all which are filled with the same blast of wind , varied according to the capacitie of the severall pipes which receive it : even so the qualitie of the apple may be but one , and this one quality may be varied , & seem yellow to the eye , to the touch smooth , and sweet to the smell , by reason of the divers instruments of the sense , which apprehend this one quality diversly . it may be also , that an apple hath many qualities besides ; but we are not able to conceive them all , because we want fit means and instruments to apprehend them . for suppose that some man is born blind , and deaf , and yet can touch , smell , and tast ; this man will not think that there is any thing , which may be seen or heard , because he wanteth the senses of hearing and seeing ; he will onely think there are those qualities in the object , which by reason of his three senses he conceiveth : even so the apple may have many more qualities ; but we cannot come to know them , because we want fit instruments for that purpose . if it be replied , that nature hath ordained as many instruments of sense , as there are sensible objects ; i demand , what nature ? for there is a confused controversie about the very essence of nature . some affirming it to be one thing , others another , few a greeing : so that what the quality of an apple is , or whether it hath one qualitie or many , i know not . let a man also consider , how many things that are separated , and by themselves , appear to differ from that which they seem to be , when they are in a mass or lump the scrapings of the goats horn seems white , but in the horn they seem black , but in the lump white . the stone toenaru , being polished , seemeth white , but unpolished & rough it seemeth yellow . sands being separated , appear rough to the touch , but a great heap , soft . i may then report , how these things appear , but whether they are so indeed , i know not . sir raleigh's observations concerning the causes of the magnificencie and opulencie of cities . that the onely way to civilize and reform the savage and barbarous lives , and corrupt manners of such people , is , to be dealt withall by gentle and loving conversation among them , to attain to the knowledge of their language , and of the multitude of their special discommodities and inconveniences in their manner of living the next is to get an admired reputation amongst them , upon a solid and true foundation of pietie , iustice , and wisdom , conjoyned with fortitude and power . the third is , discreetly to possess them with a knowledge of the condition of their own estate . thus o●phe● and amph●● , were said to draw after them the beast of the field , &c. and this must be first wrought by a visible representation , of the certaintie , truth , and sinceritie of these , together with the felicitie of a reformed estate . all which is but to give foundation , bottom , and firm footing unto action , and to prepare them to receive wholesom and good advise , for the future profit and felicitie of themselves and their posteritie . for the more commodious effecting of this reformation in a rude and barbarous people , they are to be perswaded to withdraw and unite themselves into severall colonies ; that by it an interchangeable communication and commerce of all things may more commodiously be had , and that they may so live together in civilitie , for the better succour and welfare of one another : and thereby they may more easily be instructed in the christian faith , and governed under the magistrates and ministers of the king , or other superiour power , under whom this r●so that on is sought . which course the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that 〈◊〉 took , after he had taken upon him the government of the 〈…〉 , whereby he united all the people into one citie , that before lived dispersedly in many villages . the like is put in practice at this day by the ●●r●●gales and jesuits , that they may with less difficultie and hinderance reform the rough behaviour , and savage life of the people of brazile , who dwell scattered and dispersed in cave , and cottages made of boughs & leaves of the palm-trees . alexander the great built more than seventie cities : selev●us built three cities , called ●pame● , to the honour of his wife ; and five called l●●●●ca , in memorie of his mother ; and fire called seleac● , to the honour of himself . safetie for defence of the people and their goods , in and near the town . in the situation of cities , there is to be required a place of safetie , by some natural strength , commod ousness for navigation , and conduct , for the attaining of plentie of all good things , for the sustenance & comfort of mans life , and to draw trade and entercourse of other nations ; as if the same be situate in such ●ort , as many people have need to repair thither for some natural commoditie or other of the countrey , which by traffick and transportation of cōmodities , whereof they have more plentie than will supplie their own necessitie , or for receiving of things whereof they have carcitie . and much better will it be , if the place afford some notable commoditie of it self , from whence other nations may more readily , and at better rate attain the same : likewise , and withall , be so fertil , pleasant , and healthfull of it self , that it may afford plentie of good things , for the delight and confort of the inhabitants . in former times great nations , kings and potentates have endured sharp conflicts , and held it high policie , by all means to increase then cities , with multitudes of inhabitants . and to this end the romans ever furnished themselves with strength and power , to make their neighbour-people , of necessitie , willing to draw themselves to rome to dwell , and overthrow their towns and villages of mean strength , down to the ground . so did they for this cause utterly destroy many cities , bringing always the vanquished captives to rome , for the augmentation of that citie . romulus , after a mighty fight with the sabines , condescended to peace , upon condition that ●●●●●s their king should come with all their people to dwell at rome : ●at●●● did accept , and made choice of the capitol , and the mount quirmalis for his seat and p●llace . the same course h●ld tamberlane the great , whereby he enlarged the great samar●anda , still bringing unto it , the richest and wealthiest citizens he had subdued . and the ottoman● , to make the citie constantinople rich and great , brought to it many thousand families , especially artificers out of the subdued cities ; as mahome● the great from tr●bizond , selim the first from cairo , and seliman from ●aurk . authoritie and necessitie , without the consideration of the conveniencies , and commodiousness of situation above mentioned , are of small moment in the foundation of a citie ; thereby onely it would be unlikely , either to grow or continue in magnificencie or opulencie : for it profit , height , and delight go not companions therewith , no authoritie or necessitie can retain much people or wealth . but of the place whereupon a citie is to be founded , be commodious for the aforesaid conveniences , which help greatly for the felicitie of this life ; then , no doubt , the same is likely to draw much abundance of people and riches unto the same , whereby it may , by the help of arts and industrie , in time , become magnificent & glorious . unto the good estate , greatness , and glorie of a citie , those things hereafter mentioned do greatly avail , and are of much importance , viz. religion , which is of such force and might , to amplifie cities and dominions , and of such attractive virtue to replenish the same with people and wealth , and to hold them in due obedience , as none can be more ; for without adoration of some dietie , no common wealth can subsist . witness , jerusalem rome , constantinople and all other cities that have been famous for the prosession of religion , or divine worship and no marvel , for there is not any thing in this world of more efficacie & force to allure and draw to it the hearts of men , than god. which is the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he is carefully defined , and continually sought for of all creatures ; for all regard him as their last end and refuge . light things apply themselves upwards , heavy things downwards ; the heavens to revolution , the herbs to flowers , trees to bear fruit , beasts to present their kind and man in seeking his tranquilitie and everlasting glory but forasmuch as god is of so high a nature as the sense and understanding of man cannot conceive it , every man directly turns himself to that place where he leaves some print of his power , or declares some sign of his assistance . and to such persons whom he seemeth more especially to have revealed himself . academies , & schools of learning with convenient immunities and privileges for scholars , and means for recreation for delight , are of great importance to enlarge and enrich a citie : for asmuch as men long for honour and profit , and of arts & liberal sciences some bring certain wealth to men , and some promotions & preterments to honourable functions : for by this means , not onely young men , & those that are desirous of learning and virtue in the same common-wealth , will be retained in their own countrey , but also strangers will be drawn home to them . and the more will this be available if occasion be given to scholars and students , to rise to degrees of honour and preferment by their learned exercises , and that by the policie of the same citie , good wits be accounted of , and rewarded well : that the same academies and schools be stored with plentie of doctours and learned men , of great same and reputation . courts of iustice , with due execution of the same in a citie , do much enable , enlarge , & enrich it ; for it fasteneth a great liking in a citie to virtuous men , and such as be wealthie , that therein they may be free , and in safetie from the violence of the oppressions of covetous and wicked men : and there will be rather resort thither to inhabit , or traffick there as occasions may minister unto them . and many others that have cause of suite will repair thither , whereas they may be sure to find iudgement and iustice duely executed , whereby the citie must needs be enlarged and enriched : for our lives , and all that ever we have are in the hands of iustice : so that if iustice be not administred amongst men , in vain is there any societie and commerce , or any other thing can be profitable or safe ; so much is love and charitie failed , and iniquitie increased upon the face of the earth . the excellencie and multitude likewise of artificers exercising their manuall arts and trades , do marvellously increase and enrich a state , whereof some are necessary , some commodious for a civil life , other some are of pomp and ornament , and other some of delicacie and curiositie , whereof doth follow con course of people that labour and work , and current money which doth enrich and supply materials for labourers , and work-men , buying and selling , transportation from place to place , which doth imploy and increase the artificious and cunning parts of the wit of man ; and this art and exquisitnesse of work manship and skill is so powerfull herein , that to far excels the simple commodities and materials that nature produceth ; and is alone sufficient of it self to make a citie or state , both magnificient and glorious : and the daily experience we have in these our dayes , and in former times , doth manifestly approve the same , and make evident without all contradiction . some naturall benefits that a citie also may have for the excellency of art , or work manship of some special commodities above any other place , either through the qualitie of the water , or other matter whatsoever , or some hidden mysterie of the inhabitants in working thereof , may be a great help for the enlargement and enriching of a citie . the command of a countrie that affordeth some proper commoditie , is of it self sufficient mightily to bring a citie to great wealth , and to advance it to great power , and draweth thereby dependence and concourse , much advantageous also , as well for the publick weal , as the private person . a citie also may be lord of much merchandize and traffick , by means of the commodious situation to many nations , to whom it serveth and hath relation to , as ware houses , roomth and store-houses , by reason whereof , the nations adjoyning do use to resort thereunto to make their provisions of such things . and this consisteth in the largenesse of the ports , the fitnesse of the gulphs and creeks of the seas , in the navigable rivers and channels , and the plain and safe ways that leadeth to the citie , or that come , our turn by or near it . priviledge and freedom from customs and exactions ' , doth greatly increase the trade , and draw inhabitants to a citie , whereby the same may become both rich and powerfull ; whereof the ma●ts and fairs , and markets bear good witnesse , which are frequented with great concourse of people , tradesmen and merchants , for no other respect , but that they are there free and frank from customs and exactions . and the cities in flanders are lively testimonies hereof , where the customs are very small . by reason whereof , all such as have erected new cities in times past to draw concourse of people unto it , have granted large immunities , and priviledges at the least , to the first inhabitants thereof the like have they done that have restored cities emptied with plague , consumed with wars , or afflicted with famin , or some other scourge of god. in respect whereof , freedom of cities hath been often granted to such as would with their families , inhabit there , or would bring corn and other necessaries for provision of victual . the romans , to increase their cities , made the towns that well deserved of them ( which they after called municiple ) to be partakers of their franchises and priviledges . the first means the romans used to allure people to make their habitations rather in rome than else where , was the opening the sanctuarie , & giving libertie and freedom to all that would come unto them . in respect whereof , there flocked thither , with their goods , numbers of people that were either racked with exactions , thrust out of their habitations , or unsafe , or unsure for their lives in their own countreys for religion sake . the very same reason in a manner hath increased so much the citie of geneva : for as much as it hath offered entertainment to all commers out of france and italie , that have either forsaken , or been exiled their countreys for religions sake . likewise , triumphs , goodly buildings , battels on the water fights of sword-players , hunting of wild beasts , publick shows and sights , plays solemnized with great pomp and preparation , and many other such things do draw the curious people to a citie inspeakably , which leaves behind them much treasure , and for such cause will rather settle themselves to inhabit there , than in other places . this was also the devise of rome in her infancy to enlarge herself . the causes that concern the magnificencie of a citie . to confirm a citie in her greatness , justice , peace , and pleantie are the undoubted means : for justice assureth every man his own peace causeth all arts and negotiation whatsoever to flourish : and plentie of food and victuall , that sustaineth the life of man with ease and much contentment . to conclude , all those things that cause the greatnesse of a citie , are also fit to conserve the same . sir walter raleigh's seat of government . that the seat of government is up 〈…〉 y the two great pillars thereof , viz. civile iustice , and martiall policie , which are framed out of husbandrie , merchandize , and gentry of this kingdom . they say , that the goodliest cedars which grow on the high mountains of liban●s , thrust their roots between the clifts of hard rocks , the better to bear them selves against the strong storms that blow there . as nature hath instructed those kings of trees , so hath reason taught the kings of men , to ●oot themselves in the hardie hearts of their faithfull subjects . and as those kings of trees have large tops , so have the kings of men large crowns ; whereof as the first would soon be broken from their bodies , were they not underborn by many branches ; o would the other easily tytter , were they not fastened on their heads , with the strong chains of civil justice and martial discipline . . for the administration of the first , even god himself hath given direction , judge and officers shalt thou make , which shall judge the people with righteous judgement . the second is grounded on the first laws of the world and nature , that force is to be repelled by force . yea moses in the of exodus , and elsewhere , hath delivered us many laws & policies of war. but as we have heard of the neglect and abuse in both , so have we heatd of the decline and ruine of many kingdoms & states long before our days : for that policie hath never yet prevailed ( though it hath served for a short season ) where the counterfeit hath been sold for the natural , and the outward shew and formalitie for the substance . of the emperour charls the fourth , the writers of that age witness , that he used but the name of justice and good order , being more learned in the law than in doing right , and that he had by far , more knowledge than conscience . certainly the unjust magistrate that fancieth to himself a solid and untransparable bodie of gold , every ordinarie wit can vitrifie , and make transparent pierce , and discern their corruptions ; howsoever , because not daring , they cover their knowledge , but in the mean while it is also true , that constrained dissimulation , either in the proud heart , or in the oppressed , either in publick estates , or in private persons , where the fear of god is not prevalent , doth in all the leisure of her lurking , but sharpen her teeth , the voluntarie being no less base , than the forced malitious . thus it fared between the barons of england and their kings , between the lords of switzerland & their people , between the sicilians and the french between the dolphin and john of burgoign , between charl the ninth and the french protestants , and between henry the third , his successor , and the lords of guise , hereof in place of more particulars , the whole world may serve for examples . it is a difficult piece of geographie to delinate and lay out the bounds of authority ; but it is easie enough cōceive the best use of it , and by which it hath maintained it self in lasting happiness , t hath ever acquired more honour by perswading , than by beating ; for as the bonds of reason and love are immortal , so do all other chains or cords , both rust●e & rot noble parts of their own royal and politick bodies . but we will forbear for a while to stretch this first string of civil justice ; for in respect of the first sort of men , to wit , of those that live by their own labour , they have never been displeased where they have been suffered to enjoy the fruit of their own travels , meum & tuum , mine & thine is all wherein they seek their certaintie & protection . true it is , that they are the fruit-trees of the land , which god in deuteronomie commanded to be spared , they gather honey , and hardly enjoy the wax , and break the ground with great labour , giving the best of their grain to the easefull & idle . for the second sort , which are the merchants , as the first feed the kingdome , so do these enrich it , yea their trades , especially those which are forcible , are not the least part of our martiall policie , as hereafter proved ; and to do them right , they have in all ages and times assisted the kings of this land , not onely with great sums of money , but with great fleets of ships in all their enterprises beyond the seas . the second have seldome or never offended their princes , to enjoy their trades at home upon tolerable conditions , hath ever contented them for the injuries received from other nations , give them but the commission of reprisal , they will either right themselves , or sit down with their own losse without complaint . . the third sort , which are the gentrie of england , these being neither seated in the lowest grounds , and thereby subject to the biting of every beast , nor in the highest mountains , & thereby in danger to be torn with tempest ; but the valleys between both , have their parts in the inferiour iustice , & being spread over all , are the garrisons of good order throughout the realm . sir walter raleigh's letters . sir walter raleigh's letter to mr secretary winwood , before his iourney to guiana . honourable sir , i was lately perswaded , by two gentlemen , my ancient friends , to acquaint your honour with some offers of mine , made heretofore for a journey to guiana , who were of opinion , that it would be better understood now , than when it was first propounded , which advice having surmounted my dispair , i have presumed to send unto your honour the copies of those letters which i then wrote , both to his majestie , and to the treasurer ceuill , wherein as well the reasons that first moved me are remembered , as the objections by him made are briefly answered . what i know of the riches of that place , not by hear say , but what mine eyes hath seen , i have said it often , but it was then to no end : because those that had the greatest trust , were resolved not to believe it , not because they doubted the truth , but because they doubted my disposition towards themselves ; where ( if god had blessed me in the enterprise ) i had recovered his majesties favour and good opinion . other cause than this , or other suspition they never had any . our late worthy prince of wales was extream curious in searching out the nature of my offences , the queens majestie hath informed her self from the beginning . the king of denmark at both times of his being here was throughly satisfied of my innocencie , they would otherwise never have moved his majestie on my behalf . the wife , the brother , and the son of a king , do not use to sue for men suspect ; but sir , since they all have done it out of their charitie , and but with references to me alone . your honour ( whose respect hath onely relation to his majesties service ) strengthened by the example of those princes , may with the more hardnesse do the like , being princes to whom his majesties good estate is not lesse dear ; and all men that shall oppugne it , no lesse hatefull , then to the king himself . it is true sir , that his majestie hath sometimes answered , that his councel knew me better than he did ; meaning some two or three of them , and it was indeed my infelicitie ; for had his majestie known me , i had never been here where i now am : or had i known his majestie , they had never been so long there where they now are . his majestie not knowing of me hath been my ruine , and his majestie misknowing of them , hath been the ruine of a goodly part of his estate : but they are all of them now , some living and some dying , come to his majesties knowledge . but sir , how little soever his majestie knew me , and how much soever he believed them , yet have i been bound to his majestie both for my life , and all that remains , of which , but for his majestie , nor life , nor ought else had remained . in this respect sir , i am bound to yield up the same life , and all i have for his majesties service ; to die for the king , and not by the king , is all the ambition i have in the world . walter raleigh . sir raleigh's letter to his wife , from guiana . sweet heart , i can yet write unto you but with a weak hand , for i have suffered the most violent calenture for fifteen days , that ever man did , and lived : but god that gave me a strong heart in all my adversities , hath also now strengthened it in the hell fire of heat . we have had two most grievous sicknesses in our ship , of which fourtie two have died , and there are yet many sick . but having recovered the land of guiana , this of november , i hope we shall recover them . we are yet two hundred men , and the rest of our fleet are reasonable strong , strong enough i hope to perform what we have undertaken , if the diligent care at london , to make our strength known to the spanish king by his ambassadour , have not taught the spanish king to fortifie all the enterances against us ; howsoever we must make the adventure , and if we perish , it shall be no honour for england , nor gain for his majestie to loose among many other , an hundred as valiant gentlemen as england hath in it . of captain bayl●●s base coming from us at the canaries , see a letter of kemishes to mr cory , & of the unnatural weather , storms & rains and winds , he hath in the same letter , given a touch of the way that hath ever been sailed in fourteen days , now hardly performed in fourtie days ; god i trust , will give us comfort in that which is to come . in passage to the canaries , i stayed at gomerah , where i took water in peace , because the countrey durst not denie it me ; i received there of an english race , a present of oranges , lemmons , quinces , & pome-granates without which i could not have lived ; those i preserved in fresh sands , and i have of them yet to my great refreshing . your son had never so good health , having no distemper in all the heat under the line . all my servants have escaped but crab and my cook , yet all have had the sickness . crofts and march , and the rest are all well . remember my service to my lord carew , and mr secretarie winwood . i write not to them , for i can write of nought but miseries : yet of men of sort , we have lost our serjeant major , captain pigott , and his lieuetenant , captain edward hastings , who would have died at home , for both his liver , spleen and brains were rotten . my sons lieuetenant payton and my cosin mr. hews , mr. mordant , mr. gardiner . mr. hayward , captain jennings the merchant , kemish of london , and the master chyrurgion , mr. refiner , mr. moor the governour of the barmoudas . our provost marsh. w. steed , lieutenant vescie , but to mine inestimable grief , hammon and talb●t . by the next i trust you shall hear better of us , in gods hands we were , and in him we trust , this bearer , captain alley , for his infirmitie of his head i have sent back , an honest valiant man , he can deliver you all that is past . commend me to my worthy friends at loathbury , sr john leigh and mr. bow●r , whose nephew knevil is well , and to my cosin blundell , and my most devoted and humble service to her majestie . to tell you that i might be here king of the indi●n , were a vanitie , but my name hath still lived among them ; here they feed me with fresh meat , and all that the countrey yields , all offer to obey me . commend me to poor carew my son . from galliana in guiana , the of november . sir raleigh's letter to sir ralph winwood . sir , as i have not hitherto given you any account of our proceedings and passages towards the indes , so have i no other subject to write of , than of the greatest misfortunes that ever befell any man : for whereas , for the first , all those that navigate between cape de vera and america , do passe between fifteen or twentie days at most , we found the wind so contrary , and which are also contrary to nature so many storms and rains , as we spent six weeks in the passage , by reason whereof , and that in so great heat we wanted water : for at the isle prano of cape de vero , we lost our anchours and cables , and our water casks , being driven from the island with a hu●●●icano , and were like all to have perished . great sicknesse fell amongst us , and carried away great numbers of our ablest men both for sea and land . the of november , we had sight of guiana , and soon after came to anchour in five degrees at the river gallian● , here we staid till the fourth of december , landed our sick men , set up the barges and shallops , which were brought out of england in quarters , washed our ships , and took in fresh water , being sed and cherished by the indians of my old acquaintance , with a great deal of love and respect , my self being in the hands of death these weeks , and was not able otherwise to move than as i was carried in a chair , gave order to small ships to sail into orinoque , having captain kemts for their conductor towards the mynes , and in those five ships five companies of under the command of captain parker , and captain north , brethren to the lord mounteagle and the lord north , valiant gentlemen , and of infinite patience for the labour , hunger , and heat which they have endured , my son had the third company captain thornix of kent the fourth company , captain chidlez , by his lieutenant , the fifth : but as my sergeant major captain peggot of the low countreys died in the former miserable passage , so my lieutenant sir warham s. letter lay sick without hope of life , and the charge conferred on my nephew george raleigh , who had also served long with infinite commendations ; but by reason of my absence , and of sir warhams was not so well obeyed as the enterprize required . as they passed up the river , the spaniard began the war , and shot at us both with their ordinance and muskets , whereupon the companies were forced to charge them , and soon after beat them out of the town . in the assault , my son ( more desirous of honour than safetie ) was slain , with whom ( to say truth ) all the respects of this world have taken end in me . and although these five captains had as weak companies as ever followed valiant leaders , yet were there amongst them some twentie or thirtie valiant adventurous gentlemen , and of singular courage , as of my sons companie , mr. knivet , mr. hammon , mr. longwirth , mr. iohn pleasington ; his officers , sir iohn hamden ; mr. simon leak corporall of the field , mr. hammon the elder brother , mr. nicholas of buckingham , mr. roberts of kent , mr. perin , mr. tresham , mr. mullinax , mr. winter and his brother , mr. wray , mr. miles herbart , mr. bradshavv , capt. hill , and others . sir , i have set down the names of these gentlemen , to the end , that if his majestie shall have cause to use their service , it may please you to take notice of them for very sufficient gentlemen . the other five ships staid at trinidads , having no other port capable for them near guiana . the second ship was commanded by my vice admirall capt. john pennington , of whom ( to do him right ) he is one of the sufficientest gentlemen for the sea that england hath . the third by sir warham s. leiger , an exceeding valiant and worthy gentleman . the fourth by sr john fern the fifth by captain chidley of devon. with these five ships i daily attended their armado of spain , which had they set upon us , our force divided , the one half in orinoque , an hundred and fiftie miles from us , we had not onely been torn in pieces , but all those in the river had also perished , being of no force at all for the sea fight ; for we had resolved to have been burnt by their sides , had the armado arrived : but belike , they staid for us at ma●g●●t , by which they knew we must passe towards the indies : for it pleased his majestie to value us at so little , as to command me upon my alleageance , to set down under my hand the countrey , and the river by which i was to enter it ; to set down the number of my men , and burthen of my ships , and what ordinance every ship carried , which being known to the spanish ambassadour , and by him to the king of spain , a dispatch was made , and letters sent from madrid , before my departure out of the thames ; for his first letter sent by a barque of advise , was dated the of march . at madrid , which letter i have here inclosed sent to your honour , the rest i reserve , not knowing whether they may be intercepted or not . the second by the king , dated the second of may , sent also by a coronel of diego de polo●eque , governour of guiana , elderedo and trinidado . the third by the bishop of portricho , and delivered to po●oni●que the of july , at trinidado . and the fourth was sent from the farmer and secretary of his customs in the indies . at the same time , by that of the kings hand , sent by the bishop , there was also a commission for the speedie levying of three hundred souldiers , and ten pieces of ordinance to be sent frō portricho , for the defence of guiana , an hundred & fiftie from nuevo rémo de grando , under the command of captain anthony musica , and the other hundred and fiftie from portricho , to be conducted by c. franc. laudio . now sir , if all that have traded to the indies since his majesties time knew that the spaniards have flayed alive all the poor men which they have taken , being but merchant men , what death and cruel torment shall we expect if they conquer us ? certainly they have hitherto failed grosly , being set out thence as we were , both for number , time , and place . lastly , to make an apologie for not working the myne , ( although i know his majestie expects ) whom i am to satisfie so much , as my self , having lost my son , and my estate in the enterprise , yet it is true , that the spaniards took more care to defend the passage leading unto it , than they did the town , which by the kings instructiōs they might easily do , the countreys being aspera & nemosa . but it is true , that when capt. kemish found the river low , and that he could not approach the banks in most places near the myne by a mile , and where he found a discent , a volley of muskets come from the woods upon the boat , and slew two rowers , and hurt fix others , and shot a valiant gentleman of captain thornix , of which wound he languisheth to this day . he , to wit , kemish , following his own advice , thought that it was in vain to discover the myne ; for he gave me this for an excuse at his return , that the companies of english in the town of s. thome were not able to defend it , against the daily and nightly assaults of the spaniards , that the passages to the mynes , were thick and unpassable woods , and that the myne being discovered , they had no men to work it , did not discover it at all : for it is true , the spaniards having two gold mynes near the town , the one possessed by pedro rodrigo de paran , the second by harmian frotinio , the third of silver , by captain francisco , for the want of negroes to work them : for as the indians cannot be constrained by a law of charls the fifth , so the spaniards will not , nor can endure the labour of those mynes , whatsoever the bragadochio , the spanish ambassador saith . i shall prove under the proprietors hand , by the custom-book , and the kings quinto , of which i recovered an ingot or two : i shall also make it appear to any prince or state that will undertake it , how easily those mynes , and five or six more of them may be possessed , and the most of them in those parts , which never have as yet been attempted by any , nor by any passage to them , nor ever discovered by the english , french , or dutch. but at kemish his return from orinoque , when i rejected his counsel and his course , and told him that he had undone me ; and wounded my credit with the king past recovery , he slew himself : for i told him , that seeing my son was slain , i cared not if i had lost an hundred more in opening of the myne , so my credit had been saved : for i protest before god , had not capt. whitney ( to whom i gave more countenance than to all the captains of my fleet ) run from me at the granadoes , and carried another ship with him of captain woldestons . i would have left my body at s. thomes by my sons , or have brought with me out of that or other mynes , so much gold oar , as should have satisfied the king. i propounded no vain thing ; what shall become of me i know not , i am unpardoned in england , and my poor estate consumed , and whether any prince will give me bread or no i know not . i desire your honour to hold me in your good opinino , to remember my service to my lord of ar●undel and pembrook , to take some pity on my poor wife , to whom i dare not write for renewing her sorrow for her son ; and beseech you to give a copie of this to my lord 〈◊〉 : for to a broken mind , a sick bodie , and weak eyes , it is a torment to write many letters . i have found many things of importance for discovering the state and weaknesse of the indies , which if i live , i shall here after impart unto your honour , to whom i shall remain a faithfull servant . walter raleigh sir raleigh's letter sent to his wife , copied out of his own hand writing . i was loath to write , because i know not how to comfort you , and god knows , i never knew what sorrow meant till now . all that i can say to you is , that you must obey the will and providence of god , and remember , that the queens majestie bare the losse of prince henry with a magnanimous heart , and the ladie harrington of her son . comfort your heart ( dearest bess ) i shall sorrow for us both , i shall for now the lesse , because i have not long to sorrow , because not long to live . i refer you to mr. secretarie winwoods letter , who will give you a copie of it , if you send for it , therein you shall know what hath passed ; i have written that letter , for my brains are broken , and it is a torment for me to write , and especially of misery . i have desired mr. secretarie to give my lord carew a copie of his letter . i have clensed my ship of sick men , and sent them home ; i hope god will send us somewhat before we return . you shall hear from me if i live , from the new found land , where i mean to make clean my ships and revictual ; for i have tobacco enough to pay for it . the lord blesse and comfort you , that you may bear patiently the death of your valiant son this . of march , from the isle of christophers , yours walter raleigh . yours walter raleigh . post-script . i protest before the majestie of god , that as sir francis drake , and sir john hawkins died heart broken when they failed of their enterprise , i could willingly do the like , did i not contend against sorrow for your sake , in hope to provide somewhat for you and to comfort and relieve you . if i live to return , resolve your self that it is the care for you that hath strengthened my heart . it is true that kemish might have gone directly to the myne , and meant it , but after my sons death , he made them believe he knew not the way , and excused himself upon want of water in the river , and counter feiting many impediments left it unfound . when he came back , i told him he had undone me , and that my credit was lost for ever ; he answered , that when any son was lost , and that he left me so weak , that he resolved not to find me alive , he had no reason to enrich a companie of rascals , who after my sons death made no account of him . he further told me that the english sent up into guiana , could hardly defend the spanish town of s. thome which they had taken , and therefore for them to passe through thick woods it was impossible , and more impossible to have victuall brought them into the mountains and it is true , that the governour diego polo●eqe , and other four captains being slain , whereof wat flew one , plessington , wa●s servant , and john of moroc●urs , one of his men , slew other two . i say five of them slain in the enterance of the town , the rest went off in a whole bodie , and took more care to defend the passages to their mynes ( of which they had three within a league of the town , besides a myne that was about five miles off ) than they did of the town it self . yet kemish at the first was resolved to go to the myne ; but when he came to the banck-side to land , and had two of his men slain outright from the bank , and six other hurt , and captain thornix shot in the head , of which wound , and the accident thereof , he hath pined away those twelve weeks . now when kemish came back and gave me the former reasons which moved him not to open the myne , the one the death of my son , a second the weaknesse of the english , and their impossibilities to work and to be victualled ; a third that it were a folly to discover it for the spaniards ; and lastly my weaknesse and being unpardoned ; and that i rejected all these his arguments , and told him , that i must leave him to himself to resolve it to the king and state , he shut up himself into his cabbin , and shot himself with a pocket pistol which broke one of , his ribs , and finding that he had not prevailed , he thrust a long knife under his short ribs up to the handle and died . thus much i have written to mr secretarie , to whose letters i refer you to know the truth . i did after the sealing break open the letter again , to let you know in brief the state of that business , which i pray you impart to my lord of northumberland , and silvanus sco●y . for the rest , there was never poor man so exposed to slaughter as i was ; for being commanded upon mine alleagiance to set down not onely the coū-trey but the very river by which i was to enter it , to name my ships number , men , and my artillerie . this now was sent by the spanish ambassador to his master the king of spain , the king wrote his letters to all parts of the indies , especially to the governour palamago of guiana , elderado , and trinidado , of which the first letter bore date of march ● , at ma●rill , when i had not yet left the thames , which letter i have sent ot mr secretarie . i have also other letters of the kings which i reserve , and one of the councels . the king also sent a commission to leave three hundred souldiers out of his garrisons of ●nie regno de granado è portricho , with ten pieces of brasle ordinance to entertain us ; he also prepared an army by sea to set upon us . if were too long to tell you how we were preserved , if i live i shall make it known ; my brains are broken , and i cannot write much , i live yet , and i told you why . witney for whom i sold all my plate at plymouth , and to whom i gave more credit and countenance than to all the captains of my fleet , ran from me at the granadoes , and wolleston with him , so as i have now but five ships , and out of those i have sent some into my fly boat , a sabble of idle rascals , which i know will not spare to wound me , but i care not . i am sure there is never a base slave in all the fleet hath taken the pain and care that i have done , that have slept so little , and travelled so much , my friends will not believe them , and for the rest i care not ; god in heaven blesse you and strengthen your heart . sir raleigh's letter to mr secretary winwood . sir , since the death of kemish , it is contessed by the serjeant major , and others of his inward friends , that he told them that he could have brought them unto the myne within two hours march from the riverside ; but because my son was slain my self unpardoned , and not like to live , he had no reason to open the myne either for the spaniard or for the king ; they answered , that the king ( though i were not pardoned ) had granted my heart under the great sea. he replyed , that the grant to me was to no man , non ens in the law , and therefore of no force ; this discourse they had , which i knew not of till after his death : but when i was resolved to write unto your honour , he prayed me to joyn with him in excusing his not going to the myne , i answered him i would not do it ; but if my self could satisfie the king and state , that he had reason not to open it , i should be glad of it : but for my part , i must avow that he knew it , and that he might with loss have done it ; other excuses i would not frame : he told me that he would wait on me presently , and give me better satisfaction : but i was no sooner come from him into my cabbin , but i heard a pistol go over my head , and sending to know who shot it , word was brought me that kemish shot it out of his cabbin window to cleanse it ; his boy going into his cabbin , found him lying upon his bed with much bloud by him , and looking in his face saw him dead ; the pistol being but little , did but crack his rib , but turning him over found a long knife in his bodie , all but the handle . sir i have sent into england with my cosin harbert ( a very valiant honest gentleman ) divers unworthy persons , good for nothing neither by sea nor land , and though it was at their own suit , yet i know they will wrong me in all that they can . i beseech your honour , that the scorn of men may not be believed of me , who have taken more pains , and suffered more than the meanest rascall in the ship ; these being gone , i shall be able to keep the sea untill the end of august , with some four reasonable good ships . sir , wheresoever god shall permit me to arrive in any part of europe , i will not fail to let your honour know what we have done , till then , and ever i rest your honours servant w. raleigh . sir walter raleigh's letter to king james , at his return from gviana . may it please your most excellent maiestie , if in my journey outward bound , i had my men murthered at the islands , & yet spared to take revenge , if i did discharge some spanish barks taken without spoil , if i so bear all parts of the spanish indies , wherein i might have taken twentie of their downs on the sea coasts , and did onely follow the enterprize i undertook for guiana , where without any directions from me , a spanish village was burnt , which was new set up within three miles of the myne by your majesties favour . i find no reason why the spanish ambassador should complain of me . if it were lawfull for the spaniards to murther twentie six english men , tying them back to back , and then cutting their throats , when they had traded with them whole moneth , and came to them on the land without so much as one sword , and that it may not be lawfull to your majesties subjects , being charged first by them , to repell force by force , we may justly say , o miserable english ! if p●●●●● and ●●e●●●m took campe●●● and other places in the honduras , seated in the heart of the spanish indies burnt towns , and killed the spaniards , and had nothing said unto them at this return , and my self forbore to look into the i●●●●as ; because i would not offend , i may as justly say , o miserable sir walter raleigh ! if i have spent my poor estate , lost my son , suffered by sicknesse and otherwise a world of miseries ; if i have resisted with manifest hazard of my life , the robberies and spoils , with which my companions would have made me rich , if when i was poor , i would have made my self rich , if when i have gotten my liberty , which all men and nature it self do much prize , i voluntarily lost it , if when i was sure of my life , i rendered it again , if i might elsewhere where have sold my ship and goods , and put five or six thousand pounds in my purse , and yet brought her into england , i beseech your majestie to believe , that all this i have done , because it should not be said to your majestie , that your majestie had given libertie and trust to a man whose end was but the recoverie of his libertie , and who had betrayed your majesties trust . my mutiniers told me , that if i returned from england i should be undone , but i believed in your majesties goodnesse more than in all their being arguments . sure , i am the first that being free and able to enrich my self ; yet hath embraced povertie and perill . and as sure i am , that my example shall make me the last : but your majesties wisdom and goodnesse i have made my judges , who have ever been , and shall ever be , your majesties most humble vassal walter raleigh . sir raleighs's letter to his wife , after his condemnaetion . you shall receive ( my dear wife ) my last words in these my last lines ; my love i send you , that you may keep when i am dead , and my counsell , that you may remember it when i am no more . i would not with my will present you sorrows ( dear bess ) let them go to the grave with me , and be buried in the dust . and seing that it is not the will of god that i shall see you any more , bear my destruction patiently , and with an heart like your self . first i send you all the thanks which my heart can conceive , or my words expresse , for your many travels and cares for me , which though they have not taken effect as you wished , yet my debt to you is not the lesse ; but pay it i never shall in this world . secondly , i beseech you , for the love you bare me living , that you do not hide your self many days , but by your travels seek to help my miserable fortunes , and the right of your poor child , your mourning cannot avail me that am but dust . thirdly , you shall understand , that my lands were conveyed ( bona fide ) to my child , the writings were drawn at midsummer was twelve moneths , as divers can witness , and i trust my bloud will quench their malice who desired my slaughter , that they will not seek also to kill you and yours with extream poverty . to what friend to direct you i know not , for all mine have left me in the true time of triall . most sorrie am i , that being thus surprised by death , i can leave you no better estate , god hath prevented all my determinations , that great god which worketh all in all , and if you can live free from want , care for no more , for the rest is but a vanitie : love god and begin betimes , in him you shall find true , everlasting , and endlesse comfort , when you have travelled and wearied your self with all sorts of worldly cogitations you shall sit down by sorrow in the end teach your son also to serve and fear god whilest he is young , that the fear of god may grow up in him ; then will god be an husband to you , and a father to him , an husband and a father , that can never be taken from you . baylie oweth me a thousand pounds , and arvan six hundred ; in j●rnesey also have much owing me . ( dear wife ) i beseech you , for my souls sake , pay all poor men . when i am dead , no doubt you shall be much sought unto for the world thinks i was very rich ; have a care to the fair pretences of men , for no greater miserie can befall you in this life , than to become a prey unto the world , and after to be despised . i speak ( god knows ) not to disswade you from marriage , for it will be best for you , both in respect of god and the world . as for me , i am no more yours , nor you mine , death hath cut us asunder , and god hath divided me from the world , and you from me . remember your poor child for his fathers sake , who loved you in his happiest estate . i sued for my life , but ( god knows ) it was for you and yours that i desired it : for , know it , ( my dear wife ) your child is the child of a true man , who in his own respect despiseth death and his mishapen and ugly forms . i cannot write much , ( god knows ) how hardly i steal this time when all sleep , and it is also time for me to separate my thoughts from the world . beg my dead body , which living was denied you , and either lay it in s●●●b●rn or in exceter church by my father and mother . i can say no more , time and death calleth me away . the everlasting god , powerfull , infinite , and inscrutable god almightie , who is goodnesse it self , the true light and life , keep you and yours , and have mercy upon me , and forgive my persecutors and false accusers , and send us to meet in his glorious kingdom . my dear wife farewell , blesse my boy , pray for me , and let my true god hold you both in his arms. yours that was , but now not mine own walter raleigh . sir raleigh's letter to prince henry , touching the model of a ship. most excellent prince , if the ship your highness intends to build , be bigger than the victorie , then her beams , which are laid overthwart from side to side will not serve again , and many other of her timbers and other stuff , will not serve , whereas if she be a size less , the timber of the old ship will serve well to the building of a new . if she be bigger she will be of less use , go very deep to water , and of mightie charge , our channels decaying every year , less nimble , less mannyable , and seldom to be used grande navio grande satica saith the spaniard . a ship of six hundred tuns , will carrie as good ordinance as a ship of twelve hundred tuns , and where the greater hath double her ordinance , the less will turn her broad side twice , before the great ship can wind once , and so no advantage in that over-plus of guns . the lesser will go over clear where the greater shall stick and perish ; the lesser will come and go , leave or take , and is yare , whereas the greater is slow , unmanyable , and ever full of encumber . in a well conditioned ship , these things are chiefly required . . that she be strong built . . swift in sail . . stout-sided . . that her ports be so laid , as that she may carry out her guns all weathers . . that she hull and trie well . . that she stay well , when boarding , or turning on a wind is required . to make her strong , consisteth in the care and truth of the work-man ; to make her swift , is to give her a large run , or way forward , and so afterward , done by act and just proportion , and that in laying out of her bowes before , and quarters behind ; the ship-wright be sure , that she neither sink nor hang into the water , but lie clear and a●ove it , wherein ship-wrights do often fail , and then is the speed in sailing utterly spoiled . that she be stout-sided , the same is provided by a long bearing floar , and by sharing off from above waters to the low ●●edge of the ports , which done , then will she carry out her ordinance all we●thers . to make her to hull and to trie well , which i● called a good sea-ship , there are two things principally to be regarded , the one that she have a good draught of water , the other that she be not overcharged : and this is seldom done in the kings ships , and therefore we are forced to lye , or trie in them with our main course and mizen , which with a deep keel and standing streak , she would perform . the extream length of a ship makes her unapt to stay , especially if she be floatie and want sharpnesse of way forward . and it is most true , that such over-long ships , are fitter for the narrow seas in summer , than for the ocean , or long voyages : and therefore an hundred foot by the keel , and thirtie five foot broad is a good proportion for a great ship. it is to be noted , that all ships sharp before , not having a long floar , will fall rough into the sea from a billow , and take in water over head and ears ; and the same quality have all narrow-quartered ships to sink after the tail . the high charging of ships , is that that brings many ill qualities , it makes them extream lee-ward , makes them sink deep into the seas , makes them labour sore in foul weather , and oft-times overset . safety is more to be respected than shews , or nicenesse for ease ; in sea journeys both cannot well stand together , and therefore the most necessary is to be chosen . two decks and an half is enough , and no building at all above that , but a low masters cabbin . our masters and mariners will say , that the ships will bear more well enough ; and true it is , if none but ordinary mariners served in them . but men of better sort , unused to such a life , cannot so well endure the rowling and tumbling from side to side , where the seas are never so little grown , which comes by high charging . besides those high cabbin works aloft , are very dangerous in sight , to tear men with their splinters . above all other things , have care that the great guns be four foot clear above water when all lading is in , or else these best pieces are idle sea : for if the ports lie lower , and be open it is dangerous ; and by that default was a goodly ship , and many gallant gentlemen lost , in the days of henry the eigth , before the isle of wight , in a ship called by the name of mary-rose . sir walter raleighs pilgrimage . give me my scallop shell of quiet . my staff of faith to walk upon ; my scrip of joy immortall diet ; my bottle of salvation . my gown of glorie ( hopes true gage ) and thus i le take my pilgrimage . bloud must be my bodies onely balmer , no other balm will there be given whil'st my soul , like a quiet palmer , travelleth towards the land of heaven over the silver mountains where springs the nectar fountains , there i will kisse the bowl of blisse , and drink mine everlasting fill upon every milken hill . my soul will be a drie before , but after , it will thirst no more . i le take them first to quench my thirst , and tast of nectars suckets , at those clear wells where sweetnesse dwells , drawn up by saints in chrystal buckets . then by that happy blestfull day , more peacefull pilgrims i shall see , that have cast off their rags of clay , and walk apparelled fresh like me , and when our bo●les and all we are fill'd with immortalitie , then the blessed parts wee 'l travell , strow'd with rubies thick as gravell , sealings of diamonds , saphire flowers , high walls of coral , and pearly bowers . from thence to heavens bribeless hall , where no corrupted voices brawl , no conscience molten into gold , no forg'd accuser bought or sold , no cause deferr'd , no vain-spent iourny , for there , christ is the kings attorney , who pleads for all without degrees , and he hath angels , but no fees : and when the twelve grand-million iury of our sins , with direfull furie , 'gainst our souls black verdicts give , christ pleads his death , & then we live. be thou my speaker [ taintless pleader , unblotted lawyer , true proceeder . ] thou would'st salvation even for alms , not with a bribed lawyers palms . and this is mine eternall plea to him that made heaven , earth & sea , that since my flesh must die so soon , and want a head to dine next noon , iust at the stroak , when my veins start & spread , set on my soul an everlasting head. then am i ready , like a palmer fit to tread those blest paths which before i writ . of death & iudgement , heaven & hell , who oft doth think , must needs die wel . sir raleigh's verses ; found in his bible in the gate-house at westminster . even such is time , which takes in trust our youth , our ioye , and all we have , and pays us nought but age and dust , when in the dark and silent grave : when we have wandred all our ways , shuts up the storie o● our days : and from which grave , & earth , & dust , the lord shall raise me up i trust . sir w. raleigh , on the snuff of a candle the night before he died . cowards fear to die , but courage stout , rather than live in snuff , wil be put out . sir walter raleigh's speech immediately before he was beheaded . upon simon and judes day , the lieutenant of the tower had a warrant to bring his prisoner to the kings-bench . w 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , where the attorney generall demanded execution , according to the iudgement pronou●ced against him at w 〈…〉 , the lord chief iustice caused the indictment . verdict and iudgement to be read , and after asked him , what he could say , why he should not die according to the law ; his answer was , that this fifteen years he had lived by the meer mercy of the king , and did now wonder how his mercy was turned into iustice , he not knowing any thing wherein he had provoked his majesties displeasure , and did hope , that he was clear from that iudgement by the kings commission in making him generall of the voyage to guiana , for ( as he conceived ) the words , to his trusty and well beloved subject , &c. did in themselves imply a pardon . but master attorney told him , these words were not sufficient for that purpose . whereupon he desired the opinion of the court , to which the lord chief iustice replied , it was no pardon in law. then began sir walter raleigh to make a long description of the events and ends of his voyage , but he was interrupted by the chief iustice , who told him , that it was not for any offence committed there , but for his first fact that he was now called in question , and thereupon told him , that seeing he must prepare to die he would not add affliction to affliction , nor aggravate his fault , knowing him to be a man full of misery ; but with the good samaritane administer oyl and wine for the comfort of his distressed soul. you have been a generall , and a great commander , imitate therefore that noble captain , who thrusting himself into the middest of a battell , cried aloud , mors me expect●t , & ego mortem expectabo , as you should not contemn so to do , nor should you fear death , the one sheweth too much boldnesse , the other no lesse cowardize , so with some other few instructions the court arose , and sir walter was committed into the hands of the sheriff of middlesex , who presently conveyed him to the gate house in westminster . upon thursday morning this couragious , although committed knight , was brought before the parliament-house , where there was a scaffold erected for his beheading : yet it was doubted over-night that he should be hanged , but it fell out otherwise . he had no sooner mounted the scaffold , but with a chearfull countenance and andaunted look , he saluted the companie . his attire was a wrought night-cap , a ruff band , a hair-coloured sattin doublet , with a black wrought waste-coat under it , a pair of black cut taffery breeches , a pair of ash-coloured silk stockings & a wrought black velvet night gown ; putting off his hat , he directed his speech to the lords present , as followeth . my honourable lords , and the rest of my good friends that come to see me die , know , that i much rejoyce that it hath pleased god to bring me from darknesse to night , and in freeing me from the tower , wherein i might have died in disgrace , by letting me love to come to this place , where though i lose my life , yet i shall clear some false accusations , unjustly laid to my charge , and leave behind me a testimony of a true heart , both to my king and country . two things there are which have exceedingly possest and provoked his majesties indignation against me , viz. a confederacie , or combination with france , and disloyall and disobedient words of my prince . for the first , his majestie had some cause , h●●●gh groundes upon a weak foundation , to suspect mine inclination to the french action , for not long before my departure from england , the french agent took occasion , passing by my house , to visit me , had some conference , during the time of his abode , onely concerning my voyage , and nothing else , i take god to witnesse . another suspition is had of me , because i did labour to make an escape from plymouth to france , i cannot deny , but that willingly , when i heard a rumour , that there was no hope of my life upon my return to london , i would have escaped so the safeguard of my life , and not for any ill intent or conspiracie against the state. the like reason of suspition arose , in that i perswaded sir lewis steakly , my guardian , to flee with me from london to france , but my answer to this is , as to the other , that onely for my safeguard , and thought else , was my intent , as i shall answer before the almightie . it is alleadged , that i seigned my self sick and in art made my body full of blisters when i was at salisbury . true it is , i did to ; the reason was , because i hoped thereb● to defer my coming before the king and councell , and so by delaying , might have gaine time to have got my pardon . i have an example out of scripture for my warrant , that in case of necessity , and for the safeguard of my life , david seigned himself foolish and mad , yet it was not imputed to him for sin . concerning the second imputation laid to my charge , that i should speak scandalous and reprochfull words of my prince , there is no witnesse against me but onely one , and he a chimicall french man , whom i entertained , rather for his iests than his iudgement : this man to incroach himself into the favour of the lords , and gaping after some great reward , hath falsely accused me of seditions speeches against his majestie ; against whom , if i did either speak , or think a thought hurtfull or prejudiciall , the lord blot me out of the book of life . it is not a time to flatter or fear princes , for i am a subject to none but death ? therefore have a charitable conceit of me . that i know to swear is an offence , to swear falsly at any time is a great sin , but to swear false before the presence of almightie god , before whom i am forthwith to appear , were an offence unpardonable ; therefore think me not now rashly , or untruly to confirm , or protest any thing . as for other objections , in that i was brought perforce into england , that i carried sixteen thousand pounds in money out of england with me , more than i i made known ; that i should receive letters from the french king , and such like , with many protestations he utterly denied . finis . the prerogative of parliaments in england . proved in a dialogue between a counsellour of state , and a iustice of peace . written by the worthy knight . sir walter raleigh . dedicated to that part of the parliament now assembled . preserved to be now happily ( in these distracted times ) published . london , printed for william sheares iunior , in westminster hall. . to the king . most gracious soveraign : those that are supprest and helpelesse are commonly silent , wishing that the common ill in all sort might be with their particular misfortunes : which disposition , as it is uncharitable in all men , so would it be in me more dogge-like then man-like , to bite the stone that strooke me : ( to wit ) the borrowed authority of my soveraigne misinformed , seeing their armes and hunds that flang it , are most of them already rotten . for i must confesse it ever , that they are debts , and not discontentments , that your majesty hath laid upon me ; the debts and obligation of a friendlesse adversity , farre more payable in all kinds , then those of the prosperous : all which , nor the least of them , though i cannot discharge , i may yet endeavour it . and notwithstanding my restraint hath retrenched all wayes , as well the wayes of labour and will , as of all other imployments , yet hath it left with me my cogitations , then which i have nothing else to offer on the altar of my love. of those ( most gracious soveraigne ) i have used some part in the following dispute , between a counsellour of estate , and a iustice of peace , the one disswading , the other perswading the calling of a parliament . in all which , since the norman conquest ( at the least so many , as histories have gathered ) i have in some things in the following dialogue presented your majesty with the contentions and successes . some things there are , and those of the greatest , which because they ought first to be resolved on , i thought fit to range them in the front of the rest , to the end your majesty may be pleased to examine your own great and princely heare of their acceptance , or refusall . the first is , that supposition , that your majesties subjects give nothing but with adjuction of their own interest , interlacing in one , and the same act your majesties reliefe , and their own liberties ; not that your majesties piety was ever suspected , but because the best princes are ever the least jealous , your majesty judging others by your self , who have abused your majesties trust . the fear'd continuance of the like abuse may perswade the provision but this caution , how ever it seemeth at first sight , your majesty shall perceive by many examples following but frivolous . the bonds of subjects to their kings should alwayes be wrought out of iron , the bonds of kings unto subjects but with cobwebs . this it is ( most renowned soveraigne ) that this trafficke of assurances hath been often urged , of which , if the conditions had been easie , our kings have as easily kept them ; if hard and prejudiciall , either to their honours or estates , the creditours have been paid their debts whith their own presumption . for all binding of a king by law upon the advantage of his necessity , makes the breach it self lawfull in a king , his charters and all other instruments being no other then the surviuing witnesses of unconstrained will : princeps non subjicitur nifi sua voluntate libera , mero motu & certa scientia : necessary words in all the grants of a king witnessing that the same grants were given freely and knowingly . the second resolution will rest in your majesty , leaving the new impositions , all monopolies , and other grievances of the people to the consideration of the house , provided , that your majesties revenue be not abated , which if your majesty shall refuse , it is thought that the disputes will last long , and the issues will be doubtfull : and on the contrary if your majesty vouchsafe it , it may perchance be stiled a yeelding , which seemeth by the sound to brave the regalty . but ( mose excellent prince ) what other is it to th' eares of the wise , but as the sound of a trumpet , having blasted forth a false alarme , becomes but common aire ? shall the head yeeld to the feete ? certainly it ought , when they are grieved , for wisdome will rather regard the commodity , then object the disgrace , seeing if the feet lye in fetters , the head cannot be freed , and where the feet feele but their own paines , the head doth not onely suffer by participiation , but withall by consideration of the evill . certainly the point of honour well weighed hath nothing in it to even the ballance , for by your majesties favour , your majesty doth not yeeld either to any person , or to any power , but to a dispute onely , in which the proposition and minor prove nothing without a conclusion , which no other person or power can make , but a majesty : yea this in henry the third his time was called a wisedome incomparable . for , the king raised again , recovery his authority : for , being in that extremity as he was driven with the queen and his children , cum abbatibus & prioribus satis humilibus hospitia quaerere & prandia : for the rest , may it please your majesty to consider that there can nothing befall your majesty in matters of affaires more unfortunately , then the commons of parliament with ill successe : a dishonour so perswasive and adventurous as it will not onely find arguments ; but it will take the leading of all enemies that shall offer themselves against your majesties estate . le tabourin de la paurete ne faict poinct de breuct : of which dangerous disease in princes , the remedy doth chiefly consist in the love of the people , which how it may be had & held , no man knowes better then your majesty ; how to loose it , all men know , and know that it is lost by nothing more then by the defence of others in wrong doing . the onely motives of mischances that ever come to kings of this land since the conquest . it is onely love ( most renowned soveraign ) must prepare the way for your majesties following desires . it is love which obeyes , which suffers , which gives , which stickes at nothing ; which love , as well of your majesties people , as the love of god to your majesty , that it may alwayes hold shall be the continuall prayers of your majesties most humble vassall , walter ralegh . a dialogue between a counsellour of state , and a justice of peace . counsellour . now sir , what think you of m. s. iohns tryall in star-chamber ? i know that the bruit ranne that he was hardly dealt withall , because he was imprisoned in the tower , seeing his disswasion from granting a benevolence to the king was warranted by the law. justice . surely sir it was made manifest at the hearing , that m. s. iohn was rather in love with his own letter ; he confessed he had seen your lordships letter , before hee wrote his to the major of marleborough , and in your lordships letter , there was not a word whereto the statutes by mr. sr. iohn alleadged , had reference ; for those statutes did condemn the gathering of money from the subject , under title of a free gift ; whereas a fift , a sixt , a tenth , &c. was set down and required . but my good lord , though divers shires have given to his majestie , some more , some lesse , what is this to the kings debt ? couns. wee know it well enough , but we have many other projects . iust . it is true my good lord : but your lordship will find , that when by these you have drawn many petty summes from the subjects , and those sometimes spent as fast as they are gathered , his majesty being nothing enabled thereby , when you shall be forced to demand your great aide , the the countrey will excuse it self in regard of their former payments . couns. what mean you by the great aide ? just . i mean the aide of parliament . couns. by parliament , i would fain know the man that durst perswade the king unto it , for if it should succeed ill , in what case were he ? just . you say well for your self my lord , and perchance you that are lovers of your selves ( under pardon ) do follow the advice of the late duke of alva , who was ever opposite to all resolutions in businesse of importance ; for if the things enterprised succeeded well , the advice never came in question ; if ill , ( whereto great undertakings are commonly subject ) he then made his advantage by remembring his countrey councell : but my good lord , these reserved polititians are not the best servants , for he that is bound to adventure his life for his master , is also bound to adventure his advice , keep not back councell ( saith ecclesiasticus ) when it may do good . couns. but sir , i speak it not in other respect then i think it dangerous for the king to assemble the three estates , for thereby have our former kings alwayes lost somewhat of their prerogatives . and because that you shall not think that i speak it at randome , i will begin with elder times , wherein the first contention began betwixt the kings of this land and their subjects in parliament . iust . your lordship shall do me a singular favour . couns. you know that the kings of england had no formal parliament till about the . year of hen. the first , for in his year for the marriage of his daughter , the king raised a tax upon every hide of land by the advice of his privy councell alone . but you may remember how the subjects soon after the establishment of this parliament , began to stand upon termes with the king , and drew from him by strong hand and the sword the great charter . just . your lordship sayes well , they drew from the king the great charter by the sword , and hereof the parliament cannot be accused , but the lords . couns. you say well , but it was after the establishment of the parliament , and by colour of it , that they had so great daring , for before that time they could not endure to hear of sr. edwards lawes , but resisted the confirmation in all they could , although by those lawes the subjects of this iland were no lesse free than any of all europe . just . my good lord , the reason is manifest ; for while the normans and other of the french that followed conquerour made spoyle of the english , they would not endure that any thing but the will of the conquerour should stand for law : but after a difcent or two when themselves were become english , and found themselves beaten with their own rods , they then began to favour the difference between subjection and slavery , and insist upon the law , meum & tuum , and to be able to say unto themselves , hoc sac & vives : yea that the conquering english in ireland did the like , your lordship knowes it better than i. couns. i think you guesse aright : and to the end the subject may know that being a faithfull servant to his prince he might enjoy his own life , and paying to his prince what belongs to a soveraigne , the remainder was his own to dispose . henry the first to content his vassals gave them the great charter , and the charter of forrests . just . what reason then had k. iohn to deny the confirmation . couns. he did not , but he on the contrary confirmed both the charters with additions , & required the pope whom he had them made his superior to strengthen him with a golden bul. just . but your honour knowes , that it was not long after , that he repented himself . couns. it is rrue , and he had reason so to do for the barons refused to follow him into france , as they ought to have done , and to say true , this great charter upon which you insist so much , was not originally granted regally aud freely ; for henry the first did usurpe the kingdome , and therefore the better to assure himself against robert his eldest brother , hee flattered the nobility and people with those charters . yea king iohn that confirmed them , had the like respect for arthur duke of britain , was the undoubted heir of the crown , upon whom iohn usurped . and so to conclude , these charters had their originall from kings de facto but not de jure . just . but king iohn confirmed the charter after the death of his nephew arthur , when he was then rex de jure also . couns. it is true , for he durst do no other , standing accursed , whereby few or none obeyed him , for his nobility refused to follow him into scotland , and he had so grieved the people by pulling down all the parke pales before harvest , to the end his deere might spoil the corn ; and by seizing the temporalities of so many bishopricks into his hands , and chiefly for practising the death of the duke of britain his nephew , as also having lost normandy to the french , so as the hearts of all men were turned from him . iust . nay by your favour my lord , king iohn restored k. edwards laws after his absolution , and wrote his letters in the . of his reigne to all sheriffes countermanding all former oppressions , yea this he did notwithstanding the lords refused to follow him into france . couns. pardon me , he did not restore king edwards lawes then , nor yet confirmed the charters , but he promised upon his absolution to doe both : but after his return out of france , in his . year he denyed it , because without such a promise he had not obtained restitution , his promise being constrained , and not voluntary . iust . but what think you ? was hee not bound in honour to performe it . couns. certainly no , for it was determined the case of king francis the first of france , that all promises by him made , whilest he was in the hands of charles the fift his enemy , were void , by reason the judge of honour , which tells us he durst doe no other . just . but king iohn was not in prison . couns. yet for all that , restraint is imprisonment , yea , fear it self is imprisonment , and the king was subject to both : i know there is nothing more kingly in a king than the performance of his word ; but yet of a word freely and voluntarily given . neither was the charter of henry the first so published , that all men might plead it for their advantage but a charter was left ( in deposito ) in the hands of the archbishop of canterbury for the time , and so to his successours . stephen langthon , who was ever a traytor to the king , produced this charter , and shewed it to the barons , thereby encouraging them to make war against the king. neither was it the old charter simply the barons sought to have confirmed , but they presented unto the king other articles and orders , tending to the alteration of the whole commonwealth , which when the king refused to signe , the barons presently put themselves into the field , and in rebellious and outragious fashion sent the king word , except he confirmed them , they would not desist from making war against him , till he had satisfied them therein . and in conclusion , the king being betrayed of all his nobility , in effect was forced to grant the charter of magna charta , and charta de forestis , at such time as he was invironed with an army in the meadowes of staynes , which harters being procured by force , pope innocent afterward disavowed , and threatned to curse the barons if they submitted not themselves as they ought to their soveraigne lord , which when the lords refused to obey , the king entertained an army of strangers for his own defence , wherewith having mastered and beaten the barons , they called in lewes of france ( a most unnaturall resolution ) to be their king neither was magna charta a law in the . of henry the d . but simply a charter which hee confirmed in the . of his reigne , and made it a law in the . according to littletons opinion . thus much for the beginning of the great cbarter , which had first an obscure birth from usurpation , and was secondly fostered and shewed to the world by rebellion . just . i cannot deny but that all your lordship hath said is true ; but seeing the charters were afterwards so many times confirmed by parliament and made lawes , and that there is nothing in them unequall or prejudicial to the king , doth not your honour think it reason they should be observed ? couns. yes , and observed they are in all that the state of a king can permit , for no man is destroyed but by the lawes of the land , no man disseized of his inheritance but by the lawes of the land , imprisoned they are by the prerogative where the king hath cause to suspect their loyalty : for were it otherwise , the king should never come to the knowledge of any conspiracy or treason against his person or state , and being imprisoned , yet doth not any man suffer death but by the law of the land . just . but may it please your lordship , were not cornewallis , sharpe , and hoskins imprisoned , being no suspition of treason there ? couns. they were ; but it cost them nothing . just . and what got the king by it ? for in the conclusion ( besides the murmure of the people ) cornewallis , sharpe , and hoskins having greatly overshot themselves , and repented them , a fine of or l. was laid on his majesty for their offences , for so much their diet cost his majesty . couns. i know who gave the advice , sure i am that it was none of mine : but thus i say , if you consult your memory , you shall find that those kings which did in their own times comfirme the magna charta , did not onely imprison , but they caused of their nobility and others to be slain without hearing or tryall , just . my good lord , if you will give me leave to speak freely , i say , that they are not well advised that perswade the king not to admit the magna charta with the former reservations . for as the king can never lose a farthing by it as i shall prove anon : so except england were as naples is , and kept by garrisons of another nation , it is impossible for a king of england to greaten and inrich himself by any way so assuredly , as by the love of his people : for by one rebellion the king hath more losse then by a hundred years observance of magna charta , for therein have our kings been forced to compound with roagues and rebels , and to pardon them , yea the state of the king , the mouarchie , the nobility have been endangered by them . couns. well sir , let that passe , why should not our kings raise mony as the kings of france do by their letters and edicts onely ? for since the time of lewes the . of whom it is said , that he freed the french kings of their wardship , the french kings have seldome assembled the states for any contribution . just . i will tell you why : the strength of england doth consist of the people and yeomanry , the pefants of france have no courage nor armes : in france every village and burrough hath a castle , which the french call chasteau villain , every good city hath a good cittadell , the king hath the regiments of his guards and his men at armes alwayes in pay ; yea the nobility of france in whom the strength of france consists , doe alwayes assist the king in those leavies , because themselves being free , they made the same leavies upon ther tennants . but my lord , if you marke it , france was never free in effect from civill wars , and lately it was endangered either to be conquered by the spaniard , or to be cantonized by the rebellious french themselves , since that freedome of wardship . but my good lord , to leave this digression , that wherein i would willingly satisfie your lordship , is , that the kings of england have never received losse by parliament , or prejudice . couns. no sir , you shall find that the subjects in parliament have decreed great things to the disadvantage and dishonour of our kings in former times . just . my good lord , to avoid confusion , i will make a short repitition of them all , & then your lordship may object where you see cause ; and i doubt not but to give your lordship satisfaction . in the sixt year of henry the d there was no dispute , the house gave the king two shillings of every plough land within england , and in the end of the same year he had escuage payed him ( to wit ) for every knights fee two marks in silver . in the fifth year of that king , the lords demaunded the confirmation of the great charter which the kings councell for that time present excused , alleadging that those priviledges , were exhorted by force during the kings minoritie , and yet the king was pleased to send forth his writ to the sheriffes of every countrey , requiring them to certifie what those liberties were , and how used , and in exchange of the lords demaund , because they pressed him so violently , the king required all the castles and places which the lords held of his , and had held in the time of his father , with those manors and lordships which they had heretofore wrested from the crown , which at that time ( the king being provided of forces ) they durst not deny , in the year he had the . peny of all goods given him , upon condition to confirme the great charter : for by reason of the wars in france , and the losse of rochett , he was them enforced to consent to the lords in all they demanded , in the tenth of his reigne he fined the city of london at . marks , because they had received lewis of france , in the . year in the parliament at oxford , he revoked the great charter , being granted when he was under age , and governed by the earle of pembroke and the bishop of winchester , in this . year the earles of cornewall and chester , marshall , edward earle of pembroke , gilbert earle of gloucester , warren , hereford , ferrars , and warwick , and others rebelled against the king , and constrained him to yeeld unto them in what they demaunded for their particular interest , which rebellion being appeased , he sayled into france , and in his . year he had a th of the temporality , and a disme and a half of the spirituality , and withall escuage of every knights fee. couns. but what say you to the parliament of westminster in the th . of the king , where notwithstanding the wars of france and his great charge in repulsing the welsh rebels , he was flatly denyed the subsidy demanded . iust . i confesse , my lord , that the house excused themselves by reason of their poverty , and the lords taking of armes ; in the next year it was manifest that the house was practised aganst the king : and was it not so , my good lord , think you in our two last parliaments , for in the first even those whom his majesty trusted most , betrayed him in the union , and in the second there were other of the great ones ran counter . but your lordship spake of dangers of parliaments , in this , my lord , there was a denyall , but there was no danger at all : but to returne where i left , what got the lords by practizing the house at that time ? i say that those that brake this staffe upon the king , were overturned with the counterbuffe , for he resumed all those lands which he had given in his minority , he called all his exacting officers to accompt , he found them all faulty , he examined the corruption of other magistrates , and from all these he drew sufficient money to satisfie his present necessity ; whereby he not onely spared his people , but highly contented them with an act of so great iustice : yea hubert earle of kent , the chief iustice whom he had most trusted , and most advanced , was found as false to the king as any one of the rest . and for conclusion in the end of that year at the assembly of the states at lambeth , the king had the fortieth part of every mans goods given him freely toward his debts , for the people , who the same year had refused to give the king any thing , when they saw he had squeased those spunges of the common-wealth , they willingly yeelded to give him satisfaction . couns. but i pray you what became of this hubert , whom the king had favoured above all men , betraying his majesty as he did . iust . there were many that perswaded the king to put him to death , but he could not be drawn to consent , but the king seized upon his estate which was great ; yet in the end he left him a sufficient portion , and gave him his life because he had done great service in former times : for this majesty , though he tooke advantage of his vice , yet he forgot not to have consideration of his vertue . and upon this occasion it was that the king , betrayed by those whom he most trusted , entertained strangers , and gave them their offices and the charge of his castles and strong places in england . couns. but the drawing in of those strangers was the cause that marshall earle of pembroke moved war against the king. just . it is true , my good lord , but he was soon after slain in ireland , and his whole masculine race , ten yeares extinguished , though there were five sons of them , and marshal . being dead , who was the mover and ring-leader of that war , the king pardoned the rest of the lords that had assisted marshall . couns. what reason had the king so to doe ? just . because he was perswaded , that they loved his person , and only hated those corrupt counsellors , that then bare the greatest sway under him , as also because they were the best men of war he had , whom if he destroyed , having war with the french , he had wanted commanders to have served him . couns. but what reason had the lords to take armes ? just . because the king entertained the poictovins , were not they the kings vassals also ? should the spaniards rebell , because the spanish king trusts to the neapolitans , fortagues , millanoies , and other nations his vassals , seeing those that are governed by the vice-royes and deputies , are in policy to be well entertained & to be employed , who would otherwise devise how to free themselves ; whereas , being trusted and imployed by their prince , they entertain themselves with the hopes that other the kings vassals do , if the king had called in the spaniards , or other nations , not his subjects , the nobilitie of england had reason of grief . couns. but what people did ever serve the king of england more faithfully then the gascoynes did , even to the last of the conquest of that duchie ? iust . your lordship sayes well , and i am of that opinion , that if it had pleased the queen of eng. to have drawn some of the chief of the irish nobilitie into eng. and by exchange to have made them good free-holders in eng. she had saved above . millions of pounds , which were consumed in times of those rebellions . for what held the great gascoigne firme to the crown of england ( of whom the duke of espernon married the inheritrix ) but his earldome of kendall in england , whereof the duke of espernon ( in right of his wife ) beares the title to this day ? and to the same end i take it , hath iames our soveraign lord given lands to divers of the nobilitie of scotland . and if i were worthy to advise your lordship , i should think that your lordship should do the king great service , to put him in mind to prohibite all the scottish nation to alienate and sell away their inheritance here ; for they selling , they not only give cause to the english to complain , that the treasure of england is transported into scotland , but his majestie is thereby also frustrated of making both nations one , and of assuring the service and obedience of the scots in future . couns. you say well for though those of scotland that are advanced and enriched by the kings majesties will , no doubt serve him faithfully , yet how their heires and successors , having no inheritance to lose in england , may be seduced , is uncertain . but let us go on with our parliament . and what say you to the denyall , in the th . year of his reigne , even when the king was invited to come into france by the earle of march , who had married his mother , and who promised to assist the king in the conquest of many places lost ? iust . it is true my good lord , that a subsidie was then denied , and the reasons are delivered in english histories , and indeed the king not long before had spent much treasure in aiding the duke of britain to no purpose ; for he drew over the king but to draw on good conditions for himself , as the earle of march his father in law now did : as the english barons did invite lewes of france not long before , as in elder times all the kings and states had done , and in late years the leaguers of france entertained the spaniards , and the french protestants and netherlands , queen elizabeth , not with any purpose to greaten those that aide them , but to purchase to themselves an advantageous peace . but what say the histories to this denyall ? they say , with a world of payments there mentioned , that the king had drawn the nobility drie . and besides , that whereas not long before great summes of money were given , and the same appointed to be kept in four castles , and not to be expended but by the advice of the peeres ; it was beleeved , that the same treasure was yet unspent . couns. good sir you have said enough ; judge you whether it were not a dishonour to the king to be so tyed , as not to expend his treasure but by other mens advice , as it were by their licence . iust . surely , my lord , the king was well advised to take the money upon any condition , and they were fooles that propounded the restraint ; for it doth not appear , that the king took any great heed to those overseers : kings are bound by their pietie , and by no other obligation . in queen maries time , when it was thought that she was with child , it was propounded in parliament , that the rule of the realme should be given to king philip , during the minoritie of the hoped prince or princesse ; and the king offered his assurance in great summes of money , to relinquish the government at such time as the prince or princesse should be of age : at which motion , when all else were silent in the house , lord da●res ( who was none of the wisest ) asked who shall sue the kings bonds ? which ended the dispute , ( for what other bond is between a king and his vassals , then the bond of the kings faith ? ) but , my good lord , the king , notwithstanding the denyall at that time , was with gifts from particular persons , and otherwise , supplyed for proceeding of his journey for that time into france ; he took with him caskes filled with silver and coyne , which was a great treasure in those dayes . and lastly , notwithstanding the first denyall , in the kings absence he had escuage granted him ( to wit ) s . of every knights fee. couns. what say you then to the th year of that king , in which when the king demanded reliefe , the states would not consent , except the the same former order had bin taken for the appointing of overseers for the treasure : as also that the lord chief iustice and the l. chancelor should be chosen by the states , with some barons of the exchequer and other officers . just . my good lord , admit the king had yeelded their demands , then whatsoever had been ordained by those magistrates to the dislike of the common-wealth , the people had been without remedie , whereas while the king made them , they had their appeal and other remedies . but those demands vanished , and in the end the king had escuage given him , without any of their conditions . it is an excellent vertue in a king to have patience , and to give way to the furie of mens passions . the whale when he is strucken by the fisherman , growes into that furie , that he cannot be resisted : but will overthrow all the ships and barkes that come into his way ; but when he hath tumbled a while , he is drawn to the shore with a twin'd thred . couns. what say you then to the parliament in the th . of that king ? iust . i say , that the commons being unable to pay , the king relieves himself upon the richer sort : and so it likewise happened in the . of that king , in which he was relieved chiefly by the citie of london . but , my good lord , in the parliament in london in the th year , he had given him the tenth of all the revenues of the church for years , and three marks of every knights fee throughout the kingdome , upon his promise and oath upon the observing of magna charta , but in the end of the same year , the king being then in france , he was denyed the aides which he required . what is this to the danger of a parliament ? especially at this time they had reason to refuse , they had given so great a summe in the beginning of the same year . and again ; because it was known that the king had but pretended war with the king of castile , with whom he had secretly contracted an alliance , and concluded a marriage betwixt his son edward and the lady elenor. these false fires do but fright children , and it commonly falls out , that when the cause given is known to be false , the necessitie pretended is thought to be fained . royall dealing hath evermore royall successe : and as the king was denyed in the eight and thirtieth year , so was he denyed in the nine and thirtieth year , because the nobilitie and the people saw it plainely , that the k. was abused by the pope , who as well in despite to manfred bastard son to the emperour frederick the second : as to cozen the king and to waste him , would needes bestow on the king the kingdome of sicily ; to recover which the king sent all the treasure he could borrow or scrape to the pope , and withall gave him letters of credence , for to take up what he could in italy , the king binding himself for the payment . now , my good lord , the wisdome of princes is seen in nothing more then in their enterprises . so how unpleasing it was to the state of england to consume the treasure of the land , and in the conquest of sicily so far off , and otherwise , for that the english had lost normandie under their noses , and so many goodly parts of france , of their own proper inheritances : the reason of the denyall is as well to be considered as the denyall . couns. was not the king also denyed a subsidie in the fortie first of his reigne ? iust . no , my lord : for although the king required money as before , for the impossible conquest of sicily , yet the house offered to give marks , which whether he refused or accepted , is uncertain : and whilst the king dreamed of sicily , the welsh invaded and spoyled the borders of england ; for in the parliament of london , when the king urged the house for the prosecuting the conquest of sicily , the lords utterly disliking the attempt , urged the prosecuting of the welshmen : which parliament being proroged did again assemble at oxford , and was called the mad parliament , which was no other then an assembly of rebels , for the royal assent of the king which gives life to all lawes , form'd by the three estates , was not a royall assent , when both the king and the prince were constrained to yeeld to the lords . a contrained consent is the consent of a captive and not of a king and therefore there was nothing done their either legally or royally . for if it be not properly a parliament where the subject is not free , certainely it can be none where the king is bound , for all kingly rule was taken from the king , and twelve peeres appointed , and as some writers have it . peeres , to governe the realme , and therefore the assembly made by iack straw and other rebels may aswell be called a parliament as that of oxford . principis nomen habere , non est esse princeps , for thereby was the k. driven not only to compound all quarrels with the french , but to have meanes to be revenged on the rebell lords : but he quitted his right to normandy , anjou and mayne . couns. but sir , what needed this extremity , seeing the lords required but the confirmation of the former charter , which was not prejudiciall to the king to grant ? just . yes my good lord , but they insulted upon the king , and would not suffer him to enter into his own castles , they put down the purveyor of the meat for the maintenance of his house : as if the king had been a bankrupt , and gave order that without ready money he should not take up a chicken . and though there is nothing against the royalty of a king in these charters ( the kings of england being kings of freemen and not of slaves ) yet it is so contrary to the nature of a king to be forced even to those things which may be to his advantage , as the king had some reason to seek the dispensation of his oath from the pope , and to draw in strangers for his own defence : yea jure salvo coronae nostrae is intended inclusively in all oathes and promises exacted from a soveraigne . couns. but you cannot be ignorant how dangerous a thing it is to call in other nations both for the spoil they make , as also , because they have often held the possession of the best places with which they have been trusted . just . it is true my good lord , that there is nothing so dangerous for a king as to be constrained and held as prisoner to his vassals , for by that , edward the second , and richard the second lost their kingdomes and their lives . and for calling in of strangers , was not king edward the sixth driven to call in strangers against the rebels in norfolke , cornwall , oxfordshire and elsewhere ? have not the kings of scotland been oftentimes constrained to entertain strangers against the kings of england : and the king of england at this time had he not bin diverse times assisted by the kings of scotland & had bin endangered to have been expelled for ever . couns. but yet you know those kings were deposed by parliament . just . yea my good lord being prisoners , being out of possession , and being in their hands that were princes of the blood and pretenders . it is an old countrey proverbe , ( that might overcomes right ) a weak title that weares a strong sword , commonly prevailes against a strong title that weares but a weak one , otherwise philip the second had never been duke of portugal , nor duke of millayne , nor king of naples & sicily . but good lord , errores non sunt trahendi in exemplum . i speak of regall , peaceable , and lawfull parliaments . the king at this time was but a king is name , for glocester , leicester and chichester made choise of other nine , to whom the rule of the realme was committed , and the prince was forced to purchase his liberty from the earle of leicester , by giving for his ransome the countey pallatine of chester . but my lord let us judge of those occasions by their events what became of this proud earle ? was he not soon after slain in evesham ? was he not left naked in the field , and left a shamfull spectacle , his head being cut off from his shoulders , his privie parts from his body , and laid on each side of his nose ? and did not god extinguish his race , after which in a lawfull parliament at westminster ( confirmed in a following parliament of westminster ) were not all the lords that followed leycester disinheried ? and when that fool glocester after the death of leycester ( whom he had formerly forsaken ) made himself the head of a second rebellion , and called in strangers , for which not long before he had cried out against the king , was not he in the end , after that he had seen the slaughter of so many of the barons , the spoil of their castles , and lordships constrained to submit himself , as all the survivers did , of which they that sped best , payed their fines and ransomes , the king reserving his younger son , the earledomes of leycester and derby . couns. well sir , we have disputed this king to the grave , though it be true , that he out-lived all his enemies , and brought them to confusion , yet those examples did not terrifie their successors , but the earle marshall , and hereford , threatned king edward the first , with a new war. iust . they did so , but after the death of hereford , the earle marshall repented himself , and to gain the kings favour , he made him heir of all his lands . but what is this to the parliament ? for there was never king of this land had more given him for the time of his raign , then edward the son of henry the third had . couns. how doth that appear ? just . in this sort my good lord , in this kings third year he had given him the fifteenth part of all goods . in his sixt year a twentyeth . in his twelfth year a twentyeth , in his fourteenth year he had escuage ( to wit ) forty shillings of every knights fee , in this eighteenth year he had the eleventh part of all moveable goods within the kingdome , in his nineteenth year the tenth part of all church livings in england , scotland and ireland ; for six years , by agreement from the pope , in his three and twentieth year he raised a taxe upon wool and fels , and on a day caused all the religious houses to be searched , and all the treasure in them to be seized and brought to his coffers , excusing himself by laying the fault upon his treasurer , he had also in the end of the same year , of all goods of all burgesses , and of the commons the th part , in the th year of the parliament of st. edmundsbury , he had an th part of the goods of the burgesses , and of the people in generall , the tenth part . he had also the same year by putting the clergie out of his protection a fifth part of their goods , and in the same year he set a great taxe upon woolls , to wit , from half a marke to s . upon every sack , whereupon the earle marshall , and the earle of hereford refusing to attend the king into flanders , pretended the greevances of the people . put in the end the king having pardoned them , and confirmed the great charter , he had the ninth penny of all goods from the lords and commons of the clergie , in the south he had the tenth penny , and in the north the fift penny . in the two and thirtyeth year he had a subsedy freely granted . in the three and thirtyeth year he confirmed the great charter of his own royall disposition , and the states to shew their thankfulnesse , gave the king for one year , the fift part of all the revenues of the land , and of the citizens the sixt part of their goods . and in the same year the king used the inquisition called trai le baston . by which all justices and other magistrates were grievously fined that had used extortion or bribery , or had otherwise misdemeaned themselves to the great contentation of the people . this commission likewise did enquire of entruders , barators , and all other the like vermine , whereby the king gathered a great masse of treasure with a great deal of love . now for the whole raigne of this king , who governed england years , there was not any parliament to his prejudice . couns. but there was taking of armes by marshall and hereford . just . that 's true , but why was that ? because the king , notwithstanding all that was given him by parliament , did lay the greatest taxes that ever king did without their consent . but what lost the king by those lords ? one of them gave the king all his lands , the other dyed in disgrace . couns. but what say you to the parliament in edward the seconds time his successor : did not the house of parliament banish peirce gaveston whom the king favoured ? just . but what was this gaveston but an esquier of gascoine , formerly banisht the realme by king edward the first , for corrupting the prince edward , now raigning . and the whole kingdome fearing and detesting his venemous disposition , they besought his majestie to cast him off , which the king performed by an act of his own , and not by act of parliament , yea gavestones own father in law , the earle of glocester , was one of the chiefest of the lords that procured it . and yet finding the kings affection to folow him so strongly , they all consented to have him recalled . after which when his credit so encreased , that he dispised and set at naught all the ancient nobility , and not onely perswaded the king to all manner of outrages and riots , but withall transported what he lifted of the kings treasure , and iewels : the lords urged his banishment the second time , but neither was the first nor second banishment forced by act of parliament , but by the forceable lords his enemies . lastly he being recalled by the king , the earle of lancaster caused his head to be stricken off , when those of his party had taken him prisoner . by which presumptuous act , the earle and the rest of his company committed treason and murder : treason by raising an army without warrant , murder by taking away the life of the kings subject . after which gaveston being dead , the spencers got possession of the kings favour , though the younger of them was placed about the king , by the lords themselves . couns. what say you then to the parliament held at london about the sixt year of that king. just . i say that king was not bound to performe the acts of this parliament , because the lords being too strong for the king , inforced his consent , for these be the words of our own history . they wrested to much beyond the bounds of reason . couns. what say you to the parliaments of the white wands in the th of the king. just . i say the lords that were so moved , came with an army , and by strong hand surprized the king , they constrained , ( saith the story ) the rest of the lords and compelled many of the bishops to consent unto them , yea it saith further , that the king durst not but grant to all that they required , ( to wit ) for the banishment of the spencers . yea they were so insolent that they refused to lodge the queen comming through kent in the castle of leedes , and sent her to provide her lodging where she could get it so late in the night , for which notwithstanding some that kept her out were soon after taken and hang'd , and therefore your lordship cannot call this a parliament for the reasons before alleadged . but my lord what became of these lawgivers to the king , even when they were greatest , a knight of the north called andrew herkeley , assembled the forces of the countrey , overthrew them and their army , slew the earle of hereford , and other barons , took their generall thomas earle of lancaster , the kings cozen germane at that time possessed of five earledomes , the lords clifford , talbort , moubray , maudiut , willington , warren , lord darcy , withers , knevill , leybourne , bekes , lovell , fitz williams , watervild , and divers other barons , knights and esquiers , and soon after the lord percy , and the lord warren took the lords baldsemere , and the lord audley , the lord teis , gifford , tucoet , and many others that fled from the battaile , the most of which past under the hands of the hangman , for constraining the king under colour and name of a parliament . but this your good lordship may judge , to whom , those tumultuous assemblies ( which our histories , falsely call parliaments have been dangerous , the king in the end ever prevailed , and the lords lost their lives , and estates . after which the spencers in their banishment at york , in the th of the king , were restored to the honors and estates , and therein the king had a subsedy given him the sixt penny of goods throughout england , ireland , and wales . couns. yet you see the spencers were soon after dissolved . iust . it is true my lord , but that is nothing to our subject of parliament , they may thank their own insolencie , for they branded and dispised the queen , whom they ought to have honored as the kings wife ; they were also exceeding greedy , and built themselves upon other mens ruines , they were ambitious and exceeding malicious , whereupon that came , that when chamberlain spencer was hang'd in hereford , a part of the th psalm was written over his head : quid gloriaris in malitia potens ? couns. well sir , you have all this while excused your self upon the strength and rebellions of the lords , but what say you now to king edward the third , in whose time ( and during the time of this victorious king , no man durst take armes or rebell ) the three estates did him the greatest affront that ever king received or endured , therefore i conclude where i began , that these parliaments are dangerous for a king , just . to answer your lordship in order , may it please you first to call to mind , what was given this great king by his subjects before the dispute betwixt him and the house happened , which was in his latter dayes , from his first year to his fift year , there was nothing given the king by his subjects , in his eight year at the parliament at london a tenth and a fifteenth was granted , in his tenth year he ceased upon the italians goods here in england to his own use , with all the goods of the monkes cluniackes and others , of the order of the cistertians . in the eleaventh year , he had given him by parliament a notable relief , the one half of the woolls throughout england , and of the clergy all their woolls , after which , in the end of the year he had granted in his parliament at westminster , forty shillings upon every sack of wooll , and for every wooll fels forty shillings , for every last of leatherne , as much , and for all other merchandizes after the same rate . the king promising that this years gathering ended , he would thenceforth content himself with the old custome , he had over and above this great aide the eight part of all goods of all citizens and burgesses ; and of other as of forreigne merchants , and such as lived not of the gain of breeding of sheep and cattell the fifteenth of their goods . nay my lord : this was not all , though more then ever was granted to any king , for the same parliament bestowed on the king the ninth sheaf of all the corn within the land , the ninth fleece , and the ninth lambe for two years next following ; now what think your lordship of this parliament . couns. i say they were honest men . iust . and i say , the people are as loving to their king now , as ever they were , if they be honestly and wisely dealt withall , and so his majesty hath found them in his last two parliaments , if his majestie had not been betrayed by those whom he most trusted . couns. but i pray you sir , who shall a king trust , if he may not rust those whom he hath so greatly advanced ? just . i will tell your lordship whom the king may trust . couns. who are they ? iust . his own reason , and his own excellent iudgement which have not deceived him in any thing , wherein his majesty hath been pleased to exercise them , take councell of thine heart ( saith the book of wisedome ) for there is none more faithfull unto thee then it . couns. it is true , but his majesty found that those wanted no judgement whom he trusted , and how could his majestie divine of their honesties ? just . will you pardon me if i speak freely , for if i speak out of love , which ( as solomon saith ) covereth all trespasses , the truth is , that his majestie would never beleeve any man that spake against them , and they knew it well enough , which gave them boldnesse to do what they did . couns. what was that ? just . even , my good lord , to ruine the kings estate so far as the state of so great a king may be ruin'd by men ambitious and greedy without proportion . it had been a brave increase of revenue , my lord , to have raysed l . land of the kings to l . revenue , and to raise the revenue of wards to l . more l . added to the rest of his majesties estate , had so enabled his majestie , as he could never have wanted . and my good lord , it had been an honest service to the king , to have added l . lands of the lord cobhams , woods and goods being worth l . more . couns. i know not the reason why it was not done . just . neither doth your lordship , perchance know the reason why the l . offer'd by swinnerton for a fine of the french wines , was by the then lord treasurer conferr'd on devonshire and his mistris . couns. what moved the treasurer to reject and crosse that raising of the kings lands ? just . the reason , my good lord is manifest , for had the land been raised , then had the king known when he had given or exchanged land , what he had given or exchanged . couns. what hurt had been to the treasurer whose office is truely to informe the king of the value of all that he giveth ? just . so he did when it did not concerne himself nor his particular , for he could never admit any one peece of a good manour to passe in my lord aubignes book of l . and , till he himself had bought , and then all the remaining flowers of the crowne were called out . now had the treasurer suffer'd the kings lands to have been raised , how could his lordship have made choice of the old ●ents , as well in that book of my lord aubigne , as in exchange of theobalds , or which he took hatfield in it , which the greatest subject , or favorite queen elizabeth had never durst have named unto her by way of gift or exchange . nay my lord , so many other goodly mannors have passed from his majestie , as the very heart of the kingdome mourneth to remember it , and the eyes of the kingdome shedde teares continually at the beholding it : yea the soul of the kingdome is heavy unto death with the consideration thereof , that so magnanimous a prince , should suffer himself to be so abused . couns. but sir you know that cobhams lands were entayled upon his cofens . just . yea my lord , but during the lives and races of george prook his children , it had been the kings , that is to say , for ever in effect , but to wrest the king , and to draw the inheritance upon himself , he perswaded his majestie to relinquish his interest for a pretty summe of mony ; and that there might be no counterworking , he sent prook l. to make friends whereof lord hume had l . back again , buckhurst and barwick had the other l. and the treasurer and his heires the masse of land forever . couns. what then i pray you came to the king by this great consiscation . iust . my lord , the kings majestie by all those goodly possessions , woods and goods looseth l by the year which he giveth in pension to cobham , to maintain him in prison . couns. certainly , even in conscience they should have reserved so much of the land in the crown , as to have given cobham meat and apparell , and not made themselves so great gainers , and the king l . ( per annum ) looser by the bargain , but it 's past : consilium non est eorum quae fieri nequeunt . just . take the rest of the sentence , my lord : sed consilium versatur in iis quae sunt in nostra potestate . it is yet , my good lord , in potestate regis , to right himself . but this is not all my lord ; and i fear me , knowing your lordships love to the king , it would put you in a feaver to hear all , i will therefore go on with my parliaments . couns. i pray do so , and amongst the rest , i pray you what say you to the parliament holden at iondon in the fifteenth year of king edward the third ? iust i say there was nothing concluded therein to the prejudice of the king . it is true , that a little before the sitting of the house , the king displaced his chancellour and his treasurer , and most of all his iudges and officers of the exchequer , and committed many of them to prison , because they did not supply him with money , being beyond the seas , for the rest , the states assembled , besought the king that the lawes of the two charters might be observed , and that the great officers of the crowne might be chosen by parliament . couns but what successe had these petitions . iust . the charters were observed , as before , and so they will be ever , and the other petition was rejected , the king being pleas'd , notwithstanding , that the great officers , should take an oath in parliament to do iustice. now for the parliament of westminster , in the th year of the king , the king had three markes and a half for every sack of wooll , transported ; and in his th he had a th of the clergie , and a th of the laity for one year . his majestie forbare after this to charge his subjects with any more payments , untill the th of his reigne , when there was given the king by parliament for every sack of wool transported for six yeares , by which grant , the king received a thousand markes a day , a greater matter then a thousand pounds in these dayes , and a l . a day amounts to l . a year , which was one of the greatest presents that ever was given to a king of this land . for besides the cheapenesse of all things in that age , the kings souldiers had but d. a day wages , a man at armes d . a knight but s . in the parliament at westminster , in the th year he had s . d . for every sack of wooll transported , & in the th year dismes and fifteens . in his th year he had ● l of the laity , and because the spiritualty disputed it , and did not pay so much , the king chang'd his chancellour , treasurer , & privy seal being bishops , and placed lay men in their roome . couns. it seems that in those dayes the kings were no longer in love with their great chancellors , then when they deserved well of them . just . no my lord , they were not , and that was the reason they were well served , and it was the custome then , and in many ages after , to change the treasurer & the chancellour every years , and withall to hear all mens complaints against them . couns. but by this often change , the saying is verified , that there is no inheritance in the favour of kings . he that keepeth the figge-tree ( saith solomon ) shall eate the fruit thereof ; for reason it is that the servant live by the master . just . my lord , you say well in both , but had the subject an inheritance in the princes favour , where the prince hath no inheritance in the subjects fidelity , then were kings in more unhappy estate then common persons , for the rest , solomon meaneth not , that he that keepeth the figge tree should surfet , though he meant he should eat , he meant not he should break the branches in gathering the figs , or eat the ripe ; and leave the rotten for the owner of the tree ; for what saith he in the following chapter , he saith that he that maketh hast to be ●ich , cannot be innocent . and before that , he saith , that the end of an inheritance hastily gotten , cannot be blessed . your lordship hath heard of few or none great with kings , that have not used their power to oppresse , that have not growne insolent and hatefull to the people ; yea , insolent towards those princes that advanced them . couns. yet you see that princes can change their fancies . iust . yea my lord , when favorites change their faith , when they forget that how familiar soever kings make themselves with their vassals , yet they are kings : he that provoketh a king to anger ( saith solomon ) sinneth against his own soul. and he further saith , that pride goeth before distruction , and a high mind before afall . i say therefore , that in discharging those lucifers , how dear soever they have been , kings make the world know that they have more of iudgement then of passion , yea they thereby offer a satisfactory sacrifice to all their people , too great benefits of subjects to their king , where the mind is blown up with their own deservings , and to great benefits of kings conferr'd upon their subjects , where the mind is not qualified with a great deal of modesty are equally dangerous . of this later and insolenter , had king richard the second delivered up to iustice but three or four , he had still held the love of the people , and thereby his life and estate . couns. well , i pray you go on with your parliaments . iust . the life of this great king edward drawes to an end , so do the parliaments of this time , wherein years raigne , he never received any affront , for in his th year he had a disme and a fifteen granted him freely . couns. but sir it is an old saying , that all is well that ends well , iudge you whether that in his th . year in parliament at westminster he received not an affront , when the house urged the king to remove and discharge from his presence the duke of lancaster , the lord latimer his chamberlaine , sir richard sturry , and others whom the king favoured and trusted . nay , they pressed the king to thrust a certain lady out of court , which at that time bare the greatest sway therein . iust . i will with patience answer your lordship to the full , and first your lordship may remember by that which i even now said , that never king had so many gifts as this king had from his subjects , and it hath never grieved the subjects of england to give to their king , but when they knew there was a devouring lady , that had her share in all things that passed , and the duke of lancaster was as scraping as shee , that the chancellour did eat up the people as fast as either of them both . it grieved the subjects to feed these cormorants . but my lord there are two things by which the kings of england have been prest , ( to wit ) by their subjects , and by their own necessities . the lords in former times were farre stronger , more warlike , better followed , living in their countries , then now they are . your lordship may remember in your reading , that there were many earles could bring into the field a thousand barbed horses , many a baron . or . barbed horses , whereas now very few of them can furnish twenty fit to serve the king. but to say the truth my lord , the iustices of peace in england , have oppos'd the injusticers of war in england , the kings writ runs over all , and the great seal of england , with that of the next constables will serve the turn to affront the greatest lords in england , that shall move against the king. the force therefore by which our kings in former times were troubled is vanisht away . but the necessities remain . the people therefore in these later ages , are no lesse to be pleased then the peeres , for as the later are become lesse , so by reason of the trayning through england , the commons have all the weapons in their hand . couns. and was it not so ever ? iust . no my good lord ; for the noblemen had in their armories , to furnish some them a thousand , some two thousand , some three thousand men , whereas now there are not many that can arme fifty . couns. can you blame them ? but i will onely answer for my self , between you and me be it spoken , i hold it not safe to mantain so great an armory or stable , it might cause me , or any other nobleman to be suspected , as the preparing of some innovation . iust . why so my lord , rather to be commended as preparing against all danger of innovation . couns. it should be so , but call your observation to accompt , and you shall find it as i say , for ( indeed ) such a jealousie hath been held ever since the time of the civill wars , over the military greatness of our nobles , as made them have little will to bend their studies that wayes : wherefore let every man provide according as he is rated in the muster book , you understand me . iust . very well my lord , as what might be replyed in the perceiving so much ; i have ever ( to deal plainly and freely with your lordship ) more fear'd at home popular violence , then all the forreine that can be made , for it can never be in the power of any forraigne prince , without a papisticall party , rather to disorder or endanger his majesties estate . couns. by this it seems , it is no lesse dangerous for a king to leave the power in the people , then in the nobility . iust . my good lord , the wisdome of our own age , is the foolishnesse of another , the time present ought not to be preferr'd to the policy that was , but the policy that was , to the time present ; so that the power of the nobility being now withered , and the power of the people in the flower , the care to content them would not be neglected , the way to win them often practized , or at least to defend them from oppression . the motive of all dangers that ever this monarchy hath undergone , should be carefully heeded , for this maxime hath no posterne , potestas humana radicatur in voluntatibus hominum . and now my lord , for king edward , it is true , though he were not subject to force , yet was he subject to necessity , which because it was violent , he gave way unto it , potestas ( saith pithagoras ) juxta necessitatem habitat . and it is true , that at the request of the house he discharged and put from him those before named , which done , he had the greatest gift ( but one ) that ever he received in all his dayes ( to wit ) from every person , man and woman , above the age of fourteen years d . of old mony , which made many millions of groats , worth . of our mony . this he had in generall , besides he had of every benificed priest , d . and of the nobility and gentry . i know not how much , for it is not set down . now my good lord , what lost the king by satisfying the desires of the parliament house , for assoon as he had the money in purse , he recalled the lords , and restored them , and who durst call the king to accompt , when the assembly were dissolued . where the word of a king is , there is power ( saith ecclesiasticus ) who shall say unto him , what doest thou ! saith the same author , for every purpose there is a time and judgement , the king gave way to the time , and his judgement perswaded him to yeeld to necessity , consularius nemo melior est quam tempus . couns. but yet you see the king was forc'd to yeeld to their demaunds . just . doth your lordship remember the saying of monsier de lange , that he that hath the profit of the war , hath also the honour of the war , whether it be by battaile or retreate , the king you see had the profit of the parliament , and therefore the honour also , what other end had the king then to supply his wants . a wise man hath evermore respect unto his ends : and the king also knew that it was the love that the people bare him , that they urged the removing of those lords , there was no man among them that sought himself in that desire , but they all sought the king , as by the successe it appeared . my good lord , hath it not been ordinary in england and in france to yeeld to the demaunds of rebels , did not king richard the second graunt pardon to the outragious rogues and murtherers that followed iack straw , and wat t●ler , after they had murthered his chancellor , his treasurer , chief iustice , and others , brake open his exchequer , and committed all manner of outrages and villanies , and why did he do it , but to avoid a greater danger : i say the kings have then yeelded to those that hated them and their estates , ( to wit ) to pernicious rebels . and yet without dishonour , shall it be called dishonour for the king to yeeld to honest desires of his subjects . no my lord , those that tell the king those tales , fear their own dishonour , and not the kings ; for the honour of the king is supreame , and being guarded by iustice and piety , it cannot receive neither wound nor stain . couns. but sir , what cause have any about our king to fear a parliament ? iust . the same cause that the earle of suffolke had in richard the seconds time , and the treasurer fartham , with others , for these great officers being generally hated for abusing both the king and the subject , at the request of the states were discharged , and others put in their roomes . coun . and was not this a dishonour to the king ? iust . certainly no , for king richard knew that his grandfather had done the like , and though the king was in his heart utterly against it , yet had he the profit of this exchange ; for suffolke was fined at markes , and l . lands . couns. well sir , we will speak of those that fear the parliament some other time , but i pray you go on with that , that happened in the troublesome raigne of richard the second who succeeded , the grandfather being dead . iust . that king my good lord , was one of the most unfortunate princes that ever england had , he was cruell , extreame prodigall , and wholly carryed away with his two minions , suffolk , and the duke of ireland , by whose ill advice and others , he was in danger to have lost his estate ; which in the end ( being led by men of the like temper ) he miserably lost . but for his subsedies he had given him in his first year being under age two tenths , and two fifteenes : in which parliament , alice peirce , who was removed in king edwards time , with lancaster , latimer , and sturry , were confiscate and banished in his second year at the parliament at glocester , the king had a marke upon every sack of wooll , and d . the pound upon wards . in his third year at the parliament at winchester , the commons were spared , and a subsedy given by the better sort , the dukes gave markes , and earles markes , bishoppes and abbots with myters six markes , every marke . d . and every knight , iustice , esquire , shrieve , person , vicar , & chaplaine , paid proportionably according to their estates . couns. this me thinks was no great matter . iust . it is true my lord , but a little mony went far in those dayes : i my self once moved it in parliament in the time of queen elizabeth , who desired much to spare the common people , & i did it by her commandement ; but when we cast up the subsedy books , we found the summe but small , when the l . men were left out . in the beginning of his fourth year , a tenth with a fifteen were granted upon condition , that for one whole year no subsedies should be demanded ; but this promise was as suddenly forgotten as made , for in the end of that year , the great subsedy of poll mony was granted in the parliament at northampton . couns. yea but there followed the terrible rebellion of baker , straw , and others , leister , wrais , and others . iust . that was not the fault of the parliament my lord , it is manifest that the subsedy given was not the cause ; for it is plain that the bondmen of england began it , because the were girevously prest by their lords in their tenure of villenage , as also for the hatred they bate to the lawyers and atturneyes : for the story of those times say , that they destroyed the houses and mannors of men of law , & such lawyers as they caught , slew them , and beheaded the lord chief iustice , which commotion being once begun , the head mony was by other rebels pretended : a fire is often kindled with a little straw , which oftentimes takes hold of greater timber , & consumes the whole building : and that this rebellion was begun by the discontented slaves ( whereof there have been many in elder times the like ) is manifest by the charter of manumission , which the king granted in hec verba , rich. dei gratid &c. sciatis quod de gratiâ nostrâ spirituali manumissimus , &c. to which seeing the king was constrained by force of armes , he revoked the letters pattents , and made them voide , the same revocation being strengthened by the parliament ensuing , in which the king had given him a subsedy upon woolls , called a maletot : in the same fourth year was the lord treasurer discharged of his office , and hales lord of st. iohns chosen in his place , in his fift year was the treasurer again changed , and the staffe given to segrave , and the lord chancellour was also changed , and the staffe given to the lord scroope : which lord scroope was again in the beginning of his sixt year turned off , and the king after that he had for a while kept the seal in his own hand , gave it to the bishop of london , from whom it was soon after taken and bestowed on the earle of suffolke , who they say had abused the king , and converted the kings treasure to his own use . to this the king condiscended , and though ( saith walsingham ) he deserved to loose his life and goods , yet he had the favour to go at liberty upon good sureties , and because the king was but young , & that the reliefe granted was committed to the trust of the earle of arundell for the furnishing of the kings navy against the french. couns. yet you see it was a dishonour to the king to have his beloved chancellour removed . iust . truly no , for the king had both his fine l . lands and asubsedy to boot . and though for the present it pleased the king to fancy a man all the world hated ( the kings passion overcomming his judgement ) yet it cannot be call'd a dishonour , for the king is to believe the generall counsell of the kingdome , and to preser it before his affection , especially when suffolke was proved to be false even to the king ; for were it otherwise love and affection might be called a frenzie and a madnesse , for it is the nature of humane passions , that the love bred by fidelity , doth change it self into hatred , when the fidelity is first changed into falshood . couns. but you see there were thirteen lords chosen in the parliament , to have the oversight of the government under the king. iust . no my lord , it was to have the oversight of those officers , which ( saith the story ) had imbezeled , lewdly wasted , and prodigally spent the kings treasure , for to the commission to those lords , or to any six of them , joyn'd with the kings counsell , was one of the most royall and most profitable that ever he did , if he had bin constant to himself . but my good lord , man is the cause of his own misery , for i will repeat the substance of the commission granted by the king , and confirmed by parliament , which , whether it had bin profitable for the king to have prosecured , your lordship may judge . the preamble hath these words : whereas our sovereigne lord the king perceiveth by the grievous complaints of the lords and commons of this realme , that the rents , profits , and revenues of this realme , by the singular and insufficient councell and evill government , as well of some his late great officers and others , &c. are so much withdrawen , wasted , given , granted , alienated , destroyed , and evill dispended , that he is so much impoverished and void of treasure and goods , and the substance of the crown so much diminished and destroyed , that his estate may not honorably be sustained as appertaineth . the king of his free will at the request of the lords and commons , hath ordained william archbishop of canterbury and others with his chancellour , treasurer , keeper of his privy seal , to survey and examine as well the estate and governance of his house , &c. as of all the rents , and profits , and revenues that to him appertaineth , and to be due , or ought to appertain and be due , &c. and all manner of gifts , grants , alienations and confirmations made by him of lands , tenements , rents , &c. bargained and sold to the prejudice of him and his crown , &c. and of his jewels & goods which were his grandfathers at the time of his death , &c. and where they be become . this is in effect the substance of the commission , which your lordship may read at large in the book of statutes , this commission being enacted in the tenth year of the kings reigne . now if such a commission were in these dayes granted to the faithfull men that have no interest in the sales , gifts nor purchases , nor in the keeping of the jewells at the queens death , nor in the obtaining , grants of the kings best lands , i cannot say what may be recovered , and justly recovered ; and what say your lordship , was not this a noble act for the king , if it had been followed to effect ? couns. i cannot tell whether it were or no , for it gave power to the commissiouers to examine all the grants . iust . why my lord , doth the king grant any thing , that shames at the examination ? are not the kings grants on record ? couns. but by your leave , it is some dishonour to a king , to have his judgement called in question . iust . that is true my lord , but in this , or whensoever the like shall be granted in the future , the kings judgement is not examined , but their knavery that abused the king. nay by your favour , the contrary is true , that when a king will suffer himself to be eaten up by a company of petty fellows , by himself raised , therein both the judgement and courage is disputed , and if your lordship will disdain it at your own servants hands , much more ought the great heart of a king to disdain it . and surely my lord , it is a greater treason ( though it undercreep the law ) to tear from the crown the ornaments thereof : and it is an infalliable maxime , that he that loves not his majesties estate , loves not his person . couns. how came it then , that the act was not executed ? iust . because these , against whom it was granted , perswaded the king to the contrary : as the duke of ireland , suffolk , the chief iustice tresilian , and others , yea , that which was lawfully done by the king , and the great councell of the kingdome , was ( by the mastery which ireland , suffolk , and tresilian had over the kings affections ) broken and disavowed . those that devised to relieve the king , not by any private invention , but by generall councell , were by a private and partiall assembly adjudged traitors , and the most honest iudges of the land , enforced to subscribe to that judgement . in so much that iudge belknap plainly told the duke of ireland , and the earl of suffolk , when he was constrained to set his hand , plainly told these lords , that he wanted but a rope , that he might therewith receive a reward for his subscription . and in this councell of nottingham was hatched the ruine of those which governed the king , of the iudges by them constrained , of the lords that loved the king , and sought a reformation , and of the king himself ; for though the king found by all the shrieves of the shires , that the people would not fight against the lords , whom they thought to bee most faithfull unto the king , when the citizens of london made the same answer , being at that time able to arme . men , and told the major that they would never fight against the kings friends , and defenders of the realme , when the lord ralph passet , who was near the king , told the king boldly that he would not adventure to have his head broken for the duke of irelands pleasure , when the lord of london told the earle of suffolk in the kings presence , that he was not worthy to live , &c. yet would the king in the defence of the destroyers of his estate , lay ambushes to intrap the lords , when they came upon his faith , yea when all was pacified , and that the king by his proclamation had clear'd the lords , and promised to produce ireland , suffolk , and the archbishop of yorke , tresiltan , and bramber , to answer at the next parliament , these men confest , that they durst not appear ; and when suffolk fled to callice , and the duke of ireland to chester , the king caused an army to be leavied in lancashire , for the safe conduct of the duke of ireland to his presence , when as the duke being encountered by the lords , ranne like a coward from his company , and fled into holland . after this was holden a parliament , which was called that wrought wonders . in the eleventh year of this king , wherein the fornamed lords , the duke of ireland and the rest , were condemned and confiscate , the chief iustice hanged with many others , the rest of the iudges condemned , and banisht , and a . and a . given to the king , couns. but good sir : the king was first besieged in the tower of london , and the lords came to the parliament , and no man durst contradict them . iust . certainly in raising an army , they committed treason , and though it appear , that they all loved the king , ( for they did him no harm , having him in their power ) yet our law doth construe all leavying of war without the kings commission , and all force raised to be intended for the death and destruction of the king , not attending the sequell . and it is so judged upon good reason , for every unlawfull and ill action is supposed to be accompanied with an ill intent . and besides , those lords used too great cruelty , in procuring the sentence of death against divers of the kings servants , who were bound to follow and obey their master and soveraigne lord , in that he commanded . couns. it is true , and they were also greatly to blame to cause then so many seconds to be put to death , seeing the principalls , ireland , suffolk , and york , had escaped them , and what reason had they to seek to enform the state by strong hand , was not the kings estate as dear to himself , as to them ? he that maketh a king know his errour mannerly and private , and gives him the best advice , he is discharged before god and his own conscience . the lords might have ●●tired themselves , when they saw they could not prevail , and have left the king to his own wayes , who had more to lose then they had . iust . my lord , the taking of arms cannot be excused in respect of the law , but this might be said for the lords that the king being under yeares , and being wholly governed by their enemies , and the enemies of the kingdome , and because by those evil mens perswasions , it was advised , how the lords should have been murthered at a feast in london , they were excusable during the kings minority to stand upon their guard against their particular enemies . but we will passe it over & go on with our parliaments that followed , whereof that of cambridge in the kings th year was the next , therein the king had given him a th and a th , after which being . yeares of age rechanged ( saith h. kinghton ) his treasurer , his chancellour , the iustices of either bench , the clerk of the privy seal and others , and took the government into his own hands . he also took the admirals place from the earl of arundell , and in his room he placed the earl of huntingdon in the yeare following , which was the th year of the k. in the parliament at westminster there was given to the king upon every sack of wooll s . and d . in the gound upon other merchandise , couns. but by your leave , the king was restrained this parliament , that he might not dispose of , but a third part of the money gathered . iust . no my lord , by your favour . but true it is that part of this mony was by the kings consent assigned towards the wars , but yet left in the lord treasurers hands , and my lord it would be a great ease , and a great saving to his majesty our lord and master , if it pleased him to make his assignations upon some part of his revenewes , by which he might have l . upon every l . and save himself a great deale of clamour . for seeing of necessity the navy must be maintained , and that those poor men as well carpenters as ship-keepers must be paid , it were better for his majesty to give an assignation to the treasurer of his navy for the receiving of so much as is called ordinary , then to discontent those poor men , who being made desperate beggars , may perchance be corrupted by them that lye in wait to destroy the kings estate . and if his majesty did the like in all other payements , especially where the necessity of such as are to receive , cannot possible give dayes , his majesty might then in a little rowle behold his receipts and expences , he might quiet his heart when all necessaries were provided for , and then dispose the rest at his pleasure . and my good lord , how excellently and easily might this have been done , if the l . had been raised as aforesaid upon the kings lands , and wards i say that his majesties house , his navy , his guards , his pensioners , his munition , his ambassadors and all else of ordinary charge might have been defrayed , and a great summe left for his majesties casuall expences and rewards , i will not say they were not in love with the kings estate , but i say they were unfortunately borne for the king that crost it . couns. well sir , i would it had been otherwise , but for the assignments , there are among us that will not willingly indure it . charity begins with it self , shall we hinder our selves of l . per annum to save the king ? no sir , what will become of our new years gifts , our presents and gratuities ? we can now say to those rhat have warrants for money , that there is not a penny in the exchequer , but the king gives it away unto the scots faster then it comes in . iust . my lord you say well , at least you say the truth , that such are some of our answers , and hence comes that generall murmure to all men that have money to receive , i say that there is not a penny given to that nation ; be it for service or otherwise but is spread over all the kingdome : yea they gather notes , and take copies of all the privy seals and warrants that his majesty hath given for the money for the scots , that they may shew them in parliament . but of his majesties gifts to the english , there is no bruit though they may be tenne times as much as the scots . and yet my good lord , howsoever they be thus answered that to them sue for money out of the echequer , it is due to them for . or . or . in the hundred , abated according to their qualities that shew , they are alwaies furnished . for conclusion , if it would please god to put into the kings heart to make their assignations , it would save him many a pound , and gain him many a prayer , and a great deal of love , for it grieveth every honest mans heart to see the abundance which even the petty officers in the exchequer , and others gather both from the king and subject , and to see a world of poore men runne after rhe king for their ordinary wages . couns. well , well , did you never hear this old tale , that when there was a great contentation about the weather the seamen complaining of contrary windes , when those of the high countreys desired rain , and those of the valleys sunshining dayes , iupiter sent them word by mercury , then , when they had all done , the weather should be as it had been , and it shall ever fall out so with them that complain , the course of payments shall be as they have been , what care we what petty fellows say ? or what care we for your papers ? have not we the kings eares , who dares contest with us ? though we cannot be revenged on such as you are for telling the truth , yet upon some other pretence , wee 'le clap you up , and you shall sue to us ere you get out . nay wee 'le make you confesse that you were deceived in your projects , and eat your own words : learn this of me sir , that as a little good fortune is better then a great deal of virtue : so the least authority hath advantage over the greatest wit , was he not the wisest man that said the battel was not the strongest , nor yet bread for the wise , nor riches to men of understanding , nor favour to men of knowledge : but what time and chance came to them all . iust . it is well for your lordship that it is so . but qu : elizabeth would set the reason of a mean man , before the authority of the greatest councellor she had , and by her patience therein she raised upon the usuall and ordinary customes of london without any new imposition above l a year , for though the treasurer burleigh , and the earle of leicester and secretary walshingham , all three pensioners to customer smith , did set themselves against a poor waiter of the custome-house called carwarden , and commanded the groomes of the privy chamber not to give him accesse , yet the queen sent for him , and gave him countenance against them all . it would not serve the turn , my lord , with her ; when your lordships would tell her , that the disgracing her great officers by hearing the complaints of busie heads , was a dishonour to her self , but she had alwayes this answer , that if any men complain unjustly against a magistrate , it were reason he should be severely punished , if justly , shee was queen of the small , as well as of the great , and would hear their complaints . for my good lord , a prince that suffereth himself to be besieged , forsaketh one of the greatest regalities belonging to a monarchie , to wit , the last appeal , or as the trench call it , le dernier resort . couns. well sir , this from the matter , i pray you go on . iust . then my lord , in the kings . year he had a tenth and a fifteen graunted in parliament of london . and that same year there vvas a great councell called at stamford to vvhich diverse men vvere sent for , of diverse counties besides the nobility , of vvhich the king took advice vvhether he should continue the vvar , or make a finall end vvith the french. couns. what needed the king to take the advice of any but of his ovvn councell in matter of peace or vvarre . iust . yea my lord , for it is said in the proverbs , where are many counsellers , there is health . and if the king had made the vvarre by a generall consent , the kingdome in generall vvere bound to maintain the vvarre , and they could not then say when the king required aid , that he undertook a needlesse vvarre . couns. you say vvell , but i pray you go on . iust . after the subsedy in the . yeare , the king desired to borrovv l . of the londoners , vvhich they refused to lend . couns. and vvas not the king greatly troubled there vvith . iust . yea but the king troubled the londoners soon aftar , for the king took the advantage of a ryot made upon the bishop of salisbury his men , sent for the major , and other the ablest citizens , comitted the major to prison in the castle of windsor , and others to other castles , and made a lord warden of this citie , till in the end vvhat vvith l . ready money , and other rich presents , instead of lending l . it cost them l . betvveen the fifteenth yeare and tvventieth yeare , he had tvvo aides given him in the parliaments of winchester and westminster : and this later vvas given to furnish the kings journey into ireland , to establish that estate vvhich vvas greatly shaken since the death of the kings grandfather , vvho received thence yearly l . and during the kings stay in ireland he had a th and a th granted . couns. and good reason , for the king had in his army . horse and . foot . iust . that by your favour , vvas the kings savity : for great armies do rather devour themselves then destroy enemies . such an army , ( vvhereof the fourth part vvould have conquered all ireland ) vvas in respect of ireland such an army as xerxes led into greece in this tvventieth yeare , vvherein he had a tenth of the clergy , vvas the great conspiracy of the kings unkle , the duke of glocester , and of moubrey , arundell , nottingham , and warvvick , the archbishop of canterbury and the abbbot of westminster , and others vvho in the one and tvventieth yeare of the king vvere all redeemed by parliament , and vvhat thinks your lordship , vvas not this assemble of the . states for the kings estate , vvherein he so prevailed , that he not onely overthrevv those popular lords , but besides ( the english chronicle saith , the king so vvrought and brought things about , that he obtained the power of both houses to be granted to certain persons , to . noblemen and gentlemen , or to seven of them . couns. sir , whether the king wrought well or il i cannot judge , but our chronicles say , that many things were done in this parliament , to the displeasure of no small number of people , to wit , for that diverse rightfull heires were disinherited of their lands and livings , with which wrongfull doings the people were much offended , so that the king with those that were about him , and chief in counsell , came into great infamy & slander . iust . my good lord , if your lordship will pardon mee , i am of opinion that those parliaments wherein the kings of this land have satisfied the people , as they have been ever prosperous , so where the king hath restrained the house , the contrary hath happened , for the kings atchievments in this parliament , were the ready preparations to his ruine . cov . you mean by the generall discontentment that followed , and because the king did not proceed legally with glocester and others . why sir , this was not the first time that the kings of england have done things without the counsell of the land : yea , contrary to the law . iust . it is true my lord in some particulars , as even at this time the duke of glocester was made away at call●ce by strong hand , without any lawfull triall : for he was a man so beloved of the people and so allied , having the dukes of lancaster , and york his brethren , the duke of aumarle , and the duke of hereford his nephewes , the great earles of arundell and warwicke , with diverse other of his part in the conspiracy , as the king durst not trie him according to the law : for at the triall of arundell and warwicke , the king was forced to entertaine a petty army about him . and though the duke was greatly lamented , yet it cannot be denyed but that he was then a traytor to the king and was it not so my lord with the duke of guise : your lordship doth remember the spur-gald proverb , that necessitie hath no law : and my good lord , it is the practice of doing wrong , and of generall wrongs done , that brings danger , and not where kings are prest in this or that particular , for there is great difference between naturall cruelty and accidentall . and therefore it was machiavels advice , that all that a king did in that kind , he shall do at once , and by his mercies afterwards make the world know that his cruelty was not affected . and my lord take this for a generall rule , that the immortall policy of a state cannot admit any law or priviledge whatsoever , but in some particular or other , the same is necessarily broken , yea in an aristocratia or popular estate , which vaunts so much of equality and common right , more outrage hath been committed then in any christian monarchy . couns. but whence came this hatred between the duke and the king his nephew . iust . my lord , the dukes constraining the king , when he was young , stuck in the kings heart , and now the dukes proud speech to the king when he had rendred brest formerly engaged to the duke brittain , kindled again these coales that were not altogether extinguished , for he used these words : your grace ought to put your body in great pain to winne a strong hold or town by feats of armes , ere you take upon you to sell or deliver any town gotten by the manhood and strong hand and policy of your noble progenitors . whereat , saith the story , the king changed his countenance , &c. and to say truth , it was a proud and maisterly speech of the duke ; besides that inclusively he taxed him of sloath and cowardise , as if he had never put himself to the adventure of winning such a place , undutifull words of a subject do often take deeper root then the memory of ill deeds do : the duke of biron found it when the king had him at advantage . yea the late earle of essex told queen elizabeth that her conditions was as crooked as her carkasse : but it cost him his head , which his insurrection had not cost him , but for that speech , who will say unto a king ( saith iob ) thou art wicked . certainly it is the same thing to say unto a lady , thou art crooked ( and perchance more ) as to say unto a king that he is wicked , and to say that he is a coward , or to use any other words of disgrace , it is one and the same errour . couns. but what say you for arundell , a brave and valiant man , who had the kings pardon of his contempt during his minority . iust . my good lord , the parliament which you say disputes the kings prerogative , did quite contrary , and destroyed the kings charter and pardon formerly given to arundell . and my good lord , do you remember , that at the parliament that wrought wonders , when these lords compounded that parliament , as the king did this , they were so mercilesse towards all , that they thought their enemies , as the earle of arundell most insolently suffered the qu : to kneel unto him three houres for the saving of one of her servants , and that scorne of his manebat alto mente repostum . and to say the truth , it is more barbarous & unpardonable then any act that ever he did to permit the wife of his soveraign to kneel to him being the kings vassell . for if he had saved the lords servant freely at her first request , as it is like enough that the qu : would also have saved him , miseris succurrens paria obtenibis aliquando : for your lordship sees that the earle of warwicke who was as farre in the treason as any of the rest , was pardoned . it was also at this parliament that the duke of hereford accused moubray duke of norfolke , and that the duke of hereford sonne to the duke of lancaster , was banished to the kings confusion , as your lordship well knows . couns. i know it well and god knows that the king had then a silly and weak councell about him , that perswaded him to banish a prince of the bloud , a most valiant man , and the best beloved of the people , in generall of any man living , especially considering that the king gave every day more then other offence to his subjects . for besides that he fined the inhabitants that assisted the lords in his minority ( of the . shires ) which offence he had long before pardoned , his blank charters , and letting the realme to farme to meon persons , by whom he was wholly advised , increased the peoples hatred towards the present government . iust . you say well my l. princes of an ill destiny do alwayes follow the worst counsell , or at least imbrace the best after opportunity is lost , qui consilia non ex suo corde sed alienis viribus colligunt , non animo sed auribus cogillant . and this was not the least grief of the subject in generall , that those men had the greatest part of the spoil of the commonwealth , which neither by virtue , valour or counsell could adde any thing unto it : nihil est sordidius , nihil crudelius ( saith anto : pius ) quamsi remp. i● arrode , qui nihil in eam suo labore conferent . couns. indeed the letting to farm the realm was very grievous to the subject . iust . will your lordship pardon me if i tell you that the letting to farm of his majesties customes ( the greatest revenue of the realm ) is not very pleasing . couns. and why i pray you , doth not the king thereby raise his profits every third yeare , & one farmer outbids another to the kings advantage iust . it is true my lord , but it grieves the subject to pay custome to the subject , for what mighty men are those farmers become , and if those farmers get many thousands every yeare , as the world knows they do , why should they not now ( being men of infinite wealth ) declare unto the king upon oath , what they have gained , and henceforth become the kings collectours of his custome , did not queen elizabeth who was reputed both a wise and juft princesse , after she had brought customer smith from l . a yeare to l . a yeare , made him lay down a recompence for that which he had gotten ? and if these farmers do give no recompence , let them yet present the king with the truth of their receivings and profits . but my lord for conclusion , after bullingbrook arriving in england with a small troop : notwithstanding the king at his landing out of ireland , had a sufficient and willing army : yet he wanting courage to defend his right gave leave to all his souldiers to depart , and put himself into his hands that cast him into his grave . couns. yet you see he was depos'd by parliament . iust . aswell may your lordship say he was knock't in the head by parliament , for your lordship knows that if king richard had ever escaped out of their fingers that deposed him , the next parliament would have made all the deposers traitours and rebels , and that justly . in which parliament , or rather unlawfull assembly , there appeared but one honest man , to wit , the b. of carlile , who scorned his life , and estate , in respect of right and his allegiance , and defended the right of his soveraigne lord against the kings elect and his partakers . couns. well i pray goe on with the parliaments held in the time of his successor henry the fourth . iust . this king had in his third year a subsedv , and in his fift a tenth of the clergy without a parllament ; in his sixt year he had so great a subsedie , as the house required there might be no record thereof left to posterity , for the house gave him s . of every knights fee , and of every l. land , d . and d . the pouud of goods . couns. yea in the end of this year , the parliament prest the king to annex unto the crown all temporall possessions belonging to church-men within the land , which at that time , was the third foot of all england . but the bishops made friends , and in the end saved their estates . iust . by this you see , my lord , that cromwell was not the first that thought on such a business . and if king henry the . had reserved the abbeyes , and other church lands , which he had given at the time , the revenue of the crown of england , had exceeded the revenue of the crown of spaine , with both the indies , whereas used as it was , ( a little enriched the crown ) served but to make a number of pettifoggers , and other gentlemen . couns. but what had the king in steed of this great revenue iust . he had a th of the commons , and tenth , and a half of the clergy , and withall , all pensions graunted by king edward , and king richard were made void . it was also moved that all crown lands formerly given ( at least given by king edw : and king richard ) should be taken back . couns. what think you of that , sir ? would it not have been a dishonour to the king ? and would not his successors have done the like to those that the king had advanced ? iust . i cannot answer your lordship , but by distinguishing , for where the kings had given land for services , and had not been over reached in his gifts , there it had been a dishonour to the king , to have made void the graunts of his predecessors , or his graunts , but all those graunts of the kings , wherein they were deceived , the very custome and policy of england makes them voyd at this day . couns. how mean you that , for his majestie hath given a great deal of land among us since he came into england , and would it stand with the k. honour to take it from us again . iust . yea my lord , very well with the kings honour , if your lordship , or any lord else , have under the name of l . land a year , gotten l . land , and so after that rate . couns. i will never believe that his majesty will ever doe any such thing . iust . and i believe as your lordship doth , but we spake e're while of those that disswaded the king from calling it a parliament : and your lordship asked me the reason , why any man should disswade it , or fear it , to which , this place gives me an opportunity to make your lordship answer , for though his majesty will of himself never question those grants yet when the commons shall make humble petition to the king in parliament , that it will please his majesty to assist them in his relief , with that which ought to be his own , which , if it will please his majesty to yeild unto the house will most willingly furnish & supply the rest , with what grace can his majesty deny that honest suit of theirs , the like having been done in many kings times before ? this proceeding may good lord , my perchance prove all your phrases of the kings honour , false english. couns. but this cannot concern many , and for my self , i am sure it concerns me little . iust . it is true my lord , & there are not many that disswade his majestie from a parliament . co. but they are great ones , a few of which will serve the turn wel enough . iust . but my lord , be they never so great ( as great as gyants ) yet if they disswade the king from his ready and assured way of his subsistence , they must devise how the k. may be elsewhere supplied , for they otherwise ●●nne into a dangerous fortune . couns. hold you contented sir , the king needs no great disswasion . iust . my lord , learn of me , that ●here is none of you all , than can ●erce the king. it is an essentiall property of a man truely wise , not to o●en all the boxes of his bosome , even ●o those that are near'st & dear'st unto him , for when a man is discovered to the very bottome , he is after the lesse esteemed . i dare undertake , that when your lordship hath served the king twice twelve years more , you will find , that his majesty hath reserved somewhat beyond all your capacities , his majesty hath great reason to put off the parliament , at his last refuge , and in the mean time , to make tryall of all your loves to serve him , for his majesty hath had good experience , how well you can serve your selves : but when the king finds , that the building of your own fortunes and factions , hath been the diligent studies , and the service of his majesty , but the exercises of your leasures : he may then perchance cast himself upon the generall love of his people , of which ( i trust ) he shall never be deceived , and leave as many of your lordships as have pilfered from the crown , to their examination . couns. well sir , i take no great pleasure in this dispute , goe on pray . iust . in that kings th year , he had also a subsedy , which is got by holding the house together from easter to christmas , and would not suffer them to depart . he had also a subsedy in his ninth year . in his eleventh year the commons did again presse the king to take all the temporalities of the church men into his hands , which they proved sufficient to maintain . earls , . knights , and . esquiers , with a hundred hospitals , but they not prevailing , gave the king a subsedy . as for the notorious prince , henry the fift , i find , that he had given him in his second year . markes , and after that two other subsedies , one in his fifth year , another in his ninth , without any disputes . in the time of his successor henry the sixt , there were not many subsedies . in this third year , he had a subsedy of a tunnage and poundage . and here ( saith iohn stow ) began those payements , which we call customes , because the payement was continued , whereas before that time it was granted but for a year two or three , according to the kings occasions . he had also an ayde & gathering of money in his fourth year , and the like in his tenth year , and in his thirteenth year a th he had also a fifteenth for the conveying of the queen out of france into england . in the twenty eight year of that king was the act of resumption of all honours , towns , castles , signeuries , villages , manors , lands , tenements , rents , reversions , fees , &c. but because the wages of the kings servants , were by the strictness of the act also restrained , this act of resumption was expounded in the parliament at reading the th year of the kings reigne . couns. i perceive that those 〈◊〉 of resumption were ordinary in former times ; for king stephen resumed the lands , which in former times he had given to make friends during the civill wars . and henry the second resumed all ( without exception ) which king stephen had not resumed ; for although king stephen took back a great deal , yet he suffered his trustiest servants to enjoy his gift . iust . yes my lord , and in after times also ; for this was not the last , nor shall be the last , i hope . and judge you my lord , whether the parliaments doe not only serve the king , whatsoever is said to the contrary ; for as all king henry the . gifts & graunts were made void by the duke of york when he was in possession of the kingdome by parliament . so in the time of k. h. when k. edw. was beaten out again , the parliament of westminster made all his acts voyd , made him and all his followers traytors , and gave the king many of their heads & lands . the parliaments of england do alwayes serve the king in possession . it served rich. the second to condemne the popular lords . it served bollingbrooke to depose rich. when edw. the . had the scepter , it made them all beggars that had followed h. the . and it did the like for h. when edw. was driven out . the parliaments are as the friendship of this world is , which alwayes followeth prosperity . for king edw. the . after that he was possessed of the crown , he had in his . year a subsedy freely given him : and in the year following he took a benevolence through england , which arbitrary taking from the people , served that ambitious traytor the duke of bucks . after the kings death was a plausible argument to perswade the multitude , that they should not permit ( saith sir thomas moore ) his line to raigne any longer upon them . couns. well sir , what say you to the parliament of richard the third his time ? iust . i find but one , and therein he made diverse good laws . for king henry the seventh in the beginning of his third year he had by parliament an ayde granted unto him , towards the relief of the duke of brittain , then assailed by the french king. and although the king did not enter into the warre , but by the advice of the three estates , who did willingly contribute : yet those northern men which loved richard the third , raised rebellion under colour of the money impos'd , and murthered the earle of northumberland whom the king employed in that collection . by which your lordship sees , that it hath not been for taxes and impositions alone , that the ill disposed have taken armes ; but even for those payments which have been appointed by parliament . couns. and what became of these rebels ? iust . they were fairly hang'd , & the money levied notwithstanding in the kings first year he gathered a marvailous great masse of money , by a benevolence , taking pattern by this kind of levie from edw. th . but the king caused it first to be moved in parliament where it was allowed , because the poorer sort were therein spared . yet it is true that the king used some art , for in his letters he declared that he would measure every mans affections by his gifts . in the thirteenth year he had also a subsedy , whereupon the cornish men took armes , as the northern men of the bishoprick had done in the third year of the king , couns. it is without example , that ever the people have rebelled for any thing granted by parliament , save in this kings dayes . iust . your lordship must consider , that he was not over much beloved , for he took many advantages upon the people and the nobility both . couns. and i pray you what say they now of the new impositions lately laid by the kings majesty ? do they say that they are justly or unjustly laid ? iust . to impose upon all things brought into the kingdome is very ancient : which imposing when it hath been continued a certain time , is then called customes , because the subjects are accustomed to pay it , and yet the great taxe upon wine is still called impost , because it was imposed after the ordinary rate of payement , had lasted many years . but we do now a dayes understand those things to be impositions , which are raised by the command of princes , without the advice of the common-wealth , though ( as i take it ) much of that which is now called custome , was at the first imposed by prerogative royall : now whether it be time or consent that makes them just , i cannot define , were they just because new , and not justified yet by time , or unjust because they want a generall consent : yet is this rule of aristotle verified in respect of his majestie : minus timent homines in justum pati à principe quem cultorem dei putant . yea my lord , they are also the more willingly borne , because all the world knows they are no new invention of the kings . and if those that advised his majestie to impose them , had raised his lands ( as it was offered them ) to l . more then it was , and his wards to asmuch as aforesaid , they had done him farre more acceptable service . but they had their own ends in refusing the one , and accepting the other . if the land had been raised , they could not have selected the best of it for themselves : if the impositions had not been laid , some of them could not have their silks , other pieces in farme , which indeed grieved the subject ten times more then that which his majestie enjoyeth . but certainly they made a great advantage that were the advisers , for if any tumult had followed his majesty , ready way had been to have delivered them over to the people . couns. but think you that the king would have delivered them if any troubles had followed ? iust . i know not my lord , it was machiavels counsell to caesar borgia to doe it , and king h the . delivered up empson and dudley : yea the same king , when the great cardinall woolsey , who governed the king and all his estate , had ( by requiring the sixt part of every mans goods for the king ) raised a rebellion , the king i say disavowed him absolutely , that had not the dukes of norfolk and suffolk appeased the people , the cardinall had sung no more masse : for these are the words of our story : the king then came to westminster to the cardinals palace , and assembled there a great councell , in which he protested , that his mind was never to aske any thing of his commons which might sound to the breach of his laws . wherefore he then willed them to know by whose means they were so strictly given forth . now my lord , how the cardinall would have shifted himself , by saying , i had the opinion of the iudges , had not the rebellion been appeased , i greatly doubt . couns. but good sir , you blanch my question , and answer me by examples . i aske you whether or no in any such tumult , the people pretending against any one or two great officers , the king should deliver them , or defend them ? iust . my good lord , the people have not stayed for the kings delivery , neither in england , nor in france : your lordship knows how the chancellour , treasurer , and chief iustice , with many others at severall times have been used by the rebels : and the marshals , constables , and treasurers in france , have been cut in pieces in charles the sixt his time . now to your lordships question , i say that where any man shall give a king perilous advice , as may either cause a rebellion , or draw the peoples love from the king , i say , that a king shall be advised to banish him : but if the king do absolutely command his servant to do any thing displeasing to the common-wealth , and to his own perill , there is the king bond in honour to defend him . but my good lord for conclusion , there is no man in england that will lay any invention ether grievous or against law upon the kings majesty : and therefore your lordships must share it amongst you . couns. for my part , i had no hand in it , ( i think ) ingram was be that propounded it to the treasurer . iust . alas , my good lord , every poor waiter in the custome-house , or every promooter might have done it , there is no invention in these things , to lay impositions , and sell the kings lands , are poor and common devices . it is true that ingram and his fellows are odious men , and therefore his majesty pleas'd the people greatly to put him from the coffership . it is better for a prince to use such a kind of men , then to countenance them , hangmen are necessary in a common wealth : yet in the netherlands , none but a hangmans sonne will marry a hangmans daughter . now my lord , the last gathering which henry the seventh made , was in his twentieth year , wherein he had another benevolence both of the clergy and laity , a part of which taken of the poorer sort , he ordained by his testament that it should be restored . and for king henry the eight , although he was left in a most plentifull estate , yet he wonderfully prest his people with great payments , for in the beginning of his time it was infinite that he spent in masking and tilting , banquetting , and other vanities , before he was entred into the most consuming expence of the most fond and fruitlesse warre that ever king undertook . in his fourth yeare he had one of the greatest subsedies that ever was granted ; for besides two fifteens and two dismes , he used davids law of capitation or head money , and had of every duke ten marks , of every earl five pounds , of every lord four pounds , of every knight four marks and every man rated at l . in goods , . marks , and so after the rate : yea every man that was valued but at paid d , and every man and woman above . yeares d . he had also in his sixt yeare divers subsedies granted him . in his fourteenth their was a tenth demanded of every mans goods , but it was moderated . in the parliament following , the clergie gave the king the half of their spirituall livings for one yeare , and of the laity there was demanded l , which could not be leavied in england , but it was a marvellous great gift that the king had given him at that time . in the kings seventeenth yeare was the rebellion before spoken of , wherein the king disavowed the cardinall : in his seventeenth yeare he had the tenth and fifteenth given by parliament , which were before that time paid to the pope . and before that also , the moneys that the king borrowed in his fifteenth yeare were forgiven him by parliament in his seventeenth yeare . in his . yeare a subsedy was granted of d . the pound of every man worth in goods from s . to l , from l . to l . and upwards of every pound s . and all strangers , denisens and others doubled this summe strangers not being inhabitants above . yeares d . a head . all that had lands , fees , and annuities , from . to . and so double as they did for goods : and the clergy gave d . the pound . in the thirty seventh yeare , a benevolence was taken not voluntary , but rated by commissioners , which because one of the aldermen refused to pay , he was sent for a souldier into scotland . he had also another great subsedy of six shillings the pound of the clergy , and two shillings eight pence of the goods of the laity , and four shillings the pound upon lands . in the second yeare of edward the sixt , the parliament gave the king an aid of twelve pence the pound of goods of his naturall subjects , and two shillings the pound of strangers , and this to continue for three yeares , and by the statute of the second and third of edward the sixt , it may appear , the same parliament did also give a second aid , as followeth , ( to wit ) of every ewe kept in severall pastures , d : of every weather kept as aforesaid d : of every sheep kept in the common , d , ob . the house gave the king also d . the pound of every woollen cloath made for the sale throughout england for three years . in the third and fourt , of the king , by reason of the troublesome gathering of the poly money upon sheep , and the tax upon cloath , this act of subsedy was repeal'd , and other relief given the king , and in the seventh yeare he had a subsedy and two fifteens . in the first yeare of queen mary , tunnage and poundage were granted . in the second yeare a subsedy was given to king philip , and to the queen , she had also a third subsedy in annis . & . eliz. reg , now my lord , for the parliaments of the late queens time , in which there was nothing new , neither head money , nor sheep money , nor escuage , nor any of these kinds of payments was required , but onely the ordinary subsedies , and those as easily graunted as demanded , i shall not need to trouble your lordship with any of them , neither can i inform your lordship of all the passages and acts which have passed , for they are not extant , nor printed . couns. no , it were but time lost to speak of the latter , and by those that are already remembred , we may judge of the rest , for those of the greatest importance are publick . but i pray you deal freely with me , what you think would be done for his majesty , if he should call a parliament at this time , or what would be required at his majesties hands ? iust . the first thing that would be required , would be the same that was required by the commons in the thirteenth yeare of hen. the eight ( to wit ) that if any man of the commons house should speak more largely , then of duty he ought to do , all such offences to be pardoned , and that to be of record . couns. so might every companion speak of the king what they list . iust . no my lord , the reverence which a vassall oweth to his soveraigne , is alwaies intended for every speech , howsoever it must import the good of the king , and his estate , and so long it may be easily pardoned , otherwise not ; for in queen elizabeths time , who gave freedome of speech in all parliaments , when wentworth made those motions , that were but supposed dangerous to the queens estate , he was imprisoned in the tower , notwithstanding the priviledge of the house , and there died . couns. what say you to the scicilian vespers remembred in the last parliament ? iust . i say , he repented him heartily that used that speech , and indeed besides that , it was seditious , this example held not : the french in scicily usurped that kingdome , they neither kept law nor faith , they took away the inheritance of the inhabitants , they took from them their wives , and ravished their daughters , committing all other insolencies that could be imagined . the kings majesty is the naturall lord of england , his vassals of scotland obey the english laws , if they break them , they are punished without respect . yea his majesty put one of his barons to a shamefull death , for being consenting onely to the death of a common fencer : and which of these ever did or durst commit any outrage in england , but to say the truth , the opinion of packing the last , was the cause of the contention and disorder that happened . couns. why sir ? do you not think it best to compound a parliament of the kings servants and others , that shall in all obey the kings desires ? iust . certainly no , for it hath never succeeded well , neither on the kings part , nor on the subjects , as by the parliament before-remembred your lordship may gather , for from such a composition do arise all jealousies , and all contentions . it was practized in elder times , to the great trouble of the kingdome , and to the losse and ruine of many . it was of latter time used by king henry the eight , but every way to his disadvantage . when the king leaves himself to his people , they assure themselves that they are trusted and beloved of their king , and there was never any assembly so barborus , as not to answer the love and trust of their king. henry the sixt when his estate was in effect utterly overthrown , and utterly impoverished at the humble request of his treasurer made the same known to the house : or other wise , using the treasurers own words . he humbly desired the king to take his staffe , that he might save his wardship . couns. but you know , they will presently be in hand with those impositions , which the king hath laid by his own royall prerogative . iust . perchance not my lord ; but rather with those impositions that have been by some of your lordships laid upon the king , which did not some of your lordships fear more then you do the impositions laid upon the subjects , you would never disswade his majesty from a parliament : for no man doubted , but that his majesty was advised to lay those impositions by his councell , and for particular things on which they were laid , the advice came from petty fellows ( though now great ones ) belonging to the custome-house . now my lord , what prejudice hath his majesty ( his revenue being kept up ) if the impositions that were laid by the generall councell of the kingdome , which takes off all grudging and complaint . couns. yea sir , but that which is done by the king , with the advice of his private or privy councell , is done by the kings absolute power . iust . and by whose power it is done in parliament , but by the kings absolute power ? mistake it not my lord : the three estates do but advise , as the privy councell doth , which advice if the king imbrace , it becomes the kings own act in the one , and the kings law in the other , for without the kings acceptation , both the publick and private advices be but as empty egg shels : and what doth his majesty lose if some of those things , which concerns the poorer sort to be made free again , and the revenue kept up upon that which is superfluous ? is it a losse to the king to be beloved of the commons ? if it be revenue which the king seeks , is it not better to take it of those that laugh , then of those that cry ? yea if all be conten to pay upon moderation & change of the species : is it not more honourable and more safe for the king , that the subject pay by perswasion , then to have them constrained ? if they be contented to whip themselves for the king , were it not better to give them the rod into their hands , then to commit them to the executioner ? certainly it is farre more happy for a soveraigne prince , that a subject open his purse willingly , then that the same be opened by violence . besides , that when impositions are laid by parliament , they are gathered by the authority of the law , which ( as aforesaid ) rejecteth all complaints , and stoppeth every mutinous mouth : it shall ever be my prayer that the king embrace the councel of honour and safety , and let other princes imbrace that of force . couns. but good sir , it is his prerogative which the king stands upon , & it is the prerogative of the kings , that the parliaments do all diminish . iust . if your lordship would pardon me , i would say then , that your lordships objection against parliaments is ridiculous . in former parliaments three things have been supposed dishonour of the king. the first , that the subjects have conditioned with the king , when the king hath needed them , to have the great charter confirmed : the second , that the estates have made treasurers for the necessary and profitable disbursing of those sums by them given , to the end , that the kings , to whom they were given , should expend them for their own defence , & for the defence of the common-wealth : the third , that these have prest the king to discharge some great officers of the crown , and to elect others . as touching the first my lord , i would fain learn what disadvantage the kings of this land have had by confirming the great charter , the breach of which have served onely men of your lordships rank , to assist their own passions , and to punish and imprison at their own discretion the kings poor subjects . concerning their private hatred , with the colour of the kings service , for the kings majestie take no mans inheritance , ( as i have said before ) nor any mans life , but the law of the land , according to the charter . neither doth his majesty imprison any man ( matter of practice , which concerns , the preservation of his estate excepted ) but by the law of the land . and yet he useth his prerogative as all the kings of england have ever used to : for the supream reason cause to practise many things without the advice of the law . as insurrections and rebellions , it useth the marshall , and not the common law , without any breach of the charter , the intent of the charter considered truely . neither hath any subject made complaint , or been grieved , in that the kings of this land , for their own safeties , and preservation of their estates , have used their prerogatives , the great ensigne , on which there is written soli deo. and my good lord , was not buckingham in england , and byron in france condemned , their peers uncalled ? and withall , was not byron utterly ( contrary to the custome & priviledges of the french ) denyed an advocate to assist his defence ? for where lawes forecast cannot provide remedies for future dangers , princes are forced to assist themselves by their prerogatives . but that which hath been ever grievous , and the cause of many troubles , very dangerous is , that your lordships abusing the reasons of state , do punish and imprison the k. subjects at your pleasure . it is you my lords , that when subjects have sometimes need of the kings prerogative , do then use the strength of the law , and when they require the law , you afflict them with the prerogative , and tread the great charter ( which hath been confirmed by acts of parliament ) under your feet , as a torn parchment or waste paper ? . couns. good sir , which of us do in this sort break the great charter ? perchance you mean , that we have advised the king to lay the new impositious . iust . no my lord : there is nothing in the great charter against impositions : and besides that , necessity doth perswade them . and if necessity do in somewhat excuse a private man à fortiori , it may then excuse a prince . again the kings majesty hath profit and increase of revenue by the impositions . but there are of your lordships ( contrarie to the direct letter of the charter ) that imprison the kings subjects and deny them the benefit of the law , to the kings disprofit . and what do you otherwise thereby ( if the impositions be in any sort grievous ) but renovare dolores ? and with all digg out of the dust the long buried memorie of the subjects former intentions with their kings . couns. what mean you by that ? iust . i will tell your lordship when i dare , in the mean time it is enough for me , to put your lordship in mind , that all the estates in the world , in the offence of the people , have either had profit or necessity to perswade them to adventure it , of which , if neither be urgent , and yet the subject exceedingly grieved , your lordship may conjecture , that the house will be humble suitors for a redresse . and if it be a maxime in policy to please the people in all things indifferent , and never suffer them to be beaten , but for the kings benefit ( for there are no blows forgotten with the smart but those ) then i say to make them vassals to vassals , is but to batter down those mastering buildings , erected by k henry the . & fortified by his son , by which the people the gentry of england were brought to depend upon the king alone . yea my good lord , our late dear soveraign q. eliz. kept them up , & to their advantage , as wel repaired as ever prince did defend me , & spend me , faith the irish churle . couns. then you think that this violent breach of the charter will be the cause of seeking the conformation of it in the next parliament , which otherwise could never have bin moved . iust . i know not my good lord perchance not , for if the house presse the king to graunt unto them all that is theirs by the law , they cannot ( in iustice ) refuse the king all that is his by the law. and where will be the issue of such a contention ? i dare not divine , but sure i am that it will tend to the prejudice both of the king and subject . couns. if they dispute not their own liberties , why should they then the kings liberties , which we call his prerogative . iust . among so many and so divers spirits , no man can foretell what may be propounded , but howsoever , if the matter be not slightly handled on the kings behalf , these disputes will soon dissolve for the king hath so little need of his prerogative , & so great advantage by the lawes , as the fear of imparing the one , to wit , the prerogative , is so impossible , and the burthen of the other , to wit , the law , so weighty , as but by a branch of the kings prerogative , namely , of his remission and pardon , the subject is no way able to undergo it . this my lord is no matter of flourish that i have said , but it is the truth , and unanswerable . couns. but to execute the laws very severely , would be very grievous . iust . why my lord , are the laws grievous which our selves have required of our kings ? and are the prerogatives also which our kings have reserved to themselves also grievous ? how can such a people then be well pleased ? and if your lordship confess that the lawes give too much , why does your lordship urge the prerogative that gives more ? nay i will be bold to say it , that except the lawes were better observed , the prerogative of a religious prince hath manifold lesse perils then the letter of the law hath . now my lord , for the second & third , to wit , for the appointing of treasures , and removing of councellors , our kings have evermore laught them to scorn that have prest either of these , & after the parliament dissolved , took the money of the treasurers of the parliament and recalled & restored the officers discharged , or else they have been contented , that some such persons should be removed at the request of the whole kingdom , which they themselves out of their noble natures , would not seem willing to remove . couns. well sir , would you notwithstanding all these arguments advise his majesty to call a parliament ? iust . it belongs to your lordships who enjoy the kings favour , & are chosen for your able wisedome to advise the k. it were a strange boldnesse in a poor and private person , to advise kings , attended with so understanding a councell . but be like your lorpships have conceived some other way , how money may be gotten otherwise . if any trouble should happen , your lordship knows , that then there were nothing so dangerous for a k as to be without money : a parliament cannot assemble in haste , but present dangers require hasty remedies . it will be no time then to discontent the subjects by using any unordinary wayes . couns. well sir , all this notwithstanding we dare not advise the king to call a parliament , for if it should succeed ill , we that advise , should fall into the kings disgrace . and if the king be driven into any extremity , we can say to the king that because we found it extremely unpleasing to his majesty to hear of a parliament , we thought it no good manners to make such a motion . iust . my lord , to the first let me tell you , that there was never any just prince that hath taken any advantage of the successe of councels , which have been founded on reason , to fear that , were to fear the losse of the bell , more then the losse of the steeple , and were also the way to beat all men from the studies of the kings service . but for the second , where you say you can excuse your selves upon the kings own protesting against a parliament , the king upon better consideration may encounter that fineness of yours . couns. how i pray you ? iust . even by declaring himself to be indifferent , by calling your lordships together , and by delivering unto you that he heares how his loving subjects in generall are willing to supply him , if it please him to call a parliament , for that was the common answer to all the sheriffes in england , when the late benevolence was commanded . in which respect , and because you come short in all your projects , & because it is a thing most dangerous for a king to be without treasure , he requires such of you , as either mislike , or rather fear a parliment , to set down your reasous in writing , which you either mislike , or feared it . and such as with and desire it , to set down answers to your objections : and so shall the king prevent the calling or not calling on his majesty , as some of your great councellers have done in many other things shrinking up their shoulders , and saying , the k. will have it so . couns. well sir , it grows late , & i will bid you farewell , onely you shall take well with you this advice of mine , that in all that you have said against our greatest , those men in the end shall be your iudges in their own cause , you that trouble your self with reformation ; are like to be well rewarded hereof you may assure your self , that we will never allow of any invention how profitable soever , unlesse it proceed , or seem to proceed from our selves . iust . if then my lord , we may presume to say that princes may be unhappy in any thing , certainly they are unhappy in nothing more then in suffering themselves to be so inclosed . again , if we may believe pliny , who tels us , that 't is an ill signe of prosperity in any kingdome or state , where such as deserve well , find no other recompence then the contentment of their own conseiences , a farre worse signe is it where the justly accused shall take revenge of the just accuser . but my good lord , there is this hope remaining , that seeing he hath been abused by them he trusted most , he will not for the future dishonour of his judgement ( so well informed by his own experience ) as to expose such of his vassals as have had no other motives to serve him , then simply the love of his person and his estate ) to their revenge , who have onely been moved by the love of their own fortunes , and their glory . couns. but good sir , the king hath not been deceived by all . iust . no my lord , neither have all been trusted , neither doth the world accuse all , but believe , that there be among your lordships very just and worthy men , aswell of the nobility as others , but those though most honoured in the common-wealth , yet have not been most imployed : your lordship knows it well enough , that three or of your lordships have thought your hands strong enough to beat up alone the weightiest affairs in the commonwealth , and strong enough , all the land have found them to beat down whom they pleased . couns. i understand you , but how shall it appear that they have onely sought themselves . iust . there needs no perspective glasse to discern it , for neither in the treaties of peace and warre , in matters of revenue , and matters of trade , any thing hath hapned either of love or of judgement . no my lord , there is not any one action of theirs eminent , great or small , the greatnesse of themselves onely excepted . co. it is all one , your papers can neither answer nor reply , we can . besides you tell the king no news in delivering these complaints , for he knows as much as can be told him . iust . for the first my lord , whereas he hath once the reasons of things delivered him , your lordships shall need to be well advised , in their answers there is no sophistry will serve the turn , where the iudge , & the understanding are both supreme . for the second , to say that his majesty knows , and cares not , that my lord were but to despaire all his faithfull subjects . but by your favour my lord , we see it is contrary , we find now that there is no such singular power as there hath been , iustice is described with a balance in her hand , holding it even , and it hangs as even now as ever it did in any kings dayes , for singular authority begets but generall oppression . couns. howsoever it be , that 's nothing to you , that gave no interest in the kings favour , nor perchance in his opinion , and concerning such a one , the misliking , or but misconceiving of any one hard word , phrase , or sentence , will give argument to the king either to condemne or reject the whole discourse . and howsoever his majesty may neglect your informations , you may be sure that others ( at whom you point will not neglect their revenges , you will therefore confesse it ( when it is too late ) that you are exceeding sory that you have not followed my advise . remember cardinall woolsey , who lost all men for the kings service , & when their malice ( whom he grieved ) had out-lived the kings affection , you know what became of him as vvell as i. iust . yea , my lord , i know it well , that malice hath a longer life , than either love or thankfulnesse hath , for as we alwaies take more care to put off pain , than to enjoy pleasure , because the one hath no intermission , & with the other we are often satisfied , so it is in the smart of iniury & the memory of good turns : wrongs are written in marble : benefits are ( sometimes ) acknowledged , rarely requited . but my lord , we shall do the k. great wrong , to judge him by common rules , or ordinary examples , for seeing his majesty hath greatly enriched and advanced those that have but pretended his service , no man needs to doubt of his goodnesse towards those that shall performe any thing worthy reward . nay , the not taking knowledge of those of his own vassals that have done him wrong , is more to be lamented , than the relinquishing of those that do him right , is to be supected . i am therefore , my good lo : held to my resolution by these , besides the former . the , that god would never have blest him with so many years , and in so many actions , yea in all his actions , had he paid his honest servants with evill for good . the d . where your lordship tels me , that i will be sorry for not following your advice , i pray your lordship to believe , that i am no way subject to the common sorrowing of worldly men , this maxime of plato being true , dolores omnes ex amore animi erga corpus nascuntur . but for my body , my mind values it at nothing . couns. what is it then you hope for or seek ? iust . neither riches , nor honour , or thanks , but i onely to seek to satisfie his majesty ( which i would have been glad to have done in matters of more importance that i have lived and will die an honest man. finis . the authors epitaph , made by himself . even such is time , which takes in wast our youth , and ioy 's , and all we have , and payes us but with age and dust , which be the dark and silent grave , when we have wandred all our wayes , struts up the story of our dayes : and from which earth and grave , & dust , the lord shall raise me up i trust . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e chief . other degrees . other degrees . notes for div a -e seeing . touching . hearing . smelling . tasting . notes for div a -e situation for safety & plenty . multitude of inhabitants . religigion . academies . courts of justice . artificers . privledge . the first devises of rome to allure strangers as is sanctuarie . triumps notes for div a -e huband men . merchant . gentry . notes for div a -e two things s● w. raleigh accused of . a brief view and survey of the dangerous and pernicious errors to church and state, in mr. hobbes's book, entitled leviathan by edward earl of clarendon. clarendon, edward hyde, earl of, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a brief view and survey of the dangerous and pernicious errors to church and state, in mr. hobbes's book, entitled leviathan by edward earl of clarendon. clarendon, edward hyde, earl of, - . the second impression. [ ], p., leaf of plates. printed at the theater, oxon : . reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng hobbes, thomas, - . -- leviathan. political science. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - olivia bottum sampled and proofread - aptara rekeyed and resubmitted - rina kor sampled and proofread - rina kor text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion — resoluta catenis incedit virgo , pretiumque & causa laboris . ovid. metam ▪ l. ▪ a brief view and survey of the dangerous and pernicious errors to church and state , in mr. hobbes's book , entitled leviathan . by edward earl of clarendon . the second impression . oxon : printed at the theater . . imprimatur s. r. ed● : northey knight ●her majest●es attorney generall rad. bathvrst vice-can . oxon. july . to the kings most excellent maiesty may it please your majesty , it is one of the false and evil doctrines which mr. hobbes hath publish'd in his leviathan , ( p. . ) that a banished subject , during the banishment , is not a subject . and ( pag. . ) that a banish'd man is a lawful enemy of the common-wealth that banish'd him , as being no more a member of the same . i thank god , from the time that i found my self under the insupportable burden of your majesties displeasure , and under the in famous brand of banishment , i have not thought my self one minute absolv'd in the least degree from the obligation of the strictest duty to your person , and of the highest gratitude that the most oblig'd servant can stand bound in , or from the affection that a true and faithful englishman still ow's and must still pay to his country . and as i have every day since praied for the safety of your person , and he prosperity of your affairs , with the same devotion and integrity as for the salvation of my own soul ; so i have exercis'd my thoughts in nothing so much , as how to spend my time in doing somwhat that may prove for your majesties service and honor. and therefore assoon as i had finished ( as far as i am able , without the supply of those memorials and records which are fit to be enquired into ) a work at least recommended , if not enjoin'd , to me by your blessed father , and approv'd , and in some degree perus'd by your majesty , ( which i hope will be to the honor of his majesties memory , and your own magnanimous sufferings ) i could not think of any thing in my power to perform of more importance to your majesties service , then to answer mr. hobbes's leviathan , and confute the doctrine therein contain'd , so pernicious to the soveraign power of kings , and destructive to the affection and allegiance of subjects ; notwithstanding which , by the protection the author hath from the act of indemnity , and i know not what other connivance , it is manifest enough , that many odious opinions , the seed whereof was first sowed in that book , have bin since propagated , to the extreme scandal of the government in church and state. i have often heretofore , when i had liberty for that presumtion , advertis'd your majesty , of the wickedness of very many of the principles upon which that whole book is supported , and was not without some hope of prevailing with your majesty to give your self the leisure , and the trouble , to peruse and examine some parts of it , in confidence that they would no sooner be read , then detested by you ; whereas the frequent reciting of loose and disjointed sentences , and bold inferences , for the novelty and pleasantness of the expressions , the reputation of the gentleman for parts and learning , with his confidence in conversation , and especially the humor and inclination of the time to all kind of paradoxes , have too much prevail'd with many of great wit and faculties , without reading the context , or observation of the consequences , to believe his propositions to be more innocent , or less mischievous , then upon a more deliberate perusal they will find them to be ; and the love of his person and company , have rendred the iniquity of his principles less discernible . mr. hobbes consulted too few authors , and made use of too few books ; the benefit of which my present condition has also depriv'd me of ; altho the want which i complain most of , is of friends to examine and controul , upon the reading any impropriety or indecency in my expressions , or defect of vigor in my ratiocination ; towards the weighing whereof i have had little contribution . however , i presume to think , that the antidote , how weak spirited soever , is seasonable to be administred , to expel or allay the poison that is still working very furiously . and if i know any thing of the constitution of the government of england , and of the nature and temper of that faithful nation , the publishing of his poor discourse may be of some use and service to your majesty ; that all the world may know , how much you abhor all those extravagant and absurd privileges , which no christian prince ever enjoied or affected . the consideration of this only , hath dispos'd me to expose my self to the licence of the tongues and pens of all those , who will never be without inclinations rather to insult upon my fortune , and to reproch my person , then to pity my weakness , or rectifie my understanding . if the prefixing your majesties name before it , as if you would countenance so disgraced and degraded a person , or give any protection to a work of which he is the author , doth not find your majesties approbation ; i have appointed that presumtion to be declin'd , being stedfastly resolv'd , by gods blessing , never to displease you whil'st i live , or after i am dead ; and retaining still a hope , with some confidence ( which sustains my weak decaied spirits ) that your majesty will at some time call to your remembrance , my long and incorrupted fidelity to your person , and your service : and that tho i am for the present depriv'd of that most valued and precious relation , your majesty will not be offended , that i assume the title of being your maiesties most faithful and obedient subject , and one of the oldest servants that is now living , to your father and your self , clarendon . moulins , may . . a survey of mr. hobbes his leviathan . the introduction . i have alwaies thought it a great excess in those who take upon them to answer other mens writings , to hold themselves oblig'd to find fault with every thing that they say , and to answer every clause , period , and proposition which he , to whom they have made themselves an adversary , hath laid down ; by which , besides the voluminousness that it produces , which in it self is grievous to any reader , they cannot but be guilty of many impertinences , and expose themselve● to the just censures of others , and to the advantage of their antagonists ; since there are few books which do not contain many things which are true , and cannot , or need not be contradicted . and considering withall , that those books have in all times don most mischief , and scatter'd abroad the most pernicious errors , in which the authors , by the ornament of their style , and the pleasantness of their method , and subtilty of their wit , have from specious premises , drawn their unskilful and unwary readers into unwarrantable opinions and conclusions , being intoxicated with terms and allegorical expressions , which puzzel their understandings , and lead them into perplexities , from whence they cannot disentangle themselves ; i have proposed to my self , to make some animad-versions upon such particulars , as may in my judgment produce much mischief in the world ; in a book of great name , and which is entertain'd and celebrated ( at least enough ) in the world ; a book which contains in it good learning of all kinds , politely extracted , and very wittily and cunningly disgested , in a very commendable method , and in a vigorous and pleasant style : which hath prevailed over too many , to swallow many new tenets as maximes without chewing ; which manner of diet for the indisgestion mr. hobbes himself doth much dislike . the thorough novelty ( to which the present age , if ever any , is too much inclin'd ) of the work , receives great credit and autority from the known name of the author , a man of excellent parts , of great wit , some reading , and somwhat more thinking ; one who has spent many years in foreign parts , and observation ; understands the learned as well as modern languages , hath long had the reputation of a great philosopher and mathematician , and in his age hath had conversation with very many worthy and extraordinary men , to which , it may be , if he had bin more indulgent in the more vigorous part of his life , it might have had a greater influence upon the temper of his mind , whereas age seldom submits to those questions , enquiries , and contradictions , which the laws and liberty of conversation require : and it hath bin alwaies a lamentation amongst mr. hobbes his friends , that he spent too much time in thinking , and too little in ex●●●ising those thoughts in the company of other men of the same , or of as good faculties ; for want whereof his natural constitution , with age , contracted such a morosity , that doubting and contradicting men were never grateful to him . in a word , mr. hobbes is one of the most ancient acquaintance i have in the world , and of whom i have alwaies had a great esteem , as a man who besides his eminent parts of learning and knowledg , hah bin alwaies looked upon as a man of probity , and a life free from scandal ; and it may be there are few men now alive , who have bin longer known to him then i have bin in a fair and friendly conversation and sociableness ; and i had the honor to introduce those , in whose perfections he seemed to take much delight , and whose memory he seems most to extol , first into his acquaintance . in all which respects , both of the author and the work , it cannot reasonably be imagined , that any vanity hath transported me , who know my self so incompetent for the full disquisition of this whole work , which contains in it many parts of knowledg and learning , in which i am not conversant ; and also the disadvantage , that so many years have passed since the publication of this book , without any thing like an answer to the most mischievous parts of it , as to civil government ; at least i had seen none such , till after i had finished this discourse , which was a● montpelier in the moneth of april , one thousand six hundred and seventy , where i wanted many of those books which had bin necessary to have bin carefully consulted and perused , if i had propos'd to my self to have answer'd many of those scholastic points , which seem to me enough expos'd to just cen●ure and reproch , and which i did suppose some university men would have taken occasion from , to have vindicated those venerable nurseries from that vice and ignorance , his superciliousness hath thought fit to asperse them with . i do confess since that time i have read several answers and reflexions , made by learned men of both the universities , in english and in latine upon his leviathan , or his other works published before and after ; which several answers ( though they have very pregnantly discover'd many gross errors , and grosser over-sights in those parts of science in which mr. hobbes would be thought to excel , which are like to put him more out of countenance then any thing i can urge against him , by how much he values himself more upon being thought a good philosopher , and a good geometrician , then a modest man , or a good christian ) have not so far discouraged me , as to cause me , either to believe what i had thought of and prepared before , to be the less pertinent to be communicated , or at all to inlarge , or contract my former conceptions ( though probably many things which i offer are more vigorously urg'd , and expressed in some of the other answers . notwithstanding all which , his person is by many received with respect , and his books continue still to be esteem'd as well abroad as at home : which might very well have prevail●d , with those before 〈◊〉 arguments , to have 〈◊〉 pretending to see farther into them then other men had don , and to discover a malignity undiscerned that should make them odious . but then how prevalent soever these motives were with me ; when i reflected upon the most mischievous principles , and most destructive to the peace both of church and sta●e , which are scatter'd though 〈◊〉 that book of his leviathan , ( which i only take upon me to discover ) and the unhappy impression they have made in the minds of too many ; i thought my self the more oblig'd , and not the less comp●tent for those animadversions , by the part i had acted for many years in the public administration of justice , and in the policy of the kingdom . and the leasure to which god hath condemn'd me , seems an invitation and obligation upon me , to give a testimony to the world , that my duty and affection for my king and country , is not less then it hath ever bin , when it was better interpreted , by giving warning to both , of the danger they are in , by the seditious principles of this books , that they may in time provide for their security by their abolishing and extirpating those , and the like excesses . and as it could not reasonably be expected , that such a book would be answer'd in the time when it was published , which had bin to have disputed with a man that commanded thirty legions , ( for cromwel had bin oblig'd to have supported him , who defended his usurpation ; ) so afterwards men thought it would be too much ill nature to call men in question for what they had said in ill times , and for saying which they had a plenary indulgence and absolution . and i am still of opinion , that even of those who have read his book , and not frequented his company , there are many , who being delighted with some new notions , and the pleasant and clear style throughout the book , have not taken notice of those down-right conclusions , which overthrow or undermine all those principles of government , which have preserv'd the peace of this kingdom through so many ages , even from the time of its first institution ; or restor'd it to peace , when it had at some times bin interrupted : and much less of those odious insinuations , and perverting some texts of scripture , which do dishonor , and would destroy the very essence of the religion of christ. and when i called to mind the good acquaintance that had bin between us , and what i had said to many who i knew had inform'd him of it , and which indeed i had sent to himself upon the first publishing of his leviathan , i thought my self eve● bound to give him some satisfaction why i had entertained so evil an opinion of his book . when the prince went first to paris from iersey , and my lords capel and hopton stayed in iersey together with my self , i heard shortly after , that mr. hobbes who was then at paris , had printed his book de cive there . i writ to dr. earles , who was then the princes chaplain , and his tutor , to remember me kindly to mr. hobbes with whom i was well acquainted , and to desire him to send me his book de cive , by the same token that sid. godolphin ( who had bin kill'd in the late war ) had left him a legacy of two hundred pounds . the book was immediately sent to me by mr. hobbes , with a desire that i would tell him , whether i was sure that there was such a legacy , and how he migh● take notice of it to receive it . i sent him word that he might depend upon it for a truth , and that i believed that if he found some way secretly ( to the end there might be no public notice of it in regard of the parliament ) to demand it of his brother francis godolphin , ( who in truth had told me of it ) he would pay it . this information was the ground of the dedication of this book to him , whom mr. hobbes had never seen . when i went some few years after from holland with the king ( after the murder of his father ) to paris , from whence i went shortly his majesties ambassador into spain , mr. hobbes visited me , and told me that mr. godolphin confessed the legacy , and had paid him one hundred pounds , and promised to pay the other in a short time ; for all which he thank'd me , and said he owed it to me , for he had never otherwise known of it . when i return'd from spain by paris he frequently came to me , and told me his book ( which he would call leviathan ) was then printing in england , and that he receiv'd every week a sheet to correct , of which he shewed me one or two sheets , and thought it would be finished within little more then a moneth ; and shewed me the epistle to mr. godolphin which he meant to set before it , and read it to me , and concluded , that he knew when i read his book i would not like it , and thereupon mention'd some of his conclusions ; upon which i asked him , why he would publish such doctrine : to which , after a discourse between jest and earnest upon the subject , he said , the truth is , i have a mind to go home . within a very short time after i came into flanders , which was not much more then a moneth from the time that mr. hobbes had conferred with me , leviathan was sent to me from london ; which i read with much appetite and impatience . yet i had scarce finish'd it , when sir charles cavendish ( the noble brother of the duke of newcastle who was then at antwerp , and a gentleman of all the accomplishments of mind that he wanted of body , being in all other respects a wonderful person ) shewed me a letter he had then receiv'd from mr. hobbes , in which he desir'd he would let him know freely what my opinion was of his book . upon which i wished he would tell him , that i could not enough wonder , that a man , who had so great a reverence for civil government , that he resolv'd all wisdom and religion it self into a simple obedience and submission to it , should publish a book , for which , by the constitution of any government now establish'd in europe , whether monarchical or democratical , the author must be punish'd in the highest degree , and with the most severe penalties . with which answer ( which sir charles sent to him ) he was hot pleased ▪ and found afterwards when i return'd to the king to paris , that i very much censur'd his book , which he had presented , engross'd in ●●llam in a marvellous fair hand , to the king ; and likewise found my judgment so far confirmed , that few daies before i came thither , he was compell'd secretly to fly out of paris , the justice having endeavour'd to apprehend him , and soon after escap'd into england , where he never receiv'd any disturbance . after the kings return he came frequently to the court , where he had too many disciples ; and once visited me . i receiv'd him very kindly , and invited him to see me often , but he heard from so many hands that i had no good opinion of his book , that he came to me only that one time : and methinks i am in a degree indebted to him , to let him know some reason , why i look with so much prejudice upon his book , which hath gotten him so much credit and estimation with some other men . i am not without some doubt , that i shall in this discourse , which i am now engaged in , transgress in a way i do very heartily dislike , and frequently censure in others , which is sharpness of language , and too much reproching the person against whom i write ; which is by no means warrantable , when it can be possibly avoided without wronging the truth in debate . yet i hope nothing hath fallen from my pen , which implies the least undervaluing of mr. hobbes his person , or his parts . but if he , to advance his opinion in policy , too imperiously reproches all men who do not consent to his doctrine , it can hardly be avoided , to reprehend so great presumtion , and to make his doctrines appear as odious as they ought to be esteemed : and when he shakes the principles of christian religion , by his new and bold interpretations of scripture , a man can hardly avoid saying , he hath no religion , or that he is no good christian ; and escape endeavouring to manifest and expose the poison that lies hid and conceled . yet i have chosen , rather to pass by many of his enormous sayings with light expressions , to make his assertions ridiculous , then to make his person odious , for infusing such destructive doctrine into the minds of men , who are already too licentious in judging the precepts , or observing the practice of christianity . the survey of mr. hobbes's introduction . it is no wonder that mr. hobbes runs into so many mistakes and errors throughout his whole discourse of the nature of government from the nature of mankind , when he laies so wrong a foundation in the very entrance and introduction of his book , as to make a judgment of the passions , and nature of all other men , by his own observations of himself ; and believes , ( pag. . ) that by looking into himself , and considering what he doth when he do's think , opine , reason , hope , fear , &c. and upon what grounds , he shall thereby read , and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions . and indeed by his distinction in the very subsequent words ( pag. . ) between the similitude of passions ; and the similitude of the object of the passions , and his confession , that the constitution individual and particular education do make so great a difference and disparity , he reduces that general proposition to signify so very little , that he leaves very little to be observed , and very few persons competent to observe . we have too much cause to believe , that much the major part of mankind do not think at all , are not endued with reason enough to opine , or think of what they did last , or what they are to do next , have no reflexion , without which there can be no thinking to this purpose : and the number is much greater of those who know not how to comprehend the smilitude of the objects from the passions , nor enough understand the nature of fear , as it is distinguish'd from the object that is fear'd : so that none of these persons ( which constitute a vast number ) are capable to make that observation , which must produce that knowledg which may enable them to judg of all the world. and how many there are left , who are fit from their individual constitutions or particular educations , and notwithstanding the corruption introduced by dissembling , lying , counterfeiting , and erroneous doctrine , to make that judgment , i leave to mr. hobbes to determine . and 't is probable , that those very few may conclude , that what they do when they think , opine , reason , hope , fear , contributes very little to their knowing what the thoughts and passions of other men are . and they may the rather be induced to make that conclusion , since there are so very few who think and opine as mr. hobbes doth , and whose hopes and fears are like his , with reference to the objects , or the nature it self of those passions , and that the dissimilitude is greater between the passions themselves , then between the objects ; and that men are not more unlike each other in their faces , or in their clothes , then in their thinking , hoping , and fearing . since then mr. hobbes founds so much of his whole discourse upon the verity and evidence of this first proposition , that we shall very often have occasion to resort to it as we keep him company ; and since the same seems to me to be very far from being the true key to open the cipher of other mens thoughts ; it will not be amiss to examine , and insist a little longer on this conclusion , that we may discern whether all , or any of us are endued with such an infallible faculty , that we can conclude what the thoughts and passions of other men are , by a strict observation and consideration of our own thoughts and passions ; which would very much enable us to countermine and disappoint each others thoughts and passions , and would be a high point of wisdom . in the disquisition whereof , that we may not entangle the passion and the object together , for want of skill to severe them , it may not be amiss to suppose the same passion to be in two several men whose passions have the same object , and then consider whether they are like to discover each others thoughts and passions , their hopes and their fears , by each mans looking into himself , and considering what he do's when he thinks , hopes , or fears . if mr. hobbes , loved , to as great a height as his passion can rise to , the same object that is likewise loved by another , he would hardly be able to make any judgment of the others love by his own ; and upon a mutual confession and communication , their passions would not be found to be the same . if mr. hobbes , and some other man were both condemn'd to death , ( which is the most formidable thing mr. hobbes can conceive ) the other could no more by looking into himself know mr. hobbe's present thoughts , and the extent of his fear , then he could , by looking in his face , know what he hath in his pocket . not only the several complexions , and constitutions of the body , the different educations , and climates dispose the affections and passions of men to different objects , but have a great influence upon the passions themselves . as the fears , so the hopes of men are as unlike as their gate , and meen . if a sang●ine , and a melancholic man hope the same thing , their hopes are no more alike each others , then their complexions are ; the hope of the one retaining still somwhat like despair , whilst the hope of the other looks like fruition : so little similitude there is in the passions themselves without any relation to their objects . that a man of great courage , and a very cowardly man have not the same countenance , and presence of mind in an approch of danger , proceeds not from the ones liking to be killed more then the others , but rather from the difference of their natural courage . but let us suppose a man of courage , and a coward equally guilty , or equally innocent ( that there may be no difference from the operation of conscience ) to be brought to die together by a judgment which they cannot avoid , and so to be equally without hope of life ( and death in mr. hobbes's judgment is equally terrible to all , and with equal care to be avoided , or resisted . ) how comes it to pass , that one of these undergo's death with no other concernment , then as if he were going any other journy , and the other with such confusion and trembling , that he is even without life before he dies ; if it were true that all men fear alike upon the like occasion ? there will be the same uncertainty in concluding what others do , by observing what we our selves do , when we think , opine , or reason . how shall that man , who thinks deliberately , opines modestly , and reasons dispassionately , and by his excellent temper satisfies his own judgment in a conclusion , in which at the same time he discerns others may differ from him : i say , how shall such a man by his own way of reasoning judg another mans , who usually thinks precipitately , opines arrogantly , and reasons superciliously , and concludes imperiously that man to be mistaken , who determines otherwise then he do's ? to conclude , mr. hobbes might as naturally have introduced his unreasonable doctrine of the similitude of the passions , from the wisdom that he saies is acquired by the reading of men , as from his method of reading ones self . that saying of nosce teipsum , in the sense of solon who prescribed it , was a sober truth , but was never intended as an expedient to discover the similitude of the thoughts of other men by what he found in himself , but as the best means to suppress and destroy that pride and self-conceit , which might temt him to undervalue other men , and to plant that modesty and humility in himself , as would preserve him from such presumtion . the survey of chapter , , . having resolved not to enter into the lists with mr. hobbes upon the signification of words , or propriety of expressions , in which he exercises an absolute dictatorship ; and indeed not to enlarge upon any particular that to me seems erroneous , except it be an error of that kind and consequence , as carries with it , or in it , somwhat that is hurtful to the peace and policy of the kingdom , or prejudicial to the sincerity of religion ; i should have passed over the first , second , and third chapters without any animadversion , not troubling my self whether the imagination and memory are but one thing , which for divers considerations hath divers names , ( p. . ) if i had not some apprehension , that by an unnecessary reflexion upon the scholes in the close of his second chapter , and finding fault with the using some words in the sense they ought not to be used , he hopes to dispose his readers to such a prejudice and contemt towards them , that they may more easily undervalue them in more serious instances : the principal foundation that he laies for the support of all his novelties , being to lessen and vilifie all the principles , and all the persons , which he well foresees most like to be applied to the demolishing his new structure . amongst the many excellent parts and faculties with which mr. hobbes is plentifully endowed , his order and method in writing , and his clear expressing his conceptions in weighty , proper , and significant words , are very remarkable and commendable ; and it is some part of his art to introduce , upon the suddain , instances and remarques , which are the more grateful , and make the more impression upon his reader , by the unexpectedness of meeting them where somwhat else is talk'd of : for thereby he prepares and disposes the fancy to be pleased with them in a more proper and important place . no man would have imagin'd , that in a philosophical discourse of dreams , and fayries , and ghosts , and goblins , exorcisms , crosses , and holy-water , he would have taken occasion to have reproved iob for saying , that the inspiration of the almighty giveth men understanding , job . . which can be no good expression , if it be incongruity to say , that good thoughts are inspired into a man by god : and 't is pity that st. paul did not better weigh his words , when he said , that we are not sufficient of our selves to think any thing of our selves , but our sufficiency is of god , cor. . . or when he said to the philippians , that it is god which worketh in you both to will , and to do of his good pleasure , phil. . . and that st. iohn had not bin better advised , when he said , he that committeth sin , is of the devil , joh. . . upon any of which texts a man can hardly enlarge in discourse , without saying , that good thoughts are inspir'd , or infus'd ( which he thinks he hath made the more ridiculous , by turning into other words of the like signification ) by god , and evil thoughts by the devil , which in his understanding , are amongst the many words making nothing understood ; whereas there are few expressions in which the sense of the speaker is better understood , or by which the sense of the apostles can be made more clear then by those expressionss but this momical mention of the power and goodness of god , and of the devils activity and malignity , in a place so improper and unnatural for those reflexions , will the more incline his disciples to undervalue those common notions of the goodness and assistance of god , and of the malice and vigilance of the devil ; and by making themselves merry with that proper and devout custom of speaking , and the natural results from thence , by degrees to undervalue those other conceptions of religion and piety , which would restrain and controul the licentious imagination of the excellency of their own understandings ; and prepare them to believe , that all the discourses of sanctity , and the obligations of christianity , and the essentials of a church , faith , and obedience to the dictates of gods spirit , are but the artifice and invention of church-men , to advance their own pomp and worldly interest , and that heaven and hell are but words to flatter or terrifie men ; at least , that the places of either are so situated , and have no other extent or degree of pain and pleasure , then he had thought fit to assign to them towards the end of his leviathan . nor is his instance of the train of imaginations , in his third chapter , less wonderful . and indeed , mr. hobbes had the more reason for his opinion of the similitude of thoughts , and that by looking into himself when he thinks , and upon what grounds , he can thereby know the thoughts of other men , when he was with the velocity of a thought , in a moment of time , able to decipher that impertinent question , what was the value of a roman penny ; and to discover a succession of thoughts in the enquirer , the last of which determined in the resolution of delivering up the king : which was so rare a faculty , that such a similitude of thoughts cannot be concluded to be in other men . and since erroneous doctrines have so great an influence upon the minds of men , as to corrupt the natural motives , he knows best whether he had not before this formed his new scheme of loyalty , and digested all those imaginations towards the dissolution of allegiance , and eluding the obligation of all oaths ; which if he had don , he had the key ready to decipher by , and might easily discover that which no man in england could discover who had not the same key . the survey of chapters , , , , , . we shall with less reflexion pass over his fourth chapter of speech , which he saies , was the noblest and most profitable invention of all other , whether properly or improperly , he shall do well to consider ; together with his fifth and sixth chapters , which with those which precede , and two or three which follow , he intends as a dictionary , for the better understanding and defining very many terms and words , which he is to make use of throughout the rest of his work ; and which whoever can carry with him in his memory , as he expects every man shall do , shall be often more confounded in the understanding many parts of his book , then if he forgets them all . in which yet many things are said very wittily and pleasantly ; tho it may be many critical men , whom he hath provoked , may believe many of his expressions to be incongruous ; and his definitions not so exact as might have bin expected from so great an artist ; and that all those chapters are rather for delight , in the novelty and boldness of the expression , then for any real information in the substantial part of knowledg : since few men , upon the most exact reading them over , find themselves wiser then they were before , but rather think that they better understood before what contemt signifies , then by being now told , ( pag. . ) that it is nothing else but an immobility or contumacy of the heart , in resisting the action of certain things , and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise , by other more potent objects , or from want of experience of them ; or that they do better understand the nature and original of laughter , by being informed ( pag. . ) that suddain glory is the passion which maketh some grimaces call●d laughter , and is caused either by some suddain act of their own that pleaseth them , or by the apprehension of some deform●d thing in another , by comparison whereof they suddainly applaud themselves . in which kind of illustrations those chapters , and in truth his whole book abounds , and discovers a master faculty in making easie things hard to be understood : and men will probably with the more impatience and curiosity , tho with the less reverence , enter upon the third part of his book , which is to define christian politics , after he hath so well defin'd and describ'd religion to be fear of power invisible , feigned by the mind , or imagined from tales publicly allowed , ( p. . ) all which i leave to his friends of the universities . nor shall i spend more time upon the seventh , eighth , a●d ninth chapters , leaving them to the schole-men to examine , who are in his debt for much mirth which he hath made out of them , i for my part being very indifferent between them , as believing that the schole-men have contributed very little more to the advancement of any noble or substantial part of learning , then mr. hobbes hath don to the reformation or improvement of philosophy and policy . yet i may reasonably say so much on their behalf , that if mr. hobbes may take upon him to translate all those terms of art ( the proper signification whereof is unanimously understood , and agreed between all who use them , and which in truth are a cipher to which all men of moderate learning have the key ) into the vulgar language by the assistance of ryders dictionary , he hath found a way to render and expose the worthiest professors of any science , and all science it self to the cheap laughter of all illiterate men ; which is contrary to mr. hobbes's own rule and determination , ( pag. . ) where he saies , that when a man upon the hearing any speech , hath those thoughts which the words of that speech , and their connexion , were ordained and constituted to signifie , then he is said to understand it . and surely the signification of words and terms , is no less ordain'd and constituted by custom and acceptation , then by grammar and etymologies . if it were otherwise , mr. hobbes himself would be as much exposed to ignorant auditors , when he reads a lecture upon the optics , or even in his ador'd geometry , if a pleasant translator should render all his terms as literally , as he hath don the title of the sixth chapter of suarez : for every age , as new things happen , finds new words in all languages to signifie them . the civilians , who are amongst the best judges of latine , can hardly tell how investitura came into their books , to signifie that which it hath ever signified since the quarrel begun between the emperor and the pope upon that subject , which is now as well understood in latine as any word in tully . and if bombarda had no original but from the sound , as petavius ( a very good grammarian , besides his other great learning ) saies it had not , we have no reason to be offended with the schole-men for finding words to discover their own conceptions , which equally serveour own turn . the survey of chapters , , . i do acknowledg , that in the tenth , eleventh , and twelfth chapters , many things are very well said : and tho somethings as ill , with reference to religion , and to the clergy , as if there were a combination between the priests of the gentiles , aristotle , the schole-men , and the clergy of all professions , to defame , pervert , and corrupt religion : yet he resumes that argument so frequently , that i shall chuse to examine the reason and justice of all his allegations rather in another place , then upon either of these three chapters ; to which i shall only add , that according to his natural delight in novelties of all kinds , in religion as well as policy , he hath supplied the gentiles with a new god , which was never before found in any of their catalogues , the god chaos , ( pag. . ) to which he might as warrantably have made them an additional present of his own idol , confusion . and he will as hardly find a good autority for the aspersion with which he traduces the policy of the roman common-wealth in all its greatness and lustre , ( pag. . ) that it made no scruple of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of rome it self , unless it had somthing in it that could not consist with their civil government . which how untrue soever , was a very unseasonable intimation of the wisdom of olivers's politics , at that time when he published his leviathan : whereas in truth , that great people were not more solicitous in any thing , then in preserving the unity and integrity of their religion from any mixtures : and the institution of the office of pontifex maximus was principally out of that jealousie , and that he might carefully watch that no alteration or innovation might be made in their religion . and tho they had that general awe for religion , that they would not suffer the gods of their enemies , whom they did not acknowledg for gods , to be rudely treated and violated ; and therefore they both punished their consul for having robb'd the temple of proserpine , and caused the full damages to be restored to the injur'd goddess : yet they neither acknowledg'd her divinity , nor suffer'd her to have a temple , or to have any devotion paid to her within their dominions ; nor indeed any other god or goddess to be ador'd , then those to whom sacrifices were made by the autority of the state. nor will mr. hobbes be able to name one christian kingdom in the world , where it is believed , that the king hath not his autority from christ , unless a bishop crown him ; tho all christian kingdoms have had that reverence for bishops , as to assign the highest ecclesiastical functions to be alwaies perform'd by them : but they well know the king to have the same autority in all respects before he is crown'd , as after . and what extravagant power soever the court of rome hath in some evil conjunctures heretofore usurp'd , and would be as glad of the like opportunities again ; yet in those kingdoms where that autority is own'd and acknowledg'd , there want not those who loudly protest against that doctrine , that a king may be depos'd by a pope , or that the clergy and regulars shall be exemt from the jurisdiction of their king. and yet upon these unwarrantable suggestions , he presumes to declare , that all the changes of religion may be attributed to one and the same cause , and that is , unpleasing priests ; and those not only amongst papists , but even in that church that hath presumed most of reformation , by which he intends the church of england , at that time under the most severe and barbarous persecution : and therefore it was the more enviously and maliciously , as well as dishonestly alledged . the survey of chapters , , , . the thirteenth , fourteenth , fifteenth , and sixteenth chapters , will require a little more disquisition , since under the pretence of examining , or rather ( according to his prerogative ) of determining what the natural condition of mankind is , he takes many things for granted which are not true ; as ( pag. . ) that nature hath made all men equal in the faculties of body and mind , and imputes that to the nature of man in general , which is but the infirmity of some particular man ; and by a mist of words , under the notion of explaining common terms ( the meaning whereof is understood by all men , and which his explanation leaves less intelligible then they were before ) he dazles mens eies from discerning those fallacies upon which he raises his structure , and which he reserves for his second part . and whosoever looks narrowly to his preparatory assertions , shall find such contradictions , as must destroy the foundation of all his new doctrine in government , of which some particulars shall be mentioned anon . so that if his maxims of one kind were marshalled together , collected out of these four chapters , and applied to his other maxims which are to support his whole leviathan , the one would be a sufficient answer to the other ; and so many inconsistencies and absurdities would appear between them , that they could never be thought links of one chain ; whereas he desires men should believe all the propositions in his book to be a chain of consequences , without being in any degree wary to avoid palpable contradictions , upon the presumtion of his readers total resignation to his judgment . if it were not so , would any man imagine that a man of mr. hobbes's sagacity and provoking humor , should in his fourth page so imperiously reproch the scholes for absurdity , in saying , that heavy bodies fall downwar●● out of an appetite to rest , thereby ascribing knowledg to things inanimate ; and himself should in his sixty second page , describing the nature of foul weather , say , that it lieth not in a shower or two of rain , but in an inclination thereto of many daies together ; as if foul weather were not as inanimate a thing as heavy bodies , and inclination did not imply as much of knowledg as appetite doth ? in truth , neither the one or the other word signifies in the before-mention'd instances , more then a natural tendency to motion and alteration . when god vouchsafed to make man after his own image , and in his own likeness , and took so much delight in him , as to give him the command and dominion over all the inhabitants of the earth , the air , and the sea , it cannot be imagin'd but that at the same time he endued him with reason , and all the other noble faculties which were necessary for the administration of the empire , and the preservation of the several species which were to succeed the creation ; and therefore to uncreate him to such a baseness and villany in his nature , as to make man such a rascal , and more a beast in his frame and constitution then those he is appointed to govern , is a power that god never gave to the devil ; nor hath any body assum'd it , till mr. hobbes took it upon him . nor can any thing be said more contrary to the honor and dignity of god almighty , then that he should leave his master workmanship , man , in a condition of war of every man against every man , in such a condition of confusion , ( p. . ) that every man hath a right to every thing , even to one anothers body ; inclin'd to all the malice , force and fraud that may promote his profit or his pleasure , and without any notions of , or instinct towards justice , honor , or good nature , which only makes man-kind superior to the beasts of the wilderness . nor had mr. hobbes any other reason to degrade him to this degree of bestiality , but that he may be fit to wear those chains and fetters which he hath provided for him . he deprives man of the greatest happiness and glory that can be attributed to him , who divests him of that gentleness and benevolence towards other men , by which he delights in the good fortune and tranquillity that they enjoy , and makes him so far prefer himself before all others , as to make the rest a prey to advance any commodity or conveniency of his own ; which is a barbarity superior to what the most savage beasts are guilty of , — quando leoni , fortior eripuit vitam leo ? quo nemore unquam expiravit aper majoris dentibus apri ? man only , created in the likeness of god himself , is the only creature in the world , that out of the malignity of his own nature , and the base fear that is inseparable from it , is oblig'd for his own benefit , and for the defence of his own right , to worry and destroy all of his own kind , until they all become yoaked by a covenant and contract that mr. hobbes hath provided for them , and which was never yet entred into by any one man , and is in nature impossible to be entred into . after such positive and magisterial assertions against the dignity and probity of man-kind , and the honor and providence of god almighty , the instances and arguments given by him are very unweighty and trivial to conclude the nature of man to be so full of jealousie and malignity , as he would have it believed to be , from that common practice of circumspection and providence , which custom and discretion hath introduced in human life . for men shut their chests in which their mony is , as well that their servants or children may not know what they have , as that it may be preserved from thieves ; and they lock their doors that their houses may not be common ; and ride arm'd , and in company , because they know that there are ill men , who may be inclined to do injuries if they find an opportunity . nor is a wariness to prevent the damage and injury that thieves and robbers may do to any man , an argument that mankind is in that mans opinion inclin'd and disposed to commit those out-rages . if it be known that there is one thief in a city , all men have reason to shut their doors and lock their chests : and if there be two or three drunkards in a town , all men have reason to go arm'd in the streets , to controul the violence or indignity they might receive from them . princes are attended by their guards in progress , and all their servants arm'd when they hunt , without any apprehension of being assaulted ; custom having made it so necessary , that many men are not longer without their swords then they are without their doublets , who never were jealous that any man desir'd to hurt them . nor will the instance he gives of the inhabitants in america , be more to his purpose then the rest , since as far as we have any knowledg of them , the savage people there live under a most intire subjection and slavery to their several princes ; who indeed for the most part live in hostility towards each other , upon those contentions which engage all other princes in war , and which mr. hobbes allows to be a just cause of war , jealousie of each others power to do them harm . and these are the notable instances by which mr. hobbes hath by his painful disquisition and investigation , in the hidden and deep secrets of nature , discover'd that unworthy fear and jealousie to be inherent in mankind , ( pag. . ) that the notions of right and wrong have no place , that force and fraud are the two cardinal v●rtues ; that there is no propriety , no dominion , no mine or thine distinct , but that only to be every mans that he can get , and for so long as he can keep it , and this struggle to continue , till he submits to the servitude to which he hath design'd him for his comfort and security . mr. hobbes would do very much honor to aristotle , and repair much of the injury he hath don to him , if he can perswade men to believe , ( pag. ) that the bringing in his philosophy and doctrine , hath bin a cause to take away the reputation of the clergy , and to incline the people to the reformation of religion ; and yet he hath more autority for that , then for most of his opinions , tho it may be he doth not know it . for in the year a thousand two hundred and nine , aristotles metaphysics , which had bin lately brought from constantinople , were condemn'd , and forbidden to be read by a council in paris , upon a supposition or apprehension , that that book had contributed very much to the new heretical opinions of the albigenses . so far the french clergy of that age concurred in opinion with mr. hobbes : but we may much more reasonably conceive , that it hath bin illiterateness , stupid ignorance , and having never heard of aristotle , that may at any time have brought contemt upon the clergy : and tho men may too unreasonably , it may be , adhere to aristotle in some particulars , and so may be reasonably contradicted , yet no man of the clergy or laity was ever contemned for being thought to understand aristotle . indeed mr. hobbes may easily refute aristotle , and all who have writ before or since him , if he be the soveraign magistrate , not only to enact what laws he pleases , and to interpret all that were made before according to his pleasure , but to adopt them to be the laws of nature , which he declares ( pag. . ) to be immutable and eternal . and we have great reason to watch him very narrowly , when his legislative fit is upon him , least he cast such a net over us , knit by what he calls the law of nature , or by his definitions , that we be deprived of both the use of our liberty , and our reason to oppose him . he is very much offended with aristotle , for saying in the first book of his politics , that by nature some are fit to command , and others to serve ; which he saies , ( pag. . ) is not only against reason , but also against experience , for there are very few so foolish , that had not rather govern themselves , then be governed by others . which proposition doth not contradict any thing said by aristotle , the question being , whether nature hath made some men worthier , not whether it hath made all others so modest as to confess it ; and would have required a more serious disquisition , since it is no more then is imputed to horses , and other beasts , whereof men find by experience , that some by nature are fitter for nobler uses , and others for vile , and to be only beasts of burden . but indeed , he had the less need of reason to refute him , when he had a law at hand to controul him , which he saies , is the law of nature , ( pag. . ) that every man must acknowledg every other man for his equal by nature ; which may be true as to the essentials of human nature , and yet there may be inequality enough as to a capacity of government . but whatever his opinion is , we have solomons judgment against him , insipiens erit servus sapientis , prov. . . and many learned men are of opinion , that the gibeonites , who by the help of an impudent lie found the means to save their lives , were a people by nature of low and abject spirits , fit only to do the low and mean services for which they were prepared . and some of the fathers believe , that when the patriarch iacob , in his dying prophesie of issachar , declar'd issachar is a strong ass , couching down between two burdens . and he saw that rest was good , and the land that it was pleasant , and bowed his shoulder to bear , and became a servant unto tribute , gen. . . . iacob foresaw that in that tribe there would be depressio intellectus , and that they would be only fit to servants . and 't is very true , that aristotle did believe , that divine providence doth shew and demonstrate who are fit and proper for low and vile offices , not only by very notable defects in their understandings , incapable of any cultivation , but by some eminent deformity of the body ( tho that doth not alwaies hold ) which makes them unfit to bear rule . and without doubt , the observation of all ages since that time hath contributed very much to that conclusion which mr. hobbes so much derides , of inequality by nature , and that nature it self hath a bounty which she extends to some men in a much superior degree then she doth to others . which is not contradicted by seeing many great defects and indigencies of nature in some men , wonderfully corrected and repair'd by industry , education , and above all , by conversation ; or by seeing some early blossoms in others , which raise a great expectation of rare perfection , that suddainly decay , and insensibly wither away by not being cherished and improved by diligence , or rather by being blasted by vice or supine laziness : those accidents may somtimes happen , do not very often , and are necessary to awaken men out of the lethargy of depending wholly upon the wealth of natures store , without administring any supply to it , out of their industry and observation . and every mans experience will afford him abundance of examples in the number of his own acquaintance , in which , of those who have alwaies had equal advantages of education , conversation , industry , and it may be of virtuous inclinations , it is easie to observe very different parts and faculties : some of quick apprehension , and as steady comprehension , wit , judgment , and such a sagacity as discerns at distance as well as at hand , concluding from what they see will fall out , what is presently to be don : when others born , and bred with the same care , wariness , and attention , and with all the visible advantages and benefits which the other enjoied , remain still of a heavier and duller alloy , less discerning to contrive and fore-see , less vigorous to execute , and in a word , of a very different classis to all purposes ; which can proceed from no other cause , but the distinction that nature her self made between them , in the distribution of those faculties to the one with a more liberal hand then to the other . did not all the world at that time , and hath it not ever since believed , that iulius cesar had from nature a more exalted spirit and genius , then any of those who were overcome by him ; tho some of them appear'd or were generally believ'd to be superior in the conduct of great affai●s ? there is judgment gotten by experience very necessary , but the first attemt and direction of the mind , the first daring proceeds purely from nature and its influence . when we see a marius from a common soldier , baffle the nobility of rome , and in despight of opposition , make himself seven times consul : or a dioclesan , from a mean and low birth , and no other advantage of education then every other common soldier had with him , nor countenance or assistance from any superior , but what his own virtue purchased , to raise himself to the full state and power of the greatest emperor , and to govern as great , or a greater part of the world , then ever cesar did ; and after having enjoied that empire above eighteen years in the highest glory , to give it over , and divest himself of it , merely for the ease and pleasure of retirement to his private house and garden , and to die in that repose after he had enjoied it some years ; must we believe such a man to have no advantages by nature , above all other men of the same time ? when marmurius , or vecturius ( for he went by both names ) one of the thirty tyrants , from a common black-smith who made arms ( for the man who killed him , having bin before his servant , and wrought under him , told him , hic est gladius quem ipse fecisti ) raised himself , not by a suddain mutiny and insurrection , but by passing all the degrees of a soldier , during many years in a regular and disciplin'd army , to be emperor by a common voice and election , as a man the fittest for the command ; is it possible for us to believe , that this man received no other talent from nature , then she afforded to every other blackfinith ? besides many particulat examples of this kind in every particular kingdom , in most of which the visible advantages of friends , patrons , and other accidental concurrences have not at all contributed to the preferment of them before other men , the world hath yielded us an example near our own time ( for it is little more then two hundred years since ) of such a prodigious progress and success in the power of one man , that there is nothing of story ancient or modern that is parallel to it , the great tamberlane , who ( tho not so mean a person in his original , as he is vulgarly conceived to have bin ) was born a poor prince over a contem'd and barbarous country and people , whose manners he first cultivated by his own native justice and goodness , and by the strength of his own genius , improved his own faculties and understanding to a marvellous lustre and perfection , towards which neither his climate nor his conversation could contribute . upon this stock he rais'd and led an army of his subjects , into the better dominions of their neighbors who contemned them . with these he fought , and won many battels , subdued and conquer'd many kingdoms ; and after the total defeat of the greatest army that was then in the world , he took the greatest emperor of the world prisoner , and for the contemt that he had shew'd towards him , treated him as his vilest slave . and it hath bin as notorious , that after the death of these , and the like such extraordinary persons , the forces by which they wrought those wonders , and the counsellors and officers whose administration co-operated with them , suddainly degenerated ; and as if the soul were departed from the body , became a carcass without any use or beauty . and can we believe , that those stupendous men had no talent by nature above others ? and are we bound to believe , ( pag. . ) that by the law of nature every man is bound to acknowledg other for his equal by nature ? but where are those maxims to be found which mr. hobbes declares , and publishes to be the laws of nature , in any other author before him ? that is only properly call'd the law of nature , that is dictated to the whole species : as to defend a mans self from violence , and to repel force by force ; not all that results upon prudential motives unto the mind of such as have bin cultivated by learning and education , which no doubt can compile such a body of laws , as would make all other useless , except such as should provide for the execution of , and obedience to those . for under what other notion can that reasonable conclusion , which is a necessary part of the law of nations , be call'd the law of nature , which is his fifteenth law , ( pag. . ) that all men that mediate peace be allowed safe conduct ? and of this kind much of the body of his law of nature is compil'd ; which i should not dislike , the style being in some sense not improper , but that i observe that from some of these conclusions which he pronounces to be ( pag. . ) immutable , and eternal as the laws of nature , he makes deductions and inferences to controul opinions he dislikes , and to obtain concessions which are not right , by amuzing men with his method , and confounding rather then informing their understandings , by a chime of words in definitions and pleasant instances , which seem not easie to be contradicted , and yet infer much more then upon a review can be deduc'd from them . and it is an unanswerable evidence of the irresistible force and strength of truth and reason , that whilst men are making war against it with all their power and stratagems , somwhat doth still start up out of the dictates and confessions of the adversary that determines the controversie , and vindicates the truth from the malice that would oppress it . how should it else come to pass , that mr. hobbes , whilst he is demolishing the whole frame of nature for want of order to support it , and makes it unavoidable necessary for every man to cut his neighbors throat , to kill him who is weaker then himself , and to circumvent , and by any fraud destroy him who is stronger , in all which there is no injustice , because nature hath not otherwise provided for every particular mans security ; i say , how comes it to pass , that at the same time when he is possessed of this frenzy , he should in the same , and the next chapter , set down such a body of laws prescribed by nature it self , as are immutable aud eternal ? that there appears , by his own shewing , a full remedy against all that confusion , for avoiding whereof he hath devis'd all that unnatural and impossible contract and covenant ? if the law of the gospel , whatsoever you require that others should do to you , that do ye to them , be the law of all men , as he saies it is ( pag. . ) that is , the law of nature , naturâ , id est jure gentium , saies tully , it being nothing else but quod naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit ; if it be the law of nature that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest , as he saies it is ( pag. . ) and that no man by deed , word , countenance or gesture , declare hatred or contemt of another ; if all men are bound by the law of nature , ( pag. . ) that they that are at controversie , submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator , as he saies they are : if nature hath thus providently provided for the peace and tranquillity of her children , by laws immutable and eternal , that are written in their hearts : how come they to fall into that condition of war , as to be every one against every one , and to be without any other cardinal virtues , but of force and fraud ? it is a wonderful thing , that a man should be so sharp-sighted , as to discern mankind so well inclosed and fortified by the wisdom of nature , and so blind as to think him in a more secure estate by his transferring of right to another man , which yet he confesses is impossible intirely to transfer ; and by covenants and contracts of his own devising , and which he acknowledges to be void in part , and in other parts impossibe to be perform'd . but i say , if in truth nature hath dictated all those excellent conclusions to every man , without which they cannot be called the laws of nature ; and if it hath farther instituted all those duties which are contain'd in the second table , all which he saies were the laws of nature : i know not what temtation or autority he could have , to pronounce mankind to be left by nature in that distracted condition of war , except he prefer the autority of ovids metamorphosis , of the sowing of cadmus's teeth , before any other scripture , divine or humane : and it is as strange , that by his covenants and contracts which he is so wary in wording ( as if he were the secretary of nature ) that they may bind that man fast enough whom he pleases to assign to those bonds ; and as if he were the ple●potentiary of nature too , to bind and to loose all he thinks fit : he hath so ill provided for the peace he would establish , that he hath left a door open for all the confusion he would avoid , when , notwithstanding that he hath made them divest themselves of the liberty they have by nature , and transfer all this into the hands of a single person , who thereby is so absolute soveraign , that he may take their lives and their estates from them without any act of injustice , yet after all this transferring and divesting , every man reserves a right ( as unalienable ) to defend his own life , even against the sentence of justice . what greater contradiction can there be to the peace , which he would establish upon those unreasonable conditions , then this liberty , which he saies can never be abandoned , and which yet may dissolve that peace every day ? and yet he saies , ( pag. . ) this is granted to be true by all men , in that they lead criminals to execution and prison with armed men , notwithstanding such criminals have consented to the law by which they are condemned . which indeed in an argument , that men had rather escape then be hanged , but no more an argument that they have a right to rescue themselves , then the fashion of wearing sword is an argument that men are afraid of having their throats cu● by the malice of their neighbors : both which , are arguments no man would urge to men , whose understandings he did not much undervalue . but upon many of these particulars there is a more proper occasion hereafter for enlargement . and so we pass through his prospect of the laws of nature , and many other definitions and descriptions , with liberty to take review of them upon occasion , that we may make hast to his second part , for which he thinks he hath made a good preparation to impose upon us in this first ; and he will often tell us , when he should prove what he affirms , that he hath evinc'd that point , and made it evident in such a chapter in his first part , where in truth he hath said very much , and proved very little . i shall only conclude this , with an observation which the place seems to require , of the defect in mr. hobbes's logic , which is a great presumtion , that from very true propositions he deduces very erroneous and absurd conclusions . that no man hath power to transfer the right over his own life to the disposal of another man , is a very true proposition , from whence he infers , that he hath reserved the power and disposal of it to himself , and therefore that he may defend it by force even against the judgment of law and justice : whereas the natural consequence of that proposition is , that therefore such transferring and covenanting ( being void ) cannot provide for the peace and security of a common-wealth . without doubt , no man is dominus vitae suae , and therefore cannot give that to another , which he hath not in himself . god only hath reserv'd that absolute dominion and power of life and death to himself , and by his putting the sword into the hand of the supreme magistrate , hath qualified and enabled him to execute that justice which is necessary for the peace and preservation of his people , which may seem in a manner to be provided for by mr. hobbes's law of nature , if what he saies be true , ( pag. . ) that right to the end containeth right to the means . and this sole proposition , that men cannot dispose of their own lives , hath bin alwaies held as a manifest and undeniable argument , that soveraigns never had , nor can have their power from the people . second part. the survey of chapters , . mr. hobbes having taken upon him to imitate god , and created man after his own likeness , given him all the passions and affections which he finds in himself , and no other , he prescribes him to judg of all things and words , according to the definitions he sets down , with the autority of a creator . after he hath delighted himself in a commendable method , and very witty and pleasant description of the nature and humor of the world , as far as he is acquainted with it , ( upon many particulars whereof , which he calls definitions , there will be frequent occasion of reflexions in this discourse , without breaking the thred of it by entring upon impertinent exceptions to matters positively averred without any apparent reason , when it is no great matter whether it be true or no , ) he comes at last to institute such a common-wealth as never was in nature , or ever heard of from the beginning of the world till this structure of his , and like a bountiful creator , gives the man he hath made , the soveraign command and government of it , with such an extent of power and autority , as the great turk hath not yet appear'd to affect . in which it is probable he hath follow'd his first method , and for the man after his own likeness hath created a government , that he would himself like to be trusted with ; having determined liberty , and propriety , and religion to be only emty words , and to have no other existence then in the will and breast of his soveraign governor ; and all this in order to make his people happy , and to enjoy the blessing of peace . and yet with all this , his governor would quickly find his power little enough , that is , of little continuance , if his government be founded upon no other security then is provided in his institution : and the justice he assigns will be as weak a support to his governor , as he supposes a covenant would be to the peoples benefit ; the imagination whereof he conceives to be so ridiculous , that it can only proceed form want of understanding , that covenants being but words and breath , have no force to oblige , contain , constrain , or protect any man , but what they have from the public sword , that is from the untied hands of his soveraign man : as if justice , which is the support of his governor when he breaks and violates all the elements of justice , because all men are in justice bound to observe contracts , were more then a word , or a more valiant word and stronger breath to constrain , and protect any man , when that sword is wrested from his soveraign man , or his hand is bound by the many hands which should be govern'd by him . but the people need not be offended with him , for giving so extravagant a power to a person they never intended should have such an empire over them ; if they will have patience till he hath finished his scheme of soveraignty , he will infeeble it again for them to that degree , that no ambitious man would take it up , if he could have it for asking . but to prosecute the argument in his own order . as he hath made a worse man by much , by making him too like himself ; so he hath made a much worse common-wealth then ever yet was known in the world , by making it such as he would have : and nothing can be more wonderful , then that a man of mr. hobbes his sagacity , should raise so many conclusions of a very pernicious influence upon the peace and government of every kingdom and common-wealth in europe , upon a mere supposition and figment of a common-wealth instituted by himself , and without any example . he will not find any one government in the world , of what kind soever , so instituted , as he dogmatically declares all government to be ; nor was mankind in any nation since the creation upon such a level , as to institute their government by such an assembly and election , and covenant , and consent , as he very unwarrantably more then supposes . and it was an undertaking of the more impertinence , since by his own rule , ( pag. . ) where there is already erected a soveraign power , which was then , and still is in every kingdom and state in europe , and for ought we know in the whole world , there can be no other representative of the same people , but only to certain particular ends limited by the soveraign . so that he could have no other design , but to shake what was erected , and the government was not at that time in any suspence but in his own country , by the effect of an odious and detestable rebellion ; which yet could not prevail with an effective army of above one hundred thousand men , with which the usurper had subdued three nation , to submit to the usurper in such a new model , and to transfer their right by such covenants , as he conceives mankind to be even oblig'd to do by the laws of nature ; and to induce them to do which , i do heartily wish that mr. hobbes could truly vindicate himself from designing , when he publish'd his leviathan ; upon which disquisition we cannot avoid enlarging hereafter upon further provocation . it had bin kindly don of mr. hobbes , if according to his laudable custom of illustrating his definitions by instances , as he often doth with great pregnancy , he had to this his positive determination added one instance of a government so instituted . there is no doubt there are in all governments many things don by , and with the consent of the people ; nay all government so much depends upon the consent of the people , that without their consent and submission it must be dissolved , since where no body will obey , there can be no command , nor can one man compel a million to to do what they have no mind to do : but that any government was originally instituted by an assembly of men equally free , and that they ever elected the person , who should have the soveraign power over them , is yet to be proved ; and till it be proved , must not be supposed , to raise new doctrines upon , which shake all government . how soveraign power was originally instituted , and how it came to condescend to put restraints upon it self , and even to strip it self of some parts of its soveraignty for its own benefit and advantage , and how far it is bound to observe the contracts and covenants it hath submitted to , i shall deliver my opinion before this discourse is finish'd ; and shall refer the approbation of ●it to mr. hobbes , supposing he will never think all the reason in the world to be strong enough to prove , that what all men see is ▪ cannot be . but by the way , he had dealt more like the magistrate he affects to be , if he had founded his government upon his own imperious averment , and left every man to question it that dares ; then to take notice , and fore-see an objection , which he saies is the strongest he can make , and make no better an answer to it , then to answer one question with another . he sees men will ask , ( and it is not impossible they can avoid it ) where , and when such power hath by subjects bin acknowledg'd ? which he would have us believe is substantially answered by his other question , when , or where has there bin a kingdom long free from sedition and civil war ? which might receive a very full answer , by assigning many governments under which the subjects have enjoied very long peace , quiet , and plenty , which never was , nor ever can be enjoied one hour under his ( as shall be proved when we examine it . ) but it will serve his turn , if it hath once bin disquieted by a sedition or civil war ; and so all government that is known and established , must be laid aside and overthrown , to erect another that he supposes will cure all defects . if mr. hobbes had thought fit to write problematically , and to have examin'd , as many have don , the nature of government , and the nature of mankind that is to be govern'd , and from the consideration of both , had modestly proposed such a form , as to his judgment might better provide for the security , peace , and happiness of a people , ( which is the end of government , ) then any form that is yet practic'd and submitted to ; he might well have answered one objection of an inconvenience in his new form , with another of a greater inconvenience in all other forms . but when he will introduce a government of his own devising , as founded and instituted already , and that not as somewhat new , but submitted to by the covenants , and obligations , aud election our selves have made , and so that we are bound by the rules of justice founded upon our own consent , to pretend neither to liberty , or property , other then our governor thinks fit to indulge to us ; he must be contented not to be believed , or must vouch-safe to tell us when , and where that consent of ours was given , and we submitted to those obligations : and it will be no kind of answer of satisfaction , to say magisterially , that if it be not so , it should be so for our good , which we clearly find will turn to our irreparable dammage and destruction . and it is a very confident thing , that he should hope to support his soveraign right in so unlimited an extent upon the law of nature , because ( p. . ) that forbids the violation of faith , without being pressed to tell us when , and where that faith was given , that is so obligatory , and the violation whereof must be so penal . but it is more prodigiously bold , to confess upon the matter , that there hath not hitherto bin any common-wealth , where those rights have bin acknowledged , or challeng'd , and to undervalue the argument , by making it as ridiculous , as if the savage people of america should deny there were any grounds or principles of reason so to build , as their architecture is not yet arrived at : so he thinks , that tho his savage country-men , and neighbors , have yet only bin accustomed to governments imperfect , & apt to relapse into disorders , he hath found out principles by industrious meditation , to make their constitution everlasting . and truly he hath some reason to be confident of his principles , if tho they cannot be proved by reason , he be sure they are principles from autority of scripture , as he professes them to be , and which must be examin'd in its course . in the mean time he may be thought to be too indulgent to his soveraign governor , and very neer to contradict himself , that after he hath made the keeping and observation of promises to be a part of the law of nature , which is unalterable and eternal , and so the ground and foundation of that obedience which the subject must render , how tyrannically soever exacted , yet all covenants entred into by the soveraign to be void ; and that to imagine that he is or can be bound to perform any promise or covenant , proceeds only from want of understanding . and it would be worth his pains to consider , whether the assigning such a power to his governor , or the absolving him from all covenants and promises , be a rational way to establish such a peace as is the end of government : and since he confesses the justest government may be overthrown by force , it ought prudently to be considered , what is like to prevent that force , as well as what the subject is bound to consent to ; and whether the people may not be very naturally dispos'd to use that force against him that declares himself to be absolv'd from all oaths , covenants , and promises , and whether any obligation of reason or justice can establish the government in him , who founds it upon so unrighteous a determination . if mr. hobbes did not affect to be of the humor of those unreasonable gamesters , which he saies ( pag. . ) is intolerable in the society of men , who will after trump is turned , use for trump , upon every occasion , that suit whereof they have most in their hand , whom he likens to those men who clamor and demand right reason for judg , yet seek no more , but that things should be determined by no other mens reason then their own ; i say , if mr. hobbes were not possessed by his supercilious spirit which he condemns , since this his institution of soveraignty is a mere imagination , he might with as much reason , if he would have bin pleased to have called it so , because it would have carried with it more equality , and consequently more security , have supposed a covenant to be on the soveraigns part : which that he may not do , he will not admit that they who are his subjects make any covenant with their soveraign to obey him ; which if he did , he could as well covenant again with them to govern righteously , without making them the judges of his justice , or himself liable to their controul and jurisdiction . so that the soveraign hath no security for the obedience of his people , but the promise they have made to each other ; and consequently if they rebel against him , he cannot complain of any injustice don to him , because they have broke no promise they made to him . and truly , by his own logic , they may release to one another when they think it convenient : whereas if the promises be mutual , i do not say conditional , the soveraign must not be at the mercy of his subjects ; but as they put themselves under his power , so he promises them not to use that power wantonly or tyrannically ( which will be a proper and significant word against all his interpretation ; ) by which they have as much obligation upon him to be just , as he hath upon them to be obedient , which is no other , then that they swarve from justice , if they withdraw their obedience from him . this had bin a more natural and equitable institution , and more like to have lasted , having in it the true essential form of contracts , in which it will never be found that one party covenants , and the other not ; which is the reason mr. hobbes himself gives , why no covenant can be made with god , and that ( pag. . ) the pretence of covenant with god , is so evident a lye , even in the pretenders own consciences , that it is not only ●n act of an unjust , but also of a vile and unmanly disposition ; which assertion is destructive of our religion , and against the express sense of scripture . the impossibility alledg'd for such a covenant , because it could not be don before he was soveraign , for that the subjects who submit to him were not yet one person , and after he is soveraign what he doth is void , is but a fancy of words which have no solid signification . nor is the instance which he gives of the popular government , by which he would make the imagination of such a covenant ridiculous , of any importance , for he saies ( pag. . ) no man is so dull as to say , that the people of rome made a covenant with the romans to hold the soveraign●y on such or such conditions , which not perform'd the romans might lawfully , depose the roman people ; which is , according to his usual practice , to put an objection into the mouth of a foolish adversary to make his readers merry . and yet he laies so much weight upon it , that he saies it is only over inclination to a popular government , that men do not see that there is the same reason with reference to monarchy . and so there is , and the reason good to either . for doth not every man know , that knows any thing of the government of rome , that when the soveraignty was intirely vested in the senate , and had long bin so , the people of rome made a great alteration in the soveraignty by making tribunes ( by which machiavel saies their government was the more firm and secure ) and afterwards by introducing other magistrates into the soveraignty ? nor were the admissions and covenants the senate made in those cases ever declared void , but observed with all punctuality : which is argument enough , that the soveraign power may admit limitations without any danger to it self or the people , which is all that is contended for . as there never was any such person ( pag. . ) of whose acts a great multitude by mutual covenant one with another , have made themselves every one the author , to the end he may use the strength and means of them all , as he shall think expedient for their peace , and common defence , which is the definition he gives of his common-wealth : so if it can be supposed , that any nation can concur in such a designation , and divesting themselves of all their right and liberty , it could only be in reason obligatory to the present contractors , nor do's it appear to us , that their posterity must be bound by so unthrifty a concession of their parents . for tho adam by his rebellion against god forfeited all the privileges which his unborn posterity might have claimed if he had preserved his innocence , and tho parents may alienate their estates from their children , and thereby leave them beggars ; yet we have not the draught of any contract , nor is that which mr. hobbes hath put himself to the trouble to prepare , valid enough to that purpose , by which they have left impositions and penalties upon the persons of their posterity : nor is it probable that they would think themselves bound to submit thereunto . and then the soveraign would neither find himself the more powerful , or the more secure , for his cont●●●tors having covenanted one with another , and made themselves every one the author of all his actions : and it is to be doubted , that the people would rather look upon him as the vizier basha instituted by their fathers , then as gods lieutenant appointed to govern them under him . it is to no purpose to examine the prerogatives he grants to his soveraign , because he founds them all upon a supposition of a contract and covenant that never was in nature , nor ever can reasonably be supposed to be ; yet he confesses it to be the generation ( pag. . ) of the great leviathan , and which falling to the ground all his prerogatives must likewise fall too ; and so much to the dammage of the soveraign power , ( to which most of the prerogatives are due ) that men will be apt to suppose , that they proceed from a ground which is not true , and so be the more inclined to dispute them . whereas those prerogatives are indeed vested in the soveraign by his being soveraign ; but he do's not become soveraign by vertue of such a contract and covenant , but are of the essence of his soveraignty , founded upon a better title then such an accidental convention , and their designing a soveraign by their covenants with one another , and none with or to him , who is so absolutely to command them . and here he supposes again , that whatsoever a soveraign is possessed of , is of his soveraignty ; and therefore he will by no means admit , that he shall part with any of his power which he calls essential and inseparable rights , and that whatever grant he makes of such power , the same is void : and he do's believe that this soveraign right was at the time when he published his book so well understood ( that is , cromwel liked his doctrine so well ) that it would be generally acknowledged in england at the next return of peace . yet he sees himself deceived : it hath pleased god to restore a blessed and a general peace , and neither king nor people believe his doctrine to be true , or consistent with peace . how , and why the most absolute soveraigns may , as they find occasion , part with , and deprive themselves of many branches of their power , will be more at large discovered in another place : yet we may observe in this the very complaisant humor of mr. hobbes , and how great a courtier he desir'd to appear to the soveraign power that then govern'd , by how odious and horrible a usurpation soever , in that he found a way to excuse and justifie what they had already don in the lessening and diminution of their own soveraign power , which it concern'd them to have believ'd was very lawfully and securely don . for , they having , as the most popular and obliging act they could perform , taken away wardships and tenures , he confesses after his enumeration of twelve prerogatives , which he saies ( pag. . ) are the rights which make the essence of the soveraignty , for these , he saies , are incommunicable , and inseparable , i say , he confesses the power to coin mony , to dispose of the estates and persons of infant heirs , and all other statute prerogatives may be transferred by the soveraign ; whereas he might have bin informed , if he had bin so modest as to think he had need of any information , that those are no statute prerogatives , but as inherent and inseparable from the crown , as many of those which he declares to be of the essence of the soveraignty . but both those were already entred upon , and he was to support all their actions which were past , as well as to provide for their future proceedings . if mr. hobbes had known any thing of the constitution of the monarchy of england , supported by as firm principles of government as any monarchy in europe , and which enjoied a series of as long prosperity , he could never have thought that the late troubles there proceeded from an opinion receiv'd of the greatest part of england , that the power was divided between the king , and the lords , and the house of commons , which was an opinion never heard of in england till the rebellion was begun , and against which all the laws of england were most clear , and known to be most positive . but as he cannot but acknowledg , that his own soveraignty is obnoxious to the lusts , and other irregular passions of the people ; so the late execrable rebellion proceeded not from the defect of the law , nor from the defect of the just and ample power of the king , but from the power ill men rebelliously possessed themselves of , by which they suppressed the strength of the laws , and wrested the power out of the hands of the king : against which violence his soveraign is no otherwise secure , then by declaring that his subjects proceed unjustly ; of which no body doubts but that all they who took up arms against the king , were guilty in the highest degree . and there is too much cause to fear , that the unhappy publication of this doctrine against the liberty and propriety of the subject ( which others had the honor to declare before mr. hobbes , tho they had not the good fortune to escape punishment as he hath don , i mean dr. manwaring , and dr. sibthorpe ) contributed too much thereunto . for let him take what pains he will to render those precious words unvaluable , and of no signification ; a better philosopher then he , and one who understood the rules of government better , having lived under just such a soveraign as mr. hobbes would set up , ( i mean seneca , ) will be believed before him , who pronounces , errat siquis existimat tutum esse ibi regem , ubi nihil à rege tutum est ; securitas securitate mutua paciscenda est . and he go's very far himself towards the confessing this truth , when he is forced to acknowledg , ( pag. . ) that the riches , power , and honor of a monarch , arise only from the riches , strength and reputation of his subjects ; for no king can be rich , nor glorious , nor secure , whose subjects are either poor or contemtible : which assertion will never be supported , by saying , that that condition shall be made good , and preserv'd to them by the justice and bounty of the soveraign . for riches , and strength , and reputation , are not aëry words , without a real and substantial signification , nor do consist so much in the present enjoying , especially if it shall depend upon the casual pleasure of any man , as in the security for the future , that being a mans property , that cannot be taken from him , but in that manner , and by those rules , as are generally looked upon as the fundamentals of government . and when he is transported by his passion and his appetite , and for making good his institution , to cancel and tread under foot all those known obligations , and make the precious terms of property and liberty absurd and insignificant words , to be blown away by the least breath of his monstrous soveraign , without any violation of justice , or doing injury to those he afflicts ; i say , when he is thus warmed by the flame of his passions , which he confesses ( pag. . ) alwaies dazles , never enlightens the understanding , he is so puzled by his own notions , that he make himself a way out by distinctions of his own modelling and devising : and so he is compell'd to acknowledg , that tho his illimited soveraign , whatsoever he doth , can do no injury to his subjects , nor be by any of them accused of injustice , yet that he ( p. . ) may commit iniquity , tho not injustice or injury in the proper signification , which is far more intelligible then the beatifical vision , for the obscurity and absurdity whereof he is so merry with the scholemen . as mr. hobbes his extraordinary and notorious ignorance in the laws and constitution of the government of england makes him a very incompetent judg or informer of the cause or original of the late woful calamities in england , of which he knows no more the every other man of malmesbury doth , and upon which there will be other occasion hereafter to inlarge ; so his high arrogance and presumtion that he doth understand them , makes him triumph in the observation , and wonder that so manifest a truth should of late be so little observed , that in a monarchy , he that had the soveraignty from a descent of six hundred years , was alone called soveraign , had the title of majesty from every one of his subjects , and was unquestionably taken by them for their king , was notwithstanding never considered as their representative , that name without contradiction , passing for the title of those men , which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their petitions , and give him , if he permitted it , their advice ; which he saies ( pag. . ) may serve as an admonition for those that are the true and absolute representative of a people ( which he hath made his soveraign to be ) to take heed how they admit of any other general representative upon any occasion whatsoever : all which is so unskilful and illiterate a suggestion , as could not fall into the conception of any man who is moderately versed in the principles of soveraignty . and if mr. hobbes did not make war against all modesty , he would rather have concluded , that the title of the representative of the people was not to be affected by the king , then that for want of understanding his majesty should neglect to assume it , or that his faithful counsel , and his learned judges , who cannot be supposed to be ignorant of the regalities of the crown , should fail to put him in mind of so advantageous a plea , when his fundamental rights were so foully assaulted , and in danger . but tho the king knew too well the original of his own power , to be contented to be thought the representative of the people , yet if mr. hobbes were not strangely unconversant with the transactions of those times , he would have known , which few men do not know , that the king frequently , and upon all occasions reprehended the two houses , both for assuming the style and appellation of parliament , which they were not , but in , and by his majesties conjunction with them , and for calling themselves the representative of the people , which they neither were , or could be to any other purpose then to present their petitions , and humbly to offer their advice , when and in what his majesty required it , and this was as generally understood by men of all conditions in england , as it was that rebellion was treason . but they who were able by false pretences , and under false protestations to raise an army , found it no difficult matter to perswade that army , and those who concured with them , that they were not in rebellion . the survey of chapter . i shall heartily concur with mr. hobbes in the preference of monarchy before all other kind of government for the happiness of the people , which is the end of government : and surely the people never enjoied ( saving the delight they have in the word equality , which in truth signifies nothing but keeping on their hats ) liberty or property , or received the benefit of speedy and impartial justice , but under a monarch ; but i must then advise that monarch for his greatness and security , never so far to lessen himself , as to be considered as the peoples representative , which would make him a much less man then he is . his majesty is inherent in his office , and neither one or other is conferred upon him by the people . let those who are indeed the deputies of the people , in those occasions upon which the law allows them to make deputies , be called their representative ; which term can have no other legitimate interpretation then the law gives it , which must have more autority then any dictionary that is , or shall be made by mr. hobbes , whose animadversion or admonition will never prevail with any prince to change his soveraign title , for representative of the people ; and much the less for the pains which he hath taken ( pag. . ) to instruct men in the nature of that office , and how he comes to be their representative . i cannot leave this chapter without observing mr. hobbes his very officious care that cromwell should not fall from his greatness , and that his country should remain still captive under the tyranny of his vile posterity , by his so solemn declaration , that he who is in possession of the soveraignty , tho by election ( pag. . ) is obliged by the law of nature , to provide , by establishing his successor , to keep those that had trusted him with the gove●●ment , from relapsing into the miserable condition of civil war ; and consequently he was , when elected , a soveraign absolute . and then he declares positively , contrary to the opinion of all the world , that ( pag. . ) by the institution of monarchy , the disposing of the successor is alwaies left to the judgment and the will of the present possessor ; and that if he declares expresly that such a man shall be his heir either by word or writing , then is that man immediately after the decease of his predecessor invested in the right of being monarch . mr. hobbes was too modest a man to hope that his leviathan would have power to perswade those of poland to change their form of government ; and what denmark hath gotten by having don it since , cannot in so short a time be determin'd ; or that the emperor would dissolve and cancel the golden bull , and invest his posterity in the empire in spight of the electors ; or that the papacy should be made hereditary , since cesar borgia was so long since dead , and he had carried that spirit with him : and therefore i must appeal to all dispassion'd men what mr. hobbes could have in his purpose in the year one thousand six hundred fifty one , when this book was printed , but by this new doctrine scarcely heard of till then , to induce cromwell to break all the laws of his country , and to perpetuate their slavery under his progeny , in which he follow'd his advice to the utmost of his power , tho his doctrine proved false and most detested . and tho mr. hobbes by his presence of mind , and velocity of thought , which had inabled him to fore-see the purpose of rebelling , and taking the king prisoner , and delivering him up , from that question proposed to him , concerning the value of a roman penny , might at that time discern so little possibility of his own soveraigns recovery , that it might appear to him a kind of absurdity to wish it ; yet methinks his own natural fear of danger , which made him fly out of france , assoon as his leviathan was publish'd and brought into that kingdom , should have terrified him from invading the right of all hereditary monarchies in the world , by declaring , that by the law of nature which is immutable , it is in the power of the present soveraign to dispose of the succession , and to appoint who shall succed him in the government ; and that the word heir doth not of it self imply the children or nearest kindred of a man , but whomsoever a man shall any way declare he would have succeed him , contrary to the known right and establishment throughout the world , and which would shake if not dissolve the peace of all kingdoms . nor is there any danger of the dissolution of a common-wealth by the not nominating of a successor ; since it is a known maxime in all hereditary monarchies , that the king never dies , because in the minute of the exspiration of the present , his heir succeeds him , and is in the instant invested in all the dignities , and preheminences of which the other had bin possessed : and if there were no other error or false doctrine in the leviathan ( as there are very many of a very pernicious nature ) that would be cause enough to suppress it in all kingdoms . the survey of chapter . it is modestly don of mr. hobbes at last , after so many magisterial determinations of the institution of soveraignty , and the rights and autority of it , and what is not it , to confess that all these discourses ( pag. . ) are only what he finds by speculation and deduction of soveraign rights from the nature , need , and designs of man in erecting of common-wealths , and putting themselves under monarchs , &c. and therefore if he finds that all his speculation is positively contradicted by constant and uncontroverted practice , he will believe that his speculation is not , nor ought to be of autority enough to introduce new laws and rules of government into the world. and it is high time for the soveraign power to declare , that it doth not approve those doctrines , which may lessen the affections and tenderness of princes towards their subjects , and even their reverence to god himself , if they thought that they could change religion , and suppress the scripture it self ; and that their power over their subjects is so absolute , that they give them all that they do not take from them ; and that property is but a word of no signification , and lessens the duty and obedience of subjects , and makes them less love the constitution of the government they live under ; which may prove so destructive to them , if they have temtation from their passions or their appetite to exercise the autority they justly have . it is fit therefore that all men know , that these are only his speculations , and not the claim of soveraign power . it had bin to be wished , that mr. hobbes had first taken the pains to have inform'd himself of the p●wer and autority exercised by elective princes over their subjects , and their submission rendred to them by their subjects , before he had so positively determin'd , that elective kings are not soveraigns , at least that he had given a better reason for his assertion . he that hath supreme autority over all , and against whom there is no appeal , may very justly and lawfully be called a soveraign . and if he would enquire into the autority of the emperor , in the proper dominion of the empire , he would find that he hath as soveraign a power as any prince in christendom claims , and yet he is elective . and it is a more extravagant speculation to conclude , that because the electors have the absolute power to chuse the emperor , that the soveraignty is in them before they chuse him , and that they may keep it to themselves if they think good , because none have a right to give that which they have no right to possess ; when it is known to all the world that the electors have a right to chuse the emperor , and yet that till they have chosen him , the soveraignty is not in them , nor that they can possess it them selves , and chuse whether they will give it to another ; and that when they have chosen him , he is a soveraign prince , and superior to all those who have chosen him , by all the marks of soveraignty which are known in practice , tho not possibly in speculation . and he knows well there is another soveraign prince greater then the emperor , and almost as great as he would have his soveraign to be in the extent of his power , who is likewise el●ctive , and that is the pope , and that the conclave cannot retain that soveraignty to themselves , but having by their election conferr'd ●t upon him , he is thereby become as absolute a monarch as mr. hobbes can wish . and truly , if he would rectifie his speculations , that is , his conceptions and imaginations , by examining those of other men ( a fatal neglect he hath bin guilty of throughout his whole life ) he could hardly have avoided the knowing ▪ that on every michaelmas day the whole common people of london chuse the lord major , and yet the office is not in them till they do chuse him , tho his predecessor were dead , nor can they keep it to themselves ; and so they can give that which they cannot possess , which is diametrically contrary to his speculation , which would likewise have bin controuled by all elections of the kingdom . he might have saved himself much labor ( since he agrees that a soveraign by acquisition , which is somwhat we understand , hath the same full soveraignty with his other by institution ) if he had spar'd all that which is mere speculation ; and i will gratifie him , by not insisting upon the p●ternal dominion , otherwise then as it must be confessed to be the original of monarchy , because we will do the mother no wrong , who is so meet a help in the generation . and before i proceed further upon this argument , to which i will presently return , i must lament in this place mr. 〈◊〉 so positive determining a point of justice , in which he could have no experience , and against all th● practice of the christian world , ( pag. ● . ) that he who hath qu●rter granted 〈…〉 his life given , but deferred till farther deliberation ; which doctrine , found only as he confesses by speculation , served to confirm that tyrannical power in a judgment they had given , when three great and noble persons , who were prisoners of war , were contrary to all form and rule condemn'd to be murder'd ; which sentence was barbarously executed , and afterwards reiterated upon others , the rather probably upon his speculative determination . and since we are now come to the chapter of dominion paternal and despotical , in which he discourses of his government by acquisition , which he will have by force ; or by institution , which he calls by consent , and confesses , that the rights ▪ and consequences of soveraignty are the same in both ; it may not ( i conceive ) be unseasonable to state , and lay down that scheme of government , which men reasonably believe was originally instituted , and the progress and alterations which were afterwards made , and all those covenants , promises , and conditions which were annexed to it , and by the observation of which it hath alwaies acquired strength and lustre , and bin as much impair'd , when endeavors have bin used to extend it beyond its bounds and just limits , and to make it more absolute , then is consistent with the peace and happiness of the people , which was , and is the end of its institution . and in the first place we must deny , as we have hitherto don , mr. hobbes his ground work , upon which , with many ill consequences even from thence his foundation is supported , aad that is , that war is founded in nature , which gives the stronger a right to whatever the weaker is possessed of , so that there can be no peace , or security from oppression , till such covenants are made , as may appoint a soveraign to have all that power which is necessary to provide for that peace and security ; and out of , and by this institution , his magistrate grows up to the greatness and size of his leviathan . but we say , that peace is founded in nature ; and that when the god of nature gave his creature , man , the dominion over the rest of his creation , he gave him likewise natural strength and power to govern the world with peace and order : and how much soever he lost by his own integrity , by falling from his obedience to his creator , and how severe a punishment soever he under-went by that his disobedience , it do's not appear that his dominion over man-kind was in any degree lessened or abated . so that we cannot but look upon him during his life , as the sole monarch of the world ▪ and that lasted so long , as we may reasonably compute , that a very considerable part of the world , that was peopled before the flood , was peopled in his life , since it lasted upon the point of two parts of that term ; so that his dominion was over a very numerous people . and during all that time , we have no reason to imagine that there was any such instrument of government by covenants and contracts , as is contain'd in this institution . and yet we do acknowledg , that he was by nature fully possessed of all that plenitudo potestatis , which doth of right belong to a magistrate ; and we may very reasonably believe , having no color to think the contrary , that his son seth , who was born a hundred and thirty years after him , and lived above a hundred years after he was dead , govern'd his descendants with the same absolute dominion , which might well be continued under his successor to the very time of the flood ▪ for we may very reasonably believe that noah conversed with seth , since it is evident they lived one hundred years together in the same age. nor have we the least color to believe , that there was either s●dition or civil war before the flood ; their rebellion against god in a universal exercise of idolatry , which implies a general conse●●● amongst themselves , being in the opinion of most learned men , the crying sin that provoked god to drown the world. after the flood , we cannot but think that noah remain'd the sole , monarch of the world during his life , according to that model with which he had bin very well acquainted for the space of five hundred years ; and he lived long enough after to see a very numerous increase of his children and subjects , who after his death , when the multiplication was very great , came from the east into the land of shinar , the pleasant v●●ly of shinar , where god , in the beginning , had plac'd the father of man-kind , adam ; and learned men are of opinion , that the great and principal end of the building of babel , over and above the high tower for their fame and renown to posterity , was , that they intended it for the metropolis of an universal monarchy ; so little doubt there was yet made of an entire subjection and obedience . sure we are , that the generations of noah , when man-kind was exceedingly increas'd , did divide the nations in the earth ; and mr. m●ad ass●res us , that the word which we translate divided , signifies not a scattering , or any thing of confusion , but a most distinct partition . so that this great division of the earth being perform'd in this method and order , there is no room for the imagination and dream of such an irregular and confus'd dispersion , that every man went whither he listed , and setled himself where he liked best , from whence that institution of government might arise which mr. hobbes fancies . under this division , we of the western world have reason to believe our selves of the posterity of iapheth , and that our progenitors did as well know under what government they were to live , as what portion they were to possess : and we have that blessing of iapheth , that god would inlarge him into the tents of shem , and that cham should be his servant , to assure and confirm us , that the inundation , which almost cover'd us , of the gothes and vandals from scythia , and other northern nations ( whose original habitations we cannot to this day find ) were not of the children of cham , which we might otherwise have suspected . as man-kind encreas'd , and the age of man grew less , so that they did not live to see so great a progeny issue out of their own loins as formerly , and their subjects growing less , their kindred also grew at so great a distance , that the account of their relations was not so easily or so carefully preserv'd ; hereby they who had the soveraign power , exercis'd less of the paternal affection in their government , and look'd upon those they govern'd as their mere subjects , not as their allies : and by degrees , according to the custom of exorbitant power , considering only the extent of their own jurisdiction , and what they might do , they treated those who were under them not as subjects , but as slaves , who having no right to any thing but what they gave them , would allow them to possess nothing but what they had no mind to have themselves . estates they had none that they could call their own , because when their soveraign call'd for them , they were his ; their persons were at his command when he had either occasion or appetite to use them , and their children inherited nothing but the subjection of their parents : so that they were happy or miserable , as he who had the power and command over them exercised that power with more or less rigor or indulgence , they submitting to both , acknowledging the dominion to be naturally absolute , and their subjection and obedience to be as natural . kings had not long delighted themselves with this exorbitant exercise of their power ( for tho the power had bin still the same , the exercise of it had bin very moderate , whilst there remain'd the tenderness or memory of any relation ) but they begun to discern ( according to their faculties of discerning , as their parts were better or worse ) that the great strength they seem'd to be possess'd of , must in a short time end in absoulte weakness , and the plenty they seem'd to enjoy , would become exceeding want and beggary ; that no man would build a house that his children should not inherit , nor cultivate land with good husbandry and expence , the fruit and profit whereof might be taken by another man ; that whilst their subjects did not enjoy the convenience and delight of life , they could not be sure of the affection and help of them , when they should enter into a difference with one who is as absolute as themselves , but they would rather chuse to be subject to him , whose subje●ts liv'd with more satisfaction under him : in a word , that whilst they engross'd all power , and all wealth into their own hands , they should find none who would defend them in the possession of it ; and that there is great difference between the subjection that love and discretion paies , and that which results only from fear and force ; and that despair puts an end to that duty , which nature , and it may be conscience too , would still perswade them to pay , and to continue ; and therefore that it was necessary that the subjects should find profit and comfort in obeying , as well as kings pleasure in commanding . these wise and wholsom reflexions prevail'd with princes for their own benefit to restrain themselves , to make their power less absolute , that it might be more useful ; to give their subjects a property that should not be invaded but in such cases , and with such and such circumstances , and a liberty that should not be restrain'd , but upon such terms as they could not but think reasonable . and as they found the benefit to grow from those condescentions in the improvement of civility , and those additions of delight which makes life and government the more pleasant , they inlarg'd the graces and concessions to their subjects , reserving all in themselves which they did not part with by their voluntary grants and promises . and if we take a view of the several kingdoms of the world , we shall see another manner of beauty , glory and lustre in those governments , where those condescentions , concessions , and contracts have bin most or best observ'd , then in those dominions where the soveraigns retain to themselves all the rights and prerogatives which are invested in them by the original nature of government ; upon which we shall inlarge hereafter . this is the original and pedigree of government , equally different from that which the levelling fancy of some men would reduce their soveraign to , upon an imagination that princes have no autority or power but what was originally given them by the people , and that it cannot be presumed that they would give them so much as might be applied to their own destruction , and from that which mr. hobbes hath instituted , by framing formal instruments by which an assembly of mankind ( which was never heard of , nor can be conceiv'd practicable ) hath devolv'd from themselves into one man of their own choice , an absolute power by their own consent , to exercise it in such a manner as to his pleasure is agreeable , without the observation of the common rules of justice or sobriety ; whereas it cannot be imagin'd possible in nature , that ever such an assembly of men of equal autority in themselves , will ever agree to make one man their soveraign with such an absolute jurisdiction over the rest , as must devest them of all property as well as power for the future ; and whereas in truth all power was by god and nature invested into one man , where still as much of it remains as he hath not parted with , and shar'd with others , for the good and benefit of those ( and the mutual security of both ) for whose benefit it was first intrusted to him ▪ the rest , which is enough , remains still in him , and may be applied to the preservation of the whole , against the fancies of those who think he hath nothing but what they have given him ; and likewise against those who believe that so much is given him , that he hath power to leave no body else any thing to enjoy ; the last of which are no less enemies to monarchy then the former . i am very unwilling to enter into the lists with mr. h●bbes upon the interpretation of scriptures , which he handles as imperiously as he doth a text of aristotle ▪ putting such unnatural interpretation on the words , as hath not before fallen into the thoughts of any other man , and drawing very unnatural inferences from them ; insomuch as no man can think he is really in earnest , when , to prove that the kings word is sufficient to take any thing from any subject when there is need , and that the king is judg of that need , he alledges the example of our saviour , who , he saies , as king of the jews ( p. ) commanded his disciples to take the asses colt to carry him to ierusalem , which he saies the owner permitted , and did not ask whether his necessity was a sufficient title , nor whether he was iudg of that necessity , but did acquiesce in the will of the lord : which is a very bold and ungrave wresting of scripture to purposes it could not intend ; since our saviour did not profess to do one act as a king of the jews , but declar'd that his kingdom was not of this world . and at the time he told the messengers who were sent for the ass , that if they were ask'd what they meant by it , they should answer , that the lord had need of him , upon which he knew , and he said , that they would let him go , and upon that he grounded their commission . if the owner would not permit them to take it , the messengers had no autority to have brought it to him . and his inference from , and the gloss he makes upon the question that god asked of adam , ( p. . ) hast thou eaten ? hath as little warrant from that text , as the other improper instance of our saviour . and sure when mr. hobbes thought fit by this example of our saviour in this place to wrest all property from the subject , he did not intend in any other place so far to devest him of any autority , that men were not bound to believe any thing he said , or to do any thing he commanded , because he had no commission which required obedience , his kingdom being not yet of this world . so unwary he is in the contradicting himself ; as all men are , who first resolve what they are to prove , before they consider what it is that is true . we are not oblig'd , nor indeed have any reason to believe , that god was offended with the children of israel for desiring a king , which was a government himself had instituted over them , and to which they had bin long accustomed , and had undergon much misery , and confusion whilst there was no king in israel ; but for their mutinous manner of asking it , and the reason they gave for it , that they might be like other nations , which god had taken all possible care that they should not be , and enjoined them to learn nothing of them . and the description which samuel made of the exorbitant power of kings , which indeed the kings of the nations did exercise , by whose example they desir'd to be govern'd , was rather to terrify them from pursuing their foolish demand , then to constitute such a prerogative as the king should use whom god would appoint to go in and out before them ; which methinks is very manifest , in that the worst kings that ever reign'd over them , never challeng'd or assum'd those prerogatives . nor did the people conceive themselves liable to those impositions ; as appears by the application they made to rehoboam upon the death of solomon , that he would abate some of that rigor his father had exercised towards them ; the rough rejection of which , contrary to the advice of his wisest counsellors , cost him the greater part of his dominions : and when rehoboam would by arms have reduc'd them to obedience , god would not suffer him , because he had bin in the fault himself . i am willing to take an occasion in this place to wish , that no better divines then mr. hobbes had from this place in samuel , presum'd very unwarrantably to draw inferences , to lessen the subjects reverence and obedience to kings , and to raise a prejudice and disesteem in kings towards their subjects , as people whose affections and good will are of no use to them , since they can present nothing to them that is their own , nor have any thing to give , but what they may take from them ; which two very different rather then contrary conclusions ▪ too many devines ( and some of parts ) according to their several inclinations and appetites , have presumed to wrest from that place of scripture ; the one party of them , as is said before , endeavouring maliciously to render monarchy odious and insupportable , by the unlimited affections , and humors , and pretences , and power of a single uncontroulable person ; the other believing as unreasonably , that the dispositions , natures , and hearts of the people , cannot be appli'd to the necessary obedience towards their princes , nor their reverence and duty be so well fix'd and devoted to them , as by thinking that they have nothing of their own , but whatsoever they enjoy they have only by the bounty of the king , who can take it from them when he pleases : and to this last party mr. hobbes his speculation hath for the present disposed him to adhere , tho in any other particular opinion he doth not concur with any divine of any church in christendom . for the first , whoever doth well consider the wonderful confused government that was exercised over the children of israel from the death of ioshua , when the monarchy was interrupted , under the judges for the space of above three hundred years , the barbarous negligence in the instructions of the people in the knowledg of god , and of their duty to him , insomuch that the very next generation after the death of ioshuah had lost , or was without the whole history of what god had don for them , and of what he expected from them ; so unfaithful a guide , or remembrancer is tradition , when the scripture it self is not to be found : i say , whosoever considers likewise the quality , and talent , and humor of many of the very judges who had bin over them , as the repeted acts of indiscretion and folly in sampson , which could not but make his judgment to be in the less reverence , & the strength of his arms to be more admir'd then that of his head ; with the present state they were then in under the sons of samuel , who were no better then the sons of ely had bin , will not perhaps so very much blame them for desiring a king : and tho the manner of their asking it might , as hath bin said , offend samuel , and in some degree displease god , yet he might not be offended absolutely with the thing it self , since it was no more then god himself had in a manner prescrib'd to them , as well as foretold , without any kind of disapprobation . when thou art come into the land which the lord thy god giveth thee &c. and shalt say , i will set a king over me , like as all the nations which are about me , thou shalt in any wise set him a king over thee , whom the lord thy god shall chuse . deut. . , , , . god was well content that they should have a king , but reserv'd the election of him to himself : he would have no transferring of rights , or covenanting for one another , he would chuse his own representative . nor amongst all the customs of the nations , which he orbad them to follow , did god ever shew the least dislike of their government by kings , which had bin instituted originally by himself , and probably bin continued by them even from the time of the institution , however their manners were degenerated and the knowledg of him totally forgotten . and in what degrees of grace and favor that high calling hath bin ever since with him , appears by the mention of them throughout the whole current of scripture , by the prerogatives he hath granted to them , and by his imparting to them even his own appellation . they who will in the next place , deduce the extent of the absolute and illimited power of kings from that declaration by samuel , which indeed seems to leave neither property , or liberty in their subjects , and could be only intended by samuel to terrify them from that mutinous and seditious clamor , since it hath no foundation from any other part of scripture , nor was ever practic'd or exercis'd by any good king who succeeded over them , and was blessed , and approv'd by god : and therefore when those state empirics , of what degree or quality soever , will take upon them to prescribe a new diet and exercise to soveraign princes , and invite them to assume new power and prerogatives over the people , by the precepts , warrants , and prescriptions of the scripture , they should not presume to make the sacred writ subject to their own private fancies . and if according to the more authentic method of interpreting doubtful places , they had recourse to that place , where the same matter is first handled , they would then have found , by resorting to the before mention'd place in deuteronomy , another their kind of scheme for the power , and government of kings . there , when god intended that they should be governed by a king whom he would himself chuse , he prescrib'd what he should not do and what he should do . he should not multiply horses to himself , &c. which only concern'd that people , that they might have no temtation to return to egypt , ye shall henceforth no more return that may , &c. nor shall he multiply wives , &c. tho multiplying of wives seem'd to be permitted , yet he was to have a care that the number of them did not turn his heart away . nor should he greatly multiply unto himself silver , and gold , &c. not so affect , and set his heart upon being rich , to be temted to oppress his subjects , or to injure his neighbors ; and so far the negative directed . then for the affirmative , that he should write a copy of the law in a book , &c. deut. . , , . that it should be with him , and he should read therein all the daies of his life , that he might learn to fear the lord his god , and to keep all the words of the law , and these statutes to do them ; that his heart be not lifted up , and that he turn not aside from the commandment to the right hand , or to the left ; and from this text the rabbins concluded , that he was to write a book of the law for himself , and if he had none before he was king , he was obliged assoon as he was king to have two , one whereof he was to have alwaies whith him , sive cum vadit ad praelium , sive cum sedet in judicio , ●ut in mensa , &c , those were the injunctions which god prescrib'd to his king , and were observ'd by all those who were bless'd and approv'd by him , for david seems by the words of nathan to have some particular allowance for the great number of his wives ; and multiplying gold , and silver , was for the building of the temple , and no private use of his one ; and solomons excessive greatness , was from the immediate bounty of god himself ; but he no sooner violated those precepts , and exceeded that moderation that was prescrib'd to him towards his subjects , and with reference to the multiplying wives ; then his heart turn'd away from god , and god turn'd away from him . this pleasant suggestion by which he would discountenance that importunate and impertinent demand of an example of such a government as he would institute , that tho in all places of the world men should lay the foundation of their houses in sand , it could not thence be inferr'd that so it ought to be , will never perswade men to change a government they have bin for many hundred years happy under ( tho with some vicissitudes of fortune ) for an imaginary government by his rules of arithmetic and geometry , of which no nation hath ever yet had the experiment : and if there be any country where is a sand of that nature , that hath supported the greatest edifices for hundreds of years , against all the storms of wind and rage of tempests , he shall be much too nice and scrupulous a person , who will by any rules of architecture forbear to build● his house there , because he will not lay his foundation upon sand , which by experience is found to be of equal firmness with a rock . the survey of chapter . mr. hobbes is so great an enemy to freedom that he will not allow man that which god hath given him , the freedom of his will , but he shall not entangle me in that argument , which he hath enough exercis'd himself in with a more equal adversary , who i think hath bin much too hard for him at his own weapon , reason , the learned bishop of derry , who was afterwards arch-bishop of armagh , and by which he hath put him into greater choler then a philosopher ought to subject himself to , the terrible strokes whereof i am not willing to undergo , and therefore shall keep my self close to that freedom and liberty only that is due to subjects , and of which , his business in this chapter , is to deprive them totally . a man would have expected from mr. hobbes's inventory of the several rights and powers of his soveraign in his eighteenth chapter , of which one was to prescribe rules ( pag. . ) whereby every man might know what goods he may enjoy , and what actions he might do without being molested by any of his fellow subjects , which he saies , men call propriety , that some such rule should be established as might secure that porpriety , how little soever : but he hath now better explain'd himself , and finds , that liberty and property are only fences against the invasion or force of fellow subjects , but towards the soveraign of no use or signification at all . no man hath a propriety in any thing , that can restrain the king from taking it from him , and the liberty of a subj●ct ( pag. . ) ●eth only in those things , which in regulating their actions , the soveraign hath pretermitted , such as is the liberty to buy and sell , and otherwise contract with one another ; to chuse their own abode , their own diet , their own trade of life , and to institute their children as they think fit , and the like . i wonder he did not insert the liberty to wear his clothes of that fashion which he likes best , which is as important as most of his other concessions . and yet he seems to be jealous , that even this liberty should make men imagine , that the soveraign power should be in any degree limited , or that any thing he can do to a subject , and upon what pretence soever , may be called injustice or injury , the contrary whereof he saies he hath shewed already ; for he takes it as granted , that all that he hath said he had proved : and if he hath not , he hath don it now substantially by the example of iepthah , in causing his daughter to be sacrific'd ( of which he is not sure ) and by davids killing vriah , which he saies , tho it was against equity , yet it was not an injury to vriah , because the right was given him by vriah , which i dare swear vriah never knew he had don . and by such unnatural arguments he would perswade men to be willing to be undon ; very like those which the stoics as obstinately maintain'd , that a wise man could not be injur'd because he was not capable nor sensible of it . but i wonder more , that he doth not discern what every other man cannot but discern , that by his so liberal taking away , he hath not left the subject any thing to enjoy even of those narrow concessions which he hath made to him . for how can any man believe that he hath liberty to buy and sell , when the soveraign power can presently take away what he hath sold , from him who hath bought it , and consequently no man can sell or buy to any purpose ? who can say that he can chuse his own abode , or his own trade of life , or any thing , when assoon as he hath chosen either , he shall be requir'd to go to a place where he hath no mind to go , and to do somwhat he would not chuse to do ? for his person is no more at his own disposal then his goods are ; so that he may as graciously retain to himself all that he hath granted . whether the soveraign power , or the liberty of the subject receive the greater injury and prejudice by this brief state and description he makes of the no liberty , that is , the portion he leaves to the subject , would be a great question , if he had not bin pleas'd himself to determine , that his subject ( for god forbid that any other prince should have such a subject ) is not capable of an injury ; by which the whole mischief is like to fall upon the soveraign . and what greater mischief and ruine can threaten the greatest prince , then that their subjects should believe , that all the liberty they have , consists only in those things which the soveraign hath hitherto pretermitted , that is , which he hath not yet taken from them , but when he pleases in regulating their actions to determine the contrary , they shall then have neither liberty to buy or sell , nor to contract with each other , to chuse their own abode , their own diet , their own trade of life , or to breed their own children ; and to make their misery compleat , and their life as little their own as the rest , that nothing the soveraign can do to his subject , on what pretence soever , as well in order to the taking away his life as his estate , can be called injustice or injury ; i say , what greater insecurity can any prince be in or under , then to depend upon such subjects ? and alas ! what security to himself or them can the sword in his hand be , if no other hand be lift up on his behalf , or the swords in all other hands be directed against him , that he may not cut off their heads when he hath a mind to it ? and it is not mr. hobbes's autority that will make it believ'd , that he who desires more liberty , demands an exemtion from all laws , by which all other men may be masters of their lives ; and that every subject is author of every act the soveraign doth , upon the extravagant supposition of a consent that never was given ; and if it were possible to have bin given , must have bin void at the instant it was given , by mr. hobbes's own rules , as shall be made out in its place . he himself confesses , ( pag. . ) and saies it is evident to the meanest capacities , that mens actions are deriv'd from the opinion they have of the good and evil which from those actions redound unto themselves , and consequently men that are once possessed of an opinion that their obedience to the soveraign power will be more hurtful to them then their disobedience , will disobey the laws , and thereby over-throw the common-wealth , and introduce confusion and civil war , for the avoiding whereof , all civil government was ordained . if this be true , ( as there is no reason to believe it to be ) is it possible that any man can believe , that the people , for we speak not of convincing the philosophers and the mathematicians , but of the general affections of the people , which must dispose them to obedience , that they can be perswaded by a long train of consesequences , from the nature of man , and the end of government , and the institution thereof by contracts and covenants , of which they never heard , to believe that it is best for them to continue in the same nakedness in which they were created , for fear their clothes may be stoln from them , and that they have parted with their liberty to save their lives ? there is no question , but of all calamities the calamity of war is greatest , and the rage and uncharitableness of civil war most formidable of all war. indeed foreign war seldom destroies a nation without domestic combinations and conspiracies , which makes a complication with civil war ; and sure nothing can more inevitably produce that , then an universal opinion in the people , that their soveraign can take from them all they have whenever he hath a mind to it , and their lives to , without any injustice , and consequently that their obedience to him will be more hurtful to them then their disobedience , so well hath he provided for the security of his soveraign , if his doctrine were believ'd . mr. hobbes is too much conversant in both those learned languages , to wish that the western world were depriv'd of the greek and latine tongues , for any mischief they have don ; and upon my conscience , what ever errors may have bin brought into philosophy by the autority of aristotle , no man ever grew a rebel by reading him ; and if the greatest monarch that hath ever bin in the world , except the monarch of the world , had thought his tutor aristotle had bin so great an enemy to monarchy ( yet he knew he was born and bred in a republic ) and that his works contribute so much to sedition , as mr. hobbes supposes , he would not have valued his person so much , nor read his works with such diligence as he did . and if mr. hobbes would take a view of the insurrections , and the civil wars which have at any time bin stirr'd up in the western parts , he will not find that they have bin contriv'd or fomented by men who had spent much time in the reading greek and latin authors , or that they have bin carried on upon the maxims and principles which they found there . iack straw and wat tyler , whose insurrection , in respect of the numbers and the progress it made , was as dangerous as hath happened in any age or climate , had never read aristotle or cicero ; and i belive , had mr. hobbes bin of this opinion when he taught thucydides to speak english , which book contains more of the science of mutiny and sedition , and teaches more of that oratory that contributes thereunto , then all that aristotle and cicero have publish'd in all their writings , he would not have communicated such materials to his country-men . but if this new phylosophy , and doctrine of policy and religion should be introduc'd , taught , and believ'd , where aristotle and cicero have don no harm , it would undermine monarchy more in two months , then those two great men have don since their deaths ; and men would reasonably wish , that the author of it had never bin born in the english climate , nor bin taught to write and read . it is a very hard matter for an architect in state and policy , who doth despise all precedents , and will not observe any rules of practice , to make such a model of government as will be in any degree pleasant to the governor , or governed , or secure for either ; which mr. hobbes finds ; and tho he takes a liberty to raise his model upon a supposition of a very formal contract , that never was , or ever can be in nature , and hath the drawing and preparing his own form of contract , is forc'd to allow such a latitude in obedience to his subject , as shakes the very pillars of his government . and therefore , tho he be contented that by the words of his contract , ( pag. . ) kill me , and my fellow if you please , the absolute power of all mens lives shall be submitted to the disposal of the governors will and pleasure , without being oblig'd to observe any rules of justice and equity ; yet he will not admit into his contract the other words , ( pag. . ) i will kill my self , or my fellow , and therefore that he is not bound by the command of his soveraign to execute any dangerous or dishonorable office ; but in such cases , men are not to resort so much to the words of the submission , as to the intention : which distinction surely may be as applicable to all that monstrous autority which he gives the governor to take away the lives and estates of his subjects , without any cause or reason , upon an imaginary contract , which if never so real , can never be supposed to be with the intention of the contractor in such cases . and the subtle distinctions he finds out to excuse subjects from yielding obedience to their soveraigns , and the prerogative he grants to fear , for a whole army to run away from the enemy without the guilt of treachery or injustice , leaves us some hope , that he will at last allow such a liberty to subjects , that they may not in an instant be swallowed up by the prodigious power which he pleases to grant to his soveraign . and truly , he degrades him very dishonorably , when he obliges him to be the hang-man himself , of all those malefactors , which by the law are condemn'd to die ; for he gives every man autority , without the violation of his duty , or swerving from the rules of justice , absolutely to refuse to perform that office . nor hath he provided much better for his security , then he hath for his honor , when he allows it lawful for any number of men , ( pag. . ) who have rebelled against the soveraign , or committed some capital crime , for which every one of them expects death , then to join together , and defend each other , because they do but defend their lives , which the guilty man , he saies , may do as well as the innocent . and surely , no man can legally take his life from him who may lawfully defend it ; and then the murderer , or any other person guilty of a capital crime , is more innocent , and in a better condition then the executioner of justice , who may be justly murdered in the just execution of his office . and it is a very childish security that he provides for his soveraign against this rebellion , and defence of themselves against the power of the law , ( pag. . ) that he declares it to be lawful only for the d●fence of their lives , and that upon the offer of pardon for themselves , that self-defence is unlawful : as if a body that is lawfully drawn together , with strength enough to defend their lives against the power of the law , are like to disband and lay down their arms , without other benefit and advantage then only of the saving of their lives . but tho he be so cruel as to devest his subjects of all that liberty , which the best and most peaceable men desire to possess , yet he liberally and bountifully confers upon them such a liberty as no honest man can pretend to , and which is utterly inconsistent with the security of prince and people ; which unreasonable indulgence of his cannot but be thought to proceed from an unlawful affection to those , who he saw had power enough to defend the transcendent wickedness they had committed , tho they were without an advocate to make it lawful for them to do so , till he took that office upon him in his leviathan , as is evident by the instance he gives in the next paragraph , that he thinks it lawful for every man to have as many wives as he pleases , if the king will break the silence of the law , and declare that he may do so ; which is a prerogative he vouchsafes to grant to the soveraign , to balance that liberty he gave to the subject to defend himself and his companion against him , and is the only power that may inable him to be too hard for the other . if mr. hobbes did not believe that the autority of his name , and the pleasantness of his style , would lull men asleep from enquiring into the logic of his discourse , he could not but very well discern himself , that this very liberty which he allows the subject to have , and which he doth without scruple enjoy , to sue the soveraign , and to demand the hearing of his cause , and that sentence be given according to the law , results only from that condescention and contract which the soveraign hath made with his subject , and which can as well secure many other liberties to them , as their power to sue the king ; for there could be no law precedent to that resignation of themselves and all they had , at the institution of their supreme governor ; and if there had bin , it had bin void and invalid , it being not possible that any man who hath right to nothing , and from whom any thing that he hath may be taken away , can sue his soveraign for a debt which he might take , if it were due from any other man , but can by no means be due from him to whom all belongs , and who hath power to forbid any judg to proceed upon that complaint , or any other person to presume to make that complaint , were it not for the subsequent contract which he calls a precedent law , by which the soveraign promises and obliges himself to appoint judges to exercise justice even where himself is party , and that he will be sued before those judges , if he doth not pay what he ow's to his subjects . this is the contract which gives that capacity of suing , and which by his own consent and condescention lessens his soveraignty , that his subjects may require justice from him . and yet all these promises , and lessenings , he pronounces as void , and to amount to contradictions , that must dissolve the whole soveraign power , and leave the people in confusion and war. whereas the truth is , these condescentions , and voluntary abatements of some of that original power that was in them , have drawn a cheerful submission , and bin attended by a ready obedience to soveraignty , from the time that subjects have bin at so great a distance from being consider'd as children , and that soveraigns have bin without those natural tendernesses in the exercise of their power , and which in the rigor of it could never have bin supported . and where these obligations are best observ'd , soveraignty flourishes with the most lustre , and security ; kings having still all the power remaining in them , that they have not themselves parted with , and releas'd to their subjects , and thei● subjects having no pretence to more liberty or power then the king hath granted and given to them : and both their happiness , and security consists in containing themselves within their own limits , that is , king , not to affect the recovery of that exorbitant power , which their ancestors wisely parted with , as well for their own as the peoples benefit ; and subjects to rejoice in those liberties which have bin granted to them , and not to wish to lessen the power of the king , which is not greater then is necessary for their own perservation . and to such a wholsom division , and communication of power as this is , that place of scripture ( with which mr. hobbes is still too bold ) a kingdom d●vided in it self cannot stand , cannot be applied . but that this supreme soveraign , whom he hath invested with the whole property and liberty of all his subjects , and so invested him in it , that he hath not power to part with any of it by promise , or donation , or release , may not be too much exalted with his own greatness , he hath humbled him sufficiently by giving his subjects leave to withdraw their obedience from him when he hath most need of their assistance , for the ( pag. . ) obligation of subjects to the soveraign is understood ( he saies ) to last as long , and no longer , then the power lasts to protect them . so that assoon as any town , city , or province of any princes dominions , is invaded by a foreign enemy , or possessed by a rebellious subject , that the prince for the present cannot suppress the power of the one , or the other , the people may lawfully resort to those who are over them , and for their protection perform all the offices and duties of good subjects to them , ( pag . ) for the right men have by nature to protect themselves when none else can protect them , can by no covenant be relinquish'd , and the end of obedience is protection , which wherever a man seeth it either in his own , or in an others sword , nature applieth his obedience to it and his endeavours to maintain it . and truly it is no wonder if they do so , and that subjects take the first opportunity to free themselves from such a soveraign as he hath given them , and chuse a better for themselves . whereas the duty of subjects is , and all good subjects believe they owe another kind of duty and obedience to their soveraign , then to withdraw their subjection because he is oppress'd ; and will prefer poverty , and death it self , before they will renounce their obedience to their natural prince , or do any thing that may advance the service of his enemies . and since mr. hobbes gives so ill a testimony of his government ( which , by the severe conditions he would oblige mankind to submit to for the support of it , ought to be firm , and not to be shaken ) ( pag. . ) that it is in its own nature not only subject to violent death by foreign war , but also from the ignorance and passion of men , that it hath in it from the very institution many seeds of natural mortality by intestine discord , worse then which he cannot say of any government , we may very reasonably prefer the government we have , and under which we have enjoi'd much happiness , before his which we do not know , nor any body hath had experience of , and which by his own confession is liable to all the accidents of mortality which any others have bin ; and reject his that promises so ill , and exercises all the action of war in peace , and when war comes , is liable to all the misfortunes which can possibly attend or invade it . whether the relation of subjects be extinguisht in all those cases , which mr. hobbes takes upon him to prescribe , as imprisonment , banishment , and the like , i leave to those who can instruct him better in the law of nations , by which they must be judged , notwithstanding all his appeals to the law of nature ; and i presume , if a banish'd person ( p. ) during which , he saies , he is not subject , shall join in an action under a foreign power against his country , wherein he shall with others be taken prisoner , the others shall be proceeded against as prisoners of war , when he shall be judg'd as a traitor and rebel , which he could not be , if he were not a subject : and this not only in the case of an hostile action , and open attemt , but of the most secret conspiracy that comes to be discover'd . and if this be true , we may conclude it would be very unsafe to conduct our selves by what mr. hobbes ( p. . ) finds by speculation , and deduction of soveraign rights from the nature , need ▪ and designs of men . surely this woful desertion , and defection in the cases above mention'd , which hath bin alwaies held criminal by all law that hath bin current in any part of the world , receiv'd so much countenance and justifications by mr. hobbes his book , and more by his conversation , that cromwel found the submission to those principles produc'd a submission to him , and the imaginary relation between protection and allegiance so positively proclam'd by him , prevail'd for many years to extinguish all visible fidelity to the king , whilst he perswaded many to take the engagement as a thing lawful , and to become subjects to the usurper , as to their legitimate soveraign ; of which great service he could not abstain from bragging in a pamphlet set forth in that time , that he alone , and his doctrine had prevail'd with many to submit to the government , who would otherwise have disturb'd the public peace , that is , to renounce their fidelity to their true soveraign , and to be faithful to the usurper . it appears at last , why by his institution he would have the power , and security of his soveraign , wholly and only to depend upon the contracts , and covenants which the people make one with another , to transfer all their right to a third person ( who shall be soveraign ) without entring into any covenant with the soveraign himself , which would have devested them of that liberty to disobey him , which they have reserv'd to themselves ; or receiving any covenant from him , which might have obliged him to have kept his promise to them ; by which they might have had somewhat left to them which they might have called their own , which his institution will not bear , all such promises being void . but if he be so tender-hearted , as to think himself oblig'd to observe all the promises , and make good all the grants he hath made , by which he may be disabled to provide for their safety , which is the ground that hath made all those grants and promises to be void , he hath granted him power to remedy all this , by ( p. . ) directly renouncing , or transferring the soveraignty to another : and that he might openly , and in plain terms renounce , or transfer it , he makes no doubt ; and then he saies , if a monarch shall relinquish the soveraignty both for himself , and his heirs , his subjects return to the absolute liberty of nature . because tho nature may declare who are his sons , and who are the neerest of his kin , yet it dependeth on his own will who shall be his heir : and if he will have no heir , there is no soveraignty , or subjection . this seems the hardest condition for the poor subject that he can be liable unto , that when he hath devested himself of all the right he had , only for his soveraigns protection , that he may be redeem'd from the state of war and confusion that nature hath left him in , and hath paid so dear for that protection , it is left still in his soveraigns power to withdraw that protection from him , to renounce his subjection , and without his consent to transer the soveraignty to another , to whom he hath no mind to be subject . one might have imagin'd that this new trick of transferring , and covenanting , had bin an universal remedy , that being once applied would for ever prevent the ill condition and confusion that nature had left us in , and that such a right would have bin constituted by it , that soveraignty would never have fail'd to the worlds end : and that when the subject can never retract , or avoid the bargain he hath made , how ill soever he likes it , or improve it by acquiring any better conditions in it , it shall notwithstanding be in the soveraigns power without his consent , and it may be without his privity , in an instant to leave him with out any protection , without any security , and as a prey to all who are too strong for him . this indeed is the greatest prerogative that he hath conferr'd upon his soveraign , when he had given him all that belongs to his subjects , that when he is weary of governing , he can destory them , by leaving them to destory one another . for kings and princes to resign and relinquish their crown and soveraignty , is no new transaction , nor , it may be , the better for being old . some have left them out of melancholy , and devotion , and when they have ceased to be kings made themselves monks , and repented the change of their conditions afterwards . some out of weakness and bodily infirmities , have not bin able to sustain the fatigue that the well exercising the government required , and therefore have desir'd to see those in the quiet possession of it , to whom it would of right belong when they were dead ; and the more reasonably , if they fore-saw any difficulties like to arise about their admission in those seasons ; as charles the fifth apprehended with reference to some of his dominions in italy , if his son philip was not in possession of them , before his brother ferdinando came to be emperor . some princes have bin so humorous , as upon the frowardness and refractorines● of their subjects , and because they could not govern in that manner they had a mind to do , to abdicate the government , and would have bin glad afterwards to have resumed it . and others have bin to wanton , as to relinquish their crown because they did not like the climate in which their dominions lay , and only that they might live in a better air , and enjoy the delights and pleasures of a more happy situation . but all these generally never attemted it , or imagin'd they could do it , without the approbation and consent of their subjects , which was allwaies desir'd , and yielded to , with great formality . and it is very strange that in those seasons of abdication , which supposes a suspension of soveraignty , especially in elective kingdoms , for in hereditary the immortality of the king ▪ who never dies , may make a difference , this invention of mr. hobbes , of transferring one anothers right , and covenanting with one another , hath never bin heard of ; and tho the soveraignty is invested by election , the people have very little share in that election . if mr. hobbes would have exercis'd his talent in that spacious field , as he might have don with more innocence , and ▪ it may be , more success , and have undertaken by his speculation and deduction of soveraign rights , from the nature , need , and designs of men , to prove that it is not in the just power of a monarch to relinquish and renounce his soveraignty , with what formality and consent soever ; nor more in the autority and power of the king to abdicate and relinquish his soveraignty over his people , then it is in the autority of the people to withdraw their submission and obedience from him ; and that the practice of such renunciations , tho never very frequent , hath bin the original and introduction of that mischeivous doctrine sow'd amongst the people , of their having a co-ordinate power with the soveraign , which will be much cherished by his new institution , since men are easily perswaded to believe , that they can mar what they can make , and may lawfully destroy what they create , that is , the work of their own hands ; i say , if he would have laid out his reason upon that argument , he could have made it shine very plausibly , and might have made many proselytes to his opinion ; since many learned men are so much in their judgment against that right of relinquishing and transferring in princes , that they believe it to be the only cause wherein subjects may lawfully take up defensive arms , that they may continue subjects , and to preserve their subjection and obedience from being alien'd from him to whom it is due ; and that no consent or concurrence can more make such an alienation lawful , then it can dissolve the bonds of wedlock , and qualifie both parties to make a new choice for themselves , that may be more grateful to them . but he thinks it to be more glory , to discover that to be right reason , which all other men find to be destructive to it , and ( page . . ) that the suddain and rough bustling in of a new truth , will raise his fame , as it hath don that of many other heretics before , and which he saies , doth never break the pe●ce , but only sometimes awake the war ; which , to use his own commendable expression , is ( pag. . ) like ●anding of things from one to another , with many words making nothing understood . the survey of chapter . i should pass over his two and twentieth chapter of systemes , subject , political , and private , which is a title as difficult to be understood by a literal translation as most of those to any chapter in suarez ; as few congregations , when they meet in a church to pay their devotions to god almighty , do know that they are an irregular systeme : in which , besides vulgar notions well worded , every man will discover much of that which he calls signs of error , and misreckoning , to which , he saies , ( page . . ) all mankind is too prone , and with which that chapter abounds , and will require no confutation , but that i find , and wonder to find mention of laws , and letters patents , bodies politic , and corporations , as necessary institutions for the carrying on , and advancement of trade , which are so many limitations and restraints of the soveraign power , and so many entanglements under covenants and promises , which as they are all declar'd to be void , it is in vain to mention . i did not think mr. hobbes had desir'd to establish trade , or any industry for the private accumulation of riches in his common-wealth . for is it possible to imagine , that any merchant will send out ships to sea , or make such a discovery of his estate , if it may be either seized upon before it go's out , or together with the benefit of the return when it comes home ? if trade be necessary to the good of a nation , it must be founded upon the known right of propriety , not as against other subjects only , but against the soveraign himself ; otherwise trade is but a trap to take the collected wealth of particular men in a heap , and when it is brought into less room , to have it seized on , and confiscated by the omnipotent word of the king with less trouble , and more profit . and if any laws , letters patents , charters , or any other obligations or promises , can oblige the soveraign power in these cases which refer to trade and foreign adventures , why should they not be equally valid for the securing all the other parts and relations of propriety ? however , whatsoever rigor mr. hobbes thinks fit to exercise upon the nobility and gentry of the nation , he must give over all thoughts of trade , if he doth not better provide to secure his merchants both of their liberty , and propriety . it is a good observation , and an argument for the preference of monarchy before any other form of government , in that where the government is popular , and the depressing the interest and reputation of particular subjects is an essential policy of that government , yet in the managing the affairs of their colonies and provinces at a distance from them , they chuse to commit the same to a single person , as they do the government and conduct of their armies , which are to defend their government ; which is a tacite implication , if not confession , that in their own judgment they think the monarchical the best form of government . but he might have observ'd likewise , that in all those monarchical commissions , at what distance soever , there are limits and bounds set , by referring to instructions for the punctual observation and performance of what that state or government hath bin bound by promise and contract to perform ; which hath the same force to evince , that the performance of promises and conditions , is very consistent with monarchical government : for the hazards that may arrive from thence may be as dangerous to that government if it be at a great distance , as upon any supposition whatsoever , yet is never left to the discretion of a governor . it is a wonderful latitude that mr. hobbes leaves to all his subjects , and contradictory to all the moral precepts given to the world , and to all the notions of justice , that he who hath his private interest depending , and to be debated and judg'd before any judicatory , may make as many friends as he can amongst those judges , even by giving them mony ; as if , tho it be a crime in a judg to be corrupt , the person who corrupts him may be innocent , because he thinks his own cause just , and desires to buy justice for mony which cannot be got without it ; and so the grossest and most powerful bribery shall be introduc'd , to work upon the weakness and poverty , and corruption of a judg , because the party thinks his cause to be just , and chuses rather to depend upon the affection of his judg whom he hath corrupted , then upon the integrity of his cause , and the justice of the law. but he doth not profess to be a strict casuist ▪ nor can be a good observer of the rules of moral honesty , who believes that he may induce another to commit a great sin , and remain innocent himself . nor is he in truth a competent judg of the most enormous crimes , when he reckons ( pag. . ) theft , adultery , sodomy , and any other vice that may be taken for an effect of power , or a cause of pleasure , to be of such a nature , as amongst men are taken to be against law , rather then against honor. the survey of chapter . i should with as little trouble have passed by his twenty third chapter of his public ministers , and the fanciful similies contain'd therein , not thinking it of much importance what public or private ministers he makes for such a soveraignty as he hath instituted ; but that i observe him in this place ( as most luxurious fancies use to do ) demolishing and pulling down , what he had with great care and vigilance erected and establish'd as undeniable truth before . and whereas he hath in his eighteenth chapter , ( pag. . ) pronounced the right of iudicatory , of hearing and deciding all controversies which concern law , either civil or natural , or concerning fact , to be inseparably annexed to the soveraignty , and incapable of being aliened and transferred by him ; and afterwards declares , that the judgments given by iudges qualified , and commission'd by him to that purpose , are his own proper iudgments , and to be regarded as such , which is a truth generally confess'd ; in this chapter , against all practice and all reason , he degrades him from at least half that power , and fancies a judg to be such a party , that if the litigant be not pleased with the opinion of his judg in matter of law , or matter of fact , he may therefore ( pag. . ) ( because they are both subjects to the soveraign ) appeal from his judg , and ought to be tried before another : for tho the soveraign may hear and determine the cause himself if he please , yet if he will appoint another to be judg , it must be such a one as they shall both agree upon ; for as the complainant hath already made choice of his own judg , so the defendant must be allow'd to except against such of his judges , whose interest maketh him suspect them ; which was never heard of before this institution , and the consequence of it will best appear by an instance to be very ridiculous . let us suppose that an information were preferr'd in the kings bench ( as it may well be ) against mr. hobbes , for writing and publishing such a seditious book against the establish'd government of church and state , as his leviathan is ; because the soveraign judg will not hear & determine this himself , but refers it those judges who are appointed and commission'd by him to examine and punish crimes of such a nature , would it be reasonable that mr. hobbes should except against his judges , because by their knowing the law he may suspect them , and refuse to be tri'd before any but those whom he shall agree upon ? and ( pag. ) can those be the properties of just and rational iudicature ? he hath forgotten , that before he erected his soveraignty , when there could be no judicature , he saies , ( pag. . ) it is of the law of nature , that they who are at controversie , submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator ; there indeed , for want of judicature , there was a necessity of a mutual consent , without which no man could take upon him to be an arbitrator . if a man hath a suit upon matter of title or interest with a judg , notwithstanding that he is sworn to do right , he is so far from being bound to bring his action before that judg , that he may chuse whether it shall depend in that court of which that judg is a member , tho the major part be unconcern'd , but may have his right tried in another court : but if he should have any part in the choice of his own judg , especially if he be criminal , justice would be well administred . himself acknowledges , that the judgment of such judges , is the judgment of the soveraign ; and a greater person then the soveraign hath given a fair warning to those judges ; take heed what ye do , for ye judg not for man , but for the lord , who is with you in the judgment , chron. as it is the kings judgment , he will punish it severely if it be corrupt ; and if he cannot discover it to be corrupt , for want of complaint , or want of evidence , god will punish it because it was his judgment : a corrupt judg , of all guilty persons , can never escape punishment . i am very glad that mr. hobbes is pleas'd with any part of the administration of justice in his own country ( which he would hardly like if he were exposed to it : ) and he might have observ'd that great priviledg of the lords in england , of being tried in all capital crimes by their peers , by men of their own quality and condition , to be a greater priviledg then the nobility of any nation in europe enjoy . the grandees of spain , and the dukes , and peers , and mareschals of france , in those transgressions undergo the same forms of justice , and are tried before the same judges , as the meanest peasant is for the like or the same crime : and tho he calls it , and saies it hath bin ever acknowledg'd as a priviledg of favor , yet they look upon it as a priviledg of right , of which they cannot be deprived by the word and autority of the king. and it may be he would be hardly able to bring this priviledg under his original institution of government , since probably men being then all equal , they would never have consented to such a difference , rather then equality , in the form of justice that was to be exercis●d towards them : and he values it too lightly , who thinks it can be taken from them by any arbitrary power . i cannot comprehend what mr. hobbes's meaning is , in making an embassador sent from his prince , to congratulate , or condole , or to assist at a solemnity , to be but a private person , because he saies , ( pag. . ) the business is private , and belonging to him in his natural capacity : whereas , his being sent embassador , and having in the performance of his office of congratulating or condoling , or in his assistance at the solemnity , the respect shew'd to him , and the priviledg and precedence of the person of his master , he cannot but be a public person . nor can an embassador come to be but a private person any other way , then by presuming to negotiate some unlawful thing , which he is not warranted by his commission to do ; and even in that case he expects to be treated as a public person , as well by the security that prince gave him by his reception , as by the autority of the prince who sent him , and expects to be sent to , and tried before his own master : which depends much upon the nature and circumstances of the transgression . but i wonder how mr. hobbes could bring the rights and privileges of embassadors under his disquisition , since they cannot depend upon his institution : for they neither do nor can proceed from the covenant , or contracts , or teansferring of rights between private persons ; but he must make a new institution for soveraigns , in which he will hardly be able to preserve them without some covenants , which he hitherto so much abhors . the survey of chapter . it is the custom and delight that mr. hobbes takes in the frequent repeting , almost in every chapter , the lewd principles in his institution , with some variety of pleasant expressions and instances , which he would have understood to add new vigor to his former arguments , that obliges me by tautologies to put the reader in mind of what i have said before , and to repete the same that hath bin said ; and so i must say again upon this chapter of the nutrition and procreation of a common-wealth , that he hath propos'd a very ungracious method to himself in forming his government , by assigning a greater power and autority to his soveraign , then any honest magistrate desires , or will ever exercise , or can think himself secure in ; and such a liberty and property to the subject , as they can take no delight in , and consequently can never wish well to that government , under which they shall enjoy no more . nor will they ever believe themselves to be in possession of liberty or plenty , when it is in the power of any one man to dispossess them of both , or either , at his good will and pleasure , without any violation of any justice that they can resort to , or complain of . it is a very uncomfortable propriety that any man can have in his lands and goods , because his neighbor cannot take them from him , if his prince can justly take them from him , and give them to his neigbor . princes have their particular affections and inclinations which sway them as much as other men , and are prevail'd upon by the same strong motives and impulsions ; and if they may take away all from those they do not like , and as much as they think fit from those they like less , to give to those they love , and to such as they like better , there can be no valuable propriety in any body but the soveraign alone : and when it is once found to be in him alone , he will not be long able to defend his own propriety , or his own soveraignty . it is machiavels exception against the entertaining of foreign forces , that they are only mercenary , and therefore indifferent in their affections which party wins or loses ; and no doubt those soldiers fight most resolutely , who fight to defend their own . and surely they who have nothing of their own to lose but their lives , are as apt to throw those away where they should not , as where they should be exposed ▪ and it is the usual artifice in all seditions , for the leaders and promoters of them , to perswade the people , that the tendency and consequence of such and such actions don by the magistrate , extends to the depriving them of all their propriety , the jealousie of which hurries them into all those acts of rage and despair , which prove so fatal to kingdoms . and there was never yet a wise and fortunate prince , who hath not enervated those machinations , by all the professions , and all the vindications of that propriety , which they are so vigilant to preserve and defend . and therefore it is a wonderful propesterous foundation to support a government , to declare that the subject hath no propriety in any thing that excludes the soveraign from a right of disposing it ; and it may be easily believ'd , that there is not one prince in europe , i mean that is civiliz'd ( for of the absolute power of the great turk , from whence mr. hobbes hath borrowed his model , we shall have occasion to discourse in another place ) would be able to retain his soveraignty one whole year , after he should declare , as mr. hobbes doth , that his subjects have no propriety in any thing they possess , but that he may dispose of all they have . for tho they do too often invade that propriety , and take somwhat from them that is not their own , they bear it better under the notion of oppression and rapine , and as they look upon it as the effect of some powerful subjects evil advice ( which will in time be discover'd , and reform'd by the justice of the prince , as hath often fallen out ) then they would ever do under a claim of right , that could justly take away all they have , because it is not the subjects but their own . and if mr. hobbes had taken the pains , and known where to have bin inform'd of the proceedings and transactions of w●lliam the conqueror , he would have found cause to believe , that that great king did ever dexterously endeavor , from the time that he was assured that his possession would not be disturb'd , to divest himself of the title of a conqueror , and made his legal claim to what he had got by the will of edward the confessor , whose name was precious to the nation , and who was known to have a great friendship for that prince , who had now recover'd what had bin his . and he knew so well the ill consequence which must attend the very imagination that the nation had lost its propriety , that he made hast to grant them an assurance , that they should still enjoy all the benefits and priviledges which were due to them by their own laws and customs , by which they should be still govern'd ; as they were during that kings whole reign , who had enough of the unquestionable demesnes and lands belonging to the crown , of which he was then possessed without a rival , and belonging to those great men who had perish'd with their posterity in the battel with harold , to distribute to those who had born such shares , and run such hazards in his prosperous adventure . and those laws and customs which were before the conquest , are the same which the nation and kingdom have bin since govern'd by to this day , with the addition of those statutes and acts of parliament , which are the laws of the successive kings , with which they have gratifi'd their subjects , in providing such new security for them , and advantages to the public , as upon the experience and observation of the ages and times when they were made , contributed to the honor and glory of the king , as well as the happiness of the people ; many of which are but the copies and transcripts of ancient land-marks , making the characters more plain the legible of what had bin practic'd and understood in the preceding ages , and the observation whereof are of the same profit and convenience to king and people . such were the laws in tullies time , which mr. hobbes wonderfully cites , to prove that which tully never heard of , and which indeed is quite contrary to the end of his discourse . ( pag. . ) is it possible that tully could ever have said , let the civil law be once abandoned , or but negligently guarded ( not to say oppressed ) and there is nothing that any man can be sure to receive from his ancestor , or to leave to his children ? and again , take away the civil law , and no man knows what is his own , and what another mans ? i say , he could never have mention'd and insisted upon this grand security of man-kind , if he had understood the law to be nothing but the breath of the soveraign , who could grant , and dissolve , or repeal this law , with the speaking a word that his will or fancy dictates to him . how can any man receive from his ancestor , or leave to his children , if he ben o● sure that his ancestor had , and that his children shall have a propriety ? it was the importance of , and delight in this propriety , that produc'd that happy and beneficial agreement between the soveraign power and the naked subject , which is mention'd before ; that introduc'd the beauty of building , and the cultivating the earth by art as well as industry , by securing men , that they and their children should dwell in the houses they were at the charge to build , and that they should reap the harvest of those lands which they had taken the pains to sow . whatsoever is of civility and good manners , all that is of art and beauty , or of real and solid wealth in the world , is the product of this paction , and the child of beloved propriety ; and they who would strangle this issue , desire to demolish all buildings , eradicate all plantations , to make the earth barren , and man-kind to live again in tents , and nurish his cattle by successive marches into those fields where the grass grows . nothing but the joy in propriety reduc'd us from this barbarity ; and nothing but security in the same , can preserve us from returning into it again . nor will any man receive so great prejudice and damage by this return , as the kings and princes themselves , who had a very ample recompence which they still enjoy , by dividing their unprofitable propriety with their subjects , having ever since receiv'd much more profit from the propriety in the hands of the subjects , then they did when it was in their own , or then they do from that which they reserv'd to themselves ; and they continue to have the more , or less upon a true account , as this paction is the more or less exactly observ'd and compli'd with . mr. hobbes is much mistaken in his historical conclusions , as for the most part he uses to be , when he saies , ( pag. . ) that the conqueror , and his successors , have alwaies laid arbitrary taxes on all subjests lands : except he calls what hath bin don by the free consent of the subject , which is according to the paction , to be the arbitrary tax of the soveraign , because the law is the stamp of his own royal autority . and if such arbitrary taxes have in truth at any time bin laid upon the subjects , he might have observ'd ( for somtimes it hath bin don ) that the soveraign hath receiv'd much more dammage then profit by it , and the kingdom bin in a worse state of security then it was before . nor can any argument be made from the glory and prosperity of some crowns , which have somtimes exercis'd that arbitrary power , and reduc'd the rules they ought to govern by , to the standard of their own will ; which yet they have don with such formality , as implies the consent of their subjects , tho they dare not but consent . it hath bin too frequently seen too , that the hurt and wounded patience of the people , hath , when it may be it was least apprehended , redeem'd themselves ( for l●sa patientia est furor ) by as unwarrantable rebellion from unwarrantable oppression , or out of contemt of their own ruin , because they have so little comfort in their preservation , have obstinately refused to give any assistance to their soveraign when he hath real need of it , because he hath wantonly extorted it from them when he had no need . and then men pay too dear for their want of providence , and find too late , that the neglect of justice is an infallible underminer , how undiscern'd soever , of that security which their policy would raise for themselves , in the place of that which wisdom and justice had provided for them . i agree , that it being impossible to fore-see what the expences which a soveraign may be put to , will amount to , it is as impossible by land , or otherwise to set aside such a proportion as is necessary ; but those extraordinary occasions must be supplied by such extraordinary waies , and with those formalities which the soveraign obliges himself to observe ; by observing whereof , much less inconvenience shall befall him or the public , then by cancelling those laws which establish propriety . if mr. hobbes had not bin a professed enemy to greek and latine sentences , as an argument of indisgestion , when they come up again unchewed and unchanged , he might have learn'd from seneca , who understood , and felt the utmost extent of an absolute soveraignty , and had a shrewd fore-sight what the end of it would be , how the propriety of the subject might well consist with the power of the prince : iure civili , saies he , omnia regis sunt , & tamen illa quo●um ad regem pertinet universap ss●ssio , in singulos d●minos descripta sunt , & un●quaeque res habet possessorem suum . itaque dare regi , & domum , & mancipium , & pecuniam possumus , n●c d●nore illi de suo dicimur . ad reges enim potestas omnium pertin t●ad singulos proprietas . and that prince who thinks his power so great , that his subjects have nothing to give him , will be very unhappy if he hath ever need of their hands , or their hearts . the survey of chapter . when mr. hobbes hath erected such a soveraign , and instituted such a people , that the one may say and do whatsoever he finds convenient for his purpose , and the other must nei●her say or do any thing that may displease him ; the consideration of what , and how counsel should be given under such a government , can require very little deliberation . and the truth is , the discourse of this chapter , with the differences between command and counsel , is more vulgar and pedantic then he is usually guilty of , and it is easie to be observ'd , that in his description of the office of a counsellor , and of the ability of c●unselling , ( pag. . ) that it proceeds from experience and long study , and that it requires great knowledg of the disposition of man-kind ; of the rights of government , and of the nature of equity , law , iustice , and honor , not to be attain'd without study : and of the strengths , commodities , places bo●k of their own country and their neighbors ; as also of the inclinations and designs of all nations that may any way annoy them , and this , he saies , is not attained without much experience ; he makes so lively a representation of that universal understanding , which he would be thought to be possessed with , that he could not be without hope that c●omwell would think him worthy to be a counsellor , who had given him such an earnest that he would serve him with success , and without hesitation . yet i see no reason ( if to ask counsel of another , is to permit him to give such counsel as he shall think best ; and if it be the office of a counsellor , when an action comes into deliberation , to make manifest the consequence of it in such a manner , as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently inform'd ) why he is so very angry with those two words , exhort and dehort , as to brand those who use either , with the style of corruption , and being brib'd by their own interest ; since it is very agreeable to the faith and integrity of a counsellor , to perswade him that asks his advice to do that which he thinks best to be don , and to disswade him from doing that which he thinks to be mischievous , which is to exhort and dehort ; and the examples of persons , and the autority of books , may be pertinently applied to either : since few accidents fall out in states and empires , which have not in former times happened in such conjunctures : and then if the same hath bin faithfully represented to posterity , with all the circumstance and successes , which is the natural end of all good histories to transmit ; nothing can more properly be reflected on , or bring clearer light to the present difficulties in debate , then the memory of what was upon those occasions don fortunatly , or unhappily left undon , which surely cannot but introduce useful and pertinent reflexions into the consultation . and it is not easie to comprehend what that great ability is , which his counsellor is to attain to by long study , and cannot be attain'd without , if that study be not to be conversant with books , and if neither the examples in , or autority of books be in any degree to be consider'd . nor are such expressions which may move the affections or passions of him who asks counsel , or of those who are to give it , repugnant to the office of a counsellor , since the end of counsel is to lead men to chuse that which is good , and avoid that which is worse ; and he to whom the counsel is given , will best judg whether it tends to others ends rather then his own , and will value it accordingly . and he is much a better counsellor , who by his experience and observation of the nature and humor of the people who are to be govern'd , and by his knowledg of the laws and rules by which they ought to be govern'd , gives advice what ought to be don , then he who from his speculative knowledg of man-kind , and of the rights of government , and of the nature of equity and honor , attain'd with much study , would erect an engine of government by the rules of geometry , more infallible then experience can ever find out . i am not willing now , or at any time , to accompany him in his sallies which he makes into the scripture , and which he alwaies handles , as if his soveraign power had not yet declared it to be the word of god ; and to illustrate now his distinctions , and the difference between command and counsel , he thinks fit to fetch instances from thence , have no other gods but me , make to thy self no graven image , &c. he saies , ( pag. . ) are commands , because the reason for which we are to obey them , is drawn from the will of god our king , whom we are obliged to obey : but these words , repent , and be baptized in the name of iesus , arc counsel , because the reason why we should do so , tendeth not to any benefit of god almighty , who shall be still king in what manner soever we rebel , but of our selves , who have no other means of avoiding the punishment hanging over us for our sins ; as if the latter were not drawn from the will of god as much as the former , or as if the former tended more to the benefit of god then the latter . an ordinary grammarian , without any insight in geometry , would have thought them equally to be commands : but mr. hobbes will have his readers of another talent in their understanding , and another subjection to his dictates . the survey of chapter . however mr. hobbes enjoins other judges to etract the judgments they have given when contrary to reason , upon what autority or president soever they have pronounced them , yet he holds himself obliged still tue●i opus , to justify all he hath said ; therefore we have reason to expect , that to support his own notions of liberty and propriety , contrary to the notions of all other men , he must introduce a notion of law , contrary to what the world hath ever yet had of it . and it would be answer enough , and it may be the fittest that can be given to this chapter , to say , that he hath ere ed a law , contrary and destructive to all the law , that is acknowledg'd and establish'd in any monarchy or republic that is christian ; and in this he hopes to secure himse●f by his accustomed method of definition , and d●fi●es , that civil law ( which is a term we do not dislike ) is to every subject those rules which the common wealth hath commanded him by word , writing , or other sufficient sign of the w●●l to make use of for the distinction of right ▪ in wh●ch he saies there is nothing that is not at first sight evident , that is to say of what is contrary , and what is no● contrary to the rule . from which definition his first deduction is ▪ that the soveraign is the sole legislator , and that himself is not subject to laws , because he can make , and repeal them : which in truth is no necessary deduction from his own definition ; for it doth not follow from thence , tho he makes them rules only for subjects , that the soveraign hath the sole power to repeal them ; but the true definition of a law is , that it is to every subject the rule which the common-wealth hath commanded him by word , writing , or other sufficient sign of the will made , and publish'd in that form and manner , as is accustomed in that common-wealth to make use of for the distinction of right , that is to say ; of what is contrary , and what is not to the rule ? and from this definition , no such deduction can be made , since the form of making and repealing laws is stated , and agreed upon in all common-wealths . the opinions and judgments which are found in the books of eminent lawyers , cannot be answer'd , and controuled by mr. hobbes his wonder , since the men who know least are apt to wonder most ; and men will with more justice wonder , whence he comes by the prerogative to controul the laws and government establish'd in this , and that kingdom , without so much as considering what is law here or there , but by the general notions he hath of law ; and what it is by his long study , and much cogitation . and it is a strange definition of law , to make it like his propriety , to be of concernment only between subject and subject , without any relation of security as to the soveraign , whom he exemts from any observation of them , and invests with autority by repealing those which trouble him , when he thinks fit , to free himself from the observation thereof , and by making new : and consequently he saies , he was free before , for he is free that can be free when he will. the instance he gives for his wonder , and displeasure against the books of the eminent lawyers , is , that they say , that the common law hath no controuler but the parliament , that is , that the common law cannot be chang'd or alter'd but by act of parliament , which is the municipal law of the kingdom . now methinks if that be the judgment of eminent lawyers , mr. hobbes should be so modest as to believe it to be true , till he hears others as eminent lawyers declare the contrary : for by his instance , he hath brought it now only to relate to the law of england , and then methinks he should be easily perswaded , that the eminent lawyers of england do know best whether the law be so , or no. i do not wish that mr. hobbes should be convinc'd by a judgment of that law upon himself , which would be very severe , if he should be accused for declaring , that the king alone hath power to alter the descents and inheritances of the kingdom ; and whereas the common law saies the eldest shall inherit , the king by his own edict may declare , and order , that the younger son shall inherit : or for averring , and publishing , that the king by his own autority can repeal and dissolve all laws , and justly take away all they have from his subjects ; i say , if the judgment of law was pronounc'd upon him for this seditious discourse , he would hardly perswade the world , that he understood what the law of england is , better then the judges who condemn'd him , or that he was wary enough to set up a jus vagum and incognitum of his own , to controul the establish'd government of his own country . he saies the soveraign is the only legislator : and i will not contradict him in that . it is the soveraign stamp , and royal consent , and that alone , that gives life , and being , and title of laws , to that which was before but counsel and advice : and no such constitution of his can be repeal'd and made void , but in the same manner , and with his consent . but we say , that he may prescribe or consent to such a method in the form , and making these laws , that being once made by him , he cannot but in the same form repeal , or alter them ; and he is oblig'd by the law of justice to observe and perform this contract , and he cannot break it , or absolve himself from the observation of it , without violation of justice : and any farther obligation upon him then of justice , i discourse not of . for the better cleering of this to that kind of reason by which mr. hobbes is swai'd , let us suppose this soveraignty to reside , and be fix'd in an assembly of men ; in which kind of government it is possible to find more marks and foot-steps of such a deputing , and assigning of interests , as mr. hobbes is full of , then we can possibly imagine in the original institution of monarchy . if the soveraign power be deputed into the hands of fifteen , and any vacant place to be suppli'd by the same autority that made choice of the first fifteen , may there not at that time of the election certain rules be prescrib'd ( i do not say conditions ) for the better exercise of that soveraign power ? and by the accepting the power thus explain'd , doth not the soveraign , tho there should be no oath administred for the observation thereof , which is a circumstance admitted by most monarchs , tacitly covenant that he will observe those rules ? and if he do's wilfully decline those rules , doth he not break the trust reposed in him ? i do not say forfeit the trust , as if the soveraignty were at an end , but break that trust , violate that justice he should observe ? if the soveraign power of fifteen , should raise an imposition for the defence of the common-wealth , if they should appoint this whole imposition to be paid only by those whose names are thomas ( when thomas was before in no more prejudice with the common-wealth , then any other appellation in baptism ) may not this inequality be call'd a violation of justice , and a breach of trust , since it cannot be suppos'd that such an irregular autority was ever committed to any man , or men by any deputation ? of the prerogative of necessity to swerve from rules prescrib'd , or to violate laws tho sworn to , shall be spoken to in its due time . it needs not be suppos'd , but must be confess'd , that the laws of every country , contain more in them concerning the rights of the soveraign , and the common administration of justice to the people , then can be known to , and understood by the person of the soveraign , and he can as well fight all his battels with his own hand and sword , as determine all causes of right by his own tongue and understanding . the consequence of any confusion which mr. hobbes can suppose , would not be more pernicious , then that which would follow the blowing away all these maxims of the law , if the kings breath were strong enough to do it . it is a maxim in the law ( as is said before ) that the eldest son shall inherit , and that if three or four females are heirs , the inheritance shall be equally divided between them . doth mr. hobbes believe that the word of the king hath power to change this course , and to appoint that all the sons shall divide the estate , and the eldest daughter inherit alone ? and must not all the confusion imaginable attend such a mutation ? all governments subsist and are establish'd by firmness and constancy , by every mans knowing what is his right to enjoy , and what is his duty to do : and it is a wonderful method to make this government more perfect , and more durable , by introducing such an incertainty , that no man shall know what he is to do , nor what he is to suffer , but that he who is soveraign to morrow , may cancel , and dissolve all that was don or consented to by the soveraign who was yesterday , or by himself as often as he changes his mind . it is the kings office to cause his laws to be executed , and to compel his subjects to yield obedience to them , and in order thereunto , to make choice of learned judges to interpret those laws , and to declare the intention of them , who ( pag. ) by an artificial perfection of reason gotten by long study , and experience in the law , must be understood to be more competent for that determination , then mr. hobbes can be for the alteration of law and government , by the artificial reason he hath attain'd to by long study of arithmetic and geometry . no eminent lawyer hath ever said that the two arms of a common-wealth are force and justice , the first whereof is in the king , the other deposited in the hands of the parliament ; but all lawyers know , that they are equally deposited in the hands of the king , and that all justice is administred by him , and in his name ; and all men acknowledg that all the laws are his laws ; his consent and autority only giving the power and name of a law , what concurrence , or formality soever hath contributed towards it : the question only is , whether he can repeal , or vacate such a law , without the same concurrence and formality . and methinks the instance he makes of a princes ( pag. . ) subduing another people , and consenting that they shall live , and be govern'd according to those laws under which they were born , and by which they were formerly govern'd , should manifest to him the contrary . for tho it be confess'd , that those old laws become new by this consent of his , the laws of the legislator , that is of that soveraign who indulges the use of them ; yet he cannot say that he can by his word vacate and repeal those laws , and his own concession , without dissolving all the ligaments of government , and without the violation of faith , which himself confesses to be against the law of nature . notwithstanding that the law is reason , and ( pag. . ) not the letter , but that which is according to the intention of the legislator ( that is of the soveraign ) is the law , yet when there is any difficulty in the understanding the law , the interpretation thereof may reasonably belong to learn'd judges , who by their education , and the testimony of their known abilities before they are made judges , and by their oaths to judg according to right , are the most competent to explain those difficulties , which no soveraign as soveraign can be presum'd to understand or comprehend . and the judgments and decisions those judges make , are the judgments of the soveraigns , who have qualified them to be judges , and who are to pronounce their sentence according to the reason of the law , not the reason of the soveraign . and therefore mr. hobbes would make a very ignorant judg , when he would not have him versed in the study of the laws , but only a man of good natural reason , and of a right understanding of the law of nature ; and yet he saies , ( pag. . ) that no man will pretend to the knowledg of right and wrong without much study . and if that power of interpretation of law be vested in the person of the soveraign , he may in a moment overthrow all the law ; which is evident enough by his own instances , if , to use his own expressions , his understanding were not dazled by the flame of his passions . for to what purpose is all the distinction and division of laws into human and divine , into natural and moral , into distributive and penal , when they may be all vacated , and made null by the word , or perverted by the interpretation of the soveraign ? to what purpose is a penalty of five shillings put upon such an action , if the soveraign may make him who doth that action , by his interpretation , or omnipotence , to pay five hundred pounds ? nor by his rule , is his ador'd law of nature of any force , which he saies , ( pag. ) is the law of god immutable and eternal , nay heaven and earth shall pass away , but not one title of the law of nature shall pass , for it is the eternal law of god ; he , i say , hath as much subjected that to the arbitrary power and discretion of his soveraign , as he hath don the liberty and property of the subject ; for he saies , ( pag. . ) the law of nature is a part of the civil law in all common-wealths in the world , and that tho it be naturally reasonable , yet it is by the soveraign pow●r that it is law , and he saies likewise , that all laws written , and unwritten , and the law of nature it se●f , have need of interpretation : and then he makes his supreme soveraign the only legitimate interpreter . so that he hath the law of nature as much in his power , and under his jurisdiction , as any other part of the civil law : and yet he confesses his subject is not bound to pay obedience to any thing that his soveraign enjoins against the law of nature . in such labyrinths men entangle themselves , who obstinately engage in opinions relating to a science they do not understand ; nor was it possible for him to extend the prerogative of his soveraign to such an illimited greatness , without making some invasion upon the prerogative of god himself . i believe every man who reads mr. hobbes , observes that when he entangles himself in the laws of england , and affects to be more learned in them then the chief justice cook , the natural sharpness and vigor of his reason is more flat and insipid then upon other arguments , and he makes deductions which have no coherence , involves himself in the terms without comprehending the matter , concludes the law saies that which it do's not say , and that the law hath made no provision in cases which are amply provided for , and in a word loses himself in a mist of words that render him less intelligible then at other times . nor hath he better luck , when out of iustinians institutions , he would make a parallel between the imperial laws and the laws of england , and resolves that the decrees of the common people , which were put to the question by the tribune , and had the force of laws , were like the orders of the house of commons in england ; whereas no orders made by a house of commons in england , are of any validity or force , or receive any submission longer then that house of commons continues : and if any order made by them be against any law or statute , it is void when it is made , and receives no obedience . indeed when mr. hobbes publish'd his leviathan , he might have said that it had the autority and power of the emperor , or of the whole people of rome , and which would have lasted till this time , if he had bin believ'd , and his doctrine could have bin supported by him , or them for whom it was provided . probably mr. mobbes did take delight in being thought to confute a great lawyer in the common law of england 't is certain he hath bin transported to slight usage of him , by that delight or some like passion , more then by the defect of reason in that which he would contradict . he saies 't is against the law of nature to punish the innocent ; that he is innocent that acquits himself judicially , & is acknowledg'd for innocent by the judg : and yet he saies , when a man is accus'd of a capital crime , and seeing the power of the enemy , and the frequent corruption of judges , runs away for fear of the effect , yet being taken and brought to tryal , maketh it appear that he was not guilty of the crime , and is acquitted thereof , however is condemn'd to lose his goods , this he saies , is a manifest condemnation of the innocent . he confesses afterwards , that the law may forbid an innocent man to fly , and that he may be punished for flying ; but he thinks it very unreasonable , that flying for fear of injury , should be taken for presumtion of guilt , whereas it is taken only for the guilt of flying , when he is declar'd innocent for the other . and methinks he confesseth , that a man , who must know his own innocence better then any body else , and knows that he must lose his goods , if he flies his trial , hath no reason to complain , if after he be cleer'd from the crime , he be condemned to lose his goods , which he knew he must lose when he fled ; and therefore tho he be judicially acquitted for the crime , he is not innocent , but as judicially condemned to lose his goods for his guilt in flying , the law and penalty of flying being known to him , whether written , or not written , as well as the law against the crime was . to his other dictates of the office of a judg , that he needs not be learn'd in the laws , because he shall be told by the soveraign what judgment he shall give ; and of the laws of england , that the jury is judg of the law , as well as of the fact , there needs no more be said , then that he is not inform'd , nor understands what he delivers ; and whether his notions of the divine positive law be more agreeable to truth , will be examin'd hereafter . the survey of chapter . ( pag. . ) that to be delighted in the imagination of being possessed of another mans wife , or goods , is no breach of the law that saies , thou shalt not covet : that the pleasure a man may have in imagining the death of him from whose life he expects nothing but dammage and displeasure , is no sin : that to be pleas'd in the fiction of that which would please a man if it were real , is a passion so adherent to the nature of man , and every other living creature , as to make it a sin , were to make a sin of being a man , is a body of mr. hobbes's divinity , so contrary to that of our saviour and his apostles , that i shall without any enlargement leave it to all men to consider , which of them they think most fit to believe and follow . yet methinks he gives some encouragement to those who might expect justice against him , by his own judgment ( pag. . ) upon the man that comes from the indies hither , and perswades men here to receive a new religion , or teach them any thing that tends to disobedience to the laws of this country : tho he be never so well perswaded of the truth of what he teacheth , he commits a crime , and may be justly punished , not only because his doctrine is false , but because he do's that which he would not approve in another , that coming from hence should endeavor to alter religion there . and how far this declaration of his own judgment , may operate to his own condemnation , and to the condemnation of most of his doctrines in his leviathan , which are so contrary to all the laws established in his country , he should have don well to have consider'd before he committed the transgression ; for he doth acknowledg , that in a common-wealth , where by the negligence or unskilfulness of governors and teachers , false doctrines are by time generally receiv'd , the contrary truths may be generally offensive ; and prudent men are seldom guilty of doing any thing , at least when it is in their own election to do it or not to do it , which they foresee will be offensive to the government , or governors whom they are subject to and must live under ; especially when he confesses , ( pag. . ) that tho the most suddain and rough bustling in of a new truth that can be , do's never break the peace , yet it doth somtimes wake the war : and if the secure and sound sleep of peace be once broken , and that fierce and brutish tyger war is awakened , when , or how he will be lulled into a new sleep , the wisest magistrate cannot fore-tell , and therefore will with the more vigilance discountenance and suppress such bustlers , who impudently make their way with their elbows into modest company , to dispose them to suspect , and then to censure the wisdom of their fore-fathers , for having bin swaied by their own illiterate experience , so as to prefer it before the cleer reason of thinking and learned men , who by cogitation have found a surer way for their security : and there cannot be a more certain expedient found out for the dissolving the peace of any nation , how firmly soever establish'd , then by giving leave , or permitting men of parts and unrestrain'd fancy , to examine the constitution of the government both ecclesiastical and civil , and to vent and publish what their wit and inventions may suggest to them , upon or against the same , which would expose the gravity and wisdom of all government , the infallibility of scripture , and the omnipotence of god himself , by their light and scurrilous questions and instances , to the mirth and contemt of all men , who are without an awful veneration for either ; of which there needs not be a more convincing evidence , then the presumtion of mr. hobbes throughout his leviathan ; of which it will not be possible not to give some in the progress we shall make . he is over subtle in his distinction , that every crime is a sin , but not every sin a crime ; that from the relation of sin to the law , and of crime to the civil law , may be inferr'd , that where the law ceaseth , sin ceaseth , that the civil law ceasing , crimes cease ; and yet that violation of covenants , ingratitude , arrogance , can never cease to be sin , yet are no crimes , because there is no place for accusation , every man being his own judg , and accused only by his own conscience , and cleer'd by the uprightness of his own intention ; and when his intention is right , his fact is no sin ; if otherwise , his fact is sin but no crime : that when the soveraign power ceaseth , that is , when the king is so oppressed that he cannot exercise his power , crime also ceaseth , there being no protection where there is no power , which he is careful to repete , whether it be to the purpose , or , as sure it is not , very pertinent in the difference between sin and crime . and to all that huddle of words in that whole paragraph , i shall say no more , but that it looks like the discourse of some men , which himself saies ( pag. . ) may be numbred amongst the sorts of madness , namely , when men speak such words , as put together , have in them no signification at all , by their non-coherence and contradiction . false principles of right and wrong cannot but produce many crimes , and the greater the presumtion of those is who publish them , the confusion that results thereby must be the greater : and yet notwithstanding this bundle of false principles which are contain'd in this book , the strength of the laws , and the good constitution of the government , hath hitherto , for ought appears , resisted the operation and malignity of the institution of his soveraignty , with how much confidence soever offered by him , and a true and lawful soveraign could never be induc'd to affect that power which mr. hobbes so frankly assign'd to the soveraign whom he intended to institute . and without doubt that unreasonable proposition , that justice is but a vain word , can never be established for reason , so unanswerably as by the establishment of his principles , which would make all laws cobwebs , to be blown away by the least breath of the governor ; nor by his ratiocination did marius , or sylla , or cesar , ever commit any crime , since they were all soveraigns by acquisition , and so in his own judgment possessed of all those powers which arise from his institution , whereby they might do all those acts which they did , and no man could complain of injury or injustice , every man being the author of whatever dammage he sustain'd or complain'd of ; nor will he be able to lay any crime to any of their charges ( tho he seems to condemn them ) and at that same time to support his institution of a common-wealth . but it is the less wonder , since from his own constitution , according to his first model , and knowing from whence his own obedience proceeds , he concludes , that of all passions , that which least inclines men to break the laws , is fear . he provides such terrible laws as no body can love , and must fear too much to be willing to be subject to them ; which want of willingness must make them glad of any alteration , which can bring no security to the soveraign . and i cannot enough recommend to mr. hobbes , that he will revolve his own judgment and determination in this chapter , ( pag. . ) that he , whose error proceedeth from a peremtory pursuit of his own principles and reasonings , is much more faulty then he whose error proceeds from the autority of a teacher , or an interpreter of the law publicly autoriz'd ; and that he that groundeth his actions on his private judgment , ought , according to the rectitude or error thereof , to stand or fall . and if his fear be so predominant in him , as he conceives it to be in most men , it will dispose him first to enquire what the opinion of the judges is , who are the autoriz'd interpreters of law , before he publishes his seditious principles against law , least he be obliged to stand or fall according to the rectitude or error thereof . tho every instance he gives of his soveraigns absolute power , makes it the more unreasonable , formidable , and odious , yet he gives all the support to it he can devise . and indeed , when he hath made his soveraigns word , a full and enacted law , he hath reason to oblige his subject to do whatsoever he commands , be it right or wrong , and to provide for his security when he hath don ; and therefore he declares , ( pag. . ) that whosoever doth any thing that is contrary to a former law by the command of his soveraign , he is not guilty of any crime , and so cannot be punished , because when the soveraign commands any thing to be don against a former law , the command as to that particular fact is an abrogation of the law ; which would introduce a licence to commit murder , or any other crime most odious , and against which laws are chiefly provided . but he hath in another place given his subject leave to refuse the soveraigns command , when he requires him to do an act or office contrary to his honor : so that tho he will not suffer the law to restrain him from doing what the soveraign unlawfully commands , yea his honor , of which he shall be judg himself , may make him refuse that command tho lawf●l : as if the soveraign commands him to prison , as no doubt he lawfully may for a crime that deserves death , he may in mr. hobbes's opinion refuse to obey that command . whereas government and justice have not a greater security , then that he that executes a verbal command of the king against a known law , shall be punished . and the case which he puts in the following paragraph , that the kings will being a law , if he should not obey that , there would appear two contradictory laws , which would totally excuse , is so contrary to the common rule of justice , that a man is obliged to believe , when the king requires any thing to be don contrary to any law , that he did not know of that law , and so to forbear executing his command . and if this were otherwise , kings of all men would be most miserable , and would reverse their most serious counsels and deliberations , by incogitancy , upon the suggestion and importunity of every presumtuous intruder . kings themselves can never be punished or reprehended publicly ( that being a reproch not consistent with the reverence due to majesty ) for their casual or wilful errors and mistakes , let the ill consequence of them be what they will ; but if they who maliciously lead , or advise , or obey them in unjust resolutions and commands , were to have the same indemnity , there must be a dissolution of all kingdoms and governments . but as kings must be left to god , whose vice-gerents they are , to judg of their breach of trust ; so they who offend against the law , must be left to the punishment the law hath provided for them , it being in the kings power to pardon the execution of the sentence the law inflicts , except in those cases where the offence is greater to others then to the king ; as in the murder of a husband or a father , the offence is greater to the wife and to the son for their relation , then to the king for a subject ; and therefore , upon an appeal by them , the transgressor may suffer after the king hath pardon'd him . it is a great prerogative which mr. hobbes doth in this chapter indulge to his fear , his precious bodily fear of corporal hurt , that it shall not only extenuate an ill action , but totally excuse and annihilate the worst he can commit , that , if a man by the terror of present death be compelled to do a fact against the law , he is wholly excused , because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation : and supposing such a law were obligatory , yet a man would reason , ( pag. . ) if i do it not i die presently , if i do it i die afterwards , therefore by doing it there is time of life gain'd , nature therefore compels him to the fact : by which a man seems by the law of nature to be compell'd , even for a short reprieve , and to live two or three daies longer , to do the most infamous and wicked thing that is imaginable : upon which fertile soil he doth hereafter so much enlarge , according to his natural method , in which he usually plants a stock , supposes a principle , the malignity whereof is not presently discernable , in a precedent chapter , upon which in a subsequent one he grafts new and worse doctrine , which he looks should grow and prosper by such cultivation as he applies to it in discourse ; and therefore i shall defer my considerations to the contrary , till i wait upon him in that enlarged disquisition . the survey of chapter . the eight and twentieth chapter being a discourse of punishments and rewards , it was not possible for him to forget in how weak a condition he had left his soveraign , for want of power to punish ; since want of power to punish , and want of autority to cause his punishment to be inflicted , is the same thing ; especially when the guilty person is not only not oblig'd to submit to the sentence , how just soever , but hath a right to resist it , and to defend himself by force against the magistrate and the law : and therefore he thinks it of much importance , to enquire , by what door the right and autority of punishing in any case came in . he is a very ill architect , that in building a house , makes not doors to enter into every office of it ; and it is very strange , that he should make his doors large and big enough in his institution , to let out all the liberty and propriety of the subject , and the very end of his institution being to make a magistrate to compel men to their duty ( for he confesses , they were before obliged by the law of nature to perform it one towards another , but that there must be a soveraign sword to compel men to do that which they ought to do ) yet that he should forget to leave a door wide enough for this compulsion to enter in at by punishment , and bringing the offender to justice ; since the end of making the soveraign is disappointed , and he cannot preserve the peace , if guilty persons have a right to preserve themselves from the punishment he inflicts for their guilt . it was very improvidently don , when he had the draught of the whole contracts and covenants , that he would not insert one , by which every man should transfer from himself the right he had to defend himself against public justice , tho not against private violence . and surely reason and self-preservation , that makes a man transfer all his estate and interest into the hands of the soveraign , and to be disposed by him , that he may be secure against the robbery and rapine of his neighbors & companions , will as well dispose him to leave his life to his discretion , that it may be secure from the assault of every other man , who hath a right to take it from him . but he thinks life too pretious to part with willingly , and therefore cares for no more then to invest his soveraign with a just title to punish , how unable soever he leaves him to execute it . and truly his fancy is very extraordinary in bringing it to pass . he will not suffer his power to punish to be grounded upon the concession or gift of the subjects , from which fountain all his other extravagant powers flow , which are as unnatural for them to give , but saies it was originally inherent in him by the right of nature , by which every man might subdue or kill another man , as he thought best for his own preservation ; which right still remain'd in him , when all other men transferred all their rights to him , because he never contracted with them to part with any thing , and so he comes ( pag. . ) to a right to punish , whi●h was not given but left to him , and to him only , as entire as in the condition of mere nature . is not this mere fancy without any reason ? which he needed not have exercis'd to so little purpose , to erect a lawful power , which any man may lawfully resist and oppose . nor is the right much greater that is left him , then what , it seems , is tacitly reserv'd to every man , who notwithstanding all transferring , hath still right to resist the sword of justice in his own defence , and for ought appears , to kill him that carries it . so that in truth , his soveraign is vested in no other autority , then lawfully to fight so many duels as the law hath condemned men to suffer death , since he can command none of his subjects to execute them , and they have all lawful power to defend their own lives . how this right and autority of punishing came into the hands of the soveraign , we shall not follow his example in repeting , having before confessed , that it neither is nor can be grounded on any concession or gift of the subject , but is indubitably inherent in the office of being soveraign , and inseparably annexed to it by god himself . corporal , or capital punishment , ignominy , imprisonment , or exile , are not better understood then they were before his definitions and descriptions which he makes of them , and in which he doth not so much consider the nature of a definition , as that he may insert somwhat into it , to which he may resort to prove somwhat , which men do not think of when they read those definitions : and assuming to himself to declare what will serve his turn to be the law of nature , or the law of nations , he makes such inferences and consequences , as he thinks necessary to prove his desperate conclusions . there cannot be a more pernicious doctrine , and more destructive to peace and justice , then that all men who are not subjects are enemies ; & that against enemies , whom the common-wealth judges capable to do them hurt , it is lawful by the original right of nature to make war ; which would keep up a continual war between all princes , since they are few who are not capable to do hurt to their neighbors . nor can this mischief be prevented by any treaty or league ; for whil'st they are capable of doing hurt , the lawfulness still remains , and being the original right of nature , cannot be extinguished . but the wisest and most learned who have wrote of the law of nature and of nations , abominate this proposition ; and the incomparable grotius saies , ( de iure b. & p. lib. . cap. . part . . ) illud minime ferendum est , quod quidam tradiderunt , jure gentium arma recte sumi ad imminuendam potentiam crescentem , quae nimium aucta nocere potest . it may be a motive when there is other just cause in prudence towards the war , but that it gives a title in justice , ab omni aequitatis ratione abhorret . and he saies in another place ( cap. . part . . ) that it must constare , non tantum de potentia , sed & de animo ; & quidem ita constare , ut certum id sit ea certudine quae in morali materia locum habet . and yet from this erroneous proposition , and because in ( pag. . ) war the sword judgeth not , nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent and innocent , nor hath other respect of mercy , then as it conduceth to the good of his own people , he makes no scruple to tell cromwell , that as to those who deliberately deny his autority ( for the autority of the common-wealth established , could have no other signification ) the vengeance is lawfully extended , not only to the fathers , but also to th● third and fourth generations , not yet in being , and consequently innocent of the fact for which they are afflicted , because they that so offend suffer not as subjects but as enemies , towards whom the victor may proceed as he thinks fit and best for himself . after the giving which advice , it was a marvellous confidence that introduc'd him into the kings presence , and encourag'd him still to expect , that his doctrine should be allow'd to be industriously taught and believed . if mr. hobbes were condemn'd to depart out of the dominion of the common-wealth , as many men believe he might with great justice be , and so become an exil'd person , he would be a more competent judg to determine whether banishment be a punishment , or rather an escape , or a public command to avoid punishment by flight ; and he would probably then be of opinion , that the mere change of air is a very great punishment . and if he remembers his own definition , ( pag. . ) that a free man is he , that in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do , is not hindred to do what he hath a will to , he would believe that the taking that freedom from him , and the restraining that liberty , is a very severe punishment , whether justly or unjustly inflicted , and is in no degree mitigated by his declaring , ( pag. . ) that a banish'd man is a lawful enemy of the common wealth that banished him , as being no more a member of the same , and then he may be lawfully prosecuted as well in , and after he hath undergon the punishment of banishment , as he was before ; but the duty that a banish'd person still ow's to his country , and to the soveraign of it , is set down before . but the truth is , he hath very powerfully extinguish'd all those differences and priviledges , which all writers of the ius gentium have carefully preserv'd between a just and unj●st war , between lawful enemies and the worst rebels and traitors , and hath put the last into a better condition then the former , by making them liable only to those pains and forfeiture which the law hath literally provided for them , and which in some cases preserves their estates for their families ; whereas the lawful enemy , even after quarter given , remains at the mercy of the victor , who may take his life , and inflict any other punishment upon him arbitrarily , and according to his own discretion . in the last place , he hath very much obliged his soveraign , in telling him so plainly why he hath compared him to leviathan , because he hath raised him to the same greatness , and given him the same power which leviathan is described to have in the chapter of iob , there is nothing on earth to be compared with him , he is made so as not to be afraid , be seeth every high thing to be below him , and is king of all the children of pride , job . . , . and if he had provided as well to secure his high station , as he hath for the abatement of the pride of the subject , whom he hath sufficiently humbled , he might more glory in his work : but the truth is , he hath left him in so weak a posture to defend himself , that he hath reason to be afraid of every man ; and the remedies he prescribes afterwards to keep his prodigious power from dissolution , are as false and irrational as any other advice in his institution , as will appear hereafter . the survey of chapter . mr. hobbes takes so much delight in reiterating the many ill things he hath said , for fear they do not make impression deep enough in the minds of men , that i may be pardon'd if i repete again somtimes what hath bin formerly said ; as this chapter consisting most of the same pernicious doctrines which he declar'd before , tho in an other dress , obliges me to make new , or other reflexions upon what was i think sufficiently answer'd before , and it may be repete what i have said before . he is so jealous that the strength of a better composition of soveraignty may be superior , and be preferr'd before that of his institution , that be devises all the way he can to render it more obnoxious to dissolution , and like a mountebank physician accuses it of diseases which it hath not , that he may apply remedies which would be sure to bring those or worse diseases , and would weaken the strongest parts , and support of it , under pretence of curing its defects . so in the first place he finds fault ( pag. . ) that a man to obtain a kingdom is sometimes content w●th l●ss power , then to the peace and defence of the common-wealth is necessarily required , that is , that he will observe the laws and customs of the kingdom , which by long experience have bin found necessary for the peace and defence of it . and to this he imputes the insolence of thomas beckett arch-bishop of canterbury ( pag. . ) who was supported against harry the second by the pope , the subjection of ecclesiastics to the common-wealth having , he saies , bin dispensed with by william the conquerour at his reception , when he took an oath , not to infringe the liberty of the church . and this extravagant power of the pope he imputes to the universities and the doctrine taught by them ; which reproch to the universities being in a paragraph of his next chapter , i chuse to join in the answer with the case of thomas beckett and henry the second . mr. hobbes hath so great a prejudice to the reading histories ( as if they were all enemies to his government ) that he will not take the pains carefully to peruse those , from which he expects to draw some advantage to himself ; presuming that men will not believe , that a man , who so warily weighs all he saies in the balance of reason , will ever venture to alledg any matter of fact that he is not very sure of . but if he had vouchsafed to look over the records of his own country before the time of king henry the eight , he would have found the universities alwaies opposed the power of the pope , and would have no dependance upon him , and that the kings alone introduc'd his autority , and made it to be submitted to by their laws . nor did the church of england owe their large priviledges to any donation of the popes , whose jurisdiction they would never admit , but to the extreme devotion and superstition of the people , and the piety and bounty of the kings , which gave greater donatives and exemtions to the church and clergy , then any other kingdom enjoied , or then the pope gave any where . christianity in the infancy of it wrought such prodigious effects in this island upon the barbarous affections of the princes and people who then were the inhabitants of it , that assoon as they gave any belief to the history of our saviour , they thought they could not do too much to the persons of those who preached him , and knew best what would be most acceptable to him . from hence they built churches , and endow'd them liberally , submitted so entirely to the clergy , whom they look'd upon as sacred persons , that they judged all differences , and he was not look'd upon as a good christian who did not entirely resign himself to their disposal : they gave great exemtion to the church and church men , and annex'd such priviledges to both , as testified the veneration they had for the persons , as well as for the faith. and when they suspected that the licentiousness of succeeding ages might not pay the same devotion to both , they did the best they could to establish it , by making laws to that purpose , and obliging the several princes to maintain and defend the rights and priviledges of the church ; rights and priviledges which themselves had granted , and of which the pope knew nothing , nor indeed at that time did enjoy the like himself . it is true , that by this means the clergy was grown to a wonderful power over the people , who look'd upon them as more then mortal men , and had surely a greater autority then any clergy in christendom assum'd in those ages , and yet it was generally greater then in other kingdoms , then it hath ever bin since . nor could it be otherwise during the heptarchy , when those little soveraigns maintain'd their power by the autority their clergy had with their people , when they had little dependence upon the prince . but when by the courage and success of two or three couragious princes , and the distraction that had bin brought upon them by strangers , the government of the whole island was reduced under one soveraign , the clergy , which had bin alwaies much better united then the civil state had bin , were not willing to part with any autority they had enjoied , nor to be thought of less value then they had bin formerly esteemed , and so grew troublesom to the soveraign power , somtimes by interrupting the progress of their councils by delaies , and somtimes by direct and positive contradictions . the princes had not the confidence then to resort to mr. hobbes's original institution of their right ; the manners of the nation still remained fierce and barbarous , and whatsoever was pliant in them , was from the result of religion , which was govern'd by the clergy . they knew nothing yet of that primitive contract that introduced soveraignty , nor of that faith that introduced subjection : they thought ▪ it would not be safe for them to oppose the power of the sacred clergy , with a mere secular , profane force , and therefore thought how they might lessen and divide their own troublesome clergy , by a conjunction with some religious and ecclesiastical combination . the bishops of rome of that age had a very great name and autority in france , where there being many soveraign princes then reigning together , he exercis'd a notable jurisdiction under the style of vicar of christ. the kings in england by degrees unwarily applied themselves to this spiritual magistrate ; and that he might assist them to suppress a power that was inconvenient to them at home , they suffer'd him to exercise an autority that proved afterwards very mischievous to themselves , and for which they had never made pretence before , and which was then heartily opposed by the universities , and by the whole clergy , till it was impos'd upon them by the king. so that it was not the universities , and clergy , that introduc'd the popes autority to sh●ke and weaken that of the king , but it was the king who introduc'd that power to strengthen , as he thought , his own , howsoever it fell out . and if the precedent kings had not call'd upon the pope , and given him autority to assist them against some of their own bishops , alexander the third could never have pretended to exercise so wild a jurisdiction over henry the second , nor he ever have submitted to so infamous a subordination ; nor could the pope have undertaken to assist beckett against the king , if the king had not first appeal'd to him for help against beckett . for the better manifestation of that point , which mr. hobbes his speculation and geometry hath not yet made an enquiry into , it will not be amiss to take a short survey of the precedent times , by which it will be evident how little influence the popes autority had upon the crown , or clergy , or universities of england ; and how little ground he hath for that fancy , from whence soever he took it , ( pag. . ) that william the conquerour at his reception had dispens'd with the subjection of the ecclesiastics , by the oa●h he took not to infringe the liberty of the church : whereas they who know any thing of that time , know that the oath he took was the same , and without any alteration , that all the former kings , since the crown rested upon a single head , had taken , which was at his coronation , after the bishops and the barons had taken their oath to be his true and faithful subjects . the arch-bishop , who crown'd him , presented that oath to him , which he was to take himself , which he willingly did , to defend the holy church of god , and the rectors of the same , to govern the universal people subject to him , justly , to establish equal laws , and to see them justly executed . nor was he more wary in any thing , then ( as hath bin said before ) that the people might imagine , that he pretended any other title to the government , then by the confessor : tho it is true , that he did by degrees introduce many of the norman customes which were found very useful , or convenient , and agreeable enough , if not the same , with what had bin formerly practis'd . and the common reproch , of the laws being from time to time put into french , carries no weight with it : for there was before that time so rude a collection of the laws , and in languages as foreign to that of the nation , british , saxon , danish , and latine , almost as unintelligible as either of the other , that if they had bin all digested into the english that was then spoken , we should very little better have understood it , then we do the french , in which the laws were afterwards render'd ; and it is no wonder , since a reduction into order was necessary , that the king who was to look to the execution , took care to have them in that language which himself best understood , and from whence issued no inconvenience , the former remaining still in the language in which they had bin written . before the time of william the first , there was no pretence of jurisdiction from rome over the clergy , and the church of england ; tho the infant christianity of some of the kings and princes had made some journies thither , upon the fame of the sanctity of many of the bishops who had bin the most eminent martyrs for the christian faith , and when it may be they could with more ease and security make a journy thither , then they could have don to any other bishop of great notoriety out of their own country ; for christianity was not in those times come much neerer england then dauphine , provence , and languedoc in france , and those provinces had left their bountiful testimonies of their devotion , which grew afterwards to be exercis'd with the same piety in pilgrimages first , and then expeditions to the holy land , without any other purpose of transferring a superiority over the english nation , to rome , then to ierusalem . and after the arrival of austin the monk and his companions , who were sent by pope gregory , and who never enjoy'd any thing in england but by the donation of the kings , the british clergy grew so jealous of their pretences , that tho the nation was exceedingly corrupted by the person and the doctrine of pel●gius , which had bin spred full two hundred years before austin came , the reformation and suppression of that heresy was much retarded by those mens extolling or mentioning the popes autority , which the brittish bishops were so far from acknowledging , that they would neither meet with them , nor submit to any thing that was propos'd by them , and declar'd very much against the pride and insolence of austin , for assuming any autority , and because when any of them came to him , he would not so much as rise to receive them . i can hardly contain my self from enlarging upon this subject at this time , but that it will ●eem to many to be foreign to the argument now in debate , and mr. hobbes hath little resignation to the autority of matter of fact , by which when he is pressed , he hath an answer ready , that if it were so , or not so , it should have bin otherwise , i shall therefore only restrain my discourse to the time of william the conqueror , and when i have better inform'd him of the state of the clergy , and universities of that time , i shall give him the best satisfaction i can to the instance of thomas of beckett , in which both the clergy , and the universities will be easily absolv'd from the guilt of adhering to the pope . when william found himself in possession of england , whatever application he had formerly made to the pope ( who was then in france ) and as some say had receiv'd from him a consecrated banner with some other relique , beside one single hair of st peter , for the better success of his expedition , he was so far from discovering any notable respect towards him , that he expresly forbad all his subjects from acknowledging any man to be pope , but him whom he declar'd to be so . and there was a president of such a nature in his reign by lanfranke the arch●b . of canterbury , who had the greatest credit and autority with him , as cannot be parallell'd by the like don , or permitted in any state , and impossible to be don , or permitted in any state that was in any degree subject to the pope , which was the canonization of a saint . there being at that time very great fame of aldelmus , who first brought in the composition of latine verse into england , and besides his eminent piety , had so great a faculty in singing , that by the music of his voice he wrought wonderful effects upon the barbarous and savage humor of that people , insomuch as when they were in great multitudes engag'd in a rude or licentious action , he would put him self in their way and sing , which made them all stand still to listen ; and he so captivated them by the melody , that he diverted them from their purpose , and by degrees got so much credit with them , that he reduc'd them to more civility , and instructed them in the duties of religion , into which , tho they had bin baptiz'd , they had made little enquiry . he lived a little before the time of edward the confessor , and the general testimony of the sanctity of his life , and some miracles wrought by him ( which it may be were principally the effects of his music ) being reported , and believ'd by lanfrank , edicto sancivit , ut per totam deinde angliam adelmus inter eos , qui civibus coelestibus ascripti erant , honoraretur & coleretur , as by the authors neerest that time is remembred , and at large related by harps-field in his ecclesiastical history of england without any disapprobation . nor is it probable , that lanfrank who was an italian , born and bred in lombardly , and of great reputation for learning and piety , would have assum'd that autority , if he had believ'd that he had intrenched upon the province of the bishop of rome . the truth is , canonizations in that age were not the chargeable commodities they have since grown to be , since the pope hath engross'd the disposal of them to himself ; and it is very probable , that the primitive saints , whose memories are preserv'd in the martyrologies very erroneously , were by the joint acknowledgment of the upon the notorious sanctity of their lives , and of their deaths , not by any solemn declaration of any particular autority of rome ; otherwise we should find the records of old canonizations there , as well as we do of so many new . but of so many of this nation , who suffer'd in the ten first persecutions under the roman governors more then of any other , especially if st. vrsula , and her eleven thousand virgins be reckon'd into the number , there is no other record but of the daies assign'd for their festivities . and in their whole bullarium , which for these latter hundred years so much abounds in canonizations , the first that is extant is of vldricke bishop of ausburg , by iohn the fifteenth , anno nine hundred ninety three , in a very different form , and much different circumstances from those which are now used . finally , if the popes inhibition or interposition could have bin of any moment in that time of william the conqueror , he would have bin sure to have heard of it , when he seiz'd upon the plate and jewels of all the monasteries , and laid other great impositions upon the clergy , which they had not bin accustom'd to , and of which they would have complain'd , if they had known whither to have addressed their complaints . the two next kings who succeeded him , and reigned long ( for henry the first reigned no less then five and thirty years ) wore not their crowns so fast on their heads , in respect of the juster title in their brother robert , as prudently to provoke more enemies then they had ; and therefore they kept very fair quarter with paschal , who was pope likewise many years , and were content to look on unconcern'd in the fierce quarrels between the emperour and him , for he was very powerful in france tho not in italy . and anselme the arch-bishop of canterbury had great contests with them both upon the priviledges of the clergy , and had fled to paschal to engage him in his quarrel ; yet the pope pretended to no jurisdiction in the point , but courteously interceded so far with henry the first on the behalf of anselme , that he made his peace with the king : but when he afterwards desir'd to send a legate into england , the king by the advice of the bishops , and nobles , positively refus'd to admit him . and whosoever takes a view of the constitution of christendom , as far as had reference to europe at that time , how far the greatest kingdoms and principalities , which do now controul and regulate that ambition , were from any degree of strength and power ; that italy was then crumbled into more distinct governments , then it is at present ; that france , that is now intire , was then under the command of very many soveraign princes , and the crown it self so far from any notable superiority , that the king himself was somtimes excommunicated by his own bishops and clergy , without , and against the popes direction , and somtimes excommunicated , and the kingdom interdicted by the pope , even whilst he resided in france , and in councils assembled by them there , as in the council of clermont ; that spain , that is now under one monarch , was then divided into the several kingdoms of castile , arragon , valentia , catalonia , navarr , and leon , when the moors were possess'd of a greater part of the whole , then all the other christian kings , the whole kingdom of granada with the greatest part of andoluzia , and estremadura , and a great part of portugal being then under the dominion of those infidels ; that genmany was under as many soveraign princes as it had names of cities and provinces ; and that england , which hath now scotland and ireland annex'd to it , was then , besides the unsettlement of the english provinces upon the contests in the norman family , without any pretence to the dominion of wales , at least without any advantage by it : i say , whosoever considers this , will not wonder at the starts made by many popes in that age , into a kind of power and autority in many kingdoms , that they had not before , and which was then still interrupted and contradicted ; and that when alexander the third came to be pope , who reigned about twenty years , he proceeded so imperiously with our henry the second upon the death of thomas beckett , even in a time when there was so great a schism in the church , that victor the fifth was chosen by a contrary party , and by a council called at pavia by the emperour there own'd , and declar'd to be canonically chosen , and alexander to be no pope , who thereupon fled into france : so that if our king henry the second had not found such a condescention to be very suitable to his affairs both in england , and in france , it is probable he would have declin'd so unjust and unreasonable an imposition . i am afraid of giving mr. hobbes an occasion to reproch me with impertinency in this digression , tho he hath given me a just provocation to it : and since the roman writers are so solicitous in the collecting and publishing the records of that odious process , and strangers are easily induc'd to believe , that the exercise of so extravagant a jurisdiction in the reign of so heroical a prince , who had extended his dominions farther by much then any of his progenitors had don , must be grounded upon some fix'd and confess'd right over the nation , and not from an original usurpation entred upon in that time , and when the usurper was not acknowledged by so considerable a part of christendom ; it may not prove ungrateful to many men , to make a short view of that very time , that we may see what unheard of motives could prevail with that high spirited king to submit to so unheard of tyranny . that it was not from the constitution of the kingdom , or any preadmitted power of the pope formerly incorporated into the laws and customs of the kingdom , is very evident , by the like having bin before attemted . for tho the clergy enjoied those great priviledges and immunities which are mention'd before , whereby they had so great an influence upon the hearts of the people , that the conqueror himself had bin glad to make use of them , and william the second , henry the first , and king stephen had more need of them to uphold their usurpation ; yet those priviledges how great soever , depended not at all upon the bishop of rome , nor was any rank of men more solicitous then the clergy to keep the pope from a pretence of power in the kingdom . and the bishops themselves had in the beginning of that arch-bishops contumacious and rebellious contests with the king , don all they could to discountenance and oppose him , and had given their consent in parliament , that for his disobedience all his goods and moveables should be at the kings mercy ; and it was also enacted with their consent ( after the arch-bishop had fled out of the kingdom , and was known to make some application to the pope ) that if any were found carrying a letter or mandate from the pope or the arch-bishop , containing any interdiction of christianity in england ; he should be taken , and without delay executed as a traitor both to the king and kingdom ; that whatsoever bishop , priest , or monk should have , and retain any such letters , should forfeit all their possessions , goods , and chattels to the king , and be presently banish'd the realm with their kin ; that none should appeal to the pope ; and many other particulars , which enough declare the temper of that catholic time , and their aversion to have any dependance upon a foreign jurisdiction . and after the death of beckett , and that infamous submission of the king to the popes sentence thereupon ( which yet was not so scandalous as it is vulgarly reported , as if it had bin made and undergon by the king in person ) when the same king desir'd to assist the successor of that pope , lucius the third , who was driven out of rome , and to that purpose endeavour'd to raise a collection from the clergy , which the popes nuntio appear'd in , and hoped to advance , the clergy was so jealous of having to do with the pope , or his ministers , that they declar'd , and advised the king , that his majesty would supply the pope in such a proportion as he thought fit , and that whatever they gave might be to the king himself , and not to the popes nuntio , which might be drawn into example to the detriment of the king. the king himself first shewed the way to thomas a beckett to apply himself to the pope , till when the arch-bishop insisted only upon his own ecclesiastical rights and power , in which he found not the concurrence of the other bishops or clergy , and the king not being able to bear the insolence of the man , and finding that he could well enough govern his other bishops , if they were not subjected to the autority and power of that perverse arch bishop , was willing to give the pope autority to assist him , and did all he could to perswade him to make the arch-bishop of york his legate , meaning thereby to devest the other . arch-bishop of that superiority over the clergy that was so troublesom to him , and which he exercis'd in his own right as metropolitan . but the pope durst not gratifie the king therein , knowing the spirit of beckett , and that he would contemn the legate , and knew well the ecclesiastical superiority in that kingdom to reside in his person as arch-bishop of canterbury , who , had bin reputed tanquam alterius orbis papa , yet he sent to him to advise him to submit to the king ; whereupon the haughty prelate then fled out of the kingdom , and was too hard for the king with the pope , who was perswaded by him to make use of this opportunity to enlarge his own power , and to curb and subdue that clergy that was indevoted to him ; and so by his bull he suspended the arch-bishop of york , and the other bishops who adher'd to the king in the execution of his commands ; which so much incens'd the king , that he let fall those words in his passion , that encouraged those rash gentlemen to commit that assassination , that produc'd so much trouble . it must also be remembred , that the king , when he bore all this from the pope , was indeed but half a king , having caused his son henry to be crown'd king with him , who thereupon gave him much trouble , and join'd with the french king against him : and that he had so large and great territories in france , that as the popes power was very great there , so his friendship was the more behovefull and necessary to the king. lastly , and which it may be is of more weight then any thing that hath bin said in this disquisition , it may seem a very natural judgment of god almighty , that the pope should exercise that unreasonable power over a king , who had given him an absurd and unlawful power over himself , and for an unjust end , when he obtain'd from our country-man pope adrian , who immediatly preceded alexander , a dispensation not to perform the oath which he had taken , that his brother geoffery should enjoy the county of anjoy according to the will and desire of his father , and by vertue of that dispensation , which the pope had no power to grant , defrauded his brother of his inheritance , and broke his oath to god almighty , and so was afterwards forced himself to yield to the next pope , when he assum'd a power over him in a case he had nothing to do with , and where he had no mind to obey . and this unadvised address of many other princes to the pope , for dispensations of this kind to do what the law of god did not permit them to do hath bin a principal inlet of his supremacy , to make them accept of other dispensations from him , of which they stand not in need , and to admit other his incroachments from him , which have proved very mischievous to them . of the condition of king iohn we need not speak , whose usurpation , murders , and absence of all virtue , made him fit to undergo all the reproches and censures which pope innocent the third exercis'd him with , when he usurped upon france with equal tyranny . the succeeding kings no sooner found it necessary to expel , or restrain that power which the popes had so inconveniently bin admitted to , and which they had so mischievously improv'd , but the universities not only submitted to , but advanced those acts which tended thereunto ; as appears by the writings of occam , and other learned men in the university of oxford , in the reigns of those kings both edward the first and edward the third , in which times as much was don against the power of the pope , as was afterwards don by henry the eighth himself . and the gallican church would not at this time have preserved their liberties and priviledges to that degree , as to contemn the power of the universal bishop , if the university of the sorbone had not bin more vigilant against those incroachments then the crown it self . so far have the universities bin from being the authors , or promoters of those false doctrines , which he unjustly laies to their charge . and i presume they will be as vigilant and resolute , to preserve the civil autority from being invaded and endangered , by their receiving and subscribing to his pernicious and destructive principles , which his modesty is induced to believe may be planted in the minds of men , because whole nations have bin brought to acquiesce in the great mysteries of christian religion which are above reason , and millions of men have bin made to believe , that the same body may be in innumerable places at one and the same time , which is against reason : and therefore he would have the soveraign power to make his doctrine , so consonant to reason , to be taught and preached . but his doctrine is fit only to be taught by his own apostles , who ought to be looked upon as seducers , and false prophets ; and god forbid that the soveraign powers should contribute to the making those principles believed , which would be in great danger to be destroied , if it were but suspected that they affected to have that power , which he would have to belong to them . and such princes who have bin willi●g to believe they have it , have bin alwaies most jealous that it should be known , or thought , that they do believe so ; since they know there would be a quick determination of their power , if all their subjects knew , that they believed , that all they have doth in truth belong to them , and that they may dispose of it as they please . ( pag. . ) he saies a common-wealth hath many diseases , which proceed from the poison of seditious doctrines , whereof one is , that every private man is iudg of good and evil actions , which is a doctrine never allow'd in any common-wealth , the law being the measure of all good or evil actions under every government ; and where that law permits a liberty to the subject to dispute the commands of the soveraign , no inconvenience can arise thereby : but if the soveraign by his own autority shall vacate and cancel all laws , the common-wealth must need be distracted , or much weakned . mr. hobbes will have too great an advantage against any adversary , if he will not have his government tried by any law , nor his religion by any scripture : and he could never think , that the believing , that ( pag. . ) whatsoever a man doth against his conscience is sin , is a doctrine to civil society repugnant , if he thought any of the apostles good judges of conscience , who all , upon all occasions and in all actions , commend themselves to every mans conscience , . cor. . . as also , our rejoicing is this , the testimony of our conscience cor. . and throughout the whole new testament the conscience is made the judg of all we do . and if mr. hobbes had not so often excepted against divines for being good judges in religion , i could tell him of very good ones , who are of opinion , that it is a sin to do any thing against an erroneous conscience , which is his own best excuse , that he will not depart from his own judgment , which is his conscience , how erroneous soever it is . but this liberty of conscience is restrain'd only to those cases where the law hath prescribed no rule ; for where the law enjoins the duty , no private conscience can deny obedience . in case of misperswasion , it looks upon the action as sinful in him , and so chuses to submit to the penalty , which is still obedience , or removes into another climate as more agreeable to his constitution . if mr. hobbes proposes to himself to answer all extravagant discourses or private opinions of seditious men , which have no countenance from public autority , he will be sure to chuse such as he can easily confute . all sober men agree , that tho faith and sanctity are not to be attain'd only by study and reading , yet that study and reading are means to procure that grace from god almighty that is necessary thereunto . and himself confesseth , that with all his education , discipline , correction , and other natural waies , it is god that worketh that faith and sanctity in those he thinks fit . so that if he did not think men the more unlearn'd for being divines , it is probable that there is very little difference between what those unlearned divines , and himself say upon this point , saving that they may use inspiring and infusing , which are words he cannot endure as insignificant speech , tho few men are deceiv'd in the meaning of them . if all soveraigns are subject to the laws of nature ( as he saies they are ) because such laws are divine , and cannot by any man or common-wealth be abrogated , they then are oblig'd to observe and perform those laws which themselves have made , and promised to observe , for violation of faith is against the law of nature by his own confession . nor doth this obligation set any judg over the soveraign , nor doth any civil law pretend that there is any power to punish him ; it is enough , that in justice he ought to do it , and that there is a soveraign in heaven above him , tho not on earth . the next indeed is a doctrine that troubles him , and tends , as he saies , ( pag. . ) to the dissolution of a common-wealth , that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods , such as excludes the right of the soveraign , which if true , he saies , ( p. . ) he cannot perform the office they have put him into , which is to defend them both from foreign enemies , and from the injuries of one another , and consequently there is no longer a common wealth . and i say , if it be not true , there is nothing worth the defending from foreign enemies , or from one another , and consequently it is no matter what becomes of the common-wealth . can he defend them any other way , then by their own help , with their own hands ? and it is a marvellous thing that any man can believe , that he can be as vigorously assisted by people who have nothing to lose , as by men who defending him defend their own goods and estates , which if they do not believe their own , they will never care into what hands they fall . nor is the soveraign power divided by the soveraigns consenting that he will not exercise such a part of it , but in such and such a manner , and with such circumstances ; for he hath not parted with any of his soveraignty , since no other man can exercise that which he forbears to exercise himself ; which could be don , if he had divided it . and it is much a greater crime in those who are totally ignorant of the laws , to endeavour by their wit and presumtion to undermine them , then that they who are learn'd in the study and profession of the law , do all they can to support that , which only supports the government . much less is the soveraign power divided by the soveraigns own communicating part of it to be executed in his name , to those who , by their education and experience , are qualified to do it much better then he himself can be presumed to be able to do ▪ as to appoint judges to administer justice to his people , upon all the pretences of right which may arise between themselves , or between him and them ▪ according to the rules of the law , which are manifest to them , and must be unknown to him ; who yet keeps the soveraign power in his hands to punish those deputies , if they swerve from their duty . to the mischiefs which have proceeded from the reading the histories of the ancient greeks and romans , i shall say no more in this place , then that if mr. hobbes hath bin alwaies of this opinion , he was very much to blame to take the pains to translate thucyd●des into english , in which there is so much of the policy of the greeks discovered , and much more of that oratory that disposes men to sedition , then in all tullies , or aristotles works . but i suppose he had then , and might still have more reason to believe , that very few who have taken delight in reading the books of policy and histories of the ancient greeks and romans , have ever fallen into rebellion ; and there is much more fear , that the reading this and other books writ by him , and the glosses he makes upon them in his conversation , may introduce thoughts of rebellion into young men , by weakning , and laughing at all obligations of conscience , which only can dispose men to obedience : and by perswading princes , that they may safely and justly follow the extent of their own inclinations and appetites in the government of their subjects , which must tire and wear out all subjection , at least the cheerfulness , which is the strength of it , by lessening the reverence to god almighty , which is the foundation of reverence to the king ; and undervaluing all religion , as no otherwise known , and no otherwise coustituted then by the arbitriment of the soveraign prince , whom he makes a god of heaven , as well as upon the earth , since he is upon the matter , the only author of the scripture it self ; the swallowing of all which opinions , must be the destruction of all government , and the ruine of all obedience . tho most of his reflexions are reproches upon the government of his own country , which he thinks is imperfectly instituted ; yet he cannot impute the doctrine of killing kings , whether regicide or tyrannicide , to that government , nor the unreasonable distinction of spiritual and temporal jurisdiction , to rob the soveraign of any part of his supremacy , and divide one part of his subjects from a dependance upon his justice and autority . god be thanked the laws of that kingdom admit none of that doctrine , or such distinctions to that pernicious purpose . nor do the bishops , or clergy of that kingdom ( however they are fallen from mr. hobbes his grace ) use any style or title , but what is given or permitted to them by the soveraign power . and therefore this controversy must be defended by those ( who justly lie under the reproch ) of the church of rome , who , it may be , consider him the less , because , tho they know him not to be of theirs , they think him not to be of any religion . the power of levying mony , which depending upon any general assembly , he saies , ( pag. . ) endangereth the common-wealth , for want of such nurishment , as is necessary to life and motion , shall be more properly enlarg'd upon in the next chapter , when , i doubt not , very wholsome remedies will be found for all those diseases which he will suppose may proceed from thence ; but t is to be hoped none will chuse his desperate prescriptions , which will cure the di●ease by killing the patient . he concludes this chapter , after all his bountiful donatives to his soveraign , with his old wicked doctrine , that would indeed irreparably destroy and dissolve all common-wealths , that when by a powerful invasion from a foreign enemy , or a prosperous rebellion by subjects , his soveraign is so far oppressed that he can keep the field no longer , his subjects owe him no farther assistance , and may lawfully put themselves under the conqueror , of what condition soever ; for tho , he saies , ( pag. . ) the right of the soveraign is not extinguished , yet the obligation of the members is , and so the soveraign is left to look to himself . there are few empires of the world , which at some time have not bin reduc'd , by the strength and power of an outragious enemy , to that extremity , that their forces have not bin able to keep the field any longer , which mr. hobbes makes the period of their subjects loyalty , and the dissolution of the common wealth ; yet of these at last many princes have recover'd , and redeem'd themselves from that period , and arrived again at their full height and glory by the constancy and vertue of their subjects , and their firmly believing , that their obligations could not be extinguish'd as long as the right of their soveraign monarch was not . so that there is great reason to believe , that the old rules which soveraignty allwaies prescribed to it self , are much better , and more like to preserve it , then the new ones which he would plant in their stead ; because it is very evident , that the old subjection is much more faithful and necessary to the support and defence of the soveraignty , then that new one which he is contented with , and prescribes ; which he will not only have determin'd as to any assistance of his natural soveraign , tho he confesses ( pag. . ) his right remains still in him ; but that he is obliged , ( so strictly obliged , that no pret●nce of having submitted h●mself out of fear , can absolve him ) to protect , and assist the vsurper as long as he is able . so that the entire loss of one battel , according to his judgment of subjection , and the duty of subjects , shall , or may put an end to the soveraignty of any prince in europe . and this is one of the grounds and principles , which he concludes to be against the express duty of princes , to let the people be ignorant of . if mr. hobbes had a conscience made and instructed like other mens , and had not carefully provided , that whilst his judgment is fix'd under philosophical and metaphysical notions , his conscience shall never be disturb'd by religious speculations and apprehensions ; it might possibly smite him with the remembrance , that these excellent principles were industriously insinuated , divulged and publish'd within less then two years after cromwels usurpation of the government of the three nations , upon the murder of his soveraign ; and that he then declar'd in this book ( pag. . ) that against such subjects who deliberately deny the autority of the common wealth , then , and so established , ( which , god be thanked , much the major part of the three nations then did ) the vengeance might lawfully be extended not only to the fathers , but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being , and consequently innocent of the fact for which they are afflicted ; because the nature of this offence , consists in renouncing of subjection , which is a relapse into the condition of war , commonly called rebellion , and they that so offend , suffer not as subjects , but as enemies . and truly he may very reasonably believe , surely more then many things which he doth believe , that the veneme of this book wrought upon the hearts of men , to retard the return of their allegiance for so many years , and was the cause of so many cruel and bloody persecutions against those , who still retain'd their duty and allegiance for the king. and methinks no man should be an enemy to the renewing war in such cases , but he who thinks all kind of war , upon what occasion soever , to be unlawful ; which mr. hobbes is so far from thinking , that he is very well contented , and believes it very lawful for his soveraign , in this paragraph of cruelty , to make war against any whom he judges capable to do him hurt . the survey of chapter . mr. hobbes having invested his soveraign with so absolute power and omnipotence , we have reason to expect that in this chapter of his office , he will enjoin him to use all th● autority he hath given him ; and he gives him fai● warning , that if any of the essential rights of soveraignty , specified in his eighteenth chapter ( which , in a word , is to do any thing he hath a mind to do , and take any thing he likes from any of his subjects ) be taken away , the common-wealth is dissolv'd : and therefore that it is his office to preserve those rights entire , and against his duty to transfer any of them from himself . and least he should forget the rights and power he hath bestowed upon him , he recollects them all in three or four lines , amongst which he puts him in mind , that he hath power to leavy mony , when , and as much as in his own conscience he shall judg necessary : and then tells him , that it is agaist his duty to let the people be ignorant , or mis-informed of the grounds and reasons of those his essential rights , that is , that he is oblig'd to make his leviathan canonical scripture , there being no other book ever yet printed , that can inform them of those rights , and the grounds and reason of them . and how worthy they are to receive that countenance and autority , will best appear by a farther examination of the particulars ; and yet a man might have reasonably expected from the first paragraph of this chapter another kind of tenderness , indeed as great as he can wish , of the good and welfare of the subject , when he declares , ( pag. . ) that the office of the monarch consists in the end for which he was trusted with the soveraign power , namely , the procuration of the safety of the people , to which he is obliged by the law of nature , and to render an account thereof to god the author of that law. but by safety , he saies , is not mea●● a bare preservation , but also all other contentments of life , which every man by lawful industry , without danger or hurt to the common-wealth , can acquire to h●mself . who can expect a more blessed condition ? who can desire a more gracious soveraign ? no man would have thought this specious building should have its foundation , after the manner of the foolish indians , upon sand , that , assoon as you come to rest upon it , molders away to nothing ; that this safety , safety improv'd with all the other contentments of life , should consist in nothing else , but in a mans being instructed and prepar'd to know , that he hath nothing of his own , and that when he hath by his lawful industry acquir'd to himself all the contentments of life which he can set his heart upon , one touch of his soveraigns hand , one breath of his mouth , can take all this from him without doing him any injury . this is the doctrine to be propagated , and which he is confident will easily be receiv'd and consented to , since if it were not according the principles of reason , he is sure it is a principle from autority of scripture , and will be so acknowledg'd , if the peoples minds be not tainted with dependance upon the potent , or scribled over with the opinions of their doctors . one of the reasons which he gives , why his grounds of the rights of his soveraign should be diligently and truly taught , is a very good reason to believe , that the grounds are not good , because he confesses , ( pag. . ) that they cannot be maintain'd by any civil law , or terror of legal punishment . and as few men agree with mr. hobbes in the essential rights of soveraignty , so none allows , nor doth he agree with himself , that all resistance to the rights of the soveraignty , be they never so essential , is rebellion . he allows it to be a priviledg of the subject that he may sue the king , so there is no doubt but that the soveraign may sue the subject , who may as lawfully defend as sue , and every such defence is a resistance to the soveraign right of demanding , and yet i suppose mr. hobbes will not say it is rebellion . he that doth positively refuse to pay mony to the king , which he doth justly owe to him , and which he shall be compell'd to pay , doth resist an essential right of the king , yet is not guilty of rebellion , which is constituted in having a force to support his resistance , and a purpose to apply it that way . and as the law of nature is not so easily taught , because not so easily understood as the civil law , so i cannot comprehend , why mr. hobbes should imagine the soveraign power to be more secure by the law of nature , then by the civil law , when he confesses , that the law of nature is made law , only by being made part of the civil law : and if the civil law did not provide a restraint from the violation of faith , by the terror of the punishment that must attend it , the obligation from the law of nature wonld be a very faint security to princes for the obedience of their subjects . but he chuses to appeal only to the law of nature , which is a text so few men have read and understand , to support an imaginary faith that was never given , upon which soveraignty was founded . for which he hath another reason likewise ; for his law of nature is always at hand to serve him , when no other law will. for when you tell him that the law of nature forbiddeth the violation of faith , and therefore that kings and princes are obliged to observe the promises they make , and the oaths they take ; he answers you with great confidence , and great cleerness , that that rule is only obligatory to subjects , for that by the law of nature , such promises and oaths taken by princes , are ipso facto void , invalid , an● bind not at all . so that by this omnipotent law of nature , which is indispensable and eternal , the sacred word of a king , which ought to be as fix'd and unmoveable as the center of the earth , is made as changeable as the moon ; and the breach of faith , which is so odious to god and man , is made lawful for kings , who are the only persons in the world who cannot be perjur'd , because the indispensable law of nature will not permit them to perform what they promise . and now we see the reason why the law of nature must only be able to support that government , which no civil law will be able to do : it remains , that tho there may be a very innocent and lawful resistance of some essential rights of the soveraign , for recovery whereof he may be put to sue at law , as hath bin said before , his soveraign by his right of interpreting law , may , as his institutor here hath don , interpret such resistance to be treason , and so confi●cate the estate of the greatest subject he hath , who hath an estate that he hath a mind to have . he would be glad to find some answer to the want of president , which he sees will alwaies lie in his way , that there hath not bin hitherto any common-wealth where those rights have bin acknowledg'd or challeng'd : but he hath alwaies the ill luck to leave the objection as strong as he found it ; and if he could find no artificers to assist in the erecting such a building as may last as long as the materials , notwithstanding his skill in architecture from the principles of reason , his long study of the nature of materials , and the divers effects of figure and proportion , men would rather chuse to dwell in the houses they have , then to pull them down , and exspect till he set up better in the place . he must give a better evidence then his non-reason , that his government will be everlasting , before men believe it ; and when his principles from autority of scripture come to be examin'd , they will be found to have no more solidity , then those which he hath produc'd from his long study and observation . in the mean time he shall do well to get his doctrine planted in those countries , and among that people who are made believe , that the same body may be in innumerable places at one and the same time , where possibly things equally unreasonably may be believ'd . and since men are to be taught , that they ought not to be in love with any form of government more then with their own , nor to desire change , which he saies , ( pag. . ) is like the breach of the first of gods commandments , he hath himself raised one unanswerable argument against the reception and doctrine of his l●viathan . his unskilful reproches upon the universities are sufficiently refuted in the last chapter . a man would hardly believe , that the same person should think it to be of the office of the soveraign to take care for the making of good laws , and should so frankly declare , that no law can be conceiv'd to be good , tho it be for the benefit of the soveraign , if it be not necessary for the people , for the good of the soveraign and the people cannot be separated ; and yet at the same time determine , that all laws which establish any propriety to and in the people , are invalid and void , and that it is an essential and inseparable right in the soveraign , to levy as much mony at any time , as he in his own conscience shall judg necessary . and therefore , tho i think i have in several places of this discourse sufficiently evinc'd the unreasonableness of this proposition , and the inconsistency of the good and security of the soveraign with such a power , i shall here enlarge upon the disquisition thereof , and of the reasons which induce him to believe , that any kind of restraint of his power of raising mony , by what consent of his own soever , is no less then the dissolution of the common-wealth : for this power of taking every mans mony from him , and his goods that will yield mony , is his principal contention throughout his book , besides his liberty to lay asleep , alter , and repeal all laws according to his will and pleasure . the expence and charge of the preservation and maintenance of the government being uncertain and contingent , and so not to be provided for by any constant provision or revenue , if by any emergent occasion , upon a suddain rebellion or foreign invasion , the soveraign hath not power to raise what mony he thinks necessary to suppress the one and resist the other , the kingdom must be lost ; and if he may do it in either of those cases , he may do it to prevent either ; and it ought to be suppos'd that he will not take more , tho he may take all , then is absolutely necessary for the occasion : and this is the strongest case ( and yet is not so strong in relation to an island , as it is in relation to an in-land kingdom ) he hath , or can suppose , for the support of this power , to every part of which this answer may be applied . as there is no soveraign in europe who pretends to this right of soveraignty , so there was never any kingdom , or considerable country lost by want of it , or preserv'd by the actual exercise of it : and the laws themselves permit , and allow many things to be don , when the mischief and necessity are in view , which may not warrantably be don upon the pretence of preventing it . the law of necessity is pleadable in any court , and hath not only its pardon but justification ; as when , not only a magistrate , but a private man pulls down a house or more , which are next to that house which is on fire , to prevent the farther mischief , the law justifies him , because the necessity and benefit is as visible as the fire ; yet it would not be justice in the soveraign himself , to cause a mans house to be pulled down that is seven miles distant , upon a fore-sight that the fire may come thither . i am not averse from mr. hobbes's opinion , that a man who is upon the point of starving , and is not able to buy meat , may take as much of the meat he first sees , as will serve for that meal ; and this not only by the law of nature , but for ought i know , without punishment by any municipal law , which seldom cancels the unquestionable law of nature : but this necessity will not justifie him in the stealing or taking by force an ox from any man to prevent starving for a month together , how poor soever the man is , or to rob a poulterers shop , that he may have a second course . necessity is not a word unknown , or unconsider'd by the law. no subject , who will obey the law , and submit to that power and autority which he conf●sses to be unquestionable in the king , can run into rebellion ; and if he doth , all other subjects are bound by the laws to assist , to suppress it in that manner , and with that force , and under such conduct and command as the soveraign directs . if this rebellion prospers , let the soveraigns right be what mr. hobbes assigns him , to levy mony , he will never be able to levy it in the rebels quarters ; and if they extend their quarters far , they share the soveraignty with him ; for he appoints those who live in those quarters , and enjoy protection , to assist and defend their protectors . the case is the same in an actual invasion , where the invaders right grows at least as fast as the rebels ; and the power of the soveraign , be it never so cheerfully submitted to , can levy mony only where he is obeied , and upon those whose hands must fight for him , or give him other assistance ; and then the question is , whether he be not like to be stronger by accepting what they are willing to give , then by letting them know that they have nothing to give , because all they have is his . and yet in both these cases of an actual rebellion , or actual invasion , if the king takes any mans mony that he finds ( and if he cannot find it , his right to take it will do him little good ) not as his own , but as that mans , to be laid out for his own and public defence , and to be repaid by the public , which ought not to be defended at the charge of any private man , there will be little complaint of the violation of the law , and the right of property will be still unshaken . but all these mischiefs are to be prevented by the soveraigns sagacity and fore-sight ; and if he may not levy what mony he pleases , and thinks requisite to make preparations to disappoint all such designs of both kinds , it will be too late indeed to do it after , and the common-wealth cannot but suffer by the defect of power . if the mischief be only in apprehension , there is time to raise mony in that way which is provided , and agreed upon for those extraordinary occasions , by asking their consent , who can without any complaint or murmur that can prove inconvenient , give present directions for the paiment thereof . but what if they refuse to give ; must the common-wealth perish , and every man in it , whose defence the soveraign hath undertaken , and is bound to ? if the soveraign hath taken all they have before , as he may when he will , they may have nothing left to be taken in those necessary seasons , and then what will his obligation to defend them do good ? and how are they like to assist him , when they have nothing to defend but his power to make them miserable ? it is not good to suspect , that princes will extend their power , how absolute soever it is , to undo their subjects wantonly and unnecessarily ; nor is it reasonable to imagine , that subjects who enjoy peace and plenty , will obstinately refuse to contribute towards their own preservation , when both are in danger . but since it is necessary to suppose a case that never yet fell out , to introduce a government that was never before thought of , let us admit that it is possible , that such an obstinate spirit may rule in that assembly which have the power to raise mony , that they may peremtorily refuse to give any , and by the want thereof the common-wealth is really like to be dissolv'd ; i say , admit this , ( tho the same kind of obstinacy , that is , an obstinacy as natural as this , to perform no function they ought to do , will , and must dissolve the soveraignty of his own institution ) the question shall be , whether this very disease be worthy of such a cure ? whether the confess'd possibility of such a danger be fit to be secur'd and prevented by such a remedy ? and i think most wise and dispassioned men will believe , that the perpetual inquietude and vexation , that must attend men who are in daily fear to have all they have taken from them , and believe that they have nothing their own to leave to their children and family , is too disproportion'd a provision to prevent a mischief that is possible to fall out ; and that the hazard of that is more reasonably to be submitted to , then the danger of a more probable revolution from the other distemper . and when he hath heightened the danger his soveraignty may be in , by all the desperate imaginations his melancholy or fancy can suggest to him , he will find , that no defect of power can ever make a prince so weak , so impotent , and so completely miserable , as his being soveraign over such subjects as have nothing to give , because they have nothing that is their own ; nor will the conscience of their soveraign , that he will not do all he may , bring any substantial cordial to them : but as he saies , that his soveraign may command any thing to be don against law , because his command amounts to a repeal of that law , for he that can make himself free , is free ; so they will think , that he that can be undon at the pleasure of another man , is undon already , and that every day is but the eve of his destruction , and therefore will think of all ways to prevent it ; and he knows the effect of fear too well , to think that a man who is in a continual fright can be fix'd in a firm obedience . his commentary upon the ten commandments , which in his judgment comprehends and exacts all his injunctions contain'd in his leviathan , and his other theological speculations , i refer to the consideration and examination of his friends the divines , who no doubt will be well pleased to find him a better casuist , now he comes to revolve the tenth commandment in this his thirtieth chapter , then he was in his twenty seventh chapter , in his gloss upon the same text ; for there he determines clearly , ( pag. . ) that to be delighted in the imagination only of being possessed of an other mans goods , or wife , without intention to take them from him by force or fraud , is no breach of this law , thou shalt not covet : nor the pleasure a man hath in imagining the death of a man , from whose life he expects nothing but dammage and displeasure , any sin . the business he then had , was to find excuses and extenuation for sins ; but now having occasion better to consider that commandment , of which he stood in need , he finds , that the very intention to do an unjust act , tho hinder'd , is injustice , which consisteth in the pravity of the will , as well as in the irregularity of the act ; as if in the former case , all that delight in the imagination of being possessed of another mans wife , or the pleasure one has in thinking of the death of a man he doth not love , could be without any pravity of the will. 't is true , a purpose and intendment may be more criminal then mere complacency ; but we know more or less do not change the species of things . and for the best way of inculcating all his useful doctrines , and setting aside certain daies to infuse ( which upon so good an occasion will not offend his severe ear ) the same into the hearts of the people , which he conceives to be a duty enjoin'd by the fourth commandment , i shall defer my opinion till the end of the next chapter , when upon the view of all his doctrines by retail , we may better consult upon the method of spreading them abroad . in the mean time he must not take it ill , that i observe his extreme malignity to the nobility , by whose bread he hath bin alwaies sustain'd , who must not expect any part , at least any precedence in his institution ; that in this his deep meditation upon the ten commandments , and in a conjuncture when the levellers were at highest , and the reduction of all degrees to one and the same was resolv'd upon , and begun , and exercis'd towards the whole nobility with all the instances of contemt and scorn , he chose to publish his judgment ; as if the safety of the people requir'd an equality of person , and that ( pag. . ) the honor of great persons is to be valued for their beneficence , and the aids they give to men of inferior rank , or not at all ; and that the consequence of partiality towards the great ▪ raised hatred , and an endeavor in the people to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatness ; language lent to , or borrowed from the agitators of that time . he seems to think the making of good laws to be incumbent on the soveraign as his duty , and of much importance to his government ; but he saies then , ( pag. . ) that by a good law , he doth not mean a just law , for that no law can be unjust , because it is made by the soveraign p●wer . and in truth , if the use of laws is not to restrain men from doing amiss , and to instruct and dispose them to do well , and to secure them when they do so , they are of no use at all , and it is no matter if there be any laws or no. for , to make use of his own illustration , ( pag. . ) hedges are set to stop travellers , and to keep them in the way that is allow'd and prescrib'd , and for hindering them to chuse a way for themselves , tho a better and nearer way ; and laws are made to guide , and govern , and punish men who presume to decline that rule , and to chuse another to walk by , that is more agreeable to their own appetite or convenience . he renews his trouble to find fit counsellors for his soveraign , which he hath so much consider'd before , and finds the office to be as hard as the etymology ( of which let the grammarians and he agree ) and saies plainly , ( pag. . ) that the politics is a harder study then the study of geometry : and probably he believes that he can set down as firm rules in the one , as there are in the other . ( pag. . ) good counsel , he saies , comes not by lot or inheritance , and therefore there is no more reason to expect good advice from the rich , or the noble , in the matters of state , then in delineating the dimensions of a fortress ; and is very solicitous , like a faithful leveller , that no man may have priviledges of that kind by his birth or descent , or have farther honor then adhereth naturally to his abilities ; whereas in all well instituted governments , as well among the ancient as the modern , the heirs and descendants from worthy and eminent parents , if they do not degenerate from their vertue , have bin alwaies allow'd a preference , and kind of title to emploiments and offices of honor and trust , which he thinks ( pag. . ) inconsistent with the soveraign power , tho they must be confer'd by him : and the pedegree of those pretences from the germans , is one of those dreams which he falls into , when he invades the quarters of history to make good his assertions . lastly , since he reckons the sending out colonies , and erecting plantations , the encouraging all manner of arts , as navigation , agriculture , fishing , and all manner of manufactures , to be of the policy and office of a soveraign , it will not be in his power to deny , that his soveraign is obliged to perform all those promises , and to make good all those concessions and priviledges which he hath made and granted , to those who have bin thereby induc'd ▪ to expose their fortunes and their industry to those adventures , as hath bin formerly enlarg'd upon in the case of merchants and corporations , and which is directly contrary to his conclusions and determinations . and i cannot but here observe the great vigilance and caution , which mr. hobbes ( who hath an excellent faculty of employing very soft words , for the bringing the most hard and cruel things to pass ) uses out of his abstracted love of justice , towards the regulating and well ordering his poor and strong people , whom he transplants into other countries for the ease of his own ; whom he will by no means suffer to exterminate those they find there , but only to constrain them to inhabit closer together , and not to range a great deal of ground ; that is in more significant words , which the tenderness of his nature would not give him leave to ●tter , to take from them the abundance they pos●●ss , and reduce them to such an assignation , that they may be compell'd , if they will not be perswaded , ( pag. . ) to court each little plot with art and labor to give them their sustenance in d●e season . and if all this good h●sbandry will not serve the turn , but that they are still over-charg'd with inhabitants , he hath out of his deep meditation prescrib'd them a sure remedy for that too , ( pag. . ) war , which he saies will provid● for every man by victory , or death ; that is , they must cut the throats of all men who are troublesom to them , which without doubt must be the natural and final period of all his prescriptions in policy and government . the survey of chapter . after he hath form'd such a kingdom for man , as is agreeable to his good will and pleasure , he concludes this second part of his discourse , by assigning the one and thirtieth chapter to the consideration of the kingdom of god by nature ; concerning which , he enlargeth himself with less reservation in the third part of his discourse , which immediatly follows , and therefore i shall make no reflexions upon what he saies concerning it , till we come thither : nor upon his worship and attributes which he assigns to god , or rather what are not attributes to him ; in which , under pretence of explaining or defining , he makes many things harder then they were before . as all men who know what the meaning of knowledg and understanding is , know it less after they are told , that i● is ( pag. . ) nothing else but a tumult in the mind , raised by external things , that press the organical parts of mans body . and i must confess , he hath throughout this whole chapter with wonderful art , by making use of very many easie , proper , and very significant words , made a shift to compound the whole so involv'd and intricate , that there is scarce a chapter in his book , the sense whereof the reader can with more difficulty carry about him , and observe the several fallacies and contradictions in it . of which kind of obscurity mr. hobbes makes as much use , as of his brightest elucidations , and having the soveraign power over all definitions : which he uses not ( as is don in geometry , which he saies , is the only science it hath pleased god hith●rto to bestow upon man-kind ) as preliminaries or postulata , by which men may know the setled signification of words , but reserves the prerogative to himself , to give new definitions as often as he hath occasion to use the same terms , that when it conduces to his purpose , he may inform his reader , or else perplex him . and therefore he doth not think himself safe in the former plain definition which he gives of understanding , ( pag. . ) that it is nothing else but conception caused by speech ; by which , speech being peculiar to man , understanding must be peculiar to him also : but now being in his one and thirtieth chapter , and to deprive god of understanding , that definition will not serve his turn , since it cannot be doubted but that god doth hear all we say ; and therefore we are to be amuzed by being told , ( pag. . ) that understanding is nothing else but a tumult of the mind , raised by external things , that press the organical parts of mans body : so that there being no such thing in god , and it depending on natural causes , cannot be attributed to him . and now he is as safe as ever he was , and let him that finds no tumult in his mind , that presses the organical parts of his body , get knowledg and understanding as he can . i am not willing , under pretence of adjourning some reflexions , which would be natural enough upon this chapter , to a more seasonable occasion , for enlargement upon the third part of his discourse , to be thought purposely to pretermit some of his expressions in this chapter , which seem to have somwhat of piety and of godliness in them , and to raise hope that his purposes are yet better then they appear'd to be . after all that illimited power he hath granted to his soveraign , and all that unrestrain'd obedience which he exacts from his subject , he doth in the first paragraph of this chapter frankly acknowledg , ( pag. . ) that the subjects owe simple obedience to their soveraign , only in those things wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the law of god , and is very solicitous so to instruct his subject , that for want of entire knowledg of his duty to both laws , he may neither by too much civil obedience offend the divine majesty , or through fear of offending god , transgress the commandments of the commonwealth ; a circumspection worthy the best christian , and is enough to destroy many of the prerogatives which he hath given to his soveraign , and to cancel many of the obligations he hath impos'd upon his subject . but if the reader will suspend his judgment till he hath read a few leaves more , he will find , that mr. hobbes hath bin wary enough to do himself no harm by his specious divinity , but hath a salvo to set all streight again ; for he make● no scruple of determining , ( pag. . ) that the books of the holy scripture , which only contain the laws of god , are only canonical , when they are establish'd for such by the soveraign power . so that when he hath suspended obedience to the soveraign in those things wherein their obedience is repugnant to the law of god , it is meant only till the soveraign declares that it is not repugnant to the law of god ; with other excellent doctrine , the examination whereof we must not anticipate before its time ; and shall only wonder at his devout provision , ( pag. . ) that praiers and thanksgiving to god , be the best and most significant of honor . and whereas most pious men are of opinion , that rhose devotions being the most sincere , and addressed to none but to god himself , who at the same time sees the integrity of the heart , ought to be without the least affectation of word , or elegance of expression ; he will have them ( pag. . ) made in words and phrases , not sudden and plebeian , but beautiful and well compos'd , for else we do not god so much honor as we may : and therefore he saies , tho the heathen did ●●surdly to worship images for gods , yet their doing it in verse and with music , both of voice and instrument , was reasonable . i cannot omit the observation of his very con●ident avoiding that place in the scripture , ( pag. . ) it is better to obey god then man , which he could not but find did press him very hard , and was worthy of a better answer , then that it hath place in the kingdom of god by pact , and not by nature ; which if it be an answer , hath not that perspicuity in it , which good geometricians require ; and the answer stands much more in need of a commentary , then the text , which he will supply us with in the next edition . however , let it be as it will , he hath , he saies , ( pag. . ) recover'd some hope , that at one time or other this writing of his may fall into the hands of a soveraign who will consider it himself , ( he acknowledg'd at that time no soveraign but cromwell ) and without the help of any interessed or envious interpreter , and by the exercise of entire soveraignty in protecting the public teaching it , convert the truth of speculation into the utility of practice . it is one of the unhappy effects , which a too gracious and merciful indulgence ever produces in corrupt and proud natures , that they believe , that whatsoever is tolerated in them is justified and commended ; and because mr. hobbes hath not receiv'd any such brand which the authors of such doctrine have bin usually mark'd with , nor hath seen his book burned by the hand of the hang-man , as many books more innocent have bin , he is exalted to a hope , that the supreme magistrate will at some time so far exercise his soveraignty , as to protect the public teaching his principles , and convert the truth of his speculation into the utility of practice . but he might remember , and all those who are scandaliz'd , that such monstrous and seditious discourses have so long escaped a judicial examination and punishment , must know , that mr. hobbes his leviathan was printed and publish'd in the highest time of cromwell's wicked usurpation , for the vindication and perpetuating whereof , it was contriv'd and design'd , and when all legal power was suppress'd ; and upon his majesties blessed return , that merciful and wholsom act of oblivion , which pardon'd all treasons and murders , sacriledg , robbery , heresies and blasphemies , as well with re●erence to their writings as their persons , and other actions , did likewise wipe out the memory of the enormities of mr. hobbes and his leviathan . and this hath bin the only reason , why the last hath bin no more enquired into then the former , it having bin thought best , that the impious doctrines of what kind soever , which the license of those times produc'd , should rather expire by neglect , and the repentance of the authors , then that they should be brought upon the stage again by a solemn and public condemnation , which might kindle some parts of the old spirit with the vanity of contradiction , which would otherwise , in a short time , be extinguish'd : and it is only in mr. hobbes his own power to reverse the security that act hath given him , by repeting his former errors , by making what was his off-spring in tyrannical times , when there was no king in israel , his more deliberate and legitimate issue and productions , in a time when a lawful government flourishes , which cannot connive at such bold transgressors and transgressions ; and he will then find , that it hath fallen into the hands of a soveraign that hath consider'd it very well , not by allowing the public teaching it , but by a declared detestation and final snppression of it , and enjoining the author a public recantation . we shall conclude here our disquisition of his policy and government of his commonwealth , with the recollecting and stating the excellent maximes and principles upon which his government is founded and supported , that when they appear naked , and uninvolv'd in his magisterial discourses , men may judg of the liberty and security they should enjoy , if mr. hobbes doctrine were inculcated into the minds of men by their education , and the industry of those masters under whom they are to be bred , as he thinks it necessary it should be ; which principles are in these very terms declared by him . . that the kings word is sufficient to take any thing from any subject when there is need , and that the king is iudg of that need . pag. . cap. . part . . . the liberty of a subject lieth only in those things , which in regulating their actions , the soveraign hath pretermitted , such as is the liberty to buy and sell , and otherwise to contract with one another ; to chuse their own abode , their own diet , their own trade of life , and institute their children as they themselves think fit , and the like . pag. . cap. . par . . . nothing the soveraign can do to a subject , on what pretence soever , can properly be called injustice or injury . pag. . . when a soveraign prince putteth to death an innocent subject , tho the action be against the law of nature , as being contrary to equity , yet it is not an injury to the subject , but to god. pag. . . no man hath liberty to resist the word of the soveraign ; but in case a great many men together , have already resisted the soveraign power unjustly , or committed some capital crime , for which every one of them expecteth death , they have liberty to join together , and to assist and defend one another . pag. . . if a soveraign demand , or take any thing by pretence of his power , there lieth in that case no action at law. pag. . . if a subject be taken prisoner in war , or his person , or his means of life be within the guards of the enemy , and hath his life and corporal liberty given him , on condition to be subject to the victor , he hath liberty to accept the condition , and having accepted it , is the subject of him that took him . pag. . . if the soveraign banish the subject , during the banishment he is no subject . pag. . . the obligation of subjects to the soveraign , is as long , and no longer then the power lasteth , by which he is able to protect them . pag. . . whatever promises or covenants the soveraign makes , are void . pag. . . he whose private interest is to be judged in an assembly , may make as many friends as he can ; and tho he hires such friends with mony , yet it is not injustice . pag. . cap. . part . . . the propriety which a subject hath in his lands , consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them , and not to exclude their soveraign . pag. . cap. . part . . . when the soveraign commandeth a man to do that which is against law , the doing of it is totally excus'd ; when the soveraign commandeth any thing to be don against law , the command as to that particular fact is an abrogation of the law. pag. . cap. . part . . . tho the right of a soveraign monarch cannot be extinguish'd by the act of another , yet the obligation of the members may ; for he that wants protection , may seek it any where ; and when he hath it , is oblig'd ( without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himself out of fear ) to protect his protector as long as he is able . pag. . cap. . part . . if upon the short reflexions we have made upon these several doctrines , as they lie scattered over his book , and involv'd in other discourses , which with the novelty administers some pleasure to the unwary reader , the contagion thereof be not enough discover'd , and the ill consequence and ruine that must attend kings and princes who affect such a government , as well as the misery insupportable to subjects who are compelled to submit to it ; it may be , the view of the naked propositions by themselves , without any other clothing or disguise of words , may better serve to make them oqious to king and people ; and that the first will easily discern , to how high a pinnacle of power soever he would carry him , he leaves him upon such a precipice , from whence the least blast of invasion from a neighbor , or from rebellion by his subjects , may throw him headlong to irrecoverable ruine : and the other will as much abhor an allegiance of that temper , that by any misfortune of their prince they may be absolv'd from , and cease to be subjects , when their soveraign hath most need of their obedience . and surely if these articles of mr. hobbes's creed be the product of right reason , and the effects of christian obligations , the great turk may be look'd upon as the best philosopher , and all his subjects as the best christians . the third part. the survey of chapters , , . as we had no reason to expect a rational discourse of civil government and policy , when the opinion and judgment of all lawyers were excluded , and all establish'd laws contradicted , so we may well look for a worse of christian politics , when the advice of all divines is positively protested against , and new notions of divinity introduc'd , as rules to restrain our conceptions , and to regulate our understandings . and as he hath not deceiv'd us in the former , he will as little disappoint us in the latter . but having taken a brief survey of the dangerous opinions , and determinations in mr. hobbes his two first parts of his leviathan , concerning the constitution , nature , and right of soveraigns , and concerning the duty of subjects , which he confesses contains doctrine very different from the practice of the greatest part of the world , and therefore ought to be watched with the more jealousy for the novelty of it ; i shall not now accompany him through his remaining two parts in the same method , by taking a view of his presumtion in the interpretation of several places of scripture , and making very unnatural deductions from thence to the lessening the dignity of scripture , and to the reproch of the highest actions don by the greatest persons by the immediate command of god himself . for if those marks , and conditions which he makes necessary to a true prophet , and without which he ought not to be believed , were necessary , moses was no true prophet , nor had the children of israel any reason to believe , and follow him , when he would carry them out of egypt ; for he concludes from the thirteenth chapter of deu●eronomy , and the five first verses thereof , ( pag. . ) that god will not have miracles alone serve for argument to prove the prophets calling ; for the works of the egyptian sorcerers , tho not so great as those of moses , yet were great miracles ; and that how great soever the miracles are , yet if the intent be to stir up revolt against the king , or him that governeth by the kings autority , he that doth such miracles is not to be consider'd otherwise , then as sent to make trial of their allegiance , for he saies , those words in the text revolt from the lord your god , are in this place equivalent to revolt from the king ; for they had made god their king by pact at the foot of mount sina● : whereas moses had no other credit with the people , but by the miracles which he wrought in their presence , and in their sight ; and that which he did perswade them to , was to revolt and withdraw themselves from the obedience of pharaoh , who was , during their abode in egypt , the only king they knew and acknowledged . so that in mr. hobbes's judgment the people might very well have refused to believe him ; and all those prophets afterwards who prophesied against several of the kings , ought to have bin put to death ; and the argumentation against the prophet ieremy was very well founded , when the princes said unto the king , ier. . . we beseech thee let this man be put to death , for thus he weakeneth the hands of the men of war , when he declar'd that the city should surely be given into the hands of the king of babylon . but mr. hobbes is much concern'd to weaken the credit of prophets , and of all who succeed in their places ; and he makes great use of that prophets being deceiv'd by the old prophet in the first of kings , when he was seduced to eat and drink with him . whereas he might have known , that that prophet was not so much deceiv'd by an other , as by his own willfulness , in closing with the temtation of refreshing himself by eating and drinking ; chusing rather to believe any man of what quality soever , against the express command that he had received from god himself . what his design was to make so unnecessary an enquiry into the authors of the several parts of scripture , and the time when they were written , and his more unnecessary inference , that moses was not the author of the five books which the christian world generally believe to be written by him , tho the time of his death might be added afterwards very warrantably , and the like presumtion upon the other books , he best knows ; but he cannot wonder that many men , who observe the novelty and positiveness of his assertions , do suspect , that he found it necessary to his purpose , first to lessen the reverence that was accustom'd to be paid to the scriptures themselves , and the autority thereof , before he could hope to have his interpretation of them hearken'd unto , and received ; and in order to that , to allow them no other autority , but what they receive from the declaration of the king ; so that in every kingdom there may be several , and contrary books of scripture ; which their subjects must not look upon as scripture , but as the soveraign power declares it to be so ; which is to shake or rather overthrow all the reverence and submission which we pay unto it , as the undoubted word of god , and to put it in the same scale with the alcoran , which hath as much autority by the stamp which the grand signior puts upon it in all his dominion ; and all the differences and controversies , which have grown between the several sects of mahometans , which are no fewer in number , nor prosecuted with less animosity between them , then the disputes between christians in matter of religion , have all proceeded from the several glosses upon , and readings of the alcoran , which are prescribed or tolerated by the several princes in their respective dominions , they all paying the same submission and reverence to mahomet , but differing much in what he hath said and directed ; and by this means the grand signior , and the persian , and the petty princes under them , have run into those schisms , which have given christianity much ease and quiet . this is a degree of impiety mr. hobbes was not arrived at when he first published his book de cive , where tho he allowed his soveraign power to give what religion it thought fit to its subjects , he thought it necessary to provide it should be christia●● which was a caution too modest for his leviathan . nor can it be preserved , when the scriptures , from whence christianity can only be prov'd and taught to the people , are to depend only for the validity 〈◊〉 , upon the will , understanding , and autority of the prince , which ( with all possible submission , reverence , and resignation to that earthly power , and which i do with all my heart acknowledg to be instituted by god himself , for the good of mankind ) hath much greater dignity in it self , and more reverence due to it , then it can receive from the united testimony and declaration of all the kings and princes of the world. with this bold prologue of the uncertain canon of scripture , he takes upon him as the foundation of his true ratiocination ( pag. . ) to determine out of the bible the meaning of such words , as by their ambiguity may ( he saies ) render what he is to infer upon them obscure and disputable . and with this licence he presumes to give such unnatural explanations , descriptions , and definitions to several words and terms , which in themselves have no difficulty , as disturbs the whole analogy of scripture , and exposes those expressions , which are dictated by the spirit of god , in his light and comical interpretations , to the mirth of those who are too much inclin'd to be merry with the scripture , and to the scandal of all men who are piously affected , and look upon the sacred writings with that devotion that becomes them . and upon these foundations , with much more confidence then any of the primitive fathers of the church assum'd to themselves , he proceeds to the interpretation of several texts of scripture , in a diferent sense from what those fathers , and all other men but himself , have understood them to signify . i shall not therefore , as i said , wait upon him in the particular survey of his glosses upon , and interpretations of the several texts of scripture , with which he is bold , not only for my own incompetency in those high mysteries , but because i am not sure that it is a work fit for the most accomplish'd person in the knowledg of tongues , and the most difficult points of divinity , to undertake , and to argue and contend with him upon , and to answer his vain and light conceptions ; lest the sobriety and gravity of scripture be too much exposed to the critical licence of grammarians , or the greater licentiousness of petulant and profane persons , who chuse the scripture for both the matter , and the language for the argument of their common and loosest discourses ; which exorbitancy is much propagated since the publication of mr. hobbes his writings . and therefore it may be fitter for a general disapprobation and discountenance by the soveraign power , or ecclesiastical autority , as a discourse which introduces a corruption of manners in the minds of men , and exposes religion to the irreverent examination of dissolute persons , and prostitutes the sacred mysteries of our faith , the incarnation of our blessed lord and saviour , the trinity , the sacraments , the precious pledges of our salvation , to a philosophical and mathematical inquisition ; and under the notion of translating proper and significant words and terms , in the understanding whereof all learned men have agreed , into vulgar and common language , which no terms of any art ever admitted , hath in truth traduced the whole scheme of christianity into burlesque , and rais'd conceptions of it , very much inferiour to the sublime importance of that profession which must carry us to heaven . it will hardly be believed that mr. hobbes intended to advance the estimation and resignation that is due from mankind to the everlasting word of god , when he took such impertinent pains to enquire ( cha. . ) and examine , what the word of god is , and to exercise his fancy in many inferences , deductions , and distinctions upon several texts of scripture , where that expression ( the word of god ) is used , and in the understanding whereof there was never before any difficulty conceiv'd to be . and there could no benefit accrue to the people , by communicating a criticism to them , whereby they must believe ( pag. . ) that god spake these words and said , are less gods words then i am the lord thy god , as if the last could have a due efficacy and regard , if they all are not understood to be spoken by him . in which kind of unnecessary learning and curiosity he seems to recreate himself upon all the texts of scripture , which he thinks fit to apply to his use , and in which he takes much pains to mend many expressions in scripture , for the impropriety of speech , without accusing the translation ; as these words of eliah to god , kings . . i have don all these thy words , which he saies are instead of ( which , i suppose he means , would be better ) ( pag. . ) i have don all these things at thy word , and the like upon many other sayings of the prophets . since after all his learned examination , and careful ratiocination , and too light a mention of the several parts of scripture , and the authors thereof , he is at last compell'd to confess , that ( p. . ) he sees not any reason to doubt , but that the old and new testament , as we have them now , are the true registers of those things which were don and said by the prophets and apostles ; ( p. . ) and that it is believ'd on all hands , that the first , and original author of them is god ; it is to be wish'd that he had chosen rather to have acquiesc'd under the modest and prudent resolution of his third paragraph of this chapter , that when any thing is written in the scripture too hard for our examination , we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words , and not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic of such mysteries as are not comprehensible , nor fall under any rule of natural science ; because he saies very well , ( p. . ) that it is with the mysteries of our religion , as with wholsome pills for the sick , which swallowed whole have the virtue to cure , but ●hewed , are for the most part cast up again without effect : i say , it is great pitty that he had not rather rested under that sober consideration , then embark'd himself , in the two next chapters , in a sea of new and extravagant interpretations of several texts of scripture , without any other autority then of his own ungovern'd fancy , which can only amuse men with the novelty into impertinent enquiries , or dispose them to believe , that he hath not that reverence to the scripture , or adoration of the author of it , that would become him to have . the survey of chapters , . when he had exercis'd his unruly fancy and imagination , upon making it as doubtful what is scripture , and the sense and meaning thereof as difficult , as he was able to do , he proceeds in the two next chapters ( the thirty fifth and thirty sixth ) to the examination of the true signification of many words , terms , and expressions us'd in all theological discourses , what the meaning of kingdom of god , of holy , and sacred , of the word of god , and of prophets is , upon the interpretation of which there hath never yet bin any doubt made , or controversy amongst christians . and after the whole foundation of christian religion is laid upon the word of god , and so often mention throughout the scripture ▪ of several particular words spoken by god , and with such declaratory circumstances , that he is said to have spoken face to face , and as a man speaks to his friend , as he did to moses , mr. hobbes takes great pains to make it believ'd , that he never spake at all , and then we can have none of his words ; in which , whatever other intention he hath , he declines his own rule , which he had prescrib'd in the foregoing chapters , to captivate his understanding to the words , and not to labour in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic of such mysteries as are not comprehensible , nor fall under any rules of natural science . nor is it probable that he had a purpose to raise more veneration towards the holy prophets recorded in the sacred story , when he took such pains to examine the etymology of their title and appellation , which he saies , ( pag . ) sometimes signifies a foreteller of things to come , and sometimes one that speaketh incoherently , as men that are distracted , and thence goes to their commission , and qualification , how they came to know the will and pleasure of god. and when he hath brought their title as low as he thinks fit , and their qualifications as mean , he is contented that the name of a prophet ( pag. . ) may be given not improperly to them , that in christian churches have a calling to say public praiers for the congregation . but that they may not be too much exalted with the vocation , he allows prophecy to signify that which women may do in the church : and at last is content that the heathen poets shall likewise be called prophets : all which he concludes from several texts of scripture , which he chuses to make use of . what man of a sincere and pious heart , could in order to contradict the literal sense of that expression and argument of the prophet david , and which may well be understood literally , shall he that made the eie , not see ? and he that made the ear , not hear ? controul it by such an instance as would be little less then blasphemy to repete ? and to which i shall only apply a sage saying of his own ( pag. . ) that an anatomist , or a physician may speak or write his judgment of unclean things , because it is not to please but profit ; but for another man to write his extravagant and pleasant fancies of the same , is , as if a man from being tumbled in the dirt , should come and present himself before good company ; an animadversion he will do well to remember upon many occasions wherein he transgresses it . what his design was by torturing so many texts of scripture , to make it believ'd , that the extraordinary prophets in the old testament took no other notice of the word of god , nor had any other knowledg of it then from apparitions , and dreams , that is to say , ( pag. . ) from the imagination which they had in their sleep or in an extasy , may well be suspected , when he contributes so little to advance the reverence that is due to gods word , or the honour that is due to the memory of those saints , the prophets ; neither the one , or the other being in any degree improved , to say no worse of it , by the whole discourse of that his first chapter : in which he thinks he hath said enough to perswade his disciples , from so many texts of scripture , and his commentaries upon them , that the soveraign power is the soveraign prophet , who hath under god the autority to govern the people , and that they are bound to observe for a rule ( pag. . ) that doctrine which he hath commanded to be taught , and thereby to examine , and try the truths of those doctrines which pretended prophets with miracle , or without , shall at any time advance . and it is the more observable , that he gave this soveraign power to cromwell , and annex'd to it this soveraign prophesy , that he might establish his throne for ever . nor could he have in all this any intention so opposite to his purposes , as when he had subjected all laws to his sword without any violation of justice , to subdue the gospel too , to the same arbitriment , that he might reform the one , as he had don the other . and the rather , because , tho the law was quiet , whilst his soveraign power proceeded according to his own institution without any controul , yet the gospel was troublesome to him by the noise of his own clergy , who had interpreted the scripture according to his own spirit , and purposes , whilst the contest was with the king ; but now found that all his own designs , and assuming the soveraignty himself , was expresly against the word of god : and they found so much credit with the people , that they had so long deluded , that he foresaw a storm coming against him that he could hardly ride out . and therefore mr. hobbes brought him a very seasonable relief , in making a doubt , when novelties were so much in request , and the minds of the people so well prepar'd to hearken to what they had never before heard of , whether there were any such thing as the word of god , at least that that was not it which they took to be so ; and that if the ten commandments were agreeable to his sense , yet that they were not words spoken by him : and then in bringing the autority , and qualifications of the prophets themselves so low , that there was room enough left to doubt , whether they were alwaies in the right . from whence he might easily expose his enemies , who succeed them in the office of informing and instructing them in the laws , and good pleasures of god , as men without a lawful mission , and autority to pronounce those things they do . and upon those weighty reasons , he takes upon him to advise the people , to be very circumspective , ( pag. . ) and wary in obeying the voice of man , that pretending himself to be a prophet requires us to obey god in that way , which he in gods name tells us is the way to happiness , for he in that pretends to govern them , that is to say , to rule , and reign over them , which is a thing that all men naturally desire , and is therefore worthy to be suspected of ambition , and imposture , and consequently ought to be examin'd , and tried by every man , before he yields them obedience . and having thus deprav'd the rule , the word of god , by which they were to walk , and vilified the preachers , who are to instruct them how they may observe that rule , he hath enough amuz'd them , to refer them for a complete and perfect information , and satisfaction to his soveraign power , who is his soveraign prophet , that is cromwell himself , to be told by him what they are to believe , and what they are to do , and to conform themselves thereunto , and , in his absence , to what they shall be directed by those who are autoriz'd by him to inform them , it being reasonably to be presum'd , that they are ( p. . ) men , to whom god hath given a part of the spirit of their soveraign . i wish with all my heart that it were within my comprehension , how mr. hobbes can be absolv'd from this naughty and impious discourse , since he could not hope thereby to render himself gracious to any other soveraign upon earth ; since they all detest the power he would invest them with , as a means to extirpate christian religion out of their dominions , which depends solely upon the universal veneration to the scripture ; upon which , if secular , and politic interests did not fan a small fire ( that would easily be extinguish'd ) into a flame , there are not in sixteen hundred years , many such differences grown in the interpretation thereof , as must exclude any pious believer from heaven , if in his life he carefully observes those precepts , in the understanding whereof every man of all parties agrees . nor hath he therein gratified the pope himself , who is willing to embrace all encroachments by which he may be a gainer , and uses his faculty of interpreting , to purposes monstrous enough , yet he pretends not to make what he pleases canonical scripture . if the clergy , whose learning is approved , and whose manners are blameless , are not fit to instruct the people , whither shall they repair for information ? there may be some ignorant men amongst them , who themselves need to be instructed ; and yet there is a classis of men , who may learn much even from them , if they are honest men . and there may be some seditious amongst them , who maliciously pervert the scripture , and corrupt those who should be taught by them : but as there are laws very strict for the punishment of such , so none are more glad to see those punishments inflicted , or forwarded to promote it , then the venerable part of their own order , whose known abilities ought not to be prejudic'd , nor their integrity suspected for the infamy of the other . god was never well serv'd , nor the king religiously obeied , when , and where the clergy was despis'd , or undervalued . mr. hobbes is so much delighted with his institution by covenant , that he will not suffer god himself to have a dominion over the children of israel ( pag. . ) but under an institution by pact , which he saies , is an addition to his ordinary title to all nations . indeed that their obligations to his divine majesty were increased by his communication of himself , and his gracious promises to them above other nations , is very true : but that he should thereby have a greater dominion over them then he had over the whole earth besides , is not easy to be understood ; tho he makes that assumtion the ground-work of the greatest part of his discourse and ratiocination , contain'd throughout this his third part . only whereas the security of his soveraign consists only in the covenants between the people to one another , without any obligation from the soveraign to them ; this soveraignty which he hath provided for god almighty , is more perfect , and depends upon the covenant which god himself first entred into ; and then the contract entred into on their part , like the sealing the counter-part , which he draws up as formally between them , as he did the transferring and assigning each others right in the former establishment : and all this transaction he makes good by the express words of scripture . no man can now blame him for wishing for such a soveraign , who would take the bible from every other body , and put it into his hand , with a commission to interpret it . but till he had gotten that delegation , he should have forborn making such a story out of the of genesis , . . ( pag. . ) of a covenant on gods part , and i know not what contract and promise on abrahams part , that must constitute a neerer relation , and give god a greater power over them then he had before ; whereas there was nothing like a promise from god to abraham of the land of canaan for an everlasting possession , in the of genesis , which he had not made to him many years before . he might have found the original promise in the chapter , when god commanded him to go out of his country , and from his kindred , and then premis'd to make of him a great nation , to bless them that blessed him , and to curse them that cursed him , and ( which was greater then all the rest ) that in him should all the families of the earth be blessed . abraham makes no reply , but upon the command left his country , and departed from haran , when he was seventy five years old , and took his journy towards the land of canaan , and passed through the land unto the place of sichem , unto the plain of moreh ; and the canaanite was then in the land. which expression so natural to the relation , and history , he thinks ground enough for him to deny that moses was author of the book of genesis , because that expression ( he saies , ) ( pag. . ) must be the words of one that wrote when the canaanite was not in the land ; which is an inference without shadow of reason . when he was in the land of canaan god appear'd to him again , and said , vnto thy seed will i give this land. and he was then by a famine driven into egypt : and so much time passed , that when he return'd towards bethel from whence he went into egypt , his riches were so much increased , that lot and he were compelled to part , that they might have more room to live in . and then god appear'd again to abraham , and said , lift up thine eies , and look from the place where thou art , &c. for all the land which thou seest , to thee will i give it , and to thy seed for ever , when he had yet no seed . after his sacrifice he appear'd to him again , and it is said made a covenant with abraham , saying no more upon the matter then he had promis'd before , only describing the extent of the land that he would give to his seed , from the river of egypt , to the great river , the river euphrates . what did god promise more to abraham , and what farther covenant was entred into between them , in this . chap. when mr. hobbes dates the covenant , when abraham was ninety nine years old , then he had don four and twenty years before , and what did abraham do more then he had don before , towards any contract on his part ? it is true that god enjoined him , that every man-child amongst them should be circumcis'd , which is his ( pag. . ) old covenant . and it is true , abraham , and his seed did so punctually observe that injunction , that the omission thereof was never imputed to them , and so could not be the cause of any of the calamities they sustain'd afterwards for four hundred years in egypt , or after their deliverance , when their miseries at worst little exceeded , what they may be thought to have suffer'd there . where he found that dialogue between god and abraham that makes the covenant mutual , other men know not . there is no inconvenience , nor would it be incongruous to suppose , that abraham upon such an immense benefit , and honour promised to him by god , and so often repeted to him , did make some humble acknowledgment , and promise of duty , and obedience on his part . and it appears he did whatsoever he was commanded , and assoon as he was commanded : he left his country , to live amongst strangers ; enjoin'd circumcision , and observ'd all that he was commanded , to obtain a great reward that his posterity was to receive five hundred years after : but for any man to digest this obedience into a style and method of words , to no other end , but to establish a new extravagant fancy of his own , and that he may thereby create a peculiar kingdom for god , more then his illimited power over the universe had intitled him to , and put a new interpretation upon the kingdom of god , so often us'd in scripture , as if thereby is properly , and only meant the commonwealth of the iews ( pag. ) instituted by the consent of those who were to be subject thereunto for their civil government , and regulating their behaviour towards god their king , whom they rejected and depos'd when they demanded a king from samuel ; and to confirm this by so many glosses upon several texts of scripture , is worthy only of the confidence of the author of the leviathan . but he will make all this good when he comes to mount sinai , where , he saies , this covenant was renewed . there indeed , after all their murmurings for bread , and for flesh , and for water , that they might not imagine that all the promises which god had made to their fore-fathers , gave them a title to the continuance of their protection and blessing , in spight of all their back-sliding and rebellion , and as a preface to his ten commandments , and the law which he then publish'd to them , god commanded moses to put them in mind of the great deliverances he had wrought for them , & to tell them , that if they would obey his voice indeed , and keep his covenant , then they should be a peculiar treasure unto him above all people , and they should be unto him a kingdom of priests , an holy nation ; the natural signification whereof , according to all interpreters , is , that he would in a more peculiar maner make himself known to them , by giving them laws whereby they might know how to please him , and assigning them a priesthood , to offer such sacrifices for them to him , as would be acceptable . and their answering together , all that the lord hath spoken we will do , and what they said afterwards to moses in the fright and consternation they were in upon the thunder and lightning from the mount , speak thou to us and we will hear , but let not god speak with us least we die , contained no more upon the matter , then the same professions which they had often made before upon their recollection after their several loud transgression . god was not from that time more gracious to them , or reckoned them more his own chosen people , then before , when he fed them with manna and quailes , nor did they think that they had entred into a new and stricter obligation to him : as appears by their making the golden calf , and worshipping it so soon after , even before god had finish'd his speaking to them . so that the contract on their behalf , whereby god himself was more their king then he had bin formerly , or they more the kingdom of god then they were before , is drawn up only by mr. hobbes above three thousand years after the transaction . the survey of chapter . i should make no reflexion upon the thirty seventh chapter of miracles , and their use ( tho it may be some men may imagine , that he hath a mind to lessen the faith of the greatest miracles which have bin wrought ) if , to express the humility of his resignation to his soveraign , he did not make him the sole judg of all miracles which shall be wrought within his dominions : and in this extasie of his allegiance , in spight of all the demonstrations he hath made in his kingdom of darkness , the fourth part of his instit●tes , of the absurdity , contradiction , and impossibility in the roman doctrine of the sacrament , he very frankly bestows upon the king the sole power of determining the point of transubstantiation ; which if he concludes in the affirmative , no subject must presume to contradict it . by which he hath made the pope , and the roman church amends for the many merry reproches he hath cast upon them , in allowing it to be good divinity in all those dominions where the soveraign is popish , and of which no private reason or conscience , but the public reason , the reason of the king is judg. and tho he preserves to himself , and other private men , the prerogative of believing or not believing in his heart , because thought is free , yet that must not be discover'd , because he makes it the obligation of subjects , not only to do , but to say all that their soveraign commands them to say or do ; by which he introduces such a licence of dissimulation and hypocrisie , as is odious in the civil actions of our life , but most detestable in the eies and judgment of god and man , in all acts which concern religion , and the worship of his divine majesty . and it is very reasonably to be doubted , that this loose determination in matters of faith , by a man who is thought to have digged very deep in all the mines of natural reason , hath contributed very much to that uncontroulable spirit , which by the extravagance of fancy , invention and imagination , hath made such confusion both in the speculation and practice of religion in this distracted kingdom ; and by his making that which god hath manifestly commanded , liable to be controul'd , or to receive autority from the pleasure of the king , that both god and the king are less reverenced , and their precepts less regarded , then they have us'd to be in this nation . that he may the better draw himself out of those intricacies into which he is involved by this unnecessary discourse of miracles , he resorts to his soveraign power in his definitions ; and tho he had before confess'd , ( pag. . ) that the works of the egyptian sorcerers , tho no● so great as those of moses , were yet great miracles ; now he defines a miracle , ( pag. . ) to be the work of god ( besides his operation by the way of nature ordain'd in the creation ) don for the making manifest to his elect , the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation : which definition of his own , and his own alone , is all his proof he makes ( pag. . ) that the devil , or an angel , or other created spiri● , cannot do a miracle : which as the soveraign of logic too , he makes good by as strange an argument : it must be by virtue of some natural science , or by incantation ; if it be by their own power independent , there is some power that proceedeth not from god , which all men deny . and if they do it by power given them , then is the work not from the immediate hand of god , but natural , and consequently no miracle , which is agreeable to his definition . but if it be by the permission of god , why is it natural , and therefore no miracle ? hath not god frequently permitted the devil to do miracles ? and if his providence did not restrain him , he would work miracles enough to do more mischief . and if the devil turn'd himself into the serpent , or taught the serpent so to speak like an orator , for the seduction and cozenage of poor eve , neither was natural , and cannot be look'd upon as less then a miracle ; which hath furnish'd a modern fanciful divine with an excuse for eves being deluded , that not imagining a serpent could speak , and having never heard of the devil , she concluded it to be an angel , whom she knew god had created . and now he finds , contrary to his former confession , ( pag. . ) that the magicians of egypt were impostors , and did no great matter , for that when the rod seem'd a serpent , or the waters blood , because it was not to the edification of gods people , which his definition requires , nor the rod , nor the water was enchanted , but the spectator : so that the miracle consisted only in this , that the enchanter had deceiv'd a man , which is no miracle . and so pharaoh , and his whole court , who were the spectators , and are thought to have understood as much of natural causes , as any who have succeeded them , and from that excess of understanding , believ'd god the less , as they still do who look too much into natural causes , and those learned egyptians must be all deluded and cheated by the deception of their o●n eies . methinks the text cited by himself , if a prophet rise among you , &c. and shall pretend ●he d●ing of a miracle , and the miracle come to pass , thou shalt not hearken unto him , &c. deut. . is a sufficient evidence , that such miracles may be don , contrary to mr. hobbes's assertion . nor is it easie to imagin how he will answer or avoid that text , for they are the spirits of devils , working miracles , &c. revel . . . which shall suffice for answer to his magisterial definition of miracles , and argumentation thereupon . mr. hobbes had don well to have communicated the reason or autority , if he hath any besides his own definition , that induced him to determine , ( pag. ) that the end of all the mir●cles of moses , of the prophets , of our saviour , and of his apost●es , was to ad● men to the church , not all me● , b●t s●ch as should be sa●ed , that is to say , such as god had elected and upon that assumtion he takes upon him to declare , that t●● reason why our saviour could not , or would not work any miracles in his own country , was ( pag ) because our saviour being sent from his fa●he● , he could n●t use his p●wer in the conversion of those whom his father h●d rejected ; which is a new doctrine , and besides the barb●r●ty of it , is irrational to think , that all the people of nazareth , where our saviour had vouchsafed to live , and conver●e above thirty years of his life , should be reprobated by god to everlasting damnation . besides that his greek criticism , which he dislikes , that puts , he would not , for , he could not , it is evident enough that our saviour did work miracles even there , for he laid his hands upon sick folks , and healed them , mark . . which was amongst his greatest miracles ; and it may very probably be believ'd , that some of his disciples , if not of his very apostles , were of his own country . surely the making it incapable of receiving any benefit by the ransom he paid , seems to be against the literal and declar'd end of his sufferings , and the promise of his father . the survey of chapter . when the wisdom of god himself hath erected two pillars for the support of religion , and the propagation thereof , and to defend it from being invaded by profaneness and atheism , the one of heaven , for the reward of those who serve him with devotion and integrity ; and the other of hell , for the punishment and terror of those who neglect his commands , and contemn his menaces : and when all the prophets in the old , and the evangelists and apostles in the new testament , have even contended to make the joies of the one as great and everlasting , and the pains of the other as insupportable and eternal , as their sacred faculties could enable them to do , that men might be allured to chuse that which is so pleasant , and to tremble at that which is so terrible : and that most of the fathers of the church , and all the doctors and preachers of christianity ( of how different opinions soever in other points of faith ) have still prosecuted the same method , as the best argument to dispose men to virtue , and the love of god , and to restrain them from vice , as the way that leads to the devil : it may appear very wonderful , and no less scandalous to dis-passioned men , that after sixteen hundred years mr. hobbes should arise a new evangelist , to make the joies of heaven more indifferent , and the pains of hell less formidable , then ever any christian hath before attemted to do , by impertinent inquiries where the place of either of them is to be , as if he would be well content that they should be no where , and to determine by philosophical mediums , that there can be no eternity of pain in the one , how lasting soever the joies may be in the other . i do not complain of his bringing down heaven to the earth , nor his raising and placing hell upon the same level , in which some learned men seem not to differ much from him , tho it seems to me to be contradicted by the very words and expression of the creation . for if god divided the waters that were above the firmament , from the waters that were under the firmament , and the waters under the firmament became dry land , and was earth , and the firmament was called heaven , gen. . it is not conceivable , that the heaven and the earth can be upon one and the same level . which seems likewise to be oppos'd by that text , but those that seek my soul to destroy it , shall go into the lower parts of the earth , psal. . . which implies somwhat that is deeper then the grave , and at least , that hell is either under the earth , or that it cannot be understood that it is upon the same level with heaven , if it could descend to keep court upon the earth ; which yet methinks receiv'd a greater confirmation by st. paul , now that he ascended , what is it , but that he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth ? eph. . . let the place be where it will , we know gods habitation and residence in the one , must make it as glorious as any body hath conceiv'd it to be ; and his absence , and hot displeasure , must make the other as painful . nor am i concern'd in his assigning christs reign to be upon the earth ; which as it was an opinion that had many partizans in the first ages of christianity , so it seems to get much ground in the minds of many learned men in the present ; tho he makes his reign longer upon earth then ever the millenarians imagin'd it to be , and indeed confines him to it for ever . but that mr. hobbes should perswade men to believe , ( pag. . ) that the kingdom of heaven is nothing else , but the kingdom of the king that dwelleth in heaven , by which he is himself already as much in heaven as he desires to be ; and ( pag. . ) that all that is said in the scripture concerning hell-fire , is spoken metaphorically , and that a proper sense should be enquired after ( since all metaphors may be expressed in proper words ) both of the place of hell , and the nature of the torments and tormentors , methinks it should be thought a matter of that consequence , as is more fit to be confuted by censure and chastisement , then by refelling the arguments of his presumtion . in the mean time , as he professes to find nothing in scripture that makes it apparent to him , that the soul is immortal , and a living creature independent upon the body ; so he seems much pleased with the mortality of the whole human nature , which iob complains of , there is hope of a tree , but man dieth , and wasteth away , yea man giveth up the ghost , and where is he ? man lieth down , and rise●h not till the heavens be no more . job . . , . from whence he seems to conclude ( if his very wo●ds do not make it plain ) that the soul as well as the bod● is buried in the grave , at least till the resurrection . this monstrous liberty and license in forming a new faith for himself , without any soveraign advice or approbation , a faith never before own'd or avowed by any christian , may make men wonder why he is so severe against atheists , whom he will not allow ( pag. . ) to be subjects in the kingdom of god ; nor they that believe not that god hath any care of the actions of man kind , because they acknowledg no word for his , nor have hope of his rewards , or fear of his threatning . they ( he saies ) that believe there is a god that governs the world , and hath given precepts , and propounded rewards and punishments to man-kind , are gods subjects ; all the rest are to be understood as enemies : whereas in truth , there is very little difference between a man that understands no precepts of his , and him who believes those to be his precepts or his permissions , which are contrary to his commandments ; or between those who have no hope of his reward , or fear of his threatnings , and those who believe , and perswade others to believe , that the rewards which he hath propounded are of much less value then they are esteemed to be , and the punishment which he threatens , to be less terrible , and of shorter duration then they are understood ; and take upon them to suspend the inflicting of any punishment at all upon the greatest sinner until the end of the world , by the mortality of the soul , equal to that of the body , and so to undergo no farther trouble till they are again united in the resurrection ; and even then not to be in so ill a condition , as most men apprehend , which is a consolation wicked men stand not in need of , and which no christian casuist , before mr. hobbes , ever presum'd to administer . and he may find , for the support of his atheists , who should not be so churlishly abandon'd by him , as many pregnant arguments against christianity , and as rationally pressed , and as many texts of scripture , as well of the new as the old testament , as appositely urg'd to maintain their doctrine , as any which are made use of by him for the propagation of his opinions little less dangerous . he is the first man ( since virgil accompanied aeneas thither ) that hath taken pains so accuratly to rescue and vindicate hell from the prejudice that men might have to it , from some expressions they find in scripture relating to it ; which he endeavors , by his interpretations , to make not altogether so severe as they are generally understood to be . and least any apprehension of the bottomless pit should too much amuse men , he do's assure them , from his art in which he would be thought to excel , ( pag. . ) that in the globe of the earth , which is not only finite , but also ( compar'd to the heighth of the stars ) of no considerable magnitude , a pit without a bottom , that is , a hole of infinite depth , is a thing the proportion of earth to heaven cannot bear : which perfection of science enabled him to discover , that if adam had not eaten of the apple , he had bin immortal ; and had he never died ( of which he makes not the least question ) he should not then continually have procreated his kind , ( pag. . ) for if immortals should have generated as man-kind doth now , the earth in a small time would not have bin able to afford them place to stand on . besides , there being other places of scripture which he cites , to imply , that the place of hell is under water ; so , besides the comfort that is in the uncertainty , they need the less fear the bottomless pit ; and he doth at last free them from the waters too , and the company that makes the waters the more unpleasant . st. iohn thought he had terrified some classes of sinners to the purpose , when he declar'd , that they should have their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone . apoc. . . but for their comfort mr. hobbes assures them , ( pag. . ) that all that is but a metaphorical expression , and signifies not any certain kind or place of torment ; and gives them another text to raise their spirits , that death and hell were cast into the lake of fire , ( pag. . ) that is , he saies , abolish'd and destroied ; as if after the day of iudgment there shall be no more dying , nor no more going into hell , which must be very comfortable doctrine to those whom he had before secur'd till that time , by the not existence and nothingness of the soul after its dissolution from the body . so that he had don well , that there might some fear still have remain'd in them , to have told them , that it is the opinion of very learned men , that the day of judgment it self is to last one thousand years . that the darkness which st. matthew attributes to it , and which makes the most beautiful place the less pleasant , may not make them think hell a worse place then in truth it is , he tells them , that tho the translation hath rendered it into utter darkness , the original will not bear it , ( pag. . ) and do's not signifie how great , but where that darkness is to be , namely , without the habitation of gods elect . in the careful inquisitions which he makes into the torments of hell , and into the tormentors , he finds the devil hath wrong don him , by not having his names of satan , devil , and abaddon , translated into english , by which he conscientiously doubts , that men imagining them to be proper names of demons , may be seduc'd to believe the doctrine of devils , which was the religion of the gentiles ; whereas those hard words are not proper names , but appellations , which only set out the office and quality , as satan only signifies the enemy , devil accuser , abaddon the destroier . so that heaven being to be after the resurrection upon the earth ( which he saies he hath shew'd by scripture that it is like to be ) ( pag. . ) hell must likewise be upon the earth too ; and so by satan , is meant any earthly enemy of the church ; and that the torments of hell , which are express'd in scripture by weeping , and gnashing of teeth , by the worm of conscience , fire , where the worm dies not , and the fire is not quenched , and by shame and everlasting contemt , do but metaphorically signifie ( p. . ) a grief and discontent of mind , from the sight of the eternal felicity of others ; and that they are to suffer such bodily pains and calamities as are incident to those , who not only live under evil and cruel governors , but have also for enemy , god almighty . but as to the duration of the bodily pains , tho the scripture is clear for an universal resurrection , ( pag. . ) yet there is no promise to any reprobate of an eternal life , without which he can never undergo an eternal punishment . nor can a second death be ever applied to those that can die but once , he saies , ( pag. . ) tho the fire prepared for the wicked , is an everlasting fire , and the fire shall be unquenchable , and the torments everlasting ; it cannot therefore be inferr'd , that he who shall be cast into that fire , or be tormented with those torments , shall endure , and resist them so as to be eternally burn'd and tortur'd , and yet never be destroied nor d●e . and tho there be many places that affirm everlasting ●ire and torments ( into which men may be cast successively one after another for ever ) yet he finds none that affirms there shall be any eternal life therein , of any individual person ; but to the contrary , an everlasting death , which is the second death . and then he cites the text in the revelations , whereby he saies , ( pag. . ) it is evident , that there is to be a second death of every one that shall be condemn'd at the day of iudgment , after which he shall die no more . it cannot be denied , but that he hath taken extraordinary pains on the behalf of hell , and it may be presum'd , effectually , in making it believed , ( pag. . ) that the fire thereof is neither everlasting nor unquencheable ; and that the terribleness thereof hath proceeded chiefly from the hard words it hath bin describ'd by , valley of hinnon , ge●enna , tophet , which have puzled and perplex'd mens imaginations , for want of comprehension what those terms could imply , and which seem'd the more formidable in that they had not found , and so might be thought incapable of any translation ; and therefore he hath don them the favor to inform them of the worst that they can signifie , and above all , for their comfort , hath brought the place and situation of it to be upon the earth , which is so well known to them , that they need have no other apprehensions of it then they find reason for . and for the manifestation of that important truth , he doth not so much depend upon the texts of scripture which he hath cited to that purpose , as that , he saies , he hath already proved out of divers evident places of scripture , in his thirty fifth chapter ( pag. . ) that the kingdom of god is a civil common-wealth , where god himself is soveraign , by virtue first of the old , and since of the new covenant , which he saies doth sufficiently prove , that after the coming again of our saviour in his majesty and glory , to reign actually and eternally , the kingdom of god is to be on earth ; all which refers to that institution by pact , which by his covenant with abraham , and the renewing thereof afterwards by moses at mount sinai , invested god by their chusing him to be their king , with a more peculiar dominion then he had over any other nation , because it was by their own consent and covenant ; whi●h he saies , ( pag. . ) is an addition to his ordinary title to all nations : and that this continued , till by their demanding a king , when saul was given to them , they rejected god , that he should not reign over them . i must rely upon the readers memory , or his refl●xion , to judg whether what hath bin said in answer upon that chapter , and before , doth not weigh down the imagination both of the original and subsequent covenant and contract . and for their rejection of god almighty from being their king , upon the election of saul , besides gods own particu●ar choice of his successor , fill thine horn with oil , and go , i will send thee to jesse the bethlehemite , for i have provided me a king among his sons , sam. . . his grace , and favor , and concernment for th●t people , was equally eminent and notorious from that time , as it had bin from the time of abraham to that of saul ; nor were their rebellions and murmurings greater after , then they had bin before : and then those two imaginations of his having place only in his own brain , most of his discourse in this his third part falls to the ground with them , and is of no signification . when he hath made hell much more easie , at least in a pleasanter region , and the pains thereof less durable to all those who will chuse to go thither , he is as solicitous to undeceive men in the high estimate they have made of the joies of heaven , and tells them , ( pag. . ) that to be saved , which is salvation , is to be secur'd either respectively against special evils , or absolutely against all evil , comprehending want , sickness , and death it self . and least we should think that this salvation contains some wonderful delight , which we cannot comprehend , because we know not the scene upon which it shall be shew'd ; he is fully of opinion , ( pag. . ) that this salvation must be on earth : for by salvation is set forth unto as , a glorious reign of our king by conquest , not a safety by escape ; and therefore there where we look for salvation , we must look also for triumph ; and before triumph , for victory ; and before victory for battel , which cannot well be suppos'd to be in heaven . however , tho the reason seems very good to him , he is so modest that he will not trust to it , without very evident places of scripture ; and thereupon , how positive soever he is against the literal understanding such places in scripture , which seem to imply an ascending into heaven , and condemns them all to be metaphorical expressions ; now , that he may humble our salvation down to the earth , he will have all those places of the prophets which he chuses , to be understood literally ; by which he saies it is evident , ( pag. . ) that salvation shall be on earth , then when god shall reign ( at the coming again of christ ) in ierusalem , and from ierusalem shall proceed the salvation of the gentiles that shall be receiv'd into gods kingdom . and then , with equal confidence , he mentions other texts out of the new testament , which he saies are clear ( pag. . ) that salvation , and the kingdom of god ( after the day of iudgment ) must be upon earth : whereas he saies , he cannot find any text that can probably be drawn to prove any ascension of the saints into heaven , which he seems to think would be a presumtion , and that since gods own throne is in heaven , and the earth is but his foot-stool , it would not seem suitable to the dignity of so great a king , that his subjects should have any place as high as his throne , or higher then his foot-stool . and so making the last effort to lessen the value of our redemtion , by making a grammatical enquiry into the signification of the word , and low inferences thereupon , he concludes , ( pag. . ) that the joies of life eternal , comprehended all in scripture under the name of salvation , or being saved , is to be secur'd either respectively , against special evils , or absolutely against all evils , comprehending want , sickness , and death it self ; that is , when we are once in heaven we shall never want , nor be sick , nor die again , which is a very vile expression of the joies of life eternal . i will not deprive him of that testimony his rare modesty deserves , but acknowledg , ( pag. . ) that he doth declare , because his doctrine ( tho proved out of places of scripture , not few nor obscure ) will appear to most a novelty , he did but propound it , maintaining nothing in this , or any other paradox in religion , but attending the end of that dispute of the sword concerning the autority ( not yet amongst his country-men decided ) by which all sorts of doctrine are to be approv'd or rejected , and whose commands both in speech and writing ( whatsoever be the opinions of private men ) must by all men , that mean to be protected by the laws , be obeied . this was in the time when his fidelity and allegiance was by his own rule extinguished by choice , for he was not then in the enemies quarters , and no sword drawn but that in cromwells hand , and in theirs who were under his command ; so that it was his single approbation and determination , that he waited , for the promulgation of the doctrine which he had so well prov'd out of scripture , and to him he sent this blank , for the disposal of himself , body and soul , according to his good will and pleasure . but i know not how to excuse him since the kings return , and the resurrect●on of his loialty ( which is grown and improv'd to that height , that he will deny his saviour upon his command ) for not retracting and renouncing all those odious opinions , when he very well knows , that the church of which the king is soveraign , doth detest all those his doctrines , and not concur in his interpretation of any of his texts in scripture ; and his not doing that which in conscience he is oblig'd to do , is a shrewd evidence that he considers not , nor will be subject to any other soveraignty , then that of his own capricious brain , and haughty understanding . i have so much kindness for mr. hobbes , that i heartily wish he would himself , or that some of his disciples would for him , inform the world what good end he did , or could propose to himself in writing this his eight and thirtieth chapter ; or whether he could imagine that christianity , or any christian knowledg could be advanced by it . it seems to me to be the greatest charity he can expect , to be believed to be a man that believes nothing of the immortality of the soul , of the eternal life , hell , salvation , the world to come , and redemtion , which all other christians do believe , and believe all to be evident out of scripture . since it is a less fault not to believe them , how destructive soever , then to imagine that he takes all that pains , and uses all that raillery upon the scripture , to shew how liable the word of god it self is to be ill handled , and perversly interpreted by a great and bold wit. and truly , he hath not bin disappointed in the propagation of this desperate art , which hath enabled his most devoted proselytes to apply texts of scripture to all their profane , impious , and unclean purposes ; and which , probably before they leave this world , will give them a sad presage and prospect of the next ; the which can give them no reputation or credit , except with persons pro●●igate , and abandon'd to all kinds of vice and iniquity . plain it is , that he hath not endeavor'd to advance the practice of any one christian virtue , or to improve the exercise of any one moral duty , to the end that the lives of men may be more innocent , and thereby their hopes more reasonable of eternal life ; as if he were not willing to perswade men , by the strength of his master reason , to be better then they have a mind to be , or to dis-countenance the practice of those sins which unavoidably must carry them to hell , let the situation of it be where it will , ( pag. . ) as adultery , sodomy , and any vice that may be taken for an effect of power , or a cause of pleasure ; all which vices amongst men , he saies , are taken to be against law , rather then against honor : which since he hath discover'd , he might for those wretches sake , very naturally have interposed some powerful animadversions in this chapter of eternal life , hell , and salvation . the survey of chapter . i have charity enough to hope , that mr. hobbes may have no worse design in this thirty ninth chapter , then can be made manifest out of his words , which being plain , and yielding naturally a good interpretation , i will not endeavour to pervert them to a bad , but wish he had farther enlarged upon the subject , to shew with what absurdity the word church is applied to destroy religion , as if christ had instituted one , and but one church that should have autority to controul all the christians in the world. which is a fancy ( how successful soever ) so extravagant and senseless , so far from countenance from scripture , or antiquity , so in it self impossible , that nothing is more wonderful , then that so unreasonable a pretence should gain so much credit , as to impose upon so great a part of the world so long : and which , tho it was not brought in by , could never have bin brought in or grown but under that barbarous tyranny and inundation , which by the incursion of the gothes , and vandalls , and hunns , and lombards , who successively broke in from the north , cover'd so great a part of christendom for so many hundred years . and it cannot be denied , but that tho spiritual , and temporal are proper distinctions in the government , when the soveraign , who is equal soveraign over both , will apply them to several functions in the government , and to that exercise of different parts , yet indeed they have bin made use of in the world , ( pag. . ) to make men see double , and to mistake their lawful soveraign . and they are not sharp-sighted enough , who think their government securely established under that distinction , whil'st any subject professes to owe a spiritual , or any other kind of subjection or obedience to any foreign power and jurisdiction . i would have bin very glad , he would have enlarged upon both these subjects , so proper for his excellent way of reasoning ; and i cannot avoid saying , that it is great pitty that the most faultless chapter in the book , for ought is evident , should be the shortest . the survey of chapter . we are not bound to believe , and mr. hobbes would find it a hard task to prove , that all christian princes have the same power and autority over their subjects , that abraham had over his family , which we do not find to exceed the number of three hundred and eighteen men ; and that all subjects are bound to obey the dictates of their soveraigns with the same resignation and submission as the children of israel were oblig'd to submit to the commands of moses : however , it seems to have no logical consequence in it , that because god spake only to abraham , and not to his family , therefore his family was to receive gods commands only from him . yet mr. hobbes might have remembred that god did appear likewise to hagar , one of abrahams family , even after he had expos'd her to the unjust severity of his wife ; and communicated his pleasure to her , and inform'd her of many particulars which he imparted not to abraham ; however , i say , the instance of abraham is no argument , that all subjects , who have no supernatural revelation to the contrary ▪ ought to obey the orders of their own soveraigns in the external acts and profession of religion , except it were as evident that god hath spoken to those soveraigns , as it is confessed that he spake to abraham . and there was in those daies no other way for men to know the immediate pleasure of god , what they were , or were not to do , but by his communication to some person who had credit to be believed . whereas from the time that god hath manifested his pleasure to all men in his scripture , what will please and displease him , and intrusted princes to advance his service , and provide for his worship according to the rules which he hath likewise prescrib'd to them , he hath discontinued that immediate communication . nor doth any prince pretend to that conversation with god , as abraham and moses had , who did not interpret , but relate , and report what god would , or would not have don from himself . and the salvo which he provide s●or the implicite faith which he prescribes by a mental reservation , is so destructive to common honesty , that it is not only unworthy of a christian , but of a moral man , who desires to live with any credit amongst men ; which we shall be obliged to enlarge upon in another place , where he more confidently calls for it , and therefore shall decline it here . and god be thanked , no christian prince doth himself believe , or wishes that his subjects should believe , that he is in abrahams place , to be the sole interpreter of what god hath spoken . mr. hobbes is so much addicted to the sole obligation of contracts and covenants , that he will hardly allow god himself to have a title to our obedience , but by virtue of some contract on his part , and covenant on ours ; which that he may the better make good , he assumes a jurisdiction to himself to give what signification and interpretation he pleases to words , whether they have bin generally understood to signifie so , or no ; without which he would not have determin'd , that ( pag. . ) moses had no autority to command the children of israel , nor they any obligation to obey him , until in the terror of the thundring and lightning , and the noise of the trumpet , and the smoaking of the mountain , they said unto moses , exod. . . speak thou with us , and we will hear , but let not god speak ▪ with us least we die ; by which he saies , ( pag. . ) they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the commandment of god : whereas the most that can be drawn from that engagement is , that they would hear , and receive what he should say . notwithstanding which , it doth not appear that they paid more obedience to moses , after this profession of theirs , then they had don before ; nor can it be imagin'd , that the promise to moses was more binding , then all former obligations to god. and surely he who assumes this licence of interpreting , is much to blame if he doth not make many places in scripture to signifie what conduces to his purpose ; and he may from moses having leave to go up into the mount , declare , not only that the scriptures are the mount , and therefore that the soveraign only may interpret them , but that they may not be look'd into ; which would increase the prerogative , and is as near the signification and intention of the text , as what he gives to it . but then how mr. hobbes will excuse himself for violating his own doctrine , which concludes , that ( pag. . ) no man ought in the inte●pretation of scripture , to proceed farther then the bounds which are set by his soveraign , i cannot imagine , except he hath refuge to cromwell , whom he did then acknowledge to be his soveraign . and indeed it was of no small advantage to him , that all persons under him ( by what oaths or obligations soever they were bound to administer justice to the people , according to the known rules of law and equity ) should understand themselves to be in the same capacity that the seventy were to moses , to whom god took of the spirit that was upon moses , num. . . and gave it to them ; the sense of which place , he saies , is no other , ( pag. . ) ( as he hath formerly declar'd , that spirit signifies mind , ) then that god endued them with a mind conformable ▪ and subordinate to that of moses , that they might prophesy , & speak to the people in gods name , in such manner , as to set forward such doctrine as was agreeable to moses ' s doctrine . and in truth so absolute an autority in all spiritual matters , as high as it is , is not more then is absolutely necessary to support his other power in the temporal . he administers occasion enough in this chapter to induce me to repete what hath already bin said upon the covenant made by abraham , which is a principal corner stone upon which he still persists to erect his building , which i shall forbear to do , persuming the reader will not forget it ; only i must observe the activity and restlessness of mr. hobbes his fancy , and that , as the first mention of the covenant and contract as to the end for which he formed it , was a pure dream of his own , so he adds to it , and makes it larger , as new matter occurs to him that requires such a supply . as in the beginning of this chapter , that he might make the soveraignty of abraham to appear the more unquestionable , he saies , that ( pag. . ) by his covenant he obliged himself , and his seed after him , to acknowledg , and obey the commands of god , not only such as he could take notice of ( as moral lawes ) by the laws of nature , but also such as god should in special manner deliver to him by dreams , and visions , of which before he makes no mention , tho he mention'd more then he had autority for ; for he saies , ( pag. . ) that no contract could add to , or strengthen the obligation , by which both they , and all men else were bound naturally to obey god almighty , and therefore the covenant that abraham made with god , was to take for the commandment of god , that which in the name of god was commanded him in a dream , or vision , and to deliver it to his family , and cause them to observe the same . yet notwithstanding this great addition , tho abraham and all the soveraigns who succeeded him , were qualified to govern , and prescribe to their subjects what religion they should be of , and to tell them what is the word of god , and to punish all those who should countenance any doctrine which he should forbid , from which he concludes that ( pag. ) as none but abraham in his family , so none but the soveraign in a christian common-wealth , can take notice what is , or what is not the word of god ; yet , i say , neither that , nor the renewing the same covenant with isaac , and afterwards with jacob , he saies now , did make that people the peculiar people of god , but dates that privilege , which before he dated from the covenant with abraham , to begin only from the renewing it by moses at the mount sinai ; by which he corrects his former fancy by a new one as extravagant , upon the peoples contract in those words , which he had mention'd before without that observation and gloss that he makes upon it , nor did god at that time promise more to them by moses , then he had before as expresly promis'd to abraham , isaac , and iacob . this shall suffice to what he hath so often urg'd , or shall hereafter infer from the covenant with abraham , and by moses , and of the peculiar dominion over that people by vertue of that contract . nor will i hereafter enlarge any more upon their pretended rejection of god , when they desir'd a king , which he now confirm's by a new piece of history , or a new commentary upon the text by his soveraign power of interpreting ; for he saies ( pag. . ) that when they said to samuel , make us a king to judg us like all the nations , they signified , that they would no more be govern'd by the commands that should be laid upon them by the priest in the name of god ; and consequently in deposing the high priest of roial autority , they deposed that peculiar government of god. ( pag. . ) and yet he confesses in the very next page , that when they had demanded a king after the manner of the nations , they had no design to depart from the worship of god their king , but despairing of the justice of the sons of samuel , they would have a king to iudg them in civil actions , but not that they would allow their king to change the religion which was recommended to them by moses . by which he hath again cancell'd and demolish't all that power and jurisdiction , which he would derive to all soveraigns , from that submission and contract , which he saies they made at mount sinai : for he confesses that they had no intention , that the king should have autority to alter their religion , and then it passed not by that contract . and thus when his unruly invention suggests to him an addition to the text , or an unwarrantable interpretation of it , it alwaies involves him in new perplexities , and leaves him as far from attaining his end , as when he began . it is upon his usual presumtion , that from the . chapter of numbers , he concludes , that after moses his death , the supreme power of making war and peace , and the supreme power of judicature belonged also to the high priest ; and thus ioshuah was only general of the army : whereas no more was said in that place to eleazar , then had bin before said to aaron his father , to perform the priestly office ; nor doth it ever appear that eleazar offered to assume the soveraignty in either of the cases , but was as much under ioshuah , as aaron had ever bin under moses . god appear'd unto ioshuah upon the decease of moses , and deputed him to exercise the same charge that moses had don . as i was with moses , so will i be with thee . this book of the law shall not depart out of thy mouth , that thou maiest observe to do all that is written therein . then ioshuah commanded the officers of the people . josh. , . , , . the people made another covenant with ioshuah . all that thou commandest us we will do , and whither soever thou sendest us , we will go . as we hearkned unto moses in all things , so will we hearken unto thee . whosoever doth rebel against thy commandment , and will not hearken to thy words in all that thou commandest him , shall be put to death . ver . , , . and the lord said unto joshuah , this day will i magnify thee in the sight of all israel ; as i was with moses , so will i be with thee . and thou shalt command the priests &c. josh. . , . all the orders and commands to the priests were given by ioshuah . joshua built an altar to the lord god of israel in mount ebal . he wrote upon the stones a copy of the law. he read all the law , the cursings , and the blessings , &c. josh. . , , . ioshuah divided the land , and when any doubtful cause did arise , they repair'd to him for judgment . and when the two tribes , and the half , returned to the other side of iordan , where moses had assign'd their portions , it was ioshuah who blessed them , and sent them away . there is no mention of any soveraignty of eleazar . what the jurisdiction of the high-priest was , and whether the office was limited , or any way suspended during the time of the judges , is not otherwise pertinent to this discourse , then as it contradicts mr. hobbes , in which where it is not necessary i take no delight , and therefore shall not enlarge upon those particulars . the survey of chapter . mr. hobbes hath committed so many errors in the institution and view which he hath made of all offices hitherto , that there was reason to believe , he would have the same presumtion , if he came to handle the office of our saviour himself ; and i think he hath made it good , when he allows no other autority or power to our saviour , even when he comes in the glory of his father , with his angels , to reward every man according to his works ▪ mat●h . . . then ( pag. . ) as vice-gerent of god his father , in the same manner that moses was in the wilderness , and as the high priests were before the reign of saul , and as the kings were after it : which is degrading him below the model of socinus , and in no degree equal to the description of his power in scripture ; yet large enough , if the end of his coming was no other then he assigns , and the office he is to manage , no greater then he seems to describe , ( p. . ) the giving immortality in the kingdom of the son of man , which is to be exercis'd by our saviour upon earth , in his human nature ; which seems to be much inferior to that inheritance incorruptible and undefiled , that fadeth not away , which st. peter assures us is reserved in heaven for us , pet. . . and how his immortality upon earth will be secur'd , if the earth be to be destroied by fire , as many learned men do be●ieve is clearly foretold in scripture , is worthy of his care to enquire and consider . but these extravagancies , and the greater in the next chapter , in his description and definition of the trinity , i shall leave to divines to refute , and to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction , to convince him by information , or to reform him by chastisements ; without making any observation , that how little power or jurisdiction soever he allows to other officers and ministers , he reserves to himself autority to determine the highest points . and whereas our saviour himself professes , that he hath laid down his life , & bin sacrific'd for the sins of the whole world , he takes upon him to contract the number who are to receive any benefit thereby , only to that of the elect. and he is less to be understood , when he positively declares , ( pag. . ) the end of christs coming to be , that he might restore unto god by a new covenant , the kingdom which had bin cut off by the rebellion of the israelites in the election of saul : which dream still possesses him to that degree , that he seems to think the conversion of the gentiles to be merely accidental , the restoring that peculiar kingdom to his father by a new covenant , being the great end of his coming ; and in case that nation should generally refuse him , then to call to his obedience such as should believe in him of the gentiles : whereas his coming was equally for the one as for the other , and in truth , was promis'd to the other , before the iews became the chosen people of god , if the promise made to adam after his fall had any prospect towards our saviour , of which few men make doubt . i cannot but observe some ingenuity ( if it had bin perfect ingenuity , it would have amounted to a clear retractation ) in his declaring so freely , and by so many instances , that as our saviour himself declar'd , that his kingdom is not of this world , so that he never exercis'd any soveraign jurisdiction in it , contrary to what he more magisterially publish'd in his twentieth chapter ; when his business being to prove the absolute and illimited power of kings over their subjects , and all that they have , he quotes several texts out of the old and new testament , in which the simple obedience of subjects to their soveraign is enjoin'd : and then concludes with an instance of our saviours judgment in the point , ( pag. . ) that the kings word is sufficient to take away any thing from any subject when there is need , and that the king is judg of that need ; for saying that our saviour himself , as king of the iews , commanded his disciples to take the ass ▪ and asses colt , to carry him into ierusalem , saying , go into the village , &c. matth , . he adds , as if they had bin the ●ords of our saviour , they will not ask , whether his necessity be a sufficient title , nor whether he be judg of that necessity , but acquiesce in the will of the lord. if mr. hobbes had bin a consciencious vindicator of truth , and intended by his reason and autority only to have mended the understanding of men , when he had reformed his own in a matter of great importance , and of which he had made so ill use , he would have given some satisfaction to those he may have seduc'd : and since he now discovers , ( pag. , . ) that the kingdom of christ is not to begin till the general resurrection ; and that christ , whilst he was on earth , had no kingdom in this world , this forty first chapter ought in con●cience to have bin a retractation of what he had said in the twenty precedent ; and therefore he may forgive those , who too reasonably suspect , that his design is rather to perplex and disturb , and seduce men , then to enlighten and inform them ; and that he assigns the errors in every chapter to do as much mischief as they can , and retracts none of them , least the confessing himself to be once deceiv'd , may lessen his power to deceive any more . the survey of chapter . having then left his discourse of the trinity to be censur'd by those who are more competent considerers of those high mysteries , with the matter of his former chapter , and of which it had more properly bin a part ; ( for after the having degraded our saviour to those low and insignificant offices , the bare-fac'd denying the trinity might naturally have follow'd , which he makes to be no mystery at all , and to contain as many persons as any body will assign to it , rather then those , which an article of the christian faith makes necessary to be believ'd , and which he denies with more affectation then was don by arius , or macedonius , or any of those heresies which succeeded , and were the spawn of their poison . and no doubt , he hath gratified the pope abundantly , whom he hath otherwise endeavored to provoke , in procuring such a book , that denies a vital part of christianity , to be printed and dispersed in a protestant kingdom , which it could not have bin , if the governors and over-seers of the church had ever perused or taken notice of it ; the defect whereof hath permitted it to receive too much countenance in popish countries likewise ; ) we proceed to take a view of his ecclesiastical power , in which he declares his judgment and opinion , not only of church jurisdiction , but upon the matter of all things which concern religion in the church ; that is , the profession of the christian faith. i do first observe , that he confesses , ( pag. . ) that the ecclesiastical power was left by our saviour in the hands of the apostles , and that it remained in them , and in those who were ordained by them , those hundreds of years before there were any christian soveraigns : and i will confess with him , that our saviour left no external , ordinary , coercive power to them , or with them , but only a power to proclaim the kingdom of christ , and to perswade men to submit themselves thereunto , and by precepts and good counsel , and the terrors of the lord , to teach them that have submitted , what they are to do that they may be receiv'd into the kingdom of god , and by the censures of the church chastise and discipline offenders : all which cannot be don , but by publishing and explaining the scriptures . and therefore except mr. hobb●s will take from them that which himself acknowledges that christ gave and left to them , or prove that christ took it from them , and assign'd it to other per●ons , they must still have a power to publish the scripture , and to interpret it , and are obliged to declare and teach the doctrine of christ before the doctrine of the king , which office he hath thought fit only to commit to them , and trust them with , not remembring how much more he had assign'd to them in the beginning of his last chapter , where he saies , ( pag. . ) that our saviour , when he was upon the earth , partly wrought our conversion , and partly w●rketh n●w by his ministers , and will continue to work till his coming again . and it is very ill logic to say , that because they cannot mis-interpret and pervert scripture , nor preach rebellion against their natural soveraign , since christ hath commanded subjection and obedience to them , they have therefore no autority to preach at all , or interpret the scripture , but must publish whatsoever the king bids them , in the name , and as the commands of god : yet even that , and all he hath or can say , may be true , if the cases of conscience which he hath taken upon him to determine , have any dependance upon , or affinity with the christian faith , or common honesty . what if the office of christs ministers in this world , is to make men believe and have faith in christ , and that they have no power by that title to punish men for not believing , or for contradicting what they say : doth that defect of power of compulsion , abolish that power which he hath given them of instructing and preaching , and using the keys ? as christ hath trusted them to do , and qualified them with peculiar circumstances to perform those offices ; so he hath trusted soveraign princes to assist them , whil'st they perform their office with integrity , or to punish them if they do not , with their power of compulsion , that their labors may be effectual . and princes are no less obliged to give them that assistance , then they are to perform the office of the apostles and disciples ; nor can any prince think his soveraignty impair'd , by being obliged to take care that the laws and precepts of god his soveraign be punctually submitted to , and that they , to whom in special manner the publication thereof is committed , be not only protected , but obeied and reverenc'd , whil'st they do their duty ; or ●urmise that the word of god stands in need of , or can receive any dignity or autority , by any thing he can add to it by his soveraign power . god hath left , and requir'd them to be nursing fathers to his church , and from the time of their being christians , hath communicated his scripture to them , which they have receiv'd , and which they are equally bound to obey as their meanest subject ; and if they are not good and faithful nurses , the miscarriage of the children shall be imputed to them . there is no cause of jealousie from the soveraign towards his subjects , which mr. hobbes out of his constant good will desires to kindle : for there is neither bishop nor priest who pretends to any power or jurisdiction , inconsistent with the kings supremacy , in ecclesiastical as well as temporal matters . no man can be made a bishop , but by his appointment and grant . no man can be ordained a priest , but by him whom he hath nominated to be a bishop . and if either bishop or priest mis-behave themselves to that degree , they shall by his autority be degraded , and depriv'd , and suffer as lay-men are to do , he being no less soveraign over the ecclesiastical persons and laws , then over the temporal ; and whoever so become liable , are to blame , and for ought i know , have to answer for somthing besides the departing from their dignity . in a word , prelates assume no title of honor , nor pretend to any jurisdiction that they have not receiv'd from him , and therefore deserve to be countenanc'd and supported by him , amongst his best and most useful subjects . he is not concern'd , if the king forbids him to believe in christ : it is a command of no effect , because belief and understanding never follow mens commands ; but if the king commands him to say , that he believes not in christ , he is very ready to obey him . ( pag. . ) profession with the tongue , is but an external thing , wherein a christian holding firmly in his heart the faith of christ , hath the same liberty which the prophet elisha allowed to naaman the syrian . he would be very much disappointed in the support of his monstrous impiety , if that text ought to be rendred out of the original , as dr lightfoot , a man eminently learned in the hebrew , positively saies at ought to be : for this thing the lord pardon thy servant , for that when my master hath gon into the house of rimmon to worship there , and he hath leaned upon my hand , that i have also bowed my self in the house of rimmon ; for my worshipping in the house of rimmon , the lord pardon thy servant for t●is thing . kings . . so that he craved pardon for idolatry past , and not begged leave to be idolatrous for the time to come . but admitting the text to be according to the common translation , it can do mr. hobbes no good , except he procures the same leave from another who hath as much autority as elisha had . who doth not know , that none of those examples which were either enjoin'd or permitted to be don by the divine autority , for some extraordinary end of providence , are for our imitation , when they are opposite to the truth , and justice , and integrity of gods precepts ? he may as well justifie the breach of faith , and down-right theft and robbery in his neighbors , by the example of the israelites borrowing the jewels , and other goods of the egyptians , or the assassination of an enemy , by the example of ehuds stabbing of eglon , and many other unwarrantable actions , by the example of good men directed by the spirit of god in the scripture , as maintain his own impiety , by the example or permission , if there were any , of naaman . but if mr. hobbes be gratified by not urging the impiety , nor the denunciation which st. iohn pronounced upon him , he is anti-christ , that denieth the father and the son , john . . how will he justifie the prevarication and falseness , in saying , he doth not believe that , which in his heart he d●th believe ? ye shall not deal falsly , neither lie one to another , was a part of the levitical law , and by mr. hobbes rules , a part of the law of nature , and so must not be violated , nor can be controul'd by god himself . he knows very well who is the father of lies , tho it may be he doth not enough consider what portion is allotted for his children . and if they who said they were iews , and were not , but did lie , were pronounc'd by st. iohn to be of the synagogue of satan , rev. . . there is very great danger , that he who is a christian in his heart , & upon any kings commands shall profess with his tongue that he doth not believe in christ , will not be admitted by our saviour to be of his church . in vain hath the whole current of scripture endeavor'd to raise such an awful reverence for truth , that it hath scarce pronounced more severe judgments against any species of sins , then against lying . he that telleth lies , shall not stay in my sight , saies the spirit of god by the psalmist , psal. . . he that speaketh lies shall perish , saies the same spirit in the proverbs , prov. . . let him believe what he will , he shall perish for speaking lies . and if he will believe st. paul , he will not find the heart to be the seat that comprehends all christian religion , but that the tongue hath a very necessary part assign'd to it , to perform : if thou shalt confess with thy mouth the lord iesus , and shalt believe in thy heart that god hath raised him from the dead , thou shalt be saved , rom. . ● . salvation would be gotten at too cheap a rate , if believing would serve the turn , and men might speak , and do what they find most convenient . words are actions in his own judgment , and to be punish'd with the same severity . our saviour had provided very ill for the propagation of his faith , if he had left a latitude for men to deny him in their words , so they confessed him in their hearts . how many converts would that secret , and reserv'd belief and confession have produc'd ? confession with mouth , as it is the more generous , so it is the more avowed and declar'd way of doing god service . he cannot confess him with his mouth , that doth not believe him in his heart ; and he doth believe him in his heart to no purpose , that will not confess him with his mouth . a man cannot be a true christian without both . there may be some men who may be possessed with as much fear as mr. hobbes , and as good courtiers as he , in submitting to the commands of their soveraign , of what kind soever ; but i have not heard that any man doth so frankly own it as he doth ; and the expedient that he hath found might have saved many hundred thousand lives of the christians in the primitive persecution , when the greatest part of them were not required with their mouth to deny jesus christ , but to acknowledg iupiter , or venus , or apollo ( according to the religion of the climate ) to be gods , and to worship them , which after they were christians they could not do : so that their martyrdom was , that they chose to lose their lives with the most terrible circumstances of torment , rather then they would lie , and say , that they believ'd them to be gods , when they knew they were not so : and the church hath never doubted of their being martyrs , very precious in the eies of god. but we shall have occasion to resume this argument of martyrs again very shortly . but it is not reasonable to believe or expect that those , or any other texts of scripture , can make any impression upon mr. hobbes , when he is able to save himself harmless from that determination and declaration of our saviour , who so d●nieth me before men , i will deny him before my father which is in heaven , by saying roundly , that whatsoever a subject is compell'd to do in obedience to his soveraign , and doth it not in order to his own mind , that action is not his but his soveraigns , nor is it he that in this case denieth christ before men , but his governor : so that he is well content to shift of his own damnation to his soveraign . but that this distinction will not serve his turn , is evident to all , but the casuists of his own faith ; and t will concern him to find a better way to defend himself for committing adultery , theft , murder , or any other wickedness god hath forbidden , if his soveraign commands him , then he hath taught any other men who believe his doctrine , and who deserve more satisfaction from him , for depending upon his reason . i know no difficulty in resolving his case of conscience concerning his mahometan in a christian common-wealth , nor can doubt , but that he which is a true mahometan , and believes that mahomet will not permit him to be present at the divine service in a christian church , which i do not think the mahometans restrain'd from out of their own country , no more then the jews , who make no scruple to be present at common praier , or mass , if it be attended with any convenience , looking upon themselves only as being present in the company , not at the devotion : yet i say , if he believes it , he doth well not to obey his soveraigns commands , and is much the honester men in avoiding the doing against conscience , however erroneous it may be . nor will any part of that tragical inference follow , that then any private man may disobey their princes in maintenance of any religion true , or false , there being other trials for the punishment of those , then the bare word , and command of the prince . there are two conclusions which reasonably result from mr. hobbes his axiome , and which may prove beneficial to him ; the first is , that we may believe that he doth not himself believe one word in his book that we find fault with : for writing is at least as external a thing as speaking , and therefore keeping his heart right , he might have the same liberty the prophet gave to naaman , and write what his soveraign cromwell commanded him , or what he discern'd would be so acceptable to him , that it would procure him his protection , which ought to have the same force with him as his command . the other is , that when ever he shall be commanded by the king , or required by any court of law , which is the voice of the king , to retract , and recant whatever is condemned in this book , he will cheerfully , and with a better conscience renounce them all , and write an other book more reasonably in the confutation of his errors in this . but then he is upon an other disadvantage , which is very grievous to an honest man , that when he makes that recantation , no man will believe that it is the thoughts of his heart , but only his profession with the tongue , which being but an external thing , he doth signify his obedience to that autority to which he is subject , without any remorse for the wickedness of his former writing . the truth is , this licence which he avows , how odious and impious soever , hath in it self likewise so much of levity and extreme weakness , that a man may depart a little from his gravity in answering it , and wonder why he did not make use of a text of euripides englisht in hudibras , who is much a graver writer , and far better casuist , as an autority to support his doctrine , oaths are but words , and words but wind , too feeble instruments to bind . &c. he knows well that in the custom of speaking , worse cannot be said of any man , then that he is ready to say any thing he is bid , and the natural judgment upon him , is , that no man believes any thing he saies . error is naturally pregnant , and the more desperate it is , the more fruitful . mr. hobbes well foresaw that the latitude he assum'd to himself , could not consist with the courage of the blessed martyrs of the christian faith , who had laid down their lives rather then they would with their tongue ( which would have saved their lives ) deny their saviour , or say they did not believe in him , upon the command of what emperour of soveraign soever . nor could it reasonably be expected , that a man who is so declared an enemy to martyrdom , should entertain a great reverence or esteem for the persons of martyrs ; and therefore it cannot be wondred at , that he very resolutly chargeth that glorious company ( whose memory every christian church celebrates with extraordinary devotion ) with want of wit and understanding , and with loss of their labour , and boldly determines by his prerogative of interpreting words according to his definitions and etymologies , whatever the constant , and general acceptation hath bin , that because martyr signifies a witness , ( pag. . ) and a witness must have seen what he testifies , and the fundamental article of christian religion being that iesus was the christ , therefore that none can properly be called martyrs of christ , but those that convers'd with him , and saw him before and after his resurrection , and that whosoever did not so , can witness no more then what others said , and are therefore but witnesses of other mens testimony , and are but second martyrs , or martyrs of christs witnesses . and yet for fear that they might yet have too much honour , he doth as imperiously declare , that ( pag. . ) none can be a martyr of the first , or second degree , who have not a warrant to preach christ come in the flesh , and who are not sent to the conversion of infidels ; for that no man is a witness to him that already believes , and therefore needs no witness , but to them that deny , or doubt , or have not heard it . and even to those , that there is one only article , which to die for , meriteth so honourable a name , and that article is , that ( pag. . ) iesus is the christ. but a man maintaining every doctrine , which he himself draws out of the history of our saviours life , or out of the acts or epistles of the apostles , is very far from being a martyr of christ , or a martyr of his martyrs : whereas whoever hath laid down his life for the testimony of any christian verity , or rather then he would deny any such , hath alwaies bin inserted in the number of the martyrs , by the judgment of the universal church . if mr. hobbes had bin conversant in the determination of matters upon the testimony of witnesses , he would have known , that in cases of the greatest importance , it is not alwaies necessary that the witness must have bin present , and have seen what he testifieth , or else his testimony is not good . they are very comp●●ent witnesses who declare what they have heard from others ; the question being only , whether what they say be true ; which often appears to be more unquestionable by the testimony of what others saw , and declar'd , then what they saw or heard themselves : and the truth of all matters of fact would be quickly lost , or dangerously suspected , if the death of half a dozen persons , who were present , could render the truth without evidence . so that he could not in this assertion , have any purpose to discountenance any other sort of witnesses but only martyrs . and i must complain of his extreme undervaluing his readers , in endeavouring to perswade them , from st. peters proposing , or enjoining after the death of iudas , that the rest of the apostles should ordain one to be a martyr , ( a witness with them of christs resurrection ) of those men who had accompanied with them all the time that the lord jesus went in and out amongst them , beginning from the baptism of iohn , &c. ( which he saies , makes it manifest , ( pag. . ) that he which is to be a witness of the truth of the resurrection of christ , must be some disciple th●t conversed with him , and saw him before , and after his resurrection ▪ and consequently , must be one of his original disciples , ) that none else could be a martyr . he would have too just reason to upbraid the breeding in the universities , if there be any novice in logic there , who can be imposed upon by such argumentations . they who are deluded by him , have not passed through that course education . it is true , that the method in which our saviour chose to work the conversion of men , was by matters of fact , which he submitted to the examination of the senses , and which was don in the sight of the sun , that there might be no want of witnesses . his greatest miracles were don in the greatest company , whom he had made judges as well as witnesses of what they saw . when he changed the water into wine , it was at a wedding , which in that time , and in that country , was alwaies celebrated in the presence of a great multitude , and with notable festivity . these people saw the water poured out , and in the drinking found it to be excellent wine , better then the wine that was first brought into the room : and the evidence of so many witnesses , could not but make the miracle believed , which he expected not should be believed upon a less testimony . when he rais'd the dead to life , it was alwaies in the presence of them who had seen them living , and dead : the same eies which saw them die , and sometimes buried , saw them likewise rise from the dead , and eat , and drink , and perform all the functions of life as other men . the whole people saw his passion , and were witnesses of all the circumstances of it : and all his disciples , and many other were witnesses of , and conversed with him after his resurrection . and to supply all possible defects , after his ascension ( which was in the view likewise of many witnesses ) he sent the holy ghost upon them who taught , and them who believed ; and which was a miracle little inferior to the rest , he gave many of his witnesses so long a life to publish what they had seen , and known , that it is made a question whether christianity be farther spread at present , then it was before the death of all the apostles . and then they all ( for we may say st. iohn suffer'd death , tho he out-lived it ) sealed with their blood the truth of what they had preach'd and publish'd . and afterwards , the scripture being likewise publish'd and abundantly attested , there needed no more martyrs of the history , but only for the doctrine : and they are no less martyrs who suffer death rather then they will commit a sin , against which our saviour hath pronounced damnation , then they who assert his passion , and resurrection . and , as hath bin said before , the greatest number of the primitive martyrs , were never question'd about the history of our saviour , of which the persecutors had never particularly heard , but were condemn'd for renouncing their religion in which they had bin bred , and denying those to be gods , who were worshipped as such by that country ; for which mr. hobbes hath obliged himself to have no reverence : and however they are challeng'd , and made to be martys for that religion , which now assumes the soveraignty over all religion , there was not one amongst them who ever heard of any of those opinions which are since grown up between christians , nor suffer'd for any thing , but what all the christians at present in the world do believe . and the martyrdom of all who have since suffer'd death for the maintenance of any particular opinion , hath consisted only in that they would not deny what in truth they believ'd , or pretend to believe what they thought apparent to be false : which is not therefore to be condemn'd , because mr. hobbes is resolv'd to decline it . in this rapsody of extravagant notions he proceeds to the dissecting the commission granted by our saviour to the apostles , and with the licence of a grammarian translates the terms of their commission , to make their office of as little autority as he wishes it to be . he saies preaching signifies nothing , ( pag. . ) but what a crier , or herald , or other officer useth to do publicly , in proclaiming a king ; and a crier , he saieth , hath not right to command any man : that teaching is the same thing with preaching , but to teach that iesus was christ , and risen from the dead , is not to say , that men are bound after they believe it , to obey those that tell them so against the commands of their soveraign , but that they shall do wisely to expect the coming of christ hereafter , in patience , and faith , with obedience to their present magistrate . all which signifies nothing , if it doth not signify , that where ever idolatry is the religion of the soveraign , what ever they do believe themselves , they are to practice idolatry still , and to perform all the rites of infidells , till the coming of christ himself to justify their conversion . and this no question is his meaning : to which i shall apply no other answer then the stating his proposition . and if there could remain any doubt , since that meaning is so very bad , that it could not be his , he will quickly remove that doubt in the survey he takes of baptism , and the obligation thereof . he saies that ( pag. . ) baptism in the name of the fath●r , and of the son , and of the holy-ghost , is dipping in their names , ( you shall rarely find him call them three persons , for the incongruity it would introduce in philosophy . ) the meaning of which words of baptism is this , he that is baptized is dipped or washed as a sign of becoming a new man , and a loyal subject to that god that was represented by moses , and to iesus christ his son god and man , that hath redeem'd us , and shall in his human nature represent his fathers person in his eternal kingdom after the resurrection ; and to acknowledge the doctrine of the apostles , who being assisted by the spirit of the father and the son ( he tells us often that spirit signifies nothing but mind ) were left for guides to bring us to that kingdom , to be the only and assur'd way thereunto . and so that you may not suspect him to be a better christian then he is , he hath taken the pains to let you know again the little esteem he hath of the trinity . this being our promise in baptism , and the autority of earthly soveraigns being not to be put down ( . cor. . , , . ) till the day of judgment , for that he sai●s , is ( p. . ) expresly affirmed by st. paul , it is manifest that we do not in baptism constitute an other a●tority over us , by which our externall actions are to be govern'd in this life , but promise to take the doctrine of the apostles for our direction in the way to life eternal . so that the greater moiety of the world being ( according to the computation made by the learned men ) mere heathen men , and pagans , and much the greater part of the other moiety being mahometans ( no account being taken of the jews ) neither the one , or the other , however they may in their hearts believe the doctrine of the apostles , are bound to make profession outwardly of the christian religion , before the second coming of our saviour to judgment , except their own soveraigns command them so to do . and in all these ravings he hath texts of scripture at hand , which he perverts , and interprets to his own ends , contrary to the genuine sense , and indeed to the whole analogy of faith and scripture , ( as any man must conclude who examines them ) and the interpretation which hath bin alwaies made of them before mr. hobbes . a man would imagine that he had bin contented , that the apostles and their successors should enjoy some dignity and prerogative ▪ when he confesses that ( pag. . ) the end of baptism is remission of sins , and to baptize , is to declare the reception of men into gods kingdom , and to refuse to baptize , is to declare their exclusion ; and that the power to declare them cast out , or retained in it , was given to the apostles , and their substitutes and successors . but he quickly humbles them from this exaltation , and since no man can judg the secret thoughts of the heart , he saies , ( pag. . ) the apostles , and their successors were to follow the outward marks of repentance , which appearing , they had no autority to deny absolution . besides they alwaies were , and are but ministerial , they have nothing to do to judg of ( pag. . ) the truth of repentance ; that belongs to the assembly of the faithfull , the judgment belonging to them , and only the publication of it to the apostle , or pastor of the church as prolocutor , after the assembly had first heard the cause , and determin'd it . so that it seems st. peter was a little too presumtious , in undertaking to know the heart of an●nias , and saphira , and in pronouncing so severe a judgment upon them without so much as asking the advice of the assembly . i shall not accompany him in his disquisition upon excommunication , the use and effects of it , upon whom it is to be exercis'd , and for what faults , or the conditions which are requisite to make men liable to it , and whether the teacher of christian doctrine may as a master in any science , abandon his disciples that obstinately continue in an unchristian life : but he cannot say the excommunicate have wrong ; because they are not obliged to obey ; in all which he mingles great errors , with some truth well expressed , and the errors being of a less magnitude then those he is usually guilty of , i shall not particularly insist upon them . but i cannot but observe his close design , to make the foolishness of preaching of no effect , by his absolving their auditory from any kind of obligation to believe them ; which he would not attemt to do , if he had less autority then from the apostles themselves . ( acts . . . ) for from saint pauls behaviour in the synagogue in thessalonica ( pag. . ) when some of them believed , and others did not believe , he finds the reason was , that st. paul came to them without any legal commission , came only to perswade them , and reasoned with them out of the scriptures , which were well known to the iews , and believed by them to be the word of god. and the reason why , when they all believed the scripture , they did not all alike believe him , was , that some approved , and oth●rs disapproved the interpretation which st. paul shad made , and every one interpreted them to himself ; for whoever perswades by reasoning from principles written , makes him to whom he speaks judg both of the meaning of those principles , and also of the force of his inferences upon them . if st. paul had bin to be iudg himself of what he said , what needed he to have quoted any places of scripture to prove his doctrine ? it had bin enough to have said , i find it so in scripture , that is to say in your laws , of which i am interpreter , as sent from christ. therefore the iews of thessalonica , were the sole iudges of what st. paul alledged out of scripture ; and every man might believe , or not believe , according as the allegations seem'd to himself , to be agreeable to the meaning of the places alledged . and generally , he saies , in all cases of the world , he that pretendeth any proof , maketh him iudg of his proof to whom he addresseth his speech . which cleerly absolves the jews for not believing our saviour himself when he alledged texts of scripture to inform and convince them , and absolves all private men from yielding obedience , or believing the interpretation of judges in point of law , if their own sense pleases them better ; which introduces as wild a confusion in church and state , as himself can wish ; and he , and his disciples would become the only confident interpreters of the law and the gospel . it is a very painful thing to read this two and fortieth chapter of mr. hobbes , in which all the loose and licentious reflections upon piety , and religion , the undervaluing and perverting the scripture , and the utter contemt of the church , which are a little more warily scatter'd throughout his book , ( that is , by being scattered , not so easily discern'd ) are collected , and gathered more closely together into such a mass of impiety , that the very repeting all the particulars , without which they cannot be replied to , must be more grievous and offensive to most devout persons , then the most unclean discourse can appear to the chastest eares . and the argument being of power ecclesiastical , he hath made all ecclesiastical power to be of no signification , and the most useless thing upon the earth . our saviour himself ( who is the fountain from whence all ecclesiastical power must flow ) he hath discover'd to have so little autority when he was here , that he could delegate little to his apostles . and since men were not bound to believe him , nor committed any fault if they did not believe him , he could not leave his apostles in a state of more reverence and esteem : and their greatest privilege was , to leave the conversation of those , who did not care for their company . and that he might with great method and order make all this appear , is the business of this very long chapter , towards which the most innocent paragraph in it contributes somewhat , as appears by those which we have already examin'd ; and therefore we can take little delight , or administer it to others , in the survey of the rest . it cannot but be wonder'd at , that mr. hobbes , who evidently hath taken pains in reading the scripture , to what ill purposes , and with what evil intentions soever , could have the confidence to affirm , ( pag. . ) that the apostles preached nothing , but that iesus was the christ , &c. that he was not dead but risen again from the dead , and gon up into heaven , and should come again to judg the world , &c. all which are indeed the elements of the christian faith , but he saies , none of them preached , that himself , or any other apostle was such an interpreter of the scripture , as all that became christians , ought to take their interpretations for law. the foundation must be , that it might be believ'd , that christ the messias was come ; for till that was believ'd , what he said , or what he did , was of little moment . yet their great business too was to make them know , that the simple believing that , would not serve their turn ; that christian religion did not consist more , ( it may be not so much ) in believing , as in doing . in all christs sermons upon the mount , there is very little of opinion taught , or prescrib'd , only the practice● of christian duties was vigorously urged : wherefore by their fruits you shall know them ; whosoever heareth these sayings of mine , and doth them , mat. . . a great part of his redemtion was , that he qualified us to receive redemtion ; and tho he paid the price of his blood for our ransom , yet he left somthing to be don still by us , in following his example , and observing his precepts . the informing and convincing the world of this , was the office of the apostles ; and all they said , and all they wrote , were interpretations , and commentaries upon what our saviour himself had said , and don , and together contain'd so perfect a body of christianity , that we are not obliged to any thing under the penalty of damnation , but what is contained therein , or evidently deduced from thence . the office of the apostles was to point out , and demonstrate the way to that salvation , which was so dearly purchased for us ; and efficaciously to prove , that the declining that way , and walking in a contrary path , must lead us to eternal perdition ; and confidently to declare , and pronounce the reward and the punishment to both , that men may chuse for themselves . this they were to do , and this they did ; and after all this , are we now to believe that they had no autority for what they did , and that we have no obligation upon us , nor the jew , nor the gentile before us , to believe what they said , or to do what they enjoined ? mr. hobbes is the first commentator upon the evangelists , who upon that advice of our saviours , search the scriptures , john . . observes and concludes , ( pag. . ) that if our saviour himself had not meant that the iews should interpret the scriptures , he would not have hidden them to search them , and take from thence the proof of his being the christ , but he would either have interpreted them himself , or referred them to the interpretation of the priests ; that is , because as he vouchsafed to expose his miracles to the test and examination of their grossest senses , so now by condescending to quote scripture for his own manifestation , he intended to make themselves the judges , whether he spoke to the purpose or no , and at liberty to believe him or not , without forfeiture of their innocence . did he not interpret the scriptures himself , when by the several texts , which he cited out of several of the prophets , he made it evident to them , that those prophesies were of his person , and could refer to none else ? and since they all confessed that they were the word of god , he advised them to search the scriptures , because they are they that testifie of him . the apostles observe the same method , demonstrate out of the prophets , whom they all professed to believe , what christ must do when he came , and what must be don to him , and that all that was don and suffered by him which was fore told . his admirable life and doctrine was well known to them all , they had bin present at his trial , and at his death , and had with their eies seen the terrible circumstances of it ; they had seen him buried , and the jews had providently appointed a guard of soldier , who had without remorse beheld his passion , to watch his tomb : and yet after all this vigilance , the body was not found , but as he had promised himself , and what had bin by the prophets fore-told of him , the third day he was risen ; of which there were so many eie-witnesses , who had seen , and conferr'd with him for many daies , and had at last beheld with their bodily eies , his body ascend in the air towards heaven . and besides that the greatest part of all this was seen and known by all the people , the preachers and declarers of it appear'd to be very extraordinary men , by the daily m●racles they wrought , by which such multitudes were compell'd , & could not re●ist believing all they said , and promis'd to observe the precepts they enjoin'd . but all this is nothing : others , and much greater numbers did , and lawfully might refuse to do either ; for mr. hobbes saies positively , ( pag. . ) that the people had liberty to interpret the scriptures to themselves , till such time as there should be pastors that could autorize an interpreter , whose interpretation should be gene●ally stood to , but that could not be till kings were pastors , or pastors kings . so that what the apostles , or our saviour himself had said , laid no obligation upon those who heard them . we have now the reason why he was concern'd so much to extend those plain words of the children of israel , in their fright , to moses , speak thou to us , and we will hear th●e , to such an absolute obligation of their obedience , since without it , he saies , ( pag. . ) they had not bin obliged to have receiv'd the ten commandments , since they were forbid to approach the mountain , by which they might have heard what god said to moses : but that obligation that they would hear moses , made all sure again , and so they came to receive them . yet he confesses , ( pag. . ) that they could not but acknowledg the second table for gods laws , because they were all the laws of nature : but for those of the first table that were peculiar to the israelites , ( which gives him occasion to enlarge his commentary upon the third commandment , in which he saies , the meaning of those words , they shall not take the name of god in vain , is , that they should not speak rashly of their king , nor d●spute his r●ght , nor the commissions of moles and aaron his lieutenants ) it was their own obligation ( speak thou to us , and we will hear , &c. ) by which they were to receive them as laws , and ( pag. . ) the iudicial law , which godprescrib'd to the magistrates of israel ▪ for the rule of the administration of iustice , and the levitical law , the rule prescrib'd touching the rites and ceremonies of the priests and levi●es , because laws , he saies , only by virtue of the same promise of ob●dience to moses . and so he proceeds to a new enqui●y into the authenticalness of the old and new testament ( in which chase i am weary of following him ) and concludes , ( pag. . ) that whoever offers us any other rules , which the soveraign rule hath not pr●scr●b'd they are but counsel and advice , which whether good or bad , he that is counsel'd may without injustice refuse to observe . and ( pag. . ) that the scripture of the new testament is there only law , where the lawful civil pow●r hath made it so . since the reception of the new testament as a law ( that is , within the canon of scripture ) depends wholly upon the word of the soveraign , and by that word is receiv'd and acknowledg'd to be the word of god , and from thence is obeied as such : it must likewise , by his rule , still subsist by the sole autority of the soveraign , for he can by his word to morrow abrogate that which this day he made a law. so that if a christian soveraign be succeeded by a soveraign who is a jew , or an evil christian , he may abrogate that law by which the new testament was declar'd to be within the canon of scripture , and then the subjects must neither ( pag. . ) in their actions or discourse observe the same , and can only privatly wish ▪ that they had liberty to practice them ; by which the confessed word of god must be made void , and controul'd by the commandments of man. and he hath the confidence to aver , that the very council held by the apostles , in which they use this style , it seem'd good to the holy ghost , and to us , &c. hath no autority to oblige any body , ( pag. . ) since the apostles could have no other power then that of our saviour , who could only perswade , not command ; for they who have no kingdom can make no laws . and so i hope leviathan hath now laid about him , and perform'd his full function , which makes him worthy to receive a more reasonable answer then is in the power of any private person , or of the universities to give him , and is very fit for the state it self to reward him for , to the full extent of his desert . mr. hobbes hath invested the soveraign with his absolute independent power , by the example of moses , and david , and solomon , both in church and state ; and being obliged to confess , that for some hundred of years after the preaching of the gospel● , there was no civil soveraign to meddle with it , but that the direction of all ecclesiastical affairs appertain'd to the apostles and their successors , and those who were ordain'd by them ; he finds a way to invest his christian monarch with that jurisdiction and supremacy , by the right all heathen soveraigns had , who had the name of pastors of the people , because there was no subject that could lawfully teach the people , but by their permission and autority ; and that no body can think , that the right of heathen kings is taken away by their conversion to the faith of christ , who never ordain'd , that kings for believing in him should be deposed ▪ that is , subjected to any but himself . and therefore christian princes are still the supreme pastors of their people , and have power to ordain what pastors they please to teach the church . but to make their title the more unquestionable , he resorts to the title he found out for his soveraign by institution , that from the pa●t and covenant which the people made to , and with each other , he becomes the representative of the people , which he confesses , that he that makes himself soveraign , by his irresistible power , without any election , pact or covenant , likewise is the representative of the people , and so hath the same power and authority , as if he were by their election . he finds now , that the christian soveraign , assoon as he is christian , becomes the representative of the church , and so the teachers he elects are elected by the church , which was all the title they had from the time of the apostles , to the time of the soveraigns becoming christian , from which time he is the true representative of the church as well as of the state , ( pag. . ) and from this consolidation of the right politic and ecclesiastic in christian soveraigns , he saies , it is evident , that they have all manner of power over their subjects that can be given to man , and may make such laws , as themselves shall judg fittest for the government of their own subjects , both as they are the common-wealth , and as they are the church . but as his civil soveraign rejects his institution , and knows he hath much a better title to his power , then he could have by pretending to be the representative of the people ; so his christian soveraign will as much reject the being representative of the church , knowing that he hath a better title by being soveraign , to govern his clery , and all ecclesiastical persons in his own dominions , and for suppressing all seditious and erroneous doctrines , which may disturb the peace , or discredit the integrity of the church , then such a representation would give him . and they are little beholding to him for deriving their supremacy ecclesiastical from the heathen princes , since few heathen soveraigns ever pretended to have the supreme , or indeed any power or autority in what concern'd the service and worship of their god , the direction and government whereof appertain'd to magistrates , and ministers assigned for that sacred province : as the great turk himself ( as hath bin said before ) doth not give laws , but receives advice , and the interpretation of the mufty , in whatsoever mahomet hath enjoin'd to be don . but let the title be what it will , he will be sure that his soveraign shall have a power as unlimitted in all ecclesiastical affairs , as in civil ; and not only to give what religion he thinks fit , and to allow what book he pleases for scripture to his subjects , but that he may himself if he pleases , perform all the functions himself in religion ( pag. . ) as to baptize , administer the sacrament of the lords supper , consecrate temples and pastors to gods service . and he saies , the reason is evident why they do it not ; which is no other , but that they have somwhat else to do . however he is sure they may be literal pastors of their own subjects in their own persons , and have autority to preach , to baptize , to administer the sacrament of the lords supper , and to consecrate both temples and persons to gods service : which he doth not grant , out of the high qualifications which he believes to be inherent in the power and person of a king , but from the low esteem he hath of those offices and mysteries of religion . for fore-seeing the objection that those administrations ( by the testimony of all antiquity ) require the imposition of such mens hands , as by the like imposition successively from the time of the apostles have bin ordain'd to the like ministry ; he removes that difficulty , by offering a prospect of the original and use of the imposition of hands , and instructs us from the perpetual custom and usage in all nations , of imposition of hands as well in civil as in sacred occasions , as well in inflicting punishment , as in conferring honors and dignities ; as in the condemnation of him who blasphemes the lord , all that heard him , shall lay their hands upon his head , and that all the congregation should stone him . and when iairus his daughter was sick , he did not desire our saviour to heal her , but to lay his hands upon her , that she might be healed . and they brought little children up to him , that he might lay his hands upon them , &c. and the reason is , he saies , ( pag. . ) as in the case of the blasphemer , where the witnesses laid their hands upon the guilty persons , rather then a priest or levite , or other minister of iustice , because none else were able to design or demonstrate to the eies of the congregation , who it was that had blasphemed , and ought to die , so in other things , it is natural to design any individual thing , rather by the hand to assure the eies , then by words to inform the ear in matters of gods public service . all which , and many other texts , of which he never finds want to any purpose , must signifie , if they signifie any thing , that the imposition of hands , that venerable circumstance that hath bin from the beginning of christianity , and where ever it is professed , applied to all ecclesiastical functions , is to no other purpose but to point out the person , that all the people may know who is the person that is ordained : but the person of every soveraign prince , is too notorious and perspicuous to need any such demonstration , and therefore he may baptize , preach and consecrate , and do all other offices without it . to all which , i shall suspend any farther answer , until he can prevail with one christian prince to assume and exercise the power he so frankly confers upon him ; or one christian subject willing to receive those honors and graces from their royal hands . i have waited upon mr. hobbes into cardinal bellarmine's quarters , and i will not interpose and disturb him there in the controversie he hath with him , which takes up the remainder of his forty second chapter , more then to say , that he takes upon him to answer that book of bellarmine , which of all that ever he writ is most easie to be answer'd having less of reason and learning in it , and having few assertors , and being generally condemn'd among the papists themselves , and particularly by the colledg of sorbone , the fairest representers of the doctrine of the church of rome : and in answering of which , he hath said nothing new , nor so substantially as many others have don , as he must confess , if he reads william berkeley , the father of iohn . he contends with ●ellarmine●or ●or some texts of scripture , which , he saies , conclude for his soveraign , upon which the other would establish the supreme autority of the pope ; and which in truth , cannot be applied with any colour to either of them . and he cannot take it ill , that i have , and shall take the same method in answering many of his arguments , which he himself thought fit to do , before he would enter upon any particular disquisition of those of the cardinals , by laying open the consequences of his doctrine , ( pag. . ) that princes , and states , that have the civil soveraignty in their several common-wealths , may bethink themselves , whether it be convenient for them , and conducing to the good of their subjects , of whom they are to give an account at the day of iudgment , to admit the same : which way of exposing his whole book , is without doubt the best way of answering it . i shall only add , that as it was unreasonably undertaken by bellarmine , to establish a title that depends upon matter of fact by arguments from reason , which proves , that it ought to be so ; so mr. hobbes , who when history controuls him , thinks it a sufficient answer to say , if it was not so , it should be so , as unreasonably follows the same method , and would , by the ill consequences which would flow from such a right , devest the pope of an autority , which he confidently saies was granted to him immediately by our saviour , and hath bin enjoied by his predecessors from that time to this . which if true , all the arguments from reason may fortifie , but can never shake a right so founded upon a clear and plain grant , from one who had an original power to grant , and wherewith the possession hath gon ever since . he therefore who will pertinently answer and controul these pretences ( which mr. hobbes can well do , if it would not cross some other of his doctrines ) must do it by positively denying any such grant , which never was , nor ever can be produced in such plain and significant terms , as are necessary to the grant of the most inferior office in any church or state. he would make it manifestly appear , that for many hundreds of years no bishop of rome made the least pretence to any such soveraignty ; and when they began to make it , with what a torrent of contradiction it was rejected . he would make it evident , that all that power which that see assum'd , was granted to them by kings and princes , and restor'd to them again when they were oppressed by their own factions and schisms , and by more powerful enemies . he would point out the very article of time , when by the incursions of the goths and vandals into italy , and the foul arts practiced by the popes , their autority by degrees increased to a great height , by the bounty of charlemain , in making them great temporal princes ; against the inconvenience whereof he thought he had sufficiently provided , when he reserved to himself , and succeeding emperors , to make all the popes . he would shew them many wonderful accidents , by which the power of the emperor grew to decay , and the weakness of all neighbor kings and princes , by the rebellions in their several kingdoms , and their unreasonable bloody wars amongst themselves ; and then the artifices still practiced by the popes to foment those divisions , and to contribute to their own greatness & usurpation ; notwithstanding all which , that there hath not bin one century of years from st. peter to this time , that there hath not bin some notorious opposition and contradiction to that supremacy , which was argument enough , that it was never look'd upon as a catholic verity . all this he would prove to be true , as likewise , that no prince of the roman communion , who at present is most indulgent to it , ( as all of them are in such a degree as is most advantageous to their own affairs ) look upon it as such , and that a submission to the popes autority , except it be commanded or allowed by the king , and the law , is not taken for a part of religion in any kingdom but that of england . this is the method that must be taken towards the enervating those high pretences ; and if it were vigorously pursued by one well versed in the pontifical histories , in which he needs no other witness then their own records , i mean popish writers , all the world would be convinc'd , except only such princes who are very well paid for the communication of part of their soveraignty to him , that the pope hath not out of his own dominions , so much as the power of the metropolitan schole-master , which mr. hobbes seems willing to confer upon him . the survey of chapter . he who hath taken so ill a survey of heaven if self , is not like to be a good guide for the way thither ( which is the business of his forty third chapter ) and which , into how little room soever he brings all that is necessary to salvation , would be very difficult to find , if it were not for his old expedient , his soveraigns commands ; since the most prescrib'd and known way , which hath bin thought to lead thither , ( is quite damm'd up by him ) the scriptures . ( pag. . ) that which made the patriarchs , and the prophets of old to believe , was god himself , who spake unto them supernaturally , and the person whom the apostles , and disciples that conversed with christ believ'd was our saviour himself . but of us , to whom neither god the father , nor our saviour ever spoke , he saies , it cannot be said that the person whom we believe , is god. so that the faith of christians ever since our saviours time , hath had no other foundation , then the reputation of their pastors , and the old , and new testament , which their soveraign princes have made the rule of their faith ; which princes are the only persons whom christians now hear speak from god , and to whom consequently they are beholding for their salvation . admit that single contracted article iesus is christ , comprehends all that is necessary to salvation , for he confesses , that he who holdeth that foundation , iesus is the christ , holdeth expressly all that he seeth rightly deduc'd from it , and implicitly all that is consequent thereunto , tho he have not skill enough to discern the consequence ; i demand still , how they shall believe this article whom their soveraigns forbid to look upon the new testament as scripture , which is all the evidence they can have for it : and yet he saies , ( pag. . ) for the belief of this article , we are to reject the autority of an angel from heaven , much more of any mortal man if he teach the contrary ; i know well he reconciles this contradiction by believing in the heart , and denying with the tongue , having the example of naaman . but how shall he believe in his heart if he be depriv'd of the new testament ? and if he doth come to believe in his heart as he ought to do , what affection and duty can he have for that soveraign who will not be saved himself , and requires him to renounce his saviour ? he must be content with a mere verbal affection without any influence upon the heart , which is much less duty then he requires towards his soveraign whom he is so intirely to obey , that he must say all he bids him say , and do all he bids him do : so much more duty he requires for his earthly then for his heavenly soveraign . i wish with all my heart that mr. hobbes did remember , or believe his own good rule in the end of this chapter , which would have preserved him from many presumtions , which administer great trouble and grief to his readers for his sake , ( pag. . ) it is not the bare words but the scope of the writer that giveth the true light by which any writing is to be interpreted , and they that insist upon single texts , without considering the main design , can derive n●thing from them clearly , but rather by casting atomes of scripture , as dust before mens eies , make every thing more obscure then it is ; an ordinary artifice , he saies , of those that seek not the truth but their own advantage . alas ! that it should be an advantage to mr. hobbes , to perswade men to believe that our saviour hath not given us new laws , but counsel to observe those we are subject to ; and that in his sermon upon the mount , ( which is the compendium of christianity ) ●e did not make any new law to the iews , but only expound the law of moses , to which they were subject before . since all those plain , and lively precepts of charity and humility , and a virtuous and pious life , were more then an exposition of the law of moses ; sure his declaration , that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her , &c. was more then an interpretation of that commandment , thou sha●t not commit adultery . if his determination , that whosoever should put away his wife , saving for the cause of adultery , &c. be not a new law , it cannot be a commentary upon that of moses , let him give her a writing of divorcement . was the utter suppression of circumcision , was the total abolishing of all their sacrifices , making no new law to the jews , but only expounding the law of moses ? and yet he came not to destroy the law , or the prophets , but to fulfil : and when he had fulfilled what was there foretold of him , the law became felo-de-se , and ceased to be useful any longer . when our saviour bid the pharisees learn what that text in the prophet hosea meaneth , i will have mercy , and not sacrifice , did he intend they should repair to the law of moses for instruction , because they were subject to it ? i do with some passion desire mr. hobbes to consider sadly ( for there will at some time or other , before he struggles out of this world , be sadness to him in the consideration ) whether it be probable , or possible , that our saviour should give such a charge to his apostles , that when in any house or city , they who were in it refused to receive them , or hear their words , that they should shake off the dust of their feet , with so terrible a declaration by our saviour himself , verily i say unto you , it shall be more tolerable for the land of sodome and gomorrah in the day of iudgment , then for that city , mat. . . i say , can any man imagine , that christ should there have made so fierce a denunciation , if he had intended the precepts which himself , and his apostles gave , should be looked upon only as good counsel , which men might as innocently disbelieve as believe ; and that they which should believe , might securely suspend yielding any obedience to what he directed , till his second coming to judgment ? indeed the day of judgment would be so far from being a day of terror , that it would be as festival a day , as mr. hobbes himself can wish it , if none be to be punished there for not observing the advice , or not obeying the precepts which our saviour , and his apostles gave to them . but of this i have said enough before , which i think i need not to repete or inlarge upon , and am willing to get out , and wish mr. hobbes will likewise , from this maze and labyrinth of confusion , and be advis'd by himself , to give over the casting atomes of scripture as dust before mens eies , to make every thing more obscure then it is . i cannot omit the observation of the three several definitions which he makes of heresy in three several places , as they were suitable to his occasions ; which himself declares to proceed from ignorance , when ( pag. . ) men give different names to one and the same thing , from the difference of their own passions . in his eleventh chapter , whilst he affected to be plain and perspicuous in his expressions , and explanation of words , he saies , heresy signifies no more then private opinion , but has only a tincture of greater choler ; but in his forty second chapter of the power ecclesiastical , in which it concern'd him to be wary what punishment he permitted to be inflicted on it , he declares , that ( pag. . ) an heretic is he , that being a member of the church , teacheth nevertheless some private opinion which the church hath forbidden . which knowing to be his own case , he was very well contented to resort to st. paul , and to grant him autority in this case to make rules as well as to give advice , and finds his direction to titus to be such as pleases him , a man that is an heretic after the first and second admonition reject , tit. . . but to reject in this place he saies is not to excommunicate the man , but to give over admonishing him , to let him alone , to set by disputing with him as one that is to be convinc'd only by himself ; and then he doubts not to shift for himself . but now when he hath better thought of it in his contest with bellarmine , he hath reason to be sorry that he hath left so much autority in the church , as to reject in his own sense , least the cardinal procures that power for the pope , whom he hath allowed to be the master schole-master , and then he may find another signification of reject , then letting him alone . and therefore he now pronounces ( pag. . ) that heresy is nothing else but a private opinion obstinately maintained , contrary to the opinion which the public person ( that is to say the representant of the common-wealth ) hath commanded to be taught : by which he saies , it is manifest ( he hath made it manifest by his definition ) that an opinion publicly appointed to be taught cannot be heresy , nor the soveraign princes that autorize them , heretics . and yet he may remember , that the doctrine of arius , after it was condemned by the gatholic church , was not thought to be the less heresy for the countenance it receiv'd from two or three emperours , or for being allowed in the dominions of several princes , and tho the pope himself ( liberius ) to redeem himself from banishment , which was inflicted upon him , for refusing to condemn athanasius , became likewise an arian : so that mr. hobbes was not the first inventor of that expedient , by believing in the heart and denying with the mouth . but still he is in an ill case : for his own soveraign hath already condemn'd him in the declaratory law , that whosoever contradicts any thing that is determined by , or in the four first general councils , is an heretic , and to be proceeded against , and censured as such : which form will not be satisfied by rejecting him , and leaving him to himself . so that there is but one way to save him harmless , which is his not being obstinate ; and that , whosoever knows him , or believes him , will undertake he shall never make use of . the fourth part. the survey of chapter . we are now to enter upon his fourth part of the kingdom of darkness , whereof the first chapter , which is the forty fourth in number , will take us little time : the greatest part being against the doctrine , or the practice of the church of rome , i shall not enlarge , but leave them to agree as they can . in the other part he doth but repete what he hath formerly , and in other places said of eternal life , and everlasting death ( being a professed adversary to eternity ) and of the immortality of the soul ( which by no means he allows ; ) to all which somewhat hath likewise bin said before . and i shall add no more , then what himself saies of some popes , applying some places of scripture to prove their autority over kings and princes , that it was not arguing from scripture , but a wanton insulting over princes : so in truth , he doth not so much argue from , as insult upon the scripture , by perverting , and applying it to unnatural significations , which never occurred to any man but himself , and will be best answered by that autority , which ought to controul such presumtuous undertakers . for why should any particular man enter into dispute with him , on the behalf of the immortality of the soul , of the eternity of the joies of heaven , and the everlastingness of the pains of hell , as if they were points in controversy , when no christian church in the world , makes , or admits the least doubt to be made of either . nor can any man imagine , why he leads us into this his kingdom of darkness , but that he may resume again all those arguments which lie scatter'd through the several chapters of his book , and which can never prevail , whilst there is any light to direct the understanding by . he renews his particular dream of ( pag. . ) gods peculiar kingdom over the iews only , which ceased , and was determin'd by , and in the election of saul , which he saies , he hath proved at large in the thirty fifth chapter , as he believes he had don every thing that he hath once affirm'd , ( how weakly or erroneously soever ) and from the not understanding this , or not comprehending , that from that time of saul , god hath bin without a kingdom , and we are not under any other kings by pact , but our civil soveraigns● men , he saies , are fallen in the error , that the present church is christs kingdom . but what argumentation can a man hold with him , who from the not understanding , or believing that dissolution of gods kingdom in the election of saul ( which no body ever heard of but from him ) deduces the popes challenging to be vicar general of christ in the present church , the introduction of purgatory , and transubstantiation , and all other errors in the church of rome , which he takes great pains to confute , and would perswade us to believe , that the imagination of the immortality of the soul is the only ground and foundation of the general error of eternal life , and everlasting death ; which makes him so solemnly endeavour to prove the nullity of either by so many texts of scripture : which can never be difficult for him to do in this , and any other particular that occurs to him to prove , whilst he may take upon him to pervert the current sense and interpretation of some texts in scripture to his own purpose , and to wrest and torture words to comply with his extravagant wi● and logic : and when he cannot decline the taking notice of other texts , which manifestly controul his unnatural glosses , he may acquiesce in a confession , that they are very hardly to be reconcil'd with the doctrine received : ( pag. . ) nor , he saies , is it any shame to confess the profoundness of the scripture to be too great to be sounded by the shortness of human understanding : which being prudently , and modestly consider'd in the beginning of this chapter , or rather in the beginning of his book , might have saved the labour , and the reproch of most of the texts of scripture , which he hath unwarily or absurdly quoted from the beginning , and which presumtion and method he continues to the end of his book . and as i have formerly said , if a diligent peruser of the whole doth mark what himself saies in one place , that will fully answer what he affirms in another , his book would need no other refutation . as to that part of his most material argument against the everlastingness of hell fire in this chapter , that ( pag. . ) it seems very hard to say , that god who is the father of mercies , that doth in heaven and earth all that he will , that hath the hearts of all men in his disposal , that worketh in men both to do and to will , and without whose free gift , a man hath neither an inclination to good , nor repentance of evil , should punishments transgressions without any end of time , and with all the extremity of torture , that men can imagine , or more . all which will not require , nor can receive a fuller answer then he himself prescribes , when he will establish the utmost extent of arbitrary power in his instituted soveraign . he saies , ( pag. . ) it is reason , that he which do's injury without other limitation then that of his own will , should suffer punishment , without other limitation then that of his will whose law is thereby violated . and so i shall keep him no longer company in his kingdom of darkness . the survey of chapter . i should not presume to except against so many of mr. hobbes his definitions , but that pretending to so much plainness and perspicuity , and having declared the necessary use of definition to be for the setling the signification of words , without which he saies , ( pag. . ) a man that seeks precise truth will find himself entangled in words as a bird in lime twiggs , the more he struggles the more belimed ; and observing that rule for the most part throughout the first parts of his book , except where he found it necessary for his own purpose , sometimes to perplex and belime his readers : yet in the two last parts , supposing that he hath enough captivated them to believe any thing he saies , he takes more care to fit his definitions for the support of his assertions , then that his assertions may naturally result from the integrity of the definitions . especially since he hath gotten into his kingdom of darkness , he takes less care to illustrate the instances and similies he thinks fit to use ; and so good philosophers may comprehend what he means , he is content to leave his less knowing readers involved and puzled amongst hard words , with which they have not used to keep company . as he begins this chapter , with the definition of sight , which will not make any man see the farther or the better , ( pag. . ) that sight is an imagination made by the impression on the organs of sight by lucid bodies , either in one direct line , or in many lines reflected from opaque , or refracted in the passage through diaphanous ●o●ies , which produceth in living creatures , in whom god hath placed such organs , an imagination of the object from whence the impression proceedeth . it may be doubted that many of his friends , who have given too much credit to all he saies , may have found themselves in this definition entangled in words as a bird in lime twiggs . and if it were necessary in this place to tell them what sight is , they would have understood him better , if he had said , that sight is a faculty that god hath given to living creatures who keep their eies open . however whether it be clear or no it serves his turn , by his skill in optics , and the unskilfulness he concludes most other men have in that science , to examine that part of the religion of the gentiles , which was called demonology . and by the credit that kind of learning had got among the jews , he finds a way to controul the literal sense of the scripture in the most important places , and to undermine the miracles which were wrought by our saviour himself . rather then he will have his geography and geometry contradicted , and because there ( pag. ) is not any mountain high enough , he saies , to shew him one whole hemisphere , he will have the devil 's carrying our saviour unto a high mountain , and all that relates thereunto , to be nothing else but a vision , or dream , then which no jew could more undervalue it , or christ be more dishonour'd , then to have his conflict with the enemy of mankind , to be look'd on only , and consider'd as a dream . and that his philosophy may be preserved unhurt , which assures him , that no corporeal spirit may be in a body of flesh and bone , full already of vital and animal spirits , he will not believe that our saviour ever cast the devil out of any man , only ( pag. . ) that he cured those persons of madness or lunacy , which cures have bin wrought by many other persons , and so would be unworthy to be reckon'd amongst the miracles of christ. nor will he admit that satan otherwise entred into iudas , then that he had a traiterous intention of selling his master . i wonder he doth not impute his hanging himself afterwards , or hanging in the air , to nothing but a fit of melancholy . under pretence of informing , and reforming the church of rome in their worshipping of images , which he saies ( and it may be reasonably ) is a relique of gentilism , and rather left then brought into the church , he could not avoid persecuting it to idolatry , which he doth not think well enough defin'd , nor well enough defended by christian divines . and remembring how he preserved himself from renouncing our saviour , when he denied that he believed in him ( by believing in him in his heart at the same time that he denied him , ) upon his soveraigns command ; he will not deprive his soveraign of that prerogative , nor be without the benefit of his own fear in the liberty to commit idolatry . and therefore that he may not be thought to do any thing out of ignorance ( of wickedness he is not so tender ) he declares frankly , that ( pag. . ) to pray to the king for fair wea●her , or for any thing which god only can do for us , is divine worship , and idolatry ; on the other side , if the king compel a man to it by the terror of death , or other great corporal punishment , it is not idolatry ; for the worship which the soveraign commandeth to be don unto himself by the terror of his law , is not a sign that he that obeieth him , doth inwardly honor him as a god , but that he is desirous to save himself from death , or from a miserable life ; and that which is not a s●gn of internal honor , is no worship , and therefore no idolatry . the sum is , that there is no wickedness ( for there can be no greater wickedness then idolatry ) which a man may not commit to save his life , or to avoid pain : which is a thesis in mr. hobbes's religion , suitable to the rest of his policy and piety , and might properly have bin controuled by his own love of justice , of which he would be thought to be an idolater , for he saies ( pag. ) that which gives to human action the relish of iustice , is a certain nobleness and gallantness of courage rarely found , by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life , to fraud or breach of promise . and sure he hath as great obligations to preserve him from idolatry ; and therefore i wish , that to the great bulk of scorn of which he is possess'd , he had that scorn likewise added , to be beholding to such an expedient for the preservation of his life . that this doctrine of mr. hobbes is very pernicious , and destructive to the very essence of religion , cannot be doubted by pious and religious men . but what kind of arguments to apply towards the information or conversion of him , is very difficult to find . that which is got by reasoning from the autority of books , will work nothing upon him , ( pag. . ) because it is not knowledg , but faith . so that the example of socrates , who scorned to redeem his life by the least trespass against truth or ingenuity ; or the precepts and judgments of seneca , will be of no force with him , tho both great , and confessed philosophers . what would seneca have thought or said of any corrupt way for the prolongation of life , if he had known any thing of the obligations of christianity , when only upon the strength of natural reason , he could so much undervalue it . non est vita tanti ut sudem , ut aestu●m . o quam contemta res est homo , nisi supra humana se erexerit ? what shall we say , when a heathen philosopher valued life only as it was a way to somwhat more precious , tho he could not comprehend it ; and when a christian philosopher , who pretends to have a full prospect of all that is most precious , will redeem his life at the price of disclaiming , to have any share in it ? when philosophy disswaded men from an over affectation of death , that there might not be ad m●riendum inconsulta animi inclinatio , but that they should patiently attend natures pleasure , and christianity shall be perswaded , that it may prolong life , by the basest submissions , and by the most unworthy and unrighteous condescentions ? mr. hobbes is of the venetian curats mind , of whom cardinal i●yeuse makes mention in his letters . when paul the fifth had issued out his interdict against the republick , whereby any priest who should say mass , or perform any other part of his function , stood excommunicated ; and the republic had publish'd an edict , that the magistrates upon any priests refusal to say mass , or to do any thing else that his duty obliged him to do , should cause every such priest to be hanged : a magistrate demanded of his neighbor curate , whether he would say mass ; and he making some pause , the magistrate told him , that if he refused , he must presently hang him . the curate replied with more resolution , that he had rather be excommunicated thirty years , then hanged a quarter of an hour , and that princes did at last make an end of all quarrels by treaties of peace , and then their subjects on both sides had the benefit of the articles , only he had heard that they who were hang'd had never the benefit of any articles , therefore for his part he would say mass. yet it is probable , the autority of the republic would not have bin so absolute , if their injunction had bin to have committed idolatry . mr. hobbes is not of seneca's mind , who consulted nature as much as he , citius mori an tardius ad rem non pertinet , bene mori an male ad rem pe●tinet ; bene autem mori est effugere male vivendi per●culum . but he is too much a philosopher to be swaied by the dictates of other philosophers . let us therefore resort to the scriptures , and put him in mind of the example of those three in daniel , who chose to be thrown into the hot fiery furnace , rather then to fall down before the image which nebuchadnezzar had set up ; or of daniel himself , who would not only not pray to the king , but would not defer praying to god only for thirty daies , nor would be contented to pray to him in his heart , or in a private corner , which he might securely have don , but would be found upon his knees , when he knew the penalty was to be thrown into the lions den , as he was . and mr. hobbes will tell you that tho they did well , they might have don otherwise . yet methinks he should not so easily evade all the denunciations made by the prophets , of gods judgments against israel and iudah for their idolatry , when they were only guilty of it , under the power , and by the command of their idolatrous kings . and yet that was no excuse for them : the judgments were pronounced against the people , and they underwent the punishment . but he will say it was , because they had forsaken god in their hearts , and were as great idolaters as their kings . yet still the fault was his , who took not care that they should be instructed in the true knowledg of god. but no objection out of the scripture can weigh with him . let us therefore resort to himself , and to his own reason , to convert or confute him . and he seems not so fully satisfied in this latitude which he hath given himself , as in other his bold assertions , but is more perplexed then he uses to be : to ( pag. . ) worship god , not as inanimating or present in the place or image , but to the end to be put in mind of him , or of some works of his , if that place , or image be dedicated , or set up by private autority , he saies it is idolatry , but if by the soveraigns autority , it is not . as if the autority of setting it up , could make that which in it self is idolatry , to cease to be idolatry . he doth acknowledg ( pag. . ) that a scandalous worship of images , tho it is but a seeming worship , and may sometimes be joined with an inward and hearty detestation of the image , and proceed only from the fear of death , or other grievous punishment , tho it be no idolatry , is nevertheless a sin ; and if it be a sin , no man ought to commit it for the safety of his life , by all the precepts which christ and his apostles have left to guide us towards the next world . but that confession keeps him not long in pain , for it is a sin he saies ( pag. . ) only in men whose actions are looked at by others , as lights to guide them by , whereas the example of those we regard not , works not upon us at all . if a pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others , or any other of whose knowledg there is a great opinion , do external honor to an idol for fear , unless he make his fear and unwillingness to do it , as evident as his worship , he scandalizeth his brother by seeming to approve idolatry ; for his brother arguing from the action of his teacher , or of him whose know●edg he esteemeth great , concludes it to be lawful in it self . and this scandal , he saies , is a sin , and a scandal given . yet in the page before he saies as positively , that ( pag. . ) it cannot be said that he that do's it , scandalizeth , or layeth any stumbling block before his brother ; because how wise or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner , another man cannot from thence argue that he approveth it , but that he doth it for fear , and that it is not his act , but the act of his soveraign . so hard a thing is it after such an excess to make any approch to truth , without involving a mans self in contradictions . he is very positive , that ( pag. . ) in a pastor who hath undertaken to preach christ to all nations , by giveing such a worship to an image , it were not only a sinful scandal , but a perfidious forsaking his charge . and truly , this obligation upon the pastor to suffer in such a case , is i think the only priviledg he grants him above other men : for we shall find hereafter , that he thinks himself qualified to preach as well as he . and that he may not be thought too indifferent in the matter it self , he doth confess , that ( pag. . ) for an unlearned man , that is in the power of an idolatrous king , or state , if commanded upon pain of death to worship before an idol , he detesteth the idol in his heart , he doth well , tho if he had the fortitude to suffer death rather then worship it , he should do better . and it is observable , that tho he makes such a kind of worshipper the more or the less scandalous by his example , he doth not presume ( tho he would be understood to do so ) to absolve him from sin . for tho the notoriety and example , may be an aggravation of the sin , yet it cannot make that a sin , that was in it self no sin ; nor can the secrecy of committing it , make that which in it self is sin , become no sin . and therefore whether it amount to idolatry or no , no terror of death ought to prevail over any christian to commit that sin . whether his pedigree of idolatry be well derived from the gentiles , is not worth the inquiry , since he takes so little care for the shutting it out of the christian church . for the canonizing of saints , and the popes assuming the title of pontifex maximus , ( the remembrance of which office in the roman state , might have put him in mind to have retracted what he said before , of the admitting the exercise of all religions in that republic ) and the abridging his universal jurisdiction , tho he gives him more then ever constantine is suggested to have granted to him , and for the procession of images , and the original of wax-candles , and torches lighted , and the information he gives us of holy-water , and some processions , i shall refer him to some of his friends of the roman church , who in truth are in too great an arrear to him ; for which they make no excuse that i have heard , but that they never think themselves concern'd to write against a mahometan . the survey of chapter . upon his forty sixth chapter i shall not enlarge , but heartily wish that he himself had enlarged more upon it , as an argument which he understands more then most that he hath handled : & yet i think he knows more of the learning , then of the places where it is professed , otherwise he could not so much mistake the universities , as to believe , that philosophy hath no other place here , then as a hand-maid to the roman religion . and whatever opinion he had when he wrote his leviathan , i presume he finds by this time , that his beloved and justly esteemed geometry , is studied and taught there by men who have convinced him of many errors , and of not being enough conversant in that science ; insomuch as the learned and reverend dr. ward , the present lord bishop of salisbury , and dr. wallis , the worthy professor of geometry in oxford , have both produced a person to him , whom he thought in the beginning of his leviathan impossible to find , ( pag. . ) who is so stupid , as both to mistake in geometry , and also to persist in it , when another detects his error to him . and for the universities in general being the hand-maids to the roman religion , over and above what hath bin truly said of our own famous universities , that they have bin in all times eminent opposers of the papal power , and are at present the greatest bullwarks christendom hath against that tyranny , and the propagation of the roman doctrine ; i may justly say , that the other famous universities of europe , tho in popish countries , as the sorbone , lovain , and even salamanca it self , have bin so far from advancing the most pernicious point of popery , ( i call it most pernicious , because it is most destructive to the peace of christendom ) the most supreme and universal jurisdiction of the pope , ( which if rejected as it ought to be , there would quickly be as much unity of opinion amongst christians , as christianity it self requires ) that they all contradicted it as long as their civil soveraign would permit . and as the sorbone still continues its vigor , as enjoying a freer air ; so the other two have not deserved , by any demonstration they have made , to be suspected to have degenerated from the spirit that possessed them in the council of trent , when the pope was more afraid of their bishops , then of the cardinal of lorrain himself , or of the two crowns of france and spain . and truly , it might be wished , that in this chapter , he had either forborn to have asked that question , ( pag. . ) to what purpose such subtlety was in a discourse of that nature , where he pretends to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of government and obedience ; or that he had given a clearer and more satisfactory answer , then by saying , that it is to that purpose , that men may no longer suffer themselves to be abus'd by them , that by the doctrine of separated essences , built on the vain philosophy of aristotle , would fright them from obeying the laws of their countries , as men fright birds from the corn with an emty doublet , a hat , and a crooked stick . it is not possible that mr. hobbes can believe that many of those who are most guilty of disobeying the laws , or have openly and rebelliously opposed the soveraign power in his own country , or in foreign kingdoms , have ever bin led into it by the doctrine of separated essences , which very terms few of them have ever heard of . and if the immortality of the soul , which he thinks so great an absurdity , hath some dependance upon the opinion of separated essences , it will still as little concern that classis of men , against whom he intends to inveigh , who rather believe they have no souls at all , then that they are immortal , ( the belief of which , would make them more consider what is like to become of them by their wicked and rebellious lives ) to which they are most like to be induced by mr. hobbes's doctrine , that the soul and body die together , which would secure them from a world of troublesom apprehensions . he knew too well the lord say , mr. pim , and mr. hambden , who first promoted the rebellion , and the earl of essex who conducted it , to suspect that they were corrupted to it by the doctrine of separated essences . and if cromwell , and vane , and ireton , who carried it much farther then the others intended to do , and made it incapable of reconciliation , grew better inform'd of the mischiefs of that doctrine , it was after the publication of the leviathan ; and yet they continued more of the opinion then most other men , in the literal sense , that faith , and wisdom , and other virtues , were somtimes pour'd into them , and somtimes blown into them from heaven , and yet were not more rebels from that opinion then they were before : with which words mr. hobbes renews his mirth , more then he hath cause for , except it be for their sakes . if he were constant to his own assertions , and did not think himself oblig'd to defend every new definition he thinks fit to give ( as in the beginning of this chapter , he makes a very new definition of philosophy , never heard of before , nor applicable to any philosophy but his own ) a man might wonder that he should so categorically pronounce , that , ( pag. . ) that original knowledg , called experience , in which consisteth prudence , is no part of philosophy , because it is not attain'd by reasoning , but found as well in brute beasts as in man , and is but a memory of successions of events in times past , wherein the omission of every little circumstance , altering the effect , frustrateth the expectation of the most prudent , whereas nothing is produced by reasoning aright , but general , eternal , and immutable truth . how is this consistent with the definition he formerly gave ( pag. ) that moral philosophy is nothing else , but the science of what is good and evil , in the conversation and society of mankind ? for now he excludes all this from being any part of philosophy . which may make some men apt to believe , that he doth not reason aright in words he understands ; for he saies ( pag. . ) that he who reasoneth aright in words he understandeth , can never conclude an error . so that if we have discover'd any error throughout his book ( and we are monstrously in the fault , if we have not in such abundant choice ) we may without presumtion conclude by his own rule , that either he hath not reasoned aright , or that he hath don it in words that he doth not understand . and he would have don well to have informed us , what those brute beasts are in whom that original knowledg , called experience , in which consisteth prudence , is found , as well as in man. i shall not labor to reconcile him to the schole-men , with whose learning i am not much in love , nor do believe that they have made any necessary or useful knowledg much more clear , or easie by their definitions or distinctions ; and do often wish , that very many of them had bin bred artificers , and handy-craft-men , in which they would have don the world much more good , and learning much less hurt . and as canon and gun-powder were first the invention of a monk , or a friar , so i believe some of the schole-men would have bin excellent lock-smiths , or ship-carpenters , and would have enriched the world with many useful discoveries and inventions . and more i shall not say to their language , or to the errors of tradition , or the other enormities of the roman church , which he takes alwaies in his way , let the subject of his discourse be what it will ; and i wish they would be provoked by him to consider and amend their faults . nor will i take any pains to disswade mr. hobbes from taking upon him to preach , but shall only put him in mind that if he doth , he thereby becomes a pastor , by which he will deprive himself of the liberty , by his own doctrine , to deny our saviour , or to worship an image , upon what autority or command soever . and if he finds himself among the idolaters of america , he will i doubt , as good a christian as he is , forbear to preach jesus christ , when he remembers that he is without a commission , and what judgment he hath pronounced against the poor indian that shall come into england to change the religion that is here establishde . but above all , whatever latitude his civil soveraign , at that time when his levia●han was published , permitted for the performing those functions , god be thanked , his present civil soveraign will not give him that liberty , until he receives orders from the bishops ; and it is probable they will not be forward to point him out by their hands , that he may be known to be qualified for that office and emploiment . the survey of chapter . if mr. hobbes hath in this his last chapter discover'd the true causes of that darkness , which hath hitherto hindred this new devouring light of his from breaking in upon us , we have more obligations to the papists and presbyterians , then i knew we had : however , i shall not gratifie him , by undertaking to vindicate either of them from the reproches he charges them with ; nor will i take upon me to reply to his sly and bitter insinuations against the clergy in all kinds , protestants as well as papists , in a thread that runs through his book from one end to the other . they are of age , let them speak for themselves . only i cannot but observe , and i should be unexcusable if i should not , that after all his bitter and uncharitable invectives against the bishops and clergy of the church of england , and of which he would still be thought a member , he hath not in this his last chapter of cui bono , bin able to fasten the least reproch upon them , of being swaied by any other motives then the most abstracted considerations of conscience , duty , gratitude , and generosity , constantly and stedfastly to adhere to the king : since they had in their view , before the civil war was begun , all the prejudice to their persons , and all the destruction to their interest that fell out afterwards ; and had their election , whether they would , besides keeping what they were possessed of , receive greater additions and graces from those who opposed the king , or by continuing faithful to him , be dispossessed of all they had , be cast into prisons ( and new prisons made for them in old ships and barques upon the water ) and with such circumstances of inhumanity , that put a short end to the lives of many thousands of them , their wives and children . and they chose the latter , and to be exposed to all the misery and contemt imaginable , rather then to dissemble or concele that fidelity and allegiance they ow'd to their king , in the highest of his afflictions and persecution : and from the moment of his execrable murder , continued the same affection and loialty to his son , their present soveraign , when the triumphant and victorious faction made it penal to acknowledg him , or to give him the title of king. and therefore it was below the education of mr. hobbes , and a very ungenerous and vile thing , to publish his leviathan with so much malice and acrimony against the church of england , when it was scarce strugling in its own ruines ; and against all the bishops and clergy of the same , when many of them were weltering in their own blood upon scaffolds , and the rest reduced to all the miseries human nature can be exposed to , without any suggestion of a crime , but of fidelity to the king. when the reverend bishops who were left alive , and out of prison , being stripped of all that was their own , preserved themselves from famine , by stooping to the lowest offices of teaching schole , and officiating in private families for their bread ; which , together with the alms of those charitable persons who were themselves undon , was all the portion that the poor bishops , and all the faithful clergy of the church of england , had to preserve themselves in the low condition to which they were reduced . and it is but justice to the memory of those persons , and for the everlasting glory of that church , to say , that the whole orthodox clergy were joint sufferers with , and for the crown ; and that very few can be named , who were ever reputed or looked upon as sons of the church of england , that adhered to , or concurred with the rebels . some few impious apostates in the beginning of the rebellion became perjur'd , to satisfie their ambition by the countenance of the great incendiaries , who paid them well for their labor . afterwards , they made and ordained their own clergy , and then undertook and performed the function themselves , their own creatures finding them too wicked to be complied with , whil'st the true clergy somtimes lost their lives upon scaffolds , somtimes on gibbets for the greater disgrace , to give testimony of their fast and unshaken loialty to the king ; and others died in prisons , or lurked in obscure , but safe and charitable corners . these were the men who propagated loialty and allegiance with the utmost hazard of their lives , when it was near extirpation ; countermined the stratagems which were every day set on foot , to corrupt the affections of those who had paid dear for being good subjects , and to make them weary of being so great losers for conscience sake ; when mr. hobbes his leviathan absolv'd all men from their allegiance , and industriously perswaded all sorts of men , that cromwell was their true and lawful soveraign , and that it was folly and guilt , and inevitable deserved ruin , not to adhere to him , and assist him against any opposition soever . these are the men who as diligently administred antidotes against his poison , prevented the operation of it in many , and the application of it to more ; watched the tares which he , and others of his party scattered abroad , and pulled them up before they got strength to grow to do the mischief he intended ; and , tho they were all banish'd the universities , and durst not be seen there , that his vile principles , or as bad , might take root and flourish there ; yet found means to preserve and purifie those nurseries , and keep those fountains clean , and so to cultivate learning and good manners there ; that whil'st the chief governors were placed there as olivers centinels , to keep the protestant religion from entring into his disciples , to instruct those who were under his charge to be good subjects to him , that seed brought up very little fruit ; but the elements of duty and allegiance to their absent , banished , lawful soveraign , were sucked in greedily by them , and flourished accordingly . in a word , these were the men , who were look'd upon with esteem and reverence by all the nobility and gentry of the kingdom , who retain'd their affection and duty towards the king entirely in their hearts , and thereby the opportunity to perform many notable services to the king , and to give him useful advertisements ; and having unquestioned credit in a treacherous and perfidious season , when children betrayed their fathers , servants their masters , and friends one another , were trusted by all men ; and so having no farther care for themselves , then to live very meanly , they became treasurers and almoners for all indigent gentlemen who had served the king , or desired so to do ; and relieved very many of that kind , that they might be ready upon a good opportunity to serve his majesty , and not be forced to go to him , who had not wherewith to relieve them . they discharged the expense of many expresses , which were frequently sent to the king , and from him , which amounted to a great charge ; and contributed much to the maintenance of those of the clergy who faithfully attended his majesties person , and often transmitted such sums of mony to his majesty himself , as were very seasonable supplies to him in great distresses . i can have no end , and have no temtation to say all this , but hold my self obliged to justice and truth to give this testimony , since all the particulars are well known to me , having at that time the honor to be in some trust with his majesty , and thereby the full knowledg of what then passed , of which there are not now many other witnesses amongst the living . and therefore i could not omit this proper season in the close of mr. h●bbes his book , throughout which he hath made so violent a war upon them without any colour of reason , to say , that he ows them many acknowledgments , but more to god alm●ghty for the scandal he hath brought upon religion , upon the best constituted church of the world , and upon the most learned clergy of any church , and the most irreconcilable to any thing that is erroneous , or offensive in the roman religion , which therefore looks upon them as the only considerable and formidable enemy they have to encounter . i shall not need to take any pains to remove him from the good opinion he had of independency when he published his book , because ( pag. . ) it left every man to do what liked him best in religion , as he saies , but in truth because cromwell was then thought to be of that faction . but i dare say he did with his heart , as well as by his tongue , quit that party the very day that the king was proclaimed , as he is ready to quit all his other opinions true or false , assoon as the soveraign power shall please to require him ; which makes whatever he saies , the less to need answering . and i shall be less solicitous to deprive the pope of his new kingdom of fairies , with the title to which mr. hobbes hath gratified him , to allay that fear , and apprehension which he had endeavoured so much before to infuse into the minds of all princes , of his dangerous greatness and power : if at last prove no more then the king of fairies hath , it is less terrible then he represented it to be . but since he hath not thought fit to retain that modesty which he professed to have , ( pag. . ) that tho he had proved his doctrine out of places of scripture not few nor obscure , yet because it will appear to most men a novelty , he did but propound it , maintaining nothing in this , or any other paradox of religion , but attending the end of that dispute of the sword , concerning the autority ( not yet amongst his country-men decided ) by which all sorts of doctrine are to be approved , or rejected , and whose commands both in speech and writing ( whatsoever be the opinions of private men ) must by all men , who mean to be protected by their laws be obeied ; notwithstanding which reservation , and after he hath seen that dispute of the sword concerning the autority amongst his country men decided , after he hath seen that prodigy of mankind , whom he acknowledged to be his soveraign , instituted and adored by him , exposed upon the gallows , and his carcass placed upon the stage that is reserved for the most infamous traitors and rebels , and all his actions condemned and detested by the whole nation ( all which were govern'd and steered exactly by mr. hobbes his own institution , and sufficiently shew how insecure they will prove to any man that observes them ) and after he hath seen his true and lawful soveraign , his disavowed and renounced soveraign , and whose subjects he had absolv'd from his obedience , restored and established with the universal and unexpressible joy of his three kingdoms , and thereby his whole doctrine with reference to the ecclesiastical as well as civil government , disavowed and condemn'd , and not exemplarily punished only by his majesties gracious observation of the act of indemnity , of which few subjects have more need : it is too malicious an obstinacy and perversness in him , still to adhere to his odious paradoxes , both in his conversation and by private transcripts , which he labors to get printed , and was never more solicitous to have his most destructive doctrines to be published and confirm'd by autority , ( the ill consequence whereof to himself , he despises the learning of the law too much to understand . ) and as he would allow no other right to the subject in his liberty or propriety , but what the soveraigns silence hath permitted in not taking it from him , as to dwell where he pleases , and educate his children as he thinks fit , and the like : so he interprets the present silence of the law , as an approbation of those his monstrous principles , which it knows not how to contradict , not considering the while that this silence of the law cannot be broken , but in the loud inflicting those severe punishments upon him , as without the shelter of that soveraigns mercy whom he so much despised and provoked , would at once in his ruine discredit all his vain philosophy , and more pernicious theology ; and he would find the successors of sr. edward cooke , with whose great ignorance he makes himself so merry , learned enough to instruct him in the duty , and reverence , that is due from all subjects to the law , and government . and for the better manifestation of the premises , having now walked to the end of his fourth part , before we take a view of his review and conclusion , we will observe the same method we did at the end of his two first parts , and according to the advice himself gives in his examination of bellarmines doctrine , lay open his conclusions , and principles in religion , which lie scatter'd through those other two parts , that men may take a view of the consequences , and bethink themselves , whether christianity be advanc'd , and consequently whether the peace and happiness of mankind be provided for , and secured by such doctrines . . those books of scripture only are canonical , and ought to be looked upon as the word of god in every nation , which are established for such by the soveraign autority of each nation . pag. . . none can know that the scriptures are gods word ( tho all true christians believe it ) but they to whom god himself ●ath revealed it supernaturally . pag. . . men ought to consider , who hath next under god the autority of governing christian men , and to observe for a rule , that doctrine which he commandeth to be taught ; that is , all subjects ought to profess that religion which the soveraign enjoines , whether he be christian or heathen . pag. . . by the kingdom of heaven , is meant the kingdom of the king that dwelleth in heaven , and that the kingdom of god is to be on earth . pag. , . . the immortal life beginneth not in man till the resurrection and day of iudgment , and hath for cause , not his specifical nature and generation , but promise . pag. . . gods enemies , and their torments after iudgment , appear by the scripture to have their places upon earth . pag. . the fire shall be unquenchable , and the torments everlasting after the resurrection . but it cannot therefore be inferr'd , that he who shall be cast into that fire , or be tormented with those torments , shall endure and resist them so , as to be eternally burned and tortured , and yet never be destroied , or die . pag. . . there shall be a second death of every one that shall be condemn'd at the day of judgment , after which he shall die no more . the scriptures affirm not , that there shall be an eternal life therein of any individual person , but to the contrary , an everlasting death . pag. . . the salvation we are to look for , is to be upon the earth . for since gods throne is in heaven , and the earth is his footstool , it is not for the dignity of so great a king , that his subjects should have any place so high as his throne , or higher then his foot-stool . pag. . . if we be commanded by our lawful prince to say we do not believe in christ , we may obey such his command . pag. . . none can be martyrs for christ , but they that conversed with him on earth , and saw him after he was risen ; for a witness must have seen what he testifieth , or else his testimony is not good . pag. . . none can be a martyr who hath not a warrant to preach christ come in the flesh , and none but such who are sent to the conversion of infidels . pag. . . to teach out of the old testament that iesus was christ , and risen from the dead , is not to say , that men are bound after they believe it , to obey those who tell them so against the laws and commands of their soveraigns , but they do wisely to expect the coming of christ hereafter in patience , and faith , with obedience to their present magistrates , pag. . . the autority of earthly soveraigns being not to be put down till the day of iudgment , it is manifest we do not in baptism constitute over us another autority , by which our external actions are to be governed in this life . pag. . . they who received not the doctrine of christ did not sin therein . pag. . . christian kings have power to baptize , to preach , to administer the lords supper , and to consecrate both temples and persons to gods service , &c. . . no man shall live in torments everlastingly . pag. . . to pray voluntarily to the king for fair weather , or for any thing that god only can do for us , is divine worship , and idolatry ; but if a king compel a man to it by the terror of death , or other great corporal punishment , it is not idolatry . pag. . . if one being no pastor , or of eminent reputation for knowledg in christian doctrine , do external honor to an idol for fear , and an other follow him , this is no scandal given , for he had no cause to follow such example . pag. . and now i hope he hath made an ample paraphrase upon religion , according to the definition he g●ve of it in the first entrance of his leviathan , when he defines ( pag. . ) religion , to be f●ar of power invisible , feigned by the mind , or imagined from tales publicly told ; and when the seed he sows for religion to grow from , or to consist in , are opinion of ghosts , ignorance of second causes , devotion towards what men fear , and taking things casual for prognosticks . these , amongst others , are the doctrines of mr. hobbes in his two last parts ; which , i believe , in the judgment of most christians , are assoon renounc'd as pronounc'd , and which indeed need little other confutation then the reciting them ; yet i doubt not , many men will say , how scandalous soever the assertions seem to be , ( since he appeals to the scripture , and cites several texts out of the same , for the making good the worst of his opinions ) it is pity that his ignorance , or perverseness in those interpretations had not bin made appear , by manifesting that those places of scripture could not admit that interpretation , and what the genuine sense thereof is . which consideration had bin more reasonable and necessary , if these errors had bin publish'd , and those glosses made and own'd by any national church , or any body of learned men ; but it may be thought too great a presumtion for a private man , a stranger to divinity , to take upon him to put unnatural interpretations upon several texts of scripture , the better to apply them , and make them subservient to his own corrupt purposes and opinions , contrary to the whole current of scripture , and to the doctrine thereof , and without the least autority or shadow , that the like interpretation was ever made before by any other man : i say , such a person cannot reasonably expect , that any body should too seriously examine all his frivolous and light suggestions , and endeavor to vindicate those texts from such impossible interpretations . yet if any man thinks it worth his pains , i am well content that he receive that honor , and will still hope that mr. hobbes may be so well instructed in the true sense and end of the scripture , that he may better discern the eternity of the reward and punishment in the next world. and so we conclude our discourse upon his book , and examine what he saies in his conclusion . the review and conclusion , is only an abridgment and contracting the most contagious poison that runs through the book , into a less vessel or volume , least they , who will not take the pains to read the book , or reading it may by inadvertency and incogitancy not be hurt enough by it , may here in less room , and more nakedly , swallow his choicest doctrine at one morsel : and is in truth , a sly address to cromwell , that being then out of the kingdom , and so being neither conquered nor his subject , he might by his return submit to his government , and be bound to obey ; it which , being uncompelled by any necessity or want , but having as much to sustain him abroad as he had to live upon at home , could not proceed from a sincere heart and uncorrupted . this review and conclusion he made short enough , to hope the cromwell himself might read it ; where he should not only receive the pawn of his new subjects allegiance , by his declaring his own obligation and obedience , but by publishing such doctrine , as being diligently infused by such a master in the mystery of government , might secure the people of the kingdom ( over whom he had no right to command ) to acquiesce and submit to his brutal power . and in order to that , he takes upon him very positively to declare ( which no man had ever presumed to do before ) the precise time when subjects become obliged to submit to the conqueror ; and saies , ( pag. . ) that time is , as to an ordinary subject , when the means of his life is within the guards and garrisons of the enemy ; and for him who hath nearer obligations , he hath liberty to submit to his new master , when his old one can give him protection no longer . and he is very careful that it may be the more taken notice of , to insert in another letter his maxime , ( pag. . ) that every man is bound by nature , as much as in him lies , to protect in war the autority by which he is himself protected in time of peace . all which he saies , appears by consequence from those laws which he hath mentioned throughout his book , ( pag. . ) yet that the times require to have it inculcated and remembred ; which shall not oblige me to recapitulate what hath bin said before upon the propositions . and he is so fearful that cromwell was not solicitous enough for his own security , that he tells him in his review ( which he had not before said in his book ( pag. . ) that conquerors must require not only a submission of mens actions to them for the future , but also an approbation of all their actions past . which advice he followed as far as he could , till he found it too unreasonable to impose , even upon those who had concurred with him in most of the mischief that he had don . and least he should be too scrupulous and modest in using the power he had , and too apt to be amused with reproches , he saies , ( pag. . ) the toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny , is a toleration of hatred to commonwealth in general ; to the extravagancy of which assertion , enough hath bin said before . these are the choice flowers he hath bound up together in his review , least the odor of them might lose some of its fragrancy in the bigness of the book . and having with great tenderness provided , that no man should think it lawful to kill him ; and insinuated as much , and with as much virulency as he could , a prejudice to the roial party ; he gives his own testimony of his whole doctrine , and saies , ( pag. . ) the principles of it are true , and proper , and the ratiocination solid ; and therefore concludes , that it might be profitably printed , and more profitably taught in the vniversities , &c. and other licence then his own it never had to be printed . but mr. hobbes knows well , that a mans testimony in his own behalf , is not valid ; and if mine could carry any autority with it , i would make no scruple to declare , that i never read any book that contains in it so much sedition , treason , and impiety as this leviathan ; and therefore that it is very unfit to be read , taught , or sold , as dissolving all the ligaments of government , and undermining all principles of religion . i do not with that the author should be ordered to recant , because he would be too ready to do it upon his declared salvo : nor do i wish he should undergo any other punishment , then by knowing that his book is condemned by the soveraign autority , to be publickly burn'd , which by his own judgment will restrain him from publishing his pernicious doctrine in his discourses , which have don more mischief then his book . and i would be very willing to preserve the just testimony which he gives to the memory of sidny godolphin , who deserved all the eulogy that he gives him , and whose untimely loss in the beginning of the war , was too lively an instance of the inequality of the contention , when such inestimable treasure was ventur'd against dirty people of no name , and whose irreparable loss was lamented by all men living who pretended to virtue , how much divided soever in the prosecution of that quarrel . but i find my self temted to add , that of all men living , there were no two more unlike then mr. godo●phin and mr. hobbes , in the modesty of nature , or integrity of manners ; and therefore it will be too reasonably suspected , that the freshness of the legacy rather put him in mind of that noble gentleman , to mention him in the fag-end of his book very unproperly , and in a huddle of many unjustifiable and wicked particulars , when he had more seasonable occasion to have remembred him in many parts of his book . however , i cannot forbear to put him in mind , that i gave him , for an expiation of my own defects , and any trespasses which i may have since committed against him , the friendship of that great person ; and first informed him of that legacy , which had not otherwise bin paid before the printing his review . and for my own part , i shall conclude as i begun , with the profession of so much esteem of his parts , and reverence for his very vigorous age , ( which in , and for it self is venerable ) that in order to his conversion to be a good subject , and a good christian , i could be well content , that as he seems to wish in his commentary upon the fourth commandment , ( pag. . ) as the iews had every seventh day , in which the law was read and expounded ; so he thinks it necessary that some such times be determined , wherein the people may assemble together , and ( after praiers and praises given to god the soveraign of soveraigns ) hear those their duties told them , which are prescribed in this his leviathan ; and the positive laws , such as generally concern them all , read and expounded , and be put in mind of the autority that maketh them laws : so i say , i should not be displeased , if himself were allowed to make choice of his own sabbaths , to read his lectures in both universities , and if he desired it afterwards , in the city , upon those theses , which for his ease are faithfully collected in this answer out of his book . and if this exercise doth not cure him , i could wish that the same application and remedy might be tried , by which the emperor alexander severus cured the censoriousness and ambition of ovinius camillus , who was as old , and loved his ease as well as mr. hobbes ; yet being not satisfied with the present conduct of affairs ( and from thence became very popular ) he had a purpose to make himself emperor . of which severus being inform'd , and having receiv'd and examin'd the full truth of it , he sent for him , and gave him thanks , as aelius spartianus tells us , quod curam reipub. quae recusantibus bonis imponeretur , sponte reciperet : and thereupon took him full of fear , and terrified with the conscience of his own guilt , with him to the senate , participem imperii appellavit , in palatium recepit , & ornament is imperialibus , & melioribus quam ipse utebatur , affecit . afterwards , when there was occasion of an expedition against the barbarians , he offered him , vel ipsum si vellet ire , vel ut secum proficisceretur ; which he chusing , and severus himself walking still on foot with his colleague , who had accompanied him for many daies with intolerable fatigue , the emperor caused a horse to be brought to him , upon which having rode some daies , as much tired as before , carpento imposuit . the conclusion was , he was so weary and ready to die under the command , that abdicavit imperium ; and severus after he had commended him to the soldiers , tutum ad villas suas ire praecepit , in quibus diu vixit . i should be very glad that mr. hobbes might have a place in parliament , and sit in counsel , and be present in courts of justice , and other tribunals ; whereby it is probable he would find , that his solitary cogitation , how deep soever , and his too peremtory adhering to some philosophical notions , and even rules of geometry , had misled him in the investigation of policy , and would rather retire to his quiet quarter in the peak , without envy of those whom he left in emploiment , then keep them longer company in so toilsom , uneasie , and ungrateful transactions . and possibly this might , and i doubt only could , prevail upon him , to make such recollection and acknowledgment of all the falshood , profaneness , impiety and blasphemy in his book , as may remove all those rubs and disturbances , which he may justly apprehend , as well in the way to his last journy , as at the end of it , if he be not terrified with that disinal pronunciation , if we sin willfully , after that we have received the knowledg of the truth , there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins , but a certain fearful looking for of judgment , and fiery indignation , which shall devour the adversaries . finis . political discourses of sir robert filmer, baronet, viz. patriarcha, or the natural power of kings. the free-holders grand-inquest. observations upon aristotles politicks. directions for obedience to government. also observations upon mr. hobbs's leviathan. mr. milton against salmatius. hugo grotius de jure belli & pacis. mr. hunton's treatise on monarchy. with an advertisement to the jurymen of england touching witches patriarcha. filmer, robert, sir, d. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) political discourses of sir robert filmer, baronet, viz. patriarcha, or the natural power of kings. the free-holders grand-inquest. observations upon aristotles politicks. directions for obedience to government. also observations upon mr. hobbs's leviathan. mr. milton against salmatius. hugo grotius de jure belli & pacis. mr. hunton's treatise on monarchy. with an advertisement to the jurymen of england touching witches patriarcha. filmer, robert, sir, d. . [ ], , [ ] p. [s.n.], london : printed in the year m dc lxxx. [ ] a reissue of patriarcha (wing f ) with new title page in place of frontispiece; original title page not cancelled. reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng monarchy -- great britain -- early works to . political science -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion political discourses of sir robert filmer , baronet , viz. patriarcha , or the natural power of kings . the free-holders grand-inquest . observations upon aristotles politicks . directions for obedience to government . also observations upon mr. hobbs's leviathan . mr. milton against salmatius . hugo grotius de jure belli & pacis . mr. hunton's treatise of monarchy . with an advertisement to the jurymen of england touching witches . london , printed in the year m dc lxxx . patriarcha : or the natural power of kings . by the learned sir robert filmer , baronet . lucan . lib. ● . libertas — populi , quem regna coercent libertate perit — claudian . fallitur , egregio quisquis sub principe oredit servitium ; nusquam libertas gratior extat quam sub rege pio — london , printed , and are to be sold by walter davis book-binder , in amen-corner , near pater-noster-row , . the copy of a letter written by the late learned dr. peter heylyn , to sir edward filmer , son of the worthy author , concerning this book and his other political discourses . sir , how great a loss i had in the death of my most dear and honoured friend , your deceased father , no man is able to conjecture , but he that hath suffered in the like . so affable was his conversation , his discourse so rational , his judgment so exact in most parts of learning , and his affections to the church so exemplary in him , that i never enjoyed a greater felicity in the company of any man living , than i did in his : in which respects i may affirm both with safety and modesty , that we did not only take sweet counsel together , but walked in the house of god as friends : i must needs say , i was prepared for that great blow , by the loss of my preferment in the church of westminster , which gave me the opportunity of so dear and beloved a neighbourhood ; so that i lost him partly before he died , which made the misery the more supportable , when i was deprived of him for altogether . but i was never more sensible of the infelicity , than i am at this present , in reference to that satisfaction , which i am sure he could have given the gentleman whom i am to deal with : his eminent abilities in these political disputes , exemplified in his judicious observations upon aristotles politiques ; as also in some passages on grotius , hunton , hobbs , and other of our late discoursers about forms of government , declare abundantly how fit a man he might have been to have dealt in this cause , which i would not willingly should be betrayed by unskilful handling : and had he pleased to have suffered his excellent discourse called patriarcha to appear in publick , it would have given such satisfaction to all our great masters in the schools of politie , that all other tractates in that kind , had been found unnecessary . vide certamen epistolare . . the contents . chap. i. that the first kings were fathers of families . ( ) the tenent of the natural liberty of the people , new , plausible , and dangerous . ( ) the question stated out of bellarmine , and some contradictions of his noted . ( ) bellarmine's argument answered out of bellarmine himself . ( ) the royal authority of the patriarchs before the flood . ( ) the dispersion of nations over the world after the confusion of babel , was by entire families , over which the fathers were kings . ( ) and from them all kings descended . ( ) all kings are either fathers of their people : ( ) or heirs of such fathers , or usurpers of the right of such fathers . ( ) of the escheating of kingdoms . ( ) of regal and paternal power and of their agreement . chap. ii. it is unnatural for the people to govern , or chose governours . ( ) aristotle examined about the fredom of the people , and justisied . ( ) suarez disputes against the regality of adam . ( ) families diversly defined by aristotle , bodin , and others . ( ) suarez contradicting bellarmine . ( ) of election of kings , ( ) by the major part of the people , ( ) by proxie , and by silent acceptation . ( ) no example in scripture of the peoples choosing their king. mr. hookers judgement therein . ( ) god governed alwayes by monarchy . ( ) bellarmine and aristotles judgement of monarchy . ( ) imperfections of the roman democratie . ( ) rome began her empire under kings , and perfected it under emperours . in danger the people of rome always fled to monarchy . ( ) vvhether democraties were invented to bridle tyrants , or whether they crept in by stealth . ( ) democraties vilified by their own historians . ( ) popular government more bloody than tyranny . ( ) of a mixed government of the king and people . ( ) the people may not judge nor correct their king. ( ) no tyrants in england since the conquest . chap. iii. positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of kings . ( ) regal authority not subject to positive laws . kings were before laws . the kings of judah and israel not tyed to laws . ( ) of samuel's description of a king. ( ) the power ascribed to kings in the new testament . ( ) vvhether laws were invented to bridle tyrants . ( ) the benefit of laws . ( ) kings keep the laws , though not bound by the laws . ( ) of the oaths of kings . ( ) of the benefit of the kings prerogative over laws . ( ) the king the author , the interpreter , and corrector of the common laws . ( ) the king iudge in all causes both before the conquest and since . ( ) the king and his councel anciently determined causes in the star-chamber . ( ) of parliaments . ( ) vvhen the people were first called to parliaments . ( ) the liberty of parliaments not from nature , but from the grace of princes . ( ) the king alone makes laws in parliament . ( ) he governs both houses by himselfe , ( ) or by his councel , ( ) or by his iudges . errata . page . line . for calume read calvin . chap. i. that the first kings were fathers of families . ( ) the tenent of the natural liberty of mankind , new , plausible , and dangerous . ( ) the question stated out of bellarmine : some contradictions of his noted . ( ) bellarmine's argument answered out of bellarmine himself . ( ) the royal authority of the patriarchs before the flood . ( ) the dispersion of nations over the world after the confusion of babel , was by entire families , over which the fathers were kings . ( ) and from them all kings descended . ( ) all kings are either fathers of their people , ( ) or heirs of such fathers , or usurpers of the right of such fathers . ( ) of the escheating of kingdoms . ( ) of regal and paternal power , and their agreement . since the time that school-divinity began to flourish , there hath been a common opinion maintained , as well by divines , as by divers other learned men , which affirms , mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom from all subjection , and at liberty to choose what form of government it please : and that the power which any one man hath over others , was at first bestowed according to the discretion of the multitude . this tenent was first hatched in the schools , and hath been fostered by all succeeding papists for good divinity . the divines also of the reformed churches have entertained it , and the common people every where tenderly embrace it , as being most plausible to flesh and blood , for that it prodigally destributes a portion of liberty to the meanest of the multitude , who magnifie liberty , as if the height of humane felicity were only to be found in it , never remembring that the desire of liberty was the first cause of the fall of adam . but howsoever this vulgar opinion hath of late obtained a great reputation , yet it is not to be found in the ancient fathers and doctors of the primitive church : it contradicts the doctrine and history of the holy scriptures , the constant practice of all ancient monarchies , and the very principles of the law of nature . it is hard to say whether it be more erroneous in divinity , or dangerous in policy . yet upon the ground of this doctrine both jesuites , and some other zealous favourers of the geneva discipline , have built a perillous conclusion , which is , that the people or multitude have power to punish , or deprive the prince , if he transgress the laws of the kingdom ; witness parsons and buchanan : the first under the name of dolman , in the third chapter of his first book labours to prove , that kings have been lawfully chastised by their commonwealths : the ●atter in his book de jure regni apud scotos , maintains a liberty of the people to depose their prince . cardinal bellarmine and calume , both look asquint this way . this desperate assertion whereby kings are made subject to the censures and deprivations of their subjects , follows ( as the authors of it conceive ) as a necessary consequence of that former position of the supposed natural equality and freedom of mankind , and liberty to choose what form of government it please . and though sir john heyward , adam blackwood , john barclay , and some others have learnedly confuted both buchanan and parsons , and bravely vindicated the right of kings in most points , yet all of them , when they come to the argument drawn from the natural liberty and equality of mankind , do with one consent admit it for a truth unquestionable , not so much as once denying or opposing it ; whereas if they did but confute this first erroneous principle , the whole fabrick of this vast engine of popular sedition would drop down of it self . the rebellious consequence which follows this prime article of the natural freedom of mankind may be my sufficient warrant for a modest examination of the original truth of it ; much hath been said , and by many , for the affirmative ; equity requires that an ear be reserved a little for the negative . in this discourse i shall give my self these cautions : first , i have nothing to do to medle with mysteries of state , such arcana imperii , or cabinet-councels , the vulgar may not pry into . an implicite faith is given to the meanest artificer in his own craft , how much more is it then due to a prince in the profound secrets of government ? the causes and ends of the greatest politique actions and motions of state dazle the eyes , and exceed the capacities of all men , save only those that are hourly versed in the managing publique affairs : yet since the rule for each men to know in what to obey his prince , cannot be learnt without a relative knowledge of those points wherein a sovereign may command , it is necessary when the commands and pleasures of superiours come abroad and call for an obedience , that every man himself know how to regulate his actions or his sufferings ; for according to the quality of the thing commanded , an active or passive obedience is to be yielded ; and this is not to limit the princes power , but the extent of the subjects obedience , by giving to caesar the things that are caesar's , &c. secondly , i am not to question , or quarrel ●● the rights or liberties of this or any other nation ; my task is chiefly to enquire from whom these first came , not to dispute what , or how many these are ; but whether they were derived from the laws of natural liberty , or from the grace and bounty of princes . my desire and hope is , that the people of england may and do enjoy as ample privileges as any nation under heaven ; the greatest liberty in the world ( if it be duely considered ) is for a people to live under a monarch . it is the magna charta of this kingdom , all other shews or pretexts of liberty , are but several degrees of slavery , and a liberty only to destroy liberty . if such as maintain the natural liberty of mankind , take offence at the liberty i take to examine it , they must take heed that they do not deny by retail , that liberty which they affirm by whole-sale : for , if the thesis be true , the hypothesis will follow , that all men may examine their own charters , deeds , or evidences by which they claim and hold the inheritance or freehold of their liberties . thirdly , i must not detract from the worth of all those learned men , who are of a contrary opinion in the point of natural liberty : the profoundest scholar that ever was known hath not been able to search out every truth that is discoverable ; neither aristotle in philosophy , nor hooker in divinity . they are but men , yet i reverence their judgements in most points , and confess my self beholding to their errors too in this ; something that i found amiss in their opinions , guided me in the discovery of that truth which ( i perswade my self ) they missed . a dwarf sometimes may see that which a giant looks over ; for whilest one truth is curiously searched after , another must necessarily be neglected . late writers have taken up too much upon trust from the subtile school-men , who to be sure to thrust down the king below the pope , thought it the safest course to advance the people above the king , that so the papal power might take place of the regal . thus many an ignorant subject hath been fooled into this faith , that a man may become a martyr for his countrey , by being a traytor to his prince ; whereas the new-coyned distinction of subjects into royallists and patriots , is most unnatural , since the relation between king and people is so great , that their well-being is so reciprocal . ( ) to make evident the grounds of this question , about the natural liberty of mankind , i will lay down some passages of cardinal bellarmine , that may best unfold the state of this controversie . secular or civil power ( saith he ) is instituted by men ; it is in the people , unless they bestow it on a prince . this power is immediately in the whole multitude , as in the subject of it ; for this power is in the divine law , but the divine law hath given this power to no particular man — if the positive law be taken away , there is left no reason , why amongst a multitude ( who are equal ) one rather than another should bear rule over the rest . — power is given by the multitude to one man , or to more , by the same law of nature ; for the commonwealth cannot exercise this power , therefore it is bound to bestow it upon some one man , or some few . — it depends upon the consent of the multitude to ordain over themselves a king , or consul , or other magistrates ; and if there be a lawful cause , the multitude may change the kingdom into an aristocracy or democracy . thus far bellarmine ; in which passages are comprised the strength of all that ever i have read , or heard produced for the natural liberty of the subject . before i examine or refute these doctrines , i must a little make some observations upon his words . first , he saith , that by the law of god , power is immediately in the people ; hereby he makes god to be the immediate author of a democratical estate ; for a democracy is nothing else but the power of the multitude . if this be true , not only aristocracies , but all monarchies are altogether unlawful , as being ordained ( as he thinks ) by men , whenas god himself hath chosen a democracy . secondly , he holds , that although a democracy be the ordinance of god , yet the people have no power to use the power which god hath given them , but only power to give away their power ; whereby it followeth , that there can be no democratical government , because he saith , the people must give their power to one man , or to some few ; which maketh either a regal or aristocratical estate ; which the multitude is tyed to do , even by the same law of nature which originally gave them the power : and why then doth he say , the multitude may change the kingdom into a democracy ? thirdly , he concludes , that if there be lawful cause , the multitude may change the kingdom . here i would fain know who shall judge of this lawful cause ? ●f the multitude ( for i see no body else can ) then this is a pestilent and dangerous conclusion . ( ) i come now to examine that argument which is used by bellarmine , and ●s the one and only argument i can find produced by my author for the proof of the natural liberty of the people . it is thus framed : that god hath given or ordained power , is evident by scripture ; but god hath given it to no particular person , because by nature all men are equal ; therefore he hath given power to the people , or multitude . to answer this reason , drawn from the equality of mankind by nature , i will first use the help of bellarmine himself , whose very words are these : if many men had been together created out of the earth , they all ought to have been princes over their posterity . in these words we have an evident confession , that creation made man prince of his posterity . and indeed not only adam , but the succeeding patriarchs had , by right of father-hood , royal authority over their children . nor dares bellarmie deny this also . that the patriarchs ( saith he ) were endowed with kingly power their deeds do testifie ; for as adam was lord of his children , so his children under him , had a command and power over their own children ; but still with subordination to the first parent , wh● is lord-paramout over his children children to all generations , as being the grand-father of his people . ( ) i see not then how the children of adam , or of any man else can be free from subjection to their parents : and this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority , by the ordination of god himself ; it follows that civil power not only in general i● by divine institution , but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents , which quite takes away tha● new and common distinction , which refers only power universal and absolute to god ; but power respective , in regard of the special form of government , to the choice of the people . this lordship which adam by com●●nd had over the whole world , and right descending from him the pa●●●archs did enjoy , was as large and ●ple as the absolutest dominion of ●y monarch which hath been since the ●eation : for dominion of life and ●eath , we find that judah the father ●onounced sentence of death against ●amar his daughter-in-law , for play●●g the harlot ; bring her forth ( saith 〈◊〉 ) that she may be burnt . touching ●ar , we see that abram commanded an ●rmy of souldiers of his own fa●ily . and esau met his brother jacob ●ith men at arms. for matter of ●eace , abraham made a league with ●●imelech , and ratified the articles with ● oath . these acts of judging in ca●al crimes , of making war , and con●●uding peace , are the chiefest marks of ●overeignty that are found in any monarch . ( ) not only until the flood , but ●fter it , this patriarchal power did con●●nue , as the very name patriarch doth ●● part prove . the three sons of noah ●ad the whole world divided amongst them by their father ; for of them ●● the whole world over-spread , according to the benediction given to him a● his sons , be fruitful and multiply , a● replenish the earth . most of the civil● nations of the earth labour to fet● their original from some one of t●● sons or nephews of noah , which we● scattered abroad after the confusion babel : in this dispersion we must certainly find the establishment of reg● power throughout the kingdoms of t●● world. it is a common opinion , that at th● confusion of tongues there were ●● distinct nations erected , all which we● not confused multitudes , without hea●● or governours , and at liberty to choo●● what governours or government the● pleased ; but they were distinct families , which had fathers for rulers over them ; whereby it appears that even i● the confusion god was careful to preserve the fatherly authority , by distributing the diversity of languages according to the diversity of families for so plainly it appears by the text first , after the enumeration of the son● of japhet , the conclusion is , by these ●ere the isles of the gentiles divided in their lands , every one after his tongue , after their families , in their nations ; so ●t is said : these are the sons of ham ●fter their families , after their tongues , ●● their countreys , and in their nations . the like we read , these are the sons of ●hem after their families , after their tongues , in their lands , after their nations . these are the families of the sons of noah after their generations in their nations ; and by these were these nations divided in the earth , after the flood . in this division of the world , some are of opinion that noah used lots for the distribution of it ; others affirm he ●ayled about the mediterranean sea in ten years , and as he went about , appointed to each son his part , and so made the division of the then known world into asia , africa , and europe , according to the number of his sons ) ●he limits of which three parts are all ●ound in that midland sea. ( ) but howsoever the manner of this division be uncertain , yet it is most certain the division it self was by families from noah and his children , over which the parents were heads and princes . amongst these was nimrod , who n● doubt ( as sir walter raleigh affirms was , by good right , lord or king over his family ; yet against right did h● enlarge his empire , by seizing violentl● on the rights of other lords of families : and in this sense he may be sai● to be the author and first founder o● monarchy . and all those that do attribute unto him the original regal power , do hold he got it by tyranny o● usurpation , and not by any due election of the people or multitude , o● by any faction with them . as this patriarchal power continued in abraham , isaac , and jacob , even until the egyptian bondage ; so we find it amongst the sons of ismael and esau . i● is said , these are the sons of ismael , and these are their names by their castles and towns , twelve princes of their tribes and families . and these are the names of the dukes that came of esau , according to their families & their places by their nations . ( ) some perhaps may think that these princes and dukes of families were but ●ome petty lords under some greater kings , because the number of them are so many , that their particular territories ●ould be but small , and not worthy the ti●e of kingdoms ; but they must consider , ●hat at first , kings had no such large dominions as they have now adays ; we find ● the time of abraham , which was about ● years after the flood , that in a little ●orner of asia , kings at once met in ba●●il , most of which were but kings of ●ities apiece , with the adjacent territo●es , as of sodom , gomorrah , shinar , &c. in ●he same chapter is mention of melchise●ck king of salem , which was but the ci●● of jerusalem . and in the catalogue of ●●e kings of edom , the names of each ●ing's city is recorded , as the only mark ● distinguish their dominions . in the ●and of canaan , which was but a small cir●it , joshuah destroyed thirty one kings ; ●nd about the same time , adonibeseck had ●o kings , whose hands and toes he had ●t off , and made them feed under his ta●●e . a few years after this , kings came ● benhadad king of syria , and about seventy kings of greece went to the wars of troy. caesar found more kings in france , than there be now princes there , and at his sailing over into this island , he found four kings in our county of kent . these heaps of kings in each nation , are an argument their territories were but small , and strongly confirms our assertion , that erection of kingdoms came at first only by distinction of families . by manifest footsteps we may trace this paternal government unto the israelites coming into aegypt , where th● exercise of supreme patriarchal jurisdiction was intermitted , because they were in subjection to a stronger prince after the return of these israelites ou● of bondage , god out of a special ca● of them , chose moses and josuah successively to govern as princes in th● place and stead of the supreme fathers and after them likewise for a time , h● raised up judges , to defend his people in time of peril . but when god gav● the israelites kings , he reestablished th● antient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government . and whensoever he made choice of any special person to be king , he intended that the issue also should have benefit thereof , as being comprehended sufficiently ●n the person of the father , although the father only was named in the graunt . ( . ) it may seem absurd to maintain that kings now are the fathers of their people , since experience shews the contrary . it is true , all kings be not the natural parents of their subjects , yet they all either are , or are to be reputed the next heirs to those first progenitors , who were at first the natural parents of the whole people , and in their right succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction ; and such heirs are not only lords of their own children , but also of their brethren , and all others that were subject to their fathers : and therefore we find , that god told cain of his brother abel , his desires shall be subject ●nto thee , and thou shalt rule over him . accordingly , when jacob bought his brother's birth-right , isaac blessed him thus , be lord over thy brethren , and ●et the sons of thy mother how before thee . as long as the first fathers of families lived , the name of patriarchs did aptly belong unto them ; but after a few descents , when the true fatherhood it self was extinct , and only the right of the father descends to the true heir , then the title of prince or king was more significant , to express the power of him who succeeds only to the right of that fatherhood which his ancestors did naturally enjoy ; by this means it comes to pass , that many a child , by succeeding a king , hath the right of a father over many a gray-headed multitude , and hath the title of pater patriae . ( . ) it may be demanded what becomes of the right of fatherhood , in case the crown does escheate for want of an heir ? whether doth it not then devolve to the people ? the answer is it is but the negligence or ignorance of the people to lose the knowledge of the true heir : for an heir there always is . if adam himself were still living , and now ready to die , it is certain that there is one man , and but one in the world who is next heir● although the knowledge who should be that one one man be quite lost . . this ignorance of the people being admitted , it doth not by any means follow ; that for want of heirs the supreme power is devolved to the multitude , and that they have power to rule , and chose what rulers they please . no , the kingly power escheats in such cases to the princes and independent heads of families : for every kingdom is resolved into those parts whereof at first it was made . by the uniting of great families or petty kingdoms , we find the greater monarchies were at the first erected ; and into such again , as into their first matter many times they return again . and because the dependencie of ancient families is ●oft obscure or worn out of knowledge ; ●herefore the wisdom of all or most princes have thought fit to adopt many times ●hose for heads of families , and princes of provinces , whose merits , abilities , or fortunes , have enobled them , or made them fit and capable of such re●al favours . all such prime heads and ●athers have power to consent in the uniting or conferring of their fatherly right of sovereign authority on whom they please : and he that is so elected , claims not his power as a donative from the people ; but as being substituted properly by god , from whom he receives his royal charter of an universal father , though testified by the ministry of the heads of the people . if it please god , for the correction of the prince , or punishment of the people , to suffer princes to be removed and others to be placed in their rooms either by the factions of the nobility or rebellion of the people ; in all suc● cases , the judgement of god , who ha●● power to give and to take away kingdoms , is most just : yet the ministry of men who execute god's judgment without commission , is sinful and damnable . god doth but use and turn men unrighteous acts to the performance o● his righteous decrees . ( . ) in all kingdoms or common wealths in the world , whether th● prince be the supreme father of the people , or but the true heir of such father , or whether he come to the crown by usurpation , or by election of the nobles , or of the people , or by any other way whatsoever ; or whether some few or a multitude govern the commonwealth : yet still the authority that is in any one , or in many , or in all these , is the only right and natural authority of a supreme father . there is and always shall be continued to the end of the world , a natural right of a supreme father over every multitude , although by the secret will of god , many at first do most unjustly obtain the exercise of it . to confirm this natural right of regal power , we find in the decalogue , that the law which enjoyns obedience to kings , is delivered in the terms of honour thy father , as if all power were originally in the father . if obedience to parents be immediately due ●y a natural law , and subjection to ●rinces , but by the mediation of an ●umane ordinance ; what reason is there ●hat the laws of nature should give ●ace to the laws of men ? as we see he power of the father over his child , gives place , and is subordinate to the power of the magistrate . if we compare the natural rights of a father with those of a king , we find them all one , without any difference at all , but only in the latitude or extent of them : as the father over one family , so the king as father over many families extends his care to preserve , feed , cloth , instruct and defend the whole commonwealth . his war , his peace , his courts of justice , and all his acts of sovereignty tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferiour father , and to their children , their rights and privileges ; so that all the duties of a king are summed up in an universal fatherly care of his people . chap. ii. it is unnatural for the people to govern , or chose governours . ( . ) aristotle examined about the freedom of the people , and justified . ( . ) suarez disputing against the regality of adam . ( . ) families diversly defined by aristotle , bodin and others . ( . ) suarez contradicting bellarmine . ( . ) of election of kings . ( . ) by the major part of the people . ( . ) by proxy , and by silent acceptation . ( . ) no example in scripture of the peoples chosing their king. mr. hooker's judgment therein . ( . ) god governed always by monarchy . ( . ) bellarmine and aristotle's judgment of monarchy . ( . ) imperfections of the roman democratie . ( . ) rome began her empire under kings , and perfected under emperours . in danger , the people of rome always fled to monarchy . ( . ) whether democraties were invented to bridle tyrants , or rather that they came in by stealth . ( . ) democraties vilified by their own historians . ( . ) popular government more bloody than tyranny . ( . ) of a mixed government of the king and people . ( . ) the people may not judge or correct their king. ( . ) no tyrants in england since the conquest . ( . ) by conferring these proofs and reasons drawn from the authority of the scripture , it appears little less than a paradox which bellarmine and others affirm of the freedom of the multitude , to chose what rulers they please . had the patriarchs their power given them by their own children ? bellarmine does not say it , but the contrary : if then the fatherhood enjoyed this authority for so many ages by the law of nature , when was it lost , or when forfeited , or how is it devolved to the liberty of the multitude ? because the scripture is not favourable to the liberty of the people ; therefore many fly to natural reason , and to the authority of aristotle . i must crave liberty to examine or explain the opinion of this great philosopher ; but briefly , i find this sentence in the third of his politiques . cap. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it seems to some not to be natural for one man to be lord of all the citizens , since a city consists of equals . d. lambine in his latine interpretation of this text , hath omitted the translation of this word [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] by this means he maketh that to be the opinion of aristotle , which aristotle alleadgeth to be the opinion but of some . this negligence , or wilful escape of lambine , ●n not translating a word so material , hath been an occasion to deceive many , who looking no farther than this latine translation , have concluded , and made the world now of late believe , that aristotle here maintains a natural equality of men ; and not only our english translator of aristotle politiques is in this place misled by following lambine ; but even the learned monsieur duvall in his synopsis bea● them company : and yet this version of lambine's is esteemed the best , and printed at paris with causabon's corrected greek copy , though in the rendring of this place , the elder translations have been more faithful ; and he that shall compare the greek text with the latine , shall find that causabon had just cause in his preface to aristotle works , to complain that the best translations of aristotle did need correction : to prove that in these words which seem to favour the equality of mankind aristotle doth not speak according to his own judgment , but recites only the opinion of others ; we find him clearly deliver his own opinion , that the power of government did originally arise from the right of fatherhood which cannot possibly consist with that natural equality which men dream of : for in the first of his politiques he agrees exactly with the scripture , and lays this foundation of government , the first society ( saith he ) made of many houses is a village , which seems most naturally to be a colony of families or foster-brethren of children and childrens children . and therefore at he beginning , cities were under the government of kings , for the eldest in very house is king : and so for kindred●ke it is in colonies . and in the fourth of his politiques , cap. , he gives the title of the first and divinest sort of government to the institution of kings , by defining tyranny to be a digression ●●om the first and divinest . whosoever weighs advisedly these ●assages , will find little hope of natural reason in aristotle to prove the natural ●iberty of the multitude . also before ●im the divine plato concludes a commonweal to be nothing else but a large ●amily . i know for this position aristotle quarrels with his master , but most ●njustly ; for therein he contradicts his own principles : for they both agree ●o fetch the original of civil government from the prime government . no doubt but moses's history of the creation guided these two philosophers in finding out of this lineal subjection deduced from the laws of the first parents , according to that rule o● st. chrysostom , god made all mankind of one man , that he might teach the world to be governed by a king , and not by a multitude . the ignorance of the creation , occasioned several errors amongst the heathen philosophers . polybius , though otherwise a most profound philosopher and judicious historian , yet here he stumbles ; for in searching out the original of civil societies , he conceited that multitudes of men after a deluge a famine , or a pestilence , met together like herds of cattel without any dependency , untill the strongest bodies and boldest minds got the mastery of their fellows ; even as it is ( saith he ) among bulls , bears and cocks . and aristotle himself , forgetting his first doctrine , tells us , the first heroica● kings were chosen by the people for their deserving well of the multitude either by teaching them some new arts or by warring for them , or by gathering them together , or by dividing land amongst them ; also aristotle had another ●ancy , that those men who prove wise of mind , were by nature intended to be lords , and govern , and those which were strong of body were ordained to obey , and to be servants . but this is a dangerous and uncertain rule , and not without some folly ; for if a man prove both wise and strong , what will aristotle have done with him ? as he was wise , he could be no ●ervant , and as he had strength , he could not be a master ; besides , to speak like a philosopher , nature intends all things to be perfect both in wit and strength . the folly or imbecillity proceeds from some errour in generation ●r education ; for nature aims at perfection in all her works . ( ) suarez the jesuite riseth up against the royal authority of adam , ●● defence of the freedom and liberty of the people ; and thus argues . by ●ight of creation ( saith he ) adam had only oeconomical power , but not political ; he had a power over his wife , and a fatherly power over his sons , whilst they were not made free : he might also in process of time have servants and a compleat family ; and in that family he might have compleat oeconomical power . but after that families began to be multiplied , and men to be separated , and become the head of several families ; they had the same power over their families . but political power did not begin , until families began to be gathered together into one perfect community ; wherefore a● the community did not begin by the creation of adam , nor by his will alone but of all them which did agree in this community : so we cannot say that adam naturally had political primacy in that community ; for that cannot be gathered by any natural principles because by the force of the law o● nature alone , it is not due unto an● progenitor , to be also king of his posterity . and if this be not gathered out of the principles of nature , w● cannot say , god by a special gift o● providence gave him this power ; fo● there is no revelation of this , nor testimony of scripture . hitherto suarez whereas he makes adam to have a fatherly power over his sons , and yet shuts up this power within one family , ●he seems either to imagine , that all adam's children lived within one house , and under one roof with their father ; or else , as soon as any of his children ●ived out of his house , they ceased to be subject , and did thereby become free. for my part , i cannot believe that adam ( although he were sole monarch of the world ) had any such spacious palace , as might contain any such considerable part of his children . it is ●ikelier , that some mean cottage or tent ●id serve him to keep his court in . it were hard he should lose part of his authority , because his children lay not within the walls of his house . but if suarez will allow all adam's children to be of his family , howsoever they were separate in dwellings ; if their ha●itations were either contiguous , or ●t such distance , as might easily receive ●is fatherly commands . and that all ●hat were under his commands , were ●f his family , although they had many children or servants married , having temselves also children . then i see no reason , but that we may call adam's family a commonwealth , except we will wrangle about words : for adam living years , and seeing or descents from himself , he might live to command of his children and their posterity a multitude far bigger , than many commonwealths and kingdoms . ( . ) i know the politicians and civil lawyers do not agree well about the definition of a family , and bodin doth seem in one place to confine it to a house ; yet in his definition , he doth enlarge his meaning to all persons under the obedience of one and the same head of the family ; and he approves better of the propriety of the hebrew word for a family , which is derived from a word that signifies a head , a prince , or lord , than the greek word for a family , which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies a house . no● doth aristotle confine a family to one house ; but esteems it to be made of those that daily converse together whereas before him , charondas called family homosypioi , those that feed together out of one common pannier . and epimenides the cretian , terms a family homocapnoi , those that sit by a common fire , or smoak . but let suarez understand what he please by adam's family ; if he will but confess , as he needs must , that adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death , of peace and war , and the like , within their houses or families ; he must give us leave at least , to call them kings of their houses or families ; and if they be so by the law of nature , what liberty will be left to their children to dispose of ? aristotle gives the lie to plato , and ●hose that say political and oeconomical ●ocieties are all one , and do not differ ●pecie , but only multitudine & pauci●te ; as if there were no difference betwixt a great house and a little city . all the argument i find he brings against them in this . the community of man and wise , ●iffers from the community of master and servant , because they have several ends. the intention of nature by conjunction of male and female , is generation ; but the scope of master and servant , is preservation : so that a wife and a servant are by nature distinguished , because nature does not work like the cutlers of delphos , for she makes but one thing for one use . if we allow this argument to be sound , nothing doth follow but only this , that conjugal and despotical communities do differ . but it is no consequence , that therefore , oeconomical and political societies do the like : for though it prove a family to consist of two distinct communities , yet it follows not , that a family and a commonwealth are distinct because , as well in the commonwealth as in the families , both these communities are found . and as this argument comes not home to our point , so it is not able to prove that title which it shews for● for if it should be granted ( which ye● is false ) that generation and preservation differ about the individuum , ye● they agree in the general , and serv● both for the conservation of mankind even as several servants differ in the particular ends or offices ; as one t● brew , and another to bake ; yet they agree in the general preservation of th● family . besides , aristotle confesses , that amongst the barbarians ( as he calls all them that are not grecians ) a wife and a servant are the same , because by nature , no barbarian is fit to govern ; it is fit the grecians should rule over the barbarians ; for by nature a servant and a barbarian is all one : their family consists only of an ox for a man-servant , and a wife for a maid ; so they are fit only to rule their wives and their beasts . lastly , aristotle ( if it had pleased him ) might have remembred , that nature doth not always make one thing but for one use : he knows , the tongue serves both to speak , and to taste . ( . ) but to leave aristotle , and return to suarez ; he saith that adam had fatherly power over his sons , whilst they were not made free. here i could wish that the jesuite had taught as , how and when sons become free : ● know no means by the law of nature . it is the favour i think of the parents only , who when their children are of age and discretion to ease their parents of part of their fatherly care , are then content to remit some part of their fatherly authority ; therefore the custom of some countreys doth in some cases enfranchise the children of inferiour parents , but many nations have no such custome , but on the contrary have strict laws for the obedience of children : the judicial law of moses giveth full power to the father to stone his disobedient son , so it be done in presence of a magistrate : and yet it did not belong to the magistrate to enquire and examine the justness of the cause : but it was so decreed , lest the father should in his anger , suddenly , or secretly kill his son. also by the laws of the persians , and of the people of the upper asia , and of the gaules , and by the laws of the west-indies , the parents have power of life and death over their children . the romans , even in their most popular estate , had this law in force , and this power of parents was ratified and amplified by the laws of the twelve tables , to the enabling of parents to sell their children two or three times over . by the help of the fatherly power , rome long flourished , and oftentimes was freed from great dangers . the fathers have drawn out of the very assemblies their own sons ; when being tribunes , they have published laws tending to sedition . memorable is the example of cassius , who threw his son headlong out of the consistory , publishing the law agraria , for the division of lands , in the behoof of the people ; and afterwards , by his own private judgment put him to death , by throwing him down from the tarpeian rock ; the magistrates and people standing thereat amazed , and not daring to resist his fatherly authority , although they would with all their hearts , have had that law for the division of land : by which it appears , it was lawful for the father to dispose of the life of his child , contrary to the will of the magistrates or people . the romans also had a law , that what the children got , was not their own , but their fathers ; although solon made a law , which acquitted the son from nourishing of his father , if his father had taught him no trade , whereby to get his living . suarez proceeds , and tells us , that in process of time , adam had compleat oeconomical power . i know not what this compleat oeconomical power is , nor how , or what it doth really and essentially differ from political : if adam did , or might exercise the same jurisdiction , which a king doth now in a commonwealth , then the kinds of power are not distinct ; and though they may receive an accidental difference by the amplitude , or extent of the bounds of the one beyond the other ; yet since the like difference is also found in political estates , it follows that oeconomical and political power , differ no otherwise , than a little commonweal differs from a great one. next , saith suarez , commnnity did not begin at the creation of adam . it is true , because he had no body to communicate with ; yet community did presently follow his creation , and that by his will alone : for it was in his power only , ( who was lord of all ) to appoint what his sons should have in proper , and what in common ; so that propriety and community of goods did follow originally from him ; and it is the duty of a father , to provide as well for the common good of his children , as the particular . lastly , suarez concludes , that by the law of nature alone , it is not due unto any progenitor , to be also king of his posterity . this assertion is confuted point-blank by bellarmine , who expresly affirmeth , that the first patents ought to have been princes of their posterity . and untill suarez bring some reason for what he saith : i shall trust more to bellarmine's proofs , than to his denials . ( . ) but let us condescend a while to the opinion of bellarmine and suarez , and all those , who place supreme power in the whole people ; and ask them of their meaning be , that there is but one and the same power in all the people of the world ; so that no power can be granted , except all the men upon the earth meet and agree , to choose a governour . an answer is here given by suarez , that it is scarce possible , nor yet expedient , that all men in the world should be gathered together into one community : it is likelier , that either never , o● for a very short time , that this power was in this manner , in the whole multitude of men collected ; but a little after the creation , men began to be divided into several commonwealths ; and this distinct power was in each o● them . this answer of scarce possible , no● yet expedient : — it is likelier bege●● a new doubt , how this distinct power comes to each particular community when god gave it to the whole multitude only , and not to any particular assembly of men. can they shew , o● prove , that ever the whole multitude met , and divided this power which god gave them in gross , by breaking into parcels , and by appointing a distinct power to each several common-wealth ? without such a compact i cannot see ( according to their own principles ) how there can be any election of a magistrate by any commonwealth but by a meer usurpation upon the privilege of the whole world. if any think●s that particular multitudes at their own discretion , had power to divide themselves into several commonwealths ; ●hose that think so , have neither reason nor proof for so thinking : and ●hereby a gap is opened for every petty factious multitude , to raise a new commonwealth , and to make more commonweals than there be families in the world. but let this also be yielded them , that in each particular commonwealth , there is a distinct power in the multitude . was a general meeting of a whole kingdom ever known for the election of a prince ? is there any example of it ever found in the whole world ? to conceit such a thing , is to ●magine little less than an impossibility . and so by consequence , no one form of government , or king , was ever established according to this supposed law of nature . ( . ) it may be answered by some , that if either the greatest part of a kingdom , or if a smaller part only by themselves , and all the rest by proxy , or if the part not concurring in election , do after , by a tacit assent ratifie the act of others , that in all thes● cases , it may be said to be the world of the whole multitude . as to the acts of the major part o● a multitude , it is true , that by politic● humane constitutions , it is oft ordained , that the voices of the most shall over-rule the b●est ; and such ordinances bind , because , where men are assembled by an humane power ; that power that doth assemble them , can also limit and direct the manner of the execution of that power , and by such derivative power , made known by law or custom , either the greater part or two thirds , or three parts of five or the like , have power to oversway the liberty of their opposits . but in assemblies that take their authority from the law of nature , it cannot be so : for what freedom or liberty is due to any man by the law of nature , no inferiour power can alter , limit or diminish● no one man , nor a multitude , can give away the natural right of another . the law of nature is unchangeable , and howsoever one man may hinder another in the use or exercise of his natural right , yet thereby no man ●oseth the right of it self ; for the right ●nd the use of the right may be distinguished , as right and possession are ●oft distinct . therefore , unless it can be proved by the law of nature , that the major , or some other part , have power ●o over-rule the rest of the multitude ; ●t must follow , that the acts of multitudes not entire , are not binding to all , but only to such as consent unto them . ( . ) as to the point of proxy ; it cannot be shewed or proved , that all those that have been absent from popular elections , did ever give their voices to some of their fellows . i ask but one example out of the history of the whole world , let the commonweal be but named , wherever the multitude , or so much as the greatest part of it consented , either by voice or by procuration , to the election of a prince . the ambition sometimes of one man , sometimes of many , or the faction of a city or citizens , or the mutiny of an army , hath set up or put down princes ; but they have never tarried for this pretended order by proceeding of the whole multitude . lastly , if the silent acceptation o● a governour by part of the people , be an argument of their concurring i● the election of him ; by the same reason , the tacit assent of the whole commonwealth may be maintained : from whence it follows , that every prince that comes to a crown , either by succession , conquest , or usurpation may be said to be elected by the people ; which inference is too ridiculous for in such cases , the people are so far from the liberty of specification , that they want even that of contradiction . ( . ) but it is in vain to argue against the liberty of the people in the election of kings , as long as men are perswaded , that examples of it are to be found in scripture . it is fit therefore , to discover the grounds of this errour : it is plain by an evident text that it is one thing to choose a king , and another thing to set up a king over the people ; this latter power the children of israel had , but not the former . this distinction is found most eviden● in deut. . . where the law of god saith , him shalt thou set king over thee , whom ●●e lord shall choose ; so god must eli●e , and the people only do constitu●e . mr. hooker in his eighth book ●f ecclesiastical policy , clearly expounds ●is distinction ; the words are worthy ●●e citing : heaps of scripture ( saith he ) ●e alledged , concerning the solemn coro●●tion or inauguration of saul , david , so●mon and others , by nobles , ancients , and the people of the commonwealth of isr●el ; as if these solemnities were a kind of deed , whereby the right of dominion is given ; which strange , untrue , and unnatural conceits , are set abroad by ●ed-men of rebellion , only to animate ●nquiet spirits , and to feed them with ●ossibilities of aspiring unto the thrones , they can win the hearts of the people ; whatsoever hereditary title any other before them may have . i say these ●njust and insolent positions , i would ●ot mention , were it not thereby to make the countenance of ●ruth more orient . for unless we will openly proclaim defiance unto all ●aw , equity and reason , we must ( for ●here is no other remedy ) acknowledg , that in kingdoms hereditary , birth-right giveth right unto sovereign dominion , and the death of the predecesso● putteth the successor by blood in s●sin . those publick solemnities before mentioned , do either serve for an open testification of the inheritor's right or belong to the form of induci●● of him into possession of that thing ●● hath right unto . this is mr. hooker judgment of the israelites power t● set a king over themselves . no doubt but if the people of israel had had power to choose their king , they would never have made choice of joas , a child but of seven years old , nor of manases a boy of twelve ; since ( as solomon saith ) wo to the land whose king a child : nor is it probable they would have elected josias , but a very child and a son to so wicked and ido●trous a father , as that his own servants murthered him ; and yet all th● people set up this young josias , an● slew the conspirators of the death o● ammon his father ; which justice of the people , god rewarded , by making this josias the most religious king , tha● ever that nation enjoyed . ( . ) because it is affirmed , that ●e people have power to choose , as ●ell what form of government , as ●hat governours they please ; of which mind is bellarmine , in those ●aces we cited at first . therefore it necessary to examine the strength ● what is said in defence of popular commonweals , against this natural form of kingdoms , which i maintain'd . here i must first put the ●ardinal in mind of what he affirms cold blood , in other places ; where saith , god when he made all man●d of one man , did seem openly to ●●nifie , that he rather approved the go●●rnment of one man , than of many . ●●ain , god shewed his opinion , ●●en he endued not only men , but creatures with a natural propensi●● to monarchy ; neither can it be ●●ubted , but a natural propensity is be referred to god , who is au●●or of nature . and again ; in a ●●ird place , what form of government god confirmed by his authori●● may be gathered by that common●al , which he instituted amongst the hebrews , which was not aristocratical ( as calvin saith ) but plainly monarchichal . ( . ) now if god , ( as bellarmie saith ) hath taught us by natural instinct , signified to us by the creation and confirmed by his own example the excellency of monarchy , why should bellarmine or we doubt , but that it is natural ? do we not find that in every family , the government of one alone , is most natural god did always govern his own people by monarchy only . the patriarchs , dukes , judges and kings we●● all monarchs . there is not in all the scripture , mention or approbation o● any other form of government . a● the time when scripture saith , th● was no king in israel , but that eve● man did that which was right in ●● own eyes ; even then , the israelit●● were under the kingly government of the fathers of particular families for in the consultation , after the be● jamitical war , for providing wives f●● the benjamites , we find , the elders ●● the congregation bare only swa●● judges . . to them also were complaints to be made , as appears by verse . and though mention be made of all the children of israel , all the congregation , and all the people ; yet by the term of all , the scripture means only all the fathers , and not all the whole multitude , as the text plainly expounds it self in . chron. . . where solomon speaks ●nto all israel , to the captains , the judges , and to every governour the chief of the fathers ; so the elders of israel are expounded to be the chief of the fathers of the children of israel . kings . . chron. . . at that time also , when the people of israel beg'd a king of samuel , they were governed by kingly power . god out of a special love and care to the house of israel , did choose to be their king himself , and did govern them at that time by his viceroy samuel , and his ●ons ; and therefore god tells samuel , they have not rejected thee but me , that ● should not reign over them . it seems ●hey did not like a king by deputation , but desired one by succession , like all the nations . all nations belike had kings then , and those by inheritance , not by election : for we do not find the israelites prayed , that they themselves might choose their own king ; they dream of no such liberty , and yet they were the elders of israel gathered together . if other nations had elected their own kings , no doubt but they would have been as desirous to have imitated other nations as well in the electing , as in the having of a king. aristotle in his book of politicks when he comes to compare the several kinds of government , he is very reserved in discoursing what form h● thinks best : he disputes subtilely to and fro of many points , and judiciously of many errours , but concludes nothing himself . in all those books i find little commendation of monarchy . it was his hap to live in those times when the grecians abounded with several commonwealths , who had then learning enough to make them seditious . yet in his ethicks , he hath so much good manners , as to confess in right down words , that monarchy is the best form of government , and a popular estate the worst . and though he be not so free in his politicks , yet the necessity of truth hath here and there extorted from him , that which amounts no less to the dignity of monarchy ; he confesseth it to be first , the natural , and the divinest form of government ; and that the gods themselves did live under a monarchy . what can a heathen say more ? indeed , the world for a long time ●new no other sort of government , out only monarchy . the best order , the greatest strength , the most stability and easiest government , are to be found all in monarchy , and in to other form of government . the new platforms of commonweals , were first hatched in a corner of the world , amongst a few cities of greece , which have been imitated by very ●ew other laces . those very cities were first , for many years , governed by kings , untill wantonness , ambition or faction of the people , made them attempt new kinds of regiment ; all which mutations proved most bloody and miserable to the authors of them ; happy in nothing , but that they continued but a small time . ( . ) a little to manifest the imperfection of popular government , let us but examine the most flourishing democratie that the world hath ever known ; i mean that of rome . first , for the durability ; at the most , it lasted but years ( for so long it was from the expulsion of tarquin , to julius caesar . ) whereas both the assyrian monarchy lasted , without interruption , at the least twelve hundred years , and the empire of the east continued years . . for the order of it , during these years , there was not any one settled form of government in rome : for after they had once lost the natural power of kings , they could not find upon what form of government to rest : their fickleness is an evidence that they found things amiss in every change. at the first they chose two annual consuls instead of kings . secondly , those did not please them long , but they must have tribunes of the people to defend their liberty . thirdly , they leave tribunes and consuls , and choose them ten men to make them laws . fourthly , they call for consuls and tribunes again : sometimes they choose dictators , which were temporary kings , and sometimes military tribunes , who had consular power . all these shiftings caused such notable alteration in the government , as it passeth historians to find out any perfect form of regiment in so much confusion : one while the senate made laws , another while the people . the dissentions which were daily between the nobles and the commons , bred those memorable seditions about usury , about marriages , and about magistracy . also the graecian , the apulian , and the drusian seditions , filled the market-places , the temples , and the capitol it self , with blood of the citizens ; the social war was plainly civil ; the wars of the slaves , and the other of the fencers ; the civil wars of marius and sylla , of cataline , of caesar and pompey the triumvirate , of augustus , lepidus and antonius : all these shed an ocean of blood within italy and the streets of rome . thirdly , for their government , let it be allowed , that for some part of this time it was popular , yet it was popular as to the city of rome only , and not as to the dominions , or whole empire of rome ; for no democratie can extend further than to one city . it is impossible to govern a kingdom , much less many kingdoms by the whole people , or by the greatest part of them . ( . ) but you will say , yet the roman empire grew all up under this kind of popular government , and the city became mistress of the world. it is not so ; for rome began her empire under kings , and did perfect it under emperours ; it did only encrease under that popularity : her ●reatest exaltation was under trajan , ●s her longest peace had been under augustus . even at those times , when the roman victories abroad , did amaze the world , then the tragical slaughter of citizens at home , deserved commiseration from their vanquished enemies . what though in that age of her popularity , she bred many admired captains and commanders ( each of which was able to lead an army , ●ough many of them were but ill re●●ited by the people ? ) yet all of them ●ere not able to support her in times 〈◊〉 danger ; but she was forced in her ●●eatest troubles to create a dictator who was a king for a time ) thereby giving this honourable testimony of monarchy , that the last refuge in perils of states , is to fly to regal authority . and though romes popular estate for a while was miraculou●●●● upheld in glory by a greater prud●nce than her own ; yet in a short time , after manifold alterations , she was ruined by her own hands . suis & ipsa roma viribus ruit : for the arms she had prepared to conquer other nations , were turned upon her self , and civil contentions at last settled the government again into a monarchy . ( . ) the vulgar opinion is , tha● the first cause why the democratical government was brought in , was to curb the tyranny of monarchies . but the falshood of this doth best appear by the first flourishing popular estate of athens which was founded , not because o● the vices of their last king , but that his vertuous deserts were such as th● people thought no man worthy ●nough to succeed him ; a pretty wa●ton quarrel to monarchy ! for whe● their king codrus understood by th● oracle , that his country could not be saved , unless the king were slain i● the battel : he in disguise entered hi● enemies camp , and provoked a common souldier to make him a sacrifice for his own kingdom , and with his death ended the royal government ; for after him was never and more kings of athens . as athens thus or love of her codrus , changed the government , so rome on the contrary , out of hatred to her tarquin , ●d the like . and though these two famous commonweals did for contrary ●uses abolish monarchy , yet they both agreed in this , that neither of them thought it fit to change their state to a democratie : but the one chose ●●chontes , and the other consuls to ● their governours ; both which did ●ost resemble kings , and continued , ●●till the people by lessening the authority of these their magistrates , did ● degrees and stealth bring in their ●opular government . and i verily be●●●ve , never any democratical state ●ewed it self at first fairly to the ●orld by any elective entrance , but ●ey all secretly crept in by the back●●or of sedition and faction . ( . ) if we will listen to the judgment of those who should best know ●e nature of popular government , ● shall find no reason for good men desire or choose it . zenophon that brave scholar and souldier disallowed the athenian commonweal , for that they followed that form of government wherein the wicked are always in greatest credit , and vertuous men kept under . they expelled a●ristides the just ; themistocles died i● banishment ; meltiades in prison phocion the most virtuous and just man of his age , though he had been chosen forty five times to be their general , yet he was put to death with all his friends , kindred and servants , by the fury of the people , without sentence , accusation , or any cause at all . nor were the people of rome much more favourable to their worthies ; they banished rutilius , metellus , coriolanus , the two scipio's and tully● the worst men sped best ; for as znophon saith of athens , so rome was a sanctuary for all turbulent , discontented and seditious spirits . the impunity of wicked men was such , that upon pain of death , it was forbidden all magistrates to condemn to death , or banish any citizen , o● to deprive him of his liberty , or so much as to whip him for what offence ever he had committed , either against ●e gods or men. the athenians sold justice as they ●d other merchandise ; which made ●lato call a popular estate a fair , here every thing is to be sold . the ●fficers when they entered upon their ●harge , would brag , they went to a ●olden harvest . the corruption of ●ome was such , that marius and pompey durst carry bushels of silver to the assemblies , to purchase the ●oices of the people . many citizens ●der their grave gowns , came arm● into the publick meetings , as if ●●ey went to war. often contrary ●ctions fell to blows , sometimes with ●ones , and sometimes with swords ; ●e blood hath been suckt up in the ●arket places with spunges ; the ri●●r tiber hath been filled with the ●ead bodies of the citizens , and the ●●mmon privies stuffed full with them . if any man think these disorders popular states were but casual , such as might happen under any ●nd of government , he must know , that such mischiefs are unavoidable , and of necessity do follow a●● democratical regiments ; and the reason is given , because the nature of all people is , to desire liberty without restraint , which cannot b● but where the wicked bear rule● and if the people should be so indiscreet , as to advance vertuous men they lose their power : for that good men would favour none but the good , which are always the fewer in number ; and the wicked and vitious ( which is still the greate● part of the people ) should be excluded from all preferment , and i● the end , by little and little , wise men should seize upon the state , and take it from the people . i know not how to give a better character of the people , than can be gathered from such authors as lived amongst or near the popular states ; thucydides , zenophon , liv●● tacitus , cicero , and salust , have set them out in their colours . i will borrow some of their sentences : there is nothing more uncertain than the people ; their opinions are as variable and suddain as tempests ; there is neither truth nor judgment in them ; they are not led by wisdom to judg of any thing , but by violence and rashness ; nor put they any difference between things true and false . after the manner of cattel , they follow the herd that goes before ; they have a custom always to favour the worst and weakest ; they are most prone to suspitions , and use to condemn men for guilty upon any false suggestion ; they are apt to believe all news , especially if it be sorrowful ; and like fame , they make it more in the believing ; when there is no author , they fear those evils which themselves have feigned ; they are most desirous of new stirrs and changes , and are enemies to qui●et and rest ; whatsoever is giddy or head-strong , they account manlike and couragious ; but whatsoever is modest or provident , seems sluggish ; each man hath a care of his particular , and thinks basely ●● the common good ; they look upon approaching mischiefs as the● do upon thunder , only every ma● wisheth it may not touch his own person ; it is the nature of the● they must serve basely , or dom●neer proudly ; for they know ●● mean. thus do they paint to the life this beast with many head● let me give you the cypher ●● their form of government ; as it ●● begot by sedition , so it is nourished by arms : it can never stand without wars , either with an enemy abroad or with friends at home . the only means to preserve it , is , to have some powerful enemies near , who ma● serve instead of a king to govern it , that so , though they have not king amongst them , yet they may have as good as a king over them : for the common danger of an enem● keeps them in better unity , tha● the laws they make themselves . ( ) many have exercised their wits in parallelling the inconveniences ●f regal and popular government , but we will trust experience before speculations philosophical , it cannot be ●nyed but this one mischief of sedition ●hich necessarily waits upon all populari●● , weighes down all the inconveniences ●●at can be found in monarchy , though ●●ey were never so many . it is said , ●●in for skin , yea , all that a man hath ●ill he give for his life ; and a man ●ill give his riches for the ransome of ●s life . the way then to examine what ●roportion the mischiefs of sedition ●nd tyranny have one to another , is ●● enquire in what kind of government ●ost subjects have lost their lives : ●et rome which is magnified for her popularity , and vilified for the tyrannical monsters the emperours , furnish us with examples . consider-whether the ●ruelty of all the tyrannical emperours ●●at ever ruled in this city did ever ●ill a quarter of the blood that was pour● out in the last hundred years of her ●orious common wealth . the murthers by tyberius , domitian , and commodus , ●ut all together , cannot match that civil tragedy which was acted in that one sedition between marius and sylla , nay , even by sylla's part alone ( not to mention the acts of marius ) were fourscore and ten senators put to death , fifteen consuls , two thousand and six hundred gentlemen , and a hundred thousand others . this was the heighth of the roman liberty : any man might be killed that would . a favour not fit to be granted under a royal government . the miseries of those licentious times are briefly touched by plutarch in these words . sylla ( saith he ) fell to sheding of bloud , and filled all rome with infinite and unspeakable murthers — this was not only done in rome , but in all the cities of italy throughout , there was no temple of any god whatsoever , n● altar in any bodies house , no liberty of hospital , no fathers house , which was not embrewed with blood , and horrible murthers , the husbands were slain in the wives armes , and the children i● the mothers laps ; and yet they tha● were slain for private malice were no nothing in respect of those that were murthered only for their goods — ●e openly sold their goods by the ●ryer , sitting so proudly in his chair of ●ate , that it grieved the people more see their goods packt up by them to ●hom he gave , or disposed them , than see them taken away . sometimes he ●ould give a whole countrey , or the ●hole revenues of certain cities , unto ●omen for their beauties , or to plea●t jeasters , minstrels , or wicked ●ves , made free . and to some he ●ould give other mens vvives by force , ●d make them be married against their ●lls . now let tacitus and suetonius be ●rched , and see if all their cruel em●rours can match this popular villa●● in such an universal slaughter of ci●ens , or civil butchery . god only ●s able to match him , and over-match●him , by fitting him with a most re●●rkable death , just answerable to his ●●e , for as he had been the death of ●ny thousands of his country-men , so many thousands of his own kindred the flesh were the death of him , for ●died of an impostume , which corrupt●● his flesh in such sort , that it turned to lice , he had many about him to shift him continually night and day ; yet the lice they wiped from him , were nothing to them that multiplied upon him , there was neither apparel , linnen , bathes , vvashings , nor meat it self , but was presently filled with swarms of this vile vermine . i cite not this to extenuate the bloody acts of any tyrannical princes , nor will i plead in defence of their cruelties : only in the comparative , i maintain the mischiefs to a state to be less universal under a tyrant king ; for the cruelty of such tyrants extends ordinarily no further then to some particular men that offend him and not to the whole kingdome : it is truly said by his late majesty king james , a king can never be so notoriously vitious , but he will generally favour justice , and maintain some order except in the particulars wherein his i● ordinate lust carries him away . eve● cruel domitian , dionysius the tyrant , an● many others , are commended by historians for great observers of justice : ● natural reason is to be rendered for i● it is the multitude of people , and the abundance of their riches , which are th●● only strength and glory of eve● prince : the bodies of his subjects do him service in vvar , and their goods supply his present wants , therefore if not out of affection to his people , yet out of natural love to himself , every tyrant desires to preserve the lives , and protect the goods of his subjects , which cannot be done but by justice , and if it be not done , the princes loss is the greatest ; on the contrary , in a popular state , every man knows the publick good doth not depend wholly on his care , but the common-wealth may well enough be governed by others though he tend only his private benefit , ●he never takes the publick to be his own business ; thus as in a family , where one office is to be done by many servants , one looks upon another , and every one leaves the business for his fellow , until it is quite neglected by all ; nor are they much to be blamed for their negligence , since it is an even wager , their ignorance is as great : for magistrates among the people , being for the most part annual , do always lay down their office before they understand it ; so that a prince of a duller understanding , by use and experience must needs excell them ; again , there is no tyrant so barbarously wicked , but his own reason and sense will tell him , that though he be a god , yet he must dye like a man ; and that there is not the meanest of his subjects but may find a means to revenge himself of the injustice that is offered him : hence it is that great tyrants live continually in base fears , as did dionysius the elder ; tiberius , caligula , and nero are noted by suetonius to have been frighted with panick fears . but it is not so , where wrong is done to any particular person by a multitude , he knows not who hurt him , or who to complain of , or to whom to address himself for reparation . any man may boldly exercise his malice and cruelty in all popular assemblies . there is no tyranny to be compared to the tyranny of a multitude . ( ) what though the government of the people be a thing not to be endured , much less defended , yet many men please themselves with an opininion , that though the people may not govern ; yet they may partake and joyn with a king in the government , and so make a state mixed of popular and regal power , which they take to be the best tempered and equallest form of government . but the vanity of this fancy is too evident , it is a meer impossibility or contradiction , for if a king but once admit the people to be his companions , he leaves to be a king , and the state becomes a democracy ; at least , he is but a titular and no real king , that hath not the soveraignty to himself ; for the having of this alone , and nothing but this makes a king to be a king. as for that shew of popularity which is found in such kingdoms ●s have general assemblies for consultation about making publick laws : it must be remembred that such meetings ●o not share or divide the soveraignty with the prince : but do only deliberate and advise their supreme head , who ●ill reserves the absolute power in ●imself ; for if in such assemblies , the ●ing , the nobility , and people have ●ual shares in the soveraignty , then ●e king hath but one voice , the no●lity likewise one , and the people one , ●●d then any two of these voices should have power to over-rule the third ; thus the nobility and commons together should have power to make a law to bind the king , which was never yet seen in any kingdom , but if it could , the state must needs be popular and not regal . ( ) if it be unnatural for the multitude to chuse their governours , or to govern , or to partake in the government , what can be thought of that damnable conclusion which is made by too many , that the multitude may correct , or depose their prince , if need be surely the unnaturalness , and injustice of this position cannot sufficiently be expressed : for admit that a king make a contract or paction with his people , either originally in his ancestors , or personally at his coronation ( for both these pactions some dream of , but cannot offer any proof for either ) yet by no law of any nation can a contract be thought broken , except that first a lawful tryal be had by the ordinary judge of the breakers thereof , or else every man may be both party and judge i● his own case , which is absur'd once to be thought , for then it will lye in the hands of the headless multitude when they please to cast off the yoke of government ( that god hath laid upon them ) to judge and punish him , by whom they should be judged and punished themselves . aristotle can tell us , what judges the multitude are in their own case , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the judgment of the multitude in disposing of the soveraignty may be seen in the roman history , where we may find many good emperours murthered by the people , and many bad elected by them : nero , heliogabalus , otho , vitellius , and such other monsters of nature , were the minions of the multitude , and set up by them : pertinax , alexander , severus , gordianus , gallus emilianus , quintilius , aurelianus , tacitus , probus , and numerianus ; all of them good emperours in the judgment of all historians , yet murthered by the multitude . ( ) whereas many out of an imaginary fear pretend the power of the people to be necessary for the repressing of the insolencies of tyrants ; wherein they propound a remedy far worse than the disease , neither is the disease indeed so frequent as they would have us think , let us be judged by the history even of our own nation : we have enjoyed a succession of kings from the conquest now for above years ( a time far longer than ever yet any popular state could continue ) we reckon to the number of twenty six of these princes since the norman race , and yet not one of these is taxed by our historians for tyrannical government . it is true , two of these kings have been deposed by the people , and barbarously murthered , but neither of them for tyranny : for as a learned historian of our age saith , edward the second and richard the second were not insupportable either in their nature or rule , and yet the people , more upon wantonness than for any want , did take an unbridled course against them . edward the second , by many of our historians is reported to be of a good and vertuous nature , and not unlearned : they impute his defects rather to fortune than either to council or carriage of his affairs , the deposition of him was a violent fury , led by a wife both cruel and unchast , and can with no better countenance of right be justifyed , than may his lamentable both indignities and death it self . likewise the deposition of king richard ii , was a tempestuous rage , neither led or restrained by any rules of reason or of state — examin his actions without a distempered judgment , and you will not condemne him to be exceeding either insufficient or evil ; weigh the imputations that were objected against him , and you shall find nothing ●●ither of any truth or of great moment ; hollingshed writeth , that he was most unthankfully used by his subjects ; for although , through the frailty of his youth , he demeaned himself more dissolutely than was agreeable to the royalty of his estate , yet in no kings days were the commons in greater wealth , the nobility more honoured , and the clergy less wronged ; who notwithstanding , in the evil guided strength of their will , took head against him , to their own headlong destruction afterwards ; partly during the reign of henry , his next successor , whose greatest atchievements were against his own people , in executing those who conspired with him against king richard : but more especially in succeeding times , when , upon occasion of this disorder , more english blood was spent , than was in all the foreign wars together which have been since the conquest . twice hath this kingdom been miserably wasted with civil war , but neither of them occasioned by the tyranny of any prince . the cause of the baron's wars is by good historians attributed to the stubbornness of the nobility , as the bloody variance of the houses of york and lancaster , and the late rebellion , sprung from the wantonness of the people . these three unnatural wars have dishonoured our nation amongst strangers , so that in the censures of kingdoms , the king of spain is said to be the king of men , because of his subjects willing obedience ; the king of france king of asses , because of their infinite taxes and impositions ; but the king of england is said to be the king of devils , because of his subjects often insurrections against , and depositions of their princes . chap. iii. positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of kings . ( . ) regal authority not subject to the positive laws , kings before laws ; the king of judah and israel not tyed to laws . ( . ) of samuel 's description of a king , sam. . ( . ) the power ascribed unto kings in the new testament . ( . ) whether laws were invented to bridle tyrants . ( . ) the benefit of laws . ( . ) kings keep the laws , though not bound by the laws . ( . ) of the oathes of kings . ( . ) of the benefit of the king's prerogative over laws . ( . ) the king the author , the interpreter , and corrector , of the common laws . ( . ) the king , judge in all causes both before the conquest and since . ( . ) the king and his council have anciently determined causes in the star-chamber . ( . ) of parliaments . ( . ) when the people were first called to parliament . ( . ) the liberty of parliaments , not from nature , but from grace of the princes . ( . ) the king alone makes laws in parliament . ( . ) governs both houses as head by himself . ( . ) by his council . ( . ) by his judges . ( . ) hitherto i have endeavour'd to shew the natural institution of regal authority , and to free it from subjection to an arbitrary election of the people : it is necessary also to enquire whether humane laws have a superiority over princes ; because those that maintain the acquisition of royal jurisdiction from the people , do subject the exercise of it to positive laws . but in this also they erre , for as kingly power is by the law of god , so it hath no inferiour law to limit it . the father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will ; not by the laws and wills of his sons or servants . there is no nation that allows children any action or remedy for being unjustly governed ; and yet or all this every father is bound by the ●aw of nature to do his best for the pre●ervation of his family ; but much more ● a king always tyed by the same law of nature to keep this general ground , that the safety of the kingdom be his ●hief law : he must remember , that he profit of every man in particular , and of all together in general , is not always one and the same ; and that the publick is to be preferred before the private ; ●nd that the force of laws must not be ● great as natural equity it self , which ●nnot fully be comprised in any laws ●hatsoever , but is to be left to the re●●gious atchievement of those who ●●ow how to manage the affaires of ●tate , and wisely to ballance the particular profit with the counterpoize of ●e publick , according to the infinite va●ety of times , places , persons ; a proof ●nanswerable , for the superiority of princes above laws , is this , that there were ●ings long before there were any laws : or a long time the word of a king ●as the only law ; and if practice ( as ●●th sir walter raleigh ) declare the ●eatness of authority , even the best kings of judah and israel were not tyed to any law ; but they did what-soever they pleased , in the greatest matters . ( ) the unlimitted jurisdiction of kings is so amply described by samuel , that it hath given occasion to some to imagine , that it was , but either a plot or trick of samuel to keep the government himself and family , by frighting the israelites with the mischiefs in monarchy , or else a prophetical description only of the future iii government of saul : but the vanity of these conjectures are judiciously discovered in that majestical discourse of the true law of free monarchy ; wherein it is evidently shewed , that the scope of samuel was to teach the people a dutiful obedience to their king , even in those things which themselves did esteem mischievous and inconvenient ; for by telling them what a king would do , he indeed instructs them what a subject must suffer ; yet not so that it is right for kings to do injury , but it is right for them to go unpunished by the people if they do it : so that in this point it is all one , whether samuel describe a king , or a tyrant , for patient obedience is due to both ; ●ho remedy in the text against tyrants , but in crying and praying unto god in that day . but howsoever in a rigorous construction samuel's description be applyed to a tyrant ; yet the words by a benigne interpretation may agree with the manners of a just king ; and the scope and coherence of the text doth best imply the more moderate , or qualified sense of the words ; for as sir w. raleigh confesses , all those inconveniences and miseries which are reckon●ed by samuel as belonging to kingly government were not intollerable , but such as have been born , and are still born , by free consent of subjects towards their princes ; nay at this day , and in this land , many tenants by their tenures and services are tyed to the same subjection , even to subordinate and ●nferior lords : to serve the king in his wars , and to till his ground , is not only agreeable to the nature of subjects , but much desired by them ; according to their several births , and conditions : the like may be said for the offices of women-servants , confectioners , cooks , and bakers , for we cannot think that the king would use their labours without giving them wages , since the text it self mentions a liberal reward of his servants . as for the taking of the tenth of their seed , of their vines , and of their sheep , it might be a necessary provision for their kings household , and so belong to the right of tribute : for whereas is mentioned the taking of the tenth it cannot agree well to a tyrant , who observes no proportion , in fleecing his people . lastly , the taking of their fields vineyards , and olive-trees , if it be by force or fraud , or without just recompence , to the dammage of private persons only , it is not to be defended but if it be upon the publick charge and general consent , it might be justifyed , as necessary at the first erects on of a kingdome ; for those who wi●● have a king , are bound to allow hi● royal maintenance , by providing revenues for the crown , since it both for the honour , profit and safety too of the people to have their king glorious , powerful , and abounding in ●iches , besides we all know the lands ●nd goods of many subjects may be oft●mes legally taken by the king , either ●y forfeitures , escheat , attainder , out●wry , confiscation , or the like . ●hus we see samuel's character of a ●ng may literally well bear a mild ●nse , for greater probability there is at samuel so meant , and the israelites understood it ; to which this may be ●ded , that samuel tells the israelites , ●s will be the manner of the king that ●ll reign over you : and ye shall ●● because of your king which ye shall ●e chosen you ; that is to say : thus ●●ll be the common custom or fashi● or proceeding of saul your king ; as the vulgar latine renders it , this ●l be the right or law of your king ; ● meaning as some expound it , the ●●al event , or act of some individu●●agum , or indefinite king , that might ●en one day to tyrannise over them . ●hat saul , and the constant practice saul , doth best agree with the lite● sense of the text. now that saul ●no tyrant , we may note that the ●le asked a king , as all nations had . god answers , and bids samuel to hear the voice of the people , in all things which they spake , and appoint them a king. they did not ask a tyrant , and to give them a tyrant , when they asked a king , had not been to hear their voice in all things but rather when they asked an egge , to have given them a scorpion : unless we will say , that all nations had tyrant● besides , we do not find in all scripture that saul was punished , or so much a● blamed , for committing any of tho●● acts which samuel describes : and if s●muel's drift had been only to terrifie th● people , he would not have forgott● to foretell saul's bloody cruelty , ●● murthering innocent priests , a● smiteing with the edge of the swo● the city of nob , both man , woman and child . again , the israelites ne● shrank at these conditions proposed b● samuel , but accepted of them , as such ●● all other nations were bound u●● for their conclusion is , nay , but we ●● have a king over us , that we also may ●● like all the nations , and that our k●●● may judge us , and go out before us to ●● our battels . meaning he should ●● his privileges , by doing the work ●● them , by judging them , and fighting for them . lastly , whereas the mention of the peoples crying unto the lord , argues they should be under some tyrannical oppression ; we may remember , that the peoples complaints and cries are not always an argument ●f their living under a tyrant . no man can say king solomon was a tyrant , yet all the congregation of israel complain'd that solomon made their yoke grievous , and therefore their prayer to ●ehoboam is , make thou the grievous ser●ice of thy father solomon , and his hea●y yoke which he put upon us , lighter , and ●e will serve thee . to conclude , it is ●rue , saul lost his kingdom , but not ●or being too cruel or tyrannical to his ●ubjects , but by being too merciful to ●is enemies ; his sparing agag when he ●hould have slain him , was the cause why the kingdom was torn from him . ( . ) if any desire the direction of the new testament , he may find our saviour limiting and distinguishing royal ●ower , by giving to caesar those things ●at were caesar 's , and to god those things that were god's . obediendum est in quibus mandatum dei non impeditur . we must obey where the commandment of god is not hindred ; there is no other law but gods law to hinder our obedience . it was the answer of a christian to the emperour , we only worship god , in other things we gladly serve you and it seems tertullian thought whatsoever was not god's was the emperours when he saith , bene opposuit caesari pecuniam , te ipsum deo , alioqui quid erit deisi omnia caesaris . our saviour hath well apportioned our money for coesar and our selves for god , for otherwise what shall god's share be , if all be coesar's the fathers mention no reservation of any power to the laws of the land , or to the people . s. ambrose , in his apologie for david , expresly saith he was a king , and therefore bound to no laws , because kings are free from the bonds of any fault . s. augustine also resolves , imperator non est subjectus leg● bus , qui habet in potestate alias leges ferr● the emperour is not subject to laws who hath power to make other laws for indeed , it is the rule of solomon , that we must keep the king's commandment and not to say , what dost thou ? because where the word of a king is , there is power , and all that he pleaseth , he will do . if any mislike this divinity in england , let him but hearken to bracton , chief justice in henry the third's days , which was since the institution of parliaments , his words are , speaking of the ●ing , omnes sub eo , & ipse sub nullo , ●●si tantum sub deo , &c. all are under ●m , and he under none , but god on●● : if he offend , since no writ can go ●ainst him , their remedy is by peti●ning him to amend his fault , which he shall not do , it will be punishment sufficient for him to expect god as revenger : let none presume to search to his deeds , much less to oppose ●●em . when the jews asked our blessed sa●ur , whether they should pay tri●e ? he did not first demand what the ●w of the land was , or whether there ●● any statute against it , nor enquired ●ether the tribute were given by ●●nsent of the people , nor advised ●● to stay their payment till they should grant it ; he did no more but look upon the superscription , and concluded , this image you say is caesar's , therefore give it to caesar . nor must it here be said , that christ taught this lesson only to the conquered jews , for in this he gave direction for all nations , who are bound as much in obedience to their lawful kings , as to any conquerour or usurper whatsoever . whereas being subject to the higher powers , some have strained these word to signifie the laws of the land , or else to mean the highest power , as well aristocratical and democratical , as regal it seems s. paul looked for such interpretation , and therefore thought fit to be his own expositor , and to let it be known , that by power he understood monarch that carryed a sword : wi●● thou not be afraid of the power ? that i● the ruler that carryeth the sword , fo● he is the minister of god to thee — ●● he beareth not the sword in vain . it not the law that is the minister of god or that carries the sword , but the r●ler or magistrate ; so they that say th●● law governs the kingdom , may as we●● say that the carpenters rule builds an house , and not the carpenter ; for the law is but the rule or instrument of the ruler . and s. paul concludes ; for this cause pay you tribute also , for they are gods ministers attending continually upon this very thing . render therefore tribute to whom tribute is due , custom to whom custom . he doth not say , give as a gift to gods minister . but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , render or restore tribute , as a due . also st. peter doth most clearly expound this place of st. paul , where he saith , submit your selves to every ordinance of man , for the lords sake , whether it be to the king as supreme , or unto governours , as unto them that are sent by him . here the very self same word ( supreme , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which st. paul coupleth with power , st. peter conjoineth with the king , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , thereby to maniest that king and power are both one . also st. peter expounds his own words of humane ordinance , to be the king , who is the lex loquens , a speaking law ; he cannot mean that kings themselves are an human ordinance , since st. paul calls the supreme power , the ordinance of god ; and the wisdom of god saith , by me kings reign : but his meaning must be , that the laws of kings are human ordinances . next , the governours that are sent by him ; that is by the king , not by god , as some corruptly would wrest the text , to justifie popular governours as authorized by god , whereas in gramatical construction [ him ] the relative must be referred to the next antecedent , which is king ; besides , the antithesis between supreme and sent , proves plainly that the governours were sent by kings ; for if the governours were sent by god , and the king be an humane ordinance , then it follows , that the governours were supreme , and not the king ; or if it be said , that both king and governours are sent by god , then they are both equal , and so neither of them supreme . therefore st. peter's meaning is in short , obey the laws of the king , or of his ministers . by which it is evident , that neither st. peter , nor s. paul , intended other-form of government than only monarchical , much less any subjecton of princes to humane laws . that familiar distinction of the schoolmen , whereby they subject kings to the directive , but not to the coactive power of laws , is a confession that kings are not bound by the positive laws of any nation : since the compulsory power of laws is that which properly makes laws to be laws ; by binding men by rewards or punishment to obedience ; whereas the direction of the law , is but like the advice and direction which the kings council gives the king , which no man says is a law to the king. ( ) there want not those who believe that the first invention of laws was to bridle and moderate the over-great power of kings ; but the truth is , the original of laws was for the keeping of the multitude in order : popular estates could not subsist at all without laws ; whereas kingdoms were govern'd many ages without them . the people of athens , as soon as they gave over kings , were forced to give power to draco first , then to solon , to make them laws , not to bridle kings , but themselves ; and though many of their laws were very severe and bloody , yet for the reverence they bare to their law-makers they willingly submitted to them . nor did the people give any limited power to solon , but an absolute jurisdiction , at his pleasure to abrogate and confirm what he thought fit ; the people never challenging any such power to themselves : so the people of rome gave to the ten men , who were to chuse and correct their laws for the twelve tables , an absolute power , without any appeal to the people . ( . ) the reason why laws have been also made by kings , was this , when kings were either busyed with wars , or distracted with publick cares , so that every private man could not have accesse to their persons , to learn their wills and pleasure ; then of necessity were laws invented , that so every particular subject might find his prince's pleasure decyphered unto him in the tables of his laws , that so there might be no need to resort to the king ; but either for the interpretation or mitigation of obscure or rigorous laws , or else in new cases , for a supplement where the law was defective . by this means both king and people were in many things ●eased : first , the king by giving laws doth free himself of great and intolerable troubles , as moses did himself by chusing elders . secondly , the people have the law as a familiar admonisher and interpreter of the king's pleasure , which being published throughout the kingdom , doth represent the presence and majesty of the king : also the judges and magistrates , ( whose help in giving judgment in many causes kings have need to use ) are restrained by the common rules of the law from using their own liberty to the injury of others , since they are to judge according to the laws , and not follow their own opinions . ( . ) now albeit kings , who make the laws , be ( as king james teacheth us ) above the laws ; yet will they rule their subjects by the law ; and a king , governing in a setled kingdom , leaves to be a king , and degenerates into a tyrant , so soon as he seems to rule according to his laws ; yet where he sees the laws rigorous or doubtful , he may mitigate and interpret . general laws made in parliament , may , upon known respects to the king , by his authority be mitigated or suspended , upon causes only known to him . and although a king do frame all his actions to be according to the laws , yet he is not bound thereto , but at his good will , and for good example : or so far forth as the general law of the safety of the common-weale doth naturally bind him ; for in such sort only positive laws may be said to bind the king , not by being positive , but as they are naturally the best or only means for the preservation of the common-wealth . by this means are all kings , even tyrants and conquerours , bound to preserve the lands , goods , liberties , and lives of all their subjects , not by any municipial law of the land , so much as the natural law of a father , which binds them to ratifie the acts of their fore-fathers and predecessors , in things necessary for the publick good of their subjects . ( . ) others there be that affirm , that ●lthough laws of themselves do not ●ind kings , yet the oaths of kings at ●heir coronations tye them to keep all ●he laws of their kingdoms . how far this is true , let us but examine the oath of ●he kings of england at their coronation ; ●he words whereof are these , art thou ●leased to cause to be administred in all thy ●udgments indifferent and upright justice , ●nd to use discretion with mercy and ve●ity ? art thou pleased that our upright laws and customs be observed , and dost thou promise that those shall be protected ●nd maintained by thee ? these two are ●he articles of the king's oath , which concern the laity or subjects in general ; to which the king answers affirmatively . being first demanded by the arch-bishop of canterbury , pleaseth it ●ou to confirm and observe the laws and ●ustoms of ancient times , granted from ●od , by just and devout kings , unto the english nation , by oath unto the said people . especially the laws , liberties , and customs granted unto the clergy and laity ●y the famous king edward . we may observe , in these words of the articles of the oath , that the king is required to observe not all the laws , but only the upright , and that with discretion and mercy . the word upright cannot mean all laws , because in the oath of richard the second , i find evil and unjust laws mentioned , which the king swears to abolish ; and in the old abridgment of statutes , set forth in henry the eighth's days , the king is to swear wholly to put out evil laws ; which he cannot do , if he be bound to all laws now what laws are upright and what evil , who shall judge but the king since he swears to administer upright justice with discretion and mercy ( o● as bracton hath it ) oequitatem proecipia● & misericordiam . so that in effect , the king doth swear to keep no laws , but such as in his judgment are upright , and those not literally always , but according to equity of his conscience , join'd with mercy , which is properly the office of a chancellour rather than of judge ; and if a king did strictly sweat to observe all the laws , he could not without perjury give his consent to the repealing or abrogating of any st●tute by act of parliament , which would be very mischievable to the ●tate . but let it be supposed for truth , that kings do swear to observe all the laws ●f their kingdoms , yet no man can ●hink it reason that kings should be ●ore bound by their voluntary oaths ●han common persons are by theirs . now if a private person make a con●ract , either with oath or without oath , he is no further bound than the ●quity and justice of the contract ties ●im ; for a man may have relief against ●n unreasonable and unjust promise , if ●ther deceit , or errour , or force , or ●ear induced him thereunto : or if it be ●urtful or grievous in the performance . ●ince the laws in many cases give the ●ing a prerogative above common per●ons , i see no reason why he should be ●enyed the priviledge which the meanst of his subjects doth enjoy . here is a fit place to examine a question which some have moved , whe●●er it be a sin for a subject to disobey ●e king , if he command any thing contrary to his laws ? for satisfaction in this point , we must resolve , that not only in human laws , but even in divine , a● thing may be commanded contrary to law , and yet obedience to such a command is necessary . the sanctifying of the sabbath is a divine law ; yet if a master command his servant not to go to church upon a sabbath-day , that best divines teach us , that the servant must obey this command , though it may be sinful and unlawful in the master because the servant hath no authority or liberty to examine and judge whether his master sin or no in so commanding ; for there may be a just cause for a master to keep his servant from church , as appears luke . . yet it i● not fit to tye the master to acquaint hi● servant with his secret counsels , or present necessity : and in such cases , th● servants not going to church , become the sin of the master , and not of th● servant . the like may be said of th● king's commanding a man to serve his in the wars , he may not examine whether the war be just or unjust , but mu●● obey , since he hath no commission ● judge of the titles of kingdoms , cau●es of war ; nor hath any subje●● power to condemn his king for breach of his own laws . ( . ) many will be ready to say , it is a slavish and dangerous condition to be subject to the will of any one man , who is not subject to the laws . but ●uch men consider not , . that the prerogative of a king is to be above all laws , ●or the good only of them that are under the laws , and to defend the peoples liberties , as his majesty graciously affirmed in his speech after his last answer to the petition of right : howsoever some ●re afraid of the name of prerogative , ●et they may assure themselves , the case ●f subjects would be desperately miserable without it . the court of chancery ●t self is but a branch of the kings prerogative , to relieve men against the in●xorable rigour of the law , which without it is no better than a tyrant , since ●ummum jus , is summa injuria . general ●ardons , at the coronation and in parliaments , are but the bounty of the prerogative . . there can be no laws without a supreme power to command or ●ake them . in all aristocraties the no●es are above the laws , and in all democraties the people . by the like reason , in a monarchy the king must of necessity be above the laws ; there can be no soveraign majesty in him that is under them ; that which giveth the very being to a king is the power to give laws ; without this power he is but an● equivocal king. it skills not which way kings come by their power , whether by election , donation , succession , or by any other means ; for it is still the manner of the government by supreme power that makes them properly kings , and not the means of obtaining their crowns neither doth the diversity of laws nor contrary customs , whereby each kingdom differs from another , make the forms of common-weal different unless the power of making laws be in several subjects . for the confirmation of this point aristotle saith , that a perfect kingdom is that wherein the king rules all thing according to his own will , for he that is called a king according to the law● makes no kind of kingdom at all . th●● it seems also the romans well understood to be most necessary in a monarchy ; for though they were a people most greedy of liberty , yet the senate did free augustus from all necessity of laws , that he might be free of his own authority , and of absolute power over himself and over the laws , to do what he pleased , and ●eave undone what he list , and this decree was made while augustus was yet absent . accordingly we find , that ulpian the great lawyer delivers it for a rule of the civil law ; princeps , le●ibus solutus est . the prince is not bound ●y the laws . ( ) if the nature of laws be advi●edly weighed , the necessity of the princes being above them may more manifest it self ; we all know that a law in general is the command of a superior ●ower . laws are divided ( as bellermine ●ivides the word of god ) into written and unwritten , not for that it is not written at all , but because it was not written by the first devisers or makers of it . the common law ( as the lord chancellor egerton teacheth us ) is the common custom of the realm . now concerning customs , this must be considered , ●hat for every custom there was a time ●hen it was no custom ; and the first president we now have , had no president when it began ; when every custom began , there was something else than custom that made it lawful , or else the beginning of all customs were unlawful . customs at first became lawful only by some superiour , which did either command or consent unto their beginning . and the first power which we find ( as it is confessed by all men ) is the kingly power , which was both in this and in all other nations of the world , long before any laws , or any other kind of government was thought of ; from whence we must necessarily infer , that the common law it self , or common customs of this land , were originally the laws and commands o● kings at first unwritten . nor must we think the commen customs ( which are the principles o● the common law , and are but few ) to be such , or so many , as are able to give special rules to determine every particular cause . diversity of cases are infinite , and impossible to be regulated by any law ; and therefore we find , even in the divine laws which are delivere● by moses , there be only certain principal laws , which did not determine but only direct the high-priest or magistrate , whose judgment in special cases ●id determine , what the general law intended . it is so with the common law , for when there is no perfect rule , ●udges do resort to those principles , or common law axiomes , whereupon former judgments , in cases some-what ●ike , have been delivered by former ●udges , who all receive authority from the king , in his right and name to give sentence according to the rules and presidents of antient times : and where presidents have failed , the judges have resorted to the general law of reason , and accordingly given judgment , without any common law to direct them . nay , many times , where ●here have been presidents to direct , ●hey , upon better reason only , have changed the law , both in causes crimical and civil , and have not insisted so much on the examples of former judges , as examined and corrected their ●easons ; thence it is that some laws are ●ow obsolete and out of use , and the ●ractice quite contrary to what it was in former times , as the lord chancellor egerton proves , by several instances . nor is this spoken to derogate from the common law , for the case standeth so with the laws of all nations , although some of them have their laws and principles written and established : for witnesse to this , we have aristotle his testimony in his ethiques , and in several places in his politiques ; i will cite some of them . every law ( saith he ) is in the general , but of some things there can be no general law — when therefore the law sqeaks in general , and something falls out after besides the general rule : then it is fit that what the law-maker hath omitted or where he hath erred by speaking generally , it should be corrected or supplyed as if the law-maker himself were present to ordain it . the governour , whether h● be one man , or more , ought to be lord ●ver all those things whereof it was impossible the law should exactly speak , because it is not easie to comprehend all things under general rules — whatsoever the law cannot determine , it leaves to the governours to give judgment therein , and permits them to rectifie whatsoever upon tryal they find to be better than the written laws . besides , all laws are of themselves dumb , and some or other must be trusted with the application of them to particulars , by examining all circumstances , to pronounce when they are broken , or by whom . this work of right application of laws is not a thing easie or obvious for ordinary capacities ; but requires profound abilities of nature , for the beating out of the truth , witness the diversity , and sometimes the contrariety of opinions of the learned judges , in some difficult points . ( ) since this is the common condition of laws , it is also most reasonable that the law-maker should be trusted with the application or interpretation of the laws ; and for this cause anciently the kings of this land have sitten personally in courts of judicature , and are still representatively present in all courts ; the judges are but substituted , and called the kings justices , and their power ceaseth when the king is in place . to this purpose , bracton , that learned chief justice in the reign of henry the third , saith in express terms ; in doubtful and obscure points the interpretation and will of our lord the king is to be expected ; since it is his part to interpret , who made the law ; for as he saith in another place , rex , & non alius debet judicare , si solus ad id sufficere possit , &c. the king , and no body else , ought to give judgment , if he were able , since by vertue of his oath he is bound to it ; therefore the king ought to exercise power as the vicar or minister of god , but if our lord the king be not able to determine every cause , to ease part of his pains by distributing the burthen to more persons , he ought to chuse wise men fearing god , &c , and make justices of them : much to the same purpose are the words of edward the first , in the beginning of his book of laws , written by his appointment by john briton , bishop of hereford , we will ( saith he ) that our own jurisdiction be above all the jurisdictions of our realm , so as in all manner of felonies , trespasses , contracts , and in all other actions , personal , or real , we have power to yield such judgments as do appertain without other process , wheresoever we know the right truth as judges . neither may this be taken to be meant of an imaginary presence of the king's person in his courts , because he doth immediately after in the same place severally set forth by themselves the jurisdictions of his ordinary courts ; but must necessarily be understood of a jurisdiction remaining in the king 's royal person . and that this then was no new-made law , or first brought in by the norman conquests , appears by a saxon law made by king edgar , in these words , as i find them in mr. lambert , nemo in lite regem appellato , nisi quidem domi justitiam consequi , aut impetrare non poterit , sin summo jure domi urgeatur , ad regem , ut is onus aliqua ex parte allevet , provocato . let no man in suit appeal to the king , unless he may not get right at home ; but if the right be too heavy for him , then let him go to the king to have it eased . as the judicial power of kings was exercised before the conquest , so in those setled times after the conquest , wherein parliaments were much in use , there was a high-court following the king , which was the place of soveraign justice , both for matter of law and conscience , as may appear by a parliament in edward the first 's time , taking order , that the chancellour and the justices of the bench should follow the king , to the end that he might have always at hand able men for his direction in suits that came before him : and this was after the time that the court of common-pleas was made stationary , which is an evidence that the king reserved a soveraign power , by which he did supply the want , or correct the rigour of the common law ; because the positive law , being grounded upon that which happens for the most part , cannot foresee every particular which time and experience brings forth . ( . ) therefore though the common law be generally good and just , yet in some special case it may need correction , by reason of some considerable circumstance falling out , which at the time of the law-making was not thought of . also sundry things do fall out , both in war and peace , that require extraordinary help , and cannot wait for the usual care of common law , the which is not performed , but altogether after one sort , and that not without delay of help and expence of time ; so that although all causes are , and ought to be referred to the ordinary processe of common law , yet rare matters from time to time do grow up meet , for just reasons , to be referred to the aid of the absolute authority of the prince ; and the statute of magna charta hath been understood of the institution then made of the ordinary jurisdiction in common causes , and not for restraint of the absolute authority , serving only in a few rare and singular cases , for though the subjects were put to great dammage by false accusations and malitious suggestions made to the king and his council , especially during the time of king edward the third , whilst he was absent in the wars in france , insomuch as in his reign divers statutes were made , that provided none should be put to answer before the king and his council without due processe ; yet it is apparent the necessity of such proceedings was so great , that both before edward the third's days , and in his time , and after his death , several statutes were made , to help and order the proceedings of the king and his council . as the parliament in . edw. . cap. . did provide , that the chancellour and justices of the king's bench should follow the king ; that so he might have near unto him some that be learned in the laws , which be able to order all such matters as shall come unto the court , at all times when need shall require . by the statute of . edw. . cap. . taliation was ordained , in case the suggestion to the king proved untrue . then . edw. . cap. . takes away taliation , and appoints imprisonment till the king and party grieved be satisfied . in the statutes of . ric. . cap. . and . hen. . cap. . dammages and expences are awarded in such cases . in all these statutes it is necessarily implyed , that complaints upon just causes might be moved before the king and his council . at a parliament at glocester , . ric. . when the commons made petition , that none might be forced by writ out of chancery , or by privy seal , to appear before the king and his council , to answer touching free-hold . the king's answer was he thought it not reasonable that he should be constrained to send for his leiges upon causes reasonable : and albeit he did not purpose that such as were sent for should answer [ finalment ] peremptorily touching their free-hold , but should be remanded for tryal thereof , as law required : provided always , ( saith he ) that at the suit of the party , where the king and his council shall be credibly informed , that because of maintenance , oppression , or other out-rages , the common law cannot have duly her course , in such case the council for the party . also in the th year of his reign , when the commons did pray , that upon pain of forfeiture , the chancellour or council of the king , should not after the end of the parliament make any ordinance against the common law ; the king answered , let it le used as it hath been used before this time , so as the rega●lity of the king be saved , for the king will save his regalities as his progeni●tors have done . again , in the th year of henry the fourth , when the commons complained against subpoena's , and other writs , grounded upon false suggestions ; the king answered , that he would give in charge to his officers , that they should abstain more than before time they had , to send for his subjects in that manner . but yet ( saith he ) it is not our intention , that our officers shall so abstain , that they may not send for our subjects in matters and causes necessary , as it hath been used in the time of our good progenitors . likewise when for the same cause complaint was made by the commons , anno . hen. . the king's answer was , le roy s'advisera , the king will be advised ; which amounts to a denyal for the present , by a phrase peculiar for the kings denying to pass any bill that hath passed the lords and commons . these complaints of the commons , and the answers of the king , discover , that such moderation should be used , that the course of the common law be ordinarily maintained , lest subjects be convented before the king and his council without just cause , that the proceedings of the council-table be not upon every slight suggestion , nor to determine finally concerning free ●old of inheritance . and yet that upon ●ause reasonable , upon credible information , in matters of weight , the king's ●egallity or prerogative in sending for ●is subjects be maintain'd , as of right ought , and in former times hath been ●onstantly used . king edward the first , finding that ●ogo de clare was discharged of an ac●usation brought against him in parliament , for that some formal imperfections ●ere found in the complaint , commanded him nevertheless to appear before him and his council , ad faciendum , & ●cipiendum quod per regem & ejus conci●●m fuerit faciendum ; and so proceeded ●● an examination of the whole cause . ●● edw. . edward the third , in the star-cham●●r ( which was the ancient council-cham●●r at westminster ) upon the complaint ●● elizabeth audley , commanded james ●udley to appear before him and his ●ouncil , and determin'd a controversie between them , touching lands contain'd the covenants of her joynture . rot : ●aus . de an . . ed. : henry the fifth , in a suit before him and his council for the titles of the mannors of seere and s. laurence , in the isle of thenet , in kent , took order for the sequestring the profits till the right were tryed , as well for avoiding the breach of the peace , as for prevention of waste and spoil . rot. patin . anno hen. . henry the sixth commanded the justices of the bench to stay the arraignment of one verney of london , till they had other commandment from him an● his council , because verney , being indebted to the king and others , practised t● be indicted of felony , wherein he might have his clergy , and make his purgation of intent to defraud his creditors . . hen. . rot. . in banco regis . edward the fourth and his council , 〈◊〉 the star-chamber , heard the cause of the master and poor brethren of s. leonard in york , complaining , that sir hugh ha●ings , and others , withdrew from them great part of their living , which consisted chiefly upon the having of thrave of corn of every p●ough-land within the counties of york , westmer●nd , cumberland , and lancashire . rot. ●aten . de anno . ed. . part . memb. . henry the seventh and his council , in ●●e star-chamber , decreed , that margery ●nd florence becket should sue no further in their cause against alice radley , ●idow , for lands in wolwich and plum●ad in kent ; for as much as the matter ●d been heardfirst before the council of ●ng ed. . after that before the presi●●nt of the requests of that king , hen. and then lastly , before the council of said king. . hen. . what is hitherto affirmed of the de●dency and subjection of the com●on law to the soveraign prince , the ●e may be said as well of all statute ●●ws ; for the king is the sole immedi● author , corrector , and moderator them also ; so that neither of these ● kinds of laws are or can be any ●inution of that natural power ●●ch kings have over their people , by ●t of father-hood , but rather are an ●ument to strengthen the truth of it ; for evidence whereof , we may in some points consider the nature of parliaments , because in them only all statutes are made . ( . ) though the name of parliament ( as mr. cambden saith ) be of no great antiquity , but brought in out of france yet our ancestors , the english saxons had a meeting , which they called , the assembly of the wise ; termed in latine conventum magnatum , or , proesentia regis , procerumque prelaterumque collector●● the meeting of the nobility , or the presence of the king , prelates , an● peers assembled ; or in general , magnu● concilium , or commune concilium ; an● many of our kings in elder times mad● use of such great assemblies for to consult of important affaires of state ; a● which meetings , in a general sense , ma● be termed parliaments . great are the advantages which b●● the king and people may receive by well-ordered parliament ; there is n●thing more expresseth the majesty a supreme power of a king , than such assembly , wherein all his people knowledge him for soveraign lord , and make all their addresses to him by humble petition and supplication ; and by their consent and approbation do strengthen all the laws , which the king , ●●at their request and by their advice and ministry , shall ordain . thus they facilitate the government of the king , by making the laws unquestionable , either to the subordinate magistrates , or ●refractory multitude . the benefit which ●●crews to the subject by parliaments , is , that by their prayers and petitions kings are drawn many times to redress their just grievances , and are overcome by their importunity to grant many ●hings which otherwise they would not ●ield unto ; for the voice of a multitude is easilier heard . many vexations of the people are without the knowledge of the king ; who in parliament seeth ●nd heareth his people himself ; whereas ● other times he commonly useth the ●yes and ears of other men . against the antiquity of parliaments ●e need not dispute , since the more an●ent they be , the more they make for ●e honour of monarchy ; yet there be certain circumstances touching the forms of parliaments , which are fit to be considered . first , we are to remember , that until about the time of the conquest , there could be no parliaments assembled of the general states of the whole kingdom of england , because till those days we cannot learn it was entirely united into one kingdom ; but it was either divided into several kingdoms , or governed by several laws . when julius coesar landed he found kings in kent ; and the british names of dammonii , durotriges , belgae● attrebatii , trinobantes , iceni , silures and the rest , are plentiful testimonies o● the several kingdoms of brittains , whe● the romans left us . the saxons divide us into kingdoms : when these saxon● were united all into a monarchy , they had always the danes their companions , or their masters in the empire , ti● edward the confessors days , since who● time the kingdom of england hath continued united , as now it doth : but for a thousand years before we cannot fin● it was entirely setled , during the tim● of any one kings reign . as under th● mercian law : the west saxons were confined to the saxon laws ; essex , norfolk , suffolk , and some other places , were vexed with danish laws ; the northumbrians also had their laws apart . and until edward the confessors reign , who was next but one before the conquerour , the laws of the kingdom were so several and uncertain , that he was forced to cull a few of the most indifferent and best of them , which were from him called st. edwards laws : yet some say that eadgar made those laws , and that the confessor did but restore and mend them . alfred also gathered out of mulmutius laws , such as he translated into the saxon tongue . thus during the time of the saxons , the laws were so variable , that there is little or no likelihood to find any constant form of parliaments of the whole kingdom . ( ) a second point considerable is , whether in such parliaments , as was ●n the saxon's times , the nobility ●nd clergy only were of those assem●lies , or whether the commons were also called ; some are of opinion , that ●hough none of the saxon laws do mention the commons , yet it may be gathered by the word wisemen , the commons are intended to be of those assemblies , and they bring ( as they conceive ) probable arguments to prove it , from the antiquity of some burroughs that do yet send burgesses , and from the proscription of those in antient demesne , not to send burgesses to parliament . if it be true , that the west-saxons had a custom to assemble burgesses out of some of their towns , yet it may be doubted , whether other kingdoms had the same usage ; but sure it is , that during the heptarchy , the people could not elect any knights of the shire , because england was not then divided into shires . on the contrary , there be of our historians who do affirm , that henry the first caused the commons first to be assembled by knights and burgesses of their own appointment , for before his time only certain of the nobility and prelates of the realm were called to consultation about the most important affairs of state. if this assertion be true it seems a meer matter of grace of this king , and proves not any natural right of the people , originally to be admitted to chuse their knights and burgesses of parliament , though it had been more for the honour of parliaments , if a king , whose title to the crown had been better , had been author of the form of it ; because he made use of it for his unjust ends. for thereby he secured himself against his competitor and elder brother , by taking the oaths of the nobility in parliament ; and getting the crown to be setled upon his children . and as the king made use of the people , so they , by colour of parliament , served their own turns ; for after the establishment of parliaments by strong hand , and by the sword , they drew from him the great charter , which he granted the rather to flatter the nobility and people , as sir walter raleigh in his dialogue of parliaments doth affirm , in these words . the great charter was not originally granted legally and freely ; for henry the first did but usurp the kingdom , and therefore , the better to assure himself against robert his elder brother , he flattered the nobility and people with their charters ; yea , king john , that confirmed them , had the like respect , for arthur duke of brittain was the undoubted heir of the crown , upon whom king john usurped , and so to conclude , these charters had their original from kings de facto , but not de jure — the great charter had first an obscure birth by usurpation , and was secondly sostered and shewed to the world by rebellion . ( . ) a third consideration must be , that in the former parliaments , instituted and continued since king henry the first 's time , is not to be found the usage of any natural liberty of the people ; for all those liberties that are claimed in parliament are the liberties of grace from the king , and not the liberties of nature to the people ; for if the liberty were natural , it would give power to the multitude to assemble themselves when and where they please , to bestow soveraignty , and by pactions to limit and direct the exercise of it . whereas , the liberties of favour and grace , which are claimed in parliaments , are restrained both for time , place , persons , and other circumstances , to the sole pleasure of the king. the people can not assemble themselves , but the king , by his writs , calls them to what place he pleases ; and then again scatters them with his breath at an instant , without any other cause shewed than his will. neither is the whole summoned , but only so many as the kings writs appoint . the prudent king edward the first , summoned always those barons of ancient families , that were most wise , to his parliament , but omited their sons after their death , if they were not answerable to their parents in understanding . nor have the whole people voices in the election of knights of the shire or burgesses , but only free-holders in the counties , and freemen in the cities and burroughs ; yet in the city of westminster all the house-holders , though they be neither free-men nor free-holders , have voices in their election of burgesses . also during the time of parliament , those priviledges of the house of commons , of freedom of speech , power to punish their own members , to examine the proceedings and demeanour of courts of justice and officers , to have access to the king's person , and the like , are not due by any natural right , but are derived from the bounty or indulgence of the king , as appears by a solemn recognition of the house ; for at the opening of the parliament , when the speaker is presented to the king , he , in the behalf and name of the whole house of commons , humbly craves of his majesty , that he would be pleased to grant them their accustomed liberties of freedom of speech , of access to his person , and the rest . these priviledges are granted with a condition implyed , that they keep themselves within the bounds and limits of loyalty and obedience ; for else why do the house of commons inflict punishment themselves upon their own members for transgressing in some of these points ; and the king , as head , hath many times punished the members for the like offences . the power which the king giveth , in all his courts , to his judges or others to punish , doth not exclude him from doing the like , by way of prevention , concurrence , or evocation , even in the same point which he hath given in charge by a delegated power ; for they who give authority by commission , do always retain more than they grant : neither of the two houses claim an infallibility of not erring , no more than a general council can . it is not impossible but that the greatest may be in fault , or at least interested or engaged in the delinquency of one particular member . in such cases it is most proper for the head to correct , and not to expect the consent of the members , or for the parties peccant to be their own judges . nor is it needful to confine the king , in such cases , within the circle of any one court of justice , who is supreme judge in all courts . and in rare and new cases rare and new remedies must be sought out ; for it is a rule of the common law , in novo casu , novum remedium est apponendum : and the statute of westminst . . cap. . giveth power , even to the clarks of the chancery , to make new forms of writs in new cases , lest any man that came to the king's court of chancery for help , should be sent away without remedy : a president cannot be found in every case ; and of things that happen seldom , and are not common , there cannot be a common custom . though crimes exorbitant do pose the king and council in finding a president for a condigne punishment , yet they must not therefore pass unpunished . i have not heard that the people , by whose voices the knights and burgesses are chosen , did ever call to an account those whom they had elected ; they neither give them instructions or directions what to say , or what to do in parliament , therefore they cannot punish them when they come home for doing amiss : if the people had any such power over their burgesses , then we might call it , the natural liberty of the people , with a mischief . but they are so far from punishing , that they may be punished themselves for intermedling with parliamentary business ; they must only chuse , and trust those whom they chuse to do what they list ; and that is as much liberty as many of us deserve , for our irregular elections of burgesses . ( ) a fourth point to be consider'd , is , that in parliament all statutes or laws are made properly by the king alone , at the rogation of the people , as his majesty king james , of happy memory , affirms in his true law of free monarchy ; and as hooker teacheth us , that laws do not take their constraining force from the quality of such as devise them , but from the power that doth give them the strength of laws : le roy le veult , the king will have it so , is the interpretive phrase pronounced at the king 's passing of every act of parliament : and it was the ancient custom for a long time , till the days of henry the fifth , that the kings , when any bill was brought unto them , that had passed both houses , to take and pick out what they liked not , and so much as they chose was enacted for a law : but the custom of the later kings hath been so gracious , as to allow always of the entire bill as it hath passed both houses . ( ) the parliament is the king's court , for so all the oldest statutes call it , the king in his parliament : but neither of the two houses are that supreme court , nor yet both of them together ; they are only members , and a part of the body , whereof the king is the head and ruler . the king 's governing of this body of the parliament we may find most significantly proved both by the statutes themselves , as also by such presidents as expresly shew us , how the king , sometimes by himself , sometimes by his council , and othertimes by his judges , hath over-ruled and directed the judgments of the houses of parliament ; for the king , we find that magna charta , and the charter of forrests , and many other statutes about those times , had only the form of the kings letters-patents , or grants , under the great seal , testifying those great liberties to be the sole act and bounty of the king : the words of magna charta begin thus ; henry , by the grace of god , &c. to all our arch-bishops , &c. and our faithful subjects , greeting . know ye , that we , of our meer free-will , have granted to all free-men these liberties . in the same style goeth the charter of forrests , and other statutes . statutum hibernioe , made at westminster , . februarii . hen. . is but a letter of the king to gerrard , son of maurice , justice of ireland . the statute de anno bissextili begins thus , the king to his justices of the bench , greeting , &c. explanationes statuti glocestrioe , made by the king and his justices only , were received always as statutes , and ●re still printed amongst them . the statute made for correction ●f the th chapter of the statute of ●locester , was signed under the great ●eal , and sent to the justices of the ●ench , after the manner of a writ pa●●nt , with a certain writ closed , dated ●y the kings hand at westminster , re●iring that they should do , and execute ●● and every thing contained in it , although the same do not accord with the ●atute of glocester in all things . the statute of rutland , is the kings ●tters to his treasurer and barons of his ●cchequer , and to his chamberlain . the statute of circumspecte agis ●●s , the king to his judges sendeth ●eeting . there are many other statutes of the ●he form , and some of them which ● only in the majestique terms of , the ●g commands , or , the king wills , or , ● lord the king hath established , or , our lord the king hath ordained : or his especial grace hath granted : without mention of consent of the commons or people ; insomuch that some statutes rather resemble proclamations than acts of parliament : and indeed some of them were no other than mee● proclamations ; as the provisions of merton , made by the king at an assembly o● the prelates and nobility , for the cornation of the king and his queen eleano● which begins , provisum est in c●ria domini regis apud merton . also a provision was made . hen. . de assisa ultimoe pr●sentationis , which was continued and allowed for law , until tit. west . . an . . e●● . cap. . which provides the contrary i● express words : this provision begins , pr●visum fuit coram dom. rege , archiepiscopi● episcopis , & baronibus , quod , &c. it see● originally the difference was not gre●● between a proclamation and a statut● this latter the king made by comm●● council of the kingdom . in the form he had but the advice only of his gre●● council of the peers , or of his priv●●● council only . for that the king had great council , besides his parliament , a●pears by a record of . hen. . abo●● an exchange between the king and the earl of northumberland : whereby the king promiseth to deliver to the earl lands to the value , by the advice of parliament , or otherwise by the advice of his grand council , and other estates of the realm , which the king will assemble , in case the parliament do not meet . we may find what judgment in later times parliaments have had of proclamations , by the statute of . of hen. cap. . in these words , forasmuch as the king , by the advice of his council , hath set forth proclamations , which obstinate persons have contemned ; not considering what a king by his royal power may do : considering that sudden causes and occasions fortune many times , which do require speedy remedies , and that by abiding for a parliament , in the mean time might happen great prejudice to ensue to the realm : and weighing also , that his majesty , which by the kingly and re●al power given him by god , may do many things in such cases , should not be dri●en to extend the liberties , and supre●ity of his regal power , and dignity , by willfulness of froward subjects : it is therefore thought fit , that the king with the advice of his honourable council should set forth proclamations for the good of the people , and defence of his royal dignity as necessity shall require . this opinion of a house of parliament was confirmed afterwards by a second parliament , and the statute made proclamations of as great validity , as if they had been made in parliament . this law continued until the government of the state came to be under a● protector , during the minority of edward the sixth , and in his first year it was repealed . i find also , that a parliament in the th year of henry the seventh , did so great reverence to the actions , or ordinances of the king , that by statut● they provided a remedy or means to levy a benevolence granted to the king although by a statute made not long before all benevolences were damne● and annulled for ever . mr. fuller , in his arguments against the proceedings of the high-commission court , affirms , that the statute of . h. . cap. . which giveth power to ordinaries to imprison and set fines on subjects , was made without the assent of the commons , because they are not mentioned in the act. if this argument be good , we shall find very many statutes of the same kind , for the assent of the commons was seldom mentioned in the elder parliaments . the most usual title of parliaments in edward the d , rich. . the three henries . . . in edw. . and rich. . days , was : the king and his parliament , with the assent of the prelates , earles , and barons , and at the petition , or at the special instance of the commons , doth ordain . the same mr. fuller saith , that the statute made against lollards , was without the assent of the commons , as appears by their petition in these words , the commons beseech , that whereas a statute was made in the last parliament , &c. which was never assented nor granted ●y the commons , but that which was done ●herein , was done without their assent . ( . ) how far the kings council hath directed and swayed in parliament , hath in part appeared by what hath been already produced . for further evidence , we may add the statute of westminster : the first which saith , these be the acts of king edward . made at his first parliament general , by his council , and by the assent of bishops , abbots , priors , earles , barons , and all the commonalty of the realm , &c. the statute of bygamy saith , in presence of certain reverend fathers , bishops of england , and others of the kings council , for as much as all the king's council , as well justices as others , did agree , that they should be put in writing , and observed . the statute of acton burnell saith , the king , for himself , and by his council , hath ordained and established . in articuli super chartas ; when the great charter was confirmed , at the request of his prelates , earls and barons we find these passages . . nevertheless the king and his council do not intend by reason of this statute to diminish the king right , &c. . and notwithstanding all these things before-mentioned , or any part of them ; both the king and his council , and all they that were present at the making of this ordinance , will and intend that the right and prerogative of his crown shall be saved to him in all things . here we may see in the same parliament the charter of the liberties of the subjects confirmed , and a saving of the kings prerogative : those times neither stumbled at the name , nor conceived any such antipathy between the terms , as should make them incompatible . the statute of escheators hath this title , at the parliament of our soveraign lord the king , by his council it was agreed , and also by the king himself commanded . and the ordinance of inquest goeth thus , it is agreed and ordained by the king himself , and all his council . the statute made at york , . ed. . saith , whereas the knights , citizens , and burgesses desired our soveraign lord the king in his parliament , by their petition , that for his profit , and the commodity of his prelates , earls , barons , and commons , it may please him to provide remedy ; our soveraign lord the king desiring the profit of his people by the assent of his prelates , earles , barons , and other nobles of his council being there , hath ordained . in the parliament primo edwardi the third , where magna charta was confirmed , i find this preamble , at the request of the commonalty by their petition made before the king and his council in parliament , by the assent of the prelates , earles , barons , and other great men assembled , it was granted . the commons presenting a petition unto the king , which the king's council did mislike , were content thereupon to mend and explain their petition ; the form of which petition is in these words , to their most redoubted soveraign lord the king , praying the said commons , that whereas they have pray'd him to be discharged of all manner of articles of the eyre , &c. which petition seemeth to his council to be prejudicial unto him , and in disinherison of his crown , if it were so generally granted . his said commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of him , which should fall in disinherison of him or his crown perpetually , as of escheators , &c. but of trespasses , misprisions , negligences , and ignorances , &c. in the time of henry the third , an order or provision was made by the king's council , and it was pleaded at the common law in bar to a writ of dower . the plantiffs attorney could not deny it , and thereupon the judgment was ideo ●sine die . it seems in those days an order of the council-board was either parcel of the common-law or above it . the reverend judges have had regard in their proceedings , that before they would resolve or give judgment in new cases , they consulted with the king 's privy council . in the case of adam brabson , who was assaulted by r. w. in the presence of the justices of assize at westminster , the judges would have the advice of the kings council : for in a like case , because r. c. did strike a juror at westminster which passed in an inquest against one of his friends , it was adjudged by all the council that his right hand should be cut off , and his lands and goods forfeited to the king. green and thorp were sent by judges of the bench to the kings council , to demand of them whether by the statute of . ed. . cap. . a word may be amended in a writ ; and it was answered , that a word may well be amended , although the statute speak but of a letter or syllable . in the case of sir tho. oghtred , knight , who brought a formedon against a poor man and his wife ; they came and yielded to the demandant , which seemed suspitious to the court , whereupon judgment was stayed ; and thorp said , that in the like case of giles blacket , it was spoken of in parliament , and we were commanded , that when any like case should come , we should not go to judgment without good advice : therefore the judges conclusion was , sues au counseil , & comment ils voillet que nous devomus faire , nous volume faire , & auterment nient en cest case . sue to the council , and as they will have us to do , we will ; and otherwise not in this case . ( . ) in the last place , we may consider how much hath been attributed to the opinions of the kings judges by parliaments , and so find , that the kings council hath guided and ruled the judges , and the judges guided the parliament . in the parliament of . hen. . the commons made suit , that william de la poole , d. of suffolke , should be committed to prison , for many treasons and other crimes . the lords of the higher house were doubtful what answer to give , the opinion of the judges was demanded . their opinion was , that he ought not to be committed , for that the commons did not charge him with any particular offence , but with general reports and slanders . this opinion was allowed . in another parliament , . hen. . ( which was prorogued ) in the vacation the speaker of the house of commons was condemned in a thousand pound dammages , in an action of trespass , and was committed to prison in execution for the same . when the parliament was re-assembled , the commons made suit to the king and lords to have their speaker delivered ; the lords demanded the opinion of the judges , whether he might be delivered out of prison by priviledge of parliament ; upon the judges answer it was concluded , that the speaker should still remain in prison , according to the law , notwithstanding the priviledge of parliament , and that he was the speaker : which resolution was declared to the commons by moyle , the king's serjeant at law ; and the commons were commanded in the kings name , by the bishop of lincolne , ( in the absence of the arch-bishop of canterbury , then chancellour ) to chuse another speaker . in septimo of hen. . a question was moved in parliament , whether spiritual persons might be convented before temporal judges for criminal causes . there sir john fineux , and the other judges , delivered their opinion , that they might and ought to be : and their opinion was allowed and maintained by the king and lords , and dr. standish , who before had holden it ; the same opinion was delivered from the bishops . if a writ of errour be sued in parliament upon a judgment given in the kings bench , the lords of the higher house alone , ( without the commons ) are to examine the errours ; the lords are to proceed according to law , and for their judgment therein they are to be informed by the advice and counsel of the judges , who are to inform them what the law is , and so to direct them in their judgment ; for the lords are not to follow their own opinions or discretions otherwise . so it was in a writ of errour brought in parliament by the dean and chapter of lichfield , against the prior and covent of newton-panel , as appeareth by record . see flower dew's case , p. . h. . fol. . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e kings . . gen. ▪ . notes for div a -e arist . pol. lib. . c. . machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of t. livius, translated out of the italian. to which is added his prince. with some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. by e.d. discorsi sopra la prima deca di tito livio. english machiavelli, niccolò, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing m aa estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) machivael's [sic] discourses upon the first decade of t. livius, translated out of the italian. to which is added his prince. with some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors. by e.d. discorsi sopra la prima deca di tito livio. english machiavelli, niccolò, - . dacres, edward. machiavelli, niccolò, - . principe. english. [ ], , [ ]; [ ], , [ ] p. printed for g. bedell, and t. collins, and are to be sold at their shop at the middle-temple gate in fleetstreet, london : . dedication signed: edward dacres. a translation, by edward dacres, of: machiavelli, niccolò. discorsi sopra la prima deca di tito livio. "nicholas machiavel's prince" has separate title page, with impint: london, printed for daniel pakeman, ; register and pagination are seaparate. reproduction of the original in the harvard university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng livy -- early works to . political science -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - jason colman sampled and proofread - jason colman text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion machivael's discourses upon the first decade of t. livius , translated out of the italian . to which is added his prince . with some marginal animadversions noting and taxing his errors . by e. d. london , printed for g. bedell , and t. collins ; and are to be sold at their shop at the middle-temple gate in fleetstreet to the most noble and illustrious james duke of lenox , earl of march , baron of setrington , darnly , terbanten , and methuen , lord great chamberlain and admiral of scotland , knight of the most noble order of the garter , and one of his majesties most honorable privy council in both kingdoms . i offer here to your graces patronage my best endeavors , discovering at large their imperfections , in what i can claim mine in this work . for which however i may have incurred the blame of some , as unable to do the author , i have undertaken , his full right , but rather by my rude stile wronging his original lustre ; yet perhaps , with others more moderate , i may find favor and good acceptance , as well for my choice of the author , whose worth will somewhat beare me out , as because i have contributed hereunto what i ought , which can be no more then what i could . mine author was a florentine , whose national attribute among the italians is subtilty , and whose particular eminence in cunning hath styled the most cunning , as his sectaries , machiavillians . nor hath this workman taken in hand a work unproper for his skill , being the discovery of the first foundations , and analyzing of the very grounds upon which the roman commonwealth was built , and afterwards rose to such glory and power , that neither before nor after all the ages of the world ever afforded the like example . this book i conceived , i might not unfitly present your grace with , as unto whose service i owe my self and what i can , and whom as well for neereness of blood , as affection and favor , his sacred majesty may most probably imploy in this our ship of state near the helme , to the end it may in some part serve for your experience , as a good sea-card , whereby you may become able and expert , as well in the entrances and passages into all creeks and harbors of quiet , as in the discovery and avoidance of all rocks and shelves ; for as at sea it is alwaies seen , that in a stormy and tempestuous time , the master dares not trust the rudder in the hand of others then such as are the best approved and experienced mariners ; so , in all states we find , that however in time of peace and quiet , allyance , blood , and favor have a main stroke in matter of preferments and imployments too yet when the times grow perplexed with perils and difficulties , true worth and experience are sought after , and then of value . no climate is so benigne , as to afford a perpetual calme , and therefore your grace may do well to enable your self for the service of your prince and countrey , that being called for into the steerage in turbulent times , not favor , onely may give you a place there , but use find you necessary , whereunto if i could contribute a poore mite , i had done enough . notwithstanding however my authour , in what he hath done well , hath far excelled others , yet is he not without his blemishes and errors to ; which , as well as i was able to discover them , i have markt , and thereunto added some observations , taking ( as i think ) all his notorious errors in this book : wherein i may have committed faults too , which you may be pleased to pass over , as no strange thing , but accept rather the duty of your graces humblest servant , edward dacres . a table of the arguments of each several chapter . what were in general the beginnings of every city , and especially that of rome . chap. . how many kindes of commonwealths there are , and what was that of rome , chap. . vpon what occasions the tribunes of the people were created in rome , whereby the common-wealth became more perfect , chap. . that the disagreement of the senate and people of rome made the commonwealth both free and mighty . chap. . whether the people or the nobility are the the better guardians of liberty , and which have greater occasions of being tumultuous , either they that strive to inlarge the state , or they that endeavor but to maintain it . chap. . whether in rome there could have been such a state founded as would quite have taken away the hatreds between the people and the senate . chap. . how usefull accusations are in a republique for the maintenance of liberty ; chap. . accusations are not more beneficial to commonwealths then calumnies pernicious . chap. . how needful it is , that he who frames anew the laws , and laies new fonndations of a commonwealth , be alone without companion or competitor . chap. . as the founders of a commonwealth or kingdom are praise-worthy , so the beginners of a tyranny deserve much infamy . chap. . of the romans religion . chap. . of what importance it is to hold a worthy esteem of religion ; and that italy for having faild therein by means of the church of rome hath gone to wrack , chap. . in what manner the romans avail'd themselves of their religion , in ordering the city , in undertaking their designes , and stopping of tumults chap. . the romans interpreted their auspices as necessity . required , and with discretion made a shew to observe their religion ; yet upon occasion they neglected it ; but if any did rashly contemn it , they punished him . chap. . the samnites for the extream remedy to their broken state , have recourse to religion . chap. . people accustomed to live under a prince , if by any accident they become free , have much adoe to maintain their liberty . chap. . a disorderly people getting their liberty , cannot keep themselves free without great difficulties . chap. . in what manner , in a corrupted city ; a free state may be maintained , being gotten ; or how when they have it not , it may be gotten and well ordered . chap. . a very mean prince may easily subsist , succeeding a brave and valorous prince ; but a mean one following one that is mean , brings a state into great hazard . chap. . two continued successions of valorous princes work great effect , and commonwealths well ordered , of necessity have valorous successions : and therefore are their gains and increases great . chap. . what blame that prince or republique deserves that wants soldiers of his own subjects . chap. . what we may observe in the case of the three horatij romans , and the three curiatij albans . chap. . that the whole fortune ought not to be laid at stake , where the whole forces trie not for it : and for this cause it is often hurtfull to guard the passages . chap. . commonwealths well ordered appoint rewards and punishments for their people , and never recompence the one with the other . chap. . whosoever would reforme an ancient state in a free city , let him retain at least the shadow of the old customs . chap. . a new prince in a city or province taken by him , should make innovations in every thing . chap. . it is very seldom , that men know how to be altogether mischievous , or altogether good . chap. . for what reason the romans were less ungratefull to their citizens , then the athenians . chap. . whether of the two be more ungratefull , people , or a prince . chap. . what means a prince or republ should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude , and what a commander or citizen to be free from their danger . chap. . that the roman commanders were never extraordinarily punish'd , for any error committed , nor at all punish'd when either by their ignorance , or upon some unlucky resolution taken by them , the commonwealth suffered . chap. . a prince or republ. should not defer to do good unto men , until their necessity require it . chap. . when an inconvenience is grown in a state or against a state , it is better to bear with it for a while , then presently to struggle with it . chap. . the dictators authority did good and not harme to the commonwealth of rome , and how authorities which the citizens take upon them of themselves , and not those that are given them by the peoples free voices , are hurtfull to the government . chap. . the reason why in rome the creation of the decemvirate was hurtful to the liberty of that republique , notwithstanding that it was made by publique and free voices . chap. . the citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the commonwealth , ought not disdain the less as unworthy of them . chap. . what distastes the agrarian law gave in rome , and that it is very ●ff●●sive to make a law in a commonwealth , that looks far backwards , and yet goes directly against an ancient custome of the city . chap. . weak commonwealths are hardly drawn to a certain resolution and know not how to determine , and the course they ordinarily take , they are rather forc'd too , then choose of themselves . chap. . the same accidents are seen to befall several people . chap. the creation of the decemvirate in rome , and what therein is to be noted , where among many other things is considered , how by the like accident a republique may be preserved or suppressed . chap. . of humble to become proud , of mercifull cruell , without passing through the due means between these extreams , argues indiscretion , and turns not to advantage . chap. . how easily men may be corrupted . chap. . they that fight for their own glory , are the good and faithfull soldiers . chap. . a multitude without a head is unprofitable , and a man should not first threaten , and afterwards demand the power . chap. . it is a matter of very evill example , when he that makes a law , neglects the observing of it : and it is very dangerous in a state , to make a continual practice of cruel executions . chap. . men arise by degrees from one ambition to another , and first they ayme no further then that they themselves suffer no harme of others , afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others . chap. . men though they are deceived in generalities , yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars . chap. . he that would not have a magistracy given to one that is base and lewd , let him cause it to be demanded either by one that is very base and very lewd , or by one that is very noble and very good . chap. . if those cities , that have had their beginning free as rome , have found difficulty to make laws , that can maintain them so ; those that have had their beginning immediatly servile , find almost an impossibility . chap. . the power of stopping the publique actions of the city , should not be given into the hands of one council , or one magistracy . chap. . a commonwealth or prince should make a shew to doe that of a free mind , which indeed meere necessity compells them to do . chap. . to stay the insolence of one that grows powerfull in a commonwealth , there is no way more secure and less offensive , then to seize beforehand , and so prevent him of those ways , by which he attains to that power . chap. . the people deceived by a false shew of good , oftentimes seek their own ruine , and great hopes and large promises do easily move them . chap. . what authority the presence of a great and worthy personage hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude . chap. . how easily things are ordered in a city where the people is not corrupted ; and that where a parity is , there is no place for a principality ; and where that is not , a republique cannot be . chap. . before strange accidents and changes befall a city or countrey , usually there are some prodigies that forerun them , or men that foretel them . chap. . a common people united are strong and vigorous , but taken apart and separated , vile and contemptible . chap. . the multitude is more wise and constant then a prince . chap. . what confederation or league is rather to be trusted ; either that which is made with a republique , or that is made with a prince . chap. . how the consulship and every other magistracy in rome , was given without respect of age . chap. . the table of the second book . vvhich contributed more to the romans in the conquest of their empire , either their vertue or their fortune . chap. . what people the romans had to make warr withall , and how obstinately they fought for the defence of their liberty . chap. . rome became a great city , by ruining those that were near neighbors unto her , and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her dignities . chap. . republiques have taken three particular courses to amplify and inlarge their states . chap. . that the changes of religions and languages , together with the chances of flouds and pestilences , abolish the memory of things . chap. . how the romans proceeded in making of war. chap. . how much land the romans allowed to each man they sent out to inhabit their colonies . chap. . the occasions , wherefore people leave their own native soyles , and invade other countreys . chap. . vpon what occasions wars are begun among princes . chap. . moneys are not the sinews of war , according to the common opinion . chap. . it is not a match wisely made , to joyn alliance with a prince , whose credit is greater then his strength . chap. . whether it is better for a prince fearing to be assaild by his enemy , himself first to begin the war with him , or to expect while it comes home to him . chap. . that men rise from poore and small beginnings to great fortunes , rather by the help of guile then force . chap. . they are often deceived who think with humility to overcome pride . chap. . weak states are alwaies irresolute in their determinations ; and slow deliberations are alwayes hurtful . chap. . how much the order used by our soldiers in these modern times , differ from those of the ancients . chap. . what esteem our modern armies ought to have of artillery , and if the opinion which is generally conceived of it be true . chap. . how by authority taken from the example of the romans , and from the use of the ancient military discipline , the foot is more to be esteemed then the horse . chap. . that conquests in republiques not well governed , and that proceed not according to the roman valour , procure rather their ruine then advancement . chap. . what hazard that prince or commonwealth runs , which is served by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers . chap. . the first rector that ever the romans sent to any place , was to capua four hundred years after they began to make war. chap. . how erroneus many times the opinions of men are , when they give their judgments touching great affairs . chap. . how much the romans in giving judgement upon their subjects , whensoever occasion was offered that constrained them thereunto , avoyded the middle way , and rather betook themselves to one of the extreams . chap. . fortresses in general do more harme then good . chap. . it is a wrong course , to assail a city fallen into discord , thinking by means thereof to become master of it . chap. . contempt and contumely begets a hatred against them that use it , without any return of advantage to them . chap. . prudent princes and commonwealths ought to be content with the victory , for oftentimes when that suffices not , they lose it . chap. . how dangerous a thing it is for a republique or prince , not to revenge an injury done against the publique state , or against a private person . chap. . fortune blinds mens eyes , when she will not suffer them to prevent her designs . ch. . republiques and princes that really are mighty , seek not by moneys to make alliance with others , but with their valor and repute of their forces . chap. . how dangerous a thing it is to give credit to men that are banishd out of their countrey . chap. . how may wayes the romans used to make themselves masters of towns. chap. . that the romans gave their commanders of their armies , free and large commissions . chap. . the table of the third book . for the maintenance of a religion or commonwealth long in being , it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds . chap. . it is a very great part of wisdom sometimes to seem a fool . chap. . that it was necessary for preservation of the new gotten liberty , to put brutus his sons to death . chap. . no prince lives secure in his principality , while those are living who were despoyled of it . chap. . what it is that makes a prince lose his kingdome , which he injoys by right of inheritance . chap. . of conspiracies . chap. . from whence proceeds it , that of the changes from liberty to slavery , and from slavery to liberty , some are without blood , others exceeding bloody . chap. . he that will make alteration in a republique , must consider the subject he is to worke upon . chap. . how a man must of necessity change with the times , if he will alwaies have good success in his undertakings . chap. . that a captain cannot avoid battel when his enemy will fight in any case . ch. . he that hath to deal with many , however that he be the weaker , provided that he can but support their first violence , overcomes . chap. . that a wise commander upon his own soldiers , should lay all manner of necessity to fight , and take it , as much as he can , from his enemies . chap. . whether more trust is to be reposed in a good commander having a weak army , or in a good army having a weak commander . chap. . new sleights and inventions that are used in the midst of a fight , and new cryes that are heard , what effects they produce . chap. . that the command of an army ought to be given in charge onely to one , and where there are more , they alwaies erre . chap. . in time of difficulty and peril , true worth and vertue is sought after ; and in calm and quiet times , not their vertues but their wealth , friends and parentage prefer them . chap. . that he who hath received any not able disgrace or injury done him from a prince or republique , should never be intrusted by them in any employment or service of importance . chap. . there is nothing more worthy of a commander , then to be able to discover before-hand and espy out the enemies practices . chap. whether in the government of a multitude , mildness or severity be of greater availe . chap. . one example of humanity prevailed with the falisci , more then all the force of rome could . chap. . from whence it came that hannibal by a manner of proceeding different from that of scipioes , wrought the same effect in italy , which the other did in spain . chap. . how manlius torquatus his rigor , and valerius corvinus his mildness gaind each of them the same glory . chap. . for what cause camillus was banished rome . chap. . the continuation of governments brought rome into thraldom . chap. . of cincinnatus and many romans poverties ' chap. . how that upon the occasion of women , states have been ruined . chap. . how a city at discord in it self is to be united : and how that opinion is not true , that to maintain cities in obedience , it is necessary to keep them in discord , and divided into factions . chap. . that the citizens actions ought to be well weighed : for many times under vertuous and charitable deeds , are laid the fouudacions of tyranny . chap. . that the peoples faults grow from their princes . chap. . a citizen , that will of his own authority do any good in his own city , of necessity must first extinguish all envy : and what order is to be taken for the defence of a city upon the enemies approach . chap. . powerful commonwealths , and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage and the same dignity . chap. . what means some have practised to disturb a treaty of peace . chap. . it much furthers an army in the winning of a battel , to be confident of their own forces and their generals valor . chap. . what fame , report , or opinion causes the people , to begin to cast their favors upon a citizen : and whether a prince or a people do bestow their magistracies with better judgement . chap. . what dangers they incur , that put themselves forwards as principals to advise any designe , which are so much the greater , by how much this carries with it the more difficulty and peril . chap. . the reason wherefore the french have been and are thought in combats at the beginning more then men , and afterwards less then women . chap. . whether slight skirmishes or battels are necessary before a great battel ; and what is to be done to know a new enemy , when one would avoid those skirmishes . chap. . what manner of man that general ought to be , on whose abilities an army may confidently rely chap. . that a commander ought exactly to know scituations . chap. . how deceit is commendable used against the enemy in time of war. chap. . that the defence of ones countrey ought to be undertaken , either with ignominy or with glory , or whatsoever way it be done , it is well defended . chap. . promises extorted by force ought not to be kept . chap. . those men that are bred in the same country , do throughout all ages keep very neere the same nature and dispositim . chap. . by sudden supprisal and boldness many times more is obtained , then by ordinary means can be gotten . chap. . which course is the better in a battel , either at the first to sustain onely the enemies shock and reserve some forces till the latter end to give them a blow withall , or else as upon themaine to venture all upon the fury of the first onset chap. . whence proceeds it that one family in a city holds a long time the same manners and disposition . chap. . that a good citizen for the good of his country ought to forget all private wrongs . chap. . when we see the enemy commit a great error , we ought to beleeve there is some treachery in the business . chap. . a republique if one would preserve it free , hath every day neeed of provision of new orders : and in regard of his good deserts that way , fabius was termed magnus , chap. . finis . machiavels discourses upon the first decade of t. livivs translated out of italian . the preface . when i consider the esteem which is made of antiquity , and that many times ( letting pass further examples ) a small piece of an ancient statute hath been bought at a great rate , only to have it at hand , to adorn the house withall , and that thereby they may be able to cause others , who take delight in the art , to draw copies thereof , and these likewise endeavour , as lively as they can , to represent it again in all their works and on the other side seeing the most vertuous actions that histories relate us , to have been archieved by kingdomes , ancient common-wealths , kings captains , citizens and law-givers , and such others who have undergone much for their countries good ; that these , i say , have been rather admired then follow'd , or rather by every one have been so much avoided , that now the very footsteps of that ancient vertue is utterly defac'd , i cannot but both marvaile and grieve : and the rather , because i perceive , that in matters of process arising in a commonwealth among citizens , or in criminal causes , recourse is alwaies made to those judgements and those remedies which formerly have been ordain'd and practis'd by the ancients ; for the civil-lawes are nothing else , but the opinions given by ancient lawyers , which since having been reduc'd to a method , todirect our doctors of the law now a daies , in giving of their judgements : yet for all this in the ordering of commonwealths , in the maintenance of states , in the government of kingdomes , in ordeining of military discipline , in waging of war , in giving judgment upon the subjects , in amplifying of the empire , there are neither princes , nor republiques , commanders , nor citizens who ever seek after any of these ancient patternes , which i perswade my self proceeds not so much from that weakness , into which the breeding and customes now a daies have brought the world , or from that evill which idleness accompanied with ambition hath done to many christian countries and cities , as from their want of the true knowledge of histories , in that by reading them , they conceive not that meaning nor relish that tastethey have in them : whence it arises that many who read , take delight to hear the variety of accidents , which are frequent in them , without further regard of imitating them deeming that not only hard , but unpossible , as if the heavens , the sun , the elements , and men were alter'd from what they were of old , in the●ir motion , order and power . wherefore being desirous to withdraw men from this errour , i thought fit to write upon these bookes of t : livius , which have escap'd the malice of the times , what i thought , conformable to moderne and ancient affaires , of purpose for the better understanding of them , that they who shall well peruse these discourses of mine , may there reap that profit for which end the knowledg of historie ought to be sought after . and however this be a taske of great difficulty , yet by the helpe of those who have incourag'd me to undergoe this burden , i beleeve i shall carry it so far onwards , that there shall be left for him that comes after me , but very little way to bring it to a good end . chap. i. what were in generall the beginnings of every city , and especially that of rome . whosoever shall reade what beginning the city of rome had , who were the lawmakers , and how it was founded , will nothing marvaile that so great vertue was continued so many years in the city , and that from thence afterwards there grew so mighty an empire , to which that commonwealth attain'd . and therefore to discourse first of her birth , i say , that all cities were built either by the natives of the place they were built in , or by strangers . the first comes to passe when the inhabitants being dispers'd in many and small numbers finde they cannot live safe , each one not having strength apart , as well by reason of their situation , as their small number to resist the violence of those that would force them ; or if they would joyn together for their defence , the enemy comming upon them , they cannot do it in time ; and when they should be in one body , they must of necessity abandon divers of their retreats , & so become a sudden prey to their enemies : wherefore to escape these dangers , either of themselves , or upon the motion of some one of authority among them , they confine themselves to dwell together , in a place chosen as well for their better commodity of living as more facility of defence . of this sort among many others were athens & venice . the first under the command of theseus , was upon the like occasions built by the scattered inhabitants : the other , much people being retired into certain little ilands at the point of the adriatique sea ( to avoid those wars which then were beginning in italy by reason of those huge and continual inundations of barbarians upon the declining of the roman empire ) began among themselves without the authority of any particular prince , to live under those lawes they thought most proper for their preservation : which prov'd luckily to them , for the long quiet their situation gave them , that sea having no outlet , and those people which then afflicted italy , not having ships to annoy them , so that every little beginning was sufficient to give them that greatness they now have . the second sort is , when a city is built by strangers which are either absolute of themselves , or depend upon others , & such are colonies which are sent out either by a commonwealth or prince to disburden their towns of inhabitants , or for the defence of some country which of late they have gotten , and would safely keep without much expence ; of which sort the romans built many througouht all their dominions ; others were built by some prince , not to make his seate there , but for his glory ; and so was alexandria by alexander : and because these cities have not their beginning free , they seldome attain to that greatness , as to be esteemed the head cities of kingdomes . the like beginning had florence ( whither it was built by syllaes souldiers , or by chance by the inhabitants of the mountains of fiesola ; who taking heart upon that long peace the world enjoyed under octavian , came down & dwelt in the plain upon the arne ) for it was built under the romau government , neither could it in the beginning make greater increase , then what the princes favour allow'd it . the founders of cities are then said to be absolute and free , when any people either led by a prince , or of themselves , are forc'd by contagion , famine , or war to abandon their native soyle , and seek a new dwelling and these are are content to inhabite the cities in the country they have conquered , as moses did , or build new , as did aeneas . in this case appeares the ability of the founder , and the fortune of the city founded , the which is more or less admirable , as he who gave thereto the beginning was of greater or or less abilities : which is seen in two kindes ; the first in choyce of the situation , the second in making the lawes . and because men act some things upon necessity , others by their own election , and the greater vertue is there seen where election hath the least power ; it is to be consider'd , whether it were better to chuse barren places to build cities in , to the end men being forc'd to labor for their sustenance , might live the better in agreement , the poverty of their country giving less occasion of discord , as it was in raugia : and in many other cities built in like places , which choyce without doubt would be wiselier made and more profitable , of men were content to live of their own , and not seek to rule over others , but seeing it not possible for men to live in security without force , it is necessary to avoid a barren soyle , and to plant themselves in fruitful places , where they may be enabled by the plenty of their seat to enlarge and desend their territories against those that would assault them , and over-master all that would oppose their greatness . and to the end the riches of the country occasion not too much the ease of the people , it would be fit to provide that the laws oblige them to take these paines , the situation doth not , and to imitate those who have liv'd in pleasant and fruitfull countries , and apt to breed men given to luxury , loth to use that industry vertue requires , and yet were so wise as to prevent those harmes the plenty of the soyle , and so consequently the peoples idleness might cause : having impos'd such a necessity of labour upon those they brought up to be souldiers , as by means of their strict discipline , they far surpassed others who because of their rough and barren countries were borne fierce ; such was the kingdome of the aegyptians that notwithstanding the countries delicacies , the laws strictness prevail'd so far , as there were bred by them many great personages : and if time had not worne out their names , it would appeare they had deserv'd as much praise , as did great alexauder , and many others whose memories stories continue fresh amongst us : and whosoever had considered the soldans kingdome , and the mamalucks order , with their military discipline , before they were ruin'd by selimus the great turke , would have seen in that how the souldiers were train'd up in continuall exercises , and therein have known how much they fear'd that case to which the goodness of their country invited them , unless it had been oppos'd with severe lawes . i avow therefore the choyce better in a fertile place , when that good government takes order for a moderate use of the abundance . when alexander the great had a purpose to build a city for his glory , dinocrates the architect came to him and shewed him , how it might be built upon mount athos , which place , besides that it would be strong , he could so order , that the city should be made in forme of a man : which would be a wonder worthy his greatness : and being askd again by alexander whereupon the inhabitants should live , answerd he had not well advis'd of that point yet : whereat having laught , he left the mountain alone , & built alexandria so , that people might resort thither , as well for the farness of the soyle , as the commodity of of the sea , and the river nilus . whoever then shall examine the beginning of rome , if aeneas be taken for the first founder , it must be numberd among the cities that were built by strangers ; if romulus , among those that were built by the natives ; and in what manner soever it were , it will appear it had a beginning free of it self without dependence of any ; and moreover that the laws made by romulus , numa , and others , kept it under in an exact obedience ( as hereafter shall be said : ) so that neither the fruitfulness of the country , the commodity of the sea , the osten victories , nor the vastness of the empire , could in many ages corrupt it ; but maintained it so eminent for vertue , that never any commonwealth came near it . and because those exploits she did , and are recited by t. livius , were acted upon publique or private counsel , and either within or without the city , i will begin my discourse upon those things passed within land done upon publique advice , which i shall think worthy of remarke , adding likewise all the dependences thereupon ; with which the first book or first part shall end . chap. ii. how many kinds of commonwealths there are ; and what was that of rome . i will sorbear to discourse of those cities which have had their beginnings in subjection under others , and speak of such only as were free in their births from forrain servi●ude , having had instantly the raines of their own government in their own hands , either as a commonwealth , or as a principality which have had . as divers beginnings , so likewise sundry lawes and ordinances : for some either in their beginning , or not long after receiv'd their laws from one alone , and that at once , as the spartans did theirs from lycurgus : others had their 's casually and at several times , and upon occasion , as rome : so that it is a great happiness for a common-wealth to light upon a man of such wisdome so to order the state , as without need of alteration it may continue in security under them : as we see that sparta kept the same without change or any dangerous tumult above eight hundred years . and on the contrary , that city may in some degree be termd unhappy , which having not met with a judicious founder , is forc'd to give it self a new frame : and of these the more unlucky is that which is the more amiss : and such is that which together with all its own new ordinances , hath much mistaken the right way to perfection : for it is almost impossible for those of this degree to be setled again by any accident : those others although their order be not exact , yet the beginning they have taken being good , and like enough to prove better , have a good possibility , as may fall out , to become perfect : but sure it is , ' will never be without danger : for the multitude seldome agrees to a new law , if it touch any change of government in the city , unless the necessity of doing it be shew'd them by some extremity , which never coming without danger , it is like enough the commonwealth may be sooner ruin●d , then brought into good order . of which that of florence gives sufficient proof , which upon that accident of arezo in the second year was anew orderd , and by that of pirato in the twelfth inbroyld again . intending then to treate what were the ordinances of the city of rome , and the accidents that brought it to perfection , i say , that some , who have writ of commonwealths , will have it that there was one of these three kinds of states term'd by them a principality , another an aristocracy , and a third a popular government : and that they who lay the first grounds of rule and order in a city , ought most to have regard to some one of these , as it seems fittest to their purpose . some others ( and that following the opinion of many more wise ) think that there be six sorts of governments ; of which three are bad in extremity , and three good in themselves , but so easie to be corrupted , that even they become pernicious . those which are good , are the three aforesaid ; the bad are the other three which depend on these , and every one of them in such sort resemble that which it ap● preaches , that they change suddenly from one into the other : for the principality easily becomes tyranny ; that of the nobility falls into the hands of some few ; and the popular will as easily become tumultuous : so that if he that lays the foundation of a commonwealth , ordaines in a city one of these three sorts , it is but for a small continuance : for it is beyond the power of any remedy to hinder that it slip not into its contrary , for the resemblances which in this case there is between the vertue and the vice . these differences of governments grew by chance among men ; for in the beginning of the world , when the inhabitants were thin , they were scatter'd abroad for a time like wild beasts ; afterwards man kind increasing , they gather'd together , and that they might be able better to defend themselves , they began to cast their eyes upon him who had the most strength and courage among them , and made him their head and obeyed him . hereupon began the discerning of things good and honest from bad and hurtful : for seeing that if any one hurt his benefactour , it caused hatred and pitty among men , blaming the ungrateful , and honouring the thankful ; and thinking withal that the same injuries might as well be done to themselves ; to avoid the like evil , they betook them to make laws and to make punishments against the offenders : hence came the knowledge of justice , which was the occasion that when they were to chuse a prince , they sought not after him that was the lustiest , but the wisest and justest . but afterwards when they had their prince by succession , and not by election , suddenly the heirs began to degenerate from their ancestors ; and forsaking vertuous actions , they thought that princes had nothing to do but to exceed others in luxurie and wantonness , and in what belong'd to their pleasure : so that the prince beginning to be hated , and because he was hated to fear , and passing on beyond this fear to hurt , hereon grew tyranny . thence afterwards grew those violences , conspiracies and treasons against princes , which were not undertaken by those that were fearful or weak ; but if any surpassed others in courage , valour , wealth , and birth , those were the actors , not being able to indure the shameful life of that prince . the multitude then following the authority of those great ones , took armes against the prince ; and he being down , they yeelded obedience to these as to their deliverers : and they hating the name of one head alone , fram'd a government of themselves , and in the beginning ( in regard of the tyranny past ) carried themselves fairly according to the laws they had made , preferring the publique good before their own advantage , and in summe , rul'd and maintain'd the state with exceeding diligence . this government afterwards falling into the hands of their children , who never knew the change of fortune , nor had the experience of adversity , not being content to live in a civil equality , but abandoning themselves to covetousness , ambition , and ravishing of women , so carried it , that they ingross'd in the hands of some few the government that belong'd to the whole nobility , without any regard of the state , in so much that it befell to them quickly as to the tyrant . for the multitude loathing their government , serv'd it self of any one that had any design against these governours , and so some there were quickly found that made head against them , who with the aid of the people put them down . and the remembrance of the prince being yet fresh , and of the wrongs they suffered under him , having taken away this government of few , and being unwilling to restore that of a prince , they chose the popular , which they so ordain'd , that neither a few that were mighty , nor one prince alone should have any power there . and because all states in the beginning are venerable , this popular state subsisted a while but not long , especially when that generation was out that ordain'd it : for suddenly they grew licentious , not fearing private men , nor publick ministers , so that every one living as he listed , they daily did one another divers outrages , and at length wereforc'd by necessity , or by the perswasion of some good man , for to avoid such insolency , to change a new into a principality , and so from thence by degrees , they grew exorbitant in their behaviour , and upon the occasions aforesaid : and this is the circle , in which all states turning about have been and are governed : but seldome do they returne into the self same governments : for hardly any commonwealth can be of so long durance as to undergoe so many changes , and yet stand afoot : but rather it comes to pass , the state while it is in tumult , counsell and force then alwaies failing , becomes subject to some neighbouring government which is better order'd then it self : but were it not for this , a state were always capable of revolution into these sorts of government : i say then , that all these kinds are pernicious for the short continuance of the three which are good ; and the malignity of the other three which are bad : whereupon the sage law-givers having perceived this defect , avoiding each one by it self , chose one that might partake of all , esteeming that more sound and firme : for the one guards the other , being that in one and the same city , there was the principality , nobility , and commonalty as parts of the governments . among those , who by such like ordinances have deserv'd most commendations , is lycurgus , who made his laws after such a manner in sparta , that giving the king the nobility , and the people their shares , he compos'd a government that lasted above eight hundred yeares , to his great credit and that cities quiet . the contrary befell solon , who made the laws in athens , which because it was a popular state , prov'd but short liv'd , and he before he died saw the tyranny of pisistratus begun : and though after forty years his heires were driven from thence , and athens recover'd its liberty ( because it took again a popular government according to solons institutions ) it maintain'd it not above a hundred years , notwithstanding that to hold it , there were many lawes made by which the insolences of the great men were restrain'd and the licentiousness of all in general : which were never provided for by solon : yet because he compounded not this with the authority of the principality as also of the nobility , athens continu'd but a short time in respect of sparta . but let us come to rome , which though it had not a lycurgus to put it so in order that it might long subsist free , yet such were the accidents that chanc'd in it , by reason of the disunion of the commonalty and the senate , that what their founder had not provided for , chance did : for if rome lit not upon the best fortune , it lit upon the next to the best ; for though the first ordinances were defective , yet they aim'd not amiss at the true perfection : because romulus and all the kings made many and good laws and these agreeing to the maintenance of liberty . but because their design was to lay the foundations of a kingdome , and not of a commonwealth , when the city became free , there wanted many things which were fit to be instituted in favour of liberty , but were never ordain'd by those kings . and albeit their kings lost rule upon the occasion and by the means alledged , yet they that expel'd them presently setting up two consuls who should stand in the kings stead , chas'd out of rome the regal title only , & not the regal power ; so that there being in that commonwealth the consuls and the senate , it was compos'd only of two of these forenamed qualities , that is to say , of the principality & nobility . there remain'd only to give the commonalty a place in the government , whereupon the roman nobility being grown insolent , upon the occasions ( which shall be hereafter told ) the people rose up against them , so that rather then to lose all , they were constrain'd to allow the people their part ; & on the other side , the senate & the consuls were likewise to continue with so great authority as they might well maintain their degree in that commonwealth : & so began the creation of the tribuns of the people , after which the state of that commonwealth became more firme , all the three kinds of governments having their shares . and fortune did so much favour them , that though they proceeded from the rule of a king , & of the nobility , to that of the people , by the same degrees , and for the same reasons set down before ; yet to give power to the nobility , they never took away all the authority from the royalty ; nor was the power of the nobility quite diminish'd , to give it to the people : but being mingled , it made an exact commonwealth , to which perfection it came by the departing of the commonalty from the senate , as it shall be shewed at length in the two next following chapters . chap. iii. vpon what occasions the tribuns of the people were created in rome : whereby the commonwealth became more perfect . according as it is shewed by all those that reason of civil government , and so every history is full of examples to that purpose , it is necessary that he who frames a common-wealth , and ordaines laws in it , should presuppose that all men are bent to mischief , and that they have a will to put in practice the wickedness of their minds , so oft as occasion shall serve : and that when any mischief lies covert for a time , it proceeds from an occasion unknown , which is not come to light , because trial of the contrary hath not yet been made , but time afterwards discovers it , which they say is father of the truth . it seem'd that there was in rome a perfect union of the people and senate , when the tarquins were banisht , and that the nobility having laid by their pride , were become of a popular disposition , and supportable to every one even of the meanest ranke . this deceit lay hid , nor was the occasion thereof known as long as the tarquins liv'd , of whom the nobility being afraid , and doubting that upon their ill treating of the people , they might side with them , behav'd themselves with good respect towards them : but no sooner were the tarquins dead , and the nobility delivered of that feare , but they began to spit against the people the poison that all this while had lurked in their breasts , and in all sorts possible to vex and molest them : which thing confirmes what i said before , that men never do good , unless inforc'd thereto : but where choice is abundant , and liberty at pleasure , confusion and disorder suddenly take place . wherefore it is said , that hunger and poverty make men laborious , and laws make them good . but where one thing alone by it self without a law does good , there , is no need of the law : but when that good custom failes , the law becomes necessary forthwith . yet the tarquins being foil'd , who with feare of them kept the nobility in awe , it was fit to think out a new way which should work the same effect the tarquins did , when they were alive . and so at length after many broyles , tumults , and hazards of breaches between the people and the nobility , at length for the peoples assurance , the tribuns were created , and they bore such sway and had such credit , that they could alwaies after mediate between the people and the senate , and stop the nobilities insolency . chap. iv. that the disagreement of the people and the senate of rome , made the commonwealth both free and mighty . i must not fail to discourse upon these tumults , which were in rome from the tarquins death till the creation of the tribuns ; and afterwards upon some other things against the opinion of many , who say that rome was a very disorderly commonwealth , and full of such confusion , that if good fortune and military vertue had not supplyed their defects , it would have been inferiour to any . i cannot deny that fortune and warlike discipline were causes of the roman empire : but methinks they do not consider , that where good discipline is , it is likely too that there is good order , and seldom also happens it but that there is good fortune . but let us come to the other particulars of that city . i say that they who condemne the troubles between the nobility and the people , to me seem to blame those things which were the first occasion of romes liberty : and that they think more of the stirs and noises which arose from those tumults , then they regard the good effects they brought forth : and that they consider not , how there are two severall humours in every republique , that of the commons , and the other of the great-ones ; and how all the laws that are made in favor of liberty , spring first from their disagreement , as easily we may perceive it follow'd in rome . for from the tarquins to the gracchies more then . years , the tumults of rome seldome times caus'd banishment , and very seldome blood : insomuch as no man can well deem these stirres hurtful , nor say the commonwealth was divided , which in so long a time through her discord , banish'd not above eight or ten citizens , and put very few to death , nor yet condemn'd many in sums of money . neither can that be term'd with reason in any sort a disorderly commonwealth , whence we have so many rare examples of vertue : for good examples proceed from good education & a good education from good laws , & good laws from those tumults which many unadvisedly do condemn : for whosoever shall examin the end thereof , shall not find that they produc'd any banishment or violence in hinderance of the common good , but laws & ordinances in benefit of the publick liberty . and if any man should alledge that the means were extravagant , & in a manner outragions . to see the people together cry out against the senate , and the senate against the people , to run tumultuously through the streers , to shut up their shops , and the whole people of rome to quit the town , all which things fright even those that read them . i say that every city ought to have its own waies whereby the people may vent their ambition , & especially those cities that in matters of importance wil availe themselves of their people ; among which rome had this way , that when the people would have a law made , either they did some of the things forenamed , or refus'd to have their names inrolled for the warres , so that to quiet them , there was a necessity in some sort to give them satisfaction . and it is but seldom seen , that the desires of free people tend to the hurt of liberty ; for they arise either from their oppression , or from their suspicion they are falling into it . and in case these opinions were false , yet is there a meanes to rectifie them , if some discreet oratour in their assemblies perswade them of their error ; and the people ( as tully says ) though of themselves ignorant , yet are they of capacity to conceive the truth , being told them by any man worthy of credit , and do easily submit . wherefore we ought more sparingly to blame the roman government , and consider the good effects issued from that commonwealth , which never proceeded but from good causes . and for creating the tribuns , they deserve exceeding great praise ; for besides the giving to the people their share of government , they were ordain'd as guardians of the roman liberty , as it shall appear in the chapter following . chap. v. whether the people or the nebiliry are the better guardians of liberty ; and which have greater occasions of being tzmvltuous ; either they that strive to enlarge the state , or they than endeavour but to maintain it . they who have judiciously laid the foundations of a commonwealth , have , among other principal things ordain'd by them , provided a safegard for liberty , which as it is rightly plac'd , so is it of long or shorter durance . and because in every republick there are the nobility and the commons , question is made to which of these two more safely may be intrusted the guard of liberty . and among the lacedemonians , and in our times among the venetians it hath been given to the nobility ; but among the romans it was committed to the peoples trust ; and therefore is it necessary to examine which of these two common-wealths made the better choyce . and if a man list to argue the case , there want not arguments on both parts : butif we look to the issue they had , we should yeeld it to the nobility , because sparta and venice enjoy'd either of them their freedome , longer then rome . and comming to argument i say ( first taking part with the romans ) that they ought rather to be intrusted as guardians of any thing , who are least desirous to usurpe it , & without doubt considering the designes of the nobility & of the people , we must needs confess they are very ambitious of rule , these only desire not to be oppress'd , and consequently affect the continuance of their freedome , having less hope to usurpe it , then the nobility ; so● that the people being set as guardians of the common liberty , it is probable , they are more careful of it ; and being themselves out of hope of it , will never suffer that it fall into others hands . on the other side , he that argues for the spartan and venetian customes , sayes , that they who intrust it with them that are powerful , doe two good things at once ; the one , that they rather give a satisfaction to their ambition , that having a greater part in the common-wealth , by holding this staffe in their hand they have greater reason to be contented : the other is , that they free the peoples unquiet minds from such a kinde of authority which is the occasion of infinite discords and offences in the commonwealth , and like enough to bring the nobility to some desperation , which in time may do much mischief : and they give us rome it self for an example hereof , that when the tribuns of the people had this authority in their hands , they were not content to have one consul to be a plebeyan , but would have both , and thereupon they would have the censor and the pretour , and all other dignities in the rule of the city : nor was this enough , but led on still with the same rage , they began in after times to adore those men whom they saw fit to curbe the nobility , whereupon grew the power of marius and the ruine of rome : and , truly whosoever should sift this matter throughly , the one and the other , would much doubt which he should make choyce of for the guardians of liberty , not knowing which sort of men is more hurtsull in a commonwealth , either that which desires to gain the honour it hath not , or the other which endeavours to maintain what they have already got ; and at last , whosoever shall examin the whole throughly , will make this conclusion ; either you reason of a republick that aymes at such a dominion as rome had , or of one which seeks no farther then her own preservation . in the fir● case , it is best to doe as rome did , and follow her footsteps . in the second , he may follow venice and sparta for those occasions , as it shall be said in the chapter following . but to return to the point , what kind of men are the more hurtful in a republick ? either they that would enlarge the state , or those that are wary not to lose what they have already gotten ; i say that marcus menenius being made dictatour , and marcus follius general of the horse , both plebeyans , to inquire after certain conspiracies , which were made in capua against rome , authority was also given from the people to find out those that in rome by ambition or any extraordinary way did strive to gain the consu●ship , and the other great honours of the city ; whereupon the nobility thinking this authority granted to the dictatour as against them , they reported all about rome that they were not the nobles that ambituously sought after dignities by unlawful means , but the plebeyans who not confident of their births nor worths , sought by extravagant wayes to attain to those degrees , and particularly accused the dictatonr ; and so powerfull was the accusation , that menenius in a publick assembly , where he complain'd of the calumnies the nobility had laid on him , quit the dictatourship , and submitted himself to the tryal , which was made before the people , and after his cause was heard , he was absolved : where it was argued , whether savour'd more of ambition , either he that would maintain , or he that would gain ; for the one and the other appetite may occasion very great tumults . yet notwithstanding most commonly are they caus'd by him who already hath the possession , because the feare of losing doth breed in them the same desires which are in those who aime at conquest : because men think they hold not surely what they have , unless they make a new addition of somewhat else ; and besides this , the larger territories they are master of , the greater force and power they are able to imploy in bringing their designs to effect ; and this also may we adde , that their unlimited and ambitious behaviours kindle in the breasts of those that have not , a desire to have , or to be reveng'd on those that despoyle them , or else to become lords themselves of that wealth and those honours , which they see others use ill . chap. vi. whether in rome there could have been ●uch a state founded , as would quite ha●● taken away the hatreds between the people and the senate . wee have discours'd upon the effects , which the differences , betwixt the people and the senate , made . now they continuing till the gracchies , where they occasion'd the ruine of the common liberty , some man would wish , that rome could have atchieved these glorious acts she did , without those jarres in her . yet it seems worthy the consideration , to see , if it were possible , so to frame a state in rome , as could void all differences● ; and if a man would examin this , he should have recourse to those republiques , which , without so many fallings out and bickerings , have been long free , and see , what kind of state theirs was , and whether rome were capable of it . an example among the ancients is sparta , among the modernes venice , both by me formerly named . sparta made it self a king with a little senate to govern it . venice divided not the government with the names , but in one general tearm , all those that had a hand in it were call'd gentlemen , which chance rather cast on them , then the deliberation of their founder : for many inhabitants being met together upon those rocks , where now stands that city upon the occasions foretold , when they were grown to such a number , that for them to live together it was necessary for them to ordain lawes they appointed a forme of government , and meeting also together in counsel to advise touching the city , when they found themselves of sufficient number to make up a body politick , they excluded all others who afterwards in process of time should come to dwell there , from all power in state affaires . and in success of time , finding there were many inhabitants in the place out of the government , to give them reputation that govern'd , they call'd them gentlemen , and the others plebeyans . so that this order might well be begun and continued without the dislike of any : for when it was first made , every one that dwelt at venice , did equally partake of the government , so that none could complain : they , who afterwards came to inhabit there , finding the state setled and limited , had neither occasion nor meanes to make any tumult : there was no occasion , because nothing was taken from them : and the meanes they had not , because they that govern'd kept them in subjection , nor trusted them so far with any imployment that they could take authority upon them . add hereunto , that they who afterwards came to inhabit venice , were not many , nor of so great a number , that there was disproportion between the governors and those that were governed ; for the number of the gentlemen was either equal to them , or greater then they were : so that for these reasons venice could well begin such a state and maintain it in unity . sparta , as i said , was govern'd by a king and a strict senate , and might well maintain it self so a long time ; because there being in sparta but few inhabitants , and they having seis'd upon the government in prevention of those that should afterwards come to inhabit there , and with reputation living in observance of lycurgus lawes , took away quite all occasion of discord , so that they might easily continue together in a long agreement ; for lycurgus by his laws ordain'd in sparta more equality of estates , and less of dignities ; for here poverty was to all alike ; and the plebeyans less ambitious : for the magistracies of the city were communicable only to some few citizens , and were held apart from the people , neither did the nobility ever with their harsh usage make them covetous of them . this eame from the spartan kings , who being plac'd in that principality , and set in the midst of that nobility , had no surer means to maintain their dignity stedfast , then to defend the people from injurious oppressions : which made the people , that it neither feared nor affected the government , and not having the rule nor fearing it , the contention they might have with the nobility was quite avoided , and all occasion of tumults : and in this sort they might live in peace a long time . but two principal things caus'd this agreement ; because the inhabitants of sparta were few , and therefore might be govern'd by few : the other , because not accepting of strangers into their republick , they had not occasion , either of being corrupted , or making great increase , so as to become insupportable to those few that govern'd them . wherefore considering these things , it appears ; that the founders of rome were to have us'd one of these two expedients , if they desir'd to maintain it quicker , like one of these commonwealths we have spoken of : either not to imploy the common people in war , as the venetians ; or not admit strangers into the city , as the spartans : both of which they did , which gave the people force and increase , and sundry occasions of tumults . so that if the roman state grew more quiet , this inconvenient follow'd , that it was also weaker ; because it disabled it self of the means to come to the greatness it attain'd . and therefore , if rome would take away the occasions of disagreements , it took away the means of amplifying the state. and in all humane affaires it is plain , whosoever does throughly examin it , that upon the cutting off one inconvenient , another will streight arise : therefore if thou wouldst make a numerous and a warlike people to inlarge far the bounds of the empire , thou mak'st them of such a temper , that they shall never be maneggiable at thy will ; a● if thou keptst them weake and disarmed to have them at command : but if they get the rule into their hand , thou shalt not be able to bridle them ; or else become so base , that thou shalt be made a prey to what enemy so e're assaults thee . and for this cause in all our deliberations wee ought to advise , where least inconvenients are , and to take that for the best course : for there is non● absolutely free from hazard and suspicion rome then , like sparta , could have made 〈◊〉 ●rince for life , and a small senate , but could nor then , as shee , not increase the number of her citizens , having a desire to extend her dominions : which was the cause that a king for terme of life , and the little number of senators , touching their agreement , would have nothing availd . whereupon if a man were anew to lay grounds of a republick , he should first resolve , whether hee would have it extend its power and rule , as rome : or confine it self to small limits . in the first case then , hee must order it , as rome , and give place to tumults and general differences , the best he may ; for without great number of men , and those warlike , could never any commonwealth increase , or if it increase , continue . in the second case thou maist so order it , as sparta or venice . but by reason that ambition to extend the dominions , is the poison of such like commonwealths , their founder ought , as much as may be , in all those waies forbid them to inlarge themselves ; for all such gaines grounded upon a weake common-wealth , do quite ruine it , as it befell sparta and venice : whereof the first , having subdued as it were all greece , upon a very small accident , discover'd its own weak foundation : for the rebellion of thebes following , caus'd by pelopidas , with other cities imitating , utterly ruin'd that republick . in like manner venice , having possest her self of a great part of italy , and the greatest not by force , but by mony , and craft , when it came to make trial of its force , lost all in a day . i should well beleeve , that the way to frame a commonwealth of long continuance , were to order it within as sparta or venice , to place it in a strong situation , and make it of such resistance , that no man can hope to subdue it on a sudden ; and on the otherside , that it be not so great , to become a terror to the neighbors , and so likely it may long enjoy its state. for upon two occasions ordinarily men make war against a republick ; the one , to become master of it , the other for fear it become master of them . and this way i have spoken of , takes quite away these two causes ; for if it be hard to overcome , as i presuppose it , being well furnish'd for defence , it will seldome , or never chance that any can make a design to conquer it : and if it containes it self within its own limits , and it be manifest by experience , that in it there is no ambition , it shall never come to pass , that any for feare interrupt its quiet . and this would the rather be , if in it were made a law or order to forbid the amplifying of the state. and without doubt i beleeve , that the bringing of things to consist in these termes and in this equality of temper , were the true civil government , and the perfect quiet of a city . but being that all humane things are in continual motion , and nothing stands firm , they must ever be rising or falling . and to many things that reason doth not perswade thee , necessity bindes thee ; so that having settled a commonwealth able to maintain it self , not augmenting ; and necessity should force it to inlarge it self , it would manifestly loosen its own foundations , and suddenly bring it self to ruine . on the otherside , if the heavens should prove so favourable , as to blow away all clouds and tempests of war , thence would arise that sloth and idleness would either divide them , or make them effeminate . which two things together , or either by it self , would occasion their ruine and therefore , being impossible ( as i think ) to poise all things so justly by the balance , or reduce them to this perfection of temper , it is properest , in founding the republick , to provide for the most honorable part , and so to order it , that when necessity shall inforce its inlarging , it may be able to keep what it hath gotten . and to return to our first discourse , i think it necessary to follow the roman ordinances , and not those of other common wealths ; for to find a mediocrity between the one and the other , i think it not possible . and those enmities , which should grow betwixt the people and the senate , ought to be tolerated , taking them for a necessary inconvenient , to attain to romes greatness . for besides other reasons alledged , where the authority of the tribunes is prov'd necessary for the preservation of liberty , it manifestly appears what great benefit they make in commonwealths of the power of accusing , which among other things was committed to the tribunes , as in the chapter following shall be declar'd . chap. vii . how useful accusations are in a republike for the maintenance of liberty . there cannot be a more profitable or necessary power given to those that in a city are appointed as guardians of the liberty , then is that of accusing the citizens to the people , or before any magistrate , or any councel , whensoever they offend in any thing against the free state. this order workes two very useful effects in a republick . the first is , that the citizens for feare of being accused , attempt nothing against the state ; and in case they do , forthwith without any respect given them , are suppres'd . the other is , that it gives a way to vent the humours that grow in the cities , in any manner against any citizens . and when these humours have not ordinary vents , they burst out extraordinary waies , and so are the ruine of a commonwealth . and there is not any thing renders a republick more setled and stedfast , then to ordain it in such a manner , that the alteration of these humours that stir it , have some out-let , appointed by the lawes ; which may be shew'd by divers examples , and especially by that of coriolanus , which titus livius reports : where he saies , that the nobility of rome being angry with the people , as thinking them to have too much authority , by creation of the tribunes , who protected them ; and rome ( as some time it chances ) being in great want of provisions , and thereupon the senate sent for corne into sicily , coriolanus an enemy of the popular faction advis'd , that now the time was come , they had power to chastise the people , and to take away that authority which they had laid hold on in prejudice of the nobility , by keeping them in hunger and want , distributing the corn to them . which opinion of his they hearing of , took such distast against coriolanus , that had not the tribunes cited him to appear to defend his cause , the people had slain him in a tumult as he came out of the senate . upon which accident , we note that which before was said , how fit and usefull it is , that the commonwealths with their lawes give meanes to vent the choler , which the universality hath conceiv'd against any one citizen . for when they have not these ordinary meanes , they have recourse to extraordinary ; and out of question these are of worse effect then those . for if by an orderly course one citizen be ssuppres'd , although it were wrongfully done , yet follwes thereupon little or no disorder in the republick , because the execution is done without any private mans power , or assistance of forrein forces , which are those , that take away the common liberty ; but by the publick and lawful power , which have their particular bounds , nor any way pass so far as to endammage , the commonwealth . and to confirm this opinion with examples , this of coriolanus from the ancients shall suffice me ; upon which let every one consider , what mischief thereby had faln on the common-wealth of rome , if in a tumult he had been flain ; for thereupon had grown offences between particular men ; offences cause feare , feare seekes defence , for defence men make partisans , and thus parties grow in cities , and from them the ruine of cities . but the matter being order'd by publick authority , they took away all those mischiefes which might have happen'd , had it been carried by private power ; we have seen in our daies what innovations it hath brought on the florentine republick , in that the multitude had no legal meanes to vent their displeasure against a single citizen : as it befel in the time of franciscus valorus , who was as it were prince of the city , and being by many thought ambitious , and a man that by his insolent and high stomack would not content himself to live within a civil government , and there being no way in the commonwealth to resist him , unless with some faction opposite to his , thence it came , that he not doubting other then some extraordinary meanes , began to seek favourers of his party , to defend him . on the other side , they that oppos'd him , having no ready way to suppress him , devis'd some extraordinary waies : insomuch as they came at length to fight , and where ( if by an ordinary course he could have been restrain'd : ) his power had sunk with his own loss onely a now having to use extraordinary meanes in breaking it , there ensued not only his , but the ruine of many other noble citizens . there might also be alledged , to confirm our former conclusion , the accident chanc'd in florence , upon the occasion of peter soderinus , which wholly proceeded from the want of meanes in that republick , to accuse the ambition of some powerful citizens ; for , it was not enough to accuse a mighty man , before eight judges in a commonwealth . the judges ought to be in great number ; for a few do after the manner of two or three ; so that if such courses were taken , either the citizens would have accus'd him living ill , and thereby , without calling the spanish army to aid , would have wreak'd their anger on him ; or not behaving himself ill , they durst not have ventur'd to seek his ruine , for feare themselves of incurring danger . and so on all sides had ceas'd that ravenous cruelty , which was the cheif occasion of offence . whereupon we may conclude this , that so oft as we see forrein forces call'd upon by any party of citizens , we may well beleeve that in that city there is lack of good , ordinances : even lack of that ordinary meanes to vent without extraordinary waies the maligne humors which grow in men ; whereunto it is sufficiently remedied , by allowing of accusations before many judges , and withall countenancing them . which courses were so well order'd in rome , that in so many quarrels between the people and the senate , neither the one nor the other , nor any particular citizen ever intended to availe themselves by any forreign strength ; because they having a remedy at home , were not necessitated to go seek it abroad . and though the examples above written are sufficient to prove this , yet i will alledg another , related by titus livius in his history : who reports , that in clusia , the noblest city in those daies in all tuscany , by one lucumon aruns was ravished , and he , not being able to work his revenge by reason of the ravishers might , went and found out the french-men who then raign'd in that place we now call lombardy and encourag'd them to bring an army to clusia , showing them that with their gain they might revenge him of the injury done him : and if aruns had seen possibility to have been righted by any means in the city , he never would have inquir'd after any barbarous power . but as these accusations are profitable in a commonwealth : so are calumnies unprofitable and hurtful , as it shall appear by our discourse in the next chapter . chap. viii . accusations are not more beneficial to common-wealths , then calumnies pernitious . notwithstanding , that the virtue of furius camillus , after he had freed the city of rome from the siege and oppression of the frenchmen , had brought to pass , that none of the citizens of rome thought it took any way from their credit or degree , to give him place : yet manlius capitolinus could not endure that so much honor and renown should be ascribed to him . being of opinion , that touching the safety of rome , in that he , had defended the capitol from the enemies he deserv'd as much as camillus ; and in regard of other warlike glories , he was no way second to him . so that overburden'd with envy , nor being able to take rest for this mans honor , and perceiving he could sow no discord among the fathers , he made his address to the people , scattering among them divers sinister opinions . and among other things , he said this also , that the treasure which was collected for the frenchmen , and after not given them , was usurp'd by some private citizens ; and if it were had again , it might be turn'd to the publick good , easing the people of their tributes , or some private debts . these words were of force with the people , so that they began to run together , and as they listed to raise many tumults in the city : which thing much displeasing the senat , and they taking it for a matter of great moment , and dangerous , created a dictatour , that he might examin the case , and bridle the violence of manlius . whereupon the dictator cited him , and they met in publick one against the other , the dictator environ'd with the nobility , manlius with the people , manlius was demanded , who had the treasure he spoke of , for the senate was as desirous to understand as the people . whereunto manlius answer'd not particularly , but as by excuses , said there was no need to tell them what they already knew , so that the dictator caus'd him to be put in prison . hereupon may we observe , how extreamly pernicious and damageable are calumnies , as well in free cities , as in any other kind of government ; and therefore to repress them ought not any law or ordinance be spar'd , that may serve to the purpose . neither can there be found any better expedient to extinguish them , then to open many waies to accusations ; for as they do much help a republick , so calumnies hurt it : and ●on the other part , there is this difference , that calumnies have no need of testimonies , nor of any particular incounter to prove them ; so that every one may be caluminated , but not accus'd ; accusations being tied to certain particulars and circumstances , to udemonstrate their truth . men are accus'd before magistrates , the people and councells ; slander'd they are by calumnies , as well in private as in publick . and there slander is most in use , where accusations are nor accustomed , and where the cities are loth to receive them . therefore every founder of a republick ought so to order it , that therein any citizen may be accused without feare or suspect . and this done and well observ'd , he ought sharply to punish the slanderers , who have no reason to complain when they are punish'd , there being publick places to heare his accusations , whom they in private would have slandered . and where this part is not well order'd , there alwaies follows much confusion ; for calumnies do provoke and not chastise the citizens ; and those that are provok'd , think to availe themselves rather by hating , then fearing the things that are said against them . this part ( as it is said ) was well order'd at rome , and alwaies ill in our city of florence . and as at rome this order did much good , so at florence this disorder did much harme : and whosoever reades the stories of this city , shall see , how many slanders have from time to time been devis'd against those citizens , who have been imployed in the most important affairs of it . of one they said , he rob'd the common : treasury ; of another , he fail'd of such an attempt , being corrupted ; and of a third , he ran , into this or that inconvenient through ambition . from whence proceeded , that on every side grew hatred ; whereupon came division , from division they came to factions , from factions to ruine . but had there been a meanes in florence to accuse the citizens , and punish slanderers , that infinite number of calumnies , that afterward grew , had never followed ; for those citizens either condemned or assoild that they had been , could never have hurt the city , and would have been less accused , then they were slander'd ; every one ( as i have said ) being not so readily able to accuse as to slander . and among other things , some citizens have serv'd themselves of these calumnies , as steps and helps to their ambitious ends ; who having to incounter powerful men opposed themselves as they listed , and left nothing undone to work their intent ; for taking part with the people , and confirming them in their evil opinion , already conceived of these , have made the people their own friends . and though i could bring examples enough , i will be content with this one . the florentine army was in the field at lucca commanded by john guicchiard an able captain . either his government was so ill , or the success prov'd so unlucky , that he faild in taking the town . so that howsoever the case stood , john was blam'd for it , saying , he had been bribed by the luccheses : which slander being favour'd by his enemies , brought john to extream despair . and though to justifie himself he offer'd his submission to trial and imprisonment , yet could he never wipe away that blur , because in that commonwealth there were not the meanes to do it , whereupon grew much distast between johns friends , who were the greater part of the potent men , and his adversaries , who were some that desir'd to make innovations in florence . which matter , upon these and otherlike occasions , increased so , that thereupon ensued the ruine of that republique . m. capitolinus therefore was a slanderer , and not an accuser , and the romans shewed directly in this case , how slanderers ought to be punish'd . for they ought to make them become accusers : and when the accusation proves true , either reward them , or at least not punish them ; and when false , punish them , as manlius . chap. ix . how needful it is , that he who frames anew the laws , and laies new foundations of a common wealth , be alone without companion or competitor . and perchance some will think , that i have run too far within the roman history , not having made any mention yet , of the founders of that republick , nor of the laws which belong'd , either to their religion , or their military discipline . and therefore not willing to hold them longer in suspence , who are desirous to understand somewhat in this case , i say , that many peradventure will think this a matter of evil example , that the ordainer of a civil government , as was romulus , should first have taken his brothers life from him , and after have consented to t. tacius the sabines death , chosen by him his companion in the kingdom ; judging hereby that his own citizens might by authority taken from their prince for ambition , or desire to rule , endamage those that should oppose their power . whose opinion we should acknowledg true , if we consider nor the end which induc'd him to commit this homicide . and we may take this for a general rule , that never or seldom it chances , that any republick or kingdom is from the beginning well ordein'd or throughly new reformed of its old customs , unless the disposing of it depend absolutely upon the will of one . nay rather there is a necessity of it , that that one be absolute , that appoints the manner how , and by whose understanding all such ordination is regulated . wherefore a wise founder of a republick , who seeks not his own advantage , but the publick good ; not to strengthen his own succession , but seeks his countries profit , ought indeavor to get the power wholly into his own hands : neither will any man of good judgment ever blame any extraordinary action he shall put in practice , for the setling of a good government in a kingdom , or framing sure foundations in a commonwealth . it holds well together , though the act accuse him , that the effect excuse him ; and when that is good , as it prov'd to romulus , it will alwaies excuse him ; for he that uses violence to waste , is blameable , not he that uses it for redress and order . and therefore ought he be so wise and virtuous , that the authority he hath possest himself of , he leave not to descend hereditarily on another . for men being more inclined to ill then good , his successor may turne that to ambition which he manag'd vertuously . besides this , though one be fit to ordein a thing , yet it s not so ordein'd to last long , when it rests upon the shoulders of one man ; well may it indure , being committed to the care of many , to whom it belongs to maintain it . for even so , as many are not proper for the framing of one thing , because all of them hit not on the true good of it , by reason of their several opinions among them so ; after they have known it , neither agree they to let it proceed to its advantage . and that romulus was one of those , who for the death of his brother and companion , might be excus'd : and that what he did was for the common good , and not for his own ambition , it appears , in that he forth with ordain'd a senate , with whom he might take counsell , and by their opinions be advis'd . and he , who considers well the authority romulus reserv'd himself , will perceive it was no more than to command the armies , when they had resolv'd on war ; and to assemble the senate ; which was apparent afterwards , when rome became free upon the banishment of the tarquins : whereupon the romans were never brought in any new order , unless that in lieu of a king during life , they made two consuls yearly : which confirms , that all the first ordinances of that city were more agreeable to a civil and free government , then to one absolute and monarchical . to verifie the thing abovesaid , we might bring many examples , as moses , lycurgus , solon , and other founders of kingdomes and commonwealths , who could well , having an absolute power in their hands , ordain laws for the common good ; but i will let them pass , as well know . i shall alleadg only one , not so famous , but well worthy their consideration , who desire to be good law-makers : which is , that agis king of sparta advising to reduce the spartans within those bounds the laws of licurgus had included them ; thinking that , because they had broken out of that strictness , his city had lost very much of the ancient vertue , and by consequent of force and government , was in the beginning of his attempts slain by the spartan ephores , as one , that aim'd to possess himself of the tyranny . but cleomenes afterwards succeeding him in the kingdom , upon his reading of agis records and writings , which fell into his hands , he understood his intention , and grew desirous himself , to bring the same thing to pass ; but found it was impossible to do that good to his country , unless he became absolute of authority , it seeming to him , by reason of mens ambition , that he was unable to do good to many , against the will of a few . and taking a fit opportunity , at length hee brought in all the ephores , and every one else that could withstand him , and afterwards restor'd into force licurgus his lawes : which deliberation had bin able to have a new reviv'd sparta , and gain'd cleomenes the reputation licurgus had , if then the macedons power had not grown so vast , and the other grecian republick been so weake . for after such order given , being set upon by the macedons , and finding himself single too weak to deale with them , there being none could give him assistance , was overcome ; and his project ( though just and commendable ) became unperfect . wheresore , upon the weighing of all these things together , i conclude , it necessary that a founder of a republiek ought alone to have an absolute authority ; and that romulus , for the death of remus and tatius , deserves rather excuse than blame . chap. x. as the founders of a commonwealth or kingdom are exceedingly praise-worthy , so the beginners of a tyranny deserve much infamy . amongst all commendable men , those deserve esteem in the first place , who have taken care in laying the grounds of divine worship , and true religion : the next belongs to them who have been the founders of commonwealths or kingdoms . after those are they famous that commanding over armies have inlarg'd either their kingdom or country . to these wee may adjoyn learned men . and because they are of different dignities , every one of them are valued according to their degree . and to all other men , whose number is infinite , wee use to give that share of commendations , which their art and skill deserves . on the contrary , infamous are they and execrable , that are the perverters of religion , the dissipatours of kingdoms and republicks , enemies of vertue and learning , and of any other art , that brings profit , and renown to mankind ; as also are the irreligious , the mad-braind , the ignorant , the slothful , and base . and there will never be any so foolish , or so wise , so mischievous or so good , that the choice of the two qualities of men being made him , will not commend that which is commendable , and blame the blameable . notwithstanding seeing that the most part , as it were , beguiled by counterfeit good , and vain glory , suffer themselves either voluntarily or ignorantly to be counted in the number with those that merit more blame then praise● and having meanes with their perpetual honor to frame a republick or kingdom , yet affect they a tyranny ; neither are they advis'd by this course , what reputation , what glory , what honor , security , quiet , and satisfaction of mind they flie from , and into what infamy , dispraise , blame , danger , and unquietness they plunge themselves : and it is impossible , that , they that live private men in a common-wealth , or that by fortune , or by their vertues become princes , if they read the histories , or make any account of antiquities therein related , that those private men , i say , had not rather be scipioes in their native country , than cesars ; and those that are princes , rather agesilaus , timoleon , or dion , than nabis , phalaris , or dionysius : for they would perceive these execedingly in all mens hatred , and , these as much beloved . they would see also how timoleon and those of his like had no lefs power in their country , then had dionysius or phalaris ; but they would find also they had far more security . nor let any be deeeived by cesars glory , seeing his memory much celebrated by writers : for they that praise him , were corrupted by his fortune , and frighted by the continuance of the empire , which being govern'd under that name , gave not writers leave to speak freely of him . but he that would know what free writers would say of him , let him look upon that they say of cataline : and cesar is so much the more to be disprais'd , in that he executed the ill , the other did but intend . let him see also how much they praise brutus ; so that not daring to blame the other , because of his power , they attributed much honor to his enemy . let him consider also him that is become prince in a republick , what praises , after rome was made an empire , those emperors rather deserv'd , that liv'd under the laws , as good princes , than they that went a contrary course to them ; and he shall find , that titus , nerva , trajan , adrian , and antonius and marcus had no need of praetorian soldiers , nor a multitude of the legions to guard them ; for their own vertues , the good will of the people , and the love of the senate did defend them . moreover he shall see , that the eastern and western armies were not enough to save caligula , nero , vitellius , and the other wicked emperors from their enemies , whom their vile conditions and damned lives had procured them . and if their story were well read over , it might serve to give good instruction to any prince , to shew him the way of glory and of disgrace , the way of security , and of distrust . fot of emperors , that were from cesar to maximinus , were slain , . only died natural deaths . and if any of those that were slain were good , as galba and pertinax , it proceeded from the corruption the predecessor had left among the soldiers . and if among those , those that died natural deaths , any were wicked or lewd , as severus , it was caus'd by his great fortune and valonr , which two accompany very few . hee shall see also by reading this story , how a man may order a good kingdome : for all those emperours that succeeded in the empire by inheritance , except titus , were mischievous ; those that were adopted , were all good , as were those five from nerva to marcus. and as the empire fell upon the heyres , it return'd alwaies to its destruction . let a prince be put in mind of the times from nerva to marcus , and compare them with those that went before them , and that follow'd them ; let him choose in which he would have been borne , or over whether he would have had command . for in those that were govern'd by the good , he shall see a prince live in security in the midst of his secure citizens , the world replenish'd with peace and justice , the senate enjoying their authority , the magistrates their honours , and the wealthy citizens their estates , nobility and vertue exalted , and with these all rest and good . and on the other side all rancour , dissoluteness , corruption , and ambition extinguished , he shall see a returne of the golden age , where every one may keep and defend what reputation he pleases , and in the end shall see the world triumph , the prince reverenc'd and honour'd , and the people in agreement and security if afterwards he consider severally the times of the other emperours , he shall find the warres made them terrible , and seditions full of discord ; as well in peace as in war cruell ; so many princes slain with the sword , so many civil , so many forrain warres , italy afflicted , and full of new misfortunes , the cities thereof having been sackt and ruin'd ; he shall see rome burnt , the capitol by her own citizens defac'd and spoyl'd , the antient temples desolated , and their ceremonies neglected , the cities repleate with adulteries , the sea full of banishments , and the rocks besmeard with blood . he shall see follow in rome a numberless number of cruelties ; and nobility , wealth , honours , and above all , vertue reputed as a most capital crime . he shall see accusers rewarded , servants corrupted against their masters , children against their parents , and they , who had not enemies , oppressed by their friends , and then he shall know very well , how much rome , italy , and the world was beholding to caesar . and without doubt , if he be borne of mankind , he will be frighted from imitating those wicked times , and inflam'd with zeale to trace the good . and truly a prince ayming at glory , would with to be lord of a disorder'd city , not to ruine it wholly , as did caesar , but to recompose and restore it , as romulus . and beleeve me , the heavens cannot give men greater occasion of glory , nor men desire it . and if to renew and restore the frame of a city , there were necessity for a man to depose his principality , the man that did not set it in order because he would not fall from his dignity , should yet deserve excuse . but when he could hold his principality , and yet restore the government , he is no way excusable . and in sum , let them be well advis'd , to whom the heavens present such opportunity , that either of these two wales be propounded them , the one that gives them security in life , and makes them glorious after death ; the other that causes them to live in continual troubles , and leave behind them in everlasting infamy . chap. xi . of the romans religion . though romulus were romes first founder , and she was to acknowledge from him her birth and bringing up ; notwithstanding the heavens judging that romulus his lawes were not sufficient for such an empire , put it into the roman senat 's mindes to elect numa pompilius to succeed romulus , that what he left unfinished , the other might supply . who finding a very fierce people , and being desirous to reduce them into civil obedience by peaceable waies , applied himself to religion , as a thing wholly necessary to preserve civility ; and ordain'd it in such a sort , that for many ages there was not such a feare of god , as in that commonwealth . which facilitated much any enterprise , whatsoever either the senate , or those brave roman courages did undertake . and whosoever shall discourse of the innumerable actions of the people of rome jointly , and of many of the romans by themselves in severall , shal perceive that those citizens fear'd more to break an oath , than the lawes ; as they that made more account of the power of god , than of man ; as it appears manifestly , by the examples of scipio and manlius torquatus : for after that hannibal had given the romans an overthrow at canna , many citizens assembled together , and being affrighted resolv'd to quit the country , and go into sieily ; which scipio understanding went and found them out , and with his sword drawn in his hand compelled them to sweare , they would never forsake their native country . lucius manlius , that was afterwards call'd torquatus , was accus'd by marcus pomponius tribune of the people , and before the judgment day came , titus went to find marcus , and threatning to kill him if he swore not to take the accusation off from his father , bound him by his oath : and he though by feare compell'd to sweare , yet took the accusation off : and so those citizens , whom neither the love to their country , nor the lawes thereof could retain in italy , were kept by force of an oath they were constrained to take : and that tribune laid aside the hatred he bore to the father , the injury he receiv'd of the son , and his own reputation , to keep the oath he took : which proceeded of nothing else , but the religion numa brought in among them . and it is manifest , if a man consider well the roman histories , of how much availe their religion was for the commanding of armies , to reconcile the common people , to preserve good men , and to shame the lewd . so that if we were to dispute , to whether prince rome were more oblig'd , romulus or numa ; i beleeve numa would be prefer'd ; for where religion is , military discipline is easily brought in ; and where they are already warlike , and have no religion , this hardly followes . and it is plain , that romulus to order the senate , and frame certain other civil and military ordinances , had no need of the authority of a god , which to numa was necessary , who feign'd to have familiar conversation with a nymph , who instructed him wherewith continually to advise the people . and all sprung from this , because he desiring to settle new orders , and unaccustomed in that city , doubted that his own authority was not of full force . and truly never was there yet any maker of extraordinary laws in a nation , that had not his recourse to god ; for other . wise the laws had not been accepted . for many several goods are known by a wise man , which have not such evident reasons in themselves , that he by perswasion can quickly make others conceive them . therefore the wise men , that would free themselves of this difficulty , have recourse to a god : so did lycurgus , so solon , so many others , whose design was the same with theirs . thereupon the people of rome admiring his goodness and wisdom yeelded to all his purposes . but it is true , because those times were then full of religion , and those men rude and gross , on whom he spent his pains , this much facilitated his designs , being thereby able to mould them into a new forme . and without question , if any one in these daies would frame a republick , he should find it easier to deale with rude mountainers , who had never known any civility , than with those who had been accustomed to live in cities , where the government 's corrupted : and a carver shall easier cut a saire statue out of a rough marble , than out of one that hath been bungl'd upon by another . wherefore having well considered all , i conclude , that the religion introduc'd by nutna was one of the principal occasions of that cities happiness ; for that caus'd good orders , good orders brought good fortune , and from their good fortunes grew all the happy successes of their enterprises : and as the observance of divine worship occasions the greatness of a commonwealth ; so the contempt of it destroys it . for where the feare of god is wanting , it must needs be that either that kingdom goes to ruine , or that it be supported by the awe it stands in of the prince , who may supply the defects of religion : and because princes are but short-liv'd , that kingdom must needs have an end quickly , according as the vertue thereof failes : from whence it comes , that governments which depend upon the vertue of one man , abide but a while , because that vertue ends with his life ; and it seldome chances that it is renew'd by succession , as well saies the poet dante . rade volte discende per li rami l'humana probitate & questo vuole , quel , che lada , perche da lui si chiami . therefore the safety of a commonwealth or kingdom consists not wholly in a prince that governs wisely while he lives , but in one that so orders it , that he dying , it can preserve it self . and although it be easier to work rude and untaught people to a new course and frame , yet argues it not therefore an impossibility to prevaile with men that have liv'd in a civill government , and presume somewhat to understand themselves . the florentines think not themselves either ignorant or rude , yet were they perswaded by frier jerom savanarola , that he talked with god. i will not judge whether it were true or not , because we ought not to speak of such a great personage , but with reverence . but truly i say , that very many beleev'd him , not having seen any great matter to perswede them thereto : for his life , doctrine , and the subject he took , were sufficient to make them credit him . wherefore let no man be discouraged , as if he could not reach to what another hath heretofore attaind ; for men , as we said in our preface , were born , liv'd and died , under the same laws of nature . chap. xii . of what importance it is to hold a worthy esteem of religion , and that italy for having fail'd therein , by means of the church of rome , hath gone to wrack . those princes or those republicks which would keep themselves from ruine , are above all other things , to preserve the ceremonies of their religion incorrupted , and maintain it alwaies venerable . for there is no greater sign of a countries going to destruction , then to see in it the contempt of divine worship . and this is easie to be understood , it being once known upon what ground the religion is built where a man is born . for every religion hath the foundation of its being upon some principal thing . the life of the gentiles religion subsisted upon the answers of the oracles , and upon the sect of the conjecturers and soothsayers : all the other ceremonies , sacrifices , and rites depended on these . because they easily believ'd , that that god that could foretell thee thy future good or evill , could also send it thee . from hence came the temples , the sacrifices and supplications , and all other ceremonies in their veneration : for the oracle of delos , the temple of jupiter ammon , and other famous oracles held the world in devotion and admiration . as they afterwards began to speak in imperious manner , and their falshood was discover'd among the people , men began to be incredulous , and apt to disturb all good orders , therefore the princes of a republick or kingdom should maintain the grounds of the religion they hold ; and this being done , they shall easily keep their commonwealth religious , and eonsequently vertuous and united . they ought also to favour and increase all those things that advantage it , howsoever that they think them false ; and the rather should they do it , the wiser they are and understand the causes of natural things . and because this course hath been taken by many wise men , hence grew the opinion of miracles which are celebrated even in false religions ; for wise men augment them what beginning so ever they have , and their authority afterwards gives them credit . of these miracles there was great quantity at rome : and among others there was this one ; the roman soldiers sacking the vejentes city , some of them went into the temple of juno , and comming to her image ask'd her , wilt thou go to rome ? some thought she nodded , another thought she said , yes . for those men being very religious ( which t. livius shews , for that entry into the temple was without tu mult ) all devout and full of reverence , imagined they heard that answer , which p●radventure they presuppos'd before ●and would be made them ; this opinion and belief was altogether favour'd and augmented by camillus and the other principal men of the city . which religion if it were maintained among the princes of the christian republick according as by the institutor thereof it was ordain'd , the christian states and republicks would be far more in unity , and enjoy more happiness far then now they do : nor does any thing give us so shrewd a conjecture of the declining of it , as to see , that those people that are neerest neighbours to the church of rome , head of our religion , are the most inreligious . and whosoever would well consider the original grounds thereof , and look upon the present use how much this differs from those , without question he would judge the ruine or scourge thereof were near at hand . and because some are of opinion , that the welfare of italy depends upon the church of rome , yet the contrary might rather be proved , considering those that in the church of rome observe not the precepts they ought , but rather adulterate the holy and catholick ordinances which were wont to be kept . moreover this comes to pass , because the church hath alwaies held , and still holds this country divided : and truly never was any province either united or happy , unless it were wholly reduc'd to the obedience of one commonwealth , or prince ; as it befel france and spain . and the cause that italy is not in the same terms , nor hath not one republick or one prince to govern it , is only the church ; for having inhabited there and held the ●e●●mporal government , it hath never been so potent , nor of such prowess , that it could get the rest of italy into its hands , and become lords thereof . and on the other side , it was never so weak , that for fear of losing the temporal dominion it could not call in a powerfull friend to defend it against him that were grown too puissant in italy ; as anciently it hath been seen by sundry experiences , when by means of charles the great it drove out the lombards , who had as it were the absolute power of all italy ; and when in our daies it took the venetians power from them by the frenchmens ayd , and afterwards chased away the french by help of the swisses . therefore the church being not powerfull to subdue all italy it self , nor yet suffering any other to master it , hath been the cause , that it could never be brought to have but one head ; but hath alwaies been under more princes and lords ; whereupon is grown such a disunion , and so much weakness , that italy hath been made asprey not only of powerfull barbarians , but of any the next assaylant . for which we and other italians are beholding to the church & none else . and whosoever would readily see the truth by certain experience , it were needfull he were of such power , as to send the court of rome , with the authority it hath in italy , to dwell in the switzers country , who at this day are the only people that live , for their religion and military discipline , as their ancestors did : and he should find that in a short time the ill orders and customs of that court would breed more disorder in that country , then any accident else could , that should evergrow there . chap. xiii . in what manner the romans avail'd themselves of their religion , in ordering the city , in undertaking their designes , and in stopping of tumulis . i think it not out of purpose , to bring some example , where in the romans serv'd themselves of their religion , for the ordering of their city , and the following of their enterprises . and though many there are in t. livius , yet i will content my self with these . the people of rome having created their tribunes of consular power , and except one , all plebeians , and it falling out that year , that there was pestilence and famine , and certain other prodigies , the nobility of rome took hold of this occasion , at the tribunes new creation , to say that the gods were angry , because rome had abus'd the majesty of their empire , and that they had no other means to appease them , then to reduce the election of the tribunes to the former course . whence it came , that the people frighted by this superstition made the tribunes all of the nobility . the like was also in their conquest of the vejentes city , that the commanders of their armies did serve themselves of the religion , to keep them in heart for any enterprise : for that year the albanilak being miraculously sweld , and the roman soldiers weari●d with the long siege , and intending to ●return to rome , the romans found , that apollo and certain other oracles told them , that that year the vej●ntes city should be taken , that the water of the albanlake should be pour'd out : which thing made the soldiers endure the tediousnes , of the war and the siege , perswaded by the hope they had to take the town , and were contented to continue the enterprise ; so that camillus being made dictatour subdued the city after ten years siege . and so the accustomed religion help'd well , both for the taking in of that town , and for the restitution of the tribunship to the nobility ; for without the ayde thereof , the one or the other had hardly had their success . and this other example i must also add to this purpose . there were in rome a great many tumults rais'd upon the occasion of terentillus a tribune , he desiring to make a law , for causes which hereafter we shall declare in their place . among the first remedies which the nobility serv'd themselves of , was the religion , whereof they made use two waies : in the first , they made the sibill's books be searcht , and answer as it were to the city , that by means of civill discord they should hazzard the loss of their liberty that year : which thing , though the tribunes had herein discover'd their subtilty , yet it so frighted the people , that it quite took off their eagerness in the pursuit . the other way was , that when appius herdonius with a great number of outlaws , and slaves , near upon four thousand men , having possess'd themselves by right of the capitoll , so that it might be fear'd that if the aequi or volsci , the romans sworn enemies , had approacht the town , they might have taken it : the tribunes not forbearing for all this to continue in their obstinacy , and to enact the law made by terentillus , saying this assault of their ; feigned , and not true , one puhlius valerius a grave citizen , and of good authority , went out of the senate , and told them partly in friendly termes , and partly in threatning , the dangers in which the city stood , and the unseasonableness of their demand , and thereby brought the people to swear , they would not forsake the consuls command . whereupon the people being return'd to obedience , recover'd the capitoll by force . but the consul publius valerius being slain in this conflict , there was forthwith another consul made , one titus quintius , who to keep the people from idleness , and to give no space to think again of terentillus his law , commanded them to go forth of rome with him against the volsci , saying that by the oath they had taken not to abandon the consul , they were bound to follow him ; whereunto the tribunes oppos'd , saying , that oath was made to the consul now slain , not to him . yet titus livius shews that the people in awfulness to their religion world rather obey the consul● than beleeve the tribunes , saying these words in favour of the ancient religion : men did not then adaies so little reverence the gods , as now ; nor people wrest their oaths , nor the laws , to their own ends . whereby , the tribunes doubting then to lose their whole dignity , agreed with the consul to submit to his obedience , and that for a whole year they would treat no more of terentillus his law , and the consuls for a year should not draw the people out to war ; and thus the religion gave the senate means to overcome that difficulty , which , without it , they could never have master'd . chap. xiv . the romans interpreted their auspices , as necessity requir'd , and with discretion made a shew to observe their religion , yet upon occasion they neglected it ; but if any did rashly contemn it , they punisht them . the soothsayings were not only ( as before we have discours'd ) for the most part , the ground of the gentiles ancient religion , but they were also the occasions of the roman republiques welfare . whereupon the romans had more regard of them , than of any order else , and made use of them in their consular assemblies , in the beginning of their enterprises , in drawing forth their armies into the field , in fighting of pitcht battells , and in any other action of theirs of importance either civill or military . nor ever would they have undertaken any expedition , till first they had perswaded the soldiers , the gods had promis'd them the victory . and among the other orders of soothsayers , they had some in their armies , they call'd pollarij . and whensoever they intended to fights battell with the enemy , they would have the pollarij to make their conjectures : and when the chickens peckt , they went to fight with good auspaces ; and not pecking , they forbare to fight . notwithstanding when ●ason shew'd something was to be done , hough the divination , were averse , yet were they not scarr'd from it : but , they turn'd and woond it with such terms and fashions so properly , that it appear'd , they did it not with an contempt of religion . which course was us'd once in a fight , by papirius the consull , which he had ( of great importance ) with the samnites , after which they were much worn and broken . for papirius encountring with the samnites , and perceiving in the skirmish that the victory was sure , had a mind hereupon to fight a full battell , and therefore commanded the pollarij , they should make their conjectures ; but the chickens not pecking , and the chief soothsayer seeing the forwardness of the army to fight , and the opinion the general and all the soldiers had of the victory , that he might not take away the occasion of well doing from the army sent back to the consull , that the soothsayers answer'd well ; so that while papirius was ordering his squadrons , some of the pollarij having told certain soldiers , that the chickens had not peckt , they told it to spurius papirius the consulls nephew , and he again to the consul ; whereto he suddenly reply'd , that he should take a care to perform his own duty well , and that for himself and the army the conjectures were faire ; and if the soothsayer had told lyes , it would turn to his own loss : and that in effect it should succeed according to his prognostication , he commanded the l●vetenants to place the pollarij in the forefront of the battell . whereupon it chanc't that going forward against their enemies , one of the roman soldiers threw a dart , and as it hap'd , slew a principal soothsayer : which being come to the consuls eare , he said that all things went forward luckily , and with the gods favour , for the army by the death of that lyer was purg'd of all crime , and excus'd of the wrath conceiv'd against them . and thus by knowing how to accommodate his designs to the divinations , he chose to fight , the army never perceiving that he had any whit neglected the rites of their religion . appius pulcher went a contrary course to this , in sicily , in the first carthaginian wars ; who desirous to fight with the enemy , caus'd the pollarij to make their divinations ; and they answering that the chickens did not feed , he said , let us see then if they will drink , and so made them be thrown into the sea , and then fighting , lost the day . and thereupon he was afterwards condemn'd at rome , and papirius honour'd ; not so much , the one for having won , and the other for having lost , as the one for having crost the soothsayers with much discretion , the other very rashly . nor was there any other end of this manner of soothsaying , then to incourage the soldiers to fight , for boldness always wins the victory : which thing was not only in use with the romans , but with forrainers also ; whereof i have a purpose to bring an example in the chapter following . chap. xv. the samnites , for the extream remedy to their broken state , have recourse to religion . the samnites having been sundry times routed by the romans , and at last overthrown in tuscany , their armies and their captains slain , and their confederates overcome , who were the tuscans , french , and umbrians : they could not suhsist , neither by their own , nor their friends forces , yet they would not quit the war , not regarding though they had but ill success in the defence of their liberty ; but had rather be overcome , then forbear to trie if they could get the victory . whereupon they put it to the last proof . and because they knew the obstinacy of the soldiers minds would help the victory well forward , and to induce them hereto , there was no better means then religion , they advis'd to renew an old sacrifice of theirs by the help of ovius pattius their priest : which they order'd in this manner ; the folemn sacrifice being made , and amidst the slain beasts , and the altars set on fire , having caus'd the chief of the army to swear never to forsake the fight , they cal'd the soldiers one by one , and in the midst of those altars enclos'd by many centurions with their fwords drawn , first they made them swear , they should not disclose any thing they either heard or saw : afterwards with words of execration , and verses full of horrour made them vow and promise to the gods , to be ready in whatsoever their general should command , never to abandon the fight , and kill whomsoever they saw fly ; which if they fail'd in , might it light upon their family and kindred . and some of them being amaz'd , and refusing to swear , were presently slain by their centurions , so that the rest that followed them , frighted by the sierceness of the spectacle , swore all . and to augment the magnificence of their meeting , being sixty thousand men , half of them were clad with white cloth , with plumes and seathers upon their helmets , and thus arrai'd they incamp'd themselves at aquilonia . against these came papirius , who in his speech to incourage his soldiers , said , surely their plumes could make no wounds , nor their painted and golden shields defend the blows of the roman pikes . and to take away the doubt his soldiers had of their enemies because of the oath taken , said , it was rather a discouragement to them then otherwise ; for they were afraid of their own people , the gods , and their enemies . and when they came to the fight , the samnites were overthrown , for the roman vertue , and the feare conceiv'd by reason of their former losses , overcame what ever obstinacy they could have resolv'd on by force of their religion or oath taken . yet it is plain , how they thought they could have no other refuge , nor try other remedy , that could give them hope to recover their lost vertue . which fully shewes , how great confidence religion well us'd can give . and though haply this part would be fit rather to have place among the extrinsecall matters , yet depending upon one of the most important ordinances of the roman republick , i thought better to insert it in this place , that i might not be driven to interrupt my discourse , and have need to return hereunto many times . chap. xvi . people accustomed to live under a prince , if by any accident they become free , have much adoe to maintain their liberty . how hard it is for a people , us'd to live , in subjection to a prince , afterwards to maintain their liberty , if by any accident they get it , as rome did upon the tarquins banishment , very many examples shew us , which we read in the memorialls of ancient histories . and not without good reason : for the people is nothing different from a brute beast , which ( though fierce of nature and wilde ) hath been bred alwaies in a den and under command ; and though by ehance it hath got loose into the fields , yet not being used to seek the sood , nor being acquainted with the coverts , where to hide itself , becomes the prey of the first that seeks to take it , the self-same thing befalls a people used to live under the government of others ; the which not having knowledg to treat of publick desences or offences , not knowing the neighbour princes , nor yet known by them , quickly returns under the yoke , which oftentimes is heavier , then that which before was taken from their neck ; and they come to fall into these difficulties , though as yet there be not entred among them much disorder . for a people that is quite debauch'd cannot for a little while , no not a whit , enjoy their liberty , as it shall after appear . and therefore our speeches are not of those people , where corruption is overgrown , but where there is more good then naught . to this former we may add another difficulty , which is , that the state that becomes free , procures enemies that side against it , and not friends to side with it . those hold together as enemies , who got advantages by the tyrannical government , feeding upon the princes riches whereby they used to help themselves , which being now taken from them , they cannot rest content , but every one is necessitated to try if he can again recall the royalty , that so they may recover their former advancements . they get not , as i have said , friends to side with them ; for the free government propounds honours and rewards upon some worthy and determinated occasions , otherwise it rewards none , nor honours none . and when a man hath received those honours and those advantages , which he thinks , he deserv'd ; he acknowledges no obligation to them that reward him . moreover , that common good which men reap of free government , is not known by any , while it is possest ; which is , to injoy freely ones own without suspicion , not to doubt of his wives or daughters honours , not to be in fear for his sons , or for himself . for no man thinks himself beholding to one that offends him not . and therefore if they come to have a free state , as it is above mentioned , there arise those that will be partisans against them , and not side with them : and to prescribe a remedy for these inconvenients and disorders , which these difficulties might bring us , there is none more potent , nor soveraign , nor necessary , than to kill brutus his sonns , who as the story shews , were induc'd together with other young romans , to conspire against their native country , for no other reason , than because they could not so extraordinarily advantage themselves under the consuls , as under the kings ; so that they thought the peoples liberty was become their slavery . and he that undertakes to govern a multitude either by way of liberty , or by way of principality , and assures not himself of those that are enemies to his new state , is not like to continue long . true it is , that i judge those princes very unfortunate , who to secure their dominions are to go extravagant waies , having the vast multitude for their enemies : for he that hath but few enemies , easily and without many offences secures himself ; but he that hath the universality against him , is never out of jealousie ; and the more cruelty he uses , the weaker becomes his power . so that the greatest remedy he hath , is to make the people friendly . and though this discourse be different from the former , treating here of an exceeding good prince , and there of a republick , yet that i may not return here often upon this occasion , i shall say somewhat of it , but briefly . and therefore if a prince would gain the good will of a people , that was enemy to him ( speaking of those princes , that are become tyrants of their native country ) i say , he ought to examine first , what the people desire ; and he shall alwaies find , that they desire two things ; the one , to be reveng'd of him that occasion'd their slavery ; the other , to have their liberty restor'd . to the first , the prince can satisfie in whole , to the second in part . as for the first , there is an example to the point . clearchus a tyrant of heraclea being in banishment , it happen'd that upon a difference risen between the people and the nobility of heraclea , that the nobility , finding themselves too weak , turn'd to favour clearchus , and conspiring with him , against the will of the people , let him into the town , and took away the peoples liberty ; so that clearchus being in a streight between the insolence of the nobility , whom he could not any way content , nor rectify , and the rage of the people , that could not indure thus to have lost their liberty , resolv'd in one , to free himself of the importunity of the nobles , and withall to gain the people . and to this purpose having taken a convenient opportunity , cut in pieces all the nobility , to the peoples great satisfaction , and thus he satlsfy'd one of the desires the people have , that is , to be reveng'd . but as for the people 's other desire , to recover their liberty , if the prince cannot satisfy them , let him examine , what are the reasons make them desire sreedom , and he shall find , there is but a small number of them would be free , to command . but all the rest , which are the many , desire liberty to life securely . for in all republicks of what manner soever ordered , not above forty or fifty citizens attain to the degrees of authority : and because these are but few , it is an easie thing to be sure of them , either by taking them out of the way , or by letting them share of such honours , as agree to their conditions , which they may very well be contented with . those others , whom it suffices , if they can live securely , are easily satisfied by making ordinances and laws , wherewith together with his power , he may comprehend their safety in general . and when a prince does this , and that the people perceive it , that by no accident he breaks those laws , they will begin in a short time to live secure and content . wee have an example of the kingdom of france , which continues not in quiet by other means , than that their kings are tyed to many laws , wherein the security of all his people is containd . and he that was the founder of that state , ordain'd , that the kings should dispose of the wars and the moneys at their pleasures , but with all other matters they had nothing to do , but they were at the laws appointment . that prince therefore or republick , which secures not themselves at their entrance into the government , ought at least take hold of the first occasion , as the romans did . he that lets that pass , repents himself too late , of not having done what he should . the people of rome being not as yet debauch't , when they recovered their liberty , might well maintain it , when brutus his sonnes were slain , and the tarquins dead , by those remedies , and orders , which we have at several times recounted . but had the people been corrupted , neither in rome , nor any where else , could they have found means strong enough to preserve it , as in the chapter sollowing we shall shew . chap. xvii . a disorderly people , getting their liberty , cannot keep themselves free without very great difficulties . i think it necessarily true , that either the kings were to be expelled out of rome , or else rome it self would have grown feeble and of no worth ; for considering how exceedingly the kings were corrupted , if after that rate two or three successions had followed , and that corruption that was in them had distended it self throughout the members , so that they likewise had received of the corruption , it had been impossible ever to have reformed it . but losing the head when the body was sound , it might easily be reduced to a free and orderly government . and this should be presupposed for certain , that a debaucht city living under a prince , though that prince with all his stock be rooted out , yet can it not become free , but rather fall still into the hands of new lords , who continually make an end one of another . and without the creation of some new prince , they shall never have an end , unless he by his goodness and valour maintain them free . but their liberty is of no longer conyinuance than his life , as was that o● syracusa for dions and timoelons lives : whose vertues in several times , while they liv'd kept that city free ; so soon as they were dead , it fell into the former servitude , we find not a braver example then that of rome , which upon the tarquins banishments , could presently lay hold off , and maintaine that liberty . but caesar being slain , c. caligula , nero , and the whole race of the caesars blotted out , it could not , not onely keep , no not so much as give a beginning to their liberty . neither did so great variety of accidents in one and the same citie proceed from other , than that , when the tarquins were expell'd , the people of rome were not toucht with this corruption , and in these latter times they were throughly infected . for then to settle their mindes in a resolution against kings , it was enough to take an oath of them , that never any king should raigne at rome . but in the after ages , the authority and severity of brutus , with all the orientall regions , were not of force to hold them in disposition to maintain that liberty , which he like the first brutus had restored them . which sprung from that corruption , which marius his faction spread among the people ; whereof caesar coming to be the chiefe , could so blind that multitude , that they could not perceive the yoke , which he himself put on their neck . and though this example of rome be better than any other , yet will i alleadge to this purpose , some people known in our dayes . and therefore i say , that no meanes could ever bring milan or naples to their freedome , by reason of the infection of all their members . which appeared after the death of philip visconti , when milan desiring to recover her liberty , neither was able , nor knew how to keepe it . yet that of rome was a great happiness , that their kings grow naught suddenly , that they were banisht , and that before the infection was gone down into the bowels of that citie , which was the occasion that those many tumults , which were raised in rome ( men doing it to a good end ) did not hurt , but help the commonwealth . and we may make this conclusion , that where the matter is corrupted , lawes , though well made , profit little , unless they have such a maker , that with strong hand forces obedience to them , till the matter become good : which , whether it hath ever happened , i know not , or whether it be possible it can happen : for it is plain , as a little before i said , that a city declining by corruption of matter , if ever it chances to rise again , it is meerly by the vertue of one man , who is then living , and not by the vertue of the generality , that keepes the good lawes in force : and suddenly when that man is dead , it returnes to the old guise , as it came to pass at thebes , which , by the vertue of epaminondas while he liv'd , could subsist in forme of a republique and government , but he being gone , it fell into the former disorders . the reason is , because a man cannot live so long a time as is sufficient to disaccustome them to the ill , and accustome them throughly to the good . and if one man of a very long life , or two vertuous governors successively continued , do not dispose of them to good , when one of them failes , as i have said before , they are presently ruined , unless the other with many dangers , and much bloudshed recover them out of destruction . for that corruption and unfitness for freedome , arises from an inequality , that is in the city : and if a man would reduce it to equality , he must use many extraordinary wayes , which few know or will serve themselves of , as other where more particularly shall be said . chap. xviii . in what manner in a corrupted city a free state may be maintained , being gotten ; or how when they have it not , it may be gotten , and well order'd . i thinke , it will not be out of the way , nor disagreeing to the former discourse , to consider whether in a city disordered , a free state can be preserv'd , that being there a soot already ; or not being there , how it may be attain'd , and then reduc'd to good order . whereupon , i say , that it is very hard to do the one or the other : and though it be almost impossible to give a strict rule thereof ( because we should necessarily proceed according to the degrees of the corruption ) yet it not being unfit to reason of every thing , i shall not let this pass . and i presuppose a city corrupted in extremity , from whence i shall come more to augment such a difficulty , because there are no lawes nor ordinances sufficient to bridle a universall corruption . for as there is need of lawes , to preserve good customes ; so , to have the lawes well observ'd , there is need of good customes . besides this , the ordinances and lawes made in a republique at birth thereof , when men were good , serve not to purpose afterwards , when once they are growne vicious . and if the lawes vary being accommodated according to the accidents , seldome or never vary the old orders of the city : which makes that the new lawes suffice nor , because the orders that continue in force do corrupt . and to lay this part more plain to the understanding , i say , that in rome there was the order of government , or rather of the states , and the lawes afterwards which together with the magistrates did bridle the citizens . the order of the state was the authority of the people , of the senate , of the tribuns , and of the consuls the manner of demanding or creating of magistrates and the manner of making lawes . these orders little or nothing did they vary among the citizens ; the lawes varied which bridled the citizens , as did that law against adulteries , against expences , against ambition , and many others , according as by degrees the citizens grew corrupted . but the orders of state standing sted . fast , which in the time of corruption were no longer good , those lawes which were renew'd again , were not of force to keep men good , but would have been well helpt , if when the lawes were renew'd , the orders also had bin chang'd . and that it is true that such orders in a corrupted city were not good , it is expresly seen in two principal heads . as for the creation of magistrates , and making lawes , he people of rome gave the consulate and the other prime degrees of the city , onely to those that sued for them . this order was in the beginning good , because none stood for them , but those citizens that esteem'd themselves worthy of them , and to receive the repulse was a shame ; so that to be thought worthy , every one did well . but this way afterwards in a corrupted city proov'd very hurtfull ; for not the best deserving men , but the most powerfull , sued for the magistracy , and those of small power ( howsoever vertuous ) forbore to demand them for fear . it came not to this inconvenient , at once , but by degrees , as men fall into all other inconvenients . for the romans having brought under affrica , and asia , and reduc'd well nigh all greece to their obedience , doubted no way of their liberty , and thought they had no more enemies could scare them . thus farre their security , and the weakness of their enemies workt , that the people of rome in bestowing the consulate , regarded not vertue so much as favour , raising to that dignity those that could make most friends , not those that knew best how to subdue their enemies . after , from those that had most favour , they fell to give them to those that had most power . so that the good , by reason of the defect of this order , were quite excluded . a tribun of the people and any other citizen might propound a law to the people , and thereupon every citizen had the liberty to speak either in favour of it , or against it , before it were determin'd of . this order was commendable , while the integrity of the citizens held : for it was alwayes well , that every one may give his opinion thereupon , that the people , having heard every one , may after make choyce of the best . but the citizens being grown mischievous , this order became naught ; for those that were powerfull onely propounded lawes , not for the common good , but to advance their own powers , and against those dar'd none to speak , for fear of these . so that the people was brought either by falshood or force to determine their own ruine . therefore it was necessary , to the end that rome in her corrupted age should maintaine her liberty , that as in the progress of her life she had made new lawes , so should she have made new orders : for other orders and other manners of living ought to be ordain'd in a good subject , and others in a bad ; nor can the forme be like , where the matter is quite contrarily dispos'd . but these orders are either to be renewed all of a sudden when they are discovered to be no longer good , or else by little and little , when their defaults be taken notice of by every one : i say , that either the one or the other of these two things are almost impossible . for to renew them by degrees , it is fit a very wise man should be the cause of it , who should foresee this inconvenient afarre off : and when any of these arise , it is a very likely thing that none of these men step forth ; and when they should they would never be able to perswade another what they eonceiv'd ; because men accustomed alwaies to live in one manner , will not alter it ; and the rather not seeing that evill present , which is to be shew'd by conjectures . touching the innovation of these orders on a sudden when every one knowes they are not good ; i say , that this unprofitableness , which is easily knowne , is hard to correct ; for to effect this ordinary meanes serve not , they being rather hurtfull ; but of necessity extraordinary remedies are to be put in practise , as violence and war ; and in any case ought a man strive to become prince of that city that he may have power to order it at his pleasure . and because the restoring of a city to a politique and a civil government , presupposes a good man ; and by violence to become prince of a commonwealth presupposes an evil man , for this cause it shall very seldome come to pass , that a good man will ever strive to make himself prince by mifchievous wayes , although his ends therein be all good ; nor will a wicked man by wicked meanes attaining to be prince , do good ; nor ever comes it into his heart to use that authority well , which by evil meanes he came to . from all these things above written arises the difficulty or impossibility , that is in corrupted cities , theree to maintaine a republique , or to create one anew . and when it were to be created or maintained , it were fittest to reduce it rather towards a popular state ; to the end that those men , who by reason of their insolence cannot be amended by the lawes , might in some manner be restrained as it were by a regall power . and to constraine them by any other way to become good , would either be a most cruel attempt , or altogether impossible : as i said before , that cleomenes did , who that he might command alone flew the ephores ; and if romulus for the same reasons slew his brother , and titus tatius the sabine , but afterwards excercised very vertuously their authority : yet it is to be noted that neither the one nor the other of them had the subject staind with that corruption , whereof we have discoursed in this chapter : and therefore they might intend well ; and when they did not , give colour to a bad designe with a good success . chap. xix . a very mean prince may easily subsist , succeeding a brave and valourous prince : but a mean one following a mean , brings a state into great hazzard . when we consider the valour , and the manner of romulus , numa , and tullus proceedings , the first roman kings , we shall find , that rome hit upon a very great fortune , having the first king fierce and warlick , the second peaceable and religious , the third of like courage to romulus , and a lover of war rather then peace . for in rome it was necessary , that in her infancy there should arise some one to order her in the eourse of civill government ; but in like manner it was afterwards needfull that the other kings should betake themselves again to romulus his valour , otherwise that city would have become effeminate , and been prey'd on by her neighbours . whence we may observe , that the successor , though not of so great valour as the predecessour , is able to maintain a state by the valour of him that hath govern'd it before , and enjoy the fruits of his labour : but if it come to pass , either that he be of long life or that after him there follows no other of like valour as the first , of necessity that kingdom must go to ruine . so on the contrary , if two of great valour successively follow one the other , it is often seen , they effect mighty things , and eternize their names . david was a man for armes , for learning and judgement excellent : and such was his valour , that having overcome and subdued his neighbours , he left his son solomen a peaceable kingdom , which he might well maintain by peacefull meanes , without any war , and happily possess the fruits of his fathers vertue . but he could not leave it now to roboam his sonn , who not resembling his grandfather in vertue , nor having the like good hap his father had , with much adoe remain'd heire to the sixth part of the kingdom . bajazet the turkish sultan , although he gave himself rather to peace then war , yet could he also enjoy his father mahomets labors ; who having as david beaten all his neighbours left him a setled kingdom , easie to be continued by peace : but if his sonn selimus , now raigning , had resembled the father and not the grandfather , that kingdom had gone to wrack . but we see this man like to outgoe his grandfathers glory . whereupon i agree with these examples , that after an excellent prince a feeble one may subsist , but after one feeble one a kingdom cannot stand with another , unless it be such a one as france , which subsists by force of her ancient ordinances . and those are weak princes , that are not in the exercise of war. and therefore i conclude with this discourse , that such was romulus his valour , that it could give space to numa pompilius for many years by peacefull means to govern rome . but him followed tullus , who by his courage recover'd romu'us reputation : after him came ancus , so endowed by nature , that he knew how to use peace , and support war. and first he addrest himself in a peaceable way ; but presently when he knew that his neighbours , thinking him esseminate , undervalu'd him , he consider'd that to maintain rome , he was to apply himself to the warres , and rather follow romulus his steps , than numas . hence let all princes , that hold a state , take example , that he that resembles numa , shall either keep it or lose it , as the times prove , and fortunes wheele turns ; but he that takes after romulus , arm'd as he with wisdom and force , shall hold it in any case , unless by an obstinate and overmighty power it be wrested from him . and certainly we may well think , if rome had light upon a man , for her third king , who knew not how by armes to recover her reputation , she could never afterwards , or not without much adoe , have taken root , or attain'd that grow'th she after grew to . and thus whiles she liv'd under the kings , she ran the hazzard of ruining under a weake or naughty king. chap. xx. two continued successions of vertuous princes worke great effects ; and commonwealths well ordered of necessity have vertuous succession : and therefore are their gains and increases great . after rome had banisht her kings , she was deliver'd of those dangers which , as is before said , she hazzarded , a feeble or naughty king succeeding in her . for the sum of the empire was reduc'd unto consuls , who came not to the government , by inheritance , or treachery , or by extream ambition , but by the voices of the citizens ; and they were alwaies very worthy men , whose vertue and fortune rome enjoying , could from time to time attain to her vastest greatness , in but so many more years , as she had been under her kings . for we see , that two continued successions of brave princes are of force enough to conquer the whole world , as was philip of macedon , and alexander the great . which so much the rather ought a republick do , having the means to choose not only two successions , but an infinite number of valorous princes , who follow one the other ; which valourous succession may alwaies be in every well order'd common-wealth . chap. xxi . what blame that prince or republick deserves , that wants soldiers of his own subjects . the princes of these times , and the modern republicks , who for defences or offences want soldiers of their own , may be ashamed of themselves , and consider by the example of tullus , that this defect is not for want of men fit for war , but by their fault , who had not the understanding to make their men soldiers . for tullus , rome having been forty years in peace , found not ( when he succeeded in the kingdom ) a man that had been ere at war. yet he intending to make war , serv'd not himself either of the samnites or tascans , nor of others train'd up in armes , but advis'd as a very prudent man , to make use of his own people . and such was his vertue , that on a sudden with his discipline he made them very good soldiers . truer it is than any other truth , if where men are , there want soldiers , it is the princes fault , not any other defect either of scituation or nature . whereof we have a very late example : for every one knows , how of late daies the king of england assayl'd the kingdom of france , and took no other soldiers than his own people . and by reason that kingdom had not been at war above thirty years before , it had neither soldier nor captain that ever had been at war ; yet he nothing doubted with those to set upon a kingdom furnisht with captains and good armies , who had continually born armes in the warrs of italy . all this proceeded from that this king was a very wise man , and that kingdom well govern'd ; which in time of peace neglected not military discipline . pelopidas and epaminondas , thebans , after they had set thebes at liberty , and drawn her out of bondage of the spartan government , perceiving well they were in a city accustomed to servitude , and in the midst of esseminate people , yet made no difficulty ( such was their vertue ) to train them up in arms , and with those to go and meet the spartan armies in the field , and overcome them . and he that makes relation of it , saies , that these two prov'd in short time , that not only in lacedemon soldiers were bred , but in any other place where men are bred , if they found any could train them in the exercise . as it appears that tullus knew how to train them to the war. and virgill could not better express this opinion , nor with other words come near it , where he saies : — — — residesque movebit tullus in arma viros — — — — people with peace grown dull , that nere us'd armes . tullus shall soldiers make — — — — chap. xxii . what we may observe in the case of the three horatij romans , and the three curiatij albans . tullus the roman king and metius the alban made an agreement , that that people should be lord of the other , whose three , above mentioned , champions vanquisht the others . all the curiatij , albans , were slain ; there remain'd alive onely one of the horatij , romans ; and by this , metius king of the albans with his people became subject to the romans . and this horatius the conquerour returning into rome , and meeting one of his own sisters , who had been married to one of the three dead curiatij , that lamented the death of her husband , slew her . whereupon that horatius was brought into judgement , and after many disputes freed , rather at his fathers suite , than for his own merits , where three things are to be considered . one , that the whole fortune of the state ought never be hazzarded with a part of the forces . the other , that in a city well govern'd faults be never made amends for with deserts : the third , that matches were never wisely made , where a man-ought or can doubt the performance will not follow . for so much imports it a city to become subject , that a man ought not beleeve , that any of those kings or people would rest content , that three of their fellow citizens should have brought them to this yoke ; of which mind we saw metius was : who , though presently after the romans victory , he acknowleg'd himself vanquisht , and promis'd obedience to tullus , yet in the first expedition they were to meet against the vejentes , it appear'd , how he sought to deceive him ; as he , that was too late aware of his rashness in the bargain he made . and because we have spoken enough of this third thing to be noted , we shall speak onely of the other two , in the two following chapters . chap. xxiii . that the whole fortune ought not be laid at stake , where the whole forces try not for it : and for this cause it is often hurtfull to guard the passages . never was he thought good gamester , that would hazzard his whole ●●st , upon less then the strength of his whole game : and this is done divers waies . one is , doing as tullus and metius did , when they committed the whole fortune of their countrey , and the valour of so many men as the one and the other had in their armies , to the vafour and fortune of three of their citizens , which were but a very small part of either of their forces . nor did they consider , how by this adventure all the toyle their ancestors had taken in ordering the commonwealth so , that it might long continue free , and to make the citizens defenders of their liberty , was all in vain , it being left in the hands of so few to lose it . which thing those kings could not have known how more to have undervalued . and for the most part they likewise fall into the same inconvenient , who ( upon the enemies approach ) intend to keep the hard places and guard the passages . for this resolution will alwayes be hurtfull , unless in that hard passage thou canst bring together all thy whole forces . and in such case , this course may be well taken . but the place being rough , and it not being possible to hold all thy forces there , there is loss in it . and to judge thus i am perswaded by the example i finde of those , that when they are assaulted by a powerfull enemy , their country being environed with mountaines and rocky places , have never endeavoured to fight with the enemy upon the passages or mountaines , but have gone beyond to encounter them : or when they would not do this , they have expected them among the mountains , in plain and easy places and not mountainous ; and the reason thereof hath been given before . for it is not possible to bring many men together to the guard of mountainous places , because provisions for long time cannot easily be furnish'd , and because the passages are streight and capable of few , and therefore not possible to withstand an enemy pressing on with the gross of his army . and it is an easy thing for the enemy to come on with his gross ; because his intention is but to pass on , and not to stay . and it is impossible for him that awaits him , to await in gross , having to lodge there for a longer time , not knowing when the enemy wiil pass in places ( as i said ) streight and barren . loosing therefore that passage which thou hadst intended to keep , and wherein thy people and thy army repos'd some trust , most commonly there enters such a terror into the rest of thy people , that without any means to make trial of their valor , thou art left the loser , and with part of thy forces thou hast lost all thy fortunes . every one knows with what difficulty anniball past the alpes , which divides lombardy from france , and those , which divide lombardy from tuscany ; yet the romans first expected him upon the tesin , and afterwards upon the plain of arezo ; and would rather have their army wasted by their enemies , in places where they might overcome , then bring it upon the alpes , where likely it would have been destroyed by the malignity of the place . and whosoever shall with discretion read histories , shall find that very few expert commanders have assayd to keep the like passages , for these reasons we have said ; and because they cannot all divide themselves , the mountains being as open fields , and not having only ordinary and accustomed , but many by-waies , though not known to strangers , yet to the inhabitants , by whose help thou shalt be guided any way in despight of the opposers . whereof we can alleadg a very late example . in the year when francis the first king of france intended to pass into italy , to recover the state of lombardy , the greatest ground they had that disswaded his enterprise , was , that the swisses would step his passage on the mountains , and as after experience shew'd it , this ground of theirs was slight . for that king having left aside two or three places kept by them , came from thence by another way unknown , and was sooner in italy then any were aware of him , so that herewith being daunted , they retir'd into milan , and all the people of lombardy took the french party , having fail'd in the opinion they had , that the french men would be stop'd on the top of the mountains . chap. xxiiii . commonwealths well order'd appoint rewards and punishments for their people , and never recompence the one with the other . the deserts of horatius had been exceeding great , having by his valour vanquish'd the curiatij . his offence was horrible , having slain his sister . notwithstanding such a kind of homicide so much displeas'd the romans that it brought them to dispute , whether they should grant him his life , though his merits were so great and so fresh : which thing , to him that looks but superficially on it , would seem an example of popular ingratitude . yet he that shall examin better , and with more consideration inquire , what the orders of commonwealths ought to be , shall rather blame that people for having absolv'd him , then for having had a mind to condemn him . and this is the reason , for never any republick in good ordrr , eancell'd the faults of their citizens with their deserts . but having ordain'd rewards for good service , and punishments for desservice , and having rewarded one when he had done well , if afterwards he commit any offence , they chastise him without any regard to his former merits . and when these orders are strictly observ'd , a city continues long free , otherwise it would soone go to ruine . for if a man growne into great reputation for some notable peece of service done to the state , should take upon him the confidence that he could without danger of punishment commit any offence , in a short time would he become so unreasonably insolent , that the civill state could no longer consist . it is very necessary , if we would have punishment for offences fear'd , alwayes to reward good deserts , as it appeares they did at rome . and though the republique be but poore , and can bestow but little , yet may the subject well content himselfe with that little ; for so even a small gift bestowd on any one , for requitall of a good , though great , shall finde with him that receives it an honourable and thankfull acceptance . the story of horatius cocles is very well knowne , and that also of mutius scevola ; how the one bore up the enemies upon a bridge , till it was cut off behinde him ; the other burnt his owne hand , for having mistaken , when he meant to have killed porsena the tuscan king. to these for two such notable acts was given by the publilick two acres of ground to each of them . and marke also the story of manlius capitolinus . to him for having delivered the capitoll from the french , which were encamp'd before it , they who together with him were within besieg'd gave him a small measure of flour , which reward ( according to the then present fortune of rome ) was large , and of such a quality too , that afterwards manlius , either moov'd by envy , or his owne ill nature , occasion'd a sedition in rome , and seeking to get the people of his faction , was , without any regard had of his good deserts , thrown headlong downe from that capitoll which he , to his great renowne , had formerly deliver'd . chap. xxv . whosoever would reforme an ancient state in a free city , let him retain at least the shadow of the old customes . he that hath a minde to reforme the state of a city , to bring it into liking , and the better with every ones satisfaction to maintaine it , is forc'd to keep the forme or shadow of the ancient customes , to the end the people perceive not the change of them , though indeed they are quite new , & farr different from the fore-past . for they generally satisfy themselves as well with that that seemes to be , as that that is . nay rather are they many times more mov'd with appearances , then truthes . and for this cause , the romans knowing this necessity , when first they lived free , having in change of one king created two consuls , would not suffer them to have more then twelve lictors , because they should not outgo the number of those that attend on the king. moreover , when the yearly sacrifice was made in rome , which could not be done without the presence of the king , and the romans willing that the people , by the absence of a king , should not find a lacke of any of the old ceremonies , created a head of the said sacrifice , whom they call'd the king priest ; who yet was lower in degree , then the high priest . so that this way the people was satisfied of that sacrifice , and never had any occasion by any default in it , to wish their kings again restored . and this they all ought to observe , that would cancell the old manner of living in a city , and reduce it to a new and free course . for being these novelties somewhat moove mens mindes , therefore thou shouldst do well to call thy wits about thee , and work these alterations in the old mould , as much as might be . and if the magistrates , both in number , and authority , and durance , differ from the ancient , at least let them keep the same name : and this ( as i have said ) rather ought he to observe , who meanes to take upon him an absolute authority , which is call'd a tyranny , for he is to innovate every thing . chap. xxvi . a new prince in a city or province taken by him , should make innovations in every thing . whosoever becomes prince of a city or state , and the rather , when his forces are but weake to keep it , and means not to hold it neither as a kingdome , nor as a regular republique , the best expedient he can find , for the maintenance of that principality , is , that he ( himself being a new prince ) make every thing new in the state , as it is ordinary in the cities to make new governments with new names , with new jurisdictions , with new men , and to enrich the poore , as david did , when he came to the crowne . that filled the hungry with good things , and the rich sent empty away . to build moreover new cities , and to pull down some that are built , to remove the inhabitants from one place to another , and in some to leave nothing untoucht in that province , that there be neither degree , order , nor state , nor wealth , but he that possesses it , acknowledges it from these . and to take for paterne philip of macedon alexanders father , who by these means became of a little king , prince of all greece . and he that writes of him sayes , that he chang'd his people from province to province , as herds-men change their herds from pasture to pasture . these courses are very cruel , and against all christian and humane manner of living . and every man ought refuse to be a king , and desire rather to live a private man , then reigne , so much to the ruine of mankind . yet he that will not use that first way of good , if he will preserve himself , must enter into this of evil . but men take to certain middle wayes , which are very naught ; for they know not how to be all good , nor all evil : as shall be shewed for example in the next chapter . chap. xxvii . it is very seldom , that men know how to be altogether mischievous , or altogether good . pope julius the second going in the year to bolonia to chase out of that state the house of the benticogli , which had held the principallity of that city a hundred years , had a minde also to draw iohn pagolus baglioni out of perugia , whereof he was a tyrant , as he that had conspired against all tyrants , that were seised of any of the churches lands : and being come near perugia , with this resolution knowne to every one , stayed not to enter the city with his army to guard him , but went in without a guard , notwithstanding that iohn pagolus was therein with much people , which he had got together for his defence . so that carried forward by that rage wherewith he governed all things , with his ordinary guard he put himself in his enemies hands , whom afterwards he led away with him , leaving a governor in that city , to keep it for the church . by the wise men , that were with the pope , was noted the rashness of the pope , and the base cowardise of john pagolus ; nor could they conceit , whence it came , that he did not to his perpetual renown suppress then at once his enemy , and enrich himself with the prey , all the cardinalls being then with the pope , who had the best of all their jewels with them . neither could any man think that he abstain'd either for goodness or conscience sake , that withheld him . for into the heart of a wicked man , that incestuously convers'd with his sister , and that had slain his cousins and nephewes , to rule , there could never enter any religious respect . whereupon every one concluded , that men know not how to be honourably mischievous , nor perfectly good . and where a mischief hath in it greatness , and is generous in some part , they know not how to enter into it . so iohn pagolus , who made no account of being an incestuous and publique paricide , knew not ( or to say better ) had not the courage , though upon just occasion , to do an exploit that every one should have admir'd him for , and he left of himself an everlasting memory ; being the first that had shew'd the prelats what a thing it is to set at naught , him that lives , and reignes , as they did ; and so had done an act , whose greatness had surpast all infamy , and what ever danger could depend on it . chap. xxviii . for what reason the romans were less ungratefull to their citizens , than the athenians . whosoever reades the actions of republiques , shall find in all of them some kinde of ingratitude towards their citizens , but less in rome , than in athens , or peradventure than in any commonwealth else . and if we would enquire after the reason thereof , speaking of rome and athens , i think it happen'd , because the romans had less occasion to suspect their citizens , than had the athenians . for at rome , considering her from the banishment of her kings till sylla , and marius , her liberty was never taken away by any of her citizens , so that she had no great reason to suspect them , or by consequence suddenly to offend them . the contrary befell athens ; for her liberty being taken from her in her most flourishing time , and under colour of doing her some good , so soon as she became free , remembring the wrong she had receiv'd , and the slavery she had indur'd , became a sharp revengeress , not only of her citizens faults , but of the shadow of their faults . from hence came the banishment and the death of so many rare men . from hence the order of the osteacisme , and all other violence , which in several times by her was done to the prime of her citizens , and that is very true which those that write of civil government say , that the people bit● more siercely , after they have recover'd their liberty , than while they have continually maintain'd it . whosoever then considers what is said , will neither in this blame athes , nor commend rome : but will ●ccuse onely the necessity , because of the diversity of accidents which did arise in this city for he shall see , if narrowly he look into affairs , if romes liberty had been taken away , as was that of athens , rome would not have been more pitifull to her citizens , than was athens . whereof one may make a very good guess , by that which chanc't , after the banishment of the kings , against collatine , and publius valerius : whereof the first ( although he had his hand in the setting of rome at liberty ) was banisht , for no other occasion , than that he was sirnamed tarquin . the other having onely given suspicion of himself , by building a house upon the hill celius , was like to have bin banisht . so that we may well think ( seeing how suspicious and severe rome was in these two things ) that she would have bin as ungratefull , as athens , if , as she in her infancy and before her growth , had bin so much wrong'd . and that i need not turn again to this subject of ingratitude , i shall speak further of it in the chapter following . chap. xxix . whether of two be the more ungratefull , a people , or a prince . me thinks it is not out of the purpose of our former matter , to discourse , whether a prince or people give us greater examples of ingratitude . ●nd the better to argue this part , i say , this vice of ingratitude growes either of covereousness or suspicion . for when a people or prince have sent out a commander of theirs , in any expedition of importance , where that commander overcoming hath gain'd a great deale of glory , that prince or people is in like manner bound to reward him : and if in f●w of reward he disgraces him , or wrongs him , incited thereunto by avarice , not willing by reason of this coveteousness , to satisfie him , he commits an errour , without excuse , and drawes upon himself everlasting infamy . yet are there many princes , who offend in this kind . and cornelius tacitus declares in this sentence the occasion . it is more pleasing to revenge an injury , then to requite a courtesy : for thanks is thought a burden , but revenge a gain . but when he rewards him not , but rather hur●s him , not through avarice , but upon suspicion , then the people or prince deserves some excuse . and of these ingratitudes practis'd for such cause we read many ; for that commander who valorously hath gain'd his lord a kingdom , by conquering his enemies , replenishing himself with glory , and his souldiers with riches , of force gets such reputation with his own soldiers , with his enemies , and his kings own subjects , that that victory can no wayes sayour well to his lord that put him in the imployment . and because mens natures are ambitious , and full of suspicion , and know not how to set limits to their fortune , it is impossible , but that suspicion which grows in the prince after that commanders victory , shall by himself be increas'd upon some way or terme insolently us'd ; so that the prince cannot advise himself otherwise , than to provide for his own safety . and to this end , thinks either to put him to death , or to take away his reputation , which he hath gotten in his army , or among his people , and withall diligence to shew , that his valour got not the victory , but rather it came by chance , or by the enemies cowardise , or by the direction of the other captaines , who were together with him in that imployment . after that vespasian , being in judea , was by his army declar'd emperor , antonius primus , who was then with another army in illiria , took his part , and came thence into italy against vitellius , who commanded at rome , and valorously conquer'd two vitellian armies , and made himself , master of rome ; so that mutianus sent by vespanian found all already gotten by antonius his valor , and all difficulties surpassed . the reward antonius gain'd hereby , was , that mutianus took away his command of the army , and by little and little made him of no authority in rome ; whereupon antonius went away to vespasian , who was yet in asia , by whom he was so coldly receiv'd , that in a short time depriv'd of all dignity he dyed in despaire . and of these examples stories are full . in our daies , every one living knows , with what industry and valour gonsalvus ferdinand , warring in the kingdom of naples against the frenchmen for ferdinand king of arragon , brought that kingdom under his obedience ; and how he had for reward of his conquest , that ferdinand parted from arragon , and came to naples , and first discharged him of his command of soldiers , afterwards took from him the fortresses , and then brought him away with him into spain , where a while after he dyed in disgrace . therefore this suspicion is so natural in princes , that they cannot escape it ; and it is impossible they prove thankfull to those , who by victory have under their banners made great conquests . and from that which a prince is not free , 't is no marvaile , nor a thing worthy of greater note , that a people is not free . for a city living free hath two ends , the one to gain , the other to keep it self free ; and it cannot be , but in the one or the other by excess of love it may erre . touching the errors in getting , they shall be spoken of in their place : as for the errors in maintaining their liberty , there are these among others , to hurt those citizens they should reward , and to suspect those they should repose upon . and though these wayes in a republique come to corruption , cause great evils , and that many times they hasten it to a tyranny , as at rome it befell caesar , who by strong hand took away that , which unthankfulness denied him : yet in a commonwealth not corrupted , are they causes of great good , and make it live more free , keeping men for fear of punishment more vertuous and less ambitious . it is true , that of all people that ever reign'd , upon the causes above alleadg'd , rome was the least ungratefull ; for of her ingratitude we may say , there is no other example , but that of scipio ; for coriolanus and camillus were banisht for the injury , the one and the other had done the people . but the one was not pardoned , because he alwaies continued his malicious mind against the people ; the other was not only recall'd , but all his lifetime after , ador'd as a prince . but the ingratitude us'd towards scipio , grew from a suspicion the citizens began to have of him , which was never conceived of the others ; which arose first from the greatness of the enemy scipio had overcome ; from the reputation that the conquest of so long and perrilous a war had given him ; from the quick dispatch of it : from those favours which youth , wisdome , and other his memorable vertues had gotten him . which things were so great , that the magistrates of rome fear'd his authority , more than any thing which displeas'd the grave men , as a matter not accustomed in rome . and his manner of living was thought so extraordinary , that priscus cato , reputed a man of great integrity , was the first that stir'd against him , and said , that a city could not be called free , where the magistrates stood in fear of one citizen . so if the people of rome in this case followed cato's opinion , they deserve that excuse , which i said before , those princes and people merit , who through suspicion prove unthankfull . wherefore concluding this discourse , i say , that whether this vice be used either through suspicion or covetousness , it shall appear that the people never put it in practise upon covetousness , and upon suspicion less than princes , having less cause to be suspicious , as quickly it shall be declared . chap. xxx . what means a prince or republique should use to avoid this vice of ingratitude : or what a commander or citizen , to be free from their danger . a prince to avoyd this necessity of living with suspicion , or being ungratefull , ought personally go to the warrs , as in the beginning did those roman emperors , and in our daies the turk does ; and as those that are valorous have done , and yet do . for overcoming , the glory and the gain is all their own . and when they are not there in person , ( the glory of the action belonging to another ) they think , they cannot well make that conquest their own , unlefs they put out that glory in another which they themselves knew not how to get , and so become ungratefull , and unjust . and without doubt greater is their loss , than their gain ; but when either through negligence , for lack of judgment they stay idle at home , and send out a commander , i have no other precept to give them , than what they know of themselves . but i advise that commander , because , as i think , he can hardly escape the nips of unthankfulness , that he betake himself to one of these two expedients ; either presently upon his victory let him leave his army , and put himself into his princes hands , abstaining from any action savouring of insolence or ambition , that so he having no occasion given of suspicion may have reason to reward him , or at least not hurt him : or when he likes not to do thus , let him resolutely take part against him , and use all those means whereby he may think to hold from his prince what he hath gotten , procuring the soldiers and the subjects good wills ; let him make friendship with his neighbors , possess with his men the strong places , corrupt the chief of his army , and assure himself of those he cannot ; and this way endeavor to punish his lord for the ingratitude he would have us'd towards him . otherwaies there are not ; but ( as it was said before ) men know not how to be wholly vicious , nor wholly good . and alwaies it comes to pass , that presently after the victory , they will not part with their army ; behave themselves with modesty they cannot , and to stand upon defyance in some honorable termes they know not how . so that being irresolute which way to take , between delay and doubt they are suppressed . but to a republique which would avoyd this vice of ingratitude , we cannot apply the same remedy , we may to a prince ; that is , that she go herself , and not send out in her imployments , being necessitated to make use of some one of her citizens . it sutes well therefore , that for her best remedy , she take the same course the commonwealth of rome took , to be less unthankfull then all others . which grew from her manner of government ; for the whole city , both nobles and plebeians being train'd up to war , there arose alwaies in rome in all ages men of such valour , experience , and reputation , that there was no occasion to doubt of any one of them , they being many who kept one another in order . and so long they continued ●iu integrity , and with regard not to make others jealous of their ambition , nor give occasion to the people to do them harme , taking them for ambitious persons ; for if any one were made dictator , he got most honor by it , that laid down his dictatorship soonest . and so such like way not being sufficient to raise suspect , could not breed ingratitude . so that a republique that would not have cause given her to be unthankfull , should governe her self in the same manner rome did . and a citizen that would be free from all their despights , should follow the same steps the citizens of rome went. chap. xxxi . that the roman commanders were never extraordinarily punish'd for any error committed ; nor at all punish'd , when either by their ignorance , or upon some unlucky resolution taken by them the commonwealth suffer'd loss . the romans , as formerly we have discours'd , were not only less ungrateful , than other commonwealths , but also were more pitifull , and more advised in the punishment of the generalls of their armies , than any else . for if their fault proceeded from malice , yet they gently chastis'd them ; but if it was through ignorance , they were so far from punishing them , that they rewarded and honour'd them . this manner of proceeding was well consider'd by them ; for they judg'd it a matter of great importance to those that commanded their armies , to have their mind free , without any clog upon it , and without any outwards respects to restrain them in their resolutions ; because they would not add new difficulties and danger to a thing by it self hard and dangerous : advising well that with these hindrances a man cannot bravely execute his designs . for example , when they sent an army into greece , against philip of macedon , or into italy against anniball , or against those people they first overcame ; that commander to whom the imployment was committed had the vexation of all those cares that follow such charges which are of weight and importance . now if to such cares , this were added , that many examples of the romans were recorded , where they had crucifyed or otherwise put to death those that had lost any battels , it was impossible , that that captain among so many suspicions cou'd resolve any thing couragiously . therefore they deeming these sufficiently punish'd with the shame of their loss , they were not willing to startle them with any more grievous punishment here is one example , of a fault committed , and not through ignorance . sergius and verginius were incamp'd against the veyans , each of them commanding a part of the army : sergius was to incounter the tuscans , and verginius was to set upon the other side : it chanc'd , that sergius being assaulted by the falisci , and other people , endur'd rather to be quite rout'd and put to flight , before he would send for ayd to verginius . and on the other side , verginius , staying til til he should humble himself , would rather see the dishonour of his country , and the ruine of the army , than succour him . a case indeed very exemplary , and of much malice ; neither would it have bin for the common-wealth of romes reputation , to have let the one or the other pass without censure . true it is , that where another republique would have punish'd them with death , this punish'd them only in a sum of money . the cause hereof was , not that their offences deserv'd not greater punishment , but because the romans would in this case , for the reasons already alleadged , continue their ancient customes . and touching errors of ignorance , we have no better example , than that of maro ; through whose rashness the romans having bin broken at canne by hanniball , where the republique came indanger to lose her liberty , yet because it was ignorance , and not malice , they not only did not chasise him ; but honor'd him , and the whole order of the senat●rs m●thim upon the way in his return to rome ; and because they could not thank him for the battel fought , they thankt him yet that he was return'd to rome , and had not despair'd of the roman state. when papirius cursor would have put fabius to death , for having contrary to his command fought with the samnites , among other reasons which fabius his father brought against the dictators obstinacy was this , that the people of rome , in any loss that ever her captains had made , had never done that which papirius in a victory would have done . chap. xxxii . a republique or prince should not defer to do good unto men , until their necessity requires it . although it succeeded happily to the romans , to have us'd liberality towards the people upon occasion of a sudden danger , when porsenna made war against rome , to restore the tarquins , where the senate doubting of the people , lest they would sooner accept of the kings , than endure out the war ; to make themselves sure of them , they took off from them the taxes of salt , and every kind of grievance , saying , the poor contributed enough to the common good , if they did but nourish their children ; and thereupon in regard of this benefit , the people expos'd themselves to indure the siege , the famine , and the war. yet let none , presuming upon this example , delay to gain the good will of the people til the times of danger ; for it will never prove so well to them , as it did to the romans ; for the generality will think they have not this good from thee , but from thy adversaries ; and being to fear , that , when that necessity is past , thou wilt withhold from them that good which of force thou didst them , they will not think themselves any way beholding to thee . and the reason why this business succeeded well to the romans , was , because the state was new , and not well setled yet ; and that people also had seen , that formerly laws had bin made for their advantage , as that of appeal to the people ; so that they might well perswade themselves , that the good they had , was done them , not so muth upon occasion of their enemies coming , as from the good disposition of the senate towards them . moreover , the kings were yet fresh in their memory , by whom they had bin many waies scorn'd , and abus'd . and because such like occasions seldom fall out , it seldom also comes to pass , that the like remedies are of use : whosoever therefore sit at the helme in a state , be it either a commonwealth , or a prince , should consider before hand , what contrary times may come upon them , and what men in their troubles they may stand in need of ; and therefore should live with them alwaies in such a manner , that upon any accident chancing , they may find them ready and willing to serve their occasions . and he that governs otherwise , either prince , or republique , but especially a prince , and afterwards upon the exigent , when danger is at hand , thinks with any benefits to recover or obligemen to him , is much deceiv'd ; for he does not onely not secure himself , but hastens his own destruction . chap. xxxiii . when an inconvenient is much grown , either in a state , or against a state , it is better to beare with it for a while , then presently to struggle with it . when the commonwealth of rome grew in reputation , force , and rule , the neighboring people , who at first were not aware of the harme this new republique might do them , began , though late , to know their fault ; and desiring to remedy that which at first they had neglected , nigh fourty several people were joyned together a●ainst rome ; whereupon the romans , among the remedies they were wont to make use of in their extreamest dangers , betook them to create a dictatour , that is , to give power to one man , that without calling any council he might resolve , and without any appeal , he might execute his resolutions . which remedy , as then it serv'd to purpose , and was the occasion they overcame those eminent dangers : so it was alwaies exceeding profitable in all those occasions , which in the grow'th of the empire at any time did rise against the republique . upon which accident we are first to discourse , how that , when an inconvenient that rises either in a commonwealth or against a commonwealth , caus'd by an inward or an outward cause , is become so great , that it begins to make every one afraid , the safer course is , to temporise with it , then strive forthwith to extinguish it . for most commonly it proves , that they who indeavor to quench it kindle it much more , and suddenly pluck down that mischief upon their heads , which was then but fear'd from thence . and of such like accidents many arise in the commonwealth , oftner upon inward oceasions then outward . where oftentimes , either a citizen is suffered to lay hold of more forces then is reasonable ; or else some law begins to be corrupted , which is the very nerve and life of liberty . and this error is suffer'd to pass on so far , that there is more danger in the remedy , then in the evil . and so much the harder is it to know these inconvenients at their birth , by how much more it seems to agree with mens natures , alwaies to favor things in their beginnings : and these favors are of more force , rather then in any thing else , in those works that seem to have somewhat of vertue in them , and are done by young men . for if in a republique any young noble man put forward himself , having in him extraordinary vertue , all the citizens begin to cast their eyes on him , and agree together without any consideration to honor him ; so that if he hath any touch of ambition , meeting with those favors nature affords him , and this accident coming suddenly in place , before the citizens perceive the errors they are in , it falls out that they have small means to help themselves . and when these , that have the remedies in their powers , would put them in practise , they do but with haste augment his authority . hereof we might alleadge sundry examples ; but i will give onely one out of our own city . cosmus of medici , from whom the house of medici in this city took the beginning of their greatness , came into such reputation , through the favor that his own wisdom and the other citizens ignorance gave him , that he began to make the state somewhat afraid of him , so that some citizens held it very dangerous to offend him , and others as dangerous to let him alone . but nicholas of vizzano living at the same time , who was esteem'd a very expert man in civil affairs ; and being that the first error was made is not knowing the dangers that might arise upon cosmus his reputation , while he liv'd , would never suffer , that they should make the second , which was , that they should indeavor to put him down ; judging that such an assay would be altogether the ruine of their state , as in effect it came to pass , which was after his death . for those citizens that were left , not following this advice , made themselves strong against cosmus , and chas'd him out of florence . whereupon it follow'd that his faction resenting the injury , a while after recall'd him , and made him prince of the commonwealth ; to which step he could never have climb'd , without that manifest opposition . the selfsame befell rome with caesar , whose vertue being favor'd by pompey and others , at length came to change their favor into fear , whereof cic●ro witnesses , saying , that pompey had late begun to fear caesar . which fear caus'd them to think upon the remedies , and the remedies they us'd hasten'd the ruine of their commonwealth . i say then , that seeing it is a hard thing to know these evils when they arise , this difficulty being occasion'd by a deceit , wherewith most things in their beginning do deceive , the wiser way is to dissemble them , when they are knowne , then to oppose them . for temporizing with , them they either are extinguish'd of themselves , or at least the evill is put off for a longer time . and in all affaires princes ought to be well advis'd , who intend either to suppresse evills , or to oppose their forces and their invasions , that in liew of hurt they do them not good ; and thinking to thrust on forward a businesse , they draw it not after them ; or instead of choaking a plant , they water is not . and they should well consider , wherein the greatest force consists , and when they find their powers sufficient to heale what is amiffe , they should then apply their strongest remedies ; or otherwise , let it alone , nor in any case meddle with it ; for it would fall out as before hath bin said , and as it befel the neighbours of rome ; for whom it had bin better , after that rome was so growne in strength , with treaties of peace to indeavour to quiet it and so yet keep it backward , rather then by making a strong warre against it , to force it to new courses , and new defences . for to what other purpose serv'd their conspiracy , then to make them more lively , and to thinke upon new wayes , whereby in a farre shorter time they much inlarg'd their power ? among which , was the creation of a dictatour , by which , new order they not onely overcame the dangers that hung over their heads , but it was an occasion to stop very many misischiefes , which without that remedy the commonwealth must needs have incurr'd . chap. xxxiiii . the dictatours authority did good , and not harme , to the commonwealth of rome ; and how authorities which the citizens take upon them of themselves , and not those that are given them by the peoples free voices , are hurtfull to the civill government . those romans are by some writer condemned , that found out in that city the way to create a dictatour , as a thing that in time might occasion the roman tyranny ; alleadging , that the first tyrant that was in that city , commanded it under the title of a dictatour , saying , that if this had not bin , caesar could never with any publque title have given any honest colour to his tyranny . which matter was never well examined by him that holds this opinion , but beleev'd without ground . for it was not the name , not the degree of the dictatour , that brought rome into bondage , but it was the authority the citizens tooke upon themselves through the long continuance of their rule . and if in rome there had bin wanting the title of a dictatour , they would have taken another : for forces will easily gaine titles , but not titles forces . and we see it , that the dictatour , while he was made according to the publique orders , and not by his owne authority , alwayes did good to the city . for those magistrates that are created , and those authorities that are given by extraordinary courses wrong the republiques , and not those that come the rodinary way as it appeares it followed in so long a processe of time , that never any dictatour did otherwise , then good to the commonwealth . whereof there are very evident proofes . first because to put a citizen in case that he can do hurt , and take extaordinary authority upon him , we must suppose him to have many conditions , which in a republique not corrupted he can never have ; for he must be very rich , and have many adherents and partisans , which he cannot have , if the lawes be strictly observ'd ; and in case they had , such kind of men are so doubted , that the citizens free votes seldome meete in them . moreover , the dictarous was created onely for a time , and not for ever , and onely to remedy the present necessity ; for which he was created . and by his authority he had power to resolve by him what courses to take against urgent danger , and to execute any thing without calling a counsell , and to punish any one without appeale . yet could he do nothing , tending to the diminution of the state , as it would have bin● to take away the senates authority , or the peoples , to disanull the old ordinances of the city , and to make new ; so that , the short time of his dictatourship meeting with his authority , which was limited to him , and the people of rome not corrupted , it was unpossible he should exceed his bounds , and hurt the city : and , we finde by experience , that he evermore advantag'd it . and indeed among other roman ordinances , this is one deserves consideration , and worthy to be reckoned among those which contributed to the inlargement of that empire : for without such like course taken , cities could hardly escape out of such extravagant michiefes ; for the wayes ordinarily us'd in republiques . which more slowly ( being that no counsell , nor magistrate hath power of himselfe to go through with any matter , but in many things nave neede of of one another , because there goes time in getting together their consents ) their remedies are very dangerous , when they are to cure that which cannot stay for time : and therefore commonwealths among their orders should have some such like way ; and the republique of venice ( which is excellent among these modernes ) hath reserv'd the authority to a few citizens , that in occurrences of importance , without more advice , all of them joyntly of accord may resolve ; for when in a republique there wants such an expedient , it must needs by keeping the old customes go to ruine , or to escape it , break them . and in a commonwealth , it were to be desir'd , that nothing should chance , which might call in the use of extraordinary courses . for though that extraordinary way at that time did good , yet the example prooves of ill consequence : for the custome is brought in , to breake the old orders at first for good , which afterwards under that colour are broken to ill intent . so that a republique can never be perfect , unlesse with her lawes she hath provided for all things , and for every mischance ordain'd the remedy , and tract out the way of her government : and therefore concluding i say , that those republiques which in their dangers have not recourse to a dictatour , or such like authorities , will alwayes in those heavy accidents fall to ruine . and , in this new ordinance the manner of making the choice is to be noted , how judiciously it was provided for by the romans ; for the creation of the dictatour being some what a disgrace to the consulls , the heads of the city being as well to come under obedience , as others ; and presupposing , that some distaste hereof might arise among the citizens , they ordein'd the power of making this choice should be in the consuls ; thinking , that when the occasion came , that rome should stand in need of this royall power , they would do it with a good will , and that they doing it themselves , it would lesse grieve them : for the hurts , or any evil that a man brings voluntarily upon himself , and of his owne choyce , are farre lesse troublesome , then those that are done him by another : although that afterwards in the latter times , the romans us'd in liew of a dictatour , to give such authority to the consull in these words , let the consull takecare the commonwealth receive no dammage . and to returne to our matter , i conclude , that the neighibouring inhabitants of rome by seeking to suppresse them , made them not onely provide for their defence , but also gave them the way how they might with more force , better advice , and greater authority offend them . chap. xxxv . the reason , why in rome the creation of the decemvirate was hurtfull to the liberty of that republique , notwitstanding that it was made by publique and free voices . and it seemes contrary to that which was said before , that the authority which is seis'd on by violence , not that which is given by suffrages , is hurtfull to commonweales , as the election of the ten citizens created by the people of rome to make lawes therin , who in time became tyrants in it , and without any respect laid hold on the liberty thereof . where we ought well consider the manner of giving the authority , and the time for which it is given : and when an absolute authority is given for a long time ( calling a yeare or somewhat more a long time ) it will alwayes be dangerous , and will produce either good or bad effects , according as the persons to whom it shall be intrusted shall proove good or bad : and if we looke into the authority the ten had , and that which the dictatours had , we shall find that of the ten farre to outreach the other . for when the dictatour was created , the tribuns , the consuls , and the senate remain'd still in their authority , nor could the dictatour take it from them and if he could deprive one of the consulship , and remove another from the senate , yet could he not disanull the whole order of senatours , and make new lawes : so that the senate , the consuls , and the tribuns continuing with their authority , came to be as a guard upon him , to keepe him from swerving out of he right way . but in the creation of the ten there fell out the cleane contrary ; for they cashierd the consuls and tribuns and gave authority of themselves to make lawes and every thing else , as absolutly as the people of rome . so that being absolute of themselves without consuls , without tribuns , without appeale to the people , and hereby having none to looke into their courses , the second yeare they had the meanes , especially moov'd by the ambition of appius , to become insolent . and hereupon it is to be noted , that when it is said , that a power given by free suffrages , never hurt any commonwealth , we must presuppose , that the people suffer not themselves to be induc'd to give it , unlesse with due circumstances , and at due seasons . but when , either being deceiv'd , or upon some other occasion leading them blindsold , they are brought to give it undiscreetly , and in that kind as the people of rome gave it to the ten , it will befall them alwayes , as it did to these . which is easily proov'd , considering the causes that held the dictatours in goodnesse , and those that gave the ten occasion of becomming evill . and advising also how those republiques have done , that have bin thought well governed , in the giving of authority for a long time , as the sparitans gave their kings , and the venetians their duke ; for a man may preceive that in one or other sort they had their guards upon them , that they who were ill dispos'd could not at their pleasures abuse that authority . nor availes it in this case , that the matter is not corrupted ; for an absolute authority corrupts the matter in a very short time , gathers friends , and makes partisans , neither is poverty or want of good kindred a let ; for wealth , and every other advantage presently runnes after them , as particularly in the ereation of the ten we shall treate . chap. xxxvi . the citizens who have possessed the greatest charges in the commonwealth , ought not to disdaine the lesse , as unworthy of them . the romans had made marcus fabius , and caius manlius consuls , and gain'd a very glorious battell of the veyentes and the etruscans , where in quintus fabius was slaine . the consuls brother , who had bin consul the yeare before . where we should well consider , how proper the lawes of that citie were for her advancement . and how much those other republique that trace not herfoote steps , decevie themselves . for though the romans were zealous lovers of glory , yet never did they esteeme it dishonourable at one time to obey , where other whiles they had commanded ; and to serve in that army whereof they had bin commanders . which custome is contrary to the opinion , lawes , and courses of the citizens of our times . and in venice yet is this errour , that a citizen having borne a great office , esteemes it a disgrace to accept of a lesse , and the citie allowes him to refuse it . which thing though it were honourable for the private , yet is it wholly unprofitable for the publique for a commonwealth may expect better performance from , and repose more trust in that citizen , who descends from a greater charge to undertake a lesse , then in him that from a lesse arises to the command of a greater . because they cannot with good reason trust him with their weighty affayres , unlesse they see men about him of such reverence and vertue that his inexperience may be guided and directed by their vertue and authority . and if in rome there had bin that custome which is in venice , and other republique and moderne kingdomes , that he who had once bin consull would never goe to the warr afterwards , but as consul , many things very prejudiciall to the free government of the state would have growne therupon ; and through the errours committed by these new men , and by their ambition , which they might have us'd with more freedome , not having those grave men about them , by whose presence they might be so kept in awe , that they should not dare to step aside : and so they would have become dissolute ; which would all have turn'd to the publique losse . chap. xxxvii . vvhat distaste the agrarian law gave in rome , and that it is very offensive to make a law in a commonwealth , that lookes far backwards , and yet goes directly against an ancient custome of the citie . it is an opinion of the ancient writers , that men are wont to vex themselves in their crosses , and glut and cloy themselves in their prosperity ; and that from the one and the other of these two passions proceede the same affects : for at what time soever men are freed from fighting for necessity , they are presently together by the ears through ambition ; which is so powerfull in mens hearts , that to what degree fo●ver they arise , it never abandons them . the reason is , because nature hath created men in such a sort , that they can desire every thing , but not attaine to it . so that the desire of getting being greater then the power to get , thence growes the dislike of what a man injoyes , and the small satisfaction a man hath thereof . hereupon arises the change of their states , for some men desiring to have more , and others fearing to lose what have they already , they procede to enmities and warre , from whence comes the destruction of one country , and the advantage of another . this discourse i have made , because it suffis'd not the commons of rome , to secure themselves from the nobility by creating the tribuns , to which desire they were forc'd by nenecessity ; but that they suddenly , upon the obteining thereof began to contend out of ambition , and thinke to share equally with the nobility both in honours and fortunes , as the things that are in most value with men . whereupon grew that disease that brought forth the quarrell touching the agrarian law . and in conclusion , caus'd the destruction of the roman republique . and because commonwealths well ordered are to maintain the publique wealthy , and the particulars poore , it is likely there was in rome some defect in this law , which either was not so exactly fram'd at the beginning , but that every day it had need of some revising and amending ; or that the making of it was so long put off , that it became scandalous to look so farre backwards ; or that being well instituted at first , in time it grew by use corrupt . so in what manner soever it were , that law was never mention'd in rome , but that the whole city was in a tumult . this law had two principall heads . by one they order'd that no citizen could possesse more then so many acres of ground : by the other , that the lands which they tooke from their enemies should be divided among the people of rome . it came therefore to thwart the nobility two manner of wayes ; because they that had the greatest states in possessio , were not permitted by thelaw who were the greater part of the nobility ; and there upon ought not to injoy it : and when the enemies goods should be divided among the common people , they tooke from the nobility the meanes to grow rich . these quarrells then being taken up against potent persons , and they by their resistance thinking to defend the publique , whensoever ( as it is said ) mention was made of this law , the whole city was in an uproare ; and the nobility wrought it out with patience and with diligence , either by drawing an army forth into the field , or by opposing another tribune against him that propounded it , or sometimes by yeelding a part , or else by sending a colony into that place which was to be divided , as it befell them of the country of antium , for which upon a dispute touching this law , there was a colony drawne out of rome and sent into this place , unto whom the said county was consign'd . where titus livius uses a notable kind of speech , saying , that with much adoe they found any one in rome , that would give in their names to go to the said colony , the people being rather desirous of these advantages in rome , then to go and injoy them in antium . and the quarrell touching this law continued a good while , till the romans transported their armes into the uttermost parts of italy , and likewise out of italy . after which , as it seemes , it ceas'd : which so fell out , because the fields , which the enemies of rome possessed , were farre apart from the peoples sight , and in a place where it was not safe to come to cultivate them , and therefore grew they lesse desirous of them , and the romans also did lesse use to punish their enemies in that manner . and when they did dispossess any towne of the territory , they there distributed colonies , so that upon such reasons this law was laid asleepe till the gracchies time , by whom it being afterwards awaked , quite ruin'd the roman liberty . for they found their adversaries strength doubled ; and hereupon kindled such a hatred betweene the people , and the senate , that they came to blowes and to bloud without civill meane , or order . so that the publique magistrates having no power to give remedy hereto , nor either of the factions relying on them , they sought private helpes , each party thinking to make a head should defend them . in this quarrell , and disorder , the people chose marius , and made him foure times consull ; and so long he continued his consulship , with small interva's , that he had power of his owne selfe to make himselfe thrice more consul . against which pestilence the nobility having no other remedy , began to favour sylla ; and having made him head of their faction , they came to civill warres , and after much bloodshed and change of chance , the nobility remain'd conquerer these quarrells were anew reviv'd in caesar and pompeyes time ; for caesar being made head of marius his party , and pompey of syllaes , coming to fight , caesar remain'd victour ; who was the first tyrant in rome , ( so that that city never after injoy'd her liberty , such beginning then , and end had the agrarian law . and although we shew'd other where , how the discords of rome between the senat and the people preserv'd romes liberty , because they sprung from those lawes in favor of liberty , and therefore the end of this agrarian law may seeme disagreeing to such a conclusion ; yet i say , that upon this i no way change my opinion ; for so great is the nobilities ambition , that if by divers wayes and sundry meanes it were not abated in a city , it would suddenly bring that city to destruction : so that if the strife touching the agrarian law had much adoe in three hundred yeares to inthrall rome ; it is like enough it would have bin brought much sooner into servitude , when the people both with this law , and also with their other humours , had not alwayes bridled the nobilities ambition . we see by this also , how much men esteeme wealth rather then honours , because the nobility of rome , if it toucht matter of honour , ever gave way to the people without any extraordinary distasts : but when it concern'd their wealth , so obstinatly did they defend it , that the people to vent their humour had their recourse to those extravagant wayes that are above discours'd of . the authors of which disorder were the gracchi , whose intention ought to be commended , rather then their discretion . for to take away a disorder grown in a commonwealth , and hereupon to make a law that lookes faire backwards , is a course ill advis'd of ; and ( as formely it hath been said at large ) it doth nothing else but hasten that evill to which the disorder guides thee ; but giving way to the time some what , either the mischiefe comes slower , or of it selfe at length before it comes to the upshot ) goes out chap. xxxviii . weake commonwealths are hardly drawne to a certaine resolution , and know not how to determine : and the course they ordinarily take , they are rather forc'd to , then choose of them selves . there being in rome a very grievous pestilence , and thereupon the volsci and the equi thinking a fit time presented to bring the city of rome into subjection , these two people having got a very great army together , set upon the latini and the hernici , and wasted their country : this the latini and hernici were constrain'd to give notice of at rome , and intreat , that the romans would undertake their defence : to whom the romans , exceedingly afflicted by the plague , answer'd that they should take a course to defend themselves with their owne forces , because they were not then able to do it . wherein appeares the magnanimity and wisdome of that senate , that even in all fortunes they would reigne and give law to those deliberations their vassalls should make ; nor were they asham'd to resolve any thing , when necessity press'd them to it , though contrary to their manner of living , and the resolutions usually made by them . this i say , because at other times the same senate had forbidden the said people to arme and defend themselves ; and therefore to a senat , whose judgment had bin weaker then was theirs , it would have seem'd an abatement of reputation , to have granted them such a defence . but they alwayes weighed businesses in their due balance , and ever chose the lesser ill in lieu of the greater good : for it agreed ill with them ; to see themselves unable to defend their subjects ; and they were as little content , that they should arme without them , for the reasons alleadged , and others also that are evident . yet knowing , that in any case upon necessity they were to take armes , having the enemy upon their backes , they tooke the more honourable part , and would rather , that what they were to do , they should do it with their leave , to the end that having disobeyed upon necessity , they should not be accustomed to disobey voluntarily . and though this may well appeare a course fit for every republique to take , the weake and ill advised common wealths cannot do the like , nor know not how to stand upon termes of honour in the like niceties . the duke valentine had taken faeuza , and made bologna yeeld to his conditions ; afterwards desiring to returne from thence to rome through tuscany , sent a confident of his into florence to aske passage for himselfe with his army . hereupon they consulted at florence , how to manage this businesse , nor did any one advise them to grant it him . wherein they followed not the course the romans tooke : for the duke being exceedingly well armed , and the florentines in a manner disarmed , that they could not hinder his passage , it had bin much more for their honour , if it had seem'd that he had passd with their licence , rather then by force ; for there it was wholly their disgrace , which had bin in part lesse , if they had carried it otherwise . but the worst condition these weak republiques have , is to take to no resolution , so that what party soever they take , they take it perforce ; and if any good be done them , it is forc'd upon them , for which they owe no thankes to their owne wisdome . i will give two other examples , that happen'd in our dayes in the state of our city , in the yeare , when lewi the of france had recover'd milan , being desirous to put pisa into our hands , for the summe of ducats , which the florentines had promis'd him , after such restitution , he sent his army commanded by the lord beaumont towards pisa , in whom , ( although he were a french man ) yet the florentines repos'd much trust . this army and captaine came on betweene cascina and pisa , to assaile the walls , where staying some daies to give order for the siege , there came some deputies of pisa to beavmont , who offer'd to yeeld up the city to the french army with these conditions , that upon the kings word he should promise , not to give them into the florentines hands , till after foure monthes , which termes were utterly resus'd by the florentines , whereupon ensued , that after a while they left the siege with disgrace . nor was that accord refus'd for other reason , then because they doubted of the kings word ; although ( such was the weaknes of their counsell ) that they were forc'd to put themselves into his protection , though they trusted him not : nor in the meane while did they consider , that the king could easier deliver pisa into their hands , having gotten possession of it , than promise hee would deliver that which hee had not yet in his power : wherein if hee had fayl'd , it had bin easy to discover the kings intention , and so have spar'd their cost . in such sort that it had bin a great deal more to their advantage , had they agreed , that beaumont should have taken it upon any promise ; as it was seene afterwards by experience in the yeare . when upon the rebellion of arezzo , the lord jubalt was sent by the king of france with succours to the florentines . who being come neare to arezzo , began to treate agreement with the towne , which upon certaine termes would have yeelded , as before the pisans , but were againe refused by the florentines . which jubalt perceiving , and thinking that the florentines did little understand themselves , hee began to practise an agreement with them by himself , without admitting the commissaries into the party , so that hee concluded a peace of his owne head , and thereupon entred arezzo with his owne people , shewing the florentines , they were fooles , and understood not the affaires of the world ; and if they desir'd to have arezzo in their hands , they should let the king know of it , who could more easily deliver it them , having his people already in the towne , then if they were without before the walls . in florence they forbare not to rayle upon , and blame the said jubalt , till they understood , that if beaumont had bin like jubalt , they should have had pisa as well as arezzo . and thus to returne to our purpose , republiques which will not come to resolution , seldome make any party much to their advantage , unlesse they are forc't thereupon : because their weaknesse will never suffer them to determine , where there is any doubt : and unlesse that doubt bee cancell'd by a neessitie that violently thrusts them forward , they remaine always in suspence . chap. xxxix . the same accidents are seene to befall severall peoples . this is easily knowne by any one that considers things present and things long past , that in all cities and all peoples there are now the same desires and the same humours , there were alwayes ; so that it is very easy for him that examines with diligence the things that are past , to foresee the future in any commonwealth , and to serve himself of those remedies , which were in use among the auncients ; or not finding of those which were us'd , to devise new , for the resemblance these accidents have with the auncient . but because these considerations are neglected , or not understood by the reader ; or if understood , not knowne to him that governs , it followes , that continually in all successions of ages the same offeeces happen . the citie of florence after yeares having lost a part of their dominions , as pisa and other townes , was forc't to make warre against those that held them . and because hee that had them in his hands , was of great power , it came it passe , that they were at great expence in the warrs , without good successe . from these great expences they proceeded with impositions to grieve the people , and from those grievances came the peoples murmurings and complaints . and for that this warre was order'd by a magistracie of tenne citizens , who were call'd the councell of tenne for the warre , they were malic't by the whole body of the citie , as the authours of the warre , and the expences of the same ; and they began to p●rswade themselves , that by taking away that magistracie , they should end their wars ; so that having to make new , they would not supply the places , but rather suffering that magistracie to expire , they referr'd their imployments all to the senate : which resolution was so hurtfull , that not onely it ended not the warre , ( as the generality was perswaded ) but those men being put out of the imployment , who guided it with understanding , there followed such confusion , that besides pisa , they lost arezzo , and many other places , in so much that the people perceiving their errour , and that the feaver occasion'd the mischiefe , and not the physitian , they created anew the magistracie of tenne . the selfe same humour grew up in rome against the name of the consuls ; for the people seeing one warre arise from another , giving them no rest , where they ought to have attributed it wholly to their neighbours ambition , who d●sir'd to suppresse them , they imputed it rather to the ambition of the nobilitie ; who not being able in rome to chastise the people protected by the , tribunitiall power , indeavour'd to draw them our of rome under the consuls , and there to oppresse them , where they had no assistance . and hereupon they thought it necessary to take away the consuls , or so to limit their power , that they should have no authority over the people neither at home nor abroad . the first that assa●d to put that law in practise , was one terentillus a tribun , who propounded they should create five men , to consider the consuls power , and moderate it . which thing much angred the nobility , giving them to thinke , that the majestic of the empire was wholly declined ; and that there was not left to the nobilitie any dignity more in the commonwealth . yet such was the tribuns obstinacie , that the consuls name was quite put out , and in the conclusion they were contented after some other order taken , rather to create tribuns with consulan power , than the consuls ; in such hatred had they their name and their authority . and so they proceeded a long time , till at length , having knowne their errous , as the florentins return'd to the counsell of tenne , so they anew created their consuls . chap. xl. the creation of the decemvirate in rome , and what the rein is to be noted ; where among many other things is consider'd , how by the like accident a republique may be preserv'd , or suppressed . having a purpose to discourse particularly of the accidents that happen'd at rome upon the creation of the decemvirate , methinks it is not much out of the way first to relate summarily the story of that creation ; and afterwards to sift out the parts that are in those notable actions ; which are many and of good consideration , as well for those that endeavor to maintain a republique free , as for them that intend to bring it under the yoke ; for in this discourse there will appear many errors committed by the senate , and by the people , in prejudice of the common liberty , and many faults made by appius chiefe of the decemvirate , lammageable to that tyrannie which he had presupposed already founded in rome . after many disputes and strifes past between the people and the nobility , about the framing of new lawes in rome , whereby they might firmly establish the liberty of that state , with one accord they sent spurius posthumius with two other citizens to athens , for the copies of those lawes which solon gave to that city , that thereupon they might found the roman ordinances . after their returne , they came to appoint the men that were to examine and frame the said lawes . and they ordained ten citizens for a year , of which appius claudius was one , a cunning and a turbulent man. and that they might without any respect make such lawes , they took away the power of all other magistrates in rome , espeaially of the , tribuns and consuls . they took away also all appeal to the people ; so that these new officers became absolute princes of rome . afterwards appius gain'd the authority of all his other companions , by means of the favors the people did him , for he was grown so popular in his behaviour , that it seem'd a mervail , how so suddenly he had chang'd his nature and disposition , having alwaies before this time bin thought a cruel persecutor of the common people . these ten governed themselves very moderately , not having above twelve lictors , who always went before him that was chiese among them . and although they had the absolute authority , yet when they were to punish any citizen of rome for homicide , they cited him in presence of the people , and made them judge him . they writ their laws in ten tables ; and before they confirm'd them , published them to the general view , that every man might read and understand them , whereby it might be known if there were any fault in them , which before their confirmation should be amended . after this appius caus'd a rumour to be spread throughout rome that if to these ten tables an addition of twoothers were made , they would be perfect so that the conceithereof gave the people occasion to make the councell of tenne againe for another yeare , whereunto the people consented willingly , as well because they would not have the consuls anew ●created , as for that they hop'd they might well subsist without tribuns , these being judges of the causes , as is aforesaid : it being then agreed to make a new election , the whole nobility betook themselves to sue for these honors , and appius was amongst the formost of them , and behav'd himself in his suit with so much courtesie towards the people , that all his competitors were jealous of it . they did not beleeve , that he being so proud a man , used all this courtesie for nought . and being in doubt publiquely to oppose him , they resolved to do it cunningly , and so though he were the youngest of them all , they gave him the authority to propound to the people the ten that were to be elected , thinking he would use the same terms others did , not to name himself , being a thing unusual and disgracefull in rome . but he took this impediment for an opportunity : and named himself among the first , to the admiration , and displeasure of all the nobility ; and after named nine others to his own purpose . which new creation made for another yeer , began to shew the people and the nobility their error ; for suddenly , appius made an end of dissembling to be what he was not : and began to show his inbred pride : and infected his companions with his own evil conditions : and to fright the people and the senate , in exchange of twelve lictors , they made a hundred and twenty . the fear was equall in all , for a while ; but they began afterwards to give respect to the senate , and rudely to handle the commons . if any one being wrong'd by one of these iudges did appeal to another , he was worse abused in his appeal , than in his first tryal . so that the people having perceived their error , began to look the nobility in the face with a great deal of sorrow ; and thence they took occasion to seek after their liberty , from whence by fearing their bondage , they had brought the commonwealth into that misery . and the nobility was wel pleased with this their affliction : that being weary of their present condition , they might desire to have their consuls restored . the dayes came at length that ended the year : the two tables of the lawes were finished but not published . the ten hereupon tooke occasion to continue on their magistracie , and hold the state by violence , and make the young nobilitie their guard , on whom they bestowed the goods of those they condemned . with which gifts the youth being corrupted , lov'd rather their own licentious life , than the common liberty . it fell out about this time , that the sabini and the volsci made war against the romans . upon which fear the ten began to see the weakness of their own estate : for without the senate they could not take order for the war ; and assembling the senate together they thought they lost their authority : yet upon meer necessity they took this last course ; and having gotten the senators together , many of them spake against the pride of the tenn , and in particular valerius and horatius ; and their authority had bin quite abolished , but that the senate , of meer envy to the common people , would not shew their authority , thinking , that if the ten should voluntarily depose their magistracy , the making of tribuns of the people might perhaps be left . the war was then resolved of , and two armies were led forth commanded by part of the ten : and appius staid at home to govern the city . whereupon it happen'd , that he fell in love with virginia ; and when he would have taken her by force , her father virginius to free her , slew her ; whereupon ensued divers tumults at rome , and in the armies , which being brought back again and joyn'd with the remainder of the people at rome , went apart thence to the holy mount : where they staid , til the ten had deposed their magistracy , and that the tribuns and consuls being created , rome was restor'd to the ancient forme of liberty . it is noted then by the text , that the inconvenient of setting up a tyranny grew first upon the same occasions , that the greater part of tyrannies ordinarily use to arise upon in cities , and this is from the overmuch desire the people have of liberty , and the excessive ambition the nobility have to command . and when they agree not to make a law in favor of liberty , and either party betakes it self to favour some one , then suddenly starts up a tyranny . the people and the nobility of rome consented to create the ten ; and to create them with so great authority , as they did for the desire they both had , the one to extinguish the memory of the consuls , the other of the tribuns . when they were created , the people thinking that appius was become of the popular faction , and rudely handled the nobility , the people betook themselves to favour him . and when a people is led into such an error , as to give reputation to any one , because he creates those evil that they hate , if he hath wit , it will alwaies come to pass , that he shall make himself lord of that city ; for he will wait his opportunity together with the peoples favor to extinguish the nobility , and will never endeavor to oppress the people , till he hath quite supprest the nobles ; at which time when the people shall perceive themselves to be in bondage , they shall not know whether to have recourse for help . this course have they all held , that have laid the foundations of a tyrannie in any commonwealth . which if appius had likewise held , his tyrannie would have bin of longer durance , and not have fail'd so quickly ; but he went the clean contrary way ; nor could a man have done more undiscreetly , than he , who to maintain a tyrannie , made those his enemies that bestowed it first upon him , and could still make it good , and fought to gain those to be his friends , who neither agreed to give it him , nor could maintain it to him , and so lost those that were his friends , and strove to make those his friends , that could not be so : for though the nobility desire to tyrannize , yet that part of the nobility that hath not a share in the tyrannie , is alwaies enemy to the tyrant ; nor is it possible ever to gain them all to his side , by reason of the nobilities exceeding ambition and excessive avarice , seeing that the tyrant cannot have so great wealth , nor so many honors , as to satisfie them all . and thus appius , forsaking the people , and cleaving to the nobility , committed a most evident error , and so for other reasons abovesaid ; and because , if a man will hold any thing by violence , he that forces must needs be stronger than he that is forced . from whence it comes , that those tyrarts who have the generality to friend , and the great ones their enemies , are in the more safety , because , their violence is supported with greater forces , than that which is favored by the nobility , and hated by the people : for with the peoples favor the forces within are sufficient to maintain themselves , as they were to nabis tyrant of sparta , when all greece and the people of rome assaulted him , having made himself sure of some few of the nobility , and alwaies having the people his friend , wherewith he defended himself : which he could not have done , if they had bin otherwise . in that other degree , to have but few friends at home , the forces within suffice nor , but must be sought after abread : and they are to be of three kinds , the one to have a guard of strangers , to assure thy person ; the other , to have an army in the country , which may serve the same turn the people could ; the third , to hold correspondence and friendship with thy put issant neighbours , who may defend thee . and whosoever takes these courses , and observes them rightly , though the people be his enemy , yet in some sort may he save himself . but appius could not by any army make himself master of the country , the country there and rome being one and the same thing ; and what he could do , he knew not how to do , and so perish'd in his beginning . the senate also and the people in the creation of the decemvira●e committed very great errors . for , though it be formerly said in the discourse touching a dictator , that those magistrates , who are made of themselves , not those that are chosen by the people , endammage the liberty , yet the people ought , when they make their magistrates , take such order in their making , that they restrain them by some regards from growing wicked . and where they should set a guard over them , to keep them good , the romans took it away , creating that the sole magistracy in rome , nullifying all the rest , for the excessive desire ( as we before said ) the senate had to suppress the tribuns , and the common people the consuls : which blinded them both so , that they concur'd in this disorder : for men ( as king ferdinand said ) do oftentimes like certain lesser birds of prey , who so eagerly pursue the prey , whereunto they have a natural provocation , that they perceive not a greater bird over their heads with like eagerness ready to seize on them . the people of romes error then is made plain by this discourse , as i propounded it in the beginning , in going to save their liberty ; as appius his errors also in going to seize upon the tyranny . chap. xli . of humble to become , proud , of● mercifull cruel , without passing through the due means between these extreams , argues indiscretion , and turns nothing to advantage . among other termsill us'd by appius , to maintain his tyranny , it was not of small moment , to leap too suddenly from one quality to another : for his craft in deceiving the people , by dissembling popularity , was used to good purpose . the terms likewise he held to cause a new creation of the ten , were well us'd : as also his boldness in creating himself one of them , contrary to the nobilities opinion it was a course rightly taken , to chuse his collegues to his own turn : but it was not advisedly done , presently upon this ( according as i sayd above ) to change his disposition at an instant , of a friend to shew himself enemy to the people , of curteous to become insolent , of mild harsh , and to do this so suddenly , that without any excuse he discovers to all the falshood of his heart . for he that hath seem'd good for a while , and would , to serve his own turn , become wicked , should come to it by the due degrees ; and in such sort goeon with his occasions , that before the different disposition deprive him of his ancient favors , it may have given him so many new , that his authority be no way diminished : otherwise being found unmask'd and without friends , he perishes . chap. xlii . how easily men may be corrupted . it is remarkable also in this matter touching the decemvirate , how easily men are corrupted , so that they make themselves become of aquite contrary nature , though at first good , and well brought up : considering how that youth , which appius had taken near to him for guard of his person , began to favor the tyranny , for a very small profit which they made thereof . and how quintus fabisu , one of the second ten that were chosen , being an excellent man ; blinded with a little ambition , and perswaded by the malignity of appius , chang'd all his good conditions into very bad , and became like him ; which being throughly examin'd , shall cause those that institute the lawes of republiques or kingdoms to be more exactin bridling humane desires , and in taking from them all hope of escaping scot-free whensoever they offend . chap. xliii . they that fight for their own glory , are the good and faithfull soldiers . it is considerable also upon the above written treaty , what difference there is between an army satisfied and contented in it self , fighting for its own glory , and that which is ill dispos'd , fighting for other mens ambition ; for where the roman armies were alwaies wont under the consuls to be victorious , under the decem. virate they were alwaies losers . from this example may we know in part the reasons why mercenary soldiers are unprofitable , who have no other obligation to make them stand true to thee , but some small stipend thou bestowest on them . which cannot be a motive so sufficient , or of such weight , as to gain thee their truth and love so far , as to die in thy behalf . for in those armies , wherein there is not that affection towards him for whom they fight , which makes them become his partisans where can never be so much valor , as to subdue or resist an enemy that hath never so little vertue or courage . and because neither this affection , nor contention can grow in others , more then in thy natural subject , it is necessary in the maintaining of a state , whether it be commonwealth or kingdom , to arme the native subjects , as we see all they have done , who with their armies have made any great conquests . the roman armies under the decemvirates were valorous as formerly : but because the same disposition was not in them , they atchiev'd not the like exploits . but so soon as the decemvirate had an end , and they , as free men , began to war , they took to them again their former courages , and by consequence their undertakings prov'd successfull , according to their ancient wont . chap. xliiii . a multitude without a head is unprofitable : and a man should not first threaten ; and afterward demand the power . the common people of rome , upon the occasion of verginius being gone apart armed into the holy mount , the senate deputed some unto them to demand , by what authority they had forsaken their captains and retired into the mountain ; and such was the esteem of the senates authority , that the people having no head of their multitude , no man durst make answer . and titus livius sayes , they wanted not what to answer , but they wanted who should answer : which thing does punctually shew the unprofitableness of a multitude without a head , and therefore verginius perceiving the disorder , sound the expedient of creating twenty tribuns of war who should be their head to answer , and confer with the senate . and having demanded , that valenius and horatius should be sent them , to whom they would declare their mindes , these refused to go , til the ten had deposed their magistracy : and being come to the mountain where the people was , the demands were , that they would have the triburs of the people created again , and that they might appeal to the people from every magistrate , and that all the ten should be deliver'd into their hands , and they would burn them quick : valerius and horatius commended their first demands : and blam'd their latter , as impious , saying , you condemn cruelty , and yet you use it your selves . and they were advis'd to leave making mention of the ten , and attend onely to lay hold of their authority and power , and afterwards they should not want means of satisfaction ; where plainly it appears , how much it savors of folly , and little of wisdome , to demand a thing , and before-hand to say , i will do ill with it . for a man ought not herein discover his intention , but first in any case indeavor to be master of what he desires . for it is enough to ask a man his weapons , without saying to him , i will kill thee with them , being thou hast power , when thou art possest of them , to do as thou list . chap. xlv . it is a matter of very evil example , when he that makes a law neglects the observing of it : and it is very dangerous in a state , to make a continuall practise of cruel executions . the agreement being made and rome reduc'd to her ancient forme , verginius cited appius before the people , to defend his own cause : whom appearing accompanied with many of the nobility , verginius commanded to be cast into prison . appius began to cry out , and appeal to the people . verginius said , he was not worthy to be allow'd that appeal which himself had destroy'd , or have the people defend him , who had so much endammag'd them . appius replied , that they ought not to violate that appeal , which they with such earnest desire had ordain'd . for all this he was imprison'd , and before the day of giving judgment , he slew himself . and though appius his lewd life deserv'd any punishment , yet savor'd it but little of eivil government , to violate the lawes , and especially that which was but then made . for i beleeve not , there is any thing of worse example in a republique , then to make a law , and not observe it ; and the more , when he that makes it breaks it . florence after the ninty fourth year having its state reestablish'd by the aid of frier ierom savanarola , whose writings shew his learning , wisdome , and vertue , and having among other ordinances to assure the citizens , caus'd a law to be made , that a man might appeal to the people from the sentences , which for matter of state , the eight , or the seignory should give : which law he long perswaded , and with much a do at length obtain'd . it happen'd that a while after the confirmation of it , five citizens were condemn'd to death by the seignory for some offence touching the state ; and they desiring to appeal , were not suffer'd , and so the law not observ'd . which more wrong'd the reputation of that frier , then any other accident . for if that appeal was profitable , he should have caus'd it to be observ'd , if otherwise , he should never have so urg'd the making of it . and so much more remarkable was this accident , in that the frier in those many sermons which he made , after the breach of this law , never either condemned him that broke it , or excus'd the breach , as he that would not condemn any thing that serv'd to his purpose ; and excuse it he could not . which having discover'd his ambitious and sactious mind , took much from his credit , and charg'd him with blame enough . it is a very great fault also in a state , every day in the citizens mindes to renew the memory of old wrongs done to this or that man with new punishments , as it befell at rome after the decemvirate . for all the ten , and other citizens at sundry times were accus'd , and condemn'd , so that all the nobility were exceedingly affrighted , thinking they would never leave condemning them , til they had destroyed the whole nobility . and certainly it had produc'd some inconvenient in the city , if marcus duellius the tribun had not taken order for it . who made a decree , that for a whole year it should not be lawfull for any man to cite or accuse any citizen of rome , which assur'd all the nobility . where we see , how great a hurt it is to a republique or prince , to hold their subjects minds in suspicion and fear with continual persecutions and punishments : and without doubt a worse course cannot be taken . for men that begin to doubt of mischief , in any case provide for themselves in their dangers , and grow bolder , and less respectfull how they venture on novelties . wherefore it is necessary either never to hurt any , or the hurt that is to be done to do at once , and afterwards let men injoy some assurance , that may give them cause to quiet and settle their minds . chap. xlvi . men arise by degrees from one ambition to another : and first they aime no further , then that they themselves suffer no hurt of others , afterwards they strive to be able to hurt others . the people of rome having recovered their liberty , and being return'd into their former state , or rather greater , insomuch as they had made new laws , which were as new foundations laid to establish their power , it seem'd probable , that rome for some while would have bin at quiet ; yet by experience the contrary was seen , for every day there sprung up new tumults and new disagreements . and because titus livius very judiciously gives the reason from whence they grew , methinks it is not out of purpose , punctually to relate his words where he sayes , that alwaies either the people or the nobility waxed proud , when the other grew humble ; and when the commons containd themselves modestly within their bounds , then began the youth of the nobility to provoke them with all manner of injuries ; nor could the tribuns much remedy this , for they also had their shares in the sufferance . the nobility on the other side , although well they wot that their youth was too insolent , yet being that insolency was to be committed by one side , they wished rather their own should be the actors , then the commonalty . and thus the desire of maintaining the liberty caused each to proceed so far til they oppressed the other . and the order of these accidents is , that while men endeavor to be out of fear themselves , they begin to put others in fear ; and that injury which they chase from themselves , they thrust upon another , as if there were a necessity either to hurt or to be hurt . hereby is seen in what manner among other things common-wealths come to dissolution , and men rise from one ambition to another . and as that sentence of salust put in caesars mouth , was very true ; that all evil examples first spring from good beginnings . the first thing that those citizens ( as is above said ) endeavor , who behave themselves ambitiously in a republick , is , not onely to be out of the reach of private mens wrongs , but out of the magistrates power . to attain hereto , they seek after friendships , which they gain by means , in appearance honest , either by supplying their want of moneys , or by protecting them from those that are too mighty for them . and because this seems worthy and noble , every one is easily deceived , and thereupon no body seeks to remedy it , till he presevering in the same course without let , becomes such a one , that the private citizens stand in aw of him , and the magistrates bear him respect . and when he is grown to this height , and no order first taken for restraint of his greatness , he comes to be in such termes , that it proves very dangerous to justle with him , for the causes i have formerly alleadged , of the danger there is to strive with an inconvenient , which is already come to some growth in a city , because then it is brought to such an exigent , that there is a necessity to seek either to extinguish it with danger of sudden ruine : or letting it alone , to submit to the yoke of bondage , unless death or some other accident prevent it . for being once come to the terms above written , that both citizens and magistrates stand in fear to offend him , and his , without much adoe after will they understand their own strength , and hurt at their own pleasure . whereupon a republique among her wayes of government ought to use this , to watch carefully over her citizens , that they have not power under the colour of good to do mischief : and that their reputation be such as may advantage the commonwealth , and not wrong it , as in its own place we shall argue it . chap. xlvii . men , though they are deceiv'd in generalities , yet are they not so easily beguiled in particulars . the people of rome ( as is abovesaid ) having taken in distaste the very name of consuls , & being desirous that plebeyans might be made consuls , or their authority limited , the nobility , that the consular authority might as well be chosen out of the commons as the nobility ; the people were herewith contented , thinking to abolish the consulate , and to have their share in this highest dignity hence grew a notable accident , that when they came to create these tribuns , which they could have made all plebeyans , the people chose them all out of the nobility ; whereupon titus livius uses these words : the event of these assemblies , or councils , shewed , that mindes differ much , when contention is made for liberty or honour , and when all strife being appeas'd , the judgments rest clear . and examining from whence this proceeds , i beleeve it is from thence that men are more deceiv'd in generalities , than in particularities . the common people of rome thought generally , they deserv'd the consulate , because they were the greatest part of the city , because they underwent the greater dangers in the wars , because they were they , by force of whose armes rome maintain'd her liberty , and became mighty . and thinking ( as is said ) this their desire reasonable , they would have this authority in any case . but when they came to pass their judgments in particular upon their own men , they perceiv'd their weakness , and judg'd that no one of them deserv'd that , which raking them all together , they thought they had bin worthy of . so that being asham'd of them , they had recourse to those that were of merit : at which resolution titus livius worthily marvailing , sayes thus ; this modesty , uprightness , and greatness of mind , where shall you now adayes find it in one man , which then was in whole people ? in confirmation hereof , another notable example may be brought which happen'd in capua , after that hanniball had broken the roman army at cannae : upon which occasion all italy being in an uproar , capua was ready to rise too , for the hatred there was between the people and the senate . and at that time pacuvius calanus being the principal magistrate , and perceiving the great hazzard they went to be slain by them , and the city yielded up to hanniball , now that the state of rome was in distress . afterwards he added , that if they would let him order the business , he would provide so , that they should be both friends ; but he would shut them all up in the palace , and by giving the people power over them to chastise them , save them . the senators yielded to his advice , and he call'd the people together , having the whole senate shut up in the palace , and said , that the time was come wherein they might take down the nobilities pride , and revenge themselves on them for the injuryes they had received at their hands , he holding them all prisoners in his keeping : but because he thought they liked not their city should be without government , it was fit ( being they intended to kill the old senators ) to create new ones first . and therefore he had put the names of all the senators in a bag , and so would begin to draw them forth one by one before them ; and so put them to death presently , as soon as they should have made choice of a successor . and having begun to take out one , when he was nam'd , there was a great noise made , calling him a proud , cruell , and arrogant man. and pacu 〈…〉 vius requiring that they should make an exchange of him , the whole multitudestood silent . and after a little while one of the commons was named : whereat one began to whistle , another to laugh , some to speak in one sort , some in another . and so followed all the rest one after another as they were nam'd , being thought unworthy to be made senators , so that pacuvius hereupon taking occasion , sayd ' seeing that you judge that this city must needs be in ill case without a senate , and you are not agreed to change your old senators , i think it would be well that ye were made friends ; for this fright wherein the senators have bin put will so humble them , that the courtesie which ye sought otherwhere , ye shall find with them . and hereunto being agreed , there followed the union ; and it was plain , how they were deceived , when they were forc'd to come to particulars . besides , people in judging generally of affairs and their accidents are beguil'd , which they afterwards understand in particular , and perceive the deceit . after the year . the principal men of the city being chac't out of florence , and there being not any orderly government , but rather an ambitious licentiousness , so that things went from bad to worse , many of the popular faction perceiving the destruction of the city , and understanding no other cause thereof , they blam'd the ambition of some powerfull man , that nourish'd these disorders , to the end he might make of it a state to his own purpose , and take away the liberty ; and these men were alwayes in the publique places of meeting , speaking evil of many citizens , and threatning them , that if ever they came to the government of the state , they would discover this their treachery and chastise it . it happen'd oftentimes , that some of these or the like were prefer'd to the principal magistracy , and when they were once in the place , and saw things nearer , they knew well the disorders from whence they grew , and the dangers that hung over them , and the difficulty to remedy them . and having seen how the times and not the men caus'd the disorder , became forthwith of another mind , and chang'd their opinion . for the knowledg of things in particular took away that deceit , which when they considered generally , was presupposed in them : so that they that had first , when they were private men , heard them speak , and saw them afterwards being prefer'd to the chief magistracy stand quiet , thought it came not from an exacter knowledge of things , but because they had bin carried away , and corrupted by the great ones . and this befalling many men many times , it came to a proverb , that said , these are of one mind in the piazza , and of another in the palace . considering therefore this whole discourse , we see , how a man may quickly open the peoples eyes , for seeing that a generality deceives them , it is expedient to bring them to descend to particulars , as pacuvius did in capua , and the senate in rome . i think also , this may pass for a conclusion , that no wise man ought to avoyd the peoples judgment in particular things , about the distributions of degrees and dignities : for onely in this the people are not deceived ; or if sometime they are deceived , it is very seldom ; but a few men are oftentimes deceived , when they are to make the like distribution : nor do i take it to be superfluous , to shew , in the next chapter , the order the senate held to clear the peoples judgments in these distributions . chap. xlviii . he that would not have a magistracy given to one that is base and lewd , let him cause it to be demanded either by one that is very base and lewd , or by one that is noble and very good . when the senate was afraid that the tribuns with consular authority would be chosen out of the plebeyans , they held one of these two courses to prevent it : either they made some of the best reputed men of rome stand for the magistracy , or they used fit means to corrupt some forbid plebeyan and of the basest condition , who crept in to be competitor with the plebeyans that usually of the best quality stood for it . this last way made the people asham'd to bestow it , and the first asham'd to refuse it , all which turnes to the purpose of our former discourse : where it s shewed , though the people be deceived in generals , yet is it not in particulars . chap. xlix . if those cities that have had their beginning free , as rome , have found difficulty to make lawes that can maintain them ; so those that have had their beginning immediatly servile , find almost an impossibility of it . how hard a thing it is , in the ordering of a republique to make provision of all such laws as may keep it free , the proceedings of the roman republique does well shew ; where notwithstanding that many lawes were made first by r●mulus , after by numa , tullus hostilius , and servius , and last by the ten citizens created for the like work , nevertheless alwaies in the managing of that city new necessities were discover'd , and it was needfull to make new laws : as it befell when they created the censours , which was one of those orders that help'd to keep rome free at that time when she liv'd in liberty : for being made arbiters of the fashions and manners of rome , they were a special occasion that rome held off so long from being corrupted . indeed in the beginning of that magistracy they committed one error creating it for five years : but not long after wards it was amended by the wisdome of mamercus the dictator , who , by a new law he made , reduc'd the said magistracy to the terms of eighteen moneths . which the censour , that were then in office took so much a miss that they put mamercus out of the senate ' which thing was much blam'd both by the people and the fathers . and because the story shews not any where , that mamercus could defend himself , it must needs be , that either the historian was defective , or the laws of rome in this part not perfect : for it is not well , that in a commonwealth it should so be ordein'd , that a citizen for publishing a law agreeable to the liberty they liv'd in , should be wrong'd without any remedy , but returning to the beginning of this discourse ; i say , that a man ought to consider by the creation of this new magistrate , that if those cities that have had their beginnings free , and were under their own government , as rome , with much adoe can find out good laws to maintain them free , it is no marvel , that those cities which have had their beginnings immediatly servile , have not found not onely difficulty , but impossibity ever so to order themselves , that they can quietly come to a civil government , as appears it befell the city of florence , because her beginning was in subjection to the roman empire , and having gotten leisure to breathe , began to make her own laws , which having bin mingled with the ancient , that were naught , could not work any good effect , and thus she proceeded in a government for years ( as we have by certain relations ) without ever attaining to such a condition , that she could truly be term'd a republique : and these difficulties which she hath had , have those cities alwaies had whose beginnings have bin like hers and though many times by publique and free voices ample authority hath bin given to some few citizens to reforme this , yet never have they order'd it to the advantage of the publique , but to serve the turn of their own faction , which hath caus'd more disorder , then order in the city . and to come to some particular example , i say , among other things which he that ordains a republique should consider , is , that he well advise to what men he gives the power of life and death over his citizens . this was well provided for in rome ; for by ordinary course they might appeal to the people : yet if there were any occasion of importance , where , to delay execution , by means of the appeal , was dangerous , they had the help of a dictator , who had power immediatly to execute ; which remedy they never us'd , but upon necessity . but florence and other cities beginning as she did , that is servile , had this authority committed alwaies to a stranger , who was sent by the prince , to this purpose . when afterwards they became free , they continued this authority in a stranger , whom they called their captain . which thing , because he might easily be corrupted by the potent citizens , was very pernicious . but afterwards this order chagning upon the alteration of the states , they ordained eight citizens , to supply the captains place . which order of evil became very evil , for the reasons we have otherwhere alleadged , that a few are alwaies servants of a few , and especially of the most wealthy : from which the city of veuice is well guarded , which hath ten citizens , who have power to punish any citizen without appeal : and because they would not be of sufficient force to punish those that are potent , though they have the authority they have ordained the quarantie , or council of forty : and besides , they have taken care , that the council of the pregai , which is the chiefer council , may punish them : so that , where there is no want of an accuser , they are never destitute of a judge , to restrain the great mens insolency . there is then no marvail ( seeing that in rome order'd by it self , and by so many sage persons , there grew every day new occasions , whereupon new lawes were to be made in favor of the common liberty ) if in other cities which have had their beginnings more disordered , there arise such difficulties that put them quite past all recovery . chap. l. the power of stopping the publique actions of the city , should not be given into the hands of one council , or one magistracy . titus quincius cincinnatus ; and cneus iulius mentus were consuls together in rome , who upon a quarrel arisen between them two , made a stay in all the actions belonging to the republique : which the senate seeing , perswaded them to create a dictator , to the end that might be done , which , by reason of their discord , was hindred . but the consuls disagreeing in every thing else , in this alone were of accord both of them , not to make a dictator : so that the senate finding no other help , desir'd assistance from the tribuns , who with the senates authority forc'd the consuls to obey . where the profitable use of the tribunate is in the first place remarkable , which serv'd to good purpose to bridle the great mens ambitions exercis'd not onely against the common people , but also among themselves : in the next place , that it should never be so ordain'd in a city , that a few should resolve of those things that are the ordinary maintenance of a common-wealth . for example , if thou givest the power to one consul to make a distribution of honors and profits , or to a magistrate to dispatch some business to be done , it is fit to impose a necessity on him , that he do it in any case , or so provide that another might and should do it : otherwise the order would be defective , and perilous , as we see it was in rome , unless they could have oppos'd the consuls obstinacy with the tribuns authority . in the commonwealth of venice the great council bestows both the honors and the profits . it sometime chanc't , that the universality upon some disdaine conceiv'd , or by reason of some false suggestion did not make choice of any successours to the magistrates of their cities , nor to their ministers of state abroad , which was a very great disorder ; for all at once , their townes and cities wanted their lawfull iudges ; nor could any thing be obtained while the universality were appeased , or were no longer deceived . and this inconvenient would have brought those cities to ill termes , had not some discreet citizens otherwise taken order for them . who having layd hold of a fit occasion , made a law , that all the magistrates within or without the citie should continue still in their offices , till new choice were made , and their successours appointed . and thus they tooke away from that counsell all opportunity of enabling them , with the commonwealths danger , to stop the publique actions . chap. li. a commonwealth or prince should make a shew to doe that of a free mind , which indeed meere necessitie compells them to doe . wise men gaine themselves alwayes the thanks of every thing in their actions , although in truth meere necessitie constraines them in any case to doe them . this discretion was well made use of by the romane senate , when they resolv'd to ad a dayly stipend out of the common treasury to those that served in the warres ; it being then of custome there to serve as their own proper charges . but the senate ceiving , that after that manner they could not long make warre ; and hereupon neither could they besiege townes , nor lead their armies farre off ; and judging it needfull they should doe the one and the other , they determined to allow the sayd stipends , which they did in such a way , that they got themselves thanks for that , to which they were bound by necessitie . and this present was so acceptable to the people , that all rome seem'd overjoyd with it , they thinking it to be a great benefit , which they never had hopes of , nor of themselves had ever sought after . and though the tribuns did their best to blot out these thanks , by shewing it was a matter of grievance and not of case to the people , seeing of necessitie they were to impose greater taxes on them , wherewith to pay these stipends , yet could they not prevayle so much , but that the people tooke it very thankfully . which also the senate augmented by the course they tooke in ordering of the tributes . for the greatest and heaviest were those they layd upon the nobilitie , and so were those that were first payd . chap. lii . to stay the insolence of one that growes powerfull in a commonwealth , there is no way more secure , and lesse offensive , than to seike before hand , and so prevent him of those wayes by which he attains to that power . wee see by the above written discourse , how great credit the nobility got with the people , upon the demonstrations make for their advantage , as well by the stipend appoined , as also by the course they tooke in imposing the taxes : in which way if the nobilitie had continued , they had wholly avoyded all manner of tumult in that citie , and they had taken from the tribuns the credit they had with the people , and by consequence their authority . and truly it is not possible in a commonwealth , especially in those that are corrupted , by any better way , lesse hurtfull , and more easy to oppose the ambition of any citizen , than to prepossesse those wayes , by which a man perceives he takes his course , to attaine that dignitie hee aymes at . which meanes if they had put in practise against cosmus of medici , his adversaries had gotten more by the bargaine , than by chasing him from florence : for if those citizens that were at brabble with him had taken the course to favour the people , they had without any imbroyle or violence taken out of his hands those weapons which were to him of greatest advantage . peter soderini gain'd himself credit with this onely in the citie of florence , that he favou'd the universality . which universality gave him the repute , to be a lover of the cities libertie . and surely for those citizens that envyed his greatnesse , it was much easier , and had bin a businesse of fairer carriage , of lesse danger and dammage to the commonwealth , to lay hold before hand of those wayes by which he became great , than by offering to oppose him , lest that in ruining him , the whole remainder of the common-wealth also should have fallen to ruine . for if they could have taken out of his hands the forces whereby hee became strong , which they might easily have done , they could in all their publique counsells and resolutions have oppos'd him without suspicion or regard . and if any man should reply , that if the citizens that hated peter committed an orrour in not prepossessing the wayes wherby he gain'd upon the people : peter also came to commit an errour in not laying hold beforehand of those wayes by which his adversaries frighted him : i answer , that peter deserves excuse , as well because it was hard for him to doe it , as because the meanes were not fit for him to use . for the wayes by which he was hurt , were to favour the house of medici , by which favours they overmaster'd him , and at last ruin'd him . yet peter could not fairely take his part , because hee could not with any good repute destroy that libertie , over which hee was appointed as guardian ; and seeing these favors could not passe in private , they were suddenly exceeding dangerous to peter : for what way soever it had bin that he had bin discover'd to be a friend of the medici , he had fallen into the jealousie , and incurr'd the hatred of the people . whereupon his enemyes had had greater power to suppresse him , then formerly they had . therefore men ought in every resolution , consider the defects and dangers thereunto belonging , and not fasten on any one of them , when they carry with them more danger then profit , notwithstanding that they seeme well to tend to the end propounded : for being otherwise , in this case it would befall them , as it befell tullius , who by going about to diminish marc antonius his power , increas'd it . for marc antonius being judged an enemy of the senate , and he having got together a great army , good part whereof had followed caesars faction , tullius to take these souldiers from him , perswaded the senate to set up the reputation of octavianus , and seng him accompanied with the consuls , and an armie against marc antonius ; alleadging , that so soone as ere the souldiers that followed marc antonius should heare the name of octavianus , caesars nephew , and that would be call'd caesar too , they would forsake the other , and follow this . so that marc antonius being dispossest of his advantages would easily be suppressed . which fell out cleane contrary . for marc antonius got octavianus to his part , who leaving 〈…〉 lius and the senate joyned forces with him . which thing proov'd wholly the ruine of those great mens party . which also it was easy to have conjectur'd : nor was that credible which tullius perswaded himselfe ; but he should rather have made account , that neither that name that with so great glory had exterminated his enemies , and gain'd himself the principality in rome , nor yet his heirs , or adherents , would ever suffer them quietly to injoy their libertie . chap. liii . the people deceiv'd by a false shew of good oftentimes seek their owne ruine ; and that great hope and large promises doe easily move them . when the ●yentes citie was taken , the people of rome were possess'd of an opinion , that it would be profitable for them to send halfe the romans to dwell at veyum : and because that citie had a plentifull country about it , frequent with buildings , and neare neighbouring to rome , halfe of the romane citizens might thereby be enrich't , without giving any disturbance to the civill government by reason of their neare scituation . which thing the senate and the graver romans thought so unprofitable or rather so hurtfull , that they freely profess'd , they would rather suffer death , then agree to any such matter : so that the businesse coming to dispute , did so iorage the people against the senate , that they had come to blowes and to bloud , had not some of the graver and reverenter citizens oppos'd themselves against their furie ; whose regard bridled the people so , that they proceeded not in their insolencie . here two things are to be noted , the first , 〈◊〉 people many times deceived by an imaginary good , cover their owne ruine ; and unlesse they be given to understand , which is the evill , and which the good , by some man they trust , the republiques ordinarily run much hazzard . and when it so falls out , that the people hath no great confidence in any one , as sometimes it comes to passe , having bin of late deceived either by things , or men , of necessitie they goe to ruine . and dante , to this purpose , sayes , in his discourse of a monarchie : a populo molte volte grida , viva la sua morte amocoia lavita the vulgar oftimes their own ruine chuse and life for death ignorantly refuse . from this increduliti 〈…〉 ises , that sometimes in commonwealths good courses are not taken , as formerly it was sayd touching the venetians , when being set upon by so many enemyes , they could not resolve till they were quite ruin'd , to gain any of them againe , by restitution of what they had wrongfully taken whereupon warre was made against them , and a conspiracie of the princes . wherefore when we consider here , that which is easy , and that which is hard to perswade a people to , this distinction is to be made . either , that which thou art to perswade them to , represents at the first view gaine or losse ; or is a course that carryes somwhat in it of courage or cowardise , and when in things that are propounded to the people , there appears advantage , though cover ly therebe disadvantage in it ; and when it seemes couragious , though underneath there be covertly hid the destruction of the republique , it will alwayes be very easy to draw the multitude thereto . and so likewise it will bee alwayes very difficult to perswade them to those courses , where there appears either cowardise or losse , though when it is better weigh'd and advis'd upon , therin is contein'd both safety and advantage . and what i have said is confirmed with very many examples of the romans , as also with those from abroad , both moderne and ancient . for from hence grew the evill opinion which was rais'd in rome of fab max. who could not perswade the people of rome , that it was profitable for that commonwealth to proceed slowly in that war , & to susteine and beare up against hanniballs violence without fighting : for the people deem'd it a base course , nor had they judgement to discerne the advantage there was to be gotten by it : nor had fab. reasons sufficient to make it plaine by demonstrations : & ordinarily the people are so much blinded in these opinions of courage , that though they of rome had committed that error to give power to him that was commander of the horse under fab. to fight with hannib . whether f. would or no , & that by reason thereof the roman army had like to have bin broken , if f. had not succourd it , yet this experience serv'd them not , but that they afterwards made varro c. not for any other worth of his , but because in al meetings & publique places of rome , he had bragg'd he would discomfit han. whensoever he had power given him to do it : whence came the battell & discomfiture at cannae , & near upon the ruine of rome . i will alleadge one other ro. example . hanniball had bin in italy . or . yeares , & had fill'd the whole country full of bloudy slaughters of the romans , when there came into the senate one m. centenius penula , a very base fellow , yet he had had some place of charge in the armie ; and offer'd , that if they would give him authoritie to leavy an armie of voluntaries , in what place soever it were in italie , hee would in a short time deliver into their hands hanniball , either prisoner or dead . the senate thought his demand very rash , yet they considering that if it were denied him , and afterwards his motion were made knowne to the people , that some trouble might arise thereupon , and so the evill will and envy thereof light upon the senate , they yielded to him , being content rather to suffer the hazzard of all those that went out with him , then to give any occasion of raising new discontents among the people , considering how likely this course was to be acceptable , and how hard to be disswaded . he went then with this inordinate and rude multitude to seek out hanniball , with whom he no sooner met , but he and all his troops were either slaine or routed . in greece in the city of athens , nicias a very grave and discreet man , could never perswade the people that it was not for their good to go and undertake an expedition against sicily , so that they having resolved thereupon , contrary to the wise mens likeings , there ensued the whole ruine of athens . scipio when he was made consull , and that he desir'd the province of affricke , promising the utter ruine of carthage , whereunto the senate not agreeing by the advice of fabius maximus , threatened to propound it to the people , as he that well knew how such like resolutions pleas'd them . we could also to this purpose lay downe some examples of our owne city , as was that of hercules betivogli , commander for the florentines , together with antoni giacomini ; after they had routed bartolomeus alvianus at saint vincenti , they went to incampe before pisa , which enterprise was resolv'd on by the people upon the brave promises hercules made them ; though many discreet citizens did no way like of it , yet they could not hinder it , thrust on by the generall desire , which was grounded on the commanders large promises . i say therefore , that there is not an easier way to inlarge a commonwealth , where the people hath the authority , then to put them into brave undertakings . for where the people is of any worth or valour , those will be alwayes well lik'd of , and if any man be of different opinion , he shall not be of force to perswade it . but if hereupon comes the destruction of the city , thence proceeds also , and most ordinarily the particular ruine of those citizens who are made the commanders of such like undertakings ; for the people having presupposed the victory , when they go by the losse , never impute it to their general 's evill fortune or want of sufficient forces , but blame him rather of treason or ignorance , and so either put him to death , imprison or confine him , as it befell very many carthaginian captains , and athenians . nor shall any of the former victories gloriously gotten , afterwards shelter them , for the present mishap cancels the records of all good past : as it befell antoni giacomini our countrey man here , who not having overcome the pisans , as the people presupposed , and he had promised , fell into such disgrace with the people , that for all his many good services past , he lived rather by the courtesy of those that having power with the people , protected him , then by any assurance else was given him . chap. liv. what authority the presence of great and worthy personages hath to appease and quiet the rage of a multitude . the second thing remarkable upon the text alleadged in the former chapter is , that nothing so readily restrains the fury of a multitude inraged , as the reverence of some grave man comming among them , as virgil sayes to the same purpose , and not without reason . tum pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem conspexere , silent , arrectisque auribus astant . and therefore that man of worth and merit , that either hath the command of an army , or that abides in a city where a tumult arises , ought represent himself upon the occasion , with the greatest grace , and in as honorable termes as may be , cladding himself with the ornaments belonging to his degree and quality , to gain him the more reverence . a few years agoe , florence was divided into two factions , of the frateschi and arrabiati , for so they were called : and comming to blowes , the frateschi were overcome , among whom was paul antonius sodorini , a citizen of great esteem in those dayes : and the people in the time of those tumults going in armes to sack his house , franciscus his brother then bishop of valterra , and now cardinal , was by chance in his house , who presently having perceived the stir , and seen the multitude comming , clad himself with his most honorable vestments and thereupon his episcopal rochet , and so met these armed people , where by the awfulness of his person and good words he staid them : which thing throughout the city for many dayes was much noted and celebrated . i conclude then that there is not a more setled nor more necessary remedy to stop the fury of a multitude , then the presence of such a man , who in his aspect and worth brings an awful reverence with him . and thereupon we see ( to return to the text formerly alleadged ) with what obstinacy the commons of rome accepted the party , to go to veium , thinking it advantagious to them , but never considering the mischief therein involved ; and how being there arose divers tumults upon the occasion , there would have bin harme done , had not the senate accompanied with many grave and reverent personages restrained their fury . chap. lv. how easily things are ordered in a city where the people is not corrupted : and that where a parity is there is no place for a principallity ; and where that is not , a republique cannot be . although that heretofore we have sufficiently treated , what is to be feared and what to be hoped for of cities that are corrupted : yet methinks it is not out of purpose to consider a resolution the senate took , touching the vow camillus made , to give the tenth part of the prey they took from the veientes , to apollo . which prey being fallen into the peoples hands , seeing they could no otherwise ever see any account of it , the senate made an edict , that every one should publiquely produce the tenth part of what he had gotten in the spoil of veium . and though this resolution took not place , the senate having afterwards found out another expedient , and by other means given satisfaction to apollo for the people , yet we perceive by these determinations , how much the senate trusted in the peoples goodness and how they judg'd , that there was not one of them but wou'd punctually bring forth what he was commanded by the edict . and on the other side , how the people thought not in any part to deceive the edict , by giving less then was due , but rather to free themselves therefrom , by shewing their open distaste at such course taken . this example with many others , above alleadged , give very good evidence of the great goodness and religion was in that people , and what might be hop'd for of them . and truly where this goodness is not , little can be hop'd for : as we can hope for nothing in those countreys , which in these daies we see corrupted , as in italy above others , so france and spain retain a part of the same corruption : and if in those countreys we see not so great disorders as every day arise in italy , it proceeds not so much from the peoples goodness ( which is very much fail'd ) as from that they are under one king who keeps them together in union , not onely by his vertue , but by the ordinary course of government in those kingdomes , which is not yet quite perverted . this goodness is yet seen in germany , and this kind of conscience is also of great force with those people , which is the occasion that many republiques continue free , and do so strictly observe their own laws , that no forrain enemy abroad , nor ambitious man at home , dares offer to seize on them . and to proove this true , that in those countreys there remain still the marks of that ancient goodness , i will give another example , like to that abovesaid of the senate and of the people of rome . those republiques use , when they chance to have need of any money they lay out for the common good , that the magistrates , or the consuls , having , authority , should taxe the inhabitants of the city one or two in the hundred , of that which every man is worth . and such a resolution being made according to the order of the town , every man comes besore thereceivers of that tax , and having first taken an oath to pay a convenient sum , he throws into a chest , appointed to that purpose , what in his conscience he thinks he should pay . of which payment there is no other witness , but he that payes . whereby we may well guess at the great good and religion there is yet left among those men . and we may well think , that every one payes the due sum ; for if it were not paid , the imposition would not yeeld that quantity , as those of old time were wont to do : which failing , the deceipt would appear : whereupon they would seek some other means to leavy their moneys , then this . which goodness is so much the more to be admir'd in these times , because it is very rare , or rather remains onely in this countrey . which proceeds from two things , the one , because they have not had much commerce with their neighbors ; for neither have these gone into their countreys , nor they come to visit these , because they have bin contented with those goods , to feed on those victuals , and to be clad with those wools , which the countrey affords ; whereby is taken away the occasion of all conversation , and the beginning of all corruption . for so they could not learn the french , spanish , or italian manners , which nations together corrupt the whole world . the other reason is , because those republiques where the common liberty is preserv'd , and uncorrupted , do not permit that any citizen of theirs should live after the manner of a gentleman , but rather maintain among them an equality ; and those that live in that countrey are cruel enemies to the lords and gentlemen . and if by chance they fall into their hands , they put them to death , as the principal authors of corruption , and occasions of scandal . and to make plain this name of gentlemen what it is , i say , that those are call'd gentlemen , that live in idleness , yet deliciously , of the profits of their estates , without having any care to cultivate their lands , or to take any other pains necessary to the maintenance of mans life . these kind of men are very hurtfull in every commonwealth , and countrey ; but worse are they , that , besides the foresaid fortunes , hold strong castles , and have vassals that obey them . with these two sorts of men the kingdom of naples abounds . the countrey about rome , romagna , and lombardia . this is the cause , that in those countreys there hath never bin any republique nor any civil government : for such kinds of men are enemies to all civil government . and if a man had a minde to bring into such countreys the forme of a commonwealth , he would find it impossible ; but to bring them under some order , if any man had the power , he could take no other course , then reduce them to a royalty . the reason is this , because where the matter is so extreamly corrupted , that the laws are not able to restrain it , it is needfull to ordain together with them a greater power , which is the authority of a king , who by his absolute and extraordinary power may be of force to bridle the excessive ambition and corruption of the mighty . this reason is verified in the example of tuscany : where we see that in a small space of countrey three republiques have long consisted , florence , siena , and lucca ; and that the other cities of that countrey serve in such a kind , that they have their dispositions and their orders much like them , and that they would willingly maintain the common liberty , all this arises from hence , because there are no lords of castles in those countreys , and never a one , or very few gentlemen ; but such equality , that an understanding man that hath appli'd himself to the knowledg of the ancient civil governments , might easily reduce them to a free state . but their misfortune hath bin so great , that as yet they have not lit upon any man that had either the power or knowledg to put it in execution . this conclusion then i draw from hence , that he that strives to frame a republique where there are many gentlemen , cannot do it , unless he first dspatch them all out of the way : and he that would erect a monarchy or a principallity where there is much equality , shall never effect it , unless he drawes out of that equality many of ambitious and turbulent mindes , and makes them rather gentlemen in effect , then in title , enriching them with castles , and possessions , allowing them the favor of wealth and men , to the end that he being plac'd in the midst of them , by their means may maintain his power , and they by his favor preserve their ambition , and the rest be constrain'd to bear that yoke which force and nothing else can make them endure . and there being by this way a proportion from him that forces , to him that is forced , thereby men continue setled every one in their order . and because to bring a countrey to be a republique which is fit to be a kingdom , and of one fit to be a republique to make a kingdome , is a subject worthy of a man of extraordinary judgment and authority ; many there have bin that have endeavor'd it , but few have bin able to go through with it : because the weight and consequence thereof partly frights them , and partly so overbears them , that they fail in their first beginnings . i think the experience we have of the republique of venice will seem a little to contrary my opinion , that where there are gentlemen , a republique cannot be instituted : for there none can partake of the dignities , unless they be gentlemen . the answer hereto is , that this example makes no opposition against us ; for the gentlemen in that republique are rather in name , then in effect : for they have not great revenues out of possessions , and lands , but their great wealth is founded upon merchandise , and moveable goods ; and moreover none of them hold any castles , or have any jurisdiction over men : but the name of gentleman among them is a name of honor and credit , not being grounded upon any of those things that caus'd those in other cities to be call'd gentlemen . and as other republiques have all their divisions under several names , so venice is divided into the gentility , and the commonalty ; and their order is , that those are capable of all honors , these not . which is not any cause of imbroile among them , for the reasons we have other where said . let a common-wealth then be there ordain'd , where allthings are reduc'd to an equality ; and contrariwise , let a prince be made , where great inequality is ; otherwise shall there be neither proportion nor continuance . chap. lvi . before strange accidents and changes befall a city or a countrey , usually there are some prodigies which forerun them , or men that foretell them . from whence this proceeds i know not , but it is evident as well by ancient as modern examples , that no very heavy accident ever befell any countrey or city , that hath not bin foretold either by some diviners , or by some revelations , or prodigies , or signes from heaven . and not to goe too far from home to fetch the proof hereof , every one knows how long before the coming of charles the eighth of france into italy was foretold by fryer jerome savanarola : and how besides this , it was said throughout all tuscany , that there were heard in the aire , and seen over arrezzo , many men in armes skirmishing together . moreover we all know here that before laurens of medici the old mans death the duemo or principal church was fir'd with lightning on the top , even to the ruine thereof . nor is any man here ignorant how a little before that peter soderini , who had bin made the florentines chief standard-bearer for life , was banish'd and depriv'd of his dignities , the palace was in the same manner burnt with lightning . a man might alleadge other examples beside these , but i leave them rather to avoyd tediousness . i shall relate that onely which titus livius speaks of , before the the frenchmens coming to rome , and that is , how one marcus ceditius a plebeyan told the senate , that he had heard at midnight , as he past by the new way , a voyce greater than any mans , which warn'd him to tel the magistrates that the frenchmen were coming to rome . the reason hereof i think fit to be discours'd upon , and treated of by some man well versed in the knowledge of natural and supernatural things , which i profess not . yet it may be , as some philosophers will have it , that the ayre being full of spirits , who by their natural knowledge foreseeing things to come take compassion upon men , and advertise them by such like signes , to the end they should prepare themselves for their defence . but however it is , we may find it true , that alwaies after such strange accidents , new and extraordinary chances befall countreys . chap. lvii . the common people united are strong and vigorous , but taken apart and separated , vile and contemptible . many romans ( the countrey all about being much ruined and wasted upon the frenchmens passage to rome ) were gone to dwell at veyum , contrary to the appointment and order of the senate ; who , to remedy this disorder , commanded by their publique edicts , that every one within a set time , under a certain penalty , should return to inhabite at rome . at which edicts at first , they against whom they were directed , scoffed ; but afterwards , when the time drew near that they were to obey , they all yielded their obedience . and titus livius uses these words : of fierce that they were all in general , each one out of his particular fear became obedient . and truly the nature of a multitude in this particular cannot better be laid open , than here in this text it is shewed : for the multitude is many times very insolent in their speeches against their princes decrees . afterwards when they see their punishment near and certain , not trusting to one another , they hasten all to obedience ; so that it plainly appears , that a man ought to have regard to the good or ill disposition of the people towards him ; if it be good , to take such order that it may still continue ; if ill , to provide so that it cannot hurt him . this is meant for those ill dispositions which the people have bred in them upon any other occasion , than for the loss of their liberty , or for the love of their prince , who is yet living . for the evil humors that arise from these causes are terrible beyond measure , and have need of great remedies to restrain them . their other indispositions will be easy , when they have not made choyce of any heads , to whom they may have their recourse : for on oneside , there is not a more dreadfull thing , than a dissolute multitude , and without a head : and on the other side , there is nothing weaker then it ; for though they have their weapons in their hands , yet will it be easy to reduce them , provided that thou canst avoyd the first shock of their furie : for when their rage is a little appeas'd and every one considers that he is to return again to his home , they begin then a little to doubt of themselves , and to take a care for their safety , either by flight or agreement . therefore a multitude up in armes , desiring to escape these dangers , is to make ehoyce of a head out of themselves who may direct them , keep them united , and provide for their defence , as did the common people of rome , when after the death of verginia , they departed from rome , and for their own preservations , they chose tribuns from among themselves : which if they do not , there allwaies befalls them that which titus livius saies in his above written discourse , that joyntly together they are of strength and vigor ; but when each one afterwards begins to advise of his own danger , they become weak and contemptible . chap. lviii . the multitude is more wise and constant , then a prince . that nothing is more vain or inconstant than the multitude , as well our author titus livius , as all other historians do affirm : for we find it often in the relations of mens actions , that the multitude hath condemned some man to death , whom afterwards they have grieved for and exceedingly wish'd for again : as we see the people of rome did for manlius capitolinus , whom after they had condemn'd to death , they much desir'd again . and these are the words of the author . the people , after that by his death they perceiv'd themselves free from danger , wished him alive again . and in another place , when he shewes the accidents that followed in 〈…〉 cusa after the death of hieronymus , hie 〈…〉 nephew , he sayes , this is the nature of the multitude , that they are either slavish in their obedience , or insolent in their auihority . i know not , whether herein i undertake not too hard a task , so full of difficulties , that i must either give it over with shame , or continue it with blame , having a desire to defend that , which , as i have said , is accused by all writers . but however it be , i do not judge it , nor ever will , a defect to defend some opinions with their reasons , without any intention to use either authority or force . therefore i say , that of that defect whereof those writers accuse the multitude , all men in particular are guilty , and especially princes : for every one that is not regulated by the lawes would commit the same errors which the loose multitude does . and this we may easily know , for there are and have bin many evil princes ; and vertuous and discreet ones but a few . i speak of princes , that have bin able to break the bridle that could check them ; among whom we reckon not those that were in egypt , when in that very ancientest antiquity that countrey was governed by the lawes ; nor those of spavta , nor those that in our daies are in france , which kingdom is order'd more by the laws , than any other which in these times we have knowlege of . and these kings which grow up under such constitutions are not to be accounted in that number , from whence we are to consider the nature of every man by himself , and discerne if he be like the multitude : for in parallell with them , we should set down a multitude in like manner regulated by the lawes , as they are , and therein shall be found the same goodness that is in them : and we shall see they neither insolently domineere , nor slavishly serve , as the people of rome , which whilest the republique continued uncorrupted , never serv'd basely , nor rul'd proudly , but with their own customes , and magistrates held their own degree honorably . and when it was necessary to rise up against one that were powerfull , they did it , as it appear'd in the example of manlius , and in that of the ten , and others , who went about to oppress them . and when it was requisite they should obey the dictators , and the consuls , for the common safety , they did it likewise : and if the people of rome desired again manlius capitolinus being dead , it is no marvail ; for they desired his vertues , which had bin such , that the remembrance of them mov'd every one to compassion , and might be of force likewise to work the same effect in a prince : for it is the opinion of all writers , that vertue is commended even in ones enemies . and if manlius , in the midst of that great desire had bin reviv'd , the people of rome would have given the same judgement upon him that they had done when they drew him out of prison , and condemn'd him to death . in like manner we see there were some princes esteem'd wise too , that have put some men to death , whom afterwards they have much desired again ; as alexander did clitus , and others of his friends , and herod mariamme . but that which our historian speaks touching the nature of the multitude , belongs not to that which is regulated by the lawes , as was that of the romans , but to that which is loose , as was that of the syracusians , which committed those errors that men inraged and dissolute fall into , as did alexander the great , and herod , in the cases aforesaid . therefore the nature of the multitude is not more blame-worthy , than that of princes : for all equally do erre , when all without respect have power to erre . whereof , besides this i have alleadged , there are examples enough , as well among the roman emperors , as other kings and princes , where we may see such unconstancy and variation of life , as never was yet seen in any multitude . i conclude then , beyond the common opinion , which sayes , that the people when they have the principallity in their hands , are various , mutable , unthankfull , affirming that these faul●s are no otherwise in them , than they are in particular princes . and if a man blamed both peoples and princes together , he might say true ; but exempting princes , he is deceiv'd . for a people that rules , and is well in order , will be constant , prudent and gratefull , as well as a prince , or better , though esteem'd wise . and on the other side , a prince loosen'd from the law will be unthankfull , various , and imprudent , more than the people : and the diversitie of their proceeding arises not from the diversity of their dispositions ( because in all of them it is much after one manner , and if there be any advantage on either side , it is on the peoples part ) but rather that the one hath more regard to the lawes under which they live , than the other . and he that considers the people of rome , shall find that for four hundred years the name of a king was hatefull to them , and yet were they zealous for the glory , and common good of their countrey : and he shall see many examples among them that witness the one thing , and the other of them and if any man alleadge to mee the unthankfulnesse they used towards scipio , i answer that which formerly at large was sayd in this matter , where it was made plaine , that people are lesse ungratefull than princes . but as touching wisedome , and settled stayednesse , i say that a people is wiser and more stayd , and of more exact judgment than a prince . and therefore not without cause the peoples voyce is likened to gods voyce ; for wee see that the universall opinions bring to passe rare effects in their presages , so that it seemes by their secret vertues they foresee their owne good or evill . and touching their judgement in things , it is seldome seene , that when they heare two oratours , pleading each of them a contrary part , when they are both of equall worth , but that they follow the better opinion , and are very capable of the truth they heare . and if in matters of courage , or in things that appeare profitable ( as it was abovesayd ) they erre , many times also does a prince erre , drawne aside by his owne passions , which are greater in them then in the people . we see likewise in their choosing of officers , they make a farre better choice then does a prince . nor will a people ever be perswaded to advance to dignity a man infamous and of a corrupt life , to which a prince may easily and diverse wayes be brought . we see a people begin to hate some one thing , and continue many ages in the same opinion , which we see not it a prince . and of the one and the other of these two things , the people of rome shall serve me for witnesse , which in so many hundreds of yeares , in so many electio 〈…〉 of consulls and tribuns , never made foure choices , whereof they had cause to repent them . and they hated so much ( as i said ) the name of a king , that no citizen of theirs could ever so farre oblige them , that if once he affected the royalty , they would pardon his due punishment . moreover we see , that in those cities where the principality is in the people , in a short time exceeding great increases are made , and farre greater then those that have bin made under the government of a prince , as rome did after the banishment of her kings , and athens after she freed her selfe from pisistratue ; which proceeds from nothing else , but that the peoples governments are better then princes . nor will we agree to this , that all that our historian sayes in the text before alleadged , or any where else , opposes this our opinion ; for if we shall run over all the disorders of peoples , & the disorders of princes , and all the glorious actions of people , as those also of princes , we shall see the people farre surmount the princes in vertue and in glory . and if princes exceede the people in ordaining of lawes , in framing a civill government , in making of statutes and new institutions , yet in the maintenance and preservation hereof the people go so farre beyond them , that they attaine to the glory of their founders . and in summe , to conclude this matter , i say , that as princes states have lasted long , so likewise have those of republiques ; and the one and the other have had need to be regulated by the lawes : for a prince that hath the power to doe what he list , commits divers follies ; and a people that can do what they will , seldome give great proofes of their wisdome . if then the argument be touching a prince and a people tied and chained to their lawes , a man shall see more vertue in the people , then in the prince : but if the reasoning be of the one and the other loose from the lawes , fewer errours will appeare in the people then in the prince ; and those lesse , and which are capable of greater remedies : for a good man may easily have the meanes to perswade with a licentious and tumultuous people , and so reduce them to reason . but to a mischievous prince no man can speake , nor is there any other remedy but the sword . whereupon a man may guess at the importance of one and the others evill : for if words are of where he cut off the lappet of sauls garment , and therefore was checkt by his owne conscience . and that in the psalm , . touch not mine anointed , &c. nor doe the heathen writers any thing give way hereunto ; wherefore tacitus sayes , ferenda regum ingenia , neque usui crebras mutationes . ann. . and quomodo sterilitatem & caetera naturae mala , ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate : vitia erunt donec homines , sed neque haec continua , & meliorum interventu pensantur . hist . . i neede not alleadge others : the troubles that fell upon the roman empire when they began to murder their princes , however bad , may argue their part : which was when nero , otho , galba , vitellius successively were slaine , tacitus speaking of the story he writ of it , sayes it was , opus plenum magnis casibus , arroxpraelijs , discors seditioni bus , ipsa etiam pace saevum , hist . . for they are much deceived who promise themselves quiet by meanes of a tyrants death : for as iulius caesar said , kingdomes never change them without great combustions , and states suffer worser michiefes , by not enduring insolent princes . for howbeit both particulars , and the publique also smarts because of this disorder , yet the life of the prince is the very soule and bond of the republique : rege incolumi mens omnibus una est , amisso rapere fidem , sayes the poet. this case hath bin argued by diverse at large , and the onely remedy is thus concluded on . the treacle of this venim is prayer and not vengeance : the people oppressed shal lift up their heart to god , as did the israelites , when tyrannis'd over by pharaoh ; for the cruelties of bad princes come not to passe by chance ; and therefore is it necessary to have our recourse to god , who sometimes for chastisement sometimes for try all permits them . force to cure the peoples evill , when as that of kings requires the sword ; there is no man that will not say , but that where the medicines mustbe stronger , the more dangerous are the evills . when a people is risen in tumult , the follies which they commit are not so perillous , nor is there such feare to be had of the present evill , as of that which may befall , it being possible some tyrant may grow up in the midst of that confusion . but during the time of mischievous princes the contrary happens ; for the greatest feare is of the present evill ; and of the time to come there is hope , men easily perswading themselves , that his evill life may produce their liberty . so that a man may see the difference between the one and the other ; the desperate feare of the one , is , of the present state ; of the other , of the state into which it may fall . the multitudes cruelties are exercis'd against those that they feare , lest they should seize upon the common good . the princes against those that they feare , lest they should seeke to recover their owne againe . but the opinion against the people growes dayly , for every one may freely speake evill of the people without feare , even while they have the government in their hands . a man speakes not evill of princes , but with many fears and jealousies . nor is it much out of purpose ( seeing the matter drawes me to it ) to argue in the chapter following , what confederacies a man may best trust to , either those that be made with a republique , or that are made with a prince . chap. lix . what confederation or league is rather to be trusted , either that which is made with a republique , or that is made with a prince . because every day we have it , that one prince with another , or one republique with another make leagues , and joyne friendship together , and in like manner also confederacies are drawne and agreements made betweene a republique and a prince . i thinke to examine , which is the firmest league , whereof a man should make surest account of ; either of that with a republique , or the other with a prince . and examining the whole , i beleeve that in many cases they are alike , and in some there is some difference : and therefore , that accords made by force shall not be truly kept thee neither by prince nor commonwealth . and i thinke that when feare comes upon them touching their state , as well the one as the other , rather then perish , will breake their faith with thee , and requite thee with unthankfulnesse . demetrius , he that was ever termed the taker of cities , had done exceeding much good to the athenians ; it chanc'd afterwards , that being routed by his enemies , and seeking refuge in athens as in a city that was his friend , and much ingag'd to him , he was not admitted into it . which griev'd him much more then the losse of his souldiers and army had done . pompey when his army was routed by caesar in thessaly , fled into egypt to ptolomy , who formerly had bin restor'd by him into his kingdome , and was put to death by him . which things we see had the same occasions : yet more humanity and lesse injury was us'd by the republique , then by the prince . therefore where there is fear , a man shal finde in effect the same faith . and if there be any commonwealth or prince who to keepe their faith with thee , expect while they ruine , it may proceed also from the same occasion . and as for a prince , it may well chance , that he is allied to some powerfull prince , who though he then hath not the opportunity to defend him , yet may he well hope , that in time he may restore him into his state , or else that having taken side with him as partisan , he thinkes he cannot obtaine a faithfull and fair accord with his enemy . of this sort were those princes of the kingdome of naples , that tooke part with the french. and for republiques , of this sort was saguntum in spaine , which till it was ruin'd tooke part with the romans ; and so was florence for siding with the french in the yeare one thousand five hundred and twelve . and i believe , having summ'd up every thing , that in these cases , where the danger is urgent , there is more assurance rather in the republiques , then in the princes : for though the republiques were of the same minde and had the same intention as princes had , yet for that they move but slowly , it will cause them to stay longer in resolving themselves , then a prince will ; and thereupon they will be longer a breaking their faith then he . confederacies are broken for profit , wherein commonwealths are farre stricter in their observance of accords , then princes . and we might bring many examples , where even for a very small gaine a prince hath broken his faith ; and where exceeding great advantages could not one whit move a commonwealth , as was the party themistocles propounded to the athenians , to whom in an oration made them he said , that he could advise them so , that their country should gaine much advantage by it , but them he might not tell it , for feare of discovering it , for by the discovery the opportunity of doing it would be taken away . whereupon the athenians chose aristides , to whom he should communicate this secret , and together with him consult upon it : whom themistocles shew'd how the whole navall army of all greece was in their hands under their protection , though intrusted them upon their faith , so that it was in their power by the ruine thereof to make themselves lords of all greece . whereupon aristides told the people that themistocles advice was exceeding profitable , but very dishonest . for which cause the people wholly resus'd it , which philip of macedon would not have done , nor those other princes who seeke their owne gaine rather , and have made more advantage by breaking their faith , than by any way else . touching the breaking of agreements , upon the not observance of some particulars therein , i meane not to meddle with them , being ordinary matters ; but i speak of those that breake upon extraordinary and maine points . wherein , by what we have said , i beleeve the people are lesse faulty than the princes , and therefore may better bee trusted than they . chap. lx. how the consulship and every other magistracie in rome was given without respect of age . it appeares by order of the story , that the commonwealth of rome , after that the consulship came among the people , bestowed it upon their citizens , without regard of yeares or bloud : and indeed they never had respect to age , but altogether aimed at vertue , whether it were in young , or old . which wee perceive by the testimonie of valerius corvinus , who at . yeares of age was made consul . and the same valerius , speaking to his souldiers , sayd , that the consulship was the reward of vertuc , and not of bloud . which thing , whether it were advisedly sayd or no , might require much dispute . and touching bloud , this was yeelded to upon necessitie , and this necessitie that was in rome might be in every citie that would doe the same things rome did , as otherwhere is sayd : for toyle , and labour cannot be imposed on men without reward ; nor can their hopes of obtaining reward bee taken from them , without danger . and therefore it was fit timely to give them hope of the consulship , and by this hope were they a while fed without having it ; at length that hope served not , but there was a necessity to come to performance with them . but the citie that imployes not their people in any glorious action may treate the mafter their owne manner , as other where it was argued . but that which will take the same course rome tooke , must make this distinction . and grant that it be so , for that of time there is no reply : nay rather it is necessary ; for in the choosing of a young man into a degree which hath need of the discretion of an old man , it is likely ( the people being to make the choyce ) that some very worthy and noble action of his preferres him thereto . and when a young man becomes endowed with such vertues that hee hath made himself famous by his heroicke actions , it were a very great wrong , that that citie might not serve her selfe of him then , but should be put off to expect , till that vigour and quicknesse of spirit were grown old and dull , whereof in that age his country might have made good use , as rome did of valerius corvinus , of scipio , and pompey , and many others , that triumphed very young . the second booke . the preface . men do alwaies commend , but not alwaies with reason , the times of old , and blame the present : and they take part so much with things past , that they celebrate not onely those ages which they have known by the memory writers have lest them , but those also , which now being old , they remember they have seen in their youth . and when this their opinion is false , as most commonly it is , i perswade my self the reasons that bring them into this error , are divers . and the first i take to be , that of matters of old the truth is not wholly known , & of thoi● actions most commonly those things are conceal'd that would bring any infamy upon the times , but whatsoever advances their credit & glory is set out with magnificence . for most writers do so much follow the conquerors fortune , that to make their victories glorious , they not only augment what they have vertuously done but they so illustrate their enomies actions , that those that are afterwards born in any of their countreys , either conquering or conquered , have cause to admire those men and times , and so consequently are forc'd exceedingly to praise and love them . besides this , men hating things either for fear , or envic , two very powerfull causes of hatred are quite spent in things that are passed , being they are not able to hurt , nor can give occasion of envic . but on the contrary part , it comes to pass that those things that are now in hand , and we see , which by reason of the through knowledge we have of them , no tittle thereof being conceal'd from us , and knowing in them together with the good , many things worthy dislike , hereupon we are compell'd to judge them much inferior to matters of old , although that in truth the present deserve far more glory and reputation : this i say , not arguing touching the arts , which are now brought to such perfection , that the times cannot take from them , nor add but little more glory to them ; but speaking of things belonging to means lives and manners , whereof the proofes are not very evident ; i answer , that this custome above written of praising and blaming is sometimes false and sometimes true : for sometimes they must needs light upon the truth ; because all humane things are continually in motion , and either rise or fall . as we see the civil government of a city or countrey so ordain'd by some rare person , that for a time even by reason of the worth of this man , the state mends much , and is more and more amplified : he that is then borne in that state , and commends more the times of old , than those moderne , is much deceiv'd : and the cause of his errour proceeds from those things that have bin formerly sayd . but those that are afterwards born in that city or countrie , whose dayes are onely during their decline from their excellence , then erre nor . and i devising with my selfe whence these things proceed , i think the world hath continued alwayes in one manner , and that in i● hath beene alwayes as much good as evill ; but that that good and evill does change from country to country , as it appeares by that which is discover'd to us of those ancient kingdomes , which alter'd from the one to the other , by change of manners . but the world continued the same . there was onely this difference , that where it first had plac'd its vertue in assiria , it afterwards remov'd it into media , then into persia , in so much that at length it came into italie , and so to rome . and if after the romane empire there succeeded not any other that lasted , nor where the world had retired all its vertue together ; yet we see it was spread abroad into severall nations , where men behav'd themselves very bravely and valouroufly , as in the kingdome of france , the kingdome of the turks , and that of the soldan ; so now adayes in germanie , and so among those that were first of the saracin sect , which did great exploits , and made themselves masters of so great a part of the world , after they had destroyed the easterne empire of rome . in all these provinces then , after the romanes were ruined , and in all these sects hath that vertue resided ; and now in some of them indeed it may be wished for , but in othersome worthily commended . and he that is borne in those countries , and praises the times past more than the present , may be deceived : but he that is borne in italy and not in greece , and is not become either in italy , a tramontan , or in greece , a turk , hath reason to blame the times present , and commend the former , for therein were many things made them marvail , but in these there is nothing can recover them out of extream misery , infamy , and disgrace , where there is no observance either of religion or lawes , nor of warlike discipline , but they are wholly bespotted with all manner of filthiness . and so much the more detestable are these vices , by how much they are most in those that are greatest , who sitting in their tribunals command all , and will be ador'd . but returning to our discourse , i say , that if mens understandings are corrupted in matter of judgment , touching which age is the better , the present or that of old , in those things by reason of their antiquitie they could not have such an exact knowledge , as they might have of their own times , yet should they not be corrupted in old men touching the judgement of the times of their youth , and old age , having known and seen equally the one and the other ; which thing would be true , if those men all the time of their lives continued still at the same state of judgement , and had the same desires . but they altering , though the times , change not , yet cannot seem so to men to continue the same , they having other desires , other delights , and other considerations in their old age , than in their youth : for the strength of mens bodies , when they grow old , decaying , and their judgements and understandings increasing , as must needs be , that those things which in their youths they thought supportable and good , becomes afterwards to them growing old intollerable and hurtfull : and where these men ought herein to lay the fault upon their own judgements , they blame the times . besides this , the desire of man being insatiable ( because of nature he hath it , that he can and will desire every thing , though of fortune he be so limited , that he can attain but a few ) there arises thence a dislike in mens minds , and a loathing of the things they injoy which causes them to blame the times present and commend those pass'd , as also those that are to come , although they have no motives grounded upon reason to incite them thereto . i know not then , whether i shall deserve to be numbred among them that are deceiv'd ; if too much in these discourses of mine i shall praise the times of the ancient romans , and blame our own . and truly if the vertue that then reign'd , and the vice that now reigns , were not more clear than the sun , i should not speak so freely , for fear i should incur the censure of that error whereof i have now blam'd others : but the matter being so evident , that every man sees it , i shall with boldness speak that plainly which i conceive of those & these times , to the end those young men who shall chance to read these my writings , may avoyd the evil of these times , and prepare their minds to imitate the good of these of old , whensoever their good , fortune shall give them occasion : for it is the duty of a good man , to reach unto others that good , which by reason of the malignity of the times , and of fortune , thou hast not bin able to do thy self , to the end that many being given to understand hereof , some of them , whom the heavens shall more favor , may put it in practice . and having in my former book of discourses spoken of the romans deliberations , touching their affairs within the city ; in this we shall treat of those which the people of rome did , belonging to the enlargement of the empire . chap. i. which contributed more to the romans in the conquest of their empire , either their virtue , or their fortune . many have bin of opinion , among whom is plutarch a great writer , that the people of rome were more favor'd by fortune , than assisted by their vertues , in gaining their empire . and among other reasons which he alleadges to that purpose , he sayes , it appears by the confession of the same people , that they acknowledged all their victories from fortune , having consecrated more temples to her , than to any other god . and livie seems to side with this opinion : because it is very seldome , that he brings in any roman speaking where he makes mention of vertue , but that he joynes fortune therewith . whereunto i will not yield in any termes , nor think i it can be maintain'd : for if never any republique made the same progress that rome made ; it is because never hath any republique bin so order'd to make its advantage , as rome was : for the valour of their armies gain'd them their empire , and their order of proceeding , and their own mannor with that which their first founder likewise devised for them , made them keep what they had gotten , as hereafter in several discourses shall be declar'd . that two strong wars never at the same time met together to shake their state , they say , it was the people of romes fortune , and not their valor : for they had no wars with the latins , til they had not onely beaten the samnites , but were fain to undertake a war in defence of them . neither war'd they with the tuscans , til they had first subdued the latins , and wholly weakned the samnices with many routes : whereof if two entire powers ( when they were fresh ) had joyned together against the romans , without doubt a man may easily conjecture that the ruine of the roman republique would have followed thereupon . but however this thing came to pass , it never befell them to have two strong wars made against them at once , but rather luckily it proov'd , that when one began , the other ended , and at the end of one another began , which we may easily see , by viewing their wars , how they followed in order : for letting alone those wars which they made before rome was taken by the frenchmen , we see , that whilest they fought with the aequi and the volsci , never ( so long as these people were of any considerable power ) did any other people set upon them . they they being conquer'd , the war against the samnites began ; and though before the finishing of this war the latins rebel'd against the romans , nevertheless , when that rebellion followed , the samnites were in league with rome , and with their army help'd the romans to bring down the latins pride ; and when they were subdued , the war with the samnites again was reviv'd . but their forces being broken by divers defeats given them , the war with the tuscans arose ; and when that was quieted , the samni es began anew to stir , upon pyrrhus has passage into italy ; when he was defeated , and beaten back into greece , then first was kindled the fire of the carthaginian wars : nor was that quenched til that all the french , as well beyond , as on this side the alpes , conspired against the romans ; so that between pobolonia and pisa , where now is the tower at saint vincenti , they were vanquish'd with a very great slaughter . after this , for the space of years , they had not any war of much importance : for they had no quarrel with any but with the ligurians , and the remainder of those french that werein lombardie : and so they continued , til the second carrhaginian war begin ; which troubled italie for years space . which being made an end of with great glory , that of macedon sprung up , and was ended , when that of antiochus , and afterwards that of asia took their turns . after which victorie , there remained not in the whole world neither prince nor republique that either by themselves or altogether could oppose the roman forces . but before that last victory , he that considers the order of these wars , and the manner of their proceeding , shall find mingled with their fortune much valour and wisdome ; so that he who examines the occasion of such fortune , shall easily discover it : for it is very certain , that when a prince or a people have gained such a reputation , that neither prince nor people bordering upon him dares by himself assault him , and is afraid of him , it will alwaies so fall out , that none of them all will set upon him , unless forc'd thereto , so that it shall be at that great princes choyce , to war with which of his neighbors he shall please , and the rest with little pains to quiet . who , partly in regard of his power , partly beguil'd by some devices he shall make use of to lull them asleep , are easily kept from stirring . and for other powerfull princes , who are more remote and have no dealing with him , they look upon the matter , as a thing afar off , and nothing belonging to them . in which error they continue so long , til the fire comes close to their doors : which then being come so near , they have no means to extinguish it , but only to use their own armes , which suffice nor , the enemy being now grown exceeding mighty . i will let pass , how the samnites stood still and look'd upon the romans , while they overcame the volsci and the aequi : and that i may not be too tedious , i will satisfie my self with the carthaginians , who were of great power and estimation , when the romans war'd with the samnites and tuscans : for even then they were masters of all affrica , and had sardinia and scicily in their hands , and had the rule of some part of spain . who being that their forces were remote from the people of romes confines , never thought of assaulting them , nor of giving succours to the samnites , and tuscans ; but as if the romans increase had bin the carthaginians advantage , they made a confederacy with them , seeking their friendship : nor did they perceive their error committed , til the romans having subdued all those peoples that lay between them and the carthaginians , began to make war with them for the rule of scicily and spain . the self-same befell the french , that hapned to the carthaginians , and so to philip of macedon , and antiochus ; and every one of them beleeved ( while the romans were busy with another ) that that other might chance to vanquish them , and that they had time enough , either by peace or war , to defend themselves from them . so that , i beleeve , that the same fortune herein the romans had , all princes would have had , provided , that they proceeded as the people of rome did , and were of equal valour with them . to this purpose it would not be unfit , to declare the course the people of rome held in their entryes into other princes countreys , but that inour treaty of principallities , we have discoursed thereupon at laege . i will only say this in bries , they alwaies did put in practice to make themselves some friends in the countreys they came newly acquainted with , who served them for a ladder to climb up to them , or a gate to enter them , or a tye to hold them ; as it appears , by means of the capuans they enterd into samnium , by the camertins into tuscany , by the mamertins into scicly , by the saguntins into spain , by mafinissa into affrica , by the ae olians into greece , by eumenes and other princes into asia , by the masilians and the heduans into france . and so they never fail'd of the like supports , whereby to facilitate their undertakings , either in the inlargement of their dominions , or in the maintaining them . which , those people that shall observe , shall find themselves in less want of good fortune , than they who neglect it . and to the end , that every one may know of what avail our vertue was beyond their for une , in the conquest of their empire , we will treat in the chapter following , concerning the quality of those people with whom they were to make war , and with what obstinacy they defended their liberty . chap. ii. what people the romans had to make war withall , and how obstinately they fought for the defence of their liberty . nothing made it more painfull to the romans to vanquish their neighbors near about them , as also some other countreys further off , then the affection that in those days many people did bear to their liberty , which they so obstinately defended , that they had never bin subdu'd , but by an excessive valour : for , by many examples , we know to what dangers they expos'd themselves , as well for the maintenance as the recovery of it ; and what revenges they took against those that had laid hold on it . we know likewise what dammages peoples and cities receive by servitude and whereas now adayes , there is onely one countrey that can say , she hath free cities in her : in ancient-times people liv'd very free in all countreys . we see that in those times whereof at this present we speak , in italy from the alpes ( which make a partition between tuscany and lombardy ) even to the very point of italy , there were many free peoples , as were the tuscans , the romans the samnites , and many others , that dwelt in the other parts of italy : nor does any man relate , that there was any king , besides those that raign'd in rome , and porsena king of tuscany ; whose race how it came to an end , history leaves us no memory . but we plainly see , that at the same time the romans went to incamp before vejum , tuscany was free , and so absolutely injoy'd their liberty , and withall so much hated the name of a prince , that the inhabitants of vejum for their defence having made a king among them , ask'd aid of the tuscans against the romans ; but they resolv'd after many deliberations taken , to give them none whiles they liv'd under a king , judging it not right to defend their countrey , who of themselves had subjected it to another . and it is an easy thing to gue●s , whereupon it is that people take such an affection to their liberty : because we see by experience , that cities have never bin much amplified neither in domition nor riches , unless only during their liberty . and truly it is a strange thing to consider , unto what greatness athens attained in the space of a hundred years , after she had freed her self from pisistratus his tyranny : but above all it is most strange to think unto what greatness rome attained after she was deliver'd from her kings : the reason thereof is easy to be understood : for it is no mans particular go●● , but the common good , that amplifies the city . and without question this common good is not regarded but in republiques , for there whatsoever makes for their advantage is put in practice : and though it turns to this or that private mans loss , yet are they so many , whom the said good concerns , that they are alwaies able to put it forward , in despight of those few that suffer by it . the contrary falls our , when there is a prince ; where , most commonly , that which makes for him endammages the city , and that which makes for the city hurts him ; so that suddenly where a tyranny growes upon a free state , the least ill that can thence result to those cities , is not to proceed , nor increase more in power , nor wealth : but for the most part , or rather alwaies , it comes to pass , that they go backward : and if hap would have it , that a tyranc should proove valorous , who by his courage and prowess should inlarge his dominions , there would thence no profit arise to the republique , but to him alone : for he cannot advance any of these citizens that are brave and worthy , over whom he tyrannizes , unless he desires to give himself some jeulousy of them . nor can he yet subject or make tributary the cities that he conquers , to that city which he tyrannizes over ; for it is not for his advantage to make it powerfull ; it rather makes for him , to hold the state disjoyn'd , that each town and province acknowledge him , in so much that of his conquests , he onely reaps he good , and not his countrey . and he hat would see the confirmation of this opinion , let him read xenophon in his treaty of a tyranny it is no marval then , that the peoples of old did so extreamly harc tyrants , and lov'd the free gouernment , & that the very name of liberty was in such request amongst them : as it happen'd , when hieronymus , nephew of hiero the siracusan , was slain in siracusa : for the news of his death being brought to his army , which lay not far from the city , they began to rise up in tumult , and take their armes in hand against them that slew him : but when they perceiv'd that in siracusa all cried out liberty , allured with the delight of that name , they were all appeas'd , and laid aside their anger conceiv'd against them that kil'd the tyrant , & advis'd together by what means there might be ordain'd in that city a free government . and it is no marvail , that people take extraordinary revenge of those that have laid hold of their liberty . touching which there are many examples , whereof i intend to relate onely one , that fell out in corcira a city of greece , in the times of the peloponnesian wat : where the province being divided into two factions , one of which followed the athenians , the other the spartans ; it came to pass , that of many cities which were divided among themselves , the one part follow'd the friendship of the spartans , the other that of athens ; it happening so , that in the said city the nobility prevail'd , and tooke from the people their liberty ; but the people by means of the athenians took heare again , and having laid hold on the nobility , shut them up into a prison capable of them all , from whence they drew them out by eight and by ten at a time , pretending to banish them into severall parts , but they put them to death after a cruell manner . whereof they that remain'd having some notice , resolv'd as much as lay in their power , to avoid this shamefull death ; so that arm'd with what they could get , and fighting with those that sought to enter , they defende'd the passage into the prison : whereupon , the people running together uncovered the top of the house , and with the ruines thereof overwhelm'd them . there follow'd also in the said province many such other horrible chances , so that we find it true , that people pursue more agerly the revenge of a liberty once taken from them actually , then of that which was onely contriv'd in the intention to be pluck'd from them . weighing then from whence it may arise , that in the times of old people esteem'd more of liberty , then now a dayes , i beleeve it proceeds from the same cause which makes men lesse valiant now adayes then formerly , which i thinke is the difference of our education from that of old , grounded upon the difference of our religion from the ancient : for our religion having shew'd us the truth , and the true way , causes us lesse to make account of the honour of this world ; whereupon the gentiles esteeming much of it , and placing therein their greatest good , became braver in their actions . which may be consider'd from many of their orders , beginning from the magnificence of their sacrifices and the poorenesse of ours , where indeede the pompe is more delicate then magnificke , but not any action of bravery or fiercenesse . and with the gentiles also there was no want of pompe and magnificence in the ceremonies , but thereunto was added the action of the sacrifice full of bloud and cruelty , slaying a multitude of beasts ; the sight of which being terrible made men of the same disposition . besides , the ancient religion did not beatificate but onely men fraught with worldly glory , as were the commanders of armies , and princes of nations . our religion hath rather glorified humble and contemplative men , then those of action . moreover it hath plac'd the chiefe good in humility , and in the rejecting and contempt of worldly things . that other imagin'd the chiefe happinesse to consist in the greatnesse of courage , in the strength of body , and in all other things fit to make men exceeding valiant : and if our religion requires valour in a man , it is rather that he be fit for a strong sufferance , then for a strong action . this manner of living then , as it seemes , hath made the world become feeble , and given it in prey to wicked persons , who may securely rule over it , as they list , seeing that all men to obtaine paradise , think rather of suffering their wrongs , then revenging them : and though it may appeare , that the world is growne effeminate , and the heavens disarm'd , it proceeds without doubt from the cowardise of men , who have given an interpretation of our religion according to their owne lazy and idle dispositions , and not agreeable to vertue : for if they would consider how much it allowes the advancement and defence of ones country , they should see that it wills , that we should love and honour it , and so prepare our selves that we may be able to defend it . these kindes of educations then , and false interpretations , cause that there be not so many republiques now adayes in the world as were of old . nor by consequence do we see among people such an affection to liberty as formerly : although i beleeve rather the reason hereof is , because the roman empire with its force and power extinguish'd all the republiques and free governments . and though afterwards that empire was dissolv'd , yet could not the cities againe be restor'd , and anew order'd in a civill government , unlesse it were in very few places of that empire . yet howsoever it was , the romans in every little corner of the world found , as it were , a conspiracy of commonwealths very strongly arm'd , and very obstinate to defend their liberties ; which shewes that the people of rome without an extraordinary and rare valour had never made conquest of them . and to give an example of some member thereof , that of the samnires shall s●ffice me : who ( and indeed it is admirable , and so titus livius avowes it ) were so powerfull and warlike , that they were of force , till the time of papirius cursor the consul , sonne of the first papirius , to resist the romans , which was for the space of forty six yeares , after so many routes , destruction of their townes , and so many slaughters made in their country : especially considering the country then , where so many cities were , and such a vast number of men , though now almost not inhabited . and then there was such order , and so great force , that it was insuperable , had it not bin assaulted by a roman power . and it is an easy thing to know , whence that order and this disorder arise , for all that came from the free manner of living then , and this from the slavery now . for all countries and provinces which live free in every part , as formerly i said , make exceeding large progresses : for here we see the people more numerous , because the marriages are more free , and desir'd by men : being that every one willingly begets those children which he beleeves he can bring up , and nourish , without doubting their patrimony will be ravish'd from them ; and when he knowes they are borne free and not slaves , so that by meanes of their vertue they may become princes . we see riches likewise increase there in greater measure , as well those which arise from cultivation , as those which are gotten by the trades of handicraftsmen : for every one is more provident in gaining and multiplying of those goods , which , when he hath gotten , he beleeves he shall peaceably injoy . from whence it comes to passe , that men even contend who shall more advance the private and publique good ; so that the one and the other increase exceedingly . the contrary hereof followes in al those countries that live in servitude ; and so much the more faile they of their accustomed good , by how much their servitude is harder . and of all hard servitudes , none exceeds that which is subject to a free republique , because ordinarily it is of longest continuance , and so least hopes there are of being deliver'd from it : a second reason is , the end of a republique is to enfeeble and weaken all other bodies in her , whereby to augment her owne . which thing a prince that brings thee under his rule does not , especially if it be not some barbarian prince , a ruiner of countries , and a destroyer of all civill societyes among men , as are the easterne princes . but if any of them have bin instructed in humane customes and the arts ordinary among men , they most commonly affect equality in the cities they have subdued , and let them still possesse all their arts and ancient customes ; so that , if they cannot increase , as in liberty , they goe not to wracke , as in thraldome , speaking of that thraldome into which cities fall , when they serve a stranger ; for i have formerly spoken enough of subjection to a native . whosoever then considers well all that which is said , will not much marvaile at the power which the samnites had being free , nor at their weakenesse into which afterwards they fell by servitude . and titus livius gives us good testimony thereof in many places , in hanniballs warres , where he declares , that the samintes being oppressed by one legion of souldiers , that were in nola , sent ambassadours to hanniball to intreat him for succours ; whose speeches were to this purpose , that they had for a hundred yeares warr'd with the romans , serving themselves onely of their owne souldiers and captaines , and had many times withstood two consular armies , and two consuls , and that now they were brought so low , they had much a doe to defend themselves from one small roman legion that was in nol●● . chap. iii. rome became a great citie , by ruining those that were near neighbours to her , and by admitting strangers without difficulty to share in her dignisies . all this while rome wax'd great upon the ruines of alba. those that intend a city should farre inlarge the bounds of her domnions , ought withall indeavour provide , that she be well fraught with inhabitants : for without a great multitude of men in her , she will never be able to grow great . and this is done two wayes , either by love or by force : by love holding the wayes open and secure to strangers , that might have a design to come and dwell in it , to the end that every one might come willingly to inhabit it ; by force ruining and defacing the neighbour cities and sending out the inhabitants thereof to dwell in thine : all which was punctually observ'd in rome , so that in the timeof the sixth king in rome there dwelt thousand men able to beare armes : for the romans meant to behave themselves like the good husbandman , who to make a plant grow big , and fructify , and ripen well its fruits , cuts off the firstsprouts it thrusts forth , that so the vertue thereof remaining yet in the roote of the plant , may shortly after bring forth others more lively and fruitfull . and that this course held was necessary and good for the founding and inlarging of an empire , the example of sparta and athens shewes us plaine , who being both very warlike republiques , and furnished with excellent lawes , yet could they never attaine to the roman empires greatnesse , which seemed indeed a little more tumultuary and not so well ordered as they , whereof can be alleadged no other reason , then that aforesaid . for rome having inlarged by those two wayes the body of her city , was able to put in armes six hundred and thousand souldiers , whereas sparta and athens never exceeded each of them twenty thousand men . which proceeded not from that the scituation of rome was more bountifull then theirs , but onely from the different course they tooke : for licurgus founder of the spartan republique considering that nothing could soone take away the power of his lawes , then a commixtion of new inhabitants , did what he could to hinder strangers from living with them ; and that they should neither joyne matrimonies with them , nor admit them into their civill government , nor have any thing to do with them , which are the ordinary occasions of accord among men . he ordained likewise that leather money should passe currant , thereby to take from every one the defire to come thither and bring any merchandise , or art to them : so that , that citie could never grow big by multiplying her inhabitants . and because all our actions imitate nature , it is neither possible , nor naturall , that the slender body of a tree should beare a grosse bough ; therefore a smal republique cannot hold cities nor kingdomes of greater power and strength then she her selfe is ; and if perchance it comes to passe that she layes hold on them , it befalls her as it does that tree the boughs whereof are greater then the body , that sustaining it with much adoe , with every small b'ast it is broken , as we see it happen'd to sparta : which having seized on the rule of all the cities of greece , thebes no sooner rebell'd against her , but all the other cities likewise fell from her , and so remain'd as the dead trunk of a tree without branches : which could never befall rome , having her body and stocke so huge , that it was of force with ease to support any bough whatsoever . this manner then of proceeding , together with those others which we shall afterwards speake of , made rome exceeding great and powerfull . which titus livius shewes in few words where he sayes , all this while rome wax'd great upon the ruines of alba chap. iiii. republiques have taken three particular courses , to amplifie and inlarge their states . he that hath read the ancient histories with observation , findes that commonwealths have three manner of wayes to amplify their states . the one hath bin that which the ancient tuscans followed , to make a league of many republiques together , where no one is preserred before the other , neither in authority nor in dignity ; and to make other cities partakers with them in their gains ; just as now adayes the swisses do , and formerly in greece the achaeans and etolians were wont . and because the romans had much war with the tuscans , the better to shew the quality of this first way , i will inlarge my self in giving notice of them par ieularly . before the romans had any great power in italy , the tuscans were very mighty both by sea and by land : and though there is no particular history that touches their affairs , yet is there some small remembrance thereof , and some signes left us of their greatness ; and we know , how they sent a colony to the sea coast above , called by them adria , which prooved of such renown , that it gave the name to that sea , and the latins call it the adri tick to this day . moreover we know , that they had conquered all from tiber , to the very foot of the alpes , which encompass the whole body of italy . notwithstanding that two hundred years before the romans grew to any considerable strength , the said tuscans lost the dominion of that countrey which is now called lombardy ; which was seized on by the french ; who either driven by necessity , or allured by the delicacy of the fruits , especially the wines , came into italy under the conduct of bellovesus their captain , and having defeated and chased out the natives ; seated themselves in that place , therein built many cities , and called the countrey gallia , from the name they then bare ; and this they held til they were conquered by the romans . the tuscans then liv'd with that equality , and proceeded in the amplifying their state , in that first manner , spoken of before : and there were twelve cities , among which were clusium , vejum , desola , aretium , and volaterra and the like ; who by way of league rul'd their dominions ; nor could they inlarge their conquests beyond the bounds of italy , whereof also there was a great part left untoucht by them , for the reasons which we shall afterwards tell . the other manner is to make allies , yet not so thought , that thou still reservest not to thy self the principal place in the command & rule and title of all the exploits , which course was alwaies observ'd by the romans . the third manner is , to make them immediatly subjects , and not allies , as did the spa●tans and athenians : of which three waies , this last is altogether unprofitable ; as it appears , it was in the two foresaid republiques , which , for no other cause went to ruine , but for possessing themselves of those dominions , which they were not able to hold . for it is a thing of great difficulty and pains to hold the government of cities by violence , especially of those that have bin accustomed to live free . and if thou beest not in armes , and well furnished with good numbers of soldiers , thou canst neither command , nor rule them . and to be able to do this , it is necessary to make friends and companions , who may assist thee in multiplying the people of thy city . and because these two cities , did neither the one nor the other of these , their manner of proceeding was of no advantage to them . and because rome which gives us an example touching this third manner , did the one and the other , therefore grew it to that excessive power : and for that she alone took this course of living , she alone therefore became so mighty : for she having taken to her throughout all italy many for her companions to help her , who in many things liv'd with her upon equal termes ; but on the other side , as is abovesaid , reserving to her self alwaies the seat of the empire , and the title of commanding , these their companions ( who were never aware of it ) with their own pains & loss of their own bloud came to bring their own necks to the yoke : for when they began to transport their armies out of italy , and to reduce kingdomes into provinces , & to make thosetheir subjects , who for that they were used to live under kings , were never much troubled to become subjects ; and receiving roman governors over them , and having bin overcome by armies , whereof the romans had the name and title , they acknowledged no other head , but rome . so that those allyes of rome that were in italy , found themselves on a sudden begirt round by romes subjects , and oppress'd by an exceeding vast city , as then rome was : and when they perceiv'd the deceit into which they had bin train'd , it was too late to help it , rome had then gotten such authority with forrein nations , and was then of such strength within it self , the people of their city being grown very numerous and warlike . and although those their companions , to be reveng'd on them for these injuries , conspir'd together against them , yet in a short time were they losers by the war , making their own conditions worse : for of allies , they became subjects . which manner of proceeding ( as is said ) hath bin observ'd onely by the romans : nor can a republique that would enlarge her state take any other ; for experience hath not shew'd us any course more certain or true . this way formerly spoken of concerning the leagues , wherein anciently the tuscans , acheans , and aerosians liv'd , and which now adayes the swisses use , is the better way next after that the romans took : for , it being not possible by it to grow very great , thou gainest two advantages thereby , the one , that easily thou drawest no war upon thee ; the other , that what thou gettest thou easily holdest . the reason why they cannot grow great , is , because they are disunited republiques , and placed in divers seats ; which makes it more difficult to consult and resolve . and besides , because they are not very greedy of extending the limits of their dominions ; for that divers commonalties being to participate of that rule , they value not so much such conquests , as does a republique alone , which hopes to injoy it all her self . moreover , they govern themselves by common advice and counsel , and therfore of force they must be slower in every deliberation , then they that live within the walls of the same city . it is plain also by experience , that this manner of proceeding prescribes it self certain bounds , which it passes not ; nor have we any example that they were exceeded . and these were to joyn together some dozen or fourteen commonalties , and afterwards never seek to go beyond that : for being come to those terms , that they think they are able to defend themselves against every one , they desire no greater power , as well because necessity does not bind them to have greater force ; as also because they understand not any great profits that arise from such like purchases , for the causes formerly alledged : for then of necessity they must either go on forward to make themselves allyes , and so the multitude would make a confusion ; or els to make them their subjects : and because they see herein many difficulties , and no great advantage in holding them , they make no account of them . whereupon , when they have attaind to such greatness , that they think they may live secure , they apply themselves to two things ; the one to entertain others in their protection , and undertake their defences , and by these means to draw money from every part , which they can very easily divide among one another , and the other to serve in the wars under another , and to take pay of this or that prince , who gives them wages for their service , as now adayes the switzers do , and as we read , those we spoke of before did , whereof titus livius bears witness , where he sayes , that when philip king of macedon came to a parley with titus quintius flamminius , to treat an accord in presence of a prercur of the aetolians , the said pretour comming to some words with philip ; was reproved by him for avarice and infidelity , saying , that the ae●olians were not ashamed to take pay and serve in the wars on both sides , so that many times their ensignes were seen in two contrary armies . we know withall , that this manner of proceeding by leagues hath bin alwayes alike , and hath prodec'd the same effects . we see also , that that way of making people become subjects hath bin alwaies weak , and brought forth but small advantages ; and when they have exceeded the due mean , they have gone to ruine , and if this course of making subjects , be unprofitable in warlike commonwealths , surely in those that are disordered , it must needs be far worse , as in our daies have bin the republiques of italy . wherefore we find that to be the true way , which the romans held , which is the rather to be admired , in somuch as there was no other example thereof before that of rome , nor since hath bin any that hath imitated it . and touching the leagues , there are the switzers onely & the swevian league that follows them . and , as in the conclusion of this matter shall be said , so many orders observ'd by the romans , as well concerning the affairs within the city , as those without , in these our times are not onely not followed , but made no account of ; some of them are deem'd untrue , some unpossble , others nothing to purpose , or unprofitable : so that whiles we stand still in this ignorance , we become a prey to any that invades our countrey . and though it should seem difficult to imitate the romans , yet ought it not seem so , to follow the steps of the ancient tuscans , especially to the tuscans now living : for though they were not able for the reasons alledged , to make themselves an empire like that of rome , yet could they gain them that power in italy , that their manner of proceeding would permit them , which for a long time was with great glory of their rule , and wars , and with exceeding great commendation of their manners and religion . which power and glory was first abated by the french , and afterwards quite put out by the romans , and so put out , that of this power , which two thousand years since was very great , at this present we have no memory left . which hath made me muse , what the cause is that matters are thus forgotten , whereof in the chapter following we shall treat . chap. v. that the changes of religions and languages , together with the chances of floods or pestilences , abolish the memory of things . to those philosophers , who would have made men beleeve that the world is eternal , i think one might have replyed , that if such antiquity were true , it would be consequent , that we should have some notice of more then five thousand years time past , being that it is not apparent , how the remembrances of times by several occasions were abolish'd . whereof part proceeds from men , and part from heaven . those that proceed from men , are the changes of sects and tongues : for when a new sect begins , that is , a new religion , the first endeavor , to gain it self reputation , is , to blot out the memory of the old ; and when it so falls out , that the founders of the new sect are of a different language , they easily extinguish it : which thing is known , by considering the waies , which the christian religion used against the sect of the gentiles , whereby it hath cancel'd all their orders and ceremonies , and defac't the whole remembrance of thatancient theology . it is true , that they attaind not thorowly to wipe out the knowledge of the prime men thereof , which was occasioned by their maintaining of the latin tongue , to which they were forc't , being they were to write this new law in it : for if they could have writ it in a new tongue , considering the other persecutions they made against it , there would have bin no remembrance left of things past . and whosoever reads what courses st. gregory took , and the other heads of the christian religion , shall see with what obstinacy they persecuted all the ancient memorials , burning all the poets and historians works , defacing their images , and destroying every other thing that gave any lightwww . of that antiquity ; so that if to this p●rsecution , they had added a new language , we should have seen every thing in a short time forgotten . it is very likely therefore that what the founders of the christian religion did against the sect of the gentiles , they of gentilis●●e had done formerly to the sect that preceded it : and because the sects in a five or six thousand years chance two or three times , the memory of things past before that time is utterly lost . and though yet there remain some remembrance thereof , we take it as some fabulous thing , whereunto no man gives credit , as it befalls the story written by diodorus siculus , in which though he gives account of a forty or fifty thousand years , nevertheless is it esteemed ( and so i think it too ) a false tail . as for the causes that proceed from heaven , they are such as extinguish the race of mankind , and reduce to a small number the inhabitants of part of the world ; and this comes to pass , either by pestilence or famine , or by a deluge of waters ; but that of most importance is this last , because it is more universal , and because those that escape , are all such as live among the mountains and are simple and ignorant people , who having no knowledge of antiquity , cannot derive it to their posterity : and if among them any knowing man chance to escape , to gain himself , reputation and a name , he conceals it , and alters it at his own pleasure , so that there is left to his successors only so much as he hath bin pleas'd to commit to writing , and no more . and that these in undations , pestilences , and famines sometimes come , i beleeve there is no doubt , as well because all histories are full of them , as for that we see this effect of defacing the memory of things , as also becauie it accords well with reason that it is so : for nature , as in simple bodies , when there is gatherd together enough superfluous matter , moves many times of it self , and makes a purgation , which is the preservation of that bodie ; so it falls out in this mixt body of mankinde , that when all countries are stuffed with inhabitants , that they can neither live there , nor go otherwhere , because all places are already possessed and replenish'd , and when the subtilty and wickedness of man is grown to that fulness it can attain to , it holds with reason , that of force the world be purged by one of these three waies , that men being become few , and having suffer'd much , may live with more convenience and grow better , whereupon it is nothing strange , that , as it is abovesaid , the tuscan nation in old time was very potent , full of religion and vertue , had their own manners and their native tongue , which the power the romans quite abolish'd , so that , as it is said , onely their name remains still in the memory of posterity . chap. vi. how the romans proceeded in making of war. having discours'd , how the romans proceeded in enlarging their state , we will now treat of their proceedings in making of war , and in every one of their actions it will appear with how great judgement , they left aside the common way that others went , whereby they might more easily attain the highest pitch of greatness . the intention of that man , that makes war , either by election or by ambition , is to get , and keep what he hath gotten , and to proceed so there with , that he may enrich and not impoverish his own country . it is necessary for him then , both in getting and holding , to take a care not to diminish , but rather to augment the publique profit of his countrey . he that will do these things , must follow the way and course the romans took , who at first made their wars great and short ; for comming into the field with huge armies , all the wars they had with the latines , samnites and tuscans , they dispatcht in a very short time : and if notice were exactly taken of all those wars they made from the beginning of rome , til the siege of veium , we should find they were all ended , one in six dayes , another in ten , and a third in some twenty dayes space : for their custome was this ; so soon as ever they had discover'd the war , they presently went out with their armies and fought with their enemies , who being overmaster'd ( to save their countrey from spoil ) yeilded to their conditions , and the romans condemn'd them in loss of some of their territories , and those they turn'd to their private profits , or bestow'd them upon some colony they sent thither , which being seituate upon some frontier of theirs , became guardians of their confines , to the advantage of the inhabitants of that colony , who had those fields in possession , and with the profit of the generality of rome , that held this guard without expence . nor could there be any way more assured , nor of more strength or advantage : for til the enemy went into the field , this guard was sufficient . and when they went forth strong into the field to oppress that colony , the romans also went out with their forces , and join'd battel with them , wherein having got the day , they laid more heavy burdens on them , and so return'd home . thus came they by little and little to great credit among them , and forces in themselves . and this course held they alwaies , till they chang'd their manner of proceeding in war : which was after the siege of vejum , where to enable them to make a long war they determined to pay the soldiers , whereas formerly , being that the wars were short , there was no need to give them pay . and though the romans gave pay , and that by vertue hereof they were able to make longer wars , and to make those more remote , they were forc'd to stay longer in the field , yet did they never alter from their first order , to dispatch them quickly , according to the time and place . nor did they ever leave sending of colonies : for besides their natural guise , the consuls ambition held them to their first custome of making their wars short ; for being created but for a years time , and thereof to stay at home six moneths , they desired to finish the war , that they might triumph . to send colonies , the profit and great advantage they made thereof , still prevail'd with them . they altered indeed somwhat touching the spoiles , whereof they were not so liberal , as in former times they had bin ; because they thought there was not so great need , the soldiers receiving their stipends ; as also because the spoiles being greater , they intended therewith so to fill the common treasure , that they might not be constrain'd upon any enterprise in hand to leavy monies upon the city . which order in a very short time much enrich'd their treasury . these two courses then they took , about the dividing the spoiles , and sending of colonies , caus'd rome to grow rich by the war , whereas other princes and republiques , if they find that means to releeve themselves , become impoverishd ; so that it came to this at last , that a consul thought he might not triumph unless he brought much gold and silver and spoils of every kind into the treasury : thus the romans by their above written waies , sometimes by making a quick end of the wars , otherwhiles by drawing them out at length with discomfitures and invasions and treaties to their advantage , grew alwaies more mighty . chap. vii . how much land the romans allowed to each man they sent out to inhabit their colonies . by what parcels the romans did divide the land among them , i beleeve it is hard to find out the truth , because i think they bestow'd on them more or less , according to the places , whether they sent the colonies ; and it is credible , howsoever the case went , and whether soever they were sent , the allowance was but small . first to the end they might be able to send the more men thither , they being intrusted with the guard of that countrey . besides , because they living sparingly at home , it agrees not with reason , that they would allow their men , where wishall to abound much abroad and titus livius sayes , that , when they had taken veium , they sent a colony thither , and to each man they gave three acres and a half and a twelfth part . for besides the things above written , they judge it was not the quantity of the land that suppli'd their wants , but the well c●●tiating of it . and moreover it is very necessary , that the whole colony have fields in common , were every one may freely feed his cattel , and woods from whence to fetch fuell for firing , without which a colony cannot well subfist . chap. viii . the occasion , wherefore people leave their own native soyles , and invade other countreys . seeing that we have formerly discours'd of the manner of proceeding in war which the romans us'd , and how the tuscans were assail'd by the french , me thinks it were not much from the matter , to shew , that there are two sorts of war made . the one is through the ambitions of princes , or commonwealths , who indeavor the inlargement of their dominions ; such as were the wars of alexander the great , and the romans , and such as now adayes every prince and potentate makes one with another . which wars are dangerous indeed , but yet they do not wholly chase the inhabitants out of a countrey ; for the conqueror is contented onely with the obedience of nations , and most commonly suffers them to live under their own laws , and enjoy their own goods in their own houses . the other kind of war is , when the whole people with all their families , rise from a place , forced either by famine or war , and goe to seek a new habitation and new countrey , not out of ambition to command , as the others , but to possess it by themselves , and to drive thence or destroy the ancient inhabitants thereof . this kind of war is very cruel and terrible : and touching these wars , salust speaks in the end of the jugurthin , where he sayes , that when jugurth was overcome , the french were perceived to stir , who then came into italy : and there he relates , that the people of rome fought with all other nations for rule and command , but with the french every one fought for his life and safety : for it sufficeth a prince or commonwealth that assails a countrey , to destroy onely those that command , whereas these populations must make a general destruction , being that they will live upon that , which formerly sustained others . the romans had three several wars of these , exceeding dangerous . the first was that when rome was taken , which was seis'd on by those frenchmen , that ( as is above said ) had taken lombardy from the tuscans , and seated themselves there ; whereof titus livius alledges two reasons ; the first , as we said before , is , that they were allur'd by the pleasantness of the fruits and the wines of italy , whereof they had scarcity in france : the second , that the people in france being exceedingly multiplyed , the countrey could not seed them , whereupon the princes of those places thought it fit , that part of them should goe to seek some new habitation , and that resolution being taken , they chose for captains of them that were to depart , bellovessus , and sicovessus , two french kings , whereof bellovessus came into italy , and sicovessus went into spain . upon the passage of which bellovessus follow'd the seisure of lombardy , and thereupon the war , which first the french made against rome . next this was that , they made after the first carthaginian war , when between piombin and pisa they slew more then hundred thousand , french. the third was , when the germans and cimbrians came into italy , who having overcome several roman armies , were subdu'd by marius . the romans then masterd these three very perilous wars , nor was there need of less valor than theirs to overcome them : for we see , how that after the valor of the romans faild , and their armies lost their ancient vertue , that empire was ruind by such like people , as the goths , vandalls , and such others , who possessd themselves of the whole western empire . such people come out of their own countreys , as is above said , compell'd thereto by necessity , which necessity proceeds either from famine , or from some war and oppression inflicted on them in their own countreys . so that they are constraind to seek new habitations . and these either are in great multitudes , and then they break with violence into others countreys , destroy the inhabitants , possess their goods , make a new kingdome , and change the name of the country , as moses did , and those people likewise that seiz'd upon the romane empire ; for these new names , that are in italy , and in the other provinces , grew from nothing else , than that they were so named by their new lords . as is lombardy now , which was called gallia cisalpina ; france was called gallia transalpina , and now is named of the french ; for so were those people called , that made themselves masters of it . sclavonia was called illyrium ; hungary , pannonia ; england , brittanny ; and many other countreys , that have changed their names , which it would be too long to recite . moses allso called that part of syria , which he made himself master of , jury . and , because i have formerly said , that some people are driven out of their own habitations by war , whereupon they are forc'd to seek a new , where to seat themselves , i will alleage an example to that purpose , of the maurusians , ancientiy a people of syria ; who having notice of the hebrews comming , and thinking they could not resist them , thought it better to leave their countrey , than in striving to save that , lose themselves ; and so rising thence with their families , they went into affrique , where they sate down , driving out the inhabitants they found in those places . and so they , who could not defend their own countrey , could yet take that of others from them . and procopius , who writes of the war , that bellifarius made with the vandals , that possessed themselves of affrique , reports that he read letters written in certain pillars , in those parts where these maurusians did inhabite , thus saying , we are maurusians who fled from the face of jesu the robber , who was son of nave . where the occasion of the departure of these people out of syria plainly appears ; wherefore these people are very terrible , when they are driven out by extream necessity , and unless they be encountred by puissant forces , cannot be stopd : but when those that are constraind to abandon their countrey are not very numerous , there is no such danger of them , as of those people we spoke , because they cannot use such violence , but ought rather by some stratagem , make themselves masters of some strong place , and therein being setled , keep it by making of friends and allies ; as we see aeneas did with dido , the massilians and others , who all by agreement with their neighbors , where they once set themselves down , were able to continue . the people that goe forth in the greatest multitudes , and those also that have gone forth , almost all came out from those parts of scythia , cold , and poore countries , where , because there are men in abundance , and the country of that condition , that it cannot feed them all , they are compeld to goe forth , having many causes to drive them out , and nothing to keep them in . and if now for these five hundred years it hath not happend , that any of these nations have made an inundation upon any countrey , it hath proceeded from several reasons . the first is , the great evacuation that countrey made in the declining of the empire , they having since sent out huge swarms more than thirty several times : the second is , because germany , and england , from whence these people came , have their countries well mended , so that they are able to live there , with better conveniency ; and thereupon not necessitated to change their seat . on the other side , these men being very warli● , are as it were a bulwark against the scythians , who border upon them , to keep them within their confines and territories : and many times there chance great risings among the tartars , who are kept in by the hungarians and polacks : who vaunt , and not without reason , that were it not for their forces , italy and the church had often felt the weight of the tartars armies . and this shall suffice , touching those forenam'd peoples . chap. ix . vpon what occasions commonly warres are begun among princes . the occasion , that gave beginning to the warres betweene the romanes and samnites , who had beeng long in league together , is very ordinary , and happens often to powerfull principalities which occasion , either comes by chance , or else is offerd by him that desires to make warre . that which was betweene the romans and samnites , feil out by chance : for the samnites intention was not , by making warre first against the sidicini , and then against the campani , afterwards to set upon the romanes . but the campani being oppressed , having their recourse to rome , beyond the romanes expectation and the samnites , the campani giving themselves into the romans hands , they were constraind to desend them , as their subjects , and take upon them that warre , which they thought with their honour they could not avod : for it seemd very reasonable to the romans , not to undertake the defence of the campani , though their friends , against the samnites their friends ; but they thought it also a shame not to dessend them , when they were their subjects ; or recommended to their protection , judging that when they had not taken that defence in hand , they cut off the way from all others that ever should have a mind to shelter themselves under their power . and rome having for her maine end the empire and glory , and not qui●t , could not refuse this enterprise . the selfe same occasion gave beginning to the first warre against the carthaginians , for the defence of the massineses , which the romans undertooke in sicily ; which fell out by chance also . but now the second warre , that grew between them , came not by chance . for hannibal the carthaginian captaines , set upon the saguntins that were allyes to the romans in spaine , not so much for to endammage them , as to provoke the romanes to warres , and to have occasion to fight with them , and so to passe into italie . this manner of kinoling new warres hath been alwayes usd among those that are mighty and that have some saith joynd , some other respects : for if i desire to make warre with a prince , and between us some capitulations of peace have firmly been observed a long time , upon some other title fair justifiable , and under some other colour , i will assayle some ally of his , rather than himselfe , knowing very well , that in setting upon his alley , eyther he will resent it , and so i shall have my intent of moving warre against him ; or not resenting it , his weaknesse shall be discoverd , or his infidelitie , in not defending one that is under his protection ; and the one and the other of these two is sufficient to discredit him , and facilitate my designes . therefore what wee have formerly sayd , may be noted touching the taking occasions to move warre , out of this example of the yeelding of the campani ; and besides what remedie a citie may have , which cannot by her selfe alone make her defence , and yet in any case would not fall into her assaylants hands . which is freely to give her selfe into his hands , who thou hast a purpose should defend thee , as the capuans to the romanes , and the florentines to robert king of naples , who though he would not defend them as allyes , yet afterwards defended them being his subjects , against the forces of castruvius of lucca , who then put them hard to it . chap. x. moneys are not the sinews of war , according to the common opinion . because every one can begin a warre at his owne pleasure , but not end it , a prince should before he undertake an enterprise , measure his owne forces , and order himselfe according to them ; he should also have so much judgement , that he deceive not himselfe with the conceit of his owne forces ; and he shall alwayes be sure to be deceiv'd when he measures them , either by the scituation , or by the good will of men towards him , his owne proper forces on the other side fayling him : for the things aforesayd may increase well thy forces , though give thee them they cannot ; and by themselves alone they are of on worth , nor nothing avayle without the helpe of souldiers fathfull to thee : for great store of treasure serves to no purpose without that ; nor the strength of thy country , neither doth the faithfulnesse nor good will of men last ; for these cannot be faithfull to thee , thou not having force to defend them . every mountaine , every lake , every unaccessible place is made plaine , where the strong defendants are wanting . nay rather moneys are so far from defending thee , that they expose thee for a prey . nor is there any thing more false than that common opinion that affirmes moneys to be the sinews of warre , which sentence was first given by q. curtius , in the warre betweene antipater the macedonian , and the king of sparta ; where he relates , that for want of moneys , the king of spar●a was forc'd to fight , and was broken whereas if he had deferd the battell a few dayes , newes had come into greece of alexanders death , where he had remaind conqueror without combat . but his treasure fayling , and he doubting his armie would leave him for want thereof , was constraind to hazard the battell ; whereupon q curtius sayes , that moneys are the firews of war ; which sentence is alledgd every day , and followd too by some princes , not quite so wise as they should be : for making this their ground , they beleeve , that this is able to defend them , if they have treasure enough ; and never consider , that if treasure were of force to overcome , that darius would have conquerd alexander , the greekes masterd the romanes , and in our dayes the duke charles subdu'd the swissers , and not long time since the pope and the florentins together would have found no difficultie in overcomming francis maria nephew of pope julius the second in the warre of orbin . but all these above nam'd , were overcome by those who esteemd not mony , but good souldiers the sinews of warre . among other things , that croesus king of lydia shewd to solon the athenian , was a treasure unmeasurable , and asking him what he thought of his power , solon answerrd him , he thought him no whit the more powerfull for that ; for warre was made with iron and not with gold , and some one might come , who had more iron than be , and take his gold from him . moreover , when after the death of alexander the great , a vast multitude of french pass'd over into greece , and after into asia , the french sending ambassadours to the king of macedon to treate some accord , that king to shew them his power , and to fright them , let them see his treasure , where was much gold and silver , whereupon these french , who had in a manner concluded a firme peace , brake t ; their desire grew so great then to take his gold from him : and so was that king despoyld for that which he had gatherd together to defend him . the venetians also , a few yeares since , having their treasury full of coyne , lost their whole state , being not able to defend themselves thereby . wherefore i say , that gold as the common opinion cryes it up , is not the sinewes of warre , but a good armie of slour souldiers ; for gold is not sufficient to finde good souldiers , but good souldiers are able well to finde our gold . as for the romanes ( if they would have waged warre by moneyes rather tha with the sword ) the treasure of the world , considering their vast undertakings , and the great difficulties they had therein , would not have servd their turnes . but they making their warres with the sword , never found scarcitie of gold ; for they had it in abundance brought even into their camps by those that stood in feare of them . and if that spartan king for want of money , were to hazard the fortune of a battell , that befell him upon the matter of moneys , which many times hath chanc'd upon other occasions : for it hath been often seene , that when an armie wants provision of victualls , and is necessitated either to samish or sight , usually they make choyce to fight , because it is greater honour , and where in some sort fortune hath in her power to savour thee . moreover , it hath often come to passe , that a commander perceiving succours comming to his enemies armie , must either fight with them quickly , and make tryall of the chance of battell , or expecting the i●grossing of the armie , come at length to fight perforce upon many disadvantages . besides , it hath been seene , as it befell asdruball , when in the mar●hes he was ass●ulted by claudius nero , together with the other romane consull , that when a captaine is necsstated either to fly or fight , he alwayes makes choyce to fight ; thinking by this bargaine , though exceeding hazardous , he may gaine ; but in that other he must needs lose in any case . there are therefore many necessities that can force a captaine beyond what he intended , to resolve to put it to a battell , among which sometimes may happen the scarcitie of moneys , though not therefore should wee esteeme moneyes to be the sinews of warre rather , than other things , which bring men into the like necessities . wee may therefore resolve the question , that money is not the sinews of warre , but good souldiers rather . it is true , moneys are necessary in the second place , but it is such a necessitie , which good souldiers themselves may overcome : for it it as impossible that good souldiers should lack money , as by moneys alone to produce good souldiers . what we here averre , every history shews us to be true in many places , notwithstanding that pericles perswaded the athenians to make warre with a●l peloponnesus , declaring , that they might overcome that warre with industry and by force of money ; and though in that warre the athenians sometimes prospeed , yet at last they lost it , and the advice , and good souldiers of sparta prevayld more , than the industry and money of athens . but titus livius gives us a better testimony for this opinion then any one else , where discoursing of alexander the great , whether if he had come into italie , he had been able to vanquish the romans , he shews there three things necessary in the warre ; a great number of souldiers , & those good , wise commanders , and good fortune : where examining , whether eyther the romanes or alexander excelld herein , at length he concludes , without making any mention of moneys . the capuans , when they were requird by the sidicins , to take armes in their behalfe against the samnites , should not have measurd their power by their treasure , but by their good souldiers : for by taking that course they tooke to assist them , after two overthrowes , to save themselves , they were forc'd to become tributaries to the romanes . chap. xi . it is not a match wisely made , to joyne alliance with a prince , whose credit is greater then his strength . titus livius having a purpose to shew the sidicins errour in relying upon the capuans aid , and the capuans errour also in beleeving they were able to defend them , could not expresse it in more lively termes then these , the capuans contributed to the sidicins ayd , rather more reputation then forces . where we may observe , that those leagues that are made with princes , who have not either the commodity to assist thee by reason of the distance of place , or forces to do it , because of some disorder of their owne at home , or for some other occasion , add rather reputation to them that trust in them , then any strength to their party : as in our dayes it befell the florentines , when in the yeare . the pope and the king of naples assayl'd them : who being allyes of the king of france , drew from that allyance more reputation to their side , then safe guard : as likely enough it would befall that prince now , who under maximilian the emperours protection should undertake any enterprise : for this is one sort of those allyances , which bring more fame then advantage , as here in this text is alledg'd , that of the capuans brought the sidicins . therefore in this point the capuans committed an errour , in esteeming their owne forces greater then they were . and so sometimes the small discretion men have , causes them when they neither know how , nor have the meanes to defend themselves , to take upon them the protections of others which the tarentines also did : who , when the roman army was going to joyne battell with that of the samnites , sent their ambassadours to the roman consul , to let him understand that they will'd there should be peace betweene those two people ; and how that otherwise they should make warre against the party that should refu●e it . so that the consul scoffing at this proposition , caus'd the triumphs to sound in presence of their ten ambassadours , and so made his army march towards the enemy , shewing the tarentins by his deeds and not by words what answer they deserv'd . and having now discours'd in this chapter against some courses princes take amisse for others defence , i will in that that followes speake touching those they take for their owne defence . chap. xii . whether it be better for a prince , fearing to be assail'd by his enemy , himselfe first to begin the warre with him , or to expect while it comes home to him . i have heard it disputed sometimes by men well practis'd in military discipline , if there be two princes neare of equal force , and the one that is the more resolute have proclaim'd warre against the other , which were the best course for that other , either to attend quietly in his owne confines whiles his enemy come upon him , or else to goe finde him at home , and there assaile him . and i have heard them alledge arguments on both sides ; and those that argue for this going to assaile him , produce the counsell that croesus gave cyrus , when being arriv'd upon the borders of the messagetes to make warre against them , their queene thomyris sent him word , that he should take his choice , either to enter into her kingdom where she would awaite him , or if he would rather that she should come and si●nde him in his owne . and when the matter came to dispute , croesus advis'd against the opinion of the rest , to goe & seeke her in her owne country ; urging that otherwise if he overcame her farre from her owne confines , he could not take her kingdome from her , because she would have time to repaire her losses ; but if he conqur'd her within her owne territories , he might pursue her just upon her slight ; & so giving her no time of recovery , take the state from her . moreover they alledge the advice that hanniball gave antiochus , when that king had a purpose to make warie against the romans , where he shewes how the romans could not be overcome but in italy ; for there another might availe himselfe of their armes , their wealth , and their friends also . but whosoever fought with them out of italy , leaving italy free to them , left them that strength , that never would want life to give them fresh supplies at all occasions . and concluded , that it was easier to take rome from them , then the empire ; and italy , rather than their other provinces . agathocles also is alleadg'd , who not being able to support the war at home , assail'd the carthaginians , who then had made warre against him , and brought them to aske peace . the example of scipio is likewise urg'd , who to take the warre out of italy , assail'd affricke . they that maintaine the contrary , say , that he that would bring his enemy to destruction , should withdraw him from home . the athenians are brought for example , who while they made a convenient warre at their owne homes , remain'd victors : but when they departed out of their country , and transported their army into s●cily , they quite lost their liberty . they alledge the poeticall sables withall , where it is shew'd , how that anteus king of lybia assail'd by egyptian hercules was insuperable , whiles he staid for him within the confines of his owne kingdome , but when by hercules subtilty he was trained out of it , he lost both state and life . whereby occasion was given to the fable of anteus , that while he was upon the ground , he recovered forces from his mother , which was the ground , which hercules perceiving , took him up in his armes , and held him from the earth . moderne advices also are alledged ; every one knowes that ferdinand king of naples was in his dayes held a very wise prince ; and some two years before his death fame flying , that charles the eight then king of france had a determination to come and assail him , after he had made much preparation fell sick , when on his death-bed , among other memorials he left his sonne alphonsus , was this also , that he should attend his enemies comming within his countrey , and upon no case should dr●w any of his forces out of his state , but should await them within his own confines with his strength entire . which was not followed by him , but there was an army sent into romania , which without any combat , lost both it self and the state . the arguments , which besides the things abovesaid , are brought on each side , are these ; that he , that assailes , comes on with more courage , then he that attends , which gives the army more confidence : besides this , it takes away from the enemy divers conveniencies of being able to make use of what is his own ; for he cannot help himself upon those subjects , whose houses have first bin sackt and their goods pillaged : and for having the enemy in the house ; the prince is constrained to take more care how he wrings money from them , and vexes them : so that he comes to dry that fountain , as hannibal sayes , which furnishes , him with means to sustain the war. to this may be added , that the souldiers being in a forrain countrey , are forced to fight , and of that necessity makes a vertue , as we have often said ; on the other side , they say , when one awaits his enemy , he does it with much advantage : for without any discommodity to thy self thou art able to give thine enemy much trouble to come by his provisions , and other necessaries belonging to an army . thou canst also better hinder his designs , because thou knowest the countrey better then he . thou canst also incounter him with more forces , because there they may easily be united , which thou canst not draw all from home . thou canst also being routed , recover thy self with more ease , because many of thy army will save themselves , in that they have their places of refuge near , as well because the supplies are not to come from far ; thou bringst to the hazzard all thy forces , and not all thy fortune ; whereas parting thence thou hazzardst all thy fortune with but a part of thy forces . and some there have bin who the better to weaken their enemie , suffer him to enter many dayes journies into their countrey , and take divers townes , to the end that leaving gatrisons in all of them , he may weaken his army , and so they may afterwards fight with him at more ods . but to give my opinion herein what i think , i beleeve , this distinction is to be made ; either my countrey is armed , as was that of the romans , or that of the switzers is , or it is disarmed as that of the carthaginians was , or else that of the king of france , or the italians countrey is . in this case the enemy is to be kept off from comming in , because thy advantage than consists in thy revenue , and not in thy men , so that whensoever the current thereof is cut off from thee , thou art quite spoil'd ; nor doth any thing so much hinder thee , as the war within thy doores . the carthaginians yeeld us evident examples hereof , who , whiles they had their own home free , were able with their revenue to make war against the romans , which , when it was assaild , could not supply them against agathocles . the florentines had not any remedy against castruccius lord of ●ucca , because he warr'd with them in their owne country , so that they were faine , for their defence , to yeeld themselves to robert king of naples . but castruccius being dead , the same florentines had the courage to assail the duke of milan at his owne home , and wrought so far as to take his countrey from him ; so much valor shew'd they in forrain wars , and such cowardise in their domestick . but when countries are armed , as that of rome was , and as the switzers are , the nearer thou commest to them , the harder they are to vanquish ; for these bodies are able to bring together more forces to resist a suddain violence , then they are to , assail an enemy abroad . neither in this case does the authority of hanniball move me , because his passion , and his own interest , made him say so to antiochus ; ●r if ●h● romans had in that space of time received those three routs in france , which they had in italy by hanniball , without doubt they had bin quite undone : for then they could not have helped themselves by the remainders of their armies , nor could they have had those conveniencies to repair their losses , nor made head against their enemies with such strength as they did . we never find , that to afsail any countrey they sent out an army passing the number of . but to defend themselves at home against the french after the first punicke war , they armed eighteen hundred thousand men . nor could they afterwards defeat them in lombardy , as they did in tuscany : because against so great a maltitude of enemies , they had never been able to draw so great forces so far out , nor fight with them upon the like advantage . the cimbrians broke an army of the romans in germany , nor could the romans any way help themselves . but when they came into italy , that they once united their forces together , they presently dispatched them . the switzers it is easy to vanquish our of their own countrey , whether they cannot send above thirty or forty thousand men : but to overcome them at home , where they are able to make a body of a hundred thousand men , is exceeding difficult . i conclude therefore anew , that that prince , who hath his people armed and addrest for war , may alwaies well expect a mighty and dangerous war at his own home , neither let him goe to meet it . but he , whose subjects are unarmed , and his countrey unaccustomed to war , let him alwaies keep it as far from home as he can . and so the one and the other , each in their degree , will better defend themselves . chap. xiii . that men rise from poore and small beginnings to great fortunes , rather by the help of guile than force . i take it to be very true , that seldome or never it comes to pass , that men of meane fortunes attain to any high degrees without force or fraud : unless that dignity , which a man hath gotten , came to him by gift , or was cast on him by inheritance neither do i think , we ever find , that force alone suffices ; but we often see , that guile alone avails , as he shall clearly perceive , that reads philip of macedons life , and that of agathocles the sicilian , and many others such like , who from very vile and poore fortunes have gain'd either a kingdome , or some other great dignities . xenophon in cyrus his life , declares this necessity of deceit , being that the first expedition which he makes cyrus to undertake against the armenian king , is full of guile , and how by deceit , and nor by force he makes him seize on his kingdom ; by which action he concludes nothing else , but that it is necessary for a prince , that will atcheive great matters , to learn to be a cunning deceiver . besides this he makes him deceive ciaxares king of the medes his mothers uncle many waies , without which fraud he shews cyrus could never have attain'd to that greatness he afterwards came . and i beleeve , that there was never any plac'd in a low condition that ever came to any great dignity onely by plain force ; and ingenuously ; though i grant that by guile alone one well may , as john galeacius did who took from his uncle barnard the state and rule of lombardy . and that , which princes are necessitated to do in the beginnings of their increase , republiques are likewise forc'd to , till they are become mighty ; then force alone suffices . and because rome in every part lit either by chance or by choyce upon all the necessary means to become great , it failed not also of this , nor in her beginning could have dealt more cunningly , than to take the course we formerly discoursed of , to make her some companions ; for under this name , she brought many to be her servants , as were the latins , and other people neare about her : for first she served her self of their armes in subduing her neighbours round about , and in taking upon her self the reputation of the state ; afterwards when she had brought them under likewise , she came to such growth , that no power was able to withstand her . and the latins never perceived their own servitude , til after that they saw the samnites twice broken , and forced to agreement . which victory as it gained the romans great reputation with forrain princes , whereby they heard of the romans name , though they never felt their armes : so it bred great envie and suspect in those that both saw and felt their strength , among which were the latins : and so far prevailed this envie and fear , that not onely the latins , but the colonies which they had in latium together with the capuans by them lately defended , conspired all against the name of the romans . and the latins mov'd that war in that manner , as is formerly said , that for the most part wars are mov'd , not assailing the romans , but defending the sidicins against the samnites , against whom the samnites made war with the romans leave . and that it is true , that the latins stirred upon the knowledge of this deceit , t. livius declares it by the mouth of annius setinus a latin pretour , who told them in their assemblie , thus , for if yet we can endure servitude , under the name of an equal league . wherefore we find the romans in their first growth wanted not that guile , which they had need to make use of , that from low beginnings aim to mount high , which the more covert it is , is the less discommendable , as was this of the romans . chap. xiiii . they are often deceiv'd , who think with humility to overcome pride . wee often see that humility does not onely not help , but hurt some times , especially when it is used towards insolent men ; who either for envie or some other occasion , have conceiv'd hatred against thee . whereof our historian gives us good testimony in this occasion of war between the romans and the latins : for the samnites complaining to the romans , that the latins had assaild them , the romans would not yet forbid the latins that war , being desirous nor any way to incense them . whereby they did not onely not incense them , but made them become more insolent towards them , so that they sooner discover'd themselves enemies , whereof the words us'd by the forenamed : latin pretour , annlus in the same assembly , give good proof , saying : te tryed their patience in refusing them souldiers ; who doubts but they were angry , yet this disgrace have they sufferd : they have heard we prepare an armie against the samnites their allyes ; nor for this stirred they one foot out of the city : and whence came this modesty of theirs think ye , but from their knowledge as well of your forces as their own ? and therefore hereby we plainly see , how much the romans patience increased the latines arrogance . wherefore a prince should never agree to descend a whit from his ra●ck , not ever let goe any thing upon accord , if he have a minde to leave it honorably , but onely then when he is able , or when he thinks also he is able to maintain it : for it is better for the most part ( the matter being brought to such termes , that thou canst not let it goe in the manner above said ) to let it be taken from thee by force , rather than by fear of forces : for it thou lettestit goe for fear , thou doest it to free thy self from war , which most commonly it will not doe ; for he to whom with such open cowa●dise thou hast yeelded this , will not there with rest satisfi'd , but take other things from thee also , and will the rather be incited against thee , in that he values thee less ; when likewise on the other side , thou shalt finde thy friends more slack in thy defence , esteeming thee either weak or cowardly . but if thou forthwith upon discovery of thy enemies intent , gettest thy forces in a readiness , howsoever they be inferior to his , he will begin to make account of thee , as also will other princes thy neighbours abou thee , so that some there will be who will have a minde to ayd thee ( thou being in armes ) who , if thou hadst abandon'd thy self , would never have struck stroke for thee . this is meant , when thou hast but one enemy . but in case thou hast more , thou shalt do very wisely , to render what thou hast belonging to any one of them for to regain him to thee , notwithstanding the war be discoverd , that thou mayest take him asunder from the other confederates thine enemies . chap. xv. weake states are alwaies irresolute in their determinations ; and slow deliberations are alwaies hurtfull . in this very same matter , and in the same beginnings of the war between the latins and the romans , we may observe , that in every consultation it is good to come to the particular of that which is to be deliberated on , and not to stay long in doubt , and upon the uncertainty of a thing . which is manifest in the consultation the latins made , when they thought to quit themselves of the romans : for the romans having had some sent of this ill humour that had possessed the latins , to be ascertained of the master , and to try if without armes they could regain those people , gave order they should send eight citizens to rome , to the end they might advise with them . the latins , understanding this , and being conscious to themselves of many things done contrary to the will of the romans , called an assembly together , to appoint who should go to rome , and to give them order what they should say . and annius their pretour being in the assembly during this dispute , utter'd these words : the sum of our affairs is , as i take it , that ye should advise rather what we should do , than what we should say ; for it is an easy matter , when things are once resolved on , to put them into fit termes . without question these words are most true , and ought to be relished by every prince , and every commonwealth : for during the uncertainly and doubt of that which a man will do , there is no man knowes what he should say : but when the mind is once setled and resolved of what is to be done , words to the purpose easily follow . i have the more willingly noted this passage , by reason that many times i have known that such doubt hath much wrong'd publick actions , even to the loss and disgrace of our republike . and it shall ever come to pass , that , in doubtfull cases , and where there is need of judgement to deliberate , this resolution shall be when they are to be advised , and deliberated on by weak man. no less hurtfull also are slick and slow consultations , than these ambigu●us , especially those that are to be taken in favour of any friend ; for slowness helps no body , and hurts ones self . these resolutions so taken , proceed either from weakness of courage , or forces , or from their malignity that should resolve , who guided by their own passtors , to ruine a state , and to fulfill some desire of their own , s●ff●r not the consultation to goe forward , but rather hinder and cross it . for good citizens , though they perceive the whole stream of the people to run the more dangerous way , yet will they never hinder the delibaration , being that those affairs attend not time . when jerome the tyrant in syraacusa was dead , there being a great war between the carthaginians , and the romans , the syracusians put it to question , which allyance they should take , the roman or carthaginian ; and such was the eagerness of the parties , that the matter remain'd in doubt , and they took to neither side , til ' that apollonides one of the cheif men in syracufia , in a very discreet oration of his , shewed that they were not to be blam'd that advised to adhere to the romans , nor they that would take part with the carthaginians , but rather that irresolution and slowness in taking to any side was detestable ; for he saw fully in that ambiguity the ruine of the republique . but were it that the party were once made , on which side soe'r it were , a●man might conceive some good hopes upon it . nor could titus livius more fully shew , than in his part he does , the harme which this hanging in suspence drawes after it . he makes it plain also in this case of the latins ; for the lavinians being sought to by them for ayd against the romans , put off the resolut on of it so long , that when they were just going forth of the town to give succors to them , news came that the latins were defeated . whereupon their pretour milonius said , we shall pay ●ear to the romans for this little way we have gone : for if at first they had resolv'd either to help , or not to help the latins , not helping them they had not given offence to the romans ; but helping them , had their aid , come in time , with the addition of their forces , they might have gain'd them the victory ; but by delay loss came every way , as it befell them . and had the florentines observ'd this well , they had never receiv'd so many dammages nor troubles by the french , as they had in lewis the twelfths passage into italy against lodowicke duke of milan : for the king treating of such a passage , sought the florentines for their consent ; and their agents that were with the king , agreed with him , to stand neuters , and that the king comming into italy , should maintain them in their state , and receive them into his protection , and gave the city a moneths time to ratifie this . which ratification was delayd by some , who in their little wisdome favour'd duke lodowicks affairs , til that the king was even upon the point of victory , when the florentines offering the ratification , it would not be accepted by the king , who knew the florentines came by force , and not willingly to his friendship . which the city of florence was to buy out dear , and like enough to have lost the state , as afterwards another time upon the like accident it chanc'r . and so much the worse was the course they took ; for it was of no advantage to duke lodowicke , who if he had bin victour , would have shewed more displeasure against them , than did the king. and though touching the mischief this weakness brings upon a republique , we have formerly spoken in another chapter ; yet upon a new occasion offerd by a new accident , i had a minde to repeat it thinking it very specially a matter worthy to be noted by all republiques like unto ours . chap. xvi . how much the orders used by our souldiers in these modern times , differ from those of the ancients . the romans fought not a battel in any war they undertook with any nation , of greater importance than this with the latins , in torquatus and decius his consulship : for in all reason it had followed , that as the latins by losing it became subjects , the romans should have undergone the same condition , had not they got the mast●ry ; and of this opinion is titus livius : for on each part he makes the armies equal for their order , valour , resolution , and number ; he makes there this difference only , that the commanders of the roman army were of more valour than those of the latins . it appears also that in the ordering of this battel , there befell two accidents , the like whereof was never seen before , nor since have we had but rare examples following them : that of two consuls , to hold their soldiers minds firm and obedient to their commands , and resolute to fight , the one kill'd himself , the other his son. the equality which titus livius sayes in these two armies , was , because they had both serv'd in the wars a long time together ; they used the●ame language , order , and armes : for in the ordering of their battel , they had the same manner , and their troupes and the captains of them had the same names ; there was a necessity being they were of equal force and valour , that something extraordinary should happen , that could se●tle and fix the ones resolution , rather than the others : in which ( as otherwhere we have said ) consists the victory : for while that lasts in the combarants hearts , the armies never turne their backs . and to the end it might last the longer in the romans breasts than in the latins , partly fortune , and partly the consùls valour were cause ; for torquatus killed his son , and decius himself . titus livius , where he shews the equality of their forces , sets downe the whole order the romanes used in their armies and in their battels . which being that he relates at large , i will not rehearse againe , but discourse onely upon that i shall thinke remarkable , and which , because it hath been neglected by all our captaines of later times , hath been the occasion of many disorders in severall armyes stand battells . i say therefore , that out of livius his words wee gather that the romane army had three principal divisions , which in proper termes may be calld squadrons ; the first was of the hastati , the second of the prencipi , the third of the triarij : and each of these had their horsemen . in the ordering of a battell , they plac't the hastati for most , in the second place on the right side , upon the shoulders of those the prencipi were set , and in the third place yet in the same file , the riarij came . the horse of all these ranks they plac't on the right hand and on the left of these three battells : which squadrons of horse from their formes and places were call'd wings : because they lookt like the two wings of that body . they rangd the first squadron of the hastati , which was in front , in a manner close shut together , that it might be able either to force upon , or sustain the enemy . the second squadron of the prencipi ( because it was not the first to fight , but was ordeind to succour the for most , in case it was either beaten or driven backe ) this they made not so compact together , but kept their ranks thinne , so that they might receive in to them without disordering themselves the first squadron , whensoever being prest on by the enemy , they were forc't to retire . the third squadron of the triarij had their ranks yet thinner than the second ; that , if need were , they might receive the two former squadrons of the hastati and prencipi . the troupes then being all plac'd in this order , began the fight : and if the hastati were forc'd or overcome , they retir'd into the thinnesse of the ranks of the prencipi , and they united together , and having made of two battallions one body , undertooke the fight afresh ; and if these were beaten back and routed , they fell backe into the thinner rankes of the triarij , and so all the battallions became one body , renewd the fight againe , where if they vanquished , because they had not other repayre , they lost the day . and because that alwayes when this last quadron of the triarij came to try for it , the army was in danger , thereupon grew his proverb , thematter came so farre as the triarij . the commanders of our dayes , as they have abandoned all the other instructions , and follow nor in any part the ancient discipline , so have they quite neglected this part , which is of no small importance : for he that so arrang●s his armie , that in the fight he can three times repair himself , to lose he must have fortune three times his enemy , and be to incounter a valour sufficient to vanquish him . but he that stands onely on the first shock ( as now our christian armies doe ) may easily lose : for every little disorder , or meane valour , is able to take from him the victory . that which makes our armyes not able to recover themselves three times , is , because they have lost the manner of receiving one squadron within another : which comes to passe , because now adayes battells are rangd which one of these two disorders ; either they place their troupes at the shoulders the one of another , and make their battell large of breadth , and thinne in depth ; which makes it weaker , because there is but small distance from the brest to the backe . and when to make it stronger , they reduce the troupes to the romane manner , if the first front be broken , not having order to be receivd in the second , they fall together into a confusion , and rout themselves : for if that before be beaten backe , it falls upon the second ; if the second strives to advance , it is hindred by the first : whereupon the first and the second both beating upon the third , causes such a confusion , that commonly a very little matter destroys a whole army . the spanish and french armyes in the battle at ravenna , where the lord de pors generall of the french forces dyed , which was ( according to our times ) a well fought battell , was arranged in one of these forenam'd wayes : which is , that one and the other armie came on with all their people plac'd to shoulder the one the other , so that neither army had but one front , and were much more in breadth then in depth . and this befalls them alwayes , where they have a large plaine , as they had at ravenna . for knowing the disorder they make in retiring , by placing themselves in one file , they avoide it when they can , which they do by making the front large , as it is said . but when the scite of the country restraines them , they remaine in the forenam'd disorder , without advising themselves of the remedy . in which they passe through their enemies countries , they goe out to forrage , or venture on any other exploit . and at saint regulus in that occasion of pisa , and otherwhere , where the florentines were routed by the pisans , during the warre which was betweene the florentines and that city , for their rebellion , after charles the king of france his passage into italy , those defeates were caused by nothing else but by their owne horse : which being in vantgard , and by the enemies beaten backe into the florentine foote , routed it , whereupon all the remainder turn'd their backes ; and criacus de borgo , the ancient generall of the florentine infantery , hath said it many times in my hearing , that they had never bin routed but by their own horse . the swisses who are the principall masters of our modern warres , when they serve with the french , above all things have a care to place themselves on the side , for feare their owne horse driven backe should beate upon them . and howbeit these things seeme easie to understand , and very easie to practise , yet hath not there been any of our contemporary commanders , that would follow these ancient orders , or amend the moderne . and though they have made their armies tripartite , terming the one the vauntguard , the other the battell , and the last the rereguard : they make no other use thereof , but to command them when they are quatered in their lodgings , but in any service , very seldome it is ( as is formerly said ) but that they make all these bodies run one fortune . and because many to excuse their own ignorance , alledge that the violence of the artillery permits not that many of the ancient orders be observd , i will argue it in the next chapter , and examine , whether the artillery doe hinder the practise of the ancient valour . chap. xvii . what esteeme our moderne armies ought to have of artilery , and if the opinion ; which is generally conceived of it , be true . when i consider , besides the things formerly written , how many pitcht battells were fought by the romans at severall times , that general opinion which many hold , comes into my minde , that if a●tilery had bin used in those dayes , the romans could never so easily have subdued the countryes they did , nor have brought these nations they did , to become their tributaries , nor in any case could they have made such brave conquests . they say moreover , that by reason of these guns , men cannot put in practice nor shew the valour they could of old . and then they adde a third matter , that it makes it more difficult to come to a battell now , then formerly ; nor can they containe themselves within the orders of those times , so that in time the warre will be all reduced to the artillery . and being desirous now not out of purpose to argue touching the the truth of such opinions , and how much artillery hath augmented or diminished the force of armies , and whether they bereave or affoard good captaines occasion to behave themselves valourously , i will begin to speake concerning , their first opinion ; that the ancient roman armies would never have made those conquests they did , had artilery bin then in use . whereupon i say in answer , that warre is made either in defence or offence . and then we are to examine , to which of these two parts it does more good or hame . and though reasons may be alledged on both sides , yet i thinke , that without comparison the defendant receives more dammage by it , then the assailant . the reason , which hereof i give , is , that the defendant is either within a walled towne , or in the field within trenches : if he be in a towne , either it is but little , as most commonly for tresses are , or great and large . in the first case , the defendant is quite lost ; for such is the force of artillery , that no wall be it of what thicknesse it will , but in a few dayes is ruined by it . and if those that are within the walls , have not good roome to retire themselves , with retrenchments and fortifications , they are lost ; nor can they support the shocke of the enemy , when he would enter by breach in the wall , nor hath he any helpe herein of his artillery : for this is a maxime , that where met can enter in by throngs and with violence , the artillery cannot keep them off . therefore the furious assaults of the tramontaines it is not possible for the defendant to resist ; but the assaults the italians give , are well enough endured , who never all in a ●hrong , but scatteringly come to the fight , which they by a name very fit for the purpose , call skirmishes . and these that goe with this disorder and timcrousnesse to enter a breach , where artillery is , go to an apparent death , and against them artillery is a good use : but those who in throngs , when the one presses forward the other , come to the breach , unlesse sustained by ditches and ramparts , will enter any place , and the artillery shall never beat them off ; and though some few of them be slaine , yet can they never be so many as can hinder them of victory . that this is true , we finde in many conquests which fortainers have here made in italy , especially in that of brescia : for that towne having rebelled against the french , and the fort holding good yet for the french king , the venetians were to support all the violence , that from thence could fall in upon the towne , having all that way guarded with artillery , that descended from the fortresse into the city , some of them being planted against the front , others upon the flankes , and so in every other place fir . whereof the lord of fois made not any account , but descending a foote with his troopes passed through the midst of them , and tooke the towne , nor ever appeared it that he had received thereby any notable losse . so that he who defends a little towne ( as it is said ) which is walled in , but hath not space to retire with ●etrenchments and fortifications , and trusts upon the artillery , is presently lost . and thou defendest a great towne , and hast conveniency for retreat , yet without comparison is the artillery more availeable to those without , then within the walls . first , because thou wouldest with thy artillery annoy those without , thou must of force raise thy selfe with it above the levell : for while thou art on the levell , every small fence or trench that the enemy makes secures him , and thou canst no wayes dammage him ; so that thou being to raise thy selfe , and to mount thy peeces on the curtaine of the wall , or some other way , drawest two difficulties upon thee . the first is , that thou canst not bring ordnance thither , neither of that bignesse nor effect , that he without can , being that great things are not manageable in small spaces . the other is , that though we grant thou canst bring such peeces thither , yet canst thou not make those safe and strong fortifications to secure thy artilery within which they without can , being upon the plaine ground , and having those conveniences , and that roome , they can desire . so that it is impossible for him that defends a towne to keepe his artillery mounted on those high places , when those without have store of great and good peeces . and if he brings them into lower places , they become for the most part unprofitable , as it is said . so that the defence of a city is to be made by the bodies of men , as it was the custome of old , and with the small shot : whereby if they make any small advantage , in regard of the small shot , they suffer as much losse , which counterpoises all the good the artillery can do them : for by them the towne walls are all laid flat , and , as it were , buried in the ditches , so that when the enemy comes to enter by assault , either because the walls are beaten downe , or that the ditches are filled , he that is within , hath more disadvantages thereby , then otherwise he had . and therefore ( as it was formerly said ) these instruments of wa●re do more helpe the besieger , then the besieged . touching the third point , which is to retire into the campe , and there to make intrenchments , to keepe off from battell till some convenience or advantage gotten , i say , that herein thou hast no more helpe ordinarily to keepe thee from fighting , then had the ancients . and sometimes by reason of the artillery thou hast more disadvantage : for if the enemy come upon thee , and have some small advantage of the field , as it may easily chance that he gets the upper ground of thee , or that at his arrivall thou hast not fully cast up thy trenches , nor cover'd thy selfe well with them , presently he dislodges thee whithout remdy , and thou art forced to come cut of thy fortifications and fight : which befell the spaniards in the battell at ravenna , who , being fortified betweene the river roncus , and a trench they had cast up , the fence whereof was not of that hight was needfull , so that the french had gotten some small advantage of the ground , were forc'd by the artillery out of their fortifications to come to fight . but grant ( as most commonly it should be ) that the place where thou hast encamped , were higher then those others whereof the enemies were masters , and that their fortifications were good and secure in such sort as by meanes of scituation and other thy preparations the enemy dares not assaile thee , in this case they will be forced to use those meanes , which of old they were wont , when any one lay with his army , where he could not be endammag'd , which were to forrage the country and pillage it , to beleager some of the cheife townes , to hinder thy provisions , so that by some necessity thou shalt of force dislodge and be brought to fight , where the artillery , as we shall hereafter shew is not of so great effect . considering then what sort of warres the romars made , being in all most all of them they were assailants , and not defendants , it shall appeare ( being that these things above written are true . ) that they would have had greater advantages , and sooner have made their conconquests , had the artillery bin in those times . touching the second point , that men cannot make proofe of their valour as of old they might , by reason of the artillery , i say , that it is true , that where men are to shew themselves in scattered troops , they run more hazard , then when they are to scale a wall or make such like assaults , where they are not all in one body , but each one a part shewes himselfe . it is true also that the captaines and commanders of armies are exposed to more danger of death , being that then the artillery can reach them in any place ; nor availes it them to be in the hindermost rankes , or invironed by their valiantest souldiers . yet we see , that neither of these two dangers do often endammage much ; for places fortified are not easily scal'd , nor do they weakly goe to assaile them : but if they will take them , they must besieges them , as it was the custome of old . and where they take their townes by assault , the dangers now a dayes are not much greater then they were wont to be : for even in those times they who defended the townes , wanted not their instruments of warre where with to shoote at their enemies , which ( though perhaps they were not of that violence ) yet for slaughter were of the same effect . touching the death of captaines and commanders , in foure and twenty yeares time , that these last warres have bin in italy , we have not so many examples , as in ten yeares the ancients had : for from count lodowicke of mirandola , that died at ferrara , when the venetians , a few yeares since , assai'd that state , and the duke of nemours , that died at cerignuola , there hath not any one bin slaine by the canon : for the lord of fois was slain by the sword at ravenna , and not by the cannon . so that if men give no particular proofs of their valour , it is not caused by their canon , but prooeeds from their evil orders , and the feebleness of their armies , which when they want valour in the gross , cannot then in any particular make shew of it . touching the third allegation made by them , that they can never come to joyne battel , but that the sum of all will depend upon the artillery , i say that this opinion is utterly false , and so shall it be held by those who according to the valour of old will imploy their armies : for whosoever will have a good army , must use them in trainings or rather in battels to come up close to the enemy , and there fall to handy blows with him , and take him by the coller : and they ought to ground more upon the infantry then the cavallery , for some reasons we shall here , after alledge . and when they shall rely most upon the foot , and upon these waies we have spoken of , the artillery becomes quite unprofitable ; for more easily can the infantry avoyd the blow of the cannon by comming up close to the enemy , then of old they could escape the sury of the elephants , the chariors arm'd with hooks , and such other unaccusiomed encounters which the roman infantry met with , and sound remedy against , which they would to much the more easily have found against these , as much as the time is of very short durance in which the artillery can harme thee , in comparison of of that wherein the elephan●s and chariots ●id mischeif : for these in the very middle and heat of the battle did put all into disorder ; whereas the artillery hinders thee onely before the battel : which hinderance the infantry easily avoid , either by going cover'd under the naturall scite of the place , or by stooping towards the ground when they shoot : which also we see by experience is not necessary , especially to escape the canon , which can hardly be so right levell'd , but that if they go high they miss thee , if low they come short of thee . afterwards when the armies are come to handy blowes , this is more clear then the light , that neither the great nor small shot can do thee much harm : for if the enemy places the artillery before him , thou mayst easily take it ; if behind him , it hurts himself before it can touch thee : or if it be on either side of thee , it cannot so gall thee , but that thou mayest come up close to it ; whereupon will follow the effect we have said . nor needs there much dispute upon this : for we have seen it by the example of the switzers , who at navarra in the year . without arrillery or horse assail'd the french army within their fortifications being guarded with artillery , and yet routed them being no way hinder'd thereby : and the reason is , ( besides the things formerly alledged ) because the artillery hath need to be guarded , if we would it should make any good execution , either by some wall , or trenches or some kind of fortifications , and when it fails of these defences it becomes a prey to the enemy , & so is made unprofitable , as it comes to pass when it is defended onely by men , or as it may be in field battels , it cannot be plac'd on the flank , unless it be on that manner , that the ancients used their instruments of war , when they plac'd them without their squadrers , because they should play from without the ranks ; and whensoever they were put at , either by the horse or others they retired behind the legions : whose ever accounts otherwise of them , does not well understand the use of them , and trusts'upon that , which may easily deceive him , and if the turk by the help of his artillery , have gaind any victory of the sophy and the so'dan , it was not occasion'd by other vertue of it , then by the affright the unusual noise thereof put the horse into . therefore i conclude , comming to the end of this discourse , that the artillery is prossitable in an army , where there is a mingle of the ancient valour , without which it avails little against a couragious army . chap. xviii . how by authority taken from the romans , and from the use of the ancient military discipline , the foot is more to be esteemd , than the horse . wee can plainly sshew it by many reasons and examples , how much the romans in all military actions did prefer the infantry before the cavalry , and thereupon grounded the assurance of all their executions , as it appears by many examples , and among others , when they sought with the latins near the lake of regillum , where the roman army giving ground a little , for their succours , the horse-men were commanded to light and serve a soct whereby they made good the fight and gaind the victory . where it is manifest , the romans had more confidence in them being a foot , than a horseback , they us'd the same termes in many other fights , and sound it alwaies a present help in their dangers . nor let hannibals opinion counterballance this , who seeing in the battel at canna that the consuls made their horsemen light and serve afoot , scoffing at the course they took , said , i had rather indeed they should be delivered bound into my hands . which opinion however that it was utterd by a very able man , yet if we are to follow authorities , we may rather give credit to a roman commonwealth , and so many excellent captains , that flourished in it , than to one hanniball alone , though without this authority the reasons are evident : for a man on foot can go in many places , where a horseback he cannot : he may be able to instruct them , how to keep their ranks , and being somewhat confus'd , how they may be restored again . it is very hard to make the horse keep their ranks , and when once they are in disorder , it is impossible to recover them . besides this , as we see it among men , so is it among horses ; some there are which have but small courage , others again exceeding couragious . and many times it falls out , that a brave horse is back'd by a cowardly fellow , and sometimes a timerous jade is mounted by a stout souldier ; and there which way soever it is that this disparitie follows , arises uprofitableness and disorder . the infantry well united in their ranks are easily able to rout the horse , and very hardly can they be routed by them : which opinion is confirmed ( besides many ancient moderne examples ) by their authorities who have left us the records of ancient republiques , where they shew us , how that at first they began to make war a horseback , because they understood neither the order nor the use of the foot , which when they once had the knowledge of , they quickly conceiv'd how much more profitable they were than the horse . but hereupon it follows not that the horse are not necessary in armies , to discover , and to forrage and prey about in the countrey , and to pursue the enemies in their slight , and in part also to oppose all the attempts of the the adversaries horse . but the ground-worke , and the very nerves of the army , and whereof most account is to be made , is the infantry . and among the italian princes faults , which have euthral'd italy to strangers , there is none greater than that they made no account of this order , and turn'd all their regard towards the service of horsemen : which disorder proceeded from the evil disposition of the captains , and their ignorance that govern'd the state : by reason that for these twenty-five years last past all the military affairs in italy were in the hands of men that had no setled estates , but were captains adventurers , serving where they could have pay , who presently devised how they could maintain their reputation , they continuing in armes when the princes were unarmed . and because they could not continually get pay for a good number of foot , nor had any subjects whereof to serve themselves , and a small number got them no credit , they be took themselves to horse : for a captain having pay for or horse , subsisted thereby in good repute , and the payment was not such , but that those that rul'd the state could easily satisfie it . and to the end this should come on more easily , and to keep themselves the better in esteem , they took all respect and reputation from the foot , and reserred all to their cavallery ; and so far increas'd they this disorder , that in the greatest armie they levyed , the least part of them was foot . which custom , together with many other disorders intermixt with it , hath much weakned the italian soldiery , so that this country hath easily bin trodden under foot by all strangers . this error , of esteeming the horse more than the foot , is laid open yet more plainly , by another example of the romans . the romans were incamped at sora ; and a troop of horse having made a sally out of the town to assualt the camp , a captain of the roman horse went to incounter them with his cavalry , whereupon the first shock , meeting brest to brest , it chanc'd that the commander of each troop was slain , and the residue being left without government , and the skirmish still continuing , the romans that they might the better vanquish their enemies , light from their horses , and forc't their enemies ( if they would defend themselves ) to do the like , wherewith the romans carried away the victory . this example could not serve better to the purpose , in shewing of how much value the infantry is , above the horse : for if in other occasions the consuls made the horsemen to dismount , it was to succour the foot that were in distress , and had need of ayd . but in this place they light not to assist the foot , nor to fight with their enemies foot , but fighting a horseback with horsemen , they thought that though they were not able to master them on horseback , that alightning they could more easily vanquish them : i will therefore conclude , that a body of foot in good order and array cannot without much difficulty be overcome by another body of foot . crassus and marchus antonius both romans , made an introde of many daies journeys into the parthians kingdome , with a very few horse and a good number of foot , where they incountred with numberless troops of the parthian horse . crassus was left there dead with part of the army ; marcus antonius valorously sav'd himself . nevertheless , in these roman losses it appears , how much the infantry exceeded the horse : for being in an open country , where there are few mountains , and very few rivers , and the sea-coast far off , and remote from all conveniency , yet for all this did marcus antonius even in the opinion of the parthians themselves , very valourously escape , nor ever durst the whole parthian cavalry venture to break into the ranks of his army . if crassus perish'd there , whosoever well reads his actions , shall find , that he was rather treacherously beguild , than forc'd , nor ever in all his disorders , durst the parthians set upon him , but alwaies went along by him , to keep in his soldiers from stragling , and getting of provisions , and by promising fairly , but observing nothing , brought him at length unto extream distress . i should think i were to take much pains in perswading that the valour of the infantry does much excel that of the horse , but that there are many modern examples which give us a very satisfactory testimony . and t is well known that swisses at navarra , formerly alleaged by us , went to encounter horse and as many more foot , & vanquish'd them : for the horse could no way harm them , and the foot being for the most part gascoignes and ill ordered , they made small account of . we see likewise that afterwards swisses , went to find francis the french king about milan , who had an army of horse and foot , and a tire of ordnance ; and though they gaind not the battel at at navarra , yet they fought bravely two dayes together , and when at length they were broken the moity of them escap'd . marcus regulus attilius presum'd with his infantry to incounter not onely the enemies horse , but their elephants ; and though his purpose came not to effect , yet was it not so , but that the valour of his infantry was such , that he had very good reason to hope he might well overcome that difficulty . and therefore i answer , that he that would overcome a body of foot in good array , must oppose them with another body of foot in better order than they ; otherwise he sustains an evident loss . in the dayes dayes of philip visconti duke of milan , there came down into lombardy some swisses , whereupon the duke carmignuola being then his general , sent him with neare upon a thousand horse and some few foot to incounter them : who not knowing the manner of their fighting , went to meet them with his horse , not doubting but that he could presently rout them . but finding them to stand firm , and having lost many souldiers , retir'd ; yet being a very able man , and knowing in new accidents how to try new wayes , having repaird his broken troupes , he went again to meet them , where he made all his armed men a light , and serve on foot , and so by them having made a head to those of his infantry , he invested the swisses , who found no way to help themselves : for carmignuolaes horsemen bring lighted , who were wel arm'd , were able with facilitie to enter into the swisses ranks without much hurt : which when they had pierc'd , they could easily harme ; so that of their whole number there was left onely that part alive , that was by carmignuolaes curtesie preserv'd . i beleeve well that many know this difference of valour that is between the one and the other of these orders , but so unhappy are these times , that neither the ancient nor modern examples , nor the acknowledgement of the error is of force to prevail with modern princes to readvise themselves and consider , that to recover the reputation of the souldiery of a countrey or state , it is necessary to revive again these orders and entertain them near their persons , to encourage them and allow them means to live , to the end they may restore to them both life and reputation . but as we use to forsake these customs , so we leave other orders also formerly spoken of ; whereupon it comes to pass , that the very conquests we make turne to our losses , and not to the advancement of a state , as hereafter we shall say . chap. xix . that conquests in republiques not well govern'd , and which proceed not according to the roman vertue , prove rather their ruine , than advancement . these opinions contrary to the truth , and grounded on evil precedents , which have bin introduced by these our corrupt ages , cause men not to stand much upon straying from old wonted uses . some thirty years agoe , an italian would never have bin perswaded , that ten thousand foot in a plain had ever bin able to assault ten thousand horse and so many more foot , and not only fight with them , but vanquish them too , as it is plain by the example of the battel at navarra ; by us sundry times alleag'd . and however that stories are full of them , yet would they not have given us credit : and if they had beleeved us , they would have said , that in these dayes men are better arm'd , and that a squadron of men at armes would have bin of force to have shock'd with a rock , and not only with a body of foot , and thus with these false excuses they corrupted their judgments . nor would they have taken into consideration , that lucullus with a few foot routed a horse that tigranes led , and yet among those horsemen there was a sort of them very like our men at armes . and so this fallacy was discover'd by the example of forrain nations . and as thereby it proves true , touching the infantry , which is related in story , so ought it be beleev'd that all the rest of the ancient orders are true and usefull . and when this we re once credited , republiques and princes would fail less , and be of more strength to resist any force should come upon them , nor hope so much in the flight ; and those that should have in their hands the government of state , would be better able to guide it , either by way of amplification or by way of preservation , and would think that to increase the number of their citizens , and make them as their associates and not vassals , to send forth colonies to keep the countries gained , to make a general stock out of the booties taken , to tame the enemy with incursions , & by set battels , & not long sieges , to maintain the publique state in wealth , & the private in scarcity , and to be industrious in keeping the armies in good discipline , are the means to inlarge a commonwealth & gain an empire . and when this way of amplification should not like them , then should they think that all addition to their state are the ruine of commonwealths , and therefore should restrain all ambition , regulating their city according to their lawes and customs , forbidding all inlargments , only ayming at defenee of what they have , and keeping them under good government , as the republicks of germany do , and so have liv'd free a good while . notwithstanding ( as otherwhere i have said , when i discours'd touching the difference there was in the ordering of a state to become fit to conquer ; and the ordering of one to be able to maintain it self ) it is impossible , that a republick should have the hap to stand quiet , and enjoy her own liberty , with her small territories : for though she molest not others yet she shall be molested her self : she may also have some mind or some necessity in some part to extend her bounds : and in case she have no enemy abroad , yet may she find some one at home , as it must needs be alwaies that such be found among a great many potent citizens , and if those republicks of germany can subsist in that manner , & have been able to continue for a time it arises from some conditions , that are in that country , & which are no where else sound , nor could they maintain such a manner of government without them . this part of germany , whereof i speak , was subject to the roman empire , as were france & spain ; but when the empire began to decline , & the title of the empire was brought into that country , the most potent of those cities began ( according to the baseness or the necessity of those emperors ) to set themselves at liberty , buying themselves out from the empire , and reserving thereunto only a a certain annual rent . insomuch as by little and little , all those cities , which he●d immediatly of the emperor , and were no way in subjection to any prince , in such like manner set themselves free . it happened in the same times , when these cities bought out their liberties , that certain communalties of the duke of austria's subjects , rebell'd agianst him , among which were tilibourg , the swisses and others , who prospering in the beginning , by little and little came to such growth , that they not only shook off the austrian yoke , but even became a terror to all their neighbours , and these are those they call swisses . this country therefore is divided into the swisses , republcks , which they call-free townes , princes , and the emperor . and the reason why among such variety of governments there arise no warres , or if any do , why they continue not , is that reverence they yeeld to the emperor , who albeit he hath no great forces , yet is held in such esteem among them , that he alwaies reconciles them , & with his authority interposing himself as mediator , takes away all discontents : & the greatest & longest warrs that have been there , were those that follow'd between the swisses & the duke of austria ; and though now for these many years the emperor and the duke of austria have been one and the same thing , yet was he never so powerful as to tame the swisses insolence , where there was never any means of accord , unless it were by force ; nor hath the residue of germany ever given him much assistance : partly because those communalties cannot find in their hearts to hurt those that desire to live under a civil government , as they themselves do and partly because those princes are not able , being poor , or will not , by reason that they envy too great puissance . those commonalties therfore may live contented with their small dominions , because they have no occasion ( in regard of the imperial authority ) to wish it greater . they may live the better in union within their owne walls , because they have the enemy near at hand , who would willingly take any opportunity to lay hold on them , whensoever they should fall into discord : but if that country were otherwise conditioned , it were fit for them to seeke the inlargement of their state , & so interrupt their owne rest : and because otherwhere there are not the like termes , this manner of living cannot be followed , and there is a necessity either to strengthen the state by way of leagues , or to amplifie it as the romans did . and whosoever undertake any other course of government , seeke not their owne life , but ruine and desttruction : for many wayes , and for many reasons are conquests hurtfull : for it is very possible to gaine dominion , and not strength ; and he that does increase his dominions , & yet growes not in strength , must needs go to wrack . they cannot grow strong , that grow poore in the wars , although they prove victorious , because their conquests cost them more then they get by them , as the venetians & the florentins did , who have bin much weaker , when the one commanded all lombardy , and the other tuscany , then when the one was contented with the seaonley and the other with six miles round of territories : for al this preceeded from their desire to conquer , & their ignorance to take the right course : and they deserve the more blame , in that they have very little excuse having seene the ways the romanes went , because they might have followed their example , being that the romanes without any patterne to follow , by their own judgment , found out a fit way to go . moreover sometimes such gains gotten do no smal harm to a well govern'd commonwealth , when either such a city or country is conquer'd that abounds with pleasures , where by conversation with them , their manners are learned , as it happen'd to rome at first in the conquest of capua , & afterwards to hannibal . and had capua been of further distance from the city , that the soldiers error had not had the remedy near hand , or that rome had been in some part corrupted , without question that conquest had prov'd the roman republicks ruine . and t. livius witnesses the same in these words : even then was capua little good for the military discipline , which being the instrument of all sorts of pleasures , besotted the soldiers minds so , that they forgot their native countries . and truly such like cities sufficiently avenge themselves on their conquerors without fight , or loss of blood ; for by infecting them with their contagious vices , they expose them to the conquest of whoever assailes them . and juvenal could not better have expressed this , then where in his satyres he saies , that by their conquests of forrain nations , their minds were possessed with forrain vices , in exchange of parsimony , & other excellent vertues ; glutrony and luxury making their habitation there , revenged the worlds conquest on them . if therefore these gettings were likely to have been dangerous to the romans , in the times that they proceeded with such wisdome and vertue , how will they prove to those who go on in much different waies from them ? and who besides the other errors they run into ( whereof we have formerly spoken enough ) serve themselves of either mercenary or auxiliary soldiers ? whereupon those mischiefs often befall them , which we shall mention in the following chap. chap. xx. what hazzard that prince or commonwealth runs , which is serv'd by auxiliary and mercenary soldiers . if in another work of mine i had not treated at large of mercenary and auxiliary soldiers how unprofitable they are , and how very profitable the native soldiers of the country are , i would much more have inlarged my self in this discourse , than now i purpose ; but having otherwhere discours'd hereupon at length , i shall now only point at it . not yet did i think fit wholly to pass it over , having found in titus livius so large an example belonging to those soldiers : for auxiliary soldiers are those that a prince or commonwealth sends with their captains and pay ready furnish'd in thy aid . and comming to the text of t. livius , i say , that the romans having in severall places broken two armies of the samnites with their forces , which they sent to succor the capuans , and thereby freed them from that warr the samnites made against them , purposing to return to rome , to the end the capuans dispoyl'd of ayd should not a new becom a prey to the samnites , left behind them in the country about capua two legions to defend them . which legions growing corrupt through idleness , began to be insnar'd with the delicacies thereof so that having for gotten their owne country , and the reverence they ought to the senate , they resolved to take armes , and make themselves lords of that country , which they by their valours had defended , thinking those inhabitants not worthy to injoy those goods , which they knew not how to defend . which thing , the romanes having had some inkling of it before , was stopped , and punished by them , as , where we speak of conspiracies , it shall be show'd at large . therefore i say again , that of all kindes of souldiers the auxiliaries are the most dangerous ; because among those , that prince or republique that uses them for ayd , hath no authority , but onely he that sends them : for auxiliary souldiers are those that are sent th●e by a prince , as i have sayd , under the command of his own captaines , under his own ensignes and pay also , as this army was , which the romanes sent to capua . these kinds of souldiers , when they have vanquished , most commonly pillage as well them that have hir'd them , as the enemy against whom they have hired them ; and this they do , either through the maligne disposition of their prince that sends them , or through their owne ambition and however the romanes had no intention to violate the agreement and conventions made with the capuans , yet the facility wherewith those souldiers thought themselves able to take their towne , was such that it might have been of force to perswade them to think of taking the town and state from the capuans : many examples to this purpose may be alledg'd ; but this , and that of the inhabitants of rhegium shall suffice me , from whom both lives & town were taken by one legion of soldiers , which the romans had there left in garrison . therefore a prince or a republick should rather take any other course , than seek to bring auxiliary soldiers into his country , principally when he is most to rely upon them : for any accord or agreement ( though very hard ) to which he shall yeeld with his enemy , shall be more tolerable than this . and if things past were well call'd to mind , and those that are present well consider'd on , for one that hath had good success in such a business , a man shall find exceeding many who have been abus'd . and a prince , or an ambitious republick can never have a fitter opportunity to seise on a town or country , than when they are requir'd to send their armies for defence thereof . wherefore he that is so ambitious , that not only for his own defence , but for offence to another , calls in such like aids , seeks to gain that he cannot hold , and which also he that gets it for him , can at his pleasure take from him , but so great is mans ambition , that if he can fulfill his desire for the present , he is never aware of that evill , which shortly after may thence redound to him . nor do the ancient examples avail any thing with him , as well in this , as in other things we have treated of : for were men hereby mov'd , they would perceive that the more freely and fairly they dealt with their neighbours , and the farther of they were from making themselves masters of them , the more readily would they offer to cast themselves into their armes , as hereafter shall appear by example of the capuans . chap. xxi . the first pretour that the romans ever sent to any place , was to capua , four hundred years after they began to make war. how much the romans in their manner of proceeding in their conquests did differ from those , who now a daies inlarge their dominions , we have formerly discours'd enough , and how they suffer'd those towns which they did not utterly race , to live with their own laws , as well those that yeelded to them as subjects , as those that came under their protection as associates . and in them they left no marks of the roman empire , but tied them to some certain conditions , which whiles they observ'd , they still maintain'd them in their state and dignity . and we know that these courses were continued till they began to conquer abroad out of italy , and that they reduc'd kingdomes and states into provinces . whereof the example is very clear ; for the first place that ever they sent any preror to was capua , whether they sent him not through their own ambition , but upon the capuans intreaty , who ( being they were at discord one with another ) judg'd it necessary to have a citizen of rome amongst them , that might put them in order again and reunite them . the antiates also mov'd by their example , and constrain'd by the same necessity requir'd to have a prefect sent them . and t. livius saies upon this occasion , and upon this new way of ruling ; that now not only the roman armes , but their lawes also were in great repute . we see therefore how much this course taken , further'd the romans advancement : for those cities especially that are accustomed to live free , or to be govern'd by their own citizens , are well enough contented to live in another manner of quiet under a rule they see not ( though it may bring some burden with it too ) rather than under that which they having every day in their view , continually reproaches them with their slavery . besides this ; the prince gains hereby another advantage , that his officers having not in their hands these judicatures and magistracies , whereby they were to regulate those cities , there can no imputation or aspersion be cast upon the prince . and hereby many occasions of calumny and hatred against him are taken away . and that this is true , besides ancient examples , which we could alledge , we have one of late memory in italy : for as it is well known ( geneva having been several times possessed by the french ) that king did alwaies ( except at this present time ) send them a french governor , who under him should govern them . for this present only , but upon any intention of the kings ; but it seem'd necessity so order'd it , he hath suffered them to be governed by their own lawes , and to have a genowes for their magistrate . and i make no question but that he that inquires which of these two waies most secures the king for his rule over them , & gives the people most satisfaction , would the rather alow of this latter . moreover men cast themselves the more freely into thy armes , the further off they think thee from being desirous to rule ; & so much the less do they fear thee in regard of their liberty , by how much the more curteous and familiar thou art with them . this familiarity and free manner of behaviour made the capuans hasty to aske a prerour of the romans : but had the romans of themselves made but the least shew they would have sent one thicher , they would presently have been in jealousie of them , and started from them . but what need we go to capua and rome for examples , having store enough at florence and in tuscany ? it is well known how long since it is that pistotia willingly yeelded it self to the government of florence . it is as well known also , what enmity hath been between the florentines and the pisans , the luckeses and the seneses ; and this difference of diposition proceeds not from thence , that the pistoyeses value not their liberty , as well as others do , but because the florentines us'd these with that respect they do their own brothers , but the others they treated as enemies . this was the occasion made the pistoyeses offer themselves freely to be govern'd by them ; and the others struggle with all might and main , as yet they do also , not to come under them . and doubtless , had the florentines either by way of alliances or succours grown familiar with their neighbours , and not have alwaies scar'd them , they had at this instant been lords of all tuscany . but hereupon i advise not , that armes and force are not to be us'd , but that they are to be reserv'd for the last place , where and when other meanes will not serve . chap. xxii . how erroneous many times the opinions of men are , when they give their judgements touching great affaires . how false oftentimes mens opinions are , they well see , who are eye-witnesses of their deliberations , which many times unless they be determined of by able men , are contrary to all truth . and because that excellent men in corrupted commonwealths ( especially in peaceable times ) both for envy and occasions of ambition are maligned , such adwise is follow'd , as by reason of a common error is well approv'd of , or such as is put forward by men that aime rather at grace and favour then the general good . this error afterward is discover'd in times of adversity , and of force recourse is had to those that in times of peace were utterly forgotten , as in its own place in this part it shall fully be spoken of . there are also certain accedents where men are very easily beguiled , if not well experienced in affaires , the present accident having in it self many likelihoods fit to make that credible , whereof in such a case men are perswaded . these words are spoken upon that which numicius the pretour ( after that the latins were defeated by the romans ) perswaded them ; and upon that which few years since , many beleeved , when francis the first , king of france came to the conquest of milan , which was defended by the swissers . therefore i say , that lewis the twelfth being dead , and francis of angoulesme succeeding in the kingdome of france , and desiring to restore the duchy of milan to the kingdome whereof the switzers had of late possessed themselves , by means of pope julius the seconds encouragement , desired to have some aid in italy , which might further his undertakings , so that besides the venetians , whom king lewis had gain'd , he tried the florentines , and pope leo the tenth , thinking his enterprise much facilitated , by having them to side with him , because the king of spains soldiers were in lombardy , and some of the emperors forces in verona . pope leo yeelded not to the kings desire , but by those that counselled him , he was perswaded ( as it was said ) to stand neuter , showing him that herein consisted certain victory : for it was nothing at all for the churches good , to have either mighty in italy , the king or the swissers . but if he desired to restore it to the ancient liberty , it was fit to free it from the one and the other . and because it was not possible to varquish the one or the other , divided or united , it was not ami's to let them overcome one another , and that afterwards the church with her allies should assaile the conqueror , and it was impossible to find a better occasion then the present , both being incamped : and so the pope having his forces in order , whereby he might be able to present himself upon the confines of lombardy , near the two armies under colour of guarding his own state , should there abide till they had fought their battell : which in all probability ( each army being very valorous ) could not but prove bloody to them both and leave the conqueror so feeble , that the pope might easily assaile and break him , and thereby he should attain to become lord of lombardy , and only arbitrator of all italy . and how erroneous this opinion was , appear'd by the event of the matter : for the swissers being vanquish'd after a long fight , the popes and the spanish soldiers were so far from assailing the conquerors , that they prepared themselves with what haste they could for flight ; which also would have little avail'd them had it not been for the kings humanity or coldness in their pursuit , who sought not after a second victory , but was contented to make agreement with the church . this opinion hath some arguments for it , which carry a colour of truth , but indeed are far from it : for it seldome comes to pass , that the conqueror loses many of his soldiers ; for of them , there are some only slai in the battel , and not in the flight : and during the heat of the combat , whiles men stand face to face one with another , few of them fall , especially because for the most part this continues but a small while . and in case it should last long , and many of the conquerors should fall ; yet such is the reputation , and terror also , that victory draws with it , that it far exceeds the dammage , that by the death of those soldiers can be suffer'd . so that an army , which upon the opinion , that such a one were weakned , going to assaile it , would be much deceived , unless it were such an army that at all times , before and after the victory , were able to deale with it . in this case the assailing army may be able according to the fortune and valor it hath to win or lose : but that which had formerly fought , & vanquish'd , would have some advantage of the other : which appears plainly by the experience the latins gave us , and the fallacy by which numicius the pretour was abus'd , as also by the dammage which those people brought upon themselves by beleeving him , who ( when the romans had vanquish'd the latins ) cried out through all latium , that then was it time to assaile the romans , who were weakned with the late fight they had with the latines ; that the romans had carried away only the name of the victory , but had suffered all other sorts of dammages , even as much as if they had been overcome , and that any small force , if now a fresh it should assaile them , were enough to dispatch them . whereupon those people that gave credit to him , levied a new army , and were presently defeated , and so suffered that loss , which others shall that hold the like opinion . chap. xxiii . how much the romans in giving judgement upon their subjects , whensoever occasion was offer'd , that constrain'd them thereunto , avoided the mid way , and rather betook themselves to one of the extreames . the latins were now reduc'd to such termes , that they could neither endure peace , nor maintain war. of all unhappy conditions this is the worst , unto which a prince or republick can be brought , that they can neither accept of peace , nor support the war ; unto which those are reduc'd , who are overmuch offended at the conditions of peace , and on the other side , if they have a mind to make war , either they must cast themselves as a prey into the hands of those that ayd them , or become a prey to their enemy . and into these mischances men fall by evil advices and evil courses , by not having well weighed their own forces , as before it was said : for that republique or prince , that should well weigh them , very hardly would ever be brought to those termes the latines came , who when they should not have made accord with the romans , made it , and when , they should not have broke peace with them brake it . whereby they brought it so to pass that their agreement and disagreement with the romans did equally endammage them . the latins then were overcome and much broken at first by manlus torquatus , and afterwards by camillus ; who having forc't them to yeeld and render themselves to the romans , and put garrisons in all the i owns in latium , and taken hostages of them all , when he came back to rome , related to the senate , that all latium was in the people of romes hands . and because this judgement is remarkable , and deserves note , to the end it may be follow'd , when princes have the like occasions given them , i will produce the very words , that livie put in camillus his mouth , which did testifie both of the manner the romans held in amplifying the state , and that in their judgements touching the state , they alwaies avoided the middle way , and turn'd to the extreams : for a government is nothing else , but to have such a tye upon the subjects , that they either cannot , or will not hurt thee . this is done either by making thy self fully sure of them , in taking away from them all means to hurt thee , or by doing them so much good , that it is not probable they will wish to change their state : all which is there comprehended ; first by the proposition camillus made , and afterwards by the judgement the senate gave thereupon . his words were these , in this consultation , the immortal gods have given you so much power , that it is wholly in your hands to chuse , whether latium shall continue still a nation or no. and therefore now may ye for ever procure your selves repose and security from thence , either by rigor and punishment , or by clemency and pardon ; chuse ye whether . are ye minded to proceed by way of cruelty against those that have yeelded , and are vanquish'd ? ye may indeed blot out the very name of latium ; but will ye , as your ancestors have done before you , enlarge the roman empire , by receiving into your city those whom ye have conquer'd ? then have ye here means to grow mighty to your great glory . certes that government is of all other most sure , where the subjects take joy in their obedience . and therfore it is behoovefull , whiles their mindes are in suspence between fear and hope , to prevent them either with speedy punishment or benefit . to this purpose followed the senates deliberation , which was according to the consuls words ; for calling them town by town , before them , those that were of any moment , they either much benefited , or quite ruined them , granting divers exemptions and priviledges to those they would do good to , freely making them citizens , and giving them security every way . they dismantled the other strong towns , and sent colonies thither , and brought the people from thence into rome , and so dispersed them , that neither with their arms nor counsel they could do any more harm : nor ever did they make use of any neutral way , in things ( as i have said ) of moment . princes should imitate this judgment given ; and hereunto the florentines should have intended , when in the year . arezzo and the valley of chiana rebelled ; which had they done , they had secured their government , and much amplified the city of florence , and likewise might have given them those fields they wanted for their sustenance : but they made use rather of that middle way , which is the most pernicious , in giving judgment upon men , so that part of the aretins they confined , part they condemned , and took from all of them their honors , and ancient degrees in the city , and yet left the city whole and untouched : and if any citizen in their consultations advised that arezzo should be dismantelled , and razed , they who seemed to be of the wiser sort , said it would be a disgrace to the florentines to raze it ; because it would be thought then that florence wanted forces to hold them ; which are some of those reasons that seem to be , but are not true : for by the same reason a patricide were not to be put to death , not any vile or scandalous person , it being a shame for that prince to shew that he is not able to bridle such a man alone : and these kind of men having such opinions , perceive not , how men in particular , and sometimes a whole city together too , do wrong a state : so that for others example , and his own safeguard , a prince hath no other remedy , but uterly to raze it . and indeed the honor consists in the knowledg and power to chastise , and not in being able to hold a city under stil with many dangers : for the prince that punishes not him that offends , so that he cannot offend more , is esteemd ignorant and unworthy . this sentence which the romans gave , is confirm'd by the judgement they gave upon the privernates . where by the text in livie two things may be observed : the one , which is formerly spoken of , that subjects are either to be oblig'd by good done them , or else to be quite extingnish'd ; the other is , how much avails the generous conrage of the minde , and true speaking in the presence of sage and discreet men . the senate of rome was assembled to give their sentence upon the privernates , who having been in rebellion , were by force reduc'd to the roman obedience . many citizens were sent from the privernates to crave pardon of the senate , who being come before them , were thus ask'd by one of the senators , what punishment he should censure the privernates worthy of ? whereunto one of the privernates reply'd , the same that they deserve , who think themselves worthy of liberty . whereunto the consul answerd , what if we remit you your punishment , what peace shall we hope for with you ? to which he said again , if it be good you give us , you shall have it faithfully and perpetually observ'd , if ill , not long . whereupon the wises of those of the senate , howbeit many were angry thereat , said , that they had heard a stout and a free man speak ; neither was it credible that any nation , or any man indeed , would continue any longer , than he must needs , in such a condition , whereof he repents himself ; and there onely was it likely a peace would be inviolably kept , where it was made of their own good wills and freely ; but it was in no case to be hop'd for there , where they were brought into bondage and servitude . and upon these words they decreed , that the privernates should be made citizens of rome , and honoured them with all the priviledges of their bourgessie , saying , that they finally were worthy to be citizens of rome , who valu'd nothing else in comparison of their liberty . so much were these generous spirits taken with this stout and free answer : for , an answer else would have been false and cowardly . and those that think otherwise of men ( especially such as are us'd to be free , or to their thinking are free ) are much deceiv'd , and by this deceit are they feduc'd to take wrong courses for themselves , and of little satisfaction to others : from whence arise the often rebellions and ruines of states . but to return to our discourse , i conclude as well by this , as by that judgement given upon the latins , when sentence is to pass upon puissant cities , and that have been accustomed to enjoy their liberties , it is necessary either utterly to raze them , or by benefiting of them to oblige them ; otherwise it is all to no purpose ; for the middle way here in is absolutely to be avoided , which is dangerous , as it prov'd to the samnites , having inclos'd the romans at the gallows of gaudium , when they would not follow that old mans counsell that advis'd them , either to let them go with all courtesie and love , or put them all to the sword . but they taking that neutral way , disarming them , and putting them all to pass under the gallows , let them go with shame and disdain so that a while after they found by their own dammage how advantageous that old mans advice had been , and how hurtfull their own resolution was , as we shall discourse thereof more at large in its own place . chap. xxiv . fortresses in general do more harm then good . peradventure it may seem to the wise men of our times a matter not well advised on , that the romans , when they would make themselves sure of the people of latium , and of the city of privernum , never thought upon the building of some fortress which might serve for a bridle to hold them in obedience , especially being it passes for a proverb in florence , alledg'd by our states men , that pisa and other such like cities should be kept with citradells . and truely had the romans been like them , they would have provided for the building of them : but because they were of another kind of courage , and judgement , and had another manner of power , therefore they never built any . and whiles rome liv'd free , and observ'd her own ordinances , & institutions , for the propagation of vertue , she never built any one to keep under cities or provinces , though it may be , she preserv'd some of them she found already built . whereupon having seen the manner of the romans proceedings herein , and that of the princes of our times , i think to take it into consideration , whether it be good to build fortresses , & whether they advantage or wrong him that builds them . we must consider then , that fortresses are built either for resistance against the enemy , or for defence against any tumult of the subjects . in the first case they are unnecessary , in the second hurtfull . and to give a reason , wherefore in the second case they are hurtfull , i say , that that prince or republick that is afraid of his own subjects , and their rebellion , must needs have his fear arising from the hatred his own subjects bear him ; and that hatred from his own evill carriages , which evill carriages proceed from thence , either that he beleeves he is able to keep them under by force , or from the princes small discretion : and one of the causes that makes him think himself able to rule them by force , is the having built these citradels , over them : for evill treatings , which are the causes of hatred , for the most part are deriv'd from thence , that that prince or republick hath cittadels upon them ; which ( when this is true ) are far more hurtful , than profitable : for first ( as it is said ) they make thee bolder and more rough among thy subjects , being that thou hast thy security within them : for all these forces and violences which are in use to bridle a people withall , are of no value , but these two ; either that thou hast alwaies a good army ready to send into the field , as the romans had , or that thou doest disperse , extinguish , disorder , and disunite them so , that in no case they can make such a body as can hurt thee : for be it that thou doest impoverish them , they that are despoil'd of their goods , have weapons left them . if thou disarmst them , even rage will find them weapons . if thou destroyest their heads , and proceedest still to injure the rest , there will grow up again new heads , as fast as those of hydra . if thou buildest cittadels , they are quite unprofitable in time of peace , because they encourage thee to wrong them ; but in time of war they are of least use ; for then are they assaulted by the enemy , and thy subjects too ; nor is it possible they can resist them both . and if ever they were unprofitable , they are now a dayes so , in regard of the artillery , by reasons of whose fury and violence , it is unpossible to defend small fortresses , and where there is no place for retiring with new retrenchments , as formerly hath been shew'd . but i will dispute this matter more plainly yet . wilt thou o prince with these cittadels curb thy citizens ? or wilt thou whether prince or commonwealth that thou art , bridle a city thou hast taken by war ? i will address my self to the prince , and tel him , that such a fortress to curb his citizens cannot be more unprofitable , for the reasons above alleadgd : because it makes thee prompter , and less careful how thou doest oppress them , which oppression makes them desperate in attempting thy ruine , and so inrages them , that that fortress , which is the cause thereof , can no way preserve thee ; so that a sage and good prince , to keep himself still good , and that he may not give occasion to , nor imbolden his children to become bad , will never build fortress , to the end they relie not upon the cittadels , but rather upon the hearts of men . and if count francis storce that came to be duke of milan was reputed wise , and yet in milan he built a cittadel , i say , that herein he little shewd his wisdome , as appeard by the effect , seeing that fortress proved rather a disadvantage and loss , then any safeguard to his heirs : for thinking that by means thereof they might pass their time in security , and yet injure their citizens and subjects , they forbare not any kind of violence ; whereupon being grown very odious , they lost the state , so soon as they were assail'd by their enemy . nor could that fortress defend them , nor did it any way advantage them in the war , and in time of peace it had done them much harme ; for if there had been no such citradel , and they for want of discretion onely had sharply handled some of their subjects , they might sooner have discover'd the danger , and withdrawn themselves from it , and so afterwards they would have bin able with more courage to have resisted the french fury , having their subjects to freind without any fortress , then having them become thine enemies with thy fortress , which gives thee no help at all . for either it is lost by the treachery of him that guards it , or is forced by the assailant , or else by famine . and if thou wouldest that these should avail thee , and help the to recover a state lost , where only the fortress holds for thee , thou must have an army , wherewith thou maist assault him that chased the from thence . and whensoever thou hast this army , thou couldest not in any wise faile of recovering the state , howsoever there were no fortress at all ; and that the more easily , by how much the inhabitants would be more thy friends , then if thou hadst ill-treated them through presumption upon thy fortress . and it hath been proved by experience , how that this cittadell of milan hath little availed either the forces or the french party in the adversity of the one or other , but hath rather brought upon them many ruins and mischiefes , having never advised , by means thereof , upon any fair way to keep that state . guido vbaldo duke of vrbin , son to frederick , who in his daies was esteemed a great captain , being driven out of his state by caesar borgia son to pope alexander the sixt , when afterwards upon a new grown occasion he returned thither again , he caused all the fortresses to be demolished that were in the country , thinking they did more harme then good : for he having gained mens hearts to him , for their sakes would not abide them ; and in regard of enemies , he saw they were not able to defend him , it being needfull to have a good army in the field to preserve them withall , so that he resolved to raze them all . pope julius , having driven the bentivogli out of bolonia , built a cittadell there , and caused a governor of his to ransacke them shrewdly , insomuch that the people rebelled , and he suddenly lost the cittadel , so that it served him to little purpose , or rather wronged him as much , as carrying himself otherwise it could have helped him . nicolas of castello father of the vitelli , returning into his country from whence he had been banished , forthwith demolished two several fortresses , which pope sextus the fourth had built there , deeming that not the fortress , but the peoples good wills were more likely to continue him in his state. but of all other examples , the freshest and of most remarke in every point , and that which is fittest to shew the incommodity of building them , and the fruit of razing them , is that of genua which fell out in these latter times . it is well known how that genua in the yeare . rebelled against lewis the twelfth , king of france , who came in person , and with all his strength to regain it : which being done , he caused an exceeding strong cittadel to be built there , surpassing in strength all others that are now adaies known : for in regard of the scituation , and the other circumstances belonging thereto , it was impregnable , being placed upon the very point of a hill , which stretched it self out into the sea , called by the genueses , godefa . and hereby the whole port , and a great part of the town of genua was subject to its battery : it happend afterwards in the year of our lord god . when the french were driven out of italy , for all the fortress , genua rebelled and octavian fregoso recovered the state thereof , who by his industry in the terme of moneths took it by famine , and as every one beleeved , so he was advised by many , to reserve it for his refuge in any accident . but he , as he was exceeding wise , knowing that they were not fortresses , but mens good wills that preserved princes in their state , razed it to the ground , and so without laying the foundation of his dominion upon the fortress , but rather upon his own valour and judgement , he hath continually held it , and holds it yet . and whereas a thousand foot were formerly of force to charge the state of genua , his adversaries have since assailed it with ten thousand , and have not been able to hurt him . by this therefore it appears , how the demolishing of the fortress hurt not octavian at all , nor did the building of it advantage the king of france : for when he was able to come into italy bringing an army with him , he might recover genua , though he had no fortress there ; but when he could bring no army with him into italy , neither could he keep the genueses in obedience , though he had a fortress there . it was therefore an expence to the king to build it , and a shame to lose it , and to octavian a glory to regain it . but let us come to those republiques that raise up fortresses , not in their native countries , but in those they have conquered . and to shew this fallacy , if that example of france and genua suffice not , this of florence and pisa may , where the florentines had built a cittadel , to keep that town in subjection : and never advised themselves , that a city which had alwaies been a prosessed enemy to the florentines , having lived free , which hath a recourse to liberty for a colour of rebellion , it was necessary ( being desirous to keep her ) to use that manner the romans had , either to take her as a companion into the state , or to deface and ruine her : for of what value cittadels are , we saw in king charles his comming into italy , to whom they were yeelded , either through the treachery or cowardise of their governors . whereas if they had not been , the florentines would never have grounded their ability of keeping pisa stil upon them , nor would the king have been of power that way to have bereaved the florentines of that city ; and those means , whereby untill that time it had been maintained , would peradventure have been of force to preserve it . and without doubt they could not have made a worse triall , then that of the fortresses . i conclude therefore , that for the safety of ones native country , a strong hold is but hurtfull ; & to keep under towns that are conquered , cittadels availe little . and hereunto the authority of the romans shall suffice me , who dismantelled the towns they intended to hold by force , & never built up their walls ; and if any one against this opinion should alledge me the example of tarentum in ancient times , and in these modern that of brescia , which places , by means of the cittadells , were recovered from the subjects rebellion : i answer , that at the years end fabius maximus was sent with the whole army to recover tarentum , who would have been able to recover that , though thete had been no cittadell there . and though fabius put those means in practise , yet had they never been , he would have us'd some other , which would have produced the same effect . and i know not what advantage a cittadell yeelds , that to regain thee the town , requires a consular army , and a fabius maximus for commander , before it can be done . and that the romans in any case had recover'd it plainly , appears by the example of capua , where there was no cittadell , but they got it by the soldiers valor . but to that of brescia , i say , that seldome chances which befell in that rebellion , that the fortress which is possessed still by thy forces ( the town being fallen into rebellion ) should have a great army to friend and near hand , as was that of the french : for the lord de fois the kings general being with his army at bolonia , when he understood the loss of brescia , by means of the fortress indeed recover'd the towne . therefore that fortress yet stood in need ( to do any good ) of such a one as was the lord of fois , and a french army , that in three daies might relieve them ; so that this example against those on the contrary side is of small weight : for many fortresses have been taken in the wars in our daies , and recover'd by the same fortune that the field hath been taken , and recovered again , not only in lombardy , but in romania , in the kingdom of naples , and in all parts of italy . but touching the building of sortresses for defence against forrain enemies , i say , they are not usefull to those people , nor kingdoms , who have good armies on foot ; they are rather unprofitable , because that good armies without fortresses are of force to keep them : but fortresses without good armies cannot defend thee . and this we see by experience of those who have been held excellent in matters of state and government and other things , as we know the romans and spartans were : for if the romans built no fortresses , the spartans did not only forbear from them , but suffered none of their cities to be wall'd in neither , because they would have no other guard but a mans own valor , to defend him . whereupon when a spartan was asked by an athenian , whether the walls about athens were not very faire , he answered him , yes , if all the inhabitants of the town were women . to that prince then that hath good armies , when upon the maritime frontiers of his state he hath a fortress , that for some few daies he is able to sustain the enemy , till things are somewhat order'd , it would sometimes be of small avail , but of no necessity . but when a prince hath no strong army , fortresses either in the heart of his state , or at his frontiers , are hurtfull , or unprofitable : hurtfull , because he easily loses them , and being lost they make war upon him ; or put case they are so strong , that the enemy cannot take them , they are left behind by the enemies army , and so they become of no service . for good armies , if they meet not with very sharp encounters , enter far into their enemies countries , 〈◊〉 thout regard either of town or fortress they leave behind them : as it was evident in the ancient stories , and as we see francis maria did , who in these latter times without any regard of them , left ten of the enemies cities behind him , to assayl that of vrbin , that prince then that can raise a good army , can do well enough , without having any strong holds : but he that cannot have an army ready , should never build any : well may he fortifie the city of his abode , and keep it in good strength , and the citizens thereof well disposed , whereby he may be able to support the enemies violence , till either some accord , or some forrain aid come to his relief . all other designes are expensive in time of peace , and unfruitfull in time of war. and whosoever shall well weigh all this that i have said , shall perceive that the romans as they were in all other their affairs very judicious , so were they very well advised in this judgement they gave upon the latins , and the privernates , where taking no care at all for citadels , they assur'd themselves of them by wiser and better waies . chap. xxv . it is a wrong course to assayle a city fallen into discord , thinking by means thereof , to master it . in the roman republick the people and the nobility were so far fallen asunder , that the veyentes together with the eburans by means of their disagreement , thought they might be able quite to root out the romans : and having levied an army , and forrag'd all the country of rome , the senate armed out cneus manilius and m. fabius against them , who having brought their army near to that of the veyntes , they forbear not with all insolences and reproaches to revile them , and disgrace the roman name , and such was their fool-hardiness and presumptions that the romans though then they were ar●ods one with another , came to agreement , and so comming to the combat , broke and vanquish'd them . we see therefore how much men deceive themselves ( as formerly we have treated ) in the courses they take , and that many times where they think to get , they lose . the veyentes beleev'd , that by getting upon the romans that were at variance one with another , they should overcome them , but it prov'd the occasion of reconcilement to the romans , but of ruine to themselves : for the causes of discord in republicks , is most commonly idleness and peace ; and the cause of union and concord is fear and war. wherefore had the veyentes been wise , the more at variance they had perceived rome to have been , so much the more should they have forborn from war against them , and with devices of peace cast about how to master them . the way is , to endeavour to be reputed a confident friend of that city , which is in discord : and whiles they come not to armes , to carry himself as an umpire between both parties . and when they do come to armes , to afford some slow favours to the weaker party , as well to keep them still at war , and consume them , as to hinder them from doubting that with thy great forces thou meanest to suppress them , and become their prince . and when this part is well plaid , it cannot fail ordinarily , but that it will directly have the success thou lookest for . the city of pistoya ( as in another discourse and to another purpose i said ) came to the florentines republick , by no other trick than this : for it being divided in factions , the florentines now favouring the one , and then the other without any imputation of blame from either , brought them to such terms , that being tir'd with their tumultuous living , they came willingly to cast themselves into the florentines armes . the city of siena never changed her state upon the florentines favour , but when their courtesies came but thin and small : for when they were frequent and strong , they united them rather for the defence of the state in which they liv'd . i will adde to these aforesaid one other example . philp visconti duke of milan , several times made war against the florentines , grounding much upon their disagreements , and alwaies came off a loser . whereupon he was wont to say , when he complained of the evill success of his undertakings , that the florentines follies had made him spend two millions of gold to no purpose . therefore ( as it was said before ) the veyentes and the etruscans deceived themselves by this conceit of theirs , and were at last in a set battell vanquish'd by the romans . and thus will others find themselves deceiv'd , whoever shall seek by the like course , and upon the same occasion to subdu any nation or people . chap. xxvi . contempt and contumely begets a hatred against those that use it , without any returne of advantage to them . i eeleeve it is one of the greatest parts of wisdome in men , to abstain from threatning or injuring of any one in words ; for neither the one nor other bereave the enemy of any part of his strength ; but the one makes him more wary of thee , and the other bear more deadly hatred against thee , and devise by all manner of waies he can to hurt thee . this is plain by the example of the veyentes , whereof we spake in the former chapter : who to the wrong of making war against the romans , added the reproach of words , from which every prudent commander ought to restrain his soldiers : so that they are things that incense and provoke the enemy to revenge , and are no defence ( as it is said ) against the hurt he does , insomuch that they are all weapons thrown from thee , which returne againe upon thee , whereof there followed a notable example a good while since in asia , where gabades a commander of the persians , having a long while lien incamped before amida , and determined upon the tediousness of the siege to depart , and therefore to that purpose rising with his campe , those of the town being come all upon the walls , and grown insolent upon their victory , forbore no kind of outrage , disgracing , blaming and reproaching the enemy with his baseness and cowardise : whereupon gabades being incensed , alter'd his purpose , and return'd to the siege , where such was their indignation at the contumely , that in a few daies they took and sack'd the town . in the same manner it befell the veyentes , who were not content ( as is said ) to make war against the romans , but they rayl'd on them in vile termes , going even to their very trenches to reproach them , so that they incensed them more with their words then blowes : and those soldiers which were hardly drawn to fight , constrein'd the consul to begin to fight , so that the veyentes suffer'd , as the others we spoke of before , for their insolence . wherefore every good commander of armies , and good governor of commonwealths is to practice all possible remedies , that these injuries or reproaches be not us'd either in the city or the army , neither one among another , nor against the enemy : for being practised against the enemy , there arise from thence the aforesaid inconvenients : and among themselves they would do worse , when there is no reparation made , which wise and judicious men have alwaies awarded . when the roman legions left at capua conspired against the capuans , as in its place shall be related , and a sedition was there occasioned by this conspiracy , ( which was afterwards quieted by valerius corvinus ) among other constitutions which were made in the agreement , they ordained very grievous punishments for those that should ever reproach any of those soldiers with that sedition . tiberius gracchus , who during the warrs with hannibal was made a captain over some certain number of slaves , whom the romans for want of men had put into armes , ordained specially a capital punishment for any that should object to any of them their servitude : so hurtful a matter ( as it is said ) was it thought by the romans to set men at nought , and reproach them with any disgrace ; for there is nothing so much incenses men to rage or breeds more hatred in them , whether it be spoken in earnest or in jeast . bitter taunts when they have too great a mingle of truth with them , leave behind them a very distastfull remembrance . chap. xxvii . prudent princes and commonwealths ought to be contented with the victory : for oftentimes when that suffices them not , they lose it . the using of disgracefull words against the enemy , proceeds most commonly from an insolencie , which either the victory or a false hope of victory incites thee to : which false hope causes men to erre not only in their sayings , but in their doings also : for this hope when it enters into mens breasts , makes them go beyond the point , and many times lose the opportunity of having a certain good , hoping to attain unto a better uncertain good : and because this is a matter worthy consideration , men often deceiving themselves , to the dammage of their state , i am of advice to shew it particularly by ancient examples and modern , being it cannot so distinctly be prov'd by reasons . hannibal , after he had defeated the romans at canna , sent his agents to carthage , to give them notice of the victory , and to demand new supplies . it was argued in the senate , what was fit to be done . hanno an old man and a discreet citizen of carthage advised , to use this victory wisely , and make peace with the romans , being that now they might have it upon reasonable termes , having gained a battell ; and that they should not go about to seek for it after a battell lost : for it should be the carthaginians design to shew the romans , that they were able to deal with them , and having gotten a victory , they should take a care not to lose it for hope of a greater . this course was not taken , but afterwards the senate of carthage understood that this was very good counsell , when the occasion was lost . when alexander the great had conquer'd all the levant , the commonwealth of tyre , famous in those daies , and puissant , by reason that their city was seated in the water , as venice is , seeing alexanders greatness , sent ambassadors to him to tell him , that they would become his faithfull servans , and yeeld him what obedience he should desire , but that they would not admit either him or his soldiers into their town . whereat alexander disdaining , that any one city should shut her gates against him , seeing he had forc'd all others open throughout the whole world , would not accept their conditions , but rejected them , and forthwith sent his army thither . that town stood in the water , and was well provided with victualls , and other munition fit for defence , so that alexander after four moneths spent , considering that one city took away all that time from his glory , which many other great conquests never did , and therefore determined to try an agreement , and to grant what they of themselves had asked . but they of tyre being grown insolent hereupon , not only refused the conditions , but slew those that came to treat with them . whereupon alexander all enraged at this affront , so stronly assaulted the town , that he took it , destroy'd it , and slew or made slaves all the men therein . a spanish army came upon the florentines territories , to restore the medici into florence , and to lay some taxes upon the town , being hired hereunto by some citizens inhabiting therein , who put them in hopes that as soon as they should set foot in their country , they would take armes in favour of them ; they comming into the plain , and none of these discovering themselves to be for them , because they had want of victualls , tryed to make an agreement , whereupon the florentines grown proud , would not accept of any , upon which occasion followed the loss of prato , and the ruine of that state. therefore princes cannot commit a greater error when they are assail'd ( in case the assailants are far more puissant then they ) then to refuse all termes of agreement , especially when they are proffer'd them : for never will such poor ones be offerd , wherein is not in a good measure comprised his good that accepts them , and some part of his victory . wherefore the tyrians should have satisfied themselves , that alexander accepted those conditions he had formerly refused : and their victory had been great enough , when with their armes in hand , they had made so mighty a prince as he to yeeld to their demands . it should have sufficed the florentines also , and they had gotten a good victory too , if the spanish army gave way to any of their desires , though they had not fulfilled all of them ; for that armies design was to change the state of florence , to take away her devotion to france , and to draw some monies from her . when of these three the people had yeelded to two , which were the last , and had gotten themselves but one , which was the preservation of their state , they within had each of them gained some honour and satisfaction , nor should the people have troubled themselves for the other two things , one remaining to them ; nor should they have offered , sing they had been sure of a certain victory to hazard it at fortunes discretion , trying even the extremity thereof , which never any wise man will endanger himself in , unless it be upon necessity . hanniball being departed out of italy , where he had been very glorious for sixteen years , recalled by his own country men the carthaginians , to releive his native country , found asdruball and siphax defeated , the kingdome of numidia lost , and carthage restrain'd within the compass of her own walls , which had no other refuge but him and his army : and knowing that was his countries last hopes , he would not hazard it , till he had first made trial of all other remedies : nor was he asham'd to ask peace , judging , that if there was any way to save his country , it was by that , and not by war , which being refused him , though he had been sure to lose , he would not faile to fight , thinking that it might fall out so , that possible it was for him to overcome , and if lose , it he must lose it gloriously . and if hanniball , who was so valorous a captain , and had his army intire , did require peace , before he would hazard the battell , when he perceived that in losing it , his country would be subdued , what should another of less valor and experience then he do ? but men run into this error , by not knowing how to limit their hopes , so that grounded on their own vast conceits , without weighing their strengths , they are utterly ruin'd . chap. xxviii . how dangerous a thing it is for a republick or prince not to revenge an injury done against a publick state , or against a private person . what , indignation may cause men to do , is easily known , by that which befell the romans , when they sent the three fabij for ambassadours to the french , who came to invade tuscany , and in particular clusium : for the people of clusium , having sent to require aide at rome , the romans sent their ambassadors to the french , to let them know they were to forbear from making warr against the tuscans , which ambassadours being upon the place , and fitter to play the soldiers part , then the ambassadors , the french and the tuscans comming to fight , they rank'd themselves amongst the foremost to combat the french , whence it came , that being known by them , they converted all the hatred they bore the tuscans against the romans , which hatred became greater : for the french by their ambassadors having complained to the senate of this injury , and required in satisfaction of the dammage , that the aforementioned fabij should be given into their hands , they were not only not given them , or in any other manner punished , but when the time of their assemblies came , they were made tribuns with consular power : insomuch that the french perceiving those to be honored , that should have been punipunished , took all this as done in despight and disgrace to them : and thus incensed with rage and disdain they came to assaile rome , which they took , the capitoll excepted . which destruction fell upon the romans , only for their inobservance of justice : for their ambassadors having offended against the law of nations , when they should have been punished , were honored . therefore it is worthy consideration , how much every republick or prince should beware of doing the like wrong , not only against a nation , but also against any particular man : for if a man be exceedingly offended either by the publick , or by any private man , and hath had no reparation made him to his content : if he lives in a commonwealth , he will seek even with the utter ruine thereof to avenge himself : if he lives under a prince , and be a man of any courage , he will never rest , till in some kind or other he be revenged on him , however that he knows he draws thereby his own destruction on his head . and to verify this , there is not a fitter nor truer example , then that of philip of macedon alexanders father . in his court there was a very handsome young noble man named pausanias , and of him one attalus , one of the cheifest men , that was neer about philip , was inamourd ; who having several times tryed if he would yeeld to him , and finding him far off from consenting to any such thing , determined to gain that by a trick and by force , which no way else he saw he could attain to . and having made a solemn invitation , whereat pausanias and many other noble men met , after that every one had liberally eate and drinke , caus'd pausanias to be taken and brought to some by-chamber , were not only by force he satisfied his beastly lust upon him , but the more to disgrace him , he made him be so used by many others in the like manner . of which injury pausanias several times made his complaint to philip , who having held him a long time in hope of revenging him , instead thereof made attalus governour of a province in greece ; whereupon pausanias seeing his enemy honored , and not punished , converted his indignation not against him that had injured him , but against philip that had not aveng'd him . and on a morning when philips daughter was solemnly married to alexander of epirus , as philip went to the temple to celebrate the espousals , he slew him between the two alexanders , the son , and the son in law . which example is much like that of the romans , and is remarkeable for all those that rule , who should never value any man at so low a rate , as to think ( that by heaping injury upon injury ) he that is thus wrong'd will not devise some way to be reveng'd , though it be with his own utter loss and destruction . chap. xxix . fortune blinds mens minds , when she will not suffer them to prevent her designes . if we consider well the course of humane affaires , wee shall many times see things come to pass , and chances happen which the heavens altogether would not , that order should be taken to prevent . and in as much as this , which i speak of , befell rome , where there was so much valor , so much religion and good order , it is no marvail if the same thing often fall out in a city or country that wants the said things : and because this place is very remarkable to shew the power heaven hath over human things , t. livius at large and with words of very great efficacy represses it , saying , that the heavens would for some end , that the romans should know their power ; and therefore caus'd those fabij to erre , that were sent ambassadors to the french , and by their means provokt them to make war against rome . and afterwards ordaind , that for the suppressing of that war , there was nothing done in rome worthy of the romans , having first ordain'd , that camillus , who only was able to remedy so great a mischief should then be banished to ardea . and then the french comming towards rome , they who to resist the fury of the volsci and many their neighbouring enemies , had several times created a dictatour ; now upon the approach of the french never created any . moreover , for their choyce of soldiers , it was very weake , and without any extraordinary diligence : & they were so slow in taking of arms , that they were hardly time enough to incounter the french at the river allia , ten miles from rome . here the tribuns pitcht their campe without any ordinary diligence : not viewing the ground first , neither incompassing it with trench or pali●ado , making use neither of human nor divine helps . and in ranging of their battell , they left their ranks so thin and weak , that as well the soldiers as the captains did nothing worthy of the roman discipline . they fought afterwards without any effusion of blood , for they fled before they were assayl'd : the greater part went thence to veium , the other retir'd to rome , who never going into their own houses , went unto the capitoll : so that the senate taking no care to defend rome , did not so much as shut the gates , and part of them fled from thence , and part got into the capitoll ; yet in defence thereof , they had not such disorder ; for they did not cloy it with unusual people , they furnished it with all the corne they could possibly get , that it might endure out the siege : and the greater part of the unprofitable multitude of old men , women , and children , fled unto the neighbouring towns about , the rest staid at rome for a prey to the french. so that whoever should have read of the brave atchievements of that people many years before , and afterwards of these times following them , would have much a do to beleeve it were the same people . and t. livius having reckon'd up the aforesaid disorders , concludes thus , so much does fortune blind mens eyes , when shee would not have her force withstood . nor can this conclusion be more true . whereupon men that are alwaies under hard crosses deserve the less blame , as they that enjoy continuall prosperity also merit less prayse ; for we shall many times see those led to their destruction , and these advanc'd to an extraordinory greatness by some occasion the heavens have presented in their furtherances hereto , giving means to the one to behave himself vertuously , & quite bereaving the other of them . and we may well say fortune does this , for she makes choyce of a man ( when she purposes to bring great matters to pass ) of such judgement and spirit , that knows how to make use of those occasions she presents him . so in like manner , when shee would bring horrible destructions upon any place , she there preferrs men to that purpose , that they may help to draw on that ruine . and in case there be any that may prevent these mischiefes , shee either brings him to his end , or else deprives him of all abilities to do any goood . this we very well know by our authors discourse , how that fortune for to amplify rome , and to bring it to that greatness it attain'd to , deemd it necessary to scourge it , as we shall discourse at large in the beginning of the next book following , but yet would not wholly ruin it . and this appears , in as much as shee banished camillus , but put him not to death : shee made rome be taken , but not the capitoll : shee ordein'd that the romaus should not think out any thing of avayle to save rome ; yet for defence of the capitoll , they wanted of no good advice . to the end rome should be taken , she causd the greater part of those soldiers , that were routed at allia , to go to vejum . and as for defence of the city of rome , she cut off all the waies to order it , so shee prepar'd every thing ready to recover it again , having conducted an intire roman army to vejum , and camillus to ardea , whereby they might be able to make a strong head under the command of a captain never blemished with any disgrace of loss yet , & throughly whole in his reputation , for the recovery of his country . wee might here produce some modern example to confirm what wee have said : but because i think it unnecessary , being this may well suffice , i shall omit it . i avow therefore this to be very true , as by many histories wee may see it , that men may well follow fortune , but not oppose it ; they may well weave her webs , but not break them . wherefore let men never abandon themselves , being they know not what shall become of them in the end , the passages of their fortunes being through crooked and unknown waies ; they should ever hope , and so hoping put on still , and never give over in despaire , whatsoever chance or trouble they be faln into . chap. xxx . republicks and princes , that really are mighty , seek not by monies to make alliance with others , but by their valour , and repute of their forces . the romans were straightly besiegd in the capitoll , and however they lookt for ayd from vejum , and from camillus , being forc't by famine , they came to termes of agreement with the french , to redeem themselves for a certain sum of money , upon which agreement , as they were weighing the gold , camillus , arriv'd with his army , which fortune brought to pass ( saies our historian ) to the end that the romans should not live redeemd by gold . which thing is not only remarkable in this part , but in the procese of this commonwealths actions , where it is evident , that they never vanquished towns with moneys , nor ever bought peace by mony , but by prowesse in the warres . which i think never befell any other republick ; and among other signes by which a man discerns the power of a state , he is to marke in what manner it lives with the neighbouring states . and when it is so orderd , that they become tributaries thereunto , to keep friendship with it , there is an assured sign , that that state is powerfull . but when the said neighbours , though inferious to it , draw money from thence , there is then a great evidence of the weakness thereof . read all the roman stories , and ye shall see how the massilians , the aeduans , the rhodians , hiero , the siracusan , enmenes , and massinissa kings joyning upon the confines of the roman empire , to have friendship with it , concur'd in expences and tribute at all times that need was , seeking after no other requitall thereof , but to be protected by it . wee shall see the contrary in poor and feeble states ; and so beginning at ours of florence in the times past , even when the reputation thereof was at the greatest , there was never a great lord in romania , that had not some allowance from thence , and besides she gave to those of perugia , and castella , & to all the rest of her neighbours . for had this city been warlick and strong , the contrary would have followd ; for all those to have been under the protection of it , would have given money , and have sought to buy its friendship , and not to sell their own . neither have the florentines alone liv'd in this baseness , but the venetians , and the king of france , who , though a prince of great dominions , lives tributary to the swisses , and the king of engl. the cause whereof is , in that he disarmes his subjects , and because that king and those other afore-named had rather enjoy a present profit to rack their people and squeese them , and avoid rather an imaginary than a real danger , than do such expedients as would secure and for ever make their states happy . which disorder , though some while it may produce quiet , yet in time it proves the cause of want , losses , and unrecoverable ruine . and it would be too long to relate , how many times the florentines , the venetians , and this kingdome , have redeemd themselves even in the warrs , and how many times they have subjected themselves to disgrace , which the romans were only once like to have done . it would be tedious to tell , how many towns the florentines and venetians have bought , whereof afterwards the inconvenience hath been found , and how that those things that are bought with gold , men know not how to desend with the sword . the romans observd this brave way and manner of living , while they were free ; but after they came under their emperors governments , and that those emperors grow naught , and lov'd the shade , and could not endure any toyle in the sun , they began also to redeem themselves , somtimes from the parthians , somtimes from the germans , and now and then also from some others of their neighbours , which was the beginning of that great empires ruine . whereupon arose the like inconvenients from their having disarm'd their people , from whence also proceeds another greater , that the nearer thy enemy comes to thee , the weaker he finds thee ; for whosoever lives after that manner we have spoken of above , treats evill those subjects he hath within his dominions , because his men are not so well disciplin'd in the wars , as to keep the enemy from entring into the heart of their country whence it proceeds , that to keep the enemy off : he allows some provision of moneys to those princes or people that border upon his country . and thereupon , those states make some resistance upon the confines only , which when the enemy hath past , they have no kind of remedy left : and they perceive not , that this their manner of proceeding , is quite contrary to all good order : for the heart and the vital parts of a body are to be arm'd , and not the extremities thereof ; for it can live without those , but if these be hurt it dyes : but these states keep the heart disarm'd , and arme their hands and feet . what this disorder hath done at florence , hath been and is daily seen : for when any army posses the frontiers , and enters near to the heart of the country , there is no further remedy . wee saw not long since the same proof of the venetians ; and had not their . city been begirt by the waters , we should have seen an end of it . wee have not so often seen this tryal in france , because it is so great a kingdom , that it hath few enemies mightier than it : nevertheless . when the english invaded that country in the year . the whole country quak'd , and the king himself , and every one thought , that one defeat alone would have been sufficient to lose him the state. the contraty befell the romans ; for the nearer the enemy approached to rome , the more able he found the city to make resistance . and it was evident , when hannibal came into italy , that after three defeats , and the slaughters of so many captains and soldiers , they were not only able to sustain the enemy , but to vanquish him . all this proceeded from that they had well armd the heart , and made small account of the extremities ; for the foundation of their state was the people of rome ; and the latins , and the other townes their allyes in italy , and their colonies , from whence they drew so many soldiers , that with them they were able to fight with and keep in awe the whole world . and that this is true , it appears by the question hanno the carthaginian put to hannibals agents , after that great overthrow at canna , who having exceedingly magnified hannibals great acts , were asked by hanno , whether any of the komans were yet come to demand peace , or if any town of the latins , or any of their colonies had yet rebelld against the roman ; and they denying the one and the other , hanno reply'd , then is the warr yet as intire as it was at first . we see therefore by this discourse , and what wee have otherwhere said , what difference there is between the proceedings of republicks now adayes , and those of the ancients . wee see also hereupon every day exceeding great losses , and wonderfull great conquests : for where men are but of small valour and resolution , fortune shews much power : and because shee is alwaies various , therefore do common-wealths and states change often , and will alwaies change , till at length some one stand up , who is so much a lover of antiquitie , as to regulate her , that she take not occasion to shew at every turne of the sun , how great her power is . chap. xxxi . how dangerons a thing it is , to give credit to men that are banished out of their country . methinks it is not out of purpose , to treat among these other discourses , how dangerous a thing it is to trust those that are banished out of their country , these being matters that every day are practis'd by those that are rulers of states ; especially seeing it may be prov'd by a memorable example out of t. livius in his history , though this thing be out of his purpose quite . when alexander the great passed into asia with his army , alexander of epirus his kinsman & uncle , came with certain troopes into italy , being cald upon by some outlawd lucans , who put him in hope , that by their means he might become master of that whole country . whereupon it came to pass , that he being come into italy upon their word and assurance , was slain by them ; their citizens , having promisd them their return into their country , if they slew him . therefore should it be consider'd , how vain their words and promises are , who are banished their countries ; for , in regard of their word , it is to be thought , that whensoever by other means than thine , they can be restord to their country , they will forsake thee , and cleave to others , notwithstanding all the promises they have made thee . and this is the reason why there is no hold to their word , because so extream is their desire to return to to their native homes , that naturally they beleeve many things that are false , and some things out of their own cunning they adde ; so that between what they think , and what they say they think , they put thee in such hopes , that grounding thereupon , thou art brought to a vain expence , or to undertake somwhat that proves thy destruction . i will satisfie my self with the aforesaid example of alexander , and only this other of themistocles the athenian , who being outlawd , fled to darius in asia , where he promised him so much , when he should invade greece , that darius undertook the enterprise . but themistocles not being able to make good his promises , either for shame or fear of punishment , poisoned himself . and if themistocles a rare man committed this error , what should we think but that they do much more erre , who because of their less vertue will suffer themselves to be more violently drawn by their own passions and desires . and therefore a prince ought to proceed very slowly in undertakings upon the relation of exil'd men ; for otherwise he suffers either great shame , or dammage by them and because it seldom comes to pass , that towns and countries are taken by stealth , or by intelligence that any one hath in them ; methinks it is not much out of purpose to treate thereof in the chapter following , adding thereunto by how many waies the romans got them . chap. xxxii . how many waies the romans used to make themselves masters of townes . the romans applying themselves all to the war , did evermore make it with all advantage possible , as well for the expence , as for every thing else belonging thereto . from hence it proceeded , that they were alwaies aware of taking of townes by long sieges , thinking it a matter of great charges , and incommodity , that surpasses far the profit their conquest thereof can bring . and for this cause they though it more for their own advantage , to take a town any way else then by siege . whereupon in such great and so many wars , we have very few examples of sieges made by them . the waies then whereby they got their townes , were either by conquest or yeilding . and this conquest was either by force or open violence , or by force mingled with fraud . open violence was either by assault , without beating the walls , which was to beleagure a town round with an army : for they environd it , and combatted it on all parts , and many times it prov'd so luckily to them , that in one assault they took a town , though a very vast one , as when scipio took new carthage in spain . or when this assault served not , they betook them to break down the walls with their rams , and oher their warlike engines , or else by some mine or vault they made , whereby they enter'd the city , by which way the took the city of veium ; or to make themselves equal in height with those that defended the walls , they made towres of wood , or cast up mountains of earth , which leaned upon the wall on the outside , whereby they might get to the hight of it . against these assaults , they that defended the towns , in the first case in regard of their being besing'd round , rannne a more sudden hazard , and had more doubtfull remedies : for having need in every place of many defendants , perchance either those that they had , were not so many as could supply every place , or change often to refresh them : or if they could , they were not all of equal courage to make resistance : and in case the skirmish had inclin'd in any part , all had bin lost . therefore it came to pass ( as i said ) that this way lit many times on good success . but when it succeeded not at first , they did not much more try that way , because it was dangerous for the army : for the city being able for so long a space to defend it self , the army could not but grow weak , and hardly be able to withstand any fally of the enemies from within , and besides the soldiers disorder'd and wearied themselves hereby , yet notwithstanding for once , and that on the sudden , they assayld that way ) as for the breaking down of the walls , they made resistance as they do now adayes with new reparations , and against their mines , they made countermines , and thereby they oppos'd their enemies either with their armes in hand , or with other engines , & among others this was one , they fill'd divers vessels with feathers , and set fire on them , which being thus kindled they put into the mine , so that by the smoke and stink thereof , the enemy was hindred of entring thereinto : and if they assail●d them with towers of wood , they sought to fire them . and for the mounts of earth , they commonly broke open the wall underneath , whereupon the mount did lean , drawing thence the earth into the town , whereby they without did raise their mount , so that however they brought the earth without , being that they within carried it away , the mount came to no great matter . these waies of assailing cannot be continued long : for they must either rise from the siege , and seek by other means to make an end of the war , as seipio did when being entred into affricke he assaulted vtica , but could not take it , he rose thence with his whole camp , and sought how to overthrow the carthaginian armies ; or else they must turne again to the siege , as they did at veium , capua , carthage , and ierusalem , and other like townes , which they took by siege . as for conquest by force and fraud , as it befel palepolis , it chanced that the romans , by treating with the inhabitants took some towne . but by his assailing the romans and others , tried many , but prevail'd in few : the reason is , because every small impediment breakes the designe , and impediments easily happen : for either the conspiracie is discover'd before it takes effect ; and without much difficultie it is discovered , as well through their infidelity , to whom it is communicated , as by the difficulty to put it in practise , being they are to agreee with enemies with whom they cannot parly , but under some other colour . but in case the conspiracy be not disclosed in the ordering of it , there arise multitudes of difficulties in putting it in execution : for if either thou commest before the time appointed , or after , all is spoiled , if any false alarme be given , as was that of the geese in the capitol ; if any usual order be broken , every little error , or affright taken , spoiles the designe . hereunto may be added the darkness of the night which often puts in fear the rather those that undertake such perilous things . and the greater part of those men that are brought upon such enterprises , being unexperienced in the scituation , the countrey , and the places , whether they areled , become astonished , disheartned , and confused upon every small accident shall happen ; and every shadow is of force to make them run away . nor ever was there any more happy in thefe fraudulent night plots , then aratus sicioneus , who was as base and cowardly in any action by day , as he was of worth and spirit in these by night . which we may well think was rather through some hidden vertue wherewith he was endowed , then because there was naturally required in them the more good luck . many of these waies are put in practice , few of them come to trial , and very few take effect . touching the gaining of townes by yeelding , they yeeld either of good will or by force : this willingness arises either upon some forrain necessity , which compels them to fly unto thy protection , as capua did unto the romans , or through a desire to be wel governed , being allur'd by the good government that prince holds among them that have given themselves into his hands : as the rodians , the massilians , and other like cities did , that gave themselves unto the romans . touching surrendring up upon force , proceeds either from a long siege , as is formerly said , or from a continual oppression of incursions , pillagings , and other hard usages , which when a city desires to be freed from she yeelds her self . of all those said ways the romans practised this last more then foure hundred and fifty years to weary out their neighbors with routs and incursions , and by gaining credit with them , by gaining credit with them , by means of agreements made , as we have said otherwhere ; and upon that way they alwaies grounded , though they tryd all , but in the other they found things either dangerous or unprofitable . for in a siege , there is length of time and expences : in forcible assault , doubt and danger : and in conspiracies , uncertainty . and they saw , that by the defeat of an enemies army , sometimes they got a kingdom in one day , and to take by siege a town that was obstinate , it cost them many years . chap. xxxiii . how the romans gave the commanders of their armies free and large commissions . i think it fit for him ( that by reading of livies story would make advantage thereof ) wel to consider all the waies of the people and senate of romes proceedings : and among other things that merite consideration , his is one , to see with what authority they sent forth their consuls , dictators , & commanders of armies , which we see was very great , and the senate reserved thing else to themselves , but a power to make new wars , and to confirme peace , but they referred every thing else to the arbitrement and power of the consul : for when the people and the senate had once resolved on the war , ( as for example sake against the latines ) they left all the rest to the consuls discretion , who had free power either to fight a batttel , or to leave it , and to besiege either this , or any other town else as he pleas'd . which things by many examples are verified , and especially by that which fell out in an expedition against the tuscans : for fabius the consul having overcome them near unto sutrium , and intending with his army to pass the wood cimina , and go into tuscany , he did not onely not advise with the senate , but gave them no notice at all of it , though he was to make the war in a new countrey full of doubts and dangers : which is witnessed by a resolution of the senate taken directly against this very course ; who having understood of the victory fabius had gotten , and doubting he would venture to pass the said woods into tuscany , thinking it would be well not to try that war , nor ruin that hazzard , sent two deputies unto fabius , to give him notice , they would not have him pass into tuscany : who came thither , when he had already past , and gotten the victory , and in liew of hindring the war , they returned ambassadors of his conquest and victory gotten . and whosoever considers these termes , will find them discreetly used : for if the senate would have had the consull to proceed on forwards in the war , onely as they gave him order , they had made him less circumspect , and slower in his actions : for he would have thought , that the glory of the victory had not bin wholly his , but that the senate had participated with him , by whose counse he had bin governed . besides this , the senate then obliged themselves to advise in things they could not have the means to understand . for , notwithstanding than among them there were men exceedingly well experienced in the wars , yet being they were not upon the place , and therefore ignorant of very many particulars , which are needfull for him to know that will advise well , by interposing their councell , they would have committed many errors . and for this cause they suffered the consul to do all of himself , and that the glory thereof should be entirely his , the love of which they thought would provoke and encourage him to do well . i have the more willingly marked this place , because i see that the republiques now adayes , as the venetian and the florentine , understand it not so : and if their commanders , proveditours , and commissioners are to plant any battery , they will know it first , and advise thereupon . which course deserves the same praise the others do , which altogether have brought them into those miseries they now suffer . the third booke . chap. i. for the maintenance of a religion or a common-wealth long in being , it is necessary oftentimes to reduce them to their first grounds . it is most true , that all things in the world have an end of their life : but those things eninjoy that course that is generally ordaind them by heaven , whichdisorder not their body , but govern it in such a regular course , that either it changes not , or if it does , it is for the better , and not for the worst . and because i speak of mixt bodies , such as are republiques and sects , i say , that those changes are for the health thereof , which bring them back to their first beginnings : and therefore are they the best order'd , and subsist the longest which ( by the help of their own orders ) may often be renewed , or that by accident without the same orders attain to the said renovation . and it is more clear than the light , that these bodies not being renewed , last not ; and the way to renew them is ( as is said ) to reduce them to their first beginnings ; for all beginnings of sects , commonwealths and kingdoms , must needs contain some goodness in them , by means whereof they recover their first reputation and increase : for in process of time that goodness growes corrupt , and unless something happen , that reduces it to the just mark , that body must needs be destroyed . and our doctors of physick say ( speaking of the bodies of men ) that a man daily gathers some evil , which sometimes hath need of cure . this reducing to the beginning ( speaking of commonwealths ) is done either by some outward accident , or by some prudence within . touching the first , we see it was necessary , that rome should be taken by the french , if we would have her spring again ; and thus springing again , should recover a new life , and a new vertue , and take her self a new to the observance of religion , and justice , which began in her to be much blemish'd , which we may easily gather by the story of livie , where he shews that in drawing gut the army against the french , and in creating the tribunes with consular power , they observed not any religious ceremonie : so in like manner , they did not onely not punish the three fabij who against the law of nations had fought against the french , but created them tribunes . and we may well think , that of other good laws also ordained by romulus , and their other sage princes , they began now to hold less esteem than was reasonable , or necessary to maintain a free government . this forrain blow therefore lit on them , to the end they should anew betake themselves to all the old orders of their city , and to shew that people , that it was not necessary not only to maintain religion and justice , but to esteem well of their good citizens , & to make more account of their vertue , than of those profits , which they thought they lost or got by their means : which we see , came directly to pass ; for presently after rome was recovered from the french , they renewed all the rites of their ancient religion , they punished those fabij who fought against the law of nations , and afterwards made such account of camillus his vertue and goodness , that the senate & all others wholly laying envy aside , gave the whole government of the commonwealth into hit hands . it is necessary therefore ( as i have said ) that men , who live together in any order , should often revise themselves , either upon occasion given by outward , or else by inward accidents . and for these last , they must either proceed from a law , which may take a review as it were of the men that are in that body , or else from some good man that may arise among them , who by his example & vertuous actions may work the same effect , which that law or order can . this good then arises in common-wealths , by the vertue of some man , or the force of some order . and touching this last , those orders that reduc'd the roman republick to its own beginning , were the tribuns of the people , the censors , & all those other laws , which were made against the ambition or insolence of men , which orders have need to be quicken'd by the vertue of some one citizen , that couragiously joynes with them for their execution , maugre the power of those that break them . the executions whereof , before the sacking of rome by the french , were notable , the death of brutus his sons , the death of those of the decemvirate , that of melius touching the laying down the price of their corne : after the taking of rome , was the death of manlius capitolinus , the death of the son of manlius torquatus , the execution which papirius cursor did upon the commander of his cavallerie , the accusation of the scipios : which things being they were extraordinary & remarkable , whenosever any of them did chance , caused men more strictly to conforme themselves to the exact rule ; and when these began to fall out seldom , then began they to give men more leisure to grow naught , and become more dangerous and tumultuous ; for from one to another of such like executions , there should not pass more than ten years time ; for after such a time men begin again to change their manners and trespass against the lawes : and unless something chance , which anew calls the punishment to memory , and puts them in fear thereof , there meer together so many delinquents , that without danger they cannot be punished . to this purpose , they who govern'd the state of florence from . to . said it was necessary every fift year to reforme the state , otherwise it was hard to maintain it ; and they call'd reforming of the state , to put that terror and fear in men , which they caus'd in them at the first founding of the lawes , having then severely punish'd those that had offended against their manner of living . but when the memory of that punishment is once extinguished , men again take the boldness to attempt some innovations , and speak ill of the present state : and therefore it is necessary to take order for it by reducing it to the first grounds . also this bringing back of republiques to their beginnings , arises sometimes from the plain vertue of some one man , without dependance on any law , inciting thee to any execution : yet are they of so great reputation , and of such remarke , that the good men desire to follow them , and the bad are asham'd to live contrarily to them . those that in rome particularly worked these good effects , were horatius cocles , scevola , fabritius , the two decij , regulus , attilius , and some others , who by their rare and worthy examples , in rome wrought the same effect that good lawes and good orders could . and if the forenamed executions of lawes together with these particulars examples had succeeded every ten years in this city , it had been of necessary consequence that it could never be corrupted : but as the one and the other of these two things began to fall out seldome , the corruptions multiplied : for after marcus regulus the like example was never more seen . and though in rome there arose the two catoes , yet such was the distance between him and them , and between them , from th' one to th' other , and they remained so alone , that with their good examples they could effectuate no good thing , and especially the last cato , who finding a great part of the city corrupted , could not prevaile so by his example , as to better his citizens and this may suffice for republicks . but touching religions , wee see also these reformations are necessary , by example of our religion : which had it not been reduc'd again to its principles by saint francis , and saint dominique , it would have been quite defac'd : for these by their poverty , and their imitation of christs life , made a new impression thereof in mens minds , which was quite blotted our thence : and their new rules were so powerfull , and now are the cause that the dishonesty of the prelates , and the heads of the religion , do not ruine it , partly by their living in poverty , and partly by the great credit they have in confessing the people , and preaching to them , whereby they give them to understand that it is evill , to speak evil against him that is evill ; and that it is good , rather to live in obedience to them ; and if they are faulty , to leave them to the chastisement of god. and so they offend the most they can ; for they feare not the punishment they see not , and beleeve not . this reformation then hath and does maintain this religion . kingdomes also have need of reforming and restoring their laws to their first beginnings . and wee see how much good this does in the kingdom of france ; which kingdom is governed more by its lawes and customes than any other kingdom else . of which lawes and customes , the parliaments are the principal maintainers , and especially that of paris , which restores them again to life , whensoever it makes any execution against a prince of the realm , and that they condemn the king in their sentences : and till this present it hath maintained it self , by being an obstinate executioner against that nobility : but whensoever it should suffer any of their faults to escape unpunished , and they chance to multiply , without doubt it would come to pass that either they were to be corrected with great disorder , or that kingdom come to a dissolution . therefore we conclude that there is nothing more necessary in a politick government , sect , kingdom , or commonwealth that it be , than to restore it to that reputation which in its first beginning it had , and take a care that either the customes be good , or the men good , that they may rather work this effect , that it be not left to some forraign force to do it : for ( however that sometimes it be an excellent remedy , as it prov'd to rome ) yet is it so dangerous , that it is in no case to be desir'd : and to make it appear to any man , how much the actions of particular men served to advance romes greatness , and wrought many good effects in that city , i will come to the narration and discourse of them , within the bounds whereof wee will conclude this third book , and last part of this first decade . and howbeit the kings actions were great and remarkable , being the history sets them down at large , we shall omit them , nor speak of them otherwise , unless it be touching some thing they did belonging to their private advantage ; and here we will begin with brutus , father of the roman liberty . chap. ii. it is a very great part of wisdome , sometime to seem a fool . no man was ever reputed so sage or wise for any thing that ever he did , as junius brutus deserves to be accounted for taking upon him the person of a fool ; and though titus livius expresses no other but one reason to induce him thereto , which was to live in security , and preserve his patrimony ; yet if we consider his manner of proceeding , we may beleeve , that he thus dissembled , to the end he might be less observed , & have the more conveniency to suppress the kings , and free his country , upon any occasion offered . and that he thought upon this , it appears first in the interpretation he made of apolloes oracle , when he fained to fall down , that he might kiss the ground , deeming thereby that the gods favour'd his designes ; and afterwards when at the occasion where lucretia was slain , among the father , husband , and other of her kindred , he was the first that drew the knife out of the wound , and made those that were present sweare they would never more endure in time to come a king in rome . from his example are those to learn , that are discontented with any prince : and firct they should measure and weigh their own forces : and if they are so powerfull , that they are able to discover themselves as enemies , and openly make war against him , then ought they plainly go that way , as least dangerous and the morehonorable . but if they be of such condition , that they are not able to enter into termes of open hostilitie against him , then ought they to use al industry in seeking to gain his favour ; and to this effect enter into him by all those waies that are fit , following him in his sports , and taking pleasure in all those things they see he delights in . this familiarity first causes thee to live secure , and without running any hazard , gives thee means to enjoy that princes good fortune with him , and layes the way open to thee to satisfie thy own mind . it is true that some say , they would not stand so near the princes , as to be oppressed with their ruines , nor so far off , but that when their ruine comes , they may be able time enough to rise upon some part of their ruines . which middle way would be the truest , were it rightly kept . but because i think it is impossible , it is meet to reduce it to the two waies above mentioned , which is either to be at large from them , or cleave close to them . hee that does otherwise , if he be a man of eminent qualities , lives in continuall danger . nor sufficeth it to say , i care not for any thing , i desire neither honors , nor wealth , i will live quietly , and without entring into any faction ; for these excuses are heard , but pass not as current . neither can men of quality chuse this standing quiet , however that heartily they make choyce of it and without any ambition , because they are not beleeved in it , in so much as though they themselves would , yet others will not let them live so . they must then play the fool as brutus did ; and he plaies the fool a great deal , that prayses , and prates to them , is present at , and bears a part in those things that are against his own mind , to comply with his princes delights . and seeing we have spoken of this mans wisedome in recovering of the state , we will now speak of his severity in maintaining it . chap. iii. that it was necessary , for preservation of the new gotten liberty , to put brutus his sons to death . b butus his severity was no less necessary than usefull to maintain rome in the liberty she had gotten , which was of rare example in all memorials of things happen'd , to see the father sit on his tribunal , and not only condemn his sons to death , but be present and assistant at it . and this is alwaies well known to those that read ancient stories , how that after the change of a state , either from a republick into a tyranny , or from a tyranny into a republick , some memorable execution upon the enemies of the present condition is needfull . and hee that sets up a tyranny , and flaies not brutus ; and hee that brings in liberty , and slayes not brutus his sons , can hardly subsist . and because for merly wee have discoursed hereof at large , i referr my self to what was then spoken hereof . i shall alledge here only one example which was in our times , and in our country : that of peter soderini , who thought with his patience and goodness to overcome that passionate desire which was in the sons of brutus , to return under another government , but deceived himself therein . and albeit hee by his wisdome perceived well this necessity , and that the way and ambition of those that shov'd against him , gave him occasion to extinguish them , yet hee never bent his mind to it : for besides his opinion that he was able by patience and goodness to worke out all ill humors , and by liberality towards them , to weare out any enmity was borne against him , hee was of advice ( as many times by discourse hee shewed some of his friends ) that if hee would strongly incounter the oppositions were made against him , and master his adversaries , he had need take upon him extraordinary authority , whereby he should break the civil equality among them . which thing ( however that hee should never afterwards act tyrannically ) would so much affright the multitude , that they would never agree after his death to create a new standard-bearer for life , which dignity he held fit to put forward and maintain . this respect was wise and good : yet must we never suffer any evill to continue in regard of a good , being that good may easily be supprest by that evill . and he should beleeve , being his actions and his intentions were to bee judged by their end ( in case that good fortune and life should have accompanied him ) that he could have assured every one , how that what he had done , was for the safety of his country , not for his own ambition , whereby he might have been able to regulate things in such a manner , that no successor of his could do that for evill , which hee had done for good . but the first opinion deceived him , not knowing that malice is not abated by time , nor appeased by any good turne . so that because he was ignorant how to imitate brutus , he lost together with his country the state , and his own reputation . and as it is a hard thing to save a free state , so is it not easie to preserve a monarchy , as in the chapter following it shall be shewed . chap. iv. no prince lives secure in his principality , while those are living who were despoyld of it . the death of tarquinus priscus causd by the sons of ancus , and the death of servius tullus causd by tarquinius the proud , shew how hard and dangerous it is , to despoyle any one of a kingdome , and suffer him to live , though he indevour by many favours to gaine him . and we see how tarquinius prisons was deceived in thinking legally to possess that kingdom , in that it was given him by the people , and confirm'd by the senate . neither did he beleeve that disdain could so much prevaile with ancus his sons , that they would not be satisfied , with what all rome was contented . and servius tullus deluded himself , in thinking he could with new obligations gain the good will of tarquins sons . so that touching the first , every prince may well be advisd that he cannot live sure of his principality , while they live who were bereavd of it . touching the second , every one that is of power may well remember , that never were old injuries cancelld with new favours , especially when the new favours are less of value than the wrongs done and without all doubt servius tullus was nothing wise to think that tarquins sons would patiently endure to be his sons in law , whose king they thought by right they ought to be . and this desire of reigning is so great , that it not only enters their breasts , that look to succeed in the kingdome , but they also who no waies expect it . as in tarquinius his wife , servius his young daughter , who would wish this rage against that piety shee ought her father , set her husband against him , to take his life from him , and his kingdome thereby ; so much more accounted she to be a queen , than the daughter of a king. if then tarquininus priscus and servius tullus lost the kingdom for not assuring themselves of those upon whose right they had usurpd , tarquinius the proud lost it for not observing the ancient kings customes , as shall be shewd in the chapter following . chap. v. what it is that makes a king lose his kingdome , which he enjoyes by right of inheritance . tarquinius the proud having stain servius tullus , and of him no heirs remaining behind , came to possess the kingdom securely , having no cause to feare , those things that had hurt his predecessours . and however his way of getting the kingdom had been so extraordinary , and odious , yet had he observd the ancient customes of the other kings , he would have been borne with : nor would the senate nor the commonalty have risen against him to wrest the state out of his hands . hee was not then banished because his son sextus ravisht lucretia , but for that he had broken the laws of the kingdome , and ruld tyrannously , having taken all authority from the senate , and reserved it wholly to himself , and those affaires , which had been dispatcht in publick by the senate of rome with generall satssfaction , he reduc'd to be treated in his own palace , which gain'd him both blame and envie : so that in a very short time he despoyld rome of all that liberty which she had alwaies maintained under others . nor was this enough to make the senate his enemy , but he provok'd the people also against him , tiring them out in base mechanick services , and such as were far different from that , wherein his ancestors had imployd them : so that having replenish'd rome with examples of his cruelty and pride , he had now dispos'd all the romans minds to rebellion , whensoever occasion should be off r'd and had not that accident of lucretia fallen out , so soon as any other should have chanc'd , it would have produc'd the same effect : for if tarquinius had liv'd , as the other kings did , and sextus his son had committed that offence , brutus & collatinus would have had recourse to tarquinius , for revenge against sextus , and not to the people of rome . therefore let princes know , that at the same houre they begin to lose the state , when they begin to violate the laws , & and those manners & customs that are ancient , under which men have liv'd a long time . and in case they come to lose their state , and should ever become so wise as to understand with what facility they maintain their principalities , who follow good counsell , they themselves would much more lament their loss & blame themselves more than others would : for it is much easier to be belov'd by the good , than by the bad ; & to obey the laws , than command over them . and if they would understand what course they were to take , whereby to put this in practice , and that they are not to undergo greater labour than to view the lives of good princes , & take them for looking-glasses , such as were timoleon the corinthian , & aratus sicioneus , & such like , in whose lives they shall find security & satisfaction , as well of him that rules , as of him that is ruled , they would have a desire to become like them , being able for the reasons alledgd to do so ; for men , when they are well governd , seek after no other liberty , as it befell the people that were governd by the two were named before , who were constraind to be princes whiles they liv'd , however they tryed many times to retire themselves to a private life . and because in this & the two precedent chapters , we have discoursed of humors stird up against princes , and of the conspiracy made by brutus his sons against their country , & of those against tarquinius priscus & servius tullus : methinks it is not out of our purpose to speak at large thereof in the following chapter , being a matter whereof princes and private men may worthly take notice . chap. vi. of conspiracies . i would not omit to discourse somewhat touching conspiracies , being they are dangerous for princes and private men also : for wee see that more princes have lost their lives thereby , and states too , than by open war : because few are able to make open war against princes , but every one may conspire against them on the other side , private men enter not into a more dangerous nor rash enterprise than this : for it is full of difficulties , and exceeding perillous every way ; from whence proceeds it , that many of them are practisd , but few succeed . to the end there of that princes may learn to beware of these dangers , and private men be more fearful to thrust themselves into them , or rather learn to content themselves to live under that rule which their fortune hath allotted them , i shall speak thereof more at large , not omitting any thing remarkable , that may serve for instruction of the one or the other . and truly that of tacitus is well termd a golden sentence , where he saies , that men are to reverence things past , and submit to what is present ; and should wish for good princes , but whatsoever they are , endure them : and verily he who does otherwise , ruines both himself and his country . wee must then ( entring into the matter ) consider against whom conspiracies are made and wee shall find they are plotted against amans country , or against his prince , of which two i intend this present discourse : for touching those that are practis'd to deliver a town into the enemies hands that besiege it , or that have likelihood with this for any cause , wee have already sufficiently spoken . and wee will treat in this first part , touching that against a prince : and first we will examine the reasons thereof , which are many , though one there is of more importance than all the rest . and this is general hatred : for that prince , that hath provok'd general hate , must needs have net●ed some particulars , somwhat more than others , insomuch that they long to be revengd on him : and they are the more incited hereto , by the general hatred they find conceivd against him . a prince then ought to avoyd these publick blames , and how he should behave himself to avoid them ( having treated otherwhere ) i will not now middle : for if he beware well of them , offences against particulars shall be of small force to hurt him : one reason is , because princes seldom light upon men that are so sensible of an injury as to run such extream hazard to revenge them ; the other is , that though they were of such resolution , and force , as might serve to do it , yet would that general good will of men to that prince withhold them from it . the injuries must be either touching the fortunes , lives , or honors . of those that are touching mens lives , the threats are more dangerous than the execution , or rather the threats are very dangerous ; but in the execution there is no danger at all ; for he that is dead cannot think upon revenge ; and those that remain alive , most commonly leave to think of him that is dead : but he that is threatned , and sees himself put to a point , either to do or suffer , becomes a very dangerous man to the prince , as we shall say particularly in due place . the fortunes and honours of a man are those two things which excepting this necessity , touch men more nearely then any other offence , where of a prince should be wel aware : for he can never strip a man so bare , but that he may find a kinfe to revenge himself , nor so much dishonour any one , but that he may still hold an obstinate resolution of vengeance . and touching honours , the dishonoring of women is of most importance , and after this the scorne and disgrace of their persons . this armed pausanias against philip of macedon , and this hath put weapons in many others hands against divers princes . and in our dayes julius belanti had no other motive to conspire against pandulphus the tyrant of siena , but onely for that he had given him one of his daughters to wife and afterwards taken her away from him , as in its place we shall relate . the greatest cause the pazzi had to conspire against the medici , was , the inheritance of john bonrosnei , whereof they were dispossess'd by their order . and another cause , and a very great one too , why men plot treachery against a prince , is a desire which they have to free their countrey , which hath bin seis'd on by him . this mov'd brutus and cassius against caesar . this incited many others against falaris , dionysius , and such other usurpers of their countries . nor can any tyrant free himself from the danger of his humor by other means then by laying down his tyranny . and because we find none will doe this , there are but few of them that come not to ill ends ; which gave iuvenal occasion to say , few tyrants unto plutoes court do goe , but that are thither sent by bloody blow . the dangers that ( as i said before ) accompany conspiracies , are great , and continual : for in such cases there is danger in plotting them , in executing them , and after they are executed too . those that conspire , are either one or more ; that of one cannot be termed a conspiracy , but a setled resolution bred in a man to slay a prince . this alone of all the three dangers , which conspiracies hazard , is free from the first . for before the putting it in execution , it carries no hazard with it , being none is made privy to his secret , nor is there any danger , that his purpose come to the princes eare . a resolution after this sort may happen to be found in any man of any condition , little or great , noble or ignoble , familiar or not familiar with he prince : for at some times it is permitted to any man to speak with him and ; he that comes to speak with him may vent this passion of his minde . pausanias , of whom we have otherwhere spoken , slew philip of macodon , as he was going to the temple environ'd with a thousand armed men , and between his own son and son in law ; but he was one of the nobles , and well known to the prince . a poore and abject spaniard strook ferdinand king of spain with a knife in the neck ; however the wound was not mortal , yet hereby it appeared , that he had both courage and opportunity to do it . a turkish priest nam'd dervis , drew a scimitarre against bajazet , father of this present turk , but hit him not , yet wanted he neither courage nor commodity for his purpose . of this sort of resolutions thus bent , i think there are many , that would do it : for in willing this , there is neither punishment , nor danger at all , but few venture to act it ; and of those that do , exceeding few or none there are , that are not slaine in the act . therefore no man willingly will thrust himselfe upon a certaine death . but let us leave these single resolutions , and come to consider the conspiracies have bin made by great men , or those that are very familiar with the prince : for others ( unless they be stark mad ) will never offer to conspire : for mean men , and not familiar with the prince , want all those conveniencies , which are required in the executing of a conspiracy . first● , mean men cannot find those that will be true to them : for no one man can apply himself to their wills for any of those hopes which cause men to adventure upon desperate dangers , so that when they have enlarged themselves to two or three persons , some one of them becomes an accuser , and ruines all . but in case they should be so happy , that none should discover their plots , yet in the execution are they beset with such difficulties having not free access unto the prince ) that it is impossible , but that there in they must perish : for if great men , who ordinarily come near him , are oppress'd with such difficulties , which we shall presently mention , it must needs be that with those these difficulties must perpetually increase . therefore men ( because where there is losse both of life and fortunes they are not stark mad ) when they find themselves weak , are well aware of what they do : and when they are very weary of a prince , they are contented onely to curse him , and expect , while those that are of higher quality then themselves , do avenge them . and yet in case that any of such like as these should have assailed any thing , the design they had might well be laudable , but not their wisdome . we see therefore , that those that have conspired , were all great men , or familiar with the prince : whereof many have conspired , as well being mov'd by too many favors , as by too many injuries . as perennius was against commodus , plautianus against severus , sejanus against tiberius . all these were by their emperors so enriched with wealth , and dignified with titles and honours , that it seemed there wanted not any thing to perfect their power but the empire it self , which they meaning not to fail of , betook themselves to conspire against their prince , and their treasons all had that end , which their ingratitude well deserved . however that among those of this sort in these latter times that of iacob apianus against petrus gambacorti prince of pisa succeeded fortunately , which iacobus having had his education and breeding and credit too from him , afterwards took the state from him . of this sort was that of coppola in our dayes against ferdinand king of arragon , which coppola having attained to that greatness , that he thought he wanted nothing but the kingdom , meaning not to go without , lost his life . and indeed if any conspiracie against princes made by great men be ever like to take effect , this was very probable , being made by one that might have been termed a king for his power and conveniencies he had to work his will. but that greedy ambition which blinds them in their desire to rule , blinds them as well in the mannaging of this enterprise : for if they know how to act this villany with discretion , it were impossible but it should succeed . a prince then that would be well wary of conspiracies , should be more jealous of those to whom he hath afforded most favours , then of those to whom he hath done most wrongs : for these want the means , and those have them at pleasure , and the will is a like ; for the desire of rule is as great or greater then that of revenge . wherefore they are to confer but so much authority upon their favourites , that still between it and the principality they keep a distance , and leave ( as it were ) some obstacle in their way ; otherwise seldome falls it out but that it chances to them , as to the forementioned princes . but let us return to our order . i say , that being they are to be great men that plot these treasons , and have easie access unto the prince , we are to discourse upon the successes of these their undertakings , what they have been , and point at the reason that hath caus'd them to prove happy or unhappy . and ( as i formerly said ) at three severall times , herein are dangers found . in the plotting , in the acting , and after . therefore are there very few that prove lucky : for it is almost impossible to pass all these happily . and beginning to treate touching the dangers of the the first , that are of most importance , i say , there had need be much circumspection and advisement , which likewise had need be seconded by good fortune , that in the contriving and ordering of a conspiracy , it be not disclosed ; for that is done either by relation , or by conjecture . this relation proceeds from the small faith ; or small discretion of those men with whom thou communicatest thy secret . and it is a thing ordinary to find but small saith ; for thou canst not communicate it but to thy confidents , who for love of thee may adventure death , or to men that are discontented with the prince . of confidents , possible it is that one or two may be found ; but when thou openest thy self to more ; it is impossible thou shouldest find them . besides the good will they beare thee , had need be very great , to the end they be not affrighted at the punishment and peril they incurre . moreover men are often deceived touching the love , which thou beleevest another bears thee , nor canst thou ever assure thy self of it , unless thou hast had experience thereof ; and to make proof of it herein is exceeding dangerous ; and though thou hast had proof thereof in some other dangerous exploit , where they have stuck close upon thee , yet canst thou not from thence measure them for this , being this danger surpasses all others . if thou measurest their faith by their discontent against their prince , therein thou mayest easily deceive thy self : for so soon as thou hast revealed thy mind to that malecontent , thou givest him a subject whereupon to work again his own content ; and either his hatred had need be great , or thy power with him of much force to keep him faithful . hereupon it arises , that very many of them are discover'd & crush'd even in the egge ; and when one of them among many men hath bin kept secret any time , it hath bin thought of as a miracle as was that of piso against nero , & in our daies that of laurence and iulian of medici , whereunto above fifty persons were made privy , who met together all to discover themselves in the execution thereof . as for the discovery for want of discretion , that falls out when a conspirator is not wary in his talk , so that a servant or another third person comes take notice thereof , as it befe brutus his sonnes , who in contriving the business with tarquins ambassadors , were understood by a slave who accused them : or else through a certain lightness of thine own , thou communicatest it to a woman , or a child which thou lovest , or some such slight person , as dimus did , one of those that conspir'd with philotas against alexander the great , who told the treason to nicomacus , a child which he lov'd , who presently told it to ciballinus his brother , and ciballinus to the king. touching discovery by conjecture , we have an example for it , where piso conspired against nero , at which time sceuinus one of the conspirators , the day before that he was to slay nero , made his will , and gave order that milichius his freeman should cause his old and rusty dagger to be scoured ; he made all his slaves free , and gave them money ; he appointed many clouts to bind up wounds to be prepared ; by which conjectures milichius being assured of the business , accused , him before nero. scevinus was taken , and with him natalis one of the conspirators , who had bin seen the day before to talk a good while and privately in his company , who not agreeing concerning the discourse they held , were forc'd to confess the truth . so that the treason was bewraied , and the conspirators utterly ruin'd . from these occasions of discovery it is impossible to beware , but that through malice , indiscretion , or fondness all comes to light , whensoever the complotters thereof pass the number of three or four ; and in case that more then one of them chance to be taken , it is impossible but that it must be so ; for two cannot be so well agreed of all their discourses together , but that in some things they shall jarre . when one alone that is resolute , is laid hold on , he may through the strength of his courage , be able to conceal the rest of his complices : but then must his consors shew no less resolution than he , in standing firm and not discovering themselves by flight : for on which side soever courage failes , either on his that is taken , or his that is at liberty , the conspiracy is disclosd . and the example alleadgd by t. livius , is very rare in the treason that was plotted against ier lamus king of siracusa , where theodorus one of the conspirators being taken , with a stout courage conceald all his companions , and accused the kings friends ; and on the other part , all the confederates were confident of theodorus his resolution , that not one of them forsook siracusa , or made any shew of fear , wherefore all these dangers are to be passed in the ordering of a conspiracy , before the acting of it . against which these are the remedies ; the first and truest whereof , or better to term it , the only one is , not to give leisure to our complices to accuse us , nor communicate the matter unto them , till just when thou meanest to put it in execution , and not before . they who have thus done , assuredly escape the dangers belonging to the practise thereof ; and oftentimes the others also , or rather have they all had good success : and i think every one that is wise should endeavor to carry the matter thus . i will content my self to produce only two examples . nelematus not being able to indure the tyranny of aristorimus , tyrant of epirus , assembled together in his house many of his friends and kinsfolke , and having encourag'd them to set their country at liberty , some of them requir'd time to be advised and prepared : whereupon nelematus causd his servants to shut the doors , and told those he had cald together , that they should either swear presently to do this , or if not , he would deliver them all prisoners to aristotimus : whereby all of them , being mov'd , swore , and so without more delay , went and put in execution what nelematus had orderd . one of the magi having by treachery seisd upon the kingdom of persia , orthanus a great man had notice thereof , and found out the deceit , and thereupon conferd with six other princes of that state , saying , he was now underraking to vindicate the kingdom from the tyranny of that magician ; and when some of them demanded time , darius rose up ( one of the six that was cald by orthanus ) and said , either wee will all now go and execute this , or else i will go and accuse you all : so rising all by consent , and not giving any one time to repent himself , they happily effected what they desir'd . like unto these two examples also , is the course the aetolians took to put nabis the spartan tyrant to death , who sent alessamenes a citizen of theirs with horse and foot to nabis , under colour of giving him ayd : the secret they communicated to alessamenes only ; the others that were with him they charged to obey him in whatsoever matter it were , under pain of banishment . this man went into sparta , never communicating his commission to any , till just he was to put it in execution , whereupon it fell out that he slew him . they then by these means escap'd the dangers that accompany the plotting and ordering of conspiracies ; and whoever shall do as they did , shall alwaies be sure to escape them : and that every one also is able so to do , i will shew by the example of piso alledged before . piso was a very great man , and of much esteem , and very familiar with nero , on whom we much rely'd : and nero went oftentimes to banquet with him in his gardens : piso therefore might have procur'd himself friends of spirit and courage , and willing too to put such a thing in execution , being a matter easie for any great man to compass ; and when he had had nero in his gardens , then communicated the business to them , and with fit words perswaded them to it , so that they could not have had time to refuse , and impossible had it bin , but that it must have taken effect . and if we shall examine all the others we have mentiond , we shall find very few could have bin otherwise carried . but men that ordinarily do not well weigh the actions of the world , often commit very great errors , and the greater in those actions , that have something of extraordiry in them , as this . the matter then is never to be communicated , but upon necessity , or even at the very acting of it , and yet if thou wilt communicate it , let that be but unto one of whom thou hast had long experience , or that therein is interested upon the same reasons thou art . it is easier to find one man of that condition than many , and thereby also is less danger . moreover , when he should deceive thee , there were some means left yet to desend thee , which could not be where the conspirators are many : for it is the saying of a wise man , that with one alone a man may speak any thing for one man ; i , is as good as another mans no , provided that nothing be given by thee under thine own hand-writing . and of writing any thing a man shouldbe as wary as of a perilous rock ; for nothing convicts thee sooner than thine own hand . plautianus having a mind to skill severus the emperor , antonius his son , committed the execution of it to saturninus a tribune : who purposing to accuse and not obey him , yet doubting when he should come to the tryal , plautianus would be beleev'd before him , asked him a note under his hand , that might give him assurance of his commission ; which plautianus , blinded with ambition , gave him , whereupon it follow'd , that he was accus'd and convicted by the tribune , without which , and certain other tokens , plautianus had carried it clear against him , so boldly he deny'd it . therefore when one only accuses , there may be some remedy , especially in case thou beest not convicted by any writing of thiue , or countermarks , whereof a man should be well aware . in pisoes conspiracie there was a woman called epicaris , which formerly had bin one of neroes mistresses , who thinking it would serve well to purpose to joyn with the conspirators , one that was a captain of some galleys , which nero kept for his safeguard , opened to him the conspiracie , but not who were the conspirators , whereupon that captain contrary to his word given , accus'd her before nero ; but such was her boldness in denying it , that nero was astonish'd thereat , & condemned her not . there are then in communicating the matter to one alone two dangers ; the one that the party go not voluntarily to accuse thee , alledging some proof against thee ; the other that he detect thee not constraind and forc't thereunto by torture , having been apprehended upon some conjecture or suspition had of him : but in either of these two dangers there is some remedy , being that in the one it may be deny'd , by saying the party did it out of hatred he bore thee ; and in the other , by alledging that the extremity of torture compell'd him to utter any thing , though false . it is wisdome then to make no man privy to such a secret , but rather to order it conformably to the above alledged examples ; or in case thou revealst it , not to exceed one , where though there be somwhat more danger , yet is there much less than when it is discoverd to divers . near unto this course is , when a necessity constrains thee to do that to the prince , which thou seest he would do unto thee , which necessity is so excessive , that it gives thee leisure only to provide for thy security . this necessity brings the business ordinarily to a good end ; and to prove it , two examples shall suffice mee . cammodus the emperor did use lettus and elettus , captains of his guard , among his familiar and principal friends , and martia among his chief concubines and mistresses : but because sometime he had been reprehended by them for some things done , whereby he had disgrac'd his person and the empire , he resolve'd to put them to death , and writ in a list the names of martia , lettus , and eletius , and some others , who the night following he meant should die , and so put that list under his pillow ; and when he went to rise , a little boy which he lov'd , playing about his chamber and his bed , found that list , and going out with it in his hand met with martia , who took it from him , and read it , and having seen the contents thereof , sent for lettus and elettus , whereupon they three knowing the danger they were in , resolv'd to prevent it , and so without longer delay the night following slew commodus . antoninus caracalla the emperor was in mesopotamia with his armies , whereof macrinus was chief commander , a man more politick than wa●lick ; and as it comes to pass , princes that are not good , are alwaies fe●rfull , least others work against them , what they are guilty to themselves they well deserve ; antoninus writ to mate nianus his friend at rome , that he should inquire of the astrologers if any one aspird to the empire , and should advise him of it . whereupon maternianus writ back unto him , macrinus was he that aspired therto ; but the letter comming first to macrinus his hand , before the emperors , and he thereby perceiving the necessity imposd upon him , agreed with martialis 〈◊〉 centurion , one of his confidents ( whose brother a few daies before antoninus had slain ) that he should kill him , which was luckily done by him . it is evident then , that this necessity which gives no leisure , works even the same effect which that course did , i formerly said , nelematus of epirus took . we see also that prov'd which i spoke of in the beginning of this discourse , that princes threats r●tort more mischiefes on them , and occasion more desperate conspiracies , than the wrongs they do ; wheroef a prince ●ought to take good heed : for men are either to be well treated by them , or at least to be put out of doubt of them , that they be not reducd to such terms , as to think they must of force either kill or be kild : touching the dangers that are incurrd upon the execution , they arise either from changing the order given , or from want of courage in the actor , or from some error the actor commits for want of judgement , or from the fayle of fully perfecting the matter in hand by leaving some of those surviving who were appointed for death . i think therefore that nothing so much disturbs or hinders mens actions , as at an instant without respite of time , to be compeld to alter an order once given , or divert the course of it a different way from that it was first intended and if this variation causes disorder in any thing , it is in the actions of warr , and such like matters , whereof we now speak : for in such occasions , there is nothing so necessary for men to do , as to resolve with themselves to execute fully all that is look'd for at their hands . and if men have a good while bent their minds to one course or order , and that chance suddenly to be alterd , it must needs breed some disturbance to them all , and ruine the whole design , so that it is much better for them to execute any thing according to the order first given ( however that some inconvenient ensue thereupon ) then , by desiring to cancell that , to enter into a thousand inconveniences . this happens when they have not time to put themselves in order again : for when a man hath leisure , he may go his own way he likes best . the conspiracy of the pazzi against laurence and julian of the house of medi●ia , is well known : the order given amongst them was this , that they should invite the cardinal of saint george to dinner , and thereat kill them they intended ; where they had their appointments who were to slay these , as those also that were to seize on the palace , and they that were to run about the streets , and call the people together to lay hold of their liberty . it so fell out , that the pazzi and the medici together with the cardinal being in the cathedral church of florence at masse , notice was given that julian would not dine there that day , which caused the conspirators to consult together , and what they were to have done in the house to those of medici , they resolv'd to do in the church , which gave disturbance to the whole order : for john baptista de monte sacro , would not be guilty of murder committed in the church , insomuch as they were forc't to change the actors in every part , who having not time to settle & confirm their resolutions , committed such errors , that in the very execution thereof they were all ruin'd . courage sayles him that is to execute any thing , either through reverence of the person he is to do the mischief upon , or through the executioners own innate cowardise . such is the majesty and reverence which the presence of a prince carries along with it , that it is an ordinary thing for it , either to mitigate or toaffright an executioner . a slave was sent to marius , when he was taken prisoner by the minturveses , to kill him , who amaz'd at the presence of the man , and at the remembrance of his name prov'd so cowardly , that he lost all power to slay him . and if there be such power in the person of a man that is bound , and in prison , and in a manner choak'd up with ill fortune , how much more may we think there is in a prince that is at liberty at●ir'd in the majesty of his ornaments of state , and inviron'd with his trayne , insomuch that the pompe thereof is of force to affright , or else with the least courtesie he shall receive thee , to humble thee again before him . there were some conspir'd against sitalces king of thrace , and they appointed amongst them a day for the execution , and met at the place agreed on where the prince was , but none of them once mov'd to hurt him , so that they parted all thence without attempting any thing , and without knowing what it was that hinder'd them , but blaming one another for the fayle : into such errors they often fall afterwards , in so much as the treason was discover'd , and they suffer'd punishment for that evill , which they could , but durst not act . against alfonsus duke of ferrara , two of his own brothers conspir'd together , and us'd the helpe of one giannes a priest & musitian belonging to that duke who many times at their intrety brought the duke amongst them , so that it was in their power to kill him ; yet never was any of them so hardy as to do it , whereupon at length being discoverd they suffered for their wickedness , and want of wit. this negligence could not proceed from elsewhere then from that of necessity the princes presence did affright them , or that some courtesie he shew'd them humbled them . in such executions an inconvenient or error many times arises , either for lack of discretion or courage : for when the one or other of these two once amazes thee , thou art borne forward in such confusion of thy understanding , that it makes thee both say and do what thou oughtst not . and that men are thus astonished and confounded , livie does very well shew it , where he sets forth alexamenes the etolian , as he went about to kill nabis the spartan , whereof we spake formerly , that when hee came to the execution , and discoverd to those that were with him , what he was to do , t. livius saies these words : he gathers together his wits to him , which the consideration of so weighty a matter had somewhat disorderd for it is impossible , that any man ( though of a resolute courage , & accustomed to the slaughters of men , and use of his weapons ) should not be quite astonished . therefore choice is to be made of men experienced in such matters , nor should one commit them to any other , however he be esteem'd very couragious : for let no man that hath not formerly made tryall of himself , presume too much upon his courage in the performance of any great exploit . this amazement then may either cause thee to let thy weapons fall out of thy hands , or such words from thy month , as may work the same effect . luciila commodus his sister had so order'd it , that quintianus should kill him . and he awaited cowmodus in the passage into the theater , where with a naked poinard comming up to him , he cryed out , this the senate sends thee ; which words caus'd him to be first laid hold on , before hee could bring down his arme to strike him . m. antonius of volterra appointed ( as wee said before ) to kill laurence of medici , as hee came near him , said , ah traitor ! which saying of his occasioned the safety of laurence , and the wrack of that conspiracy . such a matter may be fully perfected , when it is practised only against one head , for the reasons alledged : but very hardly can it well be accomplished against two principals , or rather impossibly : for it is impossible that one and the like action should succeed at the same instant in several places : for it cannot be , but whither a man will or no , the one shall ruine the other , being done at several times . so that if it be a thing very hazardous and full of danger and small advisedness to practise against the person of one prince alone ; certainly to conspire against two , is wholly vain and to no purpose . and were it not for the reverence i bear to the historian , i would never beleeve , that were possible , which herodian says of plautianus , that he gave the charge to saturninus the centurion to kill severus and antoninus abiding in severall place ; for it dissents so much from reason , that nothing else but this authority would make me credit it . certain young men of athens conspir'd together against diocles and hippias tyrants of that city , and slew diocles ; but hippias that remaind , revenged it . chiones and leonides , heracleans , that were platoes disciples , conspird against clearchus and satirus that were tyrants ; they slew clearchus , and satirus that was left alive punished the fact . and the pazzi , several times alledged by us , has not the fortune to kill but iulian alone . insomuch as every one should be so wise as forbear to conspire against several principals : for he neither advantageth himself , nor his country , nor any body else : but rather they that are left behind , become more intolerable and fiercer , as florence , athens , and heraclea , which i spoke of before , know well it is true , that the conspiracy which pelopidas practised to free thebes his native country , had all manner of difficulties , yet it succeeded luckily : for pelopidas conspired not only against two tyrants , but against ten : and not only was he not a confident of any of theirs , and so had no easie access unto any of those tyrants , but he was a rebell : yet for all this came he into thebes , slew the tyrants and set the country at liberty . nevertheless he affected all this with the assistance of one carion a counsellor belonging to those tyrants , by whose means he had easie access to execute his purpose . yet let none take example from him : for it was an enterprise almost impossible , and a miracle it was that it succeeded ; and so it was , and is now esteemed by those writers that celebrate the memory thereof , as a matter of great rarity , and without patterne . such an execution may be hindred by a false imagination , or upon some sudden accident , that arises just upon the fact . on the morning that brutus and the other conspirators purposed to kill caesar , it fell out so that he talked a good while with cn. popilius len●● , one of the conspirators , whereupon the others seeing this long discourse , they were in fear least the said popilius had revealed the conspiracy to caesar , and they were about to attempt to slay caesar there , & not expect till he came into the senate , had it not been that when the discourse ended , they saw that cesar made not any extraordinary motion thereat , and so they settled themselves anew . these false conceits are to be consider'd , and weigh'd with discretion , & the rather , because they are easy to be taken ; for he that hath aguilty conscience , easily beleeves that others talk of him a word may be herd spoken to another purpose , that may much trouble thy mind , and make thee beleeve it touches the matter thou hast in hand , and cause thee by thy flight to discover thine own conspiracy , or put the action into disorder by hastening it faster than its time . and this comes to pass the more easily , where many are made privy to the conspiracy . touching the accidents ( because they fall out unexpected ) they cannot be shewed but by examples , and make men wary , according to their rule . ●ulius belanti of siena ( of whom i have formerly made mention ) for the hatred which he bore to pandulphus that had taken his daughter from him , whom he had first given him to wife , resolv'd to kill him , and chose this time . pandulphus went almost every day to visit a kinsman of his that was sick , and in going thither passed by julius his house : who perceiving this , provided so , that his conspirators were altogether ready in his house to kill pandulphus , as hee should pass and having plac'd them all arm'd in the entry , he had one stood in the window , that as pandulphus should pass , when he came near to the entry , should make a sign . it chanc't that pandulphus comming , & the other having given the sign , he met a friend that stopt him , and some of those that were with him passed forward before him , and hearing the noise of armes , they discoverd the ambush laid , so that pandulphus escap'd , and julius with his confederates were constrain'd to fly from siena . the chance of that meeting hindred the success of that action , & ruin'd quite julius his enterprise . for which accidents ( because they are very rare ) we cannot find any remedy , it is very necessary to examin well those that may chance , and help them as we can . it remaines now only , that we discourse of the dangers which they run after the execution done , which are all but one , and this it is , when any one is left alive to revenge the dead prince . there may then his brothers or his sons be left , or other of his allyes to whom the principality may belong , & may be left alive by thy negligence , or upon some occasions ( formerly spoken of ) that may execute this revenge , as it befell john andreas of lampognano , who together with his complotters having slain the duke of milan , and there being left alive one son of his and two brothers , they were ready at hand time enough to revenge his death . and truly in this case these conspirators are excusable : because they have here no remedy , but when any of them survives , for lack of good advisement , or through their negligence , then indeed thereis no excuse to be made for them . some conspirators at forly slew count ierolamus their lord , took prisoners his wife and sons , which were but little ones ; and thinking they could have no security , unless they became masters of the fortress , which the governour was not willing to give into their hands ; whereupon the lady katherine ( for so the countess was called ) promised the traitors , that if they would let her enter therein , she would cause it to be delivered up to them , and that they should keep her sons for pledges . they upon her word thus given , suffered her to enter in , who so soon as shee was within the walls , reproached them with the murder of her husband , and threatned them with all manner of revenge ; & to let them know shee had no regard of her children , she shewed them her privy parts , saying she had the means left her to bring forth others , so that they not knowing what to do , and too late perceiving their own error , suffered perpetual exile in punishment of their lack of wit. but of all dangers that can befall after the execution , there is node mone certain , nor more terrible , then when the people is a friend to that prince thou hast slain : for against this the conspirators can have no remedy : for they can never secure themselves . we have caesar for example hereof , who because he had the people of rome to friend , was by their means revenged : for when they had chased the conspirators from rome they caused all of them in several places to be slain . treasons that are practised against ones own countrey , are less dangerous for those that work them , then those that are practised agaist princes : for in the ordering of them the dangers are less then in the others , and in executing of them they are the same , and after the execution there is none at all . in the plotting and working them the dangers are not many : for a citizen may frame himself so , as to be capable of power , without manifesting his mind therein or intention to any one ; and unless those his purposes receive some interruption , he may happily proceed in his design : but if any law made , chance to cross them , he must stay his time , and seek some other course . this is to be understood of a republique where in corruption is entred in some part ; for in one not corrupted ( no evil beginning taking 〈◊〉 place there ) these thoughts cannot enter into the heart of any citizen . the citizens then may by several means and many waies aspire unto the principality , where they run no hazard of being oppress'd , as well because republiques are more slew then a prince and stand less in doubt , & ●●h refore are less wary as also because they carry more respect towards their principal citizens , and therefore are they the more audacious and more insolent to practise against them . few there are but have read catalines conspiracy written by salust , & know how that afterwards when it was discovered , cataline , did not only abide in rome , but came into the senate-house , & spoke in villanous termes against the senate and the consul ; so great was the respect that that city bore to her citizens so that when he was departed from rome , and had his armies already on foot , lentulus nor those others had never been layd hold on , had not there been letters of his own hand brought against him , which manifestly accused him . hanno the most potent citizen in carthage , aspiring to a tyranny , had provided at the marriage of one of his own daughters to poison all the senate , and afterwards make himself prince . when this matter was known , the senate took no other order then to make a law which limited the excess of expences anbanquets and weddings ; such was the respect they bore to men of their qualities . it is very true that in the executing of a treason against ones native country , there is more difficulty , and greater dangers ; for very seldome is it , that thy own forces suffice , being to conspire against so many ; for every one hath not an army at his command , as cesar agathocles or cl●omenes , and such like , who at one pluck have been able to seise on the country : for unto such the way is easie and safe enough , but others that have not such advantages of forces , must do it either with some slight or artifice , or by the aide of forraine forces . as for slights and tricks , pisistratus the athenian having over come the megarenses , and thereby got credit with the people , one morning came out among them wounded , saying , the nobility through envy had thus wrong'd him , and ask'd leave of them for his defence to have a guard of armd men about him . by this power he easily attain'd to such greatness , that he brought athens under his tyranny . pandulfus petrucci return'd himself with others that were out-law'd into siena , & there he had the charge given him over the common guard of justice , as a mecanick office , and which others refus'd , yet in time those arm'd men gave him such reputation , that shortly after he became lord of the town . many others have used other endeavors , and other waies , and in a short space , and without danger have attained to the same . those that by their own force , or by help of forrain-forces have conspir'd to make themselves lords over their native countries , have had several successes , as fortune hath befriended them or otherwise . cataline we spoke of before , was ruined thereby . hanno ( of whom we formerly made mention ) when the poison took not effect , armed many thousands of his partisans , who with himself were all slain . some of the prime citizens of thebes , to the end they might become lords of the town , called to their aid a sparian army , and so took upon them the rule of that city . so that when we shall have examined all the conspiracies made against a country , we shall not find any , at least very few , that in the plotting thereof have been suppressed , but all of them either have taken effect , or bin ruined in the execution rather . when they are once acted , they carry not with them any further dangers , then the nature of a principality hath in it self : for when a man hath once gotten to be a tyrant , he hath his own proper and ordinary dangers belonging to him , against which there are no other remedies then those we have formerly touch'd . this is that which i had to write touching conspiracies : and if i have discours'd of those onely that are executed with the sword , and not done by poison , it is because they have all the same rule . it is rue , that those done with poison , are the more dangerous , because they are more uncertain , for that a man cannot administer by every one , and he must needs reveal it to him that he makes his instrument ; and from this necessity of revealing it , arises thy danger : moreover upon many accidents a draught of poison cannot prove deadly , as it befell those that slew co●modus ; for he having vomited up the poison which they gave him , they were forced to strangle him , before they could make him dye . whereupon i judge that princes have not a greater enemy then treason ; because when a treason is once practised against them , it either brings them to their end , or procures them much infamy ; for if it succeeds , they die ; if it be discovered , and they slay the traitors , men always suppose it hath been some device of that princes , to vent his ava●ice and cruelty against the bloods and estates of those he hath put to death . i would not fail therefore to warn those princes or republiques against which treasons have been devised , that they be wary , when a conspiracy is once disclosed to them , before they go about to revenge it , but first to pty narrowly into it , and to seek to understand well the qualities thereof , and weigh well the conditions of the conspirators , and their own ; and when they finde them great and mighty , never to discover them , till they be furnished with sufficient forces to crush them ; for in doing otherwise , they should discover it to their own ruin : wherefore they ought to dissemble it with all possible care ; because the conspirators , when they finde themselves discovered , of force are driven to act what they can without respect . we have an example hereof from the romanes , who having lift two legions of souldiers to guard the capuans against the samnitcs , as otherwhere we have said , the heads of those legions conspired together to oppress the capuans : whereof notice being given at rome , the matter was committed to rutilius the new consul , that he should take order for it , who to lull asleep the conspirators , gave it out , that the senate had again confirmed the capuan legions aboad there : which those soldiers giving credit to , and thinking they had time enough to execute their purpose , they never went about to hasten the matter : and so they stood still , till they began to see that the consul separated them one from another , which thing having begotten suspicion in them , made them discover themselves , and execute their design . nor can there be a fuller example on the one or the other part : for hereby it appears how slow men are in matters , where they think they have time enough ; and how quick , when a necessity drives them to it . nor can a prince or republique ( that would defer the discovery of a treason for his own advantage ) take a better course , then by some device or trick offer the conspirators shortly some handsome opportunity , to the end that they attending that , or thinking they have time enough , may give leasure to that prince or commonwealth to punish them . they who have done otherwise , have hastened their own destruction , as the duke of athens did , and william of the family of the pazzi . the duke being become the tyrant of florence , and understanding that there was a conspiracy plotted against him , caused without further examining the matter , one of the conspirators to be laid hold on , which gave and alarme to the rest , whereupon arming themselves , they took the state from him . william being a commissary in the valley of chiana in the year . having had notice , that in arezzo there was a conspiracy in favour of the vitelli , to take that town from the florentines , presently went to the town , and not considering his own forces , nor the conspirators , nor taking order to furnish himself with any , by the bishops advice , who was his sons , caused one of the conspirators to be laid hands on , whereupon the first presently took arms , got away the town from the florentines , and william of a commissary was made a prisoner . but when those conspiracies are feeble , they may and ought without any regard be suppressed . yet in any case we must not follow two courses which have been used in a maner contrary one to the other : the one by the forenamed duke of athens , who to shew he believed that he had the citizens of florence good wills , put one to death that detected a conspiracy against him : the other by dion a siracusan , who to sound the minde of one whom he had in suspicion , agreed that callippus , of whom he was very confident , should make him believe that he were working a plot against him ; but these matters fell out ill for them both . for the one took all courage away from the accusers , and encouraged traitors ; the other made the way easie to his own ruine , or rather he himself was principal of the conspiracy against himself , and so it fell out ; for callippus ( being that he could without any respect practise such a thing against dion ) did it so in earnest , that he took both his life and his state from him . chap. vii . from whence proceeds it , that of the changes from liberty to slavery , and from slavery to liberty , some are without blood , others exceeding bloody ? some will marvail perchance from whence it comes to pass , that of many changes which are made from a free state to a tyrannical , and contrarily , some are with much effusion of blood , others quite without any : for , as we learn by histories , in such like alterations sometimes very many men have been slain , and sometimes again not one hath suffered any injury , as i● befell in the change that rome made from her kings to consuls , wherein none but the tarquins were banished , without wrong done to any body else . which depends hereupon ; for that state that is changed , begins first either by violence , or without it : and when it begins with violence , it must needs begin with doing wrong to many ; and it is necessary afterwards that in its destruction , they who have been wronged , revenge themselves , and so from their desire of revenge proceeds the effusion of blood and death of many . but when that state is begun by the common consent of an universality , and thereby hath been amplify'd , it hath no cause afterwards , when that universality is ruined , to wrong others then the head onely ; and of this kinde was the state of rome , and the tarquins banishment , as also was in florence the state which the medici held , when afterwards in their destructions in the year . none else were hurt but they . and so such like changes never prove very dangerous ; but those rather are very full of danger , which are wrought by those that endeavor to revenge themselves withall , which have been such , that they have caused horror even in him that reads them . and because of examples to this purpose histories are full fraught , i will let this pass . chap. viii . he that will make alteration in a republique , must consider the subject he is to work upon . it hath been formerly treated how that a malicious citizen cannot work mischief in a republique that is not grown corrupted ; which conclusion is confirmed ( besides the reasons that then were alledged ) with the example of sp. cassius , and of manlius capitolinus . which spurius being an ambitious man , and desirous to take upon him extraordinary authority in rome , and gain the people to him by doing them many good turns , as was that , to sell them those fields , which the romans had taken from the hermici , this his ambition was desc●yed by the fathers , and so much suspected , that when hh spoke to the people and offered to give them those moneys , which the corn was sold for , that the publique had caused to be brought from sicily , they wholly refused them , thinking that spurius meant to give them the price of their liberty . but had that people been already corrupted , they would not have refused the said price , but rather have opened him that way to the tyranny , which now they shut against him . a fuller example hereof manlius capitolinus represents unto us ; for in him we see , what excellencies of mind and body , how many brave exploits acted in defence of a mans native country , a brutish desire of rule quite rases out : which ( as it appeared ) grew in him , through the envy he bore camillus for the honors were done him , whereby his understanding was so blinded , as not considering the manner of government used in the city , nor examining , whereupon he was to work , unapt as yet to receive so evil a form , betook himself to raise tumults in rome against the senate , and contrary to the laws of his country . wherein the perfection of that city is very evident , and the goodness of the matter thereof ; for in his case none of the nobility , however that they were very eager defenders the one of another , never stirred in his favour , nor any of his kindred undertook any thing in his defence : whereas ordinarily when others were accused , they used to accompany them in a rueful manner , clad in black , and all sorrowful ; whereby they might gain compassion in favor of the defendant , and with manlius none of these were seen . the tribunas of the people , who were wont to favour those things , which seemed to be mov'd for the peoples advantage , and the more they were against the nobility , so much the forwarder used to thrust them , in this case held with the nobility to suppress a common mischief . the people of rome exceedingly desirous of their own advantage , and a great favourer of any thing that thwarted the nobility , however they afforded manlius many favors , nevertheless , when the tribunes cited him , and referred his cause to be judged by the people , that people being become judge of a defendant , without regard condemned him to death . wherefore i believe there is not any example in this history more proper to shew the goodness of that common-wealths orders , then this , seeing that not one of this whole city moved in behalf of a very valourous citizen , who as well publikely as privately had done many worthy acts : because in all of them the love of their country was of more force than any other regard , and they considered more the present danger ; that depended on him , than his fore-past deserts , so that by his death they set themselves at liberty . and t. livius says , this end had that man , who had he not been born in a free state , was worthy of admiration . where two things are to be considered ; the one , that by other means a man ought to seek after glory in a city corrupted , than in one that lives strictly according to the civil government ; the other is ( wich is almost the same with the first ) that men in their proceedings , and the rather in actions of consequence should consider the times , and conforme themselves thereunto : and those that by their evill choice , or natural inclination disagree with the times , most commonly live unhappily , and their actions have but ill successes . the contrary befalls those that can accord with the times : and without question , by the historians words which we for merly mentioned , we may make this conclusion , that if manlius had been borne in the times that marius and silla were , where the matter was already corrupted , that his ambition could have made some impression therein , he might , have workd the same effect , and had the same success that silla and marius had , and others afterwards , who after them aspird to the tyranny . so in like manner , if silla and marius had liv'd in manlius his daies . they had been crushd in the very egge : for one man may indeed begin with his evill courses and mischievous waies to debauch the people of a city : but it is impossible that one mans life can suffice to corrupt it so , that he himself can make any advantage thereof . and in case it were possible , that in tract of time , he could do it , yet would it be impossible , in regard of the manner of mens proceedings , who are impatient , and cannot defer any passion of theirs long . moreover , they erre in their affairs , and in those especially which they much desire , in so much as either through their small patience , or through their error , they would venture upon the executing of their purposes , in counter time , and so come to an evill end . therefore is it necessary , if a man would gain authority in a republick , and induce some ill for me thereinto , to find the matter already disorderd by time , and that by little and little , and from age to age is brought into disorder , which of force comes thereunto , when it is not ( as formerly hath been said ) refreshd by vertuous examples , or by new ●aws reduc'd to the first principles . manlius ●hen had been a rare man , and famous , had he been borne in a corrupted city . and therefore should those citizens that in republicks undertake any thing either in favour of liberty , or in favour of tyranny , consider the subject they are to work on , and from thence conjecture the difficulty of the worke : for it is as hard and dangerous to set free a people that would live in thral●om , as to inthrall a people that would live free . and because we have before rouchd , that in all manner of actions men should consider the quality of the times , and proceed conformably to those , we will speak of them at length in the chapter following . chap. ix . how a man must of necessity change with the times , if he will alwaies have good success in his undertakings . i have many times consider'd , how the occasion of mens good or evill fortunes depends upon the manner of the encounter of their proceedings with the times : for it is evident , that some men proceed in their affaires with violence , others with regard and wariness . and because that in the one and other of these two ways , the convenient terms are transgressed , being that they cannot hit upon the true way ; both in the one and the other they fail . but he fails least , and oftnest lights upon good success , that meets ( as i have said ) time in its own way , and always proceeds according as his own nature puts him forward . every one knows how fabius maximus proceeded with his army carefully and warily , far from all that kind of metle and confidence which other whiles the romans used ; and his good fortune would have it , that this his way agreed well with the times : for hannibal being come a young man into italy , and with a fresh gale of fortune , and having twice broken the romane armies , and that republike almost lost all her good soldiers , and therefore being affrighted , could not light upon better fortune than to have such a captain , who by his slowness and wariness should keep the enemy in play with vain delaies : nor could fabius have met with times fitter for his ways : whereupon came it to pass that he grew glorious . and that fabius did this upon the instigation of his own nature , and not upon a meer choice , we see that when scipio desired to pass over into affrica with those armies , whereby to make an end of the war , fabius much contradicted it , as he that could not go out of his own pace , nor leave his own custome , so that for all him , hannibal might have continued still in italy ; for he perceived not , that the times were changed , and it was needful to alter the manner of making war. and had fabius been king of rome , he might easily have spoiled that war , because he would not have known how to alter his proceedings with the alteration of times . but being he was born in a republike , where there was divers citizens , and divers humors , as she had fabius , who was excellent in those times , when the war was onely to be supported ; so had she scipio in the times when their enemies were to be overcome . whence arises it , that a republike hath a longer life , and longer enjoys good fortune than a principality : because she can better fit her self for several accidents , by reason of the variety of her subjects that are in her , then can a prince : for a man that is accustomed to proceed in one manner , never alters , as it is said , and must of necessity , when the times disagree with his way , go to wrack . peter soderini , formerly spoken of , proceeded in all his affairs with mildness and patience : and he and his country prospered , while the times agreed with his manner of proceedings : but when the times fell out so , that it was needful to break off all patience and mildness , he knew not how to do it : so that together with his country he fell to ruine . pope julius the second carried himself all the time of his pontificate with great violence and rage , and because the times sorted well therewith , all his undertakings succeeded well . but if other times had come , that would have required other advice , of force he must have gone to destruction : because he would never have altered his manner nor order in his proceedings . and that we cannot change our selves , there are two reasons ; the one because we cannot resist that which our nature is inclined to ; the other is , because when one man in such a kind of proceeding hath gone on luckily , it is impossible to perswade him , that things will prove well , where hee proceeds otherwise . whereupon it comes to pass , that in one man fortune varies , because shee changes the times , and he changes not his courses . thence arises also the ruine of a city , because the orders of common wealths change not with the times , as we have treated heretofore at large , but they are flower : for it is a greater trouble to them to change ; and to effect it , they have need of times which should in a manner take a republick quite off the things whereby a thorough alteration should be made in her : for which one man alone suffices not by changing the manner of her proceedings . and because wee have made mention of fabius maximus , who held off hannibal with delayes , i purpose to treate in the following chapter , whether a captain , being desirous to fight a battel with the enemy in any case , can be so hindred that he do it not . chap. x. that a captain cannot avoid battell , when his enemy will fight in any case . cneus sulpitius the dictator held off from fighting with the french , being not willing to stand at fortunes discretion in a tryall against his enemy , whom time and a strange country would continually weaken and consume . when such an error en●ues , where all men or the greater part of them erre , i think it not much amiss mary times to reprove it . wherefore though i have formerly several times shewed , how the actions about great matters now adays differ from those of ancient times ; yet i think it not superfluous at this present to repeat it : for if in any part it differs from the ancient orders , it is especially in military orders , where now is not any of those things observed , which the ancients made much account of . and this inconvenient grew first hereupon , because commonwealths and princes , have committed this care to o●hers , and to avoid dangers , have much lai● aside that exercise ; and if perchance sometime a king in our days venture to go in person , we believe not therefore that he seeks out any new orders , that are more commendable : for when they chance to give themselves to that imployment , they do it rather in shew of their pompe , then upon any other laudable occasion . yet do these commit lesser errors , personally visiting their armies , and keeping in their own hands the majesty of their government , then republikes do , especially those of italy , which trust to others , not understanding any thing in the wars , or attending to any thing belonging to them : and on the other side , when they are desirous ( whereby they may seem to be princes ) to take any thing into deliberation , they commit therein exceeding many errors . and however that other where i have treated of some of them , yet at this present i will not forbear to tell one of very great importance . when these lazy princes , or effeminate commonwealths send forth any commander of theirs , the wisest commission that they think they can give him , is to charge him , that in any case he fight not a battel , but avoid it , and conceiting with themselves that herein they imitate fabius maximus his discretion , who by forbearing to fight , saved the romane state ; they understand not that most commonly , this commission is either to no purpose , or else hurtful . for we must take this for a conclusion , that a general , that will abide in the field , cannot avoid a battel , when the enemy will in any case fight . so that this commission is but thus , as if he should say , fight with thine enemy at his pleasure , and not at thine own . for if a man will abide in the field and not fight , the surest way is to keep himself fifty miles off from his enemy at least , and then keep good espiouns , so that if he chance to bend towards thee , thou maist avoid him at leisure . another course is to immure himself up in a city ; but the one and the other of these two courses is very pernicious . in the first he leaves his country in prey to the enemy ; and a valiant prince will rather hazard the battel than prolong the war with so much dammage to his subjects . and in the second the loss is evident ; for it must needs be , that retiring thy self within the walls of a town with thy army , thou be besiged , and at length suffer famine , and so be forced to yeeld : insomuch as to avoid battel by either of these two means , must needs prove very hurtful . the course that fabius maximus held , to abide in strong places is very good , when thou hast an army so valorous , that the enemy dares not come to find thee in thy advantages . nor can it be said that fabius avoided fighting , but rather that he would fight at his advantage . for if hannibal had gone to find him , fabius would have staid for him , and fought with him ; but hannibal durst not deal with him after his manner . so the battel was as well avoided by hannibal as by fabius ; but if one of them had been desirous to have hazarded in any case , the other had but one of these three remedies , to wit those two we have before mentioned , or to flie . there are many examples and maximes in the war , which the romanes made with philip of macedon , father of perses , to make good what i say ; for philip being assailed by the romanes , resolved not to come to battel ; and therefore first he thought to do as fabius maximus had done in italy , and placed himself with his army upon the top of a mountain , where he fortified himself all he could , deeming that the romans had not the heart to come and find him there ; but when they went thither , and fought with him , and drove him from the mountain , being not able to withstand them , he fled with the greater part of his people : and that which saved him was the roughness of the country , so that the romans could not follow the pursuite . philip then being unwilling to fight , and having pitcht his campe near the romans , had no other mean but to fly ; and having found by this experience , that when they meant not to fight , it was not enough for them to get upon the top of the mountains ; and having no mind to inclose himself in any town , resolved to take the other course , to remove many miles distant from the romanes campe. whereupon , if the romanes were in one province , they went into another , and so always they went thither from whence the romanes were parted : and considering in the end , how that in prolonging the war this way , his own estate declined , and how that his subjects were sometimes by himself , otherwhile by his enemies daily oppressed , resolved to put it to the tryal of a day , and so came to a set battel with the romanes . it is profitable then not to fight , when the armies have these conditions which fabius his army had , or that then had that of cneus sulpirius , which are , to have an army so good , that the enemie dares not come and find thee within thy fortifications , and that the enemy though he be in thy country , yet hath he not much footing therein , where he may suffer want of provisions ; and in this case the course is advantagious for the reasons titus livius alledges : vnwilling to stand at fortunes discretion on a tryal against his enemy , whom time and a strange country would daily weaken and consume . but in any other case the battel cannot be avoided , but with thy shame and danger : for to flie ( as philip did ) is the same that it is to be routed , and that with the more disgrace , by how much the less thou hast made proof of thy valor . and however he had the luck to escape , another could not have had the like , unless he had help by the scituation of the country , as well as he . that hannibal was a master in the art of war , i think every one will acknowledge , and being to oppose scipio in affrica , if he had seen any advantage in prolonging the war , without doubt he would have done it , and peradventure could too ( being a good commander and having a good army ) as well as fabius did in italy . but being he did it not , we may well believe , that some important reason perswaded him so ; for a prince that hath an army levied , and sees that for want of moneys or friends he cannot keep them long together , is a very fool if he ventures not his fortune , before his army falls asunder ; for by delaying he certainly loses , whereas hazzarding he might overcome . another thing there is yet much to be accounted of , which is , that a man ought ( even in his losing ) seek to gain glory ; and it is more glory , to be overcome by force , than by any other inconvenient , that may have made thee lose . therefore it must needs be that hannibal was forc't by these necessities ; and on the other side scipio , if hannibal would have protracted the war , and he durst not have adventured to go seek him in his trenches , had not suffered therein , in that he had already overcome siphax , and taken so many towns in affrick , so that he could have continued there with security and conveniency , as well as in italy . which was not so with hannibal , when he had to deal with fabius , nor with those french-men , when they were opposed by sulpitius . so much the less also can he avoid the fight , that with an army invades another mans country , he must ( whensoever the enemie faces him ) fight with him , and if he incampes before any town , so much the rather is he obliged to fight , as in our days it befell duke charles of burgundy , who being set down before morat , a town belonging to the swissers , was assaulted by them and broken : and so it chanc'd to the french army , that incamping at novarra , was in like manner routed by the swissers . chap. xi . he that hath to deal with many , however that he be the weaker , provided that he can but support their first violence , overcomes . the tribunes of the peoples power in rome was great , and necessary , as many times we have said : for otherwise it would never have been possible to bridle the nobilities ambition , which would much sooner , then it did , have corrupted that commonwealth : yet because in every thing ( as is often said ) some evil proper to every thing lies lurking in it , which causes new accidents to arise , it is needful with new orders to remedy them . wherefore the tribunitial power being grown insolent , and terrible to the nobility , and to all rome , some very hurtful inconvenient to the romane liberty would have risen , if the way had not been shewed by appius claudius , whereby they might defend themselves against the tribunes ambition : which was that they always found some one among them , that either was fearful or might be corrupted , or that was a lover of the common good : so that they disposed him to oppose other mens wills , that desired to draw forward any deliberation against the senates will. which remedy was a great allay to such an authority , and a long time much helped rome . which thing hath made me consider , that whensoever many powerful ones are united together against one that is powerful , though all they together are much more puissant then he , yet may there much more be hoped for in him alone , though less powerful , then in those many , though very strong : for ( leaving a part all those things , wherein one alone is able to do more then many , which things are innumerable ) this will always come to pass , that one alone , taking but a little care , shall be able to disunite those many , and so weaken that body which was strong . i will not herein alledge ancient examples , which are very frequent ; the modern shall suffice me , which have faln in our days . in the year . all italy conspired against the venetians , who when they were in a manner wholly lost , and could not any more abide in the field with their army , they corrupted lodwick that then ruled in milan , and by means of that corruption made an accord , wherein they not only had again the towns they had lost , but usurped a part of the state of ferrara . and thus they that had been loosers in the war , remained gainers by the peace . a few years past , the whole world conspired against france ; yet before they came to see the end of the war , spain broke off from her confederates , and made agreement with her , in so much as the rest of the confederates also were forced to make their accords too . so that without doubt , we ought always judge , when we see a war made by many against one , that that one is like to be a gainer at the end , provided that he be of such valour , that he is able to sustain the first brunts , and so govern himself with the time as to attend time : which if he were not able to do , he would run the hazard of many dangers , as it happened to the venetians in the eighth year , who if they could have temporised with the french army , and so have had time to gain themselves some of those that were confederated against them , they might have escaped that destruction , but not having so good an army , as thereby to play with the enemy awhile ; and hereupon not having had leisure to take any of them asunder , they were ruined : for we saw , that the pope when he had what was his , became their friend , and so spaine , and very willingly the one and the other of these two princes would have saved them the state of lombardy against france , for fear of making it too great in italy , if it had been in their power . the venetians then might have given a part , to save the rest , which if they had done in time , that it had appeared it was not of extream necessity , and before the beginning of the war , would have been wisely done of them ; but when the wars were begun , it was disgraceful , and peradventure of small benefit . but before such imbroiles , few of the citizens of venice could foresee the danger , very few the way to help , and none to advise it . but to return again to the beginning of this discourse , i conclude , that even so as the senate of rome had a remedy to save their country from the tribunes ambition , because they were many , so shall any prince that is assailed by many , finde a remedy , whensoever he knows with discretion how to use the convenient means to disunite them . chap. xii . that a wise commander upon his own souldiers should lay all manner of necessity to fight , and take it , as much as he can , from his enemies . at other times we have treated , of what advantage necessity is to hamane actions , and to what glory they have thereby been promoted ; and that by some moral philosophers it hath been written , that mens hands and tongues two of their worthiest instruments to ennoble them , would never have worked so perfectly , nor have brought mens labors to that excellency , whereunto we see them now come , had they not been thrust forward by necessity . the vertue then of such necessity being known by the ancient commanders of armies , and how thereby the souldiers minds were made the more obstinate to fight , they used all their industry , to force them by it . and on the other side , they aswell endeavored , to free their enemies from it ; and hereupon many times they opened that way to the enemy , which they could have shut against them , and shut it against their own soldiers , which they could have left open for them . he then that desires , either that a city defend it self obstinately , or that an army in the field fight it out resolutely , must try his wits to make an impression in the brests of them that are to fight , that such a necessity lies upon them . whereupon a discreet commander that is going to besige a town , may conjecture of the facility or difficulty in taking it , by the knowledge and consideration of the necessity that binds the inhabitants to defend themselves ; and as he finds the necessity urging them to be great , so let him judge it difficult to overcome them , or otherwise easie . whence it proceeds , that those towns which have rebelled , are harder to be regained then they were at their first conquest ; for in the beginning not having any cause to fear punishment , as not having offended , they yeeld easily ; but thinking ( after they have rebelled ) that they have offended , and hereupon fearing the chastisement , they prove harder to be recovered . moreover such obstinacy arises from the innate hatreds which neighboring princes and republiques , bear one to another , which proceeds from their ambition to rule , and the jealousie of their own state , especially if they be republikes as it chances in tuscany . which strife and contention hath caused , and ever will , a great difficulty in the mastery of the one or other . whereof he that considers well the city of florences neighbors , and those of venice , will not marvel ( as many do ) that florence hath spent more in her wars , and gained less then venice , for this is , because the venetians never found their neighboring towns so obstinate in their defence , as florence hath ; for that all the towns confining upon venice have been accustomed to live in subjection under a prince , and not free ; and those that have been used to serve , make small account of changing their lord , or rather many times they much desire it . so that venice ( however she hath had more powerful neighbors then florence ) yet because she hath found the townes lesse obstinate against her , hath been able sooner to subdue them then the other could , being enuironed round , by free towns. a commander therefore should ( to return to our first discourse ) when he sits down before any town , provide with all diligence to take from the defendants all scruples of such necessity , and conquently such obstinacy , promising pardon , if they are afraid of punishment : and if they doubt their liberty is aimed at , shew them there is nothing intended against the common good , but against some few ambitious men in the city , which thing hath , many times facilitated such enterprises and takings of towns. and though such colours are easily seen through , and especially by understanding men , yet are the people ost deceived thereby , who being desirous of the present peace , shut their eyes against any other , snare that under large promises can be laid for them . and this way exceeding many cities have been reduced to servitude , as it befell florence in these latter days , and crassus also with his whole army , who though he knew the parthians promises were not to be credited , which were made onely to take from his soldiers the necessity of defending themselves , yet could he not keep them obstinate , being blinded by the offers of peace made them by their enemies , as in particular may be seen in his life , by him that shall read it . when the samnites , contrary to the articles of agreement , upon the ambition of some few had forraged and spoiled the romans their confederates fields , and afterwards sent ambassadors to rome to require peace , offering to make restitution of all that was taken , and deliver them prisoners the authors of those broyles and robberies , they were refus'd by the romans , and sent back to samnium without hope of agreement : claudius pontius the commander of the samnites army , with a notable oration of his shewed , the romans would have war in any case ; and though for their own parts they wished for peace , yet necessity made them take the war in hand , saying these words , they justly take arms that are forced to do so ; and piously too who have no other hope but in them . upon which necessity he with his souldiers grounded his hopes of victory . and to the end i need not return again to this matter , i think it fit to alledge those examples of the romans , which are most worthy of remarke ; caius manilius went forth with an army to incounter the veientes , and part of their army having forced his trenches , manilius came speedily with new troops to sucour his own , and that the veientes should not escape , guarded all the passages into the campe . whereupon the veientes seeing themselves shut in of all sides , began to fight with such fury , that they slew manilius , and would have otherthrown all the rest of the romans , if , by the wisdom of one tribune , a way for them to escape by , had not been opened . where we see that whiles necessity constraned the veientes to fight , they stood to it stoutly ; but as soon as a way was opened for them , they thought more upon flying then fighting . the volsci and equi having entered with their armies upon the roman territories , the consuls were sent against them , and whiles they were in fight , the volscies army , the chief whereof was vectius metius , chanced to to be inclosed between their own trenches , which the romans were now become masters of , and the other roman army , who seeing they must all either die or make way by the sword , he spake thus to his soldiers , come along with mee ; there is neither rampire nor ditch to oppose you , but men only against men : you are equall to them in valour , and , which is the last and hardest weapon , your necessity gives you advantage of them . insomuch as this necessity is term'd by titus livius the extreamest and greatest weapon . camillus the wisest of all the roman commanders being got within the walls of the vejentes city with his army , whereby to take it more easily , and to free the enemies from that last necessity of defending themselves gave command so that the vejentes heard it , that none should hurt those that were disarmd : so that having cast all their armes upon the ground , that city was taken with little or no effusion of blood ; which course was afterwards followed by many commanders . chap. xiii . whether more trust is to be reposed in a good commander that hath a weak army , or in a good army that hath a weak commander . coriolanus being banished from rome , went from thence to the volsci , where having gotten together an army to be reveng'd of his own citizens , came from thence to rome ; from whence he was mov'd to depart , rather for pitty to his mother , than by the romans forces . upon which place t. livius saies , that hereby it is known that the commonwealth of rome grew more by the captains valours , than the soldiers , considering that the volsci formerly had been alwaies losers , and only then had overcome when co●iolanus was their general : and how ever that livie holds such an opinion , yet we see in many places of his history , that soldiers without any captain have given extraordinary proofs of their valors , and have been better ordered and fiercer after the death of their consuls , than before they were slain , as it happend in the army which the romans had in spain under the scipioes , which when the two captains were slain , was able by its own valor not only to save it self , but overcome the enemy , and keep that province for the republick . so relating all , wee shall find many examples where the soldiers valor alone hath got the day , and many others where the generals valor only hath done the same effect . in so much as wee may well judge , that either of them hath need of the other . and here it is not amiss to consider first , whether is most to be feared , either a good army led by an unskilfull commander , or a good commander followed by a bad army . and taking after cesars opinion , small account is to be made of the one or the other : for when he went into spain against afranius and petrejus , who had with them a good army , he said he little doubted them , because he went against an army that lacked a commander , shewing the commanders weakness . on the contrary when he went into thessaly against pompey , he said , i go against a commander without an army . another thing may be considerd , which is more easie , either for a good commander to make a good army , or for a good army to make a good commander ; whereupon i answer , that the question seems already decided : for more easily many shall find one , or shall instruct one so that he become good , than one alone shall many . lucullus when he was sent against mithridates , was altogether unexpert in the war ; yet that good army , wherein were so many good chieftaines , quickly made him a skilful commander . for want of soldiers the romans put many slaves in armes , and gave order to sempronius gracchus to train them , who in a small time made a very good army of them . pelopidas and epaminondas ( as we have said otherwhere ) after they had delivered thebes their native country out of the spartans bondage , made the thebans exceeding good soldiers in a short time , that they were able not only to sustain ' , but overcome the soldiers of sparta ; so that the case is equal on both sides : for the one being good , may soon find the other so : yet a good army without a good head , ordinarily becomes insolent and dangerous ; as was the macedonian army after alexander his death , and likewise the veterane soldiers in the civil warres . so that i think , that much more account is to be made of a commander that hath time and convenience to train up and arme his soldiers , than of an insolent army , having a captain from among them tumultuarily made their chief . wherefore double glory and renown may well be ascrib'd to those commanders , who have not only taken upon them to overcome the enemy , but before their comming to fight with them , have to make them fit for the occasion , disciplind and instructed their armies well : for therein appears their vertuo double and admirable ; whereas if the charge hereof were communicated to many , far less account or esteem would be made of them . chap. xiv . new sleights and inventions , that are usd in the midst of a fight , and new cryes that are heard , what effects they produce . of what moment in combates and fights a new accident is , that arises upon any new matter seen or heard , appears in many places , and especially in that occasion , where the romans fought with the volsci , where qu●ntius seeing one of the horns of his army beginning to fayle , began to cry out aloud , that they should stand firm : because the other horne of the army was already victorious : by which words , having encourag'd his own , and affrighted his enemies , hee overcame them . and if such vociserations in an army well orderd be of great effect , in one then that is but tumultuary and ill disciplind , they must needs be of much greater : because the whole frame thereof moves by the like wind . to this purpose i will alledge a notable example befaln in our dayes . the city of perugia , a few years since , was divided into two factions , of the oddi , and the bagliori ; these raignd there , the others were banishd men , who having by help of their allies gotten an army together , and brought it into some town consining upon perugia , by favour of their faction one night enterd the city , & without being descryd , came to take the piazza ; & because that city hath chains on all the corners of the waies , which kept them bard , the soldiers belonging to the oddi had a man went before them , who with a bar of iron was to break the locks of those chains , to the end the horse might pass , & there being but one only left them to break , which immediately opened into the piazza , and now a generall alarme being given , and he that broke them , being oppressed by the multitude that followd him , and not able therefore well to lift up his armes with his bar , whereby to imploy it , chanc'd to say stand back ; which word going by degrees , saying back , began to cause the furthest off to flie , and so by little and little the rest with such force , that they all routed one another . and thus the design of the oddi , by occasion of so poor an accident , became frustrate . where we may consider , that discipline and order is not usefull in an army so much for orderly fighting , as that every small accident put thee not quite into disorder : for , were it for nothing else , the ordinary multitude is unfit for the warrs , because every rumor , every voice , every noise changes them , and puts them to flight . and therefore a good commander , among his other orders , ought appoint those that are to take the word from him , & to pass it to others , and accustome his soldiers , so that they give no credit save only to their own officers , to the end that they tell them only , what is given them in charge from him : for when this part is not well observ'd , many disorders often fall out . touching the sight of these new things every commander ought well bend his wits , to make some shew whiles the battail is in tryal , whereby to encourage his own , and dishearten the enemy , because among those accidents which may give thee the victory , this is the most effectuall . whereof wee alledge for testimony the example of cneus sulpitius the roman dictatour , who comming to fight a battell with the french , arm'd all the poor drudges and rascality of the camp : and having mounted them upon mules and poor asses with armes and ensignes , to make them seem as if they were cavallry , he plac'd them behind a hill , and commanded that at a signall given , whiles he was in the hottest of the battel they should shew themselves to the enemy , which thing so ordered and done , put the french men in such a fright that they lost they day . and therefore a good commander ought to do two things ; the one is , to try some of these inventions to startle the enemy : the other , to stand so prepard that the enemy offering any such to him , he may be able to discover and quite frustrate them , as did the indian king to semiramis ; who seeing , that king had a great number of elephants , to affright him , and make him think shee had more her self than he , made a great many of them of bulls and bufaloes hides , and having put them upon camells , sent them before : but that king finding out her deceit , turnd it upon her not only vain but hurtfull . mammercus was sent dictator against the fidenates , who to affright the roman army , appointed that in the heat of the skirmish a good number of soldiers should sally forth of fidenas with lights upon the top of their lances , to the end that the romans taken a while with the novelty of the matter , should fall into some disorder . whereupon it is to be noted , that when such devices carry more truth than appearance with them , they may well be represented to the view of men , because that having in them a great deal of that which is lively and likely , their weakness cannot so quickly be discoverd : but when they have more of fiction in them than of truth , it is better either not to use them , or using them to keep them off at such a distance that a full discovery of them cannot suddenly be made , as was that trick of the muleters cn. sulpitius practisd : for when there is nothing but weakness within them , as they are approached , they are quickly seen through , and do thee wrong rather than give thee advantage , as those elephants did to semiramis , and the fires to the fidenates ; which however that at first they a little troubled the army , yet when the dictatour came up to them , and began to cry out , that they might be ashamd to fly from the smoak like bees , but that they should rather turn back their slames upon them , saying , bnrne out these people of fidenas with fire , whose rancorous spirits you could never asswage with all your courtesie . thus that device of the fidenates servd them to no purpose , and so they lost the fight . chap. xv. that the command of an army ought to be given in charge only to one ; and where there are more , they alwaies erre . the fidenates having rebelld , and slain that colony , which the romans had sent to fidenas , the romans created four tribuns with consular power to exact satisfaction for this wrong done : whereof one being left for the safeguard of rome , the rest were sent against the fidenates , and the vejentes , who because they were at variance one with another , brought back disgrace from the service , though no loss : of the disgrace they were the cause , but that they receivd no loss , the soldiers valour was the cause . whereupon the romans seeing this disorder , had their recourse to the creation of a dictator , to the end one alone should rectifie again , what three had disorderd . whence we see the unprofitableness of many commanders in one army or town , that is to defend it self : and t. livius cannot more plainly express it , than in these words , here written ; three tribuns with consular power taught us how unprofitable a thing it was , to have many commanders in the warr ; for every one of them making severall parties , and each one thinking his own best , gave opportunity to the enemy . and however that this is example sufficient to prove the disorder which a plurality of commanders causes in the war , yet will i alledge some other as well modern as ancient , for the better declaration of it . in the year . after the reprisal of milan by lewes the twelfth of france , he sent his army to pisa , to restore it to the florentines , whether john baptista ridolphi and luke antony of the albizzi were sent commissaries . and because iohn baptista was a man of credit and years , luke left the whole government in every thing unto him . and if he did not discover his ambition in opposing him , yet he manifested it by his silence , and neglecting and scorning every thing that was orderd , so that he nothing furtherd the actions of the campe neither in word nor in deed , as if he had been a man of no worth . but afterwards it appeared quite contrary , when upon an occasion following , iohn baptista was fain to returne to florence ; luke being left alone shewd his abilities , both by his courage , industry and counsell . all which things were in a manner quite lost in him , while he had a companion . i will anew produce in confirmation hereof t. livius his words , who relating , how that quintius and agrippa his collegue , being sent by the romans against the aequi , the whole disposing of the war was in quintius his hands , and saies : in the managing of weighty affaires , it is the safest way to commit the main charge to one . which is clean contrary , to what is now adaies practised by our republicks and princes : who use to send into those places , that they may the better order them , more commissaries , and more commanders than one , which causes much confusion : and if the occasion were inquired after , why the italian and french armies are now adaies ruined , we should find this had been the principall . and it may truly be concluded , that it is to more purpose to imploy one man alone of but ordinary judgement in such an expedition , then two very able men together with equall commission . chap. xvi . in times of difficulty and perill true worth and vertue is sought after , and in calme and quiet times , not mens vertues , but their wealth , friends , and parentage preferre them . it was alwaies and ever will be , that great personages and the worthyest men , in peaceable times , are of small esteem : for because of envy , following the reputation which their vertue hath gained them , in such times there are many citizens , that are ambitious , not only to bee their equals , but superiors ; and to this purpose there is a place in thucydides the greeke historian , which serves very fitly , where he shewes that when the athenian republick came off victour in the peloponnesian war , and had taken down the spartanes pride , and in a manner subjected all greece , the athenians conceited so highly of themselves , as that they designed the conquest of sicile also . this enterprise came to be disputed in athens : alcibiades and some other citizens perswaded it , as they that little caring for the publick good , thought only upon the advancing their own particular reputations , each one of them having hopes to bee sent commander in the imployment . but nicias that was the principal among the best reputed of athens , disswaded it : and the greatest reason he alledged in perswading the people to give credit to his words , was this , because while hee advised them thus that the warr should nor proceed , he perswaded them to that which was not for his advantage ; for while athens was in peace , he knew , there were many citizens would go before him ; but in time of war hee was sure none could go before , no nor come near him . wee see therefore , that in republicks there is this disorder , in times of peace to make small account of able men , which thing enrages them two several waies , the one to see their own degrees fayl them ; the other to see unworthy men , and of smaller abilities then themselves , made their companions or rather their superiors : which disorder in republicks hath caused much destruction ; for those citizens who see themselves undeservedly despised , and know that quiet times are the occasion thereof , devise all the wayes they can to disturbe them , suggesting inducements to new wars in prejudice of the commonwealth . and devising what might be the remedies hereof , we find two ; the one to keep the citizens alwaies poor , to the end that riches without vertue should not be able to corrupt neither those nor others : the other to be alwaies so ready for the war , as that they may be able continually to make war , & may have need alwaies of well reputed citizens , as rome did in her first beginnings ; for that city having alwaies some armyes abroad , there was ever place left to mens vertues , nor could they bereave such a one of his dignity , that deserved it ; or confer it upon another not deserving it ; for in case that such a thing were done , some times upon mistake or for tryall , there quickly ensued such a disorder thereupon and a danger , that all returned presently into the right way . but these other common-wealths , that are not so ordered as shee , and that then only make war when necessity constrains them , cannot free themselves of such an inconvenient , or rather they will alwaies incurr it , and there will ever some disorder be ready to arise , when that vertuous citizen thus neglected is of a revengefull disposition , and hath in the city some good repute and correspondence ; and from this the city of rome kept her self free a good while . yet she ( after she had subdu'd carthage and antiochus , as we said otherwhere , being no more in doubt of the issue of her warrs ) thought she might give the command of her armies to whom she pleas'd , not so much regarding their vertues as their other qualities , ingratiating them with the people : for we see paulus emilius had several repulses in demanding the consulate , before he was made consul , till the macedonian war chanc'd , which because it was thought dangerous , by general consent of the city was committed to him . in our city of florence after the year . many warrs following , one upon the neck of the other , and all the citizens of florence having made unlucky tryal of themselves , the city by chance lit upon one man who-shewed them the manner how their armies were to be commanded , which was antoni giacomini : and whiles the warrs in hand were perillous , the other citizens ambitions ceas'd ; and in the election of commissary or commander of their armies , he had no competitor stood with him . but when as any war was to be made where no hazard was , but a great deal of honor and dignity , he found alwaies so many competitors , that they being to make election of there commissaries to beleager piza , he was left out of the number . and however it was not perceiv'd evidently , that evill would befall the state , because antony was not sent thither , yet may we easily conjecture , because the pisans having no means for further defence or sustenance , had antony been sent thither , they would before that have been so straightly beset , that they should have surrendred themselves to the florentines directions . but they being besieged by commanders that understood not how to begirt , nor force them , were so long held in hand , that the city of florence bought them , whereas they might have had them by force . it was likely that such a distaste with antony might have done much , and he had need truly of much patience , and so good a disposition as not to desire revenge hereupon , either with the destruction of the city ( if he were able ) or with the wrong of any particular citizen , where of a republick ought to beware , as in the chapter following we shall treate . chap. xvii . that he who hath receiv'd any notable disgrace or injury done him from a prince or commonwealth , should never after be intrusted by them with any imployment or service of importance . a commonwealth should be well advis'd , never to commit any weighty service to any one , to whom any notable injury hath been done . claudius nero ( who left his army which he had lying in front against hannibal , and with part thereof went into the marches to find the other consul , to combate asdrubal , before he should joyn with hannibal ) had formerly in spain been incamp'd against asdrubal , and having shut him up in a place with his army , so that asdrubal , was either to fight at disadvantage , or perish by famin , was cunningly by asdrubal so long held in hand with certain treaties of agreement , that hee scap'd him , and took from him the opportunity he had to suppress him . which thing being known at rome , got him great discredit as well with the senate as the people , and he was spoken of very disgracefully throughout the city , to his great disreputation and despight thereat too : but being afterwards made consul , and sent against hannibal , took the course we have said , which was a very dangerous one , so that rome was amazed and in tumults , till news arived of asdrubals defeat , and claudius being afterwards asked on what ground he undertook so dangerous a course , where without an extream necessity he had hazarded the liberty of rome , answer'd that he had done it , because if it prov'd lucky , he should recover the glory he had formerly lost in spain : and if it fayl'd him , and this course fell out cross , he knew he should be reveng'd of that city and those citizens , who had unthankfully and undiscreetly wrong'd him . and when these passions , arising from such offences , are of such force in a citizen of rome , and in those dayes before corruption was crept into rome , we may well ghesse how powerfull they are in a citizen of such a city that is not so regulated nor order'd as she then was : and because to such like disorders which grow up in common-wealths , no certain remedy can be assign'd , there followes an impossibility to frame a perpetual commonwealth for by many unexpected waies desiruction breaks in upon it . chap. xviii . there is nothing more worthy of a commander , than to be able to discover before ha●d , and espye out the enemies practises . epaminondas the theban said , that nothing was more advantageous or useful to a commander , than to know the enemies designes and purposes ; and because it is hard to attaine to that knowledge . ●he deserves the greater commendations , who takes such a course that he ghesses it out . and it is not so hard to discover the enemies purposes as some times to understand his actions , and not so much his actions , which by him are done a far off , as those present and near hand : for it hath many times chanc'd , that a fight having continued til night , he hath vanquished that thinks he hath lo● , and he lost that thought he had overcome ; which error hath caus'd some to take resolutions clean contrary to their own good , as it befell brutus and cassius , who upon this mistake lost their war ; for brutus having overcome on his wing , cassius beleev'd he had lost , that the whole army was broken , and upon this error despairing of his own safety , slew himself . in our daies in the battell at saint cecily in lombardy that francis the king of france sought with the swissers , the night overtaking them , that part of the swissers , which remained entire , thought they had got the victory , knowing nothing of those that had been broken and slain . which error was the occasion that they themselves escap'd not , staying to fight again on the morning much at their disadvantage : such like error also caused to mistake , and well near ruined thereby the popes & the spanish army , which upon this false advice of victory passed the po , and had it gone never so little on for warder , had been prisoner to the french , who were the conquerors . the like error to this happened in the romans campe , and in that also of the equi , where sempronius the consul was with the army to enconnter the enemy , and the battell being joyned , the combat lasted while night with variable fortune on the one and the other side : and night being come , each army being halfe broken , neither of them returned to their quarters , but both of them chose rather to withdraw themselves unto the adjoyning hills , where they thought they might bē more secure , and the roman army divided itself into two parts , whereof the one went with the consul , the other with one tempanius a centurion , whose valor that day kept the roman army from being wholly routed ; the morning being come , the roman consul , without hearing further of the enemy , retired towards rome , and the like did the equies armie , because each of these thought the enemy had been victour , and therefore they each withdrew themselves , without any regard that they left their campes in prey to the enemy . it fell out that tempanius who was there with the remainder of the roman army , retiring too , learned by certain wounded soldiers of the equi , that their captaines were gone and had abandoned their quarters , upon which news he went into the roman quarters and saved them , but sacked those of the equi , and so returned victorious to rome : which victory ( as wee see ) consists only in , who hath notice of the enemies disorder . where we should consider , that it may often come to pass , that the two armies which are in front one against another , may be both in the like disorder , and suffer the same wants , and that after remaines vanquisher that first comes to knowledge of the others necessities . and hereof i will give a domestick and moderne example . in the year one thousand four-hundred ninty eight , when the florentines had a great army about pisa , and beleaguerd the town very strongly , whereof the venetians having undetaken the protection , and notseeing any otherway to save it , resolved to divert the war , by assayling the territories of florence on the other side ; wherefore with a strong army they entred by the vally of lamona , and seised upon the village of marradi , and besieged the fortress of castiglione which is upon the hill above : which the florentines perceiving , resolved to succour marradi , and yet not lessen their forces which they had about pisa ; so that having levied new foot , and appointed new horse , they sent them that way , whose commanders were jacobus quartus of appian , lord of piombin , and count rinuccius of marcian . these then being come to the hills above marradi , the enemies lest beleaguering marradi , and betook themselves to the village ; where these two armies being infront one against the other for some daies , both suffered much for the scarcity of provisions . and other necessaries ; and neither daring to set upon the other , nor either knowing the others wants , both at once resolved over night to raise their campes the morning following , and retire , the venetian toward berzighella and faenza , the other toward casaglia and mugello . the morning then come , and each campe having begun to send away their carriages , by chance a woman parted from the bourg of marradi , and came towards the florentine campe , being secure enough from wrong , because of her old age , and poverty , desirous belike to see some of her friends in that campe , by whom the florentine captains understanding of the venetian camps departure , upon this news grew a little more couragious , and having changed their purpose , as if they had dislodged their enemies , went out , and took their quarters , and writ to florence , they had repulsed and vanquished them . which victory proceeded from nothing else , than from having first had notice of their enemies departure : which notice had it been given on the other side , would have wrought the same effect against ours . chap. xix . whether in the government of a multitude , mildness or severity be of greater availe . the commonwealth of rome was in a combustion , because of the differences between the nobles and the commons : nevertheless as occasion of wars was offered them , they sent forth with their armies quintius and appius claudius : appius because he was cruell and rough in commanding , was ill obeyed by those that followed him , so that almost quite broken he fled from his charge . quintius by using a mild and gentle behaviour towards his soldiers , found them very obedient , and returned with victory . whereupon it seems , that to governe a multitude , it is better to be courteous then insolent , compassionate rather then cruel . notwithstanding cornelius tacitus with whom many other writers agree , in a saying of his , concludes the contrary , where he saies , to rule a multitude , severity is of more force then mildness . and devising with my self how each of these opinions may be made good , i say either thou art to governe men that ordinarily are thy companions , or that are alwaies in subjection to thee . when they are thy companions , severity or rigour cannot fully be us'd against them according as cornelius argues : and because the common people of rome had equal power in the roman government with the nobility , he that became prince among them for a time , could not rule them with roughness and rigor . and many time it was evident , that the roman commanders did more good that got the good wills of their soldiers , and held but a gentle hand over them , then those that by rough handling kept them in a slavish aw of them , unless they were accompani'd with extraordinary endowments , as was manlius tarquatus . but he that commands over subjects ( whereof cornelius discourses ) to the end they grow not insolent , and by reason of thy two great mildness tread thee not under foot , ought rather betake himself to rigor then gentleness . but this a so is not to exceed moderation , for fear of incurring hatred : for it never turns to any princes advantage to gain the peoples hate . the way to avoid it is , to lay no hands on the subjects estates : for of blood ( when rapine is not the covert cause there ) no prince is thirsty , unless forc'd thereto , which seldome he is : but where rapine is mixt , this necessity comes alwaies upon them , nor ever want they occasion , nor desire to shed blood , as in another treaty to this purpose is discours'd at large . quintius was more praise worthy then appius ; and yet the saying of cornelius limited as it ought to be , but not in the case observ'd by appius , deserves approbation . and because we have spoken of severity and mildness , methinks it is not more then needs to shew , how one action of humanity was of more force with the falisci , then many violent acts of hostility . chap. xx. one example of humanity prevail'd more with the falisci , then all the force of rome could . camillus with the army being set down before the faliscies town , and besieging it , a pedagogue that taught the children of the cheifest men of the city , thinking to gratify camillus and the people of rome , under colour of exercise going forth with them out of the town , brought them all into the campe before camillus : where having presented them he said , that by means of them the town would forth with be deliver'd into his hands . which present was not only not accepted by ●amillus , but having caus'd the pedagogue to be strip'd , and his hands bound behind him , and given to each one of those children a rod in his hand , caus'd him to be whip'd back again by them with many stripes into the town . which when they of the town understood , camillus his humanity and integrity so much pleasd them , that not desiring longer to defend themselves , they resolv'd to render up the town to him . where it is to be considered by this true example , how much more a curteous and charitable act works in mens minds then any one full of cruelty and violence ; and how that many times those countries and cities ; that no weapons , nor warlick instruments , nor any other force of man hath been able to open , one action of humanity , piety , chastity , or liberality hath laid wide open . whereof in stories ( besides this ) we have many other examples . and we all see that the romans by war were not of power to drive pyrrhus out of italy ; and yet fabritius his frankeness sent him out , when he discover'd to him the offer which a familiar friend of his had made the romans to poison him . we see also , that the conquest of new carthage got not scipio affricanus so much credit in spaine , as the example he gave of his chastity , when he restored a young woman he took , which was exceeding beautifull , untoucheed by him to her husband . the fame of which action got him friendship throughout all spaine . we see moreover how much these vertues are by the people wished for in great men , and how much commended by writers , both by those that set forth princes lives , and those also that give instructions how they ought to live . among whom zenophon takes much painesin shewing what honours , how great conquests , and how exceeding good reputation cyrus gained by his humanity and affability , and by abstaining from all actions of pride , cruelty , luxury , and other vices , which blemish men lives . yet notwithstanding , seeing hannibal by courses contrary to these , gained great fame , and great victories , i purpose to discourse thereupon in the chapter following , from whence this proceeded . chap. xxi . from whence it came , that hannibal by a manner of proceeding different from that of scipioes , wrought the same effects in italy , which the other did in spaine . i think , that some men could well marvaile , seeing certain commanders ( notwithstanding that they have led a contrary course of life ) bring to effect the like things , which they have done that lived in the manner above written : so that it appears , that the cause of these victories depends not upon the aforesaid reasons ; and it seems that those waies gain thee neither more force nor better fortune , being that glory and reputation may be gotten by contrary courses . and not to part from the men i have above written of , and the better to clear what i propounded , i say , as we see scipio enter into spain , and by his humanity and mildness gain the friendship of that whole country , and for them be adored and admired of those nations : on the contrary side wee see hannibal enter into italy , using all contrary waies , which is , by violence , cruelty and rapine , and all manner of infidelity , worke the same effect that scipio did in spain : for to hannibal all the towns in italy rebelled , and all the people ran after him . and considering whence this may arise , we see therein many reasous : the first is , that men are desirous of new matters , insomuch as very often times as well they that live at case , as they who do not , desire novelty : for ( as we said otherwhere , and it is true ) men are as well glutted with good , as afflicted and vexed with evill . this desire therefore opens the gates wide to every one , that in any country makes himself the cheif of any innovation . and be he a stranger , they run after him ; if of the country , they come all about him , they strengthen and favour him , so that in what sort soever it be he proceeds , he comes to advance exceedingly in those places . besides this , men are thrust forward by two principal things , either by love or feare , so that he as well commands them that makes himself beloved , as he that causes himself to be feared ; and most commonly he is more followed and obeyed that makes himself be feared , then he that makes himself beloved . therefore it little imports a commander by which of these wayes he goes , provided that he be a worthy man , and that worth causes him to be of great repute among men : for when that worth is great as it was in hannibal and scipio , it cancells all the errors they commit , either by the great love they beare them , or the great feare they stand in of them . for from the one and the other of these two waies great inconveniences may arise , of force to ruine a prince : for he that desires to be too much belov'd , any little that he swerves from the true way , becomes contemptible . and that other who would be too much feared , when he a little exceeds the mean , growes odious ; and to keep the middle way it is not possible : for our nature will not comport it . but it is necessary to allay these things , that exceed , with an extraordinary worth , as ha nibal and scpio both did : yet it appeard that the one and the other of them were endamag'd by their manner of life , for which they were esteem'd and valu'd . the valuation of both of them we have already spoke of : the damage as for scipio , was that his own soldiers in spain together with some of his friends mutined against him , which proceeded from nothing else than because they feard him not : for men are so unsetled that upon the least overture made to their ambition , they forth with forget all the good will they owe their prince for his mildness and courtesie , as did the aforesaid soldiers and friends , in so much as scipio , to remedie this inconvenient , was constraind to practise that cruelty in some part , which he had abhor'd . as for hannibal , we have no particular example , where the cruelty he us'd , or his small faith did him any harm . but we may well conceive , that naples and many other townes that continued in obedience to the romans , did it for fear thereof . this we see plainly , that his wicked manner of living , made him more odious to the people of rome , than any other enemy that commonwealth ever had : so that , whereas to pyrrhus ( while he was with his armie in italy ) they discoverd the party that intended to poyson him , they never forgave it hannibal ( though disarm'd and banish'd ) till they had made an end of him . these incommodities then accru'd to hannibal for being held impious , a breaker of his faith , and cruel : but on the other side , he thereby got one very great advantage , which is much admired by all writers , that in his army ( though composed of several nations ) there never arose any mutiny , neither among themselves , nor against him . which we caunot derive from any other cause than from the terror that grew from his person , which was so great , mixt with the reputation he gave of his valor , that it kept his soldiers in quietness and concord . i conclude then , that it imports not much , in which of these two waies a commander proceeds , provided he hath so great worth in him , as may well season the one and the other manner of living : for ( as it is said ) both in the one and the other there is defect and danger , when it is not corrected by some extraordinary endowments . and if hannibal and scipio , the one by commendable means , and the other by detestable courses , wrought the same effect , me thinks i should not forbear to discourse also of two roman citizens , who by several wayes , but both honorable , attaind one and the same glory . chap , xxii . how manlius torquatus his rigor , and valereus corvinus his mildness , gaind each of them the same glory . at the same time there were in rome two famous captaines , monlius torquatus and valerius corvinus : who both of equal vertue , had a like triumph'd , and liv'd in equal credit & reputation in rome ; & each of them ( touching the enemy ) had with equal valor gained it ; but as for the armyes , and treating of their soldiers , they proceeded exceeding differently : for manlius with all kind of severity commanded them , without intermitting his soldiers pains or punishments . valerius on the other part in all kinds and termes of courtefie treated them with a familiar way of affability ; for it appears , that the one to keep his soldiers in obedience put his own son to death , and the other never hurt any . yet in such a differency of proceeding , each produc'd the same fruit , as well to the enemies loss , as the commonwealths profit , and his own particular ; for never any soldier refus'd the fight or mutini'd against them , or in any part disagreed from their wills , however that manlius his commands were so rigorous , that all other kinds of commands , which exceeded measure in everity , were termed manlian commands . where we are first to consider , whence it was that manlius was constrained to proceed so rigidly : the next is , what was the cause that these two different waies brought forth the same effect : and in the last place , which is the better of the two , and more profitable to imitate . if any man consider well manlius his disposition , from the time that t. livius begins to make mention of him , he shall find him , a very valiant man , religiously loving his father and his countrey , and exceedingly reverencing his superiors . these things we gather from the slaughter of the frenchmen , from the defence of his father against the tribune , and in that before he went to fight with the frenchmen , he went to the consul , with these words , without thy allowance , i will never fight with the enemy ; no though i were assured of victory . when a man then so dispos'd attains to such dignity as to command , he desires to find all other men like himself , and his strong courage moves him to command strong and stout things : and the same ( when once they are commanded ) will likewise that they be observed ; and the rule is most certain , that when rigid and hard things are commanded , it is fit with rigour to see them observd ; otherwise wouldst thou find thy self much deciv'd . where it is to be noted that if a man will be obeyed , it is necessary he know how to command ; and they know how to command , that make a comparison between their own quality , and theirs that are to obey ; and when they see a proportion , then let them command ; but when a disproportion , let them forbeare . and therefore a wise man said , that to hold a common-wealth by violence and force , it was needfull there were a proportion between the person forcing , and the party forced : and whenever that proportion was , there it was credible that that violence would last : but when the party forced was of more force than the person forcing , it might be doubted that violence would every day fail . but returning to our discourse . i say , that to command stout and strong things it is necessary to be stout too : and he that is of this stoutness , and commands such things , can never by mildness cause them to be observ'd : but he that hath not this strength of courage , ought beware of these extraordinary commands , and in those ordinary he may well use his own humanity : for ordinary punishments are not imputed to the prince , but to the lawes and customes . we ought then to be-believe , that manlius was forced to proceed so roughly , by his own extraordinary commands , whereunto his own nature was inclinable , which are very useful in a commonwealth , because they reduce the orders thereof to their originals and ancient vigor . and if a republike were so fortunate , that she often had ( as we have formerly said ) some one by his example to renew and revive the laws , and not retain them onely from running to ruine , but draw them quite back to their beginnings , she might be perpetual . so that manlius was one of those , who by the rigor of his commands maintained the military discipline in rome , drawn thereunto first by his own nature , afterwards from a desire which he had that that should be observed , which his natural inclination had made him ordain . on the other side valerius might as he pleased proceed with curtesie , as he , whom it sufficed , that the accustomed orders were observed in the romane armies : which custome ( because it was good ) was enough to honor him , and yet not painful to observe ; nor did it force valerius to punish the offenders , as well because it may be there were none , as for that if there had been any , they imputed ( as it is said ) their punishments to the wonted orders and customes , and not to the princes cruelty . so that valerius had power to cause all humanity and mildness to fl●w from himself , whereby he might easily gain his souldiers good wills . whereupon it came to pass that the one or the other having the same obedience , were able , though proceeding diversly , to work the same effect . they that would follow these , may chance to fall into those vices of contempt and hatred , as i said in my discourse before of hanaibal and scipio , which is avoided by an excessive worth in thee , and not otherwise . it remains now that we consider which of these ways of proceeding is the more commendable : which i take to be a matter disputable , because as well the one as other is much prais'd by writers . yet they that write how a prince should rule his subjects , come nearer to valerius then manlius . and xenophon , alledged formerly by me , giving many examples of cyrus his humanity , accords much with that which t. livius says of valerius : for being made consul against the samnites , & the day come he was to fight , he spake to his souldiers with that affability and familiarity , with which he used to behave himself towards them and after such speaking , t. livius saies these words ; there was never any captain more familiar with his souldiers , among the meanest of them , freely undergoing all services : besides in military exercises , whereas the soldiers use to contend with their equals either in swiftness or strength , he himself without change of countenance as graciously and easily lost as won , nor scorned he any one that offered himself to match him ; liberal he was , and affable , no less mindful of other mens liberties then of his own dignity ; and which is the greatest point of popularity , the same course he took to attain to his magistracy , the same he followed in executing it . in like manner t. livius speaks honorably of manlius , shewing that his severity in putting his son to death , made the army so obedient to the consul , that it was a cause the romans gain'd the victory of the latines : and he proceeds so far in commending him , that after this victory , having set down all the order of the battel , and shewed all the dangers which the people of rome ran , and the difficulties there were to overcome , he concludes thus , that onely manlius his valour gave the romans that victory . and comparing the forces of the two armies together , affirms , that that side would have overcome , which soever had had manlius for their consul . so that considering all that writers speak hereof , it would be hard to give a good judgement hereupon . nevertheless , not to leave this part undecided , i say , that in a citizen living under the laws of a republike , it is more laudable and less dangerous to proceed as manlius did ; for that way is wholly in favour of the publike , and no whit regards private ambition ; for by such a course a man cannot gain any partisans , shewing himself rigid to every one , favoring onely the common good : for no man behaving himself thus , can get any particular friends , which we term ( as it was said before ) partisan . in so much that a like manner of proceeding cannot be more profitable nor more approved in a republike : the publike advantage nothing failing in it , and being impossible to give thereby any jealousie of private ambition . but in the course valerius tooke it is contrary ; for , however that in regard of the publike , the same effects are produc'd , yet there arise many doubts , by reason of the particular good will , which this man gaines of his soldiers , which in a long continuance of government might much wrong the common liberty . and if in publike there grew no mischief hereupon , the reason was , because the romans minds as yet were not corrupted , nor he long continued in his command . but if we are to consider a prince as xenophon does , we must wholly take to valerius , and leave manlius : for a prince ought in his soldiers and subjects aim at love and obedience : that he maintains the old orders , and is esteemed vertuous , will yeeld him obedience : and love his affability , humanity , his pity and those other indowments valerius had , which xenophon also writes were in cyrus : for to be a prince well-willed in particular , and to have his whole army as particularly affected to him , agrees well with all other parts of his state . but in a citizen , having an army so to take part with him , this part agrees not with the rest , which are to oblige him to live under the laws , and obey the magistrates . we read among the ancient stories of the venetian republike , how that the galleys of venice being returned home , and a difference arising between them of the gallies and the people , whereby an uprear and tumult was raised , nor could the matter be quieted by force of officers , reverence of citizens , nor fear of the principal magistrates , of a sudden when peter loredanus shewed himself to those mariners , who the year before had been their commander , for love of him they departed and left the fight . which obedience . begot such a suspition in the senate , that a little while after the venerians either by im●prisonment or death assured themselves o , him . i conclude therefore that valerius his manner of proceeding is profitable in a prince , and hurtful in a citizen , not onely to his country , but to himself : to his country , because those courses prepare a way to tyranny : to himself ; for when his country is suspicious of his proceedings , it is constrained to make sure of him with his damage . so on the contrary i affirm that manlins his proceeding in a prince is hurtful , and in a citizen profitable , and especially to the country , and also seldom offends , if now this hatred which thy severity draws after it , be not increased by suspicion which by means of thy great reputation thy other vertues charge thee with , as by and by shall be discoursed touching camillus . chap. xxiii . for what cause camillus was banished from rome . we have formerly concluded that by proceeding as valerius did , a man hurts both his country and himself . and by proceeding as manlius did , a man advantages his country , and sometimes hurts himself . which is sufficiently proved by the example of camillus , who in his manner of proceeding came nearer to manlius then valerius . whereupon titus livius speaking of him , says , his vertue the souldiers hated , and yet admired . that which caused the admiration of him , was his carefulness , his wisdom , the magnanimity of his spirit , and the good order in imploying and commanding his armies . that which got him hatred , was , that he was more fevere in chastising then liberal in rewarding them . and titus livius alledges these occasions of this hatred . the first was , that the monies which were made of the sale of the veientes goods , he brought all into the treasury , and divided not together with the spoile among the soldiers . the second , that in his triumph he made his triumphal chariot be drawn with four white horses , where they said that in his pride he strove to equal the sun. the third , that he made a vow to give apollo the tenth part of the prey taken from the veientes , which ( he desiring to pay his vow ) was to be taken out of the soldiers hands , who already had got possession of it . where those things are very easily marked , that make a prince odious with his people . of which the principal is , to bereave them of any profit , which is a matter of much importance : for the things that carry any profit with them , when a man is deprived thereof , he never forge●s , and every little necessity puts thee in mind of them ; and because necessities haunt us every day , thou remembrest these things every day : the other thing is to appear lofty and puft up with pride , then which nothing is more odious to the people , especially those that enjoy their liberty . and however that from that pride and stat●liness of theirs the people receive no hur●●ye do they always hare them that use it : whereof a prince ought to beware , as of a rock ; for to procure hatred without advantage , is but a rash and foolish course . chap. xxiv . the continuation of governments brought rome into thraldom . if we consider well the proceedings of the roman republike , we shall see that two things were the cause of that republikes dissolution : the one was contentions which grew upon the agrarian law ; the other was the continuation of governments . which things had they been well seen into in the beginning , and due remedies applied thereto , their free state would have lasted longer , and probably have been less turbulent . and however , that as for the prolonging of any charge we see not that in rome any tumult was raised , yet in effect we see how much that authority hurt the city , which the citizens took upon them by such decrees . and if the other citizens , whose magistracies were prorogued , had been wise and vertuous , as l. quintius , this inconvenient would never have fallen out , whose goodness in one example is remarkable : for there being an agreement made between the commons and the senate , and the commons having prolonged the tribunes charges for one year , judging them able to resist the nobilities ambition , the senate would for strife sake , with the commons , and not to seem of less power then they , prologue t. quintius his consulship : who absolutely denyed this determination of theirs , saying , that they should endeavor to blot out and cancell evil examples , rather then increase their number with another evil one ; and so would needs have them make new consuls . which goodness and wisdom had it been in all the cities of rome , it would never have suffered the introducing of that custome , to prolong magistracies : and from thence they would not have proceeded to the continuation of commands over armies , which thing at length ruined that republike . the first who had his command continued to him , was p. philo , who being incamped before the city of palepolis , and his consulship coming to an end , the senate thinking he had need upon gotten the victory , sent him no successor , but made him proconsul , so that he was the first proconsul . which thing ( though propounded by the senate for the publike good ) was that which in time brought rome into bondage : for the further abroad the romans went with their armies , the more thought they such prorogation necessary ; and the more they used it ; which thing produced two inconveniences ; the one that a smaller number of men were imployed and practised in commands : and by this the reputation hereof came to be restrained to a few : the other was , that one citizen continuing long time commander of an army , got it to himself , and made it of his own faction . for that army in time forgot the senate , and took him only for their head . hereby it came that sylla and marius could finde soldiers that would take their parts against the publike . by these means could caesar make himself lord of his native country . yet if the romans had not prolonged these magistracies and commands , they had never so quickly attained so great power : and had their conquests been more slow , they would not so soon have faln into servitude . chap. xxv . of cincinnatus and many other roman citizens poverties . wee have otherwhere discoursed , that the most profitable ordinance that can be made in a free state , is , that the citizens be kept bare and poore . and however in rome it appears not what order that was which wrought this effect ( especially considering the agrarian law had such opposition ) never theless it was seen by experience , that four hundred years after rome was built , there was very great poverty : nor is it credible , that other greater order produc'd this effect , than to see , that poverty was no bar to any preferment whatsoever , or any honor , and that they went to find out vertue in what cottage soever she dwelt . which manner of living made people less covet wealth . this appears plain , because when minutius the consul besieged with his army by the equi , rome was exceedingly afraid , least that army should be lost , so that they created a dictator , being the last recourse they had in their difficulties , and this was l. quintius cincinnatus , who at that time was in his little country farm , which he then manured with his own hands . which thing is celebrated by t. livius in golden words , saying : it is worth the while , to bear them talke , that value nothing in regard of wealth : nor think they a man can have access either unto honours or vertue , but where riches flow abundantly . cincinnatus was then at plough in his country village , which exceeded not the quantity of four acres of ground , when from rome deputies were sent him by the senate to let him know the election of his dictatourship , and to shew him in what danger the commonwealth then was . hee then having taken to him his gown , came to rome , and levied an army , and went thence and deliverd minutius ; and having broken and despolyed the enemies , and set him free , would not permit that the besieged army should partake of the prey , saying these words , i will not allow thou shouldst partake of th●● prey , whose prey thou wert to have been : and deprived minutius of the consulship , and made him lieutenant , telling him , thou shalt stay at this degree , till thou knowest how to be consul . he had made l. tarquinius general of his horse , who out of meer poverty served afoot . it is observable ( as is said ) what honour they did unto poverty , and how that to a good and worthy man four acres of land were sufficient to maintain him . which poverty we see that it was also in the dayes of marcus regulus : for being with the armies in affrica , he asked the senate leave , he might turne to his country farme , which was spoyled by his husbandmen . where wee see two very notable things , thè one the poverty , and how they were conten●cd therewith , and how it sufficed these citizens to gain honour from the wars , & the profits thereof they left to the publick : for if they had purposed to grow rich by the wars , it would little have troubled them , that their fields were spoyled . the other is to consider the generous rage of those citizens , who when they were made commanders of an army , exceeded any prince in magnanimity of spirit , they valued neither kings nor commonwealths , nothing affrighted or terrified them ; and afterwards when they were returned to live private men , became parsimonious , humble , and men that themselves husbanded and took pains in manuting their own small possessions , obedient to the magistrates , reverencing their superiors , so that it seems impossible that the same mind could endure such change . this poverty continued yet till the days of paulus emilius , which were in a manner the last happy daies of that republick , where a citizen who by his triumph enrich'd rome , notwithstanding kept himself very poor . and moreover , so much was poverty in esteem , that paulus for reward of behaving himself bravely in the war , gave a silver cup to a son-in-law of his ; which was the first peece of plate he ever had in his house . it were easy with a long discourse to shew , how much better fruits poverty produces than riches ; and that the one hath honored cities , countries , and religions ; and the other hath been the destruction thereof , had not this subject been handled several times by other writers . chap. xxvi . how that upon the occasion of women , states have been ruined . there fell out in the city of ardea between the nobles and the commons a debate by reason of an alliance : where a young woman that was an heire being as yet to marry , one of the commons and one of the nobles woed her at the same time , and she having no father alive , her tutors desired to bestow her on the plebeyan , and her mother on the nobleman : whereupon such a tumult was rais'd , that they came to blowes , where the nobility was in armes in favour of the nobleman , and the commons in favour of the plebeyan , so that the commons having the worse , went out of ardea , and sent for ayd to the volsci , and the nobles sent to rome . the volsci were there first , and as soon as they arrived they sat down before ardea . the romans came afterwards upon them , and inclosed the volsci between the town and them , so that they forc'd them ( brought to it by famine ) to yeeld to their discretion . and the romans entring into ardea , and putting to death the principals of the sedition , accorded all the matters of that city . in this text are many things to be observed . first we see , that women have been the occasions of many destructions , and have brought great mischiefes upon the governors of cities , and have caused many dissentions in them . and ( as it hath been already seen in this our story ) that excess committed against lucretia lost the tarquins their state. that other act against virginia deprived the ten of their power . and aristotle among the principal occasions hee shewes of tyrants destructions , reckons the injuries they did some others for their women in deflowring and ravishing them , or defiling their marriage beds ; as touching this part , in the chapter where we treated of conspiracies , we spoke at large . i say then , that absolute princes , and governors of commonwealths are to take no smaller care hereof , but ought well consider the disorders , which may grow upon such an accident , and remedy it in time , so that the remedy be neither with the hurt , nor disgrace of their state , or commonwealth , as it befell the ardeates , who for having suffered that difference to increase among citizens , came to take part with their several tactions : and when they would have reunited themselves , were forc'd to send for forrain ayds , which is the beginning of a servitude at hand . but let us come to the other remarkeable thing of the manner of reuniting cities , whereof in the chapter following we mean to treate . chap. xxvii . how a city at discord in it self is to be united ; and how that opinion is not true , that to maintain cities in obedience , it is necessary to keep them in discord , and divided into factions . by the example of the roman consuls , who made a reconciliation among the ardeates , the way is shewed how , matters are to be composed in a city at variance ; which is no other , nor can otherwaies be held , then by putting to death the chief ringleaders of seditions : for of necessity one of these three waies is to be goneeither to put them to death , as they did , or remove them out of the city , or cause them to make peace one with another , with assurance given not to wrong either the other . of these three waies this last is the most pernicious , less certain , and most unprofitable : for it is unpossible , where much blood hath been shed , and other like outrages , that a peace made by force should continue , looking one another in the face every day : and it is very hard for them to forbear injuring one another , being there may every day be given amongst them by reason of their dayly conversation new occasions of quarrels . whereupon a better example cannot be alledged then the city of pistoya . that city was divided ( as still it is ) fifteen years agoe , into the panciatichi , and the cancellieri : but then were they in armes , now they have laid them aside . and after many brabbles among them , they came at length to the shedding of blood , to demolishing of houses , and pillaging of goods , and to all other termes of hostilitie . and the florentines that were to reconcile them , alwaies took that third course : and thereupon alwaies arose greater tumults and greater scandals : so that weary hereof , they came to take that secoud course , to remove the heads of the factions , some of which they put in prison , others they confined in several places : in so much as the agreement was able to continue , and so hath done till this present day ; but without doubt the safest way had been the first . but because such like executions have some thing in them of greatness of spirit and magnanimity , a feeble republick knows not how to put them in practise , but is so far there from , that hardly arrives she to use the second remedy . and these are some of those errors , of which i spake in the beginning , that the princes of our times commit , being to give their judgements in matters of weight : for they should have a mind to se , how they have carried themselves , who of old have deliverd their opinions in like cases . but the weakness of men now a daies , caused by their weak education , and their little knowledge of things makes them esteem those opinions of the ancients partly in human , partly impossible . whereas they have certain of their moderne opinions , quite contrary to the truth , as is that , where the wise man of our city a while agoe said , it was neeedfull to hold pistoia by factions ; and pisa with cittadells : nor perceive they how unprofitable the one and the other of these things is . i will pass over the cittadels , because formerly wee spake of them at large , & now discourse of the incommodity that arises from holding the towns thou hast under thy government , divided into factions . and touching the former , it is impossible thou canst maintain both those ancient factions , prince or republick thou art that governst them : for by nature men are inclined to take part in any thing that is divided , and to be pleased more with this than with that ; so that the having a faction in that town discontented with thee , is a cause that the first war that comes , thou losest it : for it is impossible to guard a city , that hath enemies without dors , & within dores . if it be a republick that governes this city , there is no readier way to make thy subjects become nought , and to set thy city at variance , than by having in thy dominions a town thus at odds ; for each faction seeks favour , and each part strives to gain friends by all manner of corruption , so that two very great inconveniences arise thereupon : the one is , that thou canst never make them thy friends , because thou canst not well govern them , the rule ofttimes varying , sometimes with the one humor , sometimes with the other : the other is , that that favouring of sides must needs divide thy republick . and blondus speaking of the florentines , and the pistoyeses , tells us certainly , that while the florentines thought to reconcile those of pistoya , they divided themselves . whereupon wee may easily perceive the evill which grows upon this division . in the yeare . when aretium was lost , and the whole vale of tiber , and that of chiana was taken by the vitelli and the duke valentine , there came a gentleman call'd de lant , sent by the king of france , to cause a restitution of all those towns lost to the florentines again : and this de lant finding in every one of those fortresses men , who when they came to visit him , told him they were of the faction of marzocco , he much blamd their division , saying that if in france one of the kings subjects should say hee were of the kings party , he would be punished : because such a speech could signifie no less , than that there in the country were people enemies to the king , whereas that king will that all those towns be his friends , united in themselves , and without factions . but all these waies , & opinions disserting from the truth , arise from the weakness of those that are princes , who seeing they are not able to hold their states by force and valour , betake themselves to such like devices , which sometimes when things are in quietness helpe somewhat ; but if they come to any distress , and that they have warrs , they quickly shew them what little trust thereis to be had in them . chap. xxviii . that the citizens actions ought to be well weighed : for many times under vertuous and charitable deeds are laid the foundations of a tyranny . the city of rome being much oppressed by famine , and the publick provisions unsufficient to ease it , one spurius melius had a mind , being very rich in those times , out of his private estate to make provision of gorn , and feed the common people to their content . whereupon the people flocked so thick about him in favour of him , that the senate perceiving the inconvenient that grew upon this his liberality , to suppress it before it took better hold , created a dictatour , and set him on his back , who put him to death . here is to be noted , that many times those works which seem to be done upon charity and piety , and no way with reason to be condemn'd , prove very pernicious and dangerous , when they are not looked to in good time . and to argue this matter more particularly , i say that a republick cannot subsist , nor in , any case be well govern'd without citizens of good credit and reputation . on the other side the citizens reputation , is the occasion of tyranny in a commonwealth . and if we will regulate this matter , it must so be order'd , that the citizens stand upon such manner of reputation , as may advantage and not endammage the city , nor the liberty thereof . and therefore the means are to be examin'd , whereby they gain reputation , which in effect are two , either publick or private . the publick means are , when one by advising well , and doing better for the publick benefit , gains reputation . to this honour the way should be set open to the citizens , and rewards given , as well for good advices , as good actions , so that they are therefore both to be honoured and satisfied : for when these reputations are gotten by these plain and honest courses , they will never prove dangerous . but when they are gain'd by particular waies ( which is the other means by us alleadged before ) they are very dangerous and hurtfull . the private waies are the benefiting this and that other particular , lending monies , matching with their daughters , protecting them against the magistrates , and doing them such other like favours , which make men become factions , and encourage him that is thus favour'd by them , to think he may be able to corrupt the publick , & violate the laws . therefore ought a republick that is well ordered , give easy access to those that seek favour by publick means , but bar out those that work by their own private by waies , as rome did , we see . for in reward of him that did the publick goood service , she ordain'd their triumphs and all those other honors , which she bestowed on her citizens : and to punish those , who under diverse colours aspired to greatness by private waies , she appointed the publick accusations : and when these would not serve , because the people was blinded with the shew of a false good , she created a dictator , who by a kinglike power should reduce those into their rankes again that were broken out , as she did to punish spurius melius . and when one of these things is left unpunished , it is of force to ruine a republick ; for hardly upon such an example may she afterwards be brought into the right way again . chap. xxix . that the peoples faults grow first from their princes . princes have no reason to complain of any fault , which the people that is under their governments do commit : for their faults must needs proceed either from their negligence , or because they are blemished with the like errors . and whoever shall run over the nations that in our dayes have been accounted full of robberies , and such like offences , shall perceive they all wholly proceeded from those that govern'd them who were of the like condition . in romania those princes in it before they were extinguish'd by pope alexander the sixth , gave patterns to every one of a most ungodly and unconscionable life : for here a man might see horrible executions upon every slight occasion , and exceeding great rapines : which first grew from the wickedness of those princes , not from the mischeivous disposition of the people , as they said : for those princes being but poor , and yet having a mind to live as stately as those that were rich , were necessitated to apply themselves to many rapins , and to practise them diverse waies , and among other dishonest waies they toook , this was one ; they made lawes and forbad some kind of action to be done ; afterwards they were the first that gave the occasion to break it , nor ever punish'd they the breakers of it , till afterwards when they saw many others had committed the same fault , and then they began to punish the breach , not for any zeal towards the law made , but for covetousness to recover the penalty : whereupon grew many inconvenients : and above all this , that the people were impoverish'd , and no way amended , and those that were impoverish'd used all their wits to work upon those that were their inferior . whereupon arose all these evils ( we have now spoken of ) whereof the prince was the only cause . and that this is true , t. livius shews us , where he relates , that the roman ambassadors , carrying a gift of the spoile taken from the vejentes to apollo , were taken by the corsaires of lipari in sicily , and there brought to land . but timasitheus their prince , having understood , what gift it was , whether it went , and who sent it , though he were borne in lipari , yet behaved he himself like a worthy roman , and told the people , that it was impiety to lay hands on such a gift , in so much as by general consent they set the ambassadors at liberty with all that was theirs : and the historians words are these , timasitheus made all the multitude religious , which is done alwaies like a true governor , and laurence of medicim confirmation so this opinion saies , the princes actions as examples move , and those as their best patterns men approve . chap. xxx . a citizen , that will of his own authority do any good work in his own city , of necessity must first extinguish all envy ; and what order is to be given for the defence of a city upon the enemies approach . the romane senate having notice , that all tuscany had made a new levy of souldiers , with purpose to endammage rome , and that the latini and hernici , who formerly had been their friends , were now joyned to the volsoi , the perpetual enemies of rome , considered that this war might prove perillous . and camillus at that time being tribune with consular power , thought all might be well done without creating a dictator , if the other tribunes his collegues would yeeld up unto him the sum and whole command of the empire , which the said tribunes willingly did . nor thought they ( says t. livius ) it any thing derogated from their majesty , what they had yeelded to his . whereupon camillus having taken this obedience upon their words , commanded they should inroll three armies . of the first he would be general to go against the tuscans ; of the second he made quintus servilius conmander , whom he would have to abide near about rome , to withstand the latini and the hernici , if they should stir . he gave lucius quintius the command of the third army , which he levied for the guard of the city , the defence of the gates and the court of justice , in case any chance should happen ; besides this he ordained , that horatius one of his collegues , should make provision of arms and corn and other things requisite in time of war. he made cornelius also his collegue chief of the senate , and over the publike councel , to consult upon those things which in general were to be executed . thus were the tribunes in those times disposed for the good of their country to command , and to obey . it is noted by the text here , what a vertuous and prudent man may do , and what great good he may because of , and how much he may be able to advantage his country , when by means of his goodness and vertue , he hath quite extinguished all envy , which many times is the cause that men cannot effectuate a good work , the said envy not allowing them that authority which it is necessary they should have in matters of importance . and this envy is quite put out two ways ; either by some strong and difficult accident , where every one seeing themselves ready to perish , laying ambition aside , willingly run to obey him , whom they believe by his vertue able to deliver them , as it befell camillus : who having given so many proofs of his being an admirable man , and having been thrice dictator , and performed that place alwayes with the advantage of the publike , and no way to his own profit , had now caused men not to be afraid of his greatness and because he was so magnanimous , and of such great credit , they thought it no shame to them to be inferiors to him : and therefore saies titus livius very wisely these words , nor thought they it any things , &c. another way is envy blotted out , when either by violence or by course of nature they dye that have been thy competitors in attaining to any reputation , or greatness ; who seeing the more esteemed then they , it is unpossible they ever should be at rest , or have any patience . and when they are accustomed to live in a corrupted city , where their education hath not bred any goodness in them , it is unpossible , let what accident will fall out , that they should ever go back from any thing ; and without doubt to have their wills , and satisfy the waywardness of their minds , they would be contented even to see the ruine of their native country . to overcome this envy , there is no other remedy but the death of those that bear it : and when fortune is so favorable to that vertuous man , as that those men dye a natural death , he becomes glorious without giving any scandal , when without any obstacle or offence he may display his vertues . but when he hath not this good luck , he must devise by any means to take them out of his way . and before he can do any thing he must practise those wayes whereby to overcome this difficulty . and he that reads the bible with understanding , shall see that moses was forced ( if he would have his lawes and ordinances proceed ) to put a great number of men to death , who provoked by nothing else but envy , withstood his purpose . this necessity fryar jerom savonarola knew very well , and peter soderini chief standard-bearer of florence knew it also . the one could not overcome it , because he had not power to do it , which was the fryar , and because he was not well understood by those that followed him who might have had power to have done it . but it was not his fault , and his sermons are full of the blames he lays upon the wise men of the world , and of invectives against them ; for so he terms those envious men , and all that opposed his ordinances . that others believed that in time , by his goodness , and good fortune , and doing good turns to some of them , quite to extinguish this envy , seeing himself young enough too , and then wearing so many new favors , which the manner of his proceeding afforded him , so that he thought he was able to overcome those many that enviously opposed him , without any scandal , violence , or tumult . and did not know that time cannot stay ; goodness is not sufficient , fortune changes ; and there is no gift can appease malice . so that the one and the other of these two went to ruine , and their ruine proceeded either from their ignorance , or their disability to overcome this envy . the other thing remarkeable is the order which camillus took both within and abroad for the preservation of rome . and indeed not without reason the good historians ( as ours here is ) set down particularly and distinctly certain cases , to the end posterity should learn how in the like accidents they are to defend themselves . and it ought well be observ'd in this text , that there is not a more dangerous nor unprofitable defence then that which is confusedly made , and with out order , and this appears by this third army which camillus caused to be inrolled , and to be left at rome to guard the town : for many would have judg'd that part superfluous , where the people is most commonly arm'd , and warlick ; and for this cause a man would not think it needfull to have them inroll'd otherwise , but only that it sufficed to cause them to be in armes as occasion should require . but camillus and who else were wise as he was , think otherwise , who never allow a multitude to take armes , unless by certain order and appointment : wherefore upon this example , he that is appointed over the guard of a city , should avoid , as a rock , the arming of men in confusion , but ought first have those chosen and registred ? which he would have in armes , and whom he would have them obey , where their rendezvous , and whether to go , and command those that are not inrolled to abide every man at his own house , for the safeguard thereof . they that shal take this order in a city assailed , will easily be able to defend themselves : whoever does otherwise , shal neither imitate camillus , nor defend himself . chap. xxxi . powerfull commonwealths , and great and worthy personages in all manner of fortune retain the same courage , and the same dignity . among other matters of magnificence , that our historian brings in camillus speaking or doing , to shew how an excellent man ought to behave himself , he puts these words in his mouth : neithor did my dictatorship elevate my courage , nor hath my banishment abated it : by which words we see that great personages are alwaies the same in all fortunes . and though she varies , now exalting them , and then bringing them low , they never differ from themselves , but alwaies hold a constant resolution , so steadily fastened to their ordinary course of living , that by every one of them it appears that chance hath no power over them . weake men behave themselves in another manner : for they befoole and besot themselves in good fortune , attributing all the good they have to those vertues which they never knew ; whence it proceeds that they grow insupportable and odious to those that are about them ; whereupon depends the sudden alteration of fortune , which so soon as they look once in the face , they fall presently into the other defect , and become vile and abject . from hence it comes that such manner of of princes thinke rather in adversitie how to make an escape , than to stand upon their defence , as those that for having made evil use of good fortune , are not prepared for any kind of safegard . this vertue , and this vice , which i say , is found in one man alone , we find also in a republike , of which the romanes and the venetians serve us for example . those former never any bad fortune could make abject , nor any good fortune insolent , as it manifestly appeared after the defeat they had at canna , and after the victory they got against antiochus : for upon that defeat , however a very great one , because it had been the third together , they never grew base upon it , but continued to send forth armies ; they would not redeem prisoners against the orders they had made , nor send to hannibal or carthage to ask peace , but casting aside all those unworthy courses , they thought still upon providing for the war , arming for want of souldiers their old men and slaves . which thing being known to hanno the carthaginian ( as was said before ) he shewed that senate what small account they were to make of that defeat at canna . and so it appeared , as those hard times did not affright , nor abase them , on the other part neither did their more fortunate times puffe them up : for , when antiochus sent ambassadors to scipio to require an agreement , before they came to joyn battel , or that he had lost it , scipio gave him certain conditions of peace , which were , that he should retire into syria , and leave the rest to the romans disposing , which antiochus refusing , and coming to battel and losing it , sent again his ambassadors to scipio , with order that he would submit to all those conditions which the conqueror should impose on him , to whom he propounded no other conditions than what he had fomerly offered before the victory , adding these words : that the romanes if they be overcome , lose not their courages , nor when they overcome grow they insolent . clean contrary hereunto we have seen the venetians do : who in their prosperity ( thinking they had gotten it by their own valor which they never were guilty of ) grew to such an excess of insolence , that they termed the king of france saint marks son , they contemned the church ; and their ambition all italy would not hold , but imagined they were to frame a monarchy like that of the romanes . afterwards their good fortune abandoning them , and that they were a little routed by the king of france at vayla , they not onely lost all their state by rebellion , but a good part of it they gave up to the pope and the king of spaine , even through meer baseness and cowardise . and they became so vile and abject , that they sent ambassadors to the emperor , to offer themselves to be his tributaries , and writ letters to the pope full of baseness and submission , whereby to move him to compassion . into which unhappiness they fell in four days space , and after a half defeat : for their army come to battel and to fight , in their retreat lost near one half of their men , yet so that one of their proveditors that escaped , came to verona with above five and twenty thousand souldiers between foot and horse : in case that if either the venetians , or any of their orders had been of value , they might easily have recovered themselves , and looked fortune again in the face , and have been ready either to overcome , or lose more gloriously , or get more honorable terms of agreement : but the baseness of their spirits caused by the quality of their orders , nothing good in matters touching the war , made them at once lose both their state and courage . and so will it alwaies befall any that shall behave themselves as they did : for this growing insolent in good fortune , and abject in evill , arises from the manner of thy proceeding , and from the education wherein thou hast been traind up : which when it is weak & vain , makes thee like to it self , when otherwise it casts thee in another manner of mould , and makes thee know the world better , rejoycing less at the good besalls thee , as also grieving less at the evill comes upon thee : and that which is said of one man alone , is said also of many that live in the same commonwealth , who attain to that perfection , which the order and manner of government thereof wil afford . and though otherwhere we have said , that the foundation of all states is good military discipline ; and where this is not , there can neither be good lawes , nor any other thing good , methinks it is not more than needs to repeate it again ; for to many purposes , in the reading of this story , wee see this necessity appeares , and wee see that neither can the soldiers be good , unless they be traind and practis'd , nor can they be train'd , unless compos'd of thy own subjects : for the wars do not alwaies last , & unpossible it is they should : therefore is it necessary to be able to practise this military exercise in time of peace ; neither can this exercise be us'd in regard of the expence , with others then with thy own subjects . camillus was gone ( as we said before ) with the army against the tuscans , and his souldiers hāving seen the greatness of the enemies army were much amazd at it , thinking themselves too weak to sustain the violence of their enemies : the rumor of this fearefulness comming to camillus his eares , he came forth abroad amongst them , and going about through the camp , speaking now to one soldier , and then to another , workt this opinion out of their heads , and in conclusion , without any otherwise ordering of his army , said , let every man doe what he hath learned and used to doe . and whosoever shall well consider these termes and the words he said to them , for their encouragement to encounter with their enemies , shall perceive that none of these things could be said or done to an army that had not first been orderd and exercised as well in peace as in war : for upon those soldiers that have not learned to do any thing , a commander cannot rely , nor beleeve they can do any thing to the purpose : and were a new hannibal to command them , he could not subsist : for a general ( during the battell ) not being able to be in every part , unless he have first taken order to have men of his manner of courage , knowing well his orders , and the wayes of his proceeding , must of force ruine there . if then a city shall be armed and orderd as rome , and that every day the citizens are put to it to make tryal in particular and in general of their own valor , and the power of fortune , it shall alwaies come to pass , that at any time whatsoever , they shall continue setled in the same resolution , and keep themselves in the same dignity . but when they shall be disarmed , and rest only upon the helpes of fortune , and not upon their own valours , they shall change as her wheel turns , and give that example of themselves , which the venetians gave . chap. xxxii . what means some have practised to disturb a treaty of peace . circei and velitre two roman colonies being rebelled , in hope that the latines would defend them , afterwards the latines being overcome , and so those hopes failing them , divers of the citizens advised , they should send ambassadors to rome , to recommend them to the senate : which course was hindred by those that had been authors of the rebellion , who were afraid least the whole punishment should fall upon their heads ; and therefore to cut off all treaty of peace , they incited the multitude to take arms , and make an incurfion upon the rome territories . and truely when any one desires that a people or prince should wholly take their minds off from agreement , there is no truer nor certainer way than to make them do some foul act against him , with whom thou wouldst not have the accord made . for the fear of that punishment which he shall think he hath deserved for his fault , shall always keep him off . after the first wars which the carthaginians had with the romanes , those soldiers who had served the carthaginians in that war in sicily and sardinia , when the peace was concluded , went back into affrica , where not being satisfied for their pay , they made wars against the carthaginians , and having chosen two out of themselves for their heads , mathus , and spendius , they took divers towns of the carthaginians , and sacked divers . the carthaginians willing to try any other way then battell , sent asdrubal a citizen of theirs ambassadour to them , who they thought had some credit with them , having formerly been their general . and he being come , and spendius and mathus desiring to oblige all these souldiers , never to hope they could have peace again with the carthaginians , and to engage them in the war , perswaded them it was better to kill him , with all the citizens of carthage , which then they had prisoners , whereupon they not only slew them , but put them to death with torments , to this villainy adding an edict , that all carthaginians , who in time to come were taken , should in the same sort be slain . which deliberation and execution made that army exceeding cruell and obstinate against the carthaginians . chap. xxxiii . it much furthers and advantages an army in the winning of a battell , to be confident of their own forces , and their generals valour . it much helpes an army towards the winning of a battell , to make them confident , that in any case they cannot chuse but vanquish . the things that give them this confidence , are , that they be well armed and well orderd , and be acquainted one with another . nor can this confidence or this order be but among those soldiers that have been borne and liv'd together . the commander also must be of repute , so that the soldiers may be confident of his wisdome : and they shall alwaies be so , when they perceive him to be a man orderly carefull , and couragious , and that maintains well , and with esteem the majesty of his dignity : and he shall alwaies be able to do so , while he punisheth their faults , while he tires not out the soldiers to no purpose , keeps his word with them , shewes them an easie way to vanquish the enemy ; those things that may endanger them , conceals from them ; or if they be evident , by his speeches lessons their opinion of them : which things well observed , are a great occasion of confidence in the army ; and that confidence of victory the romans us'd to make their armies thus confident by way of religion : from hence proceeded , that by their southsayings and auspiees they created their consuls , they levied their souldiers , march'd with their armies , and fought their battels ; and without having done some of these things , never would a good or discreet commander , have put any thing to hazard , deeming that he might easily lose , unless his souldiers had first understood that the gods were on their side . and when any consul or captain of theirs should have fought contrary to the auspices , they would have punishd him , as they did claudius pulcher. and however we find this true in all the roman histories , yet it is proved more certain by the words which livie brings in appius claudius speaking , who complaining to the people of their tribunes insolency , and shewing that by means of them the auspices and other matters pertaining to religion were corrupted , sayes thus : let them now scoffe at religion ; for , what matter is it , whether the chickens feed , or whether they come slower out of their cage , whether a bird hath sung or no ? these , t is true , are all small things : but by not contemning of these little things , our auncestours have exceedingly amplified this commonwealth . for in these small matters there is force to hold the souldiers united and confident , which thing is a principall occasion of any victory . yet must these things be accompanied with valour , otherwise they will avail little . the prenestini having their army abroad against the romans , went to incampe upon the river of allia , a place where the romans had been overcome by the french , which they did to make their own souldiers confident , and to affright the romans with the fortune of the place . and though the course they took , was probable for those reasons wee have already said , yet the conclusion of the matter shewed , that true valour feares not every small accident : which the historian sayes very well , in those words which he makes the dictatour speak , who saies thus to the master of his cavallerie : seest thou how they taking benefit of their fortune , have incamped themselves upon the river allia ? but thou making use of thy armes and courage assayle the very heart of their armie . for a true valour , a good discpline , and an assurance taken from so many victories , cannot be extinguished by matters of small moment , nor does any vain matter affright them , nor one disorder hurt them , as we saw it ; for two manlij being consuls against the volsei , by reason that they had rashly sent part of their army to forrage , it followed , that both they that were gone and those that staid behind , were besieged ; from which danger , not the wisedome of the consuls , but the souldiers own valour freed them , where t. livius says these words , the souldiers valour even without a commander was thought firme and constant . i will not let pass one terme us'd by fabius , being newly entred with his army into tuscany , to make them confident , deeming such a confidence to be the more necessary , now that he had brought them into a new country , and to fight with new enemies ; who speaking to his souldiers before the fight , and having told them many reasons , whereupon they might hope for the victory , said , that he could also tell them certain good things , and where they might plainly see the victory , but that it was dangerous to disclose them . which course as it was discreetly us'd , so deserves it it to be followed . chap. xxxiv . what fame , report , or opinion causes the people to begin to cast their favours upon a citizen : and whether a prince or a people do bestow their magistracies with better judgement . otherwhere we said , that t. manlius , who afterwards was termed torquatus , sav'd l. manlius his father from an acccusation , which m. pomponions tribune of the people had made against him . and however the manner of saving him , was somewhat violent and extraordinary , yet that filial piety towards his father , was so acceptable to the generall , that it was not only not blamed , but when tribune were to be appointed over the legions , t. manlius was chosen in the second place . upon which success , i beleeve it fit to consider , what way the people take to give their judgements upon men in distributing of their charge that thereby we may see , whether that be true which we formerly concluded , that the people is a better distributer than a prince . i say then , that the people in their distribution follows the report that goes of one by publick voyce and fame : when they know him not otherwise by his ordinary behaviour , or by presumption or opinion conceived of him . which two things have been caused either by the fathers of such , who for that they have been great personages , and of ability in the cities , it is thought their sons should be like them , untill by their actions the contrary be found : or else it is caused by the courses such a one takes , of whom we speak : the best courses and waies that can be held , are to keep company with grave men , well dispos'd , and such as by every one are reputed wise . and because there cannot be a greater marke or discovery of a man then by the company he frequents , without question he that uses good company , gaines a good name : for it is impossible but that he shall much resemble them . or indeed this publick reputation is gotten by some extraordinary and notable exploit , however private , that hath proved in thy hands very honorable . and of all these three things , which in the beginning gain any one a good reputation , nothing gives if more amply then this last : for that first of parents , and fathers is so deceitfull , that men advance therein very leisurely , and that is presently quite spent , when it is not accompanied by the the proper vertue of him that is to be censured . the second way , which makes thee be known by the company thou usest , is better then the first ; but is much inferior to the third ; for untill thou hast given evidence of thy self by some worthy exploir , thy repute is wholly grounded upon opinion , which is very easily cancelled . but that third being begun and grounded upon thy workes , gives thee at first such renown , that needs must it be , that afterwards thou commit many acts contrary thereunto , if thou wouldst disannul it . therefore ought those men that spring up in a common-wealth , take this course , and indeavour by some extraordinary act to begin their rise . which many at rome did in their youths , either by publishing of a law , furthering the common good , or by accusing some potent citizen as a breaker of the laws , by doing such like notable things , and unwonted , whereof men should have occasion to speak afterwards . neither are such like things needfull only to begin ones reputation , but they are as necessary for the maintenance and advancement of it . and to do this , a man had need to renew them again , as manlius did during his whole life : for when he had defended his father so vertuously and beyond the ordinary strain , and by this action taken his first degree of reputation , after some years he fought with that frenchman , and took from him that chain of gold , which gave him the name of torquatus : nor stay'd he upon this , but afterwards in riper years he put his son to death for having fought without his allowance , however he had vanquished his enemy . which three actions gave him a greater name , and throughout all ages make him more famous , then ever any triumph or victory did , wherewith he was adorn'd as much as any other roman . and the reason is , because in those victories manlius had very many like him , but in these particulars he had either very few or none . scipio the elder got not greater glory by all his triumphs , then that action of defending his father upon the tesin gained him in his youth , and that other when after the defeate at canna , couragiously with his sword drawn he made many young romans swear they would never abandon italy , as already then among them it was resolv'd which two actions were the beginnings of his reputation , which made him a way to his triumphs of spain and africa , which opinion of him was also increased , when he sent back the daughter to her father , and the wife to her husband in spain . this manner of proceeding is not alone needful for those citizens , that would gain reputation , whereby to attain the dignities in their commonwealth , but is also necessary for princes to maintain their credits in their principalities : for nothing gives them so great esteem as to yeeld some rare examples of themselves , by some deed or pithy saving , agreeable with the common good , which may evidently prove the prince either magnanimous , or liberall , or just ; and that he is such a one , that his life may serve for a patterne , and his wise sayings may be used by his subjects as proverbs . but to returne , whereat we began this discourse , i say ' that the people , when they begin to confer any dignity upon one of their citizens , grounding upon any of those reasons before alledged , take no ill ground ; but when afterwards the frequent examples of one mans good carriage makes him better known , then is a better ground taken ; for in such case there can never fall any deceit . i speak only of those honours which are given to men in the beginning , before they be well known by a certain experience , or that they transgress from one action to another unlike it ; where both touching the salfe opinion and the corruption , they alwaies commit less errors , then princes . and because it may fall out , that the people might be deceived in the report , in the opinion , and actions of a man , conceiving them greater then in truth they are , which would not be so with a prince , because it is like it should be told him , or that he should be advertised thereof by some of his counsellours ; to the end therefore that the people want not these advertisements , the good founders of republicks have ordained , that when the cheisest dignities of cities are to be bestowed , whereunto it might prove dangerous to prefer unsufficient men , and seeing the peoples wills sometimes bent to advance some one unfit , that it may be lawfull for any citizen , and accounted as an honour to him , to publish in their assemblies that mans defects , that the people ( this notice not failing them ) may the better give their judgments thereupon . and that this was customary at rome , the oration which f. maximus made , witnessed , which he uttered before the people in the second punicke warr , when at the creation of the consulls they took a liking to t. ottasilius ; and fabius ; deeming him unsufficent to marnage the consulate in those times , spake against him , declaring his unsufficiency , insomuch as he hindred him of that dignity , and converted the peoples favours to one that deserved it better then he . the people then in the choice of their magistrates judge according to the truest markes they can have of men . and when they can be advised , as princes are , they run into fewer errors then princes ; and that citizen that will begin to seek the peoples favour , must with some notable exploit gain it , as titus manlius did . chap. xxxv . what dangers they incurre that put themselves forwards as principals to advise any design , which are so much the greate , by how much this carries with it the more difficulty and perill . how dangerous a thing it is for any man to become the ringleader of any new matter , which belongs to many , and how hard a thing it is to meddle in it , and bring it on forwards , and make it good being thus brought forwards , would be too long and too deep a matter to discourse on . therefore reserving it for a fitter place , i will only treate of those dangers , which citizens incur , or those that advise a prince , making themselves chief in perswading him to any weighty and important resolution , so that the councell thereof is wholly imputed to them : for , men judging things by their events , of all the evill that arises thereupon , the blame is wholly laid on him as author ; and if good come of it , he is commended for it ; but the reward comes much short of the loss is hazarded . this present sultan selimus ' termed the great turk , having made preparation ( as some report , who now come from his country ) for the conquest of syria and egypt , was encouraged by one of his bashawes , who was then upon the confines of persia , to undertake rather an expedition against the sophy ; by whose counsell being perswaded , he went to that enterprise with an exceeding great army , and comming into a very vast country , where a great part of it is desert , and rivers very few , and finding there those difficulties , which long since had ruin'd many roman armies , was so distressed thereby , that he lost there by famine and plague ( however that in the war he were the vanquisher ) a great part of his army . whereupon being errag'd against the author of that counsell , he put him to death . we reade of many citizens , that were the advisers to such and such enterprises , who because these had evill success , have straightway been banished . certain citizens of rome there were , who as authours of the advice , stood to have a consul from among the commons in rome ; it happened , that the first of them , that went abroad with their armies , was defeated . whereupon it had prov'd but unluckily to the authors of that counsell , had not their party been strong , by whose favour such resolution was taken . it is then most certain , that they who advise a republick and they that counsell a prince , are equally brought into these streights ; and if they do not advise those things , which they take to be profitable either for the city or the prince without respect , they faile of their duties ; and in case they do counsell them , they run the hazard of their lives , and of their estates ; all men herein being so blind as to judge advices good or evill by the success they take . and devising with my self by what means they might escape this infamy or danger , i see no other way , then that they put things forward moderately , and not take any thing upon them as their own enterprise , and give their opinion without passion , and defend it also modestly without passion , so that if either the city or the prince followthat advice . it may seem they willingly took that course , and were not drawn thereto by thy importunity . when thou dost so , it is not reasonable that a prince or a people should seek revenge on thee for thy counsell , it being not followed against other mens wills : for here the danger is , that many having contradicted thee , in the unhappy success of thy advice they will concur in working thy ruine . and if in this case , one should say , that when he failes of that glory which another gets by being one alone against many in advising any course , when it proves luckily , we meete here with two advantages to countervail it : the first is to be quite exempt out of all danger : the second is , if thou advisest any thing modestly , and by reason of the opposition made against it , thy counsell be not taken , and some disaster follow upon the advice another hath given , thou gainest much glory thereby . and however the glory , which is gotten by mischiefs , befallen thy city or thy prince , cannot well be said to be enjoyed , yet is there some account to be made of them . i beleeve there is no other advice can be given to men in this part ; for the perswading them to hold their peace , and not give their opinion , would be a thing very unprotable to the commonwealth and their princes , & they would hardly be able to escape danger ; for in a small time would they be suspected ; it might also befall them , as it did those friends of porse the king of macedon , who having been defeated by paulus emilius , & flying with a few of his confidents , it chanc'd , that in relating things past , one of them began to tell perse of many errors committed by him , which were the occasion of his ruine , to whom perse turning said , traitor , and hast thou delay'd to tell me it , untill now that i have no remedy ? and upon these words slew him with his own hand . and thus he suffer'd punishment for his silence when he should have spoken , and for having spoken when he should have held his peace : neither avoided he the danger , by not giving his advice . wherefore i beleeve the rules above given , are to be kept and observ'd . chap. xxxvi . the reason wherefore the french have been and are thought in combats at the beginning more then men , and afterwards less then women . the fierceness of that frenchman who challeng'd any roman whatsoever , near the river anien , to fight with him , and afterwards the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 him and t. manlius , put 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of that which t. livius sayes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 the frenchmen in the beginning of the combat are more then men , and in the end thereof prove less then women . and weighing well from whence this may proceed , many beleeve that naturally they are so dispos'd , which i think is true : but hence it followes not that this their naturall humor , which makes them so fierce in the beginning , might not be so order'd by art , as to continue them fierce till the very conclusion : and for proof hereof , i say , that there are armies of three sorts : the one where there is both fury and order , for from the order arises fury and valour , as was that of the romans ; for it appears in all their histories , that there was a very good order in that army , which military discipline in tract of time had brought in amongst them . for in a well train'd army , no man is to do any thing but by rule and order . and we find hereby , that in the roman army ( from which , insomuch as it conquer'd the whole world , all others may take example ) they neither ate , nor slept , nor bought , neither did they any military action nor domestick without the consuls order : for those armies which do otherwise , are not right armies ; and if they come to make any trial of themselves in any action , they do it by force of rage and violence , and not by valour : but where valour is accompanied with due ordinances , it makes good use of the fury in such manner and in such times that no difficulty abates it , nor ever quailes the courage , because those good ordinances reinforce the spirit , and the fury , both being still maintained by the hope of over comming , which never failes while the orders hold firme . the contrary falls out in those armies wherein is fury and not order , as were those of the french , who ever faild by little and little for it proved not , that their first assault prevailed , and that their fury whereon they much relied , was not maintained by an ordinate valour , not having any thing else , besides that , wherein to trust , as that grew coole , so they failed . on the other side the romans doubting less of dangers by reason of their good orders , not distrusting the victory , fought resolutely and obstinately with the same courage and valour as well in the end as in the beginning , or rather enraged by fighting , they grew still more fierce . the third kind of armies is , where there is no naturall fury , nor accidentall order , as the italian armies are in our daies , which are quite unprofitable : and unless they incounter with an army which upon some accident chances to run away , they shall never overcome : and without alledging other examples , we every day see that they give good proofes they have no valour at all . and because by t livius his testimony , every one may understand , how the good s●uldiery ought to be ordered and how the bad is , i will set down papirius cursor his words , having a mind to punish fabius the commander of the horse ; where he said , let neither god nor man be had in any reverence , nor the generals commands , nor his auspices be regarded ; let the souldiers pillaging up and down for want of provision as well in their friends country as in their foes , let them casheere themselves , at their pleasures , for , getting their oaths , let them quit their ensignes , nor come together at command : let them fight without the generals leave by night or by day in place of advantage or disadvantage , caring neither for ranke nor order : and let the sacred and and solemn rites of warfare become like the blind and obscure tricks and chances of robberies . by the text here we may easily see whether the warfare in our daies , be blind and casuall , or sacred and solemn , and how much it comes short of resembling that which properly is termed a warfare , & how it differs from a furious and ordinate warfare as was that of the romans , or from a furious only as was that of the french. chap , xxxvii . whether slight skirmishes or combats are necessary before a great battell , and what is to be done to know a new enemy , when one should avoid those skirmishes . it seemes that in humane actions ( as otherwhere we have discoursed ) besides other difficulties , found in bringing any thing to its perfection , there is alwaies some evill very nearly neighbouring to the good : which so easily grows up with that good , that it seems unpossible , if a man would injoy the one , to be quit of the other . and this wee see in all the works of man : and therefore is that good attain'd with difficulty , unless by thy good fortune thou be so assisted , that she by her power overcome this ordinary and natural inconvenient . the combate between manlius t●rquatus and the frenchman hath put me in mind hereof , where t. livius saies that combate so much imported the event of the war , that the french army leaving their campe in a fright , went into the tiburtine country , and thence into campania . for i consider on the one side , that a good commander ought wholly avoid to do any thing which being but of small moment , may produce but evill effects in his army : for to begin a skirmish or a combate wherein the whole forces are not imployed , and yet the whole fertune is there laid to stake , is a thing savouring too much of rashness , as i said before , when i condemn'd the guarding of the passages . on the other side i consider , that wise and experienced commanders , when they meet with a new enemy , and that is of reputatson , are forc'd before they come to joyne battell , to cause their souldiers to make tryall of them by light skirmishes , to the end that beginning to know them , and to have to deale with them , they may be rid of that terror which the report and reputation of these men have put them in . and this part in a generall is of exceeding great importance ; for there is a kind of necessity in it , which forceth thee thereunte ; for thou wilt think that thou goest to thy manifest destruction , unless thou have first by these small experiences made thy soldiers cast out that terror , which by means of the enemies reputation had possessed their minds . valerius corvinus was sent by the romans with an army against the samnites , who were new enemies , and these formerly had never proved the one the others forces , where t. livius sayes , that valerius caused the romans . to make some small skirmishes with the samnites , that a new war , and a new enemy might not affright th●m . notwithstanding it is a very great hazzard , that thy souldiers in those skirmishes remaning losers , their fear and cowardise grow not more upon them , and that effects contrary to thy purpose follow not thereupon , that is , that thou fright them not , whereas thy design was to assure them . so that this is one of those things , which hath the evill so near neighbouring unto the good , or rather they are so neare joyn'd together , that it is very easy to mistake the one for the other : whereupon i say , that a good commander should be very careful , that nothing arise , which upon any accident may take away the courage and heart of his soldiers . that which may be of force to take away their courage , is to begin to lose : and therefore a man should be well aware of these small skirmishes , and no way suffer any of them , unless with exceeding great advantage , and certain hope of victory . nor ought he undertake to guard any passages , where he cannot bring his whole army together . nor should he keep any towns unless it be those that by losing of them , his utter ruine followes thereupon ; and those that he guards , he should take such care both with their defences and also with his army , that whenever the enemy hath any design to assayle them , he may make use of all his forces in rescue of them : the others he should leave undefended : for whensoever any thing is lost , that was before abandon'd , the army being yet afoot , there is neither the reputation of the war lost , nor the hope of conquest . but when any thing is lost , which thou hadst purposed to defend , and every one beleeve , thou mightst , defend , there is the dammage and loss , and there thou hast in a manner , as those frenchmen did , by a matter of small moment lost the whole war. philip of macedon the father of perse , a warlick man , and of great esteem in his time , being assavl'd hy the romans , forsook and laid wast much of his country , as he , who because he was wise , thought it more pernicious to lose reputation by not being able to defend that which he undertook to defend , then by leaving it in prey to the enemy , to lose it as a thing neglected . the romans when after the defeat at canna , their estate was in great perplexity , refus'd many that were under their protection , and so also divers of their own subjects , charging them to defend themselves the best they could , which are better courses far , than to undertakes defences , and afterwards nor be able to go through with them ; for hereby those friends are lost , and forces only in those friends . but returning to the small skirmishes , i say ; that yet if a commander be forc'd by reason of the newness of the enemy to make any skirmish , he ought take so much advantage in it , that he run no hazard to lose it , nor do , as marius did , which is the better way . who going against the cimbrians , which were an exceeding fierce people , and came to make a prey of italy , and wheresoever they came , casting a great terror , because of their fierceness and multitude , and by reason they had formerly vanquish'd a roman army , marius thought it necessary before he came to joyn battell , to worke somewhat , which might make his souldiers lay aside that terrour , which the feare of the enemy had put them in ; and as a very well advis'd commander , brought his army several times , where the cimbrians with their troupes were to pass : and thus within the fortifications of his campe he would that his souldiers should see them , and accustome their eyes to the view of that enemy , to the end that by seeing a disordinate multitude loaded with baggage and unprofitable armes , and in part too disarm'd , they might reassure themselves , and grow desirous of battell , which course as it was discreetly practis'd by marius , so likewise ought it be diligently imitated by others , whereby they might not be forc'd to incurre those dangers which i mentioned before , nor to do as the frenchmen did : who for a matter of small moment fled in a fright into the triburtine country , and streight after into compania . and because wee have alledg'd valerius corvinus in this treaty , in the chapter following i intend , by the helpe of his words , to shew what manner of man a commander should be . chap. xxxviii . what manner of man that general ought to be , on whose abilities an army may confidently relie . valerius corvinus was ( as we faid formerly ) abroad with an army against the samnites , new enemies of the people of rome , whereupon partly to assure his own souldiers , and partly to make them know the enemy , he caus'd some of his to enter into certain light skirmishes with them , nor contented herewith , before the day of battell would needs speak to his own souldiers , and shew with all efficacy , how little esteem they were to make of such enemies , putting them in minde of their own and his valour also : where it may be noted by the words that livius brings him in speaking , what manner of man a commander ought to be , in whom an army is to have confidence : which words are these ; and also to consider , under whose conduct and auspices you fight ; whether he you are to hearken unto , be only a magnificent exhorter , fierce in words , but not of prowesse to shew you any military examples , or else such a one that knows how to make use of your armes to march before your ensignes , and behave himself bravely in the thickest of your troops . i would have yon my souldiers to follow my deeds rather then my words , and not to seek your discipline only from me , but your example , who by this right hand have gained three consulships and the height of honour . which words well consider'd teach every man how he ought to proceed if he would hold the dignity of a commander ; and whosoever shall otherwise carry it , shall find in time that dignity ( when either by chance or ambition he is raised thereunto ) will rather take from him , then any way gain him reputation : for titles honour not men , but men their titles . and from the beginning of this discourse we may consider , that if great commanders have us'd extraordinary means to confirme the resolutions of an army of old soldiers , when they were to encounter with unaccustomed enemies , how much rather is there pains to be taken with an army of fresh-water soldiers , who never yet look'd the enemy in the face for if an unaccustomed enemy terrifies an army of old soldiers ; much more probable is it that any enemy should affright an army of new soldiers , yet we have many times seen all these difficulties overcome by the exceeding great wisdome of good commanders , as gracchus the roman did and e●aminondas the theban , of whom we have spoken otherwhere , who with their armies of new souldiers vanquished armies of veteranes , who had been of long experience . the courses they took , were for many months to exercise them in counterfeit skirmishes , and train them up in obedience and order , and from thence they came to imploy them with a great deal of assurance in very fierce battells . therefore ought no warlike man doubt , but that he may be able to make good soldiers when he wants not men : for that prince who hath many men , and wants souldiers , should complain rather of his own sloth and small wisdome , then of the peoples cowardise . chap. xxxix . that a commander ought exactly know scituations . among other things befitting the general of an army , is the knowledge of scituations and countries ; for without this knowledge in general and in particular , the commander of an army cannot well effectuate any thing . and because all sciences , if a man would be exact in them , require practice , this is one that askes exceeding much practice . and this practice or ( as i may terme it ) particular knowledge is gain'd rather by means of hunting , then by any other exercise . wherefore the ancient writers say , that those heroes , that rul'd the world in their days , were brought up in the woods and in frequent huntings : for the chace teacheth thee many things besides this knowledge , which very much concernes the war. and xenophon in cyrus his life shewes , that cyrus going to assaile the king of armenia , as he gave order for the service , he put his souldiers in mind that this was nothing else then one of those chaces which they had many times made in his company . and he told those he sent to lie in ambush upon the mountains , that they were like unto those that went to pitch their toiles upon the hills , and those that scowred the plain ; that they were like those that went to put up the beast out of his covert , to the end that being chased , he fall into the toiles . this is said to shew that the chase according as xenophon allowes of it , hath a kinde of resemblance of war. and therefore is such exercise very honorable and well beseeming great personages . nor can this knowledge of countries by any fitter means be learned then by way of hunting : for the chace makes him that frequents it know how in particular the country lies where he uses to hunt ; and when a man hath made himself well acquainted with the scite , of one country , he afterwards with facility comprehends that of all other strange countries : for every country and every member of them have some kind of conformity one with another , so that he who knows the one well , may easily attain to the knowledge of the other . but he that hath never practised the one , very hardly or never , unless it be by long experience , can know the other ; whereas he that is well versed therein , at the first cast of his eye knows how that plane lies , or that hill rises , how far that vally reaches , and all such other like things , whereof for the time to come he hath gained a settled knowledge . and that this is true , t. livius shewes us by the example of publius decius , who being tribune of the souldiers in the army which cornelius the consull led against the samnites , when the consull was forc'd to betake himself to a vally , where the romans , army might easily have been inclosed by the samnites , this decius perceiving the danger they were in , said to the consul , seest thou aulus cornelius that hill which is above the enemy ? that is the strength of our hope and safety , if we , because the samnites being blinde have neglected it , quickly seise on it . and before these words uttered by decius , t. livius sayes , publius decius the souldiers tribune shewed a pretty high hill which lay a little higher then the enemies campe , of hard ascent to men incombred with compleat armes , but of easy access to men lightly harnessed . whereupon being sent thither himself by the consull with souldiers , and having sav'd the roman army , and purposing when night came , himself to depart , and so to save himself and his own souldiers , he is brought in thus speaking , follow me , that yet while it is day light we may discover what places the enemy guards and which way we may get out . all these things he went to view clad in a souldiers cassocke , to the end the enemy should take no notice the captaine rounded them . he therefore that well considers this whole text , shall see how profitable and necessary for a commander it is to understand the natural scituations of countries ; for if decius had not well known them , he had never been able to judge what advantage it was to the roman army to seize upon that hill ; nor could he have been able to discerne at such distance , whether thall hill were accessible or no. and when he had once gotten there upon it , having a mind to depart and return again to the consul , being invironed round with enemies , he would never have been able so far off to spy out the passages to escape thence , and discerne which places were guarded by the enemy , so that it must be of necessity , that decius had a very exact knowledge , whereby he brought it to pass that by the taking of that hill , the roman army was delivered , and afterwards he himself ( being besieged ) knew how to find a way of escape both for himself and those that were with him . chap. xl. how deceit is commendable , used against the enemy in time of war. however that the use of fraud in any action be detestable , yet in the managing of a war it is a thing laudable and glorious , and he is as much praise , that vanquishes the enemy by deceit , as he that overcomes him by force . and this we see , by the judgment of those that write the lives of great personages , who commend hannibal and others , who have been very notable in such like ways of proceeding . whereof because there are many examples every where obvious , i will not adde any . i will say this only , that i mean not , that that fraud is glorious , which causes thee to breake thy faith given , and agreements made : for that , though it may sometimes gain thee a state or kingdom , as formerly hath been said , yet will it never get thee any glory but i speak of such a deceit , which is put in practise against such an enemy that trusts not in thee , and that consists properly in matter of war : as was that of hannibal , when at the lake of perugia he feigned a flight , whereby he might have inclos'd the consul and the roman army ; and when to escape out of fabius maximus hishand , he tied flaming fire-brands to the horns of his whole heard of cattel . the like unto which was that , which pontius the samnites general practised to shut in the roman army at the gallows of caudium , where having placed his army behind the mountains , he sent many of his soldiers clad like shepherds with much cattel through the plain , and they being taken by the romans , and required of where the samnites army was , agreed all , according to the order received from ponutis , to say that it was gone to the siege of nocera . which thing the consuls believing , gave them opportunity to shut them up in those precipices of caudium , wherein as soon as they entred , they were presently besieg'd by the samnites ; and this victory gained by fraud , would have proved very glorious to pontius , if he had followed his fathers counsel , who advised either to set the romans freely at liberty , or put them all to the sword , and in no case take the middle way , which neither gaines friends , nor takes foes out of the way . which middle way was always pernicious in matters of state , as other where it hath formerly been said . chap. xli . that the defence of ones country ought to be undertaken , either with ignominy , or with glory , or whatsoever way it be done , it is well defended . the consul and the romane army , as is above said , were besieged by the samnites , who having propounded to the romans exceeding dishonorable terms , as was that to make them go under the gallows , and send them without arms to rome ; and hereupon the consuls standing amazed , and the whole army in despair , lucius lentulus the romanc lieutenant said , that , as he thought , no conditions were to be refused to save their country : for the safety of rome consisting in the life of that army , he thought it good to save it in any case : and that the country is well defended , by what means soever it be , either with disgrace , or with glory : for that army being saved , rome might in very good time cancel all that ignominy ; but in case it were not saved , however it should dye gloriously . rome and her liberty was utterly lost , and so his advise was followed . which thing deserves well to be noted by any citizen that chances to be called to counsel his country : for where the deliberation is wholly touching the safty of the country , there ought no consideration to be had of just or unjust , pitiful or cruel , honorable or dishonorable , but rather all other respect being laid aside , that course is to be taken which may preserve the life and maintain the liberty thereof , which thing is followed by the sayings and deeds of the french , in defence of the majesty of their king , and the power of their kingdom ; for they heat nothing with more impatience , then that it should be said such a course was dishonorable to their king ; for say they , their king cannot suffer dishonor in any resolution taken by him , either in prosperous or adverse fortune : for whether he wins or loses , they commend the action , and say it was done like a king. chap. xlii . promises extorted by force , ought not to be kept . when the consuls were return'd to rome with their disarm'd army , and the disgrace which was put upon it , the first that spake in the senate , that the peace made at candium should not be observ'd , was the consul s. posthumius , saying that the people of rome was not tied thereunto , but that he himself indeed was bound , and the rest that had promis'd the peace ; and therefore the people if they would free themselves from all tyes , were to yeeld up him and the rest that had promis'd it with him into the samnites . hands : and this conclusion he held with such obstinacy , that at length the senate was content therewith , and so sending him and the others to sanmiam , protested to the samnites , that the peace was of no force . and in this case so favourable was fortune to pesthumius , that the samnites held him not ; and when he was returned to rome among the romans , he was more glorious by his loss , then pentius was among the samnites by his conquest . where two things are to be noted . the one is , that in what action soever glory may be gotten ; for in victory it is ordinarily gain'd , but in loss , it is obtained either by shewing that loss came not by thy default , or by the atcheivement of some valorous action which may cancell it . the others is : that it is no dishonour to violate those promises which by force thou wert constrain'd to make ; and always premises extorted regarding the publick , when there is want of strength , shall be broken , and that without the disgrace of him that breaks them . wherefore in all histories we read several examples , and every day in these moderne times we see many of them ; and , not only among princes , promises forc'd when they want strength , are not kept , but also all other promises are not observed , when the occasions faile that mov'd them to promise . which if it be a thing commendable or no , or whether such like ways are to be followed by a prince or no , it is at large disputed by us in our treaty concerning a prince , so that for this present we shall not touch it . chap. xliii . those men that are bred in the same country , do throughout all ages keep very near the same nature and disposition . wise men are wont to say ( and not by chance nor without reason ) that he who will see what shall be , let him consider what hath been : for all things in the world at all times have their very incounter with the times of old , which comes to pass , because those things are wrought by men , who were always & are subject to the same passions ; & therefore follows it of necessity , that they take the same effect . it is true , that their actions sometimes in this province are more vertuous , then those in that , & so sometimes in that more then in this , according to the forme of their education , wherein those people have taken their manner of living . it gives a facility also in the knowledge of future things by those that are past , to see one nation a long time hold the same customes and conditions , being either alwayes covetous , or always treacherous , or having some other such vice or vertue . and whosoever shall read the things past belonging to our city of florence , and consider also what hath happened in the latter times , shall finde the germans and french very covetous , proud , cruel , and unfaithful : for in all these four , several times have they much wronged our city . and touching their small faith , every one know monies were given to king charles the . of france , and he promised to render the cittadels of pisa , and yet he never did it . wherein that king manifested his small faith , and muth avarice . but let us pass over these matters of late memory . every one may well have heard of that which followed in the war that the florentines had with the vicounts of milan : when florence being deprived of all other expedients , thought to bring the emperor into italy , by his reputation and forces to assail lombardy . the emperor promised to bring a good army with him , and undertake that war against the vicounts , and defend florence against their whole power , in case that at his rising up in arms the florentines would pay him an hundred thousand ducates , and at his arrival in italy another hundred thousand ; to which agreements the florentines consented , and having made the first paiment , and afterwards the second , he came onely to verona , and thence returned back again , having not done any thing in their behalf , blaming them , as if it were their fault , for not having observed the conditions between them . so that if florence had not been either constrained by necessity , or overcome by passion , and had read and known the ancient customes of the barbarians , she would never have been neither this time , nor many other times deceived by them , they having behaved themselves always after one manner , and in every part , and with every one used the same terms , as it appears they formerly did to the tuscans , who being oppressed by the romans , by reason they had been several times put in flight by them and routed , and seeing that by their own forces alone they were not able to make resistance , they agreed with the french , who dwelt on this side the alps in italy , to give them a sum of mony , to oblige them to joyn their armies with them , whereby to make head against the romans . whereupon it followed , that they having taken the monies , would not afterwards take arms for them , saying these they had received , not to make war upon their enemies , but that they should forbear to forrage the country of tuscany . and thus the tuscans through the covetousness and small truth of the french , were bereft of their monies and left without the succors they expected from them . insomuch as we see by this example of the ancient tuscans , and that of the florentines , that the french have continually used the same terms : and hereby may it easily be conjectured , what trust princes can repose in them . chap. xliv . by sudden ; surprisall and boldness many times more is obtained , then by ordinary means can be gotten . the samnites being invaded by the romans , and their army unable to stand in the field against them , determin'd having left their towns well guarded in samnium , to pass with their whole army into tuscany , which then had made truce with the romans , to try with that passage , if by the presence of their army they could induce the tuscans to take armes again : which they had denied to their ambassadors ; and in the parly the samnites had with the tuscans ( shewing what principally moved them to take armes ) they used a notable terme , where they said , they had rebelled , because peace was more grievous to these in subjection , then was war to them that enjoy their liberty . and so partly by perswasions , partly by the presence of their army , they wrought them to take armes . where it is to be noted , that when any prince desires to obtain any thing of another , he ought ( if the occasion will bear it ) never give him time to advise himself , but carry the matter so , that he may see the necessity of his sudden resolution , which is , when he that is required , perceives that by his deniall , or delay , there may arise a sudden and dangerous distaste . these termes were seen to have been well used by pope julius with the french , and by de fois the french kings general with the marquess of mantua : for pope julius having a mind to expell the bentivolij out of bolonia ; and to this purpose thinking he had need of the french forces , and that the venetians should stand newtralls ; and having sollicited the one and the other to this intent , but receiv'd from them a doubtful and various answer , resolv'd by not giving them leisure to bring them both to his bent . whereupon parting from rome with those forces he could put together , he went thence towards bolonia , and to the venetians he sent that they should continue newters , and to the king that he should send him forces ; so that they all being restrain'd by the small time they had , and considering that the pope might with reason take an open distast at either their delay or refusal , gave way to his will , and the king sent him aid , and the venetians remain'd newters . de fois also being with his army in bolonia , and having had notice of the rebellion of bressia , and being desirous to go to recover it , had two ways , the one through the kings own dominions long and tedious , the other short through the dominion of mantua ; and not only was he necessitated to pass through the dominions of that marquess , but of force was to pass by certain sluces between marish grounds and lakes , whereof that country is full , which with fortresses & other means were shut up , and guarded by him : whereupon de fois having resolv'd to take the shorter passage , to overcome all difficulties , & give no time to the marquess to deliberate , at the same instant brought his souldiers on that way , and signified to the marquess that he should send him the keys of the passage . so that the marquess surprised by this sudden resolution , sent him the keys , which he would never have done , if de fois had carried himself more cooly in the matter , that marquess being in league with the pope and the venetians , and having a son of his in the popes hands , which things gave him many fair colours to deny him . but being assailed by the sudden course taken ( upon the reasons already alledged ) yeelded . so did the tuscans with the samnites , having upon the presence of that army of samnium taken arms , which they had otherwise denyed them . chap. xlv . vvhich course is the better in a battel , either at the first to sustain onely the enemies shock , and reserve some forces till the latter end to give them a blow withall , or else as upon the main to venture all upon the fury of the first onset . decius and fabius the roman consuls were in the field with two armies against the samnites and tuscans , and coming to the skirmish and to joyn battel together , it is worth the noting in that service , which of those ways of proceeding , practised by those two consuls , were the better : for d●●ius with all his force and violence assailed the enemy ; fabius only held them up , judging the slow assault to be of more advantage , reserving his blow till the last , when the enemy should have lost his first heat of fight , or rage ( as some terme it ) where we see by the success that follow'd , that fabius his design took effect better then that of decius , who tir'd himself so in the first onset , that seeing his souldiers ready to turne their faces , to attain to that glory by death which by victory he could not , in imitation of his father , he sacrific'd himself for the roman legions . which thing when fabius understood , that he might gain no less glory by living , then his collegue had gotten by dying , put forward all these forces , which he had reserv'd for the last pinch , whereby he carried away a very happy victory . from hence is it evident , that fabius his manner of proceeding is the more secure and warrantable . chap. xlvi . whence proceedes it , that one family in a city holds a long time the same manners and disposition . it seems that not only one city hath certain wayes and orders different from those of another city , and breeds men either more hardy or more effeminate , but in the same city we see the same difference among families : which we find to be true in every city : and in rome we reade of many examples to this purpose : for we see the manlij were hard and obstinate men , the publicoli courteous and lovers of the people , the appij ambitious and enemies of the commonalty , and so many other families , have had their qualities differing one much from the other . which thing cannot proceede from the blood only , for that must needs alter by reason of the variety of marriages ; but it must come from the education , which one family hath diverse from another . for it avails much , that a youth from his tender years begins to relish well or ill any one thing : for of necessity it must make an impression , and thereupon give a rule to his manner of proceeding all the dayes of his life : and were not this so , it would be impossible that all the appij should have had the same will , and been led by the same passions , as t. livius rema●kes in many of them : and for the last , one of them being made censor , and his collegue at the end of eighteen moneths having ( as the law order'd it ) depos'd his magistracy , appius would not depose his , saying that he might hold his yet five years , according to the first law ordain'd by the censors . and however hereupon many speeches were made , and many tumults were caus'd ; yet was there no helpe to make him lay it down , maugre the people and the greater part of the senate . and whosoever reads the oration he made against p. sempronious tribune of the people , shall note upon that occasion all the appian insolences , and the goodness and humanity used by many other citizens in obedience of the laws and in their love to their country . chap. xlvii . that a good citizen for the love of his country ought to forget all private wrongs . manlius the consul was imployed with an army against the samnites , and he having been wounded in a battell , and the army therefore running some hazard , the senate judg'd it necessary to send papirius cursor thither for dictator , to supply the want of the consul ; and there being a necessity that the dictator should be nam'd by fabius who was then in tuscany with an army , and doubting that because he was his enemy , he would not name him , the senators sent him two ambassadours to intreate him , that laying aside all private differences for the publick goods sake he would name him . which fabius did , moved by the love he bore his country ; howbeit by his silence , and many other signes , he shewed that nomination pressed him , much . whereof all those , that would be thought good citizens , ought take example . chap. xlviii . when we se the enemy commit a great errour , we ought to beleeve there is some treachery in the business . fvlvius remaining lieftenant in the army which the romans had in tuscany , for that the consul was gone to rome by reason of some ceremonies there , the tuscans to see if they could draw this man forth , laid an ambuscado near the romans campe , and sent some soldiers clad like shepherds with good store of cattel , and caused them to come insight of the roman army , who so disguised came near their very trenches , whereupon the lieftenant marvelling at this their presumption , not thinking it a thing reasonable , found such an expedient as discovered the deceit , and so the tuscans , plot was spoiled . here it may firly be noted , that the commander of an army ought not to give much credit to an errour , which he plainly sees the enemy run into : for there will alwaies be some treachery lurking , it being not a thir 〈◊〉 reasonable that men should be so unwary . but oftentimes the desire of victory so blinds mens eyes , that they can se nothing else , but what they think makes all for their advantage . the frenchmen having overcome the romans at alia , and comming to rome , and finding the gates open , and without guard , stayed all that day , and the next night , without entring in , fearing some treachery , and not possibly beleeving , there could be such cowardise and so small understanding in the romans , as utterly to abandon their country . when in the year the florentines besieged pisa , alphonso del mutola , a citizen of pisa , was then the florentines prisoner , and promised if he were set free that he would open a gate of pisa to the florentine army , whereupon he had his liberty ; afterwards as if it had been to put the matter in execution , he came many times to treate with the commissaries deputies , but came not privately nor by stealth , but openly and accompanied by some pisans , who stood aside , while he talked with the florentines : so that a man might well have guest at his double heart : for there was no probability , that if the end of this practice had been faithfuly intended , as it was promis'd , it should ever have been so openly treated . but the desire the florentines had to be masters of pisa , did so blind them , that by his order comming to the gate of lucca , they left there divers of their captains and many others , to their great dishonour , by meanes of the said alphonsoes double dealing with them . chap. xlix . a republick , if one would preserve it free , hath every day need of provision of new orders , and in regard of his good deserts that way fabius was term'd maximus . there is a necessity ( as it hath been said ●other where ) that every day in a vast city such accidents , happen as have need of the physitian : and according as they are of more consequence , so have they need of the wiser physician . and if in any city the like : accidents ever happen'd , it was in rome , where there fell out both strange and unexpected , as was that , when it seemed , that all the roman dames had conspir'd to kill their husbands : so many were there that had poisoned their husbands , and so many that had prepared the poyson to give their husbands . such like also was that conspiracy of the baccanalls , which was discovered in the time of the macedonian wars , wherein were intangled many thousands of men and women : and had it not been revealed , it would have proved very dangerous for that city , or else if the romans had not been accustomed to chastise a whole multitude of offenders : for were there not other exceeding many evident tokens to shew forth the greatness and magnificence of that republick and power of her executions , yet would it sufficiently appear by the quality of the punishment she imposed on the offenders . she never stood upon it , to put to death by way of justice a whole legion at once , and a whole city , and to confine eight or ten thousand men , with extraordinary hard conditions , had it been to one man alone , much more to so many . as it befell those souldiers , who had fought unfortunately at canna , whom she confined to sicily , and layd this on them , that they should never lodge in any townes , andshould always eate standing . but of all the other execution , the most terrible was that decimation of armies , where by lot throughout a whole army one of ten was put to death . nor could there , to chastise a whole multitude , a more horrible punishment be found : for when a multitude offends , where the author is not certain , all cannot suffer , because they are too many : and to punish one part , and let the other go scotfree , were to wrong those they should punish , and those that escaped free would be encouraged to offend another time . but to put to death the tenth part by lot , when all deserve it , he that suffers , blames his evill fortune : and he that escapes , is afraid least that another time the lot may fall on him , and so is wary not to offend . those empoisoners then & baccanalls were punished as their offences deserved : and however these diseases in a republick produce evill effects , yet are they not deadly : for that almost alwayes there is time given to correct them ; but there is hardly any leasure in those that regard the state , which unless they fall under the hand of some wise man , ruine the city . there was in rome , by reason of the liberality the romans used in bestowing the burgeouship & freedom of their city upon strangers , so many new people borne , that they began to have such a part in the suffnages , that the government began to vary , and parted with those things and from those men , by whom it was accustomed to walke . which q. fabius , who was then censor , perceiving , the placed all these new people upon whom this disorder depended , under four tribes , to the end that being reduced into so small spaces they might not corrupt the whole city of rome . this thing was well understood by fabius , and by him was there a convenient remedy applied without much change : which was so well accepted by the city , that they always after gave him the title of maximus . nicolas machiavel to zanobius buondelmontius and cosimus rucelayus health . i send you a present , which if it answers not my obligations to you , yet certainly is it the greatest that nicolas machiavel could commend unto you : for herein i have expressed what i know , and what i have learned by a long experience , and continnal reading of the affairs of the world . and being that neither you nor any body else can look for more of me , you have no reason to complain , i have given you no more . well may you be sorry at the feebleness of my understanding , being that these relations of mine here are but weake , and at the errour of my judgment , being that i my self several times in my discourses am deceived . which being so , i know not which of us is the less beholding the one to the other , either i to you , who have forced me to wri●e that which of my own self i should never have undertaken : or you to me , who have given you but smal satisfaction in my writings . receive this then so , as things should be taken by friends , where more regard is had to the good will of him that sends , then to the worth of what is sent . and beleeve that herein i have one alone satisfaction , when i think that , however perchance i may have erred in many circumstances herein , in this alone i know i have not fail'd in making choise of you to whom before all others i may dedicate these my discourses , partly because in thus doing i have shewed some thankfulness for the good turnes you have done me , and partly for that me thinks i have quit the common custome of those that write , who use alwayes to dedieate all their works to princes ; and blinded by ambition , and covetousness , attribute to him the commendations of all vertuous qualities , whereas they ought to blame him for what is faulty in him . whereupon , that 's i may not run into this error , i have made choice , not of those that are princes , but of those that for their many good parts might deserve well to be so : nor of those that are able to bestow preferments , honours , nor wealth upon me , but of those who though they are not powerfull , yet are they willing to do well for me : for men , if they would carry a right judgment , should esteem of those that in themselves are , and not of those that have the means to be liberall ; and so of those that understand how to governe , and not of those that without understanding have the government of a kingdom . and writers commend rather hieron of siracusa when he was a private man , then perse of macedon , when he was a king : for hieron wanted nothing else of being a prince , then a principality : that other had no part of a king but a kingdome . enjoy therefore that good or that evill which you your selves have desired : and if you shall continue still in this error , that these my opinions be acceptable to you , i shall not faile to proceed in the rest of the story , as in the beginning i made my promise . finis . nicholas machiavel's prince . also , the life of castruccio castracani of lucca . and the meanes duke valentine us'd to put to death vitellozzo vitelli , oliverotto of fermo , paul , and the duke of gravina . translated out of italian into english , by e. d. with some animadversions noting and taxing his errors . london , printed for daniel pakeman , . to the most noble and illustrious , james duke of lenox , earle of march , baron of setrington , darnly , terbanten , and methuen , lord great chamberlain and admiral of scotland , knight of the most noble order of the garter , and one of his majesties most honourable privy counsel in both kingdomes . poysons are not all of that malignant and noxious quality , that as destructives of nature , they are utterly to be abhord ; but we find many , nay most of them have their medicinal uses . this book carries its poyson and malice in it ; yet mee thinks the judicious peruser may honestly make use of it in the actions of his life , with advantage . the lamprey , they say , hath a venemous string runs all along the back of it ; take that out , and it is serv'd in for a choyce dish to dainty palates ; epictetus the philosopher sayes , every thing hath two handles , as the fire brand , it may be taken up at one end in the bare hand without hurt : the other being laid hold on , will cleave to the very flesh , and the smart of it will pierce even to the heart . sin hath the condition of the fiery end ; the touch of it is wounding with griefe unto the soule : nay it is worse ; one sin goes not alone but hath many consequences . your grace may find the truth of this in your perusal of this author : your judgement shall easily direct you in finding out the good uses of him : i have pointed at his chiefest errors with my best endeavors , and have devoted them to your graces service : which if you shall accept and protect , i shall remain your graces humble and devoted servant , edvvard dacres . the epistle to the reader . questionless some men will blame me for making this author speak in our vulgar tongue . for his maximes and tenents are condemnd of all , as pernicious to all christian states , and hurtfull to all humane societies . herein i shall answer for my self with the comoedian , placere studeo bonis quam plurimis , & minimé multos laedere : i endeavor to give content to the most i can of those that are well disposed , and no scandal to any . i grant . i find him blamed and condemned : i do no less my self . reader , either do thou read him without a prejudicate opinion , and out of thy own judgement taxe his errors ; or at least , if thou canst stoop so low , make use of my pains to help thee ; i will promise thee this reward for thy labor : if thou consider well the actions of the world , thou shalt find him much practised by those that condemn him ; who willingly would walk as theeves do with close lanternes in the night , that they being undescried ; and yet seeing all , might surprise the unwary in the dark . surely this book will infect no man : out of the wicked treasure of a mans own wicked heart , he drawes his malice and mischief . from the same flower the bee sucks honey , from whence the spider hath his poyson . and he that means well , shall be here warnd , where the deceitfull man learnes to set his snares . a judge who hath often used to examine theeves , becomes the more expert to sift out their tricks . if mischief come hereupon , blame not me , nor blame my author : lay the saddle on the right horse : but hony , soit qui mal y pense : let shame light on him that hatcht the mischief . nicholas machiavelli , to the magnificent laurence sonne to peter of medicis health . they that desire to ingratiate themselves with a prince , commonly use to offer themselves to his view , with things of that nature as such persons take most pleasure and delight in : whereupon we see they are many times presented with horses and armes , cloth of gold , pretious stones , and such like ornaments , worthy of their greatness . having then a mind to offer up my self to your magnificence , with some testimony of my service to you , i found nothing in my whole inventory , that i think better of , or more esteeme , than the knowlege of great mens actions , which i have learned by a long experience of modern affairs , and a continual reading of those of the ancients . which , now that i have with great diligence long workt it out , and throughly sifted , i commend to your magnificence . and however i may well think this work unworthy of your view ; yet such is your humanity , that i doubt not but it shall find acceptance , considering , that for my part i am not able to tender a greater gift , than to present you with the means , whereby in a very short time you may be able to understand all that , which i , in the space of many years , and with many sufferances and dangers , have made proof and gaind the knowledge of . and this work i have not set forth either with elegancy of discourse or stile , nor with any other ornament whereby to captivate the reader , as others use , because i would not have it gain its esteem from elsewhere than from the truth of the matter , and the gravity of the subject . nor can this be thought presumption , if a man of humble and low condition venture to dilate and discourse upon the governments of princes ; for even as they that with their pensils designe out countreys , get themselves into the plains below to consider the nature of the mountains , and other high places above ; and again to consider the plains below , they get up to the tops of the mountains ; in like manner to understand the nature of the people , it is fit to be a prince ; and to know well the dispositions of princes , sutes best with the understanding of a subject . your magnificence then may be pleased , to receive this small present , with the same mind that i send it ; which if you shall throughly peruse and consider , you shall perceive therein that i exceedingly wish , that you may attain to that greatness , which your own fortune , and your excellent endowments promise you : and if your magnificence from the very point of your highness shall sometime cast your eyes upon these inferior places , you shall see how undeservedly i undergoe an extream and continual despight of fortune . the prince , written by nicholas machiavelli , secretary and citizen of florence . chap. i. how many sorts of principalities there are , and how many wayes they are attained to . all states , all dominions that have had , or now have rule over men , have been and are , either republiques or principalities . principalities are either hereditary , whereof they of the blood of the lord thereof have long time been princes ; or else they are new ; and those that are new , are either all new , as was the dutchy of millan to francis sforce ; or are as members adjoyned to the hereditary state of the prince that gains it ; as the kingdom of naples is to the king of spain . these dominions so gotten , are accustomed either to live under a prince , or to enjoy their liberty ; and are made conquest of , either with others forces , or ones own , either by fortune , or by valor . chap. ii. of hereditary principalities . i will not here discourse of republiques , because i have otherwhere treated of them at large : i will apply my self only to a principality , and proceed , while i weave this web , by arguing thereupon , how these principallities can be governed and maintained . i say then that in states of inheritance , and accustomed to the blood of their princes , there are far fewer difficulties to keep them , than in the new : for it suffices only not to transgress the course his ancestors took , and so afterward to temporise with those accidents that can happen ; that if such a prince be but of ordinary industry , he shall allwaies be able to maintain himself in his state , unless by some extraordinary or excessive power he be deprived thereof ; and when he had lost it , upon the least sinister chance that befalls the usurper , he recovers it again . we have in italy the duke of ferrara for example hereof , who was of ability to resist the venetians , in the year . and to withstand pope julius in the tenth for no other reason , than because he had of old continued in that rule ; for the natural prince hath fewer occasions , and less heed to give offence , whereupon of necessity he must be more beloved ; and unless it be that some extravagant vices of his bring him unto hatred , it is agreeable to reason , that naturally he should be well beloved by his own subjects : and in the antiquity and continuation of the dominion , the remembrances and occasions of innovations are quite extinguished : for evermore one change leaves a kind of breach or dent , to fasten the building of another . chap. iii. of mixt principalities . but the difficulties consist in the new principality ; and first , if it be not all new , but as●a member , so that it may be termed altogether as mixt ; and the variations thereof proceed in the first place from a natural difficulty , which we commonly finde in all new principalities ; for men do willingly change their lord , beleeving to better their condition ; and this beliefe causes them to take armes against him that rules over them , whereby they deceive themselves , because they find after by experience , they have made it worse : which depends upon another natural and ordinary necessity , forcing him alwaies to offend those , whose prince he newly becomes , as well by his soldiers he is put to entertain upon them as by many other injuries , which a new conquest draws along with it ; in such manner as thou findest all those thine enemies , whom thou hast endammaged in the seizing of that principality , and afterwards canst not keep them thy friends that have seated thee in it , for not being able to satisfie them according to their expectations , nor put in practice strong remedies against them , being obliged to them . for however one be very well provided with strong armies , yet hath he alwaies need of the favor of the inhabitants in the countrey , to enter thereinto . for these reasons , lewis the twelfth , king of france , suddenly took milan , and as soon lost it ; and the the first time lodwick his own forces served well enough to wrest it out of his hands ; for those people that had opened him the gates , finding themselves deceived of their opinion , and of that future good which they had promised themselves , could not endure the distastes the new prince gave them . true it is , that coutreys that have rebelled again the second time , being recovered , are harder lost ; for their lord , taking occasion from their rebellion , is less respective of persons , but cares only to secure himself , by punishing the delinquents , to clear all suspicions , and to provide for himself where he thinks he is weakest : so that if to make france lose milan the first time , it was enough for duke lodwick to make some small stir only upon the confines ; yet afterwards , before they could make him lose it the second time , they had need of the whole world together against him , and that all his armies should be wasted and driven out of italy ; which proceeded from the forenamed causes : however though both the first and second time it was taken from him . the generall causes of the first we have treated of ; it remains now that we see those of the second ; and set down the remedies that he had , or any one else can have that should chance to be in those termes he was , whereby he might be able to maintain himself better in his conquest than the king of france did . i say therefore , that these states which by conquest are annexed to the ancient states of their conquerors , are either of the same province and the same language , or otherwise ; and when they are , it is very easy to hold them , especially when they are not used to live free ; and to enjoy them securely , it is enough to have extinguished the princes line who ruled over them : for in other matters , allowing them their ancient conditions , and there being not much difference of manners betwixt them , men ordinarily live quiet enough ; as we have seen that burgundy did , britany , gascouy , and normandy , which so long time continued with france : for however there be some difference of language between them , yet can they easily comport one with another ; and whosoever makes the conquest of them , meaning to hold them , must have two regards ; the first , that the race of their former prince be quite extinguished ; the other , that he change nothing , neither in their lawes nor taxes , so that in a very short time they become one entire body with their ancient principality . but when any states are gaind in a province disagreeing in language , manners , and orders , here are the difficulties , and here is there need of good fortune , and great industry to maintain them ; and it would be one of the best and livelyest remedies , for the conqueror to goe in person and dwell there ; this would make the possession here of more secure and durable ; as the turk hath done in greece , who among all the other courses taken by him for to hold that state , had he not gone thither himself in person to dwell , it had never been possible for him to have kept it : for abiding there , he sees the disorders growing in their beginnings , and forthwith can remedy them ; whereas being not there present , they are heard of when they are grown to some height , and then is there no help for them . moreover , the province is not pillaged by the officers thou sendest thither : the subjects are much satisfied of having recourse to the prince near at hand , whereupon have they more reason to love him , if they mean to be good ; and intending to do otherwise , to fear him : and forrein princes will be well aware how they invade that state ; insomuch , that making his abode there , he can very hardly lose it . another remedy , which is also a better , is to send colonies into one or two places , which may be as it were the keys of that state ; for it is necessary either to do this , or to maintain there many horse and foot . in these colonies the prince makes no great expence , and either without his charge , or at a very small rate , he may both send and maintain them ; and gives offence only to them from whom he takes their fields and houses , to bestow them on those new inhabitants who are but a very small part of that state ; and those that he offends , remaining dispersed and poore , can never hurt him : and all the rest on one part , have no offence given them , and therefore a small matter keeps them in quiet : on the other side , they are wary not to erre , for fear it befalls not them , as it did those that were dispoild . i conclude then , that those colonies that are not chargeable , are the more trusty , give the less offence ; and they that are offended , being but poor and scattered , can do but little harme , as i have said ; for it is to be noted , that men must either be dallyed and flattered withall , or else be quite crusht ; for they revenge themselves of small dammages ; but of great ones they are not able ; so that when wrong is done to any man , it ought so to be done , that it need fear no return of revenge again , but in lieu of colonies , by maintaining soldiers there , the expence is great ; for the whole revenues of that state are to be spent in the keepingof it ; so the conquest proves but a loss to him that hath got it , & endammages him rather ; for it hurts that whole state to remove the army from place to place , of which annoyance every one hath a feeling , and so becomes enemie to thee ; as they are enemies , i wis , who are outraged by thee in their own houses , whensoever they are able to do thee mischief . every way then is this guard unprofitable . besides , he that is in a different province , ( as it is said ) should make himself head and defender of his less powerfull neighbors , and devise alwaies to weaken those that are more mighty therein , and take care that upon no chance there enter not any foreiner as mighty as himself ; for it will alwaies come to pass , that they shall be brought in by those that are discontented , either upon ambition , or fear ; as the e●olians brought the romans into greece ; and they were brought into every countrey they came , by the natives ; and the course of the matter is , that so soon as a powerfull stranger enters a countrey , all those that are the less powerfull there , cleave to him , provoked by an envy they beare him that is more mighty than they ; so that for these of the weaker sort , he may easily gain them without any pains : for presently all of them together very willingly make one lump with that he hath gotten : he hath only to beware that these increase not their strengths , nor their authorities , and so he shall easily be able by his own forces , and their assistances , to take down those that are mighty , and remain himself absolute arbitre of that countrey . and he that playes not well this part , shall quickly lose what he hath gotten ; and while he holds it , shall find therein a great many troubles and vexations . the romans in the provinces they seiz'd on , observed well these points , sent colonies thither , entertained the weaker sort , without augmenting any thing their power , abated the forces of those that were mighty , and permitted not any powerfull forreiner to gain too much reputation there . and i will content my self only with the countrey of greece for example hereof . the achayans and etolians were entertained by them , the macedons kingdome was brought low , antiochus was driven thence , nor ever did the achayans or etolians deserts prevail so far for them , that they would ever promise to enlarge their state , nor the perswasions of philip induce them ever to be his friends , without bringing him lower ; nor yet could antiocbus his power make them ever consent that he should hold any state in that countrey : for the romans did in these cases that which all judicious princes ought to do , who are not only to have regard unto all present michiefs , but also to the future , and to provide for those with all industry ; for by taking order for those when they are asarre off , it is easie to prevent them ; but by delaying till they come near hand to thee , the remedy comes too late ; for this malignity is grown incurable : and it befalls this , as the physicians say of the hectick feaver , that in the beginning it is easily cur'd , but hardly known ; but in the course of time , not having been known in the beginning , nor cured , it becomes easie to know , but hard to cure . even so falls it out in matters of state ; for by knowing it aloof off ( which is given only to a wise man to do ) the mischiefs that then spring up , are quickly helped ; but when , for not having been perceived , they are suffered to increase , so that every one sees them , there is then no cure for them : therefore the romans , seeing these inconvenients af●ar off , alwaies prevented them , and never sufferd them to follow ; for to escape a war , because they knew that a war is not undertaken , but deferred for anothers advantage ; therefore would they rather make a war with philip and antiochus in greece , to the end it should not afterwards be made with them in italy , though for that time they were able to avoid both the one and the other , which they thought not good to do : nor did they approve of that saying that is ordinarily in the mouthes of the sages of our dayes , to enjoy the benefits of the present time ; but that rather , to take the benefit of their valor and wisdome ; for time drives forward every thing , and may bring with it as well good as evil , and evil as good . but let us return to france , and examine if any of the things prescribed have been done by them : and we will speak of lewis 〈◊〉 not of charles , as of whom by reason 〈…〉 he long possession he held in italy we better knew the wayes he went : and you shall see he did the clean contrary to what should have been done by him that would maintain a state of different language and conditions . king lewis was brought into italy by the venetians ambition , who would have gotten for their shares half the state of lombardy : i will not blame his comming , or the course he took , because he had a mind to begin to set a foot in italy ; but having not any friends in the country , all gates being barred against him , by reason of king charles his carriage there , he was constrained to joyn friendship with those he could ; and this consideration well taken , would have proved lucky to him , when in the rest of his courses he had not committed any error . the king then having conquered lombardy , recovered presently all that reputation that charles had lost him ; genua yeelded to him , the florentines became friends with him ; the marquess of mantua , the the duke of ferrara , the bentivolti , the lady of furli , the lord of faenza , pesaro rimino , camerino , and piombino , the luc●heses , pisans and sieneses , every one came and offered him friendship : then might the venetians consider the rashness of the course they had taken , who , only to get into their hands two townes in lombardy , made the king lord of two thirds in italy . let any man now consider with how small difficulty could the king have maintained his reputation in italy , if he had followed these aforenamed rules , and secured & defended those his friends , who because their number was great , and they weak and fearful , some of the church , and others of the venetians were alwaies forced to hold with him , and by their means he might easily have been able to secure himself against those that were mightiest : but he was no sooner got into milan , than he took a quite wrong course , by giving ayd to pope alexander , to seize upon romania , and perceiv'd not that by this resolution he weakned himself , ruining his own friends , and those had cast themselves into his bosom , making the church puissant , by adding to their spiritual power , whereby they gaind their authority , and so much temporal estate . and having once got out of the way , he was constrained to go on forward ; insomuch as to stop alexanders ambition , and that he should not become lord of all tuscany , of force he was to come into italy : and this sufficed him not , to have made the church mighty , and taken away his own friends ; but for the desire he had to get the kingdome of naples , he divided it with the king of spain : and where before he was the sole arbitre of italy , he brought in a competitor , to the end that all the ambitious persons of that country , and all that were ill affected to him , might have otherwhere to make their recourse : and whereas he might have left in that kingdome some vice king of his own , he took him from thence , to place another there , that might afterward chace him thence . it is a thing indeed very natural and ordinary , to desire to be of the getting hand : and alwaies when men undertake it , if they can effect it , they shall be prais'd for it , or at least not blam'd : but when they are notable , and yet will undertake it , here lies the blame , here is the error committed . if france then was able with her own power to assail the kingdome of naples , she might well have done it ; but not being able , she should not have divided it : and if the division she made of lombardy with the venetians , deserv'd some excuse , thereby to set one foot in italy ; yet this merits blame , for not being excus'd by that necessity . lewis then committed these five faults ; extinguisht the feebler ones , augmented the state of another that was already powerful in italy , brought thereinto a very puissant forreiner , came not thither himself to dwell there , nor planted any colonies there : which faults while he liv'd , he could not but be the worse for ; yet all could not have gone so ill , had he not committed the sixt , to take from the venetians their state ; for if he had not enlarg'd the churches territories nor brought the spaniard into italy , it had bin necessary to take them lower ; but having first taken those other courses , he should never have given way to their destruction ; for while they had been strong , they would alwaies have kept the others off from venturing on the conquest of lombardy . for the venetians would never have given thoir consents thereto , unless they should have been made lords of it themselves ; and the others would never have taken it from france , to give it them : and then they would never have dar'd to go and set upon them both together . and if any one should say , that king lewis yeelded romania to alexander , and the kingdome of naples to spain , to avoid a war ; i answer with the reasons above alledged , that one should never suffer any disorder to follow , for avoiding of a war ; for that war is not sav'd , but put off to thy disadvantage . and if any others argue , that the king had given his word to the pope , to do that exploit for him , for dissolving of his marriage , and for giving the cardinals cap to him of roan ; i answer with that which hereafter i shall say touching princes words , how they ought to be kept . king lewis then lost lombardy , for not having observ'd some of those termes which others us'd , who have possessed themselves of countries , and desir'd to keep them . nor is this any strange thing , but very ordinary and reasonable : and to this purpose i spake at nantes with that french cardinal , when valentine ( for so ordinarily was caesar borgia pope alexanders son call'd ) made himself master of romania ; for when the cardinal said to me , that the italians understood not the feats of war ; i answered , the frenchmen understood not matters of state : for had they been well vers'd therein , they would never have suffer'd the church to have grown to that greatness . and by experience we have seen it , that the power hereof in italy , and that of spain also , was caused by france , and their own ruine proceeded from themselves . from whence a general rule may be taken , which never , or very seldom fails , that he that gives the means to another to become powerful , ruines himself ; for that power is caused by him either with his industry , or with his force ; and as well the one as the other of these two is suspected by him that is grown puissant . chap. iv. wherefore darius his kingdome taken by alexder , rebelled not against alexanders successors after his death . the difficulties being consider'd , which a man hath in the maintaining of a state new gotten , some might marvaile how it came to pass , that alexander the great subdued all asia in a few years ; and having hardly possessed himself of it , died ; whereupon it seemed probable that all that state should have rebelled ; nevertheless his successors kept the possession of it , nor found they other difficulty in holding it , than what arose among themselves through their own ambition . i answer , that all the principalities , whereof we have memory left us , have been governed in two several manners ; either by a prince , and all the rest vassals , who as ministers by his favor and allowance , do help to govern that kingdom ; or by a prince and by barons , who not by their princes favor , but by the antiquity of blood hold that degree . and these kinds of barons have both states of their own , and vassals who acknowledge them for their lords ; and bare them a true natural affection . those states that are govern'd by a prince and by vassals , have their prince ruling over them with more authority : for in all his countrey , there is none acknowledged for superior , but himself : and if they yeeld obedience to any one else , it is but as to his minister and officer , nor beare they him any particular good will. the examples of these two different governments now in our dayes , are , the turk , and the king of france . the turks whole monarchy is govern'd by one lord , and the rest are all his vassals ; and dividing his whole kingdom into divers sangiacques or governments , he sends several thither , and those he chops and changes , as he pleases . but the king of france is seated in the midst of a multitude of lords , who of old have been acknowledg'd for such by their subjects , and being belov'd by them , enjoy their preheminencies ; nor can the king take their states from them without danger . he then that considers the one and the other of these two states , shall find difficulty in the conquest of the turks state ; but when once it is subdu'd , great facility to hold it . the reasons of these difficulties in taking of the turks kingdom from him , are , because the invader cannot be called in by the princes of that kingdom , nor hope by the rebellion of those which he hath about him , to be able to facilitate his enterprize : which proceeds from the reasons aforesaid ; for for they being all his slaves , and oblig'd to him , can more hardly be corrupted ; and put case they were corrupted , little profit could he get by it , they not being able to draw after them any people , for the reasons we have shewed : whereupon he that assails the turk , must think to find him united ; and must rather relie upon his own forces , than in the others disorders : but when once he is overcome and broken in the field , so that he cannot repair his armies , there is nothing else to be doubted than the royal blood , which being once quite out , there is none else left to be feard , none of the others having any credit with the people . and as the conqueror before the victory could not hope in them ; so after it , ought he not to fear them . the contrary falls out in kingdoms govern'd as is that of france : for it is easie to be enter'd by the gaining of any baron in the kingdom ; for there are alwaies some male-contents to be found , and those that are glad of innovation . those for the reasons alledg'd are able to open thee a way into that state , and to further thy victory , which afterwards to make good to thee , draws with it exceeding many difficulties , as well with those that have ayded thee , as those thou hast supprest . nor is it enough for thee to root out the princes race : for there remaine still those lords who quickly will be be the ring-leaders of new changes ; and in case thou art not able to content these , nor extinguish them , thou losest that state , whensoever the occasion is offerd . now if thou shalt consider what sort of government that of darius was , thou shalt find it like to the turks dominion , and therefore alexander was necessitated first to defeat him utterly , and drive him out of the field ; after which victory darius being dead , that state was left secure to alexander , for the reasons we treated of before : and his successors , had they continued in amity , might have enjoy'd it at ease : nor ever arose there in that kingdome other tumults , than those they themselves stir'd up . but of the states that are order'd and grounded as that of france , it is impossible to become master at such ease : and from hence grew the frequent rebellions of spain , france , and greece against the romans , by reason of the many principalities those states had : whereof while the memory lasted , the romans were alwayes doubtfull of the possession of them ; but the memory of them being quite wip't out , by the power and continuance of the empire , at length they enjoy'd it securely ; and they also were able afterwards fighting one with another , each of one them to draw after them the greater part of those provinces , according as their authority had gain'd them credit therein : and that because the blood of their ancient lords was quite spent , they acknowledg'd no other but the romans . by the consideration then of these things , no man will marvaile that alexander had so little trouble to keep together the state of asia ; and that others have had such great difficulties to maintain their conquest , as pyrrhus , and many others ; which proceeds not from the small or great valour of the conquerour , but from the difference of the subject . chap. v. in what manner cities and principalities are to be govern'd , which , before they were conquer'd , liv'd under their own laws . when those states that are conquered , as it is said , have been accustomed to live under their own laws , and in liberty , there are three wayes for a man to hold them . the first is to demolish all their strong places ; the other , personally to goe and dwell there ; the third , to suffer them to live under their own laws , drawing from them some tribute , and creating the rein an oligarchy , that may continue it in thy service : for that state being created by that prince , knowes it cannot consist without his aid and force , who is like to doe all he can to maintain it ; and with more facility is a city kept by meanes of her own citizens , which hath been us'd before to live free , than by any other way of keeping . we have for example the spartans and the romans ; the spartans held athens and thebes , creating there an oligarchy : yet they lost it . the romans to be sure of capua , carthage , and numantia , dismantell'd them quite , and so lost them not : they would have kept greece as the spartans had held them , leaving them free , and letring them enjoy their own laws ; and it prospered not with them : so that they were forc'd to deface many cities of that province to hold it . for in truth there is not a surer way to keep them under , than by demolishments ; and whoever becomes master of a city us'd to live free , and dismantells it not , let him look himselfe to bee ruin'd by it ; for it alwayes in time of rebellion takes the name of libetry for refuge , and the ancient orders it had ; which neither by length of time , nor for any favours afforded them , are ever forgotten ; and for any thing that can be done , or order'd , unlesse the inhabitants be disunited and dispers'd , that name is never forgotten , nor those customes : but present●ly in every chance recourse is thither made : as pisa did after so many yeeres that she had been subdu'd by the florentines . but when the cities or the provinces are accustomed to live under a prince , and that whole race is quite extirpated ; on one part being us'd to obey ; on the other , not having their old prince ; they agree not to make one from among themselves : they know not how to live in liberty , in such manner that they are much slower to take armes ; and with more facility may a prince gaine them , and secure himselfe of them . but in republiques there is more life in them , more violent hatred , more earnest desire of revenge ; nor does the remembrance of the ancient liberty ever leave them , or suffer them to rest : so that the safest way , is , either to ruine them , or dwell among them . chap. vi. of new principalities , that are conquer'd by ones own armes and valour . let no man marvaile , if in the discourse i shall make of new principalities , both touching a prince , and touching a state , i shall alledge very famous examples : for seeing men almost alwayes walk in the pathes beaten by others , and proceed in their actions by imitation ; and being that others wayes cannot bee exactly follow'd , nor their vertues , whose parterue thou set'st before thee , attain●d unto ; a wise man ought alwayes to tread the footsteps of the worthiest persons , and imitate those that have been the most excellent : to the end that if his vertue arrive not thereto , at least if may yeeld some savour thereof , and doe as good archers use , who thinking the place they intend to hit , too farre distant , and knowing how farr the strength of their bow will carry , they lay their ayme a great deale higher than the mark ; not for to hit so high with their arrow , but to bee able with the help of so high an aime to reach the place they shoot at . i say , that in principalities wholly new , where there is a new prince , there is more and lesse difficulty in maintaining them , as the vertue of their conquerour is greater or lesser . and because this successe , to become a prince of a private man , presupposes either vertue , or fortune ; mee thinks the one and other of these two things in part should mitigate many difficulties ; however he that hath lesse stood upon fortune , hath maintain'd himselfe the better . moreover it some what facilitates the matter in that the prince is constrain'd , because he hath not other dominions , in person to come and dwell there . but to come to these who by their owu vertues , and not by fortune , attain'd to be princes ; the excellentest of these are moses , cyrus , romulus , theseus , and such like ; and though of moses we are not to reason , he onely executing the things that were commanded him by god ; yet merits he well to be admir'd , were it only for that grace that made him worthy to converse with god. but considering cyrus , and the others , who either got or founded kingdomes , we shall find them all admirable ; and if there particular actions and lawes be throughly weigh'd , they will not appeare much differing from those of moyses , which he receiv'd from so sovraigne an instructer . and examining their lives and actions , it will not appeare , that they had other help of fortune , than the occasion , which presented them with the matter wherein they might introduce what forme they then pleas'd ; and without that occasion , the vertue of their mind had been extinguish'd ; and without that vertue , the occasion had been offer'd in vaine . it was then necessary for moses to find the people of israel slaves in aegypt , and oppress'd by the aegyptians , to the end that they to get out of their thraldome , should bee willing to follow him . it was fit that romulus should not be kept in albia , but expos'd presently after his birth , that he might become king of rome , and founder of that city . there was need that cyrus should find the persians discontented with the medes government , and the medes delicate and effeminate through their long peace . theseus could not make proof of his vertue , had not he found the athenians dispers'd . these occasions therefore made these men happy , and their excellent vertue made the occasion be taken notice of , whereby their countrey became enobled , and exceeding fortunate . they , who by vertuous waies , like unto these , become princes , attain the principality with difficulty , but hold it with much ease ; and the difficulties they find in gaining the principality , arise partly from the new orders and courses they are forc'd to bring in , to lay the foundation of their state , and work their own security . and it is to be consider'd , how there is not any thing harder to take in hand , nor doubtfuller to succeed , nor more dangerous to mannage , than to be the chief in bringing in new orders ; for this chief finds all those his enemies , that thrive upon the old orders ; and hath but luke warme defenders of all those that would do well upon the new orders , which luke-warme temper proceeds partly from fear of the opposers who have the laws to their advantage ; partly from the incredulity of the men who truly believe not a new thing , unless there be some certain proof given them thereof . whereupon it arises , that whensoever they that are adversaries , take the occasion to assayle , they do it factiously ; and these others defend but cooly , so that their whole party altogether runs a hazzard . therefore it is necessary , being we intend throughly to discourse this part , to examine if these innovators stand of themselves , or if they depend upon others ; that is , if to bring their work to effect , it be necessary they should intreat , or be able to constrain ; in the first case they allwayes succeed ill , and bring nothing to pass ; but when they depend of themselves , and are able to force , then seldom it is that they hazzard . hence came it that all the prophets that were arm'd , prevail'd ; but those that were unarm'd , were too weak : for besides what we have alledg'd , the nature of the people is changeable , and easie to be perswaded to a matter ; but it is hard also to settle them in that perswasion . and therefore it behoves a man to be so provided , that when they beleeve no no longer , he may be able to compel them thereto by force . moses , cyrus , theseus , and romulus would never have been able to cause their laws long to be obey'd , had they been disarm'd ; as in our times it befel fryer jerome savanarola , who perish'd in his new constitutions , when the multitude began not to beleeve him ; neither had he the means to keep them firme , that had beleev'd ; not to force beleefe in them that had not beleev'd him . wherefore such men as these , in their proceedings find great difficulty , and all their dangers are in the way , and these they must surmount by their vertue ; but having once master'd them , and beginning to be honored by all , when they have rooted those out that envi'd their dignities , they remain powerful , secure , honorable , and happy . to these choice examples , i will add one of less remark ; but it shall hold some proportion withthem , and this shall suffice me for all others of this kind , which is hiero the sitacusan . he of a private man , became prince of siracusa , nor knew he any other ayd of fortune than the occasion : for the siracusans being oppress'd , made choyce of him for their captain , whereupon he deserv'd to be made their prince : and he was of such vertue even in his private fortune , that he who writes of him , sayes , he wanted nothing of reigning , but a kingdom ; this man extinguish'd all the old soldiery , ordaind the new ; left the old allyances , entertained new ; and as he had friendship , and soldiers that were his own , upon that ground he was able to build any edifice ; so that he indured much trouble in gaining , and suffered but little in maintaining . chap. vii . of new principalities , gotten by fortune , and other mens forces . they who by fortune only become princes of private men , with small pains attain to it , but have much a do to maintain themselves in it ; and find no difficulty at all in the way , because they are carried thither with wings : but all the difficulties arise there , after they are plac'd in them . and of such sort are those who have an estate given them for money , by the favor of some one that grants it them : as it befell many in greece , in the cities of jonia , and hellespont ; where divers princes were made by darius , as well for his own safety as his glory ; as also them that were made emperors ; who from private men by corrupting the soldiers , attaind to the empire . these subsist meerly upon the will , and fortune of those that have advanced them ; which are two voluble and unsteady things ; and they neither know how , nor are able to continue in that dignity : they know not how , because unless it be a man of great understanding and vertue , it is not probable that he who hath always liv'd a private life , can know how to command : neither are they able , because they have not any forces that can be friendly or faithful to them . moreover those states that suddenly fall into a mans hands , as all other things in nature that spring and grow quickly , cannot well have taken root , nor have made their correspondencies so firm , but that the first storm that takes them , ruines them ; in case these , who ( as it is said ) are thus on a sudden clambred up to be princes , are not of that worth and vertue as to know how to prepare themselves to maintain that which chance hath cast into their bosoms , and can afterwards lay those foundations , which others have cast before they were princes . for the one and the other of these wayes about the attaining to be a prince , by vertue , or by fortune , i will alledge you two examples which have been in the dayes of our memory . these were francis sforza , and caesar borgia ; francis by just means and with a great deal of vertue , of a private man got to be duke of millan ; and that which with much pains he had gaind , he kept with sma 〈…〉 do . on the other side caesar borgia ( commonly termed duke valentine ) got his state by his fathers fortune , and with the same lost it ; however that for his own part no pains was spar'd , nor any thing omitted , which by a discreet and valorus man ought to have been done , to fasten his roots in those estates , which others armes or fortune had bestowed on him ; for ( as it was formerly said ) he that lays not the foundations first , yet might be able by means of his extraordinary vertues to lay them afterwards , however it be with the great trouble of the architect , and danger of the edifice . if therefore we consider all the dukes progresses , we may perceive how great foundations he had cast for his future power , which i judge a matter not superflnous to run over ; because i should not well know , what better rules i might give to a new prince , than the pattern of his actions ; and however the courses he toook , availd him not , yet was it not his fault , but it proceeded from an extraordinary and extream malignity of fortune . pope alexander the sixt , desiring to make the duke his son a great man , had a great many difficulties , present and future : first he saw no way there was whereby he might be able to make him lord of any state , that was not the churches ; and if he turnd to take that from the church , he knew that the duke of milan , and the venetians would never agree to it ; for faenza and riminum were under the venetians protection . moreover , he saw that the armes of italy , and those whereof in particular he might have been able to make some use , were in their hands , who ought to fear the popes greatness : and therefore could not any wayes rely upon them : being all in the orsins and colonies hands , and those of their faction . it was necessary then , that those matters thus appointed by them should be disturbed , and the states of italy disordered , to be able safely to master part of them , which he then sound easie to do , seeing the venetians upon three considerations had us'd the means to bring the french men back again into italy : which he not only did not withstand , but furthered , with a resolution of king lewis his ancient marriage . the king then past into italy with the venetians ayd , and alexanders consent ; nor was he sooner arrived in milan , than the pope had soldiers from him for the service of romania , which was quickly yeelded up to him upon the reputation of the kings forces . the duke then having made himself master of romania , and beaten the colonies , desiring to hold it , and proceed for ward , two things hindered him : the one , his own soldiers , which he thought were not true to him ; the other , the french mens good wills ; that is to say , he feared that the princes soldiers , whereof he had served himself , would fail him , and not only hinder his conquest , but take from him what he had gotten ; and that the king also would serve him the same turn . he had experience of the orsini upon an occasion , when after the taking of faenza he assaulted bolonia , to which assault he saw them go very cold . and touching the king , he discovered his mind , when having taken the dutchy of vrbin , he invaded tuscany ; from which action the king made him retire ; whereupon the duke resolved to depend no more upon fortune , and other mens armes . and the first thing he did , was , to weaken the orsini , and colonnies factions in rome : for he gain'd all their adherents that were gentlemen , giving them large allowances , and honoring them according to their qualities with charges and governments : so that in a few months the good will they bare to the parties was quite extinguisht , and wholly bent to the duke . after this , he waited an occasion to root out the orsini , having before dispers'd those of the family of colonnia , which fell out well to his hand ; and he us'd it better . for the orsini being too late aware , that the dukes and the churches greatness was their destruction , held a council together in a dwelling house of theirs in the country adjoyning to perusia . from thence grew the rebellion of vrbin , and the troubles of romania , and many other dangers befell the duke , which he overcame all with the help of the french : and having regained his reputation , trusting neither france , nor any forrein forces , to the end he might not be put to make trial of them again , he betook himself to his sleghts ; and he knew so well to disguise his intention , that the orsins , by the mediation of paul orsine , were reconciled to him , to whom the duke was no way wanting in all manner of courtesies whereby to bring them into security , giving them rich garments , money , and horses , til their own simplicities led them all to to sinigcllia , into his hands . these heads being then pluck'd off , and their partisans made his friends , the duke had laid very good foundations , to build his own greatness on , having in his power all romania with the dutchy of vrbin , and gained the hearts of those people , by beginning to give them some relish of their well being . and because this part is worthy to be taken notice of , and to be imitated by others , i will not let it escape . the duke , when he had taken romania , finding it had been under the hands of poor lords-who had rather pillag'd their subjects , than chastis'd or amended them , giving them more cause of discord , than of peace and union , so that the whole countrey was fraught with robberies , quarrels , and other sorts of insolencies ; thought the best way to reduce them to termes of pacification , and obedience to a princely power , was , to give them some good government : and therefore he set over them one remiro d' orco , a cruel hasty man , to whom he gave an absolute power . this man in a very short time setled peace and union amongst them with very great reputation . afterwards the duke thought such excessive authority serv'd not so well to his purpose , and doubting it would grow odious , he erected a civil iudicature in the midst of the countrey , where one excellent iudge did preside , and thither every city sent their advocate : and because he knew the rigors past had bred some hatred against him , to purge the minds of those people , and to gain them wholly to himself , he purpos'd to shew , that if there was any cruelty used , it proceeded not from any order of his , but from the harsh disposition of his officers . whereupon laying hold on him , at this occasion , he caus'd his head to be struck off one morning early in the market place at cesena , where he was left upon a gibbet , with a bloody sword by his side ; the cruelty of which spectacle for a while satisfied and amaz'd those people . but to return from whence we have digressd : i say , that the duke finding himself very strong , and in part out of doubt of the present dangers , because he was arm'd after his own manner , and had in some good measure suppress'd those forces , which , because of their vicinity , were able to annoy him , he wanted nothing else to go on with his conquest , but the consideration of of france : for he knew , that the king , who now , though late , was advis'd of his error , would never suffer him : and hereupon he began to seek after new allyances , and to waver with france , when the french came towards naples against the spaniards , who then besieged gagetta ; and his design was only to be out of their danger , which had been effected for him , had pope alexander lived . and thus were his businesses carried touching his present estate . as for the future , he had reason to doubt lest the new successor to the papacy would not be his friend , and would endeavor to take that from him that alexander had bestowed on him ; and he thought to provide for this foure waies : first by rooting out the races of all those lords he had dispoyled , whereby to take those occasions from the pope . secondly , by gaining 〈◊〉 the gentlemen of rome , whereby he might 〈◊〉 able with those to keep the pope in some awe . thirdly , to make the colledge of cardinals as much at his devotion as possibly might be . fourthly , by making of so large conquests , before the popes death , as that he might be able of himself to withstand the first fury of his enemies . three of these fowre at pope - alexanders death he had effected , and the fourth 〈◊〉 had neare brought to a point . for of those lords he had stript , he put to death as many as he could come at , and very few escap'd him : he gaind him the roman gentlemen : and in the colledge he had made a great faction . and touching his new conquest , he had a designe to become lord of tuscany . and he had possessed himself already of perusia , and pombin , and taken protection of pisa : and so soon as he should have cast off his respect to france ( which now he meant to hold no longer ) being the french were now driven out of the kingdome of naples by the spaniards , so that each of them was forc'd to buy his friendship at any termes ; he was then to leap into pisa . after this lucca and siena were presently to fall to him , partly for envy to the florentines , and partly for fear . the florentines had no way to escape him : all which , had it succeeded with him , as without question it had , the very same year that alexander dy'd , he had made himself master of so great forces , and such reputation , that he would bave been able to have stood upon his own bottom , without any dependance of fortune , or resting upon others helps , but only upon his own strength and valor . but alexander dy'd five years after that he had begun to draw forth his sword : and left him setled only in the state of romania , with all his other designes in the ayre , sick unto death , between two very strong armies of his enemies ; and yet was there in this duke such a spirit and courage : and he understood so well , how men are to be gaind , and how to be lost , and so firm were the grounds he had laid in a short time , that , had he not had those armies upon his back , or had been in health , he would have carried through his purpose in spight of all opposition ; and that the foundations he grounded upon were good , it appeard in that romania held for him above a moneth , and he remained secure in rome , though even at deaths doore : and however the baglioni , vitelli , and orsini came into rome ; yet found they none would take their parts against him . and this he was able to have effected , that if he could not have made him pope whom he would , he could have hindred him that he would not should be pope . but had he been in health when alexander dy'd , every thing had gone easily with him ; and he told me on that day that julius the second was created pope , that he had fore-thought on all that which could happen , in case his father chanc'd to dye , and for every thing provided its remedy , this onely excepted , that he foresaw not that he himself should at the same time be brought unto deaths dore also . having then collected all the dukes actions , me thinks i could not well blame him , but rather ( as i have here done ) set him as a pattern to be followed by all those who by fortune and others armes have been exalted to an empire . for he being of great courage , and having lofty designes , could not carry himself otherwise ; and the only obstacle of his purposes was the brevity of alexanders life , and his own sickness . whoever therefore deemes it necessary in his entrance into a new principality , to secure himself of his enemies , and gain him friends , to overcome either by force , or by cunning , to make himself beloved , or feared of his people , be followed and reverenced by his soldiers , to root out those that can , or owe thee any hurt , to change the ancient orders with new wayes , to be severe , and yet acceptable , magnanimous , and liberall ; to extinguish the unfaithfull soldiery , and create new ; to maintain to himself the armities of kings and princes , so that they shall either with favor benefit thee , or be wary how to offend thee ; cannot find more fresh and lively examples than the actions of this man. he deserves to be found fault withall for the creation of julius the second , wherein an evil choice was made for him : for , as it is said , not being able to make a pope to his mind , he could have withheld any one from being pope ; and should never have consented that any one of those cardinals should have got the papacy , whom he had ever done harme to ; or who having attaind the pontificate were likely to be afraid of him : because men ordinarily do hurt either for fear , or hatred . those whom he had offended , were among others , he who had the title of st. peter ad vincula , colonna , sr. george , and ascanius ; all the others that were in possibility of the popedome , were such as might have feard him rather , except the cardinal of roan , and the spaniards ; these by reason of their allyance and obligation with him , the other because of the power they had , having the kingdome of france on their party ; wherefore the duke above all things should have created a spanyard pope , and in case he could not have done that , he should have agreed that roan should have been , and not st. peter ad vincula . and whoever beleeves , that with great personages new benefits blot on the remembrance of old injuries , is much deceiv'd . the duke therefore in this election , was the cause of this own ruine at last . till wee come to this seaventh chapter , i find not any thing much blame-worthy , unlesse it be on ground he layes in the second chapter ; whereupon hee builds most of thiis fabrick , viz. that subjects must either be dallyed or flatterd withall , or quite crusht . whereby our author advises his prince to support his authority with two cardinall vertues , dissimulation and cruelty . he considers not herein that the head is but a member of the body , though the principall ; and the end of the parts is the good of the whole . and here he goes against himselfe in the twenty sixt chapter of his rep. l. . where hee blames philip of macedon for such courses , terming them very cruell , and against all christian manner of living ; and that every man shou'd refuse to be a king , and desire rather to live a private life , than to reigne so much to the ruine of mankind . the life of caesar borgia , which is here given as a paterne to new princes , we shall find to have been nothing else but a cunning carriage of things so , that he might thereby first deceive and inveigle , and then suppresse all those that could oppose or hinder his ambition . for if you runne ever his life , you shall see the father pope alexander the sixt and him , both imbarqued for his advancement , wherein they engag'd the papall authority , and reputation of religion ; for faith and conscience these men never knew , though they exacted it of others : there was never promise made , but it was only so farre kept as servd for advantage ; liberali ey was made use of ; clemency and cruelty , all alike , as they might serve to worke with their purposes . all was sacrific'd to ambition ; no friendship could tye these men , nor any religion : and no marvell : for ambition made them forget both god and man. but see the end of all this cunning : though this caesar borgia contrived all his businesse so warily , that our author much commends him , and hee had attaind neere the pitch of his hopes , and had provided for each misadventure could befall him its remedy ; policy shewd it selefe short-sighted ; for hee foresaw not at the time of his fathers death , he himself should bee brought unto deaths doore also . and me thinks this example might have given occasion to our author to confesse , that surely there is a god that ruleth the earth . and many times god cutts off those cunning and mighty men in the hight of their purposes , when they think they have neare surmounted all dangers and difficulties . to the intent that the living may know , that the most high ruleth in the kingdome of men , and giveth it to whomsoever he will , and setteth up over in the basest of men . daniel . . . chap. viii . concerning those who by wicked meanes have attaind to a principality . but because a man becomes a prince of a private man two wayes , which cannot wholly be attributed either to fortune or vertue , i think not fit to let them passe me : howbeit the one of them may be more largely discoursed upon , where the republicks are treated of . these are , when by some wicked and unlawfull meanes a man rises to the principality ; or when a private person by the favour of his fellow citizens becomes prince of his countrey . and speaking of the first manner , it shall be made evident by two examples , the one ancient , the other moderne , without entring otherwise into the justice or merit of this part ; for i take it that these are sufficient for any body that is forc'd to follow them . agathocles the sicilian , not of a private man onely , but from a base and abject fortune , got to be king of siracusa . this man borne but of a potter , continued alwayes a wicked life throughout all the degrees of this fortune : neverthelesse he accompanied his lewdnesse with such a courage and resolution , that applying himselfe to military affaires , by the degrees thereof he attained to bee praetour of siracusa , and being setled in that degree , and having determined that he would become prince , and hold that by violence and without obligation to any other , which by consent had been granted him : and to this purpose haveing had some private intelligence touching his designe with amilcar the carithaginian , who was imployd with his army in sicily , one morning gatherd the people together and the senate of syracusa , as if he had some what to advise with them of matters belonging to the commonwealth , and upon a signe given , caus'd his souldiers to kill his senatours , and the richest of the people ; who being slaine , he usurp'd the principality of that city without any civill strife : and however he was twice broken by the carthaginians , and at last besieged , was able not onely to defend his own city , but leaving part of his own army at the defence thereof , with the other invaded affrique , and in a short time freed siracusa from the siege , and brought the carthaginians into extreme necessity , who were constraind to accord with him , be contented with the possession of affrique , and quitt sicily to agathocles . he then that should consider the actions and valour of this man , would not see any , or very few things to be attributed unto fortune ; seeing that as is formerly sayd , not by any ones favour , but by the degrees of service in warre with many sufferings and dangers , to which he had risen , he came to the principality ; and that hee maintaned afterwards with so many resolute and hazardous undertakings . yet cannot this be term'd vertue or valour to flay his own citizens , betray his friends , to be without faith , without pitty , without religion , which wayes are of force to gaine dominion , but not glory : for if agathocles his valour bee well weighd , in his enturing upon , and comming off from dangers , and the greatnesse of his courage , in supporting and mastering of adversities , no man can see why he should be thought any way inferiour even to the ablest captaines . notwithstanding his beastly cruelty and inhumanity with innumerable wickednesses , allow not that he should be celebrated among the most excellent men . that cannot then be attributed to fortune or vertue , which without the one or the other was attaind to by him . in our dayes , while alexander the sixth held the sea , oliverotie of fermo , who some few yeeres before had been left young by his parents , was brought up under the care of an uncle of his on the mothers side , called john foliani , and in the beginning of his youth given , by him to serve in the warres under paulo vitelli : to the end that being well instructed in that discipline , he might rise to some worthy degree in the warrs . afterwards when paulo was dead , he served under vitellozzo his brother , and in very short time , being ingenious , of a good personage , and brave courage , he became one of the prime men among the troops he served in : but thinking it but servile to depend upon another , he plotted by the ayd of some citizens of fermo ( who lik'd rather the thraldome of their city than the liberty of it ) and by the favour of the vitelli , to make himselfe master of fermo ; and writ to john foliani , that having been many yeeres from home , he had a mind to come and see him and the city , and in some part take notice os his own patrimony ; and because he had not imployd himselfe but to purchase honour , to the end his citizens might perceive , that he had not vainely spent his time , he had a desire to come in good equipage and accompanied with a hundred horse of his friends and servants ; and he intreated him that he would be pleasd so to take order , that he might be honourably received by the inhabitants of fermo , which turnd as well to his honor that was his uncle , as his that was the nephew . in this , john faild not in any office of courtesie due to his nephew : and caus'd him to be well receivd by them of fermo , and lodged him in his own house : where having passed some dayes , and stayd to put in order somewhat that was necessary for his intended villany , he made a very solemne feast , whether he invited john foliani , and all the prime men of fermo : and when all their chear was ended , and all their other entertainments , as in such feasts it is customary , oliverotto of purpose mov'd some grave discourses ; speaking of the greatnesse of pope alexander , and caesar his son , and their undertakings ; where unto john and the others making answer , he of a sudden stood up , saying , that those were things to be spoken of in a more secret place , and so retir'd into a chamber , whether john and all the others citizens followd him ; nor were they sooner set downe there , than from some secret place therein came forth diverse souldiers , who slew john and all the others : after which homicide oliverotto got a horse-backe and ravaged the whole towne , and besieged the supreme magistrate in the palace , so that for feare they were all constraind to obey him , and to settle a government , whereof hee made himselfe prince ; and they being all dead who , had they been discontented with him , could have hurt him ; he strengthned himselfe with new civill and military orders , so that in the space of a yeer that he held the principality , he was not only secure in the city of fermo , but became fearefull to all his neighbours ; and the conquest of him would have prov'd difficult , as that of agathocles , had he not let himselfe been deceivd by caesar borgia , when at sinigallia , as before was said , he took the orsini and vitelli : where he also being taken a yeere after he had committed the parricide , was strangled together with vitellozzo ( whome he had had , for master both of his vertues and vices . ) some man might doubt from whence it should proceed , that agathocles , and such like , after many treacheries and crueltyes , could possibly live long secure in his own contrey , and defend himselfe from his forrein enemies , and that never any of his own citizens conspir'd against him , seeing that by means of cruelty , many others have never been able even in peaceable times to maintaine their states , much lesse in the doubtfull times of warre . i beleeve that this proceeds from the well , or ill using of those cruelties : they may bee termd well us'd ( if it bee lawfull to say well of evill ) that are put in practice only once of necessity for securities sake , not insisting therein afterwards ; but there is use made of them for the subiects profit , as much as may be . but those that are ill us'd , are such as though they bee but few in the beginning , yet they multiply rather in time , than diminish . they that take that first way , may with the help of god , and mens care , find some remedy for their state , as agathocles did : for the others , it is impossible they should continue . whereupon it is to be noted , that in the lay ing hold of a state , the usurper thereof ought to runne over and execute all his cruelties at once , that he be not forced often to returne to them , and that he may be able , by not renewing of them , to give men some security , and gaine their affections by doing them some courtesies . hee that carries it otherwise , either for fearefullnesse , or upon evill advice , is alwayes constraind to hold his sword drawne in his hand ; nor ever can heerely upon his subjects , there being no possibility for them , because of his daily and continuall injuries , to live in any safety : for his injuries should bee done altogether , that being seldomer t●sted , they might lesse offend ; his favours should bee bestowd by little , and little to the end they might keep their taste the better ; and above all things a prince must live with his subjects in such sort , that no accident either of good or evill can make him vary : for necessity comming upon him by reason of adversries , thou hast not time given thee to make advantage of thy cruelties ; and the favours which then thou bestowest , will little help thee , being taken as if they came from thee perforce , and so yeeld no returne of thanks . chap. ix . of the civill principality . but comming to the other part , when a principall citizen , not by villany , or any other insufferable violence , but by the favour of his fellow-citizens becomes prince of his native countrey : which we may terme a civill principality ; nor to attaine hereunto is verue wholly ' or fortune wholly necessary , but rather a fortunate cunning : i say , this principality is climb'd up to , either by the peoples help , or the great mens . for , in every city we finde these two humours differ ; and they spring from this , that the people desire not to be commanded nor oppressed by the great ones , and the great ones are desirous to command and oppresse the people : and from these two several appetites , arise in the city one of these three effects , either a principality , or liberty , or tumultuary licentionsnesse . the principality is caused either by the people , or the great ones , according as the one or other of these factions have the occasion offerd ; for the great ones seeing themselves not able to resist the people , begin to turne the whole reputation to one among them , and make him prince , whereby they may under his shadow vent their spleenes . the people also , not being able to support the great mens insolencies , converting the whole reputation to one man , create him their prince , to be protected by his authority . he that comes to the principality by the assistance of the great ones , subsists with more difficulty , than he that attaines to it by the peoples favour ; for he being made prince , hath many about him , who account themselves his equalls , and therefore cannot dispose nor command them at his pleasure . but he that gaines the principality by the peoples favor , finds himselfe alone in his throne , and hath none or very few neare him that are not very supple to bend : besides this , the great ones cannot upon easie termes be satisfied , or without doing of wrong to others , where as a small matter contents the people : for the end which the people propound to themselves , is more honest than that of the great men , these desiring to oppresse , they only not to be oppressed . to this may be added also , that the prince which is the peoples enemy , can never well secure himselfe of them , because of their multitude ; well may hee bee sure of the nobles , they being but a few . the worst that a prince can look for of the people become his enemy , is to be abandoned by them : but when the greatones once grow his enemies , he is not only to feare their abandoning of him , but their making of a party against him also : for there being in them more forecast and craft , they alwayes take time by the forelocks whereby to save themselves , and seeke credit with him who they hope shall get the mastery . the prince likewise is necessitated alwayes to live with the same people , but can doe well enough without the same great men ; he being able to create new ones , and destroy them again every day , and to take from them , and give them credit as he pleases : and to cleare this part , i say , that great men ought to be considerd two wayes principally , that is , if they take thy proceedings so much to heart , as to engage their fortunes wholly in thine , in case they lye not alwayes catching at spoyle , they ought to be well honourd and esteem'd : those that bind themselves not to thy fortune , are to be considerd also two wayes ; either they doe it for lack of courage , and naturall want of spirit , and then shouldst thou serve thy selfe of them , and of them especially that are men of good advice ; for if thy affaires prosper , thou dost thy selfe honour thereby ; if crost , thou needst not feare them : but when they oblige not themselves to thee of purpose , and upon occasion of ambition , it is a signe they think more of themselves than of thee : and of these the prince ought to beware , and account of them as his discoverd enemyes : for alwayes in thy adversity they will give a hand too to ruine thee . therefore ought hee that comes to be prince by the peoples favour , keepe them his friends : which he may easily doe , they desiring only to live free from oppression : but he that becomes prince by the great mens favour , against the will of the people , ought above all things to gaine the people to him , which he may easily effect , when he takes upon him their protection : and because men when they find good , where they look for evill , are thereby more endered to their benefactour , therefore growes the people so pliant in their subjection to him , as if by their favours he had attaind his dignity . and the prince is able to gaine them to his side by many wayes , which because they vary according to the subject , no ●ertaine rule can be given thereupon ; wherefore we shall let them passe i will only conclude , that it is necessary for a prince to have the people his friend ; otherwise in his adversities he hath no helpe . nabis prince of the spartans supported the siege of all greece , and an exceeding victorious army of the romans , and against those defended his native countrey and state , and this suffic'd him alone , that as the danger came upon him , he secur'd himself of a fewer ; whereas if the people had been his enemy , this had nothing availd him . and let no man think to overthrow this my opinon with that common proverb , that he who relyes upon the people , layes his foundation in the dirt ; for that is true where a private citizen grounds upon them making his account that the people shall free him , when either his enemyes or the magistrates oppresse him : in this case he should find himself often deceiv'd , as it befell the gracchyes in rome , and in florence george scali : but he being a prince that grounds thereupon , who can command , and is a man of courage , who hath his wits about him in his adversiryes , and wants not other preparations , and holds together the whole multitude animated with his valour and orders , shall not prove deceiv'd by them , and shall find he hath layd good foundations . these principalityes are wont to be upon the point of falling when they goe about to skip from the ciuil order to the absolute : for these princes either command of themselves , or by the magistrate ; in this last case their state is more weak and dangerous , because they stand wholly at the will and pleasure of these citizens , who then areset over the magistrates , who especially in adverse times are able with facility to take their state from them either by rising up against them , or by nor obeying them ; and then the prince is not at hand in those dangers to take the absolute authority upon him : for the citizens and subjects that are accustomed to receive the commands from the magistrates , are not like in those fractions to obey his : and in doubtfull times he shall alwayes have greatest penury of whom he may trust ; for such a prince cannot ground upon that which he sees in peaceable times , when the citizens have need of the state ; for then every one runs , and every one promises , and very one will venture his life for him , when there is no danger neare ; but in times of hazzard , when the state hath need of citizens , there are but few of them then , and so much the more is this experience dangerous , in that it can be but once made . therefore a prudent prince ought to devise a way whereby his citizens alwayes and in any case and quality of time may have need of his government , and they shall alwaies after prove faithfull to him . chap. x. in what manner the forces of all principalities ought to be measured . it is requisite in examining the quality of those principalities , to have another consideration of them , that is , if a prince have such dominions , that he is able in case of necessity to subsist of himself , or else whether he hath alwaies need of another to defend him . and to clear this point the better , i judge them able to stand of themselves , who are of power either for their multitudes of men , or quantity of money , to bring into the field a compleat armie , and ioyn battel with whoever comes to assail them : and so i think those alwaies to stand in need of others help , who are not able to appear in the field against the enemy , but are forc'd to retire within their walls and guard them . touching the first case , we have treated already , and shall adde somwhat thereto as occasion shall require . in the second case , we cannot say other , save only to encourage such princes to fortifie and guard their own capital city , and of the countrey about , not to hold much account ; and whoever shall have well fortified that town , and touching other matters of governments shall have behaved himself towards his subjects , as hath been formerly said , and hereafter shall be , shall never be assaild but with great regard ; for men willingly undertake not enterprises , where they see difficulty to work them through ; nor can much facility be there found , where one assails him , who hath his town strong and wel guarded , and is not hated of his people . the cities of germany are very free ; they have but very little of the countrey about them belonging to them ; and they obey the emperor , when they please , and they stand not in fear , neither of him nor any other potentate about them : for they are in such a manner fortified , that every one thinks the siege of any of them would prove hard and tedious : for all of them have ditches and rampires , and good store of artillery , and alwaies have their publick cellars well provided with meat and drink and firing for a yeer : besides this , whereby to feed the common people , and without any loss to the publick , they have alwaies in common whereby they are able for a year to imploy them in the labor of those trades that are the sinews and the life of that city , and of that industry whereby the commons ordinarily supported themselves : they hold up also the military exercises in repute , and hereupon have they many orders to maintain them . a prince then that is master of a good strong city , and causeth not himself to be hated , cannot be assaulted ; and in case he were , he that should assail him , would be fain to quit him with shame : for the affairs of the world are so various , that it is almost impossible that an army can lie incampt before a town for the space of a whole yeer : and if any should reply , that the people having their possessions abroad , in case they should see them a fire , would not have patience , and the redious siege and their love to themselves would make them for get their prince : i answer that a prince puissant and couragious , will easily master those difficulties , now giving his subjects hope , that the mischiief will not be of durance ; sometimes affright them with the cruelty of their enemies , and other whiles cunningly securing himself of those whom he thinks too forward to run to the enemy . besides this by ordinary reason the enemy should burne and waste their countrey , upon his arrival , and at those times while mens minds are yet warme , and resolute in their defence : and therefore so much the less ought a prince doubt : for after some few dayes , that their courages grow coole , the dammages are all done , and mischiefs received , and there is no help for it , and then have they more occasion to cleave faster to their prince , thinking he is now more bound to them , their houses having for his defence been fired , and their possessions wasted ; and mens nature is as well to hold themselves oblig'd for the kindnesses they do , as for those they receive ; whereupon if all be well weigh'd , a wise prince shall not find much difficulty to keep sure and true to him his citizens hearts at the beginning and latter end of the siege , when he hath no want of provision for food and ammunition . chap. xi . concerning ecclesiastical principalities . there remains now only that we treat of the ecclesiastical principalities , about which all the difficulties are before they are gotten : for they are attained to either by vertue , or fortune ; and without the one or the other they are held : for they are maintaind by orders inverterated in the religion , all which are so powerfull and of such nature , that they maintain their princes in their dominions in what manner soever they proceed and live . these only have an estate and defend it not ; have subjects and govern them not ; and yet their states because undefended , are not taken from them ; nor their subjects , though not govern'd , care not , think not , neither are able to aliene themselves from them . these principalities then are only happy and secure : but they being sustained by superior causes , whereunto humane understanding reaches not , i will not meddle with them : for being set up and maintained by god , it would be the part of a presumptuous and rash man to enter into discourse of them . yet if any man should ask me whence it proceeds , that the church in temporal power hath attaind to such greatness , seeing that till the time of alexander the sixt , the italian potentates , and not only they who are entituled the potentates , but every baron and lord though of the meanest condition , in regard of the temporality , made but small account of it ; and now a king of france trembles at the power thereof ; and it hath been able to drive him out of italy , and ruine the venetians ; and however this be well known , me thinks it is not superstitious in some part to recall it to memory . before that charles king of france past into italy , this countrey was under the rule of the pope , venetians , the king of naples , the duke of milan , and the florentines . these potentates took two things principally to their care ; the one , that no forreiner should invade italy ; the other , that no one of them should inlarge their state. they , against whom this care was most taken , were the pope and the venetians ; and to restrain the venetians , there needed the union of all the rest , as it was in the defence of ferrara ; and to keep the pope low , they served themselves of the barons of rome , who being divided into two factions , the orsini and colonnesi , there was alwaies occasion of offence between them , who standing ready with their armes in hand in the view of the pope , held the popedome weak and feeble : and however sometimes there arose a couragious pope , as was sextus ; yet either his fortune , or his wisdome was not able to free him of these incommodities , and the brevity of their lives was the cause thereof ; for in ten years ; which time , one with another , popes ordinarily liv'd , with much ado could they bring low one of the factions . and if , as we may say , one had near put out the colonnesi , there arose another enemy to the orsini , who made them grow again , so that there was never time quite to root them out . this then was the cause , why the popes temporal power was of small esteem in italy ; there arose afterwards pope alexander the sixt , who of all the popes that ever were , shewed what a pope was able to do with money and forces : and he effected , by means of his instrument , duke valentine , and by the ocasion of the french mens passage , all those things which i have formerly discoursed upon in the dukes actions : and however his purpose was nothing at all to inlarge the church dominions , but to make the duke great ; yet what he did , turnd to the churches advantage , which after his death when the duke was taken away , was the heir of all his pains . afterwards succeeded pope julius , and found the church great , having all romania , and all the barons of rome being quite rooted out , and by alexanders persecutions , all their factions worne down ; he found also the way open for the heaping up of moneys , never practised before alexanders time ; which things julius not only follow'd , but augmented ; and thought to make himself master of bolonia , and extinguish the venetians , and chase the french men out of italy : and these designes of his prov'd all lucky to him , and so much the more to his praise in that he did all for the good of the church , and in no private regard : he kept also the factions of the orsins and colonnesi , in the same state he found them : and though there were among them some head whereby to cause an alteration ; yet two things have held them quiet ; the one the power of the church , which somewhat affrights them ; the other because they have no cardinals of their factions , who are the primary causes of all the troubles amongst them : nor shall these parties ever be at rest , while they have cardinals ; because they nourish the factious both in rome , and abroad ; and the barons then are forced to undertake the defence of them : and thus from the prelates ambitions arise the discords and tumults among the barons . and now hath pope leo his holiness found the popedome exceeding puissant , of whom it is hoped , that if they amplified it by armes he by his goodness , and infinite other vertues , will much more advantage and dignifie it . chap. xii . how many sorts of military discipline there are and touching mercinary soldiers . having treated particularly of the qualities of those principalities , which in the beginning i propounded to discourse upon , and considered in some part the reasons of their well and ill being , and shewd the waies whereby many have sought to gain , and hold them , it remains now that i speak in general of the offences and defences , that may chance in each of the forenamed . we have formerly said that it is necessary for a prince to have good foundations laid ; otherwise it must needs be that he go to wrack . the principal foundations that all states have , as well new , as old , or mixt , are good laws , and good armes ; and because there cannot be good laws , where there are not good armes ; and where there are good armes , there must needs be good laws , i will omit to discourse of the laws , and speak of armes . i say then that the armes , wherewithall a prince defends his state , either are his own , or mercenary , or auxiliary , or mixt . those that are mercenary and auxiliar , are unprofitable , and dangerous , and if any one holds his state founded upon mercenary armes , he shall never be quiet , nor secure , because they are never well united , ambitious , and without discipline , treacherous , among their friends stout , among their enemies cowardly ; they have no fear of god , nor keep any faith with men ; and so long only defer they the doing of mischief , till the enemy comes to assul thee ; and in time of peace thou art despoyled by them , in war by thy enemies : the reason hereof is , because they have no other love , nor other cause to keep them in the field , but only a small stipend , which is not of force to make them willing to hazard their lives for thee : they are willing indeed to be thy soldiers , till thou goest to fight ; but then they fly , or run away ; which thing would cost me but small pains to perswade ; for the ruine of italy hath not had any other cause now a dayes , than for that it hath these many years rely'd upon mercenary armes ; which a good while since perhaps may have done some man some service , and among themselves they may have been thought valiant : but so soon as any forrein enemy appeared , they quickly shewed what they were . whereupon charles the king of france , without opposition , made himself master of all italy : and he that said , that the causes thereof were our faults , said true ; but these were not those they beleeved , but what i have told ; and because they were the princes faults , they also have suffered the punishment . i will suller shew the infelicity of these armes . the mercenary captains are either very able men , or not : if they be , thou canst not repose any trust in them : for they will alwaies aspire unto their own proper advancements , either by suppressing of thee that art their lord , or by suppressing of some one else quite out of thy purpose : but if the captain be not valorons , he ordinarily ruines thee : and in case it be answered , that whoever shall have his armes in his hands , whether mercenary or not , will do so : i would reply , that armes are to be imployed either by a prince , or common-wealth . the prince ought to go in person , and performe the office of a commander : the republick is to send forth her citizens : and when she sends forth one that proves not of abilities , she ought to change him then ; and when he does prove valorous , to bridle him so by the laws , that he exceed not his commission . and by experience we see , that princes and republiques of themselves alone , make very great conquests ; but that mercenary armes never do other than harme ; and more hardly falls a republick armed with her own armes under the obedience of one of her own citizens , than one that is armed by forrein armes . rome and sparta subsist●d many ages armed and free . the swissers are exceedingly well armed , and yet very free . touching mercenary armes that were of old , we have an example of the car thagians , who near upon were oppress'd by their own mercenary soldiers , when the first war with the romans was finished ; however the carthagians had their own citizens for their captains . philip of macedon was made by the thebans after epaminondas his death , general of their armies ; and after the victory , he took from them their liberty . the milaneses when duke philip was dead , entertaind francis sforza into their pay against the venetians , who having vanquisht their enemie at cara●aggio , afterwards joyned with them , where by to usurp upon the milaneses his masters . sforza his father , being in joan the queen of naples pay , left her on a sudden disarmed ; whereupon she , to save her kingdom , was constrained to cast her self into the king of arragon's bosome . and in case the venetians and the florentines have formerly augmented their state with these kind of armes , and their own captains , and yet none of them have ever made themselves their princes , but rather defended them : i answer , that the florentines in this case have had fortune much their friend : for of valorous captains , which they might any way fear , some have not been victors , some have had opposition , and others have laid the aim of their ambitions another way . he who overcame not , was john aouto , of whose faith there could no proof be made , being he vanquisht not ; but every one will acknowledge , that , had he vanquisht , the florentines were at his discretion . sforza had alwaies the bracceschi for his adversaries , so that they were as a guard one upon another . francis converted all his ambition against lombardy . braccio against the church , and the kingdome of naples . but let us come to that which followed a while agoe . the florentines made paul vitelli their general , a throughly advis'd man , and who from a private fortune had rose to very great reputation : had he taken pisa , no man will deny but that the florentines must have held fast with him ; for had he been entertained in their enemies pay , they had no remedy ; and they themselves holding of him , of force were to obey him . the venetians , if we consider their proceedings , we shall see wrought both warily and gloriously , while themselves made war , which was before their undertakings by land , where the gentlemen with their own commons in armes behav'd themselves bravely : but when they began to fight by land , they lost their valor , and follow'd the customes of italy ; and in the beginning of their enlargement by land , because thee had not much territory , and yet were of great reputation , they had not much cause to fear their captains ; but as they began to extend their bounds , which was under their commander carminiola , they had a taste of this error : for perceiving he was exceeding valorous , having under his conduct beaten the duke of milan ; and knowing on the other side , how he was cold in the war , they judg'd that they could not make any great conquest with him ; and because they neither would , nor could cashier him , that they might not lose , what they had gotten , they were forced for their own safeties to put him to death . since they have had for their general bartholomew of berganio , robert st. severin , the count of petilian , and such like : whereby they were to fear their losses , as well as to hope for gain : as it fell out afterwards at vayla , where in one day they lost that , which with so much pains they had gotten in eight hundred years : for from these kind of armes grow slack and slow and weak gains ; but sadden and wonderfull losses : and because i am now come with these examples into italy , which now these many years , have been governd by mercenary armes , i will search deeper into them , to the end that their course and progress being better discoverd , they may be the better amended . you have to understand , that so soon as in these later times the yoak of the italian empire began to be shaken off , and the pope had gotten reputation in the temporality , italy was divided into several states : for many of the great cities took armes against their nobility ; who under the emperors protection had held them in oppression ; and the pope favored these , whereby he might get himself reputation , in the temporality ; of many others , their citizens became princes , so that hereupon italy being come into the churches hands as it were , and some few republicks , those priests and citizens not accustomed to the use of armes , began to take strangers to their pay . the first that gave reputation to these soldiers was alberick of como in romania . from his discipline among others descended brachio and sforza , who in their time were the arbitres of italy ; after these followed all others , who even till our dayes have commanded the armes of italy ; and the success of their valor hath been , that it was overrun by charles , pillaged by lewis , forc'd by ferdinand , and disgrac'd by the swissers . the order which they have held , hath been , first whereby to give reputation to their own armes to take away the credit of the infantry . this they did , because they having no state of their own , but living upon their industry , their few foot gave them no reputation , and many they were not able to maintain ; whereupon they reduc'd themselves to cavalery , and so with a supportable number they were entertained and honored : and matters were brought to such termes , that in an army of twenty thousand soldiers you should not find two thousand foot . they had moreover us'd all industry to free themselves and their soliders of all pains and fear , in their skirmishes , not killing , but taking one another prisoners , and without ransome for their freedom ; they repaired not all to their tents by night , nor made palizado or trench thereabout , nor lay in the field in the summer : and all these things were thus contrived and agreed of among them in their military orders , whereby ( as is said ) to avoid pains and dangers , insomuch as they have brought italy into slavery and disgrace . chap. xiii . of auxiliary soldiers , mixt , and native . the auxiliary forces , being the other kind of unprofitable armes , are , when any puissant one is called in , who with his forces comes to assist and defend thee ; such as in these later times did pope julius use , who having seen the evil proof of his mercenary soldiers in the enterprize of ferrara , applied himself to the auxiliaries , and agreed with ferdinand king of spain , that with his forces he should aid him . these armes may be profitable and advantagious for themselves ; but for him that calls them in , hurtfull ; because in losing , thou art lest defeated ; and conquering , thou becomest their prisoner . and however that of these examples the ancient stories are full fraught ; yet will i not part from this of pope julius the second , which is as yet fresh : whose course could not have been more inconsiderate , for the desire he had to get ferrara , putting himself wholly into strangers hands : but his good fortune caused another cause to arise , that hindred him from receiving the fruit of his evil choice ; for his auxiliaries being broken at ravenna , and the swissers thereupon arriving , who put the conquerors to flight beyond all opinion , even their own and others , he chanced not to remain his enemies prisoner , they being put to flight , nor prisoner to his auxiliaries , having vanquished by other forces than theirs . the florentines being wholly disarmed , brought ten thousand french to pisa for to take it , by which course they ran more hazzard , than in any time of their troubles . the emperor of constantinople , to oppress his neighbors , brought into greece ten thousand turks , who when the war was ended , could not be got out thence , which was the beginning of greeces fervitude under the infidels . he then that will in no case be able to overcome , let him serve himself of these armes ; for they are much more dangerous than the mercenaries ; for by those thy ruine is more suddenly executed ; for they are all united , and all bent to the obedience of another . but for the mercenaries to hurt thee , when they have vanquished , there is no more need of time , and greater occasion , they not being all united in a body , and being found out and paid by thee , wherein a third that thou mak'st their head , cannot suddenly gaine so great authority , that he can endammage thee . insumme , in the mercenaries their sloth and lazinesse to fight is more dangerous : in the auxiliaries their valonr . wherefore a wise prince hath alwayes avoyded these kind of armes , and betaken himself to his owne , and desired rather to loss with his owne , than conquer with anothers , accounting that not a true victorie which was gotten with others armes . i will not doubt to alleadge caesar bargia , and his actions . this duke entred into romania with auxiliarie armes s bringing with him all french souldiers : but afterwards not accounting those armes secure , bent hinselfe to mercenaries , judging lesse danger to be in those , and tooke in pay the orsini and the vitelli , which afterwards in the proof of them , finding wavering , unfaithful , and dangerous , he extinguishd , and betook himselfe to his owne ; and it may easily be perceiv'd what difference there is between the one and the other of these armes , confidering the difference that was between the dukes reputation , when he had the french men alone , and when he had the orsini and vitelli ; but when he remaind with his own , and stood of himselfe , we shall find it was much augmented : nor ever was it of grate esteeme , but when every one saw , that he wholly possessed his owne a mes . i thought not to have parted from the italian examples of late memory ; but that i must not let passe that of hiero the siracusan , being one of those i formerly nam'd . this man ( as i said before ) being made general of the siracusans forces , knew presently that mercenary souldiery was nothing for their profit in that they were hirelings , as our italians are ; and finding no way either to hold , or cashier them , made them all bee cut to peeces , and afterwards waged warre with his owne men , and none others . i will also call to memory a figure of the old testament serving just to this purpose . when david presented himselfe before saul to goe to fight with goliah the philistims champion , saul to encourage him , clad him with his owne armes , which david when he had them upon his back , refus'd , saying , he was not able to make any proofe of himself therein , and therefore would goe meet the enemy with his own sling and sword . in summe , others armes either fall from thy shoulders , or cumber or streighten thee . charls the seventh , father of lewis the eleventh , having by his good fortune and valour set france at liberty from the english , knew well this necessity of being arm'd with his owne armes , and settled in his kingdome the ordinances of men at armes , and infantry . afterwards king lewis his sonne abolisht those of the infantry , and began to take the swissers to pay ; which errour follow'd by the others , is ( as now indeed it appeares ) the cause of that kingdomes dangers . for having given reputation to the swissers , they have renderd all their own armes contemptible ; for this hath wholly ruind their foot , and oblig'd their men at armes to forrein armes : for being accustomed to serve with the swissers , they think they are not able to overcome without them . from whence it comes that the french are not of force against the swissers , and without them also against others they use not to adventure . therefore are the french armies mixt , part more naries , and part natives , which armes are farre better than the simple mercenaries or simple auxiliaries , and much inferiour to the natives ; and let the said example suffice for that : for the kingdome of france would have been unconquerable , if charles his order had been augmented and maintaind but men in their small wisdome begin a thing , which then because it hath some favour of good , discovers not the poyson that lurkes thereunder , as i before said of the h●ctick feavers . wherefore that prince which perceives not mischiefes , but as they grow up , is not truely wise ; and this is given but to few : and if we consider the first ruine of the romane empire , we shall find it was from taking the goths first into their pay ; for from that beginning the forces of the romane empire began to grow weak , and all the valour that was taken hence was given to them . i conclude then that without having armes of their owne , no principality can be secure , or rather is wholly oblig'd to fortune , not having valour to shelter it in adversity . and it was alwayes the opinion and saying of wise men , that nothing is so weak and unsetled , as is the reputation of power not founded upon ones owne proper forces : which are those that are composed of thy subjects , or citizens , or servants ; all the rest are mercenary or auxiliary ; and the manner how to order those well , is easie to find out , if those orders above nam'd by me , shall be but run over , and if it shall be but consider'd , how philip alexander the great his father , and in what manner many republicks and princes have armd and appointed themselves , to which appointments i referre my selfe wholly . chap. xiv . what belongs to the prince touching military discipline . a prince then ought to have no other ayme , nor other thought , nor take any thing else for his proper art , but warr , and the orders and discipline thereof : for that is the sole arte which belongs to him that commands , and is of so great excellency , that not only those that are borne princes , it maintains so ; but many times raises men from a private fortune to that dignity . and it is seene by the contrary , that when princes have given themselves more to their delights , than to the warres , they have lost their states ; and the first cause that makes thee lose it , is the neglect of that arte ; and the cause that makes thee gaine it , is that thou art experienc'd and approvd in that arte . francis sforza by being a man at , armes , of a private man became duke of milan ; and his sons by excusing themselves of the troubles and paines belonging to those imployments of princes , became private-men . for among other mischiefes thy neglect of armes brings upon thee , it causes thee to be contemnd , which is one of those disgraces , from which a prince ought to keepe himselfe , as hereafter shall be sayd : for from one that is disarmd to one that is armd there is no proportion ; and reason will not , that he who is in armes , should willingly yeeld obedience to him that is unfurnishd of them , and that he that is disarmd should be in security among his armed vassalls ; for there being disdaine in the one , and suspicion in the other , it is impossible these should ever well co-operate . and therefore a prince who is quite unexperienc'd in matter of warre , besides the other infelicities belonging to him , as is said , cannot be had in any esteeme among his souldiers , nor yet trust in them . wherefore he ought never to neglect the practice of the arte of warre , and in time of peace should he exercise it more than in the warre ; which he may be able to doe two wayes ; the one practically , and in his labours and recreations of his body , the other theorically . and touching the practick part , he ought besides the keeping of his own subjcts well traind up in the discipline and exercise of armes , give himselfe much to the chase , whereby to accustome his body to paines , and partly to understand the manner of situations , and to know how the mountaines arise , which way the vallyes open themselves , and how the plaines ars distended flat abroad , and to conceive well the nature of the rivers , and marrish ground , and herein to bestow very much care , which knowledge is profitable in two kinds : first he learnes thereby to know his own countrey , and is the better enabled to understand the defence thereof , and afterwards by meanes of this knowledge and experience in , these situations , easily comprehend any other situation , which a new he hath need to view , for the little hillocks . vallies , plaines , rivers , and marrish places . for example , they in tuscany are like unto those of other countries : so that from the knowledge of the site of one country , it is easie to attain to know that of others . and that prince that wants this skill , failes of the principall part a commander should be furnisht with ; for this shows the way how to discover the enemy , to pitch the camp , to lead their armies , to order their battells , and also to besiege a town at thy best advantage . philopomenes prince of the achayans , among other praises writers give him , they say , that in time of peace , he thought not upon any thing so much as the practise of warre ; and whensoever he was abroad in the field to disport himselfe with his friends , would often stand still , and discourse with them , in case the enemies were upon the top of that hill , and we here with our army , whether of us two should have the advantage , and how might we safely goe to find them , keeping still our orders ; and if we would retire our selves , what course should we take if they retir'd , how should we follow them ? & thus on the way , propounded them all such accidents could befall in any army ; would heare their opinions , and tell his owne , and confirme it by argument ; so that by his continuall thought hereupon , when ever he led any army no chance could happen , for which he had not a remedy . but touching the exercise of the mind , a prince ought to read histories , and in them consider the actions of the worthiest men , marke how they have behav'd themselves in the warrs , examine the occasions of their victories , and their losses ; wherby they may be able to avoyd these , and obtaine those ; and above all , doe as formerly some excellent man hath done , who hath taken upon him to imitate , if any one that hath gone before him hath left his memory glorious ; the course he took , and kept alwaies near unto him the remembrances of his actions and worthy deeds : as it is said , that alexander the great imitated achilles ; caesar alexander , and scipio cyrus . and whoever reads the life of cyrus , written by xenophon , may easily perceive afterwards in scipio's life how much glory his imitation gaind him , and how much scipio did conforme himselfe in his chastity , affability , humanity , and liberality with those things , that are written by xenophon of cyrus . such like wayes ought a wise prince to take , nor ever be idle in quiet times , but by his paines then , as it were provide himself of store , whereof he may make some use in his adversity , the end that when the times change , he may be able to resist the stormes of his hard fortune . chap. xv. of those things , in respect whereof , men , and especially princes , are praised , or dispraised . it now remaines that we consider what the conditions of a prince ought to be , and his termes of government over his subjects , and towards his friends . and because i know that many have written hereupon ; i doubt , left i venturing also to treat thereof , may be branded with presumption , especially seeing i am like enough to deliver an opinion different from others . but my intent being to write for the advantage of him that understands me , i thought it fitter to follow the effectuall truth of the matter , than the imagination thereof ; and many principalities and republiques , have been in imagination , which neither have been seen nor knowne to be indeed : for there is such a distance between how men doe live , and how men ought to live ; that he who leaves that which is done , for that which ought to be done , learnes sooner his ruine than his preservation ; for that man who will professe honesty in all his actions , must needs goe to ruine among so many that are dishonest . whereupon it is necessary for a prince , desiring to preserve himselfe , to be able to make use of that honestie , and to lay it aside againe , as need shall require . passing by then things that are only in imagination belonging to a prince , to discourse upon those that are really true ; i lay that all men , whensover mention is made of them , and especially princes , because they are placed aloft in the view of all , are taken notice of for some of these qualities , which procure them either commendations or blame : and this is that some one is held liberal , some miserable , ( miserable i say , nor covetous ; for the covetous desire to have , though it were by rapine ; but a miserable man is he , that too much for bears to make use of his owne ) some free givers , others extortioners ; some cruell , others pitious ; the one a leaguebreaker , another faithfull ; the one effeminate and of small courage , the other fierce and couragieus ; the one courteous , the other proud ; the one lascivious , the other chaste ; the one of faire dealing , the other wily and crafty ; the one hard , the other easie ; the one grave , the other light ; the one religious , the other incredulous , and such like . i know that every one will confesse , it were exceedingly praise worthy for a prince to be adorned with all these above nam'd qualities that are good : but because this is not possible , nor doe humane conditions admit such perfection in vertues , it is necessary for him to be so discret , that he know how to avoid the infamie of those vices which would thrust him out of his state ; and if it be possible , beware of those also which are not able to remove him thence ; but where it cannot be , let them passe with lesse regard . and yet , let him not stand much upon it , though he incurre the infamie of those vices , without which he can very hardly save his state : for if all be throughly considered , some things we shall find which will have the colour and very face of vertue , and following them , they will lead the to thy destruction ; whereas some others that shall ●s much seeme vice , if we take the course they lead us , shall discover unto us the way to our safety and well-being . the second blemish in this our authours book , i find in his fifteenth chapter : where he instructs his prince to use such an ambidexterity as that he may serve himselfe either of vertue , or vice , according to his advnatage , which in true pollicy is neither good in attaining the principality nor in securing it when it is attaind . for politicks , presuppose ethiques , which will never allow this rule : as that a man might make this small difference between vertue , and vice , that he may indifferently lay aside , or take up the , one or the other , and put it in prastise as best conduceth to the end he propounds himselfe . i doubt our authour would have blamd davids regard to saul , when sam. . in the cave he cut off the lap of sauls garment , and spared his head ; and afterwards in the . when he forbad abishai to strike him as he lay sleeping . worthy of a princes consideration is that saying of abigal to david sam. . . it shall come to passe when the lord shall have done to my lord according to all that he hath spoken concerning thee , & shall have appointed thee ruler over israel , that this shall be no grief to thee , nor offence of heart unto my lord , that thou hast forborne to shed blood &c. for surely the conscience of this evill ground whereupon they have either built , or underpropped their tyranny , causes men , as well metus as spes in longum projicere , which sets them a work on further mischiefe . chap. xvi . of liberality , and miserablenesse . beginning then at the first of the above mentioned qualities , i say that it would be very well to be accounted liberall : neverthelesse , liberality used in such a manner , as to make thee be accounted so , wrongs thee : for in case it be used vertuously , and as it ought to he , it shall never come to be taken notice of , so as to free thee from the infamie of its contrary . and therefore for one to hold the name of liberal among men , it were needfull not to omit any sumptuous quality , insomuch that a prince alwayes so dispos'd , shall waste all his revenues , and at the end shall be forc'd , if he will still maintaine that reputation of liberality , heavily to burthen his subjects , and become a great exactour ; and put in practise all those things that can be done to get mony : which begins to make him hatefull to his subjects , and fall into every ones contempt , growing necessitous : so that having with this liberality wrong'd many , and imparted of his bounty but to a few ; he feels every first mischance , and runs a hazard of every first danger . which he knowing , and desiring to withdraw himself from , incurs presently the disgrace of being termed miserable . a prince therefore not being able to use this vertue of liberality , without his own damage , in such a sort , that it may be taken notice of , ought , if he be wise , not to regard the name of miserable ; for in time he shall alwaies be esteemed the more liberal , seeing that by his parsimony his own revenues are sufficient for him ; as also he can defend himself against whoever makes war against him , and can do some exploits without grieving his subjects : so that he comes to use his liberality to all those , from whom he takes nothing , who are infinite in number ; and his miserableness towards those to whom he gives nothing , who are but a few . in our dayes we have not seen any , but those who have been held miserable , do any great matters ; but the others all quite ruind . pope julius the second , however he serv'd himself of the name of liberal , to get the papacy , yet never intended he to continue it , to the end he might be able to make war against the king of france : and he made so many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax , because his long thrift supplyed his large expences . this present king of spain could never have undertaken , nor gone through with so many exploits , had he been accounted liberal . wherefore a prince ought little to regard ( that he may not be driven to pillage his subiects , that he may be able to defend himself , that he may not fall into poverty and contempt , that he be not forced to become an extortioner ) though he incurre the name of miserable ; for this is one of those vices , which does not pluck him from his throne . and if any one should say , caesar by his liberality obtained the empire , and many others ( because they both were , and were esteemd liberal ) attaind to exceeding great dignities . i answer , either thou art already come to be a prince , or thou art in the way to it ; in the first case , this liberality is hurtful ; in the second , it is necessary to be accounted so ; and caesar was one of those that aspired to the principality of rome . but if after he had gotten it , he had survived , and not forborne those expences , he would quite have ruined that empire . and if any one should reply ; many have been princes , and with their armies have done great exploits , who have been held very liberal . i answer , either the prince spends of his own and his subjects , or that which belongs to others : in the first , he ought to be sparing ; in the second , he should not omitany part of liberality . and that prince that goes abroad with his army , and feeds upon prey , and spoyle , and tributes , and hath the disposing of that which belongs to others , necessarily should use this liberality ; otherwise would his soldiers never follow him ; and of that which is neither thine , nor thy subjects , thou mayest well be a free giver , as were cyrus , caesar and alexander ; for the spending of that which is anothers , takes not away thy reputation , but rather adds to it , only the wasting of that which is thine own hurts thee ; nor is there any thing consumes it self so much as liberality , which whilest thou usest , thou losest the means to make use of it , and becomest poore and abject ; or to avoid this poverty , an extortioner and hatefull person . and among all those things which a prince ought to beware of , is , to be dispised , and odious ; to one and the other of which , liberality brings thee . wherefore there is more discretion to hold the stile of miserable , which begets an infamy without hatred , than to desire that of liberal , whereby to incurre the necessity of being thought an extortioner , which procures an infamy with hatred . chap. xvii . of cruelty , and clemency , and whether it is better to be belov'd , or feard . descending afterwards unto the other fore-alledged qualities , i say , that every prince should desire to be held pitiful , and not cruel . nevertheless ought he beware that he ill uses not this pitty . caesar borgia was accounted cruel , yet had his cruelty redrest the disorders in romania , setled it in union , and restored it to peace , and fidelity : which , if it be well weighed , we shall see was an act of more pitty , than that of the people of florence , who to avoyd the terme of cruelty , suffered pistoya to fall to destruction . wherefore a prince ought not to regard the infamy of cruelty , for to hold his subjects united and fai●hfull : for by giving a very few proofes of himself the other way , he shall be hold more pittiful than they , who through their too much pitty , suffer disorders to follow , from whence arise murthers and rapines : for these are wont to hurt an intire universality , whereas the executions practised by a prince , hurt only some particular . and among all sorts of princes , it is impossible for a new prince to avoyd the name of cruel , because all new states are full of dangers : whereupon virgil by the mouth of dido excuses the inhumanity of her kingdom , saying , res dura & regni novitas me talia cogunt moliri & latè fines custode tenere . my hard plight and new state force me to guard . my confines all about with watch and ward . nevertheless ought he to be judicious in his giving beleif to any thing , or moving himself thereat , nor make his people extreamly afraid of him ; but proceed in a moderate way with wisdome , and humanity , that his too much confidence make him not unwary , and his too much distrust intolerable ; from hence arises a dispute , whether it is better to be belov'd or feard : i answer , a man would wish he might be the one and the other : but because hardly can they subsist both together , it is much safer to be feard , than be loved ; being that one of the two must needs fail ; for touching men , we may say this in general , they are unthankful , unconstant , dissemblers , they avoyd dangers , and are covetous of gain ; and whilest thou doest them good , they are wholly thine ; their blood , their fortunes , lives and children are at thy service , as is said before , when the danger is remote ; but when it approaches , they revolt . and that prince who wholly relies upon their words , unfurnished of all other preparations , goes to wrack : for the friendships that are gotten with rewards , and not by the magnificence and worth of the mind , are dearly bought indeed ; but they will neither keep long , nor serve well in time of need : and men do less regard to offend one that is supported by love , than by fear . for love is held by a certainty of obligation , which because men are mischievous , is broken upon any occasion of their own profit . but fear restrains with a dread of punishment which never forsakes a man. yet ought a prince cause himself to be belov'd in such a manner , that if he gains not love , he may avoid hatred : for it may well stand together , that a man may be feard and not hated ; which shall never fail , if he abstain from his subjects goods , and their wives ; and whensoever he should be forc'd to proceed against any of their lives , do it when it is to be done upon a just cause , and apparent conviction ; but above all things forbeare to lay his hands on other mens goods ; for men forget sooner the death of their father , than the loss of their patrimony . moreover the occasions of taking from men their goods , do never fail : and alwaies he that begins to live by rapine , finds occasion to lay hold upon other mens goods : but against mens lives , they are seldome found , and sooner fail . but where a prince is abroad in the field with his army , and hath a multitude of soldiers under his government , then is it necessary that he stands not much upon it , though he be termed cruel : for unless he be so , he shall never have his soldiers live in accord one with another , nor ever well disposed to any brave peice of service . among hannibals actions of mervail , this is reckoned for one , that having a very huge army , gathered out of several nations , and all led to serve in a strange countrey , there was never any dissention neither amongst themselves , nor against their general , as well in their bad fortune as their good . which could not proceed from any thing else than from that barbarous cruelty of his , which together with his exceeding many vertues , rendred him to his soldiers both venerable and terrible ; without which , to that ●ff●ct his other vertues had served him to little purpose : and some writers though not of the best advised , on one side admire these his worthy actions , and on the otherside , condemn the principal causes thereof . and that it is true , that his other vertues would not have suffic'd him , we may consider in scipio , the rarest man not only in the dayes he liv●d , but even in the memory of man ; from whom his army rebel'd in spain : which grew only upon his too much clemency , which had given way to his soldiers to become more licentious , than was well tollerable by military discipline : for which he was reprov'd by fabius maximus in the senate , who termed him the corrupter of the roman soldiery . the locrensians having been destroyed by a lieutenant of scipio's , were never reveng'd by him , nor the insolence of that lieutenant punisht ; all this arising from his easie nature : so that one desiring to excuse him in the senate , said , that there were many men knew better how to keep themselves from faults , than to correct the faults of other men : which disposition of his in time would have wrong'd scipio's reputation and gloory , had he therewith continu'd in his commands : but living under the government of the senate , this quality of his that would have disgrac'd him not only was conceal'd , but prov'd to the advancement of his glory . i conclude then , returning to the purpose of being feard , and belov'd ; insomuch as men love at their own pleasure , and to serve their own turne , and their fear depends upon the princes pleasure , every wise prince ought to ground upon that which is of himself , and not upon that which is of another : only this , he ought to use his best wits to avoid hatred , as was said . chap. xviii . in what manner princes ought to keep their words . how commendable in a prince it is to keep his word , and live with integrity , not making use of cunning and subtlety , every one knows well : yet we see by experience in these our dayes , that those princes have effected great matters , who have made small reckoning of keeping their words , and have known by their craft to turne and wind men about , and in the end , have overcome those who have grounded upon the truth . you must then know , there are two kinds of combating or fighting ; the one by right of the laws , the other meerly by force . that first way is proper to men , the other is also common to beasts : but because the first many times suffices not , there is a necessity to make recourse to the second ; wherefore it behooves a prince to know how to make good use of that part which belongs to a beast , as well as that which is proper to a man. this part hath been covertly shew'd to princes by ancient writers ; who say that achilles and many others of those ancient princes were intrusted to chiron the senator , to be brought up under his discipline : the moral of this , having for their teacher one that was half a beast and half a man , was nothing else , but that it was needful for a prince to understand how to make his advantage of the one and the other nature , because neither could subsist without the other . a prince then being necessitated to know how to make use of that part belonging to a beast , ought to serve himself of the conditions of the fox and the lion ; for the lion cannot keep himself from snares , nor the fox defend himself against the wolves . he had need then be a fox , that he may beware of the snares , and a lion that he may scare the wolves . those that stand wholly upon the lion , understand not well themselves . and therefore a wise prince cannot , nor ought not keep his faith given , when the observance thereof turnes to disadvantage , and the occasions that made him promise , are past . for if men were all good , this rule would not be allowable ; but being they are full of mischief , and would not make it good to thee , neither art thou tyed to keep it with them : nor shall a prince ever want lawfull occasions to give colour to this breach . very many modern examples hereof might be alledg'd , wherein might be shewed how many peaces concluded , and how many promises made , have been violated and broken by the infidelity of princes ; and ordinarily things have best succeeded with him that hath been nearest the fox in condition . but it is necessary to understand how to set a good colour upon this disposition , and to be able to fain and dissemble throughly ; and men are so simple , and yeeld so much to the present necessities , that he who hath a mind to deceive , shall alwaies find another that will be deceivd . i will not conceal any one of the examples that have been of late . alexander the sixth , never did any thing else than deceive men , and never meant otherwise , and alwaies found whom to work upon ; yet never was there man would protest more effectually , nor aver any thing with more solemn oaths , and observe them less than he ; nevertheless , his cousenages all thriv'd well with him ; for he knew how to play this part cunningly . therefore is there no necessity for a prince to be endued with all above written qualities , but it behooveth well that he seem to be so ; or rather i will boldly say this , that having these qualities , and alwaies regulating himself by them , they are hurtfull ; but seeming to have them , they are advantageous ; as to seem pittiful , faithful , mild , religious , and of integrity , and indeed to be so ; provided withall thou beest of such a composition , that if need require to use the contrary , thou canst , and knowest how to apply thy self thereto . and it suffices to conceive this , that a prince , and especially a new prince , cannot observe all those things , for which men are held good ; he being often forc'd , for the maintenance of his state , to do contrary to his faith , charity , humanity , and religion : and therefore it behooves him to have a mind so disposd , as to turne and take the advantage of all winds and fortunes ; and as formerly i said , not forsake the good , while he can ; but to know how to make use of 〈◊〉 evil upon necessity . a prince then ought to have a special care , that he never let fall any words , but what are all season'd with the five above written qualities , and let him seem to him that sees and hears him , all pitty , all faith , all integrity , all humanity , all religion ; nor is there any thing more necessary for him to seem to have , than this last quality : for all men in general judge thereof , rather by the sight , than by the touch ; for every man may come to the sight of him , few come to the touch and feeling of him ; yvery man may come to see what thou seemest , few come to perceive and understand what thou art ; and those few dare not oppose the opinion of many , who have the majesty of state to protect them : and in all mens actions , especially those of princes wherein there is no judgement to appeale unto men , forbeare to give their censures , till the events and ends of things . let a prince therefore take the surest courses he can to maintain his life and state : the means shall alwaies be thought honorable , and commended by every one ; for the vulgar is over-taken with the appearance and event of a thing : & for the most part of people , they are but the vulgar : the others that are but few , take place where the vulgar have no subsisteance . a prince there is in these dayes , whom i shall not do well to name , that preaches nothing else but peace and faith ; but had he kept the one and the other , several times had they taken from him his state and reputation . in the sixteenth , seventeenth , and eighteenth chap. our author descends to particulars , perswading his prince in his sixteenth to such a suppleness of disposition , as that upon occasion he can make use either of liberality or miserabley ness , as need shall require . but that of liberality is to last no longer than while he is in the way to some designe : which if he well weigh , is not really a reward of vertue , how ere it seems ; but a bait and lure to bring birds to the net . in the seventeenth chap. he treats of clemency and cruelty , neither of which are to be exercis'd by him as acts of mercy or justice ; but as they may serve to advantage his further purposes . and lest the prince should incline too much to clemnecy , our author allows rather the restraint by fear , than by love . the contrary to which all stories shew us . i will say this only , cruelty may cut of the power of some , but causes the hatred of all , and gives a will to most to take the first occasion offerd for revenge . in the eighteenth chap. our author discourses how princes ought to govern themselves in keeping their promises made : whereof he sayes they ought to make such small reckoning , as that rather they should know by their craft how to turne and wind men about , whereby to take advantage of all winds and fortunes . to this i would oppose that in the fifteenth psal . v. . he that sweareth to his neighbor , and disappointeth him not , though it were to his own hindrance . it was a king that writ it , and me thinks the rule he gave , should well befit both king and subject : and surely this perswades against all taking of advantages . a man may reduce all the causes of faith-breaking to three heads . one may be , because he that promised , had no intention to keep his word ; and this is a wicked and malitious way of dealing . a second may bee , because hee that promisd , repents of his promise made ; and that is grounded on unconstancy , and lightness in that he would not be well resolved before he entred into covenant . the third may be , when it so falls out , that it lyes not in his power that made the promise to performe it . in which case a man ought to imitate the good debter , who having not wherewithall to pay , hides not himself , but presents his person to his creditor , willingly suffering imprisonment . the first and second are very vitious and unworthy of a prince : in the third , men might well be directed by the examples of those two famous romans , regulus and posthumius . i shall close this with the answer of charles the fifth , when he was pressed to break his word with luther for his safe return from wormes ; fides rerum promissarum etsi toto mundo exulet , tamen apud imperatorem eam consistere oportet . though truth be banisht out of the whole world , yet should it alwaies find harbour in an emperors beast . chap. xix . that princes should take a care , not to incurre contempt or batred . but because among the qualities , whereof formerly mention is made , i have spoken of those of most importance , i will treat of the others more briefly under these qualityes that a prince is to beware , as in part is abovesaid , and that he fly those things which cause him to be odious or vile : and when ever he shall avoid this , he shall fully have plaid his part , and in the other disgrace , he shall find no danger at all . there is nothing makes him so odious , as i said , as his extortion of his subjects goods , and abuse of their women , from which he ought to forbear : and so long as he wrongs not his whole people , neither in their goods , nor honors , they live content , and he hath only to strive with the ambition of some sew : which many waies and easily too , is restrain'd . to be held various , light , effeminate , faint-hearted , unresolv'd , these make him be contemnd and thought base , which a prince should shun like rocks , and take a care that in all his actions there appear magnanimity , courage , gravity , and valor ; and that in all the private affairs of his subjects , he orders it so , that his word stand irrevocable : and maintain himself in such repute , that no man may think either to deceive or wind and turn him about : that prince that gives such an opinion of himself , is much esteemed , and against him who is so well esteemed , hardly are any conspiracies made by his subjects , or by forreiners any invasion , when once notice is taken of his worth , and how much he is reverenced by his subjects : for a prince ought to have two fears , the one from within , in regard of his subjects ; the other from abroad , in regard of his mighty neighbors ; from these he defends himself by good armes and good friends ; and alwayes he shall have good friends , if he have good armes ; and all things shall alwaies stand sure at home , when those abroad are firme , in case some conspiracy have not disturbed them ; and however the forrein masters stand but ticklishly ; yet if he have taken such courses at home , and liv'd as we have prescribed , he shall never be able ( in case he forsake not himself ) to resist all possibility , force and violence , as i said nabis the spartan did : but touching his subjects , even when his affairs abroad are setled , it is to be fear'd they may conspire privily ; from which a prince sufficiently secure himself by shunning to be hated or contemned , and keeping himself in his peoples good opinion , which it is necessary for him to compass , as formerly we treated at large . and one of the powerfullest remedies a prince can have against conspiracies , is , net to be hated nor dispised by the universality ; for alwaies he that conspires , beleeves the princes death is acceptable to the subject : but when he thinks it displeases them , he hath not the heart to venture on such a matter ; for the difficulties that are on the conspirators side , are infinite . by experience it is plain , that many times plots have been laid , but few of them have succeeded luckily ; for he that conspires , cannot be alone , nor can he take the company of any , but of those , who he beleeves are malecontents ; and so soon as thou hast discover'd thy self to a malecontent , thou givest him means to work his own content : for by revealing thy treason , he may well hope for all manner of favour : so that seeing his gain certain of one side ; and on the other , finding only doubt and danger , either he had need be a rare friend , or that he be an exceeding obstinate enemy to the prince , if he keeps his word with thee . and to reduce this matter into short termes : i say , there is nothing but jealousie , fear , and suspect of punishment on the conspirators part to affright him ; but on the princes part , there is the majesty of the principality , he laws , the defences of his friends and the state , which do so guard him ; that to all these things the peoples good wills being added , it is unpossible any one should be so head-strong as to conspire ; for ordinarily where a traytor is to feare before the execution of his mischiefe , in this case he is also to feare afterwards , having the people for his enemy when the fact is commited , and therefore for this cause , not being able to hope for any refuge . touching this matter , many examples might be brought ; but i will content my selfe to name one which fell out in the memory of our fathers . annibal bentivolii , grand father of this annibal who now lives , that was prince in bolonia , being slaine by the canneschi that conspir'd against him , none of his race being lest , but this john , who was then in swadling clouts ; presently the people rose upon this murder , and slew all the canneschi which proceeded from the popular affection , which the family of the bentivolii held then in bolonia : which was so great , that being there remain'd not any , now anniball was dead , that was able to manage the state ; and having notice that in florence there was one borne of the bentivolii , who till then was taken for a smiths sonne : the citizens of bolonia went to florence for him , and gave the government of their city to him , which was rul'd by him , untill john was of fit yeares to governe . i conclude then , that a prince ought to make small account of treasons , whiles he hath the people to friend : but if they be his enemies and hate him , he may well feare every thing , and every one . and well ordered states , and discreet princes have taken care withall diligence , not to cause their great men to fall into desperation , and to content the people , and so to maintaine them : for this is one of the most important businesses belonging to a prince . among the kingdomes that are well orderd and governd in our dayes , is that of france , and therein are found exceeding many good orders , whereupon the kings liberty and security depends : of which the chiefe is the parliament , and the authority thereof : for he that founded that kingdome , knowing the great mens ambition and insolence ; and judgeing it necessary there should be a bridle to curbe them ; and on the other side knowing the hatred of the commonalty against the great ones , grounded upon feare , intending to secure them , would not lay this care wholly upon the king , but take this trouble from him , which he might have with the great men , in case he favourd the commonalty ; or with the commonalty , in case he favourd the great men : and thereupon set up a third judge , which was that , to the end it should keep under the great ones , and favour the meaner sort , without any imputation to the king. it was not possible to take a better , nor wiser course then this ; nor a surer way to secure the king , and the kingdome . from whence we may draw another conclusion worthie of note , that princes ought to cause others to take upon them the matters of blame and imputation ; and upon themselves to take only those of grace and favour . here againe i conclude , that a prince ought to make good esteeme of his nobility , but not thereby to incur the commons hatred : it would seeme perhaps to many , considering the life & death of many romane emperours , that they were examples contrary to my opinion , finding that some have liv'd worthily , and shewd many rare vertues of the minde , and yet have lost the empire , and been put to death by their owne subjects , conspiring against them . intending then to answer these objections , i shall discourse upon the qualities of some emperours , declaring the occasions of their ruine , not disagreeing from that which i have alledgd ; and part thereof i will bestow on the consideration of these things , which are worthy to be noted by him that reads the actions of those times : and it shall suffice me to take all those emperours that succeeded in the empire from marcus the philosopher to maximinus , who were mercus and commodus his sonne , pertinax , julian , severus , antonius , caracalla his sonne , macrinus , heliogabalus , alexander , and maximin . and first it is to be noted , that where in the other principalities , they are to contend only with the ambition of the nobles , and the insolence of the people ; the romane emperours had a third difficulty , having to support the cruelty and covetousnesse of the souldiers , which was so hard a thing , that it caused the ruine of many , being hard to satisfy the souldiers , and the people ; for the people love their quiet , and therefore affect modest princes ; and the souldiers love a prince of a warlike courage , that is insolent , cruell , and plucking from every one : which things they would have them exercise upon the people , whereby they might be able to double their stipends , and satisfie their avarice and cruelty : whence it proceeds , that those emperous who either by nature or by art , had not such a reputation , as therewith they could curbe the one and the other , were alwayes ruind : and the most of them , specially those who as new men came to the principality , finding the difficulty of those two different humours , applyed themselves to content the sholdiers , making small account of wronging the people , which was a course then necessary ; for the princes not being able to escape the hatred of every one , ought first endeavour that they incurse not the hatred of any whole universality ; and when they cannot attaine thereunto , they are to provide with all industry , to avoyd the hatred of those universalities that are the most mighty . and therefore those emperors , who because they were but newly call'd to the empire , had need of extraordinary favours , more willingly stuck to the soldiers , than to the people ; which neverthelesse turned to their advantage , or otherwise , according as that prince knew how to maintaine his repute with them . from these causes aforesayd proceeded it , that marcus pertinax , and alexander , though all living modestly , being lovers of justice , and enemies of cruelty , courteous and bountifull , had all from marcus on ward , miserable ends ; marcus only liv'd and dy'd exceedingly honoured : for he came to the empire by inheritance , and was not to acknowledge it either from the soldiers , nor from the people : afterwards being accompanyed with many vertues , which made him venerable , he held alwayes whilst he liv'd the one and the other order within their limits , and was never either hated , or contemnd . but pertinax was created emperour against the soldiers wills , who being accustomed to live licentiously under commodus , could not endure that honest course that pertinax sought to reduce them to : whereupon having gotten himself hatred , and to this hatred added contempt , in that he was old , was ruind in the very beginning of his government . whence it ought to be observed , that hatred is gaind as well by good deeds as bad ; and therefore as i formerly said , when a prince would maintaine the state ; he is often forced not to be good : for when that generality , whether it be the people , or soldiers , or nobility , whereof thou thinkst thou standst in need to maintain thee , is corrupted , it behoves thee to follow their humour , and content them , and then all good deeds are thy adversaries . but let us come to alexander who was of that goodnesse , that among the prayses given him , had this for one , that in fourteen yeers wherein he held the empire , he never put any man to death , but by course of justice ; neverthelesse being held effeminate , and a man that suffered himselfe to be ruled by his mother , and thereupon fallen into contempt , the army conspird against him . now on the contrary discoursing upon the qualities of commodus , severus , antonius , caracalla , and maximinus , you shall find them exceeding cruell , and ravinous , who to satisfie their soldiers , forbeare no kinde of injury that could be done upon the people ; and all of them , except severus , came to evill en●s : for in severus , there was such extraordinary valour , that while he held the soldiers his freinds , however the people were much burthend by him , he might alwayes reigne happily : for his valour rendred him so admirable in the soldiers and peoples sights ; that these in a manner stood amazd and astonishd , and those others reverencing and honoring him . and because the actions of this man were exceeding great , being in a new prince , i will briefly shew how well he knew to act the foxes and the lions parts ; the conditions of which two , i say , as before , are very necessary for a prince to imitate . severus having had experience of iulian the emperours sloth , perswaded his army ( whereof he was commander in solavonia ) that they should doe well to goe to rome to revenge portinax his death , who was put to death by the imperiall guard ; and under this pretence , not making any shew that he aspird unto the empire , set his army in march directly towards rome , and was sooner come into italy , than it was knowne he had mov'd from his station . being ariv'd at rome , he was by the senate chosen emperour for feare , and julian slaine . after this beginning , two difficulties yet remaind to severus , before he could make himselfe lord of the whole state ; the one in asia , where niger the generall of those armies had gotten the title of emperour , the other in the west with albinus , who also aspird to the empire : and because he thought there might be some danger to discover himselfe enemy to them both , he purposed to set upon niger , and cozen albinas , to whom he writ , that being elected emperour by the senate , he would willingly communicate it with him ; and thereupon sent him the title of caesar , and by resolution of the senate , tooke him to him for his colleague ; which things were taken by albinks in true meaning . but afterwards when severus had overcome and slaine niger , and pacified the affaires and in the east , being returned to rome , he complaind in the senate of albinus , how little weighing the benefits received from him , he had sought to slay him by treason , and therefore was he forc'd to goe punish his ingratitude : afterwards he went into france , where he bereft him both of his state and life , whoever then shall in particular examine his actions , shall finde he was a very cruell lion , and as crafty a fox : and shall see that he was alwayes feard and reverenc'd by every one , and by the armies not hated ; and shall nothing marvell that he being a new man , was able to hold together such a great empire : for his extraordinary reputation defended him alwayes from that hatred , which the people for his extortions might have conceiv'd against him . but antonius his sonne , was also an exceeding brave man , and endued with most excellent qualities , which causd him to be admird by the people , and acceptable to the souldiers , because he was a warlike man , enduring all kind of travell and paines , despising all delicate food , and all kinde of effeminacy , which gaind him the love of all the armies : neverthelesse his fiercenesse and cruelty were such , and so hideous , having upon many particular occasions put to death a great part of the people of rome , and all those of alexandria , that he grew odious to the world , and began to be feard by those also that were neare about him ; so that he was slaine by a centurion in the very midst of his army . where it is to be noted , that these kinde of deaths , which follow upon the deliberation of a resolv'd and obstinate minde , cannot by a prince be avoyded : for every one that feares not to dye , is able to doe it ; but a prince ought to be lesse afraid of it , because it very seldome falls our . only should he beware not to doe any extreamd injury to any of those of whom he serves himself , or that he hath near about him in any imployment of his principality , as antonius did : who had reproachfully slaine a brother of that centurion ; also threatned him every day , & neverthelesse entertaind him still as one of the guards of his body , which was a rash course taken , and the way to destruction , as befell him . but let us come to commodus for whom it was very easie to hold the empire , by reason it descended upon him by inheritance , being marcus his sonne , and it had been enough for him to follow his fathers footsteps , and then had he contented both the people and the soldiers : but being of a cruell and savage desposition , whereby to exercise his actions upon the people , he gave himselfe to entertaine armies , and those in all licentionsnesse . on the other part not maintaining his dignity , but often descending upon the stages to combate with fencers , and doing such other like base things , little worthy of the imperiall majesty , he became contemptible in the soldiers sight ; and being hated of one part , and despisd of the other , he was conspird against , and slaine . it remaines now , that we declare maximinus his conditions , who was a very warlike man ; and the armies loathing alexanders effeminacy , whereof i spake before , when they had slain him , chose this man emperour , who not long continu'd so , because two things there were that brought him into hatred and contempt ; the one because he was very base , having kept cattell in thrace , which was well knowne to every one , and made them to scorne him ; the other , because in the beginning of his principality having delayd to goe to rome , and enter into possession of the imperiall throne , he had gaind the insamy of being thought exceeding cruell , having by his prefects in rome , and in every place of the empire , exercisd many cruelties , insomuch that the whole world being provok'd against him to contempt for the basenesse of his blood ; on the other side upon the hatred conceiv'd against him for feare of his crulty ; first affrica , afterwards the senate , with all the people of rome and all italy , conspired against him , with whom his own army took part ; which incamping before aquileya , and finding some difficulty to take the town , being weary of his cruelties , and because they saw he had so many enemies , fearing him the lesse , slew him . i purpose not to say any thing either of heliogabalus , macrinus , or itlian , who because they were throughly base , were sudenly extinguish ; but i will come to the conclusion of this discourse ; and i say , that the princes of our times have lesse of this difficulty to satisfie the soldiers extraordinarily in their government ; for notwithstanding that there be some considerations to be had of them , yet presently are those armies dissolv'd , because none of these princes do use to maintaine any armies together , which are annex'd and inveterated with the governments of the provinces , as were the armies of the romane empire . and therefore if then it was necessary rather to content the soldiers than the people , it was because the soldiers were more powerfull than the people : now is it more necessary for all princes , ( except the turk and the souldan ) to satisfie their people than their soldiers , because the people are more mighty than they ; wherein i except the turk , he alwayes maintaining about his person foot , and horse , upon which depends the safety and strength of his kingdome ; and it is necessary that laying afide all other regard of his people , he maintaine these his friends . the souldans kingdome is like hereunto , which being wholy in the souldiers power , he must also without respect of his people keep them his friends . and you are to consider , that this state of the souldans differs much from all the other principalities : for it is very like the papacy , which cannot be termd an hereditary principality : nor a new principality : for the sons of the deceasd prince are not heires and lords thereof , but he that is chosen receives that dignity from those who have the authority in them . and this order being of antiquity , cannot be termd a new principality , because therein are none of those difficulties that are in the new ones : for though the prince be new , yet are the orders of that state ancient , and ordaind to receive him , as if he were their hereditary prince . but let us returne to our matter ; whosoever shall consider our discourse before , shall perceive that either hatred , or contempt haye caus'd the ruine of the afore-named emperors ; and shall know also , from it came that part of them proceeding one way , and part a contrary ; yet in any of them the one had a happy success , and the others unhappy : for it was of no availe , but rather hurtful for pertinax and alexander , because they were new princes , to desire to imitate marcus , who by inheritance came to the principality : and in like manner it was a wrong to caracalla , commodus , and maximus , to imitate severus , because none of them were endued with so great valor as to follow his steps therein . wherefore a new prince in his principality cannot well imitate marcus his actions ; nor yet is it necessary to follow those of severus : but he ought make choyce of those parts in severus which are necessary for the founding of a state ; and to take from marcus those that are fit and glorious to preserve a state which is already established and setled . chap. xx. whether the citadels and many other things which princes often make use of , are profitable or dammageable . some princes , whereby they might safely keep their state , have disarmed their subjects ; some others have held the towns under their dominion , divided into factions ; others have maintain'd enmities against themselves ; others have appli'd themselves to gain them , where they have suspected at their entrance into the government ; others have built fortresses ; and others again have ruined and demolished them : and however that upon all these things , a man cannot well pass a determinate sentence , unless one comes to the particulars of these states , where some such like determinations were to be taken ; yet i shall speak of them in so large a manner , as the master of it self will bear . it was never then that a new prince would disarme his own subjects ; but rather when he hath found them disarm'd , he hath alwaies arm'd them . for being belov'd , those armes become thine ; those become faithful , which thou hadst in suspicion ; and those which were faithful , are maintaind so ; and thy subjects are made thy parrisans ; and because all thy subjects cannot be put in armes , when thou bestowest favors on those thou armest , with the others thou canst deal more for thy safety ; and that difference of proceeding which they know among them , obliges them to thee ; those others excuse thee , judgeing it necessary that they have deservd more , who have undergone more danger , and so have greater obligation : but when thou disarmst them , thou beginst to offend them , that thou distrustest them , either for cowardise , or small faith ; and the one or the other of those two opinions provokes their hatred agaist thee ; and because thou canst not stand disarmed , thou must thenturn thy self to mercenary soldiery , whereof we have formerly spoken what it is , and when it is good ; it can never be so much as to defend thee from powerful enemies , and suspected subjects ; therefore as i have said , a new prince in a new principality hath alwaies ordaind them armes . of examples to this purpose , histories are full . but when prince gains a new state , which as a member he adds to his ancient dominions , then it is necessary to disarme that state , unless it be those whom thou hast discoverd to have assisted thee in the conquest thereof ; and these also in time and upon occasions , it is necessary to render delicate and effeminate , and so order them , that all the arms of thy state be in the hands of thy own soldiers , who live in thy ancient state near unto thee . our ancestors and they that were accounted sages , were wont to say that it was necessary to hold pistoya in factions , and pisa with fortresses ; and for this cause maintaind some town ssubject to them in differences , whereby to hold it more easily . this , at what time italy was ballanc'd in a certain manner , might be well done ; but mee thinks it cannot now a dayes be well given for a precept ; for i do not beleeve , that divisions made can do any good ; rather it must needs be , that when the enemy approaches them , cities divided are presently lost ; for alwaies the weaker part will cleave to the forrein power , and the other not be able to subsist . the venetians ( as i think ) mov'd by the aforesaid reasons , maintaind the factions of the guelfes and gibellins , in their townes ; and however they never suffer'd them to spill one anothers blood , yet they nourish'd these differences among them , to the end that the citizens imployd in these quarrels , should not plot any thing against them : which as it prov'd , never serv'd them to any great purpose : for being defeated at vayla , presently one of those two factions took courage and seizd upon their whole state. therefore such like waies argue the princes weakness ; for in a strong principality they never will suffer such divisions ; for they shew them some kind of profit in time of peace , being they are able by means thereof more easily to mannage their subjects : but war comming , such like orders discover their fallacy . without doubt , princes become great , when they overcome the difficulties and oppositions that are made against them ; and therefore fortune especially when she hath to make any new prince great , who hath more need to gain reputation than an hereditary prince , causes enemies to rise against him , and him to undertake against them : to the end he may have occasion to master them , and know that ladder , which his enemies have set him upon , whereby to rise yet higher . and therefore many think , that a wise prince when he hath the occasion , ought cunningly to nourish some enmity , that by the suppressing thereof , his greatness may grow thereupon . princes , especially those that are new , have found more faith and profit in those men , who in the beginning of their state , have been held suspected , than in those who at their entrance have been their confidents . pandulphus petrucci , prince of siena , governd his state , more with them that had been suspected by him , than with the others . but of this matter we cannot speak at large , because it varies according to the subject ; i will only say this , that those men , who in the beginning of a principality were once enemies , if they be of quality so that to maintain themselves they have need of support , the prince might alwaies with the greatest facility gain for his ; and they are the rather forced to serve him faithfully , insomuch as they know it is more necessary for them by their deeds to cancel that sinister opinion , which was once held of them ; and so the prince ever draws from these more advantage , than from those , who serving him too supinely , neglect his affairs . and seing the matter requires it , i will not omit to put a prince in mind , who hath a new made himself master of a state ; by means of the inward helps he had from thence that he consider well the cause that mov'd them that favor'd him to favor him , if it be not a natural affection towards him ; for if it be only because they were not content with their former government , with much pains and difficulties shall he be able to keep them long his friends , because it will be impossible for him to content them . by these examples then which are drawn out of ancient and modern affaires , searching into the cause hereof , we shall find it much more easie to gain those men for friends , who formerly were contented with the state , and therefore were his enemies : than those , who because they were not contented therewith , became his friends , and favor'd him in getting the mastery of it . it hath been the custome of princes , whereby to hold their states more securely , to build citadels , which might be bridles and curbs to those that should purpose any thing against them , and so to have a secure retreat from the first violences . i commend this course , because it hath been used of old ; notwithstanding nicholas vitelli in our dayes hath been known to demolish two citadel in the town of castello , the better to keep the state ; guidubaldo duke of vrbin being to return into his state , out of which he was driven by caesar borgia , raz'd all the fortresses , of that countrey , and thought he should hardlyer lose that state again without them . the bentivodi returning into bolonia , used the like courses . citadels then are profitable , or not , according to the times ; and if they advantage thee in one part , they do thee harme in another , and this part may be argued thus . that prince who stands more in fear of his own people than of strangers , ought to build fortresses : but he that is more afraid of strangers than of his people , should let them alone . against the house of sforza , the castle of milan , which francis sforza built , hath and will make more war , than any other disorder in that state : and therefore the best citadel that may be , is not to incurre the peoples hatred ; for however thou holdest a fortress , and the people hate thee , thou canst hardly scape them ; for people , when once they have taken armes , never want the help of strangers at their need to take ther parts . in our dayes we never saw that they ever profited any prince , unless it were the countess of furli , when count hieronymo of furli her husband was slain ; for by means thereof she escap'd the peoples rage , and attended aid from milan , and so recover'd her state : and then such were the times that the stranger could not assist the people : but afterwards they serv'd her to little purposes when caesar borgia assaild her , & that the people which was her enemy , sided with the stranger . therefore both then , and at first , it would have been more for her safety , not to have been odious to the people , than to have held the fortresses . these things being well weigh'd then , i will commend those that shall build up fortresses , and him also that shall not ; and i will blame him , howsoever he be , that relying upon those , shall make small account of being hated by his people . chap. xxi , how a prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation . there is nothing gains a prince such repute as great exploi●s , and rare tryals of himself in heroick actions . we have now in our dayes ferdinand king of arragon the present king of spain : he in a manner may be termed a new prince ; for from a very weak king , he is now become for fame and glory , the first king of christendome , and if you shall wel consider his actions , you shall find them all illustrious , and every one of them extraordinary . he in the beginning of his reign assaild granada , and that exploit was the ground of his state. at first he made that war in security , and without suspicion he should be any waies hindred , and therein held the barons of castiglias minds busied , who thinking upon that war , rever minded any innovation ; in this while he gaind credit and authority with them , they not being aware of it ; was able to maintain with the church and the peoples money all his soldiers , and to lay a foundation for his military ordinances with that long war , which afterwards gaind him exceeding much honor . besides this , to the end he might be able hereamong to undertake greater matters , serving himself alwaies of the colour of religion , he gave himself to a kind of religious cruelty , chasing and dispoyling those jewes out of the kindome ; nor can this example be more admirable and rare : under the same cloke he invaded affrick and went through with his exploit in italy : and last of all hath he assaild france , and so alwaies proceeded on forwards contriving of great matters , which alwaies have held his subjects minds in peace and admiration , and busied in attending the event , what it should be : and these his actions have thus grown , one upon another , that they have never given leisure to men so to rest , as they might ever plot any thing against them . moreover it much avails a prince to give extraordinary proofes of himself touching the government within , such as those we have heard of bernard of milan , whensoever occasion is given by any one , that may off ctuate some great thing either of good or evil , in the civil government ; and to find out some way either to reward or punish it , whereof in the wolud much notice may be taken . and above all things a prince ought to endeavor in all his actions to spread abroad a fame of his magnificence and worthiness . a prince also is well esteemed , when he is a true friend , or a true enemy ; when without any regard he discovers himself in favor of one against another ; which course shall be alwaies more profit , than to stand neuter : for if two mighty ones that are thy neighbors , come to fall out , or are of such quality , that one of them vanquishing , thou art like to be in fear of the vanquisher , or not ; in either of these two cases , it will ever prove more for thy profit , to discover thy self , and make a good war of it : for in the first case , if thou discoverest not thy selfe , thou shalt alwaies be a prey to him that overcomes , to the contentment and satisfaction of the vanquisht ; neither shalt thou have reason on thy side , nor any thing else to defend or receive thee . for he that overcomes , will not have any suspected friends that give him no assistance in his necessity : and he that loses , receives thee not , because thou wouldest not with thy armes in hand run the hazzard of his fortune . antiochus passed into greece , thereunto induc'd by the etolians , to chace the romans thence : and sent his ambassadors to the achayans , who were the romans friends , to perswade them to stand neuters ; on the other side the romans moved them to joyne armes with theirs : this matter came to be deliberated on in the council of the achayans , where antiochus his ambassador encouraged them to stand neuters , whereunto the romans ambassador answerd ; touching the course , that is commended to you , as best and profitablest for your state , to wit , not to intermeddle in the war between us , nothing can be more against you : because , not taking either part , you shall remain without thanks , and without reputation a prey to the conqueror . and it will alwaies come to pass that he who is not thy friend , will requite thy neutrality ; and he that is thy friend , will urge thee to discover thy self by taking arms for him : and evil advised princes , to avoyd the present dangers , folow often times that way of neutrality , and most commonly go to ruine : but when a prince discovers himself strongly in favor of a party , if he to whom thou cleavest , overcomes , however that he be puissant , and thou remainest at his disposing , he is oblig'd to thee , and there is a contract of friendship made ; and men are never so openly dishonest , as with such a notorious example of dishonesty to oppress thee . besides victories are never so prosperous , that the conqueror is like neglect all respects , and especially of justice . but if he to whom thou stickst , loses , thou art received by him ; and , while he is able , he aydes thee , and so thou becomest partner of a fortune that may arise again ; the second case , when they that enter into the lists together , are of such quality , that thou needest not fear him that vanquisheth , so much the more is it discretion in thee to stick to him ; for thou goest to ruine one with his assistance , who ought to do the best he could to save him , if he were well advised ; and he overcomming , is left at thy discretion , and it is unpossible but with thy ayd he must overcome . and here it is to be noted , that a prince should be well aware never to joyn with any one more powerfull than himself , to offend another , unless upon necessity , as formerly is said . for when he overcomes , thou art left at his discretion , and princes ought avoid as much as they are able , to stand at anothers discretion . the venetians took part with france against the duke of milan , and yet could have avoided that partaking , from which proceeded their ruine . but when it cannot be avoyded , as in befel the florentines when the pope and the king of spain went both with their armies to lombardy , there the prince ought to side with them for the reasons aforesaid . nor let any state think they are able to make such sure parties , but rather that they are all doubtfull ; for in the order of things we find it alwaies , that whensoever a man seeks to avoid one inconvenient , he incurs another . but the principal point of judgement , is in discerning between the qualities of inconvenients , and not taking the bad for the good . moreover a prince ought to shew himself a lover of vertue , and that he honors those that excel in every art. afterwards ought he encourage his citizens , whereby they may be enabled quickly to exercise their faculties as well in merchandise , and husbandry , as in any other kind of traffick , to the end that no man forbear to adorne and cultivate his possessions for fear that he be despoyled of them ; or any other to open the commerce upon the danger of heavy impositions : but rather to provide rewards for those that shall set these matters afoot , or for any one else that shall any way amplifie his city or state. besides he ought in the fit times of the year entertain the people with feasts and maskes ; and because every city is devided into companies , and arts , and tribes , he ought to take special notice of those bodies , and some times afford them a meeting , and give them some proof of his humanity , and magnificence ; yet withall holding firme the majestie of his state ; for this must never fail in any case . chap. xxii . touching princes secretaries . it is no small importance to a prince , the choyce he makes , of servants being ordinarily good or bad , as his wisdome is , and first conjecture one gives of a great man , and of his understanding , is , upon the sight of his followers and servants he hath about him , when they prove able and faithful , and then may he alwaies be reputed wise because he hath known how to discern those that are able , and to keep them true to him . but when they are otherwise , there can be no good conjecture made of him ; for the first error he commits , is in this choyce . there was no man that had any knowledge of antony of vanafro , the servant of pandulfus petrucci prince of siena , who did not esteem pandulfus for a very discreet man , having him for his servant . and because there are three kinds of understandings ; the one that is advised by it self ; the other that understands when it is informed by another ; the third that neither is advised by it self nor by the demonstration of another ; the first is best , the second is good , and the last quite unprofitable . therefore it was of necessity , that if pandulfus attaind not the first degree , yet he got to the second ; for whenever any one hath the judgement to discerne between the good and the evil , that any one does and sayes , however that he hath not his invention from himself , yet still comes he to take notice of the good or evil actions of that servant ; and those he cherishes , and these he suppresses ; insomuch that the servant finding no means to deceive his master , keeps himself upright and honest . but how a prince may throughly understand his servant , here is the way that never fails . when thou seest the servant study more for his own advantage than thine , and that in all his actions , he searches most after his own profit ; this man thus qualified , shall never prove good servant , nor canst thou ever relie upon him : for he that holds the sterne of the state in hand , ought never call home his cares to his own particular , but give himself wholly over to his princes service , nor ever put him in minde of any thing not appertaining to him . and on the other side the prince to keep him good to him , ought to take a care for his servant , honoring him , enriching , and obliging him to him , giving him part both of dignities and offices , to the end that the many honors and much wealth bestowed on him , may restrain his desires from other honors , and other wealth , and that those many charges cause him to fear changes that may fall , knowing he is not able to stand without his master . and when both the princes and the servants are thus disposed , they may rely the one upon the other : when otherwise , the end will ever prove hurtfull for the one as well as for the other . chap. xxiii . that flatterers are to be avoyded . i will not omit one principle of great inportance , being an errour from which princes with much difficulty defend themselves , unlesse they be very discreet , and make a very good choice ; and this is concerning flatterors ; whereof all writings are full : and that because men please themselves so much in their own things , and therein cozen themselves , that very hardly can they escape this pestilence ; and desiring to escape it , there is danger of falling into contempt ; for there is no other way to be secure from flattery , but to let men know , that they displease thee not in telling thee truth : but when every one hath this leave , thou losest thy reverence . therefore ought a wise prince take a third course , making choyce of some understanding men in his state , and give only to them a free liberty of speaking to him the truth ; and touching those things only which he inquires of , and nothing else ; but he ought to be inquisitive of every thing , and hear their opinions , and then afterwards advise himself after his own manner ; and in these deliberations , and with every one of them so carrie himself , that they all know , that the more freely they shall speak , the better they shall be liked of : and besides those , not give eare to any one ; and thus pursue the thing resolved on , and thence continue obstinate in the resolution taken . he who does otherwise , either falls upon flatterers , or often changes upon the varying of opinions , from whence proceeds it that men conceive but slightly of him . to this purpose i will alledge you a moderne example . peter lucas a servant of maximilians the present emperor , speaking of his majesty , said that he never advised with any body , nor never did any thing after his own way : which was because he took a contrary course to what we have now said : for the emperor is a close man , who communicates his secrets to none , nor takes counsel of any one ; but as they come to be put in practise , they begin to be discovered & known , and so contradicted by those that are near about him ; and he as being an easy man , is quickly wrought from them . whence it comes that what he does to day , he undoes on the morrow ; and that he never understands himself what he would , nor what he purposes , & that there is no grounding upon any of his resolutions . a prince therefore ought alwayes to take counsell , but at his owne pleasure , & not at other mens ; or rather should take away any mans courage to advise him of any thing , but what he askes : but he ought well to aske at larger and then touching the things inquird of , be a patient heare , of the truth ; and perceiving that for some respect the truth were conceald from him , be displeased thereat . and because some men have thought that a prince that gaines the opinion to bee wise , may bee held so , not by his owne naturall indowments , but by the good counsells he hath about him ; without question they are deceivd ; for this is a generall rule and never failes , that a prince who of himselfe is not wise , can never be well advised , unlesse he should light upon one alone , wholly to direct and govern him , who himself were a very wise man. in this case it is possible he may be well governd : but this would last but little : for that governor in a short time would deprive him of his state ; but a prince not having any parts of nature , being advised of more then one , shall never be able to unite these counsels : of himself shall he never know how to unite them ; and each one of the counsellers , probably will follow that which is most properly his owne ; and he shall never find the meanes to amend or discerne these things ; nor can they fall out otherwise , because men alwayes prove mischievous , unlesse upon some necessity they be force'd to become good : we conclude therefore , that counsells from whencesoever they proceed , must needs take their beginning from the princes wisdome , and not the wisdome of the prince from good counsells . in this chapter our authour prescribes some rules how to avoyd flattery , and not to fall into contempt . the extent of these two extreames is so large on both sides , that there is left hut a very narrow path for the right temper to walke between them both : and happy were that prince , who could light on so good a pilote as to bring him to port between those rocks and these quicksands . where majesty becomes familiar , unlesse endued with a supereminent vertue , it loses all awfull regards : as the light of the sunne , because so ordinary , because so common , we should little value , were it not that all creatures feele themselves quickned by the rayes thereof . on the other side , omnis insipien arrogantiâ & plausibus capitur , every foole is taken with his owne pride and others flatteryes : and this foole keeps company so much with all great wise men , that hardly with a candle and lantern can they be discernd betwixt . the greatest men are more subject to grosse and palpable flatteries ; and especially the greatest of men , who are kings and princes : for many seek the rulers favour . prov. . . for there are divers meanes whereby private men are instructed ; princes have not that good hap : but they whose instruction is of most importance , so soone as they have taken the government upon them , no longer suffer any reproovers : for but few have accesse unto them , and they who familiary converse with them , doe and say all for favour . isocrat . to nicocles , all are afraid to give him occasion of displeasure , though by telling him truth . to this purpose therefore sayes one ; a prince excells in learning to ride the great horse , rather than in any other exercise , because his horse being no flatterer , will shew him he makes no difference between him and another man , and unlesse he keepe his seate well , will lay him on the ground . this is plaine dealing . men are more subtile , more double-heatred , they have a heart and a heart , netiher is their tongue their hearts true interpreter . counsell in the heart of man is like deepe waters ; but a man of understanding will draw is out . prov. . . this understanding is most requisite in a prince , in as much as the whole globe is in his hand , and the inferiour orbes are swayed by the motion of the highest . and therefore surely it is the honour of a king to search out such a secret : prov. . . his counsellours are his eyes and eares ; as they ought to be dear to him , so they ought to be true to him , and make him the true report of things without disguise . if they prove false eyes , let him pluck them out ; he may as they use glasse eyes , take them forth without paine , and see never a whit the worse for it . the wisdome of a princes counsellours is a great argument of the princes wisdome . and being the choyce of them imports the princes credit and safety , our authour will make him amends for his other errours by his good advice in his . chap. whether i referre him . chap. xxiv . wherefore the princes of italy have lost their states . when these things above said are well observ'd , they make a new prince seeme as if he had been of old , and presently render him more secure and firme in the state , than if he had already grown ancient therein : for a new prince is much more observd in his action , than a prince by inheritance ; and when they are known to bee vertuous , men are much more gaind and oblig'd to them thereby , than by the antiquity of their blood : for men are much more taken by things present , than by things past , and when in the present they find good , they content themselves therein , and seeke no further ; or rather they undertake the defence of him to their utmost , when the prince is not wanting in other matters to himself ; and so shall he gaine double glory to have given a beginning to a new principality , adornd , and strengthnd it with good lawes , good arms , good friends , and good examples ; as he shall have double shame , that is born a prince , and by reason of his small discretion hath lost it . and if we shall consider those lords , that in italy have lost their states in our dayes , as the king of naples , the duke of milan , and others ; first we shall find in them a common defect , touching their armes , for the reasons which have been above discoursd at length . afterwards we shall see some of them , that either shall have had the people for their enemies ; or be it they had the people to friend , could never know how to assure themselves of the great ones : for without such defects as these , states are not lost , which have so many nerves , that they are able to maintaine an army in the feld . philip of macedon , not the father of alexander the great , but he that was vanquished by titus quintius , had not much state in regard of the greatnesse of the romanes and of greece that assail'd him ; neverthelesse in that he was a warlike man and knew how to entertaine the people , and assure himself of the nobles , for many yeares he made the warre good against them : and though at last some town perhaps were taken from him , yet the kingdome remaind in his hands still . wherefore these our princes who for many yeares had continued in their principalities , for having afterwards lost them , let them not blame fortune , but their own sloth ; because they never having thought during the time of quiet , that they could suffer a change ( which is the common fault of men , while faire weather losts , not to provide for the tempest ) when afterwards mischiefes came upon them , thought rather upon flying from them , than upon their defence , and hop'd that the people , weary of the vanquishers insolence , would recall them : which course when the others faile , is good : but very ill is it to leave the other remedies for that : for a man wou'd never go to fall , beleeving another would come to take him up : which may either not come to passe , or if it does , it is not for thy security , because that defence of his is vile , and depends nor upon thee ; but those defences only are good , certaine , and durable , which depend upon thy owne selfe , and thy owne vertues . chap. xxv . how great power fortune hath in humane , affaires , and what meanes there is to resist it . it is not unknown unto me , how that many have held opinion , and still hold it , that the affaires of the world are so governd by fortune , and by god , that men by their wisdome cannot amend or alter them ; or rather that there is no remedy for them : and hereupon they would think that it were of no availe to take much paines in any thing , but leave all to be governd by chance . this opinion hath gain'd the more credit in our dayes , by reason of the great alteration of things , which we have of late seen , and do every day see , beyond all humane conjecture : upon which , i sometimes thinking , am in some paret inclind to their opinion : neverthelesse not to extingush quite our owne free will , i think it may be true , that fortune is the mistrisse of one halfe of our actions ; but yet that she lets us have rule of the other half , or little lesse . and i liken her to a precipitous torrent , which when it rages , over-flows the plaines , overthrowes the trees , and buildings , removes the earth from one side , and laies it on another , every one flyes before it , every one yeelds to the fury thereof , as unable to withstand it ; and yet however it be thus , when the times are calmer , men are able to make provision against these excesses , with banks and fences so , that afterwards when it swels again , it shall all passe smoothly along , within its channell , or else the violence thereof shall not prove so licentious and hurtfull . in like manner befals it us with fortune , which there shewes her power where vertue is not ordeind to resist her , and thither turnes she all her forces , where she perceives that no provisions nor resistances are made to uphold her . and if you shall consider italy , which is the seat of these changes , and that which hath given them their motions , you shall see it to be a plaine field , without any trench or bank ; which had it been fenc'd with convenienent vertue as was germany , spain or france ; this inundation would never heave causd these great alterations it hath , or else would it not have reach'd to us : and this shall suffice to have said , touching the opposing of fortune in generall . but restraining my selfe more to particulars , i say that to day we see a prince prosper and flourish and to morrow utterly go to ruine ; not seeing that he hath alterd any condition or quality ; which i beleeve arises first from the causes which we have long fince run over , that is because that prince that relies wholly upon fortune , runnes as her wheele turnes . i beleeve also , that he proves the fortunate man , whose manner of proceeding meets with the quality of the time ; and so likewise he unfortunate from whose course of proceeding the times differ : for we see that men , in the things that induce them to the end , ( which every one propounds to himselfe , as glory and riches ) proceed therein diversly ; some with respects , others more bold , and rashly ; one with violence , and the other with cunning ; the one with patience , th' other with its contrary ; and every one by severall wayes may attaine thereto ; we see also two veby respective and wary men , the one come to his purpose , and th' other not ; and in like maner two equally prosper , taking divers course ; the one being wary the other headstrong ; which proceeds from nothing else , but from the quality of the times , which agree , or not , with their proceedings . from hence arises that which i said , that two working diversly , produce the same effects & two equaly working , the one attains his end , the other not . hereupon also depends the alteration of the good ; for if to one that behaves himself with warinesse and patience , times and affaires turne so favourably , that the carriage of his businesse prove well , he prospers ; but if the times and affaires chance , he is ruind , because he changes not his manner of proceeding : not is there any man so wise , that can frame himselfe hereunto ; as well because he cannot go out of the way , from that whereunto nature inclines him : as also , for that one having alwayes prosperd , walking such a way , cannot be perswaded to leave it ; and therefore the respective and wary man , when it is fit time for him to use violence and force , knows not how to put it in practice , whereupon he is ruind : but if he could change hi disposition with the times and the affaires , he should not change his fortune . pope julius the second proceeded in all his actions with very great violence , and found the times and things so conformable to that his manner of proceeding that in all of them he had happy successe . consider the first exploit he did at bolonia , even while john bentivolio lived : the venetians were not well contented therewith ; the king of spain likewise with the french , had treated of that enterprises ; and nowithstanding al this , he stirrd up by his own rage and fiercenesse , personally undertook that expedition : which action of his put in suspence and stopt spaine and the venetians ; those for feare , and the others for desire to recover the kingdome of naples ; and on the other part drew after him the king of france ; for that king seeing him already in motion , and desiring to hold him his friend , whereby to humble the venetians , thought he could no way deny him his souldiers , without doing him an open injury . julius then effected that with his violent and heady motion , which no other pope with all humane wisdome could ever have done ; for it he had expected to part from rome with his conclusions settled , and all his affaires ordered before hand , as any other pope would have done , he had never brought it to passe : for the king of france would have devised a thousand excuses , and others would have put him in as many feares . i will let passe his other actions , for all of them were alike , and all of them prov'd lucky to him ; and the brevity of his life never sufferd him to feele the contrary : for had he litt upon such times afterwards , that it had been necessary for him to proceed with respects , there had been his utter ruine ; for he would never have left those wayes , to which he had been naturally inclind . i conclude then , fortune varying , and men continuing still obstinate to their own wayes , prove happy , while these accord together : and as they disagree , prove unhappy : and i think it true , that it is better to be heady than wary ; because fortune is a mistresse ; and it is necessary , to keep her in obedience to ruffle and force her : and we see , that she suffers her self rather to be masterd by those , than by others that proceed coldly . and therefore , as a mistresse , shee is a friend to young men , because they are lesse respective , more rough , and command her with more boldnesse . i have considered the chapter , as representing me a full view of humane policy and cunning : yet me thinks it cannot satisfie a christian in the causes of the good and bad successe of things . the life of man is like a game at tables ; skill availes much i grant , but that 's not all : play thy game well , but that will not winne : the chance thou throwest must accord with thy play . examine this ; play never so surely , play never so probably , unlesse the chance thoucastest , lead thee forward to advantage , all hazards are losses , and thy sure play leaves thee in the lurch . the sum of this is set down in ecclesiastes chap , . v. . the race is not to the swift , nor the battell to the strong ; neither yet bread to the wise , nor yet riches to men of understanding , nor yet favour to men of skill ; but time and chance hapeneth to them all . our cunning author for all his exact rules he delivere in his books , could not fence against the despight of fortune , as he complaines in his epistle to this booke . nor that great example of policy , duke valentine , whome cur author commends to princes for his crafts-master , could so ruffle or force his mistresse fortune , that he could keep her in obedience . man can contribute no more to his actions that vertue and wisdome : but the successe depends upon a power above . surely there is the finger of god ; or as prov. . v. . the lot is cast into the lap , but the whole disposing thereof is of the lord. it was nor josephs wisdome made all things thrive under his hand ; but because the lord was with him , & that which he did , the lord made it to prosper , gen . surely this is a blessing proceeding from the divine providence , which beyond humane capacity so cooperateth with the causes , as that their effects prove answerable , and sometimes ( that we may know there is something above the ordinary causes ) the success returns with such a supereminency of worth , that it far exceeds the vertue of the ordinary causes . chap. xxvi . an exhortation to free italy from the barbarians . having then weigh'd all things above discours'd , and devising with my self , whether at this present in italy the time might serve to honor a new prince , & whether there were matter that might minister occasion to a wise and valorous prince , to introduce such a forme , that might do honor to him , and good to the whole generality of the people in the countrey : me thinks so many things concurre in favor of a new prince , that i know not whether there were ever any time more proper for this purpose . and if as i said , it was necessary , desiring to see moses his vertue , that the children of israel should be inthrald in aegypt ; and to have experience of the magnanimity of cyrus his mind , that the persians should be oppress'd by the medes ; and to set forth the excellency of theseus , that the athenians should be dispersed ; so at this present now we are desirous to know the valor of an italian spirit , it were necessary italy should be reduc'd to the same termes it is now in , and were in more slavery than the hebrews were ; more subject than the persians ; more scatterd than the athenians ; without head , without order , battered , pillaged , rent asunder , overrun , and had undergone all kind of destruction . and however even in these later dayes , we have had some kind of shew of hope in some one , whereby we might have conjectur'd , that he had been ordained for the deliverance hereof , yet it prov'd afterwards , that in the very height of all his actions he was curb'd by fortune , insomuch that this poore countrey remaining as it were without life , attends still for him that shall heal her wounds , give an end to all those pillagings and sackings of lombardy , to those robberies and taxations of the kingdome , and of tuscany , and heal them of their soars , now this long time gangren'd . we see how she makes her prayers to god , that he send some one to redeem her from these barbarous cruelties and insolencies . we see her also wholly ready and disposed to follow any colours , provided there be any one take them up . nor do we see at this present , that she can look for other , than your illustrious family , to become cheiftain of this deliverance , which hath now by its own vertue and fortune been so much exalted , and favored by god and the church , whereof it now holds the principality : and this shall not be very hard for you to do , if you shall call to mind the former actions , and lives of those that are above named . and though those men were very rare and admirable , yet were they men , and every one of them began upon less occasion than this ; for neither was their enterprize more just than this , nor more easie ; nor was god more their friend , than yours . here is very great justice : for that war is just , that is necessary ; and those armes are religious , when there is no hope left otherwhere , but in them . here is an exceeding good disposition thereto : nor can there be , where there is a good disposition , a great difficulty , provided that use be made of those orders , which i propounded for aim and direction to you . besides this , here we see extraordinary things without example effected by god ; the sea was opened , a cloud guided the way , devotion poured forth the waters , and it rain'd down manna ; all these things have concurred in your greatness , the rest is left for you to do . god will not do every thing himself , that he may not take from us our free will , and part of that glory that belongs to us . neither is it a marvel , if any of the aforenamed italians have not been able to compass that , which we may hope your illustrious family shall : though in so many revolutions of italy , and so many feats of war , it may seem that the whole military vertue therein be quite extinguisht ; for this arises from that the ancient orders thereof were not good ; and there hath since been none that hath known how to invent new ones . nothing can so much honor a man rising a new , as new laws and new ordinances devised by him : these things when they have a good foundation given them , and contain in them their due greatness , gain him reverence and admiration ; and in italy their wants not the matter wherein to introduce any forme . here is great vertue in the members , were it not wanting in the heads . consider in the single fights that have been , and duels , how much the italians have excel'd in their strength , activity and address ; but when they come to armies , they appear not , and all proceeds from the weakness of the chieftaines ; for they that understand the managing of these matters , are not obeyed ; and every one presumes to understand ; hitherto there having not been any one so highly raised either by fortune or vertue , as that others would submit unto him . from hence proceeds it , that in so long time , and in so many battels fough for these last past years , when there hath been an army wholly italian , it alwaies hath had evil success ; whereof the river tarus first was witness , afterwards alexandria , capua , genua , vayla , bolonia , mestri . your illustrious family then being desirous to tread the footsteps of these worthyes who redeem'd their countreys , must above all things as the very foundation of the whole sabrick , be furnished with soldiers of your own natives : because you cannot have more faithful , true , nor better soldiers ; and though every one of them be good , all together they will become better when they shall find themselves entertained , commanded , and honored by their own prince . wherefore it is necessary to provide for those armes , whereby to be able with the italian valor to make a defence against forreiners . and however the swisse infantry and spanish be accounted terrible ; yet is there defect in both of them , by which a third order might not only oppose them , but may be confident to vanquish them : for the spaniards are not able to indure the horse , and the swisse are to feare the foot , when they incounter with them , as resolute in the fight as they ; whereupon it hath been seen , and upon experience shall be certain , that the spaniards are not able to beare up against the french cavalery , and the swisses have been routed by the spanish foot. and though touching this last , there hath not been any entire experience had , yet was there some proof thereof given in the battel of ravenna , when the spanish foot affronted the dutch battalions , which keep the same rank the swisses do , where the spaniards with their nimbleness of body , and the help of their targets entred in under their pikes , and there stood safe to offend them , the dutch men having no remedy : and had it not been for the cavalery that rusht in upon them , they had quite defeated them . there may then ( the defect of the one and other of these two infantries being discoverd ) another kind of them be a new ordained , which may be able to make resistance against the horse , and not fear the foot , which shall not be a new sort of armes , but change of orders . and these are some of those things which ordained a new , gain reputation and greatness to a new prince . therefore this occasion should not be let pass , to the end that italy after so long a time may see some one redeemed of hers appear . nor can i express with what dearness of affection he would be received in all those countreys which have suffered by those forrein scums , with what thirst of revenge , with what resolution of fidelity , with what piety , with what tears . would any gates be shut again him ? any people deny him obedience ? any envy oppose him ? would not every italian fully consent with him ? this government of the barbarians stinks in every ones nostrils . let your illustrious family then undertake this worthy exployt with that courage and those hopes wherewith such just actions are to be attempted ; to the end that under your colours , this countrey may be enabled , and under the protection of your fortune that saying of petrarch be verifyed . vertu contr'ul fuore prendera l'arme , & fia il combatter corto : che l'antico valore ne gli italici cor noné anchor morto . the life of castruccio castracani of lucca , composed by nicholas machiavelli , and presented to zanobiglioudilmonti and lingi alomanni his very good friends . zanobi and lingi , my very good friends , it seems a matter of great mervail to those that take it into consideration , how that all they , or the greater part of them , who have effected great things n● this world , and borne up their heads above others contemporaries , have taken their rises and births from obscure and base beginnings , or such as have been by fortune extraordinarily afflicted . for all of them have been either exposed to the mercy of savage creatures , or had such base sires , that as ashamed of them , they have feigned themselves sons to jupiter , or some other diety ; who these have been , every one having knowledge of many of them , we shall omit to relate , as superfluous , yeelding rather distaste than delight to the reader . i am indeed of opinion that it proceeds from hence , viz in that fortune willing to demonstrate unto the world , that she , and not wisdome , gives men their greatness , therefore begins to shew her strength at such a time , when wisdome can challenge no interest , but all rather is to be attributed as due to her alone . castruccio castracani of lucca was then one of those , who in regard of the times he liv'd in , and the city where he was borne , effected very great matters , and had , as others in this kind , neither a very fortunate nor known birth , as in my further discourse of his life it shall appear : which i thought fit to bring to memory , as having found therein a subject of very great example , as well in regard of valor , as fortune . and i thought i might the better direct this discourse unto you two , who of all that i know most delight in such glorious atchievements . i say then , that the family of the castracani is reckoned among the noble families of the city of lucca , however that in these daies it be much decayed , according to the course of all other worldly things . of this there was one antony borne , who took upon him religious orders , and was a canon of s. michaels at lucca , and in honor thereof was entituled master antony . he had but one sister , who was married to buonaccorso cennami ; but bnonaccorso being dead , and she remaining a widow , betook her self to live with her brother , with intention not to marry any more . mr. antony had behind his house where he dwelt , a vinyard , whereinto by reason of divers gardens bordering thereupon on several sides , the passage was very ordinary . it happened that one morning a little after the sun rise , dame dionora , for so was master antonies sister called , walking out into the vineyard , as she was gathering some herbs , after the manner of women , to make a sallet withall ; she heard somekind of russeling under a vine amongst the leaves , and casting her eye that way , she perceived some little cry there , whereupon drawing near to the noise , she discoverd the hands and face of an infant wrapt in the vine leaves , which seemed as if it asked her assistance : so that she partly marvailing , partly frighted , full of pitty and amazement , took it up in her armes , and having carried it home , and wash'd it , and swadled it in clean clouts , as they use children , at her return presented it to master antony : who considering the accident , and seeing the child , was as much amaz'd and compassionate as was his sister : and advising together what they should do in this case , resolved to bring it up , he being a priest , and she not having any children . having then taken a nurse into the house , they nourished it with as much tenderness as if it had been their own child ; and causing it to be baptized , named it castruccio after the name of their own father . castruccio as he increased in years , so he grew in person and feature , and in every thing he shewed wit and discretion : and quickly , according to his age , he learned whatsoever his master antony taught him : who purposing to make him a priest , and to turne over unto him his canonicate , and his other benifices , instructed him in that way : but he found him not a subject fit for that regular life : for so soon as castruccio came to years of age , he began to grow a little masterfull towards master antony and dame dionora , so that he stood no longer in fear of them , laying aside all church books , he began to handle armes , and took not delight in any thing more than to mannage them , or with others his equals to run , leap , or wrastle , and such other like exercises : wherein he shewed such courage and strength , that he far surpassed all others of his age ; and if any time he gave himself to reading , he took pleasure in nothing else than discourses of wars , and the actions of most famous men : for which cause master antony was much greived at heart . in the citty of lucca there happened to dwell a gentleman of the family of the guinigi , call'd master francis , who for fortunes , esteem , and valour , out-went all others the citizens of lucca : who was alwaies traind up in bearing of armes , and who had a long time serv'd under the vlscounts of milan ; and because he was a gibelline , he was accounted of a-above all that followed that faction in lucca . this man being then in lucca , and assembling morning and evening with the rest of the citizens under the governors palace , which is in the head of the palace of s. michael , being the prime place of lucca , oftentimes saw castruccio using of those exercises with other lads of the town , wherein i formerly said he took delight ; and perceiving that besides the mastring of them , he held over them a kind of princely authority , and that they again lov'd and reverenc'd him , he became very desirous to know what he was , whereof being inform'd by some there present , he became the more desirous to take him home to him ; and calling him one day to him , ask'd him , where he had rather live , either in a cavaliers house , where he might learn to ride and use his armes , or abide in a priests house , where nothing else were to be heard but their offices and masses ? master francis perceiv'd how much castruccio was cheared upon the mention of horses and armes ; yet he standing a little out of countenance , master francis again encouraging him to speak , he answered , that if his patron would therewith be content , he could not have a greater pleasure than to quit this calling of priest , and betake himself to that of a soldier . master francis was much satisfied with this reply : and in a short time so negotiated in this matter , that master antony gave him up to his charge , whereunto he was the rather moved by the lads inclination , judging thereby that he could not hold him much longer in his former course . castruccio then being prefer'd from mr. antony castracani the priests house to the palace of mr. francis guinigi the commander , it was a marvail to think in how short a time he attaind to those vertues and good qualities , which are required in a compleat cavaliere . first he became an excellent horseman : for he was able to mannage the roughest horse at ease ; and , though but a youth , in jousts and tournaments he was of prime remarque ; so that in any action of strength or activity , none could exceed him . these perfections besides were season'd with such manners , and good qualities , as that touching modesty , it was incredible how that either in word or deed he gave no distast to any ; to his superiors he yeelded reverence ; he was modest with his equals , and pleasant with his inferiors ; which gain'd him favor , not only in the whole family of guinigi , but also in the whole city of lucca . it chanced in those times , castru●cio being now arrived to eighteen years of age , that the gibellins were chased by the gulfes from pavia , in favor of whom master francis guinigi was sent for by the viscounty of milan , with whom went castruccio , as he on whose shoulders lay the charge of the whole troops : in which imployment , castruccio gave such proofs of his judgement and courage , that not one in this expedition gaind so much esteem as he , and his name became honorable , not only in pavia , but throughout all lombardy . castruccio being then returnd to lucca of far greater esteem than before his departure he was ; failed not ( to his power ) to gain himself friends , practising means to win them . but master francis guinigi now chancing to dye , and having left behind him a son named paul of years of age , appointed castruccio his tutor , and the governor of his estate ; having first caused him to be called to him before his death , and intreated him , that he would take upon him the eare to bring up his son with that faithfulness he had found himself ; and that what kindnesses he could not return to the father , he would requite to the son . and now at length master francis guinigi being dead , castruccio left tutor and governor to paul , grew in such credit and power , that the favor he was wont to find in lucca , in some part was turned into envy , and he was calumniated by many , as who they doubted had some projects upon a tyranny . among whom the principal was m. george opizi , head of the guelfes faction . this man hoping by the death of mr francis to remain without competitor in lucca , thought that castruccio , being left with that trust , by the grace & favor of his discreet carriage gaind him , had bereav'd him of all means to attain thereto ; and hereupon sowed many seeds of scandal against him , whereby to choak his well grown credit . which at first castruccio disdained , but afterwards grew jealous of it : for he thought that master george would never rest , till he had so far disgrac'd him with king robert of naples his lieuftenant , as to cause him to chase him out of lucca . at that time there was one vguccion of fagginolo of arezo , then lord of pisa , who by the pisans was first chosen for their commander , and afterwards made himself their lord. divers out-lawed luccheses of the gibellin faction abode with vguccion , whom castruccio practised to restore again with vguccions aid ; and this design he communicated also with his friends at home , who could no way endure the opizies authority . having therefore given order , as was requisite , to this purpose , castruccio fortified the tower of the honesti , and furnished it with munition and store of victuals whereby upon occasion he might be able to defend himself therein for some time : and the night being come , which was agreed of with vguccion , he gave the signe to him , who was gone down into the plain with much people between the mountains and lucca ; and having seen the signal , he came close to saint peters gate , and fired the antiport : castruccio on the other side raised a great cry , calling the people to armes , and forced the gate on the other side within : so that vguccion entring with his men , forced the town , and slew master george with all those of his family , and many others his friends and partisans , and chased out the governor , and changed the state of the city , as vguccion liked best , to the great dammage thereof ; for it appeard then , that there were above a hundred families chased out of lucca . those that fled , part went to florence , and part to pistoya , which cities were then governed by the guelfes faction ; and hereupon they became enemies to vguccion and the lucheses . and upon this the florentines and the rest of the guelfes thinking the gibellines faction grown too mighty in tuscany , accorded together to restore again these exiled luccheses , and having levyed a huge army , they came to the vale of nievole , and seizing upon mount catino , from hence they went to incampe at mount carlo , whereby to have the passage open to lucca . whereupon vguccion having gathered a good army of pisans and luccheses besides many dutch horse which he drew out of lombardy , went to find the florentines camp , which perceiving the enemies approach was removed from mount carlo , and setled between mount catino and pescia ; and vguccion sat down under mount carlo about some two miles of the enemy , where for some daies between the horse of the two armies there passed some slight skirmishes : for vguccion being faln sick , the pisans and luccheses refused to come to battel with the enemy . but vguccions malady augmenting , he retired to mount carlo for his recovery , and committed the charge of the army to castruccio , which was the guelfes destruction : for hereupon they took courage , esteeming the enemies armies as left without a head : which castruccio understood , and lay still some few dayes , the more to confirm this their opinion , making shew of feare , and not suffering any one to goe out of the trenches : and on the other side the guelfes the more they saw this feare , the more insolent they became , and every day being orderd for fight , they presented themselves before castruccios army , who thinking he had now enough , emboldned them , and having had full notice of what order they kept , resolved to come to the tryall of a day : and first with his speeches he confirmd his soldiers courage , and shewd them the victory certaine , if they would follow his directious . castruccio had seene how the enemy had plac'd all his strength in the body of the army , & the weak●r sort in the wings thereof : whereupon he did the cleane contrary ; for he put his best soldiers in his wings , and his slightest people in the body : and issuing out of his trenches with this order , so soone as ever he came within view of the enemy , which solently , as before they had wont , came to find them out , he commanded that those squadrons in the middle should goe on leisurely , but that the rest should move with speed , insomuch that when they came to ioyne battell with the enemy , onely the wings of each army fought , and the troops in the middle stood unimployd , because the middle part of castruccio's army had lagguerd so much behind , that the enemyes body had not yet reach'd to them : and thus the ablest of castruccio's army came to fight with the weakest of the enemies , and the enemies strength lay idle , not able to endammage those they were to encounter with , nor could they ayd any of their owne party : so that without much difficulty , the enemies two wings were both put to flight , and they in the middle seeing themselves left naked on each flanke , without having whereupon to shew their valour , fled likewise . the rout and the slaughter were great : for there were slaine above ten thousand men , with many officers , and great cavaliers of the guelfes faction throughout all tuscany , and many princes who came thither in favour of them : to wit , peter , king roberts brother , and charles his nephew , and philip lord of taranto : but of castruccio's side they came not to above three hundred : among which francis vguccions sonne was slaine : who being young and over-venturous , was killd at the first onset . this overthrow much augmented castruccio's credit , so that vguccion grew so jealous and suspitious of his owne state , that he continually busied his brains how to bring him to destruction ; thinking with himselfe that that victory had rather taken his power from him , than setled it : and being in this thought , while he awaited some fair colour to effect his designes , it happned that pieragnolo michaeli was slaine in lucca , a man of good worth and esteeme , and the assassine fled into castruccio's house : where the captaines and serjeants going to apprehend him , were affronted , and hindred by castruccio , so that the murtherer by his ayd escaped , which thing vguccion , who was then at pisa , hearing , and deeming then he had just occasion to punish him , calld unto his owne sonne neri , to whom he had now given the command of lucca , and chargd him , that under colour of inviting castruccio , he should lay hold on him , and put him to death . whereupon castruccio going familiarly into the commanders pallaces , not fearing any injury , was first by neri entertaind at supper , and afterwards seised on . and neri doubting , lest by putting him to death , without any publick justification the people might bee inraged , kept him alive , till he were better informd by vguccion what was farther to be done in that case : who blaming his sonnes slownesse and cowardise , for the dispatching hereof went out of pisa with four hundred horse towards lucca : and hardly yet was he arriv'd at the baths , but the pisans took armes , and slew vguccions lieutenant , and the rest of his family , that remaind at pisa , and made count gaddo of gerardesca their lord : vguccion before he came to lucca , had notice of this accident befalne in pisa ; yet thought he it not fit to turne back , left the luccheses , like as the pisans , should also shot their gates against him . but the luccheses understanding the chance at pisa notwithstanding that vguccion was enterd lucca , taking this occasion to free castruccio , first began at their meetings in the piazze to speake slightly of him , afterwards to make some hub-bub , and from thence came to armes , demanding castruccio to be set free ; insomuch that vguccion for feare of worse , drew him out of prison : whereupon castruccio suddenly rallying his friends , with the peoples favour made an assault upon vguccion who finding no other remedy , fled thence with his friends , and so went into lombardy to the lords of scala , where afterwards he dy'd poorly . but castruccio being of a prisoner become as prince of lucca , prevaild so by his friends , and with this fresh gale of the peoples , favour that he was made generall of their forces for a yeare ; which being compassed , to gaine himselfe further credit in armes , he purposd to recover for the luccheses severall towne ; which rebelld after vguccions departue , and went also by the pisans favour , with whom he had enterd into league at the campe , to serezana ; and to winne that he had built over it a fort , which , being afterwards changed by the florentines , is now calld serezanello , and in two monthes space tooke the towne , and afterwards in strength of this credit , he wonne massa , carrara , and lavenza , and in short time all lunigiana : and to stop the passage that comes from lombarby into luginiana , he tooke pontremoli and drew out thence mr. anastasia palivicini , who was lord thereof . returning then to lucca with this victory , he was met by the whole people : whereupon castruccio resolving not to deferre longer to make himselfe prince , by meanes of pazzino of poggio puccinello of porcico , francisco boccansecehi , and cecco guinigi at that time of great repute in lucca , but corrupted by him , made himself lord thereof , and so solemnely and by resolution of the people was elected their prince . at this time frederck of baviere king of the romans came into italy to take the imperiall crown , whom castruccio made his friend , and went to him with five hundred horse , having left for his lieutenant at lucca paulo guinigi , whom in remembrance of his father , he made account of as his owne child . castruccio was entertaind very honourably by frederick , who gave him many priviledges , and made him his deputy in tuseany , and because the pisans had expelld gaddo of gerardesca , and for feare of him askd succours of frederick , he made castruccio their lord , whom the pisans accepted for feare of the guelfes faction , and in particular because of the florentines . frederick then being returned into germany , and having left at rome a governour for his affairs in italy , all the gibellins as well tuscans as lomdarbs that followd the imperial faction , had their recourse to castruccio , and each promisd him the principality of their native country ; provided that by his meanes they might be restord : among whom was mattheo guidi , nardo scolare , lapo vberti , gerozzi nardi and piero buonacorsi , all gibellins , and outlawd florentines : and castruccio plotting by helpe of these , and with his owne forces to become lord of all tuscany , to gaine himselfe credit the more , entred into amity with mr. metthem viscoti prince of milan : and traind up all the men ofhis owne city and country to armes : and because lucca had five gates , he divided the country into five parts , armd them , and distributed them under captaines and colours , so that on a sudden he was able to bring together above twenty thousand men into the field , besides the help he might have from pisa . he then being environd with these forces and freinds , it fortun'd that mr. mattheo visconti was assayled by the guelfes of piacuza ; who had driven out the gibellins , in whose behalfe the florentines and king robert had sent their troopes . whereupon mr. mattheo intreated castruccio to affaile the florentines , that they being constraind to defend their owne homes , should call back their men out of londarby . so castruccio with a good army entred the vale arno , took fucachio , and st. miniato with great dammage of the country ; and upon this occasion the florentines were forc'd to call back their troopes : who were hardly returnd into tuscany , but castruccio was compeld upon another necessity to haste back to lucca . and in that city the family of poggio being of such power and authority as that it had made castruccio not only great , but prince also , and not taking themselves to have been requited as they had deservd , agreed with other families of lucca to move the city to rebellion , and to chace castruccio thence ; whereupon taking occasion one morning they came armd upon the deputy , whom castruccio had there ordaind over justice , and slew him , and further purposing to raise the people to commotion ; steven of poggio an arcient and peaceable man , who had no hand at all in this conspiracy , came before them , constrain'd his friends by his autority amongst them , to lay aside their arms offering himselfe to mediate with castruccio for them , that he should satisfie their desires . thus they layd down their armes , but not with greater discretion than they had taken them up ; for castruccio having had notice of these novelties befalne in lucca , without making any delay , with part of his troops , leaving paul guinigi commander of the residue , came thence to lucca , where having found the tumult appeasd beyond his expectation , deeming he might with the more ease secure himselfe , disposed those of his party in severall places , as best was for his turne . steven of poggio thinking with himselfe , that castruccio was beholding to him , went to him , and intreated , not for himselfe , because he thought it no way needfull for him , but for the others of his family , praying that many things he would pardon , in respect of their youth , and many things in regard of the ancient amity , and obligation he had to the whole kindred . wherunto castruccio answered courteously , and bid him be of good cheere , and told him that he received more content the tumult was appeased , than he had had trouble that it was raysed , and perswaded steven to cause them all to come to him , saying , that he thank'd god he had given him opportunity to make a shew of his clemency , and bounty . they all then presenting themselves upon stevens word and castruccios , were together with steven imprisond , and put to death . in this meane while the florentines had recoverd s. miniato ; whereupon castruccio thought fit to stay that war : considering that as yet he was not secure of lucca , being that he could not safely part from home ; and haveing causd the florentines to be felt whether they would admit of a truce , he found them easily yeelding thereto ; for they also were weary of the charge , and desirous to stop the expence . whereupon they made a truce , of two yeares , and that every one should keep what they had gotten . in the meane while castruccio being freed from the war , that he might not again incurre those dangers and hazards which formerly he had run , under divers colours and pretences , cut off all those in lucca , who could have any ambition to to aspire to the principality , and pardoned not one of them , depriving them of their country and fortunes , and those he could get in his clutches , of their lives : affirming that he had found it by experience , that none of them would abide true ; and for his better safeguard , built a fortresse in lucca , and made use of the materials of their towers , whom he had banish'd and murdred . while castruccio was thus quiet with the florentines , and that he strengthened himselfe in lucca , he fail'd not to do all that he could , without entring into open hostility to increase his greatnesse : and having a great desire to take pistoya , thinking with himselfe that by the possessiou of that city , he had gotten one foot into florence , gain'd himselfe by divers wayes the whole mountaine to friend , and by the factions he made in pistoya , so behav'd himselfe , that every one rely'd much on him . at that time the city was divided ( as always it was ) into the bianchi and neri ; head of the bianchi was bastiano of possente ; and of the neri , james of gia : each of which held streight correspondence with castrucio , & one desir'd to expell the other , so that the one and the other after many suspicions came to blowes ; james made himselfe strong at the gate towards florence . bastiano at that towards lucca , and the one and the other of them relying more upon castruccio , than upon the florentines , judging him more ready and quick of dispatch in any thing touching the warre , each of them sent to him secretly for ayd : which castruccio promis'd to them both , letting james know that he would come in person , and telling bastiano , he would send paul guinigi his foster son : and appointing a set time , sent paul by way of pescia , and himselfe went straight on to pistoya ; so that about midnight , for thus was it agreed between castruccio and paul , they both arrived at pistoya and there receiv'd as friends : being both entred , when castruccio found his time , he gave the watchword to paul , whereupon he slew james of gia , and the other bastiano of possente ; and all their partakers were partly taken , partly slaine , whereupon they forced pistoya without resistance ; and for the government of the towne , castruccio constrained the people to yeeld him obedience , remitting to them many old debts and dutyes , and thus did he to the whole country there abouts , who all flock't together : partly to see the new prince , so that every one fraught with hopes , or admiring his valour , set his heart at rest . it happened about this time , that the people of rome mutinyed upon the extreame dearth of provision there , which was caused by the popes absence , who was then at avignon , and they blamed the germane government , insomuch that every day murders and other disorders were committed , which henry the emperours deputy could no way remedy ; whereupon he had a great suspicion that the romanes would call in king robert of naples , and chace him from rome , and so restore it to the pope : and having no nearer allie , whom he could make recourse unto , than castruccio , he sent to intreat him , that he would be pleased , not only to send him aid , but to come himself also in person . castruccio thought this voyage was no way to be put off , as well to render some service of merit to the emperour , as because now the emperour was absent from rome , there was some necessity of it : leaving paul guinigi at lucca , he went thence with two hundred horse to rome , where he was entertain'd by henry , with very much honour ; and his presence in a short time gave so much credit to the imperials , that without blood or other violence , all things were wel quieted : for castruccio having caused a good quantity of corne to be brought by sea out of the countey about pisa , took away all occasion of offence . afterwards , partly by admonishing , partly by chastsing the cheif officers of rome , he reduc'd them freely under henries government ; & castruccio was created a roman senator , besides many other honors he received of the people , and that order he took with very great pomp , putting on a gown of cloth of tissue with great letters before to this purpose , this man is what it pleases god ; and again behind , and shall be what god will. in this mean while the florentines , who were displeased that castruccio during the truce , had made himself lord of pistoya , devis'd which way they might make it rebel , which by reason of his absence , they thought might easily be effected . amongst the banished pistoyeses , who were then at florence , there was baldo cocchi , and james baldini , both men of authority , and ready for any hazard . these men held correspondence with some friends they had within ; so that with the florentines helpe they entred by night into pistoya , and chaced thence castruccios friends and officers , and some of them they slew , and restored the city her liberty , which news much displeased castruccio ; so that having taken leave of henry , he came with his men by great dayes journeys to lucca . the florentines when they had word of castruccios return , thinking he would not take much rest , resolv'd to prevent him , and with their forces to enter first into the vale of nievola , before him : supposing , that if they first made themselves masters of that valley , they should cut off from him all means of possibility to recover pistoya ; and so having put in order a great army of all the friends of the guelfes faction , they came into the territory of pistoya . on the other side , castruccio came with his troops to mount carlo , and having learned where the florentines army was , determined not to meet them in the plain of pistoya , nor to attend them in the plain of psecia , but if it might be , to encounter them in the straight of saravalla ; deeming that by bringing his designe to pass , he should surely gain the victory ; for he understood the florentines had got together some forty thousand men , and he had made choyce of some twelve thousand out of all his ; and however he was confident of his own industry , and their valor , yet doubted he , lest if he set on them in a large place , he might be environ'd by the multitude of the enemies . saravalla is a castle between pescia and pistoya , plac't upon a hill that shuts in the vale of nievole , not upon the very passage , but above to that some two bow-shots of the place , by which a man passes , is more straight than on the sudden ; for of every side it rises gently but in a straight manner , especially upon the hill , where the waters are divided ; so that twenty men on the one side and the other would wholly possess it . in this place castruccio had a designe to encounter with the enemy , as well because his small troops should have the advantage , as not to discover the enemy but just upon the skirmish , fearing lest his men seeing the number of the enemies , should be startled . mr. manfredi of the german nation , was then lord of the castle of saravalla , who before that castruccio was lord of pistoya , had been lest in that castle , as in a place that was neuter between the luccheses and pistoyeses : nor afterward befel it either of them to offend him , he promising to abide neuter , and not to apply himself to the one or the other : so that for this cause , and for that the situation was strong , he had kept himself thus : but upon this accident castruccio became desirous to possess this place . and having very near acquaintance with one of the inhabitants of the place , he so appointed his business with him , that the night before the skirmish was to begin , he should take into the town m●n of his , and slay the commander ; and abiding thus prepared , he stirred not his army from mount carlo , the more to encourage the florentines to pass , who , because they desired to carry the war far of from pistoya , and to bring it into the vale of nievole , encamped under saravalla , with intintion the day following to pass the hill , but castruccio having without any noyse taken the castle in the might , p●rted from mount carlo about mid-night , and quietly arrived in the morning at the foot of saravalla , so that at the same instant both the florentines and he began to ascend the side of the hill . castruccio had sent his infantry by the rode way , & a troop of horse he had sent upon the left hand towards the castle : on the other side the florentines had sent horse before them , and after those their foot moved , not any way thinking they should find castruccio upon the top of the hill ; for they knew nothing of that he had made himself master of the castle . thus at unawares the florentine horse having got to the top of the hill discovered castruccios foot , and were so near approached them , that they had hardly time to lace on their helmets . these men then that were unprovided , being assaild by the others that were prepared , and in order , were fiercely set upon , and with much adoe made resistance and indeed some few of them made head a while : but so soon as the noyse hereof desended into the florentines camp , all was full of confusion . the horse were oppressed by the foot ; the foot by the horse , and their carriages ; the commanders because of the straifness of the place could neither advance nor retire : so that no man in this confusion knew what could or should be done : insomuch , that the horse which were at blowes with the enemies foot , were cut to pieces , and they not able to defend themselves because the malignity of the scite did not suffer them , yet made they resistance more of necessity than of valor ; for being hemmed in by the mountains on both sides behind by their friends , and before by their enemies , they had to way open for flight . hereupon castruccio having perceived that his troops were not able to break the enemy , sent a thousand foot by way of the castle , causing them to desend with the horse which he had sent before , who struck them so rudely upon the flank that the florentines unable longer to resist that violence , vanquisht rather by the place than by the enemy , all took them to flight ; and the flight began from those who were behind towards pistoya , who dispersing themselves all along the plain , every one where he best could , provided for his safeguard . this defeat was very great and bloody ; many commanders were taken , among which was bandino of rossi , francesco brunnelleschi , and john of tosa , all noble florentines , and many other tuscans , besides divers of the kingdom of naples , who being sent by king robert in favor of the guelfes , served under the florentines . the pistoyeses hearing of this rout , without delay chasing out the faction of the guelfes , yeelded themselves to castruccio . who not contented herewith , took piato , and all the castles of the plain , as well on this as on the other side of arno , and set himself down with his army in the plain of perettola some two miles off from florence , where he abode many dayes to divide the spoyle , and to feast for joy of the victory gotten , causing moneys to be stamped in scorn of the florentines , and races to be run by horse-men and queans : neither faild he to endeavor to corrupt some noble citizens , to open to him in the night the gates of florence ; but the conspiracy being discovered , they were taken and beheaded , among whom was thomas lupacco , and lambertuccio frescobaldi . hereupon the florentines being affrighted upon his defeat , hardly knew any remedy to preserve their liberty ; and to the end they might be sure of ayd , sent ambassadors to robert king of naples , to give him the city , and the dominion thereof , which that king accepied of , not so much for the honor the florentines had done him , as for that he knew well how much it imported his state that the guelfes faction should maintain the state of tuscany : and having agreed with the florentines to have of them two hundred thousand florentines by the year , he sent charles his son with four thousand horse to florence : so that the florentines were somewhat eased of castruccios troops : for they were constraind to leave their territories and to goe to pisa , there to repress a conspiracy made against him by benedicto lanfranschi , one of the cheif of pisa , who not being able to endure that his native countrey should be enthralled to a lucchese , conspired against him , plotting to seize upon the cittadel , and to chase out the garrison , and to slay those of castruccio's party . but because in such matters , if the small number be fit to keep the secret , yet suffices it not to put it in execution : while he went about to gain more men to this purpose , some there were that be wrayed his plot to castruccio : neithet passed this discovery without the infamy of bonifacio cerchi and iohn guidi florentines , who were near neighbors to pisa ; whereupon benedicto being layd hand on , was put to death , and all the rest of that family banisht , and many other noble citizens beheaded : and thinking with himself that pistoya and pisa were not very faithfull unto him , he took care both by his industry and forces to secure himself thereof : which gave leisure to the florentines to recover their strength , and to be able to attend the return of charles : who being arrived , they determined to lose no longer time , and gatherd ae great number of men ; for they called together to their ayd in a manner all the guelfes in italy , and made an exceeding great army : of more than foot , and horse , and having advised , which were first to be assaild , either pistoya or pisa , they resolved it were better to set first upon pisa , being a thing more likely to succeed , by reason of the late conspiracy there , as also of more profit , deeming that if pisa were once gotten , pistoya would soon render it self . the florentines then going forth with this army in the beginning of may , suddenly took lastra signia , mount lupo , and empoli , and came with their army to st. miniato ; castruccio on the other part perceiving this great army , which the florentines had brought againe him , was nothing startled , but rather thought that this was the time , when fortune was to give him in his hand the whole dominion of tuscany , beleeving they should have no better success in this of pisa , than formerly they had in that of serravalle ; and that now they could not hope to repair themselves again , as then ; whereupon assembling twenty thousand foot and horse , he brought his army to fucchio , and sent paul guinigi with foot to pisa . fucchio is seated in a stronger place than any other castle , upon the territory of pisa , because it is in the midst between the goseiana and the arno , and a little raised from the plain ; where he abiding , the enemies were not able , unless they divided their army into two parts ; to hinder his provision either from lucca , or pisa ; neither could they but upon disadvantage either come upon him , or goe towards pisa : for in one case , they might be inclosed in the midst between castruccios troops , and those of pisa ; in the other case , having the arno to pass , they could not do it with the enemy on their backs , without very great danger . and castruccio for their encouragement to undertake the passage , had not placed himself with his troops along the bank of arno , but a little aside near unto the walls of fucchio , and had left distance enough between the river and him . the florentines having gotten st. miniato , advised whether were to be done , either to goe to pisa , or to find out castruccio ; and having measured the difficulties of both courses , they resolved to goe and invest him ; the river arno was so low that a man might wade over it ; but yet not so , but that the infantry was wet to the shoulders , and the horse even to the saddle . upon the tenth day then of june in the morning , the florentines in battel array , caused part of their cavalery to begin to pass , and a body of ten thousand foot. castruccio who stood ready , and intent to what he had in his mind to do , with a battalion of five thousand foot , and three thousand horse fell upon them : neither gave he them any time to get out of the water but that he was at blowes with them ; he sent a thousand light armed foot up by the bank on that part , under the arno , and a thousand above it , the florentines foot were much distressed with the water and weight of their armes , nor had they all yet got over the channel of the river . when some of the horse had passed , by reason that they had moord the bottom of the arno , they made the passage the uneasier for them that came after them ; for the bottom proving rotten and miry , some of the horse came over and over on their riders , and many stuck so fast in the mud that they were there stabled : whereupon the florentine commanders seeing the difficulty to pass on that part , caused them to retire and make proof of a higher part of the river , whereby to find a sounder bottom , and the channel more favorable for their passage : against whom those whom castruccio had sent under the bank , made resistance , who slightly armed with targets and darts , in their hands , with huge outcries , wounded them both in the face and brest , insomuch that the horses affrighted both with the cryes and stroaks , would in no wise pass forwards , but fell foule one upon another ; the fight between castrucio's men and those that were already past , was sharp and terrible , andd of each side there fell many , and every one used all his skill and strength to overcome his adversary . castruccio's men would force them back into the river ; the florentines striv'd to put forwards to make place for others , that being come forth of the water , they might be able to stand to the fight , to which obstinacy there was added the captains encouragements . castrucio put his men in mind , that these were the same enemies , which but a little while ago they had beaten at seravalle . the florentines reproached theirs , that they being many , should suffer a few to overcome them . but castruccio perceiving that the fight lasted , and that his own and his adversaries were well wearied , and that on each side many were hurt and slain , he sent out another band of five thousond foot , and when he brought them up to the very back of his own that fought , he gave order that they before should open , and wheele about , one on the right hand , the other on the left , and so retire ; which thing done gave room to the florentines to advance and gain some ground . but when once they came to handy blowes , the fresh men with those that were tir'd , they staid not long ere they forc'd them back into the river , between the horse of the one side , and the other , yet there was not much advantage : whereupon castruccio knowing his own inferior , had given order to the leaders , that they should only maintain fight , as he that hoped to overcome the foot ; which done , he might be able with more ease to overcome the horse ; which out as he purposed : for having seen the foot forc'd back into the river , he sent the rest of his infantry against the enemies horse , who with lances and darts wounding them , and the cavalery also pressing them with greater fury , put them to flight . the florentine commanders seeing the difficulty that their horse had to pass , strove to make their foot pass on that part beneath the river , to fight with the flank of castruccio's troops . but the channel being deep , and all above already possest by his men , all this prov'd vain . whereupon the whole army was put to rout , to castruccio's great glory and honor , and of so great a multitude there escap'd not a third . many chieftains were taken , and charles son of king robert , together with michaelangelo falconi ; and taddeo of the albizi florentine commissaries , fled thence to empoli . the spoyl taken was great , the slaughter exceeding great , as a man may imagine in such and so great a conflict : for of the florentine army , & of castruccio's part were left dead upon the place . but fortune being enemy to his glory , when as she should have given him life , took it from him , and interrupted those designes which he a long time before had purposed to put in effect : neither could any thing but death hinder him . castruccio had toyld himself all that day in the battel , when at the end thereof all weary and sweaty , he stayd about the port of fucchio , to attend the soldiers , as they should return from the victory , and in person receive and thank them , and partly if peradventure any thing should arise from the enemies , that they had made head in any place , he might be ready to give order thereto : judgeing it the office of a good commander , to be the first to get a horse-back , and the last to light off . whereupon he standing exposed to a wind , which ordinarily about mid-day rise ; upon the arno , and uses to be pestiferous , he was all over chil'd . which thing not being made account of by him , was the occasion of his death : for the night following he was taken with a dangerous feaver , which continually augmenting , and the sickness being judged mortal by all the physitians , and castruccio perceiving of it , called paul guinigi , and spake to him these words ; had i beleeved , my son , that fortune would have cut of my course in the midst of the way , to arrive unto that glory which i by my so many good suce cesses had promis'd my self , i should have less wearied my self ; and to thee as i should have left a smaller estate , so also fewer enemies , and less envy : for i would have been content with the dominion of lucca & pisa , and never subdu'd the pistoyeses , nor with so many injuries provoked the florentines ; but by making the one and the other of these people my friends , i should have led a life , though not longer , yet surely more quiet ; and to thee should i have left an estate , though less , without doubt more secure and firm ; but fortune , who will dispose of all human affairs , gave me not so much judgement , that i was able first to know it , or so much time , that i was able to overcome it . thou hast heard , for many have told thee , and i never denyed it to thee , how i came into thy fathers house , being yet a young lad , and voyd of all those hopes which every generous spirit ought to conceive , and how i was by him brought up , and beloved by him as much as if i had been of his own blood ; whereupon under his government i became valorous and grew capable of that fortune in which thou hast and dost see mee : and because at his death , he committed thee and all this fortunes to my fidelity , i have brought thee up with that affection , and increased them with that fidelity , that i was and am bound to . and because not only whether that alone which was left thee by thy father , but that also which my fortune and valor got , were thine , i never would marry , to the end that the love of children should never take me off , from shewing in any part that thankfulness towards thy fathers blood , which i thought i was obliged to shew . i leave thee therefore a very fair state , whereat i am much pleased : but for that i leave it thee weak and unsetled , i am exceedingly grieved there remains to thee the city of lucca , wich will never be content to live under thy government : pisa is also thine : wherein there ere men naturally inconstant , and full of treachery : which , however it be divers times accustomed to serve , yet will it alwaies disdain to have a lucchese for its lord. pistoya likewise is left to thee , very little faithfull to thee , because it is divided , and by fresh injuries provok'd against our family . thou hast the florentines for thy neighbors , and those offended , and divers waies injuryed by us , and not extinguisht , to whom the news of my death would be more welcome than the conquest of all tuscany . thou canst not rely upon the princes of milan , nor upon the emperor , because they are far hence , lazy , and very slow with their succors : wherefore thou oughtst not to hope in any thing , but in thy own industry , and the remembrance of my valor , and in the reputation which this present victory gains thee : which if thou shalt know with discretion how to make use of , will ayd thee to make an accord with the florentines , who being affrighted at this present defeat , ought with desire to condiscend thereto : whom though i sought to make them mine enemies , and thought it would procure me both power and glory , yet thou art by all means to seek to gain for thy friends ; for their friendship will prove thy security and advantage . it is a thing of very much importance in this world for a man to understand his own self , and to know how to measure the forces of his own courage and state ; and he that finds himself unfit for war , should endeavor to settle his government by the rules of peace , whereunto thou shalt do well if by my advice thou address thy self , and strive by this way to enjoy my pains and dangers , which shall easily prove successful to thee , when thou shalt account these my advertisements true : and herewithall thou shalt be doubly oblig'd to me , first that i have left thee this state , and secondly that i have taught thee how to keep it . afterwards having caused those citizens to come to him , who of lucca , pisa , and pistoya , served in the wars under him ; and having recommended paul guinigi to them , and made them swear obedience to him , he died ; leaving to all those , that ever knew him , a happy remembrance of him ; and to those that had been his friends , so great a desire of him , that never any prince , that died at any time , left more . his funerals were most honorably solemnized , and he was buried at st. francesco in lucca . but neither valor , norfortune were so favorable to paul gninigi , as to castruccio ; for not long after , he lost pistoya , and after pisa ; and with much adoe held he the government of lucca : which continued in his family till paul the grand-child . castruccio then was , by what is here shewed , a man of rare note , not only for those times he lived in , but for many ages that had past long before . he was of a stature higher than ordinary , and his limb were well answerable each to other ; & of such a grace he was in his aspect , and entertain'd all men with that humanity , that he never spake with any that he sent from him discontent ; his hair inclin'd to a reddish colour , and he wore it always cut above his ears ; and alwaies in all seasons , whether it raind or snew , he went with his head uncover'd ; he was very pleasing to his friends ; and terrible to his enemies , just among his subjects , treacherous with forreiners : nor where he could vanquish by fraud , did he everstrive to do it by force : for he said the victory , and not the manner how it was got , gaind a man glory ; no man enter'd more boldly into dangers , nor was more wary to get out of them : and he was wont to say , that men ought to prove every thing , but to be astonish'd at nothing , and that god favors valiant men , who alwaies chastises the feeble with the mighty . he was also very admirable in replying or biting sharply or gentily ; and as in this kind he spared not any , so likewise , he was nothing mov'd , when himself was not spared : so that we have many things he said wittily , and heard patiently , as these : having caus'd a duckat to be given for a starling , and a friend of his reproving him for it , said castruccio thou wouldst not have given above a peny for it , and his friend saying it was true , he reply'd , a duckat is les● to mée . having a flatterer about him , and in scorn having spat upon him , the flatterer said , that fisher men to take a little fish suffer themselves to be all moyl'd in the sea ; i will let my self be daub'd by a little spittle , to catch a whale : which castruccio not only heard patiently , but rewarded . when one told him , that he liv'd too sumptuonsly ; said castruccio , if this were a vice , there would not be so splendid entertainments at the saints feasts . passing through a street , & seeing a young man comming out of a whore-house all blushing because he had been seen by him , he said to him , be not asham'd when thou goest out , but when thou entrest in . a friend of his giving him a knot to loose , that was curiously tyed , said , o foole , dest thou think i will loosen such a thing , which being tyed gives me so much trouble ? castruccio saying to one that profest himself a philosopher , you are of the condition of dogs , that alwaies go about those who can best give them meat ; no says the party , we are like phyfitians , who visit the houses that have most need of them . going from pisa to ligorne by water , and a dangerous storme there arising , and thereupon being much preplex'd , was reprehended by one of his company as pusillanimons , saying himself was not afraid of any thing ; to whom castruccio reply'd , that he nothing marvayl'd thereat ; for every one valu'd his life , according to its worth . being ask'd by onu , what he should do to gaine a good esteeme ? answered him ; see when thou goest to a feast , that a blocke sit not upon a blocke . when one blasted that he had read many things , said castruccio , it were better thou couldst brag thou hadst remembred much . another bragging though he had tipled much , he was not drunk ; he reply'd , and oxe does the same . castruccio kept a young losse , which he lay with ordinarily , and thereupon being reprov'd by a friend , telling him that it was a great wrong to him that he had suffer'd himselfe to be so taken by a wench ; thou art mistaken , quoth cactruccio , i took her , not she me . also when one blam'd him that he was too delicious in his dy●● , he said to him , i warrant thou woul● si● not spend herein so much as i doe ; that is true , quoth the other ; then reply'd he toou 〈◊〉 more covetous than i am gluttonou . being invited to supper by tadeo cernardi a ●uc●hese , a rich and magnificent citizen ; and in the hou● . tadeo shewing him a chamber all furnish'd with cloth of gold , and that it was all ●a●'d with curious stones , which were diversty wrought with sundry colours , and represented flowers , leaves , and such like green things : castruccio having got together a great deale of spettle in his mouth , spat it full in tadeos face ; at which he shewing himselfe much troubled , says castruccio ; i knew not where to spet that i might offend thee lesse . being ask'd how caesar dyed ? saith he , would to god i might dye like him . being one night in a house of one of his gentlemen , where there were divers ladyes invited to a feast , and he dancing , and sporting with them , more than befitted his condition , was reprovd by a friend , answered , he that is held a wise man in the day time , will never be thought a foole in the night . one comming to aske a favour at his hands , and castruccio seeming as if he heard not , sell down upon his knees before him , whereat castruccio chiding him , he answered , thou art the cause thereof , who carryest thine cares in thy feet : and thereby he gaind double the favour he asked . he used to say , that the way to hell was easie , because men went thither downwards , and blindfold . when one askd him a favour with many and supperfluous worrds , castruccio said to him , hereafter when thou wouldst any thing with me , send another . such another man having wearied him with a tedious speech , and telling him in the latter end , perhaps i may have tir'd you with my long speaking ; no , thou hast not , said he , for i heard not one word of all that thou hast spoken . he was wont to say of one who had been a handsome boy , and afterwards became a comely man , that he was too injurious , haveing first distracted the husbands from their wives , and afterwards the wives from their husbands . to an envious man that laughd , he said , laughst thou because thou art well , or because another suffers evill ? when he was also under the rule of master francis guinigi , one of his playfellows saying to him , what wilt thou that i shall give thee , for a blow on the mouth ? castruccio answered him , a helmet . having causd a citizen of lucca to dye , who had helpd him in his rising to his greatnesse , when it was said to him , he had ill done to put to death one of his old friends ; he reply'd ; you are deceivd , i have put to death a new enemy . castruccio commended much those that betrothd wives , but never married them , like men that say they will go to sea , but never do . he said he wondred much at men , that when they bought any vessell of earth or glasse , they found it first whether it be good ; but in taking a wife they are content only to see her . when he was neare death , one asking him , how he would be buried ? he answered , with my face downwards : for i know , that as soon as i am dead , this country shall go upside down . being asked , whether he never thought to become a fryer to save his soule ? he said no , for it was strange to him , that lazarus should go to paradise , and vguccion of faggivola to hell. being asked , when it was best to eate , to preserve the health ? he answered , if a man be rich when he is hungry ; if he be poore , when he may . seeing a gentleman a friend of his , that made his servant trusse his points , he said , i hope one day too thou wiltmake his feed thee . seeing that one had writen upon his house in latine , god keep the wicked hence ; said , the master then must not enter here . passing by a way where there was a little house with a great gate , he said , this house will run out of doores . treating with an ambassadour of the king of naples touching some good of the borderers , whereat he was some what angry , when the ambassadour said , feare you not the king then ? castruccio said , is this your king good or bad ? and he answering that he was good , castruccio reply'd , wherefore then should i be afraid of those that are good ? we might relate many others of his sayings , wherein he shewd both acurosse of wit , and gravity ; but these shall suffice in testimony of his worthy qualities . he liv'd forty four yeares , and behavd himselfe like a prince in all his fortunes : and as of his good for●●nes there are enough monunments left , so likewise would he there should be seene some of his evill fortunes ; for the manacles wherewith he was chain'd in prison , are yet to be seene fastned in the tower of his dwelling house , where they were put by him , that they might beare witnesse of his adversity . and because he was no way inseriour to philip of macedon , alexanders father , nor to scipio of rome , he dy'd in the same age they two did ; and doubtlesse he would have exceeded the one and the other , if in exchange of lucca he had had macedon , or rome for his countrey . a relation of the course taken by duke valentine in the murdering of vitellozzo vitelli oliverotio of fermo , paul , and the duke of gravina , all of them of the family of the orisini ; composd by nicholas machiavelli . duke valentine was return'd from lombardy , whither he had gone to excuse himselfe to king lewis of france , touching those many calumnies which the florentines charg'd him with , for the rebellion of arezo and the other townes of the vale of clicana , and was thence come to imola ; where he plotted his enterprise against iohn bentivogh tyrant of bolonia : for he had a mind to reduce that city into his subjection , and make it head of his duchy of romania : which thing being knowne to the vitelli and orsini , and their other complices , they thought the duke would grow too powerfull and that it was to be feard , lest that takeing balonia , he should seeke their utter ruine , that he might remaine the only champion of italy : and hereupon they made a diet at the magione , in the trritories of perusia : where there met cardinal paulo , and the duke of gravina of the family of the orsini ; vitellozzo vitelli , oliverotti of fermo , john paulo baglioni tyrant of perusia , and master antonio of venofro , sent by pandulfo petrucci head of siena : where it was argued amongst them touching the dukes greatness , and touching what his further intentions were : and that it was necessary to bridle his appetite : otherwise they ran hazard together with others , all to goe to ruine : and they determined not to abandon the bentivoli , and to seek to gain the florentines ; to one and the other of which places they dispatch'd men , promising ayd to the one , and encouraging the other to unite with them , against the common enemy . this diet was suddenly known throughout all italy , and those people that under the dukes government were discontented , among whom were the vrbinates , began to hope they might be able to inovate some things from whence it proceeded , that their minds being thus held in suspence by some of vrbino , it was plotted to take the rock of lea , which held for the duke , and these took occasion from hence . the governor fortifi'd the castle , and causing timber to be carried thither , they of the conspiracy contrived that some great peices of timber , which they were drawing into the castle , should be brought upon the bridge , to the end that being thus clogged , it could not be lift up by them within : which occasion being taken , they leapd upon the bridge , and thence into the rock , by which surprisal , so soon as it was understood , all that state rebelled , and called home again their old duke . hope now being laid hold on , not so much by the taking of the rock , as for the diet held at the magione , by means whereof they thought to be assisted : who having heard the rebellion of vrbin , imagined it not fit to lose the occasion : and getting their men together , they put forward , intending if there were any town of all that state remaining in the dukes hands , to assail it : and they sent afresh again to florence to sollicite that commonwealth to joyne with them in extinguishing this common calamity : shewing the party already gained , and such an occasion offered as the like was not to be expected . but the florentines for the hate they bare to the vitelli and the orsini upon divers occasions , not onely clave not to them , but sent nicholas machiavelli their secretary , to offer receipt to the duke , and aid against these his new enemies , who was then in imola full of fear , because of a sudden and beyond his opinion , his soldiers being become his enemies , he unarmd met with a war at hand : but having taken heart upon the florentines profers , he purposed to temporise , and hold off the war with those few people which he had , and with treaties of agreement , and partly to prepare aides , which he provided two waies , by sending to the king of france for men , and partly by taking into his pay all men at armes , and what others else made profession to serve a horse-back , and to all he gave money . notwithstanding all this , the enemies advanc'd , and thence came towards fossombrone ; where some of the dukes troops had made head : which by the vitelli and orsini were broken : which thing caused the duke to turn himself wholly to see if he with treaties of accord could stop this humor : and being an exceeding great dissembler , he faild not of any means to give them to understand who had taken armes against him , that what he had gotten he was willing should be theirs : and that it suffic'd him to enjoy the title of prince , but he was content the principality should be theirs , and so effectually perswaded he them , that they sent paul to the duke to treat of peace , and so stayed their armes : but now the duke staid not his preparations , and with a great deal of case increased both his horse and foot , and to the end these provisions should not appear , he went and scattered all his soldiers in several places throughout romans . in this while also came there to him five hundred french lances : and however he was now so strong , that with open force he was able to right himself upon his enemies ; yet thought he it the more safe and profitable way to beguile them , and for all this not to stop the treaty for peace : and this matter was so far labored in , that he made a peace with them , and assured to them their old pays , gave them four thousand duckats in hand , promised not to molest the bentivolii , and made alliance with john , and moreover that he could not constrain any of them to come in person to him , more than he thought good himself . on the other side they promised to restore unto him the dutchy of vrbiu , and all the other places taken by them , and to serve him in any expedition he should undertake ; nor without his permission to war with any one , or take pay of any one . this accord being made , guidubaldo duke of vrbin sled again to venice , having first caused all the fortresses of that state to be demolished : for relying upon the people he would not that those sorts , which he thought he could not defend , should fall into the enemies hands , whereby to bridle his friends . but duke valentine having made this agreement , and divided all his troops throughout all romania , with the frenchmen at armes , at the end of november departed from imola , and from thence went to cesena , where he abode many dayes to contriye with those that were sent by the vitelli and the orsini , who were ready then with their forces in the dutchy of vrbin , what action they should then anew enter in , but not concluding any thing , oliverotto of fermo was sent to offer him that if he would adventure an ●expedition against tuscany they were at his service ; in case he would not , they would be ready to serve him against sinigallia ; to whom the duke answered , that in tuscany he would not make any war , because the florentines were his friends : but he was well content they should goe to sinigallia : whence it came to pass that not long after , advice was brought , that the town was yeelded to them , but the fort would not : for the governor would render it to the duke in person , and to none else ; and thereupon they perswad'd him to comebefore it , the duke thought this occasion very good , and that it would not any way skare them , being he was called by them , and not going of himself : and the more to secure them , he dismis'd all his french forces , which returned thence into lombardy , save only a hundred lances of mounsieur candi●les his kinsman , and parting about the middle of december from cesena , he went thence to fano ; where withall his wiles and craft he could , he perswaded the vitelli and the orsini , to expect him at sinigallia ; shewing them that such strangenesse would make their accord to be neither faithfull nor durable ; and that he was a man that desird he might availe himselfe both of the forces and advice of his friends : and however vitellozzo was very unwilling , and that his brothers death had taught him , that he should not offend a prince and afterwards trust him ; neverthelesse , being wrought to it by paulo orfino who had been corrupted by the duke with gifts and faire promises , he agreed to attend him : whereupon the duke before the day of december , , that he was to goe from fano , communicated his purpose to eight of his cheife confidents , among whom were don michael , and the lord of enna who was afterwards cardinal : and gave them charge , that presently as soone as vitellozzo , paulo orsino , the duke of gravina , and oliverotto had met them , each two of them should get one of them between them : consigning each one by name to certaine two , who should traine them along even into sinigallia , nor suffer them to part , till they had brought them to the dukes lodging , and that they were there taken . he afterwards tooke order that all his horse and foot , which were better than two thousand horse and ten thousand foot , should be in the morning at breake of day upon the metaure , a river some five miles from fano , where they should attend him ; being then the last day of deucmber , pon the metaure with those troops , he causd some two hundred horse to go before him , afterwards the foot mov'd , and after them himselfe in person , with the rest of his men at armes . fano and sinigallia are two cities of the matches , seituate upon the bank of the adriatick sea fifteen miles distant the one from the other : so that he who goes towards sinigallia hath the mountaines on his right hand , the feet whereof sometimes are so bounded by the sea , that between them and the water there remaines but a very small distance , and where they are most extended , there is not above two miles distance . the city of sinigallia from the foot of these mountaines is not much further than a bow-shot , and from the sea not above a mile distant : along the side hereof runs alittle river , which washeth that part of the wals which is toward fano , looking towards the high way , so that till it come neare unto sinigallia , it runs for a good part of the way along the mountaines : and being come neare up to the river that passes alongst by sinigallia , it turnes upon the left hand alongst the banke thereof : so that running on for the space of a bow-shot , it reaches to a bridge , which passes that river , and stands in front with the gate that enters into sinigallia ; not by a right line , but athwart : before the gate there is a bourg of houses , with a broad place before them , which the bank of the river shoulders upon one side . so that the vitelli and orsini having given order to attend the duke , and personally to honour him , the better to give way to his men , they retir'd their own into certaine castles , some six miles from sinigallia , and had left only oliverotto in sinigallia with his band , which was some thousand foot , and a hundred and fifty horse , which were lodg'd in the bourg before nam'd . things being thus ordered , duke valentine came thence towards sinigallia , & when the first head of the horse troops came up to the bridge , they pass'd it not , but making stand , they turnd their horse , the one part towards the river , the other to the open field , and so left a way in the midst , whereby the infantry passd , which without stop entred the town . vitellozzo , paulo , and the duke of gravina upon their mules , accompanied with a few horse , went to meet the duke : & vitellozzo disarmed having a cloak all lined with green , being exceeding melancholy , as presaging his own death near at hand , caused a certain admiration of himself in all , the valor of the man being well known , and the fortune he had passd ; and it is said , that when he left his soldiers to come into sinigallia , there to meet the duke , that he did in a manner take his last leave of them ; to his captains he recommended his house , and the welfare thereof , and admonishd his nephews , that they should not so much mind the great fortunes of their family , as the valor of their ancestors . these three then being come up to the duke , and done their obeisance , were receivd by him with a chearfull countenance , and presently by those , who had charge to look to them , taken between them . but when the duke saw that oliverotto was wanting , who had staid with his men at sinigallia , and attended before at the broad place by his lodging , above the river , to keep them in order , and exercise them : he wink'd upon don michael , to whom the care of oliverotto was commited , that he should take such order that oliverotto should not escape him . whereupon don michael rode before , and being come to oliverotto , to told him , that now it was not a time to hold his men together out of their lodgings ; because then they would be taken from them by the dukes soldiers , and therefore perswaded him to send them to their lodgings , and goe with him to meet the duke : which when oliverotto had done , the duke came , and having seen seen him , called him ; to whom oliverotto having made reverence , he joyn'd in troop with the rest , and entred into sinigallia , where all dismounting at the dukes lodging , enterd with him into a private chamber , they were held prisoners to the duke , who presently got a horseback , and commanded that oliverotto and the orsinies souldiers should be all rifled . oliveroto's were all pillag'd , by reason they were near at hand ; those that belong'd to the orsini and the vitelli , being more remote having before heard of the ruine of their masters , had time to get together , where calling to mind the valor and discipline of the families of the orsini and vitelli , joyntly all in one body , in despight of the countrey , and their enemies power , they sav'd themselves . but the dukes soldiers not satisfied with the pillage of of oliverotto's soldiers , began to sack sinigallia . and had not the duke by the death of many stopped their insolence , they would utterly have sackt it . but night being come , and all stirs quiet , the duke thought fit to put vitellozzo and oliverotto to death , and having brought them together , caused them to be strangled . where neither of them spake any thing worthy of their life past ; for vitelozzo prayed , that supplication should be made to the pope , to grant him a plenary indulgence of all his fins ; oliverotto much lamenting himself , cast all the fault of the injuries against the duke on vitelozzo's back . paul , and the duke of gravina were kept alive , til the duke had word , that at rome , the pope had laid hold on the cardinal orsino , the archbishop of florence , and master james of the holy cross . after which news upon the of january , at the castle of pieve , they also were strangled in the like manner . the table of the chapters in the prince . chap. . how many sorts of principalities there are , and how many wayes they are attained to . pag. chap. . of hereditary principalities . p. chap. . of mixt principalities . p chap. . wherefore darius his kingdome , taken by alexander , rebelled not against his successors after alexanders death . p. chap. . in what manner cities and principalities are to be governed , which before they were conquered , lived under their own laws . p. chap. . of new principalities that are conquerd by ones own armes and valor . p. chap. . of new principalities gotten by fortune and other mens forces . p. chap. . concerning those who by wicked means have attaind to a principality . p. chap. . of the civil principality . p. chap. . in what manner the forces of all principalities ought to be measured . p. chap. . concerning ecclesiastical principalities . p. chap. . how many sorts of military discipline there be ; and touching mercenary soldiers . p. chap. . of auxiliary soldiers , mixt and natives . p. chap. . what belongs to the prince touching military discipline . p. chap. . of those things in respect whereof men , and especially princes are prais'd or disprais'd . p. chap. . of liherality and miserableness . p. chap. . of cruelty and clemency , and whether it is better to be belov'd or feared . p. chap. . in what manner princes ought to keep their word . p. chap. . that princes should take a care not to incur contempt or hatred . p. chap. . whether the citadels and many other things , which princes make use of , are profitable or dammageable . p. chap. . how a prince ought to behave himself to gain reputation . p. chap. . touching princes secretaries . p. chap. . that flatterers are to be avoyded . p. chap. . wherefore the princes of italy have lost their states . p. chap. . how great power fortune hath in humane affairs , and what means there is to resist it . p. chap. . an exhortation to free italy from the barbarions . p. the life of castruccio castracani of lucca . p. a relation of the course taken by the duke valentine , in the murdering of vitelozzo vitelli , olverotto of fermo , paul , and the duke of gravita , all of the family of the orsini . p. fnis. notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * without question the end was ambition , royalty admitting no companion . of whom to free himself , it seems that romulus stood not much upon how lawful meanes he used , for cain-like he slew his brother , and consented to titus tatius his death , without doubt , for venturing to take part in the authority . and touching this , it may be machiavel will speak truer neare the latter end of his . chapt. where hee saies , because the restoring of a city to a civil and politick government presupposes a good man , and by violence to become a prince of a common-wealth presupposes an evil man , for this cause it shall very seldome come to pass , that a good man will ever strive to make himself prince by mischievous waies , although his ends therein be all good ; nor will a wicked man , by wicked meanes , attaining to be prince do good , nor ever comes it into his heart to use that authority well , which by evil meanes he came to . and so at the very end of the same . chap. he concludes , that though the intent were not good , there might be a faire colour set upon it by a good success . whereby our polititian , however he windes and turns , comes at length to discover his evil ground he took , that jus regnandi gratia violandum est ; aliis in rebus pietatem colas , as is that of euripides . vertues continue seldome by descent . and this to shew their spring , the government . and that his gifts best term'd , and by him sent . * ammiratus taxes him , saying , it was rather the opinion of a cunning and crafty man , then of one that had either any religion or morality in him , whose plain and simple conditions ought to be free from all fraud and falshood ; and however the romans were deceiv'd herein , which cannot be deny'd , yet without doubt they never did this , thinking to deceive themselves , or with intention to deceive others . thus ammi . and indeed it savours of atheisme , bringing the mistress to serve the hand-maid , religion to serve policy ; as if the seasons of the year ought to accommodate themselves to men , rather then men accommodate themselves to the seasons ; not considering that religion propounds to a man a further end then policy points at . a prince therefore should be well aware of such evill devices , beleeving constantly that the religion hath no need of helpe from falshood , nor can gain any strength by lies . nondum haec quae nunc tenet seculum negligentia deum venerat , nec interpretando sibi quisque jus jurandum & leges apras faciebat . nec suls nec externis viribus jam stare potcrant , tamen bello non abstinebant adeo ne infeliciter quidem de fensae libertatis taedebat , & vinci quam non tentare victoriam malebant . non enim cristas vulnera facere , & picta atque aurata scuta transire romanum palum . qui esu●ienre imp 〈…〉 it b 〈…〉 & 〈…〉 vites 〈…〉 isit inanes . proclivius est injuriae quod beneficio vicem exsolvere , quia gratia oneri , ultio quaestui habetur . videat consul ne respquid detrimenti capiat . credebant enim haud gratuitam in tanta superbia comitetem fore . illeverò impedimentum pro occasione arripuit . appius finem fecit ferendae alienae persc 〈…〉 . et inde libertatis captare auram , unde ser vitutem timendo in eum statum remp. adduxerát . vt ipsi taedio praesentium consules desiderarent . quibus donis juventus corrum pebatur , & malebat licentiam suam , quam omnium libertatem . crudelitatem damnatis , crudelitatem initis . quod omnia mala exempla bonis initiis orta sunt . quorum co●i●orum eventus docuit , alios animos in contentione libertatis & honoris alios secundum deposita certamina incorrup to judicio esse . hanc modestiam equitatemque realitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris , quae tunc populi universi fuit . if then by chance some reverent man they spie , they all grow silent , and their ears ap 〈…〉 ex ferocibus universis singt , metu suo obedientes fuere . populus brevi , poste ●quam ab eo periculum 〈…〉 rat , desiderium 〈◊〉 haec natura multitudinis est ; aut humiliter servit aut superbe dominatur . ☞ but this is such a remedy as hath no warrant from divine or humane lawes , especially when that a tyrant is the true and lawfull prince of the country , however that by his evill government and administration of the affaires he deservedly be term'd a tyrant . that of david none is ignorant of , sam. . . and . erat praemium virtutis , non sanguinis . notes for div a -e * how this will hold with the general and most received tenent , i cannot see ; being that the prince and the people are said to make onely one politique body ; and the welfare of the part cannot be separated from the good of the whole . famous is that fable of aesops , which menenius agrippa made use of , to reconcile the commons of rome , upon distaste against the senate , gone a part in the holy mount : on a time that in man all things accorded well together , each particular member advis'd , and complaind that by their care and pains all things necessary were sought after , and provided for the belly , and that the belly onely remaind idle amongst them , injoying , those delicates which their labor had prepar'd : and thereupon conspir'd together that the hands should not put meat to the mouth , nor the mouth receive it , nor the teeth chaw it : but thus while in this choler they thought by famine to subdue the belly , the whole body fainted . whereby it came to appear that the belly afforded its service too , and as well gave as receiv'd nourishment , distributing by the veins , throughout the whole body , out of this meat which it had disgested , the blood well concocted , whereby each part was nourish'd . who is it that feels not , when any part fails , the whole is in disorder ? and who sees not likewise , when any part of the body drawes unto it more then its proportionable nutriture , that the whole pines thereupon ? as from the swelling of the spleen , the health of the whole body is disturb'd , and therefore by some politiques not unfitly compared to a princes exchequer , which when it excessively abounds beggers the whole countrey . and it is a folly to think ( saith a spauish author ) that the poverty of the comminalty will not redound to the breaking of private patrimonies , nor can great revenues continue there , where the commonwealth is rack'd to the very bones . all these things serve to argue the mutual sympathy , as between the head and the members , so between the prince and his subjects ; and to divide the interest of the prince from that of the people , cannot agree with good policy ; for as in the natural body it breeds diseases , so in the politique it produces disorder and destruction . * here machia . falsely imputes the cause of mens cowardlinesse to christian religion . i need not alleadge any battells fought by the christians , to proove him a lyar ; histories frequently affoard us examples , as well ancient as moderne , where they have bin as resolutely fought by the christians , as ever were any by the pagans : nay our owne memories may well supply us with some if we want . if we marke from whence machiavell takes his argument , it is from that the pagans slew a multitude of sacrifices , the sight of which being terrible made men of thesame disposition . by the same reason must it follow that our butchers and surgeons are more valiant then other men , as who customarily have their hands imbrued in bloud : i may well allow them to be more cruell , and therefore our lawes exclude them from being of the iury of life and death : but of being more valiant i never heard they had the reputation . creseit in terea roma albae ruinis crescit in terea roma albae ruinis . * this is all calumny ; for we find not that any have preserv'd the records of learning more than the christians , however much intermixt with paganisine . i take it that that these memorials were last in the vast deluges of the vandals , goths , and hunns , who themselves being barbarous and ignorant , envyed others learning ; and therefore destroyd all the registers of antiquity they could find : which our author injuriously imputes to the christians , being that they time out of minde , have caus'd those books to be taught the youth in their schools and we find that the most esteemd fathers in the church were adorn'd with that learning , which they are raxed to have persecuted ; which serves also very necessarily for the better understanding and illustrating of theology , and affords good arguments many times to our divines for the conviction of the gentiles out of their own writers . nor do i find there was any other restraint in those studies , than that men were advis'd to apply themselves soberly thereunto , as not being studies to dwell in , but tending rather to the service of theology . terna jugera & septunnces viritim divise●ant nos maurusij , qui fugimus a facie iesu latronis filij navae . campani magis nomen in auxilium sidiciorum , quam vires ad praesidium attulerunt . * because this whole chapter tends to shew how necessary for a princes advantage guile is , and it is again recommended by precept in machiavels treaty of a prince , i cannot but take notice that here he is blameable . dolus an virtus quis in hoste requir it , is not meant de dolo malo : supposed by machiavel in his prince chap. . where he perswades a prince to use the lyons force , and the foxes craft . to be able in all military stratagems and slights to circumvent the enemy , is one of the most requisite and not able parts in a commander : provided there be no breach of faith , nor oath violated : for as tully sayes , est jusjurandum affirmatio religiosa : quod autem affirmate , quasi deo teste promiseris , id tenendum est . it is much unworthy of a prince ( sayes a worthy late author ) to falsifie his word , either to enemy or subject that it be ; and the more villanie is it to use covert fraud , than open violence , because the enemy lies more open by giving credit to his faith : and fraus distringit , non dissolvit perjurium . and with how much more solemnity princes oaths are ordinarily taken , mee thinks , so much the more sincerity ought they to carry with them , having drawn together many eyes & ears as witnesses of their truth or falshood . i shall conclude then with tacitus , in the . of his annal . caereris mortalibus in constant confilia quod sibi conducere putant ; principum diversa sors est , quibus praecipua rerum ad samam dirigenda . nam si etiam nunc sub umbra faederis aequi servitutem pati possumus , &c. tentastis patientiam , negando militem ; quis dubitat exarsisse eos ? pertulerunt tamen hunc doloren ; exercitus nos parare adversus samnites faeritos suos audierunt nec moy erunt 〈◊〉 ab● urbe ; unde laec illi● nanra modestia nisi conscientia virium & nostrarum & suarum ? ad summa rerum nostrarum pertinere arbitror , ut cogitetis magis quid agendum nobis quam quid loquendum sit ; facile erit explicatis consillis , accommodate ●ebs verba . res redacta est ad triatios . quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites . jam tunc minime sal bris militari disciplinae capua , instrun entum omnium voluptatum , delinitos militum animos avertit a memoria patriae . gula & luxuris incubuit , ●ictunique ulci 〈…〉 orbem . quod jam non solum arma , sed jura romana pollebant . 〈◊〉 jam latio is status erat rerum , ut neque pecem , neque bellum pati possent . dij mortales ita vos potentes hujus consilit fecerunt , ut , sit latium , an non fit , in vestra manu posuerint . itaque pacem vobis ( quò ad latinos attinet ) parere in perpetuum , vel saeviendo vel ignoscendo potestis . vultis crudelius consulere in deditos victosque , licet delere nomen latinum . vultis exemplo majorum augere re●n romanam , victos in civitatem accipiendo , materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppeditat . certe id firmissimum imperium est , quo obedientes gaudent . illorum igitur animos , dum expectatione stupent , seu paena seu beneficio praeoccupari oporcet . quam poenam meritos privernates censeret . eas inquam merentur , qui se libertate dignos censent . quid si poenam remittimus vobis , qualem nos pacem vobis cum habituros● spere mus ? si ●onam dederitis , & fidelem & perpetuam ; sin malam , haud diuturnam . se audivisse vocem & liberi & viri , nec credi posse ullum populum , aut hominem denique in ea conditione , cu●us eum poenite at diutius quam necesse sit mansurum ; ibi pacem ; isse fidam , ubi voluntarij pacatisint , neque eo loco , ubi servitutem esse velint , fidem sperandam esse . eos demum , qui nihil praeserquam del ibertate cogitant , dignos ; esse qui romanifiant . spoliatis arma supersunt . ●●●or arma ministrat . facetiae asperae quae nimium ex vero traxerunt , acrem sui memoriam reliquunt . adeò obcaecat animos fortuna , cum vim suam refringi non vult . ut romani auro redempti non viverent agred urbem coronâ notes for div a -e ●tidie aggregatur ali●● , quod quandoque get curatione . ad generum cereris sine caede & sanguine pauci descendunt reges & sic ca morre tiranni . colligit & ipse animum confusum tantae cogitatione rei . hunc exitum habuit vir , nisi in libera civitate natus esset , memorabilis . cneus sulpitius dictator adversus gallos bellum trahebat , nolens le fortunae committere adversus hostem , quem tempus deteriorem in dies , & locus alienus faceret . nolens se fortunae committere adversus hostem , quem tempus deteriorem indies , & locus alienus faceret . justum est bellum , quibus necessarium ; & pia arma , quibus nisi in armis spes non est . ite mecum ; non murus nec vallum ; armati armatis obstant , virtute pates ; quod ultimum & maximum telum est , necessitate superiores estis . ibat ad exerci um sine da 〈…〉 . vado ad ducem sine exercitu . suis flammis delete fidenas , quas vestris beneficijs placare non potuistis . tres tribuni potestate consulari documento fuere , quam plurium imperium bello in utile esset : tendendo ad sua quisque consilia , cum alij aliud videretur , apperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti . saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est , summam imperij apud unum esse . in multitudine regenda , plus paena quam obsequium valet . injussu tuo adversus hastem nunquam pugnabo , non si certam victoriam videam . non alius militi familiatior dux fuit , inter infimos militum omnia baud gravatè munia obeun do ; in ludo praeterea militari cum velocitatis , viriumque inter se aequales certamina incunt ; comiter facilis vincere , ac vinci vultu eodem , nec quenquam aspernari parem qui se offerret ; factis benignus ; pro redactis , haudminus libertatis alienae , quam suae dignitatis memor ; & quo nihil popularius est , quibus artibus petierat magistratus , iisdem gerebat . eius virtutem milites oderant , & mirabantur . operae pretium est audire qui iomnia bumana prae divitiis spernunt , re●ue honori magno locum , neque virtuti putant esse , nisi effusae affluant opes . timasitheus multitudinem religinne implevit , quae semper regenti est similis . et quel che sail signor famopoi molti , che nel signor son tulti li octri volti . nec quicquam de majestate sua detractum credebant quod majestati ejus concessissent . i deubt that the understanding which he advises others of , he wants himself : not knowing the meaning of , or not believing the holy writ ; whereby he puts men past suspition of his atheisme . for what he alledges of moses , he must needs take originally from moses his books , being we have not any author of that antiquity , as could write any thing of his own knowledge touching those times . but those mach. seems not to believe further then served his own humor , reading the scriptures onely to a politicke end , not so much for the strengthening of his belief , as the bettering of his discourse . yet however machiavel did not , i hope others will believe that moses delivered to the israelites the true oracles of god ; and that it was not moses that punished the delinquents among them , but god sending his immediate judgements . as in the rebellion of corah and his complices , numbers the . moses did but citie them as to appearance : but god immediately sent his vengeance : for the earth under them opened , vers . . and when that wretched fellow gathered sticks on the sabboth , numb . moses awaited till god passed● the sentence upon him for his death ; and the manner thereof , vers . . therefore machiavell may justly be taxed for traducing moses here of more then he hath warrant for , making no other esteem of moses his bringing the israelites out of egypt , and his leading them through the wilderness , then of romulus his gathering together a●scattered multitude , and laying the foundation of that common-wealth , which action his courage and ambition of rule and glory thrust him upon ; not seeming to take notice , that moses was immediately called by god , and sent to shew his wonders and judgements against the egyptians , and to conduct the israelites into canaan ( according to gods promises formerly made to their forefathers ) wherein he behaved not himself either ambitiously or insolently , nor was any thing done by his own prowess or policy , but meerly by the ordinance of god. nec mihi dictatura animos fecit , nec exilium ademit . quod quisque didicit , aut consuevit , faciat eludant nunc licet religionem ; quid enim est , si pulli non pascentur , fi ex cavea tardius exierint , 〈◊〉 occinuerit avis ? parva sunt haec : sed parva ista non contemnendo , majores nostri maximam hanc rempublicam fecerunt . vides tu fortunâ illos fretos ad alliam consedisse . at tu fretus armis animisque invade mediam aciem . militum etiam sine rec●ore stabilis virrus putata est . nemo hominum , nemo deorum verecundiam habeat , non edicta imperatotun ; non auspicia observentur ; sine commeatu vagi milites in pacato & in hostico errent , immemores sacramenti , licentia sola exauctorentur ; infrequentia deserantur signa , neque conveniatur ad edictum , nec discernatur interdiu , nocte , aequo an iniquo loco , injussu imperatoris pugnent ; non signa , non ordines servent . iatrocinij modo caeca & fortuita pro solenni & sacrata militia sit . tanti ea dimicatio ad universi bellieventum fuit , ut gallorum exercitus , relictis trep dè castris , in tiburtinum agrum , mox in campaniam transierint . ne eos novum bellum , ne noves hostis terre . et . qui ob rem . parvi ponderis , trepidi in tiburtem agrum , & in campaniam transie●unt . tum etiam intueri cujus ductu , auspicioque incunda sit pugna ; utrum audiendus duntaxat magnificus ad hor tator sit verbis tantum ferox , operum militarium expers , an qui & ip a tela tractare , procedere ante signa , versari media in mole pugnae sciat : facta mea , non dicta vos milites sequi volo : nec disciplinam modo , sed exemplum etiam a me petere , qui hac dextrà mihi tres consulatus , summamque laudem peperi . vides tu aule corneli cacumen illud supra hostem ? arx illa est spei salutisque nestrae , si eam ( qucniam caeci reliquere samnites ) impigrè capimus . publius decius tribunus militum unum editum in saltu collem imminentem hostium castris osten dit , aditu arduum impedito agmini , expeditis haud difficilem . ite mecum , ut dum lucis aliquid superest , quibus locis hostes praesidia ponant , qua pateat hinc exitus exploremus . haec omnia sagulo militari amictus ne ducem circuire hostes notarent per lustravit . quae neque amicos parat , neque inimicos tollit . rebellasse quod pax servientibus gravior quam liberis bellum esset . notes for div a -e 〈◊〉 xenocarus i● vit . car. quinti . plutarch . de adulatore & amico ciscernendo . vertue ' against fury shall advance the fight , and it i' th' combate soon shall put to slight : for th' old roman valor is not dead , nor in th' italians brests extinguished . the grounds of obedience and government by thomas white ... white, thomas, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing w ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing w estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the grounds of obedience and government by thomas white ... white, thomas, - . [ ], p. printed by j. flesher, for laurence chapman ..., london : . reproduction of original in huntington library. table of contents: p. [ ]-[ ] eng political ethics. political science -- early works to . a r (wing w ). civilwar no the grounds of obedience and government. by thomas white, gentleman. white, thomas b the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the b category of texts with fewer than defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the grounds of obedience and government . by thomas white , gentleman . salus populi , suprema lex esto . tullius de legibus , lib. . london , printed by j. flesher , for laurence chapman next door to the fountain tavern in the strand . . to my most honoured , and best friend , sir kenelme digby . sir , the many attempts you have this long time made upon me , to declare a point of philosophy , wherein partly i was ignorant , and partly loth to meddle ( being mindefull of the poets admonition , incedis per ignes suppositos cineri doloso ) have at the last beaten out of my resistance , this little sparke of fire , or rather light ; borne by the authors intention , to shine , not to burne . for , having by experience of many our debates upon single points , found that such skirmishes were not like to gaine the victory of satisfaction upon your so solid understanding ; i saw my selfe forced to lay before your eyes , in one platforme or designe , the most intimate and bottome principles of obedience and governement . the which , i have strived to doe in the most short and summary manner i was able : not willing to bee over-curious in so awfull a subject . i play therefore the pure philosopher . i deliver the abstract notions onely : leaving to the prudence of particulars , to draw such consequences , as every ones circumstances shall make necessary and evident unto him by the short hints i give . and as for your selfe , i doubt not but my time is well employed . as for others , i feare the fortune of my other writings , may prove constant also to this ; that it will finde , those who reade it not , or who cannot judge of it , severe censurers : and those who like it , fearfull to oppose so loud and clamorous a multitude ; or at least , stonned with the adverse noise . but for this , let the eternall providence care . to me such clamours will bee no novelties : but the content of having given you satisfaction , an abundant reward of the endeavours of sir , your true friend , and most obliged servant , thomas white . the contents . ground . wherein consists the perfection of governement . pag. ground . that the nature of man reacheth not to the perfection of governement . p. ground . that a rationall beliefe is necessary to humane action . p. ground . of the vertue of obedience , and wherein it consists . p. ground . that fidelity is different from obedience ; and in what it consisteth . p. ground . in what consists right or due . p. ground . why men desire to live in community ; and of the necessity of governement . p. ground . of the authority given to an absolute governour ; and of under-sorts of governement . p. ground . of slavery and the lawfulnesse of it . p. ground . why a man is to hazard himselfe for the common good . p. ground . the quality and rationall power of a supreme governour . p. ground . who is such a governour , and the subjects duty towards him . p. ground . of the qualities of lawes and commands , in respect to obedience . p. ground . in what conditions the subject may resist governement . p. ground . wherein consists the power and liberty of the subject . p. ground . of the dispossession of a supreme former governour , and of his right . p. ground . of a supreme governour dispossessed . p. ground . the objection of divines answered . p. ground . the authority of lawyers insufficient in this question . p. the grounds of obedience and government . the first ground . wherein consists the perfection of government . xenophon , in his excellent booke of the instruction of cyrus , moves this question , why , of all other living creatures , which are of different natures from man , wee easily attaine to the mastery and rule ; but few men are so intelligent as to be fit to governe men ; and those few are the highest and worthiest part of mankind ? but , to me , the very question seems to beare the solution in its owne bowells . for , when one asks , why man is hard to be govern'd since he governes other creatures ; hee asks , why one , who hath the power to rule others , is himselfe so difficult to be master'd : and the answer is , because the powers , by which he reduceth others to his obedience , makes him apter to resist them who seeke the conquest of himself ; and so renders it a higher taske to weild and manage him , then those creatures which he hath power over . for , we need not looke into philosophy , nor study learned bookes , to know that the nature of man is inclin'd to have its owne will , and casteth all things which are under his consideration to compasse and effect it : as also , that every ordinary mans knowledge and consideration is farre beyond any we find in other living creatures ; and , by consequence , is farre lesse easily masterable then any of them . whence we may plainly collect , that were it possible for a governour to make every single person in his dominion particularly understand , that what was ordered by the governement was his owne truest interest ; such an one would be the most absolute and perfect governour ; and infallibly would find the charge of governing most easie and sweet , as well to himselfe as to his subjects . this case is cleare both in reason and in experience . reason sheweth us , that to draw any thing to action , according to its owne fitnesse and inclination , is both easier to the attempter , and makes the action it selfe more efficaciously and throughly performed . he that will drive a wedge into a hard piece of wood , strives , as far as the scituation gives him leave , to make his hammer fall downewards , because a weight hath , of it selfe , an inclination that way , and so both the impression is stronger and the arme lesse strain'd , knocking and the very fall of a weight encreasing by motion downewards : therefore black-smithes , whose continuall labour is to use the hammer , lay their iron upon their anvile , that is , in such a scituation below their heads , as is most fitting to gaine the best advantage of the descent of their hammers , which they first raise to give them scope of a descent . upon this principle it is , that they who tutour dogges , horses , elephants and hawks , knowing the ordinary attractive of beasts to be meat and some kind of flattery , make them understand , to the proportion of their capacity , that to do the action they breed them for , gaines them food ; to which they joine also certaine motions of stroking and gentle words , that make an impression in the beast of its owne excellency , and that it pleaseth its master . in like manner , to deterre them from certain actions , cudgels , whips , and harsh words are used ; which have a notabler efficacy then one would easily imagine , if he saw it not by experience . this , now , being apply'd to mankind , drives the effect home . for man , being a rationall creature , ( whose inclination it is to worke according to knowledge ) desires to know that the worke prescribed him is good , that is , good for him , or his good . and because if two actions be proposed , whereof the one is better for him then the other , the lesse good action deprives him of some good which the more good had brought him ; his inclination leads him to do the better , and by consequence to know and dispute which is the better ; which is as much as to chuse betwixt them ; and this we call being free , or having naturall liberty to do one and not the other . so that , the nature of man is to be free ; and to act what ever he does , because it seems to him the best . whence it is evidently concluded , that the perfectest way and most connaturall for governing men is , by making them determine themselves to their actions , and to proceed freely , and act , as it were , by their owne inclinations . this if the governour can effect , hee shall finde both his intent generally performed , because the subject proceedeth with much affection and courage ; and seldome or never will his commands be resisted , or their obedience repented : for , men are not wont to repine often at what themselves chuse and judge best for themselves ; especially if , even after the action performed and peradventure the attempt failed , yet the subject remaines satisfied , that it was best for him , in those circumstances , to do what he did : now , if the reasons were solid when the governour proposed them , such must of necessity be , for the most part , the sequell . experience maketh this same as manifest as reason concludeth it . what mother or nurse doth not seeke to perswade and win the yet sucking childe with gay things , with flattery and such demonstrations of love ( that is , of the childs good ) as the child is capable of ? what master or father draweth not his boyes to schoole and sitting exercises , by promises and proposalls of good , as play , goodcheere , fine cloathes , and any other toyes suitable to their tempers ? the stronger ages have stronger motives ; as , of honour , lands , offices , and the like : by which we see the most part of men led , not onely to labour , but even to hazard their lives and those very goods which are proposed them for motives of their actions . on the contrary side , how ill do those enterprises thrive , where the actors conceive themselvs either not concern'd or wrong'd ? how diligently are excuses sought out and easily found , and every cause of delay judged sufficient ? how readily ( if the actours be in great multitudes ( as soldiers or schollars ) do seditions and mutinies spring up , and all disorders grow bold and spread themselves , the commander of the action hated and esteemed an oppressour and a tyrant , his officers scorned and disobeyed ? this then is , of all hands , concluded , that the proper and naturall way of governement is , by making the obeyer understand that it is his owne profit which the action aimes at ; so to make him work out of the inclination of his owne will , and the dictamen of his owne understanding . the second ground . that the nature of man reacheth not to the perfection of governement . notwithstanding this inclination be so naturall to us , yet nature is not able to make it perfect in most both persons and actions . children are not come to the ability of judgeing ; some others are so grosse of capacity , they cannot bee brought to understand their owne good , at least in that time and circumstances which nature hath provided them ; most spend so much of their day in some one businesse , which they have chosen either for their livelyhood or pastime , that they have not sufficient leasure to attaine the knowledge necessary for other occurrences of their life : even the greatest wits are not capable to understand the nature of all things necessary to their owne private conditions . the prince himself must trust the physician , the lawyer , the mariner , the soldier , the merchant , the cook , the brewer , the baker , and divers other trades and knowledges , which he hath no possibility to understand so perfectly as to be a master in them . neverthelesse , nature doth not recede wholly from her principle , in thus subjecting one mans understanding to anothers , and the greater most times to the lesser . for it doth not this , otherwise then by making the party subjected see , it is his owne good to trust another's skill . wherefore , it is true , that he followes his owne inclination , and is ruled by his owne understanding ; and so governes himselfe ; onely , hee is a degree higher , not busying his thoughts about the particular worke , but onely about chusing the master of the worke , or about his own submission , that is , his owne action , as he is a man , and his action as that of a man , and not of a physician or pilot , or such other particular discipline or quality . it remaines therefore still that hee is free , and master of his owne action and the commanding part of it . the third ground . that a rationall beliefe is necessary to humane action . of those things to whose knowledge wee cannot our selves arrive , but must rely on the credit of others , there are two kinds ; some purely to be believed , others to be also acted . as , when we informe our selves of what passed in some forreigne country , or of the nature of trees or beasts wee never have use of ; wee are barely to assent to what is delivered : but , when a physician telleth us wee must take a purge or keepe such a dyet ; wee doe not onely believe him but act according to our beliefe . now , though in truth this second sort belongeth properly to our discourse apart , because the nature of pure beliefe is intrinsecally included in it , as a part in the whole ; yet wee must first note the errours to bee avoided in a meere speculative assent : and these are two ; one of defect , and one of excesse . the vice by defect , warnes you to believe no thing but what your selfe understand , that is , indeed to believe nothing at all . but , were these men bound to their own law , that they should take no physick till they knew it would doe them good , at least as well as the physician doth ; nor trust their cause to a lawyer till they understood the subtleties as perfectly as hee ; and so in other vocations ; i doubt they would have neither health nor wealth for physician or lawyer to worke upon . but , because those who advance this proposition are persons of wit , i must not think they stumble at so notorious a block : therefore , their meaning is onely , that wee ought not to beleeve , but what we are able to understand if wee had will and leisure to study . but , even so explicated , it is a most wilfull proposition , reason being quite on the opposite side : for , let the authority which denounceth me a truth , be sufficient to make it credible , and overvalue the mysteriousnesse of the object ; and the higher it is above my knowledge , the more necessity there is of believing it . what is but a little above me , i may easily come to know ; and so need not believe but take paines and see it : beliefe is ordained for truths whose direct and immediate evidence wee cannot compasse ; and therefore is more proper , more due , more requisite for such as are above our knowledge . but , peradventure these smart persons do suppose that all things which have a possibility to be knowne , are the subject of mans wit ; and so take these two to signifie the same sence , that the object is such as we are able to understand , and that it is understandable , or doth not couch a contradiction in its termes : and peradventure conceive themselves able to shew contradiction in whatever they refuse to believe . if this be their meaning , the maxime they goe upon is safe ; but they must be very carefull not to subsume or apply it to particular instances without much consideration : for , ordinarily , the authority is very great which by understanding men , is alledged for remote and high truths ; and so is dangerously neglected , without an exact perusal and anatomy of the truths maintained by it . there are others soe prodigall of our naturall endowments , that they will teach us a kinde of contempt of reason and understanding . in a word , their position is , that , though you be certaine the proposition made ( for ought you know ) is false , neverthelesse , you may and ought to think it true : which how to excuse , from being an irrationall act and a pure folly , is beyond my skill ; at the same time to be assured it is uncertaine , and to hold it for certaine is , to mee , an impossibility . doe i not hold that which i am certaine of ? that is , that this truth is uncertaine ? how then can i hold it is certaine ? put this in the mouth of a witnesse in any court of justice , and teach him that , though hee know certainly hee doth not perfectly remember whether hee saw the man killed , yet hee may sweare hee saw it ; what justice will remain uncorrupted ? passion and precipitation may prevail with us , to judge that cleare and evident which is not so , and carry us to believe and affirm it ; but that reason should make us believe what it telleth us it seeth no ground for , or not sufficient , is to me , an assertion the most unworthy , the most contrary to reason , and the most biassed by interest that can be imagined . if our nature be rationall , if all our actions should be conformable to our nature , and governed by reason ; there cannot bee a more pernicious proposition , then to tell us we must assent , when there is no proportioned motive think wee ought to assent . thus much i thought fit to say concerning the errours of belief in speculation ; because beliefe in practicall things , and which concernes our actions , depends of it , and includes it , and is , in part , regulated by the same rules . the believing of practical things begins to trench upon the subject of our main discourse : for it is the first and most simple or uncomposed degree of government and obedience , and so the very roots of both are dependent from and to be discovered out of it . for , wee experience by our ordinary apprehensions , that wee esteeme a physician , a lawyer , a schoole-master ought to bee obeyed , though wee doe not acknowledge in them the power of a lord or magistrate . and so wee say , the scholler will never profit , because he will not doe what his master would have him : the client loseth his cause , because he would not obey his counsell : the patient recovers not , because he followeth not the advice of his physician . and though we doe not say the doctour or counsellour commands his patient or client , yet , if we look into it , he both rewardeth and punisheth , which are the concomitants of commanding . for who obeyeth is rewarded with learning , health , and prosperity , and who disobeyeth is punished with ignorance , sicknesse , and losses . the fourth ground . of the vertue of obedience , and wherein it consists . out of this we may easily understand what nature intends by the vertue of obedience , and what are the limits and lawes of it . for it is plaine , the immediate end is that our workes and all that concernes us may be well done , even as to those things wherein our selves have no skill , or not enough , and the more remote end to bee atchieved by this is , that our life may bee good and happy , and the end of nature arrived to by us . the conditions likewise are cleere : first , that the matter of our action bee such as our selves are not sufficiently skilfull in ; the second , that our commander bee a master in that art ; the third , that hee bee a good and honourable person , in whom wee may rest confidently he will deale with us conformably to his skill , and not wilfully or for his own pleasure , or interest , doe any thing against our good and profit . if the first bee wanting , wee also our selves are wanting to our selves ; for nature hath endowed us with reason to provide for our owne good by this power : againe , it is non-sence and folly to expect another man should be more carefull of our good , then our selves : and suppose it were so , it were either our fault or his , and for ought to bee mended on one side ; our fault if wee bee not so sollicitous as wee ought to bee , that is , as much as the weight of the affaire requires ; his if he be more sollicitous of our good then the same demandeth , and soe hee who professeth such a care may bee feared to bee a busie fellow , and one who aimes at his owne profit under colour of love , unlesse it bee in an evident neglect of ours , which cannot well be imagined of one who is ready to obey another . if the second condition bee wanting , there can be no vertue in obedience , since it will nothing mend but rather impaire our life , and to the import of that action , destroy our pretence to happinesse , to submit our selves to one who hath no more skill then wee , nor can bee rationally supposed to bear us more love and care , or that hee will or ought to imploy himselfe in our particular businesse more attentively then we our selves . as for the last condition , without it obedience is a plaine precipitation of our selves into misguidance and absolute ruine , and therefore a pernicious & wicked practice . by this discourse wee may understand , it is a fallacious principle , though maintained by many , that obedience is one of the most eminent vertues , and that it is the greatest sacrifice we can offer to god , to renounce our owne wills , because our will is the chiefest good wee have . for , not denying that obedience is a great vertue ; it being , truly in it selfe , the affection to moderate the pride of our understanding , which is subject to make us think too well of our owne opinions without having evidence of the truth of them , and so hinder us from candidly seeing and acknowledging the truth ( an inclination of all others most deeply rooted in our nature , and both most hard to bee conquered , and most pernicious to be followed ) and therefore , the vertue which tempers and moderates this passion must needs be very excellent : yet i cannot give it so high a rank , as to preferre it before all . for , i see it is only a vertue in case of imperfection , as penance and some others are ; it being grounded on this , that a man is ignorant in those matters wherein hee ought to bee obedient . but , the reason displeases mee more then the conclusion : for what signifieth this , that it is the greatest good we have and can renounce for gods sake ? if it bee a great good , it is no vice , no excesse , but a naturall power or exercise of a power given us by almighty god ; and then would i know , why to renounce such a thing is pleasing to him . can we think it were pleasing to god for any one to binde up his armes or legges , or cut off his hands , pretending to doe it for his sake ? hee that made them gave them us to use ; and there by commanded us to use them according to the manner intended by nature ; and , if wee doe not so , wee offend him . there is a story of origen , that he exsected his virility , thinking to please god ; but the same story saith , hee was reproved by the whole church , and excommunicated for the fact : simeon styletes is reported to have chained himself upon a hill , that he might not goe thence ; but he was taught that such impotency was fit for beasts , not men . so that , to renounce any natural faculty or the legitimate and fitting use of it , under pretence of pleasing god , is a folly , not a vertue . but , let us see what power it is that wee must renounce ; our will : and this word doth not , in this place , signifie any interessed affection or malicious resolution ; but that will which followeth and is guided by our understanding , and that truth which god hath made us capable of : therefore the renouncing of this will , is , withall , the renouncing of our understanding ; that is , of our wits and manhood ; so that it is in effect to renounce our rationality , and that by which we are the image of god . if any man should take a fancy to goe upon all foure like a beast , or subject himself to bee led in a string like a beare about the countrey ; would not all wise men cry out on him for bestiality , and thinke him unworthy the conversation of men ? how much greater is the indignity of him who permitteth himselfe to bee carried in his whole course of life , and those actions that most concerne him without using that wit or understanding which hee hath , and by the sole direction of another ? hee can bee accounted so farre no better then a clock or watch , which tells the houre by the wit and industry of the maker , not by any sence or worth of its owne . if therefore , to renounce our wills for gods sake bee to bee accounted a sacrifice ; as farre as my understanding reacheth , it is no other then that the scripture expresseth upon another occasion , to wit , one by which the sons are sacrificed to the father , the image of god defaced to the glory of him whose image he is . the fifth ground . that fidelity is different from obedience ; and in what it consisteth . but leaving this mistake of simple devotion ; of which wee needed not have spoken so much , had there not depended on it some matter of greater consequence ( as the following discourse will manifest in its due place : ) wee are to take notice of an equivocation which may draw on some errour if not prevented . wee use to say serving-men and waiting-maids ought to bee obedient to their masters and mistresses , whereas indeed , the vertue by which they serve is not that of obedience , but of fidelity and truth , which is manifest to him that looks into the nature of hirelings . for , none thinke a husbandman , who is hired to till or fence a piece of ground , obeyeth the hirer more then hee that selleth a piece of cloth or other merchandize obeyeth the buyer , because he taketh his moneys ; but they are said to contract and performe their part of the bargaine faithfully and truly . so servants pay their duties , performe their bargains : and fidelity is their proper vertue ; to doe it carefully , and uprightly ; not obedience . for , obedience is in such actions as are the proper actions of the obeyer , which concerne his life , and by which hee may derive good if well done , and harme if amisse . now in servants the good successe pertaineth to the master , the servant hath his livelyhood and wages , whether the event goe right or wrong , so hee doe what his master commandeth . and hence it followeth , that neither ought hee bee ignorant in the action hee doeth , nor sollicitous whether his master bee either skilfull or honest : for , since what is done concerneth not him but his master , his duty is to seek to doe what hee is commanded in the best way he can , without interessing himself about the successe . this i say , as farre as he is a serving-man ; but as hee is also an honest man , it may belong to him to suggest to his master what hee thinks best ; and , sometimes , when it lieth happily in his way , to help such errours of his master as he can : without trenching on his masters credit ; still providing for his own indempnity : that hee bee not involved in his masters either imprudence or iniquity ; for by his bargaine with his master , he did not renounce the care of his own preservation . the reason of this equivocation is because wee ordinarily call obeying the doeing another mans will : and distinguish not how , sometimes , this is done with renouncing our own wills , which is in those actions whereof wee are masters , that is , our owne actions ; and , sometimes , without such renunciation , as in the actions which belong to others , in which wee have no will to renounce . now obedience as it is a vertue especially attending on the renouncing of our wills , is properly confined to the former sence , not to the other ; with which it onely hath an alliance in the name , and which truly is fidelity , as we have already declared . but , although fidelity bee a distinct vertue from obedience , yet is it not such a stranger as not to demand a place in this treatise : especially because the kinde of obedience wee desire to look into , which is that by which common-wealths and communities subsist , is founded generally on fidelity or the matter thereof which wee call promise , and in that vertue it bindes to observance . after which discourse wee shall bee prepared to venture on the matter it self of governement , and to our power , declare the force of it amongst men . man therefore being by his nature and definition a reasonable , that is , an understanding creature , or one whose primary and principall inclination is to truth or true knowledge ; and the outward carriage and action of man being naturally proportionable to his inward substance ; it is cleere his chief property , by which he behaves himself outwardly like a man , is to speak truth , and to doe as hee sayeth , when his words have action following them . hence it is , that though honesty ( which in a courtlyer terme is called honour , when applyed to a rationall carriage , and in a more spirituall language , conscience ) bee extended to many other qualities , yet it is most frequently and principally expected in his keeping his word ; in so much that though hee have other faults , either spirituall or carnall , yet if he be true of his word , he , often and in ordinary conversation , passeth for an honest man . againe , this vertue of truth is the principall and first engine of humane conversation , and he that hath it not is unfit to be admitted to treate amongst men , but is to be rejected and banished from all negotiation . thus you see what engagement every one hath , both by nature and necessity of conversation , to stand upon his word or fidelity : for so we call the vertue by which we speake our mind in reference to action , and are constant to performe what wee say . yet , since malice is growne to such a height , all nations , who pretend to the fear of any deity , have used to make men confirme their faith and promise by the invocation of the deity they worship ; hoping religion may worke in them what nature is not strong enough to effect . this confirmation is performed in two sorts : one , when we onely call god to witnesse ; as when we say , god , who sees my heart , knowes this to be truth , or that i meane as i speake : the other , when we pledge our trust in god for a security ; as when wee wish god may punish us , or never doe us good , if we break our promise . and this is properly an execration , as the other an oath ; yet both called oaths , and agree in this , that we pledge our beliefe and feare of god , to another , for his security . by which it is evident , that men generally esteem religion the thing which should pierce deepest into a mans heart and affection ; and the strongest bond and tye of faith and honesty ; and that he , who setteth little by his religion , hath neither honour nor honesty in him ; or at least wanteth the greatest and strongest part of them , and that which ought to rivet in and fixe the naturall inclination which we have to truth and fidelity . the sixth ground . in what consists right or due . the next consideration may appear too metaphysicall a subtlety for a morall treatise : yet such it is , that the ignorance of it is mother of many mistakes and quarrells . we ought therefore , to know that a man , considered in pure nature , lookes on all other things , men and beasts , and insensible creatures , as his subjects to worke on ; his onely rule being reason , which takes nothing to bee good but what is good to himself ; and makes the rule of his actions , to do what is fitting for him or conformable to his , that is , to a rationall nature . by this rule he treats another man , otherwise then a horse or a dog , and them otherwise then a tree or stone : for reason is a faculty to use every thing suitably to their natures ; as , to take a knife to cut , a horse to ride on , a man to read or write or be his counsellour . and this runs through all his actions . but as , though a taylor or mariner governe himselfe by this rule , even when he playeth the taylor or pilot , yet none can doubt but the rules of taylorship or steerage are different from this seeking his owne good and applying all things to that end : so , neither can any justly doubt but the art of a lawyer or counsellour is different from this principle which belongeth to all men . and to find out the difference , wee are to reflect , that he who maketh a promise to another , so it be a perfect one ( which we adde to decline the question of what promises oblige , what not ) puts himselfe and his promissary into a rank of agency and patiency , on a new score , to wit , that of fidelity and negotiating : so that now , not the nature of the two men , but their words , and what followeth out of them , ground their being active and passive . this power of activity is , in latine , called jus or justum , in english , right or due . the difference of these two arts is , one considers onely what is noble , and manly , and conscience ; the other , what is according to promise and consent of parties . whence we finde , by the vertue of a promise , a new order growne amongst men following out of promise : wherein three things are to be considered ; the engagement of nature and honesty ; the confirmation by oath ; and lastly , this right and duty which ariseth from the promise : for , whoever promiseth , submits himselfe to his promissary , and becomes his subject , as far as the contract reaches . the first mistake that springs from the ignorance of this difference is , the great noise we heare of the law of nature and the law of nations . for , we are made imagine that nature hath bound us to certaine lawes , and not left us to the liberty of reason , where no pacts or agreements intervene : as , that men ought to give free trade to leave the seas open , to give immunities to ambassadours , and the like : for these either depend on custome and consent , or are free for every man to dispose of , according to his owne profit , necessity , or convenience of his affaires . it is true , there is an inclination in man , from reason , to do another any good i can without my owne prejudice , and to have a desire to keepe peace with all men : but if i do not , it followes not that i wrong him , even though i do him harme or seeke his ruine ; but i wrong my selfe , nature binding me to make my carriage to every one rationall and becoming a man : for he is no otherwise to me then a piece of cloath or wood , which i cut and shape after my owne will , fittingly for my use . and , on the contrary side , the party prejudiced or refused a courtesy , gets no right over me to revenge himselfe : but nature and reason teaches him , peradventure , that it is good and prudent for him to hurt me , to prevent a greater mischiefe to himselfe ; and he doth right to himselfe in harming me , because he doth an action rationall and suitable to manhood . the different consequents of the two positions , will appeare in this : that , if there be , in nature , radicated such an order of right and naturally just or due ( as many hold ) it is a thing that reason can never infringe nor can any thing justifie what god hath shewed us by example , and we see wise politicians practise sometimes , when , without crime or offence offered , they make themselves masters of convenient places : but , if there bee no such right by nature , then reason is left mistresse to judge whether it be conformable to the nobility of man to do such an action or no . the seventh ground . why men desire to live in community ; and of the necessity of governement . not to make the foundations or under-ground workes bigger then our building ; it is time to enter upon our pretended subject of governement and obedience , and examine what it is maketh governement necessary to mankind . and , because the governement we looke upon is that of a multitude ; first it is fit to understand why men desire to live in flocks or multitudes . neither can any who hath never so little skill in nature doubt , but , as pleasure masters and heads all our actions , so likewise doth it this of living in society . the first community is of man and wife . who seeth not the power of pleasure in their mutuall society ? aristotle , out of experience , teacheth us that we take pleasure in conversing with handsome persons . and if wee consider pleasure to be nothing but the knowledge or sence of our being well or receiving some good ; and , that the immediate cause of pleasure is the impression which some naturall or apprehended good maketh of its owne presence ; and that good signifieth connaturall or fitting for us ; wee shall perceive that handsomenesse in our owne kinde must of necessity cause pleasure in us ; the impression it makes by our eyes being of the features and colour due to the perfection of our nature ; a gracefulnesse , not onely of gesture and voice , but even of wit and discourse being regularly the ground of the outward beauty . so that ( if nature hath not miscarried ) all the parts and actions of a beautifull body are gracefull to nature , and breed pleasure in others who injoy them by conversation and , as it were , communication . this then is the first origine of meeting and living together ; as , whosoever lookes into experience will easily discover : for , he will finde most men burthensome to themselves when they are alone , and to seeke company to divert themselves , so to elude the length of time . i remember to have heard a country fellow complaine of the losse of a dog which was stollen from him ; and gave for his reason , that he was to travell a whole night alone , and the dog would have beene an excellent companion to him . bees also , wee know , love company . horses not onely labour , but even eate better amongst their fellowes : and we often heare sickly stomachs thank those that visit them for the good meale they have made , as if the company helped downe their meat . pleasure therefore and love is the first combiner of men into society . the next is , that god and nature have so managed mankind , that no one hath of himself , as much as he desireth ; but regularly aboundeth in one kinde of goods and wants some other which his neighbour hath : hence , they mutually affect society ; to bee accommodated with such necessaries , as they cannot have but by communication one with another . in the third place comes feare : for hee that findeth himselfe stored with those things which hee and others love , is subject to feare those whom hee suspecteth able to bereave him of them ; and so seeketh company of friends for protection . nor doth any one feare to lose but what he affecteth to have ; so that first love marcheth in the van , and feare followeth in the reare . besides , it is against all generosity , and embases nature it selfe , to set the throne of feare above that of love ; and agreeth neither with philosophy nor morality . to make a step farther : granting once men to be desirous to live together , and taking notice of the passions they are subject to , and how self-love corrupteth the judgement of almost all in their own case ; it is evident they can never live in quiet and content , unlesse there bee some way contrived of agreement , when passion stirreth contention . they must therefore , necessarily , give consent , to end their controversies by some means . and since reason is our nature ; and every ones reason freer to see the truth in anothers case then in his owne ; and a wise and good man fitter then a fool or knave , the most naturall way for a multitude to live in peace is to have some man or men , accounted wise and good , chosen , to whose arbitrement all the rest ought to stand ; the stronger part combining to force the weaker , in case of resistance ; that is , the disinteressed part , which is the multitude , to force the interessed , which generally are but particulars if compared to the body of the people . here you see the nature of governement begin to appeare . but , to make it perfect , wee must farther consider , that many commodities are necessary to a multitude , which are to be furnished by common consent : that likewise there are many forraigne enviers to a multitude which liveth handsomely and happily : and in conclusion , that to provide for goods and prevent evils in common , is a matter of so great weight and difficulty , that it takethup the whole life of one or more men ; and by consequence , these businesses cannot be carried on by the whole body of the community , whose worke and aime is to enjoy themselves to their proportion , in getting by their labour , those accommodations of humane life , which they esteem necessary or conducing to their happinesse . it solloweth therefore , they must entrust some more or fewer to take care of the common concernements . such trustees are called governours , and the commnnity is said to obey them ; and according to the principles forelaid , you see the people are supposed ignorant of what ought to bee done for the publike , this being a businesse requiring a mans whole time ; which they neither can spare , nor doe desire to employ in this : way : you see they entrust others in whose prudence and goodnesse they confide ; and themselves execute what their trustees think fitting , either by practising when they are commanded , or giving a sufficient force to their governours to master such restif parties as will not obey : in conclusion , you see governement is , naturally , a power or right of directing the common affaires of a multitude , by a voluntary submission of the communities wills to the will of the governours ; whom they trust , upon opinion that they are understanding and honest , and will administer the commonalty by the rules of wisedome and goodnesse , as is most convenient and advantageous for the people . it seems to mee no moderate and discreet person can doubt but a governement so ordered is both necessary and connaturall to a rationall multitude , and , in a word , such as humane nature requires ; and is the best , if not the onely , that sutes to the disposition of free men and prudent . the eighth ground . of the authority given to an absolute governour ; and of under-sorts of governement . by this resignation of the peoples will , it is also evident , the magistracy receives such an activity and power as , wee have explicated before , did arise out of a mans promise to his neighbour : and by consequence , that the people as farre as they have renounced their owne will , so farre they have no power left in them to contradict or resist the orders of the magistracy . i say , as farre as the people have submitted their wills : for since this power is in the magistrate in vertue of their wills , it cannot extend farther then the peoples promise : so that if the people binde their magistrates to certaine lawes and limits ; hee hath no right to transgresse such lawes , or extend himselfe beyond the prefixed limits by his installment , and the original power given him : but above all , he cannot dispose of one chip or dispense in one the least law ; farther then he apprehends it as fit and necessary to the good of the common-wealth : and , if hee doth , hee exceedeth his patent and power . true it is , there is a great discretion to bee used in such limits , and the prudent governour will see that the good of the community requireth many of those dispensations , which carelesse governours use out of an overweening of their owne height and power . having thus declared the nature and conditions of naturall governement ; it is not amisse to see whether there bee any other governement ; and wherein distinguished from this . and casting our eyes round about us wee quickly perceive certaine communities which pretend to a defective governement : as companies of merchants or trades-men ; universities and colledges of schollers ; and cloysters of men and women , who pretend to employ themselves wholly to perfect their soules towards eternall beatitude . all these have a participation of governement ; but have not the universall administration of humane goods and evills : for , power of life and death , generally , they have none ; and are subject , for the most part , to appeals from their judgements , in matters of great consequence : neither have they any power of peace and warre : and if sometimes any of these royalties belong to them ; it is not as they are heads of such communities , but as they participate of soveraignty by priviledge , or accident . these therefore are distinguished from the governement wee pretend to declare ; as being slight imitations of it , and certaine likenesses , not the power it self ; or as some art or trade is different from morall philosophy , which is mistresse of the will , and all her actions ; the others being but ushers to the particular , as it were formes or rankes in which petty things are taught . in fine , these others are to our governement , as particulars to the universall . the governement therefore which wee explicate is that which hath power , either of all things belonging to the people it governeth ; or at least , of all comprehensible by nature and falling under sence and experience . the first of these wee see in the pope and such bishops as are withall secular princes ; the second , in other christian governements either of princes or common-wealths , where the spiritual jurisdiction is acknowledged to be higher and greater , though not commander of the temporall . but wee seeke farther , whether there bee any supreme governement different from this wee explicate , or no : and the occasion is from what wee see in certaine instances , that there is a kinde of command or rather subjection , which wee call slavery , exercised , not onely amongst heathens , but even christians , who have more conformity to nature . the ninth ground . of slavery and the lawfulnesse of it . and first , wee must looke into the notion of slavery ; which signifies a subjection to command in all things ; and that meerely for the masters profit . this all things may either reach to the hindring him from those actions which are necessary to obtaine beatitude ; or onely to corporall services , with that moderation , that the master hinders him not from such exercises as concerne the procurement of future happinesse . and clearly , it is against nature for any to submit his will so farre as to renounce eternall blisse . there cannot , then , bee any obedience due to such an extremity ; and , by consequence , there cannot be any power of commanding such enormities in the compasse of nature . the like i conceive of a subjection to be killed or maimed causlessely and without desert , or even tormented ; nay , or so penuriously abused as to have no content in life ; but perpetually to suffer sicknesse , hunger , cold , or any other notably afflictive condition , so that his life is rather a punishment then a content to him . for since life is our beeing , and since beeing is the thing most deeply recommended to us by nature ; it is evidently against the inclination of nature , to consent to the losse either of life or of the profit of life , which is , either to be well in this world or in the next : therefore it cannot be conformable to nature to renounce either ; especially , the quiet in this world being the meanes to gaine blisse in the other . neither doth it scare me to cast my eyes upon so many holy men and women , as have put themselves , voluntarily , upon penurious and painfull lives . for , i can easily answer , that they had not displeasing lives ; enjoying the fruit of contemplation , and the sweetnesse of conscience in expecting a great reward for what they did : so that , they onely refused the pleasures of this world , to gaine those of the next ; which is very rationall . but , for a man to renounce the content of this world , who either thinke not of another , or , at least , hopeth nothing out of his renunciation : this must of necessity be extremely irrationall and against nature ; whose universall aimes are , to be well , either in the next or this present life . but if there be no su●h subjection naturall , there can as little be any power of command gotten either by promise and submission of the subject , or violence of the commander ; who may perforce do what he list , but can never make it conformable to nature , to use an other with such inhumane severity . there followes yet another kinde of slavery ; which consisteth in being bound to do what his master commandeth , while his master affordeth him a convenient livelyhood ; and being subject to due punishment , without farther appeal , when he deserveth it . and this hath no apparent opposition to nature ; why , in circumstances , a man may not binde himselfe to it , and be obliged to maintaine and make good his word to his dying day . and , of such a kind of slavery , we may question , whether nature alloweth a whole people to be involved in it , or it be a thing that onely can happen accidentally in nature . and aristotle is the first man whom wee are engaged to offend in this matter ; who sayes or seemes to say , that some nations are naturally masters and commanders , others , slaves and subjects : to which conceit virgil seemes also to incline ; tu regere imperio populos romane memento &c. hae tibi erunt artes — as if it were proper to that countrey to command . neither doe i thinke aristotle's meaning was any more , then that there was a greater fitnesse in some nations to command , then in others : for , himselfe teacheth , the barbarous prisoners , whose education had been noble , should not be put to servile offices . so that , it was but a little selfe-pleasing in these two great authours , and affection towards their countries , which made them fall into this extremity , of thinking it fit that other nations should submit to theirs : whereas , had they lived in our dayes , long experience would have taught them that , in every nation , there are men fit to governe , if education and discipline be not wanting ; and againe , any nation may prove a slave , even through too much wit , if they have not goodnesse to temper it . but we must not be angry , even with great ones , if they flatter a little their countrey : but take warning it be not our owne case , either for our countrey , or , which is more absurd , for our selves . leaving then this question , whether any nation be , by nature , borne and designed to slavery ? let us see whether , within the latitude of nature , it consists that any nation can enslave it selfe in the sence propounded . i do not here intend to engage in that question ; whether one nation may oppresse another , and , by force of garrisons and armies , keepe them quiet in a legitimate course of governement and subjection ? a question much different from ours , which is onely , whether a whole nation may voluntarily submit it selfe to a government , by which it shall have nothing of its owne , nor be able to deserve or get any thing ; but bee entirely at the disposition of the magistrate it chuseth , without right or property ? that we may not walk too much in the dark , the holy scripture holdeth us out a lanthorne , in the example of joseph ; who bought up the whole nation of aegypt for pharaoh their king , so that he rendred him not onely the governour as before , but also absolute lord and master , and them his slaves ; and this by their consent . neverthelesse , i am not able to understand reason in it . to put therefore the case clearly , the meaning is ; whether a whole nation can ty it selfe so by any promise to one magistrate , as afterward to be bound , they and their children , in force of their words , not to have or dispose of their labours and goods of fortune but at the pleasure of the magistrate ; and that he hath power , arbitrarily and without any farther reason then his owne will , to give what one man possesseth to another , and make any one worke and obey another , meerly because such is his pleasure . that which induceth me to declare for the negative is the nature of man ; whose first and maine operation , is judgement and choice ; and the matter of this is his outward action : so that , who univer●ally renounceth his judgement in externe action , truely renounceth nature it selfe , in renouncing the end and action for which it was made . now , that a single man may be forced to this , i make no difficulty : for , if force can take away a single mans life , much more may it take away his outward action . but , when i speake of a nation , me thinks i speake of nature it selfe : for , i understand a nation to signifie a thing in nothing different from humane nature , except in greatnesse ; as a bit of bread from a loafe or a paile of water from the pond out of which it was taken ; and so , reason cannot teach us to do that to a nation , which ought not bee done to all humane kinde . now , who abhorres not to thinke that the use of judgement and will should bee banished out of mankinde ? were not that quite to unman us and be-beast our whole nature ? on the other side , it being the property of reason to use every thing it knoweth , according as it is fitting to the respective nature of the thing ; and nothing being more fitting for man in common and every one in particular , then to judge and governe in his little spheare of activity ; reason can never demand or approve of the contrary to be practised universally ; as is implyed in this position , that it may be done to a whole nation . i looke not into the inconvenience of such proceeding : how base and unworthy it renders the subjects ; how unfit for the service of the magistrate ; how ready to accept of any occasion to better themselves ; and the like ; which are sufficient to dehort any wise governour from attempting or desiring it : because my theame is onely upon the contracting an obligation of obedience , out of the force of their promise ; and extends no further . and , i suppose , the shewing that such a promise invalidateth the principle upon which a promise grounds its constancy , is enough , to shew that no promise so made can be constant and firme ; since a man stands to his word , because he is a man and hath a principle of judgement or choice upon judgement , by which and according to which he is and ought to be governed : now then , such a promise being a renouncing and bereaving him of this his manlinesse ; it cannot assuredly bee maintained by manlinesse which is the onely or chiefe strength of a promise . but , what must we reply to joseph ? what to many thousands of eminent christians , who seeme to professe and observe , in vertue of a vow , this very kinde of subjection ? as for joseph , he justifies himselfe , in renouncing the vassalage of his people for one fifth part of their lands and fruits . . and , not to make an estimate , how proportionable the fifth of a kingdome is to the furnishing of necessaries for governing ; so much at least is plain that , by his remission of foure parts absolutely , that is , for ever , he did not execute what he pretended by the bargaine ; but , by the formality of acquiring all , he obtained what he aimed at , that the people should willingly contribute the fifth part of their labour and goods generally , and , in case of necessity , willingly obey their governour . as for the speciall obedience vowed by some christians of exemplary life , it is professedly only , concerning spirituall instruction or exercise , even then when it is applyed to the knights champions of christendome : and this is expressed by the greatest divine the schoole ever had , in his ● . qu. . art. . ad tertium . so that , neither of these objections prejudice the conclusion we have setled ; however the outward undiscerned shew may make an appearance to the contrary . out of this conclusion it is easily seene , that the turkish , moscoviticall , tartarian and other whatsoever governements , setled upon this principle , that the goods and lives of the subjects are the princes , not to defend ( as our lawes go ) but to dispose of at will , without contradiction or limitation , more then of his pleasure ; neither do nor can ever breed any obligation of obedience in the subject , farther then out of feare or present utility . it is not amisse to adde this consideration , that those tyrannicall governours exact of their subjects no lesse then to forgoe all that is deare in this world , at their pleasures , life and meanes , wife and children , and whatsoever hath made impression upon them : so that , truely , there is no protection or security from them ; and if they rob you not , it is because they have no occasion , not because they conceive any unworthinesse in it . whence , no good nor profit doth , regularly and according to the intention of the pact and agreement , result to the particular ; but all is the high masters , and the subjects portion is onely to share those scraps he shall cast down to him , as to a dog , to make him fit to hunt for his master . the tenth ground . why a man is to hazard himselfe for the common good . it is true , this debt in the subject , of hazarding life and limbs and all that is estimable in this world , is exacted , as well in just and legitimate governements as in those hideous tyrannies ; but , there is a recompence for it , and the good of the whole reflecteth on the part ; and if one lose his life , his children and relations at last feele the sweetnesse of it ; and this makes men hazard with courage , and die with comfort . and cleerly , were there not this obligation , no common-wealth could stand . what city could be defended , if the citizens would not venture their lives upon the walls ? what army could bee managed , if the souldier would never be brought into the danger of death , or would fly as soon as the bullets began to play about his ears ? all wrongs must be suffered at their hands who would expose their own lives to hurt others ; and no justice maintained , or innocency defended . nature therefore makes it most cleer that such an obligation is unavoidable , and the daily necessity of it beateth it out so flat and plaine , that wee can no way escape so manifest an evidence . but if it bee by the direction of nature , certainly it is also rationall , and hath some principles of its truth and reasonablenesse . now , in morality the reason of all action is the good obtaineable by it ; which if lesse or not greater then what wee hazard and , peradventure , lose in the attempt , it is no good nor can bee a rationall motive of such an action . we ought therefore to seeke out this great good . aristotle proceeds as cunningly in this businesse as became so wise a master ; and , according to his fashion , where his skill reached not to explicate the particulars , remained in common termes : telling us , that bonum commune divinius est quàm particulare : but , in what this divinity consists , hee no where expresses . truly , if there were a platonick idea of the particular's goods , which might bee termed the common good , i could understand that there were a divinity in it ; but himselfe hath extinguished that flash of plato's , beyond reviving . i understand also , that the notion of common , compared to the notion of individuall , hath a kinde of excellency by its universality , which rendreth it very august and lustrous , and of a higher degree then the particular . i know again the perpetuity a common-wealth pretendeth to , compared to the mortality of a single person , vesteth it selfe with a kinde of infinity , which giveth it a glorious appearance . nay , when i see the same man work for a common-wealth , in a free way of doing it good ; and againe , for a private friend : i see a vast distance between his pretended ends ; and an eminent generosity in one over the other : whence , i believe , it cometh that heroës and heroicall vertues are chiefly taken in respect of doing good to whole countreys or cities . but when , on the other side , i see the same great master teach us , that good is the same with desireable ; and every ones good , what is desireable to him ; i finde it is an intricate labyrinth of equivocation wherein wee endlessely erre , while wee think that good taken in common , should bee accounted good , truly and properly . as , who would bee so wilde as to bend any strong labour here in england to profit the king of persia or siam , if hee expected no good to reflect on himselfe by it ? much lesse would any account it good to bee robbed or maimed , because it was good to another who possessed his money or was afraid of him : and yet if wee stick upon the common notion of good , without determining to whom it is good , ●oth these must bee esteemed not onely goods but great ones ; for , so they are to some body , though nothing or harme to the esteemer . then , to cry , the common good , is a meere deceit and flattery of words ; unlesse wee can shew that the common good is as great to us as wee make it sound . neither can the authority of learned nations and the many endevours of worthy men perswade us the contrary . for these nations generally were of popular governements , where plainly the common good was the good of them who were to reward the causes of it : so that , it was no wonder the common good should be so highly exalted and cryed up ; where it was the particular good , both to them to whom it was commended , as also the commenders themselves were to arrive to their own private pretences through that notion of the common good . the like is of all princes and governours ; who if they bee wise , conceive the common good in most circumstances , to bee compared to them as their own proper good . it remaines therefore , to see what may bee the ground on which an understanding man ought to value so highly the common good ; and expose his life and all that is deare to him , upon the score of the publicke . cleare it is , that hee who ventures his life , ventures all this world : for if hee dies , what reward remaines there in this world ? fame is a slender recompence , when the fruit of it ( which chiefly consists in being respected in company , and having a power amongst his associates ) is once passed . the good of his wife and children ; that may rejoyce a dying man ; but if there rest nothing after death , it is a comfort which soon expires ; being indeed nothing but a flash . it is then past dispute , that for him , who expects nothing in the next world , there can bee no rationall motive of voluntarily endangering his life for the common cause ; if himselfe bee not particularly interessed in it . i know philosophers reply , that there is no harme in death , nor pain after it , and wee are but as if wee never had been ; so they dispute to take away the feare of death . but first , i would ask them , why , even in such a case , the fear of death should be taken away ? what signifieth this to a sound philosopher , to take away the love of his summum bonum ? of the end for which hee is to doe all his actions ? againe if hee must embrace death , upon what motive must he make his onset ? shall hee propose to himselfe none ? or a lesse good then hee loses ? or entertaine frantick apprehensions of glory after hee is nothing ? these are not answers for philosophers and considerate persons ; but for some hare-brained fool-hardy flashes or doating oratours , who , with a multitude of fine words , can plausibly dresse up contradictions and non-sence . this therefore remaines certain , that there is no good to bee expected here equivalent to the hazard of death ; and consequently , none can bee rationally valiant , who sets not his hopes upon the next world : and as , before , wee made it apparent , that hee who was not constant to his religion , could have no rooted honour or honesty in him ; so , now it is likewise evident , hee cannot rationally bee either valiant himselfe or trusted by others in danger , farther then hee is a foole . since then , on the contrary side , the nature of common-wealths makes it beyond dispute that hazarding is necessary ; it is both evident there is another life to bee expected , and that it imports good government to plant deeply in the breast of the subjects a rationall apprehension of it . the cause therefore , and solid reason why men ought to bee valiant , is the hope of reward hereafter for doeing good to our neighbour here : and the common-wealth beeing our neerest and greatest neighbour , as including our friends , parents , acquaintance , and all of mankinde that our knowledge reacheth to ; to performe service to it is , certainly , the greatest act of charity towards our neighbour ; that is the highest externe act which god hath granted to us , and , consequently , to bee preferred before all others ; and , as such , to expect a profit and recompence in the next life . i know , it may bee objected , that in beasts also is to bee found a kinde of valour , even to the hazard of their lives for their mates and little ones , and yet no reward of the next world can be pretended for them . but , wee are to reflect , that beasts are not governed by any reason given them to governe themselves by ; but like clocks and other engines , by the wit of their makers : and therefore it ought not to bee expected they should bee addressed to that which is their individuall greatest good , as man is by his reason ; but onely to what is fittest for their creators intention ; which being onely to continue them for the use of man ; and this passion of audacity which wee see in them , being fit for that , wee are not to seeke a further reason for them to hazard their lives , nor to draw any consequence from them to mankinde , whose propriety is to governe himselfe by the knowledge of his owne good , and not to bee forced out of that for the good of any other , so the notion of good bee rightly taken . by this wee , in part , understand wherein consists the worth and excellency of a magistrate and his office : to wit , that all others ends being purely for the good of their private persons or family ; the magistrates aime is at the universall good of the whole eternall body of the common-wealth , the extent of the persons , the long and farre-sighted care , and the abstraction from his private good , manifestly exalt this function , beyond comparison , above that of private men and their intentions ; and placeth it , as it were , in an orb of honour proper to its dignity . the eleventh ground . the quality and rationall power of a supreme governour . thus is our supreme magistrate or governour mounted on his throne of justice and soveraignty . hee hath for his strength , that right the people have bestowed on him ; devesting themselves , by this submission , from interposing in common affaires . he hath besides , the strength of the people ; both their wealth and swords being delivered up to him ; so that , if he bee wise , he can make himselfe and his lawes obeyed . but chiefely he hath his owne prudence and goodnesse , which is supposed to be the choicest that could bee found in that people ; and the credit of it to be his strength and support . for , if we looke into it ; as we see that , in the naturall generation of governement , the people truely intend to be governed by one whom they esteeme the wisest and best amongst them : so afterward , when they apprehend their magistrate no solomon , yet they still conceive he is the best they can obtaine or prudently aime at ; that is , if they should attempt to change , it would bring greater inconveniences then their continuance under this weaker magistrate . so that , as it were , the essence and forme of his power to governe , is wisdome and goodnesse ; at least , such a degree of both as is supposed and apprehended the greatest possible , according to the circumstances wherein they are . his end wee finde to bee the common good : and to that is he wholly and adequately bound , by his owne goodnesse , by the peoples intention , by his owne acceptance , by the nature of the charge it selfe , and by the very forme of his life and profession : in so much that , he faileth from his duty , from the expectation of his subjects , and his owne goodnesse , if he doth the least action for his private interest , or otherwise then out of his esteeme that it is for the greatest good of the common-wealth . and truely , if it bee duely considered , we may plainely see that his private interest is not distinguished from the publick . for , how can it be ? first for honour , 't is plaine , the welfare of his subjects is his highest honour ; their knowing they are well by him , and so their love to him , his strongest security ; their expressing still on all occasions content with his actions , and esteeme of his person , his greatest pleasure ; and in fine , the more wealth they have , the greater commander is he : so that really , this private interest ( if he be indeed a good governour ) is the true felicity of his people . i doe not , by this , intend to cut off from supreame magistrates that promise and magnificence wee see usually in persons of that quality : but , whereas it may be practised either for pride and vanity , that is , to procure an esteem of the private merit of the magistrate , or else , to facilitate the governement by the awe and reverence it printeth in the subject ; i expect the supreame magistrate to be so discreet , as to understand the former is meerly a shadow or faint and fading colour , the other a reall profit and necessary instrument , and so to be embraced for the good of the people . neither must wee leave our magistrate here , but transplant our discourse into a new consideration . for , if he hath gotten a commission , he hath not , by that , lost the quality of a rationall , wise , and good man ; but joined to that a new obligation of being new fixt upon the common good , as the effect and scope of the actions of his whole life : insomuch that , to determine the quality of his action , we must make one complexe of the whole person ; and aske , what a wise and noble minde , haveing such limitations upon him , by word or oath engaged in his installment , may or ought to do concerning the limitations ? and first , it is undoubted on both sides , that neither may he , without great cause , make a breach in those hedges his way is fenced with ; nor , if he make some small and inconsiderable breaches , that hee violates therefore his oath . for , the nature of humane action is such , as not to consist in an indivisible ; but , of it selfe , to have a morall latitude ▪ our understandings not being able to reach to such small and petty differences as nature maketh and our operations containe , as far as they depend from nature . but , the question cometh , when some great fault discovers it selfe in the limitations , and the end of governement is prejudiced by such a defect ; and neverthelesse it is no doubt but 't is the intention of the people or the trustees of the people to binde their magistrate to such conditions ; whether , in such a case , he be bound to his orders and oath , or whether the duty of a wise and good man doth enfranchise him to doe what is truely best for the people , though it be against their wills ? the question seemeth hard : and therefore it is not amisse to note , that truely best signifieth that it be not onely best , if it had been fore-ordered or if it were in practise ; but that it be best to be brought into practise ; and that , notwithstanding all dammages and dangers which are to be incurred in the setling of it ; otherwise , it is clear , he ought to stand to his oath . another caution is , that the magistrate doe not onely think it so best , but know it by certainty and science ; otherwise , hee proceedeth not wisely , to hazard a disturbance of the common-wealth upon slight and weak appearances . these two suppositions premised , wee are to consider what it is that engageth the magistrate on both sides . and , for his promise , it is above declared , that hee is engaged to it by the connaturality and beauty of truth in mans nature : now not truth onely is conformable to mans nature , but also that noblenesse and goodnesse that bindeth man to man ; which in its highest pitch , that is , as it looketh upon a common-wealth or a little mankinde , is the beauty and vertue of a governour . againe , i see a governour hath in himselfe , as it were , two truths , or degrees of truth belonging to his person : one , which is the publicke honesty , either considered betwixt him and his subject or some aliens ; and this forfeited maketh his publick credit weak and unfit for the use of governement : the other is but a splendour reflecting on his own person , by which hee appeareth in the face of honour and a man of his word . for this latter it is very evident , the affection to the publicke ought to oversway it ; because being but a private good it should doe homage to those vertues which carry a man to the common interest . for the former , the dammage ensueing is to bee esteemed and poised against the profit or necessity of the common-wealth : for , if it bee evident , that the good of the change openly and vastly exceeds the dammage proceeding from the discredit ; cleerly hee is bound to admit of the discredit , to purchase the advantage accrewing by the change : but , where there is none or little difference , there the ballance hangs upon quietnesse side , and change is not to bee ventured on . this seemeth so plainly and evidently concluded , that a rationall man cannot resist it . but , to those who are used to maintaine their credit by custome more then by reason , it is a bolus of hard digestion , to tell them they must break their word for the common good : and seemeth to bee of the same nature , with that famous definition of an ambassadour , witty in england , harsh in other nations , that hee is sent ad peregrè mentiendum pro patriâ , which where the equivocation of lying abroad is not understood , is , in verity , a scandall to statesmen , whose negotiation hangs so tenderly on their credit , that , it once being broken , they have lost a principall instrument to penetrate the hearts on which they are to work . therefore , let us see whether the high magistrate ( in proceeding as wee have declared ) does truly force the rampart of veracity so necessary for a governement . let us first begin with his promise , and consider what it is . hee is entrusted to doe for the common good : and the reason why hee is entrusted is , because the entrusters conceive themselves either through their incapacity or attendance to other imployments , ignorant of what is truly the common good . they entrust him , therefore , with more then they understand ; and so his power is to proceed , according to his understanding , though it crosse theirs : hee then of necessity , must bee false to his oath , if hee doe not , according to his trust , act for the common good what hee evidently sees in a high degree to import it . further , because wee know , in morall businesses , the end aimed at , is more principall then the means ordered to it , and hath such a command over them that they are to bee or not to bee , according as is fitting for the end : and in the oath or promise of our high magistrate , if hee observe his limitations , he destroyeth the end for which they were put : hee offends against both his oath and fidelity to his people , if hee maintain such limitations , when hee is obliged , for the publick good , that is , when hee ought to break them . yes but ( replieth the man who thinketh himselfe wedded to an outward and seeming honesty in this cause ) howsoever , at least hee breaketh that part of his oath , in which hee swore directly , to those limitations . let us therefore see even that point , and ask , what was the peoples will in exacting his oath or promise ? doeth any one will what hee understandeth and knoweth not ? if one should say to another , i give thee what is in that trunk ; in which himselfe had put a suit of apparell , and , without his knowledge , his servant had taken that out and put in bags of gold to the same bulk ; would any divine , or chancery judge , or prudent person assert he were bound to bestow on that promissary all his gold , which was in the trunke ? i thinke not ; and the reason is , because it is the will and understanding which hath the power to give strength to a promise or contract ; and here the will is wanting ; for hee knew not what he said , nor intended to give any thing but a suit of clothes . how many promises doe divines and lawyers pronounce null , though they were good and valid when they were made , by reason of the change of accidents following , which could not be foreseene ? if one promise his daughter in marriage to his neighbour , and shee dyeth ; is he bound to fulfill his engagement , or seeke his neighbour another wife ? nay , if the neighbour be discovered not to be the man he was taken for ; not to have a competent estate and such like conditions ; he may justifie the disperformance of his promise ; nor shall he forfeit his credit if he doeth not keepe his word , but rather , if he do , be accounted a weak man . now , to come to our purpose , let it bee supposed the people were made understand , when they exact the promise from their magistrate , that such limitations would destroy their peace , and contentment : doth any one think they would binde their governour to maintaine them ? if they would not , t is evident , howsoever their mouthes pronounced the words , their hearts were ignorant and inculpable of such an exaction ; for they knew not what they did , they understood not nor meant what they spake . but suppose that truely they knew the incommodities that were to follow , and yet they would have them observed : for , this happeneth often in this our subject , that some ( especially great men , and sometimes the populace ) understand the inconvenience of a law , and yet for private interest will have it maintained : what then is the duty of the supreame magistrate , who is sworne to maintaine the said lawes ? the question is clearely answered by the condemnation of jephthe ; who , when he had rashly vowed to sacrifice the first thing that met him from home , did impiously murther his daughter . all understanding men know , a wicked oath is not to be observed . he that should give a mad mana sword , because he had vowed or sworne it , deserved to be hanged for the murthers by him committed : now , an ignorant and wilfull man , what is he but a mad man ? or what is madnesse but a wilfulnesse in doing evill ? if the action be naught and such as the exactor cannot , with reason , desire , he cannot by any oath bind a swearer to it : now to observe conditions which shall ruine the governement and destroy the end for which they were instituted , is an action contrary to all reason , and to which the promissary cannot binde the promiser , in any wisdome and goodnesse : he is therefore bound , rather to the destroying then fulfilling such conditions ; neither is he therefore perjured , but were rather unjust and wicked , if he observed them . this so resolved , it appeareth plainly , that no supreame magistrate can bee bound to any lawes contrary to good governement ; farther then either the danger of changing them , or the not cleerly seeing them to be such , may hold his hand . the twelfth ground . who is such a governour , and the subjects duty towards him . wee have long talked of a supreame governour ; it is time we should point him out , that he may bee knowne . and , since all agree that there are three sorts of governement , monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy ; when they are simple , there can bee no doubt who is the supreame magistrate . now , mingled they may bee , all together , or some two of them : and againe , their mixing may bee either continually , as when all parts mixed are so often engaged that their authorities run jointly , or else some are continuall , others but at certaine termes . if monarchy bee mixed , either with aristocracy or democracy , so that they be continually joint actors ; the monarch is but a servant , and the other part the master : as is to be seen i● the italian doges , and the lacedaemonian kings ; for his force is nothing , compared to his consort . if democracy and aristocracy be so mixed , the quarrell is more ballanced ; and because it is a governement divided in it selfe , and therefore dangerous ; no doubt but , if the aristocracy get power enough , she is in the posture of supreame authority . the example of this wee have in the roman common-wealth , in the time , specially , of sylla's conquest ; when , if he had setled the state in the senate , there had been no feare of caesar and pompeyes mangling that common-wealth , as afterwards fell out . monarchy and democracy can hardly be so mixed , that democracy be perpetuall , and monarchy by spurts : for that is not monarchy ; the said monarch being not long enough in power to be accounted a setled magistrate ; as wee see in the decemvirs , tribunes and dictators amongst the romans : so that , the monarch hath not the power in his hand to change any thing , which is the case we aime at . and the like is of aristocracy ; when its employment is the ordinary and continuall , and monarchy onely by turnes and seasons . there remaineth onely monarchy in continuance , compared to aristocracy and democracy at certaine turnes . and in both , it is cleare , the monarch is the supreame governour in ordinary ; and so the magistrate of whom we speake , who may alter the inconveniences , if occasion serve . as for the people , they are but a weake part , if the governour be wise : so that he is , by this posture , in the state of doing that good to the commonwealth which his judgement and conscience dictate to him to be necessary . the comparison to aristocracy is much harder ; every one of the aristocracy being , generally and regularly speaking , a petty monarch ; and the whole of them easily assembled ; and , when so , having the power in their hands : so that the monarch is not ( by vertue of his ordinary condition ) in a posture to bee able to rectifie what he seeth necessary to be altered ; therefore he is not the man wee call the supreame magistrate , but the assembly of the nobility , whereof he is but an eminent and considerable one . the subject , being correlative to the magistrate , requireth upon that title , to be reflected on ; but much more because the nature of the magistrate cannot be well understood , unlesse the duty of the subject bee joyntly declared . we must therefore declare , or seeke out at least , what honour and conscience obligeth the subject to : and , to performe this , wee must reflect upon his motive of obedience ; which , as is before insinuated , was grounded on the love and necessity of living in community , that , from it , he may receive good , and , by its protection , secure himselfe against evill . to this end he entrusteth the charge of the common administration to the magistrate ; taking himselfe as one unskilfull or unable for such employment . wee see therefore , the end of the subject in his obedience , immediately , is the publick good or the good of the commonwealth : a farther though more cordiall and deep in the subject , is the good he is to receive out of the commonwealth being well ; which is nothing else but that the particulars of the commonwealth be so . evident then it is , that the immediate motive which the subject is to propose before his eyes , in his obedience , is the good of the commonwealth ; that is , the very same motive the magistrate ought to have in administring , and which hee had when first , in his owne person or in his forefathers , he submitted himselfe to this rule . wee know , by consequence , how excellent a virtue this act of obedience is ; having a motive of so great a price and high elevation above other ordinary employments , which reach no farther then to his private good . but , herein the same vertue is lesse in the subject then in the commander ; that , because the common good is the very private good of the commander , therefore it is not related to any private good of the same nature ; and so not commanded or limited by any other , as in the subject it is by the end of his idioticall good . the next thing that occurreth is the subjects fact by making this trust ; and that is , that he hath made away all power of judgeing and caring for the common good , farther then by the eyes and hands of the magistrate , his trustee , otherwise they have not made him supreame governour : so that , if he thinketh or judgeth any thing to goe amisse , or interpose his opinion , in any reall and effective way , even so farre as to disgust himselfe or any other against the governement ; he breaketh his promise and engagement to his governour : much lesse is it in his power to recall the trust and seeke any way to take it out of the hands of his soveraigne . as for his oath of allegiance , i believe every man sees , it takes its strength from these two ; and , by consequence , is to be understood to reach whither they carry it , and strengthen the obligation that they ground : but , not to extend it selfe to what they doe not ; onely what they begin and , as it were , make , the oath doth , by religion and reverence to god , enholy and consecrate , and so give it the greatest strength that falleth upon humane liberty . by this discourse , we learn , that the magistrates security , from honesty and conscience , is the greatest that humane nature can frame ; being grounded upon the noblest vertue , fortified by the vertue of veracity so naturall and principall as is above signified ; the subject having made as great an alienation of his propriety to governement as will can ratifie ; and lastly , elevated it above his cwne soule by the invocation of him who is master both of soule and body , of time and eternity . whence , nothing but the frailty of humane condition can prejudice a governour once estated legitimately in his seat of justice ; nothing can make a subject more delinquent , then to work against this duty of obedience ; no wonder , therefore , if rebellion be connumerated with soothsaying and idolatry . and obedience preferred before sacrifice , even in the sight of god . the thirteenth ground . of the qualities of lawes and commands , in respect to obedience . out of what hath been said concerning the subject's obligation to obedience , wee may understand a distinction made by many , of the validity and lawfulnesse of commands . for , the lawfulnesse to a soveraigne commander , is no other then that hee truly thinketh it to bee for the good of the common ; that is , for the greatest good , all things considered : which if hee doth , it is , by the former discourse , lawfull for him to command , what he pleases , without reproach of conscience or honour to him ; and on the other side , if hee swerve never so little , hee so farre breaketh his trust : and the greater the abuse is , the greater also his fault and shame . but , the subject is to remember that hee hath put his confidence in his governour ; as beeing himselfe ignorant and not having leasure to look into the depth of the policy : and therefore hee is to think and judge well of his magistrates counsells , and make account hee doeth not understand the bottome of them ; and so bee prompt and forward to obey . the validity of the command consists in the obligation the subject hath to performe it : and this may faile in two degrees ; one to the not fulfilling the command , by avoiding it ; the other , by resisting it . this latter is no waies in the subjects hands , unless it be in such a case as his oath of allegiance and obligation to the good of the community , cease or bind not : the former can never happen as long as it can be presumed to be the commanders will this subject , in these circumstances , should perform this command ; for , so long , his trust obligeth him not to faile . but , because a governour many times is not rightly informed , nor can a law reach home to all particular accidents ; it is very incident that ; in some speciall cases , the subject may presume it is not the magistrates will he should be bound to this particular service . and this is so ordinary that , among us , there is a particular and highest court , to declare when wee are not bound to the written lawes . yet is it necessary to believe that even that court is able to satisfie all cases , or that private men are bound not to avoid a law without having recourse to that court , or to obey all decrees of that court if they can prudently avoid it : because no court ( especially amongst refined pleaders ) can bee without many formalities ; which are not the substance of justice , and therefore may prudently bee declined , neither honour nor conscience obliging to such proceedings . but they must ever have for their rule , that the lawmaker intended not to include them , in these circumstances , within the compasse of his law . some make us a threefold division of lawes ; the first absolute or commanding ; the second permissive ; the third they call penall lawes : the first they averre to bee obligatory , because directly intended by the law-giver ; and of this sort is verified what wee have newly discoursed . the second ( were it expressely the sense of the law to permit a thing ) is also of the former kinde and onely distinguished in the matter : for it would make the thing permitted truly lawfull . but this is not the writers meaning : for they doe not conceive it was the law-makers intention to allow of the practice ; but onely not to punish it , or to ordaine somewhat in supposition of the case . as when usury is limited to such a rate , that greater is forbidden ; but to such a rate is so permitted , that he that hath borrowed is bound and compellable to pay so many in the hundred ; but no man is bound to borrow ; nor as they say , allowed to take interest , though the law constraine the borrower to pay . but , how the law can forc● the one to give , and yet not allow the other to take , is to mee , a hard proposition and like a riddle ; and therefore , i believe , the law it selfe is to bee condemned or the practice to bee justified ; and that truly there neither is nor can bee such a kinde of law , as shall compell a thing to bee done and not approve of the doeing . the third sort also seemeth to mee no lesse contradictory : for though i confesse there are penall lawes unquestionably , that is , such as constitute punishments for offences ; yet these masters meane not such , but under the cloake of the name , teach disobedience to certaine lawes , perswading us the law-givers intention is indefinite , that either a man should doe such a thing , or suffer such a punishment if hee bee discovered to have committed the fault : which is directly against all goodnesse . for first wee are to consider whether the thing commanded bee usefull to the common-wealth ; if so , it cleerly argues it is the direct will of the lawmaker . againe , it is to be looked into , if it be universally neglected , what dammage accreweth to the common ; and this also will assure us , by the necessity of it , that it is intended for the common good , and therefore to be executed to the possibility of the subject . againe , how unworthy a thing is it of a governour , who is sapposed to be all equity and goodnesse , to ly at the catch with his subjects , to entrap them for a thing he doth not aime to have done ? besides , the name of punishment supposeth a fault ; so that , the law must be supposed to speake improperly ; which , in its dogmaticall way of proceeding , is absurd . yet doe i not deny but lawes may bee made indefinitely ; as , to command every townesman to march or pay so much monies , leaving it to his liberty to do which hee listeth : but this is no penall law , nor hath it any likely hood of one ; but is meerly a disjunctive command . neither likewise do i entrench upon such orders in communities , which being almost impossible to bee rigorously observed , have some other obligation annexed to the failing ; to be performed by the conscience of the delinquent , whether discovered or no . for , this clearely remaineth voluntary , and is ordered to make the failing rare , and to acknowledge a defect and fault in the not observing ; and so hath not that crossing of the will , and that force which one feeleth when he is discovered and , by authority , chastised . so that , in conclusion , there is but one sort of law in all these ; and that binding the subject , in force of his promise and oath , to the proportion of his concurrence to the common good , by his act of obedience . the fourteenth ground . in what conditions the subject may resist governement . now , to returne to the former part ; it is evident , if it be rationall to resist the governement , it will be lawfull also to break and remove it : for , these two actions are of the same nature ; and , in truth , pure resistance and disobedience is the annulling it . for , governement , consisting in the power of commanding , that is , of having no resistance ; to resist is not to acknowledge it , but maintaine there is no such power , at least , in this case ; that is , to take it away in this case ; that is , to set another judge or knower when obedience is due and when not ; that is , not to keepe the subject in the nature of ignorance , in which is grounded his being a subject . this being the nature of this disobedience or resisting , the magistrate is bound with all his strength to crush and breake it ; and , by consequence , it draweth along the concussion of the whole state , if the subject bee able to make good his resistance . out of this it is cleare , that a subject may not use this resistance ; but in case when it is fitting to attempt the dissolving of the governement . it followes first , that it cannot be done , but when the occass●on is greater then the value of the publick peace and good of the common-wealth . no man therefore can justly attempt such a disobedience , to save his owne life and goods , or the life and goods of his owne family , how great soever , if contained within the bounds of a private family , or but a part of the common-wealth . now , how farre this extendeth , i dare not subtilize ; it being a kinde of morall consideration and a prudentiall esteeme to weigh it in particular ; the common notion reaching no farther , then that it be not so notorious a part of the common-wealth , that it bee a homogeneall part of it , such as is fit to make a common-wealth of it selfe , to determine whose nature , is not the intent of our present embarquement . the next consideration is , that neither an universall harme , if moderate and such as may bee supported with lesse dammage then followes out of the state , is a sufficient cause of resistance to the soveraigne magistrates command . as for example , an enormous taxe ( such as was thought to be that which revolted guienne from edward the third of england , or the low countries from philip the second of spain : ) as both their wars may well testifie ; in which the taking of any one towne was of more consequence then all such a taxe would have been . how farre this also reaches is not for mee to esteeme ; who should aske me , if the governour exacted for one time all the subject had , so there remained a ground to worke upon of new , and within a little time to live contentedly ; i should be troubled to confesse it were a sufficient injury to take up armes against him , because i cannot judge which were the greater mischief to the subject . thirdly , if the wrong be of that nature as to ruine the whole common-wealth , yet not suddenly but after many yeers , if often repeated ; i cannot allow it a sufficient cause of open resistance . the reason is cleere ; for , on the one side there is no inconvenience so small but ( in processe of time ) may grow to bee the ruine of the common-wealth , if it bee often repeated and so excessively multiplied ; and on the other side , long time breeds so great changes or , at least , is subject to them , that the pure nature of the offence is not able to justifie a rebellion and breach of unity in a common-wealth , and so , not the resistance to the governour . how much the time in which the ruine would follow should bee , to make it a sufficient cause , who can judge ? onely this wee see , that what will not ruine in a set time , wil never doe it ; and i have seen people live happily , where it was said , they paid the value of their whole subsistance to their magistrate once in seven yeers . nor doe i pretend , by these instances , to set any rule for enfranchising the subject ; more then this , when evidently the tyranny of the governour is greater then the mischiefe hazarded . when ever this happeneth , bee the materiall conditions what they will , the subject is free : and if this bee not , whatsoever the circumstances bee , the subject ought not to stirre . for , this and this onely is the finall cause measuring all attempts , what is best for the people ; and knowne it is that , if it bee not evident to bee better to stirre , it is evidently better to remaine quiet : for , not-a-cause is sufficient for not changing ; but , for a change and such a change , it ought to bee a cleer and evident abbetterment . there is further to be looked into what part of the common-wealth it ought to bee that is sufficient to justifie such a quarrell . for , as there is no doubt , but the whole common-wealth , that is , such a portion of it as makes the governours party inconsiderable , is sufficient : so , there will bee lesse doubt on the other extreme , if the number resisting bee a pure single part , it is not sufficient to proceed to this extremity . the question then is , whether the party rising ought to bee the major or equall or , at least , inconsiderably lesse then those who side with the magistrate . but here wee must observe the greatnesse of the common-wealth divided . for if such parts bee of themselves , fit to make common-wealths , nothing considered but the quantity or the number ; it cannot bee doubted but that will susfice : now what that quantity is , belongeth to another science . besides all these considerations , there remaineth another ; that it can bee effected : for who is to attempt an action , ought as well to weigh the cost of compassing , as the worth and recompence when it is compassed : so that , unlesse the hazard of missing and the labour of obtaining , beeing both added into the ballance with the present quiet , bee all overswayed ; it cannot bee prudently done to engage for a change . some will tell mee , never did people expect with so much patience as i require : and your gallants , who pretend to generosity , will exclaime , it is better to dye in the field then suffer such indignities : nay , some will think or , at least , vaunt it fitter to lye in prison or rot in a dungeon , or seeke his fortune in barbary , then to be under such a slavery . my answer to these last gallants is , that they should first try what it is to rot in a dungeon , or to wander amongst barbarians ; before they engage themselves and other ignorant persons in such adventures . to the second , that i understand not those spurgalls of honour , which disquiet their fiery humours : i onely discourse of what is fitting to make a sweet and contented life , to them who thinke it consists in enjoying naturall goods of science and vertue for our mindes , and the accommodation of our sences for our bodies : those high and aereall goods of honour , and vapouring words i esteeme as ajax ( when his eyes were open ) at his death ; vertue ( said hee , meaning honour ) i followed thee as a thing , but i finde thou art but words . to the formost , i answer , i doe not averre men either have been wise or will bee so wise ; onely endevour to lay before them what it is to bee so ; let them look to the exercise . neither on the other side doe i justifie the prince who putteth his subject to such extremities , or think it prudence in him to doe it , or that he doeth not deserve all the mischiefe which may light upon him for it : i leave both to the force of nature , to their wit or folly , and to the force of reason or passion which governes in persons and present circumstances ; keeping my self in the common notions which belong to science . still there remaines one difficulty , which may breed great variety in the resolution ; and it is , who is to bee judge , whether the neglect of the magistrate bee so great , as to deserve resistance ? for , if the magistrate himselfe bee endowed with that power , it is a folly to thinke that circumstance will ever come ; and , if it belong to the people , such hot-spurres , as wee spake of , will make it come long before the season bee ripe for it . but , the truth is , this question seemeth in a manner superfluous : for it supposes , there is a question and ambiquity to bee decided ; and by the conditions put , it is cleer there can bee no question of the necessity of the resistance ; for they are such as to put the question beyond all ambiguity in the very conscience of the magistrate , the objects beating on the subject in every ones particular beyond denyall and dispute . and besides , as long as truly there is any disputablenesse , the trust reposed in the magistrate makes him judge ; for , beeing entrusted as a man both knowing and good , and the people taking themselves as ignorant in what they trust him ; cleerly hee remains sole judge , as long as there remains a case to be judged . and therefore his either ignorance , or carelessenesse , or tyranny ought to bee so evident , that it bee beyond all question ; or else the subject must have patience for his owne good , which is his aime in putting himselfe under governement . the fifteenth ground . wherein consists the power and liberty of the subject . yet may some think , on the other side , that the doctrine delivered contradicts it selfe . for , it beeing before determined , that the people hath alienated all right of judging or medling in governement ; how can it ever happen that they should have a right to interpose againe , or that such circumstances can possibly fall out in which they may resist the magistrate ? and this objection is so much the stronger , by acknowledging so great a power in the magistrate of breaking all lawes and limitations of governement , by the force of reason placed in the circumstances of power and authority , as hath been declared : whence it seemes , since that authority in the magistrate cannot consist with an opposite authority in the subject , to bridle and curb him ; they can never have this power to resist . and the truth is , the people acteth not what it doeth in such a case , by any authority acquired , but by the force of nature ; that same force by which the magistrate overswayes the lawes , but in other circumstances . and first that the people hath no authority to oppose their superiour is manifest : for , authority is a thing instituted by consent and depending on promise ; but here is no need of consent nor any thought of it ; here is no publicke meetings or ligues ; and if there were , they would bee of no value against a former tradition of their wills to their magistrate : it cannot bee therefore , that the people proceed by any such contract . whence is it then that the people come to any such power ? the answer is , as , when they first instituted government , they did it in the force of nature ; without having any other power then the pure force of rationality : so , if , by any circumstance they be devolved into the same state of anarchy that their promise made bindes no more ; then rationality teacheth them and giveth them , by force of nature , to institute another governement . now , the excessive disorders , expressed in the forementioned conditions , make it evident they are not in a governement , that is , in a conspiracy to the common good , which is the offence of governement ; but in an anarchy , and therefore remitted , by the evill managing or insufficiency of their governour , to the force of nature to provide for themselves , and not bound by any promise made to their governour : the whole end and intention of their promise being , purely , to submit to governement , that is , conduce to the common good & safety ; which having failed , there is no more obligation in their oath or promise , then if they had never made them . this is , therefore , the ground of the peoples opposition , and onely circumstance to justifie their breaking their oath and promise : so that , in truth , the magistrate , first , by his miscarriages , abdicateth himself from being a magistrate , and proveth a brigand and robber in stead of a defender ; and the people , in the way of naturall preservation of themselves , make resistance against him . i should passe farther to the change of governement , did not the loud and universall cry of all common people , especially of our northerne countries , diverting my pen , force me to attend their importunity . they say , this doctrine deliver'd ruineth their liberty ; and people are but a knot of slaves and galley-birds , if this be the course of governement . they must be satisfied , or , at least , their courage allay'd , by reason , if it be possible . for this word liberty prints it selfe in such a letter , that it leaves unstudied no man , as one speaketh . the pelagian thinkes he hath lost his naturall liberty , if it may be commanded by gods omnipotency . the worldly man accounts himselfe a slave , if rationall governement be conserved : he must have license to commit wickednesse and ruine governement , or else he is in chaines . let us then repeat the nature of governement , and see wherein consisteth the liberty of the subject , that we may know when he hath it , and what belongeth to it . the people ( we said ) to fall to their owne businesse , and the improving of nature , choose one or more to manage the common interests ; holding them wise and capable , and themselves unskilfull ; and this with a great deale of reason : for nothing but experience , and much debating is able to beget a sufficient art or knowledge , in such subtle points and turnings . besides , they esteemed a few fitter for resolution , and easier to agree then their owne multitude ; where so many private aimes are hard to be avoided , and if not prejudiciall to the common . upon these grounds , it is plaine , out of the very nature of governement , that they reserve no power in themselves to consult of common businesses . for , how absurd is it that he who hath no skill shall give counsell , or sway the resolutions of those whose art and profession it is ? or , what wise man could undertake a governement with truth and honour , if , in his greatest difficulties , he must depend on the advice , or rather wilfulnesse of an ignorant rabble ? let us look now what is left for the obeying party ; and we shall finde , it is to governe their private affaires , as farre forth as they fall not within the verge of the common good or harme . but , once put that the private mans business either hinders , or is necessary to help the common designes : and , as evident as it is that the common is to be preferred before the particular ; so evident it is , that even his proper businesse is not to be managed , so far , by his private understanding and liberty . if the souldier , when he is commanded to stand perdue , should have his private considerations allow'd him , what could the army doe ? if the citizen , being commanded to watch his turne upon the walls , might bring an excuse that he had no body to look to his shop , the city would soone fall to the enemies prey . private interest , then , must yeeld , when the publick is concerned , or else no governement can be hoped for : and , he that will leave matters of great consequence to the resolution of the govern'd party , must make them the governours . wherein then consists the liberty of every subject ? in not being controll'd in his private affaires . if there be not justice administred both against robbers and riotous oppressors , the citizen is not free : if he be molested in his domestick manage , otherwise men when the common demandeth his assistance , he is not free . but , for serving the common , it is the freest act he hath : it was his choice to elect it , it is his good to conserve it , and will be his destruction to infringe it . as it is no liberty to have an immunity to hang or maime himselfe , or his wife and children , or to commit any other unnaturall act ; no more is it to be esteem'd liberty , to have the priviledge to substract himselfe from the service of the common-wealth . they are therefore seditious spirits , who , using the name of liberty , provoke the subject against the magistrate ; and in themselves , ordinarily , it is either ignorance or faction , which is the true mistresse of such attempts . nor can it be feared , that governement , carried connaturally and as it ought to be , doth any way prejudice the liberty of the subject , what seisures soever it makes either upon goods or persons . yes , but governours will exceed the moderation of the true lawes of governement . first , the commonwealth hath a presumption of their goodness to the contrary . secondly , admit they doe , must we seek to remedy it by a greater wound which is , by taking away the life and soule of governement ? againe , the oppression is either in common upon all , or in particular upon some few : if in common , it is almost impossible to be heavy upon every one ; for , many little summes easily rise to a great one , and many hands make light worke : if the wrong be done to particulars , wee ought to consider that accidentall harmes cannot be prevented neither in nature nor in humane affaires ; and so are objects of pity rather then of hope to be amended , and to be tolerated rather , in respect of the great good which is in the common peace , then expose all to such confusion as must be , and ever hath beene where the governement is , in part , placed in unexperient hands . this , therefore , is resolved , that the plenitude of power in the governour hinders not the liberty of the subject : which is to bee contained within an inferiour sphere , and the sphere it selfe within the sphere of governement ; and to be carried by it , as the private good by the common , when the necessity of the publick requires . likewise , the propriety of right of the subject is to bee taken , not against the governour or common right , but against the encroaching of another party : as , whoever understands what common and particular signifie , easily understands that the common and particular are not two ; as the part and the whole make not two , because the part is included in the whole ; but part and part make two , because one hath no community with the other . therefore , it stands not with reason , that any private person should claim a right against the common-wealth , or the governour , which is all one ; for , so he makes the common-wealth a part distinguished from himselfe . the sixteenth ground . of the dispossession of a supreme former governour , and of his right . this rubb being taken away , our march is free to consider the action of the change of governement ; by what it is effected that the former governour remaineth no longer in his authority , and the new one beginneth to have the power . for , we speake of a supreme governour whose power is sworne to ; and so fortified , by an allegiance due from the people , and a right obtained by himselfe . and , we may presently reflect , that our former discourse , of the peoples resistance to a soveraign magistrate , reached not to the resolution of this . for , there we supposed the magistrate to have behav'd himself so unworthily , that he was truely no governour but a tyrant and robber ; and so had really depos'd himselfe , and disannull'd the subjects oath and obligation by renouncing , in deeds and practice , the nature of a governour . now , our question supposeth the governour not to have come to that extremity : but , either to have been good or innocent : or that it is doubtfull whether his excesses deserved expulsion : or , at least , if they did deserve it of themselves , yet the circumstances were not fitting for it ; but the expulsion happened either by the invasion of a stranger , or the ambition of a subject , or some popular headlesse tumult ; for , these three wayes a magistrate comes , forcibly and unjustly , to be outed of his power . and first , if the magistrate have truely deserved to be dispossessed ; or it be rationally doubted that he hath deserved it , and hee bee actually out of possession : in the former case , it is certaine , the subject hath no obligation to hazard for his restitution , but rather to hinder it : for , since it is the common good that both the magistrate and the subject are to aime at ; and clearly , out of what is expressed , it is the common harme , to admit againe of such a magistrate ; every one , to his power , is bound to resist him . if you say , he may or will repent and amend , that importeth not our question , or whether he be to be restor'd ? but , whether he be to be chosen of new ? for , since it was meerely his possession and the interest of not changing or troubling the common-wealth which oblig'd the subject to maintaine him ; it being supposed his owne desert did condemne him , this change and trouble of the common-wealth being now turned on the other side and another in possession , clearly neither he hath any right left , nor the subject any obligation to maintaine but rather oppose him . now , if his desert be doubtfull , then is it also doubtfull whether he hath right or no : and certaine , that the common good is not to be disturbed for it ; nature teaching that wee need no reason to be quiet and remaine where we are , but that to make a change we must see a strong cause and motive . the next case is , if he be innocent and wrongfully depos'd , nay , let us adde , one who had governed well and deserved much of the common-wealth : yet he is totally dispossess'd ; and so , that , it is plaine , in these circumstances , it were better for the common good to stay as they are , then to venture the restoring him , because of the publicke hazard . it is cleare , in this case , there is a comparison betweene the generall good of the common-wealth , on the one side , and the particular of this man or family on the other . let us , then , put the case on his part ; and see , if he be generous , if he hath setled in his heart that every single man ought to preferre the common interest before his particular safety , profit , or honour ; if hee bee fit for a governour , that is , one that is to espouse the common good as his owne individuall ; what he will , in honour and conscience , resolve : whether hee bee not obliged absolutely to renounce all right and claime to governement ; and , if he does not , hee bee not worse then an infidell : for , if he that hath no care of his domesticks , be reputed so ; with how much more reason , he that is ready to plunge a whole nation in blood , for his owne interest ? let us cast the accompts on the other side ; and see , that the subjects aime ought to be the publicke peace , and quiet enjoyment of their lives and interests : it will appeare that , if hee bee bound to renounce his claime , they cannot be oblig'd to maintaine it : and besides , that they are wilfully blinde , if , where the whole concernements of themselves , their wives and children lie at the stake , they will venture all for an aereall fancy , without regard to the end of governement , publicke peace ; meerely for the meanes , this mans governement , without whom the end may be obtain'd . it cannot , therefore , be rationall on either side , for a dispossess'd governour to be restor'd with hazard : unlesse it be certaine the succeeding governement be a pure tyranny , and so the dispossess'd person necessary for the quiet and peace of the common-wealth ; and therefore , that both sides pretend the good of the common-wealth , as well hee that is to be restor'd , as those who seek to restore him . but some cry , he had right ; he hath not deserv'd to lose it ; justice must be done whatever follows on it ; happy they that are unfortunate in so good a cause , they shall not lose their reward , however it fares with them now . well for them , if this plea will serve them in the next world ; nor will i dispute whether the evidence of what i deliver be so great as that ignorance may not excuse them : that question belongs to the tribunall of god onely : i must say that , before men , who are clad with flesh , and whole hearts cannot be pierced by other mens guesses , the law is , that not onely the intention bee good , but also the action be intelligent and prudent ; otherwise , we are subject to believe , that some vanity or secret hopes doe byass the actor and make his proceeding irrationall . i must also tell them , that this principle , fiat justitia & ruat coelum , is seldome practised amongst the wise ; who all agree that charity and prudence ought still to moderate the rigour of justice . it is also too metaphysicall for a morall way , to thinke that justice is a platonick idea in the concave of the moone ; no waies to be changed by circumstantiall occurrences : whereas , the truth is , justice is but a partiall and commanded vertue ; and that which governes in man , is reason or his owne nature and inclination to make all his actions connaturall and fit for a rationall creature ; and so may consult whether justice be in some to bee administred , and pronounce that summum jus est summa injuria . but , the capitall in this matter is , that truely there is no justice on either the magistrates or peoples side , to binde to the restoring him : both these depending on the promise made , and the force of the promise being none , since the ground of it is changed . for , the substance of the promise made to a magistrate , is , to obey him as a magistrate , that is , as farre as is fitting for the common-wealth and peace ; he being nothing but the instrument of the common good : now , take away that fitnesse for the common-wealth , and that which gave strength to the promise is gone , and the promise it selfe is no more a promise , nor can any obligation arise from it . who knows not , that the promise of any man depends on his intention , his intention on his knowledge , his knowledge reacheth no farther then his consideration and present memory when he maketh the promise ? so that , in nature , a promise reacheth onely to presupposed and thought on circumstances : and who , when he sweareth to a magistrate , expecteth to see him dispossessed and turned off ? nature annulleth promises : as , when we promise to come such a day , and either die or are imprisoned before . morality annulleth them : as if we promise to run such a horse against another a month hence , and the horse in the meane time falleth lame ; who will condemne the master for not venturing on such a race ? is not the man better then his word ? if then the man himselfe bee lesse then the common good , which he must violate by keeping his word ; can his word be greater ? but a promise must many times bee kept even with losse of life ? i deny it not : but , first , i must bee assured it is a promise ; which before i have declared to bee none : for , our case is case of nature not of law , we admit no presumptions ; nothing what he meant to doe or should have done , wee onely regard what was done . secondly , if it were intended to be so promised , it was wicked and irrationall ; for , to promise to regard a private mans good against the common , is unnaturall and wicked ; therefore , it never was a promise , can never binde as such , nor be professed with honour , either to be made , or , if made , to bee kept . i need not insist upon the confirmation by oath : for , every one understands , if the oath be but a confirmation of a precedent promise , and there were no promise , there can be no oath , to have the nature and force of an oath . so that , this is manifest , a magistrate actually dispossessed hath no right to be restored , nor the subject any obligation to seek to restore , but oppose him . for , what is man , or rather mankinde ( for , so we have styled a nation ) better then a herd of sheepe or oxen , if it bee to bee owned , like them , by masters ? what difference is there betweene their masters selling them to the butcher , and obliging them to venture their lives and livelihoods for his private interest ? wee know it is naturall , that the part should venture for the whole ; but that the whole should venture the losse of it selfe to save the part , i cannot understand . the governour is the highest and noblest part , yet but a part ; the people is the whole , the end , ( though not by office , yet by worth and dignity ) the master and lord , for whom those who are lords by office are to be vested and devested in lordship , when it is necessary for the common good : who thinks otherwise , deserves not the name of a man . the seventeenth ground . of a supreme governour dispossessed . but one will object , if hee were wrongfully dispossessed , hee suffered wrong ; it cannot then but bee reason hee should have reparation . and this cannot bee denied . but beside the governement taken from him , hee was peradventure injured in his reputation and spoiled of such aliments as are fit to maintaine him according to the quality of his birth and education : and , for these , hee may , as a private man , demand reparation ; but so , as still to remember he is a denizen of that countrey , a member of that people , and compared to it as a particular to its universall ; and may demand his share , yet so that if it cannot bee obtained without the concussion of the publicke , hee is to renounce it and sacrifice that interest to the good of his countrey . likewise , on the opposite side , the common-wealth may demand reparations against the dispossessed magistrate , who abused it or his subjects during his governement : not touching any thing hee did upon intention of the publick good , though it were breaking of known laws or any injurious violence offered , with pretence of serving the common-wealth ; for , the trust put in his hands vindicates him from all such actions , as long as they beare the face of any intention of the common good . but , if , for private mens satisfaction , or his owne lust , or covetousnesse hee did any wrong , of that hee may bee asked an account : not while hee is in governement but after the dispossession , when now the common distemper followeth not the prosecution of such riots , and so , his publicke protection beeing gone , hee is but a private man , and consequently , by the force of nature , subject to a stronger ; obligations of common good and former promises beeing now faded away , and hee left in the condition of a stranger , saving that his demerits follow and pursue him , if other merits doe not counterballance them and exempt him . againe , when hee is to bee judged , he cannot bee proceeded against by law ; which can judge none but the offenders against it . now wee have had often occasion to declare that the chiefe magistrate is not under the law ; the common good for which the lawes themselves were made , beeing committed to his trust , and the end hee is to look after beeing higher then the lawes , which are but a part of the meanes to arrive at that end , and therefore inferiour and subordinate to it . but those who could put their owne agreements , that is , the lawes under his feet , could not put nature under them , nor authorise him to doe any irrationall or unhandsome action : therefore , when the structure of the common-wealth is dissolved , that is , disjointed from him , then any who hath suffered wrong in the fore-declared manner may bee party against him and proceed as if there were no common-weath ; by the law which , in a wildernesse , warranteth us to kill a tyger or robber that seeketh to kill us , not pretending law for our action , but that it is manlike & rational . neither ought it bee called punishment that is done against a dispossessed magistrate , but rather revenge , or some other name that includeth no order to law . by this wee understand the truth of that famous question ; whether a soveraigne bee under the lawes ? to which is ordinarily answered , that hee is , as farre as his example and direction is necessary to his subjects ; but not so , that the law , as such , hath any superiority or force upon him . to declare this more plainly , wee must remember , the rule of his actions is , to doe what reason teaches a man in his posture ought to doe , that is , what is fitting for the publicke : now generally speaking , the common good requireth that the lawes bee observed betwixt fellowes of the same common-wealth ; wherefore nature teacheth him to give example of that observance , as farre as his publick office permits . besides , in the very person of the soveraigne are to bee distinguished , his beeing one of the common-wealth , and beeing the head or magistrate : so that , though his beeing a magistrate exempts his publicke actions and also his person and private actions from the inquisition of the law ; yet it doth not exempt his private actions from the proportion to those of the subjects , that is , from being good or bad , because like or dislike to the actions which the law commandeth or forbiddeth . so that , he is not , even in his private actions , subject to the lawes at his rule ; for that is onely reason ; but , as they are a kinde of way chalked out to him for the materiall part of his action ; as the architect frames his house for him ; or the gardiner his walkes : that is , the lawes are to him as an art under him , an art to shew him what is to bee done , not to command or punish him for not doing ; nay , not so much as necessitating him to doe , at least , universally , whether the businesse be purely betwixt subjects , or betwixt himselfe as a private person , and his subjects . for , the principle of common good beeing higher then the art of making lawes , may , nay ought in some cases , differ from the prescriptions of the law . yet this must not authorize him to dispense frequently with the law ; the governement beeing not possible to bee good in which there is no constancy : but , if the circumstances require any law to bee often forced ; the law it selfe ought to bee limited , that the practice of the subject may bee firme and customary , which is that maketh the lawe-please . thus in conclusion , though the magistrate bee not commanded by the lawes , nor personally subject to them , yet reason ( which is his rule ) bindeth him to observe them as the good of his people ; and ( ordinarily speaking ) essentiall to his end , which is the common good . the lawes therefore are his matter to work on , or instruments necessary to work by , not his rule or mastering directions . there remaines yet untouched the question that seemeth most troublesome to many , when the change of the governement is valid , and such as the subjects obedience is due to the new magistrate and to bee substracted from the old , how unjustly soever hee were bereaved of it . and , others have sought by terme of yeers to decide the difficulty : among whom , one was pope vrban the eight , an intelligent and generous prince and well versed in politick governement . hee published a decision that after five yeers quiet possession of an estate , the church was not bound to take notice whether the title were lawfull or no ; but acknowledge the possessour , in ecclesiasticall businesses . so much hee said for aimes sake . but , wee must proceed upon other principles , that is , the forelaid and main basis of our discourse , that the common good ought to bee the rule of the magistrates title , and the subjects obedience . out of which this followeth , that when ever ( considering all things ) the common good is cleerly on the possessors side , then the dispossessed hath no claime . neither ought wee expect till wee have assurance , that it will not bee better for the subject if the late owner ( after great dangers , gaineth his former power : for , first , this it selfe is uncertaine ; secondly , the successe of endevours to restore him must bee hazardous ; thirdly , many and great mischiefs , during the time of the attempt , are altogether unavoidable ; and all this to bee ballanced against those uncertaine hopes . nor , againe , must wee expect that the wills of all the subjects concurre , actually , to the acceptance of the new governour : for that is either impossible or of so long expectation , as to ruine all dissensions and jealousies in the meane time : nay , the vulgar sort are so easily led by fancy , that they understand not the common good , nor what they should wish . but you may demand , how shall it bee knowne when the common good holdeth it selfe on the possessour's hand ? i answer , wee must first see who are the common , whose welfare is to bee preferred before private interests . and presently it appeareth that , dividing the whole people into governours and governed ; the governed part is the publicke to whose good the governours are to direct their paines : and that these are they that spend their lives in seeking their owne profits , either by improving the land , or in arts and handicrafts : whence , it followes , when their good stands on the possessours side , then cleerly hee begins to gaine right and power ; and this is plaine to bee , when the merchant , the husbandman , and tradesman , with their appendices , are in an undisturbed practice of their functions , and begin to bee afraid of change upon the noise of an invasion . this resolution could not bee doubted , were it not that one might object , that what is said seemes true , abstracting from circumstances ; but it ought to bee considered , that such men see nothing but the outward appearances of what passes in humane negotiations , and so there may many circumstances lie hidden from them , which would make them thinke or wish otherwise if they knew them : as , for example , home-discontents , and forraigne conspiracies ; which if understood , would make these honest men preferre a warre , after which there is to follow a peace farre exceeding the present quiet and such a one as deserves the intervening disturbance and dammages . and indeed , i allow these men understand not such mysteries of state , nor penetrate the value of the hazard : but , if they doe not , why are they not also exempted from engaging on those motives ? and then the rest of the common-wealth will bee but so many private men , who must follow the common ▪ againe , if they think themselves well , they manifestly consent to the present governement , and therefore cut off the title of the dispossessed governour . besides , who can answer they shall be better by the returne of the dispossessed party ? surely , by common presumption , the gainer is like to defend them better then he who lost it . but , let us overslip this opportunity and end of the common good : how long must we expect , till it shall be suppos'd the right of the former magistrate is extinct ? some ages ? as wee kept our title to france , and france did to sicily and naples : or at least some generations ? as the durance of the spaniards warres upon holland : or , till the former magistrate declares the relinquishment of his right ? or , till his followers are weary of inventing new devices , to blind , & ruine their unwary friends ? all these are soone discern'd to bee meere uncertainties ; and rather nets to catch fools and bring them to the ambitious desires of some few men , then any grounded reason . but , what if an open enemy should come , could or ought the subjects joine against him with their new magistrate ? if not , the whole publick must perish : if they may , then the case is the same against their old magistrate ; since his right stood upon the common peace , and that is transferr'd from him to his rivall by the title of quiet possession . the eighteenth ground : the objection of divines answered . reason hath plaid its part ; but authority cannot be silenc'd unheard . let us therefore hearken to what it saith . and , first steps up the divine to preach us , out of scripture , the duty wee owe to priests and kings ; no lesse then death and damnation beeing the guerdons of rebellion and disobedience . the lawyers come yoaked from the popes and emperours court , taking for maxime , tempus non occurrit ecclesiae & regi . the practice seems to confirme the same ; wee seeing both some noble men and divers cities make protestations against the possession of others for many years and ages . but , which is more , they will speak reason too at least , by the divines mouth ; who telleth us , that god , by nature , is high lord and master of all ; that whoever is in power receiveth his right from him ; that obedience consists in doing the will of him who commandeth ; and concludeth that this will ought to bee obeyed till god taketh away the obligation , that is , till hee who is to be obeyed himselfe releaseth his right . the authorities they cite out of holy writ are , for the most part , meere commands to obey where obedience is due , without specifying what or when it is due . this command is extended to wicked and evill governours as well as good . one place there is , where samuel denounceth to the people the evills that will come to them by the power of the king ; and calleth them jus regis , or , as the hebrew text , judicium regis , or , legem regis , and afterward , regni . and these words are , in two sences , true ; one , that the king would do the wrongs there mentioned , by force ; the other , that the people , since they would have a king , ought not to resist him when hee did such things . yet doe i not deny but , if the particulars there mentioned , bee interpreted gently , all that is there recited might , with justice , bee practised by a king : as , when it is said hee should take away their vineyards and olive-gardens ; it may bee understood , upon confiscation and by other lawfull wayes . besides , they may peradventure alledge that god , by his speciall command , transferred the kingdome from saul to david , from roboam to jeroboam , and some others . but , they should also let us know , what they deduce from hence : for in such changes , god gave no new authority or power to such kings , but the same their predecessors had : so that , in fine , all that is brought out of scripture falleth short of proving that no time can make void the right of a king once given him from the hand of god . the reason of this weak way of alleadging scripture is , that when they read that god commandeth or doth this , they look not into nature to know what this commanding or doing is ; but presently imagine god commandeth it by expresse and direct words , and doeth it by an immediate position of the things said to bee done ; whereas in nature the commands are nothing but the naturall light god hath bestowed on mankinde , and which is therefore frequently called the law of nature . likewise , gods doing a thing is many times onely the course of naturall second causes , to which because god gives the direction and motion , hee both doeth and is said to doe all that is done by them ; as truly as the weight of a jack turnes the meat upon the spit , and the spring of a watch makes the clock of it strike : a notion not onely of a large extent and usefulnesse in it selfe , but , which gives mee just occasion of complaining against these verball and winde-blowne divines , as the bane of christendome and christian doctrine . for , whereas the scripture is a book enriched with all science and depth of learning ; this sort of grammar divines , without either logick , philosophy , or morality , meerly by the vertue of their dictionary , and such like lip-learning , undertake to bee interpreters of the sacred bible , and in stead of the sence of the letter , obtrude to the readers their owne low and many times phreneticall fancies . let us instance in our present question . the first position they take is , that god is lord and master of all things . what seems , nay truly is more conformable to scripture and reason then this assertion , as it lies in words ? and yet many not looking into the nature of god and rationall and intelligent substances , make a shift to pervert it into a meer blasphemy : for , if the sence bee onely this , that god is omnipotent and no resistance possible in any creature to his absolute will ; nothing is more certaine , nothing more holy . but , this is not the meaning of the divines ; but , that there is an attribute or notion in god of being lord and master , to which they do not say we cannot , but , ought not resist , and rather admit that wee can . and herein is the first faltring , that , in effect , they deny the omnipotency , and reduce that which is a true physicall power to a morall obligation . but this is not all . the next point is , that , if even this morality were founded in that great nature of beeing , and beeing intelligent , which is in god almighty ; and that they also held his commands were to bee obeyed , because they proceed from an understanding which cannot erre , and which is essentially the very order and well beeing of all creatures ; the former would seeme pardonable : but , they will have it quite contrary , that therefore things amongst creatures goe well , because not reason , not the eminentiall beeing of themselves in god is their off-spring , but because a high and overpowering will or voice commandeth it so . a position in respect of god , absolutely blasphemous ; as far as it makes him worke without the guidance of his understanding , that is , like the lowest order of creatures , as stockes and stones &c. it is againe afflictive and vexatious to mankinde ; taking away that sweetnesse of obeying , which consists in the perswasion that because creatures are the participation of gods owne nature , every one in its degree and mankind in the first and highest place , therefore all gods command and governement , are most conformable to their good , as it were salves to their sores , and allurements to the bringing them to their final end and perfection . but , that which is more to our purpose is , that , upon this blasphemy against god , they build the greatest inconvenience that , peradventure , is to bee found in man's nature ; to wit , that god gives to all in power the likeness and participation of this irrationall dominion which they conceive in him ; and that truly there is in superiours a kinde of dote or free gift of mastery derived from god , in vertue whereof hee is master of the inferiours and what belongs to them , either wholly or in a certaine measure , according to the extent of the power given ; that , lawfully and validly , he may dispose of all or a certain part of the things under his charge , meerly because such is his will and pleasure , & that the subject ought to be content to let him doe his will , upon this score , because it is gods will that this mans will should be fulfilled . which doctrine , though it bee manifestly against christs directions left to his disciples , and the practice of all good men ; yet , because this treatise doth not pretend to divinity , i will onely insist upon its naturall inconveniences . as first , that it is not connaturall to mankinde : which , consisting , for its better part , in understanding , is not governed conformably to its disposition , unlesse it be so guided that the understanding be principall and satisfied in it selfe and leader to the will and action ; which course of proceeding when it is observed , then is a man truely a man and his action goes on with sweetnesse , as is before declared . againe , it maketh the governour proud , insolent , and carelesse . proud , because hee taketh himselfe to bee of another orbe then his subjects ; that they are all slaves and beasts , himselfe onely master , himselfe onely intelligent and a man . infolent , because fully perswaded , by this doctrine , that he can doe them no wrong ; that they are bound to suffer what he layes on them ; that his pleasure is and must be their content and rule . carelesse , because he thinks he hath no account to make , either to god or man : not to god , since he hath submitted the people to his will and disposition ; and therefore he being incapable of doing them any wrong , cannot bee charged with any crime : much lesse is he sollicitous to content his subjects , in whom he taketh it for an insolency to repine at any thing , and esteemes it their duty to commend all he does , and to have his authority for their rule to judge all things by . on the other side , the subject becomes base , restive , ambitious . for , the worth and dignity of man , which is his liberty or guidance of himselfe , being taken away , it followes , he must be servile and flattering , a slave , a body without soule and understanding . the more worldly and rustick part must , of necessity , grumble and feele it harsh to see their labours disposed on to people , of whom they have opinion that they are idle , vicious , and unworthy : and therefore , desire liberty from such a yoke , and to become masters of their owne goods and labours ; and are easily susceptible of propositions tending to that purpose , when they come from faire tongues . lastly , the higher spirits have governement in admiration , and take it for the onely happinesse ; and therefore have their hearts wholly bent , how , by flattery , by cunning , by force , to arrive to this power to depose him that is in possession , and sit downe themselves in his seat of glory . if their hopes mount not so high , for the impossibility of the fact and the remotenesse of their quality ; then their aime is , by adulation and compliances , to come neere the highest , to bee participant of his authority , and have the like power to rob and oppresse , which they esteeme vertuous and glorious in him , and not unjust but fitting in themselves , as farre as they can doe it by the participation of that dote which god hath bestowed upon the highest magistrate . lastly , we must looke into the lame proceeding of the common good and publicke actions of such a governement ; where the subject , by the consequence of this doctrine , is set eagerly upon his owne interest , thinkes all lost that is done for his , not governour or protector , but lord and master , and therefore alienated from him . whence , it must come to passe that , what he can cousen , what hee can excuse , what hee can delay , hee is still forward to ; and , by a secret instinct of nature which abhorreth such a governement , thinketh it well done , though he cannot give an account to justifie his action . in a word , who sees not this common-wealth to be a kingdome divided in it selfe alwayes in affection , and very neere in outward action ; wanting thereunto nothing but an occasion , and some head to manage the sedition ? who sees not that the whole governement is violent ; and so may indeed continue whilst actuall force hangeth over it , but hath not the possibility of a naturall duration and length . the nineteenth ground . the authority of lawyers insufficient in this question . the divines errour being thus discovered , our plea against the lawyers will be of lesse either debate or consequence : for , this question belongeth not to their science or employment . the maximes , the rule , the highest tribunall of their judgements is the text of the law , the agreements of men , and , at most , to declare the law-makers intention : but , to judge whether the law-makers intention be conformable to nature and such as it ought , whether he exceedeth his power , whether hee bee master of the lawes , and the like , is beyond the verge of their jurisdiction . therefore , nothing is more absurd , then to demand that lawyers should plead cases betweene the soveraigne magistrate and the subject , where the common good and governement is interessed : for , there , things are not to be carried by the dictates of justinian or lancelotus , or the command of caesar or peter's successours , but either by the science of politicks , or the certitude of faith and tradition ; which are the onely two rules a high governour hath . if the divine findeth any thing contrary to the knowne law of god , he may speake : if the philosopher finde any thing against the nature of man , his mouth is not to bee stopped : the lawyer , what can he say ? it is against the agreement heretofore made by the governement of the countrey ? the governour may reply , yes ; but what you say is against the present good of the countrey , with which i am entrusted . is the countrey made for the lawes , or the lawes for the countrey ? the lawes therefore must give place , where the good of the people is against the former resolutions . if any law be repealed by the authority which made it , or by another equal ; is it the lawyers part to plead what was law before , or what is now ? when a supreme governour speaketh as such , as declaring what the present necessity requires ; if any former law bee against it , it is by his declaration annulled ; it was law before , but it is not now . but the lawyer will reply , there is no law in the land which giveth such authority : it is easily answered ; it is not a case for which a law is to bee made . see the romane governement : when there came an exigence of desperation , all their magistrates , all their formes ceased ; a dictatour was made , whose word was law , nor could any man appeale to law . such is the case when the high governour pronounceth against the law : for hee ought not to doe it , but when the law standeth not with the good and safety of the subject ; and when hee doth , law is not to be pleaded against him . againe can any law be enacted of what shall bee done in case of a conversion of the governement ? it is clearely a folly to pretend it . the ordering of the common-wealth is , then , in new hands : the former's power is expired : and to prescribe rules to them who will assuredly be their owne judges , is a piece of great simplicity . the lawyer may peradventure reply , there is no power in the land to repeale the former lawes or to oppose them . i thinke hee will bee wiser ; yet , if hee doth say it , i aske him , who made the former lawes ? was it not the people , by themselves or their deputies ? and which is the stronger , if they make them by their deputies , or by themselves ? certainely , it will be answered , by themselves ; for the deputies have no power but what they impart to them . is it then possible to put a case , in which there is no power in a countrey to repeale lawes ? evidently , who sayes so must say there is no people in the countrey ? for , if there be people , there is in them a power to dispose of themselves , more strong then in deputies . but the lawyer may say , the people cannot speake their mindes freely . i answer , certainely , they not onely can , but cannot choose but speake their mindes , in the case we put . who knoweth not that liberty and speaking of ones minde belo●geth to all circumstances a man can be put in ? the merchant that , in a tempest , throweth the precious fruits of his venture and labour into the sea , doth not he doe it freely and willingly ? the hollanders of late made a peace with the spaniard ; wee , both with the hollander and the dane , and are pretending to others : in any of these , were all parts pleased ? did no party agree to somewhat which hee would not have done , but in consideration of his present circumstances ? or , was there ever peace made after a warre , but one part grudged at somewhat ? must none of these be accounted freely done ? must none of these promises binde , and be kept , upon honour and veracity ? this is to destroy all commerce of mankinde ; nay , not to allow man so much wit as to know what is fit for him to doe in time of necessity . if then the people speake , in one circumstance , something that they would not in another ; it is not to be said they speake not their mindes , but that , according to circumstances , they alter their mindes , as all wife men doe . they agree and submit to the present conjunctures , not because they are not free , now as before , but because circumstances are changed , and now render it fitting . but , i said that , in the case i put , they could not choose but speake . my case was , that then a governour is acknowledged , when the people casting off the care and thoughts of innovation , fall to their trades and manufactures : can it be deny'd that by so doing they acquiesce to the present governement ? which if they doe , can it be questioned whether they consent or not to the repealing of all such lawes as cannot stand with the present governement ? such lawes therefore are repealed , not by deputies , but by the deputants and masters of the deputies . the lawyer , therefore , must either proclaime the present governement none , or not plead law against it : for it is pure folly to admit both , that is , faire and full contradiction . in a new governement , all lawes prejudiciall to it are annulled , by the pure admission of it : other indifferent lawes so goe on , as to bee subject to its judgement , whether and how farre to stand ; but a wise governour will continue them as farre as hee can with prudence , because innovation is contrary to the sweetnesse which is in custome , as in a kinde of nature . the conclusion . bee this then so resolved , that god himselfe hath no irrationall and dead title of lordship over his creatures , but onely his all-right-setled understanding , and irresistible omnipotency . and , as hee hath none in himselfe , so likewise not given any to those hee hath put in authority ; but , that their power is either in the submission of the subject by promise and agreement , or in the rationall disposition of the magistrate , which maketh him work what is conformable to humane nature ; and the obedience or obligation to obey in the subject is out of this , that hee hath entrusted the magistrate with the governement , and is , by that , to suppose he doth regularly what is best ( all things considered ) for the common good . that , by consequence , the title of the magistrate begins and dies with the good of the common-wealth ; and holdeth purely so long as it is good for the people . that , no lawes made by the power or agreement of men , can judge betwixt subject and soveraigne , in dispute of the common good and governement ; but onely the tribunalls of god and nature , or divinity and the science of politicks : and therefore , the maximes of law have no force in these questions ; now , if princes lose their pretences by the force of nature , it is ridiculous for private men to build hopes , upon rotten titles of ages long passed , upon weake maximes of law , after nature , by her revolutions , hath cast all law and mortall acts and agreements . and so is finished this small treatise , to the profit of them who are able and willing to make use of it . some , by the method i have used , something new in morall discourses , may imagine the doctrine i deliver , to bee more subtle in explication then solid in practice : but , let them either looke into the causes of governements , or the effects ; they will see nature and practise both conspire to give testimony to the truth . the cause of all morall effects , if morally carried , are the end and intention for which they are sought and endeavoured after ; this is manifest to bee the well-being of particulars under a governement . the practises , which are the effects , will shew , that governements breake when it is not well with the subjects , but they are oppressed by the governour ; that wise and good governours are forced sometimes to breake disordered rules which hinder their free administration ; that people , as it were , forced by naturall changes , violate the promises made to their governours , cast them off when they think them pernicious , and proceed against them , per viam facti , as they speake in the schooles , not by lawes , which cannot bee made for such matters . these are , in a manner , the whole subject of the precedent discourse . finis . an essay of a king with an explanation what manner of persons those should be that are to execute the power or ordinance of the kings prerogative / written by the right honorable francis, lord verulam, viscount saint alban. bacon, francis, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing b ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing b estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : or :e , no ) an essay of a king with an explanation what manner of persons those should be that are to execute the power or ordinance of the kings prerogative / written by the right honorable francis, lord verulam, viscount saint alban. bacon, francis, - . p. printed for richard best, london : . reproduction of original in huntington library and thomason collection, british library. eng political science -- early works to . kings and rulers -- duties. a r (wing b ). civilwar no an essay of a king, with an explanation what manner of persons those should be that are to execute the power or ordinance of the kings prero [no entry] c the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the c category of texts with between and defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion an essay of a king , with an explanation what manner of persons those should be that are to execute the power or ordinance of the kings prerogative . written by the right honorable francis , lord verulam viscount saint alban . decemb. . london , printed for richard best , . an essay of a king written by sir francis bacon . a king is a mortall god on earth , unto whom the living god hath lent his own name as a great honour : but withall told him hee should die like a man , lest he should be proud and flatter himself , that god hath with his name imparted unto him his nature also . of all kinds of men , god is least beholding unto them , for he doth most for them , and they do ordinarily least for him . a king that would not feele his crown too heavy for him , must weare it every day , but if he think it too light , he knoweth not of what mettall it is made of . he must make religion the rule of government , and not the scale ; for he that casteth in religion onely to make the scales even , his own weight is contained in these characters tekel uphrasin , he is found too light , his kingdom shall be taken from him . and that king that holds not religion the best reason of state , is void of all piety and justice , the supporters of a king . he must be able to give counsell himself , but not to relye thereupon : for though happy events justifie their councels , yet it is better that the evill event of good advice be rather imputed to a subject then a sovereigne . he is the fountain of honour , which should not run with a wast pipe , lest the courtiers ●ell the waters , and then ( as papists say of their holy wels ) to lose the vertue . he is the life of the law , not onely as he is lex loquens himself , but because he animateth the dead letter , making it active towards all his subjects praemio & poena . a wise king must doe lesse in altering his laws , then he may ; for new government is ever dangerous , it being true in the body politique , as in the corporall , that omnis subita mutatio est periculosa , and though it be for the better , yet it is not without a fearfull apprehension ; for he that changeth the fundamentall laws of a kingdome , thinketh that there is no good title to a crown but by conquest . a king that setteth to sale seats of justice , oppresseth the people , for he teacheth his judges to fell justice , and praecio parata , praecio vincitur justicia . bounty and magnificence are vertues , verae regiae , but a prodigall king is neerer a tyrant , then a parcimonious : for store at home draweth his contemplations abroad , but want supplyeth it self of what is next , and many times the next way , and herein he must be wise and know , wh●t he may justly doe . that king which is not feared , is not loved , and he that is well seen in his craft , must as well study to be feared as loved , yet not loved for feare , but feared for love . therefore as hee must alwayes resemble him whose great name he beareth , and that in manifesting the sweet influence of his mercy over the severe stroke of his justice sometimes , so in this not to suffer a man of death to live , for besides that the land doth mou●n , the restraint of justice towards sin doth more retard the affection of love , then the extent of mercy doth enflame it , and sure where love is bestowed , feare is quite lost . his greatest enemies are his flatterers , for though they ever speak on his side , yet their words still make against them . the love which a king oweth to the weal-publike , should not be restrained to any one particular , yet that his more speciall favour do reflect upon some worthy ones , is somwhat necessary , because there are so few of that capacity . hee must have a speciall care of five things , if hee would not have his crown to be put upon him . first , that simulata sanctitas , be not in the church , for that is duplex iniquitas . secondly , that inutilis aequitas , sit not in the chancecery , for that is inepta misericordia . thirdly , that utilis iniquitas , keep not the exchequer , for it is crudele latrocinium . fourthly , that fidelis temeritas be not his generall , for that will bring but seram poenitentiam . fiftly , that infidelis prudentia , be not his secretary , for that he is anguis sub viridi herba . to conclude , as he is of the greatest power , so hee is subject to the greatest cares , made the servant of his people , or else he were without a calling at all . he then that honoureth him not , is next an atheist wanting the feare of god in his heart . an explanation what manner of persons those should be , that are to execute the power or ordinance of the kings prerogative , written by the said sir francis bacon late lord chancellour , and lord st. albans . that absolute prerogative according to the kings pleasure revealed by his lawes , may be exercised and executed by any subject , to whom power may be given by the king , in any place of judgement or commission , which the king by his law hath ordained , in which the judge subordinate cannot wrong the people , the law laying downe a measure by which every judge should governe or execute ; against which law if any judge proceed , he is by the law questionable and punishable for his transgression . in this nature are all the judges and commissioners of the land no otherwise then in their courts , in which the king in person is supposed to sit who cannot worke that trespasse , felony or treason which the law hath not made so to be , neither can punish the guilty by other punishment then the law hath appointed . this prerogative or power as it is over all the subjects so being knowne by the subjects , they are without excuse if they offend ; and suffer no wrong , if they be punished . and by this prerogative the king governeth all sorts of people according unto knowne will . the absolute prerogative which is in kings according to their private will and judgement cannot be executed by any subject , neither is it possible to give such power by commission , or fit to subject the people to the same . for the king in that he is the substitute of god immediatly the father of his people , and head of the common wealth by participation with god and his subjects , discretion , iudgement , and feeling love towards those over whom he raigneth only proper to himselfe , or to his places and person , who seeing he cannot in any others diffuse his wisedome , power , or gifts , which god in respect of his place and charge hath enabled him withall , can neither subordinate any other iudge to governe by that knowledge , which the king can no otherwise then by his knowne will participate unto him . and if any subordinate iudge shall obtaine commission according , of such iudge to govern the people , that iudge is bound to think that to be his sound discretion , in which the law in which the kings known will sheweth unto him to be that iustice which hee ought to administer : otherwise he might seeme to esteeme himselfe above the kings law , who will not governe by him , or to have a power derived from other then from the king , which in the kingdome will administer iustice contrarie to the justice of the land . neither can such a judge or commissioner under the name of his high authoritie shrowde his owne high affection , seeing the conscience and discretion of every man is particular and private to himselfe ; as the discretion of the judge cannot be properly or possibly the discretion of the king , or conscience of the king ; and if not his discretion , neither the judgement that is ruled by another m●ns only . therefore it may seeme they rather desire to bee kings then to rule the people under the king , which will not administer justice by law , but by their owne wills . this administration in a subject is derogative to the kings prerogative , for he administreth justice out of a private direction , being not capable of a generall direction , how to use the kings pleasure in causes of particular respect , which if another then the king himselfe can doe , how can it be so , that any man should desire that which is unfit and impossible , but that it must p●oceed out of some exorbitant affection , the rather seeing such places to be full of trouble , and being altogether unnecessary , no man will seeke to thrust himselfe into it , but for hope of gaine . then is not any prerogative oppugned but maintained , though it be desired that every subordinate magistrate may not be made supreame , whereby he may seale up the hearts of the people , take from the king the respect due unto him only , or to judge the people otherwise then the king doth himselfe . and although the prince be not bound to render any accompt to the law , which in person administreth it selfe . yet every subordinate judge must render an accompt to the king by his lawes how hee hath administred justice in his place where he is set . but if he hath power to rule by private direction , for which there is no law , how can he be questioned by a law , if in his private censure he offendeth . therefore it seemeth that in giving such authority the king ordaineth not subordinate magistrates , but absolute kings ; and what doth the king leave to himselfe , who giveth so much to others as he hath himself ? neither is there a greater bond to tie the subject to his prince in particular then when he shal have recourse unto him in his person or in his power for releif of the wrongs which from private men be offered , or for reformation of the oppressions which any subordinate magistrate shall impose upon the people : there can be no offence in the judge , who hath power to execute according to his discretion , when the discretion of any judge shall be thought fit to be unlimited ; and therefore there can be therein no reformation , whereby the king in this useth no prerogative to gaine his subjects right . then the subject is bound to suffer helplesse wrong , and the discontent of the people is cast upon the king , the lawes being neglected , which with their equitie in all other causes and judgements , saving this , interpose themselves and yeeld remedy . and to conclude , custome cannot confirme that which is any wayes unreasonable of it selfe ; wisedome will not allow that which is many wayes dangerous , and no wayes profitable ; justice will not approve that government where it cannot be , but wrong must bee committed . neither can there be any rule by which to try it , nor meanes for reformation of it . therefore whosoever desireth government , must seeke such as he is capable of , not such as seemeth to himselfe most easie to execute ; for it appeareth that it is easie to him that knoweth not law nor justice to rule as he listeth , his will never wanting a power to it selfe : but it is safe and blamelesse both for the judge and people , and honour to the king , that judges bee appointed who know the law , and that they bee limited to governe according to the law . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a e- . custome . . wisdome . . justice . . rule against it . aphorisms political by james harrington. harrington, james, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing h ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing h estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) aphorisms political by james harrington. harrington, james, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing h ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread [ ], p. printed by j.c. for henry fletcher ..., london : . errata: p. . reproduction of original in huntington library. eng political science -- quotations, maxims, etc. aphorisms and apothegms. a r (wing h ). civilwar no aphorisms political. the second edition enlarged, by james harrington. harrington, james a this text has no known defects that were recorded as gap elements at the time of transcription. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion aphorisms political . the second edition enlarged , by james harrington . obsequium amicos , veritas odium parit . london : printed by j. c. for henry fletcher , at the sign of the three gilt cups in st. pauls church-yard . . aphorisms political . i. the errours and sufferings of the people , are from their governours . ii. when the foundation of a government cometh to be changed , and the governours change not the superstructures accordingly , the people become miserable . iii. the monarchy of england was not a government by arms , but a government by laws , though imperfect or ineffectual laws . iv. the later governments in england , have been governments by arms . v. the people cannot see , but they can feel . vi . the people having felt the difference between a government by laws , and a government by arms , will always desire the government by laws , and abhor that of arms . vii . where the spirit of the people is impatient of a government by arms , and desirous of a government by laws , there the spirit of the people is not unfit to be trusted with their liberty . viii . the spirit of the people of england , not trusted with their liberty , driveth at the restitution of monarchy by blood and violence . ix . the spirit of the people of england , trusted with their liberty , if the form be sufficient , can never set up a king ; and if the form be insufficient , ( as a parliament with a council in the intervals , or two assemblies co-ordinate ) will set up a king without blood or violence . x. to light upon a good man , may be in chance ; but to be sure of an assembly of good men , is not in prudence . xi . where the security is no more then personal , there may be a good monarch , but can be no good commonwealth . xii . the necessary action or use of each thing , is from the nature of the form . xiii . where the security is in the persons , the government maketh good men evil ; where the security is in the form , the government maketh evil men good . xiv . assemblies legitimately elected by the people , are that onely party which can govern without an army . xv . not the party which cannot govern without an army , but the party which can govern without an army , is the refined party , as to this intent and purpose truely refined ; that is , by popular election , according to the precept of moses , and the rule of scripture : take ye wise men , and understanding , and known among your tribes , and i will make them rulers over you . xvi . the people are deceived by names , but not by things . xvii . where there is a well-ordered commonwealth , the people are generally satisfied . xviii . where the people are generally dissatisfied , there is no commonwealth . xix . the parties in england declaring for a commonwealth , hold every one of them something that is inconsistent with a commonwealth . xx . to hold that the government may be managed by a few , or by a party , is inconsistent with a commonwealth ; except in a situation like that of venice . xxi . to hold that there can be any national religion or ministry without publick indowment and inspection of the magistracy , or any government without a national religion or ministry , is inconsistent with a commonwealth . xxii . to hold that there may be liberty , and not liberty of conscience , is inconsistent with a commonwealth that hath the liberty of her own conscience , or that is not popish . xxiii . where civil liberty is entire , it includes liberty of conscience . xxiv . where liberty of conscience is entire , it includes civil liberty . xxv . either liberty of conscience can have no security at all , or under popular government must have the greatest security . xxvi . to hold that a government may be introduced by a little at once , is to wave prudence , & commit things unto chance . xxvii . to hold that the wisdom of god in the formation of an house , or of a government , goeth not universally upon natural principles , is inconsistent with scripture . xxviii . to hold that the wisdom of man in the formation of an house , or of government , may go upon supernatural principles , is inconsistent with a commonwealth , and as if one should say , god ordained the temple , therefore it was not built by masons ; he ordained the snuffers , therefore they were not made by a smith . xxix . to hold that hirelings , ( as they are termed by some ) or an endowed ministry , ought to be removed out of the church , is inconsistent with a commonwealth . xxx . nature is of god . xxxi . some part in every religion is natural . xxxii . an universal effect , demonstrateth an universal cause . xxxiii . an universal cause is not so much natural , as it is nature it self . xxxiv . every man , either unto his terrour or consolation , hath some sense of religion . xxxv . man may rather be defined a religious , then a rational creature ; in regard that in other creatures there may be something of reason , but is nothing of religion . xxxvi . government is of humane prudence , and humane prudence is adequate unto mans nature . xxxvii . the prudence or government that is regardless of religion , is not adequate nor satisfactory unto mans nature . xxxviii . where the government is not adequate or satisfactory unto mans nature , it can never be quiet or perfect . xxxix . the major part of mankinde giveth it self up in the matter of religion unto the publick leading . xl . that there may be a publick leading , there must be a national religion . xli . vvhere the minor part taketh away the national religion , there the major part is deprived of the liberty of conscience by the minor . xlii . vvhere the major part is deprived of the liberty of conscience by the minor , there they will deprive the minor of that liberty of conscience which they might otherwise enjoy . xliii . in israel there was an endowed clergie or priesthood , and a national religion under inspection of the magistrate : whence the christians in apostolick times , defraying their own ministry , could have liberty of conscience ; whereas if the christians by going about to take away tythes , and abolish the national religion , had endeavoured to violate the consciences of the unconverted jews , these being far greater in number , must needs have taken away the liberty of conscience from the christians . xliv . paul in athens could freely and undisturbedly convert dionysius and others ; therefore in athens there was liberty of conscience : but if paul and his converts had gone about to drive hirelings , or an endowed priesthood or clergie out of that church , who seeth not that the athenians would have driven paul and his converts out of athens ? xlv . that there may be liberty of conscience , there must be a national religion . xlvi . that there may be a national religion , there must be an endowed clergy . xlvii . commonwealths have had their wayes of union . as the athenians , by bringing their confederates unto subjection . as the united provinces , by an equal league . or as the romans , by an unequal league . the first way is tyrannical : in the second , one commonwealth under the league , is no more then another , and each one as to her self hath a negative : which kinde of union , is not onely obstructive , but tendeth ( as we have seen both in holland and switz ) towards division . in the third way , the commonwealth uniting other commonwealths , retaineth unto her self the leading of the whole league , leaving unto each of the rest her own laws , and her own liberty . xlviii . till a commonwealth be first framed , how such a commonwealth should make an effectual union with another nation , is not possible to be seen . xlix . the new , unpractised , and heretofore unheard-of union , ( as it is vulgarly spoken ) with scotland , by uniting deputies of divers nations , not in a council apart , or by way of states general , as in the united provinces , but in the standding councils of some one commonwealth in the league , is destructive to liberty both in england and in scotland . l. if the commonwealth of england receive deputies from scotland in a greater number then that of her own , she receiveth law from a forraign interest , and so loseth her own liberty . li. if scotland be received in an equal number , it obstructeth the freedom of both , or occasioneth war or dissention . lii . if scotland be received in an inferiour number , she receiveth law from england , and so loseth her liberty . the like is understood of ireland . liii . whereas a well-ordered commonwealth should give the balance to her confederates , and not receive it from them . the councils in which divers others are thus united , though in a far inferiour number of deputies , yet if these lie in wait , or lay their heads together , may be over-ruled , obstructed , or over-balanced by forraign interests . liv. vvhere countries are divers in their laws , and yet are to receive laws one from the other , neither the common-wealth giving law , knoweth what to give , nor the common-wealth receiving law , understandeth what she receiveth : in which case the union returneth unto force or confufion . lv . the best way of holding a nation different or not different in laws , is the roman , that is , by way of province . lvi . a province , especially if she have strong holds , may by defraying of a small guard , be kept unto a just league , and for the rest enjoy her own laws , her own governmeut , and her perfect liberty : other wayes of union , will be found more chargeable , and less effectual , on both sides : for if england have no army in scotland , scotland will receive no law from england ; and if england have an army there , her hold consisteth not in the union , but in the force . the like is to be understood of ireland . lvii . if a country be very small , and not able to subsist of it self , as wales , it may be safely united and held : but the advantage that wales hath in participation of all magistracies and offices , is not that which england is able to afford unto such a country as scotland , without subjecting her neck unto the yoke . lviii . the order of a commonwealth requireth , that it consist , first , of a civil ; secondly , of a religious ; thirdly , of a military ; and fourthly , of a provincial part. the manner of uniting provinces or different nations , appertaineth unto the last part ; and in the formation of a commonwealth , to begin with that first , which is naturally last , is to invert the order , and by consequence the commonwealth , which indeed is nothing but order . lix . where there can be any other government , there can be no commonwealth . lx . where there can be a commonwealth , what tumults soever there happen , and which soever prevail , there can be no other government ; that is to say , without forraign invasion , which throughout , i must be understood to except . lxi . if sir george booth had prevailed , he must either have introduced a commonwealth , or have restored a king . lxii . if a king were restored , he must either govern by an army , or by parliaments . lxiii . a king governing now in england by an army , would for the same causes finde the same effects with the late protector . lxiv a king governing now in england by parliaments , would finde the nobility of no effect at all . lxv . a parliament where the nobility is of no effect at all , is a meer popular council . lxvi . a meer popular council , will never receive law from a king . lxvii . a meer popular council giving law unto a king , becometh thereby a democracy , or equal commonwealth ; or the difference is no greater then in the imperfection of the form . lxviii . a commonwealth or democracy to be perfect in the form , must consist especially of such an assembly , the result whereof , can go upon no interest whatsoever , but that onely which is the common interest of the whole people . lxix . an assembly consisting of a few , may go upon the interest of one man , as a king ; or upon the interest of one party , as that of divines , lawyers , and the like ; or the interest of themselves , and the perpetuation of their government . lxx . the popular assembly in a commonwealth , may consist of too few , but can never consist of too many . lxxi . in every commonwealth there hath been a popular assembly . this in israel at the least consisted of twenty four thousand , upon a monthly rotation . in athens , lacedemon , rome , it consisted of the whole citizens , that is , of all such as had right in the commonwealth , whether they inhabited in city or country . in venice it consisteth of about two thousand . in the province of holland onely , which containeth eighteen or nineteen soveraignties , the popular or resolving assemblies consist at the least of five hundred persons : these in the whole union , may amount unto five or six thousand ; in switz i believe they come unto a greater number . and the most of these assemblies have been perpetually extant . lxxii . if the popular assembly consist of so few , and so eminent persons as are capable of any orderly debate , it is good for nothing but to destroy the commonwealth . lxxiii . if the popular assembly consist of so many , and for the greater part of so mean persons as are not capable of debate , there must be a senate to help this defect . lxxiv . the reason of the senate , is , that a popular assembly rightly constituted , is not capable of any prudent debate . lxxv . the reason of the popular assembly , is , that a senate rightly constituted for debate , must consist of so few and eminent persons , that if they have the result too , they will not resolve according unto the interest of the people , but according to the interest of themselves . lxxvi . a popular assembly without a senate , cannot be wise . lxxvii . a senate without a popular assembly , will not be honest . lxxviii . the senate and the popular assembly being once rightly constituted , the rest of the commonwealth will constitute it self . lxxix . the venetians having slain divers of their dukes for their tyranny , and being assembled by such numbers in their great council as were naturally incapable of debate , pitched upon thirty gentlemen who were called pregati , in that they were prayed to go apart , and debating upon the exigence of the commonwealth , to propose as they thought good unto the great council ; and from thence first arose the senate of venice , to this day called the pregati ; and the great council , that is , the senate and the popular assembly of venice : and from these two arose all those admirable orders of that comwealth lxxx . that a people of themselves should have such understaning as when they of venice did institute their pregati or senate , is rare . lxxxi . that a senate or council of governours having supreme power , should institute a popular assembly , and propose to it , though in all reason it be the far more facile and practicable , is that which is rarer . lxxxii the diffusive body of the people is not in a natural capacity of judging ; for which cause , the whole judgement and power of the diffusive body of the people must be intirely and absolutely in their collective bodies , assemblies or representatives , or there can be no commonwealth . lxxxiii . to declare that the assemblies or representatives of the people have power in some things , and in others not , is to make the diffusive body , which is in a natural incapacity of judging , to be in a political capacity of judging . lxxxiv . to bring a natural incapacity of judging , unto a political capacity of judging , is to introduce government . to bring a natural incapacity of judging , to such a collective or political capacity of judging , as yet necessarily must retain the interest of the diffusive body , is to introduce the best kind of government . but to lay any appeal whatsoever from a political capacity of judging , to a natural incapacity of judging , is to frustrate all government , and to introduce anarchy . nor is anarchy , whether imposed or obtruded by the legislator first , or by the people , or their demagogues or incendiaries afterwards , of any other kinde whatsoever , then of this onely . lxxxv . to make principles or fundamentals , belongeth not unto men , unto nations , nor unto humane laws . to build upon such principles or fundamentals as are apparently laid by god in the inevitable necessity or law of nature , is that which truly appertaineth unto men , unto nations and unto humane laws . to make any other fundamentals , and then build upon them , is to build castles in the air . lxxxvi . whatever is violent , is not secure nor durable ; whatever is secure or durable , is natural . lxxxvii . government in the whole people , though the major part were disaffected , must be secure and durable , because it waveth force , to found it self upon nature . lxxxviii . government in a party , though all of these were well-affected , must be in-secure , and transitory , because it waveth nature , to found it self upon force . lxxxix . commonwealths , of all other governments , are more especially for the preservation , not for the destruction of mankinde . xc . commonwealths that have been given to cut off their diseased limbs , ( as florence ) have brought themselves unto impotence and ruine . commonwealths that have been given unto healing their diseased limbs ( as venice ) have been healthful and flourishing . xci . athens under the oligarchy of four hundred , was in finitely more afflicted and torn with distraction , blood and animositie of parties , then is england ; yet by introduction of a senate of four hundred , and a popular assembly of five thousand , did thereupon , so suddenly , as if it had been a charm , recover might and glory . see the eighth book of thucydides ; a story in these times most necessary to be considered . xcii . to leave our selves and posterity to a farther purchase in blood or sweat , of that which we may presently possess , enjoy , and hereafter bequeath unto posterity in peace and glory , is inhumane and impious . xciii . as certainly and suddenly as a good state of health dispelleth the peevishness and peril of sickness , doth a good state of government , the animosity and danger of parties : xciv . the frame of a commonwealth having first been proposed and considered , expedients ( in case such should be found necessary for the safe , effectual and perfect introduction of the same ) may with some aim be applied or fitted ; as to an house , when the model is resolved upon , we fit scaffolds in building . but first to resolve upon expedients , and then to fit unto them the frame of a commonwealth , is as if one should set up props , and then build a house to lean upon them . xcv . as the chief expedients in the building of an house are axes and hammers ; so the chief expedient in the building of a government , is a standing army . xcvi . as the house , which being built , will not stand without the perpetual noise or use of axes & hammers , is imperfect ; so the government , which being formed , cannot support it self without the perpetual use of a standing army . xcvii . while the civil and religious parts of a commonwealth are in forming , there is a necessity that she should be supported by an army ; but when the military and provincial parts are rightly formed , she can have no farther use of any other army . wherefore at this point , and not till then , her armies are by the practise of commonwealths , upon slighter occasions , to have half pay for life , and to be disbanded . xcviii . where there is a standing army , and not a formed government , there the army of necessity will have dictatorian power . xcix . where an army subsisteth upon the pay or riches of a single person , or of a nobility , that army is alwayes monarchical . where an army subsisteth not by the riches of a single person , nor of a nobility , that army is alwayes popular . c. the english armies are popular armies . ci. where armies are popular , and exercise dictatorian power in deposing single persons , and monarchical assemblies , there can be no greater , nor needs any other expedient for the introduction of a commonwealth . nevertheless unto this may be added some such moderate qualifications as may prune the commonwealth , not lop off her branches . whom these will not satisfie , it is not a commonwealth , but a party , that can . cii . if the late king had freely permitted unto the people the exercise of the power inevitably devolved upon them by the change of the balance , he had not been destroyed . if either of the late single persons had brought the people into an orderly exercise of the power devolved upon them , he had been great . vvhat party soever shall hinder the people from the exercise of the power devolved upon them , shall be certainly ruined : who or what party soever shall introduce the people into the due and orderly exercise of the power devolved upon them , shall be forthwith secure , and famous for ever . ciii . a man useth , nourisheth and cherisheth his body , without understanding it ; but he that made the body , understood it . civ. the reason why the nations that have commonwealths , use them so well , and cherish them so much , and yet that so few nations have commonwealths , is , that in using a commonwealth , it is not necessary it should be understood : but in making a commonwealth , that it be understood , is of of absolute necessity . caput reipublicae est nosse rempub. cicero . cv . as the natural body of a christian or saint can be no other , for the frame , then such as hath been the natural body of an israelite or of an heathen ; so the political bodies , or civil governments of christians or saints , can be no other , for the frame , then such as have been the political bodies or civil governments of the israelites , or of the heathens . cvi. it shall be as foon found when and where the soul of a man was in the body of a beast , as when or where the soul or freedom natural unto democracie , was in any other form , then that onely of a senate , and an assembly of the people . cvii . in those things wherein , and so far as art is directed or limitted by the nature of her materials , it is in art as in nature . cviii . that democracie , or equal government by the people , consist of an assembly of the people , and a senate , is that whereby art is altogether directed , limited and necessitated by the nature of her materials . cix . as the soul of man can never be in the body of a beast , unless god make a new creation ; so neither the soul or freedom natural unto democracie in any other form whatsoever , then that onely of a senate , and a popular assembly . cx . the right constitution , coherence and proper symmetry of a form of government goeth for the greater part upon invention . cxi . reason is of two parts ; invention , and judgement . cxii . judgement is most perfect in an assembly . cxiii . invention is most perfect in one man . cxiv . in one man , judgement wanteth the strength which is in a multitude of counsellours . cxv . in a multitude of counsellours , invention is none at all . xcvi . through the defect of invention , the wisest assemblies in the formation or reformation of government , have pitched upon a sole legislator . xcvii . it is not below the dignity of the greatest assembly , but according unto the practice of the best commonwealths , to admit of any man that is able to propose to them , for the good of his country . cxviii . unto the making of a well-ordered commonwealth , there goeth little more of pains or charge , or work without doors , then the establishment of an equal or apt division of the territory , and the proposing of such election unto the divisions so made , as from an equal foundation , may raise equal superstructures ; the rest being but paper-work , is as soon done , as said or voted . cxix . vvhere such elections are proposed , as being mad by the people , must needs produce a well-ordered senate and popular assembly , and the people ( who as we have already found by experience , stick not at like work ) elect accordingly ; there not the proposers of any power in themselves , but the whole people by their peculiar and natural right and power , do institute and ordain their whole commonwealth . cxx . the highest earthly felicity that a people can ask , or god can give , is an equal and well-ordered common-wealth . such an one among the israelites , was the reign of god ; and such an one ( for the same reason ) may be among christians the reign of christ , though not every one in the christian commonwealth should be any more a christian indeed , then every one in the israelitish common-wealth was an israelite indeed . septem. . . finis errata . aphor. . line . for their wayes , read three wayes . the sage senator delineated: or, a discourse of the qualifications, endowments, parts, external and internal, office, duty and dignity of a perfect politician. with a discourse of kingdoms, republiques, & states-popular. as also, of kings and princes: to which is annexed, the new models of modern policy. / by j.g. gent. de optimo senatore. english goślicki, wawrzyniec, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (thomason e _ ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing g thomason e _ estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; :e [ ]) the sage senator delineated: or, a discourse of the qualifications, endowments, parts, external and internal, office, duty and dignity of a perfect politician. with a discourse of kingdoms, republiques, & states-popular. as also, of kings and princes: to which is annexed, the new models of modern policy. / by j.g. gent. de optimo senatore. english goślicki, wawrzyniec, - . grimefield, john, j. g., gent. [ ], p. printed by ja: cottrel, for sam. speed, at the signe of the printing-press in st. paul's church-yard., london, : . a translation of "de optimo senatore" by wawrzyniec goślicki, with "the new models of modern policy" by j.g., i.e. john grimefield?, annexed. title page in red and black. annotation on thomason copy: "july:". reproduction of the original in the british library. eng politicians -- early works to . political science -- early works to . political ethics -- early works to . a r (thomason e _ ). civilwar no the sage senator delineated: or, a discourse of the qualifications, endowments, parts, external and internal, office, duty and dignity of a goślicki, wawrzyniec c the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the c category of texts with between and defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - elspeth healey sampled and proofread - elspeth healey text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the sage senator delineated : or , a discourse of the qualifications , endowments , parts , external and internal , office , duty and dignity of a perfect politician , with a discourse of kingdoms , republiques , & states-popular . as also , of kings and princes : to which is annexed , the new models of modern policy . by j. g. gent. london , printed by ja : cottrel , for sa●… . speed , at the signe of the printing-press in st. paul's church-yard . . to the reader . there are few or none ( i presume ) even among the vulgar , but understand that republique or kingdom to be most happy , that lives most peaceably : yet what doth most conduce to the welfare and felicity of king and people , hath been long debated by the ancient as well as modern philosophers , and politicians . some are of opinion , that good laws work and frame the people to a civil life ; others think it lies in the power of good education : some imagine that it proceeds from the influence and operation of the stars upon sublunary bodies ; and others , from the endeavors and examples of good kings . to the last , we subscribe : for the peace and tranquillity of a nation proceeds primarily from the splendor of princely ●●●…rtues ; which are so glorious and attractive , that they do not onely incite the subject to gaze on them , but with an extasied admiration , to adore and affect them , so that they are stimulated to an imitation , as far as in them lies : and when prince and people mutually labour in the pursuit of vertue ( pro viribus , as we say ) according to the utmost extent of their ability , how can there chuse but be a result of unanimity , peace and concord ? to perfect this , 't is requisite that a senate be elected ; which is a certain number of grave , wise , discreet persons , that may help their soveraign to pull in or slacken the reins of government , according as 't is judg'd convenient ; by the nobility of whose persons , and the prudence of whose consultations , married to the judgement of the king , the quiet and glory of the people is infinitely promoted and preserved . to which intent and purpose , we have here deciphered a sage senator , with all qualifications tending to his perfection ; his office , duty , honour , preferment and repute among the ancients , as well as those of latter ages ; first asserting , and then proving their necessity , and the benefit that accrews to a kingdom or republike from their grave and serious debates in counsel , and their industrious management of political affairs . by such union between king and council , prince and people ; the whole nation will undoubtedly flourish with a perpetual verdure , as if an immortal peace were entail'd upon them and their posterity for ever ; laws will have their full force and efficacie , as well for the punishment of malefactors , as the reward of honourable deserving persons : justice will run in its proper current , and not be diverted to sinister and base ends , by lucre or self-interest ; two hammers that are able to knock a kingdom in pieces . learning will be advanced , and the learned promoted according to their merit and desert : without this , no kingdom can stand ; take away the pen , and the pike will be unnecessary . 't was the saying of a potent monarch , that , he received more benefit from his dead , then living counsellours ; intimating thereby , that his library did afford him better counsel then his senate . learning and senators , like hippocrates his twins , are inseparable ; they cannot dwell asunder ; especially in such a one as is here described . and though i am sufficiently sensible , that a discourse of those qualities that are required in a perfect politician , is , not onely a work of great importance , but attended by a troop of opposing difficulties : yet i have endeavored to display the ancient government of the most famous kingdoms , republiques and states popular , according to the statutes , laws and customs of the most potent , as well as prudent monarchs . and my hope is , ( though my imbecility can lay no claim to merit ) that my earnest desire to promote the publick good , will plead my excuse ; and i am confident , there is no person that is unprejudiced , if commonly courteous , but will accept of my humble devoirs ; which is the very highth of the authors desires ; who at this present hath no more to say , but bid thee , reader , farewel , j. g. the table . the first book . chap. . of senators in general , their original and necessity . pag. chap. . of the diversity of man's nature in general , and of the parentage and education of a senator in particular . p. chap. . the knowledge of arts and sciences required in senators ; and particularly , that of philosophy . p. chap. . of eloquence , clemency , piety , and other vertues necessary to the accomplishment of a senator . p. chap. . of justice and her concomitants , which our senator ought to be adorned with . p. chap. . of fortitude and her concomitants , as magnanimity , constancy , patience , confidence , &c. p. chap. . of travel ; the age , gravity , and election of our senator . pag. the second book . chap. . of kings and their prerogative . pag. chap. . of the division of commonweals and kingdoms . pag. chap. . wherein is contained the various forms of the most renowned and famous commonweals and kingdoms in the world . pag. chap. . the new-fangled model of modern policy , being of three sorts , a protectordom , a committeedom , and a rumpdom ; and first of the protectordom . pag. chap. . of a committeedom . pag. chap. . of a rumpdom . pag. the sage senator . book i. chap. i. of senators in general , their original and necessity . he that sweateth in the pursuit of those studies that conduce to private recreation , as well as publike emolument , personates and represents a grave wise man ; and merits the general applause of all persons : for , omne tulit punctum , qui miscuit util● dulci . and ( if i may be a competent judge ) there is no science accompanied with more delight to the student , or benefit to the commonwealth into which he is incorporated , than that of government : wherefore being sufficiently convinced , that all the transactions of a well-regulated state are managed by solid reason , mature deliberation , and sound judgement , not by wavering opinion , uncertain fate , or fantastique fortune ; i have made the original of senators , their duty , dignity , internal and external qualifications , the theme on which i intend to expatiate in general in this first book : but more particularly in this chapter , of the original cause of their institution or creation . for the performance of that task which i have voluntarily imposed upon my self , i have dived into the depth of civil knowledge , and pried into the arcana of philosophy ; collecting whatsoever hath been related , penned , or experimentally known heretofore , either by academick learning , parliaments in commonweals , policy in government , or history . but to begin : man , the perfection of the creation , was not made a citizen or inhabitant of this world only , but lord paramount over all creatures that have a being within the compass of the terrestrial globe : this authority and dignity was conferred upon him by the supreme governour of heaven and earth , who hath descended so far below his sacred self , as to make him his co-partner in government , adorning him with divine understanding ; to the intent , that the scepter of this terrene empire may be swayed by his reason and counsel . the cause of this co-union of government between god and man , proceeds from reason ; which being perfect , makes man capable of imitating almightiness ; so that it appears , there is a kind of near alliance or consanguinity between the creator and the creature , who sometimes is made god's vicegerent upon earth : yet without divine assistance , no reason or counsel can be termed good , or perfect : for , the seed of this glimmering resemblance of a deity planted in man , if it light on fertile ground , and that happen to meet with good culture , produceth a crop according to the expectation of the coelestial planter ; otherwise , it is like corn cast into a barren soyl ; whose product is nothing but brambles , thorns , or thistles . thus then man being reduced to a sense or feeling of those sparks of divinity that lie latent in him , should be wrought to a perswasion , that he hath the character or idaea of a deity in his mind ; the impression of the creator's holy image stamped on his soul ; and ought thereupon to be so industrious in the employment of his talent , and the management of his affairs , that his actions may speak him worthy , in some sense , of so heavenly a favour bestowed on him . yet , though he be made god's associate ( as it were ) he must return him the glory , to whom it properly and primarily belongs ; and acknowledge all authority to flow from him , as from the fountain : for , as brute animals are not governed by animals , but by an herdsman ; no more can man rule or govern man , without the assistance and protection of providence divine . and should any man be so sordidly ignorant , or atheistically prophane , as to undertake the government of any country or nation , without divine knowledge or assistance ; it must necessarily follow , that that state , common-wealth , or kingdom , and every member thereof , be implunged into an ocean of misery and infelicity : for , it is in vain to build upon the imagined welfare of a state , or kingdom , if god be not the protector and patron thereof . it is then as conspicuous as the meridian sun , that all vertue , wisdom and goodness owes its original to god ; which did instigate the purblind , or rather pure-blind heathen , that had only the rush-candle of nature , to consecrate publike temples to vertue , faith , concord , wisdom , peace , &c. and if ovid the ethnick durst be so bold , well may we then à fortiori affirm , and maintain , est deus in nobis , agitante calescimus illo ; spiritus hic sacrae lumina mentis habet . it is therefore our duty to endeavour the deserving a more noble title than that of meer man , and strenuously to labour in the pursuit of understanding , that flies a higher pitch , than either humanity or morality dare aspire unto ; that so , if possible , we may surpass all our ancestors , and live according to the dictates of that which hath the greatest supremacy in us , viz. reason ; by vertue whereof , we are made sensible of a deity , know how to exercise vertu●… , embrace that which is good , and avoid what is evill : this is that which endows a man with the qualifications of wisdom , valour , and justice ; by this we are able to discern , that the terrestrial globe is wheel'd about by divine wisdom ; it is this that makes a man noble , a hero : which was the reason that the lacedaemonians imposed the title of gods upon those persons , that were judged to move in the highest sphear of understanding ; homines de meliore luto ; men of a more noble allay , than dull mud-wall'd man can boast of : nay , homer deifies hector in this ensuing distich : non hominis certe mortalis filius ille esse videtur , sed divino semine natus . so that we may maintain ( without being paradoxical ) that that man , who is guided by solid reason in all his words and actions , is quasi semi-deus inter mortales ; a demi-god among men . now , of such repute is a sage senator , or grave cousellor ; who hath reason for his cynosure , and wisdom his coadjutress in all undertakings . such persons are so necessary in a commonwealth , that they can by no means be omitted or left out : for , the king being but a single person , cannot have an eye unto all the transactions of his kingdom ; besides , somtimes it happens , that he is seduced from the conduct of reason , by yeilding to his affections , or slackning the reins of his appetite and licentiousness ; and the rude multitude , being ignorant , is altogether uncapable of that understanding , or knowledge . yet the senate , elected according to the law of the land , and compacted or made up of vertuous , sober , grave , discreet persons , do from their place , as from a pharos , or watch-tower , look about them , and provide all things requisite for the discreet and well regulating of the state wherein they live ; preventing all mutinies , seditions and dissentions that the rebellious rabble durst any waies attempt : of such great use and necessity are they , and that not only to the king , but the people also ; like unto the vital part of mans soul , which residing in the heart , enliveneth and quickens that which partakes of reason , and is situated in the head : and a monarch that is guided by the advice and counsel of a grave senate , rules his kingdom prudently , and governs it discreetly . for , as reason in all her proceedings , makes use of the service of the senses ; yet she alone determines , and deserves the greatest honour and esteem : so a prince , though he admit of counsel , is to be judged the wisest ; and is uncontroulable in all his actions : for it is a maxim among us , that the king can do no wrong . and as the hand distinguished into fingers is thereby strengthned , and made the more apt to lay hold on any thing ; so he that governeth with the aid and assistance of counsel , shall manage all affairs with the greater consideration and prudence . their original did proceed from the benefit that it was imagined would accrue to the commonwealth , whereof they were members , by their counsel : and although they , that first assembled men into cities , who before like savages , ranged over the woods , and inhabited the desarts dispersedly , without either law or order , first gained the title of kings ; yet that course alone could not make them understand the dutiful allegiance they owed unto their soveraign : wherefore perceiving , that when they were civilized , and reduced from their brutality , the authority of a single person was not of sufficiency to curb and check them in the full career of their exorbitancies , they judged it convenient to have assistance from serious and grave counsellors : which we find performed by romulus the proto-basileus , or first king of the romans ; who supposing the government of a single person without a senate to be perilous and unsafe , made a convocation of senators , who out of respect to their gray heads , and grave understandings , obtained the name of patres . theopompus also , king of sparta , trod the same path ; for , he constituted the ephori , and invested them with eminent authority : whereat his wife being offended , was so pragmatical as to tell him , that he had derogated from his dignity , and clipt the wing of his ensuing posterity , by diminishing their authority and supremacy : but he replied , like himself , that the counsel and gravity of a senate would fortifie his kingdom , and be instead of a bulwark against the impious machinations and plots of rebellious subjects . whereby it is apparent , that monarchs first embraced counsellors out of necessity : and all rational men are of opinion , that those state-transactions are most firm and solid , that are digested by the wisdome of a parliament , ere they come to a publike birth . now , i call that a parliament , or senate , which by royal authority , and the general consent of the whole nation , is freely elected , and constituted , to advise and govern the state ; and consequently , a senator , or parliament-man , is one lawfully chosen into the number of those that are authorized to sit at the helm , and steer the ship of state . and it hath ever been observed , that they were alwaies the most grave , discreet , and noble sort of subjects ; because there is no society of men , or nation , how barbarous and brutish soever , but will voluntarily and cordially consent , that the government should be imposed upon , and rest in those persons that are vertuous ; and think it just and reasonable to obey them . nor are there any so fit to govern , as the ancient , experienced , which are usually chosen ; because others , either through want of maturity or experience , are usually withdrawn by their juvenile phancies , and recreations , from such serious places of authority : but a grave counsellor is not disturbed or discomposed with extravagant affections , transported by appetite , or inveigled by youth ; but by reason directed , by counsel fortified , and by age made perfect . and further , philosophers maintain , that in all things there are three degrees ; great , small , and indifferent : and that is judged the most perfect , that participates of either , and stands in an aequilibrium between two : now , the senator standing as a mean or moderator between the king and people , the monarch and his subjects ; may be the more intimately acquainted with the perfection of all things ; and study what is the office of a king , and the duty and allegiance of a subject ; with the rights , properties , liberties , and laws appertaining to both ; and so advise them accordingly ; that the king may not turn tyrannical for want of counsel , nor the people transcend the bounds of a moderate becoming liberty : therefore he must of necessity be a man of excellent endowments , a clear intellect , and a piercing understanding , to dive into the intricacies of government . scipio saith , that as the end of mariners , and their laborious endeavours , tends to a safe arrival into the intended haven ; the physicians skill and art is employed for the recovering and preserving health in his distempered patients ; and the captains valour levels at victory : so the happiness of subjects , their glory , life , and liberty should be the summa totalis , or chiefest end that our counsellor should aime at ; all which he must labour to preserve , maintain and augment , by his industry and endeavour , to the utmost extent of his ability ; and leave no stone unturned for the benefit of the republick , of which he is a member . nor is it my design here in this treatise to broach any new-fangled opinion , like those that are hatcht in the brains of our phanatick regicides ; or to phancie a chimaera , or make my brain the womb or idaea of an utopian counsellor , that can only be imagined , and not found in esse ( as plato did in his commonwealth , and cicero in his orator ) but my discourse shall tend to , and end in a relation and description of such persons as have liv'd heretofore , and citra omnis controversiae aleam , may be hereafter . and as divine plato composed , and reduced all those things into order , that might conduce to the felicity of his city , or republick ; the same course will we take in the character of our counsellor : wherefore perswade your self to be arrived at , or come to some famous emporium , or piazza ; whereunto all persons , of all nations , countries and cities repair ; and we will disrobe every single person of some vertue , law , custome , or qualification , that shall seem most advantagious and beneficial to our enterprize ; and therewith make up our sage senator , grave counsellor , or perfect politician : that they , who for the future are invested with such eminent dignity and authority , may imitate our senator , and endeavour to be adorned with these ensuing qualifications . chap. ii. of the diversity of man's nature in general , and of the parentage and education of a senator in particular . there is nothing more clear , than that the supreme power , among many other gifts , hath conferr'd that of reason upon man , to the end that by vertue thereof , he may pry into the nature of coelestial , as well as terrestrial bodies ; and thereby honour , reverence , and adore the creator . now , he that is sensible of the gifts of god , and the benefits of nature ; and doth , both by contemplation and action , employ this supernatural gift , slowly apes the deity , and thereby resembles him , as much as comes within the compass of mortality . but , they that contrary to nature , and the end of their creation , indulge their genius , delighting themselves in sensuality , neglecting , or totally deserting reason ; facie tantum homines sunt , non animo : carry only the outward aspect or complexion of a man ; because they are destitute of his more noble endowments . hence ariseth the variety of mens natures and dispositions , or rather conditions : for , some are born free , noble , wise , and with an aptitude to govern ; others , vassals , rusticks , ideots , predestinated to servitude and bondage : all societies of men , being willing and ready to submit to the government of the more grave and wise ; promoting , and accumulating honours on them , and offices , with reverence and respect suitable to their deserving gravity and understanding . plato is of opinion , that god in mans first creation , did by his omniscience so order it , that in the generation of those that are destin'd and adapted to govern , he hath distill'd some drams of gold in their composition ; and in them that are to assist kings and superiours by their deliberate counsel , and mature advice , silver ; but the nature of peasants and mechanicks is tempered with brass and iron . which similitude the philosopher extends to the manners , nature , and capacitie of man . for , although every man naturally desireth , that the issue of his loyns may resemble him ; yet sometimes , though seldom , it happens contrary to his expectation : for gold sometimes produceth silver , a more inferiour metal . therefore it is requisite , that a prince should be capable of understanding the natural disposition and inclination of his royal off-spring , that their iron may be converted into the gold of a more noble disposition : but , if neither good education , documents nor precepts can operate upon their inclinations , so as to cause a metamorphosis , or transmutation ; the government must be transferr'd to those , whose wisdome renders them more capable . for , it hath been prognosticated , and the event hath been experimentally known to succeed according to the prediction ; that they that are ruled by ignorant , mechanick governours , come to ruine , destruction , and confusion . to prevent all which misfortunes , it is requisite , that our counsellor be a natural subject of that place or country where he governeth ; no forreigner : of the same country , because that birth and being do not only oblige , but induce a man to believe , that it is honourable , just , and requisite for him to spend his bloud in defence thereof , when occasion is offered : dulce & decorum est pro patria mori ; it is a sweet and comely thing to die for ones country . and how can it be that any man , of what constitution soever , should not affect that place wherein his parents , neighbours , friends , and allies reside ; and that country to which he is indebted for his life , name , and honour , and every thing else that is either for delight or necessity ? non nobis enim nati sumus ( saith the orator ) sed patriae ; our country challengeth the greatest part of us . and it is most certain , that nature hath so deeply rooted the affection to their native place in the mind of man , that never was any good subject timorous , or unwilling to lay down his life , and hazard his fortunes in her defence , if necessity required . nay , it hath been so prevalent , that the most impious and unnatural persons , that endeavoured the subversion of the place of their nativity , the very sight of their native soyl hath prevented their cruel enterprize . veturia did disswade her son martius befieging rome , only by reducing to his memory the love and respect he ought to bear to his natural country ; branding him with the name of impious and audacious , for being so highly ambitious , as to disturb the quiet of that city wherein he was begot and educated ; altogether unmindful of his wife , children , and friends that remained there . so notable was the piety of veturia to her country , and no less was that of her son in forgiving it ; which had been somewhat ingrateful to him at that time , through the cruelty of the tribunes persecuting the nobility . sertorius also entreated pompeius and metellus to endeavour the procurement of his revocation ; alledging , that he took it for a greater piece of honour to have the name of an obscure roman citizen , than that of emperour in any other place of the habitable world . well then might naso sing , nescio qua natale solum dulcedine cunctas dacit , & immemores non sinit esse sui . the obligation that devoteth and bindeth us to our country , is great , upon this account ; because our goods , persons and fortunes are therein contained . pythagoras ( as it is reported by divine plato ) judged it a crime of as deep a dye , to be guilty of ingratitude to the place of ones nativity , as to ones own mother , to whom we are indebted for being : nor can there be an offence so hainous , but the affection to our native country should allay and mitigate . our counsellor must be of natural birth : no forreiner ; because their counsel or advice is thought and accounted suspicious and dangerous ; which was the reason that mov'd the athenians not only to exclude strangers from their council , but to drive them out of their cities , lest they should aspire at the dignity of magistracy , and instigate or work upon the minds of citizens , so as to perswade them to innovation ; and so mutation of laws , customs and manners might ensue , and consequently seditions and rebellions . which method the venetians have diligently observed ; for , it is their study and their whole industry , to prevent their sitting among them in council , lest they intruding under a false name or title , should arrive to dignity and eminency in the republick . besides , it is requisite he be of the nobility ; begotten of honest parents ; because honest parents produce honest children , for the most part . he must be of the number of noble and free citizens , who assumes his title from that nobility that owes its original to vertue ; which he may partly challenge as his own , and partly as his ancestors . they therefore that are nobilitated and adorned with their own peculiar vertues , as well as with those of their predecessors , merit esteem , preferment , honour and fame , above all others , and are to be highly reverenced ; and the reason is , because that vertuous and good parents , have a generous , good , vertuous and noble issue : according to the lyrick poet , fortes fortibus creantur , & bonis , est in jumentis , est in equis patrum virtus , nec imbellem feroces progenerant aquilae columbam . now ( as aristotle affirmeth ) that person that comes of a noble race , is the stem of a noble stock , and hath the affluence of fortune accompanied with vertue , hath arrived to the apex or perfection , the very quintessence of true nobility . but , because it is a rarity to find one person adorned with them all ; vertue alone can by her own right and property nobilitare viros . as for revenues , large acres , specious & spacious mannors , but no manners , and the honour that we challenge from our ancestors , without vertue , they are so far from being ornaments , that they prove a disparagement and a stain to the owner . such persons render the name of their predecessors obscure ; and through the vices of their posterity , are entombed in the grave of oblivion : therefore it is better to ascend the top of nobility by a man 's own vertue ( saith the fluent orator ) than to be reputed for the opinion conceived of his ancestors ; because the beginner of nobility deserves most praise and applause . he that is the off-spring of a noble family , deserves honour and esteem undoubtedly , with this proviso , that he make it the butt and end of his endeavours and industry , to equal , if not excel , the vertues of his parents and predecessors , and to gain unto himself more vertuous and glorious attributes . and infinitely are they to be commended that do so ; for they are so far from obscuring the fame and renown of their fore-fathers , that they add a most resplendent lustre : to it by their own vertue yet verdant and blossoming . the law of the rhodians is worthy of commendation ; for they enacted , that those children that did lead a debauched life , not imitating the vertues of their parents , should be utterly disinherited , and their lands by a deed of gift freely disposed of to the most vertuous of the race or family . it is an office of piety , to leave unto posterity a demonstration of our gratitude and thankfulness to our ancestors , whose heirs we are , not only of their external substance , ( the goods of fortune , i mean ) but of their virtue , glory , and renown : which is the true inheritance , and the best of all terrene possessions . for , 't is not a stately building hung within with coats of arms , and badges of the honour of others , nor the vast unmeasurable pieces of land belonging thereunto , but vertue , that nobilitates ; as juvenal sings , tota licet veteres exornent undique cerae atria , nobilitas sola est , atque unica virtus . for , wheresoever vertue is resident , it deserves more ample commendation than fortune can lay claim to , because she refuseth none , but may be by every one embraced ; she dwels in the homely peasants cottage , as well as in the princes stately palace ; and we find the sun-bak'd peasant adorn'd with russet-honesty , when the gaudy fantastick lord oft-times is so vitious , that he is a stranger both to vertue and honesty . cleanthes was a poor water-drawer ; and , though his outside might seem rough-hewn , and he despicable and contemptible to one whose sight pries no farther than the external part : yet his mind was refin'd , and his intellect ennobled with such faculties as will speak him man , to an understanding person , maugre all the force and violence of poverty or fortune : nor did vertue find plato noble , but made him so . and it is most certain , that from bondmen kings have descended , and the off-spring of kings hath been enslaved : such revolutions , long tract of time , by the assistance of fickle fortune , doth produce : for , according to the poet , si fortuna volet , fies de rhetore consul ; si volet haec eadem , fies de consule rhetor . up and down , kiss and frown . fortune is no state at all . was not agathocles from a potter advanced to the throne ? what heroes were romulus , tullus , hostilius , tarquinius priscus , and the whole race of the romans , more than others ? of mean parentage all , not atavis regibus editi . hearken to juvenal , and he will give you the same information : et tamen ut longe repetas , longoque revolvas , nomen ab infami gentum deducis asylo . who therefore may be termed noble ? he that by nature is made vertuous , and qualified or adorned with the attribute of wisdom . moreover , as the exercise of our qualities is various , so are the degrees of nobility . the nobility of private persons , that lead a contemplative life only , may be called philosophical nobility ; but the same in those that gain glory and renown by their sage and wise counsel in behalf of the commonwealth , or that manifest themselves stout and valiant in managing war for the defence of their country , is termed civil nobility . the force and efficacy of this nobility extends to posterity , and engraves or makes monumentum aere perennius ; that is , armour of proof against the iron teeth of time ; quod nec jovis ira , nec ignis , nec poterit ferru●… , nec edax abolere vetustas . by these ensigns of fame and vertue , men are stimulated and spurred on to imitate and exceed the vertue of all their predecessors . and as in every republick there are two kinds of time , the one of peace , and the other of war : so the citizens are of two sorts ; the one fitted for peace , and the other adapted for war : the former by arms doth enlarge the territories and bounds of his native country , or at least defend them from the invasion of forraign enemies ; the other by wise counsel and grave advice doth rule and preserve it inviolable . wherefore , a commonwealth should be composed of these two sorts of men : for , as in the management and proceedings of state-affairs , action followeth consultation , and is inferior to it ; so those persons , by whose mature counsel and deliberate advice the commonwealth was quietly , peaceably and discreetly governed , were of greater esteem than those that enlarged the confines thereof by war and arms . homer , the prince of graecian poets , produceth agamemnon , saying , he could sooner surprize and subjugate the city of troy by the advice of ten nestors or ulysses , than by the valour of twice as many ajaces or achilles . pyrrhus likewise was heard to use this expression frequently , that cineas by his eloquence had won more cities , than he with all his men of war had ever conquered . but , he that excelleth in wisdom and martial knowledge , deserves the crown and honour above all : and though , as we said before , it is vertue that makes a man noble , without the additional riches of fortune ; yet it is requisite our counsellor should be wealthy ; because thereby he may be able to supply his country , if compelled to wage war ; for money is the sinews and strength of war . but good education , saith plato , is the basis and foundation of solid wisdom and prudence . it is therefore requisite , that from their tender years they be instructed in all things that conduce to the accomplishment of man , è cunabulis , as we say , even from the cradle and swathing clouts , for then are they most apt to imbibe and suck in the most wholesome precepts that shall be exhibited unto them : for then anima est quasi tabula rasa , like a blank or piece of clean white paper , capable of any vertuous or noble impression . and as it behoveth a republick to be stored with knowing subjects , so ought they to be diligent in their education , and provide them good tutors , that may instruct them , and chalk them out the way of vertue . for , as a good husbandman diligently pruneth his plants , and loppeth off the superfluous branches , when the season requires it , that they may grow the faster ; so the commonwealth , that may justly be termed the parent and housewise of subjects , ought to be extraordinary diligent to provide for the careful and vertuous education of youth , by lopping off the superfluous branches of vice , and engrafting them on the stock of vertue . the lacedaemonians used to elect magistrates out of the number of their grave , wise and sober citizens , and call them publike tutors , which might serve to educate and train up their younglings ; and were alwaies reverenced by them , being judged vertuous men in action , and well skill'd in military discipline . and the ancient romans were as strict and careful in this point of education , as the lacedaemonians . cato was so diligent in the nurture and education of his son , that he disdained not to receive him into his tuition , and take him into his pupillage or guardianship as soon as ever ripeness of age had fitted him for instruction . and although at that very time he kept chilo the grammarian , and one excellent in that art , in his house , to instruct his children , yet he had not permission to correct them , but that was left to the discretition of the father . besides , he disdained to be engaged to a school-master for the instruction of his children altogether ; wherefore he taught them the laws , manners and customes of his own as well as other nations ; as also , how to dart , handle his arms , swim , ( which was anciently much in esteem ; for , aristotle when he would set forth an absolute dulman or ignaro , saith , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , he could neither read nor swim , ) and to endure both heat and cold , that he might be hardened and seasoned for any enterprize . besides , he penn'd a history with his own hands , and committed it to the perusal of his son , that he might therein see and understand the heroick deeds and actions of his ancestors , and be instructed in the art of government . he never spake any unclean or passionate word before his son , but was as circumspect in his language , as if the vestal virgins or priests were in presence ; observing that ancient rule , nil dicta foedum , factuve haec ●●…ina tangat intra quae puer est — — and this was the oeconomique or domestique discipline of cato , and of the major part of the romans , especially of the better sort , in the education of their children . in like manner the philosophers of greece composed plaies for the instruction of youth ; which is preserved to this very day among us , ( though that custome for some years was almost obsolete and out of request . ) nor were they only capable of indoctrinating , or laying down the tenets that are necessary to a happy and good life , but they were of ability to instruct in the laws and manner of government : yea , this our present age hath some seminaries of learning and vertue ( according to the graecian custome ) the universities of cambridge and oxford , ( though lately ready to expire , and almost demolished by the phanaticks , who hated all book-learning ( as they term it ) because their crimes were so hainous , that they went beyond the mercy of the book . ) hither youth might resort , as unto a harvest of science and knowledge , and might reap a crop of vertue and good discipline . but it were to be wish'd , that the doctors and tutors in our universities would instruct their pupils in the art of living , and not disputing well altogether , ( for , so might they deserve preferment from the commonwealth , and commendation from all solid persons , ) and not take more delight in hearing a praevaricator or jester , than a solid philosopher . in ancient times , philosophers enjoyned their pupils silence , and taught it also ; but our modern wits teach them only to talk or discourse ; which is the reason the nation is filled with so many worded orators , and prating philosophers . they endeavor not , nunc di●rum , ▪ to refine the understanding , but to cloath the tongue with frothy language ; and are applauded for altercation and strength of wit in their publike arguments , but not for modesty or solid wisdom : yet there is hope of a reformation in these schools of learning , when those loyal spirits , that for their allegiance to their soveraign were dismissed , are re-instated . the ancient graecian academies were the nurseries of commonweals ; and out of them ( as from the trojan horse ) issued most excellent monarchs , stout captains , and wife governors . alexander and scipio , with whose fame the whole world hath ecchoed , had their primitive education in schools of literature ; and many others , which i omit . thus it is apparent , that men ought to be trained up in schools , that so they may be instructed in the principles of government : wherefore it ought to be the care of every state , republick and kingdom , that their seminaries of learning be as well furnished and stored with vertues , as the citizens shops are with wares and commodities . now then , we see that good education is requisite , and accomplisheth our senator . besides , he must have an inclination to vertue ; for if not , his evill disposition will hardly be bettered by philosophy : for , the nature of man prompts him to evill ; and he finding himself strengthned with the science of philosophy , is more expert , and gains more skill to palliate and plead for his bad actions : for the best of sciences possessed by a man of an evil dispostion , is depraved , and , contrary to its own nature , is a help to , and promoter of evill counsel . so that it may be maintained , that good instruction bestowed upon an evill nature , is oftentimes ill employed , and ineffectual . though it is most certain , that education prevails much with tender years , changing it from vice , and molding it according to the form of vertue . diogenes being demanded , how a man might lead a peaceable and quiet life ; replied , first , he must fear the deity , who is the author of all felicity . secondly , he must bestow good education on his children , the want whereof makes them enemies , and disrespectful to their aged parents . thirdly , he must avoid ingratitude to his friends , which of all crimes is the most odious and comprehensive , containing within it self a whole bundle of offences . ingratum dixeris , & omnia dixeris . mention but ingratitude , and you have epitomized all sins in a word . moreover , it is necessary that children be instructed in the rudiments of grammar , rhetorick and logick , whereby they may understand the property of speech , and the excellency thereof , as also defend it by argumentation . thus may he understand the art of eloquence , which is perfected by use , discourse , and surveying the works of poets and orators ; and being thus instructed , he will shake off those petty inconsiderable things that are understood by every mean capacity , and take into consideration matters of greater weight and importance . and the mind , beginning to know her self , seeks after the true food and nourishment that will satisfie and content her , which is philosophy ; of which in this ensuing chapter . chap. iii. the knowledge of arts and sciences required in senators ; and particularly , that of philosophy . philosophy is the food and medicine of the mind , affording it vertue as aliment , and healing all sorts of maladies and disturbances that are incident thereunto , making a perfect path-way to happiness . the reason is , because that then the mind shaketh on the terrene incumbranees that usually clog the body , and meditates upon things divine and coelestial . this knowledge of philosophy is of two sorts ; the one consists in the subtilty of nature , and is subject to the universal contemplation of all men : the other demonstrateth and laies down the true institution of men and manners , shewing how republicks and kingdoms ought to be regulated , and private families ordered . to the first these parts of philosophy belong : physicks or natural philosophy , metaphysicks or divinity , and the mathematicks ; and to the other , ethicks , politicks and oeconomicks . nor is the finis or end of these two sorts of philosophy altogether discrepant , since they both tend to the perfection of man : yet in this they differ , that the one endeavours it by contemplation , and the other by action ; the one by theory , and the other by practice ; whereof a double felicity doth arise , the one private , and the other publike . now , those that place felicity in the exercise of vertue for the good of the republick , the more publike it be , the more praise-worthy it is judged ; because a multitude receives benefit thereby , and not one single person . yet we are necessitated and compelled to confess , that contemplation on felicity hath the pre-eminency , because it instructs in the principal efficient causes of all things and transactions . god also without action , by his perpetual and divine contemplation and prescience , foreseeing all things , doth by his own example move philosophers to prefer divine contemplation before all humane action and felicity . that philosophy is necessary in a senator , for the more secure management of state-affairs , will appear by what follows . philosophy is the eternal , immortal gift of the creator , instructing us in the knowledge of all things both divine and humane ; as also the nature of vertue and vice : so that he that ( as in a glass ) peeps therein , and then considers and meditates upon it , shall see the forms , idaea's and images of all things ; and perceive a resemblance or representation both of body and mind . it was not therefore without cause styled by fluent cicero , universal knowledge , the conduct of life , the searcher of vertue , the expeller of vice , and the panacea , or health of the soul . for indeed , there is nothing in the world to be thought or acted , either in court or council , of great or small importance , but proceeds from philosophy , as the nurse of all consultations , actions , and resolutions : which if you make your rule to walk by , all your words and actions will be judged sober , wise , discreet , and in all respects perfect , as far as man can be . for , in what country soever the people have a philosopher to their prince , or one that is counselled by philosophers ; war , discord , or rebellion is seldome found . but , methinks i hear some phanatick lay this objection in my way , as a stumbling-block to my proceedings . dost thou imagine , sir philosopher ( that 's as good as mr doctor , an usual phrase among them ) that the felicity of kingdoms and republicks , or the wisdom of kings and governours proceeds from thy lazy idle discipline ? ( rash , illiterate fellows , they never consider that the sweat of the brains is greater than the sweat of the brow ) whenas that art is but a meer juggling , prating science ; not that knowledge whereby men arrive to their intended felicity . how canst thou be so impudent ( the omer of respect they afford to every one is thou and thee ; and if it lay in their power , they would take away two as necessary pronouns , thine and mine ) as to dare to infect the kingdom ( commonwealth , i should have said ; for the name of king is enough to fright them into convulsion-fits ) with that that will prove the ruine and destruction of it ? for , as thou hast filled the schools with debate and contention , so wilt thou rend the state with divisions ; and though it may be argued out in the university without blows , yet canst thou think , that it will be determined in a commonwealth without the effusion of bloud ? how shall the happiness of a republick be maintained and preserved by philosophers , whose opinions carry so much variety , dubiousness , and diametrical opposition ? which of all the philosophical sects shall our common-wealth be guided by ; the platonist , peripatetick , stoick , cynick , or epicure ? now , they that differ about the summum bonum , do they not dissent in the substance of philosophy ? therefore i am clearly of opinion , that they who relie solely on philosophy , are rather to be excluded than admitted to govern in any state or republick whatsoever . is it consentaneous to reason , that he should be a legislator , that approves of no law , but what is of his own prescription , relying wholly upon his own reason , or rather phancie and opinion ; conceiting all persons , himself excepted , brutish and irrational ? is not this the humour and disposition of your philosophical crew ? did diogenes , zeno , or epictetus ever deserve to sit at the helm of state ? to which i reply ; there are two sorts of philosophers whom i judge altogether unfit to govern : the first are they that have only had a smack of philosophy , so that the thirsting heat of their vitious desires and appetites is not quenched by vertue ; and they themselves lead lives quite contrary to the precepts of philosophy , for want of good ground and solid foundation in that science . another sort of philosophers there is , quite contrary to the forementioned , who having à tenera aetate , from their very youth been conversant with philosophers , and studied philosophy , do waste away their daies in the contemplative part only : such kind of philosophy , which conduceth not to the emolument & benefit of the commonwealth or kingdom , is altogether improfitable . for , albeit they be learned , wise , and have turned over most authors , and can give an account of all their precepts and rules ; yet they applying their minds to contemplation , not being experienced in civill affairs , are unfit for government . now these contemplative philosophers are justly called sapientes , but they are not prudentes ; as geometricians , mathematicians , and all the society of natural philosophers . in like manner diogenes , zenocrates , chrysippus , carneades , democritus , metrocles , aristippus , anaxagoras , and thales , were wise men , and of profound knowledge ; but not prudent ; because their manner of wisdom and philosophy did prompt them to recreate and content themselves in obscure , secret and hidden matters , contrary to the nature of prudence : and though these sciences in themselves are good and commendable , yet are they impertinent and unprofitable to the state , when kept close to themselves , and not employed for the publick good . now , prudence consists in those things that require deliberation and counsel : yet , if those contemplative philosophers had not debarr'd themselves from humane society and conversation , but sought after employment in publike affairs , as pericles , solon , lycurgus , plato , demosthenes , cato , cicero , and others did , they had no doubt been men of incomparable wisdom and prudence , which socrates ( though herein he contradict aristotle ) styles the only vertue ; meaning ( as i conceive , with submission to more mature judgements ) that no vertue can be or continue without it . bion was of opinion , that prudence did excel all other vertues , as far as the sight doth the rest of the senses ; affirming that vertue to be as proper and frequent in old men , as vigour and strength in those that are young . wherefore it is requisite that our senator be endued therewith ; for he can neither speak nor act any thing sutable to his age and gravity , if he be not , as with sauce , seasoned therewith . the latines call this vertue prudentia , à providendo , from foreseeing things to come , disposing of those that are present , and recollecting things past . for , he that doth not ruminate on things past , is altogether unmindful of his elapsed life ; and he that foresees not things future , is subject to many perils , and apt to be ensnared by every misfortune . prudence ( saith cicero ) is the knowledge of things good , evill , and indifferent ; consisting wholly in the choice of that which is to be embraced , as also in that which is to be eschewed , or carefully avoyded . and according to aristotle , it is a habit coupled with perfect reason , apt for good action , and exercised in those things which are either good or evil , and may evene or happen to man during this life . therefore contemplative wisdome differs from prudence in this , that the former exceedeth not the bounds of contemplation , and the latter is wholly exercised in action , and the management of humane affairs . plato affirmeth , that there are two things observable in the life of man ; the first is , for a man to know himself : and the second , to know and understand all things : therefore let our senator be stored with this wisdom , viz. of knowing himself ; for without it , no reason , vertue , action or cogitation can be reputed good or perfect . by the help of this wisdom , the prudent man first settles and orders his own affairs ; in which skill if he be deficient , he must not be offended at the name of fool . now , under prudence is comprehended or contained the skill of well-regulating domestical business , and the knowledge of enacting and making laws , civill wisdom , and policy in consultation and judgement . which is the reason why cicero termeth the prudent management of oeconomiques , or houshold , domestical , and the fame in state-affairs , civill wisdom . and to the end that the senator may ground his wisdom upon a solid foundation , whereunto his imagination may have recourse for reason to steer him to the truth ; let him alwaies have before his eyes these things , honesty , and profit : so that whatsoever he acteth or affirmeth privately , or publikely , may be directed by them both : for , all things that can be either conceived by reason , or expressed by truth , are included within the limits of these two . wherefore it is convenient that he be furnished with a peracute wit , and solid understanding , that he may dive into the abstruse nature of things , and find out what is honest and profitable ; lest the mind hoodwinckt with inordinate affections and desires , seduce the judgement , and lead him from the path of truth . and many there are , who finding themselves to have depraved their reason , by giving the reins to their loose affections and lusts , do fall into erronious opinions quite opposite and contrary to wisdome . whence it follows inevitably , that they are not only cheated in their choice of that which is honest and profitable , but are blindfolded with the love of that which is absolutely dishonest and unprofitable . to prevent which errour , two things are to be taken into consideration . first , not to take things unknown for known , and praecipitantly assent unto them : next , not to give way in the least to any evill custome ; ( for , consuetudo or usus secunda natura ; custome doth tyrannize over the nature of man ; ) or to walk contrary to the rules of vertue . a thing that may with facility be comprehended by a senator , if he consider the good and welfare of the commonwealth , which is the meta or scope that all wisdom and counsel aims at : nor can the natives of his own country , nay , wisdom her self , require more at his hands , or expect more from him , than industry in preserving the safety and felicity of the place of his nativity . but now it lies upon me to prove what philosophy best befits a senator . wherefore since the felicity of every counsellor , and the quintessence of all knowledge consists in action , it ought to be his care and study to be exquisite in that part of philosophy which prescribeth the rules of regulating mens actions , and the science of government ; to the end , that he may understand what is the best course of life ; what is necessary and requisite for the administration of publike and private affaires , and be skilful in ordaining laws , correcting judgments , and governing of people . let him therefore be expert in that part of philosophy that instructeth the management of mans life , and the art of consultation . for otherwise what account will he be able to give de vivendi ratione , of the best way of living , according to the rules of vertue , that is uncapable of giving you a definition thereof ? what discourse can such a one make concerning counsel , justice , fortitude , temperance , or wisdom ? how shall he appease the mutineers , suppress sedition , or mitigate the rigour and severity of the laws , or proceed according to the rigour thereof , when he is ignorant of the precepts of justice and prudence ? what counsel or advice can he afford either of war , peace , or contracts , that understands not when war is lawful , or unlawful ; peace just , or unjust ; and treaties honorable , or dishonorable ? whenas he ought not only to conceive all the precepts of vertue and morality , and to understand them by name ; but to exercise and put them in practice . the sum of which knowledge is contained in the ethicks , politicks , and oeconomicks ; from these , as from a magazine or store-house , he may furnish himself with all rules , directions , and precepts , for the exercise of vertue , and the government of a kingdom , as also the order of a domestical life . and though all this while we plead for the necessity of philosophy in our senators , yet are we clearly against the divisions and sects of philosophy ; nor is it profitable , but rather injurious to the commonwealth , that the minds of men should be divided into several whimsies and opinions . first therefore , we extirpate epicurism ; because it being grounded on , and supported by sensual delights and pleasures , ought not to be in him whom we elect for our senator . the stoick we do not blame or accuse ; yet we hold it convenient that their tenets be exploded , as unfit for our counsellor ; in regard that ( as cicero saith ) they maintain the philosopher to be the only wise man , and that all other persons are but thieves , barbarous , and infatuated . for , it were absurd to admit him a senator , that is of an opinion there is no wise counsellor , freeman , or citizen , himself excepted . and though there hath ever been a dissention between the stoick and peripatetick touching the summum bonum : yet we adhere to the latter , because they are the best tutors of vertue and good manners , and the most noble , valiant , wise , discreet captains : counsellors , emperours and kings have issued out of that society . besides , it is requisite that our senator be well read in history , and exercised in all humane learning : for first , in history he will find out the notable sayings and acts of wise men , that have lived in elapsed time , which are not so plentifully found in any books , as in the monumental annals , and chronicles of fore-past ages . this was the reason that moved tully to call history , the witness of time , the light of truth , the memorial of life , and the herald of antiquity . for , can any person paint out so fully to the life , or give so perfect a delineation of vertue , fortitude , justice , continence , frugality , and contempt of death , in an eloquent and fluent oration , as may be read in the actions of cornelii , valerii , fabritii , curii , decii , mutii , and others ? what noble heroes have our modern times produced ! hath not the politick monck , noble massey , and loyal montross , been singular and almost unimitable for their policy , valour , and magnanimity ? from these , and the like , he may make an extract of the most exact civill knowledge , and direct himself in the management of state-affairs . besides , policy must be one of his chief studies : and he must be expert in understanding the transactions of noblemen , the humors , dispositions , and temper of all mens spirits , the order and government of commonweals , and civill societies : it is also necessary , that he be perfect in all ordinances , acts and laws , either for peace , war , provisions , the quality of the subject , the administration of the state , or the nature of men : as also to understand , what exalts , and what abaseth the mind ; what vertue is , what discipline and education is most convenient for youth ; what customs must be ratified or made firm ; what duty we owe to god , and what reverence to religion , and allegiance to our soveraign : in all which , we have a monck among us of late ( though none that ever entred into canonical orders ) who will sufficiently instruct us . nor must he be ignorant in leagues , contracts , and alliances with forraign princes and potentates : since such proceedings are dayly found in kings courts . well therefore did antonius describe a senator or counsellor , in these words : he is one that ought to understand by what means the kingdom or republick receives benefit ; and when occasion offers , to put them in practice . and , such were in rome the lentuli , gracchi , metelli , scipiones , and lelii . now , he that is well practised in the law , hath experience in war , or skill in oeconomicks , or domestick authority , deserves to be promoted to the dignity of a counsellor . eloquence is also a great ornament to our senator ; but of that and some other qualifications , more at large in the ensuing chapter . chap. iv. of eloquence , clemency , piety , and other vertues necessary to the accomplishment of a senator . these most noble sciences and arts will be infinitely adorned in our senator by the addition of eloquence , which is the true ornament of wisdom . for , without this accomplishment , all things else are as it were dead , till they do flourish by the help of rhetorick ; and an eloquent , terse , and curiously-penn'd oration doth not only commend the author , but the private and publike benefit is oftentimes promoted thereby . it is this that appeaseth with her neat-spun blandishments the fury of our enraged enemies . now , whatsoever he pronounceth , it must be done gravely , advisedly , eloquently , readily , and with comely gesture ; for this , according to the poet , — emollit animos , & temperat iras . the supple oyl of an insinuating oration will heal the wounds of a mutinous rabble , and reduce them to their former obedience . next unto eloquence , the knowledge and insight in the law is required ; the end whereof tends to the conservation of equity . and indeed , who can with greater wisdom decide a cause or controversie ? who can better appease sedition , ( the poyson of a kingdom ) or more rationally defend the laws , customs , rights and priviledges of the people , than he that is skill'd in the law ? well then may we say , as it hath been affirmed heretofore , that the habitation of a learned lawyer is the oracle of the city . now , the law in all kingdoms is bound to tye every man to his duty , and to defend them so long as they continue vertuous and faithful . but , it is not sufficient only to enact laws neither , that punish or recompence men according to demerits ; but , to compose laws , customs , and exercises ( as the lacedemonians did ) wherein the people may take delight : besides , such judgement must be used in the prescribing of laws , that therein all occasion of offences may be removed . for , as the physician by his medicines heals the maladies of the body ; so the counsellor ought by good and wholsome laws to cure the distempers of the mind . yet they are not to be approved of , who perceiving an inconveniency growing , immediately fall to execution , without considering how the same mischievous design may be utterly extirpated : for it is more consonant to reason , for a senator to endeavour the reducing men to justice and honesty , than to study how to execute them for every offence committed . what man can be so inhumane , that would not rather remove the cause ? and then assuredly the effect would cease . who would not rather provide corn for the poor , than through the want thereof force them to turn robbers , and send them to execution for it ? and who is there , that seeing the kingdom overspread with debauchery , and the peodle addicted to licentiousness , would not endeavour to correct and reform these enormities by pecuniary mulcts , sooner than by penal laws ? therefore , as cicero saith , if thou wilt remove covetousness , take away her mother , execess . wherefore he must have all the commodities and discommodities of his country before his eyes , and then he may be so expert in state-chirurgery , as to heal the sores and wounds wherewith the body politick is oftentimes troubled . yet we desire not that our senator should be a pleader at the bar , proctor , or advocate , because that most of that tribe ( charity forbids me to say all ) being mercenary , are many times the ministers of falshood and injustice , bearing about them minds and tongues principled against justice and truth . indeed , it is a difficult piece of business for him to be a lover of equity and truth , whose tongue hath been accustomed to walk for lucre . not but that many famous counsellors have been found among those gowned gentlemen ; but all men are incident to failings , of what profession or function soever : nor is this to be imputed to them alone , there are others that shake hands with them : but enough of that . civill discipline falls next under our consideration , whereby he is instructed how to lead his life discreetly , and to govern his country with gravity and justice . now he was termed a civill man among philosophers , who by vertue and wisdom was enabled to command civilly ; and he oftentimes had the authority of making laws , and governing of subjects . plato in his commonwealth hath framed two sorts of discipline ; the one relating to the exercises of the body , and the other of the mind : the discipline of the mind he called musica , and that of the body gymnastica . now , by the harmony of musick , he understands a certain concord or consent of mind , wherein all actions do amiably agree with vertue , and vertue with them ; which copula law and philosophy make up in man : for hereby we are capable of judging what is honest , and what dishonest ; what just , and what unjust ; what is to be loved , and what to be loathed : and besides , what duty we owe to our parents , princes and magistrates . by gymnastica , he means the exercises of the body , whereby the vigour and strength of man is much helped and encreased . this consists in leaping , running , wrestling , hunting , riding , darting , swimming , to be both right and left-handed ; in brief , all military exercises and honest recreations are contained in this word gymnastica . it is very necessary and requisite in all sorts of men ( much more then in our senator ) to conjoyn the exercises of the body with the vertues of the mind , and to mix fortitude with temperance . for , as by the one , man aspireth to that which is noble ; so by the other , he thinks it no derogation to him to be humble ; and being thus in aequilibrio , he inclines neither to this side , nor that ; so that he shall never dare , nor doubt too much . and as by fortitude we are able to repulse injury , so by temperance and moderation we abstain from offering injury . by the former , we are prompted to an honest becoming violence ; by the latter , we are instructed to check and curb hair-bain'd fury , and to quench the flames of a vindicative spirit . now , it is the opinion of plato , that the musical and gymnastical sciences conduce much to these qualifications ; for to the one , temperance , and the other vertues may be referred ; to the other , fortitude of body , and magnanimity of mind . wherefore it is convenient , that they be both united , and walk hand in hand ; because the gymnastick exercises alone , create firmness ; and musick of it self , begets too much mildness and effeminacy : but both twinn'd and coupled together in any man , do mould him according to the shape and perfection of vertue . therefore every person that would be thought fit for counsel , must be thus exercised ; because hereby he is adapted both for peace and war ; and to this very purpose was he born ; for he must be as able to perform the office of a commander , as a counsellor : notable therefore , and worthy the mentioning , was that roman institution , which imposed a command upon them to train up their noble and honourable citizens to be counsellors at home , and captains abroad : which is the reason , that rome enclosed so great a number of sage senators and stout souldiers within the circumference of her walls : insomuch that cyneas , the embassadour of pyrrhus , having had audience of the splendid and illustrious senate , reported , that in rome he had seen an assembly of many kings . nor can they be skill'd in commanding , if the subjects are not exercised in obedience ; which is performed by their love and honour to the magistrate , as well as obeying their commands ; all which proceeds from the due execution of laws : and the first step that leads up to the temple of vertue , is to submit to the law , and the law maker : for the law of every kingdom , state , or republick , is nothing but vertue , and a good decorum in the leading of our lives , reduced to certain rules . theopompus king of sparta , hearing it related that the reason why that commonwealth flourished so much , proceeded from the kings skill in policy and government ; replied , no such matter ; for the true reason is this , the subjects are well exercised in their duty and obedience to superiours . and ( as plutarch hath it ) to obey the magistracie and the laws , to undergo all dangers and travels with patience , to fight manfully , and die voluntarily , was the chief point of the lacedemonian discipline . and herein they were all trained ; to the end , that being thus instructed , they might know how to defend their country in time of war , govern it in time of peace ; and such as live privately , to employ their vacant hours honestly , that is , in the prosecution of learning ; obtaining a becoming gesture , musick , painting , vaulting , and the like , that they may keep themselves in action , and be freed from that gross imputation of ignorant . it behoves him also to be witty and docible . now , wit is a certain natural force of reason , able to conceive what is rational ; which , although many times it be not helpt by industry , art or memory , yet it is powerful of it self , and without learning may burnish a man . wherefore he must so know his own wit , as to become sharp in reason , and finding out the causes of things : which of it self is a happiness , and that a great one too ; as the poet sings , felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas . nay , wisdom her self , whereby we first conceive all things , springs from acuteness of wit : now , they that are adorned with them both , are termed ingenious ; and that wit is the best , and most to be commended , which is constant , strong , sharp , pleasant , and natural . now , the edge of ingenuity is very much acuated by the whetstone of docility and memory : by the one , we are taught to make a construction of those things that are laid before us ; by the other , we retain whatsoever proceeds from our invention , or the expressions of others ; therefore it is requisite our counsellor should be well exercised in these accomplishments : for , it is an argument of a dull , slow , ignorant person , not to have a quick conception of what is said , and a tenacious memory to recollect what hath been spoken by others . now next , he must have understanding : for as wit is the ornament of a senator , so understanding is the light of wit , by which we conceive all things , or their idaea's , whether true or false . for , by common understanding we comprehend the knowledge of things , and thereby pass a judgement on them , and conclude , all that is honest is to be referred to vertue , and what is unlawful or dishonest , to vice : yet this understanding is not separated from the senses , who are , as it were , interpreters and reporters of knowledge ; yet must we be careful to avoid being deceived by sensual judgement ; for it is frequently known , that either art or subtilty , singly or joyntly , play the cheat with us ; which errour is to be diligently avoided . besides , he must be circumspect , not only in private , but publick chances and events : for he must endeavour to foresee all blustring storms that may be injurious to the state , and study the preservation of every member thereof . this that we call circumspection , is a careful and mature consideration of things to be practised or acted ; and of great importance , as well in the serene time of peace , as in the blustring season of war ; because that wise circumspection diverts the force and fury of fortune , and we are ready to submit to grave counsel and advice . in this vertue quintus fabius did excell ; for he according to the poet , by procrastination and lingring delay , preserved the roman state . unus homo nobis cunctaendo restituit rem . but on the contrary , flaminius relying upon the arm of strength , and his courage , incircumspectly assaulted hannibal , to his great disadvantage and prejudice . so q. scipio the consul , with divers that might be mentioned , through their incircumspection were infested by the cimbri . and it is as useful in time of peace : for the senator should be eyed like argus , and lynx-sighted , to pry narrowly into those things that might arise to the discommodity of the commonwealth , and make a discovery of them ; otherwise , he cannot prevent the seditions , wars , and calamities that dayly happen to the prejudice of the common-wealth . some men are so ignorant and blinded with superfluity and pleasure , that they can hardly discern things that are placed before their eyes , much less foresee them ; which sort of men , as persons given up to their private more than the publike interest , are to be exempted from government . for , though they understand that through want of circumspection war threatens a nation , the people are captivated , the country run over and ruinated , towns sack'd , houses burnt , fields wasted , temples profaned ; yet use they no circumspection , counsel , and medicine , either to cure or cool their fury or rage . but the grave counsellor studies by what means to continue the common safety and welfare of a country or kingdom : he provideth , that the rage of a barbarous enemy may be beaten back or restrained by fortresses , pallizadoes , and garrisons ; that castles and bulwarks may be erected , the places of defence fortified , and all breaches stopt up ; all which thus ordered , check the fury of an insulting enemy , and annihilate his barbarous design and intention to bring all to destruction . now there being a convention of well-trained citizens , armed and ready to oppose , the commonwealth is thereby fortified , ( and the lacedemonians call stout men the walls of sparta ) disdaining the force of forrein enemies , and preventing their offering violence . as for his speech , he must be compendious , curt and grave , in all his orations that he pens , or speeches that he makes ; as horace adviseth him , in verbis etiam tenuis , cautusque serendis . for , a rash inconsiderate speech , is not so soon called back as pronounced ; and the unadvised utterance thereof , may prejudice the commonwealth , and afford the orator matter of repentance . and the reason is this , because in an extempore speech we pour out and divulge many things that are to be concealed . nor must our senator be overswayed by passion ; for , passion is like false position in verse , nine faults at least . now it is the noblest piece of wisdom under the heavens , for a man to monarchize over himself , so as to subjugate and conquer his affections , according to that known verse , fortior est qui se , quam qui fortissima vincit moenia — it is a greater piece of valour for a man to subdue and curb his hair-brain'd passion , than to conquer the stoutest enemy . besides , when he is put upon a parley with the enemy , a treaty with embassadors , or a conference with neighbouring princes , he must be very circumspect ; for their endeavour is to discover secrets by conjecture , and fish out the design intended by circumstances and signs . wherefore he must have a constant fixed resolution , and a composed countenance ; for the changing of the countenance , motion of the eyes , and variety of gesture , are the bewrayers of mens minds , as gondamore well observed ; and indeed , facies est index rerum . one may soon read a mans mind in his face , and by the calculation of his looks guess at his intentions . and as he must not be too credulous , no more must he be altogether incredulous , unless the reputation of the matter or person compel him to it ; since it is very unseemly , and beneath the gravity of a judicious senator , to maintain a controversie against an apparent truth . neither would we confine him to an absolute silence , or padlock his mouth , so as to debar him of that excellent gift of speech ; for , thereby he may be thought stupid or effeminate , since the one is imputed to ignorance , and the other to a kind of maidenly modesty , or misbecoming bashfulness . therefore he must use a mean between both ; yet so , that he be a greater hearer than speaker : nature bestowed on man a pair of ears , and but one single tongue . yet , notwithstanding all this , it must needs be judged as great a piece of discretion to know when to be silent , as well as how , where , to whom , and in what place to speak . next , sagacity and craftiness is requisite : for , war was never more politickly managed , armies more securely governed , nor the plots and machinations of subtile enemies more wisely undermined , or overthrown , than by the vertue of caution ; which he that wants , can no way be termed a captain general . now , sagacity is a sharp and pleasant conceit ; and as it is the property of a wise man to consult well , so it is the part of an apprehensive spirit , ingeniously to understand , and pass a solid sentence or judgement of what another speaketh . and as he must be quick of apprehension , so it is likewise necessary that he be crafty and subtill in searching and prying into the thoughts of subjects , to the end he may understand what they desire , what they expect or hope for , and what their inclination binds them most unto . by which means , he will not only keep the subject close to his lawful obedience , but also by knowing their intended conspiracies , prevent the evil thereof . for , sometimes debauched subjects aime at the destruction of sober solid persons ; induced thereunto , or rather seduced , by hate , malice , or insolency ; sometimes because they find themselves inferiour to others in riches , dignity or authority ; and sometimes because they imagine themselves to be inconsiderable , and of little or no esteem in the kingdom , republick , or state wherein providence hath allotted them their being and residence : and so by these means , create war , and cause sedition , and reduce the state to an apparent hazard . in suppressing these commotions and cogitations of wicked men , he must be close and reserved , not dealing openly , or by direct opposition ; but rather by soft perswasion , kind admonition , earnest entreaty , or favourable chastisement , reduce them to a better temper , and furnish them with more honest principles . but , if he deal with a refractory stubborn people , he must menace them with authority , and terrifie them with severity , that so he may divert them from such execrable enterprises ; perpetually meditating on the conservation of the commonwealth , which is consummated by his endeavour for the felicity of subjects , and his extirpation of sedition and discord , with their efficient causes . aristotle saith , that a man may speak doubtfully upon any occasion twice , and be excused : but if he trip the third time , he is permitted to speak no more in that cause . nor must he be tedious or prolix ; for a long-winded oration , cram'd with cart-rope speeches , longer than the memory of man can fathom , doth but talk them into dulness , and sooner stupifie their minds than quicken their attentions . and he must likewise suit his discourse to the capacity of his auditory ; for , he prodigals a mine of excellency ( saith one of our learned gentlemen ) that wasts a terse oration to an ignorant assembly , where mercury himself , were he orator , would lose his labour . therefore as his speech must not be over-long , ( a fault that caesar sometimes found cato guilty of , and reproved him for ) no more must it be obscured with aenigmatical sentences , or intricate words , which puzzle the auditors rather than profit them ; and by labouring in the explication of the terms , make them forget the subject and matter of the discourse . now it importeth not much whether his speech be penn'd or rehearsed ; yet the reasons written are more solid , and penn'd with more diligence , if the matter require a long oration . his voice should be manly , promising of gravity , not effeminacy , clear and audible ; not so low as cannot well be heard , nor so loud as to be term'd bawling . and as he must be moderate in his speech , so it is requisite that he be of a temperate mind . now , nature hath so ordered it , that there is a kind of combate or contention between the mind and body of man , suspending and diverting his disposition from the true end of vertue . for , the alluring irretiating lusts of the body do labour to oppress and enslave the mind ; and the mind armed and fortified with reason , doth endeavour to resist and oppugn them : and that vertue of mind is called temperance , which is employed in contemning all pleasures , especially those that are known by the senses , as taste , and touch ; yet doth it not generally detest all pleasures , but only those that thwart vertue and reason . now , some pleasures there are by nature lawful , and others unlawful ; and both incident to the mind , as well as the body . the corporeal pleasures are bred up and born with us , so that with difficulty are they restrained , especially in those men that take more delight and complacency in the exercises of the body than those of the mind , which renders them brutish and sensual . therefore the body must submit to the checks and controulment of the mind , and by this means man may attain perfection . all vertues conduce to the felicity of a kingdom , but temperance alone is the preservatrix of felicity ; for it keeps the state from that infection which oftentimes ariseth from excess and immoderation , and hath subverted many famous cities and countries . now every senator ought to furnish the kingdom with such laws as may punish riot and excess , lest the subject being poyson'd therewith , covetousness spring up among them , the mother of all vices . we read , that in rome there were laws and ordinances made and enacted against excess both in expences and apparel . the lacedemonians did also keep their feasts in publike places , that no man should dare to be wastful in the sight of other citizens , and so encourage them to an imitation of their luxuriousness or extravagancy . heretofore , the magistrates of gallia belgica allowed of no law nor custome that might make the people effeminate . and at this day , licentiousness and immoderate expences are inhibited by law in some parts of italy . and since the lusts of men are insatiable , ( as appears by catiline and his fellow-conspirators , who being thriftless and licentious persons , attempted to make war against the commonwealth ) they must be held in with the bridle of the law . and the senator must be free from intemperancy , that so he may be an example for others to follow and imitate ; wherein let him take pattern by the severity of the censores , who were the masters and tutors of civil temperance and modesty : and so by private admonition , as well as publike castigation , he may withdraw them from intemperance . nor is this vertue without her concomitants , modesty , bashfulness , honesty , and continency . and by these , mans life is beautified , adorned , and made happy . modesty ( say the stoicks ) is a vertue that containeth the knowledge of decent speech and action . and whatsoever we speak or do , we ought to observe a mean , lest we expatiate on a subject more largely than necessity requires , forgetting the counsel of solon , ne quid nimis . wherefore tye your self to a comely decorum in all your words and actions , composing your countenance , eyes , gesture , motion , and your whole body to a modest posture , that the simplicity and integrity of your intentions may thereby be made manifest and apparent . bashfulness sometimes gains a man much commendation ; and this qualification renders a man honest , and induceth him to lead a good life , because in all actions it instructs how to avoid all reproach , obloquy , and villany . and as justice forbids the wronging of a person by act or deed ; so bashfulness teacheth a man not to be offended : for a good man doth not only voluntarily abstain from doing injury , but is , as it were , frightned from it by bashfulness . yet i mean not here , that bashfulness that is frequent with young men , and offenders , because they are compelled or constrained to that kind of shamefac'dness ; and that perturbation of mind doth misbecome a grave and temperate person ; but that that we hunt after , ariseth from a vertuous disposition , and so gets a certain habit or exercise , accompanied with a fixed resolution to avoid all evill : so that if at any time through ignorance an errour be committed , we remain ashamed ; which is commendable . julius caesar engaged with pompeius the younger at corduba , perceiving his men ready to retreat , and seek for refuge by their heels , steps out into the front , and there in person behaved himself manfully ; which the souldiers seeing , could not for shame but turn about , and face the enemy again ; being , partly by the valour of their general , and partly by their own shamefac'dness , instigated thereunto . there is in man a certain natural instinct of honesty , prompting and spurring him on to the performance of all lawful actions , and diverting him from the perpetration of what is unlawful ; which proceedeth from vertue ; and therein her dignity resteth , though sometimes it ariseth from fame , glory and opinion . now , he that through diligent observation understandeth what is meant by measure , order , and gravity , and observes this sweet decorum in his words and actions , making it his chiefest care not to think or speak any thing unseemly , effeminate , or licentious , may be termed honest ; and the power of honesty is so great , that of it self it sufficeth to disswade men from an ignominious life . among the number of vertues required in our senator , continency & abstinency challenge no mean place ; for , they not only contemn the illecebrae , or allurements of inordinate desires , but also withhold our eyes from beholding , or our hands from fastning on them . nor is there a more noble spectacle , than to see men contented with what nature and industry hath allotted , without coveting what appertains to others ; which they might easily do , did they but consider , that natura pauc is contenta : nature will be satisfied with mean commons . paulus aemylius is highly extolled for his continency , who converted no part of the vast wealth that was brought out of macedonia and spain to his own private use , but delivered the whole into the publike exchequer ; choosing rather to be termed poor , than branded with the name of deceitful : and after his expiration , his goods being sold under the launce ( uti mos erat , according to custome ) there was not left a sufficient competency for his wife to live on . the example of scipio africanus is admirable , who in his greener years , at the taking of carthage , being but twenty years old , had there ( among many other captives ) a virgin of incomparable beauty , yet did he not offer to deflower her , but gave her to a man unto whom she was formerly betrothed ; and bestowed all that gold upon her for a dowry , which her friends offered for her redemption . we therefore judge it necessary that our senator be continent , imitating pericles in his advice to sophocles his associate , and praetor at rome ; who fixing his eye on a beautiful roman damosel , whom they met accidentally in their way to the senate-house , and being somewhat too large in her commendation ; told him , that a senator must not only keep hands free from corruption , but also chaste eyes , that cast no wanton glances , because they are grand instigations to lust . wherefore , it was judged an act of discretion in cato the censor , to turn lucius quintus flaminius out of the senate for his incontinency ; because he being consul in france , permitted a common strumpet , at her request , to strike a prisoner that had his sentence past , without offence . nay , manlius was devested of that dignity , for kissing his own wife in the sight of his own daughter . and salustius for adultery , and light actions , was excluded from fitting ( had it been so with us , henry martin had never rested so long in the parliament-house . ) i omit speaking of alexander the great , with many more , who by their continency gain'd no less honour than by their martial triumphs . now , it is most certain , that there is nothing brings more dishonour to the dignity of a senator , than a leud , debauched , incontinent life ; because it procureth private obloquy or reproach , and defaceth , or at least blemisheth the majesty of commanding . sardanapalus spun out his daies among the distaff-bearers , i mean women , consuming all his time in incontinent exercises , wasting both his internal and external substance upon wanton women , and the pleasing his gust ; as appears by that epitaph , which , living , he commanded to be engraven on his tomb , ede , bibe , lude . which aristotle chancing to spy , stopt , and read ; and smiling , said , it was fitter to be fixed on the grave of an oxe , than the tomb of a prince . all pleasures that are not reduced to necessity and honesty , are reproachful ; and those above all , draw men to vice and uncleanness most , that are discerned by the touch and taste . wherefore the counsellor must be careful , that neither his own , nor the life of his subjects , be implunged into the mire of voluptuousness and obscenity ; which may be soon effected , by removing all occasions of intemperancy . the lacedaemonians used to shew their drunken servants to their children , that they , beholding their sordidness and bestiality , might abhor the vice of excessive compotation . but it were to be wished that we could follow , as well as read these instances . great was the moderation and temperance of the ancients in their diet ; for , they lived not to eat , but did eat to live : though in these our modern times the plague of intemperance is so epidemical , that more men are infected with , and perish thereby , than by the rage or fury of war ; and it is the mode for them to drink other mens healths so long , till at last they drink away their own . who would not then commend m. curius the roman senator , that had rather the embassadors sent by the samnites should find him at a homely supper , quenching his thirst in a woodden bowl , than surrounned or accommodated with all the variety nature or art could afford ? nay , he refused the gold they presented him with ; saying , i had rather command those that are rich , than be rich . i need not mention fabricius , fabius , tubero , cato and scipio , whose temperate and sober lives have eternized their names . hortensius went not without a reproof , for presenting his guests with a boyl'd peacock , at a supper prepared for the augurs . and cassius was thought intemperate , for drinking a little water in publike , and not enduring thirst for a small time . yet do we not tye our senator to so much strictness , but only to moderation in all things . duronius was removed from the senate , because that he being a tribune , made null the law for the restraint of feasting . surely , the roman state was altogether happy in such senators , that were not only masters of counsel , but tutors of vertue and good manners . now , that the people of rome were temperate , even to admiration , may be conjectured from what is reported of them : when the presents which pyrrhus king of epire , after his overthrow , brought to rome , were publikely shewn , hoping thereby to gain the good will of the people , there was not one among them , that did so much as offer to stretch forth his hand to lay hold on any of them ; so as that king saw himself twice vanquished at once , as well by continency , as force of arms . but , when excess found footing in rome , after the victory obtained in asia , and that the people began to wantonize through plenty and idleness ; on a sudden , the civil discipline of temperance and parsimony was neglected ; and in lieu thereof , avaritiousness attended with a legion of other vices , soon entred among the roman legions , and ( if we may credit salust ) brought their city to a sad and lamentable catastrophe . nor indeed is there any thing that sooner works the ruine of king , kingdom , and subjects , than excess . diogenes seeing a bill upon the door of a prodigals house , which shewed it was to be let ; said , i knew very well that house was so full of meat and wine , that ere long it would vomit out the master . now 't is most certain , that immoderate pampering , and excessive drinking , wasteth the strength of the body , and prejudiceth the mind . notable is that law of solon , whereby that senator was thought to deserve death , that was addicted to the vice of drunkenness . philip the macedonian king being over-come with drink , past sentence upon a woman : she forthwith made her appeal ; and being demanded to whom , replied , to philip being sober . and without doubt , excess in drinking depraves the judgement of man ; insomuch , that kings are made slaves , old folks become children , wise men are infatuated and made fools , and fools turned to mad men . but our senator shall observe the old rule : — {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . a medium is to be observed in all things : we must eat and drink for necessity , not satiety ; following the advice of the poet anacharsis , who usually said , the first draught was of necessity , the second of superfluity , and the third of madness . besides , it were unseemly in a counsellor to have bloud-shot eyes , a furious countenance , and a stammering speech ; all which imperfections are the customary attendants of drunkenness : nor will it become him , overcome with meat or drink , to snore away the night , but only to use both with so much moderation , as that they may only continue health , and make the body agile and fit for action . for , by moderate diet we find , not only the mind , but the body more submissive and obedient ; when as satiety and excess is the sepulchre of the one , and the corruption of the other . we find troy to be ruinated through the excess of the inhabitants ; when as otherwise it might have stood to this day : invadunt urbem somno , vinoque sepul●am . but , although we discommend excess in both , as a thing misbecoming , and very hainous ; yet our senator must be sure not to be avaricious , niggardly , and close-fisted , because it is an argument of a base servile spirit , to debar himself of that comliness and order that is required in the family of such a person . therefore private excess must be banished , and publike magnificence maintained ; and as needless and superfluous delicacy is to be avoyded much more than penury and niggardliness ; and , as immoderate expences are known to be prejudicial both to the estate , body , and mind : so necessary and convenient fare is both comly and wholsome ; and this must be observed with respect to the place , time and persons . for , we read , that l. tubero making a publike feast , covered all his beds with the skins of kids ; and in so doing was judged indiscreet , and ignorant in the knowledge of what appertained to publike honour and dignity ; and for this same fact , lost the office of praetor . notable was that quip that a duke bestowed upon a prince , to this purpose ; who with his noble retinue being invited to a collation , the prince altogether ignorant of any mode used at court , or indeed common civility , suffered them to be seated without cushions ; which the duke perceiving , put his cloak under him in lieu thereof ; and all his followers in imitation of him , did the same ; and after their repast , left their cloaks upon the stools , and were departing : at which the prince somewhat amazed , told them , they forgot their cloaks : no , no , replied the duke , an 't please your majesty , it is not our custome to be so uncivil , as to carry our cushions along with us : then did he begin to understand the mistake , and went away ashamed . next to temperance , justice is a vertue to be very much followed by our senator ; of which in the next chapter . chap. v. of justice and her concomitants , which our senator ought to be adorned with . nature hath made all things in themselves good , certain , perfect , and in all respects absolute ; which was the reason that induced the stoick to believe , that to live according to nature was the chief felicity of man : for , nature is the conductrix & tutoress of perfect life , instructing us in our obedience to the author thereof . now , this harmony of nature may be fitly called justice ; for , this is that vertue ( and indeed regina virtutum , the queen of all vertues ) which labours in defence of the law , and preservation of the consent of nature ; since whatsoever complies with nature , is just ; and what dissenteth , unjust . such men therefore , that follow the dictates of nature , are just ; being it is contrary to nature to think ill either of god or man . whereupon justice is of three sorts , ( though there be many subdivisions ) natural , humane , and divine . the first foundation of justice natural , proceeds from nature her self ; which informes us to do as we would be done by : quod tibi fieri non vis , alteri ne feceris . this natural equity commandeth us to abstain from doing injury , or offending of any person whatsoever . and by this ligament , men are conglutinated or co-united with a mutual affection and bond of amity . in that age , which is known by the name of aetas aurea , among the poets ; by the help of natural justice only , deceit , fraud , or injury had no residence upon earth ; they were non-entia , no such things to be found in nature . then was there no sedition , tumults , or hatred ; but benevolence , fidelity , true love , and real affection . the lawyers profession was not in use , pleading and wrangling was unknown to them ; for , equity and justice determined all things , and all things were common ; every man thought that his own goods did belong as much to his neighbour as to himself . they that lived in that age were enforced and confined to vertue and honesty , because they knew not vice , and by natural instinct were stimulated to the exercise of justice . of this happy time ovid sings most excellently . aurea prima sata est aetas , quae vindice nullo , sponte suâ , sine lege , fidem rectumque colebat ; poena , metusque aberant , nec supplex turba timebat judicis orasui , sed erant sine judice tuti . but , as soon as the sun of truth declined , and began to be obscured with the caliginous mists of vice ; immediately the minds of men were depraved , and they headlong without fear or wit implunged themselves into an ocean of filthiness . then every man shielded himself against vertue , quite contrary to his former principles ; but afterwards it was a practice among them , lawful , to scandalize and prejudice all persons , whether in goods , or good name ; to lead a brutish , inhumane life ; abuse that excellent gift of reason , and employ it in the exercise of vice ; as the same poet hath it , protinus erupit venae pejoris in aevum omne nefas , fugere pudor , verumque , fidesque , in quorum subiere locum , fraudesque , dolique , insidiaeque , & vis , & amor sceleratus habendi . and surely that deluge of impiety had over-run the whole race of mankind , had not the force of nature and reason in some few , opposed , and stood as a trench against the fury of this inundation . that small residue of men ( proclaiming war against vice ) did so work upon them ( that lived like brutes ) by perswasion , as to reduce them to humanity ; informing them how to live , not only by words , but also by works ; what civility , vertue , and honour was , and what was the original of laws in cities and countries : so that hereby they might be instructed in those things that were good , honest , and civill . from hence the precepts of vertue took their original , and vast volumes of the duty and manners of men were composed . this consideration of humane nature and the universe , was epitomized in one word by the grecians , viz. {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , or wisdome ; and the authors thereof were termed {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , or wisemen , who afterwards ( according to the example of pythagoras , ) named themselves philosophers . and by this means the light of humane reason and nature , that was benegroed with the clouds of vice , did reassume its pristine lustre and splendor , and endowed us with the knowledge of divine and humane things ; which knowledge is called philosophy . thus was that golden world restored . now , that duty which natural justice prompts us to observe to our parents , is called piety ; which was the reason , that aeneas by the homer of our latine poets was styled pious aenaeas . the daughter of cimon was adorned with this vertue ; for she fed her father with her own milk , being condemned to die , and thereby did eternize her name . this justice doth also oblige us to nourish and cherish all persons in distress ; defend and govern himself : for , he that by wilful obstinacy destroys himself by famine , negligence , or violent death , is judged an enemy , and no friend to nature . by this justice natural , we are engaged to relieve and refresh our necessitated friends and neighbours , and by generation to propagate posterity ; which is called nodosa aeternitas : propagation is a knotty eternity ; for , by the issue of our loyns we do as it were tye a knot , and thereby lengthen our name and family . socrates defineth this natural justice thus : it is the science of good and evill according to nature ; which that man that exercises , deserves the term of a good man ; and if he communicate it to others , the title of a good citizen ; because then he is not only beneficial to himself , but to others also . they that nature hath been so prodigal unto , as to bestow singular gifts , and incomparable endowments on , ought to transcen●… all others in this natural justice , as much as they do in their natural parts ; otherwise they will have but a mean repute ( if any at all ) in the world . the next is justice divine ; whereby we are obliged and bound to acknowledge , love , honour , reverence , adore , and worship god : and it hath pleased nature to implant this knowledge in man ; as if thereby she would intimate unto us , that all other creatures do only feed and pamper their bodies , whenas man should aime at a more noble marke , viz. the deity . nor is there any people upon earth but adore some god or other , and hold it a duty incumbent upon every one of them so to do . now all the substance and force of this justice is contained in religion , which is the worship of god . but being that is a different subject from what we intend to expatiate on , we shall leave the prosecution thereof to the clergy . humane justice , which is also termed sometimes civil , is of an obscure and hidden nature ; for , although it receive its being from justice natural , and therefore the precepts and use thereof carry little or no seeming difficulty along with them : yet is it not truly conceived , unless it be by such who are either endued with a kind of divine nature , or have been employed in all sorts of vertue . for , this vertue requireth a learned , wise man , who reasonably , constantly and voluntarily practiseth it . and such our senator should be . all civil justice consists , partly in the preservation of humane society , and is partly exercised in a court of judicature . this vertue approveth of no unlawful , cruel , or barbarous action ; but embraceth honesty , tranquillity and peace ; endeavouring to keep men from sedition , malice , and enmity ; not coveting aliena bona ; but , unicuique suum tribuens ; gives every one their due . by this vertue our counsellor becomes a defender of the common people ; the protector of the innocent and orphans ; and a debaser of the proud and haught : a lover of those that are good , a friend to truth , and an enemy to vice , and consequently to vicious persons . the foundation of this vertue is fidelity ; which cicero defines to be a constant and true performer of promise . a just senator therefore affirms the truth , sticks close to his promise ; standeth to compacts ; restoreth what he borrows ; and is not compelled to be faithfull by law , testimony , or oath , but by his own free will and conscience ; labouring to keep under injustice , and to see that the weaker sort be not over-powred by the stronger ; that might over-come not right . valiant men , in his judgement , deserve to be crowned with reward ; and idle , puny-spirited subjects , the lash of punishment ; and by these two , punishment and preferment , the benefit of a commonwealth is infinitely promoted . in the distribution of offices , he is directed by the rule of uprightness and equity ; hating to be greaz'd in the fist with bribery , reputing those worthy of most ample honour , who can lay claim to the greatest merit . which is a thing to be very much insisted on in a kingdom , or republick ; because , honos virtutes praemium , honour is the reward of vertue ; and as due to a deserving person , as wages to an hired servant : which was the reason , that wrought the antients to erect stately images , triumphal arches ; and publike sepulchres , open commendation , and the like , were conferred on men of service and desert . now they that are nobly educated , vertuously enclined , grave and ancient , deserve honour and reverence ; and that either by bowing the head or body , in giving them place : and , as goods are of three sorts , viz. goods of the mind , goods of the body , and goods of fortune ; so they are all in conferring of honour to be respected . therefore those of the mind assume the first place ; those of the body the next , and those of fortune the last , as the meanest in value and worth , though now adaies of most esteem in the eye of the world . all these things our senator must be skill'd in ; and in the distribution of offices , and conferring of honours , he must observe equality , the balance of justice ; wherewith every mans manners , vertues and actions are poized and examined . in which he must be very circumspect and unbyassed , lest he prove partial , leaning to one side more than another ; and so come off with the term of an unequal judge . for , he that bestows honour , and accumulates favours upon the undeserving , doth a manifest injury to those that can plead desert ; and so by consequence is an unjust judge . wherefore philosophers give us a definition of this justice , as followeth : it is an habit of the mind destined to common utility ; giving honour to every person that may be judged worthy of it . and among those vertues that plead for an interest in humane society , equality is neither the last , nor the least ; she exercising the office of a handmaid or lady of honour to that queen of vertues , justice : nor doth she remove a hairs-breadth from her , but sticks close to her principles and precepts . now this equality in just pondering and weighing things , and persons , useth a double manner of proceeding ; the one ordinary , and the other common ; one judging by number , weight , and measure ; the other more difficile and secret , that is , weighing every thing by reason and judgement . which knowledge is only attained by wise men , and those that are exercised in great affairs , and matters of importance and weight ; and the other by those that are chiefly employed in barrating , buying and selling . let our senator be skill'd in that knowledge that proceeds from reason and judgement , that he may thereby understand how to distribute offices , confer honours , bestow gifts , what is due to every person , just , good , and indifferent in all things , persons , and places . this equality is an excellent qualification , and of eminent use and service in a kingdom . and where counsellors are ignorant therein , we find but raw and weak consultation , and all things managed at randome , without any thing of certainty ; to the disturbance of publike society . another kind of justice there is , which is commonly called justice forraign , not much unlike this before mentioned , chiefly conversant about judgement ; whose foundation is the law , and whose prop or support is the judgement of wise , solid , discreet senators . before such time ( as is already mentioned ) that written laws were found out , each man was his own legislator , and prescribed his own peculiar laws , not diving into the books of law-makers or doctors for precepts or instructions : for , then that pure and immaculate virgin justice had her residence in the mind of man , dictating unto him laws and precepts , whereby he led an upright life , without exercising any fraud , deceit or collusion . but , as soon as men , tired with the strict discipline of justice , began to covet their neighbours goods , offer injuries , and neglect the restauration of what they had taken no upon credit ; immediately hate , dissimulation , enmity and war sprung up , and gave way to the invention of martial weapons , as well offensive as defensive ; and that in so furious a manner , as might force justice , nay , compel jupiter himself to give place : thus , as sweet-tongued ovid sings , — terras astraea reliquit . she made her self wings , and flew to heaven for sanctuary , whereever since she hath taken up her habitation . and hence it is that we have recourse to heaven in our dayly orizons for justice . homer used to term kings inspired with the wisdome of good government , sons of jupiter : and we style them , gods vicegerents . and since reason cannot prevail with us so far , as thereby to lead a quiet , peaceable , and just life ; we must have recourse to justice ; who by her laws admonisheth , corrects , and honours us , preparing rewards for good , and storing up punishments for evill actions . this justice ( according to ulpianus ) is a constant desire , or fixed resolution to bestow upon every man that which of right belongs unto him . now the ordaining and enacting of laws , appertains to a counsellor , as the most discreet person , and fit for that office . and plato teacheth , that these things are to be observed in constituting laws , acts , or ordinances . the legislator must enact them with a paternal love , that may cause a reciprocation of filial duty : not with a lordly , tyrannical intent , yet framing them to the terror of malefactors , who neither regard law , nor reason ; according to that known hexameter , sic volo , sic jubeo ; stat pro ratione voluntas . my will is the only law that i own or acknowledge . besides , he must be sure that his laws contain no more prescription of commands , than discipline of manners ; that the severity of the one may be mitigated by the gentleness of the other . and the intent and end of all law is , that men may be felicitated thereby , as far as comes within the compass of humanity ; and that offenders may receive a punishment sutable to their crimes , of necessity , and not on set purpose : which moved justinian to make a triple division of legal precepts : to live honestly , prejudice no man , and give to every one his due . he therefore that doth abandon the law , and follows the dictates of his own corrupt will , contemning the statutes of a kingdom , is guilty of a notorious crime , as well as he that denies god , nature , or reason . heraclitus , that stream'd away his time in tears , was wont to say , that all men were as deeply engaged to defend their laws , as the walls of their city ; and his reason was , because that a wall-less city might be preserved , but a lawless one could never , by all the strength of humane invention . for by laws they expel idleness , the mother of vice , which renders the mind effeminate , and makes it grow wanton . cato said as truly , as pithily , nihil agendo , male agere didicerunt : by doing nothing , the people learn'd to do ill . diodorus mentions a certain law that was among the aegyptians , whereby every subject was compelled to give in his name to the magistrates , withall declaring what kind of life he most affected , how he lived , and what art he exercised : and if he were found to give a false account of his life , he was put to death . draco seeing the citizens wasteful , made a law , that he that was found idle should be executed ; which being too severe and rigid , solon did qualifie , punishing that offence with infamy only . by the imperial law it is provided , that idle , sloathful , and thriftless subjects be either whipt to death , or enslaved . in every kingdom there are certain exercises both for peace and war : some are bred up clergy-men , counsellors , and judges ; others , captains , commanders , and souldiers : that so the kingdom may be furnished with subjects in peace or war , and by their actions the country may be defended from the invading enemy , and her territories or skirts enlarged . nor must laws be often altered ; for , as soon as the people perceive any mutation , their minds being prone to innovation , they presently desire all the rest be changed and subverted ; though sometimes necessity requires that they be corrected or reformed . the least mutation in a kingdom , is of dangerous consequence , breeding a contempt of laws , and sedition also . wherefore the locrenses had a law , that if any man did invent a new law , he should propose it to the people in publike , with a halter about his neck ; to the end , that if it were judged pernicious or unprofitable , he should be forthwith hang'd , as an author of evill . and it doth very much concern princes and counsellors to walk according to those laws they ordain ; for it is odious to be legislator ; & legis violator ; a law-maker , and a law-breaker : for there is nothing that subjects so much look upon , as the lives of their superiors . regis ad exemplum totus componitor orbis . all nations , all the world over , follow the example of a king : which if he steer his actions according to justice , finds subjects obedient and loyal , who will keep close to their allegeance . seleucus made a law , that whosoever was taken in adultery should be deprived of both his eyes . afterwards his son was found guilty of that crime : his subjects went to mediate , desiring him to sign his pardon ; but their suit prevailed no otherwise , then that first he caused one of his sons eyes to be put out , and then one of his own ; that so the severity and reputation of law might be observed , and that the force thereof might be in more esteem than the authority of men . the ends why laws were ordained , were two : the one , that men may understand justice , and have entertainment among them ; the other , that it may continue . the first , is the duty of the law-maker , who frameth the people in the mould of vertue . and the second is the office of the judge , who is to suppress the exorbitancies of offenders , and preserve the rights and priviledges of his country . now it often falls out , that dubious businesses , and those matters of concernment too , are brought before a judge ; expecting his determination . wherefore he must reduce that to equality , which he thinketh unequal : not unlike a line cut into unequal parts , and that part which is found too long is cut shorter , and so added to the other : so doth the judge , who is the living law and oracle of the kingdom . nor must he pass a sentence upon any matter , or decide any cause , before he hath heard both plaintiff and defendant , and examined all their witnesses : for , as seneca hath it most excellently , qui statuit aliquid parte inaudita altera ; aequum licet statuerit , haud aequus fuerit . he must be voyd of all passion , hate , or partiality : one that scorns bribery , will not be daunted with menaces , or threatned out of the truth , or moved by the subtilty of adulation : for , where a judge , magistrate , or senator is subject to passion , there is little , or indeed no justice in his judicature : nor is there any one thing that poysons a commonwealth or kingdom more , then corrupt and unjust magistrates . justice of old was by philosophers painted like a beautiful virgin , having a severe grave countenance , penetrating eyes , a chaste look , inclining to gravity : which image carries this representation , that judges ought to be incorrupt , chaste , severe , sharp-witted , good , grave , constant and inexorable . cambyses , king of persia , caused the skin of an unjust judge to be flea'd , and hung up in the court , as a terror to all those that were unjust in their sentence . solon being demanded , how a kingdom might best be preserved ; answered , by the peoples obedience to superiour authority , and the magistrates subscription to the law . and bias used to say , that place was most secure , where men stood in awe of the law , no less than of a tyrant . it is a shame and reproach to a nation to have laws , that like the spiders web , entangle the weak and simple , and let the strong and mighty escape . which our senator must very diligently observe , and continually provide that the laws be preserved inviolable . justice admits of another division among moral philosophers , and that is distributive and commutative . justice distributive , is that that respects equality in the distribution of reward or punishment , according to geometrical proportion . for , as there are several degrees of crimes and offences perpetrated by the impious ; so there are likewise of the merits of deserving and vertuous persons ; in regard that the circumstances of persons , places , and time , do oftentimes aggravate the crime . as for instance ; he that offends a magistrate , deserves a higher punishment than he that offends a private person : and he that commits an insolency in the church during divine service , or in court before a judge sitting upon the bench , must be more severely corrected , than if these circumstances did not accompany the fault . and in like manner , the different conditions of men in the distribution of recompences , or conferring of honours , must be narrowly considered and pried into . wherefore it is apparent , that in the distribution of honour , as well as in the inflicting of punishment , this geometrical proportion must be observed ; because that by this means we observe the same proportion between persons , as we do between things ; and though there be an inequality of measure , yet will there be an equality of reason . as thus : he that hath a double share of merit , twice as much as another man , deserves a double recompence according to the geometrical proportion , which differs from the arithmetical , observed in justice commutative : for the latter respects the equality of quantity , and things distributable , without regard to the merits or demerits of a person . justice commutative is that that looks upon equality and faith in contracts , bargains , humane commerces and negotiations ; as buying , selling , borrowing , and the like . as for example ; the same sort of wine , oyl , corn , cloath , or other vendible commodities , is sold to a magistrate as well as to a mechanick . but now let us come to her concomitants . and first of piety ; by which we please god , and get repute among men . numa pompilius , to get credit by the religion that he framed for the romans ( counterfeiting piety ) induced them to believe that he and his wife aegeria used to convene with the gods in a certain place consecrated to camena , and there did receive the laws and religion the romans were to follow : so that they that neither by the softness of perswasion , nor the violence of compulsion could be reduced to religion ; by a counterfeit colour of piety were brought to be very religious . and if so among them , how will the true religion prevail among us that are christians ? yet in religion two things are to be declined , viz. heresie and superstition ; which vices pervert weak instable persons . there is likewise a certain kind of piety due to parents , by which we obey , reverence , and respect them . innocency is another of her associates ; which vertue affects simplicity , abhorring dissimulation and hypocrisie ; wherefore , fawning sycophants , that dog-like will {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , fall down under your feet , and seem to adore you ; dissemblers , that hold with the hare , and run with the hound ; carry fire in one hand , and water in the other ; and tale-bearers , that are rimarum pleni , full of chincks , no sooner a secret can be committed to their keeping , but it drops from them like water through a sieve ; such persons are to have no place in the catalogue of our senators . and as no man might have admittance into the temple of ceres elucina , but he that was innocent ; there being this superscription over the portal , let no man enter but he that knoweth his own innocency : so into holy council , which is the temple of justice and truth , let no man have admittance , but he that is innocent , and of integrity . his mind must be open and sincere , not obscure or deceitful , saying one thing , and meaning another ; his thoughts and his words must be relatives ; his tongue must be the true interpreter of his mind ; and his face not shrowded with a fained disguise , but full of natural sincerity . courteous he must be ; for an affable debonaire disposition will scrue it self into the good will of all men . he must hear with patience , and reply with discretion ; free from all sowerness and insolency in words or action . benignity is another thing necessary ; for as god is kind and gentle to us , so must we manifest our selves to those that are a sphere below us . he must therefore be gentle , mild , and of a sweet disposition : not austere , supercilious ; and as timon was , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a man-hater . for as to the moderator of all things , religion and piety is due ; so is love and benevolence unto men . next , clemency ; which properly appertains to magistrates , and men in authority ; for by vertue hereof , the heat of their displeasure towards malefactors is abated , and they themselves qualified . her opposite is cruelty , and bitter extremity in punishment ; a quality proper to tyrannical and inhumane persons . draco was so rigid and severe , nay ( i may say ) cruel , that he inflicted death upon idle persons , as well as murderers ; and being askt the reason , replied , because he thought that punishment due for the commission of a petty offence ; and for those of a higher nature , he could not invent any great enough . but scipio much more clement and pitiful , could say , that he had rather be instrumental to the saving of the life of one single citizen , than to the slaughter of enemies . and indeed for a magistrate to be perpetually punishing , is as reproachful , as to see physicians alwaies killing their patients with their quacksalving and emperical tricks . besides , clemency in a governour creates a kind of bashfulness or fear of offending in any person . yet clemency must be so used , as that severity , if need be , must not be altogether neglected : for no country can be well governed without it , by reason of the different dispositions of men ; for a harsh word strikes deeper with some , than a shrewd punishment with others . over-much clemency was an imperfection that the stoicks would have all wise men to want ; alledging , that it was an argument of an ignoble mind , condescending and subscribing to the guilt of other mens crimes and offences : and therefore such men may be assimilated to fond foolish women , that would have malefactors freed from the lash and rigour of the law , because crocodile-like , after the commission of an hainous offence , they can drop a deceitful tear . next , liberality . among some of those vertues that were constellated in scipio africanus , this is not the least ; that before his return from any place , he obliged some person or other to him by his liberality . the son of titus vespatianus was wont to say , that that day wherein he had not bestowed some benefit , was utterly lost . now in giving , these two things are observable ; to forget the benefits we bestow , and remember perfectly what we have received : for ingratitude is a black crime ; ingratum dixeris , & omnia dixeris ; name but ingratitude , and you epitomize all crimes in a word . magnificence is the next concomitant of justice ; which vertue consisteth in large expences , and great gifts ; differing from liberality in this only , that the one is employed in small and mean , the other in large gifts . now it is observable , that magnificent men usually erect churches , build cities , towns , and villages , and employ themselves about such things as may either redound to the glory of the creator , or else augment the fame of the author . and though parcimony be judged a noble revenue , yet must not our senator be so penurious , as altogether to forget liberality , or magnificence ; and so degenerate into covetousness , which is a malady incurable : which as salust hath it , doth effeminate both body and mind : delighting it self in two things , giving nothing , and receiving much : and yet excess must be avoided ; so that the middle way is best . the advice of apollo to his unsatisfied son phaeton is very good , — medio tutissimus ibis . therefore that no man might exceed a becoming moderation in expences , it was provided by a law at rome , that no senator should be indebted above a certain sum of money prescribed . which order was taken , to remove excess and superfluity in expences . p. rufinus was deposed by the censors for having l. weight in silver . and aemilius lepidus having spent l. in building a house , was devested of his senatorship . so strict were the ancient romans , lest the senators excess should move the plebeians to the same superfluity . yet we allow a senator far more liberty than so ; for , our laws do not so narrowly confine them . next , friendship ; which is absolutely necessary : for , since man is a civil person , and a lover of society , he cannot be destitute of other mens conversation ; from hence , as from a source or foundation , all amity , marriage , or consanguinity doth flow : and he that endeavours to deprive a kingdom of united friendship , doth in a manner snatch the sun out of the firmament . friendship is of an uniting or congregating quality ; for as cold congeals a multitude of waters into one cake of ice , so friendship makes of many one ; which is by laelius defined to be a perfect consent of things divine and humane , in all love , charity , and affection . yet are we not to entertain any person at the first sight ( prima facie , as we say ) as a friend ; we must first , according to our proverb , eat a bushel of salt with them , that so we may dive into their disposition , and know what metal they are made of . it is the opinion of the philosophical tribe , that that amity is most sure , and best grounded , that is nourished by similitude of temper ; for where mans delight is one and the same , his affection cannot be divers . such friends were achilles and patroclus ; orestes and pilades ; damon and pythias , with many more that might be mentioned . the friendship of the two last was so great , that dionysius did earnestly desire to make a third person , that so there might be a trinity of friends linked together with the ligament of love . few friends are best ; and the reason is , because perfect friendship is inconsistent with multiplicity of persons : and indeed they that delight to associate themselves with many , are not accounted friends , but sociable ; for it is one thing to be a lover of conversation , and courteous in the entertainment of all persons ; and another thing to be a friend to one whom we make a constant companion , one who is the manuscript wherein we write all our secrets . epaminondas was heard to use this expression frequently , that a man should not leave the court till he made an addition to the number of his old friends by gaining of a new one ; but this observation tends more to the obtaining of the common good will of men , than perfect friendship . now true friendship requires three things . first , vertue , from which we must never swerve ; next , pleasure , which proceeds from familiarity and sweet conversation , stealing away the tediousness of melancholy hours . for , amici fures temporis . and lastly , profit ; whereby one real friend may accommodate another with necessaries , when stimulated by that tyrant necessity . though it be the custome of the world to fawn upon a person that abounds with the affluence of all terrene comforts , and hath high and mountain'd fortunes ; but when he is at a low ebb , then they usually forsake him with a benedicite , or god help you . nor can you try a real friend better , than in the kick of malignant chance : then , if he deserves that name , he will stick close to you ; if not , scoff at your meanness . well might the satyrist say , nil habet infelix paupertas durius in se , quam quod ridiculos homines facit . — as if the poor man were but fortunes dwarf , ( saith one excellently ) made lower than the rest of men , to be laugh'd at . yet , if any thing that is unjust be requested by one friend of another , it is his duty to disswade , rather than encourage him . pericles being desired by a friend to assist him by bearing false witness ; replied like a christian more than a pagan , tuus sum usque ad aras ; i am yours to do you any courtesie that comes within the limits of my power , as far as religion gives me leave : intimating thereby , that he would aid his friend so far as justice , equity , or divinity would permit , and no farther . now by the concatenation of amity , and co-union of senators , the kingdom is as it were linked together , and so strengthned . whenas , who can expect concord or mutual love between subjects , when magistrates are disagreeing and at variance ? aristides and themistocles were enemies , yet whensoever they went out on publike embassage or commission , being arrived at the borders of the athenian land , there they laid down all contention and former enmity ; though after their return home they did often renew their old grudge and displeasure . to forget injuries received , is a noble part , and an argument of a royal spirit . out of friendship ariseth concord , which is nothing but civil amity : and a conspiracy or plot among all degrees of men to maintain liberty , law , justice , fidelity , religion and quietness in a kingdom . wherefore the senate of rome did usually sit in the house of concord , to demonstrate thereby , that in council nothing should pass contentiously . agesilaus , king of lacedaemonia , being asked why sparta was not environed with walls ; informed the questionist , that the citizens lived united ; and shewing him the men , said , behold the walls of sparta . scilurus blest with a numerous off-spring , fourscore sons , before he expired , produced a bundle of arrows , and bid them break them all at once : they replied , it was absolutely impossible : then took he the arrows from them one by one , and so brake them all ; thereby exhorting his children to live in concord , for so they might be invincible and happy ; whenas otherwise they would be ruinated and dispersed . in like manner mycypsa , king of numidia , being on his death-bed , assembled all his children , and left them this golden sentence as a legacy : by concord the smallest inconsiderable things encrease ; but the greatest and most considerable by discord come to confusion . hospitality is a companion to friendship and concord , which entertains strangers as well as friends , with courtesie and affability ; which vertue redounds very much to a mans credit and reputation . the priviledges belonging thereunto are so considerable , that the romans observed the performance of the rights thereof even to their very enemies ; and would never joyn in battel with them , till such time as the prisoners to whom they were indebted for food , were manumitted . plato understanding that it was impossible to reduce his commonwealth to a happy condition by any other way but amity , concord , or hospitality ; brought down all laws and customs to friendship , making all things common , that so mutual society and love might be conserved ; affirming withal , that that brace of words , meum and tuum , were like a pair of engines framed on purpose to unhinge the whole world . now , since it is manifest , that man , whilst he lives , floats in a turbulent sea of vexations and misfortunes , subject to perils as considerable for their number as their weight ; and that we must overcome them by patient suffering , or manfully revenge them ; we must next discourse of fortitude , which is able to supply us with weapons to defend us against the assaults of the mind and fortune . a life free from the intermixture of discontent , is aimed at by all , but impossible to be obtained by any : for nature hath so ordained it , that care , trouble and molestation is interwoven with the web of our life ; so that as our more gross part , the body , is burthened with labour and toyl ; so our more spiritual part , the mind , is disquieted with discontented imaginations . nor indeed can we tell how to rellish vertue , unless we first taste of discontent ; for , the clouds of sorrow being overblown ( like rest after labour ) the fruit of felicity is much more delightful and pleasing . vertue is not a lady that loves to smother her self in down , and lie at her ease ; — petit ardua virtus : but she affects industry , triumphing in the midst of most imminent danger : which made hercules forsake the path of pleasure , because it was wide , broad , and easie to be traced ; and turn into the way of vertue , whereunto the passage is hard , and the ascent difficult . nor must we only despise all labours and difficulty in ascending the pyramid of vertue ; but when we are possessed therewith , we must with far more courage and magnanimity endure all calamities , sorrows and afflictions . now there is no misfortune , how great soever , but she can withstand , and with her own power overcome . this excellency of mind is called fortitude , an affection that submits to vertue by constant and patient suffering . the nature and substance of prudence , justice , and temperance , is soft and effeminate without fortitude : for it is their property to think and act only ; but the quality of this vertue is to think and execute constantly , manfully , and valiantly . all commendation due to fortitude , consisteth in domestical , and publike or military actions . domestical fortitude adorns a man ; and her quality is to remove all perturbation of mind , fear , sorrow , anger , voluptuousness , and every other exorbitant affection . fortitude military consists in undergoing all perils and dangers , all labour and hardship , that so a man may be able to look death in the face , if his country or a good cause require it . he must look to lie sometimes at the signe of the star , and have his bed feathered with the down of heaven ; lie down a man , and rise a snow-ball ; gnaw match , instead of liquorish ; he must fear nothing ; contemn all worldly things , and be resolved to suffer whatsoever can befall him . moreover , it is the duty of our senator to be so couragiously affected and disposed , that all his gifts of body and mind be as with a certain sauce seasoned with fortitude ; for , as without salt all meats , so all vertues without fortitude are judged unsavoury . this is that which defendeth both body and mind from the cruel shock of misfortune . this is that which renders us quiet and peaceable in prudence , constant in temperance , and stout , valiant and invincible in justice . yet is there something to be declined in this vertue ; as being fool-hardy , proud , rash , timerous , sloathful , or puny-spirited ; for , he that intends to gain the reputation of valiant , must be pricked forward by no other spur than glory , renown , or vertue ; — immensem gloria calcar habet . he must follow the conduct of no other captain but reason , and not be led up by chance , hazard , or desperation ; alledging that rash piece of poetical fury for his excuse , una salus victis nullam sperare salutem . the people of numantia chose rather to be massacred , than yield to the merciful enemy ; and the saguntines were guided by the same precepts : but we must never act any thing desperately . well might that roman demosthenes cicero say , injustissimam pacem bello justissimo antefero ; i prefer the most unjust peace before the most just war . now he that despairs , flees from fortitude ; and it is an argument of a dunghil-spirit , to seek death by shewing the heel through fear and pusillanimity . but a valiant man despiseth life judiciously , fighteth stoutly ; not as one destitute of all hope ; but , because he is grounded on this perswasion , that it becomes him so to deport himself : which moves him rather to choose an honourable death , than blur his life with the stain of reproach . this vertue hath many concomitants , which with some other qualifications shall be the subject of the ensuing chapter . chap. vi . of fortitude and her concomitants , as magnanimity , constancy , patience , confidence , &c. this vertue , as is before mentioned , wants not her retinue of other vertues . and first , magnanimity , which makes a man aspire to honour and dignity ; and yet by the help of vertue , imitating marcellus , who consecrated a temple to honour our of the spoyls of syracusa , making the access thereunto through the house of vertue near adjoyning ; perswading himself , that there was no possible way of catching at honour , to a mans credit and reputation , but by the aid and assistance of vertue . this will support him , as bladders do a young swimmer , from being implunged into despair when he floats upon the waters of affliction . the fame of codrus shall live till the conflagration of the world , who for the preservation of his souldiers and country , offered up himself a sacrifice . curtius and scaevola are immortal ; the one , because he cast himself into a merciless gulph , to cure rome of the infectious plague ; the other , for burning his own hand , to make his enemies sensible that no torture should deter romans from prosecuting the defence of their liberty . heroick actions embalm the memories of magnanimous spirits , and preserve them sweet and fresh , maugre the malignity of fickle fortune , or the succession of ages . there is no chronicle nor history in which they shall not have a place , and be honourably mentioned and registred , for posterity to imitate . besides , our senator must bestow gifts voluntarily and liberally , and receive them with a modest blush , and a kind of unwilling willingness , following the counsel of hesiod , who teacheth , that a good turn received should be returned with interest ; for the recipient is inferiour to the donor . taxilis , an indian king , meeting with alexander the great ( as plutarch informs us ) accosted him in this manner : noble monarch , i challenge you , not to war , or duel ; but to another kind of combat : if you be our inferiour , receive a benefit ; if our superiour , bestow one on us . to whom alexander replied , as the story farther informs us , this contention is laudable , and suits with our dignity ; for we should endeavour to exceed one another in well doing : and closed these words with an embrace ; suffering him to enjoy his kingdom , with additions . among those of the more noble extract , let him behave himself with a well-balasted deportment , and be the discreet herald of his own praise ; but among those of the inferiour allay ( the vulgar i mean ) he must abstain from so doing , because of the contrary effects : for in the one , it attracts love ; in the other , it causeth hatred . next , it behoveth our senator in all successes and events to be constant and unmoved ; and not like proteus , capable of receiving all shapes . the constancy of aristides deserves no mean commendation , considered as he was a heathen ; for dionysius the tyrant , demanding his daughter in marriage , he retorted , that he had rather see her wedded to her grave , than to a tyrant : and having slain her , he was re-demanded , whether he had changed his opinion ; he replied , he was sorry for the fact , but glad that he had so exprest himself . who can but admire the constancy of cato ? who , if we may relie upon the records of the ancients , was ever observed to keep the same countenance , as well when he was repulsed and accused , as when he was praetor : being still immutable in counsel , war , at the time of his death , and when that pannick fear agueshook his whole country ; caesar being victorious , and as a tyrant usurping the government of the republick . xantippe , who was the billingsgate wife of socrates , the wife philosopher ( if a modern title may be applied to an ancient scold ) could utter this to his eternal honour , that she alwaies observed he went out and returned with the same countenance ; for indeed , he was so rarely qualified , that no violent or impetuous gusts of adversity could shake him out of his constant composed temper . merit will be crowned with her deserved bayes , velit nolit invidiae , in spight of fate ; or else her very enemies will lend a helping hand . it becomes him therefore to be a fixed star , no planet , in his own sphere ; like regulu● , who rather than the captives should be restored , delivered himself into the hands of the carthaginians . it is reported , that when nicorontos , the tyrant of cyprus , had vanquished anaxarchus ; he told him , he might prolibitu , as he pleased , torment and wrack his body , but he could never prejudice the constancy of his mind ; that would be still inviolable . yet he must be wary that his constancy extend only to just causes and ends ; for to defend any conceit by strength of sophistical dissertations , against the opinion of wise men , is an argument of a perverse and obstinate , no constant disposition : for in vain were all our consultations , if like the river euripus , they ebb and flow at no certainty . in council , as he must be active , so like a stone he must be mute , and not divulgive , because there pass many things in consultations which are to be communicated neither to strangers , nor domestical friends ; and it is the property of a light and unsettled head , to blab all mysteries spoken in council : as if they could receive nothing , but like squeamish stomachs they must immediately cast it up . the romans would not admit the senators pedarii , when they had any weighty matter in hand , nor any of the clerks to be present ; but they themselves debated it . at first , indeed , the senate-house was open to all young men , that were descended of the patricii ; till after that noble and memorable part acted by papyrius , they were forbidden ; lest through the unsetledness of greener heads , the secrets of state should be divulged , and the republick thereby damnified : who being one day questioned by his mother , what matter was so long in debate among them , and compelled to give some answer ; replied merrily , whether it were more advantagious to the common-wealth , that one man should have two wives , or one woman have two husbands : and so by dissembling the truth , came off handsomely , satisfying his mother without prejudice to the senate or the commonwealth . the next concomitant of fortitude is patience , which ( according to tully ) is a voluntary and continual enduring of adverse fortune , either for credit or commodity ; which are the two poles about which the world moves ; and the use hereof is in war greatest . for they that are men of war , souldiers , adventure their lives for their country , and undergo all perils and dangers whatsoever , with a patient , resolute , and undaunted mind . if coriolanus had taken it patiently when he had a repulse for aspiring to the consulship , he had manifested himself discreet , and his life had not been attended by so many disasters . patience is the panacea of all griefs : for things past that are irrecoverable , may be endured , though not amended . he that cannot undergo the bitter chance of misfortune , is but a bearded woman : yet in the exercise of patience , we must be very circumspect that the multitude and greatness , the quantity and quality of injuries do not discompose us : for , laesa patientia fit furor ; patience abused is turned into fury . confidence is another of fortitudes associates , which is a certain conceit or assurance of mind that we shall have future success ; encouraging , and fetting us forward to the atchievement of noble and heroick performances . he that is confident , is a perfect stranger to cowardly fear . it is storied of julius caesar , that seeing caius crastinus prepared for the pharsalick war with hope of success , asked him what he thought would be the event of the battel : whereunto crastinus ( holding up his hand armed ) answered , caesar , thou shalt be victorious , and have cause to commend me dead or alive : which accordingly fell out , and he was slain in the skirmish ; whereupon caesar assembled his army , and made an oration in his praise . aristotle affirms , that men , according to the success they have already had , judge of the future in their proceedings . plutarch reports , that antonius was alwaies accompanied with an egyptian philosopher , who , by the calculation of mens looks , would give a shrewd guess at their disposition , fortune , and destiny : he did very much expatiate upon the felicity of antonius , but more upon that of octavius ; saying , that the genius that waited on octavius was more powerful than that that attended antonius ; which he conceived , because in gaming , cock , or quail-fighting , he had the better hap , and was most fortunate ; besides other conjectures . it is thought , nay , maintained , that every king , prince , and person hath a certain guardian angel ; which spirits are by homer and plato called genii ; and by others lares , daemones , lemures ; and by us , angeli : which , as they affirm , assist them in battel , and inform them what is to be done . of which there are two sorts , the one good , the other evill . we read that uladislaus jagelonus king of polonia , in the prussian war against the germans , spied an angel armed assisting him ; whom he religiously called divum stanislaum : by reason of this spectacle , he fought resolutely , came off victorious , and in spight of the tyrants fury delivered prussia . plutarch tells us of an evil angel that still accompanied brutus ; who being in consultation about the management of war , perceived a man standing before him of a prodigious bulk : he demanding of him , who he was ; received this answer , that he was his evil spirit , whom he should see in the philippick war : which proved true ; for thereby he did not only prognosticate his ill success , but his death also , which accordingly happened . that the romans relied much upon the predictions of their spirits , appears , by the inscriptions of the roman coyns : genius augusti , genius senatus , genius populi romani ; and thereupon ovid sings , et vigilant nostra semper in urbe lares . but to pass by all these phancies ; there is nothing conduceth more to the perfecting of a conquerour , than confidence ; which our senator must be endowed with ; for many times all other helps and hopes fail , when this remains for the last refuge . security brings up the rear of the concomitants of that noble general fortitude ; which as it is the end of a good , so is it of a valiant life ; and hereby we gain tranquillity of mind . he that hath security , is in the same condition he was before his birth : my author is cicero . now , this security tends to a peaceable and quiet life in a republick , which is commonly termed , common felicity . yet our security must have a better foundation than an airy conceit ; sloath , carelesness , or negligence . pompeius , being commander of numerous forces , and going to wage war with caesar , seem'd secure ; yet some of his captains , that feared the vigilancy of caesar , advised him to be diligent : to whom he said , all was secure , and they might in utramque aurem dormire , take their rest , and sleep securely . but this security caused his flight , and by consequence his overthrow . this is an errour incident to most kingdoms and republicks ; who being russetted with peace , and grown hoary , as it were , with quietness , think themselves secure , when as they are sloathful , cowardly , dull , and negligent . the roman empire was extreamly enlarged by their vertue military ; insomuch that their eagles flew as far , if not father , than the current of their laws did run . this metropolis , from the time of romulus , till the reign of octavius augustus , was never unarm'd . but octavius finding a general peace all the world over , caused the temple of janus ( which stood open in time of universal peace only , ) to be shut ; as if thereby the state should be for ever secured from martial tumults . rome being by this means secured , no succeeding emperour opened the temple of janus : so that from that time the people embraced an idle lazy life ; whence it followed , that in process of time all countries , cities and kingdoms shook off the roman yoke , and purchased their own liberty ; whereas she , quite-disarm'd , became subject to the goths . we therefore approve of no other security in our counsellor , but such , as wanteth not care and provision to repel danger and misfortune when they begin to encroach upon us . and happy is that kingdom , that in time of peace prepares for war . it will not be amiss , i presume , to inform you what men are to be judged valiant , and the rewards due unto such persons so judged . some there are , that only led with love to vertue , grounded upon honest principles , choose rather to hazard their lives and bodies in fight , than in time of necessity to abandon their prince , country , or friends . we find it recorded , that the roman , german , and french captains did alwaies animate their souldiers to fight , with perswasions of the efficacious power of their great forces , the valour of their general , the virtue of their ancestors , and the numerous spoils taken from the enemy : but the commanders of polonia use no other argument or compellation than this ; let every person be mindful of his own virtue , and peculiar reputation : which only sentence did satisfie the polonians , whose fixed resolution it is to fight till victory seats her self upon their banners , or die in the field . now , he that stands thus affected to vertue and honesty , may lawfully be termed valiant . which sort of men are not to pass without their reward , and badges of honours , as ensigns of their loyalty and allegiance to their king . it is but reason and equity , that after the turmoyls of war , they should be cloathed with long robes , and enjoy the tranquillity of a serene , quiet and peaceable life . in rome , all such souldiers were adopted senators , as brought home any spoyl that did belong to the person of the enemy , or that wore a garland for saving a citizen in fight . those that had born office in the field for the space of ten years , were admitted to be civill magistrates . nay , regulus being removed from the dignity of a senator , was so much disturbed at the affront , that he tore his cloaths , and manifested the wounds of his body that he had received in battel ; thereby claiming a place in the senate-house ; and made a succinct relation of those martial services he had done for the good of his country ; which wrought so much upon the senate , that he was re-admitted to his former dignity . the peripateticks affirm , that anger is cos fortitudinis , the whetstone of fortitude ; and men lightly moved thereby , attempt all things with the more vivacity and sprightliness . yet our senator must be careful that he avoid all fury and outrage in the use thereof , lest he be branded with madness , and lose the title of valiant ; which may be effected by making anger a companion , no commander of fortitude . there is nothing more misbecoming any man ( especially a counsellor ) than anger : for he that is overswayed with that furious passion , becomes like a brute beast , whose property it is to seek revenge in the heat and height of fury . wherefore in all enterprises , let honesty bring up the front , or be commander ; and anger be adjutant general . plato the divine calls anger , the sinews of the mind , because thereby she is stretched and scrued up , and by lenity let down . and he that engageth with an enemy , prompted to his enterprize by no other instigation than anger , deserves the name of cholerick , and not valiant ; because he undertakes the management of his affairs , moved thereunto by a certain perturbation of mind , not by reason or honour . wherefore it was well said by the epicure , anger is the issue of madness ; which is a prejudicial to the health of the body , as the perfection of the mind . some there are that ascribe more to fortune , than , if rightly considered , she can lay claime to ; and being armed with this conceit , only cry out victoria , before they do classicum canere ; which , as we say , count their chickens before they be hatcht . for although the force of fortune be great , and most considerable in war , ( because it is most prevalent in those things where reason is least powerful ) yet must we not rely upon her so much , as altogether to forsake all advice and consultation ; for , those that are conducted by reason , want not the auspices of fortune . hannibal suing for peace with scipio , expressed himself as followeth ; i have been instructed by good and bad success so well , that i am sensible it is far better to relie on reason , than fortune . for she often fails when a man is come to the last pinch of extremity ; and there is nothing more fickle and inconstant ; she 's a female , and will wax and wane twice in a minute ; and blinds the judgement of those that bridle not her head-strong fury . therefore let our senator be suae fortunae faber , the hammer of his own fortune ; and make way for his success by his valour and magnanimity , and then she will afford assistance ; for she lacqueys reason , as a shadow doth the body . it is the opinion of xenophon , that in war evill fortune accompanies the bad , and good fortune the good . alexander , scipio and hannibal were fortunate , but not so much through the aide of that fickle lady , as the assistance of wisdome , and the benefit of vertue . yet he behaves himself wisely , that takes fortune and opportunity when it is offered : for , post est occasio calva ; he must take her by the foretop , because she 's bald behind ; and once past , is past recovery . now , some there are , that if they find success in their undertakings , immediately ascribe all to fortune as the authoress , as is before mentioned ; yet there is no man that may be termed wise , but scorns to make her the directress of his actions . now , to the perfection of our senators body , ( for we have already discoursed of the endowments of the mind . ) the goods of the body consist partly in the whole body , and partly in some particular members thereof : health , strength and soundness are required in the whole body ; but perfect sence , and agility , and activeness in some peculiar members only . and as there is a consent or harmony between the body and mind ; so is there a certain correspondency and similitude between the vertues of them both . health resembleth justice ; because it reduceth the different constitutions of the body to an equal temperature , and they both conspire to make the body and mind perfect . strength is compared to fortitude ; because they mutually assist one another in the undergoing of perils and dangers . soundness of body is assimilated to prudence : for as prudence makes a reconciliation between all opinions and judgments , till they shake hands ; so in a sound body , all parts unite their forces together , to make it up perfect . health doth very much avail ; for in all our actions she sets us forward with courage and delight ; whereas sickness debilitates the body , and hinders it from the prosecution of a design : she 's not to be had by price , saith the lyrick poet , — non gemmis neque purpura venale nec auro . neither gold nor silver can purchase it . the multitude of acres will not cure so much as the head-ach ; nor the tumbling over of your bags , the rich-gout , stone , or collick . it is a free gift of the creator , as from the prime efficient ; but good diet and exercise is the secundary cause : therefore our senator must take heed lest he destroy or lose this inestimable jewel by intemperancy . health ( saith the prince of orators ) is maintained by knowing a mans own body , and taking an observation of those things which agree or disagree most with the natural constitution ; as also by continency in diet , and contempt of pleasures : what else remains , must be fetch'd out of the volumes of those two famous pillars of the temple of aesculapius , galen and hippocrates . diogenes used to laugh them to scorn , that thought to procure health , being distempered , by sacrificing to the gods ; and yet wallow all their life-time in debauchery and excess . let our senator therefore be , as the physicians term it , sanguine or cholerick ; for those humours encline men to be ingenious , docible , healthy , and of large memories . aristatle saith , melancholick men are witty , because they being subject to anger , are apt to have divine cogitations , and profound thoughts ; yet are they to be excluded from council , because the humour most predominant in such persons is cold and dry ; which makes their consultations solitary , sowre , sad and dull : for a melancholy person is nothing but a lump of quickned care ; whereas the merry soul is blithe , pleasant , affable and debonair . cicero chancing to meet with that passage in aristotle , that melancholick persons were ingenious ; with a smile , said , he rejoyced extremely , that nature had favoured him so far , as to make him dull witted , and not melancholick . caesar being desired to take heed of a corpulent , merry , jovial person ; said , such persons were not to be feared , but those rather that were sad , of a swarthy meagre complexion ; pointing to brutus and cassius . nor do we approve of phlegmatick persons , as fit for senators ; lest their cross humour be a disturbance to all the rest , and so prove offensive : for , as the motion of the phlegmatick is saturnine , slow and dull ; so likewise is the disposition of their mind . good proportion and comliness of bodie is requisite in our senator ; for according to the poet , gratior est pulchro veniens & corpore virtus . now i call that comliness in him , which shews him to be manly , and not effeminate . aristotle saith , in tall persons there is no great vertue , and in the short or low of stature , little ; therefore let him be of a moderate size . his body must not be gross , nor yet lean and dry , like a skeleton or anatomy . for , the former is unapt for travel , and the latter over-weak to endure hardship . besides , great notice should be taken of those that nature hath mark'd with any deformity , or defect of member , as the want of an eye : for such persons are counted crafty and subtile , and so unfit for consultation , ( had this been observed among us , hewson had never sate so oft in council . ) yet , notwithstanding all these niceties of features and comeliness , if any such person , though deformed in body , be perfect in mind ; he shall be admitted : for the excellency of vertue over-comes the imperfection of nature . and though the inward disposition is sometimes known by the outward complexion ; yet is not the conjecture of the virtues of the mind by the lineaments of the body so certain , but that it may fail : for many there be , who are rough-hewn without , but neatly polisht within . nor can deformity of body blemish the mind , though the beauty of the mind beautifie that of the body . nor doth vertue confine her self either to beauty or deformity , meanness or greatness ; but sometimes dwels with russet honesty , in the low cottage , as well as with plumed gallantry in lofty palaces . so that not the countenance of a senator is altogether to be regarded , but his mind and qualifications . now , to the robes and vesture of our senator : he must be decently apparelled , according to his degree and dignity ; for the comely ornament of a garment adds a reverence to his person ; and by his robes he is distinguished from all other sorts and kinds of persons . the roman senators wore a garment set full of studs or tufts of gold ; and on their hose did they wear the form of the moon ; which was the cognizance or hadge of great honour . this kind of ornament the romans were beholding to other nations for , according to all probability ; for isaiah the prophet foretold the noble women of judaea , that god would take away those moons and ornaments of the hose . plutarch alledgeth four causes of this fashioned hose among the romans , which for the readers delight and recreation i shall here rehearse . first , because their superstition taught them , that the souls of their heroes should be led the nearest way to heaven by the light of the moon . the second was , that the sign of the moon did manifest their descent from the arcadians , who came into italy with evander ; and the arcadians were so lunatick as to imagine themselves more ancient than the moon . the third cause that mov'd them to the wearing of the moon , was , to the end that in prosperity it might be as a memento unto them of the mutability and inconstancy of fortune . for , as the moon is sometimes partly lightned , and partly darkned ; so no honour or felicity can be so clear and refulgent , but it may somtimes be overcast with clouds of obloquy and malice . the fourth cause was , that as the moon drinks in all her light from the sun ; so ought all men to think themselves indebted to heaven for their wisdom . others there are who affirm , that the roman senators did not wear the figure of the moon , but the proportion of the letter c. as though the hundred that romulus chose to be patres ( as he call'd them ) should thence take their title . it hath ever been a custom in all kingdoms , republicks , and well-govern'd states heretofore , to distinguish the degrees of men by their vesture ; and without doubt this is of much moment to make them constant and settled in their professions . among the romans no man might be adorned with purple , but senators , magistrates , priests , and the younger sort that were of noble ranke and quality . i omit the mentioning of rings , chains , and bracelets , which were bestowed on vertuous persons , advanced to dignity , as encouragements . though these customs now adaies are obsolete , since the alteration of vertues , manners and times ; for jone is as neatly trickt up as my lady , and the artizan as the gentleman : it is most certain , that by ornaments and additional titles of honour men are put in mind of their duty ; and thereby they prosecute all things with the more eagerness and diligence . scepters , crowns , chains , rings , gowns , robes and saddles , are no dignities , but the badges of dignity , whereby men are stirred up and encouraged to perform what is requisite in the office and place whereunto those badges belong . remulus ( saith livy ) intending to take the government of a strange people upon him , did adorn himself with his majestical robes , and called twelve lictors with maces , to attend upon his person , that he might thereby appear with greater pomp and ostentation , and so captivate the hearts of the people : for the vulgar ( like children ) are hugely taken with the outward face and appearance of things ; and mind the outward bark more than the inward substance . our senator therefore shall observe such a decorum in his apparel , as not to encline to lightness or foolish gallantry , so to decline all slovingliness and rusticity : as he must not be like the frenchified gallant , who when he hath once seen paris , comes over metamorphos'd both in body and mind ; dancing out an entertainment to his friend with a giddy feather in his crown : no more must he be like the sunbak'd-peasant , who understands nothing of ceremony or civility besides the management of his plough , and understands no other gammut but hay , gee , ho , which he signs to his country teem when they draw the plow that furrows the face of the earth . he must ever observe such a comly neatness , as may speak him man , and not woman ; utterly declining and abhorring all nice curiosity . chap. vii . of travel ; the age , gravity , and election of our senator . the major part of the wisdom of a counsellor consists in the knowledge of the manners , laws and customs of all nations ; which is best attained by forrain travel , as homer sings of ulysses , dic mihi musa virum captae post tempora trojae , qui mores hominum multorum vidit , & urbes . and indeed , there is nothing accomplishes a man more than forrain travel . in motu melas . there is a certain kind of harmony in motion . and as the master of eloquence hath it , plebeiae sane sunt istae animae , quae suis affixae trabibus domi resident ; illa divinior , quae coelum imitatur , & gaudet motu . those are dunghil spirits , that live confin'd to the narrow round of the place of their nativity ; and that soul is of a more noble allay , that like the heavens rejoyceth in motion . sir thomas moor writes , that a mans best friends in travel is his coyn : yet under favour , notwithstanding the authority of so learned a grandee , if a man be accompanied with too many of these friends , his journey will be motus trepidationis ; for according to the nipping satyrist , pauca licet portes argenti vascula puri ; nocte iter ingressus gladium , contumque timebis , et motae adlunam trepidabis arundinis umbram whereas , as he immediately affirms , cantabit vacuus coram latrone viator . the indigent traveller shall sing before a qui va la ? or high-way-man . yet would not we have our counsellor so destitute of money , as thereby to expose himself to hardship and distress ; but so handsomly accommodated , as that he may take a survey of all countries with honour and credit . yet in travelling , he must be very careful that he only come over again furnished and full fraughted with those laws and customes that are honest and civil , and leave those that are erroneous and evill behind him . for , terras , non animos mutant , qui transmare currunt . or at least they should do so , and not like some green heads that corrupt themselves , and learn nothing but the superstitious idolatrous ceremonies of other countries , and be sure to retain what is bad , though it prove to their own prejudice and ruine . he must be very exact in informing himself what laws , jurisdictions , what order of life , military discipline , civil government , and domestical life is in every nation practised . he shall take particular notice of the situation of countries and places , the building of cities , their fortification , strength and ammunition . let him also understand the vertue of every prince ; how his people stand affected to him , and upon what terms ; the wisdom of their senate , the form and method of their consultations , as far as without prejudice to himself it may be pried into ; the nature and ingenuity of the people ; what vertues they adhere to , and what vices they are most addicted unto ; what learned men , souldiers and commanders are in every country to be found out ; that so by the report of them to his own nation , the best precepts may be cull'd out , and the rest rejected . yet he must take heed , lest by the new-fangled fashions that he brings over , he make not the people effeminate , and careless of their own laws , customs , and ancient vertues : for as pliny saith truly , est natura hominum novitatis avida : man's nature prompts him to embrace novelty , which oftentimes proves pernicious , and tends to the molestation of the kingdom , republick , or state . many famous persons have taken delight in travel , as nestor , menelaus , and alexander the great , out of love thereunto , homer , and democritus , that merrily passed his time away , travelled all over aegypt , babylon , and persia ; thereby hoping to obtain knowledge , that so their minds being stored with variety of observation , they might be the more accomplished , and remain content with their own fortune . the words that diodorus siculus reports to be written upon the tomb of osiris , are worthy the quotation and remembrance ; which are these , or to this effect : osiris rex sum , saturm antiquior filius , qui nullum orbis locum reliqui , quem non attigerim , discens ea omnia , quae generi humano utilia sunt , & necessaria . but if he want money to support him in travel , let him employ his time in the study of geography , and cosmography : and a smack he may have of natural philosophy ; but to consume much time in that science , is judg'd , by some , superfluous in a senator . the field of knowledge is unmeasurable and infinite ; which was the reason that men applied themselves to one particular art or science . aliquis in omnibus , and nullus in singulis , is no fit motto for a counsellor . wherefore , we commit to the jurisdiction of our senator two sorts of countries ; the one is that which containeth both god and man ( not as if we prescribed god his place of residence , but we speak here according to vulgar capacities ) not limited within the bounds of europe , asia or africa ; but is only surrounded by the posting sun . the other is the place that nature hath destined for his residence or being , as england , france , italy , spain , germany , &c. for it belongs unto him to take a survey of the order and nature of the macrocosm , the universal world , which the latines call , majorem mundum ; as well as the microcosme , or little world , where he hath his habitation and abode , which they term , minorem mundum . and when the mind is dismanacled of those worldly incumbrances which usually adhere to the body , and by travel and science is perfected , as much as lies within the verge of humanity to be ; she officiates as she ought , affecting vertue , and disaffecting vice , suppressing the lusty insurrections of the flesh , and like a monarch curbing and giving laws to all exorbitant affections . nay further , when the mind hath pried into the nature of the heavens , considered their harmonious motion , knows the circumference of the earth , her longitude , latitude , and the rarities contained therein ; hath plough'd the furrow'd ocean , and seen the wonders of the deep , understands their causes , beginnings and ends ; what is the order and beauty of the glimmering lights of heaven , and what influence they have upon sublunary bodies : what causeth the passions or deliquia of the two grand luminaries , the sun and moon ; the reason of their rising and setting , their diurnal , nocturnal and horary motion ; what is the generation and corruption of all things ; what the nature of the elements , of animals , and the vertue and beauty of that innumerable number of fragrant herbs that usually adorn the earth : when , i say , all these things are understood by one single person , and god acknowledged the supreme author and governour of them all ; shall not that person be judged a prince , rather than a meer inhabitant or citizen of the world , that is of so profound and polite an understanding ? surely yes . socrates , who by the oracle at delphos was pronounced the wisest of ethnicks , being demanded what country-man he was ; replied , a man of the world ; not confining himself to any particular place or country ; for he thought himself to be an universal prince . the same laertius reports of that tub-hugging cynick diogenes . omne solum forti patria , is an old saying ; and omne solum sapienti patria , carries as much truth with it , as the former antiquity . the whole world is a wise man's country : 't is a city that comes not under the tyrannous scourge of any nero , domitian , or caligula ; nor can be environ'd with walls , but is surrounded with the universal circle , governed by a comly order , and natural decorum , as it were with a law certain and inviolable , palizadoed with no other fortifications than the elements . the citizens or inhabitants of this place are termed philosophers , commanded only by themselves , fortified with invincible minds , and sufficiently arm'd against the griping talons of penury , or any other misfortune that can seize upon man . such persons ( nay , princes as these , i may say , without entrenching on the royal charter of kings ) no fury of war can terrifie , no faggot frighten , nor axe disturb ; for they are all valiant , resolute , and beyond the prejudice of fortune . now , to the age and gravity of our senator . they that have penned any thing of the life of man , did usually confine it to a certain proportion of time . plato assigneth eighty one years ; solon , eighty ; others affirm , that the continuance of mans life extends but to seventy , referring all to the number seven , because it frequently fals out , that every seventh year some alteration or change appears in the body . the first seven years , childrens teeth fall out ; the next seven , their hair grows ; the third , their body comes to its proper stature and height ; the fourth , they encrease in bulk and thickness ; the fifth , they arrive at their full strength and virility ; the sixth , they find themselves addicted to pleasure and delight ; the seventh , they come to the maturity and ripeness of wit and understanding ; the eighth , they begin to be termed aged , or ancient ; the ninth , weak and feeble , beholding to the support of the staff , and the help of spectacles ; and the tenth , they have one foot in the grave , and are reckoned to be è peculio proserpinae , of proserpina's fold . others there are , who maintain that this change happens every ninth year , and so ascribe the alteration thereof to every unequal number till twenty and one . pythagoras the silent , called the eightieth year of mans age fatal , dividing it into four times twenty , as followeth : childhood , continues till twenty ; youth , other twenty ; man's estate , the other twenty ; and old age , the fourth , which puts a period to all . some again compare mans age to the four seasons of the year : childhood , is compared to the spring ; youth , to summer ; manhood , to autumn ; and old-age , to winter . varro divides man's age into four degrees , and comprehends every of them within the number of fifteen : childhood ( saith he ) lasts till fifteen , for so long children are weak and tender ; youth , till thirty , because till that age men encrease and grow in height and thickness ; ripe age till forty five , for so long strength of body continues , and men are then fit to be employed in publike affairs ; old-age begins at sixty , and then the body is impotent , crazy and decay'd ; so that they are not fit for state-employments , lingring , and consuming till death come and trip up their heels , as he did all their ancestors before them . to this division of mans age we assent ; but the distinction by number doth principally belong to physicians ; for they in exhibiting their medicines , observe certain critical daies . but our opinion is , that the forty fifth year of man's age is most suitable for consulation ; because then the strength both of body and mind is arrived to the very height . besides , it is the middle age of man ; and at that time , if ever , the mind is perfect in judgement and experience , less attracted with brutish affections and desires , and least of all transported with rage , fury , or passion . when old rome was in her glory , and shone with all her splendor , senators were chosen at that age , being then most perfect in body and mind : yet dare we not deny , but that some men may be termed aged at thirty ; that is , are both prudent , grave and wise . and we find it upon record , that some , though very few , were created senators by the romans before the thirtieth year of their age ; which we do not disallow , in regard that men may be reputed ancient for vertue as well as number of years : yet care must be taken that the kingdom be governed chiefly by mature and grave head-pieces ; for as plutarch affirms , that kingdom is most happy that hath store of young mens lances , and old mens laws . pertinent is that of euripides to this purpose : dictum est vetustu●… facta juvenum , caeterum magis valent concilia senum . in athens no person was created senator before he was fifty years old . and in rome it was permitted for any man of sixty to enter the senate-house , though he never came to the senatorship by choice or election ; and after that year , it was left to his pleasure to be present or absent ; so that they did neither bind him to , nor bar him from coming to council . a good , though ancient custom ; for every man , though he hath seen as many winters as hoary-headed nestor , ought to employ himself pro posse suo , according to his utmost ability , for the benefit of his native country . plato is of opinion , that men must learn till age snow white hairs upon their heads . nulla dies sine linea ; that day is lost , in which a man hath not better'd his knowledge . yet we prohibit decrepit , doting persons , whose judgements are as crazy as their bodies ; and the reason is , because their counsels and consultations are for the most part dubious , and are rather he sitant conjectures than solid counsels , beginning every sentence with perhaps , perchance , peradventure , and the like : and this they do , as being sensible of their former imbecility and weakness , and so are unwilling to suffer a relapse into their juvenile and youthful errours and mistakes . yet , if they have only so many years over their heads as may render them grave , solid and wife , they are perfect in uttering their conceits : for by use and experience ( which is the best school-mistris ) they have gain'd , as it were , a third eye , whereby they are enabled to pry into , and discern with the more vivacity , the events and causes of things . and as every man is discovered by his speech , so is the prudence and wisdom of a senator manifested by uttering his opinion . socrates , casting his eye upon a youth that he never had seen before , saies to him , speak , that i may know thee : so may we say to our counsellor , by the solidity of thy speech , and the gravity of thy deportment , manifest thy self unto us . now his opinion must be delivered in significant , but plain naked terms ; not daubed over fuco rhetoricae lascivientis , with the paints of lasciviating rhetorique , which becomes the rhetorick school , better than the parliament house . but so much for his age and gravity . now to the election of our senator . among the romans ( in the times of yore lords of the whole world ) senators were elected divers waies ; for , they were chosen either by the king , consuls , dictators , tribunes of the people , the censors or chieftains . and the custome of free-born natives is to choose senators among themselves , or else to commit the authority of election to a single person , who for wisdome , gravity and dignity is judged the most fit , and that is the king ; which the romans did at first . romulus , the first founder of their city , elected a hundred senators ; which custome was followed by their succeeding kings . but , when kingly government , through the insolent government of tarquinius the ravisher , was removed , this power of election ( according to the quality of the time ) was somewhat changed , yet not given to a multitude ; for till the state returned to the basis and foundation of government , monarchy , senators were elected by consuls , censors , dictators , or chieftains . in all which elections , till the time of augustus , there is no mention made of lots ; but the fame , family , order , office before born , riches and possessions , were most of all considered and respected . now , since there is no earthly possession but comes far short of vertue for excellency in the choice of senators , that must be chiefly look'd upon ; because they are reputed defenders of the law , moderators of liberty , and conservers of a kingdom . and as the republick or kingdom is oftentimes infected by the vice and impiety of magistrates ; so is it antidoted , corrected and repaired by their vertues . such are the people of every country , as are the manners of their governours ; and the subjects are apt to ape the customs and constitutions of their prince . it was well said of one , that the change of princes lives , and the alteration of manners in magistrates , would also work even to a mutation of the customs , institutions and rights , nay , of the kingdom it self . and to deal really with you , evill princes are very much to be blamed , not in that they themselves are guilty of any crime , for it is a maxim in our common law , that the king can do no wrong ; but that thereby the subjects are prone to be feduced , and led away to the same exorbitancies ; which may justly be so termed in them , though not in a king . and indeed , how can it enter within the lists of possibility for a man to perswade other men to be vertuous , when he himself is vicious ? the romans derided scylla , who , though a man infinitely debauched , and wholly given up to licenciousness , did nevertheless admonish and stir up others to sobriety , temperance and frugality . and who would not blame lisander ? though he swam in a contrary stream , yet he allowed and gave toleration to the citizens for those vices which he himself abstained from and abhorred . but lycurgus deserves commendation , because he never imposed the observation of that upon any man , which he himself did not first of all diligently follow . yet in a free-state , ( if any such there be ) it hath been observed , they have been directed by the suffrage of chance . this order of election is observed by that virgin , venice . the like institution solon authorized among the athenians for the choice of the five hundred senators : for , out of every tribe were so many elected , as were thought to deserve that dignity ; whose names were put into a pot ; and into another as many beans , the one half white , and the other black : now so many as hapned upon the white , were pronounced senators ; and those that chanced to light on the black , were repulsed and dismissed : which made thucydides to call that senate , senatum à faba . besides , it was observed among the romans what office he had born before his election , and with what fidelity he had discharged himself of his duty : for they made choice of their senators out of that number of men only , that were by them styled patres , which was , as it were , the nursery of counsellors , that so they might be known to be men famous for some publike exploit , or renowned for their wisdom and gravity . among us , those that sit in parliament obtain that dignity three manner of waies : first , by reason of their tenure . secondly , by vertue of writ ; and thirdly , by vertue of office . per tenure are these : archbishops , bishops , abbots , priors , dukes , marquesses , earls and barons . and these are summoned to appear before the parliament in the space of . daies . they that come in per breve , or by writ , are these : knights of the shires , burgesses , citizens , barons of the cinque-ports , and the king's council . there come also per breve , directed to the several deans and arch-deacons of this kingdom , two several proctors of the clergy for every several deaconry & arch-deaconry ; and these proctors of the clergy are elected by the clergy . there come hither per service , or by vertue of office , the chief crier of england ; the chief usher ; the chancellor ; the treasurer ; the chamberlain , and barons of the exchequer ; the justices of either bench ; the steward of england ; the porter , grooms , and all tyed by service to be here done . the stewards office was to place the lords ; the porter used to see there be but one door to enter in and go out at : and every one of the above-mentioned officers , hath had his several charge respectively . thus have you had a description of our sage senator , of all the qualifications that tend to his accomplishment ; his duty , dignity and office displayed and laid open ; the rewards due unto , and conferred on him ; the ancient customs of the romans and grecians touching this particular ; their election and choice ; as also their manner of sitting in parliament among us ; how and by what means they obtain the senatorship , or title of parliament-men , according to our modern styles , who were so termed , because every member of this high and most absolute court of justice in england ( from which there is no appeal to any other for redress ) should sincerely and discreetly parler la ment , as it is in the old norman french , that is , freely express their minds for the benefit of the kingdom . nor are the laws of this island only , and the liberty of the subject conserved by parliament , but those of all well policied kingdoms & countries else in europe . the germans have their diets ; the danes and swedes their riicks dachs ; the spaniard calls his parliament las cortes ; and the french have ( or at least should have ) their assembly of the three states , though it be now in a manner grown obsolete , because the authority thereof was by accident devolv'd upon the king : it will not be altogether impertinent to give you a succinct account of this memorable alteration ; which hapned as followeth : when our nation had taken such large footing in france , that they advanced as far as orleans , and had forced their then soveraign to fly to bourges in berry , for sanctuary ; the assembly of the three states not being able to convene during these pressures in full parliament , because that by those invasions the enemy made into the very bowels of the kingdom , the country was altogether unpassable , so that the power that was inherent in the parliamentary convention , of enacting laws , assessing the subject with taxes , subsidiary levies , and other impositions , was transmitted to the king , during the rage and fury of that war only ; which proving of long continuance , that entrusted authority began to grow habitual , and could never hitherto be taken from him ; so that his edicts stand in lieu of acts of parliament . out of these foregoing premises this conclusion may easily be deduced , that the principal fountain whence the king derives his happiness and safety , is the parliament : it is the great conduit-pipe which conveys unto him his peoples bounty and gratitude ; the truest looking-glass wherein he discerns their loves . now the subjects love hath been ever accounted the prime citadel of a prince . in his parliament he appears as the sun in the meridian , in the altitude of his glory , in his highest state-royal , as the law informs us . but lest we should spin out too long a thread , and so wear the readers patience thread-bare , we will conclude this first book , and make the discourse which we allot for the scope and subject of our next , run in another channel . finis libri primi . the second book , treating of kings , and their prerogative . chap. i. ek {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} — a jove principium — in the trinity we find unity ; among the orders of angels there is an archangel ; the heavens have their primum mobile , and the sun is their chief luminary ; the beasts of the forest have the lion to their king ; the fowls of the air , the eagle : the fish of the sea a soveraign ; and shall man only be independent ? absit , absit ; let us therefore sing with homer : {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . kings ( saith one of our quondam pen-men , though since an apostate ) are lively representations , living statues or pictures , drawn to the life of the great deity : these pictures , for their better continuance , are done in oyl ; the colours of the crown never fade , they are no water-colours . they are gods vicegerents here upon earth ; nay , god the father , god the son , and god the holy ghost say , they are gods , and would have them live as gods . god the father plainly affirms , joh. . . dixi dii est is : i have said ye are gods . god the son told pilat● thou shouldst have no power , except it were ( ●●…ta de super ) given from above . and i 'm sure the holy ghost tells us , per me reges regnant ; by me kings reign , and not by the suffrage of the people ; for then it would have been per nos . they are the lord 's anointed , therefore not to be touch'd or brought in question by their subjects : for all the failings in a king can but make him a bad king ; but he remains a king still . if indeed , as one saith excellently , kings held their crowns by indentures from the people , they were then disobliged from their obedience to him upon his failing ( in those things whereunto he was sworn at his coronation ) on his part ; but if they receive their crowns immediately from god , and that by him alone kings raign , as is said before , then they must still stick close to their allegiance , or else come off with the brand of traytors . our modern times have furnished us with too many of that infernal rabble , who were so hellishly wicked and impious , as to fight against their lawful soveraign ; and having got him in their clutches , slew him at his own door . but to the purpose . the athenians , ( as demosthenes writes in his oration against neaera ) when theseus had contrived the model of their commonwealth , being accustomed to choose some one out of the number of the vertuous , by a general consent , manifested by holding up their hands , they elected him king . in ancient times , the election of kings was ever held sacrum & divinum quid , a certain holy and divine action among the very heathens . romulus , after the sight of twelve ravens ( if we may credit livy ) or rather because the lightning had pierced his body from the left to the right side ( as dionysius hath it ) was by divination chosen king ; and that ordinance , called jus auspiciorum , was religiously obeyed . their authority hath been judged ever as divine as their election ; for homer and isocrates joyntly affirm , that he that governeth as a king , represents the deity . the kings of persia were honour'd as gods , and the people believed that they were the sole and absolute defenders of their laws , liberties , lives , and country . the ancient latines called their kings , indigetes , that is , deified ; ( as aeneas and romulus were ) whose bodies after they were expired , could never be found . kings are the sons , not of the most voices , but of the most high ; and as god is king of the whole universe , so are they lords of the whole commonwealth . about their skirts they have this motto written by the finger of god , touch not mine anointed . nor did ever any church-man , christian father or expositor , obtrude any other sence upon this text , than that it was meant of kings , till such time as the puritan and papist , both at a time , and that time bearing not above . years date , who began then to infect the world with this damnable doctrine , that it was lawful to murder kings . it is strange that two such contrary factions , that had ever been antipathetical one to the other , should nevertheless , like herod and pilate , agree in condemning the lord's anointed . dieu & mon droit , is their motto ; god , and my right : no body else have any thing to do with me . they have a noli me tangere , to defend them from the assaults of rebellious subjects . yet although kings are counted god's lieutenants , or adjutant-generals ; the council , wisdom , and knowledge of kings is not their own , but given them by god , who is the author of every good and perfect gift , according to that verse of the holy pen-man : {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . — and since , i say , no king can with his own peculiar stock of wisdom govern his kingdom rightly ( for it is the prerogative of the almighty only to know all things that appertain to good government , ) they have ever used to call unto their aid and assistance some wise grave men , by whose advice and counsel the kingdom might be well regulated . these men being as a mean between the king and the people , do on the one hand , understand the office of the king ; and on the other , the duty of the subject ; knowing what course must be taken for the preservation of the kings honour and royal prerogative , and what belongs to the profit and benefit of his good and loyal subjects . thus a king may govern all things well , not only by his own opinion , which may oftentimes prove deceitful ; but by the general advice and counsel of others , whereby his judgement and reason is brought to perfection . and as the hand divided into many fingers , is thereby made more strong and apt to lay hold on all things ; so he that governs by the aid and assistance of councellors , will manage all publike affairs , tending to the benefit of the kingdom and country whereof he is soveraign , with the greater discretion and wisdom : for a single person is not able to manage all affairs without additionall help . alexander , king of macedonia , conquered many countries , and subjugated a multitude of enemies . pyrrhus was excellent at the choice of places for fortification . hannibal was often attended with success in victory , but knew not how to make the best improvement of it : vincere scis hannibal , uti victoria nescis . philopoemon was a brave admiral at sea ; cleon could manure lands and possessions ; cicero was a famous orator ; pompeius a valiant general ; cato a grave senator ; and scipio admirable both in peace and war . so were several others , that might be instanced : for every man ( according to the proverb ) is a roscius in his own profession . now when so many well-qualified heroes are bound up together in council , what a constellation of vertues will shine and appear there ? and what firm edicts and good laws will there be enacted by them for the publick benefit and good of the kingdom ? which he is obliged to ; for he is called rex , à regendo ; but some will have it , à recte agendo . and it is clear , that one man cannot be so clear sighted as to perceive all ; which proves that verse of homer to be true , rendred into latine , thus : bini conveniunt melius rem perspicit alter . nor doth this any waies diminish his power and authority ; for though many convene , yet he is still the head of them all , and hath a negative voice ; nor can any act be pass'd without his royal assent or approbation . it is taken pro confesso , that there is much care and vigilancy required in a monarch ; for , he must not seek so much after his own profit , as the publike good and commodity of his people ; he must observe the laws , preserve the rights and liberty of his subjects , and maintain the authority and reputation of his senate . for kings were first of all instituted for the aid and assistance of the vertuous , against those that are vicious : to them absolute power is transmitted , to the end that they may revenge injuries , and be just judges in all causes and legal proceedings . a good king ought to be as vigilant over those whom providence hath allotted him supreme , as a shepherd is of his flock . homer calls king agamemnon , the shepherd of the people ; and plato in imitation of him , the shepherd and conserver of mankind . besides , he should govern his people , not as masters do their servants , but as parents do their children ; with paternal care , not with rigid severity or cruelty . and as it is customary with indulgent parents , sometimes to rebuke their children , sometimes to admonish and encourage them , and sometimes also to correct and punish them ; so should a prince behave himself toward his subjects ; manifesting himself sometimes severe , ( when moved thereunto ) and at other times gentle , affable and courteous , both for the preservation of his people , and the safety of the kingdom ; defending and enlarging the bonum commune with no less care than a father provides for the sustentation of his children . this makes the difference between kings and tyrants : the one is studious for the publike good , the other for his own private profit . the end of the tyrants endeavour is voluptuousness ; but the kings study is honour : riches are the mark at which a tyrant levels , but vertue is the true meta of the king . tyrants desire the assistance of strangers , but kings are guarded by their own loyal subjects . alphonsus , king of arragon , being demanded what subjects of his he most tenderly affected ? answered , i love them better that love me , than those that fear me . and not without reason did he thus express himself : for fear is usually accompanied with hatred . a king is as secure by the love , good will and loyalty of his subjects , as by the defence of arms ; and his senators will stand him in more stead upon any occasion , than a tyrants souldiers . trajanus , that great emperour of the world , did alwaies call the senate , his father : for , as the father usually foretels the son what may prove beneficial , and what injurious to him : so the senate counsels the king , and instructs him how to conserve his kingdom , and by what laws and ordinances it must be governed . this is the only way to keep the king from tyranny , and the subject from rebellion . now tyranny in the one , with rebellion in the other , will soon verifie that dystich of the satyrist : adgenerum cereris sine caede , & vulnere pauci descendunt reges , & sicca morte tyranni . a good king knows how to irretiate and allure the hearts of the people to him by love and clemency , sooner than by violence and compulsion . and good people know their duty and obedience : and if the king through the sins of the people be any way misguided , they will bite their nails , and not scratch their heads ; they know it is a crime inexplable , to quarrel with majesty : the only way to live happy in a kingdom , is this , first , to give god , and then caesar his due . but when kings grow tyrannical , then there is little or no allegiance from the subject , but what they are compelled to ; whereas that is far more to be esteemed , that flows naturally and voluntarily from the people ; and this usually stirs them up to sedition , and so consequently to their utter ruine and destruction , and the downfal both of kingdom and king : and the reason is , because tyrants use certain sleights and state-tricks to deprive the subject of liberty : first , by clearing the country of all good and wise men , either by banishment , imprisonment , or death ; because the vertue of good men reproves them for their vice , and renders them odious ; whenas all they aim at is only to enslave the nation , to the intent that they may prosecute their own lust and pleasure without obstruction . such counsel as this , periander poysoned thrafibulus with ; who by his infernal rhetorick endeavoured to perswade him to cut off the highest spikes of corn ; meaning thereby , that he should cause the cream of the athenian nobility to be executed . the like subtilty did sextus tarquinius , the son of lucius , follow ; who being suborned by his father , pretended to be banished , and fled fraudulently to the gabii ; where having scrap'd as much acquaintance as he judged convenient , sent privily to his father to know his will and pleasure , and what farther was to be done in the business for his satisfaction : who conducted the messenger into the garden , where walking together , he with a wand in his hand strook off all the heads of the poppies before him ; which being by the nuncio reported to his son , who had hellish wit enough to understand such damnable mysteries , soon put the chief of the nobility to death , and by force and injustice usurped the government of the commonwealth , and deprived the subjects of their liberty . another knack they have to prejudice their subjects , by inhibiting their meetings , conventions and conferences , to prevent their study of honest discipline . nay , farther , they often sow discord among the people , to the end that filled with hate and private displeasure , they may be stirred up to civil war and sedition ; who being thereby much impoverished , and the war ceasing , are compelled to pay for their pardon ; and being after this manner fleeced both waies of their money , and reduced to poverty , become base minded , and altogether unfit to defend their lives , laws , or liberties . these , and many more that might be numerated , are the plots and devices of tyrants ; all which , they imagine , tend to their own benefit , and to the promoting of their ambitious designs ; whenas oftentimes it proves quite contrary , to their own ruine and personal destruction : for if they mount themselves too often on the subjects galled back , they will undoubtedly cast their rider , let him be never so expert a horseman . but kings are of a quite contrary temper and disposition : it is the good , and not the ruine of their subjects they labour for ; because they understand sufficiently , that the loss of subjects is the shaking off of their crowns ; and wanting their protection , they are left unarm'd to the mercy of the insulting enemy . but we will now leave the lofty subject of kings to the fancy of a more sublime wit , and the work of a more noble quill ; and come to our second chapter , which treats of the division of commonweals . chap. ii. of the division of commonweals and kingdoms . the diversity of republicks proceeds not from fortune , or chance-medley , nor the disposition of the heavens , or the influence of the stars upon things sublunary ; but every government is framed according to the minds , tempers , and constitutions of men , their wits and education ; though some ascribe their variety to the situation of the country or climate where men have their allotted residence and beeing . it is confest , that sometimes , through sedition , faction , and civil war ; kingdoms are subverted , and changed into states ; for the proof whereof we need not ramble far , since our native rebellions have lately manifested the truth hereof . such is the fluctuating condition of all worldly things , that mischance waits at the elbow of good fortune , and vice is masked with vertue , that she may not appear in her own native hew and deformity ; for man is prone to forsake v●●●…ue and embrace vice , which ever hood-winks him with an appearance of good . sometimes also it falls out , that well-governed republicks , through evill ministers , are either utterly extinguished , or altered into other forms of government . hence it happens , that kingdoms become tyrannies , optimacies come under the jurisdiction of a few ; popular states are perverted into licentious liberty , and from that reduced into tyranny ; and this is the revolution of their government , and original of their catastrophe . plato writes , that the mutation of commonweals is fatal , through the disposition of the heavens , and the operation or influence of coelestial bodies upon terrestrial . but as we have already instanced , their variation happens from the variety of the minds of the inhabitants . for some countries abound with rich , others are cram'd with poor men . in some , there is store of nobles , souldiers and husbandmen ; in others , plenty of merchants , handicraftsmen and artificers . now , wheresoever the number of merchants , artificers and husbandmen surmount the rest , that state usually becommeth popular : but where there is the greatest quantity of rich men , there is established the government of a few . where the major part of citizens be good , wise and vertuous , that state is apt to be governed as an optimacy . there are three things ( saith aristotle ) that contend for priority in government : liberty , riches and vertue . for , nobility ( which supplies the fourth place ) is the associate of vertue and riches , because the equal mixture of rich and poor men , make a popular state . a faction of rich men , is called , the government of a few ; and the consent of all three , viz. freemen , rich men , and good men , is counted an optimacie : such was the carthaginian republick ; for rich men , good men , and noblemen were therein equally esteemed . now , it is the disposition and desire of some men to live , in kingdoms rather than in any other state ; who are such men as are naturally ambitious of honour , vertuous , and fitted for action . the cappadocians having enjoyed kings for many years ( whose race was at length extinguished ) were profered by the romans to have their state converted into popular liberty ; but they refused it : whereupon they appointed ariobarsanes , their friend , king of cappadocia . the athenians followed the quite contrary course ; for they affecting a popular state , would not allow of the government by one , nor many . yea , some there are that approve of tyrannical government most of all ; as the siculi of old , who were ever accustomed to be ruled by tyrants , and so were almost all the people of asia ; who being naturally servile , are even to this age subject to tyrannical government . now , if any man demand , what a common-wealth is ? this doubt cannot arise from the name , it being a certain order among the inhabitants assembled together in one city or country , and there residing ; but from the variety and difference of republicks : for as mens manners , delights and estates be various , so also is the government of commonweals manifold . and though the terminus ad quem , or end , is one and the same , viz. bonum , good ; yet the terminus d quo , or means whereby they aspire to that good , are various , and so consequently the laws and customs are of sundry sorts that are by them used . for , he that shall compare the laws of hippodamus enacted for the miletians , with those of minos made for the candians ; or the ordinances of lycurgus , with the decrees of solon , the one writing of the lacedaemonian , the other of the athenian government , may with facility understand their laws to be divers , their magistrates unlike , and the form of their states very discrepant . the seven wise wen ( thales excepted , who did not care for fishing in the troubled waters of state-affairs ) introduced several exercises , laws and governments according to the peoples capacity , and their own pecular fancies , and by sundry orders and uses did execute them . which variety of government hath ministred matter of great controversie and contrariety of opinion ; insomuch , that the learned , as well in our , as forrain schools and universities , have assumed the disputation of the several sorts of commonweals , and confined them to a certain number ; besides , they have manifested which of them deserve the greatest commendation , and ought to be embraced . plato and aristotle seem to excell all persons that ever wrote on this subject : for they with solid judgement , and great respect to the nature of men , and the temperature of the region or climate , have discreetly appointed laws and governments suitable to the disposition and temper of the inhabitants : therefore according to the opinion of these two famous philosophers , we will discourse of three sorts of republicks : the first is called , monarchia ; the second , aristocratia ; and the third , democratia ; which the latines term , regnum , optimatum principatus , & popularis respublica . the supreme governour of all things , by his providence divine , hath so ordered , that the faculties or powers of man's mind should reside in three parts of his body , representing thereby three idaea's or forms of republicks ; constituting reason as sole monarch , or lord paramount of them all , to remain in the head , being the highest part . the second part , as most vigilant and apt to obey , he hath placed near unto it , in the breast , creating it a companion and helper to the head ; which plato calls , vim irascendi , or affectuum sedem . the third , resembling a rude multitude , witless , froward , and full of sensual desires , harbours beneath the heart , far remote from the other . in these parts of the soul , as in a mirrour or looking-glass , we may spy out three sorts of commonweals . the highest supplies the place of king , as destined and appointed to exercise authority over all . the second , though in place inferiour , yet in quality is of no less regard , being well obeyed : for , where reason swaies without the aid and assistance of the affections , all actions are weak and impotent . just so a senate wanting the assistance of reason , which deports her self partly as captain , partly as a souldier in all actions and consultations , becomes timorous and effeminate . aristotle hath therefore made a division of the power of reason , making one part absolute and standing upon its own guard , and the other , as it were , depending and subservient , like a son that obeyeth the father . which titus livius hath significantly expressed , in setting forth the errour of minutius in his unadvised fight against hannibal , which fabius reprehends in these or the like words : souldiers ( saith he ) i have often heard , that he that of himself can rightly judge , deserves the greatest commendation : next unto him are they , that know how to subscribe to the good advice of others : but he that can neither counsel , nor follow the counsel of others , is but an inch on this side a natural , and of a very shallow capacity . the third part of man's mind resembles a popular government , wherein the multitude hath authority to hear all causes , and determine or decide all controversies , though many contests arise from hence to the prejudice both of the country and inhabitants . aristotle writes also , that the image or representation of republicks may be found out in private families ; for the authority of the father over his children may be compared to principality ; because children are the parents charge ; he alone must provide for them all , and their faults are chastised , rather than severely punished by him ; so ought a good king to demean himself toward his good subjects . therefore jupiter , the god of gods and men , is by homer styled father . the husbands authority over the wife may be compared to optimacie ; for the husband ought to rule his wife according to justice , and command nothing but what may endure the test of the laws of god and man . the state popular is assimilated to brotherly society ; for they ought to live in equality , differing only in the degrees of age . and as the father that useth rigour and cruelty towards his children , is judged a tyrant , and no father ; so that king , that by the oppression of the subject endeavours to encrease his private interest , contemning all laws , and living dishonourably , puts off his kingship , and is called tyrant . a husband and wife living in discord , either through negligence , or obstinacy , rejecting the care of their children , and domestick affairs , do thereby abuse their authority , and become unworthy the name of natural parents ; so optimacie abused , deserves not that title . in like manner brethren disagreeing , neglecting their mutual profit , addicting themselves to sloath and lasciviousness , are not to be accounted brethren ; no more is a popular state so to be esteemed , if of such a temper . thus it is apparent , that through the default and inconsiderateness of superiors , true commonweals are converted into false and contrary governments . policy , which by the graecians is called , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , and by plato and aristotle , respublica popularis , may be referred to all sorts of republicks ; because that word is universal , and includes all civil government . plato adds another kind of government , that is , a king subject to his laws ; making monarchy of two sorts , and consequently two kings ; the one bound and confined , the other free , and not restrained to any law : this is his opinion of monarchy , though not ours . but now let us discourse of the best sort of republicks , though it be a very hard task : to the accomplishment of which intended work , it is requisite that a man understand the best kind and order of life ; for otherwise a perfect commonwealth cannot be conceived : but what sort of life merits the reputation of the best , as yet latet in obscuro among the major part of philosophers . the epicures , stoicks and peripateticks are of different opinions concerning this subject , and have divided the world by the variety of their sects and whimsies . but our intent is to concur with the peripateticks , because their schools have been the greatest nurseries of good governours . the stoicks , that did ever wed themselves to an austere life , ground their felicity upon vertue only ; which we disapprove not , so that they consent , that external goods , which both nature and fortune have made for the use of man , to the end he may thereby be the better accommodated , be joyned thereunto as necessary additaments ; otherwise he cannot be perfect : and seeing that man's felicity is numbred among things that are perfect , and that thing is only perfect that wants nothing ; surely , whosoever desires to be happy , must necessarily be fully furnished , so that his felicity may be absolute , and no way deficient . riches are very necessary ; the liberal person stands in need of money to perform the actions of liberality , and the just man must therewith reward and make satisfaction . the warriour wants it ; for according to the poet , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . argentis pugna telis , ac omnia vinces . now the epicure , he placeth his summum bonum in sensual delights and pleasures ; which is more becoming a beast , than a man . whereas aristotle makes a joynt agreement of vertue , and other additional ornaments , or external helps , most necessary for a well-regulated person . philosophers affirm , that there are three sorts of life : the first , consisteth in action ; the second , in contemplation ; and the third , in pleasure . that which resteth in action , if not accompanied with wisdom and vertue , proveth unprofitable , and is subject to many vices and imperfections . that which is employed in contemplation , not being accompanied with action , is vain and ineffectual . for , as he that boldly looks upon the sun when in the meridian of his lustre , is made blind with his vehement heat and tralucent splendor : so the mind of man , continually occupied with the speculation of sublime mysteries , becomes stupid , heavy , and languishing . he therefore that desires the name of vertuous , must lead a civil as well as a philosophical , an active as well as a contemplative life ; the mixture of which two , makes man happy and fortunate . but he that delights only in sensuality , absolutely forgetting that he was ever qualified with the gift of reason , may be said to represent man , as to his outward complexion or blush ; but he wants the true and proper nature of man . hence ariseth the diversity of mankind ; for some are born free , noble , wise , and fit for government ; others , servile , boorish , witless , destined to servitude and bondage . plato hath it , that god in man's creation had so ordered , that in the generation of those that are apt to govern , he hath mixed gold ; of them that are appointed as assistant to governours , silver ; and the nature of plough-men and artizans is compounded with brass and iron : which similitude aristotle applies to the manners and capacities of men . for , although every man doth naturally desire that his children should resemble him ; yet it often happens , that silver is the issue of gold , and some metal of a more inferiour allay , the issue of silver . it is therefore very requisite , that princes pry into the nature of their children , that they may understand their disposition ; and they that are like iron may be converted into gold ; or that proving impossible , the government may be allotted to others : for it hath been oraculously prophesied , that those countries that are governed by brass and iron , should perish and come to confusion . but now as to optimacie , it consists in a certain number of vertuous citizens ( or at least should ) because they govern the republick according to the rules and edicts of the law ; whereas in popular states all things are contrarily managed : for liberty being the end thereof , the state is ruled according to will and popular fury , without the consideration of vertue or reason . in such cities , men are called good , because they are profitable or beneficial to the commonwealth , not for their being endowed with honesty , which consists in the action of vertue ; so that vertue there is measured by publike profit , not honesty ; for popular justice , called jus populare , is where honour is conferred upon persons , not according to the vertue of him that receiveth , but the number of those that give it ; who think those things to be most equitable , that are so according to the vogue of the multitude , not as justice instructs us ; and that to be honourable , which hath the repute of popular fame , or approbation of the multitude . and though it must necessarily be granted , that there is corruption in all republicks ; yet is it frequently known in popular states , and that more than in any other kind of government : for if any man well-principled chance to have his residence or abode in any such state , and he out of natural reason only disgust the plebeian insolency , and by admonition , reprehension and correction strives to reduce the citizens or inhabitants to a more vertuous and religious course of life , he is instantly branded with the name of an enemy to the state , and arrested by the law of ostracisme ; and many times it falls out , that he comes to execution . many famous citizens of the popular states of greece were hereby afflicted , as aristides , thucydides , socrates , themistocles and damon ; and at rome , camillus and scipio had the same measure dealt them . aristides deserves a monument that may endure to perpetuity , for his singular vertue and wisdom ; who for his integrity of life and conversation , was sirnamed justus . and at that time when the law of ostracisme was in force among the athenians , a rude , boorish , beef-brain'd fellow , with a scrole of paper in his hand , chanced to meet him , who with much importunacy would have forced him to write his name therein . aristides being astonished at his earnest and strange request ; asked him , whether any man could ever say he had injured any person ? no , ( replied the fellow ) all the reason that prompts me to my demand , is only this , i stomach your sirname , justus . it is reported by cicero , that the ephesi , at the banishment of their prince , hermodorus , pronounced this sentence : let us not excel one another ; and if any do contrary to what is herein specified or mentioned , he shall no longer reside among us , but must procure some other dwelling place . strange customs of popular states ! plato ( as we have already instanced ) saith , that no state can be long liv'd that is governed by iron or brass ; that is , by phanatick or infatuated persons ; who being altogether unfit for government , seem to be born to disturb , rather than obey . for they , after some petty or imaginary success at war , growing insolent and tympanous , have alwaies some flattering tutors , and colloguing popular captains to extol their vertues , ready at hand ; who immediately upon this allured , or rather caught with the golden bait of glory , reject the authority of their wise governours , rebelling against their superiours , and so usurping their lawful power , take it into their hands , and manage it according to their own corrupt wills and depraved judgements ; which is the cause that such states soon expire , and that oftentimes in their very infancy : for through the diversity of minds and opinions among them , they become void of counsel ; and after a continued series ( if it last any considerable time ) of insolency , contention and faction , they become submissive either to a few , or else to some single person . thus did the athenians , who having obtained the victory in a memorable sea-fight against the medes , bladder'd up with pride from their success herein , it caused sedition and tumultuation in that state , notwithstanding the contrary endeavours of the more sober to prevent it . nay , the original of states popular sometimes ariseth from rebellion attempted against the royal party , as it frequently happened at rome : and at other times it falls out , when the people through tyranny are exasperated , and made desperate by the rigour of their princes or governours ; for then by force of arms against their king , they begin to mould a new-fashioned government among themselves ; which the swisses , not many years since , have done . as to oligarchy or tyranny , we shall not extend our discourse , but pass them by , because we judge such kind of government to be altogether unjust , insupportable , and quite contrary to a vertuous and civill life . now , as to the discovery of the most notable and imitable commonweals and kingdoms in the habitable world , that shall be the subject of our ensuing chapter . chap. iii. wherein is contained the various forms of the most memorable and famous commonweals and kingdoms in the world . the excellency and pre-eminency of every nation or republick may easily be understood by the government and laws therein practised and exercised : for those are judged the best , that direct the course of their life according to justice and equity , and not the peculiar w●imsies of their own natural fancy ; and constantly persevere therein , without so much as the appearance of change or variation : it is an apparent and clear argument of female frailty , far derogating from the dignity of man , to be so fickle and inconstant , as to seek after variety ; but to be fix'd and grounded , is an argument of a noble resolution . and first , as for the commonwealth of plato , we shall pass that by , because it is usually said , that such a government as his , neither is , hath been , nor shall be hereafter . the athenian republick was first made as followeth : that people being dispersed , and haunting the woods and fields like brute animals , were first by cecrops , and after by theseus confined to a city , which was then called cecropia , now athens , and at length reduced to a kingdom , descendable to their posterity . but what authority the senate had under those kings ( which order did represent the optimacie ) cannot be manifested or apparently known , by reason of the length of time , and multitude of years since elapsed , as also the paucity of those writers that have any waies discoursed thereon . yet we must believe , that kings had in those daies their sages or wisemen about them , and made use of their counsel in the management of their political affairs . the kings of that age ( as thucydides writes ) did rule by consent of people , and with their suffrages did many times determine those things whereof they themselves were doubtful . yet that government was of short continuance ; for , in tract of time ( which altereth all things ) it was committed to the multitude , whose force and power did utterly subvert the commonwealth . the lacedaemonian state seemed to contain all the three sorts of government , viz. king , nobles , and people ; the nobles were their senators , and the people were the ephori ; for they were alwaies elected out of the number of popular men . now the lacedaemonians are very much extolled , in that for the space of seven hundred years compleat , they have continued without any alteration of their laws , customs , or government . but the venetians in that respect may challenge a greater portion of glory , for they have till this very present age of ours constantly lived under one form of government and governours the space of one thousand years , and better . now the venetians in framing their republick , do include within the name of people , gentlemen and citizens ; being very careful to oppose any other , if he presume or dare usurp that title , because they only are capable of magistracy . the senate is chosen out of that number that represents an optimacie , and is the foundation , as it were , of that state . the duke is elected out of that number that resemble kings . polybius doth very much extol the roman monarchy , because it was made up of the king , nobility and people ; supposing that by this means the king for fear of the people durst not become insolent ; and the people , out of respect to the senate , durst not disobey the king . which form of republick is accounted most just . for as perfect harmony is made up of treble , mean , and base ; so the best and surest agreement among men , and the most stable government , is established by the mixture of the best , the mean , and the base people . romulus ( saith livy ) being ( as we have already mentioned ) by consent both of god and men elected king , though the state was then but an embryo , refused to have the reins of government lie altogether upon his own shoulders , and did therefore call unto his assistance one hundred senators , who out of respect to their age and gravity , were called fathers . and lest the people should suppose that they were hereby deluded , misled , and defrauded of all honour , and thereby envy and malignity might ensue , to the prejudice of the king or senate ; he made them judges , and gave them full power and authority to sit and determine war , and conclude peace , with many other priviledges thereunto annexed . and if this model of government had still continued in rome , there had not been so great an effusion of bloud in aspiring after liberty and enlarging the territories of the roman empire ; nor had the happiness of that country been shaken with so many seditions , which did at length work her ruine and desolation : for she was observed to be very little acquainted with peace all the time she stood upon her own legs , ever since she was able to go alone . but now let us take the governments of our age into consideration ; and first , of the french monarchy ; which owns a king , who rules ad placitum , at his own discretion : and although his authority come not under the lash of the law , yet like an honourable and just prince , he acts nothing contrary to law , or honour . in his kingdom , the noblemen , which they call peers , represent an optimacie : the people are divided into three sorts ; gentlemen , clergy-men , and the popular multitude ; and a choice number of these three assembled together by the kings edict or command , determine matters of greatest importance in the kingdom . this council was anciently called panceltium , as the aetolians named theirs panaetolium , and the universal council of the ionians was termed panionium ; though since , as we have already hinted , by reason of the english wars there , the king got all authority into his own hands , so that his word carries as much force and validity with it , as the former acts of parliament , which were their three estates conven'd and met together . as for the spanish monarchy , the king there hath soveraign authority and power ; the council-royal represents an optimacie ; and the three prime orders of knighthood may be compared to the popular state . for the order of st jago , collatrava , and alcantara , assembled with the king , decide the most important state-controversies and affairs . the monarchy of polonia consists likewise of these three sorts , i. e. the king , nobility and people ; but it is to be noted , that this word people here , denotes only knights and gentlemen . the union and fellowship of these orders is so admirable , that the king without the advice of his council and their authority , can do nothing ; nor can the council determine without the king's approbation , and the peoples consent . in this kingdom , the laws are of so great force , that every man religiously swears to keep and observe them ; and if any person act contrary to that oath , he is accounted unjust and impious . now that oath by which they swear to be strict in the observance of their laws and liberty , is in their vernacular language called , captue ; which is as much as tegmen capitis in latine : for , as the head is kept in health , and preserved from the injury of the nipping weather , by being covered ; so by vertue of that oath , their laws , lives , and liberties are conserved ; and to maintain it , no man is so fearful , as not to venture his life against tyrants , and all such as endeavour to cut the wings of publick liberty and happiness . this people enjoy great freedom ; being principled with this perswasion , that to live according to the direction of the law , is the most absolute liberty in the world . in this kingdom , the prince follows not the dictamen of his own will and fancy , but sticks close to the rule of the law . in waging war , or concluding peace , he makes use of his council ; never transgressing law : which works this effect , that the kings person is not only honoured among the people , but had in high reverence and estimation ; so that he may be said to be adored , rather than obeyed . and who indeed is there , that would not entirely love , honour , respect , and reverence that prince , that in governing steers himself by the cynosure of the law , contented to be led by the line of reason , directing himself in all his undertakings , according to the prudent and grave advice of his senators ? authority thus used , creates a general love , liking and consent among the subjects . to conclude , the king of polonia seems such a prince , as plato , aristotle , xenophon , and other legislators have desired to bear sway in all well-regulated commonweals and kingdoms , and such as both god and nature approve . the senate here bears the image of optimacy , and hath much power and authority ; for they being chosen out of the wiser sort of nobles , they only , i say , consult with the king about state-affairs . their authority is not unlike the homotimi of persia , or the ephori of lacedaemonia . the gentlemen of polonia resemble the popular state ; for on them is imposed a great part of the government , and may be said to be as a seminary from whence issue both counsellors and kings . the empire of germany consists of the emperour , princes , and people ; which being governed by divers potentates , and their policy being scattered into sundry governments , comes not easily within the reach of a concise description . the quondam kingdom of britain , now called england , obeyeth one king ; who electeth senators , unto whom the residue of nobles , and some of the popular order being joyned , make one common council , which is called in our idiom , a parliament . but native modesty forbids us to proceed any farther upon this subject ; whose encomia's we judge to be a theme far more suitable to a forrain pen . one difficulty there remains still , the resolution whereof we have reserved for the close of this chapter ; and that is this ; what a citizen is , which we have so much all along discoursed of ? to which we answer : that this word citizen hath had several acceptations among writers . some have called the whole number of inhabitants by the name of citizens . others , only those that are descended of noble and free-born citizens . some call them citizens whose fathers were free-born within the city ; others would have them to fetch their pedigree more remote , from their ancient grandfathers . and some are of opinion , that forrainers received into the society of citizens , and naturalized , or denizen'd , deserve the name of citizens . aristotle terms them citizens , that are capable of publick offices in state , and are descended of free and honest parentage . in popular states , all they are usually called citizens that dwell in the city , as well poor , as rich ; bad , as good ; none being bond-men ; for every one is capable of government , because there is an universal parity among them . of this nature was the athenian commonwealth ( before spoken of ) so long as it was subject to popular government ; and the cantons of switzerland steer the same course even to this very day . and divers cities in germany there are , called free ; where the inhabitants live popularly , secluded from gentlemen , and noble citizens . in an oligarchy , because men are most respected for their revenues and substance , they that are most rich are reputed citizens , though they are dishonourable , because careless of all vertue ; and make it their whole study to be rich quo jure , quaque injuria , by hook or by crook ( as we say ) right or wrong , no matter which way they obtain it ; to the end that they may come to dignity and preferment , not as wise and vertuous , but as rich and wealthy persons . among the romans , there were several sorts of citizens ; some were called municipes , some coloni , and others latini ; every one of them retaining those conditions that were allotted them by the people of rome . some whereof were free , some confederate , and some stipendiary . some were created citizens pleno jure , which was by voice ; and they were thought worthy of all honours ; others , jure honorario , which were of the number of those that were admitted into the the city without the suffrage of the people ; and they were honoris gratia called citizens , as the campani , and equites . he likewise was counted a citizen of rome , whose name was written in the book of the censors , and was an house-keeper . by all which it is perspicuous and evident , that in all republicks they were properly called citizens that could plead a right to office , and could give suffrage in the state ; whereas he that wants these priviledges , is rather to be called inhabitant , or client , than citizen . in monarchies and aristocracies those are citizens that are vertuous . in the latter , good and vertuous men only govern ; in the former , one alone , that for bounty , liberality , and magnificency excels all others . those people which are naturally slaves , or wickedly debauched , do for the most part obey tyrants , and that government is called imperium despoticum : yet are not all they to be judged slaves , that are encumbred with the power and oppression of tyrants , if they be not withall base minded and vicious . for we read of many citizens that have freed themselves and their country from servitude , by slaying or expelling the tyrants ; and if they found their expectations were herein frustrated , they chose rather to lose their lives than their liberty , as brutus and cato did , with many other romans . thus we have given the description and division of the ancient states popular , republicks and kingdoms ; in the next chapter we shall demonstrate the new models of government set up by the rebellious since the late unhappy wars between king and parliament . chap. iv. the new-fangled model of modern policy , being of three sorts ; a protectordom , a committeedom , and a rumpdom ; and first , of the protectordom . as for that hellish monster , that damnable machiavilian that first gave rise to this same strange and unheard of government ; we shall say nothing tending either to his parentage , birth , or education , because we have reserved that as a subject for another entire peece ; only , that he might be said to be a man of blouds , in the plural number , as zipporah said to her husband moses : who butcher-like made cruelty his profession , and was never better than when he had his sword sheathed in his country-mens bowels ; so that we may affirm , what succeeding ages will unquestionably maintain : — dicat de tygride natum posteritas — an audacious rebel , that durst aspire from the mean condition of a private person , to the throne , though he first wash'd his hands in the bloud of his soveraign ! he represented the real tragedy of a king and no king ; whose mouth water'd after that title , but that he durst not assume it , being he had fought so long against it , and was sworn to the deposition of all kingship for the future . he , to raise himself on the top of the pyramid of honour , trampled over the heads of the most loyal subjects of the realm ; made a foot-ball of a crown , and endeavoured utterly to extirpate the royal progeny , root and kind , stem and stock : nay , i will be bold to say , if that an innocent babe had been born with vive le roy in his mouth , he must have been food for his sword , as well as the first-born were for herods . it is credibly reported , that hugh peters , that spiritual dragooner , and nol , hatch'd this government as they were walking together in a field : a brace of pious devils ! they would carry the outward shew of sanctity , whenas all their actions proclaim'd them diabolical . there was never so furious an incendiary , as this pious pulpit-cuffer ; nor no machiavel more apt to receive the impression of infernal counsel , who would sacrifice both soul and body to accomplish his own ends , or promote his self-interest . the whole nation was enchained in a more than aegyptian bondage ; who were compelled to submit to this tyrant nol , or be cut off by him ; nothing but a word and a blow , his will was his law ; tell him of magna charta , he would lay his hand on his sword , and cry magna farta : no liberty was granted to the subject , unless it were that of conscience ; and that too was denied the more orthodox and loyal party . the people were rob'd of all laws , rights and priviledges , and sometimes of their lives ; whilst he , like a tyrant , insulted with a quis contradicet ? the citizens were so fleeced and pilled , that had this inhumane barbarous wretch continued much longer , he had sent london into the country a begging . to say god save the king , was a crime as black as any forbidden in the decalogue : but so long as that was prohibited publikely and privately , it was in vain to cry out , god speed the plough , or expect any blessing from the superiour power . his infernal plots and machinations had wrought the utter ruine and desolation of the country , had not providence divine cut him off , to the general benefit and rejoycing of the nation . english ground groaned with the burthen of this inhumane tyrant . it was not enough that the english should be scourged , but the whip must lye before them ; it was not sufficient that he should be the author of all their woes while living , but they must live subject to his tyranny and oppression ; and like so many mutes , condescend to all his actions by silence , not daring to mention the least dislike , though it thwarted their disposition never so much . he was a rod of their own making , and they were content to untruss whilest he whipt them . in vain it was for the most accurate wit to plead reason or law against the sword : the tongue is too weak a weapon for the dagger . during the usurpation of this same hellish tyrant , what a chaos of confusion bespread the face of the whole nation ? how was all the land benegroed with more than the egyptian darkness of persecution ? the whole country was enveloped in clouds , and ruine hung over the heads of the people , by as slender a thread , as the sword over the head of damocles at the banquet . the whole land was entombed in despair , and little or no hope of a resurrection , till a divine hand wrought it by his long-expected death : and it is the cordial wish and hearty desire of the loyal pen-man , that all his majesties and the kingdoms enemies were as stately interred as he was . had he deserved an epitaph , we would have stretch'd hard but our brain should have furnished him with one ; but since he was so unworthy , we hold it as great a disparagement to our quill to bestow a copy of verses on him , as he was a grief and trouble to the loyal party of the nation . and indeed , how can any son of phoebus employ his time so ill , as to salute his dead corpse with an epitaph , that was so great an enemy to them when living ; who had a real design to extirpate all literature , and implunge us into as deep a gulph of ignorance and profaneness as the turk is cast into ? he hated all learning , and the learned , because his crimes were so black and horrid that they went far beyond the mercy of the book . he granted a toleration for all religions , because his own was to choose ; and that he might not offend the tender consciences of his pretended zealots and favourites , who were true vassals to the lust and villany of such an imperious usurper . honesty was so much out of fashion , that he that was vertuous was a malefactor , and deserved death ; for knavery was à la mode ; and you know the old saying , it is as good to be out of the world , as out of the fashion . an honest loyall subject was as much hooted and pointed at , and judged as ridiculous an object , as a spanish don in his country garb at paris . an honest man was as strange a sight in england , as a horse in venice , or a beggar in holland ; and he was as like to be preferred to his favour , as a spurrier was to queen elizabeth . but since he is in his grave ▪ we will not rake up his ashes any farthe●… if he can find any rest there now dead , who living i am sure had little or none in his conscience ; ( for he ever carried a civil war in his breast , of fears , suspicions and jealousies ) he shall lie secure ; for we intend to disturb him no farther . after the death of this british idoll , richard the fourth his son peep'd out ; who had no fault so great , as that he had him to his father ; for it was generally believed , he would be but tenant to the right landlord , or the stuarts steward , to set all things in order till he was restored . but alas ! he prov'd but a fortnights wonder ; no sooner up , but down ; his deposition ( if we may credit report ) was the womanish plot of weeping fleetwoods lady ; who stomach'd it that his preferment should be greater than her husbands , though it proved to little purpose : & indeed , it is seldom known that female counsel ever arrives to any better success ; nor is there any reason that the distaff should be a companion for the scepter . a kitchin was a great deal more fit for her than a throne , though she had ambition enough to perswade her self that she deserved the name of a princess . yet had richard been heir of his fathers parts ( though it was well he was not ) he would soon have frustrated all their designs , and come to as much height and greatness : but he had not enough of the rogue in his composition , to make up a damned politician . he was fitter to bear a hawk on his fist , than to hold a scepter in his hand . a sedentary , retired , country-life , was far more suitable to his temper and disposition , than a tumultuous city-life . he was altogether ignorant in that so much practised profession of piecing the lion with the foxes tail ; which no doubt he might have done , had he been as well read in machiavil as his sire was . he was not much read in politicks , as appears by the small term of time that was allotted him to play the protector . but no matter , it was well it fell out so : he is like to fare the better for it , in the judgement of the most censorious . besides , it was what suited with his phancy ( according to relation ) better than all the usurped power and authority of his predecessor . exit protector , he was but like a pageant , a king in a play ; he only appears upon the stage , makes a leg , and takes his leave of you : but what comes next ? the state-grotescoes will soon resolve you , the business is already hatch'd ; room for a committteedom , which being the second branch of this tripartite anarchy , challenges a place in the fifth chapter . chap. v. of a committeedom . when richard ( as the major part of the gentry do ) had retired himself to his country-house for a mouth-full of fresh air , there starts up another kind of government , hatch'd by a committee of safety ; ( of slavery , they meant ) who were a rude rabble of factious , illiterate , phanatick , disloyal rebels ; a knot of knipperdolings ; of the same stamp with that german botcher , jack-a-leyden : the very merdaille and excrementitious off-scouring of the nation : during which time we might be said to be the true antipodes ; for the shooe was placed above the head : and the nation troubled with such a state-apoplexy , or political meagrim , that it would soon have reel'd to its destruction ( being drunk with rebellion ) had not the heavens made a restautation of our pristine laws and ancient liberty , by the re-establishment of our most gracious soveraign , charles the second . thus did they wheel about the circumference of government , till they hit upon the center , viz. monarchy . how like a senseless body did the nation lie , during this strange unheard-of government ? nor was it a wonder ; for how can the members live without their head ? miserable and despicable was the condition of the natives , so that they became ridiculous to their neighbours ; law lay bleeding , and justice run quite contrary to her institution . learning was of so small esteem and account , that it was thought an incumbrance and prejudice to him that could boast of it . divinity was quite out of date ; churches were pulled down for edification ; to rob cathedrals sacrilegiously , was piety ; the temple was converted into a stable ; so that it might well be said , that horse and man serv'd god alike . the pulpits were hung with blew aprons , and cheapside produced better preachers than cambridge . no order nor decorum in gods house , but all things sluttishly handled ; as if the queen of sciences , divinity , must be cloathed in filthy rags . as if the father of languages understood no language but english , the latine and greek fathers must not be quoted , but were almost come to the chandlers shops to make waste paper . no prayer but what was by the spirit : bold audacious villains , that dare ascend the pulpit , and there talk with god ex tempore . and indeed , most of these spirit-mongers made moving sermons : for not a man of understanding in the church , but would go out before they had done . the orthodox clergy were dis-respected , calumniated , reviled , imprisoned , and executed , what not ? but why , or wherefore , no one knew : as squeamish as these sectaries seemed to be , they could swallow down fat benefices , and never disgorge them . the steeple-houses must down , they were superstitious businesses ; they say , their tender , i say , their large consciences prompted them to these sacrilegious actions ; and all for the promoting of their own filthy lucre and self-interest ; which made them convert those church-utensils that were consecrated to sacred uses , to their own benefit and profit . these foul fiends haunted sacred grounds most , not out of devotion , but gain ; thus was it their dayly practice to learn to leap over steeples : and whereas we used to say , lord encrease our faith ; we might then heartily cry out and say , lord decrease our faiths ; for we had then so many among us , that if a jew or pagan had come to be converted among us , he would have found as much difference in the outward ceremony and preaching of the word , as there is between our tenets and theirs : outward shew and ostentation had almost worm'd out the substance of religion . but this cockatrice ( thanks to heaven ) was crusht in the shell ; this prodigious birth prov'd abortive , almost as soon confounded as conceived . had we suffered those birds of prey to have been fledge ( for they were but pin-feathered ) it might have been said in our proverb , that we brought up birds to pick out our own eyes . but they were all soon got by lowbelling ; these silly wood-cocks were ensnared in a gin laid by the royal party . well may albion acknowledge st george her patron , since we have a trinity of them to protect us ; one st george , and a brace of sir georges . this committee-conventicle of cacodaemons was soon crackt and dissolved ; which hapned very successfully , for else the whole nation had soon come to its dissolution . if ever there was a tower of babel , sure it was here then ; for what could be said of england more justly , than that it was a land of confusion ? now the anabaptists strutted it en cuerpo ; they domineered as if they had been sole masters of the universe : and had liberty to broach their damnable and erroneous opinions in all places without controule : six days shalt thou labour , that part of the commandment they allowed ; and the seventh thou shalt teach , that was their own addition ; at work all the week , and a preaching on sundaies . surely the leaven of these pharisees must be very strong , that can work a cobler out of the stall into the pulpit ; where you might see him thumb the bible with his massey fist , and begins to pitch on a portion of scripture , though he begin at the wrong end of the book ; and then like a fugitive , runs away from the text ( and how can he do otherwise ? for he is beside the last . ) ne sutor ultra creptdam , was an ancient proverb ; but they neglected all antiquity so much , that they pulled down all churches whose outside pronounced them ancient , and crept in holes and corners ; which is enough to evince that they can never be registred inter angelos , who were found so often in angulis : but their deeds of darkness required such dark corners , who if they had appeared in the light , had soon manifested their imbecility and villany : but now we may in the juglers dialect say , presto ! jack lambert and his legion of hobgoblins are vanished ; ingoldsby routed his forces , and secured his person ; where now in the tower he hath so much liberty ( though confined ) as to sing a palinode for his fore-past misdemeanors , if he have but the grace to do so : his hellish crew may wait for his deliverance by an angel , as long as the turks did for the resurrection of their mahomet , and find themselves at length miserably deluded . all which may afford them matter of repentance , if they have but the knowledge to make a spiritual improvement of so gracious an opportunity . but as their reign was short and of small continuance , so will we be , suiting the discourse to the matter discoursed on , and come to the third sort of this new-fangled government , which will take up the last chapter . chap. vi . of the rumpdom . the subject of this discourse being concerning the rump , we thought fit to place it in the buttock of our book , that so we may come to an end by discoursing of an end , a fag-end of parliament , the rump . it is credibly reported , that noble brown was their godfather , and bestowed this name upon these arse-worms ; which proves him to be as good a nomenclator as adam , who gave names according to the nature of the beasts that came before him ; and so did he ; which was , and will continue to be a brand upon them ( notwithstanding the vote that past in the house for a fifty pound forfeiture on every person that should call them by that name ) and their posterity , so long as the sun and moon endures . had he searched all the dictionaries that ever were extant , he could never have found out a term more suitable for them . had these beasts been to enter the ark , it would have puzzled noah himself to have suited them into pairs . this rump was made up of a rabble of rude , illiterate , rebellious fellows ; a heap or cluster of mechanicks ; that intended to reduce the nation to as much slavery and servility , as they themselves were born to . and first of all , let us nip hesilrig ; that wide-mouth'd fellow , that could swallow down church and bishops lands without any scruple or conscience : so furious a villain , that he was able to set a whole kingdom in combustion : one , that would have made a bonefire of the city , so that he might but have warm'd his hands thereby , rather than fail . so horrible a mammonist , that he was resolved to cram his coffers , though he starved his conscience : so that lord have mercy upon rich sir a. hesilrig a sinner , might have been the sum of his letany . desborow , that bloudy beef-brain'd wretch falls under our description next ; who was a state hay-gee-ho , or carter ; and never shall come to the honour to be waggoner to charles his wain ; who still thought , when he sate in the parliament , that he was whistling to the country teem ; and therefore alwaies endeavoured to ride the citizens , and make asses of them . but indeed , to speak truth , we cannot much blame the man ; for he was ever so much used to the whip , that he must still be lashing where-ever he came . yet one would have thought he might have spit in his hand and took better hold ; for now his whip may prove like a rod for his own breech : but no matter , every school-boy could have told him , that the rump used to pay for all faults ; and he might have remembred that we have a proverb runs thus , the pot goes not so often to the water , but it comes broke home at last ; which no doubt he will soon be made sensible of . but i am weary with whistling to this brawny boor . enter scot : his very name implies treachery ; as treacherous as a scot , is old , though true ; and may be appliable to him : for they are as true types one of the other , as the dragon of the devil . a bitter enemy to kingship he was , and one that had the impudence to affirm publikely ( so report informs me ) that he was one of the chiefest that sate in the highest court of injustice for the executing of charles the first ; and were it to do again , he would be as ready upon that design as ever . sure he was some kin to a tinker , he proves himself such a man of metal . surge harry martin ; shew thy smock-face : well might he be a rumper , he delighted so much in the tail . a lewd dissolute fellow ; fitter to walk before a party of whores , than to lead up a regiment of horse . this is one of that sanctified crew , that would procure any business to be done , if a female , from whom he might but expect a kindness , put up the petition . but he was once handsomly fitted by a handsome girl ; which action made the name of trepan first known in england : his lustful desire , though unaccomplished , cost two hundred pounds in sawce ; only they were so civil to bestow a dinner of him , inviting some other of the members of this mock-parliament , only to divulge the frollick . henceforth , harry , take this advice as from a friend , beware of all such costly petitions , if ever it be thy hap to prefer any more . but to dwell upon particulars thus , would require a volume : i must hasten , since i am come to the end . thus did nol and the rump play at nose in a — with the nation , intending ( as it is thought ) to stink the people out of their dominions , and to remain with their confederates lords of great britain . ( as for the rumpers , they provided a scavenger ) to sweep london-streets ; and he hath swept them away , and made the house clean for more deserving persons . i wonder what benefit did ever accrew to the nation by their acts and ordinances ; or when did they ever attempt any thing , but , tinker-wise , in mending one hole they made three ? all their consultations tended only to their own preferment . a knot of gnawing vermine , that fed upon the fat of the land ; a company of book-worms , who , because ignorant themselves , were resolved to destroy all learning , and implunge the people into an abyss of brutishness and barbarism : and make them subscribe to , and approve of whatsoever their dunghil spirits prompted them to . but i must draw to a period . this new-fangled model you have under the notion of modern policy ( though it is a favour to call it so ) for rebellion it should be ; but i was unwilling to front my page with so formidable a title . for the nation hath been too too long sensible of the heavy effects of rebellion ; which have lighted somewhat hard upon their shoulders . the latter part of this piece , i confess , differs from the former , as much as heraclitus from democritus ; yet it is no offence , i presume , ( if i may be thought a sufficient apothecary ) to put a scruple of mirth into a dose of seriousness ; wherefore i shall conclude with what i ever made my motto , — non seria semper . finis . patriarcha, or, the natural power of kings by the learned sir robert filmer. filmer, robert, sir, d. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing f estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) patriarcha, or, the natural power of kings by the learned sir robert filmer. filmer, robert, sir, d. . [ ], p. : port. printed and are to be sold by walter davis ..., london : . frontispiece: engraved portrait of charles ii. errata on p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . monarchy. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread - tcp staff (michigan) text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion carolus secundus dei gratia , angliae , scotiae , franciae , et hiberniae rex , fidei defensor etc. patriarcha : or the natural power of kings . by the learned sir robert filmer , baronet . lucan . lib. . libertas — populi , quem regna coercent libertate perit — claudian . fallitur , egregio quisquis sub principe oredit servitium ; nusquam libertas gratior extat quam sub rege pio — . london , printed , and are to be sold by walter davis book-binder , in amen-corner , near pater-noster-row , . the copy of a letter written by the late learned dr. peter heylyn , to sir edward filmer , son of the worthy author , concerning this book and his other political discourses . sir , how great a loss i had in the death of my most dear and honoured friend , your deceased father , no man is able to conjecture , but he that hath suffered in the like . so affable was his conversation , his discourse so rational , his judgment so exact in most parts of learning , and his affections to the church so exemplary in him , that i never enjoyed a greater felicity in the company of any man living , than i did in his : in which respects i may affirm both with safety and modesty , that we did not only take sweet counsel together , but walked in the house of god as friends : i must needs say , i was prepared for that great blow , by the loss of my preferment in the church of westminster , which gave me the opportunity of so dear and beloved a neighbourhood ; so that i lost him partly before he died , which made the misery the more supportable , when i was deprived of him for altogether . but i was never more sensible of the infelicity , than i am at this present , in reference to that satisfaction , which i am sure he could have given the gentleman whom i am to deal with : his eminent abilities in these political disputes , exemplified in his judicious observations upon aristotles politiques ; as also in some passages on grotius , hunton , hobbs , and other of our late discoursers about forms of government , declare abundantly how fit a man he might have been to have dealt in this cause , which i would not willingly should be betrayed by unskilful handling : and had he pleased to have suffered his excellent discourse called patriarcha to appear in publick , it would have given such satisfaction to all our great masters in the schools of politie , that all other tractates in that kind , had been found unnecessary . vide certamen epistolare . . the contents . chap. i. that the first kings were fathers of families . ( ) the tenent of the natural liberty of the people , new , plausible , and dangerous . ( ) the question stated out of bellarmine , and some contradictions of his noted . ( ) bellarmine's argument answered out of bellarmine himself . ( ) the royal authority of the patriarchs before the flood . ( ) the dispersion of nations over the world after the confusion of babel , was by entire families , over which the fathers were kings . ( ) and from them all kings descended . ( ) all kings are either fathers of their people : ( ) or heirs of such fathers , or vsurpers of the right of such fathers . ( ) of the escheating of kingdoms . ( ) of regal and paternal power and of their agreement . chap. ii. it is unnatural for the people to govern , or chose governours . ( ) aristotle examined about the fredom of the people , and justisied . ( ) suarez disputes against the regality of adam . ( ) families diversly defined by aristotle , bodin , and others . ( ) suarez contradicting bellarmine . ( ) of election of kings , ( ) by the major part of the people , ( ) by proxie , and by silent acceptation . ( ) no example in scripture of the peoples choosing their king. mr. hookers judgement therein . ( ) god governed alwayes by monarchy . ( ) bellarmine and aristotles judgement of monarchy . ( ) imperfections of the roman democratie . ( ) rome began her empire under kings , and perfected it under emperours . in danger the people of rome always fled to monarchy . ( ) vvhether democraties were invented to bridle tyrants , or whether they crept in by stealth . ( ) democraties vilified by their own historians . ( ) popular government more bloody than tyranny . ( ) of a mixed government of the king and people . ( ) the people may not judge nor correct their king. ( ) no tyrants in england since the conquest . chap. iii. positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of kings . ( ) regal authority not subject to positive laws . kings were before laws . the kings of judah and israel not tyed to laws . ( ) of samuel's description of a king. ( ) the power ascribed to kings in the new testament . ( ) vvhether laws were invented to bridle tyrants . ( ) the benefit of laws . ( ) kings keep the laws , though not bound by the laws . ( ) of the oaths of kings . ( ) of the benefit of the kings prerogative over laws . ( ) the king the author , the interpreter , and corrector of the common laws . ( ) the king iudge in all causes both before the conquest and since . ( ) the king and his councel anciently determined causes in the star-chamber . ( ) of parliaments . ( ) vvhen the people were first called to parliaments . ( ) the liberty of parliaments not from nature , but from the grace of princes . ( ) the king alone makes laws in parliament . ( ) he governs both houses by himselfe , ( ) or by his councel , ( ) or by his iudges . errata . page . line . for calume read calvin . chap. i. that the first kings were fathers of families . ( ) the tenent of the natural liberty of mankind , new , plausible , and dangerous . ( ) the question stated out of bellarmine : some contradictions of his noted . ( ) bellarmine's argument answered out of bellarmine himself . ( ) the royal authority of the patriarchs before the flood . ( ) the dispersion of nations over the world after the confusion of babel , was by entire families , over which the fathers were kings . ( ) and from them all kings descended . ( ) all kings are either fathers of their people , ( ) or heirs of such fathers , or vsurpers of the right of such fathers . ( ) of the escheating of kingdoms . ( ) of regal and paternal power , and their agreement . since the time that school-divinity began to flourish , there hath been a common opinion maintained , as well by divines , as by divers other learned men , which affirms , mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom from all subjection , and at liberty to choose what form of government it please : and that the power which any one man hath over others , was at first bestowed according to the discretion of the multitude . this tenent was first hatched in the schools , and hath been fostered by all succeeding papists for good divinity . the divines also of the reformed churches have entertained it , and the common people every where tenderly embrace it , as being most plausible to flesh and blood , for that it prodigally destributes a portion of liberty to the meanest of the multitude , who magnifie liberty , as if the height of humane felicity were only to be found in it , never remembring that the desire of liberty was the first cause of the fall of adam . but howsoever this vulgar opinion hath of late obtained a great reputation , yet it is not to be found in the ancient fathers and doctors of the primitive church : it contradicts the doctrine and history of the holy scriptures , the constant practice of all ancient monarchies , and the very principles of the law of nature . it is hard to say whether it be more erroneous in divinity , or dangerous in policy . yet upon the ground of this doctrine both iesuites , and some other zealous favourers of the geneva discipline , have built a perillous conclusion , which is , that the people or multitude have power to punish , or deprive the prince , if he transgress the laws of the kingdom ; witness parsons and buchanan : the first under the name of dolman , in the third chapter of his first book labours to prove , that kings have been lawfully chastised by their commonwealths : the latter in his book de jure regni apud scotos , maintains a liberty of the people to depose their prince . cardinal bellarmine and calume , both look asquint this way . this desperate assertion whereby kings are made subject to the censures and deprivations of their subjects , follows ( as the authors of it conceive ) as a necessary consequence of that former position of the supposed natural equality and freedom of mankind , and liberty to choose what form of government it please . and though sir iohn heyward , adam blackwood , iohn barclay , and some others have learnedly confuted both buchanan and parsons , and bravely vindicated the right of kings in most points , yet all of them , when they come to the argument drawn from the natural liberty and equality of mankind , do with one consent admit it for a truth unquestionable , not so much as once denying or opposing it ; whereas if they did but confute this first erroneous principle , the whole fabrick of this vast engine of popular sedition would drop down of it self . the rebellious consequence which follows this prime article of the natural freedom of mankind may be my sufficient warrant for a modest examination of the original truth of it ; much hath been said , and by many , for the affirmative ; equity requires that an ear be reserved a little for the negative . in this discourse i shall give my self these cautions : first , i have nothing to do to medle with mysteries of state , such arcana imperii , or cabinet-councels , the vulgar may not pry into . an implicite faith is given to the meanest artificer in his own craft , how much more is it then due to a prince in the profound secrets of government ? the causes and ends of the greatest politique actions and motions of state dazle the eyes , and exceed the capacities of all men , save only those that are hourly versed in the managing publique affairs : yet since the rule for each men to know in what to obey his prince , cannot be learnt without a relative knowledge of those points wherein a sovereign may command , it is necessary when the commands and pleasures of superiours come abroad and call for an obedience , that every man himself know how to regulate his actions or his sufferings ; for according to the quality of the thing commanded , an active or passive obedience is to be yielded ; and this is not to limit the princes power , but the extent of the subjects obedience , by giving to caesar the things that are caesar's , &c. secondly , i am not to question , or quarrel at the rights or liberties of this or any other nation ; my task is chiefly to enquire from whom these first came , not to dispute what , or how many these are ; but whether they were derived from the laws of natural liberty , or from the grace and bounty of princes . my desire and hope is , that the people of england may and do enjoy as ample privileges as any nation under heaven ; the greatest liberty in the world ( if it be duely considered ) is for a people to live under a monarch . it is the magna charta of this kingdom , all other shews or pretexts of liberty , are but several degrees of slavery , and a liberty only to destroy liberty . if such as maintain the natural liberty of mankind , take offence at the liberty i take to examine it , they must take heed that they do not deny by retail , that liberty which they affirm by whole-sale : for , if the thesis be true , the hypothesis will follow , that all men may examine their own charters , deeds , or evidences by which they claim and hold the inheritance or freehold of their liberties . thirdly , i must not detract from the worth of all those learned men , who are of a contrary opinion in the point of natural liberty : the profoundest scholar that ever was known hath not been able to search out every truth that is discoverable ; neither aristotle in philosophy , nor hooker in divinity . they are but men , yet i reverence their judgements in most points , and confess my self beholding to their errors too in this ; something that i found amiss in their opinions , guided me in the discovery of that truth which ( i perswade my self ) they missed . a dwarf sometimes may see that which a giant looks over ; for whilest one truth is curiously searched after , another must necessarily be neglected . late writers have taken up too much upon trust from the subtile school-men , who to be sure to thrust down the king below the pope , thought it the safest course to advance the people above the king , that so the papal power might take place of the regal . thus many an ignorant subject hath been fooled into this faith , that a man may become a martyr for his countrey , by being a traytor to his prince ; whereas the new-coyned distinction of subjects into royallists and patriots , is most unnatural , since the relation between king and people is so great , that their well-being is so reciprocal . ( ) to make evident the grounds of this question , about the natural liberty of mankind , i will lay down some passages of cardinal bellarmine , that may best unfold the state of this controversie . secular or civil power ( saith he ) is instituted by men ; it is in the people , unless they bestow it on a prince . this power is immediately in the whole multitude , as in the subject of it ; for this power is in the divine law , but the divine law hath given this power to no particular man — if the positive law be taken away , there is left no reason , why amongst a multitude ( who are equal ) one rather than another should bear rule over the rest . — power is given by the multitude to one man , or to more , by the same law of nature ; for the commonwealth cannot exercise this power , therefore it is bound to bestow it upon some one man , or some few . — it depends upon the consent of the multitude to ordain over themselves a king , or consul , or other magistrates ; and if there be a lawful cause , the multitude may change the kingdom into an aristocracy or democracy . thus far bellarmine ; in which passages are comprised the strength of all that ever i have read , or heard produced for the natural liberty of the subject . before i examine or refute these doctrines , i must a little make some observations upon his words . first , he saith , that by the law of god , power is immediately in the people ; hereby he makes god to be the immediate author of a democratical estate ; for a democracy is nothing else but the power of the multitude . if this be true , not only aristocracies , but all monarchies are altogether unlawful , as being ordained ( as he thinks ) by men , whenas god himself hath chosen a democracy . secondly , he holds , that although a democracy be the ordinance of god , yet the people have no power to use the power which god hath given them , but only power to give away their power ; whereby it followeth , that there can be no democratical government , because he saith , the people must give their power to one man , or to some few ; which maketh either a regal or aristocratical estate ; which the multitude is tyed to do , even by the same law of nature which originally gave them the power : and why then doth he say , the multitude may change the kingdom into a democracy ? thirdly , he concludes , that if there be a lawful cause , the multitude may change the kingdom . here i would fain know who shall judge of this lawful cause ? if the multitude ( for i see no body else can ) then this is a pestilent and dangerous conclusion . ( ) i come now to examine that argument which is used by bellarmine , and is the one and only argument i can find produced by my author for the proof of the natural liberty of the people . it is thus framed : that god hath given or ordained power , is evident by scripture ; but god hath given it to no particular person , because by nature all men are equal ; therefore he hath given power to the people , or multitude . to answer this reason , drawn from the equality of mankind by nature , i will first use the help of bellarmine himself , whose very words are these : if many men had been together created out of the earth , they all ought to have been princes over their posterity . in these words we have an evident confession , that creation made man prince of his posterity . and indeed not only adam , but the succeeding patriarchs had , by right of father-hood , royal authority over their children . nor dares bellarmine deny this also . that the patriarchs ( saith he ) were endowed with kingly power , their deeds do testifie ; for as adam was lord of his children , so his children under him , had a command and power over their own children ; but still with subordination to the first parent , who is lord-paramout over his childrens children to all generations , as being the grand-father of his people . ( ) i see not then how the children of adam , or of any man else can be free from subjection to their parents : and this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority , by the ordination of god himself ; it follows , that civil power not only in general is by divine institution , but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents , which quite takes away that new and common distinction , which refers only power universal and absolute to god ; but power respective , in regard of the special form of government , to the choice of the people . this lordship which adam by command had over the whole world , and by right descending from him the patriarchs did enjoy , was as large and ample as the absolutest dominion of any monarch which hath been since the creation : for dominion of life and death , we find that iudah the father pronounced sentence of death against thamar his daughter-in-law , for playing the harlot ; bring her forth ( saith he ) that she may be burnt . touching war , we see that abram commanded an army of souldiers of his own family . and esau met his brother iacob with men at arms. for matter of peace , abraham made a league with abimelech , and ratified the articles with an oath . these acts of judging in capital crimes , of making war , and concluding peace , are the chiefest marks of sovereignty that are found in any monarch . ( ) not only until the flood , but after it , this patriarchal power did continue , as the very name patriarch doth in part prove . the three sons of noah had the whole world divided amongst them by their father ; for of them was the whole world over-spread , according to the benediction given to him and his sons , be fruitful and multiply , and replenish the earth . most of the civilest nations of the earth labour to fetch their original from some one of the sons or nephews of noah , which were scattered abroad after the confusion of babel : in this dispersion we must certainly find the establishment of regal power throughout the kingdoms of the world. it is a common opinion , that at the confusion of tongues there were distinct nations erected , all which were not confused multitudes , without heads or governours , and at liberty to choose what governours or government they pleased ; but they were distinct families , which had fathers for rulers over them ; whereby it appears that even in the confusion god was careful to preserve the fatherly authority , by distributing the diversity of languages according to the diversity of families ; for so plainly it appears by the text : first , after the enumeration of the sons of iaphet , the conclusion is , by these were the isles of the gentiles divided in their lands , every one after his tongue , after their families , in their nations ; so it is said : these are the sons of ham after their families , after their tongues , in their countreys , and in their nations . the like we read , these are the sons of shem after their families , after their tongues , in their lands , after their nations . these are the families of the sons of noah after their generations in their nations ; and by these were these nations divided in the earth , after the flood . in this division of the world , some are of opinion that noah used lots for the distribution of it ; others affirm he sayled about the mediterranean sea in ten years , and as he went about , appointed to each son his part , and so made the division of the then known world into asia , africa , and europe , ( according to the number of his sons ) the limits of which three parts are all found in that midland sea. ( ) but howsoever the manner of this division be uncertain , yet it is most certain the division it self was by families from noah and his children , over which the parents were heads and princes . amongst these was nimrod , who no doubt ( as sir walter raleigh affirms ) was , by good right , lord or king over his family ; yet against right did he enlarge his empire , by seizing violently on the rights of other lords of families : and in this sense he may be said to be the author and first founder of monarchy . and all those that do attribute unto him the original regal power , do hold he got it by tyranny or usurpation , and not by any due election of the people or multitude , or by any faction with them . as this patriarchal power continued in abraham , isaac , and iacob , even until the egyptian bondage ; so we find it amongst the sons of ismael and esau. it is said , these are the sons of ismael , and these are their names by their castles and towns , twelve princes of their tribes and families . and these are the names of the dukes that came of esau , according to their families & their places by their nations . ( ) some perhaps may think that these princes and dukes of families were but some petty lords under some greater kings , because the number of them are so many , that their particular territories could be but small , and not worthy the title of kingdoms ; but they must consider , that at first , kings had no such large dominions as they have now adays ; we find in the time of abraham , which was about years after the flood , that in a little corner of asia , kings at once met in batail , most of which were but kings of cities apiece , with the adjacent territories , as of sodom , gomorrah , shinar , &c. in the same chapter is mention of melchisedeck king of salem , which was but the city of ierusalem . and in the catalogue of the kings of edom , the names of each king's city is recorded , as the only mark to distinguish their dominions . in the land of canaan , which was but a small circuit , ioshuah destroyed thirty one kings ; and about the same time , adonibeseck had kings , whose hands and toes he had cut off , and made them feed under his table . a few years after this , kings came to benhadad king of syria , and about seventy kings of greece went to the wars of troy. caesar found more kings in france , than there be now princes there , and at his sailing over into this island , he found four kings in our county of kent . these heaps of kings in each nation , are an argument their territories were but small , and strongly confirms our assertion , that erection of kingdoms came at first only by distinction of families . by manifest footsteps we may trace this paternal government unto the israelites coming into aegypt , where the exercise of supreme patriarchal jurisdiction was intermitted , because they were in subjection to a stronger prince . after the return of these israelites out of bondage , god out of a special care of them , chose moses and iosuah successively to govern as princes in the place and stead of the supreme fathers : and after them likewise for a time , he raised up iudges , to defend his people in time of peril . but when god gave the israelites kings , he reestablished the antient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government . and whensoever he made choice of any special person to be king , he intended that the issue also should have benefit thereof , as being comprehended sufficiently in the person of the father , although the father only was named in the graunt . ( . ) it may seem absurd to maintain that kings now are the fathers of their people , since experience shews the contrary . it is true , all kings be not the natural parents of their subjects , yet they all either are , or are to be reputed the next heirs to those first progenitors , who were at first the natural parents of the whole people , and in their right succeed to the exercise of supreme iurisdiction ; and such heirs are not only lords of their own children , but also of their brethren , and all others that were subject to their fathers : and therefore we find , that god told cain of his brother abel , his desires shall be subject unto thee , and thou shalt rule over him . accordingly , when iacob bought his brother's birth-right , isaac blessed him thus , be lord over thy brethren , and let the sons of thy mother bow before thee . as long as the first fathers of families lived , the name of patriarchs did aptly belong unto them ; but after a few descents , when the true fatherhood it self was extinct , and only the right of the father descends to the true heir , then the title of prince or king was more significant , to express the power of him who succeeds only to the right of that fatherhood which his ancestors did naturally enjoy ; by this means it comes to pass , that many a child , by succeeding a king , hath the right of a father over many a gray-headed multitude , and hath the title of pater patriae . ( . ) it may be demanded what becomes of the right of fatherhood , in case the crown does escheate for want of an heir ? whether doth it not then devolve to the people ? the answer is , it is but the negligence or ignorance of the people to lose the knowledge of the true heir : for an heir there always is . if adam himself were still living , and now ready to die , it is certain that there is one man , and but one in the world who is next heir , although the knowledge who should be that one one man be quite lost . . this ignorance of the people being admitted , it doth not by any means follow ; that for want of heirs the supreme power is devolved to the multitude , and that they have power to rule , and chose what rulers they please . no , the kingly power escheats in such cases to the princes and independent heads of families : for every kingdom is resolved into those parts whereof at first it was made . by the uniting of great families or petty kingdoms , we find the greater monarchies were at the first erected ; and into such again , as into their first matter many times they return again . and because the dependencie of ancient families is oft obscure or worn out of knowledge ; therefore the wisdom of all or most princes have thought sit to adopt many times those for heads of families , and princes of provinces , whose merits , abilities , or fortunes , have enobled them , or made them fit and capable of such regal favours . all such prime heads and fathers have power to consent in the uniting or conferring of their fatherly right of sovereign authority on whom they please : and he that is so elected , claims not his power as a donative from the people ; but as being substituted properly by god , from whom he receives his royal charter of an vniversal father , though testified by the ministry of the heads of the people . if it please god , for the correction of the prince , or punishment of the people , to suffer princes to be removed , and others to be placed in their rooms , either by the factions of the nobility , or rebellion of the people ; in all such cases , the judgment of god , who hath power to give and to take away kingdoms , is most just : yet the ministry of men who execute god's judgments without commission , is sinful and damnable . god doth but use and turn mens vnrighteous acts to the performance of his righteous decrees . ( . ) in all kingdoms or common-wealths in the world , whether the prince be the supreme father of the people , or but the true heir of such a father , or whether he come to the crown by usurpation , or by election of the nobles , or of the people , or by any other way whatsoever ; or whether some few or a multitude govern the commonwealth : yet still the authority that is in any one , or in many , or in all these , is the only right and natural authority of a supreme father . there is and always shall be continued to the end of the world , a natural right of a supreme father over every multitude , although by the secret will of god , many at first do most unjustly obtain the exercise of it . to confirm this natural right of regal power , we find in the decalogue , that the law which enjoyns obedience to kings , is delivered in the terms of honour thy father , as if all power were originally in the father . if obedience to parents be immediately due by a natural law , and subjection to princes , but by the mediation of an humane ordinance ; what reason is there that the laws of nature should give place to the laws of men ? as we see the power of the father over his child , gives place , and is subordinate to the power of the magistrate . if we compare the natural rights of a father with those of a king , we find them all one , without any difference at all , but only in the latitude or extent of them : as the father over one family , so the king as father over many families extends his care to preserve , feed , cloth , instruct and defend the whole commonwealth . his war , his peace , his courts of justice , and all his acts of sovereignty tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferiour father , and to their children , their rights and privileges ; so that all the duties of a king are summed up in an universal fatherly care of his people . chap. ii. it is unnatural for the people to govern , or chose governours . ( . ) aristotle examined about the freedom of the people , and justified . ( . ) suarez disputing against the regality of adam . ( . ) families diversly defined by aristotle , bodin and others . ( . ) suarez contradicting bellarmine . ( . ) of election of kings . ( . ) by the major part of the people . ( . ) by proxy , and by silent acceptation . ( . ) no example in scripture of the peoples chosing their king , mr. hooker's iudgment therein . ( . ) god governed always by monarchy . ( . ) bellarmine and aristotle's iudgment of monarchy . ( . ) imperfections of the roman democratie . ( . ) rome began her empire under kings , and perfected under emperours . in danger , the people of rome always fled to monarchy . ( . ) whether democraties were invented to bridle tyrants , or rather that they came in by stealth . ( . ) democraties vilified by their own historians . ( . ) popular government more bloody than tyranny . ( . ) of a mixed government of the king and people . ( . ) the people may not judge or correct their king. ( . ) no tyrants in england since the conquest . ( . ) by conferring these proofs and reasons drawn from the authority of the scripture , it appears little less than a paradox which bellarmine and others affirm of the freedom of the multitude , to chose what rulers they please . had the patriarchs their power given them by their own children ? bellarmine does not say it , but the contrary : if then the fatherhood enjoyed this authority for so many ages by the law of nature , when was it lost , or when forfeited , or how is it devolved to the liberty of the multitude ? because the scripture is not favourable to the liberty of the people ; therefore many fly to natural reason , and to the authority of aristotle . i must crave liberty to examine or explain the opinion of this great philosopher ; but briefly , i find this sentence in the third of his politiques . cap. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it seems to some not to be natural for one man to be lord of all the citizens , since a city consists of equals . d. lambine in his latine interpretation of this text , hath omitted the translation of this word [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] by this means he maketh that to be the opinion of aristotle , which aristotle alleadgeth to be the opinion but of some . this negligence , or wilful escape of lambine , in not translating a word so material , hath been an occasion to deceive many , who looking no farther than this latine translation , have concluded , and made the world now of late believe , that aristotle here maintains a natural equality of men ; and not only our english translator of aristotle's politiques is in this place misled by following lambine ; but even the learned monsieur duvall in his synopsis bears them company : and yet this version of lambine's is esteemed the best , and printed at paris with causabon's corrected greek copy , though in the rendring of this place , the elder translations have been more faithful ; and he that shall compare the greek text with the latine , shall find that causabon had just cause in his preface to aristotle's works , to complain that the best translations of aristotle did need correction : to prove that in these words which seem to favour the equality of mankind , aristotle doth not speak according to his own judgment , but recites only the opinion of others ; we find him clearly deliver his own opinion , that the power of government did originally arise from the right of fatherhood , which cannot possibly consist with that natural equality which men dream of : for in the first of his politiques he agrees exactly with the scripture , and lays this foundation of government , the first society ( saith he ) made of many houses is a village , which seems most naturally to be a colony of families or foster brethren of children and childrens children . and therefore at the beginning , cities were under the government of kings , for the eldest in every house is king : and so for kindred-sake it is in colonies . and in the fourth of his politiques , cap. , he gives the title of the first and divinest sort of government to the institution of kings , by defining tyranny to be a digression from the first and divinest . whosoever weighs advisedly these passages , will find little hope of natural reason in aristotle to prove the natural liberty of the multitude . also before him the divine plato concludes a commonweal to be nothing else but a large family . i know for this position aristotle quarrels with his master , but most unjustly , for therein he contradicts his own principles : for they both agree to fetch the original of civil government from the prime government . no doubt but moses's history of the creation guided these two philosophers in finding out of this lineal subjection , deduced from the laws of the first parents , according to that rule of st. chrysostom , god made all mankind of one man , that he might teach the world to be governed by a king , and not by a multitude . the ignorance of the creation , occasioned several errors amongst the heathen philosophers . polybius , though otherwise a most profound philosopher , and judicious historian , yet here he stumbles ; for in searching out the original of civil societies , he conceited , that multitudes of men after a deluge , a famine , or a pestilence , met together like herds of cattel without any dependency , untill the strongest bodies and boldest minds got the mastery of their fellows ; even as it is ( saith he ) among bulls , bears and cocks . and aristotle himself , forgetting his first doctrine , tells us , the first heroical kings were chosen by the people for their deserving well of the multitude ; either by teaching them some new arts , or by warring for them , or by gathering them together , or by dividing land amongst them ; also aristotle had another fancy , that those men who prove wise of mind , were by nature intended to be lords , and govern , and those which were strong of body were ordained to obey , and to be servants . but this is a dangerous and uncertain rule , and not without some folly ; for if a man prove both wise and strong , what will aristotle have done with him ? as he was wise , he could be no servant , and as he had strength , he could not be a master ; besides , to speak like a philosopher , nature intends all things to be perfect both in wit and strength . the folly or imbecillity proceeds from some errour in generation or education ; for nature aims at perfection in all her works . ( ) suarez the jesuite riseth up against the royal authority of adam , in defence of the freedom and liberty of the people ; and thus argues . by right of creation ( saith he ) adam had only oeconomical power , but not political ; he had a power over his wife , and a fatherly power over his sons , whilst they were not made free : he might also in process of time have servants and a compleat family ; and in that family he might have compleat oeconomical power . but after that families began to be multiplied , and men to be separated , and become the heads of several families ; they had the same power over their families . but political power did not begin , until families began to be gathered together into one perfect community ; wherefore as the community did not begin by the creation of adam , nor by his will alone , but of all them which did agree in this community : so we cannot say that adam naturally had political primacy in that community ; for that cannot be gathered by any natural principles , because by the force of the law of nature alone , it is not due unto any progenitor , to be also king of his posterity . and if this be not gathered out of the principles of nature , we cannot say , god by a special gift or providence gave him this power ; for there is no revelation of this , nor testimony of scripture . hitherto suarez . whereas he makes adam to have a fatherly power over his sons , and yet shuts up this power within one family , he seems either to imagine , that all adam's children lived within one house , and under one roof with their father ; or else , as soon as any of his children lived out of his house , they ceased to be subject , and did thereby become free. for my part , i cannot believe that adam ( although he were sole monarch of the world ) had any such spacious palace , as might contain any such considerable part of his children . it is likelier , that some mean cottage or tent did serve him to keep his court in . it were hard he should lose part of his authority , because his children lay not within the walls of his house . but if suarez will allow all adam's children to be of his family , howsoever they were separate in dwellings ; if their habitations were either contiguous , or at such distance , as might easily receive his fatherly commands . and that all that were under his commands , were of his family , although they had many children or servants married , having themselves also children . then i see no reason , but that we may call adam's family a commonwealth , except we will wrangle about words : for adam living years , and seeing or descents from himself , he might live to command of his children and their posterity a multitude far bigger , than many commonwealths and kingdoms . ( . ) i know the politicians and civil lawyers do not agree well about the definition of a family , and bodin doth seem in one place to confine it to a house ; yet in his definition , he doth enlarge his meaning to all persons under the obedience of one and the same head of the family ; and he approves better of the propriety of the hebrew word for a family , which is derived from a word that signifies a head , a prince , or lord , than the greek word for a family , which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies a house . nor doth aristotle confine a family to one house ; but esteems it to be made of those that daily converse together : whereas before him , charondas called a family homosypioi , those that feed together out of one common pannier . and epimenides the cretian , terms a family homocapnoi , those that sit by a common fire , or smoak . but let suarez understand what he please by adam's family ; if he will but confess , as he needs must , that adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death , of peace and war , and the like , within their houses or families ; he must give , us leave at least , to call them kings of their houses or families ; and if they be so by the law of nature , what liberty will be left to their children to dispose of ? aristotle gives the lie to plato , and those that say political and oeconomical societies are all one , and do not differ specie , but only multitudine & paucitate ; as if there were no difference betwixt a great house and a little city . all the argument i find he brings against them in this . the community of man and wife , differs from the community of master and servant , because they have several ends. the intention of nature by conjunction of male and female , is generation ; but the scope of master and servant , is preservation : so that a wife and a servant are by nature distinguished , because nature does not work like the cutlers of delphos , for she makes but one thing for one use. if we allow this argument to be sound , nothing doth follow but only this , that conjugal and despotical communities do differ . but it is no consequence , that therefore , oeconomical and political societies do the like : for though it prove a family to consist of two distinct communities , yet it follows not , that a family and a commonwealth are distinct ; because , as well in the commonweal , as in the families , both these communities are found . and as this argument comes not home to our point , so it is not able to prove that title which it shews for ; for if it should be granted ( which yet is false ) that generation and preservation differ about the individuum , yet they agree in the general , and serve both for the conservation of mankind ; even as several servants differ in the particular ends or offices ; as one to brew , and another to bake ; yet they agree in the general preservation of the family . besides , aristotle confesses , that amongst the barbarians ( as he calls all them that are not grecians ) a wife and a servant are the same , because by nature , no barbarian is fit to govern ; it is fit the grecians should rule over the barbarians ; for by nature a servant and a barbarian is all one : their family consists only of an ox for a man-servant , and a wife for a maid ; so they are fit only to rule their wives and their beasts . lastly , aristotle ( if it had pleased him ) might have remembred , that nature doth not always make one thing but for one use : he knows , the tongue serves both to speak , and to taste . ( . ) but to leave aristotle , and return to suarez ; he saith that adam had fatherly power over his sons , whilst they were not made free. here i could wish that the jesuite had taught us , how and when sons become free : i know no means by the law of nature . it is the favour i think of the parents only , who when their children are of age and discretion to ease their parents of part of their fatherly care , are then content to remit some part of their fatherly authority ; therefore the custom of some countreys doth in some cases enfranchise the children of inferiour parents , but many nations have no such custome , but on the contrary have strict laws for the obedience of children : the judicial law of moses giveth full power to the father to stone his disobedient son , so it be done in presence of a magistrate : and yet it did not belong to the magistrate to enquire and examine the justness of the cause ; but it was so decreed , lest the father should in his anger , suddenly , or secretly kill his son. also by the laws of the persians , and of the people of the upper asia , and of the gaules , and by the laws of the west-indies , the parents have power of life and death over their children . the romans , even in their most popular estate , had this law in force , and this power of parents was ratified and amplified by the laws of the twelve tables , to the enabling of parents to sell their children two or three times over . by the help of the fatherly power , rome long flourished , and oftentimes was freed from great dangers . the fathers have drawn out of the very assemblies their own sons ; when being tribunes , they have published laws tending to sedition . memorable is the example of cassius , who threw his son headlong out of the consistory , publishing the law agraria , for the division of lands , in the behoof of the people ; and afterwards , by his own private judgment put him to death , by throwing him down from the tarpeian rock ; the magistrates and people standing thereat amazed , and not daring to resist his fatherly authority , although they would with all their hearts , have had that law for the division of land : by which it appears , it was lawful for the father to dispose of the life of his child , contrary to the will of the magistrates or people . the romans also had a law , that what the children got , was not their own , but their fathers ; although solon made a law , which acquitted the son from nourishing of his father , if his father had taught him no trade , whereby to get his living . suarez proceeds , and tells us , that in process of time , adam had compleat oeconomical power . i know not what this compleat oeconomical power is , nor how , or what it doth really and essentially differ from political : if adam did , or might exercise the same jurisdiction , which a king doth now in a commonwealth , then the kinds of power are not distinct ; and though they may receive an accidental difference by the amplitude , or extent of the bounds of the one beyond the other ; yet since the like difference is also found in political estates , it follows that oeconomical and political power , differ no otherwise , than a little commonweal differs from a great one. next , saith suarez , commnnity did not begin at the creation of adam . it is true , because he had no body to communicate with ; yet community did presently follow his creation , and that by his will alone : for it was in his power only , ( who was lord of all ) to appoint what his sons should have in proper , and what in common ; so that propriety and community of goods did follow originally from him ; and it is the duty of a father , to provide as well for the common good of his children , as the particular . lastly , suarez concludes , that by the law of nature alone , it is not due unto any progenitor , to be also king of his posterity . this assertion is confuted point-blank by bellarmine , who expresly affirmeth , that the first parents ought to have been princes of their posterity . and untill suarez bring some reason for what he saith : i shall trust more to bellarmine's proofs , than to his denials . ( . ) but let us condescend a while to the opinion of bellarmine and suarez , and all those , who place supreme power in the whole people ; and ask them if their meaning be , that there is but one and the same power in all the people of the world ; so that no power can be granted , except all the men upon the earth meet and agree , to choose a governour . an answer is here given by suarez , that it is scarce possible , nor yet expedient , that all men in the world should be gathered together into one community : it is likelier , that either never , or for a very short time , that this power was in this manner , in the whole multitude of men collected ; but a little after the creation , men began to be divided into several commonwealths ; and this distinct power was in each of them . this answer of scarce possible , nor yet expedient : — it is likelier begets a new doubt , how this distinct power comes to each particular community , when god gave it to the whole multitude only , and not to any particular assembly of men. can they shew , or prove , that ever the whole multitude met , and divided this power which god gave them in gross , by breaking into parcels , and by appointing a distinct power to each several common-wealth ? without such a compact i cannot see ( according to their own principles ) how there can be any election of a magistrate by any commonwealth , but by a meer usurpation upon the privilege of the whole world. if any think that particular multitudes at their own discretion , had power to divide themselves into several commonwealths ; those that think so , have neither reason nor proof for so thinking : and thereby a gap is opened for every petty factious multitude , to raise a new commonwealth , and to make more commonweals than there be families in the world. but let this also be yielded them , that in each particular commonwealth , there is a distinct power in the multitude . was a general meeting of a whole kingdom ever known for the election of a prince ? is there any example of it ever found in the whole world ? to conceit such a thing , is to imagine little less than an impossibility . and so by consequence , no one form of government , or king , was ever established according to this supposed law of nature . ( . ) it may be answered by some , that if either the greatest part of a kingdom , or if a smaller part only by themselves , and all the rest by proxy , or if the part not concurring in election , do after , by a tacit assent ratifie the act of others , that in all these cases , it may be said to be the work of the whole multitude . as to the acts of the major part of a multitude , it is true , that by politick humane constitutions , it is oft ordained , that the voices of the most shall over-rule the rest ; and such ordinances bind , because , where men are assembled by an humane power ; that power that doth assemble them , can also limit and direct the manner of the execution of that power , and by such derivative power , made known by law or custom , either the greater part , or two thirds , or three parts of five , or the like , have power to oversway the liberty of their opposits . but in assemblies that take their authority from the law of nature , it cannot be so : for what freedom or liberty is due to any man by the law of nature , no inferiour power can alter , limit or diminish ; no one man , nor a multitude , can give away the natural right of another . the law of nature is unchangeable , and howsoever one man may hinder another in the use or exercise of his natural right , yet thereby no man loseth the right of it self ; for the right and the use of the right may be distinguished , as right and possession are oft distinct . therefore , unless it can be proved by the law of nature , that the major , or some other part , have power to over-rule the rest of the multitude ; it must follow , that the acts of multitudes not entire , are not binding to all , but only to such as consent unto them . ( . ) as to the point of proxy ; it cannot be shewed or proved , that all those that have been absent from popular elections , did ever give their voices to some of their fellows . i ask but one example out of the history of the whole world , let the commonweal be but named , wherever the multitude , or so much as the greatest part of it consented , either by voice or by procuration , to the election of a prince . the ambition sometimes of one man , sometimes of many , or the faction of a city or citizens , or the mutiny of an army , hath set up or put down princes ; but they have never tarried for this pretended order by proceeding of the whole multitude . lastly , if the silent acceptation of a governour by part of the people , be an argument of their concurring in the election of him ; by the same reason , the tacit assent of the whole commonwealth may be maintained : from whence it follows , that every prince that comes to a crown , either by succession , conquest , or vsurpation , may be said to be elected by the people ; which inference is too ridiculous ; for in such cases , the people are so far from the liberty of specification , that they want even that of contradiction . ( . ) but it is in vain to argue against the liberty of the people in the election of kings , as long as men are perswaded , that examples of it are to be found in scripture . it is fit therefore , to discover the grounds of this errour : it is plain by an evident text , that it is one thing to choose a king , and another thing to set up a king over the people ; this latter power the children of israel had , but not the former . this distinction is found most evident in deut. . . where the law of god saith , him shalt thou set king over thee , whom the lord shall choose ; so god must eligere , and the people only do constituere . mr. hooker in his eighth book of ecclesiastical policy , clearly expounds this distinction ; the words are worthy the citing : heaps of scripture ( saith he ) are alledged , concerning the solemn coronation or inauguration of saul , david , solomon and others , by nobles , ancients , and the people of the commonwealth of israel ; as if these solemnities were a kind of deed , whereby the right of dominion is given ; which strange , untrue , and unnatural conceits , are set abroad by seed-men of rebellion , only to animate unquiet spirits , and to feed them with possibilities of aspiring unto the thrones , if they can win the hearts of the people ; whatsoever hereditary title any other before them may have . i say these unjust and insolent positions , i would not mention , were it not thereby to make the countenance of truth more orient . for unless we will openly proclaim defiance unto all law , equity and reason , we must ( for there is no other remedy ) acknowledg , that in kingdoms hereditary , birth-right giveth right unto sovereign dominion , and the death of the predecessor , putteth the successor by blood in seisin . those publick solemnities before-mentioned , do either serve for an open testification of the inheritor's right , or belong to the form of inducing of him into possession of that thing he hath right unto . this is mr. hooker's judgment of the israelites power to set a king over themselves . no doubt , but if the people of israel had had power to choose their king , they would never have made choice of ioas , a child but of seven years old , nor of manasses a boy of twelve ; since ( as solomon saith ) wo to the land whose king is a child : nor is it probable they would have elected iosias , but a very child , and a son to so wicked and idolatrous a father , as that his own servants murthered him ; and yet all the people set up this young iosias , and flew the conspirators of the death of ammon his father ; which justice of the people , god rewarded , by making this iosias the most religious king , that ever that nation enjoyed . ( . ) because it is affirmed , that the people have power to choose , as well what form of government , as what governours they please ; of which mind is bellarmine , in those places we cited at first . therefore it is necessary to examine the strength of what is said in defence of popular commonweals , against this natural form of kingdoms , which i maintain'd . here i must first put the cardinal in mind of what he affirms in cold blood , in other places ; where he saith , god when he made all mankind of one man , did seem openly to signifie , that he rather approved the government of one man , than of many . again , god shewed his opinion , when he endued not only men , but all creatures with a natural propensity to monarchy ; neither can it be doubted , but a natural propensity is to be referred to god , who is author of nature . and again ; in a third place , what form of government god confirmed by his authority , may be gathered by that common-weal , which he instituted amongst the hebrews , which was not aristocratical , ( as calvin saith ) but plainly monarchichal . ( . ) now if god , ( as bellarmine saith ) hath taught us by natural instinct , signified to us by the creation , and confirmed by his own example the excellency of monarchy , why should bellarmine or we doubt , but that it is natural ? do we not find , that in every family , the government of one alone , is most natural ? god did always govern his own people by monarchy only . the patriarchs , dukes , iudges and kings were all monarchs . there is not in all the scripture , mention or approbation of any other form of government . at the time when scripture saith , there was no king in israel , but that every man did that which was right in his own eyes ; even then , the israelites were under the kingly government of the fathers of particular families : for in the consultation , after the benjamitical war , for providing wives for the benjamites , we find , the elders of the congregation bare only sway. iudges . . to them also were complaints to be made , as appears by verse . and though mention be made of all the children of israel , all the congregation , and all the people ; yet by the term of all , the scripture means only all the fathers , and not all the whole multitude , as the text plainly expounds it self in . chron. . . where solomon speaks unto all israel , to the captains , the iudges , and to every governour the chief of the fathers ; so the elders of israel are expounded to be the chief of the fathers of the children of israel . kings . . chron. . . at that time also , when the people of israel beg'd a king of samuel , they were governed by kingly power . god out of a special love and care to the house of israel , did choose to be their king himself , and did govern them at that time by his viceroy samuel , and his sons ; and therefore god tells samuel , they have not rejected thee but me , that i should not reign over them . it seems they did not like a king by deputation , but desired one by succession , like all the nations . all nations belike had kings then , and those by inheritance , not by election : for we do not find the israelites prayed , that they themselves might choose their own king ; they dream of no such liberty , and yet they were the elders of israel gathered together . if other nations had elected their own kings , no doubt but they would have been as desirous to have imitated other nations as well in the electing , as in the having of a king. aristotle in his book of politicks , when he comes to compare the several kinds of government , he is very reserved in discoursing what form he thinks best : he disputes subtilely to and fro of many points , and judiciously of many errours , but concludes nothing himself . in all those books , i find little commendation of monarchy . it was his hap to live in those times when the grecians abounded with several commonwealths , who had then learning enough to make them seditious . yet in his ethicks , he hath so much good manners , as to confess in right down words , that monarchy is the best form of government , and a popular estate the worst . and though he be not so free in his politicks , yet the necessity of truth hath here and there extorted from him , that which amounts no less to the dignity of monarchy ; he confesseth it to be first , the natural , and the divinest form of government ; and that the gods themselves did live under a monarchy . what can a heathen say more ? indeed , the world for a long time knew no other sort of government , but only monarchy . the best order , the greatest strength , the most stability and easiest government , are to be found all in monarchy , and in no other form of government . the new platforms of commonweals , were first hatched in a corner of the world , amongst a few cities of greece , which have been imitated by very few other laces . those very cities were first , for many years , governed by kings , untill wantonness , ambition or faction of the people , made them attempt new kinds of regiment ; all which mutations proved most bloody and miserable to the authors of them ; happy in nothing , but that they continued but a small time . ( . ) a little to manifest the imperfection of popular government , let us but examine the most flourishing democratie that the world hath ever known ; i mean that of rome . first , for the durability ; at the most , it lasted but years ( for so long it was from the expulsion of tarquin , to iulius caesar. ) whereas both the assyrian monarchy lasted , without interruption , at the least twelve hundred years , and the empire of the east continued years . . for the order of it , during these years , there was not any one settled form of government in rome : for after they had once lost the natural power of kings , they could not find upon what form of government to rest : their fickleness is an evidence that they found things amiss in every change. at the first they chose two annual consuls instead of kings . secondly , those did not please them long , but they must have tribunes of the people to defend their liberty . thirdly , they leave tribunes and consuls , and choose them ten men to make them laws . fourthly , they call for consuls and tribunes again : sometimes they choose dictators , which were temporary kings , and sometimes military tribunes , who had consular power . all these shiftings caused such notable alteration in the government , as it passeth historians to find out any perfect form of regiment in so much confusion : one while the senate made laws , another while the people . the dissentions which were daily between the nobles and the commons , bred those memorable seditions about vsury , about marriages , and about magistracy . also the graecian , the apulian , and the drusian seditions , filled the market-places , the temples , and the capitol it self , with blood of the citizens ; the social war was plainly civil ; the wars of the slaves , and the other of the fencers ; the civil wars of marius and sylla , of cataline , of caesar and pompey the triumvirate , of augustus , lepidus and antonius : all these shed an ocean of blood within italy and the streets of rome . thirdly , for their government , let it be allowed , that for some part of this time it was popular , yet it was popular as to the city of rome only , and not as to the dominions , or whole empire of rome ; for no democratie can extend further than to one city . it is impossible to govern a kingdom , much less many kingdoms by the whole people , or by the greatest part of them . ( . ) but you will say , yet the roman empire grew all up under this kind of popular government , and the city became mistress of the world. it is not so ; for rome began her empire under kings , and did perfect it under emperours ; it did only encrease under that popularity : her greatest exaltation was under trajan , as her longest peace had been under augustus . even at those times , when the roman victories abroad , did amaze the world , then the tragical slaughter of citizens at home , deserved commiseration from their vanquished enemies . what though in that age of her popularity , she bred many admired captains and commanders ( each of which was able to lead an army , though many of them were but ill requited by the people ? ) yet all of them were not able to support her in times of danger ; but she was forced in her greatest troubles to create a dictator ( who was a king for a time ) thereby giving this honourable testimony of monarchy , that the last refuge in perils of states , is to fly to regal authority . and though romes popular estate for a while was miraculously upheld in glory by a greater prudence than her own ; yet in a short time , after manifold alterations , she was ruined by her own hands . suis & ipsa roma viribus ruit : for the arms she had prepared to conquer other nations , were turned upon her self , and civil contentions at last settled the government again into a monarchy . ( . ) the vulgar opinion is , that the first cause why the democratical government was brought in , was to curb the tyranny of monarchies . but the falshood of this doth best appear by the first flourishing popular estate of athens , which was founded , not because of the vices of their last king , but that his vertuous deserts were such as the people thought no man worthy enough to succeed him ; a pretty wanton quarrel to monarchy ! for when their king codrus understood by the oracle , that his country could not be saved , unless the king were slain in the battel : he in disguise entered his enemies camp , and provoked a common souldier to make him a sacrifice for his own kingdom , and with his death ended the royal government ; for after him was never any more kings of athens . as athens thus for love of her codrus , changed the government , so rome on the contrary , out of hatred to her tarquin , did the like . and though these two famous commonweals did for contrary causes abolish monarchy , yet they both agreed in this , that neither of them thought it fit to change their state into a democratie : but the one chose archontes , and the other consuls to be their governours ; both which did most resemble kings , and continued , untill the people by lessening the authority of these their magistrates , did by degrees and stealth bring in their popular government . and i verily believe , never any democratical state shewed it self at first fairly to the world by any elective entrance , but they all secretly crept in by the back-door of sedition and faction . ( . ) if we will listen to the judgment of those who should best know the nature of popular government , we shall find no reason for good men to desire or choose it . zenophon that brave scholar and souldier disallowed the athenian commonweal , for that they followed that form of government wherein the wicked are always in greatest credit , and vertuous men kept under . they expelled aristides the just ; themistocles died in banishment ; meltiades in prison ; phocion the most virtuous and just man of his age , though he had been chosen forty five times to be their general , yet he was put to death with all his friends , kindred and servants , by the fury of the people , without sentence , accusation , or any cause at all . nor were the people of rome much more favourable to their worthies ; they banished rutilius , metellus , coriolanus , the two scipio's and tully : the worst men sped best ; for as zenophon saith of athens , so rome was a sanctuary for all turbulent , discontented and seditious spirits . the impunity of wicked men was such , that upon pain of death , it was forbidden all magistrates to condemn to death , or banish any citizen , or to deprive him of his liberty , or so much as to whip him for what offence soever he had committed , either against the gods or men. the athenians sold justice as they did other merchandise ; which made plato call a popular estate a fair , where every thing is to be sold. the officers when they entered upon their charge , would brag , they went to a golden harvest . the corruption of rome was such , that marius and pompey durst carry bushels of silver into the assemblies , to purchase the voices of the people . many citizens under their grave gowns , came armed into the publick meetings , as if they went to war. often contrary factions fell to blows , sometimes with stones , and sometimes with swords ; the blood hath been suckt up in the market places with spunges ; the river tiber hath been filled with the dead bodies of the citizens , and the common privies stuffed full with them . if any man think these disorders in popular states were but casual , or such as might happen under any kind of government , he must know , that such mischiefs are unavoidable , and of necessity do follow all democratical regiments ; and the reason is given , because the nature of all people is , to desire liberty without restraint , which cannot be but where the wicked bear rule ; and if the people should be so indiscreet , as to advance vertuous men , they lose their power : for that , good men would favour none but the good , which are always the fewer in number ; and the wicked and vitious ( which is still the greatest part of the people ) should be excluded from all preferment , and in the end , by little and little , wise men should seize upon the state , and take it from the people . i know not how to give a better character of the people , than can be gathered from such authors as lived amongst or near the popular states ; thucydides , zenophon , livie , tacitus , cicero , and salust , have set them out in their colours . i will borrow some of their sentences : there is nothing more uncertain than the people ; their opinions are as variable and suddain as tempests ; there is neither truth nor judgment in them ; they are not led by wisdom to judg of any thing , but by violence and rashness ; nor put they any difference between things true and false . after the manner of cattel , they follow the herd that goes before ; they have a custom always to favour the worst and weakest ; they are most prone to suspitions , and use to condemn men for guilty upon any false suggestion ; they are apt to believe all news , especially if it be sorrowful ; and like fame , they make it more in the believing ; when there is no author , they fear those evils which themselves have feigned ; they are most desirous of new stirrs and changes , and are enemies to quiet and rest ; whatsoever is giddy or head-strong , they account manlike and couragious ; but whatsoever is modest or provident , seems sluggish ; each man hath a care of his particular , and thinks basely of the common good ; they look upon approaching mischiefs as they do upon thunder , only every man wisheth it may not touch his own person ; it is the nature of them , they must serve basely , or domineer proudly ; for they know no mean. thus do they paint to the life this beast with many heads . let me give you the cypher of their form of government ; as it is begot by sedition , so it is nourished by arms : it can never stand without wars , either with an enemy abroad , or with friends at home . the only means to preserve it , is , to have some powerful enemies near , who may serve instead of a king to govern it , that so , though they have not a king amongst them , yet they may have as good as a king over them : for the common danger of an enemy keeps them in better unity , than the laws they make themselves . ( ) many have exercised their wits in parallelling the inconveniences of regal and popular government , but if we will trust experience before speculations philosophical , it cannot be denyed but this one mischief of sedition which necessarily waits upon all popularity , weighes down all the inconveniences that can be found in monarchy , though they were never so many . itis said , skin for skin , yea , all that a man hath will he give for his life ; and a man will give his riches for the ransome of his life . the way then to examine what proportion the mischiefs of sedition and tyranny have one to another , is to enquire in what kind of government most subjects have lost their lives : let rome which is magnified for her popularity , and vilified for the tyrannical monsters the emperours , furnish us with examples . consider-whether the cruelty of all the tyrannical emperours that ever ruled in this city did ever spill a quarter of the blood that was poured out in the last hundred years of her glorious common wealth . the murthers by tyberius , domitian , and commodus , put all together , cannot match that civil tragedy which was acted in that one sedition between marius and sylla , nay , even by sylla's part alone ( not to mention the acts of marius ) were fourscore and ten senators put to death , fifteen consuls , two thousand and six hundred gentlemen , and a hundred thousand others . this was the heighth of the roman liberty : any man might be killed that would . a favour not fit to be granted under a royal government . the miseries of those licentious times are briefly touched by plutarch in these words . sylla ( saith he ) fell to sheding of bloud , and filled all rome with infinite and unspeakable murthers — this was not only done in rome , but in all the cities of italy throughout , there was no temple of any god whatsoever , no altar in any bodies house , no liberty of hospital , no fathers house , which was not embrewed with blood , and horrible murthers , the husbands were slain in the wives armes , and the children in the mothers laps ; and yet they that were slain for private malice were no-nothing in respect of those that were murthered only for their goods — he openly sold their goods by the cryer , sitting so proudly in his chair of state , that it grieved the people more to see their goods packt up by them to whom he gave , or disposed them , than to see them taken away . sometimes he would give a whole countrey , or the whole revenues of certain cities , unto women for their beauties , or to pleasant jeasters , minstrels , or wicked slaves , made free . and to some he would give other mens vvives by force , and make them be married against their wills . now let tacitus and suetonius be searched , and see if all their cruel emperours can match this popular villany , in such an universal slaughter of citizens , or civil butchery . god only was able to match him , and over-matched him , by fitting him with a most remarkable death , just answerable to his life , for as he had been the death of many thousands of his country-men , so as many thousands of his own kindred in the flesh were the death of him , for he died of an impostume , which corrupted his flesh in such sort , that it turned all to lice , he had many about him to shift him continually night and day ; yet the lice they wiped from him , were nothing to them that multiplied upon him , there was neither apparel , linnen , bathes , vvashings , nor meat it self , but was presently filled with swarms of this vile vermine . i cite not this to extenuate the bloody acts of any tyrannical princes , nor will i plead in defence of their cruelties : only in the comparative , i maintain the mischiefs to a state to be less universal under a tyrant king ; for the cruelty of such tyrants extends ordinarily no further then to some particular men that offend him , and not to the whole kingdome : it is truly said by his late majesty king iames , a king can never be so notoriously vitious , but he will generally favour justice , and maintain some order ; except in the particulars wherein his inordinate lust carries him away . even cruel domitian , dionysius the tyrant , and many others , are commended by historians for great observers of justice : a natural reason is to be rendered for it ; it is the multitude of people , and the abundance of their riches , which are the only strength and glory of every prince : the bodies of his subjects do him service in vvar , and their goods supply his present wants , therefore if not out of affection to his people , yet out of natural love to himself , every tyrant desires to preserve the lives , and protect the goods of his subjects , which cannot be done but by justice , and if it be not done , the princes loss is the greatest ; on the contrary , in a popular state , every man knows the publick good doth not depend wholly on his care , but the common-wealth may well enough be governed by others though he tend only his private benefit , he never takes the publick to be his own business ; thus as in a family , where one office is to be done by many servants , one looks upon another , and every one leaves the business for his fellow , until it is quite neglected by all ; nor are they much to be blamed for their negligence , since it is an even wager , their ignorance is as great : for magistrates among the people , being for the most part annual , do always lay down their office before they understand it ; so that a prince of a duller understanding , by use and experience must needs excell them ; again , there is no tyrant so barbarously wicked , but his own reason and sense will tell him , that though he be a god , yet he must dye like a man ; and that there is not the meanest of his subjects but may find a means to revenge himself of the injustice that is offered him : hence it is that great tyrants live continually in base fears , as did dionysius the elder ; tiberius , caligula , and nero are noted by suctonius to have been frighted with panick fears . but it is not so , where wrong is done to any particular person by a multitude , he knows not who hurt him , or who to complain of , or to whom to address himself for reparation . any man may boldly exercise his malice and cruelty in all popular assemblies . there is no tyranny to be compared to the tyranny of a multitude . ( ) what though the government of the people be a thing not to be endured , much less defended , yet many men please themselves with an opininion , that though the people may not govern ; yet they may partake and joyn with a king in the government , and so make a state mixed of popular and regal power , which they take to be the best tempered and equallest form of government . but the vanity of this fancy is too evident , it is a meer impossibility or contradiction , for if a king but once admit the people to be his companions , he leaves to be a king , and the state becomes a democracy ; at least , he is but a titular and no real king , that hath not the soveraignty to himself ; for the having of this alone , and nothing but this makes a king to be a king. as for that shew of popularity which is found in such kingdoms as have general assemblies for consultation about making publick laws : it must be remembred that such meetings do not share or divide the soveraignty with the prince : but do only deliberate and advise their supreme head , who still reserves the absolute power in himself ; for if in such assemblies , the king , the nobility , and people have equal shares in the soveraignty , then the king hath but one voice , the nobility likewise one , and the people one , and then any two of these voices should have power to over-rule the third ; thus the nobility and commons together should have power to make a law to bind the king , which was never yet seen in any kingdom , but if it could , the state must needs be popular and not regal . ( ) if it be unnatural for the multitude to chuse their governours , or to govern , or to partake in the government , what can be thought of that damnable conclusion which is made by too many , that the multitude may correct , or depose their prince , if need be ? surely the unnaturalness , and injustice of this position cannot sufficiently be expressed : for admit that a king make a contract or paction with his people , either originally in his ancestors , or personally at his coronation ( for both these pactions some dream of , but cannot offer any proof for either ) yet by no law of any nation can a contract be thought broken , except that first a lawful tryal be had by the ordinary judge of the breakers thereof , or else every man may be both party and judge in his own case , which is absur'd once to be thought , for then it will lye in the hands of the headless multitude when they please to cast off the yoke of government ( that god hath laid upon them ) to judge and punish him , by whom they should be judged and punished themselves . aristotle can tell us , what judges the multitude are in their own case , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the judgment of the multitude in disposing of the soveraignty may be seen in the roman history , where we may find many good emperours murthered by the people , and many bad elected by them : nero , heliogabalus , otho , vitellius , and such other monsters of nature , were the minions of the multitude , and set up by them : pertinax , alexander , severus , gordianus , gallus emilianus , quintilius , aurelianus , tacitus , probus , and numerianus ; all of them good emperours in the judgment of all historians , yet murthered by the multitude . ( ) whereas many out of an imaginary fear pretend the power of the people to be necessary for the repressing of the insolencies of tyrants ; wherein they propound a remedy far worse than the disease , neither is the disease indeed so frequent as they would have us think , let us be jugded by the history even of our own nation : we have enjoyed a succession of kings from the conquest now for above years ( a time far longer than ever yet any popular state could continue ) we reckon to the number of twenty six of these princes since the norman race , and yet not one of these is taxed by our historians for tyrannical government . it is true , two of these kings have been deposed by the people , and barbarously murthered , but neither of them for tyranny : for as a learned historian of our age saith , edward the second and richard the second were not insupportable either in their nature or rule , and yet the people , more upon wantonness than for any want , did take an unbridled course against them . edward the second , by many of our historians is reported to be of a good and vertuous nature , and not unlearned : they impute his defects rather to fortune than either to council or carriage of his afsairs , the deposition of him was a violent fury , led by a wife both cruel and unchast , and can with no better countenance of right be justifyed , than may his lamentable both indignities and death it self . likewise the deposition of king richard ii , was a tempestuous rage , neither led or restrained by any rules of reason or of state — examin his actions without a distempered judgment , and you will not condemne him to be exceeding either insufficient or evil ; weigh the imputations that were objected against him , and you shall find nothing either of any truth or of great moment ; hollingshed writeth , that he was most unthankfully used by his subjects ; for although , through the frailty of his youth , he demeaned himself more dissolutely than was agreeable to the royalty of his estate , yet in no kings days were the commons in greater wealth , the nobility more honoured , and the clergy less wronged ; who notwithstanding , in the evil guided strength of their will , took head against him , to their own headlong destruction afterwards ; partly during the reign of henry , his next successor , whose greatest atchievements were against his own people , in executing those who conspired with him against king richard : but more especially in succeeding times , when , upon occasion of this disorder , more english blood was spent , than was in all the foreign wars together which have been since the conquest . twice hath this kingdom been miserably wasted with civil war , but neither of them occasioned by the tyranny of any prince . the cause of the baron's wars is by good historians attributed to the stubbornness of the nobility , as the bloody variance of the houses of york and lancaster , and the late rebellion , sprung from the wantonness of the people . these three unnatural wars have dishonoured our nation amongst strangers , so that in the censures of kingdoms , the king of spain is said to be the king of men , because of his subjects willing obedience ; the king of france king of asses , because of their infinite taxes and impositions ; but the king of england is said to be the king of devils , because of his subjects often insurrections against , and depositions of their princes . chap. iii positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of kings . ( . ) regal authority not subject to the positive laws , kings before laws ; the king of judah and israel not tyed to laws . ( . ) of samuel 's description of a king , sam. . ( . ) the power ascribed unto kings in the new testament . ( . ) whether laws were invented to bridle tyrants . ( . ) the benefit of laws . ( . ) kings keep the laws , though not bound by the laws . ( . ) of the oathes of kings . ( . ) of the benefit of the king's prerogative over laws . ( . ) the king the author , the interpreter , and corrector , of the common laws . ( . ) the king , iudge in all causes both before the conquest and since . ( . ) the king and his council have anciently determined causes in the star-chamber . ( . ) of parliaments . ( . ) when the people were first called to parliament . ( . ) the liberty of parliaments , not from nature , but from grace of the princes . ( . ) the king alone makes laws in parliament . ( . ) governs both houses as head by himself . ( . ) by his council . ( . ) by his iudges . ( . ) hitherto i have endeavour'd to shew the natural institution of regal authority , and to free it from subjection to an arbitrary election of the people : it is necessary also to enquire whether humane laws have a superiority over princes ; because those that maintain the acquisition of royal jurisdiction from the people , do subject the exercise of it to positive laws . but in this also they erre , for as kingly power is by the law of god , so it hath no inferiour law to limit it . the father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will ; not by the laws and wills of his sons or servants . there is no nation that allows children any action or remedy for being unjustly governed ; and yet for all this every father is bound by the law of nature to do his best for the preservation of his family ; but much more is a king always tyed by the same law of nature to keep this general ground , that the safety of the kingdom be his chief law : he must remember , that the profit of every man in particular , and of all together in general , is not always one and the same ; and that the publick is to be preferred before the private ; and that the force of laws must not be so great as natural equity it self , which cannot fully be comprised in any laws whatsoever , but is to be left to the religious atchievement of those who know how to manage the affaires of state , and wisely to ballance the particular profit with the counterpoize of the publick , according to the infinite variety of times , places , persons ; a proof unanswerable , for the superiority of princes above laws , is this , that there were kings long before there were any laws : for a long time the word of a king was the only law ; and if practice ( as saith sir walter raleigh ) declare the greatness of authority , even the best kings of iudah and israel were not tyed to any law ; but they did what-soever they pleased , in the greatest matters . ( ) the unlimitted jurisdiction of kings is so amply described by samuel , that it hath given occasion to some to imagine , that it was , but either a plot or trick of samuel to keep the government himself and family , by frighting the israelites with the mischiefs in monarchy , or else a prophetical description only of the future ill government of saul : but the vanity of these conjectures are judiciously discovered in that majestical discourse of the true law of free monarchy ; wherein it is evidently shewed , that the scope of samuel was to teach the people a dutiful obedience to their king , even in those things which themselves did esteem mischievous and inconvenient ; for by telling them what a king would do , he indeed instructs them what a subject must suffer ; yet not so that it is right for kings to do injury , but it is right for them to go unpunished by the people if they do it : so that in this point it is all one , whether samuel describe a king , or a tyrant , for patient obedience is due to both ; no remedy in the text against tyrants , but in crying and praying unto god in that day . but howsoever in a rigorous construction samuel's description be applyed to a tyrant ; yet the words by a benigne interpretation may agree with the manners of a just king ; and the scope and coherence of the text doth best imply the more moderate , or qualified sense of the words ; for as sir w. raleigh confesses , all those inconveniences and miseries which are reckoned by samuel as belonging to kingly government were not intollerable , but such as have been born , and are still born , by free consent of subjects towards their princes ; nay at this day , and in this land , many tenants by their tenures and services are tyed to the same subjection , even to subordinate and inferior lords : to serve the king in his wars , and to till his ground , is not only agreeable to the nature of subjects , but much desired by them ; according to their several births , and conditions : the like may be said for the offices of women-servants , confectioners , cooks , and bakers , for we cannot think that the king would use their labours without giving them wages , since the text it self mentions a liberal reward of his servants . as for the taking of the tenth of their seed , of their vines , and of their sheep , it might be a necessary provision for their kings household , and so belong to the right of tribute : for whereas is mentioned the taking of the tenth ; it cannot agree well to a tyrant , who observes no proportion , in fleecing his people . lastly , the taking of their fields , vineyards , and olive-trees , if it be by force or fraud , or without just recompence , to the dammage of private persons only , it is not to be defended ; but if it be upon the publick charge and general consent , it might be justifyed , as necessary at the first erection of a kingdome ; for those who will have a king , are bound to allow him royal maintenance , by providing revenues for the crown , since it is both for the honour , profit and safety too of the people to have their king glorious , powerful , and abounding in riches , besides we all know the lands and goods of many subjects may be oft-times legally taken by the king , either by forfeitures , escheat , attainder , outlawry , confiscation , or the like . thus we see samuel's character of a king may literally well bear a mild sense , for greater probability there is that samuel so meant , and the israelites so understood it ; to which this may be added , that samuel tells the israelites , this will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you : and ye shall cry because of your king which ye shall have chosen you ; that is to say : thus shall be the common custom or fashion , or proceeding of saul your king ; or as the vulgar latine renders it , this shall be the right or law of your king ; not meaning as some expound it , the casual event , or act of some individuum vagum , or indefinite king , that might happen one day to tyrannise over them . so that saul , and the constant practice of saul , doth best agree with the liteteral sense of the text. now that saul was no tyrant , we may note that the people asked a king , as all nations had . god answers , and bids samuel to hear the voice of the people , in all things which they spake , and appoint them a king. they did not ask a tyrant , and to give them a tyrant , when they asked a king , had not been to hear their voice in all things , but rather when they asked an egge , to have given them a scorpion : unless we will say , that all nations had tyrants . besides , we do not find in all scripture , that saul was punished , or so much as blamed , for committing any of those acts which samuel describes : and if samuel's drift had been only to terrifie the people , he would not have forgotten to foretell saul's bloody cruelty , in murthering innocent priests , and smiteing with the edge of the sword the city of nob , both man , woman , and child . again , the israelites never shrank at these conditions proposed by samuel , but accepted of them , as such as all other nations were bound unto . for their conclusion is , nay , but we will have a king over vs , that we also may be like all the nations , and that our king may iudge us , and go out before us to fight our battels . meaning he should earn his privileges , by doing the work for them , by judging them , and fighting for them . lastly , whereas the mention of the peoples crying unto the lord , argues they should be under some tyrannical oppression ; we may remember , that the peoples complaints and cries are not always an argument of their living under a tyrant . no man can say king solomon was a tyrant , yet all the congregation of israel complain'd that solomon made their yoke grievous , and therefore their prayer to rehoboam is , make thou the grievous service of thy father solomon , and his heavy yoke which he put upon us , lighter , and we will serve thee . to conclude , it is true , saul lost his kingdom , but not for being too cruel or tyrannical to his subjects , but by being too merciful to his enemies ; his sparing agag when he should have slain him , was the cause why the kingdom was torn from him . ( . ) if any desire the direction of the new testament , he may find our saviour limiting and distinguishing royal power , by giving to caesar those things that were caesar 's , and to god those things that were god's . obediendum est in quibus mandatum dei non impeditur . we must obey where the commandment of god is not hindred ; there is no other law but gods law to hinder our obedience . it was the answer of a christian to the emperour , we only worship god , in other things we gladly serve you . and it seems tertullian thought whatfoever was not god's was the emperours , when he saith , bene opposuit caesari pecuniam , te ipsum deo , alioqui quid erit dei , si omnia caesaris . our saviour hath well apportioned our money for caesar , and our selves for god , for otherwise what shall god's share be , if all be caesar's . the fathers mention no reservation of any power to the laws of the land , or to the people . s. ambrose , in his apologie for david , expresly saith , he was a king , and therefore bound to no laws , because kings are free from the bonds of any fault . s. augustine also resolves , imperator non est subjectus legibus , qui habet in potestate alias leges ferre . the emperour is not subject to laws , who hath power to make other laws . for indeed , it is the rule of solomon , that we must keep the king's commandment , and not to say , what dost thou ? because where the word of a king is , there is power , and all that he pleaseth , he will do . if any mislike this divinity in england , let him but hearken to bracton , chief justice in henry the third's days , which was since the institution of parliaments , his words are , speaking of the king , omnes sub eo , & ipse sub nullo , nisi tantum sub deo , &c. all are under him , and he under none , but god only : if he offend , since no writ can go against him , their remedy is by petitioning him to amend his fault , which if he shall not do , it will be punishment sufficient for him to expect god as a revenger : let none presume to search into his deeds , much less to oppose them . when the iews asked our blessed saviour , whether they should pay tribute ? he did not first demand what the law of the land was , or whether there was any statute against it , nor enquired whether the tribute were given by consent of the people , nor advised them to stay their payment till they should grant it ; he did no more but look upon the superscription , and concluded , this image you say is caesar's , therefore give it to caesar. nor must it here be said , that christ taught this lesson only to the conquered iews , for in this he gave direction for all nations , who are bound as much in obedience to their lawful kings , as to any conquerour or vsurper whatsoever . whereas being subject to the higher powers , some have strained these words to signifie the laws of the land , or else to mean the highest power , as well aristocratical and democratical , as regal : it seems s. paul looked for such interpretation , and therefore thought fit to be his own expositor , and to let it be known , that by power he understood a monarch that carryed a sword : wilt thou not be afraid of the power ? that is , the ruler that carryeth the sword , for he is the minister of god to thee — for he beareth not the sword in vain . it is not the law that is the minister of god , or that carries the sword , but the ruler or magistrate ; so they that say the law governs the kingdom , may as well say that the carpenters rule builds an house , and not the carpenter ; for the law is but the rule or instrument of the ruler . and s. paul concludes ; for this cause pay you tribute also , for they are gods ministers attending continually upon this very thing . render therefore tribute to whom tribute is due , custom to whom custom . he doth not say , give as a gift to gods minister . but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , render or restore tribute , as a due . also st. peter doth most clearly expound this place of st. paul , where he saith , submit your selves to every ordinance of man , for the lords sake , whether it be to the king as supreme , or unto governours , as unto them that are sent by him . here the very self same word ( supreme , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which st. paul coupleth with power , st. peter conjoineth with the king , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , thereby to maniest that king and power are both one . also st. peter expounds his own words of humane ordinance , to be the king , who is the lex loquens , a speaking law ; he cannot mean that kings themselves are an human ordinance , since st. paul calls the supreme power , the ordinance of god ; and the wisdom of god saith , by me kings reign : but his meaning must be , that the laws of kings are human ordinances . next , the governours that are sent by him ; that is by the king , not by god , as some corruptly would wrest the text , to justifie popular governours as authorized by god , whereas in gramatical construction [ him ] the relative must be referred to the next antecedent , which is king ; besides , the antithesis between supreme and sent , proves plainly that the governours were sent by kings ; for if the governours were sent by god , and the king be an humane ordinance , then it follows , that the governours were supreme , and not the king ; or if it be said , that both king and governours are sent by god , then they are both equal , and so neither of them supreme . therefore st. peter's meaning is in short , obey the laws of the king , or of his ministers . by which it is evident , that neither st. peter , nor s. paul , intended other-form of government than only monarchical , much less any subjecton of princes to humane laws . that familiar distinction of the schoolmen , whereby they subject kings to the directive , but not to the coactive power of laws , is a confession that kings are not bound by the positive laws of any nation : since the compulsory power of laws is that which properly makes laws to be laws ; by binding men by rewards or punishment to obedience ; whereas the direction of the law , is but like the advice and direction which the kings council gives the king , which no man says is a law to the king. ( ) there want not those who believe that the first invention of laws was to bridle and moderate the over-great power of kings ; but the truth is , the original of laws was for the keeping of the multitude in order : popular estates could not subsist at all without laws ; whereas kingdoms were govern'd many ages without them . the people of athens , as soon as they gave over kings , were forced to give power to draco first , then to solon , to make them laws , not to bridle kings , but themselves ; and though many of their laws were very severe and bloody , yet for the reverence they bare to their law-makers they willingly submitted to them . nor did the people give any limited power to solon , but an absolute jurisdiction , at his pleasure to abrogate and confirm what he thought fit ; the people never challenging any such power to themselves : so the people of rome gave to the ten men , who were to chuse and correct their laws for the twelve tables , an absolute power , without any appeal to the people . ( . ) the reason why laws have been also made by kings , was this , when kings were either busyed with wars , or distracted with publick cares , so that every private man could not have accesse to their persons , to learn their wills and pleasure ; then of necessity were laws invented , that so every particular subject might find his prince's pleasure decyphered unto him in the tables of his laws , that so there might be no need to resort to the king ; but either for the interpretation or mitigation of obscure or rigorous laws , or else in new cases , for a supplement where the law was defective . by this means both king and people were in many things eased : first , the king by giving laws doth free himself of great and intolerable troubles , as moses did himself by chusing elders . secondly , the people have the law as a familiar admonisher and interpreter of the king's pleasure , which being published throughout the kingdom , doth represent the presence and majesty of the king : also the judges and magistrates , ( whose help in giving judgment in many causes kings have need to use ) are restrained by the common rules of the law from using their own liberty to the injury of others , since they are to judge according to the laws , and not follow their own opinions . ( . ) now albeit kings , who make the laws , be ( as king iames teacheth us ) above the laws ; yet will they rule their subjects by the law ; and a king , governing in a setled kingdom , leaves to be a king , and degenerates into a tyrant , so soon as he seems to rule according to his laws ; yet where he sees the laws rigorous or doubtful , he may mitigate and interpret . general laws made in parliament , may , upon known respects to the king , by his authority be mitigated or suspended , upon causes only known to him . and although a king do frame all his actions to be according to the laws , yet he is not bound thereto , but at his good will , and for good example : or so far forth as the general law of the safety of the common-weale doth naturally bind him ; for in such sort only positive laws may be said to bind the king , not by being positive , but as they are naturally the best or only means for the preservation of the common-wealth . by this means are all kings , even tyrants and conquerours , bound to preserve the lands , goods , liberties , and lives of all their subjects , not by any municipial law of the land , so much as the natural law of a father , which binds them to ratifie the acts of their fore-fathers and predecessors , in things necessary for the publick good of their subjects . ( . ) others there be that affirm , that although laws of themselves do not bind kings , yet the oaths of kings at their coronations tye them to keep all the laws of their kingdoms . how far this is true , let us but examine the oath of the kings of england at their coronation ; the words whereof are these , art thou pleased to cause to be administred in all thy iudgments indifferent and upright iustice , and to use discretion with mercy and verity ? art thou pleased that our upright laws and customs be observed , and dost thou promise that those shall be protected and maintained by thee ? these two are the articles of the king's oath , which concern the laity or subjects in general ; to which the king answers affirmatively . being first demanded by the arch-bishop of canterbury , pleaseth it you to confirm and observe the laws and customs of ancient times , granted from god , by just and devout kings , unto the english nation , by oath unto the said people . especially the laws , liberties , and customs granted unto the clergy and laity by the famous king edward . we may observe , in these words of the articles of the oath , that the king is required to observe not all the laws , but only the upright , and that with discretion and mercy . the word upright cannot mean all laws , because in the oath of richard the second , i find evil and unjust laws mentioned , which the king swears to abolish ; and in the old abridgment of statutes , set forth in henry the eighth's days , the king is to swear wholly to put out evil laws ; which he cannot do , if he be bound to all laws . now what laws are upright and what evil , who shall judge but the king , since he swears to administer upright justice with discretion and mercy ( or as bracton hath it ) aequitatem praecipiat , & misericordiam . so that in effect , the king doth swear to keep no laws , but such as in his iudgment are upright , and those not literally always , but according to equity of his conscience , join'd with mercy , which is properly the office of a chancellour rather than of a judge ; and if a king did strictly swear to observe all the laws , he could not without perjury give his consent to the repealing or abrogating of any statute by act of parliament , which would be very mischievable to the state. but let it be supposed for truth , that kings do swear to observe all the laws of their kingdoms , yet no man can think it reason that kings should be more bound by their voluntary oaths than common persons are by theirs . now if a private person make a contract , either with oath or without oath , he is no further bound than the equity and justice of the contract ties him ; for a man may have relief against an unreasonable and unjust promise , if either deceit , or errour , or force , or fear induced him thereunto : or if it be hurtful or grievous in the performance . since the laws in many cases give the king a prerogative above common persons , i see no reason why he should be denyed the priviledge which the meanest of his subjects doth enjoy . here is a fit place to examine a question which some have moved , whether it be a sin for a subject to disobey the king , if he command any thing contrary to his laws ? for satisfaction in this point , we must resolve , that not only in human laws , but even in divine , a thing may be commanded contrary to law , and yet obedience to such a command is necessary . the sanctifying of the sabbath is a divine law ; yet if a master command his servant not to go to church upon a sabbath-day , the best divines teach us , that the servant must obey this command , though it may be sinful and unlawful in the master ; because the servant hath no authority or liberty to examine and judge whether his master sin or no in so commanding ; for there may be a just cause for a master to keep his servant from church , as appears luke . . yet it is not fit to tye the master to acquaint his servant with his secret counsels , or present necessity : and in such cases , the servants not going to church , becomes the sin of the master , and not of the servant . the like may be said of the king 's commanding a man to serve him in the wars , he may not examine whether the war be just or unjust , but must obey , since he hath no commission to judge of the titles of kingdoms , or causes of war ; nor hath any subject power to condemn his king for breach of his own laws . ( . ) many will be ready to say , it is a slavish and dangerous condition to be subject to the will of any one man , who is not subject to the laws . but such men consider not , . that the prerogative of a king is to be above all laws , for the good only of them that are under the laws , and to defend the peoples liberties , as his majesty graciously affirmed in his speech after his last answer to the petition of right : howsoever some are afraid of the name of prerogative , yet they may assure themselves the case of subjects would be desperately miserable without it . the court of chancery it self is but a branch of the kings prerogative , to relieve men against the inexorable rigour of the law , which without it is no better than a tyrant , since summum ius , is summa injuria . general pardons , at the coronation and in parliaments ; are but the bounty of the prerogative . . there can be no laws without a supreme power to command or make them . in all aristocraties the nobles are above the laws , and in all democraties the people . by the like reason , in a monarchy the king must of necessity be above the laws ; there can be no soveraign majesty in him that is under them ; that which giveth the very being to a king is the power to give laws ; without this power he is but an equivocal king. it skills not which way kings come by their power , whether by election , donation , succession , or by any other means ; for it is still the manner of the government by supreme power that makes them properly kings , and not the means of obtaining their crowns . neither doth the diversity of laws , nor contrary customs , whereby each kingdom differs from another , make the forms of common-weal different , unless the power of making laws be in several subjects . for the confirmation of this point , aristotle saith , that a perfect kingdom is that wherein the king rules all things according to his own will , for he that is called a king according to the law , makes no kind of kingdom at all . this it seems also the romans well understood to be most necessary in a monarchy ; for though they were a people most greedy of liberty , yet the senate did free augustus from all necessity of laws , that he might be free of his own authority , and of absolute power over himself and over the laws , to do what he pleased , and leave undone what he list , and this decree was made while augustus was yet absent . accordingly we find , that vlpian the great lawyer delivers it for a rule of the civil law ; princeps , legibus solutus est . the prince is not bound by the laws . ( ) if the nature of laws be advisedly weighed , the necessity of the princes being above them may more manifest it self ; we all know that a law in general is the command of a superior power . laws are divided ( as bellermine divides the word of god ) into written and unwritten , not for that it is not written at all , but because it was not written by the first devisers or makers of it . the common law ( as the lord chancellor egerton teacheth us ) is the common custom of the realm . now concerning customs , this must be considered , that for every custom there was a time when it was no custom ; and the first president we now have , had no president when it began ; when every custom began , there was something else than custom that made it lawful , or else the beginning of all customs were unlawful . customs at first became lawful only by some superiour , which did either command or consent unto their beginning . and the first power which we find ( as it is confessed by all men ) is the kingly power , which was both in this and in all other nations of the world , long before any laws , or any other kind of government was thought of ; from whence we must necessarily infer , that the common law it self , or common customs of this land , were originally the laws and commands of kings at first unwritten . nor must we think the common customs ( which are the principles of the common law , and are but few ) to be such , or so many , as are able to give special rules to determine every particular cause . diversity of cases are infinite , and impossible to be regulated by any law ; and therefore we find , even in the divine laws which are delivered by moses , there be only certain principal laws , which did not determine out only direct the high-priest or . magistrate , whose judgment in special cases did determine , what the general law intended . it is so with the common law , for when there is no perfect rule , judges do resort to those principles , or common law axiomes , whereupon former judgments , in cases some-what like , have been delivered by former judges , who all receive authority from the king , in his right and name to give sentence according to the rules and presidents of antient times : and where presidents have failed , the judges have resorted to the general law of reason , and accordingly given judgment , without any common law to direct them . nay , many times , where there have been presidents to direct , they , upon better reason only , have changed the law , both in causes criminal and civil , and have not insisted so much on the examples of former judges , as examined and corrected their reasons ; thence it is that so no laws are now obsolete and out of use , and the practice quite contrary to what it was in former times , as the lord chancellor egerton proves , by several instances . nor is this spoken to derogate from the common law , for the case standeth so with the laws of all nations , although some of them have their laws and principles written and established : for witnesse to this , we have aristotle his testimony in his ethiques , and in several places in his politiques ; i will cite some of them . every law ( saith he ) is in the general , but of some things there can be no general law — when therefore the law sqeaks in general , and something falls out after besides the general rule : then it is fit that what the law-maker hath omitted , or where he hath erred by speaking generally , it should be corrected or supplyed , as if the law-maker himself were present to ordain it . the governour , whether he be one man , or more , ought to be lord over all those things whereof it was impossible the law should exactly speak , because it is not easie to comprehend all things under general rules — whatsoever the law cannot determine , it leaves to the governours to give iudgment therein , and permits them to rectifie whatsoever upon tryal they find to be better than the written laws . besides , all laws are of themselves dumb , and some or other must be trusted with the application of them to particulars , by examining all circumstances , to pronounce when they are broken , or by whom . this work of right application of laws is not a thing easie or obvious for ordinary capacities ; but requires profound abilities of nature , for the beating out of the truth , witness the diversity , and sometimes the contrariety of opinions of the learned judges , in some difficult points . ( ) since this is the common condition of laws , it is also most reasonable that the law-maker should be trusted with the application or interpretation of the laws ; and for this cause anciently the kings of this land have sitten personally in courts of judicature , and are still representatively present in all courts ; the judges are but substituted , and called the kings justices , and their power ceaseth when the king is in place . to this purpose , bracton , that learned chief justice in the reign of henry the third , saith in express terms ; in doubtful and obscure points the interpretation and will of our lord the king is to be expected ; since it is his part to interpret , who made the law ; for as he saith in another place , rex , & non alius debet iudicare , si solus ad id sufficere possit , &c. the king , and no body else , ought to give iudgment , if he were able , since by vertue of his oath he is bound to it ; therefore the king ought to exercise power as the vicar or minister of god , but if our lord the king be not able to determine every cause , to ease part of his pains by distributing the burthen to more persons , he ought to chuse wise men fearing god , &c , and make iustices of them : much to the same purpose are the words of edward the first , in the beginning of his book of laws , written by his appointment by iohn briton , bishop of hereford . we will ( saith he ) that our own iurisdiction be above all the iurisdictions of our realm , so as in all manner of felonies , trespasses , contracts , and in all other actions , personal , or real , we have power to yield such iudgments as do appertain without other process , wheresoever we know the right truth as iudges . neither may this be taken to be meant of an imaginary presence of the king's person in his courts , because he doth immediately after in the same place severally set forth by themselves the jurisdictions of his ordinary courts ; but must necessarily be understood of a jurisdiction remaining in the king 's royal person . and that this then was no new-made law , or first brought in by the norman conquests , appears by a saxon law made by king edgar , in these words , as i find them in mr. lambert , nemo in lite regem appellato , nisi quidem domi iustitiam consequi , aut impetrare non poterit , sin summo jure domi urgeatur , ad regem , ut is onus aliqua ex parte allevet , provocato . let no man in suit appeal to the king , unless he may not get right at home ; but if the right be too heavy for him , then let him go to the king to have it eased . as the judicial power of kings was exercised before the conquest , so in those setled times after the conquest , wherein parliaments were much in use , there was a high-court following the king , which was the place of soveraign justice , both for matter of law and conscience , as may appear by a parliament in edward the first 's time , taking order , that the chancellour and the iustices of the bench should follow the king , to the end that he might have always at hand able men for his direction in suits that came before him : and this was after the time that the court of common-pleas was made stationary , which is an evidence that the king reserved a soveraign power , by which he did supply the want , or correct the rigour of the common law ; because the positive law , being grounded upon that which happens for the most part , cannot foresee every particular which time and experience brings forth . ( . ) therefore though the common law be generally good and just , yet in some special case it may need correction , by reason of some considerable circumstance falling out , which at the time of the law-making was not thought of . also sundry things do fall out , both in war and peace , that require extraordinary help , and cannot wait for the usual care of common law , the which is not performed , but altogether after one sort , and that not without delay of help and expence of time ; so that although all causes are , and ought to be referred to the ordinary processe of common law , yet rare matters from time to time do grow up meet , for just reasons , to be referred to the aid of the absolute authority of the prince ; and the statute of magna charta hath been understood of the institution then made of the ordinary jurisdiction in common causes , and not for restraint of the absolute authority , serving only in a few rare and singular cases , for though the subjects were put to great dammage by false accusations and malitious suggestions made to the king and his council , especially during the time of king edward the third , whilst he was absent in the wars in france , insomuch as in his reign divers statutes were made , that provided none should be put to answer before the king and his council without due processe ; yet it is apparent the necessity of such proceedings was so great , that both before edward the third's days , and in his time , and after his death , several statutes were made , to help and order the proceedings of the king and his council . as the parliament in . edw. . cap. . did provide , that the chancellour and iustices of the king's bench should follow the king ; that so he might have near unto him some that be learned in the laws , which be able to order all such matters as shall come unto the court , at all times when need shall require . by the statute of . edw. . cap. . taliation was ordained , in case the suggestion to the king proved untrue . then . edw. . cap. . takes away taliation , and appoints imprisonment till the king and party grieved be satisfied . in the statutes of . ric. . cap. . and . hen. . cap. . dammages and expences are awarded in such cases . in all these statutes it is necessarily implyed , that complaints upon just causes might be moved before the king and his council . at a parliament at glocester , . ric. . when the commons made petition , that none might be forced by writ out of chancery , or by privy seal , to appear before the king and his council , to answer touching free-hold . the king's answer was , he thought it not reasonable that he should be constrained to send for his leiges upon causes reasonable : and albeit he did not purpose that such as were sent for should answer [ finalment ] peremptorily touching their free-hold , but should be remanded for tryal thereof , as law required : provided always , ( saith he ) that at the suit of the party , where the king and his council shall be credibly informed , that because of maintenance , oppression , or other out-rages , the common law cannot have duly her course , in such case the council for the party . also in the th year of his reign , when the commons did pray , that upon pain of forfeiture , the chancellour or council of the king , should not after the end of the parliament make any ordinance against the common law ; the king answered , let it be used as it hath been used before this time , so as the regality of the king be saved , for the king will save his regalities as his progenitors have done . again , in the th year of henry the fourth , when the commons complained against subpoena's , and other writs , grounded upon false suggestions ; the king answered , that he would give in charge to his officers , that they should abstain more than before time they had , to send for his subjects in that manner . but yet ( saith he ) it is not our intention , that our officers shall so abstain , that they may not send for our subjects in matters and causes necessary , as it hath been used in the time of our good progenitors . likewise when for the same cause complaint was made by the commons ; anno . hen. . the king's answer was , le roy s'advisera , the king will be advised ; which amounts to a denyal for the present , by a phrase peculiar for the kings denying to pass any bill that hath passed the lords and commons . these complaints of the commons , and the answers of the king , discover , that such moderation should be used , that the course of the common law be ordinarily maintained , lest subjects be convented before the king and his council without just cause , that the proceedings of the council-table be not upon every slight suggestion , nor to determine finally concerning free hold of inheritance . and yet that upon cause reasonable , upon credible information , in matters of weight , the king's regallity or prerogative in sending for his subjects be maintain'd , as of right it ought , and in former times hath been constantly used . king edward the first , finding that bogo de clare was discharged of an accusation brought against him in parliament , for that some formal imperfections were found in the complaint , commanded him nevertheless to appear before him and his council , ad faciendum , & recipiendum quod per regem & ejus concilium fuerit faciendum ; and so proceeded to an examination of the whole cause . . edw. . edward the third , in the star-chamber ( which was the ancient council-chamber at westminster ) upon the complaint of elizabeth audley , commanded iames audley to appear before him and his council , and determin'd a controversie between them , touching lands contain'd in the covenants of her joynture . rot. claus. de an . . ed. . henry the fifth , in a suit before him and his council for the titles of the mannors of seere and s. laurence , in the isle of thenet , in kent , took order for the sequestring the profits till the right were tryed , as well for avoiding the breach of the peace , as for prevention of waste and spoil . rot. patin . anno . hen. . henry the sixth commanded the justices of the bench to stay the arraignment of one verney of london , till they had other commandment from him and his council , because verney , being indebted to the king and others , practised to be indicted of felony , wherein he might have his clergy , and make his purgation , of intent to defraud his creditors . . hen. . rot. . in banco regis . edward the fourth and his council , in the star-chamber , heard the cause of the master and poor brethren of s. leonards in york , complaining , that sir hugh hastings , and others , withdrew from them a great part of their living , which consisted chiefly upon the having of a thrave of corn of every plough-land within the counties of york , westmerland , cumberland , and lancashire . rot. paten . de anno . ed. . part . memb. . henry the seventh and his council , in the star-chamber , decreed , that margery and florence becket should sue no further in their cause against alice radley , widow , for lands in wolwich and plumstead in kent ; for as much as the matter had been heard first before the council of king ed. . after that before the president of the requests of that king , hen. . and then lastly , before the council of the said king. . hen. . what is hitherto affirmed of the dependency and subjection of the common law to the soveraign prince , the same may be said as well of all statute laws ; for the king is the sole immediate author , corrector , and moderator of them also ; so that neither of these two kinds of laws are or can be any diminution of that natural power which kings have over their people , by right of father-hood , but rather are an argument to strengthen the truth of it ; for evidence whereof , we may in some points consider the nature of parliaments , because in them only all statutes are made . ( . ) though the name of parliament ( as mr. cambden saith ) be of no great antiquity , but brought in out of france , yet our ancestors , the english saxons , had a meeting , which they called , the assembly of the wise ; termed in latine , conventum magnatum , or , praesentia regis , procerumque prelaterumque collectorum . the meeting of the nobility , or the presence of the king , prelates , and peers assembled ; or in general , magnum concilium , or commune concilium ; and many of our kings in elder times made use of such great assemblies for to consult of important affaires of state ; all which meetings , in a general sense , may be termed parliaments . great are the advantages which both the king and people may receive by a well-ordered parliament ; there is nothing more expresseth the majesty and supreme power of a king , than such an assembly , wherein all his people acknowledge him for soveraign lord , and make all their addresses to him by humble petition and supplication ; and by their consent and approbation do strengthen all the laws , which the king , at their request and by their advice and ministry , shall ordain . thus they facilitate the government of the king , by making the laws unquestionable , either to the subordinate magistrates , or refractory multitude . the benefit which accrews to the subject by parliaments , is . that by their prayers and petitions kings are drawn many times to redress their just grievances , and are overcome by their importunity to grant many things which otherwise they would not yield unto ; for the voice of a multitude is easilier heard . many vexations of the people are without the knowledge of the king ; who in parliament seeth and heareth his people himself ; whereas at other times he commonly useth the eyes and ears of other men . against the antiquity of parliaments we need not dispute , since the more ancient they be , the more they make for the honour of monarchy ; yet there be certain circumstances touching the forms of parliaments , which are fit to be considered . first , we are to rememember , that until about the time of the conquest , there could be no parliaments assembled of the general states of the whole kingdom of england , because till those days we cannot learn it was entirely united into one kingdom ; but it was either divided into several kingdoms , or governed by several laws . when iulius caesar landed he found kings in kent ; and the british names of dammonii , durotriges , belgae , attrebatii , trinobantes , iceni , silures , and the rest , are plentiful testimonies of the several kingdoms of brittains , when the romans left us . the saxons divided us into kingdoms : when these saxons were united all into a monarchy , they had always the danes their companions , or their masters in the empire , till edward the confessors days , since whose time the kingdom of england hath continued united , as now it doth : but for a thousand years before we cannot find it was entirely setled , during the time of any one kings reign . as under the mercian law : the west saxons were confined to the saxon laws ; essex , norfolk , suffolk , and some other places , were vexed with danish laws ; the northumbrians also had their laws apart . and until edward the confessors reign , who was next but one before the conquerour , the laws of the kingdom were so several and uncertain , that he was forced to cull a few of the most indifferent and best of them , which were from him called st. edwards laws : yet some say that eadgar made those laws , and that the confessor did but restore and mend them . alfred also gathered out of mulmutius laws , such as he translated into the saxon tongue . thus during the time of the saxons , the laws were so variable , that there is little or no likelihood to find any constant form of parliaments of the whole kingdom . ( ) a second point considerable is , whether in such parliaments , as was in the saxon's times , the nobility and clergy only were of those assemblies , or whether the commons were also called ; some are of opinion , that though none of the saxon laws do mention the commons , yet it may be gathered by the word wisemen , the commons are intended to be of those assemblies , and they bring ( as they conceive ) probable arguments to prove it , from the antiquity of some burroughs that do yet send burgesses , and from the proscription of those in antient demesne , not to send burgesses to parliament . if it be true , that the west-saxons had a custom to assemble burgesses out of some of their towns , yet it may be doubted , whether other kingdoms had the same usage ; but sure it is , that during the heptarchy , the people could not elect any knights of the shire , because england was not then divided into shires . on the contrary , there be of our historians who do affirm , that henry the first caused the commons first to be assembled by knights and burgesses of their own appointment , for before his time only certain of the nobility and prelates of the realm were called to consultation about the most important affairs of state. if this assertion be true , it seems a meer matter of grace of this king , and proves not any natural right of the people , originally to be admitted to chuse their knights and burgesses of parliament , though it had been more for the honour of parliaments , if a king , whose title to the crown had been better , had been author of the form of it ; because he made use of it for his unjust ends. for thereby he secured himself against his competitor and elder brother , by taking the oaths of the nobility in parliament ; and getting the crown to be setled upon his children . and as the king made use of the people , so they , by colour of parliament , served their own turns ; for after the establishment of parliaments by strong hand , and by the sword , they drew from him the great charter , which he granted the rather to flatter the nobility and people , as sir walter raleigh in his dialogue of parliaments doth affirm , in these words . the great charter was not originally granted legally and freely ; for henry the first did but vsurp the kingdom , and therefore , the better to assure himself against robert his elder brother , he flattered the nobility and people with their charters ; yea , king john , that confirmed them , had the like respect , for arthur duke of brittain was the undoubted heir of the crown , upon whom king john vsurped , and so to conclude , these charters had their original from kings de facto , but not de jure — the great charter had first an obscure birth by vsurpation , and was secondly fostered and shewed to the world by rebellion . ( . ) a third consideration must be , that in the former parliaments , instituted and continued since king henry the first 's time , is not to be found the usage of any natural liberty of the people ; for all those liberties that are claimed in parliament are the liberties of grace from the king , and not the liberties of nature to the people ; for if the liberty were natural , it would give power to the multitude to assemble themselves when and where they please , to bestow soveraignty , and by pactions to limit and direct the exercise of it . whereas , the liberties of favour and grace , which are claimed in parliaments , are restrained both for time , place , persons , and other circumstances , to the sole pleasure of the king. the people cannot assemble themselves , but the king , by his writs , calls them to what place he pleases ; and then again scatters them with his breath at an instant , without any other cause shewed than his will. neither is the whole summoned , but only so many as the kings writs appoint . the prudent king edward the first , summoned always those barons of ancient families , that were most wise , to his parliament , but omited their sons after their death , if they were not answerable to their parents in understanding . nor have the whole people voices in the election of knights of the shire or burgesses , but only free-holders in the counties , and freemen in the cities and burroughs ; yet in the city of westminster all the house-holders , though they be neither free-men nor free-holders , have voices in their election of burgesses . also during the time of parliament , those priviledges of the house of commons , of freedom of speech , power to punish their own members , to examine the proceedings and demeanour of courts of justice and officers , to have access to the king's person , and the like , are not due by any natural right , but are derived from the bounty or indulgence of the king , as appears by a solemn recognition of the house ; for at the opening of the parliament , when the speaker is presented to the king , he , in the behalf and name of the whole house of commons , humbly craves of his majesty , that he would be pleased to grant them their accustomed liberties of freedom of speech , of access to his person , and the rest . these priviledges are granted with a condition implyed , that they keep themselves within the bounds and limits of loyalty and obedience ; for else why do the house of commons inflict punishment themselves upon their own members for transgressing in some of these points ; and the king , as head , hath many times punished the members for the like offences . the power which the king giveth , in all his courts , to his judges or others to punish , doth not exclude him from doing the like , by way of prevention , concurrence , or evocation , even in the same point which he hath given in charge by a delegated power ; for they who give authority by commission , do always retain more than they grant : neither of the two houses claim an infallibility of not erring , no more than a general council can . it is not impossible but that the greatest may be in fault , or at least interested or engaged in the delinquency of one particular member . in such cases it is most proper for the head to correct , and not to expect the consent of the members , or for the parties peccant to be their own judges . nor is it needful to confine the king , in such cases , within the circle of any one court of justice , who is supreme judge in all courts . and in rare and new cases rare and new remedies must be sought out ; for it is a rule of the common law , in novo casu , novum remedium est apponendum : and the statute of westminst . . cap. . giveth power , even to the clarks of the chancery , to make new forms of writs in new cases , lest any man that came to the king's court of chancery for help , should be sent away without remedy : a president cannot be found in every case ; and of things that happen seldom , and are not common , there cannot be a common custom . though crimes exorbitant do pose the king and council in finding a president for a condigne punishment , yet they must not therefore pass unpunished . i have not heard that the people , by whose voices the knights and burgesses are chosen , did ever call to an account those whom they had elected ; they neither give them instructions or directions what to say , or what to do in parliament , therefore they cannot punish them when they come home for doing amiss : if the people had any such power over their burgesses , then we might call it , the natural liberty of the people , with a mischief . but they are so far from punishing , that they may be punished themselves for intermedling with parliamentary business ; they must only chuse , and trust those whom they chuse to do what they list ; and that is as much liberty as many of us deserve , for our irregular elections of burgesses . ( ) a fourth point to be consider'd , is , that in parliament all statutes or laws are made properly by the king alone , at the rogation of the people , as his majesty king iames , of happy memory , affirms in his true law of free monarchy ; and as hooker teacheth us , that laws do not take their constraining force from the quality of such as devise them , but from the power that doth give them the strength of laws : le roy le veult , the king will have it so , is the interpretive phrase pronounced at the king 's passing of every act of parliament : and it was the ancient custom for a long time , till the days of henry the fifth , that the kings , when any bill was brought unto them , that had passed both houses , to take and pick out what they liked not , and so much as they chose was enacted for a law : but the custom of the later kings hath been so gracious , as to allow always of the entire bill as it hath passed both houses . ( ) the parliament is the king's court , for so all the oldest statutes call it , the king in his parliament : but neither of the two houses are that supreme court , nor yet both of them together ; they are only members , and a part of the body , whereof the king is the head and ruler . the king 's governing of this body of the parliament we may find most significantly proved both by the statutes themselves , as also by such presidents as expresly shew us , how the king , sometimes by himself , sometimes by his council , and other-times by his judges , hath over-ruled and directed the judgments of the houses of parliament ; for the king , we find that magna charta , and the charter of forrests , and many other statutes about those times , had only the form of the kings letters-patents , or grants , under the great seal , testifying those great liberties to be the sole act and bounty of the king : the words of magna charta begin thus ; henry , by the grace of god , &c. to all our arch-bishops , &c. and our faithful subjects , greeting . know ye , that we , of our meer free-will , have granted to all free-men these liberties . in the same style goeth the charter of forrests , and other statutes . statutum hiberniae , made at westminster , . februarii . hen. . is but a letter of the king to gerrard , son of maurice , justice of ireland . the statute de anno bissextili begins thus , the king to his iustices of the bench , greeting , &c. explanationes statuti glocestriae , made by the king and his iustices only , were received always as statutes , and are still printed amongst them . the statute made for correction of the th chapter of the statute of glocester , was signed under the great seal , and sent to the justices of the bench , after the manner of a writ patent , with a certain writ closed , dated by the kings hand at westminster , requiring that they should do , and execute all and every thing contained in it , although the same do not accord with the statute of glocester in all things . the statute of rutland , is the kings letters to his treasurer and barons of his exchequer , and to his chamberlain . the statute of circumspecte agis runs , the king to his iudges sendeth greeting . there are many other statutes of the same form , and some of them which run only in the majestique terms of , the king commands , or , the king wills , or , our lord the king hath established , or , our lord the king hath ordained : or , his especial grace hath granted : without mention of consent of the commons or people ; insomuch that some statutes rather resemble proclamations , than acts of parliament : and indeed some of them were no other than meer proclamations ; as the provisions of merton , made by the king at an assembly of the prelates and nobility , for the coronation of the king and his queen eleanor , which begins , provisum est in curia domini regis apud merton . also a provision was made . hen. . de assisa ultimae praesentationis , which was continued and allowed for law , until tit. west . . an . . ed. . cap. . which provides the contrary in express words : this provision begins , provisum fuit coram dom. rege , archiepiscopis , episcopis , & baronibus , quod , &c. it seems originally the difference was not great between a proclamation and a statute ; this latter the king made by common council of the kingdom . in the former he had but the advice only of his great council of the peers , or of his privy council only . for that the king had a great council , besides his parliament , appears by a record of . hen. . about an exchange between the king and the earl of northumberland : whereby the king promiseth to deliver to the earl lands to the value , by the advice of parliament , or otherwise by the advice of his grand council , and other estates of the realm , which the king will assemble , in case the parliament do not meet . we may find what judgment in later times parliaments have had of proclamations , by the statute of . of hen. cap. . in these words , forasmuch as the king , by the advice of his council , hath set forth proclamations , which obstinate persons have contemned ; not considering what a king by his royal power may do : considering that sudden causes and occasions fortune many times , which do require speedy remedies , and that by abiding for a parliament , in the mean time might happen great prejudice to ensue to the realm : and weighing also , that his majesty , which by the kingly and regal power given him by god , may do many things in such cases , should not be driven to extend the liberties , and supremity of his regal power , and dignity , by willfulness of froward subjects : it is therefore thought fit , that the king with the advice of his honourable council should set forth proclamations for the good of the people , and defence of his royal dignity as necessity shall require . this opinion of a house of parliament was confirmed afterwards by a second parliament , and the statute made proclamations of as great validity , as if they had been made in parliament . this law continued until the government of the state came to be under a protector , during the minority of edward the sixth , and in his first year it was repealed . i find also , that a parliament in the th year of henry the seventh , did so great reverence to the actions , or ordinances of the king , that by statute they provided a remedy or means to levy a benevolence granted to the king , although by a statute made not long before all benevolences were damned and annulled for ever . mr. fuller , in his arguments against the proceedings of the high-commission court , affirms , that the statute of . h. . cap. . which giveth power to ordinaries to imprison and set fines on subjects , was made without the assent of the commons , because they are not mentioned in the act. if this argument be good , we shall find very many statutes of the same kind , for the assent of the commons was seldom mentioned in the elder parliaments . the most usual title of parliaments in edward the d , rich. . the three henries . . . in edw. . and rich. . days , was : the king and his parliament , with the assent of the prelates , earles , and barons , and at the petition , or at the special instance of the commons , doth ordain . the same mr. fuller saith , that the statute made against lollards , was without the assent of the commons , as appears by their petition in these words , the commons beseech , that whereas a statute was made in the last parliament , &c. which was never assented nor granted by the commons , but that which was done therein , was done without their assent . ( . ) how far the kings council hath directed and swayed in parliament , hath in part appeared by what hath been already produced . for further evidence , we may add the statute of westminster : the first which saith , these be the acts of king edward . made at his first parliament general , by his council , and by the assent of bishops , abbots , priors , earles , barons , and all the commonalty of the realm , &c. the statute of bygamy saith , in presence of certain reverend fathers , bishops of england , and others of the kings council , for as much as all the king's council , as well iustices as others , did agree , that they should be put in writing , and observed . the statute of acton burnell saith , the king , for himself , and by his council , hath ordained and established . in articuli super chartas ; when the great charter was confirmed , at the request of his prelates , earls and barons , we find these passages . . nevertheless the king and his council do not intend by reason of this statute to diminish the kings right , &c. . and notwithstanding all these things before-mentioned , or any part of them ; both the king and his council , and all they that were present at the making of this ordinance , will and intend that the right and prerogative of his crown shall be saved to him in all things . here we may see in the same parliament the charter of the liberties of the subjects confirmed , and a saving of the kings prerogative : those times neither stumbled at the name , nor conceived any such antipathy between the terms , as should make them incompatible . the statute of escheators hath this title , at the parliament of our soveraign lord the king , by his council it was agreed ; and also by the king himself commanded . and the ordinance of inquest goeth thus , it is agreed and ordained by the king himself , and all his council . the statute made at york , . ed. . saith , whereas the knights , citizens , and burgesses desired our soveraign lord the king in his parliament , by their petition , that for his profit , and the commodity of his prelates , earls , barons , and commons , it may please him to provide remedy ; our soveraign lord the king desiring the profit of his people by the assent of his prelates , earles , barons , and other nobles of his council being there , hath ordained . in the parliament primo edwardi the third , where magna charta was confirmed , i find this preamble , at the request of the commonalty by their petition made before the king and his council in parliament , by the assent of the prelates , earles , barons , and other great men assembled , it was granted . the commons presenting a petition unto the king , which the king's council did mislike , were content thereupon to mend and explain their petition ; the form of which petition is in these words , to their most redoubted soveraign lord the king , praying the said commons , that whereas they have pray'd him to be discharged of all manner of articles of the eyre , &c. which petition seemeth to his council to be prejudicial unto him , and in disinherison of his crown , if it were so generally granted . his said commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of him , which should fall in disinherison of him or his crown perpetually , as of escheators , &c. but of trespasses , misprisions , negligences , and ignorances , &c. in the time of henry the third , an order or provision was made by the king's council , and it was pleaded at the common law in bar to a writ of dower . the plantiffs attorney could not deny it , and thereupon the iudgment was ideo sine die . it seems in those days an order of the council-board was either parcel of the common-law or above it . the reverend judges have had regard in their proceedings , that before they would resolve or give iudgment in new cases , they consulted with the king 's privy council . in the case of adam brabson , who was assaulted by r. w. in the presence of the iustices of assize at westminster , the judges would have the advice of the kings council : for in a like case , because r. c. did strike a juror at westminster which passed in an inquest against one of his friends , it was adjudged by all the council that his right hand should be cut off , and his lands and goods forfeited to the king. green and thorp were sent by judges of the bench to the kings council , to demand of them whether by the statute of . ed. . cap. . a word may be amended in a writ ; and it was answered , that a word may well be amended , although the statute speak but of a letter or syllable . in the case of sir tho. oghtred , knight , who brought a formedon against a poor man and his wife ; they came and yielded to the demandant , which seemed suspitious to the court , whereupon iudgment was stayed ; and thorp said , that in the like case of giles blacket , it was spoken of in parliament , and we were commanded , that when any like case should come , we should not go to iudgment without good advice : therefore the judges conclusion was , sues au counseil , & comment ils voillet que nous devomus faire , nous volume faire , & auterment nient en cest case . sue to the council , and as they will have us to do , we will ; and otherwise not in this case . ( . ) in the last place , we may consider how much hath been attributed to the opinions of the kings iudges by parliaments , and so find , that the kings council hath guided and ruled the iudges , and the iudges guided the parliament . in the parliament of . hen. . the commons made suit , that william de la poole , d. of suffolke , should be committed to prison , for many treasons and other crimes . the lords of the higher house were doubtful what answer to give , the opinion of the iudges was demanded . their opinion was , that he ought not to be committed , for that the commons did not charge him with any particular offence , but with general reports and slanders . this opinion was allowed . in another parliament , . hen. . ( which was prorogued ) in the vacation the speaker of the house of commons was condemned in a thousand pound dammages , in an action of trespass , and was committed to prison in execution for the same . when the parliament was re-assembled , the commons made suit to the king and lords to have their speaker delivered ; the lords demanded the opinion of the judges , whether he might be delivered out of prison by priviledge of parliament ; upon the judges answer it was concluded , that the speaker should still remain in prison , according to the law , notwithstanding the priviledge of parliament , and that he was the speaker : which resolution was declared to the commons by moyle , the king's serjeant at law ; and the commons were commanded in the kings name , by the bishop of lincolne , ( in the absence of the arch-bishop of canterbury , then chancellour ) to chuse another speaker . in septimo of hen. . a question was moved in parliament , whether spiritual persons might be convented before temporal iudges for criminal causes . there sir iohn fineux , and the other judges , delivered their opinion , that they might and ought to be : and their opinion was allowed and maintained by the king and lords , and dr. standish , who before had holden it ; the same opinion was delivered from the bishops . if a writ of errour be sued in parliament upon a judgment given in the kings bench , the lords of the higher house alone , ( without the commons ) are to examine the errours ; the lords are to proceed according to law , and for their judgment therein they are to be informed by the advice and counsel of the judges , who are to inform them what the law is , and so to direct them in their judgment ; for the lords are not to follow their own opinions or discretions otherwise . so it was in a writ of errour brought in parliament by the dean and chapter of lichfield , against the prior and covent of newton-panel , as appeareth by record . see flower dew's case , p. . h. . fol. . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e kings . . gen. , . notes for div a -e arist. pol. lib. . c. . leviathan, or, the matter, forme, and power of a common wealth, ecclesiasticall and civil by thomas hobbes ... leviathan hobbes, thomas, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing h estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) leviathan, or, the matter, forme, and power of a common wealth, ecclesiasticall and civil by thomas hobbes ... leviathan hobbes, thomas, - . [ ], p. printed for andrew crooke, london : . added engraved t.p. errata: p. 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . state, the. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion non est postestas super terram quae comparetur ei iob. . . leviathan or the matter , forme and power of a common-wealth ecclesiasticall and civil . by thomas hobbes of malmesbury . london printed for andrew crooke leviathan , or the matter , forme , & power of a common-wealth ecclesiasticall and civill . by thomas hobbes of malmesbury . london , printed for andrew crooke , at the green dragon in st. pauls church-yard , . fide ✚ et ✚ fortitudine . the right hon. ble algernon capell , earl of essex , viscount maldon , and baron capell of hadham : . to my most honor'd friend mr francis godolphin of godolphin . honor'd sir , your most worthy brother mr sidney godolphin , when he lived , was pleas'd to think my studies something , and otherwise to oblige me , as you know , with reall testimonies of his good opinion , great in themselves , and the greater for the worthinesse of his person . for there is not any vertue that disposeth a man , either to the service of god , or to the service of his country , to civill society , or private friendship , that did not manifestly appear in his conversation , not as acquired by necessity , or affected upon occasion , but inhaerent , and shining in a generous constitution of his nature . therefore in honour and gratitude to him , and with devotion to your selfe , i humbly dedicate unto you this my discourse of common-wealth . i know not how the world will receive it , nor how it may reflect on those that shall seem to favour it . for in a way beset with those that contend , on one side for too great liberty , and on the other side for too much authority , 't is hard to passe between the points of both unwounded . but yet , me thinks , the endeavour to advance the civill power , should not be by the civill power condemned ; nor private men , by reprehending it , declare they think that power too great . besides , i speak not of the men , but ( in the abstract ) of the seat of power , ( like to those simple and unpartiall creatures in the roman capitol , that with their noyse defended those within it , not because they were they , but there , ) offending none , i think , but those without , or such within ( if there be any such ) as favour them . that which perhaps may most offend , are certain texts of holy scripture , alledged by me to other purpose than ordinarily they use to be by others . but i have done it with due submission , and also ( in order to my subject ) necessarily ; for they are the outworks of the enemy , from whence they impugne the civill power . if notwithstanding this , you find my labour generally decryed , you may be pleased to excuse your selfe , and say i am a man that love my own opinions , and think all true i say , that i honoured your brother , and honour you , and have presum'd on that , to assume the title ( without your knowledge ) of being , as i am , sir , your most humble , and most obedient servant , tho. hobbes , paris . aprill / . . the contents of the chapters . the first part , of man. chap. introduction . page . chap. . of sense . page . chap. . of imagination . page . chap. . of the consequence or train of imaginations . page . chap. . of speech . page . chap. . of reason and science . page . chap. . of the interiour beginnings of voluntary motions , commonly called the passions ; and the speeches by which they are expressed . page . chap. . of the ends or resolutions of discourse . page . chap. . of the vertues , commonly called intellectuall , and their contrary defects . page . chap. . of the severall subjects of knowledge . page . chap. . of power , worth , dignity , honour , and worthinesse . page . chap. . of the difference of manners . page . chap. . of religion . page . chap. . of the naturall condition of mankind as concerning their felicity and misery . page . chap. . of the first and second naturall lawes , and of contract . page . chap. . of other lawes of nature . page . chap. . of persons , authors , and things personated . page . the second part , of common-wealth . chap. . of the causes , generation , and definition of a common-wealth . page . chap. . of the rights of soveraignes by institution . page . chap. . of severall kinds of common-wealth by institution ; and of succession to the soveraign power . page . chap. . of dominion paternall , and despoticall . page . chap. . of the liberty of subjects . page . chap. . of systemes subject , politicall , and private . page . chap. . of the publique ministers of soveraign power . page . chap. . of the nutrition , and procreation of a common-wealth . page . chap. . of counsell . page . chap. . of civill lawes . page . chap. . of crimes , excuses , and extenuations . page . chap. . of punishments , and rewards . page . chap. . of those things that weaken , or tend to the dissolution of a common-wealth . page . chap. . of the office of the soveraign representative . page . chap. . of the kingdome of god by nature . page . the third part. of a christian common-wealth . chap. . of the principles of christian politiques . page . chap. . of the number , antiquity , scope , authority , and interpreters of the books of holy scripture . page . chap. . of the signification , of spirit , angell , and inspiration in the books of holy scripture . page . chap. . of the signification in scripture of the kingdome of god , of holy , sacred , and sacrament . page . chap. . of the word of god , and of prophets . page . chap. . of miracles , and their use . page . chap. . of the signification in scripture of eternall life , hel , salvation , the world to come , and redemption . page . chap. . of the signification in scripture of the word church . page . chap. . of the rights of the kingdome of god , in abraham , moses , the high priests , and the kings of judah . page . chap. . of the office of our blessed saviour . page . chap. . of power ecclesiasticall . page . chap. . of what is necessary for a mans reception into the kingdome of heaven . page . the fourth part. of the kingdome of darknesse . chap. . of spirituall darknesse from misinterpretation of scripture . page . chap. . of daemonology , and other reliques of the religion of the gentiles . page . chap. . of darknesse from vain philosophy , and fabulous traditions . page . chap. . of the benefit proceeding from such darknesse ; and to whom it accreweth . page . a review and conclusion . page . errata . page . in the margin , for love praise , r●…d love of praise . p. . l. . for signied , r. signified . p. . l. . for performe , r. forme . l. . for soveraign , r. the soveraign . p. . l. . for lands , r. hands . p. . l. . for in , r. in his . p. . l. . for in , r. is . p. . in the margin , for ver . . r. ver . . &c. p. . l. . for are involved , r. are not involved . p. . l. . for those bodies , r. these bodies . p. . ●… . a. for in generall . r. in generall , . p. . l. . for were , r. where . p. . l. . for benefit . r. benefits . p. . l. . dele also . l. . for delivered , r. deliver . p. . l. . for other , r. higher . p. . l. . for and left , r. if left . l. . for write , r. writt . p. . l. . for of the , r. over the. p. . l. . for but of , r. but by mediation of . l. . dele and. l. . for putting , r. pulling . p. . l. . for tisme , r. baptisme . p. . l. . for that the , r. that . p. . l. . for observe , r. obey . l. . for contrary the , r. contrary to the. p. . l. . for our saviours of life , r. of our saviours life . p. . l. . for if shall , r. if he shall . l. . for haven , r. heaven . l. . for of church , r. of the church . p. . l. . dele inter . l. . dele are . p. . l. . for he had , r. he hath . p. . l. . dele of . p. . l. . for to ay , r. to lay. p. . l. . for him , r. them . the introduction . nature ( the art whereby god hath made and governes the world ) is by the art of man , as in many other things , so in this also imitated , that it can make an artificial animal . for seeing life is but a motion of limbs , the begining whereof is in some principall part within ; why may we not say , that all automata ( engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch ) have an artificiall life ? for what is the heart , but a spring ; and the nerves , but so many str●…gs ; and the ●…oynts , but so many wheeles , giving motion to the whole body , such as was intended by the artificer ? art goes yet further , imitating that rationall and most excellent worke of nature , ma●… . for by art is created that great leviathan called a common-wealth , or state , ( in latine civitas ) which is but an artificiall man ; though of greater stature and strength than the naturall , for whose protection and defence it was intended ; and in which , the soveraignty is an artificiall soul , as giving life and motion to the whole body ; the magistrates , and other officers of judicature and execution , artificiall joynts ; reward and punishment ( by which fastned to the seate of the soveraignty , every joynt and member is moved to performe his duty ) are the nerves , that do the same in the body naturall ; the wealth and riches of all the particular members , are the strength ; salus populi ( the peoples safety ) its businesse ; counsellors , by whom all things needfull for it to know , are suggested unto it , are the memory ; equity and lawes , an artificiall reason and will ; concord , health ; sedition , sicknesse ; and civill war , death . lastly , the pa●…ts and covenants , by which the parts of this body politique were at first made , set together , and united , resemble that fiat , or the let us make man , pronounced by god in the creation . to describe the nature of this artificiall man , i will consider first , the matter thereof , and the artificer ; both which is man. secondly , how , and by what covenants it is made ; what are the rights and just power or authority of a soveraigne ; and what it is that preserveth and dissolveth it . thirdly , what is a christian common-wealth . lastly , what is the kingdome of darkness . concerning the first , there is a saying much usurped of late , . that wisedome is acquired , not by reading of books , but of men. consequently whereunto , those persons , that for the most part can give no other proof of being wise , take great delight to shew what they think they have read in men , by uncharitable censures of one another behind their backs . but there is another saying not of late understood , by which they might learn truly to read one another , if they would take the pains ; and that is , nos●…e teipsum , read thy self : which was not meant , as it is now used , to countenance , either the barbarous state of men in power , towards their inferiors ; or to encourage men of low degree , to a sawcie behaviour towards their betters ; but to teach us , that for the similitude of the thoughts , and passions of one man , to the thoughts , and passions of another , whosoever looketh into himself , and considereth what he doth , when he does think , opine , reason , hope , feare , &c , and upon what grounds ; he shall thereby read and know , what are the thoughts , and passions of all other men , upon the like occasions . i say the similitude of passions , which are the same in all men , desire , feare , hope , not the similitude of the objects of the passions , which are the things desired , feared , hoped , &c : for these the constitution individuall , and particular education do so vary , and they are so easie to be kept from our knowledge , that the characters of mans heart , blotted and confounded as they are , with dissembling , lying , counterfeiting , and erroneous doctrines , are legible onely to 〈◊〉 that 〈◊〉 hearts . and though by mens actions wee do discover their designe sometimes ; yet to do it without comparing them with our own , and distinguishing all circumstances , by which the case may come to be altered , is to decypher without a key , and be for the most pa●… deceived , by too much trust , or by too much diffidence ; as he that reads , is himself a good or evil man. but let one man read another by his actions never so perfectly , it serves him onely with his acquaintance , which are but few . he that is to govern a whole nation , must read in himself , not this , or that particular man ; but man-kind : which though it be hard to do , harder than to learn any language , or science ; yet , when i shall have set down my own reading orderly , and perspicuously , the pains left ano●…her , will be onely to consider , if he also find not the same in himself . for this kind of doctrine , admitteth no other demonstration . of man. chap. i. of sense . concerning the thoughts of man , i will consider them first singly , and afterwards in trayne , or dependance upon one another . singly , they are every one a representation or apparence , of some quality , or other accident of a body without us ; which is commonly called an object . which object worketh on the eyes , eares , and other parts of mans body ; and by diversity of working , produceth diversity of apparences . the originall of them all , is that which we call sense ; ( for there is no conception in a mans mind , which hath not at first , totally , or by parts , been begotten upon the organs of sense . ) the rest are derived from that originall . to know the naturall cause of sense , is not very necessary to the business now in hand ; and i have else-where written of the same at large . nevertheless , to fill each part of my present method , i will briefly deliver the same in this place . the cause of sense , is the externall body , or object , which presseth the organ proper to each sense , either immediatly , as in the tast and touch ; or mediately , as in seeing , hearing , and smelling : which pressure , by the mediation of nerves , and other strings , and membranes of the body , continued inwards to the brain , and heart , causeth there a resistance , or counter-pressure , or endeavour of the heart , to deliver it self : which endeavour because outward , seemeth to be some matter without . and this seeming , or fancy , is that which men call sense ; and consisteth , as to the eye , in a light , or colour figured ; to the eare , in a sound ; to the nostrill , in an odour ; to the tongue and palat , in a savour ; and to the rest of the body , in heat , cold , hardnesse , softnesse , and such other qualities , as we discern by feeling . all which qualities called sensible , are in the object that causeth them , but so many several motions of the matter , by which it presseth our organs diversly . neither in us that are pressed , are they any thing else , but divers motions ; ( for motion , produceth nothing but motion . ) but their apparence to us is fancy , the same waking , that dreaming . and as pressing , rubbing , or striking the eye , makes us fancy a light ; and pressing the eare , produceth a dinne ; so do the bodies also we see , or hear , produce the same by their strong , though unobserved action . for if those colours , and sounds , were in the bodies , or objects that cause them , they could not bee severed from them , as by glasses , and in ecchoes by reflection , wee see they are ; where we know the thing we see , is in one place ; the apparence , in another . and though at some certain distance , the reall , and very object seem inv●…sted with ●…he fancy it beg●…ts i●… us ; yet still the object is one thing ▪ the image or fancy is another . so that sense in all cases , is nothing els but originall fancy , caused ( as i have said ) by the pressure , that is , by the motion , of externall things upon our eyes , eares , and other organs thereunto ordained . but the philosophy-schooles , through all the universities of christendome , grounded upon certain texts of aristotle , teach another doctrine ; and say , for the cause of vision , that the thing seen , sendeth forth on every side a visible species ( in english ) a vi●…ble 〈◊〉 , apparition , or aspect , or a being seen ; the receiving whereof into the eye , is seeing . and for the cause of hearing , that the thing heard , sendeth forth an a●…dible species , that is , 〈◊〉 audible aspe●…t , or audible being seen ; which entring at the eare , maketh hearing . nay for the ca●…se of understanding also , they say the thing understood sendeth forth intelligible species , that is , an intelligible being seen ; which comming into the understanding , makes us understand . i say not this , as disapproving the use of universities : but because i am to speak hereafter of their office in a common-wealth , i must let you see on all occasions by the way , what things would be amended in them ; amongst which the frequency of insignificant speech is one . chap. ii. of imagination . that when a thing lies still , unlesse somewhat els stirre it , it will lye still for ever , is a truth that no man doubts of . but that when a thing is in motion , it will eternally be in motion , unless somewhat els stay it , though the reason be the same , ( namely , that nothing can change it selfe , ) is not so easily assented to . for men measure , not onely other men , but all other things , by themselves : and because they find themselves subject after motion to pain , and lassitude , think every thing els growes weary of motion , and seeks repose of its own accord ; little considering , whether it be not some other motion , wherein that desire of rest they find in themselves , consisteth . from hence it is , that the schooles say , heavy bodies fall downwards , out of an appetite to rest , and to conserve their nature in that place which is most proper for them ; ascribing appetite , and knowledge of what is good for their conservation , ( which is more than man has ) to things inanimate , absurdly . when a body is once in motion , it moveth ( unless something els hinder it ) eternally ; and whatsoever hindreth it , cannot in an instant , but in time , and by degrees quite extinguish it : and as wee see in the water , though the wind cease , the waves give not over rowling for a long time after ; so also it happeneth in that motion , which is made in the internall parts of a man , then , when he sees , dreams , &c. for after the object is removed , or the eye shut , wee still retain an image of the thing seen , though more obscure than when we see it . and this is it , the latines call imagination , from the image made in seeing ; and apply the same , though improperly , to all the other senses . but the greeks call it fancy ; which signifies apparence , and is as proper to one sense , as to another . imagination therefore is nothing but decaying sense ; and is found in men , and many other living creatures , aswell sleeping , as waking . the decay of sense in men waking , is not the decay of the motion made in sense ; but an obscuring of it , in such manner , as the light of the sun obscureth the light of the starres ; which sta●…s do no less exercise their vertue by which they are visible , in the day , than in the night . but because amongst many stroaks , which our eyes , eares , and other organs receive from externall bodies , the predominant onely is sensible ; therefore the light of the sun being predominant , we are not affected with the action of the starrs . and any object being removed from our eyes , though the impression it made in us remain ; yet other objects more present succeeding , and working on us , the imagination of the past is obscured , and made weak ; as the voyce of a man is in the noyse of the day . from whence it followeth , that the longer the time is , after the sight , or sense of any object , the weaker is the imagination . for the continuall change of mans body , destroyes in time the parts which in sense were moved : so that distance of time , and of place , hath one and the same effect in us . for as at a great distance of place , that which wee look at , appears dimme , and without distinction of the smaller parts ; and as voyces grow weak , and inarticulate : so also after great distance of time , our imagination of the past is weak ; and wee lose ( for example ) of cities wee have seen , many particular streets ; and of actions , many particular circumstances . this decaying sense , when wee would express the thing it self , ( i mean fancy it selfe , ) wee call imagination ; as i said before : but when we would express the decay , and signifie that the sense is fading , old , and past , it is called memory . so that imagination and memory , are but one thing , which for divers considerations ●…ath divers names . much memory , or memory of many things , is called experience . againe , imagination being only of those things which have been formerly perceived by sense , either all at once , or by parts at severall times ; the former , ( which is the imagining the whole object , as it was presented to the sense ) is simple imagination ; as when one imagineth a man , or horse , which he hath seen before . the other is compounded ; as when from the sight of a man at one time , and of a horse at another , we conceive in our mind a centaure . so when a man compoundeth the image of his own person , with the image of the actions of an other man ; as when a man imagins himselfe a her●…s , or an alexander , ( which happeneth often to them that are much taken with reading of romants ) it is a compound imagination , and properly but a fiction of the mind . there be also other imaginations that rise in men , ( though waking ) from the great impression made in sense : as from gazing upon the sun , the impression leaves an image of the sun before our eyes a long time after ; and from being long and vehemently attent upon geometricall figures , a man shall in the dark , ( though awake ) have the images of lines , and angles before his eyes : which kind of fancy hath no particular name ; as being a thing that doth not commonly fall into mens discourse . the imaginations of them that sleep , are those we call dreams . and these also ( as all other imaginations ) have been before , either totally , or by parcells in the sense . and because in sense , the brain , and nerves , which are the necessary organs of sense , are so benummed in sleep , as not easily to be moved by the action of externall objects , there can happen in sleep , no imagination ; and therefore no dreame , but what proceeds from the agitation of the inward parts of mans body ; which inward parts , for the connexion they have with the brayn , and other organs , when they be distempered , do keep the same in motion ; whereby the imaginations there formerly made , appeare as if a man were waking ; saving that the organs of sense being now benummed , so as there is no new object , which can master and obseure them with a more vigorous impression , a dreame must needs be more cleare , in this silence of sense , than are our waking thoughts . and hence it cometh to passe , that it is a hard matter , and by many thought impossible to distinguish exactly between sense and dreaming . for my part , when i consider , that in dreames , i do not often , nor constantly think of the same persons , places , objects , and actions that i do waking ; nor remember so long a trayne of coherent thoughts , dreaming , as at other times ; and because waking i often observe the absurdity of dreames , but never dream of the absurdities of my waking thoughts ; i am well satisfied , that being awake , i know i dreame not ; though when i dreame , i think my selfe awake . and seeing dreames are caused by the distemper of some of the inward parts of the body ; divers distempers must needs cause different dreams . and hence it is , that lying cold breedeth dreams of feare , and raiseth the thought and image of some fearfull object ( the motion from the brain to the inner parts , and from the inner parts to the brain being reciprocall : ) and that as anger causeth heat in some parts of the body , when we are awake ; so when we sleep , the over heating of the same parts causeth anger , and raiseth up in the brain the imagination of an enemy . in the same manner ; as naturall kindness , when we are awake causeth desire ; and desire makes heat in certain other parts of the body ; so also , too much heat in those parts , while wee sleep , raiseth in the brain an imagination of some kindness s●…ewn . in summe , our dreams are the reverse of our waking imaginations ; the motion when we are awake , beginning at one end ; and when we dream , at another . the most difficult discerning of a mans dream , from his waking thoughts , is then , when by some accident we observe not that we have slept : which is easie to happen to a man full of fearfull thoughts ; and whose conscience is much troubled ; and that sleepeth , without the circumstances , of going to bed , or putting off his clothes , as one that noddeth in a chayre . for he that taketh pains , and industriously layes himself to sleep , in case any uncouth and exorbitant fancy come unto him , cannot easily think it other than a dream . we read of marcus brutus , ( one that had his life given him by iulius caesar , and was also his favorite , and notwithstanding murthered him , ) how at philippi , the night before he gave battell to augustus c●…sar , hee saw a fearfull apparition , which is commonly related by historians as a vision : but considering the circumstances , one may easily judge to have been but a short dream . for sitting in his tent , pensive and troubled with the horrour of his rash act , it was not hard for him , slumbering in the cold , to dream of that which most affrighted him ; which feare , as by degrees it made him wake ; so also it must needs make the apparition by degrees to vanish : and having no assurance that he slept , he could have no cause to think it a dream , or any thing but a vision . and this is no very rare accident : for even they that be perfectly awake , if they be timorous , and supperstitious , possessed with fearfull tales , and alone in the dark , are subject to the like fancies ; and believe they see spirits and dead mens ghosts walking in church-yards ; whereas it is either their fancy onely , or els the knavery of such persons , as make use of such superstitious feare , to passe disguised in the night , to places they would not be known to haunt . from this ignorance of how to distinguish dreams , and other strong fancies , from vision and sense , did arise the greatest part of the religion of the gentiles in time past , that worshipped satyres , fawnes , nymphs , and the like ; and now adayes the opinion that rude people have of fayries , ghosts , and goblins ; and of the power of witches . for as for witches , i think not that their witchcraft is any reall power ; but yet that they are justly punished , for the false beliefe they have , that they can do such mischiefe , joyned with their purpose to do it if they can : their trade being neerer to a new religion , than to a craft or science . and for fayries , and walking ghosts , the opinion of them has i think been on purpose , either taught , or not confuted , to keep in credit the use of exorcisme , of crosses , of holy water , and other such inventions of ghostly men . neverthelesse , there is no doubt , but god can make unnaturall apparitions : but that he does it so often , as men need to feare such things , more than they feare the stay , or change , of the course of nature , which he also can stay , and change , is no point of christian faith . but evill men under pretext that god can do any thing , are so bold as to say any thing when it serves their turn , though they think it untrue ; it is the part of a wise man , to believe them no further , than right reason makes that which they say , appear credible . if this superstitious fear of spirits were taken away , and with it , prognostiques from dreams , false prophecies , and many other things depending thereon , by which , crafty ambitious persons abuse the simple people , men would be much more fitted than they are for civill obedience . and this ought to be the work of the schooles : but they rather nourish such doctrine . for ( not knowing what imagination , or the senses are ) , what they receive , they reach : some saying , that imaginations rise of themselves , and have no cause : others that they rise most commonly from the will ; and that good thoughts are blown ( inspired ) into a man , by god ; and evill thoughts by the divell : or that good thoughts are powred ( infused ) into a man , by god , and evill ones by the divell . some say the senses receive the species of things , and deliver them to the common-sense ; and the common sense delivers them over to the fancy , and the fancy to the memory , and the memory to the judgement , like handing of things from one to another , with many words making nothing understood . the imagination that is raysed in man ( or any other creature indued with the faculty of imagining ) by words , or other voluntary signes , is that we generally call understanding ; and is common to man and beast . for a dogge by custome will understand the call , or the rating of his master ; and so will many other beasts . that understanding which is peculiar to man , is the understanding not onely his will ; but his conceptions and thoughts , by the sequell and contexture of the names of things into affirmations , negations , and other formes of speech : and of this kinde of understanding i shall speak hereafter . chap. iii. of the consequence or trayne of imaginations . by consequence , or trayne of thoughts , i understand that succession of one thought to another , which is called ( to distingui●…h it from discourse in words ) mentall discourse . when a man thinketh on any thing whatsoever , his next thought after , is not altogether so casuall as it seems to be . not every thought to every thought succeeds indifferently . but as wee have no imagination , whereof we have not formerly had sense , in whole , or in parts ; so we have no transition from one imagination to another , whereof we never had the like before in our senses . the reason whereof is this . all fancies are motions within us , reliques of those made in the sense : and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense , continue also together after sense : in so much as the former comming again to take place , and be praedominant , the later followeth , by coherence of the matter moved , in such manner , as water upon a plain table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger . but because in sense , to one and the same thing perceived , sometimes one thing , sometimes another succeedeth , it comes to passe in ●…ime , that in the imagining of any thing , there is no certainty what we shall imagine next ; onely this is certain , it shall be something that succeeded the same before , at one time or another . this trayne of thoughts , or mentall discourse , is of two sorts . the first is vnguided , without designe , and inconstant ; wherein there is no passionate thought , to govern and direct those that follow , to it self , as the end and scope of some desire , or other passion : in which case the thoughts are said to wander , and seem impertinent one to another , as in a dream . such are commonly the thonghts of men , that are not onely without company , but also without care of any thing ; though even then their thoughts are as busie as at other times , but without harmony ; as the sound which a lute out of tune would yeeld to any man ; or in tune , to one that could not play . and yet in this wild ranging of the mind , a man may oft-times perceive the way of it , and the dependance of one thought upon another . for in a discourse of our present civill warre , what could seem more impertinent , than to ask ( as one did ) what was the value of a roman penny ? yet the cohaerence to me was manifest enough . for the thought of the warre , introduced the thought of the delivering up the king to his enemies ; the thought of that , brought in the thought of the delivering up of christ ; and that again the thought of the pence , which was the price of that treason : and thence easily followed that malicious question ; and all this in a moment of time ; for thought is quick . the second is more constant ; as being regulated by some desire , and designe . for the impression made by such things as wee desire , or feare , is strong , and permanent , or , ( if it cease for a time , ) of quick return : so strong it is sometimes , as to hinder and break our sleep . from desire , ariseth the thought of some means we have seen produce the like of that which we ayme at ; and from the thought of that , the thought of means to that mean ; and so continually , till we come to some beginning within our own power . and because the end , by the greatnesse of the impression , comes often to mind , in case our thoughts begin to wander , they are quickly again reduced into the way : which observed by one of the seven wise men , made him give men this praecept , which is now worne out , respice finem ; that is to say , in all your actions , look often upon what you would have , as the thing that directs all your thoughts in the way to attain it . the trayn of regulated thoughts is of two kinds ; one , when of an effect imagined , wee seek the causes , or means that produce it : and this is common to man and beast . the other is , when imagining any thing whatsoever , wee seek all the possible effects , that can by it be produced ; that is to say , we imagine what we can do with it , when wee have it . of which i have not at any time seen any signe , but in man onely ; for this is a curiosity hardly incident to the nature of any living creature that has no other passion but sensuall , such as are hunger , thirst , lust , and anger . in summe , the disconrse of the mind , when it is governed by designe , is nothing but seeking , or the faculty of invention , which the latines call sagacitas , and solertia ; a hunting out of the causes , of some effect , present or past ; or of the effects , of some present or past cause . sometimes a man seeks what he hath lost ; and from that place , and time , wherein hee misses it , his mind runs back , from place to place , and time to time , to find where , and when he had it ; that is to say , to find some certain , and limited time and place , in which to begin a method of seeking . again , from thence , his thoughts run over the same places and times , to find what action , or other occasion might make him lose it . this we call remembrance , or calling to mind : the latines call it reminiscentia , as it were a re-conning of our former actions . sometimes a man knows a place determinate , within the compasse whereof he is to seek ; and then his thoughts run over all the parts thereof , in the same manner , as one would sweep a room , to find a jewell ; or as a spaniel ranges the field , till he find a sent ; or as a man should run over the alphabet , to start a rime . sometime a man desires to know the event of an action ; and then he thinketh of some like action past , and the events thereof one after another ; supposing like events will follow like actions . as he that foresees what wil become of a criminal , re-cons what he has seen follow on the like crime before ; having this order of thoughts , the crime , the officer , the prison , the judge , and the gallowes . which kind of thoughts , is called foresight , and prudence , or providence ; and sometimes wisdome ; though such conjecture , through the difficulty of observing all circumstances , be very fallacious . but this is certain ; by how much one man has more experience of things past , than another ; by so much also he is more prudent , and his expectations the seldomer faile him . the present onely has a being in nature ; things past have a being in the memory onely , but things to come have no being at all ; the future being but a fiction of the mind , applying the sequels of actions past , to the actions that are present ; which with most certainty is done by him that has most experience ; but not with certainty enough . and though it be called prudence , when the event answereth our expectation ; yet in its own nature , it is but presumption . for the foresight of things to come , which is providence , belongs onely to him by whose will they are to come . from him onely , and supernaturally , proceeds prophecy . the best prophet naturally is the best guesser ; and the best guesser , he that is most versed and studied in the matters he guesses at : for he hath most signes to guesse by . a signe , is the event antecedent , of the consequent ; and contrarily , the consequent of the antecedent , when the like consequences have been observed , before : and the oftner they have been observed , the lesse uncertain is the signe . and therefore he that has most experience in any kind of businesse , has most signes , whereby to guesse at the future time ; and consequently is the most prudent : and so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business , as not to be equalled by any advantage of naturall and extemporary wit : though perhaps many young men think the contrary . neverthelesse it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast . there be beasts , that at a year old observe more , and pursue that which is for their good , more prudently , than a child can do at ten . as prudence is a praesumtion of the future , contracted from the experience of time past ▪ so there is a praesumtion of things past taken from other things ( not future but ) past also . for he that hath seen by what courses and degrees , a flourishing state hath first come into civil warre , and then to ruine ; upon the sight of the ●…ines of any other state , will guesse ▪ the like warre , and the like courses have been there also . but this conjecture , has the same incertainty almost with the conjecture of the future ; both being grounded onely upon experience . there is no other act of mans mind , that i can remember , naturally planted in him , so , as to need no other thing , to the exercise of it , but to be born a man , and live with the use of his five senses . those other faculties , of which i shall speak by and by , and which seem proper to man onely , are acquired , and encreased by study and industry ; and of most men learned by instruction , and discipline ; and proceed all from the invention of words , and speech . for besides sense , and thoughts , and the trayne of thoughts , the mind of man has no other motion ; though by the help of speech , and method , the same facultyes may be improved to such a height , as to distinguish men from all other living creatures . whatsoever we imagine , is finite . therefore there is no idea , or conception of any thing we call infinite . no man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude ; nor conceive infinite swiftness , infinite time , or infinite force , or infinite power . when we say any thing is infinite , we signifie onely ▪ that we are not able to conceive the ends , and bounds of the thing named ; having no conception of the thing , but of our own inability . and therefore the name of god is used , not to make us conceive him ; ( for he is incomprehensible ; and his greatnesse , and power are unconceivable ; ) but that we may honour him . also because whatsoever ( as i said before , ) we conceive , has been perceived first by sense , either all at once , or by parts ; a man can have no thought , representing any thing , not subject to sense . no man therefore can conceive any thing , but he must conceive it in some place ; and indued with some determinate magnitude ; and which may be divided into parts ; nor that any thing is all in this place , and all in another place at the same time ; nor that two , or more things can be in one , and the same place at once : for none of these things ever have , or can be incident to sense ; but are absurd speeches , taken upon credit ( without any signification at all , ) from deceived philosophers , and deceived , or deceiving schoolemen . chap. iv. of speech . the invention of printing , though ingenious , compared with the invention of letters , is no great matter . but who was the first that found the use of letters , is not known . he that first brought them into greece , men say was cadmus , the sonne of agenor , king of phaenicia . a profitable invention for continuing the memory of time past , and the conjunction of mankind , dispersed into so many , and distant regions of the earth ; and with all difficult , as proceeding from a watchfull observation of the divers motions of the tongue , palat , lips , and other organs of speech ; whereby to make as many differences of characters , to remember them . but the most noble and profitable invention of all other , was that of speech , consisting of names or appellations , and their connexion ; whereby men register their thoughts ; recall them when they are past ; and also declare them one to another for mutuall utility and conversation ; without which , there had been amongst men , neither common-wealth , nor society , nor contract , nor peace , no more than amongst lyons , bears , and wolves . the first author of speech was god himself , that instructed adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight ; for the scripture goeth no further in this matter . but this was sufficient to direct him to adde more names , as the experience and use of the creatures should give him occasion ; and to joyn them in such manner by degrees , as to make himself understood ; and so by succession of time , so much language might be gotten , as he had found use for ; though not so copious , as an orator or philosopher has need of . for i do not find any thing in the scripture , out of which , directly or by consequence can be gathered , that adam was taught the names of all figures , numbers , measures , colours , sounds , fancies , relations ; much less the names of words and speech , as generall , speciall , affirmative , negative , interrogative , optative , infinitive , all which are usefull ; and least of all , of entity , intentionality , quiddity , and other insignificant words of the school . but all this language gotten , and augmented by adam and his posterity , was again lost at the tower of babel , when by the hand of god , every man was stricken for his rebellion , with an oblivion of his former language . and being hereby forced to disperse themselves into severall parts of the world , it must needs be , that the diversity of tongues that now is , proceeded by degrees from them , in such manner , as need ( the mother of all inventions ) taught them ; and in tract of time grew every where more copious . the generall use of speech , is to transferre our mentall discourse , into verbal ; or the trayne of our thoughts , into a trayne of words ; and that for two commodities ; whereof one is , the registring of the consequences of our thoughts ; which being apt to slip out of our memory , and put us to a new labour , may again be recalled , by such words as they were marked by . so that the first use of names , is to serve for markes , or notes of remembrance . another is , when many use the same words , to signifie ( by their connexion and order , ) one to another , what they conceive , or think of each matter ; and also what they desire , feare , or have any other passion for . and for this use they are called signes . speciall uses of speech are these ; first , to register , what by cogitation , wee find to be the cause of any thing , present or past ; and what we find things present or past may produce , or effect : which in summe , is acquiring of arts. secondly , to shew to others that knowledge which we have attained ; which is , to counsell , and teach one another . thirdly , to make known to others our wills , and purposes , that we may have the mutuall help of one another . fourthly , to please and delight our selves , and others , by playing with our words , for pleasure or ornament , innocently . to these uses , there are also foure correspondent abuses . first , when men register their thoughts wrong , by the inconstancy of the signification of their words ; by which they register for their conceptions , that which they never conceived ; and so deceive themselves . secondly , when they use words metaphorically ; that is , in other sense than that they are ordained for ; and thereby deceive others . thirdly , when by words they declare that to be their will , which is not . fourthly , when they use them to grieve one another : for seeing nature hath armed living creatures , some with teeth , some with horns , and some with hands , to grieve an enemy , it is but an abuse of speech , to grieve him with the tongue , unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern ; and then it is not to grieve , but to correct and amend . the manner how speech serveth to the remembrance of the consequence of causes and effects , consisteth in the imposing of names , and the connexion of them . of names , some are proper , and singular to one onely thing ; as peter , iohn , this man , this tree : and some are common to many things ; as man , horse , tree ; every of which though but one name , is nevertheless the name of divers particular things ; in respect of all which together , it is called an universall ; there being nothing in the world universall but names ; for the things named , are every one of them individuall and singular . one universall name is imposed on many things , for the●… similitude in some quality , or other accident : and wheras a proper name bringeth to mind one thing onely ; universals recall any one of those many . and of names universall , some are of more , and some of lesse extent ; the larger comprehending the lesse large : and some again of equall extent , comprehending each other reciprocally . as for example , the name body is of larger signification than the word man , and comprehendeth it ; and the names man and rationall , are of equall extent , comprehending mutually one another . but here wee must take notice , that by a name is not alwayes understood , as in grammar , one onely word ; but sometimes by circumlocution many words together . for all these words , hee that in his actions observeth the lawes of his country , make but one name , equivalent to this one word , just. by this imposition of names , some of larger , some of stricter signification , we turn the reckoning of the consequences of things imagined in the mind , into a reckoning of the consequences of appellations . for example , a man that hath no use of speech at all , ( such , as is born and remains perfectly deafe and dumb , ) if he set before his eyes a triangle , and by it two right angles , ( such as are the corners of a square figure , ) he may by meditation compare and find , that the three angles of that triangle , are equall to those two right angles that stand by it . but if another triangle be shewn him different in shape from the former , he cannot know without a new labour , whether the three angles of that also be equall to the same . but he that hath the use of words , when he observes , that such equality was consequent , not to the length of the sides , nor to any other particular thing in his triangle ; but onely to this , that the sides were straight , and the angles three ; and that that was all , for which he named it a triangle ; will boldly conclude universally , that such equality of angles is in all triangles whatsoever ; and register his invention in these generall termes , every triangle hath its three angles equall to two right angles . and thus the consequence found in one particular , comes to be registred and remembred , as an universall rule ; and discharges our mentall reckoning , of time and place ; and delivers us from all labour of the mind , saving the first ; and makes that which was found true here , and now , to be true in all times and places . but the use of words in registring our thoughts , is in nothing so evident as in numbring . a naturall foole that could never learn by heart the order of numerall words , as one , two , and three , may observe every stroak of the clock , and nod to it , or say one , one , one ; but can never know what houre it strikes . and it seems , there was a time when those names of number were not in use ; and men were fayn to apply their fingers of one or both hands , to those things they desired to keep account of ; and that thence it proceeded , that now our numerall words are but ten , in any nation , and in some but five , and then they begin again . and he that can tell ten , if he recite them out of order , will lose himselfe , and not know when he has done : much lesse will he be able to adde , and substract , and performe all other operations of arithmetique . so that without words , there is no possibility of reckoning of numbers ; much lesse of magnitudes , of swiftnesse , of force , and other things , the reckonings whereof are necessary to the being , or well-being of man-kind . when two names are joyned together into a consequence , or affirmation ; as thus , a man is a living creature ; or thus , if he be a man , he is a living creature , if the later name living creature , signifie all that the former name man signifieth , then the affirmation , or consequence is true ; otherwise false . for true and false are attributes of speech , not of things . and where speech is not , there is neither truth nor falshood . errour there may be , as when wee expect that which shall not be ; or suspect what has not been : but in neither case can a man be charged with untruth . seeing then that truth consisteth in the right ordering of names in our affirmations , a man that seeketh precise ●…ruth , had need to remember what every name he uses stands for ; and to place it accordingly ; or else he will find himselfe entangled in words , as a bird in lime-twiggs ; the more he struggles , the more belimed . and therefore in geometry , ( which is the onely science that it hath pleased god hitherto to bestow on mankind , ) men begin at settling the significations of their words ; which settling of significations , they call definitions ; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning . by this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge , to examine the definitions of former authors ; and either to corr●…ct them , where they are negl●…gently set down ; or to make th●… himselfe . for the errours of definitions multiply themselves , according as the reckoning proceeds ; and lead men into absurdities , which at last they see , but cannot avoyd , without reckoning anew from the beginning ; in which lyes the foundation of their errours . from whence it happens , that they which trust to books , do as they that cast up many little summs into a greater , without considering whether those little summes were rightly cast up or not ; and at last finding the errour visible , and not mistrusting their first grounds , know not which way to cleere themselves ; but spend time in fluttering over their bookes ; as birds that entring by the chimney , and finding themselves inclosed in a chamber , flutter at the false light of a glasse window , for want of wit to consider which way they came in . so that in the right definition of names , lyes the first use of speech ; which is the acquisition of science : and in wrong , or no definitions , lyes the first abuse ; from which proceed all false and senslesse tenets ; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books , and not from their own meditation , to be as much below the condition of ignorant men , as men endued with true science are above it . for between true science , and erroneous ●…octrines , ignorance is in the middle . naturall sense and imagination , are not subject to absurdity . nature it selfe cannot erre : and as men abound in copiousnesse of language ; so they become more wise , or more mad than ordinary . nor is it possible without letters for any man to become either excellently wise , or ( unless his memory be hurt by disease , or ill constitution of organs ) excellently fool●…h . for words are wise mens counters , they do but reckon by them : but they are the mony of fooles , that value them by the authority of an aristotle , a cicero , or a thomas , or any other doctor whatsoever , if but a man. subject to names , is whatsoever can enter into , or be considered in an account ; and be added one to another to make a summe ; or substracted one from another , and leave a remainder . the latines called accounts of mony rationes , and accounting , ratiocinatio : and that which we in bills or books of account call items , they called nomina ; that is , names : and thence it seems to proceed , that they extended the word ratio , to the faculty of reckoning in all other things . the greeks have but one word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for both speech and reason ; not that they thought there was no speech without reason ; but no reasoning without speech : and the act of reasoning they called syllogisme ; which signifieth summing up of the consequences of one saying to another . and because the same things may enter into account for divers accidents ; their names are ( to shew that diversity ) diversly wrested , and diversified . this diversity of names may be reduced to foure generall heads . first , a thing may enter into account for matter , or body ; as living , sensible , rationall , hot , cold , moved , quiet ; with all which names the word matter , or body is understood ; all such , being names of matter . secondly , it may enter into account , or be considered , for some accident or quality , which we conceive to be in it ; as for being moved , for being so long , for being hot , and then , of the name of the thing it selfe , by a little change or wresting , wee make a name for that accident , which we consider ; and for living put into the account life ; for moved , motion ; for hot , heat ; for long , length , and the like : and all such names , are the names of the accidents and properties , by which one matter , and body is distinguished from another . these are called names abstract ; because severed ( not from matter , but ) from the account of matter . thirdly , we bring into account , the properties of our own bodies , whereby we make such distinction : as when any thing is seen by us , we reckon not the thing it selfe ; but the sight , the colour , the idea of it in the fancy : and when any thing is heard , wee reckon it not ; but the hearing , or sound onely , which is our fancy or conception of it by the eare : and such are names of fancies . fourthly , we bring into account , consider , and give names , to names themselves , and to speeches : for , generall , universall , speciall , aequivocall , are names of names . and affirmation , interrogation , commandement , narration , syllogisme , sermon , oration , and many other such , are names of speeches . and this is all the variety of names positive ; which are put to mark somewhat which is in nature , or may be feigned by the mind of man , as bodies that are , or may be conceived to be ; or of bodies , the properties that are , or may be feigned to be ; or words and speech . there be also other names , called negative ; which are notes to signifie that a word is not the name of the thing in question ; as these words nothing , no man , infinite , indocible , three want foure , and the like ; which are nevertheless of use in reckoning , or in correcting of reckoning ; and call to mind our past cogitations , though they be not names of any thing ; because they make us refuse to admit of names not rightly used . all other names , are but insignificant sounds ; and those of two sorts . one , when they are new , and yet their meaning not explained by definition ; whereof there have been aboundance coyned by schoole-men , and pusled philosophers . another , when men make a name of two names , whose significations are contradictory and inconsistent ; as this name , an incorporeall body , or ( which is all one ) an incorporeall substance , and a great number more . for whensoever any affirmation is fal●…e , the two names of which it is composed , put together and made one , signifie nothing at all . for example , if it be a false affirmation to say a quadrangle is round , the word round quadrangle signifies nothing ; but is a meere sound . so likewise if it be false , to say that vertue can be powred , or blown up and down ; the words in-po●…red vertue , in-blown vertue , are as absurd and insignificant , as a round quadrangle . and therefore you shall hardly meet with a senslesse and insignificant word , that is not made up of some latin or greek names . a frenchman seldome hears our saviour called by the name of parole , but by the name of verbe often ; yet verbe and parole differ no more , but that one is latin , the other french. when a man upon the hearing of any speech , hath those thoughts which the words of that speech , and their connexion , were ordained and constituted to signifie ; then he is said to understand it : understanding being nothing else , but conception caused by speech . and therefore if speech be peculiar to man ( as for ought i know it is , ) then is understanding peculiar to him also . and therefore of absurd and false affirmations , in case they be universall , there can be no understanding ; though many think they understand , then , when they do but repeat the words softly , or con them in their mind . what kinds of speeches signifie the appetites , aversions , and passions of mans mind ; and of their use and abuse , i shall speak when i have spoken of the passions . the names of such things as affect us , that is , which please , and displease us , because all men be not alike affected with the same thing , nor the same man at all times , are in the common discourses of men , of inconstant signification . for seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions ; and all our affections are but conceptions ; when we conceive the same things differently , we can hardly avoyd different naming of them . for though the nature of that we conceive , be the same ; yet the diversity of our reception of it , in respect of different constitutions of body , and prejudices of opinion , gives every thing a tincture of our different passions . and therefore in reasoning , a man must take heed of words ; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature , have a signification also of the nature , disposition , and interest of the speaker ; such as are the names of vertues , and vices ; for one man calleth wisdome , what another calleth feare ; and one cruelty , what another justice ; one prodigality , what another magnanimity ; and one gravity , what another stupidicy , &c. and therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination . no more can metaphors , and tropes of speech : but these are less dangerous , because they profess thei●… inconstancy ; which the other do not . chap. v. of reason , and science . when a man reasoneth , hee does nothing else but conceive a summe totall , from addition of parcels ; or conceive a remainder ; from substraction of one summe from another : which ( if it be done by words , ) is conceiving of the consequence of the names of all the parts , to the name of the whole ; or from the names of the whole and one part , to the name of the other part . and though in some things , ( as in numbers , ) besides adding and substracting , men name other operations , as multiplying and dividing ; yet they are the same ; for multiplication , is but adding together of things equall ; and division , but substracting of one thing , as often as we can . these operations are not incident to numbers onely , but to all manner of things that can be added together , and taken one out of another . for as arithmeticians teach to adde and substract in numbers ; so the geometricians teach the same in lines , figures ( solid and superficiall , ) angles , proportions , times , degrees of swiftnesse , force , power , and the like ; the logicians teach the same in consequences of words ; adding together two names , to make an affirmation ; and two affirmations , to make a syllogisme ; and many syllogismes to make a demonstration ; and from the summe , or conclusion of a syllogisme , they substract one proposition , to finde the other . writers of politiques , adde together pactions , to find mens duties ; and lawyers , lawes , and facts , to find what is right and wrong in the actions of private men . in summe , in what matter soever there is place for addition and substraction , there also is place for reason ; and where these have no place , there reason has nothing at all to do . out of all which we may define , ( that is to say determine , ) what that is , which is meant by this word reason , when wee reckon it amongst the faculties of the mind . for reason , in this sense , is nothing but reckoning ( that is , adding and substracting ) of the consequences of generall names agreed upon , for the marking and signifying of our thoughts ; i say marking them , when we reckon by our selves ; and signifying , when we demonstrate , or approve our reckonings to other men . and as in arithmetique , unpractised men must , and professors themselves may often erre , and cast up false ; so also in any other subject of reasoning , the ablest , most attentive , and most practised men , may deceive themselves , and inferre false conclusions ; not but that reason it selfe is alwayes right reason , as well as arithmetique is a certain and infallible art : but no one mans reason , nor the reason of any one number of men , makes the certaintie ; no more than an account is therefore well cast up , because a great many men have unanimously approved it . and therfore , as when there is a controversy in an account , the parties must by their own accord , set up for right reason , the reason of some arbitrator , or judge , to whose sentence they will both stand , or their controversie must either come to blowes , or be undecided , for want of a right reason constituted by nature ; so is it also in all debates of what kind soever : and when men that think themselves wiser than all others , clamor and demand right reason for judge ; yet seek no more , but that things should be determined , by no other mens reason but their own , it is as intolerable in the society of men , as it is in play after ttump is turned , to use for trump on every occasion , that suite whereof they have most in their hand . for they do nothing els , that will have every of their passions , as it comes to bear sway in them , to be taken for right reason , and that in their own controversies : bewraying their want of right reason , by the claym they lay to it . the use and end of reason , is not the finding of the summe , and truth of one , or a few consequences , remote from the first definitions , and settled significations of names ; but to begin at these ; and proceed from one consequence to another . for there can be no certainty of the last conclusion , without a certainty of all those affirmations and negations , on which it was grounded , and inferred . as when a master of a family , in taking an account , casteth up the summs of all the bills of expence , into one sum ; and not regarding how each bill is summed up , by those that give them in account ; nor what it is he payes for ; he advantages himself no more , than if he allowed the account in grosse , trusting to every of the accountants skill and honesty : so also in reasoning of all other things , he that takes up conclusions on the trust of authors , and doth not fetch them from the first items in every reckoning , ( which are the significations of names settled by definitions ) , loses his labour ; and does not know any thing ; but onely beleeveth . when a man reckons without the use of words , which may be done in particular things , ( as when upon the sight of any one thing , wee conjecture what was likely to have preceded , or is likely to follow upon it ; ) if that which he thought likely to follow , followes not ; or that which he thought likely to have preceded it , hath not preceded it , this is called error ; to which even the most prudent men are subject . but when we reason in words of generall signification , and fall upon a generall inference which is false ; though it be commonly called error , it is indeed an absurdity , or senslesse speech . for error is but a deception , in presuming that somewhat is past , or to come ; of which , though it were not past , or not to come ; yet there was no impossibility discoverable . but when we make a generall assertion , unlesse it be a true one , the possibility of it is unconceivable . and words whereby we conceive nothing but the sound , are those we call absurd , insignificant , and non-sense . and therefore if a man should talk to me of a round quadrangle ; or accidents of bread in cheese ; or immateriall substances ; or of a free subject ; a free-will ; or any free , but free from being hindred by opposition , i should not say he were in an errour ; but that his words were without meaning ; that is to say , absurd . i have said before , ( in the second chapter , ) that a man did excell all other animals in this faculty , that when he conceived any thing whatsoever , he was apt to enquire the consequences of it , and what effects he could do with it . and now i adde this other degree of the same excellence , that he can by words reduce the consequences he findes to generall rules , called theoremes , or aphorismes ; that is , he can reason , or reckon , not onely in number ; but in all other things , whereof one may be added unto , or substracted from another . but this privedge , is allayed by another ; and that is , by the priviledge of absurdity ; to which no living creature is subject , but man onely . and of men , those are of all most subject to it , that professe philosophy . for it is most true that cicero sayth of them somewhere ; that there can be nothing so absurd , but may be found in the books of philosophers . and the reason is manifest . for there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions , or explications of the names they are to use ; which is a method that hath been used onely in geometry ; whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable . the first cause of absurd conclusions i ascribe to the want of method ; in that they begin not their ratiocination from definitions ; that is , from settled significations of their words : as if they could cast account , without knowing the value of the numerall words , one , two , and three . and whereas all bodies enter into account upon divers considerations , ( which i have mentioned in the precedent chapter ; ) these considerations being diversly named , divers absurdities proceed from the confusion , and unfit connexion of their names into assertions . and therefore the second cause of absurd assertions , i ascribe to the giving of names of bodies , to accidents ; or of accidents , to bodies ; as they do , that say , faith is infused , or inspired ; when nothing can be powred , or breathed into any thing , but body ; and that , extension is body ; that phantasmes are spirits , &c. the third i ascribe to the giving of the names of the accidents of bodies without us , to the accidents of our own bodies ; as they do that say , the colour is in the body ; the sound is in the ayre , &c. the fourth , to the giving of the names of bodies , to names , or speeches ; as they do that say , that there be things universall ; that a living creature is genus , or a generall thing , &c. the fifth , to the giving of the names of accidents , to names and speeches ; as they do that say , the nature of a thing is its definition ; a mans command is his will ; and the like . the sixth , to the use of metaphors , tropes , and other rhetoricall figures , in stead of words proper . for though it be lawfull to say , ( for example ) in common speech , the way goeth , or leadeth hither , or thither , the proverb sayes this or that ( whereas wayes cannot go , nor proverbs speak ; ) yet in reckoning , and seeking of truth , such speeches are not to be admitted . the seventh , to names that signifie nothing ; but are taken up , and learned by rote from the schooles , as hypostatical , transubstantiate , consubstantiate , eternal-now , and the like canting of schoolemen . to him that can avoyd these things , it is not easie to fall into any absurdity , unlesse it be by the length of an account ; wherein he may perhaps forget what went before . for all men by nature reason alike , and well , when they have good principles . for who is so stupid , as both to mistake in geometry , and also to persist in it , when another detects his error to him ? by this it appears that reason is not as sense , and memory , borne with us ; nor gotten by experience onely , as prudence is ; but attayned by industry ; first in apt imposing of names ; and secondly by getting a good and orderly method in proceeding from the elements , which are names , to assertions made by connexion of one of them to another ; and so to syllogismes , which are the connexions of one assertion to another , till we come to a knowledge of all the consequences of names appertaining to the subject in hand ; and that is it , men call science . and whereas sense and memory are but knowledge of fact , which is a thing past , and irrevocable ; science is the knowledge of consequences , and dependance of one fact upon another : by which , out of that we can presently do , we know how to do something else when we will , or the like , another time : because when we see how any thing comes about , upon what causes , and by what manner ; when the like causes come into our power , wee see how to make it produce the like effects . children therefore are not endued with reason at all , till they have attained the use of speech : but are called reasonable creatures , for the possibility apparent of having the use of reason in time to come . and the most part of men , though they have the use of reasoning a little way , as in numbring to some degree ; yet it serves them to little use in common life ; in which they govern themselves , some better , some worse , according to their differences of experience , quicknesse of memory , and inclinations to severall ends ; but specially according to good or evill fortune , and the errors of one another . for as for science , or certain rules of their actions , they are so farre from it , that they know not what it is . geometry they have thought conjuring : but for other sciences , they who have not been taught the beginnings , and some progresse in them , that they may see how they be acquired and generated , are in this point like children , that having no thought of generation , are made believe by the women , that their brothers and sisters are not born , but found in the garden . but yet they that have no science , are in better , and nobler condition with their naturall prudence ; than men , that by mis-reasoning , or by trusting them that reason wrong , fall upon false and absurd generall rules . for ignorance of causes , and of rules , does not set men so farre out of their way , as relying on false rules , and taking for causes of what they aspire to , those that are not so , but rather causes of the contrary . to conclude , the light of humane minds is perspicuous words , but by exact definitions first snuffed , and purged from ambiguity ; reason is the pace ; encrease of science , the way ; and the benefit of man-kind , the end . and on the contrary , metaphors , and senslesse and ambiguous words , are like ignes f●…i ; and reasoning upon them , is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities ; and their end , contentention , and sedition , or contempt . as , much experience , is prudence ; so , is much science , sapience . for though wee usually have one name of wisedome for them both ; yet the latines did alwayes distinguish between prudentia and sapientia ; ascribing the former to experience , the later to science . but to make their difference appeare more cleerly , let us suppose one man endued with an excellent naturall use , and dexterity in handling his armes ; and another to have added to that dexterity , an acquired science , of where he can offend , or be offended by his adversarie , in every possible posture , or guard : the ability of the former , would be to the ability of the later , as prudence to sapience ; both usefull ▪ but the later infallible . but they that trusting onely to the authority of books , follow the blind blindly , are like him that trusting to the false rules of a master of fence , ventures praesumptuously upon an adversary , that either kills , or disgraces him . the signes of science , are some , certain and infallible ; some , uncertain . certain , when he that pretendeth the science of any thing , can teach the same ; that is to say , demonstrate the truth thereof perspicuously to another : uncertain , when onely some particular events answer to his pretence , and upon many occasions prove so as he sayes they must . signes of prudence are all uncertain ; because to observe by experience , and remember all circumstances that may alter the successe , is impossible . but in any businesse , whereof a man has not infallible science to proceed by ; to forsake his own naturall judgement , and be guided by generall sentences read in authors , and subject to many exceptions , is a signe of folly , and generally scorned by the name of pedantry . and even of those men themselves , that in councells of the common-wealth , love to shew their reading of politiques and history , very few do it in their domestique affaires , where their particular interest is concerned ; having prudence enough for their private affaires : but in publique they study more the reputation of their owne wit , than the successe of anothers businesse . chap. vi. of the interiour beginnings of voluntary motions ; commonly called the passions . and the speeches by which they are expressed . there be in animals , two sorts of motions peculiar to them : one called vitall ; begun in generation , and continued without interruption through their whole life ; such as are the course of the bloud , the pulse , the breathing , the conco●…ion , nutrition , excretion , to which motions there needs no help of imagination : the other is animall motion , otherwise called voluntary motion ; as to go , to speak , to move any of our limbes , in such manner as is first fancied in our minds . that sense , is motion in the organs and interiour parts of mans body , caused by the action of the things we see , heare , and that fancy is but the reliques of the same motion , remaining after sense , has been already sayd in the first and second chapters . and because going , speaking , and the like voluntary motions , depend alwayes upon a precedent thought of whither , which way , and what ; it is evident , that the imagination is the first internall beginning of all voluntary motion . and although unstudied men , doe not conceive any motion at all to be there , where the thing moved is invisible ; or the space it is moved in , is ( for the shortnesse of it ) insensible ; yet that doth not hinder , but that such motions are . for let a space be never so little , that which is moved over a greater space , whereof that little one is part , must first be moved over that . these small beginnings of motion , within the body of man , before they appear in walking , speaking , striking , and other visible actions , are commonly called endeavour . this endeavour , when it is toward something which causes it , is called appetite , or desire ; the later , being the generall name ; and the other , often-times restrayned to signifie the desire of food , namely hunger and thirst. and when the endeavour is fromward something , it is generally called aversion . these words appetite , and aversion we have from the latines ; and they both of them signifie the motions , one of approaching , the other of retiring . so also do the greek words for the same , which are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . for nature it selfe does often presse upon men those truths , which afterwards , when they look for somewhat beyond nature , they stumble at . for the schooles find in meere appetite to go , or move , no actuall motion at all : but because some motion they must acknowledge , they call it metaphoricall motion ; which is but an absurd speech : for though words may be called metaphoricall ; bodies , and motions cannot . that which men desire , they are also sayd to love : and to hate those things , for which they have aversion . so that desire , and love , are the same thing ; save that by desire , we alwayes signifie the absence of the object ; by love , most commonly the presence of the same . so also by aversion , we signifie the absence ; and by hate , the presence of the object . of appetites , and aversions , some are born with men ; as appetite of food , appetite of excretion , and exoneration , ( which may also and more properly be called aversions , from somewhat they feele in their bodies ; ) and some other appetites , not many . the rest , which are appetites of particular things , proceed from experience , and triall of their effects upon themselves , or other men . for of things wee know not at all , or believe not to be , we can have no further desire , than to tast and try . but aversion wee have for things , not onely which we know have hurt us ; but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us , or not . those things which we neither desire , nor hate , we are said to contemne : contempt being nothing else but an immobility , or contumacy of the heart , in resisting the action of certain things ; and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise , by other more potent objects ; or from want of experience of them . and because the constitution of a mans body , is in continuall mutation ; it is impossible that all the same things should alwayes cause in him the same appetites , and aversions : much lesse can all men consent , in the desire of almost any one and the same object . but whatsoever is the object of any mans appetite or desire ; that is it , which he for his part calleth good : and the object of his hate , and aversion , evill ; and of his contempt , vile ▪ and inconsiderable . for these words of good , evill , and contemptible , are ever used with relation to the person that useth them : there being nothing simply and absolutely so ; nor any common rule of good and evill , to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves ; but from the person of the man ( where there is no common-wealth ; ) or , ( in a common-wealth , ) from the person that representeth it ; or from an arbitrator or judge , whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up , and make his sentence the rule thereof . the latine tongue has two words , whose significations approach to those of good and evill ; but are not precisely the same ; and those are pulchrum and turpe . whereof the former signifies that , which by some apparent signes promiseth good ; and the later , that , which promiseth evil. but in our tongue we have not so generall names to expresse them by . but for pulchrum , we say in some things , fayre ; in others beautifull , or handsome , or gallant , or honourable , or comely , or amiable ; and for turpe , foule , deformed , ugly , base , nauseous , and the like , as the subject shall require ; all which words , in their proper places signifie nothing els , but the mine , or countenance , that promiseth good and evil. so that of good there be three kinds ; good in the promise , that is pulchrum ; good in effect , as the end desired , which is called jucundum , delightfull ; and good as the means , which is called vtile , profitable ; and as many of evil : for evill , in promise , is that they call turpe ; evil in effect , and end , is molestum , vnpleasant , troublesome ; and evill in the means , inutile , unprofitable , hurtfull . as , in sense , that which is really within us , is ( as i have sayd before ) onely motion , caused by the action of externall objects , but in apparence ; to the sight , light and colour ; to the eare , sound ; to the nostrill , odour , &c : so , when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes , eares , and other organs to the heart ; the reall effect there is nothing but motion , or endeavour ; which consisteth in appetite , or aversion , to , or from the object moving . but the apparence , or sense of that motion , is that wee either call delight , or trouble of mind . this motion , which is called appetite , and for the apparence of it delight , and pleasure , seemeth to be , a corroboration of vitall motion , and a help thereunto ; and therefore such things as caused delight , were not improperly called jucunda , ( à juvando , ) from helping or fortifying ; and the contrary , molesta , offensive , from hindering , and troubling the motion vitall . pleasure therefore , ( or delight , ) is the apparence , or sense of good ; and molestation or displeasure , the apparence , or sense of evill . and consequently all appetite , desire , and love , is accompanied with some delight more or lesse ; and all hatred , and aversion , with more or lesse displeasure and offence . of pleasures , or delights , some arise from the sense of an object present ; and those may be called pleasures of sense , ( the word sensuall , as it is used by those onely that condemn them , having no place till there be lawes . ) of this kind are all onerations and exonerations of the body ; as also all that is pleasant , in the sight , hearing , smell , tast , or touch ; others arise from the expectation , that proceeds from foresight of the end , or consequence of things ; whether those things in the sense please or displease : and these are pleasures of the mind of him that draweth those consequences ; and are generally called joy . in the like manner , displeasures , are some in the sense , and called payne ; others , in the expectation of consequences , and are called griefe . these simple passions called appetite , desire , love , aversion , hate , joy , and griefe , have their names for divers considerations diversified . as first , when they one succeed another , they are diversly called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire . secondly , from the object loved or hated . thirdly , from the consideration of many of them together . fourthly , from the alteration or succession it selfe . for appetite with an opinion of attaining , is called hope . the same , without such opinion , despaire . aversion , with opinion of hurt from the object , feare . the same , with hope of avoyding that hurt by resistence , courage . sudden courage , anger . constant hope , confidence of our selves . constant despayre , diffidence of our selves . anger for great hurt done to another , when we conceive the same to be done by injury , indignation . desire of good to another , benevolence , good will , charity . if to man generally , good nature . desire of riches , covetousnesse : a name used alwayes in signification of blame ; because men contending for them , are displeased with one anothers attaining them ; though the desire in it selfe , be to be blamed , or allowed , according to the means by which those riches are sought . desire of office ; or precedence , ambition : a name used also in the worse sense , for the reason before mentioned . desire of things that conduce but a little to our ends ; and fear of things that are but of little hindrance , pusillanimity . contempt of little helps , and hindrances , magnanimity . magnanimity , in danger of death , or wounds , valour , fortitude . magnanimity , in the use of riches , liberality . pusillanimity , in the same wretchednesse , miserablenesse ; or parsimony ; as it is liked , or disliked . love of persons for society , kindnesse . love of persons for pleasing the sense onely , naturall lust . love of the same , acquired from rumination , that is , imagination of pleasure past , luxury . love of one singularly , with desire to be singularly beloved , the passion of love . the same , with fear that the love is not mutuall , jealousie . desire , by doing hurt to another , to make him condemn some fact of his own , revengefuln●…sse . desire , to know why , and how , curiosity ; such as is in no living creature but man : so that man is distinguished , not onely by his reason ; but also by this singular passion from other animals ; in whom the appetite of food , and other pleasures of sense , by praedominance , take away the care of knowing causes ; which is a lust of the mind , that by a perseverance of delight in the continuall and indefatigable generation of knowledge , exceedeth the short vehemence of any carnall pleasure . feare of power invisible , feigned by the mind , or imagined from tales publiquely allowed , religion ; not allowed , superstition . and when the power imagined , is truly such as we imagine , true religion . feare , without the apprehension of why , or what , panique terror ; called so from the fables , that make pan the author of them ; whereas in truth , there is alwayes in him that so feareth , first , some apprehension of the cause , though the rest run away by example ; every one supposing his fellow to know why . and therefore this passion happens to none but in a throng , or multitude of people . joy , from apprehension of novelty , admiration ; proper to man , because it excites the appetite of knowing the cause . joy , arising from imagination of a mans own power and ability , is that exultation of the mind which is called 〈◊〉 : which if grounded upon the experience of his own former actions , is the same with confidence : but if grounded on the flattery of others ; or onely supposed by himself , for delight in the consequences of it , is called vaine-glory : which name is properly given ; because a well grounded confidence begetteth attempt ; whereas the supposing of power does not , and is therefore rightly called va●…ne . griefe , from opinion of want of power , is called deiection of mind . the vain-glory which consisteth in the feigning or supposing of abilities in our selves , which we know are not , is most incident to young men , and nourished by the histories , or fictions of gallant persons ▪ and is corrected oftentimes by age , and employment . sudden glory , is the passion which maketh those gr●…aces called laughter ; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own , that pleaseth them ; or by the apprehension of some d●…ed thing in another , by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves . and it is incident most to them , that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves ▪ who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour , by observing the imperfections of other men . and therefore much laughter at the defects of others , is a signe of pusillanimity . for of great minds , one of the proper workes 〈◊〉 , to help and free others from scorn ; and compare themselves onely with the most able . on the contrary , sudden de●…ction , is the passion that causeth w●…ping ; and is caused by such accidents , as su●…ly ●…ake away some vehement hope , or some prop of their powe●… : and they are most subject to it , that rely principally on helps externall , such as are ▪ women , and children . therefore some weep for the losse of friends ▪ others for their unkindnesse ; others for the sudden sto●… made to their thoughts of revenge , by reconciliation . but in all cases , both laughter , and weeping , are sudden motions ; custome taking them both away . for no man laughs at old 〈◊〉 ▪ or weeps for an old calamity . griefe , for the discovery of some defect of ability , is shame , or the passion that discovereth it selfe in blushing ; and consisteth in the apprehension of some thing dishonourable ; and in young men , is a signe of the love of good reputation ; and commendable : in old men it is a signe of the same ▪ but because it comes too l●…e , not commendable . the contempt of good reputation is called impudence . griefe , for the calamity of another , is pitty ; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himselfe ; and therefore is called also compassion , and in the phrase of this present time a fellow-●…ing : and therefore for ca●…y ●…ving from great wickedness , the best men have the least pitty ; ●…nd for the same calamity , those have least pitty , that think themselves least obnoxious to the same . contempt , or little sense of the calamity of others , is that which men call cruelty ; proceeding from security of their own fortune . for , that any man should take pleasure in other mens great harmes , without other end of his own , i do not conceive it possible . griefe , for the successe of a competitor in wealth , honour , or other good , if it be joyned with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equall or exceed him , is called emulation : but joyned with endeavour to supplant , or hinder a competitor , envie . when in the mind of man , appetites , and aversions , hopes , and feares , concerning one and the same thing , arise alternately ; and divers good and evill consequences of the doing , or omitting the thing propounded , come successively into our thoughts ; so that sometimes we have an appetite to it ; sometimes an aversion from it ; sometimes hope to be able to do it ; sometimes despaire , or feare to attempt it ; the whole summe of desires , aversions , hopes and fears , continued till the thing be either done , or thought impossible , is that we call deliberation . therefore of things past , there is no deliberation ; because manifestly impossible to be changed : nor of things known to be impossible , or thought so ; because men know , or think such deliberation vain . but of things impossible , which we think possible , we may deliberate ; not knowing it is in vain . and it is called deliberation ; because it is a putting an end to the liberty we had of doing , or omitting , according to our own appetite , or aversion . this alternate succession of appetites , aversions , hopes and fears , is no lesse in other living creatures then in man : and therefore beasts also deliberate . every deliberation is then sayd to end , when that whereof they deliberate , is either done , or thought impossible ; because till then wee retain the liberty of doing , or omitting , according to our appetite , or aversion . in deliberation , the last appetite , or aversion , immediately adhaering to the action , or to the omission thereof , is that wee call the will ; the act , ( not the faculty , ) of willing . and beasts that have deliberation , must necessarily also have will. the definition of the will , given commonly by the schooles , that it is a rationall appetite , is not good . for if it were , then could there be no voluntary act against reason . for a voluntary act is that , which proceedeth from the will , and no other . but if in stead of a rationall appetite , we shall say an appetite resulting from a precedent deliberation , then the definition is the same that i have given here . will therefore is the last appetite in deliberating . and though we say in common discourse , a man had a will once to do a thing , that neverthelesse he forbore to do ; yet that is properly but an inclination , which makes no action voluntary ; because the action depends not of it , but of the last inclination , or appetite . for if the intervenient appetites , make any action voluntary ; then by the same reason all intervenient aversions , should make the same action involuntary ; and so one and the same action , should be both voluntary & involuntary . by this it is manifest , that not onely actions that have their beginning from covetousnesse , ambition , lust , or other appetites to the thing propounded ; but also those that have their beginning from aversion , or feare of those consequences that follow the omission , are voluntary actions . the formes of speech by which the passions are expressed , are partly the same , and partly different from those , by which wee expresse our thoughts . and first , generally all passions may be expressed indicatively ; as i love , i feare , i joy , i deliberate , i will , i command : but some of them have particular expressions by themselves , which neverthelesse are not affirmations , unlesse it be when they serve to make other inferences , besides that of the passion they proceed from . deliberation is expressed sub●…tively ; which is a speech proper to signifie suppositions , with their consequences ; as , if this be done , then this will follow ; and differs not from the language of reasoning , save that reasoning is in generall words ; but deliberation for the most part is of particulars . the language of desire , and aversion , is imperative ; as do this , forbeare that ; which when the party is obliged to do , or forbeare , is command ; otherwise prayer ; or els counsell . the language of vain-glory , of indignation , pitty and revengefulness , optative : but of the desire to know , there is a peculiar expression , called interrogative ; as , what is it , when shall it , how is it done , and why so ? other language of the passions i find none : for cursing , swearing , reviling , and the like , do not signifie as speech ; but as the actions of a tongue accustomed . these formes of speech , i say , are expressions , or voluntary significations of our passions : but certain signes they be not ; because they may be used arbitrarily , whether they that use them , have such passions or not . the best signes of passions present , are either in the countenance , motions of the body , actions , and ends , or aimes , which we otherwise know the man to have . and because in deliberation , the appetites , and aversions are raised by foresight of the good and evill consequences , and sequels of the action whereof we deliberate ; the good or evill effect thereof dependeth on the foresight of a long chain of consequences , of which very seldome any man is able to see to the end . but for so farre as a man seeth , if the good in those consequences , be greater than the evill , the whole chaine is that which writers call apparent , or seeming good. and contrarily , when the evill exceedeth the good , the whole is apparent , or seeming evill : so that he who hath by experience , or reason , the greatest and surest prospect of consequences , deliberates best himselfe ; and is able when he will , to give the best counsell unto others , continuall successe in obtaining those things which a man from time to time desireth , that is to say , continuall prospering , is that men call felic●…ty ; i mean the felicity of this life . for there is no such thing as perpetual●… tranquillity of mind , while we live here ; because life it selfe is but motion , and can never be without de●…re , nor without feare , no more than without sense . what kind of felicity god hath ordained to them that devoutly honour him , a man shall no sooner know , than enjoy ; being joyes , that now are as incomprehensible , as the word of schoole-men beatificall vision is unintelligible . the forme of speech whereby men signifie their opinion of the goodnesse of any thing , is praise . that whereby they signifie the power and greatnesse of any thing , is magnifying . and that whereby they signifie the opinion they have of a mans felicity , is by the greeks called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for which wee have no name in our tongue . and thus much is sufficient for the present purpose , to have been said of the passions . chap. vii . of the ends , or resolutions of discourse . of all discourse , governed by desire of knowledge , there is at last an end , either by attaining , or by giving over . and in the chain of discourse , wheresoever it be interrupted , there is an end for that time . if the discourse be meerly mentall , it consisteth of thoughts that the thing will be , and will not be or that it has been , and has not been , alternately . so that wheresoever you break off the chayn of a mans discourse , you leave him in a praesumption of it will be , or , it will not be ; or it has been , or , has not been . all which is opinion . and that which is alternate appetite , in deliberating concerning good and evil ; the same is alternate opinion , in the enquiry of the truth of past , and futu●…e . and as the last appetite in deliberation , is called the will ; so the last opinion in search of the truth of past , and future , is called the judgement , or resolute and finall sentence of him that discourseth . and as the whole chain of appetites alternate , in the question of good , or bad , is called deliberation ; so the whole chain of opinions alternate , in the question of true , or false , is called doubt . no discourse whatsoever , can end in absolute knowledge of fact , past , or to come . for , as for the knowledge of fact , it is originally , sense ; and ever after , memory . and for the knowledge of consequence , which i have said before is called science , it is not absolute , but conditionall . no man can know by discourse , that this , or that , is , has been , or will be ; which is to know absolutely : but onely , that if this be , that is ; if this has been , that has been ; if this shall be , that shall be : which is to know conditionally ; and that not the consequence of one thing to another ; but of one name of a thing , to another name of the same thing . and therefore , when the discourse is put into speech , and begins with the definitions of words , and proceeds by connexion of the same into generall affirmations , and of these again into syllogismes ; the end or last summe is called the conclusion ; and the thought of the mind by it signified , is that conditionall knowledge , or knowledge of the consequence of words , which is commonly called science . but if the first ground of such discourse , be not definitions ; or if the definitions be not rightly joyned together into syllogismes , then the end or conclusion , is again opinion , namely of the truth of somewhat said , though sometimes in absurd and senslesse words , without possibility of being understood . when two , or more men , know of one and the same fact , they are said to be conscious of it one to another ; which is as much as to know it together . and because such are fittest witnesses of the facts of one another , or of a third ; it was , and ever will be reputed a very evill act , for any man to speak against his conscience : or to corrupt or force another so to do : insomuch that the plea of conscience , has been alwayes hearkened unto very diligently in all times . afterwards , men made use of the same word metaphorically , for the knowledge of their own secret facts , and secret thoughts ; and therefore it is rhetorically said , that the conscience is a thousand witnesses . and last of all , men , vehemently in love with their own new opinions , ( though never so absurd , ) and obstinately bent to maintain them , gave those their opinions also that reverenced name of conscience , as if they would have it seem unlawfull , to change or speak against them ; and so pretend to know they are true , when they know at most , but that they think so . when a mans discourse beginneth not at definitions , it beginneth either at some other contemplation of his own , and then it is still called opinion ; or it beginneth at some saying of another , of whose ability to know the truth , and of whose honesty in not deceiving , he doubteth not ; and then the discourse is not so much concerning the thing , as the person ; and the resolution is called beleefe , and faith : faith , in the man ; beleefe , both of the man , and of the truth of what he sayes . so that in beleefe are two opinions ; one of the saying of the man ; the other of his vertue . to have faith in , or trust 〈◊〉 ▪ or beleeve a man , signifie the same thing ; namely , an opinion of the veracity of the man : but to beleeve what is said , signifieth onely an opinion of the truth of the saying . but wee are to observe that this phrase , i beleeve in ; as also the latine , credo in ; and the greek , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are never used but in the writings of divines . in stead of them , in other writings are put , i beleeve him ; i trust him ; i have faith in him ; i rely on him : and in latin , credo illi ; fido illi : and in greek , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : and that this singularity of the ecclesiastique use of the word hath raised many disputes about the right object of the christian faith. but by beleeving in , as it is in the creed , is meant , not trust in the person ; but confession and acknowledgement of the doctrine . for not onely christians , but all manner of men do so believe in god , as to hold all for truth they heare him say , whether they understand it , or not ; which is all the faith and trust can possibly be had in any person whatsoever : but they do not all believe the doctrine of the creed . from whence we may inferre , that when wee believe any saying whatsoever it be , to be true , from arguments taken , not from the thing it selfe , or from the principles of naturall reason , but from the authority , and good opinion wee have , of him that hath sayd it ; then is the speaker , or person we believe in , or trust in , and whose word we take , the object of our faith ; and the honour done in believing , is done to him onely . and consequently , when wee believe that the scriptures are the word of god , having no immediate revelation from god himselfe , our beleefe , faith , and trust is in the church ; whose word we take , and acquiesce therein . and they that believe that which a prophet relates unto them in the name of god , take the word of the prophet , do honour to him , and in him trust , and believe , touching the truth of what he relateth , whether he be a true , or a false prophet . and so it is also with all other history . for if i should not believe all that is written by historians , of the glorious acts of alexander , or caesar ; i do not think the ghost of alexander , or caesar , had any just cause to be offended ; or any body else , but the historian . if livy say the gods made once a cow speak , and we believe it not ; wee distrust not god therein , but livy . so that it is evident , that whatsoever we believe , upon no other reason , then what is drawn from authority of men onely , and their writings ; whether they be sent from god or not , is faith in men onely . chap. viii . of the vertues commonly called intellectuall ; and their contrary defects . vertue generally , in all sorts of subjects , is somewhat that is valued for eminence ; and consisteth in comparison . for if all things were equally in all men , nothing would be prized . and by vertues intellectuall , are alwayes understood such abilityes of the mind , as men praise , value , and desire should be in themselves ; and go commonly under the name of a good witte ; though the same word witte , be used also , to distinguish one certain ability from the rest . these vertues are of two sorts ; naturall , and acquired . by naturall , i mean not , that which a man hath from his birth : for that is nothing else but sense ; wherein men differ so little one from another , and from brute beasts , as it is not to be reckoned amongst vertues . but i mean , that witte , which is gotten by use onely , and experience ; without method , culture , or instruction . this naturall witte , consisteth principally in two things ; celerity of imagining , ( that is , swift succession of one thought to another ; ) and steddy direction to some approved end . on the contrary a slow imagination , maketh that defect , or fault of the mind , which is commonly called dulnesse , stupidity , and sometimes by other names that signifie slownesse of motion , or difficulty to be moved . and this difference of quicknesse , is caused by the difference of mens passions ; that love and dislike , some one thing , some another : and therefore some mens thoughts run one way , some another ; and are held to , and observe differently the things that passe through their imagination . and whereas in this succession of mens thoughts , there is nothing to observe in the things they think on , but either in what they be like one another , or in what they be unlike , or what they serve for , or how they serve to such a purpose ; those that observe their similitudes , in case they be such as are but rarely observed by others , are sayd to have a good wit ; by which , in this occasion , is meant a good fancy . but they that observe their differences , and dissimilitudes ; which is called distinguishing , and discerning , and judging between thing and thing ; in case , such discerning be not easie , are said to have a good judgement : and particularly in matter of conversation and businesse ; wherein , times , places , and persons are to be discerned , this vertue is called discretion . the former , that is , fancy , without the help of judgement , is not commended as a vertue : but the later which is judgement , and discretion , is commended for it selfe , without the help of fancy . besides the discretion of times , places , and persons , necessary to a good fancy , there is required also an often application of his thoughts to their end ; that is to say , to some use to be made of them . this done ; he that hath this vertue , will be easily fitted with similitudes , that will please , not onely by illustration of his discourse , and adorning it with new and apt metaphors ; but also , by the rarity of their invention . but without steddinesse , and direction to some end , a great fancy is one kind of madnesse ; such as they have , that entring into any discourse , are snatched from their purpose , by every thing that comes in their thought , into so many , and so long digressions , and parentheses , that they utterly lose themselves : which kind of folly , i know no particular name for : but the cause of it is , sometimes want of experience ; whereby that seemeth to a man new and rare , which doth not so to others : sometimes pusillanimity ; by which that seems great to him , which other men think a trifle : and whatsoever is new , or great , and therefore thought fit to be told , withdrawes a man by degrees from the intended way of his discourse . in a good poem , whether it be epique , or dramatique ; as also in sonnets , epigrams , and other pieces , both judgement and fancy are required : but the fancy must be more eminent ; because they please for the extravagancy ; but ought not to displease by indiscretion . in a good history , the judgement must be eminent ; because the goodnesse consisteth , in the method , in the truth , and in the choyse of the actions that are most profitable to be known . fancy has no place , but onely in adorning the stile . in orations of prayse , and in invectives , the fancy is praedominant ; because the designe is not truth , but to honour or dishonour ; which is done by noble , or by vile comparisons . the judgement does but suggest what circumstances make an action laudable , or culpable . in hortatives , and pleadings , as truth , or disguise serveth best to the designe in hand ; so is the judgement , or the fancy most required . in demonstration , in councell , and all rigourous search of truth , judgement does all ; except sometimes the understanding have need to be opened by some apt similitude ; and then there is so much use of fancy . but for metaphors , they are in this case utterly excluded . for ●…eeing they openly professe deceipt ; to admit them into councell , or reasoning , were manifest folly . and in any discourse whatsoever , if the defect of discretion be apparent , how extravagant soever the fancy be , the whole discourse will be taken for a signe of want of wit ▪ and so will it never when the discretion is manifest , though the fancy be never so ordinary . the secret thoughts of a man run over all things , holy , prophane , clean , obscene grave , and light , without shame , or blame ; which verball discourse cannot do , farther than the judgement shall approve of the time , place , and persons . an anatomist , or a physitian may speak , or write his judgement of unclean things ; because it is not to please , but profit : but for another man to write his extravagant , and pleasant fancies of the same , is as if a man , from being tumbled into the dirt , should come and present himselfe before good company . and 't is the want of discretion that makes the difference . again , in profest remissnesse of mind , and familiar company , a man may play with the sounds , and aequivocall significations of words ; and that many times with encounters of extraordinary fancy : but in a sermon , or in publique , or before persons unknown , or whom we ought to reverence , there is no gingling of words that will not be accounted folly : and the difference is onely in the want of discretion . so that where wit is wanting , it is not fancy that is wanting , but discretion . judgement therefore without fancy is wit , but fancy without judgement not . when the thoughts of a man , that has a designe in hand , ●…unning over a multitude of things , observes how they conduce to that designe ; or what designe they may conduce unto ; if his observations be such as are not easie , or usuall , this wit of his is called prudence ; and dependeth on much experience , and memory of the like things , and their consequences heretofore . in which there is not so much difference of men , as there is in their fancies and judgements ; because the experience of men equall in age , is not much unequall , as to the quantity ; but lyes in different occasions ; every one having his private designes . to govern well a family , and a kingdome , are not different degrees of prudence ; but different sorts of businesse ; no more then to draw a picture in little , or as great , or greater then the life , are different degrees of art. a plain husband-man is more prudent in affaires of his own house , then a privy counseller in the affaires of another man. to prudence , if you adde the use of unjust , or dishonest means , such as usually are prompted to men by feare , or want ; you have that crooked wisdome , which is called craft ; which is a signe of pusillanimity . for magnanimity is contempt of unjust , or dishonest helps . and that which the latines call versutia , ( translated into english , shifting , ) and is a putting off of a present danger or incommodity , by engaging into a greater ; as when a man robbs one to pay another , is but a shorter sighted craft , called versutia , from vers●…a , which signisies taking mony at usurie , for the present payment of interest . as for acquired wit , ( i mean acquired by method and instruction , ) there is none but reason ; which is grounded on the right use of speech ; and produceth the sciences . but of reason and science , i have already spoken in the fifth and sixth chapters . the causes of this difference of witts , are in the passions : and the difference of passions , proceedeth partly from the different constitution of the body , and partly from different education . for if the difference proceeded from the temper of the brain , and the organs of sense , either exterior or interior , there would be no lesse difference of men in their sight , hearing , or other senses , than in their fancies , and discretions . it proceeds therefore from the passions ; which are different , not onely from the difference of mens complexions ; but also from their difference of customes , and education . the passions that most of all cause the differences of wit , are principally , the more or lesse desire of power , of riches , of knowledge , and of honour . all which may be reduced to the first , that is desire of power . for riches , knowledge and honour are but severall sorts of power . and therefore , a man who has no great passion for any of these things ; but is as men terme it indifferent ; though he may be so farre a good man , as to be free from giving offence ; yet he cannot possibly have either a great fancy , or much judgement . for the thoughts , are to the desires , as scouts , and spies , to range abroad , and find the way to the things de●…ired : all stedinesse of the minds motion , and all quicknesse of the same , proceeding from thence . for as to have no desire , is to be dead : so to have weak passions , is dulnesse ; and to have passions indifferently for every thing , giddinesse , and distraction ▪ and to have stronger , and more vehement passions for any thing , than is ordinarily seen in others , is that which men call madnesse . whereof there be almost as many kinds , as of the passions themselves . sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant passion , proceedeth from the evill constitution of the organs of the body , or harme done them ; and sometimes the hurt , and indisposition of the organs , is caused by the vehemence , or long continuance of the passion . but in both cases the madnesse is of one and the same nature . the passion , whose violence , or continuance maketh madnesse , is either great vaine-glory ; which is commonly called pride ▪ and selfe-conceipt ; or great dejection of mind . pride , subjecteth a man to anger , the excesse whereof , is the madnesse called rage , and fury . and thus it comes to passe that excessive desire of revenge , when it becomes habituall , hurteth the organs , and becomes rage : that excessive love , with jealousie , becomes also rage : excessive opinion of a mans own selfe , for divine inspiration , for wisdome , learning , forme , and the like , becomes distraction , and giddinesse : the same , joyned with envy , rage : vehement opinion of the truth of any thing , contradicted by others , rage . dejection , subjects a man to causelesse fears ; which is a madnesse commonly called melancholy , apparent also in divers manners ; as in haunting of solitudes , and graves ; in superstitious behaviour ; and in fearing some one , some another particular thing . in summe , all passions that produce strange and unusuall behaviour , are called by the generall name of madnesse . but of the severall kinds of madnesse , he that would take the paines , might enrowle a legion . and if the excesses be madnesse , there is no doubt but the passions themselves , when they tend to evill , are degrees of the same . ( for example , ) though the effect of folly , in them that are possessed of an opinion of being inspired , be not visible alwayes in one man , by any very extravagant action , that proceedeth from such passion ; yet when many of them conspire together , the rage of the whole multitude is visible enough . for what argument of madnesse can there be greater , than to clamour , strike , and throw stones at our best friends ? yet this is somewhat lesse than such a multitude will do . for they will clamour , fight against , and destroy those , by whom all their life-time before , they have been protected , and secured from injury . and if this be madnesse in the multitude , it is the same in every particular man. for as in the middest of the sea , though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him ; yet he is well assured , that part contributes as much , to the roaring of the sea , as any other part , of the same quantity : so also , though wee perceive no great unquietnesse , in one , or two men ; yet we may be well assured , that their singular passions , are parts of the seditious roaring of a troubled nation . and if there were nothing else that bewrayed their madnesse ; yet that very arrogating such inspiration to themselves , is argument enough . if some man in bedlam should entertaine you with sober discourse ; and you desire in taking leave , to know what he were , that you might another time requite his civility ; and he should tell you , he were god the father ; i think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his madnesse . this opinion of inspiration , called commonly , private spirit , begins very often , from some lucky finding of an errour generally held by others ; and not knowing , or not remembring , by what conduct of reason , they came to so singular a truth , ( as they think it , though it be many times an untruth they light on , ) they presently admire themselves ; as being in the speciall grace of god almighty , who hath ●…evealed the same to them supernaturally , by his spirit . again , that madnesse is nothing else , but too much appearing passion , may be gathered out of the effects of wine , which are the same with those of the evill disposition of the organs . for the variety of behaviour in men that have drunk too much , is the same with that of mad-men : some of them raging , others loving , others laughing , all extravagantly , but according to their severall domineering passions : for the effect of the wine , does but remove dissimulation ; and take from them the sight of the deformity of their passions . for , ( i believe ) the most sober men , when they walk alone without care and employment of the mind , would be unwilling the vanity and extravagance of their thoughts at that time should be publiquely seen : which is a confession , that passions unguided , are for the most part meere madnesse . the opinions of the world , both in antient and later ages , concerning the cause of madnesse , have been two . some , deriving them from the passions ; some , from daemons , or spirits , either good , or bad , which they thought might enter into a man , possesse him , and move his organs in such strange , and uncouth manner , as mad-men use to do . the former sort therefore , called such men , mad-men : but the later , called them sometimes daemoniacks , ( that is , possessed with spirits ; ) sometimes energumeni , ( that is , agitated , or moved with spirits ; ) and now in italy they are called not onely pazzi , mad-men ; but also spiritati , men possest . there was once a great conflux of people in abdera , a city of the greeks , at the acting of the tragedy of andromeda , upon an extream hot day : whereupon , a great many of the spectators falling into fevers , had this accident from the heat , and from the tragedy together , that they did nothing but pronounce iambiques , with the names of perseus and andromeda ; which together with the fever , was cured , by the comming on of winter : and this madnesse was thought to proceed from the passion imprinted by the tragedy . likewise there raigned a fit of madnesse in another graecian city , which seized onely the young maidens ; and caused many of them to hang themselves . this was by most then thought an act of the divel . but one that suspected , that contempt of life in them , might proceed from some passion of the mind , and supposing they did not contemne also their honour , gave counsell to the magistrates , to strip such as so hang'd themselves , and let them hang out naked . this the story sayes cured that madnesse . but on the other side , the same graecians , did often ascribe madnesse , to the operation of the eumenides , or furyes ; and sometimes of ceres , phoebus , and other gods : so much did men attribute to phantasmes , as to think them aëreal living bodies ; and generally to call them spirits . and as the romans in this , held the same opinion with the greeks : so also did the jewes ; for they called mad-men prophets , or ( according as they thought the spirits good or bad ) daemoniacks ; and some of them called both prophets , and daemoniacks , mad-men ; and some called the same man both daemoniack , and mad-man . but for the gentiles , 't is no wonder ; because diseases , and health ; vices , and vertues ; and many naturall accidents , were with them termed , and worshipped as daemons . so that a man was to understand by daemon , as well ( sometimes ) an ague , as a divell . but for the jewes to have such opinion , is somewhat strange . for neither moses , nor abraham pretended to prophecy by possession of a spirit ; but from the voyce of god ; or by a vision or dream : nor is there any thing in his law , morall , or ceremoniall , by which they were taught , there was any such enthusiasme ; or any possession . when god is sayd , numb . . . to take from the spirit that was in moses , and give to the . elders , the spirit of god ( taking it for the substance of god ) is not divided . the scriptures by the spirit of god in man , mean a mans spirit , enclined to godlinesse . and where it is said exod. . . whom i have filled with the spirit of wisdome to make garments for aaron , is not meant a spirit put into them , that can make garments ; but the wisdome of their own spirits in that kind of work . in the like sense , the spirit of man , when it produceth unclean actions , is ordinarily called an unclean spirit ; and so other spirits , though not alwayes , yet as often as the vertue or vice so stiled , is extraordinary , and eminent . neither did the other prophets of the old testament pretend enthusiasme ; or , that god spake in them ; but to them by voyce , vision , or dream ; and the burthen of the lord was not possession , but command . how then could the jewes fall into this opinion of possession ? i can imagine no reason , but that which is common to all men ; namely , the want of curiosity to search naturall causes ; and their placing felicity , in the acquisition of the grosse pleasures of the senses , and the things that most immediately conduce thereto . for they that see any strange , and unusuall ability , or defect in a mans mind ; unlesse they see withall , from what cause it may probably proceed , can hardly think it naturall ; and if not naturall , they must needs thinke it supernaturall ; and then what can it be , but that either god , or the divell is in him ? and hence it came to passe , when our saviour mark . . ) was compassed about with the multitude , those of the house doubted he was mad , and went out to hold him : but the scribes said he had belzebub , and that was it , by which he cast out divels ; as if the greater mad-man had awed the lesser . and that ( john . . ) some said , he hath a divell , and is mad ; whereas others holding him for a prophet , sayd , these are not the words of one that hath a divell . so in the old testament he that came to anoynt jehu , kings . . was a prophet ; but some of the company asked jehu , what came that mad-man for ? so that in summe , it is manifest , that whosoever behaved himselfe in extraordinory manner , was thought by the jewes to be possessed either with a good , or evill spirit ; except by the sadduces , who erred so farre on the other hand , as not to believe there were at all any spirits , ( which is very neere to direct atheisme ; ) and thereby perhaps the more provoked others , to terme such men daemoniacks , rather than mad-men . but why then does our saviour proceed in the curing of them , as if they were possest ; and not as if they were mad ? to which i can give no other kind of answer , but that which is given to those that urge the scripture in like manner against the opinion of the motion of the earth . the scripture was written to shew unto men the kingdome of god , and to prepare their mindes to become his obedient subjects ; leaving the world , and the philosophy thereof , to the disputation of men , for the exercising of their naturall reason . whether the earths , or suns motion make the day , and night ; or whether the exorbitant actions of men , proceed from passion , or from the divell , ( so we worship him not ) it is all one , as to our obedience , and subjection to god almighty ; which is the thing for which the scripture was written . as for that our saviour speaketh to the disease , as to a person ; it is the usuall phrase of all that cure by words onely , as christ did , ( and inchanters pretend to do , whether they speak to a divel or not . ) for is not christ also said ( math. . . ) to have rebuked the winds ? is not he said also ( luk. . . ) to rebuke a fever ? yet this does not argue that a fever is a divel . and whereas many of those divels are said to confesse christ ; it is not necessary to interpret those places otherwise , than that those mad-men confessed him . and whereas our saviour ( math. . . ) speaketh of an unclean spirit , that having gone out of a man , wandreth through dry places , seeking rest , and finding none ; and returning into the same man , with seven other spirits worse than himselfe ; it is manifestly a parable , alluding to a man , that after a little endeavour to quit his lusts , is vanquished by the strength of them ; and becomes seven times worse than he was . so that i see nothing at all in the scripture , that requireth a beliefe , that daemoniacks were any other thing but mad-men . there is yet another fault in the discourses of some men ; which may also be numbred amongst the sorts of madnesse ; namely , that abuse of words , whereof i have spoken before in the fifth chapter , by the name of absurdity . and that is , when men speak such words , as put together , have in them no signification at all ; but are fallen upon by some , through misunderstanding of the words they have received , and repeat by rote ; by others , from intention to deceive by obscurity . and this is incident to none but those , that converse in questions of matters incomprehensible , as the schoole-men ; or in questions of abstruse philosophy . the common sort of men seldome speak insignificantly , and are therefore , by those other egregious persons counted idiots . but to be assured their words are without any thing correspondent to them in the mind , there would need some examples ; which if any man require , let him take a schooleman into his hands , and see if he can translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point ; as the trinity ; the deity ; the nature of christ ; transubstantiation ; free-will , &c. into any of the moderne tongues , so as to make the same intelligible ; or into any tolerable latine , such as they were acquainted withall , that lived when the latine tongue was vulgar . what is the meaning of these words . the first cause does not necessarily inflow any thing into the second , by force of the essentiall subordination of the second causes , by which it may help it to worke ? they are the translation of the title of the sixth chapter of suarez first booke , of the concourse , motion , and help of god. when men write whole volumes of such stuffe , are they not mad , or intend to make others so ? and particularly , in the question of transubstantiation ; where after certain words spoken , they that say , the white nesse , round nesse , magnitude , quality , corruptibility , all which are incorporeall , &c. go out of the wafer , into the body of our blessed saviour , do they not make those nessles , tudes , and ties , to be so many spirits possessing his body ? for by spirits , they mean alwayes things , that being incorporeall , are neverthelesse moveable from one place to another . so that this kind of absurdity , may rightly be numbred amongst the many sorts of madnesse ; and all the time that guided by clear thoughts of their worldly lust , they forbear disputing , or writing thus , but lucide intervals . and thus much of the vertues and defects intellectuall . chap. ix . of the severall subiects of knowledge . there are of knowledge two kinds ; whereof one is knowledge of fact : the other knowledge of the consequence of one affirmation to another . the former is nothing else , but sense and memory , and is absolute knowledge ; as when we see a fact doing , or remember it done : and this is the knowledge required in a witnesse . the later is called science ; and is conditionall ; as when we know , that , if the figure showne be a circle , then any straight line through the center shall divide it into two equall parts . and this is the knowledge required in a philosopher ; that is to say , of him that pretends to reasoning . the register of knowledge of fact is called history . whereof there be two sorts : one called naturall history ; which is the history of such facts , or effects of nature , as have no dependance on mans will ; such as are the histories of metalls , plants , animals , regions , and the like . the other , is civill history ; which is the history of the voluntary actions of men in common-wealths . the registers of science , are such books as contain the demonstrations of consequences of one affirmation , to another ; and are commonly called books of philosophy ; whereof the sorts are many , according to the diversity of the matter ; and may be divided in such manner as i have divided them in the following table . science , that is , knowledge of consequences ; which is called also philosophy . consequences from the accidents of bodies naturall ; which is called naturall philosophy . consequences from the accidents common to all bodies naturall ; which are quantity , and motion . consequences from quantity , and motion indeterminate ; which being the principles , or first foundation of philosophy , is called philosophia prima . philosoph prima . consequences from motion , and quantity determined . consequences from quantity , and motion determined by figure , ..... mathematiques , geometry . arithmeti qu by number , .... mathematiques , geometry . arithmeti qu consequences from the motion , and quantity of bodies in speciall . consequences from the motion , and quantity of the great parts of the world , as the earth and starres , cosmography , astronomy . geography . consequences from the motion of speciall kinds , and figures of body , mechaniques , science of en neers . architectur navigation . doctrine of weight , physiques , or consequences frō qualities . consequences from the qualities of bodyes transient , such as sometimes appear , sometimes vanish , ............ meteorolog consequences from the qualities of bodies permanent . consequences from the qualities of the starres . consequences from the light of the starres . out of this , and the motion of the sunne , is made the science of ...................... sciography . consequences from the influence of the starres , ............... astrology . consequences of the qualities from liquid bodies that fill the space between the starres ; such as are the ayre , or substance aetheriall . consequences from the qualities of bodies terrestriall . consequences from the parts of the earth , that are without sense , consequences from the qualities of minerals , as stones , metalls , &c. consequences from the qualities of vegetables . consequences from the qualiti●…s of animals . consequences from the qualities of animals in generall consequences from vision , .... optiques . consequences from sounds , .... musique . consequences from the rest of the senses . consequences from the qualities of men in speciall consequences from the passions of men , ............ ethiques . consequences from speech , in magnifying , vilifying , &c. poetry . in perswadi●…g , .. rhethori qu in reasoning , ... logique . in contracting , .. the science of 〈◊〉 and uniust . consequences from the accidents of politique bodies ; which is called politiques , and civill philosophy . . of consequences from the institution of common-wealths , to the rights , and duties of the body politique , or soveraig●… . . of consequences from the same , to the duty , and right of the subjects . place this table between folio . and . chap. x. of power , worth , dignity , honour , and worthinesse . the power of a man , ( to take it universally , ) is his present means , to obtain some future apparent good. and is either originall , or instrumentall . naturall power , is the eminence of the faculties of body , or mind : as extraordinary strength , forme , prudence , arts , eloquence , liberality , nobility . instrumentall are those powers , which acquired by these , or by fortune , are means and instruments to acquire more : as riches , reputation , friends , and the secret working of god , which men call good luck . for the nature of power , is in this point , like to fame , increasing as it proceeds ; or like the motion of heavy bodies , which the further they go , make still the more hast . the greatest of humane powers , is that which is compounded of the powers of most men , united by consent , in one person , naturall , or civill , that has the use of all their powers depending on his will ; such as is the power of a common-wealth : or depending on the wills of each particular ; such as is the power of a faction , or of divers factions leagued . therefore to have servants , is power ; to have friends , is power : for they are strengths united . also riches joyned with liberality , is power ; because it procureth friends , and servants : without liberality , not so ; because in this case they defend not ; but expose men to envy , as a prey . reputation of power , is power ; because it draweth with it the adhaerence of those that need protection . so ●…s reputation of love of a mans country , ( called popularity , ) for the same reason . also , what quality soever maketh a man beloved , or feared of many ; or the reputation of such quality , is power ; because it is a means to have the assistance , and service of many . good successe is power ; because it maketh reputation of wisdome , or good fortune ; which makes men either feare him , or rely on him . affability of men already in power , is encrease of power ; because it gaineth love . reputation of prudence in the conduct of peace or war , is power ; because to prudent men , we commit the government of our selves , more willingly than to others . nobility is power , not in all places , but onely in those common-wealths , where it has priviledges : for in such priviledges consisteth their power . eloquence is power ; because it is seeming prudence . forme is power ; because being a promise of good , it recommendeth men to the favour of women and strangers . the sciences , are small power ; because not eminent ; and therefore , not acknowledged in any man ; nor are at all , but in a few ; and in them , but of a few things . for science is of that nature , as none can understand it to be , but such as in a good measure have attayned it . arts of publique use , as fortification , making of engines , and other instruments of war ; because they conferre to defence , and victory , are power : and though the true mother of them , be science , namely the mathematiques ; yet , because they are brought into the light , by the hand of the artificer , they be esteemed ( the midwife passing with the vulgar for the mother , ) as his issue . the value , or worth of a man , is as of all other things , his price ; that is to say , so much as would be given for the use of his power : and therefore is not absolute ; but a thing dependant on the need and judgement of another . an able conductor of souldiers , is of great price in time of war present , or imminent ; but in peace not so . a learned and uncorrupt judge , is much worth in time of peace ; but not so much in war. and as in other things , so in men , not the seller , but the buyer determines the price . for let a man ( as most men do , ) rate themselves at the highest value they can ; yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others . the manifestation of the value we set on one another , is that which is commonly called honouring , and dishonouring . to value a man at a high rate , is to honour him ; at a low rate , is to dishonour him . but high , and low , in this case , is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himselfe . the publique worth of a man , which is the value set on him by the common-wealth , is that which men commonly call dignity . and this value of him by the common-wealth , is understood , by offices of command , judicature , publike employment ; or by names and titles , introduced for distinction of such value . to pray to another , for ayde of any kind , is to honour ; because a signe we have an opinion he has power to help ; and the more difficult the ayde is , the more is the honour . to obey , is to honour ; because no man obeyes them , whom they think have no power to help , or hurt them . and consequently to disobey , is to dishonour . to give great gifts to a man , is to honour him ; because 't is buying of protection , and acknowledging of power . to give little gifts , is to dishonour ; because it is but almes , and fignifies an opinion of the need of small helps . to be sedulous in promoting anothers good ; also to flatter , is to honour ; as a signe we seek his protection or ayde . to neglect , is to dishonour . to give way , or place to another , in any commodity , is to honour ; being a confession of greater power . to arrogate , is to dishonour . to s●…w any signe of love , or feare of another , is to honour ; for both to love , and to feare , is to value . to contemne , or lesse to love or feare , then he expects , is to dishonour ; for 't is undervaluing . to praise , magnifie , or call happy , is to honour ; because nothing but goodnesse , power , and felicity is valued . to revile , mock , or pitty , is to dishonour . to speak to another with consideration , to appear before him with decency , and humility , is to honour him ; as signes of fear to offend . to speak to him rashly , to do any thing before him obscenely , slovenly , impudently , is to dishonour . to believe , to trust , to rely on another , is to honour him ; signe of opinion of his vertue and power . to distrust , or not believe , is to dishonour , to hearken to a mans counsell , or discourse of what kind soever , is to honour ; as a signe we think him wise , or eloquent , or witty . to sleep , or go forth , or talk the while , is to dishonour . to do those things to another , which he takes for signes of honour , or which the law or custome makes so , is to honour ; because in approving the honour done by others , he acknowledgeth the power which others acknowledge . to refuse to do them , is to dishonour . to agree with in opinion , is to honour ; as being a signe of approving his judgement , and wisdome . to dissent , is dishonour ▪ and an upbraiding of errour ; and ( if the dissent be in many things ) of folly . to imitate , is to honour ; for it is vehemently to approve . to imitate ones enemy , is to dishonour . to honour those another honours , is to honour him ; as a signe of approbation of his judgement . to honour his enemies , is to dishonour him . to employ in counsell , or in actions of difficulty , is to honour ; as a signe of opinion of his wisdome , or other power . to deny employment in the same cases , to those that seek it , is to dishonour . all these wayes of honouring , are naturall ; and as well within , as without common-wealths . but in common-wealths , where he , or they that have the supreme authority , can make whatsoever they please , to stand for signes of honour , there be other honours . a soveraigne doth honour a subject , with whatsoever title , o●… office , or employment , or action , that he himselfe will have taken for a signe of his will to honour him . the king of persia , honoured mordecay , when he appointed he should be conducted through the streets in the kings garment , upon one of the kings horses , with a crown on his head , and a prince before him , proclayming , thus shall it be done to him that the king will honour . and yet another king of persia , or the same another time , to one that demanded for some great service , to weare one of the kings robes , gave him leave so to do ; but with this addition , that he should weare it as the kings foole ; and then it was dishonour . so that of civill honour , the fountain is in the person of the common-wealth , and dependeth on the will of the soveraigne ; and is therefore temporary , and called civill honour ; such as are magistracy , offices , titles ; and in some places coats , and scutchions painted : and men honour such as have them , as having so many signes of favour in the common-wealth ; which favour is power . honourable is whatsoever possession , action , or quality , is an argument and signe of power . and therefore to be honoured , loved , or feared of many , is honourable ; as arguments of power . to be honoured of few or none , dishonourable . dominion , and victory is honourable ; because acquired by power ; and servitude , for need , or feare , is dishonourable . good fortune ( if lasting , ) honourable ; as a signe of the favour of god. ill fortune , and losses , dishonourable . riches , are honourable ; for they are power . poverty , dishonourable . magnanimity , liberality , hope , courage , confidence , are honourable ; for they proceed from the conscience of power . pusillanimity , parsimony , fear , diffidence , are dishonourable . timely resolution , or determination of what a man is to do , is honourable ; as being the contempt of small difficulties , and dangers . and irresolution , dishonourable ; as a signe of too much valuing of little impediments , and little advantages : for when a man has weighed things as long as the time permits , and resolves not , the difference of weight is but little ; and therefore if he resolve not , he overvalues little things , which is pusillanimity . all actions , and speeches , that proceed , or seem to proceed from much experience , science , discretion , or wit , are honourable ; for all these are powers . actions , or words that proceed from errour , ignorance , or folly , dishonourable . gravity , as farre forth as it seems to proceed from a mind employed on some thing else , is honourable ; because employment is a signe of power . but if it seem to proceed from a purpose to appear grave , it is dishonourable . for the gravity of the former , is like the steddinesse of a ship laden with merchandise ; but of the later , like the steddinesse of a ship ballasted with sand , and other trash . to be conspicuous , that is to say , to be known , for wealth , office , great actions , or any eminent good , is honourable ; as a signe of the power for which he is conspicuous . on the contrary , obscurity , is dishonourable . to be descended from conspicuous parents , is honourable ; because they the more easily attain the aydes , and friends of their ancestors . on the contrary , to be descended from obscure parentage , is dishonourable . actions proceeding from equity , joyned with losse , are honourable ; as signes of magnanimity : for magnanimity is a signe of power . on the contrary , craft , shifting , neglect of equity , is dishonourable . covetousnesse of great riches , and ambition of great honours , are honourable ; as signes of power to obtain them . covetousnesse , and ambition , of little gaines , or preferments , is dishonourable . nor does it alter the case of honour , whether an action ( so it be great and difficult , and consequently a signe of much power , ) be just or unjust : for honour consisteth onely in the opinion of power . therefore the ancient heathen did not thinke they dishonoured , but greatly honoured the gods , when they introduced them in their poems , committing rapes , thefts , and other great , but unjust , or unclean acts : in so much as nothing is so much celebrated in jupiter , as his adulteries ; nor in mercury , as his frauds , and thefts : of whose praises , in a hymne of homer , the greatest is this , that being born in the morning , he had invented musique at noon , and before night , stolne away the cattell of apollo , from his herdsmen . also amongst men , till there were constituted great common-wealths , it was thought no dishonour to be a pyrate , or a high-way theefe ; but rather a lawfull trade ▪ not onely amongst the greeks , but also amongst all other nations ; as is manifest by the histories of antient time . and at this day , in this part of the world , private duels are , and alwayes will be honourable , though unlawfull , till such time as there shall be honour ordained for them that refuse , and ignominy for them that make the challenge . for duels also are many times effects of courage ; and the ground of courage is alwayes strength or skill , which are power ; though for the most part they be effects of rash speaking , and of the fear of dishonour , in one , or both the combatants ; who engaged by rashnesse , are driven into the lists to avoyd disgrace . scutchions , and coats of armes haereditary , where they have any eminent priviledges , are honourable ; otherwise not : for their power consisteth either in such priviledges , or in riches , or some such thing as is equally honoured in other men . this kind of honour , commonly called gentry , has been derived from the antient germans . for there never was any such thing known , where the german customes were unknown . nor is it now any where in use , where the germans have not inhabited . the antient greek commanders , when they went to war , had their shields painted with such devises as they pleased ; insomuch as an unpainted buckler was a signe of poverty , and of a common souldier : but they transmitted not the inheritance of them . the romans transmitted the marks of their families : but they were the images , not the devises of their ancestors . amongst the people of asia , afrique , and america , there is not , nor was ever , any such thing . the germans onely had that custome ; from whom it has been derived into england , france , spain and italy , when in great numbers they either ayded the romans , or made their own conquests in these westerne parts of the world . for germany , being antiently , as all other countries , in their beginnings , divided amongst an infinite number of little lords , or masters of families , that continually had wars one with another ; those masters , or lords , principally to the end they might , when they were covered with arms , be known by their followers ; and partly for ornament , both painted their armor , or their scutchion , or coat , with the picture of some beast , or other thing ; and also put some eminent ▪ and visible mark upon the crest of their helmets . and this ornament both of the armes , and crest , descended by inheritance to their children ; to the eldest pure , and to the rest with some note of diversity , such as the old master , that is to say in dutch , the here-alt thought fit . but when many such families , joyned together , made a greater monarchy , this duty of the herealt , to distinguish scutchions , was made a private office a part . and the issue of these lords , is the great and antient gentry ; which for the most part bear living creatures , noted for courage , and rapine ; or castles , battlements , belts , weapons , bars , palisadoes , and other notes of war ; nothing being then in honour , but vertue military . afterwards , not onely kings , but popular common-wealths , gave divers manners of scutchions , to such as went forth to the war , or returned from it , for encouragement , or recompence to their service . all which , by an observing reader , may be found in such antient histories , greek and latine , as make mention of the german nation , and manners , in their times . titles of honour , such as are duke , count , marquis , and baron , are honourable ; as signifying the value set upon them by the soveraigne power of the common-wealth : which titles , were in old time titles of office , and command , derived some from the romans , some from the germans , and french. dukes , in latine duces , being generalls in war : counts , comites , such as bare the generall company out of friendship ; and were left to govern and defend places conquered , and pacified : marquises , marchiones , were counts that governed the marches , or bounds of the empire . which titles of duke , count , and marquis , came into the empire , about the time of constantine the great , from the customes of the german militia . but baron , seems to have been a title of the gaules , and signifies a great man ; such as were the kings , or princes men , whom they employed in war about their persons ; and seems to be derived from vir , to ber , and bar , that signified the same in the language of the gaules , that vir in latine ; and thence to bero , and baro : so that such men were called berones , and after barones ; and ( in spanish ) varones . but he that would know more particularly the originall of titles of honour , may find it , as i have done this , in mr. seldens most excellent treatise of that subject . in processe of time these offices of honour , by occasion of trouble , and for reasons of good and peaceable government , were turned into meer titles ; serving for the most part , to distinguish the precedence , place , and order of subjects in the common-wealth : and men were made dukes , counts , marquises , and barons of places , wherein they had neither possession , nor command : and other titles also , were devised to the same end . worthinesse , is a thing different from the worth , or value of a man ; and also from his merit , or desert ; and consisteth in a particular power , or ability for that , whereof he is said to be worthy : which particular ability , is usually named fitnesse , or aptitude . for he is worthiest to be a commander , to be a judge , or to have any other charge , that is best fitted , with the qualities required to the well discharging of it ; and worthiest of riches , that has the qualities most requisite for the well using of them : any of which qualities being absent , one may neverthelesse be a worthy man , and valuable for some thing else . again , a man may be worthy of riches , office , and employment , that neverthelesse , can plead no right to have it before another ; and therefore cannot be said to merit or deserve it . for merit , praesupposeth a right , and that the thing deserved is due by promise : of which i shall say more hereafter , when i shall speak of contracts . chap. xi . of the difference of manners . by manners , i mean not here , decency of behaviour ; as how one man should salute another , or how a man should wash his mouth , or pick his teeth before company , and such other points of the small moralls ; but those qualities of man-kind , that concern their living together in peace , and unity . to which end we are to consider , that the felicity of this life , consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied . for there is no such finis ultimus , ( utmost ayme , ) nor summum bonum , ( greatest good , ) as is spoken of in the books of the old morall philosophers . nor can a man any more live , whose desires are at an end , than he , whose senses and imaginations are at a stand . felicity is a continuall progresse of the desire , from one object to another ; the attaining of the former , being still but the way to the later . the cause whereof is , that the object of mans desire , is not to enjoy once onely , and for one instant of time ; but to assure for ever , the way of his future desire . and therefore the voluntary actions and inclinations of all men , tend , not onely to the procuring , but also to the assuring of a contented life ; and differ onely in the way : which ariseth partly from the diversity of passions , in divers men ; and partly from the difference of the knowledge , or opinion each one has of the causes , which produce the effect desired . so that in the first place , i put for a generall inclination of all mankind , a perpetuall and restlesse desire of power after power , that ceaseth onely in death . and the cause of this , is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight , than he has already attained to ; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power : but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well , which he hath present , without the acquisition of more . and from hence it is , that kings , whose power is greatest , turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by lawes , or abroad by wars : and when that is done , there succeedeth a new desire ; in some , of fame from new conquest ; in others , of ease and sensuall pleasure ; in others , of admiration , or being flattered for excellence in some art , or other ability of the mind . competition of riches , honour , command , or other power , enclineth to contention , enmity , and war : because the way of one competitor , to the attaining of his desire , is to kill , subdue , supplant , or repell the other . particularly , competition of praise , enclineth to a reverence of antiquity . for men contend with the living , not with the dead ; to these ascribing more than due , that they may obscure the glory of the other . desire of ease , and sensuall delight , disposeth men to obey a common power : because by such desires , a man doth abandon the protection might be hoped for from his own industry , and labour . fear of death , and wounds , disposeth to the same ; and for the same reason . on the contrary , needy men , and hardy , not contented with their present condition ; as also , all men that are ambitious of military command , are enclined to continue the causes of warre ; and to stirre up trouble and sedition : for there is no honour military but by warre ; nor any such hope to mend an ill game , as by causing a new shuffle . desire of knowledge , and arts of peace , enclineth men to obey a common power : for such desire , containeth a desire of leasure ; and consequently protection from some other power than their own . desire of praise , disposeth to laudable actions , such as please them whose judgement they value ; for of those men whom we contemn , we contemn also the praises . desire of fame after death does the same . and though after death , there be no sense of the praise given us on earth , as being joyes , that are either swallowed up in the unspeakable joyes of heaven , or extinguished in the extreme torments of hell : yet is not such fame vain ; because men have a present del●…ght therein , from the foresight of it , and of the benefit that may redo●…nd thereby to their posterity : which though they now see not , yet they imagine ; and any thing that is pleasure in the sense , the same also is pleasure in the imagination . to have received from one , to whom we think our selves equall , greater benefits than there is hope to requite , disposeth to counterfeit love ; but really secret hatred ; and puts a man into the estate of a desperate debtor , that in declining the sight of his creditor , tacitely wishes him there , where he might never see him more . for benefits oblige ; and obligation is thraldome ; and unrequitable obligation , perpetuall thraldome ; which is to ones equall , hatefull . but to have received benefits from one , whom we acknowledge for superiour , enclines to love ; because the obligation is no new depression : and cheerfull acceptation , ( which men call gratitude , ) is such an honour done to the obliger , as is taken generally for retribution . also to receive benefits , though from an equall , or inferiour , as long as there is hope of requitall , disposeth to love : for in the intention of the receiver , the obligation is of ayd , and service mutuall ; from whence proceedeth an emulation of who shall exceed in benefiting ; the most noble and profitable contention possible ; wherein the victor is pleased with his victory , and the other revenged by confessing it . to have done more hurt to a man , than he can , or is willing to expiate , enclineth the doer to hate the sufferer . for he must expect revenge , or forgivenesse ; both which are hatefull . feare of oppression , disposeth a man to anticipate , or to seek ayd by society : for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty . men that distrust their own subtilty , are in tumult , and sedition , better disposed for victory , than they that suppose themselves wife , or crafty . for these love to consult , the other ( fearing to be circumvented , ) to strike first . and in sedition , men being alwayes in the procincts of battell , to hold together , and use all advantages of force , is a better stratagem , than any that can proceed from subtilty of wit. vain-glorious men , such as without being conscious to themselves of great sufficiency , delight in supposing themselves gallant men , are enclined onely to ostentation ; but not to attempt : because when danger or difficulty appears , they look for nothing but to have their insufficiency discovered . vain-glorious men , such as estimate their sufficiency by the flattery of other men , or the fortune of some precedent action , without assured ground of hope from the true knowledge of themselves , are enclined to rash engaging ; and in the approach of danger , or difficulty , to retire if they can : because not seeing the way of safety , they will rather hazard their honour , which may be salved with an excuse ; than their lives , for which no salve is sufficient . men that have a strong opinion of their own wisdome in matter of government , are disposed to ambition . because without publique employment in counsell or magistracy , the honour of their wisdome is lost . and therefore eloquent speakers are enclined to ambition ; for eloquence seemeth wisedome , both to themselves and others . pusillanimity disposeth men to irresolution , and consequently to lose the occasions , and fittest opportunities of action . for after men have been in deliberation till the time of action approach , if it be not then manifest what is best to be done , 't is a signe , the difference of motives , the one way and the other , are not great : therefore not to resolve then , is to lose the occasion by weighing of trifles ; which is pusillanimity . frugality , ( though in poor men a vertue , ) maketh a man unapt to atchieve such actions , as require the strength of many men at once : for it weakeneth their endeavour , which is to be nourished and kept in vigor by reward . eloquence , with flattery , disposeth men to confide in them that have it ; because the former is seeming wisdome , the later seeming kindnesse . adde to them military reputation , and it disposeth men to adhaere , and subject themselves to those men that have them . the two former , having given them caution against danger from him ; the later gives them caution against danger from others . want of science , that is , ignorance of causes , disposeth , or rather constraineth a man to rely on the advise , and authority of others . for all men whom the truth concernes , if they rely not on their own , must rely on the opinion of some other , whom they think wiser than themselves , and see not why he should deceive them . ignorance of the signification of words ; which is , want of understanding , disposeth men to take on trust , not onely the truth they know not ; but also the errors ; and which is more , the non-sense of them they trust : for neither error , nor non-sense , can without a perfect understanding of words , be detected . from the same it proceedeth , that men give different names , to one and the same thing , from the difference of their own passions : as they that approve a private opinion , call it opinion ; but they that mislike it , haeresie : and yet haeresie signifies no more than private opinion ; but has onely a greater tincture of choler . from the same also it proceedeth , that men cannot distinguish , without study and great understanding , between one action of many men , and many actions of one multitude ; as for example , between the one action of all the senators of rome in killing catiline , and the many actions of a number of senators in killing caesar ; and therefore are disposed to take for the action of the people , that which is a multitude of actions done by a multitude of men , led perhaps by the perswasion of one . ignorance of the causes , and originall constitution of right , equity , law , and justice , disposeth a man to make custome and example the rule of his actions ; in such manner , as to think that unjust which it hath been the custome to punish ; and that just , of the impunity and approbation whereof they can produce an example , or ( as the lawyers which onely use this false measure of justice barbarously call it ) a precedent ; like little children , that have no other rule of good and evill manners , but the correction they receive from their parents , and masters ; save that children are constant to their rule , whereas men are not so ; because grown strong , and stubborn , they appeale from custome to reason , and from reason to custome , as it serves their turn ; receding from custome when their interest requires it , and setting themselves against reason , as oft as reason is against them : which is the cause , that the doctrine of right and wrong , is perpetually disputed , both by the pen and the sword : whereas the doctrine of lines , and figures , is not so ; because men care not , in that subject what be truth , as a thing that crosses no mans ambition , profit , or lust . for i doubt not , but if it had been a thing contrary to any mans right of dominion , or to the interest of men that have dominion , that the three angles of a triangle , should be equall to two angles of a square ; that doctrine should have been , if not disputed , yet by the burning of all books of geometry , suppressed , as farre as he whom it concerned was able . ignorance of remote causes , disposeth men to attribute all events , to the causes immediate , and instrumentall : for these are all the causes they perceive . and hence it comes to passe , that in all places , men that are grieved with payments to the publique , discharge their anger upon the publicans , that is to say , farmers , collectors , and other officers of the publique revenue ; and adhaere to such as find fault with the publike government ; and thereby , when they have engaged themselves beyond hope of justification , fall also upon the supreme authority , for feare of punishment , or shame of receiving pardon . ignorance of naturall causes disposeth a man to credulity , so as to believe many times impossibilities : for such know nothing to the contrary , but that they may be true ; being unable to detect the impossibility . and credulity , because men love to be hearkened unto in company , disposeth them to lying : so that ignorance it selfe without malice , is able to make a man both to believe lyes , and tell them ; and sometimes also to invent them . anxiety for the future time , disposeth men to enquire into the causes of things : because the knowledge of them , maketh men the better able to order the present to their best advantage . curiosity , or love of the knowledge of causes , draws a man from consideration of the effect , to seek the cause ; and again , the cause of that cause ; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last , that there is some cause , whereof there is no former cause , but is eternall ; which is it men call god. so that it is impossible to make any profound enquiry into naturall causes , without being enclined thereby to believe there is one god eternall ; though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind , answerable to his nature . for as a man that is born blind , hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire , and being brought to warm himself by the same , may easily conceive , and assure himselfe , there is somewhat there , which men call fire , and is the cause of the heat he feeles ; but cannot imagine what it is like ; nor have an idea of it in his mind , such as they have that see it : so also , by the visible things of this world , and their admirable order , a man may conceive there is a cause of them , which men call god ; and yet not have an idea , or image of him in his mind . and they that make little , or no enquiry into the naturall causes of things , yet from the feare that proceeds from the ignorance it selfe , of what it is that hath the power to do them much good or harm , are enclined to suppose , and feign unto themselves , severall kinds of powers invisible ; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations ; and in time of distresse to invoke them ; as also in the time of an expected good successe , to give them thanks ; making the creatures of their own fancy , their gods. by which means it hath come to passe , that from the innumerable variety of fancy , men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. and this feare of things invisible , is the naturall seed of that , which every one in himself calleth religion ; and in them that worship , or feare that power otherwise than they do , superstition . and this seed of religion , having been observed by many ; some of those that have observed it , have been enclined thereby to nourish , dresse , and forme it into lawes ; and to adde to it of their own invention , any opinion of the causes of future events , by which they thought they should best be able to govern others , and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers . chap. xii . of religion . seeing there are no signes , nor fruit of religion , but in man onely ; there is no cause to doubt , but that the seed of religion , is also onely in man ; and consisteth in some peculiar quality , or at least in some eminent degree therof , not to be found in other living creatures . and first , it is peculiar to the nature of man , to be inquisitive into the causes of the events they see , some more , some lesse ; but all men so much , as to be curious in the search of the causes of their own good and evill fortune . secondly , upon the sight of any thing that hath a beginning , to think also it had a cause , which determined the same to begin , then when it did , rather than sooner or later . thirdly , whereas there is no other felicity of beasts , but the enjoying of their quotidian food , ease , and lusts ; as having little , or no foresight of the time to come , for want of observation , and memory of the order , consequence , and dependance of the things they see ; man observeth how one event hath been produced by another ; and remembreth in them antecedence and consequence ; and when he cannot assure himselfe of the true causes of things , ( for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible , ) he supposes causes of them , either such as his own fancy suggesteth ; or trusteth to the authority of other men , such as he thinks to be his friends , and wiser than himselfe . the two first , make anxiety . for being assured that there be causes of all things that have arrived hitherto , or shall arrive hereafter ; it is impossible for a man , who continually endeavoureth to secure himselfe against the evill he feares , and procure the good he desireth , not to be in a perpetuall solicitude of the time to come ; so that every man , especially those that are over provident , are in an estate like to that of prometheus . for as prometheus , ( which interpreted , is , the prudent man , ) was bound to the hill caucasus , a place of large prospect , where , an eagle feeding on his liver , devoured in the day , as much as was repayred in the night : so that man , which looks too far before him , in the care of future time , hath his heart all the day long , gnawed on by feare of death , poverty , or other calamity ; and has no repose , nor pause of his anxiety , but in sleep . this perpetuall feare , alwayes accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes , as it were in the dark , must needs have for object something . and therefore when there is nothing to be seen , there is nothing to accuse , either of their good , or evill fortune , but some power , or agent invisible : in which sense perhaps it was , that some of the old poets said , that the gods were at first created by humane feare : which spoken of the gods , ( that is to say , of the many gods of the gentiles ) is very true . but the acknowledging of one god eternall , infinite , and omnipotent , may more easily be derived , from the desire men have to know the causes of naturall bodies , and their severall vertues , and operations ; than from the feare of what was to be fall them in time to come . for he that from any effect hee seeth come to passe , should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof , and from thence to the cause of that cause , and plonge himselfe profoundly in the pursuit of causes ; shall at last come to this , that there must be ( as even the heathen philosophers confessed ) one first mover ; that is , a first , and an eternall cause of all things ; which is that which men mean by the name of god : and all this without thought of their fortune ; the solicitude whereof , both enclines to fear , and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things ; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods , as there be men that feigne them . and for the matter , or substance of the invisible agents , so fancyed ; they could not by naturall cogitation , fall upon any other conceipt , but that it was the same with that of the soule of man ; and that the soule of man , was of the same substance , with that which appeareth in a dream , to one that sleepeth ; or in a looking-glasse , to one that is awake ; which , men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy , think to be reall , and externall substances ; and therefore call them ghosts ; as the latines called them imagines , and umbrae ; and thought them spirits , that is , thin aëreall bodies ; and those invisible agents , which they feared , to bee like them ; save that they appear , and vanish when they please . but the opinion that such spirits were incorporeall , or immateriall , could never enter into the mind of any man by nature ; because , though men may put together words of contradictory signification , as spirit , and incorporeall ; yet they can never have the imagination of any thing answering to them : and therefore , men that by their own meditation , arrive to the acknowledgement of one infinite , omnipotent , and eternall god , choose rather to confesse he is incomprehensible , and above their understanding ; than to define his nature by spirit incorporeall , and then confesse their definition to be unintelligible : or if they give him such a title , it is not dogmatically , with intention to make the divine nature understood ; but piously , to honour him with attributes , of significations , as remote as they can from the grossenesse of bodies visible . then , for the way by which they think these invisible agents wrought their effects ; that is to say , what immediate causes they used , in bringing things to passe , men that know not what it is that we call causing , ( that is , almost all men ) have no other rule to guesse by , but by observing , and remembring what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time , or times before , without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent event , any dependance or connexion at all : and therefore from the like things past , they expect the like things to come ; and hope for good or evill luck , superstitiously , from things that have no part at all in the causing of it : as the athenians did for their war at lepanto , demand another phormio ; the pompeian faction for their warre in afrique , another scipio ; and others have done in divers other occasions since . in like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by , to a lucky or unlucky place , to words spoken , especially if the name of god be amongst them ; as charming , and conjuring ( the leiturgy of witches ; ) insomuch as to believe , they have power to turn a stone into bread , bread into a man , or any thing , into any thing . thirdly , for the worship which naturally men exhibite to powers invisible , it can be no other , but such expressions of their reverence , as they would use towards men ; gifts , petitions , thanks , submission of body , considerate addresses , sober behaviour , premeditated words , swearing ( that is , assuring one another of their promises , ) by invoking them . beyond that reason suggesteth nothing ; but leaves them either to rest there ; or for further ceremonies , to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves . lastly , concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to passe , especially concerning their good or evill fortune in generall , or good or ill successe in any particular undertaking , men are naturally at a stand ; save that using to conjecture of the time to come , by the time past , they are very apt , not onely to take casuall things , after one or two encounters , for prognostiques of the like encounter ever after , but also to believe the like prognostiques from other men , of whom they have once conceived a good opinion . and in these foure things , opinion of ghosts , ignorance of second causes , devotion towards what men fear , and taking of things casuall for prognostiques , consisteth the naturall seed of religion ; which by reason of the different fancies , judgements , and passions of severall men , hath grown up into ceremonies so different , that those which are used by one man , are for the most part ridiculous to another . for these seeds have received culture from two sorts of men . one sort have been they , that have nourished , and ordered them , according to their own invention . the other , have done it , by gods commandement , and direction : but both sorts have done it , with a purpose to make those men that relyed on them , the more apt to obedience , lawes , peace , charity , and civill society . so that the religion of the former sort , is a part of humane politiques ; and teacheth part of the duty which earthly kings require of their subjects . and the religion of the later sort is divine politiques ; and containeth precepts to those that have yeelded themselves subjects in the kingdome of god. of the former sort , were all the founders of common-wealths , and the law-givers of the gentiles : of the later sort , were abraham , moses , and our blessed saviour ; by whom have been derived unto us the lawes of the kingdome of god. and for that part of religion , which consisteth in opinions concerning the nature of powers invisible , there is almost nothing that has a name , that has not been esteemed amongst the gentiles , in one place or another , a god , or divell ; or by their poets feigned to be inanimated , inhabited , or possessed by some spirit or other . the unformed matter of the world , was a god , by the name of chaos . the heaven , the ocean , the planets , the fire , the earth , the winds , were so many gods. men , women , a bird , a crocodile , a calf , a dogge , a snake , an onion , a leeke , de●…fied . besides , that they filled almost all places , with spirits called daemons : the plains , with pan , and panises , or satyres ; the woods , with fawnes , and nymphs ; the sea , with tritons , and other nymphs ; every river , and fountayn , with a ghost of his name , and with nymphs ; every house , with its lares , or familiars ; every man , with his genius ; hell , with ghosts , and spirituall officers , as charon , cerberus , and the furies ; and in the night time , all places with larvae , lemures , ghosts of men deceased , and a whole kingdome of fayries , and bugbears . they have also ascribed divinity , and built temples to meer acciden●…s , and qualities ; such as are time , night , day , peace , concord , love , contention , vertue , honour , health , rust , fever , and the like ; which when they prayed for , or against , they prayed to , as if there were ghosts of those names hanging over their heads , and letting fall , or withholding that good , or evill , for , or against which they prayed . they invoked also their own wit , by the name of muses ; their own ignorance , by the name of fortune ; their own lust , by the name of cupid ; their own rage , by the name furies ; their own privy members by the name of priapus ; and attributed their pollutions , to ●…ncubi , and succubae : insomuch as there was nothing , which a poet could introduce as a person in his poem , which they did not make either a god , or a divel . the same authors of the religion of the gentiles , observing the second ground for religion , which is mens ignorance of causes ; and thereby their aptnesse to attribute their fortune to causes , on which there was no dependance at all apparent , took occasion to obtrude on their ignorance , in stead of second causes , a kind of second and ministeriall gods ; ascribing the cause of foecundity , to venus ; the cause of arts , to apolla ; of subtilty and craft , to mercury ; of tempests and stormes , to aeolus ; and of other effects , to other gods : insomuch as there was amongst the heathen almost as great variety of gods , as of businesse . and to the worship , which naturally men conceived fit to bee used towards their gods , namely oblations , prayers , thanks , and the rest formerly named ; the same legislators of the gentiles have added their images , both in picture , and sculpture ; that the more ignorant sort , ( that is to say , the most part , or generality of the people , ) thinking the gods for whose representation they were made , were really included , and as it were housed within them , might so much the more stand in feare of them : and endowed them with lands , and houses , and officers , and revenues , set apart from all other humane uses ; that is , consecrated , and made holy to those their idols ; as caverns , groves , woods , mountains , and whole ilands ; and have attributed to them , not onely the shapes , some of men , some of beasts , some of monsters ; but also the faculties , and passions of men and beasts ; as sense , speech , sex , lust , generation , ( and this not onely by mixing one with another , to propagate the kind of gods ; but also by mixing with men , and women , to beget mongrill gods , and but inmates of heaven , as bacchus , hercules , and others ; ) besides , anger . revenge , and other passions of living creatures , and the actions proceeding from them , as fraud , theft , adultery , sodomie , and any vice that may be taken for an effect of power , or a cause of pleasure ; and all such vices , as amongst men are taken to be against law , rather than against honour . lastly , to the prognostiques of time to come ; which are naturally , but conjectures upon the experience of time past ; and supernaturally , divine revelation ; the same authors of the religion of the gentiles , partly upon pretended experience , partly upon pretended revelation , have added innumerable other superstitious wayes of divination ; and made men believe they should find their fortunes , sometimes in the ambiguous or senslesse answers of the priests at delphi , delos , ammon , and other famous oracles ; which answers , were made ambiguous by designe , to own the event both wayes ; or absurd , by the intoxicating vapour of the place , which is very frequent in sulphurous cavernes : sometimes in the leaves of the sibills ; of whose prophecyes ( like those perhaps of nostradamus ; for the fragments now extant seem to be the invention of later times ) there were some books in reputation in the time of the roman republiques sometimes in the insignificant speeches of mad-men , supposed to be possessed with a divine spirit ; which possession they called enthusiasme ; and these kinds of foretelling events , were accounted theomancy , or prophecy : sometimes in the aspect of the starres at their nativity ; which was called horoscopy , and esteemed a part of judiciary astrology : sometimes in their own hopes and feares , called thumomancy , or presage : sometimes in the prediction of witches , that pretended conference with the dead ; which is called necromancy , conjuring , and witchcraft ; and is but juggling and confederate knavery : sometimes in the casuall flight , or feeding of birds ; called augury : sometimes in the entrayles of a sacrificed beast ; which was aruspicina : sometimes in dreams : sometimes in croaking of ravens , or chattering of birds : sometimes in the lineaments of the face ; which was called metoposcopy ; or by palmistry in the lines of the hand ; in casuall words , called omina : sometimes in monsters , or unusuall accidents ; as ecclipses , comets , rare meteors , earthquakes , inundations , uncouth births , and the like , which they called portenta , and ostenta , because they thought them to portend , or foreshew some great calamity to come : somtimes , in meer lottery , as crosse and pile ; counting holes in a sive ; dipping of verses in homer , and virgil ; and innumerable other such vaine conceipts . so easie are men to be drawn to believe any thing , from such men as have gotten credit with them ; and can with gentlenesse , and dexterity , take hold of their fear , and ignorance . and therefore the first founders , and legislators of common-wealths amongst the gentiles , whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience , and peace , have in all places taken care ; first , to imprint in their minds a beliefe , that those precepts which they gave concerning religion , might not be thought to proceed from their own device , but from the dictates of some god , or other spirit ; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortalls , that their lawes might the more easily be received : so numa pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he instituted amongst the romans , from the nymph egeria : and the first king and founder of the kingdome of peru , pretended himselfe and his wife to be the children of the sunne : and mahomet , to set up his new religion , pretended to have conferences with the holy ghost , in forme of a dove . secondly , they have had a care , to make it believed , that the same things were displeasing to the gods , which were forbidden by the lawes . thirdly , to prescribe ceremonies , supplications , sacrifices , and festivalls , by which they were to believe , the anger of the gods might be appeased ; and that ill success in war , great contagions of sicknesse , earthquakes , and each mans private misery , came from the anger of the gods ; and their anger from the neglect of their worship , or the forgetting , or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required . and though amongst the antient romans , men were not forbidden to deny , that which in the poets is written of the paines , and pleasures after this life ; which divers of great authority , and gravity in that state have in their harangues openly derided ; yet that beliefe was alwaies more cherished , than the contrary . and by these , and such other institutions , they obtayned in order to their end , ( which was the peace of the commonwealth , ) that the common people in their misfortunes , laying the fault on neglect , or errour in their ceremonies , or on their own disobedience to the lawes , were the lesse apt to mut●…ny against their governors . and being entertained with the pomp , and pastime of festivalls , and publike games , made in honour of the gods , needed nothing else but bread , to keep them from discontent , murmuring , and commotion against the state. and therefore the romans , that had conquered the greatest part of the then known world , made no scruple of tollerating any religion whatsoeuer in the city of rome it selfe ; unlesse it had somthing in it , that could not consist with their civill government ; nor do we read , that any religion was there forbidden , but that of the jewes ; who ( being the peculiar kingdome of god ) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge subjection to any mortall king or state whatsoever . and thus you see how the religion of the gentiles was a part of their policy . but where god himselfe , by supernaturall revelation , planted religion ; there he also made to himselfe a peculiar kingdome ; and gave lawes , not only of behaviour towards himselfe ; but also towards one another ; and thereby in the kingdome of god , the policy , and lawes civill , are a part of religion ; and therefore the distinction of temporall , and spirituall domination , hath there no place . it is true , that god is king of all the earth : yet may he be king of a peculiar , and chosen nation . for there is no more incongruity therein , than that he that hath the generall command of the whole army , should have withall a peculiar regiment , or company of his own . god is king of all the earth by his power : but of his chosen people , he is king by covenant . but to speake more largly of the kingdome of god , both by nature , and covenant , i have in the following discourse assigned an other place . from the propagation of religion , it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds , or principles ; which are only an opinion of a deity , and powers invisible , and supernaturall ; that can never be so abolished out of humane nature , but that new religions may againe be made to spring out of them , by the culture of such men , as for such purpose are in reputation . for seeing all formed religion , is founded at first , upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person , whom they believe not only to be a wise man , and to labou●… to procure their happiness , but also to be a holy man , to whom god himselfe vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally ; it followeth necessarily , when they that have the government of religion , shall come to have either the wisedome of those men , their sincerity , or their love suspected ; or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token of divine revelation ; that the religion which they desire to uphold , must be suspected likewise ; and ( without the feare of the civill sword ) contradicted and rejected . that which taketh away the reputation of wisedome , in him that formeth a religion , or addeth to it when it is allready formed , is the enjoyning of a beliefe of contradictories : for both parts of a contradiction cannot possibly be true : and therefore to enjoyne the beleife of them , is an argument of ignorance ; which detects the author in that ; and discredits him in all things else he shall propound as from revelation supernaturall : which revelation a man may indeed have of many things above , but of nothing against naturall reason . that which taketh away the reputation of sincerity , is the doing , or saying of such things , as appeare to be signes , that what they require other men to believe , is not believed by themselves ; all which doings , or sayings are therefore called scandalous , because they be stumbling blocks , that make men to fall in the way of religion : as injustice , cruelty , prophanesse , avarice , and luxury . for who can believe , that he that doth ordinarily such actions , as proceed from any of these rootes , believeth there is any such invisible power to be feared , as he affrighteth other men withall , for lesser faults ? that which taketh away the reputation of love , is the being detected of private ends : as when the beliefe they require of others , conduceth or seemeth to conduce to the acquiring of dominion , riches , dignity , or secure pleasure , to themselves onely , or specially . for that which men reap benefit by to themselves , they are thought to do for their own sakes , and not for love of others . lastly , the testimony that men can render of divine calling , can be no other , than the operation of miracles ; or true prophecy , ( which also is a miracle ; ) or extraordinary felicity . and therefore , to those points of religion , which have been received from them that did such miracles ; those that are added by such , as approve not their calling by some miracle , obtain no greater beliefe , than what the custome , and lawes of the places , in which they be educated , have wrought into them . for as in naturall things , men of judgement require naturall signes , and arguments ; so in supernaturall things , they require signes supernaturall , ( which are miracles , ) before they consent inwardly , and from their hearts . all which causes of the weakening of mens faith , do manifestly appear in the examples following . first , we have the example of the children of israel ; who when moses , that had approved his calling to them by miracles , and by the happy conduct of them out of egypt , was absent but . dayes , revolted from the worship of the true god , recommended to them by him ; and setting up * a golden calfe for their god , relapsed into the idolatry of the egyptians ; from whom they had been so lately delivered . and again , after moses , aaron , joshua , and that generation which had seen the great works of god in israel , * were dead ; another generation arose , and served baal . so that miracles fayling , faith also failed . again , when the sons of samuel , * being constituted by their father judges in bersabee , received bribes , and judged unjustly , the people of israel refused any more to have god to be their king , in other manner than he was king of other people ; and therefore cryed out to samuel , to choose them a king after the manner of the nations . so that justice fayling , faith also fayled : insomuch , as they deposed their god , from reigning over them . and whereas in the planting of christian religion , the oracles ceased in all parts of the roman empire , and the number of christians encreased wonderfully every day , and in every place , by the preaching of the apostles , and evangelists ; a great part of that successe , may reasonably be attributed , to the contempt , into which the priests of the gentiles of that time , had brought themselves , by their uncleannesse , avarice , and jugling between princes . also the religion of the church of rome , was partly , for the same cause abolished in england , and many other parts of christendome ; insomuch , as the fayling of vertue in the pastors , maketh faith faile in the people : and partly from bringing of the philosophy , and doctrine of aristotle into religion , by the schoole-men ; from whence there arose so many contradictions , and absurdities , as brought the clergy into a reputation both of ignorance , and of fraudulent intention ; and enclined people to revolt from them , either against the will of their own princes , as in france , and holland ; or with their will , as in england . lastly , amongst the points by the church of rome declared necessary for salvation , there be so many , manifestly to the advantage of the pope , and of his spirituall subjects , residing in the territories of other christian princes , that were it not for the mutuall emulation of those princes , they might without warre , or trouble , exclude all forraign authority , as easily as it has been excluded in england . for who is there that does not see , to whose benefit it conduceth , to have it believed , that a king hath not his authority from christ , unlesse a bishop crown him ? that a king , if he be a priest , cannot marry ? that whether a prince be born in lawfull marriage , or not , must be judged by authority from rome ? that subjects may be freed from their alleageance , if by the court of rome , the king be judged an heretique ? that a king ( as chilperique of france ) may be deposed by a pope ( as pope zachary , ) for no cause ; and his kingdome given to one of his subjects ? that the clergy , and regulars , in what country soever , shall be exempt from the jurisdiction of their king , in cases criminall ? or who does not see , to whose profit redound the fees of private masses , and vales of purgatory ; with other signes of private interest , enough to mortifie the most lively faith , if ( as i sayd ) the civill magistrate , and custome did not more sustain it , than any opinion they have of the sanctity , wisdome , or probity of their teachers ? so that i may attribute all the changes of religion in the world , to one and the same cause ; and that is , unpleasing priests ; and those not onely amongst catholiques , but even in that church that hath presumed most of reformation . chap. xiii . of the naturall condition of mankind , as concernîng their felicity , and mis●…ry . nature hath made men so equall , in the faculties of body , and mind ; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body , or of quicker mind then another ; yet when all is reckoned together , the difference between man , and man , is not so considerable , as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit , to which another may not pretend , as well as he . for as to the strength of body , the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest , either by secret machination , or by confederacy with others , that are in the fame danger with himselfe . and as to the faculties of the mind , ( setting aside the arts grounded upon words , and especially that skill of proceeding upon generall , and infallible rules , called science ; which very few have , and but in few things ; as being not a native faculty , born with us ; nor attained , ( as prudence , ) while we look after somewhat els , ) i find yet a greater equality amongst men , than that of strength . for prudence , is but experience ; which equall time , equally bestowes on all men , in those things they equally apply themselves unto . that which may perhaps make such equality incredible , is but a vain conceipt of ones owne wisdome , which almost all men think they have in a greater degree , than the vulgar ; that is , than all men but themselves , and a few others , whom by fame , or for concurring with themselves , they approve . for such is the nature of men , that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty , or more eloquent , or more learned ; yet they will hardly believe there be many so wise as themselves : for they see their own wit at hand , and other mens at a distance . but this proveth rather that men are in that point equall , than unequall . for there is not ordinarily a greater signe of the equall distribution of any thing , than that every man is contented with his share . from this equality of ability , ariseth equality of hope in the attaining of our ends. and therefore if any two men desire the same thing , which neverthelesse they cannot both enjoy , they become enemies ; and in the way to their end , ( which is principally their owne conservation , and sometimes their delectation only , ) endeavour to destroy , or subdue one an other . and from hence it comes to passe , that where an invader hath no more to feare , than an other mans single power ; if one plant , sow , build , or possesse a convenient seat , others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united , to dispossesse , and deprive him , not only of the fruit of his labour , but also of his life , or liberty . and the invader again is in the like danger of another . and from this diffidence of one another , there is no way for any man to secure himselfe , so reasonable , as anticipation ; that is , by force , or wiles , to master the persons of all men he can , so long , till he see no other power great enough to endanger him : and this is no more than his own conservation requireth , and is generally allowed . also because there be some , that taking pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest , which they pursue farther than their security requires ; if others , that otherwise would be glad to be at ease within modest bounds , should not by invasion increase their power , they would not be able , long time , by standing only on their defence , to subsist . and by consequence , such augmentation of dominion over men , being necessary to a mans conservation , it ought to be allowed him . againe , men have no pleasure , ( but on the contrary a great deale of griefe ) in keeping company , where there is no power able to over-awe them all . for every man looketh that his companion should value him , at the same rate he sets upon himselfe : and upon all signes of contempt , or undervaluing , naturally endeavours , as far as he dares ( which amongst them that have no common power to keep them in quiet , is far enough to make them destroy each other , ) to extort a greater value from his contemners , by dommage ; and from others , by the example . so that in the nature of man , we find three principall causes of quarrell . first , competition ; secondly , diffidence ; thirdly , glory . the first , maketh men invade for gain ; the second , for safety ; and the third , for reputation . the first use violence , to make themselves masters of other mens persons , wives , children , and cattell ; the second , to defend them ; the third , for trifles , as a word , a smile , a different opinion , and any other signe of undervalue , either direct in their persons , or by reflexion in their kindred , their friends , their nation , their profession , or their name . hereby it is manifest , that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe , they are in that condition which is called warre ; and such a warre , as is of every man , against every man. for warre , consisteth not in battell onely , or the act of fighting ; but in a tract of time , wherein the will to contend by battell is sufficiently known : and therefore the notion of time , is to be considered in the nature of warre ; as it is in the nature of weather . for as the nature of foule weather , lyeth not in a showre or two of rain ; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together : so the nature of war , consisteth not in actuall fighting ; but in the known disposition thereto , during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary . all other time is peace . whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of warre , where every man is enemy to every man ; the same is consequent to the time , wherein men live without other security , than what their own strength , and their own invention shall furnish them withall . in such condition , there is no place for industry ; because the fruit thereof is uncertain : and consequently no culture of the earth ; no navigation , nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea ; no commodious building ; no instruments of moving , and removing such things as require much force ; no knowledge of the face of the earth ; no account of time ; no arts ; no letters ; no society ; and which is worst of all , continuall feare , and danger of violent death ; and the life of man , solitary , poore , nasty , brutish , and short . it may seem strange to some man , that has not well weighed these things ; that nature should thus dissociate , and render men apt to invade , and destroy one another : and he may therefore , not trusting to this inference , made from the passions , desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by experience . let him therefore consider with himselfe , when taking a journey , he armes himselfe , and seeks to go well accompanied ; when going to sleep , he locks his dores ; when even in his house he locks his chests ; and this when he knowes there bee lawes , and publike officers , armed , to revenge all injuries shall bee done him ; what opinion he has of his fellow subjects , when he rides armed ; of his fellow citizens , when he locks his dores ; and of his children , and servants , when he locks his chests . does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions , as i do by my words ? but neither of us accuse mans nature in it . the desires , and other passions of man , are in themselves no sin. no more are the actions , that proceed from those passions , till they know a law that forbids them : which till lawes be made they cannot know : nor can any law be made , till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it . it may peradventure be thought , there was never such a time , nor condition of warre as this ; and i believe it was never generally so , over all the world : but there are many places , where they live so now . for the savage people in many places of america , except the government of small families , the concord whereof dependeth on naturall lust , have no government at all ; and live at this day in that brutish manner , as i said before . howsoever , it may be perceived what manner of life there would be , where there were no common power to feare ; by the manner of life , which men that have formerly lived under a peacefull government , use to degenerate into , in a civill warre . but though there had never been any time , wherein particular men were in a condition of warre one against another ; yet in all times , kings , and persons of soveraigne authority , because of their independency , are in continuall jealousies , and in the state and posture of gladiators ; having their weapons pointing , and their eyes fixed on one another ; that is , their forts , garrisons , and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdomes ; and continuall spyes upon their neighbours ; which is a posture of war. but because they uphold thereby , the industry of their subjects ; there does not follow from it , that misery , which accompanies the liberty of particular men . to this warre of every man against every man , this also is consequent ; that nothing can be unjust . the notions of right and wrong , justice and injustice have there no place . where there is no common power , there is no law : where no law , no injustice . force , and fraud , are in warre the two cardinall vertues . justice , and injustice are none of the faculties neither of the body , nor mind . if they were , they might be in a man that were alone in the world , as well as his senses , and passions . they are qualities , that relate to men in society , not in solitude . it is consequent also to the same condition , that there be no propriety , no dominion , no mine and thine distinct ; but onely that to be every mans , that he can get ; and for so long , as he can keep it . and thus much for the ill condition , which man by meer nature is actually placed in ; though with a possibility to come out of it , consisting partly in the passions , partly in his reason . the passions that encline men to peace , are feare of death ; desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living ; and a hope by their industry to obtain them . and reason suggesteth convenient articles of peace , upon which men may be drawn to agreement . these articles , are they , which otherwise are called the lawes of nature : whereof i shall speak more particularly , in the two following chapters . chap. xiv . of the first and s●…cond naturall lawes , and of contracts . the right of nature , which writers commonly call jus naturale , is the liberty each man hath , to use his own power , as he will himselfe , for the preservation of his own nature ; that is to say , of his own life ; and consequently , of doing any thing , which in his own judgement , and reason , hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto . by liberty , is understood , according to the proper signification of the word , the absence of externall impediments : which impediments , may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would ; but cannot hinder him from using the power left him , according as his judgement , and reason shall dictate to him . a law of nature , ( lex naturalis , ) is a precept , or generall rule , found out by reason , by which a man is forbidden to do , that , which is destructive of his life , or taketh away the means of preserving the same ; and to omit , that , by which he thinketh it may be best preserved . for though they that speak of this subject , use to confound jus , and lex , right and law ; yet they ought to be distinguished ; because right , consisteth in liberty to do , or to forbeare ; whereas law , determineth , and bindeth to one of them : so that law , and right , differ as much , as obligation , and liberty ; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent . and because the condition of man , ( as hath been declared in the precedent chapter ) is a condition of warre of every one against every one ; in which case every one is governed by his own reason ; and there is nothing he can make use of , that may not be a help unto him , in preserving his life against his enemyes ; it followeth , that in such a condition , every man has a right to every thing ; even to one anothers body . and therefore , as long as this naturall right of every man to every thing endureth , there can be no security to any man , ( how strong or wise soever he be , ) of living out the time , which nature ordinarily alloweth men to live . and consequently it is a precept , or generall rule of reason , that every man , ought to endeavour peace , as farre as he has hope of obtaining it ; and when he cannot obtain it , that he may seek , and use , all helps , and advantages of warre . the first branch of which rule , containeth the first , and fundamentall law of nature ; which is , to seek peace , and follow it . the second , the summe of the right of nature ; which is , by all means we can , to defend our selves . from this fundamentall law of nature , by which men are commanded to endeavour peace , is derived this second law ; that a man be willing , when others are so too , as farre-forth , as for peace , and defence of himselfe he shall think it necessary , to lay down this right to all things ; and be contented with so much liberty against other men , as he would allow other men against himselfe . for as long as every man holdeth this right , of doing any thing he liketh ; so long are all men in the condition of warre . but if other men will not lay down their right , as well as he ; then there is no reason for any one , to devest himselfe of his : for that were to expose himselfe to prey , ( which no man is bound to ) rather than to dispose himselfe to peace . this is that law of the gospell ; whatsoever you require that others should do to you , that do ye to them . and that law of all men , quod tibi fieri non vis , alteri ne feceris . to lay downe a mans right to any thing , is to devest himselfe of the liberty , of hindring another of the benefit of his own right to the same . for he that renounceth , or passeth away his right , giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before ; because there is nothing to which every man had not right by nature : but onely standeth out of his way , that he may enjoy his own originall right , without hindrance from him ; not without hindrance from another . so that the efect which redoundeth to one man , by another mans defect of right , is but so much diminution of impediments to the use of his own right originall . right is layd aside , either by simply renouncing it ; or by transferring it to another . by simply renouncing ; when he cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth . by transferring ; when he intendeth the benefit thereof to some certain person , or persons . and when a man hath in either manner abandoned , or granted away his right ; then is he said to be obliged , or bound , not to hinder those , to whom such right is granted , or abandoned , from the benefit of it : and that he ought , and it is his duty , not to make voyd that voluntary act of his own : and that such hindrance is iniustice , and iniury , as being sine jure ; the right being before renounced , or transferred . so that injury , or injustice , in the controversies of the world , is somewhat like to that , which in the disputations of scholers is called absurdity . for as it is there called an absurdity , to contradict what one maintained in the beginning : so in the world , it is called injustice , and injury , voluntarily to undo that , which from the beginning he had voluntarily done . the way by which a man either simply renounceth , or transferreth his right , is a declaration , or signification , by some voluntary and sufficient signe , or signes , that he doth so renounce , or transferre ; or hath so renounced , or transferred the same , to him that accepteth it . and these signes are either words onely , or actions onely ; or ( as it happeneth most often ) both words , and actions . and the same are the bonds , by which men are bound , and obliged : bonds , that have their strength , not from their own nature , ( for nothing is more easily broken then a mans word , ) but from feare of some evill consequence upon the rupture . whensoever a man transferreth his right , or renounceth it ; it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himselfe ; or for some other good he hopeth for thereby . for it is a voluntary act : and of the voluntary acts of every man , the object is some good to himselfe . and therefore there be some rights , which no man can be understood by any words , or other signes , to have abandoned ; or transferred . as first a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them , that assault him by force , to take away his life ; because he cannot be understood to ayme thereby , at any good to himselfe . the same may be sayd of wounds ; and chayns , and imprisonment ; both because there is no benefit consequent to such patience ; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded , or imprisoned : as also because a man cannot tell , when he seeth men proceed against him by violence , whether they intend his death or not . and lastly the motive , and end for which this renouncing , and transferring of right is introduced , is nothing else but the security of a mans person , in his life , and in the means of so preserving life , as not to be weary of it . and therefore if a man by words , or other signes , seem to despoyle himselfe of the end , for which those signes were intended ; he is not to be understood as if he meant it , or that it was his will ; but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted . the mutuall transferring of right , is that which men call contract . there is difference , between transferring of right to the thing ; and transferring , or tradition , that is , delivery of the thing it selfe . for the thing may be delivered together with the translation of the right ; as in buying and selling with ready mony ; or exchange of goods , or lands : and it may be delivered some time after . again , one of the contractors , may deliver the thing contracted for on his part , and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after , and in the mean time be trusted ; and then the contract on his part , is called pact , ▪ or covenant : or both parts may contract now , to performe hereafter : in which cases , he that is to performe in time to come , being trusted , his performance is called keeping of promise , or faith ; and the fayling of performance ( if it be voluntary ) violation of faith. when the transferring of right , is not mutuall ; but one of the parties transferreth , in hope to gain thereby friendship , or service from another , or from his friends ; or in hope to gain the reputation of charity , or magnanimity ; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion ; or in hope of reward in heaven ; this is not contract , but gift , free-gift , grace : which words signifie one and the same thing . signes of contract , are either expresse , or by inference . expresse , are words spoken with understanding of what they signifie : and such words are either of the time present , or past ; as , i give , i grant , i have given , i have granted , i will that this be yours : or of the future ; as , i will give , i will grant : which words of the future , are called promise . signes by inference , are sometimes the consequence of words ; sometimes the consequence of silence ; sometimes the consequence of actions ; somtimes the consequence of forbearing an action : and generally a signe by inference , of any contract , is whatsoever sufficiently argues the will of the contractor . words alone , if they be of the time to come , and contain a bare promise , are an insufficient signe of a free-gift and therefore not obligatory . for if they be of the time to come , as , to morrow i will give , they are a signe i have not given yet , and consequently that my right is not transferred , but remaineth till i transferre it by some other act. but if the words be of the time present , or past , as , i have given , or do give to be delivered to morrow , then is my to morrows right given away to day ; and that by the vertue of the words , though there were no other argument of my will. and there is a great difference in the signification of these words ; volo hoc tuum esse cras , and cras dabo ; that is , between i will that this be thine to morrow , and , i will give it thee to morrow : for the word i will , in the former manner of speech , signifies an act of the will present ; but in the later , it fignifies a promise of an act of the will to come : and therefore the former words , being of the present , transferre a future right ; the later , that be of the future , transferre nothing . but if there be other signes of the will to transferre a right , besides words ; then , though the gift be free , yet may the right be understood to passe by words of the future : as if a man propound a prize to him that comes first to the end of a race , the gift is free ; and though the words be of the future , yet the right passeth : for if he would not have his words so be understood , he should not have let them runne . in contracts , the right passeth , not onely where the words are of the time present , or past ; but also where they are of the future : because all contract is mutuall translation , or change of right ; and therefore he that promiseth onely , because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth , is to be understood as if he intended the right should passe : for unlesse he had been content to have his words so understood , the other would not have performed his part first . and for that cause , in buying , and selling , and other acts of contract , a promise is equivalent to a covenant ; and therefore obligatory . he that performeth first in the case of a contract , is said to merit that which he is to receive by the performance of the other ; and he hath it as due . also when a prize is propounded to many , which is to be given to him onely that winneth ; or mony is thrown amongst many , to be enjoyed by them that catch it ; though this be a free gift ; yet so to win , or so to catch , is to merit , and to have it as due . for the right is transferred in the propounding of the prize , and in throwing down the mony ; though it be not determined to whom , but by the event of the contention . but there is between these two sorts of merit , this difference , that in contract , i merit by vertue of my own power , and the contractors need ; but in this case of free gift , i am enabled to merit onely by the benignity of the giver : in contract , i merit at the contractors hand that hee should depart with his right ; in this case of gift , i merit not that the giver should part with his right ; but that when he has parted with it , it should be mine , rather than anothers . and this i think to be the meaning of that distinction of the schooles , between meritum congrui , and meritum condigni . for god almighty , having promised paradise to those men ( hoodwinkt with carnall desires , ) that can walk through this world according to the precepts , and limits prescribed by him ; they say , he that shall so walk , shall merit paradise ex congruo . but because no man can demand a right to it , by his own righteousnesse , or any other power in himselfe , but by the free grace of god onely ; they say , no man can merit paradise ex condigno . this i say , i think is the meaning of that distinction ; but because disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own termes of art , longer than it serves their turn ; i will not affirme any thing of their meaning : onely this i say ; when a gift is given indefinitely , as a prize to be contended for , he that winneth meriteth , and may claime the prize as due . if a covenant be made , wherein neither of the parties performe presently , but trust one another ; in the condition of meer nature , ( which is a condition of warre of every man against every man , ) upon any reasonable suspition , it is voyd : but if there be a common power set over them both , with right and force sufficient to compell performance ; it is not voyd . for he that performeth first , has no assurance the other will performe after ; because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle mens ambition , avarice , anger , and other passions , without the feare of some coerceive power ; which in the condition of meer nature , where all men are equall , and judges of the justnesse of their own fears , cannot possibly be supposed . and therfore he which performeth first , does but betray himselfe to his enemy ; contrary to the right ( he can never abandon ) of defending his life , and means of living . but in a civill estate , where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith , that feare is no more reasonable ; and for that cause , he which by the covenant is to perform first , is obliged so to do . the cause of feare , which maketh such a covenant invalid , must be alwayes something arising after the covenant made ; as some new fact , or other signe of the will not to performe : else it cannot make the covenant voyd . for that which could not hinder a man from promising , ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing . he that transferreth any right , transferreth the means of enjoying it , as farre as lyeth in his power . as he that selleth land , is understood to transferre the herbage , and whatsoever growes upon it ; nor can he that sells a mill turn away the stream that drives it . and they that give to a man the right of government in soveraignty , are understood to give him the right of levying mony to maintain souldiers ; and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice . to make covenants with bruit beasts , is impossible ; because not understanding our speech , they understand not , nor accept of any translation of right ; nor can translate any right to another : and without mutuall acceptation , there is no covenant . to make covenant with god , is impossible , but by mediation of such as god speaketh to , either by revelation supernaturall , or by his lieutenants that govern under him , and in his name : for otherwise we know not whether our covenants be accepted , or not . and therefore they that vow any thing contrary to any law of nature , vow in vain ; as being a thing unjust to pay such vow . and if it be a thing commanded by the law of nature , it is not the vow , but the law that binds them . the matter , or subject of a covenant , is alwayes something that falleth under deliberation ; ( for to covenant , is an act of the will ; that is to say an act , and the last act , of deliberation ; ) and is therefore alwayes understood to be something to come ; and which is judged possible for him that covenanteth , to performe . and therefore , to promise that which is known to be impossible , is no covenant . but if that prove impossible afterwards , which before was thought possible , the covenant is valid , and bindeth , ( though not to the thing it selfe , ) yet to the value ; or , if that also be impossible , to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible : for to more no man can be obliged . men are freed of their covenants two wayes ; by performing ; or by being forgiven . for performance , is the naturall end of obligation ; and eorgivenesse , the restitution of liberty ; as being a retransferring of that right , in which the obligation consisted . covenants entred into by fear , in the condition of meer nature , are obligatory . for example , if i covenant to pay a ransome , or service for my life , to an enemy ; i am bound by it . for it is a contract , wherein one receiveth the benefit of life ; the other is to receive mony , or service for it ; and consequently , where no other law ( as in the condition , of meer nature ) forbiddeth the performance , the covenant is valid . therefore prisoners of warre , if trusted with the payment of their ransome , are obliged to pay it : and if a weaker prince , make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger , for feare ; he is bound to keep it ; unlesse ( as hath been sayd before ) there ariseth some new , and just cause of feare , to renew the war. and even in common-wealths , if i be forced to redeem my selfe from a theefe by promising him mony , i am bound to pay it , till the civill law discharge me . for whatsoever i may lawfully do without obligation , the same i may lawfully covenant to do through feare : and what i lawfully covenant , i cannot lawfully break . a former covenant , makes voyd a later . for a man that hath passed away his right to one man to day , hath it not to passe to morrow to another : and therefore the later promise passeth no right , but is null . a covenant not to defend my selfe from force , by force , is alwayes voyd . for ( as i have shewed before ) no man can transferre , or lay down his right to save himselfe from death , wounds , and imprisonment , ( the avoyding whereof is the onely end of laying down any right , and therefore the promise of not resisting force , in no covenant transferreth any right ; nor is obliging . for though a man may covenant thus , unlesse i do so , or so , kill me ; he cannot covenant thus , unlesse i do so , or so , i will not resist you , when you come to kill me . for man by nature chooseth the lesser evill , which is danger of death in resisting ; rather than the greater , which is certain and present death in not resisting . and this is granted to be true by all men , in that they lead criminals to execution , and prison , with armed men , notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law , by which they are condemned . a covenant to accuse ones selfe , without assurance of pardon , is likewise invalide . for in the condition of nature , where every man is judge , there is no place for accusation : and in the civill state , the accusation is followed with punishment ; which being force , a man is not obliged not to resist . the same is also true , of the accusation of those , by whose condemnation a man falls into misery ; as of a father , wife , or benefactor . for the testimony of such an accuser , if it be not willingly given , is praesumed to be corrupted by nature ; and therefore not to be received : and where a mans testimony is not to be credited , he is not bound to give it . also accusations upon torture , are not to be reputed as testimonies . for torture is to be used but as means of conjecture , and light , in the further examination , and search of truth : and what is in that case confessed , tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured ; not to the informing of the torturers : and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient testimony : for whether he deliver himselfe by true , or false accusation , he does it by the right of preserving his own life . the force of words , being ( as i have formerly noted ) too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants ; there are in mans nature , but two imaginable helps to strengthen it . and those are either a feare of the consequence of breaking their word ; or a glory , or pride in appearing not to need to breake it . this later is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on , especially in the pursuers of wealth , command , or sensuall pleasure ; which are the greatest part of mankind . the passion to be reckoned upon , is fear ; whereof there be two very generall objects : one , the power of spirits invisible ; the other , the power of those men they shall therein offend . of these two , though the former be the greater power , yet the feare of the later is commonly the greater feare . the feare of the former is in every man , his own religion : which hath place in the nature of man before civill society . the later hath not so ; at least not place enough , to keep men to their promises ; because in the condition of meer nature , the inequality of power is not discerned , but by the event of battell . so that before the time of civill society , or in the interruption thereof by warre , there is nothing can strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on , against the temptations of avarice , ambition , lust , or other strong desire , but the feare of that invisible power , which they every one worship as god ; and feare as a revenger of their perfidy . all therefore that can be done between two men not subject to civill power , is to put one another to swear by the god he feareth : which swearing , or oath , is a forme of speech , added to a promise ; by which he that promiseth , ●…gnisieth , that unlesse he performe , he renounceth the mercy of his god , or calleth to him for vengeance on himselfe . such was the heathen forme , let jupiter kill me else , as i kill this beast . so is our forme , i shall do thus , and thus , so help me god. and this , with the rites and ceremonies , which every one useth in his own religion , that the feare of breaking faith might be the greater . by this it appears , that an oath taken according to any other forme , or rite , then his , that sweareth , is in vain ; and no oath : and that there is no swearing by any thing which the swearer thinks not god. for though men have sometimes used to swear by their kings , for feare , or flattery ; yet they would have it thereby understood , they attributed to them divine honour . and that swearing unnecessarily by god , is but prophaning of his name : and swearing by other things , as men do in common discourse , is not swearing , but an impious custome , gotten by too much vehemence of talking . it appears also , that the oath addes nothing to the obligation . for a covenant , if lawfull , binds in the sight of god , without the oath , as much as with it : if unlawfull , bindeth not at all ; though it be confirmed with an oath . chap. xv. of other lawes of nature . from that law of nature , by which we are obliged to transferre to another , such rights , as being retained , hinder the peace of mankind , there followeth a third ; which is this , that men performe their covenants made : without which , covenants are in vain , and but empty words ; and the right of all men to all things remaining , wee are still in the condition of warre . and in this law of nature , consisteth the fountain and originall of justice . for where no covenant hath preceded , there hath no right been transferred , and every man has right to every thing ; and consequently , no action can be unjust . but when a covenant is made , then to break it is unjust : and the definition of iniustice , is no other than the not performance of covenant . and whatsoever is not unjust , is just. but because covenants of mutuall trust , where there is a feare of not performance on either part , ( as hath been said in the former chapter , ) are invalid ; though the originall of justice be the making of covenants ; yet injustice actually there can be none , till the cause of such feare be taken away ; which while men are in the naturall condition of warre , cannot be done . therefore before the names of just , and unjust can have place , there must be some coërcive power , to compell men equally to the performance of their covenants , by the terrour of some punishment , greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant ; and to make good that propriety , which by mutuall contract men acquire , in recompence of the universall right they abandon : and such power there is none before the erection of a common-wealth . and this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the schooles : for they say , that justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own . and therefore where there is no own , that is , no propriety , there is no injustice ; and where there is no coërceive power erected , that is , where there is no common-wealth , there is no propriety ; all men having right to all things : therefore where there is no common-wealth , there nothing is unjust . so that the nature of justice , consisteth in keeping of valid covenants : but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civill power , sufficient to compell men to keep them : and then it is also that propriety begins . the foole hath fayd in his heart , there is no such thing as justice ; and sometimes also with his tongue ; seriously alleaging , that every mans conservation , and contentment , being committed to his own care , there could be no reason , why every man might not do what he thought conduced thereunto : and therefore also to make , or not make ; keep , or not keep covenants , was not against reason , when it conduced to ones benefit . he does not therein deny , that there be covenants ; and that they are sometimes broken , sometimes kept ; and that such breach of them may be called injustice , and the observance of them justice : but he questioneth , whether injustice , taking away the feare of god , ( for the same foole hath said in his heart there is no god , ) may not sometimes stand with that reason , which dictateth to every man his own good ; and particularly then , when it conduceth to such a benefit , as shall put a man in a condition , to neglect not onely the dispraise , and revilings , but also the power of other men . the kingdome of god is gotten by violence : but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence ? were it against reason so to get it , when it is impossible to receive hurt by it ? and if it be not against reason , it is not against justice : or else justice is not to be approved for good . from such reasoning as this , succesfull wickednesse hath obtained the name of vertue : and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of faith ; yet have allowed it , when it is for the getting of a kingdome . and the heathen that believed , that saturn was deposed by his son jupiter , believed neverthelesse the same jupiter to be the avenger of injustice : somewhat like to a piece of law in cokes commentaries on litleton ; where he sayes , if the right heire of the crown be attainted of treason ; yet the crown shall descend to him , and eo instante the atteynder be voyd : from which instances a man will be very prone to inferre ; that when the heire apparent of a kingdome , shall kill him that is in possession , though his father ; you may call it injustice , or by what other name you will ; yet it can never be against reason , seeing all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves ; and those actions are most reasonable , that conduce most to their ends . this specious reasoning is neverthelesse false . for the question is not of promises mutuall , where there is no security of performance on either side ; as when there is no civill power erected over the parties promising ; for such promises are no covenants : but either where one of the parties has performed already ; or where there is a power to make him performe ; there is the question whether it be against reason , that is , against the benefit of the other to performe , or not . and i say it is not against reason . for the manifestation whereof , we are to consider ; first , that when a man doth a thing , which notwithstanding any thing can be foreseen , and reckoned on , tendeth to his own destruction , howsoever some accident which he could not expect , arriving may turne it to his benefit ; yet such events do not make it reasonably or wisely done . secondly , that in a condition of warre , wherein every man to every man , for want of a common power to keep them all in awe , is an enemy , there is no man can hope by his own strength , or wit , to defend himselfe from destruction , without the help of confederates ; where every one expects the same defence by the confederation , that any one else does : and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him , can in reason expect no other means of safety , than what can be had from his own single power . he therefore that breaketh his covenant , and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so , cannot be received into any society , that unite themselves for peace and defence , but by the errour of them that receive him ; nor when he is received , be retayned in it , without seeing the danger of their errour ; which errours a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security : and therefore if he be left , or cast out of society , he perisheth ; and if he live in society , it is by the errours of other men , which he could not foresee , nor reckon upon ; and consequently against the reason of his preservation ; and so , as all men that contribute not to his destruction , forbear him onely out of ignorance of what is good for themselves . as for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetuall felicity of heaven , by any way ; it is frivolous : there being but one way imaginable ; and that is not breaking , but keeping of covenant . and for the other instance of attaining soveraignty by rebellion ; it is manifest , that though the event follow , yet because it cannot reasonably be expected , but rather the contrary ; and because by gaining it so , others are taught to gain the same in like manner , the attempt thereof is against reason . justice therefore , that is to say , keeping of covenant , is a rule of reason , by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life ; and consequently a law of nature . there be some that proceed further ; and will not have the law of nature , to be those rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life on earth ; but to the attaining of an eternall felicity after death ; to which they think the breach of covenant may conduce ; and consequently be just and reasonable ; ( such are they that think it a work of merit to kill , or depose , or rebell against , the soveraigne power constituted over them by their own consent . ) but because there is no naturall knowledge of mans estate after death ; much lesse of the reward that is then to be given to breach of faith ; but onely a beliefe grounded upon other mens saying , that they know it supernaturally , or that they know those , that knew them , that knew others , that knew it supernaturally ; breach of faith cannot be called a precept of reason , or nature . others , that allow for a law of nature , the keeping of faith , do neverthelesse make exception of certain persons ; as heretiques , and such as use not to performe their covenant to others : and this also is against reason . for if any fault of a man , be sufficient to discharge our covenant made ; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it . the names of just , and injust , when they are attributed to men , signifie one thing ; and when they are attributed to actions , another . when they are attributed to men , they signifie conformity , or inconformity of manners , to reason . but when they are attributed to actions , they signifie the conformity , or inconformity to reason , not of manners , or manner of life , but of particular actions . a just man therefore , is he that taketh all the care he can , that his actions may be all just : and an unjust man , is he that neglecteth it . and such men are more often in our language stiled by the names of righteous , and unrighteous ; then just , and unjust ; though the meaning be the same . therefore a righteous man , does not lose that title , by one , or a few unjust actions , that proceed from sudden passion , or mistake of things , or persons : nor does an unrighteous man , lose his character , for such actions , as he does , or forbeares to do , for feare : because his will is not framed by the justice , but by the apparent benefit of what he is to do . that which gives to humane actions the relish of justice , is a certain noblenesse or gallantnesse of courage , ( rarely found , ) by which a man scorns to be beholding for the contentment of his life , to fraud , or breach of promise . this justice of the manners , is that which is meant , where justice is called a vertue ; and injustice a vice. but the justice of actions denominates men , not just , but guiltlesse : and the injustice of the same , ( which is also called injury , ) gives them but the name of guilty . again , the injustice of manners , is the disposition , or aptitude to do injurie ; and is injustice before it proceed to act ; and without supposing any individuall person injured . but the injustice of an action , ( that is to say injury , ) supposeth an individuall person injured ; namely him , to whom the covenant was made : and therefore many times the injury is received by one man , when the dammage redoundeth to another . as when the master commandeth his servant to give mony to a stranger ; if it be not done , the injury is done to the master , whom he had before covenanted to obey ; but the dammage redoundeth to the stranger , to whom he had no obligation ; and therefore could not injure him . and so also in common-wealths , private men may remit to one another their debts ; but not robberies or other violences , whereby they are endammaged ; beca●…se the detaining of debt , is an injury to themselves ; but robbery and violence , are injuries to the person of the common-wealth . whatsoever is done to a man , conformable to his own will signied to the doer , is no injury to him . for if he that doeth it , hath not passed away his originall right to do what he please , by some antecedent covenant , there is no breach of covenant ; and therefore no injury done him . and if he have ; then his will to have it done being signified , is a release of that covenant : and so again there is no injury done him . justice of actions , is by writers divided into commutative , and distributive : and the former they say consisteth in proportion arithmeticall ; the later in proportion geometricall . commutative therefore , they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for ; and distributive , in the distribution of equall benefit , to men of equall merit . as if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy ; or to give more to a man than he merits . the value of all things contracted for , is measured by the appetite of the contractors : and therefore the just value , is that which they be contented to give . and merit ( besides that which is by covenant , where the performance on one part , meriteth the performance of the other part , and falls under justice commutative , not distributive , ) is not due by justice ; but is rewarded of grace onely . and therefore this distinction , in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded , is not right . to speak properly , commutative justice , is the justice of a contractor ; that is , a performance of covenant , in buying , and selling ; hiring , and letting to hire ; lending , and borrowing ; exchanging , bartering , and other acts of contract . and distributive justice , the justice of an arbitrator ; that is to say , the act of defining what is just. wherein , ( being trusted by them that make him arbitrator , ) if he performe his trust , he is said to distribute to every man his own : and this is indeed just distribution , and may be called ( though improperly ) distributive justice ; but more properly equity ; which also is a law of nature , as shall be shewn in due place . as justice dependeth on antecedent covenant ; so does gratitude depend on antecedent grace ; that is to say , antecedent free-gift : and is the fourth law of nature ; which may be conceived in this forme , that a man which receiveth benefit from another of meer grace , endeavour that he which giveth it , have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. for no man giveth , but with intention of good to himselfe ; because gift is voluntary ; and of all voluntary acts , the object is to every man his own good ; of which if men see they shall be frustrated , there will be no beginning of benevolence , or trust ; nor consequently of mutuall help ; nor of reconciliation of one man to another ; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war ; which is contrary to the first and fundamentall law of nature , which commandeth men to seck peace . the breach of this law , is called ingratitude ; and hath the same relation to grace , that injustice hath to obligation by covenant , a fifth law of nature , is compleasance ; that is to say , that every man strive to accommodate himselfe to the rest . for the understanding whereof , we may consider , that there is in mens aptnesse to society ; a diversity of nature , rising from their diversity of affections ; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an aedifice . for as that stone which by the asperity , and irregularity of figure , takes more room from others , than it selfe fills ; and for the hardnesse , cannot be easily made plain , and thereby hindereth the building , is by the builders cast away as unprofitable , and troublesome : so also , a man that by asperity of nature , will strive to retain those things which to himselfe are superfluous , and to others necessary ; and for the stubbornness of his passions , cannot be corrected , is to be left , or cast out of society , as combersome thereunto . for seeing every man , not onely by right , but also by necessity of nature , is supposed to endeavour all he can , to obtain that which is necessary for his conservation ; he that shall oppose himselfe against it , for things superfluous , is guilty of the warre that thereupon is to follow ; and therefore doth that , which is contrary to the fundamentall law of nature , which commandeth to seek peace . the observers of this law , may be called sociable , ( the latines call them commodi ; ) the contrary , stubborn , insociable , froward , intractable . a sixth law of nature , is this , that upon caution of the future time , a man ought to pardon the offences past of them that repenting , desire it . for pardon , is nothing but granting of peace ; which though granted to them that persevere in their hostility , be not peace , but feare ; yet not granted to them that give caution of the future time , is signe of an aversion to peace ; and therefore contrary to the law of nature . a seventh is , that in revenges , ( that is , retribution of evil for evil , ) men look not at the greatnesse of the evill past , but the greatnesse of the good to follow . whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other designe , than for correction of the offender , or direction of others . for this law is consequent to the next before it , that commandeth pardon , upon security of the future time . besides , revenge without respect to the example , and profit to come , is a triumph , or glorying in the hurt of another , tending to no end ; ( for the end is alwayes somewhat to come ; ) and glorying to no end , is vain-glory , and contrary to reason ; and to hurt without reason , tendeth to the introduction of warre ; which is against the law of nature ; and is commonly stiled by the name of cruelty . and because all signes of hatred , or contempt , provoke to fight ; insomuch as most men choose rather to hazard their life , than not to be revenged ; we may in the eighth place , for a law of nature , set down this precept , that no man by deed , word , countenance , or gesture , declare hatred , or contempt of another . the breach of which law , is commonly called contumely . the question who is the better man , has no place in the condition of meer nature ; where , ( as has been shewn before , ) all men are equall . the inequallity that now is , has bin introduced by the lawes civill . i know that aristotle in the first booke of his politiques , for a foundation of his doctrine , maketh men by nature , some more worthy to command , meaning the wiser sort ( such as he thought himselfe to be for his philosophy ; ) others to serve , ( meaning those that had strong bodies , but were not philosophers as he ; ) as if master and servant were not introduced by consent of men , but by difference of wit : which is not only against reason ; but also against experience . for there are very few so foolish , that had not rather governe themselves , than be governed by others : nor when the wise in their own concei●… , contend by force , with them who distrust their owne wisdome , do they alwaies , or often , or almost at any time , get the victory . if nature therefore have made men equall , that equalitie is to be acknowledged : or if nature have made men unequall ; yet because men that think themselves equall , will not enter into conditions of peace , but upon equall termes , such equalitie must be admitted . and therefore for the ninth law of nature , i put this , ' that every man acknowledge other for his equall by nature . the breach of this precept is pride . on this law , dependeth another , that at the entrance into conditions of peace , no man require to reserve to himselfe any right , which he is not content should be reserved to every one of the rest . as it is necessary for all men that seek peace , to lay down certaine rights of nature ; that is to say , not to have libertie to do all they list : so is it necessarie for mans life , to retaine some ; as right to governe their owne bodies ; enjoy aire , water , motion , waies to go from place to place ; and all things else without which a man cannot live , or not live well . if in this case , at the making of peace , men require for themselves , that which they would not have to be granted to others , they do contrary to the precedent law , that commandeth the acknowledgment of naturall equalitie , and therefore also against the law of nature . the observers of this law , are those we call modest , and the breakers arrogant men . the greeks call the violation of this law 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that is , a desire of more than their share . also if a man be trusted to judge between man and man , it is a precept of the law of nature , that he deale equally between them . for without that , the controversies of men cannot be determined but by warre . he therefore that is partiall in judgment , doth what in him lies , to deterre men from the use of judges , and arbitrators ; and consequently , ( against the fundamentall lawe of nature ) is the cause of warre . the observance of this law , from the equall distribution to each man , of that which in reason belongeth to him , is called equity , and ( as i have sayd before ) distributive justice : the violation , acception of persons , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and from this followeth another law , that such things as cannot be divided , be enjoyed in common , if it can be ; and if the quantity of the thing permit , without stint ; otherwise proportionably to the number of them that have right . for otherwise the distribution is unequall , and contrary to equitie . but some things there be , that can neither be divided , nor enjoyed in common . then , the law of nature , which prescribeth equity , requireth , that the entire right ; or else , ( making the use alternate , ) the first possession , be determined by lot. for equall distribution , is of the law of nature ; and other means of equall distribution cannot be imagined . of lots there be two sorts , arbitrary , and naturall . arbitrary , is that which is agreed on by the competitors : naturall , is either primogeniture , ( which the greek calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies , given by lot ▪ ) or first seisure . and therefore those things which cannot be enjoyed in common , nor divided , ought to be adjudged to the first possessor ; and in some cases to the first-borne , as acquired by lot. it is also a law of nature , that all men that mediate peace , be allowed safe conduct . for the law that commandeth peace , as the end , commandeth intercession , as the means ; and to intercession the means is safe conduct . and because , though men be never so willing to observe these lawes , there may neverthelesse arise questions concerning a mans action ; first , whether it were done , or not done ; secondly ( if done ) whether against the law , or not against the law ; the former whereof , is called a question of fact ; the later a question of right ; therefore unlesse the parties to the question , covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another , they are as farre from peace as ever . this other , to whose sentence they submit , is called an arbitrator . and therefore it is of the law of nature , that they that are at controversie , submit their right to the judgement of an arbitrator . and seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit , no man is a fit arbitrator in his own cause : and if he were never so fit ; yet equity allowing to each party equall benefit , if one be admitted to be judge , the other is to be admitted also ; & so the controversie , that is , the cause of war , remains , against the law of nature . for the same reason no man in any cause ought to be received for arbitrator , to whom greater profit , or honour , or pleasure apparently ariseth out of the victory of one party , than of the other : for hee hath taken ( though an unavoydable bribe , yet ) a bribe ; and no man can be obliged to trust him . and thus also the controversie , and the condition of war remaineth , contrary to the law of nature . and in a controversie of fact , the judge being to give no more credit to one , than to the other , ( if there be no other arguments ) must give credit to a third ; or to a third and fourth ; or more : for else the question is undecided , and left to force , contrary to the law of nature . these are the lawes of nature , dictating peace , for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes ; and which onely concern the doctrine of civill society . there be other things tending to the destruction of particular men ; as drunkenness , and all other parts of intemperance ; which may therefore also be reckoned amongst those things which the law of nature hath forbidden ; but are not necessary to be mentioned , nor are pertinent enough to this place . and though this may seem too subtile a deduction of the lawes of nature , to be taken notice of by all men ; whereof the most part are too busie in getting food , and the rest too negligent to understand ; yet to leave all men unexcusable , they have been contracted into one easie sum , intelligible , even to the meanest capacity ; and that is , do not that to another , which thou wouldest not have done to thy selfe ; which sheweth him , that he has no more to do in learning the lawes of nature , but , when weighing the actions of other men with his own , they seem too heavy , to put them into the other part of the ballance , and his own into their place , that his own passions , and selfe-love , may adde nothing to the weight ; and then there is none of these lawes of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable . the lawes of nature oblige in foro interno ; that is to say , they bind to a desire they should take place : but in foro externo ; that is , to the putting them in act , not alwayes . for he that should be modest , and tractable , and performe all he promises , in such time , and place , where no man els should do so , should but make himselfe a prey to others , and procure his own certain ruine , contrary to the ground of all lawes of nature , which tend to natures preservation . and again , he that having sufficient security , that others shall observe t●…e same lawes towards him , observes them not himselfe , seeketh not peace , but war ; & consequently the destruction of his nature by violence . and whatsoever lawes bind in foro interno , may be broken , not onely by a fact contrary to the law , but also by a fact according to it , in case a man think it contrary . for though his action in this case , be according to the law ; yet his purpose was against the law ; which where the obligation is in foro interno , is a breach . the lawes of nature are immutable and eternall ; for injustice , ingratitude , arrogance , pride , iniquity , acception of persons , and the rest , can never be made lawfull . for it can never be that warre shall preserve life , and peace destroy it . the sames lawes , because they oblige onely to a desire , and endeavour , i mean an unfeigned and constant endeavour , are easie to be observed . for in that they require nothing but endeavour ; he that endeavoureth their performance , fulfilleth them ; and he that fulfilleth the law , is just. and the science of them , is the true and onely moral philosophy . for morall philosophy is nothing else but the science of what is good , and evill , in the conversation , and society of man-kind . good , and evill , are names that signifie our appetites , and aversions ; which in different tempers , customes , and doctrines of men , are different : and divers men , differ not onely in their judgement , on the senses of what is pleasant , and unpleasant to the tast , smell , hearing , touch , and sight ; but also of what is conformable , or disagreeable to reason , in the actions of common life . nay , the same man , in divers times , differs from himselfe ; and one time praiseth , that is , calleth good , what another time he dispraiseth , and calleth evil : from whence arise disputes , controversies , and at last war. and therefore so long a man is in the condition of meer nature , ( which is a condition of war , ) as private appetite is the measure of good , and evill : and consequently all men agree on this , that peace is good , and therefore also the way , or means of peace , which ( as i have shewed before ) are justice , gratitude , modesty , equity , mercy , & the rest of the laws of nature , are good ; that is to say , morall vertues ; and their contrarie vices , evill . now the science of vertue and vice , is morall philosophie ; and therfore the true doctrine of the lawes of nature , is the true morall philosophie . but the writers of morall philosophie , though they acknowledge the same vertues and vices ; yet not seeing wherein consisted their goodnesse ; nor that they come to be praised , as the meanes of peaceable , sociable , and comfortable living ; place them in a mediocrity of passions : as if not the cause , but the degree of daring , made fortitude ; or not the cause , but the quantity of a gift , made liberality . these dictates of reason , men use to call by the name of lawes , but improperly : for they are but conclusions , or theoremes concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defence of themselves ; wheras law , properly is the word of him , that by right hath command over others . but yet if we consider the same theoremes , as delivered in the word of god , that by right commandeth all things ; then are they properly called lawes . chap. xvi . of persons , authors , and things personated . a person , is he , whose words or actions are considered , either as his own , or as representing the words or actions of an other man , or of any other thing to whom they are attributed , whether truly or by fiction . when they are considered as his owne , then is he called a naturall person : and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other , then is he a feigned or artificiall person . the word person is latine : insteed whereof the greeks have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies the face , as persona in latine signifies the disguise , or outward appearance of a man , counterfeited on the stage ; and somtimes more particularly that part of it , which disguiseth the face , as a mask or visard : and from the stage , hath been translated to any representer of speech and action , as well in tribunalls , as theaters . so that a person , is the same that an actor is , both on the stage and in common conversation ; and to personate , is to act , or represent himselfe , or an other ; and he that acteth another , is said to beare his person , or act in his name ; ( in which sence cicero useth it where he saies , unus sustineo tres personas ; mei , adversarii , & judicis , i beare three persons ; my own , my adversaries , and the judges ; ) and is called in diverse occasions , diversly ; as a representer , or representative , a lieutenant , a vicar , an attorney , a deputy , a procurator , an actor , and the like . of persons artificiall , some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent . and then the person is the actor ; and he that owneth his words and actions , is the author : in which case the actor acteth by authority . for that which in speaking of goods and possessions , is called an owner , and in latine dominus , in greeke 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; speaking of actions , is called author . and as the right of possession , is called dominion ; so the right of doing any action , is called authority . so that by authority , is alwayes understood a right of doing any act : and done by authority , done by commssiion , or licence from him whose right it is . from hence it followeth , that when the actor maketh a covenant by authority , he bindeth thereby the author , no lesse than if he had made it himselfe ; and no lesse subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same . and therfore all that hath been said formerly , ( chap. . ) of the nature of covenants between man and man in their naturall capacity , is true also when they are made by their actors , representers , or procurators , that have authority from them , so far-forth as is in their commission , but no farther . and therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor , or representer , not knowing the authority he hath , doth it at his own perill . for no man is obliged by a covenant , whereof he is not author ; nor consequently by a covenant made against , or beside the authority he gave . when the actor doth any thing against the law of nature by command of the author , if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him , not he , but the author breaketh the law of nature : for though the action be against the law of nature ; yet it is not his : but contrarily , to refuse to do it , is against the law of nature , that forbiddeth breach of covenant . and he that maketh a covenant with the author , by mediation of the actor , not knowing what authority he hath , but onely takes his word ; in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand , is no longer obliged : for the covenant made with the author , is not valid , without his counter-assurance . but if he that so covenanteth , knew before hand he was to expect no other assurance , than the actors word ; then is the covenant valid ; because the actor in this case maketh himselfe the author . and therefore , as when the authority is evident , the covenant obligeth the author , not the actor ; so when the authority is feigned , it obligeth the actor onely ; there being no author but himselfe . there are few things , that are uncapable of being represented by fiction . inanimate things , as a church , an hospital , a bridge , may be personated by a rector , master , or overseer . but things inanimate , cannot be authors , nor therefore give authority to their actors : yet the actors may have authority to procure their maintenance , given them by those that are owners , or governours of those things . and therefore , such things cannot be personated , before there be some state of civill government . likewise children , fooles , and mad-men that have no use of reason , may be personated by guardians , or curators ; but can be no authors ( during that time ) of any action done by them , longer then ( when they shall recover the use of reason ) they shall judge the same reasonable . yet during the folly , he that hath right of governing them , may give authority to the guardian . but this again has no place but in a state civill , because before such estate , there is no dominion of persons . an idol , or meer figment of the brain , may be personated ; as were the gods of the heathen ; which by such officers as the state appointed , were personated , and held possessions , and other goods , and rights , which men from time to time dedicated , and consecrated unto them . but idols cannot be authors : for an idol is nothing . the authority proceeded from the state : and therefore before introduction of civill government , the gods of the heathen could not be personated . the true god may be personated . as he was ; first , by moses ; who governed the israelites , ( that were not his , but gods people , ) not in his own name , with hoc dicit moses ; but in gods name , with hoc dicit dominus . secondly by the son of man , his own son , our blessed saviour jesus christ , that came to reduce the jewes , and induce all nations into the kingdome of his father ; not as of himselfe , but as sent from his father . and thirdly , by the holy ghost , or comforter , speaking , and working in the apostles : which holy ghost , was a comforter that came not of himselfe ; but was sent , and proceeded from them both . a multitude of men , are made one person , when they are by one man , or one person , represented ; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular . for it is the unity of the representer , not the unity of the represented , that maketh the person one. and it is the representer that beareth the person , and but one person : and unity , cannot otherwise be understood in multitude . and because the multitude naturally is not one , but many ; they cannot be understood for one ; but many authors , of every thing their representative saith , or doth in their name ; every man giving their common representer , authority from himselfe in particular ; and owning all the actions the representer doth , in case they give him authority without stint : otherwise , when they limit him in what , and how farre he shall represent them , none of them owneth more , than they gave him commission to act. and if the representative consist of many men , the voyce of the greater number , must be considered as the voyce of them all . for if the lesser number pronounce ( for example ) in the affirmative , and the greater in the negative , there will be negatives more than enough to destroy the affirmatives ; and thereby the excesse of negatives , standing uncontradicted , are the onely voyce the representative hath . and a representative of even number , especially when the number is not great , whereby the contradictory voyces are oftentimes equall , is therefore oftentimes mute , and uncapable of action . yet in some cases contradictory voyces equall in number , may determine a question ; as in condemning , or absolving , equality of votes , even in that they condemne not , do absolve ; but not on the contrary condemne , in that they absolve not . for when a cause is heard ; not to condemne , is to absolve : but on the contrary , to say that not absolving , is condemning , is not true . the like it is in a deliberation of executing presently , or deferring till another time : for when the voyces are equall , the not decreeing execution , is a decree of dilation . or if the number be odde , as three , or more , ( men , or assemblies ; ) whereof every one has by a negative voice , authority to take away the effect of all the affirmative voices of the rest , this number is no representative ; because by the diversity of opinions , and interests of men , it becomes oftentimes , and in cases of the greatest consequence , a mute person , and unapt , as for many things else , so for the government of a multitude , especially in time of warre . of authors there be two sorts . the first simply so called ; which i have before defined to be him , that owneth the action of another simply . the second is he , that owneth an action , or covenant of another conditionally ; that is to say , he undertaketh to do it , if the other doth it not , at , or before a certain time . and these authors conditionall , are generally called suretyes , in latine fidejussores , and sponsores ; and particularly for debt , praedes ; and for appearance before a judge , or magistrate , vades . of common-vvealth . chap. xvii . of the causes , generation , and definition of a common-wealth . the finall cause , end , or designe of men , ( who naturally love liberty , and dominion over others , ) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves , ( in which wee see them live in common-wealths , ) is the foresight of their own preservation , and of a more contented life thereby ; that is to say , of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of warre , which is necessarily consequent ( as hath been shewn ) to the naturall passions of men , when there is no visible power to keep them in awe , and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their covenants , and observation of those lawes of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters . for the lawes of nature ( as justice , equity , modesty , mercy , and ( in summe ) doing to others , as wee would be done to , ) of themselves , without the terrour of some power , to cause them to be observed , are contrary to our naturall passions , that carry us to partiality , pride , revenge , and the like . and covenants , without the sword , are but words , and of no strength to secure a man at all . therefore notwithstanding the lawes of nature , ( which every one hath then kept , when he has the will to keep them , when he can do it safely , ) if there be no power erected , or not great enough for our security ; every man will , and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art , for caution against all other men . and in all places , where men have lived by small families , to robbe and spoyle one another , has been a trade , and so farre from being reputed against the law of nature , that the greater spoyles they gained , the greater was their honour ; and men observed no other lawes there●…n , but the lawes of honour ; that is , to abstain from cruelty , leaving to men their lives , and instruments of husbandry . and as small familyes did then ; so now do cities and kingdomes which are but greater families ( for their own security ) enlarge their dominions ▪ upon all pretences of danger , and fear of invasion , or assistance that may be given to invaders , endeavour as much as they can , to subdue , or weaken their neighbours , by open force , and secret arts , for want of other caution , justly ; and are remembred for it in after ages with honour . nor is it the joyning together of a small number of men , that gives them this security ; because in small numbers , small additions on the one side or the other , make the advantage of strength so great , as is sufficient to carry the victory ; and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion . the multitude sufficient to confide in for our security , is not determined by any certain number , but by comparison with the enemy we feare ; and is then sufficient , when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment , to determine the event of warre , as to move him to attempt . and be there never so great a multitude ; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements , and particular appetites , they can expect thereby no defence , nor protection , neither against a common enemy , nor against the injuries of one another . for being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength , they do not help , but hinder one another ; and reduce thei●… strength by mutuall opposition to nothing : whereby they are easily , not onely subdued by a very few that agree together ; but also when there is no common enemy , they make warre upon each other , for their particular interests . for if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice , and other lawes of nature , without a common power to keep them all in awe ; we might as well suppose all man-kind to do the same ; and then there neither would be , nor need to be any civill government , or common-wealth at all ; because there would be peace without subjection . nor is it enough for the security , which men desire should last all the time of their life , that they be governed , and directed by one judgement , for a limited time ; as in one battell , or one warre . for though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a forraign enemy ; yet afterwards , when either they have no common enemy , or he that by one part is held for an enemy , is by another part held for a friend , they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve , and fall again into a warre amongst themselves . it is true , that certain living creatures , as bees , and ants , live sociably one with another , ( which are therefore by aristotle numbred amongst politicall creatures ; ) and yet have no other direction , than their particular judgements and appetites ; nor speech , whereby one of them can signifie to another , what he thinks expedient for the common benefit : and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know , why man-kind cannot do the same . to which i answer , first , that men are conti●…ually in competition for honour and dignity , which these creatures are not ; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground , envy and hatred , and finally warre ; but amongst these not so . secondly , that amongst these creatures , the common good differeth not from the private ; and being by nature enclined to their private , they procure thereby the common benefit . but man , whose joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men , can relish nothing but what is eminent . thirdly , that these creatures , having not ( as man ) the use of reason , do not see , nor think they see any fault , in the administration of their common businesse : whereas amongst men , there are very many , that thinke themselves wiser , and abler to govern the publique , better than the rest ; and these strive to reforme and innovate , one this way , another that way ; and thereby bring it into distraction and civill warre . fourthly , that these creatures , though they have some use of voice , in making knowne to one another their desires , and other affections ; yet they want that art of words , by which some men can represent to others , that which is good , in the likenesse of evill ; and evill , in the likenesse of good ; and augment , or diminish the apparent greatnesse of good and evill ; discontenting men , and troubling their peace at their pleasure . fiftly , irrationall creatures cannot distinguish betweene injury , and dammage ; and therefore as long as they be at ease , they are not offended with their fellowes : whereas man is then most troublesome , when he is most at ease : for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdome , and controule the actions of them that governe the common-wealth . lastly , the agreement of these creatures is naturall ; that of men , is by covenant only , which is artificiall : and therefore it is no wonder if there be somwhat else required ( besides covenant ) to make their agreement constant and lasting ; which is a common power , to keep them in awe , and to direct their actions to the common benefit . the only way to erect such a common power , as may be able to defend them from the invasion of forraigners , and the injuries of one another , and thereby to secure them in such sort , as that by their owne industrie , and by the fruites of the earth , they may nourish themselves and live contentedly ; is , to conferre all their power and strength upon one man , or upon one assembly of men , that may reduce all their wills , by plurality of voices , unto one will : which is as much as to say , to appoint one man , or assembly of men , to beare their person ; and every one to owne , and acknowledge himselfe to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person , shall act , or cause to be acted , in those things which concerne the common peace and safetie ; and therein to submit their wills , every one to his will , and their judgements , to his judgment . this is more than consent , or concord ; it is a reall unitie of them all , in one and the same person , made by covenant of every man with every man , in such manner , as if every man should say to every man , i authorise and give up my right of governing my selfe , to this man , or to this assembly of men , on this condition , that thou give up thy right to him , and authorise all his actions in like manner . this done , the multitude so united in one person , is called a common-wealth , in latine civitas . this is the generation of that great leviathan , or rather ( to speake more reverently ) of that mortall god , to which wee owe under the immortall god , our peace and defence . for by this authoritie , given him by every particular man in the common-wealth , he hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him , that by terror thereof , he is inabled to performe the wills of them all , to peace at home , and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad . and in him consisteth the essence of the common-wealth ; which ( to define it , ) is one person , of whose acts a great multitude , by mutuall covenants one with another , have made themselves every one the author , to the end he may use the strength and means of them all , as he shall think expedient , for their peace and common defence . and he that carryeth this person , is called soveraigne , and said to have soveraigne power ; and every one besides , his subiect . the attaining to this soveraigne power , is by two wayes . one , by naturall force ; as when a man maketh his children , to submit themselves , and their children to his government , as being able to destroy them if they refuse ; or by warre subdueth his enemies to his will , giving them their lives on that condition . the other , is when men agree amongst themselves , to submit to some man , or assembly of men , voluntarily , on confidence to be protected by him against all others . this later , may be called a politicall common-wealth , or common-wealth by institution ; and the former , a common-wealth by acquisition . and first , i shall speak of a common-wealth by institution . chap. xviii . of the rights of soveraignes by institution . a common-wealth is said to be instituted , when a multitude of men do agree , and covenant , every one , with every one , that to whatsoever man , or assembly of men , shall be given by the major part , the right to present the person of them all , ( that is to say , to be their representative ; ) every one , as well he that voted for it , as he that voted against it , shall authorise all the actions and judgements , of that man , or assembly of men , in the same manner , as if they were his own , to the end , to live peaceably amongst themselves , and be protected against other men . from this institution of a common-wealth are derived all the rights , and facultyes of him , or them , on whom soveraigne power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled . first , because they covenant , it is to be understood , they are not obliged by former covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto . and consequently they that have already instituted a common-wealth , being thereby bound by covenant , to own the actions , and judgements of one , cannot lawfully make a new covenant , amongst themselves , to be obedient to any other , in any thing whatsoever , without his permission . and therefore , they that are subjects to a monarch , cannot without his leave cast off monarchy , and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude ; nor transferre their person from him that beareth it , to another man , or other assembly of men : for they are bound , every man to every man , to own , and be reputed author of all , that he that already is their soveraigne , shall do , and judge fit to be done : so that any one man dissenting , all the rest should break their covenant made to that man , which is injustice : and they have also every man given the soveraignty to him that beareth their person ; and therefore if they depose him , they take from him that which is his own , and so again it is injustice . besides , if he that attempteth to depose his soveraign , be killed , or punished by him for such attempt , he is author of his own punishment , as being by the institution , author of all his soveraign shall do : and because it is injustice for a man to do any thing , for which he may be punished by his own authority , he is also upon that title , unjust . and whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their soveraign , a new covenant , made , not with men , but with god ; this also is unjust : for there is no covenant with god , but by mediation of some body that representeth gods person ; which none doth but gods lieutenant , who hath the soveraignty under god. but this pretence of covenant with god , is so evident a lye , even in the pretenders own consciences , that it is not onely an act of an unjust , but also of a vile , and unmanly disposition . secondly , because the right of bearing the person of them all , is given to him they make soveraigne , by covenant onely of one to another , and not of him to any of them ; there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the soveraigne ; and consequently none of his subjects , by any pretence of forfeiture , can be freed from his subjection . that he which is made soveraigne maketh no covenant with his subjects before-hand , is manifest ; because either he must make it with the whole multitude , as one party to the covenant ; or he must make a severall covenant with every man. with the whole , as one party , it is impossible ; because as yet they are not one person : and if he make so many severall covenants as there be men , those covenants after he hath the soveraignty are voyd , because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof , is the act both of himselfe , and of all the rest , because done in the person , and by the right of every one of them in particular . besides , if any one , or more of them , pretend a breach of the covenant made by the soveraigne at his institution ; and others , or one other of his subjects , or himselfe alone , pretend there was no such breach , there is in this case , no judge to decide the controversie : it returns therefore to the sword again ; and every man recovereth the right of protecting himselfe by his own strength , contrary to the designe they had in the institution . it is therefore in vain to grant soveraignty by way of precedent covenant . the opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant , that is to say on condition , proceedeth from want of understanding this easie truth , that covenants being but words , and breath , have no force to oblige , contain , constrain , or protect any man , but what it has from the publique sword ; that is , from the untyed hands of that man , or assembly of men that hath the soveraignty , and whose actions are avouched by them all , and performed by the strength of them all , in him united . but when an assembly of men is made soveraigne ; then no man imagineth any such covenant to have past in the institution ; for no man is so dull as to say , for example , the people of rome , made a covenant with the romans , to hold the soveraignty on such or such conditions ; which not performed , the romans might lawfully depose the roman people . that men see not the reason to be alike in a monarchy , and in a popular government , proceedeth from the ambition of some , that are kinder to the goverment of an assembly , whereof they may hope to participate , than of monarchy , which they despair to enjoy . thirdly , because the major part hath by consenting voices declared a soveraigne ; he that dissented must now consent with the rest ; that is , be contented to avow all the actions he shall do , or else justly be destroyed by the rest . for if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled , he sufficiently declared thereby his will ( and therefore tacitely covenanted ) to stand to what the major part should ordayne : and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto , or make protestation against any of their decrees , he does contrary to his covenant , and therfore unjustly . and whether he be of the congregation , or not ; and whether his consent be asked , or not , he must either submit to their decrees , or be left in the condition of warre he was in before ; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever . fourthly , because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions , and judgments of the soveraigne instituted ; it followes , that whatsoever he doth , it can be no injury to any of his subjects ; nor ought he to be by any of them accused of injustice . for he that doth any thing by authority from another , doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth : but by this institution of a common-wealth , every particular man is author of all the soveraigne doth ; and consequently he that complaineth of injury from his soveraigne , complaineth of that whereof he himselfe is author ; and therefore ought not to accuse any man but himselfe ; no nor himselfe of injury ; because to do injury to ones selfe , is impossible . it is true that they that have soveraigne power , may commit iniquity ; but not injustice , or injury in the proper signification . fiftly , and consequently to that which was sayd last , no man that hath soveraigne power can iustly be put to death , or otherwise in any manner by his subjects punished . for seeing every subject is author of the actions of his soveraigne ; he punisheth another , for the actions committed by himselfe . and because the end of this institution , is the peace and defence of them all ; and whosoever has right to the end , has right to the means ; it belongeth of right , to whatsoever man , or assembly that hath the soveraignty , to be judge both of the meanes of peace and defence ; and also of the hindrances , and disturbances of the same ; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done , both before hand , for the preserving of peace and security , by prevention of discord at home , and hostility from abroad ; and , when peace and security are lost , for the recovery of the same . and therefore , sixtly , it is annexed to the soveraignty , to be judge of what opinions and doctrines are averse , and what conducing to peace ; and consequently , on what occasions , how farre , and what , men are to be trusted withall , in speaking to multitudes of people ; and who shall examine the doctrines of all bookes before they be published . for the actions of men proceed from their opinions ; and in the wel governing of opinions , consisteth t●…e well governing of mens actions , in order to their peace , and concord . and though in matter of doctrine , nothing ought to be regarded but the truth ; yet this is not repugnant to regulating of the same by peace . for doctrine repugnant to peace , can no more be true , than peace and concord can be against the law of nature . it is true , that in a common-wealth , where by the negligence , or unskilfullnesse of governours , and teachers , false doctrines are by time generally received ; the contrary truths may be generally offensive : yet the most sudden , and rough busling in of a new truth , that can be , does never breake the peace , but only somtimes awake the warre . for those men that are so remissely governed , that they dare take up armes , to defend , or introduce an opinion , are still in warre ; and their condition not peace , but only a cessation of armes for feare of one another ; and they live as it were , in the procincts of battaile continually . it belongeth therefore to him that hath the soveraign power , to be judge , or constitute all judges of opinions and doctrines , as a thing necessary to peace ; therby to prevent discord and civill warre . seventhly , is annexed to the soveraigntie , the whole power of prescribing the rules , whereby every man may know , what goods he may enjoy , and what actions he may doe , without being molested by any of his fellow subjects : and this is it men call propriety . for before constitution of soveraign power ( as hath already been shewn ) all men had right to all things ; which necessarily causeth warre : and therefore this proprietie , being necessary to peace , and depending on soveraign power , is the act of that power , in order to the publique peace . these rules of propriety ( or meum and tuum ) and of good , evill , lawfull , and unlawfull in the actions of subjects , are the civill lawes , that is to say , the lawes of each common-wealth in particular ; though the name of civill law be now restrained to the antient civill lawes of the city of rome ; which being the head of a great part of the world , her lawes at that time were in these parts the civill law. eightly , is annexed to the soveraigntie , the right of judicature ; that is to say , of hearing and deciding all controversies , which may arise concerning law , either civill , or naturall , or concerning fact. for without the decision of controversies , there is no protection of one subject , against the injuries of another ; the lawes concerning meum and tuum are in vaine ; and to every man remaineth , from the naturall and necessary appetite of his own conservation , the right of protecting himselfe by his private strength , which is the condition of warre ; and contrary to the end for which every common-wealth is instituted . ninthly , is annexed to the soveraignty , the right of making warre , and peace with other nations , and common-wealths ; that is to say , of judging when it is for the publique good , and how great forces are to be assembled , armed , and payd for that end ; and to levy mony upon the subjects , to defray the expences thereof . for the power by which the people are to be defended , consisteth in their armies ; and the strength of an army , in the union of their strength under one command ; which command the soveraign instituted , therefore hath ; because the command of the militia , without other institution , maketh him that hath it soveraign . and therefore whosoever is made generall of an army , he that hath the soveraign power is alwayes generallissimo . tenthly , is annexed to the soveraignty , the choosing of all counsellours , ministers , magistrates , and officers , both in peace , and war. for seeing the soveraign is charged with the end , which is the common peace and defence ; he is understood to have power to use such means , as he shall think most fit for his discharge . eleventhly , to the soveraign is committed the power of rewarding with riches , or honour ; and of punishing with corporall , or pecuniary punishment , or with ignominy every subject according to the law he hath formerly made ; or if there be no law made , according as he shall judge most to conduce to the encouraging of men to serve the common-wealth , or deterring of them from doing dis-service to the same . lastly , considering what values men are naturally apt to set upon themselves ; what respect they look for from others ; and how little they value other men ; from whence continually arise amongst them , emulation , quarrells , factions , and at last warre , to the destroying of one another , and diminution of their strength against a common enemy ; it is necessary that there be lawes of honour , and a publique rate of the worth of such men as have deserved , or are able to deserve well of the common-wealth ; and that there be force in the hands of some or other , to put those lawes in execution . but it hath already been shewn , that not onely the whole militia , or forces of the common-wealth ; but also the judicature of all controversies , is annexed to the soveraignty . to the soveraign therefore it belongeth also to give titles of honour ; and to appoint what order of place , and dignity , each man shall hold ; and what signes of respect , in publique or private meetings , they shall give to one another . these are the rights , which make the essence of soveraignty ; and which are the markes , whereby a man may discern in what man , or assembly of men , the soveraign power is placed , and resideth . for these are incommunicable , and inseparable . the power to coyn mony ; to dispose of the estate and persons of infant heires ; to have praeemption in markets ; and all other statute praerogatives , may be transferred by the soveraign ; and yet the power to protect his subjects be retained . but if he transferre the militia , he retains the judicature in vain , for want of execution of the lawes : or if he grant away the power of raising mony ; the militia is in vain : or if he give away the government of doctrines , men will be frighted into rebellion with the feare of spirits . and so if we consider any one of the said rights , we shall presently see , that the holding of all the rest , will produce no effect , in the conservation of peace and justice , the end for which all common-wealths are instituted . and this division is it , whereof it is said , a kingdome divided in it selfe cannot stand : for unlesse this division precede , division into opposite armies can never happen . if there had not first been an opinion received of the greatest part of england , that these powers were divided between the king , and the lords , and the house of commons , the people had never been divided , and fallen into this civill warre ; first between those that disagreed in politiques ; and after between the dissenters about the liberty of religion ; which have so instructed men in this point of soveraign right , that there be few now ( in england , ) that do not see , that these rights are inseparable , and will be so generally acknowledged , at the next return of peace ; and so continue , till their miseries are forgotten ; and no longer , except the vulgar be better taught than they have hetherto been . and because they are essentiall and inseparable rights , it follows necessarily , that in whatsoever words any of them seem to be granted away , yet if the soveraign power it selfe be not in direct termes renounced , and the name of soveraign no more given by the grantees to him that grants them , the grant is voyd : for when he has granted all he can , if we grant back the soveraignty , all is restored , as inseparably annexed thereunto . this great authority being indivisible , and inseparably annexed to the soveraignty , there is little ground for the opinion of them , that say of soveraign kings , though they be singulis majores , of greater power than every one of their subjects , yet they be universis minores , of lesse power than them all together . for if by all together , they mean not the collective body as one person , then all together , and every one , signifie the same ; and the speech is absurd . but if by all together , they understand them as one person ( which person the soveraign bears , ) then the power of all together , is the same with the soveraigns power ; and so again the speech is absurd : which absurdity they see well enough , when the soveraignty is in an assembly of the people ; but in a monarch they see it not ; and yet the power of soveraignty is the same in whomsoever it be placed . and as the power , so also the honour of the soveraign , ought to be greater , than that of any , or all the subjects . for in the soveraignty is the fountain of honour . the dignities of lord , earle , duke , and prince are his creatures . as in the presence of the master , the servants are equall , and without any honour at all ; so are the subjects , in the presence of the soveraign . and though they shine some more , some lesse , when they are out of his sight ; yet in his presence , they shine no more than the starres in presence of the sun. but a man may here object , that the condition of subjects is very miserable ; as being obnoxious to the lusts , and other irregular passions of him , or them that have so unlimited a power in their hands . and commonly they that live under a monarch , think it the fault of monarchy ; and they that live under the government of democracy , or other soveraign assembly , attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of common-wealth ; whereas the power in all formes , if they be perfect enough to protect them , is the same ; not considering that the estate of man can never be without some incommodity or other ; and that the greatest , that in any forme of government can possibly happen to the people in generall , is scarce sensible , in respect of the miseries , and horrible calamities , that accompany a civill warre ; or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men , without subjection to lawes , and a coërcive power to tye their lands from rapine , and revenge : nor considering that the greatest pressure of soveraign governours , proceedeth not from any delight , or profit they can expect in the dammage , or weakening of their subjects , in whose vigor , consisteth their own strength and glory ; but in the restiveness of themselves , that unwillingly contributing to their own defence , make it necessary for their governours to draw from them what they can in time of peace , that they may have means on any emergent occasion , or sudden need , to resist , or take advantage on their enemies . for all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses , ( that is their passions and selfe-love , ) through which , every little payment appeareth a great grievance ; but are destitute of those prospective glasses , ( namely morall and civill science , ) to see a farre off the miseries that hang over them , and cannot without such payments be avoyded . chap. xix . of the severall kinds of common-wealth by institution , and of succession to the soveraigne power . the difference of common-wealths , consisteth in the difference of the soveraign , or the person representative of all and every one of the multitude . and because the soveraignty is either in one man , or in an assembly of more than one ; and into that assembly either every man hath right to enter , or not every one , but certain men distinguished from the rest ; it is manifest , there can be but three kinds of common-wealth . for the representative must needs be one man , or 〈◊〉 : and if more , then it is the assembly of all , or but of a part. when the representative is one man , then is the common-wealth a monarchy : when an assembly of all that will come together , then it is a democracy , or popular common-wealth : when an assembly of a part onely , then it is called an aristocracy . other kind of common-wealth there can be none : for either one , or more , or all , must have the soveraign power ( which i have shewn to be indivisible ) entire . there be other names of government , in the histories , and books of policy ; as tyranny , and oligarchy : but 〈◊〉 are not the names of other formes of government , but of the same formes misliked . for they that are discontented under monarchy , call it tyranny ; and they that are displeased with aristocracy , called it oligarchy : so also , they which find themselves grieved under a democracy , call it anarchy , ( which signifies want of government ▪ ) and yet i think no man believes , that want of government , is any new kind of government : nor by the same reason ought they to believe , that the government is of one kind , when they like it , and another , when they mislike it , or are oppressed by the governours . it is manifest , that men who are in absolute liberty , may , if they please , give authority to one man , to represent them every one ; as well as give such authority to any assembly of men whatsoever ; and consequently may subject themselves , if they think good , to a monarch , as absolutely , as to any other representative . therefore , where there is already erected a soveraign power , there can be no other representative of the same people , but onely to certain 〈◊〉 ; ends , by the soveraign limited . for that were to erect two soveraigns ; and every man to have his person represented by two actors , that by opposing one another , must needs divide that power , which ( if men will live in peace ) is indivisible ; and thereby reduce the multitude into the condition of warre , contrary to the end 〈◊〉 which all soveraignty is instituted . and therefore as it is absurd , to think that a soveraign assembly , inviting the people of their dominion , to send up their deputies , with power to make known their advise , or desires , should therefore hold such deputies , rather than themselves , for the absolute representative of the people : so it is absurd also , to think the same in a monarchy . and i know not how this so manifest a truth , should of late be so little observed ; that in a monarchy , he that had the soveraignty from a descent of years , was alone called soveraign , had the title of majesty from every one of his subjects , and was unquestionably taken by them for their king , was notwithstanding never considered as their representative ; that name without contradiction passing for the title of those men , which at his command were sent up by the people to carry their petitions , and give him ( if he permitted it ) their advise . which may serve as an admonition , for those that are the true , and absolute representative of a people , to instruct men in the nature of that office , and to take heed how they admit of any other generall representation upon any occasion whatsoever , if they mean to discharge the 〈◊〉 committed to them . the difference between these three kindes of common-wealth , consisteth not in the difference of power ; but in the difference of convenience , or aptitude to produce the peace , and security of the people ; for which end they were instituted . and to compare monarchy with the other two , we may observe ; first , that whosoeuer beareth the person of the people , or is one of that assembly that bears it , 〈◊〉 also his own naturall person . and though he be carefull in his politique person to procure the common interest ; yet he is more or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe , his family , kindred and friends ; and for the most part , if the publique interest chance to crosse the private , he preferrs the private : for the passions of men , are commonly more potent than their reason . from whence it follows , that where the publique and private interest are most closely united , there is the publique most advanced . now in monarchy , the private interest is the same with the publique . the riches , power , and honour of a monarch arise onely from the riches , strength and reputation of his subjects . for no king can be rich , nor glorious , nor secure ; whose subjects are either poore , or contemptible , or too weak through want , or dissention , to maintain a war against their enemies : whereas in a democracy , or aristocracy , the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt , or ambitious , as doth many times a perfidious advice , a treacherous action , or a civill warre . secondly , that a monarch receiveth counsell of whom , when , and where he pleaseth ; and consequently may heare the opinion of men versed in the matter about which he deliberates , of what rank or quality soever , and as long before the time of action , and with as much secrecy , as he will. but when a soveraigne assembly has need of counsell , none are admitted but such as have a right thereto from the beginning ; which for the most part are of those who have beene versed more in the acquisition of wealth than of knowledge ; and are to give their advice in long discourses , which may , and do commonly excite men to action , but not governe them in it . for the understanding is by the flame of the passions , never enlightned , but dazled : nor is there any place , or time , wherein an assemblie can receive counsell with secrecie , because of their owne multitude . thirdly , that the resolutions of a monarch , are subject to no other inconstancy , than that of humane nature ; but in assemblies , besides that of nature , there ariseth an inconstancy from the number . for the absence of a few , that would have the resolution once taken , continue firme , ( which may happen by security , negligence , or private impediments , ) or the diligent appearance of a few of the contrary opinion , undoes to day , all that was concluded yesterday . fourthly , that a monarch cannot disagree with himselfe , out of envy , or interest ; but an assembly may ; and that to such a height , as may produce a civill warre . fifthly , that in monarchy there is this inconvenience ; that any subject , by the power of one man , for the enriching of a favourite or flatterer , may be deprived of all he possesseth ; which i confesse is a great and inevitable inconvenience . but the same may as well happen , where the soveraigne power is in an assembly : for their power is the same ; and they are as subject to evill counsell , and to be seduced by orators , as a monarch by flatterers ; and becoming one an others flatterers , serve one anothers covetousnesse and ambition by turnes . and whereas the favorites of monarchs , are few , and they have none els to advance but their owne kindred ; the favorites of an assembly , are many ; and the kindred much more numerous , than of any monarch . besides , there is no favourite of a monarch , which cannot as well succour his friends , as hurt his enemies : but orators , that is to say , favourites of soveraigne assemblies , though they have great power to hurt , have little to save . for to accuse , requires lesse eloquence ( such is mans nature ) than to excuse ; and condemnation , than absolution more resembles justice . sixtly , that it is an inconvenience in monarchie , that the soveraigntie may descend upon an infant , or one that cannot discerne between good and evill : and consisteth in this , that the use of his power , must be in the hand of another man , or of some assembly of men , which are to governe by his right , and in his name ; as curators , and protectors of his person , and authority . but to say there is inconvenience , in putting the use of the soveraign power , into the hand of a man , or an assembly of men ; is to say that all government is more inconvenient , than confusion , and civill warre . and therefore all the danger that can be pretended , must arise from the contention of those , that for an office of so great honour , and profit , may become competitors . to make it appear , that this inconvenience , proceedeth not from that forme of government we call monarchy , we are to consider , that the precedent monarch , hath appointed who shall have the tuition of his infant successor , either expressely by testament , or tacitly , by not controlling the custome in that case received : and then such inconvenience ( if it happen ) is to be attributed , not to the monarchy , but to the ambition , and injustice of the subjects ; which in all kinds of government , where the people are not well instructed in their duty , and the rights of soveraignty , is the same . or else the precedent monarch , hath not at all taken order for such tuition ; and then the law of nature hath provided this sufficient rule , that the tuition shall be in him , that hath by nature most interest in the preservation of the authority of the infant , and to whom least benefit can accrue by his death , or diminution . for seeing every man by nature seeketh his own benefit , and promotion ; to put an infant into the power of those , that can promote themselves by his destruction , or dammage , is not tuition , but trechery . so that sufficient provision being taken , against all just quarrell , about the government under a child , if any contention arise to the disturbance of the publique peace , it is not to be attributed to the forme of monarchy , but to the ambition of subjects , and ignorance of their duty . on the other side , there is no great common-wealth , the soveraignty whereof is in a great assembly , which is not , as to consultations of peace , and warre , and making of lawes , in the same condition , as if the government were in a child . for as a child wants the judgement to dissent from counsell given him , and is thereby necessitated to take the advise of them , or him , to whom he is committed : so an assembly wanteth the liberty , to dissent from the counsell of the major part , be it good , or bad . and as a child has need of a tutor , or protector , to preserve his person , and authority : so also ( in great common-wealths , ) the soveraign assembly , in all great dangers and troubles , have need of custodes libertatis ; that is of dictators , or protectors of their authoritie ; which are as much as temporary monarchs ; to whom for a time , they may commit the entire exercise of their power ; and have ( at the end of that time ) been oftner deprived thereof , than infant kings , by their protectors , regents , or any other tutors . though the kinds of soveraigntie be , as i have now shewn , but three ; that is to say , monarchie , where one man has it ; or democracie , where the generall assembly of subjects hath it ; or aristocracie , where it is in an assembly of certain persons nominated , or otherwise distinguished from the rest : yet he that shall consider the particular common-wealthes that have been , and are in the world , will not perhaps easily reduce them to three , and may thereby be inclined to think there be other formes , arising from these mingled together . as for example , elective kingdomes ; where kings have the soveraigne power put into their hands for a time ; or kingdomes , wherein the king hath a power limited : which governments , are nevertheles by most writers called monarchie . likewise if a popular , or aristocraticall common-wealth , subdue an enemies countrie , and govern the same , by a president , procurator , or other magistrate ; this may seeme perhaps at first sight , to be a democraticall , or aristocraticall government . but it is not so . for elective kings , are not soveraignes , but ministers of the soveraigne ; nor limited kings soveraignes , but ministers of them that have the soveraigne power : nor are those provinces which are in subjection to a democracie , or aristocracie of another common-wealth , democratically , or aristocratically governed , but monarchically . and ●…irst , concerning an elective king , whose power is limited to his life , as it is in many places of christendome at this day ; or to certaine yeares or moneths , as the dictators power amongst the romans ; if he have right to appoint his successor , he is no more elective but hereditary . but if he have no power to elect his successor , then there is some other man , or assembly known , which after his decease may elect a new , or else the common-wealth dieth , and dissolveth with him , and returneth to the condition of warre . if it be known who have the power to give the soveraigntie after his death , it is known also that the soveraigntie was in them before : for none have right to give that which they have not right to possesse , and keep to themselves , it they think good . but if there be none that can give the soveraigntie , after the decease of him that was first elected ; then has he power , nay he is obliged by the law of nature , to provide , by establishing his successor , to keep those that had trusted him with the government , from relapsing into the miserable condition of civill warre . and consequently he was , when elected , a soveraign absolute , secondly , that king whose power is limited , is not superiour to him , or them that have the power to limit it ; and he that is not superiour , is not supreme ; that is to say not soveraign . the soveraignty therefore was alwaies in that assembly which had the right to limit him ; and by consequence the government not monarchy , but either democracy , or aristocracy ; as of old time in sparta ; where the kings had a priviledge to lead their armies ; but the soveraignty was in the ephori . thirdly , whereas heretofore the roman people , governed the land of judea ( for example ) by a president ; yet was not judea therefore a democracy ; because they were not governed by any assembly , into the which , any of them , had right to enter ; nor by an aristocracy ; because they were not governed by any assembly , into which , any man could enter by their election : but they were governed by one person , which though as to the people of rome was an assembly of the people , or democracy ; yet as to people of judea , which had no right at all of participating in the government , was a monarch . for though where the people are governed by an assembly , chosen by themselves out of their own number , the government is called a democracy , or aristocracy ; yet when they are governed by an assembly , not of their own choosing , 't is a monarchy ; not of one man , over another man ; but of one people , over another people . of all these formes of government , the matter being mortall , so that not onely monarchs , but also whole assemblies dy , it is necessary for the conservation of the peace of men , that as there was order taken for an artificiall man , so there be order also taken , for an artificiall eternity of life ; without which , men that are governed by an assembly , should return into the condition of warre in every age ; and they that are governed by one man , assoon as their governour dyeth . this artificiall eternity , is that which men call the right of succession . there is no perfect forme of government , where the disposing of the succession is not in the present soveraign . for if it be in any other particular man , or private assembly , it is in a person subject , and may be assumed by the soveraign at his pleasure ; and consequently the right is in himselfe . and if it be in no particular man , but left to a new choyce ; then is the common-wealth dissolved ; and the right is in him that can get it ; contrary to the intention of them that did institute the common-wealth , for their perpetuall , and not temporary security , in a democracy , the whole assembly cannot faile , unlesse the multitude that are to be governed faile . and therefore questions of the right of succession , have in that forme of government no place at all . in an aristocracy , when any of the assembly dyeth , the election of another into his room belongeth to the assembly , as the soveraign , to whom belongeth the choosing of all counsellours , and officers . for that which the representative doth , as actor , every one of the subjects doth , as author . and though the soveraign assembly , may give power to others , to elect new men , for supply of their court ; yet it is still by their authority , that the election is made ; and by the same it may ( when the publique shall require it ) be recalled . the greatest difficultie about the right of succession , is in monarchy : and the difficulty ariseth from this , that at first sight , it is not manifest who is to appoint the successor ; nor many times , who it is whom he hath appointed . for in both these cases , there is required a more exact ratiocination , than every man is accustomed to use . as to the question , who shall appoint the successor , of a monarch that hath the soveraign authority ; that is to say , who shall determine of the right of inheritance , ( for elective kings and princes have not the soveraign power in propriety , but in use only , ) we are to consider , that either he that is in possession , has right to dispose of the succession , or else that right is again in the dissolved multitude . for the death of him that hath the soveraign power in propriety , leaves the multitude without any soveraign at all ; that is , without any representative in whom they should be united , and be capable of doing any one action at all : and therefore they are incapable of election of any new monarch ; every man having equall right to submit himselfe to such as he thinks best able to protect him ; or if he can , protect himselfe by his owne sword ; which is a returne to confusion , and to the condition of a war of every man against every man , contrary to the end for which monarchy had its first institution . therfore it is manifest , that by the institution of monarchy , the disposing of the successor , is alwaies left to the judgment and will of the present possessor . and for the question ( which may arise sometimes ) who it is that the monarch in possession , hath designed to the succession and inheritance of his power ; it is determined by his expresse words , and testament ; or by other tacite signes sufficient . by expresse words , or testament , when it is declared by him in life time , viva voce , or by writing ; as the first emperours of rome declared who should be their heires . for the word heire does not of it selfe imply the children , or nearest kindred of a man ; but whomsoever a man shall any way declare , he would have to succeed him in his estate . if therefore a monarch declare expresly , that such a man shall be his heire , either by word or writing , then is that man immediatly after the decease of his predecessor , invested in the right of being monarch . but where testament , and expresse words are wanting , other naturall signes of the will are to be followed : whereof the one is custome . and therefore where the custome is , that the next of kindred absolutely succeedeth , there also the next of kindred hath right to the succession ; for that , if the will of him that was in posession had been otherwise , he might easily have declared the same in his life time . and likewise where the custome is , that the next of the male kindred succeedeth , there also the right of succession is in the next of the kindred male , for the same reason . and so it is if the custome were to advance the female . for whatsoever custome a man may by a word controule , and does not , it is a naturall signe he would have that custome stand . but where neither custome , nor testament hath preceded , there it is to be understood , first , that a monarchs will is , that the government remain monarchicall ; because he hath approved that government in himselfe . secondly , that a child of his own , male , or female , be preferred before any other ; because men are presumed to be more enclined by nature , to advance their own children , than the children of other men ; and of their own , rather a male than a female ; because men , are naturally fitter than women , for actions of labour and danger . thirdly , where his own issue faileth , rather a brother than a stranger ; and so still the neerer in bloud , rather than the more remote ; because it is alwayes presumed that the neerer of kin , is the neerer in affection ; and 't is evident that a man receives alwayes , by reflexion , the most honour from the greatnesse of his neerest kindred . but if it be lawfull for a monarch to dispose of the succession by words of contract , or testament , men may perhaps object a great inconvenience : for he may sell , or give his right of governing to a stranger ; which , because strangers ( that is , men not used to live under the same government , nor speaking the same language ) do commonly undervalue one another , may turn to the oppression of his subjects ; which is indeed a great inconvenience : but it proceedeth not necessarily from the subjection to a strangers government , but from the unskilfulnesse of the governours , ignorant of the true rules of politiques . and therefore the romans when they had subdued many nations , to make their government digestible , were wont to take away that grievance , as much as they thought necessary , by giving sometimes to whole nations , and sometimes to principall men of every nation they conquered , not onely the privileges , but also the name of romans ; and took many of them into the senate , and offices of charge , even in the roman city . and this was it our most wise king , king james , aymed at , in endeavouring the union of his two realms of england and scotland . which if he could have obtained , had in all likelihood prevented the civill warres , which make both those kingdomes , at this present , miserable . it is not therefore any injury to the people , for a monarch to dispose of the succession by will ; though by the fault of many princes , it hath been sometimes found inconvenient . of the lawfulnesse of it , this also is an argument , that whatsoever inconvenience can arrive by giving a kingdome to a stranger , may arrive also by so marrying with strangers , as the right of succession may descend upon them : yet this by all men is accounted lawfull . chap. xx. of dominion paternall , and despoticall . a common-wealth by acquisition , is that , where the soveraign power is acquired by force ; and it is acquired by force , when men singly , or many together by plurality of voyces , for fear of death , or bonds , do authorise all the actions of that man , or assembly , that hath their lives and liberty in his power . and this kind of dominion , or soveraignty , differeth from soveraignty by institution , onely in this , that men who choose their soveraign , do it for fear of one another , and not of him whom they institute : but in this case , they subject themselves , to him they are afraid of . in both cases they do it for fear : which is to be noted by them , that hold all such covenants , as proceed from fear of death , or violence , voyd : which if it were true , no man , in any kind of common-wealth , could be obliged to obedience . it is true , that in a common-wealth once instituted , or acquired , promises proceeding from fear of death , or violence , are no covenants , nor obliging , when the thing promised is contrary to the lawes ; but the reason is not , because it was made upon fear , but because he that promiseth , hath no right in the thing promised . also , when he may lawfully performe , and doth not , it is not the invalidity of the covenant , that absolveth him , but the sentence of the soveraign . otherwise , whensoever a man lawfully promiseth , he unlawfully breaketh : but when the soveraign , who is the actor , acquitteth him , then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise , as by the author of such absolution . but the rights , and consequences of soveraignty , are the same in both . his power cannot , without his consent , be transferred to another : he cannot forfeit it : he cannot be accused by any of his subjects , of injury : he cannot be punished by them : he is judge of what is necessary for peace ; and judge of doctrines : he is sole legislator ; and supreme judge of controversies ; and of the times , and occasions of warre , and peace : to him it belongeth to choose magistrates , counsellours , commanders , and all other officers , and ministers ; and to determine of rewards , and punishments , honour , and order . the reasons whereof , are the same which are alledged in the precedent chapter , for the same rights , and consequences of soveraignty by institution . dominion is acquired two wayes ; by generation , and by conquest . the right of dominion by generation , is that , which the parent hath over his children ; and is called paternall . and is not so derived from the generation , as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because he begat him ; but from the childs consent , either expresse , or by other sufficient arguments declared . for as to the generation , god hath ordained to man a helper ; and there be alwayes two that are equally parents : the dominion therefore over the child , should belong equally to both ; and he be equally subject to both , which is impossible ; for no man can obey two masters . and whereas some have attributed the dominion to the man onely , as being of the more excellent sex ; they misreckon in it . for there is not alwayes that difference of strength , or prudence between the man and the woman , as that the right can be determined without war. in common-wealths , this controversie in decided by the civill law : and for the most part , ( but not alwayes ) the sentence is in favour of the father ; because for the most part common-wealths have been erected by the fathers , not by the mothers of families . but the question lyeth now in the state of meer nature ; where there are supposed no lawes of matrimony ; no lawes for the education of children ; but the law of nature , and the naturall inclination of the sexes , one to another , and to their children . in this condition of meer nature , either the parents between themselves dispose of the dominion over the child by contract ; or do not dispose thereof at all . if they dispose thereof , the right passeth according to the contract . we find in history that the amazons contracted with the men of the neighbouring countries , to whom they had recourse for issue , that the issue male should be sent back , but the female remain with themselves : so that the dominion of the females was in the mother . if there be no contract , the dominion is in the mother . for in the condition of meer nature , where there are no matrimoniall lawes , it cannot be known who is the father , unlesse it be delared by the mother : and therefore the right of dominion over the child dependeth on her will , and is consequently hers . again , seeing the infant is first in the power of the mother , so as she may either nourish , or expose it ; if she nourish it , it oweth its life to the mother ; and is therefore obliged to obey her , rather than any other ; and by consequence the dominion over it is hers . but if she expose it , and another find , and nourish it , the dominion is in him that nourisheth it . for it ought to obey him by whom it is preserved ; because preservation of life being the end , for which one man becomes subject to another , every man is supposed to promise obedience , to him , in whose power it is to save , or destroy him . if the mother be the fathers subject , the child , is in the fathers power : and if the father be the mothers subject , ( as when a soveraign queen marrieth one of her subjects , ) the child is subject to the mother ; because the father also is her subject . if a man and a woman , monarches of two severall kingdomes , have a child , and contract concerning who shall have the dominion of him , the right of the dominion passeth by the contract . if they contract not , the dominion followeth the dominion of the place of his residence . for the soveraign of each country hath dominion over all that reside therein . he that hath the dominion over the child , hath dominion also over the children of the child ; and over their childrens children . for he that hath dominion over the person of a man , hath dominion over all that is his ; without which , dominion were but a title , without the effect . the right of succession to paternall dominion , proceedeth in the same manner , as doth the right of succession to monarchy ; of which i have already sufficiently spoken in the precedent chapter . dominion acquired by conquest , or victory in war , is that which some writers call despoticall , from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifieth a lord , or master ; and is the dominion of the master over his servant . and this dominion is then acquired to the victor , when the vanquished , to avoyd the present stroke of death , covenanteth either in expresse words , or by other sufficient signes of the will , that so long as his life , and the liberty of his body is allowed him , the victor shall have the use thereof , at his pleasure . and after such covenant made , the vanquished is a servant , and not before : for by the word servant ( whether it be derived from servire , to serve , or from servare , to save , which i leave to grammarians to dispute ) is not meant a captive , which is kept in prison , or bonds , till the owner of him that took him , or bought him of one that did , shall consider what to do with him : ( for such men , ( commonly called slaves , ) have no obligation at all ; but may break their bonds , or the prison ; and kill , or carry away captive their master , justly : ) but one , that being taken , hath corporall liberty allowed him ; and upon promise not to run away , nor to do violence to his master , is trusted by him . it is not therefore the victory , that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished , but his own covenant . nor is he obliged because he is conquered ; that is to say , beaten , and taken , or put to flight ; but because he commeth in , and submitteth to the victor ; nor is the victor obliged by an enemies rendring himselfe , ( without promise of life , ) to spare him for this his yeelding to discretion ; which obliges not the victor longer , than in his own discretion hee shall think fit . and that which men do , when they demand ( as it is now called ) quarter , ( which the greeks called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , taking alive , ) is to evade the present fury of the victor , by submission , and to compound for their life , with ransome , or service : and therefore he that hath quarter , hath not his life given , but deferred till farther deliberation ; for it is not an yeelding on condition of life , but to discretion . and then onely is his life in security , and his service due , when the victor hath trusted him with his corporall liberty . for slaves that work in prisons , or fetters , do it not of duty , but to avoyd the cruelty of their task-masters . the master of the servant , is master also of all he hath ; and may exact the use thereof ; that is to say , of his goods , of his labour , of his servants , and of his children , as often as he shall think fit . for he holdeth his life of his master , by the covenant of obedience ; that is , of owning , and authorising whatsoever the master shall do . and in case the master , if he refuse , kill him , or cast him into bonds , or otherwise punish him for his disobedience , he is himselfe the author of the same ; and cannot accuse him of injury . in summe the rights and consequences of both paternall and despoticall dominion , are the very same with those of a soveraign by institution ; and for the same reasons : which reasons are set down in the precedent chapter . so that for a man that is monarch of divers nations , whereof he hath , in one the soveraignty by institution of the people assembled , and in another by conquest , that is by the submission of each particular , to avoyd death or bonds ; to demand of one nation more than of the other , from the title of conquest , as being a conquered nation , is an act of ignorance of the rights o●… soveraignty , for the soveraign is absolute over both alike ; or else there is no soveraignty at all ; and so every man may lawfully protect himselfe , if he can , with his own sword , which is the condition of war. by this it appears , that a great family if it be not part of some common-wealth , is of it self , as to the rights of soveraignty , a little monarchy ; whether that family consist of a man and his children ; or of a man and his servants ; or of a man , and his children , and servants together : wherein the father or master is the soveraign . but yet a family is not properly a common-wealth ; unlesse it be of that power by its own number , or by other opportunities , as not to be subdued without the hazard of war. for where a number of men are manifestly too weak to defend themselves united , every one may use his own reason in time of danger , to save his own life , either by flight , or by submission to the enemy , as hee shall think best ; in the same manner as a very small company of souldiers , surprised by an army , may cast down their armes , and demand quarter , or run away , rather than be put to the sword . and thus much shall suffice ; concerning what i find by speculation , and deduction , of soveraign rights , from the nature , need , and designes of men , in erecting of common-wealths , and putting themselves under monarchs , or assemblies , entrusted with power enough for their protection . let us now consider what the scripture teacheth in the same point . to moses , the children of israel say thus . * speak thou to us , and we will heare thee ; but let not god speak to us , lest we dye . * this is absolute obedience to moses . concerning the right of kings , god himself by the mouth of samuel , saith , * this shall be the right of the king you will have to reigne over you . he shall take your sons , and set them to drive his chariots , and to be his horsemen , and to run before his chariots ; and gather in his harvest ; and to make his engines of war , and instruments of his chariots ; and shall take your daughters to make perfumes , to be his cookes , and bakers . he shall take your fields , your vine-yards , and your olive-yards , and give them to his servants . he shall take the tyth of your corne and wine , and give it to the men of his chamber , and to his other servants . he shall take your man-servants , and your maid-servants , and the choice of your youth , and employ them in his businesse . he shall take the tyth of your flocks ; and you shall be his servants . this is absolute power , and ●…ummed up in the last words , you shall be his servants . againe , when the people heard what power their king was to have , yet they consented thereto , and say thus , * we will be as all other nations , and our king shall judge our causes , and goe before us , to conduct our wars . here is confirmed the right that soveraigns have , both to the militia , and to all judicature ; in which is conteined as absolute power , as one man can possibly transferre to another . again , the prayer of king salomon to god , was this . * give to thy servant understanding , to judge thy people , and to di●…cerne between good and evill . it belongeth therefore to the soveraigne to bee judge , and to praescribe the rules of discerning good and evill : which rules are lawes ; and therefore in him is the legislative power . saul sought the life of david ; yet when it was in his power to slay saul , and his servants would have done it , david forbad them , saying , * god forbid i should do such an act against my lord , the anoynted of god. for obedience of servants st. paul saith , * servants obey your masters in all things ; and , * children obey your parents in all things . there is simple obedience in those that are subject to paternall , or despoticall dominion . again , * the scribes and pharisees sit in moses chayre , and therefore all that they shall bid you observe , that observe and do . there again is simple obedience . and st paul , * warn them that they ▪ subject themselves to princes , and to those that are in authority , & obey them . this obedience is also simple . lastly , our saviour himselfe acknowledges , that men ought to pay such taxes as are by kings impo●…ed , where he sayes , give to caesar that which is caesars ; and payed such taxes himselfe . and that the kings word , is sufficient to take any thing from any subject , when there is need ; and that the king is judge of that need : for he himselfe , as king of the jewes , commanded his disciples to take the asse , and asses colt to carry him into jerusalem , saying , * go into the village over against you , and you shall find a shee asse tyed , and her colt with her , unty them , and bring them to me . and if any man ask you , what you mean by it , say the lord hath need of them : and they will let them go . they will not ask whether his necessity be a sufficient title ; nor whether he be judge of that necessity ; but acquiesce in the will of the lord. to these places may be added also that of genesis , * you shall be as gods , knowing good and evill . and verse . who told thee that thou wast naked ? hast thou eaten of the tree , of which i commanded thee thou shouldest not eat ? for the cognisance or judicature of good and evill , being forbidden by the name of the fruit of the tree of knowledge , as a triall of adams obedience ; the divel to enflame the ambition of the woman , to whom that fruit already seemed beautifull , told her that by tasting it , they should be as gods , knowing good and evill . whereupon having both eaten , they did indeed take upon them gods office , which is judicature of good and evill ; but acquired no new ability to distinguish between them aright . and whereas it is sayd , that having eaten , they saw they were naked ; no man hath so interpreted that place , as if they had been formerly blind , and saw not their own skins : the meaning is plain , that it was then they first judged their nakednesse ( wherein it was gods will to create them ) to be uncomely ; and by being ashamed , did tacitely censure god himselfe . and thereupon god saith , hast thou eaten , &c. as if he should say , doest thou that owest me obedience , take upon thee to judge of my commandements ? whereby it is cleerly , ( though allegorically , ) signified , that the commands of them that have the right to command , are not by their subjects to be censured , nor disputed . so that it appeareth plainly , to my understanding , both from reason , and scripture , that the soveraign power , whether placed in one man , as in monarchy , or in one assembly of men , as in popular , and aristocraticall common-wealths , is as great , as possibly men can be imagined to make it . and though of so unlimited a power , men may fancy many evill consequences , yet the consequences of the want of it , which is perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour , are much worse . the cond●…tion of man in this life shall never be without inconveniences ; but there happeneth in no common-wealth any great inconvenience , but what proceeds from the subjects disobedience , and breach of those covenants , from which the common-wealth hath its being . and whosoever thinking soveraign power too great , will seek to make it lesse ; must subject himselfe , to the power , that can limit it ; that is to say , to a greater . the greatest objection is , that of the practise ; when men ask , where , and when , such power has by subjects been acknowledged . but one may ask them again , when , or where has there been a kingdome long free from sedition and civill warre . in those nations , whose common-wealths have been long-lived , and not been destroyed , but by forraign warre , the subjects never did dispute of the soveraign power . but howsoever , an argument from the practise of men , that have not sifted to the bottom , and with exact reason weighed the causes , and nature of common-wealths , and suffer daily those miseries , that proceed from the ignorance thereof , is invalid . for though in all places of the world , men should lay the foundation of their houses on the sand , it could not thence be inferred , that so it ought to be . the skill of making , and maintaining common-wealths , consisteth in certain rules , as doth arithmetique and geometry ; not ( as tennis-play ) on practise onely : which rules , neither poor men have the leisure , nor men that have had the leisure , have hitherto had the curiosity , or the method to find out . chap. xxi . of the liberty of subjects . liberty , or freedome , signifieth ( properly ) the absence of opposition ; ( by opposition , i mean externall impediments of motion ; ) and may be applyed no lesse to irrationall , and inanimate creatures , than to rationall . for whatsoever is so tyed , or environed , as it cannot move , but within a certain space , which space is determined by the opposition of some externall body , we say it hath not liberty to go further . and so of all living creatures , whilest they are imprisoned , or restrained , with walls , or chayns ; and of the water whilest it is kept in by banks , or vessels , that otherwise would spread it selfe into a larger space , we use to say , they are not at liberty , to move in such manner , as without those externall impediments they would . but when the impediment of motion , is in the constitution of the thing it selfe , we use not to say , it wants the liberty ; but the power to move ; as when a stone lyeth still , or a man is fastned to his bed by sicknesse . and according to this proper , and generally received meaning of the word , a free-man , is he , that in those things , which by his strength and wit he is able to do , is not hindred to doe what he has a will to . but when the words free , and liberty , are applyed to any thing but bodies , they are abused ; for that which is not subject to motion , is not subject to impediment : and therefore , when 't is said ( for example ) the way is free , no liberty of the way is signified , but of those that walk in it without stop . and when we say a guift is free , there is not meant any liberty of the guift , but of the giver , that was not bound by any law , or covenant to give it . so when we speak freely , it is not the liberty of voice , or pronunciation , but of the man , whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise then he did . lastly , from the use of the word free-will , no liberty can be inferred of the will , desire , or inclination , but the liberty of the man ; which consisteth in this , that he finds no stop , in doing what he has the will , desire , or inclination to doe . feare , and liberty are consistent ; as when a man throweth his goods into the sea for feare the ship should sink , he doth it neverthelesse very willingly , and may refuse to doe it if he will : it is therefore the action , of one that was free : so a man sometimes pays his debt , only for feare of imprisonment , which because no body hindred him from detaining , was the action of a man at liberty . and generally all actions which men doe in common-wealths , for feare of the law , are actions , which the doers had liberty to omit . liberty , and necessity are consistent : as in the water , that hath not only liberty , but a necessity of descending by the channel ; so likewise in the actions which men voluntarily doe : which , because they proceed from their will , proceed from liberty ; and yet , because every act of mans will , and every desire , and inclination proceedeth from some cause , and that from another cause , in a continuall chaine , ( whose first link is in the hand of god the first of all causes , ) proceed from necessity . so that to him that could see the connexion of those causes , the necessity of all mens voluntary actions , would appeare manifest . and therefore god , that seeth , and disposeth all things , seeth also that the liberty of man in doing what he will , is accompanied with the necessity of doing that which god will , & no more , nor lesse . for though men may do many things , which god does not command , nor is therefore author of them ; yet they can have no passion , nor appetite to any thing , of which appetite gods will is not the cause . and did not his will assure the necessity of mans will , and consequently of all that on mans will dependeth , the liberty of men would be a contradiction , and impediment to the omnipotence and liberty of god. and this shall suffice , ( as to the matter in hand ) of that naturall liberty , which only is properly called liberty . but as men , for the atteyning of peace , and conservation of themselves thereby , have made an artificiall man , which we call a common-wealth ; so also have they made artificiall chains , called civill lawes , which they themselves , by mutuall covenants , have fastned at one end , to the lips of that man , or assembly , to whom they have given the soveraigne power ; and at the other end to their own ears . these bonds in their own nature but weak , may neverthelesse be made to hold , by the danger , though not by the difficulty of breaking them . in relation to these bonds only it is , that i am to speak now , of the liberty of subjects . for seeing there is no common-wealth in the world , wherein there be rules enough set down , for the regulating of all the actions , and words of men , ( as being a thing impossible : ) it followeth necessarily , that in all kinds of actions , by the laws praetermitted , men have the liberty , of doing what their own reasons shall suggest , for the most profitable to themselves . for if wee take liberty in the proper sense , for corporall liberty ; that is to say , freedome from chains , and prison , it were very absurd for men to clamor as they doe , for the liberty they so manifestly enjoy . againe , if we take liberty , for an exemption from lawes , it is no lesse absurd , for men to demand as they doe , that liberty , by which all other men may be masters of their lives . and yet as absurd as it is , this is it they demand ; not knowing that the lawes are of no power to protect them , without a sword in the hands of a man , or men , to cause those laws to be put in execution . the liberty of a subject , lyeth therefore only in those things , which in regulating their actions , the soveraign hath praetermitted : such as is the liberty to buy , and sell , and otherwise contract with one another ; to choose their own aboad , their own diet , their own trade of life , and institute their children as they themselves think fit ; & the like . neverthelesse we are not to understand , that by such liberty , the soveraign power of life , and death , is either abolished , or limited . for it has been already shewn , that nothing the soveraign representative can doe to a subject , on what pretence soever , can properly be called injustice , or injury ; because every subject is author of every act the soveraign doth ; so that he never wanteth right to any thing , otherwise , than as he himself is the subject of god , and bound thereby to observe the laws of nature . and therefore it may , and doth often happen in common-wealths , that a subject may be put to death , by the command of the soveraign power ; and yet neither doe the other wrong : as when jeptha caused his daughter to be sacrificed : in which , and the like cases , he that so dieth , had liberty to doe the action , for which he is neverthelesse , without injury put to death . and the same holdeth also in a soveraign prince , that putteth to death an innocent subject . for though the action be against the law of nature , as being contrary to equitie , ( as was the killing of uriah , by david ; ) yet it was not an injurie to uriah ; but to god. not to uriah , because the right to doe what he pleased , was given him by uriah himself : and yet to god , because david was gods subject ; and prohibited all iniquitie by the law of nature . which distinction , david himself , when he repented the fact , evidently confirmed , saying , to thee only have i sinned . in the same manner , the people of athens , when they ●…anished the most potent of their common-wealth for ten years , thought they committed no injustice ; and yet they never questioned what crime he had done ; but what hurt he would doe : nay they commanded the banishment of they knew not whom ; and every citizen bringing his oystershell into the market place , written with the name of him he desired should be banished , without actuall accusing him , sometimes banished an aristides , for his reputation of justice ; and sometimes a scurrilous jester , as hyperbolus , to make a jest of it . and yet a man cannot say , the soveraign people of athens wanted right to banish them ; or an athenian the libertie to jest , or to be just. the libertie , whereof there is so frequent , and honourable mention , in the histories , and philosophy of the antient greeks , and romans , and in the writings , and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the politiques , is not the libertie of particular men ; but the libertie of the common-wealth : which is the same with that , which every man then should have , if there were no civil laws , nor common-wealth at all . and the effects of it also be the same . for as amongst masterlesse men , there is perpetuall war , of every man against his neighbour ; no inheritance , to transmit to the son , nor to expect from the father ; no propriety of goods , or lands ; no security ; but a full and absolute libertie in every particular man : so in states , and common-wealths not dependent on one another , every common-wealth , ( not every man ) has an absolute libertie , to doe what it shall judge ( that is to say , what that man , or assemblie that representeth it , shall judge ) most conducing to their benefit . but withall , they live in the condition of a perpetuall war , and upon the confines of battel , with their frontiers armed , and canons planted against their neighbours round about . the athenians , and romanes were free ; that is , free common-wealths : not that any particular men had the libertie to resist their own representative ; but that their representative had the libertie to resist , or invade other people . there is written on the turrets of the city of luca in great characters at this day , the word libertas ; yet no man can thence inferre , that a particular man has more libertie , or immunitie from the service of the commonwealth there , than in constantinople . whether a common-wealth be monarchicall , or popular , the freedome is still the same . but it is an easy thing , for men to be deceived , by the specious name of libertie ; and for want of judgement to distinguish , mistake that for their private inheritance , and birth right , which is the right of the publique only . and when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings in this subject , it is no wonder if it produce sedition , and change of government . in these westerne parts of the world , we are made to receive our opinions concerning the institution , and rights of common-wealths , from aristotle , cicero , and other men , greeks and romanes , that living under popular states , derived those rights , not from the principles of nature , but transcribed them into their books , out of the practise of their own common-wealths , which were popular ; as the grammarians describe the rules of language , out of the practise of the time ; or the rules of poetry , out of the poems of homer and virgil. and because the athenians were taught , ( to keep them from desire of changing their government , ) that they were freemen , and all that lived under monarchy were slaves ; therefore aristotle puts it down in his politiques , ( lib. . cap. . ) in democracy , liberty is to be supposed : for 't is commonly held , that no man is free in any other government . and as aristotle ; so cicero , and other writers have grounded their civill doctrine , on the opinions of the romans , who were taught to hate monarchy , at first , by them that having deposed their soveraign , shared amongst them the soveraignty of rome ; and afterwards by their successors . and by reading of these greek , and latine authors , men from their childhood have gotten a habit ( under a false shew of liberty , ) of favouring tumults , and of licentious controlling the actions of their soveraigns ; and again of controlling those controllers , with the effusion of so much blood ; as i think i may truly say , there was never any thing so deerly bought , as these western parts have bought the learning of the greek and latine tongues . to come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject ; that is to say , what are the things , which though commanded by the soveraign , he may neverthelesse , without injustice , refuse to do ; we are to consider , what rights we passe away , when we make a common-wealth ; or ( which is all one , ) what liberty we deny our selves , by owning all the actions ( without exception ) of the man , or assembly we make our soveraign . for in the act of our submission , consisteth both our obligation , and our liberty ; which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence ; there being no obligation on any man , which ariseth not from some act of his own ; for all men equally , are by nature free. and because such arguments , must either be drawn from the expresse words , i authorise all his actions , or from the intention of him that submitteth himselfe to his power , ( which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so submitteth ; ) the obligation , and liberty of the subject , is to be derived , either from those words , ( or others equivalent ; ) or else from the end of the institution of soveraignty ; namely , the peace of the subjects within themselves , and their defence against a common enemy , first therefore , seeing soveraignty by institution , is by covenant of every one to every one ; and soveraignty by acquisition , by covenants of the vanquished to the victor , or child to the parent ; it is manifest , that every subject has liberty in all those things , the right whereof cannot by covenant be transferred . i have shewn before in the . chapter , that covenants , not to defend a mans own body , are voyd . therefore , if the soveraign command a man ( though justly condemned , ) to kill , wound , or mayme himselfe ; or not to resist those that assault him ; or to abstain from the use of food , ayre , medicine , or any other thing , without which he cannot live ; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey . if a man be interrogated by the soveraign , or his authority , concerning a crime done by himselfe , he is not bound ( without assurance of pardon ) to confesse it ; because no man ( as i have shewn in the same chapter ) can be obliged by covenant to accuse himselfe . again , the consent of a subject to soveraign power , is contained in these words , i authorise , or take upon me , all his actions ; in which there is no restriction at all , of his own former naturall liberty : for by allowing him to kill me , i am not bound to kill my selfe when he commands me . 't is one thing to say , kill me , or my fellow , if you please ; another thing to say , i will kill my selfe , or my fellow . it followeth therefore , that no man is bound by the words themselves , either to kill himselfe , or any other man ; and consequently , that the obligation a man may sometimes have , upon the command of the soveraign to execute any dangerous , or dishonourable office , dependeth not on the words of our submission ; but on the intention ; which is to be understood by the end thereof . when therefore our refusall to obey , frustrates the end for which the soveraignty was ordained ; then there is no liberty to refuse : otherwise there is . upon this ground , a man that is commanded as a souldier to fight against the enemy , though his soveraign have right enough to punish his refusall with death , may neverthelesse in many cases refuse , without injustice ; as when he substituteth a sufficient souldier in his place : for in this case he deserteth not the service of the common-wealth . and there is allowance to be made for naturall timorousnesse , not onely to women , ( of whom no such dangerous duty is expected , ) but also to men of feminine courage . when armies fight , there is on one side , or both , a running away ; yet when they do it not out of trechery , but fear , they are not esteemed to do it unjustly , but dishonourably . for the same reason , to avoyd battell , is not injustice , but cowardise . but he that inrowleth himselfe a souldier , or taketh imprest mony , taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature ; and is obliged , not onely to go to the battell , but also not to run from it , without his captaines leave . and when the defence of the common-wealth , requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms , every one is obliged ; because otherwise the institution of the common-wealth , which they have not the purpose , or courage to preserve , was in vain . to resist the sword of the common-wealth , in defence of another man , guilty , or innocent , no man hath liberty ; because such liberty , takes away from the soveraign , the means of protecting us ; and is therefore destructive of the very essence of government . but in case a great many men together , have already resisted the soveraign power unjustly , or committed some capitall crime , for which every one of them expecteth death , whether have they not the liberty then to joyn together , and assist , and defend one another ? certainly they have : for they but defend their lives , which the guilty man may as well do , as the innocent . there was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty ; their bearing of arms subsequent to it , though it be to maintain what they have done , is no new unjust act . and if it be onely to defend their persons , it is not unjust at all . but the offer of pardon taketh from them , to whom it is offered , the plea of self-defence , and maketh their perseverance in assisting , or defending the rest , unlawfull . as for other lyberties , they depend on the silence of the law. in cases where the soveraign has prescribed no rule , there the subject hath the liberty to do , or forbeare , according to his own discretion . and therefore such liberty is in some places more , and in some lesse ; and in some times more , in other times lesse , according as they that have the soveraignty shall think most convenient . as for example , there was a time , when in england a man might enter in to his own land , ( and dispossesse such as wrongfully possessed it , ) by force . but in after-times , that liberty of forcible entry , was taken away by a statute made ( by the king ) in parliament . and in some places of the world , men have the liberty of many wives : in other places , such liberty is not allowed . if a subject have a controversie with his soveraigne , of debt , or of right of possession of lands or goods , or concerning any service required at his hands , or concerning any penalty , corporall , or pecuniary , grounded on a precedent law ; he hath the same liberty to sue for his right , as if it were against a subject ; and before such judges , as are appointed by the soveraign . for seeing the soveraign demandeth by force of a former law , and not by vertue of his power ; he declareth thereby , that he requireth no more , than shall appear to be due by that law. the sute therefore is not contrary to the will of the soveraign ; and consequently the subject hath the liberty to demand the hearing of his cause ; and sentence , according to that law. but if he demand , or take any thing by pretence of his power ; there lyeth , in that case , no action of law : for all that is done by him in vertue of his power , is done by the authority of every subject , and consequently , he that brings an action against the soveraign , brings it against himselfe . if a monarch , or soveraign assembly , grant a liberty to all , or any of his subjects , which grant standing , he is disabled to provide for their safety , the grant is voyd ; unlesse he directly renounce , or transferre the soveraignty to another . for in that he might openly , ( if it had been his will , ) and in plain termes , have renounced , or transferred it , and did not ; it is to be understood it was not his will ; but that the grant proceeded from ignorance of the repugnancy between such a liberty and the soveraign power : and therefore the soveraignty is still retayned ; and consequently all those powers , which are necessary to the exercising thereof ; such as are the power of warre , and peace , of judicature , of appointing officers , and councellours , of levying mony , and the rest named in the th chapter . the obligation of subjects to the soveraign , is understood to last as long , and no longer , than the power lasteth , by which he is able to protect them . for the right men have by nature to protect themselves , when none else can protect them , can by no covenant be relinquished . the soveraignty is the soule of the common-wealth ; which once departed from the body , the members doe no more receive their motion from it . the end of obedience is protection ; which , wheresoever a man seeth it , either in his own , or in anothers sword , nature applyeth his obedience to it , and his endeavour to maintaine it . and though soveraignty , in the intention of them that make it , be immortall ; yet is it in its own nature , not only subject to violent death , by forreign war ; but also through the ignorance , and passions of men , it hath in it , from the very institution , many seeds of a naturall mortality , by intestine discord . if a subject be taken prisoner in war ; or his person , or his means of life be within the guards of the enemy , and hath his life and corporall libertie given him , on condition to be subject to the victor , he hath libertie to accept the condition ; and having accepted it , is the subject of him that took him ; because he had no other way to preserve himself . the case is the same , if he be deteined on the same termes , in a forreign country . but if a man be held in prison , or bonds , or is not trusted with the libertie of his bodie ; he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to subjection ; and therefore may , if he can , make his escape by any means whatsoever . if a monarch shall relinquish the soveraignty , both for himself , and his heires ; his subjects returne to the absolute libertie of nature ; because , though nature may declare who are his sons , and who are the nerest of his kin ; yet it dependeth on his own will , ( as hath been said in the precedent chapter , ) who shall be his heyr . if therefore he will have no heyre , there is no soveraignty , nor subjection . the case is the same , if he dye without known kindred , and without declaration of his heyre . for then there can no heire be known , and consequently no subjection be due . if the soveraign banish his subject ; during the banishment , he is not subject . but he that is sent on a message , or hath leave to travell , is still subject ; but it is , by contract between soveraigns , not by vertue of the covenant of subjection . for whosoever entreth into anothers dominion , is subject to all the laws thereof ; unlesse he have a privilege by the amity of the soveraigns , or by speciall licence . if a monarch subdued by war , render himself subject to the victor ; his subjects are delivered from their former obligation , and become obliged to the victor . but if he be held prisoner , or have not the liberty of his own body ; he is not understood to have given away the right of soveraigntie ; and therefore his subjects are obliged to yield obedience to the magistrates formerly placed , governing not in their own name , but in his . for , his right remaining , the question is only of the administration ; that is to say , of the magistrates and officers ; which , if he have not means to name , he is supposed to approve those , which he himself had formerly appointed . chap. xxii . of systemes subject , politicall , and private . having spoken of the generation , forme , and power of a common-wealth , i am in order to speak next of the parts thereof . and first of systemes , which resemble the similar parts , or muscles of a body naturall . by systemes ; i understand any numbers of men joyned in one interest , or one businesse . of which , some are regular , and some irregular . regular are those , where one man , or assembly of men , is constituted representative of the whole number . all other are irregular . of regular , some are absolute , and independent , subject to none but their own representative : such are only common-wealths ; of which i have spoken already in the . last precedent chapters . others are dependent ; that is to say , subordinate to some soveraign power , to which every one , as also their representative is subject . of systemes subordinate , some are politicall , and some private . politicall ( otherwise called bodies politique , and persons in law , ) are those , which are made by authority from the soveraign power of the common-wealth . private , are those , which are constituted by subjects amongst themselves , or by authoritie from a stranger . for no authority derived from forraign power , within the dominion of another , is publique there , but private . and of private systemes , some are lawfull ; some unlawfull : lawfull , are those which are allowed by the common-wealth : all other are unlawfull . irregular systemes , are those which having no representative , consist only in concourse of people ; which if not forbidden by the common-wealth , nor made on evill designe , ( such as are conflux of people to markets , or shews , or any other harmelesse end , ) are lawfull . but when the intention is evill , or ( if the number be considerable ) unknown , they are unlawfull . in bodies politique , the power of the representative is alwaies limited : and that which prescribeth the limits thereof , is the power soveraign . for power unlimited , is absolute soveraignty . and the soveraign , in every commonwealth , is the absolute representative of all the subjects ; and therefore no other , can be representative of any part of them , but so far forth , as he shall give leave : and to give leave to a body politique of subjects , to have an absolute representative to all intents and purposes , were to abandon the government of so much of the commonwealth , and to divide the dominion , contrary to their peace and defence , which the soveraign cannot be understood to doe , by any grant , that does not plainly , and directly discharge them of their subjection . for consequences of words , are not the signes of his will , when other consequences are signes of the contrary ; but rather signes of errour , and misreckonning ; to which all mankind is too prone . the bounds of that power , which is given to the representative of a bodie politique , are to be taken notice of , from two things . one is their writt , or letters from the soveraign : the other is the law of the common-wealth . for though in the institution or acquisition of a common-wealth , which is independent , there needs no writing , because the power of the representative has there no other bounds , but such as are set out by the unwritten law of nature ; yet in subordinate bodies , there are such diversities of limitation necessary , concerning their businesses , times , and places , as can neither be remembred without letters , nor taken notice of , unlesse such letters be patent , that they may be read to them , and withall sealed , or testified , with the seales , or other permanent signes of the authority soveraign . and because such limitation is not alwaies easie , or perhaps possible to be described in writing ; the ordinary lawes , common to all subjects , must determine , what the representative may lawfully do , in all cases , where the letters themselves are silent . and therefore in a body politique , if the representative be one man , whatsoever he does in the person of the body , which is not warranted in his letters , nor by the lawes , is his own act , and not the act of the body , nor of any other member thereof besides himselfe : because further than his letters , or the lawes limit , he representeth no mans person , but his own . but what he does according to these , is the act of every one : for of the act of the soveraign every one is author , because he is their representative unlimited ; and the act of him that recedes not from the letters of the soveraign , is the act of the soveraign , and therefore every member of the body is author of it . but if the representative be an assembly ; whatsoever that assembly shall decree , not warranted by their letters , or the lawes , is the act of the assembly , or body politique , and the act of every one by whose vote the decree was made ; but not the act of any man that being present voted to the contrary ; nor of any man absent , unlesse he voted it by procuration . it is the act of the assembly , because voted by the major part ; and if it be a crime , the assembly may be punished , as farre-forth as it is capable , as by dissolution , or forfeiture of their letters , ( which is to such artificiall , and fictitious bodies , capitall , ) or ( if the assembly have a common stock , wherein none of the innocent members have propriety , ) by pecuniary mulct . for from corporall penalties nature hath exempted all bodies politique . but they that gave not their vote , are therefore innocent , because the assembly cannot represent any man in things unwarranted by their letters , and consequently are involved in their votes . if the person of the body politique being in one man , borrow mony of a stranger , that is , of one that is not of the same body , ( for no letters need limit borrowing , seeing it is left to mens own inclinations to limit lending ) the debt is the representatives . for if he should have authority from his letters , to make the members pay what he borroweth , he should have by consequence the soveraignty of them ; and therefore the grant were either voyd , as proceeding from errour , commonly incident to humane nature , and an unsufficient signe of the will of the granter ; or if it be avowed by him , then is the representer soveraign , and falleth not under the present question , which is onely of bodies subordinate . no member therefore is obliged to pay the debt so borrowed , but the representative himselfe : because he that lendeth it , being a stranger to the letters , and to the qualification of the body , understandeth those onely for his debtors , that are engaged ; and seeing the representer can ingage himselfe , and none else , has him onely for debtor ; who must therefore pay him , out of the common stock ( if there be any , ) or ( if there be none ) out of his own estate . if he come into debt by contract , or mulct , the case is the same . but when the representative is an assembly , and the debt to a stranger ; all they , and onely they are responsible for the debt , that gave their votes to the borrowing of it , or to the contract that made it due , or to the fact for which the mulct was imposed ; because every one of those in voting did engage himselfe for the payment : for he that is author of the borrowing , is obliged to the payment , even of the whole debt , though when payd by any one , he be discharged . but if the debt be to one of the assembly , the assembly onely is obliged to the payment , out of their common stock ( if they have any : ) for having liberty of vote , if he vote the mony , shall be borrowed , he votes it shall be payd ; if he vote if shall not be borrowed , or be absent , yet because in lending , he voteth the borrowing , he contradicteth his former vote , and is obliged by the later , and becomes both borrower and lender , and consequently cannot demand payment from any particular man , but from the common treasure onely ; which fayling he hath no remedy , nor complaint , but against himselfe , that being privy to the acts of the assembly , and to their means to pay , and not being enforced , did neverthelesse through his own folly lend his mony . it is manifest by this , that in bodies politique subordinate , and subject to a soveraign power , it is sometimes not onely lawfull , but expedient , for a particular man to make open protestation against the decrees of the representative assembly , and cause their dissent to be registred , or to take witnesse of it ; because otherwise they may be obliged to pay debts contracted , and be responsible for crimes committed by other men : but in a soveraign assembly , that liberty is taken away , both because he that protesteth there , denies their soveraignty ; and also because whatsoever is commanded by the soverign power , is as to the subject ( though not so alwayes in the sight of god ) justified by the command ; for of such command every subject is the author . the variety of bodies politique , is almost infinite : for they are not onely distinguished by the severall affaires , for which they are constituted , wherein there is an unspeakable diversitie ; but also by the times , places , and numbers , subject to many limitations . and as to their affaires , some are ordained for government ; as first , the government of a province may be committed to an assembly of men , wherein all resolutions shall depend on the votes of the major part ; and then this assembly is a body politique , and their power limited by commission . this word province signifies a charge , or care of businesse , which he whose businesse it is , committeth to another man , to be administred for ▪ and under him ; and therefore when in one common-wealth there be divers countries , that have their lawes distinct one from another , or are farre distant in place , the administration of the government being committed to divers persons , those countries where the soveraign is not resident , but governs by commission , are called provinces . but of the government of a province , by an assembly residing in the province it selfe , there be few examples . the romans who had the soveraignty of many provinces ; yet governed them alwaies by presidents , and praetors ; and not by assemblies , as they governed the city of rome , and territories adjacent . in like manner , when there were colonies sent from england , to plant virginia , and sommer-ilands ; though the government of them here , were committed to assemblies in london , yet did those assemblies never commit the government under them to any assembly there ; but did to each plantation send one governour ; for though every man , where he can be present by nature , desires to participate of government ; yet where they cannot be present , they are by nature also enclined , to commit the government of their common interest rather to a monarchicall , then a popular form of government : which is also evident in those men that have great private estates ; who when they are unwilling to take the paines of administring the bu●…inesse that belongs to them , choose rather to trust one servant , then an assembly either of their friends or servants . but howsoever it be in fact , yet we may suppose the government of a province , or colony committed to an assembly : and when it is , that which in this place i have to say , is this ; that whatsoever debt is by that assembly contracted ; or whatsoever unlawfull act is decreed , is the act onely of those that assented , and not of any that dissented , or were absent , for the reasons before alledged . also that an assembly residing out of the bounds of that colony whereof they have the government , cannot execute any power over the persons , or goods of any of the colonie , to seize on them for debt , or other duty , in any place without the colony it selfe , as having no jurisdiction , nor authoritie elsewhere , but are left to the remedie , which the law of the place alloweth them . and though the assembly have right , to impose a mulct upon any of their members , that shall break the lawes they make ; yet out of the colonie it selfe , they have no right to execute the same . and that which is said here , of the rights of an assembly , for the government of a province , or a colony , is appliable also to an assembly for the government of a town , an university , or a college , or a church , or for any other government over the persons of men . and generally , in all bodies politique , if any particular member conceive himself injuried by the body it self , the cognisance of his cause belongeth to the soveraign , and those the soveraign hath ordained for judges in such causes , or shall ordaine for that particular cause ; and not to the body it self . for the whole body is in this case his fellow subject , which in a soveraign assembly , is otherwise : for there , if the soveraign be not judge , though in his own cause , there can be no judge at all . in a bodie politique , for the well ordering of forraigne traffique , the most commodious representative is an assembly of all the members ; that is to say , such a one , as every one that adventureth his mony , may be present at all the deliberations , and resolutions of the body , if they will themselves . for proof whereof , we are to consider the end , for which men that are merchants , and may buy and sell , export , and import their merchandise , according to their own discretions , doe neverthelesse bind themselves up in one corporation . it is true , there be few merchants , that with the merchandise they buy at home , can fraight a ship ▪ to export it ; or with that they buy abroad , to bring it home ; and have therefore need to joyn together in one society ; where every man may either participate of the gaine ; according to the proportion of his adventure ; or take his own , and sell what he transports , or imports , at such prices as he thinks fit . but this is no body politique , there being no common representative to oblige them to any other law , than that which is common to all other subjects . the end of their incorporating , is to make their gaine the greater ; which is done two wayes ; by sole buying , and sole selling , both at home , and abroad . so that to grant to a company of merchants to be a corporation , or body politique , is to grant them a double monopoly , whereof one is to be sole buyers ; another to be sole sellers . for when there is a company incorporate for any particular forraign country , they only export the commodities vendible in that country ; which is sole buying at home , and sole selling abroad . for at home there is but one buyer , and abroad but one that selleth : both which is gainfull to the merchant , because thereby they buy at home at lower , and sell abroad at higher rates : and abroad there is but one buyer of forraign merchandise , and but one that sels them at home ; both which againe are gainfull to the adventurers . of this double monopoly one part is disadvantageous to the people at home , the other to forraigners . for at home by their sole exportation they set what price they please on the husbandry , and handy works of the people ; and by the sole importation , what price they please on all forraign commodities the people have need of ; both which are ill for the people . on the contrary , by the sole selling of the native commodities abroad , and sole buying the forraign commodities upon the place , they raise the price of those , and abate the price of these , to the disadvantage of the forraigner : for where but one selleth , the merchandise is the dearer ; and where but one buyeth the cheaper : such corporations therefore are no other then monopolies ; though they would be very profitable for a common-wealth , if being bound up into one body in forraigne markets they were at liberty at home , every man to buy , and sell at what price he could . the end then of these bodies of merchants , being not a common benefit to the whole body , ( which have in this case no common stock , but what is deducted out of the particular adventures , for building , buying , victualling and manning of ships , ) but the particular gaine of every adventurer ▪ it is reason that every one be acquainted with the employment of his own ; that is , that every one be of the assembly , that shall have the power to order the same ; and be acquainted with their accounts . and therefore the representative of such a body must be an assembly , where every member of the body may be present at the consultations , if he will. if a body politique of merchants , contract a debt to a stranger by the act of their representative assembly , every member is lyable by himself for the whole . for a stranger can take no notice of their private lawes , but considereth them as so many particular men , obliged every one to the whole payment , till payment made by one dischargeth all the rest : but if the debt be to one of the company , the creditor is debter for the whole to himself , and cannot therefore demand his debt , but only from the common stock , if there be any . if the common-wealth impose a tax upon the body , it is understood to be layd upon every member proportionably to his particular adventure in the company . for there is in this case no other common stock , but what is made of their particular adventures . if a mulct be layd upon the body for some unlawfull act , they only are lyable by whose votes the act was decreed , or by whose assistance it was executed ; for in none of the rest is there any other crime but being of the body ; which if a crime , ( because the body was ordeyned by the authority of the common-wealth , ) is not his . if one of the members be indebted to the body , he may 〈◊〉 sued by the body ; but his goods cannot be taken , nor his person imprisoned by the authority of the body ; but only by authority of the common-wealth : for if they can doe it by their own authority , they can by their own authority give judgement that the debt is due , which is as much as to be judge in their own cause . those bodies made for the government of men , or of traffique , be either perpetuall , or for a time prescribed by writing . but there be bodies also whose times are limited , and that only by the nature of their businesse . for example , if a soveraign monarch , or a soveraign assembly , shall think fit to give command to the towns , and other severall parts of their territory , to send to him their deputies , to enforme him of the condition , and necessities of the subjects , or to advise with him for the making of good lawes , or for any other cause , as with one person representing the whole country , such deputies , having a place and time of meeting assigned them , are there , and at that time , a body politique , representing every subject of that dominion ; but it is onely for such matters as shall be propounded unto them by that man , or assembly , that by the soveraign authority sent for them ; and when it shall be declared that nothing more shall be propounded , nor debated by them , the body is dissolved . for if they were the absolute representative of the people , then were it the soveraign assembly ; and so there would be two soveraign assemblies , or two soveraigns , over the same people ; which cannot consist with their peace . and therefore where there is once a soveraignty , there can be no absolute representation of the people , but by it . and for the limits of how farre such a body shall represent the whole people , they are set forth in the writing by which they were sent for . for the people cannot choose their deputies to other intent , than is in the writing directed to them from their soveraign expressed . private bodies regular , and lawfull , are those that are constituted without letters , or other written authority , saving the lawes common to all other subjects . and because they be united in one person representative , they are held for regular ; such as are all families , in which the father , or master ordereth the whole family . for he obligeth his children , and servants , as farre as the law permitteth , though not further , because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions , which the law hath forbidden to be done . in all other actions , during the time they are under domestique government , they are subject to their fathers , and masters , as to their immediate soveraigns . for the father , and master being before the institution of common-wealth , absolute soveraigns in their own families , they lose afterward no more of their authority , than the law of the common-wealth taketh from them . private bodies regular , but unlawfull , are those that unite themselves into one person representative , without any publique authority at all ; such as are the corporations of beggars , theeves and gipsies , the better to order their trade of begging , and stealing ; and the corporations of men , that by authority from any forraign person , unite themselves in anothers dominion , for the easier propagation of doctrines , and for making a party , against the power of the common-wealth . irregular systemes , in their nature , but leagues , or sometimes meer concourse of people , without union to any particular designe , not by obligation of one to another , but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and inclinations , become lawfull , or unlawfull , according to the lawfulnesse , or unlawfulnesse of every particular mans designe therein : and his designe is to be understood by the occasion . the leagues of subjects , ( because leagues are commonly made for mutuall defence , ) are in a common wealth ( which is no more than a league of all the subjects together ) for the most part unnecessary , and savour of unlawfull designe ; and are for that cause unlawfull , and go commonly by the name of factions , or conspiracies . for a league being a connexion of men by covenants , if there be no power given to any one man , or assembly ( as in the condition of meer nature ) to compell them to performance , is so long onely valid , as there ariseth no just cause of distrust : and therefore leagues between common-wealths , over whom there is no humane power established , to keep them all in awe , are not onely lawfull , but also profitable for the time they last . but leagues of the subjects of one and the same common-wealth , where every one may obtain his right by means of the soveraign power , are unnecessary to the maintaining of peace and justice , and ( in case the designe of them be evill , or unknown to the common-wealth ) unlawfull . for all uniting of strength by private men , is , if for evill intent , unjust ; if for intent unknown , dangerous to the publique , and unjustly concealed . if the soveraign power be in a great assembly , and a number of men , part of the assembly , without authority , consult a part , to contrive the guidance of the rest ; this is a faction , or conspiracy unlawfull , as being a fraudulent seducing of the assembly for their particular interest . but if he , whose private interest is to be debated , and judged in the assembly , make as many friends as he can ; in him it is no injustice ; because in this case he is no part of the assembly . and though he hire such friends with mony , ( unlesse there be an expresse law against it , ) yet it is not injustice . for sometimes , ( as mens manners are , ) justice cannot be had without mony ; and every man may think his own cause just , till it be heard , and judged . in all common-wealths , if a private man entertain more servants , than the government of his estate , and lawfull employment he has for them requires , it is faction , and unlawfull . for having the protection of the common-wealth , he needeth not the defence of private force . and whereas in nations not throughly civilized , severall numerous families have lived in continuall hostility , and invaded one another with private force ; yet it is evident enough , that they have done unjustly ; or else that they had no common-wealth . and as factions for kindred , so also factions for government of religion , as of papists , protestants , &c. or of state , as patricians , and plebeians of old time in rome , and of aristocraticalls and democraticalls of old time in greece , are unjust , as being contrary to the peace and safety of the people , and a taking of the sword out of the hand of the soveraign . concourse of people , is an irregular systeme , the lawfulnesse , or unlawfulnesse , whereof dependeth on the occasion , and on the number of them that are assembled . if the occasion be lawfull , and manifest , the concourse is lawfull ; as the usuall meeting of men at church , or at a publique shew , in usuall numbers : for if the numbers be extraordinarily great , the occasion is not evident ; and consequently he that cannot render a particular and good account of his being amongst them , is to be judged conscious of an unlawfull , and tumultuous designe . it may be lawfull for a thousand men , to joyn in a petition to be delivered to a judge , or magistrate ; yet if a thousand men come to present it , it is a tumultuous assembly ; because there needs but one or two for that purpose . but in such cases as these , it is not a set number that makes the assembly unlawfull , but such a number , as the present officers are not able to suppresse , and bring to justice . when an unusuall number of men , assemble against a man whom they accuse ; the assembly is an unlawfull tumult ; because they may deliver their accusation to the magistrate by a few , or by one man. such was the case of st. paul at ephesus ; where demetrius , and a great number of other men , brought two of pauls companions before the magistrate , saying with one voyce , great is diana of the ephesians ; which was their way of demanding justice against them for teaching the people such doctrine , as was against their religion , and trade . the occasion here , considering the lawes of that people , was just ; yet was their assembly judged unlawfull , and the magistrate reprehended them for it , in these words , * if demetrius and the other work-men can accuse any man ; of any thing , there be pleas , and deputies , let them accuse one another . and if you have any other thing to demand , your case may be judged in an assembly lawfully called . for we are in danger to be accused for this dayes sedition , because , there is no cause by which any man can render any reason of this concourse of people . where he calleth an assembly , whereof men can give no just account , a sedition , and such as they could not answer for . and this is all i shall say concerning systemes , and assemblyes of people , which may be compared ( as i said , ) to the similar parts of mans body ; such as be lawfull , to the muscles ; such as are unlawfull , to wens , biles , and apostemes , engendred by the unnaturall conflux of evill humours . chap. xxiii . of the publique ministers of soveraign power . in the last chapter i have spoken of the similar parts of a common-wealth : in this i shall speak of the parts organicall , which are publique ministers . a publique minister , is he , that by the soveraign , ( whether a monarch , or an assembly , ) is employed in any affaires , with authority to represent in that employment , the person of the common-wealth . and whereas every man , or assembly that hath soveraignty , representeth two persons , or ( as the more common phrase is ) has two capacities , one naturall , and another politique , ( as a monarch , hath the person not onely of the common-wealth , but also of a man ; and a soveraign assembly hath the person not onely of the common-wealth , but also of the assembly ) ; they that be servants to them in their naturall capacity , are not publique ministers ; but those onely that serve them in the administration of the publique businesse . and therefore neither ushers , nor sergeants , nor other officers that waite on the assembly , for no other purpose , 〈◊〉 for the commodity of the men assembled , in an aristocracy , or democracy ; nor stewards , chamberlains , cofferers , or any other officers of the houshold of a monarch , are publique ministers in a monarchy . of publique ministers , some have charge committed to them of a generall administration , either of the whole dominion , or of a part thereof . of the whole , as to a protector , or regent , may bee committed by the predecessor of an infant king , during his minority , the whole administration of his kingdome . in which case , every subject is so far obliged to obedience , as the ordinances he ●…all make , and the commands he shall give be in the kings name , and not inconsistent with his soveraigne power . of a part , or province ; as when either a monarch , or a soveraign assembly , shall give the generall charge thereof to a governour , lieutenant , praefect or vice-roy : and in this case also , every one of that province , is obliged to all he shall doe in the name of the soveraign , and that not incompatible with the soveraigns right . for such protectors , vice-roys , and governors , have no other right , but what depends on the soveraigns will ; and no commission that can be given them , can be interpret●…d for a declaration of the will to transferre the sovernignty , without expresse and perspicuous words to that purpose . and this kind of publique ministers resembleth the nerves , and tendons that move the severall limbs of a body naturall . others have speciall administration ; that is to say , charges of some speciall businesse , either at home , or abroad : as at home , first , for the oeconomy of a common-wealth , they that have authority concerning the treasure , as tributes , impositions , rents , fines , or whatsoever publique revenue , to collect , receive , issue , or take the accounts thereof , are publique ministers : ministers , because they serve the person representative , and can doe nothing against his command , nor without his authority : publique , because they serve him in his . politicall capacity . secondly , they that have authority concerning the militia ; to have the custody of armes , forts , ports ; to levy , pay , or conduct souldiers ; or to provide for any necessary thing for the use of war , either by land or sea , are publique ministers . but a souldier without command , though he fight for the common-wealth , does not therefore represent the person of it ; because there is none to represent it to . for every one that hath command , represents it to them only whom he commandeth . they also that have authority to teach , or to enable others to teach the people their duty to the soveraign power , and instruct them in the knowledge of what is just , and unjust , thereby to render them more apt to live in godlinesse , and in peace amongst themselves , and resist the publique enemy , are publique ministers : ministers , in that they doe it not by their own authority , but by anothers ; and publique , because they doe it ( or should doe it ) by no authority , but that of the soveraign . the monarch , or the soveraign assembly only hath immediate authority from god , to teach and instruct the people ; and no man but the soveraign , receiveth his power dei gratiâ simply ; that is to say , from the favour of none but god : all other , receive theirs from the favour and providence of god , and their soveraigns ; as in a monarchy dei gratiâ & regis ; or dei providentiâ & voluntate regis . they also to whom jurisdiction is given , are publique ministers . for in their seats of justice they represent the person of the soveraign ; and their sentence , is his sentence ; for ( as hath been before declared ) all judicature is essentially annexed to the soveraignty ; and therefore all other judges are but ministers of him , or them that have the soveraign power . and as controversies are of two sorts , namely of fact , and of law ; so are judgements , some of fact , some of law : and consequently in the same controversie , there may be two judges , one of fact , another of law. and in both these controversies , there may arise a controversie between the party judged , and the judge ; which because they be both subjects to the soveraign , ought in equity to be judged by men agreed on by consent of both ; for no man can be judge in his own cause . but the soveraign is already agreed on for judge by them both , and is therefore either to heare the cause , and determine it himself , or appoint for judge such as they shall both agree on . and this agreement is then understood to be made between them divers wayes ; as first , if the defendant be allowed to except against such of his judges , whose interest maketh him suspect them , ( for as to the complaynant he hath already chosen his own judge , ) those which he excepteth not against , are judges he himself agrees on . secondly , if he appeale to any other judge , he can appeale no further ; for his appeale is his choice . thirdly , if he appeale to the soveraign himself , and he by himself , or by delegates which the parties shall agree on , give sentence ; that sentence is finall : for the defendant is judged by his own judges , that is to say , by himself . these properties of just and rationall judicature considered , i cannot forbeare to observe the excellent constitution of the courts of justice , established both for common , and also for publique pleas in england . by common pleas , i meane those , where both the complaynant and defendant are subjects : and by publique , ( which are also called pleas of the crown ) those , where the complaynant is the soveraign . for whereas there were two orders of men , whereof one was lords , the other commons ; the lords had this priviledge , to have for judges in all capitall crimes , none but lords ; and of them , as many as would be present ; which being ever acknowledged as a priviledge of favour , their judges were none but such as they had themselves desired . and in all controversies , every subject ( as also in civill controversies the lords ) had for judges , men of the country where the matter in controvesie lay ; against which he might make his exceptions , till at last twelve men without exception being agreed on , they were judged by those twelve . so that having his own judges , there could be nothing alledged by the party , why the sentence should not be finall . these publique persons , with authority from the soveraign power , either to instruct , or judge the people , are such members of the common-wealth , as may fitly be compared to the organs of voice in a body naturall . publique ministers are also all those , that have authority from the soveraign , to procure the execution of judgements given ; to publish the soveraigns commands ; to suppresse tumults ; to apprehend , and imprison malefactors ; and other acts tending to the conservation of the peace . for every act they doe by such authority , is the act of the common-wealth ; and their service , answerable to that of the hands , in a bodie naturall . publique ministers abroad , are those that represent the person of their own soveraign , to forraign states . such are ambassadors , messengers , agents , and heralds , sent by publique authoritie , and on publique businesse . but such as are sent by authoritie only of some private partie of a troubled state , though they be received , are neither publique , nor private ministers of the common-wealth ; because none of their actions have the common-wealth for author . likewise , an ambassador sent from a prince , to congratulate , condole , or to assist at a solemnity , though the authority be publique ; yet because the businesse is private , and belonging to him in his naturall capacity ▪ ; is a private person . also if a man be sent into another country , secretly to explore their counsels , and strength ; though both the authority , and the businesse be publique ; yet because there is none to take notice of any person in him , but his own ; he is but a private minister ; but yet a minister of the common-wealth ; and may be compared to an eye in the body naturall . and those that are appointed to receive the petitions or other informations of the people , and are as it were the publique eare , are publique ministers , and represent their soveraign in that office . neither a counsellor ( nor a councell of state , if we consider it with no authority of judicature or command , but only of giving advice to the soveraign when it is required , or of offering it when it is not required , is a publique person . for the advice is addressed to the soveraign only , whose person cannot in his own presence , be represented to him , by another . but a body of counsellors , are never without some other authority , either of judicature , or of immediate administration : as in a monarchy , they represent the monarch , in delivering his commands to the publique ministers : in a democracy , the councell , or senate propounds the result of their deliberations to the people , as a councell ; but when they appoint judges , or heare causes , or give audience to ambassadors , it is in the quality of a minister of the people : and in an aristocracy the councell of state is the soveraign assembly it self ; and gives counsell to none but themselves . chap. xxiv . of the nutrition , and procreation of a common-wealth . the nutrition of a common-wealth consisteth , in the plenty , and distribution of materials conducing to life : in concoction , or preparation ; and ( when concocted ) in the conveyance of it , by convenient conduits , to the publique use . as for the plenty of matter , it is a thing limited by nature , to those commodities , which from ( the two breasts of our common mother ) land , and sea , god usually either freely giveth , or for labour selleth to man-kind . for the matter of this nutriment , consisting in animals , vegetals , and minerals , god hath freely layd them before us , in or neer to the face of the earth ; so as there needeth no more but the labour , and industry of receiving them . insomuch as plenty dependeth ( next to gods favour ) meerly on the labour and industry of men . this matter , commonly called commodities , is partly native , and partly forraign : native , that which is to be had within the territory of the common-wealth : forraign , that which is imported from without . and because there is no territory under the dominion of one common-wealth , ( except it be of very vast extent , ) that produceth all things needfull for the maintenance , and motion of the whole body ; and few that produce not something more than necessary ; the superfluous commodities to be had within , become no more superfluous , but supply these wants at home , by importation of that which may be had abroad , either by exchange , or by just warre , or by labour : for a mans labour also , is a commodity exchangeable for benefit , as well as any other thing : and there have been common-wealths that having no more territory , than hath served them for habitation , have neverthelesse , not onely maintained , but also encreased their power , partly by the labour of trading from one place to another , and partly by selling the manifactures , whereof the materials were brought in from other places . the distribution of the materials of this nourishment , is the constitution of mine , and thine , and his ; that is to say , in one word propriety ; and belongeth in all kinds of common-wealth to the soveraign power . for where there is no common-wealth , there is ( as hath been already shewn ) a perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour ; and therefore every thing is his that getteth it , and keepeth it by force ; which is neither propriety , nor community ; but uncertainty . which is so evident , that even cicero , ( a passionate defender of liberty , ) in a publique pleading , attributeth all propriety to the law civil , let the civill law , saith he , be once abandoned , or but negligently guarded ▪ ( not to say oppressed , ) and there is nothing , that any man can be sure to receive from his ancestor , or leave to his children . and again ; take away the civill law , and no man knows what is his own , and what another mans . seeing therefore the introduction of propriety is an effect of common-wealth ; which can do nothing but by the person that represents i●… , it is the act onely of the soveraign ; and consisteth in the lawes , which none can make that have not the soveraign power . and this they well knew of old , who called that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( that is to say , distribution , ) which we call law ; and defined justice , by distributing to every man his own . in this distribution , the first law , is for division of the land it selfe : wherein the soveraign assigneth to every man a portion , according as he , and not according as any subject , or any number of them , shall judge agreeable to equity , and the common good. the children of israel , were a common-wealth in the wildernesse ; but wanted the commodities of the earth , till they were masters of the land of promise ; which afterward was divided amongst them , not by their own discretion , but by the discretion of eleazar the priest , and joshua their generall : who when there were twelve tribes , making them thirteen by subdivision of the tribe of joseph ; made neverthelesse but twelve portions of the land ; and ordained for the tribe of levi no land ; but assigned them the tenth part of the whole fruits ; which division was therefore arbitrary . and though a people comming into possession of a land by warre , do not alwaies exterminate the antient inhabitants , ( as did the jewes , ) but leave to many , or most , or all of them their estates ; yet it is manifest they hold them afterwards , as of the victors distribution ; as the people of england held all theirs of william the conquerour . from whence we may collect , that the propriety which a subject hath in his lands , consisteth in a right to exclude all other subjects from the use of them ; and not to exclude their soveraign , be it an assembly , or a monarch . for seeing the soveraign , that is to say , the common-wealth ( whose person he representeth , ) is understood to do nothing but in order to the common peace and security , this distribution of lands , is to be understod as done in order to the same : and consequently , whatsoever distribution he shall make in prejudice thereof , is contrary to the will of every subject , that committed his peace , and safety to his discretion , and conscience ; and therefore by the will of every one of them , is to be reputed voyd . it is true , that a soveraign monarch , or the greater part of a soveraign assembly , may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their passions , contrary to their own consciences , which is a breach of trust , and of the law of nature ; but this is not enough to authorise any subject , either to make warre upon , or so much as to accuse of injustice , or any way to speak evill of their soveraign ; because they have authorised all his actions , and in bestowing the soveraign power , made them their own . but in what cases the commands of soveraigns are contrary to equity , and the law of nature , is to be considered hereafter in another place . in the distribution of land , the common-wealth it selfe , may b●… conceived to have a portion , and possesse , and improve the same by their representative ; and that such portion may be made sufficient , to susteine the whole expence to the common peace , and defence necessarily required : which were very true , if there could be any representative conceived free from humane passions , and infirmities . but the nature of men being as it is , the setting forth of publique land , or of any certaine revenue for the common-wealth , is in vaine ; and tendeth to the dissolution of government , and to the condition of meere nature , and war , assoon as ever the soveraign power falleth into the hands of a monarch , or of an assembly , that are either too negligent of mony , or too hazardous in engaging the publique stock , into a long , or costly war. common-wealths can endure no diet : for seeing their expence is not limited by their own appetite , but by externall accidents , and the appetites of their neighbours , the publique riches cannot be limited by other limits , than those which the emergent occasions shall require . and whereas in england , there were by the conquerour , divers lands reserved to his own use , ( besides forrests , and chases , either for his recreation , or for preservation of woods , ) and divers services reserved on the land he gave his subjects ; yet it seems they were not reserved for his maintenance in his publique , but in his naturall capacity : for he , and his successors did for all that , lay arbitrary taxes on all subjects land , when they judged it necessary . or if those publique lands , and services , were ordained as a sufficient maintenance of the common-wealth , it was contrary to the scope of the institution ; being ( as it appeared by those ensuing taxes ) insufficient , and ( as it appeares by the late small revenue of the crown ) subject to alienation , and diminution . it is therefore in vaine , to assign a portion to the common-wealth ; which may sell , or give it away ; and does ●…sell , and give it away when t is done by their representative . as the distribution of lands at home ; so also to assigne in what places , and for what commodities , the subject shall traffique abroad , belongeth to the soveraign . for if it did belong to private persons to use their own discretion therein , some of them would bee drawn for gaine , both to furnish the enemy with means to hurt the common-wealth , and hurt it themselves , by importing such things , as pleasing mens appetites , be neverthelesse noxious , or at least unprofitable to them . and therefore it belongeth to the common-wealth , ( that is , to the soveraign only , ) to approve , or disapprove both of the places , and matter of forraign traffique . further , seeing it is not enough to the sustentation of a common-wealth , that every man have a propriety in a portion of land , or in some few commodities , or a naturall property in some usefull art , and there is no art in the world , but is necessary either for the being , or well being almost of every particular man ; it is necessary , that men distribute that which they can spare , and transferre their propriety therein , mutually one to another , by exchange , and mutuall contract . and therefore it belongeth to the common-wealth , ( that is to say , to the soveraign , ) to appoint in what manner , all kinds of contract between subjects , ( as buying , selling , exchanging , borrowing , lending , letting , and taking to hire , ) are to bee made ; and by what words , and signes they shall be understood for valid . and for the matter , and distribution of the nourishment , to the severall members of the common-wealth , thus much ( considering the modell of the whole worke ) is sufficient . by concoction , i understand the reducing of all commodities , which are not presently consumed , but reserved for nourishment in time to come , to some thing of equall value , and withall so portable , as not to hinder the motion of men from place to place ; to the end a man may have in what place soever , such nourishment as the place affordeth . and this is nothing else but gold , and silver , and mony. for gold and silver , being ( as it happens ) almost in all countries of the world highly valued , is a commodious measure of the value of all things else between nations ; and mony ( of what matter soever coyned by the soveraign of a common-wealth , ) is a sufficient measure of the value of all things else , between the subjects of that common-wealth . by the means of which measures , all commodities , moveable , and immoveable , are made to accompany a man , to all places of his resort , within and without the place of his ordinary residence ; and the same passeth from man to man , within the common-wealth ; and goes round about , nourishing ( as it passeth ) every part thereof ; in so much as this concoction , is as it were the sanguification of the common-wealth : for naturall bloud is in like manner made of the fruits of the earth ; and circulating , nourisheth by the way , every member of the body of man. and because silver and gold , have their value from the matter it self ; they have first this priviledge , that the value of them cannot be altered by the power of one , nor of a few common-wealths ; as being a common measure of the commodities of all places . but base mony , may easily be enhansed , or abased . secondly , they have the priviledge to make common-wealths move , and stretch out their armes , when need is , into forraign countries ; and supply , not only private subjects that travell , but also whole armies with provision . but that coyne , which is not considerable for the matter , but for the stamp of the place , being unable to endure change of ayr , hath its effect at home only ; where also it is subject to the change of laws , and thereby to have the value diminished , to the prejudice many times of those that have it . the conduits , and wayes by which it is conveyed to the publique use , are of two sorts ; one , that conveyeth it to the publique coffers ; the other , that issueth the same out againe for publique payments . of the first sort , are collectors , receivers , and treasurers ; of the second are the treasurers againe , and the officers appointed for payment of severall publique or private ministers . and in this also , the artificiall man maintains his resemblance with the naturall ; whose veins receiving the bloud from the severall parts of of the body , carry it to the heart ; where being made vitall , the heart by the arteries sends it out again , to enliven , and enable for motion all the members of the same . the procreation , or children of a common-wealth , are those we call plantations , or colonies ; which are numbers of men sent out from the common-wealth , under a conductor , or governour , to inhabit a forraign country , either formerly voyd of inhabitants , or made voyd then , by warre . and when a colony is setled , they are either a common-wealth of themselves , discharged of their subjection to their soveraign that sent them , ( as hath been done by many common-wealths of antient time , ) in which case the common-wealth from which they went , was called their metropolis , or mother , and requires no more of them , then fathers require of the children , whom they emancipate , and make free from their domestique government , which is honour , and friendship ; or else they remain united to their metropolis , as were the colonies of the people of rome ; and then they are no common-wealths themselves , but provinces , and parts of the common-wealth that sent them . so that the right of colonies ( saving honour , and league with their metropolis , ) dependeth wholly on their licence , or letters , by which their soveraign authorised them to plant. chap. xxv . of counsell . how fallacious it is to judge of the nature of things , by the ordinary and inconstant use of words , appeareth in nothing more , than in the confusion of counsels , and commands , arising from the imperative manner of speaking in them both , and in many other occasions besides . for the words doe this , are the words not onely of him that commandeth ; but also of him that giveth counsell ; and of him that exhorteth ; and yet there are but few , that see not , that these are very different things ; or that cannot distinguish between them , when they perceive who it is that speaketh , and to whom the speech is directed , and upon what occcasion . but finding those phrases in mens writings , and being not able , or not willing to enter into a consideration of the circumstances , they mistake sometimes the precepts of counsellours , for the precepts of them that command ; and sometimes the contrary ; according as it best agreeth with the conclusions they would inferre , or the actions they approve . to avoyd which mistakes , and render to those termes of commanding , counselling , and exhorting , their proper and distinct significations , i define them thus . command is , where a man saith , doe this , or doe not this , without expecting other reason than the will of him that sayes it . from this it followeth manifestly , that he that commandeth , pretendeth thereby his own benefit : for the reason of his command is his own will onely , and the proper object of every mans will , is some good to himselfe . counsell , is where a man saith , doe , or doe not this , and deduceth his reasons from the benefit that arriveth by it to him to whom he saith it . and from this it is evident , that he that giveth counsell , pretendeth onely ( whatsoever he intendeth ) the good of him , to whom he giveth it . therefore between counsell and command , one great difference is , that command is directed to a mans own benefit ; and counsell to the benefit of another man. and from this ariseth another difference , that a man may be obliged to do what he is commanded ; as when he hath covenanted to obey : but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counselled , because the hurt of not following it , is his own ; or if he should covenant to follow it , then is the counsell turned into the nature of a command . a third difference between them is , that no man can pretend a right to be of another mans counsell ; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himselfe : but to demand right to counsell another , argues a will to know his designes , or to gain some other good to himselfe ; which ( as i said before ) is of every mans will the proper object . this also is incident to the nature of counsell ; that whatsoever it be , he that asketh it , cannot in equity accuse , or punish it : for to ask counsell of another , is to permit him to give such counsell as he shall think best ; and consequently , he that giveth counsell to his soveraign , ( whether a monarch , or an assembly ) when he asketh it , cannot in equity be punished for it , whether the same be conformable to the opinion of the most , or not , so it be to the proposition in debate . for if the sense of the assembly can be taken notice of , before the debate be ended , they should neither ask , nor take any further counsell ; for the sense of the assembly , is the resolution of the debate , and end of all deliberation . and generally he that demandeth counsell , is author of it ; and therefore cannot punish it ; and what the soveraign cannot , no man else can . but if one subject giveth counsell to another , to do any thing contrary to the lawes , whether that counsell proceed from evill intention , or from ignorance onely , it is punishable by the common-wealth ; because ignorance of the law , is no good excuse , where every man is bound to take notice of the lawes to which he is subject . exhortation , and dehortation , is counsell , accompanied with signes in him that giveth it , of vehement desire to have it followed ; or to say it more briefly , counsell vehemently pressed . for he that exhorteth , doth not deduce the consequences of what he adviseth to be done , and tye himselfe therein to the rigour of true reasoning ; bnt encourages him he counselleth , to action : as he that dehorteth , deterreth him from it . and therefore they have in their speeches , a regard to the common passions , and opinions of men , in deducing their reasons ; and make use of similitudes , metaphors , examples , and other tooles of oratory , to perswade their hearers of the utility , honour , or justice of following their advise . from whence may be inferred , first , that exhortation and dehortation , is directed to the good of him that giveth the counsell , not of him that asketh it , which is contrary to the duty of a counsellour ; who ( by the definition of counsell ) ought to regard , not his own benefit , but his whom he adviseth . and that he directeth his counsell to his own benefit , is manifest enough , by the long and vehement urging , or by the artificiall giving thereof ; which being not required of him , and consequently proceeding from his own occasions , is directed principally to his own benefit , and but accidentarily to the good of him that is counselled , or not at all . secondly ; that the use of exhortation and dehortation lyeth onely , where a man is to speak to a multitude ; because when the speech is addressed to one , he may interrupt him , and examine his reasons more rigorously , than can be done in a multitude ; which are too many to enter into dispute , and dialogue with him that speaketh indifferently to them all at once . thirdly , that they that exhort and dehort , where they are required to give counsell , are corrupt counsellours , and as it were bribed by their own interest . for though the counsell they give be never so good ; yet he that gives it , is no more a good counsellour , than he that giveth a just sentence for a reward , is a just judge . but where a man may lawfully command , as a father in his family , or a leader in an army , his exhortations and dehortations , are not onely lawfull , but also necessary , and laudable : but then they are no more counsells , but commands ; which when they are for execution of soure labour ; sometimes necessity , and alwayes humanity requireth to be sweetned in the delivery , by encouragement , and in the tune and phrase of counsell , rather then in harsher language of command . examples of the difference between command and counsell , we may take from the formes of speech that expresse them in holy scripture . have no other gods but me ; make to thy selfe no graven image ; take not gods name in vain ; sanctifie the sabbath ; honour thy parents ; kill not ; steale not , &c. are commands ; because the reason for which we are to obey them , is drawn from the will of god our king , whom we are obliged to obey . but these words , sell all thou hast ; give it to the poore ; and follow me , are counsell ; because the reason for which we are to do so , is drawn from our own benefit ; which is this , that we shall have treasure in heaven . these words , go into the village over against you , and you shall find an asse tyed , and her colt ; loose her , and bring her to me , are a command : for the reason of their fact is drawn from the will of their master : but these words , repent , and be baptized in the name of jesus , are counsell ; because the reason why we should so do , tendeth not to any benefit of god almighty , who shall still be king in what manner soever we rebell ; but of our selves , who have no other means of avoyding the punishment hanging over us for our sins . as the difference of counsell from command , hath been now deduced from the nature of counsell , consisting in a deducing of the benefit , or hurt that may arise to him that is to be counselled , by the necessary or probable consequences of the action he propoundeth ; so may also the differences between apt , and inept counsellours be derived from the same . for experience , being but memory of the consequences of like actions formerly observed , and counsell but the speech whereby that experience is made known to another ; the vertues , and defects of counsell , are the same with the vertues , and defects intellectuall : and to the person of a common-wealth , his counsellours serve him in the place of memory , and mentall discourse . but with this resemblance of the common-wealth , to a naturall man , there is one dissimilitude joyned , of great importance ; which is , that a naturall man receiveth his experience , from the naturall objects of sense , which work upon him without passion , or interest of their own ; whereas they that give counsell to the representative person of a common-wealth , may have , and have often their particular ends , and passions , that render their counsells alwayes suspected , and many times unfaithfull . and therefore we may set down for the first condition of a good counsellour , that his ends , and interest , be not inconsistent with the ends and interest of him he counselleth . secondly , because the office of a counsellour , when an action comes into deliberation , is to make manifest the consequences of it , in such manner , as he that is counselled may be truly and evidently informed ; he ought to propound his advise , in such forme of speech , as may make the truth most evidently appear ; that is to say , with as firme ratiocination , as significant and proper language , and as briefly , as the evidence will permit . and therefore rash , and unevident inferences ; ( such as are fetched onely from examples , or authority of books , and are not arguments of what is good , or evill , but witnesses of fact , or of opinion . ) obscure , confused , and ambiguous expressions , also all metaphoricall speeches , tending to the stirring up of passion , ( because such reasoning , and such expressions , are usefull onely to deceive , or to lead him we counsell towards other ends than his own ) are repugnant to the office of a counsellour . thirdly , because the ability of counselling proceedeth from experience , and long study ; and no man is presumed to have experience in all those things that to the administration of a great common-wealth are necessary to be known , no man is presumed to be a good counsellour , but in such businesse , as he hath not onely been much versed in , but hath also much meditated on , and considered . for seeing the businesse of a common-wealth is this , to preserve the people in peace at home , and defend them against forraign invasion , we shall find , it requires great knowledge of the disposition of man-kind , of the rights of government , and of the nature of equity , law , justice , and honour , not to be attained without study ; and of the strength , commodities , places , both of their own country , and their neighbours ; as also of the inclinations , and designes of all nations that may any way annoy them . and this is not attained to , without much experience . of which things , not onely the whole summe , but every one of the particulars requires the age , and observation of a man in years , and of more than ordinary study . the wit required for counsel , as i have said before ( chap. . ) is judgement . and the differences of men in that point come from different education , of some to one kind of study , or businesse , and of others to another . when for the doing of any thing , there be infallible rules , ( as in engines , and edifices , the rules of geometry , ) all the experience of the world cannot equall his counsell , that has learnt , or found out the rule . and when there is no such rule , he that hath most experience in that particular kind of businesse , has therein the best judgement , and is the best counsellour . fourthly , to be able to give counsell to a common-wealth , in a businesse that hath reference to another common-wealth , it is necessary to be acquainted with the intelligences , and letters that come from thence , and with all the records of treaties , and other transactions of state between them ; which none can doe , but such as the representative shall think fit . by which we may see , that they who are not called to counsell , can have no good counsell in such cases to obtrude . fifthly , supposing the number of counsellors equall , a man is better counselled by hearing them apart , then in an assembly ; and that for many causes . first , in hearing them apart , you have the advice of every man ; but in an assembly many of them deliver their advise with i , or no , or with their hands , or feet , not moved by their own sense , but by the eloquence of another , or for feare of displeasing some that have spoken , or the whole assembly , by contradiction ; or for feare of appearing duller in apprehension , than those that have applauded the contrary opinion . secondly , in an assembly of many , there cannot choose but be some whose interests are contrary to that of the publique ; and these their interests make passionate , and passion eloquent , and eloquence drawes others into the same advice . for the passions of men , which asunder are moderate , as the heat of one brand ; in assembly are like many brands , that enflame one another , ( especially when they blow one another with orations ) to the setting of the common-wealth on fire , under pretence of counselling it . thirdly , in hearing every man apart , one may examine ( when there is need ) the truth , or probability of his reasons , and of the grounds of the advise he gives , by frequent interruptions , and objections ; which cannot be done in an assembly , where ( in every difficult question ) a man is rather astonied and dazled with the variety of discourse upon it , than informed of the course he ought to take . besides , there cannot be an assembly of many , called together for advice , wherein there be not some , that have the ambition to be thought eloquent , and also learned in the politiques ; and give not their advice with care of the businesse propounded , but of the applause of their 〈◊〉 orations , made of the divers colored threds , or shreds of authors ; which is an impertinence at least , that takes away the time of serious consultation , and in the secret way of counselling apart , is easily avoided . fourthly , in deliberations that ought to be kept secret , ( whereof there be many occasions in publique businesse , ) the counsells of many , and especially in assemblies , are dangerous ; and therefore great assemblies are necessitated to commit such affaires to lesser numbers , and of such persons as are most versed , and in whose fidelity they have most confidence . to conclude , who is there that so far approves the taking of counsell from a great assembly of counsellours , that wisheth for , or would accept of their pains , when there is a question of marrying his children , disposing of his lands , governing his household , or managing his private estate , especially if there be amongst them such as wish not his prosperity ? a man that doth his businesse by the help of many and prudent counsellours , with every one consulting apart in his proper element , does it best , as he that useth able seconds at tennis play , placed in their proper stations . he does next best , that useth his own judgement only ; as he that has no second at all . but he that is carried up and down to his businesse in a framed counsell , which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions , the execution whereof is commonly ( out of envy , or interest ) retarded by the part dissenting , does it worst of all , and like one that is carried to the ball , though by good players , yet in a wheele-barrough , or other frame , heavy of it self , and retarded also by the inconcurrent judgements , and endeavours of them that drive it ; and so much the more , as they be more that set their hands to it ; and most of all , when there is one , or more amongst them , that desire to have him lose . and though it be true , that many eys see more then one ; yet it is not to be understood of many counsellours ; but then only , when the finall resolution is in one man. otherwise , because many eyes see the same thing in divers lines , and are apt to look asquint towards their private benefit ; they that desire not to misse their marke , though they look about with two eyes , yet they never ayme but with one ; and therefore no great popular common-wealth was ever kept up ; but either by a forraign enemy that united them ; or by the reputation of some one eminent man amongst them ; or by the secret counsell of a few ; or by the mutuall feare of equall factions ; and not by the open consultations of the assembly . and as for very little common-wealths , be they popular , or monarchicall , there is no humane wisdome can uphold them , longer then the jealousy lasteth of their potent neighbours . chap. xxvi . of civill lawes . by civill lawes , i understand the lawes , that men are therefore bound to observe , because they are members , not of this , or that common-wealth in particular , but of a common-wealth . for the knowledge of particular lawes belongeth to them , that professe the study of the lawes of their severall countries ; but the knowledge of civill law in generall . to any man. the antient law of rome was called their civil law , from the word civitas , which signifies a common-wealth : and those countries , which having been under the roman empire , and governed by that law , retaine still such part thereof as they think fit , call that part the civill law , to distinguish it from the rest of their own civill lawes . but that is not it i intend to speak of here ; my designe being not to shew what is law here , and there ; but what is law ; as plato , aristotle , cicero , and divers others have done , without taking upon them the profession of the study of the law. and first it is manifest , that law in generall , is not counsell , but command ; nor a command of any man to any man ; but only of him , whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him . and as for civill law , it addeth only the name of the person commanding , which is persona civitatis , the person of the common-wealth . which considered , i define civill law in this manner . civill law , is to every subject , those rules , which the common-wealth hath commanded him , by word , writing , or other sufficient sign of the will , to make use of , for the distinction of right , and wrong ; that is to say , of what is contrary , and what is not contrary to the rule . in which definition , there is nothing that is not at first sight evident . for every man seeth , that some lawes are addressed to all the subjects in generall ; some to particular provinces ; some to particular vocations ; and some to particular men ; and are therefore lawes , to every of those to whom the command is directed ; and to none else . as also , that lawes are the rules of just , and unjust ; nothing being reputed unjust , that is not contrary to some law. likewise , that none can make lawes but the common-wealth ; because our subjection is to the common-wealth only : and that commands , are to be signified by sufficient signs ; because a man knows not otherwise how to obey them . and therefore , whatsoever can from this definition by necessary consequence be deduced , ought to be acknowledged for truth . now i deduce from it this that followeth . the legislator in all common-wealths , is only the soveraign , be he one man , as in a monarchy , or one assembly of men , as in a democracy , or aristocracy . for the legislator , is he that maketh the law. and the common-wealth only , praescribes , and commandeth the observation of those rules , which we call law : therefore the common-wealth is the legislator . but the common-wealth is no person , nor has capacity to doe any thing , but by the representative , ( that is , the soveraign ; ) and therefore the soveraign is the sole legislator . for the same reason , none can abrogate a law made , but the soveraign ; because a law is not abrogated , but by another law , that forbiddeth it to be put in execution . the soveraign of a common-wealth , be it an assembly , or one man , is not subject to the civill lawes . for having power to make , and repeale lawes , he may when he pleaseth , free himselfe from that subjection , by repealing those lawes that trouble him , and making of new ; and consequently he was free before . for he is free , that can be free when he will : nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe ; because he that can bind , can release ; and therefore he that is bound to himselfe onely , is not bound . . when long use obtaineth the authority of a law , it is not the length of time that maketh the authority , but the will of the soveraign signified by his silence , ( for silence is sometimes an argument of consent ; ) and it is no longer law , then the soveraign shall be silent therein . and therefore if the soveraign shall have a question of right grounded , not upon his present will , but upon the lawes formerly made ; the length of time shal bring no prejudice to his right ; but the question shal be judged by equity . for many unjust actions , and unjust sentences , go uncontrolled a longer time , than any mancan remember . and our lawyers account no customes law , but such as are reasonable , and that evill customes are to be abolished : but the judgement of what is reasonable , and of what is to be abolished , belongeth to him that maketh the law , which is the soveraign assembly , or monarch . . the law of nature , and the civill law , contain each other , and are of equall extent . for the lawes of nature , which consist in equity , justice , gratitude , and other morall vertues on these depending , in the condition of meer nature ( as i have said before in the end of the th chapter , ) are not properly lawes , but qualities that dispose men to peace , and to obedience . when a common-wealth is once settled , then are they actually lawes , and not before ; as being then the commands of the common-wealth ; and therefore also civill lawes : for it is the soveraign power that obliges men to obey them . for in the differences of private men , to declare , what is equity , what is justice , and what is morall vertue , and to make them binding , there is need of the ordinances of soveraign power , and punishments to be ordaine d for such as shall break them ; which ordinances are therefore part of the civill law. the law of nature therefore is a part of the civill law in all common-wealths of the world . reciprocally also , the civill law is a part of the dictates of nature . for justice , that is to say , performance of covenant , and giving to every man his own , is a dictate of the law of nature . but every subject in a common-wealth , hath covenanted to obey the civill law , ( either one with another , as when they assemble to make a common representative , or with the representative it selfe one by one , when subdued by the sword they promise obedience , that they may receive life ; ) and therefore obedience to the civill law is part also of the law of nature . civill , and naturall law are not different kinds , but different parts of law ; whereof one part being written , is called civill , the other unwritten , naturall . but the right of nature , that is , the naturall liberty of man , may by the civill law be abridged , and restrained : nay , the end of making lawes , is no other , but such restraint ; without the which there cannot possibly be any peace . and law was brought into the world for nothing else , but to limit the naturall liberty of particular men , in such manner , as they might not hurt , but assist one another , and joyn together against a common enemy . . if the soveraign of one common-wealth , subdue a people that have lived under other written lawes , and afterwards govern them by the same lawes , by which they were governed before ; yet those lawes are the civill lawes of the victor , and not of the vanquished common-wealth . for the legislator is he , not by whose authority the lawes were first made ▪ but by whose authority they now continue to be lawes . and therefore where there be divers provinces , within the dominion of a common-wealth , and in those provinces diversity of lawes , which commonly are called the customes of each severall province , we are not to understand that such customes have their force , onely from length of time ; but that they were antiently lawes written , or otherwise made known , for the constitutions , and statutes of their soveraigns ; and are now lawes , not by vertue of the praescription of time , but by the constitutions of their present soveraigns . but if an unwritten law , in all the provinces of a dominion , shall be generally observed , and no iniquity appear in the use thereof ; that law can be no other but a law of nature , equally obliging all man-kind . . seeing then all lawes , written , and unwritten , have their authority , and force , from the will of the common-wealth ; that is to say , from the will of the representative ; which in a monarchy is the monarch , and in other common-wealths the soveraign assembly ; a man may wonder from whence proceed such opinions , as are found in the books of lawyers of eminence in severall common-wealths , directly , or by consequence making the legislative power depend on private men , or subordinate judges . as for example , that the common law , hath no controuler but the parlament ; which is true onely where a parlament has the soveraign power , and cannot be assembled , nor dissolved , but by their own discretion . for if there be a right in any else to dissolve them , there is a right also to controule them , and consequently to controule their controulings . and if there be no such right , then the controuler of lawes is not parlamentum , but rex in parlamento . and were a parlament is soveraign , if it should assemble never so many , or so wise men , from the countries subject to them , for whatsoever cause ; yet there is no man will believe , that such an assembly hath thereby acquired to themselves a legislative power . item , that the two arms of a common-wealth , are force , and justice ; the first whereof is in the king ; the other deposited in the hands of the parlament . as if a common-wealth could consist , where the force were in any hand , which justice had not the authority to command and govern . . that law can never be against reason , our lawyers are agreed ; and that not the letter , ( that is , every construction of it , ) but that which is according to the intention of the legislator , is the law. and it is true : but the doubt is , of whose reason it is , that shall be received for law. it is not meant of any private reason ; for then there would be as much contradiction in the lawes , as there is in the schooles ; nor yet , ( as sr. ed. coke makes it , ) an artificiall perfection of reason , gotten by long study , observation , and experience , ( as his was . ) for it is possible long study may encrease , and confirm erroneous sentences : and where men build on false grounds , the more they build , the greater is the ruine : and of those that study , and observe with equall time , and diligence , the reasons and resolutions are , and must remain discordant : and therefore it is not that juris prudentia , or wisedome of subordinate judges ; but the reason of this our artificiall man the common-wealth , and his command , that maketh law : and the common-wealth being in their representative but one person , there cannot easily arise any contradiction in the lawes ; and when there doth , the same reason is able , by interpretation , or alteration , to take it away . in all courts of justice , the soveraign ( which is the person of the common-wealth , ) is he that judgeth : the subordinate judge , ought to have regard to the reason , which moved his soveraign to make such law , that his sentence may be according thereunto ; which then is his soveraigns sentence ; otherwise it is his own , and an unjust one . . from this , that the law is a command , and a command consisteth in declaration , or manifestation of the will of him that commandeth , by voyce , writing , or some other sufficient argument of the same , we may understand , that the command of the common-wealth , is law onely to those , that have means to take notice of it . over naturall fooles , children , or mad-men there is no law , no more than over brute beasts ; nor are they capable of the title of just , or unjust ; because they had never power to make any covenant , or to understand the consequences thereof ; and consequently never took upon them to authorise the actions of any soveraign , as they must do that make to themselves a common-wealth . and as those from whom nature , or accident hath taken away the notice of all lawes in generall ; so also every man , from whom any accident , not proceeding from his own default , hath taken away the means to take notice of any particular law , is excused , if he observe it not ; and to speak properly , that law is no law to him . it is therefore necessary , to consider in this place , what arguments , and signes be sufficient for the knowledge of what is the law ; that is to say , what is the will of the soveraign , as well in monarchies , as in other formes of government . and first , if it be a law that obliges all the subjects without exception , and is not written , nor otherwise published in such places as they may take notice thereof , it is a law of nature . for whatsoever men are to take knowledge of for law , not upon other mens words , but every one from his own reason , must be such as is agreeable to the reason of all men ; which no law can be , but the law of nature . the lawes of nature therefore need not any publishing , nor proclamation ; as being contained in this one sentence , approved by all the world , do not that to another , which thou thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe . secondly , if it be a law that obliges only some condition of men , or one particular man , and be not written , nor published by word , then also it is a law of nature ; and known by the same arguments , and signs , that distinguish those in such a condition , from other subjects . for whatsoever law is not written , or some way published by him that makes it law , can be known no way , but by the reason of him that is to obey it ; and is therefore also a law not only civill , but naturall . for example , if the soveraign employ a publique minister , without written instructions what to doe ; he is obliged to take for instructions the dictates of reason ; as if he make a judge , the judge is to take notice , that his sentence ought to be according to the reason of his soveraign , which being alwaies understood to be equity , he is bound to it by the law of nature : or if an ambassador , he is ( in all things not conteined in his written instructions ) to take for instruction that which reason dictates to be most conducing to his soveraigns interest ; and so of all other ministers of the soveraignty , publique and private . all which instructions of naturall reason may be comprehended under one name of fidelity ; which is a branch of naturall justice . the law of nature excepted , it belongeth to the essence of all other lawes , to be made known , to every man that shall be obliged to obey them , either by word , or writing , or some other act , known to proceed from the soveraign authority . for the will of another , cannot be understood , but by his own word , or act , or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose ; which in the person of the common-wealth , is to be supposed alwaies consonant to equity and reason . and in antient time , before letters were in common use , the lawes were many times put into verse ; that the rude people taking pleasure in singing , or reciting them , might the more easily reteine them in memory . and for the same reason solomon adviseth a man , to bind the ten commandements * upon his ten fingers . and for the law which moses gave to the people of israel at the renewing of the covenant , * he biddeth them to teach it their children , by discoursing of it both at home , and upon the way ; at going to bed , and at rising from bed ; and to write it upon the posts , and dores of their houses ; and * to assemble the people , man , woman , and child , to heare it read . nor is it enough the law be written , and published ; but also that there be manifest signs , that it proceedeth from the will of the soveraign . for private men , when they have , or think they have force enough to secure their unjust designes , and convoy them safely to their ambitious ends , may publish for lawes what they please , without , or against the legislative authority . there is therefore requisite , not only a declaration of the law , but also sufficient signes of the author , and authority . the author , or legislator is supposed in every common-wealth to be evident , because he is the soveraign , who having been constituted by the consent of every one , is supposed by every one to be sufficiently known . and though the ignorance , and security of men be such , for the most part , as that when the memory of the first constitution of their common-wealth is worn out , they doe not consider , by whose power they use to be defended against their enemies , and to have their industry protected , and to be righted when injury is done them ; yet because no man that considers , can make question of it , no excuse can be derived from the ignorance of where the soveraignty is placed . and it is a dictate of naturall reason , and consequently an evident law of nature , that no man ought to weaken that power , the protection whereof he hath himself demanded , or wittingly received against others . therefore of who is soveraign , no man , but by his own fault , ( whatsoever evill men suggest , ) can make any doubt . the difficulty consisteth in the evidence of the authority derived from him ; the removing whereof , dependeth on the knowledge of the publique registers , publique counsels , publique ministers , and publique seales ; by which all lawes are sufficiently verified ; verifyed , i say , not authorised : for the verification , is but the testimony and record ; not the authority of the law ; which consisteth in the command of the soveraign only . if therefore a man have a question of injury , depending on the law of nature ; that is to say , on common equity ; the sentence of the judge , that by commission hath authority to take cogninisance of such causes , is a sufficient verification of the law of nature in that individuall case . for though the advice of one that professeth the study of the law , be usefull for the avoyding of contention ; yet it is but advice : t is the judge must tell men what is law , upon the hearing of the controversy . but when the question is of injury , or crime , upon a written law ; every man by recourse to the registers , by himself , or others , may ( if he will ) be sufficiently enformed , before he doe such injury , or commit the crime , whither it be an injury , or not : nay he ought to doe so : for when a man doubts whether the act he goeth about , be just , or injust ; and may informe himself , if he will ; the doing is unlawfull . in like manner , he that supposeth himself injured , in a case determined by the written law , which he may by himself , or others see and consider ; if he complaine before he consults with the law , he does unjustly , and bewrayeth a disposition rather to vex other men , than to demand his own right . if the question be of obedience to a publique officer ; to have seen his commission , with the publique seale , and heard it read ; or to have had the means to be informed of it , if a man would , is a sufficient verification of his authority . for every man is obliged to doe his best endeavour , to informe himself of all written lawes , that may concerne his own future actions . the legislator known ; and the lawes , either by writing , or by the light of nature , sufficiently published ; there wanteth yet another very materiall circumstance to make them obligatory . for it is not the letter , but the intendment , or meaning ; that is to say , the authentique interpretation of the law ( which is the sense of the legislator , ) in which the nature of the law consisteth ; and therefore the interpretation of all lawes dependeth on the authority soveraign ; and the interpreters can be none but those , which the soveraign , ( to whom only the subject oweth obedience ) shall appoint . for else , by the craft of an interpreter , the law may be made to beare a sense , contrary to that of the soveraign ; by which means the interpreter becomes the legislator . all laws , written , and unwritten , have need of interpretation . the unwritten law of nature , though it be easy to such , as without partiality , and passion , make use of their naturall reason , and therefore leaves the violaters thereof without excuse ; yet considering there be very few , perhaps none , that in some cases are not blinded by self love , or some other passion , it is now become of all laws the most obscure ; and has consequently the greatest need of able interpreters . the written laws , if they be short , are easily mis-interpreted , from the divers significations of a word , or two : if long , they be more obscure by the diverse significations of many words : in so much as no written law , delivered in few , or many words , can be well understood , without a perfect understanding of the finall causes , for which the law was made ; the knowledge of which finall causes is in the legislator . to him therefore there can not be any knot in the law , insoluble ; either by finding out the ends , to undoe it by ; or else by making what ends he will , ( as alexander did with his sword in the gordian knot , ) by the legislative power ; which no other interpreter can doe . the interpretation of the lawes of nature , in a common-wealth , dependeth not on the books of morall philosophy . the authority of writers , without the authority of the common-wealth , maketh not their opinions law , be they never so true . that which i have written in this treatise , concerning the morall vertues , and of their necessity , for the procuring , and maintaining peace , though it bee evident truth , is not therefore presently law ; but because in all common-wealths in the world , it is part of the civill law : for though it be naturally reasonable ; yet it is by the soveraigne power that it is law : otherwise , it were a great errour , to call the lawes of nature unwritten law ; whereof wee see so many volumes published , and in them so many contradictions of one another , and of themselves . the interpretation of the law of nature , is the sentence of the judge constituted by the soveraign authority , to heare and determine such controversies , as depend thereon ; and consisteth in the application of the law to the present case . for in the act of judicature , the judge doth no more but consider , whither the demand of the party , be consonant to naturall reason , and equity ; and the sentence he giveth , is therefore the interpretation of the law of nature ; which interpretation is authentique ; not because it is his private sentence ; but because he giveth it by authority of the soveraign , whereby it becomes the soveraigns sentence ; which is law for that time , to the parties pleading . but because there is no judge subordinate , nor soveraign , but may erre in a judgement of equity ; if afterward in another like case he find it more consonant to equity to give a contrary sentence , he is obliged to doe it . no mans error becomes his own law ; nor obliges him to persist in it . neither ( for the same reason ) becomes it a law to other judges , though sworn to follow it . for though a wrong sentence given by authority of the soveraign , if he know and allow it , in such lawes as are mutable , be a constitution of a new law , in cases , in which every little circumstance is the same ; yet in lawes immutable , such as are the lawes of nature , they are no lawes to the same , or other judges , in the like cases for ever after . princes succeed one another ; and one iudge passeth , another commeth ; nay , heaven and earth shall passe ; but not one title of the law of nature shall passe ; for it is the eternall law of god. therefore all the sentences of precedent judges that have ever been , cannot all together make a law contrary to naturall equity : nor any examples of former judges , can warrant an unreasonable sentence , or discharge the present judge of the trouble of studying what is equity ( in the case he is to judge , ) from the principles of his own naturall reason . for example sake , 't is against the law of nature , to punish the innocent ; and innocent is he that acquitteth himselfe judicially , and is acknowledged for innocent by the judge . put the case now , that a man is accused of a capitall crime , and seeing the power and malice of some enemy , and the frequent corruption and par●…iality of judges , runneth away for feare of the event , and afterwards is taken , and brought to a legall triall , and maketh it sufficiently appear , he was not guilty of the crime , and being thereof acquitted , is neverthelesse condemned to lose his goods ; this is a manifest condemnation of the innocent . i say therefore , that there is no place in the world , where this can be an interpretation of a law of nature , or be made a law by the sentences of precedent judges , that had done the same . for he that judged it first , judged unjustly ; and no injustice can be a pattern of judgement to succeeding judges . a written law may forbid innocent men to fly , and they may be punished for flying : but that flying for feare of injury , should be taken for presumption of guilt , after a man is already absolved of the crime judicially , is contrary to the nature of a presumption , which hath no place after judgement given . yet this is set down by a great lawyer for the common law of england . if a man ( saith he ) that is innocent , be accused of felony , and for feare flyeth for the same ; albeit he judicially acquitteth himselfe of the felony ; yet if it be found that he fled for the felony , he shall notwithstanding his innocency , forfeit all his goods , chattells , debts , and duties . for as to the forfeiture of them , the law will admit no proofe against the presumption in law , grounded upon his flight . here you see , an innocent man , judicially acquitted , notwithstanding his innocency , ( when no written law forbad him to fly ) after his acquitall , upon a presumption in law , condemned to lose all the goods he hath . if the law ground upon his flight a presumption of the fact , ( which was capitall , ) the sentence ought to have been capitall : if the presumption were not of ●…he fact , for what then ought he to lose his goods ? this therefore is no law of england ; nor is the condemnation grounded upon a presumption of law , but upon the presumption of the judges . it is also against law , to say that no proofe shall be admitted against a presumption of law. for all judges , soveraign and subordinate , if they refuse to heare proofe , refuse to do justice : for though the sentence be just , yet the judges that condemn without hearing the proofes offered , are unjust judges ; and their presumption is but prejudice ; which no man ought to bring with him to the seat of justice , whatsoever precedent judgements , or examples he shall pretend to follow . there be other things of this nature , wherein mens judgements have been perverted , by trusting to precedents : but this is enough to shew , that though the sentence of the judge , be a law to the party pleading , yet it is no law to any judge , that shall succeed him in that office. in like manner , when question is of the meaning of written lawes , he is not the interpreter of them , that writeth a commentary upon them . for commentaries are commonly more subject to cavill , than the text ; and therefore need other commentaries ; and so there will be no end of such interpretation . and therefore unlesse there be an interpreter authorised by the soveraign , from which the subordinate judges are not to recede , the interpreter can be no other than the ordinary judges , in the same manner , as they are in cases of the unwritten law ; and their sentences are to be taken by them that plead , for lawes in that particular case ; but not to bind other judges , in like cases to give like judgements . for a judge may erre in the interpretation even of written lawes ; but no errour of a subordinate judge , can change the law , which is the generall sentence of the soveraigne . in written lawes , men use to make a difference between the letter , and the sentence of the law : and when by the letter , is meant whatsoever can be gathered from the bare words , 't is well distinguished . for the significations of almost all words , are either in themselves , or in the metaphoricall use of them , ambiguous ; and may be drawn in argument , to make many senses ; but there is onely one sense of the law. but if by the letter , be meant the literall sense , then the letter , and the sentence or intention of the law , is all one . for the literall sense is that , which the legislator intended , should by the letter of the law be signified . now the intention of the legislator is alwayes supposed to be equity : for it were a great contumely for a judge to think otherwise of the soveraigne . he ought therefore , if the word of the law doe not fully authorise a reasonable sentence , to supply it with the law of nature ; or if the case be difficult , to respit judgement till he have received more ample authority . for example , a written law ordaineth , that he which is thrust out of his house by force , shall be restored by force : it happens that a man by negligence leaves his house empty , and returning is kept out by force , in which case there is no speciall law ordained . it is evident , that this case is contained in the same law : for else there is no remedy for him at all ; which is to be supposed against the intention of the legislator . again , the word of the law , commandeth to judge according to the evidence : a man is accused falsly of a fact , which the judge saw himself done by another ; and not by him that is accused . in this case neither shall the letter of the law be followed to the condemnation of the innocent , nor shall the judge give sentence against the evidence of the witnesses ; because the letter of the law is to the contrary : but procure of the soveraign that another be made judge , and himself witnesse . so that the incommodity that follows the bare words of a written law , may lead him to the intention of the law , whereby to interpret the same the better ; though no incommodity can warrant a sentence against the law. for every judge of right , and wrong , is not judge of what is ●…ommodious , or incommodious to the common-wealth . the abilities required in a good interpreter of the law , that is to say , in a good judge , are not the same with those of an advocate ; namely the study of the lawes . for a judge , as he ought to take notice of the fact , from none but the witnesses ; so also he ought to take notice of the law , from nothing but the satutes , and constitutions of the soveraign , alledged in the pleading , or declared to him by some that have authority from the soveraign power to declare them ; and need not take care before-hand , what hee shall judge ; for it shall bee given him what hee shall say concerning the fact , by witnesses ; and what hee shall say in point of law , from those that shall in their pleadings ●…hew it , and by authority interpret it upon the place . the lords of parlament in england were judges , and most difficult causes have been heard and determined by them ; yet few of them were much versed in the study of the lawes , and fewer had made profession of them : and though they consulted with lawyers , that were appointed to be present there for that purpose ; yet they alone had the authority of giving sentence . in like manner , in the ordinary trialls of right , twelve men of the common people , are the judges , and give sentence , not onely of the fact , but of the right ; and pronounce simply for the complaynant , or for the defendant ; that is to say , are judges not onely of the fact , but also of the right : and in a question of crime , not onely determine whether done , or not done ; but also whether it be murder , homicide , felony , assault , and the like , which are determinations of law : but because they are not supposed to know the law of themselves , there is one that hath authority to enforme them of it , in the particular case they are to judge of . but yet if they judge not according to that he tells them , they are not subject thereby to any penalty ; unlesse it be made appear , they did it against their consciences , or had been corrupted by reward . the things that make a good judge , or good interpreter of the lawes , are , first , a right understanding of that principall law of nature called equity ; which depending not on the reading of other mens writings , but on the goodnesse of a mans own naturall reason , and meditation , is presumed to be in those most , that have had most leisure , and had the most inclination to meditate thereon . secondly , contempt of unnecessary riches , and preferments . thirdly , to be able in judgement to devest himselfe of all feare , anger , hatred , love , and compassion . fourthly , and lastly , patience to heare ; diligent attention in hearing ; and memory to retain , digest and apply what he hath heard . the difference and division of the lawes , has been made in divers manners , according to the different methods , of those men that have written of them . for it is a thing that dependeth not on nature , but on the scope of the writer ; and is subservient to every mans proper method . in the institutions of justinian , we find seven sorts of civill lawes . . the edicts , constitutions , and epistles of the prince , that is , of the emperour ; because the whole power of the people was in him . like these , are the proclamations of the kings of england . . the decrees of the whole people of rome ( comprehending the senate , ) when they were put to the question by the senate . these were lawes , at first , by the vertue of the soveraign power residing in the people ; and such of them as by the emperours were not abrogated , remained lawes by the authority imperiall . for all lawes that bind , are understood to be lawes by his authority that has power to repeale them . somewhat like to these lawes , are the acts of parliament in england . . the decrees of the common people ( excluding the senate , ) when they were put to the question by the tribune of the people . for such of them as were not abrogated by the emperours , remained lawes by the authority imperiall . like to these , were the orders of the house of commons in england . . senatûs consulta , the orders of the senate ; because when the people of rome grew so numerous , as it was inconvenient to assemble them ; it was thought fit by the emperour , that men should consult the senate , in stead of the people : and these have some resemblance with the acts of counsell . . the edicts of praetors , and ( in some cases ) of the aediles : such as are the chiefe justices in the courts of england . . responsa prudentum ; which were the sentences , and opinions of those lawyers , to whom the emperour gave authority to interpret the law , and to give answer to such as in matter of law demanded their advice ; which answers , the judges in giving judgement were obliged by the constitutions of the emperour to observe : and should be like the reports of cases judged , if other judges be by the law of england bound to observe them . for the judges of the common law of england , are not properly judges , but juris consulti ; of whom the judges , who are either the lords , or twelve men of the country , are in point of law to ask advice . . also , unwritten customes , ( which in their own nature are an imitation of law , ) by the tacite consent of the emperour , in case they be not contrary to the law of nature , are very lawes . another division of lawes , is into naturall and positive . natur●…ll are those which have been lawes from all eternity ; and are called not onely naturall , but also morall lawes ; consisting in the morall vertues , as justice , equity , and all habits of the mind that conduce to peace , and charity ; of which i have already spoken in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters . positive , are those which have not been from eternity ; but have been made lawes by the will of those that have had the soveraign power over others ; and are either written , or made known to men , by some other argument of the will of their legislator . again , of positive lawes some are humane , some divine : and of humane positive lawes , some are distributive , some penal . distributive are those that determine the rights of the subjects , declaring to every man what it is , by which he acquireth and holdeth a propriety in lands , or goods , and a right or liberty of action : and these speak to all the subjects . penal are those , which declare , what penalty shall be inflicted on those that violate the law ; and speak to the ministers and officers ordained for execution . for though every one ought to be informed of the punishments ordained before-hand for their transgression ; neverthelesse the command is not addressed to the delinquent , ( who cannot be supposed will faithfully punish himselfe , ) but to publique ministers appointed to see the penalty executed . and these penal lawes are for the most part written together with the lawes distributive ; and are sometimes called judgements . for all lawes are generall judgements , or sentences of the legislator ; as also every particular judgement , is a law to him , whose case is judged . divine positive lawes ( for naturall lawes being eternall , and universall , are all divine , ) are those , which being the commandements of god , ( not from all eternity , nor universally addressed to all men , but onely to a certain people , or to certain persons , ) are declared for such , by those whom god hath authorised to declare them . but this authority of man to declare what be these positive lawes of god , how can it be known ? god may command a man by a supernaturall way , to deliver lawes to other men . but because it is of the essence of law , that he who is to be obliged , be assured of the authority of him that declareth it , which we cannot naturally take notice to be from god , how can a man without supernaturall revelation be assured of the revelation received by the declarer ? and how can he be bound to obey them ? for the first question , how a man can be assured of the revelation of another , without a revelation particularly to himselfe , it is evidently impossible : for though a man may be induced to believe such revelation , from the miracles they see him doe , or from seeing the extraordinary sanctity of his life , or from seeing the extraordinary wisedome , or extraordinary felicity of his actions , all which are marks of god extraordinary favour ; yet they are not assured evidences of speciall revelation . miracles are marvellous workes : but that which is marvellous to one , may not be so to another . sanctity may be feigned ; and the visible felicities of this world , are most often the work of god by naturall , and ordinary causes . and therefore no man can infallibly know by naturall reason , that another has had a supernaturall revelation of gods will ; but only a beliefe ; every one ( as the signs thereof shall appear greater ; or lesser ) a firmer , or a weaker belief . but for the second , how he can be bound to obey them ; it is not so hard . for if the law declared , be not against the law of nature ( which is undoubtedly gods law ) and he undertake to obey it , he is bound by his own act ; bound i say to obey it , but not bound to believe it : for mens beliefe , and interiour cogitations , are not subject to the commands , but only to the operation of god , ordinary , or extraordinary . faith of supernaturall law , is not a fulfilling , but only an assenting to the same ; and not a duty that we exhibite to god , but a gift which god freely giveth to whom he pleaseth ; as also unbelief is not a breach of any of his lawes ; but a rejection of them all , except the laws naturall . but this that i say , will be made yet cleerer ▪ by the examples , and testimonies concerning this point in holy scripture . the covenant god made with abraham ( in a supernaturall manner ) was thus , this is the covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed after thee . abrahams seed had not this revelation , nor were yet in being ; yet they are a party to the covenant , and bound to obey what abraham should declare to them for gods law ; which they could not be , but in vertue of the obedience they owed to their parents ; who ( if they be subject to no other earthly power , as here in the case of abraham ) have soveraign power over their children , and servants . againe , where god saith to abraham , in thee shall all nations of the earth be blessed : for i know thou wilt command thy children , and thy house after thee to keep the way of the lord , and to observe righteousnesse and judgement , it is manifest , the obedience of his family , who had no revelation , depended on their former obligation to obey their soveraign . at mount sinai moses only went up to god ; the people were forbidden to approach on paine of death ; yet were they bound to obey all that moses declared to them for gods law. upon what ground , but on this submission of their own , speak thou to us , and we will heare thee ; but let not god speak to us , lest we dye ? by which two places it sufficiently appeareth , that in a common-wealth , a subject that has no certain and assured revelation particularly to himself concerning the will of god , is to obey for such , the command of the common-wealth : for if men were at liberty , to take for gods commandements , their own dreams , and fancies , or the dreams and fancies of private men ; scarce two men would agree upon what is gods commandement ; and yet in respect of them , every man would despise the commandements of the common-wealth . i conclude therefore , that in all things not contrary to the morall law , ( that is to say , to the law of nature , ) all subjects are bound to obey that for divine law , which is declared to be so , by the lawes of the common-wealth . which also is evident to any mans reason ; for whatsoever is not ▪ against the law of nature , may be made law in the name of them that have the soveraign power ; and there is no reason men should be the lesse obliged by it , when t is propounded in the name of god. besides , there is no place in the world where men are permitted to pretend other commandements of god , than are declared for such by the common-wealth . christian states punish those that revolt from christian religion , and all other states , those that set up any religion by them forbidden . for in whatsoever is not regulated by the common-wealth , t is equity ( which is the law of nature , and therefore an eternall law of god ) that every man equally enjoy his liberty . there is also another distinction of laws , into fundamentall , and not fundamentall : but i could never see in any author , what a fundamentall law signifieth . neverthelesse one may very reasonably distinguish laws in that manner . for a fundamentall law in every common-wealth is that , which being taken away , the common-wealth faileth , and is utterly dissolved ; as a building whose foundation is destroyed . and therefore a fundamentall law is that , by which subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given to the soveraign , whether a monarch , or a soveraign assembly , without which the common-wealth cannot stand ; such as is the power of war and peace , of judicature , of election of officers , and of doing whatsoever he shall think necessary for the publique good . not fundamentall is that , the abrogating whereof , draweth not with it the dissolution of the common-wealth ; such as are the lawes concerning controversies between subject and subject . thus much of the division of lawes . i find the words lex civilis , and jus civile , that is to say , law and right civil , promiscuously used for the same thing , even in the most learned authors ; which neverthelesse ought not to be so . for right is liberty , namely that liberty which the civil law leaves us : but civill law is an obligation ; and takes from us the liberty which the law of nature gave us . nature gave a right to every man to secure himselfe by his own strength , and to invade a suspected neighbour , by way of prevention : but the civill law takes away that liberty , in all cases where the protection of the law may be safely stayd for . insomuch as lex and jus , are as different as obligation and liberty . likewise lawes and charters are taken 〈◊〉 for the same thing . yet charters are donations of the soveraign ; and not lawes , but exemptions from law. the phrase of a law is jubeo , injungo , i command , and enjoyn : the phrase of a charter is dedi , concessi , i have given , i have granted : but what is given or granted , to a man , is not forced upon him , by a law. a law may be made to bind all the subjects of a common-wealth : a liberty , or charter is only to one man , or some one part of the people . for to say all the people of a common-wealth , have liberty in any case whatsoever ; is to say , that in such case , there hath been no law made ; or else having been made , is now abrogated . chap. xxvii . of crimes , excuses , and extenuations . a sinne , is not onely a transgression of a law , but also any contempt of the legislator . for such contempt , is a breach of all his lawes at once . and therefore may consist , not onely in the commission of a fact , or in the speaking of words by the lawes forbidden , or in the omission of what the law commandeth , but also in the intention , or purpose to transgresse . for the purpose to breake the law , is some degree of contempt of him , to whom it belongeth to see it executed . to be delighted in the imagination onely , of being possessed of another mans goods , servants , or wife , without any intention to take them from him by force , or fraud , is no breach of the law , that sayth , thou shalt not covet : nor is the pleasure a man may have in imagining , or dreaming of the death of him , from whose life he expecteth nothing but dammage , and displeasure , a sinne ; but the resolving to put some act in execution , that tendeth thereto . for to be pleased in the fiction of that , which would please a man if it were reall , is a passion so adhaerent to the nature both of man , and every other living creature , as to make it a sinne , were to make sinne of being a man. the consideration of this , has made me think them too severe , both to themselves , and others , that maintain , that the first motions of the mind , ( though checked with the fear of god ) be sinnes . but i confesse it is safer to erre on that hand , than on the other . a crime , is a sinne , consisting in the committing ( by deed , or word ) of that which the law forbiddeth , or the omission of what it hath commanded . so that every crime is a sinne ; but not every sinne a crime . to intend to steale , or kill , is a sinne , though it never appeare in word , or fact : for god that seeth the thoughts of man , can lay it to his charge : but till it appear by some thing done , or said , by which the intention may be argued by a humane judge , it hath not the name of crime : which distinction the greeks observed , in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; wherof the former , ( which is translated sinne , ) signifieth any swarving from the law whatsoever ; but the two later , ( which are translated crime , ) signifie that sinne onely , whereof one man may accuse another . but of intentions , which never appear by any outward act , there is no place for humane accusation . in like manner the latines by peccatum , which is sinne , signifie all manner of deviation from the law ; but by crimen , ( which word they derive from cerno , which signifies to perceive , ) they mean onely such sinnes , as may be made appear before a judge ; and therfore are not meer intentions . from this relation of sinne to the law , and of crime to the civill law , may be inferred , first , that where law ceaseth , sinne ceaseth . but because the law of nature is eternall , violation of covenants , ingratitude , arrogance , and all facts contrary to any morall vertue , can never cease to be sinne. secondly , that the civill law ceasing , crimes cease : for there being no other law remaining , but that of nature , there is no place for accusation ; every man being his own judge , and accused onely by his own conscience , and cleared by the uprightnesse of his own intention . when therefore his intention is right , his fact is no sinne : if otherwise , his fact is sinne ; but not crime . thirdly , that when the soveraign power ceaseth , crime also ceaseth : for where there is no such power , there is no protection to be had from the law ; and therefore every one may protect himself by his own power : for no man in the institution of soveraign power can be supposed to give away the right of preserving his own body ; for the safety whereof all soveraignty was ordained . but this is to be understood onely of those , that have not themselves contributed to the taking away of the power that protected them : for that was a crime from the beginning . the source of every crime , is some defect of the understanding ; or some errour in reasoning ; or some sudden force of the passions . defect in the understanding , is ignoran●…e ; in reasoning , erroneous opinion . again , ignorance is of three sorts ; of the law , and of the soveraign , and of the penalty . ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man ; because every man that hath attained to the use of reason , is supposed to know , he ought not to do to another , what he would not have done to himselfe . therefore into what place soever a man shall come , if he do any thing contrary to that law , it is a crime . if a man come from the indies hither , and perswade men here to receive a new religion , or teach them any thing that tendeth to disobedience of the lawes of this country , though he be never so well perswaded of the truth of what he teacheth , he commits a crime , and may be justly punished for the same , not onely because his doctrine is false , but also because he does that which he would not approve in another , namely , that comming from hence , he should endeavour to alter the religion there . but ignorance of the civill law , shall excuse a man in a strange country , till it be declared to him ; because , till then no civill law is binding . in the like manner , if the civill law of a mans own country , be not so sufficiently declared , as he may know it if he will ; nor the action against the law of nature ; the ignorance is a good excuse : in other cases ignorance of the civill law , excuseth not . ignorance of the soveraign power , in the place of a mans ordinary residence , excuseth him not ; because he ought to take notice of the power , by which he hath been protected there . ignorance of the penalty , where the law is declared , excuseth no man : for in breaking the law , which without a fear of penalty to follow , were not a law , but vain words , he undergoeth the penalty , though he know not what it is ; because , whosoever voluntarily doth any action , accepteth all the known consequences of it ; but punishment is a known consequence of the violation of the lawes , in every common-wealth ; which punishment , if it be determined already by the law , he is subject to that ; if not , then is he subject to arbitrary punishment . for it is reason , that he which does injury , without other limitation than that of his own will , should suffer punishment without other limitation , than that of his will whose law is thereby violated . but when a penalty , is either annexed to the crime in the law it selfe , or hath been usually inflicted in the like cases ; there the delinquent is excused from a greater penalty . for the punishment foreknown , if not great enough to deterre men from the action , is an invitement to it : because when men compare the benefit of their injustice , with the harm of their punishment , by necessity of nature they choose that which appeareth best for themselves : and therefore when they are punished more than the law had formerly determined , or more than others were punished for the same crime ; it is the law that tempted , and deceiveth them . no law , made after a fact done , can make it a crime : because if the fact be against the law of nature , the law was before the fact ; and a positive law cannot be taken notice of , before it be made ; and therefore cannot be obligatory . but when the law that forbiddeth a fact , is made before the fact be done ; yet he that doth the fact , is lyable to the penalty ordained after , in case no lesser penalty were made known before , neither by writing , nor by example , for the reason immediatly before alledged . from defect in reasoning , ( that is to say , from errour , ) men are prone to violate the lawes , three wayes . first , by presumption of false principles : as when men from having observed how in all places , and in all ages , unjust actions have been authorised , by the force , and victories of those who have committed them ; and that potent men , breaking through the cob-web lawes of their country , the weaker sort , and those that have failed in their enterprises , have been esteemed the onely criminals ; have thereupon taken for principles , and grounds of their reasoning , that justice is but a vain word : that whatsoever a man can get by his own industry , and hazard , is his own : that the practice of all nations cannot be unjust : that examples of former times are good arguments of doing the like again ; and many more of that kind : which being granted , no act in it selfe can be a crime , but must be made so ( not by the law , but ) by the successe of them that commit it ; and the same fact be vertuous , or vicious , as fortune pleaseth ; so that what marius makes a crime , sylla shall make meritorious , and caesar ( the same lawes standing ) turn again into a crime , to the perpetuall disturbance of the peace of the common-wealth . secondly , by falsé teachers , that either mis-interpret the law of nature , making it thereby repugnant to the law civill ; or by teaching for lawes , such doctrines of their own , or traditions of former times , as are inconsistent with the duty of a subject . thirdly , by erroneous inferences from true principles ; which happens commonly to men that are hasty , and praecipitate in concluding , and resolving what to do ; such as are they , that have both a great opinion of their own understanding , and believe that things of this nature require not time and study , but onely common experience , and a good naturall wit ; whereof no man thinks himselfe unprovided : whereas the knowledge , of right and wrong , which is no lesse difficult , there is no man will pretend to , without great and long study . and of those defects in reasoning , there is none that can excuse ( though some of them may extenuate ) a crime , in any man , that pretendeth to the administration of his own private businesse ; much lesse in them that undertake a publique charge ; because they pretend to the reason , upon the want whereof they would ground their excuse . of the passions that most frequently are the causes of crime , one , is vain-glory , or a foolish over-rating of their own worth ; as if difference of worth , were an effect of their wit , or riches , or bloud , or some other naturall quality , not depending on the will of those that have the soveraign authority . from whence proceedeth a presumption that the punishments ordained by the lawes , and extended generally to all subjects , ought not to be inflicted on them , with the same rigour they are inflicted on poore , obscure , and simple men , comprehended under the name of the vulgar . therefore it happeneth commonly , that such as value themselves by the greatnesse of their wealth , adventure on crimes , upon hope of escaping punishment , by corrupting publique justice , or obtaining pardon by mony , or other rewards . and that such as have multitude of potent kindred ; and popular men , that have gained reputation amongst the multitude , take courage to violate the lawes , from a hope of oppressing the power , to whom it belongeth to put them in execution . and that such as have a great , and false opinion of their own wisedome , take upon them to reprehend the actions , and call in question the authority of them that govern , and so to unsettle the lawes with their publique discourse , as that nothing shall be a crime , but what their own designes require should be so . it happeneth also to the same men , to be prone to all such crimes , as consist in craft , and in deceiving of their neighbours ; because they think their designes are too subtile to be perceived . these i say are effects of a false presumption of their own wisdome . for of them that are the first movers in the disturbance of common-wealth , ( which can never happen without a civill warre , ) very few are left alive long enough , to see their new designes established : so that the benefit of their crimes , redoundeth to posterity , and such as would least have wished it : which argues they were not so wise , as they thought they were . and those that deceive upon hope of not being observed , do commonly deceive themselves , ( the darknesse in which they believe they lye hidden , being nothing else but their own blindnesse ; ) and are no wiser than children , that think all hid , by hiding their own eyes . and generally all vain-glorious men , ( unlesse they be withall timorous , ) are subject to anger ; as being more prone than others to interpret for contempt , the ordinary liberty of conversation : and there are few crimes that may not be produced by anger . as for the passions , of hate , lust , ambition , and covetousnesse , what crimes they are apt to produce , is so obvious to every mans experience and understanding , as there needeth nothing to be said of them , saving that they are infirmities , so annexed to the nature , both of man , and all other living creatures , as that their effects cannot be hindred , but by extraordinary use of reason , or a constant severity in punishing them . for in those things men hate , they find a continuall , and unavoydable molestation ; whereby either a mans patience must be everlasting , or he must be eased by removing the power of that which molesteth him : the former is difficult ; the later is many times impossible , without some violation of the law. ambition , and covetousnesse are passions also that are perpetually incumbent , and pressing ; whereas reason is not perpetually present , to resist them : and therefore whensoever the hope of impunity appears , their effects proceed . and for lust , what it wants in the lasting , it hath in the vehemence , which sufficeth to weigh down the apprehension of all easie , or uncertain punishments . of all passions , that which enclineth men least to break the lawes , is fear . nay , ( excepting some generous natures , ) it is the onely thing , ( when there is apparence of profit , or pleasure by breaking the lawes , ) that makes men keep them . and yet in many cases a crime may be committed through feare . for not every fear justifies the action it produceth , but the fear onely of corporeall hurt , which we call bodily fear , and from which a man cannot see how to be delivered , but by the action . a man is assaulted , fears present death , from which he sees not how to escape , but by wounding him that assaulteth him ; if he wound him to death , this is no crime ; because no man is supposed at the making of a common-wealth , to have abandoned the defence of his life , or limbes , where the law cannot arrive time enough to his assistance . but to kill a man , because from his actions , or his threatnings , i may argue he will kill me when he can , ( seeing i have time , and means to demand protection , from the soveraign power , ) is a crime . again , a man receives words of disgrace , or some little injuries ( for which they that made the lawes , had assigned no punishment , nor thought it worthy of a man that hath the use of reason , to take notice of , ) and is afraid , unlesse he revenge it , he shall fall into contempt , and consequently be obnoxious to the like injuries from others ; and to avoyd this , breaks the law , and protects himselfe for the future , by the terrour of his private revenge . this is a crime : for the hurt is not corporeall , but phantasticall , and ( though in this corner of the world , made sensible by a custome not many years since begun , amongst young and vain men , ) so light , as a gallant man , and one that is assured of his own courage , cannot take notice of . also a man may stand in fear of spirits , either through his own superstition , or through too much credit given to other men , that tell him of strange ▪ dreams and visions ; and thereby be made believe they will hurt him , for doing , or omitting divers things , which neverthelesse , to do , or omit , is contrary to the lawes ; and that which is so done , or omitted , is not to be excused by this fear ; but is a crime . for ( as i have shewn before in the second chapter ) dreams be naturally but the fancies remaining in sleep , after the impressions our senses had formerly received waking ; and when men are by any accident unassured they have slept , seem to be reall visions ; and therefore he that presumes to break the law upon his own , or anothers dream , or pretended vision , or upon other fancy of the power of invisible spirits , than is permitted by the common-wealth , leaveth the law of nature , which is a certain offence , and followeth the imagery of his own , or another private mans brain , which he can never know whether it signifieth any thing , or nothing , nor whether he that tells his dream , say true , or lye ; which if every private man should have leave to do , ( as they must by the law of nature , if any one have it ) there could no law be made to hold , and so all common-wealth would be dissolved . from these different sources of crimes , it appeares already , that all crimes are not ( as the stoicks of old time maintained ) of the same allay . there is place , not only for excuse , by which that which seemed a crime , is proved to be none at all ; but also for extenuation , by which the crime , that seemed great , is made lesse . for though all crimes doe equally deserve the name of injustice , as all deviation from a strait line is equally crookednesse , which the stoicks rightly observed ; yet it does not follow that all crimes are equally unjust , no more than that all crooked lines are equally crooked ; which the stoicks not observing , held it as great a crime , to kill a hen , against the law , as to kill ones father . that which totally excuseth a fact , and takes away from it the nature of a crime , can be none but that , which at the same time , taketh away the obligation of the law. for the fact committed once against the law , if he that committed it be obliged to the law , can be no other than a crime . the want of means to know the law , totally excuseth : for the law whereof a man has no means to enforme himself , is not obligatory . but the want of diligence to enquire , shall not be considered as a want of means ; nor shall any man , that pretendeth to reason enough for the government of his own affairs , be supposed to want means to know the lawes of nature ; because they are known by the reason he pretends to : only children , and madmen are excused from offences against the law naturall . where a man is captive , or in the power of the enemy , ( and he is then in the power of the enemy , when his person , or his means of living , is so , ) if it be without his own fault , the obligation of the law ceaseth ; because he must obey the enemy , or dye ; and consequently such obedience is no crime : for no man is obliged ( when the protection of the law faileth , ) not to protect himself , by the best means he can . if a man by the terrour of present death , be compelled to doe a fact against the law , he is totally excused ; because no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation . and supposing such a law were obligatory ; yet a man would reason thus , if i doe it not ▪ i die presently ; if i doe it , i die afterwards ; therefore by doing it , there is time of life gained ; nature therefore compells him to the fact . when a man is destitute of food , or other thing necessary for his life , and cannot preserve himselfe any other way , but by some fact against the law ; as if in a great famine he take the food by force , or stealth , which he cannot obtaine for mony ▪ nor charity ; or in defence of his life , snatch away another mans sword , he is totally excused , for the reason next before alledged . again , facts done against the law , by the authority of another ; are by that authority excused against the author ; because no man ought to accuse his own fact in another , that is but his instrument : but it is not excused against a third person thereby injured ; because in the violation of the law , both the author , and actor are criminalls . from hence it followeth that when that man , or assembly , that hath the soveraign power , commandeth a man to do that which is contrary to a former law , the doing of it is totally excused : for he ought not to condemn it himselfe , because he is the author ; and what cannot justly be condemned by the soveraign , cannot justly be punished by any other . besides , when the soveraign commandeth any thing to be done against his own former law , the command , as to that particular fact , is an abrogation of the law. if that man , or assembly , that hath the soveraign power , disclaime any right essentiall to the soveraignty , whereby there acc●…eth to the subject , any liberty inconsistent with the soveraign power , that is to say , with the very being of a common-wealth , if the subject shall refuse to obey the command in any thing , contrary to the liberty granted , this is neverthelesse a sinne , and contrary to the duty of the subject : for he ought to take notice of what is inconsistent with the soveraignty , because it was erected by his own consent , and for his own defence ; and that such liberty as is inconsistent with it , was granted through ignorance of the evill consequence thereof . but if he not onely disobey , but also resist a publique minister in the execution of it , then it is a crime ; because he might have been righted , ( without any breach of the peace , ) upon complaint . the degrees of crime are taken on divers scales , and measured , first , by the malignity of the source , or cause : secondly , by the contagion of the example : thirdly , by the mischiefe of the effect ; and fourthly , by the concurrence of times , places , and persons . the same fact done against the law , if it proceed from presumption of strength , riches , or friends to resist those that are to execute the law , is a greater crime , than if it proceed from hope of not being discovered , or of escape by flight : for presumption of impunity by force , is a root , from whence springeth , at all times , and upon all temptations , a contempt of all lawes ; whereas in the later case , the apprehension of danger , that makes a man fly , renders him more obedient for the future . a crime which we know to be so , is greater than the same crime proceeding from a false perswasion that it is lawfull : for he that committeth it against his own conscience , presumeth on his force , or other power , which encourages him to commit the same again : but he that doth it by errour , after the errour shewn him , is conformable to the law. hee , whose errour proceeds from the authority of a teacher , or an interpreter of the law publiquely authorised , is not so faulty , as he whose errour proceedeth from a peremptory pursute of his own principles , and reasoning : for what is taught by one that teacheth by publique authority , the common-wealth ●…eacheth , and hath a resemblance of law , till the same authority controuleth it ; and in all crimes that contain not in them a denyall of the soveraign power , nor are against an evident law , excuseth totally : whereas he that groundeth his actions , on his private judgement , ought according to the rectitude , or errour thereof , to stand , or fall . the same fact , if it have been constantly punished in other men , is a greater crime , than if there have been many precedent examples of impunity . for those examples , are so many hopes of impunity , given by the soveraign himselfe : and because he which furnishes a man with such a hope , and presumption of mercy , as encourageth him to offend , hath his part in the offence ; he cannot reasonably charge the offender with the whole . a crime arising from a sudden passion , is not so great , as when the same ariseth from long meditation : for in the former case there is a place for extenuation , in the common infirmity of humane nature : but he that doth it with praemeditation , has used circumspection , and cast his eye , on the law , on the punishment , and on the consequence thereof to humane society ; all which in committing the crime , hee hath contemned , and postposed to his own appetite . but there is no suddennesse of passion sufficient for a totall excuse : for all the time between the first knowing of the law , and the commission of the fact , shall be taken for a time of deliberation ; because he ought by meditation of the law , to rectifie the irregularity of his passions . where the law is publiquely , and with assiduity , before all the people read , and interpreted ; a fact done against it , is a greater crime , than where men are left without such instrustion , to enquire of it with difficulty , uncertainty , and interruption of their callings , and be informed by priuate men : for in this case , part of the fault is discharged upon common infirmity ; but in the former , there is apparent negligence , which is not without some contempt of the sovetaign power . those facts which the law expresly condemneth , but the law-maker by other manifest signes of his will tacitly approveth , are lesse crimes , than the same facts , condemned both by the law , and law-maker . for seeing the will of the law-maker is a law , there appear in this case two contradictory lawes ; which would totally excuse , if men were bound to take notice of the soveraigns approbation , by other arguments , than are expressed by his command . but because there are punishments consequent , not onely to the transgression of his law , but also to the observing of it ▪ he is in part a cause of the transgression , and therefore cannot reasonably impute the whole crime to the ●…quent . for example , the law condemneth duells ; the punishment is made capitall ▪ on the contrary part , he that refuseth duell , is subject to contempt and 〈◊〉 , without remedy ; and sometimes by the soveraign himselfe thought unworthy to have any charge , or preferment in warre : if thereupon he accept duell , considering all men lawfully endeavour to obtain the good opinion of them that have the soveraign power , he ought not in reason to be 〈◊〉 punished ; seeing part of the fault may be discharged on the punisher : which i say , not as wishing liberty of private revenges , or any other kind of disobedience ; but a care in governours , not to countenance any thing obliquely , which directly they forbid . the examples of princes , to those that see them , are , and ever have been , more potent to govern their actions , than the lawes themselves . and thought it be our duty to do , not what they do , but what they say ; yet will that duty never be performed , till it please god to give men an extraordinary , and supernaturall grace to follow that precept . again , if we compare crimes by the mischiefe of their effects , first , the same fact , when it redounds to the dammage of many , is greater , than when it redounds to the hurt of few . and therefore , when a fact hurteth , not onely in the present , but also , ( by example ) in the future , it is a greater crime , than if it hurt onely in the present : for the former , is a fertile crime , and multiplyes to the hurt of many ; the later is barren . to maintain doctrines contrary to the religion established in the common-wealth , is a greater fault , in an authorised preacher , than in a private person : so also is it , to live prophanely , incontinently , or do any irreligious act whatsoever . likewise in a professor of the law , to maintain any point , or do any act , that tendeth to the weakning of the soveraign power , is a greater crime , than in another man : also in a man that hath such reputation for wisedome , as that his counsells are followed , or his actions imitated by many , his fact against the law , is a greater crime , than the same fact in another : for such men not onely commit crime , but teach it for law to all other men . and generally all crimes are the greater , by the scandall they give ; that is to say , by becomming stumbling-blocks to the weak , that look not so much upon the way they go in , as upon the light that other men carry before them . also facts of hostility against the present state of the common-wealth , are greater crimes , than the same acts done to private men : for the dammage extends it selfe to all : such are the betraying of the strengths , or revealing of the secrets of the common-wealth to an enemy ▪ also all attempts upon the representative of the common-wealth , be it a monarch , or an assembly ; and all endeavours by word , or deed to diminish the authority of the same , either in the present time , or in succession : which crimes the latines understand by crimina laesae majestatis , and consist in designe , or act , contrary to a fundamentall law. likewise those crimes , which render judgements of no effect , are greater crimes , than injuries done to one , or a few persons ; as to receive mony to give false judgement , or testimony , is a greater crime , than otherwise to deceive a man of the like , or a greater summe ; because not onely he has wrong , that falls by such judgements ; but all judgements are rendered uselesse , and occasion ministred to force , and private revenges . also robbery , and depeculation of the publique treasure , or revenues , is a greater crime , than the robbing , or defrauding of a private man ; because to robbe the publique , is to robbe many at once . also the counterfeit usurpation of publique ministery , the counterfeiting of publique seales , or publique coine , than counterfeiting of a private mans person , or his seale ; because the fraud thereof , extendeth to the dammage of many . of facts against the law , done to private men , the greater crime , is that , where the dammage in the common opinion of men , is most sensible . and therefore to kill against the law , is a greater crime , than any other injury , life preserved . and to kill with torment , greater , than simply to kill . and mutilation of a limbe , greater , than the spoyling a man of his goods . and the spoyling a man of his goods , by terrour of death , or wounds , than by clandestine surreption . and by clandestine surreption , than by consent fraudulently obtained . and the violation of chastity by force , greater , than by flattery . and of a woman married , than of a woman not married . for all these things are commonly so valued ; though some men are more , and some lesse sensible of the same offence . but the law regardeth not the particular , but the generall inclination of mankind . and therefore the offence men take , from contumely , in words , or gesture , when they produce no other harme , than the present griefe of him that is reproached , hath been neglected in the lawes of the greeks , romans , and other both antient , and moderne common-wealths ; supposing the true cause of such griefe to consist , not in the contumely , ( which takes no hold upon men conscious of their own vertue , ) but in the pusillanimity of him that is offended by it . also a crime against a private man , is much aggravated by the person , time , and place . for to kill ones parent , is a greater crime , than to kill another : for the parent ought to have the honour of a soveraign , ( though he have surrendred his power to the civill law , ) because he had it originally by nature . and to robbe a poore man , is a greater crime , than to robbe a rich man ; because 't is to the poore a more sensible dammage . and a crime committed in the time ▪ or place appointed for devotion , is greater , than if committed at another time or place : for it proceeds from a greater contempt of the law. many other case●… of aggravation , and extenuation might be added : but by these i have set down , it is obvious to every man , to take the altitude of any other crime proposed . lastly , because in almost all crimes there is an injury done , not onely to some private men , but also to the common-wealth ; the same crime , when the accusation is in the name of the common-wealth , is called publique crime ; and when in the name of a private man , a private crime ; and the pleas according thereunto called publique , judicia publica , pleas of the crown ; or private pleas. as in an accusation of murder , if the accuser be a private man , the plea is a private plea ; if the accuser be the soveraign , the plea is a publique plea. chap. xxviii . of punishments , and rewards . apunishment , is an evill inflicted by publique authority , on him that hath done , or omitted that which is judged by the same authority to be a transgression of the law ; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience . before i inferre any thing from this definition , there is a question to be answered , of much importance ; which is , by what door the right , or authority of punishing in any case , came in . for by that which has been said before , no man is supposed bound by covenant , not to resist violence ; and consequently it cannot be intended , that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person . in the making of a common-wealth , every man giveth away the right of defending another ; but not of defending himselfe . also he obligeth himselfe , to assist him that hath the soveraignty , in the punishing of another ; but of himselfe not . but to covenant to assist the soveraign , in doing hurt to another , unlesse he that so covenanteth have a right to doe it himselfe , is not to give him a right to punish . it is manifest therefore that the right which the common-wealth ( that is , he , or they that represent it ) hath to punish , is not grounded on any concession , or gift of the subjects . but i have also shewed formerly , that before the institution of common-wealth , every man had a right to every thing , and to do whatsoever he thought necessary to his own preservation ; subduing , hurting , or killing any man in order thereunto . and this is the foundation of that right of punishing , which is exercised in every common-wealth . for the subjects did not give the soveraign that right ; but onely in laying down theirs , strengthned him to use his own , as he should think fit , for the preservation of them all : so that it was not given ▪ but left to him , and to him onely ; and ( excepting the limits set him by naturall law ) as entire , as in the condition of meer nature , and of warre of every one against his neighbour . ●…rom the definition of punishment , i inferre , first , that neither private revenges , nor injuries of private men , can properly be stiled punishment ; because they proceed not from publique authority . secondly , that to be neglected , and unpreferred by the publique favour , is not a punishment ; because no new evill is thereby on any man inflicted ; he is onely left in the estate he was in before . thirdly , that the evill inflicted by publique authority , without precedent publique condemnation , is not to be stiled by the name of punishment ; but of an hostile act ; because the fact for which a man is punished , ought first to be judged by publique authority , to be a transgression of the law. fourthly , that the evill inflicted by usurped power , and judges without authority from the soveraign , is not punishment ; but an act of hostility ; because the acts of power usurped , have not for author , the person condemned ; and therefore are not acts of publique authority . fifthly , that all evill which is inflicted without intention , or possibility of disposing the delinquent , or ( by his example ) other men , to obey the lawes , is not punishment ; but an act of hostility ; because without such an end , no hurt done is contained under that name . sixthly , whereas to certain actions , there be annexed by nature , divers hurtfull consequences ; as when a man in assaulting another , is himselfe slain , or wounded ; or when he falleth into sicknesse by the doing of some unlawfull act ; such hurt , though in respect of god , who is the author of nature , it may be said to be inflicted , and therefore a punishment divine ; yet it is not contaned in the name of punishment in respect of men , because it is not inflicted by the authority of man. seventhly , if the harm inflicted be lesse than the benefit , or contentment that naturally followeth the crime committed , that harm is not within the definition ; and is rather the price , or redemption , than the punishment of a crime : because it is of the nature of punishment , to have for end , the disposing of men to obey the law ; which end ( if it be lesse than the benefit of the transgression ) it attaineth not , but worketh a contrary effect . eighthly , if a punishment bè determined and prescribed in the law it selfe , and after the crime committed , there be a greater punishment inflicted , the excesse is not punishment , but an act of hostility . for seeing the aym of punishment is not a revenge , but terrour ; and the terrour of a great punishment unknown , is taken away by the declaration of a lesse , the unexpected addition is no part of the punishment . but where there is no punishment at all determined by the law , there whatsoever is inflicted , hath the nature of punishment . for he that goes about the violation of a law , wherein no penalty is determined , expecteth an indeterminate , that is to say , an arbitrary punishment . ninthly , harme inflicted for a fact done before there was a law that forbad it , is not punishment , but an act of hostility : for before the law , there is no transgression of the law : but punishment supposeth a fact judged , to have been a transgression of the law ; therefore harme inflicted before the law made , is not punishment , but an act of hostility . tenthly , hurt inflicted on the representative of the common-wealth , is not punishment , but an act of hostility : because it is of the nature of punishment , to be inflicted by publique authority , which is the authority only of the representative it self . lastly , harme inflicted upon one that is a declared enemy , fals not under the name of punishment : because seeing they were either never subject to the law , and therefore cannot transgresse it ; or having been subject to it , and professing to be no longer so , by consequence deny they can transgresse it , all the harmes that can be done them , must be taken as acts of hostility . but in declared hostility , all infliction of evill is lawfull . from whence it followeth , that if a subject shall by fact , or word , wittingly , and deliberatly deny the authority of the representative of the common-wealth , ( whatsoever penalty hath been formerly ordained for treason , ) he may lawfully be made to suffer whatsoever the representative will : for in denying subjection , he denyes such punishment as by the law hath been ordained ; and therefore suffers as an enemy of the common-wealth ; that is , according to the will of the representative . for the punishments set down in the law , are to subjects , not to enemies ; such as are they , that having been by their own act subjects , deliberately revolting , deny the soveraign power . the first , and most generall distribution of punishments , is into divine , and humane . of the former i shall have occasion , to speak , in a more convenient place hereafter . humane , are those punishments that be inflicted by the commandement of man ; and are either corporall , or pecu●…ary , or ignominy , or imprisonment , or exile , or mixt of these . corporall punishment is that , which is inflicted on the body directly , and according to the intention of him that inflicteth it : such as are stripes , or wounds , or deprivation of such pleasures of the body , as were before lawfully enjoyed . and of these , some be capitall , some lesse than capitall . capitall , is the infliction of death ; and that either simply , or with torment . lesse than capitall , are stripes , wounds , chains , and any other corporall paine , not in its own nature mortall . for if upon the infliction of a punishment death ●…ollow not in the intention of the inflicter , the punishment is not to bee esteemed capitall , though the harme prove mortall by an accident not to be foreseen ; in which case death is not inflicted , but hastened . pecuniary punishment , is that which consisteth not only in the deprivation of a summe of mony , but also of lands , or any other goods which are usually bought and sold for mony . and in case the law , that ordaineth such a punishment , be made with design to gather mony , from such as shall transgresse the same , it is not properly a punishment , but the price of priviledge , and exemption from the law , which doth not absolutely forbid the fact , but only to those that are not able to pay the mony : except where the law is naturall , or part of religion ; for in that case it is not an exemption from the law , but a transgression of it . as where a law exacteth a pecuniary mulct , of them that take the name of god in vaine , the payment of the mulct , is not the price of a dispensation to sweare , but the punishment of the transgression of a law undispensable . in like manner if the law impose a summe of mony to be payd , to him that has been injured ; this is but a satisfaction for the hurt done him ; and extinguisheth the accusation of the party injured , not the crime of the offender . ignominy , is the infliction of such evill , as is made dishonorable ; or the deprivation of such good , as is made honourable by the common-wealth . for there be some things honorable by nature ; as the effects of courage , magnamity , strength , wisdome , and other abilities of body and mind : others made honorable by the common-wealth ; as badges , titles , offices , or any other singular marke of the soveraigns favour . the former , ( though they may faile by nature , or accident , ) cannot be taken away by a law ; and therefore the losse of them is not punishment . but the later , may be taken away by the publique authority that made them honorable , and are properly punishments : such are degrading men condemned , of their badges , titles , and offices ; or declaring them uncapable of the like in time to come . imprisonment , is when a man is by publique authority deprived of liberty ; and may happen from two divers ends ; whereof one is the safe custody of a man accused ; the other is the inflicting of paine on a man condemned . the former is not punishment ; because no man is supposed to be punisht , before he be judicially heard , and declared guilty . and therefore whatsoever hurt a man is made to suffer by bonds , or restraint , before his cause be heard , over and above that which is necessary to assure his custody , is against the law of nature . but the later is punishment , because evill , and inflicted by publique authority , for somewhat that has by the same authority been judged a transgression of the law. under this word imprisoment , i comprehend all restraint of motion , caused by an externall obstacle , be it a house , which is called by the general name of a prison ; or an iland , as when men are said to be confined to it ; or a place where men are set to worke , as in old time men have been condemned to quarries , and in these times to gallies ; or be it a chaine , or any other such impediment . exile , ( banishment ) is when a man is for a crime , condemned to depart out of the dominion of the common-wealth , or out of a certaine part thereof ; and during a prefixed time , or for ever , not to return into it : and seemeth not in its own nature , without other circumstances , to be a punishment ; but rather an escape , or a publique commandement to avoid punishment by flight . and cicero sayes , there was never any such punishment ordained in the city of rome ; but cals it a refuge of men in danger . for if a man banished , be neverthelesse permitted to enjoy his goods , and the revenue of his lands , the meer change of ayr is no punishment ; nor does it tend to that benefit of the common-wealth , for which all punishments are ordained , ( that is to say , to the forming of mens wils to the observation of the law ; ) but many times to the dammage of the common-wealth . for a banished man , is a lawfull enemy of the common-wealth that banished him ; as being no more a member of the same . but if he be withall deprived of his lands , or goods , then the punishment lyeth not in the exile , but is to be reckoned amongst punishments pecuniary . all punishments of innocent subjects , be they great or little , are against the law of nature : for punishment is only for transgression of the law , and therefore there can be no punishment of the innocent . it is therefore a violation , first , of that law of nature , which forbiddeth all men , in their revenges , to look at any thing but some future good : for there can arrive no good to the common-wealth , by punishing the innocent . secondly , of that , which forbiddeth ingratitude : for seeing all soveraign power , is originally given by the consent of every one of the subjects , to the end they should as long as they are obedient , be protected thereby ; the punishment of the innocent , is a rendring of evill for good. and thirdly , of the law that commandeth equity ; that is to say , an equall distribution of justice ; which in punishing the innocent is not observed . but the infliction of what evill soever , on an innocent man , that is not a subject , if it be for the benefit of the common-wealth , and without violation of any former covenant , is no breach of the law of nature . for all men that are not subjects , are either enemies , or else they have ceased from being so , by some precedent covenants . but against enemies , whom the common-wealth judgeth capable to do them hurt , it is lawfull by the originall right of nature to make warre ; wherein the sword judgeth not , nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent , and innocent , as to the time past ; nor has other respect of mercy , than as it conduceth to the good of his own people . and upon this ground it is , that also in subjects , who deliberatly deny the authority of the common-wealth established , the vengeance is lawfully extended , not onely to the fathers , but also to the third and fourth generation not yet in being , and consequently innocent of the fact , for which they are afflicted : because the nature of this offence , consisteth in the renouncing of subjection ; which is a relapse into the condition of warre , commonly called rebellion ; and they that so offend , suffer not as subjects , but as enemies . for rebellion , is but warre renewed . reward , is either of gift , or by contract . when by contract , it is called salary , and wages ; which is benefit due for service performed , or promised . when of gift , it is benefit proceeding from the grace of them that bestow it , to encourage , or enable men to do them service . and therefore when the soveraign of a common wealth appointeth a salary to any publique office , he that receiveth it , is bound in justice to performe his office ; otherwise , he is bound onely in honour , to acknowledgement , and an endeavour of requitall . for though men have no lawfull remedy , when they be commanded to quit their private businesse , to serve the publique , without reward , or salary ; yet they are not bound thereto , by the law of nature , nor by the institution of the common-wealth , unlesse the service cannot otherwise be done ; because it is supposed the soveraign may make use of all their means , insomuch as the most common souldier , may demand the wages of his warrefare , as a debt . the benefit which a soveraign bestoweth on a subject , for fear of some power , and ability he hath to do hurt to the common-wealth , are not properly rewards ; for they are not salaryes ; because there is in this case no contract supposed , every man being obliged already not to do the common-wealth disservice : nor are they graces ; because they be extorted by fear , which ought not to be incident to the soveraign power : but are rather sacrifices , which the soveraign ( considered in his naturall person , and not in the person of the common-wealth ) makes , for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himselfe ; and encourage not to obedience , but on the contrary , to the continuance , and increasing of further extortion . and whereas some salaries are certain , and proceed from the publique treasure ; and others uncertain , and casuall , proceeding from the execution of the office for which the salary is ordained ; the later is in some cases hurtfull to the common-wealth ; as in the case of judicature . for where the benefit of the judges , and ministers of a court of justice , ariseth for the multitude of causes that are brought to their cognisance , there must needs follow two inconveniences : one , is the nourishing of sutes ; for the more sutes , the greater benefit : and another that depends on that , which is contention about jurisdiction ; each court drawing to it selfe , as many causes as it can . but in offices of execution there are not those inconveniences ; because their employment cannot be encreased by any endeavour of their own . and thus much shall suffice for the nature of punishment , and reward ; which are , as it were , the nerves and tendons , that move the limbes and joynts of a common-wealth . hitherto i have set forth the nature of man , ( whose pride and other passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to government ; ) together with the great power of his governour , whom i compared to leviathan , taking that comparison out of the two last verses of the one and fortieth of job ; where god having set forth the great power of leviathan , calleth him king of the proud. there is nothing , saith he , on earth , to be compared with him . he is made so as not to be afraid . hee seeth every high thing below him ; and is king of all the children of pride . but because he is mortall , and subject to decay , as all other earthly creatures are ; and because there is that in heaven , ( though not on earth ) that he should stand in fear of , and whose lawes he ought to obey ; i shall in the next following chapters speak of his diseases , and the causes of his mortality ; and of what lawes of nature he is bound to obey . chap. xxix . of those things that weaken , or tend to the dissolution of a common-wealth . though nothing can be immortall , which mortals make ; yet , if men had the use of reason they pretend to , their common-wealths might be secured , at least , from perishing by internall diseases . for by the nature of their institution , they are designed to live , as long as man-kind , or as the lawes of nature , or as justice it selfe , which gives them life . therefore when they come to be dissolved , not by externall violence , but intestine disorder , the fault is not in men , as they are the matter ; but as they are the makers , and orderers of them . for men , as they become at last weary of irregular justling , and hewing one another , and desire with all their hearts , to conforme themselves into one firme and lasting edifice ; so for want , both of the art of making fit lawes , to square their actions by , and also of humility , and patience , to suffer the rude and combersome points of their present greatnesse to be taken off , they cannot without the help of a very able architect , be compiled , into any other than a crasie building , such as hardly lasting out their own time , must assuredly fall upon the heads of their posterity . amongst the infirmities therefore of a common-wealth , i will reckon in the first place , those that arise from an imperfect institution , and resemble the diseases of a naturall body , which proceed from a defectuous procreation . of which , this is one , that a man to obtain a kingdome , is sometimes content with lesse power , than to the peace , and defence of the common-wealth is necessarily required . from whence it commeth to passe , that when the exercise of the power layd by , is for the publique safety to be resumed , it hath the resemblance of an unjust act ; which disposeth great numbers of men ( when occasion is presented ) to rebell ; in the same manner as the bodies of children , gotten by diseased parents , are subject either to untimely death , or to purge the ill quality , derived from their vicious conception , by breaking out into biles and scabbs . and when kings deny themselves some such necessary power , it is not alwayes ( though sometimes ) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake ; but many times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure : wherein they reason not well ; because such as will hold them to their promises , shall be maintained against them by forraign common-wealths ; who in order to the good of their own subjects let slip few occasions to weaken the estate of their neighbours . so was thomas becket archbishop of canterbury , supported against henry the second , by the pope ; the subjection of ecclesiastiques to the common-wealth , having been dispensed with by william the conquerour at his reception , when he took an oath , not to infringe the liberty of the church . and so were the barons , whose power was by william rufus ( to have their help in transferring the succession from his elder brother , to himselfe , ) encreased to a degree , inconsistent with the soveraign power , maintained in their rebellion against king john , by the french. nor does this happen in monarchy onely . for whereas the stile of the antient roman common-wealth , was , the senate , and people of rome ; neither senate , nor people pretended to the whole power ; which first caused the seditions , of tiberius gracchus , caius gracchus , lucius saturninus , and others ; and afterwards the warres between the senate and the people , under marius and sylla ; and again under pompey and caesar , to the extinction of their democraty , and the setting up of monarchy . the people of athens bound themselves but from one onely action ; which was , that no man on pain of death should propound the renewing of the warre for the island of salamis ; and yet thereby , if solon had not caused to be given out he was mad , and afterwards in gesture and habit of a mad-man , and in verse , propounded it to the people that flocked about him , they had had an enemy perpetually in readinesse , even at the gates of their citie ; such dammage , or shifts , are all common-wealths forced to , that have their power never so little limited . in the second place , i observe the diseases of a common-wealth , that proceed from the poyson of seditious doctrines ; whereof one is , that every private man is judge of good and evill actions . this is true in the condition of meer nature , where there are no civill lawes ; and also under civill government , in such cases as are not determined by the law. but otherwise , it is manifest , that the measure of good and evill actions , is the civill law ; and the judge the legislator , who is alwayes representative of the common-wealth . from this false doctrine , men are disposed to debate with themselves , and dispute the commands of the common-wealth ; and afterwards to obey , or disobey them , as in their private judgements they shall think fit . whereby the common-wealth is distracted and weakened . another doctrine repugnant to civill society , is , that whatsoever a man does against his conscience , is sinne ; and it dependeth on the presumption of making himself judge of good and evill . for a mans conscience , and his judgement is the same thing ; and as the judgement , so also the conscience may be erroneous . therefore , thought he that is subject to no civill law , sinneth in all he does against his conscience , because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason ; yet it is not so with him that lives in a common-wealth ; because the law is the publique conscience , by which he hath already undertaken to be guided . otherwise in such diversity , as there is of private consciences , which are but private opinions , the common-wealth must needs be distracted , and no man dare to obey the soveraign power , farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes . it hath been also commonly taught , that faith and sanctity , are not to be attained by study and reason , but by supernaturall inspiration , or infusion . which granted , i see not why any man should render a reason of his faith ; or why every christian should not be also a prophet ; or why any man should take the law of his country , rather than his own inspiration , for the rule of his action . and thus wee fall again into the fault of taking upon us to judge of good and evill ; or to make judges of it , such private men as pretend to be supernaturally inspired , to the dissolution of all civill government . faith comes by hearing , and hearing by those accidents , which guide us into the presence of them that speak to us ; which accidents are all contrived by god almighty ; and yet are not supernaturall , but onely , for the great number of them that concurre to every effect , unobservable . faith , and sanctity , are indeed not very frequent ; but yet they are not miracles , but brought to passe by education , discipline , correction , and other naturall wayes , by which god worketh them in his elect , at such time as he thinketh fit . and these three opinions , pernicious to peace and government , have in this part of the world , proceeded chiefly from the tongues , and pens of unlearned divines ; who joyning the words of holy scripture together , otherwise than is agreeable to reason , do what they can , to make men think , that sanctity and naturall reason , cannot stand tog●…ther . a fourth opinion , repugnant to the nature of a common-wealth , is this , that he that hath the soveraign power , is subject to the civill lawes . it is true , that soveraigns are all subject to the lawes of nature ; because such lawes be divine , and cannot by any man , or common-wealth be abrogated . but to those lawes which the soveraign himselfe , that is , which the common-wealth maketh , he is not subject . for to be subject to lawes , is to be subject to the common-wealth , that is to the soveraign representative , that is to himselfe ; which is not subjection , but freedome from the lawes . which errour , because it setteth the lawes above the soveraign , setteth also a judge above him , and a power to punish him ; which is to make a new soveraign ; and again for the same reason a third , to punish the second ; and so continually without end , to the confusion , and dissolution of the common-wealth . a fif●…h doctrine , that tendeth to the dissolution of a common-wealth , is , that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods ; such , as excludeth the right of the soveraign . every man has indeed a propriety that excludes the right of every other subject : and he has it onely from the soveraign power ; without the protection whereof , every other man should have equall right to the same . but if the right of the soveraign also be excluded , he cannot performe the office they have put him into ; which is , to defend them both from forraign enemies , and from the injuries of one another ; and consequently there is no longer a common-wealth . and if the propriety of subjects , exclude not the right of the soveraign representative to their goods ; much lesse to their offices of judicature , or execution , in which they represent the soveraign himselfe . there is a sixth doctrine , plainly , and directly against the essence of a common-wealth ; and 't is this , that the soveraign power may be divided . for what is it to divide the power of a common-wealth , but to dissolve it ; for powers divided mutually destroy each other . and for these doctrines , men are chiefly beholding to some of those , that making profession of the lawes , endeavour to make them depend upon their own learning , and not upon the legislative power . and as false doctrine , so also often-times the example of different government in a neighbouring nation , disposeth men to alteration of the forme already setled . so the people of the jewes were stirred up to reject god , and to call upon the prophet samuel , for a king after the manner of the nations : so also the lesser cities of greece , were continually disturbed , with seditions of the aristocraticall , and democraticall factions ; one part of almost every common-wealth , desiring to imitate the lacedaemonians ; the other , the athenians . and i doubt not , but many men , have been contented to see the late troubles in england , out of an imitation of the low countries ; supposing there needed no more to grow rich , than to change , as they had done , the forme of their government . for the constitution of mans nature , is of it selfe subject to desire novelty : when therefore they are provoked to the same , by the neighbourhood also of those that have been enriched by it , it is almost impossible for them , not to be content with those that solicite them to change ; and love the first beginnings , though they be grieved with the continuance of disorder ; like hot blouds , that having gotten the itch , tear themselves with their own nayles , till they can endure the smart no longer . and as to rebellion in particular against monarchy ; one of the most frequent causes of it , is the reading of the books of policy , and histories of the antient greeks , and romans ; from which , young men , and all others that are unprovided of the antidote of solid reason , receiving a strong , and delightfull impression , of the great exploits of warre , atchieved by the conductors of their armies , receive withall a pleasing idea , of all they have done besides ; and imagine their great prosperity , not to have proceeded from the aemulation of particular men , but from the vertue of their popular forme of government : not considering the frequent seditions , and civill warres , produced by the imperfection of their policy . from the reading , i say , of such books , men have undertaken to kill their kings , because the greek and latine writers , in their books , and discourses of policy , make it lawfull , and laudable , for any man so to do ; provided before he do it , he call him tyrant . for they say not regicide , that is , killing of a king , but tyrannicide , that is , killing of a tyrant is lawfull . from the same books , they that live under a monarch conceive an opinion , that the subjects in a popular common-wealth enjoy liberty ; but that in a monarchy they are all slaves . i say , they that live under a monarchy conceive such an opinion ; not they that live under a popular government : for they find no such matter . in summe , i cannot imagine , how any thing can be more prejudiciall to a monarchy , than the allowing of such books to be publikely read , without present applying such correctives of discreet masters , as are fit to take away their venime : which venime i will not doubt to compare to the biting of a mad dogge , which is a disease the physicians call hydrophobia , or fear of water . for as he that is so bitten , has a continuall torment of thirst , and yet abhorreth water ; and is in such an estate , as if the poyson endeavoured to convert him into a dogge : so when a monarchy is once bitten to the quick , by those democraticall writers , that continually snarle at that estate ; it wanteth nothing more than a strong monarch , which neverthelesse out of a certain tyrannophobia , or feare of being strongly governed , when they have him , they abhorre . as there have been doctors , that hold there be three soules in a man ; so there be also that think there may be more soules , ( that is , more soveraigns , ) than one , in a common-wealth ; and set up a supremacy against the soveraignty , canons against lawes ; and a ghostly authority against the civill ; working on mens minds , with words and distinctions , that of themselves signifie nothing , but bewray ( by their obscurity ) that there walketh ( as some think invisibly ) another kingdome , as it were a kingdome of fayries , in the dark . now seeing it is manifest , that the civill power , and the power of the common-wealth is the same thing ; and that supremacy , and the power of making ( anons , and granting faculties , implyeth a common-wealth ; it followeth , that where one is soveraign , another supreme ; where one can make lawes , and another make canons ; there must needs be two common-wealths , of one & the same subjects ; which is a kingdome divided in it selfe , and cannot stand . for notwithstanding the insignificant distinction of temporall , and ghostly , they are still two kingdomes , and every subject is subject to two masters . for seeing the ghostly power challengeth the right to declare what is sinne , it challengeth by consequence to declare what is law , ( sinne being nothing but the transgression of the law ; ) and again , the civill power challenging to declare what is law , every subject must obey two masters , who both will have their commands be observed as law ; which is impossible . or , if it be but one kingdome , either the civill , which is the power of the common-wealth , must be subordinate to the ghostly , and then there is no soveraignty but the ghostly ; or the ghostly must be subordinate to the temporall , and then there is no supremacy but the temporall . when therefore these two powers oppose one another , the common-wealth cannot but be in great danger of civill warre , and dissolution . for the civill authority being more visible , and standing in the cleerer light of naturall reason cannot choose but draw to it in all times a very considerable part of the people : and the spirituall , though it stand in the darknesse of schoole distinctions , and hard words ; yet because the fear of darknesse , and ghosts , is greater than other fears , cannot want a party sufficient to trouble , and sometimes to destroy a common-wealth . and this is a disease which not unfitly may be compared to the epilepsie , or falling-sicknesse ( which the jewes took to be one kind of possession by spirits ) in the body naturall . for as in this disease , there is an unnaturall spirit , or wind in the head that obstructeth the roots of the nerves , and moving them violently , taketh away the motion which naturally they should have from the power of the soule in the brain , and thereby causeth violent , and irregular motions ( which men call convulsions ) in the parts ; insomuch as he that is seized therewith , falleth down sometimes into the water , and sometimes into the fire , as a man deprived of his senses ; so also in the body politique , when the spirituall power , moveth the members of a common-wealth , by the terrour of punishments , and hope of rewards ( which are the nerves of it , ) otherwise than by the civill power ( which is the soule of the common-wealth ) they ought to be moved ; and by strange , and hard words suffocates their understanding , it must needs thereby distract the people , and either overwhelm the common-wealth with oppression , or cast it into the fire of a civill warre . sometimes also in the meerly civill government , there be more than one soule : as when the power of levying mony , ( which is the nutritive faculty , ) has depended on a generall assembly ; the power of conduct and command , ( which is the motive faculty , ) on one man ; and the power of making lawes , ( which is the rationall faculty , ) on the accidentall consent , not onely of those two , but also of a third ; this endangereth the common-wealth , somtimes for want of consent to good lawes ; but most often for want of such nourishment , as is necessary to life , and motion . for although few perceive , that such government , is not government , but division of the common-wealth into three factions , and call it mixt monarchy ; yet the truth is , that it is not one independent common-wealth , but three independent factions ; nor one representative person , but three . in the kingdome of god , there may be three persons independent , without breach of unity in god that reigneth ; but where men reigne , that be subject to diversity of opinions , it cannot be so . and therefore if the king bear the person of the people , and the generall assembly bear also the person of the people , and another assembly bear the person of a part of the people , they are not one person , nor one soveraign , but three persons , and three soveraigns . to what disease in the naturall body of man , i may exactly compare this irregularity of a common-wealth , i know not . but i have seen a man , that had another man growing out of his side , with an head , armes , breast ; and stomach , of his own : if he had had another man growing out of his other side , the comparison might then have been exact . hitherto i have named such diseases of a common-wealth , as are of the greatest , and most present danger . there be other , not so great ; which neverthelesse are not unfit to be observed . as first , the difficulty of raising mony , for the necessary uses of the common-wealth ; especially in the approach of warre . this difficulty ariseth from the opinion , that every subject hath of a propriety in his lands and goods , exclusive of the soveraigns right to the use of the same . from whence it commeth to passe , that the soveraign power , which foreseeth the necessities and dangers of the common-wealth , ( finding the passage of mony to the publique treasure obstructed , by the tenacity of the people , ) whereas it ought to extend it selfe , to encounter , and prevent such dangers in their beginnings , contracteth it selfe as long as it can , and when it cannot longer , struggles with the people by stratagems of law , to obtain little summes , which not sufficing , he is fain at last violently to open the way for present supply , or perish ; and being put often to these extremities , at last reduceth the people to their due temper ; or else the common-wealth must perish . insomuch as we may compare this distemper very aptly to an ague ; wherein , the fleshy parts being congealed , or by venomous matter obstructed ; the veins which by their naturall course empty themselves into the heart , are not ( as they ought to be ) supplyed from the arteries , whereby there succeedeth at first a cold contraction , and trembling of the limbes ; and afterwards a hot , and strong endeavour of the heart , to force a passage for the bloud ; and before it can do that , contenteth it selfe with the small refreshments of such things as coole for a time , till ( if nature be strong enough ) it break at last the contumacy of the parts obstructed , and dissipateth the venome into sweat ; or ( if nature be too weak ) the patient dyeth . again , there is sometimes in a common-wealth , a disease , which resembleth the pleurisie ; and that is , when the treasure of the common-wealth , flowing out of its due course , is gathered together in too much abundance , in one , or a few private men , by monopolies , or by farmes of the publique revenues ; in the same manner as the blood in a pleurisie , getting into the membrane of the breast , breedeth there an inflammation , accompanied with a fever , and painfull stitches . also , the popularity of a potent subject , ( unlesse the common-wealth have very good caution of his fidelity , ) is a dangerous disease ; because the people ( which should receive their motion from the authority of the soveraign , ) by the flattery , and by the reputation of an ambitious man , are drawn away from their obedience to the lawes , to follow a man , of whose vertues , and designes they have no knowledge . and this is commonly of more danger in a popular government , than in a monarchy , because an army is of so great force , and multitude , as it may easily be made believe , they are the people . by this means it was , that julius caesar , who was set up by the people against the senate , having won to himselfe the affections of his army , made himselfe master , both of senate and people . and this proceeding of popular , and ambitious men , is plain rebellion ; and may be resembled to the effects of witchcraft . another infirmity of a common-wealth , is the immoderate greatnesse of a town , when it is able to furnish out of its own circuit , the number , and expence of a great army : as also the great number of corporations ; which are as it were many lesser common-wealths in the bowels of a greater , like wormes in the entrayles of a naturall man. to which may be added , the liberty of disputing against absolute power , by pretenders to politicall prudence ; which though bred for the most part in the lees of the people ; yet animated by false doctrines , are perpetually medling with the fundamentall lawes , to the molestation of the common-wealth ; like the little wormes , which physicians call ascarides . we may further adde , the insatiable appetite , or bulimia , of enlarging dominion ; with the incurable wounds thereby many times received from the enemy ; and the wens , of ununited conquests , which are many times a burthen , and with lesse danger lost , than kept ; as also the lethargy of ease , and consumption of riot and vain expence . lastly , when in a warre ( forraign , or intestine , ) the enemies get a finall victory ; so as ( the forces of the common-wealth keeping the field no longer ) there is no farther protection of subjects in their loyaly ▪ then is the common-wealth dissolved , and every man at liberty to protect himselfe by such courses as his own discretion shall suggest unto him . for the soveraign , is the publique soule , giving life and motion to the common-wealth ; which expiring , the members are governed by it no more , than the carcasse of a man , by his departed ( though immortall ) soule . for though the right of a soveraign monarch cannot be extinguished by the act of another ; yet the obligation of the members may . for he that wants protection , may seek it any where ; and when he hath it , is obliged ( without fraudulent pretence of having submitted himselfe out of fear , ) to protect his protection as long as he is able . but when the power of an assembly is once suppressed , the right of the same perisheth utterly ; because the assembly it selfe is extinct ; and consequently , there is no possibility for the soveraignty to re-enter . chap. xxx . of the office of the soveraign representative . the office of the soveraign , ( be it a monarch , or an assembly , ) consisteth in the end , for which he was trusted with the soveraign power , namely the procuration of the safety of the people ; to which he is obliged by the law of nature , and to render an account thereof to god , the author of that law , and to none but him . but by safety here , is not meant a bare preservation , but also all other contentments of life , which every man by lawfull industry , without danger , or hurt to the common-wealth , shall acquire to himselfe . and this is intended should be done , not by care applyed to individualls , further than their protection from injuries , when they shall complain ; but by a generall providence , contained in publique instruction , both of doctrine , and example ; and in the making , and executing of good lawes , to which individuall persons may apply their own cases . and because , if the essentiall rights of soveraignty ( specified before in the eighteenth chapter ) be taken away , the common-wealth is thereby dissolved , and every man returneth into the condition , and calamity of a warre with every other man , ( which is the greatest evill that can happen in this life ; ) it is the office of the soveraign , to maintain those rights entire ; and consequently against his duty , first , to transferre to another , or to lay from himselfe any of them . for he that deserteth the means , deserteth the ends ; and he deserteth the means , that being the soveraign , acknowledgeth himselfe subject to the civill lawes ; and renounceth the power of supreme judicature ; or of making warre , or peace by his own authority ; or of judging of the necessities of the common-wealth ; or of levying mony , and souldiers , when , and as much as in his own conscience he shall judge necessary ; or of making officers , and ministers both of warre , and peace ; or of appointing teachers , and examining what doctrines are conformable , or contrary to the defence , peace , and good of the people . secondly , it is against his duty , to let the people be ignorant , or mis-informed of the grounds , and reasons of those his essentiall rights ; because thereby men are easie to be seduced , and drawn to resist him , when the common-wealth shall require their use and exercise . and the grounds of these rights , have the rather need to be diligently , and truly taught ; because they cannot be maintained by any civill law , or terrour of legall punishment . for a civill law , that shall forbid rebellion , ( and such is all resistance to the essentiall rights of soveraignty , ) is not ( as a civill law ) any obligation , but by vertue onely of the law of nature , that forbiddeth the violation of faith ; which naturall obligation if men know not , they cannot know the right of any law the soveraign maketh . and for the punishment , they take it but for an act of hostility ; which when they think they have strength enough , they will endeavour by acts of hostility , to avoyd . as i have heard some say , that justice is but a word , without substance ; and that whatsoever a man can by force , or art , acquire to himselfe , ( not onely in the condition of warre , but also in a common-wealth , ) is his own , which i have already shewed to be false : so there be also that maintain , that there are no grounds , nor principles of reason , to sustain those essentiall rights , which make soveraignty absolute . for if there were , they would have been found out in some place , or other ; whereas we see , there has not hitherto been any common-wealth , where those rights have been acknowledged , or challenged . wherein they argue as ill , as if the savage people of america , should deny there were any grounds , or principles of reason , so to build a house , as to last as long as the materials , because they never yet saw any so well built . time , and industry , produce every day new knowledge . and as the art of well building , is derived from principles of reason , observed by industrious men , that had long studied the nature of materials , and the divers effects of figure , and proportion , long after mankind began ( though poorly ) to build : so , long time after men have begun to constitute common-wealths , imperfect , and apt to relapse into disorder , there may , principles of reason be found out , by industrious meditation , to make their constitution ( excepting by externall violence ) everlasting and such are those which i have in this discourse set forth : which whether they come not into the fight of those that have power to make use of them , or be neglected by them , or not , concerneth my particular interest , at this day , very little . but supposing that these of mine are not such principles of reason ; yet i am sure they are principles from authority of scripture ; as i shall make it appear , when i shall come to speak of the kingdome of god , ( administred by moses , ) over the jewes , his peculiar people by covenant . but they say again , that though the principles be right , yet common people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them . i should be glad , that the rich , and potent subjects of a kingdome , or those that are accounted the most learned , were no lesse incapable than they . but all men know , that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine , proceed not so much from the difficulty of the matter , as from the interest of them that are to learn. potent men , digest hardly any thing that setteth up a power to bridle their affections ; and learned men , any thing that discovereth their errours , and thereby lesseneth their authority : whereas the common-peoples minds , unlesse they be tainted with dependance on the potent , or scribbled over with the opinions of their doctors , are like clean paper , fit to receive whatsoever by publique authority shall be imprinted in them . shall whole nations be brought to acquiescé in the great mysteries of christian religion , which are above reason ; and millions of men be made believe , that the same body may be in innumerable places , at one and the same time , which is against reason ; and shall not men be able , by their teaching , and preaching , protected by the law , to make that received , which is so consonant to reason , that any unprejudicated man , needs no more to learn it , than to hear it ? i conclude therefore , that in the instruction of the people in the essentiall rights ( which are the naturall , and fundamentall lawes ) of soveraignty , there is no difficulty , ( whilest a soveraign has his power entire , ) but what proceeds from his own fault , or the fault of those whom he trusteth in the administration of the common-wealth ; and consequently , it is his duty , to cause them so to be instructed ; and not onely his duty , but his benefit also , and security , against the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his naturall person , from rebellion . and ( to descend to particulars ) the people are to be taught , first , that they ought not to be in love with any forme of government they see in their neighbour nations , more than with their own ; nor ( whatsoever present prosperity they behold in nations that are otherwise governed than they , ) to desire change . for the prosperity of a people ruled by an aristocraticall , or democraticall assembly , commeth not from aristocracy , nor from democracy , but from the obedience , and concord of the subjects : nor do the people flourish in a monarchy , because one man has the right to rule them , but because they obey him . take away in any kind of state , the obedience , ( and consequently the concord of the people , ) and they shall not onely not flourish , but in short time be dissolved . and they that go about by disobedience , to doe no more than reforme the common-wealth , shall find they do thereby destroy it ; like the foolish daughters of peleus ( in the fable ; ) which desiring to renew the youth of their decrepit father , did by the counsell of medea , cut him in pieces , and boyle him , together with strange herbs , but made not of him a new man. this desire of change , is like the breach of the first of gods commandements : for there god sayes , non habebis does alienos ; thou shalt not have the gods of other nations ; and in another place concerning kings , that they are gods. secondly , they are to be taught , that they ought not to be led with admiration of the vertue of any of their fellow subjects , how high soever he stand , nor how conspicuously soever he shine in the common-wealth ; nor of any assembly , ( except the soveraign assembly , ) so as to deferre to them any obedience , or honour , appropriate to the soveraign onely , whom ( in their particular stations ) they represent ; nor to receive any influence from them , but such as is conveighed by them from the soveraign authority . for that soveraign , cannot be imagined to love his people as he ought , that is not jealous of them , but suffers them by the flattery of popular men , to be seduced from their loyalty , as they have often been , not onely secretly , but openly , so as to proclaime marriage with them in facie ecclesiae by preachers ; and by publishing the same in the open streets : which may fitly be compared to the violation of the second of the ten commandements . thirdly , in consequence to this , they ought to be informed , how great a fault it is , to speak evill of the soveraign representative , ( whether one man , or an assembly of men ; ) or to argue and dispute his power , or any way to use his name irreverently , whereby he may be brought into contempt with his people , and their obedience ( in which the safety of the common-wealth consisteth ) slackened . which doctrine the third commandement by resemblance pointeth to . fourthly , seeing people cannot be taught this , nor when 't is taught , remember it , nor after one generation past , so much as know in whom the soveraign power is placed , without setting a part from their ordinary labour , some certain times , in which they may attend those that are appointed to instruct them ; it is necessary that some such times be determined , wherein they may assemble together , and ( after prayers and praises given to god , the soveraign of soveraigns ) hear those their duties told them , and the positive lawes , such as generally concern them all , read and expounded , and be put in mind of the authority that maketh them lawes . to this end had the jewes every seventh day , a sabbath , in which the law was read and expounded ; and in the solemnity whereof they were put in mind , that their king was god ; that having created the world in six dayes , he rested the seventh day ; and by their resting on it from their labour , that that god was their king , which redeemed them from their servile , and painfull labour in egypt , and gave them a time , after they had rejoyced in god , to take joy also in themselves , by lawfull recreation . so that the first table of the commandements , is spent all , in setting down the summe of gods absolute power ; not onely as god , but as king by pact , ( in peculiar ) of the jewes ; and may therefore give light , to those that have soveraign power conferred on them by the consent of men , to see what doctrine they ought to teach their subjects . and because the first instruction of children , dependeth on the care of their parents ; it is necessary that they should be obedient to them , whilest they are under their tuition ; and not onely so , but that also afterwards ( as gratitude requireth , ) they acknowledge the benefit of their education , by externall signes of honour . to which end they are to be taught , that originally the father of every man was also his soveraign lord , with power over him of life and death ; and that the fathers of families , when by instituting a common-wealth , they resigned that absolute power , yet it was never intended , they should lose the honour due unto them for their education . for to relinquish such right , was not necessary to the institution of soveraign power ; nor would there be any reason , why any man should desire to have children , or take the care to nourish , and instruct them , if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them , than from other men . and this accordeth with the fifth commandement . again , every soveraign ought to cause justice to be taught , which ( consisting in taking from no man what is his ) is as much asto say , to cause men to be taught not to deprive their neighbours , by violence , or fraud , of any thing which by the soveraign authority is theirs . of things held in propriety , those that are dearest to a man are his own life , & limbs ; and in the next degree , in most men , ) those that concern conjugall affection ; and after them riches and means of living . therefore the people are to be taught , to abstain from violence to one anothers person , by private revenges ; from violation of conjugall honour ; and from forcible rapine , and fraudulent surreption of one anothers goods . for which purpose also it is necessary they be shewed the evill consequences of false judgement , by corruption either of judges or witnesses , whereby the distinction of propriety is taken away , and justice becomes of no effect : all which things are intimated in the sixth , seventh , eighth , and ninth commandements . lastly , they are to be taught , that not onely the unjust facts , but the designes and intentions to do them , ( though by accident hindred , ) are injustice ; which consisteth in the pravity of the will , as well as in the irregularity of the act . and this is the intention of the tenth commandement , and the summe of the second table ; which is reduced all to this one commandement of mutuall charity , thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe : as the summe of the first table is reduced to the love of god ; whom they had then newly received as their king. as for the means , and conduits , by which the people may receive this instruction , wee are to search , by what means so many opinions , contrary to the peace of man-kind , upon weak and false principles , have neverthelesse been so deeply rooted in them . i mean those , which i have in the precedent chapter specified : as that men shall judge of what is lawfull and unlawfull , not by the law it selfe , but by their own consciences ; that is to say , by their own private judgements : that subjects sinne in obeying the commands of the common-wealth , unlesse they themselves have first judged them to be lawfull : that their propriety in their riches is such , as to exclude the dominion , which the common-wealth hath over the same : that it is lawfull for subjects to kill such , as they call tyrants : that the soveraign power may be divided , and the like ; which come to be instilled into the people by this means . they whom necessity , or covetousnesse keepeth attent on their trades , and labour ; and they , on the other side , whom superfluity , or sloth carrieth after their sensuall pleasures , ( which two sorts of men take up the greatest part of man-kind , ) being diverted from the deep meditation , which the learning of truth , not onely in the matter of naturall justice , but also of all other sciences necessarily requireth , receive the notions of their duty , chiefly from divines in the pulpit , and partly from such of their neighbours , or familiar acquaintance , as having the faculty of discoursing readily , and plausibly , seem wiser and better learned in cases of law , and conscience , than themselves . and the divines , and such others as make shew of learning , derive their knowledge from the universities , and from the schooles of law , or from the books , which by men eminent in those schooles , and universities have been published . it is therefore manifest , that the instruction of the people , dependeth wholly , on the right teaching of youth in the universities . but are not ( may some man say ) the universities of england learned enough already to do that ? or is it you will undertake to teach the universities ? hard questions . yet to the first , i doubt not to answer ; that till towards the later end of henry the eighth , the power of the pope , was alwayes upheld against the power of the common-wealth , principally by the universities ; and that the doctrines maintained by so many preachers , against the soveraign power of the king , and by so many lawyers , and others , that had their education there , is a sufficient argument , that though the universities were not authors of those false doctrines , yet they knew not how to plant the tru●… . for in such a contradiction of opinions , it is most certain , that they have not been sufficiently instructed ; and 't is no wonder , if they yet retain a relish of that subtile liquor , wherewith they were first seasoned , against the civill authority . but to the later question , it is not fit , nor needfull for me to say either i , or no : for any man that sees what i am doing , may easily perceive what i think . the safety of the people , requireth further , from him , or them that have the soveraign power , that justice be equally administred to all degrees of people ; that is , that as well the rich , and mighty , as poor and obscure persons , may be righted of the injuries done them ; so as the great , may have no greater hope of impunity , when they doe violence , dishonour , or any injury to the meaner sort , than when one of these , does the like to one of them : for in this consisteth equity ; to which , as being a precept of the law of nature , a soveraign is as much subject , as any of the meanest of his people . all breaches of the law , are offences against the common-wealth : but there be some , that are also against private persons . those that concern the common-wealth onely , may without breach of equity be pardoned ; for every man may pardon what is done against himselfe , according to his own diseretion . but an offence against a private man , cannot in equity be pardoned , without the consent of him that is injured ; or reasonable satisfaction . the inequality of subjects , proceedeth from the acts of soveraign power ; and therefore has no more place in the presence of the soveraign ; that is to say , in a court of justice , then the inequality between kings , and their subjects , in the presence of the king of kings . the honour of great persons , is to be valued for their beneficence , and the aydes they give to men of inferiour rank , or not at all . and the violences , oppressions , and injuries they do , are not extenuated , but aggravated by the greatnesse of their persons ; because they have least need to commit them . the consequences of this partiality towards the great , proceed in this manner . impunity maketh insolence ; insolence hatred ; and hatred , an endeavour to pull down all oppressing and contumelious greatnesse , though with the 〈◊〉 of the common wealth . to equall justice , appertaineth also the equall imposition of taxes ; the equality whereof dependeth not on the equality of riches , but on the equality of the debt , that every man oweth to the common-wealth for his defence . it is not enough , for a man to labour for the maintenance of his life ; but also to fight , ( if need be , ) for the securing of his labour . they must either do as the jewes did after their return from captivity , in re-edifying the temple , build with one hand , and hold the sword in the other ; or else they must hire others to fight for them . for the impositions that are layd on the people by the soveraign power , are nothing else but the wages , due to them that hold the publique sword , to defend private men in the exercise of severall trades , and callings . seeing then the benefit that every one receiveth thereby , is the enjoyment of life , which is equally dear to poor , and rich ; the debt which a poor man oweth them that defend his life , is the same which a rich man oweth for the defence of his ; saving that the rich , who have the service of the poor , may be debtors not onely for their own persons , but for many more . which considered , the equality of imposition , consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed , than of the riches of the persons that consume the same . for what reasonis there , that he which laboureth much , and sparing the fruits of his labour , consumeth little , should be more charged , then he that living idlely , getteth little , and spendeth all he gets ; seeing the one hath no more protection from the common-wealth , then the other ? but when the impositions , are layd upon those things which men consume , every man payeth equally for what he useth : nor is the common-wealth defrauded , by the luxurious waste of private men . and whereas many men , by accident unevitable , become unable to maintain themselves by their labour ; they ought not to be left to the charity of private persons ; but to be provided for , ( as far-forth as the necessities of nature require , by the lawes of the common-wealth . for as it is uncharitablenesse in any man , to neglect the impotent ; so it is in the soveraign of a common-wealth , to expose them to the hazard of such uncertain charity . but for such as have strong bodies , the case is otherwise : they are to be forced to work ; and to avoyd the excuse of not finding employment , there ought to be such lawes , as may encourage all manner of arts ; as navigation , agriculture , fishing , and all manner of manifacture that requires labour . the multitude of poor , and yet strong people still encreasing , they are to be transplanted into countries not sufficiently inhabited : where neverthelesse , they are not to exterminate those they find there ; but constrain them to inhabit closer together , and not range a great deal of ground , to snatch what they find ; but to court each little plot with art and labour , to give them their sustenance in due season . and when all the world is overchargd with inhabitants , then the last remedy of all is warre ; which provideth for every man , by victory , or death . to the care of the soveraign , belongeth the making of good lawes . but what is a good law ? by a good law , i mean not a. just law : for no law can be unjust . the law is made by the soveraign power , and all that is done by such power , is warranted , and owned by every one of the people ; and that which every man will have so , no man can say is unjust . it is in the lawes of a common-wealth , as in the lawes of gaming : whatsoever the gamesters all agree on , is injustice to none of them . a good law is that , which is needfull , for the good of the people , and withall perspicuous . for the use of lawes , ( which are but rules authorised ) is not to bind the people from all voluntary actions ; but to direct and keep them in such a motion , as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires , rashnesse , or indiscretion ; as hedges are set , not to stop travellers , but to keep them in the way . and therefore a law that is not needfull , having not the true end of a law , is not good. a law may be conceived to be good , when it is for the benefit of the soveraign ; though it be not necessary for the people ; but it is not so . for the good of the soveraign and people , cannot be separated . it is a weak soveraign , that has weak subjects ; and a weak people , whose soveraign wanteth power to rule them at his will. unnecessary lawes are not good lawes ; but trapps for mony : which where the right of soveraign power is acknowledged , are superfluous ; and where it is not acknowledged , unsufficient to defend the people . the perspicuity , consisteth not so much in the words of the law it selfe , as in a declaration of the causes , and motives , for which it was made . that is it , that shewes us the meaning of the legislator ; and the meaning of the legislator known , the law is more easily understood by few , than many words . for all words , are subject to ambiguity ; and therefore multiplication of words in the body of the law , is multiplication of ambiguity : besides it seems to imply , ( by too much diligence , ) that whosoever can evade the words , is without the compasse of the law. and this is a cause of many unnecessary processes . for when i consider how short were the lawes of antient times ; and how they grew by degrees still longer ; me thinks i see a contention between the penners , and pleaders of the law ; the former seeking to circumscribe the later ; and the later to evade their circumscriptions ; and that the pleaders have got the victory . it belongeth therefore to the office of a legislator , ( such as is in all common-wealths the supreme representative , be it one man , or an assembly , ) to make the reason perspicuous , why the law was made ; and the body of the law it selfe , as short , but in as proper , and significant termes , as may be . it belongeth also to the office of the soveraign , to make a right application of punishments , and rewards . and seeing the end of punishing is not revenge , and discharge of choler ; but correction , either of the offender , or of others by his example ; the severest punishments are to be inflicted for those crimes , that are of most danger to the publique ; such as are those which proceed from malice to the government established ; those that spring from contempt of justice ; those that provoke indignation in the multitude ; and those , which unpunished , seem authorised , as when they are committed by sonnes , servants , or favorites of men in authority : for indignation carrieth men , not onely against the actors , and authors of injustice ; but against all power that is likely to protect them ; as in the case of tarquin ; when for the insolent act of one of his sonnes , he was driven out of rome , and the monarchy it selfe dissolved . but crimes of infirmity ; such as are those which proceed from great provocation , from great fear , great need , or from ignorance whether the fact be a great crime , or not , there is place many times for lenity , without prejudice to the common-wealth ; and lenity when there is such place for it , is required by the law of nature . the punishment of the leaders , and teachers in a commotion ; not the poore seduced people , when they are punished , can profit the common-wealth by their example . to be severe to the people , is to punish that ignorance , which may in great part be imputed to the soveraign , whose fault it was , they were no better instructed . in like manner it belongeth to the office , and duty of the soveraign , to apply his rewards alwayes so , as there may arise from them benefit to the common-wealth : wherein consisteth their use , and end ; and is then done , when they that have well served the common-wealth , are with as little expence of the common treasure , as is possible , so well recompenced , as others thereby may be encouraged , both to serve the same as faithfully as they can , and to study the arts by which they may be enabled to do it better . to buy with mony , or preferment , from a popular ambitious subject , to be quiet , and desist from making ill impressions in the mindes of the people , has nothing of the nature of reward ; ( which is ordained not for disservice , but for service past ; ) nor a signe of gratitude , but of fear : nor does it tend to the benefit , but to the dammage of the publique . it is a contention with ambition , like that of hercules with the monster hydra , which having many heads , for every one that was vanquished , there grew up three . for in like manner , when the stubbornnesse of one popular man , is overcome with reward , there arise many more ( by the example ) that do the same mischiefe , in hope of like benefit : and as all forts of manifacture , so also malice encreaseth by being vendible . and though sometimes a civill warre , may be differred , by such wayes as that , yet the danger growes still the greater , and the publique ruine more assured . it is therefore against the duty of the soveraign , to whom the publique safety is committed , to reward those that aspire to greatnesse by disturbing the peace of their country , and not rather to oppose the beginnings of such men , with a little danger , than after a longer time with greater . another businesse of the soveraign , is to choose good counsellours ; i mean such , whose advice he is to take in the government of the common-wealth . for this word counsell , consilium , corrupted from considium , is of a large signification , and comprehendeth all assemblies of men that sit together , not onely to deliberate what is to be done hereafter , but also to judge of facts past , and of law for the present . i take it here in the first sense onely : and in this sense , there is no choyce of counsell , neither in a democracy , nor aristocracy ; because the persons counselling are members of the person counselled . the choyce of counsellours therefore is proper to monarchy ; in which , the soveraign that endeavoureth not to make choyce of those , that in every kind are the most able , dischargeth not his office as he ought to do . the most able counsellours , are they that have least hope of benefit by giving evill counsell , and most knowledge of those things that conduce to the peace , and defence of the common-wealth . it is a hard matter to know who expecteth benefit from publique troubles ; but the signes that guide to a just suspicion , is the soothing of the people in their unreasonable , or irremediable grievances , by men whose estates are not sufficient to discharge their accustomed expences , and may easily be observed by any one whom it concerns to know it . but to know , who has most knowledge of the publique affaires , is yet harder ; and they that know them , need them a great deale the lesse . for to know , who knowes the rules almost of any art , is a great degree of the knowledge of the same art ; because no man can be assured of the truth of anothers rules , but he that is first taught to understand them . but the best signes of knowledge of any art , are , much conversing in it , and constant good effects of it . good counsell comes not by lot , nor by inheritance ; and therefore there is no more reason to expect good advice from the rich , or noble , in matter of state , than in delineating the dimensions of a fortresse ; unlesse we shall think there needs no method in the study of the politiques , ( as there does in the study of geometry , ) but onely to be lookers on ; which is not so . for the politiques is the harder study of the two . whereas in these parts of europe , it hath been taken for a right of certain persons , to have place in the highest councell of state by inheritance ; it is derived from the conquests of the antient germans ; wherein many absolute lords joyning together to conquer other nations , would not enter in to the confederacy , without such priviledges , as might be marks of difference in time following , between their posterity , and the posterity of their subjects ; which priviledges being inconsistent with the soveraign power , by the favour of the soveraign , they may seem to keep ; but contending for them as their right , they must needs by degrees let them go , and have at last no further honour , then adhaereth naturally to their abilities . and how able soever be the counsellours in any affaire , the benefit of their counsell is greater , when they give every one his advice , and the reasons of it apart , than when they do it in an assembly , by way of orations ; and when they have praemeditated , than when they speak on the sudden ; both because they have more time , to survey the consequences of action ; and are lesse subject to be carried away to contradiction , through envy , emulation , or other passions arising from the difference of opinion . the best counsell ▪ in those things that concern not other nations , but onely the ease , and benefit the subjects may enjoy , by lawes that look onely inward , is to be taken from the generall informations , and complaints of the people of each province , who are best acquainted with their own wants , and ought therefore , when they demand nothing in derogation of the essentiall rights of soveraignty , to be diligently taken notice of . for without those essentiall rights , ( as i have often before said , ) the common-wealth cannot at all subsist . a commander of an army in chiefe , if he be not popular , shall not be beloved , nor feared as he ought to be by his army ; and consequently cannot performe that office with good successe . he must therefore be industrious , valiant , affable , liberall and fortunate , that he may gain an opinion both of sufficiency , and of loving his souldiers . this is popularity , and breeds in the souldiers both desire , and courage , to recommend themselves to his favour ; and protects the severity of the generall , in punishing ( when need is ) the mutinous , or negligent souldiers . but this love of souldiers , ( if caution be not given of the commanders fidelity , ) is a dangerous thing to soveraign power ; especially when it it is in the hands of an assembly not popular . it belongeth therefore to the safety of the people , both that they be good conductors , and faithfull subjects , to whom the soveraign commits his armies . but when the soveraign himselfe is popular ; that is , reverenced and beloved of his people , there is no danger at all from the popularity of a subject . for souldiers are never so generally unjust , as to side with their captain ; though they love him , against their soveraign , when they love not onely his person , but also his cause . and therefore those , who by violence have at any time suppressed the power of their lawfull soveraign , before they could settle themselves in his place , have been alwayes put to the trouble of contriving their titles , to save the people from the shame of receiving them . to have a known right to soveraign power , is so popular a quality , as he that has it needs no more , for his own part , to turn the hearts of his subjects to him , but that they see him able absolutely to govern his own family : nor , on the part of his enemies , but a disbanding of their armies . for the greatest and most active part of mankind , has never hetherto been well contented with the present . concerning the offices of one soveraign to another , which are comprehended in that law , which is commonly called the law of nations , i need not say any thing in this place ; because the law of nations , and the law of nature , is the same thing . and every soveraign hath the same right , in procuring the safety of his people , that any particular man can have , in procuring the safety of his own body . and the same law , that di●…tateth to men that have no civil government , what they ought to do , and what to avoyd in regard of one another , dictateth the same to common-wealths , that is , to the consciences of soveraign princes , and soveraign assemblies ; there being no court of naturall justice , but in the conscience onely ; where not man , but god raigneth ; whose lawes , ( such of them as oblige all mankind , ) in respect of god , as he is the author of nature , are naturall ; and in respect of the same god , as he is king of kings , are lawes . but of the kingdome of god , as king of kings , and as king also of a peculiar people , i shall speak in the rest of this discourse . chap. xxxi . of the kingdome of god by nature . that the condition of meer nature , that is to say , of absolute liberty , such as is theirs , that neither are soveraigns , nor subjects , is anarchy , and the condition of warre : that the praecepts , by which men are guided to avoyd that condition , are the lawes of nature : that a common-wealth , without soveraign power , is but a word , without substance , and cannot stand : that subjects owe to soveraigns , simple obedience , in all things , wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the lawes of god , i have sufficiently proved , in that which i have already written . there wants onely , for the entire knowledge of civill duty , to know what are those lawes of god. for without that , a man knows not , when he is commanded any thing by the civill power , whether it be contrary to the ●…aw of god , or not : and so , either by too much civill obedience , offends the divine majesty , or through feare of offending god , transgresses the commandements of the common-wealth . to avoyd both these rocks , it is necessary to know what are the lawes divine . and seeing the knowledge of all law , dependeth on the knowledge of the soveraign power ; i shall say something in that which followeth , of the kingdome of god. god is king , let the earth rejoyce , saith the psalmist . and again , god is king though the nations be angry ; and he that sitteth on the cherubins , though the earth be moved . whether men will or not , they must be subject alwayes to the divine power . by denying the existence , or providence of god , men may shake off their ease , but not their yoke . but to call this power of god , which extendeth it selfe not onely to man , but also to beasts , and plants , and bodies inanimate , by the name of kingdome , is but a metaphoricall use of the word . for he onely is properly said to raigne , that governs his subjects , by his word , and by promise of rewards to those that obey it , and by threatning them with punishment that obey it not . subjects therefore in the kingdome of god , are not bodies inanimate , nor creatures irrationall ; because they understand no precepts as his : nor atheists ; nor they that believe not that god has any care of the actions of mankind ; because they acknowledge no word for his , nor have hope of his rewards , or fear of his threatnings . they therefore that believe there is a god that goeverneth the world , and hath given praecepts , and propounded rewards , and punishments to mankind , are gods subjects ; all the rest , are to be understood as enemies . to rule by words , requires that such words be manifestly made known ; for else they are no lawes : for to the nature of lawes belongeth a sufficient , and clear promulgation , such as may take away the excuse of ignorance ; which in the lawes of men is but of one onely kind , and that is , proclamation , or promulgation by the voyce of man. but god declareth his lawes three wayes ; by the dictates of naturall reason , by revelation , and by the voyce of some man , to whom by the operation of miracles , he procureth credit with the rest . from hence there ariseth a triple word of god , rational , sensible , and prophetique : to which correspondeth a triple hearing ; right reason , sense supernaturall , and faith. as for sense supernaturall , which consisteth in revelation , or inspiration , there have not been any universall lawes so given , because god speaketh not in that manner , but to particular persons , and to divers men divers things . from the difference between the other two kinds of gods word , rationall , and prophetique , there may be attributed to god , a twofold kingdome , naturall , and prophetique : naturall , wherein he governeth as many of mankind as acknowledge his providence , by the naturall dictates of right reason ; and prophetique , wherein having chosen out one peculiar nation ( the jewes ) for his subjects , he governed them , and none but them , not onely by naturall reason , but by positive lawes , which he gave them by the mouths of his holy prophets . of the naturall kingdome of god i intend to speak in this chapter . the right of nature , whereby god reigneth over men , and punisheth those that break his lawes , is to be derived , not from his creating them , as if he required obedience , as of gratitude for his benefits ; but from his irresistible power . i have formerly shewn , how the soveraign right ariseth from pact : to shew how the same right may arise from nature , requires no more , but to shew in what case it is never taken away . seeing all men by nature had right to all things , they had right every one to reigne over all the rest . but because this right could not be obtained by force , it concerned the safety of every one , laying by that right , to set up men ( with soveraign authority ) by common consent , to rule and defend them : whereas if there had been any man of power irresistible ; there had been no reason , why he should not by that power have ruled , and defended both himselfe , and them , according to his own discretion . to those therefore whose power is irresistible , the dominion of all men adhaereth naturally by their excellence of power ; and consequently it is from that power , that the kingdome over men , and the right of afflicting men at his pleasure , belongeth naturally to god almighty ; not as creator , and gracious ; but as omnipotent . and though punishment be due for sinne onely , because by that word is understood affliction for sinne ; yet the right of afflicting , is not alwayes derived from mens sinne , but from gods power . this question , why evill men often prosper , and good men suffer adversity , has been much disputed by the antient , and is the same with this of ours , by what right god dispenseth the prosperities and adversities of this life ; and is of that difficulty , as it hath shaken the faith , not onely of the vulgar , but of philosophers , and which is more , of the saints , concerning the divine providence . how good ( saith david ) is the god of israel to those that are upright in heart ; and yet my feet were almost gone , my treadings had well-nigh slipt ; for i was grieved at the wicked , when i saw the ungodly in such prosperity . and job , how earnestly does he expostulate with god , for the many afflictions he suffered , notwithstanding his righteousnesse ? this question in the case of job , is decided by god himselfe , not by arguments derived from job's sinne , but his own power . for whereas the friends of job drew their arguments from his affliction to his sinne , and he defended himselfe by the conscience of his innocence , god himselfe taketh up the matter , and having justified the affliction by arguments drawn from his power , such as this , where wast thou when i layd the foundations of the earth , and the like , both approved job's innocence , and reproved the erroneous doctrine of his friends . conformable to this doctrine is the sentence of our saviour , concerning the man that was born blind , in these words , neither hath this man sinned , nor his fathers ; but that the works of god might be made manifest in him . and though it be said , that death entred into the world by sinne , ( by which is meant that if adam had never sinned , he had never dyed , that is , never suffered any separation of his soule from his body , ) it follows not thence , that god could not justly have afflicted him , though he had not sinned , as well as he afflicteth other living creatures , that cannot sinne . having spoken of the right of gods soveraignty , as grounded onely on nature ; we are to consider next , what are the divine lawes , or dictates of naturall reason ; which lawes concern either the naturall duties of one man to another , or the honour naturally due to our divine soveraign . the first are the same lawes of nature , of which i have spoken already in the . and . chapters of this treatise ; namely , equity , justice , mercy , humility , and the rest of the morall vertues . it remaineth therefore that we consider , what praecepts are dictated to men , by their naturall reason onely , without other word of god , touching the honour and worship of the divine majesty . honour consisteth in the inward thought , and opinion of the power , and goodnesse of another : and therefore to honour god , is to think as highly of his power and goodnesse , as is possible . and of that opinion , the externall signes appearing in the words , and actions of men , are called worship ; which is one part of that which the latines understand by the word cultus : for cultus signifieth properly , and constantly , that labour which a man bestowes on any thing , with a purpose to make benefit by it . now those things whereof we make benefit , are either subject to us , and the profit they yeeld , followeth the labour we bestow upon them , as a naturall effect ; or they are not subject to us , but answer our labour , according to their own wills. in the first sense the labour bestowed on the earth , is called culture ; and the education of children a culture of their mindes . in the second sense , where mens wills are to be wrought to our purpose , not by force , but by compleasance , it signifieth as much as courting , that is , a winning of favour by good offices ; as by praises , by acknowledging their power , and by whatsoever is pleasing to them from whom we look for any benefit . and this is properly worship : in which sense publicola , is understood for a worshipper of the people ; and cultus dei , for the worship of god. from internall honour , consisting in the opinion of power and goodnesse , arise three passions ; love , which hath reference to goodnesse ; and hope , and fear , that relate to power : and three parts of externall worship ; praise , magnifying , and blessing : the subject of praise , being goodnesse ; the subject of magnifying , and blessing , being power , and the effect thereof felicity . praise , and magnifying are signified both by words , and actions : by words , when we say a man is good , or great : by actions , when we thank him for his bounty , and obey his power . the opinion of the happinesse of another , can onely be expressed by words . there be some signes of honour , ( both in attributes and actions , ) that be naturally so ; as amongst attributes , good , just , liberall , and the like ; and amongst actions , prayers , thanks , and obedience . others are so by institution , or custome of men ; and in some times and places are honourable ; in others dishonourable ; in others indifferent : such as are the gestures in salutation , prayer , and thanksgiving , in different times and places , differently used . the former is naturall ; the later arbitrary worship . and of arbitrary worship , there bee two differences : for sometimes it is a commanded , sometimes voluntary worship : commanded , when it is such as hee requireth , who is worshipped : free , when it is such as the worshipper thinks fit . when it is commanded , not the words , or gesture , but the obedience is the worship . but when free , the worship consists in the opinion of the beholders : for if to them the words , or actions by which we intend honour , seem ridiculous , and tending to contumely ; they are no worship ; because no signes of honour ; and no signes of honour ; because a signe is not a signe to him that giveth it , but to him to whom it is made ; that is , to the spectator . again , there is a publique , and a private worship . publique , is the worship that a common-wealth performeth , as one person . private , is that which a private person exhibiteth . publique , in respect of the whole common-wealth , is free ; but in respect of particular men it is not so . private , is in secret free ; but in the sight of the multitude , it is never without some restraint , either from the lawes , or from the opinion of men ; which is contrary to the nature of liberty . the end of worship amongst men , is power . for where a man seeth another worshipped , he supposeth him powerfull , and is the readier to obey him ; which makes his power greater . but god has no ends : the worship we do him , proceeds from our duty , and is directed according to our capacity , by those rules of honour , that reason dictateth to be done by the weak to the more potent men , in hope of benefit , for fear of dammage , or in thankfulnesse for good already received from them . that we may know what worship of god is taught us by the light of nature , i will begin with his attributes . where , first , it is manifest , we ought to attribute to him existence : for no man can have the will to honour that , which he thinks not to have any beeing . secondly , that those philosophers , who sayd the world , or the soule of the world was god , spake unworthily of him ; and denyed his existence : for by god , is understood the cause of the world ; and to say the world is god , is to say there is no cause of it , that is , no god. thirdly , to say the world was not created , but eternall , ( seeing that which is eternall has no cause , ) is to deny there is a god. fourthly , that they who attributing ( as they think ) ease to god , take from him the care of man-kind ; take from him his honour : for it takes away mens love , and fear of him ; which is the root of honour . fifthly , in those things that signifie greatnesse , and power ; to say he is finite , is not to honour him : for it is not a signe of the will to honour god , to attribute to him lesse than we can ; and finite , is lesse than we can ; because to finite , it is easie to adde more . therefore to attribute figure to him , is not honour ; for all figure is finite : nor to say we conceive , and imagine , or have an idea of him , in our mind : for whatsoever we conceive is finite : nor to attribute to him parts , or totality ; which are the attributes onely of things finite : nor to say he is in this , or that place : for whatsoever is in place , is bounded , and finite : nor that he is moved , or resteth : for both these attributes ascribe to him place : nor that there be more gods than one ; because it implies them all finite : for there cannot be more than one infinite : nor to ascribe to him ( unlesse metaphorically , meaning not the passion , but the effect ) passions that partake of griefe ; as repentance , anger mercy : or of want ; as appetite , hope , desire ; or of any passive faculty : for passion , is power limited by somewhat else . and therefore when we ascribe to god a will , it is not to be understood , as that of man , for a rationall appetite ; but as the power , by which he effecteth every thing . likewise when we attribute to him sight , and other acts of sense ; as also knowledge , and understanding ; which in us is nothing else , but a tumult of the mind , raised by externall things that presse the organicall parts of mans body : for there is no such thing in god ; and being things that depend on naturall causes , cannot be attributed to him . hee that will attribute to god , nothing but what is warranted by naturall reason , must either use such negative attributes , as infinite , eternall , incomprehensible ; or superlatives , as most high , most great , and the like ; or indefinite , as good , just , holy , creator ; and in such sense as if he meant not to declare what he is , ( for that were to circumscribe him within the limits of our fancy , ) but how much wee admire him , and how ready we would be to obey him ; which is a signe of humility , and of a will to honour him as much as we can : for there is but one name to signifie our conception of his nature , and that is , i am : and but one name of his relation to us , and that is god ; in which is contained father , king , and lord. concerning the actions of divine worship , it is a most generall precept of reason , that they be signes of the intention to honour god ; such as are , first , prayers : for not the carvers , when they made images , were thought to make them gods ; but the people that prayed to them . secondly , thanksgiving ; which differeth from prayer in divine worship , no otherwise , than that prayers precede , and thanks succeed the benefit ; the end both of the one , and the other , being to acknowledge god , for author of all benefits , as well past , as future . thirdly , gifts ; that is to say , sacrifices , and oblations , ( if they be of the best , ) are signes of honour : for they are thanksgivings . fourthly , not to swear by any but god , is naturally a signe of honour : for it is a confession that god onely knoweth the heart ; and that no mans wit , or strength can protect a man against gods vengeance on the perjured . fifthly , it is a part of rationall worship , to speak considerately of god ; for it argues a fear of him , and fear , is a confession of his power . hence followeth , that the name of god is not to be used rashly , and to no purpose ; for that is as much , as in vain : and it is to no purpose , unlesse it be by way of oath , and by order of the common-wealth , to make judgements certain ; or between common-wealths , to avoyd warre . and that disputing of gods nature is contrary to his honour : for it is supposed , that in this naturall kingdome of god , there is no other way to know any thing , but by naturall reason ; that is , from the principles of naturall science ; which are so farre from teaching us any thing of gods nature , as they cannot teach us our own nature , nor the nature of the smallest creature living . and therefore , when men out of the principlès of naturall reason , dispute of the attributes of god , they but dishonour him : for in the attributes which we give to god , we are not to consider the signification of philosophicall truth ; but the signification of pious intention , to do him the greatest honour we are able . from the want of which consideration , have proceeded the volumes of disputation about the nature of god , that tend not to his honour , but to the honour of our own wits , and learning ; and are nothing else but inconsiderate , and vain abuses of his sacred name . sixthly , in prayers , thanksgiving , offerings and sacrifices , it is a dictate of naturall reason , that they be every one in his kind the best , and most significant of honour . as for example , that prayers , and thanksgiving , be made in words and phrases , not sudden , nor light , nor plebeian ; but beautifull , and well composed ; for else we do not god as much honour as we can . and therefore the heathens did absurdly , to worship images for gods : but their doing it in verse , and with musick , both of voyce , and instruments , was reasonable . also that the beasts they offered in sacrifice , and the gifts they offered , and their actions in worshipping , were full of submission , and commemorative of benefits received , was according to reason , as proceeding from an intention to honour him . seventhly , reason directeth not onely to worship god in secret ; but also , and especially , in publique , and in the sight of men : for without that , ( that which in honour is most acceptable ) the procuring others to honour him , is lost . lastly , obedience to his lawes ( that is , in this case to the lawes of nature , ) is the greatest worship of all . for as obedience is more acceptable to god than sacrifice ; so also to set light by his commandements , is the greatest of all contumelies . and these are the lawes of that divine worship , which naturall reason dictateth to private men . but seeing a common-wealth is but one person , it ought also to exhibite to god but one worship ; which then it doth , when it commandeth it to be exhibited by private men , publiquely . and this is publique worship ; the property whereof , is to be uniforme : for those actions that are done differently , by different men , cannot be said to be a publique worship . and therefore , where many sorts of worship be allowed , proceeding from the different religions of private men , it cannot be said there is any publique worship , nor that the common-wealth is of any religion at all . and because words ( and consequently the attributes of god ) have their signification by agreement , and constitution of men ; those attributes are to be held significative of honour , that men intend shall so be ; and whatsoever may be done by the wills of particular men , where there is no law but reason , may be done by the will of the common-wealth , by lawes civill . and because a common-wealth hath no will , nor makes no lawes , but those that are made by the will of him , or them that have the soveraign power ; it followeth , that those attributes which the soveraign ordaineth , in the worship of god , for signes of honour , ought to be taken and used for such , by private men in their publique worship . but because not all actions are signes by constitution ; but some are naturally signes of honour , others of contumely , these later ( which are those that men are ashamed to do in the sight of them they reverence ) cannot be made by humane power a part of divine worship ; nor the former ( such as are decent , modest , humble behaviour ) ever be separated from it . but whereas there be an infinite number of actions , and gestures , of an indifferent nature ; such of them as the common-wealth shall ordain to be publiquely and universally in use , as signes of honour , and part of gods worship , are to be taken and used for such by the subjects . and that which is said in the scripture , it is better to obey god than men , hath place in the kingdome of god by pact , and not by nature . having thus briefly spoken of the naturall kingdome of god , and his naturall lawes , i will adde onely to this chapter a short declaration of his naturall punishments . there is no action of man in this life , that is not the beginning of so long a chayn of consequences , as no humane providence , is high enough , to give a man a prospect to the end . and in this chayn , there are linked together both pleasing and unpleasing events ; in such manner , as he that will do any thing for his pleasure , must engage himselfe to suffer all the pains annexed to it ; and these pains , are the naturall punishments of those actions , which are the beginning of more harme than good. and hereby it comes to passe , that intemperance , is naturally punished with diseases ; rashnesse , with mischances ; injustice , with the violence of enemies ; pride , with ruine ; cowardise , with oppression ; negligent government of princes , with rebellion ; and rebellion , with slaughter . for seeing punishments are consequent to the breach of lawes ; naturall punishments must be naturally consequent to the breach of the lawes of nature ; and therfore follow them as their naturall , not arbitrary effects . and thus farre concerning the constitution , nature , and right of soveraigns ; and concerning the duty of subjects , derived from the principles of naturall reason . and now , considering how different this doctrine is , from the practise of the greatest part of the world , especially of these western parts , that have received their morall learning from rome , and athens ; and how much depth of morall philosophy is required , in them that have the administration of the soveraign power ; i am at the point of believing this my labour , as uselesse , as the common-wealth of plato ; for he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of state , and change of governments by civill warre , ever to be taken away , till soveraigns be philosophers . but when i consider again , that the science of naturall justice , is the onely science necessary for soveraigns , and their principall ministers ; and that they need not be charged with the sciences mathematicall , ( as by plato they are , ) further , than by good lawes to encourage men to the study of them ; and that neither plato , nor any other philosopher hitherto , hath put into order , and sufficiently , or probably proved all the theoremes of morall doctrine , that men may learn thereby , both how to govern , and how to obey ; i recover some hope , that one time or other , this writing of mine , may fall into the hands of a soveraign , who will consider it himselfe , ( for it is short , and i think clear , ) without the help of any interessed , or envious interpreter ; and by the exercise of entire soveraignty , in protecting the publique teaching of it , convert this truth of speculation , into the utility of practice . of a christian common-wealth . chap. xxxii . of the principles of christian politiques . i have derived the rights of soveraigne power , and the duty of subjects hitherto , from the principles of nature onely ; such as experience has found true , or consent ( concerning the use of words ) has made so ; that is to say , from the nature of men , known to us by experience , and from definitions ( of such words as are essentiall to all politicall reasoning ) universally agreed on . but in that i am next to handle , which is the nature and rights of a christian common-vvealth , whereof there dependeth much upon supernaturall revelations of the will of god ; the ground of my discourse must be , not only the naturall word of god , but also the propheticall . neverthelesse , we are not to renounce our senses , and experience ; nor ( that which is the undoubted word of god ) our naturall reason . for they are the talents which he hath put into our hands to negotiate , till the coming again of our blessed saviour ; and therefore not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicite aith , but employed in the purchase of justice , peace , and true religion . for though there be many things in gods word above reason ; that it is to say , which cannot by naturall reason be either demonstrated , or confuted ; yet there is nothing contrary to it ; but when it seemeth so , the fault is either in our unskilfull interpretation , or erroneous ratiocination . therefore , when any thing therein written is too hard for our examination , wee are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words ; and not to labour in sifting out a philosophicall truth by logick , of such mysteries as are not comprehensible , nor fall under any rule of naturall science . for it is with the mysteries of our religion , as with wholsome pills for the sick , which swallowed whole , have the vertue to cure ; but chewed , are for the most part cast up again without effect . but by the captivity of our understanding , is not meant a submission of the intellectuall faculty , to the opinion of any other man ; but of the will to obedience , where obedience is due . for sense , memory , understanding , reason , and opinion are not in our power to change ; but alwaies , and necessarily such , as the things we see , hear , and consider suggest unto us ; and therefore are not effects of our will , but our will of them . we then captivate our understanding and reason , when we forbear contradiction ; when we so speak , as ( by lawfull authority ) we are commanded ; and when we live accordingly ; which in sum , is trust , and faith reposed in him that speaketh , though the mind be incapable of any notion at all from the words spoken . when god speaketh to man , it must be either immediately ; or by mediation of another man , to whom he had formerly spoken by himself immediately . how god speaketh to a man immediately , may be understood by those well enough , to whom he hath so spoken ; but how the same should be understood by another , is hard , if not impossible to know . for if a man pretend to me , that god hath spoken to him supernaturally , and immediately , and i make doubt of it , i cannot easily perceive what argument he can produce , to oblige me to beleeve it . it is true , that if he be my soveraign , he may oblige me to obedience , so , as not by act or word to declare i beleeve him not ; but not to think any otherwise then my reason perswades me . but if one that hath not such authority over me , shall pretend the same , there is nothing that exacteth either beleefe , or obedience . for to say that god hath spoken to him in the holy scripture , is not to say god hath spoken to him immediately , but by mediation of the prophets , or of the apostles , or of the church , in such manner as he speaks to all other christian men . to say he hath spoken to him in a dream , is no more then to say he dreamed that god spake to him ; which is not of force to win beleef from any man , that knows dreams are for the most part naturall , and may proceed from former thoughts ; and such dreams as that , from selfe conceit , and foolish arrogance , and false opinion of a mans own godlinesse , or other vertue , by which he thinks he hath merited the favour of extraordinary revelation . to say he hath seen a vision , or heard a voice , is to say , that he hath dreamed between sleeping and waking : for in such manner a man doth many times naturally take his dream for a vision , as not having well observed his own slumbering . to say he speaks by supernaturall inspiration , is to say he finds an ardent desire to speak , or some strong opinion of himself , for which hee can alledge no naturall and sufficient reason . so that though god almighty can speak to a man , by dreams , visions , voice , and inspiration ; yet he obliges no man to beleeve he hath so done to him that pretends it ; who ( being a man ) may erre , and ( which is more ) may lie . how then can he , to whom god hath never revealed his wil immediately ( saving by the way of natural reason ) know when he is to obey , or not to obey his word , delivered by him , that sayes he is a prophet ? of prophets , of whom the k. of israel asked counsel , concerning the warre he made against ramoth gilead , only micaiah was a true one . the prophet that was sent to prophecy against the altar set up by ieroboam , though a true prophet , and that by two miracles done in his presence appears to be a prophet sent from god , was yet deceived by another old prophet , that perswaded him as from the mouth of god , to eat and drink with him . if one prophet deceive another , what certainty is there of knowing the will of god , by other way than that of reason ? to which i answer out of the holy scripture , that there be two marks , by which together , not asunder , a true prophet is to be known . one is the doing of miracles ; the other is the not teaching any other religion than that which is already established . asunder ( i say ) neither of these is sufficient . if a prophet rise amongst you , or a dreamer of dreams , and shall pretend the doing of amiracle , and the miracle come to passe ; if he say , let us follow strange gods , which thou hast not known ▪ thou shalt not hearken to him , &c. but that prophet and dreamer of dreams shall be put to death , because be hath spoken to you to revolt from the lord your god. in which words two things are to be observed ; first , that god wil not have miracles alone serve for arguments , to approve the prophets calling ; but ( as it is in the third verse ) for an experiment of the constancy of our adherence to himself . for the works of the egyptian sorcerers , though not so great as those of moses , yet were great miracles . secondly , that how great soever the miracle be , yet if it tend to stir up revolt against the king , or him that governeth by the kings authority , he that doth such miracle , is not to be considered otherwise than as sent to make triall of their allegiance . for these words , rev●…lt from the lord your god , are in this place equivalent to revolt from your king. for they had made god their king by pact at the foot of mount sinai ; who ruled them by moses only ; for he only spake with god , and from time to time declared gods commandements to the people . in like manner , after our saviour christ had made his disciples acknowledge him for the messiah , ( that is to say , for gods anointed , whom the nation of the iews daily expected for their king , but refused when he came , ) he omitted not to advertise them of the danger of miracles . there shall arise ( saith he ) false christs , and false prophets , and shall doe great wonders and miracles , even to the seducing ( if it were possible ) of the very elect. by which it appears , that false prophets may have the power of miracles ; yet are wee not to take their doctrin for gods word . st. paul says further to the galatians , that if himself , or an angell from heaven preach another gospel to them , than he had preached , let him be accursed .. that gospel was , that christ was king ; so that all preaching against the power of the king received , in consequence to these words , is by st. paul accursed . for his speech is addressed to those , who by his preaching had already received iesus for the christ , that is to say , for king of the iews . and as miracles , without preaching that doctrine which god hath established ; so preaching the true doctrine , without the doing of miracles is an unsufficient argument of immediate revelation . for if a man that teacheth not false doctrine , should pretend to bee a prophet without shewing any miracle , he is never the more to bee regarded for his pretence , as is evident by deut. . v. , . if thou say in thy heart , how shall we know that the word ( of the prophet ) is not that which the lord hath spoken . when the prophet shall have spoken in the name of the lord , that which shall not come to passe , that 's the word which the lord hath not spoken , but the prophet has spoken it out of the pride of his own heart , fear him not . but a man may here again ask , when the prophet hath foretold a thing , how shal we know whether it will come to passe or not ? for he may foretel it as a thing to arrive after a certain long time , longer then the time of mans life ; or indefinitely , that it will come to passe one time or other : in which case this mark of a prophet is unusefull ; and therefore the miracles that oblige us to beleeve a prophet , ought to be confirmed by an immediate , or a not long deferr'd event . so that it is manifest , that the teaching of the religion which god hath established , and the shewing of a p●…esent miracle , joined together , were the only marks whereby the scripture would have a true prophet , that is to say , immediate revelation to be acknowledged ; neither of them being singly sufficient to oblige any other man to regard what he saith . seeing therefore miracles now cease , we have no sign left , whereby to acknowledge the pretended revelations , or inspirations of any private man ; nor obligation to give ear to any doctrine , farther than it is conformable to the holy scriptures , which since the time of our saviour , supply the place , and sufficiently recompense the want of all other prophecy ; and from which , by wise and learned interpretation , and carefull ratiocination , all rules and precepts necessary to the knowledge of our duty both to god and man , without enthusiasme , or supernaturall inspiration , may easily be deduced . and this scripture is it , out of which i am to take the principles of my discourse , concerning the rights of those that are the supream governors on earth , of christian common-wealths ; and of the duty of christian subjects towards their soveraigns . and to that end , i shall speak in the next chapter , of the books , writers , scope and authority of the bible . chap. xxxiii . of the number , antiquity , scope , authority , and interpreters of the books of holy scripture . by the books of holy scripture , are understood those , which ought to be the canon , that is to say , the rules of christian life . and because all rules of life , which men are in conscience bound to observe , are laws ; the question of the scripture , is the question of what is law throughout all christendome , both naturall , and civill . for though it be not determined in scripture , what laws every christian king shall constitute in his own dominions ; yet it is determined what laws he shall not constitute . seeing therefore i have already proved , that soveraigns in their own dominions are the sole legislators ; those books only are canonicall , that is , law , in every nation , which are established for such by the soveraign authority . it is true , that god is the soveraign of all soveraigns ; and therefore , when he speaks to any subject , he ought to be obeyed , whatsoever any earthly potentate command to the contrary . but the question is not of obedience to god , but of when , and what god hath said ; which to subjects that have no supernaturall revelation , cannot be known , but by that naturall reason , which guided them , for the obtaining of peace and justice , to obey the authority of their severall common-wealths ; that is to say , of their lawfull soveraigns . according to this obligation , i can acknowledge no other books of the old testament , to be holy scripture , but those which have been commanded to be acknowledged for such , by the authority of the church of england . what books these are , is sufficiently known , without a catalogue of them here ; and they are the same that are acknowledged by st. ierome , who holdeth the rest , namely , the wisdome of solomon , ecclesiasticus , iudith , tobias , the first and the second of maccabees , ( though he had seen the first in hebrew ) and the third and fourth of esdras , for apocrypha . of the canonicall , iosephus a learned iew , that wrote in the time of the emperour domitian , reckoneth twenty two , making the number agree with the hebrew alphabet . st. ierome does the same , though they reckon them in different manner . for iosephus numbers five books of moses , thirteen of prophets , that writ the history of their own times ( which how it agrees with the prophets writings contained in the bible wee shall see hereafter ) , and four of hymnes and morall precepts . but st. ierome reckons five books of moses , eight of prophets , and nine of other holy writ , which he calls of hagiographa . the septuagint , who were . learned men of the iews , sent for by ptoiemy king of egypt , to translate the iewish law , out of the hebrew into the greek , have left us no other for holy scripture in the greek tongue , but the same that are received in the church of england . as for the books of the new testament , they are equally acknowledged for canon by all christian churches , and by all sects of christians , that admit any books at all for canonicall . who were the originall writers of the severall books of holy scripture , has not been made evident by any sufficient testimony of other history , ( which is the only proof of matter of fact ) ; nor can be by any arguments of naturall reason : for reason serves only to convince the truth ( not of fact , but ) of consequence . the light therefore that must guide us in this question , must be that which is held out unto us from the bookes themselves : and this light , though it shew us not the writer of every book , yet it is not unusefull to give us knowledge of the time , wherein they were written . and first , for the pentateuch , it is not argument enough that they were written by moses , because they are called the five books of moses ▪ no more than these titles , the book of ioshua , the book of iudges , the book of ruth , and the books of the kings , are arguments sufficient to prove , that they were written by ioshua , by the iudges , by ruth , and by the kings . for in titles of books , the subject is marked , as often as the writer . the history of livy , denotes the writer ; but the history of scanderbeg , is denominated from the subject . we read in the last chapter of deuteronomie , ver . . concerning the sepulcher of moses , that no man knoweth of his sepulcher ●…o this day , that is , to the day wherein those words were written . it is therefore manifest , that those words were written after his interrement . for it were a strange interpretation , to say moses spake of his own sepulcher ( though by prophesie ) , that it was not found to that day , wherein he was yet living . but it may perhaps be alledged , that the last chapter only , not the whole pen●… , was written by some other man , but the rest not : let us therefore consider that which we find in the book of genesis , chap. . ver . . and abraham passed through the land to the place of sichem , unto the plain of moreh , and the canaanite was then in the land ; which must needs bee the words of one that wrote when the canaanite was not in the land ; and consequently , not of moses , who dyed before he came into it . likewise numbers . ver . . the writer citeth another more ancient book , entituled , the book of the warres of the lord , wherein were registred the acts of moses , at the red-sea , and at the brook of arnon . it is therefore sufficiently evident , that the five books of moses were written after his time , though how long after it be not so manifest . but though moses did not compile those books entirely , and in the form we have them ; yet he wrote all that which hee is there said to have written : as for example , the volume of the law , which is contained , as it seemeth , in the of deuteronomie , and the following chapters to the . which was also commanded to be written on stones , in their entry into the land of canaan . and this also did moses himself write , and delivered to the priests and elders of israel , to be read every seventh year to all israel , at their assembling in the feast of tabernacles . and this is that law which god commanded , that their kings ( when they should have established that form of government ) should take a copy of from the priests and levites ; and which moses commanded the priests and levites to lay in the side of the arke ; and the same which having been lost , was long time after found again by hilkiah , and sent to king iosias , who causing it to be read to the people , renewed the covenant between god and them . that the book of ioshua was also written long after the time of io●…a , may be gathered out of many places of the book it self . ioshua had set up twelve stones in the middest of iordan , for a monument of their passage ; of which the writer saith thus , they are there unto this day ; for unto this day , is a phrase that signifieth a time past , beyond the memory of man. in like manner , upon the saying of the lord , that he had rolled off from the people the reproach of egypt , the writer saith , the place is called gilgal unto this day ; which to have said in the time of ioshua had been improper . so also the name of the valley of achor , from the trouble that achan raised in the camp , the writer saith , remaineth unto this day ; which must needs bee therefore long after the time of ioshua . arguments of this kind there be many other ; as iosh. . . . . . . . . the same is manifest by like arguments of the book of iudges , chap. . , . . . . . . . . . and ruth . . but especially iudg. . . where it is said , that jonathan and his sonnes were priests to the tribe of dan , untill the day of the captivity of the land . that the books of samuel were also written after his own time , there are the like arguments , sam. . . . , . . . & . . where , after david had adjudged equall part of the spoiles , to them that guarded the ammunition , with them that fought , the writer saith , he made it a statute and an ordinance to israel to this day . again , when david ( displeased , that the lord had slain vzzah , for putting out his hand to sustain the ark , ) called the place perez-vzzah , the writer faith , it is called so to this day : the time therefore of the writing of that book , must be long after the time of the fact ; that is , long after the time of david . as for the two books of the kings , and the two books of the chronicles , besides the places which mention such monuments , as the writer saith , remained till his own days ; such as are kings . . . . . . . . kings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . chron. . . . . it is argument sufficient they were written after the captivity in babylon , that the history of them is continued till that time . for the facts registred are alwaies more ancient than the register ; and much more ancient than such books as make mention of , and quote the register ; as these books doe in divers places , referring the reader to the chronicles of the kings of iuda , to the chronicles of the kings of israel , to the books of the prophet samuel , of the prophet nathan , of the prophet ahijah ; to the vision of iehdo , to the books of the prophet serveiah , and of the prophet addo . the books of esdras and nehemiah were written certainly after their return from captivity ; because their return , the re-edification of the walls and houses of ierusalem , the renovation of the covenant , and ordination of their policy are therein contained . the history of queen esther is of the time of the captivity ; and therefore the writer must have been of the same time , or after it . the book of iob hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written : and though it appear sufficiently ( ezektel . . and iames . . ) that he was no fained person ; yet the book it self seemeth not to be a history , but a treatise concerning a question in ancient time much disputed , why wicked men have often prospered in this world , and good men have been afflicted ; and it is the more probable , because from the beginning , to the third verse of the third chapter , where the complaint of iob beginneth , the hebrew is ( as st. jerome testifies ) in prose ; and from thence to the sixt verse of the last chapter in hexameter verses ; and the rest of that chapter again in prose . so that the dispute is all in verse ; and the prose is added , but as a preface in the beginning , and an epilogue in the end but verse is no usuall stile of such , as either are themselves in great pain , as job ; or of such as come to comfort them , as his friends ; but in philosophy , especially morall philosophy , in ancient time frequent . the psalmes were written the most part by david , for the use of the quire. to these are added some songs of moses , and other holy men ; and some of them after the return from the captivity , as the . and the . whereby it is manifest that the psalter was compiled , and put into the form it now hath , after the return of the jews from babylon . the proverbs , being a collection of wise and godly sayings , partly of solomon , partly of agur the son of jakeh , and partly of the mother of king le●…el , cannot probably be thought to have been collected by solomon , rather then by agur , or the mother of lemuel ; and that , though the sentences be theirs , yet the collection or compiling them into this one book , was the work of some other godly man , that lived after them all . the books of ecclesiastes and the canticles have nothing that was not solomons , except it be the titles , or inscriptions . for the words of the preacher , the son of david , king in jerusalem ; and , the song of songs , which is solomon's , seem to have been made for distinctions sake , then , when the books of scripture were gathered into one body of the law ; to the end , that not the doctrine only , but the authors also might be extant . of the prophets , the most ancient , are sophoniah , jonas , amos , hosea , isaiah and michaiah , who lived in the time of amaziah , and azariah , otherwise ozias , kings of judah . but the book of jonas is not properly a register of his prophecy , ( for that is contained in these few words , fourty dayes and ninivy shall be destroyed , ) but a history or narration of his frowardnesse and disputing gods commandements ; so that there is small probability he should be the author , seeing he is the subject of it . but the book of amos is his prophecy . jeremiah , abdias , nahum , and habakkuk prophecyed in the time of josiah . ezekiel , daniel , aggeus , and zacharias , in the captivity . when ioel and malachi prophecyed , is not evident by their writings . but considering the inscriptions , or titles of their books , it is manifest enough , that the whole scripture of the old testament , was set forth in the form we have it , after the return of the iews from their captivity in babylon , and before the time of ptolemaeus philadelphus , that caused it to bee translated into greek by seventy men , which were sent him out of iudea for that purpose . and if the books of apocrypha ( which are recommended to us by the church , though not for canonicall , yet for profitable books for our instruction ) may in this point be credited , the scripture was set forth in the form wee have it in , by esd●… ; as may appear by that which he himself saith , in the second book , chapt . . verse , , &c. where speaking to god , he saith thus , thy law is burnt ; therefore no man knoweth the things which thou hast done , or the works that are to begin . but if i have found grace before thee , send down the holy spirit into me , and i shall write all that hath been done in the world , since the beginning , which were written in thy law , that men may find thy path , and that they which will live in the later days , may live . and verse . and it came to passe when the forty dayes were fulfilled , that the highest spake , saying , the first that thou hast written , publish openly , that the worthy and unworthy may read it ; but keep the seventy last , that thou mayst deliver them onely to such as be wise among the people . and thus much concerning the time of the writing of the bookes of the old testament . the writers of the new testament lived all in lesse then an age after christs ascension , and had all of them seen our saviour , or been his disciples , except st. paul , and st. luke ; and consequently whatsoever was written by them , is as ancient as the time of the apostles . but the time wherein the books of the new testament were received , and acknowledged by the church to be of their writing , is not altogether so ancient . for , as the bookes of the old testament are derived to us , from no other time then that of esdras , who by the direction of gods spirit retrived them , when they were lost : those of the new testament , of which the copies were not many , nor could easily be all in any one private mans hand , cannot bee derived from a higher time , than that wherein the governours of the church collected , approved , and recommended them to us , as the writings of those apostles and disciples , under whose names they go . the first enumeration of all the bookes , both of the old , and new testament , is in the canons of the apostles , supposed to be collected by clement the first ( after st. peter ) bishop of rome . but because that is but supposed , and by many questioned , the councell of laodicea is the first we know , that recommended the bible to the then christian churches , for the writings of the prophets and apostles : and this councell was held in the . yeer after christ. at which time , though ambition had so far prevailed on the great doctors of the church , as no more to esteem emperours , though christian , for the shepherds of the people , but for sheep ; and emperours not christian , for wolves ; and endeavoured to passe their doctrine , not for counsell , and information , as preachers ; but for laws , as absolute governours ; and thought such frauds as tended to make the people the more obedient to christian doctrine , to be pious ; yet i am perswaded they did not therefore falsifie the scriptures , though the copies of the books of the new testament , were in the hands only of the ecclesiasticks ; because if they had had an intention so to doe , they would surely have made them more favorable to their power over christian princes , and civill soveraignty , than they are . i see not therefore any reason to doubt , but that the old , and new testament , as we have them now , are the true registers of those things , which were done and said by the prophets , and apostles . and so perhaps are some of those books which are called apocrypha , and left out of the canon , not for inconformity of doctrine with the rest , but only because they are not found in the hebrew . for after the conquest of asia by alexander the great , there were few learned jews , that were not perfect in the greek tongue . for the seventy interpreters that converted the bible into greek , were all of them hebrews ; and we have extant the works of philo and josephus both jews , written by them eloquently in greek . but it is not the writer , but the authority of the church , that maketh a book canonicall . and although these books were written by divers men , yet it is manifest the writers were all indued with one and the same spirit , in that they conspire to one and the same end , which is the setting forth of the rights of the kingdome of god , the father , son , and holy ghost . for the book of genesis , deriveth the genealogy of gods people , from the creation of the world , to the going into egypt : the other four books of moses , contain the election of god for their king , and the laws which hee prescribed for their government : the books of joshua , judges , ruth , and samuel , to the time of saul , describe the acts of gods people , till the time they cast off gods yoke , and called for a king , after the manner of their neighbour nations : the rest of the history of the old testament , derives the succession of the line of david , to the captivity , out of which line was to spring the restorer of the kingdome of god , even our blessed saviour god the son , whose coming was foretold in the bookes of the prophets , after whom the evangelists write his life , and actions , and his claim to the kingdome , whilst he lived on earth : and lastly , the acts , and epistles of the apostles , declare the coming of god , the holy ghost , and the authority he left with them , and their successors , for the direction of the jews , and for the invitation of the gentiles . in summe , the histories and the prophecies of the old testament , and the gospels and epistles of the new testament , have had one and the same scope , to convert men to the obedience of god ; . in moses , and the priests ; . in the man christ ; and . in the apostles and the successors to apostolicall power . for these three at several times did represent the person of god : moses , and his successors the high priests , and kings of judah , in the old testament : christ himself , in the time he lived on earth : and the apostles , and their successors , from the day of pentecost ( when the holy ghost descended on them ) to this day . it is a question much disputed between the divers sects of christian religion , from whence the scriptures derive their authority ; which question is also propounded sometimes in other terms , as , how wee know them to be the word of god , or , why we b●…leeve them to be so : and the difficulty of resolving it , ariseth chiefly from the impropernesse of the words wherein the question it self is couched . for it is beleeved on all hands , that the first and originall author of them is god ; and consequently the question disputed , is not that . again , it is manifest , that none can know they are gods word , ( though all true christians beleeve it , ) but those to whom god himself hath revealed it supernaturally ; and therefore the question is not rightly moved , of our know edge of it . lastly , when the question is propounded of our beleefe ; because some are moved to beleeve for one , and others for other reasons , there can be rendred no one generall answer for them all . the question truly stated is , by what authority they are made law. as far as they differ not from the laws of nature , there is no doubt , but they are the law of god , and carry their authority with them , legible to all men that have the use of naturall reason : but this is no other authority , then that of all other morall doctrine consonant to reason ; the dictates whereof are laws , not made , but eternall . if they be made law by god himselfe , they are of the nature of written law , which are laws to them only to whom god hath so sufficiently published them , as no man can excuse himself , by saying , he knew not they were his . he therefore , to whom god hath not supernaturally revealed , that they are his , nor that those that published them , were sent by him , is not obliged to obey them , by any authority , but his , whose commands have already the force of laws ; that is to say , by any other authority , then that of the common-wealth , residing in the soveraign , who only has the legislative power . again , if it be not the legislative authority of the common-wealth , that giveth them the force of laws , it must bee some other authority derived from god , either private , or publique : if private , it obliges onely him , to whom in particular god hath been pleased to reveale it . for if every man should be obliged , to take for gods law , what particular men , on pretence of private inspiration , or revelation , should obtrude upon him , ( in such a number of men , that out of pride , and ignorance , take their own dreams , and extravagant fancies , and madnesse , for testimonies of gods spirit ; or out of ambition , pretend to such divine testimonies , falsely , and contrary to their own consciences , ) it were impossible that any divine law should be acknowledged . if publique , it is the authority of the common-wealth , or of the church . but the church , if it be one person , is the same thing with a common-wealth of christians ; called a common-wealth , because it consisteth of men united in one person , their soveraign ; and a church , because it consisteth in christian men , united in one christian soveraign . but if the church be not one person , then it hath no authority at all ; it can neither command , nor doe any action at all ; nor is capable of having any power , or right to any thing ; nor has any will , reason , nor voice ; for all these qualities are personall . now if the whole number of christians be not contained in one common-wealth , they are not one person ; nor is there an universall church that hath any authority over them ; and therefore the scriptures are not made laws , by the universall church : or if it bee one common-wealth , then all christian monarchs , and states are private persons , and subject to bee judged , deposed , and punished by an universall soveraigne of all christendome . so that the question of the authority of the scriptures , is reduced to this , whether christian kings , and the soveraigne assemblies in christian common-wealths , be absolute in their own territories , immediately under god ; or subject to one vicar of christ , constituted of the vniversall church ; to bee judged , condemned , deposed , and put to death , as hee shall think expedient , or necessary for the common good . which question cannot bee resolved , without a more particular consideration of the kingdome of god ; from whence also , wee are to judge of the authority of interpreting the scripture . for , whosoever hath a lawfull power over any writing , to make it law , hath the power also to approve , or disapprove the interpretation of the same . chap. xxxiv . of the signification of spirit , angel , and inspiration in the books of holy scripture . seeing the foundation of all true ratiocination , is the constant signification of words ; which in the doctrine following , dependeth not ( as in naturall science ) on the will of the writer , nor ( as in common conversation ) on vulgar use , but on the sense they carry in the scripture ; it is necessary , before i proceed any further , to determine , out of the bible , the meaning of such words , as by their ambiguity , may render what i am to inferre upon them , obscure , or disputable . i will begin with the words body , and spirit , which in the language of the schools are termed , substances , corporeall , and incorporeall . the word body , in the most generall acceptation , signifieth that which filleth , or occupyeth some certain room , or imagined place ; and dependeth not on the imagination , but is a reall part of that we call the vniverse . for the vniverse , being the aggregate of all bodies , there is no reall part thereof that is not also body ; nor any thing properly a body , that is not also part of ( that aggregate of all bodies ) the vniverse . the same also , because bodies are subject to change , that is to say , to variety of apparence to the sense of living creatures , is called substance , that is to say , subject , to various accidents ; as sometimes to be moved , sometimes to stand still ; and to seem to our senses sometimes hot , sometimes cold , sometimes of one colour , smel , tast , or sound , somtimes of another . and this diversity of seeming , ( produced by the diversity of the operatiō of bodies , on the organs of our sense ) we attribute to alterations of the bodies that operate , & call them accidents of those bodies . and according to this acceptation of the word , substance and body , signifie the same thing ; and therefore substance incorporeall are words , which when they are joined together , destroy one another , as if a man should say , an incorporeall body . but in the sense of cōmon people , not all the universe is called body , but only such parts thereof as they can discern by the sense of feeling , to resist their force , or by the sense of their eyes , to hinder them from a farther prospect . therefore in the common language of men , aire , and aeriall substances , use not to be taken for bodies , but ( as often as men are sensible of their effects ) are called wind , or breath , or ( because the same are called in the latine spiritus ) spirits ; as when they call that aeriall substance , which in the body of any living creature , gives it life and motion , vitall and animall spirits . but for those idols of the brain , which represent bodies to us , where they are not , as in a looking-glasse , in a dream , or to a distempered brain waking , they are ( as the apostle saith generally of all idols ) nothing ; nothing at all , i say , there where they seem to be●… ; and in the brain it self , nothing but tumult , proceeding either from the action of the objects , or from the disorderly agitation of the organs of our sense . and men , that are otherwise imployed , then to search into their causes , know not of themselves , what to call them ; and may therefore easily be perswaded , by those whose knowledge they much reverence , some to call them bodies , and think them made of aire compacted by a power supernaturall , because the sight judges them corporeall ; and some to call them spirits , because the sense of touch discerneth nothing in the place where they appear , to resist their fingers : so that the proper signification of spirit in common speech , is either a subtile , fluid , and invisible body , or a ghost , or other idol or phantasme of the imagination . but for metaphoricall significations , there be many : for sometimes it is taken for disposition or inclination of the mind ; as when for the disposition to controwl the sayings of other men , we say , a spirit of contradiction ; for a disposition to uncleannesse , an unclean spirit ▪ for perversenesse , a froward spirit ; for sullennesse , a dumb spirit , and for inclination to godlinesse , and gods service , the spirit of god : sometimes for any eminent ability , or extraordinary passion , or disease of the mind , as when great wisdome is called the spirit of wisdome ; and mad men are said to be possessed with a spirit . other signification of spirit i find no where any ; and where none of these can satisfie the sense of that word in scripture , the place falleth not under humane understanding ; and our faith therein consisteth not in our opinion , but in our submission ; as in all places where god is said to be a spirit ; or where by the spirit of god , is meant god himselfe . for the nature of god is incomprehensible ; that is to say , we understand nothing of what he is , but only that he is ; and therefore the attributes we give him , are not to tell one another , what he is , nor to signifie our opinion of his nature , but our desire to honor him with such names as we conceiv●… most honorable amongst our selves . gen. . . the spirit of god moved upon the face of the waters . here if by the spirit of god be meant god himself , then is motion attributed to god , and consequently place , which are intelligible only of bodies , and not of substances incorporeall ; and so the place is above our understanding , that can conceive nothing moved that changes not place , or that has not dimension ; and whatsoever has dimension , is body . but the meaning of those words is best understood by the like place , gen. . . where , when the earth was covered with waters , as in the beginning , god intending to abate them , and again to discover the dry land , useth the like words , i will bring my spirit upon the earth , and the waters shall be diminished : in which place by spirit is understood a wind , ( that is an aire or spirit moved , ) which might be called ( as in the former place ) the spirit of god , because it was gods work . gen. . . pharaoh calleth the wisdome of joseph , the spirit of god. for joseph having advised him to look out a wise and discreet man , and to set him over the land of egypt , he saith thus , can we find such a man as this is , in whom is the spirit of god ? and exod. . . thou shalt speak ( saith god ) to all that are wise hearted , whom i have filled with the spirit of vvisdome , to make aaron garments , to consecrate him . where extraordinary understanding , though but in making garments , as being the gift of god , is called the spirit of god. the same is found again , exod. . , , , . and . . and isaiah . , . where the prophet speaking of the messiah , saith , the spirit of the lord shall abide upon him , the spirit of wisdome and understanding , the spirit of counsell , and fortitude ; and the spirit of the fear of the lord. where manifestly is meant , not so many ghosts , but so many eminent graces that god would give him . in the book of judges , an extraordinary zeal , and courage in the the defence of gods people , is called the spirit of god ; as when it excited othoniel , gideon , jephtha , and samson to deliver them from servitude , judg. . . . . . . . . . , . and of saul , upon the newes of the insolence of the ammonites towards the men of jabesh gilead , it is said ( sam. . . ) that the spirit of god came upon saul , and his anger ( or , as it is in the latine , his fury ) was kindled greatly . where it is not probable was meant a ghost , but an extraordinary zeal to punish the cruelty of the ammonites . in like manner by the spirit of god , that came upon saul , when hee was amongst the prophets that praised god in songs , and musick ( sam. . . ) is to be understood , not a ghost , but an unexpected and sudden zeal to join with them in their devotion . the false prophet zedekiah , saith to micaiah ( kings . . ) which way went the spirit of the lord from me to speak to thee ? which cannot be understood of a ghost ; for micaiah declared before the kings of israel and judah , the event of the battle , as from a vision , and not as from a spirit , speaking in him . in the same manner it appeareth , in the books of the prophets , that though they spake by the spirit of god , that is to say , by a speciall grace of prediction ; yet their knowledge of the future , was not by a ghost within them , but by some supernaturall dream or vision . gen. . . it is said , god made man of the dust of the earth , and breathed into his nostrills ( spiraculum vitae ) the breath of life , and man was made a living soul. there the breath of life inspired by god , signifies no more , but that god gave him life ; and ( job . . ) as long as the spirit of god is in my nostrils ; is no more then to say , as long as i live . so in ezek. . . the spirit of life was in the wheels , is equivalent to , the wheels were alive . and ( ezek. . . ) the spirit entred into me , and set me on my feet , that is , i recovered my vitall strength ; not that any ghost , or incorporeall substance entred into , and possessed his body . in the chap. of numbers . verse . i will take ( saith god ) of the spirit , which is upon thee , and will put it upon them , and they shall bear the burthen of the people with thee ; that is , upon the seventy elders : whereupon two of the seventy are said to prophecy in the campe ; of whom some complained , and joshua desired moses to forbid them ; which moses would not doe . whereby it appears ; that joshua knew not they had received authority so to do , and prophecyed according to the mind of moses , that is to say , by a spirit , or authority subordinate to his own . in the like sense we read ( deut. . . ) that joshua was full of the spirit of wisdome , because moses had laid his hands upon him : that is , because he was ordained by moses , to prosecute the work hee had himselfe begun , ( namely , the bringing of gods peopl●… into the promised land ) , but prevented by death , could not finish . in the like sense it is said , ( rom. . . ) if any man have not the spirit of christ , he is none of his : not meaning thereby the ghost of christ , but a submission to his doctrine . as also ( john . . ) hereby you shall know the spirit of god ; every spirit that confesseth that jesus christ is come in the fl●…sh , is of god ; by which is meant the spirit of unfained christianity , or submission to that main article of christian faith , that jesus is the christ ; which cannot be interpreted of a ghost . likewise these words ( luke . . ) and jesus full of the holy ghost ( that is , as it is exprest , mat. . . and mar. . . of the holy spirit , ) may be understood , for zeal to doe the work for which he●… was sent by god the father : but to interpret it of a ghost , is to say , that god himselfe ( for so our saviour was , ) was filled with god ; which is very unproper , and unsignificant . how we came to translate spirits , by the word ghosts , which signifieth nothing , neither in heaven , nor earth , but the imaginary inhabitants of mans brain , i examine not : but this i say , the word spirit in the text signifieth no such thing ; but either properly a reall substance , or metaphorically , some extraordinary ability or affection of the mind , or of the body . the disciples of christ , seeing him walking upon the sea , ( mat. . . and marke . . ) supposed him to be a spirit , meaning thereby an aeriall body , and not a phantasme : for it is said , they all saw him ; which cannot be understood of the delusions of the brain , ( which are not common to many at once , as visible bodies are ; but singular , because of the differences of fancies ) , but of bodies only . in like manner , where he was taken for a spirit , by the same apostles ( luke . , . ) ; so also ( acts . . ) when st. peter was delivered out of prison , it would not be beleeved ; but when the maid said he was at the dore , they said it was his angel ; by which must be meant a corporeall substance , or we must say , the disciples themselves did follow the common opinion of both jews and gentiles , that some such apparitions were not imaginary , but reall ; and such as needed not the fancy of man for their existence : these the jews called spirits , and angels , good or bad ; as the greeks called the same by the name of daemons . and some such apparitions may be reall , and substantiall ; that is to say , subtile bodies , which god can form by the same power , by which he formed all things , and make use of , as of ministers , and messengers ( that is to say , angels ) to declare his will , and execute the same when he pleaseth , in extraordinary and su●…naturall manner . but when hee hath so formed them they are substances , endued with dimensions , and take up roome , and can be moved from place to place , which is peculiar to bodies ; and th●…refore are not ghosts incorporeall , that is to say , ghosts that are in no place ; that is to say , that are no where ; that is to say , that see●…ing to be somewhat , are nothing . but if corporeall be taken in the most vulgar manner , for such substances as are perceptible by our externall senses ; then is substance incorporeall , a thing not imaginary , but reall ; namely , a thin substance invisible , but that hath the same dimensions that are in grosser bodies . by the name of angel , is signified generally , a messenger ; and most often , a messenger of god : and by a messenger of god , is signified , any thing that makes known his extraordinary presence ; that is to say , the extraordinary manifestation of his power , especially by a dream , or vision . concerning the creation of angels , there is nothing delivered in the scriptures . that they are spirits , is often repeated : but by the name of spirit , is signified both in scripture , and vulgarly , both amongst jews , and gentiles , sometimes thin bodies ; as the aire , the wind , the spirits vitall , and animall , of living creatures ; and sometimes the images that rise in the fancy in dreams , and visions ; which are not reall substances , nor last any longer then the dream , or vision they appear in ; which apparitions , though no reall substances , but accidents of the brain ; yet when god raiseth them supernaturally , to signifie his will , they are not unproperly termed gods messengers , that is to say , his angels . and as the gentiles did vulgarly conceive the imagery of the brain , for things really subsistent without them , and not dependent on the fancy ; and out of them framed their opinions of daemons , good and evill ; which because they seemed to subsist really , they called substances ; and because they could not feel them with their hands , incorporeall : so also the jews upon the same ground , without any thing in the old testament that constrained them thereunto , had generally an opinion , ( except the sect of the sadduces , ) that those apparitions ( which it pleased god sometimes to produce in the fancie of men , for his own service , and therefore called them his angels ) were substances , not dependent on the fancy , but permanent creatures of god ; whereof those which they thought were good to them , they esteemed the angels of god , and those they thought would hurt them , they called evill angels , or evill spirits ; such as was the spirit of python , and the spirits of mad-men , of lunatiques , and epileptiques : for they esteemed such as were troubled with such diseases , daemoniaques . but if we consider the places of the old testament where angels are mentioned , we shall find , that in most of them , there can nothing else be understood by the word angel , but some image raised ( supernaturally ) in the fancy , to signifie the presence of god in the execution of some supernaturall work ; and therefore in the rest , where their nature is not exprest , it may be understood in the same manner . for we read gen. . that the same apparition is called , not onely an angel , but god ; where that which ( verse . ) is called the angel of the lord , in the tenth verse , saith to agar , i will multiply thy seed exceedingly ; that is , speaketh in the person of god. neither was this apparition a fancy figured , but a voice . by which it is manifest , that angel signifieth there , nothing but god himself , that caused agar supernaturally to apprehend a voice from heaven ; or rather , nothing else but a voice supernaturall , testifying gods speciall presence there . why therefore may not the angels that appeared to lot , and are called gen. . . men ; and to whom , though they were two , lot speaketh ( ver . . ) as but to one ▪ and that one , as god , ( for the words are , lot said unto them , oh not so my lord ) be understood of images of men , supernaturally formed in the fancy ; as well as before by angel was understood a fancyed voice ? when the angel called to abraham out of heaven , to stay his hand ( gen. . . ) from slaying isaac , there was no apparition , but a voice ; which neverthelesse was called properly enough a messenger , or angel of god , because it declared gods will supernaturally , and saves the labour of supposing any permanent ghosts . the angels which jacob saw on the ladder of heaven ( gen. . . ) were a vision of his sleep ; therefore onely fancy , and a dream ; yet being supernaturall , and signs of gods speciall presence , those apparitions are not improperly called angels . the same is to be understood ( gen. . . ) where jacob saith thus , the angel of the lord appeared to mee in my sleep . for an apparition made to a man in his sleep , is that which all men call a dreame , whether such dreame be naturall , or supernaturall : and that which there jacob calleth an angel , was god himselfe ; for the same angel saith ( verse . ) i am the god of bethel . alfo ( exod. . . ) the angel that went before the army of israel to the red sea , and then came behind it , is ( verse . ) the lord himself ; and he appeared not in the form of a beautifull man , but in form ( by day ) of a pillar of cloud , and ( by night ) in form of a pillar of fire ; and yet this pillar was all the apparition , and angel promised to moses ▪ exod. . . ) for the armies guide : for this cloudy pillar , is said , to have descended , and stood at the dore of the tabernacle , and to have talked with moses . there you see motion , and speech , which are commonly attributed to angels , attributed to a cloud , because the cloud served as a sign of gods pre●…ence ; and was no lesse an angel , then if it had had the form of a man , or child of never so great beauty ; or wings , as usually they are painted , for the false instruction of common people . for it is not the shape ; but their use , that makes them angels . but their use is to be significations of gods presence in supernaturall operations ; as when moses ( exod. . . ) had desired god to goe along with the campe , ( as he had done alwaies before the making of the golden calfe , ) god did not answer , i will goe , nor i will send an angell in my stead ; but thus , my presence shall goe 〈◊〉 thee . to mention all the places of the old testament where the name of angel is found , would be too long . therefore to comprehend them all at once , i say , there is no text in that part of the old testament , which the church of england holdeth for canonicall ; from which we can conclude , there is , or hath been created , any permanent thing ( understood by the name of spirit or angel , ) that hath not quantity ; and that may not be , by the understanding divided ; that is to say , considered by parts ; so as one part may bee in one place , and the next part in the next place to it ; and , in summe , which is not ( taking body for that , which is some what , or some where ) corporeall ; but in every place , the sense will bear the interpretation of angel , for messenger ; as john baptist is called an angel , and christ the angel of the covenant ; and as ( according to the same analogy ) the dove , and the fiery tongues , in that they were signes of gods speciall presence , might also be called angels . though we find in daniel two names of angels , gabriel , and michael ; yet it is cleer out of the text it selfe , ( dan. . . ) that by michael is meant christ , not as an angel , but as a prince : and that gabriel ( as the like apparitions made to other holy men in their sleep ) was nothing but a supernaturall phantasme , by which it seemed to daniel , in his dream , that two saints being in talke , one of them said to the other , gabriel , let us make this man understand his vision : for god needeth not , to distinguish his celestiall servants by names , which are usefull onely to the short memories of mortalls . nor in the new testament is there any place , out of which it can be proved , that angels ( except when they are put for such men , as god hath made the messengers , and ministers of his word , or works ) are things permanent , and withall incorporeall . that they are permanent , may bee gathered from the words of our saviour himselfe , ( mat. . . ) where he saith , it shall be said to the wicked in the last day , go ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels : which place is manifest for the permanence of evill angels , ( unlesse wee might think the name of devill and his angels may be understood of the churches adversaries and their ministers ; ) but then it is repugnant to their immateriality ; because everlasting fire is no punishment to impatible substances , such as are all things incorporeall . angels therefore are not thence proved to be incorporeall . in like manner where st. paul sayes ( cor. . . ) know ye not that wee shall judge the angels ? and pet. . . ( for if god spared not the angels that sinned , but cast them down into hell . and ( iude , . ) and the angels that kept not their first estate , but left their owne habitation , hee hath reserved in everlasting chaines under darknesse unto the iudgment of the last day ; though it prove the permanence of angelicall nature , it confirmeth also their materiality . and ( mat. . . ) in the resurrection men doe neither marry , nor give in marriage , but are as the angels of god in heaven : but in the resurrection men shall be permanent , and not incorporeall ; so therefore also are the angels . there be divers other places out of which may be drawn the like conclusion . to men that understand the signification of these words , substance , and incorporeall ; as incorporeall is taken not for subtile body , but for not body , they imply a contradiction : insomuch as to say , an angel , or spirit is ( in that sense ) an incorporeall substance , is to say in effect , there is no angel nor spirit at all . considering therefore the signification of the word angel in the old testament , and the nature of dreams and visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of nature ; i was enclined to this opinion , that angels were nothing but supernaturall apparitions of the fancy , raised by the speciall and extraordinary operation of god , thereby to make his presence and commandements known to mankind , and chiefly to his own people . but the many places of the new testament , and our saviours own words , and in such texts , wherein is no suspicion of corruption of the scripture , have extorted from my feeble reason , an acknowledgment , and beleef , that there be also angels substantiall , and permanent . but to beleeve they be in no place , that is to say , no where , that is to say , nothing , as they ( though indirectly ) say , that will have them incorporeall , cannot by scripture bee evinced . on the signification of the word spirit , dependeth that of the word inspiration ; which must either be taken properly ; and then it is nothing but the blowing into a man some thin and subtile aire , or wind , in such manner as a man filleth a bladder with his breath ; or if spirits be not corporeall , but have their existence only in the fancy , it is nothing but the blowing in of a phantasme ; which is improper to say , and impossible ; for phantasmes are not , but only seem to be somewhat . that word therefore is used in the scripture metaphorically onely : as ( gen. . . ) where it is said , that god inspired into man the breath of life , no more is meant , then that god gave unto him vitall motion . for we are not to think that god made first a living breath , and then blew it into adam after he was made , whether that breath were reall , or seeming ; but only as it is ( acts . . ) that he gave him life , and breath ; that is , made him a living creature . and where it is said ( tim. . . ) all scripture is given by inspiration from god , speaking there of the scripture of the old testament , it is an easie metaphor , to signifie , that god enclined the spirit or mind of those writers , to write that which should be usefull , in teaching , reproving , correcting , and instructing men in the way of righteous living . but where st. peter ( pet. . . ) saith , that prophecy came not in old time by the will of man , but the holy men of god spake as they were moved by the holy spirit , by the holy spirit , is meant the voice of god in a dream , or vision supernaturall , which is not insp●…ration : nor when our saviour breathing on his disciples , said , receive the holy spirit , was that breath the spirit , but a sign of the spirituall graces he gave unto them . and though it be said of many , and of our saviour himself , that he was full of the holy spirit ; yet that fulnesse is not to be understood for infusion of the substance of god , but for accumulation of his gifts , such as are the gift of sanctity of life , of tongues , and the like , whether attained supernaturally , or by study and industry ; for in all cases they are the gifts of god. so likewise where god sayes ( joel . . ) i will powre out my spirit upon all flesh , and your sons and your daughters shall prophecy , your old men shall dream dreams , and your young men shall see visions , wee are not to understand it in the proper sense , as if his spirit were like water , subject to effusion , or infusion ; but as if god had promised to give them propheticall dreams , and vision . for the proper use of the word infused , in speaking of the graces of god , is an abuse of it ; for those graces are vertues , not bodies to be carryed hither and thither , and to be powred into men , as into barrels . in the same manner , to take inspiration in the proper sense , or to say that good spirits entred into men to make them prophecy , or evill spirits into those that became phrenetique , lunatique , or epileptique , is not to take the word in the sense of the scripture ; for the spirit there is taken for the power of god , working by causes to us unknown . as also ( acts . . ) the wind , that is there said to fill the house wherein the apostles were assembled on the day of pentecost , is not to be understood for the holy spirit , which is the deity it self ; but for an externall sign of gods speciall working on their hearts , to effect in them the internall graces , and holy vertues hee thought requisite for the performance of their apostleship . chap. xxxv . of the signification in scripture of kingdome of god , of holy , sacred , and sacrament . the kingdome of god in the writings of divines , and specially in sermons , and treatises of devotion , is taken most commonly for eternall felicity , after this life , in the highest heaven , which they also call the kingdome of glory ; and sometimes for ( the earnest of that felicity ) sanctification , which they terme the kingdome of grace ; but never for the monarchy , that is to say , the soveraign power of god over any subjects acquired by their own consent , which is the proper signification of kingdome . to the contrary , i find the kingdome of god , to signifie in most places of scripture , a kingdome properly so named , constituted by the votes of the people of israel in peculiar manner ; wherein they chose god for their king by covenant made with him , upon gods promising them the possession of the land of canaan ; and but seldom metaphorically ; and then it is taken for dominion over sinne ; ( and only in the new testament ; ) because such a dominion as that , every subject shall have in the kingdome of god , and without prejudice to the soveraign . from the very creation , god not only reigned over all men naturally by his might ; but also had peculiar subjects , whom he commanded by a voice , as one man speaketh to another . in which manner he reigned over adam , and gave him commandement to abstaine from the tree of cognizance of good and evill ; which when he obeyed not , but tasting thereof , took upon him to be as god , judging between good and evill , not by his creators commandement , but by his own sense , his punishment was a privation of the estate of eternall life , wherein god had at first created him : and afterwards god punished his posterity , for their vices , all but eight persons , with an universall deluge ; and in these eight did consist the then kingdom of god. after this , it pleased god to speak to abraham , and ( gen. . , . ) to make a covenant with him in these words , i will establish my covenant between me , and thee , and thy seed after thee in their generations , for an ev●…rlasting covenant , to be a god to thee , and to thy seed after thee ; and i will give unto thee , and to thy seed after thee , the land wherein thou art a stranger , all the land of canaan for an everlasting possession . in this covenant abraham promiseth for himselfe and his posterity to obey as god , the lord that spake to him : and god on his part promiseth to abraham the land of canaan for an everlasting possession . and for a memoriall , and a token of this covenant , he ordaineth ( verse ii. ) the sacrament of circumcision . this is it which is called the old covenant , or testament ; and containeth a contract between god and abraham ; by which abraham obligeth himself , and his posterity , in a peculiar manner to be subject to gods positive law ; for to the law morall he was obliged before , as by an oath of allegiance . and though the name of king be not yet given to god , nor of kingdome to abraham and his seed ; yet the thing is the same ; namely , an institution by pact , of gods peculiar soveraignty over the seed of abraham ; which in the renewing of the same covenant by moses , at mount sinai , is expressely called a peculiar kingdome of god over the jews : and it is of abraham ( not of moses ) st. paul saith ( rom. . . ) that he is the father of the faithfull ; that is , of those that are loyall , and doe not violate their allegiance sworn to god , then by circumcision , and afterwards in the new covenant by baptisme . this covenant , at the foot of mount sinai , was renewed by moses ( exod. . . ) where the lord commandeth moses to speak to the people in this manner , if you will obey my voice indeed , and keep my covenant , then yee shall be a peculiar people to me , for all the earth is mine ; and yee shall be unto me a sacerdotall kingdome , and an holy nation . for a peculiar people , the vulgar latine hath , peculium de cunctis populis : the english translation made in the beginning of the reign of king james , hath , a peculiar treasure unto me above all nations ; and the geneva french , the most precious iewel of all nations . but the truest translation is the first , because it is confirmed by st. paul himself ( tit. . . ) where he saith , alluding to that place , that our blessed saviour gave himself for us , that he might purifie us to himself , a peculiar ( that is , an extraordinary ) people : for the word is in the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is opposed commonly to the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : and as this signifieth ordinary , quotidian , or ( as in the lords prayer ) of daily use ; so the other signifieth that which is overplus , and stored up , and enjoyed in a speciall manner ; which the latines call peculium : and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason god rendereth of it , which followeth immediately , in that he addeth , for all the earth is mine , as if he should say , all the nations of the world are mine ; but it is not so that you are mine , but in a speciall manner : for they are all mine , by reason of my power ; but you shall be mine , by your own consent , and covenant ; which is an addition to his ordinary title , to all nations . the same is again confirmed in expresse words in the same text , yee shall be to me a sacerdotall kingdome , and an holy nation . the vulgar latine hath it , regnum sacerdotale , to which agreeth the translation of that place ( pet. . . ) sacerdotium regale , a regal priesthood ; as also the institution it self , by which no man might enter into the sanctum sanctorum , that is to say , no man might enquire gods will immediately of god himselfe , but onely the high priest. the english translation before mentioned , following that of geneva , has , a kingdom of priests ; which is either meant of the succession of one high priest after another , or else it accordeth not with st. peter , nor with the exercise of the high priesthood : for there was never any but the high priest onely , that was to informe the people of gods will ; nor any convocation of priests ever allowed to enter into the sanctum sanctorum . again , the title of a holy nation confirmes the same : for holy signifies , that which is gods by speciall , not by generall right . all the earth ( as is said in the text ) is gods ; but all the earth is not called holy , but that onely which is set apart for his especiall service , as was the nation of the jews . it is therefore manifest enough by this one place , that by the kingdome of god , is properly meant a common-wealth , instituted ( by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto ) for their civill government , and the regulating of their behaviour , not onely towards god their king , but also towards one another in point of justice , and towards other nations both in peace and warre ; which properly was a kingdome , wherein god was king , and the high priest was to be ( after the death of moses ) his sole viceroy , or lieutenant . but there be many other places that clearly prove the same . as first ( sam. . . ) when the elders of israel ( grieved with the corruption of the sons of samuel ) demanded a king , samuel displeased therewith , prayed unto the lord ; and the lord answering said unto him , hearken unto the voice of the people , for they have not rejected thee , but they have rejected me , that i should not reign over them . out of which it is evident , that god himself was then their king ; and samuel did not command the people , but only delivered to them that which god from time to time appointed him . again , ( sam. . . ) where samuel saith to the people , when yee saw that nahash king of the children of ammon came against you , ye said unto me , nay , but a king shall reign over us , when the lord your god was your king : it is manifest that god was their king , and governed the civill state of their common-wealth . and after the israelites had rejected god , the prophets did foretell his restitution ; as ( isaiah . . ) then the moon shall be confounded , and the sun ashamed , when the lord of hosts shall reign in mount zion , and in ierusalem ; where he speaketh expressely of his reign in zion , and jerusalem ; that is , on earth . and ( micah . . ) and the lord shall reign over them in mount zion : this mount zion is in jerusalem upon the earth . and ( ezek. . . ) as i live , saith the lord god , surely with a mighty hand , and a stretched out arme , and with fury powred out , i wil rule over you ; and ( verse . ) i will cause you to passe under the rod , and i will bring you into the bond of the covenant ; that is , i will reign over you , and make you to stand to that covenant which you made with me by moses , and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of samuel , and in your election of another king. and in the new testament , the angel gabriel saith of our saviour ( luke . , . ) he shall be great , and be called the son of the most high , and the lord shall give him the throne of his father david ; and he shall reign over the house of jacob for ever ; and of his kingdome there shall be no end . this is also a kingdome upon earth ; for the claim whereof , as an enemy to caesar , he was put to death ; the title of his crosse , was , iesus of nazareth , king of the iews ; hee was crowned in scorn with a crown of thornes ; and for the proclaiming of him , it is said of the disciples ( acts . . ) that they did all of them contrary to the decrees of caesar , saying there was another king , one iesus . the kingdome therefore of god , is a reall , not a metaphoricall kingdome ; and so taken , not onely in the old testament , but the new ; when we say , for thine is the kingdome , the power , and glory , it is to be understood of gods kingdome , by force of our covenant , not by the right of gods power ; for such a kingdome god alwaies hath ; so that it were superfluous to say in our prayer , thy kingdome come , unlesse it be meant of the restauration of that kingdome of god by christ , which by revolt of the israelites had been interrupted in the election of saul . nor had it been proper to say , the kingdome of heaven is at hand ; ot to pray , thy kingdome come , if it had still continued . there be so-many other places that confirm this interpretation , that it were a wonder there is no greater notice taken of it , but that it gives too much light to christian kings to see their right of ecclesiasticall government . this they have observed , that in stead of a sacerdotall kingdome , translate , a kingdome of priests : for ▪ they may as well translate a royall priesthood , ( as it is in st. peter ) into a priesthood of kings . and whereas , for a peculiar people , they put a pretious jewel , or treasure , a man might as well call the speciall regiment , or company of a generall , the generalls pretious jewel , or his treasure . in short , the kingdome of god is a civill kingdome ; which consisted , first in the obligation of the people of israel to those laws , which moses should bring unto them from mount sinai ; and which afterwards the high priest for the time being , should deliver to them from before the cherubins in the sanctum sanctorum ; and which kingdome having been cast off , in the election of saul , the prophets foretold , should be restored by christ ; and the restauration whereof we daily pray for , when we say in the lords prayer , thy kingdome come ; and the right whereof we acknowledge , when we adde , for thine is the kingdome , the power , and glory , for ever and ever , amen ; and the proclaiming whereof , was the preaching of the apostles ; and to which men are prepared , by the teachers of the gospel ; to embrace which gospel , ( that is to say , to promise obedience to gods government ) is , to bee in the kingdome of grace , because god hath gratis given to such the power to bee the subjects ( that is , children ) of god hereafter , when christ shall come in majesty to judge the world , and actually to govern his owne people , which is called the kingdome of glory . if the kingdome of god ( called also the kingdome of heaven , from the gloriousnesse , and admirable height of that throne ) were not a kingdome which god by his lieutenants , or vicars , who deliver his commandements to the people , did exercise on earth ; there would not have been so much contention , and warre , about who it is , by whom god speaketh to us ; neither would many priests have troubled themselves with spirituall jurisdiction , nor any king have denied it them . out of this literall interpretation of the kingdome of god , ariseth also the true interpretation of the word holy . for it is a word , which in gods kingdome answereth to that , which men in their kingdomes use to call publique , or the kings . the king of any countrey is the publique person , or representative of all his own subjects . and god the king of israel was the holy one of israel . the nation which is subject to one earthly soveraign , is the nation of that soveraign , that is , of the publique person . so the jews , who were gods nation , were called ( exod. . . ) a holy nation . for by holy , is alwaies understood , either god himselfe , or that which is gods in propriety ; as by publique , is alwaies meant , either the person of the common-wealth it self , or something that is so the common-wealths , as no private person can claim any propriety therein . therefore the sabbath ( gods day ) is a holy day ; the temple , ( gods house ) a holy house ; sacrifices , tithes , and offerings ( gods tribute ) holy duties ; priests , prophets , and anointed kings , under christ ( gods ministers ) holy men ; the coelestiall ministring spirits ( gods messengers ) holy angels ; and the like : and wheresoever the word holy is taken properly , there is still something signified of propriety , gotten by consent . in saying hallowed be thy name , we do but pray to god for grace to keep the first commandement , of having no other gods but him . mankind is gods nation in propriety : but the jews only were a holy nation . why , but because they became his propriety by covenant ? and the word profane , is usually taken in the scripture for the same with common ; and consequently their contraries , holy , and proper , in the kingdome of god must be the same also . but figuratively , those men also are called holy , that led such godly lives , as if they had forsaken all worldly designs , and wholly devoted , and given themselves to god. in the proper sense , that which is made holy by gods appropriating or separating it to his own use , is said to be sanctified by god , as the seventh day in the fourth commandement ; and as the elect in the new testament were said to bee sanctified , when they were endued with the spirit of godlinesse . and that which is made holy by the dedication of men , and given to god , so as to be used onely in his publique service , is called aso sacred , and said to be consecrated , as temples , and other houses of publique prayer , and their utensils , priests , and ministers , victimes , offerings , and the externall matter of sacraments . of holinesse there be degrees : for of those things that are set apart for the service of god , there may bee some set apart again , for a neerer and more especial service . the whole nation of the israelites were a people holy to god ; yet the tribe of levi was amongst the israelites a holy tribe ; and amongst the levites , the priests were yet more holy ; and amongst the priests , the high priest was the most holy. so the land of judea was the holy land ; but the holy city wherein god was to be worshipped , was more holy ; and again , the temple more holy than the city ; and the sanctum sanctorum more holy than the rest of the temple . a sacrament , is a separation of some visible thing from common use ; and a consecration of it to gods service , for a sign , either of our admission into the kingdome of god , to be of the number of his peculiar people , or for a commemoration of the same . in the old testament , the sign of admission was circumcision ; in the new testament , baptisme . the commemoration of it in the old testament , was the eating ( at a certaine time , which was anniversary ) of the paschall lamb ; by which they were put in mind of the night wherein they were delivered out of their bondage in egypt ; and in the new testament , the celebrating of the lords supper ; by which , we are put in mind , of our deliverance from the bondage of sin , by our blessed saviours death upon the crosse . the sacraments of admission , are but once to be used , because there needs but one admission ; but because we have need of being often put in mind of our deliverance , and of our alleagance , the sacraments of commemoration have need to be reiterated . and these are the principall sacraments , and as it were the solemne oathes we make of our alleageance . there be also other consecrations , that may be called sacraments , as the word implyeth onely consecration to gods service ; but as it implies an oath , or promise of alleageance to god , there were no other in the old testament , but circumcision , and the passeover ; nor are there any other in the new testament , but baptisme , and the lords supper . chap. xxxvi . of the word of god , and of prophets . when there is mention of the vvord of god , or of man , it doth not signifie a part of speech , such as grammarians call a nown , or a verb , or any simple voice , without a contexture with other words to make it significative ; but a perfect speech or discourse , whereby the speaker affirmeth , denieth , commandeth , promiseth , threatneth , wisheth , or interrogateth . in which sense it is not vocabulum , that signifies a word ▪ but sermo , ( in greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) that is , some speech , discourse , or saying . again , if we say the word of god , or of man , it may bee understood sometimes of the speaker , ( as the words that god hath spoken , or that a man hath spoken : in which sense , when we say , the gospel of st. matthew , we understand st. matthew to be the writer of it : and sometimes of the subject : in which sense , when we read in the bible , the words of the days of the kings of israel , or iudah , 't is meant , that the acts that were done in those days , were the subject of those words ; and in the greek , which ( in the scripture ) retaineth many hebraismes , by the word of god is oftentimes meant , not that which is spoken by god , but concerning god , and his government ; that is to say , the doctrine of religion : insomuch , as it is all one , to say 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and theologia ; which is , that doctrine which wee usually call divinity , as is manifest by the places following [ acts . . ] then paul and barnabas waxed bold , and said , it was necessary that the word of god should first have been spoken to you , but seeing you put it from you , and judge your selves unworthy of everiasting life , loe , we turn to the gentiles . that which is here called the word of god , was the doctrine of christian religion ; as it appears evidently by that which goes before . and [ acts . . ] where it is said to the apostles by an angel , go stand and speak in the temple , all the vvords of this life ; by the words of this life , is meant , the doctrine of the gospel ; as is evident by what they did in the temple , and is expressed in the last verse of the same chap. daily in the temple , and in every house they ceased not to teach and preach christ iesus : in which place it is manifest , that jesus christ was the subject of this word of life ; or ( which is all one ) the subject of the vvords of this life eternall , that our saviour offered them . so [ acts . . ] the word of god , is called the word of the gospel , because it containeth the doctrine of the kingdome of christ ; and the same word [ rom. . , . ] is called the word of faith ; that is , as is there expressed , the doctrine of christ come , and raised from the dead . also [ mat. . . ] vvhen any one heareth the vvord of the kingdome ; that is , the doctrine of the kingdome taught by christ. again , the same word , is said [ acts . . ] to grow and to be multiplyed ; which to understand of the evangelicall doctrine is easie , but of the voice , or speech of god , hard and strange . in the same sense the doctrine of devils , signifieth not the words of any devill , but the doctrine of heathen men concerning daemons , and those phantasms which they worshipped as gods. considering these two significations of the word of god , as it is taken in scripture , it is manifest in this later sense ( where it is taken for the doctrine of christian religion , ) that the whole scripture is the word of god : but in the former sense not so . for example , though these words , i am the lord thy god , &c. to the end of the ten commandements , were spoken by god to moses ; yet the preface , god spake these words and said , is to be understood for the words of him that wrote the holy history . the word of god , as it is taken for that which he hath spoken , is understood sometimes properly , sometimes metaphorically . properly , as the words , he hath spoken to his prophets : metaphorically , for his wisdome , power , and eternall decree , in making the world ; in which sense , those fiats , let their be light , let there be a firmament , let us make man , &c. [ gen. . ] are the word of god. and in the same sense it is said [ iohn . . ] all things were made by it , and without it was nothing made that was made : and [ heb. . . ] he upholdeth all things by the vvord of his power ; that is , by the power of his word ; that is , by his power : and [ heb. . . the worlds were framed by the vvord of god ; and many other places to the same sense : as also amongst the latines , the name of fate , which signifieth properly the word spoken , is taken in the same sense . secondly , for the effect of his word ; that is to say , for the thing it self , which by his word is affirmed , commanded , threatned , or promised ; as [ psalm . . ] where joseph is said to have been kept in prison , till his vvord was come ; that is , till that was come to passe which he had [ gen. . . ] foretold to pharaohs butler , concerning his being restored to his office : for there by his word was come , is meant , the thing it self was come to passe . so also [ king. . . ] elijah saith to god , i have done all these thy vvords , in stead of i have done all these things at thy word , or commandement : and [ ier. . . ] vvhere is the vvord of the lord , is put for , vvhere is the evill he threatned : and [ ezek. . . ] there shall none of my vvords be prolonged any more : by words are understood those things , which god promised to his people . and in the new testament [ mat. . . ] heaven and earth shal pass away , but my vvords shal not pass away ; that is , there is nothing that i have promised or foretold , that shall not come to passe . and in this s●…nse it is , that st. john the evangelist , and , i think , st. john onely calleth our saviour himself as in the flesh the vvord of god [ as ioh. . . ] the word was made flesh ; that is to say , the word , or promise that christ should come into the world ; who in the beginning was with god ; that is to say , it was in the purpose of god the father , to send god the son into the world , to enlighten men in the way of eternall life ; but it was not till then put in execution , and actually incarnate ; so that our saviour is there called the word , not because he was the promise , but the thing promised . they that taking occasion from this place , doe commonly call him the verbe of god , do but render the text more obscure . they might as well term him the nown of god : for as by nown , so also by verbe , men understand nothing but a part of speech , a voice , a sound , that neither affirms , nor denies , nor commands , nor promiseth , nor is any substance corporeall , or spirituall ; and therefore it cannot be said to bee either god , or man ; whereas our saviour is both . and this vvord which st. iohn in his gospel saith was with god , is [ in his epistle , verse . ] called the vvord of life ; and [ verse . ] the eternall life , which was with the father : so that he can be in no other sense called the word , then in that , wherein he is called eternall life ; that is , he that hath procured us eternall life , by his comming in the flesh . so also [ apocalypse . . ] the apostle speaking of christ , clothed in a garment dipt in bloud , saith ; his name is the vvord of god ; which is to be understood , as if he had said his name had been , he that was come according to the purpose of god from the beginning , and according to his word and promises delivered by the prophets . so that there is nothing here of the incarnation of a word , but of the incarnation of god the son , therefore called the vvord , because his incarnation was the performance of the promise ; in like manner as the holy ghost is called the promise . there are also places of the scripture , where , by the word of god , is signified such words as are consonant to reason , and equity , though spoken sometimes neither by prophet , nor by a holy man. for pharaoh necho was an idolater ; yet his words to the good king josiah , in which he advised him by messengers , not to oppose him in his march against carchemish , are said to have proceeded from the mouth of god ; and that josiah not hearkning to them , was slain in the battle ; as is to be read chron. . vers . , , . it is true , that as the same history is related in the first book of esdras , not pharaoh , but jeremiah spake these words to josiah , from the mouth of the lord. but wee are to give credit to the canonicall scripture , whatsoever be written in the apocrypha . the vvord of god , is then also to be taken for the dictates of reason , and equity , when the same is said in the scriptures to bee written in mans heart ; as psalm . . ierem. . . deut. . , . and many other like places . the name of prophet , signifieth in scripture sometimes prolocutor ; that is , he that speaketh from god to man , or from man to god : and sometimes praedictor , or a foreteller of things to come : and sometimes one that speaketh incoherently , as men that are distracted . it is most frequently used in the sense of speaking from god to the people . so moses , samuel , elijah , isaiah , ieremiah , and others were prophets . and in this sense the high priest was a prophet , for he only went into the sanctum sanctorum , to enquire of god ; and was to declare his answer to the people . and therefore when caiphas said , it was expedient that one man should die for the people , st. john saith [ chap. . . ] that he spake not this of himselfe , but being high priest that year , he prophesied that one man should dye for the nation . also they that in christian congregations taught the people [ cor. . . ] are said to prophecy . in the like sense it is , that god saith to moses [ exod. . . ] concerning aaron , he shall be thy spokes-man to the people ; and he shall be to thee a mouth , and thou shalt be to him instead of god : that which here is spokes-man , is [ chap. . . ] interpreted prophet ; see ( saith god ) i have made thee a god to pharaoh , and aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet . in the sense of speaking from man to god , abraham is called a prophet [ genes . . . ] where god in a dream speaketh to abimelech in this manner , now therefore restore the man his wife , for he is a prophet , and shall pray for thee ; whereby may be also gathered , that the name of prophet may be given , not unproperly to them that in christian churches , have a calling to say publique prayers for the congregation . in the same sense , the prophets that came down from the high place ( or hill of god ) with a psaltery , and a tabret , and a pipe , and a harp [ sam. . , . and [ vers . . ] saul amongst them , are said to prophecy , in that they praised god , in that manner publiquely . in the like sense , is miriam [ exod. . . ] called a prophetes●…e . so is it also to be taken [ cor. . , . ] where st. paul saith , every man that prayeth or prophecyeth with his head covered , &c. and every woman that prayeth or prophecyeth with her head uncovered : for prophecy in that place , signifieth no more , but praising god in psalmes , and holy songs ; which women might doe in the church , though it were not lawfull for them to speak to the congregation . and in this signification it is , that the poets of the heathen , that composed hymnes and other sorts of poems in the honor of their gods , were called vates ( prophets ) as is well enough known by all that are versed in the books of the gentiles , and as is evident [ tit. . . ] where st. paul saith of the cretians , that a prophet of their owne said , they were liars ; not that st. paul held their poets for prophets , but acknowledgeth that the word prophet was commonly used to signifie them that celebrated the honour of god in verse . when by prophecy is meant praediction , or foretelling of future contigents ; not only they were prophets , who were gods spokesmen , and foretold those things to others , which god had foretold to them ; but also all those impostors , that pretend by the helpe of familiar spirits , or by superstitious divination of events past , from false causes , to foretell the like events in time to come : of which ( as i have declared already in the . chapter of this discourse ) there be many kinds , who gain in the opinion of the common sort of men , a greater reputation of prophecy , by one casuall event that may bee but wrested to their purpose , than can be lost again by never so many failings . prophecy is not an art , nor ( when it is taken for praediction ) a constant vocation ; but an extraordinary , and temporary employment from god , most often of good men , but sometimes also of the wicked . the woman of endor , who is said to have had a familiar spirit , and thereby to have raised a phantasme of samuel , and foretold saul his death , was not therefore a prophetesse ; for neither had she any science , whereby she could raise such a phantasme ; nor does it appear that god commanded the raising of it ; but onely guided that imposture to be a means of sauls terror and discouragement ; and by consequent , of the discomfiture , by which he fell . and for incoherent speech , it was amongst the gentiles taken for one sort of prophecy , because the prophets of their oracles , intoxicated with a spirit , or vapor from the cave of the pythian oracle at delphi , were for the time really mad , and spake like mad-men ; of whose loose words a sense might be made to fit any event , in such sort , as all bodies are said to be made of materia prima . in the scripture i find it also so taken [ sam. . . ] in these words , and the evill spirit came upon saul , and he prophecyed in the midst of the house . and although there be so many significations in scripture of the word prophet ; yet is that the most frequent , in which it is taken for him , to whom god speaketh immediately , that which the prophet is to say from him , to some other man , or to the people . and hereupon a question may be asked , in what manner god speaketh to such a prophet . can it ( may some say ) be properly said , that god hath voice and language , when it cannot be properly said , he hath a tongue , or other organs , as a man ? the prophet david argueth thus , shall he that made the eye , not see ? or he that made the ear , not hear ? but this may be spoken , not ( as usually ) to signifie gods nature , but to signifie our intention to honor him . for to see , and hear , are honorable attributes , and may be given to god , to declare ( as far as our capacity can conceive ) his almighty power . but if it were to be taken in the strict ; and proper sense , one might argue from his making of all other parts of mans body , that he had also the same use of them which we have ; which would be many of them so uncomely , as it would be the greatest contumely in the world to ascribe them to him . therefore we are to interpret gods speaking to men immediately , for that way ( whatsoever it be ) , by which god makes them understand his will : and the wayes whereby he doth this , are many ; and to be sought onely in the holy scripture : where though many times it be said , that god spake to this , and that person , without declaring in what manner ; yet there be again many places , that deliver also the signes by which they were to acknowledge his presence , and commandement ; and by these may be understood , how he spake to many of the rest . in what manner god spake to adam , and eve , and cain , and noah , is not expressed ; nor how he spake to abraham , till such time as he came out of his own countrey to sichem in the land of canaan ; and then [ gen. . . ] god is said to have appeared to him . so there is one way , whereby god made his presence manifest ; that is , by an apparition , or vision . and again , [ gen. . . ] the word of the lord came to abraham in a vision ; that is to say , somewhat , as a sign of gods presence , appeared as gods messenger , to speak to him . again , the lord appeared to abraham [ gen. . . ] by an apparition of three angels ; and to abimelech [ gen. . . ] in a dream : to lot [ gen. . . ] by an apparition of two angels : and to hagar [ gen. . . ] by the apparition of one angel : and to abraham again [ gen. . . ] by the apparition of a voice from heaven : and [ gen. . . ] to isaac in the night ; ( that is , in his sleep , or by dream ) : and to jacob [ gen. . . ] in a dream ; that is to say ( as are the words of the text ) iacob dreamed that he saw a ladder , &c. and [ gen. . . ] in a vision of angels : and to moses [ exod. . . ] in the apparition of a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush : and after the time of moses , ( where the manner how god spake immediately to man in the old testament , is expressed ) hee spake alwaies by a vision , or by a dream ; as to gideon , samuel , eliah , elisha , isaiah , ezekiel , and the rest of the prophets ; and often in the new testament , as to ioseph , to st. peter , to st. paul , and to st. iohn the evangelist in the apocalypse . onely to moses hee spake in a more extraordinary manner in mount sinai , and in the tabernaele ; and to the high priest in the tabernacle , and in the sanctum sanctorum of the temple . but moses , and after him the high priests were prophets of a more eminent place , and degree in gods favour ; and god himself in express words declareth , that to other prophets hee spake in dreams and visions , but to his servant moses , in such manner as a man speaketh to his friend . the words are these [ numb . . , , . ] if there be a prophet among you , i the lord will make my self known to him in a vision , and will speak unto him in a dream . my servant moses is not so , who is faithfull in all my house ; with him i will speak mouth to mouth , even apparently , not in dark speeches ; and the similitude of the lord shall he behold . and [ exod. . . ] the lord spake to moses face to face , as a man speaketh to his friend . and yet this speaking of god to moses , was by mediation of an angel , or angels , as appears expressely , acts . ver . . and . and gal. . . and was therefore a vision , though a more cleer vision than was given to other prophets . and conformable hereunto , where god saith ( deut. . . ) if there arise amongst you a prophet , or dreamer of dreams , the later word is but the interpretation of the former . and [ ioel . . ] your sons and your daughters shall prophecy ; your old men shall dream dreams , and your young men shall see visions : where again , the word prophecy is expounded by dream , and vision . and in the same manner it was , that god spake to solomon , promising him wisdome , riches , and honor ; for the text saith , [ kings . . ] and solomon awoak , and behold it was a dream : so that generally the prophets extraordinary in the old testament took notice of the word of god no otherwise , than from their dreams , or visions ; that is to say , from the imaginations which they had in their sleep , or in an extasie : which imaginations in every true prophet were supernaturall ; but in false prophets were either naturall , or feigned . the same prophets were neverthelesse said to speak by the spirit ; as [ zach. . . ] where the prophet speaking of the jewes , saith , they made their hearts hard as adamant , lest they should hear the law , and the words which the lord of hosts hath sent in his spirit by the former prophets . by which it is manifest , that speaking by the spirit , or inspiration , was not a particular manner of gods speaking , different from vision , when they ▪ that were said to speak by the spirit , were extraordinary prophets , such as for every new message , were to have a particular commission , or ( which is all one ) a new dream , or vision . of prophets , that were so by a perpetuall calling in the old testament , some were supreme , and some subordinate : supreme were first moses ; and after him the high priests , every one for his time , as long as the priesthood was royall ; and after the people of the jews , had rejected god , that he should no more reign over them , those kings which submitted themselves to gods government , were also his chief prophets ; and the high priests o●…fice became ministeriall . and when god was to be consulted , they put on the holy vestments , and enquired of the lord , as the king commanded them , and were deprived of their office , when the king thought fit . for king saul [ sam. . . ] commanded the burnt offering to be brought , and [ sam. . . ] he commands the priest to bring the ark neer him ; and [ ver . . ] again to let it alone , because he saw an advantage upon his enemies . and in the same chapter saul asketh counsell of god. in like manner king david , after his being anointed , though before he had possession of the kingdome , is said to enquire of the lord [ sam. . . ] whether he should fight against the philistines at keilah ; and [ verse . ] david commandeth the priest to bring him the ephod , to enquire whether he should stay in keilah , or not . and king solomon [ kings . . ] took the priesthood from abiathar , and gave it [ verse . ] to zadoc . therefore moses , and the high priests , and the pious kings , who enquired of god on all extraordinary occasions , how they were to carry themselves , or what event they were to have , were all soveraign prophets . but in what manner god spake unto them , is not manifest . to say that when moses went up to god in mount sinai , it was a dream , or vision , such as other prophets had , is contrary to that distinction which god made between moses , and other prophets , numb . . , , . to say god spake or appeared as he is in his own nature , is to deny his infinitenesse , invisibility , incomprehensibility . to say he spake by inspiration , or infusion of the holy spirit , as the holy spirit signifieth the deity , is to make moses equall with christ , in whom onely the godhead [ as st. paul speaketh col. . . ] dwelleth ▪ bodily . and lastly , to say he spake by the holy spirit , as it signifieth the graces , or gifts of the holy spirit , is to attribute nothing to him supernaturall . for god disposeth men to piety , justice , mercy , truth , faith , and all manner of vertue , both morall , and intellectuall , by doctrine , example , and by severall occasions , naturall , and ordinary . and as these ways cannot be applyed to god , in his speaking to moses , at mouut sinai ; so also , they cannot be applyed to him , in his speaking to the high priests , from the mercy-seat . therefore in what manner god spake to those soveraign prophets of the old testament , whose office it was to enquire of him , is not intelligible . in the time of the new testament , there was no soveraign prophet , but our saviour ; who was both god that spake , and the prophet to whom he spake . to subordinate prophets of perpetuall calling , i find not any place that proveth god spake to them supernaturally ; but onely in such manner , as naturally he inclineth men to piety , to beleef , to righteousnesse , and to other vertues all other christian men . which way , though it consist in constitution , instruction , education , and the occasions and invitements men have to christian vertues ; yet it is truly attributed to the operation of the spirit of god , or holy spirit , ( which we in our language call the holy ghost ) : for there is no good inclination , that is not of the operation of god. but these operations are not alwaies supernaturall . when therefore a prophet is said to speak in the spirit , or by the spirit of god , we are to understand no more , but that he speaks according to gods will , declared by the supreme prophet . for the most common acceptation of the word spirit , is in the signification of a mans intention , mind , or disposition . in the time of moses , there were seventy men besides himself , that prophecyed in the campe of the israelites . in what manner god spake to them , is declared in the of numbers , verse . the lord came down in a cloud , and spake unto moses , and took of the spirit that was upon him , and gave it to the seventy elders . and it came to passe , when the spirit rested upon them , they prophecyed , and did not cease . by which it is manifest , first , that their prophecying to the people , was subservient , and subordinate to the prophecying of moses ; for that god took of the spirit of moses , to put upon them ; so that they prophecyed as moses would have them : otherwise they had not been suffered to prophecy at all . for there was [ verse . ] a complaint made against them to moses ; and joshua would have moses to have forbidden them ; which he did not , but said to joshua , bee not jealous in my behalf . secondly , that the spirit of god in that place , signifieth nothing but the mind and disposition to obey , and assist ▪ moses in the administration of the government . for if it were meant they had the substantiall spirit of god ; that is , the divine nature , inspired into them , then they had it in no lesse manner then christ himself , in whom onely the spirit of god dwelt bodily . it is meant therefore of the gift and grace of god , that guided them to co-operate with moses ; from whom their spirit was derived . and it appeareth [ verse . ] that , they were such as moses himself should appoint for elders and officers of the people : for the words are , gather unto me seventy men , whom thou knowest to be elders and officers of the people : where , thou knowest , is the same with thou appointest , or hast appointed to be such . for we are told before [ exod. . ] that moses following the counsell of jethro his father-in-law , did appoint judges , and officers over the people , such as feared god ; and of these , were those seventy , whom god by putting upon them moses spirit , inclined to aid moses in the administration of the kingdome : and in this sense the spirit of god is said [ sam. . , . ] presently upon the anointing of david , to have come upon david , and left saul ; god giving his graces to him he chose to govern his people , and taking them away from him , he rejected . so that by the spirit is meant inclination to gods service ; and not any supernaturall revelation . god spake also many times by the event of lots ; which were ordered by such as he had put in authority over his people . so wee read that god manifested by the lots which saul caused to be drawn [ sam. . . ] the fault that jonathan had committed , in eating a honey-comb , contrary to the oath taken by the people . and [ iosh. . . ] god divided the land of canaan amongst the israelite , by the lots that ioshua did cast before the lord in shiloh . in the same manner it seemeth to be , that god discovered [ ioshua . , &c. ] the crime of achan . and these are the wayes whereby god declared his will in the old testament . all which ways he used also in the new testament . to the virgin mary , by a vision of an angel : to ioseph in a dream : again to paul in the way to damascus in a vision of our saviour : and to peter in the vision of a sheet let down from heaven , with divers sorts of flesh , of clean , and unclean beasts ; and in prison , by vision of an angel : and to all the apostles , and writers of the new testament , by the graces of his spirit ; and to the apostles again ( at the choosing of matthias in the place of judas iscariot ) by lot . seeing then all prophecy supposeth vision , or dream , ( which two , when they be naturall , are the same , ) or some especiall gift of god , so rarely observed in mankind , as to be admired where observed ; and seeing as well such gifts , as the most extraordinary dreams , and visions , may proceed from god , not onely by his supernaturall , and immediate , but also by his naturall operation , and by mediation of second causes ; there is need of reason and judgment to discern between naturall , and supernaturall gifts , and between naturall , and supernaturall visions , or dreams . and consequently men had need to be very circumspect , aud wary , in obeying the voice of man , that pretending himself to be a prophet , requires us to obey god in that way , which he in gods name telleth us to be the way to happinesse . for he that pretends to teach men the way of so great felicity , pretends to govern them ; that is to say , to rule , and reign over them ; which is a thing , that all men naturally desire , and is therefore worthy to be suspected of ambition and imposture ; and consequently , ought to be examined , and tryed by every man , before hee yeeld them obedience ; unlesse he have yeelded it them already , in the institution of a common-wealth ; as when the prophet is the civill soveraign , or by the civil soveraign authorized . and if this examination of prophets , and spirits , were not allowed to every one of the people , it had been to no purpose , to set out the marks , by which every man might be able , to distinguish between those , whom they ought , and those whom they ought not to follow . seeing therefore such marks are set out [ deut. . , &c. ] to know a prophet by ; and [ iohn . . &c. ] to know a spirit by : and seeing there is so much prophecying in the old testament ; and so much preaching in the new testament against prophets ; and so much greater a number ordinarily of false prophets , then of true ; every one is to beware of obeying their directions , at their own perill . and first , that there were many more false then true prophets , appears by this , that when ahab [ kings . ] consulted four hundred prophets , they were all false impostors , but onely one michaiah . and a little before the time of the captivity , the prophets were generally lyars . the prophets ( saith the lord by ieremy , cha . . verse . ) prophecy lies in my name . i sent them not , neither have i commanded them , nor spake unto them , they prophecy to you a false vision , a thing of naught ; and the deceit of their heart . in so much as god commanded the people by the mouth of the prophet i●…remiah [ chap. . . ] not to obey them . thus saith the lord of hosts , hearken not unto the words of the prophets , that prophecy to you . they make you vain , they speak a vision of their own heart , and not out of the mouth of the lord. seeing then there was in the time of the old testament , such quarrells amongst the visionary prophets , one contesting with another , and asking , when departed the spirit from me , to go to thee ? as between michaiah , and the rest of the four hundred ; and such giving of the lye to one another , ( as in ierem. . . ] and such controversies in the new testament at this day , amongst the spirituall prophets : every man then was , and now is bound to make use of his naturall reason , to apply to all prophecy those rules which god hath given us , to discern the true from the false . of which rules , in the old testament , one was , conformable doctrine to that which moses the soveraign prophet had taught them ; and the other the miraculous power of foretelling what god would bring to passe , as i have already shewn out of deut. . . &c. and in the new testament there was but one onely mark ; and that was the preaching of this doctrine , that iesus is the christ , that is , the king of the jews , promised in the old testament . whosoever denyed that article , he was a false prophet , whatsoever miracles he might seem to work ; and he that taught it was a true prophet . for st. iohn [ epist. . , &c. ] speaking expressely of the means to examine spirits , whether they be of god , or not ; after he had told them that there would arise false prophets , saith thus , hereby know ye the spirit of god. every spirit that confesseth that iesus christ is come in the flesh , is of god ; that is , is approved and allowed as a prophet of god : not that he is a godly man , or one of the elect , for this , that he confesseth , professeth , or preacheth jesus to be the christ ; but for that he is a prophet avowed . for god sometimes speaketh by prophets , whose persons he hath not accepted ; as he did by baalam ; and as he foretold saul of his death , by the witch of endor . again in the next verse , every spirit that confesseth not that iesus christ is come in the flesh , is not of christ. and this is the spirit of antichrist . so that the rule is perfect on both sides ; that he is a true prophet , which preacheth the messiah already come , in the person of jesus ; and he a false one that denyeth him come , and looketh for him in some future impostor , that shall take upon him that honour falsely , whom the apostle there properly calleth antichrist . every man therefore ought to consider who is the soveraign prophet ; that is to say , who it is , that is gods vicegerent on earth ; and hath next under god , the authority of governing christian men ; and to observe for a rule , that doctrine , which in the name of god , hee hath commanded to bee taught ; and thereby to examine and try out the truth of those doctrines , which pretended prophets with miracle , or without , shall at any time advance : and if they find it contrary to that rule , to doe as they did , that came to moses , and complained that there were some that propecyed in the campe , whose authority so to doe they doubted of ; and leave to the soveraign , as they did to moses to uphold , or to forbid them , as hee should see cause ; and if hee disavow them , then no more to obey their voice ; or if he approve them , then to obey them , as men to whom god hath given a part of the spirit of their soveraigne . for when christian men , take not their christian soveraign , for gods prophet ; they must either take their owne dreames , for the prophecy they mean to bee governed by , and the tumour of their own hearts for the spirit of god ; or they must suffer themselves to bee lead by some strange prince ; or by some of their fellow subjects , that can bewitch them , by slaunder of the government , into rebellion , without other miracle to confirm their calling , then sometimes an extraordinary successe , and impunity ; and by this means destroying all laws , both divine , and humane , reduce all order , government , and society , to the first chaos of violence , and civill warre . chap. xxxvii . of miracles , and their use. by miracles are signified the admirable works of god : & therefore they are also called wonders . and because they are for the most part , done , for a signification of his commandement , in such occasions , as without them , men are apt to doubt , ( following their private naturall reasoning , ) what he hath commanded , and what not , they are commonly in holy scripture , called signes , in the same sense , as they are called by the latines , ostenta , and portenta , from shewing , and fore-signifying that , which the almighty is about to bring to passe . to understand therefore what is a miracle , we must first understand what works they are , which men wonder at , and call admirable . and there be but two things which make men wonder at any event : the one is , if it be strange , that is to say , such , as the like of it hath never , or very rarely been produced : the other is , if when it is produced , we cannot imagine it to have been done by naturall means , but onely by the immediate hand of god. but when wee see some possible , naturall cause of it , how rarely soever the like has been done ; or if the like have been often done , how impossible soever it be to imagine a naturall means thereof , we no more wonder , nor esteem it for a miracle . therefore , if a horse , or cow should speak , it were a miracle ; because both the thing is strange , & the naturall cause difficult to imagin : so also were it , to see a strange deviation of nature , in the production of some new shape of a living creature . but when a man , or other animal , engenders his like , though we know no more how this is done , than the other ; yet because 't is usuall , it is no miracle . in like manner , if a man be metamorphosed into a stone , or into a pillar , it is a miracle ; because strange : but if a peece of wood be so changed ; because we see it often , it is no miracle : and yet we know no more , by what operation of god , the one is brought to passe , than the other . the first rainbow that was seen in the world , was a miracle , because the first ; and consequently strange ; and served for a sign from god , placed in heaven , to assure his people , there should be no more an universall destruction of the world by water . ●…ut at this day , because they are frequent , they are not miracles , neither to them that know their naturall causes , nor to them who know them not . again , there be many rare works produced by the art of man : yet when we know they are done ; because thereby wee know also the means how they are done , we count them not for miracles , because not wrought by the immediate hand of god , but of humane industry . furthermore , seeing admiration and wonder , is consequent to the knowledge and experience , wherewith men are endued , some more , some lesse ; it followeth , that the same thing , may be a miracle to one , and not to another . and thence it is , that ignorant , and superstitious men make great wonders of those works , which other men , knowing to proceed from nature , ( which is not the immediate , but the ordinary work of god , ) admire not at all : as when ecclipses of the sun and moon have been taken for supernaturall works , by the common people ; when neverthelesse , there were others , could from their naturall causes , have foretold the very hour they should arrive : or , as when a man , by confederacy , and secret intelligence , getting knowledge of the private actions of an ignorant , unwary man , and thereby tells him , what he has done in former time ; it seems to him a miraculous thing ; but amongst wise , and cautelous men , such miracles as those , cannot easily be done . again , it belongeth to the nature of a miracle , that it be wrought for the procuring of credit to gods messengers , ministers , and prophets , that thereby men may know , they are called , sent , and employed by god , and thereby be the better inclined to obey them . and therefore , though the creation of the world , and after that the destruction of all living creatures in the universall deluge , were admirable works ; yet because they were not done to procure credit to any prophet , or other minister of god , they use not to be called miracles . for how admirable soever any work be , the admiration consisteth not in that it could be done , because men naturally beleeve the almighty can doe all things , but because he does it at the prayer , or word of a man. but the works of god in egypt , by the hand of moses , were properly miracles ; because they were done with intention to make the people of israel beleeve , that moses came unto them , not out of any design of his owne interest , but as sent from god. therefore after god had commanded him to deliver the israelites from the egyptian bondage , when he said they will not beleeve me , but will say , the lord hath not appeared unto me , god gave him power , to turn the rod he had in his hand into a serpent , and again to return it into a rod ; and by putting his hand into his bosome , to make it leprous ; and again by putting it out to make it whole , to make the children of israel beleeve ( as it is verse . ) that the god of their fathers had appeared unto him : and if that were not enough , he gave him power to turn their waters into bloud . and when hee had done these miracles before the people , it is said ( verse . ) that they beleeved him . neverthelesse , for fear of pharaoh , they durst not yet obey him . therefore the other works which were done to plague pharaoh , and the egyptians , tended all to make the israelites beleeve in moses , and were properly miracles . in like manner if we consider all the miracles done by the hand of moses , and all the rest of the prophets , till the captivity ; and those of our saviour , and his apostles afterward ; we shall find , their end was alwaies to beget , or confirme beleefe , that they came not of their own motion , but were sent by god. wee may further observe in scripture , that the end of miracles , was to beget beleef , not universally in all men , elect , and reprobate ; but in the elect only ; that is to say , in such as god had determined should become his subjects . for those miraculous plagues of egypt , had not for end , the conversion of pharaoh ; for god had told moses before , that he would harden the heart of pharaoh , that he should not let the people goe : and when he let them goe at last , not the miracles perswaded him , but the plagues forced him to it . so also of our saviour , it is written , ( mat. . . ) that he wrought not many miracles in his own countrey , because of their unbeleef ; and ( in marke . . ) in stead of , he wrought not many , it is , he could work none . it was not because he wanted power ; which to say , were blasphemy against god ; nor that the end of miracles was not to convert incredulous men to christ ; for the end of all the miracles of moses , of the prophets , of our saviour , and of his apostles was to adde men to the church ; but it was , because the end of their miracles , was to adde to the church ( not all men , but ) such as should be saved ; that is to say , such as god had elected . seeing therefore our saviour was sent from his father , hee could not use his power in the conversion of those , whom his father had rejected . they that expounding this place of st. marke , say , that this word , hee could not , is put for , he would not , do it without example in the greek tongue , ( where would not , is put sometimes for could not , in things inanimate , that have no will ; but could not , for would not , never , ) and thereby lay a stumbling block before weak christians ; as if christ could doe no miracles , but amongst the credulous . from that which i have here set down , of thenature , and use of a miracle , we may define it thus , a miracle , is a work of god , ( besides his operation by the way of nature , ordained in the creation , ) done , for the making manifest to his elect , the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation . and from this definition , we may inferre ; first , that in all miracles , the work done , is not the effect of any vertue in the prophet ; because it is the effect of the immediate hand of god ; that is to say , god hath done it , without using the prophet therein , as a subordinate cause . secondly , that no devil , angel , or other created spirit , can do a miracle . for it must either be by vertue of some naturall science , or by incantation , that is , vertue of words . for if the inchanters do it by their own power independent , there is some power that proceedeth not from god ; which all men deny : and if they doe it by power given them , then is the work not from the immediate hand of god , but naturall , and consequently no miracle . there be some texts of scripture , that seem to attribute the power of working wonders ( equall to some of those immediate miracles , wrought by god himself , ) to certain arts of magick , and incantation . as for example , when we read that after the rod of moses being east on the ground became a serpent , the magicians of egypt did the like by their enchantments ; and that after moses had turned the waters of the egyptian streams , rivers , ponds , and pooles of water into blood , the magicians of egypt did so likewise , with their enchantments ; and that after moses had by the power of god brought frogs upon the land , the magicians also did so with their enchantments , and brought up frogs upon the land of egypt ; will not a man be apt to attribute miracles to enchantments ; that is to say , to the efficacy of the sound of words ; and think the sam●… very well proved out of this , and other such places ? and yet there is no place of scripture , that telleth us what an enchantment is . if therefore enchantment be not , as many think it , a working of strange effects by spells , and words ; but imposture , and delusion , wrought by ordinary means ; and so far from supernaturall , as the impostors need not the study so much as of naturall causes , but the ordinary ignorance , stupidity , and superstition of mankind , to doe them ; those texts that seem to countenance the power of magick , witcheraft , and enchantment , must needs have another sense , than at first sight they seem to bear . for it is evident enough , that words have no effect , but on those that understand them ; and then they have no other , but to signifie the intentions , or passions of them that speak ; and thereby produce , hope , fear , or other passions , or conceptions in the hearer . therefore when a rod seemeth a serpent , or the waters bloud , or any other miracle seemeth done by enchantment ; if it be not to the edification of gods people , not the rod , nor the water , nor any other thing is enchanted ; that is to say , wrought upon by the words , but the spectator . so that all the miracle consisteth in this , that the enchanter has deceived a man ; which is no miracle , but a very easie matter to doe . for such is the ignorance , and aptitude to error generally of all men , but especially of them that have not much knowledge of naturall causes , and of the nature , and interests of men ; as by innumerable and easie tricks to be abused . what opinion of miraculous power , before it was known there was a science of the course of the stars , might a man have gained , that should have told the people , this hour , or day the sun should be darkned ? a juggler by the handling of his goblets , and other trinkets , if it were not now ordinarily practised , would be thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the devil . a man that hath practised to speak by drawing in of his breath , ( which kind of men in antient time were called ventriloqui , ) and so make the weaknesse of his voice seem to proceed , not from the weak impulsion of the organs of speech , but from distance of place , is able to make very many men beleeve it is a voice from heaven , whatsoever he please to tell them . and for a crafty man , that hath enquired into the secrets , and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily maketh to another of his actions and adventures past , to tell them him again is no hard matter ; and yet there be many , that by such means as that , obtain the reputation of being conjurers . but it is too long a businesse , to reckon up the severall sorts of those men , which the greeks called thaumaturgi , that is to say , workers of things wonderfull ; and yet these do all they do , by their own single dexterity . but if we looke upon the impostures wrought by confederacy , there is nothing how impossible soever to be done , that is impossible to bee beleeved . for two men conspiring , one to seem lame , the other to cure him with a charme , will deceive many : but many conspiring , one to seem lame , another so to cure him , and all the rest to bear witnesse ; will deceive many more . in this aptitude of mankind , to give too hasty beleefe to pretended miracles , there can be no better , nor i think any other caution , then that which god hath prescribed , first by moses , ( as i have said before in the precedent chapter , ) in the beginning of the . and end of the . of deuteronomy ; that wee take not any for prophets , that teach any other religion , then that which gods lieutenant , ( which at that time was moses , ) hath established ; nor any , ( though he teach the same religion , ) whose praediction we doe not see come to passe . moses therefore in his time , and aaron , and his successors in their times , and the soveraign governour of gods people , next under god himself , that is to say , the head of the church in all times , are to be consulted , what doctrine he hath established , before wee give credit to a pretended miracle , or prophet . and when that is done , the thing they pretend to be a miracle , we must both see it done , and use all means possible to consider , whether it be really done ; and not onely so , but whether it be such , as no man can do the like by his naturall power , but that it requires the immediate hand of god. and in this also we must have recourse to gods lieutenant ; to whom in all doubtfull cases , wee have submitted our private judgments . for example ; if a man pretend , that after certain words spoken over a peece of bread , that presently god hath made it not bread , but a god , or a man , or both , and neverthelesse it looketh still as like bread as ever it did ; there is no reason for any man to think it really done ; nor consequently to fear him , till he enquire of god , by his vicar , or lieutenant , whether it be done , or not . if he say not , then followeth that which moses saith , ( deut. . . ) he hath spoken it presumptuously , thou shalt not fear him . if he say 't is done , then he is not to contradict it . so also if wee see not , but onely hear tell of a miracle , we are to consult the lawful church ; that is to say , the lawful head thereof , how far we are to give credit to the relators of it . and this is chiefly the case of men , that in these days live under christian soveraigns . for in these times , i do not know one man , that ever saw any such wondrous work , done by the charm , or at the word , or prayer of a man , that a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason , would think supernaturall : and the question is no more , whether what wee see done , be a miracle ; whether the miracle we hear , or read of , were a reall work , and not the act of a tongue , or pen ; but in plain terms , whether the report be true , or a lye . in which question we are not every one , to make our own private reason , or conscience , but the publique reason , that is , the reason of gods supreme lieutenant , judge ; and indeed we have made him judge already , if wee have given him a soveraign power , to doe all that is necessary for our peace and defence . a private man has alwaies the liberty , ( because thought is free , ) to beleeve , or not beleeve in his heart , those acts that have been given out for miracles , according as he shall see , what benefit can accrew by mens belief , to those that pretend , or countenance them , and thereby conjecture , whether they be miracles , or lies . but when it comes to confession of that faith , the private reason must submit to the publique ; that is to say , to gods lieutenant . but who is this lieutenant of god , and head of the church , shall be considered in its proper place hereafter . chap. xxxviii . of the signification in scripture of eternall life , hell , salvation , the world to come , and rÉdemption . the maintenance of civill society , depending on justice ; and justice on the power of life and death , and other lesse rewards and punishments , residing in them that have the soveraignty of the common-wealth ; it is impossible a common-wealth should stand , where any other than the soveraign , hath a power of giving greater rewards than life ; and of inflicting greater punishments , then death . now seeing eternall life is a greater reward , than the life present ; and eternall torment a greater punishment than the death of nature ; it is a thing worthy to be well considered , of all men that desire ( by obeying authority ) to avoid the calamities of confusion , and civill war , what is meant in holy scripture , by life eternall , and torment eternall ; and for what offences , and against whom committed , men are to be eternally tormented ; and for what actions , they are to obtain eternall life . and first we find , that adam was created in such a condition of life , as had he not broken the commandement of god , he had enjoyed it in the paradise of eden everlastingly . for there was the tree of life ; whereof he was so long allowed to eat , as he should forbear to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evill ; which was not allowed him . and therefore as soon as he had eaten of it , god thrust him out of paradise , lest he should put forth his hand , and take also of the tree of life , and live for ever . by which it seemeth to me , ( with submission neverthelesse both in this , and in all questions , whereof the determination dependeth on the scriptures , to the interpretation of the bible authorized by the common-wealth , whose subject i am , ) that adam if he had not sinned , had had an eternall life on earth : and that mortality entred upon himself , and his posterity , by his first sin. not that actuall death then entred ; for adam then could never have had children ; whereas he lived long after , and saw a numerous posterity ere he dyed . but where it it is said , in the day that thou eatest thereof , thou shalt surely die , it must needs bee meant of his mortality , and certitude of death . seeing then eternall life was lost by adams forfeiture , in committing sin , he that should cancell that forfeiture was to recover thereby , that life again . now jesus christ hath satisfied for the sins of all that beleeve in him ; and therefore recovered to all beleevers , that eternall life , which was lost by the sin of adam . and in this sense it is , that the comparison of st. paul holdeth ( rom. . , . ) as by the offence of one , iudgment came upon all men to condemnation , even so by the righteousnesse of one , the free gift came upon all men to iustification of life . which is again ( cor. . , . ) more perspicuously delivered in these words , for since by man came death , by man came also the resurrection of the dead . for as in adam all die , even so in christ shall all be made alive . concerning the place wherein men shall enjoy that eternall life , which christ hath obtained for them , the texts next before alledged seem to make it on earth . for if as in adam , all die , that is , have forfeited paradise , and eternall life on earth , even so in christ all shall bee made alive ; then all men shall be made to live on earth ; for else the comparison were not proper . hereunto seemeth to agree that of the psalmist , ( psal. . . ) vpon zion god commanded the blessing , even life for evermore : for zion , is in jerusalem , upon earth : as also that of s. joh. ( rev. . . ) to him that overcommeth i will give to eat of the tree of life , which is in the midst of the paradise of god. this was the tree of adams eternall life ; but his life was to have been on earth . the same seemeth to be confirmed again by st. joh. ( rev. . . ) where he saith , i iohn saw the holy city , new ierusalem , coming down from god out of heaven , prepared as a bride adorned for her husband : and again v. . to the same effect : as if he should say , the new jerusalem , the paradise of god , at the coming again of christ , should come down to gods people from heaven , and not they goe up to it from earth . and this differs nothing from that , which the two men in white clothing ( that is , the two angels ) said to the apostles , that were looking upon christ ascending ( acts . . ) this same iesus , who is taken up from you into heaven , shall so come , as you have seen him go up into heaven . which soundeth as if they had said , he should come down to govern them under his father , eternally here ; and not take them up to govern them in heaven ; and is conformable to the restauration of the kingdom of god , instituted under moses ; which was a political government of the jews on earth . again , that saying of our saviour ( mat. . . ) that in the resurrection they neither marry , nor are given in marriage , but are as the angels of god in heaven , is a description of an eternall life , resembling that which we lost in adam in the point of marriage . for seeing adam , and eve , if they had not sinned , had lived on earth eternally , in their individuall persons ; it is manifest , they should not continually have procreated their kind . for if immortals should have generated , as mankind doth now ; the earth in a small time , would not have been able to afford them place to stand on . the jews that asked our saviour the question , whose wife the woman that had married many brothers , should be , in the resurrection , knew not what were the consequences of life eternall : and therefore our saviour puts them in mind of this consequence of immortality ; that there shal be no generation , and consequētly no marriage , no more then there is marriage , or generatiō among the angels . the comparison between that eternall life which adam lost , and our saviour by his victory over death hath recovered ; holdeth also in this , that as adam lost eternall life by his sin , and yet lived after it for a time ; so the faithful christian hath recovered eternal life by christs passion , though he die a natural death , and remaine dead for a time ; namely , till the resurrection . for as death is reckoned from the condemnation of adam , not from the execution ; so life is reckoned from the absolution , not from the resurrection of them that are elected in christ. that the place wherein men are to live eternally , after the resurrection , is the heavens , meaning by heaven , those parts of the world , which are the most remote from earth , as where the stars are , or above the stars , in another higher heaven , called coelum empyreum , ( whereof there is no mention in scripture , nor ground in reason ) is not easily to be drawn from any text that i can find . by the kingdome of heaven , is meant the kingdom of the king that dwelleth in heaven and his kingdome was the people of israel , whom he ruled by the prophets his lieutenants , first moses , and after him eleazar , and the soveraign priests , till in the days of samuel they rebelled , and would have a mortall man for their king , after the manner of other nations . and when our saviour christ , by the preaching of his ministers , shall have perswaded the jews to return , and called the gentiles to his obedience , then shall there be a new kingdom of heaven ; because our king shall then be god , whose throne is heaven ; without any necessity evident in the scripture , that man shall ascend to his happinesse any higher than gods footstool the earth . on the contrary , we find written ( ioh. . . ) that no man hath ascended into heaven , but he that came down from heaven , even the son of man , that is in heaven . where i observe by the way , that these words are not , as those which go immediately before , the words of our saviour , but of st. john himself ; for christ was then not in heaven , but upon the earth . the like is said of david ( acts . . ) where st. peter , to prove the ascension of christ , using the words of the psalmist , ( psal. . . ) thou wilt not leave my soule in hell , not suffer thine holy one to see corruption , saith , they were spoken ( not of david , but ) of christ ; and to prove it , addeth this reason , for david is not ascended into heaven . but to this a man may easily answer , and say , that though their bodies were not to ascend till the generall day of judgment , yet their souls were in heaven as soon as they were departed from their bodies ; which also seemeth to be confirmed by the words of our saviour ( luke . , . ) who proving the resurrection out of the words of moses , saith thus , that the dead are raised , even moses shewed , at the bush , when he calleth the lord , the god of abraham , and the god of isaac , and the god of iacob . for he is not a god of the dead , but of the living ; for they all live to him . but if these words be to be understood only of the immortality of the soul , they prove not at all that which our saviour intended to prove , which was the resurrection of the body , that is to say , the immortality of the man. therefore our saviour meaneth , that those patriarchs were immortall ; not by a property consequent to the essence , and nature of mankind ; but by the will of god , that was pleased of his mere grace , to bestow eternall life upon the faithfull . and though at that time the patriarchs and many other faithfull men were dead , yet as it is in the text , they lived to god ; that is , they were written in the book of life with them that were absolved of their sinnes , and ordained to life eternall at the resurrection . that the soul of man is in its own nature eternall , and a living creature inpedendent on the body ; or that any meer man is immortall , otherwise than by the resurrection in the last day , ( except enos and elias , ) is a doctrine nor apparent in scripture . the whole . chapter of iob , which is the speech not of his friends , but of himselfe , is a complaint of this mortality of nature ; and yet no contradiction of the immortality at the resurrection . there is hope of a tree ( saith hee verse . ) if it be cast down , though the root thereof wax old , and the stock thereof die in the ground , yet when it senteth the water it will bud , and bring forth boughes like a plant. but man dyeth , and wasteth away , yea , man giveth up the ghost , and where is he ? and ( verse . ) man lyeth down , and riseth not , till the heavens be no more . but when is it , that the heavens shall be no more ? st. peter tells us , that it is at the generall resurrection . for in his . epistle , . chapter , and verse , he saith , that the heavens and the earth that are now , are reserved unto fire against the day of iudgment , and perdition of ungodly men , and ( verse . ) looking for , and hasting to the comming of god , wherein the heavens shall be on fire , and shall be dissolved , and the elements shall melt with fervent heat . neverthelesse , we according to the promise look for new heavens , and a new earth , wherein dwelleth righteousnesse . therefore where job saith , man riseth not till the heavens be no more ; it is all one , as if he had said , the immortall life ( and soule and life in the scripture , do usually signifie the same thing ) beginneth not in man , till the resurrection , and day of judgement ; and hath for cause , not his specificall nature , and generation ; but the promise . for st. peter saies not , wee look for new heavens , and a new earth , ( from nature , ) but from promise . lastly , seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places of scripture , in the . chapter of this book , that the kingdom of god is a civil common-wealth , where god himself is soveraign , by vertue first of the old , and since of the new covenant , wherein he reigneth by his vicar , or lieutenant ; the same places do therefore also prove , that after the comming again of our saviour in his majesty , and glory , to reign actually , and eternally ; the kingdom of god is to be on earth . but because this doctrine ( though proved out of places of scripture not few , nor obscure ) will appear to most men a novelty ; i doe but propound it ; maintaining nothing in this , or any other paradox of religion ; but attending the end of that dispute of the sword , concerning the authority , ( not yet amongst my countrey-men decided , ) by which all sorts of doctrine are to bee approved , or rejected ; and whose commands , both in speech , and writing , ( whatsoever be the opinions of private men ) must by all men , that mean to be protected by their laws , be obeyed . for the points of doctrine concerning the kingdome god , have so great influence on the kingdome of man , as not to be determined , but by them , that under god have the soveraign power . as the kingdome of god , and eternall life , so also gods enemies , and their torments after judgment , appear by the scripture , to have their place on earth . the name of the place , where all men remain till the resurrection , that were either buryed , or swallowed up of the earth , is usually called in scripture , by words that signifie under ground ; which the latines read generally infernus , and inferi , and the greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that is to say , a place where men cannot see ; and containeth as well the grave , as any other deeper place . but for the place of the damned after the resurrection , it is not determined , neither in the old , nor new testament , by any note of situation ; but onely by the company : as that it shall bee , where such wicked men were , as god in former times in extraordinary , and miraculous manner , had destroyed from off the face of the earth : as for example , that they are in inferno , in tartarus , or in the bottomelesse pit ; because corah , dathan , and abirom , were swallowed up alive into the earth . not that the writers of the scripture would have us beleeve , there could be in the globe of the earth , which is not only finite , but also ( compared to the height of the stars ) of no considerable magnitude , a pit without a bottome ; that is , a hole of infinite depth , such as the greeks in their daemonologie ( that is to say , in their doctrine concerning daemons , ) and after them the romans called tartarus ; of which virgill sayes , bis patet in praeceps , tantum tenditque sub umbras , quantus ad ●…thereum coeli suspectus olympum : for that is a thing the proportion of earth to heaven cannot bear : but that wee should beleeve them there , indefinitely , where those men are , on whom god inflicted that exemplary punnishment . again , hecause those mighty men of the earth , that lived in the time of noah , before the floud , ( which the greeks called heroes , and the scripture giants , and both say , were begotten , by copulation of the children of god , with the children of men , ) were for their wicked life destroyed by the generall deluge ; the place of the damned , is therefore also sometimes marked out , by the company of those deceased giants ; as proverbs . . the man that wandreth out of the way of understanding , shall remain in the congregation of the giants , and job . . behold the giants groan under water , and they that dwell with them . here the place of the damned , is under the water . and isaiah . . hell is troubled how to meet thee , ( that is , the king of babylon ) and will displace the giants for thee : and here again the place of the damned , ( if the sense be literall , ) is to be under water . thirdly , because the cities of sodom , and gomorrah , by the extraordinary wrath of god , were consumed for their wickednesse with fire and brimstone , and together with them the countrey about made a stinking bituminous lake : the place of the damned is sometimes expressed by fire , and a fiery lake : as in the apocalypse ch . . . but the timorous , incredulous , and abominable , and murderers , and whoremongers , and sorcerers , and idolaters , and all lyars , shall have their part in the lake that burnetb with fire , and brimstone ; which is the second death . so that it is manifest , that hell fire , which is here expressed by metaphor , from the reall fire of sodome , signifieth not any certain kind , or place of torment ; but is to be taken indefinitely , for destruction , as it is in the . chapter , at the . verse ; where it is said , that death and hell were cast into the lake of fire ; that is to say , were abolished , and destroyed ; as if after the day of judgment , there shall be no more dying , nor no more going into hell ; that is , no more going to hades ( from which word perhaps our word hell is derived , ) which is the same with no more dying . fourthly , from the plague of darknesse inflicted on the egyptians , of which it is written ( exod. . . ) they saw not one another , neither rose any man from his place for three days ; but all the children of israel had light in their dwellings ; the place of the wicked after judgment , is called vtter darknesse , or ( as it is in the originall ) darknesse without . and so it is expressed ( mat. . . ) where the king commandeth his servants , to bind hand and foot the man that had not on his wedding garment , and to cast him out , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , externall darknesse , or darknesse without : which though translated vtter darknesse , does not signifie how great , but where that darknesse is to be ; namely , without the habitation of gods elect. lastly , whereas there was a place neer jerusalem , called the valley of the children of hinnon ; in a part whereof , called tophet , the jews had committed most grievous idolatry , sacrificing their children to the idol moloch ; and wherein also god had afflicted his enemies with most grievous punishments ; and wherein josias had burnt the priests of moloch upon their own altars , as appeareth at large in the of kings chap. . the place served afterwards , to receive the filth , and garbage which was carried thither , on t of the city ; and there used to be fires made , from time to time , to purifie the aire , and take away the stench of carrion . from this abominable place , the jews used ever after to call the place of the damned , by the name of gehenna , or valley of hinnon . and this gehenna , is that word , which is usually now translated hell ; and from the fires from time to time there burning , we have the notion of everlasting , and vnquenchable fire . seeing now there is none , that so interprets the scripture , as that after the day of judgment , the wicked are all eternally to be punished in the valley of hinnon ; or that they shall so rise again , as to be ever after under ground , or under water ; or that after the resurrection , they shall no more see one another ; nor stir from one place to another ; it followeth , me thinks , very necessarily , that that which is thus said concerning hell fire , is spoken metaphorically ; and that therefore there is a proper sense to bee enquired after , ( for of all metaphors there is some reall ground , that may be expressed in proper words ) both of the place of hell , and the nature of hellish torments , and tormenters . and first for the tormenters , wee have their nature , and properties , exactly and properly delivered by the names of , the enemy , or satan ; the accuser , or diabolus ; the destroyer , or abaddon . which significant names , satan , devill , abaddon , set not forth to us any individuall person , as proper names use to doe ; but onely an office , or quality ; and are therefore appellatives ; which ought not to have been left untranslated , as they are , in the latine , and modern bibles ; because thereby they seem to be the proper names of daemons ; and men are the more easily seduced to beleeve the doctrine of devills ; which at that time was the religion of the gentiles , and contrary to that of moses , and of christ. and because by the enemy , the accuser , and destroyer , is meant , the enemy of them that shall be in the kingdome of god ; therefore if the kingdome of god after the resurrection , bee upon the earth , ( as in the former chapter i have shewn by scripture it seems to be , ) the enemy , and his kingdome must be on earth also . for so also was it , in the time before the jews had deposed god. for gods kingdome was in palestine ; and the nations round about , were the kingdomes of the enemy ; and consequently by satan , is meant any earthly enemy of the church . the torments of hell , are expressed sometimes , by weeping , and gnashing of teeth , as mat. . . sometimes , by the worm of conscience ; as isa. . . and mark . , , : sometimes , by fire , as in the place now quoted , where the worm dyeth not , and the fire is not quenched , and many places beside : sometimes by shame , and cont●…mpt , as da●… . . . and many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth , shall awake ; some to everlasting life ; and some to shame , and everlasting contempt . all which places design metaphorically a grief , and discontent of mind , from the sight of that eternall felicity in others , which they themselves through their own incredulity , and disobedience have lost . and because such felicity in others , is not sensible but by comparison with their own actuall miseries ; it followeth that they are to suffer such bodily paines , and calamities , as are incident to those , who not onely live under evill and cruell governours , but have also for enemy , the eternall king of the saints , god almighty . and amongst these bodily paines , is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second death . for though the scripture bee clear for an universall resurrection ; yet wee do not read , that to any of the reprobate is promised an eternall life . for whereas st. paul ( cor. . , . ) to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again , saith , that the body is sown in corruption , and is raised in incorruption ; it is sown in dishonour , it is raised in glory ; it is sown in weaknesse , it is raised in power ; glory and power cannot be applyed to the bodies of the wicked : nor can the name of second death , bee applyed to those that can never die but once : and although in metaphoricall speech , a calamitous life everlasting , may bee called an everasting death yet it cannot well be understood of a second death . the fire prepared for the wicked , is an everlasting fire : that is to say , the estate wherein no man can be without torture , both of body and mind , after the resurrection , shall endure for ever ; and in that sense the fire shall be unquenchable , and the torments everlasting : but it cannot thence be inferred , that hee who shall be cast into that fire , or be tormented with those torments , shall endure , and resist them so , as to be eternally burnt , and tortured , and yet never be destroyed , nor die . and though there be many places that affirm everlasting fire , and torments ( into which men may be cast successively one after another for ever ; ) yet i find none that affirm there shall bee an eternall life therein of any individuall person ; but to the contrary , an everlasting death , which is the second death : for after death , and the grave shall have delivered up the dead which were in them , and every man be judged according to his works ; death and the grave shall also be cast into the lake of fire . this is the second death . whereby it is evident , that there is to bee a second death of every one that shall bee condemned at the day of judgement , after which hee shall die no more . the joyes of life eternall , are in scripture comprehended all under the name of salvation , or being saved . to be saved , is to be secured , either respectively , against speciall evills , or absolutely , against all evill , comprehending want , sicknesse , and death it self . and because man was created in a condition immortall , not subject to corruption , and consequently to nothing that tendeth to the dissolution of his nature ; and fell from that happinesse by the sin of adam ; it followeth , that to be saved from sin , is to be saved from all the evill , and calamities that sinne hath brought upon us . and therefore in the holy scripture , remission of sinne , and salvation from death and misery , is the same thing , as it appears by the words of our saviour , who having cured a man sick of the palsey , by saying , ( mat. . . ) son be of good cheer , thy sins be forgiven thee ; and knowing that the scribes took for blasphemy , that a man should pretend to forgive sins , asked them ( v. . ) whether it were easier to say , thy sinnes be forgiven thee , or , arise and walk ; signifying thereby , that it was all one , as to the saving of the sick , to say , thy sins are forgiven , and arise and walk ; and that he used that form of speech , onely to shew he had power to forgive sins . and it is besides evident in reason , that since death and misery , were the punishments of sin , the discharge of sinne , must also be a discharge of death and misery ; that is to say , salvation absolute , such as the faithfull are to enjoy after the day of judgment , by the power , and favour of jesus christ , who for that cause is called our saviour . concerning particular salvations , such as are understood , sam. . . as the lord liveth that saveth israel , that is , from their temporary enemies , and sam. . . thou art my saviour , thou savest me from violence ; and kings . . god gave the israelites a saviour , and so they were delivered from the hand of the assyrians , and the like , i need say nothing ; there being neither difficulty , nor interest , to corrupt the interpretation of texts of that kind . but concerning the generall salvation , hecause it must be in the kingdome of heaven , there is great difficulty concerning the place . on one side , by kingdome ( which is an estate ordained by men for their perpetuall security against enemies , and want ) it seemeth that this salvation should be on earth . for by salvation is set forth unto us , a glorious reign of our king , by conquest ; not a safety by escape : and therefore there where we look for salvation , we must look also for triumph ; and before triumph , for victory ; and before victory , for battell ; which cannot well be supposed , shall be in heaven . but how good soever this reason may be , i will not trust to it , without very evident places of scripture . the state of salvation is described at large , isaiah . ver . , , , , . look upon zion , the city of our solemnities ; [ thine eyes shall see ierusalem a quiet habitation , a tabernacle that shall not be taken down ; not one of the stakes thereof shall ever be removed , neither sh●…ll any of the cords thereof be broken . but there the glorious lord will be unto us a place of broad rivers , and streams ; wherein shall goe no gally with oares ; neither shall gallant ship passe ●…hereby . for the lord is our iudge , the lord is our lawgiver , the lord is our king , he will save us . thy tacklings are loosed ; they could not well strengthen their mast ; they could not spread the sail : then is the prey of a great spoil divided ; the lame take the prey . and the inhabitant shall not say , i am sicke ; the people that shall dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity . in which words wee have the place from whence salvation is to proceed , ierusalem , a quiet habitation ; the eternity of it , a tabernacle that shall not be taken down , &c. the saviour of it , the lord , their iudge , their lawgiver , their king , he will save us ; the salvation , the lord shall be to them as abroad mote of swift waters , &c. the condition of their enemies , their tacklings are loose , their masts weak , the lame shal take the spoil of them . the condition of the saved , the inhabitant shal not say , i am sick : and lastly , all this is comprehended in forgivenesse of sin , the people that dwell therein shall be forgiven their iniquity . by which ●…t is evident , that salvation shall be on earth , then , when god shall reign , ( at the coming again of christ ) in jerusalem ; and from jerusalem shall proceed the salvation of the gentiles that shall be received into gods kingdome : as is also more expressely declared by the same prophet , chap. . , . and they ( that is , the gentiles who had any jew in bondage ) shall bring all your brethren , for an offering to the lord , out of all nations , upon horses , and in charets , and in litters , and upon mules , and upon swift beasts , to my holy mountain , ierusalem , saith the lord , as the children of israel bring an offering in a clean vessell into the house of the lord. and i will also take of them for priests and for lev●…tes , saith the lord : whereby it is manifest , that the chief seat of gods kingdome ( which is the place , from whence the salvation of us that were gentiles , shall proceed ) shall be jerusalem : and the same is also confirmed by our saviour , in his discourse with the woman of samaria , concerning the place of gods worship ; to whom he saith , iohn . . that the samaritans worshipped they knew not what , but the jews worship what they knew , for salvation is of the iews ( ex iudae is , that is , begins at the jews ) : as if he should say , you worship god , but know not by whom he wil save you , as we doe , that know it shall be by one of the tribe of judah , a jew , not a samaritan . and therefore also the woman not impertinently answered him again , we know the messias shall come . so that which out saviour saith , salvation is from the iews , is the same that paul sayes ( rom. . , . ) the gospel is the power of god to salvation to every one that beleeveth : to the iew first , and also to the greek . for therein is the righteousnesse of god revealed from faith to faith ; from the faith of the jew , to the faith of the gentile . in the like sense the prophet ioel describing the day of judgment , ( chap. . , . ) that god 〈◊〉 shew wonders in heaven , and in earth , bloud , and fire , and pillars os smoak . the sun should be turned to darknesse , and the moon into bloud , before the great and terrible day of the lord come , he addeth verse . and it shall come to passe , that whosoever shall call upon the name of the lord , shall be saved . for in mount zion , and in ierusalem shall be salvation . and obadiah verse . saith the same , vpon mount zion shall be deliverance ; and there shall be holinesse , and the house of iacob shall possesse their possessions , that is , the possessions of the heathen , which possessions he expresseth more particularly in the following verses , by the mount of esau ▪ the land of the philistines , the fields of ephraim , of samaria , gilead , and the cities of the south , and concludes with these words , the kingdom shall be the lords . all these places are for salvation , and the kingdome of god ( after the day of judgement ) upon earth . on the other side , i have not found any text that can probably be drawn , to prove any ascension of the saints into heaven ; that is to say , into any coelum empyreum , or other aetheriall region ; saving that it is called the kingdome of heaven : which name it may have , because god , that was king of the jews , governed them by his commands , sent to moses by angels from heaven ; and after their revolt , sent his son from heaven , to reduce them to their obedience ; and shall send him thence again , to rule both them , and all other faithfull men , from the day of judgment , everlastingly : or from that , that the throne of this our great king is in heaven ; whereas the earth is but his footstoole . but that the subjects of god should have any place as high as his throne , or higher than his footstoole , it seemeth not sutable to the dignity of a king , nor can i find any evident text for it in holy scripture . from this that hath been said of the kingdom of god , and of salvation , it is not hard to interpret what is meant by the world to come . there are three worlds mentioned in scripture , the old world , the present vvorld , and the vvorld to come . of the first , st. peter speaks , if god spared not the old vvorld , but saved noah the eighth person , a preacher of righteousnesse , bringing the flood upon the world of the ungodly , &c. so the first world , was from adam to the generall flood . of the present world , our saviour speaks ( iohn . . ) my kingdome is not of this vvorld . for he came onely to teach men the way of salvation , and to renew the kingdome of his father , by his doctrine . of the world to come , st. peter speaks , neverthelesse we according to his promise look for new heavens , and a new earth . this is that world , wherein christ coming down from heaven , in the clouds , with great power , and glory , shall send his angels , and shall gather together his elect , from the four winds , and from the uttermost parts of the earth , and thence forth reign over them , ( under his father ) everlastingly . salvation of a sinner , suppposeth a precedent redemption ; for he that is once guilty of sin , is obnoxious to the penalty of the same ; and must pay ( or some other for him ) such ransome , as he that is offended , and has him in his power , shall require . and seeing the person offended , is almighty god , in whose power are all things ; such ransome is to be paid before salvation can be acquired , as god hath been pleased to require . by this ransome , is not intended a satisfaction for sin , equivalent to the offence ; which no sinner for himselfe , nor righteous man can ever be able to make for another : the dammage a man does to another , he may make amends for by restitution , or recompence , but sin cannot be taken away by recompence ; for that were to make the liberty to sin , a thing vendible . but sins may bee pardoned to the repentant , either gratis , or upon such penalty , as god is pleased to accept . that which god usually accepted in the old testament , was some sacrifice , or oblation . to forgive sin is not an act of injustice , though the punishment have been threatned . even amongst men , though the promise of good , bind the promiser ; yet threats , that is to say , promises of evill , bind them not ; much lesse shall they bind god , who is infinitely more mercifull then men . our saviour christ therefore to redeem us , did not in that sense satisfie for the sins of men , as that his death , of its own vertue , could make it unjust in god to punish sinners with eternall death ; but did make that sacrifice , and oblation of himself , at his first coming , which god was pleased to require , for the salvation at his second coming , of such as in the mean time should repent , and beleeve in him . and though this act of our redemption , be not alwaies in scripture called a sacrifice , and oblation , but sometimes a price ; yet by price we are not to understand any thing , by the value whereof , he could claim right to a pardon for us , from his offended father ; but that price which god the father was pleased in mercy to demand . chap. xxxix . of the signification in scripture of the word church . the word church , ( ecclesia ) signifieth in the books of holy scripture divers things . sometimes ( though not often ) it is taken for gods house , that is to say , for a temple , wherein christians assemble to perform holy duties publiquely ; as , cor. . ver . . let your women keep silence in the churches : but this is metaphorically put , for the congregation there assembled ; and hath been since used for the edifice it self , to distinguish between the temples of christians , and idolaters . the temple of jerusalem was gods house , and the house of prayer ; and so is any edifice dedicated by christians to the worship of christ , christs house : and therefore the greek fathers call it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the lords house ; and thence , in our language it came to be called kyrke , and church . church ( when not taken for a house ) signifieth the same that ecclesia signified in the grecian common-wealths ; that is to say , a congregation , or an assembly of citizens , called forth , to hear the magistrate speak unto them ; and which in the common-wealth of rome was called concio , as he that spake was called ecclesiastes , and concionator . and when they were called forth by lawfull authority , it was ecclesia legitima , a lawfull church , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . but when they were excited by tumultuous , and seditious clamor , then it was a confused church , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it is taken also sometimes for the men that have right to be of the congregation , though not actually assembled ; that is to say , for the whole multitude of christian men , how far soever they be dispersed : as ( act. . . ) where it is said , that saul made havock of the church : and in this sense is christ said to be head of the church . and sometimes for a certain part of christians , as ( col. . . salute the church that is in his house . sometimes also for the elect onely ; as ( ephes. . . ) a glorious church , without spot , or wrinkle , holy , and without blem●…sh ; which is meant of the church triumphant , or , church to come . sometimes , for a congregation assembled , of professors of christianity , whether their profession be true , or counterfeit , as it is understood , mat. . . where it is said , tell it to the church , and if hee neglect to hear the church , let him be to thee as a gentile , or publican . and in this last sense only it is that the church can be taken for one person ; that is to say , that it can be said to have power to will , to pronounce , to command , to be obeyed , to make laws , or to doe any other action whatsoever ; for without authority from a lawfull congregation , whatsoever act be done in a concourse of people , it is the particular act of every one of those that were present , and gave their aid to the performance of it ; and not the act of them all in grosse , as of one body ; much lesse the act of them that were absent , or that being present , were not willing it should be done . according to this sense , i define a church to be , a company of men professing christian religion , united in the person of one soveraign ; at whose command they ought to assemble , and without whose authority they ought not to assemble . and because in all common-wealths , that assembly , which is without warrant from the civil soveraign , is unlawful ; that church also , which is assembled in any common-wealth , that hath forbidden them to assemble , is an unlawfull assembly . it followeth also , that there is on earth , no such universall church , as all christians are bound to obey ; because there is no power on earth , to which all other common-wealths are subject : there are christians , in the dominions of severall princes and states ; but every one of them is subject to that common-wealth , whereof he is himself a member ; and consequently , cannot be subject to the commands of any other person . and therefore a church , such a one as is capable to command , to judge , absolve , condemn , or do any other act , is the same thing with a civil common-wealth , consisting of christian men ; and is called a civill state , for that the subjects of it are men ; and a church , for that the subjects thereof are christians . temporall and spirituall government , are but two words brought into the world , to make men see double , and mistake their lawfull soveraign . it is true , that the bodies of the faithfull , after the resurrection , shall be not onely spirituall , but eternall : but in this life they are grosse , and corruptible . there is therefore no other government in this life , neither of state , nor religion , but temporall ; nor teaching of any doctrine , lawfull to any subject , which the governour both of the state , and of the religion , forbiddeth to be taught : and that governor must be one ; or else there must needs follow faction , and civil war in the common-wealth , between the church and state ; between spiritualists , and temporalists ; between the sword of iustice , and the shield of faith ; and ( which is more ) in every christian mans own brest , between the christian , and the man. the doctors of the church , are called pastors ; so also are civill soveraignes : but if pastors be not subordinate one to another , so as that there may bee one chief pastor , men will be taught contrary doctrines , whereof both may be , and one must be false . who that one chief pastor is , according to the law of nature , hath been already shewn ; namely , that it is the civill soveraign : and to whom the scripture hath assigned that office , we shall see in the chapters following . chap. xl. of the rights of the kingdome of god , in abraham , moses , the high priests , and the kings of judah . the father of the faithfull , and first in the kingdome of god by covenant , was abraham . for with him was the covenant first made ; wherein he obliged himself , and his seed after him , to acknowledge and obey the commands of god ; not onely such , as he could take notice of , ( as morall laws , ) by the light of nature ; but also such , as god should in speciall manner deliver to him by dreams , and visions . for as to the morall law , they were already obliged , and needed not have been contracted withall , by promise of the land of canaan . nor was there any contract , that could adde to , or strengthen the obligation , by which both they , and all men else were bound naturally to obey god almighty : and therefore the covenant which abraham made with god , was to take for the commandement of god , that which in the name of god was commanded him , in a dream , or vifion ; and to deliver it to his family , and cause them to observe the same . in this contract of god with abraham , wee may observe three points of important consequence in the government of gods people . first , that at the making of this covenant , god spake onely to abraham ; and therefore contracted not with any of his family , or seed , otherwise then as their wills ( which make the essence of all covenants ) were before the contract involved in the will of abraham ; who was therefore supposed to have had a lawfull power , to make them perform all that he covenanted for them . according whereunto ( gen. . , . ) god saith , all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him , for i know him that he will command his children and his houshold after him , and they shall keep the way of the lord. from whence may be concluded this first point , that they to whom god hath not spoken immediately , are to receive the positive commandements of god , from their soveraign ; as the family and seed of abraham did from abraham their father , and lord , and civill soveraign . and consequently in every common-wealth , they who have no supernaturall revelation to the contrary , ought to obey the laws of their own soveraign , in the externall acts and profession of religion . as for the inward thought , and beleef of men , which humane governours can take no notice of , ( for god onely knoweth the heart ) they are not voluntary , nor the effect of the laws , but of the unrevealed will , and of the power of god ; and consequently fall not under obligation . from whence proceedeth another point ; that it was not unlawfull for abraham , when any of his subjects should pretend private vision , or spirit , or other revelation from god , for the countenancing of any doctrine which abraham should forbid , or when they followed , or adhered to any such pretender , to punish them ; and consequently that it is lawfull now for the soveraign to punish any man that shall oppose his private spirit against the laws : for hee hath the same place in the common-wealth , that abraham had in his own family . there ariseth also from the same , a third point ; that as none but abraham in his family , so none but the soveraign in a christian common-wealth , can take notice what is , or what is not the word of god. for god spake onely to abraham ; and it was he onely , that was able to know what god said , and to interpret the same to his family : and therefore also , they that have the place of abraham in a common-wealth , are the onely interpreters of what god hath spoken . the same covenant was renewed with isaac ; and afterwards with jacob ; but afterwards no more , till the israelites were freed from the egyptians , and arrived at the foot of mount sinai : and then it was renewed by moses ( as i have said before , chap. . ) in such manner , as they became from that time forward the peculiar kingdome of god ; whose lieutenant was moses , for his owne time : and the succession to that office was setled upon aaron , and his heirs after him , to bee to god a sacerdotall kingdome for ever . by this constitution , a kingdome is acquired to god. but seeing moses had no authority to govern the israelites , as a successor to the right of abraham , because he could not claim it by inheritance ; it appeareth not as yet , that the people were obliged to take him for gods lieutenant , longer than they beleeved that god spake unto him . and therefore his authority ( notwithstanding the covenant they made with god ) depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his sanctity , and of the reality of his conferences with god , and the verity of his miracles ; which opinion coming to change , they were no more obliged to take any thing for the law of god , which he propounded to them in gods name . we are therefore to consider , what other ground there was , of their obligation to obey him . for it could not be the commandement of god that could oblige them ; because god spake not to them immediately , but by the mediation of moses himself : and our saviour saith of himself , if i bear witnesse of my self , my witnesse is not true ; much lesse if moses bear witnesse of himselfe , ( especially in a claim of kingly power over gods people ) ought his testimony to be received . his authority therefore , as the authority of all other princes , must be grounded on the consent of the people , and their promise to obey him . and so it was : for the people ( exod. . . ) when they saw the thunderings , and the lightnings , and the noyse of the trumpet , and the monntaine smoaking , removed , and stood a far off . and they said unto moses , speak thou with us , and we will hear , but let not god speak with us lest we die . here was their promise of obedience ; and by this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the commandement of god. and notwithstanding the covenant constituteth a sacerdotall kingdome , that is to say , a kingdome hereditary to aaron ; yet that is to be understood of the succession , after moses should bee dead . for whosoever ordereth , and establisheth the policy , as first founder of a common-wealth ( be it monarchy , aristocracy , or democracy ) must needs have soveraign power over the people all the while he is doing of it . and that moses had that power all his own time , is evidently affirmed in the scripture . first , in the text last before cited , because the people promised obedience , not to aaron but to him . secōdly , ( exod. . , . ) and god said unto moses , come up unto the lord , thou , and aaron , nadab and abihu , and seventy of the elders of israel . and moses alone shall come neer the lord , but they shall not come nigh , neither shall the people goe up with him . by which it is plain , that moses who was alone called up to god , ( and not aaron , nor the other priests , nor the seventy elders , nor the people who were forbidden to come up ) was alone he , that represented to the israelites the person of god ; that is to say , was their sole soveraign under god. and though afterwards it be said ( verse . ) then went up moses , and aaron , nadab , and abihu , and seventy of the elders of israel , and they saw the god of israel , and there was under his feet , as it were a paved work of a saphire stone . &c. yet this was not till after moses had been with god before , and had brought to the people the words which god had said to him . he onely went for the bnsinesse of the people ; the others , as the nobles of his retinue , were admitted for honour to that speciall grace , which was not allowed to the people ; which was , as in the verse after appeareth ) to see god and live . god laid not his hand upon them , they saw god , and did eat and drink ( that is , did live ) , but did not carry any commandement from him to the people . again , it is every where said , the lord spake unto moses , as in all other occasions of government ; so also in the ordering of the ceremonies of religion , contained in the , , , , , , and chapters of exodus , and throughout leviticus : to aaron seldome . the calfe that aaron made , moses threw into the fire . lastly , the question of the authority of aaron , by occasion of his and miriams mutiny agaiust moses , was ( numbers . ) judged by god himself for moses . so also in the question between moses , and the people , who had the right of governing the people , when corah , dathan , and abiram , and two hundred and fifty princes of the assembly gathered themselves together ( numb . . . ) against moses , and against aaron , and said unto them , ye take too much upon you , seeing all the congregation are holy , every one of them , and the lord is amongst them , why lift you up your selves above the congregation of the lord ? god caused the earth to swallow corah , dathan , and abiram with their wives and children alive , and consumed those two hundred and fifty princes with fire . therefore neither aaron , nor the people , nor any aristocracy of the chief princes of the people , but moses alone had next under god the soveraignty over the israelites : and that not onely in causes of civill policy , but also of religion : for moses onely spake with god , and therefore onely could tell the people , what it was that god required at their hands . no man upon pain of death might be so presumptuous as to approach the mountain where god talked with moses . thou shalt set bounds ( saith the lord , exod. . . ) to the people round about , and say , take heed to your selves that you goe not up into the mount , or touch the border of it ; whosoever toucheth the mount shall surely be put to death . and again ( verse . ) goe down , charge the people , lest they break through unto the lord to gaze . out of which we may conclude , that whosoever in a christian common-wealth holdeth the place of moses , is the sole messenger of god , and interpreter of his commandements . and according hereunto , no man ought in the interpretation of the scripture to proceed further then the bounds which are set by their severall soveraigns . for the scriptures since god now speaketh in them , are the mount sinai ; the bounds whereof are the laws of them that represent gods person on earth . to look upon them , and therein to behold the wondrous works of god , and learn to fear him is allowed ; but to interpret them ; that is , to pry into what god saith to him whom he appointeth to govern under him , and make themselves judges whether he govern as god commandeth him , or not , is to transgresse the bounds god hath set us , and to gaze upon god irreverently . there was no prophet in the time of moses , nor pretender to the spirit of god , but such as moses had approved , and authorized . for there were in his time but seventy men , that are said to prophecy by the spirit of god , and these were of all moses his election ; concerning whom god said to moses ( numb . . . ) gather to mee seventy of the elders of israel , whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people . to these god imparted his spirit ; but it was not a different spirit from that of moses ; for it is said ( verse . ) god came down in a cloud , and took of the spirit that was upon moses , and gave it to the seventy elders . but as i have shewn before ( chap. . ) by spirit , is understood the mind ; so that the sense of the place is no other than this , that god endued them with a mind conformable , and subordinate to that of moses , that they might prophecy , that is to say , speak to the people in gods name , in such manner , as to set forward ( as ministers of moses , and by his authority ) such doctrine as was agreeable to moses his doctrine . for they were but ministers ; and when two of them prophecyed in the camp , it was thought a new and unlawfull thing ; and as it is in the . and . verses of the same chapter , they were accused of it , and joshua advised moses to forbid them , as not knowing that it was by moses his spirit that they prophecyed . by which it is manifest , that no subject ought to pretend to prophecy , or to the spirit , in opposition to the doctrine established by him , whom god hath set in the place of moses . aaron being dead , and after him also moses , the kingdome , as being a sacerdotall kingdome , descended by vertue of the covenant , to aarons son , eleazar the high priest : and god declared him ( next under himself ) for soveraign , at the same time that he appointed joshua for the generall of their army . for thus god saith expressely ( numb . . . ) concerning joshua ; he shall stand before eleazar the priest , who shall ask counsell for him , before the lord , at his word shall they goe out , and at his word they shall come in , both he , a●…d all the children of israel with him : therefore the supreme power of making war and peace , was in the priest. the supreme power of judicature belonged also to the high priest : for the book of the law was in their keeping ; and the priests and levites onely , were the subordinate judges in causes civill , as appears in deut. . , , . and for the manner of gods worship , there was never doubt made , but that the high priest till the time of saul , had the supreme authority . therefore the civill and ecclesiasticall power were both joined together in one and the same person , the high priest ; and ought to bee so , in whosoever governeth by divine right ; that is , by authority immediate from god. after the death of joshua , till the time of saul , the time between is noted frequently in the book of judges , that there was in those dayes no king in israel ; and sometimes with this addition , that every man did that which was right in his own eyes . by which is to bee understood , that where it is said , there was no king , is meant , there was no soveraign power in israel . and so it was , if we consider the act , and exercise of such power . for after the death of joshua , & eleazar , there arose another generation ( judges . . ) that knew not the lord , nor the works which he had done for israel , but did evill in the sight of the lord , and served baalim . and the jews had that quality which st. paul noteth , to look for a sign , not onely before they would submit themselves to the government of moses , but also after they had obliged themselves by their submission . whereas signs , and miracles had for end to procure faith , not to keep men from violating it , when they have once given it ; for to that men are obliged by the law of nature . but if we consider not the exercise , but the right of governing , the soveraign power was still in the high priest. therefore whatsoever obedience was yeelded to any of the judges ( who were men chosen by god extraordinarily , to save his rebellious subjects out of the hands of the enemy , ) it cannot bee drawn into argument against the right the high priest had to the soveraign power , in all matters , both of policy and religion . and neither the judges , nor samuel himselfe had an ordinary , but extraordinary calling to the government ; and were obeyed by the israelites , not out of duty , but out of reverence to their favour with god , appearing in their wisdome , courage , or felicity . hitherto therefore the right of regulating both the policy , and the religion , were inseparable . to the judges , succeeded kings : and whereas before , all authority , both in religion , and policy , was in the high priest ; so now it was all in the king. for the soveraignty over the people , which was before , not onely by vertue of the divine power , but also by a particular pact of the israelites in god , and next under him , in the high priest , as his vicegerent on earth , was cast off by the people , with the consent of god himselfe . for when they said to samuel ( sam. . . ) make us a king to judge us , like all the nations , they signified that they would no more bee governed by the commands that should bee laid upon them by the priest , in the name of god ; but by one that should command them in the same manner that all other nations were commandcd ; and consequently in deposing the high priest of royall authority , they deposed that peculiar government of god. and yet god consented to it , saying to samuel ( verse . ) hearken unto the voice of the people , in all that they shall say unto thee ; for they have not rejected thee , but they have rejected mee , that i should not reign over them . having therefore rejected god , in whose right the priests governed , there was no authority left to the priests , but such as the king was pleased to allow them ; which was more , or lesse , according as the kings were good , or evill . and for the government of civill affaires , it is manifest , it was all in the hands of the king. for in the same chapter , verse . they say they will be like all the nations ; that their king shall be their judge , and goe before them , and fight their battells ; that is , he shall have the whole authority , both in peace and war. in which is contained also the ordering of religion : for there was no other word of god in that time , by which to regulate religion , but the law of moses , which was their civill law. besides , we read ( kings . . ) that solomon thrust out abiathar from being priest before the lord : he had therefore authority over the high priest , as over any other subject ; which is a great mark of supremacy in religion . and we read also ( kings . ) that hee dedicated the temple ; that he blessed the people ; and that he himselfe in person made that excellent prayer , used in the consecrations of all churches , and houses of prayer ; which is another great mark of supremacy in religion . again , we read ( kings . ) that when there was question concerning the book of the law found in the temple , the same was not decided by the high priest but josiah sent both him , and others to enquire concerning it , of hulda , the prophetesse ; which is another mark of the supremacy in religion . lastly , wee read ( chron. . . ) that david made hashabiah and his brethren , hebronites , officers of israel among them westward , in all businesse of the lord , and in the service of the king. likewise ( verse . ) that hee made other hebronites , rulers over the reubenites , the gadites , and the halfe tribe of manasseh ( these were the rest of israel that dwelt beyond jordan ) for every matter pertaining to god , and affairs of the king. is not this full power , both temporall and spirituall , as they call it , that would divide it ? to conclude ; from the first institution of gods kingdome , to the captivity , the supremacy of religion , was in the same hand with that of the civill soveraignty ; and the priests office after the election of saul , was not magisteriall , but ministeriall . notwithstanding the government both in policy and religion , were joined , first in the high priests , and afterwards in the kings , so far forth as concerned the right ; yet it appeareth by the same holy history , that the people understood it not ; but there being amongst them a great part , and probably the greatest part , that no longer than they saw great miracles , or ( which is equivalent to a miracle ) great abilities , or great felicity in the enterprises of their governours , gave sufficient credit , either to the fame of moses , or to the colloquies between god and the priests ; they took occasion as oft as their governours displeased them , by blaming sometimes the policy , sometimes the religion , to change the government , or revolt from their obedience at their pleasure : and from thence proceeded from time to time the civill troubles , divisions , and calamities of the nation . as for example , after the death of eleazar and joshua , the next generation which had not seen the wonders of god , but were left to their own weak reason , not knowing themselves obliged by the covenant of a sacerdotall kingdome , regarded no more the commandement of the priest , nor any law of moses , but did every man that which was right in his own eyes ; and obeyed in civill affairs , such men , as from time to time they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour nations that oppressed them ; and consulted not with god ( as they ought to doc , ) but with such men , or women , as they guessed to bee prophets by their praedictions of things to come ; and though they had an idol in their chappel , yet if they had a levite for their chaplain , they made account they worshipped the god of israel . and afterwards when they demanded a king , after the manner of the nations ; yet it was not with a design to depart from the worship of god their king ; but despairing of the justice of the sons of samuel , they would have a king to judg them in civill actions ; but not that they would allow their king to change the religion which they thought was recommended to them by moses . so that they alwaies kept in store a pretext , either of justice , or religion , to discharge them selves of their obedience , whensoever they had hope to prevaile . samuel was displeased with the people , for that they desired a king , ( for god was their king already , and samuel had but an authority under him ) ; yet did samuel , when saul observed not his counsell , in destroying agag as god had commanded , anoint another king , namely , david , to take the succession from his heirs . rehoboam was no idolater ; but when the people thought him an oppressor ; that civil pretence carried from him ten tribes to jeroboam an idolater . and generally through the whole history of the kings , as well of judah , as of israel , there were prophets that alwaies controlled the kings , for transgressing the religion ; and sometimes also for errours of state ; as jehosaphat was reproved by the prophet jehu , for aiding the king of israel against the syrians ; and hezekiah , by isaiah , for shewing his treasures to the ambassadors of babylon . by all which it appeareth , that though the power both of state and religion were in the kings ; yet none of them were uncontrolled in the use of it , but such as were gracious for their own naturall abilities , or felicities . so that from the practise of those times , there can no argument be drawn , that the right of supremacy in religion was not in the kings , unlesse we place it in the prophets ; and conclude , that because hezekiah praying to the lord before the cherubins , was not answered from thence , nor then , but afterwards by the prophet isaiah , therefore isaiah was supreme head of the church ; or because iosiah consulted hulda the prophetesse , concerning the book of the law , that therefore neither he , nor the high priest , but hulda the prophetesse had the supreme authority in matter of religion ; which i thinke is not the opinion of any doctor . during the captivity , the iews had no common-wealth at all : and after their return , though they renewed their covenant with god , yet there was no promise made of obedience , neither to esdras , nor to any other : and presently after they became subjects to the greeks ( from whose customes , and daemonology , and from the doctrine of the cabalists , their religion became much corrupted ) : in such sort as nothing can be gathered from their confusion , both in state and religion , concerning the supremacy in either . and therefore so far forth as concerneth the old testament , we may conclude , that whosoever had the soveraignty of the common-wealth amongst the jews , the same had also the supreme authority in matter of gods externall worship ; and represented gods person ; that is the person of god the father ; though he were not called by the name of father , till such time as he sent into the world his son jesus christ , to redeem mankind from their sins , and bring them into his everlasting kingdome , to be saved for evermore . of which we are to speak in the chapter following . chap. xli . of the office of our blessed saviour . we find in holy scripture three parts of the office of the messiah : the first of a redeemer , or saviour : the second of a pastor , counsellor , or teacher , that is , of a prophet sent from god , to convert such as god hath elected to salvation : the third of a king , an eternall king , but under his father , as moses and the high priests were in their severall times . and to these three parts are correspondent three times . for our redemption he wrought at his first coming , by the sacrifice , wherein he offered up himself for our sinnes upon the crosse : our conversion he wrought partly then in his own person ; and partly worketh now by his ministers ; and will continue to work till his coming again . and after his coming again , shall begin that his glorious reign over his elect , which is to last eternally . to the office of a redeemer , that is , of one that payeth the ransome of sin , ( which ransome is death , ) it appertaineth , that he was sacrificed , and thereby bare upon his own head , and carryed away from us our iniquities , in such sort as god had required . not that the death of one man , though without sinne , can satisfie for the offences of all men , in the rigour of justice , but in the mercy of god , that ordained such sacrifices for sin , as he was pleased in his mercy to accept . in the old law ( as we may read , leviticus the . ) the lord required , that there should every year once , bee made an atonement for the sins of all israel , both priests , and others ; for the doing whereof , aaron alone was to sacrifice for himself and the priests a young bullock ; and for the rest of the people , he was to receive from them two young goates , of which he was to sacrifice one ; but as for the other , which was the scape goat , he was to lay his hands on the head thereof , and by a confession of the iniquities of the people , to lay them all on that head , and then by some opportune man , to cause the goat to be led into the wildernesse , and there to escape , and carry away with him the iniquities of the people . as the sacrifice of the one goat was a sufficient ( because an acceptable ) price for the ransome of all israel ; so the death of the messiah , is a sufficient price , for the sins of all mankind , because there was no more required . our saviour christs sufferings seem to be here figured , as cleerly ; as in the oblation of isaac , or in any other type of him in the old testament : he was both the sacrificed goat , and the scape goat ; hee was oppressed , and he was afflicted ( esay . . ) ; he opened not his mouth ; he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter , and as a sheep is dumbe before the shearer , so opened he not his mouth : here he is the sacrificed g●…at . he hath born our griefs , ( ver . . ) and carried our sorrows : and again , ( ver . . ) the lord hath laid upon him the iniquities of us all : and so he is the scape goat . he was cut off from the land of the living ( ver . . ) for the transgression of my people : there again he is the sacrificed goat . and again , ( ver . . ) he shall bear their sins : hee is the scape goat . thus is the lamb of god equivalent to both those goates ; sacrificed , in that he dyed ; and escaping , in his resurrection ; being raised opportunely by his father , and removed from the habitation of men in his ascension . for as much therefore , as he that redeemeth , hath no title to the thing redeemed , before the redemption , and ransome paid ; and this ransome was the death of the redeemer ; it is manifest , that our saviour ( as man ) was not king of those that he redeemed , before hee suffered death ; that is , during that time hee conversed bodily on the earth . i say , he was not then king in present , by vertue of the pact , which the faithfull make with him in baptisme : neverthelesse , by the renewing of their pact with god in tisme , they were obliged to obey him for king , ( under his father ) whensoever he should be pleased to take the kingdome upon him . according whereunto , our saviour himself expressely saith , ( iohn . . ) my kingdome is not of this world . now seeing the scripture maketh mention but of two worlds ; this that is now , and shall remain to the day of judgment , ( which is therefore also called , the last day ; ) and that which shall bee after the day of judgement , when there shall bee a new heaven , and a new earth ; the kingdome of christ is not to begin till the generall resurrection . and that is it which our saviour saith , ( mat. . . ) the son of man shall come in the glory of his father , with his angels ; and then he shall reward every man according to his works . to reward every man according to his works , is to execute the office of a king ; and this is not to be till he come in the glory of his father , with his angells . when our saviour saith , ( mat. . . ) the scribes and pharisees sit in moses seat ; all therefore whatsoever they bid you doe , that observe and doe ; hee declareth plainly , that hee ascribeth kingly power , for that time , not to himselfe , but to them . and so hee doth also , where he saith , ( luke . . ) who made mee a iudge , or divider over you ? and ( iohn . . ) i came not to judge the world , but to save the world . and yet our saviour came into this world that hee might bee a king , and a judge in the world to come : for hee was the messiah , that is , the christ , that is , the anointed priest , and the soveraign prophet of god ; that is to say , he was to have all the power that was in moses the prophet , in the high priests that succeeded moses , and in the kings that succeeded the priests . and st. iohn saies expressely ( chap. . ver . . ) the father judgeth no man , but hath committed all judgment to the son. and this is not repugnant to that other place , i came not to judge the world : for this is spoken of the world present , the other of the world to come ; as also where it is said , that at the second coming of christ , ( mat. . . ) yee that have followed me in the regeneration , when the son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory , yee shall also sit on twelve thrones , judging the twelve tribes of israel . if then christ whilest hee was on earth , had no kingdome in this world , to what end was his first coming ? it was to restore unto god , by a new covenant , the kingdom , which being his by the old covenant , had been cut off by the rebellion of the israelites in the election of saul . which to doe , he was to preach unto them , that he was the messiah , that is , the king promised to them by the prophets ; and to offer himselfe in sacrifice for the sinnes of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto ; and in case the nation generally should refuse him , to call to his obedience such as should beleeve in him amongst the gentiles . so that there are two parts of our saviours office during his aboad upon the earth : one to proclaim himself the christ ; and another by teaching , and by working of miracles , to perswade , and prepare men to live so , as to be worthy of the immortality beleevers were to enjoy , at such ti●…e as he should come in majesty , to take possession of his fathers kingdome . and therefore it is , that the time of his preaching , is often by himself called the regeneration ; which is not properly a kingdome , and thereby a warrant to deny obedience to the magistrates that then were , ( for hee commanded to obey those that sate then in moses chaire , and to pay tribute to caesar ; but onely an earnest of the kingdome of god that was to come , to those to whom god had given the grace to be his disciples , and to beleeve in him ; for which cause the godly are said to bee already in the kingdome of grace , as naturalized in that heavenly kingdome . hitherto therefore there is nothing done , or taught by christ , that tendeth to the diminution of the civill right of the jewes , or of caesar. for as touching the common-wealth which then was amongst the jews , both they that bare rule amongst them , and they that were governed , did all expect the messiah , and kingdome of god ; which they could not have done if their laws had forbidden him ( when he came ) to manifest , and declare himself . seeing therefore he did nothing , but by preaching , and miracles go about to prove himselfe to be that messiah , hee did therein nothing against their laws . the kingdome hee claimed was to bee in another world : he taught all men to obey in the mean time them that sate in moses seat : he allowed them to give caesar his tribute , and refused to take upon himselfe to be a judg. how then could his words , or actions bee seditious , or tend to the overthrow of their then civill government ? but god having determined his sacrifice , for the reduction of his elect to their former covenanted obedience , for the means , whereby he would bring the same to effect , made use of their malice , and ingratitude . nor was it contrary to the laws of caesar. for though pilate himself ( to gratifie the jews ) delivered him to be crucified ; yet before he did so , he pronounced openly , that he found no fault in him : and put for title of his condemnation , not as the jews required , that he pretended to bee king ; bnt simply , that hee was king of the iews ; and notwithstanding their clamour , refused to alter it ; saying , what i have written , i have written . as for the third part of his office , which was to be king ▪ , i have already shewn that his kingdome was not to begin till the resurrection . but then he shall be king , not onely as god , in which sense he is king already , and ever shall be , of all the earth , in vertue of his omnipotence ; but also peculiarly of his own elect , by vertue of the pact they make with him in their baptisme . and therefore it is , that our saviour saith ( mat. . . ) that his apostles should sit upon twelve thrones , judging the twelve tribes of israel , when the son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory : whereby he signified that he should reign then in his humane nature ; and ( mat. . . ) the son of man shall come in the glory of his father , with his angels , and then he shall reward every man according to his works . the same we may read , marke . . and . . and more expressely for the time , luke . , . i appoint unto you a kingdome , as my father hath appointed to mee , that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdome , and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of israel . by which it is manifest , that the kingdome of christ appointed to him by his father , is not to be before the son of man shall come in glory , and make his apostles judges of the twelve tribes of israel . but a man may here ask , seeing there is no marriage in the kingdome of heaven , whether men shall then eat , and drink ; what eating therefore is meant in this place ? this is expounded by our saviour ( iohn . . ) where he saith , labour not for the meat which perisheth , but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life , which the son of man shall give you . so that by eating at christs table , is meant the eating of the tree of life ; that is to say , the enjoying of immortality , in the kingdome of the son of man. by which places , and many more , it is evident , that our saviours kingdome is to bee exercised by him in his humane nature . again , he is to be king then , no otherwise than as subordinate , or vicegerent of god the father , as moses was in the wildernesse ; and as the high priests were before the reign of saul : and as the kings were after it . for it is one of the prophecies concerning christ , that he should be like ( in office ) to moses : i will raise them up a prophet ( saith the lord , deut. . . ) from amongst their brethren like unto thee , and will put my words into his mouth , and this similitude with moses , is also apparent in the actions of our saviour himself , whilest he was conversant on earth . for as moses chose twelve princes of the tribes , to govern under him ; so did our saviour choose twelve apostles , who shall sit on twelve thrones , and judge the twelve tribes of israel : and as moses authorized seventy elders , to receive the spirit of god , and to prophecy to the people , that is , ( as i have said before , ) to speak unto them in the name of god ; so our saviour also ordained seventy disciples , to preach his kingdome , and salvation to all nations . and as when a complaint was made to moses , against those of the seventy that prophecyed in the camp of israel , he justified them in it , as being subservient therein to his government ; so also our saviour , when st. john complained to him of a certain man that cast out devills in his name , justified him therein , saying , ( luke . . ) forbid him not , for hee that is not against us , is on our part . again , our saviour resembled moses in the institution of sacraments , both of admission into the kingdome of god , and of commemoration of his deliverance of his elect from their miserable condition . as the children of israel had for sacrament of their reception into the kingdome of god , before the time of moses , the rite of circumcision , which rite having been omitted in the wildernesse , was again restored as soon as they came into the land of promise ; so also t●…e jews , before the coming of our saviour , had a rite of baptizing , that is , of washing with water all those that being gentiles , embraced the god of israel . this rite st. john the baptist used in the reception of all them that gave their names to the christ , whom hee preached to bee already come into the world ; and our saviour instituted the same for a sacrament to be taken by all that beleeved in him . from what cause the rite of baptisme first proceeded , is not expressed formally in the scripture ; but it may be probably thought to be an imitation of the law of moses , concerning leprousie ; wherein the leprous man was commanded to be kept out of the campe of israel for a certain time ; after which time being judged by the priest to be clean , hee was admitted into the campe after a solemne washing . and this may therefore bee a type of the washing in baptisme ; wherein such men as are cleansed of the leprousie of sin by faith , are received into the church with the solemnity of baptisme . there is another conjecture drawn from the ceremonies of the gentiles , in a certain case that rarely happens ; and that is , when a man that was thought dead , chanced to recover , other men made scruple to converse with him , as they would doe to converse with a ghost , unlesse hee were received again into the number of men , by washing , as children new born were washed from the uncleannesse of their nativity , which was a kind of new birth . this ceremony of the greeks , in the time that judaea was under the dominion of alexander , and the greeks his successors , may probably enough have crept into the religion of the jews . but seeing it is not likely our saviour would countenance a heathen rite , it is most likely it proceeded from the legall ceremony of washing after leprosie . and for the other sacrament , of eating the paschall lambe , it is manifestly imitated in the sacrament of the lords supper ; in which the breaking of the bread , and the pouring out of the wine , do keep in memory our deliverance from the misery of sin , by christs passion , as the eating of the paschall lambe , kept in memory the deliverance of the jewes out of the bondage of egypt . seeing therefore the authority of moses was but subordinate , and hee but a lieutenant to god ; it followeth , that christ , whose authority , as man , was to bee like that of moses , was no more but subordinate to the authority of his father . the same is more expressely signified , by that that hee teacheth us to pray , our father , let thy kingdome come ; and , for thine is the kingdome , the power , and the glory ; and by that it is said , that hee shall come in the glory of his father ; and by that which st. paul saith , ( cor. . . ) then commeth the end , when hee shall have delivered up the kingdome to god , even the father ; and by many other most expresse places . our saviour therefore , both in teaching , and reigning , representeth ( as moses did ) the person of god ; which god from that time forward , but not before , is called the father ; aud being still one and the same substance , is one person as represented by moses , and another person as represented by his sonne the christ. for person being a relative to a representer , it is consequent to plurality of representers , that there bee a plurality of persons , though of one and the same substance . chap. xlii . of power ecclesiasticall . for the understanding of povver ecclesiasticall , what , and in whom it is , we are to distinguish the time from the ascension of our saviour , into two parts ; one before the conversion of kings , and men endued with soveraign civill power ; the other after their conversion . for it was long after the ascension , before any king , or civill soveraign embraced , and publiquely allowed the teaching of christian religion . and for the time between , it is manifest , that the power ecclesiasticall , was in the apostles ; and after them in such as were by them ordained to preach the gospell , and to convert men to christianity , and to direct them that were converted in the way of salvation ; and after these the power was delivered again to others by these ordained , and this was done by imposition of hands upon such as were ordained ; by which was signified the giving of the holy spirit , or spirit of god , to those whom they ordained ministers of god , to advance his kingdome . so that imposition of hands , was nothing else but the seal of their commission to preach christ , and teach his doctrine ; and the giving of the holy ghost by that ceremony of imposition of hands , was an imitation of that which moses did . for moses used the same ceremony to his minister joshua , as wee read de●…teronomy . ver . . and ioshua the son of nun was full of the spirit of vvisdome ; for moses had laid his hands upon him . our saviour therefore between his resurrection , and ascension , gave his spirit to the apostles ; first , by breathing on them , and saying , ( iohn . . ) receive yee the holy spirit ; and after his ascension ( acts . , . ) by sending down upon them , a mighty wind , and cloven tongues of fire ; and not by imposition of hands ; as neither did god lay his hands on moses : and his apostles afterward , transmitted the same spirit by imposition of hands , as moses did to joshua . so that it is manifest hereby , in whom the power ecclesiasticall continually remained , in those first times , where there was not any christian common-wealth ; namely , in them that received the same from the apostles , by successive laying on of hands . here wee have the person of god born now the third time . for as moses , and the high priests , were gods representative in the old testament ; and our saviour himselfe as man , during his abode on earth : so the holy ghost , that is to say , the apostles , and their successors , in the office of preaching , and teaching , that had received the holy spirit , have represented him ever since . but a person , ( as i have shewn before , chapt . . ) is he that is represented , as often as hee is represented ; and therefore god , who has been represented ( that is , personated ) thrice , may properly enough be said to be three persons ; though neither the word person , nor trinity be ascribed to him in the bible . st. iohn indeed ( epist. . . ) saith , there be three that bear witnesse in heaven , the father , the word , and the holy spirit ; and these three are one : but this disagreeth not , but accordeth fitly with three persons in the proper signification of persons ; which is , that which is represented by another . for so god the father , as represented by moses , is one person ; and as represented by his sonne , another person ; and as represented by the apostles , and by the doctors that taught by authority from them derived , is a third person ; and yet every person here , is the person of one and the same god. but a man may here ask , what it was whereof these three bare witnesse . st. iohn therefore tells us ( verse . ) that they bear witnesse , that god hath given us eternall life in his son. again , if it should bee asked , wherein that testimony appeareth , the answer is easie ; for he hath testified the same by the miracles he wrought , first by moses ; secondly , by his son himself ; and lastly by his apostles , that had received the holy spirit ; all which in their times represented the person of god ; and either prophecyed , or preached jesus christ. and as for the apostles , it was the character of the apostleship , in the twelve first and great apostles , to bear witnesse of his resurrection ; as appeareth expressely ( acts . ver . , . ) where st. peter , when a new apostle was to be chosen in the place of judas iscariot , useth these words , of these men which have companied with us all the time that the lord iesus went in and out amongst us , beginning at the baptisme of iohn , unto that same day that hee was taken up from us , must one bee ordained to be a witnesse with us of his resurrection : which words interpret the bearing of witnesse , mentioned by st. john. there is in the same place mentioned another trinity of witnesses in earth . for ( ver . . ) he saith , there are three that bear vvitnesse in earth , the spirit , and the vvater , and the bloud ; and these three agree in one : that is to say , the graces of gods spirit , and the two sacraments , baptisme , and the lords supper , which all agree in one testimony , to assure the consciences of beleevers , of eternall life ; of which testimony he saith ( verse . ) he that beleeveth on the son of man hath the witnesse in himself . in this trinity on earth , the unity is not of the thing ; for the spirit , the water , and the bloud , are not the same substance , though they give the same testimony : but in the trinity of heaven , the persons are the persons of one and the same god , though represented in three different times and occasions . to conclude , the doctrine of the trinity , as far as can be gathered directly from the scripture , is in substance this ; that the god who is alwaies one and the same , was the person represented by moses ; the person represented by his son incarnate ; and the person represented by the apostles . as represented by the apostles , the holy spirit by which they spake , is god ; as represented by his son that was god and man ) , the son is that god ; as represented by moses , and the high priests , the father , that is to say , the father of our lord jesus christ , is that god : from whence we may gather the reason why those names father , son , and holy spirit in the signification of the godhead , are never used in the old testament : for they are persons , that is , they have their names from representing ; which could not be , till divers men had represented gods person in ruling , or in directing under him . thus wee see how the power ecclesiasticall was left by our saviour to the apostles ; and how they were ( to the end they might the better exercise that power , ) endued with the holy spirit , which is therefore called sometime in the new testament paracletus which signifieth an assister , or one called to for helpe , though it bee commonly translated a comforter . let us now consider the power it selfe , what it was , and over whom . cardinall bellarmine in his third generall controversie , hath handled a great many questions concerning the ecclesiasticall power of the pope of rome ; and begins with this , whether it ought to be monarchicall , aristocraticall , or democraticall . all which sorts of power , are soveraign , and coercive . if now it should appear , that there is no coercive power left them by our saviour ; but onely a power to proclaim the kingdom of christ , and to perswade men to submit themselves thereunto ; and by precepts and good counsell , to teach them that have submitted , what they are to do , that they may be received into the kingdom of god when it comes ; and that the apostles , and other ministers of the gospel , are our schoolemasters , and not our commanders , and their precepts not laws , but wholesome counsells ; then were all that dispute in vain . i have shewn already ( in the last chapter , ) that the kingdome of christ is not of this world : therefore neither can his ministers ( unlesse they be kings , ) require obedience in his name . for if the supreme king , have not his regall power in this world ; by what authority can obedience be required to his officers ? as my father sent me , ( so saith our saviour ) i send you . but our saviour was sent to perswade the jews to return to , and to invite the gentiles , to receive the kingdome of his father , and not to reign in majesty , no not , as his fathers lieutenant , till the day of judgment . the time between the ascension , and the generall resurrection , is called , not a reigning , but a regeneration ; that is , a preparatiof men for the second and glorious coming of christ , at the day of judgment ; as appeareth by the words of our saviour , mat. . . you that have followed me in the regeneration , when the son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory , you shall also sit upon twelve thrones ; and of st. paul ( ephes. . . ) having your feet shod with the preparation of the gospell of peace . and is compared by our saviour , to fishing ; that is , to winning men to obedience , not by coercion , and punishing ; but by perswasion : and therefore he said not to his apostles , hee would make them so many nimrods , hunters of men ; but fishers of men . it is compared also to leaven ; to sowing of seed , and to the multiplication of a grain of mustard-seed ; by all which compulsion is excluded ; and consequently there can in that time be no actual r●…igning . the work of christs ministers , is evangelization ; that is , a proclamation of christ , and a preparation for his second comming ; as the evangelization of john baptist , was a preparation to his first coming . again , the office of christs ministers in this world , is to make men beleeve , and have faith in christ : but faith hath no relation to , nor dependence at all upon compulsion , or commandement ; but onely upon certainty , or probability of arguments drawn from reason , or from something men beleeve already . therefore the ministers of christ in this world , have no power by that title , to punish any man for not beleeving , or for contradicting what they say ; they have i say no power by that title of christs ministers , to punish such : but if they have soveraign civill power , by politick institution , then they may indeed lawfully punish any contradiction to their laws whatsoever : and st. paul , of himselfe and other the then preachers of the gospell , saith in expresse words , wee have no dominion over your faith , but are helpers of your ioy. another argument , that the ministers of christ in this present world have no right of commanding , may be drawn from the lawfull authority which christ hath left to all princes ; as well christians , as infidels . st. paul saith ( col. . . ) children obey your parents in all things ; for this is well pleasing to the lord. and ver . . servants obey in all things your masters according to the flesh , not with eye-service , as me●…-pleasers , but in singlenesse of heart , as fearing the lord : this is spoken to them whose masters were infidells ; and yet they are bidden to obey them in all things . and again , concerning obedience to princes . ( rom. . the first . verses ( exhorting to be subject to the higher powers , he saith , that all power is ordained of god ; and that we ought to be subject to them , not onely for fear of incurring their wrath , but also for conscience sake . and st. peter , ( epist. chap. . ver . , , . ) submit your selves to every ordinance of man , for the lords sake , whether it bee to the king , as supreme , or unto governours , as to them that be sent by him for the punishment of evill doers , and for the praise of them that doe well ; for so is the will of god. and again st. paul ( tit. . . ) put men in mind to be subject to principalities , and powers , and to obey magistrates . these princes , and powers , whereof st. peter , and st. paul here speak , were all infidels : much more therefore we are to observe those christians , whom god hath ordained to have soveraign power over us . how then can wee be obliged to obey any minister of christ , if he should command us to doe any thing contrary the command of the king , or other soveraign representant of the common-wealth , whereof we are members , and by whom we look to be protected ? it is the●…efore manifest , that christ hath not left to his ministers in this world , unlesse they be also endued with civill authority , any authority to command other men . but what ( may some object ) if a king , or a senate , or other soveraign person forbid us to beleeve in christ ? to this i answer , that such forbidding is of no effect ; because beleef , and unbeleef never follow mens commands . faith is a gift of god , which man can neither give , nor take away by promise of rewards , or menaces of torture . and if it be further asked , what if wee bee commanded by our lawfull prince , to say with our tongue , wee beleeve not ; must we obey such command ? profession with the tongue is but an externall thing , and no more then any other gesture whereby we signifie our obedience ▪ and wherein a christian , holding firmely in his heart the faith of christ , hath the same liberty which the prophet elisha allowed to naaman the syrian . naaman was converted in his heart to the god of israel ; for hee saith ( kings . . ) thy servant will henceforth offer neither burnt offering , nor sacrifice unto other gods but unto the lord. in this thing the lord pardon thy servant , that when my master goeth into the house of rimmon to worship there , and he leaneth on my hand , and i bow my selfe in the house of rimmon ; when i bow my selfe in the house of rimmon , the lord pardon thy servant in this thing . this the prophet approved , and bid him goe in peace . here naaman beleeved in his heart ; but by bowing before the idol rimmon , he denyed the true god in effect , as much as if he had done it with his lips . but then what shall we answer to our saviours saying , whosoever denyeth me before men , i will deny him before my father which is in heaven ? this we may say , that whatsoever a subject , as naaman was , is compelled to in obedience to his soveraign , and doth it not in order to his own mind , but in order to the laws of his country , that action is not his , but his soveraigns ; nor is it he that in this case denyeth christ before men , but his governour , and the law of his countrey . if any man shall accuse this doctrine , as repugnant to true , and unfegined christianity ; i ask him , in case there should be a subject in any christian common-wealth , that should be inwardly in his heart of the mahometan religion , whether if his soveraign command him to bee present at the divine service of the christian church , and that on pain of death , he think that mahometan obliged in conscience to suffer death for that cause , rather than to obey that command of his lawfull prince . if he say , he ought rather to suffer death , then he authorizeth all private men , to disobey their princes , in maintenance of their religion , true , or false : if he say , he ought to bee obedient , then he alloweth to himself , that which hee denyeth to another , contrary to the words of our saviour , whatsoever you would that men should doe unto you , that doe yee unto them ; and contrary to the law of nature , ( which is the indubitable everlasting law of god ) do not to another , that which thou wouldest not he should doe unto thee . but what then shall we say of all those martyrs we read of in the history of the church , that they have needlessely cast away their lives ? for answer hereunto , we are to distinguish the persons that have been for that cause put to death ; whereof some have received a calling to preach , and professe the kingdome of christ openly ; others have had no such calling , nor more has been required of them than their owne faith . the former sort , if they have been put to death , for bearing witnesse to this point , that jesus christ is risen from the dead , were true martyrs ; for a martyr is , ( to give the true definition of the word ) a witnesse of the resurrection of jesus the messiah ; which none can be but those that conversed with him on earth , and saw him after he was risen : for a witnesse must have seen what he testifieth , or else his testimony is not good . and that none but such , can properly be called martyrs of christ , is manifest out of the words of st. peter , act. . , . vvherefore of these men which have companyed with us all the time that the lord iesus went in and out amongst us , beginning from the baptisme of iohn unto that same day hee was taken up from us , must one one be ordained to be a martyr ( that is a witnesse ) with us of his resurrection : where we may observe , that he which is to bee a witnesse of the truth of the resurrection of christ , that is to say , of the truth of this fundamentall article of christian religion , that jesus was the christ , must be some disciple that conversed with him , and saw him before , and after his resurrection ; and consequently must be one of his originall disciples : whereas they which were not so , can witnesse no more , but that their antecessors said it , and are therefore but witnesses of other mens testimony ; and are but second martyrs , or martyrs of christs witnesses . he , that to maintain every doctrine which he himself draweth out of the history our saviours of life , and of the acts , or epistles of the apostles ; or which he beleeveth upō the authority of a private man , wil oppose the laws and authority of the civill state , is very far from being a martyr of christ , or a martyr of his martyrs . 't is one article onely , which to die for , meriteth so honorable a name ; and that article is this , that iesus is the christ ; that is to say , he that hath redeemed us , aud shall come again to give us salvation , and eternall life in his glorious kingdome . to die for every tenet that serveth the ambition , or profit of the clergy , is not required ; nor is it the death of the witnesse , but the testimony it self that makes the martyr : for the word signifieth nothing else , but the man that beareth witnesse , whether he be put to death for his testimony , or not . also he that is not sent to preach this fundamentall article , but taketh it upon him of his private authority , though he be a witnesse , and consequently a martyr , either primary of christ , or secundary of his apostles , disciples , or their successors ; yet is he not obliged to suffer death for that cause ; because being not called thereto , t is not required at his hands ; nor ought hee to complain , if he loseth the reward he expecteth from those that never set him on work . none therefore can be a martyr , neither of the first , nor second degree , that have not a warrant to preach christ come in the flesh ; that is to say , none , but such as are sent to the conversion of infidels . for no man is a witnesse to him that already beleeveth , and therefore needs no witnesse ; but to them that deny , or doubt , or have not heard it . christ sent his apostles , and his seventy disciples , with authority to preach ; he sent not all that beleeved : and he sent them to unbeleevers ; i send you ( saith he ) as sheep amongst wolves ; not as sheep to other sheep . lastly , the points of their commission , as they are expressely set down in the gospel , contain none of them any authority over the congregation . we have first ( mat. . ) that the twelve apostles were sent to the lost sheep of the house of israel , and commanded to preach , that the kingdome of god was at hand . now preaching in the originall , is that act , which a crier , herald , or other officer useth to doe publiquely in proclaiming of a king. but a crier hath not right to command any man. and ( luke . . ) the seventy disciples are sent out , as labourers , not as lords of the harvest ; and are bidden ( verse . ) to say , the kingdome of god is come nigh unto you ; and by kingdom here is meant , not the kingdome of grace , but the kingdome of glory ; for they are bidden to denounce it ( ver . . ) to those cities which shall not receive them , as a threatning , that it shall be more tolerable in that day for sodome , than for such a city . and ( mat. . . ) our saviour telleth his disciples , that sought priority of place , their office was to minister , even as the son of man came , not to be ministred unto , but to minister . preachers therefore have not magisteriall , but ministeriall power : bee not called masters , ( saith our saviour , mat. . . ) for one is your master , even christ. another point of their commission , is , to teach all nations ; as it is in mat. . . or as in st. mark . . goe into all the world , and preach the gospel to every creature . teaching therefore , and preaching is the same thing . for they that proclaim the comming of a king , must withall make known by what right he commeth , if they mean men shall submit themselves unto him : as st. paul did to the jews of thessalonica , when three sabbath dayes he reasoned with them out of the scriptures , opening , and alledging that christ must needs have suffered , and risen again from the dead , and that this iesus is christ. but to teach out of the old testament that jesus was christ , ( that is to say , king , ) and risen from the dead , is not to say , that men are bound after they beleeve it , to obey those that tell them so , against the laws , and commands of their soveraigns ; but that they shall doe wisely , to expect the coming of christ hereafter , in patience , and faith , with obedience to their present magistrates . another point of their commission , is to baptize , in the name of the father , and of the son , and of the holy ghost . what is baptisme ? dipping into water . but what is it to dip a man into the water in the name of any thing ? the meaning of these words of baptisme is this . he that is baptized , is dipped or washed , as a sign of becomming a new man , and a loyall subject to that god , whose person was represented in old time by moses , and the high priests , when he reigned over the jews ; and to jesus christ , his sonne , god , and man , that hath redeemed us , and shall in his humane nature represent his fathers person in his eternall kingdome after the resurrection ; and to acknowledge the doctrine of the apostles , who assisted by the spirit of the father , and of the son , were left for guides to bring us into that kingdome , to be the onely , and assured way thereunto . this , being our promise in baptisme ; and the authority of earthly soveraigns being not to be put down till the day of judgment ; ( for that is expressely affirmed by s. paul cor. . , , , where he saith , as in adam all die , so in christ all shall be made alive . but every man in his owne order , christ the first fruits , afterward they that are christs , at his comming ; then commeth the end , when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to god , even the father , when he shall have put down all rule , and all authority and power ) it is manifest , that we do not in baptisme constitute over us another authority , by which our externall actions are to bee governed in this life ; but promise to take the doctrine of the apostles for our direction in the way to life eternall . the power of remission , and retention of sinnes , called also the power of loosing , and binding , and sometimes the keyes of the kingdome of heaven , is a consequence of the authority to baptize , or refuse to baptize . for baptisme is the sacrament of allegeance , of them that are to be received into the kingdome of god ; that is to say , into eternall life ; that is to say , to remission of sin : for as eternall life was lost by the committing , so it is recovered by the remitting of mens sins . the end of baptisme is remission of sins : and therefore st. peter , when they that were converted by his sermon on the day of pentecost , asked what they were to doe , advised them to repent , and be baptized in the name of iesus , for the remission of sins . and therefore seeing to baptize is to declare the reception of men into gods kingdome ; and to refuse to baptize is to declare their exclusion ; it followeth , that the power to declare them cast out , or retained in it , was given to the same apostles , and their substitutes , and successors . and therefore after our saviour had breathed upon them , saying , ( iohn . . ) receive the holy ghost , hee addeth in the next verse , vvhos 's soever sins ye remit , they are remitted unto them ; and whose soever sins ye retain , they are retained . by which words , is not granted an authority to forgive , or retain sins , simply and absolutely , as god forgiveth or retaineth them , who knoweth the heart of man , and truth of his penitence and conversion ; but conditionally , to the penitent : and this forgivenesse , or absolution , in case the absolved have but a feigned repentance , is thereby without other act , or sentence of the absolvent , made void , and hath no effect at all to salvation , but on the contrary , to the aggravation of his sin. therefore the apostles , and their successors , are to follow but the outward marks of repentance ; which appearing , they have no authority to deny absolution ; and if they appeare not , they have no authority to absolve . the same also is to be observed in baptisme : for to a converted jew , or gentile , the apostles had not the power to deny baptisme ; nor to grant it to the un-penitent . but seeing no man is able to discern the truth of another mans repentance , further than by externall marks , taken from his words , and actions , which are subject to hypocrisie ; another question will arise , who it is that is constituted judge of those marks . and this question is decided by our saviour himself ; if thy brother ( saith he ) shal trespasse against thee , go and tell him his fault between thee , and him alone ; if shall hear thee , thou hast gained thy brother . but if he will not hear thee , then take with thee one , or two more . and if he shall neglect to hear them , tell it unto the church ; but if he neglect to hear the church , let him be unto thee as an heathen man , and a publican . by which it is manifest , that the judgment concerning the truth of repentance , belonged not to any one man , but to the church , that is , to the assembly of the faithull , or to them that have authority to bee their representant . but besides the judgment , there is necessary also the pronouncing of sentence : and this belonged alwaies to the apostle , or some pastor of the church , as prolocutor ; and of this our saviour speaketh in the verse , whatsoever ye shall bind on earth , shall be bound in heaven ; and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth , shall be loosed in heaven . and conformable hereunto was the practise of st. paul ( cor. . , , & . ) where he saith , for i verily , as absent in body , but present in spirit , have determined already , as though i were present , concerning him that hath so done this deed ; in the name of our lord iesus christ when ye are gathered together , and my spirit , with the power of our lord iesus christ , to deliver such a one to satan ; that is to say , to cast him out of the ch●…rch , as a man whose sins are not forgiven . paul here pronounceth the sentence ; but the assembly was first to hear the cause , ( for st. paul was absent ; ) and by consequence to condemn him . but in the same chapter ( ver . , . ) the judgment in such a case is more expressely attributed to the assembly : but now i have written unto you , not to keep company , if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator , &c. with such a one no not to eat . for what have i to do to judg them that are without ? do not ye judg them that are within ? the sentence therefore by which a man was put out of church , was pronounced by the apostle , or pastor ; but the judgment concerning the merit of the cause , was in the church ; that is to say , ( as the times were before the conversion of kings , and men that had soveraign authority in the common-wealth , ) the assembly of the christians dwelling in the same city ; as in corinth , in the assembly of the christians of corinth . this part of the power of the keyes , by which men were thrust out from the kingdom of god , is that which is called excommunication ; and to excommunicate , is in the originall , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to cast out of the synagogue ; that is , out of the place of divine service ; a word drawn from the custome of the jews , to cast out of their synagogues , such as they thought in manners , or doctrine , contagious , as lepers were by the law of moses separated from the congregation of israel , till such time as they should be by the priest pronounced clean . the use and effect of excommunication , whilest it was not yet strengthened with the civill power , was no more , than that they , who were not excommunicate , were to avoid the company of them that were . it was not enough to repute them as heathen , that never had been christians ; for with such they might eate , and drink ; which with excommunicate persons they might not do ; as appeareth by the words of st. paul , ( cor. . ver . , , &c. ) where he telleth them , he had formerly forbidden them to company with fornicators ; but ( because that could not bee without going out of the world , ) he restraineth it to such fornicators , and otherwise vicious persons , as were of the brethren ; with such a one ( he saith ) they ought not to keep company , no not to eat . and this is no more than our saviour saith ( mat. . . ) let him be to thee as a heathen , and as a publican . for publicans ( which signifieth farmers , and receivers of the revenue of the common-wealth ) were so hated , and detested by the jews that were to pay it , as that publican and sinner were taken amongst them for the same thing : insomuch , as when our saviour accepted the invitation of zacchaeus a publican ; though it were to convert him , yet it was ohjected to him as a crime . and therefore , when our saviour , to heathen , added publican , he did forbid them to eat with a man excommunicate . as for keeping them out of their synagogues , or places of assembly , they had no power to do it , but that of the owner of the place , whether he were christian , or heathen . and because all places are by right , in the dominion of the common-wealth ; as well hee that was excommunicated , as hee that never was baptized , might enter inter into them by commission from the civill magistrate ; as paul before his conversion entred into their synagogues at damascus , to apprehend christians , men and women , and to carry them bound to jerusalem , by commission from the high priest. by which it appears , that upon a christian , that should become an apostate , in a place where the civill power did persecute , or not assist the church , the effect of excommunication had nothiug in it , neither of dammage in this world , nor of terrour : not of terrour , because of their unbeleef ; nor of dammage , because they are ret●…rned thereby into the favour of the world ; and in the world to come , were to be in no worse estate , then they which never had beleeved . the dammage redounded rather to the church , by provocation of them they cast out , to a freer execution of their malice . excommunication therefore had its effect onely upon those , that beleeved that jesus christ was to come again in glory , to reign over , and to judge both the quick , and the dead , and should therefore refuse entrance into his kingdom , to those whose sins were retained ; that is , to those that were excommunicated by the church . and thence it is that st. paul calleth excommunication , a delivery of the excōmunicate person to satan . for without the kingdom of christ , all other kingdomes after judgment , are comprehended in the kingdome of satan . this is it that the faithfull stood in fear of , as long as they stood excommunicate , that is to say , in an estate wherein their sins were not forgiven . whereby wee may understand , that excommunication in the time that christian religion was not authorized by the civill power , was used onely for a correction of manners , not of errours in opinion : for it is a punishment , whereof none could be sensible but such as beleeved , and expected the coming again of our saviour to judge the world ; and they who so beleeved , needed no other opinion , but onely uprightnesse of life , to be saved . there lyeth excommunication for injustice ; as ( mat. . ) if thy brother offend thee , tell it him privately ; then with witnesses ; lastly , tell the church ; and then if he obey not , let him be to thee as an heathen man , and a publican . and there lieth excommunication for a scandalous life , as ( cor. . . ) if any man that is called a brother , be a fornicator , or covetous , or an idolater , or a drunkard , or an extortioner , with such a one yee are not to eat . but to excommunicate a man that held this foundation , that iesus was the christ , for difference of opinion in other points , by which that foundation was not destroyed , there appeareth no authority in the scripture , nor example in the apostles . there is indeed in st. paul ( titus . . ) a text that seemeth to be to the contrary . a man that is an haeretique , after the first and second admonition , reject . for an haeretiqne , is he , that being a member of the church , teacheth neverthelesse some private opinion , which the church has forbidden : and such a one , s. paul adviseth titus , after the first , and second admonition , to reject . but to reject ( in this place ) is not to excommunicate the man ; but to give over admonishing him , to let him alone , to set by disputing with him , as one that is to be convinced onely by himselfe . the same apostle saith ( tim. . . ) foolish and unlearned questions avoid : the word avoid in this place , and reject in the former , is the same in the originall , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : but foolish questions may bee set by without excommunication . and again , ( tit. . . ) avoid foolish questions , where the originall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ( set themby ) is equivalent to the former word reject . there is no other place that can so much as colourably be drawn , to countenance the casting out of the church faithfull men , such as beleeved the foundation , onely for a singular superstructure of their own , proceeding perhaps from a good & pious conscience . but on the contrary , all such places as command avoiding such disputes , are written for a lesson to pastors , ( such as timothy and titus were ) not to make new articles of faith , by determining every small controversie , which oblige men to a needlesse burthen of conscience , or provoke them to break the union of the church . which lesson the apostles themselves observed well . s. peter , and s. paul , though their controversie were great , ( as we may read in gal. . . ) yet they did not cast one another out of the church . neverthelesse , during the apostles times , there were other pastors that observed it not ; as diotrephes ( iohn . &c. ) who cast out of the church , such as s. john himself thought fit to be received into it , out of a pride he took in praeeminence ; so early it was , that vain-glory , and ambition had found entrance into the church of christ. that a man be liable to excommunication , there be many conditions requisite ; as first , that he be a member of some commonalty , that is to say , of some lawfull assembly , that is to say , of some christian church , that hath power to judge of the cause for which hee is to bee excommunicated . for where there is no community , there can bee no excommunication ; nor where there is no power to judge , can there bee any power to give sentence . from hence it followeth , that one church cannot be excommunicated by another : for either they have equall power to excommunicate each other , in which case excommunication is not discipline , nor an act of authority , but schisme , and dissolution of charity ; or one is so subordinate to the other , as that they both have but one voice , and then they be but one church ; and the part excommunicated , is no more a church , but a dissolute number of individuall persons . and because the sentence of excommunication , importeth an advice , not to keep company , nor so much as to eat with him that is excommunicate , if a soveraign prince , or assembly bee excommunicate , the sentence is of no effect . for all subjects are bound to be in the company and presence of their own soveraign ( when he requireth it ) by the law of nature ; nor can they lawfully either expell him from any place of his own dominion , whether profane or holy ; nor go out of his dominion , without his leave ; much lesse ( if he call them to that honour , ) refuse to eat with him . and as to other princes and states , because they are not parts of one and the same congregation , they need not any other sentence to keep them from keeping companywith the state excommunicate : for the very institution , as it uniteth many men into one community ; so it dissociateth one community from another : so that excommunication is not needfull for keeping kings and states asunder ; nor has any further effect then is in the nature of policy it selfe ; unlesse it be to instigate princes to warre upon one another . nor is the excommunication of a christian subject , that obeyeth the laws of his own soveraign , whether christian , or heathen , of any effect . for if he beleeve that iesus is the christ , he hath the spirit of god , ( joh. . . ) and god dwelleth in him , and he in god , ( joh. . . ) but hee that hath the spirit of god ; hee that dwelleth in god ; hee in whom god dwelleth , can receive no harm by the excommunication of men . therefore , he that beleeveth jesus to be the christ , is free from all the dangers threatned to persons excommunicate . he that beleveeth it not , is no christian. therefore a true and unfeigned christian is not liable to excommunication : nor he also that is a professed christian , till his hypocrisy appear in his manners , that is , till his behaviour bee contrary to the law of his soveraign , which is the rule of manners , and which christ and his apostles have commanded us to be subject to . for the church cannot judge of manners but by externall actions , which actions can never bee unlawfull , but when they are against the law of the common-wealth . if a mans father , or mother , or master bee excommunicate , yet are not the children forbidden to keep them company , nor to eat with them ; for that were ( for the most part ) to oblige them not to eat at all , for want of means ●…o get food ; and to authorise them to disobey ▪ their parents , and masters , contrary to the precept of the apostles . in summe , the power of excommunication cannot be extended further than to the end for which the apostles and pastors of the church have their commission from our saviour ; which is not to rule by command and coaction , but by teaching and direction of men in the way of salvation in the world to come . and as a master in any science , may abandon his scholar , when hee obstinately neglecteth the practise of his rules ; but not accuse him of injustice , because he was never bound to obey him : so a teacher of christian doctrine may abandon his disciples that obstinately continue in an unchristian life ; but he cannot say , they doe him wrong , because they are not obliged to obey him : for to a teacher that shall so complain , may be applyed the answer of god to samuel in the like place , they have not rejected thee , but mee . excommunication therefore when it wanteth the assistance of the civill power , as it doth , when a christian state , or prince is excommunicate by a forain authority , is without effect ; and consequently ought to be without terrour . the name of fulmen excommunicationis ( that is , the thunderbolt of excommunication ) proceeded from an imagination of the bishop of rome , which first used it , that he was king of kings , as the heathen made jupiter king of the gods ; and assigned him in their poems , and pictures , a thunderbolt , wherewith to subdue , and punish the giants , that should dare to deny his power : which imagination was grounded on two errours ; one , that the kingdome of christ is of this world , contrary to our saviours owne words , my kingdome is not of this world ; the other , that hee is christs vicar , not onely over his owne subjects , but over all the christians of the world ; whereof there is no ground in scripture , and the contrary shall bee proved in its due place . st. paul coming to thessalonica , where was a synagogue of the jews , ( acts . , . ) as his manner was , went in unto them , and three sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the scriptures , opening and alledging , that christ must needs have suffered and r●…sen again from the dead ; and that this iesus whom he preached was the christ. the scriptures here mentioned were the scriptures of the jews , that is , the old testament . the men , to whom he was to prove that jesus was the christ , and risen again from the dead , were also jews , and did beleeve already , that they were the word of god. hereupon ( as it is verse . ) some of them beleeved , and ( as it is in the . ver . ) some beleeved not . what was the reason , when they all beleeved the scripture , that they did not all beleeve alike ; but that some approved , others disapproved the interpretation of st. paul that cited them ; and every one interpreted them to himself ? it was this ; s. paul came to them without any legall commission , and in the manner of one that would not command , but perswade ; which he must needs do , either by miracles , as moses did to the israelites in egypt , that they might see his authority in gods works ; or by reasoning from the already received scripture , that they might see the truth of his doctrine in gods word . but whosoever perswadeth by reasoning from principles written , maketh him to whom hee speaketh judge , both of the meaning of those principles , and also of the force of his inferences upon them . if these jews of thessalonica were not , who else was the judge of what s. paul alledg●…d out of scripture ? if s. paul , what needed he to quote any places to prove his doctrine ? it had been enough to have said , i find it so in scripture , that is to say , in your laws , of which i am interpreter , as sent by christ. the interpreter therefore of the scripture , to whose interpretation the jews of thessalonica were bound to stand , could be none : every one might beleeve , or not beleeve , according as the allegations seemed to himselfe to be agreeable , or not agreeable to the meaning of the places alledged . and generally in all cases of the world , hee that pretendeth any proofe , maketh judge of his proofe him to whom he addresseth his speech . and as to the case of the jews in particular , they were bound by expresse words ( deut. . ) to receive the determination of all hard questions , from the priests and judges of israel for the time being . but this is to bee understood of the jews that were yet unconverted . for the conversion of the gentiles , there was no use of alledging the scriptures , which they beleeved not . the apostles therefore laboured by reason to confute their idolatry ; and that done , to perswade them to the faith of christ , by their testimony of his life , and resurrection . so that there could not yet bee any controversie concerning the authority to interpret scripture ; seeing no man was obliged during his infidelity , to follow any mans interpretation of any scripture , except his soveraigns interpretation of the laws of his countrey . let us now consider the conversion it s●…lf , and see what there was therein , that could be cause of such an obligation . men were converted to no other thing then to the beleef of that which the apostles preached : and the apostles preached nothing , but that jesus was the christ , that is to say , the king that was to save them , and reign over them eternally in the world to come ; and consequently that hee was not dead , but risen again from the dead , and gone up into heaven , and should come again one day to j●…dg the world , ( which also should rise again to be judged , ) and reward every man according to his works . none of them preached that himselfe , or any other apostle was such an interpreter of the scripture , as all that became christians , ought to take their interpretation for law. for to interpret the laws , is part of the administration of a present kingdome ; which the apostles had not . they prayed then , and all other pastors ever since , let thy kingdome come ; and exhorted their converts to obey their then ethnique princes . the new testament was not yet published in one body . every of the evangelists was interpreter of his own gospel ; and every apostle of his own epistle ; and of the old testament , our saviour himselfe saith to the jews ( iohn . . ) search the scriptures ; for in them yee thinke to have eternall life , and they are they that testifie of me . if hee had not meant they should interpret them , hee would not have bidden them take thence the proof of his being the christ : he would either have interpreted them himselfe , or referred them to the interpretation of the priests . when a difficulty arose , the apostles and elders of the church assembled themselves together , and determined what should bee preached , and taught , and how they should interpret the scriptures to the people ; but took not from the people the liberty to read , and interpret them to themselves . the apostles sent divers . letters to the churches , and other writings for their instruction ; which had been in vain , if they had not allowed them to interpret , that is , to consider the meaning of them . and as it was in the apostles time , it must be till such time as there should be pastors , that could authorise an interpreter , whose interpretation should generally be stood to : but that could not be till kings were pastors , or pastors kings . there be two senses , wherein a writing may be said to be canonicall ; for canon , signifieth a rule ; and a rule is a precept , by which a man is guided , and directed in any action whatsoever . such precepts , though given by a teacher to his disciple , or a counsellor to his friend , without power to compell him to observe them , are neverthelesse canons ; because they are rules : but when they are given by one , whom he that receiveth them is bound to obey , then are those canons , not onely rules , but laws : the question therefore here , is of the power to make the scriptures ( which are the rules of christian faith ) laws . that part of the scripture , which was first law , was the ten commandements , written in two tables of stone , and delivered by god himselfe to moses ; and by moses made known to the people . before that time there was no written law of god , who as yet having not chosen any people to bee his peculiar kingdome , had given no law to men , but the law of nature , that is to say , the precepts of naturall reason , written in every mans own heart . of these two tables , the first containeth the law of soveraignty ; . that they should not obey , nor honour the gods of other nations , in these words , non-habebis deos alienos coram me , that is , thou shalt not have for gods , the gods that other nations worship ; but onely me : whereby they were forbidden to obey , or honor , as their king and governour , any other god , than him that spake unto them then by moses , and afterwards by the high priest. . that they should not make any image to represent him ; that is to say , they were not to choose to themselves , neither in heaven , nor in earth , any representative of their own fancying , but obey moses and aaron , whom he had appointed to that office . . that they should not take the name of god in vain ; that is , they should not speak rashly of their king , nor dispute his right , nor the commissions of moses and aaron , his lieutenants . . that they should every seventh day abstain from their ordinary labour , and employ that time in doing him publique honor. the second table containeth the duty of one man towards another , as to honor parents ; not to kill ; not to commit adultery ; not to steale ; not to corrupt iudgment by false witnesse ; and finally , not so much as to designe in their heart the doing of any injury one to another . the question now is , who it was that gave to these written tables the obligatory force of lawes . there is no doubt but they were made laws by god himselfe : but because a law obliges not , nor is law to any , but to them that acknowledge it to be the act of the soveraign ; how could the people of israel that were forbidden to approach the mountain to hear what god said to moses , be obliged to obedience to all those laws which moses propounded to them ? some of them were indeed the laws of nature , as all the second table ; and therefore to be acknowledged for gods laws ; not to the israelites alone , but to all people : but of those that were peculiar to the israelites , as those of the first table , the question remains ; saving that they had obliged themselves , presently after the propounding of them , to obey moses , in these words ( exod. . . ) speak thou to us , and we will hear thee ; but let not god speak to us , lest we dye . it was therefore onely moses then , and after him the high priest , whom ( by moses ) god declared should administer this his peculiar kingdome , that had on earth , the power to make this short scripture of the decalogue to bee law in the common-wealth of israel . but moses , and aaron , and the succeeding high priests were the civill soveraigns . therefore hitherto , the canonizing , or making of the scripture law , belonged to the civill soveraigne . the judiciall law , that is to say , the laws that god prescribed to the magistrates of israel , for the rule of their administration of justice , and of the sentences , or judgments they should pronounce , in pleas between man and man ; and the leviticall law , that is to say , the rule that god prescribed touching the rites and ceremonies of the priests and levites , were all delivered to them by moses onely ; and therefore also became lawes , by vertue of the same promise of obedience to moses . whether these laws were then written , or not written , but dictated to the people by moses ( after his forty dayes being with god in the mount ) by word of mouth , is not expressed in the text ; but they were all positive laws , and equivalent to holy scripture , and made canonicall by moses the civill soveraign . after the israelites were come into the plains of moab over against jericho , and ready to enter into the land of promise , moses to the former laws added divers others ; which therefore are called deuteronomy ; that is , second laws . and are ( as it is written , deut. . . ) the words of a covenant which the lord commanded moses to make with the children of israel , besides the covenant which he made with them in horeb. for having explained those former laws , in the beginning of the book of deuteronomy , he addeth others , that begin at the . cha. and continue to the end of the . of the same book . this law ( deut. . . ) they were commanded to write upon great stones playstered over , at their passing over jordan : this law also was written by moses himself in a book ; and delivered into the hands of the priests , and to the elders of israel . ( deut. . . ) and commanded ( ve . . ) to be put in the side of the arke ; for in the ark it selfe was nothing but the ten commandements . this was the law , which moses ( deuteronomy . . ) commanded the kings of israel should keep a copie of : and this is the law , which having been long time lost , was found again in the temple in the time of josiah , and by his authority received for the law of god. but both moses at the writing , and josiah at the recovery thereof , had both of them the civill soveraignty . hitherto therefore the power of making scripture canonicall , was in the civill soveraign . besides this book of the law , there was no other book , from the time of moses , till after the captivity , received amongst the jews for the law of god. for the prophets ( except a few ) lived in the time of the captivity it selfe ; and the rest lived but a little before it ; and were so far from having their prophecies generally received for laws , as that their persons were persecuted , partly by false prophets , and partly by the kings which were seduced by them . and this book it self , which was confirmed by josiah for the law of god , and with it all the history of the works of god , was lost in the captivity , and sack of the city of jerusalem , as appears by that of esdras . . thy law is burnt ; therefore no man knoweth the things that are done of thee , or the works that shall begin . and before the captivity , between the time when the law was lost , ( which is not mentioned in the scripture , but may probably be thought to be the time of rehoboam , when * shishak king of egypt took the spoile of the temple , ) and the time of josiah , when it was found againe , they had no written word of god , but ruled according to their own discretion , or by the direction of such , as each of them esteemed prophets . from hence we may inferre , that the scriptures of the old testament , which we have at this day , were not canonicall , nor a law unto the jews , till the renovation of their covenant with god at their return from the captivity , and restauration of their common-wealth under esdras . but from that time forward they were accounted the law of the jews , and for such translated into greek by seventy elders of judaea , and put into the library of ptolemy at alexandria , and approved for the word of god. now seeing esdras was the high priest , and the high priest was their civill soveraigne , it is manifest , that the scriptures were never made laws , but by the soveraign civill power . by the writings of the fathers that lived in the time before that christian religion was received , and authorised by constantine the emperour , we may find , that the books wee now have of the new testament , were held by the christians of that time ( except a few , in respect of whose paucity the rest were called the catholique church , and others haeretiques ) for the dictates of the holy ghost ; and consequently for the canon , or rule of faith : such was the reverence and opinion they had of their teachers ; as generally the reverence that the disciples bear to their first masters , in all manner of doctrine they receive from them , is not small . therefore there is no doubt , but when s. paul wrote to the churches he had converted ; or any other apostle , or disciple of christ , to those which had then embraced christ , they received those their writings for the true christian doctrine . but in that time , when not the power and authority of the teacher , but the faith of the hearer caused them to receive it , it was not the apostles that made their own writings canonicall , but every convert made them so to himself . but the question here , is not what any christian made a law , or canon to himself , ( which he might again reject , by the same right he received it ; ) but what was so made a canon to them , as without injustice they could not doe any thing contrary thereunto . that the new testament should in this sense be canonicall , that is to say , a law in any place where the law of the common-wealth had not made it so , is contrary to the nature of a law. for a law , ( as hath been already shewn ) is the commandement of that man , or assembly , to whom we have given soveraign authority , to make such rules for the direction of our actions , as hee shall think fit ; and to punish us , when we doe any thing contrary to the same . when therefore any other man shall offer unto us any other rules , which the soveraign ruler hath not prescribed , they are but counsell , and advice ; which , whether good , or bad , hee that is counselled , may without injustice refuse to observe ; and when contrary to the laws already established , without injustice cannot observe , how good soever he conceiveth it to be . i say , he cannot in this case observe the same in his actions , nor in his dicourse with other men ; though he may without blame beleeve his private teachers , and wish he had the liberty to practise their advice ; and that it were publiquely received for law. for internall faith is in its own nature invisible , and consequently exempted from all humane jurisdiction ; whereas the words , and actions that proceeed from it , as breaches of our civill obedience , are injustice both before god and man. seeing then our saviour hath denyed his kingdome to be in this world , seeing he had said , he came not to judge , but to save the world , he hath not subjected us to other laws than those of the common-wealth ; that is , the jews to the law of moses , ( which he saith ( mat. . ) he came not to destroy , but to fulfill , ) and other nations to the laws of their severall soveraigns , and all men to the laws of nature ; the observing whereof , both he himselfe , and his apostles have in their teaching recommended to us , as a necessary condition of being admitted by him in the last day into his eternall kingdome , wherein shall be protection , and life everlasting . seeing then our saviour , and his apostles , left not new laws to oblige us in this world , but new doctrine to prepare us for the next ; the books of the new testament , which containe that doctrine , untill obedience to them was commanded , by them that god had given power to on earth to be legislators , were not obligatory canons , that is , laws , but onely good , and safe advice , for the direction of sinners in the way to salvation , which every man might take , and refuse at his owne perill , without injustice . again , our saviour christs commission to his apostles , and disciples , was to proclaim his kingdome ( not present , but ) to come ; and to teach all nations ; and to baptize them that should beleeve ; and to enter into the houses of them that should receive them ; and where they were not received , to shake off the dust of their feet against them ; but not to call for fire from heaven to destroy them , nor to compell them to obedience by the sword. in all which there is nothing of power , but of perswasion . he sent them out as sheep unto wolves , not as kings to their subjects . they had not in commission to make laws ; but to obey , and teach obedience to laws made ; and consequently they could not make their writings obligatory canons , without the help of the soveraign civill power . and therefore the scripture of the new testament is there only law , where the lawfull civill power hath made it so . and there also the king , or soveraign , maketh it a law to himself ; by which he subjecteth himselfe , not to the doctor , or apostle that converted him , but to god himself , and his son jesus christ , as immediately as did the apostles themselves . that which may seem to give the new testament , in respect of those that have embraced christian doctrine , the force of laws , in the times , and places of persecution , is the decrees they made amongst themselves in their synods . for we read ( acts . . ) the stile of the councell of the apostles , the elders , and the whole church , in this manner , it seemed good to the holy ghost , and to us , to lay upon you no greater burthen than these necessary things , &c. which is a stile that signifieth a power to lay a burthen on them that had received their doctrine . now to lay a burden on another , seemeth the same that to oblige ; and therefore the acts of that councell were laws to the then christians . neverthelesse , they were no more laws than are these other precepts , repent ; be baptized ; keep the commandements ; beleeve the gospel ; come unto me ; sell all that thou hast ; give it to the poor ; and , follow me ; which are not commands , but invitations , and callings of men to christianity , like that of esay . . ho , every man that thir●…teth , come yee to the waters , come , and buy wine and milke without money . for first , the apostles power was no other than that of our saviour , to invite men to embrace the kingdome of god ; which they themselves acknowledged for a kingdome ( not present , but ) to come ; and they that have no kingdome , can make no laws . and secondly , if their acts of councell , were laws , they could not without sin be disobeyed . but we read not any where , that they who received not the doctrine of christ , did therein sin ; but that they died in their sins ; that is , that their sins against the laws to which they owed obedience , were not pardoned . and those laws were the laws of nature , and the civill laws of the state , whereto every christian man had by pact submitted himself . and therefore by the burthen , which the apostles might lay on such as they had converted , are not to be understood laws , but conditions , proposed to those that sought salvation ; which they might accept , or refuse at their own perill , without a new sin , though not without the hazard of being condemned , and excluded out of the kingdome of god for their sins past . and therefore of infidels , s. john saith not , the wrath of god shall come upon them , but the wrath of god remaineth upon them ; and not that they shall be condemned ; but that they are condemned already . nor can it be conceived , that the benefit of faith , is remission of sins , unlesse we conceive withall , that the dammage of infidelity , is the retention of the same sins . but to what end is it ( may some man aske ) , that the apostles , and other pastors of the church , after their time , should meet together , to agree upon what doctrine should be taught , both for faith and manners , if no man were obliged to observe their decrees ? to this may be answered , that the apostles , and elders of that councell , were obliged even by their entrance into it , to teach the doctrine therein concluded , and decreed to be taught , so far forth , as no precedent law , to which they were obliged to yeeld obedience , was to the contrary ; but not that all other christians should be obliged to observe , what they taught . for though they might deliberate what each of them should teach ; yet they could not deliberate what others should do , unless their assembly had had a legislative power ; which none could have but civil soveraigns . for though god be the soveraign of all the world , we are not bound to take for his law , whatsoever is propounded by every man in his name ; nor any thing contrary to the civill law , which god hath expressely commanded us to obey . seeing then the acts of councell of the apostles , were then no laws , but counsells ; much lesse are laws the acts of any other doctors , or councells since , if assembled without the authority of the civill soveraign . and consequently , the books of the new testament , though most perfect rules of christian doctrine , could not be made laws by any other authority then that of kings , or soveraign assemblies . the first councell , that made of the scriptures we now have , canon , is not extant : for that collection of the canons of the apostles , attributed to clemens , the first bishop of rome after s. peter , is subject to question : for though the canonicall books bee there reckoned up ; yet these words , sint vobis omnibus clericis & l●…icis libri venerandi , &c. containe a distinction of clergy , and laity , that was not in use so neer st. peters time . the first councell for setling the canonicall scripture , that is extant , is that of laodicea , can. . which forbids the reading of other books then those in the churches ; which is a mandate that is not addressed to every ch●…istian , but to those onely that had authority to read any thing publiquely in the church ; that is , to ecclesiastiques onely . of ecclesiasticall officers in the time of the apostles , some were magisteriall , some ministeriall . magisteriall were the offices of preaching of the gospel of the kingdom of god to infidels ; of administaing the sacraments , and divine service ; and of teaching the rules of faith and manners to those that were converted . ministeriall was the office of deacons , that is , of them that were appointed to the administration of the secular necessities of the church , at such time as they lived upon a common stock of mony , raised out of the voluntary contributions of the faithfull . amongst the officers magisteriall , the first , and principall were the apostles ; whereof there were at first but twelve ; and these were chosen and constituted by our saviour himselfe ; and their office was not onely to preach , teach , and baptize , but also to be nar●…yrs , ( witnesses of our saviours resurrection . ) this testimony , was the specificall , and essentiall mark ; whereby the apostleship was distinguished from other magistracy ecclesiasticall ; as being necessary for an apostle , either to have seen our saviour after his resurrection , or to have conversed with him before , and seen his works , and other arguments of his divinity , whereby they might be taken for sufficient witnesses . and therefore at the election of a new apostle in the place of judas iscariot , s. peter saith ( acts . , . ) of these men that have companyed with us , all the time that the lord iesus went in and out among us , beginning from the baptisme of iohn unto that same day that he was taken up from us , must one be ordained to be a witnesse with us of his resurrection : where , by this word must , is implyed a necessary property of an apostle , to have companyed with the first and prime apostles in the time that our saviour manifested himself in the flesh . the first apostle , of those which were not constituted by christ in the time he was upon the earth , was matthias , chosen in this manner : there were assembled together in jerusalem about christians ( acts . . ) these appointed two , ioseph the iust , and matthias ( ver . . ) and caused lots to be drawn ; and ( ver . . ) the lot fell on matthias , and he was numbred with the apostles . so that here we see the ordination of this apostle , was the act of the congregation , and not of st. peter , nor of the eleven , otherwise then as members of the assembly . after him there was never any other apostle ordained , but paul and barnabas ; which was done ( as we read ( acts . , , . ) in this manner . there were in the church that was at antioch , certaine prophets , and teachers ; as barnabas , and simeon that was called niger , and lucius of cyrene , and manaen ; which had been brought up with herod the tetrarch , and saul . as they ministred unto the lord , and fasted , the holy ghost said , separate mee barnabas , and saul for the worke whereunto i have called them . and when they had fasted , and prayed , and laid their hands on them , they sent them away . by which it is manifest , that though they were called by the holy ghost , their calling was declared unto them , and their mission authorized by the particular church of antioch . and that this their calling was to the apostleship , is apparent by that , that they are both called ( acts . . ) apostles : and that it was by vertue of this act of the church of antioch , that they were apostles , s. paul declareth plainly ( rom. . . ) in that hee useth the word , which the holy ghost used at his calling : for hee stileth himself , an apostle separated unto the gospel of god ; alluding to the words of the holy ghost , separate me barnabas and saul●… , &c. but seeing the work of an apostle , was to be a witnesse of the resurrection of christ , a man may here aske , how s. paul , that conversed not with our saviour before his passion , could know he was risen . to which is easily answered , that our saviour himself appeared to him in the way to damascus , from heaven , after his ascension ; and chose him for a vessell to bear his name before the gentiles , and kings , and children of israel ; and consequently ( having seen the lord after his passion ) was a competent witnesse of his resurrection : and as for barnabas , he was a disciple before the passion . it is therefore evident that paul , and barnabas were apostles ; and yet chosen , and authorized ( not by the first apostles alone , but ) by the church of antioch ; as matthias was chosen , and authorized by the church of jerusalem . bishop , a word formed in o●…r language , out of the greek episcopus , signifieth an overseer , or superintendent of any businesse , and particularly a pastor , or shepherd ; and thence by metaphor was taken , not only amongst the jews that were originally shepherds , but also amongst the heathen , to signifie the office of a king , or any other ruler , or guide of people , whether he ruled by laws , or doctrine . and so the apostles were the first christian bishops , instituted by christ himselfe : in which sense the apostleship of judas is called ( acts . . ) his bishoprick . and afterwards , when there were constituted elders in the christian churches , with charge to guide christs flock by their doctrine , and advice ; these elders were also called bishops . timothy was an elder ( which word elder , in the new testament is a name of office , as well as of age ; ) yet he was also a bishop . and bishops were then content with the title of elders . nay s. john himselfe , the apostle beloved of our lord , beginneth his second epistle with these words , the elder to the elect lady . by which it is evident , that bishop , pastor , elder , doctor , that is to say , teacher , were but so many divers names of the same office in the time of the apostles . for there was then no government by coercion , but only by doctrine , and perswading . the kingdome of god was yet to come , in a new world ; so that there could be no authority to compell in any church , till the common-wealth had embraced the christian faith ; and consequently no diversity of authority , though there were diversity of employments . besides these magisteriall employments in the church ; namely , apostles , bishops , elders , pastors , and doctors , whose calling was to proclaim christ to the jews , and infidels , and to direct , and teach those that beleeved we read in the new testament of no other . for by the names of evangelists and prophets , is not signified any office , but severall gifts , by which severall men were profitable to the church : as evangelists , by writing the life and acts of our saviour ; such as were s. matthew and s. iohn apostles , and s. marke and s. luke disciples , and whosoever else wrote of that subject , ( as s. thomas , and s. barnabas are said to have done , though the church have not received the books that have gone under their names : ) and as prophets , by the gift of interpreting the old testament ; and sometimes by declaring their speciall revelations to the church . for neither these gifts , nor the gifts of languages , nor the gift of casting out devils , or of curing other diseases , nor any thing else did make an officer in the church , save onely the due calling and election to the charge of teaching . as the apostles , matthias , paul , and barnabas , were not made by our saviour himself , but were elected by the church , that is , by the assembly of christians ; namely , matthias by the church of jerusalem , and paul , and barnabas by the church of antioch ; so were also the presbyters , and pastors in other cities , elected by the churches of those cities . for proof whereof , let us consider , first , how s. paul proceeded in the ordination of presbyters , in the cities where he had converted men to the christian faith , immediately after he and barnabas had received their apostleship . we read ( acts . . ) that they ordained elders in every church ; which at first sight may be taken for an argument , that they themselves chose , and gave them their authority : but if we confider the originall text , it will be manifest , that they were authorized , and chosen by the assembly of the christians of each city . for the words there are , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , when they had ordained them elders by the holding up of hands in every congregation . now it is well enough known , that in all those cities , the manner of choosing magistrates , and officers , was by plurality of suffrages ; and ( because the ordinary way of distinguishing the affirmative votes from the negatives , was by holding up of hands ) to ordain an officer in any of the cities , was no more but to bring the people together , to elect them by plurality of votes , whether it were by plurality of elevated hands , or by plurality of voices , or plurality of balls , or beans , or small stones , of which every man cast in one , into a vessell marked for the affirmative , or negative ; for divers cities had divers customes in that point . it was therefore the assembly that elected their own elders : the apostles were onely presidents of the assembly to call them together for such election , and to pronounce them elected , and to give them the benediction , which now is called consecration . and for this cause they that were presidents of the assemblies , as ( in the absence of the apostles ) the elders were , were called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and in latin a●…tistites ; which words signifie the principall person of the assembly , whose office was to number the votes , and to declare thereby who was chosen ; and where the votes were equall , to decide the matter in question , by adding his own ; which is the office of a president in councell . and ( because all the churches had their presbyters ordained in the same manner , ) where the word is constitute , ( as titus . . ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for this cause left i thee in crete , that thou shouldest constitute elders in every city , we are to understand the same thing ; namely , that hee should call the faithfull together , and ordain them presbyters by plurality of suffrages . it had been a strange thing , if in a town , where men perhaps had never seen any magistrate otherwise chosen then by an assembly , those of the town becomming christians , should so much as have thought on any other way of election of their teachers , and guides , that is to say , of their presbyters , ( otherwise called bishops , ) then this of plurality of suffrages , intimated by s. paul ( acts . . ) in the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : nor was there ever any choosing of bishops , ( before the emperors found it necessary to regulate them in order to the keeping of the peace amongst them , ) but by the assemblies of the christians in every severall town . the same is also confirmed by the continuall practise even to this day , in the election of the bishops of rome . for if the bishop of any place , had the right of choosing another , to the succession of the pastorall office , in any city , at such time as he went from thence , to plant the same in another place ; much more had he had the right , to appoint his successour in that place , in which he last resided and dyed : and we find not , that ever any bishop of rome appointed his successor . for they were a long time chosen by the people , as we may see by the sedition raised about the election , between damasus , and vrsicinus ; which ammianus marcellinus saith was so great , that iuventius the praefect , unable to keep the peace between them , was forced to goe out of the city ; and that there were above an hundred men found dead upon that occasion in the church it self . and though they afterwards were chosen , first , by the whole clergy of rome , and afterwards by the cardinalls ; yet never any was appointed to the succession by his predecessor . if therefore they pretended no right to appoint their own successors , i think i may reasonably conclude , they had no right to appoint the successors of other bishops , without receiving some new power ; which none could take from the church to bestow on them , but such as had a lawfull authority , not onely to teach , but to command the church ; which none could doe , but the civill soveraign . the word minister in the originall 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifieth one that voluntarily doth the businesse of another man ; and differeth from a servant onely in this , that servants are obliged by their condition , to what is commanded them ; whereas ministers are obliged onely by their undertaking , and bound therefore to no more than that they have undertaken : so that both they that teach the word of god , and they that administer the secular affairs of the church , are both ministers , but they are ministers of different persons . for the pastors of the church , called ( acts . . ) the ministers of the word , are ministers of christ , whose word it is : but the ministery of a deacon , which is called ( verse . of the same chapter ) serving of tables , is a service done to the church , or congregation : so that neither any one man , nor the whole church , could ever of their pastor say , he was their minister ; but of a deacon , whether the charge he undertook were to serve tables , or distribute maintenance to the christians , when they lived in each city on a common stock , or upon collections , as in the first times , or to take a care of the house of prayer , or of the revenue , or other worldly businesse of the church , the whole congregation might properly call him their minister . for their employment , as deacons , was to serve the congregation ; though upon occasion they omitted not to preach the gospel , and maintain the doctrine of christ , every one according to his gifts , as s. steven did ; and both to preach , and baptize , as philip ▪ did : for that philip , which ( act. . . ) preached the gospell at samaria , and ( verse . ) baptized the eunuch , was philip the deacon , not philip the apostle . for it is manifest ( verse . ) that when philip preached in samaria , the apostles were at jerusalem , and ( verse . ) when they heard that samaria had received the word of god , sent peter and iohn to them ; by imposition of whose hands , they that were baptized , ( verse . ) received ( which before by the baptisme of philip they had not received ) the holy ghost . for it was necessary for the conferring of the holy ghost , that their baptisme should be administred , or confirmed by a minister of the word , not by a minister of the church . and therefore to confirm the baptisme of those that philip the deacon had baptized , the apostles sent out of their own number from jerusalem to samaria , peter , and john ; who conferred on them that before were but baptized , those graces that were signs of the holy spirit , which at that time did accompany all true beleevers ; which what they were may be understood by that which s. marke saith ( chap. . . ) these signes follow them that beleeve in my name ; they shall cast out devills , they shall speak with new tongues ; they shall take up serpents , and if they drink any deadly thing , it shall not hurt them ; they shall lay hands on the sick , and they shall recover . this to doe , was it that philip could not give ; but the apostles could , and ( as appears by this place ) effectually did to every man that truly beleeved , and was by a minister of christ himself baptized : which power either christs ministers in this age cannot conferre , or else there are very few true beleevers , or christ hath very few ministérs . that the first deacons were chosen , not by the apostles , but by a congregation of the disciples ; that is , of christian men of all sorts , is manifest out of acts . where we read that the twelve , after the number of disciples was multiplyed , called them together , and having told them , that it was not fit that the apostles should leave the word of god , and serve tables , said unto them ( verse . ) brethren looke you out among you seven men of honest report , full of the holy ghost , and of wisdome , whom we may appoint over this businesse . here it is manifest , that though the apostles declared them elected ; yet the congregation chose them ; which also , ( verse the fift ) is more expressely said , where it is written , that the saying pleased the multitude , and they chose seven , &c. under the old testament , the tribe of levi were onely capable of the priesthood , and other inferiour offices of the church . the land was divided amongst the other tribes ( levi excepted , ) which by the subdivision of the tribe of joseph , into ephraim and manasses , were still twelve . to the tribe of levi were assigned certain cities for their habitation , with the suburbs for their cattell : but for their portion , they were to have the tenth of the fruits of the land of their brethren . again , the priests for their maintenance had the tenth of that tenth , together with part of the oblations , and sacrifices . for god had said to aaron ( numb . . . ) thou shalt have no inheritance in their land , neither shalt thou have any part amongst them , i am thy part , and thine inheritance amongst the children of israel . for god being then king , and having constituted the tribe of levi to be his publique ministers , he allowed them for their maintenance , the publique revenue , that is to say , the part that god had reserved to himself ; which were tythes , and offerings : and that is it which is meant , where god saith , i am thine inheritance . and therefore to the levites might not unfitly be attributed the name of clergy from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifieth lot , or inheritance ; not that they were heirs of the kingdome of god , more than other ; but that gods inheritance , was their maintenance . now seeing in this time god himself was their king , and moses , aaron , and the succeeding high priests were his lieutenants ; it is manifest , that the right of tythes , and offerings was constituted by the civill power . after their rejection of god in the demanding of a king , they enjoyed still the same revenue ; but the right thereof was derived from that , that the kings did never take it from them : for the publique revenue was at the disposing of him that was the publique person ; and that ( till the captivity ) was the king. and again , after the return from the captivity , they paid their tythes as before to the priest. hitherto therefore church livings were determined by the civill soveraign . of the maintenance of our saviour , and his apostles , we read onely they had a purse , ( which was carried by judas iscariot ; ) and , that of the apostles , such as were fisher-men , did sometimes use their trade ; and that when our saviour sent the twelve apostles to preach , he forbad them to carry gold , and silver , and brasse in their purses , for that the workman is worthy of his hire : by which it is probable , their ordinary maintenance was not unsuitable to their employment ; for their employment was ( ver . . ) freely to give , because they had freely received ; and their maintenance was the free gift of those that beleeved the good tyding they carryed about of the coming of the messiah their saviour . to which we may adde , that which was contributed out of gratitude ; by such as our saviour had healed of diseases ; of which are mentioned certain women ( luke . , . ) which had been healed of evill spirits and infirmities ; mary magdalen , out of whom went seven devills ; and ioanna the wife of chuza , herods steward ; and susanna , and many others , which ministred unto him of their substance . after our saviours ascension , the christians of every city lived in common , * upon the mony which was made of the sale of their lands and possessions , and laid down at the feet of the apostles , of good will , not of duty ; for whilest the land remained ( saith s. peter to ananias ( acts . . ) was it not thine ? and after it was sold , was it not in thy power ? which sheweth he needed not have saved his land , nor his money by lying , as not being bound to contribute any thing at all , unlesse he had pleased . and as in the time of the apostles , so also all the time downward , till after constantine the great , we shall find , that the maintenance of the bishops , and pastors of the christian church , was nothing but the voluntary contribution of them that had embraced their doctrine . there was yet no mention of tythes : but such was in the time of constantine , and his sons , the affection of christians to their pastors , as ammianus marcellinus saith ( describing the sedition of damasus and vrsicinus about the bishopricke , ) that it was worth their contention , in that the bishops of those times by the liberality of their flock , and especially of matrons , lived splendidly , were carryed in coaches , and were sumptuous in their fare and apparell . but here may some ask , whether the pastor were then bound to live upon voluntary contribution , as upon almes , for who ( saith s. paul cor. . . ) goeth to war at his own charges ? or who feedeth a flock , and eateth not of the milke of the flock ? and again , doe ye not know that they which minister about holy things , live of the things of the temple ; and they which wait at the altar , partake with the altar ; that is to say , have part of that which is offered at the altar for their maintenance ? and then he concludeth , even so hath the lord appointed , that they which preach the gospel should live of the gospel . from which place may be inferred indeed , that the pastors of the church ought to be maintained by their flocks ; but not that the pastors were to determine , either the quantity , or the kind of their own allowance , and be ( as it were ) their own carvers . their allowance must needs therefore be determined , either by the gratitude , and liberality of every particular man of their flock , or by the whole congregation . by the whole congregation it could not be , because their acts were then no laws : therefore the maintenance of pastors before emperours and civill soveraigns had made laws to settle it , was nothing but benevolence . they that served at the altar lived on what was offered . so may the pastors also take what is offered them by their flock ; but not exact what is not offered . in what court should they sue for it , who had no tribunalls ? or if they had arbitrators amongst themselves , who should execute their judgments , when they had no power to arme their officers ? it remaineth therefore , that there could be no certaire maintenance assigned to any pastors of the church , but by the whole congregation ; and then onely , when their decrees should have the force ( not onely of canons , but also ) of laws ; which laws could not be made , but by emperours , kings , or other civill soveraignes . the right of tythes in moses law , could not be applyed to the then ministers of the gospell ; because moses and the high priests were the civill soveraigns of the people under god , whose kingdom amongst the jews was present ; whereas the kingdome of god by christ is yet to come . hitherto hath been shewn what the pastors of the church are ; what are the points of their commission ( as that they were to preach , to teach , to baptize , to be presidents in their severall congregations ; ) what is ecclesiasticall censure , viz. excommunication , that is to say , in those places where christanity was forbidden by the civill laws , a putting of themselves out of the company of the excommunicate , and where christianity was by the civill law commanded , a putting the ▪ excommunicate out of the congregations of christians ; who elected the pastors and ministers of the church , ( that it was , the congregation ) ; who consecrated and blessed them , ( that it was the pastor ) ; what was their due revenue , ( that it was none but their own possessions , and their own labour , and the voluntary contributions of devout and gratefull christians ) . we are to consider now , what office in the church those persons have , who being civill soveraignes , have embraced also the christian faith. and first , we are to remember , that the right of judging what doctrines are fit for peace , and to be taught the subjects , is in all common-wealths inseparably annexed ( as hath been already proved cha . . ) to the soveraign power civill , whether it be in one man , or in one assembly of men . for it is evident to the meanest capacity , that mens actions are derived from the opinions they have of the good , or evill , which from those actions redound unto themselves ; and consequently , men that are once possessed of an opinion , that their obedience to the soveraign power , will bee more hurtfull to them , than their disobedience , will disobey the laws , and thereby overthrow the common-wealth , and introduce confusion , and civill war ; for the avoiding whereof , all civill government was ordained . and therefore in all common-wealths of the heathen , the soveraigns have had the name of pastors of the people , because there was no subject that could lawfully teach the people , but by their permission and authority . this right of the heathen kings , cannot bee thought taken from them by their conversion to the faith of christ ; who never ordained , that kings for beleeving in him , should be deposed , that is , subjected to any but himself , or ( which is all one ) be deprived of the power necessary for the conservation of peace amongst their subjects , and for their defence against foraign enemies . and therefore christian kings are still the supreme pastors of their people , and have power to ordain what pastors they please , to teach the church , that is , to teach the people committed to their charge . again , let the right of choosing them be ( as before the conversion of kings ) in the church , for so it was in the time of the apostles themselves ( as hath been shewn already in this chapter ) ; even so also the right will be in the civill soveraign , christian. for in that he is a christian , he allowes the teaching ; and in that he is the soveraign ( which is as much as to say , the church by representation , ) the teachers hee elects , are elected by the church . and when an assembly of christians choose their pastor in a christian common-wealth , it is the soveraign that electeth him , because t is done by his authority ; in the same manner , as when a town choose their maior , it is the act of him that hath the soveraign power : for every act done , is the act of him , without whose consent it is invalid . and therefore whatsoever examples may be drawn out of history , concerning the election of pastors , by the people , or by the clergy , they are no arguments against the right of any civill soveraign , because they that elected them did it by his authority . seeing then in every christian common-wealth , the civill soveraign is the supreme pastor , to whose charge the whole flock of his subjects is committed , and consequently that it is by his authority , that all other pastors are made , and have power to teach , and performe all other pastorall offices ; it followeth also , that it is from the civill soveraign , that all other pastors derive their right of teaching , preaching , and other functions pertaining to that office ; and that they are but his ministers ; in the same manner as the magistrates of towns , judges in courts of justice , and commanders of armies , are all but ministers of him that is the magistrate of the whole common-wealth , judge of all causes , and commander of the whole militia , which is alwaies the civill soveraign . and the reason hereof , is not because they that teach , but because they that are to learn , are his subjects . for let it be supposed , that a christian king commit the authority of ordaining pastors in his dominions to another king , ( as divers christian kings allow that power to the pope ; ) he doth not thereby constitute a pastor over himself , nor a soveraign pastor over his people ; for that were to deprive himself of the civill power ; which depending on the opinion men have of their duty to him , and the fear they have of punishment in another world , would depend also on the skill , and loyalty of doctors , who are no lesse subject , not only to ambition , but also to ignorance , than any other sort of men . so that where a stranger hath authority to appoint teachers , it is given him by the soveraign in whose dominions he teacheth . christian doctors are our schoolmasters to christianity ; but kings are fathers of families , and may receive schoolmasters for their subjects from the recommendation of a stranger , but not from the command ; especially when the ill teaching them shall redound to the great and manifest profit of him that recommends them : nor can they be obliged to retain them , longer than it is for the publique good ; the care of which they stand so long charged withall , as they retain any other essentiall right of the soveraignty . if a man therefore should ask a pastor , in the execution of his office , as the chief priests and elders of the people ( mat. . . ) asked our saviour , by what authority dost thou these things , and who gave thee this authority : he can make no other just answer , but that he doth it by the authority of the common-wealth , given him by the king , or assembly that representeth it . all pastors , except the supreme , execute their charges in the right , that is by the authority of the civill soveraign , that is , iure civili . but the king , and every other soveraign , executeth his office of supreme pastor , by immediate authority from god , that is to say , in gods right , or iure divino . and therefore none but kings can put into their titles ( a mark of their submission to god onely ) dei gratiâ rex , &c. bishops ought to say in the beginning of their mandates , by the favour of the kings majesty , bishop of such a diocesse ; or as civill ministers , in his majesties name . for in saying , divinâ providentiâ , which is the same with dei gratiâ , though disguised , they deny to have received their authority from the civill state ; and sliely slip off the collar of their civill subjection , contrary to the unity and defence of the common-wealth . but if every christian soveraign be the supreme pastor of his own subjects , it seemeth that he hath also the authority , not only to preach ( which perhaps no man will deny ; ) but also to baptize , and to administer the sacrament of the lords supper ; and to consecrate both temples , and pastors to gods service ; which most men deny ; partly because they use not to do it ; and partly because the administration of sacraments , and consecration of persons , and places to holy uses , requireth the imposition of such mens hands , as by the like imposition successively from the time of the apostles have been ordained to the like ministery . for proof therefore that christian kings have power to baptize , and to consecrate , i am to render a reason , both why they use not to doe it , and how , without the ordinary ceremony of imposition of hands , they are made capable of doing it , when they will. there is no doubt but any king , in case he were skilfull in the sciences , might by the same right of his office , read lectures of them himself , by which he authorizeth others to read them in the universities . neverthelesse , because the care of the summe of the businesse of the common-wealth taketh up his whole time , it were not convenient for him to apply himself in person to that particular . a king may also if he please , sit in judgment , to hear and determine all manner of causes , as well as give others authority to doe it in his name ; but that the charge that lyeth upon him of command and government , constrain him to bee continually at the helm , and to commit the ministeriall offices to others under him . in the like manner our saviour ( who surely had power to baptize ) baptized none * himselfe , but sent his apostles and disciples to baptize . so also s. paul , by the necessity of preaching in divers and far distant places , baptized few : amongst all the corinthians he baptized only * crispus , cajus , and stephanus ; and the reason was , because his principall * charge was to preach . whereby it is manifest , that the greater charge , ( such as is the government of the church , ) is a dispensation for the lesse . the reason therefore why christian kings use not to baptize , is evident , and the same , for which at this day there are few baptized by bishops , and by the pope fewer . and as concerning imposition of hands , whether it be needfull , for the authorizing of a king to baptize , and consecrate , we may consider thus . imposition of hands , was a most ancient publique ceremony amongst the jews , by which was designed , and made certain , the person , or other thing intended in a mans prayer , blessing , sacrifice , consecration , condemnation , or other speech . so jacob in blessing the children of joseph ( gen. . . ) laid his right hand on ephraim the younger , and his left hand on manasseh the first born ; and this he did wittingly ( though they were so presented to him by joseph , as he was forced in doing it to stretch out his arms acrosse ) to design to whom he intended the greater blessing . so also in the sacrificing of the burnt offering , aaron is commanded [ exod. . . ] to lay his hands on the head of the bullock ; and [ ver . . ] to lay his hand on the head of the ramme . the same is also said again , levit. . . & . . likewise moses when he ordained joshua to be captain of the israelites , that is , consecrated him to gods service , [ numb . . . ] laid his hands upon him , and gave him his charge , designing , and rendring certain , who it was they were to obey in war. and in the consecration of the levites [ numb . . . ] god commanded that the children of israel should put their hands upon the levites . and in the condemnation of him that had blasphemed the lord [ levit. . . ) god commanded that all that heard him should lay their hands on his head , and that all the congregation should stone him . and why should they only that heard him , lay their hands upon him , and not rather a priest , levite , or other minister of justice , but that none else were able to design , and demonstrate to the eyes of the congregation , who it was that had blasphemed , and ought to die ? and to design a man , or any other thing , by the hand to the eye , is lesse subject to mistake , than when it is done to the eare by a name . and so much was this ceremony observed , that in blessing the whole congregation at once , which cannot be done by laying on of hands , yet aaron [ levit. . . ] did lift up his hand towards the people when he blessed them . and we read also of the like ceremony of consecration of temples amongst the heathen , as that the priest laid his hands on some post of the temple , all the while he was uttering the words of consecration . so naturall it is to design any individuall thing , rather by the hand , to assure the eyes , than by words to inform the eare in matters of gods publique service . this ceremony was not therefore new in our saviours time . for jairus [ mark . . ] whose daughter was sick , besought our saviour ( not to heal her , but ) to ay h is hands upon her , that shee might bee healed . and [ matth. . . ] they brought unto him little children , that hee should put his hands on them , and pray . according to this ancient rite , the apostles , and presbyters , and the presbytery it self , laid hands on them whom they ordained pastors , and withall prayed for them that they might receive the holy ghost ; and that not only once , but sometimes oftner , when a new occasion was presented : but the end was still the same , namely a punctuall , and religious designation of the person , ordained either to the pastorall charge in general , or to a particular mission ▪ so [ act. . . ] the apostles prayed , and laid their hands on the seven deacons ; which was done , not to give them the holy ghost , ( for they were full of the holy ghost before they were chosen , as appeareth imdiately before , verse . ) but to design them to that office. and after philip the deacon had converted certain persons in samaria , peter and john went down [ act . . ] and laid their hands on them , and they received the holy ghost . and not only an apostle , but a presbyter had this power : for s. paul adviseth timothy [ tim. . . ] lay hands suddenly on no man ; that is , designe no man rashly to the office of a pastor . the whole presbytery laid their hands on timothy , as we read tim. . . but this is to be understood , as that some did it by the appointment of the presbytery , and most likely their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or prolocutor , which it may be was st. paul himself . for in his epist. to tim. ver . . he saith to him , stirre up the gift of god which is in thee , by the laying on of my hands : where note by the way , that by the holy ghost , is not meant the third person in the trinity , but the gifts necessary to the pastorall office. we read also , that st. paul had imposition of hands twice ; once from ananias at damascus [ acts . , . ] at the time of his baptisme ; and again [ acts . . ] at antioch , when he was first sent out to preach . the use then of this ceremony considered in the ordination of pastors , was to design the person to whom they gave such power . but if there had been then any christian , that had had the power of teaching before ; the baptizing of him , that is , the making him a christian , had given him no new power , but had onely caused him to preach true doctrine , that is , to use his power aright ; and therefore the imposition of hands had been unnecessary ; baptisme it selfe had been sufficient . but every soveraign , before christianity , had the power of teaching , and ordaining teachers ; and therefore christianity gave them no new right , but only directed them in the way of teaching truth ; and consequently they needed no imposition of hands ( besides that which is done in baptisme ) to authorize them to exercise any part of the pastorall function , as namely , to baptize , and consecrate . and in the old testament , though the priest only had right to consecrate , during the time that the soveraignty was in the high priest ; yet it was not so when the soveraignty was in the king : for we read [ kings . ] that solomon blessed the people , consecrated the temple , and pronounced that publique prayer , which is the pattern now for consecration of all christian churches , and chappels : whereby it appears , he had not only the right of ecclesiasticall government ; but also of exercising ecclesiasticall functions . from this consolidation of the right politique , and ecclesiastique in christian soveraigns , it is evident , they have all manner of power over their subjects , that can be given to man , for the government of mens externall actions , both in policy , and religion ; and may make such laws , as themselves shall judge fittest , for the government of their own subjects , both as they are the common-wealth , and as they are the church : for both state , and church are the same men . if they please therefore , they may ( as many christian kings now doe ) commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the pope ; but then the pope is in that point subordinate to them , and exerciseth that charge in anothers dominion iure civili , in the right of the civill soveraign ; not iure divino , in gods right ; and may therefore be discharged of that office , when the soveraign for the good of his subjects shall think it necessary . they may also if they please , commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor , or to an assembly of pastors ; and give them what power over the church , or one over another , they think most convenient ; and what titles of honor , as of bishops , archbishops , priests , or presbyters , they will ; and make such laws for their maintenance , either by tithes , or otherwise , as they please , so they doe it out of a sincere conscience , of which god onely is the judge . it is the civill soveraign , that is to appoint judges , and interpreters of the canonicall scriptures ; for it is he that maketh them laws . it is he also that giveth strength to excommunications ; which but for such laws and punishments , as may humble obstinate libertines , and reduce them to union with the rest of the church , would bee contemned . in summe , he hath the supreme power in all causes , as well ecclesiasticall , as civill , as far as concerneth actions , and words , for those onely are known , and may be accused ; and of that which cannot be accused , there is no judg at all , but god , that knoweth the heart . and these rights are incident to all soveraigns , whether monarchs , or assemblies : for they that are the representants of a christian people , are representants of the church : for a church , and a common-wealth of christian people , are the same thing . though this that i have here said , and in other places of this book , seem cleer enough for the asserting of the supreme ecclesiasticall power to christian soveraigns ; yet because the pope of romes challenge to that power universally , hath been maintained chiefly , and i think as strongly as is possible , by cardinall bellarmine , in his controversie de summo pontifice ; i have thought it necessary , as briefly as i can , to examine the grounds , and strength of his discourse . of five books he hath written of this subject , the first containeth three questions : one , which is simply the best government , monarchy , aristocracy , or democracy ; and concludeth for neither , but for a government mixt of all three : another , which of these is the best government of the church ; and concludeth for the mixt , but which should most participate of monarchy : the third , whether in this mixt monarchy , st. peter had the place of monarch . concerning his first conclusion , i have already sufficiently proved ( chapt . . ) that all governments , which men are bound to obey , are simple , and absolute . in monarchy there is but one man supreme ; and all other men that have any kind of power in the state , have it by his commission , during his pleasure ; and execute it in his name : and in aristocracy , and democracy , but one supreme assembly , with the same power that in monarchy belongeth to the monarch , which is not a mixt , but an absolute soveraignty . and of the three sorts , which is the best , is not to be disputed , where any one of them is already established ; but the present ought alwaies to be preferred , maintained , and accounted best ; because it is against both the law of nature , and the divine positive law , to doe any thing tending to the subversion thereof . besides , it maketh nothing to the power of any pastor , ( unlesse he have the civill soveraignty , ) what kind of government is the best ; because their calling is not to govern men by commandement , but to teach them , and perswade them by arguments , and leave it to them to consider , whether they shall embrace , or reject the doctrine taught . for monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy , do mark out unto us three sorts of soveraigns , not of pastors ; or , as we may say , three sorts of masters of families , not three sorts of schoolmasters for their children . and therefore the second conclusion , concerning the best form of government of the church , is nothing to the question of the popes power without his own dominions : for in all other common-wealths his power ( if hee have any at all ) is that of the schoolmaster onely , and not of the master of the family . for the third conclusion , which is , that st. peter was monarch of the church , he bringeth for his chiefe argument the place of s. matth. ( chap. . , . ) thou art peter , and upon this rock i will build my church , &c. and i will give thee the keyes of heaven ; whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth , shall be bound in heaven , and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth , shall be loosed in heaven . which place well considered , proveth no more , but that the church of christ hath for foundation one onely article ; namely , that which peter in the name of all the apostles professing , gave occasion to our saviour to speak the words here cited ; which that wee may cleerly understand , we are to consider , that our saviour preached by himself , by john baptist , and by his apostles , nothing but this article of faith , that he was the christ ; all other articles requiring faith no otherwise , than as founded on that . john began first , ( mat. . . ) preaching only this , the kingdome of god is at hand . then our saviour himself ( mat. . . ) preached the same : and to his twelve apostles , when he gave them their commission ( mat. . . ) there is no mention of preaching any other article but that . this was the fundamentall article , that is the foundation of the churches faith. afterwards the apostles being returned to him , he asketh them all , ( mat. . . ) not peter onely , who men said he was ; and they answered , that some said he was iohn the baptist , some elias , and others ieremias , or one of the prophets : then ( ver . . ) he asked them all again , ( not peter onely ) whom say yee that i am ? therefore s. peter answered ( for them all ) thou art christ , the son of the living god ; which i said is the foundation of the faith of the whole church ; from which our saviour takes the occasion of saying , vpon this stone i will build my church : by which it is manifest , that by the foundation-stone of the church , was meant the fundamentall article of the churches faith. but why then ( will some object ) doth our saviour interpose these words , thou art peter ? if the originall of this text had been rigidly translated , the reason would easily have appeared : we are therefore to consider , that the apostle simon , was surnamed stone , ( which is the signification of the syriacke word cephas , and of the greek word petrus ) . our saviour therefore after the confession of that fundamentall article , alluding to his name , said ( as if it were in english ) thus , thou art stone , and upon this stone i will build my church : which is as much as to say , this article , that i am the christ , is the foundation of all the faith i require in those that are to bee members of my church : neither is this allusion to a name , an unusuall thing in common speech : but it had been a strange , and obscure speech , if our saviour intending to build his church on the person of s. peter , had said , thou art a stone , and upon this stone i will build my church , when it was so obvious without ambiguity to have said , i will build my church on thee ; and yet there had been still the same allusion to his name . and for the following words , i will give thee the keyes of heaven , &c. it is no more than what our saviour gave also to all the rest of his disciples [ matth. . . ] whatsoever yee shall bind on earth , shall be bound in heaven . and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth , shall be loosed in heaven . but howsoever this be interpreted , there is no doubt but the power here granted belongs to all supreme pastors ; such as are all christian civill soveraignes in their own dominions . in so much , as if st. peter , or our saviour himself had converted any of them to beleeve him , and to acknowledge his kingdome ; yet because his kingdome is not of this world , he had left the supreme care of converting his subjects to none but him ; or else hee must have deprived him of the soveraignty , to which the right of teaching is inseparably annexed . and thus much in refutation of his first book , wherein hee would prove st. peter to have been the monarch universall of the church , that is to say , of all the christians in the world . the second book hath two conclusions : one , that s. peter was bishop of rome , and there dyed : the other , that the popes of rome are his successors . both which have been disputed by others . but supposing them true ; yet if by bishop of rome , bee understood either the monarch of the church , or the supreme pastor of it ; not silvester , but constantine ( who was the first christian emperour ) was that bishop ; and as constantine , so all other christian emperors were of right supreme bishops of the roman empire ; i say of the roman empire , not of all christendome : for other christian soveraigns had the same right in their severall territories , as to an office essentially adhaerent to their soveraignty . which shall serve for answer to his second book . in the third book , he handleth the question whether the pope be antichrist . for my part , i see no argument that proves he is so , in that sense the scripture useth the name : nor will i take any argument from the quality of antichrist , to contradict the authority he exerciseth , or hath heretofore exercised in the dominions of any other prince , or state. it is evident that the prophets of the old testament foretold , and the jews expected a messiah , that is , a christ , that should re-establish amongst them the kingdom of god , which had been rejected by them in the time of samuel , when they required a king after the manner of other nations . this expectation of theirs , made them obnoxious to the imposture of all such , as had both the ambition to attempt the attaining of the kingdome , and the art to deceive the people by counterfeit miracles , by hypocriticall life , or by orations and doctrine plausible . our saviour therefore , and his apostles forewarned men of false prophets , and of false christs . false christs , are such as pretend to be the christ , but are not , and are called properly antichrists , in such sense , as when there happeneth a schisme in the church by the election of two popes , the one calleth the other antipapa , or the false pope . and therefore antichrist in the proper signification hath two essentiall marks ; one , that he denyeth jesus to be christ ; and another that he professeth himselfe to bee christ. the first mark is set down by s. iohn in his epist. . ch . . ver . every spirit that confesseth not that iesus christ is come in the flesh , is not of god ; and this is the spirit of antichrist . the other mark is expressed in the words of our saviour , ( mat. . . ) many shall come in my name , saying , i am christ ; and again , if any man shall say unto you , l●…e , here is christ , there is christ , beleeve it not . and therefore antichrist must be a false christ , that is , some one of them that shall pretend themselves to be christ. and out of these two marks , to deny iesus to be the christ , and to affirm himselfe to be the christ , it followeth , that he must also be an adversary of iesus the true christ , which is another usuall signification of the word antichrist . but of these many antichrists , there is one speciall one , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the antichrist , or antichrist definitely , as one certaine person ; not indefinitely an antichrist . now seeing the pope of rome , neither pretendeth himself , nor denyeth jesus to bee the christ , i perceive not how he can be called antichrist ; by which word is not meant , one that falsely pretendeth to be his lieutenant , or vicar generall , but to be hee . there is also some mark of the time of this speciall antichrist , as ( mat. . . ) when that abominable destroyer , spoken of by daniel , * shall stand in the holy place , and such tribulation as was not since the beginning of the world , nor ever shall be again , insomuch as if it were to last long , ( ver . . ) no flesh could be saved ; but for the elects sake those days shall be shortened ( made fewer ) . but that tribulation is not yet come ; for it is to be followed immediately ( ver . . ) by a darkening of the sun and moon , a falling of the stars , a concussion of the heavens , and the glorious coming again of our saviour in the cloudes . and therefore the antichrist is not yet come ; whereas , many popes are both come and gone . it is true , the pope in taking upon him to give laws to all christian kings , and nations , usurpeth a kingdome in this world , which christ took not on him : but he doth it not as christ , but as for christ , wherein there is nothing of the antichrist . in the fourth book , to prove the pope to be the supreme judg in all questions of faith and manners , ( which is as much as to be the absolute monarch of all christians in the world , ) he bringeth three propositions : the first , that his judgments are infallible : the second , that he can make very laws , and punish those that observe them not : the third , that our saviour conferred all jurisdiction ecclesiasticall on the pope of rome . for the infallibility of his judgments , he alledgeth the scriptures : and first , that of luke . . simon , simon , satan hath desired you that hee may sist you as wheat ; but i have prayed for thee , that thy faith faile not ; and when thou art converted , strengthen thy thy brethren . this , according to bellarmines exposition , is , that christ gave here to simon peter two priviledges : one , that neither his faith should fail , nor the faith of any of his successors : the other , that neither he , nor any of his successors should ever define any point concerning faith , or manners erroneously , or contrary to the definition of a former pope : which is a strange , and very much strained interpretation . but he that with attention readeth that chapter , shall find there is no place in the whole scripture , that maketh more against the popes authority , than this very place . the priests and scribes seeking to kill our saviour at the passeover , and judas possessed with a resolution to betray him , and the day of killing the passeover being come , our saviour celebrated the same with his apostles , which he said , till the kingdome of god was come hee would doe no more ; and withall told them , that one of them was to betray him : hereupon they questioned , which of them it should be ; and withall ( seeing the next passeover their master would celebrate should be when he was king ) entred into a contention , who should then be the greatest man. our saviour therefore told them , that the kings of the nations had dominion over their subjects , and are called by a name ( in hebrew ) that signifies bountifull ; but i cannot be so to you , you must endeavour to serve one another ; i ordain you a kingdome , but it is such as my father hath ordained mee ; a kingdome that i am now to purchase with my blood , and not to possesse till my second coming ; then yee shall eat and drink at my table , and sit on thrones , judging the twelve tribes of israel : and then addressing himself to st. peter , he saith , simon , simon , satan seeks by suggesting a present domination , to weaken your faith of the future ; but i have prayed for thee , that thy faith shall not fail ; thou therefore ( note this , ) being converted , and understanding my kingdome as of another world , confirm the same faith in thy brethren : to which s. peter answered ( as one that no more expected any authority in this world ) lord i am ready to goe with thee , not onely to prison , but to death . whereby it is manifest , s. peter had not onely no jurisdiction given him in this world , but a charge to teach all the other apostles , that they also should have none . and for the infallibility of st. peters sentence definitive in matter of faith , there is no more to be attributed to it out of this text , than that peter should continue in the beleef of this point , namely , that christ should come again , and possesse the kingdome at the day of judgement ; which was not given by this text to all his successors ; for wee see they claime it in the world that now is . the second place is that of matth. . thou art peter , and upon this rocke i will build my church , and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it . by which ( as i have already shewn in this chapter ) is proved no more , than that the gates of hell shall not prevail against the confession of peter , which gave occasion to that speech ; namely this , that iesus is christ the sonne of god. the third text is iohn . ver . , . feed my sheep ; which contains no more but a commission of teaching : and if we grant the rest of the apostles to be contained in that name of sheep ; then it is the supreme power of teaching : but it was onely for the time that there were no christian soveraigns already possessed of that supremacy . but i have already proved , that christian soveraignes are in their owne dominions the supreme pastors , and instituted thereto , by vertue of their being baptized , though without other imposition of hands . for such imposition being a ceremony of designing the person , is needlesse , when hee is already designed to the power of teaching what doctrine he will , by his institution to an absolute power over his subjects . for as i have proved before , soveraigns are supreme teachers ( in generall ) by their office ; and therefore oblige themselves ( by their baptisme ) to teach the doctrine of christ : and when they suffer others to teach their people , they doe it at the perill of their own souls ; for it is at the hands of the heads of families that god will require the account of the instruction of his children and servants . it is of abraham himself , not of a hireling , that god saith ( gen. . . ) i know him that he will command his children , and his houshold after him , that they keep the way of the lord , and do justice and judgement . the fourth place is that of exod. . . thou shalt put in the breastplate of iudgment , the vrim and the thummin : which hee saith is interpreted by the septuagint 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , evidence and truth : and thence concludeth , god had given evidence , and truth , ( which is almost infallibility , ) to the high priest. but be it evidence and truth it selfe that was given ; or be it but admonition to the priest to endeavour to inform himself cleerly , and give judgment uprightly ; yet in that it was given to the high priest , it was given to the civill soveraign : for such next under god was the high priest in the the common-wealth of israel ; and is an argument for evidence and truth , that is , for the ecclesiasticall supremacy of civill soveraigns over their own subjects , against the pretended power of the pope . these are all the texts hee bringeth for the infallibility of the judgement of the pope , in point of faith. for the infallibility of his judgment concerning manners , hee bringeth one text , which is that of iohn . . when the spirit of truth is come , hee will lead you into all truth : where ( saith he ) by all truth , is meant , at least , all truth necessary to salvation . but with this mitigation , he attributeth no more infallibility to the pope , than to any man that professeth christianity , and is not to be damned : for if any man 〈◊〉 in any point , wherein not to erre is necessary to salvation , it is impossible he should be saved ; for that onely is necessary to salvation , without which to be saved is impossible . what points these are , i shall declare out of the scripture in the chapter following . in this place i say no more , but that though it were granted , the pope could not possibly teach any error at all , yet doth not this entitle him to any jurisdiction in the dominions of another prince , unlesse we shall also say , a man is obliged in conscience to set on work upon all occasions the best workman , even then also when he hath formerly promised his work to another . besides the text , he argueth from reason , thus . if the pope could erre in necessaries , then christ hath not sufficiently provided for the churches salvation ; because he hath commanded her to follow the popes directions . but this reason is invalid , unlesse he shew when , and where christ commanded that , or took at all any notice of a pope : nay granting whatsoever was given to s. peter , was given to the pope : yet seeing there is in the scripture no command to any man to obey st. peter , no man can bee just , that obeyeth him , when his commands are contrary to those of his lawfull soveraign . lastly , it hath not been declared by the church , nor by the pope himselfe , that he is the civill soveraign of all the christians in the world ; and therefore all christians are not bound to acknowledge his jurisdiction in point of manners . for the civill soveraignty , and supreme judicature in controversies of manners , are the same thing : and the makers of civill laws , are not onely declarers , but also makers of the justice , and injustice of actions ; there being nothing in mens manners that makes them righteous , or unrighteous , but their conformity with the law of the soveraign . and therefore when the pope challengeth supremacy in controversies of manners , hee teacheth men to disobey the civill soveraign ; which is an erroneous doctrine , contrary to the many precepts of our saviour and his apostles , delivered to us in the scripture . to prove the pope has power to make laws , he alledgeth many places ; as first , deut. . . the man that will doe presumptuously , and will not he arken unto the priest , ( that standeth to minister there before the lord thy god , or unto the iudge , ) even that man shall die , and thou shalt put away the evill from israel . for answer whereunto , we are to remember that the high priest ( next and immediately under god ) was the civill soveraign ; and all judges were to be constituted by him . the words alledged sound therefore thus . the man that will presume to disobey the civill soveraign for the time being , or any of his officers in the execution of their places , that man shall die , &c. which is cleerly for the civill soveraignty , against the universall power of the pope . secondly , he alledgeth that of matth. . whatsoever yee shall bind , &c. and interpreteth it for such binding as is attributed ( matth. . . ) to the scribes and pharisees , they bind heavy burthens , and grievous to be born , and lay them on mens shoulders ; by which is meant ( he sayes ) making of laws ; and concludes thence , that the pope can make laws . but this also maketh onely for the legislative power of civill soveraigns : for the scribes , and pharisees sat in moses chaire , but moses next under god was soveraign of the people of israel : and therefore our saviour commanded them to doe all that they should say , but not all that they should do . that is , to obey their laws , but not follow their example . the third place , is iohn . . feed my sheep ; which is not a power to make laws , but a command to teach . making laws belongs to the lord of the family ; who by his owne discretion chooseth his chaplain , as also a schoolmaster to teach his children . the fourth place iohn . . is against him . the words are , as my father sent me , so send i you . but our saviour was sent to redeeem ( by his death ) such as should beleeve ; and by his own , and his apostles preaching to prepare them for their entrance into his kingdome ; which he himself saith , is not of this world , and hath taught us to pray for the coming of it hereafter , though hee refused ( acts . , . ) to tell his apostles when it should come ; and in which , when it comes , the twelve apostles shall sit on twelve thrones ( every one perhaps as high as that of st. peter ) to judge the twelve tribes of israel . seeing then god the father sent not our saviour to make laws in this present world , wee may conclude from the text , that neither did our saviour send s. peter to make laws here , but to perswade men to expect his second comming with a stedfast faith ; and in the mean time , if subjects , to obey their princes ; and if princes , both to beleeve it themselves , and to do their best to make their subjects doe the same ; which is the office of a bishop . therefore this place maketh most strongly for the joining of the ecclesiasticall supremacy to the civill soveraignty , contrary to that which cardinall bellarmine alledgeth it for . the fift place is acts . . it hath seemed good to the holy spirit , and to us , to lay upon you no greater burden , than these necessary things , that yee abstain from meats offered to idoles , and from bloud , and from things strangled , and from fornication . here hee notes the word laying of burdens for the legislative power . but who is there , that reading this text , can say , this stile of the apostles may not as properly be used in giving counsell , as in making laws ? the stile of a law is , vve command : but , vve think good , is the ordinary stile of them , that but give advice ; and they lay a burthen that give advice , though it bee conditionall , that is , if they to whom they give it , will attain their ends : and such is the burthen , of abstaining from things strangled , and from bloud ; not absolute , but in case they will not erre . i have shewn before ( chap. . ) that law , is distinguished from counsell , in this , that the reason of a law , is taken from the designe , and benefit of him that prescribeth it ; but the reason of a counsell , from the designe , and benefit of him , to whom the counsell is given . but here , the apostles aime onely at the benefit of the converted gentiles , namely their salvation ; not at their own benefit ; for having done their endeavour , they shall have their reward , whether they be obeyed , or not . and therefore the acts of this councell , were not laws , but counsells . the sixt place is that of rom. . let every soul be subject to the higher powers , for there is no power but of god ; which is meant , he saith not onely of secular , but also of ecclesiasticall princes . to which i answer , first , that there are no ecclesiasticall princes but those that are also civill soveraignes ; and their principalities exceed not the compasse of their civill soveraignty ; without those bounds though they may be received for doctors , they cannot be acknowledged for princes . for if the apostle had meant , we should be subject both to our own princes , and also to the pope , he had taught us a doctrine , which christ himself hath told us is impossible , namely , to serve two masters . and though the apostle say in another place , i write these things being absent , lest being present i should use sharpnesse , according to the power which the lord hath given me ; it is not , that he challenged a power either to put to death , imprison , banish , whip , or fine any of them , which are punishments ; but onely to excommunicate , which ( without the civill power ) is no more but a leaving of their company , and having no more to doe with them , than with a heathen man , or a publican ; which in many occasions might be a greater pain to the excommunicant , than to the excommunicate . the seventh place is cor. . . shall i come unto you with a rod , or in love , and the spirit of lenity ? but here again , it is not the power of a magistrate to punish offenders , that is meant by a rod ; but onely the power of excommunication , which is not in its owne nature a punishment , but onely a denouncing of punishment , that christ shall inflict , when he shall be in possession of his kingdome , at the day of judgment . nor then also shall it bee properly a punishment , as upon a subject that hath broken the law ; but a revenge , as upon an enemy , or revolter , that denyeth the right of our saviour to the kingdome : and therefore this proveth not the legislative power of any bishop , that has not also the civill power . the eighth place is , timothy . . a bishop must be the husband but of one wife , vigilant , sober , &c. which he saith was a law. i thought that none could make a law in the church , but the monarch of the the church , st. peter . but suppose this precept made by the authority of st. peter ; yet i see no reason why to call it a law , rather than an advice , seeing timothy was not a subject , but a disciple of s. paul ; nor the flock under the charge of timothy , his subjects in the kingdome , but his scholars in the schoole of christ : if all the precepts he giveth timothy , be laws , why is not this also a law , drink no longer water , but use a little wine for thy healths sake ? and why are not also the precepts of good physitians , so many laws ? but that it is not the imperative manner of speaking , but an absolute subjection to a person , that maketh his precepts laws . in like manner , the ninth place , tim. . . against an elder receive not an accusation , but before two or three vvitnesses , is a wise precept , but not a law. the tenth place is , luke . . he that heareth you , heareth mee ; and he that despiseth you , despiseth me . and there is no doubt , but he that despiseth the counsell of those that are sent by christ , despiseth the counsell of christ himself . but who are those now that are sent by christ , but such as are ordained pastors by lawfull authority ? and who are lawfully ordained , that are not ordained by the soveraign pastor ? and who is ordained by the soveraign pastor in a christian common-wealth , that is not ordained by the authority of the soveraign thereof ? out of this place therefore it followeth , that he which heareth his soveraign being a christian , heareth christ ; and hee that despiseth the doctrine which his king being a christian , authorizeth , despiseth the doctrine of christ ( which is not that which bellarmine intendeth here to prove , but the contrary ) . but all this is nothing to a law. nay more , a christian king , as a pastor , and teacher of his subjects , makes not thereby his doctrines laws . he cannot oblige men to beleeve ; though as a civill soveraign he may make laws suitable to his doctrine , which may oblige men to certain actions , and sometimes to such as they would not otherwise do , and which he ought not to command ; and yet when they are commanded , they are laws ; and the externall actions done in obedience to them , without the inward approbation , are the actions of the soveraign , and not of the subject , which is in that case but as an instrument , without any motion of his owne at all ; because god hath commanded to obey them . the eleventh , is every place , where the apostle for counsell , putteth some word , by which men use to signifie command ; or calleth the following of his counsell , by the name of obedience . and therefore they are alledged out of cor. . . i commend you for keeping my precepts as i delivered them to you . the greek is , i commend you for keeping those things i delivered to you , as i delivered them . which is far from signifying that they were laws , or any thing else , but good counsell . and that of . thess. . . you know what commandements we gave you : where the greek word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , equivalent to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , what wee delivered to you , as in the place next before alledged , which does not prove the traditions of the apostles , to be any more than counsells ; though as is said in the verse , he that despiseth them , despiseth not man , but god : for our saviour himself came not to judge , that is , to be king in this world ; but to sacrifice himself for sinners , and leave doctors in his church , to lead , not to drive men to christ , who never accepteth forced actions , ( which is all the law produceth ; ) but the inward conversion of the heart ; which is not the work of laws , but of counsell , and doctrine . and that of thess. . . if any man obey not our word by this epistle , note that man , and have no company with him , that he may bee ashamed : where from the word obey , he would inferre , that this epistle was a law to the thessalonians . the epistles of the emperours were indeed laws . if therefore the epistle of s. paul were also a law , they were to obey two masters . but the word obey , as it is in the greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , signifieth hearkning to , or putting in practice , not onley that which is commanded by him that has right to punish , but also that which is delivered in a way of counsell for our good ; and therefore st. paul does not bid kill him that disobeys , nor beat , nor imprison , nor amerce him , which legislators may all do ; but avoid his company , that he may bee ashamed : whereby it is evident , it was not the empire of an apostle , but his reputation amongst the faithfull , which the christians stood in awe of . the last place is that of heb. . . obey your leaders , and submit your selves to them , for they watch for your souls , as they that must give account : and here also is intended by obedience , a following of their counsell : for the reason of our obedience , is not drawn from the will and command of our pastors , but from our own benefit , as being the salvation of our souls they watch for , and not for the exaltation of their own power , and authority . if it were meant here , that all they teach were laws , then not onely the pope , but every pastor in his parish should have legislative power . again , they that are bound to obey , their pastors , have no power to examine their commands . what then shall wee say to st. iohn who bids us ( epist. chap. . ver . . ) not to beleeve every spirit , but to try the spirits whether they are of god , because many false prophets are gone out into the world ? it is therefore manifest , that wee may dispute the doctrine of our pastors ; but no man can dispute a law. the commands of civill soveraigns are on all sides granted to be laws : if any else can make a law besides himselfe , all common-wealth , and consequently all peace , and justice must cease ; which is contrary to all laws , both divine and humane . nothing therefore can be drawn from these , or any other places of scripture , to prove the decrees of the pope , where he has not also the civill soveraignty , to be laws . the last point hee would prove , is this , that our saviour christ has committed ecclesiasticall iurisdiction immediately to none but the pope . wherein he handleth not the question of supremacy between the pope and christian kings , but between the pope and other bishops . and first , he sayes it is agreed , that the jurisdiction of bishops , is at least in the generall de iure divino , that is , in the right of god ; for which he alledges s. paul , ephes. . . where hee sayes , that christ after his ascension into heaven , gave gifts to men , some apostles , some prophets , and some evangelists , and some pastors , and some teachers and thence inferres , they have indeed their jurisdiction in gods right ; but will not grant they have it immediately from god , but derived through the pope . but if a man may be said to have his jurisdiction de jure divino , and yet not immediately ; what lawfull jurisdiction , though but civill , is there in a christian common-wealth , that is not also de jure divino ? for christian kings have their civill power from god immediately ; and the magistrates under him exercise their severall charges in vertue of his commission ; wherein that which they doe , is no lesse de jure divino mediato , than that which the bishops doe , in vertue of the popes ordination . all lawfull power is of god , immediately in the supreme governour , and mediately in those that have authority under him : so that either hee must grant every constable in the state , to hold his office in the right of god ; or he must not hold that any bishop holds his so , besides the pope himselfe . but this whole dispute , whether christ left the jurisdiction to the pope onely , or to other bishops also , if considered out of those places where the pope has the civill soveraignty , is a contention de lana caprina : for none of them ( where they are not soveraigns ) has any jurisdiction at all . for jurisdiction is the power of hearing and determining causes between man and man ; and can belong to none , but him that hath the power to prescribe the rules of right and wrong ; that is , to make laws ; and with the sword of justice to compell men to obey his decisions , pronounced either by himself , or by the judges he ordaineth thereunto ; which none can lawfully do , but the civill soveraign . therefore when he alledgeth out of the of luke , that our saviour called his disciples together , and chose twelve of them which he named apostles , he proveth that he elected them ( all , except matthias , paul and barnabas , ) and gave them power and command to preach , but not to judge of causes between man and man : for that is a power which he refused to take upon himselfe , saying , who made me a iudge , or a divider , amongst you ? and in another place , my kingdome is not of this world . but hee that hath not the power to hear , and determine causes between man and man , cannot be said to have any jurisdiction at all . and yet this hinders not , but that our saviour gave them power to preach and baptize in all parts of the world , supposing they were not by their own lawfull soveraign forbidden : for to our own soveraigns christ himself , and his apostles , have in sundry places expressely commanded us in all things to be obedient . the arguments by which he would prove , that bishops receive their jurisdiction from the pope ( seeing the pope in the dominions of other princes hath no jurisdiction himself , ) are all in vain . yet because they prove , on the contrary , that all bishops receive jurisdiction when they have it from their civill soveraigns , i will not omit the recitall of them . the first , is from numbers . where moses not being able alone to undergoe the whole burthen of administring the affairs of the people of israel , god commanded him to choose seventy elders , and took part of the spirit of moses , to put it upon those seventy elders : by which is understood , not that god weakned the spirit of moses , for that had not eased him at all , but that they had all of them their authority from him ; wherein he doth truly , and ingenuously interpret that place . but seeing moses had the entire soveraignty in the common-wealth of the jews , it is manifest , that it is thereby signified , that they had their authority from the civill soveraign : and therefore that place proveth , that bishops in every christian common-wealth have their authority from the civill soveraign ; and from the pope in his own territories only , and not in the territories of any other state. the second argument , is from the nature of monarchy ; wherein all authority is in one man , and in others by derivation from him : but the government of the church , he says , is monarchicall . this also makes for christian monarchs . for they are really monarchs of their own people ; that is , of their own church ( for the church is the same thing with a christian people ; ) whereas the power of the pope , though hee were s. peter , is neither monarchy , nor hath any thing of archicall , nor craticall , but onely of didacticall ; for god accepteth not a forced , but a willing obedience . the third , is , from that the sea of s. peter is called by s. cyprian , the head , the source , the roote , the sun , from whence the authority of bishops is derived . but by the law of nature ( which is a better principle of right and wrong , than the word of any doctor that is but a man ) the civill soveraign in every common-wealth , is the head , the source , the root , and the sun , from which all jurisdiction is derived . and therefore the jurisdiction of bishops , is derived from the civill soveraign . the fourth , is taken from the inequality of their jurisdictions : for if god ( saith he ) had given it them immediately , he had given aswell equality of jurisdiction , as of order : but wee see , some are bishops but of own town , some of a hundred towns , and some of many whole provinces ; which differences were not determined by the command of god ; their jurisdiction therefore is not of god , but of man ; and one has a greater , another a lesse , as it pleaseth the prince of the church . which argument , if he had proved before , that the pope had had an universall jurisdiction over all christians , had been for his purpose . but seeing that hath not been proved , and that it is notoriously known , the large jurisdiction of the pope was given him by those that had it , that is , by the emperours of rome , ( for the patriarch of constantinople , upon the same title , namely , of being bishop of the capitall city of the empire , and seat of the emperour , claimed to be equall to him , ) it followeth , that all other bishops have their jurisdiction from the soveraigns of the place wherein they exercise the same : and as for that cause they have not their authority de iure divino ; so neither hath the pope his de iure divino , except onely where hee is also the civill soveraign . his fift argument is this , if bishops have their iurisdiction immediately from god , the pope could not take it from them , for he can doe nothing contrary to gods ordination ; and this consequence is good , and well proved . but ( saith he ) the pope can do this , and has done it . this also is granted , so he doe it in his own dominions , or in the dominions of any other prince that hath given him that power ; but not universally , in right of the popedome : for that power belongeth to every christian soveraign , within the bounds of his owne empire , and is inseparable from the soveraignty . before the people of israel had ( by the commandment of god to samuel ) set over themselves a king , after the manner of other nations , the high priest had the civill government ; and none but he could make , nor depose an inferiour priest : but that power was afterwards in the king , as may be proved by this same argument of bellarmine ; for if the priest ( be he the high priest or any other ) had his jurisdiction immediately from god , then the king could not take it from him ; for he could doe nothing contrary to gods ordinance : but it is certain , that king solomon ( kings . . ) deprived abiathar the high priest of his office , and placed zadok ( verse . ) in his room . kings therefore may in the like manner ordaine , and deprive bishops , as they shall thinke fit , for the well governing of their subjects . his sixth argument is this , if bishops have their jurisdiction de iure divino ( that is , immediately from god , ) they that maintaine it , should bring some word of god to prove it : but they can bring none . the argument is good ; i have therefore nothing to say against it . but it is an argument no lesse good , to prove the pope himself to have no jurisdiction in the dominion of any other prince . lastly , hee bringeth for argument , the testimony of two popes , innocent , and leo ; and i doubt not but hee might have alledged , with as good reason , the testimonies of all the popes almost since s. peter : for considering the love of power naturally implanted in mankind , whosoever were made pope , he would be tempted to uphold the same opinion . neverthelesse , they should therein but doe , as innocent , and leo did , bear witnesse of themselves , and therefore their witnesse should not be good . in the fift book he hath four conclusions . the first is , that the pope is not lord of all the world : the second , that the pope is not lord of all the christian world : the third , that the pope ( without his owne territory ) has not any temporall jurisdiction directly : these three conclusions are easily granted . the fourth is , that the pope has ( in the dominions of other princes ) the supreme temporall power indirectly : which is denyed ; unlesse hee mean by indirectly ▪ that he has gotten it by indirect means , then is that also granted . but i understand , that when he saith : he hath it indirectly , he means , that such temporall jurisdiction belongeth to him of right , but that this right is but a consequence of his pastorall authority , the which he could not exercise , unlesse he have the other with it : and therefore to the pastorall power ( which he calls spirituall ) the supreme power civill is necessarily annexed ; and that thereby hee hath a right to change kingdomes , giving them to one , and taking them from another , when he shall think it conduces to the salvation of souls . before i come to consider the arguments by which hee would prove this doctrine , it will not bee amisse to lay open the consequences of it ; that princes , and states , that have the civill soveraignty in their severall common-wealths , may bethink themselves , whether it bee convenient for them , and conducing to the good of their subjects , of whom they are to give an account at the day of judgment , to admit the same . when it is said , the pope hath not ( in the territories of other states ) the supreme civill power directly ; we are to understand , he doth not challenge it , as other civill soveraigns doe , from the originall submission thereto of those that are to be governed . for it is evident , and has already been sufficiently in this treatise demonstrated , that the right of all soveraigns , is derived originally from the consent of every one of those that are to bee governed ; whether they that choose him , doe it for their common defence against an enemy , as when they agree amongst themselves to appoint a man , or an assembly of men to protect them ; or whether they doe it , to save their lives , by submission to a conquering enemy . the pope therefore , when he disclaimeth the supreme civill power over other states directly , denyeth no more , but that his right cometh to him by that way ; he ceaseth not for all that , to claime it another way ; and that is , ( without the consent of them that are to be governed ) by a right given him by god , ( which hee calleth indirectly , ) in his assumption to the papacy . but by what way soever he pretend , the power is the same ; and he may ( if it bee granted to be his right ) depose princes and states , as often as it is for the salvation of soules , that is , as often as he will ; for he claimeth also the sole power to judge , whether it be to the salvation of mens souls , or not . and this is the doctrine , not onely that bellarmine here , and many other doctors teach in their sermons and books , but also that some councells have decreed , and the popes have accordingly , when the occasion hath served them , put in practise . for the fourth councell of lateran held under pope innocent the third ▪ ( in the third chap. de haereticis , ) hath this canon . if a king at the popes admonition , doe not purge his kingdome of haeretiques , and being excommunicate for the same , make not satisfaction within a yeer , his subjects are absolved of their obedience . and the practise hereof hath been seen on divers occasions ; as in the deposing of chilperique , king of france ; in the translation of the roman empire to charlemaine ; in the oppression of iohn king of england ; in transferring the kingdome of navarre ; and of late years , in the league against henry the third of france , and in many more occ●…rrences . i think there be few princes that consider not this as injust , and inconvenient ; but i wish they would all resolve to be kings , or subjects . men cannot serve two masters : they ought therefore to ease them , either by holding the reins of government wholly in their own hands ; or by wholly delivering them into the hands of the pope ; that such men as are willing to be obedient , may be protected in their obedience . for this distinction of temporall , and spirituall power is but words . power is as really divided , and as dangerously to all purposes , by sharing with another indirect power , as with a direct one . but to come now to his arguments . the first is this , the civill power is subject to the spirituall : therefore he that hath the supreme power spirituall , hath right to command temporall princes , and dispose of their temporalls in order to the spirituall . as for the dictinction of temporall , and spirituall , let us consider in what sense it may be said intelligibly , that the temporall , or civill power is subject to the spirituall . there be but two ways that those words can be made sense . for when wee say , one power is subject to another power , the meaning either is , that he which hath the one , is subject to him that hath the other ; or that the one power is to the other , as the means to the end . ●…r wee cannot understand , that one power hath power over another power ; or that one power can have right or command over another : for subjection , command , right , and power are accidents , not of powers , but of persons : one power may be subordinate to another , as the art of a sadler , to the art of a rider . if then it bee granted , that the civill government be ordained as a means to bring us to a spirituall felicity ; yet it does not follow , that if a king have the civill power , and the pope the spirituall , that therefore the king is bound to obey the pope , more then every sadler is bound to obey every rider . therefore as from subordination of an art , cannot be inferred the subjection of the professor ; so from the subordination of a government , cannot be inferred the subjection of the governor . when therefore he saith , the civill power is subject to the spirituall , his meaning is , that the civill soveraign , is subject to the spirituall soveraign . and the argument stands thus , the civil soveraign , is subject to the spirituall ; therefore the spirituall prince may command temporall princes . where the conclusion is the same , with the antecedent he should have proved . but to prove it , he alledgeth first , this reason , kings and popes , clergy and laity make but one common-wealth ; that is to say , but one church : and in all bodies the members depend one upon another : but things spirituall depend not of things temporall : therefore temporall depend on spirituall . and therefore are subject to them . in which argumentation there be two grosse errours : one is , that all christian kings , popes , clergy , and all other christian men , make but one common-wealth : for it is evident that france is one common-wealth , spain another , and venice a third , &c. and these consist of christians ; and therefore also are severall bodies of christians ; that is to say , severall churches : and their severall soveraigns represent them , whereby they are capable of commanding and obeying , of doing and suffering , as a naturall man ; which no generall or universall church is , till it have a representant ; which it hath not on earth : for if it had , there is no doubt but that all christendome were one common-wealth , whose soveraign were that representant , both in things spirituall and temporall : and the pope , to make himself this representant , wanteth three things that our saviour hath not given him , to command , and to iudge , and to punish , otherwise than ( by excommunication ) to run from those that will not learn of him : for though the pope were christs onely vicar , yet he cannot exercise his government , till our saviours second coming : and then also it is not the pope , but st. peter himselfe , with the other apostles , that are to be judges of the world . the other errour in this his first argument is , that he sayes , the members of every common-wealth , as of a naturall body , depend one of another : it is true , they cohaere together ; but they depend onely on the soveraign , which is the soul of the common-wealth ; which failing , the common-wealth is dissolved into a civill war , no one man so much as cohaering to another , for want of a common dependance on a known soveraign ; just as the members of the naturall body dissolve into earth , for want of a soul to hold them together . therefore there is nothing in this similitude , from whence to inferre a dependance of the laity on the clergy , or of the temporall officers on the spirituall ; but of both on the civill soveraign ; which ought indeed to direct his civill commands to the salvation of souls ; but is not therefore subject to any but god himselfe . and thus you see the laboured fallacy of the first argument , to deceive such men as distinguish not between the subordination of actions in the way to the end ; and the subjection of persons one to another in the administration of the means . for to every end , the means are determined by nature , or by god himselfe supernaturally : but the power to make men use the means , is in every nation resigned ( by the law of nature , which forbiddeth men to violate their faith given ) to the civill soveraign . his second argument is this , every common-wealth , ( because it is supposed to ●…e perfect and sufficient in it self , ) may command any other common-wealth , not subject to it , and force it to change the administration of the government ; nay depose the prince , and set another in his room , if it cannot otherwise defend it selfe against the injuries he goes about to doe them : much more may a spiritu●…ll common-wealth command a temporall one to change the administration of their government , and may depose princes , and institute others , when they cannot otherwise defend the spirituall good. that a common-wealth , to defend it selfe against injuries , may lawfully doe all that he hath here said , is very true ; and hath already in that which hath gone before been sufficiently demonstrated . and if it were also true , that there is now in this world a spirituall common-wealth , distinct from a civill common-wealth , then might the prince thereof , upon injury done him , or upon want of caution that injury be not done him in time to come , repaire , and secure himself by warre ; which is in summe , deposing , killing , or subduing , or doing any act of hostility . but by the same reason , it would be no lesse lawfull for a civill soveraign , upon the like injuries done , or feared , to make warre upon the spirituall soveraign ; which i beleeve is more than cardinall bellarmine would have inferred from his own proposition . but spirituall common-wealth there is none in this world : for it is the same thing with the kingdome of christ ; which he himselfe saith , is not of this world ; but shall be in the next world , at the resurrection , when they that have lived justly , and beleeved that he was the christ , shall ( though they died naturall bodies ) rise spirituall bodies ; and then it is , that our saviour shall judge the world , and conquer his adversaries , and make a spirituall common-wealth . in the mean time , seeing there are no men on earth , whose bodies are spirituall ; there can be no spirituall common-wealth amongst men that are yet in the flesh ; unlesse wee call preachers , that have commission to teach , and prepare men for their reception into the kingdome of christ at the resurrection , a common-wealth ; which i have proved already to bee none . the third argument is this ; it is not lawfull for christians to tolerate an infidel , or haereticall king , in case he endeavour to draw them to his haeresie , or infidelity . but to judge whether a king draw his subjects to haeresie , or not , belongeth to the pope . therefore hath the pope right , to determine whether the prince be to be deposed , or not deposed . to this i answer , that both these assertions are false . for christians , ( or men of what religion soever , ) if they tolerate not their king , whatsoever law hee maketh , though it bee concerning religion , doe violate their faith , contrary to the divine law , both naturall and positive : nor is there any judge of haeresie amongst subjects , but their owne civill soveraign : for haeresie is nothing else , but a private opinion , obstinately maintained , contrary to the opinion which the publique person ( that is to say , the representant of the common-wealth ) hath commanded to bee taught . by which it is manifest , that an opinion publiquely appointed to bee taught , cannot be haeresie ; nor the soveraign princes that authorize them , haeretiques . for haeretiques are none but private men , that stubbornly defend some doctrine , prohibited by their lawfull soveraigns . but to prove that christians are not to tolerate infidell , or haereticall kings , he alledgeth a place in deut. . where god forbiddeth the jews , when they shall set a king over themselves , to choose a stranger : and from thence inferreth , that it is unlawfull for a christian , to choose a king , that is not a christian. and 't is true , that he that is a christian , that is , hee that hath already obliged himself to receive our saviour when he shall come , for his king , shal tempt god too much in choosing for king in this world , one that hee knoweth will endeavour , both by terrour , and perswasion to make him violate his faith . but , it is ( saith hee ) the same danger , to choose one that is not a christian , for king , and not to depose him ▪ when hee is chosen . to this i say , the question is not of the danger of not deposing ; but of the justice of deposing him . to choose him , may in some cases bee unjust ; but to depose him , when he is chosen , is in no case just. for it is alwaies violation of faith , and consequently against the law of nature , which is the eternall law of god. nor doe wee read , that any such doctrine was accounted christian in the time of the apostles ; nor in the time of the romane emperours , till the popes had the civill soveraignty of rome . but to this he hath replyed , that the christians of old , deposed not nero , nor dioclesian , nor iulian , nor valens an arrian , for this cause onely , that they wanted temporall forces . perhaps so . but did our saviour , who for calling for , might have had twelve legions of immortall , invulnerable angels to assist him , want forces to depose caesar , or at least pilate , that unjustly , without finding fault in him , delivered him to the jews to bee crucified ? or if the apostles wanted temporall forces to depose nero , was it therefore necessary for them in their epistles to the new made christians , to teach them ( as they did ) to obey the powers constituted over them , ( whereof nero in that time was one , ) and that they ought to obey them , not for fear of their wrath , but for conscience sake ? shall we say they did not onely obey , but also teach what they meant not , for want of strength ? it is not therefore for want of strength , but for conscience sake , that christians are to tolerate their heathen princes , or princes ( for i cannot call any one whose doctrine is the publique doctrine , an haeretique ) that authorize the teaching of an errour . and whereas for the temporall power of the pope , he alledgeth further , that st. paul ( cor. . ) appointed judges under the heathen princes of those times , such as were not ordained by those princes ; it is not true . for st. paul does but advise them , to take some of their brethren to compound their differences , as arbitrators , rather than to goe to law one with another before the heathen judges ; which is a wholsome precept , and full of charity , fit to bee practised also in the best christian common-wealths . and for the danger that may arise to religion , by the subjects tolerating of an heathen , or an erring prince , it is a point , of which a subject is no competent judg●… ; or if hee bee , the popes temporall subjects may judge also of the popes doctrine . for every christian prince , as i have formerly proyed , is no lesse supreme pastor of his own subjects , than the pope of his . the fourth argument , is taken from the baptisme of kings ; wherein , that they may be made christians they submit their scepters to christ ; and promise to keep , and defend the christian faith. this is true ; for christian kings are no more but christs subjects : but they may , for all that , bee the popes fellowes ; for they are supreme pastors of their own subjects ; and the pope is no more but king , and pastor , even in rome it selfe . the fifth argument , is drawn from the words spoken by our saviour , feed my sheep ; by which was given all power necessary for a pastor ; as the power to chase away wolves , such as are haeretiques ; the power to shut up rammes , if they be mad , or push at the other sheep with their hornes , such as are evill ( though christian ) kings ; and power to give the flock convenient food : from whence hee inferreth , that st. peter had these three powers given him by christ. to which i answer , that the last of these powers , is no more than the power , or rather command to teach . for the first , which is to chase away wolves , that is , haeretiques , the place hee quoteth is ( matth. . . ) beware of false prophets which come to you in sheeps clothing , but inwardly are ravening wolves . but neither are haeretiques false prophets , or at all prophets : nor ( admitting haeretiques for the wolves there meant , ) were the apostles commanded to kill them , or if they were kings , to depose them ; but to beware of , fly , and avoid them : nor was it to st. peter , nor to any of the apostles , but to the multitude of the jews that followed him into the mountain , men for the most part not yet converted , that hee gave this counsell , to beware of false prophets : which therefore if it conferre a power of chasing away kings , was given , not onely to private men ; but to men that were not at all christians . and as to the power of separating , and shutting up of furious rammes , ( by which hee meaneth christian kings that refuse to submit themselves to the roman pastor , ) our saviour refused to take upon him that power in this world himself , but advised to let the corn and tares grow up together till the day of judgment : much lesse did hee give it to st. peter , or can s. peter give it to the popes . st. peter , and all other pastors , are bidden to esteem those christians that disobey the church , that is , ( that disobey the christian soveraigne ) as heathen men , and as publicans . seeing then men challenge to the pope no authority over heathen princes , they ought to challenge none over those that are to bee esteemed as heathen . but from the power to teach onely , hee inferreth also a coercive power in the pope , over kings . the pastor ( saith he ) must give his flock convenient food : therefore the pope may , and ought to compell kings to doe their duty . out of which it followeth , that the pope , as pastor of christian men , is king of kings : which all christian kings ought indeed either to confesse , or else they ought to take upon themselves the supreme pastorall charge , every one in his own dominion . his sixth , and last argument , is from examples . to which i answer , first , that examples prove nothing : secondly , that the examples he alledgeth make not so much as a probability of right . the fact of jehoiada , in killing athaliah ( kings . ) was either by the authority of king joash , or it was a horrible crime in the high priest which ( ever after the election of king saul ) was a mere subject . the fact of st. ambrose , in excommunicating theodosius the emperour , ( if it were true hee did so , ) was a capitall crime . and for the popes , gregory . greg. . zachary , and leo . their judgments are void , as given in their own cause ; and the acts done by them conformably to this doctrine , are the greatest crimes ( especially that of zachary ) that are incident to humane nature . and thus much of power ecclesiasticall ; wherein i had been more briefe , forbearing to examine these arguments of bellarmine , if they had been his , as a private man , and not as the champion of the papacy , against all other christian princes , and states . chap. xliii . of what is necessary for a mans reception into the kingdome of heaven . the most frequent praetext of sedition , and civill warre , in christian common-wealths hath a long time proceeded from a difficulty , not yet sufficiently resolved , of obeying at once , both god , and man , then when their commandements are one contrary to the other . it is manifest enough , that when a man receiveth two contrary commands , and knows that one of them is gods , he ought to obey that , and not the other , though it be the command even of his lawfull soveraign ( whether a monarch , or or a soveraign assembly , ) or the command of his father . the difficulty therefore consisteth in this , that men when they are commanded in the name of god , know not in divers cases , whether the command be from god , or whether he that commandeth , doe but abuse gods name for some private ends of his own . for as there were in the church of the jews , many false prophets , that sought reputation with the people , by feigned dreams , and visions ; so there have been in all times in the church of christ , false teachers , that seek reputation with the people , by phantasticall and false doctrines ; and by such reputation ( as is the nature of ambition , ) to govern them for their private benefit . but this difficulty of obeying both god , and the civill soveraign on earth , to those that can distinguish between what is necessary , and what is not necessary for their reception into the kingdome of god , is of no moment . for if the command of the civill soveraign bee such , as that it may be obeyed , without the forfeiture of life eternall ; not to obey it is unjust ; and the precept of the apostle takes place ; servants obey your masters in all things ; and , children obey your parents in all things ; and the precept of our saviour , the scribes and pharisees sit in moses chaire , all therefore they shall say , that observe , and doe . but if the command be such , as cannot be obeyed , without being damned to eternall death , then it were madnesse to obey it , and the counsell of our saviour takes place , ( mat. . . ) fear not those that kill the body , but cannot kill the soule . all men therefore that would avoid , both the punishments that are to be in this world inflicted , for disobedience to their earthly soveraign , and those that shall be inflicted in the world to come for disobedience to god , have need be taught to distinguish well between what is , and what is not necessary to eternall salvation . all that is necessary to salvatian , is contained in two vertues , faith in christ , and obedience to laws . the latter of these , if it were perfect , were enough to us . but because wee are all guilty of disobedience to gods law , not onely originally in adam , but also actually by our own transgressions , there is required at our hands now , not onely obedience for the rest of our time , but also a remission of sins for the time past ; which remission is the reward of our faith in christ. that nothing else is necessarily required to salvation , is manifest from this , that the kingdome of heaven is shut to none but to sinners ; that is to say , to the disobedient , or transgressors of the law ; nor to them , in case they repent , and beleeve all the articles of christian faith , necessary to salvation . the obedience required at our hands by god , that accepteth in all our actions the will for the deed , is a serious endeavour to obey him ; and is called also by all such names as signifie that endeavour . and therefore obedience , is sometimes called by the names of charity , and love , because they imply a will to obey ; and our saviour himself maketh our love to god , and to one another , a fulfilling of the whole law : and sometimes by the name of righteousnesse ; for righteousnesse is but the will to give to every one his owne , that is to say , the will to obey the laws : and sometimes by the name of repentance ; because to repent , implyeth a turning away from finne , which is the same , with the return of the will to obedience . whosoever therefore unfeignedly desireth to fulfill the commandements of god , or repenteth him truely of his transgressions , or that loveth god with all his heart , and his neighbor as himself , hath all the obedience necessary to his reception into the kingdom of god : for if god should require perfect innocence , there could no flesh be saved . but what commandements are those that god hath given us ? are all those laws which were given to the jews by the hand of moses , the commandements of god ? if they bee , why are not christians taught to obey them ? if they be not , what others are so , besides the law of nature ? for our saviour christ hath not given us new laws , but counsell to observe those wee are subject to ; that is to say , the laws of nature , and the laws of our severall soveraigns : nor did he make any new law to the jews in his sermon on the mouut , but onely expounded the laws of moses , to which they were subject before . the laws of god therefore are none but the laws of nature , whereof the principall is , that we should not violate our faith , that is , a commandement to obey our civill soveraigns , which wee constituted over us , by mutuall pact one with another . and this law of god , that commandeth obedience to the law civill , commandeth by consequence obedience to all the precepts of the bible ; which ( as i have proved in the precedent chapter ) is there onely law , where the civill soveraign hath made it so ; and in other places but counsell ; which a man at his own perill , may without injustice refuse to obey . knowing now what is the obedience necessary to salvation , and to whom it is due ; we are to consider next concerning faith , whom , and why we beleeve ; and what are the articles , or points necessarily to be beleeved by them that shall be saved . and first , for the person whom we beleeve , because it is impossible to beleeve any person , before we know what he saith , it is necessary he be one that wee have heard speak . the person therefore , whom abraham , isaac , jacob , moses and the prophets beleeved , was god himself , that spake unto them supernaturally : and the person , whom the apostles and disciples that conversed with christ beleeved , was our saviour himself . but of them , to whom neither god the father , nor our saviour ever spake , it cannot be said , that the person whom they beleeved , was god. they beleeved the apostles , and after them the pastors and doctors of the church , that recommended to their faith the history of the old and new testament : so that the faith of christians ever since our saviours time , hath had for foundation , first , the reputation of their pastors , and afterward , the authority of those that made the old and new testament to be received for the rule of faith ; which none could do but christian soveraignes ; who are therefore the supreme pastors , and the onely persons , whom christians now hear speak from god ; except such as god speaketh to , in these days supernaturally . but because there be many false prophets gone out into the world , other men are to examine such spirits ( as st. iohn adviseth us ; epistle , chap. . ver . . ) whether they be of god , or not . and therefore , seeing the examination of doctrines belongeth to the supreme pastor , the person which all they that have no speciall revelation are to beleeve , is ( in every common-wealth ) the supreme pastor , that is to say , the civill soveraigne . the causes why men beleeve any christian doctrine , are various : for faith is the gift of god ; and he worketh it in each severall man , by such wayes , as it seemeth good unto himself . the most ordinary immediate cause of our beleef ; concerning any point of christian faith , is , that wee beleeve the bible to be the word of god. but why wee beleeve the bible to be the word of god , is much disputed , as all questions must needs bee , that are not well stated . for they make not the question to be , why we beleeve it , but , how wee know it ; as if beleeving and knowing were all one . and thence while one side ground their knowledge upon the infallibility of the church , and the other side , on the testimony of the private spirit , neither side concludeth what it pretends . for how shall a man know the infallibility of the church , but by knowing first the infallibility of the scripture ? or how shall a man know his own private spirit to be other than a beleef , grounded upon the authority , and arguments of his teachers ; or upon a presumption of his own gifts ? besides , there is nothing in the scripture , from which can be inferred the infallibility of the church ; much lesse , of any particular church ; and least of all , the infallibility of any particular man. it is manifest therefore , that christian men doe not know , but onely beleeve the scripture to be the word of god ; and that the means of making them beleeve which god is pleased to afford men ordinarily , is according to the way of nature , that is to say , from their teachers . it is the doctrine of st. paul concerning christian faith in generall , ( rom. . . ) faith cometh by hearing , that is , by hearing our lawfull pastors . he saith also ( ver . , . of the same chapter ) how shall they beleeve in him of whom they have not heard ? and how shall they hear without a preacher ? and how shall they preach , except they be sent ? whereby it is evident , that the ordinary cause of beleeving that the scriptures are the word of god , is the same with the cause of the beleeving of all other articles of our faith , namely , the hearing of those that are by the law allowed and appointed to teach us , as our parents in their houses , and our pastors in the churches : which also is made more manifest by experience . for what other cause can there bee assigned , why in christian common-wealths all men either beleeve , or at least professe the scripture to bee the word of god , and in other common-wealths scarce any ; but that in christian common-wealths they are taught it from their infancy ; and in other places they are taught otherwise ? but if teaching be the cause of faith , why doe not all beleeve ? it is certain therefore that faith is the gift of god , and hee giveth it to whom he will. neverthelesse , because to them to whom he giveth it , he giveth it by the means of teachers , the immediate cause of faith is hearing . in a school , where many are taught , and some profit , others profit not , the cause of learning in them that profit , is the master ; yet it cannot be thence inferred , that learning is not the gift of god. all good things proceed from god ; yet cannot all that have them , say they are inspired ; for that implies a gift supernaturall , and the immediate hand of god ; which he that pretends to , pretends to be a prophet , and is subject to the examination of the church . but whether men know , or beleeve , or grant the scriptures to be the word of god ; if out of such places of them , as are without obscurity , i shall shew what articles of faith are necessary , and onely necessary for salvation , those men must needs know , beleeve , or grant the same . the ( vnum necessarium ) onely article of faith , which the scripture maketh simply necessary to salvation , is this , that jesus is the christ . by the name of christ , is understood the king , which god had before promised by the prophets of the old testament , to send into the world , to reign ( over the jews , and over such of other nations as should beleeve in him ) under himself eternally ; and to give them that eternall life , which was lost by the sin of adam . which when i have proved out of scripture , i will further shew when , and in what sense some other articles may bee also called necessary . for proof that the beleef of this article , iesus is the christ , is all the faith required to salvation , my first argument shall bee from the scope of the evangelists ; which was by the description of the life of our saviour , to establish that one article , iesus is the christ. the summe of st. matthews gospell is this , that jesus was of the stock of david ; born of a virgin ; which are the marks of the true christ : that the magi came to worship him as king of the jews : that herod for the same cause sought to kill him : that john baptist proclaimed him : that he preached by himselfe , and his apostles that he was that king : that he taught the law , not as a scribe , but as a man of authority : that he cured diseases by his word onely , and did many other miracles , which were foretold the christ should doe : that he was saluted king when hee entred into jerusalem : that he fore-warned them to beware of all others that should pretend to be christ : that he was taken , accused , and put to death ▪ for saying , hee was king : that the cause of his condemnation written on the crosse , was jesus of nazareth , the king of the jevves . all which tend to no other end than this , that men should beleeve , that iesus is the christ. such therefore was the scope of st. matthews gospel . but the scope of all the evangelists ( as may appear by reading them ) was the same . therefore the scope of the whole gospell , was the establishing of that onely article . and st. john expressely makes it his conclusion , iohn . . these things are written , that you may know that iesus is the christ , the son of the living god. my second argument is taken from the subject of the sermons of the apostles , both whilest our saviour lived on earth , aud after his ascension . the apostles in our saviours time were sent , luke . . to preach the kingdome of god : for neither there , nor mat. . . giveth he any commission to them , other than this , as ye go , preach , saying , the kingdome of heaven is at hand ; that is , that iesus is the messiah , the christ , the king which was to come . that their preaching also after his ascension was the same , is manifest out of acts . . they drew ( saith st. luke ) iason and certain brethren unto the rulers of the city , crying , these that have turned the world upside down are come hither also , whom iason hath received . and these all do contrary to the decrees of caesar , saying , that there is another king , one iesus : and out of the . & . verses of the same chapter , where it is said , that st. paul as his manner was , went in unto them ; and three sabbath dayes reasoned with them out of the scriptures ; opening and alledging , that christ must needs have suffered , and risen againe from the dead , and that this iesus ( whom hee preached ) is christ. the third argument is , from those places of scripture , by which all the faith required to salvation is declared to be easie. for if an inward assent of the mind to all the doctrines concerning christian faith now taught , ( whereof the greatest part are disputed , ) were necessary to salvation , there would be nothing in the world so hard , as to be a christian. the thief upon the crosse though repenting , could not have been saved for saying , lord remember me when thou commest into thy kin●…dome ; by which he testified no beleefe of any other article , but this , that iesus was the king. nor could it bee said ( as it is mat. . . ) that christs yoke is easy , and his burthen light : nor that little children beleeve in him , as it is matth. . . nor could st. paul have said ( cor. . . ) it pleased god by the foolishnesse of preaching , to save them that beleeve : nor could st. paul himself have been saved , much lesse have been so great a doctor of the church so suddenly , that never perhaps thought of transubstantiation , nor purgatory , nor many other articles now obtruded . the fourth argument is taken from places expresse , and such as receive no controversie of interpretation ; as first , iohn . . search the scriptures , for in them yee thinke yee have eternall life ; and they are they that testifie of mee . our saviour here speaketh of the scriptures onely of the old testament ; for the jews at that time could not search the scriptures of the new testament , which were not written . but the old testament hath nothing of christ , but the markes by which men might know him when hee came ; as that he should descend from david ; be born at bethlem , and of a virgin ; doe great miracles , and the like . therefore to beleeve that this jesus was he , was sufficient to eternall life : but more than sufficient is not necessary ; and consequently no other article is required . again , ( iohn . . ) whosoever liveth and beleeveth in mee , shall not die eternally , therefore to beleeve in christ , is faith sufficient to eternall life ; and consequently no more faith than that is necessary , but to beleeve in jesus , and to beleeve that jesus is the christ , is all one , as appeareth in the verses immediately following . for when our saviour ( verse . ) had said to martha , beleevest thou this ? she answereth ( verse . ) yea lord , i beleeve that thou art the christ , the son of god , which should come into the world : therefore this article alone is faith sufficient to life eternall ; and more than sufficient is not necessary . thirdly , iohn . . these things are written that yee might beleeve , that iesus is the christ , the son of god , and that beleeving yee might have life through his name . there , to beleeve that iesus is the christ , is faith sufficient to the obtaining of life ; and therefore no other article is necessary . fourthly , iohn . . every spirit that confesseth that iesus christ is come in the flesh , is of god. and ioh. . . whosoever beleeveth that iesus is the christ , is born of god. and verse . who is hee that overcommeth the world , but he that beleeveth that iesus is the son of god ? fiftly , act. . ver . , . see ( saith the eunuch ) here is water , what doth hinder me to be baptized ? and philip said , if thou beleevest with all thy heart thou mayst . and hee answered and said , i beleeve that iesus christ is the son of god. therefore this article beleeved , iesus is the christ , is sufficient to baptisme , that is to say , to our reception into the kingdome of god , and by consequence , onely necessary . and generally in all places where our saviour saith to any man , thy faith hath saved thee , the ca●…se he saith it , is some confession , which directly , or by consequence , implyeth a beleef , that jesus is the christ. the last argument is from the places , where this article is made the foundation of faith : for he that holdeth the foundation shall bee saved . which places are first , mat. . . if any man shall say unto you , loe , here is christ , or there , beleeve it not , for there shall arise false christs , and false prophets , and shall shew great signes and wonders , &c. here wee see , this article jesus is the christ , must bee held , though hee that shall teach the contrary should doe great miracles . the second place is , gal. . . though we , or an angell from heaven preach any other gospell unto you , than that wee have preached unto you , let him bee accursed . but the gospell which paul , and the other apostles , preached , was onely this article , that jesus is the christ : therefore for the beleef of this article , we are to reject the authority of an angell from heaven ; much more of any mortall man , if he teach the contrary . this is therefore the fundamentall article of christian faith. a third place is , joh. . . beloved , bele●…ve not every spirit . hereby yee shall know the spirit of god ; every spirit that confesseth that iesus christ is come in the fl●…sh , is of god. by which it is evident , that this article , is the measure , and rule , by which to estimate , and examine all other articles ; and is therefore onely fundamentall . a fourth is , matt. . . where after st. peter had professed this article , saying to our saviour , thou art christ the son of the living god , our saviour answered , thou art peter , and upon this rock i will build my church : from whence i inferre , that this article is that , on which all other doctrines of the church are built , as on their foundation . a fift is ( cor. . ver . , , &c. ) other foundation can no man lay , than that which is laid , jesus is the christ. now if any man build upon this foundation , gold , silver , pretious stones , wood , hay , stubble ; every mans work shall be made manifest ; for the day shall declare it , because it shall be revealed by fire , and the fire shall try every mans work , of what sort it is . if any mans work abide , which he hath built thereupon , he shall receive a reward : if any mans work shall bee burnt , he shall suffer losse ; but he himself shall be saved , yet so as by fire . which words , being partly plain and easie to understand , and partly allegoricall and difficult ; out of that which is plain , may be inferred , that pastors that teach this foundation , that jesus is the christ , though they draw from it false consequences , ( which all men are sometimes subject to , ) they may neverthelesse bee saved ; much more that they may bee saved , who being no pastors , but hearers , beleeve that which is by their lawfull pastors taught them . therefore the beleef of this article is sufficient ; and by consequence , there is no other article of faith necessarily required to salvation . now for the part which is allegoricall , as that the fire shall try every mans work , and that they shall be saved , but so as by fire , or through fire , ( for the originall is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) it maketh nothing against this conclusion which i have drawn from the other words , that are plain . neverthelesse , because upon this place there hath been an argument taken , to prove the fire of purgatory , i will also here offer you my conjecture concerning the meaning of this triall of doctrines , and saving of men as by fire . the apostle here seemeth to allude to the words of the prophet zachary , ch. . ; . who speaking of the restauration of the kingdome of god , saith thus , two parts therein shall be cut off , and die , but the third shall be left therein ; and i will bring the third part through the fire , and will refine them as silver is refined , and will try them as gold is tryed ; they shall call on the name of the lord , and i will hear them . the day of judgment , is the day of the restauration of the kingdome of god ; and at that day it is , that st. peter tells us * shall be the conflagration of the world , wherein the wicked shall perish ; but the remnant which god will save , shall passe through that fire , unhurt , and be therein ( as silver and gold are refined by the fire from their drosse ) tryed , and refined from their idolatry , and be made to call upon the name of the true god. alluding whereto st. paul here saith , that the day ( that is , the day of judgment , the great day of our saviours comming to restore the kingdome of god in israel ) shall try every mans doctrine , by judging , which are gold , silver , pretious stones , wood , hay , stubble ; and then they that have built false consequences on the true foundation , shall see their doctrines condemned ; neverthelesse they themselves shall be saved , and passe unhurt through this universall fire , and live eternally , to call upon the name of the true and onely god. in which sense there is nothing that accordeth not with the rest of holy scripture , or any glimpse of the fire of purgatory . but a man may here aske , whether it bee not as necessary to salvation , to beleeve , that god is omnipotent ; creator of the world ; that jesus christ is risen ; and that all men else shall rise again from the dead at the last day ; as to beleeve , that jesus is the christ. to which i answer , they are ; and so are many more articles : but they are such , as are contained in this one , and may be deduced from it , with more , or lesse difficulty . for who is there that does not see , that they who beleeve jesus to be the son of the god of israel , and that the israelites had for god the omnipotent creator of all things , doe therein also beleeve , that god is the omnipotent creator of all things ? or how can a man beleeve , that jesus is the king that shall reign eternally , unlesse hee beleeve him also risen again from the dead ? for a dead man cannot exercise the office of a king. in summe , he that holdeth this foundation , jesus is the christ , holdeth expressely all that hee seeth rightly deduced from it , and implicitely all that is consequent thereunto , though he have not skill enough to discern the consequence . and therefore it holdeth still good , that the beleef of this one article is sufficient faith to obtaine remission of sinnes to the penitent , and consequently to bring them into the kingdome of heaven . now that i have shewn , that all the obedience required to salvation , consisteth in the will to obey the law of god , that is to say , in repentance ; and all the faith required to the same , is comprehended in the beleef of this article jesus is the christ ; i will further alledge those places of the gospell , that prove , that all that is necessary to salvation is contained in both these joined together . the men to whom st. peter preached on the day of pentecost , next after the ascension of our saviour , asked him , and the rest of the apostles , saying , ( act. . . ) men and brethren what shall we doe ? to whom st. peter answered ( in the next verse ) repent , and be baptized every one of you , for the remission of sins , and ye shall receive the gift of the holy ghost . therefore repentance , and baptisme , that is , beleeving that jesus is the christ , is all that is necessary to salvation . again , our saviour being asked by a certain ruler , ( luke . . ) what shall i doe to inherite eternall life ? answered ( verse . ) thou knowest the commandements , doe not commit adultery , doe not kill , doe not steal , doe not bear false witnesse , honor thy father , and thy mother : which when he said he had observed , our saviour added , sell all thou hast , give it to the poor , and come and follow me : which was as much as to say , relye on me that am the king : therefore to fulfill the law , and to beleeve that jesus is the king , is all that is required to bring a man to eternall life . thirdly , st. paul saith ( rom. . . ) the just shall live by faith ; not every one , but the just ; therefore faith and justice ( that is , the will to be just , or repentance ) are all that is necessary to life eternall . and ( mark . . ) our saviour preached , saying , the time is fulfilled , and the kingdom of god is at hand , repent and beleeve the evangile , that is , the good news that the christ was come . therefore to repent , and to beleeve that jesus is the christ , is all that is required to salvation . seeing then it is necessary that faith , and obedience ( implyed in the word repentance ) do both concurre to our salvation ; the question by which of the two we are justified , is impertinently disputed . neverthelesse , it will not be impertinent , to make manifest in what manner each of them contributes thereunto ; and in what sense it is said , that we are to be justified by the one , and by the other . and first , if by righteousnesse be understood the justice of the works themselves , there is no man that can be saved ; for there is none that hath not transgressed the law of god. and therefore when wee are said to be justified by works , it is to be understood of the will , which god doth alwaies accept for the work it selfe , as well in good , as in evill men . and in this sense onely it is , that a man is callod iust , or vnjust ; and that his justice justifies him , that is , gives him the title ; in gods acceptation , of just ; and renders him capable of living by his faith , which before he was not . so that justice justifies in that sense , in which to justifie , is the same that to denominate a man iust ; and not in the signification of discharging the law ; whereby the punishment of his sins should be unjust . but a man is then also said to be justified , when his plea , though in it selfe unsufficient , is accepted ; as when we plead our will , our endeavour to fulfill the law , and repent us of our failings , and god accepteth it for the performance it selfe : and because god accepteth not the will for the deed , but onely in the faithfull ; it is therefore faith that makes good our plea ; and in this sense it is , that faith onely justifies : so that faith and obedience are both necessary to salvation ; yet in severall senses each of them is said to justifie . having thus shewn what is necessary to salvation ; it is not hard to reconcile our obedience to god , with our obedience to the civill soveraign ; who is either christian , or infidel . if he bee a christian , he alloweth the beleefe of this article , that iesus is the christ ; and of all the articles that are contained in , or are by evident consequence deduced from it : which is all the faith necessary to salvation . and because he is a soveraign , he requireth obedience to all his owne , that is , to all the civill laws ; in which also are contained all the laws of nature , that is , all the laws of god : for besides the laws of nature , and the laws of the church , which are part of the civill law , ( for the church that can make laws is the common-wealth , ) there bee no other laws divine . whosoever therefore obeyeth his christian soveraign , is not thereby hindred , neither from beleeving , nor from obeying god. but suppose that a christian king should from this foundation iesus is the christ , draw some false consequences , that is to say , make some superstructions of hay , or stubble , and command the teaching of the same ; yet seeing st. paul says , he shal be saved ; much more shall he be saved , that teacheth them by his command ; and much more yet , he that teaches not , but onely beleeves his lawfull teacher . and in case a subject be forbidden by the civill soveraign to professe some of those his opinions , upon what just ground can he disobey ? christian kings may erre in deducing a consequence , but who shall judge ? shall a private man judge , when the question is of his own obedience ? or shall any man judg but he that is appointed thereto by the church , that is , by the civill soveraign that representeth it ? or if the pope , or an apostle judge , may he not erre in deducing of a consequence ? did not one of the two , st. peter , or st. paul erre in a superstructure , when st. paul withstood st. peter to his face ? there can therefore be no contradiction between the laws of god , and the laws of a christian common-wealth . and when the civill soveraign is an infidel , every one of his own subjects that resisteth him , sinneth against the laws of god ( for such as are the laws of nature , ) and rejecteth the counsell of the apostles , that admonisheth all christians to obey their princes , and all children and servants to obey their parents , and masters , in all things . and for their faith , it is internall , and invisible ; they have the licence that naaman had , and need not put themselves into danger for it . but if they do , they ought to expect their reward in heaven , and not complain of their lawfull soveraign ; much lesse make warre upon him . for he that is not glad of any just occasion of martyrdome , has not the faith he professeth , but pretends it onely , to set some colour upon his own contumacy . but what infidel king is so unreasonable , as knowing he has a subject , that waiteth for the second comming of christ , after the present world shall bee burnt , and intendeth then to obey him ( which is the intent of beleeving that iesus is the christ , ) and in the mean time thinketh himself bound to obey the laws of that infidel king , ( which all christians are obliged in conscience to doe , ) to put to death , or to persecute such a subject ? and thus much shall suffice , concerning the kingdome of god , and policy ecclesiasticall . wherein i pretend not to advance any position of my own , but onely to shew what are the consequences that seem to me deducible from the principles of christian politiques , ( which are the holy scriptures , ) in confirmation of the power of civill soveraigns , and the duty of their subjects . and in the allegation of scripture , i have endeavoured to avoid such texts as are of obscure , or controverted interpretation ; and to alledge none , but in such sense as is most plain , and agreeable to the harmony and scope of the whole bible ; which was written for the re-establishment of the kingdome of god in christ. for it is not the bare words , but the scope of the writer that giveth the true light , by which any writing is to bee interpreted ; and they that insist upon single texts , without considering the main designe , can derive no thing from them cleerly ; but rather by casting atomes of scripture , as dust before mens eyes , make every thing more obscure than it is ; an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth , but their own advantage . of the kingdome of darknesse . chap. xliv . of spirituall darknesse from misinterpretation of scripture . besides these soveraign powers , divine , and humane , of which i have hitherto discoursed ▪ there is mention in scripture of another power , namely , * that of the rulers of the darknesse of this world , * the kingdome of s●…tan , and * the princpality of 〈◊〉 over daemons , that is to say , over phantasmes that appear in the air : for which cause satan is also called * the prince of the power of the air ; and ( because he ruleth in the darknesse of this world ) * the prince of this world : and in consequence hereunto , they who are under his dominion , in opposition to the faithfull ( who are the children of the light ) are called the children of darknesse . for seeing beelzebub is prince of phantasmes , inhabitants of his dominion of air and darknesse , the children of darknesse , and these daemons , phantasmes , or spirits of illusion , signifie allegorically the same thing . this considered , the kingdome of darknesse , as it is set forth in these , and other places of the scripture , is nothing else but a confederacy of dece●…vers , that to obtain do●… over men in this present world , endeavour by dark , and erroneons doctrines , to extinguish in them the light , both of nature , and of the gospell ; and so to dis-prepare them for the kingdome of god to co●… . as men that are utterly deprived from their nativity , of the light of the bodily eye , have no idea at all , of any such light ; and no man conceives in his imagination any greater light , than he hath at some time , or other , perceived by his outward senses : so also is it of the light of the gospel , and of the light of the understanding , that no man can conceive there is any greater degree of it , than that which he hath already attained unto . and from hence it comes to passe , that men have no other means to acknowledge their owne darknesse , but onely by reasoning from the un-foreseen mischances , that befall them in their ways ; the darkest part of the kingdom of satan , is that which is without the church of god ; that is to say , amongst them that beleeve not in jesus christ. but we cannot say , that therefore the church enjoyeth ( as the land of goshen ) all the light , which to the performance of the work enjoined us by god , is necessary . whence comes it , that in christendome there has been , almost from the time of the apostles , such justling of one another out of their places , both by forraign , and civill war ? such stumbling at every little asperity of their own fortune , and every little eminence of that of other men ? and such diversity of ways in running to the same mark , felicity , if it be not night amongst us , or at least a mist ? wee are therefore yet in the dark . the enemy has been here in the night of our naturall ignorance , and sown the tares of spirituall errors ; and that , first , by abusing , and putting out the light of the scriptures : for we erre , not knowing the scriptures . secondly , by introducing the daemonology of the heathen poets , that is to say , their fabulous doctrine concerning daemons , which are but idols , or phantasms of the braine , without any reall nature of their own , distinct from humane fancy ; such as are dead mens ghosts , and fairies , and other matter of old wives tales . thirdly , by mixing with the scripture divers reliques of the religion , and much of the vain and erroneous philosophy of the greeks , especially of aristotle . fourthly , by mingling with both these , false , or uncertain traditions , and fained , or uncertain history . and so we come to erre , by giving heed to seducing spirits , and the daemonology of such as speak lies in hypocrisie , ( or as it is in the originall , tim. . , . of those that play the part of lyars ) with a seared conscience , that is , contrary to their own knowledge . concerning the first of these , which is the seducing of men by abuse of scripture , i intend to speak briefly in this chapter . the greatest , and main abuse of scripture , and to which almost all the rest are either consequent , or subservient , is the wresting of it , to prove that the kingdome of god , mentioned so often in the scripture , is the present church , or multitude of christian men now living , or that being dead , are to rise again at the last day : whereas the kingdome of god was first instituted by the ministery of moses , over the jews onely ; who were therefore called his peculiar people ; and ceased afterward , in the election of saul , when they refused to be governed by god any more , and demanded a king after the manner of the nations ; which god himself consented unto , as i have more at large proved before , in the . chapter . after that time , there was no other kingdome of god in the world , by any pact , or otherwise , than he ever was , is , and shall be king , of all men , and of all creatures , as governing according to his will , by his infinite power . neverthelesse , he promised by his prophets to restore this his government to them again , when the time he hath in his secret counsell appointed for it shall bee fully come , and when they shall turn unto him by repentance , and amendment of life : and not onely so , but he invited also the gentiles to come in , and enjoy the happinesse of his reign , on the same conditions of conversion and repentance ; and hee promised also to send his son into the world , to expiate the sins of them all by his death , and to prepare them by his doctrine , to receive him at his second coming : which second coming not yet being , the kingdome of god is not yet come , and wee are not now under any other kings by pact , but our civill soveraigns ; saving onely , that christian men are already in the kingdome of grace , in as much as they have already the promise of being received at his comming againe . consequent to this errour , that the present church is christs kingdome , there ought to be some one man , or assembly , by whose mouth our saviour ( now in heaven ) speaketh , giveth law , and which representeth his person to all christians , or divers men , or divers assemblies that doe the same to divers parts of christendome . this power regal under christ , being challenged , universally by the pope , and in particular common-wealths by assemblies of the pastors of the place , ( when the scripture gives it to none but to civill soveraigns , ) comes to be so passionately disputed , that it putteth out the light of nature , and causeth so great a darknesse in mens understanding , that they see not who it is to whom they have engaged their obedience . consequent to this claim of the pope to vicar generall of christ in the present church , ( supposed to be that kingdom of his , to which we are addressed in the gospel , ) is the doctrine , that it is necessary for a christian king , to receive his crown by a bishop ; as if it were from that ceremony , that he derives the clause of dei gratiâ in his title ; and that then onely he is made king by the favour of god , when he is crowned by the authority of gods universall vicegerent on earth ; and that every bishop whosoever be his soveraign , taketh at his consecration an oath of absolute obedience to the pope . consequent to the same , is the doctrine of the fourth councell of lateran , held under pope innocent the third , ( chap. . de haereticis . ) that if a king at the popes admonition , doe not purge his kingdome of haeresies , and being excommunicate for the same , doe not give satisfaction within a year , his subjects are absolved of the bond of their obedience . where , by haeresies are understood all opinions which the church of rome hath forbidden to be maintained . and by this means , as often as there is any repugnancy between the politicall designes of the pope , and other christian princes , as there is very often , there ariseth such a mist amongst their subjects , that they know not a stranger that thrusteth himself into the throne of their lawfull prince , from him whom they had themselves placed there ; and in this darknesse of mind , are made to fight one against another , without discerning their enemies from their friends , under the conduct of another mans ambition . from the same opinion , that the present church is the kingdome of god , it proceeds that pastours , deacons , and all other ministers of the church , take the name to themselves of the clergy ; giving to other christians the name of laity , that is , simply people . for clergy signifies those , whose maintenance is that revenue , which god having reserved to himselfe during his reigne over the israelites , assigned to the tribe of levi ( who were to be his publique ministers , and had no portion of land set them out to live on , as their brethren ) to be their inheritance . the pope therefore , ( pretending the present church to be , as the realme of israel , the kingdome of god ) challenging to himselfe and his subordinate ministers , the like revenue , as the inheritance of god , the name of clergy was sutable to that claime . and thence it is , that tithes , and other tributes paid to the levites , as gods right , amongst the israelites , have a long time been demanded , and taken of christians , by ecclesiastiques , iure divino , that is , in gods right . by which meanes , the people every where were obliged to a double tribute ; one to the state , another to the clergy ; whereof , that to the clergy , being the tenth of their revenue , is double to that which a king of athens ( and esteemed a tyrant ) exacted of his subjects for the defraying of all publique charges : for he demanded no more but the twentieth part ; and yet abundantly maintained therewith the commonwealth . and in the kingdome of the iewes , during the sacerdotall reigne of god , the tithes and offerings were the whole publique revenue . from the same mistaking of the present church for the kingdom of god , came in the distinction betweene the civill and the canon laws : the civil law being the acts of soveraigns in their own dominions , and the canon law being the acts of the pope in the same dominions . which canons , though they were but canons , that is , rules propounded , and but voluntarily received by christian princes , till the translation of the empire to charlemain ; yet afterwards , as the power of the pope encreased , became rules commanded , and the emperours themselves ( to avoyd greater mischiefes , which the people blinded might be led into ) were forced to let them passe for laws . from hence it is , that in all dominions , where the popes ecclesiasticall power is entirely received , jewes , turkes , and gentiles , are in the roman church tolerated in their religion , as farre forth , as in the exercise and profession thereof they offend not against the civill power : whereas in a christian , though a stranger , not to be of the roman religion , is capitall ; because the pope pretendeth that all christians are his subjects . for otherwise it were as much against the law of nations , to persecute a christian stranger , for professing the religion of his owne country , as an infidell ; or rather more , in as much as they that are not against christ , are with him . from the same it is that in every christian state there are certaine men , that are exempt , by ecclesiasticall liberty , from the tributes , and from the tribunals of the civil state ; for so are the secular clergy , besides monks and friars , which in many places , bear so great a proportion to the common people , as if need were , there might be raised out of them alone , an army , sufficient for any warre the church militant should imploy them in , against their owne , or other princes . a second generall abuse of scripture , is the turning of consecration into conjuration , or enchantment . to consecrate , is in scripture , to offer , give , or dedicate , in pious and decent language and gesture , a man , or any other thing to god , by separating of it from common use ; that is to say , to sanctifie , or make it gods , and to be used only by those , whom god hath appointed to be his publike ministers , ( as i have already proved at large in the . chapter ; ) and thereby to change , not the thing consecrated , but onely the use of it , from being profane and common , to be holy , and peculiar to gods service . but when by such words , the nature or qualitie of the thing it selfe , is pretended to be changed , it is not consecration , but either an extraordinary worke of god , or a vaine and impious conjuration . but seeing ( for the frequency of pretending the change of nature in their consecrations , ) it cannot be esteemed a work extraordinary , it is no other than a conjuration or incantation , whereby they would have men to beleeve an alteration of nature that is not , contrary to the testimony of mans sight , and of all the rest of his senses . as for example , when the priest , in stead of consecrating bread and wine to gods peculiar service in the sacrament of the lords supper , ( which is but a separation of it from the common use , to signifie , that is , to put men in mind of their redemption , by the passion of christ , whose body was broken , and blood shed upon the crosse for our transgressions , ) pretends , that by saying of the words of our saviour , this is my body , and this is my blood , the nature of bread is no more there , but his very body ; notwithstanding there appeareth not to the sight , or other sense of the receiver , any thing that appeared not before the consecration . the egyptian conjurers , that are said to have turned their rods to serpents , and the water into bloud , are thought but to have deluded the senses of the spectators by a false shew of things , yet are esteemed enchanters : but what should wee have thought of them , if there had appeared in their rods nothing like a serpent , and in the water enchanted , nothing like bloud , nor like any thing else but water , but that they had faced down the king , that they were serpents that looked like rods , and that it was bloud that seemed water ? that had been both enchantment , and lying . and yet in this daily act of the priest , they doe the very same , by turning the holy words into the manner of a charme , which produceth nothing new to the sense ; but they face us down , that it hath turned the bread into a man ; nay more , into a god ; and require men to worship it , as if it were our saviour himself present god and man , and thereby to commit most grosse idolatry . for if it bee enough to excuse it of idolatry , to say it is no more bread , but god ; why should not the same excuse serve the egyptians , in case they had the faces to say , the leeks , and onyons they worshipped , were not very leeks , and onyons , but a divinity under their species , or likenesse . the words , this is my body , are aequivalent to these , this signifies , or represents my body ; and it is an ordinary figure of speech : but to take it literally , is an abuse ; nor though so taken , can it extend any further , than to the bread which christ himself with his own hands consecrated . for hee never said , that of what bread soever , any priest whatsoever , should say , this is my body , or , this is christs body , the same should presently be transubstantiated . nor did the church of rome ever establish this transubstantiation , till the time of innocent the third ; which was not above . years agoe , when the power of popes was at the highest , and the darknesse of the time grown so great , as men discerned not the bread that was given them to eat , especially when it was stamped with the figure of christ upon the crosse , as if they would have men beleeve it were transubstantiated , not onely into the body of christ , but also into the wood of his crosse , and that they did eat both together in the sacrament . the like incantation , in stead of consecration , is used also in the sacrament of baptisme : where the abuse of gods name in each severall person , and in the whole trinity , with the sign of the crosse at each name , maketh up the charm : as first , when they make the holy water , the priest saith , i conjure thee , thou creature of water , in the name of god the father almighty , and in the name of iesus christ his onely son our lord , and in vertue of the holy ghost , that thou become conjured water , to drive away all the powers of the enemy , and to eradicate , and supplant the enemy , &c. and the same in the benediction of the salt to be mingled with it ; that thou become conjured salt , that all phantasmes , and knavery of the devills fraud may fly and depart from the place wherein thou art sprinkled ; and every unclean spirit bee conjured by him that shall come to judg the quicke and the dead . the same in the benediction of the oyle , that all the power of the enemy , all the host of the devill , all assaults and phantasmes of satan , may be driven away by this creature of oyle . and for the infant that is to be baptized , he is subject to many charms : first , at the church dore the priest blows thrice in the childs face , and sayes , goe out of him unclean spirit , and give place to the holy ghost the comforter . as if all children , till blown on by the priest were daemoniaques : again , before his entrance into the church , he saith as before , i conjure thee , &c. to goe out , and depart from this servant of god : and again the same exorcisme is repeated once more before he be baptized . these , and some other incantations , are those that are used in stead of benedictions , and consecrations , in administration of the sacraments of baptisme , and the lords supper ; wherein every thing that serveth to those holy uses ( except the unhallowed spittle of the priest ) hath some set form of exorcisme . nor are the other rites , as of marriage , of extreme unction , of visitation of the sick , of consecrating churches , and church-yards , and the like , exempt from charms ; in as much as there is in them the use of enchanted oyle , and water , with the abuse of the crosse , and of the holy word of david , asperges me domine hyssopo , as things of efficacy to drive away phantasmes , and imaginary spirits . another generall error , is from the misinterpretation of the words eternall life , everlasting death , and the second death . for though we read plainly in holy scripture , that god created adam in an estate of living for ever , which was conditionall , that is to say , if he disobeyed not his commandement ; which was not essentiall to humane nature , but consequent to the vertue of the tree of life ; whereof hee had liberty to eat , as long as hee had not sinned ; and that hee was thrust out of paradise after he had sinned , lest hee should eate thereof , and live for ever ; and that christs passion is a discharge of sin to all that beleeve on him ; and by consequence , a restitution of eternall life , to all the faithfull , and to them onely : yet the doctrine is now , and hath been a long time far otherwise ; namely , that every man hath eternity of life by nature , in as much as his soul is immortall : so that the flaming sword at the entrance of paradise , though it hinder a man from coming to the tree of life , hinders him not from the immortality which god took from him for his sin ; nor makes him to need the sacrificing of christ , for the recovering of the same ; and consequently , not onely the faithfull and righteous , but also the wicked , and the heathen , shall enjoy eternall life , without any death at all ; much lesse a second , and everlasting death . to salve this , it is said , that by second , and everlasting death , is meant a second , and everlasting life , but in torments ; a figure never used , but in this very case . all which doctrine is founded onely on some of the obscurer places of the new testament ; which neverthelesse , the whole scope of the scripture considered , are cleer enough in a different sense , and unnecessary to the christian faith. for supposing that when a man dies , there remaineth nothing of him but his carkasse ; cannot god that raised inanimated dust and clay into a living creature by his word , as easily raise a dead carkasse to life again , and continue him alive for ever , or make him die again , by another word ? the soule in scripture , signifieth alwaies , either the life , or the living creature ; and the body and soule jointly , the body alive . in the fift day of the creation , god said , let the waters produce reptile animae viventis , the creeping thing that hath in it a living soule ; the english translate it , that hath life : and again , god created whales , & omnem animam viventem ; which in the english is , every living creature : and likewise of man , god made him of the dust of the earth , and breathed in his face the breath of life , & factus est homo in animam viventem , that is , and man was made a living creature : and after noah came out of the arke , god saith , hee will no more smite omnem animam viventem , that is , every living creature : and deut. . . eate not the bloud , for the bloud is the soule ; that is , the life . from which places , if by soule were meant a substance incorporeall , with an existence separated from the body , it might as well be inferred of any other living creature , as of man. but that the souls of the faithfull , are not of theirown nature , but by gods speciall grace , to remaine in their bodies , from the resurrection to all eternity , i have already i think sufficiently proved out of the scriptures , in the . chapter . and for the places of the new testament , where it is said that any man shall be cast body and soul into hell fire , it is no more than body and life ; that is to say , they shall be cast alive into the perpetuall fire of gehenna . this window it is , that gives entrance to the dark doctrine , first , of eternall torments ; and afterwards of purgatory , and consequently of the walking abroad , especially in places consecrated , solitary , or dark , of the ghosts of men deceased ; and thereby to the pretences of exorcisme and conjuration of phantasmes ; as also of invocation of men dead ; and to the doctrine of indulgences ; that is to say , of exemption for a time , or for ever , from the fire of purgatory , wherein these incorporeall substances are pretended by burning to be cleansed , and made fit for heaven . for men being generally possessed before the time of our saviour , by contagion of the daemonology of the greeks , of an opinion , that the souls of men were substances distinct from their bodies , and therefore that when the body was dead , the soul●… of every man , whether godly , or wicked , must subsist somewhere by vertue of its own nature , without acknowledging therein any supernaturall gift of gods ; the doctors of the church doubted a long time , what was the place , which they were to abide in , till they should be re-united to their bodies in the resurrection ; supposing for a while , they lay under the altars : but afterward the church of rome found it more profitable , to build for them this place of purgatory ; which by some other churches in this later age , has been demolished . let us now consider , what texts of scripture seem most to confirm these three generall errors , i have here touched . as for those which cardinall bellarmine hath alledged , for the present kingdome of god administred by the pope , ( than which there are none that make a better shew of proof , ) i have already answered them ; and made it evident , that the kingdome of god , instituted by moses , ended in the election of saul : after which time the priest of his own authority never deposed any king. that which the high priest did to athaliah , was not done in his owne right , but in the right of the young king joash her son : but solomon in his own right deposed the high priest abiathar , and set up another in his place . the most difficult place to answer , of all those that can be brought , to prove the kingdome of god by christ is already in this world , is alledged , not by bellarmine , nor any other of the church of rome ; but by beza ; that will have it to begin from the resurrection of christ. but whether hee intend thereby , to entitle the presbytery to the supreme power ecclesiasticall in the common-wealth of geneva , ( and consequently to every presbytery in every other common-wealth , ) or to princes , and other civill soveraigns , i doe not know . for the presbytery hath challenged the power to excomunicate their owne kings , and to bee the supreme moderators in religion , in the places where they have that form of church government , no lesse then the pope callengeth it universally . the words are ( marke . . ) verily i say unto you , that there be some of them that stand here , which shall not tast of death , till they have seene the kingdome of god come with power . which words , if taken grammatically , make it certaine , that either some of those men that stood by christ at that time , are yet alive ; or else , that the kingdome of god must be now in this present world . and then there is another place more difficult : for when the apostles after our saviours resurrection , and immediately before his ascension , asked our saviour , saying , ( acts . . ) wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdome to israel , he answered them , it is not for you to know the times and the seasons , which the father hath put in his own power ; but ye shall receive power by the comming of the holy ghost upon you , and yee shall be my ( martyrs ) witnesses both in ierusalem , & in all iudaea , and in samaria , and unto the uttermost part of the earth : which is as much as to say , my kingdome is not yet come , nor shall you foreknow when it shall come ; for it shall come as a theefe in the night ; but i will send you the holy ghost , and by him you shall have power to beare witnesse to all the world ( by your preaching ) of my resurrection , and the workes i have done , and the doctrine i have taught , that they may beleeve in me , and expect eternall life , at my comming againe : how does this agree with the comming of christs kingdome at the resurrection ? and that which st. paul saies ( thessal . . , . ) that they turned from idols , to serve the living and true god , and to waite for his sonne from heaven ; where to waite for his sonne from heaven , is to wait for his comming to be king in power ; which were not necessary , if his kingdome had beene then present . againe , if the kingdome of god began ( as beza on that place ( mark . . ) would have it ) at the resurrection ; what reason is there for christians ever since the resurrection to say in their prayers , let thy kingdome come ? it is therefore manifest , that the words of st. mark are not so to be interpreted . there be some of them that stand here ( saith our saviour ) that shall not tast of death till they have seen the kingdome of god come in power . if then this kingdome were to come at the resurrection of christ , why is it said , some of them , rather than all ? for they all lived till after christ was risen . but they that require an exact interpretation of this text , let them interpret first the like words of our saviour to st. peter concerning st. john , ( chap. . . ) if i will that he tarry till i come , what is that to thee ? upon which was grounded a report that hee should not dye : neverthelesse the truth of that report was neither confirmed , as well grounded ; nor refuted , as ill grounded on those words ; but left as a saying not understood . the same difficulty is also in the place of st. marke . and if it be lawfull to conjecture at their meaning , by that which immediately followes , both here , and in st. luke , where the same is againe repeated , it is not unprobable , to say they have relation to the transfiguration , which is described in the verses immediately following ; where it is said , that after six dayes iesus taketh with him peter , and iames , and iohn ( not all , but some of his disciples ) and leadeth them up into an high mountaine apart by themselves , and was transfigured before them . and his rayment became shining , exceeding white as snow ; so as no fuller on earth can white them . and there appeared unto them elias with moses , and they were talking with iesus , &c. so that they saw christ in glory and majestie , as he is to come ; insomuch as they were sore afraid . and thus the promise of our saviour was accomplished by way of vision : for it was a vision , as may probably bee inferred out of st. luke , that reciteth the same story ( ch . . ve . . ) and saith , that peter and they that were with him , were heavy with sleep : but most certainly out of matth. . . ( where the same is again related ; ) for our saviour charged thē , saying , tell no man the vision untill the son of man be risen from the dead . howsoever it be , yet there can from thence be taken no argument , to prove that the kingdome of god taketh beginning till the day of judgement . as for some other texts , to prove the popes power over civill soveraignes ( besides those of bellarmine ; ) as that the two swords that christ and his apostles had amongst them , were the spirituall and the temporall sword , which they say st. peter had given him by christ : and , that of the two luminaries , the greater signifies the pope , and the lesser the king ; one might as well inferre out of the first verse of the bible , that by heaven is meant the pope , and by earth the king : which is not arguing from scripture , but a wanton insulting over princes , that came in fashion after the time the popes were growne so secure of their greatnesse , as to contemne all christian kings ; and treading on the necks of emperours , to mocke both them , and the scripture , in the words of the . psalm , thou shalt tread upon the lion and the adder , the young lion and the dragon thou shalt trample under thy feet . as for the rites of consecration , though they depend for the most part upon the discretion and judgement of the governors of the church , and not upon the scriptures ; yet those governors are obliged to such direction , as the nature of the action it selfe requireth ; as that the ceremonies , words , and gestures , be both decent , and significant , or at least conformable to the action . when moses consecrated the tabernacle , the altar , and the vessels belonging to them , ( exod. . ) he anointed them with the oyle which god had commanded to bee made for that purpose ; and they were holy : there was nothing exorcized , to drive away phantasmes . the same moses ( the civill soveraigne of israel ) when he consecrated aaron ( the high priest , ) and his sons , did wash them with water , ( not exorcized water , ) put their garments upon them , and anointed them with oyle ; and they were sanctified , to minister unto the lord in the priests office ; which was a simple and decent cleansing , and adorning them , before hee presented them to god , to be his servants . when king solomon , ( the civill soveraigne of israel ) consecrated the temple hee had built , ( kings . ) he stood before all the ●…ongregation of israel ; and having blessed them , he gave thankes to god , for putting into the heart of his father , to build it ; and for giving to himselfe the grace to accomplish the same ; and then prayed unto him , first , to accept that house , though it were not sutable to his infinite greatnesse ; and to hear the prayers of his servants that should pray therein , or ( if they were absent , ) towards it ; and lastly , he offered a sacrifice of peace-offering , and the house was dedicated . here was no procession ; the king stood still in his first place ; no exorcised water ; no asperges me , nor other impertinent application of words spoken upon another occasion ; but a decent , and rationall speech , and such as in making to god a present of his new built house , was most conformable to the occasion . we read not that st. john did exorcize the water of jordan ; nor philip the water of the river wherein he baptized the eunuch ; nor that any pastor in the time of the apostles , did take his spittle , and put it to the nose of the person to be baptized , and say , in odorem suavitatis , that is , for a sweet savour unto the lord ; wherein neither the ceremony of spittle , for the uncleannesse ; nor the application of that scripture for the levity , can by any authority of man be justified . to prove that the soule separated from the body , liveth eternally , not onely the soules of the elect , by especiall grace , and restauration of the eternall life which adam lost by sinne , and our saviour restored by the sacrifice of himself , to the faithfull ; but also the soules of reprobates , as a property naturally consequent to the essence of mankind , without other grace of god , but that which is universally given to all mankind ; there are divers places , which at the first sight seem sufficiently to serve the turn : but such , as when i compare them with that which i have before ( chapter . ) alledged out of the of iob , seem to mee much more subject to a divers interpretation , than the words of iob. and first there are the words of solomon ( ecclesiastes . . ) then shall the dust return to dust , as it was , and the spirit shall return to god that gave it . which may bear well enough ( if there be no other text directly against it ) this interpretation , that god onely knows , ( but man not , ) what becomes of a mans spirit , when he expireth ; and the same solomon , in the same book , ( chap. . ver . , . ) delivereth the same sentence in the sense i have given it : his words are , all goe ( man and beast ) to the same place ; all are of the dust , and all turn to dust again ; who knoweth that the spirit of man goeth upward , and that the spirit of the beast goeth downward to the earth ? that is , none knows but god ; nor is it an unusuall phrase to say of things we understand not , god knows what , and god knows where . that of gen. . . enoch walked with god , and he was not ; for god took him ; which is expounded heb. . . he was translated , that he should not die ; and was not found , because god had translated him . for before his translation , he had this testimony , 〈◊〉 he pleased god , making as much for the immortality of the body , as of the soule , proveth , that this his translation was peculiar to them that please god ; not common to them with the wicked ; and depending on grace , not on nature . but on the contrary , what interpretation shall we give , besides the literall sense of the words of solomon ( eccles. . . ) that which befalleth the sons of men , befalleth beasts , even one thing befalleth them ; as the one dyeth , so doth the other ; yea , they have all one breath ( one spirit ; ) so that a man hath no praeeminence above a beast , for all is vanity . by the literall sense , here is no naturall immortality of the soule ; nor yet any repugnancy with the life eternall , which the elect shall enjoy by grace . and ( chap. . ver . . ) better is he that hath not yet been , than both they ; that is , than they that live , or have lived ; which , if the soule of all them that have lived , were immortall , were a hard saying ; for then to have an immortall soule , were worse than to have no soule at all . and againe , ( chapt. . . ) the living know they shall die , but the dead know not any thing ; that is , naturally , and before the resurrection of the body . another place which seems to make for a naturall immortality of the soule , is that , where our saviour saith , that abraham , isaac , and jacob are living : but this is spoken of the promise of god , and of their certitude to rise again , not of a life then actuall ; and in the same sense that god said to adam , that on the day hee should eate of the forbidden fruit , he should certainly die ; from that time forward he was a dead man by sentence ; but not by execution , till almost a thousand years after . so abraham , isaac , and jacob were alive by promise , then , when christ spake ; but are not actually till the resurrection . and the history of dives and lazarus , make nothing against this , if wee take it ( as it is ) for a parable . but there be other places of the new testament , where an immortality seemeth to be directly attributed to the wicked . for it is evident , that they shall all rise to judgement . and it is said besides in many places , that they shall goe into everlasting fire , everlasting torments , everlasting punishments ; and that the worm of conscience never dyeth ; and all this is comprehended in the word everlasting death , which is ordinarily interpreted everlasting life in torments : and yet i can find no where that any man shall live in torments everlastingly . also , it seemeth hard , to say , that god who is the father of mercies , that doth in heaven and earth all that hee will ; that hath the hearts of all men in his disposing ; that worketh in men both to doe , and to will ; and without whose free gift a man hath neither inclination to good , nor repentance of evill , should punish mens transgressions without any end of time , and with all the extremity of torture , that men can imagine , and more . we are therefore to consider , what the meaning is , of everlasting fire , and other the like phrases of scripture . i have shewed already , that the kingdome of god by christ beginneth at the day of judgment : that in that day , the faithfull shall rise again , with glorious , and spirituall bodies , and bee his subjects in that his kingdome , which shall be eternall : that they shall neither marry , nor be given in marriage , nor eate and drink , as they did in their naturall bodies ; but live for ever in their individuall persons , without the specificall eternity of generation : and that the reprobates also shall rise again , to receive punishments for their sins : as also , that those of the elect , which shall be alive in their earthly bodies at that day , shall have their bodies suddenly changed , and made spirituall , and immortall . but that the bodies of the reprobate , who make the kingdome of satan , shall also be glorious , or spirituall bodies , or that they shall bee as the angels of god , neither eating , nor drinking , nor engendring ; or that their life shall be eternall in their individuall persons , as the life of every faithfull man is , or as the life of adam had been if hee had not sinned , there is no place of scripture to prove it ; save onely these places concerning eternall torments ; which may otherwise be interpreted . from whence may be inferred , that as the elect after the resurrection shall be restored to the estate , wherein adam was before he had sinned ; so the reprobate shall be in the estate , that adam , and his posterity were in after the sin committed ; saving that god promised a redeemer to adam , and such of his seed as should trust in him , and repent ; but not to them that should die in their sins , as do the reprobate . these things considered , the texts that mention eternall fire , eternall torments , or the worm that never dieth , contradict not the doctrine of a second , and everlasting death , in the proper and naturall sense of the word death . the fire , or torments prepared for the wicked in gehenna , tophet , or in what place soever , may continue for ever ; and there may never want wicked men to be tormented in them ; though not every , nor any one eternally . for the wicked being left in the estate they were in after adams sin , may at the resurrection live as they did , marry , and give in marriage , and have grosse and corruptible bodies , as all mankind now have ; and consequently may engender perpetually , after the resurrection , as they did before : for there is no place of scripture to the contrary . for st. paul , speaking of the resurrection ( cor. . ) understandeth it onely of the resurrection to life eternall ; and not the resurrection to punishment . and of the first , he saith that the body is sown in corruption , raised in incorruption ; sown in dishonour , raised in honour ; sown in weaknesse , raised in power ; sown a naturall body , raised a spirituall body : there is no such thing can be said of the bodies of them that rise to punishment . so also our saviour , when hee speaketh of the nature of man after the resurrection , meaneth , the resurrection to life eternall , not to punishment . the text is luke . verses . , . a fertile text . the children of this world marry , and are given in marriage ; but they that shall be counted worthy to obtaine that world , and the resurrection from the dead , neither marry , nor are given in marriage : neither can they die any more ; for they are equall to the angells , and are the children of god , being the children of the resurrection : the children of this world , that are in the estate which adam left them in , shall marry , and be given in marriage ; that is , corrupt , and generate successively ; which is an immortality of the kind , but not of the persons of men : they are not worthy to be counted amongst them that shall obtain the next world , and an absolute resurrection from the dead ; but onely a short time , as inmates of that world ; and to the end onely to receive condign punishment for their contumacy . the elect are the onely children of the resurrection ; that is to say , the sole heirs of eternall life : they only can die no more : it is they that are equall to the angels , and that are the children of god ; and not the reprobate . to the reprobate there remaineth after the resurrection , a second , and eternall death : between which resurrection , and their second , and eternall death , is but a time of punishment and torment ; and to last by succession of sinners thereunto , as long as the kind of man by propagation shall endure ; which is eternally . upon this doctrine of the naturall eternity of separated soules , is founded ( as i said ) the doctrine of purgatory . for supposing eternall life by grace onely , there is no life , but the life of the body ; and no immortality till the resurrection . the texts for purgatory alledged by bellarmine out of the canonicall scripture of the old testament , are first , the fasting of david for saul and ionathan , mentioned ( kings , . . ) ; and againe , ( sam. . . ) for the death of abner . this fasting of david , he saith , was for the obtaining of something for them at gods hands , after their death ; because after he had fasted to procure the recovery of his owne child , assoone as he knew it was dead , he called for meate . seeing then the soule hath an existence separate from the body , and nothing can be obtained by mens fasting for the soules that are already either in heaven , or hell , it followeth that there be some soules of dead men , that are neither in heaven , nor in hell ; and therefore they must bee in some third place , which must be purgatory . and thus with hard straining , hee has wrested those places to the proofe of a purgatory : whereas it is manifest , that the ceremonies of mourning , and fasting , when they are used for the death of men , whose life was not profitable to the mourners , they are used for honours sake to their persons ; and when t is done for the death of them by whose life the mourners had benefit , it proceeds from their particular dammage : and so david honoured saul , and abner , with his fasting ; and in the death of his owne child , recomforted himselfe , by receiving his ordinary food . in the other places , which he alledgeth out of the old testamēt , there is not so much as any shew , or colour of proofe . he brings in every text wherein there is the word anger , or fire , or burning , or purging , or clensing , in case any of the fathers have but in a sermon rhetorically applied it to the doctrine of purgatory , already beleeved . the first verse of psalme , . o lord rebuke me not in thy wrath ; nor chasten me in thy hot displeasure : what were this to purgatory , if augustine had not applied the wrath to the fire of hell , and the displeasure to that of purgatory ? and what is it to purgatory , that of psalme , . . wee went through fire and water , and thou broughtest us to a moist place ; and other the like texts , ( with which the doctors of those times entended to adorne , or extend their sermons , or commentaries ) haled to their purposes by force of wit ? but he alledgeth other places of the new testament , that are not so easie to be answered : and first that of matth. . . whosoever speaketh a word against the sonne of man , it shall be forgiven him ; but whosoever speaketh against the holy ghost , it shall not bee forgiven him neither in this world , nor in the world to come : where he will have purgatory to be the world to come , wherein some sinnes may be forgiven , which in this world were not forgiven : notwithstanding that it is manifest , there are but three worlds ; one from the creation to the flood , which was destroyed by water , and is called in scripture the old world ; another from the flood , to the day of judgement , which is the present world , and shall bee destroyed by fire ; and the third , which shall bee from the day of judgement forward , everlasting , which is called the world to come ; and in which it is agreed by all , there shall be no purgatory : and therefore the world to come , and purgatory , are inconsistent . but what then can bee the meaning of those our saviours words ? i confesse they are very hardly to bee reconciled with all the doctrines now unanimously received : nor is it any shame , to confesse the profoundnesse of the scripture , to bee too great to be sounded by the shortnesse of humane understanding . neverthelesse , i may propound such things to the consideration of more learned divines , as the text it selfe suggesteth . and first , seeing to speake against the holy ghost , as being the third person of the trinity , is to speake against the church , in which the holy ghost resideth ; it seemeth the comparison is made , betweene the easinesse of our saviour , in bearing with offences done to him while hee himselfe taught the world , that is , when he was on earth , and the severity of the pastors after him , against those which should deny their authority , which was from the holy ghost : as if he should say ▪ you that deny my power ; nay you that shall crucifie me , shall be pardoned by mee , as often as you turne unto mee by repentance : but if you deny the power of them that teach you hereafter , by vertue of the holy ghost , they shall be inexorable , and shall not forgive you , but persecute you in this world , and leave you without absolution , ( though you turn to me , unlesse you turn also to them , ) to the punishments ( as much as lies in them ) of the world to come : and so the words may be taken as a prophecy , or praediction concerning the times , as they have along been in the christian church : or if this be not the meaning , ( for i am not peremptory in such difficult places , ) perhaps there may be place left after the resurrection for the repentance of some sinners : and there is also another place , that seemeth to agree therewith . for considering the words of st. paul ( cor. . . ) what shall they doe which are baptized for the dead , if the dead rise not at all ? why also are they baptized for the dead ? a man may probably inferre , as some have done , that in st. pauls time , there was a custome by receiving baptisme for the dead , ( as men that now beleeve , are sureties and undertakers for the faith of infants , that are not capable of beleeving , ) to undertake for the persons of their deceased friends , that they should be ready to obey , and receive our saviour for their king , at his his coming again ; and then the forgivenesse of sins in the world to come , has no need of a purgatory . but in both these interpretations , there is so much of paradox , that i trust not to them ; but propound them to those that are throughly versed in the scripture , to inquire if there be no clearer place that contradicts them . onely of thus much , i see evident scripture , to perswade me , that there is neither the word , nor the thing of purgatory , neither in this , nor any other text ; nor any thing that can prove a necessity of a place for the soule without the body ; neither for the soule of lazarus during the four days he was dead ; nor for the soules of them which the romane church pretend to be tormented now in purgatory . for god , that could give a life to a peece of clay , hath the same power to give life again to a dead man , and renew his inanimate , and rotten carkasse , into a glorious , spirituall , and immortall body . another place is that of cor. . where it is said , that they which built stubble , hay , &c. on the true foundation , their work shall perish ; but they themselves shall be saved ; but as through fire : this fire , he will have to be the fire of purgatory . the words , as i have said before , are an allusion to those of zach. . . where he saith , i will bring the third part through the fire , and refine them as silver is refined , and will try them as gold is tryed : which is spoken of the comming of the messiah in power and glory ; that is , at the day of judgment , and conflagration of the present world ; wherein the elect shall not be consumed , but be refined ; that is , depose their erroneous doctrines , and traditions , and have them as it were sindged of ; and shall afterwards call upon the name of the true god. in like manner , the apostle saith of them , that holding this foundation iesus is the christ , shall build thereon some other doctrines that be erroneous , that they shall not be consumed in that fire which reneweth the world , but shall passe through it to salvation ; but so , as to see , and relinquish their former errours . the builders , are the pastors ; the foundation , that iesus is the christ ; the stubble and hay , false consequences drawn from it through ignorance , or frailty ; the gold , silver , and pretious stones , are their true doctrines ; and their refining or purging , the relinquishing of their errors . in all which there is no colour at all for the burning of incorporeall , that is to say , impatible souls . a third place is that of cor. . before mentioned , concerning baptisme for the dead : out of which he concludeth , first , that prayers for the dead are not unprofitable ; and out of that , that there is a fire of purgatory : but neither of them rightly . for of many interpretations of the word baptisme , he approveth this in the first place , that by baptisme is meant ( metaphorically ) a baptisme of penance ; and that men are in this sense baptized , when they fast , and pray , and give almes : and so baptisme for the dead , and prayer for the dead , is the same thing . but this is a metaphor , of which there is no example , neither in the scripture , nor in any other use of language ; and which is also discordant to the harmony , and scope of the scripture . the word baptisme is used ( mar. . . & luk. . . ) for being dipped in ones own bloud , as christ was upon the cross , and as most of the apostles were , for giving testimony of him . but it is hard to say , that prayer , fasting , and almes , have any similitude with dipping . the same is used also mat. . . ( which seemeth to make somewhat for purgatory ) for a purging with fire . but it is evident the fire and purging here mentioned , is the same whereof the prophet zachary speaketh ( chap. . v. . ) i will bring the third part through the fire , and will refine them , &c. and st. peter after him ( epist. . . ) that the triall of your faith , which is much more precious than of gold that perisheth , though it be tryed with fire , might be found unto praise , and honour , and glory at the appearing of iesus christ ; and st. paul ( cor. . . ) the fire shall trie every mans work of what sort it is . but st. peter , and st. paul speak of the fire that shall be at the second appearing of christ ; and the prophet zachary of the day of judgment : and therefore this place of s. mat. may be interpreted of the same ; and then there will be no necessity of the fire of purgatory . another interpretation of baptisme for the dead , is that which i have before mentioned , which he preferreth to the second place of probability : and thence also he inferreth the utility of prayer for the dead . for if after the resurrection , such as have not heard of christ , or not beleeved in him , may be received into christs kingdome ; it is not in vain , after their death , that their friends should pray for them , till they should be risen . but granting that god , at the prayers of the faithfull , may convert unto him some of those that have not heard christ preached , and consequently cannot have rejected christ , and that the charity of men in that point , cannot be blamed ; yet this concludeth nothing for purgatory , because to rise from death to life , is one thing ; to rise from purgatory to life is another ; as being a rising from life to life , from a life in torments to a life in joy . a fourth place is that of mat. . . agree with thine adversary quickly , whilest thou art in the way with him , left at any time the adversary deliver thee to the iudge , and the iudge deliver thee to the officer , and thou be cast into prison . verily i say unto thee , thou shalt by no means come out thence , till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing . in which allegory , the offender is the sinner ; both the adversary and the judge is god ; the way is this life ; the prison is the grave ; the officer , death ; from which , the sinner shall not rise again to life eternall , but to a second death , till he have paid the utmost farthing , or christ pay it for him by his passion , which is a full ransome for all manner of sin , as well lesser sins , as greater crimes ; both being made by the passion of christ equally veniall . the fift place , is that of matth. . . whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause , shall be guilty in iudgment . and whosoever shall say to his brother , racha , shall be guilty in the councel . but whosoever shall say , thou foole , shall be guilty to hell fire . from which words he inferreth three sorts of sins , and three sorts of punishments ; and that none of those sins , but the last , shall be punished with hell fire ; and consequently , that after this life , there is punishment of lesser sins in purgatory . of which inference , there is no colour in any interpretation that hath yet been given of them : shall there be a distinction after this life of courts of justice , as there was amongst the jews in our saviours time , to hear , and determine divers sorts of crimes ; as the judges , and the councell ? shall not all judicature appertain to christ , and his apostles ? to undersand therefore this text , we are not to consider it solitarily , but jointly with the words precedent , and subsequent . our saviour in this chapter interpreteth the law of moses ; which the jews thought was then fulfilled , when they had not transgressed the grammaticall sense thereof , howsoever they had transgressed against the sentence , or meaning of the legislator . therefore whereas they thought the sixth commandement was not broken , but by killing a man ; nor the seventh , but when a man lay with a woman , not his wife ; our saviour tells them , the inward anger of a man against his brother , if it be without just cause , is homicide : you have heard ( saith hee ) the law of moses , thou shalt not kill , and that whosoever shall kill , shall bee condemned before the iudges , or before the session of the seventy : but i say unto you , to be angry with ones brother without cause ; or to say unto him racha , or foole , is homicide , and shall be punished at the day of judgment , and session of christ , and his apostles , with hell fire : so that those words were not used to distinguish between divers crimes , and divers courts of justice , and divers punishments ; but to taxe the distinction between sin , and sin , which the jews drew not from the difference of the will in obeying god , but from the difference of their temporall courts of justice ; and to shew them that he that had the will to hurt his brother , though the effect appear but in reviling , or not at all , shall be cast into hell fire , by the judges , and by the session , which shall be the same , not different courts at the day of judgment . this considered , what can be drawn from this text , to maintain purgatory , i cannot imagine . the sixth place is luke . . make yee friends of the unrighteous mammon , that when yee faile , they may receive you into everlasting tabernacles . this he alledges to prove invocation of saints departed . but the sense is plain , that we should make friends with our riches , of the poore ; and thereby obtain their prayers whilest they live . he that giveth to the poore , lendeth to the lord. the seventh is luke . . lord remember me when thou commest into thy kingdome : therefore , saith hee , there is remission of sins after this life . but the consequence is not good . our saviour then forgave him ; and at his comming againe in glory , will remember to raise him againe to life eternall . the eight is acts . . where st. peter saith of christ , that god had raised him up , and loosed the paines of death , because it was not possible he should be holden of it : which hee interprets to bee a descent of christ into purgatory , to loose some soules there from their torments : whereas it is manifest , that it was christ that was loosed ; it was hee that could not bee holden of death , or the grave ; and not the souls in purgatory . but if that which beza sayes in his notes on this place be well observed , there is none that will not see , that in stead of paynes , it should be bands ; and then there is no further cause to seek for purgatory in this text. chap. xlv . of daemonology , and other reliques of the religion of the gentiles . the impression made on the organs of sight , by lucide bodies , either in one direct line , or in many lines , reflected from opaque , or refracted in the passage through diaphanous bodies , produceth in living creatures , in whom god hath placed such organs , an imagination of the object , from whence the impression proceedeth ; which imagination is called sight ; and seemeth not to bee a meer imagination , but the body it selfe without us ; in the same manner , as when a man violently presseth his eye , there appears to him a light without , and before him , which no man perceiveth but himselfe ; because there is indeed no such thing without him , but onely a motion in the interiour organs , pressing by resistance outward , that makes him think so . and the motion made by this pressure , continuing after the object which caused it is removed , is that we call imagination , and memory , and ( in sleep , and sometimes in great distemper of the organs by sicknesse , or violence ) a dream : of which things i have already spoken briefly , in the second and third chapters . this nature of sight having never been discovered by the ancient pretenders to naturall knowledge ; much lesse by those that consider not things so remote ( as that kowledge is ) from their present use ; it was hard for men to conceive of those images in the fancy , and in the sense , otherwise , than of things really without us : which some ( because they vanish away , they know not whither , nor how , ) will have to be absolutely incorporeall , that is to say immateriall , or formes without matter ; colour and figure , without any coloured or figured body ; and that they can put on aiery bodies ( as a garment ) to make them visible when they will to our bodily eyes ; and others say , are bodies , and living creatures , but made of air , or other more subtile and aethereall matter , which is , then , when they will be seen , condensed . but both of them agree on one generall appellation of them , daemons . as if the dead of whom they dreamed , were not inhabitants of their own brain , but of the air , or of heaven , or hell ; not phantasmes , but ghosts ; with just as much reason , as if one should say , he saw his own ghost in a looking-glasse , or the ghosts of the stars in a river ; or call the ordinary apparition of the sun , of the quantity of about a foot , the daemon , or ghost of that great sun that enlighteneth the whole visible world : and by that means have feared them , as things of an unknown , that is , of an unlimited power to doe them good , or harme ; and consequently , given occasion to the governours of the heathen common-wealths to regulate this their fear , by establishing that daemonology ( in which the poets , as principall priests of the heathen religion , were specially employed , or reverenced ) to the publique peace , and to the obedience of subjects necessary thereunto ; and to make some of them good daemons , and others evill ; the one as a spurre to the observance , the other , as reines to withhold them from violation of the laws . what kind of things they were , to whom they attributed the name of daemons , appeareth partly in the genealogie of their gods , written by hesiod , one of the most ancient poets of the graecians ; and partly in other histories ; of which i have observed some few before , in the . chapter of this discourse . the graecians , by their colonies and conquests , communicated their language and writings into asia , egypt , and italy ; and therein , by necessary consequence their daemonology , or ( as st. paul calles it ) their doctrines of devils : and by that meanes , the contagion was derived also to the jewes , both of iudaea , and alexandria , and other parts , whereinto they were dispersed . but the name of daemon they did not ( as the graecians ) attribute to spirits both good , and evill ; but to the evill onely : and to the good daemons they gave the name of the spirit of god ; and esteemed those into whose bodies they entred to be prophets . in summe , all singularity if good , they attributed to the spirit of god ; and if evill , to some daemon , but a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , an evill daemon , that is , a devill . and therefore , they called daemoniaques , that is , possessed by the devill , such as we call mad-men or lunatiques ; or such as had the falling sicknesse ; or that spoke any thing , which they for want of understanding , thought absurd : as also of an unclean person in a notorious degree , they used to say he had an unclean spirit ; of a dumbe man , that he had a dumbe devill ; and of iohn baptist ( math. . . ) for the singularity of his fasting , that he had a devill ; and of our saviour , because he said , hee that keepeth his sayings should not see death in aeternum , now we know thou hast a devill ; abraham is dead , and the prophets are dead : and again , because he said ( iohn . . ) they went about to kill him , the people answered , thou hast a devill , who goeth about to kill thee ? whereby it is manifest , that the jewes had the same opinions concerning phantasmes , namely , that they were not phantasmes that is , idols of the braine , but things reall , and independent on the fancy . which doctrine if it be not true , why ( may some say ; did not our saviour contradict it , and teach the contrary ? nay why does he use on diverse occasions , such forms of speech as seem to confirm it ? to this i answer , that first , where christ saith , a spirit hath not flesh and bone , though hee shew that there be spirits , yet hee denies not that they are bodies : and where st. paul saies , we shall rise spirituall bodies , he acknowledgeth the nature of spirits , but that they are bodily spirits ; which is not difficult to understand . for air and many other things are bodies , though not flesh and bone , or any other grosse body , to bee discerned by the eye . but when our saviour speaketh to the devill , and commandeth him to go out of a man , if by the devill , be meant a disease as phrenesy , or lunacy , or a corporeal spirit , is not the speech improper ? can diseases heare ? or can there be a corporeall spirit in a body of flesh and bone , full already of vitall and animall spirits ? are there not therefore spirits , that neither have bodies , nor are meer imaginations ? to the first i answer , that the addressing of our saviours command to the madnesse , or lunacy he cureth , is no more improper , than was his rebuking of the fever , or of the wind , and sea ; for neither do these hear : or than was the command of god , to the light , to the firmament , to the sunne , and starres , when he commanded them to bee : for they could not heare before they had a beeing . but those speeches are not improper , because they signifie the power of gods word : no more therefore is it improper , to command madnesse , or lunacy ( under the appellation of devils , by which they were then commonly understood , ) to depart out of a mans body . to the second , concerning their being incorporeall , i have not yet observed any place of scripture , from whence it can be gathered , that any man was ever possessed with any other corporeall spirit , but that of his owne , by which his body is naturally moved . our saviour , immediately after the holy ghost descended upon him in the form of a dove , is said by st. matthew ( chapt. . . ) to have been led up by the spirit into the wildernesse ; and the same is recited ( luke . . ) in these words , iesus being full of the holy ghost , was led in the spirit into the wildernesse : whereby it is evident , that by spirit there , is meant the holy ghost . this cannot be interpreted for a possession : for christ , and the holy ghost , are but one and the same substance ; which is no possession of one substance , or body , by another . and whereas in the verses following , he is said to have been taken up by the devill into the holy city , and set upon a pinnacle of the temple , shall we conclude thence that hee was possessed of the devill , or carryed thither by violence ? and again , carryed thence by the devill into an exceeding high mountain , who shewed him thence all the kingdomes of the world : wherein , wee are not to beleeve he was either possessed , or forced by the devill ; nor that any mountaine is high enough , ( according to the literall sense , ) to shew him one whole hemisphere . what then can be the meaning of this place , other than that he went of himself into the wildernesse ; and that this carrying of him up and down , from the wildernesse to the city , and from thence into a mountain , was a vision ? conformable whereunto , is also the phrase of st. luke , that hee was led into the wildernesse , not by , but in the spirit : whereas concerning his being taken up into the mountaine , and unto the pinnacle of the temple , hee speaketh as st. matthew doth . which suiteth with the nature of a vision . again , where st. luke sayes of judas iscariot , that satan entred into him , and thereupon that he went and communed with the chief priests , and captaines , how he might betray christ unto them : it may be answered , that by the entring of satan ( that is the enemy ) into him , is meant , the hostile and traiterours intention of selling his lord and master . for as by the holy ghost , is frequently in scripture understood , the graces and good inclinations given by the holy ghost ; so by the entring of satan , may bee understood the wicked cogitations , and designes of the adversaries of christ , and his disciples . for as it is hard to say , that the devill was entred into judas , before he had any such hostile designe ; so it is impertinent to say , he was first christs enemy in his heart , and that the devill entred into him afterwards . therefore the entring of satan , and his wicked purpose , was one and the same thing . but if there be no immateriall spirit , nor any possession of mens bodies by any spirit corporeall , it may again be asked , why our saviour and his apostles did not teach the people so ; and in such cleer words , as they might no more doubt thereof . but such questions as these , are more curious , than necessary for a christian mans salvation . men may as well aske , why christ that could have given to all men faith , piety , and all manner of morall vertues , gave it to some onely , and not to all : and why he left the search of naturall causes , and sciences , to the naturall reason and industry of men , and did not reveal it to all , or any man supernaturally ; and many other such questions : of which neverthelesse there may be alledged probable and pious reasons . for as god , when he brought the israelites into the land of promise , did not secure them therein , by subduing all the nations round about them ; but left many of them , as thornes in their sides , to awaken from time to time their piety and industry : so our saviour , in conducting us toward his heavenly kingdome , did not destroy all the difficulties of naturall questions ; but left them to exercise our industry , and reason ; the scope of his preaching , being onely to shew us this plain and direct way to salvation , namely , the beleef of this article , that he was the christ , the son of the living god , sent into the world to sacrifice himselfe for our sins , and at his comming again , gloriously to reign over his elect , and to save them from their enemies eternally : to which , the opinion of possession by spirits , or phantasmes , are no impediment in the way ; though it be to some an occasion of going out of the way , and to follow their own inventions . if wee require of the scripture an account of all questions , which may be raised to trouble us in the performance of gods commands ; we may as well complaine of moses for not having set downe the time of the creation of such spirits , as well as of the creation of the earth , and sea , and of men , and beasts . to conclude , i find in scripture that there be angels , and spirits , good and evill ; but not that they are incorporeall , as are the apparitions men see in the dark , or in a dream , or vision ; which the latines call spectra , and took for daemons . and i find that there are spirits corporeall , ( though subtile and invisible ; ) but not that any mans body was possessed , or inhabited by them ; and that the bodies of the saints shall be such , namely , spirituall bodies , as st. paul calls them . neverthelesse , the contrary doctrine , namely , that there be incorporeall spirits , hath hitherto so prevailed in the church , that the use of exorcisme , ( that is to say , of ejection of devills by conjuration ) is thereupon built ; and ( ▪ though rarely and faintly practised ) is not yet totally given over . that there were many daemoniaques in the primitive church , and few mad-men , and other such singular diseases ; whereas in these times we hear of , and see many mad-men , and few daemoniaques , proceeds not from the change of nature ; but of names . but how it comes to passe , that whereas heretofore the apostles , and after them for a time , the pastors of the church , did cure those singular diseases , which now they are not seen to doe ; as likewise , why it is not in the power of every true beleever now , to doe all that the faithfull did then , that is to say , as we read ( mark . . ) in christs name to cast out devills , to speak with new tongues , to take up serpents , to drink deadly poison without harm taking , and to cure the sick by the laying on of their hands , and all this without other words , but in the name of iesus , is another question . and it is probable , that those extraordinary gifts were given to the church , for no longer a time , than men trusted wholly to christ , and looked for their felicity onely in his kingdome to come ; and consequently , that when they sought authority , and riches , and trusted to their own subtilty for a kingdome of this world , these supernaturall gifts of god were again taken from them . another relique of gentilisme , is the worship of images , neither instituted by moses in the old , nor by christ in the new testament ; nor yet brought in from the gentiles ; but left amongst them , after they had given their names to christ. before our saviour preached , it was the generall religion of the gentiles , to worship for gods , those apparences that remain in the brain from the impression of externall bodies upon the organs of their senses , which are commonly called ideas , idols , phantasmes , conceits , as being representations of those externall bodies , which cause them , and have nothing in them of reality , no more than there is in the things that seem to stand before us in a dream : and this is the reason why st. paul says , wee know that an idol is nothing : not that he thought that an image of metall , stone , or wood , was nothing ; but that the thing which they honored , or feared in the image , and held for a god , was a meer figment , without place , habitation , motion , or existence , but in the motions of the brain . and the worship of these with divine honour , is that which is in the scripture called idolatry , and rebellion against god. for god being king of the jews , and his lieutenant being first moses , and afterward the high priest ; if the people had been permitted to worship , and pray to images , ( which are representations of their own fancies , ) they had had no farther dependence on the true god , of whom their can be no similitude ; nor on his prime ministers , moses , and the high priests ; but every man had governed himself according to his own appetite , to the utter eversion of the common-wealth , and their own destruction for want of union . and therefore the first law of god was , they should not take for gods , alienos deos , that is , the gods of other nations , but that onely true god , who vouchsafed to commune with moses , and by him to give them laws and directions , for their peace , and for their salvation from their enemies . and the second was , that they should not make to themselves any image to worship , of their own invention . for it is the same deposing of a king , to submit to another king , whether he be set up by a neighbour nation , or by our selves . the places of scripture pretended to countenance the setting up of images , to worship them ; or to set them up at all in the places where god is worshipped , are first , two examples ; one of the cherubins over the ark of god ; the other of the brazen serpent : secondly , some texts whereby we are commanded to worship certain creatures for their relation to god ; as to worship his footstool : and lastly , some other texts , by which is authorized , a religious honoring of holy things . but before i examine the force of those places , to prove that which is pretended , i must first explain what is to be understood by worshipping , and what by images , and idols . i have already shewn in the chapter of this discourse , that to honor , is to value highly the power of any person : and that such value is measured , by our comparing him with others . but because there is nothing to be compared with god in power ; we honor him not but dishonour him by any value lesse than infinite . and thus honor is properly of its own nature , secret , and internall in the heart . but the inward thoughts of men , which appeare outwardly in their words and actions , are the signes of our honoring , and these goe by the name of worship , in latine cultus . therefore , to pray to , to swear by , to obey , to bee diligent , and officious in serving : in summe , all words and actions that betoken fear to offend , or desire to please , is worship , whether those words and actions be sincere , or feigned : and because they appear as signes of honoring , are ordinarily also called honor. the worship we exhibite to those we esteem to be but men , as to kings , and men in authority , is civill worship : but the worship we exhibite to that which we think to bee god , whatsoever the words , ceremonies , gestures , or other actions be , is divine vvorship . to fall prostrate before a king , in him that thinks him but a man , is but civill worship : and he that but putteth off his hat in the church , for this cause , that he thinketh it the house of god , worshippeth with divine worship . they that seek the distinction of divine and civill worship , not in the intention of the worshipper , but in the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , deceive themselves . for whereas there be two sorts of servants ; that sort , which is of those that are absolutely in the power of their masters , as slaves taken in war , and their issue , whose bodies are not in their own power , ( their lives depending on the will of their masters , in such manner as to forfeit them upon the least disobedience , ) and that are bought and sold as beasts , were called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is properly , slaves , and their service 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 : the other , which is of those that serve ( for hire , or in hope of benefit from their masters ) voluntarily ; are called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; that is , domestique servants ; to whose service the masters have no further right , than is contained in the covenants made betwixt them . these two kinds of servants have thus much common to them both , that their labour is appointed them by another : and the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is the generall name of both , signifying him that worketh for another , whether , as a slave , or a voluntary servant : so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth generally all service ; but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the service of bondmen onely , and the condition of slavery : and both are used in scripture ( to signifie our service of god ) promiscuously . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because we are gods slaves ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , because wee serve him : and in all kinds of service is contained , not onely obedience , but also worship ; that is , such actions , gestures , and words , as signifie honor. an image ( in the most strict signification of the word ) is the resemblance of some thing visible : in which sense the phantasticall formes , apparitions , or seemings of visible bodies to the sight , are onely images ; such as are the shew of a man , or other thing in the water , by reflexion , or refraction ; or of the sun , or stars by direct vision in the air ; which are nothing reall in the things seen , nor in the place where they seem to bee ; nor are their magnitudes and figures the same with that of the object ; but changeable , by the variation of the organs of sight , or by glasses ; and are present oftentimes in our imagination , and in our dreams , when the object is absent ; or changed into other colours , and shapes , as things that depend onely upon the fancy . and these are the images which are originally and most properly called ideas , and idols , and derived from the language of the graecians , with whom the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth to see. they are also called phantasmes , which is in the same language , apparitions . and from these images it is that one of the faculties of mans nature , is called the imagination . and from hence it is manifest , that there neither is , nor can bee any image made of a thing invisible . it is also evident , that there can be no image of a thing infinite : for all the images , and phantasmes that are made by the impression of things visible , are figured : but figure is a quantity every way determined : and therefore there can bee no image of god ; nor of the so●…le of man ; nor of spirits ; but onely of bodies visible , that is , bodies that have light in themselves , or are by such ●…nligtened . and whereas a man can fancy shapes he never saw ; making up a figure out of the parts of divers creatures ; as the poets make their centaures , chimaeras , and other monsters never seen : so can he also give matter to those shapes , and make them in wood , clay or metall . and these are also called images , not for the resemblance ▪ of any corporeall thing , but for the resemblance of some phantasticall inhabitants of the brain of the maker . but in these idols , as they are originally in the brain , and as they are painted , carved , moulded , or moulten in matter , there is a similitude of the one to the other , for which the materiall body made by art , may be said to be the image of the phantasticall idoll made by nature . but in a larger use of the word image , is contained also , any representation of one thing by another . so an earthly soveraign may be called the image of god : and an inferiour magistrate the image of an earthly soveraign . and many times in the idolatry of the gentiles there was little regard to the similitude of their materiall idol to the idol in their fancy , and yet it was called the image of it . for a stone unhewn has been set up for neptune , and divers other shapes far different from the shapes they conceived of their gods. and at this day we see many images of the virgin mary , and other saints , unlike one another , and without correspondence to any one mans fancy ; and yet serve well enough for the purpose they were erected for ; which was no more but by the names onely , to represent the persons mentioned in the history ; to which every man applyeth a mentall image of his owne making , or none at all . and thus an image in the largest sense , is either the resemblance , or the representation of some thing visible ; or both together , as it happeneth for the most part . but the name of idoll is extended yet further in scripture , to signifie also the sunne , or a starre , or any other creature , visible or invisible , when they are worshipped for gods. having shewn what is worship , and what an image ; i will now put them together , and examine what that idolatry is , which is forbidden in the second commandement , and other places of the scripture . to worship an image , is voluntarily to doe those externall acts , which are signes of honoring either the matter of the image , which is wood , stone , metall , or some other visible creature ; or the phantasme of the brain , for the resemblance , or representation whereof , the matter was formed and figured ; or both together , as one ●…nimate body , composed of the matter and the phantasme , as of a body and soule . to be uncovered , before a man of power and authority , or before the throne of a prince , or in such other places as hee ordaineth to that purpose in his absence , is to worship that man , or prince with civill worship ; as being a signe , not of honoring the stoole , or place , but the person ; and is not idolatry . but if hee that doth it , should suppose the soule of the prince to be in the stool , or should present a petition to the stool , it were divine worship , and idolatry . to pray to a king for such things , as hee is able to doe for us , though we prostrate our selves before him , is but civill worship ; because we acknowledge no other power in him , but humane : but voluntarily to pray unto him for fair weather , or for any thing which god onely can doe for us , is divine worship , and idolatry . on the other side if a king compell a man to it by the terrour of death , or other great corporall punishment , it is not idolatry : for the worship which the soveraign commandeth to bee done unto himself by the terrour of his laws , is not a sign that he that obeyeth him , does inwardly honour him as a god , but that he is desirous to save himselfe from death , or from a miserable life ; and that which is not a sign of internall honor , is no worship ; and therefore no idolatry . neither can it bee said , that hee that does it , scandalizeth , or layeth any stumbling block before his brother ; because how wise , or learned soever he be that worshippeth in that manner , another man cannot from thence argue , that he approveth it ; but that he doth it for fear ; and that it is not his act , but the act of his soveraign . to worship god , in some peculiar place , or turning a mans fa●… towards an image , or determinate place , is not to worship , or honor the place , or image ; but to acknowledge it holy , that is to say , to acknowledge the image , or the place to be set apart from common use : for that is the meaning of the word holy ; which implies no new quality in the place , or image ; but onely a new relation by appropriation to god ; and therefore is not idolatry ; no more than it was idolatry to worship god before the brazen serpent ; or for the jews when they were out of their owne countrey , to turn their faces ( when they prayed ) toward the temple of jerusalem ; or for moses to put off his shoes when he was before the flaming bush , the ground appertaining to mount sinai ; which place god had chosen to appear in , and to give his laws to the people of israel , and was therefore holy ground , not by inhaerent sanctity , but by separation to gods use ; or for christians to worship in the churches , which are once solemnly dedicated to god for that purpose , by the authority of the king , or other true representant of the church . but to worship god , as inanimating , or inhabiting , such image , or place ; that is to say , an infinite substance in a finite place , is idolatry : for such finite gods , are but idols of the brain , nothing reall ; and are commonly called in the scripture by the names of vanity , and lyes , and nothing . also to worship god , not as inanimating , or present in the place , or image ; but to the end to be put in mind of him , or of some works of his , in case the place , or image be dedicated , or set up by private authority , and not by the authority of them that are our soveraign pastors , is idolatry . for the commandement is , thou shalt not make to thy selfe any graven image . god commanded moses to set up the brazen serpent ; hee did not make it to himselfe ; it was not therefore against the commandement . but the making of the golden calfe by aaron , and the people , as being done without authority from god , was idolatry ; not onely because they held it for god , but also because they made it for a religious use , without warrant either from god their soveraign , or from moses , that was his lieutenant . the gentiles worshipped for gods , jupiter , and others ; that living , were men perhaps that had done great and glorious acts ; and for the children of god , divers men and women , supposing them gotten between an immortall deity , and a mortall man. this was idolatry , because they made them so to themselves , having no authority from god , neither in his eternall law of reason , nor in his positive and revealed will. but though our saviour was a man , whom wee also beleeve to bee god immortall , and the son of god ; yet this is no idolatry ; because wee build not that beleef upon our own fancy , or judgment , but upon the word of god revealed in the scriptures . and for the adoration of the eucharist , if the words of christ , this is my body , signifie , that he himselfe , and the seeming bread in his hand ; and not onely so , but that all the seeming morsells of bread that have ever since been , and any time hereafter shall bee consecrated by priests ; bee so many christs bodies , and yet all of them but one body , then is that no idolatry , because it is authorized by our saviour : but if that text doe not signifie that , ( for there is no other that can be alledged for it , ) then , because it is a worship of humane institution , it is idolatry . for it is not enough to say , god can transubstantiate the bread into christs body : for the gentiles also held god to be omnipotent ; and might upon that ground no lesse excuse their idolatry , by pretending , as well as others , a transubstantiation of their wood , and stone into god almighty . whereas there be , that pretend divine in●…piration , to be a supernaturall entring of the holy ghost into a man , and not an acquisition of gods graces , by doctrine , and study ; i think they are in a very dangerous dilemma . for if they worship not the men whom they beleeve to be so inspired , they fall into impiety ; as not adoring gods supernaturall presence . and again , if they worship him , they commit idolatry ; for the apostles would never permit themselves to be so worshipped . therefore the safest way is to beleeve , that by the descending of the dove upon the apostles ; and by christs breathing on them , when hee gave them the holy ghost ; and by the giving of it by i●…position of hands , are understood the signes which god hath been pleased to use , or ordain to bee used , of his promise to assist those persons in their study to preach his kingdome , and in their conversation , that it might not be scandalous , but edifying to others . besides the idolatrous worship of images , there is also a scandalous worship of them ; which is also a sin ; but not idolatry . for idolatry is to worship by signes of an internall , and reall honour : but scandalous worship , is but seeming worship ; and may sometimes bee joined with an inward , and hearty detestation , both of the image , and of the phantasticall daemon , or idol , to which it is dedicated ; and proceed onely from the fear of death , or other grievous punishment ; and is neverthelesse a sin in them that so worship , in case they be men whose actions are looked at by others , as lights to guide them by ; because following their ways , they cannot but stumble , and fall in the way of religion : whereas the example of those we regard not , works not on us at all , but leaves us to our own diligence and caution ; and consequently are no causes of our falling . if therefore a pastor lawfully called to teach and direct others , or any other , of whose knowledge there is a great opinion , doe externall honor to an idol for fear ; unlesse he make his feare , and unwillingnesse to it , as evident as the worship ; he scandalizeth his brother , by seeming to approve idolatry . for his brother arguing from the action of his teacher , or of him whose knowledge he esteemeth great , concludes it to bee lawfull in it selfe . and this scandall , is sin , and a scandall given . but if one being no pastor , nor of eminent reputation for knowledge in christian doctrine , doe the same , and another follow him ; this is no scandall given ; for he had no cause to follow such example : but is a pretence of scandall which hee taketh of himselfe for an excuse before m●…n : for an unlearned man , that is in the power of an idolatrous king , or state , if commanded on pain of death to worship before an idoll , hee detesteth the idoll in his heart , hee doth well ; though if he had the fortitude to suffer death , rather than worship it , he should doe better . but if a pastor , who as christs messenger , has undertaken to teach christs doctrine to all nations , should doe the same , it were not onely a sinfull scandall , in respect of other christian mens consciences , but a perfidious forsaking of his charge . the summe of that which i have said hitherto , concerning the worship of images , is this , that he that worshippeth in an image , or any creature , either the matter thereof , or any fancy of his own , which he thinketh to dwell in it ; or both together ; or beleeveth that such things hear his prayers , or see his devotions , without ears , or eyes , committeth idolatry : and he that counterfeiteth such worship for fear of punishment , if he bee a man whose example hath power amongst his brethren , committeth a sin : but he that worshippeth the creator of the world before such an image , or in such a place as he hath not made , or chosen of himselfe , but taken from the commandement of gods word , as the jewes did in worshipping god before the cherubins , and before the brazen serpent for a time , and in , or towards the temple of jerusalem , which was also but for a time , committeth not idolatry . now for the worship of saints , and images , and reliques , and other things at this day practised in the church of rome , i say they are not allowed by the word of god , nor brought into the church of rome , from the doctrine there taught ; but partly left in it at the first conversion of the gentiles ; and afterwards countenanced , and confirmed , and augmented by the bishops of rome . as for the proofs alledged out of scripture , namely , those examples of images appointed by god to bee set up ; they were not set up for the people , or any man to worship ; but that they should worship god himselfe before them ; as before the cherubins over the ark , and the brazen serpent . for we read not , that the priest , or any other did worship the cherubins ; but contrarily wee read ( kings . . ) that hezekiah brake in pieces the brazen serpent which moses had set up , because the people burnt incense to it . besides , those examples are not put for our imitation , that we also should set up images , under pretence of worshipping god before them ; because the words of the second commandement , thou shalt not make to thy selfe any graven image , &c. distinguish between the images that god commanded to be set up , and those which wee set up to our selves . and therefore from the cherubins , or brazen serpent , to the images of mans devising ; and from the worship commanded by god●… to the will●… worship of men , the argument is not good . this also is to bee considered , that as hezekiah brake in pieces the brazen serpent , because the jews did worship it , to the end they should doe so no more ; so also christian soveraigns ought to break down the images which their subjects have been accustomed to worship ; that there be no more occasion of such idolatry . for at this day , the ignorant people , where images are worshipped , doe really beleeve there is a divine power in the images ; and are told by their pastors , that some of them have spoken ; and have bled ; and that miracles have been done by them ; which they apprehend as done by the saint , which they think either is the image it self , or in it . the israelites , when they worshipped the calfe , did think they worshipped the god that brought them out of egypt ; and yet it was idolatry , because they thought the calfe either was that god , or had him in his belly . and though some man may think it impossible for people to be so stupid , as to think the image to be god , or a saint ; or to worship it in that notion ; yet it is manifest in scripture to the contrary ; where when the golden calfe was made , the people said , * these are thy gods o israel ; and where the images of laban * are called his gods. and wee see daily by experience in all sorts of people , that such men as study nothing but their food and ease , are content to beleeve any absurdity , rather than to trouble themselves to examine it ; holding their faith as it were by entaile unalienable , except by an expresse and new law. but they inferre from some other places , that it is lawfull to paint angels , and also god himselfe : as from gods walking in the garden ; from jacobs seeing god at the top of the ladder ; and from other visions , and dreams . but visions , and dreams , whether naturall , or snpernaturall , are but phantasmes : and he that painteth an image of any of them , maketh not an image of god , but of his own phantasm , which is , making of an idol . i say not , that to draw a picture after a fancy , is a sin ; but when it is drawn , to hold it for a representation of god , is against the second commandement ; and can be of no use , but to worship . and the same may be said of the images of angels , and of men dead ; unlesse as monuments of friends , or of men worthy remembrance : for such use of an image , is not worship of the image ; but a civill honoring of the person , not that is , but that was : but when it is done to the image which we make of a saint , for no other reason , but that we think he heareth our prayers , and is pleased with the honour wee doe him , when dead , and without sense , wee attribute to him more than humane power ; and therefore it is idolatry . seeing therefore there is no authority , neither in the law of moses , nor in the gospel , for the religious worship of images , or other representations of god , which men set up to themselves ; or for the worship of the image of any creature in heaven , or earth , or under the earth : and whereas christian kings , who are living representants of god , are not to be worshipped by their subjects , by any act , that signifieth a greater esteem of his power , than the nature of mortall man is capable of ; it cannot be imagined , that the religious worship now in use , was brought into the church , by misunderstanding of the scripture . it resteth therefore , that it was left in it , by not destroying the images themselves , in the conversion of the gentiles that worshipped them . the cause whereof , was the immoderate esteem , and prices set upon the workmanship of them , which made the owners ( though converted , from worshipping them as they had done religiously for daemons ) to retain them still in their houses , upon pretence of doing it in the honor of christ , of the virgin mary , and of the apostles , and other the pastors of the primitive church ; as being easie , by giving them new names , to make that an image of the virgin mary , and of her sonne our saviour , which before perhaps was called the image of venus , and cupid ; and so of a iupiter to make a barnabas , and of mercury a paul , and the like . and as worldly ambition creeping by degrees into the pastors , drew them to an endeavour of pleasing the new made christians ; and also to a liking of this kind of honour , which they also might hope for after their decease , as well as those that had already gained it : so the worshipping of the images of christ and his apostles , grew more and more idolatrous ; save that somewhat after the time of constantine , divers emperors , and bishops , and generall councells observed , and opposed the unlawfulnesse thereof ; but too late , or too weakly . the canonizing of saints , is another relique of gentilisme : it is neither a misunderstanding of scripture , nor a new invention of the roman church , but a custome as ancient as the common-wealth of rome it self . the first that ever was canonized at rome , was romulus , and that upon the narration of iulius proculus , that swore before the senate , he spake with him after his death , and was assured by him , he dwelt in heaven , and was there called quirinus , and would be propitious to the state of their new city : and thereupon the senate gave publique testimony of his sanctity . iulius caesar , and other emperors after him , had the like testimony ; that is , were canonized for saints ; for by such testimony is canonization , now defined ; and is the same with the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of the heathen . it is also from the roman heathen , that the popes have received the name , and power of pontifex maximus . this was the name of him that in the ancient common-wealth of rome , had the supreme authority under the senate and people , of regulating all ceremonies , and doctrines concerning their religion : and when augustus caesar changed the state into a monarchy , he took to himselfe no more but this office , and that of tribune of the people , ( that is to say , the supreme power both in state , and religion ; ) and the succeeding emperors enjoyed the same . but when the emperour constantine lived , who was the first that professed and authorized christian religion , it was consonant to his profession , to cause religion to be regulated ( under his authority ) by the bishop of rome : though it doe not appear they had so soon the name of pontifex ; but rather , that the succeeding bishops took it of themselves , to countenance the power they exercised over the bishops of the roman provinces . for it is not any priviledge of st. peter , but the priviledge of the city of rome , which the emperors were alwaies willing to uphold , that gave them such authority over other bishops ; as may be evidently seen by that , that the bishop of constantinople , when the emperour made that city the seat of the empire , pretended to bee equall to the bishop of rome ; though at last , not without contention , the pope carryed it , and became the pontifex maximus ; but in right onely of the emperour ; and not without the bounds of the empire ; nor any where , after the emperour had lost his power in rome ; though it were the pope himself that took his power from him . from whence wee may by the way observe , that there is no place for the superiority of the pope over other bishops , except in the territories whereof he is himself the civill soveraign ; and where the emperour having soveraign power civill , hath expressely chosen the pope for the chief pastor under himselfe , of his christian subjects . the carrying about of images in procession ; is another relique of the religion of the greeks , and romans : for they also carried their idols from place to place , in a kind of chariot , which was peculiarly dedicated to that use , which the latines called thensa , and vehiculum deorum ; and the image was placed in a frame , or shrine , which they called ferculum : and that which they called pompa , is the same that now is named procession : according whereunto , amongst the divine honors which were given to iulius caesar by the senate , this was one , that in the pompe ( or procession ) at the circaean games , he should have thensam & ferculum , a sacred chariot , and a shrine ; which was as much , as to be carried up and down as a god : just as at this day the popes are carried by switzers under a canopie . to these processions also belonged the bearing of burning torches , and candles , before the images of the gods , both amongst the greeks , and romans . for afterwards the emperors of rome received the same honor ; as we read of caligula , that at his reception to the empire , he was carried from misenum to rome , in the midst of a throng of people , the wayes beset with altars , and beasts for sacrifice , and burning torches : and of caracalla that was received into alexandria with incense , and with casting of flowers , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , with torches ; for 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were they that amongst the greeks carried torches lighted in the processions of their gods : and in processe of time , the devout , but ignorant people , did many times honor their bishops with the like pompe of wax candles , and the images of our saviour , and the saints , constantly , in the church it self . and thus came in the use of wax candles ; and was also established by some of the ancient councells . the heathens had also their aqua lustralis ; that is to say , holy water . the church of rome imitates them also in their holy dayes . they had their bacchanalia ; and we have our wakes , answering to them : they their saturnalia , and we our carnevalls , and shrovetuesdays liberty of servants : they their procession of priapus ; wee our fetching in , erection , and dancing about may-poles ; and dancing is one kind of worship : they had their procession called ambarvalia ; and we our procession about the fields in the rogation week . nor do i think that these are all the ceremonies that have been left in the church , from the first conversion of the gentiles : but they are all that i can for the present call to mind ; and if a man would wel observe that which is delivered in the histories , concerning the religious rites of the greeks and romanes , i doubt not but he might find many more of these old empty bottles of gentilisme , which the doctors of the romance church , either by negligence , or ambition , have filled up again with the new wine of christianity , that will not faile in time to break them . chap. xlvi . of darknesse from vain philosophy , and fabulous traditions . by philolosphy , is understood the knowledge acquired by reasoning , from the manner of the generation of any thing , to the properties ; or from the properties , to some possible way of generation of the same ; to the end to bee able to produce , as far as matter , and humane force permit , such effects , as ●…umane life requireth . so the geometrician , from the construction of figures , findeth out many properties thereof ; and from the properties , new ways of their construction , by reasoning ; to the end to be able to measure land , and water ; and for infinite other uses . so the astronomer , from the rising , setting , and moving of the sun , and starres , in divers parts of the heavens , findeth out the causes of day , and night , and of the different seasons of the year ; whereby he keepeth an account of time : and the like of other sciences . by which definition it is evident , that we are not to account as any part thereof , that originall knowledge called experience , in which consisteth prudence : because it is not attained by reasoning , but found as well in brute beasts , as in man ; and is but a memory of successions of events in times past , wherein the omission of every little circumstance altering the effect , frustrateth the expectation of the most prudent : whereas nothing is produced by reasoning aright , but generall , eternall , and immutable truth . nor are we therefore to give that name to any false conclusions : for he that reasoneth aright in words he understandeth , can never conclude an error : nor to that which any man knows by supernaturall revelation ; because it is not acquired by reasoning : nor that which is gotten by reasoning from the authority of books ; because it is not by reasoning from the cause to the effect , nor from the effect to the cause ; and is not knowledg , but faith. the faculty of reasoning being consequent to the use of speech , it was not possible , but that there should have been some generall truthes found out by reasoning , as ancient almost as language it selfe . the savages of america , are not without some good morall sentences ; also they have a little arithmetick , to adde , and divide in numbers not too great : but they are not therefore philosophers . for as there were plants of corn and wine in small quantity dispersed in the fields and woods , before men knew their vertue , or made use of them for their nourishment , or planted them apart in fields , and vineyards ; in which time they fed on akorns , and drank water : so also there have been divers true , generall , and profitable speculations from the beginning ; as being the naturall plants of humane reason : but they were at first but few in number ; men lived upon grosse experience ; there was no method ; that is to say , no sowing , nor planting of knowledge by it self , apart from the weeds , and common plants of errour and conjecture : and the cause of it being the want of leasure from procuring the necessities of life , and defending themselves against their neighbors , it was impossible , till the erecting of great common-wealths , it should be otherwise . leasure is the mother of philosophy ; and common-wealth , the mother of peace , and leasure . where first were great and flourishing cities , there was first the study of philosophy . the gymnosophists of india , the magi of persia , and the priests of chaldaea and egypt , are counted the most ancient philosophers ; and those countreys were the most ancient of kingdomes . philosophy was not risen to the graecians , and other people of the west , whose common-wealths ( no greater perhaps then lucca , or geneva ) had never peace , but when their fears of one another were equall ; nor the leasure to observe any thing but one another . at length , when warre had united many of these graecian lesser cities , into fewer , and greater ; then began seven men , of severall parts of greece , to get the reputation of being wise ; some of them for morall and politique sentences ; and others for the learning of the chaldaeans and egyptians , which was astronomy , and geometry . but we hear not yet of any schools of philosophy . after the athenians by the overthrow of the persian armies , had gotten the dominion of the sea ; and thereby , of all the islands , and maritime cities of the archipelago , as well of asia as europe ; and were grown wealthy ; they that had no employment , neither at home , nor abroad , had little else to employ themselves in , but either ( as st. luke says , acts . . in telling and hearing news , or in discoursing of philosophy publiquely to the youth of the city . every master took some place for that purpose . plato in certain publique walks called academia , from one ac●…demus : aristotle in the walk of the temple of pan , called lycaeum : others in the stoa , or covered walk , wherein the merchants goods were brought to land : others in other places ; where they spent the time of their leasure , in teaching or in disputing of their opinions : and some in any place , where they could get the youth of the city together to hear them talk . and this was it which carneades also did at rome , when he was ambassadour : which caused cato to advise the senate to dispatch him quickly , for feare of corrupting the manners of the young men that delighted to hear him speak ( as they thought ) fine things . from this it was , that the place where any of them taught , and disputed , was called schola , which in their tongue signifieth leasure ; and their disputations , diatribae , that is to say , passing of the time . also the philosophers themselves had the name of their sects , some of them from these their schools : for they that followed 〈◊〉 doctrine , were called academiques ; the followers of aristotle , peripatetiques , from the walk hee taught in ; and those that zeno taught , stoiques , from the stoa : as if we should denominate men from more-fields , from pauls-church , and from the exchange , because they meet there often , to prate and loyter . neverthelesse , men were so much taken with this custome , that in time it spread it selfe over all europe , and the best part of afrique ; so as there were schools publiquely erected , and maintained for lectures , and disputations , almost in every common-wealth . there were also schools , anciently , both before , and after the time of our saviour , amongst the iews : but they were schools of their law. for though they were called synagogues , that is to say , congregations of the people ; yet in as much as the law was every sabbath day read , expounded , and disputed in them , they differed not in nature , but in name onely from publique schools ; and were not onely in jerusalem , but in every city of the gentiles , where the jews inhabited . there was such a schoole at damascus , whereinto paul entred , to persecute . there were others at antioch , iconium and thessalonica , whereinto he entred , to dispute : and such was the synagogue of the libertines , cyren●…ans , alexandrians , cilicians , and those of asia ; that is to say , the schoole of libertines , and of iewes , that were strangers in ierusalem : and of this schoole they were that disputed ( act. . . ) with saint steven . but what has been the utility of those schools ? what science is there at this day acquired by their readings and disputings ? that wee have of geometry , which is the mother of all naturall science , wee are not indebted for it to the schools . plato that was the best philosopher of the greeks , forbad entrance into his schoole , to all that were not already in some measure geometricians . there were many that studied that science to the great advantage of mankind : but there is no mention of their schools ; nor was there any sect of geometricians ; nor did they then passe under the name of philosophers . the naturall philosophy of those schools , was rather a dream than science , and set forth in senselesse and insignificant language ; which cannot be avoided by those that will teach philosophy , without having first attained great knowledge in geometry : for nature worketh by motion ; the wayes , and degrees whereof cannot be known , without the knowledge of the proportions and properties of lines , and figures . their morall philosophy is but a description of their own passions . for the rule of manners , without civill government , is the law of nature ; and in it , the law civill ; that determineth what is honest , and dishonest ; what is iust , and vnjust ; and generally what is good , and evill : whereas they make the rules of good , and bad , by their own liking , and disliking : by which means , in so great diversity of taste , there is nothing generally agreed on ; but every one doth ( as far as he dares ) whatsoever seemeth good in his owne eyes , to the subversion of common-wealth . their loigque which should bee the method of reasoning , is nothing else but captions of words , and inventions how to puzzle such as should goe about to pose them . to conclude , there is nothing so absurd , that the old philosophers ( as cicero saith , who was one of them ) have not some of them maintained . and i beleeve that scarce any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall philosophy , than that which now is called aristotles metaphysiques ; nor more repugnant to government , than much of that hee hath said in his politiques ; nor more ignorantly , than a great part of his ethiques . the schoole of the jews , was originally a schoole of the law of moses ; who commanded ( deut. . . ) that at the end of every seventh year , at the feast of the tabernacles , it should be read to all the people , that they might hear , and learn it : therefore the reading of the law ( which was in use after the captivity ) every sabbath day , ought to have had no other end , but the acquainting of the people with the commandements which they were to obey , and to expound unto them the writings of the prophets . but it is manifest , by the many reprehensions of them by our saviour , that they corrupted the text of the law with their false commentaries , and vain traditions ; and so little understood the prophets , that they did neither acknowledge christ , nor the works he did ; of which the prophets prophecyed . so that by their lectures and disputations in their synagogues , they turned the doctrine of their law into a phantasticall kind of philosophy , concerning the incomprehensible nature of god , and of spirits ; which they compounded of the vain philosophy and theology of the graecians , mingled with their own fancies , drawn from the obscurer places of the scripture , and which might most easily bee wrested to their purpose ; and from the fabulous traditions of their ancestors . that which is now called an vniversity , is a joyning together , and an incorporation under one government of many publique schools , in one and the same town or city . in which , the principall schools were ordained for the three professions , that is to say , of the romane religion , of the romane law , and of the art of medicine . and for the study of philosophy it hath no otherwise place , then as a handmaid to the romane religion : and since the authority of aristotle is onely current there , that study is not properly philosophy , ( the nature whereof dependeth not on authors , ) but aristotelity . and for geometry , till of very late times it had no place at all ; as being subservient to nothing but rigide truth . and if any man by the ingenuity of his owne nature , had attained to any degree of perfection therein , hee was commonly thought a magician , and his art diabolicall . now to descend to the particular tenets of vain philosophy , derived to the universities , and thence into the church , partly from aristotle , partly from blindnesse of understanding ; i shall first consider their principles . there is a certain philosophia prima , on which all other philosophy ought to depend ; and consisteth principally , in right limiting of the significations of such appellations , or names , as are of all others the most universall : which limitations serve to avoid ambiguity , and aequivocation in reasoning ; and are commonly called definitions ; such as are the definitions of body , time , place , matter , forme , essence , subject , substance , accident , power , act , finite , infinite , quantity , quality , motion , action , passion , and divers others , necessary to the explaining of a mans conceptions concerning the nature and generation of bodies . the explication ( that is , the setling of the meaning ) of which , and the like terms , is commonly in the schools called metaphysiques ; as being a part of the philosophy of aristotle , which hath that for title : but it is in another sense ; for there it signifieth as much , as books written , or placed after his naturall philosophy : but the schools take them for books of supernaturall philosophy : for the word metaphysiques will bear both these senses . and indeed that which is there written , is for the most part so far from the possibility of being understood , and so repugnant to naturall reason , that whosoever thinketh there is any thing to bee understood by it , must needs think it supernaturall . from these metaphysiques , which are mingled with the scripture to make schoole divinity , wee are told , there be in the world certaine essences separated from bodies , which they call abstract essences , and substantiall formes : for the interpreting of which iargon , there is need of somewhat more than ordinary attention in this place . also i ask pardon of those that are not used to this kind of discourse , for applying my selfe to those that are . the world , ( i mean not the earth onely , that denominates the lovers of it worldly men , but the vniverse , that is , the whole masse of all things that are ) is corporeall , that is to say , body ; and hath the dimensions of magnitude , namely , length , bredth , and depth : also every part of body , is likewise body , and hath the like dime●…ions ; and consequently every part of the universe , is body ; and that which is not body , is no part of the universe : and because the universe is all , that which is no part of it , is nothing ; and consequently no where . nor does it follow from hence , that spirits are nothing ; for they have dimensions , and are therefore really bodies ; though that name in common speech be given to such bodies onely , as are visible , or palpable ; that is , that have some degree of opacity : but for spirits , they call them incorporeall ; which is a name of more honour , and may therefore with more piety bee attributed to god himselfe ; in whom wee consider not what attribute expresseth best his nature , which is incomprehensible ; but what best expresseth our desire to honour him. to know now upon what grounds they say there be essences abstract , or substantiall formes , wee are to consider what those words do properly signifie . the use of words , is to register to our selves , and make manifest to others the thoughts and conceptions of our minds . of which words , some are the names of the things conceived ; as the names of all sorts of bodies , that work upon the senses , and leave an impression in the imagination : others are the names of the imaginations themselves ; that is to say , of those ideas , or mentall images we have of all things wee see , or remember : and others againe are names of names ; or of different sorts of speech : as vniversall , plurall , singular , are the names of names ; and definition , affirmation , negation , true , false , syllogisme , interrogation , promise , covenant , are the names of certain forms of speech . others serve to shew the consequence , or repugnance of one name to another ; as when one saith , a man is a body , hee intendeth that the name of body is necessarily consequent to the name of man ; as being but severall names of the same thing , man ; which consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word is. and as wee use the verbe is ; so the latines use their verbe est , and the greeks their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 through all its declinations . whether all other nations of the world have in their severall languages a word that answereth to it , or not , i cannot tell ; but i am sure they have not need of it : for the placing of two names in order may serve to signifie their consequence , if it were the custome , ( for custome is it , that give words their force , ) as well as the words is , or bee , or are , and the like . and if it were so , that there were a language without any verb answerable to est , or is , or bee ; yet the men that used it would bee not a jot the lesse capable of inferring , concluding , and of all kind of reasoning , than were the greeks , and latines . but what then would become of these terms , of entity , essence , essentiall , ●…ssentiality , that are derived from it , and of many more that depend on these , applyed as most commonly they are ? they are therefore no names of things ; but signes , by which wee make known , that wee conceive the consequence of one name or attribute to another : as when we say , a man , is , a living body , wee mean not that the man is one thing , the living body another , and the is , or beeing a third : but that the man , and the living body , is the same thing ; because the consequence , if hee bee a man , hee is a living body , is a true consequence , signified by that word is. therefore , to bee a body , to walke , to bee speaking , to live , to see , and the like infinitives ; also corp●…reity , walking , speaking , life , sight , and the like , that signifie just the same , are the names of nothing ; as i have elsewhere more amply expressed . but to what purpose ( may some man say ) is such subtilty in a work of this nature , where i pretend to nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine of government and obedience ? it is ●…o this purpose , that men may no longer suffer themselves to be abused , by them , that by this doctrine of separated essences , built on the vain philosophy of aristotle , would fright them from obeying the laws of their countrey , with empty names ; as men fright birds from the corn with an empty doublet , a hat , and a crooked stick . for it is upon this ground , that when a man is dead and buried , they say his soule ( that is his life ) can walk separated from his body , and is seen by night amongst the graves . upon the same ground they say , that the figure , and colour , and tast of a peece of bread , has a being , there , where they say there is no bread : and upon the same ground they say , that faith , and wisdome , and other vertues are sometimes powred into a man , sometimes blown into him from heaven ; as if the vertuous , and their vertues could be asunder ; and a great many other things that serve to lessen the dependance of subjects on the soveraign power of their countrey . for who will endeavour to obey the laws , if he expect obedience to be powred or blown into him ? or who will not obey a priest , that can make god , rather than his soveraign ; nay than god himselfe ? or who , that is in fear of ghosts , will not bear great respect to those that can make the holy water , that drives them from him ? and this shall suffice for an example of the errors , which are brought into the church , from the entities , and essences of aristotle : which it may be he knew to be false philosophy ; but writ it as a thing consonant to , and corroborative of their religion ; and fearing the fate of socrates . being once fallen into this error of separated essences , they are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it . for seeing they will have these forms to be reall , they are obliged to assign them some place . but because they hold them incorporeall , without all dimension of quantity , and all men know that place is dimension , and not to be filled , but by that which is corporeall ; they are driven to uphold their credit with a distinction , that they are not indeed any where circumscriptivè , but definitivè : which terms being meer words , and in this occasion insignificant , passe onely in latine , that the vanity of them may bee concealed . for the circumscription of a thing , is nothing else but the determination , or defining of its place ; and so both the terms of the distinction are the same . and in particular , of the essence of a man , which ( they say ) is his soule , they affirm it , to be all of it in his little finger , and all of it in every other part ( how small soever ) of his body ; and yet no more soule in the whole body , than in any one of those parts . can any man think that god is served with such absurdities ? and yet all this is necessary to beleeve , to those that will beleeve the existence of an incorporeall soule , separated from the body . and when they come to give account , how an incorporeall substance can be capable of pain , and be tormented in the fire of hell , or purgatory , they have nothing at all to answer , but that it cannot be known how fire can burn soules . again , whereas motion is change of place , and incorporeall substances are not capable of place , they are troubled to make it seem possible , how a soule can goe hence , without the body to heaven , hell , or purgatory ; and how the ghosts of men ( and i may adde of their clothes which they appear in ) can walk by night in churches , church-yards , and other places of sepulture . to which i know not what they can answer , unlesse they will say , they walke definitivè , not circumscriptivè , or spiritually , not temporally : for such egregious distinctions are equally applicable to any difficulty whatsoever . for the meaning of eternity , they will not have it to be an endlesse succession of time ; for then they should not be able to render a reason how gods will , and praeordaining of things to come , should not be before his praescience of the same , as the efficient cause before the effect , or agent before the action ; nor of many other their bold opinions concerning the incomprehensible nature of god. but they will teach us , that eternity is the standing still of the present time , a nunc-stans ( as the schools call it ; ) which neither they , nor any else understand , no more than they would a hic-stans for an infinite greatnesse of place . and whereas men divide a body in their thought , by numbring parts of it , and in numbring those parts , number also the parts of the place it filled ; it cannot be , but in making many parts , wee make also many places of those parts ; whereby there cannot bee conceived in the mind of any man , more , or fewer parts , than there are places for : yet they will have us beleeve , that by the almighty power of god , one body may be at one and the same time in many places ; and many bodies at one and the same time in one place ; as if it were an acknowledgment of the divine power , to say , that which is , is not ; or that which has been , has not been . and these are but a small part of the incongruities they are forced to , from their disputing philosophically , in stead of admiring , and adoring of the divine and incomprehensible nature ; whose attributes cannot signifie what he is , but ought to signifie our desire to honour him , with the best appellations we can think on . but they that venture to reason of his nature , from these attributes of honour , losing their understanding in the very first attempt , fall from one inconvenience into another , without end , and without number ; in the same manner , as when a man ignorant of the ceremonies of court , comming into the presence of a greater person than he is used to speak to , and stumbling at his entrance , to save himselfe from falling , le ts slip his cloake ; to recover his cloake , le ts fall his hat ; and with one disorder after another , discovers his astonishment and rusticity . then for physiques , that is , the knowledge of the subordinate , and secundary causes of naturall events ; they render none at all , but empty words . if you desire to know why some kind of bodies sink naturally downwards toward the earth , and others goe naturally from it ; the schools will tell you out of aristotle , that the bodies that sink downwards , are heavy ; and that this heavinesse is it that causes them to descend : but if you ask what they mean by heavinesse , they will define it to bee an endeavour to goe to the center of the earth : so that the cause why things sink downward , is an endeavour to be below : which is as much as to say , that bodies descend , or ascend , because they doe . or they will tell you the center of the earth is the place of rest , and conservation for heavy things ; and therefore they endeavour to be there : as if stones , and metalls had a desire , or could discern the place they would bee at , as man does ; or loved rest , as man does not ; or that a peece of glasse were lesse safe in the window , than falling into the street . if we would know why the same body seems greater ( without adding to it ) one time , than another ; they say , when it seems lesse , it is condensed ; when greater , rarefied . what is that condensed , and rarefied ? condensed , is when there is in the very same matter , lesse quantity than before ; and rarefied , when more . as if there could be matter , that had not some determined quantity ; when quantity is nothing else but the determination of matter ; that is to say of body , by which we say one body is greater , or lesser than another , by thus , or thus much . or as if a body were made without any quantity at all , and that afterwards more , or lesse were put into it , according as it is intended the body should be more , or lesse dense . for the cause of the soule of man , they say , creatur infundendo , and creando infunditur : that is , it is created by powring it in , and powred in by creation . for the cause of sense , an ubiquity of species ; that is , of the shews or apparitions of objects ; which when they be apparitions to the eye , is sight ; when to the eare , hearing ; to the palate , tast ; to the nostrill , smelling ; and to the rest of the body , feeling . for cause of the will , to doe any particular action , which is called volitio , they assign the faculty , that is to say , the capacity in generall , that men have , to will sometimes one thing , sometimes another , which is called voluntas ; making the power the cause of the act : as if one should assign for cause of the good or evill acts of men , their ability to doe them . and in many occasions they put for cause of naturall events , their own ignorance ; but disguised in other words : as when they say , fortune is the cause of things contingent ; that is , of things whereof they know no cause : and as when they attribute many effects to occult qualities ; that is , qualities not known to them ; and therefore also ( as they thinke ) to no man else . and to sympathy , antipathy , antiperistasis , specificall qualities , and other like termes , which signifie neither the agent that produceth them , nor the operation by which they are produced . if such metaphysiques , and physiques as this , be not vain philosophy , there was never any ; nor needed st. paul to give us warning to avoid it . and for their morall , and civill philosophy , it hath the same , or greater absurdities . if a man doe an action of injustice , that is to say , an action contrary to the law , god they say is the prime cause of the law , and also the prime cause of that , and all other actions ; but no cause at all of the injustice ; which is the inconformity of the action to the law. this is vain philosophy . a man might as well say , that one man maketh both a streight line , and a crooked , and another maketh their incongruity . and such is the philosophy of all men that resolve of their conclusions , before they know their premises ; pretending to comprehend , that which is incomprehensible ; and of attributes of honour to make attributes of nature ; as this distinction was made to maintain the doctrine of free-will , that is , of a will of man , not subject to the will of god. aristotle , and other heathen philosophers define good , and evill , by the appetite of men ; and well enough , as long as we consider them governed every one by his own law : for in the condition of men that have no other law but their own appetites , there can be no generall rule of good , and evill actions . but in a common-wealth this measure is false : not the appetite of private men , but the law , which is the will and appetite of the state is the measure . and yet is this doctrine still practised ; and men judge the goodnesse , or wickednesse of their own , and of other mens actions , and of the actions of the common-wealth it selfe , by their own passions ; and no man calleth good or evill , but that which is so in his own eyes , without any regard at all to the publique laws ; except onely monks , and friers , that are bound by vow to that simple obedience to their superiour , to which every subject ought to think himself bound by the law of nature to the civill soveraign . and this private measure of good , is a doctrine , not onely vain , but also pernicious to the publique state. it is also vain and false philosophy , to say the work of marriage is repugnant to chastity , or continence , and by consequence to make them morall vices ; as they doe , that pretend chastity , and continence , for the ground of denying marriage to the clergy . for they confesse it is no more , but a constitution of the church , that requireth in those holy orders that continually attend the altar , and administration of the eucharist , a continuall abstinence from women , under the name of continuall chastity , continence , and purity . therefore they call the lawfull use of wives , want of chastity , and continence ; and so make marriage a sin , or at least a thing so impure , and unclean , as to render a man unfit for the altar . if the law were made because the use of wives is incontinence , and contrary to chastity , then all marriage is vice : if because it is a thing too impure , and unclean for a man consecrated to god ; much more should other naturall , necessary , and daily works which all men doe , render men unworthy to bee ▪ priests , because they are more unclean . but the secret foundation of this prohibition of marriage of priests , is not likely to have been laid so slightly , as upon such errours in morall philosophy ; nor yet upon the preference of single life , to the estate of matrimony ; which proceeded from the wisdome of st. paul , who perceived how inconvenient a thing it was , for those that in those times of persecution were preachers of the gospel , and forced to fly from one countrey to another , to be clogged with the care of wife and children ; but upon the designe of the popes , and priests of after times , to make themselves the clergy , that is to say , sole heirs of the kingdome of god in this world ; to which it was necessary to take from them the use of marriage , because our saviour saith , that at the coming of his kingdome the children of god shall neither marry , nor bee given in marriage , but shall bee as the angels in heaven ; that is to say , spirituall ▪ seeing then they had taken on them the name of spirituall , to have allowed themselves ( when there was no need ) the propriety of wives , had been an incongruity . from aristotles civill philosophy , they have learned , to call all manner of common-wealths but the popular , ( such as was at that time the state of athens , ) tyranny . all kings they called tyrants ; and the aristocracy of the thirty governours ●…et up there by the lacedemonians that subdued them , the thirty tyrants : as also to call the condition of the people under the democracy , liberty . a tyrant originally signified no more simply , but a monarch : but when afterwards in most parts of greece that kind of government was abolished , the name began to signifie , not onely the thing it did before , but with it , the hatred which the popular states bare towards it : as also the name of king became odious after the deposing of the kings in rome , as being a thing naturall to all men , to conceive some great fault to be signified in any attribute , that is given in despight , and to a great enemy . and when the same men shall be displeased with those that have the administration of the democracy , or aristocracy , they are not to seek for disgracefull names to expresse their anger in ; but call readily the one anarchy , and the other , oligarchy , or the tyranny of a few . and that which offendeth the people , is no other thing , but that they are governed , not as every one of them would himselfe , but as the publique representant , be it one man , or an assembly of men thinks fit ; that is , by an arbitrary government : for which they give evill names to their superiors ; never knowing ( till perhaps a little after a civill warre ) that without such arbitrary government , such warre must be perpetuall ; and that it is men , and arms , not words , and promises , that make the force and power of the laws . and therefore this is another errour of aristotles politiques , that in a wel ordered common-wealth , not men should govern , but the laws . what man , that has his naturall senses , though he can neither write nor read , does not find himself governed by them he fears , and beleeves can kill or hurt him when he obeyeth not ? or that beleeves the law can hurt him ; that is , words , and paper , without the hands , and swords of men ? and this is of the number of pernicious errors : for they induce men , as oft as they like not their governours , to adhaere to those that call them tyrants , and to think it lawfull to raise warre against them : and yet they are many times cherished from the pulpit , by the clergy . there is another errour in their civill philosophy ( which they never learned of aristotle , nor cicero , nor any other of the heathen , ) to extend the power of the law , which is the rule of actions onely , to the very thoughts , and consciences of men , by examination , and inquisition of what they hold , notwithstanding the conformity of their speech and actions : by which , men are either punished for answering the truth of their thoughts , or constrained to answer an untruth for fear of punishment . it is true , that the civill magistrate , intending to employ a minister in the charge of teaching , may enquire of him , if hee bee content to preach such , and such doctrines ; and in case of refusall , may deny him the employment : but to force him to accuse himselfe of opinions , when his actions are not by law forbidden , is against the law of nature ; and especially in them , who teach , that a man shall bee damned to eternall and extream torments , if he die in a false opinion concerning an article of the christian faith. for who is there , that knowing there is so great danger in an error , whom the naturall care of himself , compelleth not to hazard his soule upon his own judgement , rather than that of any other man that is unconcerned in his damnation ? for a private man , without the authority of the common-wealth , that is to say , without permission from the representant thereof , to interpret the law by his own spirit , is another error in the politiques ; but not drawn from aristotle , nor from any other of the heathen philosophers . for none of them deny , but that in the power of making laws , is comprehended also the power of explaining them when there is need . and are not the scriptures , in all places where they are law , made law by the authority of the common-wealth , and consequently , a part of the civill law ? of the same kind it is also , when any but the soveraign restraineth in any man that power which the common-wealth hath not restrained ; as they do , that impropriate the preaching of the gospell to one certain order of men , where the laws have left it free . if the state give me leave to preach , or teach ; that is , if it forbid me not , no man can forbid me . if i find my selfe amongst the idolaters of america , shall i that am a christian , though not in orders , think it a sin to preach jesus christ , till i have received orders from rome ? or when i have preached , shall not i answer their doubts , and expound the scriptures to them ; that is , shall i not teach ? but for this may some say , as also for administring to them the sacraments , the necessity shall be esteemed for a sufficient mission ; which is true : but this is true also , that for whatsoever , a dispensation is due for the necessity , for the same there needs no dispensation , when there is no law that forbids it . therefore to deny these functions to those , to whom the civill soveraigne hath not denyed them , is a taking away of a lawfull liberty , which is contrary to the doctrine of civill government . more examples of vain philosophy , brought into religion by the doctors of schoole-divinity , might be produced ; but other men may if they please observe them of themselves . i shall onely adde this , that the writings of schoole-divines , are nothing else for the most part , but insignificant traines of strange and barbarous words , or words otherwise used , then in the common use of the latine tongue ; such as would pose cicero , and varro , and all the grammarians of ancient rome . which if any man would see proved , let him ( as i have said once before ) see whether he can translate any schoole-divine into any of the modern tongues , as french , english , or any other copious language : for that which cannot in most of these be made intelligible , is not intelligible in the latine . which insignificancy of language , though i cannot note it for false philosophy ; yet it hath a quality , not onely to hide the truth , but also to make men think they have it , and desist from further search . lastly , for the errors brought in from false , or uncertain history , what is all the legend of fictitious miracles , in the lives of the saints ; and all the histories of apparitions , and ghosts , alledged by the doctors of the romane church , to make good their doctrines of hell , and purgatory , the power of exorcisme , and other doctrines which have no warrant , neither in reason , nor scripture ; as also all those traditions which they call the unwritten word of god ; but old wives fables ? whereof , though they find dispersed somewhat in the writings of the ancient fathers ; yet those fathers were men , that might too easily beleeve false reports ; and the producing of their opinions for testimony of the truth of what they beleeved , hath no other force with them that ( according to the counsell of st. iohn epist. chap. . verse . ) examine spirits , than in all things that concern the power of the romane church , ( the abuse whereof either they suspected not , or had benefit by it , ) to discredit their testimony , in respect of too rash beleef of reports ; which the most sincere men , without great knowledge of naturall causes , ( such as the fathers were ) are commonly the most subject to : for naturally , the best men are the least suspicious of fraudulent purposes . gregory the pope , and s. bernard have somewhat of apparitions of ghosts , that said they were in purgatory ; and so has our beda : but no where , i beleeve , but by report from others . but if they , or any other , relate any such stories of their own knowledge , they shall not thereby confirm the more such vain reports ; but discover their own infirmity , or fraud . with the introduction of false , we may joyn also the suppression of true philosophy , by such men , as neither by lawfull authority , nor sufficient study , are competent judges of the truth . our own navigations make manifest , and all men learned in humane sciences , now acknowledge there are antipodes : and every day it appeareth more and more , that years , and dayes are determined by motions of the earth . neverthelesse , men that have in their writings but supposed such doctrine , as an occasion to lay open the reasons for , and against it , have been punished for it by ▪ authority ecclesiasticall . but what reason is there for it ? is it beca●…se such opinions are contrary to true religion ? that cannot be , if they be true . let therefore the truth be first examined by competent judges , or confuted by them that pretend to know the contrary . is it because they be contrary to the religion established ? let them be silenced by the laws of those , to whom the teachers of them are subject ; that is , by the laws civill : for disobedience may lawfully be punished in them , that against the laws teach even true philosophy . is it because they tend to disorder in government , as countenancing rebellion , or sedition ? then let them be silenced , and the teachers punished by vertue of his power to whom the care of the publique quiet is committed ; which is the authority civill . for whatsoever power ecclesiastiques take upon themselves ( in any place where they are subject to the state ▪ ) in their own right , though they call it gods right , is but usurpation . chap. xlvii . of the benefit that proceedeth from such darknesse , and to whom it accreweth . cicero maketh honorable mention of one of the cass●… , a severe judge amongst the romans , for a custome he had , in criminall causes , ( when the testimony of the witnesses was not sufficient , ) to ask the accusers , cuibono ; that is to say , what profit , honor , or other contentment , the accused obtained , or expected by the fact. for amongst praesumptions , there is none that so evidently declareth the author , as doth the benefit of the action . by the same rule i intend in this place to examine , who they may be , that have possessed the people so long in this part of christendome , with these doctrines , contrary to the peaceable societies of mankind . and first , to this error , that the present church now militant on earth , is the kingdome of god , ( that is , the kingdome of glory , or the land of promise ; not the kingdome of grace , which is but a promise of the land , ) are annexed these worldly benefits ; first , that the pastors , and teachers of the church , are entitled thereby , as gods publique ministers , to a right of governing the church ; and consequently ( because the church , and common-wealth are the same persons ) to be rectors , and governours of the common-wealth . by this title it is , that the pope prevailed with the subjects of all christian princes , to beleeve , that to disobey him , was to disobey christ himselfe ; and in all differences between him and other princes , ( charmed with the word power spirituall , ) to abandon their lawfull soveraigns ; which is in effect an universall monarchy over all christendome . for though they were first invested in the right of being supreme teachers of christian doctrine , by , and under christian emperors , within the limits of the romane empire ( as is acknowledged by themselves ) by the title of pontifex maximus , who was an officer subject to the civill state ; yet after the empire was divided , and dissolved , it was not hard to obtrude upon the people already subject to them , another title , namely , the right of st. peter ; not onely to save entire their pretended power ; but also to extend the same over the same christian provinces , though no more united in the empire of rome . this benefit of an universall monarchy , ( considering the desire of men to bear rule ) is a sufficient presumption , that the popes that pretended to it , and for a long time enjoyed it , were the authors of the doctrine , by which it was obtained ; namely , that the church now on earth , is the kingdome of christ. for that granted , it must be understood , that christ hath some lieutenant amongst us , by whom we are to be told what are his commandements . after that certain churches had renounced this universall power of the pope , one would expect in reason , that the civill soveraigns in all those churches , should have recovered so much of it , as ( before they had unadvisedly let it goe ) was their own right , and in their own hands . and in england it was so in effect ; saving that they , by whom the kings administred the government of religion , by maintaining their imployment to be in gods right , seemed to usurp , if not a supremacy , yet an independency on the civill power : and they but seemed to usurpe it , in as much as they acknowledged a right in the king , to deprive them of the exercise of their functions at his pleasure . but in those places where the presbytery took that office , though many other doctrines of the church of rome were forbidden to be taught ; yet this doctrine , that the kingdome of christ is already come , and that it began at the resurrection of our saviour , was still retained . but cui bono ? what profit did they expect from it ? the same which the popes expected : to have a soveraign power over the people . for what is it for men to excommunicate their lawful king , but to keep him from all places of gods publique service in his own kingdom ? and with force to resist him , when he with force endeavoureth to correct them ? or what is it , without authority from the civill soveraign , to excommunicate any person , but to take from him his lawfull liberty , that is , to usurpe an unlawfull power over their brethren ? the authors therefore of this darknesse in religion , are the romane , and the presbyterian clergy . to this head , i referre also all those doctrines , that serve them to keep the possession of this spirituall soveraignty after it is gotten . as first , that the pope in his publique capacity cannot erre . for who is there , that beleeving this to be true , will not readily obey him in whatsoever he commands ? secondly , that all other bishops , in what common-wealth soever , have not their right , neither immediately from god , nor mediately from their civill soveraigns , but from the pope , is a doctrine , by which there comes to be in every christian common-wealth many potent men , ( for so are bishops , ) that have their dependance on the pope , and owe obedience to him , though he be a forraign prince ; by which means he is able , ( as he hath done many times ) to raise a civill war against the state that submits not it self to be governed according to his pleasure and interest . thirdly , the exemption of these , and of all other priests , and of all monkes , and fryers , from the power of the civill laws . for by this means , there is a great part of every common-wealth , that enjoy the benefit of the laws , and are protected by the power of the civill state , which neverthelesse pay no part of the publique expence ; nor are lyable to the penalties , as other subjects , due to their crimes ; and consequently , stand not in fear of any man , but the pope ; and adhere to him onely , to uphold his universall monarchy . fourthly , the giving to their priests ( which is no more in the new testament but presbyters , that is , elders ) the name of sacerdotes , that is , sacrificers , which was the title of the civill soveraign , and his publique ministers , amongst the jews , whilest god was their king. also , the making the lords supper a sacrifice , serveth to make the people beleeve the pope hath the same power over all christians , that moses and aaron had over the jews ; that is to say , all power , both civill and ecclesiasticall , as the high priest then had . fiftly , the teaching that matrimony is a sacrament , giveth to the clergy the judging of the lawfulnesse of marriages ; and thereby , of what children are legitimate ; and consequently , of the right of succession to haereditary kingdomes . sixtly , the deniall of marriage to priests , serveth to assure this power of the pope over kings . for if a king be a priest , he cannot marry , and transmit his kingdome to his posterity ; if he be not a priest then the pope pretendeth this authority ecclesiasticall over him , and over his people . seventhly , from auricular confession , they obtain , for the assurance of their power , better intelligence of the designs of princes , and great persons in the civill state , than these can have of the designs of the state ecclesiasticall . eighthly , by the canonization of saints , and declaring who are martyrs , they assure their power , in that they induce simple men into an obstinacy against the laws and commands of their civill soveraigns even to death , if by the popes excommunication , they be declared heretiques or enemies to the church ; that is , ( as they interpret it , ) to the pope . ninthly , they assure the same , by the power they ascribe to every priest , of making christ ; and by the power of ordaining pennance ; and of remitting , and retaining of sins . tenthly , by the doctrine of purgatory , of justification by externall works , and of indulgences , the clergy is enriched . eleventhly , by their daemonology , and the use of exorcisme , and other things appertaining thereto , they keep ( or thinke they keep ) the people more in awe of their power . lastly , the metaphysiques , ethiques , and politiques of aristotle , the frivolous distinctions , barbarous terms , and obscure language of the schoolmen , taught in the universities , ( which have been all erected and regulated by the popes authority , ) serve them to keep these errors from being detected , and to make men mistake the ignis fatuus of vain philosophy , for the light of the gospell . to these , if they sufficed not , might be added other of their dark doctrines , the profit whereof redoundeth manifestly , to the setting up of an unlawfull power over the lawfull soveraigns of christian people ; or for the sustaining of the same , when it is set up ; or to the worldly riches , honour , and authority of those that sustain it ▪ and therefore by the aforesaid rule , of cui bono , we may justly pronounce for the authors of all this spirituall darknesse , the pope , and roman clergy , and all those besides that endeavour to settle in the mindes of men this erroneous doctrine , that the church now on earth , is that kingdome of god mentioned in the old and new testament . but the emperours , and other christian soveraigns , under whose government these errours , and the like encroachments of ecclesiastiques upon their office , at first crept in , to the disturbance of their possessions , and of the tranquillity of their subjects , though they suffered the same for want of foresight of the sequel , and of insight into the designs of their teachers , may neverthelesse bee esteemed accessaries to their own , and the publique dammage : for without their authority there could at first no seditious doctrine have been publiquely preached . i say they might have hindred the same in the beginning : but when the people were once possessed by those spirituall men , there was no humane remedy to be applyed , that any man could invent : and for the remedies that god should provide , who never faileth in his good time to destroy all the machinations of men against the truth , wee are to attend his good pleasure , that suffereth many times the prosperity of his enemies , together with their ambition , to grow to such a height , as the violence thereof openeth the eyes , which the warinesse of their predecessours had before sealed up , and makes men by too much grasping let goe all , as peters net was broken , by the struggling of too great a multitude of fishes ; whereas the impatience of those , that strive to resist such encroachment , before their subjects eyes were opened , did but encrease the power they resisted . i doe not therefore blame the emperour frederick for holding the stirrop to our countryman pope adrian ; for such was the disposition of his subjects then , as if hee had not done it , hee was not likely to have succeeded in the empire : but i blame those ▪ that in the beginning , when their power was entire , by suffering such doctrines to be forged in the universities of their own dominions , have holden the stirrop to all the succeeding popes , whilest they mounted into the thrones of all christian soveraigns , to ride , and tire , both them , and their people , at their pleasure . but as the inventions of men are woven , so also are they ravelled out ; the way is the same , but the order is inverted : the web begins at the first elements of power , which are wisdom , humility , sincerity , and other vertues of the apostles , whom the people converted , obeyed , out of reverence , not by obligation : their consciences were free , and their words and actions subject to none but the civill power . afterwards the presbyters ( as the flocks of christ encreased ) assembling to consider what they should teach , and thereby obliging themselves to teach nothing against the decrees of their assemblies , made it to be thought the people were thereby obliged to follow their doctrine , and when they refused , refused to keep them company , ( that was then called excommunication , ) not as being infidels , but as being disobedient : and this was the first knot upon their liberty . and the number of presbyters encreasing , the presbyters of the chief city or province , got themselves an authority over the parochiall presbyters , and appropriated to themselves the names of bishops : and this was a second knot on christian liberty . lastly , the bishop of rome , in regard of the imperiall city , took upon him an authority ( partly by the wills of the emperours themselves , and by the title of pontifex maximus , and at last when the emperours were grown weak , by the priviledges of st. peter ) over all other bishops of the empire : which was the third and last knot , and the whole synthesis and construction of the pontificiall power . and therefore the analysis , or resolution is by the same way ; but beginneth with the knot that was last tyed ; as wee may see in the dissolution of the praeterpoliticall church government in england . first , the power of the popes was dissolved totally by queen elizabeth ; and the bishops , who before exercised their functions in right of the pope , did afterwards exercise the same in right of the queen and her successours ; though by retaining the phrase of iure divino , they were thought to demand it by immediate right from god : and so was untyed the first knot . after this , the presbyterians lately in england obtained the putting down of episcopacy : and so was the second knot dissolved : and almost at the same time , the power was taken also from the presbyterians : and so we are reduced to the independency of the primitive christians to follow paul , or cephas , or apollos , every man as he liketh best : which , if it be without contention , and without measuring the doctrine of christ , by our affection to the person of his minister , ( the fault which the apostle reprehended in the corinthians , ) is perhaps the best : first , because there ought to be no power over the consciences of men , but of the word it selfe , working faith in every one , not alwayes according to the purpose of them that plant and water , but of god himself , that giveth the increase : and secondly , because it is unreasonable in them , who teach there is such danger in every little errour , to require of a man endued with reason of his own , to follow the reason of any other man , or of the most voices of many other men ; which is little better , then to venture his salvation at crosse and pile . nor ought those teachers to be displeased with this losse of their antient authority : for there is none should know better then they , that power is preserved by the same vertues by which it is acquired ; that is to say , by wisdome , humility , clearnesse of doctrine , and sincerity of conversation ; and not by suppression of the naturall sciences , and of the morality of naturall reason ; nor by obscure language ; nor by arrogating to themselves more knowledge than they make appear ; nor by pious frauds ; nor by such other faults , as in the pastors of gods church are not only faults , but also scandalls , apt to make men stumble one time or other upon the suppression of their authority . but after this doctrine , that the church now militant , is the kingdome of god spoken of in the old and new testament , was received in the world ; the ambition , and canvasing for the offices that belong thereunto , and especially for that great office of being christs lieutenant , and the pompe of them that obtained therein the principall publique charges , became by degrees so evident , that they lost the inward reverence due to the pastorall function : in so much as the wisest men , of them that had any power in the civill state , needed nothing but the authority of their princes , to deny them any further obedience . for , from the time that the bishop of rome had gotten to be acknowledged for bishop universall , by pretence of succession to st. peter , their whole hierarchy , or kingdome of darknesse , may be compared not unfitly to the kingdome of fairies ; that is , to the old wives fables in england , concerning ghosts and spirits , and the feats they play in the night . and if a man consider the originall of this great ecclesiasticall dominion , he will easily perceive , that the papacy , is no other , than the ghost of the deceased romane empire , sitting crowned upon the grave thereof : for so did the papacy start up on a sudden out of the ruines of that heathen power . the language also , which they use , both in the churches , and in their publique acts , being latine , which is not commonly used by any nation now in the world , what is it but the ghost of the old romane language ? the fairies in what nation soever they converse , have but one universall king , which some poets of ours call king oberon ; but the scripture calls beelzebub , prince of daemons . the ecclesiastiques likewise , in whose dominions soever they be found , acknowledge but one universall king , the pope . the ecclesiastiques are spirituall men , and ghostly fathers . the fairies are spirits , and ghosts . fairies and ghosts inhabite darknesse , solitudes , and graves . the ecclesiastiques walke in obscurity of doctrine , in monasteries , churches , and church-yards . the ecclesiastiques have their cathedrall churches ; which , in what towne soever they be erected , by vertue of holy water , and certain charmes called exorcismes , have the power to make those townes , cities , that is to say , seats of empire . the fairies also have their enchanted castles , and certain gigantique ghosts , that domineer over the regions round about them . the fairies are not to be seized on ; and brought to answer for the hurt they do . so also the ecclesiastiques vanish away from the tribunals of civill justice . the ecclesiastiques take from young men , the use of reason , by certain charms compounded of metaphysiques , and miracles , and traditions , and abused scripture , whereby they are good for nothing else , but to execute what they command them . the fairies likewise are said to take young children out of their cradles , and to change them into naturall fools , which common people do therefore call elves , and are apt to mischief . in what shop , or operatory the fairies make their enchantment , the old wives have not determined . but the operatories of the clergy , are well enough known to be the universities , that received their discipline from authority pontificiall . when the fairies are displeased with any body , they are said to send their elves , to pinch them . the ecclesiastiques , when they are displeased with any civill state , make also their elves , that is , superstitious , enchanted subjects , to pinch their princes , by preaching sedition ; or one prince enchanted with promises , to pinch another . the fairies marry not ; but there be amongst them incubi , that have copulation with flesh and bloud . the priests also marry not . the ecclesiastiques take the cream of the land , by donations of ignorant men , that stand in aw of them , and by tythes : so also it is in the fable of fairies , that they enter into the dairies , and feast upon the cream , which they skim from the milk. what kind of money is currant in the kingdome of fairies , is not recorded in the story . but the ecclesiastiques in their receipts accept of the same money that we doe ; though when they are to make any payment , it is in canonizations , indulgences , and masses . to this , and such like resemblances between the papa●…y , and the kingdome of fairies , may be added this , that as the fairies have no existence , but in the fancies of ignorant people , rising from the traditions of old wives , or old poets : so the spirituall power of the pope ( without the bounds of his own civill dominion ) consisteth onely in the fear that seduced people stand in , of their excommunications ; upon hearing of false miracles , false traditions , and false interpretations of the scripture . it was not therefore a very difficult matter , for henry . by his exorcisme ; nor for qu. elizabeth by hers , to cast them out . but who knows that this spirit of rome , now gone out , and walking by missions through the dry places of china , japan , and the indies , that yeeld him little fruit , may not return , or rather an assembly of spirits worse than he , enter , and inhabite this clean swept house , and make the end thereof worse than the beginning ? for it is not the romane clergy onely , that pretends the kingdome of god to be of this world , and thereby to have a power therein , distinct from that of the civill state. and this is all i had a designe to say , concerning the doctrine of the politiques . which when i have reviewed , i shall willingly expose it to the censure of my countrey . a review , and conclusion . from the contrariety of some of the naturall faculties of the mind , one to another , as also of one passion to another , and from their reference to conversation , there has been an argument taken , to inferre an impossibility that any one man should be sufficiently disposed to all sorts of civill duty . the severity of judgment , they say , makes men censorious , and unapt to pardon the errours and infirmities of other men : and on the other side , celerity of fancy , makes the thoughts lesse steddy than is necessary , to discern exactly between right and wrong . again , in all deliberations , and in all pleadings , the faculty of solid reasoning , is necessary : for without it , the resolutions of men are rash , and their sentences unjust : and yet if there be not powerfull eloquence , which procureth attention and consent , the effect of reason will be little . but these are contrary faculties ; the former being grounded upon principles of truth ; the other upon opinions already received , true , or false ; and upon the passions and interests of men , which are different , and mutable . and amongst the passions , courage , ( by which i mean the contempt of wounds , and violent death ) enclineth men to private revenges , and sometimes to endeavour the unsetling of the publique peace : and timorousnesse , many times disposeth to the desertion of the publique defence . both these they say cannot stand together in the same person . and to consider the contrariety of mens opinions , and manners in generall , it is they say , impossible to entertain a constant civill amity with all those , with whom the businesse of the world constrains us to converse : which businesse , consisteth almost in nothing else but a perpetuall contention for honor , riches , and authority . to which i answer , that these are indeed great difficulties , but not impossibilities : for by education , and discipline , they may bee , and are sometimes reconciled . judgment , and fancy may have place in the same man ; but by turnes ; as the end which he aimeth at requireth . as the israelites in egypt , were sometimes fastened to their labour of making bricks , and other times were ranging abroad to gather straw : so also may the judgement sometimes be fixed upon one certain consideration , and the fancy at another time wandring about the world . so also reason , and ●…loquence , ( though not perhaps in the naturall sciences , yet in the morall ) may stand very well together . for wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of errour , there is much more place for adorning and preferring of truth , if they have it to adorn . nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the laws , and not fearing a publique enemy ; nor between abstaining from injury , and pardoning it in others . there is therefore no such inconsistence of humane nature , with civill duties , as some think . i have known cleernesse of judgment , and largenesse of fancy ; strength of reason , and gracefull elocution ; a courage for the warre , and a fear for the laws , and all eminently in one man ; and that was my most noble and honored friend mr. sidney godolphin ; who hating no man , nor hated of any , was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late civill warre , in the publique quarrell , by an undiscerned , and an undiscerning hand . to the laws of nature , declared in the . chapter , i would have this added , that every man is bound by nature , as much as in him lieth , to protect in warre , the authority , by which he is himself protected in time of peace . for he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his owne body , cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy him , by whose strength he is preserved : it is a manifest contradiction of himselfe . and though this law may bee drawn by consequence , from some of those that are there already mentioned ; yet the times require to have it inculcated , and remembred . and because i find by divers english books lately printed , that the civill warres have not yet sufficiently taught men , in what point of time it is , that a subject becomes obliged to the conquerour ; nor what is conquest ; nor how it comes about , that it obliges men to obey his laws : therefore for farther satisfaction of men therein , i say , the point of time , wherein a man becomes subject to a conquerour , is that point , wherein having liberty to submit to him , he consenteth , either by expresse words , or by other sufficient sign , to be his subject . when it is that a man hath the liberty to submit , i have shewed before in the end of the . chapter ; namely , that for him that hath no obligation to his former soveraign but that of an ordinary subject , it is then , when the means of his life is within the guards and garrisons of the enemy ; for it is then , that he hath no longer protection from him , but is protected by the adverse party for his contribution . seeing therefore such contribution is every where , as a thing inevitable , ( notwithstanding it be an assistance to the enemy , ) esteemed lawfull ; a totall submission , which is but an assistance to the enemy , cannot be esteemed unlawful . besides , if a man consider that they who submit , assist the enemy but with part of their estates , whereas they that refuse , assist him with the whole , there is no reason to call their submission , or composition an assistance ; but rather a detriment to the enemy . but if a man , besides the obligation of a subject , hath taken upon him a new obligation of a souldier , then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new power , as long as the old one keeps the field , and giveth him means of subsistence , either in his armies , or garrisons : for in this case , he cannot complain of want of protection , and means to live as a souldier : but when that also failes , a souldier also may seek his protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it ; and may lawfully submit himself to his new master . and so much for the time when he may do it lawfully , if hee will. if therefore he doe it , he is undoubtedly bound to be a true subject : for a contract lawfully made , cannot lawfully be broken . by this also a man may understand , when it is , that men may be said to be conquered ; and in what the nature of conquest , and the right of a conquerour consisteth : for this submission is it implyeth them all . conquest , is not the victory it self ; but the acquisition by victory , of a right , over the persons of men . he therefore that is slain , is overcome , but not conquered : he that is taken , and put into prison , or chaines , is not conquered , though overcome ; for he is still an enemy , and may save himself if hee can : but he that upon promise of obedience , hath his life and liberty allowed him , is then conquered , and a subject ; and not before . the romanes used to say , that their generall had pacified such a province , that is to say , in english , conquerea it ; and that the countrey was pacified by victory , when the people of it had promised imperata facere , that is , to doe what the romane people commanded them : this was to be conquered . but this promise may be either expresse , or tacite : expresse , by promise : tacite , by other signes . as for example , a man that hath not been called to make such an expresse promise , ( because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable ; ) yet if he live under their protection openly , hee is understood to submit himselfe to the government : but if he live there secretly , he is lyable to any thing that may bee done to a spie , and enemy of the state. i say not , hee does any injustice , ( for acts of open hostility bear not that name ) ; but that he may be justly put to death . likewise , if a man , when his country is conquered , be out of it , he is not conquered , nor subject : but if at his return , he submit to the government , he is bound to obey it . so that conquest ( to define it ) is the acquiring of the right of soveraignty by victory . which right , is acquired , in the peoples submission , by which they contract with the victor , promising obedience , for life and liberty . in the . chapter i have set down for one of the causes of the dissolutions of common-wealths , their imperfect generation , consisting in the want of an absolute and arbitrary legislative power ; for want whereof , the civill soveraign is fain to handle the sword of justice unconstantly , and as if it were too hot for him to hold : one reason whereof ( which i have not there mentioned ) is this , that they will all of them justifie the war , by which their power was at first gotten , and whereon ( as they think ) their right dependeth , and not on the possession . as if , for example , the right of the kings of england did depend on the goodnesse of the cause of william the conquerour , and upon their lineall , and directest descent from him ; by which means , there would perhaps be no tie of the subjects obedience to their soveraign at this day in all the world : wherein whilest they needlessely think to justifie themselves , they justifie all the successefull rebellions that ambition shall at any time raise against them , and their successors . therefore i put down for one of the most effectuall seeds of the death of any state , that the conquerors require not onely a submission of mens actions to them for the future , but also an approbation of all their actions past ; when there is scarce a common-wealth in the world , whose beginnings can in conscience be justified . and because the name of tyranny , signifieth nothing more , nor lesse , than the name of soveraignty , be it in one , or many men , saving that they that use the former word , are understood to bee angry with them they call tyrants ; i think the toleration of a professed hatred of tyranny , is a toleration of hatred to common-wealth in generall , and another evill seed , not differing much from the former . for to the justification of the cause of a conqueror , the reproach of the cause of the conquered , is for the most part necessary : but neither of them necessary for the obligation of the conquered . and thus much i have thought fit to say upon the review of the first and second part of this discourse . in the . chapter , i have sufficiently declared out of the scripture , that in the common-wealth of the jewes , god himselfe was made the soveraign , by pact with the people ; who were therefore called his peculiar people , to distinguish them from the rest of the world , over whom god reigned not by their consent , but by his own power : and that in this kingdome moses was gods lieutenant on earth ; and that it was he that told them what laws god appointed them to be ruled by . but i have omitted to set down who were the officers appointed to doe execution ; especially in capitall punishments ; not then thinking it a matter of so necessary consideration , as i find it since . wee know that generally in all common-wealths , the execution of corporeall punishments , was either put upon the guards , or other souldiers of the soveraign power ; or given to those , in whom want of means , contempt of honour , and hardnesse of heart , concurred , to make them sue for such an office. but amongst the israelites it was a positive law of god their soveraign , that he that was convicted of a capitall crime , should be stoned to death by the people ; and that the witnesses should cast the first stone , and after the witnesses , then the rest of the people . this was a law that designed who were to be the executioners ; but not that any one should throw a stone at him before conviction and sentence , where the congregation was judge . the witnesses were neverthelesse to be heard before they proceeded to execution , unlesse the fact were committed in the presence of the congregation it self , or in sight of the lawfull judges ; for then there needed no other witnesses but the judges themselves . neverthelesse , this manner of proceeding being not throughly understood , hath given occasion to a dangerous opinion , that any man may kill another , in some cases , by a right of zeal ; as if the executions done upon offenders in the kingdome of god in old time , proceeded not from the soveraign command , but from the authority of private zeal : which , if we consider the texts that seem to favour it , is quite contrary . first , where the levites fell upon the people , that had made and worshipped the golden calfe , and slew three thousand of them ; it was by the commandement of moses , from the mouth of god ; as is manifest , exod. . . and when the son of a woman of israel had blasphemed god , they that heard it , did not kill him , but brought him before moses , who put him under custody , till god should give sentence against him ; as appears , levit. . , . again , ( numbers . , . ) when phinehas killed zimri and cosbi , it was not by right of private zeale : their crime was committed in the sight of the assembly ; there needed no witnesse ; the law was known , and he the heir apparent to the soveraignty ; and which is the principall point , the lawfulnesse of his act depended wholly upon a subsequent ratification by moses , whereof he had no cause to doubt . and this presumption of a future ratification , is sometimes necessary to the safety a common-wealth ; as in a sudden rebellion , any man that can suppresse it by his own power in the countrey where it begins , without expresse law or commission , may lawfully doe it , and provide to have it ratified , or pardoned , whilest it is in doing , or after it is done . also numb . . . it is expressely said , whosoever shall kill the murtherer , shall kill him upon the word of witnesses : but witnesses suppose a formall judicature , and consequently condemn that pretence of ius zelotarum . the law of moses concerning him that enticeth to idolatry , ( that is to say , in the kingdome of god to a renouncing of his allegiance ( deut. . . ) forbids to conceal him , and commands the accuser to cause him to be put to death , and to cast the first stone at him ; but not to kill him before he be condemned . and ( deut. . ver . , , . ) the processe against idolatry is exactly set down : for god there speaketh to the people , as judge , and commandeth them , when a man is accused of idolatry , to enquire diligently of the fact , and finding it true , then to stone him ; but still the hand of the witnesse throweth the first stone . this is not private zeale , but publique condemnation . in like manner when a father hath a rebellious son , the law is ( deut. . . ) that he shall bring him before the judges of the town , and all the people of the town shall stone him . lastly , by pretence of these laws it was , that st. steven was stoned , and not by pretence of private zeal : for before hee was carried away to execution , he had pleaded his cause before the high priest. there is nothing in all this , nor in any other part of the bible , to countenance executions by private zeal ; which being oftentimes but a conjunction of ignorance and passion , is against both the justice and peace of a common-wealth . in the . chapter i have said , that it is not declared in what manner god spake supernaturally to moses : not that he spake not to him sometimes by dreams and visions , and by a supernaturall voice , as to other prophets : for the manner how he spake unto him from the mercy-seat , is expressely set down numbers . . in these words , from that time forward , when moses entred into the tabernacle of the congregation to speak with god , he heard a voice which spake unto him from over the mercy-seate , which is over the arke of the testimony , from between the cherubins he spake unto him . but it is not declared in what consisted the praeeminence of the manner of gods speaking to moses , above that of his speaking to other prophets , as to samuel , and to abraham , to whom he also spake by a voice , ( that is , by vision ) unlesse the difference consist in the cleernesse of the vision . for face to face , and mouth to mouth , cannot be literally understood of the infinitenesse , and incomprehensibility of the divine nature . and as to the whole doctrine , i see not yet , but the principles of it are true and proper ; and the ratiocination solid . for i ground the civill right of soveraigns , and both the duty and liberty of subjects , upon the known naturall inclinations of mankind , and upon the articles of the law of nature ; of which no man , that pretends but reason enough to govern his private family , ought to be ignorant . and for the power ecclesiasticall of the same soveraigns , i ground it on such texts , as are both evident in themselves , and consonant to the scope of the whole scripture . and therefore am perswaded , that he that shall read it with a purpose onely to be informed , shall be informed by it . but for those that by writing , or publique discourse , or by their eminent actions , have already engaged themselves to the maintaining of contrary opinions , they will not bee so easily satisfied . for in such cases , it is naturall for men , at one and the same time , both to proceed in reading , and to lose their attention , in the search of objections to that they had read before : of which , in a time wherein the interests of men are changed ( seeing much of that doctrine , which serveth to the establishing of a new government , must needs be contrary to that which conduced to the dissolution of the old , ) there cannot choose but be very many . in that part which treateth of a christian common-wealth , there are some new doctrines , which , it may be , in a state where the contrary were already fully determined , were a fault for a subject without leave to divulge , as being an usurpation of the place of a teacher . but in this time , that men call not onely for peace , but also for truth , to offer such doctrines as i think true , and that manifestly tend to peace and loyalty , to the consideration of those that are yet in deliberation , is no more , but to offer new wine , to bee put into new cask , that both may be preserved together . and i suppose , that then , when novelty can breed no trouble , nor disorder in a state , men are not generally so much inclined to the reverence of antiquity , as to preferre ancient errors , before new and well proved truth . there is nothing i distrust more than my elocution ; which neverthelesse i am confident ( excepting the mischances of the presse ) is not obscure . that i have neglected the ornament of quoting ancient poets , orators , and philosophers , contrary to the custome of late time , ( whether i have done well or ill in it , ) proceedeth from my judgment , grounded on many reasons . for first , all truth of doctrine dependeth either upon reason , or upon scripture ; both which give credit to many , but never receive it from any writer . secondly , the matters in question are not of fact , but of right , wherein there is no place for witnesses . there is scarce any of those old writers , that contradicteth not sometimes both himself , and others ; which makes their testimonies insufficient . fourthly , such opinions as are taken onely upon credit of antiquity , are not intrin●…ecally the judgment of those that cite them , but words that passe ( like gaping ) from mouth to mouth . fiftly , it is many times with a fraudulent designe that men stick their corrupt doctrine with the cloves of other mens wit. sixtly , i find not that the ancients they cite , took it for an ornament , to doe the like with those that wrote before them . seventhly , it is an argument of indigestion ; when greek and latine sentences unchewed come up again , as they use to doe , unchanged . lastly , though i reverence those men of ancient time , that either have written truth perspicuously , or set us in a better way to find it out our selves ; yet to the antiquity it self i think nothing due : for if we will reverence the age , the present is the oldest . if the antiquity of the writer , i am not sure , that generally they to whom such honor is given , were more ancient when they wrote , than i am that am writing : but if it bee well considered , the praise of ancient authors , proceeds not from the reverence of the dead , but from the competition , and mutuall envy of the living . to conclude , there is nothing in this whole discourse , nor in that i writ before of the same subject in latine , as far as i can perceive , contrary either to the word of god , or to good manners ; or to the disturbance of the publique tranquillity . therefore i think it may be profitably printed , and more profitably taught in the universities , in case they also think so , to whom the judgment of the same belongeth . for seeing the universities are the fountains of civill , and morall doctrine , from whence the preachers , and the gentry , drawing such water as they find , use to sprinkle the same ( both from the pulpit , and in their conversation ) upon the people , there ought certainly to be great care taken , to have it pure , both from the venime of heathen politicians , and from the incantation of deceiving spirits . and by that means the most men , knowing their duties , will be the less subject to serve the ambition of a few discōtented persons , in their purposes against the state ; and be the lesse grieved with the contributions necessary for their peace , and defence ; and the governours themselves have the lesse cause , to maintain at the common charge any greater army , than is necessary to make good the publique liberty , against the invasions and encroachments of forraign enemies . and thus i have brought to an end my discourse of civill and ecclesiasticall government , occasioned by the disorders of the present time , without partiality , without application , and without other designe , than to set before mens eyes the mutuall relation between protection and obedience ; of which the condition of humane nature , and the laws divine , ( both naturall and positive ) require an inviolable observation . and though in the revolution of states , there can be no very good constellation for truths of this nature to be born under , ( as having an angry aspect from the dissolvers of an old government , and seeing but the backs of them that erect a new ; ▪ ) yet i cannot think it will be condemned at this time , either by the publique judge of doctrine , or by any that desires the continu●…nce of publique peace . and in this hope i return to my interrupted speculation of bodies naturall ; wherein , ( if god give me health to finish it , ) i hope the novelty will as much please , as in the doctrine of this artificiall body it useth to offend . for such truth , as opposeth no mans profit , nor pleasure , is to all men welcome . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e memory . dreams . apparitions or visions . understanding . trayne of thoughts unguided . trayne of thoughts regulated . remembrance . prudence . signes . con●…ecture of the time past . originall of speech . the use of speech . abuses of speech . names proper & common . universall . necessity of d●…ons . subject to names ▪ use of names positive . negative names with their vses . words insignificant . understanding . inconstant names . reason what it is . reason defined . right reason where . the use of reason . of error and absurdity . causes of absurditie . . . . . . . . science . prudence & sapience , with their difference . signes of science . motion vitall and animal . endeavour . appetite . desire . hunger . thirst. aversion . love. hate . contempt . good. evill . pulchrum . turpe . delightfull . profitable . 〈◊〉 . unprofitable . delight . displeasure . pleasure . offence . pleasures of sense . pleasures of the mind joy. paine . griefe . hope . despaire . feare . courage . anger . confidence . diffid●…nce . indignation . benevolence . good nature . covetousnesse ambition . pusillanimity . magnanimity . valour . liberality . miserablenesse . kindnesse . naturall lust. luxury . the passion of love. jealousie . revengefulnesse . curiosity . religion . superstition . true religion . panique terrour . admiration . glory . vain-glory. dejection . sudden glory . laughter . sudden dejection . weeping . shame . blushing . impudence . pitty . cruelty . emulation . envy . deliberation . the will. formes of speech , in passion . good and evill apparent . felicity . praise . magnification . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . judgement , or sentence ●…inal . doubt . science . opinio●… . consci●…ce . beliefe . faith. intellectuall vertue defined . wit , naturall , or acquired . naturall wit. good wit , or fancy . good judgement . discretion . prudence . craft . acquired wit. giddinesse . madnesse . rage . melancholy . insignificant speech . power . worth. dignity . to honour and dishonour . honourable . dishonourable . coats of armes . titles of honour . worthinesse . fitnesse . what is here meant by manners . a restlesse desire of power , in all men . love of contention from competition . civil obedience from love of ease . from feare of death , or wounds . and from love of arts. love of vertue , from love praise . hate , from difficulty of requiting great benefits . and from conscience of deserving to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . promptnesse to hurt , from fear . and from distrufl of their own wit ▪ vain undertaking from vain-glory. ambition , from opinion of sufficiency . irresolution , from too great valuing of small matters . con●…idence in others ●…rom ignorance of the marks of wisdome and kindnesse . and from ignorance of naturall causes . and from want of understanding . adhaerence to custome , from ignorance of the nature of right and wrong . adhaerence to private men , from ignorance of the causes of peace . credulity from ignorance of nature . curiosity to know , from care of future time . naturall re ligion , from the same . religion , in man onely . first , from his desire of knowing causes . from the consideration of the begining of thing●… . from his observation of the sequell of things . the naturall cause of religion , the anxiety of the time to come . which makes them fear the power of inuisible things . and suppose them incorporeall . but know not the way how they effect any thing . but honour them as they honour m●…n . and attribute to them all extraordinary events . foure things , naturall seeds of religion . mide different by culture . the absurd opinion of gentilisme . the designes of the authors of the religion of the heathen . the true religion , and the lawes of gods kingdome the same . chap. . the causes of change in religion . injoyning beleefe of impossibilities . doing contrary to the religion they establish . want of the testimony of miracles . * exod. . , . * judges . . * sam. . . men by nature equall . from equ●…lity proce●…ds di●…idence . from diffidence warre . out of civil states , there is alwayes warre of every one against every one . the incommodities of such a war. in such a warre , nothing is unjust . the passions that incline men to peace . right of nature what . liberty what . a law of nature what . difference of right and law. naturally every man has right to everything . the fundamentall law of nature . the seoond law of nature . what it is to lay down a right . renouncing a right what it is . transferring right what . obligation . duty . injustice . not all rights are alienable . contract what . covenant what . free-gift . signes of contract expresse . signes of contract by inference . free gift passeth by words of the present or past. signes of contract are words both of the past , present , and future . merit what . covenants of mutuall trust , when invalid . right to the end , containeth right to the means . no covenant with beasts . nor with god wit●…out speciall revelation . no covenant , but of possible and future . covenants how made voyd . covenants extorted by feare are valide . the former covenant to one , makes voyd the later to another . a mans covenant not to defend himselfe , is voyd . no man obliged to accuse himself . the end of an oath . the forme of an oath . no oath , but by god. an oath addes nothing to the obligation . the third law of nature , justice . justice and jnjustice what . justice and propriety begin with the constitution of common-wealth . justice not contrary to reason . covenants not discharged by the vice of the person to whom they are made . justice of men , & iustice of actions what . iustice of manners , and iustice of actions . nothing done to a man , by his own consent can be injury . justice commutative , and distributive . the fourth law of nature , gratitude . the fifth , mutuall accommodetion , or compleasance . the sixth , facility to pardon . the seventh , that in revenges , men respect onely the future good . the eighth , against contumely . the ninth , against 〈◊〉 . the tenth against arrogance . the elev●…nth equity . the twelfth , equall use of things common . the thirteenth , of lot. the fourteenth , of primogeniture , and first seising . the ●…fteenth , of mediators . the sixteenth , of submission to arbitrement . the seventeenth , no man is his own judge . the eighteenth , no man to be judge , that has in him a natural cause of partiality . the nineteenth , of witnesses . a rule , by which the laws of n●…ture may e●…sily be examined . the lawes of nature oblige inconscience alwayes , but in effect then onely when there is security . the laws of nature are eternal ; and yet easie . the science of these lawes , is the true morall philosophy . a person what . person naturall , and artificiall . the word person , whence . actor . author , authority . covenants by authority , bind the author . but not the actor . the authority is to be shewne . things personated , inanimate . irrational ; false gods ; the true god. a multitude of men , how one person . every one is author . an actor may be many men made one by plur●…lity of voy●… ▪ representatives , when the number is even , unprofitable . negativ●… voyce . notes for div a -e the end of commonwe●…th , particular security : chap. . which is not to be had from the law of nature : nor from the conjunction of a few men or familyes : nor from a great multitude , unlesse directed by one judgement : and that continually . why certain creatures without reason , or speech , do neverthelesse live in society , without any c●…rcive power . the generation of a common-wealth . the definition of a common-wealth . soveraigne , and subje●…t , what . the act of instituting a common-wealth , what . the consequences to such institution , are . the subjects cannot change the forme of government . . soveraigne power cannot be forfeited . no man can without injustice protest against the institution of the soveraigne declared by the major part . the soveraigns actions cannot be justly accused by the subject . what soever the soveraigne doth , is unpunishable by the subject . . the soveraigne is judge of what is necessary for the peace and defence of his subjects . and iudge of what doctrines are fit to be taught them . the right of making rules , whereby the subjects may every man know what is so his owne , as no other subject can without injustice take it from him . to ●…im also belongeth the right of all judicature and decision of controversise : . and of making war , and peace , as he shall think best : . and of choosing all counsellours , and ministers ; both of peace , and warre : . and of rewarding , and punishing , and that ( where no former law hath determined the measure of it ) arbitrary : . and of honour and order . these rights are indivisible . and can by no grant passe away without direct renouncing of the soveraign power . the power and honour of subjects vanisheth in the presence of the power soveraign . soveraigne power not so hurtfull as the want of it , and the hurt proceeds for the greatest part from not submitting readily , to a lesse . the different formes of common-wealths but three . tyranny and oligarchy , but different names of monarchy , and aristocracy . subordinate representatives dangerous . comparison of monarchy , with soveraign assemblyes . of the right of succession . the present monarch hath right to dispose of the succ●…ssim . succession passeth by expresse words ; or , by not controlling a custome ; or , by presumption of naturall affec●… . to dispose of the succession though to a king of another nation , not unlawfull . a common-wealth by acquisition . wherein 〈◊〉 from a common-wealth by ins●…on . the rights of soveraignty the same in both . dominion paternall how attained . not by g●…neration , but by contract ; or education ; or precedent subjection of one of the parents to the other . the right of succession followeth the rules of the right of possession . despoticall dominion how attained . not by the victory , but by the consent of the vanquished . difference between a family and a kingdom . the rights of monarchy from scripture . * exod. . . * exod. . . * sam. . , , &c. * verse . . * kings . . * sam. . . * coll. . . * verse . * math. . , . * tit. . . * mat. . , . * gen. . soveraign power ought in all common-wealths to be absolute . liberty what . what it is to be free. feare and liberty consistent . liberty and necessity consistent . artificiall bonds , or covenants . liberty of subjects consisteth in liberty from covenants . liberty of the subject consistent with the unlimited power of the soveraign . the liberty which writers praise , is the liberty of soveraigns ▪ not of private men . liberty of subjects how to be measured . subjects have liberty to defend their own bodies , even against them that lawsully invade them ; are not bound to hurt themselves ; nor to warfare , unlesse they voluntarily undertake it . the greatest liberty of subjects , dependeth on the silence of the law. in what cases subjects are absolved of their obedience to their soveraign . in case of captivity . in case the soveraign cast off the government from himself and his heyrs . in case of banishment . in case the soveraign render himself subject to another . the divers sorts of systemes of people . in all bodies politique the power of the representative is limited . by letters patents : and the lawes . when the representative is one man , his unwarranted acts are his own onely . when it is an assembly , it is the act of them that assented onely . when the representative is one man , if he borrow mony , or owe it , by contract ; he is lyable onely , the members not . when it is an assembly , they onely are liable that have assented . if the debt be to one of the assembly , the body onely is obliged . protestation against the decrees of bodies politique sometimes lawful ; but against soveraign power never . bodies politique for government of a province , colony , or town . bodies politique for ordering of trade . a bodie politique for counsel to be given to the soveraign . a regular private body , lawfull , as a family . private bodies regular , but unlawfull . systemes irregular , such as are private leagues secret cabals . feuds of private families . factions for government . * acts . . publique minister who. ministers for the generall administration . for speciall administration , as for oeco●…my . for instruction of the people . for judicature . for 〈◊〉 . counsellers without other employment then to advise are not publique ministers . the nourishment of a common-wealth consisteth in the commodities of sea and land : and the right distribution of them . all private estates of land proceed originally from the arbitrary distribution of the soveraign . propriety of a subject excludes not the dominion of the soveraign , but onely of another subject . the publique is not to be dieted . the places and matter of traffique depend , as their distribution , on the soveraign . the laws of transferring propriety belong also 〈◊〉 the soveraign . mony the bloud of a common-wealth . the conduits and way of mony to the publique use . the children of a common-wealth colonies . counsell wha●… . differences between command . and counsell ▪ exhortation and dehortation what . differennce●… of fit and unfit counsellours . civill law what . the soveraign is legistator : and not subject to civill law. use , a law not by vertue of time , but of the soveraigns consent . the law of nature , and the civill law contain each other . provinciall lawes are not made by custome , but by the soveraign power ▪ some foolish opinions of lawyers concerning the making of lawes . sir edw. coke , upon l●…tleton , lib. . ch. . 〈◊〉 . . b. law made , ●…f not also made known , is no law. unwritten lawes are all of them lawes of nature . * prov. . . deut. . . * deut. . . nothing is law where the legislator cannot be known . difference between verifying and authorising the law verifyed by the subordinate judge . by the publique registers . by letters patent , and publique seale . the interpretation of the law dependeth on the soveraign power . all law●… need interpretation . the a●…thenticall interpretation of law is not that of writers . the interpreter of the law is the judge giving sentence vivâ ▪ voce in every particular case . the sentence of a judge , does not bind him , or another judge to give like sentence in like cases ever after . the difference between the letter and sentence of the law. the abilities required in a judge . divisions of law. another division of law. divine positive law how made known to be law. gen. . . another division of lawes . a fundamentall law what . difference between law and right : and between a law and a charter . sinne what . a crime what . where no civill law is , there is 〈◊〉 crime . ignorance of the law of nature excuseth no man. ignorance of the civill law excuseth sometimes . ignorance of the soveraign excuseth not . ignorance of the penalty excuseth not . punishments declared before the fact , excuse from greater punishments after it . nothing can be made a crime by a law made after the fact. false principles of right and wrong causes of crime . false teachers mis-interpreting the law of nature , and false inferences from true 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 teachers . by their passions ; presumption of riches , and friēds ; wisedome . hatred , lust , ambition , covetousnesse , causes of crime . fear sometimes cause of crime , as when the danger is neither present , nor corporeall . crimes not equall . totall excuses . excuses against the author . preseumption of power , aggravateth . evill teachers , extenuate . examples of impunity , extenuate . praemeditation , aggravateth . tacite approbation of the soveraign , extenuates . comparison of crimes from their effects . laesa majestas . bribery and false testimony . depeculation . counterfeiting authority . crimes against private men compared . publique crimes what . the definition of punishment . right to punish whence derived . private injuries , and revenges no punishments : nor denyall of preferment : nor pain inflicted without publique hearing : nor pain inflicted by usurped power : nor pain inflicted without respect to to the future good . naturall evill consequences , no punishments . hurt inflicted , if lesse than the benefit of transgressing , is not punishment . where the punishment is annexed to the law , a greater hurt is not punishment , but 〈◊〉 . hurt inflicted for a fact done before the law , no punishment . the representative of the common-wealth unpunishable . hurt to revolted subjects is done by right of war , not by way of punishment . punishments corporall . capitall . ignominy . imprisonment . exile . the punishment of innocent subjects is contrary to the law of nature . but the harme done to innocents in war , not so : nor that which is done to declared rebels . reward is either salary , or grace . benefits bestowed for fear , are not rewards . salaries certain and casuall . dissolution of common-wealths proceedeth from their imperfect institution . want of absolute power . private judgement of good and evill . erroneous conscience . pretence of inspiration . subjecting the soveraign power to civill lawes . attributing of absolute propri●…ty to 〈◊〉 . dividing of the soveraign power . imitatio●… of neighbour natiou●… . imitation of the gre●…ks , and romans . mixt government . want of mony. monopolies and abuses of publicans . popular men . excessive greatnesse of a ●…own , multitude of corporations . liberty of disputing against soveraign power . dissolution of the common-wealth . the procuration of the good of the people . by instr●…ction & lawes . against the duty of a soveraign to relinquish any essentiall right of soveraignty : or not to se●… the people taught the grounds of them . objection of those that say there are no principles of reason for absolute soveraig●…ty . objection from the incapacity of the vulgar . subjects are to be taught , not to affect change of government : nor adhere ( against the soveraign ) to popular men ▪ nor to dispute the soveraign power : and to have dayes set apart to learn their duty : and to honour their parents . and to avoyd doing of injury : and to do all this sincerely from the heart . the use of u●…iversities ▪ equall ●…xes . publique charity . 〈◊〉 of idlenesse . go●… lawe●… wh●…t . such as are necessary . such as are perspicuous . punishments . rewards . counsellours . commanders . the scope of the following chapters . psal. . psal. . . who are subjects in the kingdome of god. a threefold word of god , reason , revelation , proph●…y . a twofold kingdome of god , naturall and prophetique . the right of gods soveraignty is derived from his omnipotence . sinne not the cause of all affliction . psal. . ver . , , . job . v. . divine lawes . honour and worship what . severall signes of honour . worship naturall and arbitrary . worship commanded and free. worship publique and private . the end of worship . attributes of divine honour . actions that are signes ▪ of divine honour . publique worship consisteth in uniformity . all attributes depend on the lawes civill . not all actions . naturall punishments . the conclusion of the second part. notes for div a -e the word of god delivered by prophets is the mainprinciple of christian politiques . yet is not naturall reason to be renounced . what it is to captivate the understanding . how god speaketh to men . by what marks prophets are known . kings . kings . deut. . v. , , , , . mat. . . gal. . . the marks of a prophet in the old law , miracles , and doctrin conformable to the law . miracles ceasing , prophets cease , and the scripture supplies their place . of the books of holy scripture . their antiquity . the penta●… not written by moses . deut. . . deut. . . king. . . & . , , . the book of joshua written after his time . josh. . . josh. . . josh. . . the booke of judges and ruth written long after the captivity . the like of the bookes of samuel . sam. . . the books of the kings , and the ▪ chronicles . ezra and nehemiah . esther . job . the psalter . the proverbs . ecclesiastes and the canticles . the prophets . the new testament . their scope . the question of the authority of the scriptures stated . their authority and interpretation . body and spirit how taken in the scripture . the spirit of god taken in the scripture sometimes for a wind , or breath . secondly , for extraordinary gifts of the vnderstanding . thirdly , for extraordinary affections . fourthly , for the gift of prediction by dreams and visions . fif●…ly , for life . sixtly , for a subordination to authority . seventhly , for aeriall bodies . angel what . inspiration what . the kingdom of god taken by divines metaphorically , but in the scriptures properly . the originall of the kingdome of god. that the kingdome of god is properly his civill soveraignty over a peculiar people by pact . holy what . sacred what . degrees of sanctity . sacrament . word what . the words spoken by god , and concerning god , both are called ▪ god 's word in scripture . tim. . . the word of god metaphorically used , first , for the decrees and power of god. secondly , for the effect of his word . acts . . luke . . thirdly , for the words of reason and equity . divers acceptions of the word prophet . praediction of future contingents , not alwaies prophecy . the manner how god hath spoken to the prophets . to the extraordinary prophets of the old testament he spake by dreams , or visions . to prophets of perpetuall calling , and supreme , god spake in the old testament from the mercy seat , in a manner not expressed in the scripture . to prophets of perpetuall calling , but subordinate , god spake by the spirit . ●…od sometimes also spake by lots . every man ought to examine the probability of a pretended prophets calling . all prophecy but of the soveraign prophet is to be examined by every subject . a miracle is a work that causeth admiration . and must therefore be rare , and whereof there is no naturall cause known . that which seemeth a miracle to one man , may seem otherwise to another . the end of miracles . exo. . , &c. the definition of a miracle . exod. . . exod. . . exod. . . that men are apt to be deceived by false miracles . cautions against the imposture of miracles . the place of adams eternity if he had not sinned , had been the terrestiall paradise . gen. . . texts concerning the place of life eternall , for beleevers . ascension into heaven . the place after judgment , of those who were never in the kingdome of god , 〈◊〉 having been in , are cast out . tartarus . the congregation of giants . lake of fire . vtter darknesse . gehenna , and tophet . of the literall sense of the scripture concerning hell. satan , devill , not proper names , but appellatives . torments of hell. apoc. . , . the joyes of life eternall , and salvation the same thing . salvation from sin , and from misery , all one . the place of eternall salvation . pet. . . pet. . . redemption . church the lords house . ecclesia properly what . acts . . in what sense the church is one person . church defined . a christian common-wealth , and a church all one . the soveraign rights of abraham . abraham had the sole power of ordering the religion of his own people . no pretence of private spirit against the religion of abraham . abraham sole judge , and interpreter of what god spake . the authority of moses whereon grounded . john . . moses was ( under god ) soveraign of the jews , all his own time , though aaron had the priesthood . all spirits were subordinate to the spirit of moses . after moses the soveraignty was in the high priest. of the soveraign power between the time of joshua and of saul . of the rights of the kings of israel . the practice of supremacy in religion , was not in the time of the kings , according to the right thereof . chro. . . after the captivity the iews ●…ad no setled common-wealth . three parts of the office of christ. his office as a redeemer . christs kingdome not of this wo●…ld . the end of christs comming was to renew the covenant of the kingdome of god , and to perswade the elect to imbrace it , which was the second part of his office. the preaching of christ not contrary to the then law of the iews , nor of caesar. the third part of his office was to be king ( under his father ) of the elect. christs authority in the kingdome of god subordinate to that ▪ of his father . one and the same god is the person represented by moses , and by christ. of the holy spirit that fel on the apostles . of the trinity . the power ecclesiasticall is but the power to teach . an argument thereof , the power of christ himself : from the name of regeneration : from the compari●…on of it , with fishing , leaven , seed . f●…om the nature of 〈◊〉 : cor. . . from the authority christ hath l●…st to civill princes . what christians may do to avoid persecution . of martyrs . argument from the points of their commission , to preach ; and teach ; to baptize ; and to forgive , and retain sinnes . mat. . , , . of excommunication . the use of excommunication without civill power , acts . . of no effect upon an apostate . but upon the faithfull only . for what fault lyeth excommunication . ofpersons liaable to excommunication . sam. . of the interpreter of the scriptures before civil soveraigns became christians . of the power to make scripture law. of the ten commandements . of the iudiciall , and leviticall law. the second law. * kings : . the old testament when made canonicall . the new testament began to be canonicall under christian soveraigns . of the power of councells to make the scriptures law. john . . john . . of the right of constituting ecclesiasticall officers in the time of the apostles . matthias made apostle by the congregation . paul and barnabas made apostles by the church of antioch . what offices in the church are magisteriall . ordination of teachers . ministers of the church what : and how chosen . of ecclesiasticall revenue , under the law of moses . in our saviours time , and after . mat. . , . * acts . . the ministers of the gospel lived on the benevolence of their flocks . cor. . . that the civill soveraign being a christian hath the right of appointing pastors . the pastor all authority of soveraigns only is de jure divino , that of other pastors is jure civili . christian kings have power to execute all manner of pastoral function . * john . . * cor. . , . * c●…r . . . the civill soveraigne if a christian , is head of the church in his own dominions . cardinal bellarmines books de summo pontifice considered . the first book . the second book . the third book . * dan. . . the fourth book . texts for the infa●…ibility of the popes judgement in points of faith. texts for the same in point of manners . the question of superiority between the pope and other bishops . of the popes ●…mporall power . the difficulty of obeying god and man both at once , is none to them that distinguish between what is , and what is not necessary to salvation . all that is necessary to salvation is contained in faith and obedience . what obedience is necessary ; and to what laws . in the faith of a christian , who is the person beleeved . the causes of christian faith. faith comes by hearing . the onely necessary article of christian faith ; proved from the scope of the evangelists : from the sermons of the apostles : from the easinesse of the doctrine : from formall ●…ud cleer texts . from that it is the foundation of all other articles . pet. . v. , , . in what sense other articles may be called n●…cessary . that faith , and obedience are both of them necessary to salvation . what each of them contributes thereunto . obedience to god and to the civill soveraign not inconsistent , whether christian , or infidel . notes for div a -e the kingdom of darknesse what . * eph. . . * mat. . . * mat. . . * eph. . . * joh. . . the church not yet fully ●…reed of darknesse . four causes of spirituall darknesse . errors from misinterpreting the scriptures , concerning the kingdome of god. as that the kingdome of god is the present church : and that the pope is his vicar generall : and that the pastors are the clergy . error from mistaking consecration for conjuration . incantation in the ceremonies of baptisme . and in marriage , in visitation of the sick , and in consecration of places . errors from mistaking eternall life , and everlasting death : as the doctrine of purgatory , and exorcismes , and invocation of saints . the texts alledged for the doctrines aforementioned have been answered before . answer to the text on which beza inferreth that the kingdome of christ began at the resurrection . explication of the place in mark . . abuse of some other texts ▪ in defence of the power of the pope . the manner of consecrations in the scripture , was without exorcisms . the immortality of mans soule , not proved by scripture to be of nature , but of grace . eternall torments what . answer of the texts alledged for purgatory . places of the new testament for purgatory answered . baptisme for the dead , how understood . the originall of daemonclogy . what were the daemons of the ancients . how that doctrine was spread . how far received by the jews . john . . why our saviour controlled it not . the scriptures doe not teach that spirits are incorporeall . the power of casting out devills , not the same it was in the primitive church . another relique of gentilisme , worshipping of images , left in the church , not brought into it . answer to certain seeming texts for images . what is worship . distinction between divine and civill worship . an image what . phantasmes . fictions . materiall images . idolatry what . scandalous worship of images . answer 〈◊〉 the argument from the cherubins , and brazen serpent . * exod. . . * gen. . . painting of fancies no idolatry : but abusing them to religious worship is . how idolatry was left in the church . canonizing of saints . the name of pontifex . procession of images . wax candles , and torches lighted . what philosophy is . prudence no part of philosophy . no false doctrine is part of philosophy : no more is revelation supernaturall : nor learning taken upon credit of authors . of the beginnings and progresse of philosophy . of the schools of philosophy amongst the athenians . of the schools of the jews . the schoole of the graecians unprofitable . the schools of the jews unprofitable . university what it is . errors brought into religion from aristotles metaphysiques . errors concerning abstract essences . nunc-stans . one body in many places , and many bodies in one place at once . absurdities in naturall philosopy , as gravity the cause of heavinesse . quantity put into body already made . powring in of soules . ubiquity of apparition . will , the cause of willing . ignorance an occult cause . one makes the things incongruent , another the incongruity . private appetite the rule of publique good : and that lawfull marriage is unchastity : and that all government but popular , is tyranny : that not men , but law governs . laws over the conscience . private interpretation of law. language of schoole-divines . errors from tradition . suppression of reason . he that receiveth benefit by a fact , is presumed to be the author . that the ●…hurch militant is the kingdome of god , was first taught by the church of rome . and maintained also by the presbytery . infallibility . subjection of bishops . exemptions of the clergy . the names of sace●…dotes , and sacri●… . the sacramentation of marriage . the single life of priests . auricular confession . canonization of saints , and declaring of martyrs . transubstantiation , pennance , absolution . purgatory , indulgences , externall works . daemonology and exorcism . school-divinity . the authors of spirituall darknesse , who they be . comparison of the papacy with the kingdome of fayries . two treatises of government in the former, the false principles and foundation of sir robert filmer and his followers are detected and overthrown, the latter is an essay concerning the true original, extent, and end of civil government. two treatises of government locke, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing l estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) two treatises of government in the former, the false principles and foundation of sir robert filmer and his followers are detected and overthrown, the latter is an essay concerning the true original, extent, and end of civil government. two treatises of government locke, john, - . [ ], , [i.e. ] p. printed for awnsham churchill ..., london : . attributed to john locke. cf. dnb. later published as: two treatises of civil government. reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng filmer, robert, -- sir, d. . -- patriarcha. political science -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread - tcp staff (michigan) text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion licensed . aug. . . i. fraser . two treatises of government : in the former , the false principles , and foundation of sir robert filmer , and his followers , are detected and overthrown . the latter is an essay concerning the true original , extent , and end of civil government . london , printed for awnsham churchill , at the black swan in ave-mary-lane , by amen - corner , . the preface . reader , thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse , concerning government ; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should have filled up the middle , and were more than all the rest , 't is not worth while to tell thee . these , which remain , i hope , are sufficient to establish the throne of our great restorer , our present king william ; to make good his title , in the consent of the people , which being the only one , of all lawful governments , he has more fully and clearly than any prince in christendom . and to justifie to the world , the people of england , whose love of their just and natural rights , with their resolution to preserve them , saved the nation , when it was on the very brink of slavery and ruine . if these papers have that evidence , i flatter my self , is to be found in them , there will be no great miss of those which are lost , and my reader may be satisfied without them . for i imagine i shall have neither the time , nor inclination to repeat my pains , and fill up the wanting part of my answer , by tracing sir robert again , through all the windings and obscurities which are to be met with in the several branches of his wonderful systeme . the king , and body of the nation , have since so throughly confuted his hypothesis , that , i suppose , no body hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our common safety , and be again an advocate for slavery ; or the weakness to be deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile , and well turned periods . for if any one will be at the pains himself , in those parts which are here untouched , to strip sir robert's discourses of the flourish of doubtful expressions , and endeavour to reduce his words to direct , positive , intelligible propositions , and then compare them one with another , he will quickly be satisfied , there was never so much glib nonsense put together in well sounding english. if he think it not worth while , to examine his works all through , let him make an experiment in that part where he treats of usurpation ; and l●t him try whether he can , with all his skill , make sir robert intelligible , and consistent with himself , or common sense . i should not speak so plainly of a gentleman , long since past answering , had not the pulpit , of late years , publickly owned his doctrine , and made it the currant divinity of the t●●es . 't is necessary those men , who , taking on them to be teachers , have so dangerously mis-led others , should be openly shewed of what authority their patriarch , whom they have followed , is , or ought to be ; that so they may either recant what , upon so ill grounds , they have vented , or justifie his opinions . for i should not have writ against sir robert , or taken the pains to shew his mistakes , inconsistencies , and want of ( what he so much boasts of , and pretends wholly to build on ) scripture-proofs , were there not men amongst us , who , by crying up his books , and espousing his doctrine , save me from the reproach or writing against a dead adversary . they have been so zealous in this point , that if i have done him any wrong , i cannot hope they should spare me . i wish , where they have done the truth and the publick wrong , ( there being scarce a greater mischief to prince and people , than the propagating wrong notions concerning government ) they would be as ready to redress it . and that all times might not have reason to complain of the drum ecclesiastick . if any one , concerned really for truth , undertake the confutation of my hypothesis , i promise him either to recant my mistake , upon fair conviction ; or to answer his difficulties . but he must remember two things : first , that cavilling here and there , at some expression , or little incident of my discourse , is not an answer to my book . secondly , that i shall not take railing for arguments , nor think either of these worth my notice . though i shall always look on my self as bound to give satisfaction to any one , who shall appear to be conscientiously scrupulous in the point , and shall shew any just grounds for his scruples . i have nothing more , but to advertise the reader , that a. stands for our authour , o. for his observations on hobbs , milton , &c. and that a bare quotation of pages always means pages of his patriarcha . the contents of book i. chap. i. the introduction p. . chap. ii. of paternal , and regal power p. . chap. iii. of adam's title to sovereignty , by creation p. . chap. iv. of adam's title to sovereignty , by donation , gen. . . p. . chap. v. of adam's title to sovereignty , by the subjection of eve p. . chap. vi. of adam's title to sovereignty , by fatherhood p. . chap. vii . of father-hood and propriety , consider'd together as fountains of sovereignty p. . chap. viii . of the conveyance of adam's sovereign , monarchical power p. . chap. ix . of monarchy , by inheritance from adam p. . chap. x. of the heir to monarchical power of adam p. . chap. xi . who heir p. . the contents of book ii. chap. i. the introduction p. . chap. ii. of the state of nature p. . chap. iii. of the state of war p. . chap. iv. of slavery p. . chap. v. of property p. . chap. vi. of paternal power p. . chap. vii . of political , or civil society p. . chap. viii . of the beginning of political societies p. . chap. ix . of the ends of political society , and government p. . chap. x. of the forms of a commonwealth p. . chap. xi . of the extent of the legislative power p. . chap. xii . of the legislative , executive , and federative power of the common-wealth p. . chap. xiii . of the subordination of the powers of the commonwealth p. . chap. xiv . of prerogative p. . chap. xv. of paternal , political , and despotical power , considered together p. . chap. xvi . of conquest p. . chap. xvii . of vsurpation p. . chap. xviii . of tyranny p. . chap. xix . of the dissolution of governments p. . the end of the contents . book i. chap. i. § . . slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of man , and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation ; that 't is hardly to be conceived , that an englishman , much less a gentleman , should plead for 't . and truly i should have taken this as any other treatise , which would perswade all men , that they are slaves and ought to be so ; for such an other exercise of wit , as was his who writ the encomium of nero , rather than for a serious discourse meant in earnest , had not the gravity of the title and epistle , the picture in the front of sr. rbts , book , and the applause that followed it , required me to believe that the author and publisher were both in earnest , i therefore took the patriarcha of sr. r. filmer into my hands with all the expectation , and read it through with all the attention due to a treatise , that made such a noise at it's coming abroad , and cannot but confess my self mightily surprised , that in a book which was to provide chains for all mankind , i should find nothing but a rope of sand useful perhaps to such whose skill and business it is to raise a dust , and would blind the people the better to mislead them , but is not of any force to draw those into bondage , who have their eyes open and so much sense about them , as to consider that chains are but an ill wearing , how much care soever hath been taken to file and polish them . § . . if any one think i take too much liberty in speaking so freely of a man who is the great champion of absolute power , and the idol of those who worship it ; i beseech him to make this small allowance for once , to one , who even after the reading of roberts book , cannot but think himself as the laws allow him a freeman , and i know no fault it is to do so , unless any one better skill'd in the fate of it than i , should have it revealed to him , that this treatise which has lain dormant so long , was when it appeared in the world to carry by strength of its arguments , all liberty out of it , and that from thence forth our authors short model was to be the pattern in the mount and the perfect standard of politics for the future . his system lies in a little compass 't is no more but this , that all government is absolute monarchy , and the ground he builds on is this , that no man is born free ? . since there have been a generation of men sprung up in the world that would flatter princes with an opinion that they have a divine right to absolute power , let the laws by which they are constituted and are to govern , and the conditions under which they enter upon their authority , be what they will , and their engagements to observe them never so well ratified by solemn oaths and promises , they have denied mankind a right , to natural freedom , whereby they have not only as much as in them lies expos'd all subjects to the utmost misery of tyranny and oppression , but have also so unsettled the titles , and shaken the thrones of princes . ( for they too , by these men's doctrin , except only one , are all born slaves , and by divine right are subjects to adams right heir ) as if they had design'd to make war upon all government , and subvert the very foundations of human society . . however we must believe them upon their own bare words , when they tell us we are all born slaves and there is no remedy for it , we must continue so ; life and thraldom we entered into together , and can never be quit of the one , till we part with the other , though i do not find scripture or reason any where say so , however these men would perswade us that divine authority hath subjected us to the unlimited will of another . an admirable state of mankind , and that which they have not had wit enough to find out till this latter age. for however sr. rob. filmer seems to condemn the novelty of the contrary opinion , patr. p. . yet i believe it will be hard for him to find any other age or country of the world , but this which have asserted monarchy to be iure divino . and he confesses patr. p. . that heyward , blackwood , barclay and others that have bravely vindicated the right of kings in most points , never thought of this , but with one consent admitted the natural liberty and equality of mankind . by whom this doctrine came at first to be broach'd and brought in fashion amongst us , and what sad effects it gave rise to , i leave to historians to relate or the memory of those who were contemporaries with sibthorp and manwering to recolect my business at present , being only to consider what sr. r. f. who is allowed to have carried this argument farthest , and is supposed to have brought it to perfection , has said in it ; for from him every one who would be as fashionable as french was at court , has learned and runs away with this short system of politics , viz. men are not born free , and therefore could never have the liberty to choose either governors or forms of government , princes have their power absolute and by divine right , for slaves could never have a right to compact or consent ; adam was an absolute monarch , and so are all princes ever since . chap. ii. of paternal and regal power . . sir r. f's great position is , that men are not naturally free , this is the foundation on which his absolute monarchy stands , and from which it erects it self to an height that it's power is above every power , caput inter nubila , so high above all earthly and human things , that thought can scarce reach it , that promises and oaths which tye the infinite deity , cannot confine it . but if this foundation fails , all his fabric falls with it , and governments must be left again to the old way of being made by contrivance and the consent of men ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) making use of their reason to unite together into society . to prove this grand position of his , he tells us , p. . men are born in subjection to their parents , and therefore cannot be free . and this authority of parents , he calls royal authority , p. , . fatherly authority , right of fatherhood , p. , . one would have thought he would in the beginning of such a work as this , on which was to depend the authority of princes and the obedience of subjects , have told us expresly what that fatherly authority is , have defined it , though not limited it , because in some other treatises of his , he tells us 't is unlimited , and unlimitable , he should at least have given us such an account of it , * that we might have had an entire notion of this fatherhood or fatherly authority when ever it came in our way in his writings ; this i expected to have found in the first chapter of his patriarcha . but † instead there of having , . en passant made his obeysance to the arcana imperii , p. . o made his complement to the rights and liberties of this or any other nation , p. . which he is going presently to null and destroy ; and o made his leg to those learned men who did not see so far into the matter as himself , p. . he comes to fall on bellarmine , p. . and by a victory over him , establishes his fatherly authority beyond any question ; bellarmine being routed by his own confession , p. . the day is clear got , and there is no more need of any forces : for having done that , i observe not that he states the question or rallies up any arguments to make good his opinion , but rather tells us the story as he thinks fit of this strange kind of domineering phantom , called the fatherhood , which whoever could catch presently got empire and unlimited absolute power . he assures us how this fatherhood began in adam , continued it's course , and kept the world in order all the time of the patriarchs till the flood , got out of the arch with noah and his sons , made and supported all the kings of the earth till the captivity of the israelites in egypt , and then the poor fatherhood was under hatches till god by giving the israelites kings , re-established the ancient and prime right of the lineal succession in paternal government . this is his business from p. to . and then obviating an objection , and clearing a difficulty or two with one half reason , p. . to confirm the natural right of regal power , he ends the first chapter . i hope 't is no injury to call an half quotation an half reason , for god says , honour thy father and mother , but our author contents himself with half , leaves out thy mother quite , as little serviceable to his purpose , but of that more in an other place . i do not think our author so little skill'd in the way of writing discourses of this nature , nor so careless of the point in hand , that he by oversight commits the fault that he himself in his anarchy of a mix'd monarchy , p. . objects to mr. hunton in these words . where first i charge the a that he hath not given us any definition● or discription of monarchy in general , for by the rules of method , he should have first defin'd . and by the like rule of method sr. rob. should have told us , what his fatherhood or fatherly authority is before he had told us , in whom it was to be found and talked so much of it . but perhaps sr. rob. found that this fatherly authority , this power of fathers and of kings , for he makes them both the same , p. . would make a very odd and frightful figure , and very disagreeing , with what either children imagin of their parents , or subjects of their kings , if he should have given us the whole d●aught together in that gigantic form , he had painted it in his own phancy , and therefore like a wary physician , when he would have his patient swallow some harsh or corrosive liquor , he mingles it with a large quantity of that , which may delute it ; that the scatter'd parts may go down with less feeling and cause less aversion . . let us then endeavour to find what account he gives us of this fatherly authority , as it lies scatter'd in the several parts of his writings . and first as it was vested in adam , he says not only adam , but the succeeding patriarchs , had by right of fatherhood , royal authority over their children , p. . this lordship which adam by command had over the whole world , and by right descending from him , the patriarchs did injoy ; was as large and ample as the absolute dominion of any monarch , which hath been since the creation . p. . dominion of life and death ; making war and concluding peace , p. . adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death , p. . kings in the right of parents , succeed to the exercise of supream jurisdiction . p. . as kingly power is by the law of god , so it hath no inferior law to limit it , adam was lord of all , p. . the father of a family governs by no other law , then by his own will , p. . the superiority of princes is above laws , p. . the unlimited jurisdiction of kings , is so amply described by samuel . p. . kings are above the laws . p. . and to this purpose see a great deal more which our a — delivers in bodins's words . it is certain that all laws , priviledges and grants of princes have no force , but during their life ; if they be not ratified by the express consent or by sufferance of the prince following especially priviledges . o. p. . the reason why laws have been also made by kings , was this ; when kings were either busied with wars , or distracted with public cares , so that every private man , could not have acc●ss to their persons , to learn their wills and pleasure , then were laws of necessity invented , that so every particular subject , might find his princes pleasure decypher'd unto him in the tables of his laws . p. . in a monarchy , the king must by necessity be above the laws , p. . a perfect kingdom is that , wherein the king rules all things according to his own will , p. . neither common nor statute laws , are or can be any diminution of that general power , which kings have over their people by right of fatherhood , p. . adam was the father , king and lord over his family , a son , a subject and a servant or slave , were one and the same thing at first . the father had power to dispose or sell his children or servants , whence we find that at the first reckoning up of goods in scripture , the man-servant and the maid-servant , are numbred among the possessions , and substance of the owner , as other goods were . o pref . god also hath given to the father a right or liberty , to alien his power over his children ; to any other whence we find the sale and gift of children , to have been much in use , in in the beginning of the world , when men had their servants for a possession and an inheritance , as well as other goods , whereupon we find the power of castrating and making eun●chs● much in use in old times . o. p. . law is nothing else but the will of him , that hath the power of the supream father , o. p. . it was gods ordinance , that supremacy should be unlimited in adam , and as large as all the acts of his will , and as in him , so in all others that have supream power . o. p. . . i have been fain to trouble by reader , with these several quotations in our a — s own words , that in them might be seen his own discription , of his fatherly authority , as it lies scatter'd up and down in his writings , which he supposes was first vested in adam , and by right , belongs to all princes ever since . this fatherly authority then or right of fatherhood , in our a — s sence is a divine unalterable right of sovereignty , whereby a father or a prince , hath an absolute arbitrary unlimited and unlimitable power , over the lives , libertys , and estates of his children or subjects , so that he may take or alienate their estates , sell , castrate , or use their persons as he pleases , they being all his slaves , and he lord and proprietor of every thing , and his unbounded will their law. . our a — having placed such a mighty power in adam , and upon that supposition , founded all government , and all power of princes , it is reasonable to expect , that he should have proved this with arguments clear and evident , suitable to the weightiness of the cause . that since men had nothing else left them ; they might in slavery had such undeniable proofs of its necessity , that heir consciences might be convinced , and oblige them to submit peaceably to that absolute dominion , which their governors had a right to exercise over them , without this ; what good could our a — do , or pretend to do , by erecting such an unlimited power , but flatter the natural vanity and ambition of men , too apt of its self to grow and increase , with the possession of any power ? and by perswading those , who by the consent of their fellow men are advanced to great , but limited degrees of it , that by that part which is given them , they have a right to all that was not so , and therefore may do what they please , because they have authority to do more then others , and so tempt them to do what is neither for their own , nor the good of those under their care , whereby great mischeifs cannot but follow . . the sovereignty of adam , being that on which as a sure basis , our a — builds his mighty absolute monarchy , i expected that in his patriarcha , this his main supposition would have been proved and established , with all that evidence of arguments , that such a fundamental tenet required , and that this on which the great stress of the business depends , would have been made out with reasons sufficient to justifie the confidence , with which it was assumed . but in all that treatise , i could find very little tending that way ; the thing is there so taken for granted without proof , that i could scarce believe my self , when upon attentive reading that treatise , i found there so mighty a structure , rais'd upon the bare supposition of this foundation ; for it is scarce credible , that in a discourse where he pretends to confute , the erroneous principle of mans natural freedom , he does it by a bare supposition of adams authority , without offering any proof for that authority . indeed he confidently says , that adam had royal authority . p. , and . absolute lordship and dominion of life and death , p. . an vniversal monarchy , p. . absolute power of life and death , p. . he is very frequent in such assertions , but what is strange in all his whole patriarcha , i find not one pretence of a reason , to establish this his great foundation of government ; not any thing that looks like an argument , but these words ; to confirm this natural right of regal power , we find in the decalogue , that the law which injoyns obedience to kings , is delivered in the terms , honour thy father , as if all power were originally in the father . and why may i not add as well , that in the decalogue , the law that injoyns obedience to queens , is delivered in the terms of honour thy mother , as if all power were originally in the mother ? the argument as sr. rob. puts it , will hold as well for one as tother , but of this more in its due place . . all that i take notice of here , is that this is all our a — says in this first , or any of the following chapters , to prove the absolute power of adam , which is his great principle , and yet as if he had there settled it upon sure demonstration , he begins his d. chapter with these words , by confering these proofs and reasons , drawn from the authority of the scripture . where those proofs and reasons for adams sovereignty , are , bateing that of honour thy father above mentioned , i confess , i cannot find unless what he says , p. . in these words we have an evident confession , viz. of belarmin , that creation made man prince of his posterity , must be taken for proofs and reasons drawn from scripture , or for any sort of proofs at all : though from thence by a new way of inference i● the words , immediately following . and indeed he concludes ) the royal authority of adam , sufficiently settled in him . . if he has in that chapter , or any where in the whole treatise , given any other proofs of adams royal authority , other then by often repeating it , which among some men goes for argument , i desire any body for him to shew me the place and page , that i may be convinced of my mistake , and acknowledge my oversight . if no such arguments are to be found , i beseech those men , who have so much cryed up this book , to consider whether they do not give the world cause to suspect , that 't is not the force of reason and argument , that makes them for absolute monarchy , but some other by interest , and therefore are resolved to applaud any author , that writes in favour of this doctrin , whether he support it with reason or no. but i hope they do not expect that rational and indifferent men should be brought over to their opinion , because this their great dr. of it , in a discourse made on purpose , to set up the absolute monarchical power of adam , in opposition to the natural freedom of mankind , has said so little to prove it , from whence it is rather naturally to be concluded that there is little to be said . . but that i might omit no care to inform my self in our a — s full sense , i consulted his observations on aristotle , hobs , &c. to see whether in disputing with others he made use of any arguments , for this his darling tenet of adam's sovereignty , since in his treatise of the natural power of kings , he had been so sparing of them : and in his observations on mr. hobs's leviathan i think he has put in short , all those arguments for it together , which in his writings i find him any where to make use of , his words are these . if god created only adam , and of a piece of him made the woman , and if by generation from them two , as parts of them all mankind be propagated : if also god gave to adam not only the dominion over the woman and the children that should issue from them , but also over the whole earth to subdue it , and over all the creatures on it , so that as long as adam lived , no man could claim or enjoy any thing but by donation , assignation or permission from him , i wonder , &c. o. . here we have the sum of all his arguments , for adams sovereignty and against natural freedom , which i find up and down in his other treatises , which are these following , gods creation of adam , the dominion he gave him over eve : and the dominion he had as father over his children , all which i shall particularly consider . chap. iii. of adams title to sovereignty by creation . . sir rob. in his preface to his observations on aristotle's politics tells us , a natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed without the denial of the creation of adam ; but how adams being created , which was nothing but his receiving a being immediately from omnipotency , and the hand of god , gave adam a sovereignty over any thing , i cannot see , nor consequently understand how a supposition of natural freedom is a denial of adams creation , and would be glad any body else ( since our a — did not vouchsafe us the favour ) would make it out for him : for i find no difficulty to suppose the freedom of mankind , though i have always believed the creation of adam ; he was created or began to exist by gods immediate power , without the intervention of parents or the pre existence of any of the same species to beget him , when it pleased god he should , and so did the lyon , the king of beasts before him , by the same creating power of god , and if bare existence by that power , and in that way , will give dominion without any more adoe , our a — by this argument will make the lion have as good a title to it as he , and certainly the ancienter . no! for adam had his title by the appointment of god , says our a — in another place . then bare creation gave him not dominion , and one might have supposed mankind free without denying the creation of adam , since 't was gods appointment made him monarch . . but let us see how he puts his creation and this appointment together . by the appointment of god , says sir rbt. as soon as adam was created he was monarch of the world , though he had no subjects , for though there could not be actual government till there were subjects , yet by the right of nature it was due to adam to be governour of his posterity , though not in act , yet at least in habit , adam was a king from his creation , i wish he had told us here what he meant by gods appointment . for whatsoever providence orders , or the law of nature directs , or positive revelation declares , may be said to be by gods appointment , but i suppose it cannot be meant here in the first sense , i. e. by providence ; because that would be to say no more , but that as soon as adam was created he was de facto monarch , because by right of nature it was due to adam , to be governour of his posterity . but he could not de facto be by providence constituted the governour of the world at a time , when there was actually no government , no subjects to be governed , which our a — here confesses . monarch of the world is also differently used by our author , for sometimes he means by it a proprietor of all the world exclusive of the rest of mankind , and thus he does in the same page of his preface before cited , adam says he being commanded to multiply and people the earth and to subdue it , and having dominion given him over all creatures , was thereby the monarch of the whole world , none of his posterity had any right to possess any thing but by his grant or permission or by succession from him , o let us understand then by monarch proprietor of the world , and by appointment gods actual donation , and revealed positive grant made to adam , gen. . as we see sir robt. himself does in this parallel place , and then his argument will stand thus , by the positive grant of god ; as soon as adam was created , he was proprietor of the world , because by the right of nature it was due to adam to be governour of his posterity , in which way of arguing there are two manifest falsehoods . first , it is false that god made that grant to adam , as soon as he was created , since though it stands in the text immediately after his creation , yet it is plain it could not be spoken to adam till after eve was made and brought to him , and how then could he be monarch by appointment as soon as created , especially since he calls , if i mistake not , that which gods says to eve , gen. . the original grant of government , which not being till after the fall , when adam was somewhat , at least in time and very much , distant in condition , from his creation , i cannot see , how our a can say in this sense , that by gods appointment as soon as adam was created he was monarch of the world. secondly , were it true that gods actual donation appointed adam monarch of the world as soon as he was created , yet the reason here given for it would not prove it , but it would always be a false inference that god by a positive donation appointed adam monarch of the world , because by right of nature it was due to adam to be governour of his posterity ; for having given him the right of government by nature , there was no need of a positive donation , at least it will never be a proof of such a donation . . on the other side the ma●ter will not be much mended , if we understand by gods appointment the law of nature ( though it be a pretty ha●sh expression for it , in this place ) and by monarch of the world , sovereign ruler of mankind ; for then the sentence under consideration must run thus . by the law of nature , as soon as adam was created he was governour of mankind , for by right of nature it was due to adam to be governour of his posterity , which amounts to this , he was governour by right of nature , because he was governour by right of nature ; but supposing we should grant that a man is by nature governour of his children , adam could not hereby be monarch as soon as created , for this right of nature being founded in his being their father , how adam could have a natural right to be governour before he was a father , by which only he had that right , is , methinks , hard to conceive unless he will have him to be a father before he was a father , and to have a title before he had it . . to this foreseen objection , our a — answers very logically , he was governour in habit and not in act : a very pretty way of being a governour without government , a father without children , and a king without subjects . and thus sir robt. was an author before he writ his book , not in act 't is true , but in habit , for when he had once publish'd , it was due to him by the right of nature , to be an author as much as it was to adam to be governour of his children when he had begot them ; and if to be such a monarch of the world , an absolute monarch in habit but not in act will serve the turn : i should not much envy it to any of sir robts . friends that he thought fit graciously to bestow it upon , though even this of act and habit , if it signified any thing but our a — 's skill in destinctions , be not to his purpose in this place ; for the question is not here about adams actual exercise of government , but actually having a title to be governour , government says our a — was due to adam by the right of nature , what is this right of nature , a right fathers have over their children by begetting them , generatione jus acquiritur parentibus in liberos , says our a — out of grotius , o. . the right then follows the begetting as arising from it , so that according to this way of reasoning or distinguishing of our a — , adam as soon as he was created , had a title only in habit and not in act , which in plain english is he had actually no title at all . . to speak less learnedly and more intelligibly , one may say of adam he was in a possibility of being governour , since it was possible he might beget children and thereby acquire that right of nature , be it what it will to govern them that accrues from thence , but what connection this has with adams creation to make him say , that as soon as he was created he was monarch of the world ; for it may be as well said of noah , that as soon as he was born he was monarch of the world , since he was in possibility ; which in our a — s sense is enough to make a monarch , a monarch in habit , to out live all mankind but his own posterity , i say what such necessary connection there is betwixt adams creation and his right to government ; so that a natural freedom of mankind cannot be suppos'd without the denial of the creation of adam , i confess for my part i do not see . nor how those words by the appointment , &c. o. . however explain'd , can be put together to make any tollerable sense at least to establish this position , with which they end , viz. adam was a king from his creation , a king says our a — not in act but in habit , i. e. actually no king at all . . i fear i have tired my readers patience by dwelling longer on this passage then the weightiness of any argument in it , seems to require : but i have unavoidably been ingag'd in it by our a — s way of writing , who hudling several suppositions together , and that in doubtful and general terms makes such a medly and confusion , that it is impossible to shew his mistakes without examining the several senses , wherein his words may be taken , and without seeing how in any of these various meanings , they will consist together , and have any truth in them ; for in this present passage before us , how can any one argue against this position of his , that adam was a king from his creation , unless one examin whether the words from his creation , be to be taken as they may for the time of the commencement of his government as the foregoing words import , as soon as he was created he was monarch , or for the cause of it , as he says , p. . creation made man prince of his posterity . how farther can one judge of the truth of his being thus king , till one has examined whether king be to be taken , as the words in the beginning of this passage would perswade , on supposition of his private dominion , which was by gods positive grant , monarch of the world by appointment ; or king on supposition of his fatherly power over his off spring which was by nature , due by the right of nature , whether i say king be to be taken in both , or one only of these two senses or in neither of them , but only this , that creation made him prince in a way different from both the other ; for though this assertion , that adam was king from his creation be true , in no sense yet it stands here as an evident conclusion drawn from the preceding words , though in truth it be but a bare assertion joyn'd to other assertions of the same kind , which confidently put together in words of undetermined and dubious meaning , look like a sort of arguing , when there is indeed neither proof nor connection : a way very familiar with our a — of which having given the reader a taste , here , i shall as much as the argument will permit me , avoid touching on hereafter , and should not have done it here , were it not to let the world see how incoherences in matter and suppositions , without proofs put handsomly together in good words and a plausible stile , are apt to pass for strong reason and good sense , till they come to be look'd into with attention . chap. iv. of adams title to sovereignty by donation , gen. . . having at last got through the foregoing passage , where we have been so long detain'd , not by the force of arguments and opposition , but the intricacy of the words , and the doubtfulness of the meaning ; let us go on to his next argument , for adams sovereignty our a — tells us in the words of mr. selden , that adam by donation from god , gen. . was made the general lord of all things , not without s●ch a private dominion to himself , as without his grant did exclude his children . this determination of mr. selden , sa●s our a — , is consonant to the history of the bible , and natural reason . o. . and in his pref. to hi● ob. on arist. he says thus ; the first government in the world was monarchical in the father of all flesh , adam being commanded to multiply and people the earth , and to subdue it , and having dominion given him over all creatures , was thereby the monarch of the whole world , none of his posterity had any right to possess any thing , but by his grant or permission , or by succession from him , the earth , saith the psalmist , hath he given to the children of men , which shew the title comes from fatherhood . . before i examin this argument , and the text on which it is founded , it is necessary to desire the reader to observe , that our a — according to his usual method , begins in one sense , and concludes in another , he begins here with adams propriety , or private dominion , by donation , and his conclusion is , which shew the title comes from fatherhood . . but let us see the argument , the words of the text are these ; and god blessed them , and god said unto them , be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth end subdue it , and have dominion over the fish of the sea , and over the fowl of the air , and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth , gen. . from whence our a — concludes , that adam having here dominion given him over all creatures , was thereby the monarch of the whole world ; whereby must be meant , that either this grant of god , gave adam property , or as our a — calls it , private dominion over the earth , and all inferior or irrational creatures , and so consequently , that he was thereby monarch , or o that it gave him rule and dominion over all earthly creatures whatsoever , and thereby over his children , and so he was monarch ; for as mr. selden has properly worded it , adam was made general lord of all things , one may very clearly understand him , that he means nothing to be granted to adam , here but property , and therefore he says not one word of adams monarchy . but our a — says , adam was hereby monarch of the world , which properly speaking , signifies sovereign ruler of all the men in the world , and so adam by this grant , must be constituted such a ruler . if our a — means otherwise , he might with much clearness , have said , that adam was hereby proprietor of the whole world. but he begs your pardon in that point , clear , destinct speaking , not serving every where to his purpose , you must not expect it in him , as in mr. selden , or other such writers . . in opposition therefore to our a — s doctrin , that adam was monarch of the whole world , founded on this place , i shall shew . o. that by this grant , gen. . god gave no immediate power to adam over men , over his children , over those of his own species , and so he was not made ruler , or monarch by this charter . o. that by this grant , god gave him not private dominion , over the inferior creatures , but right in common with all mankind , so neither was he monarch , upon the account of the property here given him . . o. that this donation , gen. . gave adam no power over men , will appear if we consider the words of it . for since all positive grants , convey no more then the express words , they are made in , will carry , let us see which of them here will comprehend mankind , or adams posterity , and those i imagin , if any , must be these , every living thing that moveth , the words in the hebrew are , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. bestiam reptantem , of which words , the scripture it self , is the best interpreter , god having created the fishes and fowls the th day , the beginning of the th , he creates the irrational inhabitants of the dry land , which ver. th are described in these words , let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind ; cattel and creeping things , and beasts of the earth , after his kind , and ver . . and god made the beasts of the earth after his kind , and cattel after their kind , and every thing that creepeth on the earth , after his kind ; here in the creation of the brute inhabitants of the earth , he first speaks of them all under one general name , of living creatures , and then afterwards , divides them into three ranks , o. cattel , or such creatures as were or might be tame , and so be the private possession of particular men o. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which ver . and in our bible , is translated beasts , and by the septuagint 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , wild beasts , and is the same word , that here in our text , ver . . where we have this great charter to adam , is translated living thing , and is also the same word used , gen. . . where this grant is renew'd to noah , and there likewise translated beast , o. the third rank were the creeping animals , which ver . and are comprised under the word , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the same that is used here ver . . and is translated , moving but in the former verses creeping , and by the septuagint in all these places , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or reptils ; from whence it appears that the words , which we translate here in gods donation , ver . . living creatures moving , are the same which in the history of the creation , ver . , . signifie two ranks of terrestrial creatures , viz. wild beasts and reptils , and are so understood by the septuagint . . when god had made the irrational animals of the world , divided into three kinds , from the places of their habitation , viz. fishes of the sea , fowls of the air , and living creatures of the earth , and these again into cattel , wild beasts and reptils , he considers of making man , and the dominion he should have over the terrestrial world , ver . . and then he reckons up the inhabitants of these three kingdoms ; but in the terrestrial , leaves out the second rank 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or wild beasts , but here ver . . where he actually executes this design , and gives him this dominion the text mentions ; the fishes of the sea , and fowls of the air , and the terrestial creatures in the words that signifie the wild beasts and reptils , though translated living thing , that moveth , leaving out cattel . in both which places though the word that signifies wild beasts , be omitted in one , and that which signifies cattel in the other , yet since god certainly executed in one place what he declares he designed in the other , we cannot but understand the same in both places , and have here only an account , how the terrestrial irrational animals , which were already created and reckon'd up at their creation , in three distinct ranks of cattel , wild beasts and reptils were here , ver . . actually put under the dominion of man , as they were designed o. . nor do these words contain in them , the least appearance of any thing that can be wrested , to signifie god's giving one man dominion over another , adam over his posterity . and this further appears from gen. . . where god renewing this charter to noah and his sons , he gives them dominion over the fowls of the air , and the fishes of the sea , and the terrestrial creatures , expressed by 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 wild beasts and reptils , the same words that in the text before us gen. . are translated every moving thing , that moveth on the earth , which by no means can comprehend man , the grant being made to noah and his sons , all the men then living , and not to one part of men over another , which is yet more evident from the very next words ver . . where god gives every 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , every moving thing , the very words used ch. . . to them for food . by all which it is plain , that gods donation to adam , cha. . . and his designation , v. . and his grant again to noah and his sons , refer to , and contain in them , neither more nor less , then the works of the creation the th day , and the beginning of the th , as they are set down from th , to th , ver . inclusively of the st . ch. and so comprehend all the species of irrational animals of the teraqueous globe , though all the words whereby they are expressed in the history of their creation , are no where used in any of the following grants , but some of them omitted in one , and some in another , from whence i think it is past all doubt , that man cannot be comprehended in this grant , nor any dominion over those of his own species be convey'd to adam . all the terrestrial irrational creatures are enumerated at their creation , ver . . under the names , beasts of the earth , cattel and creeping things , but man being not then created , was not contain'd under any of those names , and therefore whether we understand the hebrew words right or no , they cannot be supposed to comprehend man in the very same history , and the very next verses following , especially since that hebrew word , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which if any in this donation to adam , cha. . . must comprehend man , is so plainly used in contradistinction to him , as gen. . . . . . . gen. . , . and if god made all mankind slaves to adam and his heirs , by giving adam dominion over every living thing , that moveth on the earth , chap. . . as our a — would have it , me thinks sr. rob. should have carried his monarchical power one step higher , and satisfied the world , that princes might have eat their subjects too , since god gave as full power to noah and his heirs , cha. . . to eat every living thing that moveth , as he did to adam , to have dominion over them , the hebrew words in both place being the same . . david , who might be supposed to understand the donation of god in this text , and the right of kings too , as well as our a — in his comment on this place , as the learned and judicious ainsworth calls it , in the th psalm , finds here no such charter of monarchical power , his words are , thou hast made him , i. e. man the son of man , a little lower then the angels , thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands , thou hast put all things under his feet , all sheep and oxen and the beasts of the field , and the fowl of the air , and fish of the sea , and whatsoever passeth through the paths of the sea. in which words , if any one can find out that there is meant any monarchical power of one man over another , but only the dominion of the whole species of mankind , over the inferior species of creatures , he may for ought i know , deserve to be one of sr. rob. monarchs in habit , for the rareness of the discovery . and by this time , i hope it is evident , that he that gave dominion over every living thing , that moveth on the earth , gave adam no monarchical power over those of his own species , which will yet appear more fully in the next thing i am to shew . . o. whatever god gave by the words of this grant , gen. . it was not to adam in particular , exclusive of all other men , whatever dominion he had thereby , it was not a private dominion , but a dominion in common , with the rest of mankind . that this donation was not made in particular to adam , appears evidently from the words of the text , it being made to more then one , for it was spoken in the plural number , god blessed them , and said unto them , have dominion , god says unto adam and eve , have dominion , thereby says our a — adam was monarch of the world , but the grant being to them , i. e. spoke to eve also , as many interpreters think with reason , that these words were not spoken till adam had his wife , must not she thereby be lady , as well as he lord of the world ? if it be said that eve was subjected to adam , it seems she was not so to him , as to hinder her dominion over the creatures , or property in them , for shall we say that god ever made a joynt grant to two , and one only was to have the benefit of it . . but perhaps 't will be said eve was not made till afterward ; grant it so , what advantage will our a — get by it the text will be only the more directly against him , and shew that god in this donation , gave the world to mankind in common , and not to adam in particular . the word them in the text must include the species of man , for 't is certain them can by no means signify adam alone . in the th verse where god declares his intention to give this dominion , it is plain he meant , that he would make a species of creatures , that should have dominion over the other species of this terrestrial globe , the words are , and god said let us make man in our image after our likeness , and let them have dominion over the fish , &c. they then were to have dominion . who ? even those who were to have the image of god , the individuals of that species of man that he was going to make , for that them should signifie adam singly , exclusive of the rest , that should be in the world with him , is against both scripture and all reason : and it cannot possibly be made sense , if man in the former part of the verse do not signifie the same with them in the latter , only man there , as is usual , is taken for the species , and them the individuals of that spceies , and we have a reason in the very text ; for god makes him in his own image after his own likeness , makes him an intellectual creature and so capable of dominion ; for wherein soever else the image of god consisted , the intellectual nature was certainly a part of it , and belong'd to the whole species , and enabled them to have dominion over the inferior creatures , and therefore david says in the th psalm above cited , thou hast made him little lower then the angels , thou hast made him to have dominion , 't is not of adam king david speaks here , for verse . 't is plain , 't is of man and the son of man , of the species of mankind . . and that this grant spoken to adam was made to him , and the whole species of man , is clear from our a ●● own proof out of the psalmist● the earth , saith the psalmist , hath he given to the children of men , which shews the title comes from fatherhood , these are sir robts . words in the preface before cited , and a strange inference it is he makes , god hath given the earth to the children of men , ergo the title comes from fatherhood . 't is pitty the propriety of the hebrew tongue had not used fathers of men instead of children of men , to express mankind , then indeed our a — might have had the countenance of the sound of the words , to have placed the title in the fatherhood ; but to conclude that the fatherhood had the right to the earth , because god gave it to the children of men is a way of arguing peculiar to our a — and a man must have a great mind to go contrary to the sound as well as sense of the words , before he could light on it ; but the sense is yet harder and more remote from our a — s purpose : for as it stands in his preface , it is to prove adams being monarch , and his reasoning is thus , god gave the earth to the children of men , ergo adam was monarch of the world , i defie any man to make a more pleasant conclusion then this , which cannot be excused from the most obvious absurdity , till it can be shewn that by children of men , he who had no father adam alone is signified , but whatever our a — does the scripture speaks not nonsense . . to maintain this property and private dominion of adam , our a — labours in the following page to destroy the community granted to noah and his sons , in that parallel place , gen. , , . and he endeavours to do it two ways . o. sir robt. would perswade us against the express words of the scripture , that what was here granted to noah was not granted to his sons in common with him ; his words are . as for the general community between noah and his sons , which mr. selden will have to be granted to them , gen. . the text doth not warrant it , what warrant our a — would have when the plain express words of scripture , not capable of another meaning , will not satisfie him , who pretends to build wholly on scripture is not easy to imagine . the text says , god blessed noah and his sons , & said unto them , i e. as our a — would have it unto him , for saith he , although the sons are there mentioned with noah in the blessing , yet it may best be understood , with a subordination or benediction in succession , o. . that indeed is best , for our a — to be understood , which best serves to his purpose , but that truly may best be understood by any body else , which best agrees with the plain construction of the words , and arises from the obvious meaning of the place , and then with subordination and in succession , will not be best understood , in a grant of god , where he himself put them not , nor mentions any such limitation . but yet , our a — has reasons , why it may best be understood so . the blessing , says he , in the following words , might truly be fulfilled , if the sons either under or after their father , enjoy'd a private dominion , o. . which is to say , that a grant whose express words give a joynt title in present ; for the text says into your hands they are delivered , may best be understood with a subordination or in succession , because 't is possible , that in subordination , or succession it may be enjoy'd , which is all one as to say , that a grant of any thing in present possession , may best be understood of reversion ; because 't is possible one may live to enjoy it in reversion . if the grant be indeed to a father and his sons , who is so kind as to let his children enjoy it presently in common with him , one may truly say as to the event , one will be as good as the other ; but it can never be true , that what the express words grants in possession and in common , may best be understood , to be in reversion . the summ of all his reasoning amounts to this . god did not give to the sons of noah , the world in common with their father , because 't was possible they might enjoy it under , or after him , a very good sort of argument , against an express text of scripture ; but god must not be believed , though he speaks it himself , when he says he does any thing , which will not confist with sr. robt's . hypothesis . . for 't is plain , however he would exclude them , that part of this benediction , as he would have it in succession , must needs be meant to the sons , and not to noah himself at all , be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth , says god , in this blessing , this part of the benediction as appears by the sequel concerned not noah himself at all ; for we read not of any children he had after the flood , and in the following chapter , where his posterity is reckon'd up , there is no mention of any , and so this benediction in succession , was not to take place , till years after , and to save our a — s imaginary monarchy , the peopleing of the world , must be defer'd years ; for this part of the benediction cannot be understood with subordination , unless our a — will say , that they must ask leave of their father noah , to lye with their wives . but in this one point our a — is constant to himself in all his discourses , he takes only care there should be monarchs in the world , but very little that there should be people , and indeed his way of government is not the way to people the world ; for how much absolute monarchy helps to fulfil this great and primary blessing of god almighty , be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth , which contains in it the improvement too of arts and siences , and the conveniences of life , may be seen in those large and rich countries , which are happy under the turkish govermnent , where are not now to be found / , nay in many , if not most parts of them / , perhaps i might say not / of the people , that were formerly , as will easily appear to any one , who will compare the accounts we have of it at this time , with ancient history , but this by the by . . the other parts of this benediction of grant , are so expressed that they must needs be understood , to belong to noahs sons , not with a subordination or in succession , but as far forth and equally as to noah himself . the fear of you , and the dread of you , says god , shall be upon every beast , &c. will any body , but our a — say , that the creatures feared and stood in awe of noah only , and not of his sons without his leave , or till after his death ; and the following words into your hands they are delivered , are they to be understood as our a — says , if your father please , or they shall be deliver'd into your hands hereafter . if this be to argue from scripture , i know not what may not be proved by it , and i can scarce see how much this differs from that fiction and phansy , or how much a surer foundation it will prove then the opinions of philosophers and poets , which our a — so much condemns in his preface . . but our a — goes on to prove that it may best be understood with a subordination or a benediction in succession , for , says he , it is not probable that the private dominion ' which god gave to adam , and by his donation , assignation or cession to his children , was abrogated , and a community of all things instituted between noah and his sons . — noah was left the sole heir of the world , why should it be thought that god would disinherit him of his birth-right , and make him of all men in the world the only tenant in common with his children , o. . . . the prejudices of our own ill grounded opinions , however by us called probable , cannot authorize us to understand scripture contrary to the direct and plain meaning of the words ; i grant , 't is not probable that adams private dominion was here abrogated , because it is more then improbable , for it will ever be proved that ever adam had any such private dominion : and since parallel places of scripture are most probable to make us know , how they may be best understood , there needs but the comparing this blessing here to noah and his sons after the floud , with that to adam after the creation , gen. . to assure any one that god gave adam no such private dominion . 't is probable , i confess , that noah should have the same title , the same property and dominion after the floud , that adam had before it . but since private dominion cannot consist with the blessing and grant god gave to him and his sons in common , 't is a sufficient reason to conclude that adam had none , especially since in the donation made to him , there is no words that express it , or do in the least favour it ; and then let my reader judge whether it may best be understood , when in the one place there is not one word for it , not to say , what has been above proved , that the text it self proves the contrary , and in the other , the words and sense are directly against it . . but our a — says , noah was the sole heir of the world , why should it be thought that god would disinherit him of his birth-right-heir , indeed in england signifies the eldest son , who is by the law of england to have all his fathers land , but where god ever appointed any such heir of the world , our a — would have done well to have shewed us , and how god disinherited him of his birth-right , or what harm was done him if god gave his sons a right to make use of a part of the earth for the support of themselves and families , when the whole was not only more then noah himself , but infinitely more then they all could make use of , and the possessions o● one could not at all prejudice , or as to any use straighten that of the other . . our a — probably foreseeing he might not be very successful in perswading people out of their senses , and say what he could , men would be apt to believe the plain words of scripture , and think as they saw , that the grant was spoken to noah and his sons joyntly . he comes , ● to insinuate as if this grant to noah , conveyed no property , no dominion ; because subduing the earth and dominion over the creatures are therein omitted , nor the earth once named . and therefore , says he , there is a considerable difference between these two texts , the first blessing gave adam a dominion over the earth and all creatures , the latter allows noah liberty to use the living creatures for food , here is no alteration or diminishing of his title , to a property of all things , but an enlargment only of his commons , o. . so that in our a — s sense , all that was said here to noah and his sons , gave them no dominion , no property , but only enlarged the commons ; their commons , i should say since , god says , to you are they given , though our a — says his , for as for noahs sons , they it seems by sr. robt's . appointment during their fathers life time , were to keep fasting days . . any one but our a — would be mightily suspected , to be blinded with prejudice , that in all this blessing to noah and his sons , could see nothing but only an enlargment of commons . for as to dominion which our a — thinks omitted , the fear of you and the dread of you , says god , shall be upon every beast , which i suppose , expresses the dominion , or superiority was designed man over the living creatures , as fully as may be , for in that fear and dread , seems cheifly to consist what was given to adam , over the inferior animals , who as absolute a monarch as he was , could not make bold with a lark or a rabbit to satisfie his hunger , and had the herbs but in common with the beasts , as is plain from gen. . . and . in the next place , 't is manifest that in this blessing to noah and his sons , property is not only given in clear words , but in a larger extent then it was to adam . into your hands they are given , says god , to noah and his sons , which words if they give not property , nay property in possession , 't will be hard to find words that can , since there is not a way to express a mans being possessed of any thing more natural , nor more certain then to say , it is delivered into his hands . and verse d to shew that they had then given them the utmost property man is capable of , which is to have a right to destroy any thing by using it , every moving thing that liveth , saith god , shall be meat for you , which was not allowed to adam in his charter . this our a — calls a liberty of using them for food , and only an enlargment of commons , but no alteration of property , o. . what other property man can have in the creatures , but the liberty of using them , is hard to be understood . so that if the first blessing as our a — says , gave adam dominion over the creatures , and the blessing to noah and his sons gave them such a liberty to use them , as adam had not ; it must needs give them something that adam with all his sovereignty , wanted something that one would be apt to take for a greater property ; for certainly he has no absolute dominion over even the brutal part of the creatures , and the property he has in them , is very narrow and scanty , who cannot make that use of them , which is permitted to another ; should any one , who is absolute lord of a country , have bidden our a — subdue the earth , and given him dominion over the creatures in it , but not have permitted him to have taken a kid or a lamb out of the flock , to satisfie his hunger , i guess , he would scarce have thought himself lord or proprietor of that land , or the cattel on it , but would have found the difference between having dominion , which a shepherd may have , and having full property as an owner , so that had it been his own case , sr. rob. i believe would have thought here was an alteration , nay an enlarging of property , and that noah and his children had by this grant , not only property given them , but such a property given them in the creatures , as adam had not , for however in respect of one another , men may be allowed to have propriety in their distinct portions of the creatures , yet in respect of god the maker of heaven and earth , who is sole lord and proprietor of the whole world , mans propriety in the creatures , is nothing but that liberty to use them , which god has permitted , and so mans property may be altered and enlarged as we see it was here , after the flood , when other uses of them are allowed , which before were not ; from all which i suppose , it is clear that neither adam nor noah , had any private dominion , any property in the creatures , exclusive of his posterity , as they should successively grow up into need of them , and come to be able to make use of them . . thus we have examined our a — s argument for adams monarchy , founded on the blessing pronounced , gen. . wherein i think 't is impossible for any sober reader , to find any else but the setting of mankind above the other kinds of creatures , in this habitable earth of ours . 't is nothing but the giving to man , the whole species of man , as the chief inhabitant , who i● the image of his maker , the dominion over the other creatures . this lies so obvious in the plain words , that any one but our a — , would have thought it necessary to have shewn , how these words that seem'd to say the quite contrary , gave adam monarchical absolute power over other men , or the sole propriety in all the creatures , and me thinks in a business of this moment , and that whereon he builds all that follows , he should have done something more then barely cite words which apparently make against him , for , i confess , i cannot see any thing in them , tending to adams monarchy , or private dominion , but quite the contrary . and i the less deplore the dulness of my apprehension herein , since i find the apostle seems to have as little notion of any such private dominion of adam as i , when he says , god gives us all things richly to enjoy , which he could not do , if it were all given away already , to monarch adam , and the monarchs his heirs and successors . to conclude , this text is so far from proving adam sole proprietor , that on the contrary , it is a confirmation of the original community of all things amongst the sons of men , which appearing from this donation of ●od , as well as other places of scripture , the sovereignty of adam , built upon his private dominion , must fall , not having any foundation to support it . . but yet if after all , any one will needs have it so , that by this donation of god adam was made sole proprietor of the whole earth , what will this be to his sovereignty , and how will it appear that propriety in land gives a man power over the life of another , or how will the poffession even of the whole earth give any one a sovereign arbitrary authority over the persons of men ; the most specious thing to be said , is , that he that is proprietor of the whole world may deny all the rest of mankind food , and so at his pleasure starve them , if they will not acknowledge his sovereignty and obey his will. if this were true , it would be a good argument to prove that there was never any such property , that god never gave any such private dominion , since it is more reasonable to think that god who bid mankind increase and multiply , should rather himself give them all a right to make use of the food and raiment and other conveniences of life , the materials whereof he had so plentifully provided for them , then to make them depend upon the will of a man for their subsistance , who should have power to destroy them all when he pleased , and who being no better then other men , was in succession likelyer by want and the dependance of a scanty fortune , to tye them to hard service then by liberal allowance of the conveniences of life promote the great design of god , increase and multiply , he that doubts this , let him look into the absolute monarchies of the world , and see what becomes of the conveniences of life and the multitudes of people . . but we know god hath not left one man so to the mercy of another , that he may starve him if he please , god the lord and father of all has given no one of his children such a property in his peculiar portion of the things of this world , but that he has given his needy brother a right in the surplussage of his goods , so that it cannot justly be denyed him when his pre●●ing wants call for it . and therefore no man could ever have a just power over the life of another by right of property in land or possessions , since 't would always be a sin in any man of estate to let his brother perish for want of affording him relief out of his plenty ; for as iustice gives every man a title to the product of his honest industry , and the fair acquisitions of his ancestors descended to him , so charity gives every man a title to so much out of anothers plenty as will keep him from extream want , where he has no means to subsist otherwise ; and a man can no more justly make use of anothers necessity , to force him to become his vassal by withholding that relief , god requires him to afford to the wants of his brother , then he that has more strength can seize upon a weaker , master him to his obedience , and with a dagger at his throat offer him death or slavery . . should any one make so perverse an use of gods blessings powred on him with a liberal hand , should any one be cruel and uncharitable to that extremity , yet all this would not prove that propriety in land , even in this case , gave any authority over the persons of men , but only that compact might ; since the authority of the rich proprietor and the subjection of the needy beggar began not from the possession of the lord , but the consent of the poor man who prefer'd being his subject to starving . and the man he thus submits to , can pretend to no more power over him then he has consented to , upon compact , upon this ground a mans having his stores filled in a time of scarcity , having money in his pocket , being in a vessel at sea , being able to swim , &c. may as well be the foundation of rule and dominion , as being possessor of all the land in the world , any of these being sufficient to enable me to save a mans life who would perish if such assistance were denyed him ; and any thing by this rule that may be an occasion of working upon anothers necessity to save his life or any thing dear to him , at the rate of his freedom may be made a foundation of sovereignty as well as property ; from all which it is clear that tho god should have given adam private dominion , yet that private dominion could give him no sovereignty ; but we have already sufficiently proved that god gave him no private dominion . chap. v. of adams title to sovereignty by the subjection of eve. . the next place of scripture we find our a — build his monarchy of adam on is . gen. . and thy desire shall be to thy husband , and he shall rule over thee . here we have ( says he ) the original grant of government , from whence he concludes , in the following part of the page o. . that the supream power is setled in the fatherhood , and limited to one kind of government , that is to monarchy ; for let his premises be what they will , this is always the conclusion , let but rule in any text , be but once named , and presently absolute monarchy is by divine right establish'd , if any one will but carefully read our a — s own reasoning from these words , o. . and consider among other things , the line and posterity of adam , as he there brings them in , he will find some difficulty , to make sense of what he says ; but we will allow this at present , to his peculiar way of writing , and consider the force of the text in hand . the words are the curse of god upon the woman , for having been the first and forwardest in the disobedience , and if we will consider the occasion of what god says here to our first parents , that he was denouncing judgment , and declaring his wrath against them both , for their disobedience , we cannot suppose that this was the time , wherein god was granting adam prerogatives and priviledges , investing him with dignity and authority , elevating him to dominion and monarchy ; for though as a helper in the temptation , as well as a partner in the transgression , eve was laid below him , and so he had accidentally a superiority over her , for her greater punishment , yet he too had his share in the fall , as well as the sin , and was laid lower , as may be seen in the following verses , and 't would be hard to imagin that god in the same breath , should make him universal monarch over all mankind , and a day labourer for his life . turn him out of paradice , to till the ground ver . . and at the same time , advance him to a throne , and all the priviledges and ease of absolute power . . this was not a time , when adam could expect any favours , any grant of priviledges from his offended maker . if this be the original grant of government , as our a — tells us , and adam was now made monarch , whatever sr. rob. would have him , 't is plain , god made him but a very poor monarch , such an one , as our a — himself would have counted it no great priviledge to be , god sets him to work for his living , and seems rather to give him a spade into his hand , to subdue the earth , then a scepter to rule over its inhabitants . in the sweat of thy face , thou shalt eat thy bread , says god to him ver . . this was unavoidable , may it perhaps be answered , because he was yet without subjects , and had no body to work for him , but afterwards living as he did above years , he might have people enough , whom he might command to work for him ; no says god , not only whilst thou art without other help , save thy wife , but as long as thou livest , shalt thou live by thy labour . in the sweat of thy face , shalt thou eat thy bread , till thou return unto the ground , for out of it wast thou taken , for dust thou art , and unto dust shalt thou return , v. . it will perhaps be answered again , in favour of our a — , that these words are not spoken personally to adam , but in him , as their representative to all mankind , this being a curse upon mankind , because of the fall . . god , i believe , speaks differently from men , because he speaks with more truth , more certainty , but when he vouchsafes , to speak to men ; i do not think , he speaks differently from them , in crossing the rules of language , in use amongst them , this would not be to condescend to their capacities , when he humbles himself to speak to them , but to loose his design in speaking , what thus spoken , they could not understand . and yet thus must we think of god , if the interpretations of scripture , necessary to maintain our a — s doctrin , must be received for good ; for by the ordinary rules of language , it will be very hard to understand what god says ; if what he speaks here , in the singular number to adam must be understood to be spoken to all mankind , and what he says in the plural number , gen. . and . must be understood of adam alone , exclusive of all others , and what he says to noah and hi● sons joyntly , must be understood to be meant to noah alone , gen . . farther it is to be noted , that these words here of gen. . which our a — calls the original grant of government were not spoken to adam , neither indeed was there any grant in them made to adam , but a punishment laid upon eve , and if we will take them as they were directed in particular to her , or in her , as a representative to all other women , they will at most concern the female sex only , and import no more but that subjection they should ordinarily be in to their husbands , but there is here no more law to oblige a woman to such a subjection , if the circumstances either of her condition or contract with her husband should exempt her from it , then there is that she should bring forth her children in sorrow and pain , if there could be found a remedy for it , which is also a part of the same curse upon her , for the whole verse runs thus , unto the woman he said , i will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception ; in sorrow thou shall bring forth children , and thy desire shall be to thy husband , and he shall rule over thee . 't would i think have been a hard matter for any body , but our a — to have found out a grant of monarchical government to adam in these words , which were neither spoke to , nor of him , neither will any one , i suppose , by these words , think the weaker sex , as by a law so subjected to the curse contained in them , that 't is their duty , not to endeavour to avoid it . and will any one say that eve , or any other woman , sin'd , if she were brought to bed , without those multiplyed pains , god threatens her here with , or that either of our queens mary or elizabeth , had they married any of their subjects had been by this text , put into a political subjection to him , or that he thereby should have had monarchical rule over her , god in this text , gives not that i see any authority to adam over eve , or men over their wives , but only foretels what should be the womans lot , how by his providence he would order it so , that she should be subject to her husband , as we see that generally the laws of mankind and customs of nations , have ordered it so , and there is , i grant , a foundation in nature for it . . thus when god says of iacob and esau that the elder should serve the younger , gen. . no body supposes that god hereby made iacob essaus sovereign , but foretold what should de facto come to pass . but if these words here spoke to eve must needs be understood as a law to bind her and all other women to subjection , it can be no other subjection then what every wife owes her husband , and then if this be the original grant of government and the foundation of monarchial power , there will be as many monarchs as there are husbands : if therefore these words give any power to adam , it can be only a conjugal power , not political , the power that every husband hath to order the things of private concernment in his family , as proprietor of the goods and land there , and to have his will take place in all things of their common concernment before that of his wife ; but not a political power of life and death over her , much less over any body else . . this i am sure : if our a — will have this text to be a grant , the original grant of government , political government , he ought to have proved it by some better arguments then by barely saying , that thy desire shall be unto thy husband , was a law whereby eve and all that should come of her , were subjected to the absolute monarchical power of adam and his heirs . thy desire shall be to thy husband , is too doubtful an expression , of whose signification interpreters are not agreed , to build so confidently on , and in a matter of such moment and so great and general concernment ; but our a — according to his way of writing , having once named the text , concludes presently without any more ado , that the meaning is , as he would have it , let the words rule and subject be but found in the text or margent , and it immediately signifies the duty of a subject to his prince , and the relation is changed , and though god says husband , sr. robt. will have it king , adam has presently absolute monarchial power over eve , and not only eve but all that should come of her , though the scripture says not a word of it , nor our a — a word to prove it . but adam must for all that be an absolute monarch , and so to the end of the chapter quite down to ch. . and here i leave my reader to consider whether my bare saying , without offering any reasons to evince it , that this text gave not adam that absolute monarchial power , our a — supposes , be not as sufficient to destroy that power as his bare assertion is to establish it , since the text mentions neither prince nor people , speaks nothing of absolute or monarchial power , but the subjection of eve , a wife to her husband . and he that would treat our a — so , although he would make a short and sufficient answer to the greatest part of the grounds he proceeds on , and abundantly confute them by barely denying ; it being a sufficient answer to assertions without proof to deny them without giving a reason , and therefore should i have said nothing but barely deny'd that by this text the supream power was setled and founded by god himself , in the fatherhood , limited to monarchy , and that to adams person and heirs , all which our a — notably concludes from these words , as may be seen in the same page o. . and desired any sober man , to have read the text , and considered to whom and on what occasion it was spoken , he would no doubt have wondered how our a — found out monarchical absolute power in it , had he not had an exceeding good faculty to find it himself , where he could not shew it others ; and thus we have examined the two places of scripture , all that i remember our a — brings to prove adams sovereignty , that supremacy , which he says , it was gods ordinance should be unlimitted in adam , and as large as all the acts of his will. o. , viz. gen. . and . gen. . one whereof signifies only the subjection of the inferior ranks of creatures to mankind , and the other the subjection that is due from a wife to her husband , both far enough from that which subjects owe the governors of political societies . chap. vi. of adams title to sovereignty by fatherhood . . there is one thing more and then i think i have given you all that our a — brings for proof of adams sovereignty , and that is a supposition of a natural right of dominion over his children , by being their father , and this title of fatherhood he is pleased with , that you will find it brought in almost in every page , particularly , he says , not only adam but the succeeding patriarchs had by right of fatherhood royal authority over their children , p. . and in the same page . this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority , &c. this being as one would think by his so frequent mentioning it the main basis of all his frame , we may well expect clear and evident reason for it , since he lays it down as a position necessary to his purpose , that every man that is born is so far from being free , that by his very birth he becomes a subject of him that begets him , o. . so that adam being the only man created , and all ever since being begotten , no body has been born free : if we ask how adam comes by this power over his children , he tells us here 't is by begetting them : and so again , o. . this natural dominion of adam , says he , may be proved out of grotius himself , who teacheth that generatione jus acquiritur parentibus i● liberos . and indeed the act of beget●ing being that which makes a man a father , his right of father over his children can naturally arise from nothing else . . grotius tells us not here how far this jus in liberos , this power of parents over their children extends , but our a — always very clear in the point assures us , 't is supreme power , and like that of absolute monarchs over their slaves , absolute power of life and death : he that should demand of him how , or for what reason , it is , that begetting a child gives the father such an absolute power over him , will find him answer nothing , we are to take his word for this as well as several other things , and by that the laws of nature and the constitutions of government must stand and fall ; had he been an absolute monarch , this way of talking might have suited well enough , pro ratione voluntas , may there be allowed : but 't is but an ill way of pleading for absolute monarchy , and sr. robts . bare sayings will scarce establish it , one slaves opinion without proof is not of weight enough to dispose of the liberty and fortunes of all mankind ; if all men are not as i think they are naturally equal , i 'm sure all slaves are , and then i may without presumption oppose my single opinion to his , and be as confident that my saying , that begetting of children makes them not slaves to their fathers , sets all mankind free , as his affirming the contrary makes them all slaves . but that this position , which is the foundation of all their doctrin , who would have monarchy to be iure divino , may have all fair play , let us hear what reasons others give for it , since our a — offers none . . the argument , i have heard others make use of , to prove that fathers by begetting them , come by an absolute power over their children is this ; that fathers have a power over the lives of their children , because they give them life and being , which is the only proof it is capable of , since there can be no reason , why naturally one man should have any claim or pretence of right over that in another , which was never his , which he bestowed not , but was received from the bounty of another . o. i answer that every one who gives an other any thing , has not always thereby a right to take it away again ; but o. they who say the father gives life to his children , are so dazled with the thoughts of monarchy that they do not , as they ought , remember god who is the author and giver of life , 't is in him alone we live , move and have our being . how can he be thought to give life to another that knows not wherein his own life consists , philosophers are at a loss about it after their most diligent enquiries ; and anatomists after their whole lives and studies spent in dissections and diligent examining the bodies of men , confess their ignorance in the structure and use of many parts of mans body , and in that operation wherein life consists in the whole ; and doth the rude plough man or the more ignorant voluptuary frame or fashion such an admirable engine as this is , and then put life and sense into it ; can any mansay , he formed the parts that are necessary to the life of his child , or can he suppose himself to give the life , and yet not know what subject is fit to receive it , nor what actions or organs are necessary for its reception or preservation ? . to give life to that which has yet no being is to frame and make a living creature , fashion the parts and mould and suit them to their uses , and having proportion'd and fitted them together to put into them a living soul. he that could do this might indeed have some pretence to destroy his own workmanship . but is there any one so bold , that dares thus far arrogate to himself the incomprehensible works of the almighty ? who alone did at first and continues still to make a live soul , he alone can breath in the breath of life . if any one thinks himself an artist at this , let him number up the parts of his childs body which he hath made , tell me their uses and operations , and when the living and rational soul began to inhabit , this curious structure when sense began , and how this engine he has framed thinks and reasons ; if he made it , let him when it is out of order mend it , at least tell wherein the defects lie ? shall he that made the eye not see , says the psalmist , psalm . . . see these mens vanities : the structure of one part is sufficient to convince us of an all wise contriver , and he has so visible a claim to us as his workmanship , that one of the ordinary apellations of god in scripture is , god our maker and the lord our maker . and therefore though our a — for the magnifying his fatherhood be pleased to say , o. . that even the power which god himself exerciseth over mankind is by right of fatherhood , yet this fatherhood is such an one as utterly excludes all pretence of title in earthly parents ; for he is king because he is indeed maker of us all , which no parents can pretend to be of their children . . but had men skill and power to make their children , 't is not so slight a piece of wormanship , that it can be imagined they could make them without designing it , what father of a thousand when he begets a child thinks farther then the satisfying his present appetite , god in his infinite wisdom has put strong desires of copulation into the constitution of men , thereby to continue the race of mankind , which he doth most commonly without the intention , and often against the consent and will of the begetter . and indeed those who desire and design children , are but the occasions of their being , and when they design and wish to beget them , do little more towards their making then deucalion and his wife in the fable did towards the making of mankind , by throwing pebles over their heads . . but grant that the parents made their children , gave them life and being , and that hence there followed an absolute power . this would give the father but a joynt dominion with the mother over them ; for no body can deny but that the woman hath an equal share , if not the greater , as nourishing the child a long time in her own body out of her own substance . there it is fashion'd , and from her it receives the materials and principles of its constitution ; and it is so hard to imagin the rational soul should presently inhabit the yet unformed embrio , as soon as the father has done his part in the act of generation , that if it must be supposed to derive any thing from the parents , it must certainly owe most to the mother : but be that as it will , the mother cannot be denied an equal share in begetting of the child , and so the absolute authority of the father will not arise from hence , our a — indeed is of another mind ; for he says , we know that god at the creation gave the sovereignty to the man over the woman , as being the nobler and principal agent in generation , o. . i remember not this in my bible , and when the place is brought where god at the creation gave the sovereignty to man over the woman , and that for this reason , because he is the nobler and principal agent in generation , it will be time enough to consider and answer it : but it is no new thing for our a — to tell us his own phancies for certain and divine truths , though there be often a great deal of difference between his and divine revelations ; for god in the scripture says , his father and his mother that begot him . . they who alledge the practice of mankind , for exposing or selling their children , as a proof of their power over them , are with sr. robt. happy arguers and cannot but recommend their opinion by founding it on the most shameful action and most unnatural murder , humane nature is capable of . the dens of lions and nurseries of wolves know no such cruelty as this ; these savage inhabitants of the desart obey god and nature , in being tender and careful of their off-spring ; they will hunt , watch , fight and almost starve for the preservation of their young , never part with them , never forsake them till they are able to shift for themselves ; and is it the priviledge of man alone to act more contrary to nature then the wild and most untamed part of the creation ? doth god forbid us under the severest penalty , that of death , to take away the life of any man , a stranger , and upon provocation ? and does he permit us to destroy those he has given us the charge and care of , and by the dictates of nature and reason as well as his reveal'd command , requires us to preserve ? he has in all the parts of the creation taken a peculiar care to propagate and continue the several species of creatures , and makes the individuals act so strongly to this end , that they sometimes neglect their own private good for it , and seem to forget that general rule which nature teaches all things of self preservation and the preservation of their young , as the strongest principle in them over rules the constitution of their particular natures ; thus we see when their young stand in need of it , the timerous come valiant , the feirce and savage kind , and the ravenous tender and liberal . . but if the examples of what hath been done , be the rule of what ought to be , history would have furnish'd our a — with instances , of this absolute fatherly power in its heigth and perfection , and he might have shew'd us in peru , people that begot children on purpose to fatten and eat them . the story is so remarkable , that i cannot but set it down in the a — s words . in some provinces , says he , they were so liquorish after mans flesh , that they would not have the patience to stay still the breath was out of the body , but would suck the blood as it ran from the wounds of the dying man ; they had public shambles of mans flesh , and their madness herein was to that degree that they spared not their own children which they had begot on strangers , taken in war : for they made their captives their mistrisses and choisly nourished the children they had by them , till about thirteen years old they butcher'd and eat them , and they served the mothers after the same fashion , when they grew past child-bearing and ceased to bring them any more roasters , garcilasso de la vega hist. des yncas de peru , l. . c. . . thus far can the busie mind of man , carry him to a brutality below the level of beasts ; when he quits his reason , which places him almost equal to angels , nor can it be otherwise in a creature , whose thoughts are more then the sands , and wider then the ocean , where fancy and passion must needs run him into strange courses , if reason , which is the only star and compass , be not that he steers by ; the imagination is always restless and suggests variety of thoughts , and the will , reason being laid aside , is ready for every extravagant project ; and in this state , he that goes farthest out of the way , is thought fittest to lead , and is sure of most followers ; and when fashion hath once established , what folly or craft began , custom makes it sacred , and 't will be thought impudence or madness , to contradict or question it . he that will impartially survey the world , will find so much of the religion , government and manners of the nations of the world , brought in , and continued by these means , that he will have but little reverence for the practices , which are in fashion amongst men , and will have reason to think , that the woods and forests , where the irrational untaught inhabitants keep right by following nature , are fitter to give us rules , then cities and palaces , where those that call themselves civil and rational , go out of their way , by the authority of example . . be it then as sr. rob. says , that anciently , it was usual for men , to sell and castrate their children , o. . let it be , that they expose them , add to it , if you please , for this is still greater power , that they begat them for their tables to fat and eat them , if this proves a right to do so , we may by the same argument , justifie adultery , incest and sodomy , for there are examples of these too , both ancient and modern ; sins , which i suppose , have their principal aggravation from this , that they cross the main intention of nature , which willeth the increase of mankind , and the continuation of the species in the highest perfection and the distinction of families , with the security of the marriage bed , as necessary thereunto . . in confirmation of this natural authority of the father , our a — brings a lame proof , from the positive command of god in scripture ; his words are , to confirm the natural right of regal power , we find in the decalogue , that the law which injoyns obedience to kings , is delivered in the term , honour thy father , p. . whereas many confefs , that government only in the abstract , is the ordinance of god , they are not able to prove any such ordinance in the scripture , but only in the fatherly power , and therefore we find the commandment that injoyns obedience , to superiors , given in the terms , honour thy father ; so that not only the power and right of government , but the form of the power governing , and the person having the power , are all the ordinances of god. the first father had not only simply power , but power monarchical , as he was father immediately from god , o. . to the same purpose , the same law is cited by our a — in several other places , and just after the same fashion , that is , and mother , as apocriphal words , are always left out ; a great argument of our a — s ingenuity , and the goodness of his cause , which required in its defender , zeal to a degree of warmth , able to warp the sacred rule of the word of god , to make it comply with his present occasion , a way of proceeding , not unusual to those , who imbrace not truths , because reason and revelation offers them , but espouse tenets and parties , for ends different from truth , and then resolve at any rate to defend them ; and so do with the words and sense of authors , they would fit to their purpose , just as procustes did with his guests , top or stretch them , as may best fit them to the size of their notions , and they always prove like those , so served , deformed and useless . . for had our a — set down this command without garbling , as god gave it , and joyned mother to father , every reader would have seen , that it had made directly against him , and that it was so far from establishing the monarchical power of the father , that it set up the mother equal with him , and injoyn'd nothing but what was due in common , to both father and mother ; for that is the constant tenor of the scripture , honour thy father and thy mother , exod. . he that smiteth his father or mother , shall surely be put to death , . . he that curseth his father or his mother , shall surely be put to death , ver . . repeated lev. . . and by our saviour , math. . . ye shall fear every man his mother and his father , lev. . . if a man have a rebellious son , which will not obey the voice of his fath●r or the voice of his mother , then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him , and say this our son is stuborn and rebellious , he will not obey our voice , deut. . , , , . cursed be he that setteth light by his father or his mother , . . my son , hear the instructions of thy eather , and forsake not the law of thy mother , are the words of solomon a king , who was not ignorant of what belonged to him , as a father or a king , and yet he joyns father and mother together , in all the instructions he gives children quite through his book of proverbs , woe unto him , that sayeth unto his father , what begettest thou , or to the woman , what hast thou brought forth , isa. . v. . in thee have they set light by father or mother , ezek. . . and it shall come to pass , that when any shall yet prophesy , then his father and his mother that begat him , shall say unto him , thou shalt not live , and his father and his mother that begat him shall thrust him through when he prophesieth , zech. . . here not the father only , but father and mother joyntly , had power in this case of life and death . thus ran the law of the old testament , and in the new they are likewise joyn'd , in the obedience of their children , eph. . . the rule is , children obey your parents , and i do not remember , that i any where read , children obey your father and no more , the scripture joyns mother too in that homage , which is due from children , and had there been any text , where the honour or obedience of children , had been directed to the father alone , 't is not likely that our a — , who pretends to build all upon scripture , would have omitted it , nay the scripture makes the authority of father and mother , in respect of those they have begot , so equal that in some places it neglects , even the priority of order , which is thought due to the father , and the mother is put first , as lev. . . from which so constantly joyning father and mother together , as is found quite through the scripture , we may conclude that the honour they have a title to from their children , is one common right belonging so equally to them both , that neither can claim it wholly , neither can be excluded . . one would wonder then how our a — infers from the th commandment , that all power was originally in the father . how he finds monarchical power of government , settled and fixed by the commandment , honour thy father and thy mother ; if all the honour due by the commandments , be it what it will , be the only right of the father , because he , as our a — says , has the sovereignty over the woman , as being the nobler and principal agent in generation , why did god afterwards all along joyn the mother with him , to share in this honour , can the father by this sovereignty of his discharge the child from paying this honour to his mother . the scripture gave no such license to the jews , and yet there were often breaches wide enough betwixt husband and wife , even to divorce and seperation , and i think no body will say , a child may withhold honour from his mother , or as the scripture terms it , set light by her , though his father should command him to do so , no more then the mother could dispense with him , for neglecting to honour his father , whereby 't is plain , that this command of god , gives the father no sovereignty , no supremacy . . i agree with our a — , that the title to this honour , is vested in the parents by nature , and is a right which accrews to them , by their having begotten their children , and god by many positive declarations has confirm'd it to them , i also allow our a — s rule , that in grants and gifts , that have their original from god and nature , as the power of the father , let me add and mother , for whom god hath joyned together , let no man put a sunder , no inferior power of men can limit , nor make any law of prescription against them , o. . so that the mother having by this law of god , a right to honour from her children , which is not subject to the will of her husband , we see this absolute monarchical power of the father , can neither be founded on it , nor consist with it ; and he has a power very far from monarchical , very far from that absoluteness our a — contends for , when another has over his subjects the same power he hath , and by the same title , and therefore he cannot forebear saying himself , that he cannot see how any mans children can be free from subjection to their parents , p. . which in common speech , i think signifies mother as well as father , or if parents here signifies only father , 't is the first time i ever yet knew it to do so , and by such an use of words , one may say any thing . . by our a — s doctrin , the father having absolute jurisdiction over his children , has also the same over their issue , and the consequence is good , were it true , that the father had such a power , and yet i ask our a — whether the grand-father by his sovereignty , could discharge the grand-child from paying to his father , the honour due to him by the th commandment ; if the grand-father , hath by right of fatherhood , sole sovereign power in him , and by honour thy father be commanded , that obedience which is due to the sovereign , 't is certain the grand-father might dispence with the grand-sons honouring his father , which since 't is evident in common sense , he cannot 't is evident honour thy father and mother , cannot mean an absolute subjection to a sovereign power , but something else . the right therefore which parents have by nature , and which is confirmed to them by the th commandment , cannot be that political dominion , which our a — would derive from it , for that being in every civil society , supream somewhere , can discharge any subject , from any political obedience , to any one of his fellow subjects . but what law of the magistrate , can give a child liberty , not to honour his father and mother ; 't is an eternal law , annex'd purely to the relation of parents and children , and so contains nothing of the magistrates power in it , nor is subjected to it . . our a — says , god hath given to a father , a right or liberty to alien his power over his children to any other , o : . i doubt whether he can alien , wholly the right of honour that is due from them ; but be that as it will , this i am sure , he cannot alien , and retain the same power , if therefore the magistrates sovereignty , be as our a — would have it , nothing but the authority of a supream father , p. . 't is unavoidable , that if the magistrate hath all this paternal right as he must have , if fatherhood be the fountain of all authority , then the subjects though fathers , can have no power over their children , no right to honour from them ; for it cannot be all in anothers hands , and a part remain with them , so that according to our a — s own doctrin , honour thy father and mother , cannot possibly be understood of political subjection and obedience , since the laws both in the old and new testament , that commanded children to honour and obey their parents , were given to such , whose fathers were under such government , and fellow subjects with them in political societies , and to have bid them honour and obey their parents in our a — s sense , had been to bid them be subjects to those , who had no title to it , the right to obedience from subjects , being all vested in another , and instead of teaching obedience , this had been to foment sedition , by setting up powers that were not ; if therefore this command , honour thy father and mother , concern political dominion , it directly overthrows our a — s monarchy , since it being to be paid by every child to his father , even in society , every father must necessarily have political dominion , and there will be as many sovereigns , as there are fathers , besides that the mother too hath her title , which destroys the sovereignty of one supream monarch . but if honour thy father and mother , mean something distinct from political power , as necessarily it must , it is besides our a — s business , and serves nothing to his purpose . . the law that enjoyns obedience to kings is delivered , says our a — , in the terms , honour thy father , as if all power were originally in the father , o. . and that law is also delivered , say i , in the terms , honour thy mother , as if all power were originally in the mother , i appeal whether the argument be not as good on one side as the other , father and mother being joyned all along in the old and new testament , where honour or obedience is injoyn'd children , again our a — tell us , o. . that this command honour thy father gives the right to govern , and makes the form of government monarchical . to which i answer , that , if by honour thy father , be meant obedience to the political power of the magistrate , it concerns not any duty we owe to our natural fathers who are subjects , because they by our a — s doctrin , are divested of all that power , it being placed wholly in the prince , and so being equally subjects and slaves with their children , can have no right by that title , to any such honour or obedience as contains in it political subjection ; if honour thy father and mother signifies the duty we owe our natural parents , as by our saviours interpretation , math. . . and all the other mention'd places , 't is plain it does , then it cannot concern political obedience , but a duty that is owing to persons , who have no title to sovereignty , nor any political authority , as magistrates over subjects , for the person of a private father , and a title to obedience , due to the supream magistrate , are things inconsistent , and therefore this command , which must necessarily comprehend the persons of our natural fathers , must mean a duty we owe them distinct from our obedience to the magistrate , and from which the most absolute power of princes cannot absolve us , what this duty is , we shall in its due place examin . . and thus we have at last got through all that in our a — looks like an argument for that absolute unlimited sovereginty described , sect. . which he supposes in adam so that mankind ever since have all been born slaves , without any title to freedom ; but if creation which gave nothing but a being , made not adam prince of his posterity ; if adam , gen. . . was not constituted lord of mankind , nor had a private dominion given him exclusive of his children , but only a right and power over the earth , and inferiour creatures in common with the children of men ; if also gen. . . god gave not any political power to adam over his wife and children , but only subjected eve to adam , as a punishment , or foretold the subjection of the weaker sex , in the ordering the common concernments of their families , but gave not thereby to adam , as to the husband power of life and death , which necessarily belongs to the magistrate ; if fathers by begetting their children acquire no such power over them , and if the command honour thy father and mother , give it not but only enjoyns a duty owing to parents equally , whether subjects or not , and to the mother as well as the father ; if all this be so as i think , by what has been said , is very evident , then man hás a natural freedom , notwithstanding all our a — confidently says to the contrary , since all that share in the same common nature , faculties and powers are in nature equal , and ought to partake in the same common rights and priviledges , till the manifest appointment of god , who is lord over all blessed for ever , can be produced to shew any particular persons supremacy , or a man 's own consent subjects him to a superior . this is so plain that our a — confesses , that sr. iohn heyward , blacwood and barclay the great vindicators of the right of kings , could not deny it , but admit with one consent the natural liberty and equality of mankind , for a truth unquestionable . and our a — hath been so far from producing any thing , that may make good his great position , that adam was absolute monarch , and so men are not naturally free , that even his own proofs make against him , so that to use is own way of arguing . this first erroneous principle failing , the whole fabrick of this vast engine of absolute power and tyranny , drops down of it self , and there needs no more to be said in answer to all that he builds upon , so false and frail a foundation . . but to save others the pains , were there any need , he is not sparing himself to shew by his own contradictions , the weakness of his own doctrins , adams absolute and sole dominion is that which he is every where full of , and all along builds on , and yet he tells us , p. . that as adam was lord of his children , so his children under him had a command and power over their own children . the unlimited and undivided sovereginty of adams fatherhood , by our a — s computation , stood but a little while , only during the first generation , but as soon as he had grand-children , sr. rob. could give but a very ill account of it , adam as father of hi● children saith he , hath an absolute , unlimited royal power over th●m , and by vertue thereof over those that they begot , and so to all generations , and yet his children , viz. cain and seth have a paternal power over their children at the same time , so that they are at the same time absolute lords , and yet subjects and slaves ; adam has all the authority , as grand-father of his people , and they have a part as fathers ; he is absolute over them and their posterity , by having begotten them , and yet they are absolute over their children by the same title , no says our a — , adams children under him , had power over their own children , but still with subordination to the the first parent . a good distinction that sounds well , and 't is pitty it signifies nothing , nor can be reconciled with our a — s words , i readily grant that supposing adams absolute power over his posterity , any of his children might have from him a delegated , and so a subordinate power , over a part or all the rest ; but that cannot be the power our a — speaks of here , it is not a power by grant and commission , but the natural paternal power , he supposes a father to have over his children ; for o , he says as adam was lord of his children , so his children under him , had a power over their own children ; they were then lords over their own children after the same manner , and by the same title that adam was , i. e. by right of generation , by right of fatherhood ; o , 't is plain he means the natural power of fathers , because he limits it to be only over their own children , a delegated power , has no such limitation , as only over their own children , it might be over others , as well as their own children ; o , if it were a delegated power , it must appear in scripture , but there is no ground in scripture to affirm that adam's children , had any other power over theirs , then what they naturally had as fathers . . but that he means here paternal power , and no other , is past doubt from the inference he makes in those words immediately following , i see not then how the children of adam or of any man else can be free from subjection to their parents , whereby it appears that the power on one side and the subjection on the other , our a — here speaks of , is that natural power and subjection between parents and children ; for that which every mans children owed could be no other , and that our a — always affirms to be absolute and unlimited . this natural power of parents over their children , adam had over his posterity , says our a — , and this power of parents over their children , his children had over theirs in his life time , says our a — also ; so that adam by a natural right of father , had an absolute , unlimited power over all his posterity , and at the same time his children had by the same right absolute unlimited power over theirs , here then are two absolute unlimited powers existing together , which i would have any body reconcile one to another , or to common sense ; for the salvo , he has put in of subordination , makes it more absurd : to have one absolute , vnlimited , nay vnlimitable power in subordination to another , is so manifest a contradiction , that nothing can be more , adam is absolute prince with the vnlimited authority of fatherhood over all his posterity ; all his posterity are then absolutely his subjects , and , as our a — says , his slaves , children and grand children are equally in this state of subjection and slavery , and yet says our a — , the children of adam have paternal , i. e. absolute , unlimited power over their own children , which in plain english is , they are slaves and absolute princes at the same time , and in the same government , and one part of the subjects have an absolute unlimited power over the other by the natural right of parentage . . if any one will suppose in favour of our a — that he here meant that parents who are in subjection themselves to the absolute authority of their father , have yet some power over their children : i confess he is something nearer the truth , but he will not at all hereby help our a — ; for he no where speaking of the paternal power , but as an absolute unlimited authority , cannot be suppos'd to understand any thing else here , unless he himself had limited it and shewed how far it reach'd : and that he means here paternal authority in that large extent is plain from the immediate following words ; this subjection of children being , says he , the fountain of all regal authority , p. . the subjection , then that in the former line , he says , every man is in to his parents , and consequently what adam's grand children were in to their parents , was that which was the fountain of all regal authority , i. e. according to our a — s absolute , vnlimitable authority , and thus adams ● children had regal authority over their children , whilst they themselves were subjects to their father , and fellow subjects with their children ; but let him mean as he pleases , 't is plain he allows adams children to have paternal power , p. . as all other fathers to have paternal power over their children , o. . from whence one of these two things will necessarily follow , that , either adams children even in his life time , had , and so all other fathers have , as he phrases it , p. . by right of fatherhood royal authority over their children , or else , that adam by right of fatherhood had not royal authority : for it must be that paternal power does , or does not , give royal authority to them that have it : if it does not , then adam could not be sovereign by this title , nor any body else , and then there is an end of all our a's politics at once ; if it does give royal authority , then every one that has paternal power has royal authority , and then by our a — s patriarchal government , there will be as many kings as there are fathers . . and thus what a monarchy he hath set up , let him and his disciples consider , princes certainly will have great reason to thank him for these new politics , which set up as many absolute kings in every country as there are fathers of children , and yet who can blame our a — for it , it lying unavoidably in the way of one discoursing upon our a — s principles ; for having placed an absolute power in fathers by right of begetting , he could not easily resolve how much of this power belong'd to a son over the children he had begotten ; and so it fell out to be a very hard matter to give all the power , as he does , to adam , and yet allow a part in his life time to his children , when they were parents , and which he knew not well how to deny them , this makes him so doubtful in his expressions , and so uncertain where to place this absolute natural power , which he calls fatherhood ; sometimes , adam alone has it all , as p. . o. , . & pref . sometimes parents have it , which word scarce signifies the father alone , p. , . sometimes children during their fathers life time , as p. . sometimes fathers of families , as p. , and . sometimes fathers indefinitely , o. . sometimes the heir to adam , o. . sometimes the posterity of adam , . . sometimes prime fathers , all sons or grand children of noah , o. . sometimes the eldest parents , p. . sometimes all kings , p. . sometimes all that have supream power , o. . sometimes heirs to those first progenitors , who were at first the natural parents of the whole people , p. . sometimes an elective king , p. . sometimes those whether a few or a multitude that govern the commonwealth , p. . sometimes he that can catch it , an vsurper , p. . o. . . thus this new nothing , that is to carry with it all power , authority and government ; this fatherhood which is to design the person and establish the throne of monarchs , whom the people are to obey , may , according to sir robt. come into any hands , any how , and so by his politics give to democracy royal authority , and make an usurper a lawful prince . and if it will do all these fine feats , much good do our author and all his followers with their omnipotent fatherhood , which can serve for nothing but to unsettle and destroy all the lawful governments in the world , and to establish in their room disorder , tyranny and u●urpation . chap. vii . of fatherhood and propriety considered together as fountains of sovereignty . . in the foregoing chapters we have seen what adams monarchy was , in our a — s opinion , and upon what titles he founded it : and the foundations which he lays the chief stress on , as those from which he thinks he may best derive monarchical power to future princes , are two , viz. fatherhood and property , and therefore the way he proposes to remove the absurdities and inconveniences of the doctrine of natural freedom , is , to maintain the natural and private dominion of adam , o. . conformable hereunto he tells us the grounds and principles of government , necessarily depend upon the original of property , o. . the s●bjection of children to their parents is the fountain of all regal authority , p. . and all power on earth is either derived or usurped from the fatherly power , there being no other original to be found of any power whatsoever , o. . i will not stand here to examine how it can be said without a contradiction , that the first ground and principles of government necessarily depend upon the original of property , and yet , that there is no other original of any power whatsoever , but that of the father : it being hard to understand how there can be no other original but fatherhood , and yet that the grounds and principles of government depend upon the original of property ; property and fatherhood being as far different as lord of a mannor and father of children , nor do i see how they will either of them agree with what our a — says , o. . of gods sentence against eve , gen. . . that it is the original grant of government , so that if that were the original , government had not its orignal by our a — s own confession , either from property or fatherhood , and this text which he brings as a proof of adam's power over eve necessarily contradicts what he says of the fatherhood , that it is the sole fountain of all power ; for if adam had any such regal power over eve , as our a — contends for ; it must be by some other title then that of begetting . . but i leave him to reconcile these contradictions as well as many others , which may plentifully be found in him by any one , who will but read him with a little attention , and shall come now to consider how these two originals of government , adam's natural and private dominion will consist and serve to make out and establish the titles of succeeding monarchs , who , as our a — obliges them , must all derive their power from these fountains . let us then suppose adam made by gods donation lord and sole proprietor of the whole earth , in as large and ample a manner , as sir robt. could wish , let us suppose him also by right of fatherhood absolute ruler over his children with an unlimited supremacy , i ask them upon adam's d●ath what becomes of his natural and private dominion , and i doubt not , 't will be answered , that they descended to his next heir , as our a — tells us in sever●l places , but that cannot possibly convey both his natural and private dominion to the same person ; for should we allow that all the propriety , all the estate of the father ought to descend to the eldest son , which will need some proof to establish it , and so he have by that title all the private dominion of the father , yet the fathers natural dominion , the paternal power cannot descend to him by inheritance ; for being a right that accrews to a man only by begetting , no man can have this natural dominion over any one , he does not beget , unless it can be suppos'd that a man can have a right to any thing , without doing that upon which that right is solely founded . for if a father by begetting , and no other title has natural dominion over his children , he that does not b●get them cannot have this natural dominion over them , and therefore be it true or false , that our a — says , o. . that every man that is born by his very birth becomes a subject to him that begets him , this necessarily follows , viz. that a man by his birth cannot become a subject to his brother who did not beget him , unless it can be suppos'd that a man by the very same title can come to be under the natural and absolute dominion of two different men at once , or it be sense to say , that a man by birth is under the natural dominion of his father only , because he begat him , and a man by birth also is under the natural dominion of his eldest brother , though he did not beget him . . if then the private dominion of adam , his property in the creatures descended at his death all entirely to his eldest son , his heir ; ( for if it did not there is presently an end of all sir robt's . monarchy and his natural dominion ) the dominion a father has over his children by begetting them , belong'd equally to all his sons who had children by the same title their father had , it immediately upon adams decease ; the sovereignty founded upon property , and the sovereignty founded upon fatherhood , come to be divided , since cain as heir had that of property alone , seth and the other sons that of fatherhood equally with him . this is the best can be made of our a — s doctrine and of the two titles of sovereignty he sets up in adam , one of them will either signifie nothing , or if they both must stand they can serve only to confound the rights of princes , and disorder government in his posterity ; for by building upon two titles to dominion , which cannot descend together , and which he allows may be separated , for he yields that adams children had their destinct territories by right of private dominion , o . p. . he makes it perpetually a doubt upon his principles where the sovereignty is , or to whom we owe our obedience , since fatherhood and property are distinct titles , and began presently upon adams death to be in distinct persons , and which then was to give way to the other ? . let us take the account of it , as he himself gives it us . he tells us out of grotius , that adams children by donation , assignation or some kind of cession before he was dead had their distinct territories by right of private dominion , abel had his flocks and pastures for them , cain had his fields for corn and the land of nod where he built him a city , o. . here 't is obvious to demand which of these two after adams death was sovereign , cain says our a — , p. . by what title ? as heir for heirs to progenitors , who were natural parents of their people , are not only lords of their own children , but also of their brethren , says our a — , p. . what was cain heir to ? not the entire possessions , not all that which adam had private dominion in , for our a — allows that abel by a title derived from his father , had his distinct territory for pasture by right of private dominion , what then abel had by private dominion , was exempt from cains dominion , for he could not have private dominion over that , which was under the private dominion of another , and therefore his sovereignty over his brother is gone with this private dominion , and so there are presently two sovereigns and his imaginary title of fatherhood is out of doors , and cain is no prince over his brother , or else if cain retain his sovereignty over abel notwithstanding his private dominion , it will follow that the first grounds and principles of government have nothing to do with property whatever our a — says to the contrary ; 't is true , abel did not out-live his father adam , but that makes nothing to the argument which will hold good against sir robt. in abels issue , or in seth , or any of the posterity of adam , not descended from cain . . the same inconvenience he runs into about the three sons of noah , who as he says , p. . had the whole world divided amongst them by their father , i a●k then in which of the three shall we find the establishment of regal power after noahs death ; if in all three as our a — there seems to say : then it will follow that regal power is founded in property of land and follows private dominion , and not in paternal power or natural dominion , and so there is an end of paternal power as the fountain of regal authority , and the so much magnified fatherhood quite vanishes . if the regal power descended to shem as eldest and heir to his father , then noahs division of the world by lot to his sons or his years sayling about the mediterranean to appoint each son his part , which our a — tells of , p. . was labour lost , his division of the world to them , was to ill or to no purpose , for his grant to cham and iaphet was little worth if shem notwithstanding this grant , as soon as noah was dead , was to be lord over them . or , if this grant of private dominion to them over their assigned territories were good , here were set up two distinct sorts of power , not subordinate one to the other with all those inconveniences which he musters up against the power of the people . o. . and which i shall set down in his own words only changing property for people . all power on earth is either derived or us●rped from the fatherly power , there being no other original to be found of any power whatsoever , for if there should be granted two sorts of power without any subordination of one to the other , they would be in perpetual strife , which should be supream , for two supreams cannot agree : if the fatherly power be supream , then the power grounded on private dominion must be subordinate and depend on it , and if the power grounded on property be supream , then the fatherly power must submit to it , and cannot be exercised without the licence of the proprietors , which must quite destroy the frame and course of natu●e . this is his own arguing against two distinct independent powers , which i have set down in his own words , only putting power rising from property , for power of the people , and when he has answered what he himself has urged here against two distinct powers , we shall be better able to see how with any tolerable sense , he can derive all regal authority from the natural and private dominion of adam , from fatherhood and property together , which are distinct titles that do not always meet in the same person , and 't is plain by his own confession , presently seperated as soon both as adams and noahs death made way for succession ; though our a — frequently in his writings jumbles them together , and omits not to make use of either , where he thinks it will sound best to his purpose , but the absurdities of this will more fully appear in the next chapter , where we shall examine the ways of conveyance of the soveriegnty of adam , to princes that were to reign after him . chap. viii . of the conveyance of adams sovereign monarchical power . . sr . rob. having not been very happy in any proofs , he brings for the sovereignty of adam , is not much more fortunate in conveying it to future princes , who if his politics be true , must all derive their titles from him ; the ways he has assigned , as they lye scatter'd up and down in his writings , i will set down in his own words ; in his preface he tells us , that adam being monarch of the whole world , none of his posterity had any right to possess any thing , but by his grant or permission , or by succession from him , here he makes two ways of conveyance of any thing , adam stood possessed of , and those are grant or succession . all kings either are , or are to be , reputed the next heirs to those first proginetors , who were at first the natural parents of the whole people , p. . there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever , but that in it , consider'd by it self , there is one man amongst them , that in nature hath a right to be the king of all the rest , as being the next heir to adam , o. . here in these places inheritance is the only way he allows of , conveying monarchical power to princes , o. . all power on earth is either derived or usurped from the fatherly power , o. . all kings that now are , or ever were , are or were either fathers of their people , or the heirs of such fathers or usurpers of the right of such fathers , o. . and here he makes inheritance or vsurpation , the only ways whereby kings come by this original power ; but yet he tells us , this fatherly empire , as it was of its self hereditary , so it was alienable by patent , and seizable by an vsurper , o. . so then here inheritance , grant or usurpation will convey it ; and last of all , which is most admirable he he tells us , p. . it skils not which way kings come by their power , whether by election , donation , succession , or by any other means , for it is still the manner of the government by s●pream power , that makes them properly kings , and not the means of obtaining their crowns , which i think is a full answer to all his whole hypothesis , and discourse about adams royal authority , as the fountain from which all princes were to derive theirs ; and he might have spared the trouble of speaking so much , as he does , up and down of heirs and inheritance , if to make any one properly a king , needs no more but governing by supream power , and it matters not by what means he came by it . . by this notable way , our a — may make oliver as properly king , as any one else he could think of ; and had he had the happiness , to live under massanellos government , he could not by this his own rule , have forborn to have done homage to him , with o king live for ever , since the manner of his government by supream power , made him properly king , who was but the day before , properly a fisher-man ; and if don quixot , had taught his squire to govern with supream authority , our a — no doubt could have made a most loyal subject , in sancho pancha's island , and he must have deserved some preferment in such governments , since i think he is the first politician , who pretending to settle government upon its true basis , and to establish the thrones of lawful princes ever tould the world , that he was properly a king , whose manner of government was by sapream power , by what means soever he obtained it , which in plain english , is to say , that regal and supream power , is properly and truly his , who can by any means seize upon it , and if this be , to be properly a king , i wonder how he came to think of , or where he will find , an vsurper . . this is so strange a doctrin , that the surpize of it , hath made me pass by , without their due reflection , the contradictions he runs into , by making sometimes inheritance alone , sometimes only grant or inheritance , sometimes only inheritance or vsurpation , sometimes all these three , and at last election or any other means , added to them , the ways whereby adams royal authority , that is , his right to supream rule , could be convey'd down to future kings and governors , so as to give them a title to the obedience and subjection of the people , but these contradictions lye so open , that the very reading of our a — s own words , will discover them to any ordinary understanding ; and though what i have quoted out of him , with abundance more of the same strain and coherence which might be found in him , might well excuse me from any farther trouble in this argument , yet having proposed to my self , to examin the main parts of his doctrin , i shall a little more particularly consider how inheritanee , grant , vsurpation , or ele●tion , can any way make out government in the world upon his principles , or derive any lawful title to any ones obedience , from this regal authority of adam , had it been never so well proved , that he had been absolute monarch , and lord of the whole world. chap. ix . of monarchy , by inheritance from adam . . though it be never so plain , that there ought to be government in the world , nay should all men be of our a — s mind , that divine appointment had ordained it to be monarchical , yet since men cannot obey any thing , that cannot command , and ideas of government in the phansy , though never so perfect , never so right , cannot give laws , nor prescribe rules to the actions of men ; it would be of no behoof for the setling of order , and establishment of government in its exercise and use amongst men , unless there were a way also taught how to know the person , to whom it belonged to have this power , and exercise this dominion over others . 't is in vain then to talk of subjection and obedience , without telling us whom we are to obey ; for were i never so fully perswaded , that there ought to be magistracy and rule in the world , yet i am never the less at liberty still , till it appears who is the person , that hath right to my obedience , since if there be no marks to know him by , and distinguish him , that hath right to rule from other men , it may be my self , as well as any other ; and therefore though submission to government be every ones duty , yet since that signifies nothing , but submitting to the direction and laws of such men , as have authority to command , 't is not enough to make a man a subject , to convince him that there is regal power in the world , but there must be ways of designing , and knowing the person to whom this regal power of right belongs , and a man can never be obliged in conscience to submit to any power , unless he can be satisfied who is the person , who has a right to exercise that power over him . if this were not so , there would be no distinction between pirates and lawful princes , he that has force is without any more ado to be obey'd , and crowns and scepters would become the inheritance only of violence and rapin , men too might as often and as innocently change their governors , as they do their physitians , if the person cannot be known , who has a right to direct me , and whose prescriptions , i am bound to follow ; to settle therefore mens consciences under an obligation to obedience , 't is necessary that they know not only that there is a power somewhere in the world , but the person who by right is vested with this power over them . . how successful our a — has been in his attempts , to set up a monarchical absolute power in adam , the reader may judge by what has been already said , but were that absolute monarchy as clear as our a — would desire it , as i presume it is the contrary , yet it could be of no use to the govrenment of mankind now in the world , unless he also make out these two things . first , that this power of adam was not to end with him , but was upon his decease conveyed entire to some other person , and so on to posterity . secondly , that the princes and rulers now on earth , are possessed of this power of adam , by a right way of conveyance derived to them . . if the first of these fail , the power of adam , were it never so great , never so certain , will signifie nothing to the present government and societies in the world , but we must seek out some other original of power for the government of polity's then this of adam , or else there will be none at all in the world. if the latter fail , it will destroy the authority of the present governors , and absolve the people from subjection to them , since they having no better a claim then others to that power , which is alone the fountain of all authority , can have no title to rule over them . . our a — having phansied an absolute sovereignty in adam , mentions several ways of its conveyance to princes , that were to be his successors , but that which he cheifly insists on , is , that of inheritance , which occurs so often in his several discourses , and i having in the foregoing chapter quoted several of these passages , i shall not need here again to repeat them , this sovereignty he erects , as had been said upon a double foundation , viz. that of property , and that of fatherhood , one was the right he was supposed to have in all creatures , a right to possess the earth with the beasts , and other inferior ranks of things in it for his private use , exclusive of all other men. the other was the right he was supposed to have , to rule and govern men , all the rest of mankind . . in both these rights , there being supposed an exclusion of all other men , it must be upon some reason peculiar to adam , that they must both be founded . that of his property our a — supposes , to arise from gods immediate donation , gen. . . and that of fatherhood , from the act of begetting now in all inheritance , if the heir succeed not to the reason , upon which his fathers right was founded , he cannot succeed to the right which followed from it ; for example , adam had a right of property in the creatures , upon the donation and grant of god almighty , who was lord and proprietor of them all , let this be so as our a — tells us , yet upon his death , his heir can have no title to them , no such right of property in them , unless the same reason , viz. gods donation , vested a right in the heir too ; for if adam could have had no property in , nor use of , the creatures without this positive donation from god , and this donation , were only personally to adam , his heir could have no right by it , but upon his death , it must revert to god the lord and owner again ; for positive grants give no title farther then the express words convey it , and by which only it is held , and thus , if as our a — himself contends , that donation , gen. . . were made only to adam , personally his heir could not succeed to his property in the creatures , and if it were a donation to any but adam , let it be shewn , that it was to his heir in our a — s sense , i.e. to one of his children exclusive of all the rest . . but not to follow our a — too far out of the way , the plain of the case is this , god having made man , and planted in him , as in all other animals , a strong desire of self preservation , and furnished the world with things fit for food and rayment , and other necessaries of life , subservient to his design , that man should live and abide for some time upon the the face of the earth , and not that so curious and wonderful a piece of workmanship by its own negligence , or want of necessaries , should perish again , presently after a few moments continuance : god , i say , having made man and the world , thus spoke to him , ( that is ) directed him by his senses and reason , as he did the inferior animals by their sense , and instinct which he had placed in them to that purpose , to the use of those things , which were serviceable for his subsistence , and gave him the means of his preservation , and therefore i doubt not , but before these words were pronounced , gen. . . if they must be understood litterally to have been spoken , or without any such verbal donation , man had a right to a use of the creatures , by the will and grant of god , for the desire , strong desire of preserving his life and being , having been planted in him , as a principle of action by god himself , reason , which was the voice of god in him , could not but teach him and assure him , that pursuing that natural inclination he had to preserve his being , he followed the will of his maker , and therefore had a right to make use of those creatures , which by his reason or senses he could discover , would be serviceable thereunto , and thus mans property in the creatures , was founded upon the right he had , to make use of those things that were necessary , or useful to his being . . this being the reason and foundation of adams property , gave the same title , on the same ground , to all his children , not only after his death , but in his life time , so that here was no priviledge of his heir above his other children , which could exclude them from an equal right , to the use of the inferior creatures , for the comfortable preservation of their beings . which is all the property man hath in them , and so adams sovereignty built on property , or as our a — calls it , private dominion comes to nothing . every man had a right to the creatures , by the same title adam had , viz. by the right every one had to take care of , and provide for , their subsistance , and thus men had a right in common , adams children in common with him . but if any one had began , and made himself a property in any particular thing , ( which how he , or any one else , could do , shall be shewn in another place ) that thing , that possession , if he dispos'd not otherwise of it by his positive grant , desc●nded naturally to his children , and they had a right to succeed to it , and possess it . . it might reasonably be asked here , how come children by this right of possessing , before any other , the properties of their parents upon their decease , for it being personally the parents , when they dye , without actually transferring their right to another , why does it not return again to the commmon stock of mankind ? 't will perhaps be answered , that common consent hath disposed of it to the children common practice , we see indeed does so dispose of it , but we cannot say , that it is the common consent of mankind ; for that hath never been asked , nor actually given , and if common tacit consent had establish'd it , it would make but a positive and not natural right of children , to inherit the goods of their parents : but where the practice is universal , 't is reasonable to think the cause is natural . the ground then i think to be this ; the first and strongest desire god planted in men , and wrought into the very principle of their nature , being that of self preservation , is the foundation of a right to the creatures for their particular support , and use of each individual person himself . but next to this , god planted in men a strong desire also of propagating their kind , and continuing themselves in their posterity , and this gives children a title , to share in the property of their parents , and a right to inherit their possessions , men are not proprietors of what they have meerly for themselves , their children have a title to part of it , and have their kind of right joyn'd with their parent 's , in the possession which comes to be wholly theirs , when death having put an end to their parents use of it , hath taken them from their possessions , and this we call inheritance : men being by a like obligation , bound to preserve what they have begotten , as to preserve themselves , their issue come to have a right in the goods they are possessed of . and that children have such a right is plain from the laws of god , and that men are convinced , that children have such a right , is evident from the law of the land , both which laws require parents to provide for their children . . for children being by the course of nature , born weak , and unable to provide for themselves , they have by the appointment of god himself , who hath thus ordered the course of nature , a right to be nourish'd and maintained by their parents , nay a right not only to a bare subsistance , but to the conveniences and comforts of life , as far as the conditions of their parents can afford it ; and hence it comes , that when their parents leave the world , and so the care due to their children ceases , the effects of it are to extend as far as possibly they can , and the provisions they have made in their life time , are understood to be intended as nature requires they should , for their children , whom after themselves , they are bound to provide for , though the dying parents , by express words , declare nothing about them , nature appoints the the descent of their property to their children , who thus come to have a title , and natural right of ●nheritance to their fathers goods , which the rest of mankind cannot pretend to . . were it not for this right of being nourished , and maintained by their parents , which god and nature has given to children and obliged parents to , as a duty , it would , be reasonable , that the father should inherit the estate of his son , and be prefer'd in the inheritance before his grand child , for to the grand father , there is due a long score of care and expences laid out upon the breeding and education of his son , which one would think in justice ought to be paid , but that having been done in obedience to the same law , whereby he received nourishment and education from his own parents , this score of education received from a mans father , is paid by taking care and providing for his own children ( is paid i say , as much as is requir'd of payment by alteration of property , unless present necessity of the parents require a return of goods for their necessary support and subsistance , for we are not now speaking of that reverence , acknowledgment , respect and honour that is always due from children to their parents , but of possessions and commodities of life valuable by money ; ) but yet this debt to the children , does not quite cancel the score due to the father , but only is made by nature preferable to it ; for the debt a man owes his father , takes place and gives the father a right to inherit the sons goods , where for want of issue , the right of children doth not exclude that ●itle . and therefore a man having a right to be maintain'd by his children where he needs it , and to injoy also the comforts of life from them , when the necessary provision due to them and their children will afford it , if his son dye without issue , the father has a right in nature to possess his goods , and inherit his estate ( whatever the municipal laws of some countries may absurdly direct otherwise , ) and so again his children and their issue from him , or for want of such his father and his issue ; but where no such are to be found , i. e. no kindred there we see the possessions of a private man , revert to the community , and so in politic societies come into the hands of the public magistrate , but in the state of nature become again perfectly common , no body having a right to inherit them , nor can any one have a property in them , otherwise then in other things common by nature , of which i shall speak in its due place . . i have been the larger , in shewing upon what ground children have a right to succeed to the possession of their fathers properties , not only because by it , it will appear , that if adam had a property ( a titular insignificant useless property ; for it could be no better , for he was bound to nourish and maintain his children and posterity out of it ) in the whole earth and its product , yet all his children coming to have by the law of nature and right of inheritance a joynt title , and right of property in it after his death , it could convey no right of sovereignty to any one of his posterity over the rest , since every one having a right of inheritance to his portion , they might enjoy their inheritance , or any part of it in common , or share it , or some parts of it , by division , as it best liked them , but no one could pretend to the whole inheritance , or any sovereignty supposed to accompany it , since a right of inheritance gave every one of the rest , as well as any one , a title to share in the goods of his father . not only upon this account , i say , have i been so particular in examining the reason of childrens inheriting the property of their fathers , but also because it will give us farther light in the inheritance of rule and power , which in countries where their particular municipal laws give the whole possession of land entirely to the first born , and descent of power has gone so to men by this custom , some have been apt to be deceived into an opinion , that there was a natural or divine right of primogeniture to both estate and power , and that the inheritance of both rule over men and property in things , sprang from the same original , and were to descend by the same rules . . property , whose original is from the right a man has to use any of the inferior creatures , for the subsistance and comfort of his life , is for the benefit and sole advantage of the proprietor , so that he may even destroy the thing , that he has property in by his use of it , where need requires ; but government being for the preservation of every mans right and property , by preserving him from the violence or injury of others , is for the good of the governed ; for the magistrate sword , being for a terror to evil doers , and by that terror to inforce men to observe the positive laws of the society , made conformable to the laws of nature , for the public good , i. e. the good of every particular member of that society , as far as by common rules , it can be provided for ; the sword is not given the magistrate for his own good alone . . children therefore , as has been shew'd , by the dependance they have on their parents for subsistance , have a right of inheritance to their fathers property , as that which belongs to them for their proper good and behoof , and therefore are fitly termed goods , wherein the first born has not a sole or peculiar right by any law of god and nature . his , and his brethrens , being equally founded on that right they had to maintenance , support and comfort from their parents , and on nothing else ; but government being for the benefit of the governed , and not the sole advantage of the governors ( but only for theirs with the rest , as they make a part of that politic body , each of whose parts and members are taken care of , and directed in their peculiar function for the good of the whole , by the laws of the society , ) cannot be inherited by the same title , that children have to the goods of their fathers . the right a son has to be maintained and provided with the necessaries and conveniences of life out of his fathers stock , gives him a right to succeed to his fathers property for his own good , but this can give him no right to succeed also to the rule , which his father had over other men ; all that a child has right to claim from his fathers is nourishment and education , and the things nature furnishes for the support of life , but he has no right to demand rule or dominion from him : he can subsist and receive from him the portion of good things , aud advantages of education naturally due to him , without empire and dominion ; that ( if his father hath any ) was vested in him , for the good and behoof of others , and therefore the son cannot claim or inherit it by a title , which is founded wholy on his own private good and advantage . . we must know how the first ruler , from whom any one claims came by his authority , upon what ground any one has empire , what his title is to it , before we can know who has a right to succeed him in it , and inherit it from him ; if the agreement and consent of men first gave a scepter into any ones hand , or put a crown on his head , that also must direct its descent and conveyance ; for the same authority , that made the first a lawful ruler , must make the second too , and so give right of succession ; and in this case inheritance or primogeniture , can in its self have no right , no pretence , to it , any farther then that consent , which established the form of the government , hath so settled the succession ; and thus we see the succession of crowns , in several countries places it on different heads , and he comes by right of succession , to be a prince in one place , who would be a subject in another . . if god , by his positive grant and revealed declaration , fi●st gave rule and dominion to any man , he that will claim by that title , must have the same positive grant of god for his succession ; for if that has not directed the course of its descent and conveyance down to others , no body can succeed to this title of the first ruler , and hereto children have no right of inheritance ; and primogeniture can lay no claim , unless god the author of this constitution hath so ordained it . thus we see the pretensions of sauls family , who received his crown from the immediate appointment of god , ended with his reign ; and david by the same title that saul reignd , viz. gods appointment , succeeded in his throne , to the exclusion of ionathan , and all pretensions of paternal inheritance . and if solomon had a right to succ●ed his father , it must be by some other title , then that of primogeniture . a cadet or sisters son , must have the preference in succession , if he has the same title the first lawful prince had . and in dominion that has its foundation only in the positive appointment of god himself , benjamin the youngest , must have the inheritance of the crown , if god so direct as well as one of that tribe had the first possession . . if paternal right , the act of begetting , give a man rule and dominion , inheritance or primogeniture can give no title ; for he that cannot succeed to his fathers title , which was begetting , cannot succeed to that power over his brethren , which his father had by paternal right over them , but i shall have more to say on this by and by . this is plain in the mean time , that any government whether supposed to be , at first founded in paternal right , consent of the people , or the positive appointment of god himself , which can supersede either of the other , and so begin a new government upon a new foundation , i say , any government began upon either of these , can by right of succession come to those only , who have the title of him , they succeed to . power founded on contract , can descend only to him , who has right by that contract , power founded on begetting , he only can have that begets , and power founded on the positive grant or donation of god , he only can have by right of succession , to whom that grant directs it . . from what i have said , i think this is clear , that a right to the use of the creatures , being founded originally in the right a man has to subsist and enjoy the conveniences of life , and the natural right children have to inherit the goods of their parents , being founded in the right they have to the same subsistance and commodities of life , out of the stock of their parents , who are therefore taught by natural love and tenderness to provide for them , as a part of themselves , and all this being only for the good of the proprietor or heir ; it can be no reason for childrens inheriting of rule and dominion , which has another original and a different end , nor can primogeniture have any pretence to a right of solely inheriting either property or power , as we shall in , its due place , see more fully , 't is enough to have shew'd here , that adams property or private dominion , could not convey any sovereignty or rule to his heir , who not having a right to inherit all his fathers possessions , could not thereby come to have any sovereignty over his brethren , and therefore if any sovereignty , on account of his property , had been vested in adam , which in truth there was not ; yet it would have died with him . . as adam's sovereignty , if he had by vertue of being proprietor of the whole world , had any authority over men , could not have been inherited by any of his children over the rest , because they had all title to divide the inheritance , and every one had a right to a portion of his fathers possessions , so neither could adam's sovereignty by right of fatherhood , if any such he had , descend to any one of his children ; for it being , in our a — s account , a right acquired by begetting to rule over those he had begotten , it was not a power possible to be inherited , because the right being consequent to , and built on , an act perfectly personal , made that power so too , and impossible to be inherited for paternal power , being a natural right , arising only from the relation of father and son , is as impossible to be inherited as the relation it self , and a man may pretend as well to inherit the conjugal power , the husband , whose heir he is , had over his wife , as he can to inherit the paternal power of a father over his children ; for the power of the husband being founded on contract , and the power of the father on begetting , he may as well inherit the power obtained by the conjugal contract , which was only personal , as he may the power obtained by begetting , which could reach no farther then the person of the begetter , unless begetting can be a title to power in him , that does not beget . . which makes it a reasonable question to ask , whether adam dying before eve his heir , suppose cain or seth should have had by right of inheriting adam's fatherhood , sovereign power over eve his mother ; for adams fatherhood , being nothing but a right he had to govern his children , because he begot them , he that inherits adam's fatherhood , inherits nothing even in our a — s sense , but the the right adam had to govern his children , because he begot them , so that the monarchy of the heir would not have taken in eve , or if it did , it being nothing but the fatherhood of adam , descended by inheritance , the heir must have right to govern eve , because adam begot her ; for fatherhood is nothing else . . perhaps it will be said with our a — , that a man can alien his power over his child , and what may be transfer'd by compact , may be possessed by inheritance , i answer , a father cannot alien the power he has over his child , he may perhaps to some degrees forfeit it , but cannot transfer it , and if any other man acquire it , 't is not by the fathers grant , but some act of his own ; for example , a father , unnaturally careless of his child , sells or gives him to another man ; and he again exposes him ; a third man finding him , breeds up cherishes and provides for him as his own : i think in this case , no body will doubt but that the greatest part of filial duty and subjection was here owing , and to be paid to , this foster father , and if any thing could be demanded from him , by either of the other , it could be only due to his natural father , who perhaps might have forfeited his right to much of that duty comprehended in the command , honour your parents , but could transfer none of it to another , he that purchased , and neglected the child got by his purchase and grant of the father , no title to duty or honour from the child , but only he acquired it , who by his own authority , performing the office and care of a father , to the forlorn and perishing infant , made himself by paternal care , a title to proportionable degrees of paternal power . this will be more easily admitted upon consideration of the nature of paternal power , for which i refer my reader to the d book . . to return to the argument in hand , this is evident ; that paternal power arising only from begetting , for in that our a — places it alone , can neither be transfer'd , nor inherited ; and he that does not beget , can no more have paternal power which arises from thence , then he can have a right to any thing who performs not the condition , to which only it is annexed ; if one should ask by what law , has a father power over his children , it will be answered no doubt by the law of nature , which gives such a power over them , to him that begets them ; if one should ask likewise by what law does our a — s heir come by a right to inherit , i think it would be answer'd by the law of nature too , for i find not that our a — brings one word of scripture to prove the right of such an heir he speaks of , why then the law of nature , gives fathers paternal power over their children , because they did beget them , and the same law of nature gives the same paternal power to the heir over his brethren , who did not beget them whence it follows , that either the father has not his paternal power by begetting , or else that the heir has it not at all ; for 't is hard to understand how the law of nature which is the law of reason , can give the paternal power to the father over his children , for the only reason of begetting , and to the first born over his brethren without this only reason , i. e. for no reason at all , and if the eldest by the law of nature can inherit thi● paternal power , without the only reason that gives a title to it , so may the youngest as well as he , and a stranger as well as either , for where there is no reason for any one , as there is not , but for him that begets , all have an equal title am sure our a — offers no reason , and when any body does , we shall see whether it will hold or no. . in the mean time 't is as good sense to say , that by the law of nature , a man has right to inherit the property of another , because he is of kin to him , and is known to be of his blood , and therefore by the same law of nature , an utter stranger to his blood , has right to inherit his estate ; as to say that by the law of nature he that begets them , has p●ternal power over his children , and therefore by the law of nature , the h●●r that begets them not , has this paternal power over them ; or supposing the law of the land gave absolute power over their children , to such only who nursed them , and fed their children themselves , could any body pretend , that this law gave any one who did no such thing , absolute power over those , who were not his children . . when therefore it can be shew'd , that conjugal power can belong to him that is not an husband , it will also i believe be proved , that our a — s paternal power acquired by begetting , may be inherited by a son , and that a brother as heir to his fathers power , may have paternal power over his brethren , and by the same rule conjugal power to , but till then , i think we may rest satisfied , that the paternal power of adam , this sovereign authority of fatherhood , were there any such , could not descend to , nor be inherited by , his next heir . fatherly power i easily grant our a — if it will do him any good , can never be lost , because it will be as long in the world as there are fathers , but none of them will have adams paternal power , or derive theirs from him , but every one will have his own , by the same title adam had his , viz. by begetting , but not by inheritance or succession , no more then husbands have their conjugal power by inheritance from adam ; and thus we see as adam had no such property , no such paternal power as gave him sovereign jurisdiction over mankind ; so likewise his sovereignty built upon either of these titles , if he had any such , could not have descended to his heir , but must have ended with him , adam therefore , as has been proved , being neither monarch , nor his imaginary monarchy , hereditable , the power which is now in the world , is not that which was adams , since all that adam could have upon our a — s grounds , either of property or fatherhood , necessarily dyed with him , and could not be convey'd to posterity by inheritance ; in the next place , we will consider whether adam had any such heir , to inherit his power as our a — talks of . chap. x. of the heir to monarchical power of adam . . our a — tells us , o. . that it is a truth undeniable , that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever , either great or small , though gathered together from the several corners and remotest regions of the world , but that in the same multitude considered by its self , there is one man amongst them , that in nature hath a right to be king of all the rest , as being the next heir to adam and all the other subject to him , every man by nature is a king or a subject , and again , p. . if adam himself were still living , and now ready to dye , it is certain that there is one man , and but one in the world who is next heir , let this multitude of men be , if our a — pleases , all the princes upon the earth , there will then be by our a — s rule , one amongst them , that in nature hath a right to be king of all the rest , as being the right heir to adam ; an excellent way to establish the titles of princes , and settle the obedience of their subjects , by setting up an hundred or perhaps , a thousand titles , if there be so many princes in the world , against any king now reigning upon our a — s grounds , as good as his own . if this right of heir carry any weight with it , if it be the ordinance of god as our a — seems to tell us , o. . must not all be subject to it , from the highest to the lowest , can those who wear the name of princes , without having the right of being heirs to adam , demand obedience from their subjects by this title , and not be bound to pay it by the same law ? either governments in the world are not to be claim'd and held by this title of adams heir , and then the starting of it is to no purpose , the being or not being adams . heir signifies nothing as to the title of dominion ; or if it really be , as our a — says , the true title to government and sovereignty , the first thing to be done , is to find out this true heir of adam , seat him in his ●hrone , and then all the kings and princes of the world come and resign up their crowns and scepters to him , as things that belong no more to them , then to any of their subjects . . for either this right in nature , of adams heir , to be king over all the race of men , ( for altogether they make one multitude ) is a right not necessary to the making of a lawful king , and so there may be lawful kings without it , and then kings titles and power depend not on it , or else all the kings in the world but one are not lawful kings , and so have no right to obedience , either this title of heir to adam is that whereby kings hold their crown , and have a right to subjection from their subjects , and then one only can have it , and the rest being subjects can require no obedience from other men , who are but their fellow subjects , or else it is not the title whereby kings rule , and have a right to obedience from their subjects , and then kings are kings without it . and this dream of the natural sovereignty of adams heir is of no use to obedience and government ; for if kings have a right to dominion , and the obedience of their subjects who are not , nor can possibly be , heirs to adam , what use is there of such a title , when we are obliged to obey without it ? if they have not , we are discharged of our obedience to them , for he that has no right to command , i am under no obligation to ob●y , and we are all free till our a — or any body for him , will shew us adams right heir ; if there be but on● heir of adam , there can be but one lawful king in the world , and no body in conscience can be obliged to obedience , till it be resolved who that is ; for it may be any one who is not known to be of a younger house , and all others have equal titles . if there be more then one heir of adam , every one is his heir , and so every one has regal power ; for if two sons can be heirs together , then all the sons are equally heirs , and so all are heirs , being all sons , or sons sons of adam , betwixt these two the right of heir cannot stand ; for by it either but one only man , or all men are kings , and take which you please , it dissolves the bonds of government and obedience , since if all men are heirs , they can owe obedience to no body ; if only one , no body can be obliged to pay obedience to him , till he be known and his title made out . chap. xi . who heir ? . the great question which in all ages has disturbed mankind , and brought on them the greatest part of those mischiefs which have ruin'd cities , depopulated countries , and disordered the peace of the world , has been not whether there be power in the world , nor whence it came , but who should have it ; the se●tling of this therefore being of no smaller moment then the security of princes , and the peace and welfare of their estates and kingdoms , a writer of politics , one would think , should take great care in setling this point , and be very clear in it ; for if this remain disputable , all the rest will be to very little purpose . and by dressing up power with all the splendor and temptation absoluteness can add to it , without shewing who has a right to have it , is only to give a greater edg to mans natural ambition , which of it self , is but too apt to be intemperate , and to set men on the more eagerly to scramble , and so lay a sure and lasting foundation of endless contention and disorder instead of that peace and tranquillity , which is the business of government , and the end of human society . . this our a — is more then ordinarily obliged to do , because he affirming that the assignment of civil power , is by divine institution , hath made the conveyance as well as the power it self sacred , so that no power , no consideration can divert it from that person , to whom by this divine right , it is assigned , no necessity or contrivance can substitute another person in his room . for if the assignment of civil power be by divine institution and adams heir , he to whom it is thus assigned , as we see in the foregoing chapter , our a — tells us , it would be as much sacriledge for any one to be king , who was not adams heir , as it would have been amongst the iews , for any one to have been priest , who had not been of aarons posterity ; for not only the priesthood in general being by divine institution , but the assignment of it to the sole line and posterity of aaron , made it impossible to be injoy'd or exercised by any one , but those persons who are the off-spring of aaron , whose succession therefore was carefully observed , and by that the persons who had a right to the priesthood certainly known . . let us see then what care our a — has taken , to make us know who is this heir , who by divine institution , has a right to be king over all men. the first account of him we meet with is , p. . in these words ; this subjection of children , being the fountain of all regal authority , by the ordination of god himself ; it follows , that civil power not only in general , is by divine institution , but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents : matters of such consequence as this is , should be in plain words , as little liable as might be , to doubt or equivocation , and i think if language be capable of expressing any thing destinctly and clearly , that of kindred , and the several degrees of nearness of blood , is one ; it were therefore to be wish'd , that our a — had used a little more intelligible expressions here , that we might have better known who it is , to whom the assignment of civil power , is made by divine institution , or at least would have told us what he meant by eldest parent ; for i believe if land had been assigned or granted to him , and the eldest parents of his family , he would have thought it had needed an interpreter , and 't would scarce have been known to whom next it belong'd . . in propriety of speech , and certainly propriety of speech is necessary in a discourse of this nature , eldest parents signifies either the eldest men and women that have had children , or those who have longest had issue , and then our a — s assertion will be , that those fathers and mothers who have been longest in the world , or longest fruitful , have by divine institution , a right to civil power ; if there be any absurdity in this , our a — must answer for it , and if hi● meaning be different from my explication be is to be blam'd . that he would not speak it plainly ; this i am sure , parents cannot signify heirs male nor eld●st parents , an infant child , who yet may sometimes be the true heir ; if there can be but one . and we are hereby still as much at a loss , who civil power belongs to , notwithstanding this assignment by divine institution , as if there had been no such assignment at all , or our a — had said nothing of it . this of eldest parents leaving us more in the dark , who by divine institution , has a right to civil power , then those who never heard any thing at all of heir , or descent , of which our a — is so full , and though the cheif matter of his writings be to teach obedience to those who have a right to it , which he tells us is conveyed by descent , yet who those are to whom this right by descent belongs , he leaves like the philosophers stone in politics , out of the reach of any one to discover from his writings . . this obscurity cannot be imputed to want of language in so great a master of stile as sr. robt. is , when he is resolved with himself what he would say , and therefore i fear finding how hard it would be to settle rules of descent by divine institution , and how little it would be to his purpose , or conduce to the clearing and establishing the tit●es of princes , if such rules of descent were settled , he chose rather to content himself with doubtful and general terms , which might make no ill sound in mens ears , who were willing to be pleas'd with them , rather then offer any clear rules of descent of this fatherhood of adam , by which mens consciences might be satisfyed to whom it descended and know the persons who had a right to regal power and with it to their obedience . . how else is it possible that laying so much stress as he does upon descent , and adams heir , next heir , true heir , he should never tell us what heir means , nor the way to know who the next or true heir is : this i do not remember he does any where expresly handle , but where it comes in his way very warily and doubtfully touch , though it be so necessary that without it all discourses of government and obedience upon his principles would be to no purpose , and fatherly power , never so well made out , will be of no use to any body ; hence , he tells us , o. . that not only the constitution of power in general , but the limitation of it to one kind ( i. e. ) monarchy and the determination of it to the individual person and line of adam are all three ordinances of god , neither eve , nor her children could either limit adams power or joyn others with him , and what was given unto adam was given in his person to his posterity ; here again our a — informs us , that the divine ordinance hath limited the descent of adams monarchical power , to whom ? to adams line and posterity , says our a — , a notable limitation , a limitation to all mankind ; for if our a — can find any one amongst mankind that is not of the line and posterity of adam , he may perhaps tell him who this next heir of adam is , but for us i despair , how this limitation of adams empire to his line and posterity will help us to sind out one heir ; this limitation indeed of our a — will save those the labour who would look for him amongst the race of bruits , if any su●h there were : but will very little contribute to the discovery of one next heir amongst men , though it make a short and easy determination of the question about the descent of adams regal power , by telling us , that the line and posterity of adam is to have it , that is in plain english , any one may have it , since there is no person living that hath not the title of being of the line and posterity of adam , and while it keeps there , it keeps within our a — s limitation by gods ordinance . indeed , p. . he tells us that such heirs are not only lords of their own children , but of their brethren , whereby , and by the words following , which we shall consider anon , he seems to insinuate that the eldest son is heir , but he no where , that i know , says it in direct words , but by the instances of cain and iacob that there follow , we may allow this to be so far his opinion concerning heirs , that where there are diverse children , the eldest son has the right to be heir ; that primogeniture cannot give any title to paternal power we have already shew'd ; that a father may have a natural right to some kind of power over his children , is easily granted , but that an elder brother has so over his brethren remains to be proved , god or nature has not any where , that ; i know , placed such jurisdiction in the first born , nor can reason find any such natural superiority amongst brethren . the law of moses gave a double portion of the goods and poss●ssions to the eldest , but we find not any where that naturally , or by gods institution , superiority or dominion belong'd to him , and the instances there brought by our a — , are but slender proofs of a right to civil power and dominion in the first born , and do rather shew the contrary . . his words are in the forecited place : and therefore we find god told cain of his brother abel ; his desire shall be subject unto thee , and thou shalt rule over him . to which i answer o these words of god to cain , are by many interpreters with great reason understood in a quite different sense then what our a — uses them in ; o , whatever was meant by them it could not be , that cain , as elder , had a natural dominion over abel ; for the words are conditional : if thou doest well and so personal to cain , and whatever was signified by them , did depend on his carriage and not follow his birth-right , and therefore could by no means be an establishment of dominion in the first born in general ; for before this abel had his distinct territories by right of private dominion , as our a — himself confesses , o. . which he could not have had to the prejudice of the heirs title , if by divine institution , cain as heir were to inherit all his fathers dominion . o if this were intended by god as the charter of primogeniture , and the grant of dominion to elder brothers in general , as such by right of inheritance , we might expect it should have included all his brethren ; for we may well suppose , adam from whom the world was to be peopled by this time , that these were grown up to be men , had more sons , then these two , whereas abel himself is not so much as named , and the words in the original , can scarce with any good construction , be apply'd to him ; o , it is too much to build a doctrin of so mighty consequence upon so doubtful and obscure a place of scripture , which may be well , nay better , understood in a quite different sense , and so can be but an ill proof , being as doubtful as the thing to be proved by it , especially when there is nothing else in scripture or reason , to be found that favours or supports it . . it follows , p. . accordingly when iacob bought his brothers birth-right , isaac blessed him thus ; be lord over thy brethren , and let the sons of thy mother bow before thee , another instance i take it , brought by our . a — to evince dominion due to birth-right , and an admirable one it is ; for it must be no ordinary way of reasoning in a man , that is pleading for the natural power of kings , and against all compact to bring for proof of it , an example where his own account of it , founds all the right upon compact , and settles empire in the younger brother , unless buying and selling be no compact ; for he tells us , when iacob bought his brothers birth-right ; but passing by that , let us consider the history it self , with what ufe our a — makes of it , and we shall find these following mistakes about it . o. that our a — reports this , as if isaac had given iacob this blessing , immediately upon his purchasing the birth-right ; for he says , when iacob bought , isaac blessed him , which is plainly otherwise in the scripture , for it appears there was a distance of time between , and if we will take the story in the order it lies , it must be no small distance ; all isaacs sojourning in gerar , and transactions with abimelech , gen. . coming between , rebeka being then beautiful and consequently young , but isaac when he blessed iacob , was old and decrepit ; and esau also complains of iacob , gen. . . that two times he had supplanted him , he took away my birth-right , says he , and behold now he hath taken away my blessing ; words , that i think , signifies distance of time , and difference of action . o. another mistake of our a — s , is , that he supposes isaac gave iacob the blessing , and bid him be lord over his brethren , because he had the birth right , for our a — brings this example to prove , that he that has the birth-right , has thereby a right to be lord over his brethren ; but it is also manifest by the text , that isaac had no consideration of iacobs having bought the birth right , for when he blessed him , he considered him not as iacob , but took him for esau , nor did esau understand any such connexion between birth-right and the blessing , for he says , he hath supplanted me these two times , he took away my birth-right , and behold now he hath taken away my blessing , whereas had the blessing , which was to be lord over his brethren , belong'd to the birth-right , esau could not have complain'd of this second as a cheat , iacob having got nothing but what esau had sould him , when he sould him his birth-right , so that it is plain , dominion if these words signifie it , was not understood to belong to the birth-right . . and that in those days of the patriarchs dominion was not understood to be the right of the heir , but only a greater portion of goods , is plain from gen. . . for sarah taking isaac to be heir , says , cast out this bond-woman and her son , for the son of this bond-woman , shall not be heir with my son , whereby could be meant nothing , but that he should not have a pretence to an equal share of his fathers estate after his death , but should have his portion presently , and be gone . accordingly , we read , gen. . , . that abraham gave all that he had unto isaac , but unto the sons of the concubines which abraham had , abraham gave gifts , and sent them away from isaac his son , while he yet lived ; that is , abraham having given portions to all his other sons and sent them away , that which he had reserved , being the greatest part of his substance , isaac as heir possessed after his death , but by being heir , he had no right to be lord over his brethren ; for if he had , why should sarah desire to rob him of one of his subjects , his slaves , by desiring to have him sent away . . thus as under the law , the priviledge of birth-right , was nothing but a double portion , so we see that before moses in the patriarchs time , from whence our a — pretends to take his model , there was no knowledge , no thought that birth-right gave rule or empire , paternal or kingly authority , to any one over his brethren , which if it be not plain enough in the story of isaac and ishmael , let them look into chron. . . and there he may read these words , ruben was the first born , but for as much as he desiled his fathers bed , his birth-right was given unto the sons of ioseph , the son of israeel , and the geneology is not to be reckon'd after the birth-right ; for iudah , prevailed above his brethren , and of him came the cheif ruler , but the birth-right was iosephs , and what this birth-right was , iacob blessing ioseph , gen. . . telleth us in these words , moreover i have given thee one portion above thy brethren , which i took out of the hand of the amorite , with my sword and with my bow , whereby it is not only plain , that the birth-right was nothing but a double portion , but the text in chron. is express against our a — s doctrin , shews that dominion was no part of the birth-right ; for it tells us that ioseph had the birth-right , but iudah the dominion ; but one would think our a — were very fond of the very name of birth-right , when he brings this instance of iacob and esau , to prove that dominion belongs to the heir over his brethren . . o. because it will be but an ill example to prove , that dominion by gods ordination , belonged to the eldest son , because iacob the youngest here had it , let him come by it how he would ; for if it prove any thing , it can only prove against our a — , that the assignment of dominion to the eldest , is not by divine institution , which would then be unalterable ; for if by the law of god , or nature , absolute power and empire belongs to the eldest son and his heirs , so that they are supream monarchs , and all the rest of their brethren slaves , our a — gives us reason to doubt , whether the eldest son has a power to part with it , to the prejudice of his posterity , since he tells us , o. . that in grants and gifts that have their original from god or nature , no inferior power of man can limit , or make any law of prescription against them . . o. because this place , gen. . . brought by our a — concerns not at all , the dominion of one brother over the other , nor the subjection of esau to iacob ; for 't is plain in the history , that esau was never subject to iacob , but lived a part in mount seir , where he founded a distinct people and government , and was himself prince over them , as much as iacob was in his own family . the words if one consider thy brethren , and thy mothers sons in them , can never be understood literally of esau , or the personal dominion of iacob over him ; for the words , sons and brethren , could not be used litterally by isaac , who knew iacob had only one brother ; and these words are so far from being true in a litteral sense , or establishing any dominion in iacob over esau , that in the story we find the quite contrary , for gen. . iacob several times calls esau lord , and himself his servant , and gen. . he bowed himself seven times to the ground to esau , whether esau then were a subject and vassal , ( nay as our a — tells us , all subjects are slaves ) to iacob , and iacob his sovereign prince by birth right ; i leave the reader to judge and believe if he can , that these words of isaac be lord over thy brethren , and let thy mothers sons bow down to thee , confirm'd iacob in a sovereignty over esau , upon the account of the birth-right he had got from him . . he that reads the story of iacob and esau , will find there was never any jurisdicton or authority , that either of them had over the other after their fathers death , they lived with the friendship and equallity of brethren , neither lord , neither slave to his brother , but independent each of other , were both heads of their distinct families , where they received no laws from one another , but lived seperately , and were the roots out of which sprang two distinct people , under two distinct governments . this blessing then of isaac , whereon our a — would build the dominion of the elder brother , signifies no more but what rebeca had been told from god , gen. . . two nations are in thy womb , and two manner of people , shall be seperated from thy bowels , and the one people shall be stronger then the other people , and the elder shall serve the younger ; and so iacob blessed iudah , gen. . and gave him the scepter and dominion , from whence our a — might have argued as well , that jurisdiction and dominion belongs to the third son over his brethren , as well as from this blessing of isaac , that it belonged to iacob ; they being both predictions of what should long after happen to their posterities , and not the declaring the right of inheritance to dominion in either ; and thus we have our a — s two great and only arguments to prove , that heirs are lords of their brethren , o. because god tells cain , gen. . that however sin might set upon him , he ought or might be master of it ; for the most learned interpreters understand the words of sin , and not of abel , and give so strong reasons for it , that nothing can convincingly be infer'd from so doubtful a text to our a — s purpose , o. because in this of gen. . isaac foretells that the israelites , the posterity of iacob , should have dominion over the edomites , the posterity of esau ; therefore says our a — heirs are lords of their brethren , i leave any one to judge of the conclusion . . and now we see how our a — has provided for the descending , and conveyance down of adams monarchical power , or paternal dominion to posterity , by the inheritance of his heir , succeeding to all his fathers authority , and becoming upon his death as much lord as his father was , not only over his own children , but over his brethren , and all descended from his father , and so in infinitum ; but yet who this heir is , he does not once tell us , and all the light we have from him in this so fundamental a point , is only that in his instance of iacob , by using the word birth-right , as that which passed from esau to iacob , he leaves us to guess that by heir , he means the eldest son , though i do not remember he any where mentions expresly the title of the first born , but all along keeps himself under the shelter of the indefinite term heir ; but taking it to be his meaning , that the eldest son is heir ( for if the eldest be not , there will be no pretence , why the sons should not be all heirs alike ) and so by right of pimogeniture has dominion over his brethren , this is but one step towards the settelment of succession , and the difficulties remain still as much as ever , till he can shew us who is meant by right heir , in all those cases which may happen where the present possessor hath no son ; but this he silently passes over , and perhaps wisely too ; for what can be wiser after one has affirm'd , that the person having that power , as well as the power and form of government is the ordinance of god , and by divine institution , vid. o. . p. . then to be careful , not to start any question concerning the person , the resolution whereof will certainly lead him into a a confession , that god and nature hath determined nothing about him ; and if our a — cannot shew who by right of nature , or a clear positive law of god , has the next right to inherit the dominion of this natural monarch , he has been at such pains about , when he dyed without a son , he might have spared his pains in all the rest , it being more necessary to settle mens consciences , and determin their subjection and allegiance , to shew them who by original right , superior and antecedent to the will , or any act of men , hath a title to this paternal iurisdiction , than it is to shew that by nature , there was such a iurisdiction ; it being to no purpose for me to know , there is such a paternal power , which i ought , and am , disposed to obey , unless where there are many pretenders , i also know the person that is rightfully invested and endow'd with it . . for the main matter in question being concerning the duty of my obedience , and the obligation of conscience i am under to pay it to him that is of right , my lord and ruler , i must know the person , that this right of paternal power resides in , and so impowers him to claim obedience from me ; for let it be true , what he says , p. . that civil power not only in general is by● divine institution , but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents , o. . that not only the power or right of government , but the form of the power of governing , and the person having that power , are all the ordinance of god , yet unless he shews us in all cases who is this person , ordain'd by god , who is this eldest parent , all his abstract notions of monarchical power will signifie just nothing , when they are to be reduced to practice , and men are conscientiously to pay their obedience ; for paternal iurisdiction being not the thing to be obeyed , because it cannot command , but is only that which gives one man a right , which another hath not , and if it come by inheritance , another man cannot have , to command and be obey'd : it is ridiculous to say , i pay obedience to the paternal power , when i obey him , to whom paternal power gives no right to my obedience ; for he can have no divine right to my obedience , who cannot shew his divine right to the power of ruling over me , as well as that by divine right , there is such a power in the world. . and hence not being able to make out any princes title to government , as heir to adam , which therefore is of no use , and had been better let alone , he is fain to resolve all into present possession , and makes civil obedience as due to an vsurper as to a lawful king , and thereby the vsurpers title as good ; his words are , o. . and they deserve to be remembred : if an vsurper dispossess the true heir , the subjects obedience to the fatherly power must go along and wait upon gods providence . but i shall leave his title of usurpers to be examin'd in its due place , and desire my sober reader to consider what thanks princes owe such politics as this , which can suppose paternal power ( i. e. ) a right to government into the hands of a cade , or a cromwell , and so all obedience being due to paternal power , the obedience of subjects will be due to them by the same right , and upon as good grounds as it is to lawful princes , and yet this , as dangerous a doctrine as it is , must necessarily follow from making all political power to be nothing else but adams paternal power by right and divine institution , descending from him without being able to shew to whom it descended , or who is heir to it . . for , i say , to settle government in the world , and to lay obligations to obedience on any mans conscience , it is as necessary ( supposing with our a — that all power be nothing but the being possessed of adams fatherhood ) to satisfie him who has a right to this power , this fatherhood when the possessor dyes without sons to succeed immediately to it , as it was to tell him that upon the death of the father , the eldest son had a right to it ; for it is still to be remembr'd , that the great question is , and that which our a — would be thought to contend for , if he did not sometimes forget it , what persons have a right to be obeyed , and not whether there be a power in the world , which is to be called paternal , without knowing in whom it resides , for so it be a power , i. e. right to govern , it matters not whether it be called paternal , regal , natural or acquired supream fatherhood , or supream brotherhood , provided we know who has it . . i go on then to ask whether in the inheriting of this paternal power , this supream fatherhood ; the grand-son by a daughter , hath a right before a nephew by a brother ? whether the grand-son by the eldest son , being an infant before the younger son a man and able ? whether the daughter before the uncle ? or any other man , descended by a male line ? whether a grand-son by a younger daughter , before a grand-daughter by an elder daughter ? whether the elder son by a concubine , before a younger son by a wife ? from whence also will arise many questions of legitimation , and what in nature is the difference betwixt a wife and a concubine ? for as to the municipal or positive laws of men , they can signifie nothing here . it may farther be asked , whether the eldest son being a fool , shall inherit this paternal power , before the younger a wise man ? and what degree of folly it must be that shall exclude him ? and who shall be judge of it ? whether the son of a fool excluded for his folly , before the son of his wise brother who reign'd ? who has the paternal power , whilst the widdow queen is with child by the deceased king , and no body knows whether it will be a son or a daughter ? which shall be heir of two male twins , who by the dissection of the mother , were laid open to the world ? whether a sister by the half blood , before a brothers daughter by the whole blood ? . these , and many more such doubts , might be proposed about the titles of succession , and the right of inheritance , and that not as idle speculations , but such as in history we shall find , have concerned the inheritance of crowns and kingdoms , and if ours want them , we need not go farther for famous examples of it , then the other kingdom in this very island , which having been fully related by the ingenious and learned author of patriarchanon monarcha , i need say no more of ; and till our a — hath resolved all the doubts , that may arise about the next heir , and shewed that they are plainly determin'd by the law of nature , or the revealed law of god , all his suppositions of a monarchical , absolute , supream , paternal power in adam , and the descent of that power to his heir , and so on ; if i say , all these his suppositions were as much demonstrations , as they are the contrary , yet they would not be of the least use to establish the authority , or make out the title of any one prince now on earth , but would rather unsettle and b●ing all into question ; for let our a — tell us as long as he please , and let all men believe it too , that adam had a paternal , and thereby a monarchical power , that this ( the only power in the world ) descended to his heirs , and that there is no other power in the world but this ; yet , if it be not past doubt , to whom this paternal power descends , and whose now it is , no body can be under any obligation of obedience , unless any one will say , that i am bound to pay obedience to paternal power in a man , who has no more paternal power then i my self , which is all one as to say , i obey a man , because he has a right to govern , and if i be asked how i know , he has a right to govern , i should answer it cannot be known , that he has any at all ; for that cannot be the reason of my obedience , which i know not to be , so much less can that be a reason of my obedience , which no body at all can know . . and therefore all this ado about adams fatherhood , the greatness of its power , and the necessity of its supposal , helps nothing to the establishing the power of those that govern , or determin the obedience of subjects , who are to obey , if they cannot tell whom they are to obey , or it cannot be known who are to govern , and who to obey ; and this fatherhood , this monarchical power of adam descending to his heirs , would be of no more use to the government of mankind , then it would be to the quieting of mens consciences● or securing their healths , if our a — had assured them , that adam had a power to forgive sins or cure ! diseases , which by divine institution descended to his heir , whilst ●his heir is impossible to be known . and should not be do as rationally , who upon this assurance of our a — , went and confessed his sins , and expected a good absolution , or took physic with expectation of health from any one who had taken on himself the name of priest or physician , or thrist himself into those imployments , saying , i acquiess in the absolving power descending from adam , or i shall be cured by the medicinal power descending from adam , as he who says , i submit to , and obey the paternal power descending from adam , when 't is confessed all these powers descend only to his single hei● , and that heir is unknown . . 't is true , the civil lawyers ha●e pretended to determine some of these cases concerning the succession of princes , but by our a — s , principles , they have medled in a matter that belongs not to them ; for if all political power he derived only from adam , and be 〈…〉 only to his successive heirs , by the ordinenee of god and divine institution , this is a right antecede●t and paramount to all government , and therefore the positive laws of men , cannot determine that which is it self , the foundation of all law and government , and is to receive its rule only from the law of god and nature . and that being silent in the case , i am apt to think there is no such right to be conveyed this way , i am fure it would be to no purpose if there were , and men would be more at a loss concerning government and obedience to governors , then if there were no such right , since by positive laws and compact , which divine institution ( if there be any ) shuts out , all these endless inextricable doubts , can be safely provided against , but it can never be understood , how a divine natural right , and that of such moment as is all order and peace in the world , should be convey'd down to posterity , without any plain natural or divine rule concerning it . and these would be an end of all civil government , if the assignment of civil power were by divine institution to the heir , and yet by that divine institution , the person of the heir , could not be known . this paternal regal power , being by divine right only his , it leaves no room for human prudence , or confent to place it any where else ; for if only one man hath a divine right to the obedience of mankind , no body can claim that obedience , but he that can shew that right ; nor can mens consciences by any other pretence be obliged to it ; and thus this doctrine cuts up all government by the roots . . thus we see how our a — laying it for a sure foundation , that the very person that is to rule , is the ordinance of god , and by divine institution , tells us at large , only that this person is the heir , but who this heir is , he leaves us to guess ; and so this divine institution which assigns it to a person , whom we have no rule to know , is just as good as an assignment to no body at all . but whatever our a — does , divine institution makes no such ridiculous assignments , nor can god be supposed to make it a sacred law , that one certain person should have a right to something , and yet not give rules to mark out , and know that person by , or give an heir a divine right to power , and yet not point out who that heir is . t' is rather to be thought , that an heir had no such right by divine institution , then that god should give such a right to the heir , but yet leave it doubtful , and undeterminable who such heir is . . if god had given the land of canaan to abraham , and in general terms to some body after him , without naming his seed , whereby it might be known , who that some-body was , it would have been as good and useful an assignment , to determin the right to the land of canaan , as it would to the determining the right of crowns , to give empire to adam and his successive heirs after him , without telling who his heir is ; for the word heir , without a rule to know who it is , signifies no more then somebody , i know not whom . god making it a divine institution , that men should not marry those who were near of kin , thinks it not enough to say , none of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him , to uncover their nakedness ; but moreover , gives rules to know who are those near of kin , forbiden by divine institution , or else that law would have been of no use , it being to no purpose to lay restraint , or give priviledges to men , in such general terms , as the particular person concern'd cannot be known by ; but god not having any where said , the next heir shall inherit all his fathers estate or dominion , we are not to wonder that he hath no where appointed who that heir should be , for never having intended any such thing , never designed any heir in that sense , we cannot expect he should any where nominate , or appoint any person to it , as we might , had it been otherwise , and therefore in scripture , though the word heir occur , yet there is no such thing as heir in our a — s sence , one that was by right of nature to inherit all that his father had , exclusive of his brethren , hence sarah suppose , that if ishmael staid in the house , to share in abrahams estate after his death , this son of a bond-woman , might be heir with isaac and therefore say , she cast out this bond-woman and her son , for the son of this bond-woman shall not be heir with my son ; but this cannot excuse our a — , who telling us there is in every number of men , one who is right and next heir to adam , ought to have told us what the laws of descent are , but h●ving been so sparing to instruct us by rules , how to know who is heir , let us see in the next place , what his history out of scripture , on which he pretends wholly to build his government , gives us in this necessary and fundamental point . . our a — to make good the title of his book , p. . begins his history of the descent of adams regal power , p. . in these words : this lordship , which adam by command had over the whole world , and by right descending from him , the patriarchs did enjoy was as large , &c. how does he prove that the patriarchs by descent did enjoy it ? for dominion of life and death , says he , we find judah the father pronounced sentence of death against thamer his daughter-in law for playing the harlot , p. . how does this prove that iudah had absolute and sovereign authority , he pronounced sentence of death ? the pronouncing of sentence of death is not a certain mark of sovereignty , but usually the office of inferior magistrates . the power of making laws of life and death is indeed a mark of sovereignty , but pronouncing the sentence according to those laws may be done by others , and therefore this will but ill prove that he had sovereign authority , as if one should say , iudge iefferies , pronounced sentence of death in the late times , therefore iudge iefferies , had sovereign authority : but it will be said , iudah did it not by commission from another , and therefore did it in his own right . who knows whether he had any right at all , heat of passion might carry him to do that which he had no authority to do . iudah had dominion of life and death , how does that appear ? he exercised it , he pronounced sentence of death a●ainst thamer , our a — thinks it very good proof , that because he did it , therefore he had a right to do-it ; he lay with her also : by the same way of proof , he had a right to do that too , if the consequence be good from doing to a right of doing , absalon too may be reckon'd amongst our a - s sovereigns , for he pronounced such a sentence of death against his brother amnon , and much upon a like occasion , and had it executed too ; if that be sufficient to prove a dominion of life and death . but allowing this all to be clear demonstration of sovereign power , who was it that had this lordship by right descending to him from adam , as large and ample as the absolutest dominion of any monarch ? judah , says our a — , iudah a younger son of iacob , his father and elder brethren living , so that if our a — s own proof be to be taken , a younger brother may in the life of his father and elder brothers , by right of descent , enjoy adams monarchical power , and if one so qualified may be monarch by descent , i know not why every man may not , and if iudah , his father and elder brother living were one of adams heirs , i know not who can be excluded from this inheritance , all men by inheritance may be monarchs as well as iudah . . touching war , we see that abraham commanded an army of . souldiers of his own family , and esau met his brother iacob with men at armes ; for matter of peace ; abraham made a league with abinéelech , &c. p. . is it not possible for a man to have . men in his family , without being heir to adam ? a planter in the west-indies has more and might if he pleased ( who doubts ) muster them up and lead them out against the indians , to seek reparation upon any injury received from them , and all this without the absolute dominion of a monarch , descending to him from adam . would it not be an admirable argument to prove , that all power by gods institution descended from adam by inheritance , and that the very person and power of this planter were the ordinance of god , because he had power in his family over servants , born in his house , and bought with his money ; for this was just abrahams case : those who were rich in the patriarchs days , as in the west-indies now , bought men and maid servants , and by their increase as well as purchasing of new , came to have large and numerous families , which though they made use of in war or peace , can it be thought the power they had over them was an inheritance descended from adam , when 't was the purchase of their money ? a mans riding in an expedition against an enemy , his horse bought in a fair would be as good a proof that the owner enjoy'd the lordship which adam by command had over the whole world , by right des●ending to him , as abrahams leading out the servants of his family , is that the patriarchs enjoy'd this lordship by descent from adam since the title to the power , the master had in both cases , whether over slaves or horses , was only from his purchase ; and the getting a dominion over any thing by bargain , and money is a new way of proving one had it by descent and inheritance . . but making war and peace are marks of sovereignty ; let it be so in politic societies , may not therefore a man in the west-indies who hath with him sons of his own friends , or companions , souldiers under pay , or slaves bought with money , or perhaps a band made up of all these , make war and peace , if there should be occasion , and ratifie the ●rticles too with an oath , without being a sovereign , an absolute king over those who went with him ; he that says he cannot , must then allow many masters of ships , many private planters to be absolute monarchs , for as much as this they have done , war and peace cannot be made for politic societies , but by the supream power of such societies , because war or peace , giving a different motion to the force of such a politic body , none can make war or peace , but that which has the direction of the force of the whole body , and that in politic societies is only the supream power . in voluntary societies for the time , he that has such a power by consent , may make war and peace , and so may a single man for himself , the state of war not consisting in the number of partysans , but the enmity of the parties where they have no superior to appeal to . . the actual making of war or peace is no proof of any other power , but only of disposing those to exercise or cease acts of enmity for whom he makes it , and this power in many cases any one may have without any politic supremacy ; and therefore the making of war or peace will not prove that every one that does so is a politic ruler , much less a king , for then commonwealths must be kings too , for they do as certainly make war and peace as monarchical governments . . but grant this a mark of sovereignty in abraham , is it a proof of the descent to him , of adams sovereignty over the whole world ? if it be , it will surely be as good a proof of the descent of adams lordship to others too . and then common-wealths , as well as abraham will be heirs to adam , for they make war and peace , as well as he ; if you say that the lordship of adam , doth not by right descend to common-wealths , though they make war and peace , the same say i of abraham , and then there is an end of your argument ; if you stand to your argument , and say those that do make war and peace , as common-wealths do without doubt , do inherit adams lordship , there is an end of your monarchy , unless you will say , that common-wealths by descent enjoying adams lordship are monarchies , and that indeed would be a new way , of making all the government in the world monarchical . . to give our a — the honour of this new invention , for i confess it is not i have first found it out by tracing his principles , and so charged it on him , 't is fit my readers know that ( as absur'd as it may seem ) he teaches it himself , p. . where he ingeniously says , in all kingdoms and common-wealths in the world , whether the prince be the supream father of the people , or but the true heir to such a father , or come to the crown by vsurpation or election , or whether some few or a multitude govern the common-wealth , yet still the authority that is in any one , or in m●ny or i● all these is the only right , and nat●r●l authority of supream father , which right of fatherhood he often tells us , is regal and royal authority ; as particularly , p. . the page immediately preceding this instance of abraham . this regal authority , he says , those that govern common-wealths have , and if it be true , ●hat regal and royal authority be in those that govern common-wealths it is as true , that common-wealths are govern'd by kings , for if regal authority be in him that governs , he that governs must needs be a king , and so all common-wealths are nothing but down right monarchies , and then what need any more ado about the matter , the governments of the world , are as they should be , there is nothing but monarchy in it . this without doubt , was the surest way our a — could have found , to turn all other governments , but monarchical out of the world. . but all this scarce proves abraham , to have been a king as heir to adam ; if by inheritance he had been king , lot , who was of the same family , must needs have been his subject , by that title before the servants in his family , but we see they lived as friends and equals , and when their herd● men could not agree , there was no pretence of jurisdiction or superiority between them , but they parted by consent , gen. . hence he is called both by abraham , and by the text abrahams brother , the name of friendship and equality , and not of jurisdiction and authority , though he were really but his nephew . and if our a — knows that abraham was adams heir , and a king , 't was more it seems then abraham himself , knew , or his servant whom he sent a woing for his son , for when he sets out the advantages of the match , . gen. . thereby to prevail with the young-woman and her friends . he says , i am abrahams servant , and the lord hath blessed my master greatly , and he is become great , and he hath given him flocks and herds and silver and gold , and men-servants and maid-servants , and camels and asses , and sarah my masters wife , bare a son to my master all he hath . can one think that a discreet servant , that was thus particular to set out his masters greatness , would have omitted the crown isaac was to have , if he had known of any such ? can it be imagin'd he should have neglected to have tould them on such an occasion as this , that abraham was a king , a name well known at that time , for he had nine of them his neighbours , if he or his master had thought any such thing , the likeliest matter of all the rest , to make his errand successful ? . but this discovery it seems was reserved for our a — to make or years after , and let him injoy the credit of it , only he should have taken care that some of adams land should have descended to this his heir , as well as all adams lordship , for though this lordship which abraham , if we may believe our a as well as the other patriarchs , by right descending to him did injoy , was as large and ample as the absolutest dominion of any monarch which hath been since the creation . yet his estate , his territories , his dominions were very narrow and scanty , for he had not the possession of a foot of land , till he bought a field and a cave of the sons of heth to bury sarah in . . the instance of esau joyn'd with this of abraham , to prove that the lordship which adam had over the whole world by right descending from him the patriarchs did injoy , is yet more pleasant then the former : esau met his brother jacob with men at arms ; he therefore was a king by right of heir to adam , arm'd men then however got together are enough to prove him that leads them to be a king and adams heir . there have been tories in ireland , ( whatever there are other in countries ) who would have thankt our a ● for so honourable an opinion of them , especially if there had been no body near with a better title of armed men , to question their royal authority of : 't is a shame for men to trifle so , to say no worse of it , in so serious an argument : here esau is brought as a proof that adams lordship , adams absolute dominion , as large as that of any monarch descended by right to the patriarchs , and in this very chap. p. . iacob is brought as an instance of one , that by birthright was lord over his brethren ; so we have here two brothers absolute monarchs by the same title , and at the same time heirs to adam ; the eldest heir to adam , because he met his brother with men , and the youngest heir to adam by birthright , esau injoy'd the lordship which adam had over the whole world by right descending to him , in as large and ample manner , as the absolutest dominion of any monarch , and at the same time , iacob lord over him , by th● right heirs have to be lords over their brethren . rifum teneatis , i never , i confess , met with any man of parts so dexterous as sir robt. at this way of arguing ; but 't was his misfortune to light upon principles that could not be accommodated to the nature of things and human affairs , nor could be made to agree with that constitution and order which god had settled in the world , and therefore must needs often clash with common sense and experience . . in the next section , he tells us : this patriarchal power continued not only till the flood , but after it as the name patriarch doth in part prove . the word patriarch doth more then in part prove , that● patriarchal power continued in the world as long as there were patriarchs , for 't is necessary that patriarchal power should be whilst there are patriarchs , as it is necessary there should be paternal or conjugal power whilst there are fathers or husbands ; but this is but playing with names . that which he would fallaciously insinuate is the thing in question to be proved , and that is that the lordship which adam had over the world , the supposed absolute universal dominion of adam by right deseending from him , the patriarchs did injoy : if he affirms such an absolute monarchy continued to the flood , in the world , i would be glad to know what records he has it from ; for i confess i cannot find a word of it in my bible ; if by patriarchal power , he means any thing else , it is nothing to the matter in hand : and how the name patriarch in some part proves , that those who are called by that name , had absolute monarchical power , i confess , i do not see , and therefore i think needs no answer , till the argument from it be made out a little clearer . . the three sons of noah had the world , says our a — , divided amongst them by their father , for of them was the whole world overspread , p. . the world might be overspread by the off spring of noahs sons , though he never divided the world amongst them ; for the earth might be replenished without being divided , all our as argument here , therefore , proves no such division . however i allow it to him , and then ask , the world being divided amongst them , which of the three was adams heir ? if adams lordship , adams monarchy , by right descended only to the eldest , then the other two could be but his subjects , his slaves ; if by ri●ht it descended to all three brothers , by the same right , it will descend to all mankind , and then it will be impossible what he says , p. . that heirs are lords of their brethren should be true , but all brothers , and consequently all men will be equal and independent , all heirs to adams monarchy , and consequently all monarchs too , one as much as another . but 't will be said noah their father divided the world amongst them , so that our a — will allow more to noah , then he will to god almighty , for o. . he thought it hard , that god himself should give the world to noah and his sons , to the prejudice of noah's birth-right , his words are , noah was left sole heir to the world , why should it be thought that god would disinherit , him of his birth-right , and make him of all men in the world , the only tenant in common with his children , and yet here he thinks it fit , that noah should disinherit shem of his birth-right , and divide the world betwixt him and his brethren , so that this birth-right , when our a — pleases , must , and when he pleases must not , be sacred and inviolable . . if noah did divide the world between his sons , and his assignment of dominions to them were good , there is an end of divine institution , and all our a — s discourse of adams heir , with whatsoever he builds on it , is quite out of doors . the natural power of kings falls to the ground ; and then the form of the power governing , and the person having that power , will be all ordinances of man and not of god , as our a — says , o. for if the right of the heir be the ordinance of god , a divine right , no man , father , or not father , can alter it : if it be not a divine right , it is only humane depending on the will of man , and so where humane institution gives it not , the first born has no right at all above his brethren ; and men may put government into what hands , and under what form , they please . . he goes on most of the civillest nations of the earth , labour to fetch their original from some of the sons or nephews of noah , p. . how many do most of the civillest nations amount to , and who are they , i fear the chineses , a very great and civil people , as well as several other people of the east , west , north and south , trouble not themselves much about this matter . all that believe the bible , which i believe are our a — s most of the civillest nation , must necessarily derive themselves from noah , but for the rest of the world , they think little of his sons or nephews . but if the heralds and antiquaries of all nations ; for 't is these men generally that labour to find out the originals of nations , or all the nations themselves should labour to fetch their original from some of the sons or nephews of noah , what would this be to prove , that the lordship which adam had over the whole world , by right descended to the patriarchs , who ever , nations , or races of men , labour to fetch their original from , may be concluded to be thought by them , men of renown , famous to posterity , for the greatness of their vertues and actions ; but beyond these they look not , nor consider who they were heirs to , but look on them as such as raised themselves by their own vertue to a degree , that would give a lustre to those , who in future ages , could pretend to derive themselves from them . but if it were ogygis , hercules , brama , tamberlain , pharamond , nay iupiter and saturn be names , from whence divers races of men , both ancient and modern , have labour'd to derive their original , will that prove , that those men enjoyed the lordship of adam , by right descending to them ; if not , this is but a flourish of our a — s to mislead his reader that in it self signifies nothing . . and therefore to as much purpose , is , what he tells us , p. . concerning this division of the world , that some say it was by lot , and others that noah sail'd round the mediterranean in ten years , and divided the world into asia , africk and europe , portions for his three sons . america then , it seems , was left to be his that could catch it , why our a — takes such pains to prove the division of the world by noah to his sons , and will not leave out an imagination , though no better then a dream , that he can find any where to favour it , is hard to guess , since such a division , if it prove any thing , must necessarily take away the title of adams heir , unless three brothers can altogether be heirs of adam ; and therefore the following words . howsoever the manner of this division be uncertain , yet it is most certain the division it self , was by families from noah and his children , over which the parents were heads and princes , p. . if allow'd him to be true , and of any force to prove , that all the power in the world is nothing but the lordship of adams , descending by right , they will only prove , that the fathers of the children , are all heirs to this lordship of adam ; for if in those days cham and iaphet , and other parents besides the eldest son were heads and princes over their families , and had a right to divide the earth by families , what hinders younger brothers , being fath●rs of families from having the same right , how cham or iaphet were princes by right descending to him , notwithstanding any title of heir in his eldest brother , younger brothers by the same right descending to them are princes now , and so all our a — s natural power of kings will reach no farther then their own children , and no kingdom by this natural right , can be bigger then a family ; for either this lordship of adam over the whole world , by right descends only to the eldest son , and then there can be but one heir , as our a — says , p. . or else ; it by right descends to all the sons equally , and then every father of a family will have it , as well as the three sons of noah , take which you will , it destroys the present governments and kingdoms that are now in the world , since whoever ha● this natural power of a king , by right descending to him , must have it either , as our a — tells us , cain had it , and be lord over his brethren , and so be alone king of the whole world , or else as he tells us here , shem , cham and iaphet had it , three brothers , and so be only prince of his own family , and all families independent one of another ; all the world must be only one empire by the right of the next heir , or else every family be a distinct government of it self , by the lordship of adams descending to parents of families . and to this only tends all the proofs , he here gives us of the descent of adams lordship ; for continuing his story of this descent he says ; . in the dispersion of babel , we must certainly find the establishment of royal power , throughout the kingdoms of the world , p. . if you must find it , pray do , and you will help us to a new piece of history ; but you must shew it us before we shall be bound to believe , that regal power was established in the world upon your principles ; for , that regal power was established in the kingdoms of the world , i think no body will dispute , but that there should be kingdoms in the world , whose several kings enjoy'd their crowns , by right descending to them from adam , that we think not only apocrypha , but also utterly impossible , and if our a - has no better foundation , for his monarchy then a supposition of what was done at the dispersion of babel : the monarchy he erects thereon , whose top is to reach to heaven to unite mankind , will serve only to divide and scatter them as that tower did , will produce nothing but confusion . . for he tells us , the nations they were divided into , were distinct families , which had fathers for rulers over them , whereby it appears that even in the confusion , god was careful to preserve the fatherly authority , by distributing the diversity of languages , according to the diversity of families , p. . it would have been a hard matter , for any one but our a - to have found out so plainly in the text , he here brings , that all the nations in that dispersion were governed by fathers , and that god was careful to preserve the fatherly authority . the words of the text are : these are the sons of shem after their families after their tongues in their lands , after their nations , and the same thing is said of cham and iaphet after an enumeration of their posterities , in all which there is not one word said of their governors , or forms of government● of fathers , or fatherly authority . but our a — ● who is very quick sighted , to spye out fatherhood , where no body else could see any the least glimpses of it , tells us positiv●ly their ruler were fathers , and god was car●f●l to preserve the fatherly authority , and why ? because those of the same family spoke the same language , and so of necessity in the division kept together , just as if one should argue thus , hanibal in his army , consisting of divers nations , kept those of the same language togegether , therefore fathers were captains of each band , and hanibal was careful of the fatherly authority , or in peopling of carolina , the english , french , scotch and wel●h that are there , plant themselves together , and by them , the country is divided in their lands after their tongues , after their families , after their nations , that therefore care was taken of the fatherly authority , or because in many parts of america , every little tribe , was a distinct people , with a different language , one should infer , that therefore god was careful to preserve the fatherly authority , or that therefore their rulers enjoy'd adams lordship by right descending to them , though we know not who were their governors , nor what their form of government , but only that they were divided into little independent societies , speaking different languages . . the scripture says not a word of their rulers or forms of government , but only gives an account , how mankind came to be divided into distinct languages and nations ; and therefore 't is not to argue from the authority of scripture , to tell us positively , fathers were their rulers , when the scripture says no such thing , but to set up phansies of ones own brain , when we confidently aver matter of fact , where records are utterly silent : and therefore the same ground has the rest that he says , that they were not confused multitudes without heads and governors , and at liberty to choose what governors or governments they pleased . . for i demand when mankind were all yet of one language , all congregated in the plain of shinar , were they then all under one monarch , who enjoyed the lordship of adam by right descending to him ? if they were not , there was then no thoughts , 't is plain , of adams heir , no right to government known then upon that title , no care taken by god or man , of adams fatherly authority : if when mankind were but one people , dwelt altogether , and were of one language , and were upon building a city together , and when 't was plain , they could not but know the right heir , for shem lived till isaacs time , a long while after the division at babel ; if then , i say , they were not under the monarchical government of adams fatherhood , by right descending to the heir , 't is plain there was no regard had to the fatherhood , no monarchy acknowledg'd due to adams heir , no empire of shems in asia , and consequently no such division of the world by noah , as our a — has talked of . and as far as we can conclude any thing from scripture in this matter , it seems from this place , that if they had any government , it was rather a common wealth , then an absolute monarchy ; for the scripture tells us , gen. . they said , 't was not a prince commanded , the building of this city and tower 't was not by the command of one monarch , but by the consultation of many , a free people , let us build us a city ; they built it for themselves as free-men , not as slaves for their lord and master , that we be not scattered abroad , and for having a city once built , fixed habitations to settle their bodies and families . this was the consultation and design of a people , that were at liberty to part asunder , but desired to keep in one body , and could not have been either necessary or likely in men tyed together under the government of one monarch , who if they had been , as our a — tells us , all slaves under the absolute dominion of a monarch , needed not have taken such care to hinder themselves , from wandering out of the reach of his dominion , i demand whether this be not plainer in scripture then any thing of adams heir or fatherly authority . . but if being , as god says , gen. . . one people , they had one ruler , one king by natural right , absolute and supream over them , what care had god to preserve the paternal authority of the supream fatherhood , if on a suddain , he suffers ( for so many , our a — talks of , ) distinct nations , to be erected out of it , under distinct governors , and at once to withdraw themselves , from the obedidience of their soveriegn . this is to entitle gods care , how , and to what , we please , can it be sense to say , that god was careful to preserve fatherly authority in those who had it not ? for if these were subjects under a supream prince , what authority had they , when at the same time he takes away the true supream fatherhood of the natural monarch ? can it be reason to say , that god for the preservation of fatherly authority , lets several new goverments with their governors start up , who could not all have fatherly authority , and is it not as much reason to say , that god is careful to destroy fatherly authority when he suffers one who is in possession of it , to have his government torn in pieces , and shared by several of his subjects ? and would it not be an argument just like this , for monarchical government to say , when any monarchy was shatter'd to pieces , and divided amongst revolted subjects , that god was careful to preserve monarchical power , by rending a settled empire into a multitude of little governments ? if any one will say that what happens in providence to be preserved god is careful to preserve as a thing , therefore to be esteemed by men as necessary or ufeful , 't is a peculiar propriety of speech , which every one will not think fit to imitate ; but this i am sure is impossible to be either proper , or true speaking , that shem for example ( for he was then alive , ) should have fatherly authority , or sovereignty by right of fatherhood over that one people at babel , and that the next moment shem yet living , others should have fatherly authority , or sovereignty by right of fatherhood over the same people , divided into so many distinct governments ; either these fathers actually were rulers , just before the confusion , and then they were not one people , but that god himself says , they were a commonwealth , and then where was monarchy ? or else these fathers , had fatherly authority but knew it not . strange ! that fatherly authority should be the only original of government amongst men , and yet all mankind not know it , and stranger yet , that the confusion of tongues should reveal it to them all of a suddain , that in an instant these should know , that they had fatherly power , and all others know that they were to obey it in them , and every one know that particular fatherly authority to which he was a subject , he that can think this arguing from scripture , may from thence make out what model of an eutopia will best suit with his phansy or interest , and this fatherhood thus disposed of , will justifie both a prince who claims an universal monarchy , and his subjects , who being fathers of families , shall quit all subjection to him and canton his empire into less governments for themselves ; for it will always remain a doubt in which of these , the fatherly authority resided , till our a - r●solv●s us , whether shem , who was then alive , or these new princes , beginning so many new empires in his dominions , and over his subject , had right to govern , since our a — tells us , that both one an tother had fatherly , which is supream , authority , and are brought in by him as instances of those , who did enjoy the lordships of adam by right descending to them , which was as large and ample as the absolutest dominion of any monarch . this at least is unavoidable , that if god was careful to preserve the fatherly authority , in the new erected nations , it necessarily follows , that he was as careful to destroy all pretences of adams heir , since he took care , and therefore did preserve the fatherly authority in so many , at least , that could not possibly be adams heirs , when the right heir ( if god had ever ordained any such inheritance ) could not but be known , shem then living , and they being all one people . . nimrod is his next instance of enjoying this patriarchal power , p. . but i know not for what reason our a — seems a little unkind to him , and says , that he against right enlarged his empire , by seizing violently on the rights of other lords of families ; these lords of families here were called fathers of families , in his account of the dispersion at babel , but it matters not how they are call'd , so we know who they are ; for this fatherly authority must be in them , either as heirs to adam , and so there could not be , nor above one at once , or else as natural parents over their children , and so every father will have paternal authority over his children by the same right , and in as large extent as those had , and so be independent princes over their own off-spring , and his lords of families , thus understood ; he gives us a very pretty account of the original of monarchy , in the following words ; and in this sense he may be said to be the author and founder of monarchy , viz. as against right seizing violently on the rights of fathers over their children , which paternal authority , if it be in them , by right of nature ; ( for else how could those come by it ) no body can take from them without their own consents , and then i desire our a — and his friends to consider how far this will concern other princes , and whether it will not according to his conclusion of that paragraph , resolve all regal power of those , whose dominions extend beyond their families , either into tyranny and usurpation , or election and consent of fathers of families , which will differ very little from consent of the people . . all his instances , in the next section , p. . of the dukes of edom , the kings in a little corner of asia in abrahams days , the kings in canaan destroyed by ioshua , and the care he takes to prove that these were all sovereign princes , and that every town in those days had a king , are so many direct proofs against him , that it was not the lordship of adam by right descending to them that made kings ; for if they had held their royalties by that title , either there must have been but one sovereign over them all , or else every father of a family had been as good a prince , and had as good a claim to royalty as these ; for if all the sons of esau , had each of them , the younger as well as the eldest , the right of fatherhood , and so were sovereign princes after their fathers death , the same right had their sons after them , and so on to all posterity , which will limit all the natural power of fatherhood , only to be over the issue of their own bodies , and their descendants which power of fatherhood dies with the head of each family , and makes way for the like power of fatherhood to take place , in each of his sons over their respective posterities , whereby the power of fatherhood will be preserv'd indeed , and is intelligible , but will not be at all to our a — s purpose , nor are any of the instances he brings proofs of any power they had by title of fatherhood as heirs of adam's paternal authority , nor by vertue of their own : for adams fatherhood being over all mankind , it could descend but to one at once , and from him to his right heir only , and so there could by that title be but one king in the world at a time ; and by right of fatherhood , not descending from adam , it must be only as they themselves were fathers , and so could be over none but their own posterity ; so that if those dukes of edom , of abraham ; and kings his neighbours : if iacob and esau and kings in canaan , the kings mutilated by adonibeseck , the kings that came to benaded , the kings of greece making war at troy , were as our a — contends all of them sovereign princes . ' ●is evident that kings derived their power from some other original then fatherhood , since some of these had power over more then their own posterity , and 't is demonstration , they could not be all heirs to adam : for i challenge any man to make any pretence to power by right of fatherhood , either intelligible or possible in any one , otherwise , then either as adams heir , or as prog●nitor over his own descendants , naturally sprung from him . and if our a — could shew that any one of these princes , of which he gives us here so large a catalogue , had his authority by either of these titles , i think i might yield him the cause , though 't is manif●st they are all impertinent and directly contrary to what he brings them to prove , viz. that the lordship which adam had over the world by right descended to the patriarchs . . having told us , p. . that the patriarchal government continued in abraham , isaac and jacob , until the egyptian bondage , p. . he tells us , by manifest footsteps we may trace this paternal government unto the israelites coming into egypt , where the exercise of supream patriarchal government was intermitted , because they were in subjection to a stronger prince , what these footsteps are of paternal government , in our a — sense , i. e. of absolute monarchical power descending from adam , and exercised by right of fatherhood we have seen , that is for years no footsteps at all , since in all that time he cannot produce any one example of any person who claim'd or exercised regal authority by right of fatherhood , or shew any one who being a king was adams heir ; all that his proofs amount to , is only this , that there were fathers , patriarchs and kings in that age of the world , but that the fathers and patriarchs had any asolute arbitrary power , or by what titles those kings had theirs , and of what extent it was , the scripture is wholly silent ; 't is manifest by right of fatherhood they neither did , nor could claim any title to dominion and empire . . to say , that the exercise of supream patriarchal government was intermitted , because they were in subjection to a stronger prince , proves nothing but what i before suspected , viz. that patriarchal iurisdiction or government was a fallacious expression , and does not in our a — signifie what he would yet insinuate by it , paternal and regal power , such an absolute sovereignty as he supposes was in adam . . for how can he say that patriarchical iurisdiction was intermitted in egypt , where there was a king , under whose regal government the israelites were ? if patriarchal were absolute monarchical iurisdiction , and if it were not , but something else , why does he make such a do about a power not in question , and nothing to the purpose ? the exercise of patriarchal jurisdiction , if patriarchal be regal , was not intermitted whilst the israelites were in egypt . 't is true , the exercise of regal power was not then in the hands of any of the promised seed of abraham , nor before neither that i know , but what is that to the intermission of regal authority , as descending from adam , unless our a — will have it , that this chosen line of abraham , had the right of inheritance to adams lordship , and then to what purpose are his instances of the rulers , in whom the fatherly authority was preserved in the confusion at babel of esau , and the dukes of edom , why are these brought as examples , of the exercise of true patriarchal government , and joyn'd with those of abraham and iudah ? if the exercise of patriarchical iurisdiction were intermitted in the world , when ever the posterity of of iacob had not supream power . i imagined monarchical government , would have served his turn in the hands of pharoh or any body . but one cannot easily discover in all places what his discourse tends to , as particularly in this place , it is not obvious to guess what he drives at , when he says , the exercise of supream patriarchal iurisdiction in egypt , or how this serves to make out the descent of adams lordship to the patriarchs or any body else . . for i thought he had been giving us out of scripture , proofs and examples of monarchical government , founded on paternal authority , descending from adam , and not an history of the iew , amongst whom yet we find no kings , till many years after they were a people , and no mention of their being heir to adam , or kings by paternal authority when they had them ; i expected , talking so much as he does of scripture , that he would have produced thence a series of monarchs , whose titles were clear to adams fatherhood , and who , as heirs to him , own'd and exercised paternal jurisdiction over their subjects , and that this was the true patriarchical government , whereas he neither proves that the patriarchs were kings , nor that either kings or patriarchs were heirs to adam , or so much as pretended to it ; and one may as well prove , that the patriarchs were all absolute monarchs , that the power both of patriarchs , and kings was only paternal , and that this power descended to them from adam , i say all these propositions may be as well proved by a confused account of a multitude of little kings in the west-indies , out of ferdinando soto , or any of our late histories of the northern america , or by our a — s kings of greece , out of homer , as by any thing he brings out of scripture , in that multitude of kings he has reckon'd up . . and methinks he should have let homer and his wars of troy alone , since his great zeal to truth or monarchy carried him , to such a pitch of transport against philosophers and poets , that he tells us in his preface , that there are too many in these days , who please themselves in runing after the opinions of philosophers and poets , to find out such an original of government , as might promise them some title to liberty , to the great scandal of christianity , and bringing in of atheism . and yet these heathen philosophers , aristotle and poet homer , are not rejected by our zealous christian politician when ever they offer any thing , that seems to serve his turn . but to return to his scripture history , our a — farther tells us , p. . that after the return of the israelites out of bondage , god out of a special care of them , chose moses and joshua successively to govern as princes in the place and stead of the s●pream fathers . if it be true , that they returned out of bondage , it must be into a state of freedom and must imply , that both before and after this bondage they were free , unless our a — will say , that changing of masters , is returning out of bondage , or that a slave returns out of bondage , when he is removed from one gally to another : if then they returned out of bondage , 't is plain that in those days , whatever our a — in his preface says to the contrary , there was difference between a son , a subject and a slave , and that neither the patriarchs before , nor their rulers after this egyptian bondage , numbered their sons or subjects amongst their p●ssessions , and disposed of them with as absolute a dominion , as they did their other goods . . this is evident in iacob , to whom reuben offered his two sons as pledges , and iudah was at last surety for benjamins safe return out of egypt , which all had been vain , superfluous , and but a sort of mockery ; if iacob had had the same power over every one of his family as he had over his ox or his ass , as an owner over his substance , and the offers that reuben or iudah made , had been such a security for returning of benjamin , as if a man should take two lambs out of his lords flock , and offer one as security , that he will safely restore the other . . when they were out of this bondage , what then , god out of a special care of them , the israelites . 't is well that once in his book , he will allow god to have any care of the people , for in other places he speaks of mankind , as if god had no care of any part of them , but only of their monarchs , and that the rest of the people , the societies of men , were made as so many herds of cattle , only for the service , use and pleasure of their princes . . chose moses and ioshuah successively to govern as princes , a shreud argument our a — has found out to prove gods care of the fatherly authority , and adams heirs , that here as an expression of his care of his own people , he chooses those for princes over them , that had not the least pret●nce to either moses of the tribe of levy , and ioshuah of the tribe of ephraim , neither of which had any title of fatherhood : but says our a — they were in the place and stead of the supream fathers : if god had any where , as plainly declared his choise of such fathers to be rulers , as he did of moses and ioshuah , we might believe moses and ioshuah were in their place and stead , but that being the question in debate , till that be better proved , moses being chosen by god to be ruler of his people , will no more prove that government belong'd to adams heir or to the fatherhood , then gods choosing aaron of the ●ribe of levy to be priest , will prove that the priesthood belonged to adams heir or the prime-fathers , since god could choose aaron to be priest , and moses ruler in israel , though neither of those offices , were setled on adams heir or the fatherhood . . our a — goes on , and after them likewise for a time he raised up iudges , to desend his people in time , of peril , p. . this proves fatherly authority to be the original of government , and that it descended from adam to his heirs , just as w●ll as what went before , only here our a — seems to confess that these iudges , who were all the governors they then had , were only men of valour , whom they made their generals to defend them in time of peril , and cannot god raise up such men , unless fatherhood have a title to government ? . but says our a — , when god gave the israelites kings , he re-established the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government , p. . . how did god re-establish it by a law , a positive command ? we find no such thing . our a means then , that when god gave them a king , in giving them a king , he re-established the right , &c. to re-establish de facto the right of lineal succession to paternal government , is to put a man in possession of that government which his fathers did enjoy , and he by lineal succession had a right to ; for first , if it were another government then what his ancestors had , it was not succeeding to an ancient right , but beginning a new one ; for if a prince should give a man , besides his ancient patrimony , which for some ages his family had been dis-seized o● , an additional estate , never before in the possession of his ancestors , he could not be said to re-establish the right of lineal succession , to any more then what had been formerly enjoy'd by his ancestors ; if therefore the power the kings of israel had , were any thing more th●n isaac or iacob had● it was not the re-establishing in them the right of succession to a power , but giving them a new power , however you please to call it paternal or not , and whether isaac and iacob had the ●ame power , that the kings of israel had ; i desire any one , by what has been above said , to consider , and i do not think they will find that either abraham , isaac or iacob , had any regal power at all . . next , there can be no re-establishment of the prime and ancient right of lineal succession to any thing , unless he that is put in possession of it , has the right to succeed , and be the true and next heir to him he succeeds to ; can that be a re-establishment , which begins in a new family , or that the re-establishment of an ancient right of lienal succession , when a crown is given to one , who has no right of succession to it , and who if the lineal succession had gone on , had been out of all possibility of pretence to it ? saul the first king , god gave the israelites , was of the tribe of benjamin , was the ancient and prime right of lineal succession re-established in him ? the next was david the youngest son of iesse , of the posterity of iudah , iacobs d son , was the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government re-establish'd in him ? or in solomon his younger son and successor in the throne ? or in ieroboham over the ten ●ribes ? or in athaliah ? who reigned six years an utter stranger to the royal blood. if the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government , were re-establish'd in any of these or their posterity . the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government , belongs to younger brothers , as well as elder , and may be re-establish'd in any man living , for whatever younger brothers by ancient and prime right of lineal succession , may have as well as the elder , that every man living may have a right to , by lineal succession , and sr. robt. as well as any other . and so what a brave right of lineal succession to his paternal or regal government , our a — has re-establish'd , for the securing the rights and inheritance of crowns , where every one may have it , let the world consider . . but says our a — however , p. . whensoever god made choice of any special person to be king , he intended that the issue also should have benefit thereof , as being comprehended sufficiently in the person of the father , although the father was only named in the grant. this yet will not help out succession , for if as our a — says , the benefit of the grant be intended to the issue of the grantee , this will not direct the succession , since , if god give any thing to a man and his issue in general , the claim cannot be to any one of that issue in particular , every one that is of his race , will have an equal right ; if it be said our a — meant heir , i believe our a — was as willing as any body to have used that word , if it would have served his turn , but solomon who succeded david in the throne , being no more his heir then ieroboam , who succeeded him in the government of the ten tribes was his issue , our a — had reason to avoid saying , that god intended it to the heirs , when that would not hold in a succession , which our a — could not except against , and so he has left his succession as undetermin'd , as if he had said nothing about it , for if the regal power be given by god to a man and his issue , as the land of canaan was to abraham and his seed , must they not all have a title to it , all share in it ? and one may as well say , that by gods grant to abr●ham and his seed , the land of canaan was to belong only to one of his se●d exclusive of all others , as by gods grant of do●inion to a man and his iss●e , this dominion was to belong all to one of his issue exclusive of all others . . but how will our a — prove that whensoever god made choice of any special person to be a king , he intended that the ( i suppose he means his ) issue , also should have benefit thereof : has he so soon forgot moses and ioshua whom in this very section , he says , god out of a special care chose to govern as princes , and the judges that god raised up . had not these princes , having the authority of the supream fatherhood , the same power that the kings had , and being specially chosen by god himself , should not their issue have the benefit of that choice as well as david or solomon ? if these had the paternal authority put into their hands immediately by god , why had not their issue the ben●fit of this grant in a succession to this power ? or if they had it as adams heirs , why did not their heirs enjoy it after them by right descending to them , for they could not be heirs to one another ? was the power the same , and from the same original in moses , ioshua and the iudges , as it was in david and the kings , and was it inheritable in one and not in the other ? if it was not paternal authority , then gods own people were govern'd by those that had not paternal authority , and those governours did well enough without it : if it were paternal authority and god chose the persons that were to exercise it , our a — s rule fails , that whensoever god makes choice of any person to be supream ruler ( for i suppose the name king has no spell in it 't is not the title , but the power makes the difference ) he intends that the issue also should have the benefit of it , since from their coming out of egypt to davids time years , the issue was never so sufficiently comprended in the person of the father , as that any son after the death of his father , succeeded to the government amongst all those judges that judged israel ; if to avoid this , it be said , god always chose the person of the successor , and so transferring the fatherly authority to him , excluded his issue from succeeding to it , that is manifestly , not so in the story of iephtha , where he articled with the people , and they made him judge over them , as is plain . iudg. . . 't is in vain then to say , that whensoever god chooses any special person to have the exercise of paternal authority ( for if that be not to be king , i desire to know the difference between a king and one having the exercise of paternal authority ) he intends the issue also should have the benefit of it , since we find the authority , the judges had , ended with them , and descended not to their issue , and if the judges had not paternal authority , i fear it will trouble our a — , or any of the friends to his principles , to tell who had then the paternal authority , that is , the government and supream power amongst the israelites , and i suspect they must confess that the chosen people of god continued a people several hundreds of years , without any knowledge or thought of this paternal authority , or any appearance of monarchical government at all . . to be satisfied of this , he need but read the story of the levit● , and the war thereupon with the benjami●es , in the . last chap. of iud. and when he finds that the levite appeals to the people for justice , that it was the tribes and the congregation that debated , resolved and directed all that was done on that occasion : he must conclude either that god was not careful to preserve the fatherly authority amongst his own chosen people , or else that the fatherly authority may be preserved where there is no monarchical government ; if the latter , then it will follow that though fatherly authority be never so well proved , yet it will not infer a necessity of monarchical government ; if the former , it will seem very strange and improbable that god should ordain fatherly authority to be so sacred amongst the sons of men , that there could be no power nor government without it , and yet that amongst his own people , even whilst he is providing a government for them , and therein prescribes rules to the several states and relations of men , this great and fundamental one , this most material and necessary of all the rest should be concealed , and lye neglected for years after . . before i leave this , i must ask how our a — knows that whensoever god makes choice of any special person to be king , he intends that the issue should have the benefit thereof , does god by the law of nature or revelation say so ? by the same law also he must say , which of his issue must enjoy the crown in succession , and so point out the heir , or else leave his issue to divide or scramble for the government : both alike absurd , and such as will destroy the benefit of such grant to the issue . when any such declaration of gods intention is produced , it will be our duty to believe god intends it so , but till that be done , our a — must shew us some better warrant before we shall be obliged to receive him as the authentic reveler of gods intentions . . the issue , says our a — , is comprehended sufficiently in the person of the father , although the father only was named in the grant : and yet god when he gave the land of canaan to abraham , gen. . . thought fit to put his seed into the grant too , so the priesthood was given to aaron and his seed ; and the crown god gave not only to david , but his seed also : and however our a — assures us that god intends , that the issue should have the benefit of it , when he chooses any person to be king , yet we see that the kingdom he gave to saul , without mentioning his seed after him never came to any of his issue , and why when god chose a person to be king , he should intend that his issue should have the benefit of it , more then when he chose one to be judg in israel ; i would fain know a reason ; or why does a grant of fatherly authority to a king more comprehend the issue , then when a like grant is made to a judge ? is paternal authority by right to descend to the issue of one and not of the other ? there will need some reason to be shewn of this difference , more then the name , when the thing given is the same fatherly authority , and the manner of giving it gods choice of the person , for i suppose our a — when he says , god raised up iudges , will by no means allow they were chosen by the people . . but since our a — has so confidently assured us of the care of god to preserve the fatherhood , and pretends to build all , he says , upon the authority of the scripture , we may well expect that that people whose law , constitution and history is chiefly contain'd in the scripture , should furnish him with the clearest instances of gods care of preserving of the fatherly authority , in that people who 't is agreed he had a most peculiar care of , let us see then what state this paternal authority or government was in amongst the iews , from their beginning to be a people . it was omitted by our a : s confession , from their coming into egypt , till their return out of that bondage : above years . from thence till god gave the israelites a king about years more , our a — gives but a very slender account of it , nor indeed all that time are there the least footsteps of paternal or regal government amongst them . but then says our a — , god re-establish'd the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government . . what a lineal succession to paternal government was then establish'd , we have already seen . i only now consider how long this lasted , and that was to their captivity about years : from whence to their destruction by the romans , above years after , the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government was again lost , and they continued a people in the promised land without it ; so that of years that they were gods peculiar people , they had hereditary kingly government amongst them , not one third of the time , and of that time there is not the leaft footsteps of one moment of paternal government , nor the re-establishment of the ancient and prime right of lineal succession to it , whether we suppose it to be derived as from its fountain , from david , saul , abraham , or which upon our a — s principles is the only true ; from adam . **** an essay concerning the true oringinal , extent and end of civil government . book . ii. chap. i. . it having been shewn in the foregoing discourse . o. that adam had not either by natural right of fatherhood , or by positive donation from god , any such authority over his children , nor dominion over the world as is pretended . o. that if he had his heirs , yet , had no right to it . o. that if his heirs had , there being no law of nature nor positive law of god that determins , which is the right heir in all cases that may arise , the right of succession , and consequently of bearing rule , could not have been certainly determined . o. that if even that had been determined , yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of adams posterity , being so long since utterly lost that in the races of mankind and families of the world , there remains not to one above another , the least pretence to be the eldest house , and to have the right of inheritance . all these premises having , as i think , been clearly made out , it is impossible that the rulers now on earth , should make any benefit , or derive any the least shadow of authority from that , which is held to be the fountain of all power , adams private dominion and paternal iurisdiction , so that , he that will not give just occasion , to think that all government in the world , is the product only of force and violence , and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts , where the strongest carries it , and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder and mischeif , tumult , sedition and rebellion , ( things that the followers of that hipothesis so loudly cry out against ) must of necessity find out another rise of government , another original of political power , and another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it , then what sr. robt. e. hath taught us . . to this purpose , i think it may not be amiss , to set down what i take to be political power . that the power of a magistrate over a subject , may be distinguished from that of a father over his children , a master over his servant , a husband over his wife , and a lord over his slave . all which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man , if he be considered under these different relations , it may help us to distinguish these powers one from another , and shew the difference betwixt a ruler of a common-wealth , a father of a family , and a captain of a gally . . political power , then i take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death , and consequently all less penalties , for the regulating and preserving of property , and of employing the force of the community , in the execution of such laws , and in the defence of the common-wealth from foreign injury , and all this only for the public good. chap. ii. of the state of nature . . to understand political power a right , and derive it from its original , we must consider what estate all men are naturally in , and that is , a state of perfect freedom to order their actions , and dispose of their possessions , and persons as they think fit , within the bounds of the law of nature , without asking leave , or depending upon the will of any other man. a state also of equality , wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal , no one having more then another , there being nothing more evident , then that creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature , and the use of the same faculties , should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection , unless the lord and master of them all , should by any manifest declaration of his will set one above another , and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty . . this equality of men by nature , the judicious hooker looks upon as so evident in it self , and beyond all question , that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men , on which he builds the duties they owe one another , and from whence he derives the great maxims of iustice and charity . his words are ; the like natural inducement , hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty , to love others then themselves , for seeing those things which are equal , must needs all have one measure ; if i cannot but wish to receive good , even as much at every mans hands , as any man can wish unto his own soul , how should i look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied , unless my self be careful to satisfie the like desire , which is undoubtedly in other men weak , being of one and the same nature ; to have any thing offered them repugnant to this desire , must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me , so that if i do harm , i must look to suffer , there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me , then they have , by me , shewed unto them ; my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in nature , as much as possible may be , imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to themward , fully the like affection ; from which relation of equality between our selves and them , that are as our selves , what several rules and canons , natural reason hath drawn for direction of life , no man is ignorant . eccl. pol. li. . . but though this be a state of liberty , yet it is not a state of licence , though man in that state have an uncontroleable liberty , to dispose of his person or possessions , yet he has not liberty to destroy himself , or so much as any creature in his possession , but where some nobler use , then its bare preservation calls for it . the state of nature , has a law of nature to govern it , which obliges every one , and reason , which is that law , teaches all mankind , who will but consult it ; that being all equal and independent , no one ought to harm another in his life , health , liberty or possessions ; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent , and infinitely wise maker : all the servants of one sovereign master , sent into the world by his order and about his business . they are his property , whose workmanship they are made to last during his , not one anothers pleasure . and being furnished with like faculties , sharing all in one community of nature , there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us , that may authorize us to destroy one another , as if we were made for one anothers uses , as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours , every one as he is bound to preserve himself , and not to quit his station willfully , so by the like reason when his own preservation comes not in competition , ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind , and not unless it be to do justice on an offender , take a way , or impair the the life , or what tends to the preservation of the life , the liberty , health , limb or goods of another . . and that all men may be restrained from invading others rights , and from doing hurt to one another , and the law of nature be observed , which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind , the execution of the law of nature is in that state , put into every mans hands , whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree , as may hinder its violation . for the law of nature would , as all other laws that concern men in this world , be in vain , if there were no body that in the state of nature , had a power to execute that law , and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders , and if any one in the state of nature may punish another , for any evil he has done , every one may do so . for in that state of perfect equality , where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another , what any may do in prosecution of that law , every one must needs have a right to do . . and thus in the state of nature , one man comes by a power over another ; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power , to use a criminal when he has got him in his hands , according to the passionate heats , or boundless extravagancy of his own will , but only to retribute to him , so far as calm reason and conscience dictates , what is proportionate to his transgression , which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint . for these two are the only reasons , why one man may lawfully do harm to another , which is that we call punishment . in trangressing the law of nature , the offender declares himself to live by another rule , then that of reason and common equity , which is that measure god has set to the actions of men , for their mutual security , and so he becomes dangerous to mankind , the tye , which is to secure them from injury and violence , being slighted and broken by him , which being a trespass against the whole species , and the peace and safety of it , provided for by the law of nature , every man upon this score , by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general , may restrain , or where it is necessary , destroy things noxious to them , and so may bring such evil on any one , who hath transgressed that law , as may make him repent the doing of it , and thereby deter him , and by his example others , from doing the like mischief . and in this case , and upon this ground , every man hath a right to punish the offender , and be executioner of the law of nature . . i doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrin to some men , but before they condemn it , i desire them to resolve me by what right any prince or state can put to death , or punish an alien , for any crime he commits in their country . 't is certain their laws by vertue of any sanction , they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative , reach not a stranger . they speak not to him , nor if they did , is he bound to hearken to them . the legislative authority , by which they are in force over the subjects of that common-wealth , hath no power over him . those who have the supream power of making laws in england , france or holland , are to an indian , but like the rest of the world , men without authority : and therefore if by the law of nature , every man hath not a power to punish offences against it , as he soberly judges the case to require , i see not how the magistrates of any community , can punish an alien of another country , since in reference to him , they can have no more power , then what every man naturally may have over another . . besides the crime which consists in violating the laws , and varying from the right rule of reason , whereby a man so far becomes degenerate , and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature , and to be a noxious creature , there is commonly injury done , and some person or other , some other man , receives damage by his transgression , in which case he who hath received any damage , has besides the right of punishment common to him , with other men , a particular right , to seek reparation from him that has done it . and any other person who finds it just , may also joyn with him that is injur'd , and assist him in recovering from the offender , so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he has suffer'd . . from these two distinct rights , the one of punishing the crime for restraint , and preventing the like offence , which right of punishing is in every body ; the other of taking reparation , which belongs only to the injured party , comes it to pass that the magistrate , who by being magistrate , hath the common right of punishing put into his hands , can often where the public good demands not the execution of the law , remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority , but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man , for the damage he has received . that , he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name , and he alone can remit ; the damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself , the goods or service of the offender , by right of self preservation , as every man has a power to punish the crime , to prevent its being committed again , by the right he has of preserving all mankind , and doing all reasonable things , he can in order to that end : and thus it is , that every man in the state of nature , has a power to kill a muderer , both to deter others from doing the like injury , which no reparation can compensate , by the example of the punishment that attends it from every body , and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal , who having renounced reason , the common rule and measure god hath given to mankind , hath by the unjust violence and slaughter , he hath committed upon one , declared war against all mankind , and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger , one of those wild savage beasts , with whom men can have no society nor security : and upon this is grounded that great law of nature , who so sheddeth mans blood , by man shall his blood be shed . and cain was so fully convinced , that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal , that after the murther of his brother , he cries out , every one that findeth me , shall slay me , so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind . . by the same reason , may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that law ; it will perhaps be demanded with death ? i answer each transgression , may be punished to that degree , and with so much severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender , give him cause to repent , and terrifie others from doing the like : every offence that can be committed in the state of nature , may in the state of nature , be also punished , equally , and as far forth , as it may , in a common-wealth ; for though it would be besides my present purpose , to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature , or its measures of punishment● ; yet , it is certain there is such a law and that too , as intelligible and plain to a rational creature , and a studier of that law , as the positive laws of common-wealths , nay possibly plainer ; as much as reason is easier to be understood , then the phansies and intricate contrivances of men , following contrary and hidden interests put into words ; for truly , so are a great part of the municipal laws of countries , which are only so far right , as they are founded on the law of nature , by which they are to be regulated and interpreted . . to this strange doctrine , viz. that in the state of nature , every one has the executive power of the law of nature , i doubt not but it will be objected ; that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases , that self love will make men partial to themselves and their friends . and on the other side ill nature , passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others . and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow , and that therefore god hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men , i easily grant , that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature , which must certainly be great , where men may be judges in their own case , since 't is easiy to be imagined , that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury , will scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it : but i shall desire those who make this objection , to remember that absolute monarchs are but men , and if government is to be the remedy of those evils , which necessarily follow from mens being judges in their own cases , and the state of nature is therefore not to be endured , i desire to know what kind of government that is , and how much better it is then the state of nature , where one man commanding a multitude , has the liberty to be judge in his own case , and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases , without the least question or controle of those , who execute his pleasure ? and in whatsoever he doth , whether lead by reason , mistake or passion , must be submitted to ? which men in the state of nature are not bound to do one to another . and if he that judges , judges amiss in his own , or any other case , he is answerable for it , to the rest of mankind . . 't is often asked as a mighty objection , where are , or ever were , there any men in such a state of nature ? to which it may suffice as an answer at present ; that since all princes and rulers of independant governments all through the world , are in a state of nature , 't is plain the world never was , nor never will be , without numbers of men in that state , i have named all governors of independent communities whether they are , or are not , in league with others ; for 't is not every compact , that puts an end to the state of nature between men , but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one community , and make one body politic , other promises and compacts , men may make one with another , and yet still be in the state of nature . the promises and bargains for truck , &c. between the two men , in soldania , in or between , a swiss and an indian , in the woods of america are binding to them , though they are perfectly in a state of nature , in reference to one another for truth , and keeping of faith belongs to men , as men , and not as members of society . . to those that say , there were never any men in the state of nature , i will not only oppose the authority of the judicious hooker , eccl. pol. li. sect. . where he says ; the laws which have been hitherto mentioned , i. e. the laws of nature , do bind men absolutely , even as they are men , although they have never any settled fellowship , never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to do , but for as much as we are not by our selves sufficient to furnish our selves with competent store of things , needful for such a life , as our nature doth desire ; a life , fit for the dignity of man , therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us , as living single and solely by our selves , we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others , this was the cause of mens uniting themselves , at first in politic societies . but i moreover affirm , that all men are naturally in that state , and remain so till by their own consents , they make themselves members of some politic society , and i doubt not in the sequel of this discourse , to make it very clear . chap. iii. of the state of war. . the state of war is a state of enmity and destruction ; and therefore declaring by word or action , not a passionate and hasty , but sedate setled design , upon another mans life , puts him in a state of war with him against whom he has declared such an intention , and so has exposed his life to the others power to be taken away by him , or any one that joyns with him in his defence , and espouses his quarrel , it being reasonable and just i should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction ; for by the fundamental law of nature , man being to be preserved , as much as possible , when all cannot be preserved , the safety of the innocent is to be preferred : and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him , or has discovered an enmity to his being for the same reason , that he may kill a wolf or a lion , because they are not under the ties of the common law of reason , have no other rule , but that of force and violence , and so may be treated as a beast of prey , those dangerous and noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy him , whenever he falls into their power . . and hence it is that he who attempts to get an other man into his absolute power , does thereby put himself into a state of war with him ; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his life . for i have reason to conclude , that he who would get me into his power without my consent , would use me as he pleased when he had got me there , and destroy me too when he had a phansy to it ; for no body can desire to have me in his absolute power , unless it be to compel me by force to that which is against the right of my freedom , i. e. make me a slave . to be free from such force , is the only security of my preservation , and reason bids me look on him , as an enemy to my preservation , who would take away that freedom , which is the fence to it , so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me , thereby puts himself into a state of war with me . he that in the state of nature , would take away the freedom that belongs to any one in that state , must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away every thing else , that freedom being the foundation of all the rest : as he that in the state of society , would take away the freedom belonging to those of that society or common-wealth , must be supposed to design to take away from them every thing else , and so be looked on as in a state of war. . this makes it lawful for a man to kill a theif , who has not in the least hurt him , nor declared any design upon his life , any farther then by the use of force , so to get him in his power , as to take away his money , or what he pleases from him , because using force , where he has no right to get me into his power , let his pretence be what it will , i have no reason to suppose , that he , who would take away my liberty , would not when he had me in his power , take away every thing else . and therefore it is lawful for me to treat him , as one who has put himself into a state of war with me , i. e. kill him if i can ; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself , whoever introduces a state of war , and is aggresser in it . . and here we have the plain difference between the state of nature , and the state of war , which however some men have confounded , are as far distant as a state of peace , goodwill , mutual assistance , and preservation ; and a state of enmity , malice , violence and mutual destruction are one from another . men living together according to reason without a common superior on earth , with authority to judge between them , is properly the state of nature . but force , or a declared design of force upon the person of another , where there is no common superior on earth to appeal to for relief , is the state of war : and 't is the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an aggressor , though he be in society and a fellow subject . thus a theif whom i cannot harm , but by appeal to the law , for having stolen all that i am worth , i may kill when he sets on me to rob me , but of my horse or coat , because the law which was made for my preservation , where it cannot interpose to secure my life from present force , which if lost , is capeable of no reparation , permits me my own defence , and the right of war , a liberty to kill the aggressor , because the aggressor allows not time to appeal to our common judge , nor the decision of the law , for remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable . want of a common judge with authority , puts all men in a state of nature ; force without right , upon a mans person , makes a state of war both where there is , and is not , a common judge . . but when the actual force is over , the state of war ceases between those that are in society , and are equally on both sides subject to the judge : and therefore in such controversies , where the question is put , who shall be iudge ? it cannot be meant , who shall decide the controversie : every one knows what iephtha here tells us , that the lord the iudge , shall judge . where there is no judge on earth , the appeal lies to god in heaven . that question then cannot mean who shall judge , whether another hath put himself in a state of war with me , and whether i may as iephtha did appeal to heaven in it ? of that i my self can only be judge in my own conscience , as i will answer it at the great day , to the supream judge of all men. chap. iv. of slavery . . the natural liberty of man is to be free from any superiour power on earth , and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man , but to have only the law of nature for his rule . the liberty of man , in society , is to be under no other legislative power , but that established , by consent , in the commonwealth ; nor under the dominion of any will , or restraint of any law , but what that legislative shall enact , according to the trust put in it . freedom then is not what sr. r. f. tells us , o. a. . a liberty for every one to do what he lists , to live as he pleases , and not to be tyed by any laws : but freedom of men , under government , is , to have a standing rule to live by , common to every one of that society , and made by the legislative power erected in it . a liberty to follow my own will in all things , where that rule prescribes not ; not to be subject to the inconstant , uncertain , unknown , arbitrary will of another man. as freedom of nature is to be under no other restraint but the law of nature . . this freedom from absolute , arbitrary power , is so necessary to , and closely joyned with a man's preservation , that he cannot part with it , but by what forfeits his preservation and life together . for a man , not having the power of his own life , cannot , by compact , or his own consent , enslave himself to any one , nor put himself under the absolute , arbitrary power of another , to take away his life , when he pleases . no body can give more power than he has himself ; and he that cannot take away his own life , cannot give another power over it . indeed having , by his fault , forfeited his own life , by some act that deserves death ; he , to whom he has forfeited it , may ( when he has him in his power ) delay to take it , and make use of him to his own service ; and he does him no injury by it . for , when-ever he finds the hardship of his slavery out-weigh the value of his life , 't is in his power , by resisting the will of his master , to draw on himself the death he desires . . this is the perfect condition of slavery , which is nothing else , but the state of war continued , between a lawful conquerour , and a captive . for , if once compact enter between them , and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side , and obedience , on the other ; the state of war and slavery ceases , as long as the compact endures . for , as has been said , no man can , by agreement , pass over to another that which he hath not in himself , a power over his own life . i confess , we find among the iews , as well as other nations , that men did sell themselves ; but , 't is plain , this was only to drudgery , not to slavery . for , it is evident , the person sold was not under an absolute , arbitrary , despotical power . for the master could not have power to kill him , at any time , whom , at a certain time , he was obliged to let go free out of his service : and the master of such a servant was so far from having an arbitrary power over his life , that he could not , at pleasure , so much as maim him , but the loss of an eye , or tooth , set him free , exod. xxi . chap. v. of property . . whether we consider natural reason , which tells us , that men , being once born , have a right to their preservation , and consequently to meat and drink , and such other things , as nature affords for their subsistence : or revelation , which gives us an account of those grants god made of the world to adam , and to noah , and his sons ; 't is very clear , that god , as k. david says , psal. cxv . xvj . has given the earth to the children of men , given it to mankind in common . but this being supposed , it seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever come to have a property in any thing ; i will not content my self to answer , that if it be difficult to make out property , upon a supposition , that god gave the world to adam and his posterity in common ; it is impossible that any man , but one universal monarch , should have any property upon a supposition , that god gave the world to adam , and his heirs in succession , exclusive of all the rest of his posterity . but i shall endeavour to shew , how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which god gave to mankind in common , and that without any express compact of all the commoners . . god , who hath given the world to men in common , hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life , and convenience . the earth , and all that is therein , is given to men for the support and comfort of their being . and though all the fruits it naturally produces , and beasts it feeds , belong to mankind in common , as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature : and no body has originally a private dominion , exclusive of the rest of mankind , in any of them , as they are thus in their natural state : yet being given for the use of men , there must , of necessity , be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use , or at all beneficial to any particular men. the fruit , or venison which nourishes the wild indian , who knows no inclosure , and is still a tenant in common , must be his , and so his , i.e. a part of him , that another can no longer have any right to it , before it can do him any good for the support of his life . . though the earth , and all inferior creatures be common to all men , yet every man has a property in his own person . this no body has any right to but himself . the labour of his body , and the work of his hands , we may say , are properly his . whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided , and left it in , he hath mixed his labour with it , and joined to it something that is his own , and thereby makes it his property . it being by him removed from the common state nature placed it in , it hath by this labour something annexed to it , that excludes the common right of other men. for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer , no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to , at least where there is enough , and as good left in common for others . . he that is nourished by the acorns he pickt up under an oak , or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood ; has certainly appropriated them to himself . no body can deny but the nourishment is his . i ask then , when did they begin to be his ? when he digested ? or when he eat ? or when he boiled ? or when he brought them home ? or when he pickt them up ? and 't is plain , if the first gathering made them not his , nothing else could . that labour put a distinction between them and common . that added something to them more than nature , the common mother of all , had done ; and so they became his private right . and will any one say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated , because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his ? was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common ? if such a consent as that was necessary , man had starved , notwithstanding the plenty god had given him . we see in commons , which remain so by compact , that 't is the taking any part of what is common , and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in , which begins the property ; without which the common is of no use . and the taking of this or that part , does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners . thus the grass my horse has bit ; the turfs my servant has cut ; and the ore i have dig'd in any place where i have a right to them in common with others , become my property , without the assignation or consent of any body . the labour that was mine , removing them out of that common state they were in , hath fixed my property in them . . by making an explicit consent of every commoner , necessary to any ones appropriating to himself any part of what is given in common . children or servants could not cut the meat which their father or master had provided for them in common , without assigning to every one his peculiar part . though the water running in the fountain be every ones ; yet who can doubt but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out ? his labour hath taken it out of the hands of nature where it was common , and belong'd equally to all her children , and hath thereby appropriated it to himself . . thus this law of reason makes the deer , that indian's who hath killed it ; 't is allowed to be his goods who hath bestowed his labour upon it , though before , it was the common right of every one . and amongst those who are counted the civiliz'd part of mankind , who have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property , this original law of nature for the beginning of property , in what was before common , still takes places ; and by vertue thereof , what fish any one catches in the ocean , that great and still remaining common of mankind ; or what ambergriese any one takes up here , is by the labour that removes it out of that common state nature left it in , made his property who takes that pains about it . and even amongst us the hare that any one is hunting , is thought his who pursues her during the chase. for being a beast that is still looked upon as common , and no man's private possession ; who-ever has imploy'd so much labour about any of that kind , as to find and pursue her , has thereby removed her from the state of nature wherein she was common , and hath began a property . . it will perhaps be objected to this , that if gathering the acorns , or other fruits of the earth , &c. makes a right to them , then any one may ingross as much as he will. to which i answer , not so . the same law of nature that does by this means give us property , does also bound that property too . god has given us all things richly , tim. vi . . is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration . but how far has he given it us , to enjoy ? as much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils ; so much he may by his labour fix a property in . whatever is beyond this , is more than his share , and belongs to others . nothing was made by god for man to spoil or destroy . and thus considering the plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world , and the few spenders , and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man could extend it self , and ingross it to the prejudice of others ; especially keeping within the bounds set by reason of what might serve for his use ; there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so establish'd . . but the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth , and the beasts that subsist on it , but the earth it self ; as that which takes in and carries with it all the rest : i think it is plain , that property in that too is acquired as the former . as much land as a man tills , plants , improves , cultivates , and can use the product of ; so much is his property . he by his labour does as it were inclose it from the common . nor will it invalidate his right to say , every body else has an equal title to it ; and therefore he cannot appropriate , he cannot inclose , without the consent of all his fellow-commoners , all mankind . god when he gave the world in common to all mankind , commanded man also to labour , and the penury of his condition required it of him . god and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth , i. e● improve it for the benefit of life , and therein lay out something upon it that was his own , his labour . he that in obedience to this command of god , subdued , tilled and sowed any part of it , thereby annexed to it something that was his property , which another had no title to , nor could without injury take from him . . nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land , by improving it , any prejudice to any other man , since there was still enough , and as good left ; and more than the yet unprovided could use . so that in effect , there was never the less left for others because of his inclosure for himself . for he that leaves as much as another can make use of , does as good as take nothing at all . no body could think himself injur'd by the drinking of another man , though he took a good draught , who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst . and the case of land and water , where there is enough of both , is perfectly the same . . god gave the world to men in common , but since he gave it them for their benefit , and the greatest conveniencies of life they were capable to draw from it ; it cannot be supposed he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated . he gave it to the use of the industrious and rational , ( and labour was to be his title to it ; ) not to the phancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious . he that had as good left for his improvement , as was already taken up , needed not complain , ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour : if he did , 't is plain he desired the benefit of anothers pains which he had no right to , and not the ground which god had given him in common with others to labour on , and whereof there was as good left as that already possessed ; and more than he knew what to do with , or his industry could reach to . . 't is true , in land that is common in england , or any other country , where there is plenty of people under government , who have money and commerce , no one can inclose or appropriate any part , without the consent of all his fellow-commoners : because this is left common by compact , i. e. by the law of the land , which is not to be violated . and though it be common , in respect of some men , it is not so to all mankind ; but is the joint propriety of this country , or this parish . besides , the remainder , after such inclosure , would not be as good to the rest of the commoners as the whole was , when they could all make use of the whole ; whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world , it was quite otherwise . the law man was under was rather for appropriating . god commanded , and his wants forced him to labour . that was his property which could not be taken from him where-ever he had fixed it . and hence subduing or cultivating the earth , and having dominion , we see , are join'd together . the one gave title to the other . so that god , by commanding to subdue , gave authority so far to appropriate . and the condition of humane life , which requires labour and materials to work on , necessarily introduce private possessions . . the measure of property , nature well set , by the extent of mens labour , and the conveniency of life : no man's labour could subdue , or appropriate all ; nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part ; so that it was impossible for any man , this way , to intrench upon the right of another , or acquire , to himself , a property , to the prejudice of his neighbour , who would still have room , for as good , and as large a possession ( after the other had taken out his ) as before it was appropriated ; which measure did confine every man's possession , to a very moderate proportion , and such as he might appropriate to himself , without injury to any body , in the first ages of the world , when men were more in danger to be lost , by wandering from their company , in the then vast wilderness of the earth , than to be striatned for want of room to plant in . and the same measure may be allowed still , without prejudice to any body , as full as the world seems . for supposing a man , or family , in the state they were at first , peopling of the world by the children of adam , or noah ; let him plant in some in-land , vacant places of america , we shall find that the possessions , he could make himself , upon the measures we have given , would not be very large , nor , even to this day , prejudice the rest of mankind , or give them reason to complain , or think themselves injured by this man's incroachment , though the race of men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world , and do infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning . nay the extent of ground is of so little value , without labour , that i have heard it affirmed , that , in spain it self , a man may be permitted to plough , sow , and reap , without being disturbed , upon land he has no other title to , but only his making use of it . but , on the contrary , the inhabitants think themselvs beholden to him , who , by his industry , on neglected , and consequently waste land , has increased the stock of corn , which they wanted . but be this as it will , which i lay no stress on ; this i dare boldly affirm , that the same rule of propriety , ( viz. ) that every man should have as much as he could make use of , would hold still in the world , without straitning any body , since there is land enough in the world , to suffice double the inhabitants , had not the invention of money , and the tacit agreement of men , to put a value on it , introduced ( by consent ) larger possessions , and a right to them ; which , how it has done , i shall , by and by , shew more at large . . this is certain , that in the beginning , before the desire of having more than men needed , had altered the intrinsick value of things , which depends only on their usefulness to the life of man ; or had agreed , that a little piece of yellow metal , which would keep without wasting or decay , should be worth a great piece of flesh , or a whole heap of corn ; though men had a right to appropriate , by their labour , each one to himself , as much of the things of nature , as he could use : yet this could not be much , nor to the prejudice of others , where the same plenty was still left , to those who would use the same industry . before the appropriation of land , he who gathered as much of the wild fruit , killed , caught , or tamed as many of the beasts as he could ; he that so employed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of nature , as any way to alter them , from the state nature put them in , by placing any of his labour on them , did thereby acquire a propriety in them : but if they perished , in his possession , without their due use ; if the fruits rotted , or the venison putrified , before he could spend it , he offended against the common law of nature , and was liable to be punished ; he invaded his neighbour's share , for he had no right , farther than his use called for any of them , and they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life . . the same measures governed the possession of land too : whatsoever he tilled and reaped , laid up and made use of , before it spoiled , that was his peculiar right ; whatsoever he enclosed , and could feed , and make use of , the cattle and product was also his . but if either the grass of his inclosure rotted on the ground , or the fruit of his planting perished without gathering , and laying up , this part of the earth , notwithstanding his inclosure , was still to be looked on as waste , and might be the possession of any other . thus , at the beginning , cain might take as much ground as he could till , and make it his own land , and yet leave enough to abel's sheep to feed on ; a few acres would serve for both their possessions . but as families increased , and industry inlarged their stocks , their possessions inlarged with the need of them ; but yet it was commonly without any fixed property in the ground they made use of , till they incorporated , setled themselves together , and built cities , and then , by consent , they came in time , so set out the bounds of their distinct territories , and agree on limits between them and their neighbours ; and by laws within themselves , setled the properties of those of the same society . for we see , that in that part of the world which was first inhabited , and therefore like to be best peopled , even as low down as abraham's time , they wandered with their flocks , and their herds , which was their substance , freely up and down ; and this abraham did , in a country where he was a stranger . whence it is plain , that , at least , a great part of the land lay in common . that the inhabitants valued it not , nor claimed property in any more than they made use of . but when there was not room enough in the same place , for their herds to feed together , they , by consent , as abraham and lot did , gen. xiii . . separated and inlarged their pasture , where it best liked them . and for the same reason esau went from his father , and his brother , and planted in mount seir , gen. xxxvi . . . and thus , without supposing any private dominion , and property in adam , over all the world , exclusive of all other men , which can no way be proved , nor any ones property be made out from it ; but supposing the world given as it was to the children of men in common , we see how labour could make men distinct titles to several parcels of it , for their private uses ; wherein there could be no doubt of right , no room for quarrel . . nor is it so strange as perhaps before consideration it may appear , that the property of labour should be able to over-ballance the community of land. for 't is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on every thing ; and let any one consider , what the difference is between an acre of land planted with tabaco , ●r sugar , sown with wheat or barley ; and an acre of the same land lying in common , without any husbandry upon it ; and he will find , that the improvement of labour makes the far greater part of the value . i think it will be but a very modest computation to say , that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man / are the eff●cts of labour : nay , if we will rightly estimate things as they come to our use , and cast up the several expences about them , what in them is purely owing to nature , and what to labour , we shall find , that in most of them / are wholly to be put on the account of labour . . there cannot be a clearer demonstration of any thing , than several nations of the americans are of this , who are rich in land , and poor in all the comforts of life ; whom nature having furnished as liberally as any other people , with the materials of plenty , i. e. a fruitful soil , apt to produce in abundance , what might serve for food , rayment , and delight ; yet for want of improving it by labour , have not / part of the conveniencies we enjoy . and a king of a large and fruitful territory there , feeds , lodges , and is clad worse than a day labourer in england . . to make this a little clearer , let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life , through their several progresses , before they come to our use , and see how much they receive of their value from human industry . bread , wine and cloth are things of daily use and great plenty , yet notwithstanding acorns , water , and leaves , or skins , must be our bread , drink and cloathing , did not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities . for whatever bread is more worth than acorns , wine than water , and cloth or silk than leaves , skins or moss , that is wholly owing to labour and industry . the one of these being the food and rayment which unassisted nature furnishes us with ; the other provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us , which how much they exceed the other in value , when any one hath computed , he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world : and the ground which produces the materials , is scarce to be reckon'd in as any , or at most , but a very small part of it : so little , that even amongst us , land that is left wholly to nature , that hath no improvement of pasturage , tillage , or planting , is called , as indeed it is , wast ; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing . . an acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of wheat , and another in america , which , with the same husbandry , would do the like , are , without doubt , of the same natural , intrinsick value . but yet the benefit mankind receives from one in a year is worth l. and the other possibly not worth a penny ; if all the profit an indian received from it were to be valued , and sold here ; at least , i may truly say , not / ● . 't is labour then which puts the greatest part of value upon land , without which it would scarcely be worth any thing ; 't is to that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products ; for all that the straw , bran , bread , of that acre of wheat , is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land , which lies waste , is all the effect of labour . for 't is not barely the plough-man's pains , the reaper's and thresher's toil , and the baker's sweat , is to be counted into the bread we eat ; the labour of those who broke the oxen , who digged and wrought the iron and stones , who felled and framed the timber imployed about the plough , mill , oven , or any other utensils , which are a vast number , requisite to this corn , from its sowing to its being made bread , must all be charged on the account of labour , and received as an effect of that : nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials , as in themselves . 't would be a strange catalogue of things , that industry provided and made use of , about every loaf of bread before it came to our use , if we could trace them ; iron , wood , leather , bark , timber , stone , bricks , coals , lime , cloth , dying● drugs , pitch , tar , masts , ropes , and all the materials made use of in the ship , that brought any of the commodities , made use of by any of the work-men , to any part of the work , all which , 't would be almost impossible , at least too long , to reckon up . . from all which it is evident , that tho' the things of nature are given in common : man ( by being master of himself , and proprietor of his own person , and the actions or labour of it ) had still in himself the great foundation of property : and that which made up the great part of what he applyed to the support or comfort of his being , when invention and arts had improved the conveniencies of life , was perfectly his own , and did not belong in common to others . . thus labour , in the beginning , gave a right of property , where ever any one was pleased to imploy it , upon what was common , which remained , a long while , the far greater part , and is yet more than mankind makes use of . men , at first , for the most part , contented themselves with what un-assisted nature offered to their necessities ; and though afterwards , in some parts of the world , where the increase of people and stock , with the use of money , had made land scarce , and so of some value , the several communities setled the bounds of their distinct territories , and , by laws , within themselves , regulated the properties of the private men of their society , and so , by compact and agreement , setled the property which labour and industry began . and the leagues , that have been made between several states and kingdoms , either expresly or tacitly dis-owning all claim and right to the land in the others possession , have , by common consent , given up their pretences to their natural common right , which originally they had to those countries : and so have , by positive agreement , settled a property amongst themselves , in distinct parts of the world ; yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found , which the inhabitants thereof , not having joyned with the rest of mankind , in the consent of the use of their common money , lye waste , and are more than the people , who dwell on it , do , or can make use of , and so still lye in common . though this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money . . the greatest part of things really useful to the life of man , and such as the necessity of subsisting made the first commoners of the world look after , as it doth the americans now , are generally things of short duration , such as , if they are not consumed by use , will decay and perish of themselves . gold , silver , and diamonds , are things , that phancy , or agreement hath put the value on , more than real use , and the necessary support of life : now of those good things which nature hath provided in common , every one hath a right ( as hath been said ) to as much as he could use , and had a property in all he could effect with his labour : all that his industry could extend to , to alter from the state nature had put it in , was his . he that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples , had thereby a property in them ; they were his goods , as soon as gathered . he was only to look that he used them before they spoiled ; else he took more than his share , and robb'd others . and indeed it was a foolish thing , as well as dishonest , to hoard up more than he could make use of . if he gave away a part to any body else , so that it perished not uselesly in his possession , these he also made use of . and if he also bartered away plumbs , that would have rotted in a week ' , for nuts that would last good for his eating a whole year , he did no injury ; he wasted not the common stock ; destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to others , so long as nothing perished uselesly in his hands . again , if he would give his nuts for a piece of metal , pleased with its colour ; or exchange his sheep for shells , or wooll for a sparkling pebble or a diamond , and keep those by him all his life , he invaded not the right of others ; he might heap up as much of these durable things as he pleased : the exceeding of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession , but the perishing of any thing uselesly in it . . and thus came in the use of money , some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling , and that , by mutual consent , men would take in exchange for the truly useful , but perishable supports of life . . and as different degrees of industry were apt to give men possessions in different proportions , so this invention of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them . for supposing an island , separate from all possible commerce with the rest of the world , wherein there were but a hundred families , but there were sheep , horses and cowes , with other useful animals , wholesome fruits , and land enough for corn , for a hundred thousand times as many , but nothing in the island , either because of its commonness , or perishableness , fit to supply the place of money : what reason could any one have there to enlarge his possessions , beyond the use of his family , and a plentiful supply to its consumption , either in what their own industry produced , or they could barter for like perishable , useful commodities , with others ? where there is not something both lasting and scarce , and so valuable to be hoarded up , there men will not be apt to enlarge their possessions of land , were it never so rich , never so free for them to take . for i ask , what would a man value ten thousand , or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land , ready cultivated , and well stocked too with cattle , in the middle of the in-land parts of america , where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world , to draw money to him , by the sale of the product . it would not be worth the inclosing , and we should see him give up again to the wild common of nature what-ever was more than would supply the conveniencies of life , to be had there , for him and his family . . thus in the beginning all the world was america , and more so than that is now ; for no such thing as money was any where known . find out something that hath the use and value of money amongst his neighbours , you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions . . but since gold and silver , being little useful to the life of man , in proportion to food , rayment , and carriage , has its value only from the consent of men , whereof labour yet makes in great part the measure , it is plain , that the consent of men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth ; i mean out of the bounds of society and compact : for in governments the laws regulate it , they having by consent , found out and agreed in a way how a man may rightfully , and without injury , possess more than he himself can make use of by receiving gold and silver , which may continue long in a mans possession , without decaying for the overplus , and agreeing those metals should have a value . . and thus , i think , it is very easy to conceive , without any difficulty , how labour could at first begin a title of property in the common things of nature , and how the spending it upon our uses bounded it . so that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about title , nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave . right and conveniency went together . for as a man had a right to all he could imploy his labour upon , so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of . this left no room for controversie about the title , nor for incroachment on the right of others ; what portion a man carved to himself , was easily seen ; and it was useless as well as dishonest , to carve himself too much , or take more than he needed . chap. vi. of paternal power . . it may perhaps be censured an impertinent criticism in a discourse of this nature , to find fault with words and names that have obtained in the world : and yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new ones when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes , as this of paternal power probably has done , which seems so to place the power of parents over their children wholly in the father , as if the mother had no share in it ; whereas if we consult reason or revelation , we shall find she hath an equal title ; which may give one reason to ask , whether this might not be more properly called parental power ? for whatever obligation nature and the right of generation lays on children ; it must certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it . and accordingly we see the positive law of god every where joins them together , without distinction , when it commands the obedience of children , honour thy father and thy mother , exod. . . whosoever curseth his father or his mother , lev. . . ye shall fear every man his mother and his father , lev. . . children obey your parents , &c. eph. . . is the stile of the old and new testament . . had but this one thing been well consider'd , without looking any deeper into the matter , it might perhaps have kept men from running into those gross mistakes they have made about this power of parents , which however it might , without any great harshness , bear the name of absolute dominion , and regal authority , when under the title of paternal power , it seem'd appropriated to the father ; would yet have sounded but odly , and in the very name shewn the absurdity , if this supposed absolute power over children had been called parental , and thereby discover'd that it belong'd to the mother too : for it will but very ill serve the turn of those men who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of the fatherhood , as they call it , that the mother should have any share in it . and it would have but ill supported the monarchy they contend for , when by the very name it appeared , that that fundamental authority from whence they would derive their government of a single person only , was not plac'd in one , but two persons jointly . but to let this of names pass . . though i have said above ( . ) that all men by nature are equal ; i cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality : age or virtue may give men a just precedency : excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level : birth may subject some , and alliance or benefits others to pay an observance to those , to whom nature , gratitude or other respects may have made it due ; and yet all this consists with the equality which all men are in , in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another : which was the equality i there spoke of , as proper to the business in hand , being that equal right that every man hath to his natural freedom , without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man. . children , i confess , are not born in this full state of equality , though they are born to it . their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them when they come into the world , and for some time after , but 't is but a temporary one . the bonds of this subjection are like the swadling cloths they are wrapt up in , and supported by , in the weakness of their infancy . age and reason as they grow up , loosen them till atlength they drop quite off , and leave a man at his own free disposal . . adam was created a perfect man , his body and mind in full possession of their strength and reason , and so was capable , from the first instance of his being , to provide for his own support and preservation , and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason god had implanted in him . from him the world is peopled with his descendants , who are all born infants , weak and helpless , without knowledge or understanding . but to supply the defects of this imperfect state , till the improvement of growth and age had removed them , adam and eve , and after them all parents were , by the law of nature , under an obligation to preserve , nourish , and educate the children they had begotten , not as their own workmanship , but the workmanship of their own maker , the almighty , to whom they were to be accountable for them . . the law that was to govern adam , was the same that was to govern all his posterity , the law of reason . but his off-spring having another way of entrance into the world , different from him , by a natural birth , that produced them ignorant , and without the use of reason , they were not presently under that law : for no body can be under a law that is not promulgated to him ; and this law being promulgated or made known by reason only , he that is not come to the use of his reason , cannot be said to be under this law : and adam's children being not presently as soon as born , under this law of reason , were not presently free . for law , in its true notion , is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest , and prescribes no farther , than is for the general good of those under that law. could they be happier without it , the law , as an useless thing , would of it self vanish ; and that ill deserves the name of confinement , which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices . so that however it may be mistaken , the end of law , is not to abolish or restrain , but to preserve and enlarge freedom . for in all the states of created beings , capable of laws , where there is no law there is no freedom . for , liberty is , to be free from restraint and violence from others , which cannot be where there is no law , and is not , as we are told , a liberty for every man to do what he lists : for who could be free , when every other man's humour might domineer over him ? but a liberty to dispose and order freely as he lists his person , actions , possessions , and his whole property within the allowance of those laws , under which he is , and therein not to be subject to the the arbitrary will of another ; but freely follow his own . . the power , then , that parents have over their children , arises from that duty which is incumbent on them , to take care of their off-spring , during the imperfect state of childhood . to inform the mind , and govern the actions of their yet ignorant nonage , till reason shall take its place , and ease them of that trouble , is what the children want , and the parents are bound to . for god haing given man an understanding to direct his actions , has allowed him a freedom of will , and liberty of acting , as properly belonging thereunto , within the bounds of that law he is under . but whilst he is in an estate , wherein he has no understanding of his own to direct his will , he is not to have any will of his own to follow : he that understands for him , must will for him too ; he must prescribe to his will , and regulate his actions ; but when he comes to the estate that made his father a free-man , the son is a free-man too . . this holds in all the laws a man is under , whether natural or civil . is a man under the law of nature ? what made him free of that law ? what gave him a free disposing of his property , according to his own will , within the compass of that law ? i answer , an estate wherein he might be suppos'd capable to know that law , that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it . when he has acquired that state , he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide , and how far he may make use of his freedom , and so comes to have it ; till then , some body else must guide him , who is presumed to know how far the law allows a liberty . if such a state of reason , such an age of discretion made him free , the same shall make his son free too . is a man under the law of england ? what made him free of that law ? that is , to have the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions , according to his own will , within the permission of that law ? a capacity of knowing that law. which is supposed , by that law , at the age of twenty one , and in some cases sooner . if this made the father free , it shall make the son free too . till then , we see , the law allows the son to have no will , but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guardian , who is to understand for him . and if the father die , and fail to substitute a deputy in this trust , if he hath not provided a tutor to govern his son , during his minority , during his want of understanding , the law takes care to do it ; some other must govern him , and be a will to him , till he hath attained to a state of freedom , and his understanding be fit to take the government of his will. but after that , the father and son are equally free , as much as tutor and pupil , after nonage ; equally subjects of the same law together , without any dominion left in the father , over the life , liberty , or estate of his son , whether they be only in the state , and under the law of nature , or under the positive laws of an establish'd government . . but if , through defects , that may happen , out of the ordinary course of nature , any one comes not to such a degree of reason , wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the law , and so living within the rules of it , he is never capable of being a free man ; he is never let loose to the disposure of his own will , because he knows no bounds to it , has not understanding , its proper guide ; but is continued under the tuition and government of others , all the time his own understanding is uncapable of that charge . and so lunaticks and ideots are never set free from the government of their parents ; children , who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may have ; and innocents , which are excluded , by a natural defect , from ever having . thirdly , madmen , which , for the present , cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide themselves , have , for their guide , the reason that guideth other men , which are tutors over them , to seek and procure their good for them , says hooker eccl. pol. lib. . § . . all which seems no more than that duty which god and nature has laid on man , as well as other creatures , to preserve their off-spring till they can be able to shift for themselves , and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority . . thus we are born free , as we are born rational ; not that we have actually the exercise of either : age that brings one , brings with it the other too . and thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together , and are both founded on the same principle . a child is free by his father's title , by his father's understanding , which is to govern him , till he hath it of his own . the freedom of a man , at years of discretion , and the subjection of a child to his parents , whilst yet short of it , are so consistent , and so distinguishable , that the most blinded contenders for monarchy , by right of fatherhood , cannot miss of it ; the most obstinate cannot but allow of it . for were their doctrine all true , were the right heir of adam now known , and , by that title , setled a monarch in his throne ; invested with all the absolute , unlimited power sr. r. f. talks of ; if he should dye as soon as his heir were born , must not the child , notwithstanding he were never so free , never so much sovereign , be in subjection to his mother and nurse , to tutors and gonours , till age and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself , and others ? the necessities of his life , the health of his body , and the information of his mind would require him to be directed by the will of others and not his own : and yet will any one think , that this restraint and subjection were inconsistent with , or spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he had a right to : or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his nonage ? this government over him only prepared him the better , and sooner for it . if any body should ask me , when my son is of age to be free ; i shall answer , just when his monarch is of age to govern . but at what time , says the judicious hooker , eccl. pol. l. . § . . a man may be said to have attain'd so far forth the use of reason , as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws whereby he is then bound to guide his actions : this is a great deal more easie for sense to discern , than for any one , by skill and learning , to determine . . commonwealths themselves take notice of , and allow , that there is a time when men are to begin to act like free men , and therefore , till that time , require not oaths of fealty or allegiance , or other publick owning of , or submission to the government of their countreys . . the freedom then of man , and liberty of acting , according to his own will , is grounded on his having reason , which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by , and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will. to turn him loose to an unrestrain'd liberty , before he has reason to guide him , is not the allowing him the priviledge of his nature , to be free ; but to thrust him out amongst brutes , and abandon him to a state as wretched , and as much beneath that of a man , as theirs . this is that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of their children . god hath made it their business to imploy this care on their off-spring , and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper this power , to apply it as his wisdom designed it , to the childrens good , as long as they should need to be under it . . but what reason can hence advance this care , of the parents , due to their off-spring , into an absolute , arbitrary dominion of the father , whose power reaches no farther , than by such a discipline , as he finds most effectual , to give such strength and health to their bodies , such vigour and rectitude to their minds , as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves and others ; and , if it be necessary to his condition , to make them work , when they are able , for their own subsistence . but , in this power , the mother too has her share with the father . . nay this power so little belongs to the father , by any peculiar right of nature , but only as he is guardian of his children , that when he quits his care of them , he loses his power over them , which goes along with their nourishment and education , to which it is inseparably annexed , and belongs as much to the foster-father of an exposed child , as to the natural father of another . so little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his issue : if all his care ends there , and this be all the title he hath to the name and authority of a father : and what will become of this paternal power in that part of the world where one woman hath more than one husband at a time ? or in those parts of america , where , when the husband and wife part , which happens frequently , the children are all left to the mother , follow her , and are wholly under her care and provision ? and if the father die whilst the children are young , do they not naturally every where owe the same obedience to their mother , during their minority , as to their father , were he alive ? and will any one say , that the mother hath a legislative power over her children ; that she can make standing rules , which shall be of perpetual obligation , by which they ought to regulate all the concerns of their property , and bound their liberty all the course of their lives , and inforce the observation of them with capital punishments ? for this is the proper power of the magistrate , of which the father hath not so much as the shadow . his command over his children , is but temporary , and reaches not their life or property . it is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their non-age ; a discipline necessary to their education : and though a father may dispose of his own possessions , as he pleases , when his children are out of danger of perishing for want ; yet his power extends not to the lives or goods , which either their own industry , or anothers bounty , has made theirs ; nor to their liberty neither , when they are once arrived to the infranchisement of the years of discretion . the father's empire then ceases , and he can from thence forwards no more dispose of the liberty of his son than that of any other man. and it must be far from an absolute , or perpetual jurisdiction , from which a man may withdraw himself , having licence from divine authority , to leave father and mother , and cleave to his wife . . but though there be a time when a child comes to be as free from subjection to the will and command of his father , as he himself is free from subjection to the will of any body else , and they are both under no other restraint , but that which is common to them both , whether it be the law of nature , or municipal law of their country ; yet this freedom exempts not a son from that honour which he ought , by the law of god and nature , to pay his parents . god having made the parents instruments in his great design of continuing the race of mankind , and the occasions of life to their children , as he hath laid on them an obligation to nourish , preserve , and bring up their off-spring : so he has laid on the children a perpetual obligation of honouring their parents , which containing in it an inward esteem and reverence to be shewn by all outward expressions , ties up the child from any thing that may ever injure or affront , disturb , or endanger the happiness , or life of those from whom he received his : and engages him in all actions of defence , relief , assistance and comfort of those by whose means he entred into being , and has been made capable of any enjoyments of life . from this obligation no state , no freedom , can absolve children . but this is very far from giving parents a power of command over their children , or an authority to make laws , and dispose as they please of their lives or liberties . 't is one thing to owe honour , respect , gratitude and assistance ; another to require an absolute obedience and submission . the honour due to parents , a monarch in his throne owes his mother , and yet this lessens not his authority , nor subjects him to her government . . the subjection of a minor places in the father a temporary government , which terminates with the minority of the child . and the honour due from a child , places in the parents a perpetual right to respect , reverence , support and compliance to more , or less , as the father's care , cost and kindness , in his education , has been more or less . and this ends not with minority , but holds in all parts and conditions of a man's life . the want of distinguishing these two powers which the father hath in the right of tuition , during minority , and the right of honour all his life , may perhaps have caused a great part of the mistakes about this matter . for to speak properly of them , the first of these is rather the priviledge of children , and duty of parents , than any prerogative of paternal power . the nourishment and education of their children , is a charge so incumbent on parents for their childrens good , that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it . and though the power of commanding and chastising them go along with it , yet god hath woven into the principles of humane nature , such a tenderness for their off-spring , that there is little fear that parents should use their power with too much rigour ; the excess is seldom on the severe side , the strong biass of nature drawing the other way . and therefore god almighty , when he would express his gentle dealing with the israelites , he tells them , that though he chasten'd them , he chasten'd them as a man chastens his son , deut. . . i. e. with tenderness and affection , and kept them under no severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them ; and had been less kindness to have slacken'd . this is that power to which children are commanded obedience , that the pains and care of their parents may not be increased , or ill rewarded . . on the other side , honour and support all that which gratitude requires to return ; for the benefits received by and from them is the indispensible duty of the child , and the proper priviledge of the parents . this is intended for the parents advantage , as the other is for the childs ; though education , the parents duty , seems to have most power , because the ignorance and infirmities of childhood , stand in need of restraint and correction ; which is a visible exercise of rule , and a kind of dominion . and that duty which is comprehended in the word honour , requires less obedience , though the obligation be stronger on grown than younger children . for who can think the command , children obey your parents , requires in a man that has children of his own , the same submission to his father , as it does in his yet young children to him ; and that by this precept , he were bound to obey all his father's commands , if out of a conceit of authority he should have the indiscretion to treat him still as a boy . . the first part then of paternal power , or rather duty , which is education , belongs so to the father , that it terminates at a certain season ; when the business of education is over it ceases of it self ; and is also alienable before . for a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands ; and he that has made his son an apprentice to another , has discharged him , during that time , of a great part of his obedience , both to himself and to his mother . but all the duty of honour , the other part , remains never the less entire to them ; nothing can cancel that . it is so inseparable from them both , that the father's authority cannot dispossess the mother of this right , nor can any man discharge his son from honouring her that bore him . but both these are very far from a power to make laws , and inforceing them with penalties , that may reach estate , liberty , limbs and life . the power of commanding ends with non-age ; and though after that , honour and respect , support and defence , and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to , for the highest benefits he is naturally capable of , be always due from a son to his parents ; yet all this puts no scepter into the father's hand , no soveraign power of commanding . he has no dominion over his sons property or actions , nor any right that his will should prescribe to his sons in all things ; however it may become his son in many things , not very inconvenient to him and his family , to pay a deference to it . . a man may owe honour and respect to an ancient or wise man ; defence to his child or friend ; relief and support to the distressed ; and gratitude to a benefactor ; to such a degree , that all he has , all he can do , cannot sufficiently pay it . but all these give no authority , no right of making laws to any one over him from whom they are owing . and 't is plain , all this is due , not to the bare title of father ; not only because , as has been said , it is owing to the mother too : but because these obligations to parents , and the degrees of what is required of children , may be varied by the different care and kindness , trouble and expence , is often imployed upon one child more than another . . this shews the reason how it comes to pass , that parents in societies , where they themselves are subjects , retain a power over their children , and have as much right to their subjection , as those who are in the state of nature , which could not possibly be , if all political power were only paternal , and that , in truth , they were one and the same thing : for then , all paternal power being in the prince , the subject could naturally have none of it ; but these two powers , political and paternal , are so perfectly distinct and separate , and built upon so different foundations , and given to so different ends , that every subject , that is a father , has as much a paternal power over his children , as the prince has over his . and every prince that has parents , owes them as much filial duty and obedience , as the meanest of his subjects do to theirs ; and can therefore contain , not any part or degree of that kind of dominion , which a prince , or magistrate has over his subject . . though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children , and the obligation on children to honour their parents , contain all the power on the one hand , and submission on the other , which are proper to this relation ; yet there is another power , ordinarily , in the father , whereby he has a tye on the obedience of his children , which , though it be common to him with other men , yet the occasions of shewing it , almost constantly happening to fathers in their private families , and in instances of it else-where being rare , and less taken notice of , it passes in the world for a part of paternal iurisdiction . and this is the power men generally have , to bestow their estates on those who please them best . the possession of the father , being the expectation and inheritance of the children ordinarily , in certain proportions , according to the law and custom of each country ; yet it is commonly in the father's power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand , according as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with his will and humour . . this is no small tye to the obedience of children : and there being always annexed to the enjoyment of land , a submission to the government of the country , of which that land is a part . it has been commonly suppos'd , that , a father could oblige his posterity to that government , of which he himself was a subject , that his compact held them , whereas , it being only a necessary condition annex'd to the land , which is under that government , reaches only those who will take it on that condition , and so is no natural tye or engagement , but a voluntary submission . for every man's children being , by nature , as free as himself , or any of his ancestours ever were , may , whilst they are in that freedom , choose what society they will join themselves to , what commonwealth they will put themselves under . but if they will enjoy the inheritance of their ancestours , they must take it on the same terms their ancestours had it , and submit to all the conditions , annex'd to such a possession . by this power indeed , fathers oblige their children to obedience to themselves , even when they are past minority , and most commonly too , subject them to this or that political power . but neither of these by any peculiar right of father-hood , but by the reward they have in their hands to inforce and recompence such a compliance ; and is no more power than what a french-man has over an english-man , who by the hopes of an estate he will leave him , will certainly have a strong tye on his obedience : and if when it is left him , he will enjoy it , he must certainly take it upon the conditions annex'd to the possession of land , in that country where it lies , whether it be france or england . . to conclude then , though the father's power of commanding , extends no farther than the minority of his children , and to a degree only fit for the discipline , and government of that age. and though that honour and respect , and all that which the latins called piety , which they indispensibly owe to their parents all their life times , and in all estates , with all that support and defence , is due to them , gives the father no power of governing , i. e. making laws and exacting penalties on his children . though by this he has no dominion over the property or actions of his son ; yet 't is obvious to conceive , how easie it was , in the first ages of the world , and in places still where the thinness of people gives families leave to separate into unpossessed quarters , and they have room to remove and plant themselves in yet vacant habitations , for the father of the family to become the prince of it ; he had been a ruler from the beginning of the infancy of his children , and when they were grown up : since without some government it would be hard for them to live together , it was likelyest it should , by the express or tacit consent of the children , be in the father , where it seemed , without any change , barely to continue . and when indeed nothing more was required to it , than the permitting the father to exercise alone , in his family , that executive power of the law of nature , which every free-man naturally hath , and by that permission resigning up to him a monarchical power , whilst they remained in it . but that this was not by any paternal right , but only by the consent of his children , is evident from hence , that no body doubts but if a stranger , whom chance or business had brought to his family , had there kill'd any of his children , or committed any other fact , he might condemn and put him to death , or otherwise have punished him as well as any of his children , which was impossible he should do by virtue of any paternal authority , over one who was not his child ; but by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature , which , as a man , he had a right to : and he alone could punish him in his family , where the respect of his children had laid by the exercise of such a power , to give way to the dignity and authority they were willing should remain in him above the rest of his family . . thus 't was easie and almost natural for children by a tacit and almost natural consent , to make way for the father's authority and government . they had been accustomed in their child-hood , to follow his direction , and to refer their little differences to him , and when they were men , who fitter to rule them ? their little properties , and less covetousness , seldom afforded greater controversies ; and when any should arise , where could they have a fitter umpire , than he , by whose care they had every one been sustain'd and brought up , and who had a tenderness for them all ? 't is no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and full age , nor looked after one and twenty , or any other age , that might make them the free disposers of themselves and fortunes , when they could have no desire to be out of their pupilage . the government they had been under , during it , continued still to be more their protection than restraint : and they could no where find a greater security to their peace , liberties , and fortunes , than in the rule of a father . . thus the natural fathers of families , by an insensible change , became the politick monarchs of them too ; and as they chanced to live long , and leave able and worthy heirs , for several successions , or otherwise : so they laid the foundations of hereditary , or elective kingdoms under several constitutions , and manors , according as chance , contrivance , or occasions happen'd to mould them . but if princes have their titles in the fathers right , and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority ; because , they commonly were those , in whose hands , we find , de facto , the exercise of government : i say , if this argument be good , it will as strongly prove that all princes , nay princes only , ought to be priests , since 't is as certain that in the beginning , the father of the family was priest , as that he was ruler in his own houshold . chap. vii . of political or civil society . . god having made man such a creature , that , in his own judgment , it was not good for him to be alone , put him under strong obligations of necessity , convenience , and inclination , to drive him into society , as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it . the first society was betwen man and wife , which gave beginning to that between parents and children ; to which , in time , that between master and servant came to be added : and though all these might , and commonly did meet together , and make up but one family , wherein , the master or mistriss of it had some sort of rule , proper to a family ; each of these , or all together came short of political society , as we shall see if we consider the different ends , ties , and bounds of each of these . . conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman , and though it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one anothers bodies , as is necessary to its chief end , procreation ; yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance ; and a communion of interests too , as necessary , not only to unite their care and affection , but also necessary to their common off-spring , who have a right to be nourished and maintained by them , till they are able to provide for themselves . . for the end of conjunction between male and female , being not barely procreation , but the continuation of the species . this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to last , even after procreation , so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones , who are to be sustained by those that got them , till they are able to shift and provide for themselves . this rule , which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of his hands , we find , the inferiour creatures steadily obey . in those viviparous animals , which feed on grass , the conjunction between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of copulation ; because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young , till it be able to feed on grass : the male only begets , but concerns not himself for the female or young , to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing . but in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer ; because the dam not being able well to subsist her self , and nourish her numerous off-spring , by her own prey alone , a more laborious , as well as more dangerous way of living , than by feeding on grass : the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family , which cannot subsist , till they are able to prey for themselves , but by the joint care of male and female . the same is to be observed in all birds ( except some domestick ones , where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding , and taking care of the young brood ) whose young needing food in the nest , the cock and hen continue mates till the young are able to use their wing , and provide for themselves . . and herein , i think , lies the chief , if not the only reason , why the male and female , in mankind , are tyed to a longer conjunction , than other creatures ; viz. because the female is capable of conceiving , and de facto is commonly with child again , and brings forth too a new birth , long before the former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help , and able to shift for himself , and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents , whereby the father , who is bound to take care for those he hath begot , is under an obligation to continue in conjugal society , with the same woman , longer than other creatures , whose young being able to subsist of themselves , before the time of procreation returns again , the conjugal bond dissolves of it self , and they are at liberty ; till hymen , at his usual anniversary season , summons them again to chuse new mates . wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great creator , who , having given to man an ability , to lay up for the future , as well as supply the present necessity , hath made it necessary , that society of man and wife should be more lasting , than of male and female amongst other creatures : that so their industry might be encouraged , and their interest better united , to make provision , and lay up goods for their common issue ; which uncertain mixture , or easie , and frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb . . but though these are ties upon mankind , which make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting , in a man , than the other species of animals ; yet it would give one reason to enquire , why this compact , where procreation and education are secured , and inheritance taken care for , may not be made determinable , either by consent , or at a certain time , or upon certain conditions , as well as any other voluntary compacts ; there being no necessity , in the nature of the thing , nor to the ends of it , that it should always be for life ; i mean , to such as are under no restraint of any positive law , which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual . . but the husband and wife , though they have but one common concern , yet having different understandings , will , unavoidably sometimes , have different wills too : it therefore being necessary , that the last determination , i. e. the rule , should be placed somewhere ; it naturally falls to the man's share , as the abler and the stronger . but this , reaching but to the things of their common interest and property , leaves the wife in the full and true possession of what , by contract , is her peculiar right ; and at least gives the husband no more power over her than she has over his life . the power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch , that the wife has , in many cases , a liberty to separate from him ; where natural right , or their contract allows it ; whether that contract be made by themselves , in the state of nature , or by the customs or laws of the countrey they live in , and the children , upon such separation , fall to the father or mother's lot , as such contract does determine . . for all the ends of marriage being to be obtained , under politick government , as well as in the state of nature , the civil magistrate doth not abridge the right or power of either , naturally necessary to those ends , viz. procreation , and mutual support , and assistance , whilst they are together ; but only decides any controversie that may arise , between man and wife , about them . if it were otherwise , and that absolute soveraignty and power of life and death naturally belong'd to the husband , and were necessary to the society between man and wife , there could be no matrimony in any of these countries , where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority ; but the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband , it was not at all necessary to it : the condition of conjugal society put it not in him , but whatsoever might consist with procreation and support of the children , till they could shift for themselves : mutual assistance , comfort , and maintenance might be varied , and regulated , by that contract which first united them in that society ; nothing being necessary to any society , that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made . . the society betwixt parents and children , and the distinct rights and powers , belonging respectively to them , i have treated of so largely , in the foregoing chapter , that i shall not here need to say any thing of it . and i think it is plain , that it is far different from a politick society . . master and servant are names as old as history , but given to those of far different condition ; for a free-man makes himself a servant to another , by selling him , for a certain time , the service , he undertakes to do , in exchange , for wages he is to receive : and though this commonly puts him into the family of his master , and under the ordinary discipline thereof ; yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him , and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them . but there is another sort of servants , which , by a peculiar name , we call slaves , who , being captives , taken in a just war , are , by the right of nature , subjected to the absolute dominion , and arbitrary power of their masters . these men having , as i say , forfeited their lives , and , with it , their liberties , and lost their estates ; and being in the state of slavery , not capable of any property , cannot , in that state , be considered as any part of civil society ; the chief end whereof is the preservation of property . . let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife , children , servants and slaves , united under the domestick rule of a family ; which what resemblance soever it may have in its order , offices , and number too , with a little commonwealth ; yet is very far from it , both in its constitution , power and end : or if it must be thought a monarchy , and the paterfamilias , the absolute monarch in it , absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power , when 't is plain , by what has been said before , that the master of the family has a very distinct and differently limited power , both as to time and extent , over those several persons that are in it ; for excepting the slave ( and the family is as much a family , and his power as paterfamilias as great , whether there be any slaves in his family or no ) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them , and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he . and he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family , who has but a very limited one over every individual in it . but how a family , or any other society of men differ from that which is properly political society , we shall best see , by considering wherein political society it self consists . . man being born , as has been proved , with a title to perfect freedom , and an uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and priviledges of the law of nature , equally with any other man , or number of men in the world , hath by nature a power , not only to preserve his property , that is , his life , liberty and estate , against the injuries and attempts of other men ; but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others , as he is perswaded the offence deserves , even with death it self , in crimes where the heinousness of the fact , in his opinion , requires it . but because no political society can be , nor subsist without having in it self the power to preserve the property , and in order thereunto , punish the offences of all those of that society ; there , and there only is political society , where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power , refign'd it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it . and thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded , the community comes to be umpire ; and by understanding indiff●●ent rules and men authorised by the community for their execution , decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society , concerning any matter of right , and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society with such penalties as the law has established ; whereby it is easy to discern who are , and are not , in political society together . those who are united into one body , and have a common establish'd law and judicature to appeal to , with authority to decide controversies between them , and punish offenders , are in civil society one with another ; but those who have no such common appeal , i mean on earth , are still in the state of nature , each being where there is no other , judge for himself , and executioner ; which is , as i have before shew'd it , the perfect state of nature . . and thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions they think worthy of it , committed amongst the members of that society ( which is the power of making laws ) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members , by any one that is not of it , ( which is the power of war and peace ; ) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society , as far as is possible . but though every man enter'd into society , has quitted his power to punish offences against the law of nature , in prosecution of his own private judgment ; yet with the judgment of offences which he has given up to the legislative , in all cases where he can appeal to the magistrate , he has given up a right to the commonwealth , to imploy his force for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth , whenever he shall be called to it , which indeed are his own judgments , they being made by himself or his representative . and herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society , which is to judge by standing laws how far offences are to be punished when committed within the commonwealth ; and also by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact , how far injuries from without are to be vindicated , and in both these to imploy all the force of all the members when there shall be need . . whereever therefore any number of men so unite into one society , as to quit every one his executive power of the law of nature , and to resign it to the publick , there and there only is a political , or civil society . and this is done whereever any number of men , in the state of nature , enter into society to make one people , one body politick under one supream government ; or else when any one joins himself to , and incorporates with any government already made . for hereby he authorizes the society , or which is all one , the legislative thereof to make laws for him as the publick good of the society shall require ; to the execution whereof , his own assistance ( as to his own decrees ) is due . and this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a commonwealth , by setting up a judge on earth , with authority to determine all the controversies , and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth ; which judge is the legislative or magistrates appointed by it . and whereever there are any number of men , however associated , that have no such decisive power to appeal to , there they are still in the state of nature . . and hence it is evident , that absolute monarchy which by some men is counted for the only government in the world , is indeed inconsistent with civil society , and so can be no form of civil government at all : for the end of civil society , being to avoid and remedy those inconveniencies of the state of nature which necessarily follow from every man 's being judge in his own case , by setting up a known authority , to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received , or controversy that may arise , and which every one of the society ought to obey . where-ever any persons are who have not such an authority to appeal to , and decide any difference between them there , those persons are still in the state of nature . and so is every absolute prince in respect of those who are under his dominion . . for he being suppos'd to have all , both legislative and executive power in himself alone , there is no judge to be found , no appeal lies open to any one , who may fairly and indifferently , and with authority decide , and from whence relief and redress may be expected of any injury or inconveniency that may be suffered from him , or by his order . so that such a man , however intitled czar , or grand signior , or how you please , is as much in the state of nature , with all under his dominion , as he is with the rest of mankind . for wherever any two men are , who have no standing rule , and common judge to appeal to on earth , for the determination of controversies of right , betwixt them , there they are still in the state of nature , and under all the inconveniencies of it , with only this woful difference to the subject , or rather slave of an absolute prince ; that whereas , in the ordinary state of nature , he has a liberty to judge of his right , and according to the best of his power , to maintain it : but whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch ; he has not only no appeal , as those in society ought to have , but , as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures , is denied a liberty to judge of , or defend his right , and so is exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies that a man can fear from one , who being in the unrestrained state of nature , is yet corrupted with flattery , and armed with power . . for he that thinks absolute power purifies mens bloods , and corrects the baseness of humane nature , need read but the history of this , or any other age , to be convinced of the contrary . he that would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of america , would not probably be much better in a throne , where perhaps learning and religion shall be found out to justifie all that he shall do to his subjects ; and the sword presently silence all those that dare question it . for what the protection of absolute monarchy is ; what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be ; and to what a degree of happiness , and security it carries civil society , where this sort of government is grown to perfection , he that will look into the late relation of ceylon may easily see . . in absolute monarchies indeed , as well as other governments of the world , the subjects have an appeal to the law , and judges to decide any controversies , and restrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves , one amongst another . this every one thinks necessary , and believes , he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to society and mankind , who should go about to take it away . but whether this be from a true love of mankind and society , & such a charity as we owe all one to another , there is reason to doubt . for this is no more than what every man , who loves his own power , profit , or greatness , may , and naturally must do ; keep those animals from hurting , or destroying one another , who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage ; and so are taken care of , not out of any love the master has for them , but love of himself , and the profit they bring him . for if it be asked what security , what fence is there , in such a state , against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler ? the very question can scarce be born . they are ready to tell you , that it deserves death only to ask after safety . betwixt subject and subject , they will grant , there must be measures , laws , and judges for their mutual peace and security . but as for the ruler , he ought to be absolute , and is above all such circumstancés ; because he has a power to do more hurt and wrong , 't is right when he does it . to ask how you may be guarded from harm , or injury , on that side , where the strongest hand is to do it , is presently the voice of faction and rebellion . as if when men , quitting the state of nature , entered into society , they agreed that all of them , but one , should be under the restraint of laws ; but that he should still retain all the liberty of the state of nature , increased with power , and made licentious by impunity . this is to think that men are so foolish , that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by pole-cats , or foxes , but are content , nay think it safety , to be devoured by lions . . but , whatever flatterers may talk , to amuze peoples understandings , it never hinders men from feeling ; and when they perceive that any man , in what station soever , is out of the bounds of the civil society they are of , and that they have no appeal , on earth , against any harm they may receive from him , they are apt to think themselves in the state of nature , in respect of him , whom they find to be so ; and to take care , as soon as they can , to have that safety and security , in civil society , for which it was first instituted , and for which only they entered into it . and therefore , though perhaps at first , as shall be shewed more at large hereafter , in the following part of this discourse , some one good and excellent man having got a preheminency , amongst the rest , had this deference paid to his goodness and vertue , as to a kind of natural authority , that the chief rule , with arbitration of their differences , by a tacit consent , devolved into his hands , without any other caution , but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom ; yet when time giving authority , and , as some men would perswade us , sacredness to customs , which the negligent , and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began , had brought in successors of another stamp , the people finding their properties not secure under the government as then it was . ( whereas government has no other end but the preservation of property ) could never be safe , nor at rest , nor think themselves in civil society , till the legislative was so placed in collective bodies of men , call them senate , parliament , or what you please , by which means every single person became subject equally , with other the meanest men , to those laws , which he himself , as part of the legislative , had established ; nor could any one , by his own authority , avoid the force of the law , when once made , nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption , thereby to license his own , or the miscarriages of any of his dependants : no man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it . for if any man may do what he thinks fit , and there be no appeal on earth , for redress or security against any harm he shall do ; i ask , whether he be not perfectly still in the state of nature , and so can be no part or member of that civil society , unless any one will say , the state of nature and civil society , are one and the same thing , which i have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm . chap. viii . of the beginning of political societies . . men being , as has been said , by nature , all free , equal and independent ; no one can be put out of this estate , and subjected to the political power of another , without his own consent , which is done by agreeing , with other men , to join and unite into a community , for their comfortable , safe , and peaceable living , one amongst another , in a secure enjoyment of their properties , and a greater security against any that are not of it . this any number of men may do , because it injures not the freedom of the rest ; they are left , as they were , in the liberty of the state of nature . when any number of men have so consented to make one community or government , they are thereby presently incorporated , and make one body politick , wherein the majority have a right , to act and conclude the rest . . for when any number of men , have by the consent of every individual , made a community , they have thereby made that community one body , with a power to act as one body , which is only by the will and determination of the majority . for that which acts any community , being only the consent of the individuals of it , and it being one body must move one way ; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it , which is the consent of the majority : or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body , one community , which the consent of every individual that united into it , agreed that it should ; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority . and therefore we see , that in assemblies impowred to act by positive laws where no number is set , by that positive law which impowers them , the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole , and of course determines , as having by the law of nature and reason , the power of the whole . . and thus every man by consenting with others to make one body politick , under one government , puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society , to submit to the determination of the majority , and to be concluded by it ; or else this original compact , whereby he with others incorporates into one society , would signifie nothing , and be no compact if he be left free , and under no other ties than he was in before in the state of nature . for what appearance would there be of any compact ? what new engagement , if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society , than he himself thought fit , and did actually consent to ? this would be still as great a liberty as he himself had before his compact , or any one else in the state of nature , who may submit himself and consent to any acts of it if he thinks fit . . for if the consent of the majority shall not in reason be received as the act of the whole , and conclude every individual ; nothing but the consent of every individual can make any thing to be the act of the whole , which , considering the infirmities of health , and avocations of business , which in a number , though much less than that of a commonwealth , will necessarily keep many away from the publick assembly ; and the variety of opinions and contrariety of interests which unavoidably happen in all collections of men , 't is next impossible ever to be had . and therefore if coming into society be upon such terms , it will be only like cato's coming into the theatre , tantum at exiret . such a constitution as this would make the mighty leviathan of a shorter duration than the feeblest creatures ; and not let it outlast the day it was born in , which cannot be suppos'd till we can think that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved . for where the majority cannot conclude the rest , there they cannot act as one body ; and consequently , will be immediately dissolved again . . whosoever therefore , out of a state of nature , unite into a community , must be understood to give up all the power necessary to the ends for which they unite into society , to the majority of the community , unless they expresly agreed in any number greater than the majority . and this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one political society , which is all the compact that is , or needs be , between the individuals that enter into or make up a commonwealth . and thus that which begins and actually constitutes any political society , is nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of majority , to unite and incorporate into such a society . and this is that , and that only , which did or could give beginning to any lawful government in the world. . to this i find two objections made . . that there are no instances to be found in story , of a company of men independant and equal one amongst another , that met together , and in this way began and set up a government . . 't is impossible of right that men should do so ; because all men being born under government , they are to submit to that , and are not at liberty to begin a new one . . to the first , there is this to answer , that it is not at all to be wonder'd that history gives us but a very little account of men that lived together in the state of nature . the inconveniencies of that condition , and the love and want of society , no sooner brought any number of them together , but they presently united and incorporated , if they designed to continue together . and if we may not suppose men ever to have been in the state of nature , because we hear not much of them in such a state ; we may as well suppose the armies of salmanasser , or xerxes , were never children , because we hear little of them till they were men , and imbodied in armies . government is every where antecedent to records , and letters seldom come in amongst a people till a long continuation of civil society , has by other more necessary arts , provided for their safety , ease and plenty . and then they begin to look after the history of their founders , and search into their original when they have outlived the memory of it . for 't is with commonwealths as with particular persons , they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies : and if they know any thing of it , they are beholding for it to the accidental records that others have kept of it . and those that we have of the beginning of any polities in the world , excepting that of the jews , where god himself immediately interpos'd , and which favours not at all paternal dominion ; are all either plain instances of such a beginning as i have mentioned , or at least have manifest footsteps of it . . he must shew a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact when it agrees not with his hypothesis ; who will not allow , that the beginning of rome and venice were by the uniting together of several men free and independent one of another , amongst whom there was no natural superiority or subjection . and if iosephus acosta's word may be taken , he tells us , that in many parts of america there was no government at all . there are great and apparent conjectures , says he , that these men , speaking of those of peru , for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths , but lived in troops , as they do this day in florida , the cheriquanas , those of bresil , and many other nations , which have no certain kings , but as occasion is offered in peace or war , they choose their captains as they please . l. . c. . if it be said , that every man there was born subject to his father , or the head of his family . that the subjection due from a child to a father , took not away his freedom of uniting into what political society he thought fit , has been already proved . but be that as it will , these men , 't is evident , were actually free ; and whatever superiority some politicians now would place in any of them , they themselves claimed it not ; but by consent were all equal , till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves . so that their politick societies all began from a voluntary union , and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governours , and forms of government . . and i hope those who went away from sparta , with palantus , mentioned by iustin l. will be allowed to have been freemen independent one of another , and to have set up a government over themselves , by their own consent . thus i have given several examples out of history , of people free and in the state of nature , that being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth . and if the want of such instances be an argument to prove , that government were not , nor could not be so begun , i suppose the contenders for paternal empire were better let it alone , than urge it against natural liberty . for if they can give so many instances out of history , of governments began upon paternal right , i think ( though at least an argument from what has been , to what should of right , be of no great force ) one might , without any great danger , yield them the cause . but if i might advise them in the case , they would do well not to search too much into the original of governments , as they have begun de facto , lest they should find at the foundation of most of them , something very little favourable to the design they promote , and such a power as they contend for . . but , to conclude , reason being plain on our side , that men are naturally free ; and the examples of history shewing that the governments of the world , that were begun in peace , had their beginning laid on that foundation , and were made by the consent of the people : there can be little room for doubt , either where the right is , or what has been the opinion , or practice of mankind about the first erecting of governments . . i will not deny , that if we look back , as far as history will direct us , towards the original of commonwealths , we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man. and i am also apt to believe , that where a family was numerous enough to subsist by it self , and continued entire together , without mixing with others , as it often happens ; where there is much land , and few people , the government commonly began in the father . for the father having , by the law of nature , the same power , with every man else , to punish , as he thought fit , any offences against that law , might thereby punish his transgressing children , even when they were men , and out of their pupilage ; and they were very likely to submit to his punishment , and all join with him against the offender in their turns , giving him thereby power to execute his sentence against any transgression , and so in effect make him the law-maker and governour over all that remained in conjunction with his family . he was fittest to be trusted ; paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care , and the custom of obeying him in their childhood , made it easier to submit to him rather than any other . if therefore they must have one to rule them , as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that live together ; who so likely to be the man as he that was their common father , unless negligence , cruelty , or any other defect of mind or body , made him unfit for it . but when either the father died , and left his next heir for want of age , wisdom , courage , or any other qualities less fit for rule , or where several families met and consented to continue together : there , 't is not to be doubted , but they used their natural freedom to set up him whom they judged the ablest and most likely to rule well over them . conformable hereunto we find the people of america , who living out of the reach of the conquering swords and spreading domination of the two great empires of peru and mexico , enjoy'd their own natural freedom ; though , caeteris paribus , they commonly prefer the heir of their deceased king ; yet if they find him any way weak or uncapable , they pass him by , and set up the stoutest and bravest man for their ruler . . thus , though looking back as far as records give us any account of peopling the world , and the history of nations , we commonly find the government to be in one hand , yet it destroys not that which i affirm ( viz. ) that the beginning of politick society depends upon the consent of the individuals to join into and make one society ; who when they are thus incorporated , might set up what form of government they thought fit . but this having given occasion to men to mistake and think , that by nature government was monarchical , and belong'd to the father , it may not be amiss , here to consider , why people , in the beginning , generally pitch'd upon this form , which though perhaps the father's preheminency might , in the first institution of some commonwealths , give a rise to , and place in the beginning , the power in one hand : yet it is plain that the reason that continued the form of government in a single person , was not any regard or respect to paternal authority ; since all petty monarchies , that is , almost all monarchies , near their original , have been commonly , at least upon occasion , elective . . first then , in the beginning of things , the father's government of the childhood of those sprung from him , having accustomed them to the rule of one man , and taught them , that where it was exercised with care and skill , with affection and love to those under it , it was sufficient to procure and preserve men ( all the political happiness they sought for , in society . ) it was no wonder that they should pitch upon , and naturally run into that form of government , which , from their infancy , they had been all accustomed to ; and which , by experience , they had found both easie and safe . to which , if we add , that monarchy being simple , and most obvious to men , whom neither experience had instructed in forms of government , nor the ambition or insolence of empire had taught to beware of the encroachments of prerogative , or the inconveniencies of absolute power ; which monarchy , in succession , was apt to lay claim to , and bring upon them . it was not at all strange , that they should not much trouble themselves to think of methods of restraining any exorbitances of those , to whom they had given the authority over them ; and of ballancing the power of government , by placing several parts of it in different hands . they had neither felt the oppression of tyrannical dominion , nor did the fashion of the age , nor their possessions , or way of living , which afforded little matter for covetousness or ambition ; give them any reason to apprehend or provide against it ; and therefore 't is no wonder they put themselves into such a frame of government , as was , not only , as i said , most obvious and simple , but also best suited to their present state and condition ; which stood more in need of defence against foreign invasions and injuries , than of multiplicity of laws , where there was but very little property : and wanted not variety of rulers and abundance of officers to direct and look after their execution , where there were but few trespasses , and few offenders . since then , those who liked one another so well as to join into society , cannot but be supposed to have some acquaintance and friendship together , and some trust one in another . they could not but have greater apprehensions of others , than of one another ; and therefore their first care and thought cannot but be supposed to be how to secure themselves against foreign force . 't was natural for them to put themselves under a frame of government , which might best serve to that end ; and chuse the wisest and bravest man to conduct them in their wars , and lead them out against their enemies , and in this chiefly be their ruler . . thus we see that the kings of the indians , in america , which is still a pattern of the first ages in asia and europe , whilst the inhabitants were too few for the countrey , and want of people and money gave men no temptation to enlarge their possessions of land , or contest for wider extent of ground ; are little more than generals of their armies : and though they command absolutely in war , yet at home , and in time of peace , they exercise very little dominion , and have but a very moderate sovereignty ; the resolutions of peace and war , being ordinarily either in the people , or in a council . though the war it self , which admits not of pluralities of governours , naturally devolves the command into the king's sole authority . . and thus in israel it self , the chief business of their judges , and first kings , seems to have been to be captains in war , and leaders of their armies ; which , ( besides what is signified by , going out and in before the people , which was , to march forth to war , and home again in the heads of their forces ) appears plainly in the story of iephtha . the ammonites making war upon israel , the gileadites , in fear , send to iephtha , a bastard of their family , whom they had cast off , and article with him , if he will assist them against the ammonites , to make him their ruler ; which they do in these words , and the people made him head and captain over them , iudg. . . which was , as it seems , all one as to be judge . and he judged israel , iudg. . . that is , was their captain-general , six years . so when iotham upbraids the shechemites with the obligation they had to gideon , who had been their judge and ruler , he tells them , he fought for you , and adventured his life far , and delivered you out of the hands of midian , iudg. . . nothing mentioned of him , but what he did as a general , and indeed , that is all is found in his history , or in any of the rest of the judges . and abimelech particularly is called king , though at most he was but their general . and when , being weary of the ill conduct of samuel's sons , the children of israel desired a king , like all the nations to judge them , and to go out before them , and to fight their battels , sam. . . god granting their desire , says to samuel , i will send thee a man , and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people israel that he may save my peole out of the hands of the philistines , c. . v. . as if the only business of a king had been to lead out their armies , and fight in their defence ; and , accordingly , at his inauguration , pouring a vial of oyl upon him , declares to saul , that , the lord had anointed him to be captain over his inheritance , c. . v. . and therefore those , who after saul's being solemnly chosen , and saluted king by the tribes , at mispah , were unwilling to have him their king , make no other objection but this , how shall this man save us ? v. . as if they should have said , this man is unfit to be our king , not having skill and conduct enough in war , to be able to defend us . and when god resolved to transfer the government to david , it is in these words , but now thy kingdom shall not continue : the lord hath sought him a man after his own heart , and the lord hath commanded him to be captain over his people , c. . v. . as if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general : and therefore the tribes who had stuck to saul's family , and opposed david's reign , when they came to hebron with terms of submission to him , they tell him , amongst other arguments they had to submit to him as to their king , that he was , in effect , their king in saul's time , and therefore , they had no reason but to receive him as their king now . also ( say they ) in time past , when saul was king over us , thou wast he that leddest out and broughtest in israel , and the lord said unto thee , thou shalt feed my people israel , and thou shalt be a captain over israel . . thus , whether a family , by degrees , grew up into a commonwealth , and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son , every one in his turn growing up under it , tacitly submitted to it , and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one , every one acquiesced , till time seemed to have confirmed it , and setled a right of succession , by prescription : or whether several families , or the descendants of several families , whom chance , neighbourhood , or business brought together , united into society ; the need of a general , whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war , and the great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but vertuous age , such as are almost all those which begin governments that ever come to last in the world , gave men one of another , made the first beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man's hand , without any other express limitation or restraint , but what the nature of the thing , and the end of government required . it was given them for the publick good and safety , and to those ends in the infancies of common-wealths , they commonly used it , and unless they had done so , young societies could not have subsisted ; without such nursing fathers : without this care of the governours , all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy , the prince and the people had soon perished together . . but the golden age ( tho' before vain ambition , and amor sceleratus habendi , evil concupiscence had corrupted mens minds into a mistake of true power and honour ) had more virtue , and consequently , better governours , as well as less vicious subjects ; and there was then no stretching prerogative on the one side to oppress the people ; nor , consequently , on the other , any dispute about priviledge , to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate : and so no contest betwixt rulers and people , about governours or government . yet , when ambition , and luxury , in future ages , would retain , and increase the power , without doing the business , for which it was given , and aided by flattery , taught princes to have distinct and separate interests , from their people ; men found it necessary to examine , more carefully , the original and rights of government ; and to find out ways to restrain the exorbitances , and prevent the abuses of that power , which they having intrusted in another's hands , only for their own good , they found , was made use of to hurt them . . thus we may see how probable it is , that people , that were naturally free , and , by their own consent , either submitted to the government of their father , or united together , out of different families , to make a government ; should generally put the rule into one man's hands , and chuse to be under the conduct of a single person ; without so much , as by express conditions , limiting or regulating his power , which they thought safe enough in his honesty and prudence . though they never dream'd of monarchy being iure divino , which we never heard of among mankind , till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age ; nor ever allowed paternal power to have a right to dominion , or to be the foundation of all government . and thus much may suffice to shew , that , as far as we have any light from history , we have reason to conclude , that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people . i say peaceful , because i shall have occasion , in another place , to speak of conquest , which some esteem a way of beginning of governments . the other objection , i find , urged against the beginning of polities , in the way i have mentioned , is this , viz. . that all men being born under government , some or other , it is impossible any of them should ever be free , and at liberty , to unite together , and begin a new one , or ever be able to erect a lawful government . if this argument be good ; i ask , how came so many lawful monarchies into the world ? for if any body , upon this supposition , can shew me any one man , in any age of the world , free to begin a lawful monarchy ; i will be bound to shew him ten other free men at liberty , at the same time , to unite and begin a new government under a regal , or any other form. it being demonstration , that if any one , born under the dominion of another , may be so free , as to have a right to command others , in a new and distinct empire ; every one that is born under the dominion of another may be so free too , and may become a ruler , or subject , of a distinct separate government . and so by this their own principle , either all men however born are free , or else there is but one lawful prince , one lawful government in the world. and then they have nothing to do but barely to shew us which that is . which when they have done , i doubt not but all mankind will easily agree to pay obedience to him . . though it be a sufficient answer to their objection to shew , that it involves them in the same difficulties that it doth those they use it against ; yet i shall endeavour to discover the weakness of this argument a little farther . all men , say they , are born under government , and therefore they cannot be at liberty to begin a new one . every one is born a subject to his father , or his prince , and is therefore under the perpetual tie of subjection and allegiance . 't is plain , mankind never owned nor considered any such natural subjection that they were born in , to one or to the other , that tied them , without their own consents , to a subjection to them and their heirs . . for there are no examples so frequent in history , both sacred and prophane , as those of men withdrawing themselves , and their obedience , from the jurisdiction they were born under , and the family or community they were bred up in , and setting up new governments in other places , from whence sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages , and which always multiplied as long as there was room enough , till the stronger , or more fortunate swallow'd the weaker ; and those great ones again breaking to pieces , dissolved into lesser dominions . all which are so many testimonies against paternal soveraignty , and plainly prove , that it was not the natural right of the father descending to his heirs , that made governments in the beginning ; since it was impossible , upon that ground , there should have been so many little kingdoms , but only one universal monarchy , if men had not been at liberty to separate themselves from their families and their government , be it what it will that was set up in it , and go and make distinct commonwealths and other governments as they thought fit . . this has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to this day : nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind , that they are born under constituted and ancient polities , that have established laws and set forms of government , than if they were born in the woods , amongst the unconfined inhabitants that run loose in them . for those who would perswade us , that by being born under any government , we are naturally subjects to it , and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the state of nature , have no other reason ( bating that of paternal power , which we have already answer'd ) to produce for it , but only because our fathers or progenitors passed away their natural liberty , and thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to the government , which they themselves submitted to . 't is true , that whatever engagements or promises any one made for himself , he is under the obligation of them , but cannot by any compact whatsoever , bind his children or posterity . for his son , when a man , being altogether as free as the father , any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son , than it can of any body else . he may indeed annex such conditions to the land he enjoyed , as a subject of any commonwealth , as may oblige his son to be of that community , if he will enjoy those possessions which were his fathers ; because that estate being his fathers property , he may dispose or settle it as he pleases . . and this has generally given the occasion to the mistake in this matter ; because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be dismembred , nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community , the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father , but under the same terms his father did ; by becoming a member of the society ; whereby he puts himself presently under the government , he finds there established , as much as any other subject of that commonweal . and thus the consent of free-men , born under government , which only makes them members of it , being given separately in their turns , as each comes to be of age , and not in a multitude together ; people take no notice of it , and thinking it not done at all , or not necessary , conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men. . but , 't is plain , governments themselves understand it otherwise ; they claim no power over the son , because of that they had over the father ; nor look on children as being their subjects , by their fathers being so . if a subject of england have a child , by an english woman , in france , whose subject is he ? not the king of england's ; for he must have leave to be admitted to the priviledges of it . nor the king of france's ; for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away , and breed him as he pleases : and who ever was judged as a traytor or deserter , if he left , or warr'd against a countrey , for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens there ? 't is plain then , by the practice of governments themselves , as well as by the law of right reason , that a child is born a subject of no country nor government . he is under his father's tuition and authority , till he come to age of discretion ; and then he is a free-man , at liberty what government he will put himself under ; what body politick he will unite himself to . for if an english-man's son , born in france , be at liberty , and may do so , 't is evident there is no tye upon him , by his father's being a subject of that kingdom ; nor is he bound up , by any compact of his ancestors : and why then hath not his son , by the same reason , the same liberty , though he be born any where else ! since the power that a father hath naturally , over his children , is the same , where-ever they be born ; and the ties of natural obligations , are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths . . every man being , as has been shewed , naturally free , and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power , but only his own consent : it is to be considered , what shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent , to make him subject to the laws of any government . there is a common distinction of an express , and a tacit consent ; which will concern our present case . no body doubts but an express consent , of any man , entering into any society , makes him a perfect member of that society , a subject of that government . the difficulty is , what ought to be look'd upon as a tacit consent , and how far it binds , i. e. how far any one shall be looked on to have consented , and thereby submitted to any government , where he has made no expressions of it at all . and to this i say , that every man , that hath any possession , or enjoyment , of any part of the dominions of any government , doth thereby give his tacit consent , and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government , during such enjoyment , as any one under it ; whether this his possession be of land , to him and his heirs for ever , or a lodging only for a week ; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the high-way ; and , in effect , it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government . . to understand this the better , it is fit to consider , that every man , when he , at first , incorporates himself into any commonwealth , he , by his uniting himself thereunto , annexed also , and submits to the community those possessions , which he has , or shall acquire , that do not already belong to any other government . for it would be a direct contradiction , for any one , to enter into society with others for the securing and regulating of property : and yet to suppose his land , whose property is to be regulated by the laws of the society , should be exempt from the jurisdiction of that government , to which he himself , and the property of the land , is a subject . by the same act therefore , whereby any one unites his person , which was before free , to any commonwealth ; by the same he unites his possessions , which were before free , to it also ; and they become , both of them , person and possession , subject to the government and dominion of that commonwealth , as long as it hath a being . who-ever therefore , from thenceforth , by inheritance , purchases permission , or otherwise enjoys any part of the land , so annext to , and under the government of that commonweal , must take it with the condition it is under ; that is , of submitting to the government of the commonwealth , under whose jurisdiction it is , as far forth , as any subject of it . . but since the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the land , and reaches the possessor of it , ( before he has actually incorporated himself in the society ) only as he dwells upon , and enjoys that : the obligation any one is under , by virtue of such enjoyment , to submit to the government , begins and ends with the enjoyment ; so that when-ever the owner , who has given nothing but such a tacit consent , to the government , will , by donation , sale , or otherwise , quit the said possession : he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth , or agree with others to begin a new one , in vacuis locis , in any part of the world they can find free and unpossessed : whereas he that has once , by actual agreement , and any express declaration , given his consent to be of any commonweal , is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be , and remain unalterably a subject to it , and can never be again in the liberty of the state of nature ; unless , by any calamity , the government , he was under , comes to be dissolved . . but submitting to the laws of any countrey ; living quietly , and enjoying priviledges and protection under them , makes not a man a member of that society ; 't is only a local protection and homage due to , and from all those , who , not being in a state of war , come within the territories belonging to any government , to all parts whereof the force of its law extends . but this no more makes a man a member of that society , a perpetual subject of that commonwealth ; than it would make a man a subject to another in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some time ; though , whilst he continued in it , he were obliged to comply with the laws , and submit to the government he found there . and thus we see , that foreigners , by living all their lives under another government , and enjoying the priviledges and protection of it , though they are bound , even in conscience , to submit to its administration , as far forth as any denison ; yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that commonwealth . nothing can make any man so , but his actually entering into it by positive engagement , and express promise and compact . this is that , which i think , concerning the beginning of political societies , and that consent which makes any one a member of any commonwealth . chap. ix . of the ends of political society and government . . if man in the state of nature be so free as has been said ; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions , equal to the greatest , and subject to no body , why will he part with his freedom , this empire , and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power ? to which 't is obvious to answer , that though in the state of nature he hath such a right , yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain , and constantly exposed to the invasion of others ; for all being kings as much as he , every man his equal , and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice ; the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe , very unsecure . this makes him willing to quit this condition , which however free , is full of fears and continual dangers : and 't is not without reason , that he seeks out , and is willing to join in society with others who are already united , or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives , liberties and estates , which i call by the general name , property . . the great and chief end therefore , of mens uniting into commonwealths , and putting themselves under government , is the preservation of their property . to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting . first , there wants an establish'd , setled , known law , received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong , and the common measure to decide all controversies between them . for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures ; yet men being biassed by their interest , as well as ignorant for want of study of it , are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases . . secondly , in the state of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge , with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. for every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of nature , men being partial to themselves , passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far , and with too much heat in their own cases , as well as negligence and unconcernedness , make them too remiss in other mens . . thirdly , in the state of nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right , and to give it due execution . they who by any injustice offended , will seldom fail , where they are able , by force to make good their injustice ; such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous , and frequently destructive to those who attempt it . . thus mankind , notwithstanding all the priviledges of the state of nature , being but in an ill condition while they remain in it , are quickly driven into society . hence it comes to pass , that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. the inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to , by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others , make them take sanctuary under the establish'd laws of government , and therein seek the preservation of their property . 't is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them ; and by such rules as the community , or those authorised by them , to that purpose shall agree on . and in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power , as well as of the governments and societies themselves . . for in the state of nature , to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights , a man has two powers . the first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of nature ; by which law , common to them all , he and all the rest of mankind , are one community , make up one society distinct from all other creatures , and were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men , there would be no need of any other , no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community , and associate into lesser combinations . the other power a man has in the state of nature , is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. both these he gives up when he joins in a private , if i may so call it , or particular political society , and incorporates into any commonwealth , separate from the rest of mankind . . the first power , viz. of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself , and the rest of mankind , he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society , so far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require ; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of nature . . secondly , the power of punishing he wholly gives up , and engages his natural force , which he might before imploy in the execution of the law of nature , by his own single authority , as he thought fit , to assist the executive power of the society , as the law thereof shall require . for being now in a new state , wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies from the labour , assistance and society of others in the same community , as well as protection from its whole strength ; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty , in providing for himself , as the good , prosperity and safety of the society shall require ; which is not only necessary but just , since the other members of the society do the like . . but though men when they enter into society , give up the equality , liberty , and executive power they had in the state of nature , into the hands of the society , to be so far disposed of by the legislative , as the good of the society shall require ; yet it being only with an intention in every one , the better to preserve himself , his liberty and property . ( for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse ) the power of the society , or legislative , constituted by them , can never be suppos'd to extend farther than the common good ; but is obliged to secure every ones property by providing against those three defects above-mentioned , that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy . and so whoever has the legislative or supream power of any common-wealth , is bound to govern by establish'd standing laws , promulgated and known to the people , and not by extemporary decrees ; by indifferent and upright judges , who are to decide controversies by those laws . and to imploy the force of the community at home , only in the execution of such laws , or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries , and secure the community from inroads and invasion . and all this to be directed to no other end , but the peace , safety , and publick good of the people . chap. x. of the forms of a commonwealth . . the majority having , as has been shew'd , upon mens first uniting into society , the whole power of the community , naturally in them , may imploy all that power in making laws for the community from time to time , and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing ; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy : or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men , and their heirs or successors ; and then it is an oligarchy : or else into the hands of one man , and then it is a monarchy : if to him and his heirs , it is an hereditary monarchy : if to him only for life , but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor , to return to them ; an elective monarchy . and so accordingly of these make compounded and mixed forms of government , as they think good . and if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives , or any limited time , and then the supream power to revert to them again ; when it is so reverted , the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please , and so constitute a new form of government . for the form of government depending upon the placing the supream power , which is the legislative , it being impossible to conceive , that an inferiour power should prescribe to a superiour , or any but the supream make laws , according as the power of making laws is placed , such is the form of the commonwealth . . by commonwealth , i must be understood all along to mean , not a democracy , or any form of government , but any independent community which the latins signified by the word civitas , to which the word which best answers in our language , is commonwealth , and most properly expresses such a society of men , which community does not , for there may be subordinate communities in a government ; and city much less ; and therefore to avoid ambiguity , i crave leave to use the word commonwealth in that sence ; in which sense i find the word used by k. iames himself , which i think to be its genuine signification ; which if any body dislike , i consent with him to change it for a better . chap. xi . of the extent of the legislative power . . the great end of mens entering into society , being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety , and the great instrument and means of that being the laws establish'd in that society : the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths , is the establishing of the legislative power , as the first and fundamental natural law which is to govern even the legislative : it self is the preservation of the society , and ( as far as will consist with the publick good ) of every person in it . this legislative is not only the supream power of the commonwealth , but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it ; nor can any edict of any body else , in what form soever conceived , or by what power soever backed , have the force and obligation of a law , which has not its sanction from that legislative which the publick has chosen and appointed : for without this the law could not have that which is absolutely necessary to its being a law , the consent of the society , over whom no body can have a power to make laws but by their own consent , and by authority received from them ; and therefore-all the obedience , which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay , ultimately , terminates in this supream power , and is directed by those laws which it enacts ; nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever , or any domestick subordinate power , discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative , acting pursuant to their trust , nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted , or farther than they do allow ; it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society which is not the supream . . though the legislative , whether placed in one or more , whether it be always in being , or only by intervals , though it be the supream power in every commonwealth ; yet , first , it is not , nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary , over the lives and fortunes of the people . for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person , or assembly , which is legislator ; it can be no more than those persons had in a state of nature before they enter'd into society , and gave it up to the community . for no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself ; and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself , or over any other , to destroy his own life , or take away the life or property of another . a man , as has been proved , cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another ; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power over the life , liberty , or possession of another , but only so much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself , and the rest of mankind ; this is all he doth , or can give up to the commonwealth , and by it to the legislative power , so that the legislative can have no more than this . their power in the utmost bounds of it , is limited to the publick good of the society . it is a power that hath no other end but preservation , and therefore can never have a right to destroy , enslave , or designedly to impoverish the subjects ; the obligations of the law of nature cease not in society , but only in many cases are drawn closer , and have by human laws , known penalties annexed to them , to inforce their observation . thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men , legislators as well as others . the rules that they make for other mens actions , must as well as their own , and other mens actions , be conformable to the law of nature , i. e. to the will of god , of which that is a declaration , and the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind , no humane sanction can be good or valid against it . . secondly , the legislative , or supream authority , cannot assume to its self a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees , but is bound to dispense justice , and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws , and known authoris'd judges . for the law of nature being unwritten , and so no where to be found but in the minds of men , they who through passion or interest , shall mis-cite , or misapply it , cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no establish'd judge : and so it serves not as it ought , to determine the rights , and fence the properties of those that live under it , especially where every one is judge , interpreter , and executioner of it too , and that in his own case : and he that has right on his side , having ordinarily but his own single strength , hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries , or punish delinquents . to avoid these inconveniencies which disorder mens properties in the state of nature , men unite into societies , that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties , and may have standing rules to bound it , by which every one may know what is his . to this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society they enter into , and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit , with this trust , that they shall be govern'd by declared laws , or else their peace , quiet and property , will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of nature . . absolute arbitrary power , or governing without setled standing laws , can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government , which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for , and tie themselves up under , were it not to preserve their lives , liberties and fortunes ; and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet . it cannot be suppos'd , that they should intend , had they a power so to do , to give any one or more an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates , and put a force into the magistrates hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them : this were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of nature , wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others , and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it , whether invaded by a single man , or many in combination . whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator , they have disarmed themselves , and armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases . he being in a much worse condition , that is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man who has the command of . than he that is expos'd to the arbitrary power of . single men , no body being secure , that his will , who has such a command , is better than that of other men , though his force be . times stronger . and therefore whatever form the commonwealth is under , the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws , and not by extempory dictates and undetermin'd resolutions . for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of nature , if they shall have armed one or a few men with the joint power of a multitude , to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts , or unrestrain'd , and till that moment unknown wills without having any measures set down which may guide and justifie their actions . for all the power the government has , being only for the good of the society , as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure : so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws ; that both the people may know their duty , and be safe and secure within the limits of the law , and the rulers too kept within their due bounds , and not be tempted by the power they have in their hands to imploy it to purposes , and by such measures as they would not have known , and own not willingly . . thirdly , the supream power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent . for the preservation of property being the end of government , and that for which men enter into society , it necessarily supposes and requires , that the people should have property , without which they must be suppos'd to lose that by entering into society , which was the end for which they entered into it . too gross an absurdity for any man to own . men therefore in society having property , they have such a right to the goods , which by the law of the community are theirs , that no body hath a right to take them , or any part of them , from them , without their own consent ; without this they have no property at all . for i have truly no property in that which another can by right take from me when he pleases , against my consent . hence it is a mistake to think , that the supream or legislative power of any commonwealth , can do what it will , and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily , or take any part of them at pleasure . this is not much to be fear'd in governments where the legislative consists wholly or in part in assemblies which are variable , whose members upon the dissolution of the assembly , are subjects under the common laws of their country , equally with the rest . but in governments , where the legislative is in one lasting assembly , always in being , or in one man , as in absolute monarchies , there is danger still , that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community , and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power by taking what they think fit from the people . for a mans property is not at all secure , though there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects , if he who commands those subjects , have power to take from any private man what part he pleases of his property , and use and dispose of it as he thinks good . . but government into whosesoever hands it is put , being as i have before shew'd , intrusted with this condition , and for this end , that men might have and secure their properties , the prince or senate , however it may have power to make laws for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another , yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole , or any part of the subjects property , without their own consent . for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all . and to let us see , that even absolute power , where it is necessary , is not arbitrary by being absolute , but is still limited by that reason , and confined to those ends which required it in some cases to be absolute , we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline . for the preservation of the army , and in it of the whole commonwealth , requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superiour officer , and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them ; but yet we see , that neither the serjeant that could command a souldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon , or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish ; can command that souldier to give him one penny of his money : nor the general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post , or not obeying the most desperate orders , cannot yet with all his absolute power of life and death , dispose of one farthing of that souldiers estate , or seize one jot of his goods ; whom yet he can command any thing , and hang for the least disobedience . because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end for which the commander has his power , viz. the preservation of the rest , but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it . . 't is true , governments cannot be supported without great charge , and 't is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection , should pay , out of his estate , his proportion for the maintenance of it . but still it must be with his own consent , i. e. the consent of the majority , giving it either by themselves , or their representatives chosen by them ; for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people , by his own authority , and without such consent of the people , he thereby invades the fundamental law of property , and subverts the end of government . for what property have i in that which another may by right take when he pleases to himself . . fourthly , the legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands , for it being but a delegated power from the people , they who have it cannot pass it over to others . the people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth , which is by constituting the legislative , and appointing in whose hands that shall be . and when the people have said , we will submit , and be govern'd by laws made by such men , and in such forms ; no body else can say other men shall make laws for them : nor can they be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen , and authorised to make laws for them . . these are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society , and the law of god and nature , have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth , in all forms of government : first , they are to govern by promulgated establish'd laws , not to be varied in particular cases , but to have one rule for rich and poor , for the favourite at court , and the country man at plough . secondly , these laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the people . thirdly , they must not raise taxes on the property of the people , without the consent of the people , given by themselves , or their deputies . and this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being , or at least where the people have not reserv'd any part of the legislative to deputies , to be from time to time chosen by themselves . fourthly , legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body else , or place it any where but where the people have . chap. xii . of the legislative , executive , and federative power of the commonwealth . . the legislative power is that which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be imploy'd for preserving the community and the members of it . because those laws which are constantly to be executed , and whose force is always to continue , may be made in a little time ; therefore there is no need that the legislative should be always in being , not having always business to do . and because it may be too great temptation to humane frailty , apt to grasp at power , for the same persons who have the power of making laws , to have also in their hands the power to execute them , whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make , and suit the law , both in its making and execution , to their own private advantage , and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community , contrary to the end of society and government . therefore in well order'd common-wealths , where the good of the whole is so considered as it ought , the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons , who duly assembled , have by themselves , or jointly with others , a power to make laws , which when they have done , being separated again , they are themselves subject to the laws they have made ; which is a new and near tie upon them to take care that they make them for the publick good . . but because the laws that are at once , and in a short time made , have a constant and lasting force , and need a perpetual execution , or an attendance thereunto : therefore 't is necessary there should be a power always in being , which should see to the execution of the laws that are made , and remain in force . and thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated . . there is another power in every commonwealth , which one may call natural , because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society . for though in a commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another , and as such are governed by the laws of the society ; yet in reference to the rest of mankind , they make one body , which is , as every member of it before was , still in the state of nature with the rest of mankind : so that the controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it , are managed by the publick ; and an injury done to a member of their body , engages the whole in the reparation of it . so that under this consideration , the whole community is one body in the state of nature , in respect of all other states or persons out of its community . . this therefore contains the power of war and peace , leagues and alliances , and all the transactions , with all persons and communities without the common-wealth , and may be called federative , if any one pleases . so the thing be understood , i am indifferent as to the name . . these two powers , executive and federative , though they be really distinct in themselves , yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within its self , upon all that are parts of it ; the other the management of the security and interest of the publick without , with all those , that it may receive benefit or damage from , yet they are always almost united . and though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the common-wealth , yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent , standing , positive laws , than the executive ; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is in , to be managed for the publick good . for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another , being to direct their actions , may well enough precede them . but what is to be done in reference to foreigners , depending much upon their actions , and the variation of designs and interests must be left in great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them , to be managed by the best of their skill for the advantage of the common-wealth . . though , as i said , the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves , yet they are hardly to be separated and placed at the same time in the hands of distinct persons . for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise , it is almost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct , and not subordinate hands ; or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons that might act separately , whereby the force of the publick would be under different commands , which would be apt sometime or other to cause disorder and ruin . chap. xiii . of the subordination of the powers of the commonwealth . . though in a constituted commonwealth , standing upon its own basis , and acting according to its own nature , that is , acting for the preservation of the community , there can be but one supream power , which is the legislative , to which all the rest are and must be subordinate , yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends , there remains still in the people a supream power to remove or alter the legislative , when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them . for all power given with trust for the attaining an end , being limited by that end , when ever that end is manifestly neglected , or opposed , the trust must necessarily be forfeited , and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it , who may place it a-new where they shall think best for their safety and security . and thus the community perpetually retains a supream power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body , even of their legislators , whenever they shall be so foolish , or so wicked , as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject . for no man or society of men , having a power to deliver up their preservation , or consequently the means of it , to the absolute will , and arbitrary dominion of another ; when ever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition , they will always have a right to preserve what they have not a power to part with ; and to rid themselves of those who invade this fundamental , sacred , and unalterable law of self-preservation , for which they enter'd into society . and thus the community may be said in this respect , to be always the supream power , but not as considered under any form of government , because this power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolv'd . . in all cases , whilst the government subsists , the legislative is the supream power . for what can give laws to another must needs be superiour to him ; and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society , but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts , and every member of the society prescribing rules to their actions , and giving power of execution where they are transgressed , the legislative must needs be the supream , and all other powers in any members or parts of the society , derived from and subordinate to it . . in some commonwealths where the legislative is not always in being , and the executive is vested in a single person , who has also a share in the legislative ; there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be called supream ; not that he has in himself all the supream power , which is that of law-making : but because he has in him the supream execution , from whom all inferiour magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers , or at least the greatest part of them ; having also no legislative superiour to him , there being no law to be made without his consent , which cannot be expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative , he is properly enough in this sense supream . but yet it is to be observed , that though oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him , 't is not to him as supream legislator , but as supream executor of the law , made by a joint power of him with others ; allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law , which when he violates , he has no right to obedience , nor can claim it otherwise than as the publick person vested with the power of the law , and so is to be consider'd as the image , phantom , or representative of the commonwealth , acted by the will of the society , declared in its laws ; and thus he has no will , no power , but that of the law. but when he quits this representation , this publick will , and acts by his own private will , he degrades himself and is but a single private person without power , and without will. the members owing no obedience but to the publick will of the society . . the executive power placed any where but in a person that has also a share in the legislative , is visibly subordinate and accountable to it , and may be at pleasure changed and displaced ; so that it is not the supream executive power that is exempt from subordination , but the supream executive power vested in one , who having a share in the legislative , has no distinct superiour legislative to be subordinate and accountable to , father than he himself shall join and consent , so that he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit , which one may certainly conclude will be but very little . of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth , we need not speak , they being so multiply'd with infinite variety in the different customs and constitutions of distinct common-wealths , that it is impossible to give a particular account of them all . only thus much which is necessary to our present purpose we may take notice of concerning them , that they have no manner of authority any of them , beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them , and are all of them accountable to some other power in the commonwealth . . it is not necessary , no nor so much as convenient , that the legislative should be always in being . but absolutely necessary , that the executive power should , because there is not always need of new laws to be made , but always need of execution of the laws that are made . when the legislative hath put the execution of the laws they make into other hands , they have a power still to resume it out of those hands when they find cause , and to punish for any mall-administration against the laws . the same holds also in regard of the federative power , that and the executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative , which as has been shew'd in a constituted common-wealth , is the supream . the legislative also in this case being suppos'd to consist of several persons ; for if it be a single person , it cannot but be always in being , and so will as supream , naturally have the supream executive power , together with the legislative , may assemble and exercise their legislative , at the times that either their original constitution , or their own adjournment appoints , or when they please ; if neither of these hath appointed any time , or there be no other way prescribed to convoke them . for the supream power being placed in them by the people , 't is always in them , and they may exercise it when they please , unless by their original constitution , they are limited to certain seasons , or by an act of their supream power , they have adjourned to a certain time , and when that time comes , they have a right to assemble and act again . . if the legislative , or any part of it be of representatives , chosen for that time by the people , which afterwards return into the ordinary state of subjects , and have no share in the legislature but upon a new choice , this power of chuseing must also be exercised by the people , either at certain appointed seasons , or else when they are summon'd to it ; and in this latter case , the power of convokeing the legislative , is ordinarily placed in the executive , and has one of these two limitations in respect of time : that either the original constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain intervals , and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially issue directions for their electing and assembling , according to due forms : or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections , when the occasions or exigencies of the publick require the amendment of old , or making of new laws , or the redress or prevention of any inconveniencies that lye on , or threaten the people . . it may be demanded here , what if the executive power , being possessed of the force of the commonwealth , shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative , when the original constitution , or the publick exigencies require it ? i say using force upon the people , without authority , and contrary to the trust put in him that does so , is a state of war with the people , who have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercise of their power . for having erected a legislative with an intent they should exercise the power of making laws , either at certain set times , or when there is need of it ; when they are hinder'd by any force from what is so necessary to the society , and wherein the safety and preservation of the people consists , the people have a right to remove it by force . in all states and conditions the true remedy of force without authority , is to oppose force to it . the use of force without authority , always puts him that uses it into a state of war , as the aggressor , and renders him liable to be treated accordingly . . the power of assembling , and dismissing the legislative , placed in the executive , gives not the executive a superiority over it , but is a fiduciary trust placed in him for the safety of the people , in a case where the uncertainty and variableness of humane affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule . for it not being possible , that the first framers of the government , should by any foresight , be so much masters of future events , as to be able to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the legislative , in all times to come , that might exactly answer all the exigences of the common-wealth ; the best remedy could be found for this defect , was to trust this to the prudence of one who was always to be present , and whose business it was to watch over the publick good . constant frequent meetings of the legislative , and long continuations of their assemblies , without necessary occasion , could not but be burthensome to the people , and must necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies , and yet the quick turn of affairs , might be sometimes such as to need their present help : any delay of their convening might endanger the publick , and sometimes too their business might be so great , that the limited time of their sitting might be too short for their work , and rob the publick of that benefit which could be had only from their mature deliberation . what then could be done in this case to prevent the community from being exposed sometime or other to eminent hazard on one side , or the other , by fixed intervals and periods , set to the meeting and acting of the legislative . but to intrust it to the prudence of some , who being present , and acquainted with the state of publick affairs , might make use of this prerogative for the publick good ? and where else could this be so well placed as in his hands who was intrusted with the execution of the laws for the same end ? thus supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and sitting of the legislative , not setled by the original constitution , it naturally fell into the hands of the executive ; not as an arbitrary power depending on his good pleasure , but with this trust always to have it exercised only for the publick weal , as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require . whether setled periods of their convening , or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legislative , or perhaps a mixture of both , hath the least inconvenience attending it , 't is not my business here to inquire , but only to shew , that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and dissolving such conventions of the legislative , yet it is not thereby superiour to it . . things of this world are in so constant a flux , that nothing remains long in the same state. thus people , riches , trade , power , change their stations ; flourishing mighty cities come to ruine , and prove in time neglected desolate corners , whilst other unfrequented places grow into populous countries , fill'd with wealth and inhabitants . but things not always changing equally , and private interest often keeping up customs and priviledges when the reasons of them are ceased , it often comes to pass , that in governments , where part of the legislative consists of representatives chosen by the people , that in tract of time , this representation becomes very unequal and disproportionate to the reasons it was at first establish'd upon . to what gross absurdities the following of custom when reason has left it may lead , we may be satisfied when we see the bare name of a town , of which there remains not so much as the ruins , where scarce so much housing as a sheepcoat , or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found , send as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers , as a whole county numerous in people , and powerful in riches . this strangers stand amazed at , and every one must confess needs a remedy . though most think it hard to find one , because the constitution of the legislative being the original and supream act of the society , antecedent to all positive laws in it , and depending wholly on the people , no inferiour power can alter it . and therefore the people , when the legislative is once constituted , having in such a government as we have been speaking of , no power to act as long as the government stands ; this inconvenience is thought incapable of a remedy . . salus populi suprema lex , is certainly so just and fundamental a rule , that he who sincerely follows it cannot dangerously err . if therefore the executive , who has the power of convoking the legislative , observing rather the true proportion than fashion of representation , regulates not by old custom , but true reason , the number of members , in all places , that have a right to be distinctly represented , which no part of the people , however incorporated , can pretend to ; but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to the publick , it cannot be judg'd to have set up a new legislative , but to have restored the old and true one , and to have rectified the disorders which succession of time had insensibly as well as inevitably introduced ; for it being the interest as well as intention of the people to have a fair and equal representative ; whoever brings it nearest to that , is an undoubted friend to , and establisher of the government , and cannot miss the consent and approbation of the community . prerogative being nothing but a power in the hands of the prince to provide for the publick good , in such cases , which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences , certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct . whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people , and establishing the government upon its true foundations , is , and always will be , just prerogative . the power of erecting new corporations , and therewith new representatives , carries with it a supposition , that in time , the measures of representation might vary , and those have a just right to be represented which before had none ; and by the same reason , those cease to have a right , and be too inconsiderable for such a priviledge which before had it . 't is not a change from the present state which perhaps corruption or decay has introduced , that makes an inroad upon the government , but the tendency of it to injure or oppress the people , and to set up one part or party with a distinction from , and an unequal subjection of the rest . whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society and people in general , upon just and lasting measures , will always , when done , justify it self ; and whenever the people shall chuse their representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures , suitable to the original frame of the government , it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society , whoever permitted or propos'd to them so to do . chap. xiv . of prerogative . . where the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands , as they are in all moderated monarchies and well-framed governments , there the good of the society requires , that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power . for the legislators not being able to foresee and provide , by laws , for all that may be useful to the community , the executor of the laws having the power in his hands , has by the common law of nature , a right to make use of it for the good of the society , in many cases where the municipal law has given no direction , till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it ; nay many things there are which the law can by no means provide for , and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands , to be ordered by him as the publick good and advantage shall require ; nay , 't is fit that the laws themselves , should in some cases , give way to the executive power , or rather to this fundamental law of nature and government , viz. that as much as may be , all the members of the society are to be preserved . for since many accidents may happen wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm , as not to pull down an innocent mans house to stop the fire when the next to it is burning ; and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law , which makes no distinction of persons , by an action that may deserve reward and pardon . 't is fit the ruler should have a power in many cases to mitigate the severity of the law , and pardon some offenders , since the end of government , being the preservation of all as much as may be , even the guilty are to be spared where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent . . this power to act according to discretion for the publick good , without the prescription of the law , and sometimes even against it , is that which is called prerogative ; for since in fome governments the law-making power is not always in being , and is usually too numerous , and so too slow for the dispatch requisite to execution ; and because also it is impossible to foresee , and so by laws to provide for all accidents and necessities that may concern the publick , or make such laws as will do no harm , if they are executed with an inflexible rigour on all occasions , and upon all persons that may come in their way , therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power , to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe . . this power whilst imployed for the benefit of the community , and suitably to the trust and ends of the government , is undoubted prerogative , and never is questioned . for the people are very seldom , or never scrupulous or nice in the point , or questioning of prerogative , whilst it is in any tolerable degree imploy'd for the use it was meant , that is , the good of the people , and not manifestly against it . but if there comes to be a question between the executive power and the people , about a thing claimed as a prerogative ; the tendency of the exercise of such prerogative , to the good or hurt of the people , will easily decide that question . . it is easy to conceive , that in the infancy of governments , when common-wealths differed little from families in number of people , they differ'd from them too , but little in number of laws : and the governours being as the fathers of them , watching over them for their good , the government was almost all prerogative . a few establish'd laws served the turn , and the discretion and care of the ruler supply'd the rest . but when mistake or flattery prevailed with weak princes , to make use of this power for private ends of their own , and not for the publick good , the people were fain by express laws , to get prerogative determin'd in those points wherein they found disadvantage from it : and declared limitations of prerogative in those cases which they and their ancestors had left in the utmost latitude , to the wisdom of those princes who made no other but a right use of it , that is , for the good of their people . . and therefore they have a very wrong notion of government , who say , that the people have incroach'd upon the prerogative when they have got any part of it to be defined by positive laws . for in so doing they have not pulled from the prince any thing that of right belong'd to him , but only declared , that that power which they indefinitely left in him , or his ancestors hands , to be exercised for their good , was not a thing they intended him , when he used it otherwise . for the end of government being the good of the community , whatsoever alterations are made in it , tending to that end , cannot be an incroachment upon any body ; since no body , in government , can have a right tending to any other end . and those only are incroachments which prejudice or hinder the publick good . those who say otherwise , speak as if the prince had a distinct and separate interest from the good of the community , and was not made for it . the root and source from which spring almost all those evils and disorders , which happen in kingly governments . and indeed , if that be so , the people , under his government , are not a society of rational creatures , entered into a community , for their mutual good , such as have set rulers over themselves , to guard and promote that good ; but are to be looked on as an herd of inferiour creatures , under the dominion of a master , who keeps them , and works them , for his own pleasure or profit . if men were so void of reason , and brutish , as to enter into society upon such terms , prerogative might indeed be , what some men would have it , an arbitrary power to do things hurtful to the people . . but since a rational creature cannot be supposed , when free , to put himself into subjection to another , for his own harm : ( though where he finds a good and a wise ruler , he may not , perhaps , think it either necessary or useful to set precise bounds to his power in all things ) prerogative can be nothing but the peoples permitting their rulers to do several things of their own free choice , where the law was silent , and sometimes too against the direct letter of the law , for the publick good , and their acquiescing in it when so done . for as a good prince , who is mindful of the trust put into his hands , and careful of the good of his people , cannot have too much prerogative , that is , power to do good : so a weak and ill prince , who would claim that power his predecessors exercised , without the direction of the law , as a prerogative belonging to him by right of his office , which he may exercise at his pleasure , to make or promote an interest distinct from that of the publick , gives the people an occasion to claim their right , and limit that power , which , whilst it was exercised for their good , they were content should be tacitly allowed . . and therefore he that will look into the history of england will find that prerogative was always largest in the hands of our wisest and best princes : because the people observing the whole tendency of their actions to be the publick good , or if any humane frailty or mistake ( for princes are but men , made as others ) appear'd in some small declinations from that end ; yet 't was visible , the main of their conduct tended to nothing but the care of the publick . the people therefore finding reason to be satisfied with these princes , whenever they acted without , or contrary to the letter of the law , acquiesced in what they did , and without the least complaint , let them inlarge their prerogative as they pleased , judging rightly that they did nothing herein to the prejudice of their laws , since they acted conformable to the foundation and end of all laws , the publick good . . such god-like princes indeed had some title to arbitrary power , by that argument that would prove absolute monarchy the best government , as that which god himself governs the universe by , because such kings partake of his wisdom and goodness . upon this is founded that saying , that the reigns of good princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties of their people . for when their successors , managing the government with different thoughts , would draw the actions of those good rulers into precedent , and make them the standard of their prerogative ; as if what had been done only for the good of the people , was a right in them to do for the harm of the people , if they so pleased : it has often occasioned contest , and sometimes publick disorders , before the people could recover their original right , and get that to be declared not to be prerogative which truly was never so : since it is impossible any body , in the society , should ever have a right to do the people harm , though it be very possible and reasonable that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings or rulers , who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the publick good . for prerogative is nothing but the power of doing publick good , without a rule . . the power of calling parliaments in england , as to precise time , place , and duration , is certainly a prerogative of the king , but still with this trust , that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation , as the exigencies of the times , and variety of occasion shall require . for it being impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble in , and what the best season : the choice of these was left with the executive power , as might be best subservient to the publick good , and best suit the ends of parliaments . . the old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative , but who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of ? i answer : between an executive power in being , with such a prerogative , and a legislative , that depends upon his will for their convening , there can be no judge on earth . as there can be none between the legislative and the people , should either the executive , or the legislative , when they have got the power in their hands , design , or go about to enslave or destroy them . the people have no other remedy in this , as in all other cases , where they have no judge on earth , but to appeal to heaven . for the rulers , in such attempts , exercising a power the people never put into their hands , who can never be supposed to consent that any body should rule over them for their harm , do that which they have not a right to do . and where the body of the people , or any single man , are deprived of their right , or are under the exercise of a power without right , having no appeal on earth , they have a liberty to appeal to heaven , when-ever they judge the cause of sufficient moment . and therefore , though the people cannot be judge , so as to have , by the constitution of that society , any superiour power , to determine and give effective sentence in the case ; yet they have reserv'd that ultimate determination to themselves , which belongs to all mankind , where there lies no appeal on earth ; by a law antecedent , and paramount to all positive laws of men , whether they have just cause to make their appeal to heaven . and this judgment they cannot part with , it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another , as to give him a liberty to destroy him ; god and nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself , as to neglect his own preservation . and since he cannot take away his own life , neither can he give another power to take it . nor let any one think this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder ; for this operates not till the inconvenience is so great , that the majority feel it , and are weary of it , and find a necessity to have it amended . and this the executive power , or wise princes never need come in the danger of . and 't is the thing , of all others , they have most need to avoid , as , of all others , the most perilous . chap. xv. of paternal , political , and despotical power , considered together . . though i have had occasion to speak of these separately before , yet the great mistakes , of late , about government , having , as i suppose , arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another , it may not , perhaps , be amiss , to consider them here together . . first then , paternal or parental power , is nothing but that which parents have over their children , to govern them , for the childrens good , till they come to the use of reason , or a state of knowledge , wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule , whether it be the law of nature , or the municipal law of their countrey , they are to govern themselves by : capable , i say , to know it , as well as several others , who live as free-men under that law. the affection and tenderness god hath planted in the breasts of parents , towards their children , makes it evident , that this is not intended to be a severe . arbitrary government ; but only for the help , instruction , and preservation of their off-spring . but , happen it as it will , there is , as i have proved , no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death , at any time , over their children , more than over any body else , or keep the child in subjection to the will of his parents , when grown to a man , and the perfect use of reason , any farther , than as having received life and education from his parents , obliges him to respect , honour , gratitude , assistance , and support , all his life , to both father and mother . and thus , 't is true , the paternal is a natural government ; but not at all extending it self to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political . the power of the father doth not reach at all to the property of the child , which is only in his own disposing . . secondly , political power is that power , which every man , having in the state of nature , has given up into the hands of the society , and therein to the governours , whom the society hath set over it self , with this express , or tacit trust , that it shall be imployed for their good , and the preservation of their property : now this power , which every man has in the state of nature , and which he parts with to the society , in all such cases where the society can secure him , is to use such means for the preserving of his own property , as he thinks good , and nature allows him ; and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others ; so as ( according to the best of his reason ) may most conduce to the preservation of himself , and the rest of mankind ; so that the end and measure of this power , when in every man's hands , in the state of nature , being the preservation of all of his society , that is , all mankind in general . it can have no other end or measure , when in the hands of the magistrate , but to preserve the members of that society , in their lives , liberties , and possessions ; and so cannot be an absolute , arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes , which are as much as possible to be preserved ; but a power to make laws , and annex such penalties to them , as may tend to the preservation of the whole , by cutting off those parts , and those only , which are so corrupt , that they threaten the sound and healthy , without which no severity is lawful . and this power has its original only from compact and agreement , and the mutual consent of those who make up the community . . thirdly , despotical power is an absolute , arbitrary power , one man has over another , to take away his life whenever he pleases ; and this is a power , which neither nature gives , for it has made no such distinction between one man and another , nor compact can convey . for man , not having such an arbitrary power over his own life , cannot give another man such a power over it , but it is the effect only of forfeiture , which the aggressor makes of his own life , when he puts himself into the state of war with another . for having quitted reason , which god hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man , and the peaceable ways which that teaches , and made use of force to compass his unjust ends upon another , where he has no right , he renders himself liable to be destroyed by his adversary , when-ever he can , as any other noxious and brutish creature that is destructive to his being . and thus captives , taken in a just and lawful war , and such only , are subject to a despotical power , which as it arises not from compact , so neither is it capable of any , but is the state of war continued . for what compact can be made with a man that is not master of his own life ? what condition can he perform ? and if he be once allowed to be master of his own life , the despotical , arbitrary power of his master ceases . he that is master of himself , and his own life , has a right too to the means of preserving it ; so that as soon as compact enters , slavery ceases , and he so far quits his absolute power , and puts an end to the state of war , who enters into conditions with his captive . . nature gives the first of these , viz. paternal power , to parents , for the benefit of their children , during their minority , to supply their want of ability , and understanding how to manage their property . ( by property i must be understood here , as in other places , to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods . ) voluntary agreement gives the second , viz. political power , to governours , for the benefit of their subjects , to secure them in the possession and use of their properties . and forfeiture gives the third , despotical power , to lords , for their own benefit over those who are stripp'd of all property . . he that shall consider the distinct rise and extent , and the different ends of these several powers , will plainly see that paternal power comes as far short of that of the magistrate , as despotical exceeds it ; and that absolute dominion , however placed , is so far from being one kind of civil society , that it is as inconsistent with it as slavery is with property . paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage his property ; political where men have property in their own disposal ; and despotical over such as have no property at all . chap. xvi . of conqvest . . though governments can originally have no other rise , than that before mentioned , nor polities be founded on any thing but the consent of the people ; yet such has been the disorders , ambition has fill'd the world with , that in the noise of war , which makes so great a part of the history of mankind , this consent is little taken notice of : and therefore many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people , and reckon conquest as one of the originals of government . but conquest is as far from setting up any government , as demolishing an house is from building a new one in the place . indeed it often makes way for a new frame of a commonwealth , by destroying the former ; but , without the consent of the people , can never erect a new one . . that the aggressor , who puts himself into the state of war with another , and unjustly invades another man's right , can , by such an unjust war , never come to have a right over the conquered , will be easily agreed by all men , who will not think that robbers and pyrates have a right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master , or that men are bound by promises , which unlawful force extorts from them . should a robber break into my house , and with a dagger at my throat , make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him , would this give him any title ? just such a title by his sword , has an unjust conquerour , who forces me into submission . the injury and the crime is equal , whether committed by the wearer of a crown , or some petty villain . the title of the offender , and the number of his followers make no difference in the offence , unless it be to aggravate it . the only difference is , great robbers punish little ones to keep them in their obedience ; but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs , because they are too big for the weak hands of justice , in this world , and have the power in their own possession which should punish offenders . what is my remedy against a robber that so broke into my house ? appeal to the law for justice . but perhaps justice is deny'd , or i am crippled and cannot stir ; robbed and have not the means to do it . if god has taken away all means of seeking remedy , there is nothing left but patience . but my son , when able , may seek the relief of the law , which i am denyed : he or his son may renew his appeal , till he recover his right . but the conquered , or their children , have no court , no arbitrator on earth to appeal to . then they may appeal , as iephtha did , to heaven , and repeat their appeal , till they have recovered the native right of their ancestours , which was , to have such a legislative over them , as the majority should approve , and freely acquiesce in . if it be objected , this would cause endless trouble ; i answer , no more than justice does , where she lies open to all that appeal to her . he that troubles his neighbour , without a cause , is punished for it , by the justice of the court he appeals to . and he that appeals to heaven , must be sure he has right on his side : and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal , as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived , and will be sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath created to his fellow-subjects ; that is , any part of mankind . from whence 't is plain , that he that conquers , in an unjust war , can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered . . but , supposing victory favours the right side , let us consider a conquerour in a lawful war , and see what power he gets , and over whom . first , 't is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him . they that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest , but must , at least , be as much free-men as they were before . and most commonly they serve upon terms , and on condition to share with their leader , and enjoy a part of the spoil , and other advantages that attend the conquering sword : or , at least , have a part of the subdued countrey bestowed upon them . and the conquering people , are not , i hope , to be slaves by conquest , and wear their laurels only to shew they are sacrifices to their leader's triumph . they that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the sword , make their heroes , who are the founders of such monarchies , arrant draw-can-sirs , and forget they had any officers and souldiers that fought on their side , in the battles they won , or assisted them in the subduing , or shared in possessing the countries they master'd . we are told by some , that the english monarchy is founded in the norman conquest , and that our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion : which if it were true , ( as by the history it appears otherwise ) and that william had a right to make war on this island ; yet his dominion by conquest , could reach no farther than to the saxons and britans , that were then inhabitants of this country . the normans that came with him , and helped to conquer , and all descended from them are freemen , and no subjects by conquest ; let that give what dominion it will. and if i , or any body else , shall claim freedom , as derived from them , it will be very hard to prove the contrary : and 't is plain , the law that has made no distinction between the one and the other , intends not there should be any difference in their freedom or priviledges . . but supposing , which seldom happens , that the conquerers and conquer'd never incorporate into one people , under the same laws and freedom . let us see next , what power a lawful conquerer has over the subdued , and that i say is purely despotical . he has an absolute power over the lives of those , who , by an unjust war , have forfeited them ; but not over the lives or fortunes of those , who ingaged not in the war , nor over the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it . . secondly , i say then the conquerour gets no power but only over those who have actually assisted , concurr'd , or consented to that unjust force that is used against him . for the people having given to their governours no power to do an unjust thing , such as is to make an unjust war , ( for they never had such a power in themselves : ) they ought not to be charged , as guilty of the violence and injustice that is committed in an unjust war , any farther than they actually abet it , no more than they are to be thought guilty of any violence or oppression their governours should use upon the people themselves , or any part of their fellow-subjects , they having impowered them no more to the one than to the other . conquerours , 't is true , seldom trouble themselves to make the distinction , but they willingly permit the confusion of war to sweep all together ; but yet this alters not the right : for the conquerour's power over the lives of the conquered , being only because they have used force to do or maintain an injustice , he can have that power only over those who have concur'd in that force , all the rest are innocent ; and he has no more title over the people of that country , who have done him no injury , and so have made no forfeiture of their lives , than he has over any other , who without any injuries or provocations , have lived upon fair terms with him . . thirdly , the power a conquerer gets over those he overcomes in a just war , is perfectly despotical ; he has an absolute power over the lives of those , who by putting themselves in a state of war , have forfeited them ; but he has not thereby a right and title to their possessions . this i doubt not , but at first sight , will seem a strange doctrine , it being so quite contrary to the practice of the world. there being nothing more familiar in speaking of the dominion of countries , than to say such an one conquer'd it . as if conquest , without any more ado , convey'd a right of possession . but when we consider , that the practice of the strong and powerful , how universal soever it may be , is seldom the rule of right , however it be one part of the subjection of the conquer'd not to argue against the conditions cut out to them by the conquering swords . . though in all war there be usually a complication of force and damage , and the aggressor seldom fails to harm the estate , when he uses force against the persons of those he makes war upon ; yet 't is the use of force only that puts a man into the state of war. for whether by force he begins the injury ; or else having quietly , and by fraud , done the injury , he refuses to make reparation , and by force maintains it , which is the same thing as at first to have done it by force ; 't is the unjust use of force that makes the war. for he that breaks open my house , and violently turns me out of doors ; or having peaceably got in , by force keeps me out , does in effect the same thing ; supposing we are in such a state , that we have no common judge on earth , whom i may appeal to , and to whom we are both obliged to submit : for of such i am now speaking . 't is the unjust use of force then that puts a man into the state of war with another , and thereby he that is guilty of it makes a forfeiture of his life . for quitting reason , which is the rule given between man and man , and using force the way of beasts , he becomes liable to be destroy'd by him he uses force against , as any savage ravenous beast , that is dangerous to his being . . but because the miscarriages of the father are no faults of the children , and they may be rational and peaceable , notwithstanding the brutishness and injustice of the father ; the father , by his miscarriages and violence , can forfeit but his own life , but involves not his childten in his guilt or destruction . his goods which nature , that willeth the preservation of all mankind as much as is possible , hath made to belong to the children to keep them from perishing , do still continue to belong to his children . for supposing them not to have join'd in the war , either through infancy or choice , they have done nothing to forfeit them , nor has the conquerour any right to take them away , by the bare right of having subdued him that by force attempted his destruction , though perhaps he may have some right to them to repair the dammages he has sustained by the war , and the defence of his own right , which how far it reaches to the possessions of the conquer'd , we shall see by and by ; so that he that by conquest has a right over a mans person , to destroy him if he pleases , has not thereby a right over his estate to possess and enjoy it . for it is the brutal force the aggressor has used , that gives his adversary a right to take away his life , and destroy him , if he pleases , as a noxious creature ; but 't is damage sustain'd that alone gives him title to another mans goods : for though i may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway , yet i may not ( which seems less ) take away his money , and let him go ; this would be robbery on my side . his force , and the state of war he put himself in , made him forfeit his life , but gave me no title to his goods . the right then of conquest extends only to the lives of those who join'd in the war , but not to their estates , but only in order to make reparation for the damages received , and the charges of the war , and that too with reservation of the right of the innocent wife and children . . let the conquerer have as much justice on his side as could be suppos'd , he has no right to seize more than the vanquish'd could forfeit ; his life is at the victors mercy , and his service and goods he may appropriate to make himself reparation ; but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children , they too had a title to the goods he enjoy'd , and their shares in the estate he possessed . for example , i in the state of nature ( and all common-wealths are in the state of nature one with another ) have injured another man , and refusing to give satisfaction , it is come to a state of war , wherein my defending by force , what i had gotten unjustly , makes me the aggressour ; i am conquered : my life , 't is true , as forfeit , is at mercy , but not my wives and childrens . they made not the war , nor assisted in it . i could not forfeit their lives , they were not mine to forfeit . my wife had a share in my estate , that neither could i forfeit . and my children also , being born of me , had a right to be maintain'd out of my labour or substance . here then is the case ; the conquerour has a title to reparation for damages received , and the children have a title to their father's estate for their subsistence . for as to the wife's share , whether her own labour or compact gave her a title to it , 't is plain , her husband could not forfeit what was hers . what must be done in the case ? i answer ; the fundamental law of nature being , that all , as much as may be , should be preserved , it follows , that if there be not enough fully to satisfie both , viz. for the conquerour's losses , and childrens maintenance , he that hath , and to spare , must remit something of his full satisfaction , and give way to the pressing and preferible title of those , who are in danger to perish without it . . but supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up to the conquerour , to the utmost farthing , and that the children of the vanquished , spoiled of all their father's goods , are to be left to starve , and perish● yet the satisfying of what shall , on this score , be due to the conquerour , will scarce give him a title to any countrey he shall conquer . for the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land , in any part of the world , where all the land is possessed , and none lies waste . and if i have not taken away the conquerour's land , which , being vanquished , it is impossible , i should ; scarce any other spoil i have done him can amount to the value of mine , supposing it of an extent any way coming near what i had over-run of his , and equally cultivated too . the destruction of a years product or two , ( for it seldom reaches four or five ) is the utmost spoil that usually can be done . for as to money , and such riches and treasure taken away , these are none of natures goods , they have but a phantastical imaginary value , nature has put no such upon them . they are of no more account by her standard , than the wampompeke of the americans to an european prince , or the silver money of europe would have been formerly to an american . and five years product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land , where all is possessed , and none remains waste , to be taken up by him that is disseiz'd : which will be easily granted , if one do but take away the imaginary value of money , the disproportion being more than between five , and five thousand . though , at the same time , half a years product is more worth than the inheritance , where there being more land than the inhabitants possess and make use of , any one has liberty to make use of the waste : but there conquerours take little care to possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished . no damage therefore , that men , in the state of nature ( as all princes and governments are in reference to one another ) suffer from one another , can give a conquerour power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished , and turn them out of that inheritance which ought to be the possession of them , and their descendants to all generations . the conquerour indeed will be apt to think himself master . and 't is the very condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right : but , if that be all , it gives no other title , than what bare force gives to the stronger over the weaker . and , by this reason , he that is strongest will have a right to whatever he pleases to seize on . . over those then that joined with him in the war , and over those of the subdued countrey that opposed him not , and the posterity even of those that did , the conquerour , even in a just war , hath , by his conquest , no right of dominion . they are free from any subjection to him , and if their former government be dissolved , they are at liberty to begin and erect another to themselves . . the conquerour , 't is true , usually , by the force he has over them , compels them , with a sword at their breasts , to stoop to his conditions , and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them ; but the enquiry is , what right he has to do so ? if it be said , they submit by their own consent ; then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conquerour a title to rule over them . it remains only to be considered , whether promises , extorted by force , without right , can be thought consent , and how far they bind . to which i shall say , they bind not at all , because whatsoever another gets from me by force , i still retain the right of , and he is obliged presently to restore . he that forces my horse from me , ought presently to restore him , and i have still a right to retake him . by the same reason , he that forced a promise from me ought presently to restore it , i. e. quit me , of the obligation of it ; or i may resume it my self , i. e. chuse whether i will perform it . for the law of nature laying an obligation on me , only by the rules she prescribes , cannot oblige me by the violation of her rules : such is the extorting any thing from me by force . nor does it at all alter the case , to say i gave my promise , no more than it excuses the force , and passes the right , when i put my hand in my pocket , and deliver my purse my self to a thief , who demands it with a pistol at my breast . . from all which it follows , that the government of a conquerour , impoposed , by force , on the subdued , against whom he had no right of war , or who joined not in the war against him , where he had right , has no obligation upon them . . but let us suppose that all the men of that community being all members of the same body politick , may be taken to have join'd in that unjust war , wherein they are subdued , and so their lives are at the mercy of the conquerour . . i say , this concerns not their children , who are in their minority . for since a father hath not , in himself , a power over the life or liberty of his child ; no act of his can possibly forfeit it : so that the children , whatever may have happened to the fathers , are free men , and the absolute power of the conquerour reaches no farther than the persons of the men , that were subdued by him , and dies with them ; and should he govern them as slaves , subjected to his absolute , arbitrary power , he has no such right of dominion over their children . he can have no power over them , but by their own consent , whatever he may drive them to say or do ; and he has no lawful authority , whilst force , and not choice , compels them to submission . . every man is born with a double right , first , a right of freedom to his person , which no other man has a power over , but the free disposal of it lies in himself . secondly , a right , before any other man , to inherit , with his brethren , his father's goods . . by the first of these , a man is naturally free from subjection to any government , though he be born in a place under its jurisdiction . but if he disclaim the lawful government of the countrey he was born in , he must also quit the right , that belong'd to him , by the laws of it , and the possessions there descending to him , from his ancestors , if it were a government made by their consent . . by the second , the inhabitants of any countrey , who are descended , and derive a title to their estates from those who are subdued , and had a government forced upon them , against their free consents , retain a right to the possession of their ancestours , though they consent not freely to the government , whose hard conditions were , by force , imposed on the possessors of that countrey . for the first conqueror never having had a title to the land of that country , the people , who are the descendants of , or claim under those , who were forced to submit to the yoke of a government by constraint , have always a right to shake it off , and free themselves from the usurpation , or tyranny the sword hath brought in upon them ; till their rulers put them under such a frame of government , as they willingly , and of choice consent to ( which they can never be supposed to do , till either they are put in a full state of liberty to chuse their government and governours , or at least till they have such standing laws , to which they have , by themselves , or their representatives , given their free consent , and also till they are allowed their due property , which is so to be proprietors of what they have , that no body can take away any part of it without their own consent , without which , men under any government are not in the state of free-men , but are direct slaves , under the force of war. ) and who doubts but the grecian christians , descendants of the antient possessors of that countrey , may justly cast off the turkish yoke they have so long groaned under , when-ever they have a power to do it ? . but granting that the conquerour , in a just war , has a right to the estates , as well as power over the persons of the conquered ; which , 't is plain , he hath not : nothing of absolute power will follow from hence , in the continuance of the government . because the descendants of these being all free-men , if he grants them estates , and possessions to inhabit his countrey , without which it would be worth nothing , whatsoever he grants them , they have so far as it is granted , property in . the nature whereof is , that , without a man 's own consent , it cannot be taken from him . . their persons are free , by a native right , and their properties , be they more or less , are their own , and at their own dispose , and not at his ; or else it is no property . supposing the conquerour gives to one man a thousand acres , to him and his heirs for ever ; to another he lets a thousand acres , for his life , under the rent of l. or l. per an. has not the one of these a right to his thousand acres for ever , and the other , during his life , paying the said rent ? and hath not the tenant , for life , a property in all that he gets over and above his rent , by his labour and industry , during the said term , supposing it be double the rent ? can any one say , the king , or conquerour , after his grant , may , by his power of conquerour , take away all , or part of the land , from the heirs of one , or from the other , during his life , he paying the rent ? or can he take away , from either , the goods or money they have got upon the said land , at his pleasure ? if he can , then all free and voluntary contracts cease , and are void , in the world ; there needs nothing but power enough to dissolve them at any time . and all the grants and promises of men , in power , are but mockery and collusion . for can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say , i give you and yours this for ever , and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised : and yet it is to be understood , that i have right , if i please , to take it away from you again to morrow ? . i will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their countrey , but this i am sure , they owe subjection to the laws of god , and nature . no body , no power can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal law. those are so great , and so strong , in the case of promises , that omnipotency it self can be tyed by them . grants , promises , and oaths are bonds that hold the almighty : what-ever some flatterres say to princes of the world , who , all together , with all their people joined to them , are , in comparison of the great god , but as a drop of the bucket , or a dust on the balance , inconsiderable , nothing ! . the short of the case , in conquest , is this , the conquerour , if he have a just cause , has a despotical right over the persons of all that actually aided , and concurred in the war against him , and a right to make up his damage and cost , out of their labour and estates , so he injure not the right of any other . over the rest of the people , if there were any that consented not to the war , and over the children of the captives themselves , or the possessions of either he has no power , and so can have , by virtue of conquest , no lawful title himself to dominion over them , or derive it to his posterity ; but is an aggressour , and puts himself in a state of war against them , and has no better a right of principality , he , nor any of his successours , than hingar , or hubba , the danes , had here in england , or spartacus , had he conquered italy ; which is to have their yoke cast off , as soon as god shall give those , under their subjection , courage , and opportunity to do it . thus , notwithstanding whatever title the kings of assyria had over iudah , by the sword , god assisted hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire . and the lord was with hezekiah , and he prospered ; wherefore he went forth , and he rebelled against the king of assyria , and served him not , kings xviii . vij . whence it is plain , that shaking off a power , which force , and not right , hath set over any one , though it hath the name of rebellion ; yet is no offence before god , but that which he allows and countenances , though even promises and covenants , when obtain'd by force , have intervened . for 't is very probable , to any one that reads the story of ahaz and hezekiah , attentively , that the assyrians subdued ahaz , and deposed him , and made hezekiah king in his father's life time ; and that hezekiah , by agreement , had done him homage , and paid him tribute till this time . chap. xvii . of vsvrpation . . as conquest may be called a foreign usurpation ; so usurpation is a kind of domestick conquest , with this difference , that an usurper can never have right on his side ; it being no usurpation but where one is got into the possession of what another has right to . this , so far as it is usurpation , is a change only of persons , but not of the forms and rules of the government : for if the usurper extend his power beyond what , of right , belonged to the lawful princes , or governours of the common-wealth , 't is tyranny , added to usurpation . . in all lawful governments the designation of the persons , who are to bear rule , being as natural and necessary a part as the form of the government it self , and that which had its establishment originally from the people . the anarchy being much alike , to have no form of government at all , or to agree that it shall be monarchical ; but to appoint no way , to design the person that shall have the power , and be the monarch . all commonwealths therefore , with the form of government established , have rules also of appointing and conveying the right to those , who are to have any share in the publick authority . and who-ever gets into the exercise of any part of the power , by other ways , than what the laws of the community have prescribed , hath no right to be obeyed , though the form of the commonwealth be still preserved ; since he is not the person the laws have appointed , and consequently not the person the people have consented to . nor can such an usurper , or any , deriving from him , ever have a title , till the people are both at liberty to consent , and have actually consented to allow , and confirm in him the power he hath , till then , usurped . chap. xviii . of tyranny . . as usurpation is the exercise of power , which another hath a right to ; so tyranny is the exercise of power beyond right , which no body can have a right to . and this is making use of the power any one has in his hands ; not for the good of those who are under it , but for his own private , separate advantage . when the governour , however entituled , makes not the law , but his will , the rule , and his commands , and actions are not directed to the preservation of the properties of his people , but the satisfaction of his own ambition , revenge , covetousness , or any other irregular passion . . if one can doubt this to be truth , or reason , because it comes from the obscure hand of a subject ; i hope the authority of a king will make it pass with him . king iames , in his speech to the parliament , . tells them thus ; i will ever prefer the weale of the publick , and of the whole commonwealth , in making of good laws , and constitutions , to any particular , and private ends of mine . thinking ever the wealth and weale of the commonwealth , to be my greatest weale , and worldly felicity ; a point , wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a tyrant . for i do acknowledge that the special and greatest point of difference , that is between a rightful king , and an usurping tyrant , is this , that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think , his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires , and unreasonable appetites ; the righteous and just king doth , by the contrary , acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people . and again , in his speech to the parliament , he hath these words ; the king binds himself , by a double oath , to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom . tacitly , as by being a king , and so bound to protect , as well the people , as the laws of his kingdom ; and expresly by his oath at his coronation : so as every just king , in a setled kingdom , is bound to observe that paction made to his people , by his laws , in framing his government agreeable thereunto , according to that paction which god made with noah , after the deluge . hereafter , seed-time , and harvest , and cold , and heat , and summer , and winter , and day , and night , shall not cease , while the earth remaineth . and therefore a king , governing in a setled kingdom , leaves to be a king , and degenerates into a tyrant , as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his laws . and a little after : therefore all kings , that are not tyrants , or perjured , will be glad to bound themselves within the limits of their laws . and they that perswade them the contrary , are vipers , pests both against them and the commonwealth . thus that learned king , who well understood the notions of things , makes the difference , betwixt a king and a tyrant , to consist only in this , that one makes the laws the bounds of his power , and the good of the publick the end of his government ; the other makes all give way to his own will and appetite . . 't is a mistake , to think this fault is proper only to monarchies , other forms of government are liable to it , as well as that : for where-ever the power , that is put in any hands , for the government of the people , and the preservation of their properties , is applied to other ends , and made use of to impoverish , harass , or subdue them to the arbitrary , and irregular commands of those that have it : there it presently becomes tyranny , whether those , that thus use it , are one , or many . thus we read of the thirty tyrants at athens , as well as one at syracuse ; and the intolerable dominion of the decemviri , at rome , was nothing better . . where-ever law ends , tyranny begins , if the law be transgressed to another's harm . and whosoever , in authority , exceeds the power given him by the law , and makes use of the force , he has under his command , to compass that upon the subject which the law allows not ; ceases , in that , to be a magistrate , and acting without authority , may be opposed , as any other man , who by force invades the right of another . this is acknowledged in subordinate magistrates . he that hath authority to seize my person in the street , may be opposed as a thief , and a robber , if he indeavours to break into my house to execute a writ , notwithstanding that i know he has such a warrant , and such a legal authority as will impower him to arrest me abroad . and why this should not hold in the highest , as well as in the most inferiour magistrate , i would gladly be informed . is it reasonable that the eldest brother , because he has the greatest part of his father's estate , should thereby have a right to take away any of his younger brothers portions ? or that a rich man , who possessed a whole countrey , should from thence have a right to seize , when he pleased , the cottage and garden of his poor neighbour ? the being rightfully possessed of great power and riches , exceedingly beyond the greatest part of the son of adam , is so far from being an excuse , much less a reason for rapine and oppression , which the endamaging another , without authority , is ; that it is a great aggravation of it . for the exceeding the bounds of authority , is no more a right , in a great , than a petty officer : no more justifiable in a king , than a constable . but so much the worse in him , as that he has more trust put in him , is supposed , from the advantage of education , and counsellours to have better knowledge , and less reason to do it , having already a greater share than the rest of his brethren . . may the commands then of a prince be opposed ? may he be resisted , as often as any one shall find himself aggrieved , and but imagine he has not right done him ? this will unhinge and overturn all politi●s , and , instead of government and order , leave nothing but anarchy and confusion . . to this i answer : that force is to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force ; who ever makes any opposition , in any other case , draws on himself a just condemation , both from god and man ; and so no such danger or confusion will follow , as is often suggested . for , . first , as , in some countries , the person of the prince , by the law , is sacred , and so , what-ever he commands , or does , his person is still free from all question or violence ; not liable to force , or any judicial censure or condemnation . but yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any inferiour officer , or other commissioned by him ; unless he will , by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people , dissolve the government , and leave them to that defence , which belongs to every one in the state of nature . for of such things who can tell what the end will be ? and a neighbour kingdom has shewed the world an odd example . in all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him from all inconveniencies , whereby he is secure , whilst the government stands , from all violence and harm whatsoever . than which , there cannot be a wiser constitution . for the harm he can do , in his own person , not being likely to happen often , nor to extend it self far ; nor being able , by his single strength , to subvert the laws , nor oppress the body of the people , should any prince have so much weakness , and ill nature as to be willing to do it . the inconveniency of some particular mischiefs that may happen , sometimes , when a heady prince comes to the throne , are well recompenced by the peace of the publick , and security of the government , in the person of the chief magistrate , thus set out of the reach of danger . it being safer for the body , that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer , than that the head of the republick should be easily , and upon slight occasions exposed . . secondly , but this priviledge belonging only to the king's person , hinders not but they may be questioned , opposed , and resisted , who use unjust force , though they pretend a commission from him , which the law authorizes not . as is plain , in the case of him that has the king 's writ to arrest a man , which is a full commission from the king ; and yet he that has it cannot break open a man's house to do it , nor execute this command of the king upon certain days , nor in certain places , though this commission have no such exception in it ; but they are the limitations of the law , which , if any one transgress , the king's commission excuses him not . for the king's authority being given him only by the law , he cannot impower any one to act against the law , or justifie him , by his commission , in so doing . the commission , or command of any magistrate , where he has no authority , being as void and insignificant as that of any private man. the difference , between the one and the other , being , that the magistrate has some authority , so far , and to such ends , and the private man has none at all . for 't is not the commission , but the authority , that gives the right of acting ; and against the laws there can be no authority . but , notwithstanding such resistance , the king's person and authority are still both secured , and so no danger to governour or government . . thirdly , supposing a government , wherein the person of the chief magistrate is not thus sacred ; yet this doctrine , of the lawfulness of resisting all unlawful exercises of his power , will not , upon every slight occasion , indanger him , or imbroil the government . for , where the injured party may be relieved , and his damages repaired , by appeal to the law , there can be no pretence for force ; which is only to be used , where a man is intercepted from appealing to the law. for nothing is to be accounted hostile force , but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal . and 't is such force alone , that puts him that uses it , into a state of war , and makes it lawful to resist him . a man , with a sword in his hand , demands my purse , in the high-way , when , perhaps , i have not d. in my pocket ; this man i may lawfully kill . to another i deliver l. to hold , only whilst i alight , ●hich he refuses to restore me when i am got up again , but draws his sword to defend the possession of it , by force : i endeavour to retake it . the mischief , this man does me , is a hundred , or possibly a thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me , ( whom i kill'd , before he really did me any ) and yet i might lawfully kill the one , and cannot so much as hurt the other lawfully . the reason whereof is plain ; because the one using force , which threatned my life , i could not have time to appeal to the law to secure it : and when it was gone , 't was too late to appeal . the law could not restore life to my dead carcass . the loss was irreparable ; which , to prevent , the law of nature gave me a right to destroy him , who had put himself into a state of war with me , and threatned my destruction . but , in the other case , my life not being in danger , i might have the benefit of appealing to the law , and have reparation , for my l. that way . . fourthly , but if the unlawful acts , done by the magistrate , be maintained , ( by the power he has got ) and the remedy , which is due by law , be , by the same power , obstructed ; ye● the right of resisting , even in such manifest acts of tyranny , will not suddenly , or on slight occasions , disturb the government . for if it reach no farther than some private mens cases , though they have a right to defend themselves , and to recover , by force , what , by unlawful force , is taken from them ; yet the right to do so , will not easily ingage them in a contest , wherein they are sure to perish : it being as impossible , for one or a few oppressed men , to disturb the government , where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned in it , as for a raving mad man , or heady male content to overturn a well setled state ; the people being as little apt to follow the one , as the other . . but if either these illegal acts , have extended to the majority of the people ; or if the mischief and oppression has light only on some few , but in such cases as the precedent and consequences seem to threaten all ; and they are perswaded in their consciences that their laws , and with them , their estates , liberties , and lives are in danger , and perhaps their religion too ; how they will be hindred from resisting illegal force , used against them , i cannot tell . this is an inconvenience , i confess , that attends all governments whatsoever , when the governours have brought it to this pass , to be generally suspected of their people , the most dangerous state they can possibly put themselves in ; wherein they are the less to be pityed , because it is so easie to be avoided . it being as impossible , for a governour , if he really means the good of his people , and the preservation of them , and their laws together , not to make them see and feel it ; as it is for the father of a family not to let his children see he loves , and takes care of them . . but if all the world shall observe pretences of one kind , and actions of another ; arts used to elude the law , and the trust of prerogative ( which is an arbitrary power in some things , left in the prince's hand , to do good , not harm , to the people ) employed contrary to the end , for which it was given , if the people shall find the ministers , and subordinate magistrates chosen , suitable to such ends , and favoured , or laid by proportionably as they promote , or oppose them : if they see several experiments made of arbitrary power , and that religion underhand favoured , though publickly proclaimed against , which is readiest to introduce it , and the operators in it supported as much as may be ; and when that cannot be done , yet approved still , and liked the better , and a long train of actings shew the councils all tending that way : how can a man any more hinder himself from being perswaded in his own mind , which way things are going ; or from casting about how to save himself , than he could from believing the captain of the ship he was in , was carrying him , and the rest of the company , to algiers , when he found him always stearing that course , though cross winds , leaks in his ship , and want of men , and provisions , did often force him to turn his course another way , for some time , which he steadily returned to again , as soon as the wind , weather , and other circumstances would let him ? chap. xix . of the dissolution of governments . . he that will , with any clearness , speak of the dissolution of government , ought , in the first place , to distinguish between the dissolution of the society , and the dissolution of the government . that which makes the community , and brings men out of the loose state of nature , into one politick society , is the agreement , which every one has , with the rest , to incorporate and act as one body , and so be one distinct commonwealth . the usual , and almost only way , whereby this union is dissolved , is the inroad of foreign force making a conquest upon them . for in that case , ( not being able to maintain and support themselves , as one intire , and independent body ) the union belonging to that body , which consisted therein , must necessarily cease , and so every one return to the state he was in before , with a liberty to shift for himself , and provide for his own safety , as he thinks fit , in some other society . whenever the society is dissolved , 't is certain , the government of that society cannot remain . thus conquerors swords often cut up governments by the roots , and mangle societies to pieces , separating the subdued or scattered multitude from the protection of , and dependence on that society which ought to have preserved them from violence . the world is too well instructed in , and too forward to allow of this way of dissolving of governments , to need any more to be said of it ; and there wants not much argument to prove , that where the society is dissolved , the government cannot remain : that being as impossible , as for the frame of an house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and displaced by a whirl-wind , or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake . . besides this over-turning , from without , governments are dissolved from within , first , when the legislative is altered , civil society being a state of peace amongst those who are of it , from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage , which they have provided in their legislative , for the ending all differences , that may arise amongst any of them . 't is in their legislative , that the members of a commonwealth are united and combined together into one coherent , living body . this is the soul that gives form , life , and unity to the commonwealth : from hence the several members have their mutual influence , sympathy , and connexion : and therefore , when the legislative is broken , or dissolved , dissolution and death follows . for the essence , and union of the society consisting in having one will , the legislative , when once established by the majority , has the declaring , and , as it were , keeping of that will. the constitution of the legislative is the first and fundamental act of society , whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union , under the direction of persons , and bonds of laws , made by persons authorized thereunto , by the consent and appointment of the people , without which no one man , or number of men , amongst them , can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest . when any one , or more , shall take upon them to make laws , whom the people have not appointed so to do , they make laws without authority , which the people are not therefore bound to obey ; by which means they come again to be out of subjection , and may constitute to themselves a new legislative , as they think best , being in full liberty to resist the force of those , who , without authority , would impose any thing upon them . every one is at the disposure of his own will , when those , who had , by the delegation of the society , the declaring of the publick will , are excluded from it , and others usurp the place , who have no such authority or delegation . . this being usually brought about by such , in the commonwealth , who mis-use the power they have : it is hard to consider it aright , and know at whose door to lay it , without knowing the form of government in which it happens . let us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons . first , a single , hereditary person having the constant , supream , executive power , and , with it , the power of convoking , and dissolving the other two , within certain periods of time. secondly , an assemby of hereditary nobility . thirdly , an assembly of representatives chosen , pro tempore , by the people : such a form of government supposed , it is evident , . first , that when such a single person , or prince sets up his own arbitrary will , in place of the laws , which are the will of the society , declared by the legislative , then the legislative is changed . for that being , in effect , the legislative whose rules and laws are put in execution , and required to be obeyed , when other laws are set up , and other rules pretended and inforced , than what the legislative , constituted by the society , have enacted , 't is plain that the legislative is changed . who-ever introduces new laws , not being thereunto authorized , by the fundamental appointment of the society , or subverts the old , disowns and overturns the power , by which they were made , and so sets up a new legislative . . secondly , when the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in its due time , or from acting freely , pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted , the legislative is altered . for 't is not a certain number of men , no , nor their meeting , unless they have also freedom of debating , and leisure of perfecting what is for the good of the society , wherein the legislative consists , when these are taken away , or altered , so as to deprive the society , of the due exercise of their power , the legislative is truly altered . for it is not names that constitute governments , but the use and exercise of those powers that were intended to accompany them : so that he who takes away the freedom , or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons , in effect takes away the legislative , and puts an end to the government . . thirdly , when , by the arbitrary power of the prince , the electours , or ways of election are altered , without the consent , and contrary to the common interest of the people , there also the legislative is altered . for if others , then those whom the society hath authorized thereunto , do chuse , or in another way than what the society hath prescribed , those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people . . fourthly , the delivery also of the people into the subjection of a foreign power , either by the prince , or by the legislative , is certainly a change of the legislative , and so a dissolution of the government . for the end , why people entered into society , being to be preserved one intire , free , independent society , to be governed by its own laws ; this is lost when-ever they are given up into the power of another . . why , in such a constitution as this , the dissolution of the government , in these cases , is to be imputed to the prince , is evident , because he having the force , treasure , and offices of the state , to imploy , and often perswading himself , or being flattered by others , that as supreme magistrate , he is uncapable of controul ; he alone is in a condition to make great advances toward such changes , under pretence of lawful authority , and has it in his hands to terrifie , or suppress opposers , as factious , seditious , and enemies to the government : whereas no other part of the legislative , or people , is capable , by themselves , to attempt any alteration of the legislative , without open and visible rebellion , apt enough to be taken notice of ; which , when it prevails , produces effects very little different from foreign conquest . besides the prince , in such a form of government , having the power of dissolving the other parts of the legislative , and thereby rendring them private persons , they can never , in opposition to him , or without his concurrence , alter the legislative by a law ; his consent being necessary to give any of their decrees that sanction . but yet so far as the other parts of the legislative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government , and do either promote , or not , what lies in them , hinder such designs , they are guilty , and partake in this , which is certainly the greatest crime men can be guilty of one towards another . . there is one way more , whereby such a government may be dissolved , and that is ; when he , who has the supreme , executive power , neglects , and abandons that charge , so that the laws , already made , can no longer be put in execution . this is demonstratively to reduce all to anarchy , and so effectually to dissolve the government . for laws not being made for themselves , but to be , by their execution , the bonds of the society , to keep every part of the body politick in its due place , and function . when that totally ceases , the government visibly ceases , and the people become a confused multitude , without order or connexion . where there is no longer the administration of justice , for the securing of mens rights ; nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force , or provide for the necessities of the publick ; there certainly is no government left . where the laws cannot be executed it is all one as if there were no laws ; and a government without laws , is , i suppose , a mystery in politicks , unconceivable to humane capacity , and inconsistent with humane society . . in these , and the like cases , when the government is dissolved , the people are at liberty to provide for themselves , by erecting a new legislative , differing from the other , by the change of persons , or form , or both , as they shall find it most for their safety and good . for the society can never , by the fault of another , lose the native and original right it has to preserve it self ; which can only be done by a setled legislative , and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it . but the state of mankind is not so miserable , that they are not capable of using this remedy , till it be too late to look for any . to tell people they may provide for themselves , by erecting a new legislative ; when , by oppression , artitifice , or being delivered over to a foreign power , their old one is gone , is only to tell them , they may expect relief , when it is too late , and the evil is past cure. this is , in effect , no more , than to bid them , first be slaves , and then to take care of their liberty ; and , when their chains are on , tell them , they may act like free-men . this , if barely so , is rather mockery than relief , and men can never be secure from tyranny , if there be no means to escape it , till they are perfectly under it : and therefore it is , that they have not only a right to get out of it , but to prevent it . . there is therefore secondly another way , whereby governments are dissolved ; and that is , when the legislative , or the prince , either of them act contrary to their trust. first , the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them , when they ●●deavour to invade the property of the subject , and to make themselves , or any part of the community , masters , or arbitrary disposers of the lives , liberties , or fortunes of the people . . the reasons why men enter into society , is the preservation of their property ; and the end why they chuse , and authorize a legislative , is , that there may be laws made , and rules set , as guards and fences to the properties of all the society , to limit the power , and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society . for since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society , that the legislative should have a power to destroy that which every one designs to secure , by entering into society , and for which the people submitted themselves to legislators of their own making ; whenever the legislators endeavour to take away , and destroy the poperty of the people , or to reduce them to slavery , under arbitrary power , they put themselves into a state of war with the people , who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience , and are left to the common refuge , which god hath provided for all men , against force and violence . whensoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society ; and either by ambition , fear , folly or corruption , endeavour to grasp themselves , or put into the hands of any other , an absosolute power , over the lives , liberties , and estates of the people : by this breach of trust they forfeit the power , the people had put into their hands , for quite contrary ends , and it devolves to the people ; who have a right to resume their original liberty , and , by the establishment of a new legislative ( such as they shall think fit ) provide for their own safety and security , which is the end for which they are in society . what i have said here , concerning the legislative , in general , holds true also concerning the supreme executor , who having a double trust put in him , both to have a part in the legislative ; and the supreme execution of the law , acts against both , when he goes about to set up his own arbitrary will , as the law of the society . he acts also contrary to his trust , when he imploys the force , treasure , and offices of the society , to corrupt the representatives , and gain them to his purposes : when he openly pre-ingages the electors , and prescribes , to their choice , such , whom he has , by sollicitation , threats , promises , or othewise , won to his designs ; and imploys them to bring in such , who have promised before-hand what to vote , and what to enact . thus to regulate candidates and electors , and new model the ways of election , what is it , but to cut up the government by the roots , and poison the very fountain of publick security ? for the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives , as the fence to their properties , could do it for no other end , but that they might always be freely chosen , and so chosen , freely act and advise , as the necessity of the commonwealth , and the publick good should , upon examination , and mature debate , be judged to require . this , those who give their votes before they hear the debate , and have weighed the reasons on all sides , are not capable of doing . to prepare such an assembly as this , and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will , for the true representatives of the people , and the law-makers of the society , is certainly as great a breach of trust , and as perfect a declaration of a design to subvert the government , as is possible to be met with . to which , if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly imploy'd to the same end , and all the arts of perverted law made use of to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a design , and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of their country , 't will be past doubt what is doing . what power they ought to have in the society who thus imploy it contrary to the trust went along with it in its first institution , is easy to determine ; and one cannot but see , that he who has once attempted any such thing as this , cannot any longer be trusted . . to this perhaps it will be said , that the people being ignorant and always discontented ; to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people , is to expose it to certain ruin : and no government will be able long to subsist , if the people may set up a new legislative whenever they take offence at the old one . to this i answer quite the contrary . people are not so easily got out of their old forms as some are apt to suggest . they are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledg'd faults in the frame they have been accustom'd to . and if there be any original defects , or adventitious ones introduced by time or corruption ; 't is not an easy thing to get them changed , even when all the world sees there is an opportunity for it . this slowness and aversion in the people to quit their old constitutions , has in the many revolutions have been seen in this kingdom , in this and former ages , still kept us to , or aftersome interval of fruitless attempts , still brought us back again to our old legislative of king , lords and commons : and whatever provocations have made the crown be taken from some of our princes heads , they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line . . but 't will be said , this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion . to which i answer , first , no more than any other hypothesis . for when the people are made miserable , and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power ; cry up their governours as much as you will for sons of iupiter , let them be sacred and divine , descended or authoriz'd from heaven ; give them out for whom or what you please , the same will happen . the people generally ill treated , and contrary to right , will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them . they will wish and seek for the opportunity , which in the change , weakness and accidents of human affairs seldom delays long to offer it self . he must have lived but a little while in the world , who has not seen examples of this in his time ; and he must have read very little , who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world. . secondly , i answer , such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in publick affairs . great mistakes in the ruling part , many wrong and inconvenient laws , and all the slips of human frailty will be born by the people , without mutiny or murmur . but if a long train of abuses , prevarications and artifices , all tending the same way , make the design visible to the people , and they cannot but feel what they lye under , and see whither they are going ; 't is not to be wonder'd that they should then rouze themselves , and endeavour to put the rule into such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was at first erected ; and without which , ancient names and specious forms , are so far from being better , that they are much worse than the state of nature , or pure anarchy ; the inconveniencies being all as great and as near , but the remedy farther off and more difficult . . thirdly , i answer , that this power in the people of providing for their safety anew , by a new legislative , when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust , by invading their property , is the best fence against rebellion , and the probablest means to hinder it . for rebellion being an opposition , not to persons but authority , which is founded only in the constitutions and laws of the government ; those , whoever they be , who by force break through , and by force j●stify their violation of them , are truly and properly rebels . for when men by entering into society and civil government , have excluded force , and introduced laws for the preservation of property , peace and unity amongst themselves ; those who set up force again in opposition to the laws , do rebellare , that is , bring back again the state of war , and are properly rebels : which they who are in power , by the pretence they have to authority , the temptation of force they have in their hands , and the flattery of those about them being likeliest to do ; the properest way to prevent the evil , is to shew them the danger and injustice of it , who are under the greatest temptation to run into it . . in both the forementioned cases , when either the legislative is changed , or the legislators act contrary to the end for which they were constituted ; those who are guilty are guilty of rebellion . for if any one by force takes away the establish'd legislative of any society , and the laws by them made , pursuant to their trust , he thereby takes away the umpirage which every one had consented to , for a peaceable decision of all their controversies , and a bar to the state of war amongst them . they who remove , or change the legislative , take away this decisive power , which no body can have but by the appointment and consent of the people ; and so destroying the authority which the people did , and no body else can set up , and introducing a power which the people hath not authoriz'd ; actually introduce a state of war , which is , that of force without authority : and thus by removing the legislative establish'd by the society , in whose decisions the people acquiesced and united , as to that of their own will ; they unty the knot , and expose the people anew to the state of war. and if those , who by force take away the legislative , are rebels , the legislators themselves , as has been shewn , can be no less esteemed so ; when they who were set up for the protection and preservation of the people , their liberties and properties , shall by force invade and indeavour to take them away ; and so they , putting themselves into a state of war with those who made them the protectors and guardians of their peace , are properly , and with the greatest aggravation , rebellantes rebels . . but if they who say it lays a foundation for rebellion , mean that it may occasion civil wars , or intestine broils , to tell the people they are absolved from obedience , when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties , and may oppose the unlawful violence of those who were their magistrates when they invade their properties , contrary to the trust put in them ; and that therefore this doctrine is not to be allow'd , being so destructive to the peace of the world. they may as well say upon the same ground , that honest men may not oppose robbers or pirars , because this may occasion disorder or bloodshed . if any mischief come in such cases , it is not to be charged upon him who defends his own right , but on him that invades his neighbours . if the innocent honest man , must quietly quit all he has for peace sake , to him who will lay violent hands upon it , i desire it may be consider'd , what a kind of peace there will be in the world , which consists only in violence and rapine ; and which is to be maintain'd only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors . who would not think it an admirable peace betwixt the mighty and the mean , when the lamb , without resistance , yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf ? polyphemus's den gives us a perfect pattern of such a peace . such a government wherein vlysses and his companions had nothing to do , but quietly to suffer themselves to be devour'd . and no doubt , vlysses , who was a prudent man , preach'd up passive obedience , and exhorted them to a quiet submission , by representing to them of what concernment peace was to mankind ; and by shewing the inconveniencies might happen , if they should offer to resist polyphemus , who had now the power over them . . the end of government is the good of mankind , and which is best for mankind , that the people should be always expos'd to the boundless will of tyranny , or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be oppos'd , when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power , and imploy it for the destruction , and not the preservation of the properties of their people ? . nor let any one say , that mischief can arise from hence , as often as it shall please a busy head or turbulent spirit to desire the alteration of the government . 't is true , such men may stir whenever they please , but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition . for till the mischief be grown general , and the ill designs of the rulers become visible , or their attempts sensible to the greater part , the people , who are more disposed to suffer , than right themselves by resistance , are not apt to stir . the examples of particular injustice , or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man , moves them not . but if they universally have a perswasion grounded upon manifest evidence , that designs are carrying on against their liberties , and the general course and tendency of things cannot but give them strong suspicions of the evil intention of their governours , who is to be blamed for it ? who can help it , if they , who might avoid it , bring themselves into this suspicion ? are the people to be blamed , if they have the sence of rational creatures , and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them ? and is it not rather their fault who put things in such a posture that they would not have them thought as they are ? i grant , that the pride , ambition , and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused great disorders in common-wealths , and factions have been fatal to states and kingdoms . but whether the mischief hath oftner began in the peoples wantonness , and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of their rulers ; or in the rulers insolence , and endeavours to get , and exercise an arbitrary power over their people ; whether oppression , or disobedience gave the first rise to the disorder , i leave it to impartial history to determine . this i am sure , who-ever , either ruler or subject , by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people , and lays the foundation for overturning the constitution and frame of any just government ; he is guilty of the greatest crime , i think , a man is capable of , being to answer for all those mischiefs , of blood , rapine , and desolation , which the breaking to pieces of governments bring on a countrey . and he , who does it , is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind ; and is to be treated accordingly . . that subjects or foreigners attempting by force , on the properties of any people , may be resisted with force , is agreed on all hands . but that magistrates , doing the same thing , may be resisted , hath of late been denied : as if those who had the greatest priviledges and advantages by the law , had thereby a power to break those laws , by which alone they were set in a better place than their brethren : whereas their offence is thereby the greater , both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law , and breaking also that trust which is put into their hands by their brethren . . whosoever uses force without right , as every one does in society , who does it without law ; puts himself into a state of war with those , against whom he so uses it , and in that state all former ties are cancelled , all other rights cease , and every one has a right to defend himself , and to resist the aggressour . this is so evident , that barclay himself , that great assertor of the powe● and sacredness of kings , is forced to confess , that it is lawful for the people , in some cases , to resist their king ; and that too in a chapter , wherein he pretends to shew that the divine law shuts up the people from all manner of rebellion . whereby it is evident , even by his own doctrine , that , since they may , in some cases , resist , all resisting of princes is not rebellion . his words are these . quod siquis dicat , ergone populus tyrannicae crudelitati & furori jugulum semper praebebit ? ergone multitudo civitates suas fame , ferro , & flammâ vastari , seque , conjuges , & liberos fortunae ludibrio & tyranni libidini exponi , inque omnia vitae pericula omnesque miserias & molestias à rege deduci patientur ? num illis quod omni animantium generi est à naturâ tributum , denegari debet , ut s● . vim vi repellant , seseque ab injuriâ tueantur ? huic breviter responsum sit , populo universo negari defensionem , quae juris naturalis est , neque ultionem quae praeter naturam est adversus regem concedi debere . quapropter si rex non in singulares tantum personas aliquot privatum odium exerceat , sed corpus etiam reipublicae , cujus ipse caput est , i.e. totum populum , vel insignem aliquam ejus partem immani & intolerandâ saevitiâ seu tyrannide divexet ; populo , quidem hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi se ab injuriâ potestas competit , sed tuendi se tantum , non enim in principem invadendi : & restituendae injuriae illatae , non recedendi à debitâ reverentiâ propter acceptam injuriam . praesentem denique impetum propulsandi non vim praeteritam ulciscendi jus habet . horum enim alterum à naturâ est , ut vitam scilicet corpusque tueamur . alterum vero contra naturam , ut inserior de superiori supplicium sumat . quod itaque populus malum , antequam factum sit , impedire potest , ne fiat , id postquam factum est , in regem authorem sceleris vindicare non potest : populus igitur hoc ampliùs quam privatus quispiam habet : quod huic , vel ipsis adversariis judicibus , excepto buchanano , nullum nisi in patientia remedium superest . cùm ille si intolerabilis tyrannis est ( modicum enim ferre omnino debet ) resistere cum reverentiâ possit , barclay contra monarchom . l. . c. . in english thus : . but if any one should ask , must the people then always lay themselves open to the cruelty and rage of tyranny ? must they see their cities pillaged , and laid in ashes , their wives and children exposed to the tyrant's lust , and fury , and themselves and families reduced , by their king , to ruine , and all the miseries of want and oppression , and yet sit still ? must men alone be debarred the common priviledge of opposing force with force , which nature allows so freely to all other creatures , for their preservation from injury ? i answer : self-defence is a part of the law of nature ; nor can it be denied the community , even against the king himself : but to revenge themselves upon him , must by no means , be allowed them ; it being not agreeable to that law. wherefore if the king shall shew an hatred , not only to some particular persons , but sets himself against the body of the commonwealth , whereof he is the head , and shall , with intolerable ill usage , cruelly tyrannize over the whole , or a considerable part of the people ; in this case , the people have a right to resist and defend themselves from injury : but it must be with this caution , that they only defend themselves , but do not attack their prince : they may repair the damages received , but must not , for any provocation , exceed the bounds of due reverence and respect . they may repulse the present attempt , but must not revenge past violences . for it is natural for us to defend life and limb , but that an inferiour should punish a superiour is against nature . the mischief which is designed them , the people may prevent before it be done , but when it is done , they must not revenge it on the king , though author of the villany . this therefore is the priviledge of the people in general , above what any private person hath ; that particular men are allowed , by our adversaries themselves , ( buchanan only excepted ) to have no other remedy but patience ; but the body of the people may , with respect , resist intolerable tyranny ; for when it is but moderate , they ought to endure it . . thus far that great advocate of monarchical power allows of resistance . . 't is true , he has annexed two limitations to it , to no purpose ; first , he says , it must be with reverence . secondly , it must be without retribution , or punishment ; and the reason he gives , is , because an inferiour cannot punish a superiour . first , how to resist force without striking again , or how to strike with reverence , will need some skill to make intelligible . he that shall oppose an assault only with a shield to receive the blows , or in any more respectful posture , without a sword in his hand , to abate the confidence and force of the assailant , will quickly be at an end of his resistance , and will find such a defence serve only to draw on himself the worse usage . this is as ridiculous a way of resisting , as iuvenal thought it of fighting ; ubi tu pulsas , ego vapulo tantum . and the success of the combat , will be unavoidably the same he there describes it : — libertas pauperis haec est : pulsatus rogat , & pugnis concisus , adorat , vt liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti . this will always be the event of such an imaginary resistance , where men may not strike again . he therefore who may resist , must be allowed to strike . and then let our author , or any body else , join a knock on the head , or a cut on the face , with as much reverence , and respect as he thinks fit . he that can reconcile blows and reverence , may , for ought i know , deserve for his pains , a civil , respectful cudgelling , where-ever he can meet with it . secondly , as to his second , an inferiour cannot punish a superiour ; that 's true , generally speaking , whilst he is his superiour . but to resist force with force , being the state of war , that levells the parties , cancels all former relation of reverence , respect , and superiority : and then the odds , that remains , is , that he , who opposes the unjust aggressour , has this superiority over him , that he has a right , when he prevails , to punish the offender , both for the breach of the peace , and all the evils that followed upon it . barclay therefore , in another place , more coherently to himself , denies it to be lawful to resist a king in any case . but he there assigns two cases , whereby a king may un-king himself . his words are , quid ergo , nulline casus incidere possunt quibus populo sese erigere atque in regem impotentius dominantem arma capere & invadere jure suo suâque authoritate liceat ? nulli certe quamdiu rex manet . semper enim ex divinis id obstat , regem honorificato ; & qui potestati resistit , dei ordinationi resistit : non aliàs igitur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat . tunc enim se ipse principatu exuit atque in privatis constituit liber : hoc modo populus & superior efficitur , reverso ad eum sc. jure illo quod ante regem inauguratum in interregno habuit . at sunt paucorum generum commissa ejusmodi quae hunc effectum pariunt . at ego cum plurima animo perlustrem , duo tantum invenio , duos , inquam , casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit & omni honore & dignitate regali atque in subditos potestate destituit ; quorum etiam meminit winzerus . horum unus est , si regnum disperdat , quemadmodum de nerone fertur , quod is nempe senatum populumque romanum , atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammaque vastare , ac novas sibi sedes quaerere decrevisset . et de caligula , quod palam denunciarit se neque civem neque principem senatui amplius fore , inque animo habuerit , interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque alexandriam commigrare , ac ut populum uno ictu interimeret , unam ei cervicem optavit . talia cum rex aliquis meditatur & molitur serio , omnem regnandi curam & animum ilico abjicit , ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit , ut dominus servi pro derelicto habiti , dominium . . alt●r casus est , si rex in alicujus olientelam se contulit , ac regnum quod liberum à majoribus & populo traditum accepit , alienae ditioni mancipavit . nam tunc quamvis forte non eâ mente id agit populo plane ut incommodet : tamen quia quod praecipuum est regiae dignitatis amisit , ut summus scilicet in regno secundum deum sit , & solo deo inferior , atque populum etiam totum ignorantem vel invitum , cujus libertatem sartam & tectam conservare debuit , in alterius gentis ditionem & potestatem dedidit ; hác velut quadam regni abalienatione effecit , ut nec quod ipse in regno imperium habuit r●tineat , nec in eum cui collatum voluit , juris quicquam transera● ; atque ita eo facto liberum jam & suae potestatis populum relinquit , cujus rei exemplum unum annales scotici suppeditant . barclay contra monarchom . l. . c. . which may be thus englished . . what then , can there no case happen wherein the people may of right , and by their own authority , help themselves , take arms , and set upon their king , imperiously domineering over them ? none at all , whilst he remains a king. honour the king , and he that resists the power , resists the ordinance of god ; are divine oracles that will never permit it . the people therefore can never come by a power over him , unless he does something that makes him cease to be a king. for then he divests himself of his crown and dignity , and returns to the state of a private man , and the people become free and superiour ; the power which they had in the interregnum , before they crown'd him king , devolving to them again . but there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this state . after considering it well on all sides , i can find but two . two cases there are , i say , whereby a king , ipso facto , becomes no king , and loses all power and regal authority over his people ; which are also taken notice of by winzerus . the first is , if he indeavour to overturn the government , that is , if he have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth , as it is recorded of nero , that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of rome , lay the city wast with fire and sword , and then remove to some other place . and of caligula , that he openly declar'd , that he would be no longer a head to the people or senate , and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks , and then retire to alexandria : and he wisht that the people had but one neck , that he might dispatch them all at a blow . such designs as these , when any king harbours in his thoughts , and seriously promotes , he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth ; and consequently forfeits the power of governing his subjects , as a master does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath abandon'd . . the other case is , when a king makes himself the dependent of another , and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him , and the people put free into his hands , to the dominion of another . for however perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people ; yet because he has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity , viz. to be next and immediately under god , supream in his kingdom ; and also because he betray'd or forced his people , whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved , into the power and dominion of a foreign nation . by this as it were alienation of his kingdom , he himself loses the power he had in it before , without transferring any the least right to those on whom he would have bestowed it ; and so by this act sets the people free , and leaves them at their own disposal . one example of this is to be found in the scotch annals . . in these cases barclay , the great champion of absolute monarchy , is forced to allow , that a king may be resisted , and ceases to be a king. that is in short , not to multiply cases : in whatsoever he has no authority , there he is no king , and may be resisted : for wheresoever the authority ceases , the king ceases too , and becomes like other men who have no authority . and these two cases he instances in , differ little from those above mention'd , to be destructive to governments , only that he has omitted the principle from which his doctrine flows ; and that is , the breach of trust , in not preserving the form of government agreed on , and in not intending the end of government it self ; which is the publick good and preservation of property . when a king has dethron'd himself , and put himself in a state of war with his people , what shall hinder them from prosecuting him who is no king , as they would any other man , who has put himself into a state of war with them . barclay , and those of his opinion , would do well to tell us . bilson , a bishop of our church , and a great stickler for the power and prerogative of princes , does , if i mistake not , in his treatise of christian subjection , acknowledge , that princes may forfeit their power , and their title , to the obedience of their subjects ; and if there needed authority in a case where reason is so plain , i could send my reader to bracton , fortescue , and the author of the mirror , and others , writers , that cannot be suspected to be ignorant of our government , or enemies to it . but i thought hooker alone might be enough to satisfie those men , who relying on him for their ecclesiastical polity , are by a strange fate carried to deny those principles upon which he builds it . whether they are herein made the tools of cunninger workmen , to pull down their own fabrick , they were best look . this i am sure , their civil policy is so new , so dangerous , and so destructive to both rulers and people , that as former ages never could bear the broaching of it ; so it may be hoped , those to come , redeem'd from the impositions of these egyptian under-taskmasters , will abhor the memory of such servile platterers , who whilst it seem'd to serve their turn , resolv'd all government into absolute tyranny , and would have all men born to what their mean souls fitted them , slavery . . here , 't is like , the common question will be made , who shall be judge whether the prince , or legislative , act contrary to their trust ? this , perhaps , ill-affected , and factious men may spread amongst the people , when the prince only makes use of his due prerogative . to this i reply ; the people shall be judge ; for who shall be judge whether his trustee or deputy acts well , and according to the trust reposed in him , but he who deputes him , and must , by having deputed him ; have still a power to discard him , when he fails in his trust ? if this be reasonable , in particular cases of private men , why should it be otherwise in that of the greatest moment , where the welfare of millions is concerned , and also where the evil , if not prevented , is greater , and the redress very difficult , dear , and dangerous ? . but farther , this question , ( who shall be judge ? ) cannot mean , that there is no judge at all . for where there is no judicature on earth , to decide controversies amongst men , god in heaven is judge . he alone , 't is true , is judge of the right . but every man is judge for himself , as in all other cases , so in this , whether another hath put himself into a state of war with him , and whether he should appeal to the supreme judge , as iephtha did . . if a controversie arise betwixt a prince , and some of the people , in a matter where the law is silent , or doubtful , and the thing be of great consequence , i should think , the proper umpire , in such a case , should be the body of the people . for in cases , where the prince hath a trust reposed in him , and is dispensed from the common , ordinary rules of the law ; there , if any men find themselves aggrieved , and think the prince acts contrary to , or beyond that trust , who so proper to judge , as the body of the people , ( who , at first , lodg'd that trust in him ) how far they meant it should extend ? but if the prince , or who-ever they be in the administration , decline that way of determination , the appeal then lies no where but to heaven . force between either persons , who have no known superiour on earth , or which permits no appeal to a judge on earth , being properly a state of war , wherein the appeal lies only to heaven , and in that state the injured party must judge for himself , when he will think fit to make use of that appeal , and put himself upon it . . to conclude , the power that every individual gave the society , when he entered into it , can never revert to the individuals again , as long as the society lasts , but will always remain in the community ; because without this , there can be no community , no commonwealth , which is contrary to the original agreement : so also when the society hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men , to continue in them and their successors , with direction and authority for providing such successors , the legislative can never revert to the people whilst that government lasts : because having provided a legislative with power , to continue for ever , they have given up their political power to the legislative , and cannot resume it . but if they have set limits to the duration of their legislative , and made this supreme power , in any person , or assembly , only temporary : or else when , by the miscarriages of those in authority , it is forfeited ; upon the forfeiture of their rulers , or at the determination of the time set , it reverts to the society , and the people have a right to act as supreme , and continue the legislative in themselves , or place it in a new form , or new hands , as they think good . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * in grants and gifts that have their origiginal from god or nature , as the power of the father hath , no inferior power of man can limit nor make any law of prescription against them , o. . † the scripture teaches that supreme power was originally in the father without any limitation , o. . notes for div a -e it is no improbable opinion , therefore , which the arch-philosopher was of , that the chief person in every houshold , was always , as it were , a king ; so when numbers of housholds joyn'd themselves in civil societies together , kings were the first kind of governours amongst them , which is also , as it seemeth , the reason why the name of fathers continued still in them , who of fathers , were made rulers ; as also the ancient custom of governours to do as melchizedec , and being kings , to exercise the office of priests , which fathers did , at the first grew , perhaps , by the same occasion . howbeit , this is not the only kind of regiment that has been received in the world. the inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry other to be devised , so that , in a word , all publique regiment , of what kind soever , seemeth evidently to have risen from the deliberate advice , consultation and composition between men , judging it convenient , and behovefull , there being no impossibility in nature , considered by it self , but that man might have lived without any publique regiment . hooker's eccl. l. . §. . the publick power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society ; and the principal use of that power is to give laws unto all that are under it , which laws in such cases we must obey , unless there be reason shew'd which may necessarily inforce , that the law of reason , or of god , doth injoin the contrary , hook. eccl. pol. . §. . to take away all such mutual grievances , injuries and wrongs , i. e. such as attend men in the state of nature . there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement amongst themselves by ordaining some kind of government publick , and by yielding themselves subject thereunto , that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern : by them the peace , tranquillity , and happy estate of the rest might be procured . men always knew that where force and injury was offered , they might be defenders of themselves ; they knew that however men may seek their own commodity ; yet if this were done with injury unto others , it was not to be suffered , but by all men , and all good means to be withstood . finally , they knew that no man might , in reason , take upon him to determine his own right , and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof , in as much as every man is towards himself , and them whom he greatly affects , partial ; and therefore , that strifes and troubles would be endless , except they gave their common consent , all to be ordered by some , whom they should agree upon , without which consent , there would ●e no reason that one man should take upon him to be lord or iudge over another . hooker's eccl. pol. l. . §. . at the first ; when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed , it may be that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of governing , but all permitted unto their wisdom and discretion , which were to rule , till , by experience , they found this for all parts very inconvenient , so as the thing , which they had devised for a remedy , did indeed but increase the sore , which it should have cured . they saw , that to live by one man's will , became the cause of all mens misery . this constrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might see their duty beforehand , and know the penalties of transgressing them . hooker's eccl. pol. l. . §. . civil law , being the act of the whole body politick , doth therefore over-rule each several part of the same body . hooker ibid. at first , when some certain kind of regiment was once approved , it may be , nothing was then further thought upon , for the manner of governing , but all permitted unto their wisdom , and discretion , which were to rule , till , by experience , they found this for all parts very inconvenient , so as the thing , which they had devised for a remedy , did indeed but increase the sore , which it should have cured . they saw , that to live by one man's will , became the cause of all mens misery . this constrained them to come unto laws wherein all men might see their duty beforehand , and know the penalties of transgressing them . hooker's eccl. pol. l. . §. . the lawful power of making laws to command whole politick societies of men , belonging so properly unto the same intire societies , that for any prince or potentate of what kind soever upon earth , to exercise the same of himself , and not by express commission , immediately and personally received from god , or else by authority derived at the first from their consent , upon whose persons they impose laws , it is no better than meer tyranny . laws they are not therefore which publick approbation hath not made so . hooker's eccl pol. l. . §. . of this point therefore we are to note , that sith men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politick multitudes of men , therefore utterly without our consent , we could in such sort be at no mans commandment living . and to be commanded we do consent when that society , whereof we be a part , hath at any time before consented , without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement . laws therefore human , of what kind soever , are available by consent . ibid. two foundations there are which bear up publick societies ; the one a natural inclination , whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship ; the other an order , expresly or secretly agreed upon , touching the manner of their union in living together ; the latter is that which we call the law of a commonweal , the very soul of a politick body , the parts whereof are by law animated , held together , and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth . law● politick , ordain'd for external order and regiment amongst men , are never framed as they should be , unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate , ●rebellious , and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature ; in a word , unless presuming man to be in regard of his depraved mind , little better than a wild beast , they do accordingly provide notwithstanding , so to frame his outward actions , that they be no hindrance unto the common good , for which societies are instituted . vnless they do this they are not perfect . hooker's ec. pol. l. . §. . humane laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct , howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measured by , which rules are two , the law of god , and the law of nature ; so that laws humane must be made according to the general laws of nature , and without contradiction to any positive law of scripture , otherwise they are ill made . ibid. l. . § . to constrain men to any thing inconvenient doth seem unreasonable . ibid. l. . §. . de corpore politico, or, the elements of law, moral and politick with discourses upon severall heads, as of [brace] the law of nature, oathes and covenants, several kinds of government : with the changes and revolutions of them / by tho. hobbs of malmsbury. hobbes, thomas, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing h ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing h estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) de corpore politico, or, the elements of law, moral and politick with discourses upon severall heads, as of [brace] the law of nature, oathes and covenants, several kinds of government : with the changes and revolutions of them / by tho. hobbs of malmsbury. hobbes, thomas, - . [ ], p. printed by t.r. for j. ridley, and are to be sold at the castle in fleetstreet ..., london : . imperfect: tightly bound with loss of text. reproduction of original in the bodleian library. eng natural law. political science -- early works to . oaths. a r (wing h ). civilwar no de corpore politico. or the elements of law, moral & politick. with discourses upon severall heads; as of the law of nature. oathes and cove hobbes, thomas f the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the f category of texts with or more defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - ben griffin sampled and proofread - ben griffin text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion de corpore politico . or the elements of law , moral & politick . with discourses upon severall heads ; as of the law of nature . oathes and covenants . several kinds of government . with the changes and revolutions of them . by tho. hobbs of malmsbury . london , printed by t. r. for j. ridley , and are to be sold at the castle in fleetstreet , by ram-alley . . to the reader . reader , you may be pleased to take notice , that the first part of the work depends upon a former treatise of humane nature written by mr. hobbs , and by a friend of his committed to the press for the benefit of mankind . it was thought fit , that nothing of so worthy an author should be left unprinted , especially considering , that this piece is most usefull for the society of reasona●le creatures , being the grounds and principles of policy , without which there would be nothing but confusion in the world . i am confident , if mens minds were but truly fixt upon the center of this discourse , they would not prove such weather-cocks , to be turned about with the wind of every false doctrine , and vain opinion . vve should then be free from those disorders which threaten distraction to the soul , and destruction to the common vvealth . but let others write never so well , if our practise doe not second their instructions , we may bee wise enough to foresee our misery , but never know how to prevent it . what pitty is it , that such rare conclusions as these are , should produce no other effect , but to informe our knowledg , and confute our conversation ; whilest we neglect the truth that is apprehended . yet there is some hope , that such observers , whose vvisdome hath received the stamp of goodnesse , will improve their skill to a reall advancement of those benefits , which lye horded up in this curious cabinet , to whose use and behoof , these excellent notions are commended , as the best that ever were writ in this kind , and may serve for a generall ground and foundation to all regular conceptions , that concern the essence and existence of man , the government of kingdoms and common-vvealths , and by consequence our eternall salvation . de corpore politico . chap. i. . . men by nature equall . . by vain glory indisposed to allow equality with themselves , to others . . apt to provoke another by comparisons . . apt to incroach one upon another . . right defined . . right to the end , implyeth right to the means . every man his own judge by nature . . every mans strength and knowledge for his owne use . . every man by nature hath right to all things . . warr and peace defined . . men by noture in the state of warr . . in manifest inequality , might is right . . reason dictateth peace . in a former treatise of humane nature already printed , hath beene set forth the whole nature of man , consisting in the powers naturall of his body and mind , and may all be comprehended in these four , strength of body , experinece , reason , and passion . . in this , it will be expedient to consider in what estate of security this our nature hath placed us , and what probability it hath left us , of continuing and preserving our selves against the violence of one another . and first , if we consider how little odds there is of strength or knowledge , between men of mature age , and with how great facility he that is the weaker in strength , or in wit , or in both , may utterly destroy the power of the stronger ; since there needeth but little force to the taking away of a mans life , we may conclude that men , considered in meer nature , ought to admit amongst themselves equality ; and that he that claimeth no more , may be esteemed moderate . . on the other side , considering the great difference there is in men , from the diversity of their passions , how some are vainly glorious , and hope for precedency and superiority above their fellows , not only when they are equall in power , but also when they are inferiour ; we must needs acknowledge that it must necessarily follow , that those men who are moderate , and look for no more but equality of nature , shall be obnoxious to the force of others , that will attempt to subdue them . and from hence shall proceed a generall diffidence in mankind , and mutuall fear one of another . . farther , since men by natural passion are divers wayes offensive one to another , every man thinking well of himself , and hating to see the same in others , they must needs provoke one another by words , and other signes of contempt and hatred , which are incident to all comparison , till at last , they must determine the preheminence by strength and force of body . . moreover , considering that many mens appetites carry them to one and the same end ; which end sometimes can neither be enjoyed in common , nor divided , it followeth , that the stronger must enjoy it alone and that it be decided by battell who is the stronger . and thus the greatest part of men , upon no assurance of odds , do neverthelesse through vanity , or comparison , or appetite , provoke the rest , that otherwise would be contented with equality . . and forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire bonum sibi , that which is good for themselves , and to avoid that which is hurtfull ; but most of all , the terrible enemy of nature , death , from whom we expect both the losse of all power , and also the greatest of bodily paines in the losing : it is not against reason , that a man doth all he can , to preserve his owne body and limbs , both from death and paine . and that which is not against reason , men call right , or jus , or blame●esse liberty , of using our own naturall power and ability . it is therefore ● right of nature , that every man may preserve his owne life and limbs , with all the power he hath . . and because where a man hath right to the end , and the end cannot be attained without the meanes ; that is , without such things as are necessary to the end , it is consequent that it is not against reason , and therefore right for a man to use all meanes , and doe whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body . . also every man by right of nature , is judge himself of the necessity of the means , and of the greatnesse of the danger . for if it be against reason , that i be judge of mine owne danger my self , then it is reason , that another man be judge thereof . but the same reason that maketh another man judge of those things that concern me , maketh me also judge of that that concerneth him . and therefore i have reason to judge of his sentence , whether it be for my benefit , or not . . as a mans judgment in right of nature is to be imployed for his own benefit , so also the strength , knowledg , and art , of every man is then rightly imployed , when he useth it for himselfe ; else must not a man have right to preserve himselfe . . every man by nature hath right to all things , that is to say , to do whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth , to possesse , use , and enjoy all things he will and can . for seeing all things he willeth , must therfore be good unto him in his own judgment , because he willeth them , and may tend to his preservation some time or other , or he may judg so , and we have made him judg thereof , sect. . it followeth , that all things may rightly also be done by him . and for this cause it is rightly sayd , natura dedil omnia omnibus , that nature hath given all things to all men ; insomuch that jus & utile , right and profit , is the same thing . but that right of all men to all things , is in effect no better than if no man had right to any thing . for there is little use and benefit of the right a man hath , when another as strong , or stronger then himselfe hath right to the same . . seeing then to the offensivenesse of mans nature one to another , there is added a right of every man to every thing , whereby one man invadeth with right , and another man with right resisteth , and men live thereby in perpetuall diffidence , and study how to p●eoccupate each other : the estate of men in this naturall liberty , is the estate of warr . for warr is nothing else but that time wherein the will and contention of contending by force , is either by words or actions sufficiently declared ; and the time which is not warr , is peace . . the estate of hostility and war being such , as thereby nature it selfe is destroyed , and men kil one another : ( as we know also that it is , both by the experience of salvage nations that live at this day , and by the histories of our ancestors , the old inhabitants of germany , and other now civill countries , where we find the people few , and short-lived , and without the ornaments and comforts of life , which by peace and society are usually invented and procured ) he therefore that desireth to live in such an estate as is the estate of liberty and right of all to all , contradicteth himselfe . for every man by natural necessity desireth his own good , to which this estate is contrary , wherin we suppose contention between men by nature equal , and able to destroy one another . . seeing this right of protecting our selves by our own discretion and force proceedeth from danger , and that danger from the fquality between mens forces , much more reason is there , that a man prevent such equality before the danger cometh , and before the necessity of battell . a man therefore that hath another man in his power to rule or govern , to do good to , or harm , hath right , by the advantage of this his present power , to take caution at his pleasure , for his security against that other in time to come . he therefore that hath already subdued his adversary , or gotten into his power any other , that either by infancy , or weaknesse , is unable to resist him , by right of nature may take the best caution , that such infant , or such feeble and subdued person can give him , of being ruled and governed by him for the time to come . for seeing we intend allwaies our one safety and preservation , we manifestly contradict that our intention , if we willingly dismiss such a one , and suffer him at once to gather strength and be our enemy . out of which may also be collected , that inresistable might in the state of nature is right . . but since it is supposed by the equality of strength and other natural faculties of men , that no man is of might sufficient , to assure himselfe for any long time , of preserving himself therby , whiles he remaineth in the state of hostility and war ; reason therefore dictateth to every man for his own good , to seek after peace , as far forth as there is hope to attain the same : and strengthen himselfe with all the help he can procure , for his own defence against those , from whom such peace cannot be obtained : and to do all those things which necessarily conduce thereunto . chap. ii. . the law of nature consisteth not in consent of men , but reason . . that every man devests himself of the right he hath to all things is one precept of nature . . what it is to relinquish and transferr ones right . . the will to transfer , and the will to accept , both necessary to the passing away of right . . right not transferred by words , de futuro , onely . . words de futuro , together with other signes of the will , may transferr right . . free gift defined . contract , and the sorts of it . . covenant defined . . contract of mutuall trust , is of no validity in the estate of hostility . . no covenant of men but with one another . . covenant how dissolved . . covenant extorted by feare , in the law of nature , valid . . covenant contrary to former covenant , voyd . . an oath defined . . oath to be administred to every man in his own religion . . oath addeth not to the obligation . . covenants binde but to endeavour . what it is we call the law of nature , is not agreed upon by those , that have hitherto wtitten . for the most part such writets as have occasion to affirm , that any thing is against the law of nature , do alledge no more than this , that it is against the consent of all nations , or the wisest and most civill nations . but it is not agreed upon , who shall judge which nations are the wisest . others make that against the law of nature , which is contrary to the consent of all mankind , which definition cannot be allowed , because then no man could offend against the law of nature ; for the nature of every man is contained under the nature of mankind . but forasmuch as all men are carried away by the violence of their passion , and by evill customes , do those things which are commonly said to be against the law of nature ; it is not the consent of passion , or consent in some errour gotten by custome , that makes the law of nature . reason is no less of the nature of man then passion , and is the same in all men , because all men agree in the will to be directed and governed in the way to that which they desire to attain , namely , their own good which is the work of reason , there can therefore be no other law of nature then reason , nor no other precepts of natural law , then those which declare unto us the wayes of peace , where the same may be obtained , and of defence where it may not . . one precept of the law of nature therefore this is , that every man devest himself of the right he hath to all things by nature . for when divers men having right not only to all things else , but to one anothers persons , if they use the same , there ariseth thereby invasion on the one part , and resistance on the other , which is war , and therefore contrary to the law of nature , the sum whereof consisteth in making peace . . wen a man devesteth and putteth from his right , he either simply relinquisheth it , or transferreth the same to another man . to relinquish it , is by sufficient signs to declare , that it is his will no more to doe that action , which of right he might have done before . to transferre right to another , is by sufficient signs to declare to that other accepting thereof , that it is his will not to resist , or hinder him , according to that right he had thereto before he transferred it . for seeing that by nature every man hath right to every thing , it is impossible for a man to transfer unto another any right that he had not before . and therefore all that a man doth in transferring of right , is no more but a declaring of the will , to suffer him to whom he hath so transferred his right , to make benefit of the same , without molestation . as for example , when a man giveth his lands or goods to another , he taketh from himself the right to enter into , and make use of the said lands or goods , or otherwise to hinder him of the use of what he hath given . . in transferring of right , two things therefore are required , one on the part of him that transferreth , which is a sufficient signification of his will therein : the other , on the part of him to whom it is transferred which is a sufficient signification of his acceptation thereof . either of these failing the right remaineth where it was : nor is it to be supposed , that he which giveth his right to one that accepteth it not , doth thereby simply relinquish it , and transfer it to whomsoever will receive it : in as much as the cause of transferring the same to one , rather then to another , is in the one , rather then in the rest . . when there appeare no other signes that a man hath relinquished , or transferred his right , but only words , it behoveth that the same be done in words , that signifie the present time , or the time past , and not only the time to come . for he that saith of the time to come ( as for example ) to morrow , i will give , declareth evidently , that he hath not yet given . the right therefore remaineth in him to day , and so continues , till he have given actually . but he that saith , i give , presently , or have given to another any thing , to have and enjoy the same to morrow , or any other time future , hath now actually transferred the sayd right , which otherwise he should have had at the time that the other is to enjoy it . . but because words alone are not a sufficient declaration of the mind , as hath been shewed , chap. . sect. words spoken , de futuro , when the will of him that speaketh them may be gathered by other signs , may be taken very often , as if they were meant de praesenti . for when it appeareth , that he that giveth , would have his words so understood by him to whom he giveth , as if he did actually transfe●r his right , then he must needs be understood to will all that is necessary to the same . . when a man transferreth any right of his to another , without consideration of reciprocal benefit past , present , or to come , this is called free gift . and in free gift , no other words can be binding , but those which are de praesenti , or de praeterito . for being de futuro only , they transfer nothing , nor can they be understood , as if they proceeded from the will of the giver ; because being a free gift , it carryeth with it no obligation greater then that which is inforced by the words . for he that promiseth to give , without any other consideration but his own affection , so long as he hath not given , deliberateth still , according as the causes of the affections continue , or diminish : and he that deliberateth , hath not yet willed , because the will is the last act of his deliberation . he that promiseth therefore , is not thereby a donor , but doson ; which name was given to that antiochus , that promised often , but seldome gave . . when a man transferreth his right upon consideration of reciprocal benefit , this is not free gift , but mutual donation , and is called contract . and in all contracts , either both parties presently perform , and put each other into a certainty and assurance of enjoying what they contract for . as when men buy or sell , or barter : or one party performeth presently , and the other promiseth , as when one selleth upon trust : or else neither party performeth presently , but trust one another . and it is impossible there should be any kind of contract besides these three . for either both the contractors trust , or neither , or else one trusteth , and the other not . . in all contracts where there is trust , the promise of him that is trusted , is called a covenant . and this though it be a promise , and of the time to come , yet doth it transfer the right , when that time cometh , no lesse then an actuall donation . for it is a manifest signe , that he which did perform , understood it was the will of him that was trusted , to performe also . promises therefore , upon consideration of reciprocal benefit , are covenants and signes of the will , or last act of deliberation , whereby the liberty of performing , or not performing , is taken away , and consequently are obligatory . for where liberty ceaseth , there beginneth obligation . . neverthelesse , in contracts that consist of such mutual trust , as that nothing be by either party performed for the present , when the contract is between such as are not compellable , he that performeth first , considering the disposition of men to take advantage of every thing for their benefit , doth but betray himself thereby to the covetousnesse or other passion of him with whom he contracteth . and therefore such covenants are of none effect . for there is no reason why the one should performe first , if the other be likely not to performe afterward . and whether he be likely or not , he that doubteth shall be judge himself , as hath been sayd , chap. . sect. . as long as they remaine in the estate and liberty of nature . but when there shall be such power coercive over both the parties , as shall deprive them of their private judgements in this point , then may such covenants be effectuall , seeing he that performeth first shal have no reasonable cause to doubt of the performance of the other , that may be compelled thereunto . . and forasmuch as in all covenants , and contracts , and donations , the acceptance of him to whom the right is transferred , is necessary to the essence of those covenants , donations , &c. it is impossible to make a covenant or donation to any , that by nature , or absence , are unable ; or if able , do not actualty declare their acceptation of the same . first of all therefore , it is impossible for any man to make a covenant with god almighty , farther then it hath pleased him to declare who shall receive and accept of the said covenant in his name . also it is impossible to make covenant with those living creatures , of whose wils we have no sufficient signe , for want of common language . . a covenant to do any action at a certain time and place , is then dissolved by the covenantor , when that time cometh , either by the performance , or by the violation . for a covenant is void that is once impossible . but a covenant not to do without time limited , which is as much as to say , a covenant never to do , is dissolved by the covenantor then only , when he violateth it or dyeth . and generally , all covenants are dischargeable by the covenantee , to whose benefit , and by whose right , he that maketh the covenant is obliged . this right therefore of the covenantee relinquished , is a release of the covenant . and universally , for the same reason , all obligations are determinable at the will of the obliger . . it is a question often moved , whether such covenants oblige , as are extorted from men by fear . as for example , whether if a man for feare of death , hath promised to give a theef an hundred pounds the next day , and not discover him , whether such covenant be obligatory , or not . and though in some cases such covenant may be void , yet it is not therefore void , because extorted by fear . for there appeareth no reason , why that which we do upon fear , should be lesse firme then that which we do for covetousnesse . for both the one and the other maketh the action voluntary . and if no covenant should be good , that proceedeth from feare of death , no conditions of peace betweene enemies , nor any laws , could be of force , which are all consented to from that fear . for who would lose the liberty that nature hath given him , of governing himselfe by his own will and power , if they feared not death in the retaining of it ? what prisoner in war might be trusted to seek his ransome , and ought not rather to be killed , if he were not tyed by the grant of his life , to perform his promise ? but after the introduction of policy and laws , the case may alter , for if by the law the performance of such a covenant be forbidden , then he that promiseth any thing to a theif , not only may , but must refuse to perform it . but if the law forbid not the performance , but leave it to the will of the promiser , then is the performance still lawfull ; and the covenant of things lawfull is obligatory , even towards a theif . . he that giveth , promiseth , or covenanteth to one , and after giveth , promiseth , or covenanteth the same to another , maketh void the later act. for it is impossible for a man to transfer that right which he himselfe hath not ; and that right he hath not , which he himself hath before transferred . . an oath is a clause annexed to a promise , containing a renuntiation of gods mercy by him that promiseth , in case he perform not as far as is lawfull and possible for him to doe . and this appeareth by the words which make the essence of the oath , so helpe me god . so also was it amongst the heathen . and the forme of the romans was , thou jupiter kill him that breaketh , as i kill this beast . the intention therefore of an oath being to provoke vengeance upon the breakers of covenant ; it is to no purpose to sweare by men , be they never so great , because their punishment by divers accidents may be avoided , whether they will or no , but gods punishment not . though it were a custome of many nations , to sweare by the life of their princes ; yet those princes being ambitious of divine honour , give sufficient testimony , that they beleeved , nothing ought to be sworne by , but the deity . . and seeing men cannot be afraid of the power they beleeve not , and an oath is to no purpose , without fear of him they swear by , it is necessary that he that sweareth , doe it in that forme which himself admitteth in his owne religion , and not in that forme which he useth , that putteth him to the oath . for though all men may know by nature , that there is an almighty power , neverthelesse they beleeve not , that they sweare by him in any other form or name , then what their own ( which they think the true ) religion teacheth them . . and by the definition of an oath , it appeareth , that it addeth not a greater obligation to perform the covenant sworne , then the covenant carryeth in it self , but it putteth a man into greater danger , and of greater punishment . covenants and oaths are de voluntariis , that is , de possibilibus . nor can the covenantee understand the covenantor to promise impossibles ; for they fall not under deliberation : and consequently ( by chap. . sect. . which maketh the covenanter interpreter ) no covenant is understood to bind further , then to our best endervour , either in performance of the thing promised , or in something equivalent . chap. iii. . that men stand to their covenants . . injury defined . . that iniury is done onely to the covenantee . . the signification of those names , just , uniust . . justice not rightly divided into commutative , and distributive . . it is a law of nature , that he that is trusted , turn not that trust to the damage of him that trusteth . . ingratitude defined . . it is a law of nature , to endeavour to accommodate one another . . and that man forgive upon caution for the future . . and that revenge ought to respect the future onely . . that reproach and contempt declared , is against the law of nature . . that indifference of commerce is of the law of nature . . that messengers imployed to procure or maintaine peace , ought to be safe by the law of nature . it is a common saying , that nature maketh nothing in vain . and it is most certaine , that as the truth of a conclusion , is no more but the truth of the premises that make it , so the force of the command , or law of nature , is no more then the force of the reasons inducing thereunto . therefore the law of nature mentioned in the former chapter , sect. . namely , that every man should devest himself of the right , &c. were utterly vaine , and of none effect , if this also were not a law of the same nature , that every man is obliged to stand to , and perform , those covenants he maketh . for what benefit is it to a man that any thing be promised , or given unto him , if he that giveth , or promiseth , performeth not , or retaineth still the right of taking back what he hath given ? . the breach or violation of covenant , is that which men call iniury , consisting in some action or omission , which is therefore called uniust . for it is action or omission without jus , or right , which was transferred or relinquish before . there is a great similitude between that we call iniury , or iniustice in the actions and conversations of men in the world , and that which is called absurd in the arguments and disputations of the schools . for as he which is driven to contradict an assertion by him before maintained , is sayd to be reduced to an absurdity ; so he that through passion doth , or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised to doe , or not to omit , is sayd to commit injustice : and there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called . for he that covenanteth , willeth to do , or omit , in the time to come . and he that doth any action , willeth it in that present , which is part of the future time contained in the covenant . and therefore he that violateth a covenant , willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing , at the same time , which is a plaine contradiction . and so iniury is an absurdity of conversation , as absurdity is a kind of iniustice in disputation . . in all violation of covenant ( to whom soever accrueth the damage ) the iniury is done onely to him to whom the covenant was made . for example , if a man covenant to obey his master , and the master command him to give money to a third , which he promiseth to doe , and doth not , though this be to the damage of the third , yet the iniury is done to the master onely . for he could violate no covenant with him with whom none was made , and therefore doth him no iniury . for iniury consisteth in violation of covenant , by the definition thereof . . the name of just , uniust , justice , iniustice ; are equivocall , and signifie diversly . for justice and iniustice , when they be attributed to actions , signifie the same thing with no iniury , and iniury , and denominate the action just , or uniust , but not the man so . for they denominate him guilty or not guilty . but when justice or iniustice , are attributed to men , they signifie pronenesse , and affection , and inclination of nature , that is to say , passions of the minde , apt to produce just and uniust actions . so that when a man is sayd to be just , or uniust ; not the action , but the passion and aptitude , to do such actions , is considered . and therefore a just man may have committed an uniust act ; and an uniust man may have done iustly , not only one , but most of his actions . for there ts an oderunt peccare in the uniust as well as in the just , but from different causes . for the uniust man who abstaineth from iniuries for fear of punishment , declareth plainly , that the justice of his actions dependeth upon civill constitution , from whence punishments proceed , which would otherwise in the estate of nature be uniust , according to the fountaine from whence they spring . this distinction therefore of justice and iniustice , ought to be remembred , that when iniustice is taken for guilty , the action is uniust , but not therefore the man ; and when justice is taken for guiltlesness , the actions are iust , and yet not alwayes the man . likewise when justice and iniustice are taken for habits of the mind , the man may be iust , or uniust , and yet not all his actions so . . concerning the justice of actions , the same is usually divided into two kinds , wherof men call the one commutative , and the other distributive ; and are sayd to consist , the one in proportion arithmetical , the other in geometrical : and commutative justice , they place in permutation , as buying , seling , and barter ; distributive , in giving to every man according to their deserts . which distinction is not well made , in as much as iniury , which is the iniustice of action , consisteth not in the inequality of the things changed , or distributed , but in the inequality that men ( contrary to nature and reason ) assume unto themselves above their fellowes . of which inequality , shall be spoken hereafter . and for commutative justice placed in buying and selling , though the thing bought be unequall to the price given for it ; yet for as much as both the buyer and the seller are made judges of 〈◊〉 value , and are thereby both satisfied , there can be no iniury done on either side , neither party having trusted , or covenanted with the other . and for distributive justice , which consisteth in the distribution of our own benefits , seeing a thing is therfore said to be our own , because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure , it can be no iniury to any man , though our liberality be farther extended towards another , then towards him ; unlesse we be thereto obliged by covenant : and then the iniustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant , and not in the inequality of distribution . . it happeneth many times , that man benefitteth , or contributeth to the power of another , without any covenant , but onely upon confidence and trust of obtaining the grace and favor of that other , whereby he may procure a greater , or no lesse benefit and assistance to himselfe . for by necessity of nature , every man doth in all his voluntary actions intend some good unto himself . in this case it is a law of nature , that no man suffer him , that thus trusteth to his charity , or good affection towards him , to be in the worse estate for his trusting . for if he shall so do , men will not dare to confer mutually to each others defence , nor put themselves into each others mercy , upon any tearmes whatsoever , but rather abide the utmost and worst even of hostility , by which general diffidence , men will not only be inforced to warr , but also afraid to come so much within the danger of one another , as to make any overture of peace . but this is te be understood of those onely , that confer their benefits ( as i have sayd ) upon trust onely , and not for tryumph or ostentation . for as when they do it upon trust , the end they aimed at , namely to be well used , is the reward ; so also when they do it for ostentation , they have the reward in themselves . . but seeing in this case there passeth no covenant , the breach of this law of nature is not to be called iniury . it hath another name , to wit , ingratitude . . it is also a law of nature . that every man do help and endeavor to accommodate each other as far as may be , without danger of their persons , and losse of their means , to maintaine and defend themselves . for seeing the causes of warr and desolation proceed from those passions , by which we strive to accommodate our selves , and to leave others as far as we can behind us , it followeth , that tha● passion by which we strive mutually to accommadate each ather , must be the cause of peace . and this passion is that charity defined , chap. . sect. . . and in this precept of nature , is included and comprehended also this , that man forgive and pardon him that hath done him wrong , upon his repentance and caution for the future . for pardon , is peace granted to him that ( having provoked to war ) demandeth it . it is not therefore charity , but feare , when a man giveth peace to him that repenteth not , nor giveth caution for maintaining thereof in the time to come . for he that repenteth not , remaineth with the affection of an enemy ; as also doth he that refuseth to give caution , and consequently , is presumed not to seek after peace , but advantage . and therefore to forgive him is not commanded in this law of nature , nor is charity , but may sometime be prudence . otherwise , not to pardon upon repentance and caution , considering men cannot abstain from provoking one another , is never to give peace . and that is against the generall definition of the law of nature . . and seeing the law of nature commandeth pardon , when there is repentance and caution for the future , it followeth , that the same law ordaineth , that no revenge be taken upon the consideration only of the offence past , but of the benefit to come , that is to say , that all revenge ought to tend to amendment , either of the person offending , or of others , by the example of his punishment ; which is sufficiently apparent , in that the law of nature commandeth pardon , where the future time is secured . the same is also apparent by this , that revenge when it considereth the offence past , is nothing else , but present triumph and glory , and directeth to no end : and what is directed to no end , is therefore unprofitable ; and consequently the triumph of revenge , is vain-glory : and whatsoever is vain , is against reason ; and to hurt one another without reason , is contrary to that , which by supposition is every mans benefit , namely peace , and what is contrary to peace , is contrary to the law of nature . . and because all signs which we shew to one another of hatred and contempt , provoke in the highest degree to quarrell and battel , ( in as much as life it self , with the condition of enduring scorn , is not esteemed worth the enjoying , much lesse peace ) it must necessarily be implyed as a law of nature , that no man reproach , revile , deride , or any otherwise declare his hatred , contempt , or disesteem of any other . but this law is very little practised . for what is more ordinary then reproaches of those that are rich , towards them that are not ? or of those that sit in place of judicature , towards those that are accused at the bar ? although to greive them in that manner , be no part of the punishment for their crime , nor contained in their office . but use hath prevailed , that what was lawful in the lord towards the servant whom he maintaineth , is also practised a● lawful in the more mighty towards the lesse though they contribute nothing towards their maintenance . . it is also a law of nature , that one man allow commerce and traffick indifferently to one another . for he that alloweth that to one man , which he denyeth to another , declareth his hatred to him , to whom he denyeth . and to declare hatred , is warr . and upon this title was grounded , the great war between the athenians , and the peloponnesians . for would the athenians have condescended to suffer the megareans , their neighbours , to traffick in their ports , and markets , that war had not begun . . and this also is a law of nature , that all messengers of peace , and such as are imployed to procure and maintaine amity between man and man , may safely come and goe . for seeing peace is the general law of nature , the meanes thereto ( such as are these men ) must in the same law be comprehended . chap. iv. . a law of nature , that every man acknowledge other for his equal . . another , that men allow aequalia aequalibus . . another , that those things which cannot be divided , be used in common . . another , that things indivisible and incommunicable , be divided by lot . . natural lot , primogeniture , and first possession . . that men submit to arbitration . . of an arbitrator . . that no man presse his counsel upon any man against his will . . how to know suddenly what is the law of nature . . that the law of nature taketh place after security from others to observe the same . . the right of nature not to be taken away by custome , nor the law of nature abrogated by any act. . why the dictates of nature are called lawes . . whatsoever is against conscience in a man that is his owne judge , is against the law of nature . . of malum poenae , malum culpae ; virtue and vice . . aptitude to society , fulfilleth the law of nature . the question which is the better man , is determinable onely in the estate o● government and policy , though it be mistaken for a question of nature , not onely by ignorant men , that thinke one man blood better then anothers by nature , but also by him , whose opinions are at this day and in these parts , of greater authority then any other humane writings . for he puttet so much difference between the powers 〈◊〉 men by nature , that he doubteth not to s● down as the ground of all his politick , that some men are by nature worthy to govern and others by nature ought to serve which foundation hath not only weakne● the whole frame of his politicks , but hath also given men colour and pretences , whereby to disturb and hinder the peace of one another . for though there were such a difference of nature , that master and servant were not by consent of men , but by inherent virtue , yet who hath that eminency of virtue above others and who is so stupid , as not to govern himself , shall never be agreed upon amongst men , who do every one naturally think himself , as able , at the least to govern another , as another to govern him . and when there was any contention between the finer and the courser wits , ( as there hath been often in times of sedition and civill war ) for the most part , these latter carried away the victory ; and as long as men arrogate to themselves more honour then they give to others , it cannot be imagined , how they can possibly live in peace : and consequently we are to suppose , that for peace sake , nature hath ordained this law , that every man acknowledg other for his equall . and the breach of this law , is that we call pride . . as it was necessary that a man should not retain his right to every thing , so also was it , that he should retain his right to some things ; to his own body ( for example ) the right of defending , whereof he could not transfer ; to the use of fire , water , free aire , and place to live in , and to all things necessary for life . nor doth the law of nature command any devesting of other rights , then of those only which cannot be retained without the losse of peace . seeing then many rights are retained , when we enter into peace one with another , reason and the law of nature dictateth , whatsoever right any man requireth to retain , he allow every other man to retain the same . for he that doth not so , alloweth not the equality mentioned in the former section . for there is no acknowledgement of worth , without attribution of the equality of benefit and respect . and this allowance of aequalia aequalibus , is the same thing with the allowing of proportionalia proportionalibus . for when a man alloweth to every man a like , the allowance he maketh , will be in the same proportion , in which are the numbers of men to whom they are made . and this is it men mean by distributive justice , and is properly termed equity . the breach of this law is that which the greeks call {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , which is commonly rendred coveteousness , but seemeth to be more precisely expressed by the word incroaching . . if there passe no other covenant , the law of nature is , that such things as cannot be divided , be used in common , proportionably to the numbers of them that are to use the same , or without limitation , when the quantity thereof sufficeth . for first supposing the thing to be used in common , not sufficient for them , that are to use it without limitation , if a few shall make more use thereof then the rest , that equality is not observed , which is required in the second section . and this is to be understood , as all the rest of the laws of nature , without any other covenant antecedent : for a man may have given away his right of common , and so the case be altered . . in those things which neither can be divided , nor used in common , the rule of nature must needs be one of these , lot , or alternate use : for besides these two wayes , there can no other equality be imagined ; and for alternate use , he that beginneth , hath the advantage ; and to reduce that advantage to equality , there is no other way but lot . in things therefore indivisible and incommunicable , it is the law of nature , that the use be alternate , or the advantage given away by lot ; because there is no other way of equality . and equality is the law of nature . . there be two sorts of lots ; one arbitrary , made by men , and commonly knowne by the names of lot , chance , hazard , and the like ; and there is natural lot , such as is primogeniture , which is no more but the chance , or lot , of being first born , which it seemeth they considered , that call inheritance by the name of kleronomia , which signifieth distribution by lot . secondly , prima occupatio , first feizing , or finding of a thing whereof no man made use before , which for the most part also is meerly chance . . although men agree upon these laws of nature , and endeavour to observe the same ; yet considering the passions of men , that make it difficult to understand by what actions , and circumstances of actions , those laws are broken , there must needs arise many great controversies about the interpretation thereof , by which the peace must need● be dissolved , and men return again to their former estate of hostility . for the taking away of which controversies , it is necessary that there be some common arbitrator and judge , to whose sentence , both the parties to the controversies ought to stand . and therefore it is a law of nature , that in every controversie , the parties thereto ought mutual●● to agree upon an arb●trator , whom they bot● trust , and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give ther●in . for where every man is his own judge , there properly is no judg at all ; as wh●re every man ca●veth out his own right , it hath the same effect , as if there were no right at all : and where is no judge , there is no end of controversie ▪ and therefore the right of hostility remaineth . . an arbitrator therefore , or he that is judge , is trusted by the parties to any controversie , to determine the same by the declaration of his own judgement therein . out of which followeth first , that the judge ought not to be concerned in the controversie he endeth ; for in that case he is a party , and ought by the same reason to bee judged by another . secondly , that he maketh no covenant with either of the parties , to pronounce sentence for the one , more then for the other . nor doth he covenant so much , as that his sentence shall be just ; for that were to make the parties judges of the sentence , whereby the controversie would remaine still undecided . neverthelesse for the trust reposed in him , and for the equality which the law of nature requireth him to consider in the parties , he violateth that law , if for favour , or hatred to either party , he give other sentence then he thinketh right . and thirdly , that no man ought to make himself judge in any controversie between others , unlesse they consent and agree thereto . . it is also the law of nature , that no man obtrude or presse his advice or counsell to any man , that declareth himselfe unwil●ing to heare the same . for seeing a man taketh counsel concerning what is good or hurt of himself onely , and not of his counsellor , and that counsel is a voluntary action , and therefore tendeth also to the good of the counsellor , there may be often iust cause to suspect the counsellor : and though there be none , yet seeing counsell unwillingly heard , is a needlesse offence to him that is not willing to hear it , and offences tend all to the breach of peace , it is therefore against the law of nature to obtrude it . . a man that shall see these lawes of nature set down and inferred with so many words , and so much adoe , may think there is yet much more difficulty and subtilty required to acknowledge and do according to the said laws in every sudden occasion , when a man hath but a little time to consider . and while we consider man in most passions , as of anger , ambition , coveteousness , vain-glory , and the like , that tend to the excluding of natural equality , it is true . but without these passions , there an easie rule to know upon a sudden , whether the action i be to do , be against the law of nature , or not . and it is but this ; that a man imagine himself in the place of the party with whom he hath to do , and reciprocally him in his . which is no more but a changing ( as it were ) of the scales . for every mans passion weigheth heavy in his owne scale , but in the scale of his neighbour . and this rule is very well knowne and expressed in this old dictate , quod tibi fieri non vis , alteri ne feceris . . these lawes of nature , the sum whereof consisteth , in forbidding us to be our own judges , and our own carvers , and in commanding us to accommodate one another ; in case they should be observed by some , and not by others , would make the observers but a prey to them that should neglect them , leaving the good both without defence against the wicked , and also with a charge to assist them : which is against the scope of the said lawes , that are made only for the protection , and defence of them that keepe them . reason therefore , and the law of nature over and above all these particular lawes , doth dictate this law in general , that those particular lawes be so far observed , as they subi●ct us not to any incommodity , that in ou● owne judgments may arise , by the neglect thereof in those towards whem we observe them ; and consequently requireth no more , but the desire and constant intention to endeavour , and be ready to observe them , unlesse there be cause to the contrary in other mens refusall to observe them towards us . the force therefore of the law of nature , is not in foro externo , till there be security for men to obey it , but is alwaies in foro interno , wherein the action of obedience being unsafe , the will and readiness to performe , is taken for the performance . . amongst the lawes of nature , customes and prescriptions are not numbred . for whatsoever action is against reason , though it be reiterated never so often , or that there be never so many precedents thereof , is still against reason , and therefore not a law of nature , but contrary to it . but consent and covenant may so alter the cases , which in the law of nature may be put by changing the circumstances , that that which was reason before , may afterwards be against it ; and yet is reason still the law . for though every man be bound to allow equally to another , yet if that other shall see cause to renounce the same , & make himself inferior , then , if from thenceforth he consider him as inferior , he breaketh not thereby that law of nature , that commandeth to allow● equallity . in sum , a mans owne cons●nt may abridge him of the liberty which the law of nature leaveth him , but custome not ; nor can either of them abrogate either these , or any other law of nature . . and forasmuch as law ( to speake properly ) is a command , and these dictates as they proceed from nature , are not commands , they are not therefore called laws , in respect of nature , but in respect of the author of nature , god almighty . . and seeing the laws of nature concern the conscience , not he only breaketh them that doth any action contrary , but also he whose action is conformable to them , in case he think it contrary . for though the action chance to be right , yet in his judgment he despiseth the law . . every man by naturall passion , calleth that good which pleaseth him for the present , or so far forth as he can foresee ; and in like manner , that which displeaseth him , evil . and therefore he that foreseeth the whole way to his proservation , ( which is the end that every one by nature aymeth at , ) must also call it good , and the contrary evil . and this is that good and evil , which not every man in passion calleth so , but all men by reason . and therefore the fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason , and the breaking of them evill . and so also the habit , or disposition , or intention to fulfill them good ; and the neglect of them evill . and from hence cometh that distinction of malum poen● , and malum culpae , ; for malum p●n● is any pain or molestation of the mind whatsoever ; but malum culpae is that action which is contrary to reason , and the law of nature : as also the habit of doing according to these and other laws of nature , that tend to our preservation , is that wee call virtue , and the habit of doing the contrary , vice . as for example , justice is that habit by which we stand to covenants , iniustice the contrary vice ; equity that habit by which we allow equality of nature , arrogancy the contrary vice ; gratitude the habit whereby we requite the benefit and trust of others , ingratitude the contrary vice ; temperance the habit , by which wee abstain from all things that tend to our destruction , intemperance the contrary vice ; prudence the same with virtue in general . as for the common opin●on , that virtue consisteth in mediocrity and vice in extreames , i see no ground for it , nor can find any such mediocrity . courage may be virtue , when the daring is extream , if the cause be good ; and extream fear no vice , when the danger is extream . to give a man more then his due , is no iniustice , though it be to give him less : and in gifts , it is not the sum that maketh liberality , but the reason . and so in all other virtues and vices . i know that this doctrine of mediocrity is aristole's , but ●is opinions concerning virtue and vice , are no other then those which were received then , and are still by the generality of men , unstudyed , and therefore not very likely to be accurate . . the sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be soc●able , and formidable to them that will not . and the same is the sum of the law of nature : for in being sociable , the law of nature taketh place by the way of peace and societie ; and to be formidable , is the law of nature in war , where to be feared is a protection a man hath from his own power : and as the ●ormer consisteth in actions of equity and justice , the latter consisteth in actions of honour . and equity , justice , and honour , contain all virtues whatsoever . chap. v. a confirmation out of holy scripture of the principall points mentioned in the two last chapters concerning the law of nature . the lawes mentioned in the former chapters , as they are called the lawes of nature , for that they are the dictates of naturall reason , and also morall lawes , because they concern the manners and conversation , one towards another , so are they also divine lawes in respect of the author thereof , god almighty ; and ought therefore to agree , or at least not to be repugnant to the word of god , revealed in holy scripture . in this chapter therefore , i shall produce such places of scripture , as appear to be most consonant to the said lawes . . and first , the word of god seemeth to place the divine law in reason , by all such texts as ascribe the same to the heart and understanding ; as psal. . . thy law is in my heart : heb. . . after those dayes saith the lord , i will put my lawes in their mind . and heb. . . the same psal. . . speaking of the righteous man he saith , the law of god in his heart , psal. . , . the law of god is perfect , converting the soul . it giveth wisdome to the simple , and light unto the eyes . jer. . . i will put my law in their inward parts , and write it in their hearts . and joh. . the law-giver himself , god almighty , is called by the name of {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , which is also called , ver. . the light of men . and vers. . the light which lighteth every man which cometh in●o the world . all which are descriptions of naturall reason . . and that the law divine , for so much as is morall , are those precepts which tend to peace , seemeth to be much confirmed by such places of scripture , as these , rom . . righteousnesse ( which is the fufilling of the law ) is called , the way of peace . and psa. . . righteousness and peace shall kiss each other . and matth. . . blessed are the peacemakers . and heb. . . melchisedeck king of salem , is interpreted king of righteousness , and king of peace . and ver. . our saviour christ is said to be , a preist for ever after the order of m●lchisedeck : out of which may be inferred , that the doctrine of our saviour christ annexeth the fulfilling of the law to peace . . that the law of nature is unalterable , is intimated by this , that the preisthood of melchisedeck is everlasting ; and by the words of our saviour , matth. . . heaven and earth , shall passe away , but one jot , or tittle of the law shall not passe till all things be fulfilled . . that men ought to stand to their covenants , is taught , psal. . where the question being asked , vers. . lord , who shall dwell in thy tavernacle , &c. it is answered , vers. . he that sweareth to h●s own hinderance , and yet changeth not . and that men ought to be gratified , where no covenant passeth , deut. . . thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn , which s. paul , cor. . . interpreteth not of oxen but of men . . that men content themselves with equality , as it is the foundation of natural law , so also is it of the second table , of the divine law , matth. . . thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self . on these two laws depend the whole law and the prophets ; which is not so to be understood , as that a man should study so much his neighbours profit as his own , or that he should divide his goods amongst his neighbours ; but that he should esteem his neighbour worthy all rights and priviledges that himself enjoyeth ; and attribute unto him , whatsoever he looketh should be attributed unto himself : which is no more , but that he should be humble , meck , and content with equality . . and that in distributing of right amongst equalls , that distribution is to be made according to the proportions of the numbers , which is the giving of aequalia aequalibus , & proportionalia proportionalibus ; we have , numb. . . . the commandement of god to moses ; thou shalt divide the land according to the number of names ; to many thou shalt give more , to few thou shall give lesse , to every one according to his number . that decision by lot is a means of peace . prov. . . the lot causeth contention to cease , and maketh partition among the mighty . . that the accommodation and forgiveness of one another , which have before been put for lawes of nature , are also law divine , there is no question . for they are the essence of charity , which is the scope of the whole law , that we ought not to repr●ach , or reprehend one another , is the doctrine of our saviour , matth. . . judge not that ye be not judged . vers. . why seest thou the mote that is in thy brothers eye , and seest not the beam that is in thine own eye ? also the law that forbiddeth us to press our councell upon others further then they admit , is a divine law . for after our charity and desire to rectifie one another is rejected , to presse it farther , is to reprehend him , and condemn him , which is forbidden in the text last recited ; as also rom. . . every one of us shall give account of himself to god . let us not therefore judge one another any more , but use your judgment rather in this , that no man put an occasion to fall , or a stumbling block before his brother . . farther , the rule of men concerning the law of nature , quod tibi fieri non vis , alteri ne feceris , is confirmed by the like , matth. . . whatsoever therefore you would have men do unto you , that do you unto them : for this is the law and the prophets . and rom. . . in that thou judgest another , thou condemnest thy self , &c. . it is also manifest by the scriptures , that these laws concern only the tribunall of our conscience ; and that the actions contrary to them , shall be no farther punished by god almighty , then as they proceed from negligence , or contempt . and first that these lawes are made to the conscience , appeareth , matth. . . for i say unto you , except your righteousnesse exceed the righteousnesse of the scribes and pharisees , ye shall not enter into the kingdome of heaven . now the pharisees were the most exact among the jews in the external performance ; they therefore must want the sincerity of conscience ; else could not our saviour have required a greater righteousnesse then theirs . for the same reason our saviour christ saith , the publican departed from the temple iustified rather then the pharisee . and christ saith , his yoke is easie , & his burthen light , which proceedeth from this , that christ required no more then our best endeavour . and rom. . . he that doubteth is condemned , if he eat . and in innumerable places both in the old and new testament , god almighty declareth , that he taketh the will for the deed , both in good and evill actions . by all which it plainly appears , that the divine law is dictated to the conscience one the other side is no less plain ; that how many and hainous actions soever a man commit through infirmity , he shall nevertheless , whensoever he shall condemn the same in his own conscience , be freed from the punishments that to such actions otherwise belong . for at what time soever a sinner doth repent him of his sinns from the bottome of his heart , i will put all his iniquties out of my remembrance , saith the lord . . concerning revenge which by the law of nature ought not to aym ( as i have sayd , chap. . sect . ) at present delight , but future profit , there is some difficulty mad● , as if the same accorded not with the law divine , by such as obiect the continuance of punishment after the day of judgement , when there shall be no place , neither for amendment nor for example . this obiection had been of some force , if such punishment had been ordained after all sinnes were past ; but considering the punishment was instituted before sinne , it serveth to the benefit of mankinde , because it keepeth men in peaceable and virtuous conversation by the terrour . and therefore such revenge was directed to the future only . . finally , there is no law of natural reason that can be against the law divine : for god almighty hath given reason to a man to be a light unto him . and i hope it is no impiety to think , that god almighty will require a strict account thereof , at the day of judgment , as of the instructions which we were to follow in our peregrination here , notwithstanding the opposition and affronts of supernaturalists now adayes , to rationall and morall conversation . chap. vi . . that men notwithstanding these lawes , are still in the state of war , till they have security one against another . . the law of nature in war , is nothing but honour . . no security without the concord of many . . that concord of many cannot be maintained without power to keep them all in awe . . the cause why concord remaineth in a multitude of some irrationall creatures , and not of men . . that vnion is necessary for the maintaining of concord . how union is made . . body politick defined . . corporation defined . . soveraign subiect defined . . two sorsts of bodies politick , patrimonia , and common wealth . in chap. . sect. . of the treatise of human nature , it hath been shewed that the opinions men have of the rewards and punishments which are to follow their actions , are the causes that make and govern the will to those actions . in this estate of man therefore , wherein all men are equal , and every man allowed to be his own judge , the fears they have one of another are equal , and every mans hopes consist in his own sleight and strength : & consequently when any man by his natural passion , is provoked to break these lawes of nature , there is no security in any other man of his own defence but anticipation . and for this cause , every mans right ( howsoever he be inclined to peace ) of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes , remaineth with him still , as the necessary means of his perservation . and therefore till there be security amongst men for the keeping of the law of nature one towards another , men are still in the estate of war , and nothing is unlawfull to any man that tendeth to his own safety or commodity : and this safety and commodity consisteth in the mutuall ayd and help of one another , whereby also followeth the mutuall fear of one another . . it is a proverbiall saying , inter arma silent leges . there is little therefore to be said concerning the lawes that men are to observe one towards another in time of war , wherein every mans being and w●ll-being is the rule of his actions . yet thus much the law of nature commandeth in war , that men satiate not the cruelty of their present passions , whereby in their own conscience they foresee no benefit to come . for that betrayeth not a necessity , but a disposition of the mind to war , which is against the law of nature . and in old time we read , that rapine was a trade o● life , wherein nevertheless many of them ●hat used it , did not only spare the lives of those they invaded , but left them also such things , as were necessary to preserve that life which they had given them ; as namely , their oxen and instruments for tillage , though they carried away all their other cattel and substance . and as the rapine it self was warranted in the law of nature , by the want of security otherwise to maintain themselves , so the exercise of cruelty was forbidden by the same law of nature , unless fear suggested any thing to the contrary . for nothing but fear can just●fie the taking away of anothers life . and because fear can hardly be made manifest , but by some action dishonorable , that bewrayeth the conscience of ones own weakness , all men , in whom the passion of courage or magnanimity hath been predominant , have abstained f●om cruelty , insomuch , that though there be in war no law , the breach wherof is iniury , yet there are in war those lawes the breach whereof is dishonour . in one word therefore , the only law of actions in war , is honour , and the right of war , providence . . and seeing natural ayd is necessary for defence , as mutual fear is necessary for peace , wee are to consider how great ayds are required for such defence , and for the causing of such mutual fear , as men may not easily adventure on one another . and first it is evident , that the mutual ayd of two or three men is of very little security . for the odds on the other side , of a man or two , giveth sufficient encouragement to an assault . and therfore before men have sufficient security in the help of one another , their number must be so great , that the odds of a few which the enemie may have , be no certaine and sensible advantage . . and supposing how great a number soever of men assembled together for their mutual defence , yet shall not the effect follow , unless they all direct their actions to one and the same end ; which direction to one and the same end is that , which chap. . sect. . is called consent . this consent ( or concord ) amongst so many men , thoug● it may be made by the fear of a present invader , or by the hope of a present conquest , or bootie , and endure as long as that action endureth , nevertheless , by the diversity of judgements and passions in so many men contending naturally ●or honour and advantage one above another ; it is impossible , not only that their consent to ayd each other against an enemie , but also that the peace should last between themselves , with out some mutual and common fear to rule them . . but contrary hereunto may be obiected , the experience we have of certain living creatures irrational , that nevertheless continually live in such good order and government for their common benefit , and are so free from sedition & war amongst themselves , that for peace , profit , and defence , nothing more can be imaginable . and the experience we have in this , is in that little creature the bee , which is therefore reckoned amongst animalia politica . why therefore may not men that foresee the benefit of concord , continually maintain the same without compulsion , as well as they ? to which i answer , that amongst other living creatures , there is no question of precedence in their owne species , nor strife about honour , or acknowledgement of one anothers wisdome , as there is amongst men , from whence arise envie and hatred of one towards another , and from thence sedition and war . secondly , those living creatures aim every one at peace , and food common the will of man being voluntary , but the beginning of voluntary actions , is not subject to deliberation and covenant , yet when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of another , he obligeth himself to this , that he resigne his strength and meanes to him , whom he covenanteth to obey . and hereby he that is to command , may by the use of all their means & strength , be able by the terrour thereof , to frame the will of them all to unity and concord , amongst themselves . . this union so made , is that which men call now adayes , a body politick , or civil society and the greeks call it {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , that is to say , a city , which may be defined to be a multitude of men , united as one person , by a common power , for their common peace , defence and benefit . and as this union into a city or body politick , is instituted with common power over all ther particular persons , or members thereof , to the common good of them all , so also may there be amongst a multitude of those members instituted , a subordinate union of certain men , for certain common actions to be don by those men for some commo● benefit of theirs , or of the whole city ; a● for subordinate government , for counsell for trade , and the like . and these subordinate bodies politick are usually calle●corporations ; and their power such over the particulars of their own society , as the whole city whereof they are members have allowed them . . in all cities , or bodies politick not subordinate , but independent , that one man , or one councell , to whom the particular members have given that common power , is called their soveraign , and his power the soveraign power ; which consisteth in the power and the strength , that every of the members have transferred to him from themselves by covenant and because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another , or for that other to receive it , it is to be understood , that to transfer a mans power and strength , is no more , but to lay by or relinquish his own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it . and every member of the body politick , is called a subiect , to wit , to the soveraign . . the cause in generall , which moveth a man to become subiect to another , is ( as i have sayd already ) the fear of not otherwise preserving himself . and a man may subiect himself to him that invadeth , or may invade him , for fear of him ; or men may joyne amongst themselves , to subject themselvs to such as they shall agree upon for fear of others , and when many men subject themselves the former way , there ariseth thence a body politick , as it were naturally . from whence proceedeth dominion , paternal , and despotique . and when they subiect themselves the other way , by mutual agreement amongst many , the body politick they make , is for the most part called a common wealth in distinction from the former , though the name be the generall name for them both . and i shall speak in the first place of common wealths , and afterward of bodies politick , patrimoniall , and despotical . the second part . chap. i. . introduction . . a multitude before their union , &c. . expresse consent of every particular , &c. . democratical , aristocraticall , monarchiall union , may be instituted for ever , or , &c. . without security no private right relinquished . . covenants of government without power of coertion are no security . . power coercive , &c. . the sword of war , &c. . decision in all debates &c. annexed to the sword . . laws civil , &c. . appointment of magestrates , &c. . soveraign power includeth impunity . . a supposed common weal●h , where lawes are made first , and the common-wealth after . . the same refelled . . mixt formes of government sup●osed in soveraignty . . that refelled . . mixt government , &c. . reason and experience to prove absolute soveraignty some where in all common wealths . . some principal , &c. marks of soveraignty . in that treatise of humane nature which was formerly printed , hath been wholly spent in the consideration of the naturall power , and the natural estate of man , namely , of his cognition and passions in the first eleven chapters , and how from thence proceed his actions ; in the twelfth , how men know one anothers minds : in the last , in what estate mens passions set them . in the first chapter of this treatise , what estate they are directed unto by the dictates of reason , that is to say , what be the principall articles of the law of nature , in the . . . . and lastly , how a multitude of persons naturall , are united by covenants into one person civil , or body politick . in this part therefore shall be considered , the nature of a body politick , and the lawes thereof , otherwise called civill laws . and whereas it hath been sayd in the last chapter , and last section of the former part , that there be two wayes of erecting a body politick ; one by arbitrary institution of many men assembled together which is like a creation out of nothing by humane wit ; the other by compulsion , which is as it were a generation thereof out of natural force ; i shall first speak of such erection of a body politick , as proceedeth from the assembly and consent of a multitude . . having in this place to consider , a multitude of men about to unite themselves into a body politick , for their security , both against one another , and against common enemies , and that by covenants , the knowledge of what covenants they must needs make , dependeth on the knowledge of the persons , and the knowledge of their end . first , for their persons they are many , and ( as yet ) not one ; nor can any action done in a multitude of people met together , be attributed to the multitude , or truly called the action of the multitude , unless every mans hand , and every mans will , ( not so much as one excepted ) have concurred thereto . for multitude , though in their persons they run together , yet they concur not alwaies in their designes . for even at that time when men are in tumult , though they agree a number of them to one mischeife , and a number of them to one another ; yet in the whole , they are amongst themselves in the state of hostility , and not of peace ; like the seditious jews besieged in jerusalem , that could joyn against their enemies , and fight amongst themselves . whensoever therefore any man saith , that a number of men hath done any act , it is to be understood , that every particular man in that number hath consented therunto , and not the greatest part only . secondly , though thus assembled with intention to unite themselves , they are yet in that estate in which every man hath right to every thing , and consequently as hath been sayd , chap. . sect. . in an estate of inioying nothing . and therefore meum & tuum , hath no place amongst them . . the first thing therefore they are to do is expresly , every man to consent to something by which they may come neer to their ends , which can be nothing else imaginable , but this , that they allow the wills of the maior part of their whole number , or the wills of the maior part of some certain number of men by them determined and named ; or lastly , the will of some one man , to involve and be taken for the wllis of every man . and this done they are united , and a body politick . and if the maior part of their whole number be supposed to involve the wills of all the particulars , then the wills of the particulars , then are they said to be a democracie , that is to say , a government wherein the whole number , or so many of them as please , being assembled together , are the soveraign , and every particular man a subject . if the major part of a certain number of men named or distinguished from the rest , be supposed to involve the wills of every one of the particulars , then are they said to be an oligarchy , or aristocracy , which two words signifie the same thing , together with the divers passions of those that use them . for when the men that be in that office please , they are called an aristocracy , or otherwise an oligarchy , where in those the major part of which declare the wills of the whole multitude being assembled , are the soveraign , and every man severally a subiect . lastly , if their consent be such , that the will of one man whom they name , shall stand for the wills of them all , then is their government or union called a mornarchy , and that one man a soveraign , and every of the rest a subiect . . and those several sorts of unions , governments , and subiections , of mans will may be understood to be made , either absolutely , that is so say , for all future time , or for a time limited only . but forasmuch as we speak here of a body politick , instituted for the perpetuall benefit and defence of them that make it ; which therefore men desire should last for ever , i will omit to speak of those that be temporary , and consider of those that be for ever . . the end for which one man giveth up , and relinquisheth to another , or others the right of protecting & defending himself by his own power , is the security which he expecteth thereby , of protection and defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it ; and a man may then account himself in the estate of security , when he can foresee no violence to be done unto him , from which the doer may not be deterred by the power of that soveraign , to whom they have every one subiected themselves : and without that security , there is no reason for a man to deprive himself of his own advantages , and make himself a prey to others . and therefore when there is not such a soveraign power erected , as may afford this security , it is to be understood that every mans right of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes , remaineth still with him ; and contrarywise , where any subiect hath right by his own judgment and discretion , to make use of his force , it is to be understood that every man hath the like , and consequently that there is no common wealth at all established . how far therefore in the making of a common wealth , man subiecteth his will to the power of others , must appear from the end , namely , security . for whatsoever is necessary to be by covenant transferred for the attaining thereof , so much is transferred , or else every man is in his naturall liberty to secure himself . . covenants agreed upon by every man assembled for the making of a common wealth ; and put in writing without erecting of a power of coercion , are no reasonable security for any of them that so covenant , nor are to be called laws , and leave men still in the estate of nature and hostility . for seeing the wills of most men are governed only by fear , and where there is no power of coercion , there is no fear , the wills of most men will follow their passions of covetousness , lust , anger , and the like , to the breaking of those covenants , whereby the rest also , who otherwise would keep them , are set at liberty , and have no law , but from themselves . . this power of coercion as hath been sayd , chap. . sect. . of the former part consisteth in the transferring of every mans right of resistance against him , to whom he hath transferred the power of coercion . it followeth therefore , that no man in any common wealth whatsoever hath right to resist him , or them , on whom they have transferred this power coercive , or ( as men use to call it the sword of justice , supposing the not resistance possible . for part . chap. . sect. . covenants bind but to the utmost of our endeavour . . and forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security , by the means of this sword of justice , that keep them all in awe , are nevertheless in danger of enemies from without , if there be not some means found , to unite their strength● and natural forces , in the resistance of such enemies , their peace amongst themselves is but in vain . and therefore it is to be understood as a covenant of every member , to contribute their several forces fore the defence of the whole , whereby to make one power as sufficie●t , as is possible for their defence . now seeing that every man hath already transferred the use of his strength to him , or them , that have the sword of justice , it followeth , that the power of defence , that is to say , the sword of war , be in the same hands , wherein is the sword of justice ; and cons●quently those two swords are but one , and that inseperably and essentially annexed to the soveraign power . . moreover , seeing to have the right of the sword , is nothing else but to have the use thereof depending onely on the judgement and discretion of him or them that have it , it followeth , that the power of indenture in all controversies , wherein the sword of justice is to be used ; and in all deliberations concerning war , ( wherein the use of that sword is required ) the right of resolving and determining what is to be done , belong to the same soveraign . . farther , considering it is no less , but much more necessary to prevent violence & rapine , then to punish the same when it is committed , & all violence proceedeth from controversies that arise between men concerning meum & tuum , right and wrong , good and bad , and the like which men use every one to measure by their own judgements , it belongeth also to the judgment of the same soveraign power , to set forth and make known the common measure by which every man is to know what is his , and what anothers ; what is good and what bad , and what he ought to do and what not , and to command the same to be observed . and these measures of the actions of the subiects are those , which men call laws politick , or civil . the making whereof , must of right belong to him that hath the power of the sword , by which men are compelled to observe them ; for otherwise they should be made in vain . . farthermore , seeing it is impossible that any one man that hath such soveraign power , can be able in person , to hear and determine all controversies , to be present at al deliberations concerning common good , and to execute and perform all those common actions that belong thereunto , whereby there will be necessity of magistrates , and ministers of publique affaires ; it is consequent that the appointment , nomination , & limitation of the same be understood , as an inseperable part of the same soveraignty , ●o which the sum of all iudicature , and execution hath been already annexed . . and forasmuch as the right to use the forces of every particular member , is transferred from themselves , to their soveraign , a man will easily fall upon this conclusion of himself , that to soveraign power ( whatsoever it doth ) there belongeth impunity . . the sum of these rights of sov●r●ignty ; namely the absolute use of the sword in peace and war , the making and abrogating of laws , supream , judicature , & decision , in al debate iudiciall and deliberative , the nomination of all magistrates , and ministers , with other rights contained in the same , make the soveraign power no less absolute in the common-wealth , then before common-wealth , every man was absolute in himself , to do , or not to do , what he thought good ; which men that have not had the experience of that miserable estate , to which men are reduced by long war , think so hard a condition , that they can not easily acknowledge such covenants , and subiection on their parts , as are here set down to have been ever necessary to their peace . and therefore some have imagined that a common-wealth may be constituted in such manner as the soveraign power may be so limited , and moderated , as they shall think fit themselves . for example ; they suppose a multitude of men to have agreed upon certain articles , ( which they presently call lawes ) declaring how they will be governed , and that done , to agree farther upon some man , or number of men , to see the same articles performed , and put in execution ; and to enable him , or them thereunto , they allot unto them a provision limited , as of certain lands , taxes , penalties , and the like then , which ( if mispent ) they shall have no more , without a new consent of the same men that allowed the former . and thus they think they have made a common wealth , in which it is unlawfull for any private man to make use of his owne sword for his security ; wherein they deceive themselves . . for first , if to the revenue , it did necessarily follow , that there might be forces raised and procured at the will of him that hath such revenue , yet since the revenue is limited , so must also the forces : b●t limited forces against the power of an enemy , which wee cannot limit , are unsufficient . whensoever therefore there happeneth an invasion greater then those forces are able to resist , and there be no other right to levy more , then is every man by necessity of nature , allowed to make the best provision he can for himself ; and thus is the private sword , and the estate of war again reduced . but seeing revenue , without the right of commanding men , is of no use , neither in peace nor war , it is necessary to be supposed , that he that hath the administration of those articles , which are in the former section supposed , must have also right to make use of the strengths of particular men . and what reason soever giveth him that right over any one , giveth him the same over all . and then is his right absolute . for he that hath right to all their forces , hath right to dispose of the same . again , supposing those limited forces and revenue , either by the necessary , or negligent use of them to fail , and that for a supply the same multitude be again to be assembled , who shall have power to assemble them , that is to compel them to come together ? if he that demandeth the supply , hath that right , to wit , the right to compell them all , then is his soveraignty absolute ; if not , then is every particular man at liberty to come , or not ; to frame a new common wealth , or not , and so the right of the private sword returneth but suppose them willingly , and of their own accord assembled to consider of this supply , if now it be stil in their choice , whether they shall give it , or not , it is also in their choice , whether the common wealth shall stand , or not . and therefore there lieth not upon any of them any civil obligation that may hinder them from using force , in case they think it tend to their defence . this device therefore of them that will make civil laws first , and then a civil body afterwards ( as if policy made a body politick , and not a body politick made policy ) is of no effect . . others , to avoid the hard condition , as they take it , of absolute subiection ( which ( in hatred thereto ) they also call slaverie ) have despised a government , as they think , mixed of three sorts of soveraignty . as for example ; they suppose the power of making laws , given to some great assembly democratical , the power of judicature to some other assembly , and the administration of the laws to a third , or to some one man ; and this policy they call mixt mona●chy , or mixt aristocracy , or mixt democracy , according as any of these three sorts do most visibly predominate . and in this estate of government , they thinke the use of the private sword excluded . . and supposing it were so , how were this condition which they call slavery , eased thereby . for in this estate they would have no man allowed , either to be his own judge , or own carver , or to make any lawes unto himself ; and as long as these three agree they are as absolutely subject to them , as is a child to the father , or a slave to the master , in the state of nature . the ease therefore of this subjection , must consist in the disagreement of those amongst whom they have dist●ibuted the rights of soveraign power . but the same disagreement is war . the division therefore of the soveraignty , either worketh no effect to the taking away of simple subjection , or introduceth war , wherein the private sword hath place againe . but the truth is , as hath been already shewed in , , , , , . precedent sections , the soveraignty is indivisible . and that seeming mixture of severall kinds of government , not mixture of the things themselves , but confusion in our understandings , that cannot find out readily to whom we have subiected our selves . . but though the soveraignty be not mixt , but be alwaies either simple democracy , or simple aristocracy , or pure monarchy , nevertheless in the administration thereof , all those sorts of government may have place subordinate . for suppose the soveraign power be democracy , as it was sometimes in rome , yet at the same time they may have a counsel aristocratical , such as was the senate ; and at the same time they may have a subordinate monarch , such as was their dictator , who had , for a time , the exercise of the whole soveraignty , & such as are all generals in war . so also in monarchy there may be a councel aristocratical of men , chosen by the monarch , or democratical of men chosen by the consent ( the monarch permitting ) of all the particular men of the common wealth . and this mixture is it that imposeth , as if it were the mixture of soveraignty . as if a man should think , because the great councel of venice doth nothing ordinarily but choose magistrats , ministers of state , captains , and governours of towns , ambassadors , councellors , and the like , that therefore their part of the soveraigt , is only chusing of magistrates : & that the making of war , and peace , and laws were not theirs , but the part of such counsellors as they appointed thereto ; wheras it is the part of these to do it but subordinately , the supream authority therof being in the great councel that chuse them . . and as reason teacheth us , that a man considered out of subjection to lawes , and out of all covenants obligatory to others , is free to do and undo , and deliberate as long as he listeth ; every member being obedient to the will of the whole man , that liberty being nothing else but his naturall power , without which he is no better then an inanimate creature , not able to help himself ; so also it teacheth us , that a body politick , of what kind soever , nor subiect to another , nor obliged by covenants , ought to be free , and in all actions to be assisted by the members , every one in their place , or at least not resisted by them . for otherwise , the power of a body politick ( the essence whereof , is the not resistance of the members ) is none , nor a body politick of any benefit . and the same is confirmed by the use of all nations and common-wealths , wherein that man or councel which is virtually the whole , hath any absolute power over every particular member ; or what nation or common-wealth is there , that hath not power and right to constitute a general in their wars ? but the power of a general is absolute ; and consequently there was absolute power in the common wealth , from whom it was derived . for no person , natural or civill , can transfer unto another more power then himself hath . . in every common vvealth , where particular men are deprived of their right to protect themselves there resideth an absolute soveraignty ; as i have already shewed . but in what man , or in what assembly of men the same is placed , is not so manifest , as not to need some marks , whereby it may be discerned . and first , it is an infallible mark of absolute soveraignty in a man or in an assembly of men , if there be no right in any other person , naturall or civil , to punish that man , or to dissolve that assembly . for he that cannot of right be punished , cannot of right be resisted ; and he that cannot of right be resisted , hath coercive power ove● all the rest , and thereby can frame and govern their actions at his pleasure , which is absolute soveraignty . contrariwise , he that in a common-wealth is punishable by any , or that assembly that is dissolvable , is not soveraign . for a greater power is alwaies required to punish and dissolve , then theirs who are punished or dissolved ; and that power cannot be called soveraign , then which there is a greater . secondly , that man or assembly , that by their own right not derived from the present right of any other , may make laws , or abrogate them at his or their pleasure , have the soveraignty absolute . for seeing the laws they make , are supposed to be made by right , the members of the common wealth to whom they are made , are obliged to obey them , and consequently not resist the execution of them , which not resistance , maketh the power absolute of him that ordaineth them . it is likewise a mark of this soveraignty , to have the right originall of appointing magistrates , judges , councellors , and ministers of state . for without that power , no act of soveraignty or government can be performed . lastly , and generally , whosoever by his own authority independent , can do any act , which another of the same common wealth may not , must needs be understood to have the soveraign power . for by nature men have equal right . this inequality therefore must proceed from the power of the common-wealth . he therefore that doth any act lawfully by his owne authorit● , which another may not , doth it by the power of the common-wealth in himself , which is absolute soveraignty . chap. ii. . democracy precedeth all other , &c. . the soveraign people covenanteth not with the subiects . . the soveraign , &c. cannot , &c. do iniury , &c. . the faults of the soveraigne people , &c. democracy , &c. an aristocracy of orators . . aristocracy how made . . the body of the optimates not properly said to iniure the subiects . . the election of the optimates , &c. . an elective king , &c. . a conditional king , &c. . the word people equivocal . . obedience discharged by release . . how such releases are to be understood . . obedience discharged by exile . . by conquest . . by ignorance of the right of succession . having spoken in generall concerning instituted policy in the former chapter , i come in this , to speak of the sorts thereof in special , how every of them is instituted . the first in order of time of these three sorts , is democracy ; and it must be so of necessity , because an aristocracy and a monarchy , require nomination of persons agreed upon , which agreement in a great multitude of men must consist in the consent of the major part ; and where the votes of the maior part involve the votes of the rest , there is actually a democracie . . in the making of a democracie , there passeth no covenant between the soveraign and any subiect . for while the democracy is a making , there is no soveraign with whom to contract . for it cannot be imagined , that the multitude should contract with it seif , or with any one man , or number of men parcell of it self , to make it self soveraign nor that a mulritude considered as one aggregate , can give it self any thing which before it had not . seeing then that soveraignty democraticall is nat conferred by the covenant of any multitude , which supposeth union and soveraignty already made ; it resteth that the same be conferred by the particular covenants of evry several man , that is to say , every man with every man , for and in consideration of the benefit of his own peace and defence , covenanteth to stand to and obey whatsoever the maior part of their whole number , or the maior part of such a number of them , as shall be pleased to assemble at a certain time and place , shall determine and command . and this is that which giveth being to a democracy , wherein the soveraign assembly was called of the greeks , by the name of demus , ( that is , the people ) from whence cometh democracy . so that , where to the supreame and independent court , every man may come that will and give his vote , there the soveraign is called the people . . out of this that hath been sayd , may readily be drawn , that whatsoever the people doth to any one particular member or subject of the common wealth , the same by him ought not to be stiled iniury . for first iniury ( by the definition , part . chap. . sect. . ) is breach of covenant ; but covenants ( as hath been said in the precedent section ) there passed none from the people to any private man ; and consequently ( to wit the people ) can do him no iniury . secondly , how uniust soever the action be , that this soveraigne d●mus shall do , is done by the will of every particular man subiect to him , who are therefore guilty of the same . if therefore they stile it iniury , they but accuse themselves . and it is against reason for the same man , both to do and complain , implying this contradiction , that wheras he first ratified the peoples acts in general , he now disalloweth the same of them in particular . it is therefore said truly , volenti non fit injuria . nevertheless nothing doth hinder but that divers actions done by the people may be uniust before god almighty , as breaches of the law of nature . . and when it hapneth , that the people by plurality of voices , that decree or command any thing contrary to the law of god or nature , though the decree and command be the act of every man , not only present in the assembly , but also absent from it , yet is not the iniustice of the decree , the iniustice of every particular man , but only of those men , by whose express-sufferag●s the decree or command was passed . for a body politick , as it is a fictious body , so are the faculties and will thereof fictious also . but to make a particular man uniust which consisteth of a body and soul natural , there is required a naturall and very will . . in all democracies , though the right of soveraignty be in the assembly which is virtually the whole body , yet the use therof is alwaies in one , or a few particular men . for in such great assemblies , as those must be , whereinto every man may enter at his pleasure , there is no means any waies to deliberate and give councel what to do but by long and set orations , whereby to every man there is more or less hope given to incline & sway the assembly to their own ends . in a multitude of speakers therefore where alwaies either one is eminent alone , or a few being equal amongst themselvs are eminent above the rest , that one or few must of necessity sway the whole . insomuch that a democracy , in effect is no more then an aristocracy of orators , interrupted sometimes with the temporary monarchy of one orator . and seeing a democracy is by institution , the beginning both of aristocracy and monarchy , we are to consider next , how aristocracy is derived from it . when the particular members of the common wealth growing weary of attendance at publick courts , as dwelling far off , or being attentive to their private businesses , and withall , displeased with the government of the people , assemble themselves to make an aristocracy , there is no more required to the making thereof , but putting to the question one by one , the names of such men as it shall consist of , and assenting to their election ; and by plurality of vote to transfer that power , which before the people had , to the number of men so named and chosen . . and from this manner of erecting an aristocracy , it is manifest , that the few , or optimates , have entred into no covenant with any of the particular members of the common vvealth , wherof they are soveraign ; and consequently cannot do any thing to any private man , that can be called injury to him , howsoever their act be wicked before almighty god , according to that which hath been sayd before sect ● . farther it is impossible , that the people , as one body politick , should covenant with the aristocracy or optimates , on whom they intend to transfer their soveraignty . for no sooner is the aristocracy erected , but the democracy is annihilated , and the covenants made unto them void . . in all aristocracies the admission of such as are from time to time to have vote in the soveraign assembly , dependeth on the will and decree of the present optimates . for they being the soveraign , have the nomination ( by the . section of the former chapter ) of all magistrates , ministers , and counsellors of state whatsoever , and may therefore chuse either to make them elective , or hereditary , at their pleasure . . out of the same democracy , the institution of a political monarch proceedeth in the same manner , as did the institutio● of the aristocracy , to wit , by a decree of the soveraign people , to passe the soveraignty to one man named and approved by plurality of suffrage . and if this soveraignty be truly and indeed transferred , the estate or common-wealth is an absolute monarchy wherein the monarch is at liberty , to dispos● as well of the succession , as of the possession and not an elective kingdome . for suppos● a decree be made first in this manner , tha● such a one shal have the soveraignty for hi● life , and that afterward they will chuse a new ▪ in this case , the power of the people is dissolved , or not ; if dissolved , then after the death of him that is chosen , there is no man bound to stand to the decrees of them that shall , as private men , run together to make a new election ; and consequently , if there be any man , who by the advantage of the raign of him that is dead , have strength enough to hold the multitude in peace and obedience , he may lawfully , or rather is by the law of nature obliged so to do ; if this power of the people were not dissolved at the chusing of their king for life , then is the people soveraign still , and the king a minister thereof only , but so , as to put the whole soveraignty in execution , a great minister , but no otherwise for his time , then a dictator was in rome . in this case at the death of him that was chosen , they that meet for a new election , have no new , but their old authority for the same . for they were the soveraign all the time , as appeareth by the acts of those elective kings , that have procured from the people , that their children might succeed them . for it is to be understood , when a man receiveth any thing from the authority of the people , he receiveth it not from the people his subiects , but from the people his soveraign . and farther though in the election of a king for his life , the people grant him the exercise of their soveraignty for that time ; yet if they see cause , they may recall the same before the time . as a prince that conferreth an office for life , may nevertheless upon suspition of abuse thereof , recall it at his pleasure ; in as much as offices that require lobour and care , are understood to passe from him that giveth them , as onera , burthens , to them that have them ; the recalling whereof are therefore not injury , but favour . nevertheless if in making an elective king , with intention to reserve the soveraignty , they reserve not a power at certaine known and determined times and places to assemble themselves , the reservation of their soveraignty is of no effect , in as much as no man is bound to stand to the decrees and determinations of those that assemble themselves without the soveraign authortiy . . in the former section is shewed , that elective kings that exercise their soveraignty for a time , which determines with their life , either are subjects , or not soveraigns ; and that it is , when the people in election of them , reserve unto themselves the right of assembling at certaine times and places limited and made known ; or else absolute soveraigns to dispose of the succession at their pleasure , and that is , when the people in their election have declared no time nor place of their meeting , or have left it to the power of the elected king , to assemble and dissolve them at such times as he himselfe shall think good . there is another kind of limitation of time to him that shal be elected to use the soveraign power , ( which whether it hath been practised anywhere , or not i know not , but it may be imagined , and hath been obiected against the rigor of soveraign power ) and it is this , that the people transfer their soveraignty upon conditions . as for example , for so long as he shall observe such and such lawes , as they then prescribe him . and here as before in elected kings , the question is to be made , whether in the electing of such a soveraign , they reserved to themselves a right of assembling at times and places limited and known , or not ; if not , then is the soveraignty of the people dissolved , and have neither power to iudge of the breach of the conditions given him , nor to command any forces for the deposing of him , whom on that condition they had set up , but are in the estate of war amongst themselves , as they were before they made themselves a democracy ; and consequently , if he that is elected by the advantage of the possession he hath of the publick meanes , be able to compel them to unity and obedience , he hath not only of the right of nature to warrant him , but of the law of nature to oblige him thereunto . but if in electing him , they reserved to themselves a right of assembling , and appointed certain times and places to that purpose , then are they soveraign still , and may call their conditional king to account at their pleasure , and deprive him of his government , if they judge he deserve it , either by breach of the condition set him , or otherwise . for the soveraign power can by no covenant with a subiect be bound to continue him in the charge he undergoeth by their command , as a burden imposed not particularly for his good , but for the good of the soveraign people . . the controversies that arise concerning the right of the people , proceed from the equivocation of the word . for the word people hath a double signification . in one sense it signifieth onely a number of men , distinguished by the place of their habitation ; as the people of england , or the people of france , which is no more , but the multitude of those particular persons that inhabit those regions , without consideration of any contracts or covenants amongst them , by which any one of them is obliged to the rest . in another sense , it signifieth a person civill , that is to say , either one man or one councel , in the will whereof is included and involved , the will of every one in particular . as for example ; in this later sence , the lower house of parliament is all the commons as long as they sit there with authority and right thereto ; but after they be dissolved , though they remain , they be no more the people nor the commons , but only the aggregate , or multitude of the particular men there sitting , how well soever they agree , or concur , in opinions amongst themselves ; whereupon they that do not distinguish between these two significations , do usually attribute such rights to a dissolved multitude , as belong only to the people virtually contained in the body of the common wealth or soveraignty . and when a great number of their own authority flock together in any nation , they usually give them the name of the whole nation . in which sense they say the people rebelleth , or the people demandeth , when it is no more then a dissolved multitude , of which though any one man may be said to demand or have right to something , yet the heap , or multitude , cannot be said to demand or have right to any thing . for where every man hath his right distinct , there is nothing left for the multitude to have right unto : and when the particulars say , this is mine , this is thine , and this is his , and have shared all amongst them , there can be nothing whereof the multitude can say , this is mine ; nor are they one body as behoveth them to be , that demand any thing under the name o mine , or his : and when they say ours every man is understood to pretend in severall , and not the multitude : on the other , side , when the multitude is united into a body politick , and thereby are a people in the other signification , and their wills virtually in the soveraign , there the rights and demands of the particulars do cease ; and he or they that have the soveraign power , doth for them all demand and vindicate under the name of his , that which before they called in the plural , theirs . . vve have seen how particular men enter into subiection by transferring their rights ; it followeth to consider , how such subiection may be discharged . and first , if he or they that have the soveraign power , shall relinquish the same voluntarily , there is no doubt , but every man is again at liberty to obey or not . likewise , if he or they retaining the soveraignty over the rest , do neverthless exempt some one or more , from their subiection , every man so exempted , is discharged , for he or they to whom any man is obliged , hath the power to release him . . and here it is to be understood , that when he or they that have the soveraign power , give such exemption , or priviledge , to a subiect , as is not seperable from the soveraignty , and nevertheless directly retaineth the soveraign power , not knowing the consequence of the priviledg they grant , the person or persons exempted or priviledged , are not thereby released . for in contradictory significations of the will , part . chap. . sect. . that which is directly signified , is to be understood for the will , before that which is drawn from it by consequence . . also exile perpetual , is a release of subiection , forasmuch , as being out of the protection , of the soveraignty that expelled him , he hath no meanes of subsisting but from himself . now every man may lawfully defend himself , that hath no other defence ; else there had been no necessity , that any man should enter into voluntary subiection , as they do in common wealths . . likewise a man is released of his subiection by conquest . for when it cometh to pass , that the power of a common wealth is overthrown , and any particular man thereby lying under the sword of his enemy , yeildeth himself captive , he is thereby bound to serve him that taketh him , and consequently discharged of his obligation to the former . for no man can serve two masters . . lastly , ignorance of the succession dischargeth obedience . for no man can be understood to be obliged to obey he knoweth not whom . chap. iii. . . titles to dominion ; master and servant , &c. . chaines and other , &c. bonds &c. slave defined . . servants have no property against their lord , &c. . the master hath right to alienate his servant . . the servant of the servant , &c. . how servitude is discharged . . the middle lord . &c. . the title of man , &c. over beasts . having set forth in the two preceding chapters , the nature of a common wealth institutive by the consent of many men together , i come now to speak of dominion , or a body politick by acquisition , which is commonly called a patrimonial kingdome . but before i enter thereinto , it is necessary to make known upon what title one man may acquire right , that is to say , property or dominion over the person of another . for when one man hath dominion over another , there is a little kingdome . and to be a king by acquisition , is nothing else but to have acquired a right or dominion over many . . considering men therefore again in the estate of nature , without covenants or subjection one to another , as if they were but even now all at once created male and female , there be three titles only , by which one man may have right and dominion over another ; whereof two may take place presently , and those are , voluntary offer of subjection , and yeilding by compulsion : the third is to take place upon the supposition of children begotten amongst them . concerning the first of these three titles , it is handled before in the two last chapters . for from thence cometh the right of soveraigns over their subjects in a common wealth institutive . concerning the second title , ( which is when a man submitteth to an assailant for fear of death ) thereby accrueth a right of dominion . for where every man ( as it happeneth in this case ) hath right to all things , there needs no more for the making of the said right effectual but a covenant from him that is overcome , not to resist him that overcometh . and thus cometh the victor to have right of absolute dominion over the conquered . by which there is presently constituted a little body politick , which consisteth of two persons , the one soveraign , which is called the master or lord ; the other subiect , which is called the servant . and when a man hath acquired right over a number of servants so considerable , as they cannot by their neighbours be securely invaded , this body politick is a kingdome despotical . . and it is to be understood that when a servant taken in the vvars , is kept bound in natural bonds , and chaines and the like , or in prison , there hath passed no covenant from the servant to his master . for those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal bonds of covenant , and they shew , that the servant is not trusted . but covenant , ( part . chap. . sect. . ) supposeth trust . there remaineth therefore in the servant thus kept bound , or in prison , a right of delivering himself , if he can , by what means soever . this kind of servant is that which ordinarily , and without passion , is called a slave . the romanes had no such distinct name , but comprehended all under the name of servus ; whereof such as they loved and durst trust , were suffered to go at liberty , and admitted to places of office , both neer to their persons , & in their affaires abroad ; the rest were kept chained , or otherwise restrained with natural impediments to their resistance . and as it was amongst the romanes , so it was amongst other nations , the former sort having no other bond but a supposed covenant , without which the master had no reason to trust them ; the later being without covenant , and no otherwise tyed to obedience , but by chains , or other like forcible custody . . a master therefore is to be supposed to have no less right over those , whose bodies he leaveth at liberty , then over those he keepeth in bonds and imprisonment , and hath absolute dominion over both , and may say of his servant , that he is his , as he may of any other thing : and whatsoever the servant had , and might call his is now the master's ; for he that disposeth of the person , disposeth of all the person could dispose of : insomuch , as though there be meum & tuum among servants distinct from one another by the dispensation and for the benefit of their master , yet there is no meum & tuum belonging to any of them against the master himselfe , whom they are not to resist , but to obey all his commands as law . . and seeing both the servant and all that is committed to him , is the property of the master , and every man may dispose of his own , and transfer the same at his pleasure , the master may therefore alienate his dominion over them , or give the same by his last will to whom he list . . and if it happen , that the master himself by captivity or voluntary subjection , become servant to another , then is that other master paramount ; & those servants of him that becometh servant , are no farther obliged , then their master paramount shall think good ; forasmuch as he disposing of the master subordinate , disposeth of all he hath , and consequently of his servants . so that the restriction of absolute power in masters , proceedeth not from the law of nature , but from the political law of him , that is their master supream or soveraign . . servants immediate to the supream master , are discharged of their servitude , or subiection in the same manner that subiects are released of their allegiance in a common wealth institutive . as first , by release . for he that captiveth , ( which is done by accepting what the captive transferreth to him ) setteth again at l●berty , by transferring back the same . and this kinde of release is called manumission . secondly , by exile . for that is no more but manumission given to a servant , not in the way benefit , but punishment . thirdly , by a new captivity , where the servant having done his endeavour to defend himself , hath thereby performed his covenant to his former master , and for the safety of his life , entring into new covenant with the conquerour , is bound to doe his best endeavour to keep that likewise . fourthly , ignorance of who is successor to his diceased master , dischargeth him of obedience : for no covenant holdeth longer then a man knoweth to whom he is to perform it . and lastly , that servant that is no longer trusted , but committed to his chains and custody , is thereby discharged of the obligation in foro interno , and therefore if he can get loose , may lawfully goe his way . . but servants subordinate , though manumitted by their immediate lord , are not thereby discharged of their subiection to their lord paramount , for the immediate master hath no propertie in them , having transferred his right before to another , namely , to his own and supream master . nor if the chief lord should manumit his immediate servant , doth he thereby release his servants of their obligation to him that is so manumitted . for by this manumission , he recovereth again the absolute dominion he had over them before . for after a release , ( which is the discharge of a covenant ) the right standeth as it did before the covenant was made . . this right of conquest , as it maketh one man master over another , so also maketh it a man to be master of the irrational creatures . for if a man in the state of nature be in hostility with men , and thereby have lawful title to subdue or kill , according as his owne conscience and discretion shall suggest , unto him for his safety and benefit , much more may he doe the same to beasts ; that is to say , save and preserve for his own service , according to his discretion , such as are of nature apt to obey , and commodious for use ; and to kill and destroy with perpetual war , all other , as fierce and noysome to him . and this dominion is therefore of the law of nature , and not of the divine law positive . for if there had been no such right , before the revealing of gods will in the scripture , then should no man to whom the scripture hath not come , have right to make use of those his creatures , either for his food or sustenance . and it were a hard condition of mankind , that a fierce and salvage beast , should with more right kill a man , then a man a beast . chap. iv. . the dominion over the child , &c. . preheminence of sex giveth not the child to the father , rather then to the mother . . the title of the father or mother , &c. . the child of a woman-servant , &c. . the right to the child given from the mother , &c. . the child of the concubine , &c. . the child of the husband and the wife , &c. . the father , or he or she that bringeth up the child , have absolute power over him . . freedome in subiects what it is . . a great family is a patrimonial kingdome . . succession of the soveraign power , &c. . though the successor be not declared , yet there is alwayes one to be presumed . . the children preferred to the succession , &c. . the males before females . . the eldest before the rest of the brothers . . the brother next to the children . . the succession of the possessor , &c. of three wayes by which a man becometh subiect to another , mentioned sect. . chap. the last , namely , voluntary offer , captivity and birth , the former two have been spoken of , under the name of subiects and servants . in the next place , we are to set down the third way of subiection , under the name of children , and by what title one-man commeth to have propriety in a child , that proceedeth from the common generation of two , ( to wit ) of male and female . and considering men again dissolved from all covenants one with another , and that ( part . chap. . sect. . ) every man by the law of nature , hath right or propriety to his own body , the child ought rather to be the proprietie of the mother , ( of whose body it is part , till the time of separation ) then of the father . for the understanding therefore of the right that a man or woman hath to his or their child , two things are to be considered ; first , what title the mother , or any other originally hath , to a child new born : secondly , how the father , or any other man , pretendeth by the mother . . for the first , they that have written of this subiect have made generation to be a title of dominion over persons , as well as the consent of the persons themselves . and because generation giveth title to two , namely , father , and mother , whereas dominion is indivisible , they therefore ascribe dominion over the child to the father only , ob praestantiam sexus ; but they shew not , neither can i find out by what coherence , either generation inferreth dominion , or advantage of so much strength , which , for the most part , a man hath more then a woman , should generally and universally entitle the father to a propriety in the child and take it away from the mother . . the title to dominion over a child , proceedeth not from the generation , but from the preservation of it ; and therefore in the estate of nature , the mother , in whose power it is to save or destroy it , hath right thereto by that power , according to that which hath been sayd , part . chap. . sect. . and if the mother shall think fit to abandon , or expose her c●ild to death , whatsoever man or woman shall finde the child so exposed shall have the same right which the mother had before ; and for this same reason , namely , for the power not of generating , but preserving . and though the child thus preservd , do in time acquire strength , whereby he might pretend equality with him or her that hath preserved him , yet shall that pretence be thought unreasonable , both because his strength was the gift of him , against whom be pretendeth , and also because it is to be presumed that he which giveth sustenance to another , whereby to strengthen him , hath received a promise of obedience in consideration thereof . for else it would be wisdome in men , rather to let their children perish , while they are infants , then to live in their danger or subiection , when they are grown . . for the pretences which a man may have to dominion over a child by the right of the mother , they be of divers kinds . one by the absolute subiection of the mother ; another , by some particular covenant from her , which is less then a covenant of such subiection . by absolute subiection , the master of the mother hath right to her child , according to sect. . chap. . whether he be the father thereof , or not . and thus the children of the servant are the goods of the master in perpetuum . of covenants that amount not to subiection between man and woman , there be some which are made for a time ; they are covenants of cohabitation , or else of copulation only . and in this later case , the children pass by covenants particular . and thus in the copulation of the amazones with their neighbours , the fathers by covenant had the male children only , the mothers retaining the females . . and covenants of cohabitation are either for society of bed , or for society of all things ; if for society of bed only , then is the woman called a concubine . and here also the child shall be his or hers , as they shall agree particularly by covenant . for although for the most part , a concubine is supposed to yeild up the right of her children to the father , yet doth not concubinate enforce so much . . but if the covenants of cohabitation be for societie of all things ; it is necessary that but one of them govern and dispose of all that is common to them both ; without which , ( as hath been often said before ) societie cannot last . and therefore the man , to whom for the most part , the woman yeildeth the government , hath for the most part also , the sole right and dominion over the children . and the man is called the husband , and the woman the vvife . but because sometimes the government may belong to the vvife only , sometimes also the dominion over the children shall be in her only . as in the case of a soveraign queen , there is no reason that her marriage should take from her the dominion over her children . . children therefore , whether they be brought up and preserved by the father , or by the mother , or by whomsoever are in most absolute subjection to him or her , that so bringeth them up , or preserveth them . and they may alienate them , that is , assign his or her dominion , by selling , or giving them , in adoption or servitude , to others ; or may pawn them for hostages , kill them for rebellion , or sacrifice them for peace , by the law of nature , when he or she , in his or her conscience , think it to be necessary . . the subiection of them who institute a common wealth amongst themselves , is no less absolute then the subiection of servants . and therein they are in equal estate . but the hope of those is greater then the hope of these . for he that subiecteth himself uncompelled , thinketh there is no reason he should be better used then he that doth it upon compulsion ; and coming in freely calleth himself , though in subiection , a freeman ; whereby it appeareth that liberty is not any exemption from subiection and obedience to the soveraign power , but a state of better hope then theirs , that have been subiected by force and conquest . and this was the reason , that the name which signifieth children in the latine tongue , is liberi , which also signifieth free men . and yet in rome nothing at that time was so obnoxious to the power of others , as children in the family of their fathers . for both the state had power over their life without consent of their fathers , and the father might kil his son by his own authority , without any warrant from the state . freedome therefore in common-wealths , is nothing but the honour of equality of favour with other subiects , and servitude the estate of the rest . a free-man therefore may expect employments of honour , rather then a servant . and this is al that can be understood by the liberty of the subiect . for in all other senses , liberty is the state of him that is not subiect . . now when a father that hath children hath servants also , the children ( not by the right of the child , but by the natural indulgence of the parents ) are such fremen . and the whole consisting of the father or mother , or both , & of the children , & of the servants , is called a family , wherin the father or mother of the family is soveraign of the same , and the rest ( both children and servants equally ) subiects . the same family , if it grow by multiplication of children , either by generation or adoption ; or of servants , either by generation , gonquest , or voluntary submission , to be so great and numerous , as in probability it may protect it self , then is that family called a patrimoniall kingdome , or monarchy by acquisition , wherein the soveraignty is in one man , as it is in a monarch made by politicall institution . so that whatsoev●r rights be in the one , the same also be in the other . and therefore i shall no more speake of them as distinct , but of monarchy in general . . having shewed by what right the several sorts of common-wealths , democracy , aristocracy , and monarchy , are erected , it followeth , to shew by what right they are continued . the right by which they are continued , is called the right of succession to the soveraign power ; whereof there is nothing to be said a democracy , because the soveraign dyeth not , as long as there be subjects alive . nor in any aristocracy , because it cannot easily fall out , that the optimates should every one fail at once : and if it should so fall out , there is no question , but the common wealth is thereby dissolved . it is therefore in a monarchy only , that there can happen a question concerning the succession . and first , forasmuch as a monarch , which is absolue soveraign , hath the dominion in his own right , he may dispose thereof at his own will . if therefore by his last will , he shall name his successor , the right passeth by that will . . nor if the monarch dye without any will concerning the succession declared , it is not therefore to be presumed , it was his will his subiects , which are to him as his children and servants , should return again to the state of anarchy , that is to war and hostility . for that were expresly against the law of nature , which commandeth to procure peace , and to maintain the same . it is therefore to be conjectured with reason , that it was the intention to bequeath them peace , that is to say , a power coercive , whereby to keep them from sedition amongst themselves ; and rather in the form of a monarchy , then any other government ; forasmuch as he , by the exercise thereof in his own person , hath declared , that he approveth the same . . farther , it is to be supposed , his intention was , that his own children should be preferred in the succession ( when nothing to the contrary , is expresly declared ) before any other . for men naturally seek their own honour , and that consisteth in the honour of their children after them . . again , seeing every monarch is supposed to desire to continue the governmen● in his successors , as long as he may ; and that generally men are indued with greate● parts of wisdom and courage , by which al● monarchies are kept from dis●olution , then women , are it is to be presumed , where no express will is extant to the contrary , he preferreth his male children before the female . not but that women may governe and have in divers ages and places governed wisely , but are not so apt thereto in generals , as men . . because the soveraign power is indivisible , it cannot be supposed , that he intended the same should be divided , but that it should descend intirely upon one of them , which is do be presumed , should be the eldest , assigned thereto by the lot of nature , because he appointed no other lot for the decision thereof . besides , what difference of ability soever there may be amongst the brethren , the odds shall be adiudged to the elder , because no subiect hath authority otherwise to judge thereof . . and for want of issue in the possessor , the brother shall be presumed successor . for by the judgement of nature , next in blood , is next in love , and next in love , is next to preferment . . and as the succession followeth the first monarch , so also it followeth him or her that is in possession ; and consequently , the children of him in possession , shall be prefe●red before the children of his father , or predecessor . chap. v. . the utility of the common-wealth , &c. . the losse of liberty , &c. . monarchy approved , &c. . monarchy less subiect to passion , &c. . . subiects in monarchy , &c. . laws in monarchy less changeable , &c. . monarchies less subiect to dissolution . having set forth the nature of a person politick , and the three sotts thereof , democracy , aristocracy , and monarchy , in this chapter shall be declared , the convencies , and inconveniencies , that arise from the same , both in general ; and of the said several sorts in particular . and first , seeing a body politick is erected only for the ruling and governing of particular men , the benefit and damage thereof consieth in the benefit or damage of being ruled . the benefit is that for which a body politick was instituted , namely , the peace and preservation of every particular man , then which it is not possible there can be a greater , as hath been touched before , part . chap. . sect. . and this benefit extendeth equally both to the soveraign and to the subjects . for he or they that have the soveraign power , have but the defence of their persons , by the assistance of the particulars ; and every particular man hath his defence by their union in the soveraign . as for other benefits , which pertain not to their safetie and sufficiency , bu● to their well and delightfull being , such as are superfluous riches , they so belong to the soveraign , as they must also be in the subject ; and so to the subiect , as they must also be in the soveraign . for the riches and treasure of the soveraign , is the dominion he hath over the riches of his subiects . if therefore the soveraign provide not so , as that particular men may have means , both to preserve themselvs , and also to preserve the publick the common or soveraign treasure can be none . and on the other side , if it were not for a common and publick treasure belonging to the soveraign power , mens private riches would sooner serve to put them into confusion and war , then to secure and maintain them . insomuch , as the profit of the soveraiegn & subiect goeth alwayes together . that distinction therefore of government , that there is one government for the good of him that governeth , & another for the good of them that be governed ; whereof the former is despotical , ( that is lordly ) the other , a government of freemen , is not right . no more is the opinion of them that hold it to be no city , which consisteth of a master and his servants . they might as well say , it were no city that consisted in a father and his own issue , how numerous soever they were . for to a master that hath no children , the servants have in them all those respects , for which men love their children . for they are his strength , and his honour . and his power is no greater over them , then over his children . . the inconvenience arising from government in general , to him that governeth consisteth partly in the continual care and trouble about the businesse of other men , that are his subiects , and partly in the danger of his person . for the head alwayes is that part , not only where the care resideth , but also against which the stroke of an enemy most commonly is directed . to ballance this incommodity , the soveraignty , together with the necessity of this care and danger , comprehendeth so much honour ; riches and means , whereby to delight the mind , as no private mans wealth can attain unto . the inconveniences of government , in generall to a subiect are none at all , if well considered , but in appearance . there be two things that may trouble his mind , o● two general grievances , the one is losse of liberty ; the other , the uncertainty of meum & tuum . for the first , it consisteth in this , that a subiect may no more governe his own actions according to his own discretion and judgement , ( which is all one ) conscience , as the present occasions from time to time shall dictate to him , but must be tyed to do according to that will onely , which once for all , he had long ago laid up , and involved in the wills of the maior part of an assembly , or in the will of some one man . but this is really no inconvenience . for , as it hath been shewed before , it is the only meanes , by which we have any possibility of preserving our selves . for if every man were allowed this liberty , of following his conscience , in such difference of consciences , they would not live together in peace an hour . but it appeareth a great inconvenience to every man in particular , to be debarred of this liberty , because every one a part considereth it as in himself , and not as in the rest , by which means , l●berty appeareth in the likeness of rule and government over others . for where one man is at liberty , and the rest bound , there that one hath government ; which honour , he that understandeth not so much , demanding by the name simply of liberty , thinketh it a great grievance and iniury to be denyed it . for the second grievance concerning meum & tuum , it is also none , but in appearance only ; it consisteth in this , that the soveraign power , taketh from him that which he used to enjoy , knowing no other propriety but use and custome . but without such soveraign power , the right of men is not proprietie to any thing , but a community , no better then to have no right at all , as hath been shewed , part. . chap. . sect. . propriety therefore being derived from the soveraign power , is not to be pretended against the same , especially , when by it every subject hath his propriety against every other subject , which when soveraignty ceaseth , he hath not , because in that case they return to war amongst t●ems●lves . those levies therfore which are made upon mens estates , by the soveraign authority , are no more but the price of that peace and defence which the sovraignty maintaineth for them . if this were not so , no money nor forces for the wars , not any other publick occasion , could justly be levied in the world . for neither king , nor democracy , nor aristocracy , nor the estates of any land , could do it , if the soverainty could not . for in all those cases it is levied by virtue of the soveraignty . nay more , by the three estates , here the land of one man may be transferred to another , without crime of his from whom it was taken , and withomt pretence of publick benefit , as hath been done ; and this without injury , because done by the soveraign power . for the power whereby it is done , is no less then soveraign , and cannot be greater . therefore this greivance for meum & tuum is not real , unless more be exacted then is necessary ; but it seemeth a greivance , because to them that either know not the right of soveraignty , or to whom that right belongeth , it seemeth an injury , and iniury howsoever little the dammage is alwaies greivous as putting us in minde of our disability to help our selves , and into envy of the power to do us wrong . . having spoken of the inconveniencies of the subiect , by government in general , let us consider the same in the three several sorts thereof , namely , democracy , aristocracy and monarchy ; whereof the two former are in effect but one . for ( as i have shewed befo●e ) democracy is but the governement of a few orators . the comparison therefore will be between monarchy and aristocracy : and to omit that the world as it was created , so also it is governed by one god almighty ; and that all the ancients have have preferred monarchy before other governments , both in opinion , because they faigned a monarchial government amongst their gods , and also by their custome ; for that in the most ancient times all people were so governed ; and that paternal government which is monarchy , was instituted in the beginning from the creation , & that other governments have proceeded from the dissolution thereof , called by the rebellious nature of mankind , and be but pieces of broken monarchies cemented by humane wit , i will insist only on this comparison upon the inconvenies that may happen to the subiects , in consequence to each of these governments . . and first , it seemeth inconvenient there should be committed so great a power to one man , as that it might be lawful to no other man or men to resist the same ; and som think it inconvenient eo nomine , because he hath the power . but this reason we may not by any means admit . for it maketh it inconvenient to be ruled by almighty god , who without question hath more power over every man , then can be conferred upon any monarch . this inconvenience therefore must be derived , not from the power , but from the aff●ctions and passions which raign in every one , as well monarch , as subject , by which the monarch may be swayd to use that power amiss . and because an aristocracy consisteth of men , if the passions of many men be more violent when they are assembled together , then the passions of one man alone , it will follow , that the inconvenience arising from passions will be greater in an aristocracy then a monarchy . but there is no doubt , when things are debated in great assemblies , but every man delivering his opinion at large without interruption endeavour●th to make whatsoever he is to set forth for good , better ; and what he would have apprehended as evill , worse , as much as is possible , to the end his counsel may take place ; which counsel also is never without ayme at his own benefit , or honour ; every mans end ●e●ng some good to himself . now this cannot be done without working on the passions of the rest . and thus the passions of these that are singly moderate , are altogether vehement , even as a great many coals , though but warm asunder , being put together , inflame one another . . another inconvenience of monarchy , is this , that the monarch , besides the riches necessary for the defence of the common wealth , may take so much more from the subiects , as may enrich his children , kindred and favourites , to what degree he pleaseth ; which though it be indeed an inconvenience , if he should so do , yet is the same both greater in an aristocracy , and also more likely to come to pass . for their , not one only , but many have children , kindred , and friends to raise . and in that point they a●e as twenty monarchs for one , and likely to set forward one anothers designs mutually , to the oppression of all the rest . the same also happeneth in a democracy , if they all do agree , otherwise they bring a worse inconvenience , to wit , sedition . . another inconvenience of monarchy , is the power of dispencing with the execution of iustice , whereby the family and friends of the monarch may with impunity , commit outrages upon the people , or oppresse them with extortion . but in ar●stocracies , not only one , but many have power of taking men out of the hands of iustice , and no man is willing his kindred or friends should be punished according to their demerits . and therefore they understand amongst themselves without further speaking , as a tacite covenant , hodie mihi , cras tibi . . another inconvenience of monarchy , is the power of altring lawes . concerning which , it is necessary that such a power be , that lawes may be altered , according as mens manners charg , or as the coniuncture of all circumstances within and without the common wealth shall require ; the change of law being then inconvenient , when it proceedeth from the change , not of the occasion , but of the minds of him or them , by whose authority the laws a●e made . now it is manifest enough of it self , that the mind of one man is not so variable in that point , as are the decrees of an assembly . for not only they have all their natural changes , but the change of any one man may be enough with eloquence and reputation , or by solicitation and faction , to make that law to day , which another by the very same means shall abrogate to morrow . . lastly , the greatest inconvenience that can happen to a common wealth , is the aptitude to dissolve into civil war , and to this are monarchies much less subiect then any other governments . for where the union or band of a common wealth is one man , there is no distraction whereas in assemblies , those that are of different opinions , and give different counsel are apt to fall out amongst themselves , and to cross the designs of the common wealth for one anothers sake : and when they cannot have the honour of making good their owne devices , they yet seek the honour to make the counsels of the adversaries prove vain . and in this contention , when the opposite factions happen to be any thing equal in strength . they presently fal to war . wherein necessity teacheth both sides , that an absolute monarch , to wit , a general , is necessary both for their defence against one another , and also for the peace of each faction within it self . but this aptitude to dissolution , is to be understood for an inconvenience in such aristocracies onely , where the affairs of state are debated in gr●at and numerous assemblies , as they were anciently in athens , and in rome ; and not in such as doe nothing else in great assemblies , but choose magistrates and counsellours , and commit the handling of state-affaires to a few ; such as is the aristocracy of venice at this day . for these are no more apt to dissolve from this occasion , then monarchies , the counsel of state being both in the one and the other alike . chap. vi . . a difficulty concerning absolute subiection to man , arising from our absolute subiection to god almighty , propounded . . that this difficulty is onely amongst those christians , that deny the interpretation of scripture , to depend upon the soveraign authority of the common-wealth . . that humane lawes are not made to govern the consciences of men , but their words and a●●ions . . places of scripture to prove obedience due from chr●stians to their soveraign in all things . . a distinction propounded betwe●n a fundamentall point of faith , and a superstruction . . an explication of the points of faith , that be fundam●ntal . . the bel●ef of those fundamental points , is all that is required to salvation , as of fai●h . . that other points not fundamen●all , are not necessary to salvation , as matter of faith ; and that no more is required by way of faith to the salvation of one man , th●n to another . . that super●●ructions are not points of the faith necessary to a christian . . how faith and justice c●ncurre to salvation . . that in christian common-wealths , obedience to god and man stand wel together . . this tenet , whatsoever is against the conscience , is sin , interpreted . that all men do confess the necessity of submitting of controversies to some humane authority . . that christians under an infidel , are discharged of the iniustice of disobeying them , in that which concerneth the faith necessary to salvation , by not resisting . having shewed , that in all common-wealths whatsoever , the necessity of peace and government requireth , that there be existent some power , either in one man , or in one assembly of men , by the name of the power soveraign , to which it is not lawfull for any member of the same common-wealth to disobey ; there occurreth now a difficulty , which if it be not removed , maketh it unlawfull for a man to put himself under the command of such absolute soveraignty , as is required thereto . and the difficulty is this ; we have amongst us the word of god for the rule of our actions : now if wee shall subiect our selves to men also , obliging our selves to do such actions , as shall be by them commanded , when the commands of god and man shall differ , we are to obey god , rather then man ; and consequently , the covenant of general obedience to man is unlaw●ull . . this difficulty hath not been of very great antiquity in the world . there was no such dilemna amongst the jewes ; for their civil law , and divine law , was one and the same law of moses ; the interpreters whereof were the priests , whose power was subordinate to the power of the king ; as was the power of aaron to the power of moses . nor is it a controversie that was ever taken notice of amongst the grecians , romanes , or other genti●es : for amongst these their severall civill lawes , were the rules whereby not only righteousness and virtue , but also religion , and the external worship of god was ordered and approved ; that being esteemed the true worship of god which was {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , according to the laws civil . also those christians that dwell under the temporal dominion of the bishop of rome , are free from this question ; for that they allow unto him ( their soveraign ) to interpret the scriptures , which are the law of god as he in his own judgement shall think right . this difficulty therefore remaineth amongst , and troubleth those christians only , to whom it is allowed , to take for the sense of the scripture , that which they make thereof , either by their own private interpretation , or by the inte●pretation of such as are not called thereunto by publick authority ; they that follow their own interpretation continually demanding liberty of conscience ; and those that follow the interpretation of others not ordained thereunto by the soveraign of the common-wealth , requiring a power in matters of religion , either above the power civil , or at least not depending on it . . to take away this scruple of conscience , concerning obedience to humane lawes , amongst those that interpret to themselves the word of god in the holy scriptures , i propound to their consideration , first , that no humane law is intended to oblige the conscience of a man , unlesse it break out into action , either of the tongue , or other part of the body . the law made thereupon would be of none effect , because no man is able to discern , but by word or other action , whether such law be kept or broken . nor did the apostles themselves pretend dominion over mens consciences concerning the faith they preached , but only perswasion and instruction . and therefore s. paul saith , cor. . . writing to the corinthians , concerning their controversies , that he and the rest of the apostles had no dominion over their faith , but were helpers of their joy . . and for the actions of men which proceed from their consciences , the regulating of which actions is the only means of peace , if they might not stand with justice , it were impossible that justice towards god , and peace amongst men , should stand together in that r●ligion that teacheth us , that justice and peace should kiss each other , and in which we have so many precepts of absolute obedience to humane authority ; as mat. . , . we have this precept . the scribes & pharisees sit in moses seat ; all therefore whatsoever they bid you observe that observe and do . and yet were the scribes and pharisees not preists , but men of temporall authority . again , luke . . every kingdome divided against it self shall be desolate ; and is not that kingdome divided against it self , where the actions of every one shall be ruled by his private opinion or conscience , and yet those actions such as give occasion of offence and breach of peace . again , rom. . . wherefore you must be subject , not because of wrath only , but also for conscience sake , tit. . . put them in remembrance , that they be subiect to principalities and powers , . pet. . . . submit your selves unto all manner of ordinance of man , for the lords sake , whether it be unto the king , as unto the superiour , or unto governours , as unto them that are sent of him for the punishment of evill doers . jude verse . these dreamers also that defile the flesh , and despise government , and speake evill of them that are in authority . and forasmuch as all subiects in common wealths are in the nature of children and servants , that which is a command to them is a command to all subiects . but to these s. paul saith , colos. . . . children obey your parents in all things , servants be obedient to your masters according to the flesh in all things . and verse . do it heartily as to the lo●d . these places considered , it seemeth strange to me , that any man in a christian common wealth , should have any occasion to deny his obedience to publick authority , upon this ground , that it is better to obey god then man . for though s. peter and the apostles did so answer the councel of the jews , that forbade them to preach christ , there appeareth no reason that christians should alledge the same against their christian governours that command to preach christ . to reconcile this seeming co●tradiction of simple obedience to god , and simple obedience to man , we are to consider a christian subiect , as under a christian soveraign , or under an infidell . . and under a christian soveraign we are to consider , what actions we are forbidden by god almighty to obey them in , and what not . the actions we are forbidden to obey them in , are such only , as imply a denial of that faith which is necessary to our salvation : for otherwise there can be no pretence of disobedience ; for why should a man incur the danger of a temporal death , by displeasing of his superiour , if it were not for fear of eternal death hereafter . it must therefore be inquired , what those propositions and articles be ; the beleife whereof our saviour or his apostles have declared to be such as without beleiving them a man cannot be saved ; and then all other points that are now controverted and made distinction of sects , papists , lutheran , calvinists , arminians &c. as in old time , the like made paulists , apollonians , and cephasians , must needs be such , as man needeth not for the holding thereof , deny obedience to his superiours . and for the points of faith necessary to salvation , i shall call them fundamental , and every other point a superstruction . . and without all controversie , there is not any more necessary point to be believed for mans salvation then this , that jesus is the messiah , that is , the christ ; which proposition is explicated in sundry sorts , but still the same in effect ; as that he is gods annointed , for that is signified by the word christ . that he was the true and lawful king of israel , the son of david , the saviour of the world , the redeemer of israel , the salvation of god he that should come into the world , the son of god , and ( which i desire by the way to have noted , against the now sect of arrians ) the begotten son of god , act. . . heb. . the only begotten son of god , joh. . . . joh. . , . joh. . . that he was god joh. joh. . . that the fulness of the god●ead dwelt in him bodily . moreover , the holy one , the holy one of god , the forgiver ●f sins , , that he is risen from the dead . these are explications , and parts of that general article , that jesus is the christ . this point therefore , and all the explications thereof are fundamental ; as also all such , as be evidently inferred from thence : as , belief in god the father . joh. . . he that beleveth in me , believeth not in me , but in him that sent me : joh. . , he that denyeth the son , hath not the father , belief in god the holy ghost , of whom christ saith , joh. . . but the comforter which is the holy ghost , whom the father will send in my name . and joh. . . but when the comforter shall come whom i will send unto you from the father , even the spirit of truth . beleife of the scriptures , by which we beleeve those points , and of the immortality of the soul , without which we cannot beleeve that he is a saviour . . and as these are the fundamentall points of faith necessary to salvation , so also are they only necessary as matter of faith ●nd also essential to the calling of a christian ; as may appear by many evident places of holy scripture : joh. . . search the scriptures , for in them you think to have eteral life , and they are they which testifie of me . now , forasmuch as by the scripture , is meant there the old testament ( the new being then not written ) the beleife of that which was written concerning our saviour in the old testament , was sufficient beleife for the obtaining of eternal life : but in the old testament there is nothing revealed concerning christ , but that he is the messiah , and such things as belong to the fundamentall points thereupon depending . and therefore those fundamental points are sufficient to salvation as of faith . and joh. . . . then sayd they unto him , what shall we do , that we might work the works of god ? jesus answered and said unto them , this is the work of god , that ye beleeve in him , whom he hath sent . so that the point to be beleived is , that jesus christ came forth from god , and he which believeth it , worketh the works of god . joh. . . . whosoever liveth and beleiveth in me , shall never dye . beleevest thou this ? she sayd unto him , yea lord , i beleeve that thou art the christ the son of god , which should come into the world . hence followeth , he that beleiveth this shall never dye . joh. . . but these things are wri●ten that ye might beleeve , that jesus is the christ , the son of god , and that in beleiving , ye might have life through his name . by which appeareth , that this fundamentall point is all that is required , as of faith to our salvation . joh. . . every spirit that confesseth that jesus christ is come into the flesh is of god : joh. . . whosoever beleiveth that j●s●s is the christ is born of god , and ver. . who is it that overcometh the world , but he that beleiveth that jesus is the son of god : and vers. . these things have i written unto you that beleeve in the name of the son of god , that ye may know that ye have ●ternall life . act. . . . the eunuch said , here is water , what doth let me to be baptized ? and philip said unto him , if thou beleevest with i● thy heart , thou mayst . he answered and sayd , i beleeve that jesus christ is the son of god . this point therefore was sufficient for the reception of man into baptisme , that is to say , to christianity . and act. . . the keeper of the prison , fell down before paul and silas , and said , sirs , what shall i do to be saved ? and they sayd , beleeve in the lord jesus christ . and the sermon of s. peter upon the day of pentecost , was nothing else but an explication , that jesus was the christ . and when they had heard him , asked him , what shal we do , he said unto them , ac. . . amend your lives , and be baptized evry one of you in the name of jesus christ for the remission of sins . rom. . . if thou shalt conf●ss with thy mouth the lord jesus , and shalt beleeve in thy heart , that god raised him up from the dead , thou shalt be saved . to these places may be added , that wheresoever our savior christ doth approve the faith of any man , the proposition beleeved ( if the same to be collected out of the text ) is alway some of those fundamentall points before mentioned , or something equivalent : as the faith of the centurion , mat. . . speake the word only , and my servant shall be healed , beleiving he was omnipotent : the faith of the woman , which had an issue of blood , math , . . if i may but touch the hem of his garment , implying , he was the messiah , the faith required of the blind men , mat. . . beleeve you that i am able to do this ? the faith of the canaanitish woman , matth. . . that he was the son of david , implying the same . and so it is in every one of those places ( none excepted ) where our saviour commendeth any mans faith , which because they are too many to insert here , i omit , and refer them to his inquisition that is not otherwise satisfied . and as there is no other faith required , so there was no other preaching : for the prophets of the old testament , preached no other , and john the baptist preached only the approach of the kingdome of heaven , that is to say , of the kingdome of christ , the same was the commission of the apostles , mat. . . go preach , saying , the kingdome of heaven is at hand . and paul preaching amongst the jews , act. . . did but testifie unto the jews that , jesus was the christ . and the heathens took notice of christians no otherwise , but by this name that they beleeved jesus to be a king , crying out . act. . . these are they that have subverted the state of the world , and here they are , whom jason hath received . and these all doe against the decrees of caesar , saying , that there is another king , one jesus . and this was the sum of the predictions , the sum of the confessions of them that beleeved , as well men as devils . this was the title of his crosse , jesus of nazareth , king of the jewes ; this the occasion of the crowne of thorns , scepter of reed , and a man to carry his crosse ; this was the subiect of the hosan●a's ; and this was the title , by which our saviour commanding to take another mans goods , bad them say , the lord hath need : and by this title , he purged the temple of the profane market kept there . nor did the apostles themselves believe any more , then that jesus was the m●ssiah , nor understand so much ; for they understood the messiah to be no more then a temporall king , till after our saviours resurrection . furthermore , this point , that christ is the messiah , is particularly set forth for fundamentall by that word , or some other equivalent thereunto in divers places . upon the confession of peter , matth. . . thou art the christ , the son of the living god , our saviour ver. . saith , upon this rock will i build my church . this point therefore is the whole foundation of christs church . rom. . . s. paul raith , i so inforced my self to preach the gospel , not where christ was named , lest i should have built upon another mans foundation , cor. . . s. paul when he had reprehended the corinthians for their sects , & curious doctrines and questions , he distinguisheth between fundamental points , and superstruction ; and saith , i have laid the foundation , and another buildeth thereupon ; but let every man take heed how he buildeth upon it , for other foundation can no man lay , then that which is laid , which is jesus christ . colos. . . as you have received christ jesus the lord , so walk in him , rooted and builded in him , and stablished in the faith . . having shewed this proposition , jesus is the christ , to be the only fundamentall and necessary point of faith , i shal set down a few places more , to shew , that other points , though they may be true , are not so necessary to be believed , as that a man may not be saved , though he believe them not . and first , if a man could not be saved without assent of the heart to the truth of all controversies , which are now in agitation concerning religion , i cannot see , how any man living can be saved ; so full of subtilty , and curious knowledge it is to be so great a divine . why therefore should a man think that our saviour , who , mat. . . saith , that his yoke is easie , should require a matter of that difficulty ? or how are little children said to believe . mat. . . or how could the good thief be thought sufficiently catechized upon the crosse ? or s. paul so perfect a christian presently upon his conversion ? and though there may be more obedience required in him that hath the fundamental points explicated unto him , then in him that hath received the same but implicitely ; yet there is no more faith required for salvation in one man , then in another . for if it be true , that whosoever shall confesse with his mouth the lord jesus , and believe in his heart , that god raised him from the dead , shall be saved ; as it is , rom. . . and that whosoever believeth that jesus is the christ , is born of god , the belief of that point is sufficient for the salvation of any man whosoever he be , for as much as concerneth faith . and seeing he that believeth not that jesus is the christ , whatsoever he believe else , cannot be saved , it followeth , that there is no more required to the salvation of one man , then another , in matter of faith . . about these points fundamental , there is little controversie amongst christians , though otherwise of different sects amongst themselves . and therefore the controversies of religion , are altogether about points unnecessary to salvation ; whereof some are doctrines raised by humane ratiocination , from the points fundamentall . as for example ; such doctrines as concern the manner of the real presence , wherein are mingled tenets of faith concerning the omnipotency & divinity of christ , with the tenets of aristotle and the peripatelicks , concerning substance and accidents , species , hypostasis , and the subsistence and migration of accidents from place to place ; words some of them without meaning , and nothing but the canting of grecian sophisters . and these doctrines are condemned expresly , col. . . where after s. paul had exhorted them to be rooted and builded in christ , he giveth them this farther caveat ; beware lest there be any man that spoil you through philosophy and vain deceits , through the traditions of men , according to the rudiments of the world . and such , are such doctrines , as are raised out of such places of the scriptures , as concern not the foundation , by mens natural reason ; as about the concatenation of causes , and the manner of gods predestination ; which are also mingled with philosophy : as if it were possible for men that know not in what manner god seeth , heareth , or speaketh , to know nevertheless the manner how he intendeth , and predestinateth . a man therefore ought not to examin by reason any point , or draw any consequence out of scripture , by reason , concerning the nature of god almighty , of which reason is not capable . and therefore s. paul , rom. . . giveth a good rule , that no man presume to understand above that which is meet to understand , but that he understand according to sobriety , which they doe not , who presume out of scripture , by their own interpretation , to raise any doctrine to the understanding , concerning those things , which are incomprehensible . and this whole controversie concerning the predestination of god , and the free wil of man , is not peculiar to christian men . for we have huge volumes of this subiect , under the name of fate & contingency , disputed between the epicurians and the stoicks , and consequently it is not matter of faith , but of philosophy : and so are also all the questions concerning any ot●er point , but the foundation before named : and god receiveth a man which part of the question soever he holdeth . it was a controversie in s. pauls time , whether a christian gentile might eate freely of any thing which the christian jews did not : and the jew condemned the gentile that he did eat , to whom s. paul saith , rom. . , let not him that eateth not , iudge him that eateth : for god hath received him . and vers. . in the question concerning the observing of holy dayes , wherein the gentiles the jewes differed , he saith unto them , he that observeth the day , observeth it to the lord , and he that observeth not the day , observeth it not to the lord . and they who strive concerning such questions , and divide themselves into sects , are not therefore to be accounted zealous of the faith , their strife being but carnal , which is confirmed by s. paul , cor. . . when one saith , i am of paul , and another , i am of apollos , are ye not carnal ? for they are not questions of faith , but of wit , wherein carnally men are inclined to seek the mastery one of another . for nothing is truly a point of faith , but that jesus is the christ ; as s. paul testifieth , cor. . . for i esteemed not the knowledge of any thing amongst you , save jesus christ , and him crucified . and tim. . . o timotheus , keep that which is committed un●o thee , and avoid prophane and vain bablings , and opposition of science falsly so called , which while s●me profess , they have erred concerning the faith . tim. . . stay prophane and vain bablings , &c. vers. . of which sort is hymeneus and philetus , which as concerning the truth , have erred , saying , that the resurrectionis past already . whereby s. paul shewed , that the raising of questions by humane ratiocination , though it be from the fundamental points themselves , is not onely not necessary , but most dangerous to the faith of a christian . out of all these places , i draw only this conclusion in general , that neither the points now in controversie amongst christians of different sects , or in any point that ever shall be in controversie , excepting only those that are contained in this article , jesus is the christ , are necessary to salvation , as of faith ; though in matter of obedience , a man may be bound not to oppose the same . . although to the obtaining of salvation , there be required no more , as hath been already declared out of the holy scriptures , as matter of faith , but the belief of those fundamental articles before set forth , neverthelesse , there are required other things , as matter of obedience . for as it is not enough in temporal kingdoms ( to avoid the punishment which kings may inflict ) to acknowledge the right and title of the king , without obedience also to his laws ; so also it is not enough , to acknowledge our saviour christ to be the king of heaven , in which consisteth christian faith , unless also we endeavour to obey his lawes , which are the lawes of the kingdome of heaven , in which consisteth christian obedience . and forasmuch as the laws of the kingdom of heaven , are the laws of nature , as hath been shewed , part. . chap. . not only faith , but also the observation of the law of nature , which is that for which a man is called just or righteous , ( in that sense , in which justice is taken not for the absence of guilt , but for the endeavor and constant will to do that which is just ) not only faith , but this justice , which also from the effect thereof , is called repentance , and sometimes works , is necessary to salvation . so that faith and justice do both concur thereto ; and in the several acceptation of this word justification , are properly said both of them to justifie ; and the want of either of them is properly said to condemn . for not only he that resisteth a king upon doubt of his titl● , but also he that doth it upon the inordinatenesse of his passions , deserveth punishment . and when faith and works are separated , not only the faith is called dead without works , but also works are called dead works without faith , and therefore s. james , chap. . . saith , even so the faith , if it have no works , is dead in it self , and vers. . for as the body without the spirit is dead , even so faith without works is dead . and s. paul , heb. . . calleth works without faith , dead works , where he saith ; not laying again the foundation of repentance from dead works . and by these dead works , is understood not the obedience and justice of the inward man , but the opus operatum , or external action , proceeding from fear of punishment , or from vain glory , and desire to be honoured of men : and these may be separated from faith , and conduce no way to a mans justification . and for that cause , s. paul , rom. . excludeth the righteousness of the law , from having part in the justification of a sinner . for by the law of moses , which is applyed to mens actions , and requireth the absence of guilt , all men living are liable to damnation , and therefore no man is iustified by works , but by faith only . but if workes be taken for the endeavour to doe them , that is , if the will be taken for the deed , or internal , for external righteousness , then doe works contribute to salvation . and then taketh place that of s. james , chap. . . ye see then how that of works a man is iustisted , and not of faith only . and both of these are ioyned to salvation , as in s. mark . . . repent and believe the gospel . and luk. . . when a certain ruler asked our saviour , what he ought to doe to inherit eternal life , he propounded to him the keeping of the commandements ; which when the ruler said he had kept , he propounded to him the faith , sell all that thou hast , and fellow me . and joh. . . he that beleeveth in the son , hath everlasting life . and he that obeyeth not the son , shall not see life . where he manifestly ioyneth obedience and faith together . and rom . . the just shall live by faith : not every one , but the just . for also the devils beleeve and tremble . but though both faith and justice ( meaning still by justice , not absence of guilt , but the good intentions of the mind , which is called righteousness by god , that taketh the will for the deed ) be both of them said to iustifie , yet are their parts in the act of justification to be distinguished . for justice is said to iustifie , not because it absolveth , but because it denominates him just , and setteth him in an estate , or capacity of salvation , whensoever he shal have faith . but faith is said to justifie , that is , to absolve , because by it a iust man is absolved of , and forgiven his uniust actions . and thus are reconciled the places of s. paul , and s. james , that faith only iustifieth , and a man is iustified by faith onely : and shewed how faith and repentance must concur to salvation . . these things considered , it will easily appear , that under the soveraign power of a christian common vvealth , there is no danger of damnation from simple obedience to humane lawes : for in that the soveraign alloweth christianity , no man is compelled to renounce that faith , which is enough for his salvation , that is to say , the fundamental points . and for other points , seeing they are not neces●ary to salvation , if we conform our actions to the lawes , we do not only what we are allowed , but also what we are commanded by the law of nature , which is the morall law taught by our saviour himself . and it is part of that obedience , which must concur to our salvation . . and though it be true , whatsoever a man doth against his conscience , is sin , yet the obedience in these cases is neither sin , nor against the conscience . for the conscience being nothing else but a mans setled judgement and opinion , when he hath once transferred his right of judging to another , that which shall be commanded , is no lesse his judgement , then the judgement of that other . so that in obedience to lawes , a man doth still according to his owne conscience , but not his private conscience . and whatsoever is done contrary to private conscience , is then a sin , when the lawes have left him to his own liberty , and never else . and then whatsoever a man doth , not only believing it is ill done , but doubting whether it be ill or not , is done ill , in case he may lawfully omit the doing . . and as it hath been proved , that a man must submit his opinions in matter of controversie to the authority of the common wealth , so also is the same confest by the practice of every one of them that otherwise deny it . for who is there differing in opinion from another , and thinking himself to be in the right , and the other in the wrong , that would not think it reasonable , if he be of the same opinion that the whole state alloweth , that the other should submit his opinion also thereunto ; or that would not be content , if not that one or a few men , yet all the divines of a whole nation , or at least an assembly of all those he liketh , should have the power to determine all the controversies of religion ? or , who is there that would not bee content , to submit his opinions either to the pope , or to a genenerall councel , or to a provincial councel , or to a presbyterie of his owne nation ? and yet in all these cases hee submitteth himselfe to no greater then humane authoritie . nor can a man bee said to submit himselfe to holy scripture , that doth not submit himselfe to some or other for the interpretation thereof . or , why should there bee any church government at all instituted , if the scripture it selfe could doe the office of a judge in controversies of faith , ? but the truth is apparent , by continuall experience , that men seeke not onely liberty of conscience , but of their actions , nor that onely , but a farther liberty of perswading others to their opinions ; nor that onely , for every man desireth that the soveraign authoritie , should admit no other opinions to bee maintained , but such as hee himselfe holdeth . . the difficulty therefore of obeying both god and man in a christian common wealth is none : all the difficulty resteth in this point , whether hee that hath received the faith of christ , having before subiected himselfe to the authoritie of an infidell , bee discharged of his obedience thereby , or not , in matters of religion . in which case it seemeth reasonable to thinke , that since all covenants of obedience are entred into for the preservation preservation of a mans life , if a man be content without resistance to lay down his life , rather then obey the commands of an infidel , in so hard a case he hath sufficiently discharged himself thereof . for no covenant bindeth farther then to endeavour ; and if a man cannot assure himself to perform a iust duty , when thereby he is assured of present death , much less it can be expected , that a man should perform that , for which he believeth in his heart he shall be damned eternally . and thus much concerning the scruple of conscience , that may arise concerning obedience to humane lawes , in them that interpret the law of god to themselves . it remaineth , to remove the same scruple from them , that submit their controversies to others not ordained thereunto by the soveraign authority . and this i refer to the chapter following . chap. vii . . the questions propounded , who are the magistrates in the kingdome of christ . . the questions exemplified , in the controversies between moses and aaron , and between moses and corah . . amongst the jews , the power temporal and spiritual in the same hand . . parallel of the twelve princes of israel , and the twelve apostles . . parallel of seventy elders , and seventy disciples . . the hierarchy of the church in our saviours time , consisted in the twelve , and in the seventy . . why christ ordained not priests for sacrifices , as moses did . . the hierarchy of the church in the apostles time , apostles , bishops , and priests . . the preaching of the gospel , was not commanding , but perswading . . excommunication . soveraignes immediate rulers ecclesiasticall under christ . . that no man hath any just pretence of religion against obedience to common-vvealth . god speaketh to man by his vicegerents . in the former chapter have been removed those difficulties opposing our obedience to humane authority ; which arise from misunderstanding of our saviours title and lawes : in the former whereof , namely , his title , consisteth our faith ; and in the latter , our justice . now they who differ not amongst themselves concerning his title , and lawes , may neverthelesse have different opinions concerning his magistrates , and the au●hority he hath given them . and this is the cause , why many christians have denyed obedience to their princes , pretending that our saviour christ hath not given this magistracy to them but to others . as for example , some say , to the pope universally ; some to a synod aristocratical ; some , to a synod democraticall in every several common vvealth ; and the magistrates of christ being they by whom he speaketh , the question is , whether he ●peak unto us by the pope , or by convocations of bishops and ministers , or by them that have the soveraign power in every common-wealth . . this controversie was the cause of those two mutinies , that happened against moses in the wilderness . the first by aaron and his sister miriam , who took upon them to censure moses for marrying an ethiopian woman . and the state of the question between them and moses , they set forth , numb. . . in these words , vvhat hath the lord spoken but only by moses ? hath be not spoken also by us ? and the lord heard this , &c. and punished the same in miriam , forgiving aaron upon his repentance . and this is the case of all them that set up the priest-hood against the soveraignty . the other was of corah , dathan , and abiram , who with two hundred and fifty captains gathered themselves together against moses , and against aaron . the state of their controversie was this , whether god were not with the multitude , as well as with moses , and every man as holy as he . for numb. . . thus they say , you take too much upon you , seeing all the congregation is holy , every one of them , and the lord is amongst them : wherefore then lift ye your selves above the congregation of the lord ? and this is the case of them that set up their private consciences , and unite themselves to take the government of religion out of the hands of him or them , that have the soveraign power of the common wealth : which how well it pleaseth god , may appear by the hideous punishment of corah and his complices . . in the government therefore of moses , there was no power neither civil , nor spiritual , that was not derived from him . nor in the state of israel under kings , was there any earthly power by which those kings were compellable to any thing , or any subiect allowed to resist them in any case whatsoever . for though the prophets by extraordinary calling , did often admonish and threaten them , yet they had no authority over them . and therefore amongst the jews , the power spirituall and temporall , was alwayes in the same hand , . our saviour christ , as he was the rightful king of the jewes in particular , as well as king of the kingdome of heaven , in the ordaining of magistrates , received that form of policy , which was used by moses . according to the number of the children of jacob , moses tooke unto him by the appointment of god , numb. . . twelve men , every one of the chief of their tribe , which were to assist him in the muster of israel . and these twelve , vers. . are called the princes of israel , twelve men , every one for the house of their fathers , which are said also , numb. . . to be heads over the houses ●f their fathers and princes of the tribes , and ●ver them that were numbred . and these were every one equall amongst themselves , in like manner our saviour tooke unto him twelve apostles to be next unto him in authority , of whom he saith , matth. . . when the son of man shall sit in the throne of his maiesty , ye shall follow me in the regeneration , shall sit also upon twelve thrones , and iudge the twelve tribes of israel . and concerning the equality of the twelve apostles amongst themselves , our saviour saith , matth. . . ye know that the lords of the gentiles have domination over them , &c. vers. . but it shall not be so amongst you ; but whosoever will be greatest among you , let him be your servant . and matth. . . he that is greatest among you , let him be your servant , and a little before , vers. . be not called rabbi , for one is your doctor , christ , and all ye are brethren . and act. . in the chusing of matthias to be an apostle , though s. peter used the part of a prolocutor , yet did no man take upon him the authority of election , but referred the same to lot . . again moses had the command of god , num. . . gather to me seventy men of the elders of israel , whom thou knowest that they are the elders of the people , and governors over them , and bring them unto the tabernacle , &c. and moses did accordingly , vers . . and these were chosen to help moses in bearing the burthen of the government , as appeareth vers. . of the same chapter . and as the twelve princes of the tribes were according to the number of jacobs children ; so were the seventy elders according to the number of the persons that went down with jacob into egypt . in like manner our saviour in his kingdome of heaven , the church , out of the whole number of those that believed in him , ordained seventy persons , which peculiarly were called the seventy disciples , to whom he gave power to preach the gospel and baptize . . in our saviours time therefore , the hierarchy of the church consisted ( besides himself that was the head ) of twelve apostles , who were equal amongst themselves , but ordained over others , as were the twelve heads of the tribes , or seventy disciples , who had every one of them power to baptize and teach , and help to govern the whole flock . . and whereas in the common wealth instituted by moses , there was not only an high priest for the present , but also a succession and order of priest ; it may be demanded why our saviour christ did not ordain the like ? to which may be answered , that the high priesthood , for as much as concerneth the authority thereof , was in the person of christ , as he was christ , that is , king . so also was it in moses , aaron having the ministerial part only . for notwithstanding that aaron was the high priest , yet the consecration of him belonged to moses exod. . . all the utensils of sacrifice , and other holy things , were ordered by moses , and in sum , the whole levitical law was delivered by god , by the hand of moses , who was to aaron a god ; and aaron to him a mouth . and for the ministerial part , there could no high priest be ordained but himself : for seeing our saviour was himself the sacrifice , who but himself could offer him up ? and for the celebration of that sacrifice for ever after , our saviour annexed the priest-hood to those whom he had appointed to govern in the church . . after the ascension of our saviour , the apostles dispersed themselves for the spreading of the gospel , and continually as they converted any number of men , in any city , or region , to the faith ; they chose out such as they thought fittest to direct them in matter of conversation and life , according to christs law , and to explicate unto them , that mysterie of christ come in the flesh , that is to say , to unfold unto them at large the office of the messiah . and of those elders some were subordinate to others , according as the apostles who ordained them , thought meet : so s. paul gave power unto titus , to ordain elders in crete , & to redress things that were amiss . so that titus was an elder & ordained elders . tit. . . for this cause i left thee in creet , that thou shouldest continue to redress the things that remain , & ordain elders in every city , where the word is {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} that is constitute ; whereby it appeareth , that in the apostles times , one elder had authority over another , to ordain and rule them . for , tim. . . timothy an elder , is made iudg of accusations against other elders . and act. . . the disciples are said to ordain elders , for all the congregations of the cities , they had preached in . and though the word there be {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , yet it signifieth not election , by holding up of hands , but simply and absolutely ordination . for the ordinary chusing of magistrates amongst the grecians , which were all either popularly governed , or else by oligarehy , being performed by holding up of hands , made that word be taken simply , for an election , or ordination , howsoever made . and thus in the primitive church , the hierarchy of the church was apostles , elders that governed other elders , and elders that ruled not , but their office was to preach , to administer the sacraments , to offer up prayers and thanksgiving in the name of the people . but at that time there appeared no distinction between the names of bishop and elder . but immediatly after the apostles time , the word bishop was taken to signifie such an elder as had the government of elders ; and other elders , were called by the name of priests , which signifieth the same that elder doth . and thus the government of bishops hath a divine pattern in the twelve rulers , and seventy elders of israel , in the twelve apostles , and seventy disciples of our saviour , in the ruling elders , and not ruling-elders in the time of the apostles . . and thus much of the magistrates over christs flock in the primitive church . for the office of a minister , or ministress was to be subiect to the flock , and to serve them in those things which appertained to their temporal business . the next thing to be considered is the authority which our saviour gave to them , either over those whom they had converted , or those whom they were about to convert . and for these latter , which as yet were without the church , the authority which our saviour gave to his apostles was no more but this , to preach unto them that jesus was the christ , and to explicate the same in all points , that concern the kingdome of heaven , and to perswade men to embrace our saviours doctrine , but by no meanes to compel any man to be subiect to them : for seeing the lawes of the kingdom of heaven , as hath been shewed , par. . chap. . sect. . are dictated to the conscience onely , which is not subiect to compulsion and constraint , it was not congruent to the style of the king of heaven to constrain men to submit their actions to him , but to advise them only ; nor for him that professeth the sum of his law to be love , to extort any duty from us with feare of temporall punishment . and therefore as the mighty men in the world , that hold others in subiection , by force , are called in scripture by the name of hunters , so our saviour calleth those whom he appointed to draw the world unto him , by subduing their affections , fishers . and therefore he saith to peter and andrew , math . . follow me and i will make yee fishers of men . and luke . . behol● ( saith christ ) i send yee forth as lambs amongst wolves . and it were to no end to give them the right of compelling without strengthing the same with greater power then of lambs amongst wolves . moreover , math . where our saviour giveth a commission to his twelve apostles . to go forth and convert the nations to the faith , he giveth them no authority of coercion and punishment , but only saith , vers. . whosoever shall not receive you , nor hear your words , when ye depart out of that house or that city , shake off the dust of your fee . it shall be easier for the land of sodome and gomorrah in the day of judgmemt then for that city . whereby it is manifest , that all that the apostles could do by their authority , was no more than to renounce communion with them , and leave their punishment to god almighty , in the day of judgement . likewise the comparisons of the kingdom of heaven , to the seed math . . and to the leven , math . . doth intimate unto us , that the increase thereof ought to proceed from internall operation of gods word preached , and not from any law or compulsion of them that preach it . moreover our saviour himselfe saith joh. . . that his kingdome is not of this world , and consequently his magistrates derive not from him any authority of punishing men in this world . and therefore also math . . after s. peter had drawn his sword in his defence , our saviour saith , put up thy sword into his place . for all that take the sword , shall perish by the sword . and vers. . how then shal the scriptures be fullfilled , which say , that it must be so ? shewing out of the scriptures , that the kingdome of christ was not to be defended by the sword . . but concerning the authority of the apostles or bishops over those who were all-ready converted and within the church , ●here be that think it greater then over them ●ithout . for some have said . though the law of christ deprive no prince of his dominion , and paul did rightly appeal unto cesar , whilst kings were ●nfidells and out of the church , yet when they became christians , and of their own accord under went the lawes of the gospel , presently as sheep to a shepherd , and as members to the head , they became subiect to the prelate of the ecclesiastical hierarchy . bell. lib. de rom. pont. chap. . which whether it be true or not , is to be considered by that light which we have from the holy scripture , concerning the power of our saviour and his apostles ▪ over such as they had converted . but our saviour , as he imitated the common-wealth of the jewes in his magistrates , the twelve and the seventy , so did he also in the censure of the church , which was excommunication ; but amongst the jews , the church did put the excommunicated persons from the congregation , which they might do by their power temporall ; but our saviour and his apostles , who took upon them no such power , could not forbid the excommunicated person to enter into any place and congregation , into which he was permitted to enter , by the prince , or soveraign of the place . for that had been to deprive the soveraign of his authority . and therefore the excommunication of a person subject to an earthly power , was but a declaration of the church , which did excommunicate , that the person so excommunicated was to be reputed still as an infidell , but not to be driven by their authority out of any company , he might otherwise lawfully come into . and this is it our saviour saith , math. . . if he refuse to hear the church , let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican . so that the whol effect of excommunicating a christan prince , is no more then he or they that so excommunicate him depart and banish themselves out of his dominion . nor can they thereupon discharge any of his subjects of their obedience to him ; for that were to deprive him of his dominion ; which they may not do , for being out of the church . it is confessed by them that make this objection , and proved in the former section , that our saviour gave no authority to his apostles to be judges over them . and therefore in no case can the soveraign power of a common-wealth be subject to any authority ecclesiasticall , besides that of christ himselfe . and though he be informed concerning the kingdome of heaven and subiect himselfe thereto , at the perswasions of persons ecclesiasticall , yet is he not thereby subiect to their goverment and rule . for if it were by their authority he took that yoke upon him , and not by their perswasion , then by the same authority he might cast it off . but this is unlawfull . for i● all the churches in the world should renounce the christian faith , yet is not this sufficient authority for any of the members to do the same . it is manifest therefore , that they who have soveraign power , are immediate rulers of the church under christ , and all other but subordinate to them . if that were not , but kings should command one thing upon pain of death , and priests another , upon pain of damnation , it would be impossible that peace and religion should stand together . . and therefore there is no iust cause for any man to withdraw his obedience from the soveraign state , upon pretence , that christ had ordained any state ecclesiasticall above it . and though kings take not upon them the ministeriall priesthood , yet are they not so meerly laick , as not to have sacerdotall jurisdiction . to conclude this chapter ; since god speaketh not in these dayes to any man by his private interpretation of the scriptures , nor by the interpretation of any power above or not depending on the soveraign power of every common wealth , it remaineth , that he speaketh by his vice-gods , or lievtenants here on earth , that is to say , by soveraign kings , or such as have soveraign authority as well as they . chap. viii . the things that dispose to rebellion , discontent , pretence , and hope of successe . . discontent that disposeth to sedition , consisteth partly in fear of want , or punishment . . partly in ambition . . six heads of pretences to rebellion . the first of them , that men ought to do nothing against conscience , confuted . . the second , that soveraigns are subiect to their own lawes , confuted . . the third , that the soveraignty is divisible , confuted . . the fourth , that subiects have a propertye distinct from the dominion of the soveraign confuted . . the fift . that the people is a person distinct from the soveraign , confuted . . the sixt , that tirannicide is lawfull confuted . . foure heads of hope of successe in rebellion . . two things necessary to an author of rebellion , much eloquence , and little wisdome . . that the authors of rebellion necessarily are to be men of little wisdome . . that the same are necessarily eloquent . . in what manner they concur to their common effects . hitherto of the causes why , and the manner how , men have made common wealths . in this chapter i shall shew breifly by what causes , and in what manner they be again destroyed ; not meaning to say any thing concerning the dissolution of a common wealth , from forreign invasions , which is as it were the violent death thereof . i shall speak only of sedition , which is also the death of the common-wealth , but like to that which happeneth to a man from sicknesse and distemper . to dispose men to sedition , three things concur . the first is discontent ; for as long as a man thinketh himself wel , and that the present government standeth not in his way to hinder his proceeding from well to better , it is impossible for him to desire the change thereof . the second is pretence of right ; for though a man be discontent , yet if in his own opinion there be no iust cause of stirring against , or resisting the government established , nor any pretence to justify his resistance , and to procure aid , he will never shew it . the third is hope of success : for it were madness to attempt without hope , when to fail , is to dye the death of a traytor . without these three , discontent , pretence , and hope , there can be no rebellion : and when the same are all together , there wanteth nothing thereto , but a man of credit to set up the standard , and to blow the trumpet . . and as for discontent , it is of two sorts : for it consisteth either in bodily pain present or expected , or else in trouble of the mind ; ( which is the general division of pleasure and pain , part . cha. sect. . ) the presence of bodily pain disposeth not to sedition ; the feare of it doth . as for example ; when a great multitude or heap of people , have concurred to a crime worthy of death , they joyn together , and take armes to defend themselves for feare thereof . so also the feare of want , or in present want , the feare of arrests and imprisonment dispose to sedition . and therefore great exactions , though the right thereof be acknowledged , have caused great seditions . as in the time of hen . the seditions of the cornish men that refused to pay a subsidy , and under the conduct of the lord audley , gave the king battel upon black heath ; and that of the northern people , who in the some kings time , for demanding a subsidy granted in parliament , murthered the ea●l of northumberland in his house . . thirdly , the other sort of discontent , which troubleth the mind of them who otherwise live at ease , without fear of want , or danger of violence , ariseth only from a sense of their want of that power , and that honour and testimony thereof , which they think is due unto them . for all joy and grief of mind consisting ( as hath been said part . chap. . sect. . ) in a contention for precedence to them with whom they compare themselves , such men must needs take it ill , and be greived with the state , as finde themselves postposed to those in honour , whom they think they excell in virtue and ability to govern . and this is it for which they think themselves regarded but as slaves . now seeing freedom cannot stand together with subiection , liberty in a common wealth is nothing but government and rule , which because it cannot be divided , men must expect in common ; and that can be no where but in the popular state or democracy . and aristotle saith well , lib. . c. . of his politicks , the ground or intention of a democracy , is liberty . vvhich he confirmeth in these words ; for men ordinarily say this , that no man can partake of liberty , but only in a popular common wealth : whosoever● therefore in a monarchicall estate ▪ where the soveraign power is absolutely in one man , claimeth liberty , claimeth ( if the hardest construction should be made thereof ) either to have the soveraignty in his turn , or to be collegue with him that hath it ; or to have the monarchy changed into a democracy . but if the same be construed ( with pardon of that unskilful expression ) according to the intention of him that claimeth , then doth he thereby claim no more but this , that the soveraign should take notice of his ability and deserving , and put him into imployment and place of subordinate government , rather then others that deserve lesse . and as one claimeth , so doth another , every man esteeming his own desert greatest . amongst all those that pretend to , or are ambitious of such honour , a few only can be served , unlesse it be in a democracy ; the rest therefore must be discontent . and so much of the first thing that disposeth to rebellion , namely , discontent consisting in fear , and ambition . . the second thing that disposeth to rebellion , is pretence of right . and that is when men have an opinion , or pretend to have an opinion , that in certain cases they may lawfully resist him or them that have the soveraign power , or deprive him or them of the means to execute the same . of which pretences , there be six special cases . one is , when the command is against their conscience , and they believe , it is unlawful for a subiect at the command of the soveraign power , to doe any action , which he thinketh in his own conscience not lawfull for him to do , or to omit any action , which he thinketh not lawful for him to omit . another is , when the command is against the lawes , and they think the soveraign power in such sort obliged to his own lawes , as the subiect is ; and that when he performeth not his duty , they may resist his power . a third is , when they receive commands from some man or men , and a supersedeas to the same from others , and think the authority is equal , as if the soveraign power were divided . a fourth is , when they are commanded to contribute their persons or money to the publick service , and think they have a propriety in the same distinct from the dominion of the soveraign power ; and that therefore they are not bound to contribute their goods and persons , no more then every man shall of himself think fit . a fifth , when the commands seem hurtfull to the people ; and they think every one of them , that the opinion and sense of the people , is the same with the opinion of himselfe , and those that consent with him , calling by the name of people , any multitude of his own faction . the sixth is , when the commands are grievous ; and they account him that commandeth grievous things , a tyrant ; and a tyrannicide , that is the killing of a tyrant , not onely lawful , but also laudable . . all these opinions are maintained in the books of the dogmaticks , and divers of them taught in publick chaires , and neverthelesse are most incompatible with peace and government , and contradictory to the necessary and demonstrable rules of the same . and for the first , namely , that a man may lawfully doe or omit any thing against his conscience , and from whence arise all seditions concerning religion and ecclesiasticall government , it hath been plainly declared in the two last chapters , that such opinion is erroneous . for those two chapters have been wholly spent , to prove , that christian religion not onely forbiddeth not , but also commandeth , that in every common wealth , every subiect should in all things to the uttermost of his power , obey the commands of him or them that is the soveraign thereof , and that a man in so obeying , doth according to his conscience and judgement , as having deposited his judgement in all controversies in the hands of the soveraign power ; and that this errour proceedeth from the ignorance of what and by whom god almighty speaketh . . as for the second opinion , which is this , that the soveraign is in such sort obliged to his own laws , as the subiect is ; the contrary thereof hath been shewed , part . chap. . sect. , , , , , . by which it appeareth , that the soveraign power is not to be resisted ; that it carryeth the sword both of war and justice ; that it hath right of deciding all controversies , both judicial , and deliberative ; that it hath the the making of all the lawes civill , that it appointeth magistrates and publick ministers , and that it implyeth an universall impunity . how can he or they be said to be subiect to the lawes which they may abrogate at their pleasure , or breake without feare of punishment ? and this error seemeth to proceed from this , that men ordinarily understand not aright , what is meant by this word law , confounding law and covenant , as if they signifie the same thing . but law implyeth a command ; covenant is but a promise . and not every command is a law , but only ( part . chap. . sect. . ) when the command is the reason we have of doing the action commanded . and then only is the reason of our actions in the command , when the omitting is therefore hurtful , because the action was commanded , not because it was hurtful of it self ; and doing contrary to a command , were not at all hurtful , if there were not a right in him that commandeth to punish him that so doth . he or they that have all punishments in their own disposing , cannot be so commanded , as to receive hurt for disobeying , and consequently no command can be a law unto them . it is an errour therefore to think , that the power which is virtually the whole power of the common wealth , and which in whomsoever it resideth , is usually called supream , ●r soveraign , can be subiect to any law but that of god almighty . . the third opinion , that the soveraign power may be divided , is no less an errour then the former , as hath been proved , part . chap. . sect. . and if there were a common wealth wherein the rights of soveraignty were divided , we must confess with bod●n , lib. . chap. . de repub. that they are not rightly to be called common wealths but the corruption of common wealths . for if one part should have power to make the laws for all , they would by their laws at their pleasure , forbid others , to make peace or war , to levy taxes , or to yeild fealty and homage without their leave ; and they that had the right to make peace and war , and command the militia , would forbid the making of other lawes , then what themselves liked . and though monarchies stand long , wherein the right of soveraignty hath seemed so divided , because monarchy of it self is a durable kind of government , yet monarchs have been thereby diverse times thrust out of their possession . but the truth is , that the right of soveraignty is such , as he or they that have it , cannot ( though they would ) give away any part thereof , and retaine the rest. as for example ; if we should suppose the people of rome to have had the absolute soveraignty of the romane state , and to have chosen them a councel by the name of the senate , and that to this senate they had given the supream power of making lawes , reserving nevertheless to themselves in direct and express terms , the whole right and title of the soveraignty ; ( which may easily happen amongst them that see not the inseparable connexion between the soveraign power , and the power of making lawes ) i say , this grant of the people to the senate , is of no effect , and the power of making lawes is in the peopl● still . for the senate understanding it to be the will , in intention of the people to r●tain the soveraignty , ought not to take that for granted , which was contradictory thereto , and passed by error . for part . chap. . sect. . in contradictory promises , that which is directly promised , is preferrd before that which is oppositp thereunto by consequence , because the consequence of a thing is not alwaies obscured , as is the thing it self . the error concerning mixt government hath proceeded from want of understanding of what is ment by this word , body politick , and how it signifieth not the concord , but the union of many men . and though in the chapters of subordinate corporations , a corporation being declared to be one person in law , yet the same hath not been taken notice of in the body of a common wealth or city , nor have any of those inumerable writers of politicks , observed and such union . . the fourth opinion , to wit , that subiects have their meum , tuum , & suum , in property , not only by virtue of the soveraign power over them all , distinct from one another , but also against the soveraign himself , by which they would pretend to contribute nothing to the publick , but what they please , hath been already confuted , by proving the absoluteness of the soveraignty and more perticularly , part . chap. . sect. . and ariseth from this , that they understand not ordinarily that before the institution of soveraign power , meum & tuum implyed no propriety , but a community , where every man had right to every thing , and was in state of war with every man . . the fifth opinion , that the people is a distinct body from him or them that have the soveraignty over them , is an error already confuted part . chap. . sect. . where is shewed , that when men say , the people rebelleth , it is to be understood of those particular persons onely and not of the whole nation . and when the people claimeth any thing otherwise then by the voice of the soveraign power , it is not the claim of the people , but only of those particular men , that claim in their own persons . and this error ariseth from the equivocation of the word people . lastly , for the opinion , that tyrannicide is lawfull , meaning by a tyrant , any man in whom resideth the right of soveraignty , is no lesse false and pernicious to humane society , then frequent in the writings of those moral philosophers , seneca and others , so greatly esteemed amongst us . for when a man hath the right of soveraignty , he cannot iustly be punished , as hath been often shewed already , and therefore much lesse deposed , or put to death . and howsoever he might deserve punishment , yet punishment is uniust without judgment preceding , and judgment uniust without power of judicature , which a subiect hath not over a soveraign . but this doctrine proceedeth from the schools of greece , and from those that writ in the romane state , in which not onely the name of a tyrant , but of a king was hatefull . . beside discontent to the disposing of a man to rebellion , and pretence there is required in the third place , hope of successe , which consisteth in foure points : . that the discontented have mutual intelligence . . that they have sufficient number . . that they have armes . . that they agree upon an head . for these four must concur to the making of one body of rebellion , in which intelligence is the life , number the limbs , arms the strength , and an head the unity , by which they are directed to one and the same action . . the authors of rebellion , that is , the men that breed these dispositions to rebel in others , of necessity must have in them these three qual●ties . . to be discontented themselves . . to be men of mean judgment and capacity . and thirdly , to be eloquent men , or good orators . and as for their discontent , from whence it may proceed , hath been already declared and for the second and third , i am to shew now , first , how they may stand together ; for it seemeth a contradiction , to place small judgement , & great eloquence , or ( as they call it ) powerful speaking in the same man . and then in what manner they concur , to dispose other men to sedition . . it was noted by salust , that in catiline ( who was author of the greatest sedition that ever was in rome ) there was eloquentiae satis , sapientiae parum , eloquence sufficient but little wisdome . and perhaps this was said of catiline , as he was catiline . but it was true of him , as an author of sedition . for , the coniunction of these two qualities made him not catiline , but seditious . and that it may be understood , how want of wisdome , and store of eloquence , may stand together , we are to consider , what it is we call wisdome , and what eloquence . and therefore i shall here again remember some things , that have been said already , part . chap. . . it is manifest that wisdome consisteth in knowledge . now of knowledge there are two kinds ; whereof the one is the remembrance of such things , as we have conceived by our sences , and of the order , in which they follow one another . and this knowledge is called experience ; and the wisdom that proceedeth from it , is that ability to coniecture by the present , of what is past , and to come , which men call prudence . this being so , it is manifest presently , that the author of sedition , whosoever he be , must not be prudent . for if he consider and take his experience aright , concerning the success which they have had , who have been the movers and authors of sedition , either in this or any other state , he shall find , that for one man that hath thereby advanced himself to honour , twenty have come to a reproachful end . the other kind of knowledge , is the remembrance of the names or appellations of things , and how every thing is called , which is in matters of common conversation , a remembrance of pacts and covenants of men made amongst themselves , concerning how to be understood of one another . and this kind of knowledge is generally called science , and the conclusions thereof truth . but when men remember not how things are named , by general agreement , but either mistake & mis-name things , or name them aright by chance , they are not said to have science , but opinion , and the conclusions thence proceeding , are uncertain , and for the most part erroneous . now that scie●ce in particular , from which proceed the true and evident conclusions of what is right and wrong , and what is good and hurtful to the beeing , and well-being of mankind , the latines call sapientia , and wee by the generall name of wisdome . for generally , not he that hath skill in geometry , or any other science speculative , but only he that understandeth what conduceth to the good and government of the people , is called a wise man . now that no author of sedition can be wise in this acceptation of the word , is sufficiently proved , in that it hath been already demonstrated , that no pretence of sedition can be right or just . and therefore the authors of sedition must be ignorant of the right of state , that is to say , unwise . it remaineth therefore , that they be such , as name things , not according to their true and generally agreed upon names , but call right and wrong , good and bad , according to their passions , or according to the authorities of such , as they admire , as aristotle , cicero , seneca , and others of like authority , who have given the names of right and wrong , as their passions have dictated ; or have followed the authotity of other men , as we do theirs . it is required therefore in an author of sedition , that he think right , that which is wrong ; and profitable , that which is pernicious ; and consequently that there be in him sapientiae parum , little wisdome . . eloquence is nothing else but the power of winning belief of what we say . and to that end we must have ayd from the passions of the hearer . now to demonstration and teaching of the truth , there are required long deductions , and great attention , which is unpleasant to the hearer . therefore they which seek not truth , but belief , must take another way , and not only derive what they would have to be believed from somewhat believed already , but also by aggravations and extenuations , make good and bad , right & vvrong , appear great or lesse , according as shall serve their turnes . and such is the power of eloquence , as many times a man is made to believe thereby , that hee sensibly feeleth smart and damage , when he feeleth none , and to enter into rage and indignation , without any other cause , then what is in the words and passion of the speaker . this considered , together with the businesse that he hath to do , who is the author of rebellion , namely , to make men believe , that their rebellion is just , their discontents grounded upon great iniuries , and their hopes great ; there needeth no more to prove , there can be no author of rebellion , that is not an eloquent and powerfull speaker , and withall ( as hath been said before ) a man of little wisdome . for the faculty of speaking powerfully , consisteth in an habit gotten of putting together passionate words , and applying them to the present passions of the hearer . . seeing then eloquence and want of discretion concur to the stirring of rebellion , it may be demanded , what part each of these acteth therein . the daughters of pelias king of thessaly , desiring to restore their old decrepit father to the vigour of his youth , by the counsell of medea , chopped him in pieces , and set him a boyling with i know not what herbs in a cauldron , but could not revive him again . so when eloquence and want of judgement go together , ●ant of judgment like the daughters of pelias consenteth through eloquence , which is as the witchcraft of medea , to cut the common wealth in peices , upon pretence , or hope of reformation , which when things are in combustion , they are not able to effect . chap. ix . . the law over soveraigns , salus populi . . that soveraigns ought to establish the religion they hold , for best . . that to forbid unnatural copulation , promiscuous use of women &c. is the law of nature . . that to leave man as much liberty as may be , &c is the duty of a soveraign by the law of nature . . meum & tuum to be set out to the subjects distinct from one another , &c. a duty of soveraigns by the law of nature . . an extraordinary power for judging the abuses of magistrates necessary , &c. . the suppressing of popularity , &c. necessary , &c. . the institution of youth , &c. necessary , &c. . avoiding of unnecessary war , a necessary duty of the soveraign , ctc. having hitherto set forth how a body politick is made , and how it may be destroyed , this place requireth to say something concerning the preservation of the same , not purposing to enter into the particulars of the art of government , but to sum up the general heads , wherein such art is to be imployed , and in which consisteth the duty of him or them that have the soveraign power . for the duty of a soveraign consisteth in the good government of the people . and although the acts of soveraign power be no injuries to the subiects who have consented to the same by their implicite wills , yet when they tend to the hurt of the people in general , they be breaches of the law of nature , and of the divine law ; and consequently the contrary acts are the duties of soveraigns , and required at their hands to the utmost of their endeavour by god almighty , under the pain of eternall death . and as the art and duty of soveraigns consist in the same acts , so also doth their profit . for the end of art is profit , and governing to the profit of the subiects , is governing to the profit of the soveraign , as hath been shewed part . chap. . sect. . and these three : . the law over them that have soveraign power . their duty ; . their profit , are one and the same thing contained in this sentence , salus populi suprema lex . by which must be understood , not the meer preservation of their lives , but generally their benifit and good . so that this is the generall law for soveraigns , that they procure to the uttermost of their endeavour , the good of the people . . and for as much as eternal , is better ●●en temporal good , it is evident , that they ●ho are in soveraign authority , are by the ●aw of nature obliged to further the esta●lishing of al such doctrines and rules , and the commanding of all such actions , as in ●heir conscience they beleive to be the true ●ay thereunto . for unless they do so , it ●annot be said truly , that they have done the ●ttermost of their endeavour . . for the tempo●al good of the people , ●●consisteth in four points : . multitude 〈◊〉 commodity of living . . peace amongst themselves . . defence against forraign ●ower . concerning multitude . it is the ●uty of them that are in soveraign autho●●ty , to increase the people ; in as much as ●●ey are governours of mankind under god ●lmighty , who having created but one ●an , and one woman , declared , that it ●as his will they should be multiplyed and ●ncreased afterwards . and seeing this is to ●e done by ordinances concerning copu●ation , they are by the law of nature bound ●o make such ordinances concerning the ●ame , as may tend to the increase of man●ind . and hence it cometh , that in them ●ho have soveraign authority , not to for●id such copulations as are against the use 〈◊〉 nature ; not to forbid the promiscuous use ●f vvomen , not to forbid one vvomen to ●ave many husbands , not to forbid marriages within certain degrees of kindred and affinity , are against the law of nature . for though it be not evident , that a private man living under the law of natural reason only , doth break the same , by doing any of the things aforesaid , yet it is manifestly apparent , that being so prejudicial as they are to the improvement of mankind , that not to forbid the same , is against the law of natural reason , in him that hath taken into his hands any portion of mankind to improve . . the comodity of living consisteth in liberty and vvealth . by liberty i mean , that there be no prohibition without necessity of any thing to any man , which was lawful to him in the law of nature , that is to say , that there be no restraint of naturall liberty , but what is necessary for the good of the common vvealth , and that well-meaning men may not fall into the danger of lawes , as into snares , before they be aware . it appertaineth also to this liberty , that a man may have commodious passage from place to place , and not be imprisoned or confined with the difficulty of wayes , and want of means for transportation of things necessary . and for the wealth of people it consisteth in three things , the well ordering of trade , procuring of labour , and forbiding the superfluous consuming of food and apparel . all those therefore that are in soveraign authority , and have taken upon them the government of people , are bound by the law of nature to make ordinances consisting in the points afore named , as being contrary to the law of nature , unnecessarily either for ones own fancy , to inthrall , or ty men so , as they cannot move without danger , or to suffer them whose maintenance is our benefit , to want any thing necessary for them , by our negligence . . for maintaiinng of peace at home , there be so many things necessary to be considered , and taken order in , as there be several causes concurring to sedition . and first , it is necessary to set out to every subiect , his propriety and distinct lands and goods , upon which he may exercise , and have the benefit of his own industry , and without which , men would fall out amongst themselves , as did the heardsmen of abraham and lot , every man enchroaching and usurping as much of the common benefit as he can , which tendeth to quarel and sedition . secondly , to divide the burthens and charges of the common wealth proportionably . now there is a proportionably to every mans abilily , and there is a proportionably to his benefit by common weath . and this latter is it , which is according to the law of nature . for the burdens of the common wealth being the price that we pay for the benefit thereof , they ought to be measured thereby . and there is no reason , when two men equally enioying by the benefit of the common wealth , their peace and liberty , to use their industry to get their livings , where of one spareth , and laieth up somewhat , the other spendeth all he gets , why they should not equally contribute to the common charge . that seemeth therefore to be the most equall way of dividing the burden of publick charge , when every man shall contribute according to what he spendeth , and not according to what he gets . and this is then done , when men pay the common wealths part in the payments they make for their own provision . and this seemeth not only most equal , but also least sensible , and least to trouble the mind of them that pay it . for there is nothing so aggravateth the grief of parting with money to the publick , as to think they are over-rated , and that their neighbours whom they envy , do thereupon insult over them , and this disposeth them to resistance , and ( after that such resistance hath produced a mischief ) to rebellion . . an other thing necessary for the maintaining of peace , is the due execution of iustice ▪ which consisteth principally in the right performance of their duties , which are the magistrates , ordained for the same by and under the authority of the soveraign power , which being private men in respect of the soveraign , and consequently such as may have private ends , whereby they may be corrupted with gifts , or intercession of friends , ought to be kept in awe by an higher power , lest people ( greived by their injustice ) should take upon them to make their own revenges , to the disturbance of the common peace ; which can by no way be avoided in the prineipal and immediate magistrates , without the judicature of the soveraign himself , or some extraordinary power delegated by him . it is therefore necessary , that there be a power extraordinary , as there shall be occasion from time to time , for the syndication of judges and other magistates , that shall abuse their authority , to the wrong and discontent of the people , and a free and open way for the presenting of grievances to him or them that have the soueraign authority . . besides these considerations , by which are prevented the discontents that arise from oppression , there ought to be some meanes for the keeping under of those , that are disposed to rebellion by ambition ; which consist principally in the constancy of him that hath the soveraign power , who ought therefore constantly to grace and encourage such , as being able to serve the common wealth , do nevertheless contain themselves within the bounds of modesty , without repining at the authority of such as are imployed , and without aggravating the errours which ( as men ) they may commit , especially when they suffer not in their own particular ; and constantly to shew displeasure , & dislike of the contrary . and not only so , but also to ordain severe punishments for such , as shall by reprehension of publick actions , affect popularity and applause amongst the multitude , by which they may be enabled to have a faction in the common wealth at their devotion . . another thing necessary , is the rooting out of the consciences of men all those opinions which seem to iustifie and give pretence of right to rebellious actions ; such as are the opinions , that a man can do nothing lawfully against his private conscience ; that they who have the soveraignty , are subiect to the civil laws : that there is an authority of subiects , whose negative may hinder the affirmative of the soveraign power ; that any subiect hath a propriety distinct from the dominion of the common wealth ; that there is a body of the people without him or them that have the soveraign power ; & that any lawful soveraign may be resisted under the name of a tyrant ; which opinions are they , which part . chap. . sect. . , , , , . have been declared , to dispose men to rebellion and because opinions which are gotten by education , and in length of time , are made habitual , cannot be taken away by force , and ●pon the sudden ; they must therefore be ●aken away also by time and education . and ●eeing the said opinions have proceeded ●rom private and publick teaching , and ●hose teachers have received them from grounds and principalls , which they have ●earned in the universities , from the doctrine of aristotle , and others , who have dilivered nothing concerning morality and policy demonstratively , but being passionately addicted to popular government , have insinuated their opinions by eloquent sophistry . there is no doubt , if the true doctrine concerning the law of nature , and the properties of a body politick , and the nature of law in general , were prespicuously set down and taught in the universities , but that young men , who come thither void of preiudice and whose minds are as white paper , capable of any instruction , would more easily receive the same , and afterwards teach it to the people , both in books and otherwise , then now they do the contrary . . the last thing contained in that supream law , salus populi , is their defence , and consisteth partly in the obedience and unity of the subiects , of which hath been already spoken , and in which consisteth the means of levying souldiers , and of having money , arms , ships , and fortified places in readiness for defence ; and partly , in the avoiding of unnecessary wars . for such common wealths , or such monarchs , as affect war for it self , that is to say , out of ambition , or of vain glory , or that make account to revenge every little iniury , or disgrace done by their neighbours , if they ruine not themselves , their fortune must be better then they have reason to expect . chap. x. . all expressions , &c. concerning future actions , are either covenant , councel or command . . the difference between a law and a covenant , . the command of him whose command is law in one thing , is law in every thing . . the difference between law and counsell . . the difference between jus and lex . . the division of laws , ctc. . that the divine morall law , and the law of nature , is the same . . that the civil lawes are the common measure of right and wrong , &c. . martiall law is civil law . . written laws , &c. unwritten , &c. customes and opinions , &c. thus far concerning the nature of man , and the constitution and properties of a body politick . there remaineth only for the last chapter , to speak of the nature and sorts of law . and first , it is manifest , that all laws are declarations of the mind , con●erning some action future to be done , or omitted . and all declarations and expres●ions of the mind concerning future actions and omissions , are either promissive , as i will do , or not do , or provisive . as for example , if this be done or not done , this will follow ; or imperative , as do this , or do it not . in the first sort of these expressions , consisteth the nature of a covenant , in the second , consisteth counsel , in the third , command . it is evident when a man doth , or forbeareth to do any action , if he be moved thereto by this only consideration , that the same is good or evil in it self ; and that there be no reason why the will or pleasure of another , should be of any weight in his deliberation , that then neither to do nor omit the action deliberated is any breach of law-and consequently , whatsoever is a law to a man , respecteth the will of another , and the declaration thereof . but a covenant is a declaration of a mans own will . and therefore a law and a covenant differ : and though they be both obligatory , and a law obligeth no otherwise then by vertue of some covenant made by him who is subiect thereunto , yet they oblige by severall sorts of promises . for a covenant obligeth by promise of an action , or omission especially named and limited ; but a law bindeth by a promise of obedience in general , whereby the action to be done , or left undone , is referred to the determination of him , to whom the covenant is made . so that the difference between a covenant and a law , standeth thus : in simple covenant , the action to be done , or not done , is first limited and made known , and then followeth the promise to do or not to do ; but in a law , the obligation to do or not to do , precedeth , and the declaration what is to be done , or not done , followeth after . . and from this may be deduced , that which to some may seem a paradox , that the command of him , whose command is a law in one thing , is a law in every thing . for seeing a man is obliged to obedience before what he is to do be known , he is obliged to obey in general , that is to say , in every thing . . that the counsel of a man is no law to him that is counselled , and that he who alloweth another to give him counsell , doth not thereby oblige himself to follow the same , is manifest enough . and yet men usually call counselling , by the name of governing , not that they are not able to distinguish between them , but because they envy many times those men that are called to counsel , & are therefore angry with them that they are counselled ▪ but if to counsellours there should be given a right to have their counsell followed , then are they no more counsellours , but masters of them whom they counsel ; and their counsels no more counsels , but lawes . for the difference between a law and a counsel being no mor but this , that in counsel the expression is do , because it is best ; in a law do , because i have a right to compel you ; or do , because i say do ; when counsel should give the reason of the action it adviseth to , because the reason thereof it self is no more counsel , but a law . . the names lex & jus , that is to say , law and right , are often confounded , and yet scarce are there any two words of more contrary signification . for right is that liberty which law leaveth us , and laws those restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge on anothers liberty . law and right therefore are no less different then restraint and liberty , which are contrary , and whatsoever a man doth , that liveth in a common wealth jure , he doth it jure civili , jure naturae , and jure divino . for whatsoever is against any of these laws , cannot be said to be jure . for the civill law cannot make that to be done jure , which is against the law divine , or of nature . and therefore whatsoever any subiect doth , if it be not conrary to the civil law , and whatsoever a soveraign doth , if it be not against the law of nature , he doth it jure divino , by divin right . but to say lege divina , by divine law , is another thing . for the laws of god and nature allowing greater liberty then is allowed by the law civil ; ( for subordinate laws do still bind mo●e then superior laws , the essence of law being not to loose , but to bind ) a man may be commanded that by a law civil , which is not commanded by the law of nature , nor by the law divine . so that of things done leg● , that is to say , by command of the law , there is some place for a distinction between lege divina & lege civili . as when a man giveth an alms , or helpeth him that is in need , he doth it not lege civili but lege divina , by the divine law , the precept whereof is charity . but for things that are done jure , nothing can be said done jure divino , that is not also jure civili , unless it be done by them that having soveraign power , are not subiect to the civil law . . the differences of law , are according to the differences either of the authors and lawmakers , or of the promulgation , or of those that are subiect to them . from the difference of the authors , or law makers , cometh the division of law into divine , natural , and civil . from the difference of promulgation , proceedeth the division of laws , into written and unwritten . and from the difference of the persons to whom the law appertaineth , it proceedeth , that some laws are called simply laws , and some penal . as for example , thou shall not steal is simply a law ; but this , he that stealeth an ox , shall restore four-fold , is a penal or as other ●all it a judicial law . now in those laws which are simply laws , the commandement is addressed to every man ; but in penal laws the commandement is addressed to the magistrate , who is only guilty of the breach of it when the penalties ordained , are not i●flicted : to the rest appertaineth nothing but to take notice of their danger . . as for the first division of law into divine , natural , and civil , the first two brea●hes are one and the same law . for the law of nature , which is also the moral law , is the law of the author of nature , god almighty ; and the law of god taught by our saviour christ , is the morall law . for the sum of gods law is ; thou shalt love god above all and thy neighbour as thy self ; and the same is the sum of the law of nature , as hath b●en shewed , part . chap. . and although the doctrin of our saviour be of three parts , moral , theological and ecclesiasticall , the former part only , which is the moral , is of the nature of a law universal ; the latter part is a branch of the law civil ; and the theological which containeth those articles concerning the divinity and kingdome of our saviour , without which there is no salvation , is not dilivered in the nature of laws , but of counsel and direction , how to avoid the punishment , which by the violation of the moral law , men are subiect to . for it is not infidelity that condemneth , ( though it be faith that saveth ) but the breach of the law and commandements of god , written fi●st in mans heart , and afterwards in tables , and delivered to the jews by the hands of moses . . in the state of nature where every man is his own judge , and differeth from other concerning the names and appellations of things , and from those differences arise quarels and breach of peace , it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things , that might fall in controversie . as for example ; of what is to be called right , what good , what virtue , what much , what little , what meum & tuum , what a pound , what a quarter , &c. for in these things private judgements may differ , and beget controversie . this common measure , some say is right reason , with whom i should consent , if there were any such thing to be found or known in rerum natura . but commonly they that call for right reason to decide any controversy , do mean , their own . but this is certain , seeing right reason is not existent , the reason of some man or men must supply the place thereof , and that man or men is he or they , that have the soveraign power , as hath been already proved ; and consequently the civil laws are to all subiects the measures of their actions whereby to determine whether they have right or wrong , profitable , or unprofitable , virtuous or vitious , and by them the use and definition of all names not agreed upon , and tending to controversie , shall be established . as for example , when upon the occasions of some strang and deformed birth it shall not be decided by aristotle , or the philosophers , whether the same be a man , or no , but by the laws , the civil law containing in it the ecclesiastical , as a part thereof , proceeding from the power of ecclesiastical government , given by our saviour to all christian soveraigns , as his immediate vicars , as hath been said part . chap. . sect. . . but seeing it hath been said , that all laws are either natural , or civil , it may be demanded , to which of these shall be referred that law , which is called martial law , and by the romans , disciplina militaris ? and it may seem to be the same with the law of nature ; because the laws by which a multitude of souldiers are governed in an army are not constant , but continually changing with the occasion ; and that is still a law , which is reason for the present , and reason is the law of nature . it is nevertheless true , that martial law is civil law , because an army is a body politick , the whole power whereof is in the general , and the laws thereof made by him ; and though they still follow and change as reason requireth , yet it is not as the reason of every private man but as the reason of the general requireth . . when he or they in whom is the soveraign power of a common wealth , are to ordain law for the government and good order of the people , it is not possible they should comprehend all cases of controversie that may fall out , or perhaps any considerable diversitie of them ; but as time shall instruct them by the rising of new ocasions , so are also laws from time to time to be ordained : and in such cases where no special law is made , the law of nature keepeth its place , and the magistrates ought to give sentence according thereunto , that is to say , according to natural reason . the constitutions therefore of the soveraign power , by which the liberty of nature is abridged , are written , because there is no other way to take notice of them , whereas the laws of nature are supposed to be written in mens hearts , written laws therefore are the constitutions of a common wealth expressed ; and unwritten , are the laws of natural reason . custome of it self maketh no laws . nevertheless when a sentence hath been once given by them that judge by their natural reason , whether the same be right or wrong , it may attain to the vigour of a law ; not because the like sentence hath of custome been given in the like case , but because the soveraign power is supposed tacitely to have approved such sentence for right , and thereby it commeth to be a law , and numbred amongst the written laws of the common wealth . for if custom were sufficient to introduce a law , then it would be in the power of every one that is deputed to hear a cause , to make his erours laws . in the like manner , those that goe under the title of respons a prudentum , that is to say , the opinions of lawyers , are not therefore laws , because responsa prudentum , but because they are admitted by the soveraign ; and from this may be collected , that when there is a case of private contract between the soveraign and the subiect , a president against reason shall not preiudice the cause of the soveraign ; no president being made a law , but upon supposition that the same was reasonable from the beginning . and thus much concerning the elements and general grounds of laws natural and politick . as for the law of nations , it is the same with the law of nature . for that which is the law of nature between man and man , before the constitution of common wealth , is the law of nations between soveraign and soveraign after . finis . divers historicall discourses of the late popular insurrections in great britain and ireland tending all, to the asserting of the truth, in vindication of their majesties / by james howell ... ; som[e] of which discourses were strangled in the presse by the power which then swayed, but now are newly retreev'd, collected, and publish'd by richard royston. howell, james, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing h estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : or : ) divers historicall discourses of the late popular insurrections in great britain and ireland tending all, to the asserting of the truth, in vindication of their majesties / by james howell ... ; som[e] of which discourses were strangled in the presse by the power which then swayed, but now are newly retreev'd, collected, and publish'd by richard royston. howell, james, ?- . [ ], p., [ ] leaf of plates : ill. printed by j. grismond, london : . "the first tome" engraved illustrated t.p.: the people is a beast which heads hath many, england of late shew'd this more then any. "no more published"--nuc pre- imprints. each essay has separate t.p. imperfect: bodleian library copy ( : ) lacks t.p. and frontispiece. reproduction of originals in the bodleian library and the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng divine right of kings. political science. great britain -- history -- civil war, - . ireland -- history -- rebellion of . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - rina kor sampled and proofread - rina kor text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion divers historicall discourses of the late popular insurrections in great britain , and ireland , tending all , to the asserting of truth , in vindication of their majesties ; by iames howell esquire ; som of which discourses were strangled in the presse by the power which then swayed , but now are newly retreev'd , collected , and publish'd by richard royston . the first tome . london , printed by i. grismond . . belua multorum capit●…m plebs vana vocatur , plus satis hoc angli ●…uper docuere popelli . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ i : h : the people is a beast which heads hath many , england of late hath shew'd this more then any . to his majesty sir , these historical discourses ( set forth in such variety of dresses ) having given so much satisfaction to the world for the asserting of truth , in vindication of your royal father of ever blessed memory , and som of them relating also to your majesty , i humbly conceiv'd might be proper for your majesties perusal & patronage . concerning the author therof his name needed not to have bin prefix'd , he being so universally well known and distinguishd from other writers both at home and abroad by his stile , which made one of the highest wits of these times say of him , author hic ex genio notus , ut ungue leo. god almighty blesse your majesty with a continuance of happiness , and daily encrease of glory , so prayeth your majesties most loyal , and humble subject , royston . a catalog of the severall peeces that are here contain'd . i. a dialog twixt patricius and peregrin presently after kintonfield battaile , which was the first book that came forth for vindication of his majesty . ii. the second part of that discours . iii. a seasonable advice sent to philip late earl of pembrock , to mind him of the severall solemn oaths wherby he was bound to adhere to the king. iv. a manifesto sent in his majesties name to the reformed churches , and princes beyond the seas touching his religion . v. apologs , and emblemes , in whose moralls the times are represented . vi. of the land of ire , or a discours of that horrid insurrection in ireland , discovering the tru causes therof . vii . the sway of the sword , or a disurs of the common militia or soldiery of the land , proving , that the command therof in chief , belongs to the ruling prince . viii . an italian prospective , through which england may discern the desperat condition she stands in . ix . a nocturnall progresse , or perambulation of most countries in christendom . x. a vindication of his majesty touching a letter he writ to rome from madrid , in answer to a letter which pope gregory the th . had sent him upon passing the dispensation for concluding the match . xi . of the trety of the i le of wight , and the death of his majesty . xii . advise from the prime statesmen of florence , how england shold come to her self again , which can be by no other means under heaven , but by calling in the king , and that , in a free confident way without articles , but what he shall be pleas'd to offer himself . the tru informer , who discovers to the world the first grounds of this ugly rebellion and popular tumults in england , scotland , and ireland . deducing the causes therof in an historicall discours from their originall . — neutrum modò , mas modò vulgus . written in the prison of the fleet anno . casuall discourses , and interlocutions betwixt patricius and peregrin , touching the distractions of the times , vvith the causes of them . patricius . surely i shold know full well that face and phisnomy : o heavens ! 't is peregrin . gentle sir , you are well met , and welcom to england , i am heartily glad of your safe arrivall , hoping now to apprehend some happie opportunity whereby i may requite part of those worthy favours i received from you in divers places t'other side side of the sea. peregrin . sir , i am as joyfull to see you , as any friend i have upon earth ; but touching favours , they deserve not such an acknowledgment , i must confesse my self to be farr in the arrear , therfore you teach me what i shold speak to you in that point : but amongst other offices of friendship you have bin pleased to do me from time to time , i give you many thanks for the faithfull correspondence you have held withme , since the time of our separation , by intercours of letters , the best sort of fuell to warm affection , and to keep life in that noble vertue friendship , which they say abroad , is in danger to perish under this cold insulary clime for want of practise . patricius . truely , sir , you shold have had an account of matters hence more amply and frequently , but that of late it hath bin usuall , and allowed by authority , to intercept and break open any letters ; but private men need not complain so much , since the dispatches of ambassadors , whose p●…ckets shold be held as sacred as their persons , h●…ve bin commonly open'd , besides some outrages offered their houses and servants ; nay , since their maj●…sties letters under the cabinet signet have bin broke up , and other counterfeit ones printed and published in their names . peregrin . indeed i must confesse the report hereof hath kept a great noise abroad , and england hath suffered much in point of national repute in this particular ; for even among barbarians , it is held a kind of sacriledge to open letters ; nay , it is held a baser kind of burglary , then to break into a house , chamber , or closet : for that is a plundering of outward things onely , but he who breaks open ones letters which are the idea's of the mind , may be said to rip up his brest , to plunder and rifle his very brain , and rob him of his most pretious and secretest thoughts . patricius . well , let us leave this distastfull subject , when these fatall commotions cease , this custom , i hope , will be abhorred in england : but now , that you are newly arrived , and so happily met , i pray be pleased t●… make me partaker of some forraign news , and how the squares go betwixt france and spain , those two great wheels , that draw after their motion ( some more , some lesse ) all the rest of the western world : and when you have done , i will give you account of the state of things in england . peregrin . i thought you had so abounded with domestick news , that you had had no list or leisure to hear any forrain ; but to obey your commands , you know that i have been any time these six years a land-loper up and down the world , and truly i could not set foot on any chr●…stian shore that was in a perfect condition of peace , but it was engag●…d either in a direct , 〈◊〉 or collaterall war , or standing upon it's guard in continuall apprensions and alarmes of fear : for , since that last flaming usher of gods vengeance , that direful comet of the yeer . appear'd in the heavens , some malevolent and ang●…y ill-aspected star hath had the predominance ever since , and by it's maligne influxes , made strange unusuall impressions upon the humors of subjects , by inci●…ing them to such insurrections , revolts , and tumults ; which caused a jewish rabbi to say lately , that it seems the grand turk thrives extraordinarily in his devotions , it being one of his prime prayers to mahomet , that he shold prevaile with god almighty to continue disentions still among christian princes . and truly , as the case stands , one may say , that the europaean world is all in pieces ; you know well with what fearfull fits of a high burning fever poor germany hath been long shaken , which hath wrought a lethargie in some of her members , by wasting of the vital spirits which shold diffuse themselves equally through that great body ; and how she st●…ll ●…ostereth a cold northern guest ( the swed ) within her bosom , and is in 〈◊〉 fear of a worse from the levant : in the netherlands one shall hear the half-starv'd souldier murmur in every corner , and railing against his king , and ready to mutiny for want of pay . in france you shall see the poor asinin peasan half weary of his life , his face being so 〈◊〉 grownd , ever and anon with new tallies . you know ther are som soverain princes , who have a long time wandred up and down in exile , being outed of their own anti●…nt patrimoniall territories , and little hopes yet , god wot , of restoring them . the world knows how savoy is become of late a kind of province to france ; nay , spain , who hath been so dexterous to put her neighbours ogether by the eares , and to foment war a far off , to keep her own home secure , is now her self in the midst of two fearfull fires , kindled on both sides of her by quite-revolted subjects , viz. the portugues and cat alan , which so puzzles her , that shee cannot tell what saint to pray unto . the venetian also , with the pope , and all the princes of italy , are arming apace ; the hollander onely , salamander like , thrives in these flames : and as i have heard of some that by a long habitu●…l custom could feed on poyson , and turn it to nourishment , so hans alone can turn war to a trade and grow fat by it . now , sir , being weary of eating my bread in such a distracted world abroad , and hoping to take some sweet repose in england , i find that shee is in as bad a case , if not worse , then any other . so much news i give you in a lump , i will be more particular with you som other time , if you please to spare me now . patricius . i hear , not without much resentment , these pithy expressions you have been pleased to make of the torn estate of europe abroad ; and since you mention that blazing star , i remember what a noble knight told me some yeers ago , that the astronomers , who lay sentinel to watch the motion and aspect of that comet , observ'd that the tail of it having pointed at divers climats , at last it seem'd to look directly on these north-west i lands , in which posture it spent it selfe , and so extinguish'd ; as if thereby it meant to tell the world , that these islands should be the stage whereupon the last act of the tragedie should be play'd . and how many scenes have passed already , both here and in ireland , we know , god wot , by too too wofull and fresh experience . peregrin . there is a saying when your neighbours house is on fire , by it's light you may see in what danger your own stands : and was england so blind and blockish , as not to take warning by so many fearfull combustions abroad ? when i took my leave last of her , i left her in such a compleat condition of happines , both in court , country , city and sea , that shee was the envie of all europ , in so much , that that golden verse might be fi●…ly applied to her then golden times , mollia securae perage●…ant otia gentes . the court was never so glorious , being hanselld every yeer almost with a new roya●… off-spring ; the gentry no where more gallan●… and sportfull ; the citizen never more gorgeous and rich , and so abounding with treasure , bullion and buildings , that no age can parallel ; commerce , inward and outward was never at that height ; the customes increasing every yeer to admiration ; the narrow seas were never guarded with braver ships , nor the navie royall for number of vessels and magazines of all sorts of materials was ever so well replenished ; the universities had never such springing dayes : and lastly , the church did so flourish , that amongst the rest of the reformed churches of christendome , i have heard her call'd the church triumphant . besides , ireland was arriv'd almost to the same degree of prosperity , for all the arrerages of the crowne were paid , and not a peny sent hence for many yeeres to maintain the standing army there , or for any other publick charge , as formerly ; trafique came to that mighty height of encrease , that in few years the crown customes and imposts came to be five times higher . in fine , ireland was brought not only to subsist of her selfe , but inabled to contribut towards the filling of the english exchequer , and to make some retribution of those vast expences the crown of england hath been at any time these yeeres to reduce her to civility ; her boggs were almost all dry'd up , and made good land ▪ her mudde-walls turn'd apace to brick in divers places , so that in one sommer that i fortun'd to be there , above . new brick-houses were built in one towne . but it hath been the fate of that island , to be 〈◊〉 neer a condition of a setled , happiness , and yet to have some odd accident still intervene to crosse it . in conclusion , there wanted nothing to make england and her united crowns so exactly blessed , that she might have assumed the title of one of the fortunat islands . good lord , how comes it to passe , that she is now fallen into such horrid distempers , and like a distracted body , laying han●…s upon her self , would thrust the sword of civil war into her own bowels ? i beseech you , sir , impart unto me the true cause of this change ; for i know none so capable to do it as your self . patriciu●… . infandum , peregrine , jubes renovare dolorem : first , sir , in the generall you know , that it is with the regions upon earth , as it is with those of the ayre , sometimes we have a clear azur'd skie with soft gentle ventilations , and a sweet serenitie the whole hemesphere over ; at other times we know the face of the heavens is over-cast with frowns , with frog vapors , and thick clouds of various shapes , which look like monsters , hovering up and down , break at last into thunder and fulgurations , and so disquiet and raise a kind of war in the aereall common-wealth . just so in the regions that are dispers'd up and down this earthly glo●…e , peepled with men ( which are but a composition of the elements ) you have sometimes a gentle calm of peace and quietude , with a general tranquillitie all the countrey over ; at other times you have ugly mishapen clouds of jealousies , fears , and discontentments rise up , which break out at last into acts of disobedience , rebellion , and fury . and as those aereall meteors and monsters above , are ingendered of those watery fogs and mists which are drawn up out of fennie and rotten low grounds here upon earth ; so in the region of the mind , the ill vapors which ascend to the brain from rotten and impostumated hearts , from desperate and mal●…-contented humorists are the causes of all civil commotions and distempers in state. but they have much to answer for in the world to come ( though they escape it in this ) who for any private interest or respect whatsoever , either of promotion , vain-glory , revenge , malice , or envie , will embroyl and plunge their own native country in any publick ingagement or civil war , by putting a partition-wall betwixt their soverain prince and their fellow-subjects . truely , in my opinion , these may be called the worst kind of betrayers of their countreys . but i am too far transported from satisfying your request in relating the true causes of these calamities , i will now fall to work , and bring you to the very source of them . ther is a pack of perverse people ( composed for the most part of the scummie and basest sort ) multiplied in england , who by a kind of natural inclination , are opposit so point blank to monarchy in state , and hierarchy in church , that i doubt if they were in heven ( whither 't is to be fear'd they run a great hazard ever to enter , it being a rule , that he who is rotten-hearted to his king , can never be right-hearted to his crea●…or ) i say if these men were in heven , they w●…uld go near to repine at the monarchical power of god almighty himself , as also at the degrees of angels , and the postures of holiness in the church triumphant . they call every crotchet of the brain , tenderness of conscience forsooth : which being well examined , is nothing else but a meer spirit of contradiction , of malice and disobedience to all higher powers which possesseth them . ther are no constitutions either ecclesiastical or civil can please them , but they wold cast both into such and such a mould , which their crack'd brains wold fain devise , yet are never able to bring to any perfection ; they are ever labouring to bring religion to the dock , and to be new trimm'd , but they wold take down her fore-castle , and scarce allow her the kings armes to adorn her : they are great listners after any court-news , and prick up their ears when any thing is spoken of king , queen , or privie councellour , and are always ready , though upon loose trust , to take up any report whereby they may whisper in conventicles and corners , and so traduce the government . these great z●…lots use to look upon themselves most commonly through multiplying glasses , which make them appear to be such huge santons , that it renders them not onely uncharitable in their opinions of others , but luciferian-like proud in their own conceit , insomuch that they seem to scorn all the world besides , beleeving that they are ●…he only elect whose souls work according ●…o the motion of the spirit : that they are ●…he true children of promise , whose faces alone look towards heven ; they are more pleased with some new reach or fancy , ( that may puzzle the pericranium ) than a frenchman is in some new faction in cloathing : they are nearest to the nature of the jew of any people upon earth , and will converse with him sooner than with some sort of christians ; and as in their pharisaicall dispositions they symbolize with the iew , so in some of their positions they jump pat with the iesuit : for though they are both in the extremes , and as contrary one to the other , as the points of a diameter , yet their opinions and practises are concentrique , viz. to depresse regall power ; both of them wold bind their kings in chaines , and the nobles in links of iron ; they both deny all passive obedience , and as the one wold have the morter of the temple tempred with blood , so the other wold beat religion into the brain with the poleaxe . their greatest master-piece of policy is to forge counter●…eit news , and to divulge and disperse it as far as they can to amuse the world , for the advancement of their designs , and strengthing their party : but the iesuit doth it more cunningly and modestly , for he fetcheth his news from far , so that before the falshood of it can be contrould , his work is commonly done , and the news forgotten ; but these later polititians use to raise lies hard by home , so that the grosseness and palpablenesse of them is presently discovered . besides , to avoid the extremes of the other , these later seem to fall into flat prophanness , for they may be called a kind of enemies to the very name , crosse , and church of christ. touching the first , they repine at any reverence to be done unto the name of jesus , though spontaneous , not coercive . for the second , which was held from the beginning to be the badg and banner of a christian , they cry up the crosse to be the mark of the b●…ast ; and for the last , viz. the church , they wold have it to be neither beautifull , holy , nor amiable , which are the three main properties that god requires in his house . to conclude , when any comes to be season'd with this sower leaven , he seems to degenerat presently from the nature and garb of a gentleman , and fals to be of a sordid and low disposition , narrow hearted and close handed ; to be timerous , cunning and jealous , and far from the common freedom , and sweetness of morall society , and from all generous and loyal thoughts towards his king and country . these , these have bin the chiefest machinators , and engeneers englands unhappy divisions , who viper-like have torn the entrailes of their own mother their dear country : but ther were other extern concurrent causes , and to find them out , i must look northward , for there the cloud began to condense first ; you know sir , the scot's nation were ever used to have their king personally resident amongst them , and though king iames by reason of his age , bounty , and long breeding there , with other advantages , drew such extraordinary respect from them , that they continued in good conformity : yet since his death , they have been over-heard to mutter at the remotenesse and absence of their king , and that they shold become now a kind of province by reason of such a distance : some of their nobles and gentry found not at the english court , nor at his majesties coronation in edenburgh that countenance , familiarity , benefit and honours which haply they expected , and 't is well known who he was , that having been denied to be lorded ( david lesley ) took a pet , and went discontented to his country , hoping that some title added to the wealth he had got abroad , should have purchased him more respect . these discontented parties tamperd with the mercenary preachers up and down scotland , to obtrude to the p●…ple what doctrines they put into their mouthes , so that the pulpits every where rung of nothing but of invectives against certain obliquities and solaecismes ( and i cannot tell what ) in government , and many glances they had upon the english church : yet all this while there was not matter enough for an insurrection , nor to dispose the peoples hearts to a mutiny ▪ until by the policy ( as some affi●…med ) of the said discontented party the english lyturgie was sent thither : this by the in●…itement of those fiery pulpiteers , was cryed up to be the greatest i doll that possibly could be brought into their kerke , insomuch that when it was first offer'd to be read , the woman and ba●…er sort of mechaniks threw stooles and stones at the bishops heads , and were ready to tear them in peeces ▪ and here began the storm . 〈◊〉 majesty having notice hereof , sent a most gracious proclamation , signifying , that whereas he had recommended that book to be practis'd amongst them , wherein he himself served god almighty twice a day , he did it out of a pious endeavour to breed an uniformity of publick divine service in all his dominions , specially in that his native kingdom . but since it had produced such dangerous effects , he was contented to revoke it absolutely ; for it was never his purpose to press the practise of the said book upon the consciences of any , he did onely commend , not absolutely command , the use of it ; therefore he exhorted and required that every one unto whom it had given any scandal , shold return to his pristine obedience , and serve god as formerly , offering herewith a gracious pardon , and to passe an act of amnestia for an abolition of all faults passed . peregrin . and would not this suffice ? in naturall motions we find that the cause being taken away , the effect ceaseth , and will not this hold in civil actions ? patricius . no , this wold not serve the turn , but 〈◊〉 was a further reach in it , and for an inch to take an ell : you know the scots since 〈◊〉 single lion came to quarter with our three , are much elevated in their spirits , more respected , emploied and trusted abroad , they are heightned in their resolutions and aims , and will questionless be daily more and more . you have heard of a mine that reach'd from our exchequer to edenburgh . and i beleeve you have not forgot boccolinies balance , that was shewed us in italie , wherein lorenzo de medici weighed all the states of christendom , and throwing in england amongst the rest , you know how much he made her to weigh less by this addition . the former proclamation i say , and pardon would not suffice , but they took opportunity to fish in those troubled waters , and vent their spleen further , by an utter extirpation of episcopacy , and by trampling the mitre under their feet , hoping to have som of the birds plumes , being pluck●… , to feather their own nests ; and they brought their work about ; good lord , what a deal of dirt was presently thrown into the bishops faces by every rurall pettie clerk ! what infamous ballads were sung , what a thick clowd of epidemical hatred hung suddenly over them , so far , that a dog with black and white spots was called a bishop amongst them up and down the streets . the chiefest contrivers of this up-roare , ●…inding their design to go on so well , and perceiving the whole country so eagerly bent against bishops , ( and what artifices and suggestions were us'd to render them so odious is incredible ) but finding withall his majestie unwilling to alter the government his father ( of so fresh and famous memory ) had left him , and to which he had bin sworn at his coronation , they put themselves in arms , and rais'd forces to beat down the mitre with the sword , if the scepter would not do it . to the frontiers they came with a great army , ( not half so great as was bruted ) pretending they came as petitioners ( though they brought their petition upon the pikes ▪ point , ) some of the great ones ▪ about the king grew cold in the action : and what a pacification was then shuffled up , and how a parliament was called thereupon in scotland , with other passages , is a fitter subject for a story then a discourse . peregrin . i could have wished two things , that either his majesty had given them battail then , having the flower of his nobility and gentry with him , who i understood came with all cheerfulnesse and pomptitude to attend him , or else that after the said pacification , his majestie had shaken off all jealousies , and with a royall freedom and a commanding confidence gone amongst them to hancell their new parliament house at edenburgh ; for it is probable , it had averted those showers and cataracts of ●…miseries which have fallen ●…pon us since ; but i pray sir , proceed . patricius . as they say , there is no wind but blows some-body good , so it was thought , this northern clowd did england some advantage , for a parliament was summond hereupon : a parliament do i call it ? it was rather an embryo of a parliament , an ephemeran of ▪ days . in this sitting his majesty declared unto both houses the indignities he had received by his scotch subjects , and therefore propos'd a supply to be made of twelve subsidies to suppress that rebellion ; and in lieu thereof he was willing to forbear and utterly to abolish the ship-money , which he had reason to think legall at first , being advised thereunto by noy his attorney generall , who had such a mighty repute in the law ; yet he would not rest ther , but he advised further with his learned councell , who concurred in opinion with noy ; nor wold he rest ther also , but he had the approbation of all the iudges singly , and afterwards of nine of the twelve jointly upon a demur . this was enough to induce his conscience to hold it legall all this while ; it was clearly proved that the moneys levied this way , were employed to no other but the intended service , the garding of the narrow seas ; and not onely for that , but to preserve his right of dominion in them , being the fairest flower of his crown , which was not onely discoursed of abroad , but began to be questioned by the french cardinall : and touching danger , how could england be but in apparant dangers ? consideri●…g how all her next neighbours were in actuall hostility , which made huge fleets of men of war , both french , dunkerkers , hamburgers and hollanders to sail and flaunt ever and anon in her channells , and hard before her royall chambers : nor came ther one penny of that publick contribution to his privat coffers , but he added much of his own demeans for the maintenance of a royal fleet every sommer : yet he was ready to passe any bill for the utter abolishing of the said ship-money , and for redressing of a●…y other grievances , provided they wold enable him to suppress this scots rebellion : some say the house was inclinable to comply with his majesties demands , but ( as the ill spirit wold have it ) that parliament was suddenly brok up , and i wold they who gave that counsel had bin then in arabia , or beyond the line , in their way to madagascar , who neverthelesse have got to be in high request with this present parliament . among others , old sir harry vane was one , who , when the house seem'd willing to give six subsidies , and the king inclinable to take them ; the said vane being the secretary of state stood up , and said , his majesty expected no less then twelve , which words did so incense and discompose the house , that they drew after them that unhappy dissolution . his majesty being reduced to these straits , and resenting still the insolence of the scot , proposed the busines to his privy councell , who suddenly made up a considerable and most noble summe for his present supply , whereunto divers of his domestick servants and officers did contribut . amongst others who were active herein , the earl of strafford bestir'd himself notably , and having got a parliament to be call'd in ireland he went over , and with incredible celeritie raised . men , who procured money of that parliament to maintain them , and got over those angry seas again in the compasse of lesse then six weeks . you may infer hence to what an exact uncontrollable obedience he had reduced that kingdom , as to bring about so great a work with such a suddennes and facilitie . an armie was also raised ▪ here , which marched to the north , and there fed upon the kings pay a whole summer . the scot was not idle all this while ; but having punctuall intelligence of every thing that passed at court , as farre as what was debated in the cabinet councel , and spoken in the bed-chamber , ( and herein amongst many others , the scot had infinite advantage of us ) he armed also , and preferring to make england the stage of the warre , rather then his own countrey , and to invade rather then to be invaded , he got over the tweed , and found the passage open , and as it were made for him all the way till hee came to the tine , and though there was a considerable army of horse and foot at newcastle , yet they never offered so much as to face him all the while , at newburgh indeed there was a small skirmish , but the english foot would not fight , so newcastle gates flew open to the scot without any resistance at all , where it is thought he had more friends then foes , and who were their friends besides for this invasion , i hope time , and the tribunall of justice will one day discover . his majesty being then at york , summoned all his nobles to appear , to advise with them in this exigence : commissioners were appointed on both sides , who met at rippon , and how the hearts and courage of some of the english barons did boil within them , to be brought to so disadvantageous a treatie with the scot , you may well imagin . so the treatie began , which the scot wold not conform himself to do , unless he were first unrebell ▪ d and made rectus in curia , and the proclamation , wherein he was declared traitour , revoked , alledging it wold be dishonorable for his majesty to treat with rebels . this treaty was adjourned to london , where this present parliament was summoned ( which was one of the chiefest errands of the sco●… , as some think . ) and thus far by these sad and short degrees , have i faithfully led you along to know the tru originals of our calamities . peregrin . truly sir , i must tell you , that to my knowledg these unhappy traverses with scotland , have made the english suffer abroad very much in point of national honour ; therefore i wonder much that all this while ther is none set a work to make a solid apologie for england in some communicable language , ( either in french or latin ) to rectifie the world in the truth of the thing , and to vindicat her , how she was bought and sold in this expedition , considering what a party the scot had here , and how his comming in , was rather an invitation , then an invasion , and i beleeve if it had bin in many parts of the world besides , some of the commanders had gone to the pot . patricius . it is the practise of some states i know , to make sacrifice of some eminent minister , for publick mistakes : but to follow the thred of my discourse . the parliament being sate , his majesty told them , that he was resolved to cast himself wholly upon the affection and fidelity of his people , whereof they were the representative body : therfore he wished them to go roundly on to close up the ruptures that were made by this infortunat war , and that the two armies , one domestick , the other forrain , which were gnawing the very bowels of the kingdom , might be dismissed . touching grievances of any kind ( and what state was ther ever so pure , but some corruption might creep into it ? ) he was very ready to redresse them : concerning the ship-money , he was willing to pass a b●…ll for the utter abolition of it , and to establish the property of the subject ; therefore he wished them not to spend too much time about that . and for monopolies , he desired to have a list of them , and he wold damn them all in one proclamation : touching ill counsellours , either in westminster-hall , or white-hall , either in church or state , he was resolved to protect none , therefore he wished that all jealousies and misunderstandings might vanish : this , with sundry other strains of princely grace he delivered unto them , but withall he told them , that they shold be very cautious how they shook the fram of an ancient government too far , in regard it was like a watch , which being put asunder , can never be made up again , if the least pin be left out . so ther were great hopes of a calm , after that cold northern storm had so blustered , and that we shold be suddenly rid of the scot , but that was least intended , untill som designs were brought about . the earl of strafford , the archbishop of canterbury , the iudges , and divers monopolists are clapt up , and you know who took a timely flight ( lord finch ) to the other side of the sea. and in lieu of these , the bishop of lincoln is enlarged , bastwick , burton , and prynn are brought into london with a kind of hosanna . his majesty gave way to all this , and to comply further with them , he took as it were into his bosom , i mean , he admitted to his privy councell those parliament lords , who were held the greatest zelots amongst them , that they might be witnesses of his secret'st actions , and to one of them ( the lord say ) he gave one of the considerablest offices of the kingdom , by the resignation of another most deserving lord , upon whom they could never fasten the least misdemeanour ; yet this great new officer wold come neither to the same oratory , chappell , or church , to joyn in prayer with his royall master , nor communicat with him in any publick exercise of devotion : and may not this be called a tru recusancie ? to another he gave one of the prime and most reposefull offices about his own person at court ( the earl of essex ) and thereby he might be said to have given a staff to beat himself . moreover , partly to give his subjects an evidence how firmly he was rooted in his religion , and how much he desired the strenthning of it abroad , the treaty of marriage went on 'twixt his eldest daughter , and the young prince of orenge . hereunto may be added as a speciall argument of compliance and grace , the passing of the bill for a trienniall parliament , and lastly ( which is the greatest evidence that possibly can be imagined , of that reall trust and confidence he reposed in them ) he passed that prodigious act of continuance . peregrin . touching the trienniall parliament , there may come some whole some fruit out of it , will keep all officers in awe , and excite the nobilitie , and young gentrie of the kingdome to studie , and understand the government of the land , and be able to sit and serve their countrey in this great senate : but for this act of continuance i understand it not ; parliaments are good physick , but ill meat ; they say abroad that england is turned hereby from a monarchy to a democracy , to a perpetual kind of quingentumvirat ; and whereas in former times ther was a heptarchy of seven ▪ kings in her , they say now she hath seventy times seven . but in lieu of these unparallell'd acts of grace and trust to the parl. what did the parliament for the king all this while ? patricius . they promised , specially upon the passing of the last act , that they would make him the most glorious , the best beloved , and richest king that ever reigned in england : and this they did with deep protestings and asseverations . but there intervened an ill-favoured accident which did much hurt , viz. a discourse ( for truely i think it was no more ) but a discourse ) which some green heads held to bring up the northern armie , to check the puritan partie , and the rabble of the citie : this kept a mightie noyse , and you know who fled upon it , and much use was made of it to make that cloud of jealousie which was but of the breadth of a hand before , to appear as big as a mountaine . yet his majestie continued still in passing acts of grace , and complying with them in every thing ▪ hee put over unto them the earle of strafford , who after a long costly triall ( wherein he carried himself with as much acutenesse , dexteritie and eloquence , as humane braine could be capable of for his defence ) hee was condemned to the scaffold , and so made a sacrifice to the scot , who stayed chiefly for his head , which besides those vast summes of money , was given him to boot . peregrin . touching the earle of strafford , 't is tru , he was full of ability , elocution and confidence , and understood the lawes of england as well as any , yet there were two things , i heard , wherein his wisdom was questioned ; first that having a charge ready against his chiefest accusers , yet he suffered them to have the priority of sute , which if he had got he had thereby made them parties , and so incapable to be produced against him : secondly , that during the time of his tryall , he applyed not himself with that compliance to his iury as well as to his iudges , for he was observed to comply only with the lords , and not with the house of commons . patricius . howsoever , as some say , his death was ●…esolved upon , ( si non per viam justitiae , saltem per viam expedientiae ) which appears in regard the proceedings against him are by a clause in the act not to be produced for a leading case or example to future ages and inferiour courts : i blush to tell you how much the rabble of the city thirsted after his blood , how they were suffered to strut up and down the streets before the royal court , and the parliament it self , with impunity ; they cried out , that if the common law fail'd , club law should knock him down , and their insolency came to that height , that the names of those lords that would not doome him to death , should be given them to fix upon posts up and downe ; and this was the first tumult that happened this parliament , whereof so many followed after their example , being not onely conniv'd at , but backed by authoritie , for there were prohibitions sent from the parliament , to hinder all processe against some of them . these myrmidons , as they termed themselves , were ready at a watchword , so that one might say there was a kind of discipline in disorder . peregrin . were ther any troubled for delivering their votes in the houses ? i thought that freedom of opinion and speech , were one of the prime priviledges of that great nationall senat. patricius . yes , those that were the minions of the house before , became now the subjects of popular malice and detraction , ( as the lord digby now earl of bristol for one ) because against the dictamen of their consciences they would not vote the earl of strafford to death , and renounce their own judgments , and captivate it to the sense of others , yet they stood firm to their first grounds , that he was a delinquent in a high nature , and incapable ever to beare office in any of his majesties dominions . peregrin . i perceive sir by your speeches , that one of the chiefest causes of these combustions may be imputed to the citie of london , which may be called the metropolis of all these evils , and i little wonder at it , for it hath been alwaies incident to all great townes , when they grow rich and populous , to fall into acts of insolence , and to spurne at government ; where so many pots , ( so many braines i meane ) are a boyling , ther must needs be a great deal of froth , but let her look to her self , for majesty hath long arms , and may reach her at last . but the truth is , that london bears no proportion with the size of this island , for either the one shold be larger , or the other lesser : london may be well compared to the liver of a cramm'd italian goose , whose fatning emacerates the rest of the whole body , and makes it grow lean and languish , and she may be well term'd a goose now more then ever , for her feathers are pluck'd apace ; but now that you have done with the earl of strafford , what is become of all the rest who were committed ? patricius . they are still in durance , and have continued so these two years and upward , yet are not proceeded against , nor brought to their answer to this very day , though all the courts of justice have bin open ever since . many hundreds more of the best sort of subjects have bin suddenly clapt up , and no cause at all mentioned in many of their commitments , and new prisons made of purpose for them , where they may be said to be buried alive , and so forgotten as if ther were no such men in the world ( wherof the author was one : ) and how this can stand with magna charta , with the petition of right ( to vindicat which , ther was so much pains taken the last parliament ) let any man of a sane judgment determin . yet one of the judges , who hath an impeachment o●… high treason still lying dormant against him , though he be not rectus in curia himself , is suffered to sit as judge upon the highest tribunall of england , whereas another for a pretended misdemeanour only is barr'd from sitting ther. others who were at first cryed up and branded to be the most infamous projectors and monopolizers of the land , ( as hamilton , holland , &c. ) are not only at liberty , but crept into favour , and made use of . peregrin ▪ hath the house of commons power to commit any but their own members without conference with the lords ? or hath any order or ordinance of one of the houses singly , or of both conjunctly , power to enjoin a virtual , binding , generall obedience without the royal consent ? patricius . the power of parliament , when king , peers , and commons , which is the whole kingdom digested as it were into one volum , is indefinit , but what either of both houses can do of themselves singly or joyntly without the king who is the life of the law , especially when a visible faction reigns amongst them , i will not determin . — tantas componere lites non opis est nostrae — but for my own opinion , i think it is as impossible for them to make a law without the king , as it was for paracelsus to make a human creture without coition of both sexes . the results of parliament without the royall consent , are as matches without fire ; and it is an incontroulable principle , that the old law must be our guide , till new be made , nor is any act of the subject justifiable , but what is warranted by the old . but to proceed in the tru discovery of these domestick scissures , my lord of stafford being gone , we hop'd fair weather wold follow . ( he who was the cause of the tempest ( as they pretended ) being thrown over-board ) but unluckie mists of jealousie grew thicker and thicker ; yet the scots were dismist , having had fidlers fare , meat , drink , and money , for eleven long moneths together . so his majesty went to scotland , where the parliament ther , did but ask and have any thing , though it be the unquestionable prerogative of majesty to grant or deny petitions , and to satisfie his conscience before any councell whatsoever . but during his sojourn ther , this formidable hideous rebellion brok out in ireland , which though it may be said to be but an old play newly reviv'd ▪ yet the scene was never so tragicall and bloody as now : for the barbarismes that have bin committed ther have bin so sanguinary , and monstrously savage , that i think posterity will hold them hyperbolicall ●…when history relates them . the irish themselves affirm ther concurr'd divers causes to kindle this fire : one , was the taking off of straffor●…s head , ( who awd them more then any deputy ever did ) and that one of his accusations shold be to have used the papists ther too favourably : secondly , the rigorous proceedings and intended courses against the roman catholiques here in england . lastly , the stopping of that regiment of irish , who was promised by his majesties royall word and letter to the king of spain , who relying upon that employment , rather then to beg , steal , or starve , turned rebels : and that , which hath agravated the rebellion all this while , and heightned much the spirit of the irish , was the introduction of the scot , whom they hate in perfection above all people els ; and intended lastly the design spoken of in our parliament , to make an absolute conquest , and nationall eradication of them , which hath made them to make vertue of necessity , and to be valiant against their wills . peregrin . indeed i heard that act of staying the irish regiment , considering how the marquesses de velada , and malvezzi , and don alonso de cardenas , who were all three ambassadours here for the king of spain at that time , having by reliance upon the sacred word and letter of a king , imprested money , and provided shipping for their transport , and bin at above . crowns charges , i say this act was very much censured abroad , to the dishonour of his majesty and our reproach . patricius . i am very sorry to hear it . well sir. his majesty by his presence having setled scotland , was at his return to london received with much joy and exultation , but though he was brought in with a hosanna at one end of the town , he found a crucifige at the other : for at westminster ther was a remonstrance fram'd , a work of many weeks , and voted in the dead of night , when most of the moderat and well-thoughted members were retired to their rest , wherein with as much aggravation and artifice as could be , the least moat in government was exposed to publick view , from the first day of his majesties inaugurat●…on to that very hour : which remonstrance as it did no good to the publick but fill peoples heads with doubts , their hearts with gall , and retard the procedure of all businesse besides , so you may well think it could expect but cold entertainment with his majesty , who hoped his great councel , according to their often deep protestations , had done something for his welcom home , that might have made him the best beloved king that ever 〈◊〉 amongst his people . peregrin . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ther is no government upon 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 up of m●…n , but is subject to corruption ; there is no court of judicature so cleane , but some cobwebs may gather in it , unlesse an act of parliament could be made to free and exempt men from all infirmities and errour ; it cannot be denied , but scotland might have something to complaine of ( though i think least of any ) and so leapt first into the pooll to be cur'd , and what she fish'd besides in those troubled waters 't is too well known : england also no doubt might have some grievances , which his majestie freely offered not onely to redresse for the present , but to free her of all feares for the future , from falling into relapses of that kinde ; but to redresse grievances by armes , by plunging the whole countrey into an intestine warre , this makes the remedy worse then the malady , it is as if one would go about to cure a sick body by breaking his head , or let him blood by giving him a dash on the nose , it is as mad a tricke as his was who set the whole house a fire to roast his egs . but truly sir , in my opinion , his majesty at his return from scotland , might have justly expected some acts of compliance and gratitude from his parliament , considering what unparallel'd acts of grace he had pass'd before . patricius . his majesty did not rest there , but complied further with them by condescending to an act for putting down the star-chamber court the high commission , the court of honour , nay , he was contented his own privy councell should be regulated , and his forests bounded not according to ancient prerogative but late custome ; nay further , he pass'd a bill for the unvoting , and utter exclusion of the spirituall lords from the parliament for ever , whereby it cannot be denied , but by the casheering of votes at a clap , and by excluding the recusant lords besides ( who subsist most by his grace ) he did not a little enervat his own prerogative . adde hereunto that having placed two worthy gentlemen biron and lunsford lieutenants of the tower , he remov'd them both one after the other , and was content to put in one of their election : and lastly , he trusted them with his greatest strength of all , with his navie royall , and call'd home pennington who had the guard of the narrow seas so many yeares . peregrin . truly sir , i never remember to have heard or read of such notable acts of grace and confidence from any king : but would not all this suffice ? patricius . no , but they demanded all the land souldiery and military strength of the kingdome to be disposed of by them , and to be put into what posture , and in what equipage , and under what commanders they pleas'd ; and this was the first thing his majesty ever denyed them , yet he would have granted them this also for a limited time , but that would not serve the turn ; hereupon his majesty grew a little sensible how they inch'd every day more and more upon his royall prerogatives ; and intending to go to his town of hull to see his magazin ( which he had bought with his own money ) with his ordinary train , he was in a hostile manner kept out , canons mounted , pistols cockt , and leveld at him . but whether that unlucky knight ( hotham ) did this out of his fidelity to the parl. or out of an apprehension of feare that some about the king , being mov'd with the barbarousnesse of the action would have pistold him , i will not determine . peregrin . i have read of divers affronts of this kinde that were offerd to the french kings , rochell shut her gates more than once against henry the great , and for the king now regnant , they did not only shut him out of many of his towns , but upon the gates of some of them they writ in legible characters , roy san foy , ville sans peur , a faithlesse king , a fearlesse towne . yet in the greatest heat of those warres , there was never any towne refus'd to let in her king , provided he came attended onely with his own traine ; and besides other people abroad , i heard the scot's nation did abhor that act at hull . but i pray sir go on . patricius . his majesty being thus shut out of one towne , he might justly suspect that an attempt might be made to shut him in , in some other ; therefore he made a motion to the yorke-shire gentlemen , to have a gard for the preservation of his person , which was done accordingly . but i am come to forward , i must go backe and tell you how the king was driven from westminster . when his majesty was return'd from scotland he retir'd to hampton court , whence upon the lord majors and the cities humble sollici●…ation , he came back to white-hal to keep his christmas . but when the bill against bishops was in agitation , which businesse ●…asted neer upon ten weekes , a crue of bold ●…turdie mechanicks , and mariners , came ●…rom the citie and ruffled before white-hall and westminster-hall , and would have violated the abby of westminster , so that for many ●…ights a court of gard was forced to be kept ●…n the body of that church , ( the chiefest sanctuary of the kingdom . ) moreover , his majesty having impeached some of the members of both houses , of high treason , and being denied to have them delivered up , he went himself to the lower house to demand them , assuring the house they should have as faire and legall a triall as ever men had . but as it pleas'd god , they were not there , but retir'd to london for refuge ; the londoners grew starke wilde thereupon , and notice being sent to all the adjacent counties , this act of the kings ( though it wanted no precedents of former times ) was aggravated in the highest degree that possibly could be . hence you may easily inferre , what small securitie his majesty had at white-hall , and what indignities he might have exposed himself unto , by that which had pass'd already from the rabble , who had vilified and cried tush at his proclamations , and disgorg'd other rebellious speeches with impunity : therefore he retird to hampton court ( as we read , our saviour withdrew himselfe once from the multitude ) thence to windsor castle , whence accompanying her majesty , with his eldest daughter to the sea side for holland , and having commanded the prince to attend him against his return at greenwich , the prince had been surpriz'd , and brought to london , had not the king come a little before . thence he removed to yorke , where he kept his court all the sommer . but to returne to london , the very next day after their majesties departure , the countrey about , especially buckinghamshire being incited by the c●…tie and parliament , came in great swarmes , and joyning with the london mechanicks , they ruffled up and down the streets , and kept such a racket , making the fearfull'st riot that ever i beleeve was heard of in parliament time : so those members which formerly were fled into the citie , were brought to the house in a kind of triumph , being garded by land and water in warlike manner by these champions : after this , sundry troops of horse came from all the shires near adjoyning to ●…he parliament , and buckingham men were ●…he first , who while they express'd their ●…ve to ( hamden ) their knight , forgot their ●…worn oath to their king , and in stead of feathers they carried a printed protestation in ●…heir hats , as the londoners had done a lit●…le before upon the pikes point . peregrin . this kept a foul noise beyond sea i re●…ember , so that upon the rialto in venice , ●…t was sung up and down , that a midsummer moon ( though it was then midst of winter ) did raign amongst the english , and you must ●…hink that it hath made the venetian to ●…hrink in his shoulders , and to look but ill-favouredly upon us , since wee 'l have none of his currans . but sir , i heard much of that protestation , i pray what was the substance of it ? patricius . it was penn'd , and enjoyn'd by the par●…iament for every one to take , and it consisted of many parts ; the first was , to maintain the tru potestant religion against all popish innovations , which word popish ( as som think ) was scrued in of purpose for a loop hole to let in any other innovation : the second was to maintain the prerogative an●… honour of the king ; then the power and priviledge of parliament ; and lastly , the propriety and liberty of the subject ; for thre●… parts of this protestation , the people up an●… down seem'd to have utterly forgotte●… them , and continue so still , as if their consciences had bin tied only to the third , viz the priviledge of parliament , and never was ther a poor people so besotted , never wa●… reason and common sence so baffled in an●… part of the world . and now will i go to attend his majesty at york , where , as i told you before , being loth to part with his sword , ( though he had half parted with his scepter before ) by denying the parliament an indefinite time to dispose of the militia , ( alleadging that as the word , so the thing was new . ) he sends forth his commissions of array , according to the old law of england , which declares i●… to be the undoubted right , and royall signorie of the king , to arm or disarm any subject : the parliament sends out clean countermands for executing the said militia , so by this clashing 'twixt the commission of array and the militia , the first flash of this odious unnaturall war may be said to break out . the pulse of the parliament beats yet higher , they send an admirall to the sea ( the earl of warwick ) not only without , but expresly against the kings special command . they had taken unto them a military gard from the city for their protection , without his majesties consent , who by the advice of the lord keeper and others , had offered them a very strong gard of constables and other officers to attend them , which the law usually allows ; yet the raising of that gard in york-shire for the safegard of his majesties person , was interpreted to be leavying of war against the parliament , and so made a sufficient ground for them to raise an army , to appoint a generall ( the earl of essex ) with whom they made publick declarations to live and die . and they assumed power to confer a new appellation of honour upon him , ( excellency ) as if any could confer honour but the king ! and this army was to be maintain'd out of the mixt con●…ribution of all sorts of people ; so a great masse of money and plate was brought into the guild hall , the semstresse brought in her silver thimble , the chamber-maid her bodkin , the cook his spoons , and the vintner his bowles , and every one somthing , to the advancement of so good a work , as to wage war directly against the sacred person of their soverain , and put the whole countrey into a combustion . peregrin . surely it is impossible that a rationall christian people shold grow so simple and sottish , as to be so far transported , without some colourable cause , therfore i pray tell me what that might be ? patricius . the cause is made specious enough , and varnished over wonderfull cunningly ; the people are made to believe they are in danger , and a prevention of that danger is promised , and by these plausible ways the understanding is wrought upon , and an affection to the cause is usher'd in , by aggravation of this danger , as one wold draw a thred through a needles eye : this huge bugbear danger , was like a monster of many heads , the two chiefest were these ▪ that ther was a plot to let in the pope ; and to 〈◊〉 the civil government into a french frame ; it is incredible to think how the pulpits up and down london did ring of this by brainsick lecturers , of whom som were come from new-england , others were pick'd out of purpose , and sent for from their own flock in the countrey , to possesse , or rather to poison the hearts of the londoners , to puzzle their intellectualls , and to intoxicat their brains by their powerfull gifts ; it was punishable to preach of peace , or of caesars right , but the common subject of the pulpit was either blasphemy against god , disobedience against the king , or incitements to sedition ; good lord , what windy frothy stuff came from these fanatick brains ; these phrenetici nebulones ( for king iames gives them no better character in his ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) who may be said to be mad out of too much ignorance , not knowledg ; who neverthelesse are come to that height of prophaness and pride , that they presume to father all their doctrines , all their non-sense , raptures and ravings upon the holy spirit . nor did the pulpit only help to kindle this fire , but the presse also did contribute much stubble ; what base scurrilous pamphlets were cryed up and down the streets , and dispersed in the 〈◊〉 ? what palpable and horrid lies were daily printed ? how they multiplied in every corner in such plenty , that one might say t●…er was a superfaetation of lies , which continue unto this day ? one while the king of denmark was comming over from the sound : another while the king of france had a huge army about calais design'd for england : another while ther was an army of irish rebels comming over with the privity of the king : another while a plot was cryed up and down to burn london : another while ther were subterranean invisible troups ( at ragland castle ) mustered under ground in wales , and thousands of papists armed in lancashire , and divers reports of this nature were daily blown up , and though the authors of them were worthlesse and mean futilous persons , yet the reports themselves had that credit as to be entertain'd and canvas'd in the high court of parliament . but these false rumors produc'd one politick effect ( and it was the end indeed for which they were dispers'd ) they did intimidat and fill the peoples hearts with fears , and dispose of them to up roars and so to part with money . peregrin . i know ther be sundry sorts of fears ; ther are conscientious fears , and ther are ●…annick fears , ther are pusillanimous fears , and ther are politick fears . the first sort of fear proceeds from guilt of conscience , which turns often to phre●…cy . the second sort of fear may be call'd a kind of chymera , 't is som sudden surprizall or consternation arising from an unknown cause . pusillanimous fear makes a mountain of a mole-hill , and proceeds from poverty of spirit , and want of courage , and is a passion of abject and degenerous minds , and may be call'd cowardise , and this fear is always accompanied with jealousie . politick fear , is a created forg'd fear wrought in another , to bring som design about ; and as we find the astronomers ( the comparison is too good ) do imagin such and such shapes and circles in the heavens , as the zodiak , equinoctiall , colures , zones and topiques with others , though ther be no such things really in nature , to make their conclusions good . so the polititian doth often devise and invent false imaginary fears , to make his proceedings more plausible amongst the silly vulgar , and therby to compasse his ends : and as the sun useth to appear far bigger to us in the morning then at noon , when he is exalted to his meridian , and the reason the philosophers use to give , is the interposition of the vapours which are commonly in the lower region , through which we look upon him ( as we find a piece of silver look bigger in a bucket of water then elsewhere ) so the polititian uses to cast strange mists of fear , and fogs of jealousie before the simple peoples eyes , to make the danger seem bigger : but truly sir , this is one of the basest kinds of policy , nor can i believe ther be any such polititians amongst the cabalists of your parliament , who pretend to be so busie about gods work , a glorious reformation , for you know ther is a good text for it , that god needeth not the wicked man ▪ he abominats to be beholding to liers to bring about his purposes : but i pray sir deal freely with me , do you imamagin ther was a design to bring in the mass●… again ? patricius . the masse ? you may say ther was a plot to bring in mahomet as soon , to bring in the alchoran , or talmud as soon ; for i dare pawn my soul , the king is as cordiall a protestant as any that breathes under his three crowns , which besides his publick deep protestations , and his constant quotidian exemplary open practise , many other convincing private reasons induce me to believe , and it is in vain to think the pope can take footing here to any purpose without the kings leave . you know as well as i sir , that of all the reformed churches in christendom , the lutheran retains most of the roman , both in his positions and practise , and comes much nearer to him then we do , yet i have observed , that from the first day of his reformation , to this , he is as averse , and as far off from rome , as the rigidest calvinist that is ; and shall i think , because ther are som humble and hansom postures , and decent vestures revived in our church ( for they were never abolished ; ) because the communion table stands in the east end where it ever stood since christianity came in all our cathedralls , which shold be a rule to all inferiour churches , though the seperatist cries it up most falsly to be an innovation : because the queen hath a few simple capuchins ( fewer then was allowed by the matrimoniall capitulations ) whither to retire sometimes : because schismaticks were proceeded against with more care , and the government of the church born up ●…ately with more countenance , shall i be●…ieve out of all this that the pope must pre●…ently come in ? shall i believe the weakness ●…f our religion to be such , as to be so easily ●…aken and overturn'd ? yet i believe ther was a pernicious plot to introduce a new religion , but what i pray ? not popery , but presbitry , and with it to bring in the doctrine of buchanan and knox for civill government , and so to cast our church and state into a scots mould . peregrin . indeed i heard the english much derided abroad for resigning their intellectualls in point of religion to the scots , whom from infidels they made christians , and reformed christians first , and now for the english to run to them for a religion , and that the uniformity & reformation shold proceed from them , having disdain'd us formerly , what a disparagement is it thinke you to the anglican church ? this with other odd traverses , as the eclipsing the glory of the king , and bringing him back to a kind of minoritie , the tampering with his conscience , i will not say the straining it so farre , the depriving him of all kind of propertie , the depressing of his regall power , wherein the honour of a nation consists , and which the english were us'd to uphold more then any other , for no king hath more awful attributs from his subjects , as sacred sovereigne , gracious and most excellent majestie , nor any king so often prayed for , for in your morning liturgie he is five times prayed for , whereas other princes are mentioned but once or twice at most in their's : i say that this , with interception of letters , some incivilities offered ambassadors , and the bold lavish speeches that were spoken of the greatest queenes in christendome , and his majesties late withdrawing his royall protection from some of his merchant-subjects in other countreys , hath made the english lose much ground in point of esteeme abroad , and to be the discourse , i will not say the scorne of other people . they stick not to say , that there is now a worse maladie fallen upon their minds , then fell upon their bodies about an age since by the sweating sicknesse , which was peculiar onely unto them and found them out under all climes . others say , there is a pure 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 amongst them , that they are turn'd to wolves ( as you know it is a common thing in l●…pland ) & that the old adage is verified in them , homo homini lupus ; nay our next neighbours give out , that the saying was never truer then now , rex anglorum , rex diabolorum . nor is it a small disrepute to the english , that the word cavalier , which is an attribute that no prince in christendome will disdain , and is the common appellation of the nobilitie and gentrie in most parts of the world , is now us'd , not onely in libels and frivolous pamphlets , but in publicke parliamentarie declarations , for a terme of reproach . but truely sir , what you have related touching the pulpit and the presse , transformes me into wonder , and i should want faith to beleeve it , did you not speak it upon your knowledge ; but the english when they fall to worke upon a new humour , use to overdoe all people . patricius . you have not yet the tithe of what i could give you , you would little think that coachmen , and feltmakers , and weavers were permitted to preach up and down without controulment , and to vent their froth and venome against church and state , to cry downe our hierarchy and liturgie , by most base and reviling speeches . peregrin . touching your lyturgie , i have heard it censur'd abroad by the regidest calvinists of generva and dort , yet i never heard any other character given of it , but that it is a most pious , pathetick , and perfect peece of devotion , both for the matter and forme of it , which i have been a little curious to observe . it begins with some choise passages of holy scripture , and a previous declaration or monitory to excite us to the worke in hand ; the first addresse wee make to god is by an humble and joynt confession which is appliable to any conscience , and comprehends in it all kind of sins . then followeth a pronuntiation of gods promises and pronesse to pardon and absolve us ; we goe on to the lords prayer , which having bin dictated by our saviour himself we often use , and is as amber throwne in amongst our frankincense , to make the sacrifice more precious and pleasing unto god ; then we proceed to som choice psalms , and other portions of holy scripture taken out of the old and new testament ; then we fall to the symbole of faith , whereof we make a solemn joynt confession in such a posture as shews a readinesse and resolution in us to defend it : and so to the letany , wherein the poor penitent peccant soul may be said to breath out herself into the bosome of her saviour by tender ejaculations , by panting groans , & eviscerated ingeminations , and there is no sin , no temptation whatsoever that humane frailty is subject unto , but you shall find a deliverance from it there , it is so full of christian charity , that there is no condition of people , but are remembred and prayed for there . then wee proceed by holy alternatif interlocutions ( whereby wee heare our selves speak as well as the minister ) to some effectuall short prayers ; because in long prayers the minde is subject to wander , as some zelots now a dayes use to bring their hearers into a wildernesse by their prayers , and into a labyrinth by their sermons . then goe we on to the decalogue , and if it be in a cathedrall , there is time enough for the hearer to examine himselfe , while the musick playes , where and when he broke any of gods holy commandements , and ask particular forgivenesse accordingly in the intervall ; then after other choice portions of scripture , and passages relating to our redemption , and endearing , unto us the merits of it , with a more particular confession of our faith , we are dismissed with a benediction : so that this liturgy may be call'd an instrument of many strings , whereon the sighing soul sends up varions notes unto heaven : it is a posie made up of divers flowers , to make it the more fragrant in the nostrills of god. now touching your bishops , i never knew yet any protestant church but could be content to have them , had they meanes to maintaine the dignitie , which the churches of france with others have not , in regerd the reformation beg an first among the people , not at court , as here it did in engl. for unlesse ther be som supervisers of gods house , endowed with eminent authority to check the fond fancies , and quench the false fatuous fires of every private spirit , and unlesse it be such an authority that may draw unto it a holy kind of awe and obedience what can be expected but confusion and atheisme ? you know what became of the israelites when the wonted reverence to the ark , and the ephod , and the priest , began to languish amongst them : for the braine of man is like a garden , which unlesse it be fenced about with a wall or hedge , is subject you know to be annoyed by all kinde of beasts which will be ready to runne into it ; so the braine unlesse it be restrain'd and bounded in holy things by rules of canonicall authoritie , a thousand wild opinions , and extravagant fancies will hourely rush into it : nor was there ever any field so subject to produce cockle and darnell , as the human brain is rank and ready to bring forth tares of schism and heresie of a thousand sorts , unlesse after the first culture the sickle of authority be applyed to grub up all such noisom weeds . patricius . yet this most antient dignity of bishops is traduced and vilified by every shallow-pated petty clerk , and not so much out of a tru zeal , as out of envy that they are not the like . and touching our liturgy , wherof you have bin pleas'd to give so exact a character , people are come to that height of impiety , that in som places it hath bin drown'd , in other places burnt , in som places torn in pieces to serve for the basest uses , nay it hath bin preached publickly in pulpits , that it is a piece forg'd in the devils shop , and yet the impious foul mouth'd babbler never was so much as questioned for it . nor did the church only eccho with these blasphemies ; but the presse was as pregnant to produce every day som monster either against ecclesiasticall , or secular government . i am asham'd to tell you how som bold pamphleters in a discourse of a sheet or two , wold presume to question , to dispute of , and determin the extent of monarchik jurisdiction , what sturdy doubts , what sawcy quaeries they put , what odd frivolous distinctions they f●…am'd , that the king though he was gods anointed , yet he was mans appointed : that he had the commanding , not the disposing power : that he was set to rule over , not to over-rule the people ; that he was king by human choice , not by divine charter ; that he was not king by the grace of god , so much as by the suffrage of the people ; that he was a creatur●… and production of the parliament : that he had no implicit trust , nor peculiar property in any thing ; that populus est potior rege ; that grex lege , lex est rege potentior ; that the king was singulis major , universis minor , ( wheras a successive monarch — uno minor est iove . — sometimes they wold bring instances from the states of holland , sometimes from the republick of venice , and apply them so impertinently to absolute and independant royalty ; but i find that the discourse and inferences of these grand statists were bottom'd upon four false foundations , viz. that the king of whom they speak must be either a minor , and idiot , an insufferable tyrant , or that the kingdom they mean , is elective ; none of all which is appliable , either to our most gracious and excellently qualified king , or to his renowned kingdom , which hath bin always reputed an ancient successive monarchy , govern'd by one suprem undeposeable and independent head , having the dignity , the royall state , and power of an imperiall crown , and being responsible to none ●…ut to god almighty and his own 〈◊〉 ●…or his actions , and unto whom a body ●…olitick compacted of prelates , 〈◊〉 , and all degrees of people is naturally subject ; but this is a theam of that transcenden●…y , that it requires a serious and solid tractat , rather then such a slender discourse as this is to handle . but i pray excuse me sir , that i have stept aside thus from the road of my main narration ; i told you before , how the clashing 'twixt the commission of array , and the militia , put all things in disarray throughout the whole kingdom ; the parliament as they had taken the first military gard , so they began to arm first , and was it not high time then for his majesty to do some thing think you ? yet he essayed by all ways imaginable to prevent a war , and to conquer by a passive fortitude , by cunctation , and longanimity . how many overtures for an accommodation did he make ? how many proclamations of pardon ? how many elaborat declarations breathing nothing but clemency , sweetness and truth did drop from his own imperious invincible pen , which will remain upon record to all ages , as so many monuments to his eternall glory ? yet som ill spirit stept still in , between his grace , and the abused subject , for by the peremptory order of parliament ( o monstrous thing ) the said proclamations of grace , and other his majesties declarations were prohibited to be read ; fearing that the strength and truth of them wold have had a vertue to unblind , or rather unbewitcht ( for rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft ) the poor besotted people : what deep protestations and holy vowes did he reiterate that the main of his designs , was to preserve the tru protestant religion , the known lawes of the land , and the just priviledges of parliament ? how often did he dehort and woo the city of london ( his imperiall chamber ) from such violent courses , so that she may be justly upbraided with the same words , as the prince of peace upbraided ierusalem withall : london , london , how often wold i have gathered thee , as a ●…en doth her chickens under her wings , yet thou wouldst not ? how often did he descend to acknowledg the manner of demanding the one and five members in his publick remonstrances ? and if ther was an errour in the proceedings , how oft did he desire his great councell to direct him in a course how to go on in the empeachment ? which they never did , but wold reserve the priviledge to themselves to be judge and party . peregrin . can your parliament protect high treason ? i am sure the character of an ambassadour cannot , which the late french ambassadour ( who for his time play'd his cards more cunning than ever count gondomar did ) knew well ; and therefore , as i heard som french men say , he got letters of revocation before his designed time : but it seems strange to me , that the king who is the protectour of the law , and fountain of justice , cannot have the benefit of the law himself , which the meanest of his vassals can claim by right of inheritance : 't is strange , i say , that the law shold be a dead letter to him who is the life of the law , but that for omission of some punctillio in the form of the processe , the charge of high treason shold be so slightly wav'd , specially treason of so universall a concernment , that it may be call'd a complication of many treasons ; for if in every petty state it be high treason to treat only with any forrein power without the privity of the prince , it must needs be treason of a higher nature actually to bring them in ; and hereof i could alleadge you many pregnant instances , ancient and modern , but that i do not desire to interrupt you in your relation . patricius . the parliament , as i told you before , armed apace , it was not fitting then his majesty shold sit idle ; therfore he summons those nobles and others , who had an immediate relation unto him by office or service , to attend him at york , according to their particular obligation and oath : but it seems the parliament assumed power to dispence with those oaths , and excuse their attendance , which dispensation prevail'd with som ( tender ) consciences ; yet the great seal posted to court , and after it most of the nobles of the land , with the flower of the gentry , and many of the prime members of the commons house ; so that were it not for the locall priviledge , the parliament for number of members , might be said to be ever since about the king : these nobles and gentlemen resenting his majesties case , and what practices ther were on foot to alter the government both of church and state , not only advised his majesty to a royall war for defence of his crown and dignity , but contributed very chearfully , and have stood constant to the work ever since . peregrin . they have good reason for it , for the security of the nobility and gentry depends upon the strength of the crown , otherwise popular government wold rush in like a torrent upon them . but surely those nobles , and those parliament gentlemen and others , som of whom i understand , were reputed the wisest and best weigh'd men for experience and parts thorowout the whole kingdom , and were cryed up in other parliaments to be the most zealous patriots for the propriety and freedom of the subject , wold never have stuck so firmly to his majesty , had they not known the bottom of his designs , that it was far from his thoughts to bring in the pope or french government ; for therby they shold have betrayed their own posterity , and made their children slaves . patricius . to my knowledge , these nobles and gentlemen are still the very same as they were in former parliaments , wherin they were so cryed up for the truest lovers of their country , and best common-wealths-men ; yet now they are branded , and voted to be seducers , and traytors , because according to their oaths and consciences , they adhere to the king their master and liege-lord , for maintenance of that religion they were baptized and bred in . those most orthodox and painfull divines , which till this parliament began were accounted the precisest sort of protestants , are now cryed down for papists , though they continue still the very same men , both for opinions and preaching , and are no more papists than i am a pythagorean . in fine , a tru english protestant is put now in the same scale with a papist , and made synonyma's . and truly these unhappy schismaticks could not devise how to cast a greater infamy upon the english protestant than they have done of late by these monstrous imputations ; they wold fasten upon him such opinions which never entred into his thoughts , they wold know ones heart better than himself , and so would be greater kardiognosticks than god almighty . but to draw to a conclusion ; the parliaments army multiplyed apace in london , the kings but slowly in the north , so that when he displayed his royal standard at nottingham , his forces were not any thing considerable , so that if the parliaments generall ( essex ) had then advanced towards him from northampton , he had put him to a very great strait ; they encreased somthing at derby , and stafford , but when he was come to shrewsbury , the welch-men came running down the mountains in such multitudes , that their example did much animate the english ; so that his army in lesse than a month that the court continued in shrewsbury , came to near upon twenty thousand horse and foot ; not long before , the nephew princes came over , and the first encounter prince rupert had with the parliaments forces was at worcester , where he defeated the flower of their cavalry , and gave them a smart blow . at shrewsbury his majesty took a resolution to march with his whole army towards london , but after seven days march he understood the parliaments forces were within six miles side-long of him , and so many miles he went out of his road to find them out , and face them : upon sunday morning he was himself betimes upon edge-hill , wher the enemies colours plainly appear'd in vale before keinton ; it was past two in the after-noon before all his infantery could get to the bottom , who upon sight of the enemies colours ran as merrily down the hill , as if they had gone to a morris dance . so his majesty himself being generalissimo , gave command the great ordnance shold flye for a defiance , so the battell began , which lasted above three hours , and as some french and dutch commanders ( who were engag'd in the fight ) told me , they never remembred to have seen a more furious battail for the time in all the german wars . prince rupert pursued the enemies horse like a whirl-wind near upon three miles , and had ther bin day enough , when he came back to the infanterie , in all probability a totall defeat had bin given them : so that the same accident may be said to fall out here , as happened in that famous battell at lewis , in henry the thirds time , where the prince of wales ( afterwards edward the first ) was so eager , and went so far ( by excesse of courage ) from the body of the army in pursuance of the londoners , that it was the fatall cause of the losse of that mighty battail . his majesty ( to his deserved and never-dying glory ) comported himself like another caesar all the while , by riding about and encouraging the souldiers , by exposing his person often to the reach of a musket-bullet , and lying in the field all that bleak night in his coach. notwithstanding that many lying pamphlets were purposely printed here , to make the world believe that he had retir'd himself all the time of the fight ; what partiall reports were made in the guild-hall to the londoners , and by what persons , ( w. and strode ) i am ashamed to tell you : but that his majesty was victorious that day ( a day which i never thought to have seen in england ) ther be many convincing arguments to prove it ; for besides the great odds of men which fell on their side , and cannons they lost , som of their ordnance were nayl'd by the kings troops the next morning after in the very face of their army . moreover , the king advanc'd forward the next day to his former road , and took banbury presently after ; but the parliamenteers went backwards , and so from that day to this , his majesty continueth master of the field . 't is tru , that in som places , as at farnham , winchester , and chichester , they have prevail'd since , but no considerable part of the royall army was ther to make opposition ; and i blush to tell you , how unworthily the law of armes was violated in all those places . peregrin . good lord , how can the souls of those men that were in the parliaments army at keinton battell , dispense with the oaths of supremacy and allegeance , besides the protestation you speak of , they had taken to preserve the person , honour , and prerogative of the king , when they thus actually bandy against his person , and appear in battel with all the engines of hostility against him ? patricius . i wold be loth to exchange consciences with them , and prevaricate so palpably with god almighty ; touching the cavaliers , they may be said to comply with their duties both towards god and their king according to the oaths you mention ; moreover , ther was a strong act of parliament ( for their security ) which was never as much as questioned or controverted , much lesse suspended or repeal'd : but always stood , and yet stands in as full validity and force , as it was the first day it was enacted , and as much binding to an universall obedience , which act runs thus : . octobris anno undecimo henrici septimi , anno dom. it is ordained , enacted , and established by the king our soverain lord , by the advice and assent of the lords spirituall and temporall , and the commons in this present parliament assembled , and by authority of the same , that from henceforth no manner of person or persons whatsoever he or they be , that attend upon the king and soverain lord of this land for the time being in his person , and do him tru and faithfull service of allegiance in the same , or be he in other places by his commandment , in his wars within this land or without : that for the said deed , and tru duty of allegiance , he or they be in no wise convict or attaint of high treason , nor of other offences for that cause , by act of parliament or otherwise by any processe of law , whereby he or any of them , shall lose or forfeit life , lands , tenements , rents , possessions , hereditaments , goods , chattels , or any other things : but to be for that deed and service utterly discharged of any vexation , trouble or loss . and if any act or acts , or other processe of the law hereafter , therupon for the same happen to be made contrary to this ordinance , that then that act or acts , or other processe of the law , whatsoever they shall be , stand and utterly void . provided alwayes that no person or persons shall take any benefit or advantage by this act , which shall hereafter decline their said allegiance . peregrin . this is as plain and fair as can be for securing both the person and conscience of the cavalier , but was ther ever any act or oath , or any thing like an oath that oblig'd englishmen to be tru unto , or fight for the parliament ? patricius . never any , but these men by a new kind of metaphysicks have found out a way to abstract the person of the king from his office , to make his soveraigntie a kind of platonick idea hovering in the aire , while they visibly attempt to assaile and destroy his person and progeny , by small and great shot , and seek him out amongst his life-gard with fire and sword ; yet they give out , they fight not only not against him , but for him , and that their army is more loyall unto him than his owne ; who , they say , fight only for the name king , though they have his person really amongst them , commanding and directing : thus they make him a strange kind of amphibium , they make in one instant a king and no king of the same individuum ; a power which the casuists affirme god almighty never assumed to himself , to doe any thing that implies a contradiction . peregrin . noble sir , you make my heart to pant within me , by the pathetick relation you have been pleas'd to make mee of these ●…uthfull times ; but one thing seems to me to be no lesse then a miracle , how his majestie hath beene able to subsist all this while , considering the infinite advantages the averse partie hath had of him ; for they have all the tenable places and townes of strength , both by land and sea ; they have the navie royall , they have all the amunition and armes of the crown , they have all the imposts and customs , poundage and tonnage ( which they levie contrary to their former protestation before the bill be pass'd ) they have the exchequer at their devotion , and all the revenue of the king , queen , and prince , and lastly , they have the citie of london , which may be eall'd a magazin of money and men , where there is a ready supplie and superfluitie of all things , that may seed , clothe , or make men gay to put them in heart and resolution : truely considering all these advantages , with divers others on their side , and the disadvantages on the kings , it turnes me into a lump of astonishment , how his majestie could beare up all this while , and keep together so many armies , and be still master of the field . patricius . i confesse sir , it is a just subject for wonderment , and we must ascribe it principally to god almightie , who is the protectour of his anointed , for his hand hath manifestly appear'd in the conduct of his affaires ; hee hath been the pilot , who hath sate at the helme ever s●…nce this storme began , and will we hope continue to steer his course till he waft him to safe harbour againe ; adde hereunto , that his majesty for his own part , hath beene wonderfully stirring , and indefatigable both for his body and minde ; and what notable things her majesty hath done , and what she hath suffered , is fitter for chronicle , then such a simple discourse . hereunto may be added besides , that his majestie hath three parts of foure of the peeres , and prime gentrie of the kingdom firme unto him , and they will venture hard before they will come under a popular government and mechanicall corporations , or let in knox or calvin to undermine this church , and bring in their bawdy stool of repentance . peregrin . truely sir , amongst other countreys , i extreamly long'd to see england , and i am no sooner come , but i am surfeited of her already , i doubt the old prophecie touching this island is come now to be verified , that the churchman was , the lawyer is , and the souldier shall be . i am afraid the english have seene their best dayes ; for i find a generall kind of infatuation , a totall eclipse of reason amongst most of them ; and commonly a generall infatuation precedes the perdition of a people ; like a fish , that putrifieth first in the head ; therefore i will trusse up my baggage and over again , after i have enjoyed you some dayes , and received your commands . patricius . dear sir , if you seriously resolve to crosse the seas againe so soon , i may chance beare you company , for as you have since the short time of your sojourn here judiciously observed a national defection of reason in the people of this island , which makes her so active in drawing on her own ruine ; so by longer experience , and by infallible symptomes i find a strange kind of vertigo to have seized upon her , which i feare will turne to the falling sicknesse , or such a frenzie that will make her to dash out her own braines : nor are her miseries , i feare , come yet to the full ; it is the method of the almightie , when he pleases to punish a people , to begin with roddes , to goe on with scourges , and if they will not do , he hath scorpions for them : therefore , i will breath any where sooner then here , for what securitie or contentment can one receive in that countrey , where religion and iustice , the two grand dorique columnes which support every state , are fallen down ? which makes all conditions of men , all professions and trades to go here daylie to utter ruine . the churchman grows every day more despicable , as if he had no propertie in any thing , nor is there any way left him to recover his tithe , but by costly troublesome sutes . the civilian , a brave learned profession , hath already made his last will ; and the common lawyers case is little better ; the courtier cannot get his pension ; the gentleman cannot recover his rents , but either they are sequestred by a high hand of unexampled power , or else the poor tenant is so heavily assess'd or plundred , that he is disabled to pay them in ; all kind of comerce both domestick and forrein visibly decayes , and falls more and more , into the hands of strangers ( to the no small dishonour of the wisedome of this nation ) nor can the tradesman recover his debts , parliamentary protections continue still in such numbers , so that it is a greater priviledge now to be a footman to the meanest of the lower house , then to be of the kings bed chamber : prenti●…es run away from their masters , and against their fathers intent turn souldiers , and for money , which is the soul of trade , i beleeve since the beginning of this parliament , above one half of the treasure of the kingdome is either conveyed to'ther side of the sea , or buried under ground , whence it must be new digg'd up againe . moreover , all things are here grown arbitrary ( yet that word took off the earle of straffords head ) religion , law , and allegiance is growne arbitrary ; nor dares the iudge upon the tribunall ( according to his oath ) do justice , but he is over-awed by ordinance ; or els the least intimation of the sense of the lower house is sufficient to enjoyne him the contrary , so that now , more then ever , it may be said here , — terras astraea reliquit . — peace also hath rov'd up and downe this island , and cannot get a place to lay her head on ; she hoped to have had entertainment in york-shire by the agreement of the best gentlemen in the countrey ; but an ordinance of parliament beat her out of doores ; then she thought to rest in cheshire , and by a solemne covenant she was promis'd to be preserv'd ther , the principal agents of that covenant having protested every one upon the word of a gentleman , and as they did desire to prosper , both themselves , their tenants and friends , , shold strictly observe it ; but the like ordinance of parliament battered down that agreement . then she thought to take footing in the west , and first in dorcetshire , then in cornwall and devonshire , and by the holy tie of the blessed sacrament she was promised to be preserved ther ; but another ordinance of parliament is pursuing her , to dispense with the commissioners of the said agreement for their oaths . lastly , his majesty is mainly endeavouring to bring her in again thorowout the whole land ; but the furious , phrentique schismaticks will have none of her ; for as one of them ( besides a thousand instances more ) preach'd in one of the most populous congregations about the city , it were better that london streets ran with bloud , and that dead carkasses were piled up as high as the battlements of pauls , than peace should be now brought in . and now that peace is shut out , learning is upon point of despair , her colledges are become courts of gard , and mars lieth in mercuries bed . honour also , with her court , lieth in the dust ; the cobler may confront the knight , the boor the baron , and ther is no judicial way of satisfaction ; which makes monarchy fear she hath no long time of abode here . publick faith also , though she had but newly set up for her self , is suddenly become bankrupt , and how could she choose ? for more of the kingdoms treasure hath bin spent within these thirty moneths , than was spent in four-score yeares before ; but she hopes to piece up her self again , by the ruines of the church ; but let her take heed of that , for those goods have bin fatall to many thousand families in this kingdom : yet , she thinks much , that those publick summs which were given to suppresse one rebellion ( in ireland ) shold be employed to maintain another rebellion ( in england . ) and lastly , methinks , i see religion in torn ragged weeds , and with slubber'd eyes sitting upon weeping-crosse , and wringing her hands , to see her chiefest temple ( pauls church ) where god almighty was us'd to be serv'd constantly thrice a day , and was the rendezvouz , and as it were the mother church , standing open to receive all commers and strangers , to be now shut up , and made only a thorow-fare for porters ; to see those scaffolds , the expence of so many thousand pounds , to lie rotting ; to see her chiefest lights like to be extinguished ; to see her famous learned divines dragg'd to prison , and utterly depriv'd of the benefit of the common law , their inheritance : methinks , i say , i see religion packing up , and preparing to leave this island quite , crying out , that this is countrey fitter for atheists than christians to live in ; for god almighty is here made the greatest malignant , in regard his house is plunder'd more than any : ther is no court left to reform heresie , no court to punish any church officer , and to make him attend his cure , not court to punish fornication , adultery , or incest : methinks i hear her cry out against these her grand reformers ( or refiners rather ) that they have put division 'twixt all degrees of persons . they have put division 'twixt husband and wife , 'twixt mother and child : the son seeks his fathers bloud in open field , one brother seeks to cut the others throat ; they have put division 'twixt master and servant , 'twixt land - lord and tenant ; nay , they have a long time put a sea of separation 'twixt king and queen ; and they labour more and more to put division 'twixt the head and the members , 'twixt his majesty and his politicall spouse , his kingdom : and lastly , they have plung'd one of the flourishingst kingdoms of europe in a war without end ; for though a peace may be plaister'd over for the time , i fear it will be but like a fire cover'd with ashes , which will break out again , as long as these fiery schismaticks have any strength in this island ; so that all the premisses considered , if turk or tartar , or all the infernal spirits and cacodaemons of hel had broken in amongst us , they could not have done poor england more mischief . sir , i pray you excuse this homely imperfect relation , i have a thousand things more to impart unto you when we may breathe freer air ; for here we are come to that slavery , that one is in danger to have his very thoughts plundered ; therfore if you please to accept of my company , i will over with you by gods help , so soon as it may stand with your conveniency , but you must not discover me to be an englishman , abroad : for so i may be jeer'd at and kickt in the streets ; i will go under another name , and am fix'd in this resolution , never to breathe english aire again , untill the king recovers his crown , and the people the right use of their pericraniums ▪ the second part of a discourse ' twixt patricius and peregrin , touching the distempers of the times . london , printed in the year , . a discours , or parly , continued betwixt patricius and peregrin , upon their landing in france , touching the civil wars of england and ireland . peregrin . gentle sir , you are happily arrived on this shore ; we are now upon firm ground , upon the fair continent of france ; we are not circumscrib'd , or coopt up within the narrow bounds of a rhumatick island ; we have all europe before us . truly i am not a little glad to have shaken hands with that tumbling element the sea ; and for england , i never intend to see her again in the mind i am in , unlesse it be in a map ; nay , in statu quo nunc , while this faction reigns , had i left one eye behind me , i should hardly returne thither to fetch it ; therefore if i be missing at any time , never look for me there . there is an old proverb , from a blacke german , a white italian , a red frenchman , i may adde one member more , and , from a round-headed englishman , the lord deliver us . i have often crossed these seas , and i found my self alwaies pitifully sick , i did ever and anon tell what wood the ship was made of ; but in this passage i did not feele the least motion or distemper in my humors : for , indeed i had no time to taink on sicknesse , i was so wholly tsken up , and transported with such a pleasing conceit , to have left yonder miserable island . peregrin . miserable island indeed ; for i thinke there was never such a tyrannie exercised in any christian countrey under heaven ; a tyrannie that extends not onely to the body , but to the braine also ; not only to mens fortunes and estates , but it reaches to their very soules and consciences , by violented new coercive oaths and protestations , compos'd by lay-men , inconsistent with the liberty of christians . never was there a nation carried away by such a strong spirit of delusion ; never was there a poor people so purblinded and puppified , if i may say so , as i finde them to be ; so that i am at a stand with my selfe , whether i shall pitie them more , or laugh at them . they not onely kisse the stone that hurts them , but the hands of them that hurle it ; they are come to that passive stupidity , that they adore their very persecutors , who from polling fall now a shaving them , and will flay them at last if they continue this popular reigne . i cannot compare england , as the case stands with her , more properly , then to a poor beast , sicke of the staggers , who cannot be cur'd without an incision . the astronomers , i remember , affirme that the moone ( which predominates over all humid bodies ) hath a more powerfull influence o're your british seas then any other ; so that according to the observation of some nevigators , they swell at a spring tide in some places , above threescore cubits high : i am of opinion , that that inconstant humorous planet , hath also an extraordinany dominion over the braines of the inhabitants ; for when they attempt any innovation ( whereunto all insulary people are more subject then other citizens of the world which are fixed upon the continent ) they swell higher , their fancies worke stronglier , and so commit stranger extravagancies then any other : witnesse these monstrous barbarismes and violencies , which have bin , and are daily offered to religion and just●…ce , ( the two grand supporters of all states ) yea , to humane reason it self since the beginning of these tumults . and now , noble sir , give me leave to render you my humble thanks for that true and solid information you pleased to give me in london of these commotions . during my short sojourne there , i lighted on divers odde pamphlets upon the seamstresses stalls , whom i wondred to see selling paper sheets in lieu of holland : on the one side i found the most impudent untruths ( vouch'd by publike authority ) the basest scurrilities , and poorest jingles of wit that ever i read in my life ; on the other side i met with many pieces that had good stuff in them , but gave mee not ( being a stranger ) a full satisfaction , they look'd no further then the beginning of this parliament , and the particular emergences thereof : but you have , by your methodicall relation , so perfectly instructed and rectified my understanding , by bringing me to the very source of these distempers , and led me all along the side of the current by so streight a line , that i believe , whosoever will venture upon the most intricate task of penning the story of these vertiginous times , will finde himself not a little beholden to that relation , which indeed may be term'd a short chronicle rather then a relation . wee are come now under another clime , and here we may mingle words , and vent our conceptions more securely ; it being , as matters stand in your countrey , more safe to speake under the lilly then the rose ; wee may here take in and put out freer ayre ; i meane , we may discourse with more liberty : for , words are nought els but aire articulated , and coagulated as it were into letters and syllables . patricius . sir , i deserve not these high expressions of your favourable censure touching that poor piece ; but this i will be bold to say , that whosoever doth read it impartially , will discover in the author the genius of an honest patriot , and a gentleman . and now methinks i look on you unfortunate island , as if one look upon a ship toss'd up and down in distresse of wind and weather , by a furious tempest , which the more she tugs and wrastles with the foamie waves of the angry ocean , the more the fury of the storme encreaseth , and puts her in danger of shipwrack ; and you must needs thinke , sir , it would move compassion in any heart , to behold a poore ship in such a desperate case , specially when all his kindred , friends and fortunes ; yea his religion , the most precious treasure of all , are aboard of her , and upon point of sinking . alas i can contribute nothing now to my poor countrey but my prayers and teares , that it would please god to allay this tempest , and cast over board those that are the true causers of it , and bring the people to the right use of reason againe . it was well observed by you , sir , that there is a nationall kinde of indisposition , and obliquity of mind that rageth now amongst our people , and i feare it will be long ere they returne to their old english temper . to that rare loyalty and love which they were used to shew to their soveraigne : for all the principles of monarchie are quite lost amongst us , those ancient and sacret flowers of the english diadem are trampled under foot ; nay , matters are come to that horrid confusion , that not onely the prerogative of the crown , but the foundamentall priviledge of the free-born subject is utterly overthrowne , by those whose predecessors were used to be the main supporters of it : so that our king is necessitated to put himself in armes for the preservation not only of his own regall rights , but of magna charta it self , which was neuer so invaded and violated in any age , by such causlesse tyrannicall imprisonments , by such unexampled destructive taxes , by stopping the ordinary processes in law , and awing all the courts of justice , by unheard-of forced oaths and associations , and a thousand other acts , which neither president , book-case or statute can warrant , whereof , if the king had done but the twentieth part , he had been cryed up to be the greatest tyrant that ever was . peregrin . sir , i am an alien , and so can speak with more freedom of your countrey . the short time that i did eate my bread there , i felt the pulse of the people with as much judgement as i could ; and i find , that this very word parliament is become a kind of idoll amongst them , they doe , as it were , pin their salvation upon 't ; it is held blasphemie to speake against it . the old english maxime was , the king can do no wrong ; another nominative case is now stept in , that the parliament can do no wrong , nor the king receive any : and whereas ther was used to be but one defender of the faith , ther are now started up amongst you , i cannot tell how many hundreds of them . and as in the sacred profession of priest-hood we hold , or at least wise shold hold , that after the imposition of hands , the minister is inspired with the holy ghost in an extraordinary manner for the enabling of him to exercise that divine function , so the english are grown to such a fond conceit of their parliament members , that as soon as any is chosen by the confus'd cry of the common people to sit within the walls of that house , an inerring spirit , a spirit of infallibility presently entereth into him ( so that he is therby become like the pope , a canon animatus ) though som of them may haply be such flat and simple animals , that they are as fit to be counsellours , as caligula's horse was to be consull , as the historian tells us . patricius . touching parliament , ther breaths not a subject under englands crown , who hath a higher esteem of it then i , it makes that dainty mixture in our government of monarchy , optimacie and democracy , betwixt whom , though ther be a kind of co ordination of power during the sitting of parliament , yet the two last , which are composed of peers and people , have no power , but what is derived from the first , which may be called the soul that animates them , and by whose authority they meet , consult and depart : they come there to propose , not to impose lawes ; they come not to make lawes by the sword ; they must not be like draco's lawes , written in bloud . their king calls them thither to be his counsellors , not controllers ; and the office of counsell is to advise , not to inforce ; they come thither to intreat , not to treat with their liege lord ; they come to throw their petitions at his feet , that so they may find a way up to his hear●… . 't is tru , i have read of high things that our parliament have done , but 't was either during the nonage and minority of our kings , when they were under protectorship , or when they were absent in a forrain war , or in time of confusion , when ther were competitors of the bloud-royall for the crown , and when the number of both houses was compleat and individed ; but i never read of any parliament that did arrogate to it self such a power paramount , such a superlative superintendence , as to check the prerogative of their soverain , to question his negative voice , to passe things , not only without , but expresly against his advice and royall command : i never heard of parliament , that wold have their king , being come to the meridian of his age , to transmit his intellectualls , and whole faculty of reason to them . i find som parliaments have bin so modest and moderat ( now moderation is the rudder that shold steer the course of all great councells ) that they have declined the agitation and cognizance of som state affaires , humbly transferring them to their soverain and his privy counsell : a parliament man then , held it to be the adaequat object of his duty , to study the welfare , to redresse the grievances , and supply the defects of that particular place for which he served ; the members then us'd to move in their own ( inferior ) sphere , and us'd not to be transported by any eccentric motions . and so they thought to have complyed with the obligation , and discharged the consciences of honest patriots , without soaring above their reach , and roving at random to treat of universals , much lesse to bring religion to their bar , or prie into the arcana imperti , the cognizance of the one belonging to the king , and his intern counsell of state : the other to divines , who , according to the etymologie of the word , use to be still conversant in the exercise of speculation of holy and heavenly things . peregrin . i am clearly of your opinion in these two particulars ; for , secrecy being the soul of policy , matters of state shold be communicated but to few ; and touching religion , i cannot see how it may quadrat with the calling , and be homogeneous to the profession of lay-men , to determine matters of divinity ; who , out of their incapacity and unaptnesse to the work , being not pares negotio , and being carryed away by a wild kind of conscience without science , like a ship without a helm , fall upon dangerous quick-sands ; so that whilest they labour to mend her , they marr her , whilst they think to settle her , they confound her , whilst they plot to prevent the growth of popery , they pave the way to bring it in , by conniving at , and countenancing those monstrous schismes which i observed to have crept into your church since the reign of this parliament : so that one may justly say , these your reformers are but the executioners of the old project of the jesuits , the main part wherof was , and is still , to hurle the ball of discord , and hatch new opinions still 'twixt the protestants , to make factions and scissures between them , and so render their religion more despicable and ridiculous . but methinks , matters are come to a strange pass with you in england , that the iudges cannot be trusted with the law , nor the prelats with the gospell ; whereas from all times , out of their long experience and years , these two degrees of men were used to be reverenced for the chief touch-men , and unquestionable expositors of both , which another power seems now to arrogate to it self , as the inerring oracle of both : but i pray god that these grand refiners of religion , prove not quack-salvers at last ; that these upstart polititians prove not impostors : for i have heard of some things they have done , that if machiavell himself were alive , he wold be reputed a saint in comparison of them . the roman ten , and athenian thirty , were babies to these ; nay , the spanish inquisition , and the bloet-rade ( that councell of bloud ) which the duke of alva erected in flanders , when he swore , that he wold drown the hollanders in their butter-tubs , was nothing to this ; when i consider the prodigious power they have assumed to themselves , and do daily exercise over the bodies , the estates and souls of men . in your former discourse you told me , that amongst multitudes of other mischiefs , wh●…ch this new faction hath wrought , they have put division 'twixt all sorts and sexes , 'twixt all conditious , both of men and women ; one thing more i may say , they have done in this kind : for , they have laboured to put division between the persons of the holy trinity , by making the first person to be offended at that voluntary genuflection and reverence which hath bin from all times practised in the christian church to the name of the second person ; so that iesu worship , as i have read in some of your profane pamphlets , is grown now to be a word of reproach amongst you . but to the point ; ther is one thing i can never cease to wonder at : that whereas at the beginning of this parliament , ther were as able and experienced , as stout and well spoken gentlemen , as any in the whole kingdom , that sate in the house , and made the far major part , i wonder i say , that they wold suffer this giddy-headed faction to carry all before them in that violent manner , that they did not crush this cocatrice in the shell . patricius . first , sir , you know ther is nothing so agreeable to the nature of man , as novelty ; and in the conduct of humane affaires , it is always seen , that when any new design or faction is a foot , the projectors are commonly more pragmaticall and sedulous upon the work ; they lie centinell to watch all advantages , the sand of their brains is always running : this hath caused this upstart faction , to stick still close together , and continue marvellously constant to their ends ; they have bin used to tyre and out-fast , to weary and out-watch the moderate and well-minded gentlemen ; sometimes till after midnight , by clancular and nocturnall sittings ; so that as his majesty saies in one of his declarations , most of their votes may be said to be nought else , but verdicts of a starv'd iury. another reason is , that they countenanced the flocking together of the promiscuous rabble from london , notwithstanding the two severall motions the lords made unto them , that they might be suppressed by parliamentary order : this riotous crue awed the wonted freedom of speech in both houses , cryed up the names , and confronted many of their members : yet these new polititians not only conniv'd at them , but call'd them their friends ; and so they might well enough , or rather their champions ; for they had ordered the matter so , that they were sure to have them ready at their devotion , at the heaving of a finger : and from this tumultuous mongrell crue , they derived their first encouragements to do such high prodigious insolencies they have committed since . adde hereunto , that they complyed exceedingly besides with the common councell of the city , they used to attend them early and late to knock heads together ; and if any new thing was to passe in the house , they wold first wait on them , to know their pleasure , and afterwards it shold be propounded and put to vote in the house : and how derogatory it is to the high law-making-councell , to make their chiefest members wait from time to time on the magistrates of the city , who in former times were used to attend them upon all occasions in westminster , i am ashamed to think on ; nor am i lesse ashamed to remember those base artifices and indirect courses that were practis'd at the election of this pretended major ; here they tack'd about to a second choice ; after the first was legally made , and how the common-councell was pack'd up of the arrandest schismaticks up and down the city . and to that mutinous wealth-swoln city , and the said unbridled pack of oppidans ( seconded afterwards by the countrey clownes ) who offered such outrages to gods house , the kings house , and the parliament house , may be ascribed all miseries , and the miscarriage of things : for they caused his majesty to forsake his own standing palace , to absent himself from his parliament , and make that unpleasing p●…ogresse up and down his kingdom ever since , which put all counsells at a stand , and to be involv'd in a confusion . peregrin . but let me tell you that your britannick sun , though he be now ore-set with these unlucky clouds , engendred of the vapours of distempered brains , and the rotten hearts of many of his own meniall servants , who have proved like the sons of serviah unto him , ingratefull monsters , yet is he still in his own orb , and will , when this foul weather 's passed , and the aire cleared a little by thunder , shine more gloriously and powerfully then before , it being a maxime of state , that rebellion suppressed , makes a prince the stronger ; now rebellion durst never yet look a prince long in the face , for the majesty of gods anointed , useth to dart such fulgent piercing beams , that dazle the eyes of disloyalty , and strikes her stark blind at last . and truly , as you say , i am also clearly of opinion , that these ingratefull londoners , as they were the comencers , so have they been the continuers and contrivers of this ugly rebellion ever since ; they seem to have utterly forgotten who hath given them the sword , and by , and from whom they hold their charter ; their corporations are now grown body politicks , & so as many petty republikes amongst them , so that they begin to smell rank of a hans-town . poor simple annimals , how they suffer their pockets to be pick'd , their purses to be cut ; how they part with their vitall spirits every week ; how desperately they post on to poverty , and their own ruine , suffering themselves in lieu of scarlet-gownes , to be governed by a rude company of red-coats , who 'twixt plundering , assessements , and visits , will quickly make an end of them . i fear ther is som formidable judgment of regall revenge hangs over that city ; for the anger of a king is like the roaring of a lyon ; and i never read yet of any city that contested with her soverain , but she smarted soundly for it at last . the present case of london bears a great deal of proportion with that of monpellier here in france , in charls the seventh's time ; for when that town had refused the publishing of many of the kings edicts and declarations , murthered som of his ministers and servants , abused the church , and committed other high acts of insolency ; the duke of berry was sent to reduce the town to obedience ; the duke pressed them with so hard a siege , that at last the best citizens came forth in procession , bare-headed , & bare-footed , with white wands in their hands , and halters about their necks to deliver the keys of all the gates to the duke , but this wold not serve the turn , for two hundred of them were condemned to the gallies , two hundred of them were hang'd , and two hundred beheaded , the king saying , he offered those as victimes for the lives of his servants whom they had murthered with the false sword of justice . but , sir , i much marvell how your church-government , which from all times hath been cryed up to be so exact , is so suddenly tumbled into this confusion ? how your prelates are fallen under so darke a cloud , considering that divers of them were renowned through all the reform'd churches in christendome for their rare learning and pietie ? at the synod at dort , you know some of them assisted , and no exception at all taken at their degree and dignity , but took precedence accordingly , how came it to passe , that they are now fallen under this eclypse , as so be so persecuted , to be push'd out of the house of peers , and hurried into prison ? i pray you be pleased to tell me . patricius . sir , i remember to have read in the irish story , that when the earl of kildare in henry the eighth's time , was brought before the lord deputy for burning cassiles church , he answered , my lord , i would never have burnt the church , unlesse i had thought the biship had been in it ; for 't was not the church , but the bishop i aim'd at . one may say so of the anglican church at this present , that these fiery zelots , these vaporing sciolists of the times are so furiously enraged against this holy primative order ; some out of envie , some out of malice , some out of ignorance , that one may say , our church had not been thus set on fire , unlesse the bishops had been in 't . i grant there was never yet any profession made up of men , but there were some bad ; we are not angels upon earth there was a iudas amongst the first dozen of christians , though apostles , and they by our saviours owne election : amongst our prelates peradventure ( for i know of no accusation fram'd against them yet ) some might be faulty , and wanting moderation , being not contented to walk upon the battlements of the church , but they must put themselves ●…pon stilts ; but if a golden chaine hath happily a copper link two or three , will you therefore breake and throw away the whole chaine . if a few sho●…makers ( i confesse the comparison is too homely , but i had it of a scots man ) sell calfes skin for neats leather , must the gentle-craft be utterly extinguish ▪ d , must we go bare foot therefore ? let the persons suffer in the name of god , and not the holy order of episcopacy but good lord , how pittifully were those poor prelats handled ? what a tartarian kind of tyranny it was , to drag twice into prison twelve grave reverend bishops , causâ adhuc inaudita , and afterwards not to be able to frame as much as an accusation of misdemeanor against them , much lesse of treason , whereof they were first impeach'd with such high clamors : but i conceive it was of purpose , to set them out of the way , that the new faction might passe things better amongst the peers . and it seemes they brought their work about ; for whilest they were thus reclused and absent , they may be sayed to be thrust out of doores , and ejected out of their owne proper ancient inheritance , and the tower wherein they were cast might be called limbo patrum all the while . peregrin . but would not all this , with those unparallell'd bills of grace you mentioned in your first discourse , which had formerly passed , suffice to beget a good understanding , and make them confide in their king ? patricius . no , but the passing of these bills of grace , were term'd acts of duty in his majesty ; they went so far in their demands that 't was not sufficient for him to give up his tower , 〈◊〉 fleet-royall , his magazines , his ports , castl●… and servants , but he must deliver up his swor●… into their hands , all the souldiery & military forces of the land ; nay , he must give up his very understanding unto them ; he must resigne his own reason , and with an implicit faith or blind obedience , he must believe all they did was to make him glorious ; and if at any time he admonished them , o●… prescribed wayes for them to proceed and expedit matters , or if he advised them in any thing , they took it in a kind of indignation , and 't was presently cryed up to be breach of priviledge . peregrin . breach of priviledge forsooth , there is no way in my conceit , to make a king more inglorious , both at home and abroad , then to disarme him ; and to take from him the command and disposing of the militia throughout his kingdome , is directly to disarm him , & wrest the sword out of his hand : and how then can he be termed a defendor ? how can he defend either himself , or others ? 't is the onely way to expose him to scorn and derision ; truly , as i conceive , that demand of the militia was a thing not only unfit for them to ask , but for him to grant . but , sir , what shold be the reson which mov'd them to make that insolent proposall ? patricius . they cry'd out that the kingdom was upon point of being ruin'd ; that it was in the very jawes of destruction ; that there were forreign and in-land plots against it : all which are prov'd long since to be nothing else but meere chymera's ; yet people for the most part continue still so grossely besotted , that they cannot perceive to this day , that these forg'd feares , these utopian plots , those publick idea's were fram'd of purpose , that they might take all the martiall power into their hands ; that so they might without controulment cast the government of church and state into what mold they pleased , and ingrosse the chiefest offices to themselves : and from these imaginary invisible dangers proceeded these visible calamities , and grinding palpable pressures which hath accompanied this odious warre ever since . peregrin . herein methinks , your statists have shewne themselves politique enough , but not so prudent & honest ; for prudence & policy , though they often agree in the end , yet they differ in election of the meanes to compasse their ends : the one serves himself of truth , strength of reason , integrity , and gallantnesse in their proceedings ; the other of fictions , fraudulence , lies , and other sinister meanes ; the work of the one is lasting and permanent , the others worke moulders away , and ends in infamy at last ; for fraud and frost alwaies end foule . but how did they requite that most rare and high unexampled trust his majesty reposed in them , when he before passed that fatall act of continuance , a greater trust then ever english king put in parliament ? how did they performe their solemn promise and deepe protestations , to make him the most glorious ( at home and abroad ) the richest and best belovedst king that ever raigned in that island . patricius . herein i must confesse , they held very ill correspondence with him , for the more he trusted them , the more diffident they grew of him ; and truly , sir , herein white differs not so much from black , as their actions have been disconsonant to their words : touching the first promise , to make him glorious ; if to suffer a neighbouring nation ( the scot ) to demand and obtain what they pleased of him ; if to break capitulations of peace with a great forrein prince ( the french king ) by the renvoy of the capuchins , and divers other acts ; if to bring the dregs and riffraffe of the city to domineere before his court-gate , notwithstanding his proclamations of repressing them ; if to confront him and seek his life by fire and sword in open field , by open desiance , and putting him upon a defensive war ; if to vote his queen a traytresse , to shoot at her , to way-lay her , to destroy her , if to hinder the reading of his proclamations , and the sleighting of his declarations ( enclosed in letters sign'd and seal'd with his own hand ) for fear they shold bring the people to their wits again ; if to call them fetters of gold , divellish devises , fraught with doctrines of division , reall mistakes , absurd suppositions , though ther never dropt from princes pen , more full , more rationall and strong sinewy expressions ; if to suffer every shallow-brain'd scolist to preach , every pamphletter to print , every rotten-hearted man or woman to prate what they please of him and his queen ▪ if to sleight his often acknowledgment , condissentions , retractions , pronunciations of peace , and proffers of pardon ; if to endeavour to bring him to a kind of servile submission ; if to bar him of the attendance of his domestiques , to abuse and imprison his messengers , to hang his servants for obeying his commission ; if to prefer the safety and repute of five ordinary men , before the honour of their king , and being actually impeach'd of treason , to bring them in a kind of triumph to his house ; if for subjects to article , treat and capitulate with him ; if to tamper with his conscience , and make him forget the solemn sacramentall oath he took at his coronation ; if to devest him of all regall rights , to take from him the election of his servants and officers , and bring him back to a kind of minority ; if this be to make a king glorious , our king is made glorious enough . touching the second promise to make him the richest king that ever was ; if to denude him of his native rights , to declare that he hath no property in any thing but by way of trust , not so much property as an elective king ; if to take away his customs of inheritance ; if to take from him his exchequer and mint , if to thrust him out of his own towns , to suffer a lowsie citizen to lie in his beds within his royall castle of windsor , when he himself would have come thither to lodg ; if to enforce him to a defensive war , and cause him to engage his jewells and plate , and so plunge him in a bottomlesse gulph of debt for his necessary defence ; if to anticipate his revenue royall , and reduce him to such exigents that he hath scarce the subsistence of an ordinary gentleman ; if this be to make a rich king , then is our king made sufficiently rich . concerning their third promise , to make him the best belovedst king that ever was ; if to cast all the aspersions that possibly could be devised upon his government by publique elaborat remonstrances ; if to suffer and give texts to the strongest lung'd pulpiteers to poyson the hearts of his subjects , to intoxicat their brains with fumes of forg'd jealousies , to possesse them with an opinion , that he is a papist in his heart , and consequently hath a design to introduce popery ; if to sleight his words , his promises , his asseverations , oaths and protestations , when he calls heaven and earth to witnesse , when he desires no blessing otherwise to fall upon himself , his wife and children , with other pathetick deep-fetcht expressions , that wold have made the meanest of those millions of christians which are his vassals , to be believed ; if to protect delinquents , and proclaim'd traytors against him ; if to suscitate , authorise , and encourage all sorts of subjects to heave up their hands against him , and levy armes to emancepate themselves from that naturall allegiance , loyalty , and subjection , wherein , they and their fore-fathers were ever tyed to his royall progenitors ; if to make them swear and damn themselves into a rebellion ; if this be to make a king beloved , then this parliament hath made king charles the best beloved king that ever was in england . peregrin . i cannot compare this rebellion in england , more properly then to that in this kingdom , in king iohn's time , which in our french chronicle beares to this day the infamous name of iaquerie de beauvoisin ; the peasans then out of a surfeit of plenty , had grown up to that height of insolency , that they confronted the noblesse and gentry ▪ they gathered in multitudes , and put themselves in armes to suppresse , or rather extinguish them ; and this popular tumult never ceased , till charles le sage debell'd it ; and it made the kings of france more puissant ever since , for it much increased their finances , in regard that those extraordinary taxes which the people imposed upon themselves for the support of the war , hath continued ever since a firm revenue to the crown ; which makes me think of a facecious speech of the late henry the great , to them of orleans : for wheras a new imposition was laid upon the townsmen during the league by monsieur de la chastre , who was a great stickler in those wars ; they petitioned henry the fourth , that he wold be pleased to take off that taxe , the king asked them , who had laid that taxe upon them ? they said monsieur de la chastre , during the time of the league , the king replyed , puis que monsieur de la chatre vous à liguè qu'il vous destigue , since monsieur de la chastre hath leagu'd you , let monsieur de la chastre unleague you , and so the said taxe continueth to this day . i have observed in your chronicles that it hath bin the fate of your english kings to be baffled often by petty companions ; as iack straw , wat tyler , cade , warbecke and symnel . a waspe may somtimes do a shrewd turn to the eagle , as you said before ; your island hath bin fruitfull for rebellions , for i think ther hapned near upon a hundred since the last conquest , the city of london , as i remember , in your story hath rebelled seven times at least , and forfeited her charter i know not how often , but she bled soundly for it at last , and commonly , the better your princes were , the worse your people have been ; as the case stands , i see no way for the king to establish a setled peace , but by making a fifth conquest of you ; and for london , ther must be a way found to prick that tympany of pride wherwith she swells so much . patricius . 't is true , ther has bin from time to time many odd insurrections in england , but our king gathered a greater strength out of them afterwards , the inconstant people are alwayes accessary to their own miseries : kings prerogatives are like the ocean , which as the civilians tell us , if he lose in one pla●…e , he gets ground in another . cares and crosses ride behind kings , clowds hang over them . they may be eclypsed a while , but they will shine afterwards with a stronger lustre . our gracious soverain hath passed a kind of ordeal , a fiery triall ; he while now hath bin matriculated and serv'd part of an apprentiship in the school of affliction ; i hope god will please shortly to cancell the indenture , and restore him to a sweeter liberty then ever . this discourse was stopp'd in the press by the tyranny of the times , and not suffer'd to see open light till now . a sober and seasonable memorandum sent to the right honourable philip late earl of pembrock , and montgomery , &c. to mind him of the particular sacred ties ( besides the common oath of alleageance and supremacy ) wereby he was bound to adhere to the king his liege lord and master . presented unto him in the hottest brunt of the late civill wars . iuramentum ligamen conscientiae maximum . london , printed in the year , . to the right honourable , philip earl of pembrock , and montgomery , knight of the bath ; knight of the most noble order of the garter ; gentleman of his majesties bed-chamber , and one of his most honorable privy counsell , &c. my lord , this letter requires no apology , much lesse any pardon , but may expect rather a good reception and thanks , when your lordship hath seriously perused the contents , and ruminated well upon the matter it treats of by weighing it in your second and third thoughts which usually carry with them a greater advantage of wisdom : it concerns not your body , or temporall estate , but things reflecting upon the noblest part of you , your soul , which being a beam of immortality , and a type of the almighty , is incomparably more precious , and rendereth all other earthly things to be but bables and transitory trifles . now , the strongest tye , the solemnest engagement and stipulation that can be betwixt the soul and her creator , is an oath . i do not understand common tumultuary rash oaths , proceeding from an ill habit , or heat of passion upon sudden contingencies , for such oaths bind one to nought else but to repentance : no , i mean serious and legall oaths , taken with a calm prepared spirit , either for the asserting of truth , and conviction of falshood , or for fidelitie in the execution of some office or binding to civill obedience and loyaltie , which is one of the essentiall parts of a christian ; such publick oaths legally made with the royall assent of the soveraigne from whom they receive both legalitie and life ( else they are invalid and unwarrantable ) as they are religious acts in their own nature , so is the taking and observance of them part of gods honor , and there can be nothing more derogatory to the high majesty and holinesse of his name , nothing more dangerous , destructive and damnable to humane souls then the infringment and eluding of them , or omission in the performance of them . which makes the turks , of whom christians in this particular may learn a tender peece of humanity , to be so cautious , that they seldom or never administer an oath to greek , jew , or any other nation , and the reason is , that if the party sworn doth take that oath upon hopes of some advantage , or for evading of danger and punishment , and afterwards rescinds it , they think themselves to be involved in the perjury , and so accessary to his damnation : our civill law hath a canon consonant to this , which is , mortale peccatum est ei praestare juramentum , quem scio verisimiliter violaturum ; 't is a mortall sin to administer an oath to him who i probably know will break it ; to this may allude another wholesome saying , a false oath is damnable , a true oath dangerous , none at all the safest . how much then have they to answer for , who of late yeares have fram'd such formidable coercive generall oaths to serve them for engins of state to lay battery to the consciences and soules of poor men , and those without the assent of their soveraign , and opposit point blank to former oaths they themselves had taken : these kind of oaths the city of london hath swallowed lately in grosse , and the country in detaile , which makes me confidently beleeve that if ever that saying of the holy prophet , the land mournes for oaths , was appliable to any part of the habitable earth , it may be now applied to this reprobate iland . but now i come to the maine of my purpose , and to those oaths your lordship hath taken before this distracted time , which the world knowes , and your conscience can testifie , were divers ; they were all of them solemn , and some of them sacramentall oaths ( and indeed , every solemn oath among the antients was held a sacrament : ) they all implyed , and imposed an indispensible fidelity , truth and loyalty from you to your soveraign prince , your liege lord and master the king : i will make some instances : your lordship took an oath when knight of the bath to love your soveraign above all earthly creatures , and for his right and dignity to live and die &c. by the oath of supremacy you swear to beare faith and true allegeance to the kings highnesse , and to your power to defend all ●…urisdictions , priviledges , preheminences and authorities belonging to his highnesse &c. your lordship took an oath when privie counsellor , to be a true and faithfull servant unto him , and if you knew or understood of any manner of thing to be attempted , done , or spoken against his majesties person , honour , crown , or dignity , you swore to let , and withstand the same to the uttermost of your power , and either cause it to be revealed to himself , or to others of his privy counsell ; the oaths you took when bedchamber man , and l. chamberlain bind you as strictly to his person . your lordship may also call to memorie when you were installed knight of the garter , ( whereof you are now the oldest living except k ▪ of denmark ) you solemnly swore to defend the honour and quarrels , the rights and lordship of your ▪ soveraigne : now the record tells us that the chiefest ground of instituting the said order by that heroick prince edward the third was , that he might have choice gallant men , who by oath and honour should adhere unto him in all dangers , and difficulties , and that by way of reciprocation hee should protect and defend them , which made alfonso duke of calabria so much importune henry the eight to install him one of the knights of the garter , that he might engage king harry to protect him against charles the eighth , who threatned then the conquest of naples . how your lordship hath acquitted your self of the performance of these oaths , your conscience ( that bosome record ) can make the best affidavit ; some of them oblige you ●…o live and dye with king charles , but what oaths or any thing like an oath binds you to live and die with the house of commons , as your lordship often gives out you will , i am yet to learne : unlesse that house which hath not power as much as to administer an oath ( much lesse to make one ) can absolve you from your former oaths , or haply by their omnipotence dispence with you for the observance of them . touching the politicall capacitie of the king , i feare that will be a weak plea for your lordship before the tribunall of heaven , and they who ▪ whisper such chimeras into your ears , abuse you in grosse ; but put case there were such a thing as politicall capacitie distinct from the personal , which to a true rationall man is one of the grossest buls that can be , yet these forementioned oaths relate most of them meerly unto the kings person , the individuall person of king charles , as you are his domestick counsellor , and cubicular servant . my lord , i take leave to tell your lordship ( and the spectator sees sometimes more then the gamester ) that the world extreamely marvels at you more then others , and it makes those who wish you best to be transformed to wonder , that your lordship shold be the first of your race who deserted the crown , which one of your progenitors said , he would still follow though it were thrown upon an hedg : had your princely brother ( william earl of pembrock ) bin living he wold have bin sooner torn by wild horses than have banded against it , or abandoned the king his master , and fallen to such grosse idolatry as to worship the beast with many heads . the world also stands astonished that you shold confederate to bring into the bowels of the land , and make elogiums in some of your speeches of that hungry people which have bin from all times so crosse and fatall to the english nation , and particularly to your own honour : many thousands do wonder that your lordship shold be brought to persecute with so much animosity and hatred that reverend order in gods church ( episcopacy ) which is contemporary with christianity it self , and wherunto you had once designed , and devoted one of your dearest sons so solemnly . my lord , if this monster of reformation ( which is like an infernall spirit clad in white , and hath a cloven head as well as feet ) prevailes , you shall find the same destiny will attend poor england , as did bohemia which was one of the flourishingst kingdoms upon that part of the earth , which happen'd thus : the common people ther repind at the hierarchy and riches of the church , therupon a parliament was pack'd where bishops were abolished , what followed ? the nobles and gentry went down next , and afterwards the crown it self , and so it became a popular confus'd anarchicall state , and a stage of bloud a long time , so that at last , when this magot had done working in the brains of the foolish peeple , they were glad to have recourse to monarchy again after a world of calamities ; though it degenerated from a successive kingdom to an elective . methinks , my lord , under favour that those notorious visible judgements which have fallen upon these refiners of reform'd religion shold unbeguile your lordship , and open your eyes : for the hand of heaven never appeared so clearly in any humane actions : your lordship may well remember what became of the hothams , and sir alexander cary , who were the two fatall wretches that began the war first , one in the north , the other in the south , plymouth and hull . your lordship may be also pleased to remember what became of brooks the lord , and hampden , the first whereof was dispatched by a deaf and dumb man out of an ancient church ( at litchfield ) which he was battering , and that suddenly also , for he fell down stone dead in the twinkling of an eye ; now , one of the greatest cavils he had against our liturgy was a clause of a prayer ther against sudden death ; besides , the fag end of his grace in that journey was , that if the design was not pleasing to god , he might perish in the action : for the other ( hampden ) he besprinkled with his bloud , and received his death upon the same clod of earth in buckingham-shire where he had first assembled the poor country people like so many geese to drive them gaggling in a mutiny to london with the protestation in their caps , which hath bin since torn in flitters , and is now grown obsolet and quite out of use . touching pym and stroud , those two worthy champions of the utopian cause , the first being opened , his stomack and guts were found to be full of pellets of bloud , the other had little or no brain in his skull being dead , and lesse when he was living : touching those who carryed the first scandalous remonstrance ( that work of night and the verdict of a starv'd jury ) to welcome the king from scotland , they have bin since ( your lordship knows well ) the chief of the eleven members impeached by the house . and now they are a kind of runnagates beyond the seas , scorn'd by all mankind , and baffled every where , yea , even by the boors of holland , and not daring to peep in any populous town but by owle-light . moreover , i believe your lordship hath good cause to remember that the same kind of riotous rascals , which rabbled the k. out of town , did drive away the speaker in like manner with many of their memberships ( amongst whom your lordship was fairly on his way , ) to seek shelter of their janizaries the redcoats : your lordship must needs find what deadly fewds fal daily ' twix●… the presbyterian and the independent , the two fiery brands that have put this poor isle so long in combustion . but 't is worthy your lordships speciall notice how your dear brethren the scots ( whom your lordship so highly magnified in some of your publick speeches ) who were at first brought in for hirelings against the king for them , offer themselves now to come in against them for the king : your lordship cannot be ignorant of the sundry clashes that have bin 'twixt the city and their memberships , and 'twixt their memberships and their men of war or military officers , who have often wav'd and disobeyed their commands : how this tatterdimallian army hath reduc'd this cow'd city , the cheated country , and their once all-commanding masters , to a perfect passe of slavery , to a tru asinin condition ; they crow over all the ancient nobility and gentry of the kindom , though ther be not found amongst them all but two knights ; and 't is well known ther be hundreds of privat gentlemen in the kingdom , the poorest of whom , is able to buy this whole host with the generall himself and all the commanders : but 't is not the first time , that the kings and nobility of england have bin baffled by petty companions : i have read of iack straw , wat tyler , and ket the tanner , with divers others that did so , but being suppressed it tended to the advantage of the king at last ; and what a world of examples are ther in our story , that those noblemen who banded against the crown , the revenge of heaven ever found them out early or late at last . these , with a black cloud of reciprocall judgments more , which have come home to these reformers very doors , shew that the hand of divine justice is in 't , and the holy prophet tells us , when gods judgments are upon earth , then the inhabitants shall learn justice . touching your lordship in particular , you have not , under favour , escap'd without some already , and i wish more may not follow ; your lordship may remember you lost one son at bridgenorth , your dear daughter at oxford , your son-in-law at newbury , your daughter-in-law at the charter-house of an infamous disease , how sick your eldest son hath bin ; how part of your house was burnt in the country , with others which i will not now mention . i will conclude this point with an observation of the most monstrous number of witches that have swarm'd since these wars against the king , more ( i dare say ) then have bin in this island since the devil tempted eve ; for in two counties only , viz. suffolk and essex , ther have bin near upon three hundred arraign'd , and eightscore executed ( as i have it from the clerks of the peace of those counties ; ) what a barbarous devilish office one had , under colour of examination , to torment poor silly women with watchings , pinchings and other artifices to find them for witches : how others call'd spirits by a new invention of villany were conniv'd at for seizing upon young children , and 〈◊〉 them on shipboard , where having their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they were so transform'd that their 〈◊〉 could not know them , and so were carryed over for new schismaticall plantations to new-england and other seminaries of rebellion . my lord , ther is no villany that can enter into the imagination of man hath bin left here uncommitted ; no crime from the highest treason to the meanest trespasse , but these reformers are guilty of . what horrid acts of prophanes have bin perpetrated up and down ! the monuments of the dead have bin rifled ! horses have bin watered at the church font , and fed upon the holy table ! widows , orphans , and hospitals have bin commonly robb'd , and gods house hath bin plunder'd more then any ! with what infandous blasphemies have pulpits rung ! one crying out , that this parliament was as necessary for our reformation , as the comming of christ was for our redemp●…ion : another belching out , that if god almighty did not prosper this cause , 't were fitting he shold change places with the devil : another , that the worst thing our savoour did , was the making of the dominical prayer , and saving the thief upon the crosse. o immortal god , is it possible that england shold produce such monsters , or rather such infernal fiends shap'd with humane bodies ! yet your lordship sides with these men , though they be enemies to the cross , to the church , and to the very name of iesus christ ; i 'le instance only in two who were esteem'd the oracles of this holy reformation , petrs , and saltmarsh ; the first is known by thousands to be an infamous , jugling and scandalous villaine , among other feats , he got the mother and daughter with child , as it was offered to be publickly proved ; i could speak much of the other , but being dead , let it suffice that he dyed mad and desperate , yet these were accounted the two apostles of the times . my lord , 't is high time for you to recollect your self , to enter into the private closet of your thoughts , and summon them all to counsel upon your pillow ; consider well the slavish condition your dear country is in , weigh well the sad case your liege lord and master is in , how he is bereav'd of his queen , his children , his servants , his liberty , his chaplains , and of every thing in which there is any comfort ; observe well , how neverthelesse , god almighty works in him by inspiring him with equality and calmnesse of mind , with patience , prudence and constancy , how hee makes his very crosses to stoop unto him , when his subjects will not : consider the monstrousnesse of the propositions that are tendred him , wherein no lesse then crown , scepter , and sword , which are things in-alienable from majesty , are in effect demanded , nay , they would have him transmit , and resign his very intellectuals unto them , not only so , but they would have him make a sacrifice of his soul , by forcing him to violate that solemne sacramentall oath hee took at his coronation when hee was no minor , but come to a full maturity of reason and judgement : make it your own case , my lord , and that 's the best way to judge of his : think upon the multiplicity of solemne astringing oathes your lordship hath taken , most whereof directly and solely enjoyne faith and loyalty to his person ; oh my lord ! wrong not your soule so much , in comparison of whom your body is but a rag of rottennesse . consider that acts of loyalty to the crown are the fairest columns to bear up a noblemans name to future ages , and register it in the temple of immortality . reconcile your self therefore speedily unto your liege lord and master , think upon the infinit private obligations you have had both to sire and son : the father kiss'd you often , kisse you now the sun lest he be too angry ; and kings , you will find , my lord , are like the sun in the heavens , which may be clouded for a time , yet he is still in his sphear , and will break out againe and shine as gloriously as ever ; let me tell your lordship that the people begin to grow extream weary of their physitians , they find the remedy to be far worse then their former disease ; nay they stick not to call some of them meer quacksalvers rather then physitians ; some goe further , & say they are no more a parliament then a pye-powder court at bartholmew-fair , ther being all the essentiall parts of a true parliament wanting in this , as fairnesse of elections , freedome of speech , fulnesse of members , nor have they any head at all ; besides , they have broken all the fundamental rules , and priviledges of parliament , and dishonoured that high court more then any thing else : they have ravish'd magna charta which they are sworn to maintain , taken away our birth-right therby , and transgressed all the laws of heaven and earth : lastly , they have most perjuriously betrayed the trust the king reposed in them , and no lesse the trust their country reposed in them , so that if reason and law were now in date , by the breach of their priviledges , and by betraying the said double trust that is put in them , they have dissolved themselves ipso facto i cannot tell how many thousand times , notwithstanding that monstrous grant of the kings , that fatall act of continuance : and truly , my lord , i am not to this day satisfied of the legality ( though i am satisfied of the forciblenesse of that act ) whether it was in his majesties power to passe it or no ; for the law ever presupposeth these clauses in all concessions of grace , in all patents , charters , and grants whatsoever the king passeth , salvo jure regio , salvo jure coronae . to conclude , as i presume to give your lordship these humble cautions and advice in particular , so i offer it to all other of your rank , office , order and relations , who have souls to save , and who by solemn indispensable oaths have ingaged themseves to be tru and loyall to the person of king charls . touching his political capacity , it is a fancy which hath bin exploded in all other parliaments except in that mad infamous parliament wher it was first hatched ; that which bears upon record the name of insanum parliamentum to all posterity , but many acts have passed since that , it shold be high and horrible treason to separat or distinguish the person of the king from his power ; i believe , as i said before , this distinction will not serve their turn at the dreadful bar of divine justice in the other world : indeed that rule of the pagans makes for them , si iusjurandum violandum est , tyrannis causâ violandum est , if an oath be any way violable , 't is to get a kingdom : we find by woful experience that according to this maxime they have made themselves all kings by violation of so many oaths ; they have monopoliz'd the whole power and wealth of the kingdom in their own hands ; they cut , shuffle , deal , and turn up what trump they please , being judges and parties in every thing . my lord , he who presents these humble advertisments to your lordship , is one who is inclin'd to the parliament of engl. in as high a degree of affection as possibly a free-born subject can be ; one besides , who wisheth your lordships good , with the preservation of your safety and honour more really then he whom you intrust with your secretest affaires , or the white iew of the upper house , who hath infused such pernicious principles into you ; moreover , one who hath some drops of bloud running in his veins , which may claim kindred with your lordship : and lastly , he is one who would kiss your feet , in lieu of your hands , if your lordship wold be so sensible of the most desperat case of your poor country , as to employ the interests , the opinion and power you have to restore the king your master by english waies , rather then a hungry forrein people , who are like to bring nothing but destruction in the van , confusion in the rear , and rapine in the middle , shold have the honour of so glorious a work . so humbly hoping your lordship will not take with the left hand , what i offer with the right , i rest , from the prison of the fleet . septembris . your lordships truly devoted servant . i. h. his late majesties royal declaration , or manifesto to all forrein princes and states , touching his constancy in the protestant religion . being traduced abroad by some malicious and lying agents , that he was wavering therin , and upon the high road of returning to rome . printed in the year , . to the unbiass'd reder . it may be said that mischief in one particular hath somthing of vertue in it , which is , that the contrivers and instruments thereof are still stirring and watchfull . they are commonly more pragmaticall and fuller of devices then those sober-minded men , who while they go on still in the plaine road of reason , having the king , and knowne lawes to justifie and protect them , hold themselfs secure enough , and so think no hurt ; iudas eyes were open to betray his master , while the rest of his fellow-servants were quietly asleep . the members at westminster were men of the first gang , for their mischievous braines were alwayes at work how to compasse their ends ; and one of their prime policies in order thereunto was to cast asspersions on their king , thereby to alienat the affections and fidelity of his peeple from him ●…notwithstanding that besides their pub●…ick declarations they made new oaths and protestations , whereby they swore to make him the best belov'd king that ever was ; ) nor did this diabolicall malice terminat only within the bounds of his own dominions , but it extended to infect other princes and states of the reformed churches abroad to make him suspected in his religion , & that he was branling in his belief , and upon the high way to rome ; to which purpose they sent missives and clandestine emissaries to divers places beyond the seas , whereof forren authors make mention in their writings . at that time when this was in the height of action , the passage from london to oxford , where the king kept then his court , was so narrowly blockd up , that a fly could scarce passe ; some ladies of honor being search'd in an unseemly and barbarous manner ; whereupon the penner of the following declaration , finding his royal master to be so grosly traduced , made his duty to go beyond all presumptions , by causing the sayd declaration to be printed and publish'd in latin , french and english , whereof great numbers were sent beyond the seas to france , holland , germany , suisserland , denmark , swethland , and to the english plantations abroad , to vindicat his majesty in this point , which produc'd very happy and advantagious effects for salmtisius , and other forrin writers of great esteem speake of it in their printed works . the declaration was as followeth . carolus , singulari omnipotentis dei providentia angliae , scotiae , franciae & hiberniae rex , fidei defensor , &c. universis et singulis qui praesens hoc scriptum ceu protestationem inspexerint , potissimum reformatae religionis cultoribus cujuscunque sint gentis , gradus , aut conditionis , salutem , &c. cum ad aures nostras non ita pridem fama pervenerit , sinistros quosdam rumores , literasque politica vel perniciosa potiùs quorundam industriâ sparsas esse , & nonnullis protestantium ecclesiis in exteris partibus emissas , nobis esse animum & consilium ab illa orthodoxa religione quam ab incunabulis imbibimus , & ad hoc usque momentum per integrum vitae nostrae curriculum amplexi sumus recedendi ; & papismum in haec regna iterum introducendi , quae conjectura , ceu nefanda potius calumnia nullo prorsus nixa vel imaginabili fundamento horrendos hosce tumultus , & rabiem plusquàm belluinam in anglia suscitavit sub pretextu cujusdam ( chimericae ) reformationis regimini , legibusque hujus dominii non solum incongruae , sed incompatibilis : volumus , uttoti christiano orbi innotescat , ne minimam quidem animum nostrum incidisse cogitatiunculam hoc aggrediendi , aut transversum unguem ab illa religione discedendi quam cum corona , septroque hujus regni solenni , & sacramentali juramento tenemur profiteri , protegere & propugnare . nectantum constantissima nostra praxis , & quotidiana in exercitiis praefa●…ae religionis praesentia , cum crebris in facie nostrorum agminum asseverationibus , publicisque procerum hujus regni testimoniis , & sedula in regiam nostram sobolem educando circumspectione ( omissis plurimis aliis argumentis ) luculentissimè hoc demonstrat , sed etiam faelicissimum illud matrimonium quod inter nostram primogenitam , & illustrissimum principem 〈◊〉 sponte contraximus , idem fortissimè attestatur : quo nuptiali faedere insuper constat , nobis non esse propositum illam profiteri solummodo , sed expandere , & corroborare quantum in nobis situm est . hanc sacrosanctam anglicanae christi ecclesiae religionem , tot theologorum convocationibus sancitam , tot comitiorum edictis confirmatam , tot regiis diplomatibus stabilitam , una cum regimine ecclesiastico , & liturgia ei annexa , quam liturgiam , regimenque celebriores protestantium authores tam germani , quam galli , tam dani quam helvetici , tam batavi , quam bohemi multis elogiis nec sine quadam invidia in suis publicis scrip●…is comproban●… & applaudunt , ut in transactionibus dordrechtanae synodus , cui nonnulli nostrorum praesulum , quorum dignitati debi●…a prestita fuit reverentia , interfuerunt , apparet istam , inquimus religionem , quam regius noster pater ( beatissimae memoriae ) in illa celeberrima fidei suae confessione omnibus christianis principibus ( ut & haec praesens nostra protestatio exhibita ) publicè asserit : istam , istam religionem solenniter protestamur , nos integram , sartam-tectam , & inviolabilem conservaturos , & pro virili nostro ( divino adjuvante numine ) usque ad extremam vitae nostrae periodum protecturos , & omnibus nostris ecclesiasticis pro muneris nostri , & supradicti sacrosancti juramenti ratione doceri , & praedicari curaturos . quapropter injungimus & in mandatis damus omnibus ministris nostris in exteris partibus tam legatis , quam residentibus , agentibusque & nunciis , reliquisque nostris subditis ubicunque orbis christiani terrarum aut curiositatis aut comercii gracia degentibus , hanc solennem & sinceram nostram protestationem , quandocunque sese obtulerit loci & temporis oportunitas , communicare , asserere , asseverare . dat. in academia et civitate nostra oxoniensi pridie idus maii , . charles by the special providence of almighty god , king of england , scotland , france , and ireland , defendor of the faith , &c. to all who profess the tru reformed protestant religion , of what nation , degree , and condition soever they be to whom this present declaration shall come , greeting . wheras we are given to understand , that many false rumors , and scandalous letters are spread up and down amongst the reforme●… churches in forein parts by the pollitick , or rather the pernitious industry of som ill-affected persons , that we have an inclination to recede from that orthodox religion , which we were born , baptized , and bred in , & which we have firmly professed and practised throughout the whol course of our life to this moment , and that we intend to give way to the introduction , and publick exercise of popery again in our dominions : which conjecture or rather most detestable calumny , being grounded upon no imaginable foundation , hath raised these horrid tumults , and more then barbarous wars throughout this flourishing island , under pretext of a kind of reformation , which wold not only prove incongruous , but incompatible with the fundamental laws and government of this kingdom , we do desire that the whol christian world shold take notice and rest assured , that we never entertained in our imagination the least thought to attempt such a thing , or to depart a jot from that holy religion , which when we received the crown and scepter of this kingdom , vve took a most solemn sacramental oath to profess and protect . nor doth our most constant practise and quotidian visible presence in the exercise of this sole religion , with so many asseverations in the head of our armies , and the publick attestation of our barons , with the circumspection used in the education of our royall off-spring , besides divers other undeniable arguments , only demonstrate this ; but also that happy alliance of marriage , vve contracted 'twixt our eldest daughter , and the illustrious prince of orenge , most clearly confirmes the reality of our intentions herein ; by which nuptial ingagement it appears further , that our endeavours are not only to make a bare profession thereof in our own dominions , but to inlarge and corroborate it abroad as much as lieth in our power : this most holy religion of the anglican church , ordained by so many convocations of learned divines , confirmed by so many acts of national parliaments , and strengthned by so many royal proclamations , together with the ecclesiastick discipline , and liturgy therunto appertaining , which liturgy and discipline , the most eminent of protestant authors , as well germans as french ; as well danes as swedes and swittzens ; as well belgians as bohemians , do with many elogies ( and not without a kind of envy ) approve and applaud in their publick writings , particularly in the transactions of the synod of dort , wherin besides other of our divines ( who afterwards were prelates ) one of our bishops assisted , to whose dignity all due respects and precedency was given : this religion we say , which our royal father of blessed memory doth publickly assert in his famous confession addres'd , as we also do this our protestation , to all christian princes ; this , this most holy religion , with the hierarchy and liturgy therof , we solemnly protest , that by the help of almighty god , we will endeavour to our utmost power , and last period of our life , to keep entire and inviolable , and will be careful , according to our duty to heaven , and the tenor of the aforesaid most sacred oath at our coronation , that all our ecclesiasticks in their several degrees and incumbences shall preach and practise the same . vvherfore vve enjoyn and command all our ministers of state beyond the seas , aswell ambassadors as residents , agents , and messengers , and vve desire all the rest of our loving subjects that sojourn either for curiosity or commerce in any forein parts , to communicate , uphold and assert this our solemn and sincere protestation when opportunity of time and place shall be offered . charles , par la providence de dieu roy de la grand ' bretagne , de france , et d' irlande , defenseur de la foy , &c. a tous ceux qui ceste presente declaration verront , particulierement a ceux de la religion reformee de quelque nation , degreou condition qu'ils soient , salut . ayant receu advis de bonne main que plusieurs faux rapports & lettres sont esparses parmi les eglises reformees de là la mer , par la politique , ou plustost la pernicieuse industrie de personnes mal affectionnes a nostre government ; que nous auons dessein a receder de celle religion que nous auons professè & pratiquè tout le temps de nostre vie iusques a present ; & de vouloir introduire la papautè derechef en nos dominions , laquelle conjecture , ou calumnie plustost , appuyee sur nul fundement imaginable , a suscitè ces horribles tumultes & allumè le feu d' une tressanglante guerre en tous les quatre coins de ceste fleurissante monarchie , soubs pretexte d' une ( chymerique ) reformation , la quelle seroit incompatible avec le governement & les loix fondementales de ce royaume . nous desi●…ons , quil soit notoire a tout le monde , que la moindre pensee de ce faire n●… a pas entree en nostre imagination , de departir ancunement de cell ' orthodoxe religion , qu' auec la couronne & le sceptre de ce royaume nous sommes tenus par un serment solennel & sacramentaire a proteger & defendre . ce qu' appert non seulement par nostre quotidienne presence es exercies de la dite religion , avec , tan●… d' asseverations a la teste de nos armees , & la publicque attestation de nos barons , avec le soin que nous tenons en la nourrituredes princes & princesses nos ensans , mais le tres-heureux mariage que nous avons conclu entre la nostre plus aisnee , & le tres-illustrie prince d' orenge en est encore un tres-evident tesmoignage , par la quell ' alliance il appert aussy , que nostre desir est de n' en faire pas vne nue profession seulement dicelle , mais de la vouloir estendre & corroberer autant qu' il nous est possible : cest ' orthodoxe religion de leglise anglicane ordonnee par tant de conventione de teologues , confirmee par tant de arrests d' parlement , & fortifie par tant d' edicts royaux auec la discipline & la lyturgi●… a elle appartenant , laquelle discipline & lyturgie les plus celebres autheurs protestants , tant francois , qu' allemands ; tant seudois que suisses , tant belgiens que bohemiens approuent entierement & non sans quelqu envie en leur escrits particulierement en la synode de dort , ou un de nos euesques assistoit , & la reverence & precedence deue a sa dignite ecclesi●…stique luy fut exactement rendue : ceste tres-sainte religion que nostre feu pere de ●…res-heureuse memoire aduoue en sa celebre confession de la foy addressee come nous faisons ceste declaration a tous princes chrestiens ; nous protestons que moyennant la grace de dieu , nous tascherone de conseruer ceste religion inviolable , & en son entier selon la mesure de puissance que dieu amis entre nos mains ; et nous requerons & commandons a tous nos ministres d' estat tant ambassadeurs , que residens , agens ou messagers , & a tous autres nos subjects qui fontleurseiour es paysestrangers de communiquer , maintenir & adouuer cestenostre solennelle protestation toutes fois & quantes que l' ocasion se presentera . apologs , or fables mythologiz'd . out of whose moralls the state and history of the late unhappy distractions in great britain and ireland may be extracted ; some of which apologs have prov'd prophetical . — nil est nisi fabula mundus . london , printed in the year , . to my honored and known friend sir i. c. knight . sir , amongst many other barbarismes which like an impetuous torrent have lately rush'd in upon us , the interception and opening of letters is none of the least , for it hath quite bereft all ingenious spirits of that correspondency and sweet communication of fancy , which hath bin alwaies esteemed the best fuel of affection , and the very marrow of friendship . and truly , in my judgement , this custom may be termed not only a barbarisme , but the ba●…est kind of burglary that can be , 't is a plundering of the very brain , as is spoken in another place . we are reduced here to that servile condition , or rather to such a height of slavery , that we have nothing left which may entitle us free rationall creatures ; the thought it self cannot say 't is free , much less the tongue or pen. which makes me impart unto you the traverses of these turbulent times , under the following fables . i know you are an exquisite astronomer . i know the deep inspection you have in all parts of philosophy , i know you are a good herald , and i have found in your library sundry books of architecture , and comments upon vitruvius . the unfolding of these apologues will put you to it in all these , and will require ▪ your second , if not your third thoughts , and when you have concocted them well , i believe , ( else i am much deceived in your genius ) they will afford you som entertainment , and do the errand upon which they are sent , which is , to communicate unto you the most material passages of this long'd-for parlement , and of these sad confusions which have so unhing'd , distorted , transvers'd , tumbled and dislocated all things , that england may be termed now , in comparison of what it was , no other then an anagram of a kingdom . one thing i promise you , in the perusal of these parables , that you shall find no gingles in them , or any thing sordid or scurrilous , the common dialect and disease of these times . so i leave you to the gard and guidance , of god and vertu who do still advance their favorits , maugre the frownes of chance . your constant servant , i. h. the great conjunction , or , parlement of stars . upon a time , the stars complained to apollo , that he displayed his beams too much upon some malignant planets ; that the moone had too great a share of his influence , and that he was carryed away too much by her motion : they complained also , that the constellation of libra ( which holds the ballance of justice ) had but a dim light , and that the astrean court was grown altogether destructive , with divers other grievances . apollo hereupon , commanded mercury to summon a generall synod , where some out of every asterisme throughout the whole firmament were to meet ; apollo told them , i am placed here by the finger of the almighty , to be monarch of the skie , to be the measurer of time , and i goe upon his errand round about the worl●… every foure and twenty houres : i am also the fountaine of heate and light , which , though i use to dispence and diffuse in equall proportions through the whole universe ; yet there is difference 'twixt objects , a castle hath more of my light then a cottage , and the cedar hath more of me then the shrub , according to the common axiom , quicquid recipitur , recipitur ad modum recip●…entis . but touching the moon , ( the second great luminary ) i would have you know , that she is dearest unto mee , therefore let none repine that i cherish her with my beams , and confer more light on her then any other . touching the malignant planets , or any other star , of what magnitude soever , that moves not in a regular motion , or hath run any excentrick exorbitant course , or that would have made me to move out of the zodiak , i put them over unto you , that upon due legall examination and proof , they may be unspher'd or extinguished . but i would have this done with moderation ; i would have you to keep as neer as you can between the tropiques and temperate zones : i would have things reduced to their true principles , i wold have things reformed , not ruin'd ; i would have the spirit of malice and lying , the spirit of partiality and injustice , the spirit of tyranny and rigour , the base spirit of feare and jealousie to be farre from this glorious syderean synod ; i would have all private interests reflecting upon revenge or profit , to be utterly banished hence : moreover , i would not have you to make grievances , where no grievances are , or dangers where no dangers are . i would have no creation of dangers ; i would have you to husband time as parsimoniously as you can , lest by keeping too long together , and amusing the world with such tedious hopes of redress of grievances , you prove your self the greatest grievance at last , and so from starrs become comets : lastly , i would have you be cautious how you tamper with my soveraign power , and chop logicke with mee in that point ; you know what became of him who once presumed to meddle with my chariot . hereupon the whole host of heaven being constellated thus into one great body , fell into a serious deliberation of things , and apollo himself continued his presence , and sate often amongst them in his full lustre , but in the meane time , whilest they were in the midst of their consultations , many odde aspects , oppositions and conjunctions hapned between them : for some of the sporades , but specially those mongrel small vulgar stars , which make up the galaxia ( the milkie way in heaven ) gather in a tumultuous disorderly manner about the body of apollo , and commit many strange insolencies , which caused apollo ( taking young phosphorus the morning-star with him ) to retire himself , and in a just indignation to withdraw his light from the synod : so all began to be involv'd in a strange kind of confusion and obscurity ; they groaped in the dark , not knowing which way to move , or what course to take , all things went cancer-like retrograde , because the sun detained his wonted light and irradiations from them . morall . such as the sun is in the firmament , a monarch is in his kingdom : for , as the wisest of men saith , in the light of the kings countenance ther is life ; and i believe that to be the morall of this astrean fable . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . or , the great councell of birds . upon a time the birds met in councell , for redresse of som extravagancies that had flown unto the volatill empire ; nor was it the first time that birds met thus ; for the phrygian fabler tells us of divers meetings of theirs : and after him we read that apollonius thyaneus , undertook the interpretation of their language , and to be their drogoman . they thus assembled in one great covie by the call of the eagle their unquestioned hereditary king , and by vertue of his royal authority , complaints were brought , that divers cormorants and harpies , with other birds of prey , had got in amongst them , who did much annoy and invade the publick liberty : sundry other birds were questioned , which caused some to take a timely flight into another aire . as they were thus consulting for advancement of the common good , many rooks , horn-owles and sea-gulls flock'd together , and ●…luttered about the place they were assembled in , where they kept a hideous noise , and committed many outrages , and nothing cold satisfie them , but the griffons head , which was therfore chopt off , and offered up as a sacrifice to make them leave their chattering , and to appease their fury for the time . they fell foul afterwards upon the pies , who were used to be much reverenced , and to sit upon the highest pearch in that great assembly : they called them i dolatrous and inauspitious birds , they hated their mix'd colour , repined at their long train , they tore their white feathers , and were ready to peck out their very eyes : they did what they could to put them in owles feathers ( as the poor sheep was in the woolfs skin ) to make them the more hated , and to be star'd and hooted at whersoever they passed . the pies being thus scar'd , presented a petition to the royall eagle , and to this his great counsell , that they might be secured to repaire safely thither to sit and consult , according to the ancient lawes of the volatill empire continued so many ages without controllment or question : in which petition they inserted a protest or caveat , that no publique act shold passe in the interim . this supplication , both for matter and form , was excepted against , and cryed up to be high treason , specially that indefinite protest they had made , that no act whatsoever shold be of any validity without them , which was alledged to derogate from the high law-making power of that great counsell , and tended to retard and disturb the great affaires which were then in agitation : so the poor pies , as if by that petition they had like the black-bird voided lime to catch themselves , ( according to the proverb , turdus cacat sibi malum ) were suddenly hurryed away into a cage , and after ten long moneths canvassing of the point , they were unpearch'd , and rendered for ever uncapable to be members of that court , they were struck dumb and voice-less , and suddenly as it were blown up away thence , though without any force of powder , as once was plotted aginst them . but this was done when a thin number of the adverse birds had kept still together , and stuck close against them , and also after that the bill concerning them had bin once ejected , which they humbly conceived by the ancient order of that court could not be re-admitted in the same session . they petitioned from the place they were cooped in , that for heavens sake , for the honour of that noble counsell , for truth and justice sake , they ●…eing as free-born denisons of the aiery region , as any other volatills whatsoever , their charge might be perfected , that so they might be brought to a legall triall , and not forced to languish in such captivity . they pleaded to have done nothing but what they had precedents for : and touching the caveat they had inserted , it was a thing unusuall in every inferiour court of judicature , and had they forborn to have done it , they had betrayed their own nest , and done wrong to their successors . it was affirmed they had bin members of that body politique , long before those lower pearch'd birds , who now wold cast them out ; and that they had bin their best friends to introduce them to have any thing do do in that generall counsell : they prayed they might not be so cruelly used , as the solan goose , and redshanke had used them , who were not content to brail and clip their wings only , but to ●…ear them so , that they shold never grow again ; to handle them so unmercifully , was not the way to make their adversaries birds of paradice : in fine , they advised them to remember what the sick kite's mother answered him , when he desired her to pray to the gods for him , how canst thou , said she , expect any good from the gods , whose temples thou hast so violated ? at last , upon the importunity and pitifulness of their petitions , the accusation of treason , which kept such a noise at first , being declined against them , they were released in the morning , but cooped up again before night : and after the revolution of four full moons , they were restored again to a conditionall liberty , under which they remain till this day . ther wants not som , who affirm , that in that great counsell of birds , ther were som decoys ( and 't is well known where decoys were first bred ) who called in , not only these mongrill obstreperous birds from abroad to commit such outrages as were spoken of before , but drew after them also many of the greatest birds , who sate in that assembly , to follow them whither they listed : others , who were of a more generous extraction , disdained to be such buzzards , as to be carryed away hood-wincked in that manner , to be birds of their feather . thus a visible faction was hatched in this great counsell , as if the said decoyes had disgorged and let fall som grains of hemlock seeds amongst them to distemper their brains . or , as if som spinturnix , that fatall incendiary bird , or som ill-boding scritch-owle , which as stories tell us appeared once at rome , in a famous , though unfortunate great counsell ( when ther was a schism in the popedom ) had appeared likewise here . ther wanted not also amongst them som amphibious birds , as the barnacle , which is neither fish nor fowle ; and the cunning ba●…t , who sometimes professeth himself a bird , sometimes a mouse . i will not say ther were any paphlagonian birds amongst them , who are known to have double hearts . but 't is certain , that in this confusion ther were som malevolent birds , and many of them so young , that they were scarce fledg'd , who like the waspe in the fable , conspired to fire the eagles nest , ( and a wasp may somtimes do mischief to an eagle as a mouse to an elephant . ) moreover som of these light brained birds flew so high , that they seemed to arrogate to themselves , and exercise royall power , but foolishly ; for we know what became of the crow upon the ram's back , when she thought to imitate the eagle : and as it was observed that they were most eager to attempt those high insolensies against jove's bird , who had bin stark naked , and as bare as cootes , unlesse he had feathered them ; so that the little ant was more grateful to esops bird ; then those birds were to the eagle their liege lord and master . but the high-born bird with the two golden wings , the noble faulcons , the martlets , the ravens , the swan , the chough , and all the ancient birds of the mountains remained faithful and firm to the eagle , and scorned to be carryed away by such decoyes ; as also the generous ostriches , who unlesse they had had an extraordinary stomach , could not have digested such iron pills as were offered them . amongst other great birds which banded against the eagle , the flying dragons , green and white , were busie , specially the white ; and for the green , considering he was an ancient bird of the mountains , and that his progenitors had bin so renowned for their rare loyaly to the crown , every one wondered that he shold be drawn so far by the forefaid decoyes , as to be the first of his race that shold clap his wings against his soverain liege lord. the aforesaid destractions continued still , and increased more and more in that general convolation of birds ; therfore the turtle wold stay ther no longer , ther was so much gall amongst them : the pelecan flew away , he saw piety so vilified ; the dove was weary of their company , she found no simplicity and plain dealing amongst them : and the kings ▪ fisher , the halcyon ( the emblem of peace ) quite forsook them , he found so mnch jarring , dissentions , and bandings on all sides ; the swallow also , who had so ancient and honourable a rank amongst them , got into another aire , he fore-saw the weather was like to so be foul : and lastly , philomela , the queen of volatills , who was partner of the eagle's nest , abandoned them quite , and put a sea 'twixt her and them ; nay , the eagle himself withdrew his royal presence from them ; so the decoyes aforesaid carryed all before them , and comported themselves by their orders in that hight , as if like the lapwing , every one had a crown on his head ; they so inchanted in a manner , all the common sort of oppidan , rurall , and sea-birds , and infused such a credulity into them , that they believed them to have an inerring spirit , and what came from them , was as tru as the pentateuch : moreover , it was shrewdly suspected , that ther was a pernicious plot amongst them to let in the stork , who is never seen to stay long in any monarchy . morall . moderation is that goden rule wherby all great counsells shold square their deliberations , and nothing can tend more to their honour or dishonour , in point of wisdom : moreover , in a successive hereditary monarchy , when subjects assume regall power , when they bar the holy church of her rights , & of that reverence which is due to her chief professors , it is the most compendious way to bring all things to confusion , and consequently to an inevitable ruine , or som fatal change. and this i hold to be the chiefest morall of this apologue of birds . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the gathering together , or parlement of flowers . upon a time , the flowers assembled , and met in one generall counsell , by the authority and summons of the soveraign rose , their undoubted naturall king , who had taken the lilly for his royall spouse . the dew of heaven fell plentifully upon this happy conjunction , which made them to bourgeon , to propagate and prosper exceedingly , in so much , that the sweet fragrant odor which they did cast , diffused it self over all the earth . to this meeting came the violet , gilliflower , the rosemary , the tulyp , lavender and thyme , the cinquefoyle ( though of a forren growth ) had an honourable rank amongst them , and as some observed , got too much credit with the royal rose . the flowers of the field were admitted also to this great counsell : the couslip , the honysukle and daisie had their delegates there present , to consult of a reformation of certain abuses which had taken rooting in the common wealth of flowers , and being all under the rose , they had priviledge to speak all things with freedome ; complaints were made that much cockle and darnell , with other noxious herbs and tares were crept in amongst them , that the poppie did pullulat too much , with divers other grievances : the successe of this senat , this great bed or posie of living flowers , was like to prove very prosperous , but that the herb briony , wormwood , wolfbane , rue , and melampod ( the emblems of sedition , malice , feare , ambition and iealousie ) thrust in amongst them , and much distempered their proceedings : these brought in with them the bur , which exceedingly retarded and intangled all businesses ; and it was thought that the thistle was too medling amongst them , which made matters grow to that acrimony and confusion , as if the herb morsus diaboli had got in amongst them . amongst many other good-morrows , they propounded to the rose , that he should part with his prickles , and transmit his strength that way to be disposed of by them ; the royall rose liked not this bold request of theirs , though couched in very smooth language , but answered , i have hitherto condescended to every thing you have propounded , much more then ▪ any of my predecessors ever did ; but touching these prickles , which god and nature hath given mee , and are inherent in me and my stock from the beginning , though they be but excressencies , yet you know they fortifie and arm me , armat spina rosam . and by them i protect you and your rights from violence , and what protection i pray can there be without strength ? therefore i will by no means part with them to enfeeble my regall power , but will retain them still , and bequeath them to my posterity , which i would be loth to betray in this point ; nor doe i much value what that silly infected animall , the king of bees tells me sometimes , when humming up and downe my leaves , he would buzze this fond belief into me , how it added much to his majestie , that nature gives him no sting , as all other bees have , because he should rely altogether upon the love and loyalty of his subjects . no ; i will take warning by the eagle , the king of volatills , and by the lyon , king of quadrupedals , who ( as the prince of moralists reports ) when by fayre insinuations the one had parted with his tallons , the other with his teeth and ongles , wherein their might , and consequently their majesty consisted , grew afterwards contemptible to all creatures , and quite lost that natural allegeance and awe which was duc unto the one from all birds , and to the other , from all beasts of field and forrest . morall . every naturall borne monarch , hath an inherent inalienable strength in himself , which is the common militia of his kingdome ; for , though the peoples love ( which oftentimes is got by an apple , and lost by a peare ) be a good cittadell , yet there must be a concurrence of some visible setled force besides , which no earthly power may dispose of without his royall commands : and for him to transmit this strength to any other , is the only way to render him inglorious and despicable , both at home and abroad ; and thus you have the spirit of these flowers , and morall of the fable . the assembly of architects . there was an ancient goodly palace , composed of divers pieces , and partition'd into sundry chambers , halls and courts , which were supported by mixt pillars , partly corinthian , partly ionique , but principally by the dorique the king of columnes , as having the firmest pedestall : some tooke exceptions , and alledged , that some of the said courts were too high , and some of the chambers in this structure were too wide . the lord of this palace call'd together the best masons and architects , to advise with him ( not without him ) for mending of those faults , the better contrivance of the roomes , and to reduce the building to a just proportion . they solemnly met , and falling to consultation hereof , they found that the chamber which was spangled with stars , and where his privat counsell of state did use to sit , were too wide ; they thought that the court erected on the north-side , and that learned court where ecclesiasticall matters were scanned , was too high ; these , with that peculiar court which was erected for the support of honour , they went about in lieu of rectifying , to ruinat and raze to the very ground ; and some of these masons ( for indeed they were rather masons then true architects ) were so precise and over criticall , that they seem'd to find fault with the position of the chappell that belong'd to this palace , because , forsooth , it stood east and west , which situation , only in regard it was ancient , they held to be a superstitious posture ; they seem'd to repine at the decencie , riches and ornament of it , with divers other frivolous exceptions . the lord of the palace said little to that , but touching the errors and disproportions in the foresaid courts and chambers of publick justice , he was very willing they should be amended , and reduced to a true dimension and symmetrie ; and that all other roomes should be searched and swept cleane : but he would be loth to see those ancient pieces quite demolish'd , for that would hazard the fall of the maine fabrique , his princely hereditary patrimony ( descended upon him from so many wise oeconomists and royall progenitors ) in regard of the ●…uncture and contignation those parts had with the whole frame . to mend a thing by demolishing it , is as curing a sick body by knocking him in the head : he told them it was easier far to pull down , then build up ; one may batter to pieces in one houre , that which cannot be built in an age : that everlasting villaine , who burnt the ephesian temple , destroyed , as it were in a trice , what was a rearing up ten long olympiads : he wish'd them further to be very cautious how they medled with th the angulars and basis of that royal structure ; for so they might prove as wise as those architects , who took out som of the foundation stones , to repair the roof . lastly , he told them , that if they intended to pull down any part of his own standing palace , they shold be well advised before hand of the fashion wherof that new fabrick shold be , which they purposed to rear up in the room of the old . moral innovations are of dangerous consequence in all things , specially in a setled well temper'd ancient state ; therfore ther shold be great heed taken , before any ancient court of judicature , erected as a pillar to support justice by the wisdom of our progenitors , be quite put down ; for it may shake the whole fram of government , and introduce a change ; and changes in government are commonly fatall , for seldom comes a better . and this i hold to be the aim of this apologue . the insurrection of the winds . it fortuned , that the winds banded against eolus : and boreas ( the north-wind ) began to bluster first , and wold blow wher he listed , he grew so boisterous , that he is call'd scopa viarum , the high-way beesom , he seem'd to sweep all before him southward , insomuch , that uniting all his strength into one body , he made towards eolus in a hostile armed manner , and so obtained of him what he desired . after his example ( and an odde example it was ) the west-wind , his fellow subject rose up , alledging , that though he blew from the left-side of heaven , yet he deserved to be as much favoured as boreas , in regard he drove a far richer trade , and blew upon a more fertile countrey , which brought in much more benefit to the rest of eolus his dominions ; therfore he would have his liberties also assur'd him , which he alledged were altogether as ancient as the others : this made him puff with such an impetuous violence , that his blasts brought with them ( god wot ) divers showres of bloud , and whole cataracts of calamities : now , as it is observed in the course of naturall things , that one mischief seldom marcheth alone , but ushers in another , and hath alwaies its concomitants , so these north and western gusts , as one wave useth to drive on another , made all the winds in the compasse , both collaterall and cardinall to rise up and rebell against eolus , even under that very clime , and in those horizons , where he kept his principall residence and royal court. and this popular wind ( for 't was no other , take it all joyntly in one puff ) did rage with that vehemency , that it turn'd every wher into fearful flames of fire ( issuing out of a kind of ignis fatuus , which by its repercussions , and furious arietations , did a world of mischief , as if it had bin that incendiary prester wind , or rather an haraucana , that indian gust , which alwaies brings the devil along with it as those savages believe ) had blown here , for , surely god was not in this wind . yet som were so simple , to think that this wind proceeded from divine inspirations ; nay , they came to that height of prophaneness , as to father it upon the holy ghost , though nothing could be more different to his sweet motions , nothing so directly opposit to his soft gentle breeses and eventilatio●…s ; for no holy consecrated thing could stand before this diabolical wind , down went all crosses it met withall ; it batter'd down church and chappel windowes ( and i fear the walls and steeples will next to wrack . ) it was so violent , that it overturn'd all stone tables that stood east-ward ; it blew away all the decent vests and ornaments of the church ; the bishops mitre ( an order contemporary with christianity it self ) did quake like an aspen leaf before it ; nay , it shrewdly shook the very imperial scepter , and crown which stood on eolus his head , so that he was like to become ludibrium ventorum . but the highest deity of heaven , he who walketh upon the wings of the wind , and makes weight for them , and gathereth them in his fist when he pleaseth , hating such an odious rebellion , rebuked these tumultuous winds , he caused a contagious aire , to rush in and mingle with them , and infect them with new d●…seases ; besides whispers of jealousies , doubts and diffidence blew and buzz'd more and more amongst them , so that they could not trust one another ; insomuch , that it made them to fall into confusion amongst themselves , which is the common fate of all rebellions . so eolus recovered his monarchy , and as they say , ther is no wind but blows som body good ; so this turn'd much to the advantage of eolus , for he grew ever after more firm and better establish'd in his regall power , because he put a competent guard in those climes whence all these boistrous winds burst forth , and so secur'd himself ever after , that they could not blow where they listed . popular insurrections being debell'd , turn to the advantage , and render the ruling prince more secure afterwards , or a broken bone being well set , growes stronger oftentimes : and so you have the principal morall of this parable in brief . post-script . sir , i long to receive your opinion of these rambling pieces of fancy , you may , peradventure , have more , when the times are open : surely the wind will not hold stil in this unlucky hole , for it is too violent to last : it begins ( thanks be to god ) to sift already , and amongst those multitudes , who expect the change , i am one that lyeth at the cape of good hope , though a long time under hatches ( in the fleet. ) howsoever , though all the winds in the compass shold bluster upon me ; nay , though a haraucana should rage , i am arm'd and resolv'd to bear the brunt , to welcome the will of god , and possesse my soul with patience . if you desire a further intimation of things , i refer you to a discourse of mine call'd the tru informer , who will give you no vulgar satisfaction . so i am yours , as at first , inalterable . i. h. of the land of ire : or , a discours of that horrid insurrection and massacres which happen'd lately in ireland ; by mercurius hibernicus : who discovers unto the world the tru causers and incendiaries therof . in vindication of his majesty , who is most maliciously traduc'd to be accessary therunto ; which is as damnable a lie as possibly could be hatched in hell ; which is the staple of lies . a lie stands upon one legg , — truth upon two . mercurius hibernicus , his advertisement to the well-temper'd reader . there is a mongrell race of mercuries lately sprung up , but i claim no acquaintance with them , much less any kindred . they have commonly but one weeks time for their conception and birth ; and then are they but like those ephemeran creatures , which pliny speaks of , that are born in the morning , grow up till noon , and perish the same night : i hope to be longer liv'd then so , because i was longer a getting , ther was more time and matter went to my generation . ther is a tale how the tru mercury indeed , descended from heven once in a disguise , to see how he was esteem'd on earth ; and entring one day into a painters-shop , he found ther divers pictures of apollo , iupiter , mars , with others ; and spying his own hanging in a corner hard-by , he asked what the price of that pourtrait might be ? the painter answered , that if he bought any of the rest , he wold give him that into the bargain for nothing : mercury hereupon shaking his white caducean , flung out in indignation , and flew up to heven . shold mercury chance to descend now from his sphear , i think he wold be much more offended to find himself personated by every petty impertinent pamphleter ; yet i believe he would not think it ill that aulicus assumes his shape , nor that the harp , who owes her first invention to him , should be made now his crest . to my honourable friend mr. e. p. sir , if you please to cast your eyes upon the following discours , i believe it will afford you som satisfaction , and enlighten you more in the irish affaires . the allegeance i owe to truth , was the midwife that brought it forth , and i make bold to make choice of you for my gossip , because i am from the prison of the fleet . nonas april is . your true servant , i. h. mercurius hibernicus . there is not any thing since these ugly warrs begun , whereof there hath been more advantage made to traduce and blemish his majesties actions , or to alienate and imbitter the affections of his people towards him , to incite them to armes , and enharden them in the quarrell , than of the irish affaires ; whether one cast his eyes upon the beginning and proceedure of that warre ( which some by a most monstrous impudence would patronize upon their majesties ) or upon the late cessation , and the transport of auxiliaries since from thence . there are some that in broken peeces have written of all three : but not in one entire discourse , as this is , nor hath any hitherto hit upon those reasons and inferences that shall be displayed herein . but he who adventures to judge of affaires of state , specially of traverses of warre , as of pacifications , of truces , suspensions of armes , parlies , and such like , must well observe the quality of the times , the successe and circumstance of matters past , the posture and pressure of things present ( and upon the place ) the inducement or enforcement of causes , the gaining of time , the necessity of preventing greater mischiefes ( whereunto true policy prometheus like hath alwaies an eye ) with other advantages . the late cessation of armes in ireland was an affaire of this nature ; a true act of state , and of as high a consequence as could be : which cessation is now become the common subject of every mans discourse , or rather the discourse of every common subject all the three kingdomes over : and not onely the subject of their discourse , but of their censure also ; nor of their censure onely , but of their reproach and obloquy . for the world is come now to that passe , that the foot must judge the head , the very cobler must pry into the cabinet counsels of his king ; nay the distaffe is ready ever and anon to arraign the scepter ; spinstresses are become states-women , and every peasan turned politician ; such a fond irregular humour reignes generally of late yeers amongst the english nation . now the designe of this small discourse , though the subject require a farre greater volume , is , to vindicate his majesties most pious intentions in condescending to this late suspension of arms in his kingdome of ireland , and to make it appeare to any rationall ingenious capacity , ( not pre-occupied or purblinded with passion ) that there was more of honour and necessity , more of prudence and piety in the said cessation , than there was either in the pacification or peace that was made with the scot. but to proceed herein the more methodically , i will lay downe , first , the reall and true radicall causes of the late two-yeers irish insurrection . secondly , the course his majesty used to suppresse it . lastly , those indispensable impulsive reasons and invincible necessity which enforced his majesty to condescend to a cessation . touching the grounds of the said insurrection , we may remember when his majesty out of a pious designe ( as his late majesty also had ) to settle an uniformitie of serving god in all his three kingdomes , sent our liturgie to his subjects of scotland ; some of that nation made such an advantage hereof , that though it was a thing only recommended , not commanded or pressed upon them , and so cald in suddenly againe by a most gracious proclamation , accompanied with a generall pardon : yet they would not rest there , but they would take the opportunity hereby to demolish bishops , and the whole hierarchy of the church ( which was no grievance at all till then ) to which end , they put themselves in actuall armes , and obtained at last what they listed ; which they had not dared to have done , had they not been sure to have as good friends in england as they had in scotland ( as lesly himself confessed to sir william berkley at newcastle ) for some of the chiefest inconformists here , had not onely intelligence with them , but had been of their cabinet-counsels in moulding the plot : though some would cast this war upon the french cardinall , to vindicate the invasion we made upon his masters dominions in the isle of rets ; as also for some advantage the english use to do the sp●…niard in transporting his treasure to dunkerk , with other offices . others wold cast it upon the iesuit , that he shold project it first , to ●…orce his m●…jesty to have recourse to his roman catholick subjects for aid , that so they might , by such supererogatory service ingratiate themselves the more into his favour . the irish hearing how well their next neighbou●…s had sped by way of arms , it filled them full of thoughts and apprehensions of fear and jealousie , that the scot wold prove more powerful hereby , and consequently more able to do them hurt , and to attemp●… waies to restrain them of that connivency , which they were allowed in point of religion : now ther is no nation upon earth that the irish hate in that perfection , and with a greater antipathy , than the scot , or from whom they conceive greater danger : for wheras they have an old prophesie amongst them , which one shall hear up and down in every mouth , that the day will come when the irish shall weep upon english mens graves : they fear that this prophesie will be verified and fulfilled in the scot above any other nation . moreover , the irish entred into consideration , that they also had sundry grievances and grounds of complaint , both touching their estates and consciences , which they pretended to be far greater than those of the scots . for they fell to think , that if the scot was suffered to introduce a new religion , it was reason they shold not be so pinched in the exercise of their old , which they glory never to have altered . and for temporall matters ( wherin the scot had no grievance at all to speak of ) the new plantations which had bin lately afoot , to be made in conaught and other places ; the concealed lands and defective titles which were daily found out ; the new customs which were imposed , and the incapacity they had to any preferment or office in church and state ( with other things ) they conceived these to be grievances of a far greater nature , and that deserved redresse much more than any the scot had . to this end , they sent over commissioners to attend this parliament in england , with certain propositions , but those commissioners were dismissed hence with a short and unsavoury answer , which bred worse bloud in the nation than was formerly gathered ; and this , with that leading case of the scot , may be said to be the first incitements that made them rise . in the cou●…se of humane actions , we daily find it to be a tru rule , exempla movent , examples move , and make strong impressions upon the fancy ; precepts are not so powerful as precedents . the said example of scotland , wrought wonderfully upon the imagination of the irish , and filled them ( as i touched before ) with thoughts of emulation , that they deserved altogether to have as good usage as the scot , their country being far more beneficial , and consequenly , more importing the english nation . but these were but confused imperfect notions , which began to receive more vigour and form after the death of the earl of strafford , who kept them under so exact an obedience , though som censure him to have screwed up the strings of the harp too high ; insomuch that the taking off of the earl of straffords head , may be said to be the second incitement to the heads of that insurrection to stir . adde hereunto , that the irish understanding with what acrimony the roman catholicks in england were proceeded against since the sitting of our parliament , and what further designes were afoot against them , and not onely against them , but for ranversing the protestant religion it self , as it is now practised ( which som shallow-braind 〈◊〉 do throw into the same scales with p●…pery . ) they thought it was high time for them to forecast what shold become of them , and how they shold ●…e 〈◊〉 in point of conscience , when a new deputy of the parliaments election ( approbation at least ) shold come over . therfore they fell to consult of som means of timely prevention : and this was another mo●…ive ( and it was a sh●…ewd one ) which p●…sht on the irish to take up arms. lastly , that army of . men , which the earl of strafford had raised to be transported to england for suppressing the scot , being by the advice of our parliament here , disbanded ; the country was annoyed by som 〈◊〉 those stragling souldiers , as not one in twenty of the irish , will from the sword to the spade , or from the pike to the plough again . therfore the two marquesses that were ambassadors here then for spaine , having propounded to have som numbers of those disbanded forces , for the service of their master ; his majesty by the mature advice of his privy counsell , to occur the mischiefs that might arise to his kingdom of ireland by those loose casheer'd souldiers , yielded to the ambassadors motion , who sent notice hereof to spain accordingly , and so provided shipping for their transport , and impressed money to advance the business ; but as they were in the heat of that 〈◊〉 ▪ his majesty being then in scotland ▪ 〈◊〉 w●…s a sudden stop made of those promised troops , who had depended long upon the spaniards service , as the spaniard 〈◊〉 do●…e on theirs . and this was the last , though no●… the least fatal cause of that horrid insurrection : all which particulars well considered , it had bin no hard matter to have bin a prophet , and standing upon the top of holy-head , to have foreseen those black clouds engendering in the irish aire , which bro●…e out afterwards into such fearful tempests of bloud . out of these premises , it is easie for any common understanding , not transported with passion and private interest , to draw this conclusion . that they who complyed with the scot in his insurrection ; they who dismissed the irish commissioners with such a short unpolitick answer , they who took off the earl of straffords head , and delayed afterwards the dispatching of the earl of leicester , they who hindered those disbanded troops in ireland to go for spain , may be justly said to have bin the tru causes of the late insurrection of the irish ; and consequently , it is easie to know upon the account of whose souls must be laid the bloud of those hundred and odde thousands poor christians , who perished in that war ; so that had it bin possible to have brought over their bodies unputrified to england , and to have cast them at the doores , and in the presence of som men i believe they wold have gushed out afresh into bloud , for discovery of the tru murtherers . the grounds of this insurrection being thus discovered , let us examine what means his majesty used for the suppression of it . he made his addresses presently to his great counsel , the english parliament then assembled , which queen elizabeth and her progenitors did seldom use to do , but only to their privy counsel in such cases , who had the discussing and transacting of all foreign affaires ; for in mannaging matters of state , specially those of war , which must be carryed with all the secrecy that may be , trop grand nombre , est encombre , as the frenchman saith , too great a number of counsellours may be an incumber , and expose their results and resolutions to discovery and other disadvantages , wheras in military proceedings the work shold be afoot before the counsels be blazed abroad . well , his majesty transmitted this business to the parliament of england , who totally undertaking it , and wedding as it were the quarlel ( as i remember they did that of the palatinate a little before by solemn vote ; the like was done by the parliament of scotland also , by a publick joynt declaration , which in regard ther came nothing of it , tended little to the honour of either nation abroad ) his majesty gave his royal assent to any propositions or acts for raising of men , money and arms to perform the work . but hereby no man is so simple as to think his majesty shold absolutely give over his own personal care and protection of that his kingdom , it being a rule , that a king can no more desert the protection of his own people , then they their subjection to him . in all his declarations ther was nothing that he endear'd and inculcated more often , and with greater aggravation and earnestness unto them , then the care of his poor subjects their fellow-protestants in ireland : nay , he resented their condition so far , and took the business so to heart , that he offered to passe over in person for their relief : and who can deny but this was a magnanimous and king-like resolution ? which the scots by publick act of counsel , did highly approve of , and declared it to be an argument of care and courage in his majesty . and questionless it had done infinite good in the opinion of them that have felt the pulse of the irish people , who are daily ore-heard to groan , how they have bin any time these . years under the english crown , and yet never saw but two of their kings all the while upon irish ground , though ther be but a salt 〈◊〉 of a few hours sail to pass over . and much more welcom shold his majesty , now regnant , be amongst them , who by general tradition , they confess and hold to come on the paternal side from 〈◊〉 ( by legal and lineal descent ) who was an irish prince , and after king of scotland , wheras the title of all our former kings and queens was stumbled at alwaies by the vulgar . his majesty finding that this royall proffer of engaging his own person , was rejected with a kind of scorn , coucht in smooth language , though the main businesse concerned himself nearest , and indeed solely himself , that kingdom being his own hereditary right . understanding also , what base sinister use ther was made of this insurrection by som trayterous malevolent persons , who , to cast aspersions upon his majesty , and to poyson the hearts of his people , besides publick infamous reports , counterfeited certain commissions in his majesties name to authorize the businesse , as if he were privy to it , though i dare pawn my soul his ( or her ) majesty knew no more of it then the great mogor did . finding also that the commissioners imployed hence for the managing and composing matters in that kingdom , though nominated by the parliament , and by their recommendation authorized by his majesty , did not observe their instructions , and yet were conniv'd at . understanding also , what an inhumane design ther was between them and the scot , in lieu of suppressing an insurrection to eradicat and extinguish a whole nation to make booty of their lands ( which hopes the london adventurers did hugge , and began to divide the bears-skin before he was taken , as his majesty told them ▪ an attempt the spaniard nor any other christian state ever intended against the worst of savages ; the conceit wherof in●…used such a desperate courage , eagerness and valour into the irish , that it made them turn necessity into a kind of vertu . moreover , his majesty taking notice that those royal subsidies , with other vast contributions wherunto he had given way , with the sums of particular adventurers ( amongst whom som aliens ( hollanders ) were taken in , besides the scot to share the country ) were misapplyed , being visibly imployed , rather to feed an english rebellion , then to suppress an irish : nay , understanding that those charitable collections which were made for the reliefe of those distressed protestants , who being stripped of all their livelihood in ireland , were forced to fly over to england , were converted to other uses , and the charity not dispensed according to the givers intention . hearing also that those . men which had been levyed and assigned to goe under the lord wharton , the lord of kerry , sir faithfull fortescue and others were diverted from going to the west of ireland , and imployed to make up the earl of essex army : and having notice besides that the earl of warwicke had stayd certaine ships going thither with supplies , and that there was an attempt to send for over to england some of those scottish forces which were in ulster , without his privity . lastly , his majesty finding himself unfitted , and indeed disabled to reach those his distressed subjects , his owne royal armie all his navall strength , revenues and magazines being out of his hands ; and having as hard a game to play still with the scot , and as pernicious a fire to quench in england , as any of his progenitors ever had : receiving intelligence also daily from his protestant nobility and gentry thence , in what a desperate case the whole kingdome stood , together with the report of the committee that attended his majesty from them expresly for that service , who amongst other deplorable passages in their petition , represented , that all means by which comfort and life should be conveyed unto that gasping kingdome , seemed to be totally obstructed , and that unlesse 〈◊〉 reliefe were afforded , his loyall subject●… there must yeeld their fortunes for a prey , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for a sacrifice , and their religion for a 〈◊〉 to the mercilesse rebels . his majesty ( as it was high time for 〈◊〉 ) taking into his princely thoughts those wofull complainrs and cryes of his poore subjects , condescended at last to appoint some persons of honour to heare what the irish could say for themselves , as they had often petitioned ; and god forbid but the king of ireland should receive his subjects petitions , as well as the king of scotland . but his majesty being unsatisfied with what they propounded then , the lord marquess of ormond marched with considerable forces against them , and though he came off with honour , yet no reliefe at all comming thither for many moneths after from the parliament here , who had undertaken the businesse , and had received all the summes and subsidies , with other unknown contributions to that end , matters grew daily worse and worse . to sum up all , his majesty receiving express and positive advice from his lord justices and counsell of state ther , that the whole kingdom was upon point of utter perdition , which was co-intimated the same time to the parliament here , by a special letter to the speaker ; i say his majesty finding that he had neither power of himself , it being transmitted to others ; and that those trustees did misapply that power and trust he had invested in them ( for the time ) to make good their undertaking for preservation of that his fruitfull kingdome ; being impelled by all these forcible reasons , his majesty sent a commission to the lord marquesse of ormond his lievtenant generall ( a most known sincere protestant ) to hearken to a treaty according to their petition ; and if any thing was amisse in that treaty in poynt of honour ( as it shall appeare by comparing it with others , there was none ) we know whom to thank . for out of these premises also , doth result this second conclusion , that they who misapplied those moneys , and mis imployed those men which were levyed with his majesties royall assent for the reduction of ireland : they who set afoot that most sanguinary design of extirpating , at least of enslaving a whole ancient nation , who were planted there by the hand of providence from the beginning : they who hindred his majesties transfretation thither to take cognizance of his own affairs , and expose the countenance of his own royall person for composing of things : they , they may be said to be the true causes of that unavoydable necessity and as the heathen poetsings , the gods , themselvs cannot resist necessity ) which enforced his majesty to capitulat with the irish , and assent to a cessation . it was the saying of one of the bravest roman emperours , and it was often used by henry the great of france , her majesties father , that he had rather save the life of one loyall subject then kill a hundred enemies : it may well be thought that one of the prevalentst inducements that moved his majesty ( besides those formerly mentioned ) to condescend to this irish cessation , was a sense he had of the effusion of his own poor subjects blood , the hazard of the utter extirpation of the protestants there , and a totall irrecoverable losse of that kingdome , as was advertised both in the petition of the protestants themselves , the relation of the committee imployd thither to that purpose , and the expresse letters of the lords justices and counsell there . to prove now , that this cessation of arms in ireland was more honourable and fuller of piety , prudence and necessity , then either the pacification or peace with the scot. i hope , these few ensuing arguments ( above divers others which cannot be inserted here , in regard of the force intended brevity of this discourse ) will serve the turne . . in primis , when the pacification was made with scotland his majesty was there personally present , attended on by the floure of his english nobility , gentry and servants , and the enemy was hard by ready to face him. at the concluding of the irish cessation , his majesty was not there personally present , but it was agitated and agreed on by his commissioner , and it hath been held alwaies less dishonourable for a king to capitulate in this kind with his own subjects by his deputy , then in his own person , for the further off he is , the lesse reflects upon him . . upon the pacification and peace with scotland , there was an amnestia , a generall pardon , and an abolition of all by-passed offences published , there were honours and offices conferred upon the chiefest sticklers in the war. at the cessation in ireland there was no such thing . . when the pacification and peace was made with the scots , there was mony given unto them , as it is too well knowne . but upon the setling of this cessation , the irish received none but gave his majesty a considerable summe as an argument of their submission and gratitude , besides the maintainance of some of his garrisons in the interim ; and so much partly in point of honour . . at the concluding of the pacification and peace with scotland , there was a vigorous , fresh , unfoiled english army a foot , and in perfect equipage ; there wanted neither ammunition , armes , money , cloaths , victuals or any thing that might put heart into the souldier and elevat his spirits . but the protestant army in ireland had not any of all these in any competent proportion , but were ready to perish , though there had been no other enemy then hunger and cold : and this implies a farre greater necessity for the said cessation . . in ireland there was imminent danger of an instant losse of the whole kingdome , and consequently , the utter subversion of the protestant religion there , as was certified both to king and parliament by sundry letters and petitions which stand upon record : there was no such danger in the affairs of scotland , either in respect of religion or kingdome ; therefore there was more piety shown in preserving the one , and prudence in preserving the other in ireland , by plucking both ( as it were ) out of the very jawes of destruction by the said cessation . we know that in the medley of mundane casualties , of two evils , the least is to be chosen , and a small inconvenience is to be born withall , to prevent a greater . if one make research into the french story , he will find , that many kinds of pacifications and suspensions of armes were covenanted 'twixt that king and som of his subjects , trenching far more upon regall dignity then this in ireland . the spaniard was forced to declare the hollanders free-states , before they could be brought to treat of a truce : and now the catalans scrue him up almost to as high conditions . but what need i rove abroad so far ? it is well known , nor is it out of the memory of man ( in queen elizabeths raign ) that in ireland it self ther have bin cessations , all circumstances well weighed , more prejudiciall to majesty then this . but that which i hear murmured at most as the effect of this cessation , is the transport of som of those souldiers to england for recruting his majesties armies , notwithstanding that the greatest number of them be perfect and rigid protestants , and were those whom our parliament it self imployed against the irish. but put case they were all papists , must his majesty therfore be held a favourer of popery ? the late king of france might have bin said as well to have bin a favourer of hugonotts , because in all his wars he imployed them most of any in places of greatest trust against the house of austria ; wheras all the world knows , that he perfectly hated them in the generall , and one of the reaches of policy he had , was to spend and waste them in the wars . was it ever known but a soveraign prince might use the bodies and strength of his own naturall-born subjects , and liege men for his own defence ? when his person hath been sought and aimed at in open field by small and great shot , and all other engines of hostility and violence : when he is in danger to be surprized or besieg'd in that place wher he keeps his court : when all the flowers of his crown his royal prerogatives which are descended upon him from so many successive progenitors ) are like to be plucked off and trampled under foot : when ther is a visible plot to alter and overturn that religion he was born , baptized , and bred in : when he is in dan●…er to be forced to infringe that solemn sacramental oath he took at his coronation to maintain the said religion , with the rights and rites of the holy anglican church , which som brain-sick schismaticks wold transform to a kirk and her discipline , to som chimerical form of government they know not what . francis the first and other christian princes , made use of the turk upon lesse occasions ; and if one may make use of a horse , or any other bruit animal , or any inanimat engine or instrument for his own defence against man , much more may man be used against man , much more may one rational creature be used against another though for destructive ends in a good cause , specially when they are commanded by a soveraign head , which is the main thing that goes to justifie a war. now touching the roman catholicks , whether english , welsh , irish , or scottish , which repaire to his majesties armies either for service or security . he looks not upon them ●…s papists , but as his subjects , not upon their religion , but their allegiance , and in that ●…uality he entertains them : nor can the pa●…ist be denyed the character of a good subject , all the while he conforms himself to the lawes in generall , and to those lawes also that are particularly enacted against him , and so keeps himself within the bounds of his civil obedience : as long as he continues so , he may challenge protection from his prince by way of right , and if his prince by som accident be not in case to protect him , he is to give him leave to defend himself the best he can , for the law of nature allowes every one to defend himself , and ther is no positive law of man can annul the law of nature . now if the subject may thus claim protection from his prince , it followeth , the prince by way of reciprocation may require assistance , service and supplies from the subject upon all publick occasions , as to suppress at this time a new race of recusants , which have done more hurt then ever the old did , and are like to prove more dangerous to his crown and regal authority then any foreign enemy . but whosoever will truly observe the genius , and trace the actions of this fatal faction which now swayes with that boundless , exorbitant , arbitrary and antinomian power , will find , that it is one of their prime pieces of policy , to traduce and falsifie any thing that is not conducible to their own ends : yet what comes from them must be so magisterial , it must be so unquestionably and incontroulably tru & lawful , that it must be believed by an implicite faith , as proceeding from an in-erring oracle ( as if these zealots were above the common condition of mankind , to whom errour is as hereditary as any other infirmity ) though the thing it self encroach never so grosly both upon the common liberty , the states and souls of men . but if any thing bear the stamp of royal authority , be it never so just and tending to peace and the publick good , yea , though it be indifferent to either side , it is presently countermanded , cryed down , and stifled ; or it is calumniated and aspersed with obloquies , false glosses and misprisions ; and this is become now the common theam wherwith their pulpits ring which makes me think , that these upstart politicians have not long to reign ; for , as the common proverb saith , fraud and frost end foul and are short-lived , so that policy , those counsels which are grounded upon scandals , reproaches and lies , will quickly moulder and totter away , and bring their authors at last to deserved infamy and shame , and make them find a tomb in their own ruines . adde hereunto as further badges of their nature , that black irreconcilable malice and desire of revenge which rageth in them , the aversness they have to any sweetness of conformity and union , the violent thirst they have of bloud , which makes me think on that dis●…ique of prudentius , who seemed to be a prophet as well as poet ( a tru vates ) in displaying the humors of these fiery dogmatists , this all-confounding faction which now hath the vogue , to the punishment , i will not say yet , the perdition of this poor island . sic m●…res produnt animum , & mihi credite , junctus semper cum falso est dogmate coedis amor . thus in english. manners betray the mind , and credit me , ther 's alwayes thirst of bloud with heresie . the sway of the sword ; or a discours of the militia train'd-bands , or common soldiery of the land ; proving , that the power and command therof in chief belongs to the ruling prince , and to no other . sine gladio nulla defensio . the author's apology . t is confefs'd that the subject of this discours were more proper to one of the long-robe , which i am not , i am no lawyer otherwise then what nature hath made me , so every man , as he is born the child of reason , is a lawyer , and a logitian also who was the first kind of lawyer : this discoursive faculty of reason comes with us into the world accompanied with certain general notions and principles to distinguish right from wrong , and falshood from truth : but touching this following discourse , because it relates somthing to law , the author wold not have adventured to have exposed it to the world , if , besides those common innate notions of reason , and some private notes of his own , he had not inform'd and ascertain'd his judgment by conference with som professed lawyers , and those the eminentest in the land , touching the truth of what it treats of ; therfore he dares humbly aver that it contains nothing but what is consonant to the fundamentall and fixed constitutions , to the known clear lawes of this kingdom . from the prison of the flcet . nonas mail . i. h. touching the polemical svvord , and command in chief of the militia , &c. government is an ordinance of god for mans good ; the kinds of government are ordinances of men for gods glory : now , among all wo●…ldly affairs there is not any thing so difficult , and fuller of incertitudes as the art of ruling man , for those nimble spirits ( as it is spoken elswhere ) who from apprentices have been made freemen of the trade , and at last thought themselves masters , having spent their youth , their manhood , and a long time of old age therein , yet when they came to leave the world they professed themselves still to be but novices in the trade . there is a known way to break , guide , and keep in awe all other animals , though never so savage and strong ; but there is no such certaine way to govern multitudes of men , in regard of such turbulences of spirit and diversity of opinions that proceed from the rational faculty , which other cretures that are contented only with sense , are not subject unto ; and this the philosopher holds to be one of the inconveniences that attend humane reason , and why it is given man as a part of his punishment . now , why the government over men is ●…o difficult , there may be two main reasons alledg'd , the first is the various events , and world of inexpected contingencies that attend humane negotiations , specially matters of state , which , as all other sublunary things , are subject to alterations , miscarriages , and change , this makes the mindes of men ▪ and consequently the moulds of policy so often to alter , scarce one amongst twenty is the same man as he was twenty yeares ago in point of judgement , which turns and changeth according to the successe and circumstances of things , the wisedome of one day is the foolishnesse of another , posterior dies est prioris magister , the day following becomes the former dayes teacher . the second reason is , the discrepant , and wavering fancies of mens braines , specially of the common peeple , who ( if not restrained ) are subject to so many crotchets and chymeras , with extravagant wanton desires , and gaping after innovations . insulary peeple are observed to be more transported with this instability then those of the continent , and the inhabitants of this i le more then others , being a well-fed spriteful peeple ; in so much , that it is grown a proverb abroad , that the englishman doth not know when he is well : now the true polititian doth use to fit his government to the fancy of the peeple , the ruler must do as the rider , some peeple are to be rid with strong bitts and curbs , and martingalls , as the napollitan , and french our next neighbour , which is the cause that a kind of slavery is entail'd upon him , for the french peasant is born with chains ; other nations may be rid with a gentle small bridle , as the venetian and the hollander , who hath not such boiling spirits as others ; a bridle doth serve also the spaniard , who is the gretest example of stability , and exact obedience to authority , of any peeple ; for though spain be the hottest countrey in christendom , yet it is not so subject to feavers as others are , i mean to fits of intestin commotions : and this was never so much tryed as of late yeers ; for though the present king hath such known frail●…ies , though he hath bin so infortunat , as to have many countreys quite revolted , and rent away from him ; though the ragingst plague that ever was in spain under any king , happen'd of late yeers , which sweep'd away such a world of peeple ; though his taxes be higher then ever were any , though he hath call'd in and engrossed all the common coyn of the countrey , and delivered but the one halfe back again , reserving the other half for himself ; though there 's no legall instrument , no bond , bill , or specialty can be writ but upon his seal'd paper , with sundry other exactions , yet his subjects are still as obedient , and awful unto him , they are as conformable and quiet , as if he were the most vertuous , and victorious prince that ever was ; and this they do principally for their own advantage , for if ther were another governour set up , it would inevitably hurle the whole countrey into combustion and tumults ; besides , they are taught , that as in choice of wives , so the rule holds in governments , seldome comes a better . touching the originals of government and ruling power , questionless the first among mankind was that naturall power of the father over his children , and that despotical domestique surintendence of a master of a house over his family ; but the world multiplying to such a masse of peeple , they found that a confused equality , and a loose unbridled way of living like ●…rute animals to be so inconvenient , that they chose one person to protect and govern ; not so much out of love to the ●…erson , as for their own conveniency and advantage , that they might live more regularly , and be secur'd from rapine , and op●…ression ; as also that justice might be administted ; and every one enjoy his own without fear , and danger : such govern●…urs had a power invested accordingly in ●…hem , also as to appoint subservient , able mi●…isters under them to help to bear the ●…urden . concerning the kinds of government , ●…ll polititians agree that monarchall is the best and noblest sort of sway , having the neerest analogy with that of heaven , viz. a supreme power in one single person ; god almighty is the god of unity , as well as of entity , and all things that have an entity do naturally propend to unity ; unity is as necessary for a well - being , as entity is for a being , for nothing conduceth more to order , tranquillity , and quietude , nor is any strength so operative as the united ; the fist is stronger then the hand , though it be nothing but the hand , viz. the fingers united by contraction ; the republick of venice which is accounted the most eagle-ey'd and lastingst state in the world , fo●… she hath continued a pure virgin , and shin'd within her watry orb nere upon thirteen ages , is the fittest to give the world advice herein , for if ever any have brought policy to be a science which consists of certitudes , this state is shee , who is grown a●… dexterous in ruling men as in rowing of 〈◊〉 gally . but whereas the vulgar opinion is that the common peeple there have a shar●… in the government , 't is nothing so , for he great counsel which is the maine hing whereon the republick turns , is compose●… onely of gentlemen who are capable b●… their birth to sit there , having passed twenty five years of age ; to which purpose they must bring a publick testimonial that they are descended of a patrician or noble family . but to return to the main matter , this sage republick who may prescribe rules of policy to all mankind , having tryed at first to govern by consuls and tribunes for som years , she found it at last a great inconvenience , or deformity rather , to have two heads upon one body ; therefore she did set up one soveraign prince ; and in the records of venice the resons are yet extant which induc'd her thereunto , whereof one of the remarkablest was this ; we have observed that in this vast university of the world all bodies according to their several natures have multiplicity of motions , yet they receive vertue and vigour but from one , which is the sun ; all causes derive their originals from one supreme cause ; we see that in one creture there are many differing members , and faculties which have various functions , yet they are all guided by one soul , &c. the island of great britain hath bin alwaies a royal isle from her first creation , and infancy ; she may be said to have worn a crown in her cradle ; and though she had so many revolutions , and changes of masters , yet she continued still royal ; nor is there any species of government that suits better , either with the quality of the countrey , and genius of the inhabitants , or relates more directly to all the ancient lawes , constitutions , and customs of the land , then monarchal ; which any one that is conversant in the old records can justifie ; britannia ab initio mundi semper regia , & regimen illius simile illi caelorum . concerning the many sorts of trust●… which were put in the supreme governor of this land ( for ther must be an implicite and unavoidable necessary trust reposed in every soveraign magistrate ) the power of the sword was the chiefest ; and it was agreeable to holy scripture he shold have it , where we know 't is said , the king beareth not the sword in vain ; the lawes of england did ever allow it to be the inalienable prerogative of the soveraign prince , nor was it ever known ( humbly under favour ) that any other power whatsoever managing conjunctly or singly , did ever pretend to the power of the publick sword , or have the militia invested in them , but this ever remained intire and untransferrible in the person of the ruler in chief , whose chiefest instrument to govern by is the sword , without which crownes , scepters , globes and maces are but bables . it is that instrument which causeth tru obedience , makes him a dread soveraign , and to be feared at home and abroad ; now 't is a maxime in policy , that ther can be no tru obedience without fear ; the crown and scepter draw only a loose kind of voluntary love , and opinion from the people , but 't is the sword that draws reverence and awe , which two are the chiefest ingredients of allegeance , it being a principle , that the best government is made of fear and love , viz. when by fear love is drawn as threed through the eye of a needle ; the surest obedience , and loyalty is caused thus , for fear being the wakefullest of our passions works more powerfully in us and predominates over all the rest ; primus in orbe deus fecit timor . to raise up a soveraign magistrate without giving him the power of the sword , is to set one up to rule a metall'd horse without a bridle ; a chief ruler without a sword , may be said to be like that logg of wood which iupiter threw down among the froggs to be their king , as it is in the fable . moreover , one of the chiefest glories of a nation is to have their supreme governor to be esteem'd , and redouted abroad as well as at home . and what forren nation will do either of these to the king of england if he be armless , and without a sword ? who will give any respect o●… precedence to his ambassadors , and ministers of state ? the sword also is the prime instrument of publick protection , therefore that king who hath not the power of the sword , must have another title given him , the protector of his peeple . now , in a successive hereditary kingdom , as england is known , and acknowledged to be by all parties now in opposition , there are three things which are inalienable from the person of the king : they are , . the crowne . . the scepter . . the sword. the one , he is to carry on his head , the other in his hand , and the third at his side ; and they may be termed all three the ensignes or peculiar instruments of a king : by the first , he reignes , by the second he makes lawes , by the third he defends them : and the two first are but bables without the last , as was formerly spoken . . touching the crown or royal diadem of england , ther is none , whether presbyterian , independent , protestant , or others now in action , but confess that it descends by a right hereditary line , ( though through divers races , and som of them conquerours ) upon the head of charles the first now regnant : 't is his own by inherent birth-right and nature , by gods law , and the law of the land , and these parliament-men at their first sitting did agnize subjection unto him accordingly , and recognize him for their soveraign liege lord : nay , the roman catholick denies not this , for though there were bulls sent to dispense with the english subjects for their allegiance to queen elizabeth , yet the pope did this against her as he took her for a heretick , not an usurpresse , though he knew well enough that she had bin declared illegitimate by the act of an english parliament . this imperial crown of england is adorned and deckd with many fair flowers , which are called , royal prerogatives ; and they are of such a transcendent nature , that they are unforfeitable , individual , and untransferrable to any other : the king can only summon and dissolve parliaments : the king can only pardon ( for when he is crowned , he is sworn to rule in mercy as well as in justice : ) the king can only coyn money , and enhance or decry the value of it : the power of electing officers of state , of justices of peace and assize is in the king ; he can only grant soveraign commissions : the king can only wage war , and make out-landish leagues : the king may make all the courts of justice ambulatory with his person , as they were used of old ▪ 't is tru , the court of common pleas must be sedentary in som certain place for such a time ; but that expired , 't is removeable at his pleasure : the king can only employ ambassadours and treat with forraign states , &c. these , with other royal prerogatives which i shall touch hereafter , are those rare and wholsom flowers wherewith the crown of england is embellished , nor can they stick any where else but in the crown , and all confess the crown is as much the king 's , as any private man's cap is his own . . the second regall instrument is the scepter , which may be called an inseparable companion , or a necessary appendix to the crown ; this invests the king with the sole authority of making lawes , for before his confirmation all results and determinations of parliament are but bills or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 they are but abortive things , and meer embryos ; nay , they have no life at all in them till the king puts breath and vigour into them : and the ancient custome was for the king to touch them with his scepter , then they are lawes , and have a vertue in them to impose an obligation of universall obedience upon all sorts of people , it being an undeniable maxime , that nothing can be generally binding without the king 's royall assent , nor doth the law of england take notice of any thing without it : this being done they are ever after styl'd the kings lawes , and the judges are said to deliver the king's judgments , which agrees with the holy text , the king by judgment shall stablish the land : nay , the law presumes the king to be alwaies the sole judge paramount , and lord chief justice of england , for he whom he pleaseth to depute for his chiefest justice , is but styl'd lord chief iustice of the rings ●…ench , not lord chief justice of england , which title is peculiar to the king himself , and observable it is , that whereas he grants commissions and patents to the lord chancellour ( who is no other then keeper of his conscience ) and to all other judges , he names the chief justice of his own bench by a short writ only containing two or three lines : which run thus , regina iohanni popham militi salutem , sciatis quod constitutmus vos justiciarium nostrum capitalem ad placita coram nobis terminandum durante beneplacito nostro ; teste &c. now , though the king be liable to the laws , and is contented to be within their verge , because they are chiefly his own productions , yet he is still their protector , moderator , and soveraigne , which attributes are incommunicable to any other conjunctly or separately . thus the king with his scepter , and by the mature advice of his two houses of parl. which are his highest councel and court , hath the sole power of making laws ; other courts of judicature doe but expound them and distribute them by his appointment , they have but iuris dati dictionem or declarationem , and herein , i meane for the exposition of the lawes the twelve iudges are to be believed before the whole kingdom besides . they are as the areopagites in athens , the chief presidents in france and spaine in an extraordinary iunta , as the cape-syndiques in the rota's of rome , and the republique of venice , whose judgments in point of interpreting lawes are incontroulable , and preferred before the opinion of the whole senate whence they received their being ; and who hath still power to repeal them , though not to expound them . in france they have a law maxime , arrest donné en rebbe rouge est irrevocable , which is , a scarlet sentence is irrevocable , meaning when all the judges are met in their robes , and the client against whom the cause goes , may chafe and chomp upon the bit , and say what he will for the space of twenty foure howers against his judges , but if ever after he traduces them , he is punishable : it is no otherwise here where every ignorant peevish client , every puny barister , specially if he become a member of the house will be ready to arraign and vie knowledge with all the reverend judges in the land , whose judgement in points of law shold be onely tripodicall and sterling : so that he may be truly call'd a just king , and to rule according to law , who rules according to the opinion of his judges ; therefore , under favour , i do not see how his majesty for his part could be call'd injust when he leavied the ship-money , considering he had the judges for it . i now take the sword in hand , which is the third instrument of a king , ( and which this short discours chiefly points at ) it is as well as the two first incommunicable and inalienable from his person ; nothing concernes his honor more both at home and abroad ; the crown and the scepter are but unweildy and impotent naked indefensible things without it . there 's none so simple as to think there 's meant hereby an ordinary single sword , such as ev'ry one carrieth by his side , or som imaginary thing or chymera of a sword ; no , 't is the polemicall publique sword of the whole kingdom , 't is an aggregative compound sword , and 't is moulded of bell-metall ; for 't is made up of all the ammunition and armes small and great , of all the military strengths both by land and sea , of all the forts , castles and tenable places within and round about the whole i le : the kings of engl. have had this sword by vertue of their royall signory from all times , the laws have girded it to their sides , they have employed it for repeling all foren force , for revenging all forren wrongs or affronts , for quelling all intestine tumults , and for protecting the weal of the whole body politicke at home : the peeple were never capable of this sword , the fundamentall constitutions of this kingdom deny it them ; 't is all one to put the sword in a mad mans hand , as in the peeples ; or for them to have a disposing power in whose hands it shall be . such was the case once of the french sword , in that notorious insurrection call'd to this day la iaqueris de beauvoisin , when the pesants and mechanicks had a design to wrest it out of the kings hand , and to depresse all the peers and gentry of the kingdom ; and the businesse had gone so far that the peasans might have prevail'd , had not the prelats stuck close to the nobility ; but afterwards poor hare ▪ brain'd things they desire the king upon bended knees to take it againe ; such popular puffs have blowen often in poland , naples and other places , where while they sought and fought for liberty by retrenching the regall power , they fool'd themselfs into a slavery unawares , and found the rule right , that excesse of freedom turns to thraldom , and ushers in all confusions . if one shold go back to the nonage of the world , when governers and rulers began first , one will find the peeple desir'd to live under kings for their own advantage , that they might be restrain'd from wild exorbitant liberty , and kept in unity ; now unity is as requisit for the wel-being of all naturall things , as entity is for their being , and 't is a receiv'd maxime in policy , that nothing preserves unity more exactly then royal government : besides , 't is known to be the noblest sort of sway ; in so much that by the law of nations , if subjects of equal degrees , and under differing princes shold meet , the subjects of a king shold take precedency of those under any republique . but to take up the sword again . i say that the sword of public power and authority is fit only to hang at the kings side , and so indeed shold the great seal hang only at his girdle , because 't is the key of the kingdom : which makes me think of what i read of charlemain , how he had the imperial seal emboss'd alwaies upon the pommell of his sword , and his reason was , that he was ready to maintain whatsoever he signed , and sealed . the civilians , who are not in all points so great friends to monarchy as the common law of england is , say , there are six iura regalia , six regal rights , viz. . potestas iudicatoria , . potestas vitae & necis , . armamenta , . bona adespota , . census , . monetarum valor : to wit , power of iudicature , power of life and death , all kind of arming , masterless goods , s●…issements , and the value of money . among these regalia's , we find that arming , which in effect is nought else but the kings sword , is among the chiefest ; and 't is as proper and peculiar to his person , as either crown or scepter . by these two he drawes a loose voluntary love and opinion only from his subjects , but by the sword he draws reverence and awe , which are the chiefest ingredients of allegiance , it being a maxime , that the best mixture of government is made of fear and love . with this sword he conferrs honor , he dubbs knights , he creates magistrates , the lord deputy of ireland , the lord mayor of london with all other corporations have their swords from him , and when he entereth any place corporate , we know the first thing that is presented him is the sword : with this sword he shields and preserves all his people that every one may sit quietly under his own vine , sleep securely in his own house , and enjoy sweetly the fruits of his labours . nor doth the point of this sword reach only to every corner of his own dominions , but it extends beyond the seas to gard his subjects from oppression , and denial of justice , as well as to vindicate the publick wrongs , make good the interests of his crown , and to assist his confederates ; this is the sword that edward the third tied the flower deluces unto ( which stick still unto it , ) when having sent to france to demand that crown by maternal right , the counsell ther sent him word that the crown of france was not tied to a distaff , to which scoffing answer he replied , that then he wold tie it to his sword , and he was as good as his word . nor is this publick sword concredited or intrusted by the peeple in a fiduciary conditionall way to the king , but it is properly and peculiarly belonging unto him , as an inseparable concomitant , perpetual usher and attendant to his crown . the king , we know , useth to maintain all garrisons upon his own charge , not the peeples ; he fortifies upon his own charge , not the peeples : and though i will not averr , that the king may impresse any of his subjects , unlesse it be upon an actuall vasion by sea , or a sudden irruption into his kingdom by land , as the scots have often done , yet at any time the king may raise volunteers , and those who have received his money , the law makes it felony , if they forsake his service . thus we see there 's nothing that conduceth more to the glory , and indeed the very essence of a king then the sword , which is the armes and military strength of his kingdom ; wherfore under favour , ther cannot be a greater point of dishonour to a king then to be disarmed , then to have his sword taken from him , or dispos'd of and intrusted to any but those whom he shall appoint ; for as à minori ad majus the argument often holds , if a private gentleman chance to be disarm'd upon a quarrell , 't is held the utmost of disgraces , much greater and more public is the dishonor that falls upon a king , if after som traverses of difference 'twixt him and his subjects , they shold offer to disarm him , or demand his sword of him : when the eagle parted with his talons , and the lion with his teeth and ongles , the apolog tells us how contemptible afterwards the one grew to be among birds , the other among birds , the other among beasts . for a king to part with the sword politic is to render himself such a ridiculous king , as that logg of wood was which iupiter let down among the froggs for their king at the importunity of their croaking ; 't is to make him a king of clouts , or as the spaniard hath it , rey de havas , a bean king , such as we use to choose in sport at twelfnight . but my hopes are , that the two present houses of parliament ( for now they may be call'd so , because they begin to parley with their king , ) will be more tender of the honour of their soveraign liege lord , which , together with all his rights and dignities , by severall solemn oaths , aud by their own binding instruments of protestation and covenant , ( not yet revok'd ) they are sworne to maintaine , and that they will demand nothing of him which may favour of aspertè or force , but what may hold water hereafter : but now , touching the militia or sword of the kingdom , i think , under favour , the king cannot transfer it to any other ; for that were to desert the protection of his people , which is point blank against his coronation oath and his office : what forren prince or state will send either ambassador , resident or agent to him , when they understand his sword is taken from him ? what reformed forein church will acknowledg him defendor of the faith , when they hear of this ? nay , they who wish england no good will , will go near to paint him out , as not long since another king was , with a fair velvet scabbard , a specious golden hilt and chape , but the blade within was of wood . i hope that they who sway now , will make better use of their successes : many of them know 't is as difficult a thing to use a victory well , as to get one ; ther is as much prudence requir'd in the one , as prowesse in the other ; they will be wiser sure then turn it to the dishonor of their king : it being a certain rule , that the glory of a nation all the world over depends upon the glory of their king , and if he be any way obscur'd , the whole kingdom is under an eclipse . i have observed , that among other characters of gallantry , which forein writers appropriat to the english nation , one is , that they use to be most zealous to preserve the honor of their king ; i trust that they who are now up will return to the steps of their progenitors , both in this particular and divers other ; that their successes may serve to sweeten and moderat things , and suppress the popular sword which still rages ; and it had bin heartily wished that a suspension of arms had preceded this treaty , which useth to be the ordinary fore-runner , and a necessary antecedent to all treaties ; for while acts of hostility continue , som ill-favour'd newes may intervene which may imbitter and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ nor can it be expected that the proceedings will go on with that candor and confidence , while the old rancor is still in action ▪ 't is impossible a sore shold heal till the inflamation be taken away ; to cast water into a wound instead of oyle is not the way to cure it : or to cast oyle upon a fire instead of water is not the way to quench it ; poor england hath had a consuming fire within her bowels many years , she is also mortally wounded in all her members , that she is still in a high fever , which hath made her rave and speak idle a long time ; and 't is like to turn to a hectic , if not timely prevented . i pray god she may have no occasion to make use of the same complaint as alexander the great made when he was expiring his last , perii turba medicorum : too many physitians have undon me . to conclude in a word , ther is but one only way , under favor , to put a period to all these fearful confusions ; it is , to put the great master-wheel in order , and in its due place again , and then all the inferior wheels will move regularly ; let the king be restor'd , and ev'ry one will come to his own , all interests will be satisfied , all things quickly rectified ; till this be done , 't is as absurd to attempt the setling of peace , as if one shold go about to set a watch by the gnomen of an horizontall diall when the sun is in a cloud . i. h. an italian prospective , through which great britain ( without any multiplying art ) may cleerly see her present danger , and foresee her future destruction , if not timely prevented . perditio tua ex te anglia . paraenesis angliae . o england ( specially thou besotted city of london ) if thou be'st not quite past cure , or grown careless and desperat of thy self , if the least spark of grace , or ray of reson be yet remaining in thee , be warn'd , be warn'd by this stranger , who having felt thy pulse , and cast thy water very exactly , discovers in thee symptoms of inevitable ruine if thou holdst on this cours . divers of thy own children oftentimes admonish'd thee with tears in their eyes , and terror in their hearts , to recollect thy self , and return to thy old road of obedience to thy soverain prince , but they have bin little regarded , let a foreiners advice then take place , and make som impressions in thee to prevent thy utter destruction . from the prison of the fleet . aug. . i. h. an account of the deplorable , and desperat condition that england stands in , sent from london , anno . to the lord francisco barberini , cardinal of the most holy apostolick see , and protector of the english nation , at his palaces in rome . my last to your eminence was but short , in regard i had been but a short time in this countrey , i have now made a longer sojourn here , and taken a leisurely information of all matters ; therefore i shall give your eminence an account proportionably : for by conversation with the most indifferent , and intelligenc'd men , and by communication with the ambassadors here resident , i have taken some paines to pump out the truth of things , and penetrat the interest of all parties . and truly , i find , that that angry star , which hath lowr'd so long upon europe in generall , hath been as predominant , and cast as direfull aspects upon this poor iland , as it hath done upon any other part : truly , my lord , in all probability this peeple have pass'd the meridian of their happinesse , and begin to decline extreamly , as well in repute abroad , as also in the common notions of religion , and indeed in the ordinary faculty of reason : i think verily the ill spirit never reign'd so much in any corner of the earth by those inhumane aud horrid things that i have observ'd among them . nor is it a petty spirit , but one of the greatest cacod●…mons that thus drives them on , and makes them so active in the pursuance of their own perdition . to deduce matters from their originall , your eminency may please to understand , that this king at his accesse to the crown had deep debts to pay , both of his fathers , and his own , he was left ingaged in a fresh warre with spain ; and had another presently after which france , and both at one time , but he came off well enough of those : afterwards never any countrey flourished in that envied happinesse , and wanton kind of prosperity ; this city of london was grown to be the greatest mart , and mistress of trade , of any in the world ; insomuch , as i have been certainly inform'd , the king might have spent meerly upon his customes crowns a day : moreover , she had a vast bank of money being made the scale of conveying the king of spains treasure to flanders : insomuch that in a few yeers she had above ten millions of his moneys brought hither , which she might have remitted in specie or in marchandize , and for which this king had five in the hundred for coynage : yet could he not get beforehand with the world , having a sister with so many nephews and neeces , having a queen with diverse children of his own , ( at least of the blood-royall ) to maintaine , with divers profuse courtiers besides , which made him more parsimonious then ordinary . the warres then growing more active 'twixt spaine and france , as also 'twixt holland and spaine both by land and sea , and divers great fleets of men of war as well french ( who were growne powerfull that way ) as dunkerkers , spaniards hollanders , and hamburgers , appearing daily in his narrow seas , and sayling close by his chambers , the world wondred this king had no greater strength at sea , in case that any of the foresaid nations should doe him an affront , as some of them had already done , by denying to dash their colours to his ships : insomuch that in holland and other places he was pasquill'd at , and pourtrayed lying in his cradle lullaby'd and rock'd asleep by the spaniard : hereupon being by advertisements from his agents abroad , and frequent advice of his privie councell at home , made sensible of the danger , and a kind of dishonour he was faln into , and having intelligence that the french cardinall began to question his title to the dominion of the narrow seas , considering he employed no visible power to preserve it , he began to consult of meanes to set forth a royall fleet : but in regard the purse of the crowne was lightly ballasted , and that he had no mind to summon the three estates , because of some indignities he had received in former parliaments by the puritan party ( a race of people averse to all kingly government , unlesse they may pare it as they please ) his then atturney generall ( noy ) a great cryed-up-lawyer , put it in his head to impose an old tax called ship-mony upon the subject , which the said lawyer did warrant upon his life to be legall , for he could produce divers records how many of his progenitors had done the like : the king not satisfied with his single opinion , refer'd it to his learn'd council , & they unanimously averred it to be agreeable to the law of the land ; yet this would not fully satisfie the king , but he would have the opinion of his twelve judges , and they also affirmed by their single vouches the said tax to be warrantable ; hereupon it was imposed and leavied , but some refusing to pay it , there was a suite commenc'd , during which all the judges were to re-deliver their opinions joyntly , and the businesse being maturely debated and canvased in open court divers months , and all arguments produc'd pro & con , nine of the said twelve judges concluded it legal . thereupon the king continued the imposition of the said tax , and never was mony imployed so much for the honour and advantage of a countrey , for he sent out every summer a royall fleet to scowre and secure the seas ; he caused a galeon to be built , the greatest and gallantest that ever spread saile : nor did he purse up , and dispose of one peny of this money to any other use , but added much of his own revenues yeerly thereunto : so the world abroad cried up the king of england to be awake againe ; trade did wonderfully encrease , both domestic and forrein in all the three kingdomes ; ireland was reduced to an absolute settlement , the arrears of the crown payed , and a considerable revenue came thence cleerly to the exchequer of england every year , the salaries of all officers , with the pay of the standing army ●…here , and all other charges being defrayed by ireland her self , which was never done before . yet for all this height of pappinesse , and the glorious fruites of the said ship-money , ( which was but a kind of petty insensible tax , & a thing of nothing to what hath hapened since ) there were some foolish peeple in this land which murmured at it , and cryed nothing else but a parliament , a parliament ; and they have had a parliament since with a vengeance . but before this occasion , it was observed , that the seeds of disobedience , and a spirit of insurrection was a long time engendring in the hearts of som of this peace-pampred people , which is conceived to proceed from their conversation and commerce with three sorts of men , viz. the scot , the hollander and the french huguenot . now an advantage happened that much conduced to necessitate the convoking of a parliament , which was an ill-favoured traverse that fell out in scotland ; for the king intending an uniformity of divine worship in all his three kingdoms , sent thither the liturgy of this church , but it found cold and course entertainment ther , for the whole nation , men , women and children rise up a gainst them : here upon the king absolutely revoked it by proclamation , wherein he declared 't was never his purpose to press the practise therof upon the consciences of any ; therfore commanded that all things shold be in statu quo prius , but this wold not serve the turn , the scot took advantge hereby to destroy hierarchy , and pull down the bishops to get their demeans : to which purpose they came with an army in open field against their own native king , who not disgesting this indignity , mustred another english army ; which being upon the confines of both kingdoms , a kind of pacification was plaistred over for the present . the king returning to london , and consulting his second thoughts , resented that insolency of the scots more then formerly : hereupon he summons a parliament , and desires aid to vindicat that affront of the scot. the scot had strong intelligence with the puritan faction in the english parliament , who seemed to abet his quarrel , rather then to be sensible of any national dishonour received from him ; which caused that short-lived parliament to dissolve in discontent , and the king was forced to find other means to raise and support an army by privat loanes of his nobler sort of subjects and servants : the scot having punctual advertisements of every thing that passed ; yea , in the kings cabinet councel was not idle all this while , but rallies what was left of the former army ( which by the articles of pacification ( a little before ) should have bin absolutely dismissed ) and boldly invades england , which he durst never have done , if he had not well known that this puritan party which was now grown very powerful here , and indeed had invited him to this expedition , wold stand to him . this forein army being by the pernicious close machinations of som mongrel englishmen aforementioned , entred into the bowels of the country , the king was forced to call this present parliament , with whom he complyed in every thing , so far as to sacrifice unto them both iudge , bishop , councellor and courtier ; yea , he yielded to the tumbling down of many tribunals of justice , which were an advantage to his prerogative ; he assented that the prelates , who were the most ancient and prime members of the upper house , and had priority of all others , since the first constitution of parliament in the enrollment of all acts , he assented i say that these , who were the greatest prop of his crown shold be quite outed from among the peers ; he granted them also a trienniall parliament , and after that , this perpetuall ; which words , to the apprehension of any rational man , carry with them a grosse absurdity in the very sense of the thing : and touching this last grant , i had it from a good hand , that the queen was a friend to this parliament , and your eminence knows how they have requited her since , but the main open councellor to this fatall act was a scot. now the reason which they alledged for this everlasting parliament was one of the baldest that ever i heard of , it was , that they might have time enough to pay the scots army , wheras in one morning they might have dispatched that , by passing so many subsidies for that use , and upon the credit of those , they might have raised what money they wold . the parliament finding the king so plyable , and his pulse to beat so gently , like ill-natur'd men they fall from inches to ells in seeking their advantages : they grew so peremptory as to demand all the military strength of the kingdom , the tower of london , with the whole royal navy , which they found in an excellent equipage , gramercy ship-money ; so that the benefit of ship-money , which they so clamoured at , turned most to their advantage of any thing afterwards . the scot being fidler-like returned to his country with meat , drink , and money , the king went a while after to keep a parliament ther , wherein he filled every blank , they did but ask and have , for he granted them what possibly they could propound , both for their kirk and state , many received honour , and they divided bishops lands amongst them : for all which unparallel'd concessions of princely grace , they caused an act already in force to be published , viz. that it shold be damnable treason in the highest degree that could be , for any of the scots nation conjunctly or singly to levy armes , or any military forces , upon any pretext whatsoever , without his majesties royal commission ; and this they caused to be don by way of gratitude , but how they perform'd it afterwards the world knowes too well . the king returning to london , in lieu of a welcom to his two houses of parliament ( to whom also before his departure he had passed more acts of grace then all his progenitors , take them all in a lump ) they had patch'd up a kind of remonstrance , which was voted in dead of the night , wherein they expos'd to the world the least moat in former government , and aggravated to the very height every grievance , notwithstanding that the king had redressed all before ; and this remonstrance , which breath'd nothing but a base kind of malice , they presented as a nosegay to their soveraign prince , to congratulat his safe return from a forein countrey ; which remonstrance they caus'd to be printed and publish'd before he could give any answer thereunto . the king finding such a virulent spirit still raign in the house , and knowing who were chiefly possess'd with it ( viz. those whom he had impeach'd before , but saw he could get no justice against them ) in such an extremity , he did an act like a generous prince , for taking the palsgrave with him , he took the first coach he met withall at his court-gate , and went to his house of commons in person , to demand five members , which he wold prove to be traitors in the highest degree 〈◊〉 to be the authors of all these distempers , protesting upon the word of a king , that they shold have as fair & legal a tryal as ever men had ; in the interim he only desir'd that their persons might be secur'd . the walls of both houses , and the very stones in london street did seem to ring of this high cariage of the kings , and the sound went thence to the country , whence the silly plebeians came presently in whole herds to this city , who strutting up and down the streets , had nothing in their mouths , but that the priviledg of parlement , the priviledg of parlement was broken , though it be the known clear law of the land , that the parlement cannot supersede or shelter any treason . the king finding how violently the pulse of the grosly seduced people did beat , and ther having bin formerly divers riotous crues of base mechaniques and mariners , who had affronted both his own court , and the two houses besides , which the commons , to their eternal reproach , conniv'd at , notwithstanding that divers motions were made by the lords to suppresse them , the king also having privat intelligence that ther was a mischievous plot to surprize his person , remov'd his court to the countrey . the king departing , or rather being driven away thus from his two houses , by this mutinous city , he might well at his going away have ubraided her in the same words as h. the . did upbraid paris , who being by such another tumultuous rabble driven out of her in the time of the ligue , as he was losing sight of her , he turn'd his face back , and said , farewel ingratefull city , i will never see thee again till i make my way into thee through thy walls : yet though the king absented himself in person thus from the two houses , he sent them frequent messages , that they wold draw into acts what he had already assented unto , and if any thing was left yet undon by him , he wold do it ; therfore he will'd them to leave off those groundless feares and jealousies wherwith they had amus'd both city and country ; and he was ready to return at all times to his palace in westminster , provided that his person might be secur'd from the former barbarisms and outrages : but in lieu of a dutiful compliance with their prince , the thoughts of the two houses ran upon nothing but war : the king then retiring into the north , and thinking with a few of his servants only to go visit a town of his ( hull ) he was denyed entrance by a fatal unlucky wretch ( hotham ) who afterwards was shamefully executed with his eldest son , by command of his new masters of the parlement : the king being thus shut out of his own town ( which open'd the first dore to a bloudy war ) put forth a declaration , wherin he warn'd all his people that they shold look to their proprieties , for if he was thus barr'd of his own , how could any privat subject be sure to be master of any thing he had , and herein he was as much prophet as prince ; for the parlement-men afterwards made themselfs land-lords of the whole kingdom , it hath bin usual for them to thrust any out of his freehold , to take his bed from under him , and his shirt from off his very back . the king being kept thus out of one of his townes , might suspect that he might be driven out of another , therfore 't was time for him to look to the preservation of his person , and the country came in voluntarily unto him by thousands to that purpose , but he made choice of a few only to be his gard , as the parlementeers had done a good while before for themselfs : but now they went otherwise to work , for they fell a levying , listing and arming men by whole regiments and brigades till they had a very considerable army afoot , before the king had one musqueteer or trooper on his side ; yet these men are so notoriously impudent , as to make the king the first aggressor of the war , and to lay upon him all the bloud that was split to this day , wherein the devil himself cannot be more shamelesse . the parliamenteers having an army of foot and horse thus in perfect equipage , 't was high time for the king to look to himself , therefore he was forced to display his royal standard , and draw his sword quite out : thus a cruel and most cruentous civil war began which lasted near upon four years without intermission , wherein there happen'd more batta les , sieges and skirmishes , then passed in the nether-lands in fourscore years , and herein the englishmen may be said to get som credit abroad in the world , that they have the same bloud running in their veines ( though not the same braines in their sculls ) which their ancestors had , who were observed to be the activest people in the field , impatient of delay , and most desirous of battaile then any nation . but it was one of the greatest miracles that ever happen'd in this land , how the king was able to subsist so long against the parlamenteers , considering the multiplicity of infinite advantages they had of him by water and land : for they had the scot , the sea and the city on their side ; touching the first , he rushed in as an auxiliary with above . horse and foot compleatly furnish ▪ d both with small and great ammunition and arms , well cloth'd and money'd : for the second , they had all the kings ships well appointed , which are held to be the greatest security of the island both for defence and offence , for every one of them is accounted one of the moving castles of the kingdom : besides , they had all the other standing stone-castles , forts , and tenable places to boot : concerning the last , ( viz. the city ) therein they had all the wealth , bravery , and prime ammunition of england , this being the only magazin of men and money : now if the k. had had but one of these on his side , he had in all probability crush'd them to nothing : yet did he bear up strangely against them a long time , and might have done longer , had he kept the campane , and not spent the spirits of his men before townes ; had he not made a disadvantagious election of som commanders in chief , and lastly , had he not had close traitors within dores , as well as open rebels without ; for his very cabinet councel , and bed-chamber were not free of such vermin , and herein the parlementeers spent unknown sums and were very prodigal of the kingdoms money . the king , after many traverses of war , being reduced to a great strait by crosse successes and counsels , rather then to fall into the hands of the parlementeers , withdrew himself in a serving-mans disguise to the scots army , as his last randevous , and this plot was manag'd by the french agent then residing here ; a man wold think that that nation wold have deem'd it an eternal honour unto them to have their own king and countrey-man throw himself thus into their armes , and to repose such a singular trust in them upon such an extremity : but they corresponded not so well with him as he expected , for though at first when the parlamenteers sollicited their dear brethren for a delivery of the kings person unto them , their note was then , if any forein petty prince had so put himself upon them , they could not with honour deliver him , much less their own native king ; yet they made a sacrifice of him at last for . crownes ; wherupon bellieure the french ambassador being convoyed by a troop of horse from the king towards london , to such a stand , in lieu of larges to the souldiers , he drew out an half crown piece , and ask'd them how many pence that was , they answered . he replyed , for so much did iudas betray his master , and so he departed . and now , that in the cours of this historical narration , i have touch'd upon france , your eminence may please to understand , that nothing almost could tend more to the advantage of that k. then these commotions in england , considering that he was embark'd in an actuall war with the house of austria and that this iland did do spain some good offices ; among other , by transport of his treasure to dunkerk in english bottomes , whereunto this king gave way , and sometimes in his own galeons , which sav'd the spaniard neer upon . in the hundred , then if he had sent it by way of genoa ; so that som think , though france made semblance to resent the sad condition of her neighbour , and thereupon sent the prince of harcour , and the foresaid monsieur bellieure to compose matters , yet she never really intended it , as being against her present interest and engagements : yet the world thinks it much that she shold publiquely receive an agent from these parlamenteeres , and that the french nobility who were us'd to be the gallantest men in the world to vindicate the quarrels of distressed ladies , are not more sensible of the outrages that have bin offer'd a daughter of france , specially of henry the greats . but to resume the threed of my narration , the king ( and with him , one may say , england also ) being thus bought and sold , the parlamenteers insteed of bringing him to westminster , which had put a period to all distempers , toss'd him up and downe to private houses , and kept the former army still afoot : and truly i think there was never prince so abus'd , or poor peeple so baffled , and no peeple but a purblind besotted peeple wold have suffred themselves to be so baffled : for notwithstanding that no enemy appeer'd in any corner of the kingdome , yet above . tagaroones have bin kept together ever since to grind the faces of the poor , and exhaust the very vitall spirits of town and countrey , and keep them all in a perfect slavery : had the parlament-men , when the scots were gone , brought their king in a generous and frank way ( as had well becom'd englishmen ) to sit among them , and trusted to him ( which of necessity they must do at last ) as they had gain ▪ d more honor far in the world abroad , so they had gain'd more upon his affections then i beleeve they will ever do hereafter . but to proceed , the king having bin a good while prisoner to the parlement , the army snatch'd him away from them , and som of the chiefest commanders having pawn'd their soules unto him to restore him speedily , in lieu thereof they tumbled him up and down to sundry places , till they juggled him at last to that small ile where now he is surrounded with a gard of strange faces ; and if happly he beginns to take delight in any of those faces , he is quickly taken out of his sight . these harsh usages hath made him become all gray and oregrown with hair so that he lookes rather like som silvan satyr then a soverain prince : and truly my lord the meanest slave in st. marks gallies or the abjects captif in algier bannier is not so miserable as he in divers kinds , for they have the comfort of their wifes , children and frends , they can convey and receive letters , send messengers upon their errands , and have privat discours with any ; all which is denied to the king of great britain , nay the young princes his children are not permitted as much as to ask him blessing in a letter . in so much that if he were not a great king of his passions , and had a heart cast in on extraordinary mould , these pressures and those base aspersions that have bin publiquely cast upon him by the parlement it self , had bin enough to have sent him out of the world e're this , and indeed 't is the main thing they drive at , to torture his braine , and tear his very heart strings if they could : so that whereas this foolish ignorant peeple speak such horrid things of our inquisition , truly my lord 't is a most gentle way of proceeding being compar'd to this kings persecutions . as the king himselfe is thus in quality of a captif , so are all his subjects becom perfect slaves , they have fool'd themselfs into a worse slavery then iew or greek under the ottomans , for they know the bottom of their servitude by paying so many sultanesses for every head ; but here , people are put to endless , unknown , tyrannical taxes , besides plundering and accize , which two words , and the practise of them ( with storming of towns ) they have learnt of their pure brethren of holland : and for plundrings , these parliamenteer-saints think they may robb any that adheres not to them as lawfully as the iewes did the egyptians : 't is an unsommable masse of money these reformers have squandred in few years , whereof they have often promis'd and solemnly voted a publick account to satisfie the kingdom : but as in a hundred things more , so in this precious particular they have dispens'd with their votes : they have consumed more treasure with pretence to purge one kingdom , then might have served to have purchas'd two ; more ( as i am credibly told ) then all the kings of england spent of the public stock since the saxon conquest : thus have they not only begger'd the whole island , but they have hurld it into the most fearfull ▪ st chaos of confusion that ever poor countrey was in ; they have torn in pieces the reines of all government , trampled upon all lawes of heaven and earth , and violated the very dictamens of nature , by making mothers to betray their sons , and the sons their fathers , but specially that great charter , which is the pandect of all the laws and liberties of the free-born subject , which at their admission to the house they are solemnly sworn to maintain , is torn in flitters : besides those severall oaths they forg'd themselfs , as the protestation and covenant , where they voluntarily swear to maintain the kings honour and rights , together with the established laws of the land , &c. now i am told , that all acts of parlement here are lawes , and they carry that majesty with them , that no power can suspend or repeal them , but the same power that made them , which is the king sitting in full parlement ; these mongrell polititians have bin so notoriously impudent as to make an inferiour ordinance of theirs to do it , which is point-blanck against the very fundamentals of this government , and their own oaths , which makes me think that there was never such a perjur'd pack of wretches upon earth , never such monsters of mankind . yet this simple infatuated peeple have a saint-like opinion of these monsters , this foolish citie gards them daily with horse and foot , whereby she may be sayd to kisse the very stones that are thrown at her , and the hand whence they came , which a dogg would not do : but she falls to recollect her self now that shee begins to be pinch'd in trade , and that her mint is starv'd , yet the leading'st men in her common-councell care not much for it , in regard most of them have left traffiquing abroad , finding it a more easie and gainefull way of trading at home , by purchasing crown or church lands , plunder'd goods , and debts upon the publick faith , with soldiers debenters ; thus the saints of this iland turne godlinesse into gaine . truly my lord , i give the english for a lost nation , if they continue long thus , never was ther a more palpable oblaesion of the brain , and a more visible decay of reason in any race of men : it is a sore judgment from heaven , that a people shold not be more sensible how they are become slaves to rebells , and those , most of them the scumm of the nation , which is the basest of miseries : how they suffer them to tyrannize by a meer arbitrary extrajudicial power o're their very souls and bodies ▪ o're their very lifs and livelihoods ; how their former freedom is turn'd to fetters , molehills into mountains of grievances , ship-money into accize , justice into tyranny : for nothing hath bin and is daily so common amongst them as imprisonment without charge , and a charge without an accuser , condemnation without apparance , and forfeitures without conviction . to speak a little more of the king , if all the infernal fiends had ligu'd against him , they could not have design'd or disgorged more malice : they wold have laid to his charge his fathers death , as arrand a lie as ever was forg'd in hell : they wold make him fore-know the insurrection in ireland , wheras the spanish ambassador here , and his confessor who is a very reverend irish-man , told me , that he knew no more of it then the grand mogor did : they charge him with all the bloud of this civil war , wheras they and their instruments were the first kindlers of it , and that first prohibited trade and shut him out of his own town : they have intercepted and printed his privat letters to his queen , and hers to him , ( oh barbarous basenesse ! ) but therin they did him a pleasure , though the intent was malitious , their aim in all things being to envenom the hearts of his people towards him ; and this was to render him a glorious and well-belov'd prince , as likewise for making him rich , ( all which they had vow'd to do upon passing the act of continuance , ) but now they have made him poorer then the meanest of all his vassals , they have made him to have no propriety in house , goods , or lands , or as one may say , in his wife and children : 't was usual for the father to hunt in his park while the son hunted for his life in the field , for the wife 〈◊〉 lie in his bedds , while the husband layed wait to murther him abroad ; they have seiz'd upon and sold his privat hangings an●… plate , yea his very cabinets , jewels , pictures , statues , and books . nor are they the honorablest sort of peeple , and men nobly extracted ( as in scotland ) that do all this , ( for then it were not so much to be wondred at ) but they are the meanest sort of subjects , many of them illiterat mechaniques , wherof the lower house is full ; specially the subordinat committees , who domineer more o're nobles and gentry , then the parliament members themselfs their masters use to do . touching those few peers that sit now voting in the upper house , they may be said to be but meer cyphers , they are grown so degenerat as to suffer the commons to give them the law , to ride upon their backs , and do most things without them : ther be many thousand petitions that have bin recommended by these lords to the lower house , which are scornfully thrown into corners and never read ; their messengers have us'd to dance attendance divers hours and days before they were vouchsafed to be let in or heard , to the eternal dishonour of those peers , and yet poor spirited things they resent it not : the commons now command all , and though , as i am inform'd , they are summon'd thither by the kings original writ but to consent to what the king and his great counsel of peers ( which is the tru court of parlement ) shall resolve upon ; the commons i say are now from consenters become the chiefest counsellors , yea controulers of all ; nay som of this lower house fly so high as to term themselfs conquerors , and though in all conferences with the lords they stand bare before them , yet by a new way of mix'd committees they carry themselfs as collegues : these are the men that now have the vogue , and they have made their priviledges so big swoln , that they seem to have quite swallowed up both the kings prerogatives , and those of the lords : these are the grandees , and sages of the times , though most of them have but crack'd braines and crazy fortunes god wot ; nay som of them are such arrand knaves and coxcombs , that 't is questionable whether they more want common honesty , or common sense ; nor know no more what belongs to tru policy then the left leg of a joynt-stool : they are grown so high a tiptoes , that they seem to scorn an act of amnestia , or any grace from their king , wheras som of them deserve to be hang'd as oft as they have haires upon their heads ; nor have they any more care of the common good of england then they have of lapland , so they may secure their own persons , and continue their power now , authority is sweet , though it be in hell. thus , my lord , is england now govern'd , so that 't is an easie thing to take a prospect of her ruine if she goes on this pace : the scot is now the swaying man , who is the third time struck into her bowels with a numerous army : they say he hath vow'd never to return till he hath put the crown on the kings head , the scept●…r in his hand , and the sword by his side ; if he do so , it will be the best thing that ever he did , though som think that he will never be able to do england as much good as he hath done her hurt ; he hath extremely out-witted the english of late years : and they who were the causers of his first and last coming in , i hold to be the most pernicious enemies that ever this nation had ; for t is probable that germany ( viz. ponterland and breme ) will be sooner free of the swed , then england of the scot , who will stick close unto him like a bur , that he cannot shake him off ; he is becom already master of the englishmans soul , by imposing a religion upon him , and he may hereafter be master of his body . your eminence knows there is a periodicall fate hangs over all kingdoms after such a revolution of time , and rotation of fortunes wheele ; the cours of the world hath bin for one nation , like so many nailes , to thrust out another ; but for this nation , i observe by conference with divers of the saddest and best weighdst men among them , that the same presages foretell their ruine as did the israelites of old , which was a murmuring against their governors ; it is a long time that both iudges , bishops and privy counsellors have bin mutter'd at , whereof the first shold be the oracles of the law , the other of the gospell , the last of state-affaires , and that our judgments shold acquiesce upon theirs ; here as i am inform'd ; 't was common for evry ignorant client to arraign his iudg ; for evry puny curat to censure the bishop ; for evry shallow-brain home-bred fellow to descant upon the results of the councell table : and this spirit of contradiction and contumacy hath bin a long time fomenting in the minds of this peeple , infus'd into them principally , by the puritanicall faction . touching the second of the three aforesaid ( i mean bishops ) they are grown so odious ( principally for their large demeanes ) among this peeple , as the templers were of old , and one may say it is a just judgment fallen upon them , for they were most busy in demolishing convents and monasteries , as these are in destroying cathedralls and ministers ; but above all , it hath bin observ'd that this peeple hath bin a long time rotten-hearted towards the splendor of the court , the glory of their king , and the old establish'd government of the land : 't is true there were a few small leakes sprung in the great vessel of the st●…te , ( and what vessel was ever so ●…ite but was subject to leakes ? ) but these wise-akers in stopping of one have made a hundred : yet if this kings raign were parallell'd to that of queen elizabeth's , who was the greatest minion of a peeple that ever was , one will find that she stretch'd the prerogative much further ; in her time as i have read in the latin legend of her life , som had their hands cut off for only writing against her matching with the duke of aniou , others were hang'd at tyburn for traducing her government ; she pardon'd thrice as many roman priests as this king did , she pass'd divers monopolies , she kept an agent at rome , she sent her sergeant at armes to pluck out a member then sitting in the house of commons by the eares , and clapt him in prison ; she call'd them sawcy fellowes to meddle with her prerogative , or with the government of her houshold , she mannag'd all forren affaires , specially the warrs with ireland soly by her privy counsell ; yet there was no murmuring at her raign , and the reason i conceave to be , that there was neither scot or puritan had then any stroke in england . yet , for all their disobedience and grumblings against their liege lord the king , this peeple are exactly obedient to their new masters of the house of commons , though they sit there but as their servants and entitle themselfs so ; and also though in lieu of the small scratches which england might happily have receiv'd before ( all which the king had cur'd ) these new masters have made such deep gashes in her , and given her such deadly wounds that i believe are incurable . my lord , i find by my researches , that there are two great idolls in this kingdom , the greatest that ever were , they are the parliament and the pulpit ; t is held high treson to speak against the one , and the whole body of religion is nailed unto the other , for there is no devotion here at all but preaching , which god wot is little better then prating . the abuse of these two hath bin the source of all the distempers which now raign : touching the latter , it hath serv'd as a subvervient engin to prop up the power and popularity of the first ; these malicious pulpit-men breath out nothing thence but either sedition , schisme or blasphemy : poor shallow brain'd sciolists , they wold question many things in the old testament , and find apocrypha in the new : and such is the violence wherewith the minds of men and women are transported towards these preachmen , and no other part of devotion besides , that in all probability they will in time take a surfet of them : so that give this giddy peeple line enough ther will be no need of catholique arms to reduce them to the apostolick church , they will in time pave the way to it themselves , and be glad to return to rome to find out a religion again . there was here before , as i am informed , a kind of a face of a church , there were some solemnities , venerations and decencies us'd that a man might discover som piety in this peeple ; there was a publick lyturgie that in pithy pathetical prayers reach'd all occasions ; the sacraments were administred with som reverence , their churches were kept neat and comly ; but this nasty race of miscreants have nothing at all of sweetnesse , of piety and devotion in them ; 't is all turn'd to a fatuous kind of zeal after more learning , as if christianity had no sobriety , consistence or end of knowledg at all : these silly things , to imitat the apostles time , wold have the same form of discipline to govern whole nations , as it did a chamberfull of men in the infancy of the church , they wold make the same coat serve our savious at . yeers , which fitted him at three : 't is incredible how many ugly sorts of heresies they daily hatch , but they are most of them old ones newly furbish'd ; they all relate to aerius , a perfect hater of bishops , because he could not be one himself . the two sectaries which sway most , are the presbyterians and independents , the presbyterian is a spawn of a puritan , and the independent a spawn of the presbyterian : there 's but one hop 'twixt the first and a iew , and but half a hop 'twixt the other and an infidell ; they are both opposit to monarchy and hierarchy ; and the latter wold have no government at all , but a parity and promiscuous confusion , a race of creatures fit only to inhabit hell : and one of the fruits of this blessed parlement , and of these two sectaries is , that they have made more jewes and athiests then i think there is in all europe besides ; but truly , my lord , i think the judgments of heaven were never so visible in any part of the earth , as they are now here , for there is rebell against rebell , house against house , cittie against army , parlement against scot , but these two sectaries , i mean the presbyterian and independent who were the fire-brands that put this poor iland first in a flame , are now in most deadly feud one against the other , though they both concur in this to destroy government : and if the king had time enough to look only upon them , they would quickly hang , draw , and destroy one another . but indeed all christian princes shold observe the motions and successes of these two unlucky incendiaries , for if they shold ligue together again , ( as they have often plaid fast and loose one with another ) and prevail here , this iland wold not terminat their designs , they wold puzzle all the world besides . their preachmen ordinarily cry out in the pulpit , ther is a great work to be done upon earth , for the reforming all mankind , and they are appointed by heaven to be the chief instruments of bringing it about ▪ they have already bin so busie abroad , that ( with vast sommes of money ) they brought the swed upon the dane , and the very savages upon the english cavaliers in virginia ; and could they confederat with turk , or tartar , or hell it self against them , they wold do it : they are monstrously puff'd up with pride , that they stick not to call themselfs conquerors , and one of the chief ringleaders of them , an ignorant home bred kind of brewer , was not ashamed to vant it publiquely in the commons house , that if he had but . men , he wold undertake to march to constantinople , and pull the ottoman emperour out of the seralio . touching the other grand idoll the parlement , 't is true that the primitive constitution of parlement in this iland was a wholesom piece of policy , because it kept a good correspondence , and clos'd all ruptures 'twixt the king and his peeple , but this thing they call parlement now , may rather be term'd a cantle of one , or indeed a conventicle of schismatiques , rather than a great counsell ; 't is like a kind of headless monster , or som estropiated carkas ; for ther is neither king nor prelat , nor scarce the seventh part of peers and commons , no not the twelfth part fairly elected ; nevertheless they draw the peeple , specially this city , like so many stupid animalls , to adore them . yet though this institution of parlement be a wholsom thing in it self , there is in my judgment a great incongruity in one particular ; and i believe it hath bin the cause of most distempers ; it is , that the burgesses are more in number than the knights of the shires ; for the knights of the shires are commonly gentlemen well born , and bred , and vers'd in the laws of the land , as well as forren governments , ( divers of them ) but the burgesses of towns are commonly tradesmen , and being bred in corporations they are most of them inclining to puritanism , and consequently to popular government ; these burgesses exceeding the knights in number , carry all before them by plurality of voices , and so puzzle all : and now that ▪ i have mentioned corporations , i must tell your lordship , that the greatest soloecism in the policy of this kingdom , is the number of them ; especially this monstrous city , which is compos'd of nothing els but of corporations ; and the greatest errors that this king , specially his father , committed , was to suffer this town to spread her wings so wide ▪ for she bears no proportion with the bignes of the iland , but may fit a kingdom thrice as spacious ; she engrosseth and dreins all the wealth and strength of the kingdom ; so that i cannot compare england more properly than to one of our cremona geese , where the custom is to fatten only the heart , but in doing so the whole body growes lank . to draw to a conclusion , this nation is in a most sad and desperat condition , that they deserve to be pittied , and preserved from sinking , and having cast the present state of things and all interests into an equal balance , i find , my lord , ther be three ways to do it , one good , and two bad . . the first of the bad ones is the sword ▪ which is one of the scourges of heaven , especially the civill sword . . the second bad one is the treaty , which they now offer the king in that small island wher he hath bin kept captif so long , ( 〈◊〉 which quality the world will account him still while he is detain'd there ) and by tha●… treaty to bind him as fast as they can , an●… not trust him at all . . the good way is , in a free confiding brave way ( englishmen-like ) to send for their king to london , where city and country shold petition him to summon a new and free full parlement , which he may do as justly as ever he did thing in his life , these men having infring'd as well all the essentiall priviledges of parlement , as every puntillio of it , for they have often risen up in a confusion without adjournment , they had two speakers at once , they have most perjuriously and beyond all imagination betrayed the trust both king and country repos'd in them , subverted the very sundamentals of all law , and plung'd the whole kingdom in this bottomless gulf of calamities : another parlement may haply do som good to this languishing island , and cure her convulsions , but for these men that arrogat to themselfs the name of parlement ( by a local puntillio only because they never stir'd from the place where they have bin kept together by meer force ) i find them by their actions to be so pervers , so irrational and refractory , so far given over to a reprobat sense , so fraught with rancor , with an irreconcileable malice and thirst of bloud , that england may well despaire to be heal'd by such phlebotomists , or quack-salvers ; be sides they are so full of scruples , apprehensions , and jealousies proceeding from blac●… guilty souls , and gawl'd consciences , that they will do nothing but chop logic with their king , and spin out time to continue their power , and evade punishment , which they think is unavoidable if ther shold be a free-parlement . touching the king he comports himself with an admired temper'd equanimity , he invades and o're-masters them more and more in all his answers by strength of reson , though he have no soul breathing to consult withall , but his own genius : he gains wonderfully upon the hearts and opinion of his peeple , and as the sun useth to appear bigger in winter , and at his declension in regard of the interposition of certain meteors 'twixt the eye of the beholder and the object , so this king being thus o're-clouded and declined , shines far more glorious in the eyes of his people ; and certainly these high morall vertues of constancy , courage and wisdom come from above ; and no wonder , for kings as they are elevated above all other peeple and stand upon higher ground , they sooner receive the inspirations of heaven ; nor doth he only by strength of reason out 〈◊〉 them , but he wooes them by gentlenesse and mansuetude ; as the gentleman of paris who having an ape in his house that had taken his only child out of the cradle , and dragged him up to the ridge of the house , the parent with ruthful he art charmed the ape by fair words and other bland●…ments to bring him softly down , which he did ; england may be said to be now just upon such a precipice , ready to have her braines dash'd out , and i hope these men will not be worse natur'd then that brute animal , but will save her . thus have i given your eminence a rough account of the state of this poor and pittifully deluded peeple , which i will perfect when i shall come to your presence , which i hope will be before this autumnal equinox ; i thought to have sojourn'd here longer , but that i am grown weary of the clime , for i fear there 's the other two scourges of heaven that menace this island , i mean the famin and pestilence , especially this city , for their prophanness , rebellion , and sacriledge ▪ it hath bin a talk a great while whether anti-christ be come to the world or no , i am sure anti-iesus , which is worse , is among this people , for they hold all veneration , though voluntary proceeding from the inward motions of a sweet devoted soul , and causing an outward genuflection , to be superstitious , insomuch that one of the synodical saints here printed and published a book entitling it against iesu worship . so in the profoundest posture of reverence i kisse your vest , as being , london this , of august , . my lord , your eminences most humbly devoted , i. h. a nocturnal progres , or a perambulation of most countreys in christendom , perform'd in one night by strength of the imagination ; which progresse terminats in these north-west iles , and declares the woful confusions they are involv'd at present . the progress of the soul by an usuall dream . it was in the dead of a long winter night , when no eyes were open but watchmens and centinels , that i was fallen soundly asleep , the cinq-out-ports were shut up closer then usually , for my senses were so trebly lock'd , that the moon , had she descended from her watry orb , might have done much more to me then she did to endymion when he lay snoaring upon the brow of latmus hill ; nay , ( be it spoken without prophanenesse ) if a rib had bin taken out of me that night , to have made a new mo●… of a woman , i shold hardly have felt it . yet , though the cousin german of death had so strongly seiz'd thus upon the exterior parts of this poor tabernacle of flesh , my inward parts were never more actif , and fuller of employments then they were that night . pictus imaginibus , formisque fugacib●… adstat morpheus , & variis fingit nova vultibus ora . methought my soul made a sally abroad into the world , and fetch'd a vast compas ; she seem'd to soar up and slice the air to cross seas , to clammer up huge hills , and never rested till she had arriv'd at the antipodes : now som of the most judicious geometricians and chorographers hold that the whole mass of the earth being round like the rest of her fellow elements , ther be places , and poizing parts of the continent , ther be peninsulas , promontories and ilands upon the other face of the earth that correspond and concenter with all those regions and iles that are upon this superficies which we read , countries that symbolize with them in qualities , in temperature of air and clime , as well as in nature of soil ; the inhabitants also of those places which are so perpendicularly opposit , do sympathize one with another in disposition , complexions and humors , though the astronomers wold have their east to be our west , and so all things vice versa in point of position , which division of the heaven is onely mans institution . but to give an account of the strange progresse my soul made that night ; the first country she lighted on was a very low flat country , and it was such an odde amphibious country , being so indented up and down with rivers and arms of the sea , that i made a question whether i shold call it water or land ; yet though the sea be invited and usher'd in into som places , he is churlistly pen'd out in som other , so that though he foam and swell , and appear as high walls hard-by , yet they keep him out , maugre all his roaring and swelling . as i wandred up and down in this watry region , i might behold from a streight long dike wheron i stood , a strange kind of forrest , for the trees mov'd up and down ; they look'd afar off as if they had bin blasted by thunder ; for they had no leafs at all ; but making a nearer approach unto them , i found they were a nomberlesse company of ship-masts , and before them appear'd a great town ( amsterdam ) incorporated up and down with water ; as i mus'd with my self upon the sight of all this , i concluded , that the inhabitants of that country were notable industrious people , who could give law so to the angry ocean , and occupie those places where the great leviathan shold tumble and take his pastime in ; as my thought ran thus , i met with a man , whom i conjectur'd to be 'twixt a marchant and a mariner , his salutation was so homely ; the air also was so foggy , that methought it stuck like cobwebs in his mustachos ; and he was so dull in point of motion , as if the bloud in his veines had bin half frozen : i began to mingle words with him , and to expostulat somthing about that country and people ; and then i found a great deal of down-right civilities in him : he told me that they were the only men who did miracles of late years ; those innumerable piles of stones you see before you in such comly neat frabriques , is a place ( said he ) that from a fish - market in effect is come to be one of the greatest marts in this part of the world , which hath made her swel thrice bigger the●… she was . years ago ; and as you behold this floating forrest of masts before her mole , so if you could see the foundations of her houses , you shold see another great forrest , being rear'd from under-ground upon fair piles of timber , which if they chance to sink in this marshy soil , we have an art to scrue them up again . we have for . years and above without any intermission , except a short-liv'd truce that once was made , wrastled with one of the greatest potentates upon earth , and born up stoutly against him , gramercy our two next neighbour kings , and their reason of state , with the advantage of our situation . we have fought our selfs into a free-state , and now quite out of that ancient allegeance we ow'd him ; and though we pay twenty times more in taxes of all sorts then we did to him , yet we are contented : we have turn'd war into a trade , and that which useth to beggar others , hath benefited us : besides , we have bin and are still the rendevous of most discontented subjects , when by the motions of unquiet consciences in points of religion , or by the fury of the sword , they are forc'd to quit their own countreys , who bring their arts of manufacture , and moveables , hither ; insomuch that our lombards are full of their goods , and our banks superabound with their gold and silver which they bring hither in specie . to secure our selfs , and cut the enemy more work , and to engage our confederats in a war with him , we have kindled fires in every corner , and now that they are together by the eares , we have bin content lately , being long woo'd thereunto , to make a peace with that king to whom we once acknowledged vassalage ; which king out of a height of spirit , hath spent . times more upon us for our reduction , then all our country is worth ; but now he hath bin well contented to renounce and abjure all claimes and rights of soverainity over us ; in so much , that being now without an enemy , we hope in a short time to be masters of all the comerce in this part of the world , and to eat our neighbours out of trade in their own commodities : we fear nothing but that exces of wealth , and a surfet of ease may make us careles and breed quarrells among our selfs , and that our generall , being married to a great kings daughter may — . here he suddenly broke the threed of his discourse , and got hastily away , being haul'd by a ship that was sailing hard by ▪ hereupon my soul took wing again , and cut her way through that foggy condens'd aire , till she lighted on a fair spacious , cleare continent , a generous and rich soile mantled up and downe with large woods , where , as i rang'd to and fro , i might see divers faire houses , townes , palaces and castles , looking like so many carkases , for no humane soul appear'd in them ; methought i felt my he art melting within me in a soft resentment of the case of so gallant a countrey , and as i stood at amaze , and in a kind of astonishment , a goodly personage makes towards me , whom both for his comportment , and countenance , i perceiv'd to be of a finer mould then that companion i had met withall before : by the trace of his looks i guessed he might be som nobleman that had bin ruin'd by som disaster : having acosted him with a fitting distance , he began in a masculin strong winded language full of aspirations and tough collision of consonants , to tell me as followeth : sir , i find you are a stranger in this countrey , because you stand so agast at the devastations of such a fair piece of the continent , then know sir , because i beleeve you are curious to carry away with you the causes thereof , that these ruthfull objects which you behold , are the effects of a long lingring war , and of the fury of the sword , a cruentous civill war that hath rag'd here above thirty yeares : one of the grounds of it was the infortunate undertaking of a prince , who liv'd not far off in an affluence of all earthly felicity ; he had the greatest lady to his wife , the bes●… purse of money , the fairest stable of horse ▪ and choicest library of books of any other of his neighbour princes . but being by desperat and aspiring counsells put upon a kingdom , while he was catching at the shadow of a crown , he lost the substance of all his own ancient possessions : by the many powerfull alliances he had ( which was the cause he was pitched upon ) the fewd continued long ; for among others a northern king took advantage to rush in , who did a world of mischiefs , but in a few yeers that king and hee found their graves in their own ruins neer upon the same time ; but now , may heaven have due thanks for it , there is a peace concluded , a peace which hath bin . long yeers a moulding , and will i hope , be shortly put in execution ; yet 't is with this fatall disadvantage , that the said northern people , besides a masse of ready money we are to give them , are to have firme footing , and a warm nest ever in this countrey hereafter , so that i fear we shall hear from them too often : upon these words this noble personage fetch'd a deep sigh , but in such a generous manner that he seem'd to break and check it before it came halfe forth . thence my soul taking her flight o're divers huge and horrid cacuminous mountaines ( the alpes ) at last i found my self in a great populous town ( naples ) but her buildings were miserably battered up and down , she had a world of palaces , castles , convents and goodly churches : as i stepped out of curiosity into one of them , upon the west side there was a huge grate , where a creature all in white beckned at me , making my approach to the grate , i found her to be a nun , a lovely creature she was , for i could not distinguish which was whiter , her hue or her habit , which made me remember ( though in a dream my self ) that saying , if dreams and wishes had been tru , there had not been found a tru maid to make a nun of , ever since a cloyster'd life began first among women ; i asked her the reason how so many ugly devastations shold befall so beautifull a city , she in a dolorous gentle tone , and ruthfull accents , the teares trickling down her cheeks like so many pearles , ( such pearly teares that wold have dissolv'd a diamond ) sobb'd out unto me this speech : gentle sir , 't is far beyond any expressions of mine , and indeed beyond humane imagination to conceive the late calamities which have befallen this faire though infortunat city , a pernicious popular rebellion broke out here upon a sudden into most horrid barbarismes , a fate that hangs over most rich popular places that swim in luxe and plenty ; but touching the grounds thereof , one may say that rebellion entred into this city , as sin first entred into the world by an apple : for our king now in his great extremities having almost halfe the world banding against him ; and putting but a small tax upon a basket of fruit to last only for a time , this fruit-tax did put the peeples teeth so on edge , that it made them gnash against the government , and rush into armes ; but they are sensible now of their own follies , for i think never any place suffered more in so short a time : the civill combustions abroad in other kingdomes may be said to be but small squibs compar'd to those horrid flakes of fire which have rag'd here , and much adoe we had to keep our vest all fire free from the fury of it : in lesse then the revolution of a yeer it consum'd above fourscore thousand soules within the walls of this city ; but 't is not the first time of forty , that this luxurious foolish peeple hath smarted for their insurrections and insolencies , and that this mad horse hath o'rethrown his rider , and drawn a worse upon his back ; who instead of a saddle , put a pack-saddle and panniers upon him : but indeed the voluptuousnesse of this peeple was grown ripe for the judgement of heaven . she was then beginning to expostulat with me about the state of my country , and i had a mighty mind to satisfie her , for i could have corresponded with her in the re●…ation of as strange things , but the lady a●…adesse calling her away , she departed in an ●…nstant , obedience seem'd to be ther so precise and punctual . i steer'd my course thence through a most delicious country to another city that lay in the very bosom of the sea , ( venice ) she was at first nothing els but a kind of posie made up of dainty green hillocks , tied together by above . bridges , and so coagulated into a curious city ; though she be espous'd to neptune very solemnly once evry ●…eer , yet she still reserves her maydenhead , ●…ad bears the title of the virgin city in that part of the world ; but i found her tugging mainly with a huge giant that wold ravish her ; he hath shrewdly set on her skirts , and a great shame it is , that she is not now assisted by her neighbours , and that they shold be together by the ears when they shold do so necessary a work , considering how that great giant is their common enemy ; and hath lately vow'd seven yeers wars against her ; specially considering , that if he comes once to ravish her , he will quickly ruin her said neighbours , she ( to her high honor be it spoken ) being their only rampart against the incursion of the said giant , and by consequence their greatest security . from this maiden city , mee thought , i was in a trice carried over a long gulf , and so through a midland sea , into another kingdom , ( spain ) where i felt the clime hotter by some degrees ; a rough-hew'n soile , for the most part , it was full of craggy barren hills ; but where there were valleys and water enough , the country was extraordinarily fruitful , whereby nature ( it seems ) made her a compensation for the sterility of the rest . yet notwithstanding the hardship of the soyl , i found her full of abbeys , monasteries , hermitages , convents , churches , and other places of devotion ; as i rov'd there a while , i encountred a grave man in a long black cloak , by the fashion whereof , and by the brimms of his hat , i perceived him to be a iesuit ; i clos'd with him , and question'd him about that country : he told me the king of that country was the greatest potentat of that part of the world ; and , to draw power to a greater unity , they of our order could be well contented , that he were universall head over temporalls , because 't is most probable to be effected by him , as we have already one universall head over spiritualls : this is the monark of the mines , i mean of gold and silver , who furnishes all the world , but most of all his own enemies with mony , which mony foments all the wars in this part of the world : never did any earthly monark thrive so much in so short a tract of time , but of late yeers he hath been ill-favouredly shaken by the revolt and utter defection of two sorts of subjects , who are now in actual arms against him on both sides of him at his own doors . ther hath bin also a long deadly feud 'twixt the next tramontan kingdom ( france ) and him , though the q. that rules there be his own sister , an unnaturall odious thing : but it seems god almighty hath a quarrel of late yeers with all earthly potentats ; for in so short a time ther never happen'd such strange shocks and revolutions : the great emperour of ethiopia hath bin outed , he and all his children by a petty companion : the king of china , a greater emperour than he , hath lost almost all that huge monarchy by the incursion of the tartar , who broke ore the wall upon him : the grand turk hath bin strangled , with . of his concubines ; the emperour of muscovy hath bin content to beg his life of his own vassals , and to see before his face divers of his chief officers hack'd to pieces , and their heads cut off and steep'd in strong water , to make them burn more bright in the market place . besides the above mentioned , this king hath also divers enemies more , yet he bears up against them all indifferently well , though with infinit expence of treasure , and the church , specially our society , hath stuck close unto him in these his exigents : whence may be inferr'd , that let men repine as long as they will at the possessions of the church , they are the best anchors to a state in a storm , and in time of need to preserve it from sinking ; besides , acts of charity wold be quite lost among men , did not the wealth of the church keep life in them : hereupon drawing a huge pair of beads from under his cloak , he began to ask me of my religion ; i told him i had a long journy to go , so that i could not stay to wait on him longer ; so we parted , and me thought i was very glad to be rid of him so well . my soul then made another flight over an assembly of hideous high hills , ( pyreneys ) and lighted under another clime , on a rich and copious country ( france ) resembling the form of a lozenge , but me thought , i never saw so many poor peeple in my life ; i encountred a pesan , and asked him what the reason was , that ther shold be so much poverly in a country wher ther was so much plenty : sir , they keep the commonalty poor in pure policy here , for being a peeple , as the world observes us to be , that are more humerous than others , and that love variety and change , if we were suffered to be pamper'd with wealth , we wold ever and anon rise up in tumults , and so this kingdom shold never be quiet , but subject to intestine broils , and so to the hazard of any invasion : but ther was of late a devillish cardinal , whose humour being as sanguin as his habit , and working upon the weaknes of his master , hath made us not only poor , but stark beggars , and we are like to continue so by an eternal war , wherein he hath plung'd this poor kingdom , which war must be maintained with our very vital spirits : but as dejected and indigent as we are , yet upon the death of that ambitious cardinal , we had risen up against this , who hath the vogue now , ( with whom he hath left his principles ) had not the fearful example of our next transmarin western neighbours ( the english ) and the knowledg we have of a worse kind of slavery , of those endles arbitrary taxes , and horrid confusions they have fool'd themselfs lately into , utterly deterr'd us , though we have twenty times more reason to rise then ever they had : yet our great city ( paris ) hath shew'd her teeth , and gnash'd them ill-favouredly of late , but we find she hath drawn water only for her own mill , we fare little the better , yet we hope it will conduce to peace , which hath bin so long in agitation . i cannot remember how i parted with that peasan , but in an instant i was landed upon a large island , and methought , 't was the temperat'st region i had bin in all the while ( england ; ) the heat of the sun ther is as harmless as his light , the evening serene●… are as wholsom ther as the morning dew ; the dog-daies as innocuous as any of the two equinoxes . as i rang'd to and fro that fair island , i spyed a huge city ( london ) whose length did far exceed her latitude , but ne●…ther for length or latitude did she seem to bear any politicall proportion with that island : she look'd , methought , like the iesuits hat whom i had met withall before , whose brimms were bigger then the crown , or like a peticoat , whose fringe was longer then the body . as i did cast my eyes upwards , methought i discern'd a strange inscription in the aire which hung just over the midst of that city written in such huge visible characters , that any one might have read it , which was this : woe be to the bloudy city . hereupon a reverend bishop presented himself to my view , his gray haires , and grave aspect struck in me an extraordinary reverence of him : so performing those complements which were fitting , i asked him of the condition of the place , he in a submiss sad tone , with clouds of melancholy waving up and down his looks , told me ; sir this island was reputed few years since to have bin in the completest condition of happiness of any part on earth , insomuch that she was repin'd a●… for her prosperity and peace by all her neighbours who were plung'd in war round about her , but now she is fallen into as deep a gulf of misery , and servitude , as she was in a height of felicity & freedom before : touching the grounds of this change , i cannot impute it to any other then to a surfet of happiness ; now , there is no surfet so dangerous as that of happinesse : ther are such horrid divisions here , that if they were a foot in hell , they were able to destroy the kingdom of satan : truly sir , ther are crep'd in more opinions among us about matters or religion , then the pagans had of old of the summum bonum , which varro saith were . the understandings of poor men were never so puzzled and distracted ; a great while there were two opposit powers ( king and parlement ) who swayed here in a kind of equality that peeple knew not whom to obey , many thousands complyed with both , as the men of calecut who adore god and the devil , tantum squantum , as it is in the indian language ) they adore the one for love , the other for fear : ther is a monstrous kind of wild liberty here that ever was upon earth ; that which was complained of as a stalking horse to draw on our miseries at first , is now only in practice , which is meer arbitrary rule ; for now both law , religion and allegiance are here arbitrary : touching the last , 't is quite lost , 't is permitted that any may prate , preach or print what they will in derogation of their annointed king : which word king was once a monosyllable of som weight in this i le , but 't is as little regarded now as the word pope ( among som ) which was also a mighty monosyllable once among us : the rule of the law is , that the king can do no wrong , ther is a contrary rule now crept in , that the king can receive no wrong ; and truly sir , 't is a great judgement both upon prince and peeple ; upon the one , that the love of so many of his vassals shold be so alienated from him ; upon the other , that their hearts shold be so poyson'd , and certainly 't is the effect of an ill spirit ; both the one and the other in all probability tend to the ruine of this kingdom . but now sir , ( because i see you are so attentive , and seem to be much mov'd at this discourse ) as i have discover'd unto you the general cause of our calamities , which was not only a satiety but a surfet of happinesse , so i will descend now to a particular cause of them ; it was a northern nation ( scot ) that brought these cataracts of mischiefs upon us ; and you know the old saying , out of the north all ill comes forth . far be it from me to charge the whole nation herewith ; no , but onely som pernicious instruments that had insinuated themselfs , and incorporated among us , and sway'd both in our court and counsels : they had a hand in every monopoly ; they had out of our exchequer , and customs near upon . crowns in yearly pensions , viis & modis ; yet they could not be content , but they must puzzle the peace and policy of this church and state : and though they are a peeple of a differing genius , differing laws , customs , and manners unto us , yet for matter of conscience they wold bring our necks into their yoak , as if they had a greater talent of reason , and clearer illuminations , as if they understood scripture better , and were better acquainted with god almighty then we , who brought them first from paganisme to christianity , and also to be reformed christians : but it seems , matters have little thriven with them ; nay the visible hand of heaven hath bin heavily upon them divers waies since they did lift their hands against their native king ; for notwithstanding the vast summs they had hence , yet is the generality of them as beggarly as ever they were ; besides , the civil sword hath rag'd ther as furiously as here , and did as much execution among them . moreover the pestilence hath bin more violent , and sweeping in their chief town ( edenburgh ) then ever it was since they were a peeple . and now lately ther 's the notablest dishonour befaln them that possibly could light upon a nation , in that . of ours shold upon even ground encounter , kill , slay , rout and utterly discomfit thrice as many of theirs , though as well appointed and arm'd as men could be : and truly sir , the advantages that accrue to this nation are not a few by that exploit ; for of late years that nation was cryed up abroad to be a more martial peeple then we , and to have baffled us in open field in divers traverses : besides , i hope a small matter will pay now their arrerages here , and elsewhere ; but principally , i hope they will not be so busie hereafter in our court and counsel , as they have bin formerly . another cause of our calamity is a strange race of peeple ( the puritans ) sprung up among our selfs , who were confederat with those of the north ; they wold make gods house cleane , and by putting out the candle of all ancient learning and knowledge , they would sweep it only by the light of an ignis fatuus : but 't is visibly found that they have brought much more rubbage into it , and wheras in reforming this house , they shold rather find out the groat that is lost , they go about to take away the mite that 's left , and so put christs spouse to live on meer almes : true it is , there is a kind of zeal that burns in them , ( and i could wish there were so much piety ) but this zeal burns with too much violence and presumption , which is no good symptom of spirituall health , it being a rule , that as the naturall heat , so the spirituall shold be moderat , els it commonly turns to a frenzy , and that is the thing which causeth such a giddinesse and distraction in their braines ; this ( proceeding from the suggestions of an ill spirit ) puffs them up with so much spirituall pride ; for the devill is so cunning a wrastler , that he oftentimes lifts men up to give them the greater fall : they think they have an inerring spirit , and that their diall must needs go tru , howsoever the sun goes : they wold make the gospell , as the caddies make the alchoran , to decide all civill temporall matters under the large notion of slander , whereof they forsooth to be the judges , and so in time to hook in all things to their classis : i believe if these men were dissected when they are dead , they would be a great deale of quicksilver found in their braines . proh superi , quantum mortalia pectora coecae noctis habent ! — but i could pitty the giddinesse of their braines , had they not so much gaul in their breasts , were they not so thirsting after blood , so full of poison and irreconcileable malice ; in so much that it may be very well thought , these men are a kin to that race which sprung out of the serpents teeth : these are they which have seduced our great counsell , and led this foolish city by the nose to begin and foment this ugly war , insomuch that if those numberless bodies which have perish'd in these commotions , were cast into her streets , and before her doores , many thousand citizens noses would bleed of pure guilt . not to hold you long , these are the men who have baffled common sence , blasted the beams of nature , and offered violence to reason it self ; these are they who have infatuated most of the peeple of this iland ; so that whereas in times past , som call'd her the i le of angels , she may be term'd now the i le of gulls , or more properly the i le of doggs , or rather indeed ●…he i le of wolfs , there is such a true lycanthrepy com in among us : i am loth to call her the iland of devills , though she hath bin branded so abroad . to conclude sir , the glory of this isle is quite blasted ; 't is tru they speak of peace , but while the king speakes to them of it , they make themselves ready for battle ; i much fear , that ixion-like we imbrace a cloud for peace , out of which there will issue out centaures , and monsters , as sprung out of that cloud . touching that ancient'st holy order whereof you see me to be ; i well hoped , that in regard they pretended to reforme things only , they wold not have quite extirpated , but regulated only this order : it had bin enough to brayle our wings , not to have ●…ear'd them : to have lopp'd and prun'd , not to have destroyed root and branch of that ancient tree which was planted by the hands of the apostles themselfs : in fine sir , we are a lost peeple , 't is no other dedalus , but the high deity of heaven can clue us out of this labyrinth of confusions , can extricat us out of this maze of miseries : the philosopher saith , 't is impossible for man to quadrat a circle ; so 't is not in the power of man , but of god alone , to make a loyall subject of a round head : among other things that strangers report of this iland , they say that winter here hath too many teares in his eyes : helas sir , 't is impossible he shold have too many now , to bewaile the lamentable base slavery , that a free-born peeple is com to : and though they are grown so tame as to kisse the rod that whips them , yet their taskmasters will not throw it into the fire . truly sir , as my tongue is too feeble to expresse our miseries , so the plummet of the best understanding is too short to fadom the depth of them . with this , the grave venerable bishop giving me his benediction , fetcht such a sigh , that would have rended a rock asunder ; and suddenly vanish'd ( methought ) out out of my sight up towards heaven . i presently after awoke about the dawnings of the day , when one could hardly discern dog from wolf ; and my soul , my arimula vagula blandula , being re-entred through the horn gate of sleep into her former mansion , half tyr'd after so long a peregrination ; and having rub'd my eyes , distended my limms , and return'd to a full expergefaction , i began to call my self to account touching those world of objects my fancy had represented unto me that night ; and when by way of reminiscence i fel to examin●… and ruminate upon them ; lord , what a masse of ideas ran in my head ! but when i call'd to mind the last countrey my soul wandred in , methought i felt my heart like a lump of lead within me , when i considered how pat every circumstance might be applyed to the present condition of england : i was meditating with my self what kind of dream this might be ; wherupon i thought upon the common division that philosophers make of dreams , that they are either divine , diabolicall , naturall , or humane . for the first , they are visions more properly or revelations , wherof ther are divers examples in the holy oracles of god , but the puddled cranies of my brain are not rooms clean enough to entertain such : touching the second kind , which come by the impulses of the devil , i have heard of divers of them , as when one did rise up out of his sleep , and fetcht a poyniard to stab his bed-fellow , which he had done , had he not bin awake ; another went to the next chamber abed to his mother , and wold have ravish'd her ; but i thank god this dream of mine was not of that kind . touching the third species of dreams ; which are naturall dreams , they are according to the humor which predominats ; if melancholy sway , we dream of black darksom devious places ; if phlegm , of waters ; if choler , of frayes , fightings , and troubles ; if sanguin predominat , we dream of green fields , gardens , and other pleasant representations ; and the physitian comes often to know the quality of a disease by the nocturnal objects of the patients fancy . humane dreams the last sort relate to the actions of the day past , or of the day following , and som representations are clear and even ; others are amphibious , mongrell , distorted and squalid objects , ( according to the species of trees over troubled waters : ) and the object is clear or otherwise , accorning to the tenuity or grossenesse of the vapors which ascend from the ventricle up to the brain . touching my dream , i think it was of this last kind ; for i was discoursing of , and condoling the sad distempers of our times the day before : i pray god som part of it prove not propheticall ; for , although the frenchman sayeth , songes sont mensonges , dreames are delusions , and that they turn to contraries , yet the spaniard hath a saying , et ciego sonnava que via yera lo que querria . the blind man dreamt he did see light , the thing he wish'd for happen'd right . insomuch that some dreams oftentimes prove tru ; as s. austin makes mention of a rich merchant in milan , who being dead , one of his creditors comes to his son to demand such a sum of money which he had lent his father ; the son was confident 't was paid , but not finding the creditors receipt , he was impleaded and like to be cast in the sute , had not his fathers ghost appeared to him , and directed him to the place where the acquittance was , which he found the next day accordingly . galen speaks of one that dreamt he had a wooden leg , and the next day he was taken with a dead palsie in one whole side . such a dream was that of william rufus , when he thought he had felt a cold gust passing through his bowels ; and the next day he was slain in the guts , by the glance of an arrow , in new forrest , a place where he and his father had committed so many sacrileges . i have read in artimedorus , of a woman that dreamt she had seen the pictures of three faces in the moone like her self , and she was brought to bed of three daughters a little after , who all died within the compas of a moneth . another dreamt , that xanthus water ran red , and the next day he fell a spitting of blood . to this i will add another fore-telling dream , whereof i have read , which was thus : two young gentlemen being travelling abroad in strange countreyes , and being come to a great towne , the one lay far in the citie , the other in an hostry without the wall in the suburbs : he in the city did dream in the dead of night , that his friend which he had left in the suburbs rush'd into his chamber panting and blowing , being pursued by others ; he dreamt so againe , and the third time he might see his friends ghost appearing at his beds side with bloud trickling down his throat , and a poyniard in his brest , telling him , dear friend , i am come now to take my last farewell of thee , and if thou rise betimes , thou shalt meet me in the way going to be buryed ; the next morning his friend going with his host towards the inn in the suburbs wher he left his friend , they met with a cart laden with dung in the way , which being staid and search'd , the dead body was found naked in the dung . i will conclude with a notable dream that osman the great turk had not many years since , a few days before he was murthered by his janizaries , . he dreamt , that being mounted upon a huge camel , he could not make him go , though he switch'd and spur'd him never so much ; at last the camel overthrew him , and being upon the ground , only the bridle was left in his hand , but the body of the camel was vanished : the mufti not being illuminated enough to interpret this dream , a santon who was a kind of idiot , told him , the camel represented the ottoman empire , which he not being able to govern , he shold be o'rethrown , which two dayes after proved tru . by these , and a cloud of examples more , we may conclude , that dreams are not altogether impertinent , but somthing may be gathered out of them ; though the application and meaning of them be denyed to man , unless by special illumination . somnia venturi sunt praescia saepe diei . by dreams we oft may guesse at the next dayes successe . thus have you a rough account of a rambling noctivagation up and down the world : i may boldly say , that neither sir iohn mandevile , or coryat himself travell'd more in so short a time : whence you see what nimble postillions the animal spirits are ; and with what incredible celerity the imagination can crosse the line , cut the tropiques , and pass to the other hemisphere of the world ; which shews that humane souls have somthing in them of the almighty , that their faculties have a kind of ubiquitary freedom , though the body be never so under restraint , as the authors is . they erre as much who think all dreams false , as they who think them alwayes tru . in the prison of the fleet . idus decembris . i. h. a vindication of his majesty , touching a letter he writ to rome from the court of spain , in answer to a letter which pope gregory the th . had sent him upon passing the dispensation for concluding the match with the i●…fanta . which letter mr. pryn mention's in his book call'd the popish royal favorit , wherby the world is apt to beleeve that his majesty had inclinations to pope●…y . ther goe's also herewith , a clearing of som aspersions that the said mr. pryn cast's upon the author hereof in the same pamphlet , viz. that he was a malignant , and no friend to parlements . wherby , he takes occasion to speak somthing of the first rise , and also of the duty as well as the authority of parlements . to my worthily honor'd friend sir w. s. knight . sir , i have many thanks to give you for the book you pleased to send me , called the popish royal favorite ; and according to your advice ( which i value in a high degree ) i did put pen to paper , and somthing you may see i have done ( though in a poor pamphleting way ) to clear my self of those aspersions that seem to be cast upon his majesty ; but truly sir , i was never so unfit for such a task ; all my papers , manuscripts , and notes having bin long since seized upon and kept from me : adde hereunto , that besides this long pressure and languishment of close restraint ( the sense wherof i find hath much stupified my spirits ) it pleased god to visit me lately with a dangerous fit of sickness , a high burning fever , with the new disease , wherof my body as well as my mind is yet somwhat crazie : so that ( take all afflictions together ) i may truly say , i have passed the ordeal , the fiery tryal . but it hath pleased god to reprieve me to see better daies i hope ; for out of this fatal black cloud , which now ore-sets this poor island , i hope ther will break a glorious sun-shine of peace and firm happinesse : to effect which , had i a jury , a grand-jury of lives , i wold sacrifice them all , and triumph in the oblation . so i most affectionately kiss your hands , and rest your faithfull ( though afflicted ) servant , from the prison of the fleet. i. h. the pre-eminence , and duty of parlement . sectio prima . i am a free-born subject of the realm of england ; wherby i claim as my native inheritance , an undoubted right , propriety , and portion in the laws of the land : and this distinguisheth me from a slave . i claim likewise protection from my soverain prince , who as he is my liege lord is obliged to protect me , and i being one of his liege peeple am obliged to obey him by way of reciprocation ; i claim also an interest and common right in the high national court of parlement , and in the power , the priviledges and jurisdiction therof , which i put in equal ballance with the laws , in regard it is the fountain whence they spring ; and this i hold also to be a principall part of my birth-right ; which great councell i honour , respect , value , and love in as high a degree as can be , as being the bulwark of our liberties , the main boundary and bank which keeps us from slavery , from the inundations of tyrannicall rule , and unbounded will-government . and i hold my self obliged in a tye of indispensable obedience , to conform and submit my self to whatsoever shall be transacted , concluded , and constituted by its authority in church or state with the royal assent , whether it be by making , enlarging , altering , diminishing , disanulling , repealing , or reviving of any law , statute , act , or ordinance whatsoever , either touching matters ecclesiastical , civil , common , capital , criminall , martial , maritime , municipall , or any other ; of all which the transcendent and uncontrollable jurisdiction of that court is capable to take cognizance . amongst the three things which the athenian captain thank'd the gods for , one was , that he was born a grecian , and not a barbarian ; for such was the vanity of the greeks , and after them of the romans in the flourish of their monarchy , to arrogat all civility to themselves , and to terme all the world besides barbarians : so i may say to rejoyce , that i was born a vassall to the crown of england ; that i was born under so well-moulded and tempered a government , which endows the subject with such liberties and infranchisements that bear up his naturall courage , and keep him still in heart ; such liberties that fence and secure him eternally from the gripes and tallons of tyranny : and all this may be imputed to the authority and wisedome of this high court of parlement , wherein there is such a rare co-ordination of power ( though the soveraignty remain still entire , and untransferrable in the person of the prince ) there is such a wholsom mixture 'twixt monarchy , optimacy , and democracy , 'twixt prince , peers , and commonalty , during the time of consultation , that of so many distinct parts , by a rare co-operation and unanimity they make but one body politick , ( like that shea●…e of arrows in the emblem ) one entire concentricall peece , the king being still the head , and the results of their deliberations but as so many harmonious diapasons arising from different strings . and what greater immunity and happinesse can there be to a peeple , than to be liable to no laws but what they make themselves ? to be subject to no contribution , assessement , or any pecuniary erogations whatsoever , but what they vote , and voluntarily yeeld unto themselves ? for in this compacted politick body , there be all degrees of peeple represented ; both the mechanick , tradesman , merchant , and yeoman have their inclusive vote , as well as the gentry , in the persons of their trustees , their knights and burgesses , in passing of all things . nor is this soveraign surintendent councell an epitome of this kingdom only , but it may be said to have a representation of the whole universe ; as i heard a fluent well-worded knight deliver the last parliameut , who compared the beautifull composure of that high court to the great work of god , the world it self : the king is as the sun , the nobles the fixed stars , the itineant judges and other officers ( that go upon messages 'twixt both houses ) to the planets ; the clergy , to the element of fire ; the commons , to the solid body of earth , and the rest of the elements . and to pursue this comparison a little farther ; as the heavenly bodies , when three of them meet in conjunction , do use to produce some admirable effects in the elementary world ; so when these three states convene and assemble in one solemne great iunta , some notable and extraordinary things are brought forth , tending to the welfare of the whole kingdom our microcosme . he that is never so little versed in the annals of this i le , will find that it hath bin her fate to be four times conquered , i exclude the scot for the scituation of his country , and the quality of the clime hath been such an advantage and security to him , that neither the roman eagles would fly thither for fear of freezing their wings , nor any other nation attempt the work . these so many conquests must needs bring with them many tumblings and tossings , many disturbances and changes in government ; yet i have observed , that notwithstanding these tumblings , it retained still the forme of a monarchy , and something there was always that had an analogy with the great assembly of parlement . the first conquest i find was made by claudius caesar , at which time ( as some well observe ) the roman ensignes , and the standard of christ came in together : it is well known what lawes the roman had ; he had his comitia , which bore a resemblance with our convention in parlement ; the place of their meeting was called praetorum , and the laws which they enacted , plebiscita . the saxon conquest succeeded next , which were the english , there being no name in welsh or irish for an english man , but saxon , to this day ; they also governed by parlement , though it were under other names , as michel sinoth , michel gemote , and witenage mote . there are records above a thousand years old of these parlements in the reigns of king ina , offa , ethelbert , and the rest of the seven kings during the heptarchy : the british kings also , who retain'd a great while some part of the isle unconquered , governed and made laws by a kind of parlementary way ; witnesse the famous laws of prince howell , called howell dha , ( the good prince howell ) whereof there are yet extant some british records : parlements were also used after the heptarchy by king kenulphus , alphred , and others ; witnesse that renowned parliament held at grately by king athelstan . the third conquest was by the danes , and they govern'd also by such generall assemblies , ( as they do to this day ) witnesse that great and so much celebrated parlement held by that mighty monarch canutus , who was king of england , denmark , norway , and other regions years before the compiling of magna charta ; and this the learned in the laws do hold to be one of the specialst , and most authentick peeces of antiquity we have extant . edward the confessor made all his laws thus , ( and he was a great legis-lator , ) which the norman conquerour ( who liking none of his sons , made god almighty his heir by bequeathing unto him this island for a legacy ) did ratifie and establish , and digested them into one entire methodicall systeme , which being violated by rufus , ( who came to such a disastrous end as to be shot to death in lieu of a buck for his sacriledges ) were restor'd by henry the first , and so they continued in force till king iohn ; whose reign is renowned for first confirming magna charta , the foundation of our liberties ever since : which may be compar'd to divers outlandish graffes set upon one english stock ; or to a posie of sundry fragrant flowers ; for the choicest of the british , the roman , saxon , danish , and norman laws , being cull'd and pick'd out and gathered as it were into one bundle , out of them the foresaid grand charter was extracted ; and the establishment of this great charter was the work of a parliament . nor are the lawes of this island only , and the freedome of the subject conserved by parlement , but all the best policed countries of europe have the like . the germanes have their diets , the danes and swedes their rijcks dachs ; the spaniard calls his parlement las cortes ; and the french have , ( or should have at least ) their assembly of three states , though it be growne now in a manner obsolete , because the authority thereof was ( by accident ) devolv'd to the king. and very remarkable it is , how this happened ; for when the english had taken such large footing in most parts of france , having advanced as far as orleans and driven their then king charles the seventh , to bourges in berry the assembly of the three states in these pressures , being not able to meet after the usuall manner in full parlement because the countrey was unpassable , the enemy having made such firme invasions up and down through the very bowels of the kingdom ; that power which formerly was inhaerent in the parlementary assembly , of making laws , of assessing the subject with taxes , subsidiary levies , and other impositions , was transmitted to the king during the war ; which continueth many years , that entrusted power by length of time grew as it were habitual in him , and could never after be re-assumed and taken from him ; so that ever since , his edicts countervaile acts of parlement . and that which made the businesse more feasable for the king , was , that the burthen fell most upon the communalty ( the clergy and nobility not feeling the weight of it ) who were willing to see the peasan pull'd down a little , because not many years before , in that notable rebellion , call'd la jaquerie de beauvoisin , which was suppressed by charles the wise , the common people put themselves boldly in arms against the nobility and gentry , to lessen their power . adde hereunto as an advantage to the work , that the next succeeding king lewis the eleventh , was a close cunning prince , and could well tell how to play his game , and draw water to his own mill ; for amongst all the rest , he was said to be the first that put the kings of france , hors de page , out of their minority , or from being pages any more , though therby he brought the poor peasans to be worse than lacquays , and they may thank themselfs for it . neverthelesse , as that king hath an advantage hereby one way , to monarchize more absolutely , and never to want money , but to ballast his purse when he will ; so ther is another mighty inconvenience ariseth to him and his whole kingdom another way ; for this peeling of the peasan hath so dejected him , and cowed his native courage so much by the sense of poverty ( which brings along with it a narrownesse of 〈◊〉 ) that he is little usefull for the war : which put 's the french king to make other nations mercenary to him , to fill up his infantery : insomuch , that the kingdom of france may be not unfitly compared to a body that hath all it's bloud drawn up into the arms , breast and back , and scarce any le●…t from the girdle downwards , to cherish and bear up the lower parts , and keep them from starving . all this seriously considered , ther cannot be a more proper and pregnant example than this of our next neighbours , to prove how infinitly necessary the parlement is to assert , to prop up and preserve the publick liberty , and national rights of a peeple , with the incolumity and well-fare of a countrey . nor doth the subject only reap benefit thus by parlement , but the prince , ( if it be well consider'd ) hath equal advantage therby ; it rendreth him a king of free and able men , which is far more glorious than to be a king of cowards , beggars , and bankrupts ; men that by their freedom , and competency of wealth , are kept still in heart to do him service against any forrain force . and it is a tru maxime in all states , that 't is lesse danger and dishonour for the prince to be poor , than his people : rich subjects can make their king rich when they please , if he gain their hearts , he will quickly get their purses . parlement encreaseth love and good intelligence 'twixt him and his peeple , it acquaints him with the reality of things , and with the tru state and diseases of his kingdom , it brings him to the knowledg of his better sort of subjects , and of their abilities , which he may employ accordingly upon all occasions ; it provides for his royal issue , pays his debts , finds means to fill his coffers : and it is no ill observation , that parlementmoneys ( the great aid ) have prospered best with the kings of england ; it exceedingly raiseth his repute abroad , and enableth him to keep his foes in fear , his subjects in awe , his neighbours and confederates in security , the three main things which go to aggrandize a prince , and render him glorious . in summe , it is the parlement that supports , and bears up the honour of his crown , and settles his throne in safety , which is the chief end of all their consultations : for whosoever is entrusted to be a member of this high court , carryeth with him a double capacity ; he sits ther as a patriot , and as a subject : as he is the one , the country is his object , his duty being to vindicat the publick liberty , to make wholsom lawes , to put his hand to the pump , and stop the leaks of the great vessel of the state , to pry into , and punish corruption and oppression , to improve and advance trade , to have the grievances of the place he serves for redressed , and cast about how to find somthing that may tend to the advantage of it . but he must not forget that he sits ther also as a subject , and according to that capacity , he must apply himself to do his soveraignt businesse , to provide not only for his publick , but his personall wants ; to bear up the lustre and glory of his court ; to consider what occasions of extraordinary expences he may have , by encrease of royal issue , or maintenance of any of them abroad ; to enable him to vindicat any affront or indignity that might be offered to his person , crown , or dignity , by any forrain state or kingdom , or intestin rebellion ; to consult what may enlarge his honour , contentment , and pleasure . and as the french tacitus ( comines ) hath ●…t , the english nation was used to be more ●…orward and zealous in this particular than ●…ny other ; according that to ancient eloquent speech of a great lawyer , domus regis vigi●…a defendit omnium , otium illius labor omni●…m , deliciae illius industria omnium , vacatio ●…lius occupatio omnium , salus illius periculum ●…nium , honor illius objectum omnium . eve●… one shold stand centinell to defend the kings house , his safety shold be the danger of 〈◊〉 , his pleasures the industry of all , his ease ●…old be the labour of all , his honour the ob●…ct of all . out of these premisses this conclusion ●…ay be easily deduced , that , the principall ●…ntain whence the king derives his happiness and safety , is his parlement ; it is that great conduit-pipe which conveighes unto him his peoples bounty and gratitude ; the truest looking-glasse wherin he discernes their loves ; ( now the subjects love hath been always accounted the prime cittadell of a prince . ) in his parlement he appears as the sun in the meridian , in the altitude of his glory , in his highest state royal , as the law tells us . therfore whosoever is averse or disaffected to his soveraign law-making court ▪ cannot have his heart well planted within him , he can be neither good subject , no●… good patriot , and therfore unworthy to breath english aire , or have any benefit , advantage , or protection from the laws . sectio secunda . by that which hath bin spoken , which is the language of my heart , i hope no indifferent judicious reader will doubt of the cordiall affection , of the high respects and due reverence i bear to parlement , as being the wholsomest constitution , ( and done by the highest and happiest reach of policy that ever was established in this island ) to perpetuate the happinesse therof . therfore i must tell that gentleman , who was author of a book entituled the popish royal favorite , ( lately printed and exposed to the world ) that he offers me very hard measure ; nay , he doth me apparent wrong , to term me therin , no friend to parlement , and a malignant ▪ a character , which as i deserve it not , so i disdain it . for the first part of his charge , i wold have him know , that i am as much a friend and as reall an affectionat humble servant and votary to the parlement as possibly he can be , and will live and die with these affections about me : and i could wish , that he were secretary of my thoughts a while , or if i may take the boldnesse to apply that comparison his late majesty used in a famous speech to one of his parlements , i could wish ther were a chrystal window in my breast , through which the world might espye the inward motions and palpitations of my heart , then would he be certified of the sincerity of this protestation . for the second part of his charge , to be a malignant , i must confesse to have som malignity that lurks within me much against my will ; but it is no malignity of mind , it is amongst the humors , not in my intellectuals ; and i believe , ther is no naturall man , let him have his humors never so well ballanced , but hath som of this malignity reigning within him ; for as long as we are composed of the four elements , whence these humors are derived , and with whom they symbolize in qualities ; which elements the philosophers hold to be in a restlesse contention amongst themselves ( and the stoick thought that the world subsisted by this innated mutual strise ) as long i say , as the four humors , in imitation of their principles ( the elements ) are in perpetual reluctancy and combate for praedominancy , ther must be som malignity lodg'd within us , as adusted choler , and the like ; wherof i had late experience , in a dangerous fit of sicknesse it pleased god to lay upon me , which the physitians told me proceeded from the malignant hypocondriacall effects of melancholy ; having bin so long in this saturnine black condition of close imprisonment , and buryed alive between the walls of this fatal fleet : these kinds of malignities , i confesse are very rife in me , and they are not only incident , but connaturall to every man according to his complexion ; and were it not for this incessant strugling and enmity amongst the humors for mastery , which produceth such malignant effects in us , our souls wold be loth ever to depart from our bodies , or to abandon this mansion of clay . now what malignity my accuser means , i know not ; if he means malignity of spirit , as som antipathy or ill impression upon the mind , arising from disaffection , hatred , or rancor , with a desire of som destructive revenge , he is mightily deceived in me ; i maligne or hate no creature that ever god made but the devill , who is the author of all malignity ; and therfore is most commonly called in french le malin esprit , the malignant spirit . every night before i go to bed , i have the grace , i thank god for it , to forgive all the world , and not to harbour , or let roost in my bosom the least malignant thought ; yet none can deny , but the publick aspersions which this my accuser casts upon me , were enough to make me a malignant towards him ; yet it could never have the power to do it : for i have prevail'd with my self to forgive him this his wrong censure of me , issuing rather from his notknowledge of me , than from malice , for we never mingled speech , or saw one another in our lives to my remembrance ; which makes me wonder the more , that a professor of the law , as he is , shold pronounce such a positive sentence against me so slightly . but methinks i over-hear him say , that my precedent discourse of parlement is invol'd in generals , and the topique axiome tells us , that dolus versatur in universalibus , ther is double dealing in universals : his meaning is , that i am no friend to this present parlement ( though he speaks in the plurall number parlements ) and consequently , he concludes me a malignant ; therin i must tell him also , that i am traduc'd , and i am confident it will be never prov'd against me , from any actions , words , or letters ( though divers of mine have bin intercepted ) or any other misdemeanor , though som things are father'd upon me which never drop'd from my quill . alas , how unworthy and uncapable am i to censure the proceedings of that great senate , that high synedrion , wherin the wisdom of the whole state is epitomized ? it were a presumption in me , of the highest nature that could be : it is enough for me to pray for the prosperous successe of their consultations : and as i hold it my duty , so i have good reason so to do , in regard i am to have my share in the happinesse ; and could the utmost of my poor endeavours , by any ministerial humble office ( and somtimes the meanest boat-swain may help to preserve the ship from sinking ) be so happy , as to contribut any thing to advance that great work ( which i am in despair to do , while i am thus under hatches in this fleet , ) i wold esteem it the greatest honor that possibly could befall me , as i hold it now to be my greatest disaster , to have fallen so heavily under an affliction of this nature , and to be made a sacrifice to publick fame , than which there is no other proof , nor that yet urg'd against me , or any thing else produc'd after so long , so long captivity which hath brought me to suck a low ebbe , and put me so far behind in the course of my poor fortunes , and indeed more than halfe undone me . for although my whole life ( since i was left to my self to swim , as they say , without bladders ) has bin nothing else but a continued succession of crosses , and that there are but few red letters found ( god wot ) in the almanack of my age , ( for which i account not my self a whit the lesse happy ) yet this crosse has carried with it a greater weight , it hath bin of a larger extent , longer continuance , and lighted heavier upon me than any other ; and as i have present patience to beare it , so i hope for subsequent grace to make use of it accordingly , that my old motto may be still confirmed , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he produceth my attestation for some passages in spaine at his majesties being there , and he quotes me right , which obligeth me to him ; and i hope all his quotations wherein he is so extraordinarily copious and elaborate in all his workes , are so ; yet i must tel him , that those interchangeable letters which pass'd between his majesty & the pope , which were originally couch'd in latin , the language wherin all nations treat with rome , and the empire with all the princes thereof , those letters i say are adulterated in many places , which i impute not to him , but to the french chronicler , from whom he took them in trust . the truth of that businesse is this ; the world knows there was a tedious treaty of an alliance 'twixt the infanta dona maria ( who now is empresse ) and his majesty , which in regard of the slow affected pace of the spaniard , lasted above ten yeares , as that in henry the sevenths time , 'twixt prince arthur , and ( afterwards ) queen katherine , was spun out above seven : to quicken , or rather to consummate the work , his majesty made that adventurous journey through the whole continent of france into spaine ; which voyage , though there was a great deale of gallantry in it ( wherof all posterity will ring untill it turne at last to a romance ) yet it prov'd the bane of the businesse , which 't is not the errand of so poor a pamphlet as this to unfold . his majesty being there arriv'd , the ignorant common people cried out , the prince of wales came thither to make himself a christian ; the pope writ to the inquisitor generall , and others , to use all industry they could to reduce him to the romane religion ; and one of olivares first complements to him , was , that he doubted not but that his highnesse came thither to change his religion : whereunto he made a short answer , that he came not thither for a religion but for a wife : there were extraordinary processions made , and other artifices us'd by protraction of things , to make him stay ther of purpose till the spring following , to work upon him the better ; and the infanta her self desir'd him ( which was esteem'd the greatest favour he received from her all the while ) to visit the nunne of carton , hoping that the say'd nunne , who was so much cried up for miracles , might have wrought one upon him ; but her art failed her , nor was his highness so weak a subject to work upon according to his late majesties speech to doctor mawe and wren , who when they came to kisse his hands before they went to spaine to attend the prince their master , he wish ed them to have a care of buckinham ; as touching his sonne charles , he apprehended no feare at all of him ; for he knew him to be so well grounded a protestant , that nothing could shake him in his religion . the arabian proverb is , that the sun never soiles in his passage , though his beams reverberate never so strongly , and dwell never so long upon the myry lake of maeotis , the black turf'd moores of holland , the aguish woose of kent and essex , or any other place , be it never so dirty ; though spaine be a hot countrey , yet one may passe and repasse through the very center of it , and never be sun-burnt , if he carry with him a bongrace , and such a one his majesty had . well , after his majesties arrivall to madrid , the treaty of marriage went on still , ( though he told them at his first comming , that he came not thither like an ambassador to treat of a marriage , but as a prince , to fetch home a wife ; ) and in regard they were of different religions , it could not be done without a dispensation from the pope , and the pope would grant none , unlesse some capitulations were stipulated in favour of the romish catholikes in england , ( the same in substance were agreed on with france . ) well , when the dispensation came , which was negotiated solely by the king of spains ministers ( because his majesty would have as little to do as might be with rome ) pope gregory the fifteenth , who died a little after , sent his majesty a letter , which was delivered by the nuncio , whereof an answer was sent a while after : which letters were imprinted and exposed to the view of the world , because his majesty would not have people whisper , that the businesse was carried in a clandestine manner . and truly besides this , i do not know of any letter , or message , or complement , that ever pass'd twixt his majesty and the pope afore or after ; some addresses peradventure might be made to the cardinalls , to whom the drawing of those matrimoniall dispatches was referred to quicken the work , but this was only by way of civil negotiation . now touching that responsory letter from his majesty , it was no other than a complement in the severest interpretation ; and such formalities passe 'twixt the crown of england , the great turke , the mogor and divers heathen princes . the pope writ first , and no man can deny , but by all morall rules , and in common humane civility his majesty was bound to answer it , specially considering how punctual they are in those countries to correspond in this kind , how exact they are repaying visits , with the performance of such ceremonies ; and had this compliance bin omitted , it might have made very ill impressions , as the posture of things stood then ; for it had prejudiced the great work in hand , i mean , the match , which was then in the heat and height of agitation , his majesties person was ther engaged , besides , and so it was no time to give the least offence : they that are never so little vers'd in businesse abroad , do know that ther must be addresses , compliances , and formalities of this nature us'd in the carriage of matters of state , as this great businesse was , wheron the eyes of all christendom were so greedily fix'd ; a businesse which was like to bring with it such an universal good , as the restitution of the palatinat , the quenching of those hideous fires in germany , and the establishing of a peace throughout all the christian world. i hope none will take offence , that in this particular which comes within the compasse of my knowledg ( being upon the stage when his scene was acted ) i do this right to the king my master , in displaying the truth , and putting her forth in her own colours , a rare thing in these days . touching the vocall forrest , an allegorical discourse , that goes abroad under my name , a good while before the beginning of this parlement , which this gentleman cites ( and that very faithfully , ) i understand ther be som that mutter at certain passages therin , by putting ill glosses upon the text , and taking with the left hand , what i offer with the right , ( nor is it a wonder for trees which ly open , and stand exposed to all weathers to be nipt . ) but i desire this favour , which in common justice , i am sure in the court of chancery cannot be denyed me , it being the priviledge of every author , and a received maxime through the world , cujus est condere , ejus est interpretari ; i say , i crave this favour , to have leave to expound my own text , and i doubt not then but to rectifie any one in his opinion of me , and that in lieu of the plums which i give him from those trees , he will not throw the stones at me . moreover , i desire those that are over criticall censu●…ers of that peece , to know , that as in divinity it is a rule , scriptur a parabolica non est argumentativa , so it is in all other kind of knowledg ; parables ( wherof that discourse is composed ) though pressed never so hard , prove nothing . the●… is another rule also , that parables must be gently used , like a nurses breast ; which if you presse too hard , you shall have bloud in stead of milk . but as the author of the vocall forrest thinks he hath done , neither his countrey , nor the common wealth of learning any prejudice therby ( that maiden fancy having received so good entertainment and respect abroad , as to be translated into divers languages , and to gain the publick approbation of som famous universities ) so he makes this humble protest unto all the world , that though the designe of that discourse was partly satyricall ( which peradventure induc'd the author to shrowd it of purpose under the shadowes of trees , and where should satyres be but amongst trees ? ) yet it never entred into his imagination to let fall from him the least thing that might give any offence to the high and honourable court of parlement , whereof he had the honour to be once a member , and hopes he may be thought worthy again : and were he guilty of such an offence , or piacle rather , he thinks he shold never forgive himself , though he were appointed his own judge . if ther occur any passages therin , that may admit a hard construction , let the reader observe , that the author doth not positively assert , or passe a judgement on any thing in that discourse , which consists principally of concise , cursory narrations of the choisest ▪ occurrences and criticismes of state , according as the pulse of time did beat then : and matters of state , as all other sublunary things , are subject to alterations , contingencies and change , which makes the opinions and minds of men vary accordingly . i will conclude with this modest request to that gentleman of the long robe ; that having unpassionately perus'd what i have written in this small discourse , in penning wherof , my conscience guided my quill all along as well as my hand , he wold please to be so charitable and just , as to reverse that harsh sentence upon me , to be no friend to parlements and a malignant . a glance upon the i le of wight , and upon the unparallell'd concessions of grace his majesty pass'd in that trety , &c. concluding with the horrid murther committed afterwards upon his sacred person . cui dabit partes scelus expiant iupiter ? a glance upon the i le of wight , or an inquisition after truth . who vindicats truth doth a good office not onely to his own country , but to all mankind ; it is the scope of this short discourse , viz. to make som researches after truth , and to rectifie the world accordingly in point of opinion , specially touching the first author and aggressor of the late ugly war in england , which brought with it such an inundation of bloud , and so did let in so huge a torrent of mischiefs to rush upon us . ther be many , and they not only presbyterians and independents , but cavaliers also , who think that the king had taken the guilt of all this bloud upon himself , in regard of that concession he passed in the preamble of the late treaty at the isle of wight ; the aim of this paper is to clear that point , but in so temperat a way , that i hope 't will give no cause of exception , much lesse of offence to any : the bloud that 's sought after here , shall not be mingled with gaule , much lesse with any venom at all . we know ther is no principle either in divinity , law or philosophy , but may be wrested to a wrong sense ; ther is no truth so demonstrative and clear , but may be subject to cavillations ; no tenet so plain , but perverse inferences may be drawn out of it ; such a fate befell that preambular concession his majesty passed at the transactions of the late treaty , in that he acknowledg'd therin that the two houses of parlement were necessitated to undertake a war in their own just and lawful defence , &c. and that therfore all oaths , declarations , or other public instruments against the houses of parlement , or any for adhering to them , &c. be declared null , suppressed , and forbidden . 't is true , his majesty passed this grant , but with this weighty consideration as it had reference to two ends . first , to smoothen and facilitate things thereby to open a passage , and pave the way to a happy peace , which this poor iland did so thirst after , having bin so long glutted with civil blood . secondly , that it might conduce to the further security , and the indemnifying of the two houses of parlement , with all their instruments , assistants , and adherents , and so rid them of all jealousies , and fear of future dangers which still lodg'd within them . now touching the expressions and words of this grant , they were not his own , nor did he give order for the dictating or penning thereof ; the king was not the author of them , but an assentor only unto them : nor was he or his party accus'd , or as much as mentioned in any of them , to draw the least guilt upon themselves . besides , he pass'd them as he doth all lawes and acts of parlement , which in case of absence another may do for him in his politic capacity , therfore they cannot prejudice his person any way . i am loth to say that he condescended to this grant , — cum strict a novacula supra , when the razor was as it were at his throat , when ther was an army of about thirty thousand effectif horse and foot that were in motion against him , when his person had continued under a black long lingring restraint , and dangerous menacing petitions and papers daily ob●…ruded against him . moreover , his majesty pass'd this concession with these two provisos and reservations , first , that it should be of no vertu or validity at all , till the whole treaty were intirely consummated ; secondly , that he might when he pleas'd inlarge and cleer the truth with the reservednesse of his meaning herein , by public declaration : now the treaty being confusedly huddled up , without discussing , or as much as receiving any proposition from himself as was capitulated , ( and reciprocall proposalls are of the essence of all treaties ) it could neither bind him , or turne any way to his disadvantage : therfore under favour , ther was too much hast us'd by the parlement , to draw that hipothetick or provisional concession to the form of an act so suddenly after in the very heat of the treaty , without his majesties knowledg , or the least intimation of his pleasure . add hereunto , that this grant was but a meer preambular proposition , 't was not of the essence of the treaty it self : and as the philosophers and schoolemen tell us , there is no valid proof can be drawn out of proemes , introductions or corollaries in any science , but out of the positive assertions and body of the text , which is only argument-proof ; so in the constitutions and laws of england , as also in all accusations and charges , forerunning prefaces & preambles ( which commonly weak causes want most ) are not pleadable : and though they use to be first in place , like gentlemen-ushers , yet are they last in dignity , as also in framing , nor had they ever the force of laws , but may be term'd their attendants to make way for them . besides , ther 's not a syllable in this preface which repeals or connives at any former law of the land , therefore those laws that so strictly inhibit english subjects to raise armes against their liege lord the king , and those lawes è contrario which exempt from all dangers , penalties or molestation , any subject that adheres to the person of the king in any cause or buarrell whatsoever , are still in force . furthermore , this introductory concession of the kings , wherein he is contented to declare , that the two houses were necessitated to take armes for their defence , may be said to have relation to the necessity , à parte pòst , not à parte antè : self-defence is the universall law of nature , and it extends to all other cretures , as well as to the rationall : as the fluent roman orator in that sentence of his , which is accounted among the critiques the excellentest that ever drop'd from cicero ; est enim haec non scripta , sed nata lex quam non didicimus , accepimus , legimus , verum ex natura ipsa arripuimus , hausimus , expressimus , ad quam non docti , sed facti , non instituti , sed imbuti sum●…s , ut si vita nostra in &c. for this ( meaning self-defence ) is not a written , but a law born with us ; a law which we have not learnt , receiv'd or read , but that which we have suck'd , drawn forth , and wrung out of the very brests of nature her self ; a law to which we are not taught , but made unto , wherwith we are not instructed , but indued withall , that if our lifes be in jeopardy , &c. we may repel force by force . therfore when the house of parliament had drawn upon them a necessity of self defence ( and i could have wish'd it had bin against any other but their own soverain prince ) his majesty was contented to acknowledge that necessity . as for example : a man of war meets with a marchant man at sea , he makes towards him , and assaults him ; the marchant man having a good stout vessell under him , and resolute , generous seamen , bears up against him , gives him a whole broad-side , and shoots him 'twixt wind and water ; so there happens a furious fight betwixt them , which being ended , the marchant cannot deny but that the man of war , though the first assailant , was necessitated to fight , and that justly in his own defence , which necessity he drew upon himself , and so was excusable , à posteriori , not à priori ; as the civilians speak of a clandestine marriage , fieri non debuit , sed factum valet ; it ought not to have been , but being done 't is valid : wherunto relates another saying , multa sunt quae non nisi per acta approbantur . ther are many things which are not allowable til they are pass'd . the kings of france have had sundry civil wars , they have had many bloudy encounters and clashes with their subjects , specially the last king lewis the thirteenth , which turn'd all at last to his advantage ; among other treaties in that of loudun , he was by force of article to publish an edict , dont lequel le roy approuvoit tout le passé comme ayant esté fait pour son service , &c. wherin the king approv'd of all that w●…s pass'd , as done for his service , &c. and these concessions and extenuations are usuall at the close of most civil wars , but ther was never any further advantage made of them , then to make the adverse party more capable of grace and pardon , as also to enable them to bear up against the brunt of laws , and secure them more firmly from all after-claps ; they were pass'd in order to an act of abolition , to a generall pardon , and consequently to a re-establishment of peace ; now , peace and war ( we know ) are like water and ice , they engender one another : but i do not remember to have read either in the french history , or any other , that such royal concessions at the period of any intestin war were ever wrung so hard , as to draw any inference from them , to cast therby the guilt of bloud , or indeed the least stain of dishonour upon the king ; for royal indulgences and grants of this nature are like nurses breasts , if you presse them gently ther will milk come forth , if you wring them too hard you will draw forth bloud in lieu of milk : and i have observed that the conclusion of such treaties in france , both parties wold hugg and mutually embrace one another in a gallant way of national humanity ; all rancor , all plundrings , sequestration , and imprisonment wold cease , nor wold any be prosecuted , much lesse made away afterwards in cold bloud . touching the comencer of this monstrous war of ours , the world knows too well , that the first man of bloud was blew-cap , who shew'd subjects the way , how to present their king with petitions upon the pikes point , and what visible judgements have fallen upon him since , by such confusions of discord and pestilence at home , and irreparable dishonour abroad , let the world judge . the irish took his rise from him : and wheras it hath bin often suggested , that his majesty had foreknowledge therof , among a world of convincing arguments which may clear him in this particular , the lord maguair upon the ladder , and another upon the scaffold , when they were ready to breath their last , and to appear before the tribunall of heaven , did absolutely acquit the king , and that spontaneously of their own accord , being unsought unto , but only out of a love to truth , and discharge of a good conscience : but touching those cruentous irish wars , in regard ther was nothing wherof more advantage was made against his late majesty , to imbitter and poyson the hearts of his subjects against him then that rebellion , i will take leave to wind up the main causes of them upon a small bottom as was spoken elsewhere . . they who kept intelligence and complyed with the scot , in his first and second insurrection . . they who dismiss'd the first irish commissioners ( who came of purpose to attend our parlement with som grievances ) with such a short unpolitic harsh answer . . they who took off straffords head , ( which had it stood on , that rebellion had never been ) and afterwards retarded the dispatch of the earl of leicester from going over to be lord-lievtenant . . lastly , they , who hindred part of that disbanded army of men rais'd there by the earl of strafford , which his majesty , in regard they were souldiers of fortune , and loose casheer'd men , to prevent the mischiefs that might befall that kingdome , by their insolencies , had promised the two spanish ambassadors , the marquesses of veloda and malvezzi , then resident in this court ; which souldiers rise up first of any , and put fire to the tumult to find somthing to do . they , i say , who did all this , may be justly said to have bin the tru causes of that horrid insurrection in ireland ; and consequently 't is easie to judge upon the account of whose souls must be laid the bloud of those hundred and odd thousand poor christians who perished in that war ▪ and had it bin possible to have brought o're their bodies unputrified to england , and to have cast them at the lower house door , and in the presence of som members , which are now either secluded , or gone to give an account in another world , i believe their noses wold have gush'd out with bloud for discovery of the tru murtherers . touching this last fire-brand of war , which was thrown into england , who they were that kindled it first , the consciences of those indifferent and unbiassed men are sittest to be judges , who have bin curious to observe with impartial eyes , the carriage of things from the beginning . i confesse , 't was a fatal unfortunat thing , that the king shold put such a distance 'twixt his person and his parlement , but a more fatal and barbarous thing it was , that he should be driven away from it , that there should be a desperate designe to surprize his person , that ven with his myrmidons , and bourges with his bandogs , ( for so ▪ they calld the riffraff of the city they brought along with them ) should rabble him away , with above four parts in five of the lords , and near upon two parts in three of the commons : yet 't is fit it should be remembred , what reiterated messages his majesty sent from time to time afterward , that he was alwaies ready to return , provided there might be a course taken to secure his person , with those peers and other who were rioted away from the houses , 't is fit it should be remembred , that there was not the least motion of war at all , till hotham kept his majesty out of his own town kingston upon hull , ( for the name whereof shew'd whose town it was ) where being attended by a few of his meniall servants , he came onely to visit her , having peaceably sent the duke of york , and the palsgrave thither the day before ) which act of hotham's by shutting the gates against him was voted warrantable by the house of commons , and it may be call'd the first thunderbolt of war : 't is fit it should be remembred , that a while after there was a compleate army of . effectif horse and foot inrolled in and about london to fetch him to his parliament by force , and remove ill counsellours from about him , ( long before he put up his royal standard ) and the generall then nam'd was to live and die with them : and very observable it is , how that generalls father was executed for a traytor , for but attempting such a thing upon queen elizabeth , i mean to remove ill counsellors from about her by force . 't is also to be observed , that the same army which was rais'd to bring him to his parliament , was continued to a clean contrary end two years afterwards to keep him from his parliament . 't is fit it should be remembred , who interdicted trade first , and brought in forraigners to help them , and whose commissions of war were neere upon two moneths date before the kings . 't is fit it should be remembred how his majesty in all his declarations and publick instruments made alwaies deep protestations , that 't was not against his parliament he raised armes , but against some seditious members , against whom he had onely desired the common benefit of the law , but could not obtain it ; 't is fit to remember , that after any good successes and advantages of his , he still courted both parliament and city to an accommodation ; how upon the treaty at uxbridge , with much importunity for the generall advantage and comfort of his peeple , and to prepare matters more fitly for a peace , he desired there might be freedom of trade from town to town , and a cessation of all acts of hostility for the time , that the inflammation being allayed , the wound might be cur●…d the sooner ; all which was denyed him . 't is fit to remember how a noble lord ( the earl of southampton ) at that time told the parliaments commissioners in his majesties name , at the most unhappy rupture of the said treaty , that when he was at the highest he would be ready to treat with them , and fight them when he was at the lowest : 't is fit the present army should remember how often both in their proposalls , and publick declarations they have inform'd the world , and deeply protested that their principall aime was to restore his majesty to honour , freedom and safety , whereunto they were formerly bound , both by their own protestation and covenant , that the two commanders in chief pawn'd unto him their soules thereupon . let them remember , that since he was first snatch'd away to the custody of the army by cromwells plot , who said , that if they had the person of the king in their power , they had the parliament in their pockets . i say being kept by the army , he never displeas'd them in the least particular , but in all his overtures for peace , and in all his propositions he had regard still that the army should be satisfied : let it be remembred , that to settle a blessed peace , to preserve his subjects from rapine and ruine , and to give contentment to his parliament , he did in effect freely part with his sword , scepter , and crown , and ev'ry thing that was proprietary to him : let it be remembred with what an admired temper , with what prudence and constancy , with what moderation and mansuetude he comported himself since his deep afflictions , insomuch that those commissioners and others who resorted unto him , and had had their hearts so averse unto him before , return'd his converts , crying him up to be one of the sanctifiedst persons upon earth : and will not the bloud of such a prince cry loud for vengeance ? bloud is a crying sin , but that of kings cryes loudest for revenge , and ruine brings . let it be remembred , that though there be some precedents of deposing kings in his kingdom , and elsewhere , when there was a competition for the right title to the crown by some other of the bloud royall , yet 't is a thing not onely unsampled , but unheard of in any age , that a king of england whose title was without the least scruple , should be summon'd and arraign'd , tryed , condemned , and executed in his own kingdom , by his own subjects , and by the name of their own king , to whom they had sworn alleagiance . the meanest student that hath but tasted the laws of the land can tell you , that it is an unquestionable fundamentall maxime , the king can do no wrong , because he acts by the mediation of his agents and ministers , he heares with other mens eares , he sees with other mens eyes , he consults with other mens braines , he executes with other mens hands , and judges with other mens consciences ; therefore his officers counsellors or favorites are punishable , not he : and i know not one yet whom he hath spar'd , but sacrificed to justice . the crown of england is of so coruscant and pure a mettall ▪ that it cannot receive the least taint or blemish ; and if there were any before in the person of the prince , it takes them all away and makes him to be rectus in curia . this as in many others may be exemplified in henry the seventh , and the late queen elizabeth : when she first came to the crown 't was mention'd in parlement , that the attainder might be taken off him , under which he lay all the time he liv'd an exile in france ; it was then by the whole house of parlement resolv'd upon the question , that it was unnecessary , because the crown purg'd all . so likewise when queen elizabeth was brought as it were from the scaffold to the throne ; though she was under a former attainder , yet 't was thought superfluous to take it off , for the crown washeth away all spots , and darteth such a brightnesse , such resplendent beams of majesty , that quite dispell all former clouds : so that put case king iames died a violent death , and his son had been accessary to it , ( which is as base a lie as ever the devil belch'd out ) yet his accesse to the crown had purged all . this businesse about the playster which was applyed to king iames , was sifted and winnow'd as narrowly as possibly a thing could be in former parlements , yet when it was exhibited as an article against the duke of buckingham , 't was term'd but a presumption or misdemeanure of a high nature : and 't is strange that these new accusers shold make that a parricide in the king , which was found but a presumption in the duke , who in case it had been so , must needs have been the chiefest accessary . and as the ancient crown and royall diadem of england is made of such pure allay , and cast in so dainty a mould , that it can receive no taint , or contract the least speck of enormity and foulenesse in it self , so it doth endow the person of the prince that weares it with such high prerogatives ; that it exempts him from all sorts of publique blemishes ; from all attainders , empeachments , summons , arraignments and tryalls ; nor is there or ever was any law or precedent in this land , to lay any crime or capitall charge against him , though touching civill matters : touching propertie of meum and tuum , he may be impleaded by the meanest vassall that hath sworn fealty to him ; as the subjects of france and spaine may against their kings , though never so absolute monarchs . in the constitutions of england , there are two incontroulable maximes , whereof the meanest mootman that hath but saluted littleton cannot be ignorant : the first is , rex in suis dominiis neque habet parem , nec superiorem . the king in his own dominions hath neither peer , or superior . the other is satis habet rex ad poenam quod deum expectet ultorem : 't is punishment enough for a king that god will take revenge of him : therefore if it be the fundamentall constitution of the land , that all just tryalls must be by teers , and that the law proclaimes the king to have no peer in his own dominions , i leave the world to judg , what capacity or power those men had to arraign their late king , to be in effect his accusers and iudges ; and that an exorbitant unsampled tribunall should be erected , with power and purpose to condemn all to cleer none , and that sentence of death should passe without conviction or law upon him that was the heard and protector of all the lawes . lastly , that they who by their own confession represent but the common people , should assume power to cut off him who immediately represented god , cui dabit partes scelus expiandi iupiter ? — well , we have seen such portentous things , that former ages never beheld , nor will future ages ever be witnesse of the like : nay , posterity , after a century or two of yeers will hold what is now really acted to be but romances . and now with thoughts full of consternation and horror , and a heart trembling with amazement and sorrow for the crying flagrant sins of this forlorn nation , specially for that fresh infandous murther committed upon the sacred person of his majesty , i conclude with this hepastick , wherein all cretures ( though irrationall ) that have sence , yea the very vegetalls seeme to abhor so damnable a fact . so fell the royal oake by a wild crew of mongrel shrubs which underneath him grew ; so fell the lion by a pack of currs ; so the rose witherd 'twixt a knot of burrs . so fell the eagle by a swarme of gnatts , so the whale perish'd by a shoale of spratts . in the prison of the fleet . febr. . i. h. advice sent from the prime statesmen of florence , how england may come to herself again , which is , to call in the king , not upon articles , but in a free confident way : which advice came immediatly upon the readmission of the secluded members , and coppies therof being delivered to the chiefest of them. it produc'd happy effects . a letter sent from the city of florence , written by a great counsellor there , touching the present distempers of england ; wherein he , with som of the prime statesmen in florence passe their iudgements which is the onely way to compose the said distempers . to my honored , and most endeared patron . it is no small diminution to my former happinesse that i have not receiv'd your commands any time these two moneths , which makes me lodg within me certain apprehensions of fear that som disaste●… might befall you in those new distractions , therefore i pray be pleased to pull this thorn out of my thoughts as speedily as it may stand with your conveniency . we are not here so barren of intelligence , but we have weekly advice of your present confusions , and truly the severest sort of speculative persons here who use to observe the method of providence , do not stick to say , that the hand of heaven doth visibly stirre therein , and that those distractions in army , state , and city are apparent judgements from above , for if one revolve the stories of former times , as i have done many ( but you more ) he will find that it hath been alwaies an inevitable fate which useth to hang over all popular insurrections to end in confusion and disorders among the chief actors themselfs at last ; and we have had divers examples thereof here among us , which hath caus'd us to be so long in quietnesse and peace . but truly sir , give me leave to tell you that your nation hath lost much of their repute abroad all the world over in statu quo nunc ; som do laugh at you ; others do scorn , and hate you ; and som do pitty and comiserat you . they who laugh at you , think you are no better than mand men ▪ having strange magots in your brains bred out of the fat of so long wanton plenty , and peace . they who scorn and hate you , do it for your sacriledge , your horrendous sacrileges , the like whereof was never committed on earth since christianity had first a hole to put her head in . they who pitty you are few , and we are of the nomber of them , as well in the common sense of humanity , as for the advantages , and improvement of wealth which this state hath receiv'd by your trading at ligorne , for that town doth acknowledge her prosperity , and that she is arrived to this flourishing estate of riches , of buildings and bravery by the correspondence she hath had this latter age with england in point of commerce , which yet we find doth insensibly impair every day , and i believe you feel it more ; therefore out of the well-wishes , and true affections we bear unto england , some of the most serious , and soberest persons of this place who are well seasoned in the world , and have studyed men under divers climes , and conversed also much with heavenly bodies , had lately a private junto , or meeting , whereunto i was admitted for one , and two of us had been in england where we received sundry free civilities ; our main businesse was to discourse , and descant upon these sad confusions , and calamitous condition wherein england with the adjoyning kingdomes are at present involved , and what might extricate her out of this labyrinth of distractions , and reduce her to a setled government ; having long canvased the businesse , and banded arguments pro & con with much earnestnesse , all our opinious did concenter at last in this point , that there was no probable way under heaven to settle a fast , and firm government among you , then for the men that are now upon the stage of power to make a speedy application to their own king , their own liege lord and soveraigne , whom god , and nature hath put over them ; let●… them beat their brains , scrue up their witts , and put all the policy they have upon the tenterhooks as farre as possibly they can , yet they will never be able to establish a durable standing government otherwise , they do but dance in a circle all this while , for the government will turn at last to the same point it was before ▪ viz. to monarchy , and this king will be restored to his royall inheritances , maugre all the cacodaemons of hell : our astrologers here , specially the famous antonio fiselli hath had notes to look into the horoscope of his nativity , and what predictions he hath made hitherto of him have proved true to my knowledge , he now confidently averrs , with the concurrence of the rest , that the aspect of all the starrs , and conjunction of the planetts much favour him the next two yeares ; nam medium coeli in genitura caroli secundi regis angliae juxta axiomata astrologiae genethliacae dirigitur ad radios sextiles lun●… anno domini . & significat acc●…ssum ad dominum , for the medium coeli in the geniture of charles the second according to the axiomes of genethliacall astrology is directed to the sextile rayes of the moon , and signifies an accesse to dominion . adde hereunto that a most lucky conjunction followes the same year , in the very centre of the said kings horoscope betwixt iupiter and sol in the moneth of september . when i was employed by this state in paris not many years agoe , i had occasion to make my addresse to your young king , and when i observed his physiognomy , and the lineaments of his face , i seemed to discern in it something extraordinary above vulgar countenances , and that he carryed a majesty in his very looks , and noting besides the goodly procerity , and constitution of his body , he seemed to be cut out for a king. now , in point of extraction , and lineage , it cannot be denyed but he is one of the greatest born princes that ever was in the world ; for whereas his grand-father , and father were allyed onely if you regard forraigne consanguinity , to the house of denmark and the guyses , this king bears in his veines not onely that bloud , but also the blouds of all the great princes of christendom , being nearly linked to the house of bourbon and france , to the house of austria , and consequently to the emperour , and spaine , as also to the duke of savoy , and our grand-duke : moreover he is nearly allyed to all the greatest princes of germany , as the saxe , brandenburg , bavaria , the palsgrave , and to the duke of lorain who descends in the directest line from charlemain ; adde hereunto that the young prince of orenge is his nephew , and which is considerable he is a pure englishman born , whereas your two former kings were forreigners . the queen his mother is of as glorious an extraction , which makes me admire the frontlesse impudence of some of your poor pamphletors who call her ever and anon the little queen , notwithstanding that the world knowes her to be the daughter of henry the great , and queen of great britain , which title and character is indelible , and must die with her. hereunto may be adjoyn'd , that this young king is now mounted to the meridian of his age , and maturity of judgement to govern , and doubtlesse hee is like to make a rare governour , having this advantage of all other soverain princes in the world to have been bredd up in the schoole of affliction so long , to have travelled so many strange countreys and observed the humors of so many nations . but to come to the cardinall point of our communication , after divers debates , and alterations how england might be brought to a stable condition of tranquility and perfect peace , to her former lustre , and glory , the finall result of all , ended in this , that there was no other imaginable meanes to do it then for you to make a timely and fitting humble addresse unto your own king , and without question it is in his power to grant you such an absolute pardon , such an abolition of all things pass'd , such a gracious amnestia , such royall concessions that may extend to the security of every person for the future that was engaged in these your revolutions , both touching his life and fortunes ; unlesse their guilt of conscience be such that like cain or iudas they thinke their sinne is greater then can be forgiven them . now the mode of your application to him may avail much , for if you chopp logique with him too farr , and stand upon puntillios , and too rigid termes , if you shew your selfs full of feares , jealousies , and distrusts , it will intangle , and quite marr the businesse , for in a soveraign prince ther must be an implicit , unavoidable necessary trust repos'd by his peeple , which all the laws that mans brain can possibly invent cannot provide against ; therefore if you proceed in a frank , and confident tru english way you may work upon his affections more powerfully , and overcome him sooner so , then by any outward arms , this way will make such tender impressions , upon that he will grant more then you can possibly expect . some forein historians as the french comines and our guicciardin do cry up the english nation for using to love their king in a more intense degree then other peeple , and to regard his honour in a higher strain , to support which they have bin alwayes so ready , and cheerful both with their persons and purses ; there is now a fair opportunity offered to rake up the embers of these old affections , and to recover the reputation of tru englishmen ; there is no peeple but may sometimes stand in their own light , go astray , and err , for error was one of the first frailties that were entayled upon man ( and his posterity ) as soon as he was thrust out of paradis ; 't is a human thing to err , but to persevere in an error is diabolicall ; you shall do well and wisely to follow the example of the spanish mule , who out of a kind of wantonesse being gone out of the high beaten road into a by path , which led her to a dirty narrow lane full of pitts and holes , at last she came to the top of a huge hideous rock where she could go no farther , for before her ther was inevitable destruction , and the lane was so narrow that she could not turn her body back , therupon in this extremity she put one foot gently after an other , and crablike went backward untill she came again to the common road ; this must be your course , by a gentle retrogradation to come into the kings high road again , and ther is no question but he will meet you more than three parts of the way : if you do not , truly in our opinions you will precipitat your selfs down a rock of inevitable destruction ; for heaven and earth are conspir'd to restore him , and though all the spirits of the air shold joyn with you , you shall not be able to oppose it . i presume you are not ignorant how ●…he two great monarks of spain and france ( which may be said to be the main poles wheron europe doth move ) have comprehended him within the private capitulations of peace , the emperour hath promised to wed his quarrell , and there is no prince or state in christendom but would gladly reach a frendly hand to restore him , being depriv'd of his birth-right , and his royal indubitable inheritance ( as you your felfs confesse ) for observing the fifth commandement , for obeying his father and mother ; from which birth-right he may be said to have been thrust out when he was in the state of innocency , being but in a manner a child , and very young then . now touching your selfs i will not flatter you , but plainly tell you that you have not one friend any where beyond the seas , nay your great confederate the swed ( as i had good intelligence ) could upbraid one of your ambassadors that are now there , that he had not washed his hands clean since they had been embrued in his princes bloud . the time that i sojourned in england i was curious to read your annals , and to make some inspections into your laws , and method of government ; as also into the genius of the peeple , and i find there is no species of government that suits better with the nature of the inhabitants , the quality of the clime , and relates more directly to the civil constitutions , laws , and customs of the land then monarchal ; the i le of great britain hath been alwaies a royall island from her very creation , from her infancy , she may be said to have worn a crown in her cradle , and although she had four or five revolutions and changes of masters , yet she still continued royal , whereunto alludes a saying that i observed in your old records , britannia ab initio mundi semper fuit regia , & regimen illiu●… simile illi caelorum : great britain hath been from the beginning of the world royall , and her government like that of the heavens . therefore , all these premises being weighed in the balance of true judgement you shall do well , and wisely to recollect your selfs , and call in your hopefull young king , whose title your consciences do acknowledge to be unquestionable , otherwise it is not onely improbable but impossible for england to be her self again , and to be setled in any stable government which may reach to posterity ; you may wind up your wits as high as you can , you may consult with your first , second , and third thoughts , but will never be able to settle a fixed government , you will be still at a losse , your debates will be like a skeyn of ravell'd threed , you will be in a labyrinth of confusions , and the end of one , will be still the beginning of another . to conclude , the current and concurrent opinion of all ministers of state here both forren and florentine is , that if you do not make a timely application to your king , you will have all the princes of christendom about your ears , and what a sad calamitous country , what an aceldama will england be then ? therefore if there be a true patriot , and publick soul amongst you , if there be ever any drops of true english bloud running in your veins , or the least spark of nationall fire and affections glowing in your bosoms toward your own dear country , prevent these imminent dangers , and invite your king by discreet and moderate proposals ; the gallant samnit general could tell the romans who had over powred them , that if they gave them easie and gentle capitulations they would perform them , but if they would tye them to too high and strict terms , they would observe them no longer then they cold have opportunity to break them . touching the affairs of italy , we are like to have a general blessed peace this side the alpes , and lombardy who hath been so pittifully harass'd a long time , and hath had her face so often scratch'd , is in a fair way to recover her former beauty ; signor giovanni palavicino , and d. lorenzo minuccio convey their most affectionate respects unto you , and so doth your entire , and faithfull servant . florence this th . of march , . ther are divers other large peeces tending to the same subject , which shall be published in the second tome . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e finch , &c. mechanicks ▪ mariners . 〈◊〉 stra●… . bishops . sco●… . m. hert. e. south . e. westm. e. worce . e. dover . wales . digbies . e. pemb. e wa●…w . arondelle . her majesty . notes for div a -e m. hamilt . scot. plut. notes for div a -e the scot. the irish. england . observations, censures, and confutations of notorious errours in mr. hobbes his leviathan and other his bookes to which are annexed occasionall anim-adversions on some writings of the socinians and such hæreticks of the same opinion with him / by william lucy ... lucy, william, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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[ ], , [ ] p. printed by j.g. for nath. brooke ..., london : . errata bound at end. imperfect: print lacking ; pages - and - from defective union theological seminary library, new york, spliced at end. reproduction of original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng hobbes, thomas, - . -- leviathan. state, the. political science. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion observations , censures and confutations of notorious errours in mr. hobbes his leviathan , and other his bookes . to which are annexed , occasionall animadversions on some vvritings of the socinians , and such haereticks ; of the same opinions with him . by william lucy bishop of st. david's . london , printed by j. g. for nath. brooke at the angel in cornhill , . imprimatur hic liber , cui titulus , observations , censures and confutations , of notorious errours in mr. hobbes his leviathan , and other his books , &c. robertus pory , s. t. p. reverendissimo in christo patri ac domino , domino archiepiscopo cantuar. sacellanus domesticus . iunii . . to the right honourable edward , earl of clarendon , and lord high chancellar of england , &c. my lord , there is no man read's your great name in the front of this book , but will be ready to enquire in himself , what interest your lordship can have in it ; i could satisfie them with the common language of dedications , and say , that those noble and high favours , i have received by your lordships kindnesse , make me endeavour , what i can , to acknowledge them , with all humility and gratitude ; but these are particular duties , the obligation of them alwayes doth , and will lie upon me , to the utmost of my power . this treatise is of publick concernment ; it handle's the highest and greatest business of church and state that , since the plantation of christian religion in england , ever any man had need to write of , and by that title it is yours . my lord , i know , and whosoever shall have the happiness to write the story of these times , as he ought , must record it , to your perpetuall honour that those most glorious and blessed alterations , which this present age enjoy's , both in ecclesiastick and politick concernments , have , in a great part , resulted out of your presence , and assistance , to our sacred sovereign , in those intricacies of affaires , with which he , and , in him , we were all involved ; my lord , i know that most addresses to him , in his accursed exile , were by your hands transferred to his ; the returns again were , for the most part through the same conduct ; so that , if there had been flaw or chink in your lordship's secrecy , to let out what was committed to your trust ; or defect of prudence in directing what was returned , i have often thought with my self , there would scarce have been a subject faithful and trusted by the king , who could have supervived his restauration , to congratulate this blessed morning of happinesse , which we now enjoy ; and therefore most of those gallant persons may acknowledge the preservation of their lives to those great and counsellour-vertues , ( as i may term them , such as most highly adorn a counsellour of state ) with which your lordship was indued , i am sure ( though unworthy those epithetes ) i can affirme it of my self and mine own being . this is the reason why this treatise creep's under , and expect's your lordships protection ; it handle's the fundamental articles of all those things which hitherto you , and all vertuous men , have endeavour'd to preserve , and for which you and they have suffered so much hardship : for when this unhappy author slight's those reasons , which have been brought , to defend the eternall infinite being of a god , this book hath justifyed it against him ; o my lord ; it is that god which hath untwisted and unravelled those many misfortunes with which you were lately entangled , and hath exalted you to a high place of dignity , wherein you may serve him ; as then you have alwayes kept your integrity to him , through many dangers for defence of his glory ; ●o , i am confident , the memory and honour of him must alwayes be pretious in your sight hereafter . vvhen he hath most unworthily disgraced our hope of heaven , this treatise hath laboured to vindicate that by reason : my lord , i know , you have always thought those eternal joys are of an unmeasurable condition , excelling these temporal , and therefore your duty and thankfulness to that god , who hath provided such blessings for you , w●ll assist me to suppress all wicked thoughts and suggestions of false reasons , which may any way disturbe the blessed assurance of that glorious expectation . vvhen this author hath spoken very dangerously of the blessed trinity , this treatise hath , by reason , as well as scripture , endeavour'd to justifie it . my lord doth know how , without the divinity of our saviour , there can be no salvation for man ; the arm of man onely could not compass it ; our thought of a god , our hope of heaven , were in vain , without it : the blessed trinity joyn's in the productions of these divine effects , which we enjoy ; your lordship therefore will perfect these noble duties towards god , which in such a high measure you have already expressed in protecting such a sacred truth from the blasting of malicious wits . these things ( my lord ) i dedicate to your lordship as to a person of great , and eminent , honour , and worth ; besides these there are in this book the vindication of divers truths , which reflect upon you , as the highest dispenser of justice in our nation , under our sovereign ; he hath abused the nature of justice , of meum and tuum , and let the world out to a dissolute confusion ; of which , although i have much more to say hereafter , yet here are delivered many things which may vindicate the anciently-received conclusions from those violences which he hath offered to them ; so then , as to a great patron of vertue , of religion , of justice , these papers are submitted to your protection ; how the particulars are handled by the author , will be your wisdom to judge ; howsoever , since it is the child of my brain , the fruit of my studies , and so one of the dearest things in the world to me , i most humbly beseech you accept this present from him who would make you a nobler , if he could , and acknowledge me to be , my lord , your lordships most reall honourer , and hearty servant will. st. david's to the christian reader . reader , i intreat you , take notice , that long since , in a sullen retirement , being amazed at the transactions of businesses in the church , so well as state. i not only grieved to observe the ruines of that glorious hedge , with which god had fenced his vineyard , ( that hedge of thorns , which formerly no man could have kicked against , but it would have hurt his foot ) broken down ; but likewise how the foxes had been in the vineyard ; how they had eaten up and devoured most of those desirable fruits of piety , humility , obedience , and fidelity , which had only a name of honour left them by former writers , but no existence in the practice of men amongst us ; considering these sad misfortunes , and studying what would become of them , i found many gallant men , with noble and heroïque spirits , repairing the hedge , by shewing the necessity of that discipline whose decay introduced all those mischiefs to the church ; others , with as high a vertue , and as effectuall pens , pruning the vines , and cherishing those decayed fruits ; i honoured their endeavours , but considered cui bono , to what purpose all this learning bestowed ; not only the foxes have been nibling the fruits and branches , but the wild bore hath been in the vineyard , and hath so far digged at the roots of religion , that the principal vines hang by little strings , and do only live , yea would die if not succoured . ( these were my reflexions on those times ) i therefore thought it necessary for some body , and applyed my particular endeavours to cast fresh earth about those roots of religion ; to chase , if i could , that wild bore out of the vineyard into his former forest of heathenish principles ; and surely if any one man , for some hundreds of years , might be called that bore , it is mr. hobbes , no one man ever writing so destructively to the principles of christianity as he hath done ; upon this reason i bent my study against him and his books , and did heretofore publish two pieces in an unknown name , being willing to have the businesse done , but not caring if my name were lost in the world ; the first was meerly philosophicall , against the two first chapters of his leviathan , which yet , because he made that the introduction and foundation of his divinity , i thought it necessarily conducing to my intentions against the other , to begin with ; since my writing that i have found some men , of great worth , and deserved reputation in letters , that have opined with some things in that piece , upon which i thought to have suspended my putting it out again , untill i had enlarged my discourse with them ; but , upon perusal , supposing they could not prophesie , nor had foreseen by reason what i urged , i resolved to publish it as it is , and take some other leisure to censure them , if god give me life . the other piece was against the th . th . and th . chapter ; both so falsly printed , that , when i saw them , i could scarce know them for mine own . i have writ against most part of his great errours , but my condition in those times was such that i was forced , upon frequent and sudain searches of inquisitive souldiers , to huddle up my papers , and throw them i know not where , nor can yet find divers of them ; those which i can find at this present , i now print , considering how lamely such duties are performed by executors , and my self grown to that age as i must commit most things to them shortly , how soon i know not ; the rest , god willing , shall come out as i shall discover them , or else can repair what is defective by my memory , at such snatches of time as i can recover from my necessary duties , who love not my life , nor any piece of it , but as it shall conduce to the glory of god , and the good of christian men , that they may lead a peaceable and godly life in unity and charity , which is the whole endeavour of your brother and servant in and for jesus christ , will : lucy bishop of st. david's . a table of generall heads . i. observations , &c. upon the first chapter of mr. hobbes's leviathan , entituled , of sense . page . ii. observations upon the second chapter of leviathan , entituled , of imagination . iii. upon the twelfth chapter of leviathan , entituled , of religion . iv. a transition to some select places in his element of philosophy . v. a paraeneticall digression to mr. hobbes . vi. observations upon the thirteenth chapter of leviathan , entituled , of the naturall condition of mankind , as concerning their felicity and misery . vii . upon the fourteenth chapter of leviathan , entituled , of the first and second naturall lawes , and of contracts , together with the first chapter in his book de corpore politico . viii . upon the fifteenth chapter of leviathan , entituled , of other laws of nature . ix . upon the sixteenth chapter of leviathan entituled , of persons , authors , and things personated . x. upon some writings of the socinians . xi . a digression to the reader , preceding the bishop's additional animadversions upon a latin apologist for mr. hobbes . a table to the severall chapters , sections , and series of the whole book . chap. i. sect. i. sense something else beside representation . page . ii. the cause of sense discussed ; not the pressure of the org●n , and consequently the heart or brain ; ibid. which implie's sense to be before sense . iii. not seeming , but some action , must be sense . ibid. sight consisteth not in light or colour figur'd . mr. hobbes's aphorisme confuted , that motion produceth nothing but motion . ibid. no motion in place , but to place . philosophy-schools and universities how necessary to christendom . ibid. chap. ii. i. whether the subject , wherein colour is , be the object of sight . colour and image not the same , nor in the same . ii. his instance of the sun's appearance by reflexion censur'd . ibid. iii. whence it is , that we see the same object double . ibid. colour is in the object ; image or species not ; iv. where it is by reflexion . mr. hobbes's fallacie between that and colour . chap. iii. i. his tedious proposition . ibid. ii. image what . the apparition of the object , not of the brain , much lesse of motion . ibid. iii. as is also colour . iv. mr. hobbes's inconstancy in the production and seat of sense . ibid. v. sparkes , appearing after a stroke upon the eye , not from any concussion of the brain ; not from the optick nerve , but rather from the white or crystalline humour . ibid. the like from a white cat or white napkin struck in the dark . ibid. which may be only the strong emission of species . the great axiome upon which philosophy , if not divinity , is founded . ibid. vi. mr. hobbes illogicall in his proofs ; ibid. he playe's the mahomet in arguing . vii . no image of light , viii . but as incorporated into some body . ix . the apparition of light , such as mr. hobbes's would make , prove's not image and colour to be the apparitions of motion . x. fire move's rather upward , then equally every way ; ibid. xi . not presently extinguished , when inclosed , and how , when it is . xii . the motion of fire what ; it hath no positive contraction ; xiii . no rejection of the contiguous medium . an instance in two fired beacons . ibid. xiv . the apparition of fire , after a stroke , is not by any rebound from the brain to the optick nerve . the difference great between the apparition of such fire , and the species issuing from any visible object . xv. improbable , that the sun worketh , as mr. hobbes fancyeth fire to do . ibid. xvi . the indepence of mr. hobbes's illatives . xvii . light and colour two things . ibid. chap. iv. i. colour , or image , not the apparition of motion , but of the object ; the former proved by two arguments ; ii. the later by three . , &c. iii. colour and light not the same thing ; iv. two arguments for the negative . chap. v. i. the first argument against the reality of colours answered . wherein the being and nature of things consist's , and how they are distinguished . ibid. ii. the second argument against the reality of colours other then the reflexion of light . iii. answered . ibid. colours reall and intentionall not the same . ibid intentional colours not the same with light. iv. sight more then a bare reception of species . the conceipt of the species not founded only upon aristotle's texts ; ibid. v. aristotle's first reason for them ; a second argument from aristotle's image in plato's eye ; ibid. a third argument from the distance between the object and organ of sight . the species why so called . ibid. an objection answer'd . ibid. chap. vi. i. mr. hobbes fallacious in his discourse about conceptions . ii. the philosophers first opinion concerning echoes . their second opinion concerning echoes ; their third opinion concerning echoes . ibid. iii. the distinction of formally and vertually applyed to their axiom , nihil dat quod non habet . iv. mr. hobbes's absurdities touching the production of sounds . ibid. v. smell and taste where . vi. what difference between the heat in the fire and that transmitted to the hand ; and how it prove's no nullity of an externall object . ibid. the nature of first and second qualities . vii . heat is neither pleasure , nor pain , but a cause of both . viii . the same cause worketh different effects , according to the subject or object about which it is busied . some danger in asserting sensible qualities to be nothing but mere apparitions . ix . a universe of motion madly fancyed by mr. hobbes . ibid. x. colour in the object when seen by reflexion . sight when , and when not , deceived . ibid. sense judgeth not of colour , but reason by collection from it . ● chap. vii . i. animals will move themselves after rest ; every thing will move towa●ds its proper place . ibid. ii. all animals , being subject to lassitude , require rest . inanimates , by locall motion , tend toward rest . ibid. all things , able to overcome the ill they are affected with , change themselves . ibid ▪ chap. viii . i. the distinction of appetite into naturall and rationall ; their conflicts , &c. ii. appetite and knowledge not more then man hath . iii. what appetite and knowledge is in inferiour creatures ; and how excellently dispoped by providence . iv. god's wisdom , not art , in the natures of all he made , and disposing the principles of their severall operations . v. all things act according to god's method , with an innate appetite to accompl●sh his end , though without knowledge how they tend to it . chap. ix . i. how standing water put in motion recovereth rest ; ii. how improperly dreames are assimilated to it when ceasing . iii. imagination something more then decaying sense ; ibid. iv. memory no decaying sense , the act of sensation being wholly past . his illustration from the sun 's light obscuring that of the stars incongruous . v ▪ extent of time doth not alwayes weaken the imagination . vi , vii . imagination and memory not one and the same thing . viii . what memory it is that maketh experience . chap. x. i. there have been prognostick dreams , and such cannot be said to arise from the agitation of the inward parts . ii. solomon's opinion of dreams d●fferent from mr. hobbes's . iii. his reasons invalid drawn from the differences of dreams . old men's dreams , constitutional dreams , phantastick dreams . ibid. whence coherent and incoherent dreams . chap. xi . i. sensitive creatures become acquainted with words , and signs , by custom , or the suggestions of appetite , not by understanding ; ii. the specifick souls , and signal differences , distinguishing them each from other ; their sagacity . chap. xii . i. religion defined ; why reckoned among the duties of justice . ii. the seed of religion in man onely , because rational ; ibid. iii. but mr. hobbes's reasons of no force to prove it . ibid. iv. his opinion of the feigned gods , invisible agents , ghosts , &c. invisible agents what . ibid. mr. hobbes stick 's an absurd opinion of man's soul undeservedly upon idolaters . v. his discourse of spirits , and ghosts , &c. too perplexed . chap. xiii . i. mr. hobbes sow's ambiguous seeds to produce false and true religion . ii. the opinion of ghosts could not introduce the assurance that there is a god. ibid. iii. ignorance of second causes apter to produce atheism then religion . iv. devotion to what we fear rather a fruit then seed of religion . v. a taking things casual for prognosticks , no seed of the false religions . ● there have been sibylls that prophesied of our saviour . chap. xiv . i. the sole immediate seed of religion an innate principle . ii. to be proved from the chain of causes . an eternity of the world , with an infinity of causations , why not to be admitted . ibid. iii. somewhat of god , though infinite , may be known ; iv. and that from phantasms . v. the conceit of finite and infinite explained ; what conceit may be had of infinite . vi. an eternity acknowledged by all of different opinions . vii . mr. hobbes's indifference be the world finite or infinite . viii . his contradiction touching the first mover . ibid. the first mover proved immoveable . ibid. ix . mr. hobbes's paralogism , by which he would charge the absurdity of one infinite exceeding another ; x. his disputing ex non concessis . no infinity at all of numbers . why the world cannot be conceived infinite in duration . ibid. xi . and yet god , the creatour of it , may and must be . no before or after in eternity , and yet how these terms are applicable to god's duration or co-existence , not to his simple or absolute existence . xii . our double conceit of god's eternity , to which no computation of time is applicable . xiii . the doctrine of eternity most agreeable to h. scripture . xiv . no absurdity in asserting eternity to be a standing instant . xv. the difference of nunc stans and tunc s●ans , as applied to eternity . xvi . eternity co-exist's with no infinite number of dayes . xvii . god so manifest in the creatures , as all ignorance is inexcusa●le ; ibid. the bishop's character of mr. hobbes ; and censure of his dispute here touching the eternity of the world ; ibid. and of the apology he is likely to make , out of such principles , at the last day . his lordship 's seasonable and salutary advice to him . mr. hobbes pretend's to be content with the doctrine of holy scripture , the fame of miracles , country-custome and laws , yet wrangle's against all . ibid. chap. xv. i. mr. hobbes contradict's himself , as touching the seeds of religion ; which are more then onely an opinion of a deity . ibid. ii. mr. hobbes more perplexed in his writing then the schoolmen . how far the foresaid opinion may be abolished out of humane nature . ibid. iii. what may be supposed mr. hobbes mean's by a formed religion . how he imposeth upon his reader . ibid. formed religion not founded upon his phantastick faith. the jewish and christian principally to be examined . ibid. chap. xvi . i. no probability of idolatry before the floud . ii. the first argument for it answered . ibid. invocation taken for the whole worship of god ; practised by adam , abel , seth , &c. ibid. or for some peculiar additional devotion . ibid. service vulgarly used to signifie common prayer ; gloria patri the doxology at the end of every psalm , &c. invocation gen. . . not improbably taken for some peculiar devotion introduced in enos's time . iii. the second argument for idolatry before the floud answered . ibid. the punishment in this world many times disproportionate to the sin . ibid. of what sort their sins were , who perished in the floud . iv. revelation , not reason , did dictate the first religion . ibid. v. the difference betwixt the occasion and foundation of religion . which prevaileth according to the congruity it hath to the will of god ; ibid. whatsoever men's opinion be of the person that introduceth it . vi. how this difference is consistent with the other of assurance that there is a god. why the promised discourse of the jewish and christian religion is omitted . ibid. chap. xvii . i. mr. hobbes abstruse in making out his conclusion of suspected governours and their religion . ii. christian religion depend's not upon the integrity and sufficiency of church governours . iii. religion , formed by divine revelations , may oblige to a belief of seeming contradictions . iv. the singular excellency of faith , to be as well against , as above , reason . v. mr. hobbes's subtilty in his citation and pretermission of examples . which , though pertinent , are dangerous to weak capacities . ibid. chap. xviii . i. mr. hobbes's scandalous description of man. ibid. ii. the equality of men by nature not universal . iii. the estate in which adam and evah were made . ibid. that wherein others . iv. memory , experience , and prudence , distinguished . ibid. v. mr. hobbes confuse , if not contradictory to himself , in arguing about prudence . vi. men universally no such opiniatours of their own prudence , as mr. hobbes pretendeth . chap. xix . i. equality of hopes doe's not render men enemies ; ii. nor of desires , as appeare's by the agreement between abraham and lot ; iii. nor self-conservation , much less delectation . ibid. iv. how , and by what , hopes and feares work upon us . not ahab's , but jezebel's malice destroyed naboth . objection answer'd . ibid. the title of occupancy sacred , &c. ibid. reason secureth men from feares ; ibid. who apprehend no danger from any bare possibility of injury , which is generally restrained by the thoughts of god's punitive justice . ibid. how reason or armes decide the controversy before occupancy . chap. xx. i. three sorts of men , although without a common humane power to awe them , not in the condition called war. ii. how a common interest in humanity may oblige to mutuall friendship . ibid. objection about st. paul's entertainment in malita answer'd . iii. time being no essentiall , constitute's no war. ibid. iv. mr. hobbes's instance in foul weather , to illustrate , erroneous . v. a disposition to war , before any act of hostility , make's no warre . his impropriety of speech . ibid. vi. men unassured of their security make not presently provision for a defensive war. chap. xxi . i. an universal war between all individuals of mankind never yet experimented . nor proved by mr. hobbes's instances . ibid. ii. what in the passions make's sins which are not such in themselves . the severall constitutions in the objects of our passions what , and whence . ibid. iii. affected ignorance of the law a sin . every man born under a law-maker , and a law. ibid. iv. the americans have kings , and justice executed amongst them . private families not at war with the kings and nations among whom they live . ibid. the concord of which hath a better dependence then upon lust . ibid. v. the exorbitances of a civil war prove not men to be in a polemical state by nature . ibid. vi. the mutuall jealousies of soveraignes render them not like gladiatours , in a direct posture of war. vii . conscience dictate's to men what is right and wrong : what law and common power they must submit to . viii . military valour and prudence , degenerated into force and fraud , lose the nature , and deserve not the name , of the two cardinal vertues in war. ix . justice and injustice no faculties , but habits , and may be in a military person . x. nations have propriety in dominions . persons in their wives . ibid. and estates , ibid. xi . their title to which may be various . that of occupancy most evident . ibid. chap. xxii . i. the right of nature extend's farther then to the preservation of life . ii. severall acceptions of necessity , and the different effects of it accordingly ; nothing necessary that god hath not provided for by some law. ibid. iii. necessity of nature make's not every particular man desirous to preserve his life ; iv. it being not in nature the principal of man's happiness . ibid. v. nor the power lost with it considerable in respect of the spiritual activity and perfection gain'd by death ; vi. which is not so terrible , and painful , as pretended . ancient instances ; the most signal that of otho and his souldiers . ibid. cato's double attempt to dispatch himself . arria's magnanimity in being a like precedent to her husband paetus . a modern instance in a young child . vii . death seizeth upon men like sleep ; ibid. diogenes take's them for brother and sister . ibid. a young child mistook one for the other . mis-representations make it otherwise apprehended . ibid. viii . the three periods of death ; ibid. in which of them , and when otherwise , pain most affect's the sick . ix . in what cases life should not be prefer'd to death . ibid. chap. xxiii . i. he that hath right to the end , hath not right to all means whatsoever in the attaining that end ; the ultimate end excepted . ibid. ii. he that judgeth by the right of nature hath a law of nature to limit and regulate him in that judgment . to which he is obliged by reason . ibid. iii. when the law of nature for preservation may be dispensed with ; as the right for a man's preserving some piece of his estate . ibid. iv. mr. hobbes mistaken in his definition of right , and division of it from law. v. what right is properly , and what wrong . whence is proved the consistence of right with law. ibid. chap. xxiv . i. what is the law , what the right of nature . man , in his most peculiar dominion , subject and tributary to god. ibid. ii. man in his first charter had dominion given him over the creatures , but not over other men . man's will not to be the rule of his judgment , nor the reason of of his actions . iii. why men are exempt from god's generall charter of dominion at man's creation ; ibid. to put a restraint on any vice which had no positive law against it ; ibid. as the sin of sodom , it may reasonably be suppos'd , had none . how mr. hobbes would have out - cained cain in the justification of fratricide . ibid. the contradiction in mutuall dominion , every man over every man. iv. no new patent made to noah , but that to adam re-enforced . ibid. noah's sons like co-heires or in●er-commoners in their right . they had not the world divided among them by consent , but by casuall occupancy , or choice , as every of them thought fit . v. an objection answer'd . ibid. the children of israel d●spossessed the canaanites by god's prerogative which he had revealed . ibid. the first generation of men understood their titles of propriety without god's peremptory command . vi. jus and utile not the same thing . ibid. places , &c. not appropriated , become duly his that first seizeth . how tully understood utile far otherwise then mr. hobbes . ibid. mr. hobbes's argument ex non concessis . ibid. chap. xxv . i. the right of nature not such as mr. hobbes define's it ; ii. not liberty , as he describe's it . externall impediments may hinder , but not take away , natural power . ibid. iii. exceptions against mr. hobbes's definition of the law of nature . a veine of errours that run through his book . iv. mr. hobbes may be allow'd to say , he declare's , when he prove's nothing ; but not to suppose a multitude of falshoods to make the horridness of one conclusion . ibid. a term wanting to mr. hobbes's just engagement in a war ; v. and to him a remembrance of his own principles . war not the only preservative of man's right or nature's ; ibid. the discourse of man's laying down his right to all things , &c. unnecessary . ibid. vi. that is not alwayes really good for which a man part 's with his right . a man may lay down his right to resistance , and preservation of his life for a greater good . objection answer'd . ibid. tertullian's signal instance in the christians of his time . ibid. vii . he may suffer imprisonment , &c. without reluctance , for the same reason ; obedience being better then sacrifice . ibid. viii . a man may renounce his right pro aris & focis . for the good of his posterity . ibid. monastick retreats . chap. xxvi . i. diversity of merit . the catcher's title to scatter'd money . ibid. ii. benignity to a musician varyeth not the nature of this or that donor's contract . iii. how the owner keep 's his property , who intended to renounce it . ibid. iv. the distinction ex congruo and ex condigno misunderstood by mr. hobbes ; how otherwise expounded by the schools . chap. xxvii . i. mr. hobbes's vain supposition of transferring right , &c. his justifying most horrid sins , where no covenant had been made against them ; ibid. his reason frustrate . as instance of two persons meeting in some place not before inhabited . ibid. his imperfect definition of injustice . ii. suspicion make's not covenants void . ibid. the case put between two nations entring league of confederacy . the evil consequences of his opinion . ibid. plato's ingenious fable ; ibid. iii. the casuists metus cadens . iv. a propriety where is no coercive power . the foundations whereon mr. hobbes build's a common-wealth , and the justice of it . v. the fool 's argument against justice unanswerable out of mr. hobbes's principles . his doctrine more honest then mr. hobbes's . ibid. taking away the fear of god an unreasonable supposition . uncertain , whether taught or learned of the other , the fool or mr. hobbes . ibid. vi. mr. hobbes's horrid supposal of getting heaven by unjust violence . vii . he pretend's to confute the fool ; ibid. but , by inadvertence , fight 's against himself . viii . the violation of faith not allow'd , for a kingdom . ix . mr. hobbes mistake's the question ; ibid. and changeth the terms fraudulently here and otherwhere . he that mean's to deceive will not declare his intent . the bishop's conclusion about deceit and injustice . x. mr. hobbes's illogicall answer about getting heaven by violence . ibid. another like it . ibid. the law of nature give 's rules for the attaining eternal felicity after death . xi . the breach of covenant , though a wicked one , conduceth not to eternal felicity ; yet such covenants ought to be broken ; as that enter'd into by theeves ; ibid. the other by an adulteresse . ibid. xii . mr. hobbes's subtilty in writing against rebellion . which cannot be by his doctrine . ibid. chap. xxviii . i. mr. hobbes unkind to religion in the disparagement he put 's upon naturall knowledge ; ii. what a perswasive the natural knowledge , or belief we have of eternal happinesse , is to withdraw us from our opinion of temporal felicity . iii. the transcendent delight here in our hopes of eternall happinesse ; for which we loath worldly pleasures ; ibid. and welcome tortures . iv. objection answer'd . ibid. the worldly advantages in prosecuting divine happinesse . ibid. the merchant-adventurers hazard . v. mr. hobbes can render himself no more secure of temporall then he seem's to be ( with little satisfaction ) of eternal felicity . vi. the promises and oaths of men , which he make's his greatest assurance being very fallible . ibid. vii . his scornful scale of knowledge . our evidence greater of future felicity then that ever there was such a man as julius caesar ; ibid. viii . being not only deliver'd to us by tradition , but most consonant to reason . ix . in man's fellowship with other creatures , and his excellency above them . x. a very child require's the satisfaction of his will. a man's will satisfyed with no worldly goods , whether bodily , sensuall , or intellectual . ibid. xi . his knowledge is defective , and cannot do it . nor ought else which is not infinite , and that infinite is god. riches do it not , which bring with them an impatient covetousnesse of getting more , when men have most . xii . man hath some imperfect knowledge of god in this life ; none positively of his eminencies , but by revelation . what faith doe's toward it . what dreames , visions , ecstacies , &c. ibid. xiii . the severall parts acted by the understanding and the will , both which faculties are imperfect in this world . xiv . the certainty of felicity after death resum'd and prov'd . ibid. xv. the objection answer'd , touching man's felicity in the knowledge , &c. he hath , though imperfect . a second objection answer'd , about eternall felicity , being the last article of our faith. the same conclusion may be the result of faith and reason . an argument to confirm this drawn from the holy martyrs constancy in their sufferings . ibid. mr. hobbes suspected of a design , to disparage the foresaid article of our faith. chap. xxix . i. several qualifications , good and bad , in the making and breaking covenants . ii. no dammage without injury . iii. the explication of commutative and distributive justice ; to which is premised that of common or legal justice . many acts of justice being not comprehended under the other two . iv. argument . against an arithmetical proportion in commutative justice examined . by what the price of any thing may be enhaunced . ibid. the asse's head and kab of pidgeons dung in the siege of samaria . when the arithmetical proportion must be applyed to the value of the thing . ibid. v. argument . against it answer'd . a judge or umpire limited by the rule of justice . ibid. vi. what may be due by both kinds of justice , without covenant . vii . the justice of an arbitratour different , according to the case . mr. hobbes too nice and singular in his language . ibid. his mistake in the division of justice ; in his measure of commutative . ibid. his boldness in confronting all the learned men before him . ibid. bodin's cavil ; ibid. his a●ery conceit of an harmonical proportion . viii . mr. hobbes's restraint of moral philosophy . ibid. ix . his censure of all philosophers . he forget's the distinction of a good man and a good citizen . ibid. the foundation of ethicks , oeconomicks , politicks . ibid. x. personal and relative perfection how taught by philosophers . mr. hobbes's philosophy compared with that of epicurus ; ibid. with that of lucretius . epicurus's excellent discourse concerning death , ibid. frugality , and temperance . mr. hobbes approacheth nearer the worst of the epicureans , then do the mahumetans . xi . wherein the stoicks placed humane happiness ; ibid. wherein aristotle . xii . mr. hobbes mistake's the philosopher's discourse of moderating passions . ibid. st. paul's philosophy . xiii . of fortitude and liberality . chap. xxx . i. mr. hobbes's definition of a person too circumstantial ; ii. no less applicable to a feigned then a true person . iii. person not latine . ibid. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , suppositum . person differently used in several arts and faculties ; ibid. iv. misplaced by mr. hobbes . no man personate's himself . ibid. cicero mis-interpreted . ibid. person how taken by the criticks . v. boethius's definition of a person ; ibid. rich. de sancto victore object 's against it . ibid. his other definition of it more difficult . scotus's objections against the former . ibid. vi. the definition explained and vindicated by the bishop . the distinction of communicable ut quod and ut quo . ibid. reasonable , of what extent . the philosophers and school-men could have rectified mr. hobbes's mistake of a person . ibid. the etymology and common acception of persona . vii . not the actor , but the acted , is the person . ibid. viii . no covenant obliging to act against the law of nature ; with whomsoever any such is made , it must not be kept . ibid. ix . the first part of mr. hobbes's answer destroy's the second . god to be obeyed before man ; ibid. an instance in the hebrew midwives ; ibid. wh● , probably , had covenanted . x. no breach of covenant which had not a right to bind . xi . the true god improperly , and over-boldly , said to be personated . ibid. moses , though instead of god , did not personate him . nor do kings . ibid. nor priests . ibid. xii . how moses was instead of god to aaron . hohim used for god , what name . ibid. how moses was made a god to pharaoh . ibid. how fully soever moses had represented god , he could not personate him . xiii . the israelites how the people of god , & how of moses . xiv . moses's phrase shew's he personated not god. xv. god was king of the israelites , moses but their judge and general ; ibid. a messenger and mediatour betwixt god and them . chap. xxxi . i. uncomely to say , our saviour personated god ; who was really god ; ibid. ii. proved to be so from acts . . & . against bernardinus ochinus , refuted by smiglecius . ibid. to whom smalcius reply's , having either not read , or not aright understood ochinus ; ochinus deserted by the socinians . ibid. smalcius attempt's in vain to evacuate the divinity of christ. iii. ch●ist's bloud not to be called the bloud of the father , according to smiglecius . smalcius's answer that argue's how it may ; ibid. his argument u●ged to the farthest by the bishop . who find's , the passions , not the actions of men , to be called god's . ibid. the shifting genius of the socinians deluded by a single word . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated . ibid. the text , which want's it , retorted upon the socinians . iv. how christ is the son of god. what a son is . ibid. v. the particulars in the definition applyed to our saviour . vi. the mystery of our saviour's divine and humane generation signifyed mic. . . the bishop's observation upon that text ; ibid. faustus socinus answer'd . and valkelius ; with other of the socinians . vii . the text taken in pieces and vindicated from their objections ; one in essence plurally expressed , when the effects are divers . christ's eternal egression compared to the shining of the sun. viii . how from the beginning may signifie from eternity . a two-fold consideration of the word beginning . a or ab often denote causations . ibid. from the beginning not to be understood , from the beginning of d●vid's reign . ibid. the socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto . ix . god's descent to man's capacity in the doctrine of his attributes ; particularly that of his eternity . ibid. x. the discourse between ochinus and his spirit moderated by the bishop ; who enlargeth upon the argument against the photinian or socinian , and the arrian . chap. xxxii . i. the next name of our saviour , the word . socinus answer'd in his ex●lication of st. john. chap. . ibid. the opinion of ebion and cerinthus discussed ; the shifts of the socinians . ii. st. john's reason of his writing not solitary , as socinus alledgeth . ibid. beza's genuine lection ; socinus singular in his , ibid. but for a little consonance with tremelius . ibid. iii. how the socinians interpret john . . with reference to the baptist's preaching . ibid. iv. their metaphor ; and metonymie , v. figures never used by christ without intimation how the text is to be understood ; ibid. so that of a vine ; a sheepheard ; a doore ; his metonymies of being the truth , life , and resurrection , ibid. the truth and life may be taken without a figure . vi. christ called the word according to none of those figures ; but , according to the catholick sense , is the internall word of god. how aaron was moses's mouth ; ibid. john baptist called a voice . ibid. the word taken for christ in a far different sense , viii . not to be understood of our saviour's humanity , neither metaphorically ; nor metonymically . ibid. ix . socinus's shift x. a brief paraphrase on the first words in st. john. ibid. a word internall and externall both of god and man. xi . the philosophers of old call'd the son of god his word ; xii . as well they who writ after , as who before st. john. xiii . which is yielded by socinus ; ibid xiv . their language used by the primitive fathers and saint paul ; that of plato consonant to holy job's and our saviour's in st. john. plato's description of heaven parallel'd to that of st. john in his revelation . ibid. xv. the words being with god signifie more then known to god , against socinus and his followers . eternall life , before christ's incarnation , known to the angels , blessed souls , prophets , philosophers . although not till afterward manifested to others . the philosophers excell the socinians in this knowledge . ibid. xvi . socinus's other text of no validity to his purpose . xvii . the discourse resumed concerning knowledge of the word before the preaching of st. john baptist. ibid. xviii . whether in the socinian , or catholick , sense may be more truly said , the word was god. xix . god , with them , no proper name , but an appellative , &c. contrary to the use of it ( single ) throughout the new testament . ibid. xx. how satan is called the god of this world , &c. how the belly , god. ibid. the socinians criticisme about the article , ibid. answer'd . and socinus's instances . ibid. how st. cyrill's rule is to be understood . ibid. xxi . socinus answer'd about tautology . as likewise to that objection , god cannot be with himself . lord and god not both one . the word god with , though not of , the father . ibid. chap. xxxiii . i. the socinians conceit of the word being with god in the beginning . ii. improbable , having no evangelical authority ; iii. that they pretend to prove's it not . ibid. the distinction of christ's divinity and humanity illustrated ; ibid. his ascent into heaven , which they insist on , not corporeall ; iv. his double capacity of priest and lay-man , alledged by them , discussed ; v. how all things we made by him . st. john's method very considerable against the socinians interpretation ; ibid. which is such , as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions , opposite to those in holy scripture . vi. christ's interest in the creation re-inforced against the socinians gloss ; wherein he was a principal , no bare instrumental cause . ibid. their other slight objection answer'd . the use of words . ibid. the benefit of tradition . ibid. vii . how life eternal , and what else , is to be understood , ver . . how both that , and the naturall life , is said to be the light of men . ibid. how christ is called the light , according to socinus ; how , according to the bishop . ibid. viii . what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly , and why render'd was . ibid. why the evangelist chose to use it , rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , writing of st. john baptist. ix . socinus put 's a diminution upon st. john's testimony of christ ; ibid. which is evidently affirmative of his divinity . x. socinus misinterpret's creation by recreation or regeneration ; and misapplie's to his purpose a text in the epistle to the e●hesians . another violence of his in wresting actuall regeneration to regeneration in endeavour . xi . smalcius's gloss ; ibid. his various significations put upon the word [ world. ] ibid. where●n he imposeth fallacies upon his reader . the bishop's animadversions . xii . their sense directly opposite to that evident in the text. xiii . the genuine sense of the terms , not changed , as they object . smalcius's reply to smiglecius , ibid. little becoming a socinian . the world knew not the word , but by supernaturall grace . ibid. what men apprehend of god by naturall abilities . ibid. the objection about st. john's upbraiding the world answer'd . the exposition of the words immediately following why omitted . xiv . the socinians word could not be made flesh , ibid. their evasion . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , how used in the beginning of st. john's gospell . ibid. their heterodox interpretation of flesh , ibid. not evident in scripture , cited by socinus . the result of their comment ; the summe of ours . ibid. xv. the union of the divinity with the humanity implyeth no mutation of god into man , notwithstanding the praedication , god is man. ibid. which is asserted , and by a familiar instance illustrated . ibid. their objection answer'd by the dependance of substances upon god. ibid. another argument of smalcius's . answer'd by the manner of existing . ibid. christ a true man , though a divine person ; whose conception and gestation in the blessed virgin 's womb conduced nothing to his personality . ibid. the divinity and humanity united render him neither two sons , nor two persons . ibid. xvi . objection , of his being the same god with the father and the holy ghost . answer , which identity implie's not that they were made flesh with him ; ibid. as scotus illustrate's excellently . the bishop's apology to the reader . ibid. xvii . smalcius's first quaere , &c. rectifyed ; answer'd . all actions not alwayes necessarily according to the nature of him , or that , which act's . ibid. smalcius's second quaere ; answered and frustrated . his third quaere ; answered , with reference to the discourse before concerning the incarnation of the father and holy ghost . ibid. xviii . our saviour's mission derogate's nothing from the authority and plenitude of power in himself . which he exercised in giving commission to his apostles . chap. xxxiv . i. the socinians opinion of the holy ghost , confuted , and this proved , that he is a distinct person of the trinity , not a mere attribute of the deity ; ibid. ii. not the gospel of christ , as they pretend out of holy scripture ; iii. not the gift of god to certain men , but by a figure . a defiance to them that call for reason in these mysteries . chap. xxxv . i. carthagena's little lesse then then blasphemous limiting god's power of enlarging the capacity of his creature . ii. what of god to be proved by reason , and by whom to be attempted . iii. aquinas's first argument against the possibility to attain by naturall reason any knowledge of the trinity . the bishop's answer grounded upon lully's demonstration by aequiparance , ibid. iv. aquinas's second argument . the bishop's first answer concerning the invisible objects of faith. ibid. the bishop's second answer concerning the after-sight of reason . ibid. his third argument from scorn and scandal . answered by the adherence to infallibility of scripture . ibid. v. trigosius and carthagena passed by . ibid. truth not oppos'd to truth . ibid. the bishop closeth with raymund lully , whom he vindicateth against vasques . and aymericus , who make's him an heretick . ibid. his advice to the pope and cardinal about converting the saracens . his devout enterprize according to it , with successe . ibid. his like adventure among the moores . ibid. their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance . the notable effect of his sufferings . ibid. vi. lully's undertaking , according to vasques ; ibid. whose arguments he recite's and forme's . the first prove's a personal plurality by concord ; ibid. another , from equality , distinction . ibid. vasques's first answer , excepting against the supposition of a reall effective act in god. ibid. the bishop's reply , that lully not only suppos'd , but prov'd i● ; ibid. his lordship's explanation of lully's sense by the necessity of god's acting somewhat from all eternity , or being idle , which could not be . vii . vasques chargeth lully with a mistake of a formal cause for an efficient ; who is mistaken by him . and the cause proved no less efficient then formal . the discourse drawn into a perfect syllogisme , proving the eternal plurality of persons by production . the objection , urging that angels cannot produce the like effect , answer'd . viii . vasques's satisfactory answer to lully's arguments for his second conclusion . the bishop proceed's upon other grounds of his to prove the trinity . ibid. god's infinite simplicity and unity . ibid. his spiritual faculties , understanding and will. ibid. himself the infinite object of his understanding , which is eternally productive of his internal word ; ibid. and that word substantial , the same with himself . ibid. the bishop guided to this discovery by scripture , as the wisemen by a star. ix . god's will as fruitful by love , as his understanding by knowledge ; ibid. and so productive of a third person , which is likewise god. x. misprinted , xi . ibid. xi . these divine productions not to be multiplyed , because infinite , by which an objection's answer'd . xii . the objection made by the assertours of the greek church answered , according to the sense of the catholick , touching the procession of the holy ghost ; illustrated by a similitude , to facilitate in part our apprehension of it . ibid. xiii . how the three divine persons must necessarily be father , son , and holy spirit . xiv . why they are called three persons , being no scripture-language , and how , long ago , debated by st. augustine . the extent or limits of this personal distinction the bishop reverently forbeare's to determine ; and dislike's the rash curiosity of the schoolmen . xv. his lordship's apology for undertaking to handle the question by reason , ibid. and seldom quoting the fathers . a digression to the reader . ibid. chap. xxxvi . i. select aphorismes out of which the author ( who apologizeth for mr. hobbes ) draw's his discourse . a good foundation of his to build upon . his noble quaere . ibid. ii. animadversions upon his ambiguous sense , touching the conservation of life . ibid. iii. his study of it as to his own particular . all men may not have like reason to be so intent . ibid. the parts and faculties of men not to be levell'd with those of beasts . the publick interest to be prefer'd and preserv'd before the personal , or more private . ibid. iv. what right a man hath to the means of preserving life , and how he is to use them . v. each particular ma● cannot pretend a right to the whole world ; nor to things conducing only to mediate and particular ends . vi. the danger of pretending a right to all , and to having a right judgment of it . two cannot have a right to the same thing at the same time . all cannot be useful to one particular person ; ibid. nor every thing to every one ; of which no right judgment can be made for want of knowledge ; ibid. the use of some known interdicted to whom hurtfull . ibid. vii . other rules , by which to institute a right judgment , beside reason . how all creatures are granted to man's use limited . ibid. his impossible supposition . ibid. his fallacy a bene divisis , &c. viii . the equality of right no argument that each man hath a right to all . the case of necessity implye's no such universal right . ibid. ix . nor the dissolution of any common-wealth . x. an objection fram'd by the author ; a second of his not so strong ; ibid. the first but weakly answered by him without regard to god's end . ibid. xi . his first argument for universal right returning , extreme necessity . the bishop's severall answers to it ; ibid. his second argument for ancient right in a lawful defence . how the force or invalidity of this argument may be understood , and how the practice moderated . ibid. xii . his objection and answer . the bishop's animadversions shewing the difference between just defence and unjust invasion , and stating the right of possession . ibid. fear entitle's a man to nothing but a guard of himself . propriety without covenant . ibid. the right to goods gotten by conquest what , ibid. th● bishop's answer from the fallibility of judgment . xiii . his [ the apologist's ] argument against the right of occupancy , ibid. which the bishop shew's to hold well against covenant . ibid. what is the right in necessity . ibid. discovery give 's not an equal right with occupancy . the imparity of swift and slow not considerable in the case . ibid. the author 's two propositions destructive to humane society ; and trade . ibid. the difficulty of discerning different titles to goods and estates . ibid. little peace to be expected , if that of occupancy be not allowed . the texts of holy scripture illustrated or cited . gen. chap. verse page ,     , . , &c. &c. &c. &c. &c ib. exod. &c. ibib . levit . &c. numb. &c. deut. judges i. sam . ibid. i. kings ii. kings job . psal. ibid. prov . eccles . isaiah jer . dan . mic . zach. mal. wisd . ii. macca . &c. st. matth . ibid. st. marke st. luke ibid. st. john ib. ibid. acts ibid. &c. ib. rom . ibid. i. cor. ibid. ii. cor. gal. ephes. phil. ii. tim . heb. i. pet. ii. pet. i. epist. st. john revel . &c. observations , censures and confutations , of divers errours in m r. hobbes his leviathan : chap. . & chap. . of humane nature . chap. i of sense , its cause , &c. particularly of sight . sect. . i let pass his introduction , although very obnoxious to censure , and , first encounter his first chapter , which seems to be the foundation of what followes , but how unfit to support such a heavy building , will appear in the examining . the title of this chapter is of sense , and he begins with a definition of the thoughts of man single , which he saith ( are , every one , representation , or appearance , of some quality , or other accident , of a body without us called an object . ) in this observe his first mistake , that he makes a mans thought nothing but a representation , and he brings no proof for what he affirms , nor answers such obj●ctions as are brought by philosophers against it ; but , as if his book were writ by him for the novices of pythagoras , and his authority were enough , he would have it swallowed without chewing ; but that this is true in no thoughts of men , whether intellectual , or sensual , is most apparent to him who shall consider , that when a man sleeps , or indeed is attent upon other business waking , although both visible and audible objects are presented to him , yet he thinks not of them , nor discerns them ; so that a mans thought is more then a representation . and to him who shall answer , that this is for lack of attention , i object , he confutes himself , for then thought is not onely a representation , but something more , a cogitation of that man , which is an act of the soul ; and certainly , as he himself phraseth it , the thought of man is an act of mans , but this representation is an act meerly of the object , and therefore cannot be the thought of man : it is true , that in every thought of man there is something appearing , but mans thought is not that apparition , but the apprehension of that appearance , and some way or other some judgment of it ; the original or first thought is sense , concerning which , he consents with the stream of philosophers , that nihil in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu , one way or other . but here he cites another book , where he hath written more at large of this matter ; i shall apply my self to both , that is named humane nature , or the fundamental elements of policy , chap. . but because i find some things in one , which are not in the other , errours enough in both , i shall treat of them apart , and first of this piece of leviathan . sect. . here first he undertakes to set down the cause of sense , as if it had but one ( as indeed , by his philosophy , it might seem to have ) this cause he makes to be the external object , which presseth the organ , proper to each sense , &c. this pressure he followes to the brain and heart , ( i wonder which way from the eye , or ear , it gets to the heart , ) there this pressure caused a resistance , or counter-passion , or endeavour of the heart to deliver it self , ( mark now , the brain , which doubtless is the fountain of sense , is left out ) which endeavour , because outward , seemeth to be some matter without ; consider the strange uncouthness of this language ; if there be such an endeavour which universally cannot be true , yet this endeavour is inward , although that which presseth it be put out ; like a man who thrusteth another out of doors , that endeavour to thrust him out is within , although the man be thrust out , all his endeavour must be within , unless he follow him out of doors , which i think he will not affirm of the brain , or heart . secondly , consider that it is impossible that the heart , or brain , should be so displeased with all apparitions , although they press them , as to endeavour to be delivered of them ; for there are some things of this nature , as sweet musick , tast , beauties in visible objects , in all senses some objects so grateful to the organ , yea , heart , or brain , yea all , that they cannot chuse but delight in them , yea hug and embrace them with all kindness ; if so , why should they endeavour to expell them ? yes , ( he may say ) because they presse them : i ask , how do the brain or heart discern that pressure ? all discerning is either by sense or understanding , no understanding before sense , it must therefore be discerned by sense , and then sense must be before there be any sense , for he makes sense not to be , untill that which pressed be thrown out : these are unheard-of discourses amongst philosophers ; but his opinions do confute that saying , nihil dictum quod non fuit dictum prius ; and therefore i must be excused for producing new objections to such opinions ; consider then that last clause of the former sentence , ( which endeavour , being outward , seemeth to be some matter without ) first , i have shewed the endeavour must be inward ; next , let us consider how this endeavour can appear to be somewhat without ; according to him , this endeavour expelled that which pressed the brain or heart , but which way can this endeavour look like some matter without ? i am confident that neither any other , nor he himself understands what he writ , but he would write somewhat to amuse a reader ; if he had said , the expelled species , or i know not what he calls it , that which pressed did seem to be some matter without , it had lookt like reason , although but like it ; but to say , the endeavour did seem to be some matter without , was a strange kind of unreasonable speech ; but he goes on , and i mean to follow him close . sect. . ( and ( saith he ) this seeming or fancy is that which we call sense , and consisteth , as to the eye , in light or colour , &c. ) this seeming , to what doth it seem ? that which seems , seems to somewhat , either the soul , or the powers of the soul , the organs , or heart , or brain ; now if it seem so to any agent whatsoever , that act on which apprehends this seeming , must be the sense , not the seeming it self : ( this seeming ( saith he ) to the eye , consisteth in light or colour figured , ) if so , then , say i , it is true , that light or colour , figured , is sight ; for when we say , a thing consists in any thing , we mean to expresse its nature ; but to say , that sight is light , or colour figured ; or that light and colour figured , is sight , is as much as ●o say , the understanding is a horse ; or a horse the understanding ; or understanding consists in a horse , because it is busied about it : it is true , understanding of a horse , doth require the being of a horse , or else it could not understand it ; and sight doth require light , or colour figured , but it cannot be said to consist in it , but as an object . he proceeds [ all qualities , called sensible , are in the object , that causeth them , but so many several motions of the matter by which it presseth our organs diversly . ] i will let passe this , because i shall have full occasion to speak of it in the second part , concerning his element of policy : he goes on , ( neither in us are they any thing but divers motions ( for motion produceth nothing but motion ) but their appearance to us is fancy , the same waking or dreaming . ) here is an aphorisme ( as if it were undeniable ) but without any proof or reason of it to be received by the reader , without examining for his authority ; the axiome is ; that motion begets nothing but motion ; a speech far from all truth in philosophy ; for were it not that there is an aim at quiet , there would scarce be any motion , finis belli pax , the end to which , and the end for which it is ; but to say , it produceth nothing but motion , is against all the experience in the world ; for although in some , and most motions , it may be said , that the effect is not produced by the power of the motion , but the vertue of that agent which operates by motion , and whose instrument that motion is ; yet that way that motion doth produce any thing , all things are produced by motion , substances , men , beasts , trees , accidents , colours , quantities , places , all whatsoever ; but all these things are not motions , yea , this last , which is place , and in which motions , and the effects of motions , are most sensibly discovered , is so far from being motion , that in our sublunary places there can be no motion in them , but onely motions to them ; nor can they themselves be locally moved , for the place of every thing is the ambient superficies : now that , with us , is either of aire or water , and if a man stir in any place , he acquires a new place , and alters the old , so that in that place he stirs not , and you cannot remove the ambient aire or water , but it alters his condition ; so that unlesse he conceive that all things are motion , it cannot be true , that motion begets nothing but motion , for motion produceth all sublunary things . when he writ his leviathan , there was motion , but this leviathan , i hope , is not motion ; it may , perhaps , in needlesse readers , cause motion and commotion , but certainly it lies still under my paper at this time , and will do all this night . this is the strangest proposition that ever was obtruded upon men , but i desist from it at this instant , perhaps to enlarge hereafter , although i think this abundantly enough . where he addes , that their appearance to us is fancy , i deny it , but that act which discerns the appearance , may in some sense be called fancy , i grant . what he addes afterwards , concerning the pressure of the eye , &c. i refer to another place , but mean not to lose it . at the latter end he censures all the philosophy schooles throughout christendom , but he is not so severe against them , as to wish them an utter extirpation ; he will hereafter reserve a room and office for them in the commonwealth ; but he lets us see , by the way , what things ( when he is made visitor general of all christendom ) would be amended . in the mean time i shall shew this use of universities , that there may be alwayes a certain company of learned men in all professions , by whom , as by a standard , all dangerous doctrines may be tryed , whether they be orthodox , or useful to the commonwealth , or no ; which censure i am confident his leviathan will never abide . and now i will examine this same businesse of sense , as it is set down more at large in the second chapter of his humane nature ; chapter . censures the . chapter of humane nature . chap. ii. concerning the object of sight , colour , image or species , &c. sect. . upon which my first observation is , that although in the head , or contents , of this chapter , there is put the definition of sense to the . number ; yet in that . number , nor elsewhere in that chapter , is there any definition of sense ; but in that number , onely some little discourse of the outward cause of sense wrought by the object ; which is most illogically done , and , for lack of defining , he disputes most perplexedly every where . i will not trouble the reader with censuring every line , but because that which is material in this chapter consists in four propositions , which he undertakes to prove , i will content my self with an enquiry into them . . the first is , that the subject wherein colour and image are inherent , is not the object of things seen . this he proves , because numb . . ( every man hath so much experience , as to have seen the sun , or other visible objects , by reflexion in the water , and the glasses ; and this alone is sufficient for this conclusion , that colour and image may be there where the thing seen is not . ) i stop here , and will first examine the proposition it self , which is proposed with much deceit , for he saith , the subject wherein colour and image are inherent , is not the object . he should have proved first , that colour and image are the same , which he knows is denyed by all his adversaries ; colour is in the object of sight , but there is no need of the image , where the substance is , nor can the image of colour be in the same subject with the colour . sect. . this uniting such things , as are in their nature distinct , breeds a mighty confusion in the discourse , and so dazzles a weak sight , that it can hardly discern betwixt them . i say then , that colour is in the object , but image is not . next i come to his proof , the appearance of the sun by reflexion , by which he would have proved , that colour and image are not in the object : but it doth not prove that the colour is not in the object , but onely the image , for the colour remains in the object , when the image and likeness is gone abroad . sect. . but he urgeth again , that divers times men see the same object double , as two candles for one , which may happen by distemper , or otherwise without distemper , if a man will , the organs being either in their right temper , or equally distempered . not to trouble the reader with my transcribing all , i answer to this , that this double sight may be two wayes , either by a distemper of the organ , or by a false reflection in the medium . the first i have had , and have been cured by physick ; the second is easie , for there may be multiplying glasses , and many such instruments , which many deliver the species double , and then the colour , or object , must appear such : but here is no reason to prove , that the colour is not in the object , because quicquid recipitur , recipitur ad modum recipientis ; if the eye be indisposed , it must needs follow , that the species shall be qualified accordingly ; and for the medium , or middle place , or mean , which transports the species ●o the eye , it must needs be , that the liquor will taste of that tap out of which it runs ; that every story is enlarged or lessened , multiplyed or diminished , according to the affection or disposition of the deliverer , and so the indisposition of the medium varying the species , it must needs be , that the colour must appear such , although it be other ; but he proves his conclusion thus [ one of these images therefore is not inherent in the object ] see here the fallacy put in his proposition at the first , confounding colour , and the image of it : it is true , the image , or species ( for i will maintain that word ) is not in the object , but the colour is ; and where he sayes , one is not in the object , i say neither is , but the colour of which that is an image , which he in this place doth labour to infringe ; and therefore as his proposition was fallacious , so his proof is vain . and i think i have said enough to this proposition . sect. . his second is , that there is nothing without us ( really ) which we call an image , or colour . this proposition is short , and his proof as short , thus numb . secondly , that the image of any thing by reflection in glass , or water , or the like , is not any thing in or behind the glass , or in or under the water , every man may grant to himself , which is the second proposition . here you may observe how the former fallacy runs through the whole discourse . his proposition was , that there was nothing without us , which we call image or colour : in his proof he disputes only of images by reflection , not at all of colours ; so that , were his argument true , yet it proved not his conclusion , because it proves not , that colours are not without us ; but his argument is false , his antecedent as well as consequence ; the image is in the glasse , as appeares , for else from the glass it could not be multiplied to the eye ; the image is there , but the colour is the object ; the image is first in the glass , and from the glass , by removing or multiplying it self , it comes to the eye ; and what he sayes will be granted , is impossible for him that hath eyes , and sees the image there . chap. iii. image and colour what : the effect of violent strokes upon the eye : the apparition of light , motion of fire , working of the sun , &c. sect. . his third proposition is , ( that the said image or colour is but an apparition unto us of the motion , agitation , or alteration , which the object worketh in the brain or spirit , or some internal substance of the head . ) here is a tedious proposition , and there is a tedious proofe of it ; to avoid confusion therefore , i will take this proposition into some pieces , and examine them apart , and then overthrow his proof . sect. . first , i observe the old fallacy , image or colour , both put as one , and the same , but it is false in both , to say that either of them is but an apparition unto us of the motion , which the object worketh in the brain . first for image , &c. all images certainly are the apparitions of those things whose images they are , the image of a horse , is the apparition of a horse , for they are the apparitions of such things as they make appear , and they make these things , and these things onely appear , whose images they are : now these visible species make red and greene coloured things appear , to wit , the object , not the motion of the brain ; which without doubt can have none of these colours . for although it is possible to be conceived , that from these images , conveighed to the brain , the brain may receive some likenesse of the object , yet that likenesse represents , and is the apparition of the object , not the brain . but then to say , it is the apparition of this motion , is ridiculous ; it is true , motion , because a thing known , hath it's apparitions , it could not be known else , but that is a distinct apparition ; as the nature of motion is distinct from other things , so must its apparition be ; but to say that all these images are apparitions of motions , is as much as if he should say , that the apparition of any thing which is quiet , and doth not move , were the apparition of a motion ; yea the conceipt which a man hath of rest it selfe , which is incompetible with motion , should be the apparition of it's clean contrary , which is motion , and the conceipt of the braine being quiet should be the conceipt of the brains motion , then which nothing can be more abhorring both to sense and reason . sect. . and then in the next place , colour is not an apparition of the motion , &c. which the object worketh in the braine , &c. his very phrase confutes it , for colour is the object , now if it be the object , it is not an apparition of the mo●ion which the object worketh . again , colour is a permanent thing , an apparition of a motion is transient , as the motion is , and that motion he names is of little or no stay at all , most suddain . again , if it be an apparition of such a motion , how came that motion to be green , yellow , blew ? &c. either it hath it originally from it self , and then that motion hath colour in it ; or else it hath it from the mover , which is the object , then how could the object make it of any colour , when by this gentleman , it hath none ? it cannot be therefore as he saith , that either colour or image can be the apparition unto us of the motion which the object worketh . sect. . secondly , observe how unconstant this gentlemans philosophy is to himself . i noted before in his leviathan , how he joyned the heart with the brain in his production of sense , and presently after the heart alone : but here , clean contrary , he puts the seat of sense to be the braine , spirits , or some internal substance of the head ; which contradictions seem to me most extreamely strange in a man so cryed up for learning , in a book so laboured , unlesse a man could think that , conceiving himself infallible , he should write quicquid in buccam venerit , what came next . i come now to his proof of his conclusion , which is numb . . sect. . [ for the . we are to consider , first , th●t every great agitation , or concussion of the b●aine ( as it hapneth from a stroak , especially if the stroak be upon the eye ) where the optick nerve suffereth any great violence , there appeareth before the eye a certain light ] i w●ll stop here , and examine it piece-meal . could a man imagine such a perturbed discourse to come from so learned a man ? he begins with a high language of a great concussion in the braine , which i wondred how he could fetch about , and exemplifies only , as it happens from a stroake , especially if the stroak be upon the eye . what proportion has a stroak upon the eye to a concussion of the brain ? though some sparks ( as i remember in my childhood , for i will not try those experiments now ) though such sparks , i say , may appear after a stroak upon the eye , yet i cannot conceive why any such thing proportionable should happen from a concussion of the brain . he proceeds [ which light is nothing without but an apparition onely , all that is real , being the concussion or motion of that nerve ] for this instance , although it be not necessary , as you will see anon , yet , for satisfaction of the reader , i will set downe my conceipt of it , as i can remember the experiment of this great rule , nosce teipsum , thus ; that fire , light or sparkes ( for such it seemed to me ) which after a great blow flasheth out of the eye , i conceive not to be any issue of the optick nerve , which is no way capable , in my judgment , of producing such an effect ; but proceeds either from the white or crystalline humor , either of which may have a disposition to it , the crystalline humour , like such a light substance agitated in the dark , may chance to make a little flaring . for the white , as i have seen a very white cat in the dark , or a very white napkin , firm & stiff , struck in the dark , send out visible sparks , like those of fire , being , as i think , nothing but strong emission of species . now the eye is utterly in the dark , for the present , upon such a blow , and therefore these little irruptions of its own light , quickly stopt by some opposition , may return themselves a spectacle to that eye out of which they came ; what he saith , that this light is nothing without , i deny it , it is , as i expressed , the sparkling , not from the nerve , but either the white or crystall●ne humour , or both ; this is my conceipt , and hath for its proofe some illustrations from other experiments , when his device of the optick nerve hath no colour for what he affirmes , nor can he shew me any thing like it besides ; but if he could , let him know , that it is a poor arguing for such a man , who despiseth universitie learning , to argue an universal conclusion concerning sense , from a particular inst●nce , from a disturbed organ ; we poor people , that have been onely used to university learning , have a conceipt amongst us , that that great axiome , upon which all philosophy , and perhaps divinity too is founded , that sense is not deceived , when it is conversant about its proper object , must be understood of a right medium , a well disposed organ , or else it may , yea , will be deceived , when either of these faile . for him therefore to draw an aphorisme from an experiment of sense , where the organ is indisposed , must be so far from a good deduction , as a man would argue the contrary . sect. . let us consider next his inference , which is this [ from which experience we may conclude , that apparition of light is really nothing but motion within ] now suppose th●s to be granted him , it proves not his conclusion , which is , that colour or image is but an apparition of motion , &c. there is much difference between these two propositions , first in their subjects , a great deal of difference betwixt colour and image , which make the subject of his proposition to be proved , and light , which is the subject of this conclusion which he deduceth , for light is neither colour not image , but an illustration of both . ly . in the predicate , for an apparition of motion is one thing , and motion its self is another . thus here is poor logick in this argument , where there is no semblance , how this conclusion , set down here , is deduced out of the premises : first , it is absolutely naught ( as i have shewed ) to prove an universal conclusion , concerning sense , from a particular instance , and that instance from an indisposed organ , and that instance it self no where offered to be proved ; for where doth he prove , that that light is nothing without ? where doth he prove , that all that is real in that light , is the concussion or motion , of the optick nerve ? now for a man to enforce a conclusion against all the universities of christendome , and all the reason of philosophy out of christendome , the arabians and ancient grecians , and not shew any proof , or evidence , of his premises , was , as if , like another mahomet , he would maintaine his opinion by his sword , without which he hath no one argument . sect. . but he makes another inference as impertinent as the former [ if therefore ( saith he ) from lucide bodies there can be derived motion , so as to affect the optick nerve in such manner as is proper thereunto , there will follow an image of light somewhere in that line , by which the motion was last derived to the eye ] he hath one phrase here , which , leaving it , as he doth , unexplained , gives a great trouble to the understanding of this proposition , and that is [ in such manner as is proper thereunto ] what is this proper manner , he should have cleared , i am sure he making it an inference , with a therefore , out of the premises , we ought to conceive nothing but a violent stroak , which a lucide body at a distance cannot give , as will , i think , appear hereafter . but as his inference is amisse , so is his conclusion , there is no image of light made by its shining , but of the light body the light it self is the medium , through which the image of the lucide , or coloured body , is conveyed to the eye , but its self hath not an image , nor is seen , as is evident ; let light shine upon the water , if it come obliquely , or by the interposition of clouds , the body of the sun or moone , or any other lucide body , is not reflected , we see nothing but the bare water ; and indeed if light in it self could terminate our sight , it could not be the proper meanes to convey colours to us , but would rather stop their progresse , or else coloured pellucid-things , would deliver all things coloured like them selves , as coloured glasses ; it is not true therefore that there would follow an image of light , and , if it would , for the reasons before , that argues nothing for colour ; and if there be an image in the line spoke of , yet that is so farre from proving that it is an image of the motion , as it proves the cleare contrary , it is an image of light , and not of motion : for although , perhaps , he may say , it is an image of light in motion , yet it is an image of the light , not of the motion , which was his proposition to prove . sect. . but he proceeds to explaine himself , [ that is to say , in the object , if we look directly on it , and in the glasse or water , when we look upon it in the time of reflection , which in effect is the third proposition ] consider first the coherence , he said before , that the image was in the line , by which the object was last , &c. ( mark now ) that is to say , in the object or glasse ; you cannot say , that the object or glasse were in the line , but one of the extream termes of the line , and indeed not terminus initians , beginning , which , in some sense , may be said in the line ; but terminus à quo , the terme from which the line takes its motion , which can in no sense be said to be in it : then conceive that he saith , the image is in the object , when we look directly upon it ; which is most unreasonable , that the image , and the thing imagined , should be in the same subject : then conceive it to be affirmed of the image of light , of which he spoke , the image of that is no where , as i have shewed ; it self indeed , as it is propagated , is imago lucis , an image of that light , which is inherent in some lucide bodies , as i have conceived , and if not , because i love not to multiply controversies , yet it is such a thing , which neither is , nor can be represented by any image , but only as it is incorporated into some body ; so that a light body may be seen in a glasse or water , but not light its self , neither in its self , or image terminating our sight : now ( saith he ) this in effect is the third proposition ; but let a man put them together , and see which way these can prove , that image and colour is but an apparition of motion , there is no appearance of proof . but he seems to proceed in proof of this cause , numb . . this number is very long , i will therefore take it in pieces . sect. . but ( saith he ) that from all lucide shining , illuminate bodies , there is a motion produced to the eye , and through the eye to the optick nerve , and so into the brain , by which that apparition of light and colour is affected ( i think it should be effected , is not hard to prove ) this proposition , if proved , conduceth not to the confirmation of the conclusion which he intends ; the conclusion which he aims at is , that image and colour are an apparition of motion : now here he sayes , he will prove that by this motion , which he speaks of , the apparition of light and colour is effected ; his proposition is , that image and colour are apparitions of motion ; he sets down to be proved , that by this motion there is an apparition of light and colour ; image and colour are the subject in one of the propositions , and motion the predicate ; motion the subject in the latter , and light and colour the predicate ; in nothing the same , which is a most illogical way of discoursing , and extreamly fallacious to any reader , who , by this means , when he finds any thing proved , mistrusts that all is so , although he know not why : so it seems , if this were granted , it were not material ; but let us see his proof . sect. . and first ( saith he ) it is evident that the fire , the only lucide body upon earth , worketh by motion equally every way , insomuch as the motion of it stopt or enclosed , it is presently extinguished , and no more fire : he is not to be trusted , no not for that which he sayes he sees , for that which he sayes is evident , i am confident , to him that hath eyes , appeares otherwise , that fire doth not work equally every way ; for a candle , any fire that you ever looked on , consider whether it move not by its flame upwards ; for although in a candle it necessarily creep downward for its sustenance , yet the motion of the fire is upward more then any other way , whether the endeavour it hath to propagate its like , which is innate in every thing , makes it follow the smoak , as a fit matter to be ignified and made fire ▪ or a desire to ascend to the place of motion , as heavy things downward ( which i am likely to vindicate from his scorn hereafter ) whatsoever it is , that it is done , is evident , against that which he sayes is evident , that it moves equally every way . sect. . why he should say what follows i understand not , that is [ in so much as the motion of it stopt , or inclosed , it is presently extinguished , and no more fire ] for this no way proves or illustrates the equal motion of the fire ; for first the hindering of the operation of the second acts , doth not destroy the first , and essence of any thing ; the stoping of the streams , doth not presently destroy the fountain , but the taking away the fountain dries the stream ; and so it is betwixt the first act , which is the form of any thing , and the second , which are the operations . now the hindering a man from discourse , which is a second act , doth not destroy his being and nature ; to hinder or stop the motion of fire is such : and that which he saith , that it is presently extinguished , and no more fire , he must take that terme ( presently ) in a very large sense , for a little time , for we see fire , raked up in embers , keeps its being many hours , yea daies , without motion , but feeding upon its own bowels , and consuming away ; but it is then ruined by enclosure , when no ayre is suffered to come to nourish it , or else some fumes , distilled down upon it , doe suffocate it , as i say then , so i may add therefore , not because its motions are stopt or inclosed , for which he gives no reason , but because it lacks ayr to nourish it , or is suffocated , as before ; yet suppose it were , this is done when the motion principally aimes upward , no whit the more for its distending its self about : in my life i never read a reasonable man talke so unreasonably of sense . sect. . he goes on [ and further , that that motion , whereby the fire worketh is dilation and contraction of it self alternately , commonly called scintillation , or glowing , is manifest also by experience . ] there was never heard the like ; did ever any man experimentally find such a motion ? or was ever contraction called glowing or sparkling ? the motion of fire is either that which is natural to inflame or ignifie the neighbouring body , or , what is in way to it , to heat and warme what is about it , and by that , and that , effect out of it exsiccation to prepare a matter for a form of fire , other motion i acknowledg none in fire ; that which he calls contraction , i conceive to be nothing but when the smoak or ambient ayr supplyes it not with a fit matter for a flame , then negatively it cannot break forth in that inflaming act , so far as it did before ; but for a positive contraction , and withdrawing it self , i absolutely deny , for every natural agent doth alwayes work , quoad posse , as much , and as far as it can , with all its force , and therefore the fire alwaies dilates , but never contracts , for lack of matter it cannot dilate as far as it did before , but it never contracts : consider here how little credit is to be given to his words , who cryes , it is evident , it is manifest , to those things which have no semblance of truth , nor doth he give them any probable proof , but only his authority to induce an assent . sect. . he proceeds [ from such a motion of the fire must needs a●ise a rejection , or casting from it self of that part of the medium , which is contiguous to it , whereby that part also rejecteth the next , and so successively ] untill at last he brings it through the optick nerve to the brain ; i deny that fire hath this local motion ( b●t if any be , it is upward only ) the motion proper to fire is ignifying , and , in order to that , calefaction and exsiccation , that rejection or casting away of the ayr , and so driving the ayr before it to the eye , as he would make us conceive , is impossible , which i will thus demonstrate ; suppose two beacons , twenty miles distant each from other , the beacons both set on fire together , the watchman of either beacon sees either fire ; now if the motion by which the fire of each beacon hath accesse to the eye of the watchmen , should be this rejection of the ayr he speaks of , these two ayrs , thus rejected , must needs meet in the medium , and in that local motion , being aerial bodies , encounter , and either stop each other , or one drive the other backward , and so it is impossible that both beacons should be seen , because the rejection of the ayre to the watchers eye is either stopt in both , or at the least in one ; so likewise should you put a body of glasse betwixt the fire and your eye , that glasse would hinder the motion of the ayr to your eye , but yet perhaps would inlarge the visibility of the fire , or , at least , the glass being transparent , the eye would see the fire , although the ayr came not at it . thus you see an impossibility of this action in its first setting out , and his fancy of sense stifled in its birth , therefore there can no good be expected from it in the progresse . but , lest i boast more then do , i will likewise examine that piece . sect. . having brought the stroak of the fire , as he conceives to the brain , he then saith ( that the brain , by resistance or reaction , makes that motion rebound to the optick nerve , which we not conceiving as motion , or rebound from within , do think it is without , and call is light , as hath been already shewed by a str●ak ) why he should so insist upon this strange , and , until by him , unheard of rebound , i cannot imagine ; he gives no reason for it , nor doe i think the subject is capable of any ; certainly the eye it self is a most tender part , and apprehensive of a stroak from abroad , as well as from a rebound , and certainly the stroak is stronger coming from the fire immediately , then rebounding from the brain , neither is the brain a fit object to make a rebound , rebounds are made by hard and solid bodies , the stroaks made upon beds , cushions , and the like , sink , and are lost in them ; the rebound is scarce any thing , if any thing , but the brain is such . now , as i have said before , there is no reason why the brain should expell every object ; and againe , it may be urged , that either the brain or the eye is the organ of this sense , ( no man knows by his discourse what he will say ) if the brain , why should it only then perceive the object when it rebounds to the optick nerve , and not whilst the stroak is within it self ? if the eye be the organ , as certainly it is , why doth it not perceive the object before the rebound , as well as after ; as it passeth to the brain , as well as when it cometh from it ? i am perswaded he can answer nothing to this dilemma ; what he saith , that ( we not conceiving as motion , or rebound from within , do think it is without ) is true , if he affirm it of light or colour , as he doth , for we can learn from him no reason to the contrary , and all sense shewes us the thing without , and therefore we conceive it such ; what he speaks of his instance of a stroak , i have spoke to it before , but here add , that there is a mighty difference betwixt that violent motion , which he expresseth from a stroak upon the eye , which flasheth fire out of the eye , and this natural motion , which proceeding from the visible object , creeps into the eye by the sight of it : i can conceive the first may happen to a blind eye ; such sparks , with a violent blow , may be beat out of it ; i am confident , if his philosophy were true , that it comes from the optick nerve , it may be done upon an eye that is blind , but this other passage of the object to the eye , is onely by the sight , and cannot be where the eye is not fitted for vision . sect. . his further philosophy about the sun , is as strange ( methinks ) when he sayes , ( we have no reason to doubt , that the fountain of light , the sun , worketh any other wayes then the fire , at least in this matter . ) this matter is in vision i conceive , and that he would have the sun work as he describes fire : but that will be hard to prove : for first , he must shew that the sun moves by dilation , and contraction : secondly , that it hath ambient ayre , or some such easily moved body to be rejected by it : thirdly , he must prove , that the sun must so reject that body , as to make it passe through the inferiour orbs ; or else he must deny that there are any orbes , from all these things , which will be very difficult , and those things which i have objected against that motion of fire , the sun must be vindicated from their opposition , before that conclusion will appear probable , that the sun worketh , in this act of vision , according to his method before described ; not but that i think the sun and fire do both the same way make themselves appear to our eyes ; but as it appeared untrue when it was affirmed of fire before , so that untruth appeares more repugnant to reason , when applyed to the sun. sect. . he proceeds [ and thus all vision hath its original from such motion as is here described , for where there is no light , there is no sight , and therefore colour must be the same with light , as being the effect of the lucide bodies . ] thus he ; but there were never read such ( therefores ) writ by a scholar : how doth this proposition , all vision hath its original from such motion , as is here described , arise out of this , where there is no light , there is no sight ? there is no dependance of one of these upon the other , and as little in that which followes , and therefore colour also must be the same with light , as being the effect of the lucide body : do these things follow any of them ? by this logick a man may argue , because heat and light are the effects of fire , therefore heat is light ; when it is evident they are divers , and affect divers senses . sect. . but i will bestow a little business about the conclusion , as well as the deduction , and shew that light and colour are two things , in which i meane first to prove his conclusion false , that colour or image are nothing but the apparition of that motion he speaks of . secondly , that colour is a real thing in the object . and lastly , that it is a distinct thing from light . chap. iv. the apparition of colour , its reality , and difference from light . sect. . and first , that colour or image is not the apparition of that motion , i thus prove ; that which is the apparition of any thing , makes it appeare in his own colours , as we speak . but this image or colour ( i take them as he puts them down together ) makes not that motion appear in its colours ; ergo : the major is evident , for if a thing appeare truly as it is , it appears in its own likenesse , and with such colours as it hath , and unless it be a colour , this image or colour , he speaks of , makes nothing appear . the minor i thus prove , if this image or colour make the motion appeare in its colours , then that motion had colour before ; but that he denies , for he makes colour to be nothing but the apparition of motion , and if colour or image be the apparition of that motion , that motion must have colour ; because it makes the motion appear in nothing but colour , either it must have colour , or it cannot appear by colour , or the image of colour . again , i can confute this his conclusion , thus ; that which is the apparition of any other thing , when that other is the same , then that is the same , and when that other varies or changes , that doth so likewise ; but when the stroak or motion from the object is the same , the colour or image varies , and when that is divers , the image is the same , therefore it cannot be the apparition of that motion : the major is evident , for the apparition of any thing , is nothing but the shewing of it as it is : the minor will be thus illustrated ; suppose two walls equally big , the one black , the other greene , these equally strike the brain , the one as the other , but the image or colour represented is black or green , divers ; but if any man shall object , that these doe not equally strike the brain , i will let him make them equall in all things but the colour , and then they must equally strike , or if , not , the colour of the wall , not the motion in the braine , is that which onely appeares and makes the difference . again , when the stroak is divers , sometimes the colour or image is the same ; so if we should conceive the strength and difference of motions , we must needs think that solid and strong bodies should move and strike the eye harder then soft and gentle , yet they may easily appear of one colour ; as we may see a downe-bed , and a stone ; either of these instances is enough to shew , that colour or image is not the apparition of that motion , but of the object which makes that motion . sect. . this i conceive , with what went before , may be abundantly enough for the confutation of his conclusion . and next i come , to my second proposition , which is , that colour is a reall thing in the object ; to prove this , i shall use this medium ; that which produceth reall effects , is a reall thing ; but colour in the object produceth reall effects ; therefore , &c. the major hath its evidence from hence , that nothing can cause an effect nobler , or more excellent then it self , which if colour , that is in the object , be not a real thing , it should do , when it produceth real effects . the minor may be demonstrated by many experiences , because some colours dissipate the sun-beams , some congregate them , which are real effects : as for instance , take one of your ordinary burning glasses , use all the art you can , it will not burn white paper or linnen , they scatter the beames ; but black , or colour the paper or linnen , it will enflame it , and so much the easier , the neerer any colour comes to black , which will collect these beams ; this is a sign undeniable , that there is some colour in that linnen or paper which hath these effects . again , some colours hurt the sight of the eye , as red , white , and light colours ; some are grateful to it , as black or green , these are real effects , and every mans daily experience sheweth them to be so . secondly , this may be proved from that operation it hath upon a mans eye ; for since the stroak , which he conceives is made upon the eye , must needs be the same made by a white or black wall , as i have shewed , or more close , the same wall now white , and anon souted or blacked , it cannot be that the divers species or image , which is wrought in the eye , can proceed from any thing but that very colour which is in the wall , because the diversity of the image must needs argue some diversity of cause , which can be none but the colour of the object , upon examination of all other pretended causes , for that varying , the image alters ; and that remaining the same , the image doth so likewise , and this so constant , that to all eyes , well disposed , it appeares such , whatsoever they are , so the medium be not some way or other clouded ; which must needs argue a certainty of causation to him , who in this very proposition allows the object a causing vertue ; because it is a motion from the object , which is by this image made appear ; now the motion is the same from black or green , but the colour only differs . thirdly , let the gentleman consider what he did mean to do , when he writ this book ; did he mean to colour the paper with real letters , or fancy onely ? if not with real letters , how could he expect that one word should not be taken for another ? he could never think that a. should force the eye or braine , otherwise then b. doth , and so cause another image , but out of this , that he coloured the paper in another figure , when he made a. then when he made b. let a man againe conceive , that in the same feather of a cock , he discernes one speck of white , another of red , another of black , and those are all discerned by another mans eye ; let a man think what can so distinguish these colours in this , and not in another feather , but that these colours are there , and not in another . it is a strange thing that his wit should think to perswade a man , not onely against his own eyes , but all the eyes in the world , and all the reason too , but his owne . well , i conceive this is enough for these two propositions , that colour is not the apparition of that motion , and that colour is a reall thing in this object : these two passed propositions are such , wherein i have disputed with master hobbes , no man that i ever read of opposing my conclusions , but himself . sect. . in the next i find various opinions among scholars , which if he would have studied , although not for truth , but to maintain his own opinion onely , although against truth ( which i doubt he unluckily affects ) he might have found much more probable reasons for what he affirms , then any produced by him . the conclusion defended by him , and denyed by me , is , that colour and light are the same thing ; this he demonstrates thus , towards the later end of the . num . where before [ their difference being onely this , that when the light cometh directly from the fountain to the eye , or indirectly by reflection from clean and polite bodies , and such as have not inward particular motion internal to alter it , we call it light ; but when it cometh to the eye by refl●ction , from uneven , rough , and course bodies , or such as are affected with internal motion of their own to alter it , then we call it colour , colour and light differing onely in this , that the one is pure , the other perturbed light ] although to deny is answer sufficient enough for all is said , there being no proof , but as if he were another moses , he delivers his philosophy as authentique , coming from his mouth without any arguments , although against the opinions of the whole world ; yet i will in little lay open some weaknesses in these expressions : first , think what he meanes by inward particular motion internal to alter light ; certainly unlesse he meanes the causes of colour , which must be against himself , i know not what it can be ; and then inward motion internall , which should have power to alter light which is external , to that body , was an uneven and course kind of expression , if it express any thing ; but the weaknesse of the whole appeares to any man that hath eyes ; for whereas he saith , when it cometh to the eye by reflection , from uneven , rough , and course bodies , or such , &c. there we call it colour ( speaking of light ) i say let it come from the most even , most clean and polite bodies that can be imagined , that nature or art have made , as brasse , silver , gold , yea , heaven it self , we call it colour , as one star is red , another more white ; and therefore this gentleman is either mistaken , or would deceive in the usage of speech . his conclusion it self may be thus overthrown . sect. . that which exists when there is no light , that cannot be the same thing with light : but colour exists where there is no light , ergo , colour is not the same with light . the major is evident , because the same cannot be , and not be , at the same time , which would be true , if at the same time colour and light being the same , colour should be , and light not . the minor will be proved thus ; colours are in the dark where light is not , that will be proved , because at night , when light leaves our horizon , yet the colours remaine the same they were before ; and that is proved , because when light ( although another light ) is brought to them , yet they are , and they apppear the same they were before : now we have an axiom in nature , and to be over-master'd and check'd by nothing but divine power , à privatione ad habitum non datur regressus , there is no recalling a word that is spoke , no making that not done , which is once done ; not making that up individually and compleatly the same which is destroyed ; no restoring a forme , and being once lost ; now this being the same it was , and appearing so at the coming of the second light , which it was at the manifestation of the first , it is evident that the light did not give this colour its being , but onely the manifestation of its being , and this colour was something besides light , which was made appear by light ; i know not what can be answered to this any further . again , i can dispute thus , that which opposeth light cannot be the same with light ; but some colours oppose light ; ergo : the major appeares , because nothing opposeth it self ; the minor is thus illustrated , because black opposeth light , for light hath an affinity with white , and black with darknesse , so that such stars , which have not something to vary their representation , to us appear white , and so do candles , and these white things , amongst us , have something of light in them , and great affinity to it , and therefore are better discerned with a weak and evening light , then darker clouds are . so likewise black hath an affinity with darknesse , which is the total privation of light , insomuch as a shadow , which is a partiall privation of light in a particular place , is black , intentionally black , as i shall discourse hereafter : it is true , that neither black , nor any colour , can be seen without light , no more can a shadow ; but dark , and black colours and shadowes , do oppose light , which is a kind of white , when in reality it is in its own subject , as the sun , or star , or candle . this certainly , joyned to what went before , may serve for my last proposition . but because there are other opposers of this conclusion besides himself , now i am in , i will speak something to their arguments . chap. v. the reality of colour vindicated by intentional colours and species . sect. . the first and chiefest i find is , because colours without light are visible only potentia , only indeed visible but reduced into act , and seen by being enlightned ; so that then by this light they are reduced into act , and therefore light is their form . for answer to this argument , we must know that the being and nature of things consists not in their second acts as they are called , which are their operations , but in their first acts , which give them their abilities to work , and they are distinguished by their abilities to operate , when time , and other opportunities , and accommodations are offered ; not by their operations themselves . thus vegetative creatures are distinguished from things inanimate , not by their operations of growth or generation , for then they should not be vegetable creatures in winter , but by their abilities to grow or generate when their season is offered ; and as their abilities distinguish them from others , so amongst themselves their several species , natures , or kinds are distinguished by their abilities to produce several sorts of things by those operations , not by the operations themselves : so it is in all things , the abilities to sense , not the act of sensation , make an animal ; the abilitie to discourse , not the act , makes the man ; for else a beast should not be a beast when he is asleep , nor a man a man , when he is either asleep , or a child . i could instance in all things , quantities , qualities whatsoever : this explains and answers this argument , although colour cannot actually be seen in the dark , yet that concerns not the nature , but the operation of colours , their second act , not their first ; they have in them a power of being seen upon occasions and opportunities , even when they are in the dark ; darknesse to them is like winter to vegetals , like sleep to beasts , like infancy to man ; and as well may they say , that the springing weather , which reduceth the tree to grow , is the tree ; that the stroak or blow which wakened the sleepy lion , is the lion ; that act which inabled the child first to discourse , is the man , as this light the colour ; because of its awaking it to an actual emission of species , or being seen . sect. . another main argument , which is urged against the distinction betwixt light and colour , is thus formed ; there is the same reason of all colours , as colours , as of any ; but we know that some colours are nothing but light reflected , therefore we may conclude the same of all . the major it self stands upon its own strength , by that word ( as colours ) for where there is the same being , there is the same reason or cause of that being . the minor is exemplified in the colours of pidgeons necks , in those colours made by a glasse of red-wine , set upon a white cloth , when a great light , or the sun shines upon the wine , it will give an eye of red to the white cloth which is under it , as likewise the sun shining through the coloured glasse ; these are real colours , but are nothing but light variously reflected ; therefore there are colours which are nothing but light . sect. . for answer to this , we may say to the major , that there is the same reason of all colours , as colours , which are reall colours and material ; but that there should be the same reason and nature with them , and intentionall , apparent or spiritual colours ( for by these names they are called ) there being but a nominal , and some outward circumstantive convenience only , is very illogically spoken ; as if one should say , that a living , and painted , or dead horse were the same , and had the same nature . to shew the convenience and difference of these from real colours , observe that they both are the object of the sight ; that when the eye sees that broken light through the red glasse , it sees a thing , for what is not , cannot be the object of sense , and because it is seen , it is not unjustly called a colour , for colour is the object of sight , and in that actual relation to the sight , they have both one common nature ; but here is the difference , that to the one light gives its being , to the other , onely its being seen , for the light falling thick in with that species and images sent forth in their first and strongest emission , when they come immediately from the object , it mingles with them , and gives them a lustre from it selfe , which is a shining colour ; but in all real colours the light adds nothing but a making of them fit to be actually seen ; and that they are one real , the other intentional colours , appeares by this , that the real are inherent in the object , which is their subject , and so the white of this paper i write upon is inherent in it , and is moved with the motion of this paper , which is the object of my sight at this time ; but red , which falls from the glasse of wine upon a white cloth , or these colours on pidgeons necks , move not with the cloth or the pidgeon , for take the pidgeon out of the flaring light , and you shall see onely his reall colours ; and remove the white cloth , and it retaines onely its whiteness , which is the inherent colour , and the intentionall colour follows the glass and light , not its subject ; so that here we find the perfect nature of a reall , absolute , inherent accident in the one , and but of an intentional relative adherent accident in the other . and here appeares a diverse nature in these two sorts of colours , they differ in their reall nature , although they agree in the relative ; and you may see it further illustrated thus : the same thing cannot at the same time have two real colours , red and white , but the white cloth , though shadowed with red from the wine , is white at that time it is so shadowed , which appears , because remove the shadowing body onely , which is the glasse , and there is the same whiteness , without any alteration or motion in the cloth ; and therefore it was the same before , but onely received an eye of red from the glasse . this may serve for the major , that there is the same reason of all colours , i say all reall , not intentionall and reall . secondly , to the minor , that must prove that these intentional colours doe not differ from the light , which i deny ; for although light is an ingredient in the constitution of them , yet it is not the total , no not refracted light , but as it mixeth with divers colours , so it appears diversly , and then , as you cannot say a book is nothing but paper , or paper inked , but a paper written or printed ; as a medicine cannot be said to be rubarb , although rubarb be in it , when there are many other ingredients , and perhaps others more predominant . so is it with this matter , although these intentional colours have light in them , yet they are something else besides light . and thus superabundantly ; this latter part concerns not his book , nor indeed , had he erred in this conclusion onely , that light is colour , would i have censured him , he had learned men in the same cause engaged with him ; but when he thought this should countenance these other propositions , that there was nothing but an apparition of motion : secondly , that colour was no reall thing in the object , which was abhorring to all sense and teason that was ever bestowed upon these things ; finding it in the lump , and thinking it a mistake , have wasted this paper about it . sect. . but i have not yet finished this businesse ; in the latter end of his first chapter of his leviathan , he saith , ( that the philosophy schools throughout christendome , grounded upon some texts of aristotle , teach another doctrine from him , and say , for the cause of vision , the thing seen sendeth forth a visible species , ( in english ) a visible shew , apparition , or aspect , the receiving whereof is sight , &c. ) this i must censure , and say , that i think that scarce any philosophie-school teacheth this conclusion , that the receiving the species is sight , but the judgment of the soul upon the receipt , for receipt is a meer passive thing , but all the language in the world makes to see an active verb ; if receipt of the species should make sight , then a looking-glass would see , for that receives the species , and truly the eye is a kind of animate looking-glass , as a looking-glass an inanimate eye ; but the difference lies in the activity of the soul , which animates the eye , but not the looking-glasse . but he is angry with the conceit of species , and would have men believe , that that opinion , so universally held , is founded only upon some texts of aristotle ; but i will tell him , it is not so founded upon texts , as if his onely authority had gained the general esteem , which that truth hath obtained upon mens judgments , but the reasons of him and his followers , which this gentleman should have endeavoured to have answered , and not have thought that his bare credit , with scorning it , should prevaile against christendom . but that a reader may take notice of some of these reasons , and not trouble himself to peruse other books , i will set down one or two , which may suffice . sect. . the first reason of aristotle is drawn from our experience thus ; we all observe , that when we have discerned things by our senses , and the act of sensing ( pardon that word sensing , it is unusuall , yet significant ) is done , yet there remains in the sensative memory , that image , which represented the object at the first ; now it is impossible that that should be any material corporeal thing , for then how could so many huge towers , castles , towns , kingdoms , yea heaven it self , if a material heaven , remaine crowded in so narrow a compass ? how could such contraries , as black and white , hot and cold , fire and water , high and low , remaine in that little ark of mans memory ? if they were material and reall things , they could not , but being spiritual , intentional , and things , as philosophers speak , diminutae entitatis , they make a shift , with their little entities , to creep into such a corner : and this confounds likewise another proposition of his , that the reception of these species makes sense ; for these entities are received and retained , and kept fast in that box which received them , the memory , but are not sense any longer then they are hot , and fresh from the object ; well , then there must be such things as these species , or else there could be no memory of the object , which , in a material condition , could not exist in the memory . a second argument may be drawn from another experiment ; suppose aristotle looks upon plato , aristotle cannot see his own face , but in plato's eyes he can ; how can that come about , but that some intentional , species and image of him crept into plato's eye ? a material thing could not , it must be an intentionall , for any material thing would be offensive to plato's eye , nor could it be that gamboll he talks of so much , a stroak from the object , for then it must have made plato see aristotle , not aristotle himself , according to his philosophy . a third argument i can frame thus ; every object , which is distant from the organ , must some way or other make it self reach the organ with its own likeness ; but for a reall passage of colours , or such like objects , there can be no imagination , there are but two wayes , either by the propagation of this image , intentionally , through the whole medium , which therefore is not discerned in its passage through the ayr , because the motion is extreamly swift , like the passage of light , instantaneal ; and because untill it meets with an eye , or glasse , or something proper to give it a receipt , it hath no pause for a consideration : this is the most common way of philosophers ; or else it must be by some seminal vertue which it sends abroad , which , when it finds a womb fit to entertain it , there is prolifical , and produceth this image , and therefore in that regard may be called species , because it is such in semine : now if it should be objected , that if it were the seed of colours , like the seed of plants , it would produce a thing of the same nature , a reall colour , not an intentionall ; it is answered , that second qualities are like equivocal agents , they cannot produce their own nature , like mules , and the monsters of nile , the furthest they goe is their image ; a colour doth not get a colour of its own nature , as heat doth heat ; nor can you make one thing white , by putting another white thing to it , unlesse you add some of that white body to the other : this conceit hath much pleased me , and i think would meet with all objections , but i am not peremptory in it , because i cannot afford my self leasure to spend so much time about such a youthfull study ; but , howsoever , one of these wayes , i conjecture , whosoever shall think that the object works upon the sense , 〈◊〉 conceive it , and therefore these species . there are many other arguments used by philosophers , the least of which he hath not touched , but controuleth them , with only , it is otherwise . i will now leave this , and come to his fourth and last proposition , in his humane nature , where before , numb . . chap. vi. concerning echoes , production of sounds , and external objects , &c. his proposition is , [ that as in conception of vision , so also in conceptions that arise from the other senses , the subject of their inherence is not the subject ( i think it false printed , he means sure the object ) but the sentient . sect. . this proposition is delivered in a strange fallacious way ; for whereas his whole discourse and intent is to prove , that sound , as well as colour , is not in the object , but in the sentient ; as with colour he joyned images ; so in this proposition , which concerns other senses , he leaves out the object , and onely names the conception : it is undoubtedly true , that the conception is in that part which conceives , not the conceived ; but the business which he labours to prove , and is in quest●o● betwixt him and me is , whether there be any thing conceived out of the sentient in the object ; he sayes no , and labours to prove it , nu. . sect. . the first argument he proves this by , is drawn from sounds , and , in them , from ecchoes , ( a man ( saith he ) may heare double , or treble , by multiplication of ec●●●es , which ecchoes ( saith he ) are sounds , as well as the o●●ginal , and , not being in one and the same place , cannot be inherent in the body that maketh them . ) this argument receives its answer variously from philosophers , according to their divers conceits of the nature of sounds ; for such as conceive sounds to be carried in their real nature , by the motion of the ayr , to the organ of sense , these conclude an eccho to be a new sound propagated by the former , differing from the first individually , not naturally , we may call it , if you will , another of the same , as some psalms of hopkins and sternholds translation ; so that as we see musical instruments , two in the same room , one violl touched , the other , out of harmony of parts , being fitted and prepared for such a motion and sound , receives the same , and that sound is the first , but a little softer , which in a whispering place , as i have observed at gloucester church , it would be stronger : now this is another motion , a derived motion , and a derived sound from the same first cause ; but as the motion was the immediate cause of the first sound ; so the first sound was parent and immediate cause of the second sound . now here is a divers sound and a divers subject , the ecchoing place , or the ayre dissipated and expulsed the subject of that eccho , but the bodies moved , or the ayr forced by these bodies , the subject of the first . this is one way of philosophers , and doth abundantly satisfie his objection , and shew there are outward subjects to these two sounds , each hath his own . but others make this eccho a kind of rebound of that sound , not onely stopping the ayre , which carried the sound from going farther ; but retorting it againe from whence it came , like a ball , which moves at the first by the hand that banded it out , but , when it is stopt by a wall , returnes towards the place it moved from first , if it meet with the wall in a right line to its motion , or , if oblique , moves obliquely , and may in that motion be retorted by two or three walls ; and this answer shews the outward subject of this sound to be the ayre , which carries it about with it , and is retorted . a third way is , of such who conceive the subject of this sound to be ayre , in which at the first it was propagated ; and that sound , from that place and subject of its birth , emitts , as colours do , its species and likenesse which by ecchoing places are entertained , as the images of colours are in looking-glasses , and there shew themselves , and from them multiply themselves to the ear , or perhaps to other ecchoing places , as glasses transmit their species ; and this likewise fully answers his objection , and shews how there may be one subject , and divers ecchoes of the same sound ; if the sound be double , it hath a diverse subject ; if it be a rebound , the same ball is diversly retorted from the power of the same stroak by divers wals ; if it be a species or likeness , the same colour with divers images of it . let no man expect my opinion , be it any of these ; it serves my turne to invalid his argument ; and these opinions , and some expressions like these , might he have observed in philosophers , and ought to have confuted . sect. . but he proceeds with a philosophical axiome , nothing can make any thing , which is not in it self . there are some rules given by philosophers which are something like this , as [ nihil dat quod non habet ] nothing can give that to another which it self hath not . but not to trouble a reader with other distinctions , this is sufficient for our businesse , nothing can give another what it self hath not , either formaliter , formally inhering in it , or virtualiter , that is , it hath power of producing it . a man , who hath not a peny in his purse formally , yet having it vertually , can give another a thousand pounds by his bond or command to his steward . the heavens , which , according to aristotles philosophy , have no heat in them formally , yet vertually , by their philosophy , produce heat in sublunary bodies : the steel and flint , which are cold , and have no fire in them , no formal fire , yet knockt together , having it vertually , produce fire enough to burn a world . instances might fill this sheet , but this last is very pat to this business : the two bodies , which make a noise or sound , have not the noise or sound in them formally , but like fire in a flint , so doth sound lye asleep in them , and by their collision , and knocking together , this fire is produced . i have discoursed of this proposition before , as it was applied to sight , under those termes ( as i remember ) that motion produceth , nothing but motion : sect. . i go on with him ( he saith the clapper , the bell , the ayr have motions , but not sounds ; then he brings this motion to the brain , and there he saith is motion , and not sound ; last of all , he gives this motion a rebound from the braine to the nerves outward , and thence it becometh an apparition without , which we call sound . ) what i have delivered before concerning the object of sight , i guess , may be applied to this of sound ; but in particular , here are some peculiar absurdities , which i will examine , as that he saith , the rebound to the nerves outward , nerves in the plural number , not naming what ; so that , by this philosophy , for all i see , a man may heare with his eyes or nose , for the rebound may be made to them , and he names not any nerve of the ear ; and truly , for all i see by his rebounds , a man may see with his ears , and heare with his eyes , for either of these are capable of such motions as he speaks of . but then let me ask this philosopher , how this motion becomes an apparition ? had that motion that apparition before , or not ? if not , how came it by if afterwards ? neither could that motion give it that nature of a sound , or apparition , which it had not , according to his philosophy , nor any thing else that had it not . if the motion had it before , then either in the brain , the ayr , the bell , or clapper , which he denied . if any thing else had it before , and then produced it , then there was sound before , and this was not the production of sound ; but he doth not say that it is sound , but that the apparition is called sound ; but as before concerning light , of what was that an apparition ? was is not an apparition of sound ? then sound was somewhere else ; and then how was it made an apparition ? was it made by that which had an apparition in it , or not , as before ? sect. . this is all he hath written there concerning sounds ; he runs over all the senses [ and ( saith he ) to proceed to the rest of the senses , it is apparent enough , that the some and taste of the same-thing are not the same to every man , and therefore are not in the thing smelt or tasted , but in the men ] short and sweet , and he shall have as short an answer , nay , i shall make his argument stronger , and then refute it : smell and taste of the same thing , are not the same to the same man at divers times , and yet it doth not follow that these qualities smelt are not in the object , for the defects and ill qualifications of the organ do disrelish and alter the thing tasted ; and yet , upon consideration of his terms , i grant his proposition , and his inference , but say , that neither prove the conclusion he proposed . his proposition is true , for he saith , smell and taste are in the men , not in the thing smelt and tasted ; it is true , these are immanent acts , and are in the organ , produced by the power of the sensitive soul , and are not in the object ; but this concludes not against the universities , that as there is no colour in the object , so there should be no odour or savour , but produced according to his bounds and rebounds ; for although the immanent acts are in the agents , yet the things smelt and tasted are elsewhere . sect. . last of all , he cometh to the lowest sense of touch or feeling , and of this sense , he saith [ so likewise the heat , we feele from the fire , is manifestly in us , and is quite different from the heat in the fire ] i believe that he speaks truth in this , that the heat in my hand is not that particular heat which is in the fire , but yet that word quite different , was a large phrase ; the difference is individual , not specifical ; it is a stream of that fountain , and differs like a streame from the fountaine , it loseth by the course , it walkes in some degrees of those perfections which it enjoyed at its first seting out : but , that it is another , appeares , because take away the fire , and the heat doth not instantly follow the fire , but by degrees weares out of my hand , just like a streame fed and supplyed by a fountaine , stop the fountain , the streames will in little leasure decay , but not instantly be dried ; as light followes the candle , or as a shadowe the man whose shadowe it is ; this proves it to be another heate from that of the fire ; why do we read nothing of apparitions , of bounds and rebounds ? this is nothing to his purpose , that heat , which is in my hand , is the object of my feeling , and it is discerned by some species which expresseth its likeness , as other objects , and presents it to the sensitive soul , which officiates this duty of judging of touches in every part of a man , which is animated by it , as it discernes colours by the eye , sounds by the eare , &c. but which way doth this prove , because heat is in my hand , which is felt , therefore there is nothing in the object discerned . the nature of those prime qualities , heat , cold , drought , moisture , is such , that it multiplies their nature even to the organ , and thus onely , immediately , sends out its likeness ; ( whether this organ be a nerve , or something else , i question not , ) but second qualities , as light or heavy , hard or soft , touch but the outward skins only , and there , and thence transmit their species , which is so apparent , as nothing can be more ; for take the weight of lead , and the lightnesse of a feather , when discerned by a mans hand , can any man say these are in the hand , or lead , or feather ? so likewise when i feel a down pillow , and a hard stone , what is it i feel ? a softnesse or hardnesse in my self ? or a gamboll of a bound or rebound ? these things cannot be imagined , these are reall things in that pillow , in that stone , but send forth intentional , not reall images into my hand ; of their natures real they cannot be , for if real , then my hand should be light or heavy , hard or soft , when it discerns those objects to be such , for whatsoever hath these real qualities in it , is denominated by them ; and then some image there must be , because whatsoever is known , must be known by reception into that facultie which knowes it , if not in its self , yet in its species or image ; and so these , who in their realities cannot come at the organ , must do it by their species . but this was much more then needed for a refutation of what he said ; but i have not done yet with him , for although his argument drawn from heat in my hand , to prove the nullitie of an externall object , is vaine , as i have shewed , for this heat is external to the organ of that sense ; and although it be true , that the heat in my hand differs from that in the fire , which did produce it ; yet his argument is most illogical , with which he endeavours to prove it thus . sect. . [ for ( saith he ) our heat is pleasure or pain , according as it is great or moderate ; but in the coal there is no such thing ] first consider the proposition , then the inference . in the proposition , he affirmes , that our heat is a pleasure or paine , which is a most strange speech in a philosophical discourse , where propriety of speech is expected ; and from that man , in that discourse , where , like another adam , he would impose names upon every thing , and strives for nothing more then to give things convenient expressions . to the business , heate is neither pleasure , nor pain in us , it may produce both , according to the convenience , or inconvenience it hath with us , but is neither ; heat is a cause of sense , but sense is neither pleasure nor pain , but they are results out of sense , as things agreeing or disagreeing to it ; so that heate is a cause of both , a remote cause , but formally it cannot be said to be either . sect. . but suppose it be spoken figuratively ( which , in these cases of philosophical punctuall discourses , is not proper ) the cause for the effect , doth it follow , that therefore because it is so in a man , and produceth not that effect in the fire , therefore it is not the same heat ? certainly causes alwayes work the same effect , where the subject is the same , but not else : heat hardens clay , which is a common instance , but softens wax ; if fire had sense , as a man hath , it would find paine or pleasure , as a man doth ; or if a man had no sense like fire , he would have no pain , or pleasure , as the fire hath not ; the same thing works diversly , according to the subject or object it is busied about . this conceit of his , i make no question , but meeting with his understanding , which was the mother of it , mightily pleased him , or else he would never have printed it in two books , and in one have cited the other ; but certainly , meeting with my dull braine , infected with contemptible universitie learning , it displeaseth me exceedingly , and therefore there is no arguing for the diversity of an agent , from the diversity of operation , when the object is diverse , it works upon . and here he concludes this businesse , saying , by this the fourth proposition is proved , &c. but how , let any man consider . now i thought to have concluded with him , but number . he crowds together such a heap of solecismes , as must not passe without a consideration of them . his number begins thus , [ and from hence also it followeth , that whatsoever accidents or qualities our sense makes us think there be in the world , they be not there , but are seeming , and apparitions onely ] i never thought to have read such a proposition from a reasonable man : the thief , who is to be arraigned at the bar , would be glad he could make the judge to be of this minde , when the evidence shall sweare he saw him break up a house , or cut a purse ; if he could perswade the judge that it were but an apparition , there were no such thing , it were well for him . but suppose this gentlemans hand were put into the fire , and when he cryes out for paine , a man should tell him , there is no such thing but only an apparition of it , do you think he would believe him ? but by this doctrine he hath one evasion , which i know not what to say to , that is , when i shall charge him with it , he can reply , it was onely an apparition of such an opinion or discourse , but no such discourse ; i can prove it no other way , but that these eyes of mine shewed it me in a book under his name called humane nature , or another called leviathan . sect. . but , this being only a negative conclusion , he proceeds further to a positive thus [ the things that really are in the world without us , are those motions by which these seemings are caused ] surely there was never heard , or read , so much nonsense , and yet it tastes not of folly , but a kind of madnesse , or else he thinks the world is mad to receive such incredible fancies without colour of reason . is all without us nothing but motion ? is the standing still of the earth nothing but motion ? is the thing that moves nothing but motion , motion moves somwhat that is not motion ; if so , what doth it move ? whatsoever moves , moves something , and if that were motion , the question goes on infinitely , unless we find somthing to be moved which is not motion ; substances , bodies , &c. are not motion ; rest is not motion , much less are they these motions by which these seemings are caused . i discern a stone hard , cold , heavy , by sense ; are these things , yea the stone it self , ( for so they term the things that really involves it ) nothing but those motions by which they appeare ? these things confute themselves ; and yet i may go further ; many of these representations , apparitions , seemings , are without motion in the object ; the house , standing still unmoved , sends forth its image to my eye , without motion ; for all motion is but of six kinds , generation and corruption about substances ; augmentation and diminution about quantities ; alteration about qualities ; lation , or local motion , about place ; he can find none of these in this house , neither in its substance , quantitie , quality , place ; but the motion is in mine eye ; no such thing neither ; mine eye is changed none of these wayes ; only an image brought to it , which is undiscernable by any sense but it self ; neither is the power of the soul moved , which then proceeds to discern the object ; for it is the same power it was before , without any real alteration or change ; for it hath the same abilities it had , neither more nor lesse ; but it is true , there is an internal immament act , which results out of that power , without any motion ; or if it may , in an improper and forced way , be halled into the notion of motion , in some unused acceptation , yet this must be an internal motion within its self , none of those things he speaks of a motion . much of this is needlesse ; that which sufficeth to shew the weaknesse of his reasoning , is to shew , that there are hundreds of things discerned by us , which are not motions , and that is most apparent . he proceeds [ and this is the great deception of sense , which also is by sense to be corrected ] if it were true , that this were a deception , i should think it a great one , yea the most universal deception that ever was in the world ; but how it shall be corrected by sense , that were worth the observing : he hath shewed it thus [ for as sense telleth me when i see directly , the colour seemeth to be in the object , so also sense telleth me , when i see by reflexion , that colour is not in the object . ] sect. . first of all observe , that if this were true , yet , being but a particular instance , he cannot deduce that generall conclusion out of it , concerning all sights , much lesse concerning all other senses ; then observe upon a direct sight , he puts onely a seeming to be in the object , but upon a reflex , peremptorily , that it is not in the object ; when , certainly , a direct sight shews its object more clearly then any reflex . but now to his instance ; why doth a reflex shew it not to be in the object , he sets not down , but perhaps he may say , in a glass the image may seeme to be in the glasse , and not in the object ; i say , the image , that which represents the object , is there , and i have known a robin red-breast fighting with his own shadow in a glasse . to this i answer , that the sight judgeth of colours , and therein is not deceived , when the distance is not too great , nor the organ , or medium , ill disposed ; for that is its proper object , over which it hath power to judg ; but in such things as are a common object to it , and other senses , it is easily mistaken , of which kind are figures , greatnesse , or littleness , distance of place , and many the like . thus it mistakes the distance of the moone from the earth , the bigness of the stars ; but then , besides these common objects , there are other which are objectum per accidens , as logicians , an object not out of its own nature affecting that act or faculty in its self , but by reason of some other thing to which it is annext , or happens to be joyned ; so we may say , we see socrates or plato , when we see them not , but their colour , and that colour , of theirs , is the onely thing by which they are discerned by sight . now there are mighty mistakes in our senses concerning these ; so when we see one man's cloaths worne by another , we think him , at the first , to be the man whose cloaths he weares ; so when we see that man to have a red , who had a pale face , we think him not the same man. my opinion of this mistake is , because although the vision of the colour is an act of sight , yet the applying that colour to the person seemes to be an act of reason , a work out of the reach of pure sense . this by the way of explication , to make all plain , that the reader may the fuller apprehend my answer to this objection ; punctually then i answer , first , that there is no such judgment of sense as to say , that colour is not in the object ; for although sense , perhaps , can onely discern the colour in the glass ; yet sense meddles not with that question , whether the same colour , can be in two subjects ; much less , whether this be a real colour in the glasse , or whether an intentional , or whether it be in the glass or not ; but if it do meddle with this last , yet in that speech , which sayes it is in the glasse , sense meddles beyond its sphere , it judgeth in a cause which belongs not to its judicature , that may be disputed by reason between him and me , and sense may give in evidence concerning what it knows circumstantially conducing to the truth , but cannot judg of it , it is not its proper object ; so then to say , sense sees it in a glass , therefore there is no colour in the object , is vaine to reason , which can discerne that every accident follows its subject ; remove the glass from the face which got that image , and there is no such image in the glasse ; and contrariwise , remove the man whither you will , the colour is with him , sticks in him , therefore colour is inherent in him , but only from him represented in the glasse : the businesse of inhesion or adhesion belongs not to sense to meddle with ; the eye sees divers colours in a rain-bow , it belongs not to sense to judge whether they inhere there or no ; so likewise in the pidgeons neck , and wheresoever it findes them , reason may dispute and collect from sense , but sense judgeth not . so that first , as i said , sense when it sees an image in a looking-glasse , collects no negative proposition , that it is not in the object , no more then the sense of that man , who thinks he sees a man in the moon , should collect that , therefore there are none upon earth . secondly , if it judg at all of the subject of inherence , whether the glass or object be the subject , yet this is so extrajudicial an act , so out of the reach of sense , as therefore there is no strong building upon it ; thus have i knowne horses mistaken , and sheep , when the colouts have been the same , and the mistake hath seized upon reason guided by sense , so that men have sworne cleane contrary ; so weak is sense in judging of any thing but its proper object ; when other things are accidentally joyned with the object , they pass an accidental and uncertain judgment upon them ; and his first conclusion is true , sense telleth me , or rather , by the information of sense , i collect , that colour is in the object , when i see it directly ; but his second can no way be true , that sense telleth me , when i see by reflection , that colour is not in the object ; for sense makes no such judgment , and reason with sense makes a cleane contrary collection . thus have i gone through these two chapters , the first of leviathan , the second of humane nature , which be the foundation of his whole book ; if the rest prove of the same nature , my labour will be much lost to meddle with it ; but i will try some other pieces . notes upon the second chapter of leviathan . chap. vii . how all creatures affect rest or motion , as most convenient for them . i have travelled the first chapter from the beginning to the end ; i shall not trouble the reader , or my self , so with others , nor can i expect they should deserve it ; but if they should , i will let pass many things , and only touch some remarkable passages , which may , in my judgement , be principally worth the censuring . sect. . he begins this chapter with a sentence , which he calls an undoubted truth , and i am confident is most absolute , and not to be doubted falshood ; that is , that when a thing lyes still , unlesse somewhat else stirre it , it will lie still for ever . this proposition is apparently false in all animals , for every sensitive creature moves its self , and hath the principles of its own motion in its self , unless the motion be violent ; long rest is as unquiet and tedious to such beasts as long labour , and therefore they will rise , and they will move themselves ; rise , if for nothing else , yet out of a lassitude they have of that lazie condition they were in ; and likewise they arise and move to their food and sustenance ; so that the case put in that latitude and indefinite term , a thing ( without any limitation lyes still , cannot look like a truth , but that it comming from so learned a man , men are amazed at the reading of it . but then go further , and let us view the meanest things , even inanimate bodies ; every thing is unquiet out of its proper place , and presseth and indeavours to get to it ; and when it is out of its place , will move towards it : suppose a plummet of lead hung in the air by a thred , in time the thred wears , the plummet changeth its place by falling down to the earth , the plummet moves its self downward ; the breaking of the thred cannot move it , for indeed the pressing of the weight of the lead , which is out of its place , breaks the thred , and moves both the thred and its self down ; so that let any thing lye still , yet it will move its self , if it be out of its place . so likewise in motion upward , take a bladder full of air , lay something upon it which may keep it under water , and let it rest there , then remove the obstacle which kept it down , it will ascend to its proper place above the water ; and surely nothing but its self moves it , as is most apparent : so far is this indefinite axiome from an undoubted truth , that it is most evidently false in all animal motions , and in all natural motions , which are of things out of their places . sect. . his second proposition is as bad , that when a thing is in motion , it will eternally be in motion unlesse something else stop it ; this is equally false with the other : first , animal motions he grants presently after , men measuring other things by themselves , judge they are weary , and so go to rest . this instance granted in a man , confutes that indefinite term , when a thing is in motion ; and what he speaks of men , there is the same reason of all sensitive creatures , which abide a lassitude or wearinesse , as well as man , and must have their sabbath , their alternam requiem to refresh them , or they cannot subsist ; and therefore , when they are in long motions , go to rest themselves ; and certainly a man may justly say , that all the locall motions of other things , as well as animals , is to rest ; the bladder , which moved it self before from under the water , rests it self upon the water ; the plummet of lead upon the earth ; every thing , when it gets its own place , rests in that : so in violent motions , when you shoot an arrow upward , it makes hast downward of it self , against the violence , and gets to the earth , where it may , and doth rest ; so that the nature of every thing is so composed , that as it is unquiet out of its fit and natural place , so it is quiet and rests in it : but he seems to give a reason for both propositions , namely , that nothing can change it self . this may have some resemblance of truth , in respect of the essence of things , because every change seems to imply a corruption and destruct●on of what it was changed from into that it was changed into , and nothing can affect , or endeavours its own destruction , or ruine ; but yet when any body is aff●cted with hurtfull accidents , it doth change them for its own advantage ; the water , when it hath that destructive accident , heat in it , by its own force and principles which are in it , works out that hurtfull heat , and reduceth its self to its own temper of coldnesse , when the violence , which the fire offers to it , is removed . thus heavy things move downwards , light upwards , when they can remove , or when those obstacles are removed , which before kept them from their natural places . and thus natural bodies of animals , expell those hurtful poysonous things , which the strength of their natural constitution can master ; and thus all things , when they are beset with any ill which they can overcome , change themselves . thus it appeares , that as his conclusions were erronious , so his reasons and foundations , upon which he built them , were weak , that nothing can change its self : what he adds of mens measuring other things by themselves , must be affirmed of fools , for i dare say he never read philosopher write so . chap. viii . of appetite and knowledge : how wisely methoded by god in all creatures , to the effecting his ends . enough , i think , is said to that ; but in the latter end of this introduction , i conceive it such , he seems to scorn that received opinion , that heavy things move downward out of an appetite to rest , and to conserve their nature , &c. ascribing ( saith he ) appetite and knowledge of what is good for their preservaion ( which is more then man has ) to things inanimate , absurdly : thus he . sect. . this proposition i censure , and shall shew first , that there is such a thing ; then answer his objection . appetite may be distinguished into natural and rationall ; natural is the bent , the disposition every thing hath to the preservation of its self , as it is a particular body ; or the generality of the universe , as it is a part of the whole . rational appetite is that which a thing hath out of the knowledge it hath of the goodnesse and fitnesse which a thing hath for him who doth desire it . now that there is such an appetite , which we call natural , in every thing which hath not reason , is apparent in every such thing ; so that no man can give any account of such actions but by the appetite ; as , why should the foxes have holes , and the fowls of the air have nests , wherein they may lay up and preserve their young , but this , that they have an appetite to preserve them ; so likewise , to come lower to his instance , why do heavy things fall downeward , after they have been forced upwards , but that they would preserve themselves ; nay , to see these two appetites in the same man , will make it more evident . every man findes in himself , besides those politique designs which he hath upon study , and arise out of reason , natural desires , and appetites of meat and drink , and this against his reasonable appetite ; for when his reason , upon grounds of physick , directs him not to eat , and , upon the controul of reason , he denies himself meat , yet he cannot choose but , by his natural appetite , desire meat ; so likewise he hath a natural appetite to live , even when reason shews him it is fit for him to dye , and to fall downwards , even when he would mount upward . thus we see there are appetites in irrational things , and the irrational part in man , which is not rational ; and these cross appetites make great contestation in man about his actions ; and sometimes the subj●ct , natural appetite , doth so powerf●lly take up arms against its supreme , the reasonable appetite , that it conquers the reasonable appetite , according to that famous speech of medéa , so much honoured , both amongst schools , divines , and philosophers : — video meliora proboque deteriora sequor . — i see what is good , and in my reason approve it , but act what in reason i detest . this invincibly shews this appetite , and that there is even in natural things , which have not the use of reason , an appetite to satisfie themselves in what , some way or other , is good for them . now then i will come to the answer of that objection , of his , which he makes with scorne , that ( saith he ) they ascribe appetite and knowledge to things inanimate , which is more then man hath . sect. . the negative piece which saith , which is more then man hath , is very false ; for although , by reason of his corrupt will , man sometimes mistakes ill for good , good for ill , and prosecutes these things accordingly ; yet he doth not this as a man , but as a depraved man , and either in things which belong to his election , having an indifferent nature ; or else out of some predominant passion within him , which as it draws his will , so it blinds oftentimes his understanding ; or else when there is a disguise put upon the obj●ct , which makes it appear other then it is ; but man , as man , hath abilities both to know , and prosecute what is good , and he alwayes doth desire what is good , at the least apparent , nor can he do otherwise . sect. . for the affirmative part , that they ascribe to inanimate things appetite , and knowledge , &c. i could answer out of my former distinction , that they do not ascribe a rational , but a natural appetite , which many times is aga●nst reason , as i have shewed ; but because we see , in unreasonable animals , swallows not only building , but fortifying , their nests with such choise and selected materials , and those so artificially plastered together , as although man may imitate , yet he cannot equal the ingenuity of the work ; because we observe bees with such wonderfull industry gathering , and , in such a constant method , contriving the disposure of that harvest they lay up against the hard time of winter , with multitudes of such things which may amaze , and draw the wit of man to admiration , rather then to contention to compare ; because in the inferiour things we find such a consent and cooperation to the general good of the universe , as can be parallel'd by no heroick vertue of any roman or romance ; that constantly the very plebeians of the world , the meanest creatures do expose themselves to a certain ru●n for the publike good , as water ascends , air descends to its own destruction , to avoid vacuity ; when we shall consider , how , as in noahs a●k , for the preservation of their species , the wolf and lamb , the lion and the bull , the horse and the beare , the hawke and the partridge , live in peace ; so , for the same intention , fire and water , heat and cold , the greatest enemies in the world meet , and inhabit , and live quietly and harmoniously together , in the same body ; i cannot chuse but adde that there is the same hand and providence disposing one , as did the other , and so will inlarge my answer to an exposition of this businesse . sect. . first then consider , that when god , the great natura naturans ( as the philosopher calls him ) at the first made all the creatures in the world , he gave each of them their several beings and natures , which were the principles of all their operations , which according to those beings they produced ; not as he , in his introduction to his leviathan , began with somewhat too high a line , ( nature , the art whereby god hath made and governs the world ) certainly if it were lawfull to call that infinite wise counsel of gods will , whereby he worketh all things , and made and governs the world , an art ; yet we could not call that art , nature , for nature is a thing made by god , and therefore not that thing , or art , by which god did make the world , and in , or with it nature her self . again , nature works necessarily that which it works , insomuch , as even in man , what he doth naturally , is necessarily done ; and what by reason , liberally , or freely : so that here was a great boldnesse in him with god , whilest he commended himself by a high and great phrase , to make that phrase speak diminishingly of god , in these transcendent works of his : but to return whence this observation distracted me ; when god gave these natures to every thing , he disposed them to advance his great designe of the beautious world , and by that nature , which he gave them , ingrafted in them dispositions to move thus , or thus , as his infinite wisdome knew fittest , either for the particular effect of each nature , or their combined effects to the whole , according to which dispositions they cannot choose but work ; and this is called appetite , the natural inclination , and bent of each thing to produce those effects , which either are agreeing to its self , or the publique good . sect. . now these things are acted by them without their knowledge , onely his who directeth them to this end . as scotus speaks , a great states-m●n gives divers officers dispatches of letters about his publique ends ; they carry the letters , and , b●ing diligent in their several charges , bring about the design , and it may be said , their diligence effected the project : so here these things do , as it were , carry gods letters , go on his errands , and although they know not what they do , yet they , by their acting according to that method he disposeth them in , bringing those mighty works of wisdom to pass , which we observe are done by them ; or as you discern in a clock , which being made artificially , and kept in motion , distinguisheth the hours of the day to us ; the hand moves to one or two a clock , and , when it comes thither , it makes such a noise , which speaks the hour of the day ; the clock moves , and moves to this end , to strike and tell the time of the day , but yet the clock thinks not of the hour , but moves to that purpose ; so is it in these inferiour things , they move like a clock in their order , and the maker of them aimed them at such or such an effect , they move to it themselves , not knowing what they do , and move to that end is designed them , and certainly as when we see a clock move in such a method , and produce such effects , as are beyond the reach of such dull things as iron and brasse , which are the materials , we are sure that there was some wiser head in the contrivance and ordering of it : so certainly , when we discern in these creatures acts of a higher and more excellent condition then their nature can produce , constantly acted by them , we cannot chuse but perceive that great and powerfull wisdome and providence of god in their operations , which we should not forget to consider punctually ; therefore to his argument we say , that these things have an appetite to actions , or such objects , not a knowledge of them ; an appetite they have , for nothing moves but by its appetite , unlesse forced , this appetite is the bent of its nature to this or that ; this is not out of knowledge in its self , but in god who so disposed it ; in its fall it is barely that natural inclination which god hath given to each thing , and , in some cases , may be called instinct , and is d●scerned both in aversenesse and inclinations , so that heavy bodies , out of this regard , move downwards , and light upwards , having such inclinations naturally in them ; but being disposed by a greater wisdom , and if they have any contrary motion , that is forced , which appeares because these , upon the remove of obstacles , when they come to themselves , retreat , like rivers into their own channels , by natural motions into their own places , as hath been shewed ; so then both , that all natural bodies have appetite , appears ; and likewise how this in the wisest and the most excellent method , which may be , is in them , although their own reason guide them not to it , but that infinitely wise reason of their maker . this , as i conceive , he writeth as an introduction to this chap. of imagination ; but how it conduceth to his design i see not ; what follows , comes a little closer . chap. ix . of motion ceasing , dreames , decaying sense , imagination , memo●y , experience , &c. sect. he begins with that refuted axiome , when a body is once in motion , it moveth ( unlesse somthing els hinder it ) eternally , and whatsoever hinders it , cannot in an instant , but by degrees , extinguish it . the rule he gives in his first part hath been already overthrown , and his instance , which he u●geth for illustration from perturbed water , being but a particular instance in one only example , cannot be of force to draw a general conclusion from it , according to any rules of logick ; but if it could be , it is so far from proving his conclusion , that it clearly ovetthrows it ; for let it be inqu●red , why the water , after that the winds cease at any time , gives over rowling , or , as his instance is in the . chap. of humane nature , why , after it is put into motion , the standing water gives over motion ; the answer cannot be made from any external thing , but only from its self , that standing water , being a heavy body , works out his enemy motion , and by degrees gets its rest , so that the water , it s own self , produceth its own rest after motion ; and for that other piece , that this stop is not in an instant , although in that instance he gives , the phrase he useth is proper enough to say , the ●i●derance is by d●grees , because nature hath to do with an enemy , a violent motion , w●ich cannot be forced away , but by degrees ; yet in natural motions we may find it , either when a heavy body falleth down , the further it goes , the swifter it moves , and yet stops upon the sudden , when it comes to the place of its rest ; so likewise in that other instance , when the bladder ascends , the stop is in that instant it gets upon the top of the water ; for although all motion is in time , unlesse generation and corruption , ( say the philosophers ) yet the terms of motions are in instant , like those times by which they are measured , as must needs appear evident . sect. . then he comes to apply this illustration of his rule to the businesse in hand , pag. . i must now reckon by pages , so also ( saith he ) it hapneth in the motion , which is made in the internal parts of a man , then when he sees dreams , &c. for after the object is removed , or the eye shut , we stil retain an image of the thing seen , though more obscure then when we see it . ) here observe how strangely he joynes together seeing and dreaming , as if seeing were a relick of sense , not sense , or a result out of it , as dreaming is ; but wherein can we find the convenience betwixt the motion of the water , which stayes a little while after the stone is stopt , and this remaining of the image ? that motion of sense is nulled , and therein a quiescence of that act ; but as in all other causes , which are not necessary to the preservation as well as the producing their effects , so here , when the cause is gone , the effect remains , the image apprehended in sense , and then it hath no other convenience with that motion , then any other cause . sect. . i r●j●ct not his etymologie , but deny his deduction , ther●fore ( saith he ) imagination is nothing but decaying sence ; for although imagination may be derived from image , yet it is something besides sense in its full notion , for sense is the meer judgment upon a present object , but imagination works upon an absent ; every sense judgeth of a particular sensative object ; so sight of colours , hearing of sounds , &c. and no other but fancy , ( so here i involve the common sense with it , because he excludes it , and i will multiply no controversie ) judgeth of all senses , and distinguisheth them : this is visible , this audible ; yea , conjoynes them together , and makes a composure , sometimes for pleasure , sometimes for grief of divers of them , which sense cannot do , sight cannot judge , or act any way upon sounds , or the ear upon colours , as is evident , a deaf man ( though seeing ) cannot hear , yet , if ever he did hear , his fancy can imagine sounds . so that imagination must needs be somthing besides decaying sense , which operates where , and when sense cannot , and is an act upon that which is the relick of sense ; when sense hath done its work , there remains the species which the object sent forth , and upon this species the power of imagination works its proper operations . decaying sense supposeth sense to be , but imagination works when sense is not , as upon colours ; when the man , that hath seen , is blind afterwards , there is not the sense of seeing , but there is in that man an imagination of colours , which he hath , but cannot now see : so , in the dark , men imagine colours , but can see none . i conclude therefore , that imagination is something beside sense , which exists when sense faileth . sect. . he goes on . [ the decay of sence in man ( saith he ) waking , is not the decay of the motion made in sence , but an obscuring of it : ] this i apprehend most untrue ; for when the organ ceaseth to judge , that motion which he calleth sence , ceaseth , and is no longer ; but those species lie lockt up in the memory , and there is no act of sensation concerning them , no not a decayed one . that philosophy , which he delivers concerning the sun and the stars , to illustrate this by , i grant , that the stars do emit and send forth their light when the sun shineth , but the excess of the suns light obscures that of the stars ; yet his application of it to this purpose is utterly vain ; for there both the objects work , like natural agents , according to their utmost , and the greater by its force masters the lesse ; but here , in our businesse , the object is removed , or the organ , and there is no operation of one upon the other at all , the species being crept within the organ , the eye cannot judge of it ; and the object or organ , being diverted , or indisposed ▪ cannot produce such an act any longer ; it is as if the stars were removed out of the heaven , not shining with the sun ; so that we fancy colors in the dark , when no strength of another object , more powerfull , doth work upon our sense ; and sometimes in the dark we do not imploy our imaginations about colours , and yet in that dark we have no vehement object to obscure our fancy ; so that it is not the suppression or weakning of sense , by another object , which maketh us not see , but the cessation of sense , by the removal of either organ , or object , one from another . and again we may observe , that although the sun shine , and the objects external move never so powerfully , yet the fancy is busied about some internal conceit , or other things absent , which could not be , if only the vehement stroakes from the object did produce this act ; for then that being , the fancy should likewise be . sect. . after this weak discourse he draws a conclusion thus : [ from whence it follows , that the longer the time is , after the sight or sense of any object , the weaker is the imagination . ] this hath some truth in it , but is not absolutely true ; for many instantly upon sight , or hearing of a thing , have no apprehension of it , as we say , it comes in at one eare , and goes out at another ; men carelesly taking notice of it , like a thing not heeded , or cared for , lose it presently ; we conceiving the memory , like a box which keeps these images , may apprehend attention like a key to it , which locks them up in that box. or , apprehending the memory like wax , we may imagine attention like that force which presseth these images into it ; but , without attention , any sensitive object , though discerned , is lost immediately , and doth not stay for time to weaken or wear it out ; when , contrariwise , it often happens , that a thing long time forgot , and not thought on , may be reviv'd and quickned again , and remain more lively in the fancy then things of a much later birth : as i remember seneca speaks of himself , and i think most men may find in themselves to be true ; that the things , which he learned when he was a child , did stick faster and fresher in his memory then those things which he learned but a little before ; so that although there may be some truth in this ; that often it happens out , that time wears out the sense or conceit of a thing ; yet , because there are many other things conducing to the preservation and destruction of conceptions besides time , therefore this is not universally true , as he proposeth it , yet should not have been censured by me , but because it seems to conduce to the illustration of what went before , which was an errour not to be swallowed down . sect. . i let pass what is between , and come to the upshot ; [ this decaying sense ( saith he ) when we would expresse the thing it self , ( i mean fancy its selfe ) we call imagination . ] this that he calls decaying sense , i confesse we call imagination , but i have shewed it not to be sense , therefore not decaying sense . [ but ( saith he ) when we would expresse the decay , and signifie that the sense is fading , old and past , we call it memory . ] here are d●vers words , of most distinct nature , hudled together , to confound the reader , ( old and past ) many things are now past , yet not old ; and those past things , although but just now , are remembred , although not old . then , saith he , [ imagination and memory are one thing , which for divers considerations hath divers names : ] i deny that they are the same thing , and prove it thus : sect. . they who have divers acts which cannot be performed by each other , are not the same thing , ( for powers are distinguished by their acts and objects ) but imagination and memory are such ; therefore they are not the same . the major hath its proof and illustration already ; the minor shall be thus confirmed ; first imagination is busied about , and acts things which come not into the reach of memory , as ●oyning two things together , a horse and a man , it makes a centaure ; this presently after he applyes to imagination , which he calls compounded imagination ; now these two , although in their parts they were discerned by sense before , and wrapt up in the memory , yet conjoyned together , having been never in the sense , cannot be in the memory ; unlesse after they were framed by the fancy the sensitive memory , but are the fruits of imagination only ; so likewise we may say , that there are many things in the memory , which are not imagined when they are in the memory , as thus : the memory is like a book , in which those things , which are attentively perceived by sense , are by that attention ingraved or lockt up , as was before exprest , or written in it ; imagination is that internall eye which reads this book , and sometimes reads one word , somtimes another : now as it happens out , that there are many things in the book which the eye sees not , yea , it cannot see all things at once ; so it is in the memory , it is impossible that the fancy should read half those things which are writ in the memory ; many things are there which cannot be looked upon all at once , and , perhaps , sometimes will never be fancied again or imagined , yet are in the memory ; and therefore certainly , where there are so distinct acts and objects , the things themselves are distinguished ; for we never say a man imagineth any thing , of which he hath not an actuall conception ; nor that he remembreth any thing by a sensative memory , of which he hath formerly had no sense ; so that those are as much distinguished , in and by their acts and objects , as any two faculties can be . sect. . what he saith presently after , [ that much memory , or memory of many things , is called experience , ] is not true in those general terms which he proposeth ; for memory of many things maketh not experience , but memory of many things alike ; so that he that shall remember that fire burnt his hand , water washt it ; that this lump of lead felt heavy ; teat bladder of air light , makes not an experimentall conclusion , from such remembrances , of either heat , or weight , or lightnesse ; but when he shall find that this air , and all he meets with , this lead , and many others are such , then he hath experience , and by experience he knows , that it is so with all other ; if he shall reply and produce common language , that we usually say , that we had once experience of such or such a passage ; and therefore one tryal and sense , with remembrance of it , makes an experience . i answer : that experience in a late way of acceptation is so used , for a particular apprehension with remembrance ; but because experience is the mother of knowledge , and one swallow assures us not of a summer , nor doth one conception give us the certainty of any science ; therefore the proper way of taking experience is from the particular knowledge of many individuums of the same nature ; and in that sense he must take it , because else in vain he defined it the memory of many things , and should have rather said , it is the remembrance of any thing : and yet give me leave to interpose my conceit , which is , that experience is not rightly termed memory of one thing , or many , for memory contains many things at quiet in it , which yet are not experiments , until applyed to something else , either in speculation or practice ; so that when we call precedent examples for rules of future practice , we rub up our memories to see what provision is in that storehouse , to furnish us with directions in our businesse at hand ; and when we find things of like nature , these are called experiments . but this being , but a nominal discourse ( as much of that which follow ▪ ) i might have saved ( as i shall do such things ) and have suffered him to beguile any man with it ; for it is not material , whether true or false ; only i have hinted out the commonest way of speaking concerning experiments , and the usefullest ; i skip now to the pag. of the . chap. chap. x. the origine of dreams , their variety , &c. wherein , impertinently i think to his maine purpose in that chap. he entreth into a long discourse of dreams , which , because it seems to squint at other matters besides this in hand , i shall with brevity censure as most unsatisfactory , and very erroneous ; first , then he saith there , [ that because the brain and nerves are so benummed in the sleep , as not easily to be moved by the action of external objects , there can happen in sleep no imagination and therefore no dreams but what proceed from agitation of the inward parts of a mans body . ] sect. . this i conceive erroneous , in that latitude of terms which he useth ; for , no doubt , there are many prophetick dreams , concerning which the scripture , both the old and new testament , are full of instance , as gen. . the butler and baker had prophetick dreams , so likewise gen. . pharaoh had a prophetick dream ; such another you may find dan. . of nebuchadnezzer . in the new testament we may observe in the . chap. of s. mat. v. . how an angel appeared to joseph in a dream : so likewise s. paul , acts . . now these , and many more , which the scripture and story furnish us withall , and we are bound to believe , do shew us , that there are dreams which arise not from the agitation of the inward parts , there being nothing in them that could prognostick any such thing ; and therefore this universal proposition , ( th●re can be no dream but such ) was a fault not to be pardoned : he spake much better in his humane nature , cap. . num. . where he saith , [ that the causes of dreams ( if they be natural ) are the actions or violence of the inward parts . ] that parenthesis ( if they be natural ) stopt a great gap , for these instances were not natural : it was much he should correct the first copy , making it more erroneous ; error it had before , but the rent in his leviathan was made wider then in his first piece of humane nature . sect. . error it had before , it was not true to say , that all natural dreams come from the agitation of the inward parts ; for as the greatest philosopher that was meer man , solomon , expresseth it , eccles. . . a dream cometh through the multitude of businesse , not onely when the inward parts of a man are unquiet and violent , but even then when they are in the best composure ; if a man have his fancy disturbed with earnestnesse of thoughts about any businesse in the day , in the night , when he takes his rest , and both the outward and inward senses are lockt up by sleep , his fancy , being opp●est with the negotiations of the day , will busie its self about them in the night , as is most apparent ; so that i remember , that the first latine verses , which i made , were made in my sleep , my thoughts , having run upon nothing else in the day , busied themselves about them in the night ; and you shall observe , that a dog , used to hunting , barks in his sleep , with the like , earnestness and useth actions of that nature ; so that all natural dreams spring not from the inward parts . sect. . but in his . chap. of humane nature , he offers at some reasons to prove his conclusion , and they are delivered at numb . . under the name of a sign , thus : [ the signes by which this appeareth to be so , are the differences of dreams ( old men commonly dream oftner , and have their dreams more painful then the young ) proceeding from the different accidents of mans body ] thus he ; i conceive this instance mistaken ; god be praised , i have lived to the age of an old man , and i find it other , because i think my thoughts are more composed , and by practice have made my passions less violent , and trouble my self w●● h lesse eagerness of businesse ; but he saith only , old men commonly ; and then i say , this may be a sign , but not a certain one ; yea , in natural things very weak , for the course of nature is constant , and is a sign that that proposition of his , which is universally proposed , is not universally true ; that many times natural dreams may arise from such inward causes , may be granted , because they co-operate with the businesse , or thoughts , or passions , to which that man is inclined ; but most oft they fail , when it is otherwise . what he further disputes there to shew , that such and such constitutions do produce alike effects in the dreams of those persons , i deny not , so it be not universally affirmed ; for we read of some men , who never dreamed ; but in the same numb . pag. . he proceeds to another sign thus , [ another sign that dreams are caused by the actions of the inward parts , is the disorder and casual consequence of one conception , or image to another . ] i grant the conclusion that may be deduced hence , that is , that some dreams may arise hence , but deny the universality ; for fancy not guided by reason , but taking things as , by chance , they offer themselves out of that book of the memory , may be as confused and disorderly , as any disturbance that comes from the inward parts ; yea , that confusion can hardly be conceived to come from the inward parts ; for suppose the predominant humor be melancholy or choler ; these can suggest only such fancies , when , on a sudden , we may observe that dreams alter their conditions , and , sometimes in an instant , change from one fancy to another , which that constant condition of the humor cannot promote ; his instance which he immediately gives , is not perswasive ; thus : for when we are waking , the antecedent thought or conception introduceth and is cause of the consequent ( as the water follows a mans finger upon a dry and level table ) but in dreams there is commonly no coherence . this example seems to me most incongruous to this purpose ; for the understanding of man waking , and his fancy , are imployed and set at work by his will , which often interrupts and crosseth the chaine of consequences , and imployes the reason sometimes to seek out new reasons ; other fingers to draw water to its end ; sometimes commands that finger to stop in the midst of its progress ; and so the finger , imployed other where , is not followed by the water ; but in a dream , if it arise from such a physical cause , as many times it doth , a man may conceive rather why things , as they are linked together in the memory , should follow one another , when one is moved or raised up , because there is no superiour power to controul that consequence . chap. xi . sensitive creatures not intelligent ; their specifick differences ; their sagacity . sect. well , that we may part with a gingle , the rest of his fancies of dreams , and his dreams of fancies , i let pass for the present , guessing that what is material in that discourse , will conveniently be met with hereafter , and now skip to the latter end of the chap. . pag. . where he defines understanding to be that imagination which is raised in every creature by word or voluntary signes . i should have let this passe with the rest ; but that i am unwilling to betray that noble faculty of mans soul , his understanding ( by which he is sever'd from , and exalted above all other sublunary creatures ) to that sordid condition of being onely a sensual quality . that we may the better apprehend this , we will first observe , that these words , and other such signs which are apprehended by things meerly sensual , although the signs are voluntary , such as are imposed by any sign-maker , yet they are perceived to have such signification by those beasts or dogs , and the like , not in a rational or intellectual manner , but a natural ; for custome meerly , which is another nature , and doth the same way facilitate any thing to us as nature doth , is the onely cause of their apprehension of these ; and this custome works onely by these two principles , of a love to that which is profitable for them , and a detestation of that is hurtful , which is nothing but that natural appetite before spoken of ; for when any of these find that by coming at such a word he is rewarded ; by disobeying such a menace , he provokes his own punishment ; he by custom being sensible of this , doth accordingly : nor do any of those words signifie any more to thar beast but his pleasure or pain ; he understands not any simple term what it signifies , but only these two things ; and from these principles they do not only listen to the words , but speak them , as parrots , without any understanding more then their belly , and by that you may have corvos poetas . now here is no understanding in these acts , but almost like a tree , which if you use to keep bent , it will grow such ; so these , being used to the reward or punishment , upon such words , do apprehend them such , and naturally follow or avoid them . but because there are some acts in these beasts which have a nearer affinity with reason then these he specifies , although i have already written somewhat to this purpose , i will , for the further satisfaction of the reader , enlarge my self a little , and so pass on to other things . sect. . as it is with man , who is one kind or species of animals , that he hath , besides that general nature of a sensitive soul , another soul which distinguisheth him from other animals ; so likewise it is with the other species or kinds of animals , they must have some particular soul , or degree of a sensitive soul , which may distinguish them from man , and one from each other ; as the canine or doggish soul distinguisheth a dog from a lion , a beare , a cat , a man. and each of these ( besides that general nature of a sensitve soul , in which they all agree ) must have some particular soul , or substantial difference in that soul , by which each of these is distinguished from the rest : now this , whatsoever it is , ( which i find not named by philosophers ) but whatsoever this is , it must be the author of those actions which belong to each ; and these peculiar fancies , which do appear in some with a great resemblance of wit , of ingenuity ; of docibility , of stupidity and blockishnesse in others ; and this quality , as natural , is propagated throughout the whole kind or species , failing in very few particulars , in some degrees onely . and when the peculiar property of any animal advanceth the condition of it to act like those of men , this in them is called by philosophers ( as i remember ) sagacity , and will appear in divers actions of elephants , dogs , birds , which fill the stories of those who write their lives ; but all these are wrought not by reason , but by that principle of nature , which dictates , eschew evil , and get good , and is directed by the several kinds of sagacity , which in every kind of animals hath some addition to the general condition of a sensitive creature , but attains not the height of understanding ; but because it may be objected here , how can we discern understanding in man , concerning these simple terms , from that of a beast ? i will answer this by experience ; for man understands these simple terms in their proper notion , but a beast onely in general ; i have seen a dog running fiercely at a horse , a woman rebuke him by this word ( out ) which , in its genuine signification , imports go abroad ; and if that word ( out ) had been used to a man , he would have answered , i am out ; but the dog , knowing it onely in generall to be a phrase of rebuke , ceased from his barking , and went his way , although other more menacing words , by other men which were present , prevailed not with him , they being , as it is likely , such words which had not been used in his ordinary correction , did not , yet this which , likely , was the word which had brought him smart , did prevail , to the appeasing him . perhaps some man , not satisfied in this , may instance in some of those famous stories of beasts , which seem to express an apprehension more particular ; but i beleeve , if they were examined , there can be no other further knowledge of simple terms , then this of pleasure and pain to his particular , which may be easily conceived to arise out of that sagacity which is in every kind of animals , in several and distinct wayes . what he adds , that , understanding which is peculiar to man , is the understanding not only his will , ( this should be a parenthesis , and a most unnecessary one ) but his conceptions and thoughts , by the sequele and contexture of the names of things into affirmations and negations . i can agree with him , that this is peculiar to man , and yet as much may be cavil'd against this , as that went before ; and the sagacious actions of many beasts would perswade us as soon , that they make propositions and syllogise , as that they apprehend , understanding the simple terms . notes upon the twelfth chapter of leviathan . chap. . of religion , the feigned gods , ghosts , and the soul of man. having done with his two first chapters , for this present , i will pass over his third , concerning the consequence and traine of imaginations , in which are many things very obnoxious to censure ; his fourth of speech likewise i passe over for the present , and his fifth with his sixth , which is nothing but an exposition of easie terms , which have been better discoursed upon by a hundred several persons ; and i skip to his twelfth , — which begins pag , . and is entituled , of religion , wherein , as in many other places , he is to blame not to expresse what religion is , that so it might appeare how pertinent and reasonable his d●scourse is , which if he had done , he might have spared much which he hath written , or otherwise disposed it . that i may proceed therefore the more confidently , take the definition of religion which is most received , which is : — sect. . that religion is a vertue , by which men give god the worship and honour due to him : and this is the reason why divines do make religion a part of iustice , and handle it as a species or part of it , though an imperfect one ; because justice gives to every one as much as is his due exactly ; but that cannot be done by man to god ; and therefore it is imperfectly a part of iustice ; but yet because in religion we , after our weake and imperfect manner , doe it , therefore it is reckoned among the duties of iustice : we doe by it give god worship and honour ; worship , as the supream ; honour , as the most excellent ; those , who are over us , we worship as our governours , although they have not excellencies to be honoured for ; those which are our inferiours , or equals , if they have excellencies in them , and extraordinary parts , we honour , although not worship them . but these two excellencies of perfection , and supremacy of authority over us , being acknowledged by every religious person to be in god , he renders him both those duties in the highest measure , as in iustice is due to him for them . thus we briefly discern what is the subject he writes of ; let us now consider what he writes of it . . first , he saith rightly , that [ there is no cause to doubt that the seed of religion is onely in man ] for certainly , the seed of religion is the assurance that god is infinitely excellent , and hath the highest , and most unquestionable authority over us by the right of governing us . this apprehension i conceive to be the seed of religion , and this can be in no creature which hath not reason and understanding , as man hath : for , certainly , if they have not understanding to apprehend those divine excellencies , they cannot have religion : and unlesse they have liberum arbitrium ( which without understanding they cannot have ) their actions can be no more pleasing to god then the fire pleaseth him when it burneth . . he labours to give reasons for his conclusion , others then that i have set down with this phrase , first , second ; but look upon them , they are so incomposed and disjoynted , that none of them can produce this conclusion , that only man hath the seed of religion ; but in page . in the beginning he urgeth an argument from the chaine and origination of causes , acknowledged to be of an absolute force for the causation of a god , and so of the apprehension of the object to which our religion is directed . but in all that discourse , let a man consider , whether it be any way pertinent to religion any otherwise , then to shew , there is a god , and to illustrate that saying of his , that fear made the heathen gods. sect. . . he saith [ that feare gives occasion to feigne as many gods , as there are men that feigne them : and for the matter or substance of the invisible agents so fancied , they could not , by natural cogitation , fall upon any other conceit , but that it was the same with the soul of man , and that the soul of man , was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a dreame to a man that sleepeth , or in a looking-glasse to one that is awake : which men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy , think to be reall , and external substances , and therefore call them ghosts , as the latines call them imagines & umbrae , and thought them spirits , that is , thin aeriall bodies ; and those invisible agents , which they feare , to be like them , save that they appear , and vanish , when they please . thus far he . in which period are many strange and forced expressions without any proof , or illustration . i will touch them briefly , but first i must expound that phrase used twice by him , invisible agents ; by that he must understand the false gods of the gentiles , for the first clause , that they conceited those false gods to be of the same nature with the soul of man , i yeeld , onely more excellent ; so was every daemon esteemed , and so even those heroes , which were from humanity , in the esteeme of idolatrous men , exalted to a coelestial excellency , thought of a greater perfection then themselves had in their earthly condition ; and that they had influence , and power over these earthly things , and therefore had prayers and sacrifice offered to them . but then let us consider his philosophy concerning mans soul , he saith , that these idolaters , who thought their gods like mans soul , thought a mans soul was of the same substance with that which appeareth in a dreame , or in a looking-glasse ] i am perswaded he dreamt when he writ this , he did not so much as see it in any glasse in this world ; and although it is too much to say , he never read it in any book , ( for his book will witness , that many unexpected things are in books ) yet i can say , that i never heard or read of any idolater that ever had that absurd opinion concerning the soul. these two things are things of a very little entity , the meanest of accidents , the one a dreame , the work of a sleeping fancie ; the other the apparition of a looking-glasse , the weak effect of a poor accident , colour , in which it produced it self in a most feeble and weake condition . contrariwise , the soul of man is the most excellent and substantial part in the most excellent creature man , the author of all those noble effects which the wit or industry of man can attaine unto ; and all this affirmed by these idolaters in their philosophical books . sect. . but he seems to give a reason for it thus [ which men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancie , think to be reall and external substances ; and therefore call them ghosts , as the latines call them imagines & umbrae ] i cannot conceive to what this relative ( which ) looks , by the preceding words it should be referred to the dreames or image in a looking-glasse , but by the consequent words it seems to look further , to the invisible agents , for no man was ever so foolish to think that dreams , or the image in a looking-glasse , are real substances ; nor yet is it true of one piece of them , which is the image in the looking-glasse , to say it is a creature of the fancy ; for the image is there , whether the fancy conceit it so , or no. but then to take this word , which , as it relates to the invisible agents , which the words following implie [ and therefore call them ghosts ] no man ever called the image in a looking-glasse a ghost : now then in this sense , although a strange perturbed one , he saith , that men not knowing these gods of theirs , those invisible agents to be nothing but creatures of the fancy called them ghosts ; i beleeve , if they had known them to be creatures of the fancy , they would not have so called them ghosts , as the latines call them imagines and umbrae : certainly i am perswaded , that the latines did never call their gods imagines or umbrae . this is a most perplexed discourse , i know not how to make sense of it , nor i beleeve he himself , for mark he goes on , [ and thought them spirits ; that is , thin aerial bodies . ] consider the relative them , what doth he meane by it ? their gods , those invisible agents ? that cannot be for the following words [ and these invisible agents , which they feared to be like them . ] now if by them before he meant these invisible agents , he could not say that they thought them like themselves ; but for the other mentioned before , the dreames or images in a glasse , no man ever thought to be spirits or aerial bodies . but he puts a difference betwixt spirits and ghosts , or imagines , or umbrae , or i know not what [ how that they apaear and vanish when they please ] and it seems the ghosts did not : this i beleeve is not delivered by any , i am confident by none of his enemies , that are studied in schoole and vniversity-learning ; but thus he builds castles in the aire , and i was about to say , fights against them ; but he leaves them upon these weak foundations , and never casts a trench , or plants a battery against them , with any solid argument ; it may be he throwes a stone , an ill word somtimes , but not the least attempt to prove what he sayes , that ever i read . hee proceeds with a discourse , from which i withhold my hand till i come to his treatise of angels , which will administer occasion of fuller censure , and here i will leap over to page . chap. xiii . the opinion of ghosts , ignorance of second causes , devotion to what we feare , taking things casual for prognostiques , mistaken for seeds of religion . of the sybils , and their oracles . in which he sets down foure things , wherein consists the natural seed of religion , opinion of ghosts , ignorance of second causes , devotion towards what we feare , and taking things casual for prognostiques . ] certainly here is a foundation laid for atheisme , sect. . it is impossible that so goodly a tree , as religion , should grow out of such rotten and contemptible seeds as these . first , i observe here , that these , he cals seeds , he puts not for the immediate , but remote causes of religion : the immediate cause ( to consent what i can with his phrase ) or the body of the tree , which supports these glorious acts , is the assurance that there is a god ; these foure seeds ( as he calls them ) do but produce that beleefe in us , and that very weakly , not able to make a man forsake all for god , which religion must do . another observation may be , that he doth not make these conceits of his to be the seeds of false religion only , but even of true ; for so presently he discourseth , that these seeds produced either true or false religion , according to their culture ; so that the culture of abraham , moses , our blessed saviour , was but a husbanding of these seeds ; and therefore these words must needs be taken in that indefinite sense they are exprest , that these are the seeds of all religion . i will consider them apart , and fi●st the opinion of ghosts is a seed of religion . sect. . all the opinion of ghosts , which he expresseth in the former part of this chapter , he makes to be an error ; now for errour to be a s●ed of truth , was never heard of before ; an ill tree cannot bring forth good fruit , nor ill seed a good tree ; errour the greater growth it hath , the greater is the errour , but it never growes into truth . again , in the seventh chapter he makes opinion to be a very weak assurance , as indeed it is , although his description of it is weak in that place , but the assurance that there is a god , is the greatest that may be ; and therefore not to grow out of such a seed . thirdly , consider , that although there can be no assurance of god without an assurance of a ghost or spirit , because god is exprest in scripture to be a spirit , yet the beliefe and assurance of god cannot grow out of the opinion of ghosts ; for although the opinion of ghosts hath many reasonable and probable arguments in nature to induce it , which prevailed with many philosophers to perswade them , that there were such things ; yet the arguments for them are not of like force with those which evince , there is a god ; and therefore the assurance of god may introduce and be a seed of the opinion of ghosts ; but the opinion of ghosts , which is lesse certain , and lesse evident , cannot introduce it . he brings no manner of proof for what he speakes , and in his catalogue of those deities which this opinion should produce , pag . he nameth chaos , ocean , planets , men , women , and other things which have no likeness with ghosts or spirits , although his daemons and some others have . now although the opinion of spirits may perswade a religion towards those things which were thought spirits ; yet it could never invite , but would crosse and oppose those , religions which were paid to corporeall things ; for by all men , who have writ of spirits , both christian , and others , spirits are thought to have a more god like power in them then bodies ; and therefore the opinion of them could not introduce the other . sect. . his second seed is ignorance of second causes , a most unhappy and unreasonable speech . ignorance the mother of religion ; ignorance of second causes cannot make a man acknowledge the first , rom. . . s. paul saith , the invisible things of him ( that is , of god ) from the creation of the world , are clearly seen , being understood by the things that are made , even his eternal power and godhead . this understanding of eternal power and godhead is the foundation and ground of religion , and this was visible , although not in its self , yet in the things that are made , the second causes ; so that not the ignorance , but the knowledge of the second causes , like iacobs ladder , leads , us from one to another , step by step , until we ascend to the highest and first cause . this he himself acknowledgeth before ; but as he often doth , so he now forgot what he had said . ignorance of second causes that they are second , and mistaking them for first may make a man think them gods , and so turne a religion to them ; but , as may appear at the bottome of the preceding page . he understands the ignorance of the causation of second causes , which , without doubt , is so farre from bringing in religion , that it is apt to produce atheism , and an opinion , that the world is governed by chance ▪ not by providence : so that , as for his first , i deny it to be a seed of religion , that is , the opinion of ghosts ; so for this second , the ignorance of second causes , i affirm that is an enemy to religion , stopping the soul from ascending up to heaven , by breaking the lowest step of that ladder which is fixed on earth . sect. . his third seed is devotion towards what we fear . that feare , timor reverentialis , may be a seed , the fomenter and cherisher of religion , yea an act of religion , i do not doubt : but that that ugly sordid feare , which he speaks of , as appeares in the bottom of page . is not to be imagined ; for the first feare ariseth out of the knowledge and apprehension we have of the excellency of god ; but this second feare , he speaks of , out of ignorance of causes . ( because men know there are causes ( saith he ) of every thing , but know not those causes , therefore they impute their good or evill fortune to some invisible agent , ) this ignorance o● causes must needs be understood of second causes ; for ignorance of the first cause can never make a man worship the first , nor impute the production of things to him ; it is true , the ignorance of some attributes , as his goodness , may make a maniche think there is an ill god ; and the same ignorance may produce almost as ill an opinion in others , that god is the author of the evil of sin ; the one , not apprehending his internal goodness , conceives god evil in himself : the other , not apprehending his goodness in operation , his benignity makes him do and produce that is ill ; but the ignorance of him , as a first cause , can never introduce a religion to him ; but then take this ignorance of causes to be the ignorance of the causation of second causes , we cannot conceive how that should breed a fear of an invisible agent , as he terms it , unless it be that god fortune , which the poet derideth : te facimus fortuna deum ; coeloque locamus . and worthily ; for there can be nothing more contradictory then the providence of god , and the blindness of fortune : now when men cannot find the chain of causes , which produce the effects they discerned , and cannot perceive how they depend upon the first cause , as they cannot who discern not the second , they must needs have that doubt or fear , that they are acted by fortune , and all things fall alike to all , without either being rewards or punishments , rods or scourges , &c. and therefore is so far from introducing of religion , as it leads to atheisme . but it is not said , that this fear , but the devotion to what we feare , is the seed of religion ; i could have wished that among other his expositions of words , he had put down what he means by devotion , but he hath not : consider then , the sense of it is , voto decernere , to decree a thing to another , by a vow ; so that when one devotes a thing to another , he then decrees it in a sacred manner to be his . now then devotion to what we feare , is decreeing some thing to it by way of vow ; devotion then to what we feare , if that we feare be god , is not a seed , but a fruit and act of religion ; for religion is not only , as he , not vainly onely , but wickedly , and prophanely , defines chap. . page . ( feare of power invisible feigned by the mind , or imagined from tales publikely allowed , ) but it is the worship due to god , and this worship is , when it is , as it ought to be , accompanied and attended with reverential feare and awe of that infinite excellency ; and this makes us devote our selves in all holy waies to his service ; but if these things , we feare , be lesse then god , although we may devote our selves , or any thing is ours , to them , it is not religion , nor in any way doth it introduce religion . so that if the thing , we feare , have in it the estimation of divine excellency , devotion to it is an act of religion , not a seed ; if it have not that estimation , it is an act of some reverence , or other habit , but no way a seed of religion , for a seed precedes the fruit , and introduceth it , which this doth not . sect. . his fourth and last seed is taking things casual for prognostiques . in all these , according to his scornfull derision , rather then definition of religion , he makes ●he seeds of it nothing but errour and folly ; no wonder that the tree should be so weak and rotten , when the very seeds are corrupted . this seed he applies page . only to the religion of the gentiles , although in general , with the rest , it was uttered of all religion , and so exprest as i have shewed : indeed if he should speak it of the true religion , it were most impiously wicked , and would imply , that the very prophecies in the old and new testament ( which were a true and reall seed of religion ) were but casual things , and not fore-seen by god , and revealed to his prophets ; but i wil take him in the best sense that he can be taken , that the taking things casual for prognostiques , were a seed of those false religions , and then i say first for the oracles , men did not therefore beleeve that there were gods , and so worship them , because of their oraculous sentences ; but because of their beliefe , that these were gods , they were confident that they spake truth , and so expounded them according to the event , whatsoever it was . for the sibyls i might say the like ( if they were such as the other ) and although he imagined these but feigned , whose copies we have , yet , that there were such , is evident in story , and that they prophecied such things as could be applyed to none but our saviour , which were not to be interpreted casual events , but prognostiques real ; and although the beliefe in them , for a great while , was a fruit of religion , for because men believed they were prophetesses , and inspired by god , therefore they beleeved what they said ; yet afterwards , as it haps in trees , so did it with their prophesies , that , which was the fruit of one , was the seed of another ; so these prophesies , which were a fruit of religion , before were a seed of religion in planting the christian church , and often made use of by the fathers an argument against the idolatrous world , to perswade them to christianity ; but it was not , as he speakes , a taking casual things for prognostiques . for the other things , he there reckons up , i guess them , for the most part , unhappy illusions , and the fruit of superstition , not the seeds of religion ; or else mistakes of second causes , which in no sense conduce to religion , as horoscopy , presages , and the like . chap. xiv . what the seed of religion . concerning the chaine of causes . what of god to be known . of finite and infinite . the first mover . the sound doctrine of eternity , &c. sect. . certainly the sole immediate seed of religion , is the assurance that there is a god of an infinite excellency governing all the world ; for therefore men perform religion to him ; but that which propagates this naturally , is first without doubt an innate principle , born in , and with a man , which naturally every man hath as soon as he hath reason ; and there never was nation , or society of men , found in the world , which denied it . it is true , there may be now and then , by the suggestions of the devill , a man found , that with malicious reason hath laboured to diswade this principle ; but that is not material ; there are errours and monsters in the morall part of man , as well as in his natural : this gentleman , who hath by nature the sight of colours , and ability to discern them , yet hath studied reasons to make men beleeve he sees none . there is nothing so abhorring to reason that malicious reason doth not oppose ; but such a truth as this , quod ubique semper , et ab omnibus , hath been held , cannot be other then natural ; and whereas he can shew one man breaking this rule , i can shew him a hundred that have no use of reason at all , and a thousand that have lost it ; so that as such a man , as he , is a rarer sight then those ; so he may well be reckoned amongst the worst of fooles and mad-men ; and therefore the psalmist , psal. . . saith , the fool hath said in his heart , there is no god ; and he himself in this chapter , pag. . affirmes , that an opinion of a diety and powers invisible , and supernatural , can never be abolished out of humane nature , but that new religions may be made to spring out of them : so that this seed is so naturally and firmly rooted in mans heart , that it cannot be extirpated by any thing , that doth not likewise with it extirpate reason . sect. . but because although this is natural , yet some men , by the wickednesse of malicious reason , have endeavoured to wither it , therefore other children of nature have endeavoured to cherish this root by watering it with the strength of invincible reasons , drawne from the chaine of causes , which suppose a seed or a tree first , and that first to be created , not generated ; for if generated , then it requires a preceding tree , or seed , and then that was not first ; and so in all the effects in the world . but these men pretend an eternity in the world , and so , in the propagation and causation of natural things , that there may be an infinity of these causations from one to another , which is almost impossible to be conceived ; for then there should be an infinite number of causes , which cannot be , for then robert , who is now born , should have no more paternities or precedings in causes then adam had ; for if there should be an infinite number of causes preceding adam , then there can be no addition to it ; for what can receive addition , is not infinite , it hath a bound to it , and then all the causations from adam to robert are nothing ; for if you should imagine in these five or six thousand yeares there may have been so many hundred generations more then were before , i can answer no , the other was infinite ; for should you fill this sheet with ciphers , and head them with the figure of one , i can make all these ciphers nines , and the figure of one nine , and make nine millions of such sheets ; and yet all this , in respect of eternity , will be not so much as one unite to all this ; and six or seaven hundred thousand were nothing being added ; because whatsoever you adde to roberts number of fathers , i can adde a thousand times as many to adams ; and therefore nature , that abhors impossibilities , abhors likewise infinites of numbers , and , by consequence , of causations eternally ; for a man to say , this eternity is à parte ante , and not à parte post , is a contradiction ; for although there may be some imagination of a thing , which , having a beginning , may have no end , but exist eternally , because it may be created with eternal principles , and the number infinite is not presently existing , nor ever shall be ; for whensoever you reckon , you shall have a finite time to reckon from , although it were ten thousand millions of yeares hence , or whensoever ; yet there can be nothing , without a beginning , eternal à parte ante , but must needs have eternal principles , which no time can corrupt , for if time could corrupt it , as suppose ten thousand yeares , or a thousand times so many , fix any time , it had been corrupted before this , or else it was not eternal à parte ante . and then to the second part , such a person , he hath actually an infinite number of causes , which cannot be ; and therefore these things must be created in some certaine time : these , and many more arguments , out of metaphysiques , as that which the philosophers call essential subordination of causes , as likewise many others , are such as of which i may say , that they render the proposition , there is a god , evidently to be discerned by the creatures , but , as aegidius romanus excellently speaks , sapientibus , this evidence is perceiveable only by wise men ; from the disquisition whereof they are not to be scared by the infinity of gods essence , because inaccessible to a finite inquirer , as he plainly asserts it in his element of philosophy , &c. whither i will make a transition , to inlarge this discourse , and cleare what i have writ from somewhat i find there opposite to my purpose . sect. . in his said book of philosophy de corpore , cap. . pag. . having proposed divers questions about the world , he concludes at the bottome of that pag. and the beginning of the next , et haec omnia ab eo qui philosophiam complecti profiteretur universam determinanda essent , si quantum quaerit , tantum sciri potest , est autem infiniti scientia finito quaesitori inaccessibilis . thus far he ; and not without reason , no finite understanding can grasp that which is infinite ; yet , although we cannot perfectly know that which is infinite , we may know many things of it . mr. hobbes himself , i dare say , doth not know the essence of the sun , yet there is not the meanest person , which follows the plough , but knowes there is a sun , and many effects of the sun , that he doth send forth light , and heat , by which the poor man is comforted . mr. hobbes his argument , therefore , because finite things cannot know god as he is , we must know nothing of him , is weake . he proceeds . sect. . whatsoever we men know , we have learned from our phantasm ; but there is no phantasm of that which is either infinite in magnitude , or time , neque enim homo , saith he , neiiher man , nor any thing that is not infinite , can have any conceipt of that which is infinite . ) he said true in affirming , that what we know , we have learned from our phantasm ; so although the soul of man have many things in it which have no being in the world , as chimera's , utopia's , leviathans , and our phantasmes are properly of things in the world ; yet those things which are in the understanding , and not in the world , are learned from those phantasmes , which are of things in the world ; as thus , that man who cannot behold the sun in his own glory , and lustre , yet seeing him behinde a thin cloud , can learn from thence , that the sun , who shines so glorious , vailed , and hid from eyes by such a dark body , would have a strange high degree of resplendent lustre , if we could see him as he is : so we learn from phantasmes apparent , as the apostle speaks , from visible things , to collect many apprehensions of that which is of its self invisible , and not to be perceived ; and , having reduced one conclusion , may collect from thence many more ; and men desirous to know god ( as he , who desires knowledge , doth ) will make such collections . the prophet david there , in a most heavenly invective , calls them not onely fools , but beastly people , who do not so collect , psal. . . understand ye brutish among the people : and ye fools , when will ye be wise ? mark ; they were foolish , and brutish , because they did not make such collections . he that planted the ear , shall he not hear , and he that formed the eye , shall he not see ? thus from one truth men may , and ought to enlarge their talent to another , and learn , as mr. hobbes expresseth , from phantasmes . but i like not so well what mr. hobbes adds ; that there is no phantasme of that whch is infinite ; nor , what he further expresseth ; neither man , nor any thing , that is not infinite , can have any conceipt of that which is infinite : to understand which i shall take a little pains to explain the conceipt of finite and infinite , sect. . finite is the same to have bounds or limits , beyond which it cannot passe ; infinite is that which hath no bounds nor limits ; and although , concerning these terms , in the first sounding , a man would think that infinite should express a meere negation , as finite an affirmation ; yet upon judgment of these things , expressed by these termes , we shall find the cleane contrary ; for by finite we understand non ultra , as much as hitherto , and no farther ; but by infinite we apprehend such a vastness , to which we can alwaies say ultra , that there is further , there is somewhat beyond , and there must be something more . and out of this regard , finite things must have a cause of their finite nature , because whatsoever is bounded , is bounded by somewhat , but infinite can have no cause , because unbounded or limited . these bounds or limits we may consider in three things ; in the essence of things , in their quantities , and in their qualities : in their essence , and so we consider all finite things to be this , and no other ; as a tree is a tree , and not a beast or bird , nor another tree ; the being of it is bounded , and limited by that difference which constituted it either in its specifical , or particular being ; and whatsoever is the cause of that being , is that which limits that thing , and makes it thus finite in being . but that which is infinite in essence hath no bounds , no limits of that being ; it is all essence , without limitation , and , in a most eminent manner , comprehends all being , without any negation . it is true , it is not finite , and therefore it is not a man , a horse , a dog , a tree , all which names doe import a restraint and confinement ; but is the perfection of all these , so that no perfection of any thing can be denied of that which is infinite essentially , to say that this infinite is not that ; let us conceive a line infinite ; imagine such a thing ; this line you cannot say it is a span , a foot , a yard , or mile long , yet it contains in it all these measures , without their limitation ; so doth an infinite being containe all beings without confinement , in a more excellent and eminent manner . what i have spoken concerning that which is infinite in essence , or being , may be applied to all other infinites in immensity , in quantity ; what is immense must be beyond all bounds of quantity ; it must have no limits , but contains eminently all quantities in it : so must number be likewise , if there be any such , which i shall disprove ( god willing ) hereafter : so must , in respect of duration , eternity be ; it must comprehend all durations , and its self be without beginning and end ; so must all infinites , in respect of quality , be , in regard of wisdome , of mercy , of power , comprehend all those acts of those qualities , which are in that which is finite , and themselves be without all bounds and limits . h●v●ng thus explained what is meant by infinitie , let us return to that which occasioned this discourse [ neither man nor any thing which is not infinite ( saith he ) can have any conceipt of that which is infinite ] ( conceptionem ullam ) is his phrase . sect. . this i disprove ; for although a mans understanding is finite , and cannot grasp , or fully comprehend that which is infinite ; yet it can lay hold on it , and apprehend , though not comprehend it ; although it cannot inclose the whole being of that is infinite ; yet he can discover that it is incomprehensible , and that discovery will give him some conceit of that infiniteness ; yea the very knowledge of finite things will yeeld him some conceit of that is infinite : so he , who travelleth in an enclosed country , can sever those hedges from his fancy , and can conceit what that country would be , if those hedges and bounds were removed ; although he do not see them so removed ; yet he can conceive what manner of country that would be , if they were removed . men may conceive that which neither is , nor ever was in the world , as an empty place , against which he hath disputed in his natural philosophy ( although many learned are of opinion against him ) and therefore had a conceipt of it . men may , and learned men have expressed their opinions to be of an infinite thing which is not , that is , of an infinite vacuity beyond the heavens , which give bounds to this visible world , & therefore have a conceipt of that infinite which they dispute for ; men have had a conceit , and , methinks , he is not far from it , that this world hath had an eternal being ; and therefore they had a conceit of this we call eternity , which is an infinite duration ; men have a conceit of infinity of number ; and therefore somewhere , in his book of philosophy ( i have forgot where ) he most ingeniously expresseth it , that if a mans hand were as active as his head ( or to this purpose ) he might divide any quantity into infinite parts : his head then is able to doe it , and then he must needs have a conceit of his own work ; he spake therefore too much when he said , no finite thing could have any conceit of that is infinite ; a conceit it may have , but an imperfect one ; and so i goe on with him . sect. . [ neque si quis ab effectu quocunque ] neither ( saith he ) if a man from any effect to its immediate cause , and from thence to his more remote , and so continually , shall ascend by a most right reasoning ; yet he cannot proceed to that which is eternall , but , being tyred , shall flag , at the last , and be ignorant whether he can go further or no ] thus far he , an ingenuous and handsome expression , i confess ; but how true , will be examined . and first , i hope mr. hobbes will not say , he is the wisest man that ever was in the world ; or that he only found out right reasoning ( and yet he speaks somewhat like this now and then ) but , howsoever , because i write not onely to him , but to other men , and , i hope , he harh not gained an universal esteem of such with the generality , i thus answer ; there was never any sort of reasoning men who denyed an eternity ; for whether they held the world had a beginning , or no beginning , which all did , and must doe ; those which held it had no beginning ( as aristotle , in my judgement ) held the world eternall ; those which held it had a beginning from water , as thales ; or ayre , as anaximenes ; or fire , as heraclitus ; or from atomes , as democritus , by chance meeting together in the great and infinite vacuum ; not to lose time in confuting all , or any of these , which are most absurd , ( yet all these , that held it was principiated by these meanes , held likewise that that principle was eternall ; so likewise plato his ideas and chaos were eternall . ) let us from the fact consider the manner in one or two instances . if , with democritus , we make the world constituted by atomes , when we resolve these mixed bodies into their principles , we come to their elements , then , with democritus , those elements may be resolved into their atomes ; by aristotle into their principles , matter , forme and privation ; these atomes , according to democritus , are eternall ; that matter , according to aristotle ; so here is an eternity found ; so likewise may be said of aire , water , which are by some imagined to be the principles ; or chaos , and ideas ; if any man can imagine any thing further , that these had a beginning , and were not eternall , his judgement can fly to none but an eternal god ; so that still there is , by the ratiocination of man , found out something that is eternal . when he said [ that by the ascending from the immediate cause to the more remote , a man would lose himself ] it was most ingenious , and had a truth with it ( which perhaps will be farther examined hereafter ) if it had been applyed to efficient causes ; as out of what egge this hen was hatched , and what hen layd this egge , &c. but when we resolve things into their constitutive causes , which make their natures that which they are , then the work will be short as is shewed , and the result easie ; man need not lose himself in the inquest . what he saith , [ that a man tyred in the search will be ignorant whether he can go further or no ] is not so boldly , as finely affirmed by him ; for certainly , although a man be weary in his journey ; yet he can discern whether he can go further or no. sect. . he proceeds , and i [ n●que absurdi sequitur quicquam ] neither , saith he , would any absurdity follow , whether the world be finite or infinite , since , whatsoever the workman should determine , all those things which we now see , would be seene . ] i will not meddle with what concernes not my present business , but remit the madness of the worlds infinity in magnitude , as not pertinent to my purpose , and apply my self to that which is in his following words about eternity . sect. . [ preterea etsi ex eo quod nihil potest movere seipsum . [ moreover ( saith he ) although out of this , that nothing can move it self , may be right enough inferred , that there is some first moving thing , which shall be eternall ; yet that cannot be inferred thence which men doe use to inferre , to wit , an eternal immoveable , but , contrariwise , an eternall thing moved ; for , as it is true , that nothing is moved of its self , so it is true likewise , that nothing is moved but from a thing moved . ) he is a most unhappy man in his way of reasoning , this contradicts w●at went before ; for , if from that conclusion , which he holds true , nothing can move its self , may be deduced a first mover which is eternall , it necessarily follows , that men , ascending from effects to immediate causes , thence to others , may arrive at that which is eternall , which was denyed not six lines before , and hath been confuted by me . againe , observe that that inference , which he censures , must be true , and his inference false ; for , if there be a first mover , and every thing moved is moved by another , then that which moves must it self be unmoved ; for if it move , then that was not the first mover , but rather that other thing which moved , that he said was the first moveable ; for a first can have nothing before it ; but that moveable , according to his philosophy , must have another moved thing which moves it ; and for the two propositions , out of which he draws his inference , he saith they are alike true ; i , that they are a like false ; that which saith , nothing moves its self ; for the nature of every thing , as aristotle defines it , is the principle of motion and rest of each natural body , that is , the natural motion and rest , and therefore moves every natural body naturally . and therefore the other proposition is like false , which saith , that every thing which is moved , is moved by something which is moved it self , which can be affirmed of none but violent motions , they are forced by something without , but neither natural , nor animal motions . and this philosophy he might have known to have been delivered by many of his friends , the schoolemen , who disavow aristotle in that argument . i will leave his discourse in the middle , which is a proud contempt of such as labour to prove the beginning of the world , and close with him again towards the latter end of . pag. where he endeavours to answer an argument somwhat like that which i urge , but how weakly , let the reader judge . the argument it self is not so strong as mine , and shall together be both examined . sect. . he begins thus , [ quis enim hoc modo demonstrantem laudet . ] who , saith he , will praise a man after this manner demonstrating : if the world be eternal , then the number of dayes ( or any other measure of time ) infinite hath preceded the birth of abraham ; but the nativity of abraham preceded the nativity of isaac ; therefore one infinite , or one eternity , should be greater then another , which is absurd , ] thus farre he . consider first the affinity this argument hath with mine in the place to which this should be inserted ; his argument is drawne from the number of dayes , mine of paternity , which overthrows one of his answers at the first view , as will appear in its place . but that wh●ch he seems to apply his strength against is that axiom , one infinite cannot be greater then another ; this is used concerning infinite in number ; the reason of this is , because whatsoever is infinite , is boundlesse , it cannot be out-gone , but its self out-goes every thing of its kind ; now what is greater then another containes that , and exceeds it ; so foure exceeds three , and therefore gives it bounds ; a hundred , and every number is bounded , it is not . and one , it is bounded in its self ; and therefore every number hath its internal bounds , and , if it be exceeded , it hath external bounds , minimum quod non , as his friends the schooles speak , so well as maximum quod sic ; it hath the least terme of that it cannot extend to , as the greatest it can exist in . sect. . well , let us consider his answer [ similis demonstratio est , ] it is a like demonstration ( saith he ) as if he from thence , that there is an infinite number of equall numbers ; therefore he should conclude that that there were so many equal numbers as there are numbers equal and unequal together taken . ] i find a mighty errour run through his whole work , which doth not become a mathematician , & is evident in this answer , that he disputes ex non concessis , his answer is drawn from a supposal , that there is an infinite number of equal numbers , which is false ; there is no infinite of either equal or unequal numbers ; for suppose the world made of atomes with democritus ( although they are called infinite , because mans eye cannot discern them , nor his wit apprehend them ) yet they , being bodies that have dimensions , must have a finite nature ; and therefore a certain number of them must goe to the constituting another bigger body , suppose a million to make a barly corne , what number you will , yet it is a number , and that number may be reckoned by unities , every one for a million , and so every million of millions may afterwards be reckoned by unities , as one may goe for a million or millions , and a million of sheets , or papers , may be filled by these , or more greater numbers may be united ; yet they are , and will be a certain number of them , and the things of this world are made in number by god almighty , aswell as measure and weight , as the son of sirak , wisdom , . . well then : there is no infinite number ; he answers from an impossible supposal ; but now hence doth he inferre . if i should grant there were an infinite number of equall numbers , then that should be equal to all numbers , even equall and unequall ; yes , it must , for there cannot be an infinite number of unities but must be equall to infinite twoes , threes , twenties , hundreds ; for 〈◊〉 which is infinite hath no bounds , if it had not infinite twenties , infinite millions , indeed infinite infinites , it had some bounds , it is not infinite , whatsoever by any reckonings , even by myriads , can be bounded , is not infinite , can be exceeded ; therefore it is absurd to say , the world was infinite in duration , for if we conceive it infinite , as i argue , there must be as many paternities of adam , as of robert , and all that number of paternities betwixt adam and robert are no addition . a drop in the sea is an addition , because the sea is bounded and finite , but if it were infinite , there could be no addition to it . the greatest number , that is , may have addition , because it is finite , but what is infinite can have none . nature therefore , which abhorres these impossibilities , allows no infinite being in the world , or to this world ; but now consider his answer once againe , you shall find the similitude , he answers , cleane contrary to my argument , and the argument opposed by himself . he sayes , because there is an infinite number of even numbers , therefore that should be equal . i dispute cleane contrary , because an infinite number of even numbers cannot be equall to even and odde , which it must if it be infinite ; therefore there is no infinite number of even numbers , twenty must be more then three , and infinite threes , if there were any such , must be infinite twenties . likewise , i think i have said enough to this answer , i will now examine his other . sect. . he proceeds in the last line of that page , and the beginning of page . [ nonne qui eternitatem mundi sic tollant . doe not ( saith he ) who so take away the eternity of the world , with ●he same work , take eternity from the builder of this world. ] no , say i , by my argument drawn from the certaine number of paternities , there is no colour for that mistake ; for i , with st. luke , . and the last , fix all paternities in god , and make him the father of adam , beyond which there is no reckoning . but howsoever my argument is quit of his answer , yet he , although he argue weakly against himself , answers as weakly , for the argument no way can be applyed to god the maker of the world , not his own argument . i will therefore , as neare as i can , draw out the force of his argument ; for at the first blush it appeares not . the maker of the world is eternal , that is , infinite in duration , and therefore infinite of dayes may be attributed to him ; therefore he cannot have more dayes added to him , for if no infinite can be longer then another , then he , that had an infinite duration in the dayes of abraham , could have no addition in the life of isaac ; so that the denyal of an imparity of infinite numbers , denyes likewise , by consequence , the infinite of god. for satisfaction to this , conceive that god is eternal , which is to be without beginning or end , the beginning and end of all creatures , but he is without either ; that in eternity there is neither prius nor posterius , before or after ; for where there is no alteration , but the thing exists the same for ever , there can be nothing before or after , for these termes require two things to be applyed to , either this and another , or this differing from its self ; but in that eternity , before the making of the world , there was nothing besides god , and he without change , so that there could be no use of those relatives before or after ; and this philosophy must be true of whatsoever is eternally existing alone . so plato concerning his eternal ideas , before they were incorporated with chaos ; so democritus must think of his eternal atomes , before that good luck , which brought them together had , compacted them into those bodies which they made . now although this , which is eternal , have no before , or after appliable to him existing in himself ; yet when he hath made creatures , then coexisting with them , and in relation to them , these phrases may be applyed , as before this man , this thing ; before a day , a yeare , or the like ; for such relations may then be had to other things , though none in himself , or to himself ; now , because of this , no duration of time , no aera , no computation can be applyed to god , before the world , to say he was a day or yeare , or so , by such time as we make our computations , or can tell how to make any ; but it is true to say , he was before the world , which signifies no more but to say , he was , and the world was not ; but to say , he was a day , a moneth , or yeare , or the like , is not true , nor to be imagined ; for time its self ( and therefore the parts of it ) is the measure of duration , in regard of its priority or posteriority ; so a year hath divers moneths , weeks ; those , dayes ; and they , houres , distinguished by the first , second , &c. now where is not this priority or posteriority , there can be no imagination of time ; so that , for my part , i am of opinion that these , who hold the whole world to be eternal , must not , cannot reckon the duration of the world ( because the whole being must be altogether ) to say that it lasts yeares , dayes , or so forth , for it must be immutable in its self , although the parts of it are mutable and subject to change , and they may be reckoned by these times , or part of them , according to which they exist ; and this world , in the bulk coexisting with its mutable parts , may , in relation to them , be said to be before or after them ; but now the case is otherwise with god , who was when there was no world , nor any mutable thing , and then could have none of those relations , which concerne them , attributed to him ; for when there is no yeare , day , houre , how can he be said , to endure and last those times ? nay , although we should fancy such a thing which is not , as a day , or houre , before this mutable world , yet we cannot apply it to him who hath no succession in him , when he hath no successive thing coexisting with him ; as concerning his immensity , he having no quantity , we can say he coexists with these quantitative things that are in the world ; but he being such that neither the heaven , nor heaven of heavens can contain , he must exist without them , and there he cannot be said to exist with any quantity or measure ; and to say , gods being was a day a year , &c. before the world , when there was no time , were as improper as to say , he were a yard long , or a mile , where there was no continued quantity , or body for him to subsist with . sect. . by eternity we conceive either the internal duration of god , or an external measure of that duration , as time is to the duration of successive things ; in the first , he being subject to no change nor alteration , no composition or commixtion , we can make no division in it of houres , or dayes , in his eternity , because there is no parts of it subject to any change ; for the second , if you conceive eternity to be an outward measure , a real measure you cannot , ( for there was no real thing without him ) you must make it then only imaginary , in the apprehension of men , what can that be ! first then , there was no man to imagine it ; secondly , if a mans present imagination work upon it , it must make the measure even to the thing measured , without beginning , without end , altogether without succession , and then th●nk if there can be day , yeare , olympiad , eclipse , aera , epocha , any thing that is used for computation of time , found in it ; certainly no mans imagination , i think , can apply any such thing to an eternall being , and therefore not dayes . sect. . this doctrine is most agreeing to the scriptures ( which teacheth the truest philosophy ) for the scripture makes him to be the creatour of the world ; if so , then before the world ; then eternall ; then these durations , which are measures of our worldly things , cannot be affirmed of him , nor time , nor parts of it , which are onely measures proportioned to those things of this world , which are successive . i need not name the places , but there are many of scripture which expresse this eternal being of god , so psal. . . before the mountains were brought forth , or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world , even from everlasting to everlasting thou art god ; here , in this one place , is all the philosophy i have delivered of gods eternity ; here is contained his eternal being , when the world was not , in that is said before . &c. when they were not , he was . secondly , here is expressed the totall being of the eternal together , in that is said , thou art god from everlasting to everlasting , not thou wert , or wilt be , only , but before them thou art ; and here is expressed likewise , that , in respect of other things , the creatures , he may be said to have these relations before and after , though not in relation to himself ; but yet no set terme , as to say , a day , or two dayes , or years , before . i am confident there is no one place of scripture which expresseth any certaine measures of duration belonging to him . i know it may be objected to this , that in the epistle to the hebrews , chap. . vers . , , . the apostle , speaking of the eternity of our saviour , according to his divinity , saith ; thou lord in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth , and the heavens are the works of thy hands . verse . . they shall perish , but thou remainest , and they all shall wax old as doth a garment . verse . and like a vesture shalt thou fold them up , and they shall be changed ; but thou art the same , and thy yeares shall not faile . in this place the eternity of christs divinity is called yeares ; and therefore those measures of our times must be applied to that eternity , and then dayes may , of which years are composed . to this we may most reasonably answer , that the apostle accommodates his manner of language to the capacity of the vulgar , and the language of men , concerning durations , so well as actions ; so before he said , the heavens were the works of gods hands , as if he had said , because all great works are wrought by hands amongst men , god had hands , by which he wrought those heavens , so , thy yeares shall not faile ; that is , thou art eternal , because men reckon their duration by yeares ; and yet observe the language , it is said , they are indeficient yeares , yeares which faile not , all our yeares , faile , the last yeare is gone , this farre in going , and untill the end of the world , mans yeares , the worlds yeares , and their durations will faile ; but gods yeares , no part of his duration , reckon it what you will , shall faile . this is the sense of the scriptures , and men cannot , without a contradiction , expound it of our time , every part of which is deficient ; thus the philosophy i have delivered being framed according to scripture , i shall answer his argument . the dayes , which may be attributed to god , and the measures of our time , can onely be in regard of his coexisting with time in this world , and therefore he doth not , nor can be said to be of more dayes , then the world hath ; for he , who affirms he hath more dayes , or any such computation , affirmes a falshood ; there were not more dayes , therefore not a coexisting with them ; and therefore he had more dayes when isaac was born , then when abraham ; but in neither of them had he an infinite number , but finite numbers of dayes ; nor doth the world yeeld more ; his durance is without number of weeks , or dayes , what successive thing soever we accompt by ; and therefore that argument , against the worlds eternity , hath no force , applied to god. sect. . i proceed with him , ita ab hoc absurdo , &c. [ therefore ( saith he ) from this absurd thing they fall into another , being constrained to say , that eternity is a standing instant and an infinite number of numbers is an unity , which is much more absurd . ] there are two parts in this objection , the first concernes the nunc stans , or permanent instant ; the second of innumerable numbers , &c. for perspicuity i take them apart , and handle them distinctly . and first for his absurdity that he conceives to be in a standing instant ; if it doe not stand still , and when it doth not , it is no longer nunc , or an instant , but time , or at the least two parts of time , but instant it is not ; now , certainly , that which hath no mutation cannot choose but perpetually , eternally , stand still ; and that , which to mutable things would be time , to him must be instant . i can shew him one instant that stood still neare two thousand yeares of time ; and therefore , if time could be infinite , would last eternally , which is iohn . . when the iewes wondred that our saviour should have seen abraham , he answered , before abraham was ( not i was , but ) i am . there is a difference in exposition , some say that this speech is understood of his humanity , that his humanity was in the thoughts of god , and his decree , before abraham ; but this cannot be the sense ; for christ being the son and posterity of abraham , even in the knowledge and decree of god , as well as in his birth in the world , therefore it could not be spoke of his humanity , that it was in the decree of god before abraham , for abraham , in the same decree , must be before christs humanity , as the father of him : but suppose it were , let me enquire , was that being , which christ had then in the knowledge or being of god before abraham , was that being existing when he spake these words , or no ? if no , then he could not say i am , but i was ; if so , it proves my conclusion , that there was a nunc stans , a standing instant neare two thousand years . but i am well satisfied , that that speech , of his , was meant of his divinity which is eternally the same , and was before abraham , when abraham was ; and after him , he being that which is , which was , and is to come , revelation . . and certainly there must needs be the same reason , that that instant must be eternall , as that it should stand still so long as before abraham to our saviour . but his words , presently after , seeme to make another reason of the absurdity in nunc stans , thus . sect. . [ cur enim eternitas ] why ( saith he ) should eternity be called nunc stans , now standing , rather then tunc , then standing ; there must therefore be either many eternities , or now and then must signifie the same ) thus he for answer ; this terme stans or standing , is indifferent to time passed or to come , when applyed to either positively ; but if either doth imply a negative of that is present , in that second consideration it no way agrees to eternity which is alwaies present ; but in the first sense , because eternity comprehends all time , when it is spoke of any thing done or being in time , as that isaac was borne , or antichrist shall be , this was , or shall be done , may be in eternity , which coexists with these times ; so , before abraham was , i am ; and who is , was , and shall be , are spoke of him ; and then , when abraham was , he was , without the negative of was , that is , denying it to be now ; then when antichrist will be , he will be , without any implyed neg. that he is not now ; and so comes in the second part of this objection , that now and then are all one ; for answer ; although now standing and then standing , if applyed to eternity , signifie the same thing , and we conceive , by both of them , an eternal immutable being ; yet now , and then , alone do signifie divers things ; old abraham , and young abraham , signifie the same person , but old and young are divers . or thus , socrates laughing , and socrates discoursing , are the same , this is false logick , and he either considered not what he writ , or did it with an intention to deceive ; this same terme [ standing ] makes them both be applied to eternity , for no duration is standing , or lasting , but that which is eternal ; all others are successive ; that eternal thing , which stands now , without succession , stands then , in passed and future times , whensoever they exist , they changed , but he remaining the same . expect not a simile to agree in all things , then it must be that very thing which it assimulates : but thus : as you may conceive a firme and strong rock made of some adamantine , or heavenly , immutable substance ; this rocke stands still , without change of the least particle ; cut a sluce of the sea into it , whose waves dash upon it , so long as these waves batter upon it , that rock is before one , and behind another , none of which relations it had before ; they are in a perpetuall flux and change , the rock stands , as it were , u●concern'd in them ; return that sea into its own channel , it hath no respect to any wave againe , no more then it had before the coming in of those waters : so that eternal , immutable , unwashable rock of beings , exists of its self , untill these turbulent waves of unconstant time are let into it , then , all that while , it hath these relations to it , of past , present , and to come ; but when things are retreated againe , when time ceaseth , there is no more any of these differences of past , or present , which are applied to time , and it had in relation only to time and temporary things , but is purely nunc stans , or tunc stans , i care not which , if it be stans , if it be standing and permanent , it expresseth the notion of eternity . well , and yet nunc and tunc , now and then differ in themselves , and are united only in this which we call eternity . revel . . . i am alpha and omega , there the time that was passed , and the time that was to come , every kind of them was applied to this nunc ; the present being , i am , in it comprehended the beginning and the end of others : it might be said of others , they were the beginning , and should be the end ; but of him , he is the beginning , and the end , the first and the last , as it is added in the . of the same revelations the . he is this in himself ; but then take him coexisting with time , he is he who is , who was , and who shall be ; so that it is evident his duration taken in its self , is the same time and nunc , now and then ; so either of them be considered standing , or permanent ; but , in respect of the creature , he may be said that was or shall be . thus i hope that argument is answered ; nunc and tunc stans , now and then , so they have that addition of permanent , are the same , which differ without that addition . now to the second argument sect. . [ and ( saith he ) they make an infinite number of numbers an unitie . ] i deny this consequence , it can be inforced no otherwise then that eternal exists an infinite number of dayes , which i deny ; eternity doth not exist an infinite number of any measures of time , nor any time , when time doth not exist , as is before expressed : but , if there should be an infinite time lasting , it would exist with it ; but , the first failing , coexisting with it cannot be . thus the reader may , in a weak manner , conceive this eternal now , how it may be the same with eternal then , and how there are not contained an infinite number of numbers in it . sect. . as to those other arguments drawn from the government of the creatures , to prove the main proposition , that there is a god ; i could delight to spend whole sheets in discourse upon them , but that i must not lose my self in this intendment i am about ; they are so evident , that , as st. paul , where before cited , rom. . . it renders men without excuse ; for the heavens declare the glory of god , and the firmament sheweth his handy work , psal. . . there is no speech nor language where their voyce is not heard , vers. . so that the manifestation is universal , no man can be excused from the observation of these things , verse . their line , or direction , is gone throughout all the earth , and their words to the end of the world : i must not be long in this theame ; as when a man sees a brave house gloriously built , he cannot chuse but think him an excellent workman that wrought it : so doth the beauty of this great building of the world make us admire the workman ; as he , who should heare excellent musique , must needs think it the work of some eminent musician ; as a man , when he sees a great man's house governed with regularity , and ordered in an exact discipline , must needs think there is a discreet steward or master , who disposeth and orders that family : so when the method , in which the world is contrived , and disciplin'd , is considered , a man must needs think that there is an infinite wisdom which governs all : and therefore the sonne of sirach , wisd. . . by the greatnesse and beauty of creatures , proportionably , the maker of them is seene ; that is , the maker of this house , the artist , who composed the harmony , the contriver of this discipline is discerned by the effects of it , which , because they require a vast and immense power and wisdom , we must attribute to god ; for if a man would think with himself how innumerable accidents , that is , external things , conduce to the producing of the least effect , a man cannot conceive how lesse then an infinite wisdom and power could , in such a method , concenter them to the least business . but i lose my self with delight in this admiration of my god , and i desist . these , and the like reasons doe cherish that innate axiome , that there is a god , even in natural man ; and this leaves all the world without excuse , for not knowing , there is a god , or knowing there is one , but not worshiping him as god , or , knowing him thus , as nature teacheth him , for worshiping idols , or images , which they must needs know not to be the author of these great effects . a paraenetical digression to mr. hobbes . now mr. hobbes , if this treatise come to your hand , as , it is likely , it may , give me leave to advise you a little with words that may lye by you , and so not passe sleightly away . you are a man , as i observe , in this philosophy-treatise , of more then ordinary conceipt ; you have spent much time in the search of nature , although you are full of paradoxes , and those not strengthened with any greater reason then your own authority ; yet they tast of a mighty acumen ingenii , as likewise of a most industrious and working head , to contrive and bring those apparent errors to such ends as you have brought them ; but , good sir , consider why do you so constantly in your leviathan , and upon all occasions , so unnecessarily , take advantages to speak against the known , and most received truths in divinity ? what need had you in this place to dispute the case of the eternity of the world , and to say , that the question of the origin of the world should be left to those which are lawfully over us in ordering divine worship , pag. . sir , we know who you meane by that from your leviathan , to wit , the supream magistrate ; suppose he should be an atheist , and deny the creation ; would you doe so likewise ? you seem to be ready , and invite others to it , in scorning those reasons are brought for it , and labouring to weary the faith of a christian man in it ; it is true , faith is able to support a fainting soul against the distractions which wicked reason can object ; but it is a wicked reason that troubles and distracts it . john . . it is said of the disciples , that they were glad when they saw the lord after his resurrection ; not that they doubted of it before , they were not all didymusses ; but faith her self is comforted by reason and visible experiments , as it is tyred and wearied in strugling against reason . consider with your self what you will answer almighty god at the last day , when he shall say , i have assisted thee in the purchase of so much learning , how hast thou used it to my honour ? why didst thou abuse it to my dishonour , in disputing against , and disturbing my poore servants from their assents to those divine truths i prescribed in my word ? it will not serve your turn to say , you did it by fate ; for the same fate will fatalize you to a worse condition then that brought you to this , if you do not repent ; it is not in this one point , but twentie more , you are guiltie of this fault , studying to countenance atheisticall wits with shewes of reason to abet their wickednesses . for god's sake ( if you think there is one ) and his son jesus christ's sake , without whom you cannot be saved ( if you think there is a jesus christ , and that there will be a salvation ) with your own hand blot out these hand-writings of your own , which will lye against you , and condemn you ; it were better done by you , with pardon from god for them , then by others reasons confuted to nothing , and the guilt remaine with you . i am perswaded you can object little against this i have writ ; and although , after these arguments i have discussed , pag. . you say concerning the worlds magnitude and beginning , you are content with that doctrine which the scriptures perswade , and the fame of those miracles which confirme them , the country-custome , and the due reverence of the lawes ; this you say , you are content with , but , like a discontented man , you wrangle against all ; can any thing be more clearly delivered in scripture then the creation of the world ? hath not the constant custome of your nation , ever since christianity was planted , acknowledg'd it ? yea , i could tell you the custome of this nation before christianity was setled , even the druids acknowledged it ; is it not an act antiently confirmed by our laws , and yet unrepealed ? you then did but speak this , and not doe it , but snarle , under a colour of reason , against that which you professe and certainly ought to repent for doing ; and though you say , this reasoning contemned by learned men ; yet i can shew you somwhat like this even in one which you your self commend in your epistle , and i am perswaded , you cannot satisfactorily answer this i have said ( laying aside the scripture ) but with scornes , as you use to doe , or with other as weake blasphemies , i pray god forgive you , and work a repentance in you . and now , reader , do thou forgive the tediousness of this digression ; in general , let me advise this , that if thou meetest with any of these muddy-souled writers , which , with thomas , will beleeve nothing but what they see , doe then consider our saviours answer , jo. . . blessed are they that do not see , and yet beleeve . doth god reveale in his sacred and blessed word any thing that seems incongruous to thy reason ? know it is most agreeing , although thou discoverest it not ; and beleeve what he requires , against thine owne reason , so shalt thou be blessed by god , and thy faith shall be crowned with happiness , which is my prayer , and shall be my endeavour in this , and all i write . chap. xv. concerning the opinion of a deity ; formed religion , what , and wherein founded . sect. . thus , having past a few observations upon his seeds of religion , i skip many impertinent discourses of his in the way , and come to his notes upon the dissolution of religion , which are entred upon by him , pag. . thus [ from the propagation of religion it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds or principles : which are onely an opinion of a diety , and powers invisible , and supernatural . ] let the reader at first consider the inconstancy of this writer , how immediately he not only deserts what he had writ in this very chapter , but opposeth it . he just before made those four fancies to be the seeds of religion , now he makes it only one , and that not the same with any of the other ; nay , he opposeth himself in this very sentence , for he speaks of the resolution of it into its first seeds and principles , in the plurall number , and yet saith , which are only an opinion of a diety . thus inconstant is errour , but then that is an intolerable phrase for him to use , to terme the seeds of religion , an opinion of a diety ; for although this word opinion may have a large sense , and be taken for whatsoever knowledge any man hath of any thing , whether by faith or demonstration ; yet , since he hath formerly defined it in a weak manner to be be a poore and faint assurance , pag. . it was unworthily , and disgracefully done of him , to call this in-bred principle , this which abides so much demonstration à posteriori to the learned , so much perswasive illustration to the meanest capacity , to call this barely opinion ; but he labours throughout the book covertly to insinuate , as much as he can , a disgracefull conceit of religion , which i meane to observe in my travailes through it . sect. . he proceedeth , and affirmes that [ that can never be abolished out of humane nature , but that new religions may again be made to spring out of them by the culture of such men as for such purpose are in reputation . ] this proposition is delivered in such universal termes as makes it exceeding difficult to understand what he meanes by it , he talkes of , and censures the schoole-men for a mystical way of writing , but , certainly , their language is significant , logical , gramatical , which his is not ; for first , what doth he meane by humane nature , the species or kind of man , as we call it mankind ? i am confident then it is true ; but if he meane that particular nature of socrates or plato , although it cannot be so extirpated out of it , as that it cannot be introduced againe ; yet it is many times so abol●shed , as it is not introduced by those he names . but then marke what follows [ but that new religions may be made to spring out of them . ] consider at the beginning he spake of seeds in the plurall number , then he made those many seeds but one , now againe in this terme ( them ) he makes many againe ; for the terme ( them ) can relate to nothing but the former seeds or seed specified . he writes most perplexedly , and because not cleere expressions to the understanding , therefore not perspicuous to have observations made upon any thing in his writing but the confusedness , yet i will proceed with him . sest . . [ for ( saith he ) seeing all formed religion is founded at fi●st upon the faith which a multitude hath in some one person whom they beleeve , not only to be a wise man , and to labour to procure their happiness , but also to be a holy man , to whom god himself vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally . ] consider how this gentlemans language contradicts himself : first he made the seed of religion only an opinion of a diety , that was for taking opinion in a large sense ; now he makes it to be the beliefe men have of some man : but yet i can answer for him somewhat : that in the first place he spoke of religion , now he speaks of it as a formed religion , by which , i think , and only think ( for that phrase , formed religion , is an unusual phrase ) yet i think he means some set form of worship , by which , in such or such a manner , men expresse their duties to god ; now as averroes said , to sacrifice to god was dictated by nature , but whether to venus , or diana , was the direction of man ; so , it may be , he meanes , by this word formed , some particular restraint of religion to this or that particular way ; and the seed of this is the beleef , &c. i have made out the sense as well as i can , to make it hold together : well then , i will take formed religion for such which , in a several sort of men , is allotted to divine worship . seeing then ( saith he ) all formed religion is founded , &c. this phrase seeing then should relate to some former proof or illustration of this proposition , but i can find no such thing attempted , nor this proposition any where else delivered by him : this is a strange kind of jugling , to make the reader beleeve , that he hath proved that which he never spoke of before . well : we will examine the conclusion , [ all formed religion is founded at first upon the faith , ] we will first examine this terme ( founded , at first ) that may be understood , that religion is bottomed upon this beleef , as a building , which is raised upon a rock , is said to be founded upon it which is the last and lowest support of it . now this beleefe , which he speaks of , cannot be such , for the foundation of religion , as he spake before , is the assurance of a god , which is either had by nature , or by those demonstrations , and illustrations spoke of before ; but perhaps , he will say , this is the foundation of religion , in general , as religion , but not as a formed religion , as this particular , that is only that beleefe which he speaks of ; i will therefore examine it in those two most remarkable religions , and evidently to be discerned , the jewes religion , and christian , in both which we may observe two principal things in the forming them ; for religion , and a most reverential worship due to god is apparent out of nature , and the demonstrations before spoke of ; but then the forming it consists in these two things , who this god is , whether jehovah or baal , christ or iupiter ; and then what manner of worship is to be performed to these ; and both these formings , i affirme , are formed , bottomed , supported by something much more firme then that beleef he speaks of . first then for the forme of the iewish religion , in the first motion , whether jehovah or baal , any heathen god be the god to whom religion is to be paid , this was not founded upon the faith which the multitude had in some one person , as he fancieth . chap. xvi . what religion before the floud . what meant by that invocation , gen. . . the sinnes and punishment of them that perished in the floud . the prevalence of religion , whence . sect. . the conditions of religion before the floud , hath so little spoke of it in scripture , as it hath bred dispute amongst divines whether there were any idolatry , either worship of idols or false gods in that long tract of time ; that which perswades me to think there was none , is , that although the time was long , yet the ages of men were so vast , that there must needs be a memorial of the creation , for there was little more then half a mans life , not above five or six hundred yeares betwixt adam and noah , which must needs be continued in that long-living age by such as were contemporaries with them both ; and then , besides this , there is no mention of any false god worshipped , or any idolatry in that whole story . wherefore in the silence of scripture , which records other faults of that age , but not this , we may collect from the former reason justly , that there was no probability of any such forgetting of god , whose great work of making them was so fresh amongst them . sect. . some arguments are objected against this conclusion ; that in the last verse of the th . chapter of genesis it is said , that adams sonne seth begot enos and then men began to call upon the lord ; so that , because men are never without some religion , and it seems the religion to the true god was forgot so quickly , it seemes necessary that then they should have some religion to a false god. for the understanding of this place , conceive with me , that it cannot be understood in that down right sense which the words seem at first to beare , and they who object it , would inferre : for invocation or calling upon the name of the lord , as it is many times ( it being a principal piece of it ) is taken for the whole worship of god , it cannot be that men should now begin to do that which , without doubt , adam , abel , seth , and all such as were godly must needs have done long before ; nay , although this story of the fathers is delivered by moses in exceeding short notes , yet in the . and . vers . of this . chap. it is recorded , that both cain and abel brought oblations to the lord , which was an act of religion ; so that religion did not now begin . there are many witty expositions given , and some in their expositions destroy the text ; but what seem's most probable to me is , that , as in every age men , desirous of gods honour , studied which way to act it most laudably , and give any addition to it ; so now they might , at this time , adde something to their natural worship by prostration on the ground , and oblaeions and sacrifices , as hymmes and invocations of god , which were not used before : men began to call upon the name of the lord in such a way , which afterwards improving it selfe to a generall devotion amongst the sonnes of god ( as i think pious men were called in those dayes ) it gained that name in a peculiar manner to be attributed to it , so that men began that worship which was known by the name of calling upon god : as you may see in confession , every acknowledgement of a mans sins , or god's goodnesse , is confession ; yet if you aske , have you been at confession ? it is understood of confessing to a priest , and accounting your sinnes to him . instances might be very many in this kind ; take one more , perhaps a little closer ; we know that every pious act is a service to god , yet , for the eminence and excellence of it , the common prayer , used in the church , hath so appropriated that name , that if a man asked were you at service to day ? it will be understood of common prayer . if the question be , at what time did service begin ? the answer will be , nine , ten , two , three a clock , and be applyed only to the beginning of serving god with it : yea , i have heard many answer , i was at sermon , not at service ; so distinctly is the word applied to that of common prayer . i can adde one instance more , almost in the very words before specified ; that doxologie which is used in the church at the end of every psalm , and some other times in the common prayers , used in divine service ( glory be to the father , &c. ) did so gaine the approbation of that name gloria patri , that although all religious devotions payd to god , are honouring and glorifying of him ; yet when we heare men speake of gloria patri , we know they meane this doxologie , and we can say of it , that gloria patri began with flavianus , as theodoret ( assisted by st. chrysostom ) and nicephorus ; so that although , in the end of this doxologie , it is said , as it was in the beginning , is now , &c. that is , that in all ages men did give glory to the father , &c. yet we can say , that at that time began glory to the father , &c. so was it in this occasion , then began the name of god to be glorified with some particular service , although men did in all ages before glorifie him . so that we may well beleeve that in that time of the birth of enos , or some years after , began that piece of worship , which , for some eminency , had that name of calling upon god , by the use of speech , appropriated to it . whether this addition was by the institution of god immediately ; or divine men , as seth or enos , introduced it in the publique religion , i determine not , being not revealed , but conceive this the most reasonable way of expounding that place , which cannot be understood in that grosse way it is urged . sect. a second argument to prove , that there was an idolatrous worship before the floud is thus framed . the punishment of sinnes is proportioned to the sins which are punished ; now the floud being the greatest punishment that ever god afflicted the world with , it is necessary that it should be for the worship of false gods , or idolatry , which are the greatest sins . to this is rightly answered , that the punishment of sins in this world is not alwaies proportioned to the sins ; all the temporal punishment , that men have , is lesse then they deserve , and therefore may in justice be moderated according to gods equitable kindnesse ; what punishment god layd upon these men , who perished in the floud , after death , was not revealed , but the judgement was most right , because they held the truth of god in unrighteousness , as st. paul , rom. . . and , as it is in the . verse of the same , because they , knowing god , glorified him not as god , neither were thankful , but became vaine in their imaginations . so that the condemnation upon the gentiles was not alwaies for errours in judgement , but errours in practise , that although they did know god aright , yet they did not worship him as god. and therefore we may be satisfied , concerning their sins , with what the scripture revealeth , and need not make them worse then they were described there , which sayes , that the wickednesse of man was great in the earth , and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evill continually , gen. . . and it is the same which s. paul before , they became vaine in their imaginations , that is , their desires , and affections ( as was described before ) they were given to all luxury and sensuality . so that here was a large scope for gods justice to punish , and the temporal punishment of this world , death by drowning , was vehemently called for by the sins of those men , who lived in that age , without any addition of false worship . i therefore conclude for that first age , in the first sense , in respect of the god they worshipped , there was none but the right god worshipt in the world ; but in regard of the second sense , the manner of worship in their religion to him , unlesse these oblations before spoke of , we find nothing recorded before the floud , that is necessary to be assented to . sect. . for both these we cannot conceive , that this religion , so formed , was founded upon the faith , &c. for although we may justly think that men , who have either by an innate principle , or else by reason , knowledge that there is a god of an infinite excellency , to whom , out of duty , they owe this divine worship which is called religion ; we may likewise think , that it is impossible for their capacities to find out what worship would be pleasing to him , unlesse he reveale it ; and therefore did act all they did , in that worship , by his direction ; yet , because there is no mention of such direction given by god before the floud , some men may conceive that seth , or such pious men , might inventis addere , and make some additions , now and then , according to the principles of pious reason , to those received duties which were acted before , and then that forme , or at the least , that piece of the form of religion was founded upon the faith , &c. i will therefore explaine one distinction which may serve our turne , perhaps often , hereafter in our controversie , and i think will make this appeare easie . sect. . that is , there is a difference betwixt an occasion of a religion , and the foundation of it , the occasion may be this faith he speaks of , but the foundation is the revelation of the will of god , that he will be so worshiped , as thus ; suppose seth , or noah , a man in whom they have such a faith , that is , an opinion of his wisdome or kindness to them , his esteeme with god ; suppose such a man should direct such or such a duty ; they listen to it for the estimation they have of his ability ; afterward , upon experience , or examination , they find it congruent to the will of god ; then they practice it accordingly with confidence : but if it be received barely upon the credulity of such a person , and found incongruous to the will of god , afterwards it will be rejected ; which shewes that , not the faith , in the man , is the foundation of this forme of religion , but the congruence it hath with the will of god. and this is the foundation of all religion , the revelation of gods will to be pleased with such service . as it happens in a foundation , that rock , upon which a castle is built , is the foundation , and the sole foundation , there may perhaps be other things necessary , to dig the earth before we come to the rock , or else to remove the rubbidge , which may hinder the setling the house upon it , but onely the rock is the foundation ; so it may be , that such a man , of whom he speakes , may be useful to the building of religion , to the manifestation of this rock , to the removing many impediments , which would hinder men from setling themselves and their faith , upon it ; but only that is the rock . there is one clause in this conclusion which may amuse the reader , that is , that the person , on whom they beleeve , they beleeve to be such [ to whom god himself vouchsafeth to declare his will supernaturally . ] now it is true , this for the most part is necessary to the plantation of religion , as i said , to remove the obstacles , that this direction , which i receive , is not the word of god , or not pleasing to him , and the like ; but the foundation is , that god reveales this to be his will. suppose seth preached the duties of religion , we have this faith , or opinion of seth ( for divine faith it is not , unlesse god declare seth is such ) we may have some weak beleefe that this is the will of god , because honest seth , to whom god , as we apprehend , makes many revelations , delivers it for such to us ; but we beleeve the duty because god requires it , and upon that we build our religion , the other is removing the rubbige . or thus , an act of parlament is made , we submit to the authority , are confident of our security accordingly ; yet i , who was not at the making of that act , know onely that that , which i reade in the book , was an act of parliament , by the printer that printed it , and that such an act is tolerated by the magistrate to passe for an act. now the foundation of the safety of my practice is the act of parliament , not the printer , these are assistants to let me know this is an act of parliament , not the foundation ; so it is with this case in hand , honest seth is like the printer , he delivers it so to me for the will of god , i ought , in discretion , to beleeve it such ; but i build my practise , and found it upon this reason , because it is the will of god. many may be the arguments which induce a perswasion that this is the will of god , but because this is the will of god , is the sole foundation of my religion . sect. . but it may be o●j●cted , that both he , and i , have said before , that the foundation of religion was the assurance that there is a god , now i make it the revealed will of god , which are not the same : i answer , that it is true , the foundation of religion , as religion , is , that there is a god ; for therefore we know that we must give him divine worship , because we know he is such ; but the foundation of formed religion , that we must worship him this or that way , is , because he hath revealed that he likes this or that manner of service . and thus , i think , that proposition is cleared , that not the faith in the man , but in the revealed will of god , is the foundation of all formed religion . at the first i projected a long discourse concerning the forming the jewish religion and the christian from that , before i was aware , i stept into the forming of religion before the floud , which might have been spared , but being writ i let passe as it is , and omit what should follow about my designe at the first , concerning those two most eminent formed religions , for by this which hath been delivered , and by the continued stories both of the old and new testament , it appeares , that by miracles and other revelations god manifested his will to these people in those ages wheresoever religion was planted . and indeed this was the sole occasion of publishing the scriptures ; i will not insist therefore at this time upon this conclusion . chap. xvii . of suspected governours , and th●●r forming or adding to religion . it s independence . ●●●iefe of seeming contradictions , &c. sect. . he proceeds [ it followeth necessarily , when they that have the government of religion shall come to have either the wisdome of those men , their sincerity , or their love suspected . ] let us pause a little upon this phrase ( those men ) it is a most ambiguous relative , if it relate to the man on whom they beleeved , as before , as it seems to doe , thus it must be , that the governours of the church suspect those men whose credit was an argument to form the religion ; but that cannot be , for the suspicion of the governour , and his lack of assurance , doth not necessarily introduce a doubt in the religion ; because few governours dare discover their own doubts , and their suspicion is seldome an infectious evil , or , if so , yet not epedemicall , unlesse countenanced and assisted by the sword ; but although the words doe import a suspicion in those governours , yet h●s meaning is , that the governours own wisdom , integrity , &c. are suspected , as it is evident by the following words [ or that they shall be unable to shew any probable token of divine revelation ] this cannot be spoken of the first instruments in the forming religion , because god confirmed their doctrine with miracles every where ; it must therefore be understood of the governours to whom this religion is committed , but how harshly , in common language , that relative ( those men ) will be applyed to these governours , may easily appeare to any man who reads it ; well : his conclusion is , that they , the governours being suspected , the religion , which they desire to uphold , must be suspected likewise , and ( without the feare of the civil sword ) contradicted , and rejec●●d . sect. . i conceive if his premises had been true , the conclusion would not be deduced out of them ; for religion formed is like the statute lsw , as before is expressed , the governours may be thought as iudges , whose ability or integrity may be suspected in expounding the sense of it , yet the law is still as true , and remaines as unsuspected as if they were vertuous ; the folly and corrupt mannage of the iudges may let in a loosnesse of living , and a neglect of the law ; but it lessens not the obligation of it , nor the estimation , but amongst sleight and trivial persons . so if bishops , or the governours in religion , cease to have apostolical integrity or sufficiencies , or that degree of it which should be expected from such persons , they open a gap to the countenancing of wickedness and prophaneness ; but the religion of christians , which is built and founded upon the revealed will of god in the statute book the bible , is not tainted by it , nor the duty to it in the opinion of any but men of fancy ; for they neither being the foundation , nor the evidence of the foundation , onely preservers of it , out of office , not of nature , they may do much harme to the building , but not corrupt the foundation , nor destroy the evidence of it , which was set out by those who were instruments in the first forming that religion , not them which were governours afterwards . sect. . he goes on , indeed in some method and ingenuity , to shew how governours may fall under this suspicion ; and first he saith , [ that which taketh away the reputation of wisdome in him , who formeth or addeth to religion , when it is already formed , is the enjoyning a beleefe of contradictories ] i here stop , and tell you , there is a difference betwixt the formers of a religion , and the governours , as i have shewed ; and for this word contradiction , i say , that in the forming of religion , which is to be done by the revealed will of god immediately , the wit of man is not to dispute contradictions ; but whatsoever it shall please god to reveale , we are to beleeve , though it appeare to us contradictory ; i dare say , i can demonstrate some things , which a weak and silly man would think contradictions , and a man exceeding me in learning , as much as i do him , may serve me so , and much rather that infinite perfection , and not to be fathomed abysse of gods most unsearchable wisdom , may say a thousand things apparent to it , feasible by that infinite power , which the wisest man may be at a losse to find possible ; and therefore whatsoever is delivered by the first agents in forming a religion , by the immediate revelation of god , must be beleeved , although it appear to us full of contradictions ; but what he speaks to us concerning the governours , if they should adde any thing to the former credenda , things to be beleeved , which to humane judgement appeares contradictory , their wisdome will be disparaged by it , may be allowed . but at the latter end of that sentence he saith , sect. . [ a man may have a revelation of many things above , but of nothing against natural reason . ] this seems to be flat against the excellency of that faith , for which the father and patterne of the faithfull is commended by st. paul , rom. . . who , speaking of abraham , saith , who against ( not onely above ) hope , beleeved in hope ; where in expresse terms the apostle overthrows his distinction ; for against hope ( must be against that hope , which natural reason could give him ) he beleeved in the promise which god made ; in faith as it was with him , so it must be with us . it is said in the following verse , that he considered not his own body now dead , nor the deadnesse of sarahs womb ; so must we not consider our impossibility in things delivered by god , how they oppose our reason , but beleeve , without thought of nature or reason for it , yea though it be against our reason ; and therefore it is most appositly phrased by st. paul in the first and last chapters to the romans , obedience unto faith ; men must captivate their reason to the revelations of god , and , not considering what reason saith against it , submit to it . thus i think , in those cases where the instruments of forming a religion doe propose any thing though contrary to our reason , or contradictory in our apprehension , we ought to submit to it , although not , in those cases , to these who have the government in religion , when it is once formed . sect. . i will adde one note more , pertinent to this business , that although in the following . pag. he puts downe examples which illustrate his other grounds of suspicion , yet , as a man guilty , he sets down none for this , but having ( as i have reason to mistrust ) some ill design , puts it downe in a language , and manner fit enough to steale a beleefe of what he speaks into an inconsiderate reader , although he gives no proof of what he writes to a judicious reader . and now i have finished what i intended concerning this chapter , for the other things which , he saith , bring these persons into suspicion , by reason of the deficience of those qualities , i grant to him , and cannot choose but say , they were handsome and ingenious expressions , and likewise fitted with very pertinent examples ; but they accidentally only , when unluckily they happen to be observed by weak capacities , doe distract the vivacity and quicknesse of their faith , and so , perhaps , may in tract of time quench and extinguish the flame of it to its first principles , as i have shewed . and here i will settle my self to what followes in the next chapter . chap. xviii . concerning the equality or inequality of men by nature ; their prudence , and self-opinion of it , not universal . sect. . this chapter is intituled of the naturall condition of mankind , as concerning their felicity or misery : and is the prettiest great nothing that ever i read ; it makes a brave and gallant shew of ingenious paradoxes , but is only a shew , where truths and falshoods are so ingeniously mixed as the one sets off the other with a great semblance of reality , although it be but a semblance ; he describes a man by his worst peices only , many of which are truly in him ; but delivering them only , without his good , he makes him little better then an incarnate devill , yea , what is worser , makes him seeme to act those things justly which we abominate in them ; so that he should be the hatefullest creature in the world ; i will therefore , for the honour of mankind , endeavour to rescue it from such foule scandals and aspersions , not catching at every word , but driving at the maine sense of what he delivers . sect. . he layes the foundation of this chapter upon equality of men , which are ( saith he ) made so equall by nature , that there is an inconsiderable difference . i put not down his own words , but the sense , to avoid tediousnesse . this conclusion , for the most part , is true , but , in general false ; for , if we look to the bodies of some men , we see them so decrepid , that their strength is not considerable alone ; and what he talkes of confederacy , by that accompt he may bring a fly in competition , for a fly , with company enough , can effect any thing ; and for the soule , there are some men so sottish , and uncapable of designe , or contrivance , that , certainly , there are many beasts which exceed them in fitness for such business as he allot's them ; but , allow this phrase , as he utter's it , to be understood of the greater sort and number of men , not of all . sect. . then let us consider that phrase , ( nature hath made men ) what shall we understand by nature , natura naturans , the god of nature , who , at the first , made men ? then we must affirme this of adam and evah , which were made , without question , in no state of enmity , nor in an absolute equality , but such a difference as was necessary for two friends which might assist one another , wishing each other good , and the good of each other was the good of both ; the hopes of each , the hopes of both ; so that those could not be the works of nature which he meanes , being such as were made for peace and amity , and where was impossibility of hostility betwixt them , the hurt of either being the hurt of both , because which soever was destroyed , the other lost much of assistance . we will therefore see how other sons of nature are made ; in what condition whatsoever man else was made , by nature he was made a poor helpless child , in the greatest disproportion , both of soul and body , to his parents , that possibly can be ; and , in this state , there are none of those things which he fancieth , nor hopes of attaining ends , nor feares of others assistance ; but the poor infant confides and trusts in h●s parents , and submits to them . methinks , he discourses of men as if they were terrigenae , born out of the earth , come up like seeds , without any relation one to the other . i let alone his secret vaunt of knowledge , in the latter end of this . pag. sect. . but in the bottome of that page , he saith [ prudence is but experience , which equall time bestowes equally upon all men , in those things they equally apply themselves to . ] see here the unconstancy of this author ; chap. the . of which i have discoursed , he saith , experience is memory of many things , chap. . pag. . ( he saith ) prudence depends upon experience ; now it is but experience : these two are impossible to be true both ; for nothing doth depend upon it self ; that , which it depend's upon , must be distinct from what depend's upon it ; now we may distinguish th●se three thus ; memory retaines the actions done and past ; experience collects from thence the practices of men in such cases ; but prudence , according to both memory , experience , and the rules of right reason , drawne from all the guidance of history , or natural reason , or what else can supply any assistance to the intended end , directs a man in his actions ; and therefore he spake very weakly of prudence , when he said , it was but experience ; and contrarily , there is a mighty difference in mens prudence ; for prudence is a thing acquired by industry and paines , in which , as men differ in the industry , so they doe in prudence , yea all men have not the like advantages of conversing with able men and bookes , which are great helps for the getting prudence ; though they may have the same industry . sect. . pag. . he saith , that [ that which may make such equality ( that is , of prudence , concerning which he had spoken before ) incredible , is but a vaine conceit of our own wisdome , &c. for such is the nature of men , that howsoever they may acknowledge many others to be more witty , or more el●quent , or more learned , yet they will hardly beleeve there are many so wise as themselves ; for they see their owne wit at hand , and others at a distance . ] this is a strange contradictory passage to its self ; for first consider that what was conceited by this to be opposed , was the equality of prudence ; to oppose this he introduceth mens conceits of their own wisdome ; he that reflects upon his exposition of names in cap. . pag. . shall find prudence and wisdome two things ; therefore a high esteeme of a mans own wisdom may be without the like imagination of his own prudence . then consider , that he saith , men will allow others more witty , learned , eloquent , but not more wise ; he proves this , because men see their own wit at hand , mark how he said , just before , that they would allow others more wit , but not more wisdom the reason , saith he , because they see their wit at hand ; would not this , if it prove any thing , prove the contrary to what he useth it ? that , because their wit , not their wisdom , is discerned at hand , others at a distance , therefore their wit must appear great , though not their wisdom . this manner of false reasoning , unreasonable arguing , is frequent with him throughout the whole book . sect. . but to the conclusion ; this estimation of a mans own eminence in prudence is least discerned of any thing in that universality which he expresseth ; for first , if prudence , as he just before defined it , be but experience , it is impossible that young men should think they have as much experience as old ; then if prudence be ( as it is ) the guide of a mans actions to their designed ends , then consider that there are none but fooles who do not take advise of men more excellent in their several wayes then themselves . doe not men , that would get health , advise with physicians ? for the setling their estates , advise with lawyers ? for the managing of a business at court , or countrey , advise with others more prudent in these practises ? in this particular business , although , i am confident , i speak more rationally then he , or perhaps then some others would doe with whom i consult ; yet i advise with those lesse scient , but i think more prudent then my self ( whether it be discretion to publish this or not ) what is the reason of this ? but that i , and all others , doe acknowledge our selves to be lesse prudent , though we find our selves more learned then some others ; well then : that doubt , he raiseth , was but a fancy of his own , and had no foundation upon any ground of reason , or experience , and therefore what he builds upon it must needs fall of its self ; where i leave it , and step to the consideration of other inferences which he introduceth , the first of which is thus framed . chap. xix . of enmity pretended from equality of our desires . how reason and religion restraine men upon mutual injuries , and moderate their feares . the title of occupancy , &c. sect. . from this equality of ability ariseth equality of hope in the attaining our ends , and therefore if any two men desire the same thing , which nevertheless they cannot both injoy , they become enemies . ] to understand this , let us look back to what i have said before , and consider men in their infancy , borne of parents , and having a necessity to be bred up by them , or else they could never come to be men , with these equalities of abilities , and these hopes he speaks of ; all this while they are under their parents tuition , and parts of their dominion ; but , perhaps , when they come to the age of discretion , they grow intire bodies , and set up for themselves , with hopes of their own , i beleeve , they have ; but what then ? two of them may have desires , and then hopes of the same things ; yea , perhaps , one of them the same desires and hopes with his father ; must he then become an enemy to that other , or to his parent ? this would make men to be beasts , or if they have more wit then beasts , to be by that only enabled to be more barbarous and beastly then beasts themselves . sect. . in the . of genesis , we may observe , how , when by the contention betwixt the heardsmen of abraham and lot , abraham saw it would not be convenient for two persons of their opulency to cohabite together , he therefore gave lot his choyce to take the right or left hand countrey , which he pleased . there can be no doubt but that abraham was more potent then lot , and could have compelled him to have gone whither he pleased ; and there can be no doubt , but , in his choise , he must needs approve that plaine of iordan , which lot had taken , as most commodious for the feeding their cattel , in the which their wealth principally consisted ; but yet he gave him his choise , which , if he had been of mr. hobbes his mind , or a man of his forming , he would not have done ; a beast would not have done it , a man , of base disposition would not , but a man of a noble & generous heart did● certainly men will not be enemies for every thing they desire or hope for , but give way to others in many things , much less doe , as he speaks presently after [ and in the way to the end which is principally their own conservation , and sometimes their delectation only . ] sect. . that such monsters have been in morality , is as apparent as other monsters in nature ; but that it should be universally true , in the sonnes of nature , were to make nature her self a monster ; that which he speaks , of self-preservation , will be discussed more pertinently hereafter ; but to say , that men universally deale so maliciously for delectation , is a most unhappie assertion ; it is true , the passions of men are extreamly unruly things , when they get the dominion , and carry men to all manner of wickedness ; but men are better then beasts , and have reason and reasonable wills , by which they can , and doe governe their passions to act what is fit , not what is delightfull onely . from this passion of hope , he proceeds to another of feare ; thus [ and from hence it comes to passe that where an invader hath no more to feare then another mans single power ] this is an imperfect sentence ( but i will collect the meaning of it ) if one plant , sow , build , others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united to dispossesse , or deprive him , not only of the fruit of his labour , but also of his life , or liberty ; and the invader is in the like danger again of another ] here now have we two passions , hope and feare assaulting every man , and provoking him to doe mischiefe , and how probable to prevaile , i will now examine . sect. . it is very evident that hopes and feares are great guides and rulers of humane actions ; and their force and power over us consists principally in the condition and qualities of the object of hopes and feares ; so that by how much the object is more desirable or terrible , by so much the object workes more efficaciously , as a greater good more then a lesse , a greater danger more then a lesse ; so only , but the probability of its falling upon us gives it a great degree of power ; for although the falling down of our houses upon us would be a certain and inevitable destruction ; yet , because not probable , we feare not . what i speake of feare may be applyed to hopes , and yet once againe , the powers , that these objects have , are by morall perswasions not by physicall or natural operations , which must certainly do their effects , when those doe not work with more certainty then morall , which may , or may not be . to come to the businesse therefore in hand when two men design the same thing , suppose the same commodious seat , if one be possessor of it , and the planter there may have such a desire of it , being furious , and wicked , as not to be contented without it , such was the case of ahab to naboths vineyard ; but yet this passi●n of his was not so violent as by sinister meanes , and the destruction of naboth , he would get it , that was an act of malice beyond his , of jezabell , as you may read kings . and yet he as wicked a man as almost ever was . lo that although men may like , and approve , what another hath ; yet the violence of few mens affections runs to such a height in malice , as to do mischiefe in so high a nature , for their content , as to destroy a man. i know to my instance of ahab it may be objected , that he lived in a civill state , in which were lawes , and ahab durst not act against them ; but in these cases men suppose no coercive power , but their own will and force to govern. to this i answer , that first the title of occupancy is a most sacred and just title , and gives dominion to the possessor , such as all men , in all ages , have reverenced ; and although there is no coercive nor punishing power , for such injuries as are done in that kind , but conscience ; yet that is enough to keep men in awe , as i shall shew you anon . and ahab , being king over israel , had no other awe ; and therefore there is seldome such violent desires of anothers good as doth produce such horrid effects . what i have said of hopes , may be applyed to feares ; feares urge men to a thousand desperate actions ; and , certainly , if men were nothing but beasts , without reason , they could not be secured from feares , without either destruction of other men , or subduing them ; nay , subduing them were not enough ; for as it happens with beasts , that that bull , or that stagge , which is subdued this day , finds a time of revenge upon the other a little after ; so may it be with men , yea it is more dangerous by so much as men have more wit to effect revenges with . but let us look back , and we sh●ll find , that feare is not where is no probability that the feared thing should happen ; not the possibility , but the probability , causeth feare ; now then when a man is possessed of any thing , if the new commer to plant by him offer him no disturbance , what probability is there that he should be disturbed by him ? men are reasonable creatures , and sociable , without society they can have no happinesse in this world ; they know that , if they should have such feare , there could be no peace to men ; and therefore , without injustice done , or violence offered or menaced , men doe not feare , but rejoyce at such vicinity ; if the possibility of injury should provoke men to such violence , as he speaks of , men might feare their servants , their children , and must by anticipation ( as he speaks presently ) take them away , and no man can live secure so long as there is another man , for there is a poss●bility of destruction to come to any man , from any man , although not a probability . let us look back therefore and see that there is in the heart of every man , a thought of a god , who amongst other infinite excellencie hath punitive justice ; to whom vengeance belongs ; and there is a secret consent to that great axiome , such measure as you mete shall be meted to you againe ; this keeps the universal kind of man in some awe from perpetuating such barbarous acts as he entitles them unto ; and , unless now and then , by some prodigious monster , we see them not violate these lawes in those high kinds which he surmiseth they doe ; all that he writes now i suppose to be but like rubbidge , cast in the reader 's way , to hinder his assault upon his castle of mischief which followes ; i lightly remove them now , but will place my battery strongly presently ; but because i have spoke only of such cases where one is poss●ssor , and the other come's with a desire to what he possesses ; the case may be otherwise where two persons shall come with equal desire to enjoy the same place , and equall title , that is , neither hath occupancy ; and to this i say , they will either debate it by reason , or else fight it out , and the strongest arme will get possession , and , with that , right , not by conquest , for that gives no title , but by occupancie , and it will be unjust for any to meddle with it whilest it is in his possession . thus much sleightly to these things , premised by him to usher in his unhappy conclusions . the rest which he saith , in order to them , may be looked upon through the glasse of what i have already writ , and will appeare of no force ; i shall therefore , to avoid tediousness , step to pag. . where he delivers this unheard of doctrine , untill by him uttered . chap. xx. the condition of warre what , or what sort of men not in it , &c. [ hereby it is manifest , that , during the time men live without a common power , to keepe them all in awe , they are in that condition is called warre , and such a warre as is of every man against every man. ] first , i will examine that phrase ( whilest men live without a common power to heep them in awe ) if this be understood , as he phraseth it , of all kind of power , then there is no such time ; for there is a power divine , which alwaies hath an invisible rod , which keeps all men in awe from perpetrating things against that law which is written in their hearts ; but if it be understood , as his discourse seemes to intimate , of such a power as is humane ; we must then p●sse over all men in their infancy , whom , although they may have discontents , and feares , and hopes , concerning their parents , and their parents concerning them ; yet their natures are framed in such necessities of their parents , and their parents look downe upon them with hearts so filled with kindness and sweetnesse , and this so setled by nature , that although that disposition may be hindred in its operation sometimes from working its proper effects ; yet it is seldome , or never , destroyed from its being ; and therefore men in that estate are most peaceable and free from warre . we must likewise leave men linked in that domestique bond of matrimony , betwixt whom , although there may be discontents , yet there cannot properly be said hostility ; and we will take men , as is hardly ever known , divers single persons without any relation one to the other , but that of humanity , by severall wrecks cast upon the same uninhabited coast ; and let us think of these men whether they are all at a warre one with another , before they have done , or received any injury one from another . sect. . in this condition , i am confident that these men would be in a state of peace rather then warre , and if one by chance should see another in misery , out of that common interest they both have in humanity , he would relieve and help the distressed like a friend , not destroy him as an enemy ; and , by that obligation of another , would strengthen , and secure his owne condition more against misfortunes , then he could by destroying him ; and this humanity is writ in every mans heart , in whom such wicked principles , as his , have not blotted it out ; from this principle it came , that ( acts . ) the barbarous people of malita entertained st. paul with such humanity ; if they had been of mr. hobbes his mind , they would have killed him , but humanity provoked them to kindnesse , and malicious axioms had not abused their judgements ; and therefore man was to man strange man , such as they had no interest in a friend . i know it may be objected here , that those of malita were men united in a common-wealth , and that might cause them to be so civil . he hath taught me to answer this afterwards , shewing how all common-wealths , being independent bodies , are to one another in the state of warre ; and therefore other people are to them like other men to each other . if he should againe reply , that they should have neither hopes nor feares from this ; i answer , they might have bor● hopes to get what they had , and feares that they might spy out their weaknesses , and many other the like , which covetousnesse and desire of safety might have suggested to them , but such as , in them , and ingenious spirits , might easily be controlled by humanity . sect. . but he goe's on to prove , that these men are at warre one with another ( for saith he ) [ warre consisteth not in battaile only ] true , for the schoole distinguish betwixt bellum and pugna , fight or battaile , and warre , or the act of fighting [ but in a tract of time , wherein the will to contend by battaile is sufficiently knowne : and therefore the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of warre . ] he is the most unhappie man in his manner of defining that ever writ ; can any man think that warre consists in a tract of time ? it is true , time is necessary to warre , it is the measure of all rest or actions in the world , it is the measure of their existence , how long they stay and tarry in the world , and so may be reckoned amongst those outward accommodations with which all natural things are fitted ; but it is no essential part of any : to say , that the nature of warre or peace , a horse , or tree , or men consists in time , were foolish ; they are in time measured by time ; but time is not essentiall constitutively , as his friends the schoolmen , and university learning teacheth , but consecutively ; they doe not make these things follow them ; and therefore it was weakly explained by him , when he said , that the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of warres . sect. . but he illustrates this by foule weather ( saith he ) [ the nature of foule weather lyeth not in a shower or two of raine , but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together : so the nature of warre consisteth not in actual fighting , but in the known disposition thereto , during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary . ] his instance , by which he illustrates this conclusion , is erronious ; for foule weather is not an inclination of time ( as he seemes to speak , or else he prove's not , that the notion of time is to be considered in the nature of warre ) but of the heavens in that time ; nor is the weather foule if there be onely an inclination to foulnesse , as hap's in lowring cloudy weather , where is no raine ; yet it is faire , as weather is faire effectively in making the wayes faire ; and this distinction is often observed by our writers of almanacks ; when they will be exact in their prognostiques of weather , they say , now it is inclinable to raine , then it will be raine , and when it doth raine , or in such a time as raine hath such a predominance to make the wayes foule , we call it a foule day or weeke ; but if there be only a disposition to raine , or so little as allayes the dust only , we say , for all that , it is faire weather not foule . sect. . as his illustration is to blame , so is his conclusion ; the disposition to warre , no not the known disposition to it , is warre , for that disposition is nothing but an inclination to warre ; but an actual , or habitual hostility , not enmity only , makes warre ; a man may hate another , one king another , and yet not make warre upon him ; yet that hatred is a disposition to war. so that a disposition to war makes not war , and then the knowledge of it cannot make it other then it is ; but then is war , when two nations endeavour the subjugation or assaulting one another , or one doth it alone ; for although true friendship requires a mutual consent of both parties ; yet a war doth not , for war may be , and is commonly , begun by one party , before the other undertakes it ; and we say often , that one nation makes war , and invade's the other unprovided . but because he vaunts often of the propriety of speech , i may tell him , that war is not properly spoke of single men but kings or nations ; for single men hate one another , cantend one with another , fight one with another , are at enmity one with the other , but not at war , that is proper to publique persons , or nations , only . sect. . what he writes afterwards , of the incommodities of war , is ingenious , but the application is not rightly made to those men ( of which he speaks ) who live without other security then what their own strength , and their own invention , shall furnish them withall ; for let us consider these men either planting neare other men , or alone , we shall still , unlesse war disturbe them , find them adopting and fitting their habitations for their own profit and content ; if a man should , in an hermeticall way , live alone , he would fit his habitation for such a solitary life ; if he should live amongst neighbours , he would accommodate his affaires , the best way he could , to have a neighbourly friendship with them . the application i cannot see how it can be forced unlesse his conclusion , that all men are at war , were granted , for instance we can have none but of hermites ; but for the plantation of families upon the same territories with others , we see abraham and lot planting amongst the canaanites , who , having ground sufficient , lived peaceably with them , and they fitted themselves with all usefull things , for a good time having no warre . i goe on with him therefore on the last particle of the . page ; he there begins . chap. xxi . the conceit of an universal war by nature vain . of the passions and their objects . the great law-maker and his laws . justice done among the americans . the law of nature and dictate of conscience . of militarie valour and prudence . the habits of justice and injustice . of propriety , occupancy , &c. sect. . [ it may seeme strange to some man , who hath not well weighed these things , that nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another ; and he may therefore not wresting to this inference made from the passions , desire , perhaps , to have the same confirmed by experience . ] it is true , the inference from those passions being too weake to prove his conclusion , that every man is at war with every man , we can hardly assent to such an universal proposition concerning a war with all , by all men , the practise of wh●ch was never experimented by any . let us see his instance briefly : it consist's in three things [ that men travel armed , they keep their doores locked ( these two might be spared in my particular , who do neither ) and that in his house he lock's his chests ; by these , saith he , this man accuseth mankind as much by his deeds as he doth by his words ; he saye's so , but i say no. for he accuseth not mankind of this wickednesse , that all the world , and each man naturally is at war one with another , but these mistrust that there are some evill and wicked men in the world ; these know men may be ill ; by these actions , they expresse it ; but he conclude's they are so ; for , certainly , as love and friendship are mighty excellencies in the conversation of man with man , so hatred and warres the greatest evill which he affirme's to be in every man towards every man. sect. . [ but , saith he , neither of us accuse nature in it , the desires , and other passions of man are in themselves no sins , no more are the actions which proceed from those desires , till they know a law that forbids them , which , till lawes be made , they cannot know : nor can any law be made till they have agreed upon the person that shall make it . ] thus he ; we agree both , that the passions are not sins , nor the acts proceeding out of them ; men may love , hate , feare , hope , &c. but the misapplication of the act to the wrong objects , to love that we should hate , or hate what we should love ; or to mistake the degrees , over-love that which is lesse lovely , or lesse love that which is more lovely , and the like , this is it make's a sin ; now the frame and constitution of the objects of our passions is either such by divine institution , or humane ; by divine , that is , the amiableness and fitness things have to man by that gift of god in nature , or else in the positive law of god , in the book of god : that which is by humane institution , is that which humane lawes make desirable or hateful ; of the first sort are these combinations of parents and children , of brethren one amongst another ; yea of men in general as men , for men are all made with natural abilities to doe one another good ; of the second sort are sacraments , and all such rites , which , having no force in their natural constitution , receive a great loveliness and sweetness , from the covenants of god to us in them ; of the last sort are all our proprieties , as goods , and such things , which by neither god in nature , not his written book , are appropriated to us , but are only given us by the law of the land wherein we live . sect. . what is said of desire , may be applyed to any other passion which , affecting any thing contrary to these rules , is a sin ; now what he adde's [ untill they know a law ] is not universally material , for ignorantia juris non excusat , such as he are so farre from knowing , that they will have contradictoriam ignorantiam , they will deny , and oppose the very bond of nature , and teach what is crosse to it ; not knowledge in such cases is a sin , and the mother of such a sin as leade's to perdition , when men hide their eyes , and will not see the sun , but draw vailes betwixt them and it [ which , saith he , untill lawes be made , cannot be known ] but there is no man made without a law to guide him . [ nor , saith he , can any law be made untill they have agreed upon the person that shall make it ] as men , who are borne in a commonwealth , doe not choose their lawmaker , but submit to him , whose government they were under ; so every man is borne a citizen of the world , and he must submit to that great governour and law-maker of the world , god , and that law he hath made for him to doe ; so that , whether a man agree upon a law-maker , or no , there is a law-maker , and a law , under which he is borne , and to which he ought to submit . pag. . he undertake's to satisfie another question thus . sect. . [ it may peradventure be thought , there was never such a time or condition of men as this is , and i beleeve it was never generally so over all the world ; but there are many places where they live so now , for the savage people in many places of america , except the government of small families , the concord whereof dependeth on natural lust , have no government at all , and live at this day in that brutish manner as i said before . ) thus farre he ; his instances in the americans is false , for they had divers kings and kingdomes , and have justice executed amongst them for misdemeanours , as may appeare to any who reade's their stories ; but howsoever , although they had but private families , yet it doth not follow , that they should be at war with all other ; we see abraham's , lot's , private families , lived peaceably in that land , where were two nations , the canaanites and the perizites cohabiting that country with them , gen. . nay , not so onely , but little families may live at peace with mighty kings , so you may see iudges the . and . that there was peace betwixt iabin a mighty king , who brought a puissant army into the field , and the house of heber the kenite ; it was a most unworthy expression , when he said , that the concord of these families dependeth on natural lust ; no , it depend's upon the natural authority of parents , the natural duty of children , the reciprocal returnes of obedience and protection betwixt master and servant . i hasten to his , and my maine designe . sect. . [ howsoever , saith he , it may be perceived what manner of life there would be where there were no common power to feare , by the manner of life , which men , that have formerly lived under a peaceable government , use to degenerate into a civill war. ] this instance nothing illustrate's his conclusion , to prove that men of themselves are at war by an instance drawn from a civill war , or indeed from any other warre ; for the conditions of war must needs be with those that are at war ; but he should prove that they are such before any warlike act , or menaces , hath passed betwixt them , and that he seeme's to doe in what follow 's . sect. . [ but ( saith he ) though there had never been any time wherein particular men were in a conditirn of war one against another : yet in all time kings and persons of soveraign authority , because of their independency , are in continual jealousies , and in the state and posture of gladiators , having their weapons pointing , and their eyes fixed one on another . ] this was so handsomly expressed , that i could willingly have let it alone ; but least it should , by the ingenuity of it , steale a credit of his opinion into a reader , i must censure it as nothing to the purpose ; for all this can prove no war , but that these soveraignes imagine each other may be wicked , and faith-breakers , just as before , because there may be thieves in his family , he lock's his chest. this prove's only that they are in a posture of war , but not in war it self ; or , indeed , this is not absolutely a posture of war , for that require's men pressed , drawne into the field . and by this reckoning all nations should be at war one with another ; and indeed there is the same condition betwixt them and particular persons , who have no supreame coercive power amongst them to restraine them ; but to say , that all nations are at war one with another , even those who are in peace , were to say , as he did before , that all things are motion , even rest its self . but now i come to the upshot which he aimed at , and i think most wicked , for which cause it was necessary for me lightly to s●eep away the rubbige , which being done , i come to his following discourse . sect. . [ to this war of every man against every man this also is consequent that nothing can be unjust . ] he must understand this of such men who are not joyned in a politique society ; now i deny , that there is nothing unjust to such men , he affirme's it ; let us consider his proofes : he prove's it thus [ the actions of right or wrong , justice and injustice , have there no place ] this is the same in other words , but his proof lye's in what followe's [ where there is no common power , there is no law , where no law , no injustice ] thus he . to this i answer , that there is no man born in this world without a law and a common power over him and others ; the law is that writ in their hearts , and this is it which st. paul speake's , rom. . . which shewe's the law written in their hearts , that law of nature that practique law which is writ in the heart of every man , and this common power is god ; and therefore , as st. paul speakes there , their conscience also bearing witness , and their thoughts , the mean while , accusing or excusing one another ; where there is evidence accusing , excusing , there is supposed a common power , so that there is a common power , and this secretly acknowledged by men ; and that he hath given them certain lawes for the breach of which there is a horror and dread , insomuch as a man cannot live , or it is a prodigie to see a man without all conscience of the principal and fundamentall rules of reason ; although men may doe and act against those lawes , yet untill a long custom of living have hardned their hearts , or some such wicked principles , as his , have , by degrees , stollen an approbation in their their understandings ( by degrees , i say , for i think it not possible to be done in an instant ) untill then it is not pospossible for men to sin against these without an accusation of their consciences . he proceed's . sect. . [ force and fraud are in war the two cardinal vertues ] in a war actually waged force is of great use , and may well be called one of the best hinges upon which war is moved ; yea , if we take force not for strength but violence , as i think he doth , but in the posture of war , or in war only in expectation , violence is the chiefe support of all injustice ; but certainly it is most improperly called a vertue in any but a most forced and violent way ; for vertues are those things which perfect the soule , which make the work and worker good ; but no force doth that , neither doth it assist in doing , but it is indifferent to good or bad ; then againe , force , even in war , may be a help to increase the wickednesse of it ; if the war be unjust , it is doubly evill , which is fortified with force ; if the acts of that war be cruell , it is doubly bloudy , which is effected by force : and then for fraud , although stratagems are lawfull , yet falshood in war is wicked , which is comprehended under that notion of fraud , as to promise one thing , and doe another ; all stratagems have a double sense , by which the enemy deceive's himself , taking the visard from the true face ; but they , having a true face discernable , are not all visards and forces ; where there is no war engaged in , but only some private end or design of one man against another , they are in themselves wicked , and provoke the just vengeance of a war from the injured party upon them . he should have said valour and prudence were cardinal vertues in war , but force and fraud are these degenerated , and when they get these names of force and fraud , they never retaine that excellent nature of being vertues . sect. . he urgeth further ; iustice and injustice ( saith he ) are none of the faculties neither of the body , nor the mind . ] i think if he take faculty , as he seem's to doe , for an innate quality , no man ever said they were ; therefore his proof is needlesse , when he come's on [ if they were , they might be in a man that were alone in the world , as well as his senses and passions ] although they are not innate faculties , but acquisite habits , i meane the vertue justice , or the vice injustice ; yet the habits may be , when they are acquired with that man who is alone , and when he is alone , though , to act accordingly , require's a present object ; now denominations are given from the habits , not the acts . he proceed's [ they are qualities that relate to men in society , not in solitude ] our dispute is of a third sort of men , neither in such society as a civill policy , nor a solitude , but men without all relations , of being under one common sublunary governance , and yet men cohabiting in the same neighbourhood , where may be perpetrated those horrid and unjust actions of murder and theevery , &c. and again , although the acts of justice doe suppose other men to doe justice upon ; yet it is other men , not other men in the same city , or polities ; and when , by the use of those acts , a habite is got , it remaine's in solitude . sect. . he draw's another conclusion [ hence thus it is consequent also to the same condition , that there be no propriety , no dominion , no mine and thine distinct , but only that to be every mans that he can get , and for so long as he can keep it . ] the wickednesse of this proposition will best appeare betwixt two states , two neighbour nations , they certainly have distinct dominions , and it is injustice for one to take by force from the other , or detaine by force what he hath gotten ill , which is against all the consent of men from the beginning of the world ; now these two nations are without any other coercive power in this world , and from that reason are justly paralleld by him to such men as he formerly spake of ; and therefore these nations should have no propriety ( as he explaines himself ) not in any thing : consider therefore gen. . and the . chap. how in two places abraham's wife sarah was like to have been taken from him by the kings of those nations where he lived ; but god punished them for it ; and they acknowledged it would have been a great sin to have layne with another mans wife . mr. hobbes would have pleaded with god , there is no propriety in any thing ; all men have title to all things ; where is no coercive power upon earth , there is no injustice : the woman is any mans who can get her by fraud or force , so long as he can keep her ; they who have no common power above them ( as these had not ) to make lawes , which might appropriate interests to particular persons , these are bound to no law , nor have any propriety but such as force gives them ; and then both abimelek and pharaoh , or other of them , might lawfully have kept sarah , abrahams wife from him ; but the principles of the law of nature say it was unjust , and they did not doe it . thus it fared concerning the propriety of wives ; now we will examine what propriety men had in estates , where was no such humane authority : without doubt the first that ever gave outward lawes , to governe a nation by , was moses ; and i conceive the decalogue to be like our magna charta , which was not a new law , but a briefe and pithy expression of what was the old law , by which this people was governed ; so were the ten commandements not a new law , but an expression in tables of that morall law of nature , which was writ in the heart of men before , and practised before his time ; in particular this of stealing , which injured the possessor of meum & tuum , mine and thine ; you may reade a most excellent passage in the . of gen. with what civility of discourse , and reciprocal courtesies , abraham bought the field in machpelah of ephron the hittite . first i collect thence , that abraham judged there was a legall interest in ephron , for else he would not have payd such a round price for it as foure hundred shekels of silver ; and then you may observe how sacred amongst all people the preservation of interest was , for in the last of gen. you shall find , that jacob , when he died in egypt , a great way off , in another nation , having , both he and his , left the land , neare two hundred yeares after the purchase , when he and his , without doubt , were not known , scarce remembred , iacob gave order for the burying of his body there , and it was performed without any disturbance ; so sacred did those people without any positive law , but the principles of nature , observe the particular interest of particular men , even such who at the time of the purchase were but sojourners among them , and at the time of the last usage were not so much as cohabitants , but strangers in another country and nation ; so that we see as men have had alwaies consciences which directed them in their actions ; so those consciences have had a sense of intruding upon another's interest , and abraham was assured that it was such amongst them ; for , upon that presumption , he paid so great a price for that field . sect. . if it should be asked , how men should come to get these interests ? i will not here scan all wayes ; one is evident , that is , occupancy , taking possession of it first , for all the things in this world being but bona utilia , and the profit they have is their service to man , he who first gets possession of them is lord of them ; thus fowles and fishes , even in planted nations , which are no mans possessions being caught by any man , are his to make profit , and when one man hath caught them , that they are his possession , it is thievery to rob him of them . i speak not here of deere , conyes , hares , nor fishes in ponds , &c. which are impaled , and so for their habitation , by our laws , are made to pay their host with their lives ; nor such things which our lawes indulging the pleasures of gent. and men of quality , have appropriated to certain persons and places , as pheasants , and partridges , and the like , but whatsoever no nationall particular law hath given to another , that the law of nature gives to the first possessor : and this law men find before any positive law of nations in the practise of the world ; so that then it is apparent , that , without positive laws , or an outward humane coercive power , the law of nations hath alwaies given a propriety in this world's goods to the sons of men . thus i have passed my opinion upon his . chapter , and i think have given reasons for what i spake ; but if this be not enough , let the reader consider what i shall speake to the next chapter , and that will the more fully discribe the mist of his opinions , and confirm mine more stronger . censures upon the th chapter of leviathan , which is entituled , the first and second naturall lawes and of contracts , which thus begin's . chap. xxii . concerning the pretended necessity in nature for the preservation of life . the prospect of an happiness beyond it ; death represented more terrible than it is , &c. sect. . [ the right of nature , which writers commonly call jus naturale , is the liberty each man hath to use his own power , as he will himself , for the preservation of his own nature ; that is to say , his own life , and consequently of doing any thing which in his own judgement and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto . ] here is a description of the right of nature , which is that he saith , writers call jus naturale : i believe this gentleman never in his life read jus naturale so described in any author . it is true , to preserve a mans own life is a branch of the right of nature , but it doth not contain the whole nature of it , as if the right of nature extended to nothing else but the preservation of a mans own life ; there are many other things which the right of nature enables us to doe ; but because i find this question in my opinion more methodically and schollarly delivered in his book entituled de copore politico , cap. . i shall therefore consider that first ; and , having cleared that discourse , apply my self to this description , and i will begin with his . number . that number begins thus . sect. . [ forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and desire that which is good for themselves , and to avoyd that which is hurtful , but most of all the terrible enemy of nature , death , from whom men expect the losse of all power , and also the greatest of bodily paine in the loosing . ] the phrase , which i here censure first , is that necessity makes us do this : i know this word necessity is often used for what we terme want or poverty , because such a man need 's somewhat , therefore we say he is in necessity ; and in this sense there may be some truth in that proposition ; for because men's lives have lack of supplies ; and , according to this gentleman , all the world are his enemies , or , what is the truth , no man will have so much care to supply him as himself , therefore he must doe it ; but then take necessity as it opposeth contingency , which is the common logical sense , it is absolutely false , for many men throw and take away their own lives ; now that which is necessarily done , cannot be otherwise ; men cannot choose but doe what they doe out of necessity ; the phrase were much more proper to say , that the law of nature enjoyne's them to provide for themselves ; for the great natura naturans , god , as i said before , know's our necessities , and like a wise law-maker , makes lawes to provide for them , and so infinitely wise are those laws that what he hath not , by some law or other , provided for , it is not necessary for any man whatsoever ; and certainly therefore where is no lawfull and honest way to preserve it , life its self is not necessary ; he seem's therefore to expresse himself better in corpore politico then in leviathan , because in leviathan he restrain's this right of nature only to the preservation of his own life , but in this , i now write against , he saith not only but [ most of all his own life ] other things he may have a right unto , but most of all , or chiefly the preservation of his own life , or rather the avoyding of death . sect. . what he saith , that ( necessity of nature makes us desire our own good , and avoyd that which is hurtful ) is true in that generality , but applyed to any particular , is false ; for there is no particular but may appeare to some men good , and to others hurtfull : even these things , life or death , are such ; some men have thought this temporall life a misery clothed with these circumstances they possesse it with , like a rotten house , which , when the winds and raine drives in , is worse then the open fields ; like a prison , it were better have no house then that ; such is the body to the soul ; and therefore men may , and have often wished to be delivered out of it , and death to some men is as desired as a freedome from a gaole . this gentleman talkes up and downe in these books , not only like a natural man , but like the worst of them , and the wickedest ; for wise men among them have written much in contempt of these sensual temporal things , in which he placeth the only aime and happiness of man. sect. . certainly , even in nature the life of man is not the principal thing of man's happinesse , and then not of mans intention and care ; for life is a thing which a man enjoyes in common with beasts and trees , and therefore if man's happinesse should be in that , he were no better , yea much worse then they whose excellency consists in a relation to man ; to live only , is to be a beast , a plant only ; but to live vertuously and reasonably , to glorifie that god who gave him those abilities by which his life is happy , that is the end of man , and of mans life , which he is to leave then when he cannot enjoy it upon these conditions ; and to a christian man , as to the best of philosophers who had thoughts and assurance of eternity , this life hath been reputed of little value ; and to die no misery ; because it is but the passage to a better and more spirituall life , although perhaps there may be some difficulties in opening the gate ; yet it is not to be compared with the happiness it admits into , nay , it hath been of such esteem amongst men of honour alwaies , that they would choose to die vertuously , rather then live dishonourably ; instances would be numerous out of the roman story ; so that it is impossible , in that absolute sense , without limitation , in which he speaks it , to be true , that this is the whole right of nature , as his leviathan or his chiefe or principal as his corpus politicum , to preserve this life , or to avoid this enemy , death , which , for multitudes , may , and , for not a few reasons , ought to be despised : these phrases which he useth , sect. . from whom we expect the lesse of power ] he meane's , death [ and the greatest of bodily paines in the loosing ] must be censured next ; and first of the first . by death we doe not loose all power ; yea without doubt , like a man out of prison , he is more active and able then he was within ; so is the soul , when it is broke out of this gaole or dunghill , its natural corruptible body ; nor can he say that he meant bodily power , for then he would not have left out that word bodily in this which he joyned with paine in his following sentence ; men , without question , who have hopes of that better life hereafter , do not expect the losse of all power by this death , but rather the increase of it ; and therefore , suppose he should say he meant bodily power , which indeed must needs be lost by death , yet who is troubled to loose a bag of silver , when in its room shall be left a bag of gold ; to loose bodily power , and gaine spirituall ? it was said of our druids in england , who taught the immortality of the soule , ignavi est rediturae parcere vitae , it was a poor dull thing , to spare that life which would returne again ; but then if they had pryed into , and could have considered , the glorious immortall existence , which men shall have hereafter for the mortall and contemptible being here , it might have been said that it were not only a dul , but a beastly thing for a man so much to affect the sensual pleasures of this fleshly life , as to be unwilling for the losse of them to gaine spirituall perfections ; we cannot then say that we expect to loose by death all our power ; and if we do leave bodily powers , we are not loosers , but gainers by it . sect. . his next phrase is [ that by death we expect in the losing these powers , the greatest bodily paine . ] this gentleman i guesse hath only looked upon death in those horrid vizards , and disguises which fearfull men masque it with , he hath not been so often in the house of mourning as i have , and there made this observation , that death is not so horrid as many men conceit it , nor the paines so great , that death is not so fearful , is apparent , not only in experience of those martyrs who have dyed for the glory of christ , and so by their blessed sufferings for him have had an assurance that they shall reigne with him ; but even in those who with heroick spirits have confronted death in politique concernments , yea sought it , which shewed , that there is not a necessity of nature to preserve life , or that they expected the greatest paine in the losing it . i could fill divers sheets with instances both ancient and moderne , these i let passe , lest they kick me in the teeth whilest i follow them in the chase ; for the former ; consider how many wicked men have killed themselves for feare of worse paines alive , so sardanapalus , so cleopatra , so nero , multitudes esteeming the paines of death deliverance from the pains of unhappie life , and themselves made choice of death upon such conditions ; but take one instance , where men were not concerned in the benefit of death themselves , but took it in relation to others good ; we may read in the life of otho , or rather in his death , that when after his losse in that great and fatal battell betwixt his forces and those of vitellius , he being retreated , and discontented , his souldiers flocked to him , beseeching him to head them again , and regaine the losse of that day , promising how that they were all ready to dye in that cause , with , and for him , if there should be necessity ; and , to give him assurance of what they said , one of the most obscure and meanest sort of souldiers drew his sword and killing himself told him , know o caesar , that we are all provided thus to die for thee ! this man had no end for himself , but onely to encourage otho , either for his countries good , or his owne , to engage againe ; yet go on , and we shall find that otho , unmoved with this or any thing else killed himself likewise , and his souldiers carrying him to his funeral pile , many more slew themselves there to dye with him ; so that as love of his country , or otho's imagined vertues provoked the first , so a bare love to his person inflamed the rest to dye with him ; now certainly there could not be a necessity of nature in these men to expect the greatest pains in death , nor indeed can i think there is such paine ; old men weare out questionless like a candle ; those deaths which this gent. speakes of , are by the assaults of enemies , or condemnation of superiours ; these are suddain , and , although there should be great paine , yet , finishing their work quickly , are to be lesse valued ; but i doe not think that there is such paine , and therefore , as it is reported of cato , so it happens to many , that when they have wounded themselves and are somwhat holpen , they yet kill themselves again ; for so it was with cato , as plutarch describes him , after his wounding himself and fall from his bed , that his bowels gushed out , and his physician , having found them unhurt , had put them up into their owne place againe , he returning to himself ( sure he was in the porch of death , and had viewed it throughly ) thrust his physician away , tare his wound wider , let out his bowels , and with them his life ; this is familiar in common experience ; now if there were so much paines in death , although they who were ignorant of it might easily adventure upon it , yet not they who knew it , as cato and those other ; for , without doubt , the paines of death were passed by cato , when his physician came to him , and he had lost his senses ; so likewise the death of arria , paelus his wife , which is celebrated by martials excellent epigram . cas●a suo gladium cum traderet arria paeto , quem de visceribus traxerat ipsa suis : crede mihi vulnus quod feci non dolet inquit , sed quod tu facies , hoc mihi paete dolet . the story goes thus , she stole to her husband in prison , bring 's him a sword under her coat , invite's him to kill himself with it , he was fearefull , she to encourage him , drawes her sword , runne's it into her own body first , gives her self a deadly wound , then give 's it him with this high expression of kindnesse . beleeve me , paetus , this wound grieves not me , that wound 's my griefe which must be made by thee . now although we may allow the manner , the sweetnesse , the elegancy of this kindness , to be the poets , yet the ground of the expression we may conceive to be reall , that she desired to have her husband dye ( as some thought ) honourably , which he , having received some of mr. hobbes his principles , was fearefull to doe ; she encouraged him to it by her owne example , and then told him , it was no hard matter to dye . now if it had been so full of paine , as mr. hobbes would have it , that paine would not have given her leave to have attended his good in the middest of it . to the same purpose i can tell a story of a child of mine own , somewhat above foure years old , who being sickly , i put out to a neighbours house , in whose care i confided , to attend her ; she grew weaker and weaker unto death , and almost immediately before her death the man of the house coming home from his business , she called the woman , whom she usually called , old mother : old mother , said she , goe give the old man his breakfast , he will be angry else ; and leave such a boy to rock me in my cradle , and so straightway dyed . this is my collection , if death had been so painfull , this child could not have had so much leasure f●om the anguish of it , as to have attended that ease of her own rocking , or that kindness to the old man ▪ sect. . i have ( i thank god ) seen divers dye without any apprehension of any great paines in them , yea like a sleep , so hath death seized upon them , so like sleepe , as by the by-standers it could not be discerned from it , and hath made me often think that death is to a dying man , as sleep to a sleepie , and as much desired ; when the body hath been tyred out with long labour it hath so gone to his long rest , which to us who have assurance of the resurrection , is no other ; and to this purpose , i remember a story related by plutarch , that when diogenes was towards his death , having taken his cicuta which was the sleepie medicine that he , and socrates , and divers others used , his physician raising him up even as he was about to die , and asking him whether he felt any trouble , diogenes answered , no ; for , saith he , the brother ushers in the sister , meaning he was asleep , as men seeme to us many times before their death . and i can second this story with another , out of mine own family , of a son of mine who was but two yeares old ; and when death laid hands upon him , he still cryed out to goe to sleepe ; now he would sleep in this mans arms , then on the bed ; sleepe is often called an image of death , but death came to him in the image of sleep ; he had been oft acquainted with sleep , had never heard death abused by those invectives which sensual men use against it ; and when death came , he took it for sleepe ; nay , so like ( to many ) is that repose of death to that of sleepe , that when they are forced from it by the importunate clamours , or halings and pullings of friends , it is just as a man awaked from sleep , and many men have complained of it as of an unjust violence . it is therefore the ugly sceletons and pictures of death which men see , and the abusive language and rhetorique which hath been used towards it , which makes death so fearfull , as it is , amongst men ; and therefore i could tell of some who having heard death in the common manner calumniated , when upon their death-bed they have been told of its approach , have wondred that that was death which had so little anguish and grief in it ; i doe not here say that no men have paine in death , there are three periods of time into which death may be divided . sect. . there is that tract of time when first a sicknesse gets such a head as it is deadly ; there is secondly that interim in which man grows insensible ; and there is , thirdly , that instant in which the soule of man is separated from the body : in regard of which last it was truly spoke of seneca , when he said , death should not be fearfull , which , when it comes , is not discerned ; for death taken in this last acceptation cannot be perceived , no not in the second , but taking death in the first way , it is many times more , many times lesse painfull , of which i would dilate physically , but avoyd tediousness ; it is a thing as apparent , as almost death its self , that sometimes in that tract of time there may be paine , and most oft is ; but there are greater paines , i beleeve , to many people that out-live their sicknesses , then those when diseases grow deadly ; and i am perswaded that the same disease , unless by wounds ( and many times in them too ) i say the same disease is most oft more painful when it is curable before it be deadly , then afterwards , because the spirits are quicker , & the man more sensible ; & therefore i conclude , that it is not true , that there is a necessity of nature which maketh men in generall avoid death in generall , as the thing by which he must needs expect the greatest paine ; for it often happens that there is little paine ; and people that have dyed with a sense of deaths ugliness , and so , with some impatience , i have found complaining of common accidents , and such which had no participation of death in them , and no cooperation to the dissolution of soule and body by death , as aches in particular parts , sometimes they were galled , and that troubled them ; sometimes that there were clods or hardness in the bed , &c. all which shewed that these paines , not those of death , were more sensible then even death its selfe . sect. . [ he proceeds , it is not against reason that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and limbes both from death and paine ] had he put in that little word and esteemed a little thing by him , ( justly and honestly ) he had said truth ; but alas else how unreasonable a thing it is , that a man , to save himself from a little pain , should act things prejudiciall to the glory of god , the publique good , or else some greater good of his own ; any man , who hath sense of any thing but sense , and unworthy ease , cannot choose but apprehend that the greater good should be chosen before the lesse , such are those before specified . therefore in such cases that they , for paine or death its self , are relinquished is against reason . what he adde's [ and that which is not against reason we call right , &c. ] i agree to ; for certainly there is no wrong which is not against reason ; but his deduction [ it is therefore a right of nature , that every man may preserve his own life and limbes with all the power he hath ] this deduction , by what is already said , cannot be true , but when his life and limbes are not opposed by some greater good . chap. xxiii . of using or misusing meanes in order to their end . the regulation of mans judgment in it . the preservation of life and estate when necessary . of right and wrong , law , &c. sect. . . i come now to number . which begins thus [ and because where a man hath right to the end , and the end cannot be attained without the meanes , that is , without such things as are necessary to the end , it is consequent that it is not against reason , and therefore right , for a man to use all meanes , and doe whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body . ] how vile and illogicall is this ; had he proved that the body were the end of man : or , instead of body , had he said , for the preservation of that end , his axiome , explained thus , might have borne him out in it ; but , as it is pu● , there is no connexion ; for suppose a man hath right to the end , his own happiness , and by that right likewise to all meanes which conduce to it ; yet unlesse this body can be proved to be that end , his application of it to the body is of no force . well ; i will examine his aphorisme . first he , who hath right to the end , hath not right to all meanes of getting it , is apparent ; for he who hath right to an estate , or an house , hath not right to take it by force , he must onely use legall meanes for the obtaining and preserving it , and so , though a man have right to his body or life , yet he hath no right to preserve it by unlawfull actions ; it is a most just rule of law , that a man must so use his owne , as he must not hurt another ; a man hath right to water and a meadow , but he must not so use his water and his meadow , as by overflowing his meadow he should drowne his neighbours corne. so although a man have right to his life , yet this right is not of such a transcendent power as to enable him , for the preservation of that life , to hurt others and destroy their lives . but once again , for further and clearer explication of that rule he gives concerning an end let us observe , that it hath no truth but concerning the last end , and in that it hath ; for since all mens actions are for an end , that is , his summum bonum , his happiness , every man , out of necessity of nature , doth , what he doth , for it , and the utmost he can for it ; but this life or body is not mans happiness , and for any second end , there being no necessity of the end it self , there is much less of any means which conduce to it ; and therefore of such ends , of which nature mans temporall life and body are , there is no manner of truth in it , no more then if we should say , it were right for a man to doe what he can , any thing to obtain pleasure , or profit , upon which he sets his heart . sect. . his . numb . must be likewise examined which saith [ also every man by right of nature is judge himself of the necessity of the meanes , and of the greatness of the danger . this hath some truth in it , and yet not to be so understood , that by right of nature a man may judge what he will , and accordingly act , and what he acts is right , as he seems to imply here , & from hence enforces afterwards ; for as in our judicatures there must use be made of judges , and the decrees of those judges will regulate and govern our possessions ; yet those judges have rules by which their judicatures should be regulated , and what they act contrary to those rules , or lawes , although it may be effected , yet it is wicked ; so it is in those , no doubt ; but every man will ( in such an impossible state as he supposeth man ) judge of the meanes and necessity , but yet there is a law of nature in every man , by which his judgement should be guided , and what he judgeth , though never so congruent to his will , contrary to this law , is not right ; so that , as a judge , though what he judgeth must be performed , and he hath power to judge what he thinkes fit ; yet he hath right to judge only according to the law of that nation which gave him the power of being a judge , all other judgement is by power , but not by right ; so is it with this man , he may act against the law of nature for the preservation of his life or limbe , but if not right , it is wicked to doe so . the argument he brings for proofe of this conclusion convinceth not me . [ for , saith he , if it be against reason that i be judge of mine own danger my self , then it is reason that another may be judge , &c. ] it is reason , say i , that in such a case i am judge , but it is reason likewise , that i judge according to law , and make my will be guided by reason , not my reason regulated by my will ; because it is mine , it is not therefore right ; but because mine according to the law of nature and right reason ; of which he himself afterwards grants , there are divers lawes both of men in society , to men single , and to men that live together , although not united in a policy . sect. . in his . number he affirms [ as a mans judgement in right of nature is to be imployed for his own benefit , so also the strength , &c. of every man is then rightly imployed when he useth it for himself . ] to use the phrase of the time , this gent. is very selfish , and indeed there is some reason in what he writes ; for as his judgement , so his strength , &c. but his judgement is to be imployed according to the law of nature only for himself , and so his strength ; when some greater good shall be proposed to him , the good of his family , his nation , the glory of god in his vertuous death , then this life is to be neglected and contemned ; as a limb is to be lost rather then a life , the lesse good rather then the greater , so a private life rather then that of a nation . but his argument is feeble and of no force , when he saith [ else a man hath no right to preserve himself , ] for although it be right for a man to preserve himself , yet not with those other greater losses ; it is right for a man to preserve each piece of his estate , yet to preserve it by force , or losse of a sons life or his owne , when that piece of his estate shall be inconsiderable , it is not right for him to doe it ; in a word , a mans understanding , strength , or whatsoever a man hath , he hath right to bestow upon the preservation of this life ; but then when they are not called for by some more excellent and more desirable good then this life , then they are to be bestowed upon that better imployment , not this . sect. . now i am arrived at his . and last number , which i meane to handle in this chapter , which begins thus [ every man by nature hath right to all things , that is to say , to doe whatsoever he listeth , to whom he listeth , to possess , use and enjoy all things he will and can . ] a good large commission : i will examine it , and , to the understanding it , i will return to his leviathan , where i left pag. . and discussing the beginning of that . chap. lay a foundation for that truth which this number occasions me to deliver . first then , let me observe , that as in the beginning of this chap. he define's right by equity , liberty ; so immediately after he define's liberty to be the absence of external impediments ; and again a little after , putting a distinction betwixt right and law , he saith , that law and right differ as much as obligation and liberty , which in one and the same matter are inconsistent ; in which proposition he discovers a mighty weakness ; for in his definition of right he make's it nothing but the power and ability to doe what he will , as indeed he make's it afterwards , when right implies an equitable title to what he doth ; and a man may have right , when he hath not power to doe accordingly , but is hindred by externall impediments from acting according to his right ; that definition of his is therefore very weak ; for what he speaks , that law and right are inconsistent , i am so directly in my judgement against it , that i think there is no right to any thing but by law , which i will thus confirme by what followes . sect. . right and wrong , or injury , are opposite termes ; so that right is the convenience or agreement which one thing hath with another ; and wrong is the disagreement ; as it is a right line which agree's with the rule of streightness ; a crooked line or a wrong one , which deviates from those rules ; a right shot that which hit's the white , and a wrong which misseth . so it is a right action which is according to the rules of actions , and a wrong which differ's from them . these rules are that we call law , which regulate's our actions ; and when they are done , accordingly they are right , and we have right to doe them ; and to this purpose , he said in the preceding chap. where no law , no injustice ; and i may say , where can be no injustice , there can be no justice ; contraries appertaine to the same subject , and expell each other out of it . so then , if right be an agreeing with some rule or law , it is so farre from being inconsistent with it , that it cannot be without it . as in a common-wealth , a man hath only such a right to use or act any thing as the law of that common-wealth gives him ; so in the generality of this world , a man can only have right to doe or act such things which the universal law of nature direct's or impowers him to doe . thus his leviathan being touched , concerning this point , i will returne to his de corpore politico , where i left , and shew what manner of right the law of nature gives a man ; and whether there be such a large charter as he expresseth , or no. chap. xxiv . of the law and right of nature . man's subjection to god , and dominion over the creatures ; the rules of his actions . man exempted out of adam's charter ; why . noah's patent ; and his sons p●ss●ssing themselves of the world . the titles of propriety discussd . jus & vtile , &c. sect. . to understand which , let us conceive , that the law of nature belonging to every thing is that law which was given it at the creation ; and the right of nature , or jus naturale , must be that authority or title is granted by that law to use or doe any thing ; which title can be nothing but that jus or right which god gave him , gen. . , . which we find to extend to the earth , the fowle , the fishes , the living things that move upon the earth , the herbs and trees ; this is his jus naturale , but yet this is not to be used as he will , although he be lord of them , there are lawes for lords as well as servants , kings as well as subjects ; and they must be subject to the king of heaven , as their subjects to them ; yea , in these things which they are made lords over ; we may see in the . of genesis , that cain and abel brought oblations to god of those things over which they had a most peculiar dominion ; they pay'd god , as it were , a tribute out of those things he gave them a right to by that law of nature which he gave them at their creation ; from whence it appeare's that man hath not such right to any thing , much lesse to all things , to do what he pleaseth with or to them , for then they had had no right to have neglected that duty of oblation , and then they could have done nothing by which god should have put a difference betwixt cain and his oblation ; and abel and his oblation , as he did : sect. . then secondly , let us consider that here is not in this charter expressed any right a man hath over other men , but this right is equally granted to man over those creatures there specified , but none to any man over another ; therefore all right that any man hath to doe any thing to another must either be by nature , as parents , in regard of whose origination of their children's lives and educa●●●● of them , they have naturally a right to governe and 〈◊〉 any things concerning them ; or else it must be by 〈◊〉 covenant , concession or yielding , expressed or 〈◊〉 of one to the other ; but in the original charter 〈◊〉 is not any grant or priviledge given to one over 〈◊〉 ; and therefore barbarous acts of inhumanity , 〈◊〉 it is to be supposed that no man would yield 〈◊〉 should act upon him , no man can have right to 〈◊〉 ; upon these considerations his proposition must 〈◊〉 perish , when he saith , every man hath right to any 〈◊〉 ; but he seemes to prove it thus . [ for seeing all 〈◊〉 he willeth must therefore be good to him , in his owne ●●dgement , because he willeth them , and may tend to his pre●●●vation some way or other , or he may judge so , and we have ●ade him judge thereof , sect. . if he had said , i have ●ade him judge thereof , the force of the argument would quickly have been shat●ered , because his authority is weake to constitute a judge in so weighty affaires ; but when he said we , i wonder who he meanes . i am sure i was none of them , nor doe i remember to have read any other , but himself , of that mind , that every man must be judge of his own cause : i know every man will judge and act according to his judgement , who is an honest and vertuous man ; but to be a judge authoritativè , which that phrase ( we have made him judge thereof ) doth imply , is that which no man saith but himself ; how he is a judge , i have shewed before , by what right to judge , by the law of nature , not by his making him ; his will hath not right with it to act any thing because he willeth it , but because it is regulated by the lawes of nature , and acts according to those rules , therfore only he hath right to doe what he doth by them ; and therefore his conclusion , which ( he saith ) follow 's out of his premises , is vain , which is , that all things may be rightly done by him . sect. . he goe's on with another , [ for saith he , for this cause it is rightly said , natura dedit omnia omnibus , that nature hath given all things to all men ] the truth of this must next be examined . nature may be said to have given all things to all men , those things before expressed in gods charter at mans creation ; but nature hath not given men right over one another , which is mainly importuned by him in both these treatises , and must be understood in the latitude of that universall terme all things ; for unless other men , all things cannot be given to him ; now that other men are not given to each other will appeare out of this , that then god should not be offended with those acts which were done one to another where is no positive law ; for where there is no positive law of god's , or man's prohibiting them , only the law of nature is of force to restraine mens actions , and to give right to every thing ; and , without doubt god can be displeased with nothing that is right ; well then , let us cast our eyes upon the . chap. of genesis ; we shall find there the sodomites attempting a most wicked and unjust act upon two strangers way-faring men , as they thought , because the assault was so universal by the old and young , of the city , it is reasonable to think , there was no positive law against that sin , for men universally would not confront a positive law ; and againe , if there had been any positive law , it is probable , lot would have urged it to them ; but there being none , and these men by the height of their lust ( which is one of mr. hobbes his titles ) having smothered the light of nature , pursued the design , and had the wrath of god falling on them by fire ; why was god so angry ? mr. hobbes would have told him , there is no positive law forbidding it , and thou hast given all things to all men by nature , and it is lawfull for any man to doe any thing to any man. let us ascend higher , and consider , in the . of genesis , that cain kills abel ; in the vers . god questions cain about him , where is thy brother abel ? his answer was somwhat like mr. hobbes's , i know not , am i my brothers keeper ? and yet this was but like him , it was very short of mr. hobbes's his impiety ; he only pleaded that he was not accomptable for him , he was not to be charged with his condition , be it what it will ; mr. hobbes he would have told god , thou hast given him to me , and i had right to doe what i would with him , by thy commission ; this villain wan thy favour from me , and now i have taken him away by that naturall right which thou hast given me ; mr. hobbes he would have out-cained cain himself , in his justification of these horrid acts , by his principles ; but because god , whose anger is never but most just , did express himself so severely against him , & could not be just , unlesse these sodomites and cain had transgressed some law ( which could be none but the law of nature ) it must needs shew that these men had no right to doe what they would with any thing , that is , with other persons ; but had their right confined in many acts by the law of natu●e ▪ againe , if every man had right over every other person , then those men have mutually right over one an●●her , and the same persons , in the same cause , in respect of the same persons , should be both superiours and infe●●ours , which is a contradiction , and impossible to be . i let this passe therefore without further trouble , and come to examine how nature hath given all those other things , the earth , the fowles , the beasts , to all men . sect. . to understand this we must have recourse to the charter before mentioned in the first of genesis , as likewise psal. . . the earth hath he given to the children of men , which gift was made by the law of nature at the first creation , for else we find no other grant , unless some men may think it a new patent which was made to noah and his sons , gen. . which yet upon examination will appeare no other but a renewing of the former charter , which being given to man in his integrity , he might justly suspect to be lost by his sinne ; god therefore , in this replanting the world , repeats the former priviledges , almost word for word , after the flood ; and therefore if it were a gift of god by nature at the first , or with nature in the creation , it is now either a positive law , or else a renewing of the former charter . let us now examine it , and begin with noah , for wh●tsoever the other charter to adam was , if it differ from that to noah , as sure it doth not , in any materiall thing , yet it would advance the knowledge of this truth but little , because all that was passed w●s so washed with the flood , as there was utterly a new beginning ; now we may observe then in the . chap. of gen. vers . . that god blessed noah and his sonnes , and gave the possession of all sublunary things to them indifferently ; for although there was a principality in noah , without doubt , over his sons ; yet it seemes by that terme ( yee ) in the plurall number , that a right to all these creatures was granted to them all , and by that universall phrase over every beast , &c. i● seemes that every one had a right to all these , though noah had his paternall dominion over his sonnes onely ; and this generall right is described by some casuists to be like that of coheires to the same inheritance when their father is dead , each of which hath his right to the whole untill they come to a partition ; and this is called non plenum dominium ; they have a right to the whole , but not a full right ; there is no grasse upon that inheritance which you can say any of these coheirs have not a right unto untill the partition , yet no one hath a full dominion of the whole , they cannot sell , or alien the whole . or , methinkes , it was like entercommoners in the same pasture ; every entercommoner hath right to the whole common , and his cattle hath right to feed in any place , and eate what they will , and can get , and so hath every mans cattle that entercommunes with him , they have all the same right ; yet that which any mans cattle hath seised on , is proper only to those cattle , and when he hath mouthed any grass , it is an injustice in another entercommoner to take that away out of his mouth , which his cattle had seised upon ; so was it with those sons of noah , they were entercommoners of the world , they might , de jure , any one , seize upon any thing , any part of it , and being seized of it , it was then his , and he had a propriety in that which before he was only a commoner of ; this was the donation of god , and they were all put out into their common ; and you shall find , not long after , how they took their shares and severall possessions , and from thence forward it was unlawfull to dispossesse any of what they were seised . for my part i cannot beleeve , as some men , that are over-wise , do think , that the world was divided by consent amongst such a handfull of men , none of all which , i can guesse , knew half the world ; but , as i expressed before , being entercommoners thrust into the same common , as they found places fit for them , and not possessed of others , they entred upon them , and enjoyed them , and those places they enjoyed in common before ; and every one had a title to them before that entrance ; but afterwards the possessed enjoyed by their private title ; and it were injustice to defraud them of those possessions . sect. . i know it may be objected , how that the children of israel dispossessed the canaanites ; and it is clearly answered , that god , who gave men their titles , never gave them so absolutely , no not in any commission by the law of nature its self , but he reserved a prerogarive to dispose of any thing otherwise , when it should please him ; and that god , by that prerogative , did give to the children of israel their title to that land , to the egyptians goods , to many other things ; which gift of gods if any man can shew to any thing which is anothers , it ceaseth to be that others , and becomes his ; for the earth is the lords , he is the absolute proprietor , our propriety is but usu-fructuary , and that dum domino placuerit ; yet untill his will is revealed to dispose otherwise of it , it is injustice to take any mans estate from him . for these proprieties , although no man can shew an universal peremptory command of gods , that thus or thus these or those worldly goods shall be appropriated to th●se or those men , yet men in the very first plantation of the world did apprehend god that granted this power of ●ppropriating some parts peculiar to themselves in the charter of entercommoning . so it appeares , that noah , understood it in the . chap of genesis , presently upon the sin of cham verse . god shall enlarge iaephet , and he shall dwell in the tents of shem , and canaan shall be his servant ; which could not be , but that there must be a propriety in shem. so that then it seemes evident to me , that both the rights of common and propriety were passed in the same deed , because as the other was expressed in the beginning of the chapter ; so this implyed or supposed in the latter end ; i think i have said enough of this conclusion , how nature gave all things to all men . if you will have a law-phrase , they had juc ad rem , not in re , they had a title to the thing , to any thing , a remote title , every man is capable to have any thing ; and if the true proprietor desert it , it may be his ; but they have only a title in re , which have lawfull possession of it , to enjoy and make use of it : he proceeds . sect. . [ so that jus & utile , right and profit , is the same thing . ] i am sure such a right is the greatest wrong in the world ; to pretend right to what another is rightfully seised of , is most unjust ; the world , untill it was possessed , and each piece of it , was indifferent to any man , and so is still ; but when possessed , it is injustice to deprive the possessor of what he enjoye's . he againe [ but that right of all , as to all things , is in effect no better then if no man had right to any thing ] thi● were true of his manner of right he delivered , but not of that i have expressed ; for by that right i spake of , all the first planters of the world had right to what they planted , and yet at this day , when any land is found inhabited only by beasts , whether such as was never before discovered , or deserted by the former inhabiters , it becomes the right of him that enters upon it ; so likewise all such fowl● , be●sts , fishes , precious stones , which by no civill law of particular nations are appropriated , are his who seiseth first upon them ; and it is an injustice , by force , or fraud , to deprive them of what they have so seised . i remember tullie hath an excellent discourse , in one paradox , to shew , that honestum & utile is the same ; but then in that he takes utile not , as mr. hobbes , for gaine , or what conduceth to the saving this life ; these things he utterly contemnes , and shewe's they are not profitable , but unprofitable , or many times hurtfull to man ; but he understands this word profitable for that which conduceth to mans happiness ; and ●his he affi●ms to be only such things as are honest , i think no man ever justified his conclusion , as he understands these termes of profit and right . he ends this sect. with an endeavour to prove his conclusion [ for saith he , there is little use and ben●fit of that right a man hath , when another , as strong or st●engt● then himself hath right to the same . ] this argument would have some force if his foundation had been well laid , which was , that every man had right to every thing even in anothers poss●ssion ; but that appeares to be a mistake in him , and therefore this argument is weak which is drawne ex non concessis . chap. xxv . concerning nature's right , liberty , power ; of warre and self-preservation by it . for what ends and advantages a man may renounce his right to life liberty , &c. sect. . thus having finished my discourse upon this subject , as much as concernes his corpus politicum , i returne to examine his handling the same in his leviathan , to see if the diversity of expression in this from the other doth adde any thing to the confirmation of his designe , cap. . pag. . he defines the right of nature to be , the liberty every man hath to use his own power , as he will himself , for the preservation of his own nature . this definition i except against , as not cut out even to the thing defined . first , it is too narrow , for this right of nature concernes not himself alone , but a man by right of nature hath right to many things which relate not to his owne life : yea , if it have such a liberty which consisteth in , to do , or , not to doe ( as he expound's it presently after ) then it is a right of nature , to forbeare to use his owne power , for the preservation of his life , aswell as to use it ; so that out of this regard his definition agree's not to every particular contained in the right of nature . secondly , like an ill made garment , as it is too streight in one place , so it is too wide in another , the liberty a man hath to use his power , as he will himself , for the preservation of his owne life , is not a right of nature ; for the right of nature , as i have shewed , is a result out of the law of nature , which impower's him for that action ; but the law of nature gives not a man leave to do what he will for the preservation , &c. ( as i have shewed before ) but only such things as are just , and according to right reason and the most publique and greatest intendments of nature , to which every particular man's nature and life is aimed by that nature which gives him his nature , are to be preferred before his life . sect. . the next thing i blame is his description of liberty , thus , [ by liberty is understood , according to the proper signification of the word , the absence of externall impediments . ] this is a most improper exposition of that liberty he immediately before put in the definition of right , for externall impediments have nothing to doe with the liberty of right ; nor doth the taking away the ability to recover his estate by strength of opposition , take away the right to have it , especially this natural right ; for other rights , by civill institution , and donation , do in some manner , depend upon outward things , because those nationall lawes , which give them these rights , are outward , although right and title be an inward thing , the issue of that outward law ; but in natural right the very law which give 's a man this right is an internall law , a law writ in man's heart ; and therefore the liberty which attend's this right , and which , he saith , this right is , can in no sense be understood to be the absence of externall impediments ; he adds [ which impediments may oft take away part of a mans power to do what he would . ] this is weakly said , or most impertinently , or both ; for external impediments can take away no part of natural power ( which alone is necessary to natural right ) this may hinder nature in its operations , but this cannot take away the power of operating ; and in oecconomicks the disobedience of a son may hinder the acts of a parents exercising his jus naturale , his natural right over his son but it cannot take away his natural right over him : these rights are internal things , which are not much concerned in what is outward but remaine and keep their being , whatsoever outward things happen . sect. . his third thing to be censured in this chap. and pag. is his definition of a law of nature which is this [ a law of nature ( lex naturalis ) is a precept , or general rule found out by reason , by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the meanes of preserving the same , and to omit that by which it may be best preserved . ] he is a most unhappie man in his definitions , which are foundations upon which he build's his discourse , yet are so weake as they cannot themselves withstand the least opposition which many reasons may assault them with . first for this , we may observe , that if he had said , such a precept , as he se●s down , had been a law of nature , or a conclusion deduced out of a law of nature , he had spoke truth ; but saying , a law of nature is such a precept , he makes this precepe to be the predicate , as we university-men , abused with university●learning , terme it , and then it must be as large as the subject . a law of nature is what this is not ; for , first , he makes this precept to be only a prohibition , to a negative law . a precept ( saith he ) by which a man is forbidden &c. when certainly , although there are negative precepts ; yet they are founded upon affirmative precepts ; no negative which is not supported by an affirmative , and this law forbidding , must be founded upon this affirmative duty enjoyned by the law of nature that a man must love his own life . certainly had not mr. hobbes proudly contemned university learning , he would have writ more properly , and have seduced himself into fewer errors ; next , observe with me that generall error which runne's through his whole discourse ; that he makes nature aiming , in all her intendments , at the benefit only of particulars in those provident lawes which she hath made for the universal , when , indeed , the nature of all lawes is to looke to the publique , and particulars only as they are parts of the publique . the latter part of that section i have shewed erroneous already , which affirmes law and right inconsistent . sect. . his next sect. in the same page and chap. begins thus [ and because the condition of man ( as hath been declared in the precedent chap. ) is a condition of war of every one against every one , in which case every one is governed by his own reason . ] he said somewhat like truth , when he said it was declared in the precedent chapter ; for certainly there was a bare declaration of such a thing , no m●nner of proof that had shew of reason . posito quolibet , sequitur quidlibet ; if men suppose impossible things , they may from thence-argue impossibilities , uno absurdo concesso , mille sequuntur , an errour in the foundation , in the first drawing a line , multiplie's its self all the way , thus in this instance he goes on [ and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a helpe unto him in preserving his life against his enemies , it followeth that in such a condition every man hath right to every thing even to one anothers bodies , ] see how many falshoods are supposed to make up this horrid conclusion . first , that unreasonable definition of the right of nature . secondly , that , as bad , of the law of nature . thirdly , that not to be imagined thesis that every man is at war with every man , without all which this cannot follow , that every man hath right to one anothers bodies ; for certainly that nature which gave a right in common to the universal world , besides that , gave every man a propriety in his owne body , and none had interest in it but by jus naturae , as parents , or by some concession expressed or implyed , as in polities ; yea in warre ( saith he ) certainly not so , neither ; for by the law of armes men have not right to butcher one another without there be martiall opposition ; there are inhumanities in warres , which men have no right to use , as perhaps will be shewed hereafter ; so that then all these propositions ( which are all app●rently false ) must be granted , or else the conclusion which is drawne out of these denied premisses is void and of no cleerness ; yet take his conclusion altogether , it hath some likeness of truth with it , [ that in such a condition every man hath right , &c. ] in such a condition , which was never knowne , which is impossible , in such a condition a man may have such a right ; he proceeds in the same place [ and consequently it is a precept , or generall rule of reason , that every man ought to endeavour peace as far as he hath hope of obtaining it : and when he cannot obtaine it , that he may seeke and use all helpes ●nd advantages of warre . ] this conclusion might have been granted without these unjust meanes of obtaining it , only one terme added to the last clause , which is , when he hath used sufficient meanes to obtaine peace and cannot get it , then he may make use of the advantages of warre ; for without this terme sufficient a man may attempt a peace , and upon any deniall or pause , at the first , he might with justice engage in a war which were most unjust . sect. . that which followe's is against his own principles , the first branch of which rule ( saith he ) containeth the first and fundamental law of nature ( which is to seeke peace , and follow it ) this , according to his principles , can be but a deduction out of the law of nature ; for if the law of nature be , as he defined it , just before in this page , a precept by which a man is forbidden to doe that which is destructive to his life , this can be no other but a deduction out of that . [ the second ( saith he ) is the summe of the right of nature , which is , by all meanes we can to defend our selves . ] the second branch is not the summe of this right , &c. but a branch of it ; for there are many other meanes to preserve our selves besides war , although in a desperate case war may be one . what followe's in that chap. concerning the second law of nature , deduced out of this , that a man should lay downe his right to all things , &c. i think it needless to speake of ; for first there is no man hath , by nature , right to any person but his owne ; secondly , a man need 's lay down his right to nothing ; for his right to any thing returnes to him , if any thing lack an owner , which is not disposed of by such powers , which by deduction from the law of nature , are authorised to sett●e them otherwise ; and therefore all those needless definitions and descriptions of what it is to lay down a right , what renouncing , what transferring , what obligation , duty , injustice , are ; which are touched in the . page , i let goe at present and for altogether , unlesse some just occasion hereafter may make me look back upon them ; only that require's a censure , which he deliver's in the bottome of that page , and the beginning of the next , which discourse as i conceive it wicked in its self , so it render's all which he spake before exceeding malicious . sect. . this discourse begin's thus [ whensoever a man transferreth his right , or renounceth it , it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself , or for some other good he hopeth for thereby . ] this i grant so far as the words expresse it ; but there is something he implies which will render it fit for censure anon ; his reason likewise i allow , which followe's [ for it is a voluntary act , and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to himself ] as for his deduct on which is layd therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood , by any words , or other signes , to have abandoned or transferred ] this in generall hath some truth ; for since the end of man is his happiness , which he must needs love , happiness and goodness being as proper an object of the will , as colours to the sight , or any other , yet this applyed to any particular thing will be found erroneous ; for although good and happiness must needs , by the law of nature , be desired ; yet because what is that good and happiness is not so universally apparent , when that good and happinesse shall be instanced in any particular , it will not be universally received ; now i will consider his examples [ as first ( saith he ) a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life ] this is a mistake in him , a man can , and many men have done it ; a man can , for a man can preferre other things before his life , and therefore can exchange h●s life for that ; men ought to preferre their countries good before their owne , both being in its self a greater good , and of greater durance ; men may preferre their souls eternall good beyond this life , the hope of which give 's the greatest comfort this life is capable of ; one may and ought to preferre the glory of god before his own life ; by which that eternal good of his own soul shall be assured to him ; these men may , and ought to preferre , who are christians ; and as reason guide's to these actions , so experience of them who have done it , for these ends , shewe's it may be done ; but there are a hundred little by-ends for which men have done it ; those of honour in severall kinds , for riches , for present pleasures ; and there is almost no worldly contentment , for which some men have not adventured , and lost their lives ; but it may justly be objected , that those did not vertuously do it . i answer ; that is not materiall to his proposition , wh●ch useth not the word , ought not , but cannot lay downe , &c. yet in the first conditions , before named , which are vertuous , take one eminent story , besides a multitude , told by tertullian in his apologeticus adversus gentes , cap. . the story is thus ; tertullian lived in the time of severus , who persecuted the christians most barbarously : tertullian , being converted to christianity , takes courage , and writes this book in defence of them , against that cruell manner of persecuting , which was to destroy them unheard , only upon confessing christianity , like wolves or beasts odious to the common-wealth ; amongst other slanders , by which this injustice was coloured to the world , this was one , which they were accused of , that they were ill affected to the imperiall government , and were enemies to it . tertullian , in answer to this , saith in . cap. if we were maliciously affected to revenge the injuries done us ; vel una nox pauculis faculis largitatem ultionis possit operari si malum malo dispungi penes nos liceret . the meaning of which is , that they were strong enough to set the city on fire , in one night , when they would . now saith he , if we would declare our selves enemies , we are strong enough to make it good , the mauri , or marcomauri , or parthi are not so numerous , they inhabit one country , we the world ; what war are we not fit for , even with unequall forces , who can suffer our selves tam libenter trucidari , so willingly to be slaine ? but , saith he , in this discipline we have learned to be killed , rather then kill ; yea , if we would not fight against you , we could , without rebellion , by a meere desertion , destroy you , by the losse ef so many citizens , this very divorse would astonish you , you would lack men whom to governe . let him that will , reade that chap. and the rest about it , he shall find the christians killed , tortured , yea persecuted , dead , so that the sanctuary of the grave , as he speaketh was not a refuge for them ; he shall find that they could easily vindicate themselves from these evils ; yet they chose to suffer them , rather then doe the least evill , having implicitely covenanted with that government , by being born under it , to obey it ; nay this shewe's , that they , and such a world of men , were of this opinion ; and it was apparently knowne , or else he durst not have published this discourse to be read by the emperour , and to disswade him from his persecution by such an argument , which , for matter of fact , might so easily have been confuted . had these men been of mr. hobbes his mind , they would have said , what doe you talk of obedience , give us life , in defence of which a man may kill any man , or men ? yea all the world rightfully ; nor can any covenant , by words , or otherwise , divest us of this right ; but they were not of his opinion , and their practise is enough to confute mr. hobbes , that a man can lay down that right , &c. and it was vertuous so to doe . sect. . what he farther instances in , concerning wounds , chaines , and imprisonment , how th●t the same may be said of them as of a mans life ; that no covenant can passe away a man's right of rescuing himself from them , may seeme answered in what was applyed to those of life ; because if we may passe away our right to our own life , much rather to these lesser things ; but i will examine his reason [ both ( saith he ) because there is no benefit consequent to such patience , as there is to the patience of suffering another to be wounded or imprisoned ] no benefit ? yes surely , great every way , when these afflictions are laid upon us by lawfull magistrates , then there is the benefit of obedience then which no sacrifice is more gratefull to almighty god ; it is that which is the foundation of politie , and without which no common-wealth can subsist ; for if men should not subject for conscience , and think that obedience to punishments a vertuous duty , which carrie's its reward in its self , no man would ever submit , so long as he could find any meanes to struggle ; the innumerable instances might be made of this , might of themselves fill a volumne ; take but that one of marcus regulus , how he rather then he would violate a little promise , and that with an enemy , did expose and thrust himself ●nto such vengeance , and tortures , as the greatest malice could impose upon him ; how much rather upon those weighty , though implicite covenants , which every man make's with that common-wealth wherein he live's , to obey the lawes made for the good of it , how much rather may they exact a submission to them , though with our owne losse and injurie ? sect. . he goes on [ and lastly , the motive and end , for which this renouncing and transferring of rights is introduced , is nothing else but the security of a mans person in his life , and in the meanes ●f so preserving life as not to be weary of it . ] i will not discourse over again these termes , renouncing and transferring of right , the nature of which i have before debated , but here onely touch upon what the end of mens submission to the lawes of politique society is , and wherein it consists , which is that he meanes by th●se phrases renouncing , &c. and , surely , to say , it is nothing else but the security , &c. is much too bold an assertion ; for certainly pro aris & focis , was wont to be the argument why men did engage themselves in any dangerous or hard adventure , and pro aris first . i may say the same for the good of their posterity , for which we have read the famous story of the children of israel , drawing our that painfull and laborious journey through so many hazards and perils , forty yeares together , that their posterity might live contentedly and blessedly in canaan ; and we daily find multitudes of men amongst us who spend as long time without any comfort in their owne lives . ( i speake of these sensual comforts and eases which he intimate's ▪ ) onely out of this regard , that they have an expectation , that their posterity after them may live plentifully . againe , as i instanced before , the good of the common-wealth in which they live hath not onely here a sufficient argument to perswade a hard , but even to cast off all life for their countries good ; i need not speake of the monastick retreats , which in god's cause many yea multitudes of men , make , and no doubt many honestly and piously , in truth and reality , even to be anchorites , and renounce all contentment in this world ; all which makes it apparent , that this life , and the contentments of it , are not the sole and onely end for which men renounce their rights and interests ; and therefore men may enter into such covenants , where even the subjection of their lifes , and all the accommodation of it may justly be engaged , without any misconstruction or fraud , as he seemes to imply immediately after , and therfore that must fall of it selfe , and i need speak no more to it . what follows in the same page ; concerning contracts , covenants , &c. i let passe , unlesse , by misapplication of them , i find hereafter that they are abused to the prejudice of some cause , which will deserve vindication , and i will now come to what he speakes of merit , at the bottome of page . and the beginning of . chap. xxvi . of merit by contrast and otherwise . the distinction ex congruo & condigno expounded according to the schools . sect. . he that performeth first ( saith the author ) in the case of contract , is said to merit that which he is to receive by the performance of the other , and he hath it as due . ] this is true which he writes , this is merit , but this expression comprehend's not all merit , this is a legal merit ; a man in this case may implead the party he conracted with , and gain his reward by right of law ; but there may be merit without a legall title , as thus ; a souldier takes a prisoner , useth him civilly , dismisseth him , afterwards that souldier , who was so treated , takes his taker prisoner , he , without question , deserved to be civilly used againe by him ; titius finds sempronius a poor necessitou● child , takes him into his house , breeds him up carefully ; without question titius deserves from sempronius all dutifull observances , but he cannot implead him for it , but in humanity it is due to both these from whom they have received these obliging kindnesses , although there was no contract preceding . what he addes presently after , of a man who scatter's money , to be his who catcheth it , is no differing case from the other , for it is by way of contract , and the title to that money is as legall in him who first snatcheth up the mony , as in him who should get that money by any other contract . in the bottome of that page he addes [ but there is between those two sorts of merit this difference , that in contract i merit by vertue of mine own power and the contractors need but in this case of free guift ( so he call's that scattering of money ) i am enabled to merit only by the benignity of the giver . ] sect. . this distinction i conceive manifestly weak ; for first , what he saith of that he call's contract is as true of the other , that in contract i merit by vertue of my power and the contractors need ; so is it in that contract , as i call it , where mony is scatter'd for him who can first catch it ; he who catcheth it first hath it by his own power of catching , and the contractors need of that pleasure to see men , scramble for the money ; and he deserves it , as well as a musician doth his hire , or any other of these men which are contracted with for any of our pleasures or recreations so likewise in the second part of his distinction what he ●ffi●mes of this other , which he calls free guift may as truly be spoken of the first which he cals contract , thus [ but in this of free guift i am enabled to merit onely by the benignity of the giver . ] what is it , i would aske , that enables ● musician to merit that angell , or what else the liberal gentleman gives him for his houre 's delight he had from him , but the benignity of the donor ; if he play a day together to a man who hath a clunched hand or no affection to the musick ( as it often happen's ) they spend their time in vaine at an unwelcome window , they then merit no more then such boyes that should catch up loose monies without the right owners disposing of it to them by some contract preceding ; but that which he speake's of the benignity of the giver , that , that enabled the receiver to merit ; that hath nothing to doe in the varying the nature of a contract ; for in contracts not the affection of the contractor , which is not possible to be t●uly known , but the words or signes by which the contract is made , are able to make a difference in it , for else contracts might be differenced according to all humane affections or vices , hopefull , fearefull , voluptuous , covetous , ambitious , &c. but these doe not vary the natures of contracts , no more then should the benignity of the donor . sect. . but he proceeds with another difference [ in contracts ( saith he ) i merit at the contractors hand that he should depart with his right ; in this case of guift i merit not that the giver should part with his right , but that then when he hath pasted with it , it should be mine . ] here is a shew of something , but indeed it is exceeding vaine and empty ; for if that mony be cast about for such as take it by scrambling , or the like , if no body come to scramble , the right owner keepeth his property , and doth not out himself of that property untill a scrambler come and get it ; i have seene money taken up againe , so the case is evident . a piece of plate is provided as the reward of him who hath the swiftest horse to runne , at such a time , or such a place ; if any horses come and runne , the swiftest horse gets the plate ; but if there come none , the plate is where it was , and the other part of runners being not performed , neither doth the contractor lose his first interest ; but if it shall happen that the right owner throw away his interest , and forsake it , without a condition of any other side , those goods taken up will be like a thing found , and perhaps fall into the hand of the lord , not the taker ; all thi● shewes , that , in these instances of his , the giver doth not depart with his right , untill the condition of his guift be performed , and by the performance of that condition a man merits his deserting his right . sect. . . but at the last , in the beginning of page . he undertakes to expound by this ( which he hath delivered ) a schoole distinction , thus ; [ this is the meaning of that distinction of the schooles between meritum congrui and meritum condigni ; for , god almighty having promised paradise to those men ( hood winkt with carnall desires ) that can walk through the world according to the precepts and limits prescribed by him , they say , he that shall so walke shall merit paradise ex congruo ; but because no man can demand a right to it by his own righteousness or any other power within himself but by the grace of god onely , they say no man merits paradise ex condigno ] thus far he . i cannot blame this gentleman to be offended with the schoolemen , since it seeme's to be a learning strange to him , and in apparence is the fate of it , as well as other learning , to be scorned by them who understands it not , which this gentleman doth not , or else he maliciously write's , and offer 's to expound this easie distinction . first , the conclusion ( as he expresseth it , ) is no where delivered in the schooles ; for with one consent , unlesse some passages in gregorius ariminensis , and durand , expounded otherwise , the schooles , both old and later agree to deliver , that heaven or glory ( which he calls paradise ) is merited ex condigno ; because that righteous men , acting such things by the assistance of god's grace , in the mystical union with christ their head , to which god hath promised heaven , heaven is due to them , as a reward of such actions , not for their owne ' excellency in an arithmeticall proportion , as some ; but a geometrieal ; or as others , by their arithmetical proportion taken vertually , as a seed is vertually a tree , and hath abilities vertually , as a tree hath actually ; so these gracious acts have glory vertually in them , as being the seed of glory ; and then , although god can be no debtor to any mans merits ; yet , he having put such a prise upon them in his gospell , these have such a blessing due to them , not out of congruity onely , but condignity , at which rate god doth value them , by his standard ; but then as they say ; heaven is merited by the righteous ex condigno , so they say that these graces , which enable a man to merit heaven ex condigno , by gods covenant those graces are merited , ex congruo , by that man before he is justified or righteous ; so that then to understand the distinction better , lest a reader should be misguided by him who is no way acquainted with school-divinity , know that merit ex condigno necessarily requires a covenant but ex congruo none . the first can never faile , because founded upon justice and title ; the other may , because built onely upon grace , as thus ; a man promiseth that he who fights this day well shall be made a captaine ; or a king promiseth that he who plead's such a cause ably shall be made a judge ; these places are due to him who doth it ; there is another , who by industry in the law hath greater abilities then he , and hath pleaded a hundred causes better ; another man who hath fought in twenty battailes better , yet not being imployed in these services to which the promise was made , they deserve those places ex congruo , but the other ex condigno ; the one is truly , and as truly merit as the other , but he deserves it not legally out of a law or covenant , but his owne vertue , and the gallantry of his commander in chiefe who rewards vertue ; or thus , he who meeting a poore man in necessity shall bargaine with him to pay him doubly for those clothes he supplies him with when he comes to a better fortune , which he then adventures upon : when he doth come to such a condition the other merits that ex condigno , he must & ought to have it payd , it is his due ; the who seeing that or such another in that sad case should , without any compact , supply him , when he came to a happier estate , ex congruo merits a returne from him ; although he cannot claime any thing upon debt or due , yet out of congruity it is fit he should be satisfied . i do not here justifie the distinction in its application by the schoole-men , but onely set downe my observation of his unjust dealing with them , and how unlike their meaning is to his ; for the prise he speaks of , which is proposed to him who winneth it out of covenant , that man who gaineth it hath it out of right of condignity , not out of the equality his worke hath to the reward in its self intrinsecally , but out of that extrinsecall value which is added to it by the owners covenant ; and therefore what he adds may have some truth , that [ because writers are not agreed upon the signification of the termes of art , he will determine nothing in it . ] i beleeve all circumstances will hardly be agreed upon ; yet thus much as i have delivered , which is contrary to what he writes , is universally consented unto by them ; and there is none of them but sayes , that what god hath covenanted for , is merited ex condigno by them who act their part . notes upon the fifteenth chapter of leviathan . chap. xxvii . of transfering right ; sinnes independence on covenants . which are not voyd by suspiiion . of propriety and coercive power . an arbitration between the fool and mr. hobbes concerning justice , the feare of god , getting heaven by violence , &c. faith not to be violated ; concerning the law of nature in order to aeternal faelicity . breach of covenant . rebellion . sect. . cap. . pag. . in the beginning of this chap. will appeare the unhappinesse of his former discourse , concerning mens natural right , over one another , here , in his first words , he supposeth [ that law of nature by which men are obliged to transferre their right one to another ] the vanity of which i have discussed before ; from this he drawes a third [ that men must keep their covenants made one to another . ] the conclusion is good , and of the highest consequence , in all commerce betwixt men that possibly can be ; but his commendation of it is not so commendable as his conclusion , but most dangerous ; his words are these [ and in this law of nature consisteth the fountaine and original of justice ] this law is of keeping of covenants . let the reader look back upon cap. . sect. . and he shall find the wicked sins of the sodomites , of cain , in which no man can say , that there was any covenant betwixt those parties preceded , concerning such actions ; and then , upon that score , they were just , because not unjust ; now if the fountaine of justice were covenant , then those actions ( being where was no covenant preceding ) could not be unjust . his reason , by which he confirm's this , is not so solid asmight be expected from such a learned man , which is this ; [ for where no covenant hath preceded , there hath no right been transferred ; and every man hath right to every thing ; and , consequently , no action can be unjust . ] see here , reader , how necessary it is timely to stop an errour ; it is a sicknesse in a man's soul , and ought to be nipt in its growth ; it is an ill guest , which is easier kep't out , then thrust out , especially when it come's with force of a law , or axiome , as this did . had he proved before , that every man hath right to every thing , even in the possession of another's person , yea to another's person , as he pretended to doe , then this conclusion would have justly been deduced thence : but i think , that being confuted , this conclusion must likewise fall with it . let us consider two or more men of divers nations met together in some , before not inhabited , place ; were it not unjust , against the law of nature , that one should murther , or maime the other , without any injury from him ? were it not just , that they should help one another in distresse , by the law of humanity ? if he say , not , consider his owne saying ( for a man so learned , as he is , cannot but , in many things , acknowledge the universall rules which governe the world , although he may misapply them ) see therefore pag. . cap. . this ( saith he ) is that law of the gospell ; whatsoever ye require that others should doe to you , that doe you to them : and that law of all men ; quod tibi fieri non vis , alteri ne f●ceris ] apply this law to these men , without any covenant , expressed , or imply'd , but onely that ; would any of these think it just , that the other should doe him violence or injury ? it is unjust then by this law , that he should doe it to the other . he againe labour's to confirme his conclusion from the definition of injustice , which , saith he , is [ the not performance of covenant ] this definition was never ( i think ) writ before ; although a thousand have treated of injustice , yet never any defined it so ; it is true , every breach of covenant is injustice : but injustice is what is not a breach of covenant , as i have shewed , and therefore will insist no further upon it . sect. . he goe's on [ but because covenants of mutual trust where there is a feare on either part ( as hath been saide in the former chap. ) are invalid ] the place he mentioned is pag. ▪ where he deliver's that [ if a covenant be made wherein neither of the p●●●les performe presently , but trust one another ; in the condition of mere nature ( which is a condition of war of every man against every man ) upon any reasonable suspition it is voyd . but if there be a common power set over them both , with right and force sufficient to compell performance , it is not voyd . ] this proposition , although it make a faire shew , upon a superficial view ; yet we shall find it , upon diligent examination , to be full of unhappy errours . had he said , such covenants are dangerous to be kept : and that men with wicked principles will not keep them , he had said somewhat that might have borne him out in it ; but to say , they are voyd , is to affirme , they have no obliging nature , or tye with them , which is not to be indured by iustice. i will first put him the case betwixt two neighbouring nations ; they enter leagues of confederacy ; they covenant upon articles ; these two are just like such particular men , unbodied in a common-wealth : can any man think , that when any of these are afrayd of the other's breach of articles , it shall therefore be fit for him to breake ? can his feare dissolve his covenant ? yes , perhaps , as in his . chap. to which this related [ if this suspition be reasonable ] a suspicion , though reasonable , is but a suspicion ; and it is possible for any man to finde reasons for suspicions ; by this all bargains , and contracts of nations one with another will be made nothing ; for no doubt but all nations may , and will suspect one another , and yet dare not breake their promises and covenants which they make ; if this doctrine of his were received , it would make all commerce betwixt nations voyd , yea , i will tell him , betwixt men in private , so that those sacred sponsalia betwixt man and woman were voyd , if no witnesses to them ; all those promises , yea oathes ( for they are but a stronger bond of the same covenant ) should be voyd , if no witnesses to testify the covenant ; if mens covenants cannot bind them , before they make a leviathan , why should that covenant binde them ? for the covenant concerning their superiour must be before he is who is an effect of it . plato in his protagoras tell 's a most ingenious fable , the result of which is this , that the world being uninhabited , iupiter appointed epimetheus to make all sorts of beasts ; but prometheus he appointed to make men , and indued them with wisdome ; these men built cities ; fenced themselves from beasts , but by their wisdome were more wicked then beasts , and injured one another most impiously ; upon that he sent mercury amongst them ; who brought the men two sisters , iustice and modesty , which regulated them in all vertue , and civility one towards another ; these are universally given to men , and are with them , where evill principles , and wicked customes , h●ve not extirpated them ; so that that which the school , from the philosophers , call's synder●sis , dictate●s to men those great axiomes of practice : doe to others as ye would be done unto ; and keep your faith , and promise , with the like : and no man doth violate these , but with an injury to the rest and quiet of his mind . i could tell stories of morall men , innumerable , who would keep covenant , even with their ruine , and death ; but they are obvious : it is apparent , that although men may , and doe break covenants ; yet they are not voyd ; they have a tye upon man in his conscience ▪ which makes them affraid to offend in scandalous and great injuries . sect. . he proceed's , [ though the original of iustice be the making of covenants ; yet injustice there can be none , till the cause of such feare be taken away , which , while men are in the condition of warre , cannot be done . ] thus farre he : this phrase , such feare , must be understood of that feare a man hath of another's violation of covenant ; i think all this is satisfied : that there may be injustice before covenant ; injustice against the practicke law of nature ; injustice after covenant , in the violation of it ; and although he imagine's feare to secure a man from violating covenant , it must certainly be such as the casuists speak of , metus cadens , such as would shake a valiant or constant man , as some certaine argument of death , or ruine , not suspicion's , that another will not keep his covenant which must excuse . againe , i have already shewed , that men are not naturally in a condition of warre ; so that he build's upon very false foundations . i will not trouble the reader with nine or tenne lines together , which are nothing but repetitions of formerly refuted conclusions : but in the next page . neare the beginning , he bring 's somthing like a new argument , from the usuall definition of justice among the schoolemen , thus : sect. . and this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of iustice in the schooles ; for they say , that justice is the constant rule of giving to every man his own : and therefore where there is no owne , that is , no propriety , there is no injustice , and where there is no coercive power erected , that is , where there is no commonwealth , there is no propriety , all men having right to all things : therefore where there is no commonwealth , there nothing is unjust . ] i am glad to find him speaking something in the schooles , although not fully approving it : the definition shall passe without any further trouble ; although i thinke it not perfect yet it will prove much better then any thing he hath produced . let us examine his inference , which is drawne into some syllogistical form , and therefore will abide a juster answer . his major is undeniable ; where is no propriety , there is no injustice ; but his minor is mightily to blame , unproved any where , which is , where is no coercive power erected , that is , no common-wealth , there is no propriety ; this proposition i have shewed often to be erroneous ; men have right to their own persons , their wives , their possessions , without this power coercive of a common-wealth ; and therefore this conclusion is not rightly deduced out of the premises . but now , good reader , pause with me a while , and consider with me , how contrary these me●nes will work to his intention's ; he int●●ds to build ● common wealth , and the justice of i● , upon ●hese foundations . that there can be no justice or injus●●●e untill then ▪ no not in covenants which ●●l●ven ▪ and 〈◊〉 iustice a being ; then is the terrour of the coercive powe● 〈◊〉 ; if it were true , i am perswaded , there were no suc● 〈◊〉 as iustice or injustice , for then there would n●t be [ a constant rule ] or , which is a b●tter word , a habit of vertue of giving every one his own ; but ● feare of the magistrate , if he do not ; and the supr●●e magistrate , who principally hath both the sword ●nd purse of iustice ( reward and punishment ) in his power , could not do justice or injustice , because he hath no coercive power above him ; and he make's no covenant ( as he discourseth ) and i meane to con●ute hereafter : but further , whatsoever wickednesse , oppression , murder , man can doe secretly , secure from the eye and sword of men , had no injustice in it ; for if the coercive power of the civill magistrate , operating upon the feare of men , be that which gives the name of justice ( as he affirme's ) then , without it , no action deserve's that name . what follow 's immediately , is but a repetition of what went before . in the margent of the same page is written , iustice not contrary to reason , ] what he write's of this head must be next examined . sect. . he begin's thus [ the foole hath said in his hea●t there is no such thing as iustice ; and sometimes also with his tongue seriously alleaging that every mans conservation and contentment being committed to his care , there could be no reason why every man might not doe what he thought conduced thereunto ; and therefore also to make , or not make , keep , or not keep , covenants , was not against reason , when it conduced to ones benefit ] thus he make's the fool to confirme his wicked conclusion ; and , for my part , i thinke the fools ' argument is unanswerable , out of mr. hobbes his principles : for if it be true , as he hath supposed , that every man hath a natural right to every thing , and every mans conservation and contentment is committed to his own charge ; and that no man can renounce by any covenant his right to defend himself from death , wounds , imprisonment , which he delivered in his page ( and , without doubt , much more may be said for other contentments , then for some of these ) then he can by no covenant be obliged to forsake any thing , but onely such little things as are scarcely considerable in justice . he goes on [ he does not therein deny that there be covenants ; and that they are sometimes broken , sometimes kept ▪ and that such breach of them may be called injustice , and the observance of them ; iustice ] in this the fool's doctrine , if he understand covenants of such as are made before there is incorporation in a common-wealth , is more honest than mr. hobbes's : for mr. hobbes deliver's , that such covenants are invalid , because there must be a feare of breach on the other side , and so the covenant is dull , and a man cannot commit injustice in the breach of them , which this foole acknowledgeth . his next words are [ but he questioneth , whether injustice , taking away the feare of god ( for the same foole hath said in his heart there is no god ) may not sometimes stand with that reason which dictateth to every man his own good , and particularly then , when it conduceth to such a benefit , as shall put a man in a condition to neglect not onely the dispraise , and revilings , but also the power of other men ] taking away the feare of god ) it a man take from any act , or habit , those circums●●nces which make it evill , it will be good ; but i am perswaded that a feare of god is so rooted in the hearts of men , that although men may darken the light , and cleare sight of it , with wicked reasoning ; although men may hinder the vivacity in the opposition of it , by customary inhabiting , reigning sins : yet it cannot be so extirpated , but that it will appeare , and breake out sometimes into action : and although a foole , or wicked man may sometimes say so ; yet other times he will not beleeve his own words , and must oft feare he is in the wrong . this kind of reasoning either mr hobbes taught , or learned from him ; for i am perswaded never man disputed so high conclusions out of such impossible supposalls , as he hath ; such is this , if there were no feare of god. let us see the force of the fool's argument ; he seem's to affirme , that injustice , taking away the fear of god , will stand with that reason which dictateth to every man his own good ; i am perswaded it is good when injustice may be committed where is no common wealth , when men commit injustice so secretly that no magistrate may take notice of it ; for if no god , no heaven , or hell , praemium or poena , for good or ill actions ; and then a man's considerations are chiefly about his owne ease , pleasure , and contentment in his bodily and sensitive life ; but yet i must adde one restraint to the fool's proposition : injustice may stand with that reason which prescribe's his own good , that is , his pleasure , or contentment ; but not with right reason , for right reason preferrs the publicke good before the private , which cannot subsist without iustice. sect. . he goes on with the fools argument most unhappily ; he was a witty foole , who disputed so [ the kingdome of god is gotten by violence ; but what if it could be gotten by unjust violence ? were it against reason so to get it , when it is impossible to receive hurt by it ? and if it be not against reason , it is not against iustice , or else iustice is not to be approved for good ] what another horrid impossible supposall is here brought to confirme the precedent ? that heaven should be got by unjust violence ; the kingdome of god , which is gods gift only , should be forced out of his hands , by wicked actions , against his will ; but yet there is a different condition in this with the other , because the kingdome of god comprehend's in it all happinesse which belong's to any , and without which , at the last departure of his soul , a man must be miserable ; and therefore it is that the philosophers call that summum bonum , which , when revealed , men cannot choose but desire : and therefore if a man could either by fraud , or force , get it , god , who hath so framed a man's desires , that there is a necessity for him to desire it , could never be offended at such endeavours ; nor can it be unjust for men so to doe . sect. . he proceed's , [ from such reasoning as this , successeful wickedn●ss hath obtained the name of vertue ] . here begin's to confute that conclusion of the foole ; that there is no such thing as iustice : this sentence is his foundation , and he thus argue's ; if there be no injustice , but all men are to doe what is most reasonable , that is , most conducing to their owne good , that is , worldly pleasure , or profit , then succesfull wickednesse may be called vertue , which is abominable , and most odious ; for certainly vertue is not measured by the event , but the nature of the act , and the naturall tendence of it to that is good . this argument of his , against the foole , is strong , but let us examine it ; doth not this , and all he speaks against the foole , fight against himself in the . chap. of his leviathan ? concerning which i have discoursed before . he deliver's that [ men naturally have a right to all things ; and any one may rightly doe any thing to any man for the securing of his life or contentment ; and that men are in a state of war ( before they are incorporated into a common-wealth ) with all the world ; that in that state , fraud and force are the cardinall vertues ] ; so then , in this state , any successefull wickednesse must needs be called vertue because a man , in such meanes ( according to his doctrine ) act's nothing but what he hath right to do , and therefore was just , and acted according to reason , and by such meanes obtain's his end 's which are his own preservation and contentment . againe , he hath delivered chap. . [ that no man can renounce his right of delivering himself from wounds , and chaines , and imprisonment , or indeed of any such thing as may make his life wearisome to him ] ; well then : let it be considered , if a man have naturally right to all those things which may secure and preserve them ; then let his compacts , or covenants , be whatsoever , yet they are invalid , which infringe this right which a man hath no power to alien from himself ; then , in order to these , whatsoever a man act 's after he hath covenanted ▪ himself into a common-wealth , be it never so wicked , must be cloathed with the specious name of vertue ; because according to reason and right ; so that ( let him say what he will ) this unlucky foole disputed most unanswerably against his principles , and the main hinges upon which his policy move's , though nothing against mine . sest . . he goe's on [ and some that in all other things have disallowed the violation of faith , yet have allowed it when it is for the getting of a kingdome . ] i doe not remember that i have read the violation of faith for the getting a kingdome justified by any man but machiavell , who indeed approve's any means to bring a man to what he aime's at ; but , certainly , no man esteemed for christianity , or morality : it is said of julius caesar , that he would often repeat out of euripides that sentence , which he rendred , quod si violandum est jus , regnandi gratiâ violandum est , aliis rebus pietatem colas . but let the reader consider , that it is here with ( if ) if right be to be violated ; and what tully saye's of him , that he was captus imperii consuetudine , ensnared with the custome or habit of commanding , which in his infancy he had coveted , and from thence would use that speech , and did practise it as unluckily as other usurpers ; but , sure , every man , who is mastered with any habit of wicked●●sse the fruition of which he viciously covet's , will say as much for that , as caesar for governing ; but none , as i know of , hath delivered it for a practique conclusion but onely machiavel ; therefore that word [ some ] might have been spared by mr. hobbes , sect. . page . he comes to make particular answers , which are not satisfactory to the foole 's argument , and therefore must be examined ; in the second line he state 's the question , certainly , not punctually to the purpose ; for whereas the fool's conclusion was , that there was no such thing as injustice , he saith lin . . ( that [ the question is not of promises mutuall , where there is no security of performance on the other side ; as when there is no civill power erected over the parties promising ; for such promises are no covenants . ] this is a most hatefull parenthesis , ( as i have shewed ) he goe's on [ but either where one of the partyes hath performed already ; or where there is a power to make him performe ] so that here is a great restraint to the fool's conclusion , and a limitation of the fool's argument , which i am perswaded , if he had disputed with mr. hobbes , he would not have allowed , for he was bred up in mr. hobbes his principles , and dispute's shrewdly out of them ; but although this be not pertinent to the foole , yet let the fool grant that this shall be the question as mr. hobbes put 's it wh●ther it be against reason , that is , against the benefit of the other , to performe , or not ] here the poore foole is abused mightily , for the fool's conclusion was about justice ; mr. hobbes put 's the question concerning benefit onely : certainly many high injustices have been beneficial , as he call's benefit , that is , profitable for this life's advantages ; but yet see by what fraudulent steps he steale's into the change of these tearmes : first he hath said , that iustice is not against reason ; reason is not against the law , which looketh onely at the happinesse of this life to that particular man ; therefore justice is whatsoever any man act 's for his own good ; all which expressions have beene before shewed not to be depending one upon the other ; but let us examine his argument [ i say ( saith he ) it is not against reason ] from iustice he went to reason ; from reason to benefit ; and now from benefit to reason againe , for the manifestation of which he hath a long discourse to shew , that the wisdome of actions is not to be measured by the events , but the for●sight and d●sign ( which shall be granted him , ) secondly ▪ in that refuted imagination of [ every man 's being at war with every man for want of a common power to keep them in awe , no man can hope to defend himself by his own power , strength , and wit &c. therefore he who declare's he think's it reason to deceive those that h●lp him , can in reason expect no other meanes of safety then what can be had from his own single power ] this is the force of what he there write's : but consider , reader , with me , that this is not to the purpose ; for the foole 's conclusion was concerning the justice and honesty of a thing ; he onely out-wit's the foole , and discourseth of cunning , or craft , or worldly profit of those actions , what is most profitable for the advance of the agent'● ease and pleasure : but then consider further , and see if this answear of his satisfy that doubt ; the question , according to his own framing , is , whether it be profitable to deceive or not ; his answer is drawn from a declaration that that man should make , that he think 's i● fit to deceive , which no man but a verier foole then he , who objected it , did ever doe ; there is no power to act any great wickedness , but under the shew of piety , not by professing to deceive , but by professing not to deceive ; oathes , covenants , protestations , cursings of themselves , are the horrid maskes of impiety , which wicked men use to deceive with , the devill can no way so efficaciously deceive , as by putting on the shape or likeness of an angel , sometimes by putting a false glosse upon the text , as with adam ; sometimes urging the scripture its self , as with our saviour . that child of the devil 's , who will prosper in this world , must not protest and declare that he will deceive , but protest against it , and utterly defy it ; so excellently the poet makes sinon , in that high fraud of his , cozen by the denying of cozenage , nec si miserum fortuna sinonem finxit , vanum etiam mendacemque improba finget· mr. hobbes , i am confident , well knowe's , that he , who is premonished of his danger , will avoyd it ; even birds do avoyd the net openly layd before them ; so that certainly this come's not close to mr. hobbes his purpose which should prove , that it were not wisely done according to his wisdome , to deceive , when he speak's onely of such who manifest and declare they will deceive ; and it is a maine fault which runne's throughout his whole book , that he attempt's one proposition , and , by shuffling and changing the tearmes , prove's another . now my conclusion is , that all deceit is injustice , all injustice unprofitable , because against the most sacred law-maker , who will avenge it here , or hereafter , whether men take notice of it , or no ; evil and injustice will hunt the wicked person ; onely honesty and justice will bring a man peace and prosperity at the last . sect. . afterwards he bring 's another answer , concerning the getting of heaven by violence , which is not logical ; for although he sayes truth , that there is but one way of getting heaven , which is , not breaking , but keeping of covenant ; yet , the fool supposing the impossibility that men might get heaven by unjust violence , he was to answer logically out of the premisses , and not to deny the supposition . then he comes to answer that argument which amused me , concerning the getting sovereignty by rebellion : for let a man read his manner of writing and judge whether in that he did not seem to make this an argument against the fool ( as indeed it was ) when , sayes he , from such reasoning as this succes●ful wickedness is called vertue : now from the hatefulness of this conclusion he overthrow's the fools conclusion . i allow his answer , but think he had had more reason to have confirmed the argument then overthrown it , because , as i have shewed , it was a doctrine corroborated by the main principles of his book ; then he raiseth a new discourse about another opinion [ there be some ( saith he ) that proceed farther , and will not have the law of nature to be those rules which conduce to the preservation of mans life upon earth , but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death . ] i am of that mind , that the law of nature doth give rules for the attaining eternal felicity after death ; for it is a most undoubted rule of the law of nature , as to the general , that bonum est appetibile , so to the particular , that according to the degrees of goodnesse , that which is majus bonum , is magis appetibile , and ought to be more desired then what is minus ; and this is so universally delivered by nature , that no reasonable man heare's the tearme's , and understand's them , but he assent's to them ; here is a major , one rule delivered concerning eternal life hereafter ; if we can find a minor corresponding , it will be ( i think ) one of the clearest delivered truths that can result out of that habit called by philosophers intellectus or habitus principiorum ; but here , in these tearmes he puts it , there can be no doubt of it : for if it be an eternall felicity ( as he call's it ) and all christians believe , the very tearmes render it cleare , that an eternall is more to be desired then a temporary , and therefore more to be endeavoured for . i insist no further upon this at this instant ; i come to that he applye's this to . sect. . [ to which ( saith he ) they think the breach of covenant may conduce , and consequently to be just and reasonable ] i think he never read in any author this conclusion delivered , that the breach of covenant doth conduce to eternal felicity ; for he put 's it in unlimited terms : it is true , if any man , or men , make a covenant to do any wicked thing , although they bind it by an oath , they are bound , and , in order to heaven , they ought , to repent of that covenant , and not keep it ; but it is not the breach of covenant , as a covenant , which disposeth them to heaven , but the acting of that holy thing which that wicked covenant forbid's them to do : suppose a combination of thieves should covenant with each other to act whatsoever such a person , whom they make their supreme , should command ; one of this college should have a sense of that wicked life he live's in , knowing that it lead's to hell and perdition , can any man think he is not bound to leave that society , and disobey whatsoever command is imposed upon him of robbery or murther ? suppose an adulteress married woman should , by her oath , covenant with her adulterer to appropriate her body to him , do not you think she was bound , in order to heaven , to break that wicked covenant ? so is it with all covenants to do evil , they ought to violate them ; but it is not the violation of covenant , but the doing of righteousness , which is acceptably pleasing to god ; but he instance's in his following words : sect. . [ such are they ( saith he ) who think it a work of merit , to kill , or depose , or rebell against the soveraign power constituted over them by their own consent ] this instance he give 's because he hoped that writing against such a horrid diabolical doctrine would usher in the rest of his wicked opinions plausibly ; i am not intended to defend their opinions who think so ; but yet i will say this for them , that i think they that write for killing of kings , which are the papists , and some others , as destructive of civill society as they , will pretend that those sovereignes are not constituted over them by their own consent : they will say , they never consented to his coronation ; to his acception ; never took the oath of alleageance and supremacy : and i will say , that if this be all the ground of this sinne in rebellion , there is no such thing as rebellion by mr. hobbes his doctrine ; for mr. hobbes ( as will be seen hereafter ) make's no sovereign , or leviathan , but such as is consented unto by every particular , of which kind there is none in the world : and therefore , where men have not made such a consent , and are bound by that covenant which is not to be seen in the whole world , there can be no sin in rebellion ; but this was onely an instance to lead on his future scorne of religion , being in it's self impertinent chap. xxviii . concerning the extent of natural knowledge ; our hopes of eternal happinesse ; and our advantages in the prosecution of it ; whereof ; as to its certainty de futuro , we may be more secure then we can be of any thing , from tradition and reason ; how unsatisfied mans understanding and will is in all things else but it and god. concerning the last article of our faith . sect. . but ( saith he ) because there is no natural knowledge of mans estate after death ; much lesse of the reward that is then to be given to the breach of faith ] had he stayed there , although this squint's at mischief , yet this might have been sl●pt over , and might have been somewhat excused , and a man might have said , that he only denyed a natural knowledge of this reward , not a divine faith ; and we christians may be content with this , although it is an unkind act to religion , to hinder it from any assistance , especially in so high a point as this , which move's the first foot towards heaven , he that cometh to god , must believe that he is , and that he is a rewarder of them who seeke him ; so that these two acts of faith are those which leades a man out of this world towards heaven , to believe there is a god ; and that he is a rewarder of them who seeke him ; both which the author hath sl●ighted ; of the first i have spoken : of the second i shall now treat . but i say , had he given it onely this slurre , i would have passed it over ; but as he denye's the assist●nce of nature to the knowledge of future happinesse ; so be most disgracefully adde's [ but onely a beliefe ground●d upon ●th●r mens saying , that they know it supernaturally , or that they know those , that knew them , that knew others , that knew it supernaturally ] could any thing be spoke more sleightingly , or unworthily , of the hope of heaven ? of all the expectation of christianity ? i curb in my self , who could be angry in bitter language , and doe think it would be comely to doe so ; but let others doe it that will , i onely meane to discourse soberly against it , in no passion . sect. . first , then , suppose all , he saith here were true ; that our knowledge of heaven were nothing but a belief &c. yet it ought to perswade more then any motive can be brought to regulate our actions with ; which will appeare , first , out of the nature of the happinesse compared with others ; next out of the evidence it hath from the nature of happinesse ; for it is an eternal happin●sse , a spiritual bappin●sse ; an eternal happinesse , therefore more to be desired then any temporal felicity whatsoever : the content that a man hath in this life is but for this life , and this life is so momentary , that there is no man hath assurance of one daye 's delay in it ; and let him who hath lead a life in an affluence of all this world's goods , think what he is the better for them on his death-bed ; what will it profit a man to gaine the whole world , and lose his own soul ? yea all his felicity past add's but to his misery ; he may say , fuimus troes , &c. but hath with it a miserum fuisse ; he cannot choose but sit down by the waters of babylon , and weep , when he remembers the sion of happinesse , which he hath lost , but cannot now enjoy . i will not drench my self in this common place of the frailnesse , weaknesse , and vanity of this world's pleasure : it is evident , in respect of eternity , it is as nothing , so that then , upon the proposal of such a question , whether had you rather enjoy this world's felicity , whilst you live , or eternal happinesse hereafter ? the answer must needs be , as if it were proposed , whether had you rather have the possession of an estate for a day , or an inheritance for ever ? and as a man would say to that , i care not for this possession a day , it is of no moment ; so must a man's judgement conclude ; this life is nothing ; it is but a day , not that certaine ; i am not made happy by any thing which can be added to me this day , but for hereafter ; and the notion of eternity doth so fill the appetite of man , and hath such a conveniency with it , as he cannot choose , if he ponder in his soul the excellency of it , but desire and embrace it . sect. . then let a man goe further , and see , that those thoughts we have of this eternal felicity , do not represent it to us as of a bodily felicity onely , but a spiritual , an intellectual felicity , proper for man , such felicity as only can make man happy , and such as can make man happy alone . conceive a man with a troubled spirit , thoughts perplexed , a wounded conscience , to speake in the scripture language , bring all the riches of this world's pleasure , meats , drinkes , musick , delightfull sights ; make up a body composed of sensuall contentments , he abhorre's them ; they vex him , they rather trouble him , then ease him , or content him ; because the intellectuall disturbance , which he hath , savour's not those things of these poore bodily delights ; they are as much below the contentments of his mind , as childish toyes to the contemplations of some grave and serious philosopher . againe , fill a soule with those speculations which , at this distance from it , he can have of heaven , and let him have to that an assurance , that he is in the way to it ; bring fires , fagots , gridirons , pincers , what you will , he will have blessed , and charitable , and comfortable thoughts at that time ; so that , with st. stephen , he can thank them for their tortures , and blesse them , and , like a man that hath received a benefit , pray to god to blesse his benefactors ; so can such a man be happy , when he hath spiritual happinesse , in the midst of all worldly miseries . this therefore must be most desirable , without which no man is happy , and with which no man miserable ; with all worldly , sensual goods a man may be miserable , who hath them ; but not so with those ; which fortify a man against all the fiery darts of satan in this world , and hereafter give him eternal felicity , without any disturbance . so that then these worldly goods , and this eternal , admit no comparison to him that apprehend's the one and the other ; that eternal felicity must needs be more desirable then the other . men may object , had we such assurance of one as the other , this were true ; but we have weak assurance of this , and great of worldly ; therefore we let this goe , and content our selves with the other . sect. . for answer to this , conceive with me , first , that although the assurance of the testimony which is given to these divine happinesses were much short of that is given to the other , yet in prudence men ought to prosecute it ; first because we can be no losers of worldly happinesse by the prosecution of this ; there is no action , which a man doth in order to eternal felicity , which hinder's , but rather adde's to temporal felicity ; the governing and regulating our passions , without which no man can have any happinesse , faith , hope , and charity , with all their proper operations ; that man is happier here in this world who hath these habits , & operates accordingly , then he who hath the greatest excesse of all worldly things ; but , contrarywise , the luxurious enjoying these temporary things rob's a man of those eternall joyes ; these actions , in which is most safety , being prejudiciall to no rational felicity ; a man acting by the rules of prudence ought rather to doe , such actions then those which are hazardous of his safety , though seemingly more evident because they appear of no other profit then for temporal , for sensual contents , and may hurt the other ; but these will be profitable for eternal , spiritual good , and cannot hurt temporal ; we find merchants venturing their estates , their lives to the east-indies , per tot discrimina rerum , although a journey full of hazard , rather then piddle at nearer and more secure trades , because the return of the first is of a higher value ; if men then reasonably take such paines , with so much hazard of life , for such a little difference of advantage as is betwixt these two , onely because there is a possibility of a better returne here ; much rather should men engage in this great adventure for eternity , where upon weaker premises ( if they were so ) men must expect such an invaluable gaine , and are assured of no possible losse : but i let this passe . suppose the evidence of it were none but such as mr. hobbes report's , a beliefe grounded upon others sayings &c. yet these other men are such , and these from whom they received it , as may give a better assurance then we can have of any worldly things . sect. . let us , to this purpose , consider what assurance mr. hobbes hath of his worldly felicity , the felicity he placeth in the enjoyment of this life , and the accommodations of it ; the security of this is by a covenant made by every man in a common-wealth with every man , to submit themselves to a leviathan , or supreame governour , and make him their representative in all his actions , as will hereafter more fully be discoursed upon ; now i shall shew , and it is evident , there is no such thing , then no security ▪ but suppose there were , he will allow his leviathan to covenant nothing with his subjects , then they have not so much as a promise for their security , not so much as is here spoken by him concerning mans felicity : a belief grounded upon other mens sayings , and here is no manner of promise ; but because i labour to advance the security men have of this unicum nec●ssarium , i will not onely compare it with mr. hobbes his security , but all that can be had in any politique society . sect. . what security can any man have for the injoying his studyed worldly happinesse ? all the security , he can have is from the promises , or oathes of men , that they will do this , or that ; this is the greatest safety that any man can have ; but , alas , how inconsiderable are promises , yea oathes of men , unlesse honest men , i would our experience did not teach us ; and who can have more then a weak probable assurance of another's integrity , unlesse he have sealed it with his bloud ? which cannot be shewed in any politique concernment de futuro , that it shall be , and if any man would doe such an act , as to dye for confirmation of it , he might be reckoned a mad man. but , contrariwise , let us examine the assurance that we have of this . sect. . [ it is grounded ( saith he ) upon other mens saying that they know it supernaturally , or that they know those , that knew them , that kn●w others , that knew it supernaturally . ] this is a most scornefull speech ; but had he set downe what men these were who first said they received it supernaturally , the case had been cleare ; they were the apostles , men of a known and assured integrity , men that sealed this truth with their blood , and dyed in and for the justification of it ; this no man would do for that he were not assured of . this , at their deaths , was a comfort in the midst of a thousand agonies . now , as aristotle speak's , it is a probable topicke what a learned and honest man delivers in matter of opinion ; so for matter of fact , without doubt , what vertuous men dare and did die for , is truth . it is the strongest assurance that can be given to man of it . these men therefore , who affirmed , that they did receive this most divine truth supernaturally , ought to have a strong assent given to what they say : i would ask him , what assurance he hath that there was a julius caesar ; nothing but this , that it was a beliefe grounded upon , &c. ( as he speak's of this ) yet i dare say , he is more assured that there was a julius caesar , then he can be of any future worldly felicity although the evidence which is given for that truth , is not to be compared with the evidence , given for this of our future felicity ; for he can never shew me a man who durst dye for the defence of that , as multitudes for the justification of this . this then , although it be handed to us from man to man , as the other , yet it being delivered by such men must needs have a perswasive force with it , more then other , which have a like tradition , but not by such undoubtable meanes . sect. . but i will not leave him so ; this truth , that there is an eternal felicity provided for men hereafter , is not onely by tradition del●vered unto us , from such as had it supernaturally revealed ; bus is also most consonant to reason , and may most reasonably be deduced out of its principles , and therefore ought most seriously , and most faithfully to be confided in ; that it is so , i will require but one supposal , which i think i have cleared in my former treatise , that there is a god ; this being granted , we must needs apprehend him provident over those works of his , and , in particular , more eminently over man , which is the most excellent piece of this fabricke , and indeed the onely piece which actively honour's and dishonour's him ; here now we find it not alwaies true , that men , who honour him , who forsake all , even their very lives for him here , are blessed by him in this world , i mean with worldly blessings ; yea , because they forsake all , and their lives , they cannot be blessed here . is it possible to think that god will desert those which hold him so dear to them , and value him at so high a rate ? it is true , i read of iob and many others , that have had a restitution of worldly comforts ; but that is not so with all ; and those that dye for him leave the world , can have no reward in this world ; againe , is it possible that this god of an infinite excellency , wisdome , power , justice &c. should suffer so many villaines to eat up his children and servants , as it were bread ? to commit sacriledge in all kinds ? perjury , blasphemy and the like ? persevering in those sins , to passe without any punishment ? wh●ch some doe in this world , ( although but a few ) supposing a god , men cannot think so ; and therefore , supposing a god , it is not to be imagined , but that there is an eternall happinesse provided for such as serve god , which is all i contend for . sect. . againe , let us consider man in himself , as he is a fellow creature wi●h beasts , plants , stones , &c. we shall , upon consideration of all the creatures in the world , find that every creature hath an object fitted to any power it hath , and some matter or other fit to fill every empty roome in it , and satisfie every natural desire in it ; to see this cleare , let us first view the lowest sort of things , stones , earth , water , aire , &c. which have no life in them , if they have power to operate by their qualitie , to heat or coole , there are objects in the world fit for such actions ; if they have appetites of this place or that , high or low , there are room 's in the world to receive them ; if the matter ( as aristotle ) desire's formes , there are formes to fit it ; you may find this truly applyed to any thing , according to that sacred axiome , so often urged by both divines and philosophers , deus et natura nihil faciunt frustra ; whereas if there were nothing to satisfy those powers and appetites , they were in vaine ; if we climb higher to plants and trees , which have life and no sense , it is evident in them , that their powers and desires of nutrition , generation , augment●tion , by which they exceed these inferiour things , have , whilest they are in this world , enough plentifully in this world to satisfy these appetites , as well as those which they have in common with those other inferiour things , then come to that other degree higher , to beasts and such things which do not live only , but have a power of moving themselves , of apprehending by sense , of delighting themselves in sensual things ; these appetites have that which can satisfie , yea fill their desires , so that more cannot be desired ; yea there is to be had in this world not onely a satisfaction but a satiety of sensual pleasure ; not a belly full onely , but enough to surfeit ; so that , for all those things below man , whatsoever they are , there is something which can sufficiently sat●sfy all the powers and appetites they have . can we think god is so liberal to these things , and lesse to man ? as the apostle dispute's doth god take care of oxen ? that is , in comparison of us men ; as our saviour , if he so clothe the grasse of the field shall he not much rather take care for us ? if he hath so provided for them , in these mean faculties and appetites , which have here ( as the schoolemen speake ) vestigium dei , onely a footstep of god in them , shall he not much ra●her for these noble powers and appetite of reason and will in man , which are made after his image ? certainly it were a high ingratitude to think so ; well then , let us inquire what satisfaction there can be found for these humane powers of reason and will , by which he excells all other things , that must be it which a man desire's , for every thing endeavour's the perfecting of its powers , and the satisfaction of its appetite , which is truly the good of that thing to which it belong's . sect. . it is an undoubted conclusion , a principle , if not the principle , which the inbred law of nature , which governe's man , hath taught every child of man , and so powerfully imprinted it in him , th●t no child , which hath reason , will deny but that he would be happy ; and in particular , if he underst●nd the tearmes , that that is his happinesse , to have all his desires , to have his will satisfied ; for , untill that be , he hath some deficiency ; there is something farther to be enquired after ; he is not at h●s journey's end ; ●hus it is with all things , there is enough for any thing below man to fulfill its appetite to ●urfeit ; but not so , for mans appetite ; this will appeare ou● of the consideration of the things in this world which are reputed good , those that are bodily , sensuall , intellectuall ; bodily , strength , beauty , health , these cannot satisfy a man's soule , though altogether ; joyn to these all sensuall delights , meates , drinkes , luxuriousnesse in any kind , for hearing , seeing , smelling ; let a man have all , those are but things which beasts may enjoy as well as he , and in these he cannot excell them ; yea they excell him in a fuller fruition of them then he can have ; then they are apt to have many casualties to deprive us of them , and a certainty that one day they must be lost , which to a man that hath a forecast with him ( which other inferiour creatures have not ) must needs disturb the content he might take in enjoying them : consider those humane intellectual things , which have pretended a title to man's felicity either the stoick's apathy , freedome from passion , or the aristotelian way of governing passions by reason , although those were handsome and ingenious , and those men trod some steps towards felicity , yet they were but the first steps onely , and those the lowest ; for if the subjects be tumultuous , the king cannot be in safety . the stoicke instead of ruling , would kill his subjects ; take away all passions , and then the king in man will lack fitting instruments to effect his businesse ; the aristotelian governed , or at the le●st prescribed rules to governe the passions , but left the palace of reason unrect●fied ; and although he freed it from the rebellion of passions , yet satisfied it no● with plenty at home ; to conclude , that which make's a man happy , and satisfie's his soule , must be something in him , by which he excell's beasts , that must be his reason , and reasonable will ; this will is not satisfied but by knowledge ; no satisfaction of it , but the enjoying that it love's ; no love without knowledge , and therefore though the will be the seat of happinesse , yet the understanding is the conduit by which th●s happinesse is brought to the will. sect. . now let us then examine what there can be in the will , brought by the understanding , which can satisfie it , and make it happy in this life ; certainly all the things in the world cannot doe it ; for although a man desire 's to know any thing , every thing , yet he cannot be happy in knowing all the things in the world . i will not dispute concerning those things which men doe know , for alas it is mighty short of what men may know ; the businesse of mens lives take them so up , that he is a wise man who know's any thing in any one art ; many things we know , quòd sunt , yet we know not the things , nor the manner of them ; in the mathematiques there is such a thing as quadratura circuli , but the worke of it is not found out ; there is a certaine number of the starres , but men doe not know it : there is a certaine influence , but the most cunning astrologer is deceived in h●s prognostiques ; this might be endlesse ; but did any one man know all these ; did he know all the contrivance of policies ; were he expert in all mechanicks , in naturall knowle●ge , in morall , in any of which never man was perfect , yet his soule would not be full with all this , nor his appetite of knowledge ; for he must needs desire ( when he knowe's all these ) to know the cause of all , which is god ; as in trismegistus his poemander , when he asked this philosophick and knowing man , what he d●sired ? he answered , i desire to know things and their causes ; the knowledge of any thing without their causes , is not satisfactory to a mans soule ; and although men are proud of little sciences , yet satisfied they cannot be without the knowledge of god , and his causation of things ; the world cannot fill the vastnesse of man's soule or desire ; they can , and doe think of other worlds , and of him who is the cause of all , and desire to know him ; i speak not of the baser sort of men , who live little otherwise then beasts ; and then whom beasts are more happy ; but of them who live like men , excelling beasts by these divine faculties of reason and will ; these cannot choose but desire to know god : for knowledge is of truth , god is the fountaine of all truth , from whence it came , yea truth its self ; and therefore that understanding , which is carried to truth ; cannot be at rest untill it come to know him againe ; god is infinite , nothing can fill the understanding but what is infinite . let a mathematician make the greatest number he can , another , yea himself , in his understanding can make a greater ; the understanding of man can grasp and containe any finite thing , and therefore is greater . let him imagine a world as great , a line as long as he can , yet the understanding of another , yea his own , at a second act , can enlarge that , and make it greater ; so that whatsoever is finite cannot fill a man's soule , but onely what is infinite ; and therefore onely god , who is infinite , can be satisfactory to man's understanding . what i say for the understanding , i say likewise for the will ; what is lesse then infinite cannot satisfy it ; i speak not of these beastly sensual affections , they may be surfeited upon , yea the very enjoying them make's men loath them : but of his humane will , his intellectual , nothing can satisfy that but what is infinitely good ; let us look upon riches , and things of that nature , although they are thirsted after most eagerly by man's ●easonable will ( no beast covet's wealth ) yet the soule of man is never satisfied with them , but they prove like fuell to the fire , the more a man hath the more he desire's they , who have so much as their riches is a burden to them , are faine to lay the load upon other mens shoulders , their servants to manage for them ; yet these men desire more ; he , who is in meane estate , require's little additions to content him ; when he hath gotten that , he hath larger desires ; when a kingdome , another ; a world ; and then grieve's he can have no more . i never read the desi●e of riches satisfied in any man but him in the parable , who cryed , soule take thine ease , for thou hast treasures layd up for many ages ; such fl●shes , and little inconsiderable ej●culations of content , men sometimes have , upon the enjoyment of worldly wealth ; but had that man beene asked a little after , would you have another ba●ne full of corne ? he would have been of another mind , and have said , let me have that , and tha● , and a thousand more ; and had he all the wealth in the world , unlesse this should be secured to him , that neither rust nor moth shall corrupt it , nor theeves breake through and steale it , yea that that great thiefe , death , shall not take him from it , his will cannot be contented ; which yet was never granted to men in this world . i will not stay upon this ; riches are not things absolutely good , but relatively onely , as they are referred to other things , they are onely bona vtilia , profitable goods , and that word profit intimate's some other things that they are profitable for ; and therefore they who desire riches , desire some other thing for which these riches are desired , and therefore they cannot satisfie that man's desire who covet's them , but he must goe further ; in one word , to conclude this discourse , goodnesse , happinesse absolute , is the object of man's will ; there is nothing good , but god ; all other things are partiall goods , they have some good , but they lacke more then they have ; and where there is a deficiency , that is not absolutely good ; therefore not any thing , not all things , can satisfie man's will , but he onely ; for still there will be a further desire in the covetous soule of man , untill they have him who is all good ; now then , if the understanding can be filled with nothing but god ; if the will can be satisfied with nothing but him ; it is most reasonable that there should be some such condition , where these two highest powers , which are given under the sunne , should be satisfied . sect. . i will next enquire , whether this satisfaction can be in this life ; if not , sure there must be such a thing hereafter ; and for this , it is fi●st evident that man hath some knowledge of god in this life ; he can by examining causes find that there must be a first ; yea , he can from thence affirme that he must be free from all imperfections , incorporeall , immense , and the like , because corporiety , mensurability , finitenesse , argue imperfection . thus have men philosophiz'd by reason : but the understanding is not filled with this ; as you may observe a country-man , when he see 's another write , walke , speake , and the like , he can tell you , these are the effects of some excellent principles in that man who doth them ; ask him , what it is ? he can , with all the world , tell you , it is his soule ; but ask , what that soule is ? he is at a stand , he knowe's nothing of it ; such are our thoughts of god , from whose works of his we know there is a cause which bringe's these mighty things to passe , which we call god ; but what that god is , who doth them , we are at a losse , by all the reason man can find out ; for as a dog can apprehend his master's kindnesse to him , or his anger , yet cannot know the excellency of his master's wisdome , power , &c. because he is in a lower rank of things then man is ; much lesse is man able to reach at that infinite excellency of god , being many degrees much lower then god , than any creature is below man. this is the knowledge a man may have of god ; if there be any thing else , it must be that other way , in which many divines have trod , besides these negatives of imperfections , to conceive these things we call perfections to be in a much more infinitely excellent manner in him who is god : so a husbandman may know that a learned man exceed's him in knowledge , and that this knowledge is in divine , naturall , and morall things ; but what that knowledge of his is , he cannot tell , unlesse that learned man reveale it to him ; so it is in respect of god , we know he hath excellencies beyond us , that these consist in these or these eminencies ; but what is the nature of these eminencies , no man can know , but he to whom god reveale's them ; yet he cannot choose but desire to know them ; but it may here be said , that god hath revealed these excellencies of his in his holy book ; he hath revealed something of himself in scripture , enough for a viaticum , for a rep●st by the way , in a riddle , darkely , behind a cloud ; by which he believe's there are such things ; yet faith cannot make men absolutely perfect ; it is the support , the foundation of things hoped for ; but peregrinamur fide , we must be strangers from happiness , whilst we live in faith ; it is of things absent ; happinesse consists in the fruition , the possession of what is present , which cannot be so long as we are believing ; faith give 's a man a nearer approach to happinesse , then any thing else in this world ; and therefore a faithfull man can passe better through all the affronts of this world , then any other ; because he knowe's there is a happiness for him elswhere ; that he is approaching to it ; his conversation is in heaven , as s. paul speaketh ; his thoughts are there , his businesse and negotiation ; this world belong's not to him ; but yet he is going to his happinesse ; onely , he is not there , untill he put off his flesh and blood . there are other revelations to prophetique persons , by dreames , visions , and other apparitions , by which god is pleased to reveale himself to some especiall servants of his ; but these are of some particular things , which cannot fill the vast understanding of man ; there are likewise extasies in some men , which ( i guess ) have had by them fuller and greater manifestations of god ; of that kind was that saint paul speake's of , in which were unutterable mysteries ; but these are very short , enough to give a man a taste of heaven , not satisfie him ; enough to make him long for more of the same , and desire to be dissolved , and be with christ ; enough to give him an eagernesse of desire , mixed with the comfort of assurance . he who hath happinesse , as it must be full , so it must be ●onstant , without losse , or feare of losing : for although beasts are happy in the present enjoyment of their happy objects , because they have no forecast of any future evill , unlesse such little sagacities , and instincts of nature as dispose them to these , or these provisions for the future ; yet man , having foreseeing eyes , alwayes looking at what will become of him hereafter , cannot be happy in the present without forecast of the future , what he shall be ; and therefore these temporary felicities cannot make him blessed . sect. . what i have said of the understanding , may be applyed to the will ; for the understanding give 's light to all the will 's actions ; and the reasonable will cannot possibly enjoy any thing without it : therefore as the understanding cannot in this world fully apprehend the infinite good , neither can the will enjoy it ; the will joye's in nothing which is not present ; and the vnderstanding is that onely arme which embraceth this infinite good , and the onely hand which layeth hold of it to convey it to the will ; and therefore , because the understanding cannot fully , and clearely , receive this infinite goodnesse , neither understanding , nor will , neither of these most excellent faculties , can be perfected in this world. sect. . and now after this tedious discourse , from which i can yet hardly withdraw my pen , consider my argument , and see if in reason it may not yield a man as strong assurance as almost any natural truth , that there is a felicity after death : consider the most apparent truths which thy reason can perswad● thee to of things unseen ; thou art ●ssured that all men in all the world are mortal , and must dye : ask the reason ; thou seest , or ●earest , that all here doe so where thou livest , and from thence canst collect that death belong's to all mankind : thou knowest that the fire burn's in the indies , because it hath a power of burning , and an appetite to it wheresoever it is : so i w●ll argue not from one species , or sort of things , but from all the things in this world : there is nothing in the world which hath an appetite not satisfiable , a power without an adequate subject , as logicians speak , therefore it must be in man , in whom certainly there can be nothing in vain or imperfect ; so that the certainty of this is drawn from the most universal principle that is in nature , and such a principle which is as universally touched upon by philosophers and school-men , as any one whatsoever , that deus & natura nihil faciunt frustra ; that frustra est potentia quae nunquam reducitur in actum ; which these powers should be , if there were no felicity after this life , because there can be none absolutely here . sect. . i know of but two things which can be objected here against this conclusion , and i will endeavour to satisfie them in order , severally . the first is , that although man cannot enjoy the compleat full satisfaction of these powers in this life , yet he may be happy in those little parcels of knowledge of god , and his delight in that , by confining his desire and curbing it in , sapere ad sobrietatem , as s. paul speaketh : and thus he will be happy here in this life . i answer , this may breed a moderate content , but not a happiness : happiness is , th●n which no more can be desired ; but there is no man know's so much of god in this life , that he ought not to desire more , because more is knowable ; for although in the fulness of happiness the whole blessed vision is manifest in a glorious manner , at one act , and that enjoyed ; yet here we get it by piece-meal , now one , then another apprehension , by parts , and pieces ; and the infiniteness of divine perfections is such , that no man's life , applyed to nothing else , can compass a full apprehension of it ; yea , the further he goe's in this journey , the further he finde's himself at a loss , and behind with knowledge ; therefore a man must not be content , but strive for more knowledge ; or if he have some content , yet this cannot be satisfaction of the powers , but a curbing them , which yield's but a half enjoyment , such as may be proper for a viator , a traveller to it , not a possessor of happiness in hope , as the prophet david say'th ; but god is our portion in the land of the living : we are here in the land of the dying , where others and we die dayly , and our happiness here is god , but god in hope ; when we come to the land of the living , god will be our portion and possession : to conclude , men may have a begun happiness here , but no● perfect untill hereafter : man perhaps may have content here , but felicity onely in heaven after life . a traveller joye's his heart to see at a distance that happy palace where he hope 's for comfort , but he is not satisfied untill he come there : so it is with us in our journey to heaven ; the happiness we have here is our hope of it , but hereafter our possession . the next objection may be , that this future felicity is an article of our faith , the conclusion of all the twelve , the resurrection of the body , and the life everlasting : now if it were demonstrable thus by reason , an act of faith is not necessary to it . i can here bring the first and last articles of our faith together , that which concern's god's creation , and this which concern's man's salvation , man's beginning and end , which are both from god , and say , that for both of them there is abundance of reason , but those reasons cannot be easily argued by every man ; and yet though every man cannot philosophize in high points of learning , every man can believe these conclusions which are proved by learned men , and that belief is requ●red of every man ; and surely belief hath great force to fasten men to that which they , upon good grounds , believe ; no man know's who is his mother , but by his belief of very easie people to deceive , and to be deceived ; and yet this belief is constantly adhered unto by all sorts of men , so that men dare depose , that such a one was this man's mother , and such this man's ; none of us , that are not travelled in those parts , know that there is a constantinople , yet we are assured by hear-say , and are most confident there is such a city : and stronger than all these may our faith be of this t●uth , as i have shewed ; faith and reason doe not destroy , but help , one the other ; for it is with our way to heaven , as to other places ; when a man hath shewed us one way , we can by that guess at another , which hath proportion and convenience to that ; like lights , when you have kindled one candle , you may easily light others at that : when the soul of man is enlightened by faith , it can with much more ease afterwards inlighten reason , which perhaps else it would never have thought upon , and reason sometimes assist's faith ; for when the persons , we believe , deliver to be believed nothing but that is reasonable , it is with comfort swallowed down and entertained , and the work of faith hath less labour when it imposeth no unreasonable thing . thus you see the same conclusion may be the result of faith and reason , and therefore although proved in one , yet exalted as an article in the other . i could now insist upon the article of faith , how confirmed by scripture , but that is done by an hundred men before , and is evident too to every one that looke's upon the new testament : i could further enlarge upon that i have already touched , concerning the credibility and fitness to believe those men which delivered it to us , that certainly , as festus said to s. paul , not he onely , but all the rest were mad with learning , or something else , who did endure so many afflictions , yea death , for religion , if there were no reward hereafter ; and the story of their sufferings was sealed to us by the blood of thousands in divers immediate centuryes , and continued by the most universally consented story in the world : so that , for certainty we , have not so much reason to believe any article of the faith ( i speak of reason ) nor any conclusion delivered by relation , as this one , that there is a blessedness hereafter for god's servants ▪ because this is the reason , and chief reason , why these men durst dye for religion ; this made shadrach , meshach , and abednego , dan. . despise the fire for gods cause ; the heroick sons , mac. . contemn tortures with a most noble constancy , because they looked for a better and happier life ; so , as it is phrased hebr. . . we are compassed about with a mighty cloud of witnesses , or indeed a cloud of mighty witnesses , to evidence the truth : mr. hobbes therefore did not doe this noble heavenly conclusion right , when he say'd , [ it is received onely upon a belief , grounded upon other mens saying , that know it supernaturally , or that they know those that knew them , that knew others , that knew it supernaturally ] which was a disgracefull expression , and , i can justly fear , intended to that purpose , to disparage this article ; for let a man consider his conclusion which follows , [ breach of faith cannot be called a precept of reason , or nature ▪ ] this , he saith , was opposed by some who held killing of sovereigns lawfull : this seemed out of his premisses to be argued ; for thus , that which conduceth to future felicity ought to be done ; but the breach of faith in killing of sovereigns conduceth to future felicity , therefore &c. what need had he any way to have disgraced our hope of heaven ; it might have served his turn much better to have shewed how the god of truth love's truth , and hate's falshood ; how unpossible it is that error and falshood should be the way to truth , how inconsistent they are : these things would abundantly have served his turn , and have contented the reader ; but to leave that , and fall foule , without occasion , upon our hope of heaven , was very ill done of him . chap. xxix . of covenants , and keeping faith ; of dammage and injury . the exercise of justice in its several kinds . arithmetical proportion is that call'd commutative . what in it and distributive may be due without covenant . the justice of an arbritratour . mr. hobbes's mistakes , about justice , merit &c. bodin's harmonical proportion . the old philosophers unjustly censur'd by mr. hobbes . of epicurus and his philosophy ; the stoicks , &c. fortitude and liberality stated better by them then he pretend's . sect. . i leave this now , and on with him [ others ( saith he ) that allow , for a law of nature , the keeping of faith , doe neverthelesse make exception of certaine persons , as hereticks &c. ] i condemn this with him , but doe not approve his reason for it , which is [ if any fault of a man be sufficient to discharge our covenant made , the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindred the making of it . ] i allow not this answer , because it destroye's that supposition , upon which it was grounded , which is that men have made a covenant ; now the question is , whether that covenant may lawfully be broke ; this is no satisfaction , to say , that there was the same reason not to make the covenant , as to breake it , for both may be amisse , to make it rashly , and to break it rashly ; and one may be well , another ill ; as to covenant to doe any honest thing , the covenant was good , the breach ill ; so likewise the covenant may be ill , and the breach good , as in those examples before instanced in ; not as it is a 〈…〉 of ●aith but of that wicked bond ; nay ▪ i can shew made a covenant with another , may doe it with an orthodox man , or with one not apparent to be other , and yet the man afterwards turne heretique , or discover his heresy ; in that case it is not possible for the covenanter to find the same reason in making , as was in breaking his covenants ; so that , although his conclusion be true , that faith is to be kept with all men , yet his foundation and ground , upon which he built it , was faulty : indeed the ground upon which his conclusion is established is , that god is the god of truth , that religion destroye's not , but perfects morall vertues , amongst which , veracity truth-speaking , is a principal one , and therefore cannot teach to break faith with any one : i would have these men who taught that doctrine , consider , how it had been possible for the apostle to have enlarged christian religion amongst the gentiles , if they had broached such a doctrine , so odious to humanity : but they taught the quite contrary , as is evident ; i let it passe , and proceed . sect. . his application of iustice and injustice to men , and actions , is ingenuous , but at the bottome of the page . he endeavours to shew that sometimes dammage is done to one , when the injury is done to another [ as when the master commands his servant to give mony to a stranger ; if it be not done , the injury is done to the master , whom he had before covenanted to obey : but that dammage redoundeth to the stranger to whom he had no obligation ] this is handsome , but a little too fine : for i am perswaded that no dammage can be where is no losse ; losse cannot be where a thing is not had ; he that hath nothing can lose nothing ; for his instance , the stranger had right to his master's kindnesse ; and the same bond , which tyed the servant to obey his master in that command , obliged him likewise to give it to the stranger ; and that bounty of the master so justly entitled the stranger to it ▪ as that servant , who defrauded him of it , is bound in conscience to make him restitution afterwards for that injury . he hath another instance , by which he endeavour's to illustrate this proposition , at the top of page [ in commonwealths private men may remit to one another their debts ; but not robberyes , or other violences , whereby they are endammaged ] how doth this prove that injury may be done to one , and the dammage to another ? any man may forgive , or remit any dammage , or injury ( no dammage without injury ) so far as it concerne's himselfe , but not wherein it concerne's another ; nor doth his following reason speak any more ; because ( saith he ) the detayning of debt is an injury to themselves ; but robbery and violence are injuries to the person of the common-wealth ] so then it seem●s , by him , that dammage is not without injury ; when the common-wealth is dammaged , it is injured ; where a private man is dammaged , he is injured ; & either of these may remit those dammages or injuries are done to them , and their parts in the same act , when one and the same act doth often endammage and injure both ; but neither can justly intermeddle with the other's interest . sest . . he proceed's , [ iustice of actions is by writers divided into commutative and distributive ] this distinction he censure 's ; i shall censure him for it , but before i doe that , that my judgement may appeare more cleare , when it is applyed to the several particulars , i will permit an explication of that division , how it is understood by the consent of those he call's writers , which are schoolemen , casuists and morall philosophers . thus they discourse of iustice : iustice of actions is either in the act●ons of a particular , relating to the whole body of the common-wealth ; or of the body or whole to par●iculars ; or of particulars one to ano●her , the first ●hey call communis iusti●ia ▪ or legalis , common or legall justice ; common , because it concerne's the community , and legall , because it hath the same intent with all lawes , which is the publike benefit : or else because it is required by the law of that nation , or some aphorisme of the law of nature , which dict●te's that the whole should be preserved rather then any particular ; of this sort are the performance of those duties and services which are required by ●he lawes of the land , as the repaires of high-wayes , paying publick taxes in to the exchequer ; yea , to expose a man's life to danger for the publick good , and preservation of either church , or state. the second sort , of the whole to particulars , is that they call distributive justice , which is apparent in the rewarding and punishing of men ; and in this is required a geometrical proportion , which require's four tearms , as thus ; such a proportion as two hath to four , hath three to six , it is just half ; or such as six hath to eight , fifteen hath to twenty , it is three parts of four ; thus when a parish relieve's the poor w●th the publick stock , such a family as hath three bed-rid people in it must have treble the relief of that which hath but one , out of the publick stock : so in disposing offices , it is justice that he who merit 's accordingly , should be exalted to dignity , and rewards proportionable ; he , who h●th merit for a captain , a captain 's place ; a colonel , a colonel's ; and so in all professions ; and it is not justly done in him who hath the dispensation of these dignities , to give the lesse worthy the place of more worth , and the more worthy the place of less worth . the third kind is of particular men one with another , and this they tearm commutative justice , which consist's in exchanges and the trade and negotiation one man hath with another ; to this they assign the measure arithmetical , which is so much as the other , five for five : he , who hath right to five shillings , must have five shillings , and no more ; he , who hath so much dammage , must ▪ in justice , have so much satisfaction , and no more , without any consideration of merit or demerit ; vertue or vice ; a shilling's worth of work must be payd with a shilling : this is the generall doctrine which is delivered by writers concerning justice . let us see what he except's . what he writ is not true ; justice of actions is not by writers divided into commutative and distributive ; when he saith , justice of actions , he must understand justice in its generall notion , which , by the consent of all writers , is first divided into legall or common justice , and particular ; there are many acts of justice which are not compr●hended under these two ; i mean not onely the acts of those that are called theological virtues , faith , hope , and charity , which are just acts , but are not contained in this division ; but there are many acts of moral justice which are none of these ; as thus , it is a gallant and heroick act of justice , for a man to adventure his life for the safety of his countrey ; justice it is , because due to his countrey , that any one part should perish rather than the whole ; but neither commutative , nor distributive justice , as may appear . it is a just action , in the danger of the common-wealth running to hazard , for a wise man to interpose his advise , to rescue it from that menacing ruine ; yet it is neither of these two ; it is a just act ( i think ) for me to write these notes upon his book ; to admonish men to avoid the danger it threaten's , if not prevented ; but not distributive or commutative justice , but that which is called common or legal justice , which looke's to the publick good ; so that you see , there are many acts of justice legall not comprehended under these heads , and this commonly delivered by writers ; but his exceptions are against the other two . his first quarrell is against the doctrine of commutative ; and it is thus ; sect. . [ commutative therefore they place in the equality of the value of the things contracted for , as if it were injustice to sell dearer then we buy ; or to give more to a man than he merit 's , ] so here are two arguments against an arithmetical proportion in commutative justice , i will examine them both [ as if it w●re injustice to sell dearer then we buy ] that 's the first : this is not a good consequence , for the value of every thing is not to be considered onely from its own intrinsecall vertue and excellency ; but , as he speak's handsomely afterwards , from [ the appetite of the buyer ] yea from many external accommodations which a thing hath , as from that pains and industry the owner took in getting these goods ; from the hazard he made in getting them ; from the necessity or pleasure he hath of those things ; all which may justly raise the price of any commodity , and are , in themselves , things valuable : i could instance in every particular ; but it is obvious , and it is delivered by all casuists , that these things are honestly to be priced , and valued , by the seller ; he speake's ingenuously , when he saith , a little after , that [ the value of all things contracted for is measured by the appetite of the contractors ] so tha● where there is a certain contract , the arithmetical proportion , in commutative iustice , is to be reckoned from the words of the contract , not from the inward value of the thing contracted for ; the first is certain , the other will alwayes be dubious : you may observe in the second book of the kings , . . that , in the siege of samaria , an asse's head was sold for fourscore pieces of silver , and a kab of pidgeons dung for five pieces of silver : this had no arithmetical proportion to the internal worth of the things , but as they were priced by the seller's necessity , which is a valuable addition to any thing which is sold : so that , in express contracts , the sense of the contract is alwayes to be considered in commutative justice ; but commutative justice hath to doe in many things where there are not verbal and certain tearms exp●essed , and , in such dealings , the arithmetical proportion must , in some rule , be applied to the value of the thing , as thus , in a clear instance ; a man hath hired many to reap in his field , he finde's another idle ; bid's him goe to work with the rest ; he doth his dayes worke with them ; he ought to be payd , according as he payd the other men , because although there was not a punctual contract , yet , it is evident , he valued a man's dayes-work at such a rate : so likewise , as i have known a master and a servant-man contract oft-times in private , at the quarter ▪ day they differ about the wages ; the master sa●th so much , the servant , more ; it is just the servant should be pay'd ; in those countreys where there are statute-wages determined , which ought to be in all , they have a recourse to that standard , and there it shall be valued how much . thus , where contracts are expressed , the tearms of them expound the arithmetical proportion ; but where not , the value must some other way be examined , and that applyed . and this may suffice , for answer to his first argument , which sayd , we might not then sell dearer than we buy : for , upon many occasions we may , and it is just to doe so : as to his confirmation , that the contractors appetites values all things : it is true , that the arithmetical proportion is considered according to the contract ; but where there is no such contract , there the inte●n●l value of the thing is onely considered ; but in both an arithmetical proportion is considered , which he seemed to be displeased with . sect. . his second argument is , that [ if this proportion should be observed , then it were injustice to give more than a man deserves . ] this argument may be blown away with saying , that giving , or not giving , have nothing to doe with justice ; giving belong's to another vertue , ca●led liberality ; acts of justice are acts of du●ty ; acts of giving are acts of bounty : but this i may tell him , that it were an act of injustice for that judge or umpire , in a case of commutative justice , betwixt john a-stiles and john an-oakes , who should make john a-stiles to give john an-oakes but a little more than the arithmetical proportion was due to him ; he may give him out of his own purse what he pleaseth ; but , out of justice , he can compell john a-stiles to give no more , or rather pay no more , than a shilling-worth of money for a shilling-worth of work , unless for costs , or cause of 〈◊〉 : so that ▪ here ▪ his second argument against 〈…〉 another man hath merited , but he cannot justly be forced to pay more . sect. . now what followe's , i think , reflect's upon distributive justice : [ merit ( saith he ) ( besides that which is by covenant , where the performance on one part meriteth the performance of the other part , and falls under justice commutative , not distributive ) is not due by justice , but is rewarded of grace onely . ] this proposition is not sense , which is , merit is not due by justice , but grace onely ; the rest is a parenthesis : no merit can properly be sayd to be due , but the thing merited ; or else , it may be , that merit , such as he meane's , hath nothing due to it by justice , but by grace ; as much as if he should say , that where is no covenant , nothing is due out of justice , but grace . this i take to be very erroneous ; as first , in commutative then distributive justice ; in commutative , restitution of fame , health , estate , when a man hath secretly injured another , is due , out of commutative justice ; he ought to make reparations , for injuries done in those things ; but it is not possible to conceive that such a man , who injured another , should contract with him to make him satisfaction for that injury . the like we may find in distributive justice ; take the instance before ; every parish is to relieve the poor which belong's to it ; suppose three poor ; one , weak with old age , can doe somewhat for his living ; another so decrepid , that he is able to doe nothing ; a third beyond the former , both himself , and his wife , perhaps a child , all disabled to help themselves ; those several persons never contracted with the overseers of the poor of that place for any almes ; they never , upon covenant , acted any thing which fore-merited th●s relief ; ye● , of justice distributive , those several miserable people ought , by the ove●see●s of the poor , in a geometrical proportion , to be so relieved : so , in colledges , there are divers degrees of places , and in many with this clause , let the most worthy be preferred ; suppose now two places voyd , and two unworthy , or not so worthy as some other two , should be preferred ; were not thi● injustice , that the less worthy of the two most eminent should be preferred to the best place , and the more worthy to the worst ? this is injustice in distributive justice ; yet neither of these made a covenant to oblige the other fellows : i am perswaded mr. hobbes , when he wrote this , thought to have merited so much of all the leviathans in christendome , ( or , at the least , from the protector ) that they ought to have preferred him to some great office in their state : but yet , i am confident , he never contracted with any for the reward : for merit ariseth not onely from grace or favour , but duty and justice ; although commutative justice onely consider's the case , yet distributive casts an eye principally upon the person , and his qualifications . he conclude's , [ therefore this distinction , in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded , is not right ] the sense , in which it useth to be expounded , is th●t sense i have delivered , and , by what i have delivered , it appeare's right . f●●st , in commutative justice an arithmetical proportion must be considered : and secondly , in distributive a geometrical . sect. . he goe's on , [ to speak properly , commutative justice is the justice of a contractor , that is , a performance of covenant in buying and selling , &c. ] thi● i have shewed erroneous : see him again , [ and distributive justice , the justice of an arbitrator , that is to say , the act of defining what is just ; wherein ( beinst trusted by them who made him arbitrator , ) if he perform his trust , he is sayd to distribute to every man his own : ] here is one c●se put for twenty of a divers nature : it is is true , in such a case , an arbitrator may doe an act of distributive justice , as in dividing of an estate betwixt wife and children , and many other of such condition , when there ought to be a regard of differing relation , and necessity ; but many times , in a reference to an arbitrator , the case may be clearly an act of commutative justice ; and , according to that justice , all the goods , contended for , must , to a peny , be assigned , according to an arithmetical proportion , without any consideration of several merits ; and , in such a case , there is no distribution , to divers their own : so that the justice of an arbitrator may be , according to the case in which he is to arbitrate , either commutative , or distributive ; what he adde's , that [ this , which he had delivered before , ) is just distribution ; and may be called ( though improperly ) distributive justice ] is hard to be apprehended ; and how it should be , indeed , just distribution , yet improperly distributive justice , poseth me , and ( i think ) will him , to explain , unless he understand the first to be an act , the second a virtue or habit of justice , which is countenanced with no one phrase used by him ; [ but ( saith he ) more properly equity ] why should he undertake not to cross the language received amongst the common people onely , but the community of learned men , with a bare affirmation ? he must use it otherwise than all authors before ; equity is a rule , by which men must walk in the acts of all justice ; but the vertue is justice , by which men deal equally , whether arbitrator or private person . in this treatise of justice , you may discerne him to blame , in saying that [ writers divide justice , into commutative and distributive , ] in which he was mistaken ; for iustice is first divided into legall or common justice , and particular ; it is particular justice only which is divided into commutative and distributive ; secondly , he was to blame to deny , that commutative justice is to be acted according to an arithmetical proportion , measuring it onely by the things commuted ; when he knowe's , that all casuists allow twenty circumstances , which may enhanse the price . thirdly , he was mistaken , when he said , [ then it were lawfull to give more to a man then he merits ; ] fourthly , he did not deliver the truth , when he said , there is no merit from justice , but grace onely , where the distribution is made ; fiftly , he said too much , when he said [ distributive justice is the act of an arbitrator ; and commutative of a contractor . ] and here let the reader consider , whether it be not a bold undertaking of mr hobbes , to confront all the learned men in the world ; schoolemen , philosophers , ancient and latter , casuists , politicians , ( all which with one consent , honour and approve this distinction , ) upon so weak grounds as are put down here ; i remember no one author that opposeth it ; i am confident , i have looked upon an hundred ; onely bodin in his sixt book de republica , cap. . where he cavill's at this distinction , methinkes , as if he thought that aristotle would have had a common-wealth governed by these distinctly , one , or the other ; but not have used them both at the same time , in his common-wealth ; and then the necessities of both in their severall opportunities would have made one , alone , improper , and therefore he addes a third and new proportion , unheard of before , which he imagine's would compleat the work , which he call's harmonica proportio ; but i can guesse it a meere airy conceipt , not clearely expressed by him , nor intelligible by any ; for he can never shew how the proportions in musick should correspond to the offices in a common-wealth , which must be done , if he make that proportion the onely rule for it ; and therefore it hath gained no ground upon the judgement of learned men ; and i believe mr. hobbes his opinion will gaine as little . but , to have my judgement , mr. hobbes was angry with it , because the schoolmen use it , and would not allow himselfe patience to examine their grounds . sect. . i passe over the rest of that chapter , in which are some things most ingenious , as his discourse of complacencie , in the page , and in some other things : but that most of all he crowde's in that abominable aphorisme before refuted : that all men are naturally at war one with another , untill i come to the last clause , where he fall's foule againe upon all manner of writers , page . where he saith , that [ the science of vertue and vice is moral philosophy . ] this so far is true , that it is a good piece of moral philosophy , to treat of the law of nature , and to shew how all vertuous actions are deduced out of it , and agree with it ; but this is not all the office of a moral philosopher ; he is first to teach the end , which is man's summum bonum , his chiefe good ; his felicity , happinesse , then to teach the meanes , which are those vertues deduced out of the law of nature , and to shew how they conduce to the end ; so that he confined moral philosophy in too narrow bounds , when he restrayned it to virtue and vice , which are only the meanes , and are handled by a moral philosopher onely in order to his end . now he come's to his high strain againe , censuring the world . sect. . but ( saith he ) the writers of moral philosophy , though they acknowledge the same vertues and vices ; yet , not seeing wherein consisteth their goodnesse , nor that they come to be praised , as the meanes of peaceable , sociable , and comfortable living , place them in a mediocrity of passions , as if not the cause , but the degree of daring , made fortitude ; or not the cause , but the quantity of a gift made liberality . ] there are many things in this period to be cen●ured , first , i blame him for accusing the whole company of the philosophers of ignorance , in so weighty a businesse , not so much as pardoning any one ; when , for my part , who have turned over hundreds of bookes in this businesse , i know no one so blind as himselfe in this particular point , i say no one , either christian , or other ; for first he committeth a mighty fault in forgetting that famous distinction , betwixt a good man , and a good citizen , acknowledged by multitudes of philosophers , and must needs be by any man , who consider's that a man may be discoursed of , either concerning himselfe in his owne nature , and the wayes of perfecting it ; or else in relation to others ; in the first consideration , that science which perfect's him is called ethicke or morall philosophy : for the second , which referre's him to others , it is either to a family , then it is oeconomick ; or else to a state or city , and then it is politick . now the writers of moral philosophy discourse which way a man should perfect himselfe ; so that they give ru●es , which way he should be happy in a desart ; in the midst of the most unhappy state in the world ; in the midst of worldly plenties , miseries : such surely are perfect in this world ; and such onely ; and this is the foundation of all oeconomicks and politicks : no man can be either o●conomically or politickly vertuous , who is not so in himselfe ; and being so in himself , having neither family nor city to dispose himself to , he may not be such to other men . mr. hobbes dedicate's a m●n wholly to others in this place , as in others he make's a man dispose all things to himself , and consider's not the divers sh●res which his parents , his friends ( i may adde ) his children ▪ and , above all , his god , is to have out of him , as well as his country . now mr. hobbes placeth the whole relation of man to be towards others , when in this period he saith in effect , that , sect. . [ the philosophers did not know that humane vertues came to be praised as the meanes of peaceable , sociable , and comfortable living ] which are things onely in respect of others : but i may tell mr. hobbes , that , in their politicks and o●conomicks , they teach this relative perfection as fully , and much truer , then hd , as will appear ; but in ethicks they teach how these vertues are excellent in themselves , and doe perfect the owner ; this is done by all sorts of philosophers ; to begin with the epicureans , whose philosophy doth , in many things , agree with his , although , in some things , he consent's with the stoicks ; in mine opinion he chooseth the worst pieces in both ; first epicurus agree's with him in this , that he makes pleasure the happinesse , the chiefe good of man , as mr. hobbes doth in many places ; and i know lactantius favour's epicurus so much , as to say , he meant the pleasures of the soule ; yet surely it seemes to be the sensuall part of the soule only ; for , in that epistle he writes to menoeceus , which is the chiefe we have of his moral philosophy , he seeme's to me to doe otherwise ; and places man's happinesse , as mr. hobbes doth elsewhere , in the enjoying sensuall contentments : now mr. hobbes , in those other places , did better then in this , where he placed man's happinesse within himself , and the use of his vertues conducing to himselfe ; but here in relation to others , which is so extrinsecall a thing , as it is impossible for a man 〈◊〉 be happy in ; for it is possible a man may lack these accommodations of other men , to converse , and be sociable , and affable with ; and then he is not happy , who can be miserable , which epicurus himself denied to be possible to a vertuous and prudent man ; so that , in respect of the end , although epicurus make the same happinesse , as mr. hobbes in other places , yet epicurus , and mr. hobbes in other places , speake righter then mr. hobbes in this . then , consider the meanes of obtaining this end : epicurus first writes against the fear of the gods , as he call's them ; a thing , which mr. hobbes countenanceth , although he let 's fall in one place ( as mr. hobbes now and then will ) that god doth punish wicked men , and blesse the honest and vertuous ; yet he after speake's against man's feare of any such thing ; because ( saith he ) nothing must be spoken of the gods , but eternal felicity , which they could not have if they were concerned in humane affaires , & therefore denies , prayers , or any religious duty , to have any power with the deities , as i remember , mr. h●bs , out of his stoical principles of the fate or necessity which belong's to all things , and actions . cross principles produce the same wicked conclusion in both , like as herod and pilate joyne together in nothing but crucifying truth ; to the same purpose lucretius ( a follower of epicurus ) speak's in his first , fifth and sixth books ; and diverse times make's it the greatest piece of happinesse , to abhorre religion and contemne it ; and make's man , by that act , to be the greatest conquerour . quare religio pedibus subjecta vicissim obteritur , nos exaequat victoria caelo . and one of mr , hobbes his principles of religion is made by him to be the chiefe , the ignorance of second causes . thus doe men , who conspire against religion , meet likewise in the meanes : but epicurus and lucretius spake out fully , mr. hobbes darkely ; thus they joyne in one principle , by which happinesse may be acquired ; but , in another , epicurus farre exceed's him ; for placing happinesse , as he doth , in the enjoyment of this world's contentments , epicurus contemne's and despiseth death , and will not allow it to be any evill , and dispute's most excellently , to prove it is not to be feared , for ( saith he ) that is not to be feared which hurt 's not ( a true rule , for those things are onely to be feared being absent , which , when they are present , will hurt us ) . now ( saith he , death hurt 's no man , for when death come's , man is not , therefore not hurt by it ; it hurt 's neither the living , nor the dead , saith he ; not the living , for , whilst men live , death is not ; not the dead , for where death is , man is not : the force of this argument is necessary , because in all injuries or hurts , that come , there must be these two termes , the thing hurting and that hurted , but these can never be together , death and man : now herein he excell's mr. hobbes , for whether mr. hobbes make's man's happinesse to consist in the enjoying the world , or in a complacencie or contentment with other men ; yet , when he make's death so fearfull a thing , as he doth , it is in vaine for that man to look for happinesse , who knowe's he must die , when he shall lose this happinesse , and he may dy this day , and suddenly lose it , by that which he , and such men , make their greatest evill , death : so that epicurus , and his sect , went beyond mr. hobbes , and spake more justifiably , out of these principles , then he did . but epicurus goe's on , and deliver's , how these sensuall pleasures are to be preserved , by frugality , and temperance ; two vertues which i cannot find in mr. hobbes his whole booke , which yet necessarily conduce to the preservation of this felicity ; frugality , that so the stock may be supported , which must maintaine his pleasures ; temperance , which [ is a moderate use of them , that so he may enjoy them the fuller ; frugality preserve's the fuel , temperance the fire ; and ( as he speake's ) the enjoyment of a mans pleasure doth not consist in the use of luxurious superfluities , but in the proportion the object hath to the appetite , or the necessity of the man who enjoye's it . so a hungry , needy , and necessitous man find's as great pleasure in a crust of bread , and a draught of water , as any riotous person doth in his greatest excesse of dainties . now i read , in mr. hobbes , nothing of these two , which are as necessary as any , for the happinesse which sensuall pleasures can bring to a man ; and therefore , although i thinke , this sect erred as much as any in his moralls ; yet , i thinke likewise , that these writers did thinke more truly then he , wherein the goodnesse of these vertues ( of which he speake's ) consisteth , that is , making , men happy ; and gave better reasons , for what they said , then he . i have dwelt longer upon this sect , both because few men have described it aright , which i have read ; and likewise because it containing as ill , or worse , opinions , then any other , hath suffered most justly , under the generall censure of writers . and , although it being a doctrine which flattered our flesh and blood , and thereby , for a while , got a great applause amongst men , and the readers of this philosophy , like ranters in divinity , were much followed for a while ; yet in the passages of an age or two , it was cryed down ; and i know not of any late writers , who hath so nearly insinuated his worst opinions , as this author , with whom i have to doe , unlesse it be the mahumetans , who agree with the epicureans in this , that sensuall pleasure is the happinesse of man ; but here they differ ; the mahumetans make that happinesse ete●nall hereafter : but epicurus ( with whom mr. hobbes seeme's to shake hands ) in this world onely . sect. . to discourse of the stoicke philosophy , were needles , because the common authors , which are read by the generality of men , as tully , seneca , epictetus , doe manifestly shew how they placed humane happinesse in his owne breast , and in his power , which is the injoyment of himself , without the disturbance of passions . and , to this end , they imposed that impossible meanes of rooting out passions , as living onely by reason ; which certainly , if it could be done , would make man's life like that of the angels ; or his bodily life like his spirituall , and these cardinal vertues , prudence , justice , fortitude , temperance , to be the supports of all this worke ; and that man's happinesse hath no dependence upon any thing without him ; these certainly carried with them much more perswasive reason to induce the end , which these vertues aimed at , then any thing mr. hobbes hath delivered . then , for aristotle , who , as appeare's , in the tenth of his ethickes , cap. . make's , first , the happinesse of man to consist in action , and that in the noblest action of man , which is of man's understanding ; then in the excellentest act of his understanding , which is contemplation ; and last of all , in the perfectest act of contemplation , which is the contemplation of god. i will not discourse his reasons , which were worthy his writing this way . a man may be happy alone without any reference to a common-wealth , yea the businesse of publique affaires would but hinder and distract this ; and throughout that book , these vertues are taught in relation of this chief good of man , his happinesse , in which he may well rest , and seek no further ; but , in his politiques , he shewe's how the same vertues conduce to the publike ; mr. hobbes , therefore , was much to blame , when he , in generall , passed so weake ( though cruell ) a censure upon the universality of morall philosophers , as to say , they did not see wherein the goodnesse of these vertues , they wrote of , consisted : and his instance is as much to blame , which is , that sect. . [ those writers place them in the mediocrity of passions , as if not the cause , but the degrees of daring , made fortitude ; or not the cause , but quantity of a gift , made liberality ; he is mistaken , almost in every word he writ . first that morall vertue , called iustice , is not in the passions , nor in any thing th●t hath not reason ; so i may say by prudence , nor doe philosophers say it is ; nor are many of the lawes of nature ( as he calle's them ) written in these inferiour faculties , but in the superiour ; nor doe these men , who write of these things , so foolishly discourse of those vertues , whose nature is busied about the moderating of passions , as if there were no more to doe but to bridle a mans passions ; but then finding it necessary for the attayning man's happinesse in this world , that men's passions must be curbed , without which , like an unruly horse , these passions will transport a man to a thousand inconveniencies , and not be governed by reason , but runne away with it ; these vertuous habits subdue those passions , that they act so far , and no farther , then prudence , and right reason shall direct them ; so that mens passions facilitated by custome , to the yoke , are made to stop , turne or move , according to time , place , persons , manner of working , quantity of working , all circumstances , as prudence and right reason shall prescribe : and this philosophy st. paul taught , gal. . . and tearme's it crucifying the flesh and the passions of it , cor . ult . i keep under , or beate down my body ( that is ) keep it in subjection , lest ▪ while i preach to others , i my selfe should be a cast away : he that keepe 's not under his body , his flesh , and the passions of it , can never regulate them according to reason ; and therefore this philosophy of theirs was most excellent , according to true grounds of reason ; but his censure is much mistaken , where he seeme's to make those philosophers onely terminate the moderation of these passions in themselves , and not reflect them upon that is most desireable , the subjecting them to reason , which all i meet with doe . and the mistake runne's in the instance given . sect. . [ as if not the cause , but the degrees of daring made fortitude ; or not the cause , but the quantity of a gift made liberality . ] i wonder , when he read any writer of note so absurd , as he make's all philosophers in generall : for fortitude , they make it ( as all other ) to consist in mediocrity ; it is excelled by temerity , or rashnesse ; it is defective in cowardlinesse ; and these are both degenerations from the vertue fortitude ; which fortitude is to dare doe that ( what danger soever be in it ) which reason prescribe's ; and to forbeare to doe that ( what advantage soever shall accrue ) which just reason shall forbid . take an instance in that man of god , david , in sam. . we may read that he durst encounter with a lyon and a beare , to rescue an innocent lamb out of their mouthes : he dare's fight with goliah in compleat armour , with nothing but a sling and a stone , to rescue his country ; yet a little after we shall read of him flying out of his wifes window for safety : yea , in the . of the same booke , we shall find david , and onely abishai with him , entring the whole army of saul : an act than which nothing could be more bold or hazardous ; and taking his speare , and bottle from his holster , and yet , he durst not touch his person , for committing of treason ; each an act of true fortitude , to dare so much , when it was fit , and dare doe no more , when it was fit ; no not for a kingdome : the rules of fortitude , are , not to feare , or hope for any thing , but upon the guidance of right reason ; so that the daring to say , or doe unjust actions , is opposite to fortitude : i may say the like of liberality , it hath two vices nigardlinesse and prodigality ; it is prodigality , profusely to throw away man's estate , or loosely to wast it , upon idle and vaine persons and occasions ; but it is nigardlinesse , to grudge his own , or other men's necessi●ies , that which he can spare from his conveniences . fortitude , liberality , all vertues have their times , places , persons , with other circumstances , to be considered in their practices , without which they are not esteemed ver●ues amongst philosophers . this made some philosophers think prudence the onely vertue , varyed according to the diversity of the objects , it was busied about , because that consider's these circumstances ; others make it the chiefe , having an interest in the acts of every other vertue ; so that he was utterly mistaken , in that expression ; nor are all vertues onely by philosophers assigned , to moderate passions , but actions , as aristotle discourseth ; as is apparent in that cardinall vertue of justice . to conclude , a vertuous man make's passions servants to reason , and governe's them , a vicious man let 's them be his masters which hinder's him from true felicity . i have done with this , and had not touched upon it , but , through this weak discourse , mr. hobbes thought to have obtruded upon an heedlesse reader , or such as is not versed in morall philosophy , a contempt of so much excellent doctrine , delivered by so many learned men ; and to have ( unjustly ) usurped the name of the onely excellent philosopher , which i ( who acknowledge my self a novice to the others ) ought not to subscribe to . censures upon the sixteenth chapter of leviathan . entituled , of persons , authors , and things personated . chap. xxx . a person what , and what to personate . boethius's definition explained and asserted . of keeping and breaking covenants . the true god personated neither by moses , nor any else . the israelites , whose people . sect. . this chapter i should wholly have let pass , but that , by a few weak grammatical notes , the plot of it seeme's to be aymed at most profane and wicked purposes : for that reason i must censure it , as not befitting a christian writer , and in its self containing many dangerous falsities ; he begin's it thus : [ a person is he , whose words or actions are considered , either as his own , or as representing the words or actions of another man , or any other thing , to whom they are attributed , whether truly or by fiction . ] reader , here is a strange definition ; definitions should be short , without unnecessary circumstances , of which this is composed : i will make it shorter for him , in his own sence ; a person is he who doth or speake's any thing ; and this is as full as his ; for whosoever doth or speake's , his words or deeds are considered either as his own , or anothers ; or he might have say'd , it is a particular man , for actions or speeches of every particular man are either considered as his own , or representing another man , or thing ; so that his tedious description might , without such circumstances , have been cut shorter , and have had the full expression of his intendment . but because mr. hobbes will speak pertinently , and be clearly understood what he meane's , he proceede's with a distinction . sect. . [ when they are considered as his own ( that is , those actions or words ) then is he called a natural person : and when they are considered as representing the words and actions of another , then is he a feigned or artificial person . ] thus may a man be distinguished into a true and counterfeit man ; and no more than the picture or the image of a man is a true man , no more is a feigned or artificial person , a true person ; and yet this feigned or artificial person doth as fully agree to his definition , as the true person ; which shewe's the definition to be to blame : the metaphysicians have an undoubted axiom , that ens and verum convertuntur ; what is not truly such , is not such . if then such a man , whom he name 's , be but a feigned person , he is not a person truly , and then not a person ; yet we shall find him endeavouring to set him out , as the onely true person , presently afterward with his grammar rules . sect. . [ the word person ( saith he ) is latine . ] sir persona is latine , person is english ; if he had sayd , person had been derived from the latine , it had been truth ; but to say , person is latine , is false ; persona in no case is person , [ instead whereof the greeks have 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ] it is true they have , and those two in greek and latine are , by the use of speaking , most strictly in these two languages appropriated , to signifie this which we call person in english ; there were other words often used to the same purpose . the grecians used 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the latines suppositum , which in time ( for words , — juvenum ritu florent modò n●ta vigentque ) grew out of esteem , and now signifie other subsisting substances , and those two former have gained , in the language of divines , the expression of that which we in english call person ; and there was reason for it , because the latter have been frequently used , by divines and philosophers in antient times , for other things besides persons ; and so now , to avoyd equivocations or tedious descriptions , both divines and philosophers speak both of suppositum and hypostasis , in a general nature , as belonging to all other substances ; but persona and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as peculiar to reasonable substances , so that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is a reasonable 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and persona a reasonable suppositum . he goe's on with [ which ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , ) signifie's the face , as persona in latine signifie's the disguise . ] this is true , consented unto by all grammarians ; but use of words in divers matters , and divers arts , is divers : first in the art of grammar , we find but three persons , i , thou , and he . secondly , in civil law , we sometimes find it the quality of a man , as rich , or poor ; in canon law a dignity , bishop called person , &c. in metaphysicks and divinity , a reasonable subsistence ; which is totally neglected by mr. hobbes , as some other acceptations : so that , when he had so debated , in such a large discourse , upon the sense of the word , he was to blame , in dwelling onely among the players , to have omitted the use of this word in so many sciences . consider the result of this horrid criticism . sect. . [ so ( saith he ) that a person is the same that an actor is , both on the stage and in common conversation ; and , to personate , is to act or represent himself or another : ] this is it i foretold you of , that although a feigned thing cannot be a true thing , yet he make's the feigned onely the true , and the representor onely to be the true person , not to be , who is represented ; and although in his definition he sayd , that [ a person is he whose words or actions are considered as his own , &c. ] and in his following division there was a natural and a feigned person ; yet here he make's all persons feigned , and their words and actions to be others : if he answer , that his words were [ represent himself or another ] then if he act himself , it is enough to constitute him a person . ] i reply , that what it is to act himself , he hath expressed in the words immediately preceding , [ a person is the same that an actor is , both on the stage and in common conversation : ] now no man can properly be say'd to act himself , or represent himself ; for the actor and the acted , the representor and the represented , are two . he proceed's , [ and he that acteth another is say'd to bear his person , or act in his name : ] very true , but if he beare's another's person , the other is the person , not he that beare's it : the constable beare's , represent's the person of a king , but is not his person ; so doth a player ; this make's all against himself , and so doth that which followe's , [ in which sense cicero useth it , where he sayes , unus sustineo tres personas ; mei , adversarii , & judicis : i bear three persons ; mine own , my adversaries , and the judges : ] and it is likely he might say so truly , but he doth not say , i am three persons , but i bear three , or act them ; they were the persons , whose parts he acted , at that time ; not he who acted them ; the persons which he bare , and he who bare them , are divers ; thus he overthrowes himself , when he labour's to shew , that the representor is the person ; but his argument prove's onely the represented to be the person ; and this we shall find in the antient tragedyes and comedyes put out . the critick , which put●s them out , calle's the persons those which were represented , not the actors , as is to be seen in seneca and terence , &c. not that i deny , this word hath sometimes been used by writers , as mr. hobbes expresseth it : but i deny that that is the universal acception of that word ; or that mr. hobbes his argument doth shew , that it was ever so accepted : but rather clean contrary ; the person is he who is represented , not the representor . but now it will become me to shew the right use of the word , and how it may and must be used otherwise than mr. hobbes direct's . sect. . a person then , taken in the most received conceipt , that divines and philosophers acknowledge , is defined by boethius , de duabus naturis , to be rationalis naturae individua substantia : an individual substance of a rational nature : this definition is most generally received , and i doubt not , but it will abide the test , when it is clearly explained , which i shall endeavour to doe ; only richardus de sancto victore gave it a rub , and make 's men pause a while to explain it ; for he , in his fourth book de trinitate , cap. . object 's against this , that it is too large , because it agree's to that which is not a person , as the divine essence ; for , saith he , this divine essence is the trinity , which is not one person . in ●is cap. he give 's another definition : persona est per se existens , solùm juxta singularem quendam rationalis existentiae modum : a person is a thing existing by its self onely , according to a single manner of a reasonable existence : if he had expounded , what this singular manner of a reasonable existence is , by which we might have discerned how the manner of existing had been divers from others , he had acted somewhat that we might have understood his meaning ; but , as it is , will be very hard : and this learned man ( i see ) but little followed ; onely his countrey-man scotus in mum senten . distinc . . quaest . unica , with his sect make other objections against this definition , because ( saith he ) by this definition , the soul of man , separated from the body , should be a person , for it agree's to that soul ; but that the soul separated is a person , is denyed by him , as indeed by most , although affirmed by some very learned , as the master of the sentences himself , and others : again , saith scotus , by this definition , there would be no person in god , because individuale cannot be where is no dividuum , a dividible thing , which cannot be affirmed of god. again , this phrase , rationalis naturae , onely agree's to man , not to god , or angels , whose knowledge is after a more excellent way , than by ratiocination and discourse . these are the main objections of scotus , and his followers , which i would answer immediately in their order , but that i think the bare explication of boethius his definition will doe it , without more business , which thus i doe . sect. . first a person is a substance ; by that term it is opposed to all accidents , and things onely imaginary ; it is an individual substance , by that term it is opposed to those are called second substances , the general or sp●cial natures of substances , which are dividual into many of the same nature , as a man , a lyon ; there are many of the same kind under each of these notions , but there are no more the same as one person ; yet if perhaps that term of richardus de sancto victore might seem more fully expressing this business , which is ( it is incommunicable ) he may use it , and by that may be denyed , that the soul of man separated is a person ; because , although it is incommunicable , ut quod ( as the scotists speak ) yet it is not absolutely , for it is communicable ut quo ; which distinction may be thus explained ; that thing is communicable ut quod , which communicate's its self wholly , and in recto , as they speak , so that it communicate's in such a manner , as a man can say another is this ; so doe general or special , any universal natures , as we can say , socrates is a man , a sensitive thing , and the like : but there are other things communicate themselves ut quo , when by them a thing receive's an addition of some nature , yet not such , as that we may say another thing is this , but that it hath this , or is made such , or such , by it : so whiteness , heat , coldness , or any form , the soul of man , the form of any thing , these communicate themselves ut quo , by which that thing , to which they are communicated , may be say'd to be white , or have whiteness ; to be hot , or have heat ; not to be whiteness or heat ; to be animated or have a soul ; but not to be that soul , and the like : thus they say that the soul of man , separated , is communicable ut quo , though incommunicable ut quod ; it hath in its self an aptitude to inform the body again , though it be now separated ; but , a person is absolutely incommunicable . the last term in this definition is , that it is rationalis , of a reasonable nature : this word reasonable , must be understood , of any intellectual nature , whether by discourse or else , and so it comprehend's all , divine , angelical , or whatsoever ; and , if i am not deceived , this mere exposition will satisfie all the objections which have been made : that of richardus who saith , this agree's to the divine nature , which is the trinity : no , saith my definition , that divine nature is dividual ; communicable , to three persons ; scotus his first argument , that it agree's with a soul separated : no , say i , that is communicable ut quo . his second , which saith , that individuum must be of that is divisible : i think , i might deny that proposition ; howsoever to that which followe's , that god cannot be divided , i say , not into beings or natures ; but , he is into persons , and that without all composition . his third , that this phrase rational cannot be understood of god , is true in a gross sense , as no words we use , can , yet reason may , be affirmed of god in a superexcellent manner , which excell's our knowledge or discourse ; and angels , although they discourse not , as most think ; yet they have an angelical reason , which discern's , in a finer manner , those things without discourse , which we doe by discourse ; nor is it necessary , that rationality should be bound up onely in the notion of discourse , but may well be extended to all manner of knowledge , beyond beasts . thus you may discern , what a person is esteemed to be , amongst such as know how to define ; and mr. hobbes , if his hatred to the school and common philosophy be not such as will not suffer him to read their books , might easily have discovered this amongst them , and have not suffered himself to be transported with the imagination of how this word is used upon the stage ; onely ( for which valla and some such are called pedagogues and players , rather than philosophers ) in words , we are not alwayes to consider their etymologie , but how they are used ; yet if we should goe to the etymologie of this word , the most commonly received amongst the schools is significant of the true use , which is per se una , a person , because it is by its self one ; nor are we to consider onely how words have been used , but how they are now in our english ; formerly a knave signified a servant , now a dishonest man ; bawdery signified onely bravery , now obscenity , with hundreds of the same nature : so that since the exposition , which i have given of this word person , is that which you shall find alwayes to be the meaning of it when it is used amongst philosophers , when he give 's another sense of it , he ought to have shewed more reason for it , then he hath . but he hath a design in it : i will therefore consider that . sest . . page . about the top of the leaf he saith [ of persons artificial some have their words and actions owned by those whom they represent ; and then the person is the actor ; and he that owneth his words or actions , is the author ] i am of another mind , not the actor , but the acted is the person , as will appear manifestly : a constable hath his actions , and his words , legally spoke in the king's name , owned as the king 's ; yet he is not the person of the king , but the king , in his own person , act 's by him ; he beare's the person , represent's the person of the king : but the king is the person , he the actor or representer : the author , according to his phrase , is the person , not the actor . i commend his observations , upon authority , and what followe's in that page , onely i can by no meanes approve what he saith , in the middle of that page . sect. . when the actor doth any thing against the law of nature by command of the author , if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him , not he , but the author breaketh the law of nature . ] this is very erroneous , or else it make's an impossible supposition , for this supposition [ if he be obliged by a former covenant ] must either be understood , that some former covenant had power to bind him to doe this act against the law of nature , and that is impossible : for no authority , but that of the god of nature , can have right to crosse the law of nature ; and then it is most consonant to the law of nature , to obey him contrary to all covenants , made to any other , by any authority , yea even of god himself ; and upon this ground the obedience of abraham to sacrifice his onely son ( which was as cross to nature as any thing could be ) was most honourable ; or else must be understood , that some covenant , of one man to another , of generall obedience , in all things should have power to oblige him to breake the law of nature , upon such a man's command ; and then it is most wicked ; first , it is sinfull to make such a covenant ; and it is doubly wicked , to keep it : for when a man make's such a bargaine , it is supposed to be in licitis et honestis , in lawfull and honest things , not against the law of nature ; yea , should a man , in expresse termes , covenant or bargaine , in particular , to doe this individual thing which is unlawful , he were bound to repent , and not to doe it : his reason , he give 's for the conclusion , is not strong enough to enforce it , which is . sect. . for though the action be against the law of nature ; yet it is not his : but contrarily , to refuse to doe it , is against the law of nature , that forbiddeth breach of covenant ] this answer consist's of two parts , i shall examine them distinctly : first he saith [ it is not his ] that is , his that doth it ; he put 's these relative termes very doubtfully ; to this i reply , if it be not his , he is not responsible for not doing of it : for no m●n can be responsible for that which belong's not to him , for any act , but what is his own ; that which he hath not power and authority to doe , his doing is not vertuous , nor his not doing viticus ; so that the first part of his answer destroye's the second , which make's the law of nature to act against the law of nature , when he hath covenanted to doe it ; but certainly those actions are the actors owne acts , and he shall answer for them , be blessed or cursed for them ; and because a man owe's obedience to god onely , and to men , onely for god's sake , therefore whatsoever any man shall command , contrary to gods law written in the bible , or the nature of man , is a sin against god : and disobedience to men commanding against the law of god , is true obedience with god. see one instance in the first of exodus , begin the story , at the fifteenth verse you shall find pharaoh commanding the hebrew midwives , that they should destroy ●he male children of the hebrews : it is said in the verse , the midwives feared god and did not as the king of egypt commanded , and in the . verse it is said , because the midwives feared god , that god made them houses , that is , blessed them : here it is evident , that when a command was given , to act that horrid sin of murder , which is against the law of nature , god blessed those persons who feared god more then men , and would not be actors in that which was against the law of nature , to destroy innocent children : nor can mr. hobbes have any evasion , to say , they had not covenanted to doe this act , for it is exceeding probable that when pharaoh commanded them to doe it , he would not have dismissed them without a promise ; as it is reasonable to think , when he convented them , and charged them with their fault , they would have excused themselves with saying , they did not promise ; but besides this mr. hobbes a little after this ( which i intend to treat ) teacheth , that every subject make's a covenant with leviathan , to owne his actions and obey him ; now then although there were no other covenant , these midwives living under that government , where leviathan pharaoh commanded it , they had covenanted to obey him , yet god blessed them , because they did not ; so that , it seeme's their actions were their own , for which god blessed them , though contrary to the command of pharaoh . sect. . the second part of his answeare is this [ but contrarily to refuse to doe it ( that is , what is commanded . ) is against the law of nature that forbiddeth breach of covenant ] it is true , that the breach of covenant considered , in its self , is against the law of nature ; for a man by covenant give 's away his liberty of using , or acting that thing for which he covenanted , otherwise then by his covenant : but consider now , if a man , that hath alienated away formerly his right to an estate , or had no right to it , should make a deed of that estate to another man , such an act could be of no benefit to that other : this is that man's case who shall covenant to act against the law of god , written in books or hearts ; he cannot covenant to doe it , it is voyd ipso facto , it is god's due , and he cannot alien it , and what he shall act , according to such a covenant , is wicked , the very pretence to have power to doe it , is a conspiracy against god and his right of dominion over us : so that there can be no breach of such a covenant , which had no right to tye or bind any man ; that conclusion therefore was a great mistake of mr. hobbes , and is justly censured here , because conducing to other ill consequences hereafter . sect. . in the . page , having discoursed of many things which may and may not be personated , towards the midst of that page , he saith that [ the true god may be personated ] this phrase gave me an amazement : for i cannot call to mind any such expression made either in scripture , or orthodox ecclesiasticall writers , and , understanding personating in that sense that mr. hobbes doth , to say , the actor is the person , it was too boldly affirmed by him ( i think ) without any ground ; had he spoke of the true god , as he did before of idols , to say , man might be trusted for those gods , in things which are dedicated to pious uses , and so , in the place of god , receive and dispose such legacies , and , in that sense , say , they personate god , quoad haec ; thus farre there might have been some excuse ; but to say , that the true god may be personated by any thing which is not god , was too great an exaltation of the creature , and diminution of his excellency ; but yet thus he doth , as appear's by his instance [ as he was ; first by moses , who governed the israelites ( that were not his , but gods people ) not in his own name with hoc dicit moses , but in gods name with hoc dicit dominus ] first by moses . i am perswaded , he can never shew me , that the true god was ever personated by moses , a man may be instead of god , in divers offices ; to the poor are in the room of god , instead of his hands , receive in god's stead those almes which , for gods sake , are given them ; kings , and those which are in authority , are in god's stead , to govern and rule us , and therefore we make conscience of obedience to them , because for this purpose they are ordained of god : priests are loco dei , in the place of god , in sacris , holy duties ; so that they open or shut the gates of heaven , absolve and bind m●n , and he that despiseth them , in those holy dispensations , despiseth christ himself ; but , none of these can be say'd to personate god , nor can any creature doe it ; he who personate's god , must represent an infinite excellency , infinite in power , infinite in wisdome , &c. yea must represent an unspeakable , an incommunicable , unexpressible , an unrepresentable excellency , which is impossible : if mr. hobbes had say'd , that some men , as moses , were messengers of god , as the apostles ; embassadors of god , to deliver or act his will amongst us , he had say'd aright ; but to make them personate him , sound 's too high for a finite creature in his sense . sect. . i know exodus . . it is said by god to moses , that aaron should be his spokes-man to the people ; he should be to him instead of a mouth ; and moses should be to him instead of god. and again , exodus . . see i have made thee a god to pharaoh , and aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet . by the understanding these two places , i think may be cleared whatsoever can be say'd , for moses his personating god ; for that which concern's h●s being a god to aaron , we may observe , that he could be no otherwise a god to aaron , then aaron was a mouth to moses ; the same words are used to both : how was he a mouth , but by speaking , and delivering those things which moses directed ? the same way was he a god to aaron , by directing aaron , such things as god directed : so as the people need not doubt , but what aaron spoke was by the direction of moses ; so aaron need not doubt , but what moses appointed him to doe , or speak , was the will of god ; and it is remarkable , that in both these places , the word used for god is elohim , which is a name given often to kings and princes , to men in authority , so in particular ; not to multiply the places , in the of exodus , . thou shalt not revile the gods , that is the princes , so thou shalt be to him as god , or a prince ; howsoever , the place enforceth no more , but that moses should be so a god , as aaron was his mouth , that was , to deliver his will ; this is not to personate or represent him as a person . the second place is as cleare , where moses is said in the chap. . to be made a god to pharaoh . the storie is thus ; moses had something of man in him , and was afraid to goe to pharaoh : be not afraid of him , saith god to him , as he is above thee without me , so thou shall be above him with me ; i can rule him , thou shalt be a god to him : thou shalt terrify him with signes and wonders , and aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet , that is , deliver thy words , as it is expounded in the following verse ; or else we may take elohim , in the other sense , for a prince or king ; so , i have made thee a king or prince over pharaoh , thou shalt have power over him , as he over his subjects ; but , which way soever , he is but enabled by god , for certain workes ; and we may take another observation ; in neither of these places , is he called god or a representment of god , but god to aaron , god to pharaoh , that is , to those particular persons , in those particular businesses : but this come's not up close to mr. hobbes who say's , the true god may be personated ; concerning which there is no such expression in these texts : but that moses was made an instrument of god's , to act some things towards these two persons , pharaoh and aaron . nay , i will adde one note more , that from these texts , had moses represented god never so fully , yet could he not be say'd to personate god , according to mr. hobbes his understanding a person , for a person , by mr. hobbes , is such a man as is a li●utenant , a representer , an atturney &c. according to all these phrases he expresseth him in the preceding page ; but none of these could moses be , because all those must be notified that they are such to the parties with whom they negotiated ; but this certainly was onely expressed to moses , he was made acquainted with this power , not aaron , not pharaoh ; and therefore he was not made one of mr. hobbes his persons : but if he were , which no where appear's , yet , it is most evident , not in that sense , which he express●th , that is , in respect of the people , which is his expression [ who governed the people ] now he is never sayd to be a god to the people , which yet he might have been by the same word , which is used in those places , signifiing a r●ler , or prince : he adde's an unadvised parenthesis [ that were not his , but gods people . ] sect. . they were god's by adopting them into a more peculiar favour then any other nation in the world , guarding them with eminent miracles of his providence ; they were moses his people , by being under god the dispenser of those acts of providence , and therefore exodus . . god called them his people ; get thee down , for thy people , which thou broughtest out of the land of egypt , have corrupted themselves ; and moses repeating , in a long discourse , the mercyes of gods providence towards them , rehearseth the same words , deut. . . so that they were the people of god , by his especial grace ; and they were moses his people , by his being , under god , their governour ; the same act is attributed to the first and supreme cause , in a most high and eminent way ; to the second , as an instrument , cooperating with it . in the of genesis , it is said , that god brought them out of the land of egypt ; in this place it is say'd , that moses brought them ; both in their several wayes , god , as the first , moses as the second cause : but let us consider , perhaps he gives , a reason for what he s●ith ; he affirme's that moses govern's the people , not in his own name , with hoc dicit moyses : but in god's , with hoc dicit dominus . sect. . if this would serve to make him personate another , then he and i should personate god ; for when we urge scripture , we say god , or the spirit of god saith it ; nay , i may say for moses ( whose humility was far from usu●ping that excellency which mr. hobbes ascribe's unto him ) if he had personated god , in mr. hobbe● his sense , he would not have used that phrase , hoc dicit dominus , but ego hoc dico ; let a man consider a player upon the stage , when he personates and act's a king , he doth not say , the king saith this , or the lord , but i command , as if he were a king ; and this is , by mr. hobbes the original of this word person , to which he applie's all . sect. . one word more : i am of opinion , as mr. hobbes in another place speake's rightly ( and others , before him , say a much ) that in the time of moses , josua , and the judges , god was the sole king of the israelites ; he gave them lawes ; they by covenant bound themselves to obey those lawes ; he to protect them ; and moses was so far from being their king , that he gave them no lawes ; so that he was but , as it were , a judge , and a generall to lead them in their battails , as god directed , and to judge their causes according to god's lawes which he had given them ; and we shall find that moses used that authority but sparingly , for , he had recourse to god still , in any weighty matter of that nature , and would not judge any thing besides the letter of the law : so you may find leviticus . , , , . that the lord himself gave sentence upon him who had blasphemed his name ; he was in the . verse put in ward , that the mind of the lord might be knowne , in the . verse the lord spake un●o moses , not his person , but his officer , bring forth , &c. verse . see likewise numbers . . the lord declared to moses what should be done to the man who gathered stickes on the sabbath day ; and the like you may find in the case of zelophehad numbers . verse . and moses brought their cause before the lord , verse . and verse . the lord spake unto moses saying , &c. so that moses was so far from personating god , that he did nothing but as a messenger , and mediatour betwixt god and them , delivering god's will to them , their requests , and many times his owne , for them , to god ; and therefore though god in . of exodus , when he was angry with the abominations of the israelites , would disown them , and his peculiar interest in them ; he , as it were , threw them off to moses , and called them his people ; yet moses pleading for them verse . &c. returne's them to god againe , and calle's them his people , which he brought forth of the land of egypt ; he owned none of those glorious workes to be his , of which he was but an instrument , but attributed all to god. well , then we see moses was but an instrument , a judge , a generall , and those offices in a weake manner performed , not without a perpetuall direction from god ; but in nothing did he personate him ; so that i think mr. hobbes was deceived in using this unheard of phrase , concerning moses ; but i would he had rested in this , and had gone no further ; me thinke's , i could have forgiven this , ( although somewhat too bold a language ) taking personating in a very large sense , that moses , and all kings , might be sayd , in a little weake manner , to personate god ( although i did distast it ) but what followe's is worse . chap. xxxi . christ personated not god , being really god hims●lfe . his divinity asserted against smalcius and other socinians . christ's bloud not the bloud of the father , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 appropriating it to him acts . . his filiation and eternal generation vindicated from the subtile exceptions of valkelius , &c. and our saviour justified in his first name of being the sonne of god. sect. . [ secondly , by the son of man , his own son , our saviour jesus christ ] i will stop here , and leave the intent of our saviour's coming , to another place ; he make's here our saviour to personate god , he call's him truly the sonne of man , and the son of god ; but in saying , he personated god , he used a phrase no whit comely to expresse such a sacred mystery by ; no man can properly be said to personate another , who is that other ; now this son of man is the son of god , and he is god , and thought it no robbery to be equall with god ; if he be god , he cannot be said , in any propriety of speech , to personate god ; for he , who personate's another , is not really that other , but counterfeitly onely ; now our blessed saviour is really god , which he would have him personate , and therefore cannot personate god. this truth , not long since , had had no need to have been spoken of , amongst christians ; whosoever , heretofore , professed the name of christ , did readily assent to it ; but of late it hath been denied by many , in polonia , and the infection hath come into our nation , and that infection hath antidotes prepared for it , which are able to remove it from the heart of those who would cordially apply it to them ; so that there need no more to be said to it ; yet because they , who read this little treatise , may perhaps not have opportunity , or leasure , to look upon other writers , i shall adde a word or two to satisfie the reader concerning this businesse , and shew , that mr. hobbes hath very unhandsomely expressed himself in it , and de●ogatorily from the eternall deity of our most blessed saviour ; and first in saying [ he doth personate god , ] for although he say , he is the sonne of god , his own son , which in its self were enough to satisfy a reader , that he must be of the same nature with his father ( for every son is such ) yet , since the waywardnesse of men hath studied so many foolish distinctions , to beguile the simple , amongst which that is one of a naturall and adopted son , of an eternally , and a temporary begotten son ; to which sense are expounded , that christ is his son , but an adopted ; christ is his own , but a temporary begotten son , either when the holy ghost overshadowed the blessed virgin , as soon , or before the world was made , as others ; ●his phrase of his cannot shelter him from many peevish and perverse doctrines , when he make's him not to be , but to personate god : i shall first shew that he is god , and then , how it is not incongruous to reason to say it , labouring in all to make my reason ascend up to my faith , not my faith descend to my reason ; crosse to which i have thought ( since first i was acqu●inted with their writings ) that the socinians first laid a plot for religion by reason , then laboured to wrest scriptures to that plot . sect. . in proving our blessed saviour to be god , i shall not use many places of scripture , one or two will be enough , so they be cleare and evident ; the first shall be acts . where you shall find that st. paul verse . did at miletum s●nd to ephesus , for the elders of the church which were there ; and verse . he gave them a charge in these words : take heed therefore to your selves and to all the flock over which the holy ghost hath made you overseeers , to feed the church of god , which he hath purchased with his own bloud . i observe that the church is called the church of god , which he hath purchased with his own blood ; this article ( he ) can relate to none but god , he therefore , who hath purchas●d this church with his blood , is god : i will spare nothing that i find brought by any in the way of answeare , but doe hope this place will vindicate its selfe , and this cause very cleerely . first then bernardinus ochinus in his second book of his dialogues , dialogue . but the first of that book page . in mine edition , bring 's this place and answeares it thus : first , that [ this is not spoke of the blood of god , but of christ , of whom a little before saint paul spake ] but this is so fa●re from all reason , as nothing can be more ; for the apostle did not name ou● saviour neerer then foure verses before , in the . verse which could abide no construction to this ; and here , in this period of scripture , which is intire in its selfe ( the church of god which he hath purchased with his blood ) is no one word which can receive this person , he , but god ; that therefore was mighty vaine . he adde's another answeare , that is , that [ god may be said to have acquired this church with his blood , that is , with the blood of christ , who was his , and whose blood was shed by his will ] this answeare of his when smiglecius had overthrowne with that reply , that , [ by the same reason the blood of bullockes and calves might be called the blood of god which were shed by the will of god ] which argument is of force against that exception o● ochinus ; for if it were therefore called gods blood because shed by his will , then all blood , that is shed by his will , may be called the blood of god ; for where is the reason of any thing , there that thing is also ; therefore valentinus smalcius , a great socinian , in his answere to smiglecius , de divina verbi incarnatione , cap. . although he will not undertake to defend ochinus , and indeed seeme's not to have read him ( although he might as well have owned the title of these opinions , as socinus ) yet he endeavour's to refute smiglecius thus ; [ for ( saith he ) ochinus may say , that he did no● say , that christs blood was called god's , onely because it was shed by the will of god , but for the redemption of us , by the will of god , which the blood of bullocks and calves could not be said to doe ; ] thus he ; bu● , first , he was mistaken in ochinus , for he writ nothing but the words i have set down , and therefore could not say , he said so , whatsoever he meant . secondly , if he had said so , as it seeme's smalcius doth , it had not been material , for which way could the offering that blood , for our redemption , appropriate it to god ? it might by that reason have been called our blood , because offered for us ; but there is no colour why the offering for us should entitle god to it , by any particular interest . but ochinus give 's a third answer [ i can also say , ( saith he ) that christ was god by participation , and that in a more excellent manner , then any other of the elect ] this answer of his i find deserted by all the socinians , who allow christ to be god , but not the great god the creator , but a man deified , and a god by office , for which those qualifications enabled him ; but here the church , which they were to feed , being acknowledged to be the church of the great god , they must not fly to a god by participation , but get some other shift . valentinus smalcius , where before , therefore bestowe's that chap. to expound this place , so as the divinity of christ may be avoided ; first then he saith that [ it is agreed on , who is meant by god in this text , we , the true and chiefe god , he and his part , the father , because he only is the true and chiefe god ] thus farre he speake's true , of both our opinions ; but now he is mistaken , when he saith [ we agree both , that god the father may be said to have acquired his church with his blood , onely by a figurative speech ] first he is mistaken in this , when he saith , that smiglecius ( against whom he write's ) should say , that god the father acquired this church with his blood ; for although it were true , that god , who was the father , yet not in the person of the father , but of the son , they being both one and the same god. secondly , he is mistaken in saying , that this was figuratively understood , when indeed it is , as the text speake's most properly , affirmed of the son , in whose person the humanity of christ was taken : that it was acquired or purchased with his owne proper blood . he goe's on , because ( saith he ) the whole blood of christ was , by a singular reason , god's ; as christ himself is called the lamb of god , so the blood of this lamb may be called rightly the blood of god ; and although this manner of speech is not familiar and common in the scriptures ; yet is it not absurd or false ] i reply : this manner of speaking is not onely unusuall , but not found in scripture , nor ( i think ) in any other author of reputation , and is absurd and false ; for , certainly , that manner of speaking is absurd and false , which expresseth another thing then what was intended , which this must , if it should meane by the blood of god , the blood of one who was not god , although belonging to god , and , as i m●y spe●k● , gods , and not gods ; resemble the case in any other thing ; i have a dog ( and , because i will make the instance without exception ) i set this dog at a sheep ; the dog with his teeth kill 's this sheep ; i may truly say , my dog killed this sheep ; nay , i can say , because i was the author of it , that i killed the sheep , but i cannot say i killed the sheep with my teeth , unl●sse i had worried the sheep with mine own teeth , but i did it with my dog 's , for although the dog was mine , and his teeth were mine out of the same interest ; yet they were not mine , but my dog's teeth ; so in all sacrifices , the beast which was sacrificed was his beast , for whom it was offered ; and the blood was his , as a part of that beast ; but yet neither was it in its self , nor was it ever called the man's blood , but the calve's the goate's , &c. nor should any man heare these words , purchased by a mans blood , but he would conceive , that that man spilt his blood for that thing ; the reason of that is , that whatsoever is a part of another , whether essentiall , as soul and body , forme and matter ; or integrall , as eye , hand , foot , root , branch , or the like , these have all of them a relation to their whole in themselves and in the usage of their names , and therefore these applications of them cannot be made to any other but their own correlative , without some addition to expound it , as thus ; my servant is mine , his soule and body , bound to serve me ; yet , when ●e dye's , i cannot say , my soul left me , for this word soul intimate's a relation to that body which it animated or ensouled ( as i may speake ) nor , what that soul desi●e's , or hate's , that my soule desire's or hate's , or the like . so when my horse is blind , i cannot say , that my eyes have lost their sight , because this phrase , mine eyes , relate's to mine own body , of which they are an integrall part , and this other not so ; the same may be said of my blood ; and therefore this learned man , seeing his answer weak , out of the usage of speeches ( although perhaps he did not discern the reason ) ●all's into passion , and crye's out , [ it is better to use this figurative manner of speech , most easy to understand , then to introduce a thing not onely absurd , but blasphemous , unto christian religion , to say , that that one and chiefe god should have blood , &c. ] i forgive his passion , but grieve , to see so much zeal , if not fury , bestowed upon so ill a cause ; for we do not say , that god had blood , as god , but as manhood was united to the divinity in the same person ; that he , taking our nature , had it with all its conditions , body and blood . i shall insist no farther upon this at this time . sect. . valentinus smalcius urgeth out of smiglecius a little further [ this language is unheard of in scripture , that christ's blood should be called the blood of the father , or that we should be redeemed by the blood of god the father , nay , if at any time our redemption be attributed to god the father , then it is added , by christ , or by his blood , but not by the blood of god the father , ] thus farre smiglecius ; now let us observe smalcius his answear , thus [ this argue's onely that the language is unusuall and rare , not that it is impossible and false ; that which is rare and unusuall may be most true , if it agree with the analogy of christian religion , and may be excused ( which , saith he , i have done above ) neither doth any thing hinde● , but that that which is commonly properly used , that god by christ , and his blood , acquired us , may , in one place , be improperly used that god the father hath acquired us by his owne blood ] first , that which he affirme's , he hath done above , i conceive to be no more then that refuted exception he made to smiglecius , that these speeches might be affirmed of god , by reason that christ was the lamb of god , and therefore his blood , god's blood ; or else what he spake in the preceding chapter , that it must be understood metaphorically , as zacharie . . he , that toucheth you , toucheth the apple of mine eye ; as likewise math. . . where our saviour saith , in that ye did , or did not , these things to his little ones , ye did , or not did , them to him ; the meaning is , that as god hold's his servan●s so deare to him , that he esteeme's the demeanour used to them as done to himself ; so these actions done by his dear ones ( in which rank christ was the chief ) may be sayd to be done by him ; when christ shed his blood , then god the father may be s●id to shed his , because done by one deare , like himself , to him . i have pressed this argument to the height , and indeed farther then he hath ; and now consider how i shall acquit my self of it , which will be thus ; i doe not , nor doe i think others can , find the actions of men , called gods actions , although the passions are often ; as thus , in that you did it to those , you did it to me ; and so he toucheth the apple of mine eye , of any one that toucheth his servants ; but actions not so , math. . . as whatsoever ye shall bind on earth , shall be bound in haven : here is a double act , on earth and in heaven ; although god interested himself as much in that act of man's , as may be , yet he call's it not his own , but man's act ; so likewise he expresseth it iohn . . whose soever sins ye remit , they are remitted ; where is set down a twofold action or remission ; now this expression is of an action , which he hath purchased with his blood ; and although there was never such a shifting genius runne through any sort of men as these socinians , to avoyd the sense of scripture ; yet , methinke's , this place is penned , as of purpose to delude their evasions ; it hath stopp'd all their mushes , and therefore it is put emphatically , with his owne blood , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intimateth a peculiar propriety to that thing to which it is applyed , appropriating it to god , distinct from other things ; the answer of smalcius is , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies no more then suus , his own , and so it is rendred by the vulgar latine , john . . thus it is ; but whether truth or no , there is the question ; our english rendreth it much better , he came unto his own , and his own received him not ; and although this word suus doth not enforce this more restrained and peculiar sense , yet it doth not deny it , but many times is used for it ; and certainly , those in st. john were , in a most proper expression , called his , his friends , his kindred , his servants , what you please of that kind : the same answer may passe to his second instance , which is taken out of the cor. . . he who commits fornication 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it is by the vulgar latine translated suum , his body , but by our english much better , his owne body ; nor indeed can the blood of christ god , be more his owne , then a man's body is his own , and therefore , whatsoever translators read , it is evident , that this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 beare's the same sense every where ; and it is remarkable , that these writers , who abhorre that vulgar translation in an hundred places , should , in this , refuse the original for it , upon no ground . he give 's another answer [ that the blood of christ may be called the blood of god , although it doe not naturally flow from the father ( we doe not say , it is the blood of the father , but of god ) because , saith he , chiefly by a miraculous working of the father , christ had his blood ] but can he shew me where there is any such example , or phrase , in scripture ? i believe not ; but he goe's on with an instance out of socinus , [ things ( saith he ) like blood , may be said to be belonging to one , which notwithstanding are not his naturally ] i can grant all this , and it hurt 's not this last phrase of being his properly , which his text enforceth ; but he instanceth cor. . ( glorify god in your body , and in your spirit , which are gods ) but here is not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the word enforcing the propriety ; and consider that the apostle taught the corinthians , in the beginning of that verse , how to understand that language , that our souls and bodies are god's ; for , ( saith he ) you are bought with a price ; because your soules and bodies are bought with a price , therefore they are his , his by purchase , yours by nature : and this distinction in either part is put downe evidently in the text : glorify god in your soul , and body both which are their own naturally , which yet are his by redemption : nay i can urge this text , emphatically , for the divinity of christ : for if he bought us and payd a price for us , then we are h●s , and he , whose we are , is god , most expresse in the text ; him we must glorifie whose we are , that is , god christ's we are by redemption , therefore christ is god ; thus this text , urged in one word , to avoyd his divinity , proved by the former text , in the words taken together , doth most cleerly confirme it , and yet you see it is not to the purpose , for this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 his own is not in the text , but if it were , yet it might be so used , because our body and spirit are expressed to be his by purchase , that is god-christs ; and in the text , which i treate of , the blood of christ , whom he terme's god , is said to be the purchasing price : so that then man's body and spirit are god's , but his purchase ; and that , which they were purchased with , was the blood of god , christ , his own blood in a most peculiar and proper acception . that our blessed saviour was god then , appeare's from this place of scripture . this the●me hath been handled by abundance ; i love n●t actum agere , my designe shall be to examine those great and chiefe names by which he is called in this relation . sect. . the first is the son of god , which mr. hobbes allowe's him to be , and therefore i might be briefe in it ; but , because that this terme , son , is variously used by writers , i will somewhat insist upon that acceptation , which is most common , to explaine what is intended by it ; there is an adopted , and there is a natural son , a son which is indeed , and a son taken into the roome of him that is such a one , legally made a son : the one is a son begot , the other is made such ; the real truely begotten son is it , which we affirme of our saviour ; he is such a son of god ; we are adopted , made sons . to know this we must first apprehend what a son is : a son is an intellectual substance , produced naturally of the same nature with the producer ; the generall nature is a substance produced , but yet that very generall terme distinguisheth a son from a father ; for although amongst created things there is no father which had not a producer , yet , the notion of a father intimate's no such thing , and in the holy and blessed trinity , the father hath no producer nor origination from any ; the rest is the difference ; first [ an intellectual substance ] this distinguisheth it from the generation of beasts , plants , mettalls , fire , water , or the like , which properly cannot be called sons of their producers ; but if any one will desire that they be called sons , i will not much contend , or gainsay it ; it will no whit hurt my designe : the next terme is , ( produced naturally ) this put 's a difference betwixt a son and arte facta , such things as are made by art : ( of the same nature with the producer ) this is the last terme , and by this it is distinguished from all equivocal generations ; and therefore a worme cannot be said to be the sonne of the sunne ; for although it be produced naturally by the sunne , yet , it is of another nature , and by that reason is not a sonne . sect. . thus , the nature of a son explained , let us examine how it may be applyed to our blessed saviour , the son of god : first it is evident , and no man will deny , that our saviour was an intellectuall substance , and that he was produced ; the chiefe querie will be , upon these two last clauses ; whether produced naturally ? and whether of the same nature ? and first that he was produced naturally , that will appeare out of this ; that being produced by god the father , as all agree , he must be either a creature , or else naturally produced ; indeed , taking naturally in a large sense , for whatsoever opposeth viol●nce , a man may say , that a creature is produced naturally , by god , because that no violence can force the om●ipotent to doe any thing ; and the creatures have imprinted in their very natures a passive obedience to god , by which they submit themselves to his sacred will ; but in this place we understand naturally , in a more strict meaning , as it opposeth , not onely violence , but arte facta , things made by art ; for those things , which are done by the nature of any thing , are done primò et per se , not per accidens ; of the nature , bent , and disposition of the agent , not because of any accidental addition , which happen's to it : this is principally discerned b● the constancy of that action or motion , for when things are accidentall , they appeare seldome , and , many times , are not such , but things ▪ or actions , that flow naturally from any , are so constantly , and , when opportunities are offered , are alwayes such : so it is accidental to me , that i write at this time , i doe not alwaies do so , no , not when i am provoked by reading , or studying an untruth , no , not this selfe same untruth which i write against ; but that i should eat meate at dinner , is a natural action , i alwaies doe it , unlesse some accidentall thing intervene , to hinder it , and then , the not eating is accidental , but the eating were natural , because this last ariseth out of the disposition and temper of my body ; the former , not eating , from some accidental distemper . sect. . now then , to shew that our saviour's generation , according to his divinity , was such , i shall handle that one place mic. . . but thou bethlehem ephratah , though thou be little amongst the thousands of judah , yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me , that is to be ruler in israel , whose goings forth have been from of old , from everlasting . my observations upon this text are , first that it is spoke of our saviour , this is evident out of that mat. . . where this text is applyed to him ; and thou bethlehem , in the land of judah , art not the least amongst the princes of judah , for out of thee shall come a governour that shall rule my people jsrael . so likewise iohn . . hath not the scripture sa●d , tha● christ cometh of the s●ed of d●vid , and out of the town of bethlehem , where david was ? this is consented to ●y all ; here then le● us consider , that that saying [ cometh forth ] is understood of his being borne at bethlehem ; this likewise is unqu●stioned , for ought i find ; then let us meditate upon the last clause , [ whose going forth have been from of old , from everlasting ; ] there is no ●eason to think but that , as his coming forth , in the precedent part of the verse , did signify h●s birth according to his humanity : so this going forth from of old &c. should signifie his birth according to his divinity ; for these cannot be understood of that birth which was at bethlehem , which the prophet saith , shall be , which was acted long time after the prophet's writing ; but of something that was acted long before , which those words inforce , from of old , and from everlasting . faustus socinus , in his answer to wic●us and bellarmine cap. . pag. . thus answers , hujus ipsius rationis vì concludi non solùm de vera nativita●e utrobique agi , s●d etiam de eadem , &c. that the fo●ce of this reason doth not onely evince , that this is m●ant of a true nativity , but the same nativity : ( observe his reason ) : for ( saith he ) the latter words , by which he means [ come forth ] coming from the same roote , as the former , must signifie the same thing , as they did in the former . ] thus he : but let me answer him ; that although it did not onely proceed out of the same root , but were the very selfe same word , and did signify the same act ; yet , when the tense is varyed , it must needs signify a diverse effect or result of that act as thus ; the fire an hundred yeares hence shall warme a man ; and the fire an hundred yeares agoe hath warmed a man ; here , though the warming be the same verb , and the object , a man , the same , yet , the tense being varyed , shall doe it , and hath done it , the act must neede 's be varyed . this is just our case : he shall be born in bethlehem , saith the prophet ; and his birth was , or hath been of old , &c. it is impossible , but that these must be spoke of two particulars ; but valkelius in his fifth book de vera religione , cap. . pag. . give 's an unnecessary stop here , saying , that [ egression , or going forth is of a larger scope , then generation ; ] but besides that he yield's to the understanding it of generation , a little after he must be evinced out of the text , for egression or coming forth out of bethlehem , was a nativity , therefore this must be so likewise ; againe , if this egression , here doe not , in its genuine sense , signify generation , yet it must needs suppose it , for nothing can go forth that is not ; it must be before it go forth ; therefore either eternall , without being generated ; or else generated , before the motion or action of coming forth ; both which are alike opposite to these divines ; besides this , i may urge , that it is a common phrase , in the language of scripture , to say , that one , who is generated by another , cometh out of him ; so gen. . . and pathrusim and casluhim out of whom came philistim , that is , they begat philistim , so gen. . . i will make nations of thee , and kings shall come out of thee , that is , shall be generated by thee ; in their degrees of their generations , they shall be thy issue . this language is so frequent , i need not instance in it ; therefore although it were , and doth often signifie something else ; yet , it doth often , in scripture language , signifie this emanation , by generation , and for the reasons above must doe so here ; socinus , where before quoted , proceede's , and saye's , that [ because these two words , which signifie the coming forth , or going forth , are derived from the same root , therefore they must signify the same birth ; and therefore if christs birth were from eternity , he must be borne in bethlehem from eternity , but , saith he , the hebrew word signifies onely a diebus secul● , from the dayes of old or time ] i will not trouble the english reader with the hebrew criticisme , which is done by others , and satisfactorily , that in this place it must be understood of eternity . to the first argument , from the roote , i have answerd already to that ; where he saith , the hebrew word signifies not eternity ; i answer , for the present , that i will not vex the english reader with these unnecessary hebrew criticismes : there are diverse have shewed that it must be so understood in this place ; his two instances out of isaiah . , . and malachi . . are of no force ; for the first , he troubled me , because it was false printed , and truly urged by valkelius , isaiah . , . in a word i grant , that word may be used for antient times , or ages ; but againe , no socinian can deny that it is used , likewise , for eternity , or before time ; howsoever , it is of force against them , who hold our saviour had no being , before he was borne of the blessed virgin ; and that he was not before , but long after the prophet writ ; but , saith socinus , [ it may be affirmed of his birth in bethlehem , it was of old , or from everlasting , as he would read it , ab initio & a diebus saeculi must be understood thus , that he , who was to be a governour , or ruler in israel , suam originem trahere ab initio , & à priscis dìebus , id est , ab eo primo tempore , cùm deus olim in suo populo regem stabilivit , & confirmavit ; quod revera caeptum est fieri in persona davidis ; that is , did draw his beginning , or derive his pedigree from the beginning or ancient times , that is , from that first time , when god heretofore established and confirmed his kingdome , or his people , which was begun to be done in the person of david . to this purpose they speake all , valkelius , smalcius , &c. but although they have the greatest art of shifting of scripture that ever men had ; yet certainly it appeare's a miserable shift in this place ; first , observe here , that there is in this sentence , [ whose goings forth have been from of old , from everlasting ] no word which in any place of the bible is pretended to signify a pedigree , or series of ancestors ; if no where else , why should it be so here then ? nay ; here is not any one word , that by any interpretation , or wresting , can signify forefathers , which were before , but only the times in which they lived ; if they will read it their own way , which is ab initio & priscis diebus , this can only intimate the time in which this egression was , not the person from whom it was . next , consider that if this emanation , this egression , here , be understood of his birth in bethlehem , that as socinus disputed , our saviour must be born there , when this was done in it , and yet he , smalcius , valkelius , all agree , it doth meane that egression , that birth ; but , smalcius in tertiam partem smig . cap. . pag. . saith , that [ socinus doth not say , that christ was born in these antient times , but that he said , sed cum qui certo tempore nasci debuit ait ortum suum habere a progenitoribus antiquissimis , which is that he who should be born at a certaine time had his originall or rising from most antient progenitors , ] i am sure socinus doth say , that the word being derived from the same roote , as i said before , must signify the same which it did before ] and from that deduced that absurdity , that [ if this phrase should be from eternity , christ was borne in bethlehem from eternity , ] and that , which smalcius speake's of , is a grosse exposition , how this phrase of being from the beginning and in antient times , should be applyed to that birth of our saviour's at bethlehem ; but the unreasonablenesse of this appeare's ( besides my former reasons ) in that there is not the least tending to such an expression out of this , that such a phrase added no distinct knowledge of this ruler , which should be borne , more then was before ; for every man had his rise from most eminent progenitors , yea , but this was one born in bethlehem ; why all that were borne in bethlehem must needs be so ; yea , but this was descended ab initio , that is , from david , who was the beginning of that kingdome of israel ; so were many more , no doubt , who were borne in bethlehem : in my judgement , this text is the most wretchedly tortured by them , that ever any , when no one word in the text ever else was used to that purpose ; nor in this use is a man taught any thing which was not full in the text before , which expressed his birth in bethlehem . sect. . i will take every word apart , and vindicate it from their several objections : first this word egressus , whose goings forth , as our english ; their explication of this , is [ that he came forth by the generation of his forefather , in particular of david , ] i answer , that it is true , that a man may be said to come forth of another , who was long time before in him , as in our usuall language , we express it , he descended from such ancestors ( i make their expression clearer then i find it in any of their authors by this explication , ) nay , we can say , such a man's son , when he shall be born , will be descended from an antient family , from kings and great persons ; but to say , he hath descended , before he is , can abide no answerable construction ; but this is our consideration , the text saith of him , who shall be borne in bethlehem , but yet is not ; that his goings forth have been from of old ; now untill a man is , he cannot be said , to have his going forth from of old ; a man may say it will be ; not that it hath been ; and therefore , without doubt , this text , speaking of the same person , which he said should be borne in bethlehem [ whose goings forth ] we must understand by it something of that person which was in those ancient times , which can be nothing but our saviour's divinity ; but they object against this phrase , that it is said goings forth , in the plurall number ; now according to true doctrine , our saviour's divinity hath but one emanation , or egression , or going forth , therefore , say they , this cannot be understood of that egression . that our saviour's egression , according to his divinity , was but one , will easily be granted by us ; but it is excellently observed by hebricians , that the holy ghost is usually pleased to expresse that which is but one in his essence , by a plurall number , when the effests are divers . so prov. . . wisdome ( we read it ] cryeth without , but in the original it is in the plural number , wisdomes ; without doubt the wisdome of god is one onely , as he is one , but the energies , the operations of this wisdome are many , in regard of which it is called wisdomes in that holy language ; so likewise concerning the mercy of god gen. . . the least of thy mercies , when , without doubt , the mercy of god is one , but the operations of mercy are divers ; multitudes of instances might be given to this purpose ; and this is the case of our saviour's divinity , the emanation , the going forth of it is but one , the operations are divers , and in regard of them it is called goings forth . god's eternall purpose to make man ; to forgive him , for jesus christ's sake ; to work man's redemption by him ; to judge the world at the last day by him ; these are operations of the eternall emanation of the son of god ; and because these are diverse , this going forth of his , which is one , is put in the plural number , goings forth . again , because i will shew that these words , in their own language , can confute nothing of our doctrine ; conceive with me then that these goings out may be understood of the manifestation of his eternal going out to us . so we say the sun shin'd oftentimes ; this or that day , when we know that the shining of the sunne is nothing but an emission and sending forth his light ; which act being a proper passi●n of the sun , we know its shining out to have been ever since the sun was created ; but because this blessed act of the sun is often impeded and hindred from manifesting its self to us , by cloudes or such impediments , therefore we say it shines , only when those cloudes are removed , and that shining , which is alwayes actu exercito , alwaies in operation , hath this operation only then manifested to us ; and these shinings of the sun , in this respect , are said to be many , in consideration of those various manifestations , although in its own nature it be but one ; thus this eternall egr●ssion , going forth of the son of god , although it be but one in its self , yet , in respect of its manifestations to us by moses and the prophets , it may , in the plural number , be said to be egr●ssions , many : and yet give me leave to adde this , that unlesse the sun-shine had its being , it could not have those many egressions and manifestations to us : so unlesse our saviour had had a being of old or in the beginning , he could not be said to have many egressions : but yet , methink's , i am not full enough in my expression , for taking the words as they require , they may say , that these egressions were not ab initio , or principio , for the egressions , or rather manifestations of his egressions were not made in the beginning ; if i should take beginning , as they doe , for the beginning of david's raigne , they had their answer , but if principium must be the reading , as we require , and indeed is countenanced by both vatablus , tremelius , and the septuagint , let it be then from the beginning ; we will distinguish then of a twofold egression of our saviour , eternall , from the father , and temporal , to us , in his manifestation , to the world in his creation , in his prophets , in his providence , and in this sense the divinity of our saviour hath diverse egressions , and these were a principio , and à diebus seculi , from the beginning , and in antient dayes . sect. . from the beginning ] here is not a word , which they do not make a quarrell at ; they are like such a man , who should make a scare-crow , and then throw stones at it ; or build a castle in the air , and then shoot at it : first they make the words of a sentence what they will , and then quarrel with us that it will not abide our sense ; in particular it is so here : they say it must be read , a principio , or ab initio , and then they object that eternity hath no beginning , nor end , and therefore it cannot be understood of an eternal emanation , or egression or going forth : well , let it be granted , that eternity hath no beginning , nor end , which is most true ; let it be granted , that what we read from of old , is best read , from the beginning , which is not necessary ; yet , the consequence is false , for that eternity , which is god himself , is the begining of all temporal things ; so that from the beginning is , from eternity . this word beginning hath a twofold consideration in this , as it is that point , or instant , in which any line , or time , begin's to be ; or else for that external point , or instant , from which that point , or instant took its rise ; thus we say , a horse began to run , from that instant in which the sign was given ; so we say , it began to be dark , from such an hour ; and indeed in all language , used by men , these prepositions , à or ab are used most genuinely to intimate the ultimum quod non , that instant in which the motion , action , or th●ng spoke of , was not , which in our particular , must needs be eternity ; again , i entreat the reader to observe with me , that these prepositions à or ab doe not alwayes signifie the termes , or points and instances , but very oft the causations and the essence , out of which another come's : so we say , the son come's from the father ; the heate from the fire ; the light from the sun ; now , in this sense , likewise , à principio , from the begining , that is ( from whose goings forth have been of old ) as they , from the beginning , from god , as from the beginning , which is eternity , which is god likewise . thus all things square evenly with our conceipt . i will next examine how it can agree with their exposition ; [ from the beginning , say they , is to be understood from the beginning of davids reign , for this word beginning is to be applied to the matter precedent , as if it were , from the beginning of this buisiness which is now treated of , and that was ( as is evident ) the rule and government of israel , as is evident out of the former part of this verse thus socinus , where before cited , and valkelius , and for assurance they produce those places before mentioned , isa. . , . and mal. . . now he , that will consider those two places , shall find that the connexion so lead's them , that they must needs intimate some former time , not eternity ; but can any man shew me a place where beginning , put absolutely , doth signify any of those antient times , and not that which was absolutely the beginning of all ? i am perswaded , no man can , for , if they could , these men would have done it , who are most industrious for their owne ends ; but then , suppose this were granted , which ought not to be , that this word beginning may abide such interpretation , what would follow ? what egressions , what goings forth , can they shew me to be before he was born at bethlehem ? yes , they say , out of his forefather david ; no say i , the chick did not goe forth of the egge , much lesse out of the hen , untill it was a chick ; the son did not go forth from his father , untill he was ; the shining had no egression out of the sun , untill that shining had its existence , being necessary to all these actions ; and therefore if our saviour had no existence before his birth at bethlehem , he could not go forth before ; and indeed a man , who consider's their exposition concerning david , and our saviour's manner of going forth , by having him , according to his humanity , his father , may say , that his goings forth were before the beginning , which yet were a most strange speech , for he came forth of judah , jacob , isaak , abraham , adam , &c. which were before david ; but , as i have said , this might be affirmed of him , after he was born , that he did come out of those progenitors , according to his humanity , or , before he was born , that he should goe forth of them ; but to say , before he was born , that his goings forth , according to that humanity , which should be born afterwards , were long before this prophesy , this is a contradiction in adjecto , it is inconsistent ; as if i should say , the chick , that will be hatched a twelve-moneths hence , hath come out of such a hen two or three yeares past ; these are impossibilities to be used in the same breath , or , as i may speak , the same verse , the same sentence , to speak in regard of the same thing , of the same person , that he shall go forth of bethlehem hereafter ; and that he hath gone forth long before . sect. . well , i will write no more of this terme , from the beginning : i come now to the last terme , a diebus seculi , from the dayes of age ; they quarrell at every thing ; this ( say they ) cannot be spoken of eternity , for eternity hath no day●s , but is totum simul , without distinction of dayes ; this hath been answer'd many times ; that since the infinite excellencies of god are such , that man , with his weake and finite understanding , cannot comprehend them in their proper notions , he is pleased to vaile that glory with such clouds as man may behold somewhat of him , in part , as the apostle speak's , darkly , like the sun behind a cloud ; and in this manner he teacheth all his attributes , which is well known , and consented to , by divines ; and in this manner he teacheth his eternity . so psalm ▪ . . thou art the same , and thy yeares shall have no end ; if he have years , he hath dayes , one as well as another ; so likewise iob . . are thy dayes as the dayes of man ? are thy years , as mans dayes ? there dayes are attributed , because man is acquainted with no duration which is not successive ; therefore god is pleased to expresse himselfe in such a manner as man is capable of learning him by ; whence , as it is evident in other god's glorious attributes , so ▪ in this very particular , eternity is used to be expressed by his own pen , in such a language as here , by dayes , and therefore may abide that sense here ; for their expression of david , that his were the dayes of age , or time , which were mean't here ; the arguments before alleadged are of strength against it ; likewise , he could not be said to go forth , when he was not , if he had no other being but his humanity , which was born long after at bethlehem . sect. . and , to conclude my handling this argument , i will touch one argument of ochinus from this place , and , the rather , because the book is not in every man's hand ; in his . dialogue , which is the first of his second book , he make's the interlocutors himselfe , who act 's the part of an orthodox man , and spiritus , which , i conceive , he would have reputed to be some holy spirit , which should instruct ochinus better ; well then , in my edition put out at basil , ( i know not whether there be any other , unlesse some pieces in english , translated by an english lady , long since , ) page . ochinus bring 's this place , i have discoursed on , [ micheas quoque de christo loquens , micheas , speaking of christ , when he had say'd , he should arise out of bethlehem , adde's this , whose originall was antient , from eternall times . in which he shewes , that he alwayes , and from eternity , was begotten of the father , ] to which spiritus answere's , that [ this may be spoken of some spirit created by god before all creatures , that is , from the beginning ; and from the dayes of time , that is , olim , heretofore , and before time , or age ( saeculo is his word ) yet not ab aeteruo , from eternity ] the spirit answere's so , that photinianisme , and socinianisme , which conceive that christ had no being before that at bethlehem , is confuted , by this text ; but , the spirit was an arian , who held that christ was a creature , according to a spiritual being , made before the world . ochinus therefore presseth him againe , [ yea , saith he , this text is spoken of an eternall generation of the sonne , therefore he say'd , origines , goings out in the plurall number , that it might expresse how continually , and alwayes , he proceede's , in the individuall moment of eternity , which cannot be say'd of that created spirit . moreover in zachary god calle's christ his companion , &c. ] here the spirit leave 's ochinus his argument , and onely falle's upon that place in zachary ; and i am of opinion , the spirit was at a losse , and therefore will enlarge my conceipt a little upon ochinus his argument ; first , it is goings forth , that in the words before signifye's his birth at bethlehem ; why should it not be so here ? creation was never termed a goeing forth ; it can be nothing then but generation . then consider , against the arian , and this arian spirit ( for i suppose all that i can find in the socinian confuted ) that this goeing forth was before the world was created , out of what must he goe forth ? there was nothing but god , he must goe forth , therefore , out of him ; againe , consider , that god is eternall , unchangeable , whatsoever goe's forth of him must be eternall likewise , or else there must be a change in him ; and therefore this must be eternall , as ochinus urged , and his spirit never answered . againe , it is in the plurall number , ( goings forth in the dayes of eternity ) this cannot be understood of any but an eternall emanation : all other goings forth have an end , when they are gone forth , and they cannot goe forth againe , unlesse they returne backe to the place , from whence they came ; but that which goe's forth eternally , went forth yesterday , to day , and a thousand dayes agoe , dayes without number , and will be so a●terwards ; and , in that respect , it may be goeings forth ▪ i● all the dayes and moments of eternity ; but yet a man may object , that all this is but one goeing forth ; it is true , but yet , that one contayne's in it ten hundred thousand goings forth , like that sun which perpetually shine's forth its light , that emanation or goeing forth of light is one continued act , yet measuring it by dayes , or time , it hath divers goeings forth , according to divers dayes , in which it shined , yesterday , the other day , &c. so may i say of this eternall emanation , or goeing forth , of the sonne of god , from his father , it was one eternall egression or goeing forth ; but measuring it by dayes , as it is here , it was an hundred thousand , his goeings forth were in the dayes of age or time , as they , or of eternity , as we read it . thus i conceive , that the errours of the photinian , or socinian , and the arian , are both convicted out of this , and it is proved , that our saviour had not onely a being , before his birth at bethlehem , but from all eternity ; this by the way of egression or emanation ▪ not by creation onely , which was as naturall to his spirituall and true being , as his birth at bethlehem to his humane nature and name . having , out of this one place , shewed , that the egression of the son was naturall , i could enlarge my self , upon an explication of the last clause of my definition , to shew , that the son of god is of the same nature with his father ; for having shewed how his coming from the father is by emanation , egression , not like a thing by force , or made to set him out a perfect sonne , there is no more required but to prove , how he is of the same nature with the father ; but i love brevity , not to tire the reader with the least unnecessary line , because that this will result out of the exposition of those other names , which are given our saviour in scripture , i shall knocke off from this , and , by explaining them , hope to stop two gaps with one bush . chap. xxxii . of our saviour's being the word ; of ebion and cerinthus ; the socinian shifts ; of christ's speaking by figures ; his being the word by none ; the division of it by internal and external ; the ancient philosophers language consonant to that in holy scripture about the word ; who excelled the socinians in the knowledge of eternal life ; with whom god in saint ioh. . is but an appllative ; each particular in which text is discussed by the bishop . sect. . the next name , that i shall undertake to treat of , is that of ( word ) our saviour is termed the word ; and herein i shall treat upon the first part of the first chap. of s. john's gospel , which because it is of high concernment in the setting forth of this truth , socinus , besides those many several places , in which he hath touched upon it , hath written a distinct comment upon it ; so hath valentinus smalcius ; i shall consider them both in my treatise upon this scripture ; and whatsoever else i find by them , other where , or any other , pertinently objected ▪ to begin then with socinus in his explication of the first part of the first chap. of iohn , put out in octavo at racovia . presently after his preface , pag. . [ primum itaq ( saith he ) quicquid de ebione & cerinthio vulgò ostentatur ; first ( saith he ) whatsoever is commonly boasted of concerning ebion and cerinthus , against whom , as if they denied christ to have been before his mother , john writ his gospell , it shall be judged a figment ; for , besides that there is no solid thing brought in its proofe , there are not lacking efficacious reasons , which constraine us to think the contrary ] thus far he ; i will draw his reasons short and answer them ; but before he undertake's his reasons he bring 's his surmise , why men were of another opinion from him , such as which he cannot answer satisfactorily , but in this place put 's off ; that they understand not the sense of the scripture ; but i let this discourse alone ; his first reason , why this opinion of st. john's gospell should be false , is page . first [ that the opinion of ebion and cerinthus , was much other ( if ebion were a certaine man ) and i● so declared by all our age , and in former ages ; or if we credit irenaeus a most antient writer , who , recording the doctrines of either , doth not so much as shew that doctrine , that they should deny , that christ , the word of god , was before mary ; yea , when he mention's cerinthus , he speake's the cleane contrary . ] i love not to trouble the reader with the vanity of citing authors ; for the clearing of this story , i shall set down what irenaeus speake's onely ; and first for the opinion of cerinthus , his words are cleare ; in his first book chap. . speaking of cerinthus , he adde's that [ jesus was not borne of a virgin , but that he was born of joseph and mary , as all other men ; after his baptisme christ descended into him , from that principality which is above all , &c. ] so that here i observe a double nature which cerinthus conceived to be in our saviour , a manhood , which he called jesus , begotten by joseph on mary ; and something above a manhood , which he called christ , which , not untill he was thirty yeares old , came into him at his baptisme : that jesus suffered , as he speake's a little after , but christ did not , being spirituall . thus you see ●renaeus his expression concerning cerinthus ; where you may observe that he allowe's our saviour no being before he was borne of mary , as he terme's her ; for although he grant's him an additionall after his baptisme , by the descending down of christ unto him ; yet that person had no being before , and that additionall was long after his birth of the blessed virgin ; and it is not expressed that he thought that christ , which came into jesus , had any being before that coming down ; and tertullian adversus haereticos num. . affirme's of cerinthus , that he say'd , [ christ was onely a man , without divinity ] to which that of irenaeus well enough agree's ; i quote tertullian now in pamelius his edition , . so that there , it seem's , that cerinthus , concerning our saviour's divinity , had the same opinion with socinus . well , to goe on with the story of cerinthus , he was a man of a most turbulent spirit ; epiphanius saith , he was the man that raised the charge against st. peter at jerusalem , for communicating with the gentiles , acts . in the case of cornelius ; as likewise , that he raised the tumult against st. paul , about circumcision , with a whole leafe of such schismaticall practices of his ; for they say , he was a jew by his father , and so stood , still , for the priviledges of their nation , and the observation of their rites ; upon this ground the loving spirit of st. john , justly abhorred him , and therefore , as irenaeus in his third book , and third chapter , there are some who have heard polycarpus report , &c. ( which polycarpus was constituted , bishop of smyrna , by st. john , as irenaeus , eusebius , and all agree , and that angell of the church of smyrna , which st. john writ to , apocalyps . . ) he , say'd irenaeus ( who , himselfe had seene polycarpus ) reported , that st. john , goeing to wash himselfe in the bath at ephesus , saw cerinthus , and presently hasted out againe , unwashed , saying , that he might feare the bath would fall , where was that enemy of the truth cerinthus ; so that here you see two things , that the opinion of cerinthus was much the same with that of the socinians ; that this cerinthus was abhorred by st. john , not as a man , but as an enemy to truth ; so that st. john , hating his opinions , might be reasonably thought to provide against them ; and all this evident out of that most ancient author , which socinus himselfe quote's ; now let us see , de facto , what was done : the same author , irenaeus , in his eleventh chapter of his third book , somewhat before the midle of that chapter , affirme's in expresse termes , that st. john was willing , by his declaring the gospell , to take away the errour of cerinthus ; then which we could have nothing more cleare , a most authentique author affirming it , upon most just and reasonable grounds ; socinus then say'd too much , when he affirmed , that it was farre from all reason , that saint john should write against ebion and cerinthus ; here we see the contrary , as much as it is possible for story to give ; but he dispute's againe against it page . deinde versimile non est , &c. moreover it is not likely that john would passe over so great a matter so slightly with silence , but that he would name the haeretiques , or at the least their haeresy , either secretly , or openly , and detest it ; which since he hath not done , why did he not somewhere clearely say , that christ was by nature god and man , or that he existed before he was born of mary ? why did he affect to be so obscure and sparing , in a thing of so great moment , the ignorance whereof bring 's eternall destruction , &c. thus farre he ; i will not undertake to understand all the apostle's reasons , but am confident , he had abundance of reason for all he did , but will answer all he sayth ; first that the scripture seldome set's down the haeretiques or haeresyes against which it write's , although sometimes it doth . secondly , to that he saith the apostle doth not clearly witnesse that christ was by nature god and man , or existed before he was born of mary , i shall shew him that he hath , in as cleare termes , as possibly could be , although not in the same ; and i am confident , that had he expressed this mystery in those very words he set's down , he and his companions would have cavilled at them , that those termes are used otherwise in some places ; that there was some copy , or other , without one of them , or all ; that they did relate to something before , or behind , and not to christ ; which are their usuall evasions ; but it is a vanity of them to teach the apostle how he should expresse himselfe , he hath done it abundantly , and as clearly , as those words would doe , as we shall see shortly . sect. . but he urgeth farther , that [ st. john give 's this and no other reason , towards the end of his gospell , john . . cur jesu signa , ( i translate it ) why he writ the miracles of jesus or ( as others would have it ) his whole history , then that we should believe that jesus is christ , the sonne of god , and , believing that , we should have life eternall . ] i will not trouble his lection which is very erroneous , but let the reader observe , that although st. john say , that this was the cause why those things , which he writ , were written ; yet he useth not that phrase put upon him by socinus , this & non aliam and no other ; but suppose he had , this will serve our designe , for all we labour for , is to prove , that our saviour is the sonne of god ; it is true , these troublesome men have brought distinctions of the sonne into naturall and adopted ; and the like ; but that he is such a sonne , as believing of which we may have eternall life , can be conceived nothing lesse , then that he must be the naturall sonne , of the same nature with his father ; all other beliefe , i doubt , will fall short of that excellency ; and therefore , beza , most genuinely , according to the originall ( which prepose's an article both to christ and the sonne ) reade's it thus , that ye should believe that jesus is that christ , that sonne of god ; which emphasis doth exceedingly much elevate the conceipt of him , shewing him to be an extraordinary christ , and an extraordinary , not merely an adopted , sonne ; which all his servants are here bound to believe ; so that , it seeme's , st. john writ this gospell to shew , that our saviour was , in some eminent and peculiar way , the sonne of god ; that which he adde's , that believing in him we might have eternall life , is an absolute avoyding a strong argument to prove his godhead ; for although i think by life here is meant eternall life ; yet in the originall there is no word of eternity , but it is word for word , as it is in our english [ ye might have life ] through his name , or in his name , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , his power , his strength , which none could grant , but the great god ; and truely i wonder where he got that translation , for it is without the originall , nor beza , nor erasmus , nor montanus , nor any , that i see , but something like it tremelius his translation out of the syriacke , and yet he reserve's that emphasis , which i make use of , and render's it thus , and when ye shall believe , ye shall have life eternall by his name , the force of which last phrase , by his name , was cleane omitted by socinus ; so then it seeme's to me , that if st. iohn did here , in these words , put down the totall reason of his writing this gospell ( which can never be evinced ) yet in this is clearely taught this conclusion of our saviours divinity , and that he was the son of god ; nor could ever man have understood it in any other sense then we doe , untill that foolish conceipt of a created god was introduced , of which ( god willing ) i entend to treate hereafter . thus i hope i have given a satisfactory answer to his objections against the story of cerinthus , which one thing granted , the expressions of the rest would be undoubtedly very perspicuous . sect. . so now at the last , i will addresse my selfe to my businesse , the first chap. of st. john verse . in the beginning was the word , &c. there is scarce any one word in these fourteen or fifteen verses , which i intend ( god willing ) to expound , that hath not abid some slurre , or other , to discountenance the true sense of it ; i shall begin with the first word , in the beginning , [ this ( say they with one consent ) is understood of the beginning of the gospell , which , ( say they ) was when john baptist begun to preach , ] so socinus , where before , at the bottome of page . and page . in principio erat verbum , in the beginning was the word , that is , christ the son of god , in the beginning of the gospell , to wit , in that time in which john baptist began to recall the israelitish people to the right ; and before that , by the preaching of the baptist , he was known to the jewes , he was , and he was designed by god to this office ( that is ) of manifesting his will ] thus far socinus ; and by this we see his conceipt to be , that in the beginning , was in the beginning of the baptist's preaching , then was christ , the word which was man ; he wonder 's much , up and down , that men should conceive that st. john should write such mysteries of christ's essence , according to his divinity , where indeed , we think , he make's him write the unreasonable things of his humanity that ever could have been conceived to be expressed by such phrases , to understand which i must trespasse a little farther upon the reader 's patience , to consider what these writers meane by this terme ( word ) which socinus and from him , the rest expresse thus . sect. . that [ it is a figurative expression and is mean't of christ in his office , not his divine nature ; figurative ; and so it is either a metaphor drawn from the similitude christ hath with our words ; for as our words expresse our minds to those we converse withall , so christ expressed the will of god to men ; secondly , by a metonymy , because christ is the author of that word which most eminently ought to be called such , because it is more profitable , and more excellent then all other , therefore ( saith he ) as christ sometimes useth a metaphor , calleth himself a vine , a shepheard , a gate , because he might most fitly be compared to these , and now speaking metonimycally , he saith , he is the truth , the life and the resurrection , because he is the author and cause of these , so here , &c. ] thus far he ; in which he and they have taken a greate deale of paines to raise mud in , and darken this cleare streame . sect. . to which i shall say first , that these figures are often used by christ , and such expressions under the notions of divinity more clearly intelligible ; but when they are used by him , he give 's some intimation to his auditor how he shall understand them figuratively onely , either in that place , or some other ; otherwise a man would hardly assent to him in any but a literal sense . there are abundance of other such like names affirmed of our saviour , besides those particularly specified by him in this place , all which to handle would require a volume : i will not therefore engage upon them , but these , he instanceth in now , i will touch upon , that by them the rest may be discerned : first then he call's himself a vine , john . . i am the true vine , that is , i am like a true vine , a true , not a false vine , which look's like a vine , but is not a true vine , that may be confided in , which will bring forth fruit , and not deceive the husbandman : now that ye may discern the similitude , observe , he adde's , my father is the husbandman , and so go's on with the branches : which evidently shew that it is a similitude . for the second , john . . i am the good shepheard , he explain's it immediately , a good shepheard giveth his life for his sheep , and so along in that chapter he shew's how his sheep are righteous , which make's it apparent that it was a similitude . again , his last metaphor is used in the same chapter , ver . . i am the door of the sheep ; we see he was the shepheard , and he is the door , in a diverse sense ; as he is the door , he admit's , and shut's out : now these things are so apparent , that the words all about them express them to be similitudes ; if not , a thousand places of scripture might teach us , that he could not otherwise be a wooden door ; or a vine , that is , a plant ; or a shepheard , such as a countrey - shepheard , whose sheep were beasts . now let us examine his metonymy : he saith , he is the truth , life , resurrection ; two of these i find in one sentence in the . of this gospel the . i am , saith our saviour , the way , the truth , and the life : truth and life are his instances ; our saviour having told the disciples ver . . whither i go , ye know , and the way ye know : thomas answered , lord , we know not whither thou goest , how can we then know the way ? jesus answered to this , i am the way , the truth , the life ; in this word , the way , no doubt but there may be both those figures he speakes of ; a metaphor first , for as a way is that middle place which is between the two termes ( à quo and ad quem ) from whence , and whither , participating of both and leading whither a man tend's ; so our saviour , god and man , participating of both the extreames , heaven and earth ; and man , walking a long by him , shall come to heaven ; next we may observe a metonymy , he was the way , because by his word he direct's us the way ; because by his life he hath trod it out for us ; and by his graces he help 's us to walke in it ; and this is apparent to any man who shall consider how impossible it is , for christ to be a way , a trodden path of ground ; or how impossible it is for any such way to lead to the journeyes end , which he aimed at . the second terme which is mentioned by socinus is truth , and for this i may say that i doubt whether there be any figure necessary ; for christ , as god , being truth it self , he must needs likewise be verax , true speaking , as well as verus ; and if he should deceive or misguide in the way , he should go against his nature , and deny himselfe , as st. paul phraseth it , tim. . . now i can justly say that here is no figure ; or , if any , it is but this , which the context exact's , i am the way , by directing you to it , and that an infallible one , which no man can be deceived by , for i am truth its self , which make's good all i have said ; and the same i may speake of his last terme ( life ) i may justly affirme that there needs be no figure in it ; christ is the life , there is an article to every terme , life its selfe , life in the fountaine ; all other lives are peters , pauls , a horse's or dog's life , but he is life its self , life in the fountaine , like light in the sun , much more glorious then any other ; therefore thou , who seekest life , life eternal , which is the journeys end of every man , must come by the way which i appoint who am truth ; and come to me , and thou shalt have it . i know as he is life in the fountain , and so may be understood ; so he may be a life to us , and called our life , the life of men , of which hereafter , both as an efficient , and an object ; as an efficient producing that life ; as an object , that life of ours consisting in the beatificall vision of the most sacred and blessed trinity ; but i see no necessity forcing me to this second exposition ; but if so the context lead's to it , i think i may run through twenty more , and certainly there are twenty more , such speeches ; but we shall find that there is something in the matter of the discourse , or in the circumstances of the text , which induce to it ; but in that i have in hand nothing to perswade any man that this term ( word ) should be understood according to any of those figures . sect. . socinus saith , it is used now here in scripture , but in the writings of this evangelist ; so my search need not be farre ; in this place of the gospell in his first epistle chapter . verse . that which was from the beginning , which we have heard , which we have seen , with our eyes , which we have looked upon , and our hands have handled , of the word of life , &c. here is no circumstance inducing us to search a sense , that merely a man should be called the word , but rather the contrary , something divine , to which that humanity was united , because ( as here ) it was from the beginning ; and because , in the second verse , that life , of which this is called the word , is termed eternall life , which was with the father , and was manifested to us , was eternall , and with him , he must therefore be eternally with him , this was afterwards manifested to us . a third place is rev. . . his name is called the word of god ; where i can find againe nothing to that sense , but in each place of these , this term , word , may most aptly be understood , according to the orthodox catholick sense , for the internal word of god ; nor indeed can they shew me any thing like it in scrirture . let a man conceive with himselfe what a strange uncouth phrase it is for a man , who speake's , to be called the word , which he speake's ; yet so must he in their language . sect. . yea , but they have just such another fetch ; aaron is is sayd , exodus . . to be moses his mouth ; the phrase is cleane otherwise , and is excellently rendred by our translators , instead of a mouth , because moses had not a clear utterance ; the second instance is that , iohn baptist is called a voyce ; for my part i think it a reasonable exposition to say , that iohn baptist was rather he that made the noise and voyce in the wilderness , then the voyce its self ; to which purpose let us look upon the . of isaiah , verse . from whence that text is made use of , by three evangelists ; we shall find there , that the prophet , like a man in a rapture , seeme's to heare this noise or voice in the wilderness , and here utter's what he heard ; he saw in his vision iohn baptist in a wilderness , fitting and preparing men for the gospell ; but the voice he heard was the v●ice of iohn baptist , who did preach that doctrine there specifyed ; i know but one objection of moment can be framed against this , which is that iohn . . when iohn had been asked , who art thou ? he answered , i am the voice , &c. as saith the prophet isaiah ; to this , first it is memorable , that in the originall it is not , i am , but onely ( i ) it is thought by many that this word i am ought to be understood , but if it be not , then he doth not affirme himselfe to be the voice , but onely leave 's them to apprehend what he is , by the prophet isaiah ; but if it be , and that we should read it , as it is commonly ( i am ) yet since he quote's the prophet , i know no reason why it should be understood in a sense d●ffering from the prophets , especially since the two other evangelists , which mention this place , have not one word of this i am ; st. matthew . . for this is he which was spoken of by the prophet isaiah , the voice of one crying in the wilderness ; so likewise st. luke . . having before delivered , how he preached the baptisme of repentance , adde's , as it is written , in the book of the words of isaiah the prophet , the voice of one , &c. well then , methinke's it is reasonable to conceive , that iohn was rather he that cryed , as he did there , then the voice , which was cryed ; but i reverence the antiquity which expound it otherwise , and those heavenly devotions which the fathers have deduced from that metaphor ; and therefore will no further discusse that interpretation , that deliver's iohn to be the voice , but grant it , and aaron the mouth of moses , in exodus ; the case is farre differing betwixt these and the word to be taken for christ , who by them was mere man , in this sentence ( in the beginning was the word ) for consider , reader , if in exodus it had been said , the mouth was in the beginning , or midle , or latter end of a buisinesse , would any man living interpret that of aaron , without that comment which the spirit of god give 's , when it saith , that aaron should be a spokesman for moses , and therefore instead of a mouth unto him ? again , had any evangelist said , as here , the word was in the beginning ; the voice was in the beginning , could any man have expounded it without that glosse , of the prophet isaiah's saying , and st. iohn's practice ? it must therefore be as wild , and reasonlesse , to say , that this term ( word ) when there is no use of speech , or other phrase in the whole book of god , expounding it so , should be so interpreted , that our saviour's humanity , which by them should speake this word , should be here called the word . i must begge the reader 's patience , for this tediousnesse , but the right understanding of this one syllable ( word ) is of high consideration , and therefore i have dwelled so long upon it , but now wee 'le strike home . sect. . in this sentence ( in the beginning was the word ) it is , not possible to understand this tearm ( word ) of our saviour's humanity , which did exist in the beginning of the gospell , which was when st. iohn began to preach ; for although our saviour was then in being , yet he was not then the word , for the gospell was not then preached , but about to be preached , and , according to them , he was called the word in reference onely to that word , which was the gospell ; so that although he was man before , in the beginning of the gospell , yet he could not be , in their notion , the word then , neither metaphorically , because then he had not revealed the will of god , concerning the salvation of men ; nor metonymically , because , then , this word , which reveale's the will of god , was not produced , and the text most expressely set's downe the time , in the beginning was the word . sect. . but socinus hath one shift , which is on the top of the . page of his treatise against the pasnonienses , pag. . [ christ was then , when john baptist began to preach , and was then destined by god to that office , to wit , in opening , or preaching the will of god. ] thus farre he ; now the revealing the will of god is the nature of the word , and it seeme's , by him , that although christ was not actually the word in the beginning of the gospell , yet he w●s such in god's decree , and that may suffice , to make him the word ; but let the reader consider that he , who is decreed to be any thing , cannot be said to be such , untill he actually exist ; now the text saith , in the beginning was the word , not it shall be the word when the decree is expired ; was , and shall be , differ as much as time can distinguish , and yet what the text saith was , socinus saith shall be , when he saith , he was decreed to be ; upon such a foundation we may say any thing , that is or shall be a thousand yeares hence , was a thousand yeares agoe , because it was then decreed to be such . and now it seeming to me , that i have answered whatsoever i have observed , delivered by any man in defence of their exposition , it will become me to apply my selfe to the justification of our exposition , which thus i doe . sect. . in the beginning was the word , that is , in the beginning of time , of things , when the world was created out of nothing , then was the word , then it had its being and existence ; other things had their beginning , they being then made , but he being not a thing made in time , but eternall , was then . this is a short delivering the true sense of the words , and i shall endeavour ( god willing ) to explaine them . the first term which i shall endeavour to expound is this term ( word ) a word is twofold , internall , and externall ; internall is that expression our intellect , or understanding , hath of its conceipt within its self ; externall , is the expression of that internall conceipt , ( i will not here stand upon the difference betwixt sermo and verbum , it is not materiall ) that there is such a difference , is apparent to any man who will consider how he deliver's nothing with his tongue , which he hath not a notion of , in his understanding , before ; and that , which he deliver's with his tongue , is the same which was before in his understanding ; in the wombe when it is in the understanding , in its birth when it is delivered by the mouth ; it had an internall being in the soul , an externall being in the voice ; now words are produced two wayes , either by voice , or by the hand ; by the mouth , or the pen ; this philosophy we must needs apprehend , after our weak manner , to be true ; true concerning god , for we cannot think of god as we ought , but we must think that he doth actually know his owne infinite excellencyes , and all whatsoever he intend's to doe , or doth , in heaven or earth ; this knowledge , being active , produceth somewhat which is his word ; when he pleaseth to expresse himselfe outwardly to man , he doth it two wayes , or by two sorts of words , written in the hearts of men , or in the creatures legibly , which are two books , in which god expresseth his will ; or else by voice , immediately framed by himselfe , or his prophets inspired by him ; the scripture confirme's all this philosophy ; first for men , i need not write of their inward words ; psal. . . speaking of the wicked man , he hath said in his heart , i shall never be removed ; so psal. . . the foole hath said in his heart , there is no god ; many times there are words and speeches in the heart , which were never delivered by tongue or pen ; but never any delivered outwardly , that was not first conceived inwardly ; a man may as well be borne , who was never conceived ; we may discerne the spirit of god , shewing us all those wayes of god's speaking , outwardly , mat. . and the last . lo a voice from heaven saying , this is my beloved sonne , in whom i am well pleased ; so rom. . . which shew the works of the law written in their hearts ; there is an expression by writing ; and rom. . , . for god hath shewed it unto them , for the invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seene , being understood by the things that are made ; there we see a writing in the creatures , and that written by god , for , saith the text , god hath sh●wed it unto them . and for god's internall word , psal. . . the lord hath said unto me , thou art my sonne , this day have i begotten thee ; here was a word spoken internally by god , and not to man ; it was declared to man , but spoken internally only to his sonne . much more may be added , to this purpose , but i love not to weary my reader unnecessarily ; the word spoken of in my text , is this internall word , and therefore written with an article , the , or that word , emphatically ; other words are the words of isaiah , ieremiah , iohn , peter , or the like ; but this was the , that word , the like of which never was ; and to this will agree most aptly all which st. iohn discourseth , as will appeare in my prosecution of it , and to none other . sect. . and in this st. john giveth the son of god no new name , but such as men knew him by long before saint john's time ; the philosophers in all ages , when their soules soared so high as to contemplate the essence of god , his creation and government of the world , they said , he had a son , or mind , which proceeded from him like light from the sun , ( that is a simile they are frequent in ) and they termed that son his word ; and they say , that that word made the world , and gave life and being to all things ; thus trismegistus in the first chapter of his poemander : and section . according to the edition of flussus , he saw in his rapture an indefinite light ; then in the fifth section he enquired , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , what comes out of the light ? the answear was made , the holy word , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the holy word ; then in the sixth section , when trismegistus had begg'd an expression of this vision , i , saith poemander , i 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 intellectus , mens , i a spirit , i translate it , or , as is commonly amongst those philosophers , the supreme spirit of god , i that spirit , thy god , am that light : and presently after , that bright or resplendent word , which thou didst see come out , is the son of god ; i could shew much more to this purpose out of him , but this is enough to shew , that this , which st. john deliver's here , when he calle's the son of god the word internall , is according to the language of this philosopher ; if there could be any farther doubt , let any man read that whole chapter , he shall find his expressions extremely full ; the same may be found up and down in plato , the sibylls , zoroaster , and many more , which i need not name , because the observations out of them are made by many , and as well as this acknowledged by socinus , as i shall shew presently . sect. . but this one thing more may be worth the marking , that not onely those philosophers , which writ before st. iohn , had these expressions , but those who lived after him , as plotinus , porphyrius , iamblicus , proclus ; but amelius , who lived after him about two hundred years , more or less , observe's this concordance of st. iohn with them : it is true , he call's him a barbarian , as the pride of the grecians did all that were not grecians , but , that , by the barbarian , he mean't st. iohn , is evident , because he set's down the words of this text , i treat of , and some following verses , and approve's the consent of that barbarian : well then , this being a language of learned men , before st. iohn , to call the son of god the word of god , in respect of his divine nature ; and it being observed by philosophers , who had no by-end , but onely the apprehension of this evangelist , i see no reason why we should be forced to give it a violent sense , not used by any , and most unconsisting ( as will appear by the examination of every word ) with the rest . sect. . this consent of these philosophers socinus foresaw , and therefore , pag. . of this treatise , he handle's this sentence , the word was made fl●sh , he saith [ si ea non add●d●sset ] if he had not added these words ( the word was made fl●sh ) some man might , and that by right , have fallen into that errour , &c. that he should think that word , of which iohn write's , to be another thing , or sometimes to have been another thing from the man iesus , and perhaps endowed with platonical philosophy , when he should see him here called god , and in the beginning to be wi●h god , ( this is pag. . ) to make the world , &c. he should presently believe that our evangelist was conformable to plato , who hath writ of god some things out of which this opinion of the trinity did flow ; and presently after he saith , that other philosophers had it from trismegistus ] and acknowledgeth iamblichus ; so that he yield's that some before , and some after st. iohn , understood this phrase of st. iohn's , according to our exposition ; but i think that he can shew me no writer , before , or after , unless photinians and themselves , which are the same , that expounded this text of the humanity of christ ; what concern's that verse , which socinus apply's that discourse to , i shall meet with in its proper place ; but what concern's me now , i cannot but think it reasonable , that when so many learned authors had philosophized with such learned discourses concerning god , his word , and spirit , under that language and notion , i cannot but imagine it most congruous to reason , that those divine speculations of theirs , so far as true , should be countenanced by one evangelist , one infallible writer of divine truths , that every man might hear god speaking to him in his own language . sect. . i am sure the first fathers , almost all , because they had to do with philosophical men , made use of those conveniencies they had with scripture , and so did saint paul ; and i may say of our evangelist , that he did frequently make use of their language and expressions , never b●ulking them , but chusing them before other , where they were fit for his purpose , and especially plato : i could instance in very many of this kind , which any man , who is acquainted with these authors , know's ; but i will select two or three , which have not , as i know of , been used to such purpose ; and the first shall be out of plato's epistle to hermias , erastus , and coriscus ; these three , in that epistle , he invite's to have a kindness and friendship one with another , and , to avoid all differences , he adviseth to establish a kind of covenant and law one with another , and confirm that even by an oath ; in which oath they should call god to witness , [ who is the captain of all things , present , and future , and the lord , who is father of that captain , and cause , whom , saith he , if we truly philosophize , we shall know clearly all of us , so far as the nature of a happy soul can attain unto ] in this speech , we see , he clearly set's down the son of god to be the cause and governour of all things , as in an hundred , well-nigh , other places ; then he saith , such as are vertuous shall see him clearly , as a happy soul can do ; what is this , but , which holy job , who was before him too , said , i know that my redeemer liveth , and that in my fl●sh i shall see god , job . , . and the same that st. john relate's our saviour to express in his prayer , this is life eternal , that they might know thee the onely true god , and iesus christ whom thou hast sent , john . . life eternal , that is the felicity plato speak's of : it is true , plato could not say , jesus christ , whom thou hast sent , because in his humanity our saviour was not yet seen in the world ; but plato spake of him according to his divinity , that felicity consisted in the clear vision of him ; and , i may truly say , i was extremely delighted with the observations of this place , and some other more frequently observed ; but as i was delighted with this , so i did admire to find plato , in his phoedo , or de anima , describing the heaven where happy souls shall be , when they are departed from th●s life , by those stones which saint iohn doth the heavenly ierusalem , rev. . plato set's down three of them , a sardius , a iasper , a smaragdos , with an &c. that there were more . st. iohn , in the . verse , put 's them down in another order , a iasper , a sardius , and the third a chalcedony , the fourth an emerald , which fourth , in the greek , is smaragdos ; now i could not but justly wonder at this consent , and perhaps may think that there is some greater mystery in it then is yet discovered ; howsoever , this serve 's my turn to shew , that st. iohn never avoided the language and expressions of these preceding philosophers , but used them : this dialogue , called phoedo in plato , contain's that discourse which socrates delivered to his friends , at the day of his death , and his whole comportment in it ; amongst other passages , having philosophized concerning the immortality of the soul , and answered all their objections , he fall's to treating , how it fared with souls departed , which died wicked , good , better , best ; and therein , describing the habitations of those happy souls , put 's down these very stones , which st. iohn mention's , with an et caetera . this being then apparent , that these gallant and great philosophers , both before , and after st. iohn , used this term word as he doth , and that st. iohn no where avoid's their expressions , it is reasonable to think he should not do so here , unless we would find some greater violence offered to the sense of the text by it , then is yet discovered ; or unless , by some other interpretation , we might discern the meaning more clearly expounded , when by their way every term is wrested , as will appear . sect. . well , to proceed ; this word being taken for the son of god , is said , according to his divinity , to be in the beginning , absolutely , without any limitation , when things first leaped out of nothing , [ and ( saith st. john ) the word was with god ] socinus expound's this , thus ; [ h●c est , that is jesus , as he was the word of god , before he was manifested by the preaching of the baptist , soli deo notus erat , was onely known to god ] ( marke this word , onely ) therefore valentinus smalcius was very much to blame , when in the third part of smiglecius cap. . pag. . editione racov. . he saith , in expresse termes , that socinus doth not adde ( deo soli ) known to god onely , but to god , and not to men ; i shall endeavour to confute both what socinus , and what he saith ; they both agree , and so doth valkelius and the rest , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is as much as to be seen or known of god ; that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which we render ( with ) signifye's to be discerned ; but they are not so elegantly expresse , as they were before , to tell us by what figure , but they insist much upon the negative part ; first , that christ was not known by any , but god , before st. john's preaching ; known he was , but not to be the word ; i have shewed that he was not the word , in their sense , before he was preached , but , that they may have all the scope that may be , he was not known that he should be the word before , but onely to god ; suppose i granted all this , would it follow , that to be with god , is to be known of god ? it can hardly be deduced , for then to be with god should signifie nothing but the common condition which bring 's to all things , past , present , and to come , for all are known of him ; but they seeme to parallel this with the first epistle of this evangelist , chap. . . where he speaking of eternall life , which was with the father , and was manifested to us , there the same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used , as if it were ( say they ) was manifest to the father ; take socinus his own words : [ quod perinde est , which is as much as if he should say , we declare to you eternall life , which before this no man kn●w , because it was only known to god , who had decreed to give it you ; ] this is in his fifteenth page , for understanding which place we may observe that it is true , that this eternal word of god , which is mentioned in st. johns gospell , was hid with god from all bodily eyes , untill the manifestation of it by the incarnation and nativity of our saviour , and that because he was with god in the bosome of the father , as it is expressed john . ▪ but after the birth of christ , in that personall union , it was seen , and heard , as the first verse of this first chap. of his first epistle expresseth it ; but , in relation to their sense , give me leave to expound that second verse of the first chap. of the first epistle of st. john , so much of it as concerne's our businesse , which is thus much ; we declare to you eternall life , which was with the father , and is now manifested to us ; this eternall happy being , which we hope to enjoy hereafter , so much i find consented unto ; now ( saith socinus ) this life was only known to god , for ( was with the father ) must be so understood by them . i deny this , for , without doubt , the angels know it , which then enjoyed it , and those blessed souls , which were admitted into abraham's bosome ; the prophets saw it , and taught this eternall life ; many philosophers knew it , as i have shewed you , and could produce twenty more , if it were needfull ; nor , as they answer concerning the word , can they say , they did not know the quale or the quantum , the quality or the quantity of it , for they did know the quality to consist in the beatifical vision ; they did know the quantity , that it was eternall ; so that then this phrase [ which was with god ] cannot be understood of being known to him by being decreed such ; so that this phrase may , if not must , thus be expounded ; in the latter part of the preceding verse the apostle call's our saviour the word of life ; we shall find in the fourth verse of the first chap. of his gospel , in him the word was life ; in this fi●st verse and the words this is applyed to [ the word was with god ] this life then must needs be with him , because in the word , which was with him , not onely because known by him , but then , when our saviour had divulged the gospell : then this life , which was in the word with the father , was manifested to us , that is divulged , not onely to prophets by revelation , or philosophers and wise men by reason and contemplation , but even to us men , who cannot soare in so high speculations with our discourse to apprehend it by faith , and not only so , but to apprehend the way of getting it by the merits of jesus christ ; so that then the socinian glosse upon this text is utterly false , which saith , that this life was onely known to god ; when , for ought i find , the philosophers , many of them , apprehended it much better then they , because they conceived the immortality of the soule ; and that the soul coming from god must needs go to him , and receive according to its works in this flesh ; when they , the socinians , conceive the soul of man like a beast's , to return to nothing of its self , but its corrupted principles , where philosophers apprehended the soul to return to its incorruptible principle , god ; so that the text meane's thus much ; that the life which was with god , as in the fountaine of it , was by our most blessed saviour revealed to men in such a way , as might most clearly manifest him to the meanest capacity by faith . socinus hath another text , which he would have to serve this illustration , but i find it not mentioned by his followers , as not of force to clear this exposition . sect. . this is luke . and the last , jesus increased in wisdome and age ( so he , but better , stature , as we ) and grace with god and men , that is , in dei conspectu : the strength of this comparison lye's in this word ( with ) which is not the same with what was so rendred in st. john ; that was 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; but i stand not upon this ; the very sense , be it what it will , will overthrow his exposition , for i must not run away to other extravagancies ; for he could not grow in wisdome , stature or grace in conspectu dei , which is his gloss , unlesse he were so re and indeed ; and therefore whatsoever is the sense of these words , which perhaps an other occasion may give me opportunity to expound , his exposition cannot be true ; and so i passe from his illustrations of this phrase by scripture , which i can observe in any of them , and returne to my text. sect. . [ the word was with god ) that is ( saith he ) was known to god , and god onely , before the preaching of john baptist , ] thus smalcius likewise , and valkelius ; what concerne's angels in this exclusive word ( soli ) i have already touched ; as likewise how he did falsify socinus , to say , he did not use it ; but they are all peremptory , that no man knew he was the word , before the preaching of the baptist ; but then being pinched by smiglecius with an objection , that he was known to the shepheards , to the wise men , to anna and simeon , he answer's in his . chap. to the third part of smig . page . thus ; that he was known to god , not onely that he was , but his quality , that he was the word : that , before the preaching of john baptist , he was known to neither men , nor angels ; they knew him that he should be the deliverer of gods people from the hands of their earthly enemies , but not to be the word ; some knew that he should deliver his people from their sins , but this word they knew not . well , let my text confute all this , which saith , the word was with god in the beginning , therefore he was then the word ; if they fly to god's fore-knowledge in his decree ( as i have said ) it could not be affirmed of him , that he was with god , but should hereafter be with him : then secondly , that he should be the word , in their sense , is no more , but that he should manifest the will of god concerning mens salvation , his gospel-will , and that was known before ; i know not how smiglecius pressed his argument , whether in those general terms , which smalcius produceth , or particular ; but to this very distinction of his i shall presse old simeon's nunc dimittis , luke . . where our saviour is said to be a light , to lighten the gentiles ; now let any man imagine how he should be this light , but by revealing this will of god to them ; for my part , i can conceive no other ; and yet this is the whole matter , which they make to be expressed by this term , word ; for although the term its self be not expressed , yet it is clea●ly implyed , in that the whole sense of it is either a metaphor , or a metonymie , is evident ; to this i could adde , that the prophets foresaw this , so isaiah . . the gentiles shall come to thy light , that is , the light which his sermons , his miracles did give , and that evidence of god's will for our salvation which he did hold forth ; this is enough to shew , that the socinians were over-seen in saying , that , according to their sense , no man foresaw that our saviour should be the word , as well as in saying , that god did know him to be such , when he was not such , that is , before the preaching of the baptist ; and , to conclude ; i have no more to do with this phrase concerning their objections , but set down the true meaning of them , which is thus . the word , which i have shewed was in the beginning , the internall word , was with god , it would not else indeed be from him , for being an internall effect of his understanding , it proceeded not in●o any externall existence , but remained there eternally , in sinu patris , in the bosome of the father ; but lest any man should doubt that this word might be some accident of another nature then god was , the text adde's , the word was god. sect. . what the word is in their sense , what in ours , is apparent ; now it remaine's whether in theirs , or ours , it may be most truly said , that the word was god : in their sense it is , that he , who declare's the will of god , for the salvation of men , is god ; though he be a man , according to his nature , yet he is a god according to his office ; nor will i do them that injury to say , they affirme him god onely in regard of this one particular of revealing the will of god , but they say , that planè div●na virtus in illo relucebat . so socinus in his defense of his animadversions contra pasnonienses , in assertionem primam , cap. . pag. . edit . racov. . so that the effect of their saying is , that christ , who was this word , was a creature endowed with divine excellencies . but we say , that this word which , is a reall word , was god in its nature , by being the naturall son of the father , as my text , he was god. sect. . their exposition of this text is thus , that this term , god , is not a proper name to that infinite excellency which created and governe's heaven and earth ; but an appellative , or name of office and authority ; not a name signifying any essence or person , so socinus upon these words , and his followers ; but yet he grant's that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , it is often applyed to the great god of all ; he saith it is often given to angels and men ; he seeme's much to delight in that place , john . . it is written in your law , i have said ye are gods , ver . . if he call them gods , unto whom the word of god came , &c. this he stand's upon in the book before specifyed contra pasno ▪ but in his comment upon this text , he insist's upon that text , cor. . . for , though there be that are called gods , whether in heaven or earth ( as there be gods many , and lords many ) ver . . but unto us there is but one god , &c. [ now ( saith he ) this shewe's , that there are many gods , besides the great god , of one of which this text ought to be understood , ] and , to confirme this , he , in the chapter before alleadged contra pasn . page . urgeth , that the apostle , to shew that he mean't not the great god , left out an article here at 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which he put before ; and this is much insisted upon by smalcius , valk●lius , and the rest ; i shall take these in order , and endeavour to answear them , i think that this same term 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or god in our language , signifye's god in his essence throughout the new testament , which is the onely authenticke book we have to give any undoubted assent unto for any term there used ; for although it may sometimes be otherwise used , yet there is alwayes some comment , some words added to it , which do illustrate it in such a manner , as any reasonable man may discerne that it is applyed to an extrinsecall sense ; in this piece i shall apply my self principally to crellius , who hath a chapter of purpose against it , being the . chapter of the first book de deo & ejus attributis , not avoiding any thing i find other where . sect. . this doctrine of mine crellius allowe's , in such cases , where this word god is spoken of such powers [ quae ne imperia quidem sunt propriè , sed similitudinem tantum cum eis habent ; which are not truly empires , but have a likenesse onely to them , ] so saith he , sathan , is called the god of this word , cor. . . ] where we see it so explained as any man may know the true god is not mean't ; so likewise the prince of this world , john . . so likewise the belly , philip. . . whose god is their belly ; in all which he that runneth may reade , this word god is a metaphor , so applyed to other things by the very context , that he cannot choose but discerne it to be used out of its proper sense ; but this is it i contend for , that out of the new testament no man can shew that this word in the singular number , without a comment to expound it , in a diverse sense , is used , for any , but for the great god , as it is put here in this ; i have bestowed much pains to examine all places used by this apostle , either in his gospell , epistles , or apocalyps , and i can find none , so that , undoubtedly , it is not his language ; that criticisme which is so much stood upon by crellius , socinus and all of that opinion , that where there is no article put to a word , there it may be understood in a large sense , but where an article , in a more strict , for which he tightly produced st. cyrill ; i answer , that neither with article , nor without can they shew me any place where this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or god , is used in the singular number absolutely , without some addition to expound it otherwise , for any but the true and great god ; if there had been any , sure , after so much paines as they have taken in this theam , they would have found it ; so that then this word god being put absolutely ( the word was god ) without any limitation or exposition , it must be understood of the true and great god ; those instances of socinus will give no denyall to my conclusion ; that of john . . where it is said of men , that god had said they were gods ; consider here the plurall number , which one onely thing is enough to distinguish them from the true god , who can be but one ; but then reade the next words , ver . . he called them gods , to whom the word of god came : observe here that these gods were not such by their nature , but by the power of the word of god , and therefore must be of another nature from him ; so likewise that in cor. . . there are gods many , and lord ▪ many , that is , many which by gentiles are worshipped for gods and lords , ver . . yet to us there is but one god , &c. a man may say of these , either they are true gods or false ; if true , they are gods to us ; if false , we have nothing to do with them ; though others magnify them and adore them for gods , yet to us they are not gods ; so that here we have the context teaching the sense of these phrases clearly ; but in my text it is put absolutely , without relation to any particular , and therefore ought to be allowed in its proper sense ; and for the rule of st. cyrill , i may justly say of it , that it is to be understood of such words which in their genuine and proper signifiation have such a double sense , a large and a restrained sense , but such words , which do naturally and properly sign●fie one , and by a figure sign●fie other things , when they are used for other things , they ought to have some circumstance to expound that they are applied to those other things , of which nature this word god is , it properly sign●fie's that divine excellency ; but , when it is affirmed of other things , it is out of some resemblance or participation of his divine excellencies , which are in them ; and then , for what i can find either from them , or mine own study , there is some circumstance or other , which demonstrate's that application to us , as may appear out of all these instances before . sect. . but smalcius in his refutation libelli de divina verbi incarnati natura , cap. . pag . urgeth against our conceit thus ; [ si in principio , &c. if in the beginning with god , or in god ( as smiglecius would have it ) none can be but god , and that which is in god is god , certainly he who say's of another , that he is in god , say's likewise that he is god , nor may he adde that he is god , but by a tautology ; therefore because st. john had said before that he was with god , and added , that he was god , he did not before affirm , that he was god , when he said , he was with god. ] this is his discourse , and it is somewhat perplexed , but the meaning , i guess , is , that this were a tautology in st. iohn , if the antecedent were true , but i will answer all in a word ; although it be true , that whatsoever is with god eternally must be god , yet this truth being not so apparent to every man's understanding , it was most useful , for the instruction of men about these divine truths , that there should be some expressions made of it . but pag ▪ . smalcius proceed's with another objection , whereas smiglecius had said , that in this place , god is put absolutely and properly , which is never said of any man , and had expounded what he mean's by that phrase absolutely , to wit , when there is no word to shew that it is used improperly ( certè ) [ surely ( saith he ) the word , or sermo , speech ( so he will render it ) is not absolutely here called god , for it is a great demonstration of an improper signification , that , in the sentence just before , it was said , the word was with god , to wit , that one god. ] i will a little abreviate his discourse ; this cannot be , ( saith he ) if that god be that word or speech , for ( saith he ) that one god cannot be with himself ; that is the force of his argument , and my answer i shall draw up short ; although nothing , and so not god , can be with himself , because , to be with whomsoever , intimate's a diversity ; yet that , which is the same in one respect , may differ from him in another , and , in that regard , be said to be with him , as , in the first , to be that other : socrates and plato are in a room together , socrates may properly be said to be a man , and to be with a man ; although these persons in the trinity differ not altogether as much as socrates and plato , for ought we know , because these are not distinct individurl natures , as they are ; yet being distinct persons , agreeing in the same nature , they may be , either of them , truly affirmed to be god , and with one another , which is god ; which i think is very evident to any intell●gent man. again , he urgeth ( si porro ) moreover , if he be not absolutely god , who is not the god of all things , and is constituted a god , surely christ is not god , for he is not the god of the father ] and the second part , that he was constituted a god , he prove's out of acts . . where it is said , that god hath made that same iesus , whom ye crucified , both lord and christ , [ lord or god ( saith he ) are all one ] before i go further , i shall deny that ; lord is a relative , lord and servant are relatives , but god is an absolute term , and therefore , as tertullian excellently dispute's against hermogenes , god was eternally god , but not eternally lord , untill the generations of the earth were finished ; and this distinction is observed all along the first chapter of genesis , untill the fifth verse of the second ; when the world was completed , he is called god still ; but from thence all along the lord god ; therefore there is a great difference betwixt saying , our saviour was made lord of all , and that he was made god ; this i put down here , for fear it might slip out of my head hereafter , when i come to examine the argument . to the first piece : that this word is not the god of the father , i answer , the word can have no eminency beyond him whose word it is : but he is god with the father , the same god in essence , coëqual , coëternal with him ; neither is the father a god over the son , that is , of an higher excellency , as he is god , but as he is man , as he hath all his being , dignity , eminency , whatsoever he hath , from the father ; he is god of god , light of light , but no whit inferiour to the father , but eternally proceeding from him ; as he was man , so he was constituted lord and christ , as he was the word , spoken by god in his etern●l generation ; as man , he was blessed by god in his temporal productions . and this sufficeth , for ought i can discern , to answer such arguments as i find against our opinion : i would have reserved this for another discourse ; i intended ( god willing ) to justifie these truths by reason , but that i thought thus much necessary to clear this 〈◊〉 . well then , this being sufficiently shewed , that the word was god , not man , and ought to be understood in its plain and express terms , that the word was god ; i shall proceed . chap. xxxiii . of the word's being with god before the beginning of st. john baptist's preaching ; and in heaven before his corporeall ascension thither ; of his acting in the creation of the world ; what life is in sin , and how he is called the light. st. john's testimony of his divinity evident enough . whom socinus misinterpret's in what he write's of the creation . the bishop's animadversions upon smalcius and valkelius glosses of the world in st. john. the mysterie of christ's incarnation discussed with them ; smalcius's three quaeries answered . sest . . verse . [ the same was in the beginning with god ] there will be little farther quarrell about these words , for every terme in the sentence hath been examined before ; yet , because i have left out one shift of theirs , concerning that being which the word had with god. i may justly insert that here ; which is , that christ was the word , in the beginning of the gospel preached by iohn baptist , ascended up into heaven , and so was with god in the beginning , just so as an embassador goe's to his king , take's , from his ▪ mouth , his direct●ons , and then goe's about his embassy ; so our saviour , with his very humanity , ascended first up into heaven , and so was with god , and then went about wording of it ▪ preaching the gospell ; this is the conceit of smalcius , valkelius ; how true , we must examine . sect. . first , it seeme's strange to me , that it was possible so high and remarkable a passage of our saviour's life should no where be recorded by any one of the four evangelists , when so many actions of lesse concernement are registred so exactly ; but this is not a necessary argument , it is not written , therefore it is not ; but , i may say of that , as st. augustin once did ; it may be with as much reason , and more , denied , then affirmed ; for a man , fifteen hundred years after , to relate an action of another man's , whose story was written by divers eye-witnesses , who mentioned no such thing , one would think were very strange . sect. . yea , but they have scripture for it , john . . what and if ye shall see the son of man ascend up , where he was before ? therefore ( say they ) he was there before , in his humanity ; if the text had added , in his humanity , the argument had been somewhat , and of force ; but the words being as they are , where he was before , it will prove , that he was there before onely , which is true of his divinity , not of his humanity ; i know they deride this distinction , and speak basely of it , but it is most true and useful , and i will illustrate it thus : in socrates , there is a soul and a body , these two constitute the person of socrates ; we can say of socrates , that he is heavy , and earthy , and fall's down , it is true of him , according to his body : we can say again , he is heavenly and light , and ascend's upward , that is true , according to his soul ; yea , we can truly affirm these , both at the same time , of the same person , taken as that person ; so we can say , socrates is as high as ever he was , when , by iterated contemplation , he admire's and adore's god again , which is onely by that part which is his soul. give me leave to apply this to our purpose : the divinity and humanity of christ make one person ; what is done by either is done by christ , cor. . . they have crucified the lord of glory , which was according to his humanity , and he is the lord of glory according to his divinity , not his humanity ; so the same christ may be said to ascend up by h●s humanity , where he was before with his divinity . there is one place more which they insist upon , that is john . . where our saviour saith , no man hath ascended up to heaven but he that came down from heaven , even the son of man , which is in heaven ; here ( say they ) it is intimated , that he had been in heaven before , because it is said in the preterperfect tense , he ascended ; first i will answer ad homines , that this text cannot avail their turn ; for , first , if it were true , that he ascended in body , yet it must be such an one as descended first , that is , such an one as came down from heaven before , and then he must be in heaven before the beginning , if in the beginning he ascended into heaven ( which they say ; ) but then mark the clause , that is , one who is in heaven , when our saviour spake it ; to the later they say , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , existens , being in heaven , because it is a participle of the present tense , by a grecism , may be understood of the preterperfect tense , he was in heaven : i confess such a language is many times used , but that it should be so here , i utterly deny ; for it is not fit for us to think , that our saviour , in so pithy a short delivery of such mysteries , did use any tautology , or unnecessary , or non-significant terms ; now consider if he had said , that no man ascended into heaven , but he that descended , who was in heaven ; what would this last clause adde to the rest ? no man can ascend up to heaven , but then he must be in heaven : no man can descend from heaven , but then , when he descended , he must be there : and this is apparent to every man , upon the repeating of the very terms , who understand's them ; and therefore if it should be construed , who was in heaven , there must be something more in it then i can discern , or else it is a tautology ; but no such thing , taking it , who is in heaven , because that was neither expresly nor impliedly delivered before ; so then , to understand this text , we may go two wayes , either take these words figuratively , and that socinus seem's to allow in his . chap. against the . of wiceus thus ; a man may be said to ascend into heaven , as i spake before ( as socrates ) by contemplation , and to descend by looking down and busieing himself about the things of this world ; so god is said to humble himself , to behold the things that are in heaven and earth , and he is in heaven , now at this instant , who contemplate's divine excellencies , even in this discourse . or else we may expound it thus , according to those two natures which were in that one person ; no man ascended , &c. christ's humanity was elevated by the incarnation and union it had with his divinity ; it was a great descent of his divinity , to be united to his humanity , and by this divinity he is still in heaven ; and this mightily enforceth his argument to prove what went before to nicodemus ; if i have told you earthly things , and ye believe not , how shall ye believe if i tell you of heavenly things ? he reprove's them for not believing him , who onely can tell them , being the onely person who is acquainted truly with heaven , who hath been in heaven by ascent , by descent , by a present inhabitation : now let us see how this can agree with our saviour's bodily ascent into heaven ; indeed in the first sense , i do wonder , socinus and they did not apply it to our saviour's being with god , in contemplation , even before john baptist his preaching ; but i do not find that they have done it , but that that text is invironed with so many circumstances , that would not abide it , and they only press this for to prove a corporal presence of his humanity , which the text will endure , for the reasons before specified , and this later hath no colour for them . well , i have done with what i find they excuse rather then defend their exposition by ; now i shall apply my self to the con●utation of it . sect. . it is a hard thing to prove a negative , and in logick it lies upon them to justifie what they affirm against all the stream of christian writers ; but i will endeavour to repeat what others have said before , and argue it clearly ; first then , we may observe heb. . . it is said , that christ entered once into the holy place ; this word once intimate's no more , no other time , but then ; & this , a man might think , were clear enough ; but they have an evasion ; he entered once as high priest , at other times before , he entered as a lay-man ; methink's they should say , as embassador , to receive his commands from his king. now , reader , consider how unfit this answer is for their months ; certainly , if then in the beginning he did go up to heaven in his humanity , he was as much a priest then as the word , for he was not , nor could be , the word by their doctrine , untill he delivered the will of god ; that he could not do , untill he received his commission and direction from god ; if they say , he had it by the decree and predetermination of god ; it is answered , that undoubtedly so was his priesthood , and therefore he was then as much priest as word ; and if it might be said , the word was with god , a man may say , the priest was with him , which that text to the hebrewes denye's , because it saith , he entred but once into the holy place , which was after his death , therefore , could not be said to do it before ; this argument , thus pressed , i have not read urged by others , and i do not know , how they can avoid it ; well then , i know not of any thing more need be said to these words ; we see them inconsistent with their glosse , and not agreeing to ours , who hold , that the word is eternally produced and with god. sect. . i will go on , verse . [ all things were made by him ] there is not one word which is not wrested by them : by this ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) all things ( say they ) is understood all things of the gospell , for so it is often used in scripture , not absolutely , but according to the subject matter that is in hand ; and so it is here , the gospell of st. john was the matter in hand , and these things were established by our saviour ; i do not deny , that that phrase all or all things should be understood of the subject matter ; i do deny that the immediate subject matter is the renovation or gospell , but is the creation , for if the apostle had intended that , he would rather have used renovation , regeneration , making new , then absolute making ; againe , it is evident that st. john , in this beginning of his gospell , describe's the nature of christ , according to his divinity , when he was , in the beginning ; where he was , with god ; what he was , in himselfe he was god , in his effects , he made all things ; then he come's to the preparation of the gospell by john baptist , and his gospell by its selfe , to his incarnation , he was made flesh ; this i put down , to shew the reader , that to us , who observe this method in the evangelist , that conceipt of the gospell , that these words should relate to it , can have no sense ; and againe i say , let the reader observe the places commonly cited by them to this purpose , that this phrase must be understood according to the subject matter , he shall find that there is something obvious in them to shew a reader , that they have such an intention ; those places are these , matth. . . mark . . john . . and , . and , . and some other , which are needlesse to put down , and would be tedious too ; but in all of them there will appeare somewhat inviting a man to that understanding , but in this nothing ; and let the reader consider , what an uncouth exposition this is , by which i can put the contrary to every proposition , and , by their glosse , it will be more true then the text ; as thus ; the word was not god ; the word did not make all things , for when the beginning was he was not , by them , nor thousands of yeares after ; with god he was not , otherwise then every thing in the world was with him , in his presence and knowledge , and that long after the beginning , contrary to the text ; and he was so farre from making all things , that indeed , ( by them ) he made nothing , but instituted some lawes and covenants onely ; now what a horrid way is this , of expounding scripture , onely because they are resolved against our saviour's eternall divinity ? let us go on . sect. . [ and without him was nothing made that was made ] i believe , that , before their glosses had come to this text , a man could not possibly have put down more distinct words ; was heaven , or earth , or any thing else then what is comprised in all ? if not , then it was not made without him ; he made it , who made all things ; yea , but ( say they ) this must be understood of all the things of the gospell ; i aske , were other things made ? if they were , then they were made by him , and without him nothing was made , that was made ; i know they will returne to their former answear , and say , it must be understood of the subjecta materia , which was the gospell , that none of those things that were made were made without him ; but let a man consider whether it be reasonable to refer this ( all things ) to such a business ; which is treated of two or three verses after , or rather to those things which immediately follow , that is , the things that are made ; they have an exception likewise against this word [ by ] all things were made by him ; that signifye's an instrument , ( say they ) and by this christ should be onely here an instrumentall cause , by which god wrought these things ; so smalcius in refutatione libelli de divinâ verbi incarnati naturâ . cap. . pag. . in my edition , . it is true , he grant's that this word [ by ] is often used for a principal cause , as is most evident , as we say , that this house was built by this man , not by his axe or hammer , no not by his servants , yea all things are said to be made by god ; but he saye's , they , who urge this argument , must prove , that it is never used otherwise ; i say , that is not necessary , in logick ; it will be enough if he can prove , that it cannot be used otherwise in this place ; and that i hope to do ; first against those , who allow our saviour to make all these things concerning the gospell ; he was the author of them , and he must not be understood as an instrument in respect of the sense that they give to [ by ] here , which make's him to be barely an instrumentall cause ; then next , taking [ all things ] as we do , and surely it must be so , if we understand , that this word is an instrument in the making the world , the heaven and earth , he must be long before he was born of the virgin , even before these things themselves were made ; which although it will not be of force against the arrians , yet is against them ; so that let this phrase [ all things ] be understood which way ye will , as they , or we , yet this word ( by ) cannot be accommodated to their exposition , for a bare instrumentall cause . there is another slight objection , that the father is not made by him , nor the holy spirit ; but the text answer's this , when it saith , without him was nothing made that was made ; but let the reader observe the same contrariety to the text , here , that was before ; there was more a hundred times made without him , then by him ; and , if where the full and clear sense of a text will go one way , it be lawful to expound it otherwise , because some word , or words are otherwhere applyed to another meaning , it is impossible to prove any thing by words ; for the liberty of language doth allow it , and the expressions of all authors make use of it , to apply the same words to diverse occasions ; and , if this licence should be granted to expositors , there is no refuge but tradition , which deliver's the sense , not the words , and by that a man may know how , and in what sense , such language was understood , either in the apostolical or next adjacent times ; for it is reasonable to think , that they had , with the words , the sense likewise delivered . thus i write , because , as appeare's , these men do use such violence to these scriptures , as is unreasonable , and without any consent , to their own intent , as i have shewed . sect. . it followe's [ in him was life ] here in these words i find little opposition ; smalc●us handle's them not , as not materiall ; socinus saith , this word [ life ] must be understood of life eternall ; i will not deny that life eternall may be mean't , and principally mean't , here ; but i am confident likewise , that all the life of every thing in the world may truly be said to be in him , in the word , as in the fountaine from whence it came , and is still preserved equally as the other ; but for life eternall , it may be said in him , besides that way , as in a fountaine , to be in him likewise , as the m●ritorious cause , yea , as in the object , for in the knowledge of him will consist much of our eternall happinesse hereafter . i will proceed [ and this life was the light of men ] that is , if we understand it of the naturall life , this life , which originally , and preservingly , is in the word , is that light which enlightneth the understanding in reasonable things , or the very sensitive in sensitive things ; for there is necessary to sight and understanding a two-fold light , internall and externall ; internall , which enable's the power to work ; and externall , which render's the object visible ; this internall light is that life which god preserve's in any living thing , that doth see ; but then apply it to the eternall life inchoate or begun here , so those graces , which put a man in the state of future happinesse , do likewise , like light , shew him the way to it ; or for that light perfect in heaven ; for tha● glory , which felicitate's and make 's us happy , doth likewise enlighten and shew that blessed object of the most sacred trinity . here we have no controversy with them , i am briefe therefore [ and the light shined in darknesse , and the darknesse comprehended it not ] to this all that socinus saith is , that christ is called the light , not onely because by heavenly doctrine he enlighten's men to life eternall ; but likewise because that , by an irreprehensible and most holy life , he shined before them , that they ought to imitate him , for so he saye's , john . . i have given you an example , that as i have done , so should ye do likewise ; the men of this world were this darknesse ] ( saith he , ) &c. this hath much truth with it , but not all that this text conteyne●s ; for first , if we conceive christ to be this light , as he saith , we may take him in a two-fold capacity ; as the word , of which was spoke before , the word of god ; then we may consider that this , which was before , shined in his humanity , which was darknesse in comparison , and that darknesse comprehended it not , that is , obscured it not so , but that some ray or glorious lustre of his divinity brake out ; or else , the whole person came into the world , which was darknesse , and that darknesse laboured to crush and suppresse him , but did not comprehend him . sect. . [ there was a man sent from god , whose name was john ] let me here admonish the reader of one word , to prevent a future objection , with which the whole troop of the socinians are full and boast , that is [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . ] which we render [ was ] signifye's , in its proper nature , to be born , or begotten of another , or draw his originall from another , and from thence , i conceive , the word gigno in latine to be derived ; but because , amongst all created things , there is nothing which is not originated , doth not draw its being from some other , therefore it is often used to signify to be ; but , i am perswaded , no where in the language of this evangelist ; and could the latine or english language so well beare with the graecisme , they would have rendered it , there was a man made sent , factus missus ; but because that sound 's harshly in these languages , they choose rather to be contented with saying , he was sent , then he was made sent ; this caution i premit , now i meet with the word , for the elegancy of the english rendred it so , but it was used in its naturall sense , where the language would beare it , all things were made by him , &c. for although the sense be the same , to say , he was made sent , as to to say , he was sent ; yet the english or latine phrase better agree's with the latter , then the former ; and the evangelist did , of purpose , as st. cyrill thought , change the phrase , from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which he had used before , in the beginning was the word , and the word was with god , and the like , because the word was not made nor created ; but when he came to st. john , although the sense be much the same , he changed the phrase from he was to that , he was made such , made sent , because he was a made creature . sect. . [ the same came for a witnesse , to beare witnesse of that light ] i find little in these words excepted against by them , onely socinus urgeth , that if john baptist were a witnesse of christ , he either knew him not to be that great god , or else he very weakly performed his trust , for he onely testifyed that he was christ ; that he was the lamb of god which taketh away the sins of the world ; that he should baptize with the holy ghost and with fire ; that he was greater then himself , but nothing of his being the great god ; i put down his sense , and first i answer to his last clause , that if he had put it down in the clearest words , that he or i could invent , they would have found where some of these words had been used to another sense , some where or other in scripture ; but i am perswaded that he did witnesse enough to satisfy any conscience , that were not absolutely resolved to the contrary ; for first consider that place in the . of this chapter : behold the lamb of god , which taketh away the sinnes of the world. who can take away man's sinnes , but god ? but the great god , against whom they were committed ? and therefore he saye's in the . verse of the same , bearing witnesse of it , this is the son of god , ( we mince it in our translation to make the phrase smoothe ) there is an article at both son , and god ; it should be , that son of that god , both with an emphasis , which these men stand much upon in other places . i know their expositions of these words , but i bring them for illustration , that a man , who is not maliciously ben● , might think this enough to expresse him the god ; and then looke upon st. matth. . . he shall baptize you with the holy ghost and with fire ; who could do that , but the great god ? then see in the same place , whose shooes latchet i am not worthy to unty● ; certainly the meanest man is worthy enough to unty the shooe-latchet of the greatest king in the world , who is onely a man ; but if he be god likewise , the greatest is not worthy of the meanest office about him . certainly , st. john baptist delivered abundantly enough for the satisfaction of any sober man in this point . i proceed [ that all men through him might believe ] i find no dispute , concerning this businesse out of these words ; i let them passe therefore ; nor about the two next verses ; i come therefore to the tenth verse . sect. . [ he was in the world , and the world was made by him , and the world knew him not . ] socinus , in his comment upon these words , boast's much , pag. . that no man , which he knowe's , expound's them right but himselfe ; and his exposition is , that the new testament being full of hebraismes ▪ and the hebrewes , having compound words , do therefore use uncompounded words for compounds , and so in this place [ the world was made by him ] is as much as re-made , regenerated , made anew ; and to this purpose he produceth , ephes. . . we are his workmanship , created in christ jesus , unto good works . certainly , if there be no clearer text then this , this term ( made ) need not be wrested to re-makeing ; for first let the reader observe here , that the word , we render ( made ) is the word which hath abid , and will abide more dispute , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which is not in that sentence to the ephesians ▪ this word hath hard luck , it is used to all purposes by them ; sometimes it signifye's to be , sometimes to be re-made ; but i say , alwayes made , in st. john ; so that although they would shew me , that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which are both used in that place , and rendered workmanship and created , may be used for recreation , yet it would not follow , that this word , which is not of kin to them , should indure that exposition ; then , let us consider , that text in the ephes. need not to be forced to his sense ; for , not to stand upon the expositions of learned men , which have applyed it to the creation , that by ( christ jesus ) is mean't our saviour according to his divinity , and so in him ( the word ) we were all created to good works ; but to take it according to the other sense , that this creation is mean't of creating those saving and justifying graces , at which the apostle seeme's to point , and in regard of them we are said to be created , those excellent , and supernaturall , qualities , being our perfection ; so that as a man may be said to be made , when his soul is put in him ; a table , or any thing , when that worke , which give 's it the last complement and degree of perfection , is added to it ; so we in the text are said to be created , but it doth not say men , we are created another thing , which god by these graces wrought us unto , and , i thinke , is regeneration ; but this phrase doth not , in its nature , signify regeneration , but it signifye's that which is applyed to men , who are fallen from a better to a worse condition ; to such men it may import a regeneration , because it bring 's them backe to their former state , and make's them that which was their first condition ; and so this creation , in the text , hath its most genuine and proper sense , which making in my text should not have , when it is said , that the world was made by him , if by it should be understood , the world was re-made or regenerated by him ; againe consider , that if this text should be understood of regeneration , i mean , that text to the ephesians , it must be by vertue of that phrase ( to good works ) [ created to good works ] for if the text had barely said , we had been his workmanship , created by him , no man could have construed it regeneration ; but now in this text , ( the world was made by him ) there is no phrase to expound it to any thing else , but the mere sense of the words ; and yet let us see another violence , if this should be granted , that this phrase ( made the world ) should be understood for regenerating ; and the world for men ; all the world , that knowe's any thing of christianity , knowe's likewise that not half the world was regenerated ; then ( say they ) it must be understood of our saviour's endeavour to regenerate the whole ; so that making must be taken for regeneration , regeneration for an endeavour to do it ; when , i dare say , he , nor they , can shew me any place in scripture , where this word ( make ) is used for regeneration , much lesse meerly for an endeavour to do it ; nay , i do not think , that they can shew me any place , where make is taken for an endeavour , but the very phrase , intimating a produced effect , is no where used for an ineffectuall endeavour . sect. . but i will leave this comment of socinus , although countenanced by his followers , and apply my self to smalcius , in his cap. refutationis libelli de divinâ verbi incarnati naturâ , pag. . upon these words , ( the world was made by him ) [ we deny ( saith he ) that by the word ( world ) is signified the old world ; that by the word ( made ) is signified creation ; that by the phrase ( by him ) is signified a principal agent . i shall undertake these in their order , as he handle's them , but his greatest endeavour is about the first word ( the world ) which he and i both first meddle with . first , he saith , this word ( world ) hath divers significations ▪ it signifie's onely men ; it signifie's the future world ; now ( saith he ) when saint john saith , the world was made by him , may be understood , that we are reformed by him ; in which sense it is said , that christ enlighten's every man which cometh into the world , as it is said in the preceding verse ; now as christ is said to enlighten every man , because he used sufficient means , and endeavoured their enlightening , so he is said , to make the world , that is , the men in it , by endeavouring to reform them . ] this is a cruel thing , to impose upon a man such expositions , where making must be taken for reforming ; for although they can shew the same root for these words in hebrew , yet not in greek , nor any place in the new testament , where the word used for making is used for reforming ; and then that reforming must be understood onely an endeavour , not an act , as i have shewed . his second way is , to take this word ( world ) for the future world , life eternal , this is pag. . as this life eternall is revealed , and given by christ ; see againe the violence of this exposition ; the world is taken for the future , in heaven ; this making of it , by the word , is the revealing of it by christ ; then which never were there heard greater falsifications of any text ; for illustration of which he bring 's the . verse of this chapter , grace and truth is by jesus christ ; when there is nothing in these words , which can give any light to any such sense in the other ; for , how can it follow , because christ is the agent , by which his servants receive grace and truth , therefore his making the world , should be understood of his revealing or giving eternall life ; but valkelius in his fifth book , de verà religione , cap. . pag. . and . give 's other illustrations : that this word ( world ) should signify the future world ; hebrewes . . peter . . these he put 's in the margin , to justify this acception of the world for the other , and in all which places it is observable ; there is no one , but the fourth to the romans , which hath this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which we render world , in it , and sometimes the word new added , which might well expound his sense , as in st. peter ; and sometimes no such intent , as he would have it , to signify the future world so in those places to the hebrews ; but then , for this place to the romans , although there is this very word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it , as the h●ir of the world , yet christ was heir of this world , and the promise was made to abraham , that all nations in the earth should be blessed in his seed , and so his seed should be heir , lord of all the world , and have kingdom and rule over all nations , ever here on earth . these are the principall things i observe amongst them , to justifie their comment upon that text ; and it appear's , that they have not shewed , that this word ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which we render made , was ever used for regenerating , much lesse for the intention of it ; again , we may marke , that this word , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , is never used for the world to come or heaven , without an addition ; when it is put absolutely , as here , it signifye's the present world. it will be now time to set down mine own conceipt , and vindicate it from such exceptions as they make against it [ he was in the world ] that is , the word , not the light , because , in the last clause , where it is said , the world knew him not , him is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the masculine gender , which agree's to the word , not to the light , which is the neuter gender . well then , he was in the world , the great world , the universe , is what was mean't by the word was in the world ; and this must be true , because the word was god , and he is every where , he in the world , and the world in him ; and this is something that a man learn's here for his faith , that god is alwayes in the world , preserving and looking to it ; but , suppose a man should take the word in their conceipt ( for a man who preached and taught other men the will of god ) were it not a strange needlesse speech , for a man to say , that he was in the world ? take the world how they will , for the great world which we inhabit , or for the company of men who live in it ; ( for onely in these two senses they understood world in this place ) but to say that the word , the word god , was in the world ; here is something delivered that men would listen to . sest . . [ and the world was made by him ] that is , as he is with it in preserving , so he was with it in making it , at the first , when it was made ; let us view the sense of their way , compared with this : the word , which is christ in his humanity , by his sermons , miracles , and life , made , that is , either reformed the world , that is men which were in the great world , and this reformation was intentionall onely , he did not do it , in a flat opposition to the text , as can be : or else the same , christ made , that is prepared and fitted to that heaven , that place of happinesse , into which his servants shall enter hereafter , when in the whole bible they cannot find this word , which is used here for world , single and alone used for heaven , or for the reformed or regenerated part of men ; nor that this word , which is here rendred ( made ) is taken for regeneration : reader , this is a strange way of expounding scripture . sect. . [ and the world knew him not ] that is , the same world which he made , and in which he was , knew him not , did not take such notice as they might , by revelations which were made of him , by the creature and the law written in their hearts ; here they except against this exposition of the term ( world , ) that we vary and change the terme from what it was used for , in the former expositions ; there we took the world for the great masse of created things , but here we take it for the world of men ; i say we do not change the sense of any term , from the most genuine and naturall signification it hath ; for although very many , and the greatest number of expositors do say , that this term ( world ) doth signify the men in the world , yet , that very exposition differ's not in sense from that i have given , no more then if a man should say , that socrates did see such or such a thing ; or that socrates his eyes saw it , which is all one ; for men are the eye of the world , by which it is able to discerne any thing ; and when it is said , the world knew him not , it must needs be understood that the men in the world knew him not , because the world can know god by nothing but its understanding part , which is men . it seeme's by smalcius in refutatione libelli de divina verbi incarnati natura , pag. . that smiglecius had made an answer , somewhat like this of mine , to which smalcius replye's , that [ this answer profit's nothing , for it remaine's firm still , that the word ( world ) is taken in another sense , in the third sentence , then it was in the second ; since it is certain , that the world , which did not know christ , is another world from that was made by him ; ] and to the similitude he answer's , that [ the men , who did not know christ , are not such a part of the world ▪ as the eye is of man , for when a man see 's not , the whole eye see 's not ; but that men knew not christ , is onely affirmed of part of men , and that the worst part of men , not all men ; so that when it is said , that the world knew him not , it must be understood of man in generall , not of the ill , the worst part of men . ] i return to this : first , that such an answer cannot become a socinian , who do in generall make this synechdoche , pars pro toto , understood here , and it is their own way , and not unusuall in scripture ; but , secondly , i say again , that it is true of the whole world , and each particular man , that neither the whole , nor any particular man in the world , did know him , as they were the world , the created world , but by an addition of supernaturall favour and grace ; this kind of phrase is used by saint paul , cor . . flesh and bloud cannot inherit the kingdom of god : it is quatenus , as it is fl●sh and bloud ; but when that corruption hath put on incorruption , when that fl●sh and bloud is sanctifyed , when it is glorifyed , and indued with supernaturall grace , then it shall inherit and possesse the kingdom of god , and with these eyes they shall see their redeemer ; so the cor. . . the naturall man receiveth not the things of the spirit , but even st. peter and st. paul were naturall men , they could not have dyed else , but quatenus , as naturall , he cannot do it ; that man , who is a naturall man , can , but not as he is naturall , by the vertue and force of his naturall abilities ; so it is here , the world [ knew him not ] that is , by any naturall abilities in that worldly condition , in which it was made , unlesse perfected by some more excellent endowmen●s and blessings ; the prophets knew him , but , they had supernaturall assistance ; the shepheards they discerne him at his birth , but angels , told it them ; to conclude , we cannot apprehend him , as he is , by any worldly assistance ; i am perswaded that men have by the naturall abilities , which god hath given them , and the consideration of his creatures , found out and known , that god made the world , and that he rule 's and governe's it by a most exact wisdome ; but that this wisdome should be a person ; that this person should be the son of god ; without some other light , then he h●th naturally , a man cannot perceive it ; for , although it be a most received axiome in the school , that omnia opera dei ad extrà sunt indivisa , that all the outward workes of god are wrought by the whole trinity ; yet , they are done by such an unity of the trinity , as is not observed out of those vestigia's ( as they speak , ) those partiall representations which are in the creature of it ; and therefore , i am perswaded , that trismegistus , socrates , plato , and such others , who have such lively expressions of these mysteries , either had some revelations made to them from above , or else had met with some prophet or prophetick writing , upon which they confiding were bold , out of t●em , to make these expositions ; to this , which i have said , i cannot discerne any thing answered , because i have not known it urged to that height by others ; nor do i know , what they can object , unlesse it be , that st. john seeme's to upbraid the world with ingratitude , that they should not take notice of so great a goodnesse of god's who made it ; but this cannot be justly urged against them , who could not know him , whom , as it seem's by discourse , the world could not ; to this i answer ; that for any thing i see , such an intention of the text is yielded to by writers on both sides , but i discerne nothing in the text that enforceth any more then an historiall narrative of the nature and condition of the world , that he was undiscerned in the world , untill some supernaturall blessing enlightned men ; i cannot discerne any such upbraiding , as they speak of , but if there be any morall intention besides the history , there is nothing can be deduced more naturally , then , that men , who have this light , are bound to a gratefull acknowledgment of all they have , to arise from god , both naturall and spirituall things , and to use them to his glory ; or , if men will apprehend such a thing as upbraiding , be it , that they may think it consisted in this , that the generality did not know him as they might , men did not apprehend so much as was apprehendible of him ; but i choose rather the first exposition , although the second be the common road ; and i proceed to the next verse . [ he came unto his own , and his own received him not ] this and the two next verses yield a great many heavenly meditations , which i could delight to discourse , as well as thinke of , but they are not pertinent to this businesse i have in hand , to shew , that our saviour was the word of god , which was god. sect. . i therefore let them passe , and come to the . verse , where we find opposition from them with much art , which we render thus [ and the word was made flesh , and dwelt amongst us ] there are two propositions in this particle [ and the word was made fl●sh , ] that is the first : here , by the word , the socinian understand's the same word as before , christ , as by preaching and miracles , he manifested the will of god to men ; but that this could not be made flesh , is evident , because it was flesh alwayes , and nothing can be made that which it is ; but this word was alwayes such ; if it had been , that flesh was made the word , there had been some sense in it , because then we had understood that that man , who at the first was not the word , by preaching , &c. was made the word ; but , this sentence [ the word was made flesh ] abide's no such construction ; to avoid this , therefore , they fly to that other term [ was made ] of which i have treated before , when it came in my way , at the sixth verse ; this word , ( say they with one consent ) signifye's ( to be ) and it should be read [ the word was fl●sh ] this i have examined before and shewed , that i can find no place in st. john , where [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] is so used , that necessarily men must understand it in their sense ; so that that place , in the sixth verse , was so read for the smoothnesse of the latine or english language , which would not abide the verball translation of the greek ; now i will adde thus much ; in these . verses , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is used for ( was ) or ( being ) at the least nine or ten times ; and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , five or six times for made ; what reason can we imagine , that the style or language should be altered here ? but then , let us consider what the sense would be , if the text were read as they would make us believe [ the word was flesh ] as much as if we should say , the preacher was a man , which were a most ridiculous speech ; and therefore , to avoid this , they fly to this term flesh , and say , that that term doth not signify flesh its self , or a man cloathed with flesh , pars pro toto , which is often in scripture ; but the humble estate of a man ; and here they bestow much rhetorick , to shew , that the evangelist , having spoken so great things of the word , that it was with god , was god ; that all things were made by him , &c. lest men should enter into this vain conceipt , that he was the great god , he pluck's him down to consider , that he is but a weak man , flesh , subject to many miseries and misfortunes , death and injuries , &c. observe here that this word flesh in its naturall and proper meaning , signifye's a part of man in a figurative manner , by a synechdoche it signifye's the whole ; but , for any thing i can discerne , in scripture it is not used for any base or miserable condition of man , but onely in generall terms , to shew , that man , whilest he live's in flesh , is subject to the infirmities of it : the places produced by socinus speak no more , the first is psal. . . he remembred that they were but flesh ; here is a speech concerning the israelites in their generall state , as men , and as frail and weak , but no particular dejectednesse of their condition , but that they were no better then men . his second place is , isaiah . . all flesh is grasse , and all the goodlinesse thereof as the flower of the field ; suppose i should yield , that here by flesh is reprepresented a low and mean condition ; yet here is such a comment joyned to this word fl●sh , as enforceth that conceipt ; but in my text there is no such thing ; so that still i may say , that this term flesh teacheth us no such thing , without an addition of such other language , as may render it of that sense ; but then again , all the expression of any lownesse or dejectednesse of estate , that is here made , is nothing else but the generall cond●tion of mankind , no particular humiliation mean't by it ; and that is evident out of that phrase [ all flesh is grasse , &c. ] this sign ( all ) shew's it to be mean't universally . so likewise jeremiah . . cursed be the man that trusteth in man , and maketh flesh his arme . here is no manner of unhappy condition taught by flesh , but that it is a creature , and must not be confided in like god. these are the places u●ged by socinus , and whatsoever i find any where of the same nature ; so that i do not find fl●sh taken for the most unhappy sort of men , but for men in generall ; and when it is said [ the word was made flesh ] it must , for ought appear's yet , be understood , was made man , such a thing which was a creature , which creature was subject to infirmity ; but , for a greater evidence to this truth , let us see what will be the result of their comment , to wit this ; that the word , which was the man christ , who preached and taught the will of god to men , was in the beginning of the gospell ; was with god , that is , known onely to him ; was god , that is , a man in authority ; all things were made by him , that is , all things were established concerning man's reformation in order to heaven , &c. he was in the world , a great strange thing , how could he be out ? and the world was made by him , that is , intended to be reformed ; but , because so great things were spoken of him , to pluck down mens over-weening conceipt , he is said to be flesh ; could any man , that understand's these words , as they would have men , conceive he was other ? is there any thing , that is delivered in their pretense of the import of these words , that should endanger a man to think otherwise ? certainly no ; and therefore , throughout all that they have said , is a monstrous violence to gods word . well , now our exposition , which is most naturall to this text , will appear in its self ; the word , the inward word of god , which in its sense was eternall , was made flesh in time ; i know nothing of moment objected against this . sect. . but the impossibility that god should be made man , st●ll remaining god ; [ nothing ( say they ) is made another , but it ceaseth to be its self , when it is made that other ; so water , when by rarefaction it is made aire , ceaseth to be water , and the like ] so socinus upon this place , pag. . so smalcius cap. . refutationis libelli , &c. so often named , pag. and . to this we can answer , that although nothing can be made another , by mutation , but it ceaseth from its own being , yet it may by union ; so the soul and body united may make one person , but this they oppose , [ that by this union the body is not affirmed to be the soule , but animatum , a living creature , as we speak ; now the effect of this action is , that god must be man , the like predication is not in the world ] ( say they ) what then ? must not this be true ? there is but one sun , must there be more because there is but one ? that there is no more such , make's it seem the more divine ; the like , the equality of which is not to be found in the creatures ; and therefore , this ought not to be urged any further . yet , because they seeme unsatisfied without such an answer , although that is not like christians , give me leave to labour for some easy expressions , which thus i doe ; a piece of iron stands by , or in the fire , it get's heat and is made hot , which it was not before , and yet it remaine's iron still ; it is true , it is not caliditas , heat its selfe , but hot ; no more can we say that the divinity is the humanity , but god is man : the i●on is made hot ; yea , [ but ( say they ) here is an addition of an accident to a substance , a subject ; but in the case of god and man , here , you would have two substances united and made one ] i shall then philosophize higher then i have hitherto , and say , that in respect , of god , all substances to him are but as accidents to other subjects ; as accidents have a dependance upon the subject , so substances upon him , he is onely ens per se subsistens , the thing which hath its subsistence by its self , independing upon any other , all other substances like accidents live , move , and have their being in and by him ; so that substances are supported by him , accidents by substances ; and he may as well be made a man , as a body white , warme , cold , or the like ; for all substances having not their existence onely , but their manner of existing , depending upon him , as any accident hath its manner of existing depending upon a body , there is no reason , if he please to unite himself to any of them , why he may not doe it . smalcius urgeth another argument thus ; [ if the word be made flesh , one of these two will follow , either that the true word is not man , if it take the person of a man ; or else that there are two persons of the word and of man , and so two sons of god in christ , if he have either person ] to these i will answer apart , as they are two dividing members ; to the first ; the true word is man , though it lack the personality of a man , which is thus shewed ; personality is the modus , the manner of existing of a reasonable substance , the subsistence ; as inhaesion or dependance , is the manner of existing amongst accidents , so is subsistence with substances , and personality is that to reasonable substances ; now , as if god should suspend this last complement and addition to the existence of an accident , which i make no doubt of ( and am confident well may be proved , but will be granted ) then this accident should exist without its usuall and commoner way of being ; so , if god please to suspend this last usuall manner of subsisting by its self , from any substance , it would and might exist without it ; as we may conceive the body of man to be a being before the infusion of the soule , yea hath a subsistence of its selfe ; yet after and at that instant of the infusion of the soul , it receive's a new manner , which it had not before , and growe's a person , and exist's with and by it ; so may any man conceive that the man christ , united to the divinity , exist's not with a humane personality , but that more excellent of the word of god , the perfection and excellentest piece in every thing , giving the denomination to every thing . and yet , he is a man existing in the person of the divinity ; smalcius , in his urging this argument , insult's mightily ( saith he ) [ it is enquired whether it be a true man , which is not an humane person , ] i answer ; yes , it is a true man , and a person , but a divine p●rson , to be a man and a true man , is to have a reasonable soul and a body ; this he hath , although the manner of his existence be not terminated in this , but the divinity ; he goes on and urgeth [ that christ was conceived in the womb of the blessed virgin , a just time sustained there , and at the last borne , all which ( saith he ) pertaines to the constituting a person ] i answer , he was thus , although these had nothing to doe in the constitution of his person ; these were but the common producers of any individual humane nature , and so , by consequence , were accidents of ordinary personality , although they were undiscerned to work any thing , nay they could work nothing in his personality . to the second part of this distinction [ or else there must be two distinct persons , and so two sons ] that which hath been delivered is sufficient to answer , that there is but one son , and one person , as athanasius in his creed ; as the soul and body make one man so the divinity and humanity make one christ ; the soul and body have but one subsistence , when they are united , but , two , when they are severed ; so if the humanity had not been taken ken into the word , or should be left by it , there would be two distinct subsistences , and two distinct persons , but being , as they are , united , there is but one . sect. . he hath another objection , which he esteem's of very great force , pag. . which is thus framed : [ when the word is the same god with the father and the holy ghost , it should follow , if the word be made fl●sh , that the father and the holy ghost should be made fl●sh likewise , and so it would agree to the father and the holy ghost , to be conceived , born , dy , arise again , as well as to the son , because omnia opera , &c. all the outward works of the trinity are inseparable . ] for answer to this , i grant that axiome to be true , and so farre forth as there is any outward action , it is most true , that the whole trinity conspired in that act ; they all produced this man christ our saviour ; they all preserved him in his being ; but the humanity of our saviour was united onely to the word , which was his divinity , and this union was it by which he was made man , nor , in respect of it , can it be said , that that was an externall action , but a taking the humanity into unity with its s●lf ; for although the object be an externall thing , yet the act being internall , a reception , not an extramission , or working without upon it , it need be no more called an externall act , then god's knowledge of the creatures , whose object is externall , but the act internall ; for all that can be said of this , is , that this manhood is united to the word , which union may well be a work of the trinity , although terminated in the son ; as when a man tye's a knot , by which two points , or any other things are united , the union is wrought by the man , but terminated in these two ; so , though this unity is wrought by the trinity , yet it is terminated in the word and humanity , not in the other persons ; or , if you would have it closer , suppose a man should glew a ring to the midle joynt of his little finger , the man made this union , but it is onely united or terminated in that joynt ; nor can we imagine what outward work was terminated by that joynt . scotus to this purpose excellently : [ a point terminate●s a line , yet hath no outward work upon it ; one relation terminate's another , the son the father , yet hath no outward causation or work upon him ; this termination , which personality give 's to any individuall nature , give 's it onely a finition , and stint's it in these particular bounds , but hath no externall work upon it at all ; so that the father and the holy ghost produce all the outward work with the son , but the son onely is interested in the union , by being made flesh , &c. ] good reader , if my weak expressions have not rendred this high mystery lively to thy capacity , excuse me , i have done mine endeavour ; and since they labour with philosophicall tricks and nice ties , to ●ustian and amaze this discourse , i must crosse them in their own way , or else their triumph will be endlesse ; the truth is , these mysteries are revealed quòd sunt , that they are , and men ought to bel●eve that , and should go no farther ; but when witty men , with wicked reason , shall labour to lay stumbling-blocks of reason in our way to heaven , it becom's us to lay them aside , which i hope , by the assistance of that god ( whose glory i endeavour ) i have , and shall do . smalcius , where before cited , adde's great vaunts of this argument with most opprobrious terms , which i meddle not with as impertinent . sect. . but because he make's some queries , which he think 's , or seem's to think , are able to stumble a reader , being unanswerable , i shall , putting them down , endeavour to answer them ; although i may justly say , in cases of this nature , it is as true as in any , that a weak and silly man may ask more , then a learned man can answer . his first is ( potest ne fieri , can it be , that he , who is god , can do any thing , not as god , or in the nature of god ? ) this last phrase ( or in the nature of god ) seem's to me a strange exposition of that ( as god ) for quatenus ipsum , is not in the nature of the thing which act's , but according to the nature , or to act out of the principles of that nature ; now that may be done even by god in these outward acts of creating and governing the creature , which acts are not in , but out of his nature , although according to his nature ; i do not understand quatenus here in the strictest sense of logicians , for that which is reciprocall , but in a larger , as i expounded , it ; to the q●estion its self : i answer to it , as it seem's to be proposed , as if it were in generall , that nothing can act any thing which is not out of the principles of its nature ; for this , consider , socrates is a man , yet he can affect sensuall things , which he doth , not as a man , but as a beast , or a sensitive creature ; he groweth and the like , not as a man , that is , out of the principles of humanity , but as a vegetable ; again , socrates is a son , or a father , or both ; he doth many things as neither ; he doth many , being a son , and a man ; as a son out of the principles of sonship , not as man out of the principles of humanity ; so that when any thing hath a substantial essence and a relative , it may act out of the principles of that relative condition it hath , and not out of the essentiall nature it hath ; if he speak , as he doth , of the persons of the trinity , no doubt , but those personall actions and relations betwixt father , son and holy spirit , although done and acted in that essence , yet are not essentiall , but personall ; and for other acts , if any person assume any thing into a personal union with it , it may act by and in that united nature , that which it act 's , not according to his divine , that is , out of that principle ; thus may it eat , walk , and the like ; this ( because he still require's instances from the creature ) is evident out of them ; a man , when his hand is warmed by fire , or cooled by frost , can , by putting his hand to another , warm or cool another's hand , still being a m●n , he act's according to the condition of that quality , which is added to him , and not according to the principles of humanity . his second quere is [ can it be , that a divine person can be a divers thing from the divine nature ] i think , amongst a thousand which he may read , that have written about this businesse , who are orthodox , he can shew none that ever affirmed it it ; they say that the father , son and spirit are diverse persons , but not diverse things , diversus est filius , not diversum , a diverse person , not a diverse substance . his third and last quere is [ whether it may be , that there should be the same nature of all three persons , and yet , one of these persons acting something , the nature should not act that same thing ? ] he instances in the incarnation , birth , death , &c. of the son , which had the divine nature , and yet the father and the holy spirit , which had the same nature and essence numero , that is , in number , with the son , should not be incarnate , born , &c. ] to this , i conceive , i have spoken sufficiently already , where i have shewed , that one person can be incarnate , and not the other , which when it is granted , all the rest will follow , he may be conceived , born , dye , &c. in that nature which was united to him , although not in that of which he was a person ; which hath been a most catholick universally received truth , these thousand yeares and upward , in the christian world , and therefore ought , if refused , to be confuted with reasons , not with opposition onely of the authority of two or three men , by a plain denyall and no more . this is all , of any moment , that i find objected against the exposition of this place , which i hope i have satisfyed , and in it evinced , that our saviour is a person in the trinity , equall with the father , and distinct from the father . sect. . which being done , it must needs follow , that mr. hobbes was much too bold with him , when he said , he did personate the father ; which , as it is a language unheard-of in scripture , so it is impossible to be true , he being equall to him in all things , and co-acting with him whatsoever he did , in heaven or earth ; what he adde's [ that our saviour came to ●educe the jews , and induce all nations into the kingdom of his father , not as of himself , but as sent from his father ] was weakly affirmed , if not worse ; for although in that errand he was sent by the father , as he was man , yet he , with plenarity of power , did execute the same , as he was the son of god , and god united to that manhood ; of which i think to discourse more fully hereafter ; but in a word for the present , t●ke that onely one sentence of our saviour's , which is the latter part of the . verse of the . chapter of st. john ; as my father hath sent me , even so send i you ; this was spoken to his apostles ; here the father sent christ as man , to bear witnesse to the truth , john . . for this end was i born , and for this end came i into the world , that i should b●ar witnesse to the truth ; so did he command his apostles , matth. . , . goe teach all nations , or discipulize them , verse . teaching them to observe all thing whatsoever i have commanded you ; where we see that his authority sent them in the same errand that he was sent in himself ; then next , which is most pertinent to this purpose , in the . ver. of the same . of st. matth. he saith , all power is given me in heaven and in earth ; so if he did not give them such power or authority , where the greatest power is given , there the lesse is included , matth. . . he gave them power over unclean spirits , those are the greatest and most powerfull things in the world ; so likewise john . . whosesoever sins ye remit , they are remitted , &c. there the power of heaven and earth is both included ; and in none of these is that unworthy diminishing term added which mr. hobbes intrude's , ( not as of himself ) for , although , as man his authority is derivative , yet , as god , he gave these powers with authority immediately from himself , with no expression of any delegation to do it ; let this suffice , as at the present , for the examination of that speech of his ; concerning which i intend a farther indagation in a fuller discourse , which the opportunity of another errour will invite me to . chap. xxxiv . the holy ghost proved to be neither attribute , nor gospell , nor a mere gift ( as the socinians fancy ; ) but the third person in the holy trinity . sect. . and now , my next undertaking must be , to do as much for the holy spirit , which i shall endeavour to do exceeding briefly : and first , i will set down what mistakes have misguided the adversaries of this truth , and vindicating it from them , shall confirm the said truth with onely one argument which i conceive convincing of it . first then , the socinians deliver , that the holy ghost is an attribute of the deity , not a person ; that it is the vertue and power of god , by which he operate's and produceth those effects that are wrought amongst us , but not a distinct person from either the father or son ; ] to confute this , i shall produce that one place , luke . . and the holy ghost descended in a bodily shape like a dove upon him , and loe , a voice from heaven , which said , thou art my beloved son , in thee i am well pleased ; the story of this is evidently thus , our saviour was now baptized , and , being gone up , out of the water , as st. matth. . . he prayed , and then the holy spirit thus descended upon him ; that this was not the power of god , is evident , because , i think , no man can shew me a bare attribute of god represented or said to appear in a bodily shape , but a person or the essence ; and secondly , if there were an attribute expressed here by this bodily apparition , it could not be the power of god , that operating power , by which his wonderfull works are wrought , because the innocent unacting nature of a dove doth the least expresse that of any other , but , as erasmus most excellently paraphrase's upon the place , he shew's us here , that as the dove brought a● olive branch after the deluge to noah , in taken that the waters were asswaged , and the wrath of god pacifyed towards mankind ; so the holy spirit , after the baptisme of our saviour , by whose baptisme ours received a confirmation , if not an institution , by which , like as by the ark of no●h , we are delivered from the wrath of god ; the holy spirit appeared in the shape of that divine messenger before , and brought us comfort , that we shall be delivered as in the ark ; to which st. peter allude's . . . the like figure whereunto ( that is of the ark , spoken of in the . verse ) is baptisme ; well , by no meanes could it any way notify the power of god in this shape , but his kindness and meekness ; now likewise , that it is a distinct person from the other , is evident , because in this very verse , the other persons are not intimated onely , but expressed , the voice from heaven uttering these words , thou art my , &c. manifesting the father , and the person spoken to declaring the son. sect. . but i find another opinion amongst them , which is in the racovian catechisme , chapter . de christi prophetico munere , pag. . in that edition i use now , at racovia , . where the question being put , quid verò spiritus sanctus ? what is the holy ghost ? he answer 's , that first in the new testament the gospell of christ is designed by it ; the catechisme produceth two places of scripture to prove this by : the first , cor. . . but god hath revealed them , ( that is , the things which he hath prepared for them that love him ) unto us by his spirit , where , say those divines , the holy spirit is said to reveal the mysteries of godlinesse to god's servants ] the other is tim. . . where it is said , god hath brought life and immortality to light by the gospell ; [ now , say they , in this latter place , the gospell is said to do that which the spirit was said to act in the former ; therefore they are one . ] a most piteous argument : the fire , a candle , and the sun , make us see the same thing , therefore they three are one ; but more closely ; the internall light in mine eye , or whatsoever it is that fit 's the organ for discerning , and the externall light of the sun , which illuminate's the object , both make me perceive the same visible object , therefore , by their logick , they are one , which is absurd ; so is it with these two , the carnall or naturall man , of himself , cannot behold the things of the spirit , god therefore infuseth into him the holy ghost , by which he is enabled to discern these myster●es of godlinesse ; bue yet th● object lie's in the dark , the gospell therefore reveale's it unto them ; as the kingly prophet most punctually phras●th it , psalm . . in thy light we shall see light ; in the light of the spirit we shall see the light of the gospell ; and yet these two are very distinct ; nay my text confute's all ; for if there be any thing in this verse , which look's like the gospell , it is the words of the voice , thou art my beloved son , &c. the apparition of the holy ghost , in the likenesse of a dove , hath nothing to do with the gospell , therefore the spirit here cannot be taken for the gospell ; but they urge again , that it is called the gospell of the spirit , cor ▪ . i say , therefore it is not the spirit , it is the gospell of the spirit , because it reveale's the spirit unto us and spiritual mysteries ; but nothing is the same with that which it reveale's ; nay , if we say any thing is of another , we must in that imply , that it is not that other . sect. . but they goe farther , and say , that this phrase , the holy spirit , signifie's dei donum , which is given to certain men , and is called the earnest of our inheritance ; no doubt , and he cite's cor. . . as ephesians . . all this is granted , that the holy spirit is taken sometimes for the gifts , but by a metonymie , the cause for the effect ; but that it should never be taken for that divine person , we deny , and they cannot prove ; for , as st. paul dispute's the case at large , cor. . the gifts of the spirit are divers , but the same spirit , that third person of the trinity , is one ; so that although the spirit may be called by the name of those gifts which proceed from it , yet he is distinct from them , and here it is evident in my text , he was another thing besides them . this is all that i find objected ; and all this is confuted out of this , where the holy spirit is said to descend upon our saviour in the likeness of a dove , to which none of these extravagant expressions can be applyed . and now , there needs no more from scripture ; their great defiance to us , to produce reason for what we speak , may be defyed by us as unnecessary in a case of faith ; where we have scripture we must believe beyond , yea against reason ; the scripture hath been abundantly handled by diverse , although in these places , which i have handled , i have endeavoured to contribute something to the clearing of them ; the rationall laid aside by all almost , as an impossible work . sect. . i therefore will adore and admire that high mystery , and shall most humbly thank almighty god , that he hath pleased to reveal such a sacred truth to our faith , but then shall admire likewise his bounty to such men , whose souls and reason he hath awakened , by his spirit , to such a height , as that they have made their reason attend their faith and follow it , although non passibus aequis , yet come up to it , and discern that it is most rationall for a man to believe it is so ; what i have observed in this kind , and wherein i can enlarge the conceipt of others , and explain any thing by reason , i shall set down ( having this occasion ) and impart to the world , with all humility to more learned men and to adoration of the divine excellencies , which are not to be fathomed by man , quid sunt , what they are , although quòd sunt , that they are ; believing that they are by faith , humane reason may justly strive to prove them , and certainly it is a godly work , as impious to labour against it ; but i am discouraged mightily by the whole body of the school , who almost with one voice , thomist and scotist , cry out that it is impossible to be done . chap. xxxv . concerning god's enlarging the capacity of nature , and admitting reason to some discovery of the holy trinity ; of lullies demonstration by aequiparance ; whom the bishop magnifies and vindicate's against vasques , &c. the production of the son , and procession of the holy ghost , by the spiritual acts of the divine understanding and will. sect. . carthagena is so impudent , that he affirme's , impossibile est per dei potentiam fieri creaturam , cui sit naturalis cognitio mysterii trinitatis ; in thomam quaest. . art ▪ primo conclusione secunda . it is impossible that by the power of god , a creature should be made , to whom the knowledge of the trinity should be natural ; which , in my conceipt , is little lesse then blasphemy ; for why cannot ●od make a creature natural doe that which he can enable him to doe ? for these termes , naturall or supernatural , are only such , because god hath confined nature to such bounds as it cannot goe farther ; and exalted other things to such an height , as is ultra sphaeram activitatis , beyond the reach of that naturall arm to come at ; but , if it shall please god to enlarge the bounds of that nature , or draw the other neerer to it , it may then do that naturally , which before , without that enlargement , it could not doe ; as we see that fire cannot , with its heat , warme a thing which is far off , yet bring that body nee●er to the fire , or let the fire be made more intense , it can then doe it ; so can god make a creature●s understanding more intense and active , and , if he please , make that sun whose glorious light , in its self , we cannot behold , have such gentle clouds interposed , as may make us see him behind them , which in its self nakedly , without those cloudes , we could not ; so may god make himself discernable by such expressions as were fit for him , and kindly to us ; it is a mighty fault in the great wits frequently , that they will limit god's abilities to their own apprehensions , and because they cannot conceive how , therefore they will say he cannot doe it ; and , because naturall men , in this condition , cannot apprehend this , therefore god cannot make such a man ; and so this author , whilest he labour's to shew how divine excellencies transcend our capacities , he himselfe confine's god's infinite power to his owne fancy . but i say , i have almost all against my undertaking , and therefore , before i go , i will smooth the way , by disputing that question de possibilitate rei , whether it be possible to be proved or no. sect. . to understand which give me leave to preface somethings necessary to be preconceived ; first , we must know that there is a god ; that this god is of an infinite excellency , infinitely true , good , immense , eternal , &c. all which have a great consent among divines , that they may be proved by reason . secondly , consider with me that there is a great difference betwixt these two ; the man pretended able to prove this by naturall reason , who never heard nor apprehended it by faith ; and him who hath assented to it first by faith ; for the former hath no reason to enquire , or with industring to search , because those things of god onely concern him by which he is ruled , as his omnisciency , his justice , his providence , and the like ; but these internal excellencies which are onely in god , and onely work as one principle in the outward works , concerning the creation or government of the world , these he hath no occasion further to busie his soul about ; but then when they are revealed by faith , a contemplative soul ambitiously strive's how he may climb up to them by reason . these permitted , i shall undertake the question . sect. . the first opposer , i meet with , is that great father of the school , aquinas himself , who indeed hath spoken as fully as any of his followers ; his discourse is in prima parte quest. art. primo in corpore : i answer ( saith he ) it must be said , that it is impossible , by naturall reason , to come to the knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons ; for it is proved before ( which is quest. . art . in corpore ) that man , by naturall reason , cannot attaine to the knowledge of god by the creatures , but the creature induce's to the knowledge of god , as effects induce to the knowledge of the cause ; that therefore onely can be known of god , which is necessary to be affirmed of him , as he is the beginning and cause of the creatures , but the creative vertue of god is common to the whole trinity , therefore it appertaine's to the unity of the essence , not to the trinity of the persons . ( thus farre he , ) and this is the first of his arguments : i will answer them by degrees , one by one , for perspicuity sake . to this first i shall answer , that although the greatest part of knowledge is either drawn from the cause to the effect , or from the effect to the cause , and the first onely can be applyed to god , who hath no cause , and whose effects some way or other , all things are ; as from that one infinite being , god , yet raymund lully , whom i most honour , in this case , hath thought of other wayes of arguing , of as great force and convincing a man's understanding as these , to wit demonstratio per aequiparantiam , by the proportion and equality of things , and per similitudimem , by their likenesse , that by equiparance or equivalence he conceiveth to be , when by one or two of an equall excellencie an other quality is proved to be as excellent ; as thus ; because god is infinitely excellent , therefore he is infinitely knowing , infinitely good ; againe this argument from equivalence may be brought from the power to the acts , thus ; the act is proportioned to he power ; where is an infinite power , there is an infinite act ; where a finite power , there but a finite act ; now by these wayes i apprehend that a man may prove the trinity , although not by the effects of god in the creature , as effects . sect. . his second argument is , that to prove the trinity by reason were derogatory from faith , which is of things invisible , as it is heb. . now , saith he , if these things were proveable by reason , they were not unseene , that is of naturall understandings . to this i answer , that from the same inconvenience , the infinite creating power and act of creating were not proveable by reason , which is an article of our faith , and although we could not prove it , yet we must believe it , which both he and his followers agree to grant . secondly , i answer , that although these things of faith are unseen by mere naturall men , without all faith , yet when a man hath faith , then that light of faith , may shew him this or that thing of them , and his reason may afterwards likewise discern it ; for you may conceive a weight too heavy for a weak man to lift , yet when a stronger assist's him , he can doe it with him which before he could not without him ; or as you may see a weake-sighted man , by the help of his spectacles , reade's those words , which else he could not have read without them , yet having clearly read them with spectacles can after , by his weaker sight , reade them without , because the sense is in his head ; so a man who , by his own weake sight of his own reason , cannot lift such a burthen as the trinity , yet having the assistance of a stronger , his faith , he can then lift up his arme of reason , to beare it likewise ; so he that was forced to use spectacles assistants to his reason , whereby he might apprehend this mystery , yet having the sense of it in his head , by that , can afterwards read it by reason ; so , though these holy mysteries are invisi●le to mere naturall men , yet , when made apparent by faith , they may afterwards be discerned likewise by reason . another argument is , that it is unprofitable to faith , for ( saith he ) when men use reasons that are not convincing , they fall into the scorne of incredulous men , who think that our faith is built upon such reasons only ; i answer , this cannot be with such as i , who professe that my faith depend's upon the scripture , which is infallible , yet have lifted up my reason to work upon , and serve that faith. sect. . i thought to have examined trigosius and carthagena , but i find little in them which will not abundantly be satisfied in my following discourse ; i shall let them passe therefore , and for this instant , be contented with what hath been written ; onely let the reader observe , that truth is not opposed to any truth , the truth of faith , to the truth of reason , divine to humane , nor doth grace destroy , but perfect nature ; nor onely enlighten the soul to apprehend , but to see ; and enable's the reason to discern what else it could not . i have here observed divers authors undertaking this work , as first richardus de sancto victore in his third book de trinitate , cap. . , . then bonaventure , in . senten . disp. . but he had ill luck with his argument , for his own disciples forsake him here , as corialanus and trigosius , scotus likewise somewhat ; but all their discourses have been answered , i conceive , satisfactorily ; onely raymund lully , i think passeth unsatisfied , though undertaken by diverse ; i shall not doubt , therefore , with his assistance to make good my conclusions of reason , that there is a trinity of persons in the unity of essence , gabriel vasques , in . question . disput. . dispute's against lully , of whom he seem's to have read three books , one called apostrophe , another de demonstratione aquiparantiae ; and lib. sententiarum , i have no one of these , but three other , his ars magna , his ars parva , and his arbor scientiarum , and i may adde a fourth , bound with his arbor , called introductorium , which furnish me with all that he urgeth out of this author and much more for this purpose ; i deal with him first , because other school men seem to derive what they know of lully , from him , and never to have seen his books ; so that , what shall be satisfactorily spoken to him , will be sufficient for the rest . i cannot but commend this author for a noble enemy , because he speak's civilly of his adversary , which others do not , but raile at him , for an haeretick , with opprobrious words , but he vindicate's him from that unworthy judgment of aimericus a most censorious unjust inquisitor , in the fourth chapter of his former dispute , where he said , that raymund lully , thought these demonstrations might be made good against saracens ; i have not that particular passage in any of his books , but something like it , in his arbor scientiarum , in arbore apostolicali , cap. de numero divinali aeternali , at the latter end of that chapter , where he saith , that ( dominus papa & ejus fratres cardinales ) the lord pope and his brethren the cardinals should do well , if they would ordain certain holy men , devoted to dye for christ , and learned in the arabick or saracens language , who should goe and preach to the saracens , and dispute with them , shewing them the trinity , which christians believe , &c. and , at the last , by these means , the pope and cardinals would more exalt the catholick faith , then by sword or buckler , or any such like means ; ] so that , it seem's clearly , by this place , that he judged , as vasques relate's ; but more then this i shall tell you , that ( when ( it seem's ) he could not get the pope and cardinals to do it , or perhaps they could not find out those persons and devout men which he name's ) he himself did undertake that work as , hierome sanches , who writ his life , relates , and went amongst the turks , and did convert diverse of their masters , which ( saith he ) ipsi vocant alphochines , and being apprehended , the first time was whipped , banished , and dismissed in a ship , but being one of those devout men , who were resolved to dye for christ , he went again to bugis in tunis , where the moores had built schools for the education of youth in the liberall sciences , where he converted many of the wisest to christianity ; to be brief : the king caused him to be put into a loathsome prison , where , in hunger and nastinesse , he remained seven moneths , and then being produced and examined he professed himself a christian , and ready to dye for christ , upon which speech he was condemned to a cave , and there to be overwhelmed with stones ; which sentence his executioners acted most cruelly , leaving him , as they thought , dead ; but some merchants stole him away by night , and ship'd him , and , by contrary winds , he was driven to the baleares insulae , and dyed fourscore years old , in the year of the lord ▪ . now let bernard , lathenburgensis , petrus gallisardus , aymericus , faber faventinus , with other his flanderers , shew me any amongst them of more christian excellency and piety , in that age , then this man , whom they call haeretick ; i dare hardly say , if he were an haeretick , ( nothing like which i see in his books ) yet that love which doth , with god , hide a multitude of faults , ought to conceal likewise his faults with men , and this love and charity towards god , of his , might excuse almost any thing ; this baptismus flaminis , as the schools call it , this tryall by fire , as st. peter . but so much for the defence of my author , to whom i confesse my self much beholden ; now to the argument which i undertake to defend . sect. . vasques put 's raymund's undertaking to consist of three propositions ; first , that there are diverse persons in the trinity ; secondly , that they are no more , nor no lesse , then three ; thirdly , that these are the father , son and holy spirit . vasques likewise saith , that raymundus undertake's to prove these per demonstrationes aequiparantiae ; and he expound's it right , what that aequiparance is , according to one branch , which is the equivalence of the things ; but he left out the other , which i set down before , that is , the equivalence betwixt the power and the effect ; next he come's to his particular argument , his first is ( saith he ) where is concord there is plurality , but in the divine goodness there is concord , therefore there is plurality . the major ( saith vasques ) he leave 's unproved , but his minor he prove's thus ; where is an act , there is concord betwixt the agent and the thing produced , but , in the divine goodness there is an act , which is bonificare , to make good , therefore , there is concord . and then vasques produceth another argument of the s●me nature ; wheresoever is equality , there is a distinction between the two equalls , but in the divine goodness there is an equality ( to wit , betwixt the good thing it self and that which is made good ) therefore there is distinction ; to this he answer's . these are not demonstrations , because they suppose that which is not to be granted by reason , nor evident , but by faith , which is , that there is a reall act in god , which should be by production ( that is ( i think ) should produce an effect ) for ( saith he ) although it may be proved by n●turall reason , that god doth understand and will , and so in god is an act and operation ; yet by no certain demonstration , can it be proved , that he should so understand and will , that these acts should produce ; and unlesse faith did teach us this , we should say , that these acts are his substance , not operations , and are onely conceived of us as operation . this is his first answer , to which i shall reply , that , although i am perswaded that that learned jesuite had found no such th●ng in the books he had read of lully's , yet i have found , in those i have with me , an ample proof of that proposition , which he affirm's can●o● be set out by reason , which is , that there is a reall act , which must be a production ; for which first i shall cite his arbor quaestionalis , de quaestionibus dignitatis dei , where the question is put , ut●um productio si● in deo , whether there be any production in god ; his solutio is , if there be no production in god , then omnes rationes , all his [ reasons ] is the word , ( but i may call them ( as he doth elsewhere ) all the formes , all such things , as we affirme knowingly to be in god ) should be idle in an infinite extension and infinite duration ; give me leave , reader , to explain this , for it is a reigning disease amongst great artists , that in high notions they do impose new terms , which do amaze a reader ; but more pardonable in him , who , having run through all arts and sciences , write's them for his own scholars , which , he supposeth , understand his language ; to explain him then , as well as i can , to such as are not acquainted with his books , the sense is this ; if in god should be no production , then all his attributes were uselesse in an infinite extension of place , and an infinite duration of time ; i use these terms , although god's immensity infinitely exceed's place , his eternity all time ; and the reason of this may be , because we conceive a most unlimited nothing beyond this world , and most unconceiveable eternity , when this world was not , and shall not be ; now ( saith he ) if there should be no internall production in god , there would be an infinite vacuity , in which was no production , and an infinite time , in which there was none ; and then , in all that vacuity and duration , god were idle , and produced nothing , which were little less then blasphemy for a naturall man to say ; for he observe's that there is nothing unactive in the whole beings of nature ; and the more excellent any thing is , the higher it growe's in action , and the more noble the effects ; it must be so in god then , unlesse we conceive something unworthily of him . this i apprehend to be the summe of that argument ; but he turne 's me to the dignities , and flowers of his arbor divinalis ; for the dignities i find reckoned god's goodness and greatness , which we call his immensity , his eternity , &c. new ( saith he ) all these have their effects ; his goodnesse produceth that which is good ; his immensity that which is such ; his eternity the like , &c. in all his other dignities ; and all these being essential●y in god , yea god , as he speak's often , there is necessity that either eternally he must produce somewhat , or be idle ; thus , i think , i have made good this proposition against vasques his first answer ; that there must be some effect produced ; but he hath another answer . sest . . againe ( saith he ) his reason to prove that there is an act of production in god , is because he is bonificativum , bonificare & bonificabile , that is , making good , and the act to make good , and the thing made good ; this ( saith he ) is frivolous , for ( saith he ) this act is not that which faith teacheth to be the production of a person , and a rationall operation , but it is a certaine act not of an efficient or producing cause , but of a formall cause , as we say , whiteness make's a thing white . by his leave , first , i find he hath reade more in lully his arguments then he set down , or else he could not have urged this now , for proofe of that which ( he said ) before he left unproved ; secondly , the proposition to be proved was not , that there was a production of a person , for that was the conclusion before to be proved , and this , that there was a reall production , was the medium from whence that will follow ; for , if there be an eternall production , it must be another essence , or an other person ; the first is impossible , therefore the second must be ; and then lastly i answer , that bonification , as making good , is not onely taken for a forme , but an efficient cause , which may be thus proved , first from god's goodnesse , and the infinite excellency of it ; now goodnesse , in its own nature , is communicative , in morality ; a good rich man give 's more then a poor good man ; a good wise man communicate's his wisdome , &c. in nature it is an excellence of fire not onely that it is warm in it selfe , but that it communicate's this warmth to other things ; of the sun , not onely that it is light , but that it doth enlighten ; of any thing , that it is good , and that it doth communicate that goodnesse ; so then , see if nature doe not teach us , that , if god be an infinite good , he must communicate and produce an infinite good ; thus may we discourse from his infinite power ; if good and powerfull both , then why should he not produce some infinite effect that is infinitely good ? for else his power should be without an act proportionable ; let no man talk of this world , this was made in time , and there would have been an infinite duration without it , or that he might make other works before it , they must be all in time ; besides that , they are finite things ▪ which doe not , cannot extend themselves to the expression of such an infinite excellencie ; and then , let me urge from that other medium aequiparantiae , before spoken of : powers are known by their act , and by their object ; all the world acknowledgeth god to have an infinite power ; where is the infinite act the infinite production ? and then conceiving that this infinite goodnesse and power are eternall , this production must needs be such if at all , because else there would be a duration in which this power were not produced into act , in which this goodnesse produced no good . thus far i think i have vindicated lully and the conclusion , out of invincible reason , that there is a plurality of persons , it must needs be that god eternally produced some infinitely good eff●ct , which , because it canno● be another essentiall god , must be another person ; if you would have thi● discourse drawn into a perfect syllogisme , take it thus : that which is infinite in power , goodnesse , immensity , eternity , perfection , must produce such an effect eternally ; but god is infinite in power , &c. therefore god must produce an effect correspondent . the major onely needs proofe ; the minor is granted even by saracens : and i prove the major thus ; that eternall thing , whose power can never be idle , must produce an effect correspondent to it selfe eternally ; but that which is infinite in power , goodness , and the like , is such a thing which can never be idle ; therefore it must produce such an effect eternally . the major is evident , because , if it be eternall , and never idle , it must produce something , or else its act is in vaine ; and it being infinite , it must produce an infinite effect , or else the infinity is idle ; we see fire , or every thing else , the more intense it is , the greater effect it produceth ; and thence climb up by degrees to infinite , we shall find that infinite must needs produce an infinite effect . i will only then prove the minor thus . that which is infinitely perfect must not onely have a lazy power which doth nothing ( for that is an infirmity for a power not to act ) but must worke accordingly . but god is infinitely perfect ( as is granted by all even saracens ) therefore he must not have this power idle and act nothing . let any man enquire , why any power doth not work , it must needes be answered , because the agent cannot , or will not ; to say god cannot , is to deny the infinity of his power , for that power is not infinite , which can be restrained ; and to say he will not , doth both destroy his goodnesse and perfection ; his goodnesse , because goodness is diffusive , it is no● goodness else ; and infinite goodness must be infinitely d●ffusive : his perfection , because it is a greater perfection , to be , and worke accordingly , then to be , onely ; he therefore must needs act this infinitely excellent work eternally ; and for my part , i see no reason why a man may not think , that lully , upon such grounds as this , might convert to this first foundation of the trinity , that god the father did eternally produce an infinitely excellent work like himselfe . i have considered with my self what may logically be objected against this , and i find nothing of moment , but that angels do not , cannot produce such an effect , which are the creatures the nearest and likest to god of any ; and my answer is , that they doe not , because they cannot ; and they cannot , because they have limited natures which are confined ; but god is infinite , without limitation ; if they could ▪ they would ; but all things that are amongst us , which have vestigia dei , the footsteps of god , doe teach us this , and therefore by reason we ought to think so of god ; this may suffice for the first conclusion , that there are diverse persons in the god head , to wit one person generating or producing , and another generated or produced . sect. . the second conclusion , which vasques charge's raymund lully with , is , that he will prove by reason , that there are three persons ; which is in his second chapter of his . disp. where before ; he produceth raymund's argument , i am perswaded , truly according to these books he read of his ; and he give 's satisfactory answers to what he produceth out of lully ; i will not tire the reader with what one or the other speak's there , be●cause i build not upon those grounds expressed in that chap. but upon others , which i shall produce out of raymund lully in those books i have of his . it is granted by all the schools , and all that have written any theology , whether out of scripture or reason , that god is infinite and without composition , most single and one ; that in him , not as an accident is in a subject , but modo eminentiori , after some divine manner , transcending our capacities , is both understanding and will ; these being in him , or rather being himself , must be infinite . this is the first foundation upon which i build , and it is a rock which hitherto hath been shaken with no winds of opposition . the second is like unto it : that since there is a production by god , who is most single and one most spiritual , this production must be by some spiritual not corporeal faculty ; and these are but those two other formerly spoken of , understanding and will ; the unders●anding of god must be infinite , and that infinite understanding must be fitted with an infinite object ; for , unless it be infinite , it cannot be divine , because whatsoever is divine is infinite ; an infinite object it must have , because else an infinite faculty should be in vain , at the least in degrees , that is , it should not have an equal object to imploy it self about ; this infinite object can be none but himself ; for as whatsoever is god must needs be infinite , so whatsoever is infinite must needs be god. they are converted ; now then thus i argue : god must needs know himself infinitely , eternally ; or else there would be some duration or nunc in which he did not know himself ; this knowledge of himself produceth his internal word , as i have spoken heretofore , that is , the conceipt , the expression of himself ; it must needs be so ; for whatsoever is understood hath , at that instant in which it is understood , an express image or character of it self , in that understanding which apprehend's it ; well then , it must necessarily be , that god understanding himself eternally must needs have the expression of himself fully , wholly , with all his infinite perfections which belong to him ; but now because in men and angels , which have a composition in their essence , yea of substance and accident , there their actual understanding is an act , that word , or image , or character , which is produced by that act , is another in●entional accident ; but in god it cannot be so , he hath no composition , he is made up of nothing , but is purely himself ; his act of understanding is substantial , his word is substantial , all the same with himself , all divine , all god ; therefore this product of this act of his understanding must be god , god of god , yet another person ; the same person cannot be the producer and the produced , nor this produced be other then the same essence with the producer , for it must be infinite , have all the attributes the producer hath , or else it is not a complete understanding , it will be short in somewhat . nay , i remember lully , where before cited , saith , because god is one , and every form ( as he call's them ) must be operative , even his unitas must be communicated , and unio must have uni●e ( he mean's unif●cere ) must make one , as well as be one : ( but of this more hereafter . ) but if it have all , it must have the deity , which in essence can be but one ; thus we may conceive the production , which is before spoken of , to be the word of god , as st. john , the character or express image of his person , as st. paul heb. . . for nothing can be a more express image of another then that which is the word of it , for that , if it be a true word , fully expresse's the being of it . and hitherto , i think , i have shewed the manner of this production to be most rational , as the scripture hath steered and guided me . the wise men , who came to worship our saviour at his birth , found him , but could never have thought upon seeking him , much less of seeking him in a stable in bethlehem , but that a star guided them : it is somewhat like these men with me ; i hope i have , by the guidance of the glorious light of the scripture , found this word , which without that light i should never have done ; and in this journey i have trod these steps ; i have shewed , that such an infinite perfection , as god is , cannot chuse but produce something correspondent to that infinite excellency : i have shewed that this must be done by a spiritual act , which in the first place is his understanding : how this is the place which this star-light of the scripture direct's us to : now i go about another work , which could not be raised but upon this foundation . sect. . it appearing , that there are two spiritual faculties , understanding and will , there is no reason to think , that the understanding , which is most given to contemplation , should be more fruitful then the will , which is in its own nature most active ; let us therefore consider the producent and the product , him that understand's , and that word , which is the product of that understanding , to be two distinct , with equal infinite excellencies , and all those perfections , which are in the producer , to be in that which is produced , those perfections infinite , it is not possible but that these must infinitely love one the other ; for a right ▪ well-guided will must needs affect with love that which is excellent and lovely , and so affect it , with such a proportion of love as the object is lovely ; therefore that which is infinitely lovely must needs be infinitely loved ; we men should love god infinitely , if the vessels of our souls could contain so great a proportion of that heavenly oile of charity , the object god deserve's it ; but either of these , being vessels infinite , cannot be deficient for lack of love , but can have as much love as the object is lovely , which is infinite ; well then , it must needs be , that these two , the producer and the produced , must love one another infinitely , and delight infinitely in one another , the father in such a son , the son in such a father ; this love , with which they affect one another , cannot be an accident , there is none such in god , it must be a substance therefore ; nor can it be another substance from the deity , both because nothing is infinite but the one onely true god , and likewise because there is no composition , either accidental or substantial in god , but whatsoever is in god is god ; this therefore must be such , so that the first production being granted , that there are two persons , a producing person and a produced , both infinitely excellent , it must follow that there must be a third . sect. . but now , why no more , may be asked , and my answer is , that those two faculties act infinitely , according to their manner of acts , and having acted infinitely , it is not possible to conceive that there should be any progresse beyond that which is infinite , and therefore one word infinitely produced by the understanding in an infinite perfection ; one love likewise proceeding infinitely from these which are infinite ; in other acts of men , or angels , multitude make's addition , because they are finite ; but in these , they would argue an imperfection , as if there were not enough acted before , these three therefore , and no more . if you desire this in a logicall form : an infinite product cannot be other then a person of the trinity ; but the product of that infinite love betwixt these two persons is an infinite product , therefore that must be a person of the trinity . the major in this syllogisme stand's upon its 〈◊〉 legs , for if it be infinite it must be god , if it be god , either essentially or personally , not essentially , because the essence of god can no way be truly said to be produced , being the fountain of all production , therefore it must be taken personally , that a person is produced ; the minor will be proved most certain ▪ that product , which is equal to that which is infinite , is infinite ; but the product of the love of these two infinite persons is equall to that is infinite , therefore , &c. the major is clear , because what is equall to that is infinite , must be infinite ▪ or else it is not equall ; the minor is thus proved ; where the object loved is infinite , and the lover infinite , there the product of that love must be proportioned ; but it is so here , the divine excellencies for the object , and the divine persons the lovers or the agents ; therefore it is not possible for a a man to conceive it other , then that it must be infinite , and another person from the other two , for the same cannot be the producer and produced in respect of the same ; another infinite essence it cannot be , it must therefore be another person . sect. . but i know it is often objected here by the assertors of the greek church ; it cannot be , that the product of these two agents should be one and the same person , since it come's from two , no more then two heates proceeding from two fires should be one . i will not here debate school-niceties , which i abhorre in such mysteries as these , where a man cannot speak truth but with danger , as st. augustine somewhere ; but i could tell you of many school-men , and those most learned , that affirm , although this love come from two persons , yet it is , as they are , one and the same essence ; but i dread to teach any thing unrevealed by the scripture , as it is expounded by the catholick church , and that is , that the holy ghost , which is but one , proceeded from both persons ; the manner i dare not pry into , which is unrevealed , and therefore , for answer , say , that as you may see two fires or candles ( if you will ) whilest severed , produce two heates , two lights , yet joyn these two fires or two candles together , they are but one , though more intense ; yea conceive them a little severed , when and where they meet in their operations with their heat or light , they unite in that quality , and in the product , the effect , they produce in the object , so it is with these ; they proceed from two persons united in the same essence ; they affect the same object , the same divine perfections , and these two affections joyn together in one holy and divine flame of love , complacence , joy , and unspeakable happiness , one in each other , which , being the fulness of infinite happiness , cannot be other then one and the same . thus , methinks , although we affirm love to proceed from these two persons as two persons , yet we may well apprehend how they may , in this substantial act , be onely one . and now , i hope , i have finished this second undertaking ; that those persons are three , the first person that speak's this internal word , the second the word that is spoken , the third this infinite love , joy , delight , comfort , that these two have one in another ; more cannot be imagined , because we can find but two spiritual faculties in the divine essence , by which it can produce any thing , that is , understanding and will ; and in this notion they have both an infinite production , which is the furthest any operation can extend it self ; and therefore though consequent productions of creation may be like sparks of the same fire , afterwards produced to give god an external glory , yet no other internal operation , which is infinite , but these two . and now i may apply my self to the third proposition , that these three persons are the father , the son , and the holy spirit . sect. . first , for the father and the son , these two relatives cannot be one without the other ; and it is evident , out of that which hath been said , that the producer and produced must be father and son ; for although , perhaps , we cannot properly say , that when fire produceth its like , that product is the son of the fire ; nor , perhaps , when we see a plant or beast do it , can we say , that that product is a son ; yet when we see any thing , that is rational , do it , we may most properly say , that it is the producer's son ; now , that god is such , can be no question , therefore in this production there is a father , and a son ; for god being most spiritual , we must expect onely a pure spiritual propagation , which can be conceived no way so ●itly , as by the understanding , nor indeed is possible ; and here , in this expression , we find all those notions , in which the same is delivered to us in scripture , to be clearly evident , as that he is the word , the internal word of god , the image of god ; no image so clear as that which is drawn in the word of any thing , the internal word fully expressing that of which it is the word ; so likewise the wisdom of god , because it is the relict of divine knowledge , because it is the highest principle and first fountain of all other beings ; and for the third person , the doubt can onely be whether he is holy , or whether a person ; and indeed there can be no doubt of either , because he is god , and then he must be most spiritual , and most holy . so that that . proposition is as clear as the former , that these persons are the father , son and holy spirit : i thought to have vindicated raymund lully from faber faventinus , who , being a scotist , i thought in his natural theology had written something various from vasques , but he deserve's pity , having no knowledge of lully but by vasques , and , what is worse , when vasques excuseth lully from that opprobrious scandal of being an heretick , he , who knew nothing of him , but in vasques , fall's upon him with that foul and disgraceful term , and endeavour's not to answer vasques his vindication of him . sect. . it may be justly enquired now , why we should call these three persons , since they are not so termed in scripture . this question was debated by s. augustine long ago , in his . book de trinitate , cap. . and , methink's , satisfactorily , in the which he hath these passages ; first , since the father is god , the son god , and the holy ghost god , why are there not three gods ? he that saith the scripture doth not call them three gods , and therefore he dare's not , answer's himself , for neither doth the scripture call them three persons . he had shewed before , that the scripture saith , that there is one god , and that these three are called god ; but as he had shewed , that although the scripture doth not say , that there is one essence of god , yet we believe confidently , there is but one essence ; so may we do of these persons ; take this phrase , propterea licuit , disputandi necessitate , tres personas dicere , non quia scriptura dicit , sed quia scriptura non contradicit : he saith , that the necessity of disputation make's a man say something , which is not against scripture , in this point ; and that is enough , for if the scripture express that there are three , and that loquendi causâ ( as he speak's at the beginning of that chapter ) de ineffabilibus ●ari aliquo modo possumus quod ●ffa i nullo modo p●ssumus ; that ( saith he ) we may say somewhat of these unspeakable things , which we cannot clearly speak out in full and significant terms , we speak thus : and again in the same chap. excedit supereminentia divinitatis usitati eloquii facultatem ; verius enim cogitatur deus , quàm dicitur ; & ve●ius est , quàm cogitatur ; the result of which is this , that the thoughts of man are short of the divine perfections , and the language of man short of his thoughts ; because our language being formed to our usual business , which we converse about , all which are excelled infinitely by the divine perfections , they must be short in their expressions of those divine excellencies : and therefore again that most excellent and learned man in the same chap. quid igitur restat , nisi ut fateamur loquendi necessitate parta haec vocabula ? and indeed they are the most significant which can be found out ; for since we conceive that this term person is the last actuality and addition which can be made to any reasonable substance , it may most justly be applied to this of the trinity and each distinct suppositum thereof ; but still with this reservation , that the divine things are ineffable and not fully to be conceived , much less expressed by us ; say god's essence is thus , or thus , we may ; but to say , that that language , whatsoever it be , doth fully express his essence , or being , is a presumption in any man ; and the like , and no otherwise , of these personalities , it is the nearest expression man can make , and let us be contented with it . a second question may be , whether this personal distinction in the trinity be a main and great difference , or some little and inconsiderable thing : for answer to this , my humility and adoration of the divine persons is such , that i dare affirm positively nothing in the world , which is not expressed in the holy scripture ; a relation we are sure there is , by which the one is signified to us and not the other , as the father , the son , and the holy spirit proceeding from them , which spiration signifie's a procession , which always involve's a person proceeded , and a person from whence it proceeded ; and these relations must needs be founded in some substance ; when we consider them in god , who hath no accident , but what difference is in that foundation the scripture is silent , i am at a maze , whether infinite , bccause whatsoever is in god is infinite , and therefore some may conceive it such ; but then they must make the unity in god infinite likewise , because that is most primarily affirmed in him , and yet both may be in him , though they seem impossible in us , whose perfections excell our thoughts , as much as these irreconciliable things amount unto ; and therefore here i could , with mr. hobbes , declaim bitterly against the school , who so boldly intrude their busy wits into the unsearchable things of god , by rashly , according to their imagination , determining twenty , yea an hundred , things about the trinity , which god hath not revealed , and yet lazily sitting still , and not endeavouring to make their understandings mount up to those things which god hath revealed ; it is a most vertuous industry in man , to make his reason wait upon faith as close as it can ; but it is an effect of a most busy and presumptuous undertaking , to adventure to pry into that ark , which god hath concealed and hid ; as i have attempted the one , so i have abstained from the other . sect. . but yet , perhaps , i may be censured for undertaking to handle this question by reason , which hath been so generally denyed by the school ; to which i have already given an answer ; but farther ; although the generality of the school have deserted this debate , yet many men of high learning have undertaken it , as not onely the mighty lully , but that learned cusanus in two books of his de visione dei , cap. . and . as likewise de cribratione alchoran , lib. . cap. . usque ad . & aliis locis ; so likewise raymundus de sabu●di in his theologia naturalis , cap. . & sequentibus , dionysius carthusianus de fide catholicâ , lib. ▪ petrus pasnonie●sis i● his decisiones theologica speculativae & morales , lib. . cap. . quaest . . conclusione . who think his and scotus his reason in that place unanswerable ; some things likewise in richardus de sancto victore and others , by reading of which author 's a man may discern what i have excerpted , and what added . but yet i may seem to have neglected antiquity in seldom or never quoting the fathers ; for this i can give divers reasons ; first , my genius doth detest that foolish ostentation ; and secondly , the use of it is unnecessary in this controversy , where neither mr. hobbes , nor the socinians , with whom i have to do , make any esteem of that argument from such authority ; and thirdly , besides that it hath been long since laboriously done by the mighty industry of bernardus paxillus de buzezeb , concerning the first four centuries ( whether he went further i know not ) which is enough in this controversy , the latter ages having been secured from these questions by the decrees of councills , and harmony of the universall church consenting with them , untill ochinus , or socinus , unhapp●ly awaked them againe . reader , once before i printed my observations upon , , . chapters of this book , then , when it was in the press , i found one argument , which i had urged in the matter of religion , opposed in another book by mr. hobbes , which became me to satisfie , the false printing of that make's me reprint it now ; and when that , and the rest , were ready for the printer , i find now again a latine book printed at amsterdam , entituled , epistolica dissertatio de principiis justi & decori , continens apologiam pro tractatu clarissimi hobbaei de cive , wherein are divers things contrary to that which i have observed upon his . and . chap. and therefore in the second edition conceive my self bound to vindicate my d●scourse from what is objected against it , which i here endeavour . chap. xxxvi . concerning preservation of life , and preference of publick interest . of faculties , passions , and parts subservient to the guidance of reason . particular men can have no universall right being limited in their proprieties and pretenses . the danger of allowing it , and not allowing the right of occupancy . sect. . in the . page of this treatise he supposeth a god , which i like well ; and that he created the world in wisdom ; and that he will exercise the vertues of justice , and truth in the government of it ; these are well supposed ; he draw's from hence , that god proposed to himself some end in this creation , ( i will dispute nothing which may be granted ) to which some fitting meanes are disposed . secondly , that those means in themselves ought to have an aptitude to the procuring that end . and thirdly , that a man shall be blessed , or punished , according as he useth or neglect's these means ; these are in the . and . pages . then in the . page he deduceth , that that , whatsoever in its own nature hinder's the attaining that end , which was intended by nature , is forbidden ; as likewise , whatsoever is in its own nature so disposed , as without it the end intended by nature cannot be attained , this is commanded . again he saith , that there are many things which , not from their own nature , but from outward circumstances do acquire the fitness or opposition to the end , and these are permitted by the law of nature , and of such consist's the laws of men . this pag. . these are the chief aphorisms , out of which he draw's his whole discourse ; and , not to trouble the reader with any unnecessary quarrells , i will come to the application of these generalls , which we may find page . and not meddle with any of these rules , unless some urgent occasion make's me look back upon them ; in that . page he thus discourseth ; i contemplating my self as part of the world , it must needs be that not by chance , but by the counsell of the most prudent and wise god , i am brought forth . this was an excellent foundation to build upon , but , to consider what i shall observe hereafter the better , remember that he contemplated himself , not onely in relation to himself , but as part of the world ; we must therefore , saith he , examine what god would have done by me ; a noble quaere , but remember , that this must be here made by the word of god or scripture ( which he fore-warned us of before ) but by the rules of right reason , what they should do who have read no scripture nor can ; but have these principles only , that there is a god , a governour of the world , who will punish evill , and reward vertue . i will go on with him . sect. . that ( saith he ) without doubt , god would have conserved in me which , if it be taken away , he had in vain given me certain partes and proprieties ; there is a truth in that proposition , but we must consider this phrase , god would have conserved in me ; i suppose he means by me ; else if he mean it absolutely , without doubt god intend's by the fabrick of man , and many times by his justice upon wicked men , not to conserve that man to whom he hath given many parts and proprieties , for no other purpose then to preserve his life . secondly , if he take it , as i think he doth ( for a conservation by that man himself ) it will be so farre true only , that a man must preserve that life , that being , in order to which those parts and proprieties were aimed , untill some greater good then that , at which those parts were directed , shall arise out of the neglect of it ; and this will be made good out of that contemplation of his upon himself as part of the world ; now a part must be lost rather then the whole , a hand then a man , a finger then a hand , and so in all relation of parts one upon another . sect. . he goe's on page . above all things i find in my self a mighty study ( summum studium is his phrase ) his chief and principall study of keeping himself safe and sound , as we may speak , salvum & incolumem are his words . i believe him , he would never else have writ this book ; but although he do so , yet all men do not ; for although there is in every man , in every thing , a desire of being , yet some beings , to some men , are surrounded with so many incommodities and troubles , that it is better not to be , then to be such . i have treated of this in my censures upon the fourteenth chapter of mr. hobbes's his leviathan , and in that handled his book de corpore politico ; but because the language of this gentleman doth vary from mr. hobbes , and therefore those expressions made there may not be applicable so perfectly to him , i shall turn my self to this discourse before me . to this study , saith he , do serve the appetites of eating and drinking , of revenge , the effects of love and grief , and , to conclude , all the passions of the soul , and the whole fabrick of the body . yet , for all this , a beast , if he could speak , might say as much for himself as this is ( as i have shewed before , ) and it were strange if man's parts and faculties had no higher a design then a beast's have ; in the universe they , and all the rest , were made subservient to man in this great world , and in this little world , man , no doubt , but they are framed so likewise to be serviceable to that which is humane ; and as god hath made man a ruler over them , so those humane parts of reason and will to govern these beastly sensuall affections ; and , it is as unseemingly , yea unnaturall , for a man's reason to subject it self to those passions and sensuall desires , as for a beast to govern a man. you may observe a goodly room in a house , the timber , stones , gilding , or whatsoever adorne's it , are all made and contrived for the necessity or beautifying that room ; yet it may hap , that afterwards that may be discerned to be unuseful , yea hurtfull , to that house ; that room must be plucked down , yea the house it self , when it shall offend the street it stand's in , and the street , if noisome to the city , to which it belong's ; alwayes the lesser good , and privater interest , must submit to the greater and more publick benefit ; so must it be with man and these parts , they are usefull to this man , this man to the city , that city to the kingdom ; when we see these parts disposed to the advance and preservation of man's life , we know man's life must be cared for , but not when a more publick end of the city , in which he live's , shall be prejudiced or hurt by it , and to this end indeed god hath given man reason , by which he may master his private and particular desires , and rule and direct them to their more publick end , so that then , in a logicall discourse , we see his reason answered which was thus ; that which hath so many passions , appetites , bodily parts subservient to it , must be preserved ; but the life of man , &c. ergo . you may discern the answer ou● of that hath been already set down , that as those passions , &c. are in themselves usefull to man's life , so man's life is usefull to that city or society where he live's ; and as these passions are to be refrain'd and kept under from ruling men's actions , when they , or either of them , are hurtfull to man's life , unto which in their creation they were disposed ; so man's life its self is not to be desired , but to be laid aside , when it is useless or hurtfull to that society , or farther end , to which it was intended ; this , with what hath been delivered against mr hobbes his . and . chapters , i think abundantly sufficient for answer to this argument of his ; i will pass over many loose buildings , which he hath raised upon this weak foundation , but concern not me , and come now to page . where he enter's upon another conclusion of mr. hobbes , which i have opposed in my piece upon the . chapter of leviathan ; and he begin's thus . sect. . since god hath commended to me the integrity of my life and members , neither can i for a little while preserve this life and breath without the use of means , it followeth , god hath granted me a right to such means , without which my life cannot be safe , for qui dat jus ad finem dat jus ad media ; he , who give 's a right to the end , give 's a right to the means . ] i am confident i have confu●ed his application of this rule , and expounded the right sense of it , when before i writ of this very businesse , which was obtruded by mr. hobbes in diverse things ; but yet , for farther satisfaction , know that the right to the means is onely out of that relation they have to the end ; if the end it self be not usefull , much lesse the means ; yea if obtaining that ●nd , by such means , doth more hurt then good , those means are not to be used ; take an instance ; a thirsty man desire's drink to quench his thirst , yet , if his physician find that that drink will increase his fever , he must not drink , the quenching his thirst , by such means , is worse then his thirst ; so to preserve my life , by such means as do more harm then my life good , is not to be done ; of which kind there may be many , had this been urged for the whole species of mankind , which is of so high a concernment in the fabrick of the world , that the design of the whole relate's to it , then his argument had carryed with it such a force as could not easily have been resisted ; but when it point's at particulars , which are inconsiderable parts of the whole , the preservation of such is not to be husbanded against any publick detriment . sect. . out of this he draw's the axiome , the right of possession , and use of those things belong's to me , which soever can yield me profit to the obtaining the end of those things that , i have said above , god require's ; but when i may judge in a right and uncorrupted judgment , all the creatures in the world can afford me that use ; therefore i have a right to all . thus farre he , whom i could well guesse to be one of mr. hobbes his disciples by his manner of arguing ; this he make's a syllogisme , but there is not one proposition which hath a logicall form , nor is there a strong connexion of one with another . his axiome , or major , is false , because he supposeth man , particular man , to be the end of all the world . for else how can the disposure of them to that end ( a particular man's advantage ) entitle a man to have right unto them ; had this been affirmed by adam , or noah , there had been some reasons for it , because they had a right to each piece of the whole world ; or had it been affirmed of mankind , the species of man , it had a truth in it , because the world is ordered to the service of that species ; but when applyed to any particular of that species , on any other sons of these fathers of the world , it is of no force , for they have onely right to , and can onely make use of their shares and particular proportions , which are distributed to them by the law 's and customs of the world , or of those nations wherein they live ; nor are other things disposed to those particular ends : god hath entitled them no farther . i can deny this proposition againe out of my former ground ; a man hath absolute right to those things which conduce to the last and universall end , but not to those things which conduce to any mediate and particular end , because that end it self may be uselesse ; now god require's , and nature require's the more publick to be advanced by the more private and particular end ; when that second is uselesse , the meanes in order to it are so likewise , which have only an utility in order to it . sect. . his minor he onely suspected to be questioned , which is ( but when i may judge , in a right and uncorrupt judgment , all the creatures in the world can afford me that use ) and therefore he labour's with divers arguments to confirme it , which i shall examine , because i think them very erroneous ; his first reason is page . because ( saith he ) singuli homines is his phrase ) single men do lawfully use single creatures , neither is there any thing which is forbid their use ; now ( saith he ) that which single men enjoy , any man may enjoy alone , neither out of the cre●●tures part is there any contradiction . these are mr. hobbes his own manner of disjoynted discourses ; the proposition to be proved was , i can judge with a right and uncorrupt judgment , all the creatures in the world can afford me that use , that is , the preservation of my life , and the contentments of it . that he prove's because , that single men do lawfully use the single creatures ; see if this be not just like to mr. hobbes his reasonings ; first he prove's , that i have a right to all things , because i can judge that they may be usefull to me ; now he prove's , i may judge that they may be usefull to me , because single men use single creatures ; for the inconsequency of the first ; suppose a son in prison for debt should judge , and truly judge , that by the death of his father his father's estate would come to him , and by that he should be released out of prison , had he right to kill his father ? by mr. hobbes his rules , who saith , that no man can divest himself of the right to keep himself from such conditions which may render his life miserable , he may ; and by this author , who follow 's him close , he may , because he can truly judge this is expe●●ent and usefull for himself ; the same may be said for wives , children , for kings ; there may be found reasons why their destructions should conduce to a private man's good ; hath he then a right to act those horrid villanies ? the first consequence must needs therefore be erroneous , which judgeth of right onely by the right judgment of the usefulnesse which it hath to the particular person ; and the second no lesse , which judgeth the usefulness to me , and a right in me to them , because other men enjoy them : for my part , i should argue more truly clean contrary ; because other men lawfully use them , i cannot ; two single men , at the same time , cannot lawfully use the same thing with a propriety , which imply's a negative to another ; they may joyn in the same work , in using the same lever , to move a great weight ; they may warm themselves by the same fire ; but have a right in the same thing they cannot , unlesse they be united into some corporation , whereby they are made one civill person , which were two naturall ; but suppose he should mean , as he seem's to do , that because no particular thing is forbid any particular man , therefore a particular man hath right to every thing ; to this i answer , that a particular man may have right to any particular thing , yet not to all , out of his own principles , because all cannot be usefull to him , he is not able to make use of all ; he that hath right to eat any piece of meat at the table , yet hath not right to eat all from other men , or to eat all the meat there , it would surfet him , although he , and every one at the table may eat what he like 's , and what he can civilly seize upon , fit and proper for him : it is so with drinks ; an hundred , or more , thirsty men come to the same river , they can judge with an uncorrupt judgment that it is fit for them to drink , and every single man may drink any single part of that water , yet no one or single person can judge it fit to drin● up the river ; it is so with cloathes , medicines , any thing that is usefull to man ; it follow 's not therefore , because single men can use these single creatures , therefore one single person may use all of them ; and this impossibility ariseth not onely out of the injustice used to other men , of which see disputes afterwards , and i shall follow him , but out of the disproportion the universe hath to any particular person , because it is too large ; a finite hand can grasp no more then the compass of it can contain ; and out of the qualities of it every thing is not convenient for every person ; he , who onely is hungry , lacke's not cloths , &c. he , who is warm , lacke's not a fire , and the like . i know it may be objected against this , that although they are not usefull now , yet they may be hereafter , and out of this forecast a man may enjoy all the creatures usefull and profitable for him now , or which shall be hereafter . i answer , they cannot , by a right judgment , think so , first because no man know's them , not the hundreth , nor the hundred thousandth part of the single creatures in the world , therefore he cannot judge they may be usefull to him ; secondly , there are many things , the very kinds and species of which are not known to any man , many fishes in the seas of the world , birds of the air , and the like ; many things , we know , would be hurtfull to us , the scorching heates of the torrid zones to us inhabitants in cold countries ; and our colder would be as offensive to them , these cannot judge those other usefull to them , or that they will be usefull to them at any time , which are averse to their dispositions ; so that although there be none of these things interdicted and forbidden the use of them in themselves , yet by god , that made them and us , many of these things being hurtfull to many men , the use of them is forbid to such . that which he adde's , neque ex parte creaturarum , &c. neither out of the creatures part is there any morall contradiction , is not true , there is a morall contradiction ; because many of these things are hurtfull to many men , therefore it is a morall contradiction to say , they should rightly be judged useful ; and my first disproportion mentioned , the quantity of the creatures , enlargeth the contradiction ; when the vessel will hold but a pint , it is a contradiction to say , i will put in a quar● into it ; when the narrow compass of any particular man's thoughts can make use of but a few things , to say , that it shall make use of all , is a contradiction , out of the vast quantity of the creature , in respect of the narrowness of our abilities . sect. . he urgeth another argument thus : unless this judgment by that reason instituted be right , there can be given no rule , according to which a judgment may be instituted of things which the lord god hath granted man to use , or what these things are which he hath withdrawn from his use . i answer , many wayes , according to the condition of the place wherein ●e live's ; if in a desart , unappropriated to any man , god hath given him right to use any thing , he meet 's with , for his accommodation ; if he live's in a polity , god hath given him right to all such things as the laws of the nation entitle him to . his third and last argument for this cause is framed at the bottom of pag. . aut omnes creaturae ; either all crea●ures are granted to man's use , or none . i will stop here , all creatures are granted to man's use , but not to this particular man , but to man●ind , which that word man will involve ; now he was to prove , that they were useful to every particular , but he prove's his conclusion , for , saith he , if it be lawful for me to mine own use to destroy any fit meat and natural form , why not all if it shall be expedient ? i answer him first , posito quolibet sequitur quidl●bet , that if it may be expedient , is an impossible supposal ; it cannot be expedient for any single man to destroy this world . i answer secondly , that it is a fallacy à bene divisi● ad malè conjuncta , the instances before of meat and drink do evince this conclusion ; take another ; i am ●o ride a journey , my friend offer 's me five or six horses , give 's me power to use any one , i can use but one ; they are all every one such as i have a right unto , but cannot use more then one ; i had right to each singular horse , but not to all . we may conceive it just so with any particular man ; suppose we should grant that god , in his journey to heaven , allow's man any creature in the world , yet , because he cannot make use of all , he cannot say , that he hath right to all conjunctim . and then lastly , i say , as before , if a man live in a polity , god hath given him use of such things onely which the law of the polity entitle's him unto ; if in a desart , he hath granted him whatsoever he can gain to his use . thus , i think , his first discourse is clearly enough answered , wherein i observe he is a true follower of mr. hobbes , not in his conclusions onely , but his way of proving them by most fallacious arguments . so , saith he , it is proved , that out of the creatures part there is no obstacle in them , but that a man may use singulis & omnibus , every single and all of them . this , he think 's , he hath proved , how weakly , i have shewed . sect. . he go's on next to shew , that there is no repugnance out of the part of my neighbour ; i will wait upon that with which he begin's this pag. . this we have proved ( saith he ) that man hath right to the use and possession of all things which lack reason . i answer , man hath , but no particular man : but ( saith he ) since my neighbour is constituted in the same dignity which god would have me sustain ( is his word ) he ought to enjoy the same privilege which i do , therefore to him should belong a like and equal right ●ver all creatures , neither out of the respect of the creatures is one part allotted to him , another to me . this seem's by him to be an introduction to what follow 's , but indeed contain's a main argument against him ; for two , much less two millions of men , particular men , cannot have a right to the same thing . therefore , saith he , we must seek somewhere else to find what portion is allotted to him , what to me , and then , saith he , let the adversaries turn which way they will , they must confess that the distinction of these creatures ariseth onely out of covenant ; this pag. . and this , saith he , they do sufficiently declare , who teach , that in extreme necessity the ancient right doth revive , and the use of those things is made lawful which they by covenant had disposed away before . thus far he . the case , which he speak's of , may be thus put ; a man ready to starve , for want of food or clothes , take's a piece of bread , or meat , or a warm garment , which belong's to another man , to supply his extremity ; here , say his authors , in this extremity his right to these things revived : therefore , saith this writer , he had right to all creatures before , or else his instance is weak : i answer , the consequence is very infirm ; he may have right to such parcels of the world , yet not to all ; he , who hath right to little pieces in a field , hath not right to the whole ; i have sh●wed in my former piece , which i now defend , that no right , but by some law ; the law of humanity , give 's him right to this ; by which we may , and ought to suppose , that men should do as they would be done unto ; and , when necessity compell's a man to such an extremity , he need not stay to ask for it ( which in that necessity he cannot do ) but take that leave which humane nature give 's one to another , and by which he is entiteled to those poor fragments ; but what hath this to do with the universe , to the partition of which neither he nor any man living conferr'd to divide ? sest . . another instance he give 's in a dissolved common-wealth , where the magistrate can no longer use his authority , there it is lawful for men to invade their neighbour's goods , so they have an honest intention to deliver them when he and the commonwealth are restored . i put down the sense of his words onely for brevitie's sake , and answer ; that it is not true , that it is lawful to take any neighbour's goods , in such a case , unless he have deserted them ; if he have deserted the use of them , any man may use them , not else ; yet let a man consider these two instances , he shall find that they are exceeding short to entitle any man to the interest of the whole world , or all the creatures in it . and yet i may adde further , that in both those instances a man hath but a temporal use of those things , not a full interest , and estate in them untill his extremity be relieved , or untill the right owner laid claim to them . a man hath found a ring , he wear's it , the use of it is his , but the ring is the right owner 's still , and when he find's and claim 's it , the use likewise must be the old owner's , it was never the finder's more then the use ; so is it with these , the extremity supplied , the commonwealth restored , he hath no longer use of them , he cannot justly sell or alien any of those things from the true owner , which he may do with any thing is his own , and therefore he had no right , interest , and title in them . he goe's on page . sect. . but you may object , a certain portion is not allotted to every single man , but any part of the world ; neither is it lawful for one to subdue the whole , for then it would be lawful for one man , if he had power to deprive others of the necessaries for life , yea to kill another , which seem's to oppose what he had said before , when god decreeing to man the use of this life did decree likewise to bestow upon him the use of these things usefull to his life , which , saith he , one man cannot take from another , unless in extreme necessity , but he doth subvert the end which god intended in the creation of another . to this he adde's another objection concerning the birth●right of the eldest son , who , he saith , hath title to his father's estate without compact ; this second i esteem very weak , and so meddle not with what he write's concerning it ; but the first , i am perswaded , is of invincible force , and his answer to it is miserable ; his answer is page . we answer , saith he , not onely in extreme necessities a man may subdue the world , such a necessity being granted ( such a necessity is impossible say i , because the world cannot be necessary to relieve any man's extreme necessity , but onely very little parts of it ) but also if any profit or commodity may be promised to arise thence , as any lord may use his good , neither can he offend against that justice by which he is bound to render to his neighbour that which is his ; the rest in that paragraph is but flourished to this purpose ; now let a man consider how this satisfies the preceding argument , that argument was drawn from the end which god intended in the creating of both these , the preservation of either was equally intended ; doth not then that man violate that justice which ought to be used towards his neighbour , when , for his commodities , even in superfluities , he shall deprive his brother of necessaries ? in his discourse there is no semblance of satisfaction to this objection , when in his answer he only affirm's , that a man hath right to all thing● for his commodity , but never set's down , god's end is preserved in that right ; i mean to urge this argument stronger hereafter . sect. . in the . page he undertake's boldly that he will prove , by most efficacious arguments , there is a right to the whole world belonging to every man ▪ page . he begin's his proof ; first , saith he , because in extreme necessity a man's ancient right doth revive ; he prove's that , because , saith he , my calamity cannot produce a right in me to such things , to which i had no right before ; my first answer to this is , that it is no more then what was said before ; secondly , i answer , as before , that no man can have such an extremity as may need the whole world ; he cannot eat , drink , or clothe himself with the whole , but parts , onely ; thirdly , i answer , his calamity revive's no title in the miserable man , but onely reduceth him to be the object of mercy ; and what inconsiderable title he hath , is a capability of a passive right to acts of humanity , by which every man , who look's upon that wretched spectacle , is bound to relieve him , and , when extremity give 's not leave to any man to stay for the convenience of asking , he take's that , out of a supposall that it will not be denyed . his second argument begin's in the last line of page . and is thus framed ; the most learned part of divines and lawyers consent , that in a moderation of a lawful defence , the defendant is not made a publick person , but doth use his ancient right which god hath granted to every man. i will not trouble the reader with every word , the sense of the argument consist's in this , that a man may defend himself against violence ; that in that defence he may lawfully kill another ; and this ariseth not out of that , that he hath done me wrong or injury , but out of that regard , that god would have me defend my self ; now , saith he , if it be lawfull to kill another , much rather to take his goods in defence of my self . to understand the force or invalidity of this argument , let us look back to what hath been said , how far my life is to be cared for , and preserved by me , one rule of which is , when a more publick concernment will not be obtained by the losse , i am not to preserve my life by the ruine of multitudes of my nation , or kingdom , of which i am a member ; again , since he in this discourse supposeth that men believe there is a god ; and that this god is a just judge punishing vice , and rewarding vertue , therefore i am to forsake this life , and resign it rather then commit such sinnes which are of a greater moment , and esteemed so by him , of which nature are regicides , paricides , nor ought a man , in rescue of himself , to kill his king or his father ; i am perswaded there is none that think 's there is a god , which doth not think that such things are an abomination to him ; then we will suppose two men , private persons , the one assaulting the other ; surely if a man can safely avoid the danger , he ought to do it ; but if he cannot , he may kill rather then be killed , because there is no reason why a man should not think himself of as usefull a condition as another private man to the publick state , or glory of god ; but my killing this man is not because i have a right over his person , but because i have a right to defend mine own person from the injuries which are offer'd to it by another private person , who hath no more right to kill me , then i him , which is none but in my own defence ; for of two evils the less is to be chosen ; either are evils in se , but this the less to me ; and this is no other then the former ; for it is not lawfull for me to kill another man , if i can avoid his assault , but when there is an extreme necessity , and his assault is otherwise unavoidable ; so that it is still in an extreme necessity , and that may be relieved with a few things , much lesse then the whole world . sect. . here he make's an objection thus ; how doth all this prove , that one single man hath right to the whole world , and that nothing out of the part of my neighbour doth hinder it ? ( this is page . ) he answer's , it doth very much conduce for it . for defence of my life , my liberty , my priviledges , it is lawfull to kill another , to break out into war against another ; much rather will it be lawful for any man to vindicate these goods to himself , which now submit themselves to the first possessor ; and to spoile my neighbour of all those things by which he contend's to out me of my possession . for answer ; surely there is much difference in these cases ; in the first i defend my life and estate from an unjust invader ; in the second i invade another's right and interest , and when he saith , that the other keep 's him out of his possession ( quibus possessione mea me contend●t exuere , is his phrase ) i would fain know what possession he can say he hat● when the other , according to his own language , is the occupant ; but if he take possession here for the right of possession , what right can he pretend to more then the occupant ? or by what law doth that title accrue to him ? that which he adde's is of no great force ; or , saith he , when there shall be a just fear that he will do the like by me , if he gain opportunities ; this fear , he speak's of , entitle's a man to nothing but a care of himself untill hostility or injury be offer'd , and then one may be provoked to a just war : since , saith he , these things , which i take from my neighbour , before covenant , are no more his then mine ; ] i doubt not but i have , and shall shew , that those things , which are in the possession of another , are his own , if in his lawful possession , without any other covenant but the law of nature ; in the mean time it must needs be granted , that the title is equall , and melior est conditio possidentis ; and since he offer 's no force to the other , there can be no justice for the other to offer violence to him ; what he add's further , is a comparison between this case and war , that what is gotten in war is the conquerours , because then all covenants cease , and the ancient rights return : certainly both the antecedent is weak and the consequent , the antecedent , because the goods , gotten by conquest , are acquired by conquest , not by an ancient right ; many a man get's goods by conquest , in a lawfull war , who had no title before to them ; i say else , all such gain is but robbery ; nor doth this simile agree ; the difference is great betwixt the taking of a man's estate from him , who offer'd me no injury , and him who is my enemy , and labour's my destruction ; at the bottom of the . page he begin's with a third argument , which he thus f●ame●s ; because the right to the use and possession of things is to be taken from the profit , which i conceive will redound to me by them , therefore what i shall trust will be profitable for me i have a title to . this argument he is tedious in , i have reduced the whole force of it to this narrow compass , and do return answer , that mine or any man's judgment of the profitableness give 's me no title to it , but the just and right judgment : i may be deceived in my judgment , and judge that profitable which is unprofitable ; nay , although i judge truly , that it is profitable , yet so may any man's estate be thought , that it would be profitable for me , if i could get it , nevertheless i have no right to it . sect. . at the bottom of the . page he enter's into another discourse against a conclusion which i have been engaged in , and must therefore undertake : his argument is thus , prima occupatio , the first occupancy before covenant shew's no right of my neighbour in any creature : his main reason is this , because then in no right , in any case of necessity , they can return to me again , because that right is onely in such things which are yield●d or forsaken ; which is a language i remember i have used , and therefore do think this reflect's upon me . first , to observe the weakness of this argument , consider that this argument fight 's equally against himself , as against me ; for he hold's , a right is obtained by covenant , and yet that right yield's to extreme necessity , therefore a man may say that it follow 's with no more force against occupancy , then against covenant . secondly , i deny that the right return's in this condition , but a supposed right of humanity invade's all mankind in such states , so that although a particular man have occupancy , yet that law , which dictate's , do as you would be done unto , appoint's the owner to relieve the necessitous person , yet i have delivered , and that truly , that men in general have right to all things as citizens of the world ; but when any thing is appropriated by occupancy or civil laws , it belong's onely to that person : certainly , saith he , ye shall find nothing here but gentium institutio , the institution of nations , which give 's the occupant right , but not to him in whose view it come's first . my answer will be short and clear , there is not the same reason for detection to give right , as there is for the other of occupancy ; first , an hundred may see the countre● , yea ten thousand , yet cannot all these have any title to it , which must be in one . if a man had right to what he see 's , any man's estate might be his ; but whosoever hath a possession hath an interest . many men see the same bird fly , the same fish in the sea , yet it is onely his who catcheth and get's possession of it ; not sight , but occupancy , yield's title and right . he give 's a third reason towards the . page , finge , feign , saith he , two men , the one swift of foot , the other slow , it appear's how unequal this pair of men are in acquiring dominion : i believe they are , and it is so in all conditions , one is strong , another weak ; one cunning , another foolish ; and these may , by those abilities , according to his method , get right from another ; why then not the swift from the slow , as well as in the other disparities ? his conclusion therefore from these premisses is exceeding weak , when he bring 's it in with a therefore ; therefore , saith he , to the first occupation out of nature no right is due ; the vanity of which conclusion is evident out of what hath been said . what he add's next , concerning misery and charity , is not worth the considering ; nor his fighting with imaginary arguments which succeed . i shall endeavour now to assist the reader with some spectacles , whereby he may more easily see through those mists which he hath cast befo●● these truths ; and first , he may consider , that these two propositions , that a man now existing in the world ( for of such he must dispute ) hath a right to all things in the world ; and the second , that first occupancy give 's no right , are of such an horrid nature , so destructive to humane society and friendship , that although fallacious arguing might deceive a man's reason , yet men ought to abhorre them : for if it be true , that each particular man hath right to all things , whatsoever a man get's by secure fraud , or force , is but a lawful recovery of his own ; for if he ought to bestow his whole endeavours for the advancement of his own contentment , and he hath right to every thing , his secure obtaining is just and right , be it which way it will ; nor can he answer this out of his own principles , and much less out of mr. hobbes , who conceiving ( as he doth ) that this is the right of nature , so mr. hobbes expresly , no man can diest himself of it , ( and sure no man can put off that which naturally belong's to him ) then it must follow , that such things may be acted carefully . then let us consider , the second proposition , were it received amongst men , how might it spoil all commerce betwixt merchants , betwixt men of divers nations ; for if occupancy give no title , it may be lawful for men to defraud , to get by force what they could from an indian , because i know of no title they have but of occupancy . no man can discern what title any subjects have in those goods they enjoy , who is not thoroughly acquainted with the laws of those several nations , nor then , unless he can survey their deeds and evidences , by which those goods were conveyed to them : surely they are not to be wrested out of any man's hands , but by such courses as may first evince his title , and therefore possession , quiet possession , with prescription , is an undoubted just title any where . and if we will have peace , which is the labour of all politicks , we must allow occupancy to be a sacred title . and this is evident out of that which was delivered in the . and ch . of leviathan ; for it is not possible to think that ham in the . of genesis did consent to his subjection to shem or japhet either , but each would , and might , take their possession in what quarter of the world they would , and the providence of god would so dispose affairs , that it should come to pass according to that prophecy . all the sons of noah were thrust into the common of the world , when any one seised upon any thing unpossessed , it was his , and must be so , or else men and all things in the world would be in a confusion . finis . an alphabeticall table of the principall contents . a a , or ab , often denotes causation , chap. . sect . . pag. . how aaron was moses's mouth , chap. . sect . . p. . the diversity of the agent cannot be argued from the diversity of operations , the object being diverse , cha . . sect . . p. . justice executed among the americans , chap. ● . sect . . p. . why angels cannot produce a plurality of persons in their spiritual essences , ch . . sect . . p. . the distinction of souls in the severall kinds of animals , chap. . sect . . p. . appearance cannot , but the act discerning it , may be called fancy , chap. . sect . . p. . the division of appetite into naturall and rationall , with the definition of each , chap. . sect . . p . the account of actions by naturall appetite , ibid. the contest between that and the rationall , ibid. god's wisdom in disposing the appetites of creatures to their actions and his ends , chap. . sect . . p. . sect . . p. . which they act without knowledge , ibid. arria's magnanimity shewed in a bloudy precedent to her husband paetus , chap. . sect . . p. . st. cyrill's rule about words to which articles are , or are not , praefixed , chap. . sect . . p. . how to be understood p. . mr. hobbes's seeds of religion charg'd by the bishop to be a foundation for atheisme , chap. . sect . . p. . god's descent to man's capacity in the doctrine of his attributes , chap. . sect . . p. . the meaning of that axiome ; nothing can give that to another , which it self hath not , chap. . sect . . p. . aymericus attempt's in vain to make lully an heretick , chap. . sect . . p. . b the sagacious industry and contrivance of bees , cha . . sect . . p. . how from the beginning mic. . . may signifie from eternity , chap. . sect . . p. . a twofold consideration of the word beginning , p. . that not to be understood , from the beginning of david's reign , ibid. the socinians interpret in the beginning , john . . with reference to the baptist's preaching , chap. . sect . . p. . what is revealed in holy writ ought to be believed though in shew , contrary to reason , p. . chap. . sect . . p. . sect . . p. . the bishop's apology for the manner of his own writing , chap. . sect . . p. . how god is said to have purchas'd his church with his own bloud , chap. . sect . . p. . god , who was the father , yet not in the person of the father , p. . not figuratively understood ibid. smalcius's interpretation absurd and false ibid. christ's bloud not to be called the bloud of the father , sect . . p. . c how mr. hobbes would have out-cained cain in the justification of fratricide , chap. . sect . . p. . cato's do●ble attempt to dispatch himself , chap. . sect . . p. . how cerinthus conceiv'd a double nature to be in christ , chap. . sect . . p. . a character of cerinthus , p. . why st. john justly abhorred him , ibid. h●s opinion concerning christ the same with that of the socinians , p. . all things able to overcome the ill they are affected with change themselves , chap. . sect . . p. . christ proved to be god , chap. sect . . p. . cor. . . urged by the bishop for the divinity of christ , sect . . p. . how christ was naturally produced , chap. . sect . . p. . the mystery of christ's divine and humane generation signified , mic. . . cha . . sect . . p. . and so asserted against socinus , p. . and valkelius , p. . with other socinians , p. . the text taken in pieces , and vindicated from their objections , sect . . p. . christ's double capacity of priest and lay-man , alleged by the socinians , discussed , chap. . sect . . p. . christ a true man , though a divine person , chap. . sect . . p. . what commission christ gave his apostles , sect . . p. . colour and image not the same , chap. . sect . . p. . colour in the object when image is not , sect . . ib. colour varyed according to the medium , sect . . p. . colour in the object , sect . . p. . colour no apparition of motion in the brain , chap. . sect . . p. . chap. . sect . . p. . colour a reall thing in the object , chap. . sect . . p. . different colours dissipating and congregating the sun-beams , ibid. colour and light not the same thing , sect . . p. . some colours opposite to light , ib. light not therefore the form of colours , because it produceth them into act , chap. . sect . . p. . sect . . p. . the difference between reall and intentionall colours , sect . . p. . intentionall colours not the same with light , chap. . sect . . p. . whence the fancy of colours in the dark , chap. . sect . . p. . the foundations , whereon mr. hobbes build's a commonwealth , and the● justice of it , ch . . sect . . p. the distinction of communicable , ut quod , and ut quo , chap. . sect . . p. . the concord of little families not dependent upon lust , ch . . sect . . p. . how vulgar speech hath appropriated confession , chap. . sect . . p. . carthagena confine's god's infinite power unto his fancy , chap. . sect . . p. . the right to goods by conquest what , chap. . sect . . p. . conscience dictate's submission to a common power and laws , chap. sect . . p. . the restraint of conscience from scandalous and great injuries , chap. . sect . . page . when man resolve's things into their constitutive causes , he need not lose himself in the inquest , chap. . sect . . p. . benignity to a musician varyeth not the nature of this or that donor's contract , cha . . sect . . p. . the original of justice consisteth not in the law of nature for keeping covenants , ch . . sect . . p. . propriety good without covenant , p. . chap. . sect . . p. . suspicion make's not covenants void , ch . . sect . . p. . the evil consequences of mr. hobbes's opinion in it , p. . the fool 's doctrine about covenants more honest then mr. hobbes's sect . . p. . the breach of covenant , though a wicked one , conduceth not to eternal felicity ; yet such covenants ought to be broken , sect . . p. . as that enter'd into by thieves , ib. the other by an adulteresse , ibid. several qualifications , good and bad , in the making and breaking covenants , chap. . sect . . p. . no covenant obliging to act against the law of nature , chap. . s. . p. . with whomsoever any such is made , it must not be kept ib. the hebrew midwives had , probably , covenanted , sect . . p. . no breach of covenant which had not a right to bind , sect . . p. the creation of the world asserted by the same authority mr. hobbes pretend's he will submit to , p. . the world's creation , not the gospel's renovation , the subject matter of st john , . . ch . . sect . . p. . christ's interest in the creation re-inforced against the socinians glosse upon that text , sect . . p. . wherein he was a principal , no ba●e instrumental cause , ibid. the creation by him not to be taken for recreation , or regeneration , sect . . p. . much lesse for an endevour to regenerate , p. creatures acting by naturall inclinations and appetites compared unto a clock . how god can enlarge the capacity of his creature , and how make the object of knowledge approach the limits of its nature , ch . . sect . . p. . d. no dammage without injury , chap. . sect . . p. . death desired by such as foresee the happinesse they are to enjoy , chapter . section . page . no losse , but rather increase of power by death , ib. section . our dru●ds opinion of it , p. . death not so terrible and painful as pretended , ib. section . ancient instances to confirm it ; that of otho and his souldiers most ●●gnal , page . arria's encouragement of self-dispatc● to her husband paetus , page . a modern instance in the bishop's child against the supposed pains of death , ibid. death as sleep to many , and a-like desirable , section . page . diogenes took them for brother and sister , ibid. another young child of the bishop's mistook death for sleep , p. misrepresentations make it otherwise apprehended , ibid. the three periods of death , ibid. section . in which of them , and when otherwise , pain affect's the sick , page . epicurus's excellent discourse against the fear of death , chapter . section . page . he that mean's to deceive will not declare his intent , chapter . section . page . devotion what , and whence , chapt●r . section . page . how dogs and other sensitive creatures come acquainted with words and signs , chapter . section . page . man , in his most peculiar dominion , subject and tributary to god , chapter . section . page . man , in his first charter , had dominion given him over other creatures , but not over other men , section . page . why men are exempt , section . page . the contradiction of mutual dominion , every man over every man , page . how christ call's himself a door , chapter . section . page . dreams improperly assimilated to moved water in its return to rest , chapter . section . page . prophetike dreams , such as are recorded in holy scripture , arise not from an agitation of the inward pa●ts , chapter . s. . p. . f. . p. . dreams , according to solomon , come from the multitude of businesse , ibid. o●d men not alwayes subject to more dreams then young , section . page . the bishop's opinion of naturall , constitutionall , and phantastike dreams , ib. of coherent , and incoherent dreams , page . e the philosophers first opinion cerning echoes , chapter . sect . . p. . their second opinion , page . their third opinion , ib. what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly , and why rendred was , chapter . section . page . why the evangelist chose it rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , page . what hard luck that word has among the socicians , section . page . christ's eternal egression compared to the shining of the sun , chapter . section . page . elohim , the name of god , often given to kings and princes , chapter . section . page . equality of hopes o● desires render's not men alwayes enemies , chapter . section . page . an instance in the contract between abraham and lot , section . page . nor self-conservation ; nor delectation , ib. section . not equality of desires , chapter . section . page . ahab's and naboth's case , ib. upon what hard conditions an estate is not to be preserved , chapter . section . page . no eternity à parte ante , which is not likewise à parte p●st , chapter . section . page . an eternity to be found in all the different principles of philosophers , section . page . how before and after may be applyed to god's eternall being , section . page . the double conceipt we may have of it , section . page . the truest philosophy of it in scripture , section . page . wherein how years and dayes are applyed to it , page . eternity a standing instant , section . page . which implie's not now and then to be both one , section . page . no● make's an infinite number of numbers an unite , section . p. . mr. hobbes blamed by the bishop for disputing the case of the world's eternity , and referring the determination to his leviathan , page . god's descent to man's capacity in the doctrine of eternity , chapter . section . page . god's eternal existence compared to an immoveable standing rock , chapter . section . . p. experience not simply memory , chapter . section . page . what , and whence , page . f the violation of faith not allowed for a kingdom , chapter . section . page . section . page caesar's sentence out of euripides doe's not positively assert it , ibid. his mistake of the question , ib. and change of the terms fraudulently , page . what faith conduceth toward eternal happinesse , chapter . section . page . how much it fixeth us upon it , section . page a busied fancy inobservant of light or colour , how radiant soever , chapter . section . page . what fear the fomenter of devotion , and what not , chapter . section . page . reason subdueth fear , chapter . section . page ▪ . which no bare possibility , but probability produceth , page . god's punitive justice secure's men from desperate fears , ib. what fear it is secure's a man from violating covenant , chapter . section . page . taking away the fear of god an unreasonable supposition made by mr. hobbes , section . p. . our evidence greater for future felicity then that ever there was such a man as julius caesar , chapter . section . page . being not only delivered to us by tradition , but most consonant to reason , section . page . in man's fellowship with other creatures , and his excellency above them , section . page . the certainty of felicity after death resum'd and prov'd , section . page . figures never used by christ without intimation how the text is to be understood , chapter . section . page . the nature of finite explain'd , chapter . section . page . fire worketh not by motion equally every way , chaper . . section . page . fire cover'd not therefore extinguished because its motion is stopt , but because it want's air to nourish it , section . . page . fire , when it cannot dilate , doe's not contract , section . page . fire doe's not reject and chase the medium to the eye , if it should , the fire of two becons could not be seen each from other , sect . . p. . flashes of fire from a stroke may affect one that is blind , section . page . the socinians heterodox interpretation of the word flesh in saint john , chapter . section . page . which is not taken in scripture for the unhappy sort of men , but for men in general , page . force and fraud no military vertues , chapter . section . page . wherein the ancient philosophers made true fortitude to consist , chapter . section . page . exemplified in david , ibid. epicurus's discourse of frugality and temperance , section . p. . g the holy ghost a distinct person of the trinity , no mere attribute of the deity , chapter . section . page . not the gospel of christ , as the socinians pretend , section . page . not the gift of god to certain men , section . page . how gloria patri is come to be appropriated to the doxology , chapter . section . page . the different effects of burning-glasses , chapter . section . page . how the gentiles conceived their false gods to be of the same nature with the soul of man , chapter . section . page . the belief of a god cannot grow out of the opinion of ghosts , chapter . section . page . how evidently god manifest's himself in his creatures , chapter . section . page . the passions , not the actions , of men to be called god's , chapter . section . page . the word 's being with god in saint john , signifie's more then known to god , against socinus and his followers , chapter . section . page . section . page . how god , with the socinians , is no proper name , &c. but an appellative , section . page . how satan is called the god of this world , section ● . page ▪ . how the b●lly is god , ibid. how 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 god , with or without an a●ticle , is to be understood of the great god , ibid. how the word , though god , may be said to have been with god , chapter . section . page . in his divinity , not humanity , cha●ter . section . page . saint john baptist's testimony sufficient to prove christ the great god , against socinus , chapter . . section . page . to do any thing as god , and in the nature of god , not the same , section . page . whose goings forth , &c. mic. . . how to be interpreted of christ , chapter . section . page . not to be understood of any but an eternal emanation , section . page . the distinction between a good man and a good citizen , chapter . section . page . 〈◊〉 justification of the ancient christians as no enemies to the imperiall government , chapter . section page . grace doe's not destroy , but perfect nature , chapter . section . page . h what a perswasive the naturall knowledge , or belief , we have of eternal happinesse is to withdraw us from our opinion of temporal felicity , chapter . section . page . the transcendent delight we have here in our hopes of eternal happinesse , section . page . fo● which we lothe worldly pleasures , ib. and welcome tortures , page . the worldly advantages in prosecuting divine happinesse , sect . . ibid. mr. hobbes can render himself no more secure of temporal then he appear's to be ( with little satisfaction ) of eternall happiness , section . page . who seem's to disparage that article of our faith , chapter . section , page . wherein the stoicks placed humane happinesse , cha●ter . section . page . wherein aristotle , page . how the heat in my hand differ's from that in the fire , which warm'd it . chapter . sect●on . page . improperly said by mr. hobbes that heat is a pleasure or pain , section . ibid. though a remote cause of both , page . plato's description of heaven parallel'd to that of saint john in his revelation , chapter . section . page . mr. hobbes's horrid supposal of getting heaven by unjust violence , chapter . s. . page . the bishop's character of mr. hobbes , page . mr. hobbes censured by the bishop for discouraging men from their assent to divine truths , page . and countenancing atheists , page . his lordship 's serious advice to him to blot out such his hand-writings , ibid. how hopes and feares affect men , chapter . section . page . the principles of humanity keep men from acting violence unprovoked , chapter . section . page . i 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated , chapter . section . page . the bishop's o●inion , that there was no idolatry before the floud , chapter . section . page . men's beginning to call upon the lord , gen. . no argument for idolatry before the floud , ibid. no● god's punishment of the world by the floud , section . page . jesus increas'd in wisdom , &c. with god and men , otherwise then socinus interpret's it , chapter . s. . page . ignorance of second causes apter to produce atheisme then religion , ch●p●er . s. . ●age . aff●cted igno●ance of the law sin , chapter . s. . page . the image in the gl●sse , chapter . s. . page . image no apparition of motion in the brains , chapter . s. . page . imagination something besides decaying sense , chapter . s. . page . imagination and memory proved not to be the same thing , s. . page . no infinity of causations , nor of causes , chapter . s. . page . man hath some knowledge of infinite , s. . page . s. . page . s. . page . the nature of infinite explained , page . no infinity of number , s. . page . were there such , no one infinity could exceed another , page . why no man can have right to act any thing inhumanely , chapter . s. . page . a standing instant of two thousand yeares , chapter . s. . page . how sacred amongst all people hath ever been the preservation of interest , chapter . s. . page . how invocation in genesis may be taken for the whole worship of god , chapter . s. . page . or for some signal additional devotion , ibid. that st. john writ against ebion and cerinthus proved , contrary to socinus , chapter . s. . page . st. john's rea●on of his writing not solitary , as socinus allegeth , s. . p. the israelites how the peo●le of god , and how of moses , chapter . s. . page . god was king of the israelites ; moses but their judge and generall , s. . page . justice and injustice , as acquired habits , may be in a solitary person , chapter . s. . page . mr. hobbes's imperfect definition of injustice , chapter . s. . page . likewise of justice , s. . page . the fool 's argument against justice unanswerable out of mr. hobbes's principles , s. . page . with what reason injustice will stand , taking away the fear of god , chapter . s. . page . the explication of commutative and distributive justice , chapter . s. . page . to which is premised that of common or legal justice , page . many acts of justice being not comprehended under the other two , page . giving , or not giving , have nothing to do with justice , s. . page in commutative justice restitution of re●aration due without contract , s. . page . so likewise in distributive justice , ibid. the preference of the lesse worthy to the better place against distributive justice , page . the justice of an arbitrator may be commutative or distributive , according to the case , s. . page . the difference between equity and distributive justice , ibid. mr. hobbes's boldnesse in confronting all learned men before him , touching commutative and distributive ju●●ice , page . bodin onely excepted , who has an aery conceipt of harmonical proportion , ibid. k mr. hobbes unkind to religion in the disparagement he put 's upon naturall knowledge , chapter . s. . page . his scornfull scale of knowledge , s. . page . man's knowledge so defective , as it cannot satisfie his will , s. . page . man hath some imperfect knowledge of god in this life , s. . page . none of his eminences , but by revelation , page . the parcells of knowledge in this life make up no accumulative or collective happinesse , s. . page . l every man born under a law-maker and a law , chapter . s. . page . s. . page . the decalogue was no new law , s. . page . exceptions against mr. hobbes's definition of the law of nature , chapter . s. . page . how the law of nature , obligeth strangers to mutuall succour in distresse , chapter . s. . page . how it give 's rules for the attaining eternall felicity after death , s. . page . mr. hobbes make's the law of nature to act against the law of nature , chapter . s. . page . liberality what , chapter . s. . page . liberty no such thing as mr. hobbes describe's it , chapter . s. . page . light , or colour figured , how conducible to sight , chapter . s. . page . light illustrate's the medium , but doe's not terminate sight , chapter . s. . page . s. . page . how our saviour is said to be a light , &c. luke . . chapter . s. . page . how christ is called the light according to socinus ; how according to the bishop , chapter . s. . page . preservation of life not the principall of mans happinesse , chapter . s. . page . when , and how to be regarded , chapter . s. . page . in what cases life should not be prefer'd to death , chapter . s. . page . chapter . s. ● . page . s. ● . page . s. . page . s. . page . how christ call's himself the life , chapter . s. . page . eternal life before christ's incarnation known to the angels , blessed souls , prophets , philosophers , ib. s. . page . although not , till afterward , manifested to others , ibid. page . what life is mean't by saint john to be in the word , chapter . s. . page . and what the light of men , ibid. raymund lully's adventures and sufferings for the conversion of the turks and moores , chapter . s. . page . m man's abilities both to know and prosecute what is good , chapter . s. . page . the inequality of men by nature considerably different , chapter . s. . page . adam and evah made in no state of enmity , nor absolute equality , ibid. s. . the debility and helpless condition of other men by nature , page . plato's ingenious fable about the making of men and beasts , chapter . s. . page . the constancy of the holy martyrs a most strong reason for eternal happinesse , chapter . s. . page . means no otherwise usefull then as they relate to an end that is such , chapter . s. . page . s. . page . all conducing to a private person's advantage not to be used , s. . page . memory not alwayes weakned by extent of time , chapter . s. . page . memory likened to a box , whereof attention is the key , ibid. to a book , s. . page . the distinction of memory , experience , and prudence , chapter . s. . page . the diversity of merit , chapter . s. . page . the di●●inction of it ex congruo , and ex condigno , misunderstood by mr. hobbes , chapter . s. . page . how otherwise expounded by the schools , page . christ had a plenarity of power in his mission from the father , chapter . s. . page . moral philosophy hath a subject of a greater extent then mr. hobbes seem's to allow it , chapter . s. . page . how moses was instead of god to aaron , chapter . s. . page . how made a god to pharaoh , ibid. a messenger and mediatour betwixt god and his people , s. . page . motion aim's at quiet , chapter . s. . page . all things produced by it , p. . things without us are not motions causing apparitions , chapter . s. . page . the six kinds of motion , page . no eternity of motion in things moved , unto which no stop or impediment occurre's , chapter . s. . page how standing water recover's its rest after motion , chapter . s. . p. . a bladder's sudain stopping its motion of ascent on the top of the water , s. . page . the first mover immoveable , chapter . s. . page . how naturall bodies move themselves without being moved by that which is moved , page . n naboth destroyed not by ahab's , but jezabell's malice , chapter . s. . page . the being and nature of things consist's not in their second but their first act , &c. chapter . section . page the right of nature extend's farther then to the preservation of life , chapter . section . page . necessity of nature make's not every particular man desirous to preserve his life , section . page . he that judgeth by the right of nature hath a law of nature to limit and regulate him in that judgment , chapter . section . page . to which he is oblig'd by reason , ib. when the law of nature for preservation may be dispens'd with , page . what is the law , what the right of nature , chapter . section . page . not such as mr. hobbes define's it , chapter . section . page . external impediments may hinder , but not take away naturall power , section . p. . nature's aiming at the benefit onely of particulars , an errour which run's through mr. hobbes's whole discourse , section . p. . how far naturall abilities conduce to the knowledge of god , chapter . section . page . actions not alwayes answerable to the principles of his or its nature which act's , section . page . severall acceptions of necessity , and the different effects of it accordingly , chapter . section . page . nothing necessary that god hath not provided for by some law , ibid. no new patent made to noah , but that to adam re-enforced , chapter . section . p. . noah's sonne 's like co-heires or enter-commoners in their right , page . o obedience due in submission to any punishment by a lawful magistrate , chapter . section . p. . god to be obeyed before man , chapter . section . p. . an instance in the hebrew midwives , ibid. the title of occupancy sacred , chapter . section . page . before occupancy , reason or arm● decide the title , p. . of all titles to interest occupancy most evident , section . page . how far in case of necessity to be remitted , chapter . section . p. discovery give 's not an equall right with occupancy , p. . little peace to be expected , if the right of occupancy be not allowed , p. . ochinus pervert's the sense of acts . , . to detract from the divinity of christ , chapter . section . page . refuted by smiglecius , ib. to whom smalcius replie's , p. . ochinus deserted by the socinians , ib. the discourse between ochinus and his spirit moderated by the bish●p , chapter . section . p. . one in essence may be plurally expressed when the effects are divers , section . p. . the heathen gods not believed for their oracles , but the oracles for their gods , chapter . . section . page . p the right of parents over their children , chapter . section . page . what make's passions sinful , chapter . section . p. . the various constitutions of the objects to our passions , ibid. the passions to be moderated by prudence and right reason , the ancient ethnick philosophy , and saint paul's , chap. . section . p. . ch . . s. . p. . the barbarous persecutions endured by the primitive christians , chapter . section . p. . mr. hobbes's definition of a person too circumstantiall , chapter . section . p. . no lesse applicable to a feigned then a true person , section . p. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , suppositum , anciently used to denote what we term person , section . p. . person differently used in severall arts and faculties , ibid. misplaced by mr. hobbes , section . p. . no man personates hi●self , ibid. that of cicero interpreted ; v●us sustineo tres personas , mei , adversarii , & judicis , ibid. per●on how taken by criticks , page . boethius's definition of a person , section . ibid. objected against by ri. de sancto victore , ibid. by scotus , p. . boethius's other definition of a person more difficult , ibid. the former definition explain'd and vindicated by the bishop , section . page . the etymology and common acception of persona , p. . not the actor , but the acted , is the person , ib. the true god improperly and over-boldly said to be personated , chapter . section . p. . moses , though instead of god did not personate him , p. . s. . p. . nor do kings , nor priests , ibid. moses's phrase shew's he personated not god , section . p. . uncomly to say , our saviour personated god , who was really god himself , chapter . section . p. . personality what , chapter . section . page . what that of christ in the flesh , ib. diversity of persons imply's not diversity of things , section . page . the whole divine nature not necessarily engaged in the acts of any single person in the trinity , ibid. the eternal plurality of persons by production in the holy trinity syllogistically proved , chapter . section . p. . why no more persons then three in the holy trinity , section . p. . how the product of two divine agents may be one and the same person , section . p. . how the three divine persons must necessarily be father , son , and holy ghost , section . . page . st. augustine's argument for their being called three persons , which is no scripture-language , section . p. . how great is the personal distinction in the holy trinity , a mystery yet unrevealed , chapter . section . p. . personal and relative perfection taught by philosophers , chapter . section . p. . how man's knowledge is from phantasms , chap. . s. . p. . the foundation of ethick , oeconomick , and politick philosophy , chapter . section . p. . mr. hobbes's philosophy compared with that of epicurus , section . p. . with that of lucretius , page . the philosophers language used by the primitive fathers and st. paul , chapter . section . p. . that of plato consonant to holy job's and our saviour's in st. john , p. . the philosophers excell the socinians in the knowledge of eternal life , section . p. . place no motion , nor can motion be in it , chapter . section . p. . the study of self-preservation not alwayes earnest , chapter . section . p. . the promises and oaths of men by experience very fallacious , chap. . section . p. . particular interest and propriety very sacred among the ancient jews , chapter . section . p. . god , by his own prerogative , gave the children of israel a title to the canaanites land , and the goods of the aegyptians , chapter . s. . p. . the first generation of men understood their title of propriety without god's peremptory command , p. . places , &c. not appropriated , become duly his that first seizeth , section . p. . how the owner keep 's his propriety , who intended to renounce it , chapter . section . p. . a propriety where is no coercive power , chapter . s. . page . two persons cannot have a propriety in the same thing at the same time . ch . . sect . . page . ib. sect . page . the inequality of men's prudence , chapter . section . p. . ib. s. . the reasons why men may , and do often distrust their own prudence , section . p. . prudence whence , and how it may be said to be but experience , chapter . section . page . what some philosophers thought of prudence , chap. . sect . . p. . god's punishment in this world not alwayes proportion'd to the sin , chapter . section , p. . q the qualifications of the visible species according to the disposition or indisposition of the organ , chapter . section . p. . the nature of prime qualities as they affect the organ , chapter . section . p. . how second qualities transmit their species , ib. sensible qualities more then mere apparitions , section . p. . quod ubique , semper , & ab omnibus , &c. a rule seldom oppos'd by malicious reason except by that of mr. hobbes , chapter . section . p. . r the approach or analogy to reason in the acts of inferiour creatures , chapter . section . p. . the same conclusion may be the result of faith and reason , chapter . section . page . reasonable , of what extent , chapter . section . page . a godly work , to make reason subservient to faith , chapter . section . page . how it may be so , chapter . section . page . being neither unprofitable , nor scandalous to faith , p. . what of god may be known by reason , section . page . unnaturall for reason to subject it self to passions and sensual desires , chapter . section . page . no rebound of the object from the brain to the optick nerve , chapter . section . page . mr. hobbes's subtilty in writing against rebellion ; which cannot be by his doctrine , chapter . section . page . what religion is , and how it come's to be reckoned a part of justice , chap - . section . p. . what is the seed of religion , and why only in man , section . page . chapter . section . page . how far religion may be abated and abolished in particular men , chapter . section . page . form'd religion not founded upon mr. hobbes's phantastike faith , section . page ● . the difference betwixt an occasion and the foundation of religion explained , ib. section . how far the opinion of any person , that introduceth it , should prevail with the people , chapter . section . p. . some difference between the foundation of religion and formed religion , section . p. . the want of integrity and prudence in chu●ch-gove●ners , render's not the catholick christian religion suspected , chapter . section . & . p. . & . no eternity of rest in things unmoved , whether animal or naturall , when extralocall , chapter . section p. . revelation did first dictate a form of religion , which might afterward be improv'd by reason , chapter . section . p. . god's revelation of himself by dreams , visions , &c. chapter . section . p. . trismegistus , socrates , plato , and such others , probably had revelations , or met with some prophetike person or writing , chapter . section . p. . r●ches cannot satisfie man's will , which bring with them an impatient covetousnesse of getting more , when men have most , chapter . section . page . they are not things absolutely good , page . he that hath right to the end , hath not right to all means whatsoever in the attaining that end , chapter . section . page . the ultimate end exce●ted , ib. mr. hobbes mistaken in his definition of right , and distinction of it from law , chapter . section . p. . what right is ●roperly , and what wrong , section . p. . the necessary consistence of right with law , ib. a man need 's lay down his right to nothing , chapter . section . page . that is not alwayes really good , for which a man part 's with his right , section . p. . a man may lay down his right to resistance and preservation of his life for a greater good , page . a man may renounce his right pro aris & focis , section . page . and for the good of his posterity , &c. ibid. the usefulnesse of things de futuro give 's a man no present right to them , chapter . section . page . section . p. . what right the law of humanity give 's a man to what is in the possession of another , section . page . the dissolution of a commonwealth give 's a man no perpetuall right to his neighbours goods , section . page . s the sagacity of severall animals , elephants , dogs , &c. chapter . section . page . which yet do not syllogize , though they seem to do it , p. . lully's advice to the pope and cardinals about converting the saracens , chapter . section . page . mr hobbes's censure of all philosophy-schools , &c. chapter . section . page . the school-men condemn'd both for their rashnesse and negligence in the rational search of the holy trinity , ch . . ● . . p. . holy scripture to be believed against reason , chapter . section . page . no sense of objects visible or audible in sleep or attention , chapter . section . p. . the cause of sense , section . page . master hobbes's fancy of it , ibid. how it come's to passe that the same object is seen double , chapter . section . p. . mr. hobbes unconstant in placing the seat of sense , chapter . section . page . what required to prevent the deception of sense , section . page . no such deception of sense as mr. hobbes fancieth , chapter . section . p. . not sense , but reason , judgeth whether colour seen by reflexion be in the object , section . p. . how service in vulgar language is come to be taken for the common-prayer of the church , chapter . section . p. . how christ call's himself a shepheard , chapter . section . page . there were sibylls that prophesied of our saviour , chapter . section . page . sight , the prae-requisites not wanting , judgeth aright of colours , but not alwayes of a common object , chapter . section . page . nor of objects by accident , as logicians speak , page . how the thief would be gratified , if the object of sight were but apparition , chapter . section . page . the subtilty of an evasion in mr. hobbes's power , ibid. smalcius's vain attempt to evacuate the divinity of christ , chapter . section . page . smell and taste are in the men , but sensible qualities in the objects , chap. . section . p. . the shifting genius of the socinians deluded by a single word , section . page . the socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto , section . p. . their shifts , chapter . section . page . the sin of sodom , and some others , may be supposed to be under no restraint of a positive law , chapter . section . p. . we ought not , beyond the revelation in holy scripture to aggravate their sins who perished by the floud , chapter . section . p. . how christ is the son of god , chapter . sect . . page . what a son is , ibid. the particulars in the definition applyed to our saviour , section . p. . how we must believe christ to be the naturall son of god , chapter . section . p. . even idolaters had a better opinion of the soul of man then to fancy it like the appearance in a dream , or looking-glasse , chap. . section . page . the subject of sound , chapter . section . p. . sound dormant before collision , section . p. . sound no rebound from the brain to the nerves outward , section . page . nor apparition of motion , ibid. of spirits and invisible agents , chapter . section . page . light and fire from the strong emission of species in the dark , chapter . s. . p. . not the receipt of the species , but the soul's judgment of it , is sight , chapter . section . p. . aristotle's reasons for visible species , chapter . section . page . . why the propagation of them through the medium is not discerned , ibid. their name supposed to be taken from some seminal vertue , ib. why reall colours produce but intentionall species , chapter . section . page . whence the appearance of light or fire after a suddain stroke , chapter . section . p. . how substances depend upon god as accidents upon their subjects , chapter . section page . that succesfull wickednesse obtaine's the name of vertue , argued by the fool , and consonant to mr. hobbes's principles , though he disowne's it , chapter . section . page . severall difficulties objected against mr. hobbes's philosophy about the sun , chapter . section . page . with what sagacious artifice swallowes build their nests , chapter . section . page . the actions dictated by what the school call's synderesis , chapter . section . page . t smalcius answer'd about the tautology , is in god , and is god , chapter . section . page . man's thought more then a mere representation , chapter . section . page . the catcher's title to scatter'd money , chapter . section . page . the benefit of tradition , chap. . section . page . how otherwise , then by the effects of god in the creature , we may adventure upon the proof of the holy trinity , chapter . section . page . lully's undertaking concerning the rationall proof of the holy trinity , ibid. section . page . vasques's answer and the bishop's reply to his arguments , page . an explanation of his sense , section . page . section . page . the bishop proceede's in this discourse , section . page . the principall authors that have attempted the rational discovery of the holy trinity , section . page . how christ call's himselfe the truth chapter . section . page . v what value may be set on things to be sold , and how enhaunced , chapter . section . page . when the arithmeticall proportian must be applyed to the value of the thing , page . how christ call's himself a vine , chapter . section . page . an untouch'd viol sounding in harmony with one touch'd , chapter . section . p. . how man understand's simple termes in their proper , but beasts only in their generall , notion , chapter . section . p. . man's understanding imperfect in this world , chapter . section . page . the union of the divinity with the humanity implieth no mutation of god into man , chapter . section . page . it maketh but one christ , page . the use and benefit of universities , chapter . section . p. . how john baptist was call'd a voice , chapter . section . page . the bishop discover's no such thing as st. john's unbraiding the world , chapter . . chapter . section . page . the use of some things known interdicted , chapter . section . page . how a man may know what is not , page . section . page . jus and utile not the same thing , chapter . section . p. . how tully understood utile far otherwise then mr. hobbes , page . w how two walls of different colours equally affect the brain , chapter . section page . three sorts of men in no condition of war , chapter . section . page . what may , and what may not , be called war in respect of time , section . page . in respect of a disposition to it ▪ section . page . neither a monastike nor sociable course of life put 's men presently into a posture of defensive war , section . page . no universal war ever enterpriz'd by mankind , chapter . section . page . the mutuall jealousies of soveraignes put them not presently into a condition of war , section . page . men have no right to practice inhumanity in war , chapter . section . page . what condition prae-requisite to a just engagement in war , ibid. war not the only conservatour of man's right or nature's , section . page . how christ call's himself the way , chapter . section . page . what weather may be rightly called fair or foul , chapter . section . page . the whispering place in glocester church , chapter . section . page . man's will not to be the rule of his judgment , nor the reason of his actions , chapter . section . page . a very child require's the satisfaction of his will , chapter . section . page . a man's will is satisfied with no worldly goods , whether bodily , sensual , or intellectual , section . page . nor ought else which is not infinite , and that infinite is god , section . page . the socinians interpret word , st. john . . by a metaphor and metonymie , chapter . section . page . how he is there call'd the word , section . page . section . page . the word not to be understood of our saviour's humanity , section . page . neither metaphorically nor metonymically , ibid. socinus's shift , that he was decreed to be the word , will not serve his purpose , section . page . a word internal and external both of god and man , section . page . the philosophers in all ages call'd the son of god his word , section . page . as well they who writ after as who before st. john , section . page . which is yielded by socinus , section . page . discourse concerning the knowledge of the word before the preaching of st. john baptist , section . page . whether in the socinian or catholike sense may be more truly said , the word was god , section . page . how the word is god with , though not god of , the father , section . page . the conceipt of smalcius and valkelius , how the word was with god in the beginning , chapter . section page . improbable , section . page . the socinians collusions about the word 's being made flesh , section . page . how the word is man , though it lack the personality of man , section page . the word 's being made flesh import's not the same of the father and the holy ghost , with whom he is the same god , section . page . the world was divided among noah's sonnes , not by consent , but by casual occupancy , or choice , as every of them thought fit , chapter . section . page . smalcius's several acceptions of the word [ world ] and the making of it in st. john , wherein he imposeth fallacies upon his reader , chapter . section . page . discovered by the bishop , page . the word [ world ] never used single in the bible for heaven , nor for the reformed or regenerated part of men , section . page . it is used for the men in the world , section . page . how the world knew not the word b●t by supernaturall grace , page . the whole world no particular man's right , chapter . section . page . section . page . section . page . section . page . no● can it be expedient for him to destroy it , section . page . nor can there be a necessity priviledging him to subdue it , section . page . finis . points , comma's , &c. to be rectified by the curious or censorious reader . title , ] after annexed dele epist. dedic . ] p . l. . r. honour , epist. to the reader ] p. . l. . for state ▪ read state , table to the chap. and sect. ] ch . . s. . r. colours , light , ch . s . r. principle , ch . . s r r●ligion , ch . . s. . r. examples , ch . . s. . l . r. live ; s. l. . r. dominions ; l . r. wives , ● . . l. r. various ; ch . . s. . l. . r. judgment , ch . . s . r ▪ fo . is ; ch . s. l. r. reason , s. . r. it ; s. . l. r it ; ch . s. . l. . r. reason ; ch . . s. . l. . r. justice ; ch . . s. . l. r. resurrection ; s. . r. tautologie ; ch . s. l . r. beginning ; ch . . s. . r. terms s. . l. . r. man ; ib. l. . r. sma●●i●●'s , ch . . s. . l. . r. scandal , s. . l. . r. vasques ; s. . l. r. him ; in the book . page l. . r. endeavour , p. . l. . r. light , or colour figured , l. . r. the understanding ib r. horse doth l. . r. it , p. . l. . r. appearance may p. . l. . r. su●ject , ib , p. . r. subject , p. . l. r. brain ; p. . l . r. ●●aring ; p. . l. . r. species ; p . l. . r. concussion , p. . l . r. pellucid things would p. l. r. that , which p. . l. . r. motion , by p. . l . r conceive's , to p. . l. r. eye is l. . r. sun is p. . l. . r. or , if not , l. r. co●e to l. . r. effects is p. l. . r. visible , p. . l. . r. colour , because p . l. . r. other only p. l. . r. predominant : so p. l. . r. heavens ; the p. . l. . r. but motion ? p. . l. . r. like ; thus l. . r. colour can p. . l. r. limitation ) p. . l. . r. men , measuring p. . l. . r. animals expell p . l. . r. preserve them ? l. ▪ r. preserve themselves ? p ▪ . l. . r. wisdom ; p. . l. r. see 's , p. . l. r. experience ; i answer l. r. being out p. . l. . r. like earnestnesse , p. . l. . r. choler . p. . l . r. he , by l. . r. a man ; p. l. . r. understanding . but p. . l. . r. negations p. . l. . r. man was l. . r. make ; l . r. men not l. . r. please ] p. . l. . r. agents , l. . r. fancy , p. . l. . r. and , p. . l . r god like p. . l r. leade's us p. ● . l. . r. cause● , p. . l. . r. that , among p. . l. . r. 〈◊〉 ▪ p. . l. . r. argument , l . r. together , had compacted p. . l. . r. heavens ; l. . r. years fail , p. . l. . r. instant , p. . l. . r. standing ? p. . l. . r. duration , p. . l. . r. grammatical p. . l. . r. floud , is p. . l. . r. god , is p. . l. . r. chapter ; l. . r. misery ; p. . l. . r. wisdom , p. . l. . r. or , if p. . l. . r. ex●ellencies p. . l. . r. words ] p. . l . r. consequent , l. . r. nature , p. . l. . r. possessions , p. . l. . r. leviathan ; ib. principal , p. . l. . r. great ; p . l. . r. she , p. . l . r. word , p. . l. . r. life , p. p. . l. . r. outward , p. . l. . r. nature , p. . l. . r. th●sts p. . l. . r. war , p. . l. . r. which , by p. . l. . r. layd , p. . l. . r. many , p. . l. . r. need , l. . r. men scramble p. . l. . r. free-gift , l. r. signes , by p. l r. himself , but p. . l. . r. sinne 's independence ib. r. covenants ; l. . r. right over l. . r. another ; here p. . l. r suspicion , it is voyd : but p . l. . r. covenant , which p. . l. . r. tongue ; p. . l. . r. vertue , p. . l. . r. wickednesse , p. . l. . r. done , according p. . l. . r. here , were l. . r. him , who p. . l. . r. do such actions , then l. . r. evident , because p. . l. . r. felicity , although the evidence , which l. . r. evidence , given p. . l. . r. roomes p. . l. . r. disputes , l. r. field , p. . l. . r. felicity , either l. . r. the stoick , instead p . l. . r. thing , without l. . r. truth , cannot l. . r. understanding , can p , . l. . r. desire's ; they , p l. . r. they , who p. . l. . r. we have p. . l. . r. distribution to l. . r. this ( which p. . l. . r. although , i l. . r. making men p. . l. . r. of god , i l. . r. liberality ] p. . l. . r. men , who l. . r. prudence , l. . r. mistaken in l. . r. passions , l. . r. custom to p. . l. . r. fortitude are , p. . p. . ▪ l. . r. person a ●rue . p. . l. . r. men , p. . l. . r. it is p. . l. . r. he , who p. . l. . r. god's people , l. . r. give 's a reason p. . l. . r. mr. hobbes , the p. . l. . r. our saviour l. . r. god which p. . l. . r. god be p. . l. . r. body , both p . l. . r. phrase , of p. . l. . r. which , in p. . l. . r. word , spoken p. . l. . r. and , as well as this , acknowledged p. . l. . r. this word , which is a reall word , p. . l. . r. before he p. . l. . r. god ; in p. . l. . r. this of p. . l. . r. produceth ephes. p. . l. . r. observable , there p. . l. . r. the same christ p. . l. . r. angels told p. . l. . r. as , by p. . l. . r. flesh , in p. . l. . r. respect of p. . l. r. inhaesion , or p. . l. . r. person ; to be p. . l. . r. expounded it . p. . l. . r. creature 's p. . l. . r. but , i say , p. . l. . r. effects , some p. . l. . r. faith may p. . l. . r. and , for l. . r. faith to p. . l. . r. lully , i think , passeth p. . l. . r. essence . gabriel l. . r. lully from p. . l. . r. lully thought p. . r. bernard luthenburgensis , p. . l. . r demonstration can p. . l. . r. god-head , p. . l. . r. these they p. . l. . r. fires , or l. . r. object ; so p. . l. . r. spirit . i p. . l. . r. end ; so p. . l. . r. them ; these p. . l. . r. paricides ; nor p. . l. . r. interest ; and in the margin . p. . l. last r. motion ; p. . l. . r. brain ; p. . l . r. amisse ; p. . l. . r. contraction ▪ p. . l. . r. medium ; p. . l. last r. feares . p. . l. . r. injury , p. . l. . r. wives , l . r. estates ; p. ● . l. . r. various ; p. . l. . r. life ; l. last r. happinesse ; p. . l. . r. end , p. . l. . r. judgment , p. . l. . r. man , in p. . l. last r. it , p. . l. . r. it ▪ p. . l. . r. nothing ; p. l. . r. war ; p. . r. socis ; p. . l. . r. hobbes ▪ p. . l. . r. principles ▪ p. . l. . r. other , p. l. last r. fool ; p. . l. last . r. question ; p. . l. . r. covenant , l. . r. one , l. . r. felicity , l. . r. broken ; l. . r. theeves ; p. . l. . r. rebellion ; p. . l. . r. happinesse ; p. . l. . r. felicity ; p. . l. last r. caesar ; p , . l last r. it ; p. . l. last r. life ; p. . l. . r. it ; p. . l. last r. justice ▪ it. p. . l. last p. . l. . r. justice ; l. last r. cavill ; p. . l last r. philosophy ; p. . l. last r. epicurus ; p. . l. last r. happinesse ; p. . l. last . circumstantial ; p. . l. last r. faculties ; p. . r it , p. . l. . r. nature ; p. . l. . r. obeyed l. last r. midwives ; . l. . r. him ; l. . r. kings ; p. . l. last r. generall ; p. . l. . r. god ; it. l. last p. . l. , r. ochinus , l. last r. smiglecius ; p. . l . r. bishop ; p. . l. . r. god ; christ's r. . l. . r. answer'd , p. . l. . r. attributes ; p ▪ . l. last r. bishop ; p. . l. . r. his ; p. . l. . r. metaphor , l. . r. metonym●e , p. . l. . r. vine ; l. . r. shepheard ; p. . l. last r. figures ; p. . l. last . r. sense ; p. . l. . r. humanity , l. . r. metaphorically , p. . l. last . r. word , p. . r. philosophers , p. . l. last . r. tautology ; p. . l. last r. interpretation , p. . l. . r. socinus ; p. . l. last . r. christ , p. . r. regeneration ; p. . l. last world , p. . l. last r. smiglecius , p. . l. last r. flesh , p. . l. . r. scripture , p. . l. . r. comment ; p. . l. . r man , i● . p. . l. . r. objection , p. . l. r. smalcius's , p. . l. . r. person , p. . l. last r. him , p. . l. last r. himself , p. . l. . r. ghost , l last r. deity ; p. . l. last r. scripture ; p. . l. last r. mysteries , p. . l. . r. blasphemous limiting p. . l. . r. scandal , p. . l. . r. vasques , p. . l . r. saracens p. . l. last r. vasques ; p. . l. . r. another , from p. . l. . r. eternity , or p. . l. . r. effect , p. ● . l. last r. knowledge ; p. . l. . r. ghost ; p. . l. last r. determine ; p. . l. last r. reason ; p. . l. . r. world ; p. . l. last r. person ; p. . l. ● . r. occupancy . the literal transpositions , defects , &c. will discover themselves to the reader without particular advertisement , and not disordering the sense , require little or no amendment by his pen. the most remarkable errours to be amended . table to the chap. and sect. chap. ● . s. . for we read were . numbers mistaken . for page . printed . for . printed . for . is printed . for . printed . for . printed ● . page . r. chap. . p. . r. chap. ●● . page . r. chap. . page . r. chap. ● . page . r. chap. . page . r. chap. . p. . r. chap. . p. . r. chap. in the alphabeticall table col . . l. . for . r. ● . in the book . page . insert this title , observations , &c. upon the second chapter of his humane nature , p. . l. . for many r. may , p . l. ▪ ● . ( i think it should be effected ) is not hard to prove , p. . l. . r. those species , p. . l. . r. i , finding , p. . l. . dele it , p. . l. . for some r. smell , p. . l. . for they passe r. it passeth , p. . l. . r. bring , p. . l. . for reat r. that , p. . l. . r. of ingenuity , of docibility , doe appear in as great a resemblance of stupidity , p. . l. . r. deduced , p. . l. , r. this is not that , p. . l. . for boldly r. solidly , p. . l. . r. or more or greater numbers , p. . l. . r. must be infinite twenties likewise . p. . l. . dele in it . p. . l. . r. it would last , p. . l. . r. unwastable rock , p. . l. . r. authors , p. . l. . for but r. yet , p. . l. . for but r. only , l. . r. is contemned , p. . l. . r. gloria patri began with flavianus , as theodore● ; assisted by st. chrysostom , as nicephorus ; p. . l. . r. and not so only , p. . l. . for do r. produce , p. l. . for wresting r. trusting , p. . l. . r. either of them , p. . l. . for discribe r. disperse , ●b . r. more strongly , p. . l. . r. whom , p. . l. ● . r. and for what , p. . l. . dele that , p. . l. ● . r. only a prohibition , a negative law , p. . l. . r. he who , p. . l. . his own care , p. . l. . r. he begin's , p. . l. . infer● and r. if a man have naturally right to all those things , and cannot renounce these , then he may rightly act any thing which may secure , p. . l. . r. ●o receive , p ▪ . l. . r. wickednesse , p. . l. . r. lead , p. . l. . r. exacted , p. . l. . r. premit , p. . l. . for hd r. he , p. . l. . r. writer , p. . l. . for not to be r. not he , p. . l. . for to r. so , p. . l. . for genesis r. e●odus , p. . l. . r. as much , p. . l. . for soon r. some , p. ● . l. . r. which was shed , p. . l. . r. his church , p. . l. . r. god's , and not god ; p. . l. . r. goings forth , l. , . r. these g●ings forth , p. . l. . for cum r. eum , p. . l. . r. isai. . p. . l. . r. nowhere , p. . l. . r. belongs to all things , p. . l. . god of this world , p. . l. . for in sin r. in him , p. . l. . r. will not endure , p. . l. . r. having no compound , l. . for would , r. could . p. . l. . r. fitted it , p. . l. . r. in token , p. . l. . r. god ▪ p. . l. . r. industry , p. . l. , r. premitted , p. . l. . for hardly r. freely , p. . l. . r. these are three , p. . l. . r. who thinke's , p. . l. . r. must not be , p. . l. . r. but by the rules of right reason directing what they should do , p. . l. ● . r. many . had , p. . l. . for by r. of adam , l. . r. or any ▪ p. ● . l. . for see r. he , p. . l. . for meat r. neat , p. . l. . for flourished r. flourishes , p. . l. . for diest r ▪ divest . in the margin . ● page . l. last for received r. revealed , p. . l. . r. property , p. . l. . r. suspicion , p. . l. . r. whereon , p. . l. . dele that p. . l. . r. singular , p. . l. . for intimating r. limiting , p. . l. . r. and to having . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e a mans thought something more then representation . pressure of the heart , or brain , made by the external object , not the true cause of sense . not seeming , but some action , must be sense . sight consisteth not in light or colour figured . motion begets somewhat beside motion . philosophy schooles , and universities , how necessary to christendom . whether the subject , wherein colour is , be to be the object . colour is in the object . whence it is that we s●e the same ●bject d●uble . the image or species not in the object . where it is by reflexion . mr. hobbs's fallacy . image what . the apparition of the object , not of the motion . as is also colour . mr. hobbes's philosophy unconstant . sparks appearing upon a str●ke on the eye not from any concussion of the brain . from the crystalline humour ▪ not the optick nerve . mr. hobbes illogical in hi● proo●s . his inference amiss . and so likewise his conclusion . light shining upon the water . mr. hobbes's incoherence . the image of light where . mr. hobbes's illogical way of discoursing . how fire is extinguished by inclosure . that it hath no positive contraction . no rejection of the contiguous m●dium . no rebound from the brain to the optick nerve . the sun works not as mr. hobbes fancieth . his independent inferences . light and colour two things . colour , or image , not the apparition of motion , but of the object . argument . argument . colour a real thing in the object . argument . argument . argument , or instance of a. b. in the book . colour and light not the same thing . a●gument . argument . arguments against the reality of colours answered . argument . wherein the being and nature of things consists , and how they are distinguished . argument . answ. colours real and intentional not the same . intentional colours not the same with light ▪ sight more then a bare reception of spe●●ies . the conceipt of species not founded only upon aristotles texts . aristotles first reason for them . a second argument from aristotle's image in plato's eye . argument . the species why so called . obj●ction answered . mr. hobb●s fallacious in his discourse . the philosophers fi●st opinion concerning ecchoes . a second opinion of theirs concerning ecchoes . their third opinion concerning ecchoes . their axiome cleard by the distinction of formally and ver●ually applied to instances , mr. hobbes's absurdities in the production of sounds . smell and taste where . what difference between the heat in the fire , and transmitted to the hands , and how it proves no nullity of an external object . heat is neither pleasure nor paine , but a cause of both . the same cause worketh different effects according to the subject or object about which it is busied . sensible qualities more then meer apparitions . a universe of motion madly fancied by mr. hobbes . colour in the object , when seen by reflexion . sight , when , and when not , deceived . sense judgeth not of colour , but reason by collection from it . notes for div a -e animals will move themselvs after rest . every thing will move towards its proper place . all animals , being subject to ●assitude , req●ire rest . inanimates , by local motion , tend toward rest . all things , able to overcome the ill th●y are affected with , change themselves . the distinction of appetite into natural and rational , their conflicts , &c. appetite and knowledge is no● more then man hath . what appeti●e and knowledg ●in in●eriour ●●eat●res , and ho● excellent●y disposed by providence . gods wisdom , not art , in the natures of all he made , and disposing the principles of their several operations . all things act according to gods method , with an innate appetite to accomplish his end , though without knowledge how they tend to it . how standing water , put in motion , recover●th rest . how dreams a●e imp●operly assimilated to it when ceasing . im●gin●tion som●hing more t●en dec●y●ng sense . memory no decaying sense , the act of sensation being wholly p●st . his illustration from the suns light , obscuring that of the stars , inc●ng●uous . extent of time doth not alwayes weaken the imagination . his language confuse . imagination and memory not one and the same thing what memory it is that makes experience . there have been prognostick dreams , and such cannot be said to arise from the agitation of the inward parts . solomons opinion of dreams different from mr. hobbes's . his reasons invalide . old mens dreams . constitutional dreams : phantastick dreams . whence coherent , and incoherent , dreams . sensitive creatures become acquainted with words , and signs , by custom or the suggestions of appetite , not by understanding . 〈◊〉 specifick souls , & signal differences distinguishing them each from other . their sagacity . notes for div a -e religion defined . why reckoned among the duties of justice . the seed of re●igion in man onely , because rational . mr. hobbes's reasons invalid and his discourse impertinent . his opinion of the feigned god , invisible agents , ghosts &c. invisible agents what . mr. hobbes sticks an absurd opinion of mans soul undeservedly upon idolaters . his discourse of spirits and ghosts &c. too perplexed . mr. hobbes sowes ambiguous seeds to produce false and true religion . the opinion of ghosts could not introduce the assurance that there is a god. ignorance of second causes apter to produce atheisme then religion . devotion to what we fear rather a fruit , then seed , of religion . a taking things casual for prognostiqu●s , no seed of the ta●●e religions . there have been sibyls that prophesied of our saviour . the sole immediate seed of religion an innate principle . to be prov'd from the chain of causes . an eternity of the world , with an infinity of causations , why not to be admitted . a transition to mr. hobbes's element of philosophy , &c. somewhat of god , though infinite , may be known . and that from phantasms . the conceit of fi●ite and infinite explain'd . what conceit may be had of infinite . an eternity acknowledged by all of different opinions . mr. hobbes's indiff●rence , be the world finite or infinite . his contrad●ction of himself by inadvertence . the first mover prov'd immoveable . mr hobb●s's paralogisme . his disputing ex non concessis . no infinity at all of numbers why the world cannot be conceived infinite in duration . and yet god the creatour , may , and must . no before or after in eternity ; and yet how these terms are applicable to gods duration or coexistenc● , not to his simple or absolute existence . our double conceipt of gods eternity , to which no computation of time is applicable the doctrine of eternity most agreeable to h. scripture . no absurdity in asserting eternity to be a standing instant . the difference of nunc stans and tunc stans as applied to eternity . eternity coex●sts , with no infinite number of dayes . god so manifest in the creatures , as all ignorance is inexcusable . notes for div a -e mr. hobbes contradict's himself , as touching the seeds of religion . which are more then only an opinion of a deity , &c. mr. hobbes more perplexed in his writing then the schoolemen . how farre the foresaid opinion may be abolished out of humane nature . what may be supposed mr. hobbes mean's by a formed religion . how he imposeth upon his reader . formed religion not founded upon his phantastike faith. the jewish and christian principally to be examined . no prob●li●y of idolatry before the floud . . argument . answ. invocation taken for the whole worship of god. practis'd by adam abel , seth , &c. or for some peculiar additional devotion . a like instance in confession the church service . gloria patri . that peculiar devotion introduced in enos's time . . argument . answ. the punishm●nt disproportionate to sin in this world . of what sort were their sins who perished in the floud . revelation , not reason , did dictate the first religion . the difference betwixt the occasion and foundation of a religion . which prevai●eth according to the congruity it hath to the will of god. whatsoever mens opinion be of the person that introduceth it . how this difference is consistent with the other of assurance that there is a god why the promised discourse of the iewish and christian religion is omitted . mr. hobbes abstruse in making out his conclusion of suspected governours and their religion . christian religion depends not upon the integrity and sufficiency of church governours . religion formed by divine revelations may o●l●ge to a belee●e of seeming contradictions . the singular excellency of faith to be as well against as above reason . mr. hobbes's subtiltie in his citation and praetermission of examples . which , though pertinent , are dangerous to weak capacities . mr. hobbes's scandalous description of man. the equality of men by nature not universal . the estate in which adam and ev●h were made . that wherein others . memory , experience , and prudence distinguished . mr hobbes confuse , ●f not contradict●●y to himself , in arguing . men , universally , no such opiniatours of their own prudence as mr. hobbes pretendeth . equality of hopes does not render men enemies . nor of desires , as appeares by the agreement between abraham and lot. nor self-conservation , much lesse delectation . how , and by what , hopes and feares work upon us . not ahab's , but jezabels malice destroyed naboth . obj. ans. the title of occupancy sacred &c. reason secureth men from feares . who apprehend no danger from any bare possibility of injury . which is generally restrain'd by the thought of gods punitive justice . how reason or armes decide the controversy before occupancy three sorts of men , although without a common humane power to awe them , not in the condition called warre . how a common interest in humanity may oblige to mutual ●●iendship . ob. repl. ans. time being no essential constitutes no war. his instance in foul weather , to illustrate , erroneous . a disposition to war , before any act of hostility , makes no war. his impropriety of speech . men unassured of their security make not presently provision for a defensive war. an universal war between all individuals of mankind never yet experimented . nor is it proved by mr. hobbes's instances . what in the passions mak●● sinnes , which are not such in themelves . the several constitutions in the objects of our passions what and whence . affected ignorance of the law a sin . every man borne under a law maker and a law. the americans have kings and justice exeeuted amongst them . private families not at war with the kings and nations among whom they live . the concord of which hath a better dependence then upon lust . the exorbitances of a civil warre prove not men to be in a polemical state by nature . the mutual jealousies of soveraigns render them not like gladiatours in a direct posture of war. conscience dictate's to men what is right and wrong ; what law and common power they must submit to . militarie va●our and prudence , degenerated into force and fraud , lose the nature , and deserve not the name of the the two cardinal vertues in war. justice and injustice , no faculties but habits , and may be in a military person . nations have propriety in dominions . persons in their wives . and estates . th●ir title to which may be various . that of occupancy most evident . notes for div a -e the right of nature extends farther then to the preservation of life . several acceptions of necessity and the different effects of it accordingly . nothing necessary that god hath not provided for by some law. necessity of nature makes not every particular man desirous to preserve his life . it being 〈◊〉 in nature the principal of mans happinesse . nor the power lost with it considerable in respect of the spiritual activity and perfection gaind by death . which is not so terrible , and painfull , as pretended . ancient instances . the most signal that of otho and his souldiers cato's double attempt to dispatch himself . arria'● magnanimity in being a like precedent to her husband paetus . a moderne i●stance in a young child . death seiseth upon men like sleep . diogenes takes them for brother and sister ▪ a young child mistook one for the other . misrepresentations make it otherwise apprehended . the three periods of death . in which of them , and when otherwise pain most affects the sick . in what cases life should not ●e pre●er'd to death . he that hath right to the end , hath not right to all means whatsoever in the attaining that end . the ultimate end excepted . he that judgeth by the right of nature hath a law of nature to limit and regulate him in that judgment . to which he is oblig'd by reason . when the law of nature for preservation may be dispenced with &c. as the right for a mans preserving some piece of his estate . mr. hobbes mistaken in his definition of right , and division of it from law. what right is properly , and what wrong . whence is proved the consistence of right with law. what is the law , what the right of nature . man in his most peculiar dominion ▪ subject and tributary to god. man in his first charter had dominion given him over the creatures , but not over other men . mans will not to b● the rule of his judgement , nor the reason of his actions . why men a●e exempt from gods general charter of dom●nion at man● creation· to put a restraint on any v●ce which had no positive law against it . as the sin of sodom● , it may be reasonably suppos'd , had none . how mr hobbes would have out-cained cain in the justification of fratricide . the contradiction in mutuall domi●ion , every man over every man. no new patent made to noah but thae to adam re-enforced . noah's sonnes like coheires or entercommoners in their right . they had not the world divided among them by consent , but by casual occupancy , or choice , as every of them thought fit . obj. ans. the children of israel dispossess'd the canaanites by gods prerogative which he had receiv'd the first generation of men underst●od their titles of prop●iety without gods peremptory command . jus and utile not the same thing . places &c not 〈…〉 that first s●iseth . how tul●ie underst●o● utile far oth●●wise then m● hobbes . mr. hobbes's a●gument ex non concessis . the right of nature not such as mr. hobbs defines it . nor liberty , as he describe's it . external impediments may hinder , but not take away naturall power . exceptions against mr. hobbes definition of the law of nature . a veine of erours that run through his book . mr. hobbes may be allowd to say , he declares , when he proves nothing . but not to suppose a multitude of falshoods to make up the horridness of one conclusion . a terme wanting to mr. hobbes's just engagement in a war. and to him a remembrance of his owne principles . war not the onely preservative of mans right or nature's . the discourse of mans laying downe his right to all things , &c. unnecessary . that is not alwayes really good for which a man pa●ts with 〈◊〉 right . a man may lay down his right to resistance , and preservation of his life for a greater good . obj. ans. tertullian's signal instance in the christians of his time . he may suffer imprisonment &c. without reluctance for the same reason .. obedience being better then sacrifice . a man may renounce h●s right pro ●ris et foci● . for the good of his posterity . monastick retreats . diversity of merit . the catchers title so sca●terd mony . benignity to a musician varieth not the , nature of this or that donors contract . how the owner keeps his ptoderty , who intended to renounce it . the distinction ex congruo & ex condigno misund●●stood by mr. hobbes . how otherwise expounded by the schooles . notes for div a -e mr. hobbes's vaine supposition of transferring right , &c. his justiying most horrid sins , where no covenant had been made against them . his reason frustrate . an instance of two persons meeting in some place not before inhabited . his imperfect definition of injustice . suspition makes not covenants voyd . the case put between two nations entring league of confederacy . the evil consequences of his opinion . plato's ingenious fable . the casuists metus ●adens . a propriety , where is no coercive power . the foundations wherein mr. hobbes builds a common wealth and the justice of it . the foole 's argument unanswerable out of mr. hobbes's principles . his doctrine more honest then mr. hobbes taking away the feare of god , an unreasonable supposition . u●certain whether taugh or learned of the other the foole or mr. hobbes . mr. hobbes's horrid supposal , of getting heaven by unjust violence . he pretends to confute the foole. but by inadvertense fights against himself . the violation of faith not ●llowed , for a kingdome . mr. hobbes mistake's the question . and changeth 〈◊〉 termes fraudulently h●re and otherwhere . he that means to deceive will not declare his intent . the bishops conclusion . mr. hobbes's illogical an●wer . another like it the law of nature give 's rules for the attaining eternal felicity afrte death . the breach of covenant though a wicked one conduceth not to eternal felicity yet such covenants ought to be broken . as that enterd into by theeves . the other by an adulteress . mr hobbes's subtilty in writing against rebelion . which cannot be by his doctrine . mr. hobbes unkind to religion in the disparagement he puts upon natural knowledge . what a perswasive the natural knowledge , or beliefe we have of eternal happinesse , is to withdraw us from our opinion of temporal felicity . the transcendent delight here in our hopes of eternal happinesse . for which we loth worldly pleasures . and welcome tortures . obj. ans. the worldly advantages in prosecuting divine happin●sse . merchant adventurer . mr. hobbes can render himself more s●cure of temporal then he seemes to be ( with little satisfaction ) of eternal felicity the promises , and oathes of men , which he make's his greatest assurance being very fallible . his scornful scale of knowledge . our evidence greater of future felicity then that ever there was such a man as julus caesar. being not only deliver'd to us by tradition , but most consonant ●o reason , in mans fell●wship with other creatures , and his excellency above them . a very chi●d requires he satisfaction of his will. a man's will satisfied wi●h no wo●ldly goods , whether b●d●ly , sensual , or intellectual . h●s knowledge ●s defective , and cannot doe it . nor ought else which is not infinite , and that infinite is god. riches doe it not , wh●ch bring with them an impatient covetousness of getting more , when men have most . man hath some imperfect knowledge of god in this life . none positively of his eminencies , but by revelation . what faith do●'s towa●d it . what dreams , visions , ecstasies &c. the severall parts acted by the understanding and the will , both which faculties are imperfect in this world . the certainty of felicity after death resum'd and proved . object . . ans. the objection answer'd , to●ching man's felic●ty in the knowledge &c. he hath , though ●mperfect . objection . answer . a second obj●ction answer'd , about eternal felicity , being the last article of our faith. the same conclusion may be the result of faith and reason . an argument to confirme this , drawn from the h. martyrs constancy in their sufferings . mr. hobbes suspected of a design , to disparage the foresaid article of our ●aith . several qualific●tions , good and bad , in the making and breaking covenants . no dammage without inju●y . the explication of commutative and dist●ibutive justice . to which is premised that of common or legal justice ▪ many acts of justice being not comprehended under the other two . argument . against an arithmeticall proportion in commutative just●ce examined . by what the price of any thing may ●e enhaunsed . the asse's head and kab of pidgeons dung in the siege of samaria . when the arithmeticall proportion must be applied to the value of the thing . . argument agai●st it answered . a judge or umpire 〈◊〉 by the rule of ●ustice . what may be due , by both kindes of justice , without covenant . the justice of an arbitrator different , according to the case . mr. hobbes 〈◊〉 nice and singular in his language . his mistake in the division of justice . in his measure of commutative . his boldnesse in confronting all the learned men before him . bod●n's cavill . his aie●y conceit of an harmonical proportion . mr. hobbes's restraint of moral philosophy . his censure of all philosophers . he forget's the distinction of a good man and a good citizen . the foundation of ethikes , oeconomikes politikes . personall and relative perfect●on how taught by philosophers . mr. hobbes's philosophy compared with that of epicurus . with that of lucretius . epicurus's excellent discourse concerning death . frugality and temporance . mr. hobbes approacheth nearer the worst of the epicureans then do the mahumetans . wherein the stoicks placed hum●ne happinesse . wherein aristotle . mr hobbes m●stake's the philosophers discou●se of moderating assions . st. pauls philosophy . of fortitude and liberality . notes for div a -e mr. hobbes's definition of a person too circumstantial . no less applicable to a feigned than a true person . person not latine . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . suppositum . person differently used in severall arts and faculties . misplaced by mr. hobbes . no man personate's himself . cicero mis-interpreted . person how taken by the criticks . boethius's definition of a person . rich. de sancto v●ctore , object 's against it . his other definition of it . more d●fficult . scotus's objections against the former . the definition explained and vindicated by the bishop . the distinction of communicable ut quod and ut qu● . reasonable , of what extent . the philosophers ●nd school-men could have r●ctified mr , h●bbes's mistake of a person . the etymologie and common a●ception of persona . not the actor , but the acted is the person . no covenant obliging to act against the law of nature with whomsoever any such is made , it must not be kept . the fi●st part of mr. hobbes's answer destroye's the second ▪ god to be obey●d before man. an instance in the hebrew midwives . who probably had covenanted . no breach of covenant which had not a right to bi●d . the true god improperly and over-boldly said to be personated . moses , though instead of god , did not personate him . nor doe kings . nor priests . how moses was instead of god to aaron . elohim . how moses was made a god to pharaoh . ho● fully soever moses had represented god , he could not personate him . the israelites how the p●ople of g●d , and how of m●ses . moses's phrase shewe's he personated not god. god was king of the israelites , moses but their judge and generall . a messenger and mediatour betwixt god and them uncomely to say , our saviour personated god. who was really god. p●●ved to be 〈◊〉 , from acts . , & . against bernard . ochinus ▪ refuted by smigl●cius . to whom sm●lcius replies having either not read or not aright understood ochinus . o●hinus deser●●d by the socinians . smalcius attempt's in vaine to evacuate the divinity of christ. christ●s blood not to be called the blood of the father , according to smiglecius . smalcius that argue's how it may . his argument urged to the farthest by the bishop . who finde's the passions ▪ not the actions of men to be called god's . the shifting genius of the socinians de — luded by a single word . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how to be translated . the text , wh●ch want's it , retorted upon the socinians . how christ is the son of god. what a son is . the particulars in the definition apply●ed to our saviour . the mysterie of our saviour's divine & humane generation signified mic. . . the bishop's observation on that text. faustus socinus answ●●'d . and valkelius . with other socinians . the text taken in pieces and vindicated from their objections . one in essence plurally expressed , when the effects are divers . christs eternal egression compared to the shining of the sun. how from the beginning may signifie from eternity . a twofold consideration of the word beginning . a or ab often denote causation● , &c. from the beginning , not to be understood , from the beginning of david's reigne . the socinians urged to a contradiction in adjecto . god's descent to man's capacity in the doctrine of his attributes . particularly that of his eternity . the discourse between ochinus and his spirit moderated by the bishop . who enlargeth upon the argument against the photinian or socinian , and the arian . the next name of our saviour , the word . socinus answerd in his explication of st. john ch. . the opin●on of ebion and cerinthus discussed . epiphanius contra haeret . tom . . cap. the shifts of the socinians . st. iohn's ●eason of his writing not solitary , as socinus alledg●th . beza's genuine lection . socinus rigula● in his ▪ but for a little consonance with tremelius . how the socinians interpret , joh. . . with re●erence to the baptist's preaching . their metaphor . and metonymie . figures never used by christ , without intimation how the text is to be understood . so that of a vine . a shepheard . a doore . his metonymies of being the truth , life , and resurrection , &c. the truth and life may be taken without a figure . christ called the word , according to none of those figures . but according to the catholick sense is the internal word of god. how aaron was moses's mouth . john baptist call'd a voice . the wo●d taken for christ in a farre different sense . not to be understood of our saviour's humanity . neither metaphorically , nor metonymically . socinus's shift . a brief paraphra●● w●●es the first 〈◊〉 in st john. a word internal and external , both of god and man. the philosophers of old call●d the son of god his word . as well they who writ after , as who before , st. john. which is yielded by socinus . their language used by the primitive fathers and st. paul. that of plato con●onant to holy job's and our saviour's in st. john. plato's de●●●lption of heaven parallel'd to that of st. john in his revelation . the words being with god signifie more th●n known to god , against socinus and h●s ●ollowers eternal life before christ's i●carnation knowne to the angel● , blessed souls , prophets , philosophers . although not till afterward , manifested to others . the ph●losophers excell the socinians in this knowledge . socinus's other text of no validity to his purpose . the discourse resumed concerning the knowledge of the word before the preaching of st. john baptist . whether in the socinian or catholick sense may be more truly said , the word was god. god , with them , no proper name , but an appellative ▪ & ● ▪ contrary to the use of it ( single ) th●oughout the new testament . how satan is called , the god of this world , &c. how the belly , god. the socinian's criticisme about the article . answered . and soci●u●'s instances . how st. cyr●ll's rule is to be understood smalcius answered about tautology . as likewise to that objection , god cannot be with himself . lo●d and god not both one . the word god with , though not of the father . the socinia●s conceit of t●e word being with god in the b●ginning improbable , having no evangelical authority . that they pretend to prove's it not . the distinction of christ's divinity and humanity illustrated . his ascent into heaven , which they insist on , not corporeal . his double capacity of priest and lay-man alledged by them , discussed . how all things were made by him ▪ st. john's method very considerable against the socinians interpretation . which is such as permit's the more truth to be in the negative propositions opposite to those in holy scripture . christ's interest in the c●eati●n reinforced against the socinians glosse wherein he was a principal ▪ no bare instrumental cause . their other slight objection answered . the use of words . the benefit of tradition . how life eternall , and what else is to be understood . ver . . h●w both that , and the naturall life is said to be the light of men . how christ is called the l●ght , according to socinus . how according to the bishop . what 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifie's properly , and why rendred was . why the evangelist chose to use it , rather then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , writing of st. john baptist . socinus put 's a diminution upon st. john's testimony of christ. which is evidently affirmat●ve of his divinity . socinus misinterprets creation by recreation , or regeneration . and in supplie's to his purpose a text in the epistle to the ephesians . another violence of his in wresting actuall regeneration to regeneration in endeavour . smalcius's g●o●●e . his various significations put upon the word [ world. ] wherein he imposeth fallacies upon his reader . the bishop's animadversions . 〈◊〉 sense ●irectly opposite to that evident in the text. the genuine sense of the terms not changed , as they object . smalcius's reply to smeglecius . little b●c●ming a socinian . the world knew not the wo●d , but by supernaturall grace . what men app●ehend of god by naturall abilities . the objection about saint joh●'s upbraiding the world answered . the exposition of the words immediately following , why omitted . the socinians word cou●d not be made fl●sh . their evasion . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 & 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 how used in the beginning of st. john's gospell . their heterodox interpretation of flesh . not evident in scripture . cited by socinus . the result of their comment . the summe of ours . the union of the divin●ty with the humanity implieth no mutation of god into man. notwithstanding the pred●cation , god is man ▪ wh●ch is asserted , ●nd by a familliar instance illustrated . their objection . answer'd by the dependa●●● of substances up on god. another argument of smalcius's . answer'd by the manner of existing . christ a true man ▪ though a divine pers●n . whose conception and gestation in the blessed virgin 's w●mb conduced nothing to his personality . the divinity an humanity uni●ed render him neither two sons nor two persons . object . of his being the same god with the father and the holy ghost . answer ▪ which identity implies not that they were made fl●sh with him . as scotus illust●ate's excellently . the bishop's apology to the reader . sm●lcius's fi●st q●erie , &c. rectifyed . answered . all actions not alwayes necessari●y according to the nature of him , or that which act 's . smalius's second querie answe●ed and frustrated . his third querie answered , with reference to the discourse before concerning the incarnation of the father and holy ghost . our saviour's mission derogate's nothing from the authori●y and plenitude of power in himself . wh●ch he exercised in giving commission to his apostles . the socinian's opinion of the holy ghost . confuted , and this proved , that he is a distinct person of the trinity , not a mere attribute of the deity . no● the gospel o● christ , as they pretend out of holy scripture . not the gift of god to certain men , but by a figure . a defiance to them that call for reason in these mysteries . which notwithstanding may be subservienr to faith. c●rthag●na's l●tle lesse then blasphemous , intimating god's power of enlarging the capac●ty of his creature . what of god to be proved by reason , and by whom to be attempted . aquinas's first argument against the possibility to attain by naturall reason any knowledge of the trinity . the bishop's answer grounded upon lulli's demonstrat●on by aequiparance . aquinas's second argum. the bishop's first answer concerning the invisible objects of faith. the bishop's second answer concerning the after-sight of reason . his third argument from scorn and sc●ndal . answer'd by the adherence to infallibility of scripture . trigosius and carthagena passed by . truth not oppos'd to truth . the bishop close●h with raymund lully , whom he vindicateth against vasques . and aymericus , who make's him an haeretick . his advice to the pope and cardinal about convert●ng the saracens . hi● devout enterprize according to it , w●th successe . his like adventure among the 〈◊〉 . their cruel sentence and execution frustrated by his strange deliverance . the notable eff●ct of his sufferings . lully's undertaking according to v●sques . whose arguments he recite's and forme's . the first prove's a personal plurality by concord . another from equality , distinction . vasques's first answer , excepting against the supposi●ion of a reall effective act in god. the bishop's r●ply , that lul●y not only supp●s●d but proved it . his lordship's explanation of lully's sense by the necessity of god's acting somewhat from all eternity or being idle , which could n●t be . vasques chargeth lully with a m●stake of a formal cause for an efficient . who is m●staken by him ▪ and the cause proved no less efficient then formal . the discourse drawn into perfect syllogisme prov●ng the eternall plurality of persons by production . the objection urging , the angel cannot produce the like effect answer'd ▪ vasqu●s's satisfact●●y answer● to lully's arguments for his second conclusion . the b●shop proceed's upon other grounds of his to prove the trinity . god's infinite simplici●y and uni●y . his spiritual faculties understand●ng and will. himself the infinite obj●ct of his understanding . which is eternally productive of his internal word . and that word subst●●ti●● , the same with himself . the bishop guided to this discovery by scripture as the wise-men by a s●ar . god's will as fruitful by love as hi● understanding by knowledge . and so productive of a third person , which is likewise god. these divine productions not to be multiplyed , because infinite , by which an objection's answered . the objection made by the assertors of the greek church answered , accord●ng to the sense of the catholick , touching the procession of the holy ghost . illustrated by a similitude to facilitate in part our apprehension of it . how the three divine persons must necessarily be father , son , and holy spirit . why they are called three persons ▪ being no scripture-language , and ●ow , long ago , debated by st. august●ne . the extent or limits of this personal disti●ction the bish●p ●eve●ently forbear's to determ●ne . and disl●ke's the rash curiosity of the school-men . his lordship's apology for undertaking to handle the question by reason . and seldom quoting the fathers . a digression to the reader . select aphor●smes out of which the author draw's his discourse . a good foundation of his to build upon . his noble quae●e . animadversions upon his ambiguous sense , touching the conservation of life . his study of it as to his own particular . all men may not have like reason to be so intent . the parts and faculties of men not to be levelled with those of beasts . the publick interest to be prefer'd and preserv'd before the personal or more private . what right a man hath to the m●a●s of preservi●g life , and how he is to use them . each particular man cannot pretend a right to the whole world . nor to things conducing onely to mediate and particular ends . the danger of pretending a right to all , and so having a right judgment of it . two cannot have a right to the same thing at the same time . all cannot be usefull to one particular perperson . nor every thing to ev●ry one . of which no right judgment can be made for want of knowledge . the use of some known interdicted to whom hurtful . o●her rule● by which to instit●te a right judgment beside reason . how all creatures are granted to man's us● limited . hi● impossible sup●osition . his fal●acy à b●ne divisi● , &c. the equality of right no argument that each man hath a right to all . the case of necessity imply's no such universal right . nor dissolution of any common-wealth . an objection fram'd by the author . a second of his not so strong . the first but weakly answer'd by him without regard to god's end . his first argument for universal right returning , extreme necessity . the bishop's severall answers to it . his second argument for ancient right in a lawfull defense . how the force o● invalidity of this argument m●y be understood , and how the practice moderated . his objection , and answer . the bishop's animadversions shewing the difference between just 〈…〉 invasion , & sta●ing the r●ght of poss●ssion . fear entitle's a man to nothing but a guard of himself . propriety withou● covenant . the r●ght to good● gotten by conquest what . his third argument . the bish●p's answer from the fallibili●y of judgm●nt . his argument against the right of occupancy . which the bishop shew's to hold well against covenant . what is the r●ght in necessity . discovery 〈◊〉 not an equal right with occupancy . the imparity of swift and slow not considerable in the case . the author 's two propositions destructive to humane society ; and trade . the difficulty of discerning different titles to goods and estates . little peace to be expected if that of occupancy be not allowed . the learned and loyal abraham cowley's definition of a tyrant (published by the present lord bishop of rochester) in his discourse concerning the government of oliver cromwell. cowley, abraham, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page image. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing c a estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the learned and loyal abraham cowley's definition of a tyrant (published by the present lord bishop of rochester) in his discourse concerning the government of oliver cromwell. cowley, abraham, - . broadside. [s.n.], london printed : . "reprinted, with 'several queries...', as an attack on james ii."--nuc pre- imprints. reproduction of original in the harvard university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng despotism. political science. great britain -- politics and government -- - . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the learned and loyal abraham cowley's definition of a tyrant , ( published by the present lord bishop of rochester ) in his discourse concerning the government of oliver cromwell . i call him a tyrant , who either intrudes himself forcibly into the government of his fellow-citizens , without any legal authority over them , or who , having a just title to the government of a people , abuses it to the destruction or tormenting of them : so that all tyrants are at the same time usurpers , either of the whole , or at least of a part of that power which they assume to themselves , and no less are they to be accounted rebels , since no man can usurp authority over others , but by rebelling against them who had it before , or at least against those laws which were his superiours . several queries proposed to the sages of the law , who have studied to advance the publick , equally with , if not more than their own private interest . q. i. whether the legislative power be in the king only , as in his politick capacity , or in the king , lords , and commons , in parliament assembled ? if in the latter , then q. ii. if the king grants a charter , and thereby great franchises and priviledges , and afterwards , the grantees obtain an act of parliament for the confirmation hereof , is this the grant of the king , or of the parliament ? if the latter , as it seems to be , because it is done by the whole , and every part of the legislative power , then q. iii. to whom can these grantees forfeit this charter ? and who shall take advantage of the forfeiture ? if the king , then an act of parliament may be destroyed without an act of parliament . if the parliament only can call them to an account , then q. iv. of what validity is a iudgment pronounced ( under a colour of law ) in b. r. against a charter granted by parliament ? if it be of any force , then the king's bench is superiour to the legislative power of the kingdom ; if not , then q. v. what reason can be assigned , why it is not as safe to act pursuant to an act of parliament , notwithstanding a iudgment entred in the king's bench , as it was to act against an act of parliament , before the iudgment was entered ? and then , q. vi. whether they that did the latter , were not right down knaves , and whether they that refuse to do the former , be not more nice than wise ? london : printed in the year . bibliotheca politica: or an enquiry into the ancient constitution of the english government both in respect to the just extent of regal power, and the rights and liberties of the subject. wherein all the chief arguments, as well against, as for the late revolution, are impartially represented, and considered, in thirteen dialogues. collected out of the best authors, as well antient as modern. to which is added an alphabetical index to the whole work. bibliotheca politica. tyrrell, james, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing t estc p this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) bibliotheca politica: or an enquiry into the ancient constitution of the english government both in respect to the just extent of regal power, and the rights and liberties of the subject. wherein all the chief arguments, as well against, as for the late revolution, are impartially represented, and considered, in thirteen dialogues. collected out of the best authors, as well antient as modern. to which is added an alphabetical index to the whole work. bibliotheca politica. tyrrell, james, - . [ ], p. , p. , [ ], , [ ], - , [ ], - , [ ], - , [ ], - , [ ], - , [ ], - , [ ], - , [ ], - , [ ] p. printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane, near the oxford-arms where may be had the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelvth, and thirteenth dialogues, london : . attributed by wing to james tyrrell. signatures: pi⁴ a-i⁴ ² a² k-s⁴ t² u- d⁴ e² f- m⁴ n- s² t- e⁴ ³a⁵ ² b-c⁴ i- n⁴ o¹ p- o⁴ chi² p- l⁴ n- u⁴ x² y- f⁴ ⁴a⁴ h- p⁴ ³b-i² . each of the thirteen dialogues and the index have a separate dated title page with the dates ranging from - . with an index and errata at end of text. reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion advertisement . the author hath thought fit for the reasons he hath given you , to alter the method he laid down in his preface to the first dialogue , and to propose the subjects he treats of in this following method . bibliotheca politica : or an enquiry into the ancient constitution of the english government ; both in respect to the just extent of regal power , and the rights and liberties of the subject . wherein all the chief arguments , as well against , as for the late revolution , are impartially represented , and considered , in thirteen dialogues . collected out of the best authors , as well antient as modern . to which is added an alphabetical index to the whole work. london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms where may be had the first , second , t●ird , fourth , fifth , sixth , seventh , eighth , ninth , tenth , eleventh , twelvth , and thirteenth dialogues , . the questions debated in the ensuing dialogues . whether monarchy be iure divino , dialogue the first . whether there can be made out from the natural , or revealed law of god , any succession to crowns by divine right ? dialogue the second . whether resistances of the svpream power , by a whole nation , or people , in cases of the last extremity can be justified by the law of nature , or rules of the gospel . dialogue the third . whether absolute non resistances of the svpream powers be enjoyned by the doctrine of the gospel , and was the ancient practice of the primitive church , and the constant doctrine of our regormed church of england . dialogue the fourth . whether the king be the sole supream legislative power of the kingdom ; and whether our great councils or parliaments , be a fundamental part of the government , or else proceeded from the favour and concessions of former kings . dialogue the fifth . whether the commons of england , represented by knights , citizens , and burgesses in parliament , were one of the three estates in parliament before the th of henry iii. or th of edw. i. dialogue the sixth . whether the commons of england , represented by knights , citizens , and burgesses in parliament , were one of the three estates in parliament , before the th of henry iii. or th of edw. i. th● second par●● dialogue the seven●h . a continuation ●f t●e former discourse , conc●rn●ng the antiquity of the commons in parliament , wherein the best authorities for it are proposed and examined . with an entrance upon the question of non resistance . the third part , dialogue the eighth . whether by the ancient laws , and constitutions of this kingdom , as well as by the statutes of the th and th of king charles the ii. all resistance of the king , or of those commissioned by him , are expresly forbid , upon any pretence whatsoever . and also , whether all those who assisted , his present majesty king william , either before , or after his coming over , are guilty of the breach of this law. dialogue the ninth . i. whether a king of england can ever fall from , or forfeit his royal dignity for any breach of an original contract , or wilful violation of the fundamental laws of the kingdom . ii. whether king william ( commonly stiled the conquerour ) did by the conquest acquire such an absolute unconditioned right to the crown of this realm , for himself , and his heirs , as can never be lawfully resisted ; or forfeited for any male-administration , or tyranny whatever . dialogue the tenth . i. in what sense all civil power is derived from god , and in what sense may be also from the people . ii. whether his present majesty king william , when prince of orange , had a just cause of war against king iames the ii. iii. whether the proceedings of his present majesty , before he was king , as also of the late convention , in respect of the said king iames , is justifiable by the law of nations , and the constitution of our government . dialogue the eleventh . i. whether the vote of the late convention , wherein they declared the throne to be vacant , can be justified from the ancient constitution , and customs of this kingdom . ii. whether the said convention declaring king william and queen mary to be lawful and rightful king and queen of england , may be justified by the said constitution . iii. whether the act passed in the said convention after it became a parliament , whereby roman catholick princes are debarred from succeeding to the crown , was according to law. dialogue the twelfth . i. whether an oath of allegiance may be taken to a king or queen de facto , or for the time being . ii. what is the obligation of such an oath , whether to an actual defence of their title against all persons whatsoever , or else to a bare submission to their power . iii. whether the bishops who refused to take the oath of allegiance to their present majesties , could be lawfully deprived of their bishopricks . dialogue the thirteenth . advertisement . the author writing these dialogue purely for the discovery of truth , and for giving a full and impartial account of all the considerable arguments and authorities that have been urged on either side , in the controversies discussed in the foregoing dialogues ; if therefore any person who having perused them , is dissatisfied with any of the arguments , answers , or authorities there made use of , and supposes he could confute them , or else put better in their stead , if such persons do not think it worth while to write a treatise on purpose on this subject , they may ( if they please ) send their animadversions to the publisher of these dialogues , who will undertake to communicate them to the author , who hereby also engages to publish them fairly , without any alterations , or additions ; together with his answers or replys to them , if the subject will admit it ; the persons concerned , may follow the method used in the foregoing appendix of additions , but are desired to send in their animadversions by the beginning of next michaelmas term , when ( if sent ) they shall be publish'd . bibliotheca politica : or a discourse by way of dialogue , whether monarchy be ivre divino : collected out of the most approved authors , both antient and modern . dialogue the first . london , printed for richard baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms . the epistle dedicatory . to all impartial and unprejudiced readers , especially those of our hopeful and ingenious nobility , and gentry .. having , out of curiosity , for some years before the late wonderful happy revolution , as well a● since , for the satisfaction of my own conscience , carefully perused all treatises of any value that have been published of late years concerning the original , and rights of civil government , a● well of monarchy , a● the other kinds thereof ; as also of the antient government , and fundamental constitutions of this kingdom , i have found it necessary in order to my better retaining of what i had read , and making a more certain iudgment thereupon , to commit to writing the most considerable arguments on both sides , as well of those who have monarchy to be jure devino , as of those who only allow it to government in general ; of those who hold an absolute subjection , or passive obedience ( as their phrase is ) as well as of those who hold resistance in some cases necessary : of those that maintain our monarchy to have been limitted , by the very constitution it self , & of those that suppose all our rights , and liberties , 〈◊〉 the very being of parliaments themselves , to owe their original wholly to the gracious concession , and favour of our former kings . having made some impartial collections of this nature , i showed them to some friends , who told me they thought they might prove of great use for the satisfying of some mens doubts and scruples concerning lawful obedience to the government of their present majesties , as looking upon it as the best and most ingenious way of conviction to propose the arguments fairly on both sides , without interposing my own iudgment , but to leave it to the intelligent , and impartial reader to embrace that side on which he found the most rational and convincing arguments : this task , tho' troublesome enough , i was prevail'd with to undertake , not for fame's sake , since i do not desire to be known ; but meerly for the puplick good and happiness of my country ; but being also satisfied that a subject of this great important deserved more pains than what i had yet bestowed upon it , and to be handled in a more artificial method , than the old dry sch●lastick way of objection , and solution : i therefore thought that it would prove more pleasant , as well as profitable for the readers ( especially those of our young nobility and gentry , for whom i principally design this undertaking ) to digest all that i had written on these subjects into so many distinct dialogues , or conversations , supposed to be held between two intimate friends , who , notwithstanding their different principles and opinions in politicks , had always maintained a strict and generous correspondency : but i was the more inclined to this way of writing , not only because i have observed that controversial matters written by way of dialogue , according to the true rules thereof , have very well obtained among all intelligent readers ; but also since the subjects i treat of are of a nice nature , and that the collections i had made contained strict inquiries into the principles , and ten●●s , in the writings of diverse persons of reputation for learning , and ingenuity ; i was sensible how invidicus a t●●k it must be to write on purpose against so many great men , as also how troublesom and ●edious is would prove to my self , as well as the readers , to pursue and confute the opinions of any author page by page , since it must be chiefly imputed to that mannar of managing of controversies , that answers to books prove so unacceptable to the world. and though i grant that this way of writing hath also its difficulties and objections , as being more diffu●ive , and so taking up more time both to write and read discourses dialogue-wise ; where either one or other of the disputants 〈◊〉 often apt to rove from the subject ; ye● i must also affirm , that this may be in great part prevented by the writer , who may , if he plea●●● take care to keep close to the question , and not start afresh , har● , 〈◊〉 the old one is run down ; and a● for the diffusiveness of dialogues above polemical discourses , that is no considerable objection , since a man may either make , or answer objections in almost as few words this way as the other . and thô it be granted that matter of ●een form in dialogues the more tedious , yet the reader , as well as traveller , will find that the 〈◊〉 of the road often 〈…〉 for its 〈◊〉 somewhat 〈◊〉 . but whether i have truly put 〈◊〉 the rules of dialogue in that , 〈◊〉 the ●●suing discourses i intend to publish on these subjects , ti●●st 〈◊〉 to the readers . iudgment ; but this much i think i may safely affirm that i have carefuly avoided all bitter , & reflecting language on either side , since i designe these discourses for common places of ar●gi●●●●nt●● no● forms of 〈◊〉 . and i have also declined showing my self a party , or giving my own opinion in any question proposed , and therefore i have 〈…〉 either 〈◊〉 my disputants converting each other to his own opinion ; since i know nothing is more easie in writing of dialogues , well as romances , than to make the knight efrane always beat the gyant . but it is fit i give you some account of this present ▪ discourse , as also of the rest that may follow it . this first dialogue then 〈◊〉 chiefly on this 〈◊〉 . whether any particular spec●es of government is of divine right , or institution ● the next shall be , whether there can be made out from the natural , or revealed law of god any succession to crowns by divine right ? the third and fourth , whether passive obedience ( as it is called ) or an absolute nonresistance of the supream powers , in any case whatsoever , be enjoyed by the law of nature , and the holy scriptures ? as also , whether this hath always been the doctrine of our reformed church of england ? the fifth concerns the original of civil authority , in what sense it is derived from god , and in what form the people , and whether their consent be always necessary to make any government to be obeyed for conscience sake ? the sixth shall treat of the original , and fundamental constitution of our english government , whether it was an absolute or limited monarchy in its first institution ; and whether the king is , and hath been the sole legislative power of the nation ? the seventh , whether the parliament , or great counsel , owe its orignal to the meer grace , and favour of our kings , or whether it is not as antient as the constitution it self ? the eighth and last , whether our late revolution , and the conventions and present parliament's declaration , and recognition of their present majesties k. william and q. mary , be not legal , and according to the antient constitution , and fundamental gov●rnment of this kingdom ? and consequently , whether the oath of allegiance may not be taken to them , not only as king and q. de facto but de iure ? in all which discourses i have considered and contracted the best arguments that i could find made use of by the most considerable both antient and modern authors , either in latine , or english , especially the pamphlets that have been writ on either side since the late revolution : but as for those in our own language , when-ever any author speaks so well , and argues so closely , that to put it into other words would make it worse , i have still put the arguments of either one , or other of the disputants in his own word , thô , because i would not be thought guilty of plagiary , i have truly quoted the book and page from whence i took it , and i hope no author will take it ill , if i have made bold sometimes to contract their arguments , without altering their sense , or words farther , than by putting in or out a word or expression to make the style run the more smoothly , and i desire they would not think i write on purpose to confute them : since i freely declare my design is not to write against any man's opinions , as they are his , but only freely to examine them , in order to an impartial discovery of the truth ; and since some of them may have been perhaps , too commonly , and favourably received by our ordinary gentry and clergy , if therefore any ingenious person will take upon him farther to assert or vindicate any opinion here questioned either by the one or other of our disputants , and will clearly , and fairly shew me where my argument might 〈◊〉 been put more home , or any objection more solidly answered , shall be so far from taking it amiss , that i shall rather give him my thanks for his pains ; and do here farther promise to insert all , or at least the substance of his arguments under their poper heads , with all due acknowledgments to their authors , if ever the discourses will bear a second impression ; only i desire him , whosoever he shall be , so far to imitate the gentlemen who are supposed to converse in these dialogues , as to for . bear all rude reflections , and course language , otherwise i hope they will give me their pardon if i only take notice of their reasons , and pass by their passion . nor would i have any candid reader to slight the two first dialogues , because they treat of opinions at present out of fashion . viz. the divine right of monarchy and succession from the patriarchal power given by god to adam , since you may easily remember that it is not many years ago , that our pulpits and presses would scarce suffer any other doctrines either to be preacht or publisht , than on these subjects : it faring with some political opinions , as with fashions , which are never so generally received , and worn , as when they have been in vogue at court. those divines and lawyers who were the first inventers , or new vampers of them , commonly receiving the greatest rewards and prefermets , who ( as the court taylors did fashions ) could invent such doctrines , and opinions , as were most burthensome , and uneasie to all sort of people , except a few great ones , who were to gain by them ; and i desire you also farther to consider , that however odd , or unreasonable these doctrines may seem to most men , yet certainly they must have , at least , a great appearance of truth , since they were able to captivate the reasons of the major part of both houses of convocation in the begining of the reign of king james the first , they then declaring them by several cannons , made on purpose , the only sure foundations of all civil authority , as also of obedience thereunto ; as plainly appears by that late treatise which goes under the name of bishop overal's convocation-book . and thô neither the king , nor parliament , then thought fit to give those cannons the stamp of civil authority , whereby they might become laws : yet for all this , it did not hinder divers learned , and ingenious men , as well of clergy , as laity , from embracing these opinions , such as were sir robert filmer , and his vindicatior mr. b. as also the most reverend and learned bishop sanderson , with divers others of note , whose arguments i have made use of , and considered in the two first dialogues , and that in a way as little reflective as possible ; since i know what is due to the memory and fame of such great , and worthy persons ; and therefore i have only made use of the initial letters of their names , or titles of their books in the margine , with an index at the beginning of each discourse , shewing what book each mark does signifie ; which method i have persued through all the rest of these discourses ; and of what is not so mark● , i desire the reader to look upon the words , if not the sense , to be my own ; since i do not pretend to be an inventer of new notions in politicks , and there is no man more sensible than my self of that old latine sentence , nihil dictum , quod non dictum prius . but tho' i have already finisht almost all the discourses , on the subjects above mentioned , yet am i not very fond of publishing them , after so many several treatises that have been written thereon ; tho' my design be for the saving of the readers money as well as time , to reduce what is material in all of them into so many d. books , and therefore i have at present published this first dialogue , as an introduction to the rest , that according to the success i find this meets with abroad , i may be more , or less encouraged to proceed● nor ●eed it seem strange to any considering person , that i chuse rather to publish one discourse at a time ; since it is but too publick a complaint how scarce a commodity money ( as well as paper ) is at this time . and therefore i have given the printer leave to publish one of these discourses in a month , or oftner , as he shall think good , since i am sensible the greatest part of common reader would rather part with eight or ten shilling● at so many several times , than all at once ; and have therein endeavoured to imitate the great council of the nation , who have thought fit to divide the present pole-tax into four quarterly payments . i have but one thing more to advertise the reader ; viz. that tho' the title of this discourse mentions no more than the discussing the question divine right of monarchy , yet the natural powers of fathers , and masters of families , and freemen , are here dis●inctly treated of , and closely enquired into , as being the first elements , or principles of all civil powers , as those alone out of which they could be at first regularly made , and into which they are upon the dissolution of civil governments again to be resolved . to conclude therefore , i hope that the arguments in this , and all the following discourses , may prove so plai● and convincing to all careful , and unprejudiced readers , that they may as easily discover the truth , as an honest unbyass'd iury-man can a● a tryal judge on which side the right and iustice of the cause inclines , upon the barehearing the evidence on both sides ; nay , even before the court hath summed it up : since , i think it may prove more useful , as well as divertive , to hear , or peruse the arguments , and reasons , in short , that may be brought o● either side , and thereon to pass a judgment , than to read over the tedious and voluminous de●ds , and evidences of the estate in question ; but on which side soever you bring in your verdict , i heartily wish that god would direct your minds , and guide your iudgments to find out and embrace the truth , which as it was the only end of my writing , so it is now and will be also of publishing this and those other treatises , i intend on the subjects i have before mentioned . adieu . the subject of the first dialogue . whether hereditary monarchy be of divine right or institution ? authors made use of in this dialogue , and how denoted in the margin . . sir robert filmers's . . observations on grotius de belli & pa●u . r. f. o. g. . patriarcha f. p. . anarchy of mixt or limited monarchy . f. a. m m. . preface to the observations on aristotle f. p. o. . directions for obedience to governours . d. o. g. . mr. bohun's preface to sir robert filmer's patriarcha . b. p. p. his conclusion to the same . b. c. p. . patriarcha non monarcha . p. n. m. . grotius de iure belli & pacis . g. i. b. . pufendorf de iure naturae & gentium . p. i. n. . two treatises of government . t. t. g. . rushworth's historical collections . r. h. c. . bishop sanderson's preface to the power of the prince , &c. b. s. p. p. adertisement . i desire always to be understood , that when i make use of the word people , i do not mean the vulgar or mixt multitude , but in the state of nature the whole body of free-men and women , especially the fathers and masters of families ; and in a civil state , all degrees of men , as well the nobility and clergy , as the common people . the first dialogue between mr. freeman , a gentleman , and mr. meanwell , a civil lawyer , supposed to be immediately upon the late king iames's first departure . f. good morrow sir , what ! at your study thus early this morning . m. that is no wonder , if you were acquainted with my hours : but pray sir , may i not likewise ask you what extraordinary occasion brings you out of your lodgings so much sooner than your ordinary time ? f. why sir , i 'll tell you : being awake very early this morning , and not able to sleep for thinking on the great change , that might happen , let either the king or prince get the better : and hearing some odd rumours last night of the king's intentions to go away : i was resolved to get up , and go to the coffee-house , to hear what news ; where i had scarc● sat● down , before a gentleman comes in from whitehall , and brings us a certain account , that the king withdrew himself this morning between three and four of the clock , no body knows whither , ( tho' most believe he is gone after the queen into france ) which i thought would be so surpri●ing ( i will not say welcome ) to you , that being so near your lodgings , i thought it would be worth while to step up , and tell you of it , and take your thoughts of this great ( and i hope happy ) change , which so great a revolution is likely to produce in this nation . m. i thank you , sir , for your kindness , tho' it is not half an hour ago , that one i employ in some business relating to a client of mine , came hither , and gave me the same account that you do , tho' it was no great surprize to me , for ever since sunday that the king sent the queen and prince away , i believ'd that he gave the game for lost . f. i must confess i was of another mind , and thought that when he had secured the queen and child , he would have had one brush with the prince before he could have got to london , and if he had the worst of i● , he could have but gone away at last . but to leap away on this manner , and to loose three kingdoms without ever striking one stroke , it is not , i confess , sutable to that high character his admirer have always had of his courage and conduct . m. alas ! good king what would you have him do ? or whom could he relye on ? when some of his near relations , and divers of those whom he had raised almost from nothing had deserted him ? how could he then trust an army of mercenaries , who being most of them but the dregs of the people , would , it is likely , rather have delivered him up to the prince , than have ventured their lives for him . f. what you have said concerning his majesties relations and confidents deserting him , makes rather against than for the king's cause ; since it cannot be supposed they would have left a prince to whom they were so much obliged , to joyn themselves with his enemy , from whom they had no reason to expect greater advantages , than they had already , unless they had been satisfied in their conscience● that the protestant religion establisht in these nations , and also our civil rights and liberties were in imminent danger of being utterly lost and destroyed ; and tho' i grant that some of the king's officers and souldiers went over to the prince ; yet considering how few they were , that did so , not being ( as i am credibly informed ) above seven or eight hundred men at the most ; and what great numbers of men he had left with him , he might methings , have turned out those officers , he suspected , and put others in their rooms , who would have engaged to live and die with him , and if this would ●ot have done , he might have sent those regiments he most suspected back to london : and then reckoning the scotch and irish forces that came lately over , besides the papists he had in his army , and those who having more courage , than conscience , could never expect to fight for a prince , who would pay them better : i am confident ( if this had been done ) he migh after the going over of those few troups , have made up as good , if not a better army than the princes ; and so need not have scampored last week from salisbury in that haste he did , whilst the enemy was near fifty miles off . but as it is , i am very well satisfied with all that hath happen'd in this great revolution , and convinced of the truth of that old saying ▪ ques perdora vult iupiter , demantat pri●● . m. so far i go along with you , that god doth often make use of the wickedness and treachery of men , to bring his great designs about ▪ but whether god hath ordained this great revolution , as you call it , for a deliverance or punishment to this nation , i am yet in doubt , for if you please to consider how much those two causes have contributed to this turn of affairs , i suppose if you argue according to my principles we must own that tho' this change hath happened by gods permissive providence , ( as all things else tho' never so ill ) yet whether he doth approve of ●ll that hath been done to procure it , i much doubt ; since if divers of our nobility , with some of our clergy had not quitted their doctrines of passive obedience , and non resistance , so long owned by the church of england , this revoluion could not have happened at all , or at least not so suddenly , as it did : so that indeed i must confess , i am not only grieved at his majesties hard fortune , but also stand amazed , and cannot but reflect with wonder on the strange vicissitude of worldly affairs , to see a great king , who but last week commanded a powerful army of more than forty thousand men forced out of his throne , and made to fly his kingdom by a prince that did not bring half that number into the field . and who can sufficiently bewail the king's misfortunes , who hath been at once betrayed by the ill advice of his counsellors , the treachery of his friends , and tho cowardice of his souldiers ? f. methinks sir. there is no such great cause of wonder , much less of concern in all this : for who can much admire that a prince should be thus used , who had not only provok'd a powerful enemy to invade him from abroad , but ( by industriously labouring to introduce popery and arbitrary government at home ) had lost the hearts of almost all , except his popish subjects , insomuch that many of his own souldiers were so terrified with the thoughts of being discarded ( like the protestant army in ireland ) to make room for irish and french papists , that they had very little courage to fight , when they saw casheering was the best reward they could expect , if they proved victorious : and who can much pity a prince , who would rather loose the affections of his people , than displease a few priests and jesuites : so that if he suffers he may thank himself ; it not being religion , but superstition , which brought this misfortune upon him . since the king having got a prince of wales , and ( as it is highly suspected ) joined himself in a strict league with france for the extirpation of hereticks , it laid an absolute necessity upon the prince of orange to come over , that by the assistance of the states of holland , he might not only relieve us , but vindicate his own , and her royal highness his princess●s right to the succession , and secure his countrey from a dangerous and powerful invasion , which it was threatned with both by sea and land , whenever the kings of france and england should be at leisure to joyn their forces to make war upon them ; which you know all europe hath expected for above these two years last past . m. these things were somewhat , if they could be proved ; but indeed , to deal freely with you , i look upon this league , and the story of the suppositious birth of the prince of wales , as meer calumnies cast out of wicked and crafty men to render the king more odious to his people . f. nay , sir , you don't hear me positively affirm , either the one or the other ; since i grant they are not yet made out ; but whatsoever will consider all the circumstances of the birth of this child cannot but be strongly inclined to believe it an imposture , notwithstanding all the depositions that are taken to the contrary . and as for the french league , you may be sure if there be any such thing , it is kept very private ; and yet i must tell you there are very high and violent presumptions to believe it true , or else why should the king of france in a late memorial to the pope , complain that his holiness by opposing his interest in europe had hindered him in those great designs he had for the extirpation of heresie , by which he must surely intend england or holland ; protestantism being sufficiently expelled out of his own countrey already . and he could not do it in either of the other without the consent and assistance of his brother the king of england ? or to what purpose should the king of england joyn with france to ruin holland , and his own son in law into the bargain , but to make a war meerly for religion ; since neither the dutch , nor the prince their stadt-holder , gave him till now any just provocation ? m. well , however , these are but bare suspitions and presumptions , at most , and not proofs ; and therefore in a doubtful matter , as this is , if we ought to judge favourably of the actions of others , much more of princes , whose councils and actions , tho' private , yet are still exposed to the censure and calumnies of their enemies , and therefore i hope you will not blame me , if i freely confess , that i am deeply concerned to see an innocent and misled king forced to seek his bread in a forreign land , and the more , since many of the nobility , gentry and common people have contributed so much to it , by taking up arms against him ; and that so great a part of his own army , and officers should contrary to their allegiance and trust reposed in them , run over to the enemy . nay , that some of our bishops and clergy-men should , contrary to the so often acknowledged doctrines of passive● obedience and non-resistance , not only countenance , but be likewise active in such desperate undertakings , and this in-direct opposition to the known laws of god and this kingdom ; which must needs make our church a scorn to our enemies the papists , and a shame and reproach to all protestant churches abroad , and render the people of england odious to all the crowned heads in europe . f. well , sir , i see you are very warm , and i hope , more than the cause deserves . you may judge as favourably of the king's proceedings , and as hardly of the actions of the nobility , gentry , clergy and people in this matter as you please . but yet i think i can make it as clear as the day , that they have done nothing by joining in arms with he prince of orange , but what is justifiable by the principles of self preservation , the fundamental constitutions of the government , and a just zoal for their religion and civil liberties , as they stand secured by our laws ; unless you would give the king a power of making up papists , and slaves whenever he pleased . but as for your doctrine of an absolute obedience without reserve , and the divine right of monarchy and succession , you need not be much concerned whether the papists laugh at you or no , since there are very few of them ( if any ) who are such fools themselves as to believe such futilous opinions . but indeed they have more reason to laugh at you whilst you maintain , than when you quit them ; since as they have only rendered you a fit object of their scorn , so they would have made you but a more cas●● sacrifice to their malice . for what can thieves desire more , than that those they design to rob , should think it unlawful to resist them ? and what could the papists have wisht for more , than that our hands being fotterred by this doctrine of an indefinite passive-obedience , our lives , religion and liberties should lye at their mercy ; which how long we should have enjoyed , whenever they thought themselves ●●rong enough to take them away , the late cruel persecutions , and extirpations of the protestants in france , savey , hungary , and other places have proved but too fatal examples , and therefore no wonder ( let your high-flown church-men write or preach what they please ) if the body of the nobility , gentry , and people of england could never be perswaded to swallow doctrines so fatal to their religion , and destructive to their civil rights and liberties both as mon and christians . and as for the antiquity of these doctrines , i think they are so far from being the antient tenets of the church of england , that they are neither to be found in its chatechism , thirty nine articles , or book of homilies , taken in their true sense and meaning ; thô indeed there is something that may tend that way in some of the late church-canons about fifty years ago , but i do not look upon them as the antient establisht doctrine of our church , because these canons are not confirmed , but condemned by two acts of parliaments , and consequently never legally established as they ought to be by the publick saction of the king and nation ? our old queen elix divines , such as bishop bilson and mr. hooker being wholly ignorant of these doctrines , nay , teaching in several places of their writings the quite contrary . no● was this doctrine of absolute subjection , and non-resistance ever generally maintained , until about the middle of king iame's reign , when some court bishops and divines began to make new discoveries in politicks as well as divinity , and did by their preaching and writings affirm that the king had an absolute power over mens estates . so that it was unlawful in any case to disobey or resist his personal command● , if they were not directly contrary to the law of god , as may appear by dr. hars●et then bishop of chichester , his sermon upon this text , give unto caesar the things that are caesar's , wherein he maintained , that all the subjects goods and money were caesar's , that is , the kings , and therefore were not to be denied him if he demanded them for the publick use ; which sermon , ( thô order'd by the lords and commons to be burnt by the hangman ) yet was so grateful to the court , that he was so far from being out of favour for it , that he was not long after translated to norwich , and from thence to the archbishoprick of york . so likewise about the beginning of the reign of king charles the first , dr. manwaring preached before him , the substance of whose sermon was somewhat higher than the former , ( viz. ) that the king was not bound by the laws of the land , not to impose taxes or subsidies without the consent of parliament , and that when they were so imposed , the subjects were oblieged in conscience , and upon pain of damnation to pay them ; which if they refused to do they were guilty of disloyalty and rebelion . for which sermon he was impeacht by the commons in parliament . car. i ▪ and thereupon sentenced by the house of lords , to be disabled to hold or receve any ecclesiastical living , or secular office whatever , and also to be imprisoned , and fined a thousand pound . notwithstanding all which , we find him presently after the parliament was disolved , not only at liberty , but also presented by the king to a rich benefice in essex , and not long after made bishop of st. davids . so likewise : one dr. sibthorp about the same time preached an as●ize sermon at northamt●n , on rom. . . wherein he maintained much the like doctrines , as that it was the king alone that made the laws and that nothing could excuse from an active obedience to his commands , but what is against the law of god and nature : and that kings had power to lay pole money upon their subject heads ▪ but this much i have read , that this sermon was licensed by dr. laud then bishop of st. davids , because archbishop abbot had refused to do it as contrary to law , for which he was very much frwoned upon at court , and it is supposed to have been one of the main causes of his suspension from his arch-episcopal jurisdiction , which not long after happened . but as for this sioth●rp , tho he lived long after , ( even till the kings return ) yet being ( as archbishop abbot describes him ) a man of but small learning , i cannot learn that he was ever preferred higher than the parsonages of barchley , and in northamptonshire . but i find a new doctrine broach'd by some modern bishops and divines about the middle of the reign of king iames the first . that monarchy was of divine right , or institution at least ; so that any other government was scarce warrantable or lawful ; and of this new sect we must more especially take notice of sir r. f. who hath written several treatises to prove this doctrine , and which is worse , that all monarchs being absolute , they cannot be limited or obliged either by oaths , laws or contracts with their people , farther than they themselves shall think fit , or consistent with their supposed prerogatives ; of which they only are to be the sole judges : so that whoever will but consider from the reign of our four last kings , what strong inclinations they had to render themselves absolute , and that few divines , or common , or civil lawyers were preferr'd in their reigns to any considerable place , either in church or state , who did not maintain these new opinions both on the bench and in the pulpit : you need not wonder when the stream of court preferment ran so strong that way , if so many were carried away with it ; since it was but to expose themselves to certain misery , if not to utter ruin , to oppugn it . all who offered by speaking or writing to maintain the contrary , being branded with the odious names of puritans , common-wealths-men , whigs , &c. some of whom you may remember were not long since imprisoned , fined , nay , whipt for so doing . so that it was no wonder if there were but very few to be found who durst with so great hazard speak what they thought , nor could any thing but the imminent danger upon our laws , religion and properties , proceeding from the kings illegal practices have opened the eyes of a great many noblemen , gentlemen and clergy , who contrary to the opinions so much lately in vogue , did generously venture both their lives and estates , to joyn their arms with the prince of orange against the king's unjust and violent proceedings . m. i do not doubt , notwithstanding all you have said , to prove before i have done , these doctrines of non-resistance , and of the divine institution of monarchy to be most consonant to the word of god , and to the doctrine of the primitive church , and also to that of our reformed church of england . nor were those divines you mention in k. iames the first 's time , the authors or ▪ inventers of these doctrines which were publickly received , and decreed by both houses of that convocation which began in the first year of k. iames , and continued till the year . as appears by divers manuscript copies of the acts or decrees of this convocation , the original of which was lately in the library founded by dr. cousins late bishop of durham , besides a very fair copy , now to be seen in the archbishops library at lambeth : which if you please to peruse , you may be quickly satisfied that the church of england ( long before ever sir r. f. writ thoses treatises you mention ) held that civil power was given by god to adam and noah , and their descendants , as also that absolute subjection and obedience was due to all soveraign powers , without any resistance ; as claiming under those original charters : these doctrines being there fully and plainly laid down and asserted , as the doctrines of our church : so that you deal very unjustly with the memory of those divines , as also of sir r. f. to make them the first breachers of it , whereas you may find that it was the opinion of the whole convocation , for many years before ever those divines , or that gentleman began to preach , or write upon this subject ; nor were these the only men who maintained these principles , but archbishop usher and bishop sanderson , ( whom i suppose you will not reckon among your flattering court bishops ) have as learnedly and fully asserted those doctrines , you so much condemn , as any of that party you find fault with , and have very well proved all resistance of the supream powers to be unlawful , not only in absolute but limited monarchies of the truth of which you may sufficiently satisfie your self , if you will but take the pains to read the learned and elaborate treatises written by those good bishops , ( viz. ) the lord primate usher's power of the prince , and obedience of the subject , and the bishop of lincoln's preface before it , as also the said bishop's treatise de iura nouto , written whilst he was doctor of the chair in oxford . f. i must beg your pardon , sir , if i have never yet seen or heard of that convocation book you mention , much less of the opinions therein contained , since there is no mention made of their proceedings , in any history or record of those times either ecclesiastical or civil , as i know of . but this much i am certain of ; that these determinations or decrees you mention , ( call them which you please ) never received the royal assent , much less the confirmation of the king and parliament , one of which ( if not both ) is certainly requisite to make any opinion either in doctrine or discipline to be received by us lay-men for the doctrine of the church of england , otherwise the canons made in would oblige us in conscience , tho' they stand at this day condemned by act of parliament : so that however , even according to your own principles , you cannot urge this book as the authoritative doctrine of the church of england , unless their determinations had received the royal assent : which you your self do not affirm they had , for you very well know that , as in civil laws , no bill is any more than waste parchment if once the king hath refused to give his royal assent to it , so likewise in spiritual or ecclesiastical matters , i think no decrees or determinations of convocations are to be received , as binding either in points of faith or manners by us lay-men , till they have received the confirmation of the king , and the two houses of parliament ; or otherwise the consequence would be , that if the king who hath the nomination of all the bishopricks and deaneries , as also of most of the great prebendaries in england , of which the convocation chiefly consists , should nominate such men into those places , which would agree with him to alter the present establisht reformed religion ●n governmen● , and to bring in popery or arbitrary power , the whole kingdom would be obliged in conscience to embrace it , or at least to submit without any contraditio● to those canons the king and convocation should thus agree to make , which of how fatal a consequence it might prove to the reformed religion in this kingdom , this kings choice of bishops and deans , such as he thought most fit for his turn , would have taught ●s when it had been too late . m. you very must mistake me sir , if you believe that i urge the authority of this book to you , as containing any ecclesiastical canons , which i grant must have the royal assent , but whether that of the two houses of parliament , i very much question , since the king without the parliament is head of the church , and diverse canons made under queen elizabeth , and king iames are good in law at this day , tho' they were never confirmed by parliament . but i only urge the authority of this book to you , to let you see that these doctrines are more antient than the time you prescribe , and also that the major part of the bishops and ●lergy of the church of england , held these doctrines which you so much condemn , long before those court bishops or divines you mention ; medled with this controversie , and i suppose we may as well quote such a convocation book , as a testimony of their sense upon these subjects , as we do the french , helvetian , or any other protestant churches confessions of faith , drawn up and passed in synod of their divines , tho' without any confirmation of the civil power . f. if you urge this convocation book only as a testimony , and not authority , i shall not contend any further about it , but then let me tell you , that if the canons or decrees of a convocation , though never so much confirmed by king and parliament , do no further oblige in conscience , than as they are agreable to the doctrine of the holy scriptures , sure their determinations without any such authority can only be look'd upon as the opinions of so many particular private men. and tho' i have a very great reuerence for the judgments of so many learned men ; yet granting those doctrines you mention to be contained in this book , i think notwithstanding , that we may justly examine them according to the rules of reason , and express testimonies of scripture , by either of which , when i see you can convince me of the falshood of my tenets , i shall count my self happy to be be●●er informed . but as for those treatises of bishop us●er , and bishop ●anderson which you now mentioned , i must needs confess they are learnedly and elaborately writen , and tho' i am against rebellion as much as any man , and do believe that subjects may too often be guilty of it , yet am i not therefore convinced that it is absolutely unlawful in all cases whatsoever , even in the most absolute and arbitrary sort of civil government , for the people when violently and intolerably opprest , to take up arms and resist such unjust violence , or to join with any foraign prince who will be so generous as to take upon him their deliverance . so that though i freely acknowledge that those good bishops you mention , were very pious and learned men , ●im ●hat i bear great reverence to their memories , yet doth it not therefore follow , that i must o●● them to be infallible , or as great polititians as they were learned divines ; or that they understood the laws of england as well as they did the scriptures or fathers ; and perhaps there may be a great deal , more said on their behalfe than can be for divers others , who have since w●●een and pr●● so much upon those subjects , for if you please to consider the times of their writing those treatises , you will find them written about the beginning or middle of the late civil wars , which they supposed to be beg●n and carried on contrary to all law and justice , under the pretenced authority of the two houses of parliament , against king charles the first ; and therefore it is no wonder if they thought themselves obliged to write very high , for the prerogatives and rights of princes , and the absolute obedience of subjects when they saw even the kings just and lawful prerogatives in danger to be taken from him by force . and altho' they may perhaps stretch several of these points too far , yet this may be very excuseable , since it is a hard matter to write so exactly against any error , as not to fall into the contrary extream , which nevertheless may sometimes prove useful enough : as those who would set a stick straight are forced to bend it to the other side : and so these doctrines which might then be seasonable , whilst the people carried on their animosities against the king , farther than in justice they ought , have not now the same reason and cogency , when this king hath so manifestly endeavoured to pull up the very foundations both of our religion and government ▪ so that i am perswaded , could those good bishops have lived by the course of nature to our times , and have seen the ill and fatal use hath been made of those doctrines by those in power , they would either absolutely have renounc'd them , or at least have been very cautious how they publish't such doubtful opinions to the world. m. i must beg your pardon sir , if i am not of your opinion , for i look upon the absolute subjection of the subjects to the higher or supream powers to be a thing of such constant and eternal obligation , that no change of times or circumstances can ever dispense with us in , or discharge us from it ; and i am so far from believing that those good bishops would ever have recanted their opinions in this particular , that had th●y lived until this time , i think they could not , without the imputation of time servers , have forborn publickly to declare and maintain them : for sure we must not deny or lay aside true principles , because of some inconveniences or hardships that may thereby happen to our religion , persons or civil liberties , since that were the ready way to give a licence to the rankest rebellion , and the highest disobedience to the supream powers , for so the primitive christians might have claimed a right to rebel against the heathen emperors , pretending they were not bound to submit themselves unto them , because they persecuted gods church , and put the christians to death for no other reason than that they were such . whereas we may plainly see st. peter and st. paul teach us another lesson , and command absolute subjection without reserve to the higher powers , which were then the tyrannical persecuting emperours , and that the primitive christians , who immediately followed the apostles , understood them in this sense ; and altho' they had sufficient strength , yet thought it unlawful to resist those ●eathen emperor 's under which they liv'd . i refer you to that vast treasure of quotations , out of the fathers and antient church historians , collected with such learning and industry by the lord primate usher in the second treatise . f. it is not my intention sir , at present to fall into a severe examination of so many texts of scripture and quotations of fathers and other authors , as are made use of by those learned men you lately mentioned , which require more consideration than our short time will now afford , therefore the best method i can propose to you for the true stating and understanding this noble controversie , were first to look into the natural state of mankind , after the fall of adam , and enquire , first , if god has appointed any kind of government by divine institution before another . secondly , if he has not ; how far civil power may be lookt upon as from god , and in what sense , as deriv'd from the people . thirdly , whether resistance by the subjects , in some cases , be incompatible and absolutely destructive to all civil government whatsoever . fourthly , whether such resistance be absolutely contrary to the doctrine of christ contain'd in the scriptures , and that of the primitive church pursuant thereunto . fifthly , whether such resistance be contrary to the constitution of this government . and the express laws of the land. sixthly , whether what has been done by the prince of orange , and those of the nobility , gentry , &c. in pursuance of these principles , has been done according to the law of nature , the scriptures , and ancient constitutions of this kingdom ; which material points , if we can once suttle , and discover where the truth lyes , it will prove the clearest comment and best interpretation of all those places of scripture , and quotations of fathers , and other authors which are cited by divines or other writers , for the doctrines of the divine institution of monarchy , and the absolute subjection of subjects without any resistance . for when we have once discovered what the law of nature or right reason dictates ; i think we may rest satisfy'd that that is the true sense of the scripture : god not having given us any precept or command , in moral , or practical things , that can be contrary to the law of nature or reason ; or incompatible with the happiness and welfare of mankind in this life ; as the reveal'd will of god does chiefly regard that which is to come . m. i do very well approve of your proposal , and therefore pray give me first your opinion on those heads , that i may see how far i may agree with you , and wherein i must differ from you ; for i do assure you my intention is not to argue with you meerly for disputes sake , but that we may correct the errors of each others understanding , and discover , if it be possible , where the truth lyes ; therefore pray sir , begin first with the natural state of mankind , but remember to do it like a christian , and one that believes that we are all deriv'd from one first parents , and that we did not at first spring up out of the earth like mushrooms , or as the men whom ovid ●eigns to have been produc'd of the dragons teeth cadmus is feigned to have sown , who as soon as they sprung out of the earth , immediately fell a fighting and killing each other . f. i thank you sir for your honest and kind advice , and shall therefore in the first place suppose , that the necessity as well as being of all civil government , proceeded from the fall of adam , since if that had not been , we had still liv'd as the poets fancy men did under the golden age , without any need of kings or common-wealths to make laws against oppression , theft , adultery , murder , and those other injuries which men are now too apt in this lapsed corrupt state to commit against each other , much less would there have been any need of judges or executioners , either to sentence or punish offenders , for if man had continued as free from sin as he was in paradise , there could have been no need of a supream coercive power , since every man would have perform'd his duty towards god and his neighbour without any punishment or constraint , so that all the authority that can be suppos'd could have been then necessary for the good and happiness of mankind , would have been no more than that of the husband over his wife , or that of parents over their children , the former of which would not have been an absolute coercive power neither , but rather such a power as his understanding then had over the inferiour faculties of his soul , join'd with a voluntary submission of her will to his , the coercive power of the husband , and his more absolute rule over her being conferr'd by god on adam , and in him on all his posterity after the fall , for the regulating and restraining the unreasonable desires and passions of the woman , which then began to exert and shew themselves in her ; and as for paternal authority , that would have been so far from being coercive , that children having no inclination to disorder either in their wills , appetites or passions , there would have been so little need of punishments , that they would not have required so much as reproof or correction : god having planted the laws of nature or reason in every mans breast , then free from rebellions motions against it , so that children then could have had no more to do , than to pay their parents all that gratitude . duty and obedience which was due to them , as the subordinate causes of their being , which could only consist in performing those indifferent things , which they then would have had occasion to command them , since mankind being immortal , and the earth bringing forth of it self all necessaries for humane life , there could have been no occasion of attending and relieving their parents when sick , old or decrepit , and unable to keep themselves ; and so likewise upon the same grounds all other men would have been equal by nature , in respect of any civil difference ; for when there was no necessity of mens service , there would have been no distinction between master and servant : but after the fall , the stare of mankind was altered , and self-love , and the desire of self-preservation grew so strong and exorbitant above all natural equity , that the inordinate passions of men blinding their reasons , they began to think they had a right , not only to the necessaries of life , but to whatever their unruly appetites d●sired , or that they thought they could make themselves masters of . to remedy which inconveniences , i suppose the fathers and masters of families , and other freemen ( in whom alone then resided that little government that then was in the world ) were forced after some time to agree upon one or more men into whose hands they might resign all their particular powers , and to make laws for the due governing and restraining those disorderly appetites and passions , and also endowing them with a sufficient authority to put them in execution : but which of the governments now extant , or that have been formerly , were prior in nature , i think cannot well be known ; whether it was a monarchy , or an aristocracy , consisting of all the heads or fathers of families , or freemen , is not material since the ss . are silent in it ; but it being sufficient to suppose , that it was at first begun by the perswasion or mediation of some one or more wise and vertuous persons , and was consented to by thy whole number , consisting of many families , who were sensible of those great inconveniences and mischiefs they lay under for want of civil government . but be it which way it will , 't is most certain that it was principally intended by god , for the god and preservation of the governed , and not for the greatness or advantage of the person or parsons appointed t● gover● , since god designed all civil government for the restraining of mans inordinate passions and lusts after the fall , and procuring by sufficient rewards and puni●●ments , that peace and happiness which could now no longer be obtained by mens natural inclinations to that which was equitable and honest ; and besides , it is absolutely impossible to suppose , that any great number of people not pressed by the invasion of a powerful enemy from abroad ▪ ( which could not be supposed in this early age of the world ) would ever be brought to consent to put themselves under the absolute power of others , but for their own greater good and preservation , or to part with their natural liberty without advantaging themselves at all by the change. m. i will not take upon me to assert , after what manner mankind would have been governed in case our first parents had continued in their primitive state of innocency ; but this much i think i may boldly affirm in opposition to what you have already said , that civil government after the fall was not alike in all the fathers and masters of families , but that adam alone was by god endued with it , as the great father and monarch of mankind ; so that not only civil power , in genere , but in specie , ( viz. ) monarchical , was immediately after the creation conferred by god upon him . and adam was monarch of the whole world even before he had any subjects . f. sir , not to interrupt you , it seems somewhat hard to conceive how adam could be a father before he had children , or a monarch before he had subjects . m. if you please to consider it , you will find no absurdity at all in this assertion . for though i confess there could be no actual government without subjects , nor fatherhood without sons ; yet by the right of nature it was due to adam to be governour of the world , when as yet he had neither sons , nor subjects , so though not in act , yet at least in habit , or in potentia ( as they say in the schools ) adam was a king , and a father , from his creation , and even in the state of innocency , he had been governour over his wife and children ; for the integrity , or excellency of the subjects doth not take away the order , or eminency of the governour : for eve was subject to adam before he sinned , and the angels who are of a most pure nature , and cannot sin , are yet subjects to god , and perform all his commands : which will serve to con●ute what you say in derogation of civil government , or power , that it was introduced by sin , or the fall of man. government , i grant as to co-active power , was not till after sin , because co-action supposeth some disorder which was not in the state of innocency ; but as for directive government , the state of humane nature requires it ; since civil society cannot be imagined without a power of government . for although as long as men continued in the state of innocency , they might not need the direction of adam in those things that were necessarily and morally to be done . yet things indifferent that depended meerly on their free-will , might well be directed by adam's sole command . f. pray , sir , give me leave to settle this point-between us , before you proceed farther , and i doubt not when you better consider what i say , you will not think we have any just occasion to differ . so far then you and i are agreed , that even before the fall , adam was superior over his wife and children , and that they owed him , not only gratitude and respect , as a parent , but also obedience in all indifferent things : yet i deny that this power or sup●●iority of adam over his wife and children , was at all a despotical or civil power , but meerly oeconomical , for the good and convenience of adam , and the well ordering and preservation of his family ; which you will easily grant , if you please to consider what are the essential differences of civil government from oeconomical . now the essential properties of civil government consist in preserving and defending the subjects , both in war and peace , from forreign enemies , and intestine injurie● , and invasions of mens persons or properties , and in revenging and punishing all such transgressions by death , or other punishments , and consequently in making laws concerning property , and for restraining all robberies , murders , and the like ▪ now , in the state of innocency there could be no need of any of these essential functions of civil power ; for your self must grant , that man was then not apt to sin , and immortal ; so that all laws about peach or war , punishments of offences , publick judgments concerning meum , & tuum , and all injuries , were absolutely needless , and had never been in nature , if adam had not sinned ; and then how you can call this authority , or superiority ( which i grant adam had over his wife and children ) civil power , i can by no means understand . but i do utterly deny , that even after the fall , adam was a monarch , or sole and absolute lord over the whole earth , and all creatures therein contained ; and desire you to give me such plain proofs of it , either from reason , or scripture , that i need no more doubt of it , than your self . m. i shall first of all give you an argument drawn from the reason of the thing ▪ and in the next place , the authority of scripture , for my opinion : and first , i think it is evident , that every man that is born , is so ●at from being free , that by his very birth he becomes a subject of him that begets him ; and even groti●● h●mself acknowledges that , generatione ●us acquiritur in liberos . and indeed , the act of begetting , being that which makes a man a father , his right of a father over his children , can naturally arise from nothing else ; and the same author in another pl●ce hath these words upon the fourth commandment , parentum nomine , qui naturales luns magistraus , etiam alios rectores par est iutelligi ▪ quorum authoritas soci●tatem humanam continet : and if parents be natural magistrates , children must needs he born natural subjects . so that , not only adam , but the succeeding patriarchs had , by right of fatherhood , regal authority over their children , as may 〈◊〉 by divers testimonies out of scr●pture , and therefore at is very reasonable that all fathers should have a power over the lives of their children , since it is to them that they owe their life , being and education ; and i think that even the power which god himself exerciseth over mankind , is by right of fatherhood . f. before you come to scripture , give me leave , in the first place to examine your first argument , which you deduced from the law of nature or reason : for i doubt , if you please better to consider of it , you will and that so light and transitory an ▪ action , as that of generation , canno● give any man an absolute property and dominion over the person and ●●fe of those whom he begets ; since sew men do principally intend the giving of a being to another , so much as they do their own pleasure , in that action ; nor do we owe our lives ( properly speaking ) to our parents , but to god , who is the true and original cause of our being , though it is true , he makes use of our parents as physical , though not as moral means , or instruments for that end ; since it doth not lye in their power to hinder their generating of children , if they perform the acts necessary thereunto ; so that both the antecedent and the consequent are altogether false , viz. that parents give their children , life and being , and that therefore they have and absolute power over their lives and persons ; which if it were true , would give the mother an equal title to the lives of the children , as the father , seeing they owe their lives as much to the one as the other : which power in the mother , i am sure you will not admit of . but as for what you say concerning the power of fathers , arising from education , though i confess that is a much better title than the other : yet doth it not follow , that , because by reason of my parents care of me before i was able to help my self , i owe my preservation and well being to them ; that therefore they are to be perpetual and absolule lords over my person and life : since by thus breeding me up , they only perform'd that duty , and trust which god had laid upon them , for the good and preservation of manking , and which they could not without committing a sin , either refuse or decline , and therefore their authority or power over my person , being only for my well-being , can extend no farther tan whilst i am not of years of discretion to understand the true means of my own good and preservation : and though i grant that i am bound in gratitude to return this care and kindness by all acts of duty and piety towards them , as long i live ; yet doth it not therefore follow , thar they are masters of my life , and of all that i have ; since this were to take away more than they themselves ever gave ▪ and though i should grant you that even the power which god himself exerciseth over mankind is by right of fatherhood ; yet this fatherhood is such , as utterly excludes all pretence of title in earthly parents ; for he is our king , because he is indeed maker of us all , which no natural parents can pretend to be of their children : but if you please more closely to consider your own argument , you will find that he will quite destroy your hypothesis . for if all fathers have an absolute power over their children , by generations , then adam could only have power over his own children which he begat , and none at all over his grand-children , since their fathers by this argument of generation ought to have had the same power over their children , which adam had over them , for the same reason : so that this monarchical power of adam as a father could extend no farther than one generation m. i shall not further urge this argument of generation , since i see you are not satisfied with it ; but this much i think i can clearly prove from scripture , that adam was lord over the persons and lives of his wife and children , by vertue of that command which god gave eve , gen. . v. . unto the woman he said , i will greatly mutilply thy sorrow and thy conception ; in sorrow thou shalt bring forth children , and thy desire shall be to thy husband , and he shall rule over thee . from which words it appears that adam had not only an absolute power granted him by god over his wife , but all the posterity that should be born of her . for in the first place it here appears that eve was to yield an absolute subjection to her husband ; who was to rule over her as her lord , from these words , and thy desire shall be [ subject ] to thy husband , ( as it is better exprest in the margin ) and he shall rule over thee . and if his wife was thus to be subject to him , then likewise by a party of reason all her children were to be so too : it being a maxime in the law of nature , as well as in the civil law , that partus sequitur ventrem : so that if eve was to be absolutely subject to adam , the issue by her must be so too , as in the case of a master of a she slave , not only the person of the woman , but all that are begotten of her either by her master or any other man , are likewise his servants , otherwise the children would be in a better condition than their mother , for adam having no superiour but god , both his wife and children must have been a like subject to him . there is likewise another rule in the civil law , which is a voice of nature too , quicquid ex me , & uxore mea nascitur , in potestate mea est , and tho this is true in some sense in all fathers whatsoever ; yet it was so in a more superlative degree , where the father had no superiour over him but god ; as adam had not ; and farther it seems apparent to me from the very method that god us'd in creating mankind that adam's wife and children should be subject to him : for if adam and eve had been created at once , it could not have been known which of these two had the best right to command , and which was to obey . for adam's strength or wit alone , would not have given him any authority over her , and it might be that eve was as strong and as wise as he , or at least she mi●ht have thought her self so , and if these two had differ'd and fought , nought but the event could have declared which of them should have been master . so when they had children born between them , the children could have told as little which of the parents they should have obey'd , in case they had differ'd in their commands : so that it had been impossible this way that any government could have been in the world. but when god created only one man , and out of him one woman was made , sure he had some great design in this , for no other creature was thus made at twice but man. now st. paul shews a reason for gods acting thus , when he says , the woman should not teach , nor usurp authority over the man , &c. and mark the reason ; for adam was created and then eve. so that in the apostles judgment this was one main cause why adam should be superiour to his wife , and all other husbands to their wives ; and in the corinthians from the history of the creation the same apostle deduces two other reasons , for the superiority of the man over the woman . for ( says he ) the man is not of the woman , but the woman of the man ; ( that is , eve was formed out of adam ) neither was the man created for the woman , but the woman for the man : so that you see here is adam stated in a degree superiority over his wife before the fall : and immediately after it , god again renewed adam's title , when he told eve ( as i have but now mention'd ) thy desire shall be subject to thy husband , and he shall rule ever thee ; now i so far agree with what you at first lay'd down ; that if the fall had not disordered her faculties , and rendered her apt and prone to disobey her husband , this command need not have been given her , but she would have known her duty from the order and end of the creation , without this explicite positive command . f. you have sir , taken a great deal of pains to prove that which i do not at all deny , that as well before as after the fall , adam ( and consequently all other husbands and fathers ) ought to be superiour to their wives and ●hildren , and likewise govern and command them in all things relating to their own good and that of the family , as long as they continue members of it : nay , that after children are separated from their fathers family , they still owe their parents all the gratitude , duty , and respect imaginable ; but yet i deny that this power which adam had over eve , and his issue by her , and all other husbands have over their wives and children , is a regal despotical power , or any more than conjugal in respect of his wife , and paternal in respect of the children , nor is that filial reverence : and obedience which children yield their fathers , the same with that respect and duty which a wife owes her husband , or the same with that servile subjection which slaves owe their lord and master ; neither is the duty of a wife of the same kind with that which sons pay their fathers , or slaves their lords ; nor did sarah when she called abraham lord ( who was then master of a separate family , and so subject to none ) ever suppose that her husband had the same authority over her as he had over hagar her bond-woman , to sell her , or turn her out of doors at his pleasure : but to make it more apparent to you , that this power granted to adam over eve , was not regal nor despotical , but only conjugal , and for the well ordering of the family , where some one must command in chief , and the rest obey to avoid confusion , will appear , first , if you consider that this subjection of eve to adam was not enjoyn'd till after the fall , and is part of gods judgments denounc'd against her , for tempting her husband to eat the forbidden fruit , and certainly included somewhat more than that superiority which he had over her by his creation , or else god should not have made it any part of the judgment denounc'd upon her . if this submission she ow'd to her husband before the fall , had been of the same nature with that subjection she was to be under after it ; which yet i take to be neither servile nor absolute , but only a conjugal obedience or submission of her will to his , in all things relating to the government of the family and the carriage of her self ; though i do not deny but the husband may sometimes restrain her by force ▪ in case she carries her self unchastly , or indiscreetly , to the loss of her reputation , and prejudice of his interest , when she will not be directed , or advis'd by his persua●ion , or commands , which before the fall when she was in a state of innocency there was no need of ; since , ( as your self grant ) before the fall she know what was her duty , and performed it without any force or 〈◊〉 , &c. and therefore that text which you have now quoted out of genesis , thy desire shall be [ subject ] to thy husband , and he shall rule over thee , is not fairly cited , for as for the marginal addition , viz. [ subject ] to thy husband , it is not warranted from the h●brew original or version of the lxx . the hebrew having no more than ( thy desire shall be to thy husband ) which the lxx renders i. e. the conversion or inclination of the desire ; by which some interpreters understand no more than the carnal appetite : so likewise from the words ( rule over thee ) they likewise observe that moses makes use of the same hebrew word , when he makes mention of the sun and moon ruling the day and night , tho they do not do it by any violence , or corporeal force ; so likewise by this ruling of the husband , is not to be understood any absolute , despotick power , whereby he hath a right to dispose of the person and actions of his wife in all things at his pleasure , but that she may in many cases refuse , nay controul his commands , and resist his actions , in case they prove unlawful or destructive to her self and children . but that this argument of st. paul of the husband's superiority over his wife , was not granted to adam alone , but equally extends to all husbands whatsoever , appears from the very text it self , or otherwise st paul had argued very impertinently of the duty of all wives ; and if so , it will follow that every one of adam's sons as soon as he took a wife , had the like authority over her as adam had over their mother ; and if over their wives , then by your maxims ( of partus sequitur ventrein ) & quicquid e● me & uxore mea nascitur , in potestate mea est , all the sons of adam must have had the same power over their children as their father had over them : so that the same consequence will still follow from theses places of scripture , and also from you civil law maxims , that either adam had no civil , or despotick power over his wife , and children , or else , if he had , that every one of his sons when married , an separated from his fathers family had the same , and consequently there were as many princes as distinct masters of families , and then what would become of adam's monarchy , i give you leave to judge . m. i must beg your pardon if i am not satisfied with your answer to my last argument : for i am still of opinion notwithstanding what you have said , that eve was to yield an absolute subjection to her husband , from that place already cited , that her ( viz. eve's ) desire ( i. e. will ) should be subject to her husband , &c. to which you answer that this subjection of eve to adam , was not the same which sons owe their fathers , or slaves to their lords ; and that eve owed adam , not a filial , or servile , but a conjugal subjection . for i would ●ain know the difference in the state of nature , between one and the other : for if you please to compare that place of genesiis , i but now quoted with that other , where god gives cain power over abel his younger brother , you will find them the same in words as also in sense . for in this god likewise tells cain , that unto thee , shall his desire be subject and thou shalt rule over him . and ●ure god could not intend by these words , that abel should yield a conjugal , but a filial subjection to his elder brother , and these words are not capable of two senses , but must be understood a like in both places ( i. e. ) that the desire ( which is a faculty of the soul , and that the most active too ) was to be subject , and the body , and all the powers of it , were to be over-ruled by him ▪ which is as full and absolute a subjection as can be express'd in words ; and whereas you say that these words were not spoken till after the fall , and thence seem to infer , that eve did not owe adam so much as a conjugal subjection before that ; st. paul hath given you an answer to that already , which it is needless to repeat , and therefore upon the whole matter i think your distinction of a conjugal subjection different from a filial or servile one , will signifie nothing , f. i doubt not , sir , but i shall be able to make good this distinction of a servile and a filial obedience , and in order to it , shall reply to the consequence you have made , for eve's absolute subjection to adam from the like expression used by god to cain , concerning his ruling over his brother abel , as is us'd here to eve concerning her subjection to her husband ; and that because the subjection of abel was absolute , that therefore her subjection must be so too . i must crave your pardon if i deny your assumption ; for i think i am able to prove , that neither abel , nor any other younger brother , was , or is obliged , by vertue of this text to yield an absolute obedience to his elder brother , in the state of nature or that he is therefore his lord and master . nor can i see any absurdity , but that the same words might be spoken to several persons , yet in different senses , which according to the nature of the persons to whom they were spoken might have different effects . as here these words when spoken to eve enjoyn a conjugal submission of eve's will to adam as her husband , but when spoken to abel they may signifie a fraternal submission of abel's will to cain's as the elder , and perhaps the wiser of the two , but without giving any absolute or despotick power over either . m. i cannot be yet satisfied with your reply ; for methinks this is but to play the fool , and trifle with god's word , when he told cain thy brother's desire shall be subject to thee , that is , ( say you , ) thou shalt rule over him only as far as he thinks sir , or if thou hast the knack to wheedle or perswade him : was not this a mighty matter for god almighty to appear to cain about ? an excellent and rational way to appease his wrath towards his brother ? whereas god here plainly enjoyneth a subjection from abel to his elder brother , and if so , by vertue of the same words , a like subjection of eve to adam , and then it will likewise follow , that as the streams are of the same nature with the fountain , the subjection of all her posterity will likewise be included in hers , which i have sufficiently proved already , had you not mistaken the true sense of those two maxim● i laid down . for first , if partus sequitur vontrem ▪ and the mother be a subject , as eve was , all her posterity must be so to all generations . and if quicquid ex me & uxore mea nascitur in potestate mea est be true , then adam's grand-children , and great-grand-children , deriving themselves from him and eve , must be likewise under adam's power . nor ca● i see how his sons , or grand-children , by setting up separate families , could ever discharge themselves from this absolute subjection to adam , since they could never have quitted his family without his consent ; and when they did quit it , unless he pleased to manumit them , they , their wives and children , were still as much subject as they were before . since i do not see if they were once subjects to him , how any thing but his express will , and consent could ever discharge them from it . nor was that authority ( which every one of these sons of adam might exercise over their wives and children , though they were not freed from the power of their father ) any more inconsistent with that subjection and obedience they owed him , as their prince , than in an absolute monarchy , the power of fathers , and husbands , over their wives and children , as to the things relating to the well-ordering and governing their families , is inconsistent with that supreme predominant power which the monarch hath over the father himself , and all his family , or than the power of a master of a family , in the isle of barbadoes , over his slaves that are married , and have children , is inconsistent with that marital and paternal power which such a slave may exercise over his wife and children within his own family , though still subordinate to the will of the master , who may forbid any such slaves , or their children to marry , but where he hath a mind they should and may likewise hinder them , from correcting or putting to death their wives and children without his consent . though such subjects in an absolute monarchy , or slaves in a plantation cannot have or enjoy any property in lande or goods but at the monarchs , or masters will ▪ and so likewise at first none of these sons of adam , though they set up distinct families from their fathers , could enjoy or inclose any part of the earth without his grant or assignment to whom the whole was given by god before . it seems likewise to be a great mistake , when you at first affirmed that all civil government was ordained by god , for the benefit and advantage of the subjects , rather than the governours . whereas from the first and most natural government it appears that children who were the subjects were ordained as much for the benefit and help of their parents , who were the first monarchs , as their parents for them . from all which we may draw these conclusions : first , that from gen. . v. . already cited , we have the original charter of government , and the fountain of all civil power derived from adam as the father of all mankind . so that not only the constitution of power in general , but the special limitation of it to one kind , ( viz. ) monarchy , and the determination of it , to the individual person of adam , are all ordinances of god. neither had eve or her children any right to limit adam'● power , or joyn themselves with him in the government . now if this supreme power was setled , and sounded by god himself in fatherhood , how is it possible for the people to have any right to alter , or dispose of it otherwise ; it being god's ordinance that this supremacy ▪ should be unlimited in adam , and as large as any acts of his will. so that he was not only a father , but a king and absolute lord over his family ; a son , a subject , and a servant , or slave , being one and the same thing at first , the father having power to dispose of or sell his children or servants at his pleasure ; and though perhaps he might deal too severely or cruelly in so doing , yet there was none above him , except god , in the state of nature , who could call him to an account , much less resist or punish him for so doing ▪ f. you have , sir , made a very long speech upon the monarchical power of adam , which you have made of so large an extent , that this imaginary kingship will swallow up all the other more dear and tender relations both of a husband , and of a father ▪ so that were i not satisfied you were a very good natured man , and spoke more the sense of others than from your own natural inclinations , i should be apt to believe that if you had sufficient power you would prove as great a tyrant over your wife , children , and all that should be under your command ; as such arbitrary tenets would give you leave ; but since i hope your errour lyes rather in your understanding , than in your nature● i shall make bold to shew you the mistakes you have committed in those principles you here lay down . i might first begin with the place of scripture you farther insist upon ; for eve's absolute subjection to adam from the like expression used by god to cain concerning his ruling over his brother abel , as is us'd here to eve , and tho' you are pleased to think my exposition of this place so ridiculous ; yet i doubt not but i be able to prove , when i come to speak of this pretended divine author of elder brothers over this younger , that this place cannot be understood in any such sense , according to the best interpretation that both the reason of the subject , and the sense the best commentators put upon it can allow ▪ but i shall defer this till we come to discourse concerning the successors of adam in this monarchical power you suppose . and therefore i shall only at present pursue that absolute power , which you suppose adam to have had , not only over eve , but all her descendants . so that your argument of eve's , and consequently all her childrens , absolute subjection to adam , depends upon a very false supposition . for if the subjection of eve to adam , and of all wives to their husbands is not servile or absolute , neither can that of the children be so , since according to your own simile , if the streams are of the same nature of the fountain , they can never rise higher than it , and tho' i grant , adam might in some cases have put his wife or children to death , for any enormous crime against the law of nature , yet i allow him that power , not as a husband or father , but only as a lord or master of a separate family , who having no superiour in the state of nature , i grant it is endued by god with this prerogative , for the good of his family , and preservation of mankind , lest such horrid crimes , so much to its prejudice should pass unpunisht . but that the husband or father doth not act thus in either of these two capacities , i can easily prove . first , because the scripture tells us the husband and wife are one flesh , and that no man ever yet hated his own flesh ▪ so that it is impossible for a husband to put his wife to death , till by the greatness of her crimes , she becomes no longer worthy of that tender affection he ought to bear her . then as to the father , he , as a father , ought not to desire to put his son to death , whose being he hath been the cause of , and who is principally made out of his own substance , and on whom he hath bestowed nourishment and education for so many years , until he finds that instead of a son he proves an enemy to his family , or hath so laid wait against his life , that as long as he lives he cannot be safe ; or else commits some of those heinous crimes which by the laws of god and nature do justly deserve no less punishment than death , in short when he ceases any longer to deserve the name of a son. yet this authority holds no longer than whilst the son remains part of his fathers family , and so subject to his power , and this i take to be the reason why we do not read , that adam took any notice of cains's murdering his brother , because he was before freed from his power , by setting up another family , which certainly had been adam's duty to have done , had he been then under his jurisdiction , murder being as great a crime before the flood as a●ter , tho' the punishment of in by death were not positively enjoin'd by god till then : but i shall prove this point more particularly by and by , as also , that adam's children might enjoy , or enclose some part of the earth without any grant or assent from adam , to whom you suppose ( tho' without any proof as yet ) that the whole earth was given by god. to conclude , i doubt you mistook me when you say , i at first affirmed that all civil government was ordained by god , for the benefit or advantage of the the subjects , rather than that of the governours , and therefore you undertake to shew me , that in the first and most natural government , viz. that of a family , children who are subjects in the state of nature , are ordained as much for the benefit , and help of their parents , who are their princes or masters , as their parents for them ; in which assertion you fall in to more than on mistake , for i do not assert that in civil government the benefit or advantage of the subject , is only to be considered ; for i shall easily grant that princes may very well challenge a very great share in the honour and other advantages that may be reapt by their government ; and yet for all that when the happiness and preservation of the subjects , is incompatible with that of the prince , the former is to be preferred , and bishop sanderson is of this opinion ; when he tells us in his lecture * de iuramento ; that the end of civil government , and the obedience that is due to it , is the safety and tranquillity of humane society , and therefore the end is certainly to be preferred before the means , when they cannot both consist together ; but this is no argument for the preferring the benefit or advantages of parents , before that of their children , since paternal government is not civil government ; nor are fathers absolute princes or masters over their children , as you suppose , and yet i think i may safely affirm , that even in this paternal government , tho' it be granted that children are ordained for the benefit , or help of their parents , yet when their happiness and preservation is inconsistent with that of their children , it may be a great doubt which is to be prefer'd , since gods chief intention in parents , was for the preservation and propagation of mankind ; and therefore i cannot see how it could ever be any part of the paternal power , for a father to make his child a slave , or to sell him to others at his pleasure as you suppose : this being no part or end of the design or duty of a father . and whereas you lay to my charge my mistaking the true sense of those civil law maxims you have quoted ; i think i can easily prove that the mi●●ake lyes on your side , and that you have misapplied them , to make them serve your purpose : for as to your first maxim , partus sequitur ventrem , from which you infer , that the child ought to be of the same condition with the mother , this rule in your civil law relates only to bastards , and not legitimate children , who follow the condition of the father according to your digest : qui ex uxore mea nascitur filius mariti est habendus , so likewise in your code , cum legitimae nuptiae factae sunt , patrem liberi sequuntur , vulgo quaesitus matrem sequitur . nor is your second maxim more true ; for tho' i grant according to your roman law , the father might have absolute power over his wife and children : yet i cannot see how this word and nascitur , can be extended beyond those that are born of a man and his wife , and therefore can never concern grand-children , much less any more remote descendants , and this very law , that a son or daughter might be killed by a father , seem'd so cruel and odious , even to the antient romans themselves , that neither the law of the twelve tables , nor the iulian law of adulteries , which were provided against fathers , sons , and daughters , ever extended it to the grand-father , grand-son , or grand-daughter by interpretation ; or argument à cas●● consimili . nor do these words , in potestate mea est , prove more than that all children are born under the power of their parents , tho' whether they shall always continue so as long as they live ; is not to be proved from this maxim ; nor if it were , doth that make it a law of nature . for i must needs observe this , of divers of you civilians , that what ever maxim you find in your civil law books , that will make for your notions , you presently adopt them for laws of nature , without ever enquiring by the strict rules of reason , and the good of mankind , ( by which alone any law of nature is to be tryed ) whether they are so or no. i shall not trouble my self to confute those false conclusions you have brought from those weak promises ; for if i have destroyed your foundation , i think your superstructure cannot stand ; and therefore you must pardon me , if i cannot find this original charter of government , and of all civil power , to be derived from adam by any argument that yet you have brought either from scripture , or reason ; only give me leave to observe thus much , upon what you have said , that if not only the constitution of civil power in general , but the special limitation of it to one kind , ( viz. ) monarchy , be the ordinance of god , i cannot see how any other government but that can be lawfully set up , or obeyed by men , since no government can challenge this priviledge against divine institution . m. since this hypothesis doth not please you , i shall be glad if you can shew me any better original , either of adam's paternal power , or of civil government , than this , that god gave adam over eve , who indeed was as at the first subject , so the representative of all that followed , and it reaches not only to all her daughters in relation to their husbands , but to all of them in relation to their fathers , and to her sons too , in relation to both their father , and their eldest brother after his decease , if no body superior to both of them , and him interposed , and diverted , or rather over-ruled it . for ( . ) if a priority of being gave adam a power over his wife , it gave him much more so over his children . ( . ) if god's taking eve out of adam , the forming her of one of his ribs without his concurrence , did yet make her his inferiour , his children were much more so , which were derived from him , and by his act. ( . ) if she were formed for him , not he for her ; and that was another reason ; this extended to his children too , who were begotten for the comfort and assistance of both him , and her . ( . ) when god put eve under the subjection of her husband after the fall , her children must needs be so too , if they were not excepted , but we read of no exception . ( . ) is it not an eternal law of nature , that all children should be subject to their parents ? and did not this law spread it self over the face of all the earth , as mankind encreased ? and whereas you would limit this power of parents over their children , both in its extent and duration , this is purely owing to the civil laws of nations , and not to the laws of nature , and is different in different places ; some having restrained the powe● of parents more ▪ and some less . but god gave the parents a power of life and death over their own children , amongst his own people the jews , and that not limited in duration neither , for the fathers power over his son was not determined but by his death , though they could not execute that power , but in the presence of a magistrate . and i am also sure that in all the histories and relations i have met with , amongst civiliz'd nations ( where it is not otherwise order'd by the civil laws of the country ) all husbands , and fathers have power of life and death over their wives , and children , and so it is at this day amongst many eastern nations , and was antiently amongst the romans , gauls , and persians , &c. which power i take not to have been given , or conferred on them , but rather left to them by the civil laws of their country in the same state , as it was establisht by the law of nature , or rather nations . now if such husbands and fathers antiently had , and still have a power of life and death in divers countries over their wives and children , i desire to know what higher power they could enjoy , since he that hath power over a man's life , which is of the highest concern to him , may certainly command him in all things else ? but as for your last scruple that you cannot see , if monarchy be of divine institution , how any government but that can be lawfully set up or obeyed by men , i think it may be a satisfactory answer , if i tell you , that if those who are born under a monarchy can justifie the form they live under to be god's ordinance , they are not bound to forbear their own justification , because others cannot do the like for the forms they live under ; let others look to the defence of their own government : if it cannot be proved , or shewed that any other form of government had ever any lawful beginning , but was brought in , or erected by rebellion , must therefore the lawful and just obedience to monarchy be denied to be the ordinance of god ? f. i hope before i have done , to give you a clearer original from the law of nature , as well of paternal authority , as civil government , without recurring to divine revelation which ( as i said before ) would oblige none but jews , and christians , or mahometans , whose law is a mixture of both the other . in the mean time give me leave to tell you , that eve's being the representative of all wives , did not put either her self or her daughters into any absolute subjection either to adam , or their husbands ; if it did , then could not this subjection be likewise owing either to adam as the patriarch , or grandfather of the family , or to his eldest son after his decease , since this would make every wife in the state of nature to have had two absolute lords , her husband , and her husband's father , which is contrary to our saviour's rule , that no man can serve two masters , that is , in the same kind of service : and therefore it plainly makes out my distinction , that there is a great deal of difference between a conjugal submission of a wife to her husband , and a servile subjection of a servant to his lord , as also of that obedience , or duty , which a subject oweth his soveraign , since by your own hypothesis it necessarily follows that either cain's wife ( for example ) was not to be subject to her husband , or else must be free from all subjection to her father adam : but as for any submission to cain , as elder brother after adam's decease , i desire to be excused medling with it till we have dispatcht the question in hand . i come now to those fresh considerations you bring for this monarchical power of adam ; for indeed i cannot call them new arguments , because most of them have been answered already . the first consideration is from the priority of the being which you suppose gave adam a power over his wife , and consequently over his children ; but i think his priority of being could give him no such power at all over her , and consequently not over them , for i desire to know whether if god had been pleased to have created , the same day that eve was made , twenty single men , and their wives , that therefore adam must have been from his being first created , monarch over them all , unless god had particularly commanded it ? i grant indeed that from god's creating eve out of adam , it did render her inferiour to him , and also from god's express command , that she was to be subject to him in all conjugal duties , yet did neither of these render her , or her children absolute of perpetual subjects , and slaves to adam . and that their being deriv'd from him , or by his act doth not at all alter the case , i have already proved . as for the third , that if she wene formed for him , and not he for her , that this must be another reason which must extend to his children too : here the assumption is not only false , but the consequence too : for she was not only formed for him , but that they might be a mutual help to each other , and therefore the scripture tell us , a man shall leave his father and his mother , and shall cleave unto hit wife , and they two shall be one flesh ; which words ( in my opinion ) are very far from proving any such absolute subjection ; for no man can ever tyrannize over his own flesh ; and if such an absolute subjection had been intended , from eve to adam , it had been more consonant to reason , for the scripture to have enjoyn'd her to have left her father , and mother , to cleave to her husband . whereas indeed there was no more meant by this text , than that when a man marries , he may freely quit his fathers family , and joyning himself to his wife , may set up another of his own . but as for the children that were begotten between them , tho' i grant they might be intended both for the comfort , and assistance of him , and her , yet i have already proved that the parents are more chiefly intended for their childrens propagation , and preservation , than the children are for their interest and happyness . your fouth consideration is only a supposition of the question which is yet to be p●oved , that eve was under an absolute subjection to adam after the fall , i have already proved this supposition not to be true , and therefore the consequence , as to the children is false likewise . your fifth , is rather an interrogation than an argument , whether children ought not to be , and have not always , been subject to their parents all over the world ? in answer to which i grant that it is true , that they have ever been so , tho' not in your sense . for i hold this subjection neither to be servile , or absolute , nor yet perpetual , as long as they live : but in reply to this limitation of the power of parents over their children both in its extent and duration , you tell me this is purely owing to the civil laws of nations , and not to the laws of nature , and for a proof of this you produce gods own people the jews , for an example that the power of the father over his son , was not determined but by his death . but your self confesses that he could not exercise this power of life and death , but in the presence of the magistrate ; the circumstances of which if they be considered , will rather make against you ; for first the father could not have this rebellio●s ▪ son put to death , till he had accus'd him before the elders of the city , that , is the judges who were establisht in every precinct , who upon a solemn hearing , were to sentence such a rebellious son to be stoned to death by all the people of the city : where you may observe that the father had no power to put him to death himself , and therefore acted in this case as an accuser or a witness , not as a judge . but if you 'l believe maimonides , one of the most learned of the jewish rabbins , he will tell you that by the municipal law of the jews , this power of the father did scarce extend beyond the thirteenth year of the son's age , after which the son was reckoned adult , and emancipated from his fathers powers , and could not after that incur this punishment of a stubborn and rebellious son ; and a father who did but strike his son after he was adult , incurr'd excommunication , for that he offended against the law. and tho' i grant that the nations you mention did exercise a power of life and death over their wives , and children , yet will not the practice of some particular nations , tho' never so much civiliz'd , amount to a proof of a law of nature , which is only to be made out from evident rules of right reason , and the great end of this law , the common good of mankind ; and especially when against the examples of those nations which you produce , i can likewise set those of many more nations , where this custum was not allowed , after once civil government was establisht . and as for the romans themselves , amongst whom the greatest examples of this kind are to be found , they will not all of them amount to above three , or four , in six or seven hundred years , and then , tho' there might be very good cause for it , yet the people of rome never so much esteemed or loved such fathers after they had put their sons to death , as they did before , but counted them too severe and cruel for so doing . and you read in valerius maximus , and seneca , that they killed erixiin a roman gentleman , for whipping his son to death like a slave ; so much did they abhor all such cruelty of parents towards their children ; and afterwards , when by the general corruption of manners amongst the romans , fathers grew more cruel to their children , and often put them to death without cause . those of your faculty , suppose that some of the roman emperous ( tho' it is uncertain who ) took away this power from fathers , and made it ( as it is now among us ) murder , for a father to put his son to death , tho' others , since there are no particular edicts to be found concerning this matter , do suppose this law to be changed by degrees , and to be left off by common consent of the romans themselves for it seems dangerous to grant to a private person the cognizance of any crime , which might belong to publick authority ; and they thought it better to strengthen both the paternal and marital power by other laws than putting to death . and therefore simplecius upon epictetus his enchiridion , says , that the romans allowed fathers this power , because they thought they might very well trust their natural affection to their children , for the exercise of that power of selling them or putting them to death , which 't was supposed they would rarely use , unless compelled by extream necessity or unpardonable crimes ; and therefore if a father would put his son to death , he was to do it with his own hands , that he might suffer as well as his son , but when this render affection ●oo failed , it was no wonder that the roman emperors did not think it for the common good of their people , to trust fathers with this power any longer , which they had hitherto exercised , not so properly by right of fatherhood , as that of the master of a family , who governed his servants and his sons by a like authority . to conclude , i cannot but observe , how slyly ▪ you wave my objection against the divine institution of monarchy , for tho' you seem loth expresly to condemn all other governments as unlawful , yet the consequence will be the same upon your principles : for if it be a good argument which some make use of , for the government of the church by bishops , because that government being supposed by them to have been instituted by the apostles by divine precept , therefore that no other government but episcopacy can be lawful , or any true church , where that government is not in use : so the same argument will likewise hold in civil governments , that all others must be unlawful if monarchy alone were ordained by god , and that all other forms whatsoever began from rebellion or the fancies of men. m. to answer what you have said , in the first place i cannot so slightly pass over this argument of the law of nations , by which i supposed the power of fathers over the persons of their children is sufficiently established , and from whence also it appears that among the iews as well as romans , the children were lookt upon as part of the substance of their father , and consequently that they had a perpetual right in their persons , as long as they lived , that the romans had the power of selling their children three times , your self do not deny ; that the iews also had it in use among them appears , first by the story of the poor woman , the widdow of one of the sons of the prophets , who complained to elisha , in the second of kings , telling him that her husband is dead , and the creditor is come to take her two sons to be bond-men . and so likewise in the new testament , our saviour in st. matthew , supposes it as a thing commonly practised in those parts of the world where he lived . for in the parable of the king , who would take account of his servants , amongst whom one owed him ten thousand talents : but for as much as he had nothing to pay , his lord commanded him to be sold , and his wife , and children , and all that he had , and payment to be made . which was founded upon that law amongst the jews , that fathers might sell their children for bond-servants , until the year of iubilee ▪ as appears by nehemiah , chap. . where he relates the complaint of those poor jews , who had been forced for want to bring their sons and their daughters into bondage : neither was it in their power to redeem them , for other men had their lands , and their vineyards . and amongst the romans , this power of selling their children continued till it was forbidden by the emperour iustinian . and as for the grecians , plutarch in his life of solon relates , that till his time it was lawful amongst the athenians , for fathers to sell their children to pay their own debts : and i suppose it was upon this account , that cymon the son of the great general miltiades , was kept in prison by the athenians , till he had paid the fine of ten thousand talents , which his father died indebted to the common-wealth . and philostratus in his life of apollonius thyanaus relates , that it was common amongst the phrygians to sell their own sons : and to come to more modern times , a son amongst the muscovites ▪ may by sold four times , but after the fourth sale the eather hath no longer a right in him , as the baron of heber●lein tells us in his relation of muscovy ; and it is not only in use amongst them , but also amongst the tartars , east-indians , chineses , and the people of japan , not only to sell their children themselves , but also , that they are liable to be sold by the prince , or his officers , for their fathers debts , or offences : so that you see here is the consent of most of the civiliz'd nations in the world , who sure , in this , follow the dictates of nature , and reason , in the exercise of a full , and absolute propriety , and dominion in , and over the persons of their children ; so that if it be a received custom , or law amongst most nations , it is also from reason too , since the law of nations is only that which receives its obligation from the consent of many nations , as grotius well observes : and aristotle lays it down as one of the strongest proofs , when all men agree in any thing : and cicero tells us , that the consent of most nations is to be looked upon as a law of nature ; and therefore these customs are to be esteemed as obligatory amongst all civiliz'd nations , where the municipal laws of those countreys have not restrained or altered this natural power , and interest , which fathers had originally over the persons of their children . but as for what you say , that according to my principles no other government can be lawful besides monarchy , i shall give you the same answer , that some of the most moderate of our divines have given to those , who would make the like objection against us of the church of england , tha● believe episcopacy to be iure divin● ; viz. that god may for the necessity of some ecclesiastical order and government in a church , allow that form of government to be lawful , which himself never instituted ; nay , which perhaps was unlawful to have been set up in the church at all ; and so likewise in civil governments , i will not deny , that those forms may be lawfully obeyed as the ordinance of god which he never institu●ed , but have wholly proceeded from the rebellions , or inventions of men. f. i must confess , sir , i cannot see how any law of nations can be supposed to lay any obligation upon mankind different from the law of nature , and reason , or the revealed law of god in scripture . and , tho' i confess there is some division amongst learned men about this matter ; yet i think it is far more rational to suppose ▪ that there are but two law that can be rules of humane actions , the natural law , and the divine . and of this opinion is the learned grotius himself in the place you but now cited , where he says , he added the words , many nations , because there can scarce be found any natural law , which is also wont to be called the law of nations , that is common to all nations : yea , that is often lookt upon as a law of nations in one country , which is not so any where else ; as ( says he ) we shall shew in its due place , concerning captivity , and postluminium . and for a farther confirmation of this , i will make bold to read to you in english some part of what th● excellent pu●endof hath written upon this subject in his learned work de jure naturae & gentium , lib. . cap. . which you may here read with me . the law of nature and the law of nations is accounted by many one and the same , which only differ by an extrinsick denomination . and form hence , hobbs , de cive , c. . § . divides the law of nature into the natural law of men , and the natural law of common wealths , which is commonly called jus gentium : and then adds that the precepts of both are the same ; but because common-wealths , when once instituted do put on the personal properties of men , that law which speaking of the duty of particular men , we call natural , being applied to all common-wealths or nations , is called jus gentium ▪ to which opinion we do likewise subscribe ; neither do we think there can be any other voluntary or positive law of nations , which can have the power of a law properly so called , and which may oblige all nations as proceeding from a superiour . but most of those things which amongst the roman civil lawyers , and others are referred to the law of nations , as suppose about the manner , of acquiring of contracts , and the like , do either belong to the law of nature , or else to the civil laws of particular nations , which agree together , for the most part , in these things : yet from which n● new , or distinct sort of law is rightly constituted , because those laws are common to nations not from any agreement or mutual obligation , but in that they do by accident agree from the peculiar will of the law-givers in each particular common-wealth ; from whence the same things may be changed by one people or nation , without consulting the rest , and often times are found to be so changed . and of this he here gives us several examples of different customs amongst nations in making war upon each other , according to diverse forms , or tacit agreements , whereby war may be managed with a little cruelty as may be : but thus he proceeds ; these customs altho' they may seem to contain some obligation , as arising from this sort of tacit agreement amongst nations , yet if any prince shall wage a lawful war , or neglect them , or should do quite contrary to them , he would not be guilty of any sin against the law of nature ; but only of a piece of roughness or incivility , that he did not make war according to those rules of honour which are used among them , by whom war is looked upon as a liberal art. [ and a little farther proceeds thus . ] amongst the principal heads of the voluntary law of nations , grotius reckons the right of ambassadors , where we also suppose that by the very law of nature , ambassadors are inviolable even with the enemy , as long as they appear ambassadors , and not spyes , and do not contrive plots against those to whom , they are sent , and having shown the necessity of ambassadors in order to peace , he thus goes on ; but there are other priviledges attributed to ambassadors , especially to those , who reside in a place rather to fish out the secrets of another state , than for peace sake , those priviledges depend from the meer indulgence of that prince to whom they are sent , and so if it seems good to him may be denied them , without the violation of any right , if he will likewise suffer that his own ambassadors should be treated in a like manner . m. i see whether this author tends , but do not understand what use you ●an make of it to your purpose . f. but i will quickly shew you if you please to have a little patience , and therefore to apply what i have now read , to the matter in hand , in the first place , it is apparent from this author , that the law , or custom of nations , hath no obligation as such , but only as it agreeth with the law of nature , and the law of god , and what laws of nations , are founded on the law of nature , can only be tryed by some rule , which certainly is not to be learned from the knowledge of the customs or laws of all nations , since who is able to know them all ? and therefore these laws must be tryed either by the natural light of a man 's own conscience , or else by considering whether this or that practice of a nation conduces to the honour or service of god , or the common good and happiness of mankind , and so may be known as well by the unlearned as the learned . now i suppose you will not affirm , that this law of the absolute property and dominion of fathers in and over their children , can be discovered by either of these ways , or that a mans conscience will tell him , that it is his duty to let his father kill him or sell him , or use him like a brute , without any contradiction or resistance . and as for the other , i think i have sufficiently proved that this absolute power which you assert of fathers over their children , doth not proceed from that great law of nature , viz. the common good and preservation of mankind , to which the practice of it may prove very destructive , which if proved , i think , i may easily answer all that you have now said about the particular customs , or laws of diverse nations concerning this matter , tho' your instances were many more than they are . for in the first place as for those you alledge out of the scripture , they do ( as i said before ) only regard th● municipal laws of the iews ; those of the romans touching this matter , did only concern those common-wealths whilst they were in being and no other nations whatsoever , and for this opinion , i have both grotius and pufendrof of my side , for the former in the beginning of the chapter last quoted , after having set down the different powers which fathers may exercise over their children , according to their different ages : thus affirms ; as you may here see . whatsoever is beyond these powers , proceeds , only from a voluntary law , which is different in diverse places so by the law which god gave the iews , the power of the father over his son or daughter , to dissolve their vows was not perpetual , but only endured as long as the children were parts of their fathers family . and by the same rule i may add , that children were not reckoned as part of their fathers goods , and to be sold by him , or seized upon by creditors for his debts any longer , than they continued members of their fathers family , and consequently were not seized upon as his sons , but servants . and i desire you to shew me an example , where ever among the iews , the children after they were adult , and parted from their fathers house , were sold or seized as slaves for their fathers debts . and as for the romans , it is plain , they acknowledged their patria potestas to be in use amongst them , neither by the law of nature , or nations , but only from their own civil law , as appears by this title , almost at the very beginning of iustininian's institutions , ( as i suppose you know better than i ) patria potestas est juris civilis , & civium romanorum propria . the text follows in these words ( as i remember ) jus potestatis quod in liberos habemus proprium est civium romanorum , nulli enim alii sunt homines qui talem in liberos habeant potestat●● , qualem nos habemus ; and therefore they would not permit strangers to exercise it over their children within the city of rome . and if the power of the father among the jews and romans was not by the law of nature , or nations , no more could it be so , tho' exercised amongst never so many other nations , since if it were one of the laws or preceps of nature , it could never have been taken away , or restrained by any civil law without the express consents of all fathers . and as for your instance of cymon amongst the athenians ; it makes nothing to this purpose ; since if i take it at the worst , it maketh no more , than that the athenian common-wealth dealt very ungratefully , and tyrannically with miltiades and his son ; and it might be that they kept him prisoner as being heir to his fathers principality in the thracian chersonnese , out of which they supposed he might pay the debt ; as the king with us doth often put an heir in prison for his fathers debts , where he hath assets by descent . but for all your other examples , unless they have a reason in nature to support them , they will no more prove that by the law of nations fathers should have a right of life and death , or of selling their children , than if you should argue from the common custom amongst the lacedemonians , the aborigines in italy , the inhabitants of the kingdom of sophiris , as amongst the indians mentioned by qu curtius , and the chineses , and the inhabitants of formosa at this day ; all which either did , or now do destroy their children as soon as they are brought forth , or else in the womb afore they are born , if they please so to do . and as for some of these nations you have instanced in , and particularly the muscovites , who can ●ell their children , but four times , it is apparent it is only a municipal law ; for if the property of the father over the sons persons were by them looked upon as perpetual , he might not only sell him four times , but forty , if it were possible . but on the other side , i have against this custom of your n●tions , the examples of divers altogether as wise , and civiliz'd , who did not permit fathers to exercise this absolute power over their children , and therefore against your example of the jews , i set that of the egyptians , who did not permit parents to put their children to death , nor yet to sell them , unless in case of great necessity , and when they could not otherwise maintain them , and then i grant it may be necessary , so likewise against your roman law , i set that of all the greek nations , none of whom permitted fathers to put their children to death , except the spartans , and that was only in one case , and that was only in one case , and that with the judgment and consent of the eldest men of the family , yet when their new born infants were so weak or ill shaped as to be thougt not worth the rearing . so likewise against ▪ your examples of the antient gauls , i set that of the germans , a nation altogether as wise and civilized as the other , to whom i could likewise add the antient britains , spaniards , and divers others , and to the more modern examples of the eastern nations , where this custom is permitted of selling or killing their children ; i shall oppose the turks and persians , amongst whom it is forbidden , as also amongst all the nations of europe , who believe christianity ; and if we go over to america , we shall find that they are there so indulgent to their children , that no fault whatsoever , tho' never so great , shall make them put them to death . and to let you see that this is most suitable to reason , the two greatest philosophers amongst the greeks , plato and aristotle , have condemned it ; the former in his laws , where he expresly forbids it , supposing that in no case whatever , a father ought to put off all piety and humanity towards his son , and that a son should be rather led by nature , than driven by force to obey his father ; especially since his power is sufficiently established by the law , and the appointing of publick judges ; and aristotle in his morals to nicomachus , lib. . cap. . accuses the jus patrium in use among the persians as tyrannical , and grotius tells you ; he makes use of these examples of the romans and persians , only that we might distinguish civil rights from natural . * from whence it appears that the putting of children to death by parents , was lookt upon as an odius thing amongst the wisest of the antients ; and therefore neither the lex regia , nor the law of the xii . tables , nor the julian law de adulteriis ( all which left fathers a power over the lives of their sons and daughters ) yet would extend this power by interpretation to the grand father towards his grand-son or grand-daughter . m. yet for all this i think all the wisest and most civilized nations were of my opinion , and it is from them that we ought to take this law of nations rather than the others ; and therefore i think the romans were a great deal wiser and better people than the greeks , and the antient gauls , than the germans . nor does your argument against this power of life and death in fathers by the law of nature , seem cogent , that if it were so , it could never be taken away or restrained by any civil law ▪ since this argument will make v● much against that power of life and death , with which you invest your fathers of families in the state of nature , since if they have it by the law of nature , it could no more he restrained , or taken away by civil laws , than any paternal power in the like case . f. i pray sir , hold , if this controversie is to be decided by the wisdom and the civility of nations , we shall never have done ; for in the first place , who shall judge of this consent of the most civilized people ? and that no account is to be made of those whom you call barbarous ; for what nation will acknowledge it self to be so ; or can arrogate so much to it self , as that it may require all others to conform themselves to their laws and customs ; and that all nations must be barbarous that act otherwise ? antiently the arrogance of the greeks , made them look upon all other nations as barbarous , and then the romans succeeded in this foolish conceit of themselves ; and at this day we people of europe ( who are but a few in comparison of the rest of the world ) do suppose our selves to exceed all others in knowledge . and yet on the other side there are diverse nations who prefer themselves far before us , and i have read that the chineses have a saying , that the europeans see with one eye , themselves with two , but that all the rest of the world are stark blind , and yet this nation maintains a power of selling , and exposing their children , which we europeans abhor . now pray tell me if there is not some common rule to be drawn from reason , or the common good of mankind , how shall we judge which is in the right ? so that notwithstanding all that hath been said on this subject : i think i may safely conclude with the judgment of the learned pufendorf , in lib. . cap. . where speaking of the paternal power , he says thus , but neither th● same power as such , seems to extend it self to that of life and death by reason of any fault , but only to a moderate chastisement . for since this authority is employed about an age , that i● weak and tender , and in which such incorrigible crimes can hardly be committed , which nothing but life can expiate , it is much better that a father should turn out of doors a son who doth willfully refuse through obstinacy and wickedness all due correction . so that abdication and disinheriting seems to be the utmost punishment which can be inflicted by a father on a son considered as such . m. i see it is to no purpose to spend longer time about this question but since your self have all along allowed that the father of a separate family in the state of nature , hath a power to put his wife or children to death , in case they have committed any heinous sins or offences against the laws of god or nature , but you have not yet told me ( and i doubt cannot ) how adam or any other master of a family could be endued with this power of life and death , unless it were granted him by god. f. i promise to give you full satisfaction to this question by and by ; but in the mean time , pray let me make it a little more plain to you , that this power of life and death , which may be exercised by masters of separate families , over their wives and children in some cases , is not by any power they receive from god , as husbands or fathers but only as heads or masters of such families , may by proved by this instance , suppose a master of a family independant on any other ( as in the indies ) hath neither wife nor children , yet sure he hath notwithstanding the same power of life and death over his servants or slaves , for such great offences as you have mentioned , in case there be no superiour power over him to take cognizance of such crimes . and to make this yet plainer , suppose a married man having a wife and children will live ( together with them ) in the family of such a master as i have now described ( yet not a● a servant , but as an inmate or boarder ) and whilst he so continues , his wife kills one of her children , or one of his sons , murders his brother , who hath right to punish this offence , but the master in whose family he is an inmate ▪ and this follows from your own supposed : for if every separate family in the state of nature be a distinct independant government , then all those that enter themselves , as members of such a family must be subject to the master or governour of it . nor do you reduce me into any absurdity by your reply to my argument , that if ▪ the power of life and death were originally in fathers by the law of nature , it could never be restrain'd nor taken from them without their consent ; that then this will make as much against the like power of masters of families ; since i must grant , this is taken away by civil laws , and why not the other ? to this i reply , that you do not observe the strength of these words , without their consent ; for i suppose that no power whatever can take this out of the hands of such fathers , or masters of families in the state of nature , without they assign it to the supream powers of the common-wealth upon its first institution ; whereas you make this power to be obtainable by force , as by conquest , or usurpation , not only over those that are not at their own disposal , as children and servants ; but over their fathers and masters too , without their consents ; which is contrary to the law of nature and reason . m. i see you take it for granted , that i will admit your instance of the power of life and death to be in the masters of families , and not as fathers in the state of nature : but as plain as you think it , since you question the power of life and death , which i suppose to be inherent in all fathers ; i know not why i may not with more reason question your allowing the like power to masters of separate families , since there is no reason , in my opinion , which you can bring for such a power in your masters of families , which i cannot with like reason urge may be also exercised by fathers , and husbands , over their wives and children , in case they deserve it . for if it be for the good and preservation of mankind , that great and enormous crimes , such as murder and adultery , should be punished , and that with death ; who is more fit to inflict these punishments , or who can be supposed to judge more impartially of them , than the father , or husband himself ? since he cannot put his son or wife to death , however they may deserve it , without very great reluctancy ; since he , a● it were , thereby lops off a limb from his own body . and therefore i cannot see any reason , why such a married man as you describe , should by coming under another man's roo● only , as an inmate , or boarder , and not as a slave , ( which i grant would alter the case ) should lose that power of life and death , which i suppose he hath by the laws of god and nature over his wife and children , unless he had actually given it up to the master of that family with whom he came to board . and therefore as i do not deny , but that a master of a separate family hath power of life and death , and also of making peace and war , with other such masters of families , nay , with princes themselves , if there be occasion , as we read in genesis , chap. . that abraham made war with the four kings who had taken lot prisoner . so likewise when judah pronounced sentence of death against thamar his daughter-in-law , for playing the harlot , bring her forth , says he , and let her be burnt , gen. . i own this was not done by the authority of a father alone ( she not being his own daughter , and his son being then dead ; ) but as the master of a separate family , who hath ( i grant ) power of life and death , as he is lord over the persons of his children , a● servants , and consequently over their wives also ; for if he hath power over his son , he hath certainly the like over all that belong to him , as long as they continue members of his family , and that he hath not thought fit to manumit , or set them free . but now i desire to know by what right these patriarch● could exercise all these mark● of soveraignty , especially this great power of life and death , unless it were derived from god at first ; since no man hath any power to dispose of his own life at his pleasure , and therefore sure hath naturally no power over that of another man's : so that not only this power of the patriarchs , but also that of all monarchs to this day , must be derived from this divine original . f. well then , i find you 're forced to quit the power of a father , as such by generation , since it plainly appears , that this power of life and death , which you affirm a husband , or father may exercise over their wives or children in the state of nature , is not , quatenus , as a father , but lord and master over them ; which in the first place i cannot allow to be true in relation to the wife ; nor that the submission of the wife's will to the husband must imply a power of life and death over her ; for if she is not his slave ( as certainly she is not , for then a man might sell his wife when he pleased ) i cannot see how she her self could convey by force of the contract , any such power over her life , tho i grant , indeed , if she happen to commit murder upon one of her children , or other person of the family , he may proceed against her as an enemy , but not as a subject ; and if it be for adultery it self , i cannot see that the husband can by the law of nature punish her with death ; for since that crime doth really dissolve the bond of matrimony , divorce , or putting her away , and deserting the child born in adultery , was even among the romans look'd upon as a sufficient punishment . but as for the power of parents over their children , i do not deny , but that a father may have the like power over his children whilst they are part of his family , as over his slaves or servants in case of such great and enormous crimes as you have already mentioned ; but that this is not as a father , but master of a family , your self have already granted in your instances of abraham and judah ; tho if you will consider the last a little better , you will find that judah did not proceed thus against thamar , as her father , or master , but by some other right ; for if you please to look upon the th verse of that chap. of genesis , from whence you cite this example , you will find that thamar , after the death of onan her husband , went with judah's leave , and dwelt in her own father's house , and she was then a member of his family , and consequently ( according to your hypothesis ) not under judah's power , when she was thus got with child by him ; and therefore not he , but her own father ought to have condemned her , if this judgment had belonged to him as to the master of the family . and therefore some of the rabbins suppose , that when judah gave this judgment against thamar , he did not act either as a father , or master of the family , for he was then under the power of the cananites ; ( who certainly had some civil government among them at that time ) and therefore they suppose that he acted thus as a civil judge , appointed by the supreme magistrate of that nation . but to defend the instance i have given you of a father of a family losing his power of life and death , upon his becoming a part or member of another family ; you your self have already yielded me as much as i can reasonably desire for the defence of my assertion , since you allow this power of life and death to fathers , not as such , but as lords , and masters over their children , as over their slaves ; and if so , i desire to know who can challenge this power but the master of the family with whom he ●ives , unless you can suppose two distinct heads , or masters in the same house , and then they will not be one family , but two , under distinct heads , each of them still retaining their distinct rights . but you will say , that this boarder , or inmate , is not a servant , or slave to the master with whom he lives , and therefore hath not forfeited ; or given up his right , or power of life and death over his own children to him ; but it is no matter whether he did , or not , since by making himself a member of the others family , he ceased to be master of his own , and concequently must lose all the natural rights or prerogatives belonging to it , of which , i grant this of life and death to be the chief ; for if families in the state of nature , are like so many distin commonweat●● , independant upon each other ; it will likewise follow , that the heads of those families must be in all things necessary for the good and preservation of the family , like so many distinct civil soveraigns , and consequently must have a power of life and death , and also of making laws , with punishments annexed to them ▪ in all cases where the good and peace of the family require it . if therefore in a civil state , or monarchy , and a●solute prince come into the dominions or teritories of another , it is acknowledg'd by all writets on this subject , that such a prince loses that power of life and death which he had before , and cannot exercise it as long as he is in the other princes dominions : so by the same reason , if the masters of families , in the state of nature , are like so many civil soveraigns , it will follow , that they must cease to be such , when they become members of anothers family , unless you will fall into the absurdity of supposing to absolute independant heads , or masters , in one and the same house ; which , what a confusion it would bring , i leave to your self to judge . m. i shall not much dispute this power of life and death with you , as belonging to masters of seperate families : but pray shew me how they can exercise this power over the lives of those that are under their jurisdiction , unless it were granted them by god , by virtue of that original power given to adam , not only as a father , but prince of his posterity . f , i do not doubt but i shall give you a satisfactory answer to this important demand , without supposing any extraordinary divine commission from god to adam ; for as for your instance of abraham's making war , leagues , or covemants with other princes , it i● no more than what any master of a seperat● family may do for his own and their defence ; and what if you or i were masters of a family in the in●ies , where their is no power above us , we might do as well as abraham , and all this without any other commission from god , than the great right of nature , self-preservation , and the well performance of that trust which god hath put into our hands , of defending , and providing for our selves and our families , since if god hath ordained the end , he hath likewise ordained all means necessary thereunto ; and therefore there is no such great mystery in this as you suppose . m. if there were no more in it than a meer right of self defence , for which i grant re●aliation , or revenge may be also necessary , you would have a great d●●l of reason on your side ; but pray shew me how a father , or master of a family ▪ can cond●mn either his wife , child , or servant to death , as a punishment for any enormous crime , such as i have mentioned ( and you agreed to ) without such a divine comm●ssion as i suppose adam had . since i own revenge or re●alla●ion may ●e used by private men in the state of nature , by the right of self defence , 〈…〉 grant may be exercised between equals ; but since all punishments , properly taken , are the acts of superiors towards their inferiors , i cannot conceive how any father , or master of a family , can inflict so great a punishment as death upon any member of it , unless he derived this power immediately from god , by virtue of the divine charter committed by him to adam , and and from thence to be derived to all masters of families , or civil soveraigns , who could never derive this power from the joynt compacts or consent of fathers , of masters of families ; since no man could convey that to another , which he had not himself . and i have already , i think , with a great deal of truth asserted , that no man hath power over his own life , to take it away when he pleases , and therefore cannot have it over another man's ; much less can convey any such right to others , except it were granted at first by god , in the manner i have supposed , which i conceive may easily be made out by several places in genesis ; by which it plainly appears that adam , and after him noah , were supernaturally endued with this divine power . f. tho ● am satisfied that this hypothesis is extreamly absurd , since if it were so only , christian or jewish soveraigns , or magistrates , who acknowledg the scriptures , could lay any claim to ▪ or exercise this divine power ; whereas we find it practised by all those nations , with whom the memory of adam , and noah is quite lost , and therefore must claim this prerogative , not from any revealed , but natural law of god ; yet however since you think you have such clear texts of scripture on your side , i desire you to produce them , tho , if they should make out what you say , they would only serve to confirm , by divine revelation , that prerogative of life and death , which all masters of families , as well as civil soveraigns , enjoyed by the law of nature , before ever the bible was written . m. as for my own part , i am so well satisfied of this supream power of life and death granted at first by god to adam , and after to noah , that i cannot see that without the supposal of this , any supream power could lawfully be exercised by civil soveraigns at this day : and therefore i am of mr. selden 's opinion , who in his most learned treatise , de iure gentium apud hebraeos , maintains with the iewish rabbins , that the law of nature can never be planly proved , and made out by reason , without a tradition of its preceps , as given by god to adam , and thence conveyed to noah , and his posterity : which divine laws , or commands , are called by the iews the seven precepts of noah , which whatsoever nation , or people , would observe , they permitted them to live as inhabitans among them ; though they did not embrace circumcision , or those other rights and ceremonies commanded by the law of moses . now amongst these precepts , that of instituting publick judgments for capital crimes , is one of the first , in pursuance of that command which god gave noah immediately after the flood , gen. . v. . whosoever sheddeth man's blood , by man shall his blood be shed : for in the image of god made he man. by which text almost all commentators understand that it is not any common man , but the person of the civil magistrate or soveraign that is to be meant : since it would be both impracticable , and also breed great confusion in civil societies , if by this word man , every common person , not endued by god with this supream power of life and death , should be understood ; and therefore i do suppose with the most learned iews , that this power was first exercised by vertue of that divine charter that was given of it by god to adam , and then renewed again to noah , by the text abovementioned . now that adam had by divine grant an absolute dominion over the whole world , and all creatures therein contained , will appear from gen. . v. , . ( here is the bible , i desire you would read it with me ) so god created man in his own image , in the image of god created he him ; male and female created he them . and god blessed them ; and god said unto them , be fruitful , and multiply , and replenish the earth , and subdue it ; and have dominion over the fish of the sea , and over the fowl of the air , and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth . by which grant , or donation , from god of subduing the earth , and having dominion over the creatures , adam was made the general lord of all things , with such a particular propriety to himself , as did exclude his children from having any share in it . so that if cain had his fields for corn , or abel his flocks , and pasture for them , it was only by adam's grant ▪ or assignation , none of his children or descendents having any property in lands or goods , without his particular grant , or permission . f. you must pardon me , sir , if i cannot be of your opinion , that all the preceps of the law of nature must depend upon no firmer foundation , than a tradition of the seven preceps , supposed by the jewish rabbins to be given to adam , and noah , and from them conveyed to all their posterity , since we find not the least mention of any such precepts in the scripture , or in josephus , philo judaeus , or any other ancient writer , but only in the t●lmud : which though it pretends to a great antiquity in its traditions , yet any judicious man that will but peruse it , may easily see the falshood , as well as absurdity of the pretended tradition of these precepts ; one of which is against ea●ing the members of any living creature ; which savours so strongly of a jewish superstition , that if that were a true precept , or law of nature , no man could eat a dish of lambstones , or a black pudding , without sinning against the law of nature : and it is very impro●●● to suppose , that all mankind , except jews , christians and mahometans , should be obliged to live or act by those laws or preceps they never heard of . for ▪ it ( as you your self must grant ) the memory or tradition of these precepts be quite lost amongst all nations , except the jews , it is all one as if they had acted without any law at all ; and consequently , if they have not some better grounds for their observation of the law of nature , than these preceps of noah , i doubt whether ( according to your hypothesis ) all civil soveraigns that do not own the original of their power of life and death ▪ to this divine charter granted to adam , and noah , must be no better than murtherers , since they take upon them to exercise this great prerogative without any divine authority for so doing . but i hope to shew you before we have concluded this conversation , that , not only the power of life , and death , but also other laws of nature , may easily be deduced , by reason , to have been given by god to mankind , by the ordinary course of his providence , without recurring to divine revelation ; which can only oblige those that have heard of it . but since you lay so much stress upon those texts of scripture you have now cited ; i pray give me leave to examine , whether they will bear that sense you put upon them . as for the first of those texts you quote , whosoever sheddeth man's blood , by man shall his blood be shed , &c. suppose i should take it in that sense you put upon it , only to extend to civil soveraigns , or magistrates , it will be so far from proving a power of life and death to have been granted by god to adam , and from him conveyed to noah , that this place seems to imply the contrary ; for if it was a known law before , that murther was to be punished with death by a father , or other magistrate , to what purpose was this command now given to noah ? since if it were a divine law before the flood , wherefore is it here repeated ? and therefore all expositors agree , that this is the first precept enjoyning murther to be punished by the civil magistrate , which , before any of the kin of the person slain might have executed , as appears by genesis . v. . when cain said unto the lord , i shall be a fugitive , and a vagabond on the earth ; and it shall come to pass , that every one that findeth me , shall slay me ; which had been a needless fear , if none but adam had a power to take away his life for the murther of his brother , as you suppose ; much less that god should have needed to have set a mark upon him to keep him from being murthered by his brethren , or other relations . nor will that other place you cite out of genesis prove adam's sole dominion over the earth , and all the things and persons therein contained : for if you please to consider it , you will find , that it is so far from proving your opinion , that it speaks the direct contrary . pray therefore observe of whom moses speaks in that place ; surely not of adam alone , when he says , male and female created he them ; and god blessed them , and said unto them , be fruitful and multiply , and replenish the earth , and subdue it , and have dominion over the fish of the sea , and over the fowl of the air , and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth : from whence we may observe , first , that these words being directed in the plural number , both to the male and female , were not intended to adam alone , but by way of anticipation , not only to himself , and eve , ( who was not then made ) but likewise to their posterity ( that is ) all mankind ; then that they should be fruitful , and multiply , and replenish the earth , and subdue it , ( that is , possess and enjoy it ) and have dominion , &c. over every living thing that moveth ( in the hebrew ) creepeth upon the face of the earth . by which words it appears , that not any dominion over mankind , but only over bruit-beasts , that move or creep upon the earth , is hereby conferred . and that this must be the true meaning of this place , is plain , if you will but read the two next verses that follow . and god said , behold , i have given you every herb bearing seed , which is upon the face of all the earth ; and every tree , in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed ; to you it shall be for meat . and to every beast of the earth , and to every fowl of the air , and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth , wherein there is life ▪ i have given every green herb for meat ; and it was so . which words are certainly directed to the same persons as the former ( that is ) to all mankind , by the same argument as that every green herb is here granted for meat to every beast of the earth , and every fowl of the air , &c. that then was , or ever shall exist in nature . so that this text which you have cited to prove this absolute and sole dominion of adam over the earth , and all thee creatures therein contained , is so far from proving any such thing , that it seems to me to make out the direct contrary doctrine , viz. that the earth , and all the creatures th●rein , were not granted to adam alone , as the sole lord and master of them ; but in common to himself , his wife , and all his posterity , who had as good a right to them , `as he had himself . so that i must tell you , if you intend to bring me over to your opinion , you must produce some better proofs out of scripture , or reason , than those made use of by 〈◊〉 r. f. and therefore i desire that you would give me some plaine● proof● for adam's absolute power over his wife , and all his posterity , than hitherto you have done ; since i cannot see any divine charter granted by god in scripture , of any absolute power , or dominion , over their lives , or persons . m. i shall , sir , do my best endeavour to give you all the satisfaction i can possibly therein ; therefore i desire you farther to take notice , that mr. selden , in his mare clasum , and all the jewish rabbins have understood this text in genesis , to give adam an absolute power over the earth , and all things therein contained , exclusive to his posterity as long as he lived . and the said author from the ancient tradition of the jews , is of the same opinion in his mare clausum ▪ so that if sir r. f. and divers others have erred in the sense of this place , i believe it is more than you or i can prove , since sure they would not have put this sense upon it , without they had some good reason for it . but this much i suppose you will admit , that adam was created by god , and is in scripture called the son of god , as indeed he was ; and if so , let your self , or any other rational man consider● whether it be at all likely that god should not endow this son of his , the father of mankind , with somuch authority and power as should enable him to govern his own family , and children , as long as he lived , without depending upon them for their consent , and chopping logick with them , whethe● his commands were reasonable , or lawful or not : and if a power of life and death was necessary ( as the murther of abel by cain shews it was ) whether adam had no more share in that power , than any of his children , or grand-children : which is sufficient to shew you the absurdity of your tenets . that the authority of adam over his posterity was not absolute in its exercise , as well as perpetual in its duration ; and this i think you cannot but admit , because you have already acknowledged this power of life and death to proceed from , or to be granted by god to adam ; and so consequently must have continued with him as long as he lived . f. well , i perceive you find your monarchy , or absolute dominion of adam over eve , and all her posterity , as also over all the creatures of the earth , not to be proved from any of these places of scripture you have brought for this extravagant opinion ▪ and therefore you now urge upon me my own concession of this supream and absolute authority of life and death , which i do not deny but adam might have exercised in some cases over his wife and children as long as they continued part of his family : but that he was not endued with this prerogative as a father , but as a head or master of his own family , i think i have sufficiently proved , and therefore need not repeat it . and indeed your own instance of the murther of abel by cain , ( which for all we can find past unpunish'd by adam ) sufficienly proves , that this power of life and death over his children or grand children , when once they were separated from his family , was not a necessary prerogative of his government , or else that his children , and grand-children , when they have erected 〈◊〉 milies of their own , had it as much from god as he ▪ and that from the same reason which you give , why god endowed adam with it , viz. because without such a power they could not have been enabled to govern their children and families as long as they lived . so that adam's being created by god , or called his son , gave him not a jo● more power over his children , and his descendents , than what as a master , or head of a family he would have had by the law of nature however ; and it is all one in this case , whether you suppose mankind to have been created by god , or to have existed from all eternity , provided you hold the being of a god , according to the hypothesis of the more modern , platonists , who tho they held the eternity of the world , yet likewise owned all things to be governed by god's providence : and therefore if on this supposition , mankind could not be well governed , nor preserved , without inflicting of capital punishments for great crimes , and that they are necessary for its peace and preservation ; it is likewise as necessary , that there should be some judge appointed by god to inflict them , which in the state of nature can be only the head , or master of a family ; as after civil government is once instituted , it belongs to the civil sovereign , or commonwealth . and this i hope will serve to answer your scruple , how adam , or any other master of a separate family , may very well be endued with this great power of life and death by the law of nature , without supposing any charter granted him for it by divine revelation ▪ or else depending upon his childrens consent for his exercise of it . but before i farther consider , whether this power of adam , or of any other father , or master , be perpetual or not , and extends any farther than his own family , give me leave to examine , whether or no children , when grown to years of discretion , and even whilst they continue members of their father's family , may not in some cases chop logick with him ( as you call it ) and not only question , but judge whether their commands be reasonable , or lawful , or not ; or else abraham ( for example ) mut have sacrificed to idols , because his father bid him . whereas josephus tells us , he rather chose to quit his country , and his father's house , than to sin against god. and therefore i think you cannot deny , but if husbands , or fathers command their wives or children to do any thing that is morally unlawful , or contrary to the laws of god , or nature , they may lawfully ( nay are obliged ) not to obey such unlawful commands . m. i shall so far agree with you , that if the thing commanded be apparently contrary to the laws of god , and nature , that they are not obliged to obey their commands ; but they must be evidently , and apparently so , before they thus take upon them to refuse obedience to them ; otherwise i deny that their conscience , however misguided , ought to be any excuse , or just ground of their disobedience . for if their conscience be truly grounded upon the laws of god , or nature , that will excuse them , but if it be not , conscience without such a law , can never do it . and yet this non-performance of the unlawful commands of the husband , or father , may very well consist without any anarchy , or disorder in the family , since the wife and children must always yield him an active-obedience , in performing all his commands ; or else a passive one , in submitting to whatever harsh usage , or punishment such a husband , or father shall please to exercise , or inflict upon them for their non performance of them , tho never so unlawful ▪ but yet certainly in all possible and indifferent things , children are boun● yeild , not only a passive , but an active obedience to their father's commands . for if his children should have a liberty to judge of his commands , whether they are reasonable , or not , what can ensue but anarchy and confusion in all families ? f. well , i am glad we are so far agreed , that a wife and children in the state of nature have liberty to judge of their husband's and father's commands , whether they are lawful , or not , and also to disobey them , when they are not so : and i think i may carry this a little farther , and affirm , that such wife and children ought not to obey the commands of such a husband or father , though they are not really contrary to such divine , or moral laws , but only erroneously supposed so by them ; and therefore most casuists agree , that even an erroneous conscience does oblige , as long as a man lies under that mistake . for st. paul tells us , whatsoever is not of faith , is sin , rom. . nay farther , such an erroneous conscience may excuse a man before god , if his ignorance was not wilful , but invincible , and not proceeding from his own fault ; but of this no man can judge , but god alone , and the party whose conscience it is ; and therefore such a husband , or father , can have no right or authority to compel their wives and children to perform such commands , because the will ought always to follow the dictates of the understanding ; and therefore they should not be forced to do that which they judge contrary to god's moral , or divine law ; since conscience may be instructed , but can never be forced . neither will your distinction of an active and passive obedience help you in this matter ; for active obedience i understand well enough ; but as for passive obedience , i think it is next door to that we call a bull , or nonsense . and to prove this , i shall give you this plain instance ; suppose you had a iew to your servant , and should command him to do you some work or other on a saturday , which he judged a breach of the fourth commandment , that forbids him to work on the seventh day , ( or sabbath ) and you being very angry , should cudgel him soundly for this refusal ; whereupon he tells you , that you may beat him as long as you please , he would not resist , but yield a passive obedience ; but yet could not perform your commands . i ask you now , whether you would rest satisfied that this iewish servant had sufficiently performed what you bad him , by submitting to your cudgelling ? and whether your dinner or horse would not be as much undress'd after this sort of passive obedience , as it was before ? m. perhaps indeed this phrase of passive obedience may be somewhat improper , and may be more properly termed an absolute subjection , or submission ; but it is all one what we call it , as long as you understand what we mean , since such submission doth sufficiently avoid that anarchy and confusion which would necessarily follow , in case it were lawful for wives , or children , in any case whatsoever , to resist their husbands , or fathers , though for the defence of life it self ; since no government can be maintained , where the parties governed have a right to resist their superiors , or governors , in any case . f. i grant indeed that no government can be maintained where the parties governed resist their superiours or governors in the due exercise of their power ; but when , they exceed those limits , they cease to act as true superiors , or governors ; and therefore when instead of husbands , or fathers , they prove destroyers of their families , i doubt not but they may then be lawfully resisted by them . for suppose such a father of a family should in a furious or drunken fit go about to kill his wife , or one of his innocent children , can any body think this was treason against the monarch of the family , if his wife , or one of his sons , should rescue her self , or this innocent child out of his hands by force , if they could not otherwise quiet him ? m. this supposition of madness , or drunkenness , in fathers of families , you gentlemen of commonwealth principles make great use of , to justify your doctrin of resistance ; and i know no reason why you might not extend it as well to anger , lust , or any other passion that a man is subject to ; and have given all the world a power to judg when a man is drunk , or mad , as well as his wife , children , or servants , nor do i know why you so much insist upon it , but because the authors from whence you had it , are so in love with rebellion and disorder , that they seek and catch at every opportunity to recommend it to the world. but , i believe , had you a wife , child , or servant , that should take the liberty of controling you upon this pretence , you would be more enraged with the reason of the resistance , than with the resistance it self . f. i am sorry , sir , any thing i have said can so far transport you to passion , as to make such unkind reflections upon your friends ; but pray be not so hot ; is it not possible that a master , or father , in the state of nature , may be mad , or drunk ? m. yes ; and is it not possible also that the wife may be so too ? now suppose they should mutually charge each other with madness , or drinking too much , who shall judg betwixt them ● what horrible confusion must this introduce into all societies , to give inferiors a power to judg their superiors to be mad , or drunk , and thereupon to resist , and oppose them with force ? but if it doth at any time happen ; wives , children , and servants , that are dutiful , may have ways to appease their husbands , fathers , or masters , when mad , or drunk , without resisting or fighting them ; as by getting out of the way , or by submission , prayers and tears , which nature hath taught them on such occasions to make use of , and which is a thousand times a better method , than those violent courses you propose . f. all i desire of you in this conversation , is , that you would be pleased to believe , i do not argue out of any love to rebellion , or disorder , or that i desire to encourage it in private families , much less to recommend it to the world ; only what i speak , is purely out of a desire of the happiness and preservation of mankind ; and i hope i say no more , than what all sober men will allow may be every day practised in private families ; and therefore , since you will needs have it , i do extend this power of resistance , not only to madness , or drunkenness alone , but even to anger , lust , or any other exorbitant passion a man can be subject to ; and i do likewise give all the world a power to judg when such a man is mad , or furiously passionate , as well as his wife , servants , or children , if in those drunken or mad fits he goeth about to kill them , or any else . for i think in that case , you will not deny , but any honest neighbour may step in and bind him , or hold his hands , and so may likewise the wife or children themselves . as suppose this father or husband should be so far transported with passion , or lust , as to go about to kill his wife , or ravish his daughter ; i hope you will not deny , but they may lawfully resist him , if they can neither run away , nor yet pacify him by submission , prayers , or tears , which i grant are much better methods , if they may prevail : but what if they can neither get away , nor yet any of those gentle means , you propose , can work any good upon him , what shall they do then ? can any one believe that god hath appointed an innocent wife , or children , to be made a sacrifice to the madness , drunkenness , passion , or lust of such a father , or husband ? and as for the case you put , where the husband or wife should charge each other with madness , or drinking too much , who should judg between them ? it is a meer cavil ; for as long as they only fall out , and only brangle , it is no matter whether there be any judg , or not . but if it proceeds to blows , and they are like to mischif or kill each other , no doubt but the children or neighbours may come in , and part them ; and may either hold , or shut up one , or both of them , till they are sober . m. pray , sir , let us leave this touchy discourse concerning self-defence , till anon , when we shall have occasion to fall more naturally upon it . suppose then i should at present grant you , that a wise or children may ( in case of such extremities as may happen to them by the madness , or drunkenness of the husband , or father ) restrain , or resist his violence , in case no other means can prevail ; what is this to disobeying his commands , or resisting him when he is sober ? which certainly they have no right to do . but to come as near you as possible i can , and to let you see i am not a man of a domineering temper , and who approves of unnecessary severities , or unnatural rigours , either in masters of families , husbands , or fathers ; i grant that no father , or master of a family , has any right to punish , or put to death the meanest of his slaves , much less his children , without a sufficient cause ; or that he may sell his children , or otherwise tyrannize over them by cruel usage , or too severe punishments , since they are not only part of his own substance , and to whom by the order of the creation he gave a being , but was also ( as you well observe ) ordained by god for their happiness , and preservation , as they were also ( as well as his wife ) for his constant help , comfort and subsistence ; and therefore they were , as much , or more , made for him , as he for them , as it is plain concerning the wife from the text in genesis , when god said , it is not good that the man should be alone , i will make him a help meet for him , gen. . . ( viz. ) the woman ; and therefore , as her subjection to her husband is perpetual , as long as she lives , so likewise is that of the children in whom he acquireth a property by their education for so many years ; which i look upon as a greater obligation than their generation ; and over both whom he must , in the state of nature , have an absolute power of life and death ; which though i grant he may happen sometimes to abuse , yet i suppose no person living hath any right in that state to resist him in the execution of it , much less to call him to an account , or punish him for the male-administration of his power . and you have granted , that the husband in the state of nature hath a power of life and death over his wife , if she murthers her children , or commits any other abominable sin against nature ; and that then she may be justly cut off from the family , and punish'd as an enemy to mankind , and so certainly may his children too . but what need i say any more of this subject , when you have not as yet answered my former arguments , concerning the absoluteness and perpetuiry of this conjugal subjection , ( and that which will likewise follow from it ) the constant service and subjection of wives and children to their fathers in the state of nature . therefore pray , sir , let us return again to that head , and let me hear what you have to object against those reasons i have brought for it . f. i beg your pardon , sir , if i have not kept so close to the point as i might have done ; but you may thank your self for it , who brought me off from what i was going farther to say on that head , by your discourse of passive obedience and non-resistance , and i know not what strange unintelligible power of life and death conferred by god on adam , as a husband , and a father . but first give me leave farther to prove , that this subjection of the wife is neither absolute , nor irrevocable . for proof of which i shall lay down these principles . . that the wife in the state of nature , when she submits her self to the power of her husband , does it to live as happily as she did before , o● rather to enjoy more of the comforts of life than in a single state. . that therefore she did not renounce either her own happiness or self-preservation . . neither did she make him the sole and absolute judg of the means that may conduce to these ends : for if this were so , let him use her never so cruelly , or severely , she could have no cause to censure him , or complain in the least against him . . if she have not so absolutely given up her will to his , she is still judge when she is well used by him ; or else so cruelly , that it is no longer to be endured . and therefore if such a husband will not allow his wife sufficient food and raiment , and other necessaries ; or that he uses her cruelly , by beating , or other punishments , or hath endeavoured to take away her life ; in all these cases in the state of nature , and where there is no superior power to complain , or appeal to , she may certainly quit him ; and i think she is not bound to return , to co-habit with him again , until she is satisfied he is sorry for his former cruel treatment of her , and is resolved to make amends for the future . but whether this repentance be real , or not , she only can be judge , since she can only judge of her own happiness , and the means of her preservation . and the end of matrimony being for their mutual happiness , and help to each other ; if he have broke his part of the compact , she is then so far discharged from hers , and consequently in the meer state of nature ( which is that we are now talking of ) the vinculum matrimonii ( as you civilians term it ) will be likewise dissolved : so likewise such a husband , for no just cause , or crime in the wife , but only to be rid of her , should endeavour to take away her life , as suppose to strangle her in her sleep , or the like , no doubt but she may ( notwithstanding your conjugal subjection ) resist him by force , and save her life , until she can call in her children , or family , for her rescue and assistance ; who sure may also notwithstanding this absolute daspotick power you place in their father , or master , rescure her from his rage and malice whether he will or not : nay they are bound to do it , unless they will be accessaries to her murther . m. these are doubtful cases at best , and do very seldom happen ; and a husband can scarce ever be supposed to be so wicked , as to hate , and destroy his own flesh , and therefore we need not make laws on purpose for cases that so rarely happen . f. rarely happen ! i see you are not very conversant at the old bayly , nor at our countrey assizes ; where if you please to come , you may often hear of cases of this nature ; and i wonder you that are a civilian , and have so many matrimonial causes in your spiritual courts , brought by wives for separation , propter saevitiam , &c. should doubt whether husbands do often use their wives so ill , that it is not to be endured . but if the wife have these privileges , pray tell me why the children shall not have the same , according to your own maxime of partus sequitur ventrem , since the subjection of children must be according to your own principles , of the same natere with that of the mother ; and then pray what becomes of this absolute and perpetual subjection you talk of ? m. yet i hope you will not affirm , but that children are under higher obligations of duty and obedience to their father , than a wife is to her husband , with whom perhaps she may in some cases be upon equal terms ; but children can never be so in respect of their father , to whom they are always inferior , and ought to be absolutely subject in the state of nature ( that is ) before civil laws have restrained paternal power . f. i thank you sir , for bringing me so naturally to the other head i was coming to , and i agree with you in your other maxim , of quicquid ex me & ●xore mea nascitur in potestate mea est , yet not in your sense ; for i● i should grant , that the father's power over the child , commences from his power over the mother by her becoming his wife , and submitting her self , and consequently all the issue that should be begotten of her , to her husband's power ; yet ( as i have proved already ) in case of the wife , so i think i may affirm the same in that of the children , that they are not deliver'd by god so absolutely to the father's will , or disposal , as that they have no right , when they attain to years of discretion , to seek their own happiness and preservation in another place , in case the father uses them as slaves , or else goes about to take away their lives without any just cause , since when children are at those years , i think they are by the laws of nature sufficient judges of their own happiness , or misery , that is , whether they are well , or ill used ; and whether their lives are in danger , or not , by their father's cruelty . for tho' i grant that children considered as such , are always inferior to their parents ; yet i must likewise affirm , that in another respect , as they are men , and make a part of that great aggregate body of mankind , they are in all points equal to them ; that is , as the parents have a right to life , happiness , and self-preservation , so have they likewise , and consequentially to all necessary means thereunto , such as food , cloaths , liberty ( i mean from being used as slaves ) which principles , if true , will likewise serve for a farther proof against that absolute property , and dominion , you supposed to be conferred on adam over the earth , and all things therein , exclusive to that of his wife and children . for if they had a right to a being and self-preservation , whether he would or not , so had they likewise to all the means necessary thereunto ; and he was not only obliged to provide food and raiment for his children , whilst they were unable to do it for themselves , but also when they grew up to years of discretion , they might take it without his assignment , and this by virtue of that grant in genesis , i before quoted , and god said , gen. . ( viz. to the man and the woman , and in them to all mankind then in their loins ) behold , i have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of the earth , &c. behold , to you it shall be for meat . so that sure you were too rash , in affirming with sir r. f. that a son , a slave , and a servant , were all one at the first : for i hope i have proved the father doth not acquire any absolute property in the person of the son , either by his begetting him , or bringing him up ; for then i grant , a son and a slave would be all one . but if you please better to consider it , you will find , that fathers were never ordained by god for perpetual lords and masters over their children , but rather as tutors and guardians , till they are of years of discretion , and able to shift for themselves ; god having designed the father to beget , and bring up his child , nor for his own interest , or advantage only , but rather for the child's happiness and preservation , which by the laws of god and nature he is bound to procure : for as it is the son's duty never to do any action that may make his father repent his begetting , or bringing him up ; so on the other side , the father ought not to treat his son so severely , as to make him weaay of his family , much less of his life . it is the apostle's precept , ephes. . . parents provoke not your children to wrath ; which certainly he knew they were apt to do , or else that precept had been needless . now pray tell me , if adam had used one of his sons ( whom he loved worse than the rest ) so cruelly , as to make him a slave instead of a son , and when grown a man , should have put him to all the servile and hard labour imaginable , with scarce victuals enough to live upon , or cloaths to cover him , what must this son have done ? born all patiently ? or else do you think it had been a damnable sin , if he had fled into the land of nod , to cain his elder brother ? m. to answer your question , i think in the first place it had ; for i do not only take cain to have been the first murderer , but rebel too ; and in the next place this question is needless ; for it can scarce be supposed , that ever adam , or any father can be so wicked and ill-natur'd , as to use a son thus cruelly without some just occasion ; but if he had , i think he ought to have endured any thing from his father , rather than have left him without his leave , since i cannot see how children can ever set themselves free from their father's power , whether they will or no. f. if that be the condition of children , they are then , instead of sons , as absolute slaves as any in turkey , whenever their father pleases . but you have already granted , that fathers ought not to use their children like slaves , nor to sell them for such to others ; and tho i have no great kindness for cain , yet i know not what warrant you have to call him rebel ; i am sure neither the scripture , nor iosephus , mention his going to the land of nod , as an offence committed against his king and father adam ; but rather as a piece of compliance , or obedience to god's sentence , who had made it part of his curse so to do . m. i shall not much trouble my self whether cain was a rebel or not ; i only tell you ▪ what some learned men have thought of his quitting his country ; but as for other children , tho i grant their fathers ought not to use them like slaves , yet if they should happen to do so , i think such children ought to bear it as a judgment inflicted by god for their sins , and should not by any means set themselves free , tho their fathers use them never so severely , since it is god's will they should be born , and continue under the power of such severe fathers . f. but pray , sir , tell me , what if this son had fallen into the power of a stranger who would thus make a slave of him , was he likewise bound to bear this as a punishment from god for his sins , and might he by no means set himself free ? since this could not happen without god's permissive providence at least , and i think you will s●arce prove it more in the case of the father , unless you will allow god to be the author of tyranny and oppression . m. i grant that a man that is made a slave to a stranger by force , without just cause given by him , may set himself free by what means he can ; but i deny he hath the same liberty in respect of his father , since the father's power over him is from god , and so is not the stranger 's . f. what power of the father do you mean ? that of making his son a slave , or of using him as a father ought to use a son ? the latter of these i very well understand to be from god , but not the former ; and if the father hath no such power from god , i cannot see how it can be any act of disobedience in a son to look to his own liberty , and preservation , since cruelty and tyranny can never be prerogatives of paternal power , as you your self confess . m. i grant , indeed , a father hath no such power from god to treat his son thus cruelly ; but if he does , i say again ▪ that god having ordained the son to be absolutely subject to his father , he must endure it , let the consequence of it be what it will : and i suppose you will not deny , but that in case of necessity , as when a father hath not wherewithal to nourish , and breed up his children , he may sell , or assign his interest in them to any person who will undertake to provide for their nourishment and education ; and that the children so sold , or assigned , do thereby become absolute servants to the person to whom they were thus assigned as long as they lived ; and why this should be their condition in respect of a stranger , and not so to their father , i can see no reason , since their father would have been at as much trouble and charge for their education as the stranger . f. i so far go along with you , that in case of such necessity as you mention , a father may sell , or assign the present interest in his child to a stranger ; yet i cannot see any reason that this sale , or assignment , should confer so absolute a property in the person of this child , as that therefore he should be a slave to this master , or fosterer , as long as he lived , since admitting that the father , or other person who takes upon him that care , may perhaps justly claim a right in the service or labour of the child , to satisfy them for their trouble and charge in bringing him up ; yet it doth not therefore follow , that this service is due as long as the child lives , but rather until such time as they can make their labour satisfy them for their charge and trouble in keeping him , which may very well be by that time the child attains to twenty five years of age at farthest ; and there are those that have offered , to breed up and maintain all the foundlings , and bastard children in england , if they may be bound to serve them until about that age ; so that i see no reason , why a few years of education , should give any man a right over another's person as long as he lived . but if you urge , that the child owed his life to his father , or fosterer , since without his assistance he must have perished , and therefore the service of the child 's whole life is but little enough to recompence it : to this i answer , that the parents are under an absolute obligation , by the laws of god and nature , to breed up their child , and they sin , if they do not perform it as they ought ; the end of a father being chiefly for the breeding up , and preservation of the child , and therefore there is no reason he should acquire such a property in him , merely because he did his duty ; and the duty of a father being to better the condition of his son , and not to make it worse , i doubt whether an absolute and perpetual servitude , or death it self , were the better bargain ; and if this right will not hold for the father himself , much less will it be for a fosterer , since he is likewise obliged by the laws of nature , and common humanity , as well as by his contract with the father , to breed up this child so assigned him ; and not to let him perish , if he be able to breed him up . nor ought this father's or fosterer's temporal advantage , which he may make of this child , to be the principal end of his undertaking , but the doing good to mankind , and the advantage he may reap thereby , is to be considered only as an encouragement , and not as the only motive to this duty , since he is obliged to do the same thing , tho he were sure the child would either dye , or be taken away from him , before he could be with him half long enough to satisfy him for his charge . neither doth this reason hold true even according to the scripture rules of gratitude , that a man hath a right to exact of one to whom he hath done a courtesy , or bestowed a benefit , a return as great as the benefit bestowed ; since this were not beneficence , but meer bartering , or exchange ; and a man who had his life saved by another's assistance , ( suppose by pulling him out of the water ) must be obliged by this principle to submit his life to his disposal ever after . and therefore i desire you would give me some better reasons , why such a son ought to be so absolutely subject to his father's power , as that it is not lawful for him upon any account whatsoever to free himself from it , let his father use him never so cruelly or severely . m. well sir , since you desire it , i will give you the best reasons i have , why god cannot permit so unreasonable a liberty as this would give to all children , in case they should make use of it whenever they thought fit ; and therefore god hath ordained it thus , to take away all those pretences of undutifulness and disobedience which children might make , should they be permitted to be their own judges , when they might quit their father's family without his leave ; which pretence of cruel usage they would be sure to make use of , thereby to leave their parents upon every slight occasion , saying , that their fathers were so cruel and severe , that there was no living with them any longer ; when , indeed , it was not so , but on the contrary , no just cause of complaint against them , more than bare correcting them for their faults , and so the father be berest of any , nay , all his children who should be helpful and serviceable to him in his old age , which would breed great confusion and inconveniences in families , especially in the state of nature , as in the case you have put concerning adam's sons , they being the only servants he could have to make use of , on all occasions . f. i desire you in the first place to take notice , that i put this case concerning adam by way of supposition only ; not but that i have a better opinion of our first parent ( notwithstanding his fall ) than to believe him so ill-nattur'd , or that he was ever so cruel as to use his children thus hardly . but in this depraved state of nature such unnatural rigours and cruelties in fathers , as well as disobedience in children , is but too frequent , which no man needs to doubt of , that will but consult the custom of divers nations in africa , and other countries at this day , where they sell their sons for slaves , and exercise this fatherly power with the greatest tyranny and rigor ; using them as slaves , or felling them to others for such things as they want . and if you think it against the law of nature for such children , when they see themselves ready to be sold to work in the mines in peru , or sugar-works at barbadoes , to run away into another countr●y to avoid such a condition , which is as bad or worse than death , you may enjoy your own opinion ; but i am sure you 'l have but f●w proselites , but such as are of the like arbitrary principles ; and as for your pretence , that if children should be allowed to judge when their fathers treated them too severely , or like slaves , they would all run away , that is but a subterfuge : for first , it is a needless caution , children being , when young , not apt to leave their parents who have bred them up , ●pon whom they depend for their subsistence , and to whom , if they are treated like children , they seldom fa●l to bear a natural duty and affection ; and if well used , they will , when of years of discretion , be likewise willing to stay with them , and look after them when sick , or old , not only for duty , but also for their own advantage , and in hopes of having a share in what goods , of estates they may leave behind them when they dye . but if , when they come to years of discretion , they can better their condition by marrying , and leaving their fathers family , their parents are bound in conscience to let tehm go , since it is their duty to better the condition of their children , and not to make it worse : always provided that such children either take care of their parents themselves , or else hire others to do it for them , in case they want their assistance by reason of their old age , poverty or sickness ; but if children may not quit their fathers families , thô they are never so hardly or severly dealt with , the consequence will be , that fathers may keep their children as slaves as long as they live , thô it were a hundred years , or else may sell them to others , to be used worse if possible ; the absurdity of which assertions , and how contrary to the common good of mankind , i might leave to any indifferent person to judge of . therefore , i think , i may very well ( according to the learned grotius ) divide the lives of children into three periods of ages . the first is the period of infancy or imperfect judgment , before the child comes to be able to exercise his reason . the second is the period of perfect judgment or discretior , yet whilst the child continues still part of his fathers family . the third is , after he has left his fathers , and entered into another family , or sets up a family himself . in the first period , all the actions of children are under the absolute government of their parents : for since they have not the use of reason , nor are able to judge what is good or bad for themselves , they could not grow up nor b● preserv'd , unless their parents judged for them what means best conduced to this end ; yet this power is still to be directed to the principal end , viz. the good and preservation of the child . in the second period , when they are of mature judgment , yet continue part of their fathers family , they are still under their fathers command , and ought to be obedient to it in all actions which tend to the good of their fathers family and concerns . and in both these ages , i allow the father has a right to make his children work , as well ●● enable them to get their own living , as also to recompence himself for the pains and care he has taken , and the charge he may have been at in their education , and also to correct them in case they refuse to work or obey his commands . but in other actions , the children have a power of acting freely , yet still with a respect of gratifying and pleasing their parents , to whom they are obliged for their being and education ▪ since without their care they could not have attain'd to that age . but this duty being not by force of any absolute subjection , but only of piety , gratitude and observance , it does not make void any act , thô done contrary to their duty . the third and last period is , when the son being of years of discretion , either by marriage or otherwise , is seperated from his fathers family . in which case , he is in all actions free , and at his own disposal , thô still with respect to those duties of piety and observance , which such a son must always owe his father , the cause thereof being perpetual . m. i must beg your pardon if i cannot come over to your opinion , notwithstanding all you have said in this long discourse ; since i cannot conceive , how in any case children can naturally have a power or moral faculty of doing what they will without their parents leave ; since they are always bound to study to please them , and thô by the laws of some nations , children when they attain to years of discretion , have a power and liberty in many actions , yet this liberty is granted them by positive and humane laws only , which are made by the supream fatherly power of princes , who can regulate , limite or assume the authority of inferiour fathers for the publick benefit of the common-wealth . so that naturally the power of parents over their children never ceases by any seperations , thô by the permission of the transcendant , fatherly power of the supream prince , children may be dispens'd with or priviledged in some cases from obedience to subordinate parents . f. and i must beg your pardon , sir , if i cannot alter my opinion in this matter , for all that you have now said , since you can give me no better reasons than what you did at first ; and thô you say , you cannot conceive how children can ever in any case , have a power or moral faculty of doing what they will without their parents leave , yet they may have such power in many cases , whether you can conceive it or no. for thô i do grant , that children are always bound to study to please their parents , yet doth not this duty of gratitude or complacency include a full and perfect dominion of fathers , in the state of nature over the persons of their children , and an absolute power over them in all cases whatsoever , so that the children can have no right to consult their own good or preservation , however it may be endangered by their fathers passion or ill nature , since a wife is always obliged to this duty of complacency to her husband ; yet is not this so absolute , but that in a state of nature she may quit his family in those cases i have already mentioned , and against which you had nothing to object ; and i deny your position , that children when they attain to years of discretion , derive that power , and liberty they use it many actions , from positive humane laws only , or that the power which parents naturally have over their children , can never cease by any seperation , but only by the permission of the father . for as for bodin , and divers others that have written on this subject , they do no more than follw others , who have asserted this absolute power of fathers upon no better grounds than the civil or roman municipal-laws , without ever troubling themselves to look into the true original of paternal authority or filial subjection , according to the laws of reason or nature . and most treatises of this subject being commonly writ by fathers , no wonder if they have been very exact in setting forth their own power over their children , but have said little or nothing of the rights of children in the state of nature , and therefore i shall farther let you see , that this duty of children , even of pleasing or obeying their parents , can only extend to such things as they may reasonably or lawfully command . for suppose , that adam had commanded some of his sons or daughters never to marry , you cannot deny but this command had been void : ( that being the only means then appointed to propagate mankind , ) for when there then lay a higher obligation upon them to encrease and multiply , than there is now , they might then certainly have chosen wives for themselves , when they were of years of dicretion and capable of marriage . and farther to shew you , that children may in some cases seperate themselves from their fathers family and subjection , without their fathers consent , is apparent , as to the daughters , who if they were at first obliged by this precept to marry , might likewise do it , whether he would or not , and were to be obedient to their husbands when they were married , the obedience which they before owed to their father , being now transferred to their husband , or also they must serve two masters , which is against our saviours rule , by which it appears , that the subjection of daughters in the state of nature is not perpetual : and to prove that sons have a like right to separate from their fathers family , let us suppose that adam had been so cruel , and unnatural as some fathers are , that being only sensible of the profit he received from his sons labours , he would never have permitted them to leave his family , nor to enjoy any thing of their own , but would have kept them like slaves as long as they lived ; if you affirm , that he might have done so if he had pleased , and that the sons had no lawful means to help themselves , since he only was judge whether ever he thought fit to set them free or not : you your self have already granted the contrary , when you affirmed , that a father had no right to sell his child as a slave , and then sure he can have as little right to use him so himself . but as for what you say against that natural equality of children to their parents considered as men , you might easily have understood it , if your thoughts were not so wholly taken up with this transcendant imaginary empire of fathers in the state of nature , as if they were some what more than men. for pray tell me , are they not equal , who have the same right from god to the same things ? for if fathers have a right to live and be preserved , so likewise have the children , and if they have a right to the end , they have likewise the same to the means necessary thereunto , such as are food rayment freedom from slavery , &c. and if they are thus equal , they must likewise when they attain to years of discretion , be endued with a power of judging for themselves , concerning what things are necessary to their happiness and perservation , and what tends to their misery or destruction , and consequently may very well judge whether their fathers treat them kindly or cruelly ; for if the father in the state of nature in the sole judge of the means that conduce to his sons happiness and preservation , without his consent he may determine that poverty . slavery and torment , shall be fit means , and conducing to this end , which is against sense and reason ; and tho i grant , that sons may sometime be mistaken in the true means that may lead to these great ends of life , yet doth not this take away their right of judging for themselves , any more than it doth the same right from their fathers , who as men are also lyable to the like mistakes . neither did any slave or subject ever give up his will so totally to his master or monarch , as absolutely to renounce all right to happiness and self preservation , or to the means that may conduce thereunto . but i think , we have sufficiently debated this great point of the natural power of fathers over their children , and therefore . let us in the next place consider whether children may not upon these principles in some cases make use also of self defence , even against their fathers , if they cannot otherwise avoid certain ruine and destruction , therefore i will first ask you what you think of this case ? a son in the state of nature being separated from his father's family , and having children and house of his own , what shall he doe in case his father , by the evil suggestions of a step-mother , or other wicked persons , be so far incensed against his son , as to send men to burn his house , plunder him of his goods , and destroy his plantation ? m. if the son be absolutely set free from his fathers family and power with his consent , i do not deny but that such a son may resist those persons his father sends to ruine him and his family , and may repel their violence by force , but i do not allow the son the same power to resist the person of the father , if he should come himself thus to destroy him . f. why so ? do you think a father by being so , hath any greater right to destroy his son and ruine his family then a stranger ? m. no ; but because the person of a father ought always to be esteemed by the son as sacred as his natural prince , and if he should have a right to resist his father by force , he might happen to kill him in the scuffle , which would be a sin against nature . f. well , suppose the worst , would this be more a sin against nature , than to suffer himself , wife , and innocent children to be turned out of all they have , and left to perish by hunger and cold ? st. paul says , that he that doth not provide for his family is worse than an infidel , and i think so would the son be if for fear of hurting his fathers person , he should permit all his family to be exposed to certain beggery and ruine . m. this precept of st. paul obliges only , when a man may provide for his family by lawful means , but not when it cannot be procured but by doing what is unlawful , as i take this resistance of the person of the father to be . f. i grant indeed that a father , acting as such , is not to be resisted , even when he corrects his son , but i suppose you will not say that in the case i put , he acts as a father , but an enemy , when he goeth about without any just occasion to kill or ruine him , unless you can suppose , that the will to preserve and destroy can consist together in the same subject ; neither can you affirm that the father hath any right to deal thus wickedly and violently towards his son , and his innocent family . by what law then must the son be obliged to sacrifice his own life , and that of wife and children , and all that he hath , to this imaginary duty ? m. there seems to me two good reasons for it . the first is that gratitude which the son must always owe his father for his being and educa●ion , and therefore if he give up his wife , children , and all that he hath to his will , it would scarce be a sufficient requital for all the benefits he hath received from him . the second is , because no circumstances whatsoever can take off or obliterate this relation ; and thô 't is true your father , whilst acting thus doth not deal with you as a father , but an enemy , yet he is still your father , and you are and will be always his son do what you can , and so consequently you will still owe him subjection . for it is a maxime not only of the civil law , but that of nature too , and this most of all in the state of nature , that is , before civil laws had restrained tha● paternal power , iura sanguinis nullo delicto dirimi possunt , and lastly from the fourth commandment of , honour the father , &c. now no man can tender honour to him whom he goeth about to resist , and so may also destroy . f. i consists you have urged this argument as home as the thing will bear ; but yet i think i can shew you , that the son is so far from acting against the law of nature in thus resisting his father , that i think he would rather transgress it if he acted otherwise . but first to answer your arguments , i deny , that either generation or education do confer so great a benefit , that a man is obliged to sacrifice himself , his wife , and children , and all he hath in return for it . first for generation , i suppose you will not much insist on that , since you must grant that a father doth not act in that matter , as a voluntary , but natural agent ; neither is it in his power to hinder the child that he gets from being conceived or born ; neither did he get him so much to propagate his spe●ies , as to gratify his own present natural appetite . then for education , which i grant is much the greater obligation , since by the former i am only born an irrational helpless creature , but by the other i am made a reasonable man , able to help and provide for my self , and knowing my duty to god and other men , yet even these obligations are not great enough to make me sacrifice my self and all that i have to his fury or humour . i grant indeed , that if it were to save a kind father's life , a son may be obliged to venture , nay lay down his life to perform it ; but i deny , that even for such a father , he hath a right to give up the lives of others which are not at his disposal ( as those of his wife and children are not ) in this case . for this were not only to return more than was first given , but also to pay debts with that which is not my own ; and to give up their lives , and let my father take them away is all one , if i can hinder it , qui non prohibet facit . then as for the relation of a father , which you say no fault of his can obliterate or destroy ; you must grant that it may be suspended for a time , as when a man binds , or resists his mad or druken father who would kill him , or his wife or children , he doth not do it to the father , but to the mad man or drunkard , and so likwise in this case , he doth not resist his father , but a furious unreasonable creature , who is so far from behaving himself as becomes a father , that he doth not act like a man : nor doth your maxime hold true in all cases , and therefore is no law of nature , for iura sanguinis aliquo delicto dirimi possunt , or else a father could never put his son to death for any crime whatever , which you have affirmed he may ; but certainly when he acts thus , it is not as a father , nor doth he destroy him as a son , but an enemy or malefactor . now i desire you or any indifferent man to consider , since the common good of mankind is the sum of all the the laws of nature , and the great rule by which they are to be tryed , which rule is to be preferred , and conduces more thereunto when they cannot consist at once or together . that a father , who by your own confession , comes to do an unlawful wicked action , ( viz. ) to ruine and destroy his son , with his wife and children , should be resisted , and consequently one mans life put in hazard , than that many innocent persons should be ruined , and perhaps starved to death for want of food and shelter . and as for the fifth commandment , that extends no more to the father than to the mother ; thô you are pleased to leave her out , because it makes against your opinion : and therefore if by honour , is meant , thou shalt no resist , then no man should resist his mother any more than his father , if she went about to kill him , and yet not the mother , but the father , is by your hypothesis , the natural monarch that hath this power of life and death over the son. but let us pursue this point no farther , if you will not be convinced i cannot help it . but pray tell me now , what a son must do , if his father transported by fury and malice should go about to kill him with a sword or other weapon , and that he hath no other way left to save his life , neither by intreaty nor flight , ( which i grant ought to be done if possible , ) whether he may resist his father with what next comes to hand , or suffer himself to be killed ? m. i am much better satisfyed in this case than in the other , that he ought rather to let his father take away his life than resist him , since here is but one life to be lost , whereas , i confess , the other case was harder , because there were more lives concerned than the sons , and i am of this opinion partly for the same reasons as before , and partly because 't is more suitable both to reason , and the law of nature , as also to holy scripture , preceps and examples : for i● st. peter command , servants to be subject to their masters , &c. not only to th● good and gentle , but also to the froward . and if servants , much more sons , who owe their fathers a higher duty and obedience , than servants can owe their masters ; and isaac was so far convinced , that his father abraham had power over his life ; that thô he was a lusty young man , and could carry wood enough to consume a burnt-offering , yet do we not find , that he offered in the least to resist his father , when he was about to bind him to be sacrificed : for he very well knew , that his father could not be resisted without endangering his life if not taking it away in the scuffle ; and sure you will grant , that a son ought rather of the two to let his father kill him , than he take away his life , by whose means he received his own ; especially since abraham was the master of a great family ; and in whose life and well being , not only his mother , but all the family had an interest as necessary for their well being and happiness : nor can i think , that abraham would have so readily assented to god's command for the doing of it , had he not been already satisfyed , that he had an unaccountable power of life and death over his son by the laws of god and nature . f. in the first place , to answer your authorities from scripture , as for that place of st peter you have cited , i● is not a precept given by the apostle to sons , but to servants or slaves , whose lives and all that they had were at their masters absolue disposal , being those whom the apostle paul calls , servants under the yoke ; and unless you will make a slave and a son to be all one , ( which you have already denyed ) this precept doth not at all concern them . and as for example of isaac , that will make as little for your advantage , for first as to abraham , he could not but know , that to kill his son without any just cause , was as much murder in him as in any other man : now what could be a juster or a higher cause than gods particular command ? so that as this act of abraham is not to be taken as an example by other fathers , so neither doth the example of isaac oblige other sons to the like submission ; therefore it is most reasonable to suppose , that isaac being then ( as chronologers make him to be ) about nineteen or twenty years of age , and of years of discretion to ask where was the lamb for the burnt-offering , was also instructed by his father , before he came to be offered , of the reason of his dealing thus with him , and then the submission was not payed to his fathers but to gods will , from whom he miraculously received his being . but if any man doubt wheter resistance in such a case were lawful , i leave it to his own conscience to consider , whether if his father had him alone in a place where he could neither run away nor yet call for help , he would suffer his father to cut his troat without any resistance , only because he pretended divine revelation for it . not but that i so far agree with you likewise , as to limit such a resistance only to the holding his fathers hands , or warding off his blows , but not to the taking away his life , but of the two rather to lose his own than to kill him , for the reasons you have given , and which i will not deny ; but yet if the father be mad , i much doubt whether the son is bo●nd to let him kill him rather than take away his life , since such a father's life is no way useful to the good of the family . so that thô i should grant that paternal power is from god , and consequently irresissible , yet doth it not follow that all the unjust force or violence , which a father as a man may use against his sons life or fortune , is such part of a paternal power as god hath commanded us not to resist , since your self must grant that he doth not thus act ( in going about to kill his son ) as a father , but a violent and wicked man : so that where the father hath no right , to take away his sons life , i think in all such cases , the right of the son to resist him doth take place . and if a man may resist or bind his father when he is mad or drunk , and in such fits goeth about to kill him , i can see nothing to the contrary why he may not do the same thing , when his father is transported by a sudden rage or unreasonable malice , since both of them do take away the use of natural reason as much the one as the other , according to that saying of the poet , ira furor brevis est . anger is but a short madness : fury and malice being alike fatal and destructive to the sons life and safety , with drunkenness and madness ; nor doth such a son resist his paternal power but only his brutish force and violence . so that if sons when grown to years of discretion ) have not a right to defend their lives in the state of nature against all persons whatsoever , who go about to take it away without any just cause , every son ought to suffer his father to kill him , when ever being transported by madness , drunkenness or sudden passion , he hath will so to do : which how it can consist with that great law of nature , of propagating and preserving the species of mankind , if a father should have any unreasonable unlimitted power , i 'll leave it to your self or any other reasonable man to consider ; nor doth it follow , that because a son can in no wise be superiour to his father , he ought not therefore to resist him ; since thô i grant punishment is a right of superiours over their inferiours , yet so is not resistance ; since every one knows that resistance ; is exercised between equals , as i have already proved , sons are to their fathers in all the rights of life and self-preservation : and conseqently to judge when their lives and estates are unjustly invaded . m. i must confess i am in a great doubt which will most conduce to that great law you mention , ( which i grant to be the sum of all the laws of nature ) viz. of preserving or prosecuting the common good of mankind ; that fathers should have an absolute irre●istible power over the lives and fortunes of their children , let them use it how they will , or else that children should have a right to resist them in some cases , when they go about to take away either of them without any just cause : for thô i own , that ( if the former principle be true ) parents may be sometimes tempted to take away their childrens lives or estates without any just cause : so on the other side if children shall assume such a power to themselves of judging when their fathers do thus go about , to invade either their lives or estates , it will ( i doubt ) lay a foundation for horrid confusions and divisions in families , since if children are under a constant subjection to their fathers , they ought then to be absolutely subject to them in the state of nature , and therefore ought not to be resisted : for if all fathers , and masters of families , are trusted by god with an absolute power of life and death over the wife , children , and servants of the family , as your self cannot deny , then no resistance of this absolute power can subsist with the peace and tranquility of that family , without the diminution or total destruction , of that absolute power , with which they are intrusted . and thô i admit that parents ought neither to use nor sell their children for slaves , not to take away either their lives or goods without great and sufficient cause : yet of these causes fathers in the state of nature must be the only and uncontrolable judges ; since if children ( whom i still consider as subjects , thô not as slaves in the state , as long as they continue members of their fathers family , ) should once have a right to resist , when they thought their lives or estates were unjustly invaded ; they might also oftentimes through undutifulness or false suggestions pretend or suppose that their fathers were mad drunk or in a passion , and went about to take away their lives , when really they intend no such thing , but only to give them due correction : which would give children an unnatural power of resisting , or perhaps of killing their fathers upon false surmises or flight occasions . and as this would introduce great mischief and confusion in privte families , so would it likewise prove a foundation of rebellion against all civil powers whatsoever ; if subjects who are the same thing in a kingdom , that children are in a family , ( in the state of nature ) should take upon them to resist their prince when ever they think he goeth about to invade either their lives or fortunes , which would likewise serve to justify all the most horrid rebellions in the world ; since all rebels whatsoever may or do pretend , that their lives , liberties and fortunes are unjustly invaded , when indeed they are not , and likewise upon the least hardship or injustice in this kind inflicted upon any private subject , either by the prince or his ministers , ( which abuses and violences do often happen even under the best governments , ) any such private person who shall think himself thus injured , may upon this principle take up arms , and endeavour to right or defend himself against such violence , by which means under pretence of securing a few men in their lives or estates , whole kingdoms ( if such persons can find follows enough ) may be cast into all the mischiefs and confusions of a civil war , till the prince and government be quite destroyed . f. i must confess , the arguments you now bring are the best you have yet produced , since they are drawn from that great and certain law of procuring the common good and peace of mankind . but , i hope i shall make it plain to you , that no such terrible consequences will follow from the principles i have already laid down , and therefore i must first take notice that you have in your answer confounded two powers together , which ought to be distingishued in the state of nature . ( viz. ) the power which fathers , as masters or heads of families , may exercise over the lives of their children or servants whilst they remain members of their family ; and that reverence and duty which children must always owe their fathers as long as they live , even after they become fathers or masters of families of their own . in the first state , i have already allowed , that such fathers , as masters of families may lawfully exercise a far greater power over their children , whilst they are members of their family , than they can when they are seperated from it , yet is not this power in all cases absolute or irresistible , as i have already proved ; and therefore i do in the first place restrain this right of self-defence , only to such cases , where a father would take away a sons life in a fit of drunkenness , madness or sudden passion , without any crime committed or just cause given : which i also limit to a bare self defence , without injuring or taking away the life of the father if it can possibly be avoided ; and in this case if the son , who is like to suffer this violence , may not judge when his life is really in danger to be destroyed , because he may pretend so when really it is not . this is no just reason to overthrow so great a right as self preservation ; since if this were a sufficient objection , it would have the same force against all self defence whatsoever : for it doth often happen that wicked and unreasonable men will pretend that they were forced to take away the lives of others only to preserve their own , when indeed it was altogether false and needless , and they only killed them to satisfy their own malice or passion , and therefore , as there is no reason that the abuse of this natural right should be used as an argument against the use of all self-defence by any man whatsoever . so likewise neither ought the like abuse hereof by some wicked children to be brought as an argument against its being made use of at all by others , who are never so unjustly assaulted , and in danger of their lives from their fathers violence . if the first principle be true , ( on which this is founded ) that a son may excercise this right of self-defence in such cases , without any intrenchment upon his fathers paternal authority , or that filial duty and respect which he must always owe him when ever he returns to himself , and will behave himself towards him as becomes a father , and not like an enemy or cut-throat . and as for the quarrels and confusions , which you alledge may happen in families between fathers and children , in case such a liberty should be allowed , those inconveniencies will prove very inconsiderable if you please to take notice , that first i do not allow this right of resistance to be exercised by any children before they attain to years of discretion . secondly , that after they have attained to these years , no resistance ought to be made against a father whilst they remain part of their fathers family , but only in defence of their own , their mothers , wives ▪ and childrens lives ; since i grant , that a son as long as he continues a member of his fathers . family , ought to bestow all his own labour for his fathers profit , and cannot acquire any property either in lands or goods without his fathers consent : and since you conceive this right of self-defence , if allowed to children , would be the cause of so great mischiefs in families , if children should have no right to judge when their fathers abused their power over them ; let us a little consider on which side this abuse is most likely to happen , for if you please but to look into the world , and survey the nature of fathers and children , and set the faults of the one against the other , you will find , ( that as i confess , ) it is the nature of many children to contradict and disobey their fathers commands , and that most young people hate restraint , and love too much liberty , and may oftentimes think their fathers too harsh or severe to them , when really they are not ; yet doth such false surmises and disobedient actions seldom end , either in absolute resistance or taking away their fathers lives by force , or if they do so , it is really done for their own defence , or whilst they are assaulted by them in their own lives , or those of their children , but is commonly acted privately to satisfie their own revenge or malice , which i hold to be utterly unlawful , so likewise let us consider on the other side , those temptations that fathers lye under of injuring their children , or taking away their lives , or u●ing them like slaves , without any just cause ; you 'll find that they by reason of their age , natural temper or infirmities , may be easily transported to that degree of passion , that not considering the follies of youth , they may oftentimes in their passion , either beat them so cruelly , as utterly to disable or maime them , or else take away their lives for little or no cause . and besides , fathers being often covetous and ill-natured , ( which are the vices of old age , ) may ( where there is no power over them to restrain them from it ) either keep them as slaves themselves , or else sell them to others for that purpose , ( as i have already given you an example of the negroes in africa , ) and which of these two inconveniencies are most likely to happen between children and parents in the state of nature ; i should leave is to any indifferent man to judge between us . and therefore i think , it more conduces to the good and peace of families , and consequently the happiness and preservation of mankind , ( which are the end of all laws ) that children should be allowed these rights ( i have al●erdy laid down ) of asserting this natural liberty from slavery , and defending their lives , and those of their wives and children from the unjust violence of their fathers than that they should be left wholly at disposal to be maimed , killed or ruined , when over this coveteousness , passion or malice may prompt them to it : sence if all fathers were satisfied that their children have a right thus to defend themselves in these cases against their unjust violence , it would be a means to make them act more catiously , and to behave themselves with greater tenderness and moderation towards them . so than to conclude , i utterly deny that these principles i have here laid down , do at all rend to countenance rebellion , or raising disturbances in civil governments , since i cannot allow you have proved parents to be princes or monarchs in the state of nature , or that families , and kingdoms or commonwealths are all one : or if i should grant them to be so , yet would it not therefore follow , that every private subject in a civil state hath the same right to defend his life , or that of his wife and children , against the violence or injustice of the supream powers , as a son may have in the state of nature to defend his life , &c. against his fathers rage or violence ; since i grant no particular subject can contradict or resist the supream power of the lawfull magistrate ( however unjustly exercised ) by force , without disturbing or at least endangering the quiet and happiness of the whole community , and perhaps the dissolution of the government it self , which is against the duty , not only of a good subject , but also of an honest moral man , who will not disturb the publick tranquility for his own private security or revenge . but in private families the case is otherwise , and children may resist their father in the cases already put , without introducing either anarchy or civil war in the family ; since it can scarce be presumed that either their mother , brothers or sisters , will take part with a son or brother against their husband and father , unless it ware that they might thereby hinder him from committing murder , by defending their son or brothers life , when thus violently and without cause assaulted ; and if it should sometimes happen otherwise , yet this would be a much less mischief , then that out of this fear the lives and liberties of an innocent wife and children , should suffer without cause by his drunkenness or passion . but as for the resistance which sons may make in the state of nature , and when separated from their fathers families , it is of a much larger extent since they may then not only defend their own lives , but also those of their wives and children with their estates against their fathers unjust violence , thò i do here likewise restrain this self-defence , only to cases of actual invasion or asault of such fathers , upon the lives and estates of his children , in which cases , i also absolutely condemn all actions and proceedings done by way of prevention , before such violence or assault is actually begun to be made upon them ; much less do i allow of any revenge or return of evil for evil , by such children , when the danger is over ; since however such revenge may be lawful between persons in the state of nature , no ways related or oblieged to each other ; yet do i by no means allow the same priviledge to children against their parents , since i look upon the obligation they have to them to be of so high a nature , that it can never totally be cancelled , thô in those cases of self-preservation and defence they may be suspended for a time , as if i owed my life , and all that i have to some great person , who hath either saved the one , or bestowed the other upon me , thô i should be very undutiful and ungratful too , if upon his becoming my enemy thô without any just cause , i should go about to return his injuries in the same kind ; yet were i not therefore obliged to give up that life and estate he had before bestowed upon me , when ever he thought fit , without any just occasion to take them away ; and i am confident that resistance in these cases , and with these restrictions , doth neither derogate from that gratitude and piety , which children always ought to pay their fathers , nor yet can tend to encourage either anarchy or rebellion ; since such sons when once married and are become masters or heads of families themselves , they then cease to be under their fathers subjection as they were before , tho i confess they are always to honour and reverence him according to gods command in all cases , when they will deal with them as fathers , and not as enemies m. i shall no longer dispute this right of resistance in children in the cases you have put , since i see it is to little purpose to argue longer with you about it ; but this much i think is still true , that all supream powers whatever , cannot without rebellion and absolute dissolution of the government be risisted by the subject ; so that if the government of fathers or heads of families be supream as you seem to grant , that cannot be resisted neither , without bringing all things therein to anarchy and confusion . f. pray give me leave sir to interrupt you a little ; i desire you to remember that i do not allow the power of fathers or masters of families to be any more then oeconomical and not civil power , and i have already shewed you how resistance of such a power , when violently and unjustly exercised , may be resisted without any anarchy or confusion in the family ; but as for resistance of civil powers in some cases , it is not the subject of this discourse , and therefore i desire you would now mind the subject in hand , and not pass off to any other till we have dispatcht this , so that i would rather if you have any fresh objections to make , that you would now do it , because it groweth late . m. i must confess ingeniously , your arguments have much s●aggered me , since i see great inconveniencies may happen , on either side ; for if the father or master may be the sole judg , when and how he may exercise this absolute power . i grant all those mischiefs may sometimes fall out , which you have here set forth , so on the other side if the children may be judges in their own case , those evils may often happen , which i have already alledged : and therefore pray pardon me , if i am not too hasty in altering my opinion in this point without better consideration ; but methinks you have not yet fully answered one of my main arguments , to prove the power of life and death to proceed from god alone , and therefore must have been conferred as first on adam , since no man hath a power over his own life , ( as i said before ) and therefore cannot have it over that of others . f. i thought i had already as good as answered this doughty objection , when i had yielded to you , that neither private men nor masters of families have any right to defend their own lives , much less to take away those of others , but as it is granted them by god in the law of nature , in order to the procuring the great end of it , viz. the happiness and propagation of mankind , which i own , could not in this lapsed and depraved state of nature we now are in , long subsist without such a power . yet i think i have already sufficiently proved , that we have no need to recur to i know not what divine charter granted by god to adam or noah , and from them derived to all civil magistrates that ever have been or shall be in the world , the consequence of which would be , that no sentence of death could be justly given against any man , but in such kingdoms or common-wealths , who own this authority as conferred on them by god in adam or noah , from which they must deride their title to it . now i desire you would shew me how many kingdoms or common-wealths there are in the world , who ever heard of , much less owned this divine charter , this fine notion , yea scarce reaching farther , than some few divines and high royalists of our own island . but be it as it will , the antecedent , or first proposition is not true , that no man in any case whatsoever hath power over his own life , and therefore neither is your consequence ; for i suppose , that for the same end for which the civil powers may take away another man's life , viz. in order to the greater good of mankind , ( of which my religion or countrey is a part , ) i am likewise master of my own , and may lay it down or expose it , when i think it can conduce to a greater good than my single life can amount to . and therefore the example of codrus the athenian king is highly celebrated by all ancient authors , and is not condemned by any christian writer , that i know of , for exposing himself to certain death to gain his citizens the victory , the loss of which would have been the ruin of the state. and in the first book of maccabees , chap. . . ( which th● it be not canonical scripture , yet is allowed to be read in our churches , as containing examples of good manners , ) you may read , that eleazar the younger brother of iudas maccabeus , is there highly commended for his valour in killing the elephant , on which the supposed king antiochus was mounted , that he might thereby destroy him likewise , tho he might be assured of his own death by the elephants falling upon him : and the zeal for the christian religion amongst the primitive christians was so great that we may read in tertullian , and divers ecclesiastical historians , of whole troops of martyrs , who tho unaccused , yet offered up their lives at the heathen tribunals to a voluntary martyrdom ; and farther , eusebius himself , doth not condemn , but rather commends some primitive christians , that being like to be taken by their heathen persecutors , cast themselves down head long from the top of their houses , esteeming ( as he their tells us ) a certain death as an advantage , because they thereby avoided the cruelty and malice of their persecutors . i could likewise give you ( if it were not two tedious ) several other examples of ancient martyrs , who have given up themselves to certain death to save the lives of some of their friends , or else of christian bishops , whom they lookt upon as more useful to the church than themselves , and which st. paul himself does likewise suppose to be lawful , when he tells the romans , that the scarcely for a righteous man would one dye , yet per adventure for a good man som● would even dare to dye , that is a man highly beneficial to others . and the same apostle , in the last chapter of this epistle , returns thanks to priscilla and aquila , not only on his own behalf , but also for all the churches of the gentiles , because they had for his life laid down their own necks , that is , hazarded their lives to save his , and where ever they might have thus exposed them , surely they might have lost them too . and therefore i think , i may with reason affirm , that in most cases , where a prince or commonwealth may command a man to expose his life to certain destruction for the publick good of his religion or countrey , he hath power likewise to do it of his own accord , without any such command , the obligation proceeding not only from the orders of his superiour , but from that zeal and affection , which by the laws of god and nature he ought to have for his religion and country , even beyond the preservation of his own life . m. well , i confess , that this that you have now said carries , some colour of reason with it , and is more than i had considered before . but pray resolve me one difficulty more , which still lies upon my mind . by what authority , less than a divine commission from god himself revealed in scripture , do supream powers take upon them to make law● ? and that under no less penalty than death it self , against such offences , as by the laws of nature do no ways deserve death , such as theft , counterfiting the publick coyn , with divers other offences , needless here to be reckoned up . and if a father ( as you will not allow him ) hath no right over the lives or persons of his wife and children , i cannot see how a master of a separate family can have any such power , more than his wife or any other of the family ; and the scripture seems to countenance this power of punishing for murder , to be in any that will take it upon them , and therefore you see cain , said , whoever meets me will slay me . and god tells noah , whoever sheddeth mans blood , by man shall his blood be shed , without restraining it to any man particularly who is to do it . f. this objection is easily answered , if you please to consider , what you your self did a good wh●●● since urge to me , that god endowed adam with so much authority , as should enable him to govern his own family and children as long as he lived ; which i readily granted you , and i only differed in the manner of its derivation , you affirming it to proceed from a divine charter or grant , by revelation conferred upon him by god , and i maintaining , that both he and every other master of a separate family , derive it only from gods natural and not revealed law , which if it be well proved , such masters of families , as also all civil powers ( whom i suppose to be endued with the power of all such masters of families or freemen taken together ) may for the s●me end , ( viz. ) the good government , and peace of ●heir families and commonwealths , make laws under no less a penalty than death it self , against such offences as by the law of nature do not deserve it , since without such a power ( the wickedness of man being come to this height it is ) no family or commonwealth , could be long preserved in peace or safety . and therefore , i suppose you will not affirm , but that such a master of a family , may very well inflict any punishment less than death for such offences , which if they find too gentle to amend those crimes , they may likewise for the same reason encrease the punishments ordained for it . and therefore , i yield , that tho theft doth not in its own nature deserve death , yet if the master of such a separate family shall find his children or servants to be so addicted to this vice , as not to be amended by any less punishments than death , he may , for the quiet of his family , make a general law , that whosoever for the future shall commit theft , shall suffer death ; and i doubt not , but such a law when promulged , may be lawfully executed , since this master of a family is intrusted by god with the sole power of judging , not only what are crimes , but also what are fit punishments for them , since both are alike necessary for the happiness and preservation of the family . and i so far agree with you , that such masters of families , have as much power over the lives of their children and servants , as the most absolute monarchs have over their subjects , that is , for their common good , and no farther . and upon the same principles , do all kings and common wealths inflict capital punishments for the transgression of all such laws , as do any way entrench upon the common interest and safety of their people , and upon this ground , they may justly inflict no-less punishments than death , for coyning of false money , which is but a sort of theft from the publick treasure of the commonwealth . and the same may be said for all capital punishments ordained against other offences of the same nature . m. if fathers or masters of families are endued by god , ( as you your self now own , ) not only with this power of life and death , for enormous crimes against the laws of nature , but also to make new laws , or ordain what punishments they please for such offences , as they shall judg destructive to the quiet and happiness of their families , i see no difference ( notwithstanding what you have hitherto said to the contrary ) between oeconomical and civil power . for if we compare the natural rights of a father or master , with those of a king or monarch , we shall find them all one without any difference at all , but only in the latitude or extent of them . for as the father or master over one family : so a king , as a father or master over many families , extends his care to preserve , feed , cloath , instruct , and defend the whole common-wealth ; his war , his peace , his courts of justice , and all his acts of soveraignty , tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate , and inferior father and his children , their rights and priviledges . hath a monarch power to make new laws , and appoint what punishments he will to enforce their observation ? so also hath a father of a family . hath an absolute prince power to command or dispose of the goods and estates of his subjects , for their common quiet and security ? so also hath a father or master of a family . so that all the duties of a king , are summed up in this universal fatherly care of his people ; and if the soveraignty be the same , i cannot see and reason , why the rights and prerogatives of it should not be so too . and therefore , if non resistance against their authority , be an unseparable prerogative of soveraign power , then if a father or master of a family be endued with it , he ought no more to be resisted , than the most absolute monarch . f. i perceive your head is very full of this notion of the idintity of natural and civil power , or else you would never insist so long upon it as you do , after what i have proved to the contrary . and therefore , since i see you look upon this as your topping argument ; i shall do my endeavour to shew you more plainly the difference between them . for tho i grant , that such fathers or masters of families , ( as we here treat of , ) are indued by god with divers powers , which are analogous , or perhaps the same with those of a king or monarch , that is , of defending their families as far as they are able from forreign force and domestick injuries , and of revenging and punishing all offences that may prove prejudicial or destructive to the peace and happiness of their families ; yet doth it not therefore follow , that the government of private families and kingdoms are all one , since they differ very much , not only in their institution , but also in their end. for first , the fatherly power by the law of nature , is ordained only for the generation and education of the children till they come to be grown up ; and his authority as a father , is ordained by god only for those ends ; and therefore this relation of a father is so inherent in him , that it can never be parted with , or assigned over to any other , so as to make the child or son so assigned , to owe the same duty to him , as he did to his father . there is also , besides the power of a father , that of a master , or head of a family over his children and servants , whilst they continue members or subjects of it , which power i grant may be assigned , or made over to one , or more persons , when ever such master shall think fit to institute a kingdom or commonwealth : yet , as dr. sanderson very well observes , this power of a master differs very much from that of the civil powers of a kingdom or commonwealth , as well in the object as end of this power . for first , the power of a father is only over one single family , whereas that of a commonwealth is over divers families , united under one civil head. secondly , in respect of the end , the power of the master is chiefly ordained for his own interest and advantage , but that of the civil power , chiefly respects the good of the whole people or community . lastly , the power of the master of the family , is only for the maintaining his own natural property , in those things which he hath acquired in the state of nature , whereas one great end of civil government , is to introduce and establish civil property in things , according to the laws of the commonwealth , and also to maintain it when so constituted . to conclude , fathers beget their children , and masters acquire to themselves slaves and servants , but it is from the consent of fathers or masters of seperate families , that any sort of civil government commenced at first , so that the people at first made kings , and not the kings the people : and further , it is the duty of fathers and masters to provide for their children and servants , but the people ought to provide for their kings , not only for their necessities , but for their magnificence and grandure ; so that the power of fathers and masters is natural , whereas that of kings and republicks is political and artificial , as proceeding from compacts or the consents of divers heads of families or other free-men . and as kingdoms and families differ in the manner of their intitution , so do they likewise in their ends , which is of a far larger extent in the latter than in the former , the maine design of instituting kingdoms and common-wealths , before not only to defend their subjects from such injuries or violence that they may do each other , but chiefly by their united forces , to guard them from the violence and invasion of foreign enemies . for thô i grant , it may be sometimes happen , that a family may consist of so great a number of children , servants or slaves , as may make a little army , such as abraham's was when he made war againk the four kings , yet is this purely accidental , and not at all essential to the being of a family , which is as perfect in all it s constituted parts , if it consists of three or four persons , as of three or four hundred . whereas a kingdom or commonwealth cannot subsist , unless it can either by its own power or united forces , defend its members from foreign force and invasions : so also in private families , in the state of nature , there can be no property acquired in lands or goods by any members of it , without the masters express will or permission . but in all civil governments , the very institution and preservation of civil property was one of its chiefest ends , which may be easily proved by experience : since in all nations , where there is any property either in lands ●or goods , there is a necessity of some civil government to maintain i● . whereas in divers parts of africa and america , where there is no distinct property in land , and where there are no other riches , than every man's cottage and garden , with their hunting and fishing instruments , there is no need of any common or civil power over them , higher than that of masters or fathers of families , who own no superiority among themselves , unless it be when they go to war , and then they chuse out of their own numbers for their captains or leaders , those whom they know to be stoutest and most experienced , whose power determines as soon as the war ceases . but to make an end of this long discourse , suppose , i should grant all you can desire , the oeconomical and civil government do not differ in kind , but in largeness or extent , yet will it not follow , that therefore it must be in all cases irresistable , since i think i am able to prove , that no power whatever ( except that of god himself , can be endued with this prerogative ) if once it goes about to frustrate , and destroy all the main ends of government , ( viz. ) the happiness and safty of the subjects , either by dowright destroying of them , or else by reducing them to a condition of slavery and misery , as the great turk uses his christian subjects . but to let you see , i would deal fairly with you , i will discourse this point of adam's soveraignity no farther , but will at present take it as the lawyers say , de bene esse , or for granted , and i desire you would shew me in the next place when adam dyed , by what law , either divine or natural , cain or seth ( chose which you will ) could command over all the rest of his brethren and their descendants . and then again , if you could do this , what benefit this doctrine would yield to all princes and states at this day , or how you intend to deduce a title for them from adam or noah , or any of their sons to their respective kingdoms , and consequently to an absolute subjection of their subjects , without which all your hypothesis will signifie nothing . m. i must return you thanks sir for your candid dealing , and for the great pains you have taken to enlighten my understanding in this important question . and thô i doubt , you have laid down principles not so suitable to gods will revealed in the holy scripture , yet i will not imput it to any want of sincerity in your self , who i hope , are satisfied of the truth of what you have maintained ; so on the other side , i desire you not to take it ill , if i cannot leave my own opinion , which i have always hitherto lookt upon , as most suitable to the doctrine of the church of england , and to the practice of the primitive church , and to the laws of the land , and must continue therein , till i am convinc'd i am in an error . but since i desire to have a further conversation with you upon this important subject , pray let me know , when we shall meet again , that i may prove to you , from holy scripture as well as those authors , i have perused that there is a divine right of blood instituted by god for the succession of kingdoms , which cannot without a kind of sacriledge , or the highest injustice , be taken away from the right heir . f. i kindly accept your profer , and if you please shall discourse this important question with you to morrow in the evening , if your occasions will give you leave . m. i expect you between seven and eight , and in the mean time am your servant . finis . advertisment . state tracts : being a further collection of several choise treatises relating to the government ; from the year . to . now published in a body , to shew the necessity , and clear the legality of the late revolution , and our present happy settlement , under the auspicious reign of their majesties , king william and queen mary . printed for richard baldwin . bibliotheca politica : or a discourse by way of dialogue , whether there can be made out from the natural , or revealed law of god , any succession to crowns by divine right ? collected out of the most approved authors , both antient and modern . dialogue the second . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms ; where also may be had the first dialogue . . the subject of the second dialogue . whether hereditary succession to crowns be by divine right , or institution , or not ? authors made use of in this discourse , and how denoted in the margin . . sir. robert filmer's patriarcha . f. p. preface to his political observations . f. p. o. observations on forms of government . f. o. g. directions to obedience . f. d. o. . patriarcha non monarcha . p. n. m. . mr. bohun's preface to sir r. filmer's patriarcha . b. p. p. conclusion to the same . b. c. p. . two treatises of government together . t. t. g. . grotius de iure belli & pacis . g. i. p. . bishop sanderson's preface to arch-bishop usher's power of the prince . s. p. p. advertisement to the reader . the author of these discourses hopes you will be so charitable as to believe , that tho' he hath made one of his disputants argue pretty stifly against the divine right of monarchy , and succession to crowns , yet he is no common-wealths-man , or one who hereby designs or desires alterations in the government of this nation , either of church , or state , since none can admire their excellent constitution more than himself ; much less does he prefer an elective , before an hereditary succession to crowns , since he justly esteems the latter , as being a most excellent , if not ( only ) means to prevent all disputes , and civil disturbances about succession , and therefore is never to be departed from , unless when some natural , or moral disability in the person , or other unavoidable necessity renders it absolutely inconsistent with the publick peace , and safety of the kingdom . therefore as a man may be said to be truly devout without superstition ( which is but the corruption , or abuse of religion ; ) so the author likewise thinks that a subject may be truly loyal , and obedient to his prince , tho' he hath never heard of , or does not believe any divine right of monarchy derived from adam , and noah , or of succession from god's promise that cain should rule over abel : nor hath the author an aversion to absolute monarchy as such , could he be assured that princes would be always as wise , and good as they ought to be ; nay , he owns , that divers nations have never been more happy than under the government of such monarchs . as the roman empire ( for instance ) never arrived to a greater heighth of riches , and power , ( if we may believe historians ) than under nerva , trajan , and the two antonines : so that indeed the fault is not in absolute monarchy as such , but in the too general corruption of humane nature , which rarely produces persons of just abilities , both as to wisdom , and goodness , fit for so great a trust. i confess subjects may be sufficiently happy , and ( if they please ) contented under any form of government , where the governours are of equal capacity and honesty , and have a real hearty love , and concern for the common good of their people : but where these are wanting , it is not meer forms , or empty names can make them so ; and therefore the author very justly admires the wisdom of the antient german , and gothick nations , who preferred a limited monarchy to all other forms of government , as an excellent medium between the mischiefs of arbitrary power , and those unhappy inconveniences that attend republicks , where either the common people , or nobility must govern . but the author farther hopes , that tho' he makes one of his disputants in this dialogue to shew the absurdity , and fatal consequences of sir r. f's principles ; yet the reader will not from thence infer , that he passes an absolute iudgment against them ; much less hath he done this out of any prejudice to sir r's person , which he never was acquainted with , since he hath rather an honour for his memory , his writings speaking him as a person of gentile learning , and subtle ingenuity : but whether his tenets be destructive to the fundamental constitutions of this government , the author submits to the reader 's considerate iudgment , which he hopes will be made without partiality , or any prejudicate opinion proceeding from this , or that party , or faction , and will determine according to the merits of the cause ; and therein observe the apostles rule , to try all things , and hold fast that which is good . the author lastly desires the reader not to think the worse of this performance , tho' all the latine quotations are not englisht ; for since these discourses are supposed to be between gentlemen , and scholars , and principally intended for such , it would be thought needless to translate them . the second dialogue between mr. freeman a gentleman and mr. meanwell a civilian . m. you are i see , sir , a punctual man to your hour ; pray do me the favour to sit down by the fire , i will but make an end of what i am writing , and wait on you presently . f. your servant sir , take your own time , but pray remember the point you are now to satisfie me in . m. now sir , i have done , and if i remember right , i am to derive a title to all the kings , and monarchs that have ever been or shall be in the world from that supream fatherly power conferred by god on adam . but pray take notice i undertake this task only for monarchies , not common-wealths , whom i must own to be of meer humane invention ; and tho' i will not say that they are absolutely unlawful , yet i think they are not the powers ordained by god in scripture . f. well sir , we will discourse farther of that anon : and therefore i do assure you , i do not desire any more of you now than that you should prove the divine institution of monarchy , and i think that task sufficient if it can be made out in one or two meetings . m. it may seem indeed somewhat absurd to maintain , that all kings are now the fathers of their people , since you 'll say experience shews the contrary . it is true all kings are not now the natural parents of their subjects , yet they all either are , or are to be reputed the next heirs to those primogenitors , who were at the first the natural parents of the whole people , and do in their right succeed to the exercise of the supream jurisdiction , and such heirs are not only lords of their own children , but also of their brethren , and all others that were subject to their fathers , and therefore i suppose , that god , when he conferred this supream power on adam , did not intend it should die with him , but descend to his heirs after his decease . f. well , i shall at present grant you all this likewise , tho' it might be questioned . but pray who were those heirs ? many , or but one person ? m. i suppose you will also grant me at present , what we before disputed , that the power of fathers over their children , being the fountain of all regal authority , by the ordination of god himself , it follows that civil power , not only in general is by divine institution , but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents . f. pray whom do you mean by eldest parents , our great grandmother 〈…〉 if you mean by it one that had longest had children , she must come in as next heir by these words . m. no sir , you altogether misapprehend me , i mean the eldest son of adam ; eve was his wife , and could have nothing to do to inherit in an hereditary monarchy as this was . f. 〈…〉 your pardon sir , if i misunderstood you , but you must thank the loosness or impropriety of your expression for it , for i suppose you cannot deny , but eldest parents commonly signifie either the eldest men , or women that have children , or those who have longest had issue and then in either of these senses , our great grand-mother eve , stood fairest to be heir of this divine power of adam ; but this i am sure of , parents can never signifie heirs male or female , much less a child who may sometimes ( according to your hypothesis ) happen to be heir ; but since i am gotten into this mistake , i shall not leave my hold , but shall make bold a little to argue our great grand mother's title , for indeed i cannot see any reason why her eldest son ( for example ) should have any right to govern his mother , and all his brothers and sisters , whilst she was alive . for first , if your argument from generation must be good , that every man that is born , becomes a subject to him that begets him , this argument will serve for eve as well as adam ; since ( as i have already proved ) the mother hath as great ( if not a greater ) share , in the generation of the children , than the father ; or secondly , if you insist upon the divine grant you so much ●●lked of last time , of adam's dominion over the creatures , in which his children were included ; i then proved to you , that this grant was made as well to eve as adam ; and consequently th● either she must have thereby an equal right with him , or at least after his decease to this dominion , as a husband and wife when joynt purchasers have to an e●tate at common law. and lastly , if the commandment of honour thy father and thy mother , were then in force by the law of nature or by express command from god , and that by honouring , obeying must be meant ( as most commentators agree ) then it will follow , that after adams decease , all eves sons and descendants , tho' never so remo●e , were to have obeyed or been subject to her , and not to her eldest son , unless you can shew me that the salique law against the succession of women was made by adam the first monarch , which i suppose you will not undertake to prove . m. i must confess , i did not consider this difficulty , for indeed it might never have happened , since eve might have died before adam , or if she did out-live him ( which is uncertain ) yet she was then very old , and consequently ( besides the natural weakness of her sex ) uncapable , or unfit for government , and so might very well leave it to seth , since cain the eldest had by the murder of his brother , and his flying away into another country , forfeited his birth-right , and made himself uncapable of the succession . f. so then here is a forfeiture , and an abdication of this divine right of succession in the very first descent ; whereas indeed i supposed , that this divine right had been at least as unforfeitable as the crown of england , the very descent of which , as our lawyers tell us , purges all defects in the next heir , tho' he had murdered his father and elder brother too . but i only shew you the absurdity of this notion , and shall not longer insist upon it , therefore pray proc●ed . m. i cannot tell what might have been said , if cain had come to claim his birth-right , but this is certain , that he neither did or could come to do it , since god condemned him to live in a strange country far from his brethren , and we read that cain went out from the presence of the lord , and dwelt in the land of nod , on the east of eden , and he built a city , and called the name of it enoch , after the name of his son enoch . and there are four descents set down immediately of his family , which could be no other than the princes of that city of cain's race . so that you see , even in cain's line , the principality descended to the eldest son. f. i confess cain's children and grand-children are particularly set down in scripture , but that they were princes or monarchs over their posterity , or which way this city was governed after cain's death , whether by one , or by all the sons of cain is no where mentioned , but i see some men can find even absolute monarchy in a text , where the scripture mentions no such thing , and no wonder , for the alchymists have found out likewise the invention of their elixir , or philosophers stone , in such texts as you or i can see no such thing . but to be more serious ; that a father should be lord over his children and posterity . i confess there may be some colour of reason , tho' none cogent enough to make it out : but that an elder brother hath any natural or divine right , to be lord over all the rest of his brethren , i can find no ground for , in reason , even upon your own principles , for if every man by his birth become the subject of him that begets him , it will necessarily follow , that a man by his birth cannot become a subject to his brother , who ( sure ) did not beget him . therefore i suppose you will still insist upon that place in the fourth of genesis , which you cited at our last meeting , when god told cain ( speaking as you suppose ) of his brother abel , his desire shall be subject unto thee , and thou shalt rule over him . from which words i then told you . i thought an absolute subjection of abel , and of all younger brothers whatsoever could not reasonably be inferred , for you may remember i shewed you , that this promise by god to cain concerning abel might be only personal , and relate to abel only , and not to the rest of his brethren , much less , all other younger brothers , that should be in the world ; and in the next place this ruling might only have been by advice and perswasion , and not by any authority or right of commanding him . so that if this be the place ( as i suppose it is ) from whence you would deduce your divine right of elder brothers being monarc●s over the younger in all hereditary monarchies , i must freely tell you i think it a very bold undertaking to found a divine right upon such doubtful expressions , as these of god to cain . m. i confess , i was now about again to urge this place to you ; for as i was not then well satisfied with your explanation of it , which you now again repeat , so upon second thoughts i am much more unsatisfied with your paraphrase upon them . for you seem to me plainly to pervert the sense of the words , and make them signifie just nothing . for sure when god spake the same words to eve concerning adam , as he did to cain concerning abel , can you conceive they were meant personally to eve only , and concerned no other wife that should be after her ? or can you assign any reason why these words should be rather meant personally in the last , and not in the first case ? unless you will do it out of pure love to anarchy and confusion . and if you say these words do not signifie any despotick power , but a ruling or governing by fair means or persuasion , this seemeth meer trifling with gods word , who says expresly , thy brothers desire shall be subject to thee ; that is ( say you ) as far as he thinks fit , and thou shalt rule over him , that is , if thou hast the knack to wheadle or persuade him . would not this have been a mighty matter for god almighty to have appeared to cain about , and an excellent argument to comfort him , and to appease his wrath against his brother ? so that it seems apparent by this law given by god to cain and abel , that this regal and paternal authority was not to dye with him , nor ●o be equally divided amongst all his children at his death , or that from thenceforth no man should have a right by birth of commanding another , for this command to abel could not be supposed to take place in the life of adam , for then adam was lord over all his children , and so none of them without his permission could rule over the rest , and if it were otherwise by adam's appointment , then adam was the soveraign still , and the son or grand-son so exercising this power was but his deputy : but after adam's decease then it became a real soveraignty in his eldest son , as having none but god superior to it . f. i hope you will judge more charitably of me ▪ than to believe that the sense that i have put upon these words , tho' different from yours , is out of any love of anarchy or confusion , much less out of any design to pervert or wrest this place of scripture : and if i should be so severe as you are , perhaps i might with more reason lay this charge at your door : for in the first place , i am not satisfied with your argument , that these words could not be meant personally , or concerning abel only , because the same words when spoken of eve do likewise concern her posterity , and therefore when spoken concerning abel they must likewise relate to all younger brothers in hereditary monarchies : which consequence i may with very good reason deny , for whatsoever subjection may be due by vertue of the like words from eve and her posterity , to adam and all other husbands , is to be supposed to have been enjoyned , because all women are descended from eve , and so were represented by her as their first parent . thus st. paul supposes all men to be in a state of sin and death , as represented by adam ; their ancestor , by whose disobedience all have sinned . but no man will affirm that all the elder brothers , or monarchs in the world were represented by cain , and all younger brothers by abel , no man at this day being ( as appears in scripture ) descended from either of them : and i cannot but take notice that the better to strengthen your notion you again foist in out of the margin of our english bible , his desire shall be subject to thee , whereas in the hebrew it is no more than , his or its desire shall be to thee . and that the words rule over , are to be interpreted according to the subject , and do not always mean a ruling by force , or command appears by the same hebrew words made use of in the first of genesis ▪ concerning the two great lights that god set in the firmament , to give light upon the earth , to rule over the day , and over the night , which cannot signifie a ruling by force or command , but only by a natural influence , or preheminence of the sun and moon above the stars or planets . and tho' you are pleased to ridicule this explanation of mine , yet i think , i may with as much reason treat yours with the like contempt , for since your self grant that this power of cain over abel , was not to commence till after the death of adam , and that this murder of abel was committed above a hundred years after adams creation , appears by the time of the birth of seth , ( who was born sometime after abel's death ) would not this thing have been a mighty comfort to cain , when he was in his dogged humor , if god had bid him chear up , for the time should come that if he behaved himself well , about eight hundred years hence , when his father adam should die , he should then lord it over his brother , and be revenged of him for the affront he had received in having his sacrifice preferred before his own ? so that this interpretation of yours is so absurd , that i do much rather agree with divers learned commentators as well jews as christians , who make not only a quite different interpretation , but also a different version of these words from the hebrew text , and if you have the learned jesuit menochius his notes upon the bible , i pray let me see them . here pray observe what he says upon this place . se● sub te erit appetitus ejus ; in hebraeo , & apud lxx est , ad te conversio ejus : sensus est , peccatum ejusque appetitus , & concupiscentia te sollicitabit ad consensum ▪ sed ita , ut ad te converti , & a te conseusum petere , & impetrare debeat ; id noster interpres ad sensum clare vertit , sub te erit appetitus ejus ; by all which he means no more , than that sin should tempt , or sollicit him to offend , but that he should rule over it , that is , had a power so to do if he would use it as he ought . so likewise mr. ainsworth upon this place , ( as you may see in pool's criticks ) puts a li●e sense upon the following words , referring the whole sentence to the sin in these words , peccatum ponitur pro poena peccati ; juxta hebraeos ita accipitur , gen. . . lev. . . rep. . . sinsus est prope te punitio peccati & ad te desiderum ejus , i. e. cupit te poena peccati tui , ut solet post peccatum admissum . sed tu si vis dominaberis illi , i. e. potes declinare peccatum , q. d. poena haec , sicut canis est , qui ad ostium cubat ▪ cupiens ingredi , sed in potestate domini est , vel claudere ostium , ne ingrediatur , vel aperire ut intret . probatur hic sensus . prius membrum de praemio l●quitur , reportabis scil . praemium , ergo posterius loquitur de poena , peccatum jam inerat ipsi , punitio vero nondum , sed ad fores erat . so that according to these learned comentators , this place is to be thus turned out of hebrew , if thou dost not well , sin lyeth at the door , and to thee is its desire , but thou mayst or shalt rule over it , which seems to me to be a much more genuin and rational interpretation , than that of our english or latin bibles ; so that i think i may justly except against the authority of so doubtful and obscure a place , as sufficient to found your monarchical power of elder brothers , in the state of nature . m. well sir , since you are no better satisfied with this testimony o●● of genesis , for the divine right of primogeniture , i will no longer insist upon it , tho' i am not yet convinced , but that my interpretation of this place is truer than yours , since i have likewise great authorities on my side , both antient and modern , besides our common versions to authorize it , and therefore since i have many other examples out of scripture of this kind , i shall the less insist upon it , but will now proceed to the examples before the floud . first therefore , it seems highly probable if not certain , that whatever civil government there was in the world , before that period of time ( as it is very rational to believe there necessarily m●st be some in so long a space as near two hundred years ) it was chief●y administred by those first patriarchs , whose names you 'l find particularly recited in the fifth of genesis , and sure that long chain we there have of them , by whose lives the chronology of the world is only reckoned till the floud , were in their several generations considerable persons , nay princes over their own families which could not but be very numerous , and indeed the very counting the age of the world by the years of their lives is to me an argument that they were no obscure unregarded men , but that they were either monarchs or princes of all mankind or at least over that part of the world in which they lived , and iosephus is likewise of my opinion in the first book of the jewish antiquities , where ( as you may see ) cap. . he expresly tells us , thus , seth autem centesimo & quinto anno genuit eno● . qui dum quinque & nongentos vixisset annos . rerum curam tradidit filio suo carnae , and immediately after proceeds thus , lamec●um autem filium genuit ma●husalas , enocho oreus , cum annos ipse habere 〈◊〉 clxxxvii . imperium vero lamecho eidem tradidit paren● , quod jam tenuerat ipse annos dcccclxix . lamechus pariter principatum reliquit noe filio , post quam regnasset annos dcclxxvii . noe denique verum summam tenuit annos nongentos & quinquaginta ; lamecho annos . aetatis habenti genitus . and noah , the last of the ten patriarchs , and the surviving patriarch of all mankind , was declared by god the universal monarch of the world , as soon as he came out of the ark , to whom he granted the dominion over all things , as appears by those words of god to noah , gen. . whereby i conceive , that tho' it hath been thence concluded by mr. selden in his mare clausum , that there was a general community between noah , and his sons , yet the text doth not clearly warrant it : for altho' the sons are there joyned with noah in the blessing , yet it may best be understood , with a subordination , or a benediction in succession ; and the blessing might truly be fulfilled , if the sons either under , or after their father enjoyed a private dominion : nor is it probable , that the private dominion , which god gave to adam and by his dona●ion , assignation or cession to his children , was abrogated , and a community of all things instituted between noah , and his sons after the flood . and when noah was left the sole heir of the world ; why should it be thought that god would disinherit him of his birth right and make him only tenant in common with his children ? and if the blessing given to adam , gen. . . be compared to that given to noah , and his sons , gen. . . there will be found a considerable difference between these two texts . in the benediction of a●●m we find expressed a subduing of the earth and a dominion over the creatures ; neither of which are expressed in the blessing of noah , nor the earth there once named : it is only said , the fear of you shall be upon the creatures , and into your hands are they delivered ; then immediately it follows , every moving thing shall be meat for you , as the green herb , &c. the first blessing gave adam dominion over the earth , and all creatures ; the latter allows noah liberty to use the living creatures for food : here is no alteration or diminishing of his title to an absolute propriety of all things , but only an enlargement of his commons . f. as for the government of the world before the flood , i have already acknowledged , that the scrip●●res being silent in it , no man can affirm any thing positively concerning it , whether it was regal , aristocratical , or paternal , neither is it any proof , that because god thought fit for our understanding the age of the world , or the genealogy of noah , from whom all mankind now takes its original to set down a series of the patriarchs from father to son , or that because they were no obscure , unregarded men , that therefore they must all be absolute princes , or monarchs over their families . this is , as a father said long ago , divinare ●agis , quam scire . but i see , when prejudice once blinds our reasons , we easily make good that old saying , facile credimus quod volumus . but as for your quotation out of iosephus , i grant indeed , that at the first sight it makes for you ; but suppose it doth , i cannot see how a man may can lay any stress upon it , since the scripture , being silent of any such monarchy , or principality in these patriarchs , since this author writes his history above three sand years , after the time that these patriarchs lived , which he there mentions ; and that we are sure there were no authors then extant , that writ of the ante-deluvian patriarchs , but moses only , iosephus could speak no otherwise than by guess , or from some uncertain tradi●ions preserved amongst the pharisees , of which sect he was : to which traditions , when not warranted by scripture ▪ how little credit is to be given , our saviour himself teaches us . and also the many futilous traditions of the rabbins at this day , do sufficiently shew us : but i suppose that by this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , there used by iosephus , ( which is rendered by the latine version principatus ) is not meant any monarchical power , but only that principality or eminency , or that reverence , and respect which their posterity paid them , either in regard of their great age and experience , or of the spirit of god , with which they might be supposed to be endued , sufficient to make them to be taken notice of , and reverenced above all other men living in their time . i have likewise upon better consideration , two other reasons to add , why by the curam rerum , mentioned in this place , cannot be meant a regal power , because iosephus mentions no such thing of adam the f●rst father , and as you suppose monarch of mankind ; which sure he would have done had he believed him endued by god with such a power . the second reason is , that if you please to observe , he ascribes to mathuselab , lamech , and noah , as many years of empire , as of life : so that either this place of iosephus signifies nothing at all , or else will make nothing to your purpose to prove these antient patriarchs to have been so many monarchs . i come now to the next period of time after the flood , and whereof i grant we may discourse with more certainty : but i could have wished you would have repeated more particularly the words , whereby you suppose god granted to noah alone , an absolute dominion over the whole earth , and all the creatures therein contained : but i perceive you thought the words not very favourable for you , or else you would have repeated , or read them to me , which since you omitted , i pray give me leave to do it for you , and then i will leave it to your self to judge whether there can be any thing drawn from this text to countenance your opinion ; the words are these : and god blessed noah , and his sons , and said unto them , be fruitful , and multiply , and replenish the earth . and the fear of you , and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth , and upon every fowl of the air , upon all that moveth upon the earth , upon all the fishes of the sea , into your hand are they delivered . every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you ; even as the green herb have i given you all things : where you may plainly see , that noah hath no preheminence in this grant above his children , who were ( for as much as i can see ) by this text to be tenants in common with him of the earth , and all its creatures ▪ nor is there much difference between this grant to noah , and his sons , and that made to adam , and eve , which i proved extended alike to all mankind , more than that the brute animals are here granted to noah , and his sons for food , which they were not before to adam . but i perceive you your self are sensible , that this is the most plain , and obvious sense of these words , and therefore you have thought good to wrest them so as may best serve your purpose ; and indeed you deal very cunningly to say , that this grant may be best understood with a subordination in succession ; 't is true indeed , it serves best for your purpose , that it should be so understood , but that will be best understood by any body else , which best agrees with the plain , and obvious sense of the words . nor will your reason signifie any thing , that the blessing might be truly fulfilled if the sons either under , or after their father enjoyed a private dominion : since that were to say that a grant whose express words , give a joynt title in present ( for the text saith , into your hands they are delivered ) may best be understood with a subordination , or in succession , because 't is possible that in subordination , or succession it may be so enjoyed , is all one as to say , that a grant of any thing in present possession , may best be understood in reversion , because 't is possible one may live so to enjoy it . and as for the other parts of this grant , they are so expressed , that they must needs be understood to belong to noah's sons , not with a subordination , or in succession , but as full and equally as to noah himself : the fear of you , and the dread of you ( says god ) shall be upon every beast , &c. can any body in reason say , that the creatures were to fear , and stand in awe of noah only , and not of his sons without his leave , or till after his death ? and are the following words , ( into your hands they are delivered , ) to be understood , ( as you say ) if your father please , or they shall be delivered into your hands hereafter ? you do also as wisely to say , that if adam had a private dominion given him by god , that he would not now abrogate it : for i grant , that if he had given adam any such private dominion , that there had been no reason for him now to have changed it . but i think i have sufficiently proved at our last meeting , that he had no such private dominion given him any more than eve , and those children that were to proceed from them . so that this supposition being false , there will be no such considerable difference as you suppose , between these two texts . for certainly , ( tho' it be not here expressed ) noah's sons had as much right to subdue or possess the earth , as the posterity of adam had before the flood , and likewise to enjoy , or eat the products thereof ; only here is granted to noah , and his sons , a power to kill the creatures for food , which was not granted to adam , or those that lived before the flood : and tho' you will have this grant to be no diminishing of noah's title to a sole propriety in all things , but only an enlargement of his commons ; yet methinks it is a considerable priviledge not only to himself , but his sons likewise , who are hereby impowered to use the creatures for food , as well as their father , or else their case had been very hard , if when the creatures were sufficiently multiplied , they might not have killed so much as a hare , or a partridge without his leave . and if they had a right thus to use these creatures , how this differs from an absolute propriety in them when ever they are taken , my dull understanding is not able to comprehend . m. well , since you will not admit of this sole dominion of noah over all things in the world : i shall not longer insist upon it , but will pass over to those other authorities i have to produce out of scripture . f. i pray sir , do ; and to let you see how fair an adversary i will be , i will for the present admit , that noah was a prince or monarch over all his posterity ; but then pray shew me to whom this power descended after his decease , for i can see nothing in scripture , that favours your divine right of primogeniture , but that every one of noah's three sons was a prince alike over his own family , and had an equal share in the earth , and all its products , the one as much as the other ; so that here it is apparent your sole monarchy of the world dwindles into a sort of gavel-kind where all the sons inherit alike . m. i cannot deny the matter of fact to be as you have laid down , but then there might be very good reason for it , which might render the sole principality of noah's eldest son to be not only unlawful , but unpracticable , for in the first place mr. selden in his mare cl●sum ( in the place afore-cited ) tells us , from the antient tradition of the jewish rabbins , that noah himself , as lord of all , was author of the distribution of the world , and of private dominion , and that by the appointment of an oracle from god , be did confirm this distribution by his last will , and testament , which at his death he lef● in the hands of his eldest son shem , and also warned all his sons , that none of them should invade any of their brothers dominions , or injure one another , because from thence discord , and civil wars would necessarily follow . nor do i see any reason why noah might not emancipate his two younger sons from the dominion of the elder , and likewise give them a separate share of the earth , and also an independent power over their own family , and posterity . in the second place , it might be impracticable for one man to govern all mankind , when in a little time it became so multiplied and dispersed over the face of the earth , and the languages so confounded by the act , or will of god , that it was impossible for the three elder sons , of these three great patriarchs , to govern them . but during the life of noah , we do not read that any of his children , or descendants , withdrew themselves from him without his leave , but rather the contrary ; for it is said , the whole earth was of one language , and of one speech ; and it came to pass as they journeyed from the east , that they found a plain in the land of shinar , &c by which words it appears they kept well enough together ; and the very reason why they began to build the tower , was left , ( said they ) we should be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth : so that there was no disunion amongst them , nor so much as a desire of it , whilst noah lived . f. i pray give me leave to answer what you have said concerning this distribution of the earth by noah's last will , and also his making all his sons lords , or monarchs alike , both which favour so strongly of the rabbinical liberty of invention , that i wonder how any learned man can believe such idle stories , especially when the scripture , and the most antient histories , and records that are extant in the world , mention no such thing ; and tho' ios●phus may in the place you have cited suppose that every one of the patriarchs he mentions , were princes , or monarchs , yet he doth not say any thing like it , concerning the three sons of noah's being monarchs , or of this partition of the earth between them , but maketh them to live together in those mountainous parts , till they descended from thence into the plain ; so that it was impossible for noah to make a distribution of those parts of the earth , which were not yet discovered ; and it is apparent by the scripture it self , that a considerable time after noah's death all mankind lived together , and therefore there was no impossibility ( as you suppose ) why noah's eldest son could not have commanded his brethren , and their descendants , they being not as yet dispersed , or separated from each other , as you may see by the first verses of 〈…〉 of genesis , which you cited but now . so that if noah's eldest son was disinherited of his right of governing his brethren , and their descendants , that could not be the cause of it , which you assign ; and if primogeniture be a divine right appointed by god himself , and unalterable by humane laws , as you suppose , i cannot see how the will of a father ▪ which is but a humane institution , can ever alter it : for i remember you laid it down as a maxim , at our last meeting , that the divine right of the right heir never dies , can be lost , or taken away ; so that if there hath been any such thing as a divine right of primogeniture belonging to the eldest son of noah , it is not likely that he would have permitted his two brothers to have usurped it from him . m. i shall not insist longer on this tradition , concerning the distribution of the earth amongst the sons of noah ; but certainly it is not a thing to be made so slight of as you do , since cedrenus a modern greek historian , is very particular in it ; besides , so many other learned men ( and the great selden among the rest ) have given countenance to it . and tho' i grant that primogeniture is of divine right , yet that might very well be altered by noah's will , especially , since his children might be satisfied that he being a prophet , and preacher of righteousness , might make this division of his paternal power by a divine command . but i shall not dwell longer upon this , but proceed to the next period of time ; ( viz. ) that of the confusion , and dispersion of tongues , in which there are more evident footsteps of this right of primogeniture , as also of the patriarchal power i maintain : and therefore pray turn to the th of genesis , and there you will find ( after the recital of the genealogy of every one of the sons of noah , whose des●endants are there particularly set down ) these words in the fifth verse ; by these were the isles of the gentiles divided in their lands ; every one after his tongue , after their families in their nations : and likewise in the th verse ; these are the sons of ham , after their families ; after their tongues in their countreys , and in their nations . and in the last verse ; these are the families of the sons of noah , and their generations in their nations ; and by these were the nations divided in the earth after the flood . so that if we consider the first plantations of the world , which were after the building of babel , and the confusion of tongues , we may find the division of the earth into distinct kingdoms , or nations , by several families and languages , whereof the sons , or grand-children of noah , were the kings , or governours , by a fatherly right : and for the preservation of this power , and right in these fathers , god was pleased upon several families to bestow a language on each by it self , the better to unite it into a nation or kingdom . so that it becoming impossible ( as i said before ) for the elder sons or descendants of these three great patriarchs to govern all mankind , who now no longer understood each other's language , it was absolutely necessary that the heads of the several families should take that care upon them , and their children submit to them ; wherein they had the direction of god almighty , who had commanded them to obey their parents , and a miraculous declaration of his will for their dispersion , by the confounding of their language , and that so ordered by god too , that the descendants of the same person , and family , spoke one tongue ; was not this a declaring these fathers princes of these several families , and tongues by god himself , who by his providence had thus confounded their tongues , and dispersed them by families , that they could no longer be governed by three , or four patriarchs , but must have as many distinct governments , as there were different tongues , there being no means at present of any intercourse , or correspondence one with another , or with their former governours ? so that however in this confusion of tongues ( by which , as iosephus supposes , there were seventy two distinct nations erected ) yet were they not confused multitudes without heads , or governours , and at liberty to chuse what governours , or government they pleased , but were so many distinct families which had fathers for rulers over them of the same speech : whereby it is manifest , that even in the confusion , god was careful to preserve fatherly authority , and monarchical power entire , by distributing the diversity of languages according to the diversity of families ; which shews that god was still for government , and that paternal too , since it is evident that every people followed their ancestor , or patriarch , as their prince or leader in this dispersion , who had a patriarchal authority over their posterity ; for by what else can you suppose they could have made their children , and descendants , to have followed them as far as the utmost isles of the gentiles ? f. i confess there are many difficulties as well in the time , as manner of this dispersion , according to our common chronology ; for if you suppose , that the building of the tower of babel , fell out within two hundred years after the flood , as most of our chronologers , who follow the hebrew account , do , then it is certain , that noah , and his sons , were still alive , who lived till above four hundred years after the flood ; so that either noah , and his sons , did not travel with the rest of their descendants into the plain of shinar , where they built the tower of babel , which yet seems contrary to the text , which says , all mankind being of one language , they travelled , &c. and if these children , and grand-children left their ancestors at home , what become of their monarchical authority , when their subjects were gone ? & you your self do assert , that none of noah's posterity divided from him , as long as he lived ; so on the other side , if you suppose , that noah , and his sons marched along with them in this expedition , you must make them either to have quitted their authority over their descendants , or else to have joyned with them in this wicked , and foolish enterprize of building a tower , whose top should reach to heaven , which is very hard to conceive of noah , a preacher of righteousness , or his sons , whom the scripture no where mentions , or blames for having a hand in this attempt . but if you will lay the fault of building this tower upon nimrod , as iosephus doth , who makes him a great tyrant , and a wicked man , this will make against your own hypothesis , which supposes no rebellion , or usurpation to have been during the life of noah . so that to avoid these absurdities , and difficulties that will follow by the placing the building of the tower of babel , within two hundred years after the flood ( as you must do if you follow the present hebrew account ) i think it were much better to embrace the account of the lxx . which by adding a hundred years to the lives of each patriarch between noah , and abraham , makes the confusion of tongues to have happened not till about five hundred years after the flood , which takes away those absurdities i mentioned , of making noah , and his sons to have had a hand in the building of the tower of babel , or else that nimrod did it , whether they would or not ; which is likewise as hard to suppose ; all which difficulties , according to this account , may very well be taken away ; since then , noah , and his sons were dead , before ever this tower began to be built : and for the further proof of this , i refer you to the learned isaac vossius his vindication of the translation of the lxx . and his chronology accommodated to that account , as most agreeable to the antient hebrew original ; but this is only by the by . m. i thank you , sir , for your solution of this great difficulty which i am satisfied cannot be better solved , than by this account of the lxx version . but i pray answer my argument , which in my opinion clearly makes out the divine institution , as well as necessity of patriarchal power . f. i was just coming to it , and therefore in the first place i must tell you , that i cannot imagine how you can prove from this text concerning the dispersion of nations , and their following certain leaders of their own family , and language , when otherwise they could not have conversed together , that therefore god must be careful in all this transaction to preserve your imaginary patriarchal power entire ; of which the scripture is altogether silent ; and you might as well tell me , that because in hannibal's , or darius's army , there were whole squadrons of different languages , who were ranged under captains of their own language or countrey , that therefore fathers , or grand-fathers were leaders of each squadron , or that darius , or hannibal , were careful to preserve paternal authority . but suppose i grant you the utmost you can ask , yet , since god thought fit at this confusion of tongues , that all those of one tribe should speak the same language , which was not understood by any other , it is likewise very reasonable to suppose , that they could not travel so far as the utmost parts of asia , without chusing , and following some captain leaders to be their guides , and commanders in so long a journey ; and whom could the people sooner chuse to follow for this purpose than their fathers , or grand-fathers , to whose natural affection , wisdom , and long experience , they had from their very infancy always paid a great respect , and submission : yet doth it not therefore follow , that such fathers , or grand-fathers , thus led , or commanded their children , and posterity ( now grown up to be men and women ) by any natural , or divine right , or that they followed them otherwise than as an army of volunteers , or than as a caravan in the desarts of arabia doth a captain of its own chusing . but if you will suppose any thing beyond this , you will find your self involved in greater difficulties , and absurdities . for pray tell me , what great care was there to preserve a patriarchal authority in this confusion and dispersion , by breaking it into so many parts ? indeed i am so blind i cannot see it . for as i will not deny , but it was god's will to confound the language , and disperse the families of mankind , both for a punishment , and also for the better peopling of the world : so am i not convinced , that god in acting thus , was at all careful to preserve the patriarchal authority , deriv'd from adam . for you cannot deny but that at the same time he destroyed the true supreme fatherhood of the natural monarch , or heir of adam , who could be but one person , as you your self have already asserted ; or , can it be any reason to say , that god for the preservation of paternal authority , let so many several new governments , with their governours start up , who must all enjoy this authority ? and is it not more reasonable to say , that god was careful to destroy this paternal authority , when he suffered those of noah's sons , or descendants then actually in possession of it , to have their monarchy torn in pieces , and shared by so many of their subjects ? and would it not be an excellent argument for monarchical government to say , when any monarchy was shattered to pieces , and divided amongst many revolted subjects , that god was only careful to preserve monarchical power , by rending a great settled empire , into a multitude of little governments . so that it is altogether irrational to conceive , that if any three , or more right heirs of noah had paternal authority , or soveraignty by right of fatherhood over mankind at babel , that the next moment , ( all they yet living ) seventy two others should have a like soveraignty by right of fatherhood over the same people , divided into so many distinct governments ; either then these seventy two fathers were actually rulers , just before the confusion , and then they were not one people , but an aristocratical common-wealth , and then where was your monarchy ? or else these seventy two fathers had paternal authority , but knew it not , which is hard to suppose . and if these seventy two grand-children of the sons of noah , had a right to divide this supreme paternal authority of adam into as many distinct governments as there were heads of families , why might not their sons have done so in infinitum ? and then there could never be any common prince , or monarch set over them all , but by force , or conquest , or else by election : either of which destroys your notion of the divine right of primogeniture . m. 't is a very pleasant notion , methinks , this of yours , that the posterity of the first planters of the world , should follow their ancestors , not as children , or subjects , but as volunteers , and from a reverence ( forsooth ) and affection to their age , wisdom , and experience . indeed i am thus far of your mind , that these children followed their fathers freely , and were not driven afore them , nor dragged after them with chains : but to infer from hence , that they owed their father none of this service , or attendance , but out of meer good nature and gratitude , which are due to strangers that have obliged us , by being our benefactors , is a notion that only becomes one , that owns no right to be derived from patriarchal , or paternal power ; and since there was none of these patriarchs , who were the leaders of mankind in this dispersion , but might be one , or two hundred years old , if not more ; can any thing in nature look more ridiculous , than for the children , and descendants of these old men to elect them who begat them to be their leaders , and governours , at a hundred years of age ? and to give you an answer why governments might not upon my principles crumble into new ones , in infinitum , i think it may be sufficient to tell you , that first , god prevented it , and that for the most part by monarchs , ever since the creation of the world ; and altho' he was pleased to permit many divisions after this time ; yet he would never suffer mankind to be crumbled into such small divisions as to make every distinct houshold an independent government . secondly , those monarchs prevented it , who would be sure to reduce to their subjection , any person that should attempt to divide himself , or family , from the rest , and set up for an independant state without his leave , and liking . thirdly , the necessity of mankind prevented it , such small parcels of men not being able to preserve themselves , but by uniting with the rest , for their support and protection : so that if you could never so clearly prove that here was no subordination to the eldest son , or heir of noah , yet this signifieth nothing , for god ordered it so to be ; and if these grand sons of noah were independant governours of their own families , with any subordination to the eldest son's son or heir of noah ; yet were they still soveraign princes , and much less had any dependance upon their own children and descendants . so that hitherto the multitude were kept under subjection , and could not set up a common-wealth without rebelling against those independant governours . now if in this horrible confusion of tongues , the people by the will of god still fell under the monarchical government of these fathers of families , i desire to know when they could obtain their freedom , and in what age it began ? f. i must confess you had some reasons to look upon my notion of the descendants of the sons of noah following their ancestors in this dispersion , not as children , or subjects , but as volunteers , to be as ridiculous as you are pleased to make it , could you have any way proved at our last meeting , that the power of parents over their children , and grand-children to all generations , is as absolute , and perpetual , as that of a master over his slaves , and that a son and a servant were all one at the first ; but since you failed in that proposition , which is the ground-work of all the rest , i must beg your pardon , if i cannot found the descendants of noah , following their fathers , or ancestors in the dispersion , upon any higher ground , than meer gratitude and esteem : i mean for all such of them , who were themselves at that time masters , or heads of separate families ; and i desire to know of you by what other motive , or obligation , a great grand-son ( for example ) was obliged to follow his great grand father to the world's end , as his prince , or leader , when perhaps his own father thought fit to lead him another way ; and i desire you to shew me if they had ( as they might very well have ) commanded different things , which was to be obeyed ? and how disobedience to a man 's own father in this case would have consisted with that law of nature , which you so much insist upon , of honouring a man's father . but indeed all this mistake proceeds from your first false notion , which i see you cannot yet be quit of , in still supposing the obedience , and subjection of children to their fathers to be absolute , and perpetual : the contrary to which i have already made out at our last meeting : and therefore i must tell you again , that this notion of these grand-children , or descendants following their fathers , or ancestors , not out of duty , but choice , is not so ridiculous as you are pleased to make it ; and tho' i do not suppose that they elected these ancestors of theirs for their leaders by a balotting-box , yet this much i am sure of , that they might prefer , if they pleased , the following of their father , or grand-father , rather than their great grand-father , if they perceived that he had doted through age , or else by weakness , or infirmities , was unable to lead them , or that his natural temper was so imperious , and tyrannical , that there was no living under his government ? neither doth the scripture it self any where declare the contrary , only says in general , that by these grand-sons of noah , the isles , or countreys of the gentiles were divided , according to their families , and nations , without particularly telling us , who were the princes , or leaders of each tribe , or family . and to instance , if this division happened in the time of peleg , or phaleg , as the greek lxx . makes it , then not arphaxad the great grand-father , or selah the grand-father , but heber the grand-son was the prince or leader of his family at this division : since it is from him that iosephus supposes the hebrews not only to have descended , but to have taken their names . nor do you any better answer the other difficulty , how all these seventy two patriarchs , or great grand-fathers , could all of them claim alike regal power from adam , or noah , whose right heir could be but one person . indeed you tell me , that god ordered it so , by appointing every nation a distinct language , and to be led by the ancestor of their family : this is altogether gratis dictum ; for tho' it be true , that the scripture says , that this division of tongues was made according to the different tribes , or families of these descendants of noah ; yet doth it no where mention their being led or commanded by seventy two grand-fathers patriarchs , and there might be , for ought that you or i know , not only seventy two , but seven-score such captains , or leaders of them , nay , every distinct father of a family , when this monarchical power came to be crumbled into so many parts , might as well have claimed a share in this regal power , they being by this confusion wholly reduced again into a state of nature . nor are your reasons sufficient to convince me of the contrary . as for your first reason , that god hath not suffered it to be so , signifies little ; for either he hath hindered it by an express command , or by the ordinary course of his providence : the former , i am sure , you can no where shew me ; and as for the latter , when ever any nation , or people , shall be pressed with the like necessity of separating themselves from the government under which they were born , as the several families of mankind had at this division of tongues : i see no reason why they may not have a like right of quitting their countrey , and becoming subjects to another government ; or else of setting up one of their own if they can . as for your second reason , that monarchs would be sure to reduce to their subjection any person that should offer to divide himself , and family from the rest , and set up for an independant state without their good leave , and liking . this is a good argument indeed , tha● they might not be able to do it , but none at all that they ought not to do it if they could , since this were but to exercise that supreme paternal authority with which god hath invested them as much as ever ●e did any of those seventy two descendants of noah , who set up so many new governments without the consent of noah's heir . your third reason , i confess , is somewhat better : that the necessity of mankind prevented it , but this also makes quite against you , and only proves , that the heads or masters of families being sensible they could not preserve themselves , but by uniting with others for their mutual safety , and protectio● , were fain to submit , ( tho' b● their own consents , ) to some common power , for their own as well as their families preservation . so that i cannot see from any thing you have said , that god had that great care you suppose of maintaining your patriarchal power , much less this divine right of primogeni●ure . m. i see it is to no purpose to wrangle with you any farther about the patriarchal power of these sons of noah , and therefore i shall proceed to the times after the confusion of tongues ; in which , the first instance i shall give you is , that of iacob , who when he had bought his brothers birth-right , isaac blessed him thus ; be lord over thy brethren , and let the sons of thy mother bow down before thee . by which is plainly denoted a regal power , or dominion over esau his brother , and the rest of his brethren , if he had had any . so likewise we find — f. i pray give me leave to interrupt you alittle , for i have a great deal to say to this instance you have now brought of iacob , and esau , and therefore i desire i may speak it before you proceed any further . and first by the way , i cannot but observe , that this divine right of primogeniture which you suppose here to be meant by the word birth-right , was capable of being sold for a mess of pottage , and all esau's heirs disinherited of their right , because their father preferred his belly , before his honour or interest . but if your principles are true , a divine right never dieth , nor can be lost or taken away . the second thing i must take notice of , is your unfair dealing , in making isaac to have presently after this sale of the birth right , and as it were in confirmation of it , to have given iacob his blessing , whereas it is apparent by this story in gen. . that many years past ( perhaps twenty or thirty ) between iacob's buying of this birth-right , and isaac's conferring of the blessing upon him , as any one that will but read the th of genesis , may easily see . but if you had better observed this text , you would have found that this blessing was nor intended for iacob , but esau for whom isaac then mistook him ; but be it as it will , whether the blessing was given to iacob , or esau , it matters not ; for from these words i can by no means gather , that any government , or superiority , was thereby conferred on esau over iacob , or iacob over esau. for first ▪ as to iacob this blessing was never fulfilled , as to be ●ord over esau , who was prince of mount s●ir in iacob's life time ; and as for bowing , or any other token of superiority , we read indeed that iacob at his meeting his brother esau , bowed seven times towards him to the ground , tho' he had before sold his birth-right to iacob ; and therefore this birth-right cannot mean any ruling power , or lordship over his brethren ; since it is manifest from the text , that iacob had no more brothers than esau ; nor had isaac any consideration of iacob's having then bought this birth-right ; for when he thus blessed him , he took him not to be iacob , but esau ; nor did esau understand any connexion between the birth-right , and the blessing ; for ▪ says he to his father , he hath supplanted me th●se two times , he took away my birth right , and behold now he hath taken away my blessing . whereas , had this blessing , to be lord over his brethren belonged to the birth-right , esau could not have complained of this second as a cheat , iacob having got nothing ▪ but what esau had sold him long before . so that it is plain dominion was not then understood to belong either to the birth-right , or blessing . and therefore it is more rational to suppose , that this word birth right , only relates to the right of priesthood , which the jews supposed always to descend to the eldest son , before the law was given : and that by blessing , is meant no more , than that double portion of goods , which by the jewish law was due to the first-born ; and that this is the true sense of this place , i desire you to look in gen. . . ( if you please to give me your bible i will shew you the place , and will read the words to you ) where sarah taking isaac to be heir , says , cast out this bond-woman and her son , for the son of this bond-woman shall not be heir with my son : whereby could be meant nothing , but that he should not have a pretence to any equal share of his fathers estate after his death , but should have his portion presently , and be gone : and farther we read , gen. . , . that abraham gave all that he had unto isaac , but unto the sons of the concubines which abraham had , abraham gave gifts , and sent them away from isaac his son , while he yet lived ; that is , abraham having given portions to all his other sons , and sent them away , that which he had reserved , being the greatest part of his substance , isaac as heir possessed after his death , but by being heir he had no right to be lord over his brethren : for if he had , why should sarah desire to rob him of one of his subjects , or slaves , by desiring to have him sent away ? so likewise , if you look into the first of chron. chap. . v. . you will find a place , that plainly confirms this interpretation , where it is said ; reuben was the first-born , but for as much as he defiled his fathers bed , his birth-right was given unto the sons of joseph , the son of israel , and the genealogy is not to be reckoned after the birth-right ; for judah prevailed above his brethren , and of him came the chief ruler ; but the birth-right was joseph's ; tho' he was the youngest son ; and that this birth right was iacob's blessing on ioseph , gen. . . tells us in these words ; moreover i have given thee one portion above thy brethren , which i took out of the hand of the amorites with my sword ' and with my bow. whereby it is not only plain , that the birth-right was nothing but a double portion ; but the text in chronicles is expresly against your opinion , and shews that dominion was no part of the birth-right ; for it tells us , that joseph had the birth-right , but judah the dominion . so that unless you were very fond of this word birth-right , without considering in what sense it is to be taken , you would never bring this instance of iacob and esau , to prove that dominion belongs to the eldest son , over his brethren : for if this blessing of isaac upon iacob signifies any thing more than this , it could not relate to his own person , who never ruled over his brother at all ; and therefore it is at most no more , than a prophecy , shewing that the jews , as being descended from iacob , should in after-times rule over the edomites , or posterity of esau , according to what rebekah had been foretold from god. two nations are in thy womb , and two manner of people shall be separated from thy bowels , and the one people sha●l be stronger than the other people , and the elder shall serve the younger . and so iacob blessed iudah , and gave him ( tho' not in his own person , but in his posterity ) the scepter , and dominion : from whence you might have argued as well , that the dominion belonged to the third son over his brethren ; as well as from this blessing of isaac , that it belonged to iacob , they being both but predictions of what should long after happen to their posterities , and not declaring any hereditary right of dominion in either iacob , or iudah . m. i will not rigorously insist , that primogeniture is such a divine right as cannot be altered by any humane act , or constitution ; but yet i take it to be such a right , that without the father orders it otherwise , in his life-time , or that the elder brother doth of his own accord depart from his right , he will have a good title to his fathers government , or kingdom , and consequently to command over the rest of his brethren ; and therefore grotius makes a great deal of difference , between hereditary , and patrimonial kingdoms , the former being to descend to the eldest son only , but the latter are divisible amongst all the sons , if the father please : and hence i suppose it was , that as mankind encreased , one petty kingdom grew out of another . thus the land of canaan , which was peopled by six sons of canaan , and philistim the son of mizraim , had eight or nine kings in the time of abraham , and above thirty kings in ioshua's time , which could proceed from no other cause , but the fathers dividing their kingdoms in their life-times , or at their death amongst their sons , and descendants ; for we hear not of one tittle of popular elections in those early days . and i have proofs enough of this in scripture . since thus we find it to have been among the sons of ishmael , and esau , as appears by gen. and . where it is said , these are the sons of ishmael , and these are their names by their castles , and towns , &c. twelve princes of their tribes , and families . and these are the names of the dukes that came of esau , according to their families , and their places by their nations . and hence it is , that in after ages , princes did often divide their kingdoms amongst their children , of which you may see divers examples in grotius de i. b. l. ii cap. . which divisions , when made and submitted to by the eldest son , i doubt not but were good . yet i think it cannot be denied for all this , that by the law of nature , or nations , where there is no will of the father declared to the contrary , the eldest son ought to inherit . and this is the judgment not only of christian , but heathen writers . thus herodotus the most antient greek historian , lays it down for a general custom of all people , or nations , that the eldest son should enjoy the empire ; and the romans were likewise of this opinion ; and therefore livy , when he speaks of two brothers of the all●broges , contending for the kingdom , says , the younger was more strong in force , than right . and in another place , he calls this right of the eldest son , the right of age and nature ; as also doth trogus pompaeius in his epitome of iustine , when he calls it the right of nations ; and in another place , a right of nature , when he says , that artabazanes the eldest son of the king of persia , challenged the kingdom himself , which the order of his birth and nature it self appointed amongst nations . i could give you many other authorities from more modern authors , but i rather chuse to give you these , because you cannot except against them , as writers prepossest by either jewish , or christian principles . so that if this right of primogeniture be not absolutely divine , yet it is at least most natural , and reasonable . f. i see you are convinced , that this divine right of primogeniture , is not to be proved out of scripture , and therefore you are contented to fall a peg lower , and to take up with the right of eldership by the law of nature , or nations , which howsoever you are pleased to confound them , are for all that two distinct things ; for if the succession of the eldest son were by the law of nature , it were no more to be altered by the will of a father , than the law of god it self ; and therefore notwithstanding all your quotations , your right of primogeniture amounts to no more than this , that it hath been a common , and received custom in many kingdoms , or nations to observe it ; and therefore herodotus , whom you have now quoted , calls it very rightly a custom of nations , that the eldest son should enjoy the empire : which yet is not true amongst all nations , or people by your own confession : for then there would have been no difference between hereditary , and patrimonial kingdoms ; but the eldest son should have inherited alone in the one as well as in the other . unless you can suppose ( as sure you will not ) that some kingdoms are to be disposed according to the law of nature , and others not . but if you would have considered grotius ( whom you have now made use of ) he would have instructed you better . for in the chapter you have now cited , he makes the difference between them to depend upon the manner of acquiring the kingdoms he speaks of ; if you please i will shew you the words ; sed in regnorum successione distingui debent regna quae pleno modo possidentur , & in patrimonio sunt , ab his quae modum habendi accipiunt ex populi consensu , de quo discrimine egimus supra . prioris generis regna dividi possunt etiam inter mares , & foeminas ut in aegypto , & britannia : olim factum vidimus . — nullo discrimine sexus , reginam scit ferre pharos , ait lucanus ; de britannis tacitus , neque enim sexum in imperio discernunt . but look a little farther , and you will find the reason of the difference be-between them : at ea regna quae populi libero consensu facta sunt haereditaria , ex praesumbia populi voluntate deferuntur . praesumitur autem populus id voluisse quod maxime expedit : and of this you may see he giveth divers examples , which we need not particularly recite : but this much is apparent , that patrimonial kingdoms are divisible among all the children , because they are supposed to be wholly in the father's power , either by conquest , or the first plantation of them : but hereditary ones that descend to the eldest son , can only become so , by the free consent of the people by whom they were instituted ; and therefore both ishmael , and esau , whose territories were wholly patrimonial , might very well divide them alike , amongst all their sons ; but then your natural right of primogeniture is quite destroyed . the like may be said of other kingdoms , where this custom took place : and therefore those places which you have cited out of the greek and roman authors of the succession of the eldest son to be by the law of nature , is to be understood according to the sense of those authors , who often confounded the law of nature , or reason , properly so called , with those commonly used , or received customs among civilized people ; which they called the law of nations , which yet were not laws properly so called , since they may without any transgression of the law of nature be practised different ways . and therefore , tho' i allow primogeniture , as well in families , as kingdoms , to have had a just preheminence by the practice of many civilized nations , and look upon it as an excellent sort of natural lot ( where the elder brother is fit to govern ) that he should succeed before the younger , to avoid strife among such relations , and civil wars in kingdoms : yet that this is still to be understood , according to the custom of the country , or will of the people , that instituted the monarchy , i desire to go no farther , than that example that you have but now brought of artabazanes , who was the eldest son of artaxerxes , but born before he was king , and xerxes his younger son , but born after his obtaining the crown ; the matter being referred to the people , they determined it in favour of xerxes ; as you will find in herodotus and iustin , whom you have but now quoted . and tho' i grant , that when afterwards in the same kingdom the like controversie was started between cyrus and arsicas ( who was afterwards called artaxerxes mnemon ) i● was judged just the quite contrary way , whether by right , or favour , i will not determine ; yet this may let you plainly see , that this antient , and wise nation , had no settled ●aw , either natural , or municipal concerning this matter . i could give you several other instances of the same kind , which you may consult at your leisure in grotius , and other authors ; only this much may be certainly gathered from what your self , as well as i have said concerning it , that there is no certain rule , or law , either of nature , or nations concerning this matter : and therefore your instances of the sons of esau , and ishmael , are so far from making out your hypothesis , that if their fathers could divide ●heir kingdoms into as many parts as they had sons , without any subjection to the elder brother , i can see no reason why every one of their children , or descendants , might not have done the like if they had pleased , till their principalities had become as small , as those of the princes ashalt , or dukes of saxony are at this day ; so that i cannot see , to what purpose you have brought these last instances out of scripture , unless it were to make against your self , and to prove , that there were then , as there are now in the world , a sort of princes , who may be lawfully so , without claiming any title from adam , or noah , much less by any right of primogeniture . m. it is sufficient for my purpose to be able to shew you from these examples of the sons of esau , and ishmael , that as well hereditary as testamentary kingdoms , did antiently commence according to the law , or received custom amongst nations without any consent of the people , or descendants of those that were to be governed by them , and as long as the succession to such kingdoms were by any certain , or known rule constantly practised among mankind , the matter is not much whether the eldest son succeed to his father alone , or that his brethren shared with him in the inheritance . for since it was god's will to institute civil government amongst mankind , it must be also his will to make the succession to it clear , and certain to all the subjects that were to submit to it , as he hath done , whether one brother or many succeed , since the will of the father is as certain a rule of succession , as that by inheritance and therefore what you have said in answer to my last instances of the sons of esau and israel signifies not much . f. i did not then deny , but grant at your last meeting , that families might at first grow up into kingdoms , but yet i do still ( as i did then ) assert that such governments could not be instituted by any father , or grand-father alone , without the express or tacit consent of his children and descendants , supposing them once married and separated from their fathers or ancestors families ; but it is needless to repeat what i then said only , give me leave to mind you , that at the beginning of this discourse , you maintain'd that not only kingly power in general , but also the succession to it by the eldest son , or his next brother is of divine right or institution , or else all that you urged concerning the natural right of dominion of cain over abel was to no purpose ; but now you insist that succession by a testament , or will of the father , is also as much by the law of nature as the other , in which i think you are very much mistaken , since the right of bequeathing kingdoms , or any thing else by testament is neither prescribed by the revealed will of god , nor the laws of nature , since all setled property in lands or goods , before the institution of a civil government , proceeding only from occupancy or possession , must cease in the state of nature , with the life of the occupant or possessor . therefore in that state a testament cannot take place by the testators death ; since as soon as he dyeth , his right in the thing bequeathed is quite lost and extinguished ; so that the dead not having an interest in any thing , the legatee cannot sustain the person of the testator , whose right ceases before that of the legate can take place ? and therefore the testament or disposition of such things , may then without any crime be neglected or altered by the survivors , unless all those who pretend an interest in it do agree to it , or swear to see it fulfilled , during the testators life time : and for this cause we find abraham binding his servant that ruled over his house with an oath not to take a wife for his son of the daughters of the land ; and iacob taking an oath of ioseph , not to bury him in egypt , because they doubted whether they could oblige their sons or servants to do it by their testaments ; so that it appears evident to me that the power of making testaments , and bequeathing lands or goods , is but a consequence of that propriety , in lands , goods , or dominions , which arises from compact or common consent in a kingdom or common-wealth , after it is instituted as i think i am able to prove whenever you please to discourse with me farther about it . but as for the right of bequeathing crowns or kingdoms by testament , as i will not deny , but that some kingdoms may have been bequeathable by their original constitution , and others become so by custom , yet i cannot grant that this right belonged to the prince or monarch by the laws of god or nature ; but proceeded p●rely from the received law or continued custom of that kingdom , so that you must either confess , that there is no such thing as a divine right of succession , or else it is such a one as signifies as much as nothing , since humane laws or constitutions can alter it or take it away . so that after all this pother about this divine right , it is not so good as an old estate tayle , which formerly no fine could bar ; and i must farther tell you , that i cannot assent to your opinion , that succession by a will or a testament is so certain as that by inheritance , since all such testaments must depend upon the credit of the witnesses , whose credit may often be questioned by the subjects , and who may very well for their own ends make a younger son to have the whole , or at least a share in the kingdom to whom his father never intended any ; and which was likewise more easie to be done before such time as written wills or testaments , solemnly published according to forms of law , came in use . but because you suppose that the natural laws of succession to kingdoms are so plain and certain , that i may a little convince you of your mistake in this matter , i shall for the present suppose that the succession of an elder son or brother is sufficiently easie to be known ; yet i doubt it will not prove so in many other instances ; and therefore to let you see , i do not make this scruple without cause , suppose abel ( for example ) to have left a son or a daughter behind him , when his brother murdered him , pray tell me who was to succeed after the death of adam , this son or daughter of abel , or seth their uncle ? m. we do not read of any children that abel had , and therefore i cannot tell what to say to it . f. well but since it is probable he might have had children pray tell me ( supposing he had ) whether this child were it son or daughter , or seth the uncle was to succeed ? m. since you will needs have me speak my opinion in a thing so uncertain , i think this child were it son or daughter ought to have succeeded before the uncle . f. pray sir , tell me by what law or rule you thus judge ; whether by the law of god or nature ? m. i must confess god hath prescribed nothing expresly concerning it ; more than what he says , numb . . that if a man dies leaving no sons , ye shall cause his inheritance to pass unto his daughter , with diverse other rules of succession to inheritances there specified , and besides it is more suitable to the laws of nature , that the children of the elder brother should inherit before their uncle , there being no reason that they should be punished for their misfortune in having their father dye before he could succeed to the government . f. i doubt the place of scripture you have cited doth not reach this case of kingdoms , for first this being a municipal law of the iews , could only concern that common-wealth ; and secondly , it only relates to private inheritances : and that this is so , may be proved from the next verse , where it is said , that a mans brethren shall be his heirs , that is , all of them were to be heirs alike , only the eldest was to have a double portion ; and if this law concerning daughters were to reach the succession of kingdoms at this day , the laws of france and other countries , where women are barred from succeeding to the crown , would be against the laws of god and nature : and the like may also be said concerning the succession of the nephews before their uncles , or of uncles rather than the nephews , whose fathers never injoyed the crown ; diverse nations having different customs , and that with a like appearance of reason concerning it . for on the one hand , if the son of abel might have pleaded , that he was the first born of the eldest son of adam , and so ought to represent his father ; seth the uncle might likewise with as good reason urge , that he was more nearly related in bloud to adam , as being his son , than the son of abel who was but his grandson , and besides being older than he , was endued with more wisdom and experience , and consequently was ●itter to govern ; but if abel left only one daughter or more , i doubt not , but the question would have been harder to be decided , since if women are not permitted to govern in private families , they will not ( especially amongst warlike nations ) be admitted to govern kingdoms , especially since it would be left in her power , not only to govern her self , but by marrying to chuse a king for her subjects , whom they do not approve of . and therefore we read that in diverse of the antient kingdoms of the world , women were excluded from the succession . nor are these the only questions , that either might then , or else have in latter ages been started concerning succession in kingdoms , and principalities , and have been the cause of great disputes between pretenders to crowns , where a king dies without lawful issue , as whether a grandson by a younger daughter , shall inherit before a grand-daughter by an elder daughter ? whether the elder son by a concubine before the younger son by a wife ? from whence also will arise many questions concerning legitimation , and what by the laws of nature is the difference betwixt a wife and a concubine ? all which can no ways be decided but by the municipal or positive laws of those kingdoms or principalities . it may further be enquired whether the eldest son being a fool or madman , shall inherit this paternal power before the younger a wise man ? and what degree of ●olly or madness it must be , that shall exclude him ? and who shall be the judges of it ? also whether the son of a fool so excluded for his folly shall succeed before the son of his wiser brother who last reigned ? who shall have the regal power whilst a widdow queen is with child by the deceased king , until she be brought to bed ? these and many more such difficulties might be proposed about the title of succession , and the right of inheritance to kingdoms , and that not as idle speculations , but such as in history we shall frequently find examples of , not only in our own , but likewise other kingdoms . from all which we may gather , that if the laws of god or nature had prescribed any set rules of succession , they would have gone farther than one or two cases ; as concerning the succession of elder sons or brothers , where an elder son dies without issue ; and would also have given certain infallible rules in all other cases of succession , besides these , and not have left it to the will , or particular laws of diverse nations , to have established the succession so many several ways , as i am able to shew have been practised in the world. m. i must confess you have taken a great deal of pains to perplex the succession to adam , which seems designed for nothing else , but to make me believe , that if adam , or any of his sons were kings or princes , it must have been by the consent , or election of their children , or descendants : which is all one as to say that those antient princes derived their titles from the iudgment or consent of the people , the contrary to which is evident as well out of sacred as civil history . f. since you appeal to history , to history you shall go , and to let you see , that i have not invented these doubts about succession of my own head , and that there might have very well been a real dispute about the succession to adam in the cases i have put , may appear by the many disputes and quarrels , that have been in several nations concerning the right of succession between the uncle and the nephew , of which grotius is so sensible , that he confesses in the latter end of the chapter last cited , that where it could not be decided by the peoples iudgment , it was fain to be so by civil wars , as well as private combats , and therefore he is forced ingenuously to confess , that this hath been practised divers ways according to the different laws and customs of nations : and he gives us here a distinction between a direct lineal succession and a transversed ; and acknowledges that amongst the germans , as also the goths and vandales , nephews were not admitted to the succession of the crown before their uncles ; the like may be said of the saxons and normans , and therefore we find in our antient english history , that before the conquest the uncle , if he were older , always enjoyed the crown before the nephew , which i can more particularly shew you if you think fit to question it . the like manner of succession was also amongst the irish-scotch for above years after ●●rgus their first king. the like custom was also observed among the irish as long as they had any kings amongst them , and is called the law of tanistry . the same was also observed in the kingdom of ●astile , where after the death of alphonso the fifth , the states of that kingdom , admitted his younger son sancho to be king , putting by ferdinand de la cerda the grand-son to the late king by his eldest son , tho' he had the crown left him by his grand-father's will. so likewise in sicily upon the death of charles the second , who left a grand son behind him by his eldest son , as also a younger son named robert ▪ between whom a difference arising concerning the succession , it being referred to pope clement v. he gave judgment for robert the younger son of charles , who was thereupon crowned king of sicily ; and for this reason it was that earl iohn brother to king richard the second was declared king of england by the estates , before arthur earl of brittain son of ieoffrey the elder brother , and glanvil , who was lord chief justice under henry the second , in that little treatise we have of his , makes it a great question who should be preferred to an inheritance , the uncle or nephew . but as for daughters , whether they shall inherit at all or not , or at least be preferred before their uncles is much more doubtfull , since not only france , but most of the kingdoms of the east at this day , from turkey to iapan do exclude women from the throne : and it was likewise as much against the grain of the antient northern nations , and hence it is that we find no mention of any queen to have reigned amongst the antient germans , or irish-scots , and never but two among the english-saxons , and those by murder or usurpation , and not by election as they ought to have done . and upon this ground it was that the nobility and people of england put by maud the emperess , and preferred stephen earl of blois to the crown before her , for tho' he derived his affinity to the crown by a woman ; yet as being a man he thought himself to be preferred before her . so likewise in the kingdom of aragon , mariana in his history tells us that antiently the brother of the king was to inherit before the daughter , examples may also be given of divers of the other instances , but these may suffice . m. i pray give me leave to interrupt you a little , for by these examples you would seem to infer , that these laws about setling the succession of crowns in several kingdoms depended upon the will of the people , whereas i may with better reason suppose , that if such laws and alterations have been in such successions they were made by the sole will of the first princes , in which the people had no hand , for in the most antient monarchies , there was a time , when the people of all countreys were governed by the sole wills of their princes , which by degrees came to be so well known in several instances , that inferior magistrates needed not resort to them in those cases , and the people being for a considerable time accustomed to such usages , they grew easie and familiar to them , and so were retained , tho the memory of those princes , who first introduced them was lost , and after kings , finding it better to continue what was so received , than to run the hazard and trouble of changing them , were for their own ease , and the good of their subjects contented they should be still from age to age so continued . which custom may hold as well in laws about succession as other things : and therefore we find that even in those monarchies , where the people have nothing to do in making laws women are excluded , which could proceed at first from nothing else , but the declared will or law of the first monarchs . so likewise the original of the salique law is wholly ascribed to pharamond the first french king , and mariana ( whom you lately cited ) tells us that alphonso king of arragon made a law , that where heirs male were wanting , the sons of a daughter should be preferred before the aunt , which law is wholly attributed to the king , for he adds presently after , sic saepe ad regum arbitrium jura regnandi commutantur . f. granting all this true that you have said , you cannot but confess that the laws of god and nature have established nothing in this matter , or else it could not be in the power of kings to make or alter laws concerning the succession , as your last quotation intimates they may ; yet even in the most absolute monarchies , the laws about the succession of the crown , must wholly depend upon the consent of the people , who are to see them observed , or else every monarch might alter these laws of succession at his pleasure , and the great turk , or king of france ( now the assembly of estates is lost ) might leave the crown to a daughter if either of them pleased , and disinherit the next heir male. but as for the original of this ●alique law in france , you 'l find your self much mistaken if you suppose that that law was made by the sole authority of pharamond , for the antient french histories tell us that the body of salique laws which are now extant , were made by the common consent of the whole nation of the francs , who committed the drawing of them up to three judges or commissioners , and which laws pharamond did only confirm ; and any one that will but consult those histories may see , that kings were so far from having the sole legislative power in their own hand , that they were frequently elected by the estates , nor is it truer that you suppose from mariana , that the kings of arragon had power alone to make laws , it appears quite contrary from the constitutions of that kingdom ▪ where the king could do nothing of this kind without the consent of the estates , and was not admitted to the crown without taking an oath to the chief justice in the name of the people , that he would observe the laws and constitutions of the kingdom , otherwise that they would not be obliged to obey him . but at once to let you see , that about the succession of the sons or descendants by daughters , the cases are much more nice and intricate , and that when such cases happen in limited monarchies where there is an assembly of estates , they are the sole iudges of such differences , may appear by two famous examples in modern history ; the first is in scotland , about four hundred years ago , when after the death of king alexander iii ▪ who died without issue , when two or three several competitors claim'd a right to the crown , as descended from several daughters of david earl of huntington , great uncle to the last king , the chief of which being iohn bayliol , and robert b●u●● , the estates of the kingdom not being able to decide it , they agreed to refer it to edward i. king of england , who adjudged the crown to bayliol ; yet did not this put an end to this great controversie , for not long after bayliol being deposed , bruce revived his title , and the states of scotland declared him king , whose posterity enjoy it at this day . a like case happened in the last age in portugal , after the death of henry , surnamed the cardinal without issue , when no less than four eminent competitors , put in their claim ; some claiming from the daughters of don durate , youngest brother to the last king henry : but the king of spain , and other princes as sons to the sisters of the said king ; henry dying without issue , left ten governours over the kingdom to decide together with the estates the differences about the succession , who quarrelling among themselves , as also with the estates before it was decided , philip the second king of spain raised an army , and soon conquered portugal : and yet we have seen in his grand son's time , that the estates of portugal declared this title void , and the crown was settled in the posterity of the duke of braganza , who still enjoy it . and how much even kings themselves have attributed to the authority of the estates in this matter , appears by the league made between philip the long , king of france , and david king of scots , wherein this condition was exprest ; that if there should happen any difference about the succession in either of these realms , he of the two kings , which remained alive , should not suffer any to place himself on the throne , but him who should have the judgment of the estates on his side , and then he should with all his power oppose him , who would after this , contest the crown . to conclude , i cannot see any means , how if such differences as these had arisen in the first generation after adam , i say , how they could ever have been decided without a civil war , or else leaving the judgment thereof to the heads or fathers of families , that were then in being : which how much it would have differed from the judgment , or declaration of the states of a kingdom at this day , i leave it to your self to judge . m. i shall not trouble my self to determine how far princes may tye up their own hands in this matter of the succession , and leave it to the states of the kingdom to limit , or determine of it , but from the beginning it was not so ; and therefore give me leave to trace this paternal government a little farther : for tho' i grant that when iacob , and his twelve sons , went into egypt together with their families , they exercised a supreme patriarchal jurisdiction , which was intermitted because they were in subjection to a stronger prince : yet after the return of these israelites out of bondage , god from a special care of them chose moses ▪ and ioshuah successively to govern as princes in the place , and ●●ead of the supreme fathers : and after them likewise for a time , he raised up judges to defend his people in time of peril . yet that all these were endued with regal authority , may appear in that moses is called in deuteronomy , a king in ieshurun , ( that is , over israel ) and when moses saw that he was to die , he besought god , to set a man over the congregation , that the congregation of the lord be not as sheep which have no shepherd . and as for the judges , it is apparent from the book that bears their name , that they had power of making peace , and war , and of judging in all cases of appeal , insomuch that whosoever would not hearken to the priest , or to the iudge , even that man should die . but when god gave the israelites kings — f. i pray give me leave to interrupt you a little , for i have a great ●eal to say against your notion of the government of the israelites before they had kings actually nominated by god ; for notwithstanding all you have said , it doth not appear to me that either moses , ioshuah , or the judges , were any more than figuratively , or in a larger sense to be stiled kings : for as for moses his being called king in ieshurun , he only calls himself so poetically , in that excellent hymn of blessing , which he bestoweth upon the twelve tribes : for certainly god did not suppose him to have been a king , when in deut. . . he speaks of the children of israel setting a king over them , as a thing that was to happen many years after , and there lays down rules how he should govern himself , which had been needless if they had had a king already : and that moses was not a king , iosephus himself shews us in his antiquities , lib. . where he makes moses to have instructed the children of israel at the time of his death to this purpose ; aristocracy is the best form of government , and the life that is led under it the most happy , and therefore let not the desire of any other sort of government take possession of you , owning no other master than the laws , and doing every thing according to it . for god is your king , and that is sufficient for you ; and if moses was no king , then certainly ioshua was none neither . m. pray give me leave to answer , what you have now said against the kingly power of moses , and ioshua ; for if you will please to remember , that tho' the sanhedrim had been constituted before this time , yet moses esteemed them as sheep without a shepherd , if a man was not set over them which might go out before them , and which might lead them out , and bring them in ; and god approved his desires , and appointed ioshua to succeed him , and the people received him accordingly , and told him ; all that thou commandest us we will do and whithersoever thou sendest us we will go , according as we hearkened unto moses in all things , so will we hearken unto thee . if this were not kingly power , then is there no such thing . so that this discourse which iosephus puts into moses his mouth , seems directly contrary to moses his thoughts , and practice . and whereas he makes moses to have opposed obedience to the laws to kingly government , it is a pure greek notion : for whilst the grecians lived under kings , they had ●ew , or no laws ; but when they set up common-wealths , they then found the necessity of having laws , and then the dominion of laws was opposed to the government of princes : but this was contrary to the practice of israel ; for they were to live according to their laws as well under kings as without them , in all estates and conditions ; and their kings were bound to govern them by the law , and not by their wills contrary to the law. so that in this iosephus clearly made the antient customs of his country to comply with a greek notion that had no being for some hundreds of years after moses was dead . and as for the time of the judges , even in the intervals between them , when every one did that which was right in his own eyes , even then the israelites were under the kingly government of the fathers of the particular families over whom the prince , or head of it had likewise a supreme power . f. but pray give me leave to speak a little farther ; let me ask you , what is an aristocrac● if this be not ? ( viz. ) an assembly of the elders , or chief fathers of families of each tribe meeting , consulting , and resolving of the publick affairs of the common-wealth , under their head or president the chief of the tribe ; and this is the government for which iosephus makes samuel so much afflicted , when the people would quit it for a monarchy . m. i think you are much mistaken in this point , for it is no where declared that these fathers of families governed their own families independently ; for then there would have been no publick government at all : nor yet is it said , that these fathers governed by majority of voices chosen out of themselves , for then i grant it would have been a democracy ; nor yet doth it appear , that a few of the better sort of fathers of every tribe governed it by a counsel , and magistrates , or that there was such counsel of the several tribes ; but on the contrary , every tribe was governed by the prince , or head of it ; and these princes moses calls the heads of the house of their fathers , in numb . . . and who were over those that were numbered and made their offerings . and moses tells us particularly what every man's name was ; as nashon the son of aminadab of the tribe of judah , and nathaniel the son of zuar , prince of issachar , &c. now if there was in those days any government at all in israel , then were these princes the governours of the several tribes , and so every tribe was under a monarch , tho' the whole state of israel was not under any one person , or constant standing council , and consequently was a system of little monarchies . f. i am not at all better satisfied with your last reply ; for in the first place i have iosephus on my side , who must needs know what the government of his country had been , better than you or i ; and he expresly calls it an aristocracy , in which the judge ( when there was one ) was only in the nature of a general , or statholder , to whom the last appeal was to be made in all causes ; and it is also as plain , that neither moses , ioshua , nor the judges had monarchical authority : f●r tho' it be true , the two first could make war , and peace , yet this was also with the consent of the princes of the congregation , as plainly appears by the story of the peace made with the gibeonites , which the princes of the congregation confirmed by an oath : neither could they raise taxes upon the people , or take any thing from them without their consent ; and therefore samuel appeals to them how little he had opprest them , whose ox or whose ass have i taken ? whom have i defrauded ? whom have i opprest ? neither could they , nor the judges their successors , make any new laws for the people ; god himself being their king , and legislator ; and therefore what you urge as to the regal power of moses , and ioshua , after the sanhedrin had been constituted , amounts to no more , but that both of them were heads , or captains of the people , to lead them out to war , and bring them back again , which is exprest by going in and out before them , and their obedience to their military orders , as also to such things , which god hath expresly commanded , is understood by these words ; all that thou commandest us , we will do ; and whithersoever thou sendest us , we will go : yet still this was with respect to their obtaining the land of canaan , for otherwise if either moses , or ioshua should have gone about of their own heads to have led them again into egypt , i suppose you will not say , the israelites were bound either to have followed them , or submitted to them ; but rather might have resisted them in such cases . and therefore iosephus his speech which he makes moses to deliver , is not so ridiculous as you are pleased to make it ; for the laws here mentioned by him , and here set in opposition to monarchy , were not such laws , as were made by the greek common-wealth , as you suppose , but the law given from god by his hand , and these he might well think were sufficient with such power , as he and ioshua enjoyed , without having any recourse to a human monarchical government , since god himself was their king ; and as for the judges that succeeded them , they had much less power , than either moses , or ioshua : since it is apparent by the story of deborah and barak , iudges the th , who were the princes or generals of the tribes of zebulun , and naphtali , that they had no power to force the people to go out to fight against the canaanites , whether they would , or no. and therefore you will find in the next chapter , in the song of victory , which they sung , that many of the tribes came not in to their assistance ; therefore it is there said , that for the divisions of reuben there were great thoughts of heart ; therefore they ask , why abidest thou among the sheepfolds , &c. and presently after it is said , gilead abode beyond jordan : and why did dan remain in the ships ? asher continued on the seashore , and abode in his breaches . and so they conclude with curse ye meroz , curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof , because they came not to the help of the lord against the mighty . so that i am perswaded , it was the want of this power in the judges of making laws , of imposing tributes , or taxes , and of forcing men to serve in the wars against their enemies , ( which they did before only as volunteers , ) that made the israelites the more desirous to have a king over them , like those of other nations , who were endued with these prerogatives . and therefore the best commentators do interpret the prediction of samuel concerning the manner of the king , that should reign over them , and would take their sons for his chariots , and his horse men , and to be captains over thousands , &c. to relate to his royal power of enrolling , and making them serve in his army , either as officers , or souldiers , and the taking of their fields and their vineyards , and the tenth of their seeds &c. to give his officers , and servants ; to signifie no more than his power of imposing publick tribute , and impositions on the people , to maintain his royal splendor , & the necessities of the state , as other neighbouring-kings were wont to do ; all which they not being used to before , they should cry unto the lord by reason of them as a great oppression : and that saul , when he came to be king used this prerogative of forcing the people to come , and serve in the war , in a higher manner than samuel , or the judges had done before , appears by the th chapter of this book , when nahash the ammonite came to make war against iabesh , saul took a yoke of oxen , and hewed them in pieces , and sent them throughout all the coasts of israel by the hands of messengers , saying , whosoever cometh not forth after saul , and after samuel , so shall it be done unto his oxen ; and the fear of the lord fell on the people , and they came out with one consent . and it seems evident to me that the power which samuel ▪ had before the children of israel desired a king was not monarchical , but mixt of aristocracy and monarchy together , in which samuel as judge had a judicial authority , and likewise a supream military power of leading them out to war against the philistines and other enemies , and yet notwithstanding , the supreme power in all other things remained wholly in the principal heads or fathers of the tribes , which whether they were chosen by the people , or enjoyed it by right of inheritance , i confess the scripture is silent , and therefore i am not at all satisfied with your notion , that the government of these people when they had no judges , consisted of twelve petty monarchies , under the heads or princes of the tribes , for there is no authority in scripture to countenance any such opinion , the place you bring for it out of the st and th of numbers , not at all proving it . for tho' i grant , there were twelve princes of the tribes whose names are there set down , and who are called heads of the houses of their fathers , yet is it no where said , that these were endued with civil power , or were chief rulers over the tribes : for it is apparent all civil power remained then in moses and the sanhedrim , who under him decided all controversies : so that it is most natural to suppose that these heads of the tribes were not civil magistrates , but the military leaders or captains of each tribe , when they went out to war , and are the same who in this chapter , are called the renowned of the congregation , &c. and heads of the thousands of israel . nor doth it follow , that because there were such officers in moses his time , that they must continue the same after , under the judges , so many slaveries and oppressions that this people had undergone , or that if they did still continue , that their power was monarchical ; or that they could do any thing without the consent of the heads , or fathers of families , of each tribe , in whom i suppose the supream authority was in the intervals of the judges ; and therefore we find in the ninth of iudges , that the men of shechem , and all the house of millo made abimelech king , that is , not over all the tribes of israel , but over ephraim and half manasses only , which is to be understood by israel in this chapter , where it is said v. . by iotham the son of gideon speaking to the men of shechem , that they had made abimelech the son of a maid servant , king over the men of shechem , because he is your brother . so likewise after abimelech was dead , the children of ammon made war against the children of israel , as appears by the th of judges , and they encamped in gilead , which was a country on the other side of iordan , which was inhabited by the reubenites , the gadites , and the other half of manasses , who by themselves consulted for their own safety ; for it is said in the last verse of this chapter , and the people and princes of gilead said one to another , what man is he that will begin to fight against the children of ammon ? he shall be head over all the inhabitants of gilead . from which assembly and consultation , it plainly appears that they looked upon themselves to have a right of setting a prince or head over them , distinct from the rest of the tribes of israel ; and in the next chapter you will find that iephtha was made prince , or judge by the elders of gilead , and tho' it is said that iephtha went with the elders of gilead , and that the people made him head and captain over them , yet that cannot be meant of all israel , but only of the two tribes , and a half , which inhabited the land of gilead , for we find chapter the . the men of ephraim making war upon iephtha , because he had not called them out to sight against the ammonites , and you will find verse the th . that iephtha gathered together the men of gilead , and fought with ephraim , and that the men of gilead smote ephraim . in all which story it appears , there was none concerned in this war but the gileadites only : that is , those tribes that inhabited that region . i have likewise another authority for this separate power of each tribe , when there was no common judge over them , as may appear from the story of the danites in the th chapter , who wanting a country to dwell in , it is there said the children of dan , sent five men of their family to spy out a country for them ; which thing could not be done , without an assembly of the chief of the whole tribe : neither is there any mention in all this story of any such chief or prince of the tribe , as you suppose , only that six hundred men went by common consent , who made war , and conquered the city and country of laish , which they called dan. but that all the children of israel , during the intervals of the judges , did meet in one common council or assembly , upon any great accident or emergency , appears by the twentieth chapter of this book of iudges ▪ where after the rape and murder committed upon the levite's wife , it is said in the two first verses , then all the children of israel went out , and the congregation was gathered together as one man from dan even to beershebah , with the land of gilead , unto the lord in mizpeh . and the chief of all the people , even of all the tribes of israel , presented themselves in the assembly of the people of god , four hundred thousand footmen that drew sword : who being thus met , the levite , the husband of the woman that was slain , having told them the story , concludes thus , behold ye are all children of israel , give here your advice and counsel , and the result is , all the people arose as one man , saying , we will not any of us go to his tent , neither will we any of us turn into his house , &c. now if this were not as democratical an assembly , as you can any where meet with in either the roman or greek hist. i leave it to you your self to judge : tho' i grant the chief of the people , or tribes of israel might preside in it . to conclude , i think i may with very great reason maintain with iosephus , that the government of the tribes of israel , was aristocratical before their setting a king over them : for had samuel been endued with an absolute monarchical power ( as you suppose ) it had been a very needless request of the children of israel , to ask him to make them a king , to judge them , as other nations . m. you have made a very long ( i had almost said a tedious ) discourse , to prove that the government of the children of israel was not monarchical , before the time of saul : and tho' i cannot now well remember all the particulars of your discourse , yet this much i can gather from it , that you are fain to confess that during the intervals of the judges , and when there was no king in israel , but that every man did that which was right in his own eyes : even then , the israelites were under the kingly government of the fathers of particular families ; for in the consultation after the benjamitical war , you mentioned , for providing wives for the benjamites , we find the elders of the congregation bare the only sway : to them also were complaints to be made , as appears by verse . and though mention be made of all the children of israel , all the congregation , and all the people ; yet by the term of all , the scripture means only all the fathers , and not all the whole multitude , as the text plainly expounds it self , in the second of chronicles , where solomon speaks unto all israel , viz. to the captains , the judges , and to every governour the chief of the fathers ; so the elders of israel are expounded to be the chief of the fathers of the children of israel . but i am less edified with your notion , in making any of the tribes to have set a judge or captain over themselves distinct from the rest of the tribes of israel . for the example you quote of abimelech makes directly against you , it being said , verse the d of that chapter , that abimelech reigned three years over israel , and in the next chapter it is said , there arose to defend israel , tola the son of puah , and that he judged israel , that is , all the twelve tribes , twenty years ; and if gideon the father of abimelech was judge over all israel , as it appears by the story he was , it will likewise follow , that abimelech his son succeeded ( tho by force and murder ) into the same power . it is likewise as plain ( notwithstanding what you have said to the contrary ) that the elders of gilead did not alone make iephtha their head or captain : for tho' i grant jephthah tells them , that if he fought , and delivered them from the children of ammon , that he would be their head ; yet it is plain by the th verse of that chapter , that jephthah went with the elders of gilead , and it was the people ( viz. of all israel ) made him head and captain over them : and it appears that jephthah uttered all these words before the lord in mizpeh , where it appears by the seventeenth verse of the former chapter , the children of israel were then assembled and incamped . nor am i yet satisfied , but that tho' god out of a special love , and care to the house of israel , did chuse to be their king himself , yet did he govern them at that time , by his vice-roy samuel , and his sons ; and therefore god tells samuel , they have not rejected thee , but me , that i should not reign over them ; it seems they did not like a king by deputation , but desired one by succession , like all the nations . all nations belike had kings then , and those by inheritance , not by election , for we do not find the israelites prayed that they themselves might chuse their own king ; they dreamt of no such liberty , and yet they were the elders of israel gathered together : if other nations had elected their own kings , no doubt but they would have been as desirous to have imitated other nations as well in the electing , as in the having a king : and therefore i am sure there is nothing to be found in scripture that countenances your notion of the peoples having a right to elect their own king. but this only by the by . but to prosecute the matter in hand , when god gave the israelites kings , he re-establisht the antient , and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government . and whensoever he made choice of any special person to be king he intended that the issue also should have benefit thereof , as being comprehended sufficiently in the person of the father , altho' the father only was named in the grant. which lineal right of succession continued in the family of david until such time as his successors by their idolatry so far provoked gods anger as to deliver them up to the king of babylon , under whose and his successors power , they , and their posterity continued subjects for many ages . f. i shall not dispute any farther with you ( since i see it is to no purpose ) concerning the government of the israelites , whether it was monarchical or aristocratical before the reign of saul ; nor yet shall i positively assert , that abimelech or jephthah and other of the judges were rulers of some particular tribes only . yet very learned men are of this opinion , since they can find no other way , but by a synchronism in the times of the judges , as also of the years of rest , and servitude , as may appear from iudg. . v. , . compared with iudg. . . to reconcile that great difference that will be found in the sacred chronology , from the time of the children of israel's coming out of egypt , to the fourth year of solomon , in which the temple was begun to be built , which doth amount to four hundred and eighty years ; whereas if you please to take the pains to cast up the years from the children of israel's coming out of egypt , to the beginning of saul's reign , according to the common account of the years of the judges , reckoned with the reigns of saul , and david , to that time , &c. it will amount to years , which is more by years than all the time from the said epocha to the fourth year of solomon taken altogether . but as for the several tribes alone consulting and ordering their own affairs , it is so plain from the examples of the people , and princes of gilead , as also from that of the danites , that you have nothing to object against it : and so likewise in the instance of all the children of israel meeting , and consulting , what to do with the benjamites , where since you cannot deny the matter of fact , you have no way to evade it , but by supposing i know not what kingly authority in the fathers of particular families , whom you do suppose to have then bore the only sway , because it is said in that chapter you quoted , that in the consultation after this war , the elders of the congregation proposed it to them , saying ; how shall we do for wives for them that remain , seeing the women , are destroyed out of benjamin ? and then follows the result of the congregation in the next verse ; and they said , ( viz. all the congregation agreed ) that there must be an inheritance for them that be escaped out of benjamin , &c. all which amounts to no more , than what i granted at first , that the heads , or elders of the tribes presided in this assembly , and put the question to them : which is so necessary in all great assemblies , that without such officers they cannot come to any resolution ; and therefore you should do well to prove the monarchical power of these elders by some better authority than this text. but if the judges had monarchical power as you suppose , notwithstanding all you have said , against the peoples electing them , it plainly appears by the examples of abimelech , and iephthah , that the people did often elect a judge , or captain over them , without any nomination by , or inspiration from god. but to return to that which is most material , your supposed restauration of patriarchal government under moses , and ioshua , after the israelites returned from the egyptian bondage , i cannot but here by the way take notice , that the truth will sometimes slip from you before you are aware ; for if it be true what you at first asserted , at our last meeting , that a servant , or slave , and a subject , were all one at the first ; and also that all monarchs are endued with fatherly power , then if pharaoh was a monarch , the children of israel were not , according to your principle , brought into bondage by pharaoh , but they were only adopted into another fatherly power . but you should have done well to have shewn more clearly than you have hitherto done , that this patriarchal iurisdiction was exercised by abraham , isaac , or iacob before the descent into egypt , since all the instances you have yet given of such a power , have proved very unlucky : for tho' i read in st. stephen's speech in the acts , that the patriarchs moved with envy sold joseph into egypt ; yet is it no where mentioned , ( nor i believe will you your self affirm ) that these patriarchs ever had a monarchical power . for till iacob went into egypt , that power was solely in him , according to your principles , and after that in pharaoh as king of egypt : so that tho' i can find the word patriarch ( but once ) in scripture , yet i can see no ground for your patriarchal authority , or iurisdiction ; and therefore that could suffer no intermission , which never had any beginning in nature . but after this you tell me , that god chose moses , and ioshua successively to govern as princes , in the place of those supreme fathers , or patriarchs ; which is easily , i confess , affirmed , only it wants proof . for tho' you endeavour to prove that all paternal power was regal , yet it still remains unproved that all regal power is paternal . it is true that god did appoint moses , and ioshua , to be the rulers of his people under him , but that doth not at all make out that they succeeded in the stead of supreme fathers , much less that they succeeded , as heirs , or successors to the patriarchal power of adam . for moses , and ioshua , being chosen by god to be rulers of his people , will no more prove that government belonged to adam's heir , as to his fatherhood , than god's chusing aaron of the tribe of levi to be priest , will prove that the priesthood belonged to adam's heir , or the prime fathers , since god could chuse aaron to be priest , and moses ruler over israel , tho' neither of those offices , were settled on adam's heir , or the first patriarchs . so likewise for what you say concerning god's raising up the judges to defend his people , proves fatherly authority to be the original of government just after the same rate ; and cannot god raise up such men unless paternal power give a title to the government ? but to come to your darling instance , the giving of the israelites kings , whereby you suppose god re establisht the antient prime right of lineal succession 〈◊〉 paternal government . this i can by no means understand ; for if by li●●●l succession you mean to adam , i desire to know how you will make it out that either saul , or david could be heirs of adam's power ? or how the power that those kings were endued with by god , was the same power , which abraham , isaac , and iacob enjoyed before . for if you please to consider it , your hypothesis consists of two propositions ; the first is , that all paternal power is the same with regal power ; which if it be proved not to be true , the other convertible proposition ( which is but the conversion of this ) will likewise be as false ; viz. that all regal power is paternal . nor is what you said last of all any truer than the rest , that whensoever god made choice of any person to be king , he intended that the issue ( i suppose you mean his issue ) should have the benefit thereof : for either moses , and ioshua , and the judges , were no kings , ( tho' you have asserted the former to be so ) or else they had not the benefit of this grant : but certainly saul was a king , and yet his issue never succeeded ; but you speak very warily to suppose this grant to be made to the issue in general , without specifying in particular , who should enjoy it , because i suppose you are sensible , that solomon , whom god expresly appointed to be david's successor , and iehoahaz , whom the people of the land made king in the room of iosiah , were neither of them eldest sons of the kings their fathers . to conclude , i desire you would shew me , what relation or title all kings , or princes now-a-days have , or can claim as heirs to adam , or noah ; or how that power with which god endued those fathers of mankind , is the same which you say all princes , or monarchs , may now claim to be given them by god : for i confess i can see no likeness , or relation at all between them . m. it may indeed seem absurd to maintain , that kings now are the fathers of their people , since experience shews the contrary . it is true , all kings are not the natural parents of their subjects , yet they all either are , or are to be reputed the next heirs to those first progenitors , who were at first the natural parents of the whole people , and in their right succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction ; and such heirs are not only lords of their own children , but also of their brethren , and all others that were subject to their fathers . and tho' i have all along supposed , that paternal government was at first monarchical ; yet i must likewise grant , that when the world was replenished with people , that this paternal government by succession ceased , and a new kind of it started up either by election conquest , or usurpation ; yet this was still paternal power , which can never be lost , or cease , tho' it may be transferred , or usurped ; or it may be ordained a new in a person who otherwise had no right to it before . thus god , who is the giver of all power , may transfer it from the father to the son , as he gave saul a fatherly power over his father kish . so that all power on earth is either derived , or usurped from the fatherly power , there being no original to be found of any power whatsoever ; for if there should be granted two sorts of power without any subordination of one to the other , they would be in perpetual strife , which should be supreme for two supremes cannot agree ; if the fatherly power be supreme , then the power of the people must be subordinate , and depend on it ; if the power of the people be supreme , then the fatherly power must submit to it , and cannot be exercised without the licence of the people , which must quite destroy the frame and course of nature . f. if this be all you have to say for the proof of so weighty an hypothesis , i confess i wonder how you , or any rational man can lay so great stress upon it : for tho' i should grant you , that some fathers of families at first became by the tacit , or express consent of their children , and descendants , to be kings , or princes over them ; doth it therefore follow that all kings govern by right of fatherhood at this day ? 't is true you tell me , that all kings , tho they are not now the natural fathers of their people , yet are still to be esteemed as such by them , as succeeding either as heirs , or successors to those that were so . i grant indeed if any kings now adays could prove themselves right heirs to adam , or noah , this were somewhat to the purpose , but to talk of a paternal power proceeding from election , conquest , or usurpation , is perfect iargon to me ; for pray tell me , can a man become endued with paternal power over me , by my electing him to be my king ? or can a man by conquest , or usurpation oblige me to yield him a filial duty , and obedience ? for if this were so , if a father of a separate family ( such as abraham was ) should be conquered by the head of another separate family , nay tho he were a thief , or a robber , if once the true father were killed , or destroyed , all the children , and descendants of the family must pay the same duty , and obedience , to this unjust conquerour , or robber , as to their true father ; and the same may be said in usurpations , in case , after the death of such a father of a family , a younger brother or nephew , should get possession of the house , and estate , and force all his brethren , and kinsmen to submit to him , they must then all own him to be endued by god with the same paternal power , which their father , or grand-father had ; and consequently must honour and obey him as their true father : both which examples , being contrary to the common sense , and reason of mankind , may shew you , how absurd this hypothesis is ; whereas indeed fatherhood being a relation of blood , and the duty and respect we owe to him , that is our father , proceeding from that piety , and gratitude we owe him both for our generation , and education ; how can this relation , or these obligations be ever transferred to , or usurped by any other , so that any other man can become my father , or i owe him that filial duty , and respect , as to him that begot me and brought me up ? and tho' i grant that god may confer a regal power on whom he pleases , either by his express will , or the ordinary course of his providence ; yet when such a person who was not a king before , doth become so , i utterly deny that the power he hath then conferred upon him , is a paternal power in relation to his subjects ; which is evident from your own instance of saul's becoming a king over his father kish . for tho' you say that god then conferred a fatherly power on saul over his own father , this is a great mistake : for then saul would have been immediately discharged from all the duties of piety , and gratitude , which he owed his father ; and they were all transferred from kish to saul ; so that after he became king , he might have treated his father with no more respect , or deference , than any other subject ; which is contrary to god's commandment , that bids all men , honour their father , and mother . and i know not how kings can be excepted out of this precept . so that your mistake arises from this preposterous confounding of paternal authority with regal power : and because adam , noah , or any other father of a separate family may be a prince over it in the state of nature , that therefore every monarch in the world is also endued with this paternal power : which that they are distinct may farther appear from your own supposed monarchical power of adam , who tho' granting him to have been a prince over his posterity , yet did not this discharge any of his descendants from their duty and obedience to their own father : and tho' i confess you talked at our last meeting of a fatherly power to be exercised in subordination to the supreme fatherly power of adam ; yet this is a meer chimera : for filial honour , and obedience , being due by the commandment only to a man 's own natural father , can never be due to two different persons at once , since they may command contradictory things , and then the commandment of honour ( that is , obey ) thy father , cannot be observed in respect of both of them ; and therefore granting adam , or noah , to have exercised a monarchical power over their children , and descendants , it could not be as they were fathers , or grand-fathers , when their sons , or grand-children were separated from them , and were heads of families of their own , for the reasons already given ; so that if they were princes in their own families , whilst their sons , or grand-children continued part of them , it was only as heads , or masters of their own families , but not by any such patriarchal , or paternal authority as you suppose . but as for the conclusion of your discourse , it being all built upon this false foundation , that all power on earth is derived , or usurped from the fatherly power ; i need say no more to it : for if that be false , all that you argue from thence concerning the subordination of all other powers to this , will signifie nothing . m. i think i can yet make out my hypothesis , notwithstanding all you have said against it : for tho' i grant the paternal relation it self can never be usurped , or transferred ; yet you may remember , i at first affirmed , that adam was not only a father , but a king and lord over his family , and a son , a subject , a servant , or a slave , were one and the same thing at first ; and the father ▪ had power to dispose of , sell , or alien his children to any other ; whence we find the sale , and gift of children , to have been much in use in the beginning of the world , when men had their servants for a possession , and an inheritance , as well as other goods ; whereupon we find the power of castrating or making eunuchs much in use in old times . and as the power of the father may be lawfully transferred , or aliened ; so it may be unjustly usurped . and tho' i confess no father , or master of a family , ought to use his children thus cruelly , and severely , and that he sins mortally if he doth so ; yet neither they , nor any power under heaven can call such an independant father , or monarch to an account , or punish him for so doing . f. i am glad at last we are come to an issue of this doughty controversie , and tho i forced you at our last meeting to confess , that fatherly power was not despotical , nor that fathers upon any account whatsoever , were absolute lords , over their children and all their descendants in the state of nature : yet now i see to preserve your hypothesis , you are fain to recur to this despotical power of fathers in the state of nature : because without supposing it , and that it may be transferred , or usurped , princes at this day ( whom without any cause you suppose to be endued with this paternal , despotick power ) could never claim any title to their subjects allegiance . and then much good may do you with your , and sr. r , f's excellent discovery : for if , as you your self acknowledge , princes are no longer related in blood to their subjects , any nearer than as we all proceed from adam our common ancestor , that relation being now so remote , signifies little or nothing , so that the true paternal authority being lost ( as you confess ) the despotick power of a lord over his servants , or his slaves only remains ; since therefore you make no difference in nature , between subjects , and slaves , then all subjects lye at the mercy of their kings to be treated in all things like slaves , when ever they please ; and they may exercise an absolute despotick power over their lives , and estates as they think fit : so that i can see nothing that can hinder them from selling their subjects , or castrating them as the king of mingr●lia , doth his subjects at this day ; and as the great turk , and persian monarchs do use those christian children whom they take away from their parents to make eunuchs for their s●raglio's , and then i think you have brought mankind to a very fine pass to be all created for the will , and lust of so many single men , which if it ever could be the ordinance of god , i leave it to your self to judge . m. i was prepared for this objection before , and therefore i think it will make nothing against this absolute power , with which i suppose god to have endued adam , and all other monarchs at the first : so that i am so far from thinking that this doctrine , will teach princes cruelty towards their subjects , that on the contrary nothing can better inculcate their duty towards them : for as god is the author of a paternal monarchy ; so he is the author of no other . he introduced all but the first man into the world , under the subjection of a supream father , and by so doing hath shewn that he never intended there should be any other power in the world , and whatever authority shall be extended beyond this is accountable to him alone , so that princes are bound to treat their subjects as their children with mercy , and lenity as far as they are capable of it , and not as their brutes . and granting that subjects and servants or slaves were at first all one , yet i think even they ought to be treated only as younger children , yet as children still : nay even conquered people that are in some countries treated as slaves , and but a little better than brutes , have certainly a very good appeal to the tribunal of god against their princes , who will undoubtedly right them in another world if they suffer patiently in this . if it be the character of a good man that he is merciful to his beast , i doubt not but the very brutes have a right to be governed with mercy and justice , and that god who is their creator as well as ours will punish cruel men if they tyrannize over them , and much more if any man shall exercise cruelty on another man who is of the same , not only nature , but blood. whereas all other hypotheses leave the prince at liberty to make his bargain with his subjects , as well as he can ; and if they be brought by force , or fraud , to an entire submission at discretion , they may then be treated accordingly , and must stand to their compact , be the terms never so unequal , and then the case of a man , and a brute , may differ very little ; and if the subject may resist , the prince may take care to prevent it , and the war may be just on both sides , which is impossible . i could likewise shew you many other benefits that would accrew both to princes , and subjects , were this hypothesis but once generally taught , and believed by both of them . f. i pray sir , spare the giving your self that trouble , for i will not dispute how honestly this hypothesis may be designed , or what mighty fea●s it might do , were it once universally received . but this neither you , nor i can ever expect will come to pass ▪ because neither princes , nor people will ever believe it to be true : for in the first place , the people will never be convinced of it , it being above a vulgar understanding , that their princes whom they are very well assured are not their fathers , nor yet right heirs to adam , or noah , should notwithstanding lay claim to a paternal authority over them . in the next place , princes can never believe that they are fathers of their people for the same reason : i grant indeed , that they may be very willing to believe one half of your hypothesis , that they are absolute lords , and masters over them , and so would be willing upon that account , to use their subjects like slaves , but that they should look upon themselves as fathers of their people , and the heirs or assigns of adam , or noah , i think no prince in christendom can be so vain to believe . so that whatever power adam , or noah , or any other father might be intrusted with by god , because of that natural affection which they were supposed to bear toward their children ; yet sure princes at this day , can lay no claim to it , since none but true fathers can be endued with this paternal affection . and whereas you suppose , that princes ought to treat their subjects , nay even those that are conquered like children , and not like slaves , or brutes : this can have very little effect upon them , who can as little believe it , as the people , for if monarchical power is not paternal ( as i think i have clearly made out ) then there can lye no obligation upon monarchs , to treat their subjects like children , and therefore since the despotical or masterly power only remains , which is ordained principally for the good , and benefit of the master , and not of the servant , or slave : who can blame princes , if they exact the utmost of their due prerogatives , and so treat their subjects like slaves , whenever it serves their humour , or interest so to do ; nor are they any more to be blamed for thus exerting their power , than a master of negroes in the west-indies is for making the best of the service of those slaves whom he hath bought with his mony , or are born in his house : whom tho i grant he is not to use like brute beasts , for the reasons you have given : yet doth it not therefore follow , that he is obliged to use them like his younger children ; for then sure he could not have a right to keep them for slaves as long as they lived , & to let them enjoy nothing but a bare miserable subsistance ; and there is very good reason for this , for almost every planter in barbadoes knows very well , the difference between the relations of a father , a master , and a prince , and that the one is not the other ; and it is from your jumbling together these three different relations of a son , a slave , and a subject , that hath led you into all these mistakes . for tho' it should be granted , that the right of a master over his slaves , may be acquired by conquest , or assigned to , or usurped by another ; yet certainly the authority , or relation of a father , and the monarchical , or civil power of a monarch can never be acquired by conquest , nor yet usurped without the consent , and submission of the children , and subjects . and therefore to conclude , i do not think your hypothesis one jot the better , by your founding it upon an imaginary paternal power , rather than upon compact , which i am sure can never be made upon so unequal term● , as to render the case of a man , and a brute , very little different ; since it would be to no purpose for any subject to make a bargain with their monarch , or conqueror ; and yet to leave themselves in as bad , or worse condition than they were in the state of nature : so that however convenient your hypothesis may be either for prince , or people , it signifies no more than the popish hypothesis of the infallibility of the pope , and general council , which because they suppose necessary , and is indeed very beneficial for the church ; therefore god hath conferred it upon them : but how false a way of reasoning this is , hath been sufficiently demonstrated . the application of this comparison is so obvious , that i leave it to you to make . m. i cannot but think , for all you have yet said , that god hath endued all princes with a paternal authority , and for this , i have the church of england on my side , which in its catechism , in the explanation of the duties contained in the th commandment , honour thy father , &c. doth comprehend under that head , not only to honour , and succour our fathers and mothers , but also to honour , and obey the king , and all them that are put in authority under him ; as if all power were originally in the father : so that this command gives him the right to govern , and makes the form of government monarchical . and if obedience to parents be immediately due by a natural law ; and subjection to princes but by the mediation of an human ordinance , what reason is there , that the laws of nature should give place to the laws of men ? as we see the power of the father over his child , gives place , and is subordinate to the power of the magistrate . and that this is not the doctrine of christianity alone , but was also believed by the best moralists amongst the heathen , may appear by this remarkable passage out of seneca de clementia , which is so put to this purpose , that i took the pains to translate it into english in my common-place-book : some of which i will now read to you . what is the duty of a prince ? that of kind parents , who use to chide their children sometimes sweetly , and at other times with more sharpness , and sometimes correct them with blows . and after having shewn that a good father will not proceed to disinherit his son , or inflict any more severe punishments upon him till he is past all hopes of amendment ; he proceeds thus . no parent proceeds to extirpation , till he hath in vain spent all other remedies . that which becomes a parent , becomes a prince who is stiled without flattery , the father of his country ; in all our other titles we consult their ( i. e. the emperours ) honour . we have called them the great , the happy , the august , and heaped upon ambitious majesty , all the titles we could invent , in giving th●se to them : but we have stiled him , the father of his country , that the prince might consider the power of a father , was given him : which is the most temperate of all powers , consulting the welfare of the children , and preferring their good before its own . and as for your objection , why princes should not be loved , and reverenced , as if they were our fathers , because not being our natural fathers , they may possibly want that natural , and fatherly affection to their subjects , and consequently may tyrannize over them ; i think this is easily answered : for first , god , who is , and ever was the true disposer of kingdoms , hath in his hands the hearts of all princes , and endows them with such affections , as he thinks fit not only towards the people in general , but towards each particular person : and therefore as he was the author of all government , and is still the preserver of it ; so no inconvenience can happen , but he is able to redress it . . that there was as great , or rather greater inconveniencies which sprung at first from the too great lenity of these natural princes , for want of power , or will to punish the disorders of their subject children , as have ever sprung since , from the tyranny , and cruelty of the worst princes : and i believe to this was owing that excessive wickedness , which forced as it were god almighty , to put an end to the first world , by that time it had stood about years . and we see afterwards eli , and samuel , good men , and severe judges towards others , were yet too indulgent to their own children ; which shews the weakness of your reasons , and the greatness of the wisdom of god , in making all government to spring from paternal power , which is the mildest of all powers , and to descend by degrees to hereditary monarchies , which are the divinest , the most natural , and the best of all governments , and in which the people have the least hand . f. i see plainly that you think the laws of nature , or reason are not on your side and therefore you are forced to recur not to the express words of scripture , but to the paraphrase , or explanation of them in our church catechism , which certainly never was intended to have that consequence drawn from it , which you have made , for tho you are pleased to omit one part of the commandment , with an , &c. yet the words are as you your self must acknowledge . honour thy father , and thy mother ; and if from honour thy father , you will gather that all power was originally in the father , it will follow by the same argument , that it must have been as originally in the mother too : father , and mother , or parents , being mentioned together , in all precepts in the old , and new testament , where honour , or obedience is enjoyned on children ; and if these words , honour thy father , must give a right to government , and make the form also monarchical , 〈◊〉 , if by these words must be meant obedience to the political power of the supream magistrate , it concerns not any duty we owe to our natural fathers , who are subjects : because they by your doctrine are divested of all that power , it being placed wholy in the prince , and so being equally subjects , and slaves with their children , can have no right by that title to any such honour , or obedience , as contains in it civil subjection . but if honour thy father and thy mother , signifies the duty we owe our natural parents . ( as by our saviours interpretation matth. . . and all the other places 't is plain it doth , ) then it cannot concern political ob●dien●● , but a du●y that is owing to persons who have no title to soveraignty , no● any political authority as monarchs over subjects . for obedience to a private father , and that civil obedience which is due to a monarch , a●● quite different , and many times contradictory , and inconsistent with each other . and therefore , this command , which necessarily comprehends the persons of our natural fathers and mothers , must mean a duty we owe them distinct from our obedience to the magistrate , and from which the most absolute power of princes cannot absolve us . and to make this yet plainer , suppose upon your hypothesis , that seth , as eldest son of adam , was heir of all his patriarchal power , how could all his brethren , and sisters honour , that is , obey eve their mother at the same time , supposing seth , and her to have commanded them things contradictory at the same time● so that , tho' i grant the compilers of our church catechism , did intend in this explanation to comprehend all the great duties towards our governours : yet it is plain , they never dreamed of this far-fetched inference , that you have drawn from their explanation of it , for tho under this command of honour thy father , and thy mother , they do indeed comprehend obedience , and honour to be due to the king , &c. this no more proves that they believed all kingly power to be paternal , than that because they likewise there infer from this command , a submission to be due to all governours , teachers , spiritual pastors , and masters , that therefore all these parties , here named , do likewise derive their authority from adam's fatherhood , or that because under the command against bearing false-witness we are taught to refrain our tongues from evil speaking , lying , and slandering , that therefore all lyes , and evil speaking whatsoever is down-right bearing false-witness against our neighbour , since nothing is more certain than that a man may commit either of the formerr without being guilty of the latter . and to answer your query , if obedience to parents be immediately due by a natural law , and subjection to princes but by a humane ordinance , what reason is there that the laws of nature should give place to those of men ? i can easily reply , that the power of a father over his child gives place , and is subordinate to the supream powers , because they are both ordained so by god , in the law of nature , it being highly reasonable , that the good of a private family should give place to the common good of the common-wealth , which is a sufficient reason , and extends to all nations , which never so much as heard of the ten commandments . but to come to your quotation out of seneca , i think this hath a great deal less weight in it , than your argument from the fifth commandment : for tho' this philosopher writ to the emperour , to perswade him to clemency ; yet this i am sure of , that as he never dreamt of this notion of adam's soveraignty , or believed that every prince was endued with paternal authority , because amongst other titles , he was stiled pater patriae . and therefore what this author here says , is to be looked upon , only as a rhetorical flourish , or at the most , to be understood but in a metaphorical sense , the arguments of this author not being to be always taken strictly as a logician , but only as an orator , who was to make use of all appearances of reason to perswade a young prince to mercy , and clemency ; and yet all this was not sufficient , as seneca himself found before he died , by woful experience . and seneca very well knew , that tully was stiled pater patriae by the senate , tho' he was never endued with your imperial , or paternal authority . but , to reply a little to your answer , against my last argument , that princes not being our natural fathers , must often want that natural , and fatherly affection towards their subjects , and therefore may tyrannize ove● them : i think the first part of your reply will make nothing in confutation of what i have said : for tho' i will not deny , but god , who hath the hearts of princes in his hands , may sometimes endue them with such affections , as he thinks fit , not only towards the people in general , but towards each particular person ; yet this may be as well evil as good affections : as god is said in iudg. . to have sent an evil spirit between abimelech , ( one of your usurping monarchs ) and the men of sichem , his subjects : and therefore god may as well send the one for the punishment , as the other for the benefit of a nation : and that god is more likely to incline the hearts of princes to such evil , than good affections towards their subjects , may appear from mankinds more often deserving god's anger , for their evil deeds , than favours for their good ones . and i desire you would shew me in how many absolute monarchies now in the world , god almighty is pleased to declare this wonderful operation of these fatherly affections towards their people . i pray deal ingenuously , and tell me , is it to be found in our european monarchies , where most princes do not only miserably harass , and oppress their subjects , by intolerable taxes , and standing armies , till they reduce them to the lowest condition of beggary , and desperation ; and where for the least differences in religion they take away their subjects lives by that cruel tribunal of the inquisition , without any fair , or legal tryal , or else where notwithstanding all edicts , oaths , and vows to the contrary , they seize upon , and spoil their subjects of their estates , and imprison , and torment their persons by those booted apostles the dragoons ; because faith is not to be kept with hereticks ; or else in another country , where the prince took upon him a prerogative to dispense with all laws at his pleasure , and to imprison , and turn men out of their freeholds , contrary to the known laws of the kingdom ? or to conclude , must we look for these divine operations amongst the eastern monarchy , where they treat their subjects like slaves , and allow them no property either in lands , or goods , farther than they think sit , and to have their persons , and lives wholy at their mercy to be castrated , made slaves of , or killed , as often as it shall please their humour , or passion ? and i doubt , if you will but read antient , as well as modern histories , and also survey the state of mankind in all the absolute monarchies between france , and iapan ; you will find more frequent examples of the evil , than good affections of these your artificial fathers towards their adopted children . m. i cannot deny , but you have given a very tragical account of the tyranny , and oppressions under divers absolute monarchies now in the world ; yet this is not the fault of the government , but of the evil principles , b●d education , or temper of those monarchs , as also often times from the unquiet , and rebellious disposition of their subjects , from the distrusting of which , they place all their security in standing armies , and guards , so that i must grant , that all those governments that are maintained by armies too strong for the subjects in general , are 〈◊〉 and degenerate into despotick monarchies , and are unsafe both to the princ● and people . and to let you see , that it is not my intention 〈◊〉 maintain , or defend oppression , or tyranny , i must freely assert , with sir r. f. ( whose principles i here take upon me to maintain ) that all princes are bound to treat their subjects as their children , and that it is contrary to the nature of mankind , to make their off-spring slaves ; and that all kings , ( nay conquerors too ) are bound to preserve the lands , goods , liberties , and lives of all their subjects not by any municipal law , but by the natural law of a father , which binds them to ratifie the acts of their fore fathers , and predecessors in things necessary for the publick good of their subjects : but yet you have not done fairly , not to take notice of the great oppressions , that are exercised in some common-wealths likewise , towards their subjects , which if you would please to consider , and weigh the fewness of these against the great number of monarchies now in the world , i believe you will have good cause to confess , that there are many more good monarchs , than equal common-wealths ; and i do believe there was as much tyranny exercised in these three kingdoms during our late civil wars , and afterwards under the government of the rump , and cromwell , till the return of the late king charles , as in all the absolute monarchies between france and china , or from the north to the south pole. and it is very remarkable , that when oliver cromwell set up the most absolute , and tyrannical government , that ever was in this island , there was yet no noise of any fears , or jealousies of it in all his times . f. i am very well pleased to find you so heartily agree with me , in condemning of tyranny , and oppression in all sorts of governments whatever , and i do assure you , i do as little approve of it , if it be any where exercised in common-wealths , as you can do in monarchies , only i must needs tell you , i am not at all of your opinion , that the oppressions , or abuses committed by the magistrates in common-wealths , are to be compared with the tyrannies , and cruelties exercised by absolute monarchs , and their subordinate ministers . for tho' i grant they often lay very severe taxes , and impositions , upon their subjects , especially such as they have acquired by conquest , and so act like absolute monarchs over them , yet are these oppressions not at all to be compared to those under arbitrary monarchies ; for tho' perhaps divers common-wealths may impose greater taxes upon their subjects than some neighbouring monarchs ; yet doth it not follow that their government is more severe for all that ; since the people having an opportunity by free trade & liberty of conscience in such common-wealths , to acquire a greater share of riches , are also thereby enabled to contribute more to the maintenance of the government , by which they reap so great benefits . thus we see a citizen of amsterdam is able to pay six times the taxes of one of antwerp , and therefore i dare for all that , appeal to any common subject ( tho' a papist ) of the united provinces , whether he had not rather live under the states of holland , than under the french king , or to any subject of the common wealths of venice , genoa , or luca whether he doth not prefer his condition , as bad as it is , to that of any of the subjects of the pope , duke of florence , or any other italian prince , not to go over into turkey , and those other eastern monarchies , where the yoke of slavery lyes yet more heavy upon the subjects , than in europe . and as for what you say in the comparing of those illegal arbitrary proceedings , that were exercised in england , during the late civil wars , and afterwards till the kings coming in , i must beg your pardon if ( besides the great hyperbole in your expressions on that occasion , which i am sure are very far from truth ) i impute those miscarriages not as the fault of this or that ●ort of government , but rather to a powerful faction backt by a standing army , which was more like a tyranny or corrupt oligarchy , than any settled government . nor is what you say concerning oliver's government more true than the former , for all men except his own faction , were not only afraid , but really sensible of the lo●s of their liberties under his tyrannical usurpation : tho' indeed there was a very good reason , why there should be fewer fears , or jealousies of it than in his late majesties time , when his government began to grow uneasie through the peoples fear of popery , and arbitrary government , which the former people had no jealousie of in cromwel's time , and as for the latter they had no occasion to fear that which was already happened . but that you may not mistake me for a common-wealths man , i must so far agree with you , that to condemn monarchy as such , were to repine at the government of god himself , so that i also grant that the fault lies not in the form of government but in the frail nature of men , which can rarely administer that great trust committed unto them , as becomes what they take upon them to be , god's vicegerents upon earth , and i must own , that i esteem monarchy limited by known laws , as the best , and most equal government in the world ; and under which both prince , and people may live most happily , and easily , if each of them will be but contented with their due share . but i beg your pardon for this digression ; and to come to a conclusion , i must freely tell you , it is not a straw matter , what yours or sr r. f's principles are concerning the fatherly power of princes , for as long as there is no ground for it in scripture , or nature , you cannot expect that either princes or people will ever believe you ; neither is it true that princes as fathers are bound to treat their subjects in all things like their children , for then princes ought to maintain their subjects , and not subjects their princes ; since it is the apostles rule , that children ought not to lay up for the parents , but the parents for the children : and tho' you pretend not to plead for tyranny , or arbitrary government , yet i cannot at all understand , why if it were not for this end , you should assert not long since , in your answer to me , that god thought fit to change paternal government , into hereditary monarchy , because of the excessive wickedness of mankind before the flood proceeding from tho too great lenity of those patriarchal princes , in not punishing the disorders of their subject children , which is a very bold assertion ; since you know no more than i , what that wickedness was in particular for which god drowned the world , much less what was the occasion of it . and therefore if god thought fit to change paternal power into hereditary monarchies which ( as i have proved ) do not at all proceed from paternal power , it will also follow that the government of your patriarchs was not sufficient for the well-being , and happiness of mankind , or else god would never have thought fit to have altered it , for a more cruel and severe way of government . but as for what you say , concerning those princes that place all their security in guards , and armies too strong for the subjects , that they are uneasie , and degenerate into despotick monarchies , ( you might better have said tyrannies ) and that they are unsafe both for prince and people , is very true , and i altogether agree with you in it . but those of your principles have no reason to find fault with princes for so doing ; for since they do but use their just prerogative over their slaves , or vassals , it is but fit that they should be made to undergo that yoke , whether they will or no , which they would not bear willingly , and as long as princes look upon themselves to be ( what they really are upon your principles ) the masters and not the fathers of their people , as they suppose the goods , and estates of their subjects to be wholly at their disposal , so can they never command them as they please , without the assistance of standing armies ; nor have you any reason to complain of those princes for keeping them too strong for the subjects , since upon your principles be they strong , or weak , the subjects are not to resist them ; but if princes , without your extraordinary fondness of using their people like children , would but always use them like subjects , with ordinary justice , and moderation ; and not oppress them with excessive taxes , and unnecessary penal laws about religion , you would find there would be no need of standing armies to keep the people in awe , who would themselves be the best defence not only against domestick , but forreign enemies , and this i 'll assure you is a much better receipt against rebellion , than all your new recipe's of paternal power in monarchs , which is not only without all ground of reason but above common apprehensions . m. you have made a long speech in answer to my hypothesis , which since you are not satisfied with , i can likewise shew you another very good reason , why the people should love , and reverence their princes , and that is those great liberties , and concessions , that all the monarchs of europe have granted their subjects , which are now past into the settled laws and customs of those kingdoms with which the people ought to be very well contented ; nor ought they to rebel or resist , tho' they may sometimes out of wantonness , and necessity , infringe , or intrench upon those priviledges which they or their ancestors have conferred upon them ; since they can never forseit that power they have originally over them . f. i do not very well understand what you mean ; for i have hitherto supposed that all subjects have a property in their estates , and a freedom for their persons by the laws of nature ; and which no civil power whatever could deprive them of , without their consent : and therefore i desire you would shew me , that if children , subjects , and slaves , were all one at the first , how we in this side of the world , came to be in a better condition , than those in asia , and africa ? or that we english-men can claim a property in our estates , and a right to our lives , which the prince cannot take away but according to some known laws ? m. i think i can easily do this , not only in relation to england , but any other kingdom , which is now governed by known laws and that upon sir r. f's hypothesis ; which i shall do as near ( as i can remember ) in the words of that excellent person the late earl of clarendon in his survey of mr. hobbs leviathan , who suppose● according to this hypothesis , that some one of noah 's descendants was an absolute monarch , at first over all his posterity , which might continue in his line for some ages , till at last their relation by blood to their subjects was removed at so great a distance , that the account of their kindred , or relation to each other , was scarce remembred , whereby they who had the soveraign power , still exprest less paternal affection in their government , looking upon those they governed as meer subjects , and not as their kinsmen or allies , till by degrees , according to the custom of exorbitant power , they ( considering only the extent of their own iurisdiction , and what they might , rather than what they should do ) treated them who were under them , not as subjects , but as slaves , who having no right to any thing , but what they permitted them , they would allow them to possess nothing , but what they had no occasion to take away ; estates they had none , that they could call their own , because when their prince called for them , they were his ; their persons were at his command , when he had either occasion , or appetite to make use of them ; and their children inherited nothing but their fathers subjection ; so that they were happy , or miserable , as he who had the power over them pleased to exercise it with more , or less rigour , or indulgence ; yet they submitted alike to both ; acknowledging his dominion to be naturally as absolute as their subjection , and obedience . these princes might for some ages have pleased themselves with this exorbitant exercise of their power , which tho' it had been always the same , yet the exercise of it had been very moderate , whilst there remained the tenderness , or memory of any relation . but these princes began at lest to discern , and be convinced that the great strength they seemed to be possest of , would in a short time degenerate into weakness , and the riches they seemed to enjoy , would end in want , and necessity , as well in themselves , as in their subjects ; since no man would build a good house , that his children could not inherit , nor cultivate their land , with any good husbandry , and expence , since the profit thereof might be given to another man ; and that if the subjects did not enjoy the conveniences of life , they could not be sure of their help , and affection , whenever they should have war with another prince , as absolute as themselves ; but they would rather chuse to be subject to him under whose government they might live with greater liberty , and satisfaction . and lastly , that if they ingrost all the wealth , and power into their own hands , they should find none who would defend them in the possession of it : and that there was a great difference between that subjection , which love and duty pays , and that which results only from fear , and force , since despair often puts an end to that duty , which reason , and it may be , conscience , would otherwise have perswaded them still to continue : and therefore , that it was necessary that their subjects should find ease , and profit in obeying , as well as kings pleasure in commanding ; these wise , and wholesom reflections might prevail with princes , for their own , as well as subjects benefit , to restrain their power , and to make it less absolute , that it might be more useful , and , to give their subjects such a property in their goods , and lands , as should not be invaded , but in such cases , and on such occasions as the necessities of the government really required . but as they found the benefit arising from these condescensions , highly tend to the improvement of the riches , and civillity of their subjects , with all those additions of pleasure , and industry , which render man's life , as well as the government easie , and pleasant , they still in several generations enlarged these graces , and concessions to their subjects , yet reserving all in themselves that they did not part with by their voluntary grants or concessions . and if we take a view of the several kingdoms of the world , we shall see another face of things , both of power , and riches in those governments , where these cond●scensions and concessions have been best observed ; than in those kingdoms where the soveraigns either retain , or resume to themselves all those rights , or prerogatives , which are invested in them from the original nature of government ; so that there still remains enough in the princes hands to be made use of , for the preservation of his own power , and the defence of his subjects , for whose benefit it was intrusted with him by god. so far the late great chancellor . and these priviledges , and condescensions , being once past into constant , and standing ●aws , by the princes that gave them , and also solemnly sworn to by their coronation oaths , do for the future bind , not only those princes that granted them , but also their successors , to their observation : and i then look upon them bound , under pain of damnation , not to break , or infringe them , without very great necessity . but however , if they shall happen so to do , since they were matters of meer grace , and favour at the first , and not of right , the princes that thus transgress them , are only accountable to god , and punishable by him , and not by their subjects , for any breaches , or infringements of such liberties , and immunities : and this may serve against the fancies of all those who think princes have nothing , but what the people have given them ; and likewise against such as mr. hobbs , who maintain so much is conferred on them , that they have a right to leave no body else any thing to enjoy , that they have a mind to take from them . and this i take to be a much better security for the peoples liberties , to leave it to the honour , and conscience of their princes , and that fear they ought to have of the divine vengeance , in case they oppress their subjects contrary to law , than your heady , and violent methods of resistance for the oppression , or tyranny of princes , which would but give the common people a pretence of taking arms , and rebelling against their princes upon every slight provocation . f. you have made a very plausible discourse , whether of your own , or from the author you quote , is not much material ; for i doubt when it comes to be examined , it will appear much more like a romance than a true history : and therefore granting at present your principles to be true , ( tho' they are not ) i desire you to shew me , how you can make it out , either from sacred , or prophane history , that any limited kingdom now in the world , ever had its original from those gracious condescensions , or concessions of princes , as you here mention : for by all that ever i can read , or observe , either from our own , or foreign history , all the liberties , and priviledges which subjects enjoy at this day , proceeded at first , either from the original contracts , customs , or constitutions of those kingdoms , or nations , at the first institution of their government ; or else were forced from princes by their subjects , who would no longer endure the severity of their yoke , or else were granted by some of them , who believing they had worse titles than their competitors to the crown , were willing to ▪ engage the people to their side , by granting them greater priviledges , than they before enjoyed . and tho' i grant the reflections you make upon the exercise of arbitrary power , and the miseries it brings both upon the prince , and people , are very true : yet i am sure the practice of most absolute monarchs throughout the whole world , hath run quite contrary to your suppositions . for princes are so far ( by what i ever read , or observed ) from being willing to part with any of their power , that they have still endeavoured by degrees to enlarge it , and render it more absolute than it was left them ; as you may observe in the government of france , spain , denmark , and sweden in this last age ; and what encroachments were made in this kingdom by the prerogative upon the peoples liberties , during the reigns of our last princes , he is a stranger to the history of the country , that hath not read of , if he do not remember them . and how much higher they would have been carried , if this strange , and sudden revolution had not put a stop to it , i had rather you and i should understand in idea than by experience . but if such grave reflections as these of yours , were able to work upon the first monarchs , i desire to know the reason why those of turkey , persia , russia , and the african emperors of morocco , and of the abissines ( who sure have been as wise as any you can name ) should not in so many ages as they have governed , see these inconveniences you mention , and restrain their exorbitant power within some moderate limits : nay , to the contrary , one of the most ambitious and aspiring monarchs in europe , is making what haste he can to reduce his kingdom into the same model . and what do you think would the princes , and councellors of these empires say to such a one as you , or i , who should offer to preach this strange doctrine to them , that they ought under pain of damnation to use their subjects as their children , and not as slaves , or meer vassals ? i doubt they would make us pay dear for publishing such false doctrine in their dominions , or at least would despise us for half-witted fellows , without any true notions in politicks , since they believe , that the true security , and glory of a king , consists in vast standing armies , great fleets , and a power to take from their subjects , and neighbours , whatever they please , thereby to enjoy their own pleasures and humours in all their hearts can desire , and to extend their empires ( per fas & nefas ) as far as ever their conquering swords will give them leave . and if you should tell them , that their subjects could not love them , nor live happily , nor contentedly under such a government ; i suppose their answer would be ( if they could speak latine ) oderint dum metuant , or in the language of their own country , that they would rather trust a standing army , than the affections of their people ; and that it is better to take from their subjects what they have a mind to ▪ than to leave it to their good will what they will give them . these are all the antient , and modern politicks that i can observe in most absolute monarchies , or in those kingdoms , where kings have taken upon them so to govern their subjects , at this day : but i defie you to shew me any one kingdom in the world , where the people owe all their liberties , and priviledges meerly to the good will , and favour of their princes ▪ who granted them only out of those wise considerations you have now mentioned . but as for the expedient at the latter end of your speech , that these priviledges , and condescensions , when once granted by kings to their subj●cts , and past into constant , and standing laws , and also solemnly sworn to by princes at their coronation , do not only bind those princes that granted them , but also their successors under pain of damnation ; i so far agree with you , tho' i must beg your pardon if i cannot think this a sufficient security , for several reasons i can give you at a more convenient time when i shall , when you please , more fully discuss this point . m. i must freely tell you sir , i am not yet satisfied neither with the instances you have brought , nor yet with your replies to my answers , and i think i can shew you as to this kingdom , that they are false in matter of fact. for if that the first and most ancient kingdoms and monarchies began by conquest at first , and that perhaps for the most part by wars unjustly made , as i may also instance in england , if this were a proper season for it , so that indeed the greatest liberty in the world , ( if it be duely considered ) is for a people to live under a paternal monarchy . it is the magna charta of this kingdom , all other shews , or pretexts of liberty are but several degrees of slavery , and a liberty only to destroy liberty . so that i think i may very well keep my first opinion , that paternal government is the foundation of all other , and i have ever thought god's love , and kindness to mankind did never appear in any thing more , ( except in man's redemption ) than in creating only one man , and out of him only one woman : so that adam was a kind of a father to his wife ▪ that marital as well as all other power might be founded in paternal iurisdiction . that all princes might look upon the meanest of their subjects , as their children : and all subjects upon their prince as their common father : and upon each other as the children of one man ; that mankind might not only be united in one common nature , but also be of one blood , of one family and be habituated to the best of governments from the very infancy of the world. were this well considered as there could be no tyrants , so neither would there be any traitors ; and rebels : but both prince and people would strive to outdo each other in the offices of love , and duty : and now do you , or any man living read sir r. f's patriarcha or other works , and see if either he , or i have ascribed one dram of power to princes which will not naturally spring from this supream-paternal power . so that upon the whole , i think reason it self would conclude , that this way of solving the first rise of government is true , and that it is the duty of all , who by the blessing of god are under paternal monarchies , to be very thankful for the favour , and to do the utmost that in them lies to preserve , and transmit that best form of government to their children after them . and surely there is no nation under heaven hath more reason for this than the english , who are under a paternal monarchy , which has taken the best care , that can be to secure them not only from oppression , and wrong , but from the very fear of it . f. since you lay the chief stress of your assertion , upon the original of most of the kingdoms and monarchies now in the world , and of our own in particular , i think i may safely joyn issue with you on both points , and in the first place affirm that an unjust conquest gives the conquerour no right to the subjects obedience much less over their lives , or estates , and if our norman william and his successours had no more right to the crown of england than meer conquest , i doubt whether they might have been driven out , after the same manner they came in : but i believe you will find upon second thoughts that unjust conquests and usurpations of crowns be no firm titles for princes to relye on ; lest the old english proverb be turned upon you , viz. that which is sauce for a goose , is sauce for a gander ; but i shall defer this discourse concerning titles by conquest , and in particular that of our kings to this kingdom to some other time when i doubt not but to shew , that it is not only false in matter of fact , but also that it will not prove that for which it is brought . and therefore what you say in your conclusion in exaltation of god's love , and kindness to mankind , in creating one man , and out of him only one woman ; that adam might be a kind of father to his wife , is a very pretty and indeed singular notion , and you would do very well to move the convocation next time it sits , that this explanation may be added to the fifth commandment , that women may be taught in the catechism that obedience to husbands , is due by the precept , of honour thy father and thy mother . and therefore i need give no other answer to all the rest you have said however specious the hypothesis may seem ( as you have drest it up , ) for princes , and people ; yet till you have proved that all paternal power is monarchical ; and that all monarchical power is derived from fatherhood , it signifies nothing . nor can these piae fraudes do any more good in politicks than religion : for as superstition can never serve to advance the true worship of god , but by creating false notions of the divine nature in me●s minds , which doth not render it , as it ought to be , the object of their love , and reverence , but servile fear : so i suppose this asserting of such an unlimited despotical power in all monarchs , and such an entire subjection as sir r. f. and you , your self exact from subjects , can produce nothing but a flavish dread without that esteem , and affection for their prince's person , and government ; which is so necessary for the quiet of princes , and which they may always have , whilst they think themselves obliged in conscience , and honour , to protect their lives and fortunes from slavery , and oppression , according to the just and known laws of the kingdom , and not to dispense with them in great , and essential points , without the consent of those who have a hand in the making of them : and all false notions of this supreme power as derived from i know not what fatherly , ( but indeed despotick ) power are so far from settling in peoples minds , a sober and rational obedience to government , that they rather make them desperate ; and careless , who is their master , since , let what change will come , they can expect no better than to be slaves . nor are subjects put in a better condition by this doctrine of absolute non resistance , since all princes are not of so generous a nature , as not to tyrannize , and insult the more over those whom they suppose will not , or else dare not resist them ; and therefore i cannot see how such a submission can soften the hearts of the most cruel princes in the world , as you suppose , much less how resistance in some cases can inrage the mildest princes to their peoples ruine , since all resistance of such mild , and merciful princes i grant to be utterly unlawful ; nor do i hold resistance ever to be practised , but where the people are already ruined in their liberties and fortunes ; or are just at the brink of it , and have no other means left but that to avoid it . to conclude , i so far agree with you , that i think it is the duty of all that are born under a kingly government limited by laws , to be very thankful to god for the favour , and to do the utmost that in them lies to preserve and transmit this best form of government to their children after them , without maintaining such unintelligible fictions as a paternal monarchy derived from adam , or noah . and tho' i own that some of our former kings have taken the best care they could , to secure this nation from popery , and arbitrary power ; yet whether the method of our three last kings have been the readiest way to secure us from the fears of it , i leave it to your own conscience ( if you are a protestant ) to judge . but since you defie me to shew you out of sir r. f's patriarcha , that he hath ascribed one dram of power to princes , which doth not naturally arise from a supreme paternal power , and that this is no exorbitant heighth ; i think i am able to prove from many passages in his patriarcha , as well as other works , that no author hath made bolder assertions to render all mankind slaves , instead of subjects , and all princes tyrants , instead of kings ; and that his principles are so far from being safe , that if they are duly lookt into and weighed , they will prove destructive as well to the rights of princes , as to the liberties of the people . m. i should be very glad to see that proved , for i must always believe till you shew me to the contrary , that this excellent author lays it down for a ground , that princes being as fathers to their people , are bound to treat their subjects as children , and not as slaves ; and therefore waving this last controversie , which we have argued as far as it will go ; pray make out what you say from his own words , and i will give up the cause . f. i wonder how you can be so partially blind , as not to see this , since you your self have already made use not only of a great deal of his doctrins , but also of his very words : and therefore pray see his obedience to government in doubtful times , as also in his preface to the observations upon aristotle's politicks , where you will find he asserts , that adam was the father , king and lord over his family ; a son , a subject and a servant , or a slave were one , and the same thing at first : the father had power to dispose of , or sell his children , or servants : whence we find , that at the first reckoning of goods in scripture , the man-servant , and the maid-servant are number'd among the possessions , and substance of the owner , as other goods were . so that then , if the power of a father , and of a monarch be all one , and that all monarchical power is despotical , the consequence is also as evident , that all subjects are also naturally slaves , unless their princes shall please to lay an easier yoke upon them . m. perhaps sir r. f. may have carried this matter a little too far ; yet if you please to look into his patriarcha , chap. . par. . you will find , that he hath this passage , which plainly speaks the contrary : the father of a family governs by no other law , than by his own will , not by the laws and wills of his sons , and servants . there is no nation that allows children any action , or remedy for being unjustly governed ; and yet for all this , every father is bound by the law of nature to do his best for the preservation of his family ; but much more is a king always tyed by the same law of nature , to keep this general ground , that the safety of his kingdom be his chief law. whence you may observe , that tho' he takes away all remedy from children against their parents , for being ill governed , yet doth he not set the father free from all obligation to preserve the good of his family , of which sure a man's children are a principal part . and if you please to look back to the second chapter , par. . you will find these words . to answer in particular to the first text , it may be said the sense of these words , by the law of nature all men are born free , must needs mean a freedom only , that is opposite to such a subjection as is between father , and son. this is made manifest by the text of the law : for ulpian in this place speaketh only of manumission , which is a setting at liberty of servants from servitude , and not of emancipation , which is the freeing of children from the fathers tuition . servitude , as the law teacheth , is a constitution of the law of nations , by which a man is subject to the dominion of any other man against nature . so not every subjection is servitude , but subjection contrary to the law of nature . yet every man is born subject to the power of a father . this the law it self saith ; in potestate nostra liberi nostri sunt . so that you see here be maketh a difference between servitude , and that subjection that is due to fathers . f. give me leave to answer these two instances before you proceed any farther , and i shall in the first place make bold to answer your last instance first , because i shall be much shorter upon it . but pray take notice by the way , that this author is very high , and rigorous for the absolute power of life , and death in all fathers , over their children in the state of nature , and that they may exercise it for very slight offences ; and therefore in this chapter you have last quoted , he seems very well satisfied with the example of cassius ▪ who threw his son out of the consistory for publishing the agrarian law , for the division of lands ; and i think this was no such great crime , for which a father might justifie the putting his son to death . and in the section before this , he justifieth the power of fathers amongst the romans , as being ratified , and amplified by the laws of the xii tables , enabling parents to sell their children two or three times over . so that these things considered , i cannot see , how this distinction of sir r. f. out of the civil law , will do him any service . for tho' i grant indeed that manumission , and emancipation are two different words , yet do they both signifie the same thing ; and tho' for the greater respect which they would shew to the condition of children , above that of slaves , they were pleased to make use of different expressions ; yet , whoever will look more closely into the nature of the subjection , that children were in , under their parents , by the roman law , will find , that the condition of children , was no better than that of slaves . for first , the father had such an absolute power over the person of the son , that he could sell him three times , whereas he could sell a slave but once . secondly , he had such an absolute power over his life , that he could take it away whenever he pleased . lastly , a son could have no property in any goods without his fathers consent , till he was emancipated , or made free : so that if his father were harsh , and ill natured , the condition of a son was worse than that of a slave , as long as his father lived . and therefore i am still of the opinion of the antient civil lawyers , which assert the natural freedom of mankind , according to the maxim you have now cited . and they acknowledge that the servitude , or absolute-subjection of children to their fathers , was not by the law of nature , but by the civil or roman law , peculiar to themselves ; as i have already proved at our last meeting . but to come to your first quotation , whereby you would justifie sir r. f. for maintaining any unjust severity in fathers , or tyranny in princes , because they are both to endeavour the common good of the family , and kingdom , t is very true he says so ; but of this common good they themselves are the sole iudges : so that if the father please to sell one or two of his children , whom he least loveth , to provide portions for the rest , he may lawfully do it for any thing i see to the contrary . so likewise immediately after he asserts the superiority of all princes above laws , because there were kings long before there were any laws . and all the next paragraph is wholy spent , in proving the unlimited iurisdiction of kings above laws , as it is described by samuel , when the israelites desired a king : so that it signifies little what laws princes make , or what priviledges they grant their subjects , since they may alter them , or abrogate them when ever they please . m. but pray take along with you , what he says in the next paragraph you quote ; where you may see these words ; it is ●here evidently shewed , that the scope of samuel , was to teach the people a dutiful obedience to their king , even in those things which themselves did esteem mischievous and inconvenient : for by telling them what a king would do , he indeed instructs them what a subject must suffer ; yet not so , as that it is right for kings to do injury , but it is right for them to go unpunished by the people if they do it : so that in this point it is all one , whether samuel describe a king , or a tyrant ; for patient obedience is due to both : no remedy in the text against tyrants , but in crying , and praying unto god in that day . and that sir r. f. is very far from justifying kings in the unnecessary breach of their laws , may farther appear by what he says , chap. . par. . of this treatise , where pray see this passage . now albeit kings who make the laws , be ( as king james teacheth us ) above the laws ; yet will they rule their subjects by the law ; and a king governing in a settled kingdom , leaves to be a king , and degenerateth into a tyrant , so soon as he leaves to rule according to his laws ; yet where he sees the laws rigorous , or doubtful , be may mitigate and interpret them . so that you see here he leaves the king no power or prerogative above the laws , but what shall be directed , and employed for the general good of the kingdom . f. but pray , sir , read on a little farther , and see if he doth not again undo all that he hath before so speciously laid down , and if you will not read it , i will : general laws made in parliament , may upon known respects to the king , by his authority , be mitigated , or suspended upon causes only known to him . and altho' a king do frame all his action to be according to the laws , yet he is not bound thereto , but at his good will , and for good example : or so far forth as the general law of the safety of the common-weal doth naturally bind him ; for in such sort only , positively laws may be said to bind the king , not by being positive , but as they are naturally the best , or only means for the preservation of the common-wealth . so that if the king have this prerogative of mitigating , interpreting , and suspending all laws , in cases only known to himself , and that he is not bound to the laws but at his own good will , and for good example . i desire to know what greater prerogative a king can desire , than to suspend the execution of any law , as often as he shall think fit . for tho' i grant the suspension of a law differs from the abrogation of it , because the former only takes away the force of it in this or that particular case , whereas the latter wholy annuls the law ; yet if this suspension be general , and in every case , where the law is to take effect , it amounts to the same thing with an abrogation of it ; as may be plainly seen in the late king 's dispersing power . for tho' it be true he pretended to no more , than to dispense with this , or that person , who should undertake a publick employment , either military , or civil , without taking the oaths , and t●st ; yet since he granted this dispensation generally to all papists , and others , that would transgress this law , it amounted to the same thing during his pleasure , as an absolute abrogation of it . and therefore i do very much wonder why divers who are very zealous for the church of england , and the king's prerogative , should be so angry with him for erecting that power , which not only this author , but all others of his principles have placed in him : and if the king may suspend this , and all other laws , upon causes only known to him , i do not see how he differs from being as absolute and arbitrary a monarch , as the great turk himself , and may when he pleases , notwithstanding all laws to the contrary , take away men's lives without any due forms of law , and raise taxes without consent of parliament . m. but pray read on a little farther , and you will find that he very much restrains this absolute power , in these words : by this mean , are all kings , even tyrants and conquerors , bound to preserve the laws , goods , liberties and lives of all their subjects , not by any municipal law of the land , but by the natural law of a father , which binds them to ratifie the acts of their fore-fathers and predecessors in things necessary for the publick good of their subjects . f. were i a monarch limited by laws , i would desire no greater a power over them , than this you have here brought out of this author . for he says ▪ positive laws do not bind the king , but as they are the b●st or only means for the preservation of the common wealth . in the next place you see that all kings are bound to preserve the lives and estates of their subjects , not by any municipal law of the land , but by the natural law of a father , which binds them to ratifie the acts of their predecessors in things necessary for the publick good of their subjects . now this paternal power is large enough of all conscience to discharge princes from any obligation to the laws farther than they please . for it before appears that the father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will , and not by the laws and wills of his sons or servants ; therefore if the power of the king be wholy paternal , he may alter this will of his as often as he please : nor can his subjects , who are all one with sons and servants , have any reason to find fault with it for he says , there is no nation that allows children any remedy for being unjustly governed . and tho' it be true , that he restrains this prerogative both in fathers and kings to the publick good of their children and subjects ; yet as long as he is left the sole and uncontroulable judge of what is for the publick good , all these fine pretences will signifie nothing . for he is bound to observe or ratifie no laws or acts of his predecessors , but what he is satisfied tend to this end : so that if he thinks fit to judge , that magna charta , for example , for the statute de tallagio non concedendo , or any liberty we enjoy , are not necessary , or contrary to the common good , he is not tied to observe them : and upon this principle it was that the judges in the reign of king charles the first founded the king's prerogative for ship money : for they supposed that the king in case of necessity ( that is , for the publick good of the subjects ) might lay a tax upon the kingdom , tho' without consent of parliament . so that upon this pretence ▪ the king being the sole iudge of the necessity , he might quickly have raised what taxes , and as often as he had pleased but , lest our kings should think themselves too strictly bound by their coronation oaths , to observe the laws , pray see in the next paragraph , how this author endeavours to help the king to creep out of that obligation too . therefore pray read on . others there be that affirm , that altho' laws of themselves do not bind kings , yet the oaths of kings at their coronations tye them , to keep all the laws of their kingdoms : how far this is true , let us but examine the oaths of the kings of england at their coronation , the words whereof are these : art thou pleased to cause to be administred in all thy judgments indifferent , and upright justice , and to use discretion with mercy , and verity ? art thou pleased , that our upright laws , and customs be observed ; and doest thou promise , that those shall be protected and maintained by thee ? these two are the ●rticles of the king's oath , which concern the laity , or subjects in general ; to which the king answers affirmatively ; being first demanded by the arch-bishop of canterbury : pleaseth it you to confirm , and observe the laws , and customs of antient times granted from god , by just and devout kings unto the english nation , by oath unto the said people , especially the laws , liberties and customs granted unto the clergy and laity , by the famous king edward ? we may observe in these words of the articles of the oath , that the king is required to observe , not all the laws , but only the upright , and that with discretion and mercy . the word upright cannot mean all laws , because in the oath of richard the second , i find evil , and unjust laws mentioned , which the king swears to abolish ; and in the old abridgment of statutes set forth in king henry the eighths days ▪ the king is to swear wholy to put out evil laws , which he cannot do , if he be bound to all laws . now what laws are upright , and what evil , who shall judge but the king ? since he swears to administer upright iustice with discretion , and mercy ; ( or as bracton hath it ) aequitatem praecipiat , & misericordiam . so that in effect the king doth swear to keep no laws but such as in his iudgment are upright , and those not literally always , but according to the equity of his conscience , joyned with mercy , which is properly the office of a chancellor rather than of a iudge : and if a king did strictly swear to observe all the laws he could not without perjury give his consent to the repealing , or abrogating of any statute by act of parliament , which would be very mischievous to the state. but let it be supposed for truth , that kings do swear to observe all the laws of their kingdoms ; yet no man can think it reason , that kings should be more bound by their voluntary oaths , than common persons are by theirs . now if a private person make a contract , either with oath , or without oath , he is no farther bound than the equity , and iustice of the contract tyes him ; for a man may have relief against an unreasonable , and unjust promise , if either deceit , or error , force , or fear induced him thereunto ; or if it be hurtfuls or grievous in the performance ; since the laws in many cases give the king a prerogative above common persons , i see no reason why he should be denied the priviledge which the meanest of his subjects doth enjoy . i need not make any long paraphrase upon these words ; it is sufficient that the king is here left sole iudge of what laws are upright , and what unjust , and consequently what laws he pleases shall be observed , and what not ▪ so that no laws , tho' thought never so just , and necessary by the parliament at the time of making of them , shall signifie any thing , if he thinks sit afterwards to judge otherwise . and lest this should not be sufficient , he hath found out another way whereby princes may absolve themselves of this troublesom obligation of oaths ; and therefore he would have them no more bound up than common persons , who because they may have relief in publick courts of justice , against an unjust promise , if either errour , deceit , force , or fear , induced them thereunto ; nay more , if it be hurtful or grievous in the performance , kings who have a prerogative above common persons , and who acknowledge no tribunal above themselves , may absolve themselves of their oaths whenever they think good ; by saying it was extorted from them by deceit force , or fear ; or if they cannot satisfie themselves without it , they might have had formerly the pope's dispensation for money , which we read king iohn , and henry the third obtained to be absolved of the oaths they had taken to observe magna charta ; but this author hath found out a shorter cut , and hath made kings both judges , and parties , and to absolve themselves by a fundamental right of government . and what hath proved the conclusion of such princes who have taken this authors liberty of breaking their coronation oath at their pleasure ? it hath only taught their subjects to imitate their example , and to make as light of their oath of allegiance . m. i will not deny but perhaps sir r f. may have carried the prerogative in this point a little too far ; yet that he meant honestly towards the common weal , in all this , i pray see the th section of this chapter , where you 'll find these words : many will be ready to say , it is a slavish , and dangerous condition to be subject to the will of any one m●n , who is not subject to the laws but such men consider not , . that the prerogative of a king is to be above all laws , for the good only of them , who are under the laws , and to defend the peoples liberties , as his majesty graciously affirmed in his speech after his last answer to the petition of right ; howsoever some are afraid of the name of prerogative , yet they may assure themselves the case of subjects would be desperately miserable without it . so that you see here he asserts no prerogative in the king to be above all laws , but only for the good of the people , and to defend their liberties , which i think is a sufficient restraint of prerogative . f. but read a little lower , and the people will have no such great cause to thank him , as you may see by these words : in all aristocracies the nobles are above the laws ; and in all democracies the people . by the like reason in a monarchy the king must of necessity be above the laws ; there can be no soveraign majesty in him that is under them . that which gives the very being to a king , is the power to give laws ; without this power he is but an equivocal king. and most part of what follows in this treatise is only to prove ▪ that the parliament , or assembly of estates was a creature wholy of the king's creation , and consequently that he alone makes the laws in it . and he hath also written a whole treatise called , the free-holders grand inquest , to prove that it is the king's authority alone , that makes the laws , and therefore that he can interpret , and dispense with them at his pleasure . so that richard the second , had this author lived in his time , might have made him a judge as we●l as tre●illian and belknap , since they all maintained the same principles . but , lest we should mistake him , see what he says at the conclusion of this treatise : for the confirmation of this point , aristotle saith , that a perfect kingdom is that wherein the king rules all things according to his own will ; for he that is called a king according to the law , makes no kind of kingdom at all . this it s●ems also the romans well understood to be most necessary in a monarchy ; for 〈◊〉 th●y were a people most greedy of liberty , yet the senate did free augustus from all necessary of laws , that he might be free of his own authority , and of absolute po●●r over himself , and over the laws to do what he pleased , and leave undone what he li●t , and this decree was made while augustus was yet absent . accordingly we find that ulpian the great lawyer delivers it for a rule of the civil law ; princeps legibus solutus est ▪ the prince is not bound by the laws . so that upon these principles all kings are not only discharged from the penalty , but also the very obligation of observing laws farther than they shall think sit . and indeed this author carries this prerogative beyond what the most moderate roman emperours ever pretended to , as i can easily shew you from your own civil law-books ; and therefore pray reach me down your volume of the code , and fee here what the emperour declares on this matter de testamentis . ex imperfecto testamento nec imperatorem haereditatem vindicare posse , sape constitutum est , licet enim lex imperii solennibus juris imperatorem solverit ; nihil tamen tam proprium imperii est , quàm legibus vivere . see likewise in the theodosian code , these words ; digna vox est majestate regnantis , legibus alligatum se principis prositeri , aded de authoritate juris , nosira pendet authoritas , & re vera majus imperio est submittere legibus principatum , & oraculo praesentis edicti quod nobis licere non patimur , aliis indicamu● , ( viz. successor●bu● theodosio & valentino . ) so that you may here see , that even the roman emperours were more modest than to declare themselves discharged by their prerogative , or thought of any of these subtile distinctions of this author from their obligation to the laws , however they were from the penalty ; which is the true sense of this phrase of being legibus solutus . but god be thanked , most of our own kings have been more conscientious than to maintain that they were not bound by their coronation oath farther than they pleased . for you may see in the preamble to the statute of provisours made in the th of ed. d. where it is declared and acknowledged by the king himself , and both houses of parliament , that the right of the crown of england , and the law of the realm is such , that upon the mischiefs and damages which happen to the realm , he ought , and was bound of his said people in his parliament thereof to make remedy , and law , in voiding the mischiefs which come thereof : and the king seeing the mischiefs , and damage aforesaid , and having regard to the said statute ( scil . the former statute of provisours ) he here farther acknowledges , that he is bound by his oath to do the same to be kept , as the law of his realm , tho' by sufferance and negligence it hath been hitherto attempted to the contrary . so likewise king henry the fourth declares in full parliament , ( as appears by the parliament roll ) that whereas the commons in parliament had granted , that the king should be in as great liberty as any of his noble progenitors : on which our said lord of his royal grace , and tender conscience , hath granted in full parliament ; that it is not his intent , nor will he alter the laws , statutes , and good usages , nor take any advantages by the said grant , but will keep the ancient laws , and statutes ordained , and used in the times of his noble progenitors , and do right to all people in mercy and truth selon● son serment , i. e. according to his coronation oath . m. i will not affirm , but sir r f. observing how much the kings prerogative was run down by the long parliament and how the least slips , and miscarriages in government were aggravated by the demogogues that then domineered , as open and violent breaches of his coronation oath , might be willing to make the best defence he could for such miscarriages , and this treatise of patriarcha being a posthumous piece , perhaps he would have altered many things in it , had he lived to publish it himself ; but i doubt not , but he was a very honest man , and meant well to the kingdom for all that . and therefore i hope you will not be too rigorous in your censure of him . f. i 'll assure you sir , i shall not , because he hath been dead many years , and therefore i had much rather censure his writings , than his person , which i never knew . but , if i may judge from his works , he was certainly no friend to parliaments , or the power of the laws above the prerogative : but that i may also shew you how dangerous , and derogatory his opinions likewise are to the titles of all soveraign princes , and monarchs , now in the world , however he may seem to write in their defence ; pray turn to his patr. chap. . par. . and to a question , 〈◊〉 becomes of the right of fatherhood in case the crown escheat for want of an h●ir ; he thus replies , which pray read . it is but the negligence , or ignorance of the people to lose the knowledge of the true heir : for an heir there always is ; if adam himself were still living , and now ready to dye , it is certain there is o●● man , and but one in the world , who is next . heir , altho' the knowledge who should be that one man be quite lost . the which he likewise repeats to the same effect , in his treatise of the anarchy of a limited , or mixed monarchy . pray see the place , and read these words . it is a truth undeniable , that there cannot be a multitude of men whatsoever , either great or small , tho' gathered together from the several corners , and remotest regions in the world ; but that in the same multitude considered by it self , there is one man amongst them , that in nature hath a right to be the king of all the rest , as being the next heir to adam , and the other subject unto him ; every man by nature is a king , or a subject . so that i think no kings in the world being able to deduce their pedigree from adam ( of whom there can be but one right heir ) they all ( or at least all but one ) are only kings de facto , and not de iure , and usurpers upon this heir of adam . so that , if god would but be pleased to reveal , who this next heir is , all the kings of the earth were bound in conscience to lay their crowns at his feet : tho' he were but a cobler , or a link-boy . how ridiculous a notion this is i leave it to any indifferent man to judge . m. i hope this opinion is like to have no very ill effect , unless any prince by vertue of this title of adams right heir should pretend a right to an universal monarchy , and then i think it were but reasonable , he should be put to make out his title ; but seeing no body doth so , to the best of my knowledge , it is but reasonable that all princes should in the mean time enjoy what they are in lawful possession of , till this heir of noah hath made out his title , and then they may consider farther of it . f. and it is very well , that this right heir is not to be found , for if he were , all princes would be usurpers , who did not immediately resign to him . but this doctrine is of more fatal consequence than you imagine : for it doth not only concern princes in respect of adam's right heir only , but also of any other right heirs to princes , who have lost their right to a crown , never so many ages ago : for look into his directions for obedience in doubtful times , and read this passage : by humane positive laws , a possession time out of mind takes away , or bars a former right , to avoid a general mischief of bringing all right into a disputation not decideable by proof , and consequently to the overthrow of all civil government in grants , gifts , and contracts between man and man ; but in grants , and gifts that have their original from god , or nature ( as the power of a father hath ) no inferiour power of man can limit , nor make any law of prescription against them . upon this ground is built that nullum tempus occurrit regi , no time barrs a king. and a little before , he gives us this reason of it . for tho' by humane laws a long prescription may take away right ; yet a divine right never dies , nor can be lost or taken away . by which principle , he renders the titles of most ( if not all ) of the princes of europe at this day very weak and disputable ; whenever any other person shall set up a title against them . m. but sir r. f. hath found a very good expedient for this , for he tells us , in the last cited discourse that the paternal power cannot be lost , tho' it may either be transferred , or usurped ; and in his anarchy of a limited monarchy , he thus more at large expresses it . many times by the act either of an usurper himself , or of those that set him up , the true heir of a crown is dispossessed , god using the ministry of the wickedest man for the removing , and setting up of kings , in such cases , the subjects obedience to the fatherly power must go along , and wait upon gods providence , who only hath right to give and take away kingdoms , and thereby to adopt subjects into the obedience of another fatherly power . and lastly in his discourse of obedience , &c. he more clearly f●●tleth this point in answer to an objection there made , that most kings now in the world have no other titles to their crowns but conquest , or usurpation ; he replieth , that tho' all kings were usurpers , yet still the first usurper hath the best tale , being in possession by the permission of god ; and where an usurper hath continued so long , that the knowledge of the right heir is lost by the subjects ; in such case the usurper in possession is to be taken and reputed by such subjects for the true heir , and is to be obey'd by them as their father . and i think you your self will not deny , but that kingdoms may be transferred from one prince to another by conquest , or a long usurpation ; and that when there is no other , better title extant , the king in possession , or his heirs may have a good title by a long possession , tho' it began by usurpation at first . f. i have not now time to answer all that your author hath as falsly , as incoherently said concerning this subject of usurpation ; and i should be glad to hear you , or any man else that will undertake to defend him , make him consistent , not only with reason , but with himself in this discourse you quote , concerning obedience to government in doubtful times . for to pass by his unintelligible notion of supposing two supream paternal powers subsisting at once , and each of them laying claim to the obedience , and submission of the subjects , the former that of the usurper , w●o being in possession of the crown by the permissive will of god , who hath thought fit to adopt the subjects into a fatherly power , and the latter , that paternal right which he supposes still to remain in the expulsed prince , and his heirs for ever . by which means the allegiance of the subjects is so divided and perplext , that they can never be able to tell , when the allegiance to the right heir is to take place before that of the usurper . m. but if you had been pleased better to observe this discourse , you would find that sir r. f. hath very well obviated this objection , as appears by these words . the right of fatherly government was ordained by god for the preservation of mankind ; if it be usurped , the usurper may be so far obeyed as may tend to the preservation of the subjects , who may thereby be enabled to perform their duty , to the true and right sovereign when time shall serve , in such cases to obey an usurper is properly to obey the first and right governour , who must be presumed to desire the safety of his subjects . the command of an usurper is not to be obeyed in any thing tending to the destruction of the governour , whose being in the first place is to be looked after . f. this is i confess a very pretty distinction to make the usurper , who governs , whether the right heir will or no , yet to do it by his consent , and that the subjects when they act thus do but still obey their rightful governour , which supposition would be contradictory to what your author hath already laid down of the subjects being adopted into the obedience of another ●atherly . power by the usurpa●ion ; for if it be as he now makes it , they still remain under the paternal power of the former prince and the usurper governs only as his deputy w●ich is a very choice refined notion : by which all men had been obliged in conscience to yield as full an obedience to cr●mwell and the rump in all things that did not tend to the destruction of ●he 〈◊〉 kings person , as to him himself , which i suppose you high royalists will by no means admit of . but this is not the main matter , that i have to except against , for if the principles i have read out of that treatise be true , that the right of a lawful monarch , and his right heirs is a divine right , and that no length of time or prescription can bar it , because a divine right never dyes , can be lost , or taken away ; till the knowledge of the right heir be lost by all the subjects ; and till when u●urpers and their heirs can never acquire an absolute , and indefeasible right in the kingdoms they possess ; it will certainly follow that the title that most princes of christen●om have to their crowns , will be hereby rendred disputable , and uncertain , for since this author acknowledges , that the titles of most kings at this day begun by unjust conquests or usurpations at first : the right heirs of many of which expulsed or deposed princes are still , or wore lately in being , they might upon this pretence make war upon the prince in possession , and his heirs , to the worlds end ; and tho' i grant , he says , that an usurper is to be fully obeyed when the knowledge of the right heir is lost by all the subjects , it is extreamly uncertain , and doubtful , what he means by it : for if he means a personal knowledge , few ordinary subjects , but those that have personally known all the royal family , can thus know who was the right heir ; and so consequently , as soon as ever his father , or ancestor that held the throne , is turned out , or dead , few private subjects can have any personal knowledge of this heir . but if he means a moral , or traditional knowledge , such as is conveyed down to posterity by history , authentick records , or genealogies ; i know not how such a knowledge can ever be said to be lost , as long as such histories or memorials remain in being : and that this is so , is apparent , many princes in europe having upon this ground better right to the crowns of some neighbouring kingdoms , than those that wear them : and we know that by vertue of such an old title from charles the great , the king of france looks upon himself to have a good title to alsatia , flanders , and all the low countries , and as much of germany as he can get : so that i will leave it to your self to judge whether these principles do not only render the titles of most princes doubtful , and uncertain , but the subjects allegiance too . m. i cannot deny but sir r. f. may have carried this point of obedience , and submission to usurpers , and of a concurrent right in the lawful monarch , and his heirs , a little too far . for i think it were much better to suppose with grotius , and other writers , that after the third generation , or succession of the crown in the family of the usurper , they may have a good and perfect title to their crowns against the right heirs of the lawful monarch ; ) and this i take to be highly reasonable for the peace , and welfare of mankind ( than that they should not be always divided in their allegiance between two opposite princes ; but till then i suppose the subjects are bound to assist , and stand for the lawful heir , and his posterity , as far as is possible , without their own apparent destruction . f. i confess this supposition is much more reasonable , than the former , but i should be glad to know by what law of god , or nature , the peaceable possession of a crown by an usurper , and his heirs , just for three generations , or successions , should give a prince a better title than three , or four years possession ; for god may have declared his will as sufficiently in that time , as in three or four hundred : and if your reason be good , that it is for the peace , and safety of mankind , that the title of the right heir , should be lost , and extinct after such a time ; i cannot see why it should not be more for the good of mankind , that their allegiance should be settled , and ascertained in a far less space , that is , as soon as the conqueror , or usurper is quietly settled in the throne , and hath received the consent or submission of all the subjects . but i do not desire at present to enter any farther into this knotty dispute , about conquest , or usurpations , but i rather desire to refer it to our next meeting . m. well , since you will have it so , i yield to it , but in the mean time , i cannot but smile at your great partiality to the people , who upon your principles , if they have but once given their consent to the usurper , he shall presently have as good a title as the most rightful monarch in the world : so that cromwell having had this consent of the people in his mock-parliament , had as good a title as king charles ii. so that notwithstanding whatever you may pretend to the contrary , you are no such enemy to usurpers , as you would make your self : but however , you have no reason in the world ( even by your own principles ) to except against this author's hypothesis of transferring the subjects allegiance by a conquest , or usurpation . f. i do not deny what you say , but then the conquest must be in a just , or lawful war , or else if the great turk , or french king , should without any provocation given , make war upon , and co●quer this kingdom , and use the people with the highest tyranny , and cruelty , they must be all bound , in conscience , not only to become , but continue absolute subjects , nay slaves to such a conqueror , without any resistance . but let the power of usurpers , or conquerors , be what it will , i am sure it cannot be that of paternal authority , for the reasons already given , nor can it be the usurpa●ion , or acquisition of the power of a master of a family , for then the subjects not being the children of the conqueror , or usurper , must be all slaves instead of subjects : so that i must again tell you , that it is from your want of distinguishing between paternal , masterly , and rega● authority , which hath led you into all these mistakes in this matter : for the relations of a father , a master , and a king , are all really distinct , and different , so that one of them is not the other , as any man may easily perceive that doth but hear the three names pronounced to him , and consider their signification : and therefore quitting this subject for the present , if you have any better arguments to prove your divine institution of monarchy , pray produce them , for it grows late . m. i shall readily obey your commands , but pray sir , in the mean time remember , that we reassume this question the next time we meet . but to come to the matter in hand , i think there are yet some material arguments behind , to prove monarchical government of divine institution . for in the first place you may please to remember , that you your self have acknowledged , that all civil government proceeds from god. secondly , you have likewise admitted , that the government of fathers , or heads of families , was the first and most antient government of any in the world after the fall ; when some government became necessary for the punishment of offences , and the restraining of the inordinate appetites , and passions of mankind . and lastly , that this government having absolute power of life , and death , in some cases over the wife , children and servants of the family ; and that if this power is conferred upon them by god ( which you likewise granted ) and doth not depend upon the consent , or compact of the wife , children , and servants : if these things were so , i leave it to your self to consider , from the premises , whether this power in heads , or fathers of families ( call them which you please ) is not a monarchical power , or the government of one man , and that ordained by god ; and that this was the only government in the world , before the institution of common-wealths , you your self cannot deny . f. i shall shew you plainly , that you would impose a fallacy either upon your self , or me in this argument , and such a one which i have likewise already answered at our last meeting . for i then told you , that the government of such heads or fathers of families , was only an oeconomical , and not a civil power ; and this i proved by divers arguments against what you then argued to the contrary ; and therefore i think i may yet safely affirm , that kingly , or monarchical power , cannot be proved to be of divine institution , by this argument : and i have a greater man than sir r. f. viz. the judicious mr. hooker on my side , who makes a plain distinction between such a head , or master of a family , and a king , as appears by these words in his ecclesiastical policy , which i desire you would read with me ; it is no improbable opinion therefore , which the arch-philosopher was of , that the chief person in every houshold was always as it were a king ; so when numbers of housholds joyned themselves in civil societies together , kings were the first kind of governours amongst them ; which is also as it seems the reason why the name of fathers continued still in them , who of fathers were made rulers ; as also the antient customs of governours to do as melchisedeck , as being kings to exercise the office of priests , ( which fathers did at the first ) gr●w , perhaps by the same occasion . howbeit this is not the only kind of regiment , that hath been received in the world ; the inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry others to be divised . so that in a word all civil regiment , of what kind soever , seems evidently to have risen from the deliberate advice , consultation , and composition , between men judging it convenient , and helpful , there being no impossibility in nature considered by it self , but that man might have lived without any publick regiment . so that you may see , that tho he places the original of all governments in the heads , or fathers of families ( which opinion i shall not oppose ; ) yet it is plain ▪ that he makes a clear distinction between oeconomical government , and that politique or civil power which arises from compact between men. so that this will not serve the purpose you bring it for . you may now proceed to what other arguments , and instances you please ; but pray do not make use any more of the examples of the patriarchs either before , or after the flood ; since they are either altogether uncertain , or else as to those after the flood ▪ i have proved them to have been not kings , but only masters of separate families . and you may likewise omit moses , ioshuah , and the judges , as instances of monarchical power by divine institution ; since i have so lately proved their authority , not to have been at all absolute , or regal . m. i shall not any longer insist upon them , since you will not admit of those instances , tho' i think there may be a great deal of weight in them . but this much i suppose you cannot deny , as well from the testimony of sacred , as prophane history , that monarchy is the first and most antient government in the world , as appears by those remains we have left concerning the egyptian , and assyrian monarchies . and as for the government of gods own people the jews , he was pleased to be king over them himself , tho' to govern by his viceroys , till such time as he was pleased to make saul , and david kings over them . now what can be a greater argument than this for the divine institution of monarchical government . f. i suppose you will not urge the antiquity of a government to be a mark of its divine institution ; it may indeed be an argument to prove that monarchy was the most natural government , because the most simple , and easie for men to light on ; and so no doubt it was , in the first ages of the world , before ambition , avarice , and luxury had debauched the minds of monarchs , the best sort of government . and so on the other side , there is this to be objected against it , that the setting up of so many common-wealths upon the ruines of monarchies , shewed that men found great mischiefs , and inconveniences in that sort of government when once it grew tyrannical , or else they had never departed from it . and this made them , as brutus said , at the beginning of the roman common-wealth , to invent other sorts of government which might partake of all the benefits without the inconveniences of absolute monarchy . but as for your instance of god's being himself king over the people of israel , this touches not the question in hand , since that being a theocratical , and not a civil common-wealth , could concern no other nation but themselves . and as for your other instance of god's making saul king , i hope you will not bring that for an argument of his approbation , which it appears he was so angry with the israelites for desiring . and though it is true , he did , at their request , make them a king ; yet it is apparent , god would have been much better pleased , had they still continued without one . so that i think there can no conclusive argument be drawn from any examples in the old testament , to prove monarchical government to be of divine institution . m. well ; however slight you make of my authorities out of the old testament ; yet i hope i shall be able to shew more cogent ones out of the new , to prove , that monarchy is the only power instituted ; or so much as taken notice of by our saviour christ and his apostles . and therefore when he would command the pharisees to yield obedience to the supreme power then in being , he bids them , upon their shewing him a piece of mony , to render to caesar the things that are caesar ' s. not taking any notice of the senate , or people , whose authority these caesars had usurped . and if st. paul , in his epistle to the romans , had only said , let every soul be subject to the higher powers , and said no more ; then men might indeed have disputed , whether st. paul , by higher powers , had not meant as well other governours , as kings , or other forms of government , as monarchy . but the good luck is , st. paul hath been his own interpreter ; for , after the general doctrin of obedience to be given by all men to the higher powers , he proceeds next to charge it home upon each particular man's conscience , under pain of damnation , saying , wilt thou not be afraid of the power ? which power he expounds in the singular number , restraining it to one person ; he is the minister of god to thee , &c. it is not , they are the ministers : and then again ▪ he beareth not the sword in vain ; and a third time , in the same verse , lest we should forget it , he says , for he is the minister of god , &c. so st. peter also doth the like ; for the self-same word that st. paul useth for higher , in st. peter is translated supream : so that though in our english bibles the words differ , yet in the original they are both the same ; and st. paul might have been englished , let every soul be subject to the supreme powers ; or st. paul might have been also translated , whether to the king as to the higher . yet there is this difference ; that whereas st. paul useth the word in the plural number , st. peter hath it in the singular , and with application to the king only , without taking any notice of any governours but kings , and those sent by them . and it is farther to be noted , that st. peter and st. paul wrote their epistles at a time when the roman senate had some share in the government ; and that it was ( in appearance at least ) a common-wealth . so that some authors suppose , that notwithstanding the emperors , by strong hand , had usurped a military power , yet a great share of the government was , for a long time , nay even then in the senate and people . but for all this , neither of the two apostles take any notice of any such popular government . no nor our saviour himself , who divideth all between god and casar , and allows nothing , that we can find , for the people , or common-wealth . f. i think your quotations out of the new testament will prove of no more weight than those from the old , and that they will not make out monarchy to be of divine institution , any more than the former . for our saviour's answer to the iews signifieth no more , than that tribute , and all lawful dues were to be pay'd to caesar , as the supreme power then in being ; to answer those iews , who doubted , whether any obedience were to be given to a forreign prince of another religion than their own . the like answer may be given to what st. paul says in the romans let every soul be subject to the highest power ; which was chiefly directed to the newly-converted iews , who might doubt as well as their country-men in iudea , whether they were bound in conscience to be subject to heathen magistrates ; as also against the sect of the gnosticks ( then newly sprung up ) who , though they called themselves christians , yet looked upon themselves to be thereby discharged from all subjection or obedience to civil powers ; being those whom st. iude expresly speaks against , who despise dominion , and speak evil of dignities . and therefore when st. paul speaks of such higher powers , it is not in the plural , but singular number ; terming him , the minister of god ; because , that at that time , there was no such thing as a common wealth ( as he knew of in the world ) the two greatest empires , the roman , and the parthian , being then govern'd by monarchs . the like i may say to that other text you have quoted out of st. peter ; which may very well be reconciled with that place of st. paul , though the one called the higher powers , the powers ordained of god ; and the other calls them , an humane ordinance , or creature ( as it is in the original ) since they certainly derive their authority from god , though by the mediation , or consent of men. and i believe you will prove mistaken , in affirming , that the senate , or people had any power when st. peter and st. paul wrote these epistles . for it plainly appears that whether these epistles were written in the reigns of claudius or nero the government was then wholly in the roman emperours ; for though i grant , that during the time of augustus , the senate had some shadow of power , and that divers provinces were under their government ; yet by that time tiberius had reigned but a few years , he quite took away all power from the senate , and made them no more , than what the parliament of paris are to the french king , meer ministers of his tyranny , and oblig'd to verify all his edicts ; and the compliance and flattery of these senators was so servile , that they passed whatsoever decrees he sent them , without the least hesitation ; till it became so fulsome even to himself , that it made him cry out , o gens in servitute●● natapunc ; so that all you have said on this subject , signifies no more , than that our saviour and his apostles did not come into the world to dissolve , or alter the civil governments , or the policies of kingdoms , but to command obedience to them ▪ as they found them setled in the world , as the moderate mela●cthon very well observes , christus non venit mutaré politias . and i doubt not , but if our blessed saviour had thought sit to come into the world about half an age sooner , and to have been born , and preached the gospel in the time of the roman common-wealth , but he would have commanded the iews to have paid tribute to the senate , and people of rome , as well as he did to caesar. and s. peter would have enjoyned all subjection , and obedience to be given them ; and might have said with greater reason of them , than of those subordinate magistrates they sent to govern their provinces , that they were the ministers of god ▪ and if your arguments for the divine right of kings be true , it would be no rebellion at this day for subjects to rise up , and destroy the supreme powers in all common-wealths , because they are not monarchical ; and consequently those in relation to whom god hath left us no rules of obedience . which doctrine , if any man 〈◊〉 offer to preach in the territories of venic● , or holland ; i think , in the 〈◊〉 the preacher might very deservedly be sent to the gallies : and , in the lat●●r , they would , at least , send him a pair of shoes . but if you have any thing fa●ther to urge for the iure divinoship of monarchy , pray will you let me hear it , for i am weary with answering such trifles . m. i confess i have not much to object against what you have now replyed 〈◊〉 therefore i shall insist no farther upon it ; only thus much i am satisfied of ; that god , by his own example , as well as institution among the iews , seems more particularly to have approved of kingly government ( and that absolute too ) than any other ; not that i will condemn all common wealths , as unlaw●●● but that as being soveraign powers , they may be also ordained of god. but i have another objection to make against your hypothesis , and that is , you have in your former conversation supposed a natural property in things , precedent to civil government , which can scarce be understood . for by what rig●t can any man lay claim to any property , but by the laws of the government in which he lives ? and how can there be any such laws before there was some supreme legislator to make them ? so that the only way ( i know of ) to solve this difficulty , is to suppose . that the sole dominion of things was in noah after the floud ; and that whatsoever property , in any thing , his posterity possest in several , they enjoyed it by his grant and allotment ; and , in vertue thereof , transmitted the same to their posterity , without waiting for the election , or consent of the people , or entring into any articles of capitulation with them , whom they were to govern ; as you suppose was necessary for the institution of civil government . and the texts , in the tenth of genesis , seem to import as much . by these were the isles of the gentiles divided in their lands , every one after his tongue , after their f●●ilies in their nations . t●ese 〈◊〉 the families of the sons of noah , after their generations in th●ir nations ; and by these were the nations divided in the earth after the floud . that is , not only the nations themselves , but the isles or countries of the earth were divided by these patriarchs , amongst their posterities , into particular states and territories . and so likewise in all the absolute monarchies in the world ; all the property that men enjoy either in goods or lands , is either actually in the prince , or else was at first derived from him ; though i do not deny , but when such a distinct propriety in goods , or lands , is once instituted by the monarch in any kingdom , that he cannot again alter it , or take it away without manifest violence and injustice . and hence it is that our common lawyers maintain , that all the lands in england are held of the king , either mediately , or immediately . for upon the conquest by william the conquerour , all mens estates were thereby vested in him : so that there is no way so natural , and easie to solve all those difficulties that do arise concerning the original of civil government and property , than to make them begin together in the persons of adam , and noah , and thence deriv'd to all their posterity . so that whatsoever absolute dominion princes or states have claimed in those countries , and places which they have either seiz'd upon themselves , as the first occupants , or else have conquer'd from others , they enjoy'd them meerly as they represented adam or noah , the first monarchs of the world. nor can we other way avoid these several other intolerable inconveniences , and absurdities that will follow from supposing an original community of things , or that every man at first might take what quantity of land he pleas'd , without the authority or assignment of any supreme power . as to what you say , concerning god's approving monarchy above all other governments , by his instituting it among the iews ; that way of arguing is very uncertain and fallacious ; since one may , by the same reason argue , that the ceremonial part of the mosaical law was the best that god could have contrived , because he was pleased to prescribe it to the iews , during the time they should be under the government of it : no doubt god prescribed them such a government both in church and state , as he thought fit for their present occasion , and inclinations ; but whether that were the best , or of perpetual institution , is no where said . but as for the other part of your argument ; f. i thought you had been very well satisfied by what i said at our first meeting , that neither adam , nor noah , had by grant or donation from god , a sole right to the earth and all things therein . but since you are not yet satisfied with what i there said , i shall answer this objection more particularly , and i doubt not but i shall make it so plain to you , that you your self shall confess , that there is no such great mystery , or difficulty in the tracing of property , as also civil government to their first origina's , without supposing any such absolute dominion , or property in adam and noah , or in any other supreme power , as their successors . i shall therefore first of all remove the main obstacle you have laid in the way , and shew you , that the places of scripture you have cited to this purpose , do not prove the thing you intend them for : i did before shew you , that there was no manner of ground for sir r. f's . opinion , that none of adam's sons could have a property in any thing , without adam's assignment ; nor that any of noah's sons , when separated from their fathers family , could have any property in any thing but by their fathers donation ; scripture and antient history being altogether silent in these matters . and therefore you are fain to lay hold of the first place of scripture that you think might serve your turn , which will not do the business neither . for supposing i should grant you , that in the dispersion , or division , that was made of mankind after the floud , over a great part of the world , the people that then followed their ancestors , or leaders , after this dispersion ( though the text doth not mention any such thing ) followed them as princes or monarchs . yet this will not prove what you would have , that these fathers of nations made this division of the earth , in right of that dominion , which god conferred at first on adam and noah . since ( as i have already proved ) if this division had been made in right of the dominion that descended upon noah , it ought to have been performed by the authority of only one man , and him the eldest descendant of the eldest son of noah : and i have also sufficiently shewed you the absurdity of this fancy of such a divine right . and besides , it plainly contradicts its self ; for either this division you talk of , was made in the days of noah , or it was not ; if the latter , then it is apparent , that from the time of noah to that of heber , there was a community of things , and properties ; though you have asserted the contrary : if the former , and that the earth was divided before , then to what purpose was this division in the days of peleg ▪ and though i grant , that about that time , every language , or nation , might , under the conduct of their prince , or leader , seize upon some territory , or island , sufficient for them to inhabit in ; yet doth not the text tell us , whether the countrey they lived in was by them divided into particular shares , or whether they made use of it in common , as the indians of america do at this day , where the quantity of land doth far exceed that of the inhabitants that live in it . nor lastly , supposing that a division was made of these countries , they then inhabited , doth it tell us , whether it was done by the sole authority of their prince , or leader , claiming as his own the whole dominion of it ; so that no man could have right to a foot of ground in it , but himself ; or whether this division was made by the joynt consent and agreement of all the rest of the heads of families , and other freemen that went along with him . the scripture is silent in these circumstances , that only telling us that the great grand-sons of noah mentioned , gen. . the isles of the gentiles were divided in their lands , every one after his tongue , after their families in their nations . and that this division was in the days of peleg , but no where declares whether every particular region , or countrey was then divided into distinct shires , or not . and as for what you say , that all princes and conquerors of territories , and countries , have the like absolute dominion and property in them as adam , and noah had over the whole world , if it were no more than that , i doubt it would be very little , since i have already proved , and i think you must grant , that no monarch at this day can claim his crown as the right heir of adam , or noah , or as their representatives , and it will , i think , be much harder to prove , that the sole property of an acquired country , or kingdom , must be in them by vertue of any such right : but as for your instance of william the conqueror's having a right to all the lands in england by conquest ; since it requires somewhat a longer answer , than the time will now afford , i shall refer speaking farther of it , till another opportunity : but pray sir , at present , make me see a little plainer what those inconveniences , and absurdities are , that will follow from my hypothesis , that god at first gave the world , and all creatures therein to mankind , to be used and enjoyed in common if they thought fit . m. i shall shew you some farther absurdities that will follow from it , than i have done already ; for tho' grotius and selden indeed maintain , that a community of things was by the law of nature , of which god is the author , and yet that such a community should not be able to continue , seems to derogate● from the providence of god , to ordain a community of things , which could not continue . and it seems also an act of high presumption in the descendants of noah , to abrogate the natural law of community by introducing that of a propriety in things . f. i pray give me leave to interrupt you , that you may not run on in a mistake ; for let grotius , or selden assert what they please , i am not tied to submit to it ; and therefore when i say , that god gave the world , and all the creatures therein to men to be used in common if they please , i thereby understood , that god hath by the laws of nature commanded nothing in this matter , but hath left the earth , and all things therein , to be used in common , or in several , as may best consist with the convenience , necessity , or customs and laws of each particular nation , or common-wealth , who god designs should live peaceably together , and make the best use of the country where they inhabit , and the things therein contained , for their own common maintenance , and safety ; according to the expression of the royal psalmist ; but the earth hath god given to the children of men , i. e. all the descendants of adam . m. well , suppose it were so , the prime duties of the second table are chiefly conversant about this right of propriety , but if this propriety were introduced by human laws , or agreements , as grotius , and you your self suppose , then both the moral , and divine law would depend upon the will of men , so that there could be no law of nature against adultery , or theft , if women , and all things else had been in common . f. this objection wholy proceeds from your not having any distinct , or true notions of the nature and true original of propriety ; and therefore if you please to hear my account of it , i hope you will grant ( when i have done ) that your objection against the community or things , will be to no purpose ; i do therefore in the first place distinguish between a natural and a civil propriety : by the former m●n might be guilty of the●t , before civil propriety was instituted ; but as for adultery ▪ that was always unlawful both by the laws of god , and nature , which abh●rs community of women , and promis●uous copulations ; and god hath particularly , ordained that the man and his wife should be one hesh , and no man that maintains a natural community of things , ever supposed that women were amongst those things that were to be in common , or that a man had the same kind of propriety in his wife , as in his horse , so that the command against adultery might very well consist with the community of things . m. suppose i grant this , i do not understand how there can be a natural propriety , and yet a community in things as you suppose . f. i wonder you should not be able to apprehend this , and have been so often at an ordinary , and a play-house ▪ at the former you know , tho' a man hath a right to his dinner , yet all the meat at the table being in common ▪ he cannot call any part of it his own , till he hath cut it , or divided it from the rest . and at the latter , a man hath a right to a place , either in the box , or in the pit , and yet he cannot tell where it is , till he hath placed himself in it , or sent some body to keep it for him . m. i do apprehend what you mean , but pray explain to me the manner of this natural propriety , ● little more at large . f. i would readily do it , since if that were well done , i grant it would be a great step to the clearing of the original , and nature of all civil power . i would readily do it , were it not now too late to enter upon so long a subject , and therefore i think we may both be sufficiently 〈◊〉 with talk , so as to put it off until another opportunity , when i shall give you my thoughts of the 〈◊〉 original of civil government , in what sense it proceeds from god , and yet how far the consentus the people is necessary to make it obligatory on the consciences of the subjects ; which when it is once well setled , i hope there will be little need of disputing farther whether this great alteration hath been brought about by lawful means or not . m. i thank you for the pains you have taken to inform my understanding in this matter : and therefore since 't is now very late , i desire we may adjourn our conversation to another time : and then i desire that you would prepare your self to discourse with me of the second important question ▪ we agreed on , viz. the irresistibility if all supreme powers by their subjects , not only because resistance in any case whatsoever 〈◊〉 inconsistent with supreme power , and destructive to the peace of civil society , but chiefly as they derive their authority immediately from god , and are only to render an account to him of their actions . f. i will not deny but what you have said is true in some sense , that all soveraign power is derived from god , and is also as such irresistible by subjects . but to affirm generally and absolutely ( as most of your opinion do ) that all commands and acts of men end●●d with this supreme authority , whether good , or bad , lawful or unlawful , are part of that authority derived from god , and therefore irresistible in any cas● , or upon any necessity whatsoever , is so dangerous a proposition , that i know none that hath contributed more to the encouragement of the r●ng and the popish faction we favoured , to make all those breaches upon our laws ▪ religion and liberties which we have suffered since the beginning of his reign . m. i am so well pleased with the freeness ▪ and ingenuity of your conversation , that i desire nothing more than to discuss this important question with you at our next meeting : but i beg your pardon , if being taken up by come business to morrow ▪ i adjourn our next meeting to the day after , when , if you please to come at the same hour at you did to night , you shall here find me ready to wait on you . in the mean time i must bid you good night . f. your servant sir , i wish you heartily good night , i will not fail to meet you at the time appointed . finis . bibliotheca politica : or a discourse by way of dialogue , whether resistances , of the svpream power by a whole nation , or people , in cases of the last extremity can be justified by the law of nature , or rules of the gospel . collected out of the most approved authors , both antient and modern . dialogue the third . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms ; where also may be had the first and second dialogues . . the subject of the third dialogue . authors whose words , or sense , are made use of in this discourse , and how denoted in the margin . . dr. hicks's iovian , or answer to iulian h. i. . mr. bohuns defence of sr. r. filmer . b. d. f. . two treatises of government . t. t. g. . a pamphlet , entituled , vindiciae iuris regii . v. i. r. . dr. sherlocks case of resistance . s. c. r. . plato , redivivus . p.r. . mr. l'estrange's observator . l. o. advertisement to the reader . the author in relation to this , as well as the subsequent dialogue , desires you to be so candid as to believe , that tho' under the name , of free-man , he hath argued against an opinion , now , or lately much in vogue , viz. that an absolute irresistibility , is an insepable prerogative of all soveraign powers , as well monarchies , as common-wealths . yet no man more abhors all unnecessary resistance , or rebellion against supream civil magistrates , and is more for an absolute submission by all particular persons , whether private , or publick in case of the highest injuries and oppressions done to themselves alone , and where the common good of the community is not immediately concerned , than himself : and this he owns to be their duty , not only out of a generous regard to the peace , & tranquillity of the common-wealth , whereof they are members , ( & which ought not to be disturbed to revenge , or redress a few private injuries , ) but also from the express command of gods will reveal'd in the holy ss . expresly forbidding , not only all revenge , but self-defence too , whilst the supream powers act legally , tho' perhaps contrary to the strict rules of justice , and equity , in such particular cases . yet for all this , the author must still declare , he doubts whether those precepts do extend to all resistance whatever , viz of any whole nation , or great body of men , whose preservation or freedom from an intolerable slavery , and oppression may render it necessary for the good of the common wealth , and is no other way to be procured but by a vigorous resistance , or else joyning with some powerful neighbour prince , or state , who shall interpose for their deliverance ; so that if such a resistance be ever lawful , it can be upon no less momentous an● account , than that of a general invasion , either of the lives , liberties , religion , or properties of a whole , or major part of a nation , as they are established by the law of nature , or the fundamental constitutions , and municpial laws of those particular kingdoms , and common-wealths , where such an insupportable tyranny and oppressions are then exercised : and if this be not lawful in such extraordinary cases , it would seem as if god had preferred the unjust power , or force , and the outward grandeur of the governours before the good and happiness of the governed , which is contrary to the main ends of all civil government , viz. the common good & happiness of mankind , even as those who are most against all resistance whatever must allow . but whether such resistance be not in these cases a lawful ( nay only means ) for the safeguard ; and deliverance of such assaulted , or oppressed nations , the author leaves it to the iudgment of the impartial reader to determine , upon the perusal of this , and the subsequent discourse ( since all that could be urged on both sides in this important question , could not be comprised , within the limits of one evenin●● conversation which the author had prescribed to himself ) yet will he not be much concerned on which side you give your sentence . since however criminal some men have endeavoured to render the doctrine of resistance even in the cases proposed ; yet the author must believe ( till he is better convinced to the contrary ) that the question being only moral , or political , and not about any point of faith , or law , may be safely maintained by either party , without any guilt , either of heresie , or treason . the author farther desires you to take notice , that tho' he hath in both these subsequent dialogues , made one of his disputants to make use , not only of the arguments , but the very expressions of two learned , and reverend divines , in some late treatises on this subject , yet that he hath not acted thus , out of any design of writing against them , or those opinions there laid down , as they are theirs , ( since it is well known the same arguments , and texts of scripture have been made use of by other writers on this subject long before ) . but as it must be confessed that none have managed this controversie with better reason , and greater eloquence , so he hopes that neither they , nor any friend of theirs , will take it amiss , if out of a just value of their learned writings , he hath put that part of the controversy in their works , as the best be could meet with , and which he dares not pretend to alter , and as for the answers , he hath put them , either in his own , or else in the expressions of one or two late writers , who have undertaken to answer what they formerly had written on this question . to conclude , since the author does not take all that those have layed down on either side , for clear , and unquestionable demonstrations , ( for then there would be no need of publishing any more than the arguments of one side ) he hopes neither party will take it ill , if he hath here fairly represented the strongest and most plausible arguments , that are brought on both sides for what doctrine soever is true , such truth will not look the worse , or lose ground if it appears in its true natural dress ) tho' set against its opposite errour : but if a great deal of what hath been layed down by persons too violent on either side , appear upon a strict examination to be meer precarious opinions ; whose best authority is the great names of some that have broacht them ; he hopes no indifferent person can take it ill , if he endeavours to discover these mistakes , since all men are liable to errours , and as none can be more sensible of this , than himself , so whenever either of those learned , and reverend persons , or any other shall convince him of any weak or false reasonings in this discourse , he promises to retract them , with he first opportunity . the third dialogue between mr. meanwell a civilian and mr. freeman a gentleman . f. you are welcome , sir , i see you are a punctual man to your word . will you be pleased to sit down by the fire , and drink a dish of tea . m. i thank you , sir , i assure you , i love to be punctual in small things , as well as in great ones , when i am not hindred , or prevented by business . f. before we come to the question , we the last time resolved to make the subject of our present entertainment , it will , i think , be convenient for me to look back , and see what i have already proved , at our two former conferences , viz. . that adam had not , either by natural right of fatherhood , or by positive donation from god , any such authority over his children , or dominion over the world , as you pretended . . that if he had , yet his sons , or heirs , had no right to it . . that if his heirs had , there being no law of nature , nor positive law of god , that determines who is the right heir in all cases that may arise , the right of succession , and consequently of bearing rule , could not have been certainly determined , without the judgment of the rest of the children , or descendants of adam . . that the knowledge of the right heir of adam , ( supposing still there was one , ) being now long since lost , no prince or monarch in the world can graft any title upon this paternal dominion of adam or noah . . that all authority of inflicting punishments of life and death , or other less penalties for the breach of the laws of nature , or the transgression of the civil laws of the common-wealth is originally derived from god , as being that power with which god in the state of nature hath intrusted , all masters , or heads of separate families , and this not as fathers , but as masters . . that since all kingdoms and commonwealths at this day do owe their original either to the election of the people , or to usurpation , or conquest ; god doth not now by the ordinary course of his providence confer this divine authority on any persons whatsoever , so as to give them a right to the people's allegiance without the people's consent first had , or else an owning of their titles by a subsequent voluntary submission to them . m. i grant indeed , that you have with great labour , and some appearance of reason too , endeavoured to prove those principles you have here laid down ; yet however , tho' the five first of them should be true , i have a great deal still to except against the last , if you please to hear me . for i think , i can shew you a great many evil consequences , that will follow from this principle of making the consent , or submission of the people at all necessary to the conveying of a supream power , or of that divine authority which you grant to be derived from god himself on all monarchs , and supream magistrates in commonwealths . f. i pray give me leave a little to interrupt you . i know very well what this evil consequence is , of supposing the consent of the people as a means at all necessary , for the conveying of this divine authority , that is , in plain english , because it will destroy your darling doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance ; therefore if it be so , pray let us rather fall presently to the question it self , than argue by consequences , which if we should go that way to work , i have my consequences likewise to urge ; some of which i have given you already . therefore , if you please , let us begin a fairer way , and hear me propose those heads , in which i doubt not but we do both agree , and then i will bring it to the main case or question , in which perhaps we differ . m. i confess , i had somewhat more to say , which would have tended to prove this doctrine of non-resistance , but since you are pleased to propose another method , which you better approve of ; i am ready to comply with you . therefore , sir , go on , in what way you think fit . f. i shall then in the first place lay it down for a principle , ( which i suppose you will not deny ) that all civil power being from god , it was principally instituted by him , for the peace , happiness and safety of mankind ; that is , of all the subjects who are to live together in a commonwealth , or civil society . : that all kings , or supream magistrates , are likewise secured by gods authority in those due rights and prerogatives which are necessary , for their well discharging this great trust or duty which god requires of them , and in consideration of which the people at first elected , or submitted themselves to them . if therefore you grant , as i suppose you will , these two reasonable propositions , the question will amount to no more than this , whether , if the supream power in any kingdom , or commonwealth , so far abuses this trust , which god by the people hath committed to them , and instead of preserving and defending the lives , liberties , and estates of their subjects , they manifestly go about to destroy , or grievously to oppress them , by making them , instead of subjects , meer slaves , and vassals ; the question , i say then , is , whether , if such violence or oppressions be committed upon the whole people , or so considerable a part of it , as that the safety and well-being of the whole commonwealth cannot in any likelihood subsist without it , the people , or such a considerable part of them , may not , ( in case their lives , liberties and persons are unjustly assaulted , and oppress 't by the officers or standing armies of the prince , or other supream powers ) for their own defence take up arms to defend their lives , liberties and estates against such an armed force , and violence . where , by the way , i desire you to take notice , that i do here asolutely disclaim all resistance of , or self defence against civil authority , or the officers commissioned by it , by any private single person , whether such power be exerted according to law or not , or else abused in some cases to the hurt or destruction of such single person only : so that i suppose this resistance to be lawful only in case of a general destruction , or intolerable oppression of the whole people , or at least a very considerable part of them , and those that are in the chiefest places of the administration . m. i confess the doctrine of resistance , as you have put it ; seems at first somewhat plausible , and to tend to the common good , and preservation of the people , or civil society . but let me tell you , i am of opinion , that when ever it comes to be put in practice , it proves ( like the other speculations of commonwealths-men ) more hurtful than beneficial to the common safety , and preservation of the people ; and consequently more destructive to the main ends of government , than conducive to the good and happiness of mankind ; and last of all , that such resistance cannot well be maintained , or executed without the deposing , or absolute destruction of the prince , or other supream magistrates , whatever may be pretended to the contrary . and indeed it is almost impossible to suppose , that any monarch or supream magistrates , should ever ( unless they were stark mad ) purposely go about to kill or destroy their subjects , in the multitude and safety of whom , consists his chief strength , and riches . and you may as well tell me , that a shepherd , whilst he is in his right wits , should go about to kill , or destroy his flock , as that a monarch should wilfully intend to kill , or destroy his people . to conclude , since the people must be in all cases of tyranny , or oppression their own iudges , and executioners too , there is no rebellion so rank , and wicked , that this pretence of a self-defence of men's lives , estates , and liberties may not justifie ; whereas indeed , it is contrary to all natural , and civil justice , for the injured party to be his own judge , and executioner too . for then the other side may pretend to the like right , and the tryal must be referred to force , and arms , in which contention , if the people are overcome they are certainly reduced to a worse condition , than they were before : but if the prince , or supream magistrates have the worst on 't , the civil power then in being is absolutely ruined : so that whether the people , or magistrate overcome , the state of both of them is very deplorable ; besides divers other evil consequences of this doctrine , which i shall defer , till i hear what you can say , to what i have now urged against your opinion . f. you have made a very plausible speech , in setting forth the dreadful consequence of this doctrine of resistance in any case whatsoever ; and i confess , if what you lay down be true , viz. , that such resistance always brings along with it greater misery upon a people , than what the utmost violence and oppression of princes can produce , then your consequence would be also true , that such resistance is never to be practised upon any account whatsoever . so on the other side , if that be not true , neither will your consequence signifie anything . i suppose you will not deny , but that there may be such a thing as a tyrant , and that that part of mankind who live under him may be sensible of his tyranny , or else the definition which king iames i ▪ gives us of a tyrant in a speech which he made to the parliament in , would be altogether in vain . but the words are so fit for this purpose , that i will read them to you out of his works . i do acknowledge , that the special , and greatest point of difference that is between a rightful king , and an usurping tyrant , is this : that whereas the proud , and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom , and people are only ordained for the satisfaction of his desires , and unreasonable appetites , the righteous and iust king doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and prosperity of his people . and so likewise in another speech he made to the parliament , he hath this memorable passage , that a king governing in a settled kingdom , leaves to be a king , and degenerates into a tyrant , so soon as he ceases to rule according to the law. so that since it is plain , that the people may judge , when they have a tyrant , instead of a king to rule over them ; and that under such a tyrant , the condition of the people may be very deplorable ; the question still remains , what is best for them to do in this case : whether it be better for them , or they be obliged , by the laws of reason , and nature , patiently to submit to it , or else , if they can , either by their own force , or the assistance of a forreign prince , to cast off the yoke . and i think i may still maintain , that they may do it , notwithstanding what you have yet urged to the contrary . in the first place therefore , tho' you count it an almost impossible thing to suppose , that a prince or monarch would ever go about to murder , or destroy his subjects , yet as incredible as it is , i can give you several examples out of history both ancient , and modern , that some tyrants have been so bruitish as not only to endeavour it , but actually to put it in practice . of the first kind is that of caligula , whom suetonius mentions , to have wisht , that all the people of rome had but one neck , that he might cut it off at once . the other is of nero , ( in the same author , as also in tacitus ) who set the city of rome on fire , and consequently would have burnt all the people in it to please his humour , and that he might sing his ballad of the destruction of troy the more naturally whilst it burnt . a third example , i find related in mocquet's travels into the east-indies , of a certain king of pegu , * about an hundred years ago , who , by the perswasion of some of his diabolical priests , or magicians , took such an aversion to his subjects , that he was resolved to destroy them , and therefore forbid them to sow their lands for two , or three years , by which means a great part of them died of famine , or were forced to devour each other . and in such cases as these , i suppose , the laws of nature , and reason will justifie self-defence in the people , and sure it had been lawful for the people of rome to have resisted caligula's guards , if he had gone about to put his wicked wish into execution , or likewise to have resisted , or put to death those incendiaries they found firing the city , tho' they might have had the emperour nero's commission for it . so likewise sure it would have been as lawful for the people of pegu , to have resisted those whom the emperour might have sent to hinder them from ploughing , and sowing their lands . and that i am not the only man of this opinion , i desire you to consult what barclay hath in his treatise , contra monarchomachos which he writ against buchanan , de iure regni apud scotos , and the author of vindiciae contra tyrannos ; where , tho'he be a most zealous assertor of the unlimited , and irresistible power of prince● , yet in his third book chap. . he speaketh to this effect , the sense of whose words , as near as i can , i will give you in english. now if any one should say , but must the people always yield their throats to the fury , and cruelty of tyranty ● must they patiently permit their cities to be destroyed by hunger , f●e or sword , and their wives and children to be exposed to the lust of a tyrant , and also themselves to be brought into the utmost dangers , and miseries of life ? must that be denyed to them which is the right of all animals by nature , that is , that they may repel force with force , and defend themselves from injury ? to this it may easily be answered , that self-defence , which is of natural right , ought not to be denyed to the people : and therefore if the king doth not only exert his hatred against some single persons , but also shall go about to destroy the body of the common-wealth , of which he is head , that is , shall exert his hatred against the whole people , or some considerable part of them by an horrid , and intolerable cruelty , or tyranny , there is a power in the people in this case , only of defending it self , but not of invading the prince , or of revenging the injury given , neither of departing from their due reverence , because of the injury received ; in short it hath right only of repelling a present force , but not of revenging a past injury , for one of them indeed is from nature , that we should defend our lives , and persons from injury , and therefore the people may be able to prevent an evil before it be done , but cannot revenge it upon the king after it is done . therefore the people hath this right more than a private man , that he hath no other remedy left him but pat●ence ; whereas the people , if the tyranny be intolerable , may still resist , tho' with respect . in all which this author hath there said we may easily understand his meaning , unless it be in this of resisting force with respect , and reverence . for i cannot understand how a man may sight against his prince with reverence , or give his guard , a knock over the pa●e , or a cut in the face , with respect to the prince's authority . but the reason is plain why the people may act thus , because when a prince once goeth about to destroy , and make war upon his people , he doth not act then , as a monarch , but like a cut-throat , and enemy to the common-wealth ; and no man can imagine , a will to destroy , and to protect the people , can at once subsist in the same person . m. but pray give me leave to interrupt you a little , i grant indeed that by the political laws of any government , which are made to secure the rights of the subjects in their lives , and fortunes , no prince , can , or ought to , take away his subjects lives , or es●ates contrary to law ; yet by the imperial laws in every government , and by the laws of the gospel , which ( as i shall hereafter shew ) establish those laws in all perfect governments ( and particularly in the english , ) all these rights legally belong to the civil soveraign especially to be accountable to none , but god , to have the sole power , and disposal of the sword , and to be free from all coercive , and vindicative power , and from all resistance by force . it is by these common laws of soveraignty , that the gospel requires passive obedience , which is but another name for non-resistance , these laws are in eternal force against the subjects in defence of the soveraign , be he good , or evil , just , or unjust , christian , or pagan , be he what he will , no subject● or number of subjects whatsoever , can lift up his or their hands against the soveraign , and be guiltless by these laws . therefore for the subjects to bear the sword against their soveraign , or to defend themselves by force against him , or his forces , is against the common laws of soveraignty , and by consequence passive obedience even unto death , becomes a duty in soveraign governments , by vertue of those laws , and we are not to resist them upon any pretence whatsoever , but therefore all subjects are bound to suffer death wrongfully , rather than to resist them upon any pretence or account whatsoever . so that let popish writers ( though never so moderate ) say what they please , concerning the lawfulness of resistance in some cases , yet we of the church of england have learned better things from the scripture and the examples of the primitive christians , which we think our selves obliged most strictly to observe . and therefore in relation to our own government , and the present state of affairs , i shall reduce all that i have to say against resistance of the king , or those commissioned by him into this syllogisme . not to be resisted by the subjects is an inseparable right of all soveraign power . but the king is here the only soveraign power . ergo the king is upon no pretence whatsoever to be resisted by his subjects . so that not to quarrel any longer about words , non-resistance is the same thing with passive obedience and submission , and by consequence these are required by the imperial laws of the government . therefore , whatsoever the imperial laws of the government require of its subjects , if it be not contrary to god's laws , they are bound to perform it . but passive obedience , or patient suffering of injuries from the soveraign , is not forbid by god's laws , and therefore subjects are bound to perform it , where it is required by the imperial laws . f. i shall forbear to say any thing , as yet , concerning what doctrines the scriptures teach , or the primitive christians practised concerning this matter , because i desire to discourse that question apart from this of the laws of nature , or reason , which we are now upon , therefore i must tell you , that tho' this new fingle-fangle term of imperial law of non-resistance may sound very prettily to their ears who mind words more than sense , yet i must freely confess , that i am altogether a stranger to this notion of imperial laws , as also of the distinction you make between the imperial and political laws of this kingdom ; and if by imperial laws you mean those of the roman empire : i never knew that those laws had any thing to do in england before , but always supposed the politick laws of our country to be the only measure of the king's prerogative , as also of the subject's obedience and subjection . nor do your own civil laws , by as much as i know of them , make any difference between the imperial and political laws of the empire , for by the one , as well as the other , the civilians understand such laws , or edi●ts , of the emperours which with the approbation of the senate were made for the peace and well government of the common-wealth , but i never yet heard of any imperial laws whereby the emperour declared , that he had a right to plunder , or murder all the citizens of rome , or that they believed they were obliged to suffer by your imperial laws without any resistance . i am sure , the senate and people did not believe , that the emperour had any such authority , when they declared nero , and maximin , for their intolerable cruelty , not only enemies of the common-wealth , but of mankind . but if by these imperial laws of non-resistance you mean no more than what you laid down in your syllogism , that it is an inseparable right or prerogative of soveraign powers , not to be resisted by their subjects , when you have proved this proposition , by the laws of nature and reason , i shall then believe it . but as for your conclusion , it being founded upon these premises , it needs no confutation , for if the imperial laws of government do not require your passive obedience ; then subjects are not bound to perform it . and to shew you the falseness and absurdity of this assertion that whatsoever the imperial laws of any government require of its subjects , if it be not contrary to god's laws , they are bound to perform it . in stead of passive obedience , or patient suffering of injuries , let us insert , to give up to the soveraign all our civil properties and estates , if demanded by him , is not forbid by god's laws , and therefore subjects are bound to perform it when ever it is required by the imperial laws : for certainly the absolute disposal of the estates of the subjects is as unseparable a prerogative of soveraign power as irresistibility it self , as i think i am able to prove , if you think fit to dispute that question . but at present i shall only confine my self to confute the major in your syllogism . in the first place therefore , tho' i do grant what you lay down for a ground to be true , that it belongs to soveraign powers to be accountable to , or punishable by , none but god , yet , i suppose , resistance of their violence and tyranny may very well be perform'd by the people , without calling them to a iudicial account or erecting a tribunal for that purpose ; calling to an account , and punishment are acts of authority of superiours over inferiours , but resistance for self-defence is a right of nature , and which no man , by entering into civil government , ever parted withal , but out of consideration of a greater good to be obtained thereby , ( viz. ) his own greater security together with the common good of that civil society , whereof he is a member ; which , when by the prince's violence it is once like to be wholly lost , his natural right of self-defence for the preservation of himself , and family again takes place ; nor doth he then resist the supreme powers as such , but as murderers , and cut-throats , who by going about to destroy the people have already loft all that right , they formerly had : and of this opinion is that moderate romish author , barclay before cited , who in the chap. of the book last quoted , hath this remarkable passage . what then ? can there no cases happen in which it may be lawful for the people by their own authority , to rise up , and resist a king governing tyrannically ? his answer to this question is , there are certainly none as long as he continues king : for the scriptures forbid it ; which say , honour the king , and he who resisteth the power , resisteth the ordinance of god ; therefore the people can have no power against him , unless he committeth something , by which he may cease to be king ; for then he himself abdicates his kingship , and becomes a private man , and by this means the people being made free , that right returns to them , which they had before the king was made ; but there are but few facts of that nature , which can produce such effects ; and i cannot , when i think of it , find more than two cases , in which a king doth ipso facto make himself no king , and thereby depriveth himself of all honour , regal dignity , and power , ( which also winzerus takes notice of . ) one of these is , if he destroys his kingdom ; and then gives us the examples of nero , and caligula as i have already done ; and next proceeds to this purpose that when any king designs , and doth seriously endeavour , to put this in practice , he casts off all care , and desire of governing ; and therefore thereby loses his empire over his subjects , as a lord of a servant loses his dominion over him , by giving up all care , and government of him . and of this opinion likewise are * grotius , and p●ffendorf † the two best , and most learned writers on this subject . who do not think it inconsistent with the rules of the gospel , for subjects to resist the king , if with a hostile mind , he seeks the destruction of his people , for , says the former , the will of commanding and destroying cannot consist together ; and therefore he who professes himself an enemy of the whole people , does thereby abdicate the kingdom , but that can scarce seem to happen in a king in his right witts , and who commands only one kingdom . but if he commands more kingdoms , it may so happen , that he would destroy the people of one nation , to gratifie the other , that he may there make colonies of them . and this , i suppose , grotius spoke in relation to the king of spain who ( they say ) had declared , that if he overcame the dutch , then in arms against him , he would fell the people for slaves into america , and people the country with spaniards . m. you very much mistake me , if you think , by imperial , i meant the roman laws , but only the common laws of soveraignty , which , tho' they destroy no man's natural , or civil rights , yet both grant , and confirm unto the legal soveraign in every government the essential rights of soveraignty , of which i take non-resistance , not only for wrath , but conscience lake , to be one of the chief . and therefore it were much better to venture the utmost that a tyrant can do towards his people by destroying them , than to give the least inlet to rebellion , by supposing the people may in any case whatsoever resist their prince ; for granting the worst that may happen , that a prince once in years to be so wicked and malicious , as to go about to destroy his people , yet he could scarce find means and hands enough to bring it about ; and admit he should destroy by his mercenary forces , , or , of them , it were better all these should perish , than that the nation should be involved in civil war , and the prince's person and government destroyed by resistance ; and therefore in all governments whatsoever , whether monarchies or common-wealths , there must be an absolute trust placed by the people in one , or more persons , which trust they can neither recall when they will , nor yet resist upon the non-performance of it . and therefore it is a mistake , when you affirm with those authors you have quoted , that a king , or other supream powers can ever lose their right , by going about to destroy the people , much less when they only think their liberties , in danger ; and i have several reasons to give you for my assertion . as first from the common notion of a trust , for what is more generally understood by trusting another , than that we lodge our concerns with him , and put them out of our disposal ? when i trust a man with my life , or fortune , all men agree , that i put it in his power to deprive me of both , for to deliver any property to another with a power of revocation is to trust him ( as we say ) no farther than we can see him . he that can recover a sum of money he hath deposited , when he pleases , to speak properly , hath it still , in his custody , and trusts his friend no more , than he doth his own coffers , and therefore if we consule our own thoughts , we shall find , that a trust naturally implies an entire reliance upon the conduct , and integrity of another , which makes us resign up our liberty , or estate to his management , imagining them safer in his hands , than in our own . in short , a trust , where there is no third person to judge of the performance , ( as in these pacts between subjects , and soveraign , there is not , ) i say , such a trust includes a translation of right , and in respect of the irrevocableness of it , is in the nature of a gift . so that there seems only to be this difference between them , that a gift ought to respect the benefit of the receiver , whereas a trust is generally made , for the advantage of him who conveyed it . and in every civil society or government under heaven that doth not depend upon another , there must be an absolute , and unco●troulable power fixed somewhere , which may irresistibly dispose of the e●ves , estates , and persons of the subjects within that civil society , or government ; for if every man be left at liberty to dispose of his own estate , and person , as he pleases himself , then can he promise himself no protection , but what his own natural force will afford him , and that will certainly be over powered at one time , or other , by others . without this trust , there can be no justice administred within the civil society , for if every particular man may be judge in his own case , the right will certainly be asserted on both sides , tho' it really can be but in one , no malefactor will ever condemn himself , nor submit to justice if he can , and may resist ; and if a war happen , every man will be for saving his own goods , from the expence , as his own person from the danger of it , and the consequence must be , that that civil society must perish either by internal disorders , or internal force . therefore this power is , and must be in one person , or body of men in every civil society , and is also indivisible ; for supposing that it should be divided to the same civil society into two , or more parts , as between two men , and two senates , or councils , without any dependance upon each other , or any third power , the consequence must needs be , that they differing , and opposing one another , and having no lawful power fixed in either of them to oblige the other to submit , must have recourse to force , and arms ; so that this civil society can never rest , till this supreme soveraign power be reduced again into one . and if you suppose this power of iudging , and resisting in the people , or multitude ▪ the matter is ten times worse , that being a blind , and heady monster , easily provoked upon flight occasions , commonly judging false , even in its own concerns , and as impl●cable in its rage , as un●atiable in its revenge . to conclude , whether this supream power be in a single person , or in a few , or in all , where ever it is lodged , none must oppose , none must resist it , nor can any man assure himself of more justice , or better usage from a senate , or a multitude , than from a prince , or single person . so that this inconvenience of being liable to have our lives sometimes taken away , our persons injured , and our estates opprest , by the evil management of our governours , is one of those humane miseries that by the corruption of men's nature from the fall took possession of the world , and can never be purged out of it till the final conflagration . and therefore the advice of cerialis in tacitus is always to be remembred , that tyrants , and evil princes are to be born with , as immoderate rains , and unkind seasons , and amends may be made by a better successor : since resistance will not cure , but only enflame the distemper . f. you have made a long speech , wherein i see you have heared together , all that wit , or interest can produce on the behalf of tyranny , tho' i must confess , i did not expect to find you of any man , so zealous an advocate for it . but i forgive it , as long as i really believe , that only a mistaken conscience , and not any private interest prompts you to it . but that i may take your speech to pieces in order to answer it : in the first place , as to what you say concerning a trust , i think you are under a very great mistake . for no man , either in a civil state , or in that of nature , ever yet so trusted another , as that , if he abused his trust , he had not reserved to himself a right of appeal ; under all civil governments this is notorious , since it is one of the main businesses of supream courts of justice , upon complaints , or appeals , of breaches of trust , to call the trustees to an account , and force them to make restitution for the wrongs they have done : and whereas you say , that in the state of nature , where there is no third person to judge of the performance , such a trust includes a translation of a right ( as in these pacts between subjects , and soveraigns : ) this is likewise a mistake , tho' it be true , that in that state , if i trust a man with my life , and fortune . i put it in his power to deprive me of both , and that this trust naturally implies a reliance upon the conduct , and integrity of another ; which makes me resign my liberty , or estate to his management ; yet doth it not therefore follow , but that upon the abuse of this trust , i may have a remedy against him , who thus breaks this trust i have so reposed in him . and when there is no third person to iudge between me , and my trustee . i my self am the sole iudge of the wrong he doth me , and may not only turn him out of his trust , if i find he abuses it ; but may also force him to make me satisfaction for the wrong he hath done : so that , if in the state of nature i trust a man with a bag of silver to keep for me : if he either imbezels , or runs away with it , i may certainly force him to make me restitution ▪ or else enter into a state of war with him , till he do ; and where there is no common power over us to whom we can appeal , this difference can no way be decided but by the sword. and therefore no trust ( as in those mutual pacts between subjects , and soveraigns ) can be irrevocable , or include a perfect translation of a right , and no trust can ever be supposed to be given but with this tacit condition , that the trustee doth not abuse it : and you your self have made a sufficient difference between a trust , and an absolute gift , but granting that a gift respects , the benefit of the receiver , whereas a trust is for the advantage of him who convey's it ; from whence it must necessarily follow , that if this trust be for his advantage ; he hath still an interest in the thing trusted , and consequently may call the trustee to an account in the state of nature , and upon satisfaction denyed , appeal to god himself by battle , or combat . so that if the supream powers are but trustees of the people , they may be resisted , when by going about to destroy them they break their trust. but as for the second part of your argument , that in all civil governments under heaven , there must be an absolute and uncontroulable power fixed some where , that may irresistibly dispose of the lives , persons , &c. of the subjects . this , tho' it seems a better argument than the former , yet is all one in effect , for the question is still , whether the people ever reposed such an absolute power in their supream magistrates , or not . i grant indeed , that as far as they act , as the nature of civil power , requires , they are not by any means to be resisted , but the question still is , whether , when a prince makes war upon the people , or goeth about to destroy them , there is then any civil power in being ; and whether the government be not already dissolved , since the main ends of government , viz. the good and preservation of the subjects , are quite destroyed . and now pray tell me , which is most suitable to that prime law of nature , the endeavour of the good , and happiness of mankind , that a whole nation should be enslaved , or destroyed by the boundless will of a tyrant , or that rulers should be sometimes resisted , when they grow intolerably tyrannical , & abuse their power to the total destruction of the lives , and properties of their subjects . so then , if such an absolute arbitrary power , in princes , or states , can never consist with the main ends of civil society , the peace & happiness of the subjects , it is plain that when ever they are reduced to such a state , they will look upon themselves , as again in the state of nature , nor would they have ever quitted their natural freedom , & tyed themselves up from providing for the security of their lives , and properties by such means as they might before have justly exercised , had it not been to obtain these ends with much greater certainty by entring into civil society , and by stated rules of right , and wrong to secure their lives and properties , with their future peace , and quiet , by surer means , than they could hope for in the meer state of nature . for it cannot be supposed that the people would ever confer such an arbitrary unlimited power on one man , or many , over their lives , and estates that they might take them away without any just cause . for this were to put themselves into a worse condition , than the meer state of nature , wherein they had a liberty to defend their just right against the injuries of others , and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it , whether invaded by a single man , or many in a combination . whereas , by supposing they have thus given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power , and will of a single person . they have wholly disarmed themselves , and only armed him to make a prey of them , whenever he pleases . he being in a much worse condition , that is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man , who hath the command of men than he that is expos'd to the arbitrary power of single men , no body being secure that his will who hath such command is better , than that of other men , tho' his force be times stronger . to conclude , granting a supreme power to be plac'd somewhere , either in a single person , or in many , yet it can by no means be absolutely arbitrary and irresistible over the lives , and fortunes of the people . for their authority being ( as i have already proved in the former conference ) no more than that power which god hath granted to every particular head of a family , and other freemen at his own dispose , for the security of their own persons , and the common good of those whom god hath intrusted to their charge , they cannot confer upon the supreme magistrate any more power , than what god hath conferred upon them before , and so can be no more than those persons had in the state of nature ; before they enter'd into society , and before they gave up their power to these supream magistrates ; viz. that only what god had before trusted them withal . now ( according to your own principles ) no man is trusted by god in the state of nature , with an absolute power over his own life , much less to destroy , or take away the life , or property of another , and therefore cannot convey any such power to those he would intrust with it . so then if a man cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another , neither hath he in the state of nature such an arbitrary power over the life , liberty or possessions of another , but only as much as the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself , and the common good of mankind ; this is all he doth , or can give up to the common-wealth , so that if it can have no more than this . it s power in the utmost bounds of it is still limited to the publick good of the civil society . all which if duly considered , the rest of your weaker arguments are easily answered . for supposing but one prince in a years so wicked as to go about to destroy his people , it will then , whenever it happens , be as much their right to defend themselves , as if it were to happen every year . and tho' you assert he could scarce find means , or hands to bring it about . yet that makes nothing to the purpose , for if he hath no right to destroy , or of the subjects , as you suppose he may , by his mercenary forces , then that , or may defend themselves if they can : for when once a prince hath thus enter'd into a state of war with his people ; who can tell when or where it will end , or can assure himself , that he shall not be the next man that shall be d●stroyed , and it is very pleasant , that you allow the prince this power of murdering to avoid civil war , as if there could be no war begun , unless there be fighting on both sides ; whereas mr. hobbs himself acknowledges , the very assaulting , or setting upon any man , to be entring into a state of war with him ; and sure i think to fall upon the people without cause , and killing , or of them is entring into a state of war , or else nothing is . and therefore you mistake the question , when you argue , from the indivisibility of the supreme power , that it must not be resisted . for the question is not here , whether it be divisible or not , but whether it be not absolutely dissolved by thus entering into a state of war with the people , whom all civil magistrates are supposed to protect when they assume the government . nor doth this give any countenance to male factors , or other single persons to rise in arms , and defend themselves against the supreme powers when they have offended against the laws , or that they think themselves injured by the undile execution of them ; since such abuses of power cannot suddenly , or upon every slight occasion disturb the government . and in the case of malefactors , the supream power is still sure to have all the people on its side , for their own security , and in case of some murders , or oppressions committed by such supream magistrates , on the lives or estates of some private persons , tho' i suppose that even such private men have a right in the state of nature to defend their lives , and to recover by force , what by unjust force is taken from them , yet this right must still give place to the publick place , and safety of the common-wealth whereof they are members , which must not be disturb●d for the sake of a few , and of this the people themselves are so sensible that it is almost as impossible , for a few oppressed men to disturb the government , where the body of the people do not think themselves concerned to it , as for a ra●ing mad-man or heady malecontent to overturn a well setled sta●e , the people being as little a●t to follow the one , as the other . so on the other side , when over the people are once convinced that their governours , instead of protecting , go about to destroy them , it is as impossible for any man to persuade them not to take up arms , and defend themselves against them , if they are able to make sufficient resistances . and therefore tho' i so far agree with you , that some oppressions , and violences may be practised in all civil governments whatsoever , since such abuses will continue as long as men are men , yet doth it not therefore follow that the supream powers , must always be born withal , and never resisted , no not when they go about to destroy the whole body of the people . m. but pray tell me , is it not a very mischievous , and unjust thing , that subjects should be both iudges and parties too in their own case . since they may pretend , that the king goeth about to destroy them , when really he does not design any such thing ; and would not this bring all things into anarchy and confusion ? i shewed you the fatal consequences of this at the beginning , but you have not yet thought fit to answer them . f. i begg your pardon , sir , i have been so taken up with answering the main arguments , that you have proposed against this right of resistance , that i have not had time to consider this objection , which is but a consequence thereof . and therefore in the first place give me leave to ask you this question . suppose you were master of a separate family in the indies , and a neighbouring prince , or cacich of the indians , should come to kill you , or to drive you out of your plantation , might you not defend your self , because you are both iudge and party too in your own case ? or suppose you should so far abuse this power of self defence , as to pretend this neighbouring prince was coming to assault you , when he realy was nor , and should therefore ( to prevent it ) set upon him first , and murder him , and his followers , must your abuse of this right which you have by the law of nature be a sufficient argument , that neither you , nor any man else in the state of natio● , should ever for the future exercise this right ? no more will the abuse of either of these be● sufficient argument against the right of self-defence against the supream powers . m. i grant indeed they are not in the state of nature , but it is much otherwise after people are entered into a civil society , or common-wealth and that upon your own principles . for then they have given up all that equality which you suppose between men , in the state of nature . for supposing what you affirm should be true , that civil government at first began from the whole body , or major part of the peoples making over all their right of governing themselves to one person , or more , upon conditions of being protected in their lives , and estates , they must likewise make over all their right of iudging for themselves , what means are necessary for their common good , and preservation ; after which transferring of their power , they can never have any right to meet again in a body either by themselves , or their representatives to judge of these breaches , or the transgressions of those conditions which they at first proposed , and agreed upon with such princes , or governours . and when the people come once to multiply into a nation , it in absolutely impossible for them ever to meet altogether again , and give their iudgment of the good or evil consequence of the monarchs actions , or to come to any resolution upon them ; so that their opinion can never afterwards be known otherwise , than by the murmurs of particular persons , which none can certainly know neither , unless they could speak with every individual person of that kingdom , which is impossible . but if you will say , this oppression needs not to be known by words , or votes , but actions , viz. by the peoples actual taking up arm ' , this must either be by the whole people altogether at once , or at least the major part of them , or else of some particular bodies of men much less than the whole , or major part . now the whole , or major part of a people of a nation to rise and take up arms all at once a● one man , is morally impossible . and if any part less than this whole , or major part ( as suppose a whole province , or city ) every such party or body of men so rising , must be guilty of rebellion and disturbing the publick peace of the common-wealth as being but private single persons , which you your self granted , and condemned as unlawful . and therefore i desire to know , who shall judge when this body , or major part of the people , are thus assaulted , so that they may justly defend themselves ? but indeed this licence of taking up arms is not only unpracticable , but unreasonable too : for it supposes , that after the people have given up all the power they had of iudging what was bad or good for the publick , they have this power still left in them , which would make them at once both subjects and soveraigns , which is a contradiction . f. had you been pleased but better to have observed what i said the last time i spoke , a great part of this objection had been saved . for i there expresly asserted , that the security of mens lives , liberties and estates , being the main ends for which men entered at first into civil society , and likewise desired to continue in it , as being the only means why civil government is to be preferred before the state of nature , the people neither did nor can give up their right of iudging , when these are invaded , or taken from them . and therefore you are very much mistaken to believe , that at the institution of civil society , men must have given up their common senses , and reason too of iudging , when they are like to be murdered , or made slaves of , or their fortunes unjustly taken from them , by those , whom they have ordained to be their governours ; and i suppose you will not say , that they thereby acquire a power of altering the nature of things , or of making war , slavery or beggery the means of procuring the welfare , and happiness of the people , any more than they can enact , that hunger , or diseases should conduce to the preservation of any mans life ; and therefore as the judgment of these things was obvious , and natural to every mans senses , and understanding in the state of nature , so it is as plain , they never intended wholly to give up all their right of judging concerning their own preservation and happiness , and all means necessarily tending thereunto , but only in such cases , and concerning such matters as are beyond the power , or above the knowledge of every ordinary private subject : thus in a disease , tho' i give up my self to the skill , and judgment of a physician , yet i do it not so absolutely , but that i still reserve to my self a right of iudging , whether he gives me poyson , instead of a purge . and if princes or supream magistrates were thus absolutely invested with an arbitrary power of doing whatsoever they pleased with the lives , liberties and estates of the people , they would then be in a much worse condition under civil government , than they were in the state of nature , as i have already proved , and therefore there is no need of any such general meetings , or assemb●ies of the whole body , or representatives of the people , to iudge when these fundamental conditions of all government are notoriously violated and broken : since it will be apparent to every mans sense and reason that is thus assaulted or injured . and as for the other part of your objection , how the people can know , when the whole body , or major part , of them , is thus assaulted , or opprest , and being so assaulted , or opprest , what number are necessary to justifie this resistance ? to this important question , i thus answer ; that if such a war , or assault be made upon such a considerable part of the people , as may justifie their resistance to be much better for the good of the common-vvealth , than that so many people should be destroyed , resistance certainly is then lawful ; and the reason why every particular person , when unjustly assaulted by his princes order , or his estate taken away by his unjust edicts , or decrees , ought not to make any publick disturbance only to save the one , or recover the other , i have given you before , viz. because the publick peace is to be preferred , before that of any private person : yet even then such a private person may very well defend himself , if unjustly assaulted by assassinates , whom the prince , or other supream magistrates shall send to take away his life without any just cause , or legal tryal ▪ tho' i grant he may not sollicit others to rise with him , and take his part or help him to defend his life , or estate . yet ( as a reverend dignitary of our church very well observed . ) no man can want authority to defend his life against him , who hath no authority to take it away . but much more when this assault , or oppression is either made upon the whole people in general , or upon so considerable a part , or member thereof , as the common-wealth could not well subsist without , if it were destroyed , in all such cases , i suppose the people thus assaulted , or opprest have a sufficient right to defend their lives , and free themselves from that slavery , and oppression they lye under ; and thus the people of rome might very well have justified their resistance of nero's incendiaries , when he sent to burn the city , tho' they had been his own guards . we read likewise in the hist. august . that the emperour caracalla , the people happening to laugh at him ( for his folly ) in playing the gladiator in his circus maximus , sent his guards to kill them ; so likewise in herodian , that , upon another supposed affront , he sent his pretorian bands to murder most of the inhabitants of alexandria , who came out to meet him with a solemn procession . and , i suppose , no rational man will deny , but that , if the citizens of rome , or alexandria , had had arms in their hands , they might have lawfully defended their lives against these murdering guards . for i think it was much better that those should be destroyed who were the aggressors , than that so vast a body of innocent people , should be made sacrifices to the undreasonable passion , or revenge of a cruel tyrant . so that when the oppression , or violence to mens liberties and properties is general , and notorious , and affect the whole body of the people , i do then suppose that any part of them , that are sufficient to defend themselves , may do it , till they can find assistance either from the rest of the people , or else from some forreign prince , or state , who will vindicate their cause , and come in to their assistance . and thus we read the town of brill in zealand , under the conduct of the count of mark first revolted from the tyranny of the duke of alva , which example was afterwards ( tho' not immediately ) followed by most of the cities of holland , and zealand , and the courage , and resolution of this count , as also of the citizens of this town , is highly commended by the historians of that time , for so nobly venturing their lives , and fortunes to ●●diem their co●utry from that slavery it then lay under till at last they were relieved , and assisted by queen elizabeth to whom the vnited provinces owe that freedom they now enjoy . m. i shall not now dispute with you what right the states of the vnited provinces , might have to resist the tyranny of the duke of alva , then governour for the king of spain , since grotius , and most writers which are not of the spanish faction , suppose , that king to have had a conditional right of governing those provinces according to their own laws , and priviledges from the very first institution of the government ; and therefore not being an absolute monarch over them , he might well be resisted upon the breach of those condition● : but this is not the case now in hand : since we are now discoursing of absolute monarchies , or common-wealths , who being invested with the supream power by the consent of the people ( as you suppose : ) and therefore may have by their consents ( whether forced or voluntary it matters not ) according to your own principles a supream vnaccountable power over them ; and in the first place i can shew you , how a man may make over all the power he hath in his own person irrevocably to another ; as when a man sells , or grants himself for a slave to another by his own consent ; who when he hath once put himself into this condition , his master hath an absolute property in his person , and an indefesible right for ever to his service . so that notwithstanding all the cruel , harsh , and unreasonable usage , he may meet with from his master , he can never regain his freedom without the consent of his lord. and this i take to be an uncontested truth agreed on by the law ; of nations , and established by the law of god. thus st. peter chargeth those , who are in this state of servitude : * to be subject to their masters with all fear , not only to the good , and gentle , but also to the froward . so likewise st. paul in both his epistles to the ephesians , and colossians , † commands servants to be obedient to them that are their masters according to the flesh , &c. and that this particularly respects slaves , appears by the . verse of the . chapter of the former of these epistles . so that if a man may thus make himself a slave , or perpetual servant to another by his own consent , i cannot see any reason why a whole nation may not do the same , and deliver themselves up to one man , or more to be governed , and treated both for their lives , liberties , and fortunes , at his or their discretion . so that , tho' he may perhaps abuse this power to the severest tyranny , or oppression : yet have they no right to shake off this yoak , or to resist him ; since their lives , and fortunes are wholly at his disposal , by their own act , and consent . and that whole nations may justly surrender themselves for slaves or absolute subjects , i can give you two examples approved of by god in the scriptures : the first is , that of the egyptians , who , when they had sold all their goods and lands to pharaoh for bread , to keep themselves alive in the seven years of famine we read of in genesis . you 'll find they were afterwards such absolute servants or slaves to pharaoh . that as for the people he removed them to cities , from one end of the borders of egypt even to the other end thereof , only the land of the priests bought he not , &c. the other is , that of the gibeonites , of whom we read , that they accepted of their lives from ioshua , and the elders of israel : tho' on the condition of the greatest slavery , rather than they would venture to be destroyed . so that if absolute monarchy were not lawful , but contrary to god's will and institution , most of the greatest kingdoms in the world would be governed contrary to the laws of god and nature ; and the subjects of all the kingdoms from france to china , ( not reckoning those of africa ) might immediately , if they were able , rebel against their monarchs , and set up what sort of government they thought fit : since none of the subjects in those kingdoms hold their lives , liberties or estates by any other tenure , than the good will or pleasure of the monarch , who may take away all or any of them as often as he pleases to do it , and that without any right of resistance in all , or any of their subjects , let them use them never so severely . f. i cannot deny , but what you say is so far true , that one man , or many together may grant , or sell themselves for slaves by their own consent ; and that the persons who thus make over themselves , have afterwards no right , or property in any thing , more than a bare subsistence , yet that servitude is not by the law of nature , but only brought in by custom ▪ or the law of nations , as all writers agree , and is so far lawful , because it tends to the good , and preservation of mankind , that prisoners taken in war should rather be kept as slaves , than immediately slain , or that men compelled by extream necessity , should sell themselves , or their children , rather than both should perish ; and therefore it is no wonder , that the apostles who were not sent to a●ter the state of things in the world , or to entrench upon any man 's civil righ●s , should command servants , or slaves , to be subject to their masters , tho' unbelievers : yet doth it not therefore follow , that when men are forced to give themselves thus up to the power of another , they likewise give him an absolute right over their lives , so as that their masters may take them away , whenever they please ; for that was more than they ever had over themselves . nor doth god confer any such power upon masters , and therefore , if the master hath no such absolute right , or property in the persons of his slaves , as he hath in his sheep , or cattle ; i see no reason , why even slaves , if their masters go about to take away their lives for no other cause , but to satisfie their own humour , or passion , may not , ( if they cannot otherwise escape ) resist their masters , and save their lives if they can . for all writers agree , that if a master doth so inhumanely abuse his slave ; that he can no longer endure it without danger of his life , he may in that case lawfully run away , and escape from him ; and why he may not as well resist him to save his life , when his master goeth about thus unjustly , and without any cause to take it away ; i can see no reason to the contrary : since it was only for the saving his life , that such a man could ever be supposed to yield himself a slave to another ; and which condition being broken on the masters part , the servant is again in the state of nature , and the relation of master and servant so far ceases ; or is at least suspended , during that violence . this being the state of particular men , i cannot think that god hath put whole nations in a worse condition ; nor can i ever imagine , that any whole nation , unless urged by some extream necessity , would ever give up themselves so absolutely for slaves , as not to have any right to defend their own lives , or a property in any thing they can enjoy ; and if ever they could be supposed to have done so , i think i may boldly affirm , that such a nation are not subjects , but slaves , and the prince not a monarch or civil governour , but only a lord of a great family , or master of a publick work-house . for i take the difference betwixt subjects , or slaves , and princes and masters of families to consist in this , that the power of a prince , is chiefly ordained for the good , and preservation of his subjects , tho' i grant his own may likewise be included in it , as an encouragement , and reward for his labour ; yet not as the principal end of his institution : whereas in a family of slaves , they are chiefly ordained for his profit , or benefit that maintains them ; but their happiness , and preservation is only accidental , and as it may conduce to that . the main end also of civil government is to institute and maintain a distinct property in men's estates , and which the prince , or common-wealth can have no right to take away . and therefore , tho' i grant that in those despoti●k monarchies you mention , the monarchs do exercise an absolute , arbitrary power over the lives , liberties , and estates of their subjects : yet that this is by divine right , or institution i utterly deny , or that it was always so in all of them from the beginning ; for most of those empires you mention can no otherwise subsist than by a constant maintaining vast standing armies , or guards to keep their subjects in obedience . nor can any governments be of divine institution , which are exercised with a sole respect to the personal power , and grandeur of the prince , rather than the good and preservation of the people . so that if you will but survey the accounts that travellers give us of those eastern parts of the world , you will find , that there are no known setled laws or properties in those countries , except at the arbitrary will of the monarch , or his viceroys ; and thus all those rich , and fruitful countries of egypt , and asia , which formerly flourished in all arts , knowledge and civility , and abounded in multitudes of people , are now in most places reduced to meer deserts , and do not breed a tenth part of that number of people , as they did in former ages : which proceeds from no other cause but the cruelty , and injustice of the government , quite different from what it was in the time of the roman emperours , who tho' , i confess , they were in some sence absolute too , yet governed by , and were obliged to observe known laws ▪ and the people had a settled property in their estates , which the prince had no right to take away . i shall not enquire how all these monarchs came to be so arbitrary at first , and thus to abuse their power . but the generality , or antiquity of this abuse can be no more a plea for its right , than that because idolatry was generally practised throughout the world within three or four hundred years after the flood , till three or above four hundred years after christ , therefore , idolatry was the true and ancient religion of the world. now , tho' i will not condemn this sort of government ▪ where the subjects enjoy no setled property in lands , or goods , as absolutely unlawful , and directly contrary to the laws of god , or nature : yet in those kingdoms and common-wealths , where civil , or hereditary property is once introduced , i think it is not lawful , nor indeed in the power of the prince or common-wealth to destroy , or take it away . and therefore if the roman emperours should have endeavoured by any laws , or edicts of their own making to have d●stroyed all civil , or hereditary property in lands and goods , and to have reduced all the estates of their subjects into their own possession : i think they might have been lawfully disobeyed , and resisted by the people , since they went about to destroy one great end of civil government , viz. the instituting , and maintaining of civil property . to conclude , i freely grant that in all countries which are governed , either by absolute monarchies , or common-wealths , the soveraignty , is so fully in one person , or body of men , that it hath no other bounds or limits under god ; but it s own will , or commands : provided they do not apparently tend to the absolute ruine , and destruction of the people ; for that being inconsistent with the notion , or end of governing them , they are , and ever will be iudges of it . and therefore even amongst the turks , and tartars themselves , if they should once find their prince go about wil●ully to destroy them , or sell them for slaves ; you would soon find ( notwithstanding this servile subjection , ) that they would quickly be rid of them , as the ianisaries have served their emperours of late years , for far less faults . m. i cannot deny but you have spoken reasonably enough on this subject , and perhaps if you had restrained this power of resistance only to such cases , where the prince , or monarch makes open war upon his people , or doth otherwise actually go about to destroy them , it might have been a tolerable doctrine that they may lawfully resist the forces he shall send against them , but this is a case that so seldom happens ( if ever at all ) that it can never be supposed , and no prince , unless he were mad , can be guilty of it ; and therefore when ever he acts thus , i think he may not only be lawfully resisted , but tyed up for a madman . but this is seldom , or never the case between monarchs , and their people , for most of the rebellions , and insurrections that i have ever read of , or observed in the world , have not proceeded from any necessity that the people had to rise up in arms , and rebel against their supream magistrates , because their lives , or estates were assaulted , or in danger to be taken away , but for the most part they arose either from the too great cruelty , or severity of the supream power towards some particular private men , who by themselves , and their friends and relations have gone about to revenge those injuries , that they supposed had been done them . and of this , all histories are to full , that i need give no particular instances of them ; all which abuses may be reduced to these heads . first , when a prince doth commonly himself violate the chastities of the wives , or daughters of the subjects , which tho' it hath been the ruine of divers princes , yet is he able to do this only to some few particular persons , and tho' if he should permit his soldiers , or officers generally to do this , without any punishment ; yet even this , can hardly , if ever , extend to all the wives , daughters , or women in a whole countrey : and therefore both these cases are to be born withal , according to your own principles , since it doth not tend to the slavery , or destruction of the people , i mean , as to their whole complexed body . a second is , when an absolute prince or monarch goeth about to alter the established religion of his countrey , and to introduce a different one by his own sole authority , whilst the major part of the people continue of another opinion . in this case , i suppose you will not affirm , that the subjects have a right to resist their prince for so doing . for then the romans might justly have rebelled against constantine , when he shut up the heathen temples , and forbad all publick sacrifices to their gods , and thereby made the christian religion the established profession of the empire . f. but pray sir , give me leave to interrupt you a little , might not constantine have a right to do this , because the christian religion is the only true one ; and that the idolatry the romans then practised , was against the law of nature ? m. whatever weight there may be in this answer , yet you have no reason to put this question now ; since you have already , viz. at our first conference asserted , that , an erroneous conscience gives men a right to follow it , during the time they are under this ignorance of the truth : and therefore if the roman emperours had not a right to do this by their own authority without any resistance , the subjects , whilst they believed the worship of their god to be thereby destroyed , might , nay , ought to have resisted the emperour , rather than to have suffered him to have altered the antient religion of the empire , and to have brought in another , which they look't upon as an upstart ; and it is very natural for men to do so , since nothing ought to be more dear to them , than the worship and honour of god. f. i do not desire at present to embark my self in this tedious , and troublesome dispute about the authority of the supream powers in matters of religion ; and therefore i shall say no more to it at present , but if your assertion be true , that an absolute monarch may set up what religion he pleases , without being resisted by the subjects , whom i suppose to be of another perswasion , it will then follow , that if the french king , or emperour of musc●vy , should turn mahometan , and should set up that superstition by force , for the publick , and national religion of the countrey , tho' with the destruction of all that should oppose it , none of their subjects might resist them in so doing ; and if so , i desire you to consider , what you have gained to religion by thus asserting such an unlimited prerogative to all monarchs . but laying aside this dispute till another time , i pray go on to the rest of those cases in which the people do take upon them to resist the supream powers . m. i shall comply with your desires , and therefore a third pretence of subjects to rebel , is , when the supream powers shall think it necessary to levy upon their people more heavy and grievous taxes , and impositions , than the people are willing , or , it may be , able to pay . now , if your principle be true , that they may rise in arms , and resist the supream powers , whenever they think themselves thus intolerably oppressed , and if they shall be sole iudges of this oppression , then all the rebellions that ever were made in england , or elsewhere , by reason of such excessive tributes , or taxes , whould be lawful . which would be a perpetual ground of anarchy , and confusion : for private subjects , not being admitted into the privy councils of princes , or states , can never be supposed to understand , whether the necessities of the common-wealth may require them , or not . and indeed the people do so often repine and murmur at the government , when the publick necessities require to impose greater taxes , or gabels than they think they can well bear , that the mobile of any great city or province for example , who think themselves thus oppressed , beyond what they are able , or perhaps willing to bear ; may rise in rebellion and throw off all obedience to civil authority , and they may have a very good pretence for it , according to your principle , because they may look upon themselves as a very considerable , nay , necessary part of the common-wealth . and thus the common people of kent might have justified their rebellion in richard the seconds time under wat tyler , and iack straw ; and the people of devonshire , and somerset-shire might likewise have justified their insurrection in henry the sevenths reign under flammock the black smith . and i could mention others of the like nature , but i forbear , because you may say they were upon account of religion . and lastly , this principle might very well justifie the insurrection of the people of naples under massaniello , which besides the vast spoil it made upon the goods and palaces of the nobility , ended at last ( whatsoever they pretended at first to the contrary ) in delivering up themselves to the king of france , who refusing to protect them they were soon reduced to their former obedience to the king of spain . in short , if the people should take upon them to resist , or rebel , whenever they thought themselves intolerably injured , and oppressed in their estates by immoderate taxes , there would be no end of such rebellions , especially considering the advantage which wicked , crafty , and ambitious men would thereby take to excite the people to rise and depose their lawful governours , and set up themselves in their room upon pretence of better government , and greater liberty . and how prone the common people have been to receive such impressions , he is but meanly a●●d●ed in antient , and modern history , who is not convinced of it . f. to answer this objection , before you proceed farther , my opinion in short is , that tho' such taxes may often prove an universal dammage , and a great impoverishment to the subjects ; yet if they are such as may be born with less trouble , than can follow from a civil war , or the change of the government , there is no just or sufficient cause of resistance of the soveraign magistrates commands , or edicts concerning them . as for example , such great taxes as the subjects pay , and perhaps may bear it well enough in holland and other countries ; since there may be a necessity for such taxes , and of this i grant the supream authority of the nation can be the only iudges . and how far this may extend , i cannot positively determine . for suppose you should ask me , if the supream powers should borrow all the ready money the subjects had , for the necessary uses of the state , so that they would give them leather , or brass money instead of it , to go at the same value , for the necessary uses of commerce , yet if they did not take away their property in their lands , corn , or living stock ; which are the necessary means of their subsistance , i do not think it were a sufficient cause , to take up arms against their governours for so doing ; be●ause the subjects cannot tell , but that the necessities of the state , ( for their necessary defence against a potent forreign enemy ) may require it . and sure , it is a much greater evil to fall into a civil war , or to be subdued by strangers , than to part with their money ; since by such a war , or conquest they might not only lose that money , but also their liberties , and estates . yet , on the other side , i would not be understood to give the supream magistrates , a power to invade the properties , and estates of their subjects to what degree they thought fit . for then they might tax them to that extremity as might force them to sell themselves , and their wives and children for slaves , or else being unable to pay , must be forced to run away and leave their habitations , ( as the peasants often do in france ; ) whereby whole villages , nay towns , may become depopulated , as they are in divers parts of italy , and turkey , by such extraordinary severitles , and therefore in absolute monarchies , where there is no nobility , gentry , nor yeomen , who can claim any property in their estates , which with us make up the best and most considerable part of the people ; and where the government being wholy military , and is exercised , over the people , only by force of arms ; i doubt not but such a people reduced to this extremity , may not only quit the countrey , where they are thus in●olerably oppress 't , but that , if they are not of themselves strong enough to make resistance and cast off this intolerable yoke by force , they may ( if an occasion be offered ) ●oyn with any neighbour prince , or state , tha● will undertake their quarrel , and upon this account , i think ▪ we may very well justifie the revolt of the greek christians from the ottoman yoke , and putting themselves under the protection of the venetians , both in the morea , and other places ; and also upon the same principles , i conceive , the common people of france , who are reduced to the like extremities , might also with a safe conscience revolt from the present king , and put themselves under the protection of the prince of orange , our now present soveraign , or the states of hotland ▪ if ever they should be successful enough to make any considerable invasion upon that kingdom . and therefore i must confess , that there can be no certain and stated rule set down to what proportion absolute princes or commonwealths may tax their subjects , since in some countreys the people can better part with a shilling , than in others they can pay a peny . and as i grant it must be left to the mercy , and discretion of the governours what taxes to impose without thus ruining and destroying their people , as it is left to the judgment of the owner of the beast , how much burden it is able to bear . so if he , by laying too great a weight , breaks the back of his horse or beast , he not only hath the loss , but makes himself the laughing-stock of all his neighbours : so that , tho' i confess the people ought to have patience , and rather to suffer many oppressions , and hardships , than to put themselves in this miserable state of war ; yet there is a midst in all things , and the people may be so cruelly oppressed by taxes , and other impositions , as it is impossible for them longer to subsist or provide necessaries for themselves , and their families : and since you have already granted , that the people may iudge when their prince makes war upon them , and goeth actually about to destroy them by the sword , i cannot see , why they may not have the same right of iudging when they are like to be destroyed by famine too . and who can be iudge of this , but those who feel it ? but indeed it is morally impossible for the people to be mistaken in so plain a case . for , tho' this many-headed beast ( as you commonly call them , ) the people cannot argue very subtilly of the future consequences of things , yet they have a very nice and tender sense of feeling , and can very well tell , when they are so injured , and oppressed : that they can bear it no longer , for then sure , they may be allowed to have as much care , and sense of their own preservation , as camels , and dromedaries , which ( as travellers relate ) tho' they are taught by their masters to kneel down , and to receive their loads , which they will patiently endure as long as they are able to bear them , yet when once their masters do over-exceed that weight , neither fair means nor foul , can prevail upon them to rise , or they will throw off those loads if risen , that they feel will otherwise break their backs . but i have discoursed long enough on this head , and therefore if you have nothing more material to except against it , i pray proceed to the rest of the causes , that subjects may , as you think , pretend to have , to take up arms against the supream powers . m. i have somewhat more to urge , towards proving that this liberty which you allow the subjects , wholy tends to anarchy , and confusion ; but i shall reserve it to the last , when i shall sum up all that i have farther to urge upon this subject , and therefore i shall proceed to the other pretences that subjects in absolute monarchies may make to rebel ; and the next may be , that the monarch looking upon his subjects as his slaves , may either use them so himself , or sell them to other nations for that purpose , as monfieur chardin tells us , the king of mingrelia often doth diverse of his people to raise money , and tho' i will not be so ridiculous as to suppose that such a monarch can sell away all his people at once ; for then he should be left alone without any subjects , and consequently become no king. yet in such monarchies as diverse of the eastern , and african are at this day , where ( as you your self own ) the people having no setled or hereditary property in their estates , the monarch may dispose of their particular persons as he thinks fit ; i cannot see any reason , why , the monarch may not in these countries without any blame exert his prerogative if he pleases , and take as many of his subjects , or their children to serve him as slaves , as he thinks necessary for his service . and therefore whatsoever people or nation have thus subjected themselves to the absolute power , or dominion of one man , they have no more right to regain their natural liberty , than i should have of taking away any thing by force which i had before given or granted to another : for this sort of civil servitude , is not so repugnant to nature as some imagine , or that because subjects were forced to consent to it for the avoiding of some greater evil , they can afterwards have any right to shake it off again when ever they will. for , tho' i grant , that god hath not instituted any such servitude , yet when once it is introduced in any country , men are not at liberty to cast off the yoke when ever they please , but to observe st. paul's rule , if thou art a servant , care not for it , but if thou are free , chuse it rather , that is , freedom is to be preferred before servitude or subjection . but where providence hath made men absolute s●rvants , or subjects ; they are bound to continue in that state , unless the supream powers , they are under , think fit to release them from it . and therefore this can be no good pretence under absolute monarchies for subjects to take up arms against their prince , for such a state of liberty which they never enjoyed . f. i shall not trouble my self to dispute , what right an absolute monarch may have over the persons of his people in a country , where they have no property , nor written laws , and where they look upon themselves as no better than slaves to their prince , and perhaps may take a pride in it , ( as i have read the russians do . ) and therefore if they have so wholy submitted themselves , i grant what you assert , is true , and that they have no right to resist , according to the old saying , volenti non fit injuri● . and yet even in these despotick monarchies , tho' the prince may pick out here and there some of his subjects to sell for slaves , or else to use them as such himself ; yet i do much question , if he should go about to make any considerable number , ( as suppose to take , or all at once for slaves , ) i say , i do much question whether these people would be so convinced of your principles of passive obedience , and non-resistance , as to let their monarch's guards drive them into slavery , like sheep to the market , but would , if they were able , make a vigorous resistance , and knock their drivers on the head. whether iure , vel injuria , i shall not dispute . but for all this , even in absolute monarchies , where the people have a setled legal property in their lands , and estates , and consequently where their persons are free , i doubt not , if their princes should go about to make all his subjects slaves ; but that they might lawfully resist him , or those he imploys in so doing . and tho' it be true , he could not make all his people slaves at once , yet if he asserted it as a part of his royal prerogative , and also exercised it on particular persons , as often as he thought sit , or could , i doubt not but the people might make it a common cause ; since none can know whose turn it may be next : for sure liberty from servitude is as necessary to man's happiness and well-being , as life is to his existence : which would seem no great benefit to those . who being born free , were reduced to slavery ; it being well said by the poet , non est vivere , sed-valere vita . and tho' the roman emperors did exercise an absolute power over their subjects , yet i never read , that they durst presume to make slaves of free-born romans , nor indeed of any of those nations they subdued ; for they had too great a sense , and love of liberty themselves , ever to impose such a yoke upon the people they conquered , which was so destructive to the common happiness and preservation of mankind . and suppose if the french grand seigni●ur , as absolute as he is , or pretends to be , should go about to sell his subjects , ( especially the nobility ) for slaves , all that the iesuites ( those instruments of slavery ) could do , would not , i believe , be able to keep that people from rising against him . but if you have nothing farther to object against what i have now said ; i pray proceed to the next flead , if you have any more instances to make . m. i am now come to the last pretence , that subjects may make to rebell . and that is , supposing the monarch , should at once , or by degrees turn the subjects out of their legal hereditary properties in their estates ; and of this you your self grant , there can be no dispute in those despotick monarchies , where there is no hereditary property allowed ; and as for all other governments , since you do own that all legal , and civil property in lands did chiefly proceed , or at least is established by the civil power , i cannot see , why , those powers in any kingdom ( if they think it would conduce to the good of the common-wealth , ) may not destroy this civil property , and either make all estates equal , or else ordain , that they shall be enjoyed ( as in all absolute monarchies ) at the will of the prince ; since , if the supream powers are the author of this property , sure they may alter , and abrogate it again as often as they think fit . f. i shall not dispute with you concerning such kingdoms , where there is no civil property yet instituted , or where the people do own themselves slaves to the prince : but if such a monarch , hath remitted any thing of this right ; and hath instituted a legal hereditary property in estates ; such a law being once made , i do not think it is in the prince's power to revoke it , any more than it is for a master to reduce his slaves again to servitude after he hath once set them free ; since both men's liberties , or a setled or hereditary property an estates do equally conduce to the happiness and propagation of mankind , and the good of that people , or nation , wherein it is introduced . and i doubt not , but pharaoh , tho' he was lord of all the lands of egypt , by the grant of the egyptians , yet might lawfully have been resisted by them , if he had gone to take away those four fifth parts of the profit of the lands , which he had left thern free by his own concession . so that even in such absolute empires , the monarchs have power to dispose of the estates of the people , only as far as the compact ▪ or concession at first made by them or their predecessors do allow : but it is also not much otherwise where the subjects do not acknowledge their estates as the gift , or benefit of the supream powers , and that may happen chiefly two ways , either . when any free people , under the conduct of a captain or leader , created by themselves , have conquered any new territory , and habitation ; or else , . when diverse fathers , or masters of a family , who had estates of their own before have agreed for their mutual security , and the quiet enjoyment of what they were already possess of , to joyn together into one common-wealth , under the command of one , or more men , or else of others that will bring their estates , and joyn themselves to such a government already constituted , and will subiect themselves to this supream power , according to the conditions already agreed on amongst them . a third case may be , when an hereditary property in land was establisht before the monarchy began , as in the roman common-wealth , this property was establish't before the government was changed from a republick to a monarchy , so that the people did not owe their property to the emperors grant , or donation . in the former case , if such a free people conquer a country under the conduct of a captain or leader , tho' , i grant , such a country may be assigned by him to all the people by lot , or in proportion to the greater merit , or service of his fellow adventurers , or soldiers , ( tho' it may seem that the property of particular men , may have proceeded , not from their own right , or possession , but from the assignment of their chief captain or leader , ) yet are not the estates which such particular men enjoy , to be look't upon only , as the meer grace , or favour of such a prince , since most of those who followed him in this conquest , or expedition , did it not , as subjects , but as volunteers , and without whose assistance , he could never have conquered at all : so that they have thereby acquired to themselves a certain portion , or share in the land so conquered , tho' for avoiding dissentions , and qu●rrels amongst them , it was left to the disposal of this new prince , as a publick trustee , to distribute to each person what share he should have . but in the other case , when fathers , or masters of families , before free , and possest of hereditary estates , do submit themselves to the command of one man voluntarily , or by election . those estates do much less depend upon the will or favour of that prince . and therefore , if such a prince should without their consents go about to take away their property in their estates , he might very iustly be resisted by them , since a quiet enjoyment of these in peace , and safety , was one of the chief reasons , that made them chuse him for their prince , and was certainly one of the original compacts of the government . and that in absolute monarchies , where the subjects were not slaves , they look't upon themselves to have such a settled property in their persons , and estates , by compact , that seneca boldly pronounced , errat , siquis existimat sutum ●sse ibi r●gem , ubi nihil à regetutum est ; securitas securitate mutua paciscenda est . and mr. hobbs himself , as much a friend as he was to the arbitrary power of monarchs , and an enemy to the natural rights of subjects , yet is forced in his leviathan to confess , that the riches , power , and honour of a monarch , arises only from the riches , strength , and reputation of his subjects , for no king can be rich , nor glorious , nor secure , whose subjects are ●●●her poor , or contemptible . tho' how this riches , and strength of subjects can consist with that absolute power which he gives his sovereign over the persons , and estates of his subjects , i cannot understand ; since he will not allow of any compacts , or conditions between him and them . but that their propriety may very well consist with the power of the prince ; seneca shews us ; iure civili ( says he ) omni● r●gis sunt , & tamen illa quorum ad regem pertinet universa possessio in singulos dominos descripta sunt , & unaquaeque res habet possessorem suum . itaque dare regi , & donum , & mancipium & pecuniam possumus , nec donare illi de suo dicimur . ad reges enim potestas omnium pertinet , ad singulos proprietas . and the earl of clarendon in his survey of the leviathan makes this excellent remark upon this passage of seneca : and that prince who thinks his power so gre●● , that his subj●cts have nothing to give him , will be very unhappy , if he hath evern n●ed of their hands , or their hearts . so that notwithstanding this universal power , or supereminent dominion of the emperour over all things , which seneca there supposes , yet , if he should have gone about to have invaded all men's properties , and reduced all men's estates into the publick treasury , i doubt not but he would soon have had not only his own legions , but the whole empire about his ears . and tho' i have heard that the french king , doth by his ex●roitant taxes , and gabels raise more m●ney out of the kingdom of france , and the territories annexed to it , than the ottoman emperour doth out of that vast empire ( of which he hath the sole propriety of the lands in himself ) yet if the french king should indeavour by the power of his standing army to take away all men's hereditary properties in their estates , and make them all to be holden at will , i doubt not , but he would not only be opposed by his subjects , and perhaps ruined in the attempt ; but also , if he should succeed in it , would be so far from being the richer , or more powerful , that he would become the poorer , and weaker , when he had done : since no man would take the pains to build , till , or improve their estates , any more than they do in turkey , when they were not sure 〈◊〉 soon they might be turned out of them ; or at least could hold them no longer , than for their lives , or a few years . so prevalent a thing is this empty shadow , and bare name of property that is now left in france ( being often charged with 〈◊〉 to above half the value of the estates ) to encourage the people to beautifie , cultivate , and improve a country abounding with all those riches , that nature , or art can produce . and to let you see , i am not at all partial , i think i may safely affirm the same of the legislative power in this kingdom , so that , if it should happen ( which tho' highly improbable , yet it is not impossible ) that the lords and commons assembled in parliament should so far abuse the trust reposed in them , as to give up all their civil properties in their estates into the kings f●ands , to be disposed of as he should think fit , and that the king should thereupon go about to turn all the people out of their estates , i doubt not , but they might in that case resist the king if he went to do it by force , notwithstanding this act of parliament , and my reason it , that a 〈◊〉 hereditary property in estates , being an antient , if not more , than parliament themselves in this nation , must consequently be a fundamental law of the government , and so cannot be altered by its representatives . for tho' it be true , the people have given them a power to dispose of what part of their estates they should think 〈◊〉 , yet did they not make it absolute , to extend either to their liberties ( i mean in respect of slavery ) or their whole properties in their estates . and if the king may be resisted , if he invade them by his own sole authority , the reason would be the same why he might be also resisted , tho' back't by an act of parliament : since the ta●●ing away of civil property would prove as dist●uctive to the people● liberties and happiness in the one case , as in the other , and as great an abuse of the trust reposed 〈◊〉 them ; that were designed to protect it . m. i cannot except against your distinction between those governments where a property in estates , did precede the institution of the government it sell ; for there , i grant , that such a property may be a fundamental law of the government , but in those monarchies that have begun by conquest , under the command of a king ; or absolute prince , over an army of his own subjects , in that case upon the conquest of a kingdom , or forreign nation , not only the prey , or goods of the 〈◊〉 , but also their estates were forfeited to the conquerour , who had a right either to retain them for himself , or else to distribute them as rewards amongst his 〈◊〉 , and soldiers : and that this is the right of all conquerors , whether common-wealth , or monarchs , by the law of nations , and was exercised amongst the antient greeks , and romans , as well as other nations , i referr you to your own authors grotius , and pufendors . and therefore , since it appears from history , that most of the kingdoms now in europe , and particularly this of england , began from conquest , under the conduct of their first kings , if then whatsoever was so conquered was acquired for them , and they alone had a property in it , it will necessarily follow that all estates which the subjects of all sorts now enjoy , must have proceeded from their grants or concessions ; and hence it is , that not only in england but also in scotland and france , they are all held either mediately , or immediately , of the king : as being at first all derived from him ; and we read in the antient laws of scotland , that the king had the whole property of the country , till the reign of malcolm conmor , who , as we read in the ancient histories of that country , granted all the lands in scotland to his nobility , and gentry , according to that old maxim in their law , rex distribuit totam toram scotiae hominibus juis : and therefore if hereditary property in estates were only from the gift and bounty of our kings without any fundamental contract between them , and their subjects , as you suppose ; i cannot see any reason ( granting the worst that can happen , which is highly improbable ) if the kings of this , or of our neighbouring nations , should go about by force to destroy , and take away this hereditary property they now enjoy , that the people should have any right to resist them ; but that it would be not only ingratitude , but rebellion so to do . for tho' i own that kings were guilty of perjury in the sight of god if they did it , yet that being an ●ffence only against god , the subjects could have no more right to resist , than sons in the state of nature had to resist their father , if he should go about to take away those estates , which he had before bestowed upon them . and as for what you say concerning the roman common-wealth , i grant indeed , that the government of the people did there precede that of the emperour , yet if you please to remember , monarchy was the first , and most antient government of that people . and i doubt not but all the property the romans had in their estates , tho' they preceeded from conquest of their arms , yet it was wholly owing to the grace and bounty of their first kings , and when upon the ex●ulsion of iarquin , the supream power became divided between the senate and people , the property of all the lands that were conquered devolved upon them , who often divided them to particular private men as they thought fit , tho' i confess the not dividing of these lands amongst the common people , was afterwards the cause of great tumults , and commotions amongst them ; yet notwithstanding the senate and nobility still maintained their power , and to the last refused to make a division of those lands , they had formerly conquered ; so that the roman emperors succeeding in the power of the senate , and people , they were likewise restored , as it were ex pos●liminio , to the prerogatives of the first kings , and consequently , as seneca himself confesses in the place you have quoted , tho' the particular propriety of estates was in private men , yet you see he grants the vniversal possession , or dominion of them was in the king , or emperor , from whom they were originally derived . i would not be thought to speak thus , as if i were an enemy to mens liberties , and properties , or that i either fear , or desire any change in them , from what we now enjoy , but since i think it a thing morally impossible to alter them , and that therefore no king will be so ill advised , as to go about to seize them into his own hands ; but only by way of discourse , supposing the worst that can happen , i think we are not only obliged in conscience , but also that it were much better for the common peace that the ring should take all we have , than that we should involve the nation in civill war , and confusion , and our consciences under the guilt of a mortal sin , by such resistance , and rebellion . f. i am very sorry to see , that by your principles all the free nations of europe lye at the mercy of any prince to be made as arrand slaves as any are in turkey , when ever their monarch please , or that they think that they can make more of their people by taking away their estates and liberties , than by let●ing them enjoy them , which would render civil property in all kingdoms like private estates , which every man may let to his tenants a● vvill , upon a rack rent , or for years , or lives as they shall think fit . but i think i may very well differ from you in both your propositions : for , omitting any farther discourse of th●se eastern monarchies , where i grant the people are little better than slaves ; yet i think i can easily prove , out of the ancient histories of those kingdoms that are now in europe , that tho' most of them began by conquest , yet was it not under the conduct of absolute monarchs , but under such princes , or leaders , whose followers ( as i said before at our last meeting , ) were not properly subjects nor mercenaries , but volunteers , under those that commanded them . and therefore would never have gone out of their own countries , but to advantage themselves , and to enjoy those priviledges , which their country-men had at home , of which , liberty in their persons , and property in their estates , were the chief ; and this is apparent in the french nation , who whatever their condition may be now , yet anciently called themselves francs ▪ in opposition to that servitude , which they supposed their neighbouring nations amongst the germans were in to the romans at that time : and tho' i grant , that these nations of the goths , vandals , francs and saxons from whom most of the kingdoms in europe are now derived , might vest , or intrust the lands of the countreys they had conquered , in him whom they had made their king , yet still it was with this trust , that retaining a sufficient part to sustain the royal dignity , they should distribute the rest to all their officers , and soldiers , according to each man's valour , or merit ; and if they had refused to have done this , can any man believe , that so free a people , as the antient histories relate them to have been , would ever have suffered it , without pulling down those kings they had set up , which was then very common among them for much slighter occasions ? and to go no higher than william ( whom you call the conquerour ) can any man believe , that if he had retained all the lands of england to himself , not only his own norman lords and souldiers , but those of other forreign nations , who assisted him in this expedition , would ever have suffered him to have reigned in quiet over them , if instead of a limited king , he had set himself up for an absolute monarch , and have granted them no estates but at his will , and pleasure : which would have reduced the conquerour , and the conquered to the same condition ▪ but as for your example of malcolm canmor , i cannot believe that the kings of scotland were so lately as his reign possessed of the whole hereditary property of all the lands in that kingdom , so as that no man had any setled interest in them before that time , and therefore i must beg your pardon , if i think this passage in their historians to be very suspicious , if not false : but i speak this only by the by , and i reserve what i have more to say on this head , for another time , wherein , i doubt not but to be able to shew you , as evidently as can be done after so many ages , that all the kingdoms in europe which are descended from the gothick or german nations commenced at first from compact , with their first kings , and have thereby an unalterable right , in their lives , liberties , and estates ; and if so , have likewise right to defend them , if generally , and vniversally invaded by their princes . but granting for the present , what you have asserted to be true , that all this property , which is now in europe , proceeded wholly from the grants , and concessions of princes ; yet will it not follow , that by the law of nature , or nations , if any king should go about generally , or at once to invade the liberties , and properties of their people , they might not lawfully be re●isted , for , as i said before , even a sl●ve when manumitted by his patron , may lawfully d●fend his liberty against him , if he goeth about to take it away , and reduce him again into slavery ; so likewise in the same state of nature ▪ if a prince freely grant his subjects a setled and hereditary property in their estates , they have likewise a right to defend them , against him , or any other that would endeavour by force to take them away ; for he that in this state grants any thing to another , grants him likewise a right to keep it , whether the donor will , or not , or else it were indeed 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , for he , that in the state of nature grants another man any thing to be possessed , or enjoyed only as long as he himself , or his heirs , shall think fit , doth in effect grant him as good as nothing ; since he may alter his mind to morrow and demand it again , and take it away the very next day . so that if you will grant , that subjects have such a right to their estates , as that the prince cannot without manifest violence , or injustice take them away , you must likewise grant , that they have also a right to defend them . but i suppose you will not deny that right , that all men have to their civil properties in all our european kingdoms , and common-wealths , tho' never so absolute : but your objection against the subjects defending it by force , if it be invaded , is , that it may cause rebellion , and confusion ; i grant indeed , it may sometimes occasion civil wars , or intestine commotions , if the people finding their liberties and properties notoriously invaded , shall oppose the unjust violence of those who , contrary to the trust reposed in them , do thus violently invade them : therefore , ( forsooth ) if this doctrine be allowed , it may prove destructive to the peace of kingdoms , and common wealths and consequently to the good , and happiness of mankind : but methinks you might as well have argued , that honest men might not resist robbers or pirates , because it may occasion disorder , and bloodshed ; if any mischief come in such cases , sure it is not to be charged upon him , who defends his own right , but on him that invades anothers . if the innocent honest man must quit all he hath for quietness sake to him who will lay violent hands upon it , i desire it may be considered , what a kind of peace there will be in the world , which would consist only in violence , and rapi●● , and which would be maintained only for the benefit of publick robbers , and oppressors . m. but pray , do you make no difference between a knot of thieves and robbers and the civil government of a monarch , or common-vvealth , which i suppose may very well be maintain'd without any hereditary property in lands as you have granted ? and it were much better in my mind to forego these outward things , than resist the civil government which is the ordinance of god , as you your self acknowledge . f. i think the best way to end this controversy , will be , to desire you to give a definition of civil government , that we may know what we mean by it , therefore , pray , will you give me an easy and plain definition of it . m. vvell sir , i shall comply with your desires ; i then take civil government to be an authority conferred by god , on one , or more persons , to make laws for the benefit , and protection of the subjects , and to inflict such punishments for their transgression , as they shall think fit , and by the subjects obedience , and assistance to protect them against forreign enemies , and also to appoint what share of civil property each person in that common-wealth shall enjoy . f. sir , tho' your definition be somewhat lame , yet i am pretty well contented with it , only i will shew you by and by wherein it is deficient : the first and therefore chiefest branch , or office of civil magistrate● , 〈◊〉 , to make laws for the benefit , and protection of the subjects : is it then a branch of this power , to send souldiers , or dragoons , to take away their liberties , lives or estates ▪ this sure is directly contrary to their duty , and that trust which god hath conferred upon them . let us go on to the next branch : the inflection of punishments for the transgr●ssion of such laws ; is this a part of civil government not only to send their souldiers , and other officers to take away their subjects lives and estates , but also to let the most capital offenders or robbers pass unpunish'd when they have done ; if you maintain these to be the prerogatives of civil government , or that to be civil government where these things are commonly practised , you may , even with mr. hobbs set the great leviathan free from all obligation to his subjects , any further than he shall think fit for his own interest , and make them always in a state of nature , that is , ( as he supposes ) of war with them , and then pray tell me , whether such a state , can be the ordinance of god , or not ? but to come to the last branch of your definition ( and in which alone i think it deficient ) the appointing what share of property each person in that common-wealth shall enjoy ; tho' i grant it may be the prerogative of civil governments to appoint this at first , yet are they likewise obliged to maintain this property when it is once instituted ; and the people have as much right to it as any king can have to his crown , viz. the civil law of that country , or consent of the whole nation : and therefore , if , according to king iames the first his rule , a king of a setled , ( or limited ) kingdom will break all the laws thereof , and degenerate into a tyrant ; unless such tyrant be the ordinance of god , he may certainly be so far opposed , for what can pirates , or robbers do more than his officers , and guards by his commission ? the former can but murder men , ravish their wives , burn their houses , and take away their estates ; and if the latter may do so too , pray where is the difference ? or what satisfaction is it to me , that i am ruined by one man having the king's commission , or by another that ruins me without it ? since i am sure , god hath given the one no more authority to do it , than the other ; if then this unlimited power be neither conferred by god , nor man upon the civil magistrates , i would fain know any reason , why thieves , and pirates may be resisted , but their instruments may not , that do the same things ; and why , when civil authority exceeds its utmost bounds , the state of nature , or self-defence , may not take place ; since the civil government is as much dissolved by such violent actions , as if a forreign enemy had broke in , and conquered the country ? but to answer your query , whether i think a civil government may not be , where there is no setled property in estates , and whether the eastern monarchies are not civil governments ? to this i answer , that i have aristotle on my side , who , not without reason affirms , that the government of one man , where there is no civil property , and where all men are slaves , is not civil government , but that of a master of a great family over his slaves : and tho' i grant , that they may have some shew of civil government among them , as in a plantation , where one of the slaves may complain to the master against another for any injury or wrong done him , yet is not this property civil government any more than that of the master of a separate family who looks upon himself as absolute lord over all his slaves , and they allowed him by god , only for his benefit , and grandeur , and not he instituted , ( as all civil powers are ) for the good , and preservation of the subjects . m. but methinks you seem herein to condemn the government of gods own people the iews , which no doubt was an absolute monarchy ; and that restrained by no laws , except what god had expresly prescribed them ; and yet you see notwithstanding samuel told them , that their kings should take away their fields , and their vineyards , and give them to his servants , and take their sons and daughters to be his servants , or slaves ; yet god leaves them no power to resist them , for so doing : but all the remedy left them , is , that they should cry out in that day , because of the king which they had chosen , and the lord would not hear them , that is , there was no remedy left them but patience . f. i have already given you my sense of that place , and i shall speak more particularly to it , when you shall come to those texts of scripture , that you said you would produce for absolute subj●ction , and non-resistance : and therefore at present : i shall only here shew you what the earl of clarendon in the above mentioned survey of the leviathan , cap. . hath very prudently as well as honestly said concerning this text : they who will deduce the extent of the absolute and illimited power of kings , from that declaration by samuel , which indeed , seems to leave neither property nor liberty to their subjects , and could be only intended by samuel to terrifie them from that mutinous , and seditious clamor ; as it hath no foundation from any other part of scripture , nor was ever practised , or exercised by any good king , who succeeded over them , and was blessed , and approved by god. so when those state empiricks ( of what degree , or quality soever ) will take upon them to prescribe a new dyet , and exercise to soveraign princes , and invite them to assume new powers , and prerogatives over the people , by the precepts , warrants , and prescriptions of the scriptures : they should not presume to make the sacred writ subject to their own private fancies . so likewise in a leaf or two before , he speaks much to the same purpose . that what samuel had said was rather to terrifie them , from pursuing their foolish demands , than to constitute such a prerogative as the kings should use , whom god would appoint to go in and out before them ; which methinks is very manifest , in that the worst kings that ever reigned over them , never challenged , or assumed those prerogatives nor did the people conceive themselves liable to those impositions ; as appears by the application they made to rehoboam upon the death of solomon , that he would abate some of that rigor his father had exercised towards them , the rough rejection o● which request , contrary to the advice of his wi●est counsellours , cost him the greater part of his dominions : and when rehoboam would by arms have reduc'd them to obedience , god would not suffer him , because he had been in the fault himself . from whence you may conclude , that this great man did not think all resistance unlawful , in case of general , and intolerable oppressions . m. i shall give you my opinion farther , of what you have now said , when you have told me more plainly in what cases you allow resistance of the supream powers , and in what not . for till you have been more clear in this matter , i cannot tell what judgment to make of your tenets . f. i thank you for putting me upon so fair a method , and therefore that you may not mistake me , and suppose that i would go about to allow subjects to resist , and take up arms against the supream power upon any less occasion than an absolu●● necessity , and apparent danger of being destroyed , and ruined in their lives , liberties , and estates ; first therefore , considering that the corruption of humane nature is such , that no sort of government whatsoever can continue long , without some inconveniences , and mischiefs , to particular men , not that any man either prince , or ●ubject was ever master of such perfect wisdom , and goodness , as always to peform his duty so exactly , as never to offend ; i do in the first place , grant , that it would be both undut●ful ▪ as well as unjust for subjects to rebell a●ainst their prince for his personal failings , or vices ; undutiful , since the prince may be often times an ill man in his private capacity , and yet a good governour , in respect of the publick ; and also unjust , since neither do we our selves exactly perform our duties toward the supream powers ( or to one another ) as we ought : and therefore it is highly reasonable for subjects to endure ▪ and pass by the personal faults or failings of princes , in consi●eration of that protection , and security , in their lives , and fortunes , which they do enjoy under them ▪ since it hath been found by experience with how great a slaughter of people , and how great a confusion , and danger of the whole common-wealth , evil princes have been resisted , or turn'd out of their thrones : and therefore i grant the private injuries of princes are to be past over , in consideration of that great charge they undergo , and for those greater benefits we receive from their government , but chiefly for the publick peace of the common wealth , or civil society ; and therefore i own it is very well said by that master in politicks , tacitus , that the ill humours or dispositions of kings , are to be born withal , and that often mutations of governments are of dangerous consequence . and he wisely introduces ceriales speaking to this purpose to the rebellious treveri : that they ought to bear with the luxury and avarice of rulers , as they do with immoderate showers , and other unnatural evils , since there will be vices whilst there are men , yet neither are these continual , but are often recompensed by the intervention of better . but i will now particularize those cases wherein i do absolutely disallow , and disclaim all resistance in subjects against the supream powers . . i deny all resistance to subjects against their princes , or supream magistrates , in all such actions , or prerogatives which are absolutely necessary to the exercise of their supream power , viz. of protecting and defending their people , as also against those who are commission'd by them for the execution of such powers . . i condemn all rebellion against princes , or states , meerly on the score of religion , or because they are not of the religion of their people , or subjects , if there be no positive law extant , disabling or forbidding princes , or other magistrates of different religions than that of their people , from being admitted to the throne , or government . . i look upon it as rebellion in the people , tumultuously to rise up in arms to alter , or reform the religion of the nation , or kingdom already established by law , without the consent of the legislators . . i disclaim all resistance , or self-defence in subjects , upon the account that the free , or publick exercise of that religion they profess , is not allowed them by the legislative power of the kingdom , or nation , provided that such supream powers do not forbid , or hinder the people professing such a different religion , to sell , or transport their estates , and persons into any other country where they please . . i deny resistance to subjects against their princes or governours upon pretence of any personal vices , as because they are wicked , atheisti●al , cruel , lustful , or debauched , provided they generally protect their subjects in their lives , liberties , and properties . . i deny this right of resistance to any particular person less than the wh●le body , or major part of the people , or at least such a considerable portion of a nation , as are able , when assaulted , or oppressed in their lives , liberties , or estates to constitute a distinct , and entire kingdom , or common-wealth of themselves . . i look upon it as wicked , and rebellious for any private subjects to assassinate , murder or imprison their monarch , or other supream governour , since no private person whatever ought to lay violent hands upon his prince , whose person ought to be sacred , and in no wise to be violated , unless he put off the character of a prince , and actually make war upon his people . but if in this case , he happen to be resisted , and perish in the attempt , he falls not as a prince , but as a common enemy , by breaking the original compact with his people ; and entring into a state of war against them : as a father who unjustly makes war upon his children , may be , ( as i have already proved at our first conference ) resisted by them in the state of nature . but as for all other grievances , or oppressions , if they are of that nature as may ruine the whole common-wealth , yet not suddenly , but after some time , and often repeated , i cannot allow such grievances , or oppressions , as a sufficient cause of resistance ; for as on the one hand , there is no inconvenience so small , but in process of time it may turn to the ruine of the common-wealth , if it be often repeated , and excessively multiplie● ; so on the other side , length of time produces so great changes , that the nature of these encroachments , or injuries are not sufficient to justifie resistance , and the breach of that peace and unity in a common wealth , which must necessarily follow by entering into a state of war. to conclude , i do not in any case whatever allow of resistance ; but only in these three necessary ones : when the lives , liberties , or estates of the whole people , of the greatest part of them , are either actually invaded , or else taken away , and when they are reduced into so bad a condition , that a state of war is to be preferred before such a peace ; a●d when the end of civil government being no longer to be obtained by it , the common-wealth may be look't upon as dissolved . m. tho' you have been pretty long in treating of this matter , yet i did not think it tedious , since i confess you have given me honestly enough , ( and so far i agree with you ) all those cases wherein you say it is u●lawful for subjects to take up arms , or resist the supream powers : but i wonder you have not added one case more , which diverse authors , that are high enough against non-resistance , in other things , do yet allow to be a sufficie●s cause of taking up arms , and resisting their prince ; and that is , when he actually hath , or goeth about to alie●ate , or make over his dominion and subjects to some forreign prince , or state. f. i am not ignorant of what you say , but i thought it not worth speaking ot , because in absolute monarchies , ( which we are now treating of ; ) if such kingdoms are patrimonial , and that the monarch hath such an absolute dominion over his subjects , as neither to let them enjoy any liberty in their persons , nor properties in their estates , but at his pleasure ; i cannot see any reason , why such a prince may not alienate his dominion , over such a kingdom , and people , as well as any private-man , may his property in his estate : nor have the people any cause to be concerned at it , since they can then likewise be but slaves , and enjoy nothing but at their princes pleasure , as they did before ; so that whether he , or a stranger govern them ▪ it is all one as to their circumstances ; but yet under such governments , as are absolute , where the people enjoy their personal lib rites , and properties in their estates , the case may be much otherwise ; since they may not be sure , that the foreign prince , to whom their own monarch , or other supream powers hath assigned them , will maintain their liberties , and properties as the former did : and therefore not being slaves before , they cannot be alienated without their own consents , and consequently they may take up arms , and defend themselves if they are able ; ●nle●s the prince , or state to whom they are so alienated will give them the like assurance to preserve their lives , liberties , and properties , as their former governours did ; and therefore i do conceive , the people of the islands of cyprus , and candy , might very well have refused to become subjects to the grand seignior , in case the venetians should have sold , or alien'● their dominion over them , before he had actually conquer'd them . but in limited , or hereditary kingdoms , which are so by their fundamental constitution , i suppose , the prince cannot upon any account whatsoever , make over his dominions , to a foreign prince without the consent of his people , and next heir : and therefore , ( granting the story to be true ; ) i doubt not but the people of this kingdom might very well have opposed king iohn , if he had gone about to have subjected it , to the dominion of the emperour of morocco , upon condition that he would assist him with an army of moors to subdue h●s barons , and nobility then in arms against him . m. i confess it is not worth while to dispute about that which so seldom happens , and is indeed almost impossible to be put in practice , and therefore i shall not much oppose you in what you have said upon this case ; yet , that i may be as good as my word , and give you my judgment concerning what you have lately said , i must freely tell you , that as it may happen , that a prince , or state may sometimes abuse their power , so as to take away the liberties , and estates of all their subjects , as you have set forth , ( and which i confess is a very great mischief ) yet upon second thoughts , i think it were much better that this inconvenience should be suffered , rather than the work mischief of leaving subjects to be the sole iudges , when their liberties , and estates are invaded , or like to be taken away ; nay , every private subject would be first iudge of it , or else the whole people could never come to pass their iudgment upon it , which would leave too great a latitude for ●urbulent , and rebellious spirits to make disturbances in kingdoms , and commonwealths : especially if there be any small grievances , on the subjects , especially too , 〈◊〉 they touch at those things they account their hereditary liberties , and properties : these , ( tho' never so small ) if the people are suffered to be their own iudges ( as you make them to be in their own case ) will soon be aggravated , and blown up to intolerable oppressions of , and invasions upon their liberties and properties , when indeed they are not : this is a pernitious doctrine , for it will be a perpetual cause of quarrels , civil wars , and rebellions , which would turn all commonwealths , tho never so well constituted , into anarchy , and confusion . so that as you have stated this question , you have broached a principle highly destructive to all civil government ; for if all , or any of the people , may resist , or rebel , ( call it what you please ) whenever they think themselves oppressed in their liberties and ●s●ates , this is for them only to be obedient , when they think themselves well governed ; but stubborn , and rebellious when they believe they are not , which would be to make all government precarious and conditional , and the people not only parties but iudges , and executioners too in their own case ; how far these conditions are observed on the governours part , and then the regularity , or irregularity of the administration will no longer be the question , but the validity of the power to command ▪ and there wants no more to dissolve such a government , than for dick , or tom , and every rascal of the mobile to say , this or that , is destructive to the peoples liberties , and properties , and therefore an insupportable grievance , and oppression . and if you will once allow any number of the people , tho' never so many , to iudge this , or that law , or order of the government , not to be for their good , and that they may likewise resist , and right themselves by arms , when ever they thus fancy , they will quickly come to say , that the government it self is not for their good neither ; and upon this ground all the rebellions ●a●sed by an incensed , and mistaken multitude against the government in all ages , may easily be justified , and wa● ▪ tyler , and mass●an●llo shall be so far from being rebels , that they may pass in future ages for heroes , and noble assertors of the peoples liberties ; and i hope you will believe , i do not speak this out of any liking , or approbation of tyranny , or that i desire , that princes should stretch their power to the utmost , to invade their subjects liberties , or estates ; but only to let you see , how far your principles may serve the pretences of wicked men to set whole kingdoms together by the ears , whenever they find the people so far discontented with the government , as to believe their malicious and wicked insinuations ; of all which those long , and cruel , civil wars , and rebellions which for several years tormented , and almost ruined these three kingdoms , are too late , and sad examples . f. i confess sir , you have made a very pathetick speech , and exerted , i suppose the utmost strength of your reason and eloquence on this subject , for you have made the consequences of this principle , viz. ( that the people may judge when their liberties , and properties are invaded ) to seem very dreadful , but after all , it is no more than what you have urged in great part already , and the main strength of your argument lyes here , that if the people should take upon them but once to judge , when they were notoriously injured , or oppress 't , and thereupon take arms , to right themselves ; they would soon make bold to put this power into use and practice , when they had no occasion for it at all , or at least not sufficient to make any open insult . but to shew you , that there is no need , of such an infallible iudge , as you suppose , to be necessary in a commonwealth any more than there is in the church ; pray , tell me , sir , would it not have been very convenient , if christ had appointed , an infallible iudge , ( be it the pope , or general counsel , or both together , ● to decide all controversies in religion , and to whose judgment all people ought to submit ? m. i cannot deny , but it would have been a very ready way to end all disputes about religion , but since god hath not thought fit to appoint any such iudge , it were very great presumption in us to set up one to please our humour , since such a one could have no infallibility , unless it were given him from above . f. you judge very well ; and doth it not therefore follow , that since there is no such infallible judge , all men ought to iudge for themselves of the truth of their religion , and also in the christian religion , what doctrines are agreeable to the word of god , and what not , and yet you see that from the ill use of this liberty have sprung all the different sects , and heresies in the world ? does it therefore follow , that men must not make use of this liberty , because they may abuse it ? so likewise , must subjects judge in no case whatsoever , when the supream power tyrannizes over them , beyond what they are able to bear ? and must they never resist , or endeavour to cast off this insupportable yoak , because they may happen one time or other to be wanton , and believe themselves oppress 't when indeed they are not ? m. i grant your parallel would have some what in it , were the consequences of every mans judging for himself in matters of religion , as fatal to the peace , and happiness of mankind , as your doctrine of the subjects judging , when it is fit for them to resist the supream powers ; for i do not at all debar them from the right of iudging , when they are oppress 't , or ill used by them , for that may very well consist with the publick peace , but i utterly disallow all manner of resistance by force , because it tends , not only to dissolve all civil government , but to disturb the common peace , and safety of mankind . f. notwithstanding your distinction , the parallel with hold in both cases , for are not differences in religion as fatal to the peace , and unity of the church , as the subjects judging , when they are oppress 't , and thereupon taking up defensive arms , can be to that of a civil state ? and do not more wars , and quarrels arise about mens differences in religion , than from any other cause you can name ? so that if the peace of the church were a sufficient cause for supposing a certain , or infallible iudge in religion , there would be the same reason to suppose it in civil matters too . and therefore your argument , from the abuse of this liberty of the subjects judging , when they may resist , is of no more force in one case , than the other ; for i grant it may so happen in a civil state , as well as in an ecclesiastical , that the subjects may rise up , and resist their civil , as well as spiritual governours , without any just cause : doth it therefore follow , that god hath wholly delivered up mankind to the domineering humours of men in power , let them abuse it never so grosly ? and therefore we must not be wiser than god almighty himself , and when he hath not appointed any certain , and infallible iudges either in civil or spiritual matters without any contradiction , or resistance , we ought not to suppose a necessity of such judges , meerly because of some inconveniences , which may perhaps often happen from the abuse of that christian liberty he hath given us . for then i doubt you will find the remedy would be much worse than the disease , as if to avoid heresies , we should set up the pope for an infallible iudge . so would it be likewise if to avoid civil wars , and rebellions we should set up the supream magistrate ( as mr. hobbs hath done ) for a certain , and irresistible iudge of whatsoever means are necessary for the people's quiet and preservation , since i have already proved , that an insupportable tyranny is not civil government , and that the supream powers can no more alter the nature of things , but their own laws , or edicts , than they can ordain poyson to be used , in stead of wholesom food , by the people . m. i confess what you have now said , carries some weight with it , and my own carnal reason doth very much incline me to your opinion , were it not for two things , the one ( as i said ) is the horrid rebellions , that have , and may again arise in these kingdoms from this principle ; which hath made god so strictly forbid , all resistance of the higher powers , upon any account whatsoever ; and therefore you are much mistaken , when you assert , that resistance , tho' for self defence , is one of the liberties , that god hath left us ; since certainly he would never so severely have forbidden it , but that he not only knew how prone men's corrupt natures were to rebellion , but also foresaw the fatal consequence of it . f. if god's commands in scripture be the greatest argument , you have against all resistance whatever , i doubt not but to shew you , ( when we come to it , ) that you as well as others are mistaken in that strict interpretation of those places of scripture ; and as for the evil consequences you suppose may follow from this doctrine , i doubt not likewise but to convince you , that much worse will follow from the irresistible tyranny of the supream powers , than ever have happen'd from the dreadfullest rebellions . and therefore i desire you to take notice , that what i have now said , is not out of any design to iustifie so horrid a crime , as i grant rebellion to be , or to incite subjects to be guilty of it ; but only to hinder civil government from being destroyed , and mankind from being made miserable . for i have first asserted , that no resistance whatever is to be made in absolute governments ; but in those cases in which the main ends of civil government are visibly destroyed , or so near it , that there is no other means left but resistance to prevent it . and then when things are once brought to this pass , it is not the people , that make this war , but the governours , who by their tyranny have brought the common-wealth into this anarchy , and confusion you so m●ch dread ; so that it is not the people , but they that are the aggressors . and as for the ill use that may be made of this doctrine , to stir up the people to rebellion , when they have no just , or sufficient provocation to re●●st . this will not prove of that dangerous consequence , you imagine if you will but consider , that i do not allow this resistance in any case ; but when the violence , or oppression of the governors is so evident , and insupportable to all the people , that groan under it , that no indifferent man in his senses , will be able to deny it ; for as long as there remains , any disputableness whether , or no the people are sufficiently opprest ▪ in their liberties , or estates , the trust reposed in the supream magistrates makes them the sole iudges of the necessity of such exorbitant actions , as being intrusted by the people as men supposed , to be both wise , and good , and themselves ignorant in diverse cases of the true means of their own preservation , and the supream powers remain the sole iudges , as long as the case is doubtful , or uncertain . but since you have already acknowledged , that the people might iudge ( if such a case should happen ) whether the prince , or other supream magistrate makes actual war upon them , i would very fain know , why the people cannot as plainly distinguish when he sends his guards , or dragoons to take away their lives and liberties , or to turn them out of their estates : and 〈◊〉 this be done , and the tyranny so evident , and general , and insupportable , that it is past all question i grant that the people ought to have patience , and rather suffer many oppressions , and hardships , than put themselves into a state of war. so that i think it is morally impossible , that the people can be mistaken in 〈◊〉 evident a case : nor i believe can you scarce shew me one example , either out of antient or modern history , of any whole nation , or people , or the major part of them , that did ever rise in arms to cast off either a foreign , or domestick yoke , which pressed too hard upon them ; but when they had the most unavoidable , and justest causes so to do . and i believe i can shew you ten examples out of histories , ( if the question were to be decided by them ) for one you can shew me to the contrary . 't is true , some private men may sometimes make disturbances , or rebellions ; but it is commonly to their own iust ruine , and perdition ; for , till the mischief be grown general , and the violence of the rulers become evident , and their attempts to destroy , or make slaves of them , are most sensible to all , or the greatest part of the people ; they are commonly more a great deal disposed to suffer , than to right themselves by resistance , well knowing the mischiefs of war , and how destructive it will prove , not only to their lives , but to the welfare of their families and posterities , as well as private concerns . so that the example of some particular injustice , oppression , nay , or absolute ruine of here and there an unfortunate person , moves them not . but if once they find their lives , liberties , and estates universally assaulted , and about to be taken away , who is to be blamed for it : the magistrate , or the people ? for the former might have avoided it if they had pleased , either by not urging them to that extremity at all , or at least redressing those grievances , and oppressions before they became so general , and insupportable , as not to be any longer endured . so that , tho' i grant , the ambition , or turbulency of private men have sometimes caused great disorders in common-wealths , and factions have been fatal to states , and kingdoms , yet whether this mischief hath oftner begun from the people's wantonness ; and desire to cast off the lawful authority of their rulers , or from the rulers insolence , and endeavours to get , and exercise a tyrannical arbitrary power over their people , that is , whether oppression , or disobedience gave the first rise to the disorder , i leave it ( as i said ) to impartial history , to determine . but this i am sure of , whoever ( either ruler , or subject ) goes about by force to invade the rights of either prince , or people , and lays a foundation for overturning the original constitution , and frame of any civil government , he is guilty of the greatest crime , i think a man is capable of , being to answer for all those mischiefs , bloudshed , rapine , and desolations which the breaking to pieces of governments does bring on a country ▪ and he who doth it is justly to be esteemed a common enemy , and is to be treated accordingly . but as for the instances you give of wa● tyler , and massianello , i grant indeed it may so happen , that a great part of the common people , or rabble may sometimes upon sudden , or false apprehensions , occasioned by some real grievances or oppressions , such as are great taxes , or gabels imposed by the state , take up arms , and rebell against the supream powers ; yet these examples do not reach the question in hand , these insurections , or rebellions you mention being of a much less number , than the whole people , or the major part of them , and in which i still include the nobility and gentry , and other land-holders , as the most considerable part . and so those insurrections were in no wise iustifiable , especially in such a government as ours , where no man can be taxed but by his own consent included in his representatives , whereas all these rebellions were chiefly ( if not altogether ) made by the meaner sort , or scum of the people , of one , or a few countries , whom i can never allow to make disturbances , since they , having very little to lose , ought in all civil governments whatsoever , to be directed and governed by those , in whom the ballance of the government in lands , and other riches doth reside and on whom they chiefly depend for their protection and subsistance , and consequently ought to make no alterations in the state without their consent , and approbation . but as for your other instance of the wars raised in these three kingdoms , against king charles the first , upon the pretence of our religion , liberties , and properties being invaded , it is not proper to be treated of in this place : since we are now discoursing of the power of princes , and the right of subjects under absolute , and not limited monarchies ; and i grant that some resistance may be rebellion , under absolute monarchies which would not be so under limited ones : yet i do still suppose that it may be lawful under such limited monarchy for the people to take up arms , and make resistance in defence of those iust liberties , and priviledges which they lawfully enjoy either by the original constitution of the government , or by acts of grace , or concession of the prince ; but this requires a more large , and accurate discourse which at another time , i am ready to give you . therefore granting at present , that those wars were down right rebellion against the king , and also that they were made under pretence of the principle i now assert , yet doth it not at all overthrow the iustice of that cause , which i now maintain ; since ( as i have already more than once intimated ) the abuse that may be sometimes made of a natural right , by some wicked , factious , or hypocritical men ought not in the least to preju●ice the exercise of that right to all the rest of mankind ; who may lye under a real necessity of making use of it . to conclude , if the people may nev●r be trusted to iudge when their liberties and properties are actually invaded , because they may happen one time or other to be mistaken , and so enter into a state of war without cause to the destruction of mankind , this argument would serve as well against all princes , and common-wealths , who , being in the state of nature with each other , should never make war for any cause or provocation , how great soever , because being iudges and executioners too in their own case , they may more easily happen to be mistaken , i suppose you your self will grant , that one , or a few men are more apt to be in an error , than , and i have already proved , that where the people have never wholly given up their liberties , and properties unto the absolute will of the supream powers , they are as to that still in a state of nature , and do reserve to themselves a right of iudging when they are violently and insupportably invaded and consequently of vindicating themselves from that oppression . and therefore granting what you have said to be true , that the people may sometimes happen to abuse this natural right of iudging , and resisting by exerting it , when there is no real and absolute necessity : so on the other side , if they are wholy debarred from it , because they may happen sometimes to abuse it , the freest people in the world , viz. ( our selves for example ) may easily be reduced into a condition of absolute slavery and beggery , and that without all remedy , by any humane means that i can think of , and which is the worst mischief of these two , i leave to your self , or any indifferent man to iudge . m. if you will have my opinion in this point● , i must freely tell you , that it is a hard matter to find out a mischief so destructive to the people , and which they should exchange for this miserable state of war , which you suppose may prove so beneficial to them , and yet i doubt , if it be throughly lookt into , not only the doctrine it self , but also the lasting wars , and miseries it may produce , would sufficiently prove the contrary since the cruellest tyranny , slavery , and loss of estates , or any thing else almost may be better born with in peace , and unity than a civil war , with the greatest liberty , and plenty : seeing all such comforts would quickly be devoured like pharaoh's fat kine , by such a cruel m●nster feeding in their bowels : and therefore since civil war is one of the greatest calamities , and punishments that god uses to send upon a nation , it seems evident to me , that the wellfare of any state , or people requires them to be obedient unto the supream powers , tho' they be never so great oppressors , or cruel tyrants . for when once they enter into this dismal state of war , who can tell whether it will have an end , without almost the total destruction of the nation , or at least by bringing them into a far worse condition of slavery and suffering , than they were before , since the state of princes , or other supream powers can never be so mean , and inconsiderable in the world , as not to find , when like to be opprest by such insurrections , and rebellions of their subjects , sufficient assistance from neighbouring princes or states , who making the cause of such a prince their own , will be sure to assist him to the utmost of their power , it being found true by experience as tully long ago observed : that the afflicted state of kings do easily draw the help and pity of many others , especially of those , who are either kings themselves , or do live in a kingdom , the regal name being by them esteemed to be great and sacred . and farther ▪ how ready a way it is to subvert the state of any such distract●d kingdom , and to bring it under the subjection of foreigners , we need not seek a plainer proof , than by an example no farther off than ireland , where derm●t king of leinster being forced by his rebellious subjects to ●rave the aid of king henry the ii. for his restoration to his kingdom , his assistance to recover his right produced that effect , which we now see , viz. that the irish lost their domi●ion , and became subject to the crown of england even to this day . and supposing , that the subjects might likewise be assisted by some foreign prince who would undertake their deliverance , they would not be in a much b●tt●r condition since if he were an absolute monarch himself , he would be 〈◊〉 , for example sake , as well as for their own security to carry as strict a hard over t●em , and use them more severely than their own prince had done before : and i doubt not , but if lewis prince of france , had been crowned king of this kingdom , as he was very near it , toward the latter end of king iohn's reign , but that he would have been more cruel , and tyrannical than ever king iohn had been before : so that they would have got nothing by the bargain , but a change of masters , and a heavier yoke imposed upon them by a foreigner . and so much the viscount melun confessed upon his death bed to many of the english nobility , which was the reason of their returning again to their allegiance to henry the third . so that i think , it had been much better for the barons and nobility of this kingdom never to have stirred , or rebell'd at all against their lawful prince . f. you seem so in love with slavery , and all the consequences of it , that it is an hundred pities but that you should feel the smart of it a little while , provided no body was to suffer by it but your self , and those of your opinion ; but could you see the miserable condition those poor people are in who live under arbitrary and tyrannical government , i doubt not but you would be of another mind , and preferr a war , tho' never so violent , before such a peace , for when men are once reduced to so desperate a condition as neither to be secured of their lives , liberties , or estates , they may have some hope to redress themselves by resistance , but need not fear to be reduced to a worse condition than they were before , and therefore i cannot understand how all the comforts of a civil life , would then be lost by a civil wa● , when i have already put-it as a chief part of the case , that subjects are never to make such a resistance but when the supream powers are just about to begin , or else have actually entered into a state of war against their subjects : for what can any foreign enemy do more if he conquers them , than take away their lives , liberties , and estates ? so that this is so far from being a state of peace , that indeed the people are already exposed to all the calamities of war : but a war , which you suppose may be made without any resistance , whilst the subjects ( forsooth ) are bound to keep the peace but much such another peace , as would be in a house unto which thieves having broken , and the inhabitants retiring into some upper rooms , there stand upon their guard ; and make resistance ; whilst the thieves having seized upon all they have below , one of them should make such a speech as this ; i pray sirs , come down , and submit your selves to us , for we assure you we intend not to kill you , but only to bind you , and take away all you have ; and is not slavery and loss of goods better with peace and safety , than by assaulting us to provoke us to fire the house , and kill you all ; for if you once enter into a state of war with us , it is very likely to end , with your total destruction , for if you continue to resist us , or think to call in company to your assistance , we can likewise call in many more of our party to come , and help us , and then e●p●●t no mercy . now pray tell me , would not this be a very rational argument to move these people to come down , and surrender themselves to these thieves , and partake of the benefits of this excellent peace they propos'd ? and whether they would not tell them that by shooting , they would also call in the neighbouring town , who might be too strong for all their fellow thieves ? now if you will but take these honest people of the next town for such neighbouring princes , or states who may joyn in the assistance of such an opprest people , this simile will fully answer your argument of those neighbouring princes , that may take part with an oppressing tyrant . and as for the consequence of such assistance , on the one side , or the other , that it may happen to bring them into a worse condition , than they were before , viz. a subjection to foreigners , ( as i have put the case , ) it can be no cause to det●r the people from resisting , for if they were ( as i suppose ) reduc'd to a condition of slavery before , and had lost all their liberties , and properties , how can we imagine them in a worse case , than they are already ? and it is all one to such a people , whether their own , or a strange prince did tyrannize , over , and oppress them : nay , were i to take my choice , i had much rather be tyrannized over , and opprest by a foreigner than from my own natural prince ; since the former con●ing in by force , and without any precedent promise , or compact , i lye wholly at his mercy , who hath no obligation upon him , & i had much rather , if i were to be ● slave be so to a stranger , than to my own father , if i were assured , that both the one , and the other would use me with like severity . and to answer your instance of your irish king ; i think that nation hath been so far from losing any thing by their subjection to the english government , that they have gained far greater priviledges , and liberties both for their persons , and estates , than ever they enjoyed under their own princes : so that they are rather the better than the worse by the change. and as for your other example of prince lewis , it is uncertain whether the condition of the english nation would have been either better , or worse under a french king , but thus much i am sure of , that had king iohn proceeded in that tyrannical course against his barons and the rest of his subjects , they could scarce have been in a worse condition under the french , nay the moors themselves , ha● king iohn , actually surrendered his crown to the sarrac●n emperour , as the historians of those times relate he offered to do . nor can i be of your opinion , that i● had been much better for the barons , and nobility of this kingdom never to have stirred , or resisted the king at all ; since if they had not , they had never obtained the great charter of our liberties from him , and if they had not , as vigorously defended it , when they had once got it , i doubt not but the people of england had been long before this time in the same condition , at to their liberties , and properties , as some of our neighbouring nations ; all which is sufficient , i think , to prove , that resistance in desperate and unavoidable cases is not attended with those mischiefs and inconveniencies you suppose . m. i shall not say much more in answer to your lost discourse , since it would be to little purpose , but only take notice that similes are not arguments , and therefore your comparison between thieves , and honest men , doth not hold as to princes ▪ and subjects ; since sure there is a great deal of difference between those , that are to be obeyed as the ordinance of god , and those who are obliged in conscience to be subject to them , and thieves who act directly contrary to gods will , and honest men who having no obligation to them may justly resist them . so that if that be false the rest of the comparison will signifie nothing ; and as for what you say concerning magna charta , i think it is not much for its credit , to have been extorted by force , and afterwards defended by rebellion ; tho' i will not go about to impeach the validity of it , since so many of our succeeding kings , have so solemnly , and voluntarily confirmed it ; only pray take notice , that it is wholly derived from the grace , and bounty of our monarchs ▪ and therefore we are not to resist , tho' it may happen to be sometimes , and in some particular cases broken , and infringed by the king , for some great occasions or necessities of which we are not compet●●t iudges . but to come to the rest of those evil consequences that may attend your doctrine of resistance ; i think the benefits , would be much greater to the people by strictly adhering to those doctrines of absolute subjection , and non-resistance than by propagating yours of rebellion . for if the former were constantly taught , and inculcated , as most beneficial for them , and if they were once really persuaded of the truth of it , and would both constantly profess , and practise it , it would make all princes , much more gentle , and mild to their subjects , than otherwise at some times they are . for now they are still fearful , that they will take the first opportunity , they can to take up arms against them : and upon the least grievance , or mis-government , to resist their authority , for then princes not needing to keep any such constant guards , and standing armies , might afford to lay much easier taxes , and impositions upon them , for the maintenance and support of the government , than now they do , and in short , would have much fewer temptations to tyranny and oppression , could they be once assured of their subjects absolute obedience , and subjection . whereas when they are under those constant fears , and suspitions of insurrections , and rebellions against them , upon the least occasion , it is no wonder , if they are tempted , sometimes to abuse this power for their own security . and therefore we read in our histories , that william the conquerour never thought himself secure from the english , whom he had newly conquered , till such time as he had turned most of the nobility , and gentry , out of their offices and estates , lest they should have any power left either in his life time , or after his death to turn him , or his posterity out of the throne , as they did the heir of the danish king cnute , who with his danes had before conquered england , as king william did afterwards with his normans : so that upon the whole matter it seems to me much more to conduce to the main design of civil government , viz. the happiness and peace of mankind in general , that princes and other supream magistrates , should be suffered ( i will not say authorized ) by god , sometimes to abuse their power to the general oppression , and enslaving of the people , without any resistan●e on their side , expecting their d●liverance wholy from him who can bring it about in his good time ; and by such means as shall seem most meet to him ▪ than that subjects should take upon them to be both iudges , and executioners too , in their own case , and thereby introduce not only all the mischiefs of civil war , and all those cruel revenges which the wrath of an incensed prince may justly inflict upon such rebels in this life ; but also the wrath of god , and those punishments that he hath denounced in the holy scriptures in the life to come against such rebellious subjects , as dare resist the supream powers ordained by god. f. before i answer the main part of your last discourse , give me leave first to justifie my simile , for tho' i grant similes are no arguments , yet they often serve to expose the absurdity of several things which either the ●alse colours of eloquence , or the too great authority of learned men might otherwise have hid from our eyes , and therefore if the supream powers have no authority from the revealed will of god , or the law of nature , nor by the municipal laws of any countrey to invade their subjects lives , liberties or estates , they may be so far compared to thieves and robbers , when they do ; nor are such violent actions of theirs to be submitted to as the ordinance of god. and i suppose you will not deny , but that a prince or state that does thus , acts as directly contrary to gods will , as thieves themselves ; and consequently all honest men or subjects having so far no obligation to suffer or obey , may justly resist them ; so that if this be true , all the rest of the comparison , currit quatuor pedibus . but as for your reflections upon magna charta it is you your self , not i , that asserted it to have been extorted by force , and d●fended by rebellion , for it is very well known to those who are at all conve●sant in our english histories , and laws ; that there was nothing granted in that charter , which was not the birth-right of the clergy , nobility , and people long before the conquest , and were comprised under the title of king edwards laws , and which were after confirmed by william the first , as also more expresly by the grants of his son henry the first , and king stephen , as appears by their charters still to be seen . and therefore these fundamental rights , and priviledges were not extorted by force from king iohn , as you suppose ; the war commencing between him , and his barons , was not , because he would not grant them fresh priviledges , which they had not before ; but because he had not kept , nor observed the fundamental laws of the land , and those rights and priviledges which before belonged to the clergy , nobility , and people , as well by the common law of the land as the grants of former kings . and therefore if king iohn by his apparent breach of them forced the nobility and people to defend them , it was no rebellion for so doing , nor was it ever declared to be so by any law now extant . but to come to the main force of your argument : i confess it were an admirable expedient not only against rebellion , but also the tyranny of princes to preach that they should not oppress their people , nor yet that the people should rebel against them , but the preaching of these doctrines , or getting as many as you can to believe them , will no more make princes leave keeping standing armies , or laying great taxes upon their people , than constant preaching against robbery , or murder , will take away the necessary use of gallows out of the nation : since we know very well , that as long as the corruption of humane nature continues ; so long must likewise all powerful remedies against it . and therefore your instance of william the conqueror will signifie very little , for i believe had all those learned divines ( who have of late so much written and preached for passive obedience and non-resistance ) been then alive , and had exerted the utmost of their reason , and eloquence to prove them necessary , nay farther , i do not believe , tho' all the people of england , should have given it under their hands , that they would not have resisted , or rebelled against king william , that yet he would have trusted them the more for all that , or have kept one soldier the less for it ; nor have remitted one denier of those great taxes he imposed , for he was too cunning and politick a prince not to understand humane nature ; which cannot willingly endure great and intolerable slavery , and oppression without resistance , if men are able , and therefore , he very well knew that after the forcible taking away of so many of the english nobilities estates , there was no way but force to keep them in obedience : and as princes can never be satisfied that their subjects have been throughly paced in these difficult doctrines , so they can never be secure , that they will not play the iades , and kick , and fling their riders , when they spur them too severely , and press too hard upon them . and therefore , i doubt such princes , whose government is severe will always find it necessary to ride this beast , ( as you call it ) the people , with strong curbs and cavessons . but besides all this , there is likewise another infirmity in the nature of mankind , and of which princes may as well be guilty , as other men , that they are more apt to oppress , and insult over those whose principles , or natural tempers may be against all resistance , and for this i appeal to your example of the primitive christians who were not one jot the better used by the roman emperours , tho' they expresly disclaimed all resistance of those emperours for persecution in matters of religion ; and tho' some neighbouring princes are thought to have their subjects in more perfect subjection , and that either their religion , or natural tempers makes them less apt to resist the violence and oppression of their monarchs , than the english , or other nations : yet i desire you to enquire whether taxes , and all other oppressions do not reign as much under those governments ; however sensible the princes may be of their subjects loyalty , and obedience . therefore to conclude , i shall freely leave it to your judgment , or that of any indifferent person , which is most agreeable to the main ends of civil government , viz the common good of mankind , and the happiness , and safety of each particular kingdom , or commonwealth , that the violence , and tyranny of princes , should be sometimes resisted , than that the people under the pretence of this irresistible power , should be liable to be made beggars , and slaves whenever any prince , or state had a mind to it . and i appeal to your own conscience , if the supposed belief of the passive obedience of some of our church , was not one of the greatest encouragements which the king , and the iesuited f●ction had , to bring in the popish religion under the colour of the dispensing power , ecclesiastical commissioners , and force of a standing army , from which unavoidable mischiefs , nothing under god but this wonderful revolution , could have rescued us : and therefore , i think it becomes any honest man to thank god for it , and join with his highness the prince of ori●●ge , as the only means ( now miracles are ceased ) which god hath been pl●ased to ordain by the course of his providence for our deliverance . m. i must confess , i am somewhat staggered with those reasons , and arguments you have now given me against those principles , which as i have always , and must still esteem as sacred , till i am convinced , i am in an errour ▪ and perhaps , if i were to consult my own 〈◊〉 reason , and natural inclinations , i should come over to your opinion : but since , it hath pleased god to lay much higher restraints , and stricter rules of obedience , and subjection on us by his revealed will in the scripture , beyond what can be discovered by the light of nature ; and that under the highest penalty , viz. damnation : i can see no reason , why god almighty , may not grant eternal life upon what conditions he pleases , tho' never so hard and uneasie for flesh , and blood to perform . so that , if our saviour iesus christ hath commanded us to take up his cross , and follow him , that is , to suffer all sorts of injuries , and afflictions , nay death it self , ( as he himself did , ) rather than to resist the supream powers under which he lived , i cannot see any reason why he should not propose his own example , for our imitation . and as he hath enjoined , and expects from us greater degrees of chastity , charity , and humility than ever he did from the iews , or pagans , so i see no reason , why he may not likewise exact from us a greater , and more perfect obedience , and submission without any resistance to all soveraign princes , and states , than ever he did either by the law of moses , or that of nature ; not but that there are sufficient proofs in the old testament , for the absolute power of princes against all rebellion , or resistance in subjects : tho' i confess , this doctrine is more plainly proved by the example of our saviour , and the precepts of his apostles in the new testament , as also from the example of the primitive christians in obedience thereunto . f. i perceive you begin to distrust your arguments drawn from natural reason , and the laws of nature , and when you are pressed with the absurdity of this doctrine of yours , you fly from gods natural , to his revealed will , and take refuge under the covert of the holy scripture , to impose an opinion contrary to the common sense , and natural notions of mankind , not corrupted with the prejudices of education ; and therefore , give me leave at present to tell you , that i think , i shall be able to prove , that the passive obedience as you call it , of the primitive christians , and their sufferings for the name of christs will not at all contradict that natural right , which i suppose all freemen to have , as well under civil government as in the state of nature , for the defence of their lives , liberties , and properties , unless where the common good , and peace of the whole or major part of the people require the contrary . and therefore , the same reasons , which oblige particular private persons to be quiet , and not to disturb the publick peace of the whole society , for their own private safety , and advantage , when the whole body of the people , or the major part of them is thus violently assaulted in their lives , liberties and estates , the same considerations of the publick good of their country , ( whereof every man is a member . ) doth then as strongly persuade , i may say enjoyn them to take up arms , and defend themselves for the preservation of the whole people or community , whose natural , and civil rights being now attack't , can no otherwise be restored to the same state they were in before , but by that last remedy that can be used in this case , viz. kim vi ●topellere . m. i confess , that of all commonwealth-hypotheses , yours is most reasonable , being coherent with it self , and also most likely to be swallowed by the people , because it flatters our corrupt natures , to which this christian doctrine of passive obedience , is so directly opposite , as also because it gives them a full liberty , i mean , not only the representative body , but the major part of them , to reassume that power which you pretend , they never parted with , and so consequently all necessity of suffering ( except when they please to think they have justly deserved it ) is taken away , and the sufferings of the primitive christians will be rendered only a tame madness , and that st. paul was very much overseen to enjoin this subjection to the romans , under the government of one of the most cruel tyrants that ever sway'd that scepter ; but we have not so learned christs ; and therefore , i am firmly persuaded , that we ought to be strictly obedient without any resistance to those civil governours , that god hath been pleased to set over us , let them abuse their power never so tyrannically . f. i am beholden to you for your plain dealing with me in this matter , and pleased to find , that you have an inclination to my principles , were it not for some texts of scripture and citations out of the fathers , and church history which give you a prejudice against them ; which i hope when they come to be closely examined will signifie no more than the former . but for the dispatching this important controversie , i pray give me leave to propose this easie method , first that you would be pleased to lay down your authorities out of scripture , in order as they lie . and afterwards to shew me , that the ancient fathers , and primitive church always understood those texts in the same sense that you do , viz. that no resistance of the supream powers is lawful to be exercised in any case whatsoever . m. i approve of your proposal , and therefore , i will first begin with those proofs , which are expresly against all rebellion or resistance in the old testament . the first governour that god set over the children of israel , when he brought them out of the land of egypt , was moses , and i think , i need not prove how sacred , and irresistible his authority was . this is sufficiently evident in the rebellion of korah , dathan , and abiram , against moses and aaron , when god caused the earth to open her mouth , and swallow them up . and lest this should be thought an extraordinary case , moses , and aaron being extraordinary persons , immediately appointed by god , and governed by his immediate direction ; the apostle st. iude alledges this example against those in his days , who were turbulent , and factious , who despised dominions , and spake evil of dignities , that they should perish in the gainsaying of core ; which he could not have done , had not this example extended to all ordinary , as well as extraordinary cases ; had it not been a lasting testimony of gods displeasure against all those , who oppose themselves against soveraign powers . but moses was not always to rule over them , and therefore god expresly provides for a succession of soveraign powers , to which they must all submit . the ordinary soveraign power of the iewish nation after moses's death was devolv'd either on the high-priest , or those extraordinary persons whom god was pleas'd to raise up , such as ioshua and the several iu●ges , till in samuels days it setled in their kings . for as for the iewish sanhedrim whose power is so much extolled by the iewish writers ( who are all a late date , many years since the destruction of ierusalem , and therefore no competent witnesses of what was done so many ages before ) it does not appear from any testimony of scripture , that there was such a court of iudicature , till after their return from the babylonish captivity . but yet god took care to secure the peace , and good government of the nation , by appointing such a power as should receive the last appeals , and whose sentence in all controversies should be final & uncontroul●ble as you may see in deuteronomy chap. . there were indeed inferiour magistrates , and iudges appointed in their several tribes and cities , which moses did by the advice of iethro his father in law , and by the approbation of god. but as the supream power was still reserv'd in the hands of moses while he liv'd , so it is here secured to the high-priest , or iudges after his death ; for it is expresly appointed , that if those inferiour iudges could not determine the controversie , they should come unto the priests , the levites , that is , the priests of the tribe of levi , ( who by the . v. appear only to be the high-priest ) and to the iudge that shall be in those days , that is , if it shall be at such a time , when there is an extraordinary judge raised by god , ( for there were not always such iudges in israel , as is evident to anyone who reads the book of iudges ) they should enquire of them and they shall shew the sentence of iudgement ; and thou shalt do according to the sentence , which they of that place ( which the lord shall chuse ) shall shew thee , and thou shalt observe to do , according to all they shall inform thee : and what the authority of the chief-priest , or of the iudge , when there was one , was in those days , appears from , v. . and the man that will do presumptuously , and wil● not hearken ●o the priest ( that standeth to minister there before the lord thy god ) or unto the iudge , even that man shall dye , and thou shalt put away the evil from israel this is as absolute an authority , as the most absolute monarch in the world can challenge that disobedience to their last and final determination , whatever the cause be , shall be punish'd with death : and what place can there be for resistance in such a constitution of government as this ? it is said indeed , v. . and according to the sentence of the law , which they shall teach thee , and according to the iudgment that they shall tell thee , thou shalt do . and hence some conclude , that they were not bound to abide by their sentence , nor were punishable if they did not , but only in such cases when they gave sentence according to the law of god. but these men do not consider , that the matter in controversie is supposed to be doubtful , and such as could not be determin'd by the inferiour courts , and therefore is submitted to the decision of the supream iudge , and as he determin'd so they must do & no man under the penalty of death , must presume to do otherwise ; which takes away all liberty of iudging from private persons , tho' this supream judge might possibly mistake in his judgment , as all humane iudicatures are liable to mistakes ; but it seems god almighty thought it necessary that there should be some final iudgment ; from whence there should be no appeal , notwithstanding the possibility of a mistake in it . so likewise when god had appointed ioshua to succeed moses , and had conferrd upon him all that power that moses had before , and that he came to give his orders to the two tribes and an half before their passage over iordan , you 'l find that they not only promis'd him perfect obedience , as they had before pay'd to moses , but farther also assure him that whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy commandment , and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandest him , he shall be put to death : so that there was a supream , and soveraign , that is , an unaccountable , and irresistible power , in the iewish nation appointed by god himself ; for indeed it is not possible that the publick peace , and security of any nation should be preserved without it . f. you have , sir methinks taken a great deal of pains to prove that which i do not at all deny , but rather joyn with you to ass●rt , that stubbornness and disobedience to gods commands is a very great sin , and the rebellion , thereunto is likened to the sin of witchcraft ; as samuel shews to no less a man , than king saul himself , when he had rebelled against ( that is , disobeyed ) god in not destroying the king of the amal●kites , and therefore it is no wonder that in a government , where god himself was the head , and had appointed moses , and aaron , as his lieutenants or substitutes under him , the one in civil , and the other in ecclesiastical matters , that god should punish their murmuring , and rebellion against them as done to himself ; not that i deny , but that st. iude does likewise denounce this judgment of perishing in the gainsaying of core , against those wicked hereticks the gnosticks , who thought themselves set free from all civil subjection , and therefore despised dominions , and spake evil of dignities , that is , not the men invested with them , but civil magistracy it self ; which they look'd upon as inconsistent with their christian liberty . but yet for all this , and that i grant god denounced no less than the sentence of death against any man that refused to hearken to the priest , or unto the iudge in those matters that should be brought before them , by way of appeal , and also that whoever would not obey ioshua , but should rebel against his commandments , should be put to death ; yet can i not think that there was any irresistible power , plac'd by god , in the persons of moses , ioshua , or the iudges , or that it was not possible for the publick peace , or security of the nation , to be preserved without that ; but indeed all these persons above nam'd , being to be obeyed , as gods substitutes , or lieutenants , as he was king of the children of israel , so likewise their commands , or dictates were only so far to be observ'd , as they perform'd this commission , and if they had swerved from it , i doubt not but they might not only have been disobeyed , but also resisted by them : and therefore , pray tell me , suppose this rebellion of core had happened , because moses making himself a distinct party , amongst the mixt multitude of strangers , that came up with them , out of the land of egypt , and others of his own tribe or whom he could bring over to his faction , under colour of this soveraign power , ( which god had given him ) had instead of leading and governing the people committed to his charge , taken upon him to have rob'd them of all those goods , and riches which they had brought with them out of the land of egypt , and had sold the people , or their children for slaves to the neighbouring nations , to inrich himself and his family ; do you believe that the children of israel had been obliged to have obeyed such a leader , and not have resisted him , and his party , if there had been occasion ? so likewise , if ioshua , instead of leading gods people into the holy land , had taken upon him , notwithstanding gods commands , to have carried them again into egypt , can you think they had been bound to obey him , and might not lawfully have resisted him if he had gone about , by the assistance of his accomplices , to force them to it ? for i doubt not but if these substitutes had acted contrary to that commission god had given them , they were no longer to be look'd upon as gods vicegerents , no more than the now lieutenant of ireland , the lord tyrconnel ought to be obeyed , and not resisted , if he should go about by vertue of that commission which the king hath conferred upon him , and by the help of the rebellious irish in that kingdom , to murder all the protestants , and set up for himself . so likewise all this strict obedience , and submission that was to be paid to the sentence of the high-priest , or iudge , was only in relation to god himself , whose sentence it was , and who always revealed his will either to the iudge by particular inspiration , or to the high-priest by the ephod , or urim and thummim ; and therefore we read in iudges , that deborah , tho' a woman , yet being a prophetess , inspir'd by god , judged israel . now suppose that this iudge , or high-priest , neglecting ( like balaam ) the divine inspiration , and the dictates of that sacred oracle , had , instead of a righteous iudgment , given a sentence , in a cause that had come before them , whereby idolatry or breach of some great point of the law of moses , had been established , do you think that god ever intended that this sentence should have been obeyed under pain of death ? and therefore you may find in the d . book of maccabees , that when iason and menelaus had by bribery obtained the high-priesthood , tho' it was then the chief authority , ( under the kings of syria ) both in ecclesiastical and civil matters , yet when they went about to undermine the iewish religion , and seduce the people to idolatry , they are not at all look'd upon as high-priests , but are there called ungodly wretches , doing nothing worthy of the high-priesthood , but having the fury of a cruel tyrant , and of a savage beast ; and were so far from being at all obeyed by the iews , that iason , menelaus , and alcimus who were successively high-priests in the room of onias , were as far as the people were able opposed by them till at last iudas maccabeus , taking arms against alcimus the high-priest , restored by force the true worship of god : so that you see , that the obedience was not pay'd to the person of the high-priests , only as such , by vertue of this precept in deuteronomy , but only as far as they observed the law of moses , and gave sentence , or judgment in all matters according to it . and therefore it is no good argument of yours , because the people were bound to obey their sentence in doubtful cases , therefore they had an absolute irresistible power to give what iudgments they pleased , and that the people were obliged to observe them under pain of death , and being guilty of rebellion . for that had been to have given the high-priests and iudges a power to have altered the true worship of god when ever they pleased , and to have introduced idolatry in the room of it . so that i think none of these places will prove any more , but that god , and his lieutenants were to be obeyed , and that it was rebellion to resist them under the iewish government , as long as they did not force the people to idolatry , which i do not at all deny . m. tho you labour to wave these examples , and precepts , which i have now cited , and will not take them for convincing , yet let me tell you your exceptions against them only tend to prove that idolatrous , kings might be resisted under the iewish law , which is directly contrary to the sacred history , as i shall prove very clearly to you by these following testimonies , i shall make use of , yet i think it is much more plain , that when the iews would have a king , their kings were to be invested with a supream and irresistible power , for when they desired a king of samuel , they did not desire a meer nominal , and titular king , but a king to iudg them , and go in and out before them , and fight their battles , that is , a king who had the supream , and soveraign authority , a king who should have all that power of government ( excepting the peculiar acts of the priestly office ) which either their high-priest , or their iudge had before . and therefore when samuel tells them , what shall be the manner of their king , tho what he says doth necessarily suppose the translation of the soveraign , and irresistible power to the person of their king , yet it doth not suppose that their king had any new power given him , more than what was ●●●●cised formerly by the priest , and iudges . he doth not deter them fr●● chusing a king , because a king should have greater power , and ●e more uncontroulable , and irresistible than their other rulers were , for samuel himself had before as soveraign , and irresistible , a power as any king , being the supream iudge of israel , whose sentence no man could disobey , or contradict , but he incurred the penalty of death , according to the mosa●cal law ; but the reason why he distuades them from chusing a king was , because the external pomp , and magnificence of kings , was like to be very chargeable , and oppressive to them . he 〈◊〉 your sons , and 〈◊〉 them for himself , for his chariots , and to be his house men and some shall ran before his chariots . and he will appoint him captains over thousands , and captains over fifties , and will set them to ear his ground , and to reap his harvest . and thus in several particulars he shews them what burdens , and exactions ; they will bring upon themselves by setting up a king ; which they were then free from ▪ and if any prince should be excessive in such ●●●actions , yet they had no way to help themselves ; they must not resist , nor rebel against him , nor expect that , whatever inconvenience they might find in kingly government , , god would relieve , and deliver them from it , when once they had chosen a king : ye shall cry out in that day because of your king , that you have chosen you , and the lord will not hear you in that day , that is , god will , not alter the government for you again how much soever you may complain of it . this , i say , is a plain proof , that their kings were to be invested with that soveraign power , which must not be resisted , tho' they oppress their subjects to maintain their own state and grandeur , and magnificence of their kingdoms : but i cannot think that these words contain the original grant and charter of regal power ; but only the translation that was formerly in their high-priests , or iudges to kings . kings had no more power , than their other governours had : for there can be no power greater than that which is irresistible : but this power in the hands of kings , was likely to be more burdensome , and oppressive to them , than it was in the hands of their priests and iudges , by reason of their different way of living , which is the only argument samuel makes use of to dissuade them from transferring the supream , and soveraign power to a king ; and therefore i rather chuse to translate mishpat , as our translators do , by the manner of the king , than with some learned men , by the right of the king , thereby understanding the original charter of kingly power : for it is not the regal power which samuel here blames , which was much like that which he himself ●ad exercised while he was supream iudge of israel , but their pompous way of living ; which would prove very oppressive , and burdensome to them , and be apt to make them complain , who had not been used to such exactions . f. you have , i must confess , made a much fairer exposition of this out of samuel , than divers of our hot and giddy divines who would render this mishpat , as it is in the hebrew , i. e. the manner of the king , by right of the king , whereby they would entitle all kings whatsoever to an absolute right to all their subjects estates , when ever they would take them away , not taking notice that this word , mishpat , is sometimes used , not only in a good , but a bad sense , not for right , or power , but for an evil custom or abuse , and therefore you may find in the second chapter of this book of samuel that speaking of the sons of eli who were sons of belial they knew not the lord , that the priests , viz. ( their ) custom with the people was , that when any man offered sacrifice , the priests servant came , whilst the flesh was in seething , with a flesh-hook of three teeth in his hand , and he strook it into the pan , or kettle , or caldron , or pot , all that the fl●sh book brought up , the priest took for himself : so they did in shiloh , unto all the israelites that came thither . where i desire you to observe , that that which is rendred in our translation the priests custom , is in the hebrew mishpat which you render right ; so that if this word would do it , these wicked priests had also a right to take away as much of every man's sacrifice as they pleased for themselves ; nay , to take it before god himself was served , and the fat burnt ( according to the rites of sacrificing ) and by the same rule kings also by this word mishpat should have a right to take what they pleas'd of the subjects estates . i do like wise also so far agree with you , that samuel does not here describe a a tyrant , but one of those absolute eastern princes , who made use of a great part of their subjects estates ( as they do at this day ) to maintain their standing armies , and royal pomp , and magnificence , so that i grant in short , samuel meant no more when he thus spake to them , but since you will have a king , he must be maintained like a king , and very great taxes will be laid upon you for this end ; of which burden if you shall hereafter be weary , or would cast it off agai● , you shall by no means do it : for since this king shall obtain the crown not only by gods appointment , but by your own choice , or election , it shall not be in your power again to depose him ; since it is your own act , and therefore samuel tells them , that when they should cry unto the lord in that day , because of the king which they had chosen , the lord would not hear them ; and as long as this king kept himself within these bounds , i grant , he was not to be resisted . yet nevertheless , this place you have now cited , as it is very far from patronising tyranny , or all the abuses of regal power , so neither do i think it was samuel's meaning to make the kings of israel so absolute , or irresistible , as that upon no account whatsoever the people might disobey , or resist them , let them use this power never so wickedly , nay , contrary to gods express commands , and the ends of all civil government ; and therefore pray tell me ; suppose , instead of these necessary burdens , which they should be subject to , when they had a king , samuel had spoke thus to them , this king ( whom you desire ) shall prove an idolater , and as cruel a tyrant as pharaoh , or any of the kings of the philistines , canaanites , or any other nations who so long tyrannized over you , and shall take away all your estates , and lives too , at his good pleasure , without any crime , or legal trial , and in short will not only himself use you for slaves , but sell you , and your children for bondmen to the egyptians , and other nations , and shall lay such grievous tributes and burthens upon you , that you shall be scarce able to live under them . now can any man think , if the israelites had been really persuaded , that their king must have such an absolute , and arbitrary power , as a necessary and inseparable prerogative of his crown , they would ever have been so fond of such a government , as to have cried out with one consent , nay , but we will have a king over us , that we may be like other nations . ( but sure ) not to tyrannize over , and enslave us , but that he may iudge us , and go out before us , and fight our battels : or do you think , if they had had such a king as this , they would ever have long endured him ? for that the children of israel did not conceive that their kings had such an absolute , and arbitrary power over them , as to oppress them with taxes , and to make their yoke more grievous to them , than they were able to bear , or to tyrannize over them at his good pleasure , appears plainly by the story in the first of kings concerning the children of israels assembling together at sichem to make rehoboam king , and you 'll find the preliminary conditions of his government were these . all the congregation of israel came , and spake unto rehoboam saying : thy father made our yoke grievous : now therefore make thou the grievous service of thy father , and his heavy yoke , which he put upon us , lighter , and we will serve thee . but see the answer that rehoboam made them , according to the wisdom of his young counsellours . my little finger shall be thicker than my fathers loyns : and whereas my father did lade you with a heavy yoke , i will add to your yoke : my father has chastised you with whips , but i will chastize you with scorpions . and mark , what follows upon this answer : so when all israel saw , that the king hearkened not unto them , the people answered the king , saying , what portion have we in david ? neither have we inheritance in the son of jesse ; to your tents , o israel : now see to thine own house , david . so israel d●parted unto their tents . and it is farther said , so israel rebelled against the house of david unto this day . nor is this action at all blamed , or disapproved by the scripture , or rebuked by any prophet at that time ; for tho' the word is here translated , they rebelled , yet in the hebrew it signifies no more than , fell away from , or revolted , and it is said before , that the king hearkened not to the people , for the 〈◊〉 ( which may be also translated revolution ) was from the lord , that he might perform his saying which he spake by ahijah th● s●ilonite unto jeroboam , when in the chapter before , the prophet promis'd him the kingdom of the t●n tribes , and that god would rend them out of the hand of solomon , ( i. e. his posterity ) and give them unto him ; who thereupon had a right to them , and that upon his being made king by the people , he had also a right to their obedience , is as evident : since to continue in a state of rebellion towards one king , and an obligation to obey another , are absolutely inconsistent in the same subject , as i have already proved at our second conference . and therefore , i cannot but here take notice of that rational account which the earl of clarendon , in his survey of the leviathan which you before quoted , gives of this revolution . nor did the people ( viz. of israel ) conceive themselves liable to those impositions ; as appears by the application they made to rehoboam upon the death of solomon , that he would abate some of that rigour his father had exercised towards them , the rough rejection of which , contrary to the advice of his wisest coun●ellours , cost him the greatest part of his dominions : and when rehoboam would by arms have reduced them to obedience , god would not suffer him , because he had been in the fault himself . m. after this extravagant way of arguing , when ever the subjects of any nation shall think themselves too much oppress'd with taxes , or other grievances , above what they are able to bear , if they are not eas'd by the king or supream magistrates upon the first petition , they may presently cast off that power they were under , and set up another , that would govern them upon cheaper terms ; for if the people of israel had this right , why may not all other nations claim the same ; and this doctrine , however comfortable it might be to the people , i am sure , it would be very mischievous to all the monarchies , and commonwealths in the world , and it is likely that the subjects of the french king , nay , states of holland and other princes , would quickly take the first opportunity either to make their princes , and states , to ●ax , them no more than they please themselves or else they , may presently cry with the israelites , to thy tents o israel ; nor can i see how the king , and parliament in england , would be in a much better con●ition in relation to the people they represent , should they impose greater taxes than they thought they could afford to pay , and this priviledge you give the israelites , seems to be clean contrary to what you laid down at our last conference ▪ wherein you excepted great taxes , and tributes to princes , or states , as no just cause of resistance , or taking up arms : and therefore , i think , i may very well maintain the old doctrine about this matter , and that tho' god did rend the kingdom from rehoboam , and bestow it upon the son of nebat , whom also when the people had made him king , they were obliged to obey , because it was gods will it should be so , who gives and takes away kingdoms from whomsoever he pleases : yet doth not this at all justifie the rebellion of the israelites , or iereboam's ●su●pation of his masters kingdom ; since god oftentimes makes use of this rebellion of the people to execute his iudgment upon a sinful prince , and nation : and therefore , it is very remarkable that after this rebellion of the israelites , from the house of david they never prospered , but by their kings , still falling one after another into the same idolatry , till god at last was so highly provoked against them , that he suffered them to be carried away captives into a strange land , near two hundred years before the tribes of iudah , and benjamin underwent the same fate for the like crime . f. i hope you will not be in a passion ; because i have brought this instance of the israelites defection from rehoboam as an example of the right that subjects may have in those cases . i have put , to resist , or cast off those supream powers that god had once set over them . for i do confess divines , and other authors , are much divided about this action of the israelites , some maintaining it to be well done , and in pursuance to god's will , and others holding it to be down-right rebellion . and therefore , i shall not positively assert either the one , or the other , much less that subjects may rebel whensoever they conceive themselves overtax't ; but thus much , i think , i may safely affirm , that if the israelites had no right upon any score whatsoever to resist , i cannot see , why rehoboam might not have made them , if he had pleas'd , as arrant slaves , as ever their ancestors were in egypt ; and what he else meant , by saying , instead of whips , to chastise them with scorpions , ( which were a sort of thorny rods , with which the iews corrected their slaves , and malefactors ) i cannot understand ; and as for taxes , tho i confess , there is no setting any positive measure to them ; since no man can positively define what the exigences of a state may require , and i think no good subjects ought to deny to contribute as much as ever they are able to afford , to maintain the government they live under , as long as they receive the protection of it : so , on the other side , should the supream power of any nation , ( where the people are not meer slaves ) under the pretence of laying necessary taxes , for the maintenance , or preservation of the government be constantly exacting from the people , more than they were able to pay , as if , for example , they should out of every mans estate take nineteen parts , and leave but the twentieth for the subsistance of those that own it , i do not think , in that case the people were obliged in conscience to pay it , and might in such case lawfully resist those officers , that should come to levy it by force . m. i could have argued farther against what you have now said , concerning this right of the people of resisting , in case of extravagant , or intolerable taxes ; but since it is not to the subject in hand , i shall refer it to another time : and therefore to return where i left off ; i shall in the next place shew you , how sacred , and irresistible the persons , and authority of kings were under the iewish government ; and there cannot be a plainer example of this , than in the case of david . he was himself anointed to be king , after sauls death , but in the mean time , he was grievously persecuted by saul , who pursued him from one place to another with a design to take away his life : how now doth david behave himself in this extremity ? what course doth he take to secure himself from saul ? why he takes the only course that is left to a subject ; he flies for it , and hides himself from saul in the mountains , and caves of the wilderness ; and when he found he was discovered in one place , he removes to another ; he kept spies upon saul to observe his motions , not that he might meet him to give him bat●le , or to take him at an advantage , but that he might keep out of his way , and not fall unawares into his hands . well , but this was no thanks to david , ( you 'll say ) because he could not do otherwise . he was too weak for saul , and not able to stand against him ; and therefore had no other remedy but flight . but yet we must consider that david was a man of war , he slew goliah , and fought the battles of israel with great success ; he was an admired , and beloved captain , which made saul so jealous of him ; the eyes of israel were upon him for their next king , and how easily might he have raised a potent , and formidable rebellion against saul ? but he was so far from this , that he invites no man to his assistance ; and when some came uninvited he made no use of them in an offensive , or defensive war against saul : nay , when god delivered saul twice into david's hands ; that he could as easily have killed him as have , cut off the skirts of his garment at engedi , or , as have taken that spear away , which stuck on the ground as his bolster , as he did in the hill of hachil●h , yet he would neither touch saul himself , nor suffer any of the people that were with him to do it , tho' they were very importunate with him to let them kill saul ; nay , tho' they urged him with an argument from providence , that it was a plain evidence , that it was the will of god that he should kill him , because god had now delivered his enemy into his hands , according to the promise he had made to david ; we know what use some men have made of this argument of providence to justifie all the villanies they had a mind to act : but david , it seems , did not think , that an opportunity of doing evil , gave him a license ; and authority to do it . opportunity , we say , makes a thief , and it makes a rebel , and a murderer too . no man can do any wickedness which he has no opportunity of doing ; and if the providence of god , which puts such opportunities into mens hands , might justifie the wickedness they commit , no man can be chargeable with any guilt whatever he does ; and certainly opportunity will as soon justifie any other sin , as rebellion , and the murder of princes . we are to learn our duty from the law of god , not from his providence : at least this must be a settled principle , that the providence of god will never justifie any action which his law forbids . and therefore , notwithstanding this opportunity which god has put into his hands to destroy his enemy , and to take the crown for his reward , david considers his duty , remembers , that tho' saul were his enemy , and that very unjustly ; yet he was still the lords anointed . the lord forbid , says he , that i should do this unto my master , the lords anointed , to stretch forth any hand against him , seeing he is the lords anointed . nay , he was so far from taking away his life , that his heart smote him for cutting off the skirt of his garment . and we ought to observe the reason david gives , why he durst not hurt saul , because he was the lords anointed , which is the very reason the apostle gives in the romans , because the powers that are , are ordained of god ; and he that resisteth the power , resisteth the ordinance of god. for to be anointed of god signifies no more than that he was made king or ordained by god. for this external unction was only a visible sign of gods designation of them , to such an office ; and it is certain , they were as much gods anointed without this visible unction as with it . cyrus is called gods anointed , tho' he never was anointed by any prophet , but only designed for his kingdom by prophecy ; and we never read in scripture , that any kings had this external vnction , who succeeded in the kingdom by right of inheritance , unless the title and succession were doubtful ; and yet they were the lords anointed too , that is , were plac'd in the throne by him . so that this is an eternal reason against r●sisti●g soveraign princes , that they are set up by god , and invested with his authority , and therefore their persons , and their authority are sacred . f. i am so far from differing with you in what you have said concerning this example of david towards saul , tho' his enemy , that i think it ought to be a pattern to every single private man , tho never so great , in a kingdom or common-wealth , how to comport himself towards the supream powers , if he himself alone be unjustly persecuted by them either in his life , or estate , that is , to fly if he can , tho' with the loss of all his estate , rather than resist , tho' there are some circumstances in this story of david that make it evident that he did not think a defensive war against those cut-throats that saul might send to kill him unlawful , and so much dr. fearn himself , in his first discourse call'd resolving of conscience , &c. against resistance of the higher powers acknowledges : for david when he fled from saul , made himself captain of four hundred men , which number soon encreased to six hundred ; and still every day grew more by additions . now why should he entertain those men , but to defend himself against the forces of saul ? that is , to make a defensive war when ever he was assaulted by him . m. i think i can give you a sufficient answer to this , and therefore you must observe that david invited none of these men in to him ; but they came as volunteers after a beloved captain , and general ; which shews how formidable he could easily have made himself , when such numbers resorted to him of their own accord . when he had them he never used them for any hostile acts against saul , or any of his forces ; he never stood his ground when he heard saul was coming , but always fled , and his men with him ; men who never were us'd to fly , and were very ready to have served him against saul himself , would he have permitted them : and i suppose you will not call it a defensive war , to fly before an enemy , and to hide themselves in caves , and mountains ; and yet this was the only defensive war which david made with all his men about him : nay , all that he would make , and all that he could make according to his professed principles ; that it was not lawful to stretch out his hand against the lords anointed . and when these men are pursued , as david was , by an enraged and jealous prince , i will not charge them of rebellion , tho' they fly before him by thousands in a company . yet there was sufficient reason why david should entertain these men who voluntarily resorted to him , tho' he never intended to use them against saul : for some of them served for spies to watch sauls motions , that he might not be surprised by him , but have timely notice to make his escape . and the very presence of such a number of men about him , without any hostile act , preserved him from being seiz'd on by some officious persons , who otherwise might have delivered him into sauls hands . and he being anointed by samuel to be king after sauls death this was the first step to his kingdom , to have such a retinue of valiant men about him ; which made his advancement to the throne more easie , and discouraged any oppositions , which might otherwise have been made against him ; as we see it proved in the event , and have reason to believe that it was thus ordered by god for that very end. it is certain that gad the prophet ▪ and abiathar the priest , who was the only man , who escaped the fury of saul when he destroyed the priests of the lord , were in david● retinue , and that david enterpriz'd nothing , without first asking counsel of god : but he who had anointed him to be king , now draws forces after him , which after saul's death should facilitate his advancement to the kingdom . f. i cannot think your answer to this objection satisfactory , for first it is evident , that when david was at the cave of adullam , his brethren , and all his fathers house , as soon as they heard it , went down thither to him , and tho' it be not expresly said , that he sent for any to come to his assistance , yet it is plain he refused none that came , and to what purpose should he make use of so many as , or men , unless it were to defend himself against those men , that saul might send against him ? since half a score , or twenty persons had been enough to have served for spies , and if he had thought himself obliged only to run away ▪ three or four servants had been enough in conscience to have waired on him in any neighbouring country ; but that david thought it no sin to defend himself from the violence of those which saul should send to kill him , is plain from what he says to abiathar upon his flight unto him after the death of his father : abide thou with me , fear not : for he that seeketh my life , seeketh thy life , but with me thou shalt be in safeguard ; and if david had not meant by these words to have defended abiathar's as well as his own life , if assaulted , and without a possibility of escaping , it had been very cold comfort , for david to have only assur'd him that he should be in safe-guard with him , till the first assault that should be made upon them , but that then he should shift for himself ; for as for his own part he would rather permit his throat to be cut by the kings officers or souldiers , than resist them . and therefore , tho' i own that it was not lawful for him to stretch out his hand against the lords anointed : since i do not allow any private subject to kill , even tyrants , unless a in state of actual war , or battle , wherein they are aggressors ; nor then neither , if it can possibly be avoided : yet do i not find it at all unlawful for david , or any other private man , to defend his own life , against such assassinates as his prince may send against him : so it may be done without a civil war , or endangering the peace of the common-wealth ; and so much you your self , tho' coldly , seem to yield , when you say , that the very presence of such a number of men about david , without any hostile act , preserved him from being seiz'd on by some officious persons , who otherwise might have delivered him into sauls hands : for i cannot think that david would have been at the trouble of keeping so many men only for shew , and a terrour to those officious persons you mention , without resisting of them if there had been occasion . and tho' you tell me that his being anointed by samuel to be king after sauls death , was the first step to the kingdom , to have such a retinue of valiant men about him ; which made his advancement to tho●punc ; throne so much the ●aster , and discouraged any opposition which might have been made against him , and that we see it proved so in the event ; and therefore have reason to believe , that it was thus ordered by god to that very end , i must take the liberty so far to differ from you . for first , i desire to know by what authority david could list , or men in arms in sauls territories ▪ and whether , according to your doctrine , they were not rebels for joyning themselves with one who was declared a traytor by the king ? and tho' you say it was thus ordered by god. i grant indeed it was , yet doth it not appear , that it was done by any divine revelation to nathan , or abiathar , but only by the ordinary course of his providence , like other things in the world ; and therefore it is no fair way of arguing for you , to affirm , that what ever david did in the matter of his own defence , contrary to your principles , he must needs do it by express order from god , of which the scripture is wholy silent , much less doth it appear from the story ▪ that these men , whom david kept with him , were only to facilitate his attaining the kingdom ( as you affirm , ) since the scripture mentions no such thing , only that after saul's death he went up by gods command to hehron with the men that were with him , and thither the men of iudah came , and there they anointed david king over the house of judah ; but 't is no where mention'd , that these men were of any use , to david for the obtaining of the crown , since the tribe of iudah would have made him king , tho' these men had not been with him , for what could , or men do against so vast a multitude as the whole tribe of iudah ? and therefore it is evident , that these forces were for no other end than his own defence . and tho' you make very light of this state of war , in which david was , in relation to saul ; yet pray tell me , supposing that the duke of monmouth had really been ( as he pretended , ) the legitimate son of king charles the ii. but by some particular disgust of his father , or by the intrigues of his competitor , the duke of york , had been forc'd to fly into scotland , and 〈◊〉 to have defended himself with , or of his tenants , and followers , tho' without fighting the kings forces that should have been se●● against him , but flying into the high-lands , and had there maintain'd himself , as david did by free quarters , or con●ribu●ion of the inhabitants ; till his father dyed , would not this have been cryed out upon in all the pulpits in england , as a most horrid rebellion , of a son and a subject against his king , and father ; tho' he had never done any act of hostility against his forces , but always 〈◊〉 from them ? and yet he , being heir apparent to the crown might have pleaded as well as david , that he kept these soldiers about him , only to keep himself from being murdered by those officious persons , whom his father , or uncle might send to apprehend him , and to have such a retinue of valiant men about him , as might render his advancement to the throne more easie when ever his father should dye . i shall not urge , as a farther proof of the lawfulness of davids resistance of sauls forces , his intention to have slay'd in keilah , and to have fortified it against saul , had not he been informed , that the men of that city would have saved themselves by delivering him up to saul : since i confess it doth not certainly appear by the text , whether david would have stayed any longer there than till saul had approach'd near to that place ; whether the keilites would have delivered him up , or not ; much less shall i urge , that other example which some men make use of , of davids going to the last battle against saul with achish , king of the philistines ; for tho' it be plain he march'd with them , as far as apbek in the tribe of issachar , yet i confess it is not certain , whether he really intended to have assisted them , or not , in this war against his country , since he might either have gone over to saul at the beginning of the battle ▪ or else have stood neuter ; tho' neither of them would have been very honourable ; or consonant with davids character , therefore i shall say nothing of this ; since the lords of the philistines , for fear he should prove a● adversary to them in the battle , made him retire again into the land of the philistines , tho' he seemed to be very much troubled to be so distrusted , that he might not fight against the enemies of that king , who had so good an opinion of him ; and therefore i pray will you proceed to those other ex●mples you have to produce out of the old testament . m. well , since you are not fully satisfied with this instance of david , ( tho' i am glad you allow the persons even of tyrannical princes to be sacred ) therefore to proceed in the story ; solomon , who succeeded david in his kingdom , did all those things which god had expresly forbid the king to do . he sent into egypt for horses . he multiplied wives , and loved many strange women , ( together with the daughter of pharaoh ) vvomen of the moabites , ammonites , &c. he multiplied silver , and gold. for this god ( who is the only iudge of soveraign princes ) was very angry with him , and threatens to rend the kingdom from him ; which was afterwards accomplish'd in the days of rehoboam : but yet this did not give authority to his subjects to rebel . if to be under the direction , and obligation of laws , makes a limited monarchy , it is certain the kingdom of israel was so . there were some things which the king was expresly forbid to do , as you have already heard ; and the law of moses , was to be the rule of his government , the standing law of his kingdom . and therefore he was commanded , when he came to the throne to write a copy of the law with his own hand , and to read in it all his days , that he might learn to fear the lord his god , and to keep all the words of this law , and these statutes to do them , and yet being a soveraign prince ; if he broke these laws , god was his iudge , and avenger ; but he was accountable to no earthly tribunal ; nor do we find , tho' there were so many wicked , and idolatrous kings of iudah , who broke all the laws of god given them by moses that ever any of the priests , or prophets stirred up the people to rebel against them for it . f. neither of these instances do reach the case in hand ; for i grant that neither the breach , or non-observance of these precepts enjoyned the kings of israel , by god ; nor yet their open idolatry were a sufficient cause , for their taking up arms , or resisting their kings in so doing ▪ since those were offences only against god , and in which the people had nothing to do , those being no part of that tacit , or implicit compact of protection , and preservation , that goeth along with all kingdoms and supream powers whatsoever . and i have already excepted out of the causes of resistance , or taking up arms , the princes being of a different religion from that of his subject ; and tho' i must own , that the kings of israel were under the direction or obligation of the law of moses , and so were limited monarchs , yet this limitation was not from the people , but from god , whose business it was to revenge the breach of it as often as they offended , and if they broke those laws , god only was their judge , and avenger ( as you your self very well observe ) who never failed severely to punish this breach of his laws . nor yet were the people of the iews always so nice and temperate as you make them ; for ( besides the example of rehoboam , which i have formerly made use of , you will find in the d . of chronicles concerning amaziah , who when he turned away from following the lord , they ( viz. the people ) made a conspiracy against him in jerusalem , and he fled to lachish but they sent to lachish after him , and slew him there : and made his son vzziah king in his stead ; nor do we read that any were punish'd for killing him , as am●ziab put to death the servants of his father king ioash , for conspiring against him , as it is related in the th . chap. of the d . of kings , and you 'l find in the same * book that the city of libna revolted ( which sure is the highest degree of resistance ) from that wicked king iehoram , who had slain all his brethren with the sword , and walked in the way of the kings of israel , as did the house of ahab , and wrought that which was evil in the sight of the lord , &c. and therefore it is said expresly in the text , that the city of libna revolted from his hand , because he had forsaken the god of his fathers . i bring not these instances to iustifie rebellion , but to let you see that it was sometimes practised , amongst the iews , tho' you affirm to the contrary . but much more lawful was the resistance , which azariah , and the priests , that were with him , made against king vzziah , when he would have burnt incense in the temple : pray turn with me to the place , and read what is there said , and they ( viz. the priests withstood uzziah the king , and said unto him , it appertaineth not unto thee , uzziah , to burn incense unto the lord , but to the priests the sons of aaron , that are consecrated to burn incense : go out of the sanctuary , for thou hast trespassed , neither shall it be for thine honour , &c. and when he persisted therein , and took the censer in his hand to burn incense , and that thereupon the leprosy arose in his forehead ▪ the priests thrust him out of the temple , the lxx . render it , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i. e. they resisted him ; iosephus says , they drove him out in haste , so that you see they went somewhat farther than solomons question , who may say to a king what doest thou ? and , which is more remarkable , they withstood him before the leprosy rose upon his forehead , and no doubt but they would have done the same to him , whether that judgment had happened , or not , since he went about to vsurp the priests office , it not being so much as lawful for him , that was no priest to set his foot within the temple . but if you look into the history of the kings of israel after their division from iudah , they are so far from teaching us these lessons of passive obedience , and non-resistance , that you will scarce find any other manner of succession amongst them , but the killing of one king , and the setting up another , and iehu for rebelling against and destroying the house of ahab , had the crown entailed by gods promise to his posterity unto the fourth generation . and tho' i do not produce any of these examples as fit for our imitation at this day , ( since what iehu did was done by gods express warrant and command ) yet i think they are sufficient evidences , that neither the person , or power of the kings of iudah , or israel were always look'd upon as so sacred , and irresistible by their subjects , as you suppose . m. i am glad you are so ingenuous to confess , that most of these examples you have brought of the resistance , and murders committed by the iews and israelites upon their kings were not lawful , or can be proposed for the imitation of christian subjects , and if so , pray make what other use of them you please , since à facto , ad ius non valet consequentia : i cannnot deny , but that the succession of the kings of israel after nadab , the son of ieroboam , was very confused . god stirring up some or other to rebel against them , and make them away as a punishment for their former rebellion , and idolatry : thus baasha killed nadab the son of ieroboam , and reigned in his stead , and for this , and his other sins , god threatned evil against baasha , and against his house , zimri slew elah the son of baasha , but he did not long enjoy the kingdom which he had vsurped by treason , and murder , for he reigning , but seven days in tirza , which being besieged , and taken by omri , he went to the palace , and burned the kings house over him with fire , and died . this example iezebel threatned iehu with , had zimri peace who slew his master ? and yet nadab and elah were both of them very wicked princes : and if that would justifie treason and murder , both baasha , and zimri had been very innocent , but as for the example of iehu's killing his master king ioram , ( you say ) it was by the particular command of god , and is no more to be produced as an example for rebellion , and the murder of princes by the general of their armies , than that because the children of israel had a power given them by god to extirpate , and destroy those seven nations whose countreys god had given them to inherit , , therefore they had a like right to destroy all other nations whatsoever , that lay near them : and therefore those actions in scripture , which are sometimes commanded by god for the bringing about the great designs of his providence , by those human means that may seem unjust to us , are not to be produced for authorities , nor alledged as examples . f. i so far agree with you , and i do by no means allow that particular private men , of what condition soever they are , should disturb the common wealth , and murder their lawful princes , tho' wicked , or idolatrous , only to satisfy their own private zeal or ambition and to set up themselves , who perhaps are altogether as o●d , or worse than him they depose , or make away . but yet i think i might very well produce these to convince you , that there were no better examples for loyalty , or passive obedience among the iews , than other nations ; and therefore that your examples out of the scripture do hitherto prove insignificant : yet i cannot but take notice of one passage , wherein by following the ordinary english translation you fall into a great mistake , where you make baasha to be slain by zimri , because he killed nadab , which , as it is there rendered in the english , is false , for the words in 〈◊〉 translation are , because he killed him , viz. ieroboam to whom it there immediatel● relates , which is false , for baasha did not kill ieroboam , but nadab his son ; neither was it suitable to gods justice to destroy baasha , for that which he himself had ordained him to do . for god by iehu the prophet , said to baasha , for as much as i exalted thee , out of the dust , and made thee prince over my people israel , and thou hast walked in the way of jeroboam , and hast made my people israel to sin , to provoke me to anger by their sins : and therefore the text concludes this narration with there words , that the word of the lord came against baasha and against his house , even for all the evil which he did in the sight of the lord in provoking him to anger with the work of his hands in being like the hous● of jeroboam , but the words which immediately follow , and because he killed him ( i. e. ieroboam ) cannot be truly rendred in our english translation , for the reason already given , and therefore the best criticks upon this place translate it thus , leaving out , and therefore he ( viz. the lord ) smote him : ( i. e. nadab ) by the hand of baasha ) whereas our translation makes the scripture to contradict it self . i have no more to observe from this history of the kings , and chron. and therefore i pray proceed to what other testimonies you have to produce . m. well , i think i can make it much more plain , from other examples and precepts out of scripture , that the iews were not only under high obligations to be subject to the higher powers , after they were carried captives to babylon , but also not to resist them , tho' they went about to exercise their power , never so cruelly , and tyrannically , even to the destruction of the whole nation . now the prophet ieremiah had given them an express command . seek the peace of the city whither i have caused you to be carried away captives , and pray to the lord for it : for in the peace thereof you shall have peace . which made it a necessary duty to be subject to these powers , under whose government they lived . and accordingly we find , that mordecai discovered the treason of bigthana , and teresh two of the kings chamberlains , the keepers of the door , who sought to lay hand on the king ahasuerus ; and how numerous and powerful the iews were at this time , and what great disturbance they could have given to the empire , appears evidently from the book of esther . king ahasuerus upon the suggestions of haman , had granted a decree for the destruction of the whole people of the iews ; which was sent into all the provinces , written , and seal'd with the kings ring ; this decree could never be reversed again ; for that was contrary to the laws of the medes and persians . and therefore when esther had found favour with the king , all that could be done for the iews , was , to grant another decree for them to defend themselves ; which accordingly was done , and the effect of it was , that the jews at shusan slew men and the jews of the other provinces slew and rested from their enemies : without this decree , mordecai did not think it lawful to resist ( which yet was a case of as great extremity , and barbarous cruelty as could ever happen ) which made him put esther upon so hazardous an attempt , as to venture into the kings presence , without being called , which was death by their law , unless the king should graciously hold out the golden scepter to them ; yet when they had obtained this decree , they were able to defend themselves and to destroy their enemies ; which is as famous an example of passive obedience , as can be met with in any history . and pray see here , what the prophet daniel acknowledges to belteshazzar . the most high god gave nebucadnezzar thy father a kingdom , and majesty , and glory , and honour : and for the majesty that he gave him , all people , nations , and languages trembled and feared before him . whom he would be slew , and whom he would be kept alive ; and whom he would be set up , and whom he would ●e pulled down and if these heathen kings received such a power from god , as the prophet here affirms , st. paul has made the application of it , that he that resisteth , resisteth the ordinance of god. and i think these examples may serve out of the old testament , and therefore i shall conclude with the saying of the wise man , who was both a prophet , and a king : where the word of a king is there is power , and who may say unto him , what doest thou ? f. tho' this last proof be the stongest you have yet brought , yet i think it will not reach the point in question , to prove , that no resistance whatsoever , tho' for saving the lives of a whole nation , can be lawful : i grant indeed that the command of the prophet ieremiah , of praying for the peace of the city whither they were carried away captives , was to be obeyed , being obliged to do it , not only by the laws of nature , and in regard of those benefits of protection , and injoying the free exercise of their religion , and liberties without being made slaves , tho' they had been carryed captives ; which was no more than removing them out of one country , and setling them in another , according to the custom of the eastern princes of those times , when they would by removing of the best , and greatest of the people out of a conquered countrey prevent their rebelling against them , as they had done before , but that they enjoyed a property in their lands , and estates after their captivity , is certain by the prophets commanding them , to build and plant vineyards in the country of babylon during the years captivity foretold by him from god. so likewise i grant it to be a necessary duty in subjects , tho' strangers , to be faithful , and obedient to those princes and states under whose governments they live ; and therefore mordecai no doubt performed his duty , when he discovered the treason of the kings chamberlains that thought to kill him . but to come to your main argument , that it was unlawful for the whole nation of the iews to resist those , who were impowered by the decree of king ahasuer●● to massacre and destroy them , i shall not dispute with you about the matter of fact , as you have related it , but only in this particular , that whereas you suppose till the king had issued out a second decree , wherein he granted the iews which were in every city to gather themselves together , and to stand for their lives , to destroy , to slay , and cause to perish all the power of the people , and province that should assault them , &c. and to take the spoil of them for a prey ; without which decree you suppose , mordecai did not think it lawful to resist , tho' it was a case of as great extremity , as could ever happen , and that therefore esther was put upon so hazardous an attempt as to venture to obtain this decree , tho' with the peril of her life : but that when they had once obtained it , they were then , and not before enabled to defend themselves , and destroy their enemies . in answer to which , i must needs tell you that , you do not fairly represent the latter part of this story ; for it no where appears in the text , ( tho' you are pleased to add it , ) that mordecai did not think it lawful for the iews to resist , till this decree was obtained ; for it is only there said , that he sent esther to the king , and as soon as she came into his presence , she fell down at his feet , and besought him with tears to put away the mischief of haman the agagite . ( pray read the words ) and she said , if it pleases the king , and if i have found favour in his fight , and the thing seems right before the king , and i be pleasing in his eyes let it be written to reverse the letters devised by haman , the son of hammedatha the agagite , which he wrote to destroy the jews which are in all the kings provinces . by which you may see that esthers request was not for a liberty to defend themselves , ( as you suppose ) but only to try if she could get the king to reverse the first decree , obtained by haman to destroy them ; but because the kings decree , when once issued out was not to be reversed , therefore , he issued this second decree , to give the iews a legal or civil power , to gather themselves together , and stand upon their defence against all that should assault them , which was so far obeyed , that the rulers of the provinces , and other officers of the king , instead of destroying , helped the iews , because ( says the text ) the fear of mordecai fell upon them . so that , tho' i own this decree , gave them a legal power to stand upon their defence , and did likewise hinder the kings officers from heading the people , and putting the first decree for their destruction in execution , as otherwise they would have done , had it not been for this last , and for that great power which they perceived mordecai had at court ; yet doth it not therefore follow , that it was before that , absolutely unlawful for the whole iewish nation to have defended their lives against those officers , or others who would have gone about to destroy them , and have totally extirpated their nation . so that i take this decree not to confer any new right in the people of the iews to defend themselves , but only to be a confirmation of that natural right of self-defence , which all nations , and every particular member of mankind have to preserve themselves and tho' i grant that particular persons are often obliged to give up this right for the publick peace , and safety of the common-wealth , yet doth not th● law extend to whole nations , or such bodies of people , without which the common wealth cannot well subsist . and therefore i leave it to any unprejudiced person to judge , whether it had not been better , that the iews should have thus resisted , and saved their lives , tho' without this second decree , which only discouraged the kings officers , and others from falling upon them , than that all gods peculiar people should have lain at the mercy of their enemies , to be destroyed according to the first cruel decree . but farther to convince you , that the iews , after the captivity , did not think it unlawful to make use of defensive arms against cruel , and persecuting tyrants , who went about to destroy their religion , and nation , it is apparent from the famous example of the priest mattathias , with iudas maccabeus , and the rest of his sons , who successively headed the people of the iews in that obstinate , and noble resistance , which they made against antiochus epiphanes , tho' then their soveraign , who when he had prophaned the temple , and would have forced the iews to renounce their circumcision , and to have sacrificed to idols , under pain of death , they joyned together , and resolved to defend themselves , and to stand up for their religion and nation , then ready to be destroyed ; and you find by the history , as it is related in the books of the maccabees , and iosephus , that god did bless those arms with success , which they had taken up in their own defence , against a prince infinitely more powerful than themselves , who with his predecessors had been their soveraigns for above years ; and tho' antiochus died long before the end of the war , yet did they still prosecute it against his successors ; nor did they ever make peace with them till ionathan , brother of iudas ( who had before recovered and purified the temple ) was acknowledged high-priest , by alexander , the pretended son of epiphanes , and that they had cast off that yoak of subjection , which they were under to the kings of syria , and had setled the government of their nation upon the princes of the asmonaean race in gratitude of that deliverance , they so justly owed to their piety , and courage ; and which continued in this family till the conquest of iudea by pompey , after years free enjoyment of it : so that it is plain , the iews , before the coming of christ , both priests , and people , did not think it unlawful to defend their lives , and religion , in case of great extremity , and that our saviour christ , hath any where by his gospel retrenched whole nations of that liberty lies upon you to prove . but to conclude , as for the text you have cited out of the proverbs , that will do you as little service : for tho' i grant it is true , that no man can say to an absolute king , or monarch , what dost thou ? i. e. call him to account as his superiour ; yet doth it not therefore follow , that a whole people , or nation , have no power to defend themselves in any case whatsoever , against his unjust , violence , or tyranny : this not being the act of a superiour , but an equal ( as i have already said ) nor any political , but a natural power . m. i confess this is the notablest example of resistance , that you have brought yet , but i think it may be easily answered , if we suppose with iosepbus and other authors , that tho' alexander the great , was certainly possest of palestine , by right of conquest , and the submission of the high-priest iaddus unto him ; yet his chief captains conspiring together , made such a scambling division of the empire among themselves , as they could , every one almost , seeking how he might suppress the rest , and attain the whole alone for himself : so as thereupon the iews , were as free from the macedonians , as any other of their bordering neighbours ; none of the said captains having any lawful interest , or title to iudah : but that which turned to the benefit of some others , brought a great detriment ( for want of ability ) unto them : for one of the said captains , viz. antiochus , having gotten to himself a very great kingdom in syria , and another , viz. ptolomy , in egypt , the iews dwelling betwixt them both , were miserably , on every side , vexed by them , sometimes the egyptians by oppression and force , brought them under their subjection , and imposed great tributes upon them ; and sometimes the syrians , growing mightier than the egyptians , did likewise very greatly afflict them ; especially in the reign of antiochus epiphanes , whose invasion and government was most unjust and tyrannical . he shed innocent blood on every side of the sanctuary , spoiled the temple , erecting in it the abomination of the gentiles , and caused it to be named the temple of jupiter olympius . not to mention the prophanation of the law , and unspeakable cruelties , exercised upon those who refused to offer sacrifice unto idols , until mattathias moved with the monstrous cruelty , and tyranny of the said antiochus , made open resistance , the government of that tyram being not then either generally received by submission , or setled by continuance . so that after the time of alexander the great , the iewish nation was governed by their own high-priests , and sanhedrim , and lived according to their own laws , in all matters , both civil , and ecclesiastical , tho' , more often , i own , with a subordination to the soveraignty of the kings of egypt , till this invasion of their religion , and liberties by antiochus . so that they had a legal right to the free exercise of their religion which could not without the highest violence , and injustice be taken from them . f. notwithstanding what you have now said concerning this action , i doubt not , but if you will consider iosephus better , as also the two books of the maccabees , you will find , th●t not only antiochus epiphanes , but also antiochus the great , and seleucus philopater were true and lawful monarchs of coelo-syria , and consequently of palestine , and tho' i grant there had been wars between antiochus the great , and ptolemy philopater , concerning the dominion of that country , yet it is plain out of iosephus's antiquities . lib. . that antiochus had re-conquer'd all this country from the egyptians , tho' he afterwards parted with half of the tribute of it to ptolomy epiphanes king of egypt , as a dowry with cleopatra his daughter ; yet surely he retained the supream dominion of it to himself , for we find in the maccabees , that seleucus philopater , supplied all the costs of the sacrifices out of his own revenues , that is , of those sacrifices , that were offered for the health of the king , as afterwards for the roman emperors . and we find in the beginning of both the books of the maccabees , that the king of syria had power to make , and unmake the high-priest when ever he pleased , as having the dominion over coelo-syria , and phoenicia , over which , as appears by the d . chap. of the d . of macc. seleucus had made apollonius governour under him : so that there cannot be more certain marks of soveraign majesty , exercised by the great turk over any of those tributary princes , or governours , which he places , and displaces at his pleasure : and therefore it is apparent , notwithstanding what you have said to the contrary , out of i know not what authors , that the government of antiochus epiphanes , was an unjust usurpation , for bating this tyranny in the exercise of it , he had a juster title than ever alexander the great had , since besides conquest , he had your own right of prescription by three descents , and i have grotius , ( besides other more antient authors ) on my side in this matter . and pray now see grotius his opinion in his first book de i.b. & p. cap. . which i will read into english , and i think will make sufficiently for my opinion . the fact of the maccabees may seem like to this , ( viz. the example of david before going ) for that some to defend these arms by this pretence , as if antiochus were not their king , but an invader , i suppose to be vain , since no where in all the history of the maccabees , antiochus is called by any other name , but that of the king ; and that deservedly , since the iews had long since acknowledged the empire of the macedonians , in whose right antiochus , had succeeded , for that the law forbids a stranger to be set over the people , is only to be understood of a voluntary election , and not of that which the people were forced to s●bmit to by a necessity of the times . but what others say , that the iews then used the right of a people , who were in their own power is not true . for first of all , the iews being conquered by nebuchadnezzar , by the right of war , obeyed by the same right the medes , and persians , as successors to the caldeans , whose whole empire devolved upon the macedonians , ( with which iustin likewise agrees in his . book ) hence the iews are said by tacitus , to have been during the empire of the medes , and persians , vilissima pars servientium . neither did they covenant any thing with alexander , and his successors , but submitted themselves to their dominion without any conditions as they had been under that of darius before . but if the iews were sometimes permitted to observe their own rites and laws , that was meerly pr●cariou● p●oce●ding from the beneficence of those kings , and not from any law superinduced on that empire . therefore there is nothing which can defend the maccabees in this matter , besides the most extreme and most certain danger ( viz. ) as long as they so contained themselves within the boun●s of self-defense , and that according to davids example , they retired into defeat places for their 〈◊〉 , nor took arms until they were set upon . so far grotius . m. i shall not farther dispute this point , tho' i thought i had very good authority on my side , but i think i have a letter apology to make for thi● a●tion of theirs , viz. that god might very well either by an express revelation , or at least a divine impulse of his holy spirit , command , or excite mattathias , and his sons the maccabees , to take arms in defence of those privi●edges , which had been so often confirmed to them , till at last it pleased god to restore the iews to an absolute liberty for some years , under their own princes , which they abusing by cruelty and ambition , tyran●●ing over their subjects , and murd●ring their brothers , it was no wonder that god was pleased to take away the scepter from them , and conferr it upon the romans , who gave it under them to herod , the son of antipater , the idumean , and therefore you can with no more justice urge this example of the maccabees to prove subjects may resist the supream powers , than to alledge the example of iehu as an authority for rebellion : since , as i said before , whatsoever god is pleased to bring about by human means , but yet by his particular precept or revelation , is to be still look'd upon as an exception from the general rules of non-resistance , and passive obedience . f. i confess what you say would fully answer my objection , could you as evidently make out from the history of the maccabees , or iosephus , that these maccabean captains did at all act in those wars they made , by any express precept , or divine revelation from god , as without any just grounds you suppose it : and therefore i desire you would shew me , if you can , any testimony out of the maccabees , or iosephus , to prove that they acted thus by vertue of any such divine inspiration ; and then i am contented to yield the cause , which if you cannot do ( as i think you can't ▪ ) i must look upon my self as to have had the better in this controversie concerning the right that subjects had to resist in case of necessity , before the coming of christ. m. yet for all that , some of the fathers , and modern commentators , on these books of the maccabees do hold , that such wonderful victories , as were obtained by iudas , and his brethren , could not have been without the miraculous providence of god , and consequently a divine inspiration assisting them , especially considering the strange iudgment , that we read fell upon antiochus for his impiety ; and that iudas had oftentimes divine revelations , appears by that dream , or vision , mentioned in the last chapter of the d of maccabees , of ieremiah the prophets giving him a golden sword , and in giving it , speaking thus , take this holy sword a gift from god , with which thou shalt wound the adversaries : which dream , if it were sent from god , as is highly probable , sufficiently confirms the commonly received opinion , that this resistance of the maccabees was by divine warrant , or inspiration : and when ever you can shew 〈◊〉 since the coming of christ , any resistance so miraculously abetted as this was , i will grant it also to be lawful . f. i do joyn issue with you in this , and must still suppose , ( until you give me better evidence to the contrary ) that the iews , under the conduct of the maccabees did not take up arms , against antiochus , and his successors by vertue of any divine inspiration to mattathias , or any of his sons , far it appears plainly , as well by the scripture , as by iosephus his testimony , that there was no more divine revelation after malachi , neither do the books of the maccabees , iosephus , sulpitius severus , or any other ancient ecclesiastical writer , mention these maccabees as men inspired by god. i grant indeed , they might be excited by some divine impulse of gods spirit to do what they did ; but this is so far from being at all miraculous , that i do suppose that divers great , and good men have been in our latter times of reformation stirred up by the same divine spirit to undertake , and perform extraordinary things ; for the reformation of religion , and the deliverance of gods church , and people . and therefore as for the vision , or dream which you mention , it doth not appear , that it was any more than an ordinary dream ; and if this might p●s● for a proof of a divine revelation , i could quote you many such dreams , as this , out of the lives of luther , calvin and divers others of the first reformers ; whom i suppose you will not maintain to have had any express revelation to do what they did , contrary to the civil and ecclesiastic laws of those princes , and states under which they lived . and tho' t is true these books are not held canonical ; yet they were always esteemed in the church as sacred writing , as written , tho' not by inspired , yet , by pious men , and tho' they are not received in matters of faith and doctrine , yet you know very well they are commanded to be read in our ch●r●●es , as containing excellent precepts , and examples in matters of morality , and therefore , 〈◊〉 p●rhaps they would not be a good authority to a praesbyterian , yet i hope we of the church●s england cannot refuse them as rules of morality . but i think we are now come to the last instanc●●hat can be brought before the coming of christ , and therefore pray will you now proceed with your quotations out of the new testament , which i suppose you have ready for me . m. i confess i am not able , in a story so imperfectly related as this of the maccabees , to prove they had gods express warrant for this resistance ; and you on the other side , produce b●t a negative argument , that they had not ( viz ) because neither iosephus , nor the book of the maccabees expresly mention any such thing , and yet for all that mattathias might ( for ought that you , or i know , ) have acted in this matter by divine revelation , since as the rabbins suppose ▪ there was for a long time after the times of the prophets a l●wer s●●t of revelation , given by god to some particular men called batcol , that is , the daughter of the v●●ce , which seems to have been some private , or inward voice , by which god revealed his will in some particular cases , and we read that long after this , iosephus relates that h●rcanus , the last good high-priest of the maccabean race , had the gift of prophecy by divine revelation : and why his great grand-father , might not have it likewise , i see no reason , besides all this , there might be other reasons , that god might allow to the people of the iews a greater liberty of resistance , even without cruel authority , to revenge the profanation of his temple , and religion , being the place , where he was pleased particularly to place his name , than are allowed to us christians at this day , who have no such visible temple , nor are under such severe obligations to extirpate idolatry . so that what mattathias , and the people of the iews acted in this matter , they might do it by the right of zealot● , for the defence of the law of moses , even as phineas did , who by killing zimri ; and cosbi , for fornication , and idolatry , did that which in another occasion , and at another time would have been down right murder . but be it as it will , i think we christians are by the laws of the gospel tyed to a stricter subjection to the supream powers , ( if it be possible ) than the iews themselves were , and whatsoever they might have done under antiochus , for their own defence , and to avoid persecution , yet iesus christ doth now require higher things of us , and hath by his own example , as well as precept , forbidden us to resist the supream powers , for any pers●cution , for religion , whatsoever , since , he hath ordained his religion , to be propagated , and desended by sufferings , and persuasions , and not by force of arms , against the will of the supream powers , and if not for religion , the most weight● of all concerns , surely not for any temporal thing whatsoever . but the proof of this , requires more time , than this evening will afford , without trespassing too much upon your , as well as my own repose . and therefore i should be glad of another evening● conversation with you , to free your mind , if it were possible from this dangerous error , and to bring you over to the true belief , and practice of the primitive christians , and of our mother the church of england , who treids exactly in their steps . f. i humbly thank you for your great kindness to me , and the pains you have taken , ●as also for what you intend to take for the better information of my conscience , and therefore if you please ; and that you have no other occasion to draw you forth out of your lodgings , i will wait upon you again to morrow in the evening , about seven , and shall think it a very proper work for the lords day , to have my conscience , better informed by those testimonies , which you say you will bring out of the new testament , and waitings of the primitive fathers , and church historians for my instruction , and if you can out of them prove to me , that all resistance whatever is unlawful : i promise you , upon the word of an honest man , to become a proselyte to this doctrine . m. i humbly thank you , sir , for your great candour , and ingenuity : and tho' i am no profest divine , yet i hope by the help of the scripture , and those quotations that i can produce out of the fathers , as also from the constant practice of the primitive church , to prove these doctrines of passive obedience , and non-resistance to be the true , antient , and apostolical b●●●s . but it is now late , and i will not trouble you any longer to night , therefore shall take my leave of you , and so sir , your humble servant . f. dear sir , good night , yours most heartily , well , to morrow i will wait upon you as i appointed . m. pray be sure to come at your hour , for i 'll expect you . finis . bibliotheca politica : or , a discourse by way of dialogue ; whether absolute non resistances of the svpream powers be enjoyned by the doctrine of the gospel , and was the ancient practice of the primitive church , and the constant doctrine of our reformed church of england . collected out of the most approved authors , both antient and modern . dialogue the fourth . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , nea● the oxford-arms ; where also may be had the first , second and third dialogues . ● . the subject of the fourth dialogue . authors made use of in this dialogue , and how denoted in the margin . . dr. sherlocks case of resistance of the supream powers . s. c. r. . mr. bohun's preface to patriarcha . b. p. p. . mr. dudley digge's unlawfulness of subjects taking up arms against their soveraigns , ed. . u. s. a. s. . the history of passive obedience . h. p. o. the fourth dialogue between mr. meanwell a civilian and mr. freeman a gentleman . m. your servant sir , i see you are better than your word , since you come somewhat before the time appointed . f. i do not deserve any great commendation for it , for this evening being a time of leisure , i had nothing else to do but to wait on you , and indeed i was impatient , `till i was with you , since i desire nothing more , than to receive satisfaction in this weighty controversie ; since i know how great a master you are both in divine , as well as civil knowledge ; and therefore , i beseech you ▪ to proceed in the method i at first proposed , by giving me these places of scripture out of the new testament , which you suppose prove your doctrine , and in the next place shew me that they were always unders●ood by the ancient fathers , as well as the practice of the whole primitive church in that sense . m. i very well approve of your method , and therefore to go on where we left off , i shall in the first place lay down some plain , and easie propositions , as the grounds of our future discourse , which i suppose you will have no reason to deny . first , therefore i suppose , that our saviours kingdom not being of this world , he came not to alter the civil government or polity of it , ( as you have already asserted ) and therefore did not alter any of those rights of soveraign powers , and those measures of obedience , and subjection which were before fixed and determined by god himself : neither hath given the people ( either considered as particular men , or as a collective body ) any power or right to resist , or rebel against such supream magistrates , tho' they never so much abuse their power by their tyrannical government , either by persecuting the true religion , or by any other violences , and oppressions whatsoever . and our saviour himself tells us , that be came not to destroy 〈◊〉 law , and the prophets , but to fulfil it ; that is , to fulfil the ancient types , and prophecies in his own person , to perfect an external , and ceremonial , by a real , and evangelical righteousness ; to perfect the moral laws with new instances and degrees of vertue , and obedience , but he abrogated no moral law , and therefore not the laws of obedience , and subjection to princes which have always been reduced to the fifth commandment . pray tell me , how you approve of this doctrine . f. i do readily agree to the greatest part of it , but yet as our saviour hath not been pleased expresly to enjoyn us to resist the supream powers when they manifestly break , and transgress all the ends of civil government , and consequently dissolve it , so on the other side , he came not to destroy those natural rights , which mankind enjoyed before his coming , of defending themselves , and providing for their own happiness and security when their civil governours either could not , or would not protect them ▪ and as i grant , that our saviour made no alteration in civil government by abridging the rights of soveraign power ; so likewise hath he not conferred upon them any new rights , or prerogatives of destroying , or ens●●●● their subjects , without any contradiction , or resistance : and consequently hath altered nothing in those natural rights , or means which the people had before his coming , of hindering the supream powers , from perverting those main ends of government , the happiness , and preservation of the people ▪ and that this liberty doth not any way destroy those rights or prerogatives which are necessary for their own security , and the well-governing of the● people , i have , i think , sufficiently proved in our last conversation . so that , unless you can now shew me , by such express authorities , as that i can have no reasonable ground to deny it , i hope you 'll pardon me , if i cannot believe , that christ by his coming into the world has taken away , or abridged , that natural right which mankind before enjoyed ( even after the institution of civil government ) of resistance or self-defence in cases of extrem●ty , against those who exercise nothing of that supream power , with which god hath invested them , but the meer title : for had the intent of our saviours coming , been for this end , he had instead of freeing us from the yo●● of the law , laid a much heavier upon our necks , if the doctrines of pass●● obedience , and non-resistance are to be taken in that large sense , and ●●●mited extent that their asserters have been pleased to give them : so that tho' i grant our saviour came to perfect , and not to abrogate the moral law , with new instances of vertue and obedience , and therefore hath not abrogated any laws of obedience , and subjection to princes ; so hath he neither abrogated the great law of nature , of self-defence in the people , wh●● they are universally assaulted , or oppress 't in their lives , liberties , or properties . and tho' i grant obedience to princes hath been reduced to the fifth commandment , yet neither doth that by commanding us to honour our father , ●nd mother , forbid all resistance of children to the violent and unreasonable ●ctions of their parents , much less of those whom they may command , or ●et on to kill , or ruine us , as i have , i think sufficiently proved at our first conference . and therefore , i pray , proceed to your proofs themselves , and shew me , that they prove , as much as you have affirmed . m. before i come to my proofs , i pray give me leave to observe it ●ou by way of ●ntroduction , that as our saviour hath left the government of the world as he found it : so he hath besides all this , given such admirable laws , as will both teach princes to govern , and subjects to obey better , which is the most effectual way to secure the publick peace , and happiness , to prevent the oppression of subjects , and rebellion against princes ; but he has not interposed in new modelling the governments of the world , which is not of such consequence , as some men imagine . it is not the external form of government , but the fatherly care and prudence , and justice of governours and the dutiful obedience of subjects , which can make any people happy . if princes , and subjects be good christians , they may be happy under most forms of government , if they be not , they can be so under none : had our saviour given subjects liberty to resist , to depose , to murder tyrannical princes , he had done them no kindness at all : for to give liberty to subjects to resist , is only to proclaim an universal license to factions , and seditions , and civil wars , and if any man can think this such a mighty blessing to the world , yet methinks , it is not a blessing , proper for the prince of peace to give . but he , who instructs princes to rule as gods ministers , and vicegerents , and to express a fatherly care , and concernment for the happiness of their subjects , and that teaches subjects to reverence , and obey their prince as the image of god , and quietly to submit , and yield to his authority , and that inforces these laws both on princes and subjects in the name and authority of god , and from the consideration of the future judgment , when princes who abuse their power shall give an account of it to their great master , and when subjects who resist , shall receive to themselves damnation , and those who patiently suffer for gods sake shall have their injuries redress't , and their obedience rewarded : i say , such a person as this , takes a more effectual course to reform the abuses of civil power , and to preserve good government in the world , than all your wise politians , and state-menders who think to reform the government of the world , by some state spells , and charms , without reforming those , who govern , and those who are governed . this our saviour hath done , and this is the best thing that could be done ; nay this was all that he could do in this matter : he never usurpt any civil power , and authority , and therefore could not new model the governments of the world , he never offers any external force , and compulsion to make men obey his laws , and therefore never forces princes to rule well , nor subjects to obey . but he has taken the same care of the government of the world ; as he has done of the other duties of piety , and vertue , that is , he has given very good laws and threatned those who break them with eternal punishments , and as the laws , and religion of our saviour prevail , so will the governments of the world mend without altering the model and constitution of them : but i come now to those places of scripture , i have to urge against your opinion — f. i pray sir , pardon me , if i interrupt you , and beg leave to make some remarks upon this preface you have now made . i will not deny , but you have spoken some honest truths , in what you have now said , tho' not without a mixture of divers mistakes , for tho' i grant that jesus christ hath not interposed in new modelling the governments of the world ; so he hath likewise given princes no authority to alter those , which they find ready made , and modelled to their hands in those countries wherein god hath placed them at the helm . and tho' you tell me , those models of government are not of such consequence as some men imagine , yet i hope you ought to have a better opinion of this of england , since it is only to this frame of government , that you 'll own , we owe all our freedom and happiness above divers other nations our neighbours : since if it were not for our laws , and original constitutions to the contrary , i do not see why we may not be made as absolute slaves as any in turkey , when ever the king pleases : i grant indeed , that it is the fatherly care , prudence , and justice of governours , that can make any people happy . but i desire you to shew me , how many governments there are in the world where princes exercise this fatherly care , as they ought , without any known laws , or where subjects express a dutiful love , and obedience to their governours ( unless servile fear must be called so ) whilst they find themselves miserable slaves , and beggars . i also yield , that if princes , and subjects are good christians , they may be happy under most forms of government ; and if not , they can be happy under none , is true in this sense , if you take happiness , for the hopes of a future life ; but otherwise there have been divers princes , who have been very good christians , and yet by carelesness of their affairs have governed their subjects very ill ; and likewise , i know some subjects who have been very loyal to their prince , and very good christians , and yet have been made very miserable , as witness the protestants in hungary , and france . but as i do not suppose , that our saviour hath given subjects liberty to resist tyrannical princes upon every slight occasion , much less to depose , or murder them ; yet will it not follow , that if he hath given liberty to subjects to resist in some cases , it would only serve to proclaim an universal license to seditions , and civil wars : since i do not suppose such wars to be lawful , but when the people are in as miserable condition as a state of war can bring them to ; and if our saviour had not allowed them this power , no rational man would think it a blessing proper for the prince of peace to give , or to come into the world to introduce slavery , and the arbitrary power of the sword. tho' i grant he instructs princes to rule as gods ministers , and vicegerents , and to express a fatherly care , and concern for the happiness of their subjects , and that he likewise teaches subjects to obey their princes : yet you know too well , how seldom these instructions have all those good effects either with the princes , or people . and therefore , as on the people's side , besides those obligations of conscience you speak of , there are likewise ordained temporal punishments , to keep subjects to their duty , so likewise there is often need of something else , besides meer conscience , and honour , to keep princes from tyrannizing over their subjects . and tho' i suppose the consideration of a future judgment may go a great way with some princes to make them perform that great trust , god hath given them , yet pray tell me , have you not read ( if not known ) some princes in the world of late times , who have either believed no such thing , as eternal damnation , or at least have found a way by nice distinctions , or equivocations to evade all laws , oaths , and promises whatsoever ? and what satisfaction is it to me , or how doth it serve to alleviate my misery , when i am made a slave , and a beggar , that those that had the rule over me will be damned for so doing . but you tell me , that i must quietly and patiently suffer this for god's sake , and that then we shall have our injuries redress'r , and obedience rewarded : i grant indeed that a single person may be rewarded in this kind , for preferring the common good , or quiet of the nation before his own private interest . but that whole nations , and bodies of people are obliged by the like rule , i utterly deny , since i do not find where our saviour either enjoyns , or requires such an absolute subjection at their hands ; and if he doth not , it is no better than will-worship to pay it , and therefore , it still lies upon you to prove it to me . to conclude . i think it may be a more effectual course , to preserve the main ends of government , for the people sometimes to resist the insupportable tyranny and violence of the supream powers in those cases of extremity i have already put , than to let those , who have got the power over us in their hands , do whatsoever they please with it to our ruine without any controul . and also , i desire you to consider , whether the fear of such resistance from subjects , when thus outraged and oppress 't , may not often be a more powerful state 's spell or charm ( as you call it ) to keep the supream powers in their duty , than those many sermons , and other discourses that have been lately preached , and publish't , that their power is irresistible , and that therefore , all their subjects are bound to endure whatsoever tyranny they have a mind to exercise upon them : in short , i absolutely agree with you , that as our saviour never usurpt any civil power , or authority , and therefore did not new model the governments of the world , so hath he also given subjects a right to maintain whatsoever models , or forms of government , god hath been pleased to establish among them , when they are in danger to be altered , or invaded either by a domestick tyranny , or forreign force . and without this right of resistance , for you to tell us , that iesus christ hath given very good laws , and threatned those that break them with eternal punishments , and that as the laws , and religion of our saviour prevail , that so the government of the world will mend without any more ado ; is altogether as reasonable , as to preach , that because christ hath given us good laws , and threatens everlasting punishments to those that break them , therefore they are sufficient to keep men from robbing , and murdering their neighbours ; and that all men giving up their natural rights of resisting such robbers , and defending themselves against them , should wholy relie upon the effi●acy of the commandment against stealing , or else on the more powerful motive with such people , of a judge , and a gallows , should let them do with us what they please , whenever we fall under their power : and therefore , i desire you would give me some better proofs , that our saviour hath enjoyned all mankind an absolute subjection to the supream powers under pain of damnation without any resistance in any case whatsoever ; but i pray pardon this digression , which your own long preface extorted from me . m. i shall not now dispute this matter with you , and therefore to observe your commands , i shall begin with that divine answer , of our saviour to the pharisees , and herodians when they consulted together to entangle him in his talk. they came to him with great ceremony , and address , saying , master we know , that thou art true , and teachest the way of god in truth , neither carest thou for any man , for thou regardest not the person of man. tell us therefore , what thinkest thou ? is it lawful to give tribute to caesar or not ? they thought it impossible that he should give any answer to this , which would not make him obnoxious , either to the roman emperours , if he denied that the iews might lawfully pay tribute to caesar , or to the pharisees , and people , if he affirmed that they might ; for there was a very potent faction among them , who thought it unlawful for the iews , to own the authority , or usurpations of any foreign prince , or to pay tribute to him as to their king , they being expresly forbidden by the law , to set a stranger over them for their king ; who was not their brother , that is , who was not a natural iew. and it seems they could not distinguish between their own voluntary act in chusing a stranger for their king ( which was indeed forbid by their law ) and their submitting to a foreign prince , when they were conquered by him . our saviour , who knew their wicked intention in all this , that they did not come with an honest design to be instructed in their duty but to seek an advantage against him , expresses some indignation at it , why tempt ye me , ye hypocrites ? but yet to return them an answer to their question , he bids them shew him the tribute money , that is , the money in which they us'd to pay tribute , and enquired , whose image , and superscription it had . for coining of money was then as certain a mark of soveraignty , as making laws , or the power of the sword. well , they acknowledge that the image , and superscription on the tribute-money was caesars , upon which he replies , render therefore unto caesar , the things that are caesar 's , and unto god the things that are gods. the plain meaning of which answer is this , that since by the very impression on their money , it is evident , that caesar is the soveraign lord , they must render unto him all the rights of soveraignty , among which tribute is one , as st. paul tells us . render therefore unto all their dues , tribute to whom tribute is due , custom to whom custom , fear to whom fear , honour to whom honour . whatever then is due to soveraign princes , and doth not interfere with their duty to god , that they must give to caesar , who at this time was their soveraign . and tho' our saviour commands us , only in general , to render to caesar the things that are caesars , without telling us , what caesar's things are ; this is so far from making his answer ambiguous , and of no use in this present controversie , that it suggests to us three plain , and natural consequences , which are sufficient to end this whole dispute . first , that our saviour did not intend to make any alteration in the rights of soveraignty , but what rights he found soveraign princes possest of , he leaves them in the quiet possession of , for had he intended to make any change in this matter , he would not have given such a general rule , to render to caesar the things that are caesars , without specifying what these things are . secondly , and therefore he leaves them to the known laws of the empire , to determine what is caesars right . what ever is essential to the notion of soveraign power , whatever the laws , and customs of nations determine to be caesar's right , that they must render to him ; for he would make no alteration in this matter . so that subjection to princes , and non resistance , is as plainly determined by our saviour in this law of paying tribute ; for subjection , and non-resistance is as essential a right of soveraign power , and as inseparable from the notion of it , as any thing can be , and so it is acknowledged by the laws , and customs of nations , and is so determin'd by the apostle st. paul as i shall shew hereafter . thirdly , i observe farther that when our saviour joyns our duty to our prince , with our duty to our god render to cae●ar the things that are caesars , and to god the things that are gods , he excepts nothing from caesars right , which by the laws of nations is due to soveraign princes , but what is a violation of , and an encroachment on god's right , and soveraignty , that is , we must pay all that obedience , and subjection to princes which is consistent with our duty to god. this is the only limit our saviour sets to our duty to princes . this , i hope , is sufficient for the explication of our saviours answer to the pharisees and herodians , which evidently contains the doctrine of obedience and subjection to princes , enforced on us by the authority of our saviour himself . f. i shall not dispute , that this instance of our saviour doth enjoyn the iews to pay tribute , and render all those rights , and dues to caesar as the supream power , which are necessary to it's essence , but you seem to me , to stretch this prerogative a great deal too far , when you thus suppose an absolute subjection to princes , without any resistance to be as plainly enjoyn'd by our saviour in this law , as paying tribute . for the reason you give for it , viz. that subjection , and non resistance is as essential a right of soveraign power , and as inseparable from the notion of it , as any can be , and that it is so acknowledged by the laws , and customs of nations , is the thing which i deny , and which having been the subject of our last conversation , is still the thing to be proved ; and i think i have there sufficiently proved that absolute non resistance is no essential right of soveraign power , nor inseparable from the notion of it : since by asserting it , no just right of soveraign power will be thereby destroyed , or taken away ; but rather confirm'd , and that i may make it out , yet plainer by a familiar instance ; a general of an army , hath an absolute power over the lives of his souldiers , that transgress his rules of war , or military discipline ; but suppose that in a mad , or drunken sit he should command some troops of his guards to cut the throats of all the rest of the army , and they be such obedient coxcombs , as to go about to put this order in execution , doth it therefore derogate , from the absoluteness of his power as general , if the army will not stand still , and let three , or four hundred fellows take away all their lives ? but that this principle of passive obedience in your sense , of suffering princes , or other supream powers to destroy , or inslave them ; is so far from being acknowledged , by the laws , and customs of all nations , that , as i think , i have proved it to be contrary to the laws of nature , and reason ; so i doubt not , but i can much easier make it out by the laws and customs of all nations , as well barbarous , as civiliz'd to be both unreasonable , and impracticable . and that it is otherwise determin'd by st. paul , i desire you to prove it to me , when you come to make use of the th to the romans , so much insisted upon by those of your opinion . but before i make an end with this text we are now upon , i cannot but take notice of your last assertion , that by rendring to caesar the things , which are caesars , god excepts nothing from caesar 's right , which by the laws of nations is due to soveraign princes , but what is a violation of , and encroachment on gods right , and soveraignty ; that is , we must pay all that obedience , and subjection to princes , which is consistent with our duty to god. now if this be the only limit that our saviour sets to our duty to princes ( as you suppose ) i wonder by what law the learned doctor from whom you borrow this principle , as also those other clergy-men of the church of england , could justifie thelr refusing to read the kings late proclamation of indulgence , or toleration , for if the king ( as they own in the oath of supremacy ) is the only supream governour of his dominions , in all things , or causes whatsoever ; he must likewise be the caesar here meant in this text ; and consequently an active , not passive obedience ought to have been paid to this declaration . since you say , that obedience is by the law of nations due to soveraign princes , to whom we must pay all that obedience and subjection , which is consistent with our duty to god , and i hope you will not say , that this declaration was inconsistent with that duty , or was any violation or encroachment upon gods rights of soveraignty . m. as for your last observation upon those clergy men who refused to read the declaration , i must confess , i have according to my civil law maxims , no excuse ready for them , since with us it is always true , in this as well as other absolute monarchies , quicquid regi placuit , legi's habet vigorem . much less can i reconcile it with that unbounded supremacy which the oath of allegiance , as also the opinions of most modern judges have placed in the king in all ecclesiastical matters ; but indeed i can least of all reconcile it with this assertion you now mention , which i confess , i have taken from divers sermons and treatises , that have been prea●ht and printed of late by our city divines ; to whom i shall leave it to answer this objection ; but to proceed with the design in hand , i shall come in the next place to prove an absolute subjection without resistance to be due to the soveraign power , from our saviour's rebuke to st. peter , when he drew his sword , and struck a servant of the high-priest , and smote off his ear , which is as plain a declaration against resistance as words can make it . then said iesus unto him , put up thy sword unto his place ; for all they that take the sword , shall perish by the sword. for the understanding of which , we must consider , upon what occasion st. peter drew his sword ; for we must not think that our saviour doth absolutely forbid the use of the sword ; which is to destroy all civil governments , and the power of princes , and to proclaim impunity to all which villanies that are committed in the world. the sword is necessary to punish wickedness , and to protect the innocents . in the hands of princes it is an instrument of justice , as st. paul tells us . that they bear not the sword in vain , but are the ministers of god , revengers to ex●cu●e wrath upon him that doth evil . in the hands of priva●e persons it may be lawfully used in self-defence ▪ thus our saviour a little before his crucifixion , gave commission to his disciples to furnish themselves with swords , tho' they parted with the●r garments for the purchase . which we suppose was not designed as a meer modish , and fashionable thing , but to defend themselves from the private assaults of robbers ▪ and such like common enemies , who as iosephus tells us , were very nu●mero●s at that time . for no man wanteth authority to defend his life against him , who hath no authority to take it away . but the case of st. peter was very different : he drew his sword indeed in his masters defence , but against a lawful authority . the officers of the chief priests , and pharisees came with iudas to the place where jesus was , to seize on him . this was a lawful authority tho' employed upon a very unjust errand ; but authority must not be resisted , tho' in defence of the greatest innocence . men who draw their swords against lawful powers shall perish with the sword , which doth not signifie , what the event shall always be , but what is the desert and merit of the action . rebels may sometimes be prosperous , but they always deserve punishment ; and if they escape the sword in this world , st. paul tells us , they shall receive damnation in the next . what can be said more expresly against resistance than this ? st. peter never could have drawn his sword in a better cause , never in the defence of a more sacred person : if we may defend oppressed innocence against a lawful authority , if we may oppose unjust and illegal violence , if any obligations of friendship , gratitude , or religion it self could justifie resistance , st. peter had not met with this rebuke . but tho' it was a very unjust action , yet it was done by a just authority ; and lawful powers must not be resisted , tho' it were in defence of the saviour of the world , and if st. peter might not use the sword in defence of christs person , there is much less pretence to fight for his religion , for tho' some call this f●ghting for religion ; it is only fighting for themselves . men may keep their religion , if they please in despite of earthly powers ; and therefore no powers can hurt religion , tho' they may persecute the professours of it : and therefore when men take up arms to avoid perse●ution , it is not in defence of religion , but of themselves , that is , to avoid their suffering for religion . and if st. peter might not fight to preserve christ himself , certainly neither he , nor we , ought to take up arms to defend our selves from persecution . christ was the first martyr for his own religion , his person was infinitely more sacred , and inviolable than any one of us can pretend to be . and if st. peter must not fight for christ , certainly we must not fight for our selves , tho' we absurdly enough call it fighting for our religion . and who were these powers st. peter resisted ? they were only the servants and officers of the high-priest . the high-priest did not appear there himself , much less , pilate , much less caesar , and yet our saviour rebukes st. peter for resisting the inferiour officers , tho' they offered the most unjust , and illegal violence . it seems he did not understand our modern distinctions between the person , and the authority of the prince , that tho' his person be sacred , and must not be touched , yet his ministers who act by his authority may be oppos'd . we may fight his navies , and demolish his garisons , and kill his subjects , who fight for him , tho' we must not touch his person . but he is a mock prince , whose authority is confin'd to his own person , who can do nothing more than what he can do with his two hands ; which cannot answer the ends of government . a prince is not meerly a natural but a political person , and his personal authority reaches as far as his commission doth . his officers and ministers of state , and commanders and soldiers are his ends , and eyes , and ears , and legs , and he who resisteth those who act by his commission , may as properly be said to resist the personal authority of the prince , as if he himself were present in his natural person as well as by his authority . thus our saviour , it seems , thought , when he rebuk'd st. peter for striking a servant of the high priest , and smiting off his ear. f. in answer to this place , which you have now brought to prove that the resistance that st. peter would have made on our saviours behalf , was absolutely unlawful , i shall not insist as some do , that christ came into the world on purpose to be a sacrifice for sin , and that therefore it was inconsistent with his design , and the person he undertook , to resist , and oppose , had it been never so lawful to resist ; tho' our saviour himself by the words , which st. iohn relates him to have spoken to st. peter , seems to favour this interpretation ; when after he had bid him put his sword into the scabbard , he adds , the cup which my father hath given me , shall i not drink it ; and so likewise the answer he gave pilate , who asked him whether he was a king ? thou sayest , that i am a king ; to this end was i born , and for this cause came i into the world , that i should bear witness unto the truth : nor yet shall i go about to interpret these words , for they that take the sword shall perish by the sword ; in that sense which grotius puts upon it , tho' quite different from yours , as if it were not designed as a rebuke to st. peter , but for the encouragement of his disciples , and being indeed a prophesie , that the iews , who now came against him with swords , and staves , should perish by the sword of the romans , who should be the avengers of christs death : but i shall take it in the same sense as you do , as a rebuke to st. peter , for going about to resist a lawful authority , tho' employed upon a very unjust errand : yet will it not prove that the supream powers may not be resisted in any case , or by any person whatsoever , let them use their power never so cruelly , or tyrannically against their subjects : i grant indeed , it proves , what i have never denyed , that a private person , tho' innocent ought not to r●sist the civil officers that come to seize him , for a crime whereof he is accused before a lawful authority , for this is not only unlawful by the command of christ , but also by the law of nature , and nations . for in england , it is not only penal , for a man to resist the officers of iustice , that come to seize him , tho' he be innocent of the crime , whereof he is accus'd , but also to withdraw himself from iustice by flight . and tho' upon tryal , he be found innocent , yet if he fled for the same , he shall forfeit all his goods ; and that very justly , because no man ought to suspect , and withdraw himself from the publick tryal of the laws ; now to apply this to the case of our saviour , tho' the action which these priests , and souldiers came about was in it self unjust ; yet was it not so , either in respect of these officers themselves , who acted by a lawful authority , nor yet was it unjust , or unlawful in respect of the high priest and sanbedrim , who sent them : for since it belong'd to them alone to iudge of a prophet , who they supposed taught contrary to the law of moses , since they did believe our saviour to be such a prophet , it was in respect of them , neither unjust nor unlawful to seize him , and bring him before them , to give an account of his doctrine , and they might likewise do this either by day , or by night with the help of more , or fewer men , according as they should think fit ; since they feared the people might rescue him ; especially since they look't upon him as one who went about to make himself king of the iews , in opposition to caesar ; and therefore whilst they lay under this mistake ▪ they were under as high an obligation , as an erroneous conscience could lay upon them of seizing him , and bringing him before the high-priest and the governour . for if they had believed him to be the true messiah , and consequently the king of their nation , it had been impossible , that they should ever have gone about to put him to death . which likewise our saviour himself acknowledges , when praying for them that crucified him , he said , father forgive them , for they know not what they do . i speak not this to excuse the priests , or san●edrim for condemning our saviour to death , or for using all the power they had with pilate to have him executed : since i grant their ignorance being in great part wilful , at least not invincible , they had no just excuse , not to believe on him , after so many miracles he had wrought in the sight of all the world : but only to prove that ( which i suppose you will not deny ) i. e. that magistrates , even whilst they act unjustly are not to be resisted in the execution of publick iustice ; no , not to rescue an innocent man by force , from the hand of iustice , after he is condemned : since the false , or unjust sentences of iudges against particular persons , are to be taken for just in common acceptation , till they be repealed ; according to that maxime in your civil law , proetor dum iniquum decernit , ius dicit ; and therefore our saviour coming to fulfil all righteousness , and to be the exact patern of divine , and moral actions could not do less than rebuke st. peter , for making use of the sword against a lawful authority , but what is this to the cases that i have put of the resistance of whole nations , or bodies of men against an unjust force , and destructive violence , upon their persons , and estates by those who pretend to act as the supream powers , tho contrary to all laws , natural , and divine , and who have no pretence to act as they do , but only their unjust and arbitrary wills back't by power : a●d that there is a great difference in these two , i will clearly shew you , from your own concession , that no man wanteth authority to defend his life against him , that hath no authority to take it away ; and therefore i suppose st. paul might only with the help of those that were with him , not only have defended his life , against those whom we find ( in the th of the acts ) who were by order of the high-priest , and chief of the iews , to have lain ●n wait to kill paul by the way , but also against any that festus the governour himself should have sent for the same end : since he there dec●ares , that it is not the manner ( i. e. law ) of the romans , to deliver any man to dye , before that he , that is accused , have the accu●●rs face to face , and have license to answer for himself , concerning the crime laid against him : and therefore as caesar could give festus no commission to murder men , so neither did god bestow on the emperour any authority to commit murder or to authorise others to do it ; and if a single person might do this , certainly much more a whole nation , country , or city may justifie such a resistance , where their lives , liberties and estates lye at stake from the violence , or tyranny of the supream powers and therefore , i do not see , but that i may very well grant the instance , you have put to be conclusive against this resistance , made by st. peter on our saviours behalf , so that your instance doth not reach the case in hand , that all resistance of supream powers is unlawful . and you your self have already granted as much as i can in reason desire , that no man wants authority to defend his life against him , who hath no authority to take it away : so that unless princes and their inferiour officers receive authority from god to commit murders , every man may defend himself against them , when they go about to take away their lives by violence contrary to law. and therefore , i see no reason , from any thing that you have hitherto said , to believe that christ did not allow this distinction between the person and authority of the prince , to be good in some cases ; or that tho' his person should be sacred , yet that his ministers who act not by his regal authority , but his personal , and tyrannical will may be opposed , nor can i find any consequence from what you say , that he is a mock prince , whose authority is confined to his own person , who can do nothing more , than what he can do with his own hands . since no man in his wits asserts , any such thing ; for i grant that an absolute prince hath power to make laws , and to command them to be put in execution , which do not contradict the laws of god , and nature , and a limited prince hath likewise a right to command in all things , that do not expresly contradict gods natural , and reveal'd laws , and also those positive laws of his country , ( which he is not the sole maker of ) that do not contradict the former ; and if he can do this ; i think he is endued with an authority sufficient to answer all the ends of government , without supposing , that he must needs have an irresistible power ( and without which he cannot answer those ends ) to murder , and enslave whomsoever he will. i grant indeed a prince is not meerly a natural , but a political person , but certainly his personal authority as king doth not reach as far as his commission , or that he who resists those , who act by his commission , may be said in all cases to resist his regal authority . since at this rate the poor protestants in ireland at the beginning of the last irish rebellion , had been in a very woful condition , if it had happened ( which was not impossible ) that king charles the first should really have granted a commission to sir phelim on●al to destroy them ; which no man could then certainly tell , but that he had , since sir phelim publickly shewed such a commission , and still asserted the truth of it , till he came upon the gallows ; but this is only by the by , and in answer to what you have now said to this matter . so that there is no need of supposing , what our saviour thought one way , or other in this matter : since he did not rebuke st. peter , for resisting the inferiour officers , because they offered an unjust , and illegal violence ; but because he resisted those who acted by a true , and legal commission from the high-priest , and sanhedrim , who supposed our saviour to be a false prophet . m. if this distinction of yours were true , it would render the example of christ's suffering , in obedience to the supream powers , tho' unjustly , yet without resistance , of no effect to us , whereas i am firmly perswaded , that christ took such a mean , and suffering a person upon him , because it was most agreeable to the religion which he preach't , and of which he was to be an example ; and therefore , tho' christ suffered for other reasons and to other ends and purposes , than we do or can suffer , yet his sufferings are an example to us , because god chose to save , and redeem us by the sufferings of his son , not only that he might expiate our sins by his blood , but also that he might be an example to us of meekness , and patience , and submission to the divine will , and subjection to government , even in the most unjust , and infamous sufferings . we may consider farther , that christs sufferings in obedience to the will , and appointment of god , doth not make him unfit to be our example . for tho' god has not so peremptorily decreed that all christians should suffer , as he did , that christ should suffer , yet when ever we are called to it ( as we always are , when we cannot avoid suffering without resisting a lawful authority ) our sufferings are as much the effects of gods decree , and appointment , as the sufferings of christ were ; and in such cases every christian may , and ought to say as his lord did . the cup which my father hath given me , shall i not drink it ? thus st. peter expresly tells the christians , to whom he wrote , and gives it as a reason , why they should suffer patiently , even for doing well . for even hereunto were you called , because christ also suffered for us , leaving us an example that we should follow his steps . now , calling , in the new testament signifies the choice , and election of god , and always supposes a divine decree , appointment and constitution , as the foundation of it . thus st. paul tells us that the gifts , and calling ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) of god are without repentance , that is , that decree he made to choose the po●●erity of abraham for his people , which still intituled all those of them to the blessings of the gospel who would believe in christ. thus the state of christianity is our calling , and holy calling , because it is the way , and means , god hath chosen and appointed for the salvation of mankind : and christians are often stiled the called , because god has now decreed to chuse all the sincere disciples of christ , as he formerly did the posterity of abraham to be his peculiar people ; and throughout the scriptures of the new testament ; god is never said to call , nor any one to be called of god , but with respect to some divine decree , and constitution ; and therefore when st. peter tells the christians , that they are called to suffer , it signifies that god hath appointed them to it , by his positive will and decree . this st. paul discourses more at large in his epistle to the romans , and comforts them under their sufferings , from this very consideration , that the sufferings which they underwent , were not the effects of meer chance and accident , nor of the wickedness and injustice of men , nor barely of god's permission , but of his decree and appointment ; and therefore they might certainly conclude , that whatever their sufferings were , they should turn to their good. and we know , that all things work together for good to them that love god , to them that are called accroding to his purpose , those who are called , that is , to suffer ( which is the argument , the apostle is discoursing of ) according to his will , and appointment . and a little after he goes on , and says ; and such persons who are thus appointed , who are thus called by god to suffer , shall be sure to conquer , and to receive the reward of conquerors . for thus the apostle adds , for whom he did foreknow he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his son ; that he might be the first born amongst many brethren . this conformity to the image of christ in this place , doth plainly signifie a conformity to him , in sufferings , as is evident from the whole scope of this place . some persons it seems there are , whom god doth predestinate , or fore-appoint to be conformed to the sufferings of christ ; for this is not the actual portion of all christians , though it is the condition of our disciple-ship . so that though god hath not made us slaves and vassals to the humour of every tyrant , yet all the afflictions and sufferings of christians , especially those which befall them on the account of religion ; are as particularly ordered , and determined by god , as the sufferings of christ himself were ; and therefore there is no difference upon this account , between the sufferings of christ , and the sufferings of his disciples ; and therefore though christ came into the world on purpose to suffer in obedience to the divine will , this doth not make him ever the l●ss fit to be an example to us . nay , this obedience to the will of god in suffering the hardest things , from the most unjust , and tyrannical powers , is an example to us of the same patient suffering and submission to the will of god. it is true , none of us in particular can know , that god hath decreed , that we shall suffer such , or such things ; and from such or such hands , as our saviour did ; but yet this we know , that it is god's will and pleasure , that we should patiently endure those sufferings which we cannot avoid without sin ; and since he hath forbid us by express laws to resist the higher powers , whatever sufferings cannot be avoided without resistance , it is god's will , and pleasure , that we should submit to them . and since none of these sufferings , which are unavoidable to us , befall us without the particular decree , and appointment of god , we have reason in imitation of our great master , to submit to them , with the same cheerfulness and self-resignation as he did . there is something indeed in the example of our saviour , which in our circumstances we are not bound to imitate ; for he punctually knowing , what god's will and pleasure was concerning him , voluntarily chose that condition which he so well knew , god had allotted for him . he freely chose a mean , and servile fortune , he chose suffering and death ; when his time of offering up himself was come , he went up to ierusalem on purpose to die there ; but we are not bound to chuse poverty and disgrace , and suffering , we are not bound voluntarily to deliver up our selves into the hands of tyrants , and persecutors , who thirst after our blood . we may , and ought to use all just and honest arts to make our condition easie and comfortable in the world , and to avoid the rage and fury of bloody men , because we cannot tell , that it is the will and appointment of god , that we shall suffer , till our sufferings are unavoidable ; and then when we must either suffer , or sin , when we must either renounce our religion , or resist the supream powers ; we must embrace sufferings , and death , as that portion which god hath allotted for us . i shall only here observe what a mighty security this is to all good christians , how absolute or tyrannical soever the power be under which they live ; that they are safe in god's hands , and all the powers of men and devils cannot touch them , till god by a positive decree appoints , and orders their sufferings . there could not be greater , nor more absolute tyrants , than the roman emperours were at this time , and yet they had no power over the meanest christian , but by an express commission from heaven . this is the special priviledge of the christian church above the rest of mankind , that they are god's peculiar care and charge ; that he doth not permit any sufferings or persecutions to befall them , but what he himself orders and appoints . it is a great security to the world , that there is no evil happens to men , but what god permits , and that he permits nothing but what he can over-rule to wise and good ends ; but it is a greater happiness to have our condition immediately allotted by god. god may permit a great many evils to befall us in anger and displeasure , but when he takes us into his immediate protection , and under his own government , whatever evils he appoints for us , whoever are the instruments of them , they are certainly for our good . and therefore there is no such danger in the doctrine of non-resistance , as some men imagine , how absolute soever this may be thought to render princes , sincere christians can suffer nothing by it , for they shall suffer nothing more , nor less than what god appoints for them to suffer ; but as for the absurdity you think you have brought me to , by granting that no man wants authority to defend his own life against him who hath no authority to take it away , that does not extend to supreme powers ; since though i grant they have no authority to take away mens lives contrary to law ; yet does it not follow that we may resist and oppose them , if they do ; this i absolutely deny , because god hath expresly commanded us not to resist them ; and i see no inconsistency between these two propositions , that a prince hath no legal authority to take away mens lives against law , and yet that he must not be resisted when he does so , for both the laws of god , and of our countrey , suppose these two to be very consistent . f. to answer this long speech of yours , the best way may be , to shew you first how far i agree with you , and wherein i must differ from you , and i will also tell you what reasons i have for it . in the first place i grant , that though our saviour was indeed the messias , and true king of the iews , yet was he not such a messias as they expected , nor was he to have a temporal , but spiritual dominion , and therefore would not be such a king , though the iews would have made him so . i likewise yield , that christ submitted to the most unjust sentence , and to the most ignominious , and painful death , rather than he would resist the higher powers ; though he could easily have called for legions of angels to his rescue : as also that he rebuked peter , when he drew his sword in his defence , and tells pilate the reason why he was so easily apprehended , and without any resistance o● opposition . my kingdom ( said he ) is not of this world , if my kingdom were of this world , then would my servants fight that i should not be delivered to the jews ; but now is my kingdom not from hence . all which plainly shews that our saviour's subjection was no matter of force , or constraint , because he wanted power to resist , but it was matter of choice , that which was most suitable to the nature of his kingdom , which was not to be propagated by carnal weapons , but by sufferings ; yet though it may not be propagated , sure it may be defended by force . in some cases , as if we were invaded by a foreign power , who made war upon the account of religion , and also in those kingdoms or common-wealths , where christianity , or the true profession of the gospel is established by law , and makes a part , not only of the ecclesiastical , but civil constitution of a nation . in these cases , if tho●e who pretend to the sole legislative power , ( but have it not ) should go about to alter the national religion by force , and put men to death contrary to the former laws , and constitutions of that kingdom , i think such illegal powers may lawfully be resisted by the people , they having as much right to the free exercise , and enjoyment of their establish'd religion , as they have to their liberties , properties , or any other civil rights ; since by this legal establishment , religion becomes a part of the civil constitution of the kingdom , and so may be maintained by the same means as other rights . dly . i grant , that in all other cases our saviour hath so far proposed his sufferings to us for our imitation , as we are engaged by our baptismal vow , to suffer in the same cause for which he himself suffered , that is , for the bearing witness , that iesus is the christ , or true messias , and son of god. and this the apostle calls ( speaking of christ himself ) the witnessing before pontius pilate a good confession . the like i also hold of all such truths , as are the necessary consequences of this great doctrine . dly . i farther grant , that when our god calls any person to suffer , for the testimony of his truth , by the cruelty of those who are the supreme powers , ( as the apostles , and primitive christians were by a particular providence , ) that then those powers are not to be resisted , but patiently submitted to by christians at this day ; whenever it proves necessary for the same great ends for which christ at first enjoyned it , ( viz. ) for bearing witness to the truth of the gospel ; and for the further propagation thereof by our constant sufferings and example , according to that saying of the primitive fathers , sanguis martyrum , semen ecclesiae ; yet is not this absolute submission to the supreme powers in matters of religion due by the law of nature , or that delivered to moses , but ( if at all ) purely from the express example of christ ; so that all the difficulty lyes in discovering , when we are thus called by our saviour to suffer , and bear witness to the truth ; though with the loss of our lives , and all that is dear to us . and therefore , if i should grant that when ever we lye under the same circumstances of giving this testimony as the primitive christians then did , and that it may serve as much for the same ends design'd by god , thereby we are also under the same obligations ; otherwise i think we are lawfully discharged from it : as for example , suppose the king should , instead of a papist , have turned mahometan , and to propagate , or set up his own abominable superstition here , should have sent for from turkey , or morocco a great army of turks , or moors , and by them would force all the christians in england to turn mahometans , by the same methods of dragooning men , and seizing their estates , as the french king hath exercised upon his protestant subjects . can any reasonable man believe , that we lye under the same obligation , thus to suffer in a country where the people are all christians , as we were if we had happened to be converted in a country where almost all or the greater part of them were mahometans , or heathens , and where the mahometan , or pagan religion hath been for many ages the established religion of that nation and government ? for in our case , there is no farther occasion to bear witness to the truth by patient suffering for it ; nor yet of propagating it by our martyrdom ; since all the people amongst whom we live , are sufficiently convinced of the truth of it : nor can it be reasonable that our saviour should give up whole nations to be thus destroyed , at the will of one , or a few men , only to do that , of which there is no need . for then iesus christ had delivered us up to be meer slaves , and vassals to the will and humour of every wicked tyrant , ( which you seem to disapprove ) without performing any of those great ends , for which he at first enjoyned this submission . and though i grant , that the afflictions and sufferings of christians , on the account of religion are as particularly ordered and determined by god , as those of christ himself ; yet , it is only , as they may be subservient to higher ends , viz. the propagation of his religion , and the good , and peace of mankind , which i think cannot be well promoted by supposing , an irresistible power in the prince , or state , of rooting christianity quite out of a nation , or country , after it is setled by law , and become the national religion thereof ; and of inslaving all the people of it when ever he pleases and though i take this to be the true bounds and limits of our submission to the supreme powers in matters of religion . but supposing not granting at present that christ hath laid any more strict commands of submission upon us in those matters , yet since he came not into the world to put us into a more miserable condition in other things , than we were before his coming , nor to take away , or abridge us of any of those natural or civil rights that we enjoy as men or subjects , therefore if the people had a right before christ , to defend their lives , liberties , or properties against the violent assaults , and oppressions of princes or states , they have still the same liberty left entire in all cases , which remain not excepted by the express precepts or example of christ ; since it is a general rule in all positive laws , that whatever is not excepted , or altered , by a subsequent law , remains the same as it was before in all other cases , which are not so particularly excepted ; and therefore though i should grant that it were now unlawful in any case to resist the supream powers who persecute , or put men to death for bearing witness to christ's true religion ; yet doth it not therefore follow that it were unlawful to resist in any other case whatsoever , though it were in the defence of our lives , liberties , or properties , since such defence was lawful ( as i have already proved ) before christ's coming , and is not expresly forbidden by any place of scripture , or express command of christ or his apostles . and without the considerations of these great ends , that jesus christ had to enjoyn his followers , an absolute submission to the supream powers in some cases , ( tho' not in all ) were to suppose , that instead of a merciful saviour he had only come into the world to patronize tyranny , and to render the condition of mankind much more miserable than it was under the law of moses , or in the state of nature , and seems to suppose that instead of commiserating men's sufferings , he only took delight to make them miserable ; nor will it be any comfort , or security to christians when they are once made slaves under an arbitrary tyrannical power , that they are safe in god's hand , and that all the powers of m●n or devils can't touch them , till god by a positive decree appoint , and order their sufferings : for if this were a good argument against all resistance , it would be so likewise against resisting pirates or robbers , since whatever we suffer from them is by god's positive decree , who thus orders all our sufferings even from them ; and 〈◊〉 i think ( since men are not now to be saved by miracles ) he hath like wise also ordain'd resistance as the only human means to prevent their malice and violence ; or escape out of their hands when we fall under them ; nor are the same ends unlawful against any other humane powers , but what god himself hath ordained . and therefore it is a very crude assertion to say , that though there could not be more absolute tyrants than the roman emperours , yet than they had no power against the meanest christian , but by an express commission from heaven ; whereas i never knew as yet ( and i would be very glad you could shew it me ) where this express commission is to be found , whereby princes , or other supream powers are authoriz'd to persecute , enslave , or take away the lives of the meanest christians , barely for matters of opinion , or faults that do not immediately concern the publick quiet and safety ; and as you have talk't a great deal of the great security it is to the world , that no evil can happen to us , but what god permits , and that he permits nothing but what he can over-rule to wise and good ends , and that god may permit a great many evils to befall us in his anger and displeasure , and that whatever evils be appoints for us , they are certainly for our good , and that therefore there is no such danger in the doctrine of non-resistance as some men imagine , because sincere christians can suffer nothing by it , since they shall suffer nothing more , or less than what god appoints them to suffer . all these arguments might as well be used for not resisting pirates , or thieves , or not endeavouring to divert , or oppose a river , that had run beyond its banks , but to let it go where it lists to the destruction of a whole country , because forsooth sincere christians can suffer nothing by it , for they can suffer nothing more nor less than god a●points them to suffer ; indeed a wondrous use of consolation . and therefore unless you can prove that all tyranny is ordained by god for our good , and that therefore we are obliged under pain of everl●sting damnation , to submit to it ; all that you have spoken concerning the example and sufferings of christ signifie just nothing ; so that i think the absurdity still lyes at your door , since if christ has not expresly forbidden all resistance of the unjust violence of princes , ( as i do not find he has by any of the texts you have yet brought ) every man may defend his life against him , who you grant hath no authority to take it away : and as for its being forbidden by the laws of our country , i shall answer that when you urge those laws to me . m. i hope i shall be able to prove that by and by , but in the mean time give me leave to observe , that it seems very strange to me ; that you should own christ hath obliged his disciples to submit without any resistance in some cases to the supreme powers , when they persecute them and put them to death for religion ; and that they might not take up arms in their own defence , and that of their religion , which is the greatest concern that men ought to have in this world ; and yet that they might do it for much less considerable matters , viz. their lives , liberties , or estates , which sure ought to be of much less importance than the glory of god , which is chiefly maintained by his true worship ; but i see you have found a salvo for this , and will not allow princes the irresistible power of persecution , when the religion is once setled by law ; that is , when the christians were strong enough to resist , which certainly would be no thanks at all , for their submission , since men who are weak and unable to resist , must needs obey , and suffer ; which were matter of force and not of duty ; whereas we find by tertullian , and all the ecclesiastical historians , that though the christians were strong and numerous enough in the roman empire , yet they chose rather to dye than to resist , as i shall shew you more particularly anon , when i come to those quotations ; but i will if you please , now proceed to the two last texts i have to cite to you out of st. paul , and st. peter . f. that we may not confound things one with another , i pray give me leave now to answer what you have objected against what i said last , before you proceed to any fresh places of scripture ; for though in the first place i doubt whether the non-resistance which tertullian and other primitive fathers so strictly preached up , was sounded upon any express command of our saviour or his apostles ; yet granting at present that christ and his apostles enjoyn'd it both by their example and precept , yet this does not reach the case now before us , for there may be very good reasons why our saviour might enjoyn an absolute submission to the 〈◊〉 powers without any resistance , though they persecute us , nay , put us to 〈◊〉 for matters of religion ; and yet he may allow us greater liberty for the defence of our lives , liberties , and estates , when assaulted by the unjust violence of the supreme powers . for , first , our saviour ordaineth his religion to be suitable to his person , viz. a meek , humble , suffering messiah to be an example of a meek , and suffering religion . secondly , religion is a thing that no power in the world can take from us , persecution indeed may encrease it , and render it more fervent , but can never diminish it , if it be real . and god hath expresly promis'd so great a reward in another life for our sufferings for it in this , that it will infinitely outweigh all that ever we can suffer on that account ; and lastly , our saviour christ was pleased to ordain his doctrine to be propagated by miracles , and sufferings to distinguish it from all the false religions that had been in the world before his , or that should be set up in opposition to it afterwards ; since neither the pagan , nor mahometan superstitions , nor yet the iewish religion can shew the like ; to subsist , nay encrease for above three hundred years under such great and cruel persecutions ; nor yet is the glory of god at all diminish'd , but rather encreas'd under persecution , since none are then firm to it , but such as are really perswaded of its truth ; and that they ought to suffer the worst that can befall them , rather than forsake it . and certainly nothing can tend more to the glory of god , than to see it subsist and encrease under a cruel and bloody persecution ; nor is it the same reason that we should suffer persecution after religion is become the setled constitution of a nation , because then every man hath the same right to it as he hath to his property or freedom : and though a man may part with either the one or the other , yet is he not obliged to give them up by force , and whether he will or no ; so likewise neither that right which he hath to enjoy his religion according to the laws of his country . and therefore i do not resolve the obligation to non-resistance in matters of religion into the being the major party in a kingdom as you suppose , for if the government of england were popish , that is , the legislative part of it , and the major part of the common people were protestants , perhaps in that case they were under all the obligations of enduring persecution without resistance , as they were under the heathen emperours ; but indeed the primitive christians were obliged to non-resistance , because they lived under a government in which christianity was forbid , and paganism established by law. and though it is true , constantine made several laws , enjoyning the free exercise of the christian religion , and forbidding the heathen sacrifices , and that the pagan temples should be shut up ; yet was not the christian religion for all that , the sole religion of the state ; the senators of rome , and the major part of the common people continuing pagans still . so that it seems the christian religion was all this while rather established , together with heathenism , than that this was wholly forbid ; since all civil offices and preferments were equally conferred upon pagans , as well as christians , if they deserved them ; and therefore it was no hard matter for iulian the apostate , to revoke so many of those edicts his uncle had made in favour of christianity , and to abrogate those , which had been publish't against the publick sacrifices to the heathen gods , and shutting up their temples ; so that no wonder if they were now again under the same obligations to suffer , as they were before constantine's time ; since the christian religion was never the only one establish't by law , so as to exclude the open profession of any other , till the time of theodosius ; after which , as also before , according as the christian religion encreas'd , and as they got greater priviledges from the emperours , so were they more stout and bold in standing up for , and defending the just rights of their religion , when ever they thought them invaded by the arian , or other heretical emperours , as i shall shew you by several instances out of church-history when we come to it ; but you may now if you please proceed to the rest of those places of scripture , which you have to produce against this doctrine of resistance in those cases i have put . m. i have many things still to object against your last discourse ; but since it grows late ; i shall now continue my self to the doctrine of the apostles concerning non-resistance ; not as if the authority , and example of our saviour were not sufficient of it self to make a law , but stood in need of the confirmation , and additional authority of his own apostles , but we might justly suspect our selves mistaken in the meaning of our saviours words , or in the intention , and design of his sufferings , had none of his apostles who were immediately instructed by himself , and acquainted with the most sacred mysteries of his kingdom ever preacht any such doctrine , as this of subjection to princes . and therefore , to give you the more abundant assurance of this , i shall plainly shew you , that the apostles taught the same doctrine , and imitated the example of their great master . i shall begin with st. paul , who hath as fully declared himself in this matter , as it is possible any man can do , by words . let every soul be subject unto the higher powers , for there is no power but of god , the powers that be , are ordained of god. whosoever therefore resisteth the power , resisteth the ordinance of god , and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation . this is a very express testimony against resistance , and therefore , i shall consider it at large , for there have been various arts used to pervert every word of it and to make this text speak quite contrary to the design , and intention of the apostle in it : and therefore , i shall divide the words into three general parts . . the doctrine the apostle instructs them in , let every soul be subject to the higher powers . . the reason , whereby he proves , and inforces this doctrine : for there is no power , but of god ; the powers that he , are ordained of god. whoever therefore resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of god. the punishment of such resistance , and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation . i shall begin with the doctrine , that every soul must be subject to the higher powers , and here are three things to be explained . . who are contained under this general expression of every soul. . who are meant by the higher powers . . what is meant by being subject . . who are contained under this general expression of every soul , which by an ordinary hebraism , signifies every man : for man is a compounded creature of body , and soul , and either part of him is very often in scripture put for the whole , sometimes flesh , and sometimes soul signifies the man ; and when every soul is oppos'd to the higher powers , it must signifie all men , of what rank , or condition soever they be , who are not invested with this higher power . and again , says he , the design of the apostle , as you shall hear more particularly , by and by , was to forbid all resistance of soveraign princes ; and had he known of any man , or number of men , who might lawfully resist , he ought not to have express't it in such general terms , as to forbid all without exception . and therefore , i shall now a little more closely examine your main argument , or indeed foundation of all that you have urged , for resistance , viz. that , tho' it is unlawful , for private or particular men , to resist the supream powers ; yet that it doth not extend unto the whole , or major part of a ●eople or nation , whenever they are outragiously oppress 't , or assaulted by the higher powers beyond what they suppose they are able to bear ; whereas the apostle here commands every soul to be subject , and therefore if the whole body of the people be subject to god , they must also be subject to the prince too , because he acts by god's ●uthority and commission ; were a sovereign prince the peoples creature , that might be a good maxim ; rex maj●r singulis , sed minor universis , that the king is greater than any particular subject , but less than all together ; but if he be god's minister , he is upon that account as much greater than all , as god is . and that the whole body of the people altogether , as well as one by one , are equally concerned in this command of being subject to the higher powers , is evident from this consideration , that nothing less than this will secure the peace and tranquillity of humane societies . the resistance of single persons is more dangerous to themselves , than to the prince ; but a powerful combination of reb●ls is formidable to the most puissant monarchs . the greater number of subjects rebell against their prince , the more do they distress his government , and threaten his crown and dignity ; and if his person and authority be sacred , the greater the violence is which is offered to him , the greater is the crime . had the apostle exhorted the romans after this manner ; let no private and single man be so foolish , as to rebel against his prince , who will be too strong for him ; but ●f you can raise sufficient forces to oppose against him , if you can all consent to depose , and murder him , this is a very innocent , and justifiable , nay , an heroical atchievement , which becomes a free-born people : how would this have secured the peace , and quiet of the world ? how would this have agreed with what follows , that princes are advanced by god , and that to resist our prince , is to resist the ordinance of god , and that such men shall be severely punish't for it in this world or the next ? for can the apostle be thought absolutely to condemn resistance , if he makes it only unlawful to resist when we want power to conquer ? which yet is all that can be made of it , if by every soul the apostle means only particular men , not the united force and power of subjects . nor can there be any reason assigned why the apostle should lay so strict a command on particular christians to be subject to the higher powers , which doth not equally concern whole nations . for if it can ever be lawful for a whole nation to resist a prince , it may in the same circumstances be equally lawful for a particular man to do it ; if a nation may conspire against a prince who invades their rights , their liberties , or their religion , why may not any man by the same reason resist a prince when his single rights and liberties are invaded ? it is not so safe , and prudent indeed for a private man to resist , as for great and powerful numbers ; but this makes resistance only a matter of discretion , not of conscience ; if it be lawful for the whole body of a nation to resist in such cases , it must be equally lawful for a particular man to do it ; but he doth it at his own peril , when he hath only his own single force to oppose against his prince . so that our apostle must forbid resistance in all men , or none . for single persons do not use to resist , or rebel , or there is no great danger to the publick if they do ; but the authority of princes , and the security of publick government , is only endangered by a combination of rebels , when the whole nation , or any considerable part for numbers , power , and interest , take arms against their prince . if resistance of our prince be a sin , it is not the less , but the greater sin , the greater and the more formidable the resistance is ; and it would very much unbecome the gravity and sacredness of an apostolical precept , to injoyn subjection to private christians , who dare not , who cannot resist alone ; but to leave a powerful combination of rebels at liberty to resist ; so that every soul must signifie all subjects , whether single or united ; for whatever is unlawful for every single person considered as a subject , is unlawful for them all together ; for the whole nation is as much a subject to the higher powers as any single man. thus i am sure it is in our government , where lords and commons assembled in parliament own themselves the subjects of the king , and have by publick laws disclaimed all power of raising any war either offensive , or defensive against the king. let us now consider what is meant by the higher powers , ( 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which signifies the supream power in any nation , in whomsoever it is placed , whether in the king , as in monarchical governments ; or in the nobles as in aristocratical ; or in the people as in democracies ; at the time of writing this epistle , the supream power was in the roman emperours ; and therefore when st. paul commands the roman christians to be subject to the higher powers , the plain meaning is , that they should be subject to the roman emperour . and thus st. peter explains it : be subject to every ordinance of man for the lords sake , whether to the king as supream , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the word us'd in this text , as to him who hath a supereminent power , and is above all others , as also unto governours that are sent by him , &c. from which text epiphanius proves , that subordinate magistrates under the king are ordained of god. and therefore that the power of under-officers , since it is the ordinance of god , ought no more to be resisted than the king 's , from whom it is derived . f. i hope i shall not be very tedious in answering your long speech , since a small share of natural reason , and grammar will do it ; therefore to be as short as i can , i do freely acknowledg , that not only private men , but whole nations are by this precept of st. paul , to be subject to the higher powers , without any rebellion against them , as well as particular persons , as far as they are powers ordain'd by god. and therefore it is necessary , that you should consider what is the true signification of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which if it be once discovered , you will find it carries its own limitation along with it ▪ for it excludes both the usurpation of the supream power , and also the illegal and wicked exercis● of it ; and of this opinion is the learned dr. sanderson in his lectures of the obligation of humane laws , where in his th ●ecture , § . ( as i remember ) he speaks to this purpose , in answer to an objection ▪ that then all those who have the power of the sword , that is , of compelling those who are under their power to perform t●eir commands , ought then to be obeyed in conscience . his answer is to this purpose , that the power he means , and on which alone lyes the obligation of conscience , is not that power which the greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , natural , or physical power or force ; or else that which is only de facto , by which any one is able to do whatever he pleases , without any hinderance ; but that power which they call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that is , lawful power , or of right , to wit , that which belongs to him that hath it by the law of nature , nations , or civil constitutions ▪ by reason of the person who bears it , and in respect of those , who are to be subject to it ; to this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or lawful authority the apostle doth now so much press an exact obedience , that he names it five times in the space of three verses , but says not one word of this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or force . so far he . and if our transl●●ors of this place had rendred the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , authorities , instead of powers , as they have rendered it in other places , and as they were forc'd to do in the first of peter ch. . ver. . where 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 coming together in the same verse , they are forced to render the former word by authorities ▪ and the latter by powers , which if they had constantly done , they had effectually prevented the false application of this text , since no man in his wits can imagi●e that when a prince ( for example ) destroys , oppresses , and enslaves his subjects , he acts thus as a lawful power or authority , or that belongs to him ( as dr. sanderson very well expresses it ) by any natural , or municipal laws , much less can be the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , true , or just authorities , or powers which are here meant by st. paul to be ordain'd by god ; and that these words may be so rendred , instead of the powers that are , appears from plato , who more than once hath 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for vera potestas , true power or authority . so that if this text were to be understood in your sense , this place of scripture would serve to countenance and defend all the tyranny , cruelty , and oppression which the most wicked tyrants can commit , all which must be ordained by god , by vertue of this equivocal word power . but that you may the better see the absurdity of this interpretation , pray let us put these things into the text instead of powers , and see how it will run then . the●● is no tyranny , violence , or oppression committed by princes , or their subordinate officers , but what is ordained of god. whosoever therefore resists this power , resists the ordinance of god. you 'll say perhaps , that this is not your meaning , yet is it the true sense that must arise from your interpretation of this place . which is no more than the voice of god approving all just and lawful governments , and confirming from heaven those moral duties of submission , obedience , and non-resistance , which were always due , and must ever be to lawful authority , that is , such as is agreeable to the laws of god , and nature , which you plainly see are not due to meer force , violence or cruelty , for that is absolutely excluded out of the text , which will by no means admit of it . the higher powers ordained by god having no commission from him for any of these wicked purposes . m. i doubt for all your confidence , that you very much mistake the sense of these words , for in the first place your ( or rather the dr's ) criticism between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 will not do ; for they both signifie the same thing in scripture , either force and power , or authority , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , i will not be brought under the power of any thing , cor. . . must signifie force , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 must signifie authority and dignity ; thus ephes. . . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which are several names , and degrees of dignity , and authority , as well as power . and in the second place , you do much more mistake , when you suppose by this word powers to be meant only the true , or just exercise of civil authority , whereas the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , are the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the persons themselves , who exercise authority , and dominion , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the rulers , v. . the ministers of god which bear the sword , v. . in st. peter , the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ▪ the king , and his governours , and magistrates , . pet. ch. . v. , . and therefore imust tell you , you do very ill to separate the power , or authority from the persons instructed with it . but suppose i should grant you , that this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth here signifie the exercise of authority , yet doth it not signifie the right and lawful use of this power , but the right to exercise this authority ; whether well , or ill , 't is all one , as to the submission due to it , because no resistance can be lawful for want of a superiour iurisdiction over it . the truth of this is evident from iohn . , . pilate says to jesus , knowest thou not that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i have power to crucifie thee , and have power to release thee , jesus grants it , and answers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. thou couldest have no power against me , except it were given thee from above . and therefore i shall reduce your argument into the form of a syllogism , that you may more plainly see the absurdity of it . powers not ordained by god , may be resisted without danger of damnation . but powers used tyrannically , are not ordained of god , therefore we are not forbidden to resist them . in this syllogism the minor is not true ; for though tyranny be not the ordinance of god , yet the power , or authority ( of which this tyranny is but an abuse ) is of divine institution : for though the supream power is commanded to rule justly , yet is it withal enabled to act otherwise ; for the good , or ill use of it is left indifferent in respect of the subjects subjection , though not of the magistrates commanding , or acting power ; so that the abuse of this power doth not make void the authority , though acting contrary to the laws of god , or nature . the obligation not to resist the supream powers receiving not any validity from their justice , nor is it weakened , or annulled by their violence , or injustice . saul was god's anointed , and pilate had his authority from above , notwithstanding their high abuse of it . so that upon the whole matter , i incline to believe , that the reason which made st. paul call the magistrates by the abstract , powers , was this ▪ he wrote to christians living in the roman empire , and it was the custom of the latin tongue to call persons endued wit● power , potestates . you may observe it in ulpi●n , l quid sit . d. de aedil . edict . § . . and in augustine , epist. . who says , sive potest●s veritati savens aliquem corrigat , laudem habet ex illo , qui fuerit emendatus ; sive inimica veritati in aliquem saeviat , laudem habet ex illo qui fuerit co●natus , and mark that , potest●s inimica veritati must needs signifie a man abusing his authority . and in i●venal we read an fidenarum gabirunque esse potestas . a●d in suetonius ▪ iurisdictionem de si●ei commissis 〈…〉 , & tan●um in urbe deligari m●gistratibus solitam , in perpetuum atque etiam per provincias potestatibus delegavit : the modern languages , italian , and french , which were bred out of the latin , retain this antient way of speaking , for potestat in old french , and podesta in italian , express not the function only , but the person who manages it . thus anciently the latin word for the chief iustice , was iustitia , as you may find in glanvil , lib. . cap. . and roger hoveden's annals ; so our king is called in the abstract , majesty , as the graecian emperours 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . many dangerous consequences flow from thence , but i desire not to make sport with that unhappy distinction , which had almost ruined as flourishing , and strongly temper'd a kingdom as any in the christian world. it exposes magistrates , and all in authority , to the 〈…〉 and injuries of the basest sort of people ; for when discontented , it is very obvious for them to tell them , tho' reverence is indeed due to the● function , yet that setting their office aside , they will take the liberty only to kick their persons , and that the magistrate is not at all affronted , though the man be soundly beaten . indeed it is against common sense to put such a difference between the person and the authority of kings , for if it were real , neither god , nor the laws of the land have made any provision for the king's safety ; for his authority is not capable of receiving any benefit , and therefore it must be acknowledged by all sober and reasonable men , that this authority doth but convey such and such priviledges upon the person , who only can be sensible of them , and consequently whatever is attempted again●t his person , is attempted against his authority likewise . f. i doubt you will have no better luck in criticisms , than my se●f , and that they will do your cause as little good ; for if there be no difference in the scripture between 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as you affirm , and that both of them signifie , not the authority alone , but the persons endued with it , and that they are all from god , then tyrants , and usurters are ordained likewise by god , and consequently oliver cromw●ll was as much the ordinance of god , as king charles , and if this be your doctrine much go●d may it do you . but pray keep it to your self , lest i● your friends the old cavaliers , come to know it , they will quite banish you their company ; besides , i can shew you other consequences that will follow from it , which i have not now a mind to urge , but may hereafter , for i have no mind to enter into that troublesome debate any more , for i told you enough of my mind concerning it the last time we met save one . but since you will needs have these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , not to signifie powers , or authorities , but the persons themselves , you shall have your will for once , only i pray now answer me one short question , when for example , charles the sixth king of france , fell mad , and would have killed his servants , by what authority did they distinguish and separate between his person , and his power ? and thought that they might very well resist and bind the one , without any diminution to the other . or by what right did the portugueses seize , and imprison their late king , and make his brother regent in his room because the former used sometimes in a frolick to murder his subjects , out of the window , or as he met them upon the way , and was besides found by reason of incurable folly to be utterly uncapable to govern ? pray tell me did not the servants , and subjects of these princes then separate the authority , from the person ? if not , they must have let them alone to have done what they would , the consequence of which you may easily imagine . m. these instances of the folly and madness of princes are the main things that you gentlemen of common-wealth principles have to defend them withal ; but to shew you there is a great difference between mad , or foolish , princes , and tyrants , who are in their right wits , i will shew you my reasons , why the one may be bound , or resiste● ▪ and not the other . in the first place , i suppose , you will not deny , but that folly , and madness do so far incapacitate the persons , that are under those misfortunes , that they hinder them from acting like ration●l men , much more from performing any of the functions of civil government . in the next place , they ought to be restrained for the common good of their people , as well as themselves , lest they should not only murder and hurt their subjects , but themselves too . and lastly , because it is the highest courtesie , and ●enefit , that can be done such mad , or foolish princes , to shut them up close , and ●inder them from exposing their folly , and madness , and re●dring themselves ridiculous to the world ; whereas a tyrant , whom i suppose in his right wits , tho' he never so much ●nslaves or oppresses his people ▪ yet civil gov●rnment may be well enough carried on , and maintained under his personal conduct , and as long as he hath wit and sense enough to govern , he is so long to be obeyed as the ordinance of god , without any resistance whatsoever . f. but this much i suppose you will not deny , but that this power of resisting , and shutting up mad , or foolish princes is wholy exercised by the law of nature , since i never heard of any civil , or munic●pal law that made provision for it . m. i shall not much dispute that with you , it may be so , but what do you inferr from thence ? f. why , no more than this , that if i can prove to you , that there is no such great difference , between mad-men , and fools , and 〈…〉 incurable tyrants ( as you imagine ) there is a like r●ght in the ●eople by the law of nature to resist , and defend themselves again●● the one as the other ; and therefore i will examine each of your three reasons , one after another , and see whether they may not as well be applied to such tyrants , whom alone i suppose may be resisted , as to mad-men , or fools , and if they do , i suppose you wi●l not deny the consequence . your first reason is , that folly , and madness do so far incapacitate their reasons that are under those misfortunes , that they hinder them from acting like rational men , much more from performing any of the functions of civil government : now pray tell me , doth no● anger , lust , pride , cruelty , and ambition , and unreasonable self-love which are the passions , and vices which disturb the souls of tyrants , and make them to take a delight to enslave , destroy , and oppress their subjects , as much incapacitate their reasons for performing these ●unctions of civil governments , as folly and madness themselves ? and i think i have already proved , that when princes bring things to this pass , they do as much deserve tutors or guardians to keep them from doing mischief , and to manage their kingdoms for them , as the most mad , or foolish prince we have read of in history : but the mischief of it is , that such tyrants , not being mad enough to be shut up like mad-men , or fools , nor yet having iudgment , nor good nature sufficient to perform the main ends of civil government , by the greatness of the rewards that they are able to bestow upon their followers , they may soon bring the best government into a state of war , and confusion : and till then , i do not allow their subjects to resist them . your next reason is , that they ought to be restrained for the common good of their people , as well as themselves ; lest they should not only hurt , or murder their subjects , but themselves too . now , pray consider , if these mad , and foolish princes may be restrained , and resisted , because they only murder , or hurt a few of their subjects , that may come in their way ; then have not such tyrants much greater reason to be resisted , and secured , that through unreasonable revenge or superstition , make war upon and destroy the people , for no other cause , but because they will not submit themselves to their unreasonable lusts ? or that burn cities , massacre whole towns of innocent subjects , and enslave , and oppress a late flourishing kingdom ; ought not these as well to be restrained or resisted for the common good of mankind , tho' perhaps they will not hurt or make themselves away , as mad men or fools may ? or can any reasonable man show me , why the extravaganoles of such mad or foolish princes may be resisted , but the furious , wicked and tyrannical actions of the other , must be submitted to as the ordinance of god ? or lastly , why a natural infirmity , or weakness , such as folly , or frenzy , shall make a prince uncapable of government , and why insufferable tyranny , which is but a moral disability , shall give princes a greater priviledge , i cannot understand ; since the latter is much more destructive to the main ends of government , i. e. the preservation , and good of the people , than the former can possibly be . as for your last reason , that it is the highest courtesie , that can be done to such mad , and foolish princes to shut them up and hinder them from exposing their folly and madness , and rendring themselves ridiculous to the world , i think the reason will hold more strongly for the one , than the other . for as such foolish and mad princes would , if they could come to themselves , thank those , who had done them so charitable an office as to resist them , and shut them up ; so likewise , i verily believe , that if the grace of god , or some natural means or accident could so far open the eyes of such a tyrant , as to let him see the folly , and wickedness of those courses he takes against the people , he would , instead of being angry , thank his subjects for resisting him , because , thereby they had not only hindred him from making himself any farther the common-hatred of his own subjects , as well as his neighbours ; but also from committing such hainous sins and offences against god , as murder , violence and oppression . to conclude , i grant , that as long as a cruel , or wicked prince can so far restrain his vices and passions , as to maintain the ends of civil government above mentioned , he is to be obeyed as the ordinance of god : but when he will set no bounds to his tyranny , but resolves that his lust shall be unconfined , whereby he becomes insupportable to his people , they may as well distinguish his person , from his power , as they do in the case of princes , when they are either fools or mad men. m. but pray consider the rest of the consequences , of my last discourse , and will not then the supposing a power in the people of making this distinction when they please , and of judging when the prince's government becomes intolerably tyrannical , make them to take upon them to judge it so , when it is quite otherwise ; and so not scruple to rebel , or to resist , ( as you call it ) when ever they are in the mind to do it ? and we have the more reason to be afraid of this because from the long parliaments and their adherents making use of this distinction among other specious pretences , were derived all the miseries of our last civil war. and therefore , tho' i own it is an easie thing to judge of the madness and folly of princes as well as other men , yet ( the wickedness and partiality of human nature consider'd , ) it is a much harder task to judge rightly , what actions of princes are destructive to civil government , and tender them as uncapable of it , as the most extravagant actions of foolish and mad princes can be pretended to make them so . f. if the instance of mad men and fools seem to displease you , because it is very pat to the subject in hand , i think i may likewise remark , that those inconveniences , you suppose of making the people iudges in this case , is the sole objection , i can find you have against what i have said ; for otherwise i do not see you have any thing to alledge against the fitness of the parallel . but i have already , i believe , made it pretty plain , that murdering , enslaving and robbing of the people of their properties are thing as easie to be judged of , as folly or madness , and if a few domesticks about the prince shall be allowed to iudge , when their monarch is mad or foolish enough to be resisted , and shut up ; i cannot see any reason , why the whole body of the people , may not as well be able to iudge , when , by his tyranny and oppression , he hath dissolved the government , and entered into a state of war with them . but to return now to the last part of your former answer , wherein you grant that this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , doth sometimes signifie not onely the person , but the exercise of authority ; but that it doth not signifie the right or lawful use of it , but abuse too ; and for the proof of this , you alledge the speech of pilate to our saviour ; i am very well satisfied , that that text will make nothing for your purpose ; for tho' i grant that the word in that place denotes power , or authority , yet doth it not there signifie the abuse of it too ? for certainly , pilate would never have told our saviour , that he had a power to abuse his authority , and to condemn him , tho' innocent : neither would our saviour have answered him , that he had that power from above . and therefore , i think i may very well maintain my syllogism to be true , notwithstanding your denying of the minor proposition ; for since you cannot affirm tyranny to be the ordinance of god , yet that the power or authority , of which this tyranny is but an abuse , is of divine institution ; which is but a fallacy if it be lookt into . for tho' you may , vulgarly speaking , call all tyranny an abuse of civil power , yet some tyranny is more than that . for it is not so properly an abuse , as a corruption of it , into quite another thing ▪ which god never instituted , and consequently therefore is not to be submitted to out of conscience . it is an old saying , corruptio optimi , est pessima , and you may as well tell me , that vinegar , notwithstanding its acidity , continues wine still , as that civil government , when it degenerates into the rankest tyranny , continues still gods ordinance ? and if this be the true consequence you draw from your argument , it signifies little , viz. that the abuse of this power , doth not make void the authority of the law of god , or nature . for i think i may maintain the clear contrary to what you assert , viz. that the obligation not to resist supream powers , doth receive some validity from the iustice they execute , and is weakened , and at last annulled by their intolerable violence , or injustice . nor are your instances of saul , or pilate to the question in hand ; i grant saul was god's anointed , and could not have been lawfully resisted by david , notwithstanding his murdering of abimelech , and the rest of the priests ; and pilate might have his authority from above , notwithstanding his abuse of it ; yet doth it not therefore follow , that if either the one , or the other , had declared themselves sworn enemies to the whole nation of the iews , and that instead of governing and protecting them , they had gone about utterly to destroy them , i think they had then ceased to be the ordinance of god , and their divine commission had been at an end . to conclude , as for the reason you give , why st. paul might call the roman emperours by the name of powers , i shall not deny it : but whether by the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the apostle means persons or powers , is much at one , for if he means the former , he only urges obedience to them as they are the means of the happiness , and preservation of the people , as appears by the third and fourth verses of the chapter you now quote , where the main reason st. paul gives for our obedience , is , that rulers are not a terror to god works , but to the evil , and that he , ( viz. the supream power ) is a minister to us for our good ; and indeed it had been a very odd way of enforcing our obedience , for him to have said the quite contrary , that this power was to be obeyed , because he was a terror to good works , and a plague to all good men , and a minister to us of all manner of mischief and misery . this had been an excellent way of proving the supream powers to be the ordinance of god. m. before i can give you a full answer to what you have now said ; i must beg leave to look back to the beginning of your first answer , where you object , that if by the higher powers here mentioned , the persons , and not the authority of those in power are to be understood , then it would follow , that tyrants and usurpers are likewise the powers ordained of god , which objection , i think , may admit of an easie answer : first , can there be no wise reason given why god may advance a bad man ( or tyrant ) to be a prince ▪ if there may , then it is no reproach to the divine providence . the natural end of human societies is the preservation of publick peace and order ; and this is in some measure attained even under the government of tyrants : but god hath a farther end than this , to bless and reward a virtuous nation , or to punish a loose and degenerate age ; and there cannot be a greater blessing , than a wise and virtuous prince , nor a greater plague , than a merciless tyrant . and therefore the providence of god , is as much concerned in setting a good , or a bad prince over any people , as in rewarding , or punishing them . upon this account god calls the king of assyria the rod of his anger , whom he raised up for the punishment of an hypocritical nation . secondly , i have already proved , that by the powers in this text , the apostle means the persons of soveraign princes , and therefore , according to his doctrine , those princes who were then in being , that is , the roman emperours , were advanced by god ; the powers that be , that is , the princes and emperours who now govern the world , are ordained and appointed by god , and that thus it is god himself tells us . i have made the earth , and given it to whom it seemed meet unto me , and now i have given all these lands into the hands of nebuchadnezzar , king of babylon , my servant . this was also the belief of the primitive christians under heathen and persecuting emperours . tertullian , who wrote his apology under severu● , asserts , that caesar was chosen by god , and therefore that the christians had a peculiar propriety in caesar , as being made emperour by their god. so likewise st. augustine , de civitate dei , speaks to this purpose ( as i remember ) ? god giveth happiness in the kingdom of heaven to the godly alone : but this earthly kingdom , both to the godly , and ungodly , as it pleases him . he that gave the government to marius , gave it also to caesar : he who gave it to augustus , gave it also to nero●● he who gave it to the vespasians father and son , most beloved emperours , gave it also to the most cruel domitian ( and not to recount the rest of them ) he who gave it to constantine the christian , gave it also to the apostate iulian. these things without doubt , the only true god governed as he pleased , by causes tho' hidden , yet not unjust . so likewise almost all the rest of the fathers do own , that wicked and tyrannical princes are given as punishments to the people for their sins , and so upon this account are to be endured , and not resisted , since it is god's will to have it so . but as for usurpers , i think i can give you a very satisfactory answer , for the most prosperous rebel is not the higher power , while our natural prince , to whom we owe obedience and subjection , is in being : and therefore , tho' such men may get the power into their hands by god's permission , yet not by god's ordinance , and he who resisteth them doth not resist the ordinance of god , but the usurpations of men. whereas in hereditary kingdoms the king never dies , but the same minute , that the natural person of a king dies , the crown descends upon the next of blood ; and therefore , he who rebelleth against the father , and murders him , continues a rebel in the reign of the son , which commences with his fathers death . it is otherwise indeed , where none can pretend a greater right to the crown than the usurper ▪ for there the possession of power seems to give a right . thus many of the roman emperours , came to the crown by very ill means , but when they were possest of it , they were then the higher powers : for the empire did not descend by inheritance , but sometimes by the election of the senate , sometimes of the army , and sometimes by force and power , which always draws a consent ( and submission ) after it . and therefore , the apostle doth not direct the christians to inquire by what title the emperours held their crowns , but commands them to submit to those who had the power in their hands . for the possession of the supream and soveraign power is title enough , when there is no better title to oppose against it , for then we must presume , that god gives him the irresistible authority of a king , to whom , he gives an irresistible power ; which is the only means , whereby monarchies and empires are transferred from one nation to another : there are two examples in scripture , which manifestly confirm , what i have now said . the first is in the kingdom of israel , after the ten tribes had divided from the tribe of iudah , and the family of david , where god had not entailed the kingdom upon any certain family . for after ieroboam the first king , it is plain by the story in the books of kings and chronicles , that for some successions , there was nothing but rebellion , and the murder of one king by another , so that the kingdom rarely descended from the father to the son ▪ and in the whole succession of these kings , it only remained in the house of ie●u for four generations , and then it returned to its former uncertainty , as you may see in the th . chap. of the d. of kings : all which plainly shews that where there is no regular succession to a kingdom , there possession of power makes a king , who yet cannot afterwards be resisted and opposed without the guilt of treason ; and this was the case of the roman empire at the writing of this epistle : and therefore the apostle might then very well say , that the powers that be , are ordained of god , and that whoever had the supream power in his hands , was the supream power , that might not be resisted . but it was otherwise in the kingdom of iudah , which god himself had entailed on david's family , as appears from the examples of ioash and athaliah , which we discoursed of at our last meeting but one ; which examples plainly shew , that no usurpations can extinguish the right and title of a natural or hereditary prince ; such usurpers , tho' they have the possession of the supream power , yet they have no right to it , and tho' god for wise reasons , may sometimes permit such usurpations , yet whilst his providence secures the persons of such deposed and banished princes from violence , he secures their title too . but to prove more plainly that no resistance is to be made against the persons or authorities of the supream powers , let them be never so cruel and tyrannical , as it is evident not only from what st. paul hath here written ; but i shall crave leave to insist farther on that text of st. peter , before cited in his st . epistle d. chap. submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the lords sake , whether it be to the king as supream , or unto governours as unto them that are sent by him , for the punishment of evil doers , and for the praise of them that do well : where by ordinance of man whether we understand , as some do , every human law , or with others more justly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , every human creature , ( as it is in the original ) that is , every man endued with supream power , it comes all to the same sense , and the king as the supream power , and his ministers , or officers , as powers subordinate to him , and acting by his commission are to be submitted to and obeyed as much as himself : and it had been in vain for st. peter to have concluded this exhortation with fear god , and honour the king , if he had allowed it lawful in any case to resist him ; since certainly no man can honour him , whom he resists ; and that this is a doctrine everlastingly true , appears by the time in which st. peter and st. paul wrote these epistles , which was either under the reigns of claudius , or nero , and i suppose you will hardly meet with two worse men , or more cruel tyrants in all the catalogue of emperours : since the former committed many wicked and cruel things by his freed-men , and officers , and also banished the iews , and christians together with them , from rome . and the latter is so notorious , for his cruelty and persecution of the christians , that his name passes into a proverb . and yet these were the higher powers , to whom the apostles commanded them to be subject . from whence you may see your errour in interpreting the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to signifie just and lawful authority , whereas it plainly signifieth in this place , the men vested with this authority howsoever tyrannically they abuse it . f. you have made a pretty long reply , and i have heard it patiently , because i confess , that on this depends the whole controversie between us ; and therefore , i shall beg that you would hear me with the like patience , because what you have now said , i grant to be of that weight as to require a large , as well as a considerable reply . and therefore , i shall make bold to consider the last part of your speech in the first place , because i can soonest dispatch it : as for your argument , that we ought to be subject to the most tyrannical governours without any resistance , because claudius or nero , whom you suppose to be cruel tyrants , then governed the empire , and persecuted the christians . in answer to this , i must tell you , that if you please better to consider of it , you will find it very doubtful , whether st. paul wrote this epistle to the romans during the reigns of claudius , or nero. the learned monsieur capel in his discourse which he hath written , on purpose , concerning the time of the writing of this epistle , proves this epistle to the romans , to have been written during the latter end of the reign of claudius . but those learned men , who will have it written during the reign of nero , do all agree , that it was in the beginning of it within the first five years , when the administration of affairs was under the ministry of seneca , and burrhus , and when the government of the empire , was most just and moderate , and divers years before ever nero burnt the city , or persecuted the christians , and did so many extravagant cruel , and tyrannical actions , as forced the senate to declare him the enemy of mankind . but as for claudius , he never persecuted the christians at all , as i know of . m. i pray sir , give me leave to interrupt you a little ; did not claudius persecute the christians , when under the notion of iews he banished them from rome , as appears by acts the eighteenth , when aquila , and priscilla were forced to quit italy and come into greece , because of that edict ? and yet it was this very claudius , to whom st. peter ( if not st. paul ) doth require all men to be subject without any resistance . f. i think this difficulty will easily be answered , for in the first place , tho' i grant that claudius towards the latter end of his reign banished the iews from rome , yet did he not banish the christians from thence , as we know of , any otherwise than as they were iews by nation , and upon this account it was , that aquila being a iew by birth , was forced to quit rome with the rest ; but neither suetonius , nor any other author tell us , that he likewise banished the christians , tho' i know indeed there are some learned men , that would interpret this passage in the former author , in his life of claudius : iudaeos tumultuantes , impulsante cresto româ expulit : to be meant of the christians being expelled rome , as instigated by christ their prophet to sedition . but tho' i own that our saviour , was sometimes called chrestus by the pagans , by way of contempt , yet , that by this chrestus here mentioned , cannot be understood our saviour christ , is very evident , for it had been very improbable , for suetonius to have made christ who was dead above thirty years before , to have excited the iews to sedition : and therefore , the lord primate usher , in the second volume of his annals , ( with much better reason ) supposes , that not our saviour , but some seditious iew called crestus , who headed this sedition , was the cause of the banishment of the iews from rome : so that this was no more a persecution for religion , than it would have been for the parliament in king charles the seconds reign during the heat of the popish plot to have banished all the papists out of england , upon the account of their former rebellions , and constant machinations to overturn the government , and religion establisht by law ; but supposing this edict to have banished the christians as well as iews , it had signified nothing , for it was no persecution for religion : and besides , being made in the last year of claudius , it was but a temporary edict ; and we find the iews to have lived quietly at rome in the reign of nero , as appears by the last chapter of the acts. but as for claudius's government , it was so far from being an insupportable tyranny , that there was no prince , that did take more care to do impartial iustice , according to that small capacity he was master of , than himself . and tho' i yield that by his proconsuls , presidents , and freemen there were many oppressions , and cruelties committed in the provinces , yet it was only against some private men , and did not extend to the destroying , and enslaving the whole body of the people , who during his reign generally enjoyed their liberties , and properties with as great freedom , as under any of his predecessors . and as for nero , all ecclesiastical historians agree , that if this epistle of st. paul was written in his reign , it was within the first five years of it , which was in his non-age , under the administration of seneca , and burrhus , during which time all the historians agree , that the empire was never better governed ▪ and as for the wickedness , and violence that nero committed afterwards , when he persecuted the christians , murdered his mother , his wife , and most of his best , and most intimate friends , and set the city on fire : st. paul was so far from knowing any thing of them , that sure he would not have urged it to the romans , as a reason of their subjection to him , that rulers are not a terrour to good works , but to the evil , or that he was a minister to them , that is , to the subjects , for good ; nay even in the worst of his reign , as far as iustice was duely administred by himself , or his under-officers . i grant , he was not to be resisted , notwithstanding his personal crimes , which could only reach a few persons , since a wicked man may often make a tolerable prince . and tho' domitian was in his own person , a cruel tyrant , yet he was so far commendable ; and to be born with by his subjects , that during his reign the proconsuls , presidents , and other inferiour magistrates , were never freer from corruption , and oppression : whereas when nerva ( who was a mild good natured prince ) succeeded him ; by his too great lenity , towards those inferiour magistrates , all things presently degenerated into a most sad condition , iustice being sold , and perverted , and the poor robbed and oppress 't , by the violence of the rich , and powerful . and even nero himself had this commendation from his greatest enemy , suetonius , that he would not be governed by his officers , and freed-men ( as claudius was ) to do foolish , and unjust things . so that if nero himself had not by burning the city , and by murdering the innocent citizens in the night , made himself a publick enemy : i do not see , but his government might very well have been born with , notwithstanding his personal crimes , and vices . for if you please to remember , i have already excepted personal faults in princes , from being any just cause of resisting their authority , if they are such as can any way consist with the common safety , and welfare of the people . m. i must confess , i never yet considered this matter , concerning the time when st. peter , and st. paul wrote these epistles , and you 'll pardon me , if i do not readily allow what you say , but i promise you to consider farther of this story , and examine the authors you have quoted ; but however , whether the christians were then actually persecuted , or not , or whether these emperours were then actually tyrants , or not , signifies very little to me ; for these holy apostles might very well foresee not only by divine revelation , but by natural prudence , or foresight , that the emperours would prove great tyrants , and persecutors of the church , and the late example of the emperour caligula had shewed them not only the possibility , but also the great likelyhood , that it might happen again ; and therefore it is no wonder , that these apostles do , in consideration of this , command all christians , to submit to , and obey all supream powers , and their subordinate officers , upon pain of damnation ; and if st. peter in this chapter last quoted commands servants to be subject to their masters , not only to the good and gentle , but also to the froward , ( that is , to the cruel , and ill-condition'd ) and gives this reason for it . for this is thank-worthy , if a man for conscience towards god endures grief , suffering wrongfully : and inforces it with this great motive , for even hereunto were ye called , because christ also suffered for us , leaving us an example , that ye should follow his steps : and if servants , or slaves were to be subject to their masters , let them use them never so cruelly ; it will , i think , hold more strong for soveraign powers who are the immediate ordinance of god. f. you need not have made your answer half so long , if you had been pleased to take notice , that i have still excepted any resistance , which might be then made against the roman emperours , upon the account of persecution upon the meer score of religion , since i grant , that our saviour hath for those particular reasons , i have already alledged , commanded us to a patient suffering , and bearing testimony to the truth of his religion by martyrdom , or any other sufferings which he shall think fit to inflict upon us by lawful authority , and for the like ends for which they were to suffer . yet hath he not therefore taken away , all those natural rights , which whole nations had of self-defence against tyranny , and slavery , whensoever they are exercised upon them . nor doth your argument from particular slaves , to their masters at all concern subjects , much less whole nations ; for , i hope , there is a great deal of difference between them , and perfect slaves , who have no interest in their own persons , and so had neither liberties , nor properties to lose . but besides , if you please better to consider this text , you will find , that this did wholy concern such christian slaves , who were for their religion's sake oftentimes the more cruelly treated by their heathen masters . and therefore those words you have but now repeated , if a man for conscience sake suffers wrongfully , as likewise those in the th verse , if you do well , and suffer for it , can only be meant of suffering for the profession of christ , since no heathen emperours , nor masters ever persecuted their subjects , or cruelly treated their slaves , for well doing , that is , doing those duties and services that they owed them , and therefore , this place makes nothing at all to the question in hand . m. but , pray , tell me ▪ doth not the apostle paul expresly command every soul , that is , every man whatsoever , ( not whole nations excepted ) to be subject to the higher powers . and since you grant it to be true as to particular men , why it should not likewise hold as to whole nations , i can see no reason , unless you will be wiser than the apostle , and make exceptions out of this general rule where the scripture it self makes none ; for can any thing be more express than this , that they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation ; and the word is in the plural number , they , and must therefore take in all men , none excepted : i have urged this already , and i finding you have not given me an answer to it ; i make bold to re-mind you of that omission . f. i beg your pardon , if the multiplicity of your objections hath made me omit any thing , that was material , to be answered ; but the truth is , i supposed , that i had in effect done it already : but since you will needs have it made plaine● to you , i hope you will pardon me , if in the doing of it , i am forced to use some repetition . therefore in the first place , i shall not deny the interpretation , which our translators put upon this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which tho' it sometimes signifies not eternal damnation , but temporal iudgments : yet i will own , it will not well agree with what follows in this place , which are only temporal reasons , and motives for this duty , now understand this word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the scripture sense , and tho' i do , it will be much at one , for i have already proved to you , that whether you take these 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for powers , or persons , they are not absolutely irresistible , and i have st. chrysostome ▪ on my side in the interpretation of this word , who understands no more by it , than that civil power , or authority is from god , but not the tyrants or wicked men that execute it ; but if it be taken for the person , endued with this authority , i have also shewn you , that when they degenerate into intolerable tyrants they lose their character , and may be resisted , as well as madmen , and fools ; so much in respect of the powers themselves , and now to come to the people : i think i have given very good reasons already , why a whole people or nation , or the major part thereof , may have a right to resist the supream powers , and yet that i need not allow particular , private persons the same liberty ; and one great reason is , because they cannot , and the other , because they ought not to do it . the first you your self do acknowledge , since you say , a private person , when he makes such resistance doth it at his own peril , when he hath only his own single self to oppose against his prince . and that single persons don't use to resist , nor is there any great danger to the publick if they do ; to which i shall likewise add a much better reason , which i have also given you before , why private subjects ought not in a civil state to make publick disturbances , to avoid any violence that may be done to their particular persons , or estates , because every private subject ought to prefer the peace , and happiness of the common-wealth , whereof he is a member , before his own private interest , which being a dictate of the law of nature , or right reason cannot extend to the whole nation , or civil society : since it is as much against the law of nature , for that to be destroyed , beggar'd , and enslaved , as it is that god should ordain all mankind to be so . and therefore our saviour , and st. paul never intending to alter any of those great laws of nature , it cannot be believed , that they would tye mankind to such strict , and severe rules of non-resistance , and subjection , as should expose them to beggary , and slavery , and ruine , with all the miseries of this life : nor do i find that our saviour , or his apostles have either promised eternal life for such slavish subjection , nor threatned damnation for such resistance . m. to answer what you have now said , i must in the first place take notice , that tho' i grant , st. chrysostome , for fear of making tyrants , and wicked princes to be ordained by god , gives that interpretation of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which you have now done , yet he owns the doctrine of non-resistance , because the power is from god , as you may here see in these quotations out of him , which the learned primate hath made use of in the second part of his treatise of the power of the prince , which you may , if you please , read with me ; and compare the greek in the margin : for it is the pleasure of god , that the magistrate whom he hath stamped with his own image should have also his own power . and he that obeyeth not him , makes war in a sort with god who hath appointed these things . let us not therefore invert this order , nor fight with god : demonstrating by our deeds , that saying of the apostle , whosoever resisteth the power , resisteth the ordinance of god. so likewise in another place , if we reverence , and fear those magistrates that are elected by the king , altho' they be wicked , altho' they be thieves , altho' they be robbers , altho' they be unjust , or whatever they be ; not despising them for their wickedness , but standing in awe of them for the dignity of them that did elect them : much more ought we thus to do in the case of god. but it is no matter in what sense this , or any other father takes these words , so long as the doctrine of non-resistance is secure . but it seems very strange that you cannot find that our saviour and his apostles have neither promised eternal life for slavish subjection , nor threatned damnation for resistance ; for as sure as the words are , that they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation , so sure it will likewise follow , that they that do the contrary , and are patiently subject , shall receive eternal life . i beg your pardon for this interruption , therefore pray go on with the rest of your reply . and let me see how you can avoid damnation , if the words of the apostle are true . f. the question is still the same , as it was before , notwithstanding what you have now said ; for it is not , whether some resistance be not unlawful , but whether all resistance whatsoever , be that resistance forbidden by the apostle . and to let you see , that you do not put such a strict interpretation upon other places of scripture , pray tell me the reason , why , when our saviour expresly commands us , not to resist the evil , ( that is , the evil doer ) but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right check , turn to him the other also ▪ and if any man will sue thee at the law , and take away thy coat , let him have thy cloak also . and whosoever shall compel thee to go a 〈◊〉 , go with him twain . give to him that asketh thee , and from him that would borrow of thee , turn not thou away . [ or yet those more severe commands ] of pulling out the right eye , and cutting off the right hand if they offend us , of making our selves eunuch● for the kingdom of heavens sake , and that be that can receive it , let him receive it . what is the reason , i say , why those places of scripture , which taken literally , are as strict as this you now quote ; that they that resist shall receive damnation , yet that most of the fathers , as well as the more modern commentators put a figurative , and not a literal sense upon these texts , pray tell me your reason why they do so . m. i think the reason is very plain , because to understand them in a literal sense , were utterly unpracticable , and contradictory to the common sense , and notions of mankind , and those natural dictates of self ▪ preservation , which st. paul approves of , when he says , no man yet hated his own flesh ; and it was altogether unsuitable to the doctrine of christ which was intended for the perfection of human nature , that is , of men's souls , and natural reasons , and for the quiet and happiness , not hurt and destruction of their bodies . f. i grant your reasons are very good , and self-evident , but pray tell me , is it not as much against the common sense and notions of mankind , that god should give any civil soveraign an arbitrary irresistible power to murder , destroy and ruine their people , if they should think fit so to do , or that iesus christ , who you say came into the world for the perfection of our human nature , and not for the destruction of our bodies , should give the supream powers , an authority to do the same things with murderers and thieves , and that it was unlawful for men to defend themselves against their violence , if they could . so that i can see no reason why this precept against non-resistance , may not be taken in a limited or rational sense , as well as swear not at all ; which tho' as express as words can make it , yet commentators interpret it to extend no farther than against swearing in common communication . so likewise this precept , children obey your parents in all things , which without the reasonable interpretation of all things lawful , would oblige children to obey their parents in whatsoever they commanded them , whether good or bad . but to come to your quotations out of st. chrysostome , which you would oppose against mine ; i think they will not serve so much to your purpose , as you imagine . for i grant , that the supream magistrate derives his power from god , but not a power to murder and destroy ; so likewise he that obeyeth him not , wars in a sort with god , and that whosoever resisteth the power , ( that is , when it is executed according to god's will ) resisteth the ordinance of god ; and as for the last quotation concerning the reverence , that is due to subordinate magistrates elected by the king , tho' they are wicked , thieves and robbers , &c. and consequently , much more the king who sends them ; this , tho' the strongest place of the three , yet will not do the business : for i believe you cannot suppose , that st. chrysostome there means that subordinate magistrates sent by the king were really thieves and robbers , and took away men's goods upon the common road , but only that by bribery , and corruption , in their offices they did robb , and peel the people , as much as if they had been really so , which extending only to some few persons , was rather to be born with ( as any intolerable inconveniences in civil government are ) than for the people to take arme and resist them . but i think the case would have been much otherwise , had these subordinate magistrates by vertue of the emperours commission , made use of his forces to murder , and robb the subjects of those provinces over which they were set ; and that it would not have been any rebellion in the people if they should have taken arms , and resisted them , since the emperours did not impower such magistrates to murder or robb , but to protect his subjects . but to give you a quotation out of st. chrysostome , in lieu of yours , i shall shew you his comment upon these words in his d. homily on the romans , let every soul be subject to the higher powers , ( that is , says he ) that christ might shew that he had not instituted his laws so , that he might overturn all common policy and government , but that he might reform it to the better , and might also teach us that superfluous , and unnecessary ways were not to be undertaken , because it was then a common discourse traducing the apostles as seditious and innovators , and doing all things they could to overthrow the common constitutions of their country ; and therefore he stops their mouths with these words . from whence we may infer , that st. chrysostome did not believe that st. paul wrote this only to give tyrants a power , to do what ever they pleased against their subjects without any resistance ; nor yet that subjects should begin unnecessary and unlawful wars , by resisting upon every slight occasion : nor doth this father here forbid subjects to resist in cases of the highest tyranny , or oppression that could befall them ; so that i take the true sense of these places of st. peter , and st. paul to be no more than this : let every christian submit to the supream powers , i. e. to the emperour , and all other subordinate magistrates sent and appointed by him . for all 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or civil authority is from god , and magistrates justly exercising this power are from him , and in his stead , all supream powers under what ever different names or titles they be , are by god's providence appointed in the world , for its order , peace and the well governing of it . he therefore that resisteth such supream powers , whoever he be , resisteth the ordinance of of god , that is , the means that god hath ordained for the restraining the disorderly lusts and passions of men. and they that will not obey their laws as far as the laws of god and nature may permit , but will resist , shall receive to themselves damnation . and thus far even tyrants and usurpers may be obeyed , tho' not as such , but as dispensers of publick iustice , and executors of the laws , and so are god's ministers for good ; that is , for the publick peace and safety . but neither the apostle , nor st. chrysostome his commentator , any where say , that either the power however exercised , or the persons that thus abuse it to the destruction of mankind , are likewise from god. m. but pray consider the medium a little more closely , by which the apostle proves , and enforces this doctrine of subjection , or non-resistance . for , says he , there is no power but of god , the powers that be are ordained of god. whosoever therefore resisteth the power , resisteth the ordinance of god. the plain meaning of which is this , that soveraign princes whether good or bad , tyrants , or good governours , being advanced to the throne by god , are his ministers , and vicegerents invested with his authority , and power to govern , and therefore , when we resist our prince , we resist the ordinance , constitution , and appointment , of god : and such men do not resist , rebel , or fight against man , but god ; as he who resisteth any subordinate magistrate , resisteth his prince , from whom they receive their authority , and commission . and this is a very forcible argument for subjection to princes , for whatever our prince be , it is certain , that god hath an absolute , and uncontroulable right over us , as being the true lord , and governour of the world ; and if earthly princes are placed in the throne by him , who is at liberty to put the government of the world , into what hands he pleases , who will dare to oppose god ▪ or ask him , why hast thou done so ? whoever hath any sense of god's dominion , and soveraignty , dares not rebel against him , and he who believes that princes are made by god , will no more dare to rebell against his prince , than against god himself . since ( as i said before ) evil princes may be sent by god for a punishment to a wicked people , as well as good ones for a blessing to a pious nation . f. if you had pleased to have considered what i have already said , you might have spared this objection ; for it is no more , than what hath been already answered ; for tho' i grant that soveraign princes are advanced to the throne by god , and are by him invested with power and authority to govern , and that when we resist our prince , we resist the ordinance of god ; yet i desire to be judged only by your own words in this matter ; the prince receives from god authority to govern , but is the murdering , ruining and enslaving the people , any part of civil government ? and when we resist our prince , we resist the ordinance of god ; but is the resisting of an implacable tyrant ▪ and an enemy of mankind , resisting the ordinance of god , or fighting against him ? and i desire you only to consider the force of your own comparison : for ( you say ) he who resisteth any subordinate magistrates , resists the princ● from whom they receive their authority and commission , yet it is only in such things , which the prince hath given them authority , or a commission to do ; as for example , a bayliff may arrest me for debt , by vertue of the king 's writ , yet if he goeth about to rob , or kill me , i may lawfully resist him , and if i kill him , it is no murder . the same may be said of all other subordinate ministers , how great soever they are , therefore to carry on your parallel , the same that subordinate magistrates are in relation to princes , the same are princes in respect of god : therefore if they never received any commission , or authority from god to destroy and enslave their people , they so far cease to be the powers ordained by god , and sure may then be resisted by their opprest people . as for the rest of your speech , as far as earthly princes , are placed in the throne by god , and govern there like his vicegerents , i own they are not to be opposed , but since you will have them to be submitted to , because they may be ordained by god for a punishment , for a wicked people : i thank you for putting me in mind to answer what you have before said upon that subject : i do not deny , but god may often for the punishment ( as you say ) of a sinful nation , give them a wicked , or tyrannical prince , and likewise that such a prince , when thus imposed by god , is to be born without resistance , as far as is possible , or that may consist with their being a people , and with those enjoyments of life , which are necessary to their being subjects , and freemen , and not slaves : and tho' i grant , that god doth likewise sometimes punish a wicked nation , by appointing conquerours , such as the king of assyria , to carry them away captive , and to reduce them to the lowest condition of poverty , and slavery , as in this case of the iews by the king of babylon , who was then the rod of g●d's anger , and whom he raised up for the punishment of an hypocritical nation . yet when he doth so , excluding all farther resistance in the people , it can only be known by d●vine revelation , and cannot extend to all conquerours whatever , whether by right or wrong . and therefore , as god doth often in his arger deliver the people , up to the power of some cruel conquerour , or tyrant ; so likewise will he in his good time , and upon their repentance , deliver them from it again : now this deliverance must be performed either by miracles , or human means . now miracles are ceased , and therefore , since only human means remain , these must be either st . by changing the hearts of such tyrannical princes into a better , and more merciful temper towards their subjects as solomon says ▪ the king 's heart is in the hand of the lord , as the rivers of water , he turneth it whithersoev●r he will. or else dly . by taking away , such a tyrannical prince out of the world , and putting another in his stead , who may govern the people more mercifully , and who will not any more destroy , or oppress them ▪ as his predecessors did . or dly . by stirring up some neighbour prince to revenge the injuries , and oppressions done unto such a persecuted , and almost ruined people ; and to restore them to the enjoyment of their former liberties , religion and estates . or lastly , by stirring up the people themselves to rise , and resist those oppressions , they lie under , by their own single forces , or by imploring the assistance of some powerful neighbouring prince , or state. now i suppose you will not deny , but that the first of these ways does never happen , the second very rarely ; and as for the d. we seldom find that when a former prince is taken out of the way , his successor grows so sensible of the tyranny , and misgovernment of his predecessors , as to let go any of that arbitrary power , which he hath usurped , or to remit any of those intolerable taxes and oppressions which he hath laid upon them ▪ but are commonly like rehoboam , when they come to the crown , so far from making their people's yoak more easie , that they rather lay it more heavy upon their necks , as we may see in the kingdom of france , in these three last descents , where every prince hath been still more severe , and tyrannical than his predecessor ; for finding himself invested in this absolute and despotick power , without any unjust act of his own , he will exercise it as he found it , and will think himself not at all obliged in conscience to restore any of those just rights his predecessors had formerly usurpt upon the people , since we find , princes seldom lose any thing they have once got , and this may continue to all generations , for ought we know , ( which is much too long for a punishment ) unless some extraordinary accident fall out , as we now see by the example of the greek christians , who having lain divers ages under the mahometan yoak , are now restored to the liberty of their religion , by the arms of the german emperour , and venetians , and are so far from being blamed for joyning themselves to their deliverers , that they are rather commended by all christendom for so doing . and i see no reason why all good french men , as well protestants as others , may not as justly joyn themselves to the prince of orange , or any other foreign prince , who will be so generous , as to undertake their deliverance from that cruel yoak , they lie under , and will restore them to their antiens liberties , and the protestants to the free exercise of their religion : nor can i see any reason , why god should deliver a people into servitude , when ever a tyrannical prince hath sufficient power to oppress them , and why god may not be as well said to deliver them , as often as the people find fit means ▪ and opportunity so to set themselves free . for doth such a tyrant derive his power from god to oppress , only because he hath power ? and may not the people likewise from the same original , derive a right to defend themselves against such an intolerable oppression ? otherwise , god would chiefly regard , and provide for this destructive tyrannical power of princes , as the chief end of all civil society , and make the good and happiness of the people as subordinate to that , or rather only by the by , which is contrary to reason . 't is true , the prophet amos saith , that there is no evil in a city which god hath not sent : so likewise are all natural evils such as famine , pestilence , inundations and foreign enemies , and yet have not the people in these cases a power to rid themselves of them , if they can , by all natural human means , and yet they may be likewise punishments sent from god ? and if they may resist , and decline such common and natural iudgments without staying for an express revelation for that purpose ; why may they not for the same reason rid themselves of such a iudgment as intolerable tyranny , when they are able , and have an opportunity to do it ? since they proceed from the like common dispensations of god's providence ; or else we must believe that the wickedness of one , or more persons , for the destruction of civil society the is more particularly derived from god , than the power of the whole people for their own preservation , and the common good and happiness of the common-wealth : by which means , princes would have the same power , and right over their subjects bodies , and estates , as they have over those of their beasts , to sell , kill , and devour them at their pleasure . m. tho' i grant it may be lawful for a people to remove natural iudgments by human means , yet doth it not follow , that they may therefore remove by force , such punishments as god pleases to lay upon them from the abuse of civil authority , by the supream powers , since he hath particularly enjoyned them to bear such punishments patiently without any resistance , because they are inflicted by those whom god hath ordained for our temporal governours , and masters , and whose violences and oppressions , as long as they continue in their sins , god hath very good reason to continue upon them , and if they repent , they may be assured that in his good time , he will either remove them , or turn them to the best : for all things ( even afflictions ) work for the good of them that fear him . and god will not suffer those that trust in him to be afflicted beyond what they are able to ●ear : and if this doctrine of yours might take place , both servants and children in the state of nature , might upon the like pretence both resist , and turn their father , and master out of doors , because ( forsooth ) their government was so severe , and tyrannical , that it was not any longer to be endured by them ; and tho' such severe fathers or masters may be ordained by god for the punishment of such wicked children , and servants , yet that being no more than other natural iudgments , they may be without any sin removed by force , or resistance , when ever they thought themselves strong enough to do it : and if this doctrine be wicked , and absurd in private families , then is it much more so in kingdoms , for certainly there is as perfect a subjection due to a soveraign prince , as to a father or m●ster , for he is more eminently the minister of god , and acts by a more sacred , and inviolable authority . and notwithstanding what you have said to the contrary , that the precep given to servants by st. peter , doth not concern subjects , i think i can very well prove that it doth ; as appears from the example of christ , which the apostle there recommended to our imitation , who was the most innocent person in the world , and yet suffered the most barbarous usage , not from the hands of a private master , but of the supream powers . and therefore , when he commands , in the same chapter , to submit to governours , as to those who are for the punishment of evil doers , and the praise of them that do well , it is evident , that he did not intend this , as a limitation of our subjection , or as if we were not bound to be subject in other cases , since in the very same chapter he requires subjection not only to the good , and gentle masters , but also to the froward , in imitation of the example of our lord , who suffered patiently under unjust , and tyrannical powers . i observe therefore , that the apostle doth not alledge this as the reason of our subjection , but as a motive , or argument to reconcile us to the practice of it . the reason of our submission to princes , is , that they are advanced by god , that they are his ministers , that those who resist them , r●sist the ordinance of god , and therefore , we must submit for god's sake , out of reverence to his authority . but it is only an encouragement to subjection to consider the great advantages of government , that rulers are not a terrour to good works , but to the evil. but tho' this motive should fail in some instances , yet whilst the reason of the subjection lasts ( and that can never fail whilst we own the soveraign authority of god ) so long it is our duty to be subject , whether our prince do his duty , or not . f. altho' what you have now replyed , is no more in effect than ● repetition of what hath been said before ▪ yet i forgive it , since your cause will admit no other , nor can i see any reason , why natural iudgments may 〈◊〉 removed by force , or natural means , but not moral or civil ones , unless you could also prove ▪ that it is god's express command that we may remove the one , but not the other : nor have you proved it otherwise than by telling me , that princes are god's ordinance , and are endued with irresistible power , all which hath been already considered . and i have already shewn you , it is neither commanded by god , nor yet ordained for the common good of mankind . and tho' i own that afflictions may sometimes serve for a punishment of a sinful nation , yet it is as likely that such a great , and lasting punishment , as a merciles● tyrant , may as well bring the people to repentance , and when they are s●fficiently amended , they may very well enjoy the benefits of it , and they may as well expect , that god will bless all lawful means , for that end , whereof i take resistance , or self-defence to be the principal ; since miracles are ceased . and of this we have an example in the d. of kings , chap. . for tho' ahaz the father of ezekiah had submitted himself , and become tributary to the king of assyria , yet when h●zek●ah his son turned to the lord , it is said , that he was with him , and that he rebelled against the king of assyria , and served him not , and yet he was then as much subject to him as iehoiachin , or zedekiah , were afterwards to nebuchadnezzar . so that all that is new in this answer of yours , is only the fatal consequences , that it would bring upon all families in the state of nature , for then ( forsooth ) children and servants might likewise pretend , that the government of their fathers and masters were so insupportable , that it was no longer to be endured , and so might rebel against them , and depose them , which doth by no means follow , for i have already proved at our first conversation , that some sort of resistance for the preservation of life and limbs , may be lawful against the outrages or violence of a father , or master of a family ; yet do i by no means allow , that they should resist them for any other correction or severe usage which they shall inflict upon them , since servants , or slaves whilst they continue under their masters power , can have no liberty , or property of their own to defend ; and a son whilst he remains part of his fathers family , i grant , differs not from a servant , so that all that ought to be done either by sons or servants in case the government of their father , or master grows so cruel and tyrannical as not to be endured , is to run away , and leave their family . and thus we read that hagar upon the severe usage of sarah her mistress , fled from her , nor was blamed by the angel for so doing . nor is what you have now said , to prove the subjection of servants , and slaves to be as absolute the one as the other , at all convincing for i have long since proved , that a family and a kingdom are very different things , and that oeconomical and civil power do not only differ in specie , but in genere too . for tho' i grant , that slavery might begin by compact as well as by war , yet subjection to civil power , could regularly commence by compact only ; and therefore , since the natural state of mankind is that of freedom from slavery , all subjects are supposed to be in that state of freedom , and to have a right both to their liberties and properties ; which , if the supream powers go about forcibly to take away , they then cease to be so , since they take away the main end of their institution , i mean , this of such a people , who are properly subjects , and not slaves : for of those , who own themselves to be slaves to their prince , i told you already , i would not take upon me to meddle : since i doubt whether such an empire can be called a civil government , or not : so , that for all that you have hitherto said , i must still believe , st. peter did not direct this precept to subjects but to servants under the yoak , that is , to slaves , such as had no property , in any thing , nor power over their own persons , but might be sold , and assigned with their wives and children to whom soever their master pleased ; which , tho' not of divine institution , yet since it was so ordained by the civil laws of the empire , neither iesus christ nor yet his apostles would make any alteration in it . nor hath he thought fit to do so , in any of those things , which we enjoy as our civil or natural rights , by the law of nature , or the municipal laws of our country : and therefore it is not true , that there is as perfect a subjection due to a soveraign prince as to a master , unless the people of that nation have made themselves absolute slaves to him , instead of subjects , which could never be but by their own consent . it is true , a prince is more eminently the minister of god , and acts by a more sacred , and inviolable authority , than a master ; yet doth it not therefore follow , that he acts as god's minister , or by this sacred or inviolable authority , when he destroys , or enslaves the subjects . nor can you say that god hath given him any authority so to do . and as for the example of christ's suffering , which you urge as a reason of our absolute subjection to princes , without any resistance i have answered that already , and therefore need say no more to it ; but do own , that in that great point of suffering for religion , when we are lawfully called thereunto , we are to follow his example , yet doth it not prove , that we are to suffer in all other cases whatsoever , concerning which he hath given us no express precept or command . m. i have something more to say to you about this matter of suffering for religion , but i shall defer it at present , and shall only now consider the evil consequences of your arguments for resistance of the supream powers in any case whatsoever , the summ of which , if i can well remember , is to this effect ; shall a prince be free from all correction till god almighty is pleased to chastise him ? must i sit still , and suffer my throat to be cut , my estate ruined , and not dare in any case to defend my self , till god is pleased to i●terpose , and that in an age in which miracles are ceased ? god is for the most part pleased to respite the punishment of opp●esso●s , till the next world , and if i be ruined in this , what comfort is it to me , or mine , that the injury shall be punisht when i shall reap no advantage by it . and suppose the subjects of such a prince should succeed in their rebellion , and prevail against him , they must then submit to another prince , of whom they have no more assurance they shall be better treated , and if they set up many , they are all men , and subject to be corrupted by power and greatness : and in an anarchy every man will become a tyran● to his neighbours , so that this doctrine of curbing , and resisting princes , is calculated for the ruine of mankind , and tends to no bodies good but theirs , who design thereby to gain a power of doing to others ▪ what they pretend to fear : and when all is done , the punishment of princes , who abuse their power must be left to god almighty , who only can and will punish his own ministers . now suppose all this were just as it is stated , if the injuries a man suffer are insupport●ble under any government he may petition for relief , and in all probability find it ; if not , he may flie into another country for succour ▪ if he cannot do that neither , he will scarce be able to resist : so that if it were never so justifiable , it could be of no use to any such miserable man , for no prince , tho' never so ill natur'd , will attempt any such thing against any such number of men , as are in a capacity of revenging the wrong done them , when they will , only out of hopes , they will not , because they ought not . nor will the histories of all ages put together , afford one instance of a monarch that ever injured any man at this rate ; whom he believed able ( if willing ) to revenge the wrong , but that he took care as far as he could to prevent it ▪ and either to take him out of the way , or to put him out of a possibility of a retaliation . so that all discontented , fretful rhetorick , is of no use in any such case . but then , on the contrary , if every ambitious , and factious man might be left at liberty to insinuate into the rabble , and the great , and little vulgar ; that princes are to be punished when they do amiss , that they are bound to act according to laws , and to their oaths , and if they do otherwise are presently to be treated as tyrants , and the common enemies of mankind : that it is lawful for a man to defend himself against the injustice and oppression of his prince , &c. this can only serve to fill the world with rebellions , wars , and confusions in which more thousands of men ▪ and estates must of necessity be ruined , and wives ravished , and murdered in the space of a few days , than can be destroyed by the worst tyrant , that ever trod upon the earth amongst his own subjects in the space of many years , or of his whole life . f. i perceive you think this place of scripture will not carry you through : and therefore you would fain confute my arguments by ridiculing them . but in answer to the expedients you have now proposed , i think i may make this return . . as for petitioning when a government grows insupportable , suppose then the prince declares he will not be petitioned in this matter , but as the french king lately did , when the protestants would have petition'd him against the violation of the edict of nantes , delights to see men ruined , or suppose he lays any man by the heels , that shall offer never so humbly to petition him either in his own , or the people's behalf , as king iames lately served the bishops ; then this expedient can signifie nothing . as for the next , flying into another country for succour , that is , a very sorry comfort , that a man must be forced to go , and beg his bread in a strange land ; and whatever this may be a duty for private or single persons , yet it cannot extend to a whole nation , since if all the people should go away , the common-wealth , or civil society would be dissolved ; and farther perhaps , as now in france , and in all tyrannical governments , it is commonly practiced , the prince should forbid his subjects to go out of his kingdom upon pain of death , or being sent to the galleys , then i think this expedient would signifie nothing neither . but now , if nothing else will do , you say , resistance can be of no use fo such miserable people , because a prince will not dare to attempt any such thing against such a number of men , as are in a capacity of revenging the wrongs done them , where they will , only out of hopes , that they will not , because they ought not to do it . i grant indeed that never any tyrant when he went about thus to oppress his people , designed they should be in a capacity to revenge the wrong he did them when they would : and therefore such tyrants take very great care by guards , and standing armies to prevent it . but yet i can shew you a prince , who very lately received such encouragement , by the writing , and preaching of our high clergy , that he seemed resolved to bring in popery , and arbitrary government upon us chiefly out of hopes , that the people would not , because ( as he thought ) they ought not to resist : and tho' i also grant , that few monarchs injure particular men so much ▪ but that , if they believe them able to revenge the wrong , they took care as far as they could to prevent it : yet this signifies nothing if once a whole nation come to be opprest , and disgusted against the government : for if such a prince , or common-wealth have not the assistance of some other power , either his own standing army , or his neighbours , his authority would soon be at an end : thus we read of the massacre , and expulsion of the french out of sicily , it was done in the twinkling of an eye , and before those in power had the least suspition of it . so likewise in the late revolt of the portugueses from the king of spain , his government was at an end in little more than a days time , and that nation will tell you , that they look upon the benefit of being governed by a prince of their own , and enjoying their own laws , as very well worth that expence of blood , and treasure they were at to obtain it . to conclude , i do not speak this to encourage the rabble , or great , and little vulgar ( as you call them ) to take arms , and punish princes every time they do amiss : nor have i at all asserted , that princes may be punished by their subjects unless you can prove to me , that every one who resists the violence of another , is his lord , and master . neither do i maintain , that tho' princes are bound to act according to laws , and to their oaths , yet if they do otherwise they are presently to be treated as tyrants ; and the common enemies of mankind , or that it is lawful for every private man to defend himself against the injustice , and oppression of his prince : i grant such doctrine would serve to fill the world with rebellions , wars , and confusions , and may produce all those dreadful consequences you have here set forth . but on the other side , under such a tyranny as where the whole people , or the major part of them , shall happen to be assaulted , enslaved , and oppressed to that degree , that no man can tell when he is safe ; i say , in such cases a tyrant may destroy more thousands of men , ravish more women , and ruine more families , and estates , than it is likely to be done by the highest resistance the people can make against him : since they are mad if ever they make this resistance unless they are also morally sure either by their own strength , or the assistance of their neighbours of succeeding in the attempt . nor do the consequences of such resistance , but rarely fall out in the manner you suppose . for it seldom happens but that the new prince to whom the people submit themselves , will ( being warned by the example of his predecessor ) take care to govern with greater mercy , and moderation , and it is much more unlikely , that if they chuse , or set up many representatives out of their own body , that they will be easily corrupted by power , and greatness thus to oppress the people . and lastly , it is much less probable , that the people can continue long in an anarchy without any government at all . so that to conclude , this doctrine of resisting of princes , or other supream powers in cases of extremity is so far from tending to the ruine of mankind that i cannot see how they can be safe without it ; and tho' the punishment of princes who abuse their power may be left to god almighty , yet i am confident the resisting of those , who tho' they have the power of the sword in their hand , yet act as none of gods ministers , is neither contrary to the laws of god , nor nature . m. i perceive you want testimonies out of scripture to justifie your doctrine of resistance , and therefore you are , when pressed by these , forced to flie to your old refuge of self-defence by the law of nature , in which tho' i have been forced to follow you , and quit the method i proposed to my self ; yet i would have you to know , it is not for want of more texts of scripture , and therefore i must still farther inforce the true sense of that place of the first of st. peter , submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the lords sake , whether it be to the king , as supream , or unto governours as to them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers , and for the praise of them that do well . for this is the very same doctrine , which st. paul taught the romans , let every soul be subject to the higher powers . for the same word is used in the original 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and therefore to submit , and to be subject is the same thing which as st. paul tells us signifies , non-resistance : only as st. paul speaks only of not resisting the higher powers , that is , emperours , and soveraign princes herein include all those who act by their authority ; and st. peter , to prevent all cavils and exceptions distinctly mentions both , that we must submit to all humane power , and authority , not only to the king as supream , that is , in st. pauls phrase , to the higher powers , to all soveraign princes , who are invested with the supream authority , but also to those , who are sent by him , who receive their authority , and commission from the soveraign prince . f. you may spare your pains for making any long explanation on this text , for i have already granted that all due submission is to be given , not only to the supream powers , but also to all those who are put in authority under them , and that not only for wrath , but for conscience sake ; yet is this place to be understood in the same sense as the former , that is , as far as they make use of this power for the great ends of government ( viz. ) the good , and preservation of the people , and not for their ruine and destruction , by taking away their lives , liberties , and properties at their pleasure . so that this precept is to be understood , according to the reason , which both st. peter , and st. paul gives for this submission , because rulers are not a terrour to good works , but to the evil ; and because , such governours are for the punishment of evil-doers , and for the praise of them that do well ; and even a government , where a heathen prince hath such supream power may , and doth most commonly in respect to most of its subjects , give more countenance , and encouragement to good works than bad ones , and therefore obedience to such a sort of governours is not only lawful , but a duty : nay , tho' through ignorance , and malice , they might persecute the true religion : for i have already proved , that at the time of writing of these epistles there was no actual persecution begun by the roman emperours against the christians ; and tho they did afterwards persecute them , yet even such as did so , being commonly men of good morals , and having much of goodness , iustice , and prudence in their natures ( such as was trajan , and the two antonin●u's ) they would not fail extreamly to encourage the practice of such , and other vertues by their examples , and by good laws preserve their subjects from the mischiefs of immoralities , and keep them in order , peace , and sobriety . but is it true when tyrants ( be they usurpers or not ) not only govern contrary to , but also subvert all the ends of government ? m. if this be the sense you put upon this place , i think i shall easily shew you not only the absurdity , but perniciousness of this interpretation , which indeed doth undermine all that obedience and subjection that is due from subjects to their soveraigns , unless they rule well , that is , according to their humours , or fancies . now i pray , consider whether these great apostles intended to oblige the christians of that age to yield obedience to those powers , which then governed the world. if they did , ( as i think no man will be so hardly as to say , that they did not ) then it will be proper to inquire whether , what they here affirm , and assign as the reason of their subjection , that rulers are not a terrour to good works but to the evil , were true of the then roman emperours , and governours , or not . if it were true , then i believe it will hold true of all kings in all ages of the world ; for there cannot well be greater tyrants than the roman emperours were at this time : and so this will prove an eternal reason , why we should be subject to princes , notwithstanding the many faults , and miscarriages of their government . and if it were not true , it is very strange ; that two such great apostles , should use such an argument to perswade christians , to submit to the powers as only proved the quite contrary , that they ought not to be subject to the present powers , because they were unjust ▪ and tyrannical , and which indeed in contradiction to the original design , and institution of civil power , we●e a terrour to good works , and not to the evil. the christians were at this time actually persecuted by the iews in palestine , and if they were not then also persecuted by the emperours , yet it was that which they might daily expect , considering their extraordinary wickedness , and cruelty : and yet the apostle exhorts them not to resist the powers , because they were not ( that is , should not be ) a terrour to good works , but to the evil. if by this he only means , that they should be subject to them , while the , encouraged vertue , and vertuous men , but might rebel against them when they did the contrary : how could the christians of those days think themselves obliged by this to submit to the higher powers ▪ for this was not their case they suffered for righteousness sake , the supream powers were a terrour to them , tho' they were innocent , tho' they could not charge them either with breaking the laws of god , or men ; and therefore upon your principles they were not bound to submit to them whenever they could find it safe to resist . so that either you put a false comment upon the text , or while the apostle undertakes to deter them from resistance , he urges such an argument , as was proper only to perswade them to rebel . f. had you been pleased to have minded more attentively , what i said last , you would not have thus misrepresented my sense ; for i have already proved , that there was no persecution in the roman empire , against the christians when those epistles were written , nor for many years after , and i have also granted that if the emperours had so persecuted them they ought not to have resisted : and therefore by good works , and evil doers , &c. in both those texts of st. peter , and st. paul , is not to be understood , only believing in christ , or behaving themselves as became innocent christians , but in general that at that time when the apostles wrote these epistles under claudius , and the beginning of nero , ( and indeed through his whole reign where he governed by his deputies ) the supream power was then really a terrour to evil works , that is , to all offences against good manners , and the publick peace of the common-wealth , and were also a punishment for evil-doers , that is , those that did transgress against the publick laws ordained for the restraining men from committing any sort of publick wickedness , or immorality . so that i own that neither the heathens , nor the christians had any reason to take arms or resist the supream power at this time . but admit there had been at that time great miscarriages , and abuses committed under their government , and that good men had been often times punished , and evil ones rewarded , and the ends of government to some degree perverted , especially at rome , where the emperours took a liberty of doing many unjust , and tyrannical actions ▪ yet i have no where ( that i know of ) affirmed , that princes ought , to be resisted only for being evil , or wicked , or that all the evil actions and mis-government of princes or their subordinate ministers ought to be resisted by the people ; but i have all along asserted the contrary , for i own that no human government can be so exact , and perfect , but it may be guilty of great miscarriages ; good men may suffer , and bad men may flourish under a vertuous prince , much more under those that are themselves wicked , and unjust : and there are many degrees of evil government and tyranny , some of which may consist well enough with the common safety of the people , which was the condition of most of the subjects of the roman empire under the reigns of claudius and nero. since they did then enjoy the protection of the common-wealth , and all the civil rights of the subjects ; and therefore , you very much mistake me in supposing , that i maintain , we are only bound to be subject to those supream powers , who rule well , or who punish wickedness , and reward vertue : since i grant this was scarce ever performed exactly even under the most regular governments , yet there is a great deal of difference between bearing with the common infirmities of all governments ; and such intolerable violences that dissolve the government it self , as by making war upon the people , and invading their civil liberty , and property . as for example , no man doubts , but the king may pardon a robber , or a murderer , but if instead of hanging , he should pardon all thieves , and murderers , that should rob or murder in a year or two together , and should likewise list them in his guards to kill and rob whom they pleased , provided he had a share of the bo●●●y ; i would very fain know of you , or any other reasonable man , whether the people were bound to bear it , and whether they might not resist them , tho' they had the king's commission for so doing . to conclude , when the apostle here says , that rulers are not a terrour to good works but to the evil , and that they are for the punishment of evil-doers , and for the praise of them that do well ; the apostles only mean in general , the great advantages of civil government for the suppression of wickedness , and encouragement of vertue , which is the true end , and the h●st improvement of human power . but this also is in great measure obtain'd under evil , and ( to some degree ) tyrannical princes , and therefore this argument for subjection is good , even under a tyrant . publick iustice was administred under the government of nero , and good men were then commonly rewarded , and bad men punished . and tho iustice be not so equally , and so universally administred under a bad prince , as under a good one , tho' such a tyrant may oppress many of his subjects , and be the occasion of divers calamities , yet whil● the main ends of civil government are maintained , it lays a great restraint upon the unruly lusts , and passions of men , and gives great security to the iust , and innocent . and therefore , good men are concerned to promote the peace , and security of civil government , tho' the prince be in some degree a tyrant , for there is more security to be had under such a tyrant , than in a civil war. in ordinary cases it is very possible for private good men to live easily and tolerably under a very bad prince , and tho' it should be their lot to suffer , yet since the peace , and quiet of human societies is in it self so great a blessing , and the publick good may be better consulted by the preservation of government , than by resistance ; it becomes every good man rather to suffer patiently under such a tyrant , than to shake and unsettle civil government , and disturb the natural course of justice , by sedition and tumults . yet all this is to be understood of such degrees of tyranny , or evil government , as may consist with the main ends of a civil society , or common-wealth , and as far as the publick good of the people may be better consulted , and preserved by the preservation , than resistance of it ; i grant it to be every man's duty patiently to suffer many injuries and abuses , rather than to make any publick disturbance : so on the other side , when the main ends of civil government , viz. the common preservation of the peoples liberties and properties are actually , or about to be destroyed , i think every honest man that is careful of his own , and his posterities well-being , and happiness may , nay , ought ( if no other remedy can be had ) to make resistance , not for the destruction , but preservation of civil government , which i already look upon as good as dissolved , before such resistance , can be lawful . m. i must confess your doctrine , as you have explained it , is not so bad as i supposed at the first hearing , but if people may never resist , till things come to such a state , as that by a general invasion of mens lives , liberties and properties the civil government be in a manner destroyed ( as you suppose ) the people may stay long enough before ever they shall be in a condition to make this resistance . for in all the small observations that i have made out of history , i never could find the people generally reduced to so sad a case , as this you have put : most of the rebellions and alterations of government that i have read of , having begun from a few tyrannical actions committed upon the persons , or estates of some great and powerful men , who being beloved by the people , were able to stir them up to revenge their particular injuries ; thus one single act of lust in the younger tarquins ravishing lucretia , gave occasion to brutus , and her husband colatine , to take arms against tarquin , and by expelling him and his family to set up a common-wealth . and therefore , since this case of such as an extream intolerable tyranny as you mention , can never , or at least very rarely happen , i think i may still maintain , what i first affirmed , that it is much better to put this mischief to the venture , and suffer all the inconveniences that may happen from it , than by allowing the people to be their own iudges , when the government proves insupportable , to give them a right of iudging and resisting whenever they shall pretend that it is so , which they may make use of not to secure their own liberties , and estates , but to gratifie their own humours , or else the ambition or revenge of great and factious men . so that unless there is some power that is irresistible , from whence there lies no appeal , it is impossible for any government to subsist . and tho' it is not necessary that this power should be always in the hands of one man , yet if god hath placed it in the hands of a prince , there it must be irresistible too , however he uses it : for if once it be made lawful to resist the supream power where ever it is placed , you dissolve human societies , or at least expose them to perpetual disorders and convulsions . factious and ambitious men will still find pretences to resist good princes as well as bad , and no government can be any longer secure than whilst ill-designing men want power to resist . now then to pass a true judgment on this whole matter , we must not only consider what present inconveniences , we may suffer from the irresistible power of the worst tyrant , but also what an irreparable mischief it is , for ever to unsettle the foundations of government . we must consider whether civil government be the greater blessing to mankind , or a tyrant the greater curse : whether it be more desirable to endure the insolence , and injustice of the greatest tyrant , when the power falls into such a hand , or for ever to be deprived of the security of government , and the blessings of peace , and order . and therefore , there is great reason why god should so severely forbid the resistance of all princes , tho' the cruellest tyrants you can imagine ; and why we should quietly , and contentedly submit to this divine appointment , because the resistance of the supream powers , ( were it once allowed by god ) would weaken the authority of all human governments , and expose them to the rage , and frenzy of ambitious , and discontented states men , or wild enthusiasts . and this , i think , is a sufficient answer to this pretence , that the apostle limits our subjection to princes to the regular exercise of their authority . f. i see we are ev'n come where we set out , to the necessity of an irresistible power , and the mischief that must follow if the people ever iudge for themselves , which indeed is but the same argument in politicks , which the church of rome makes use of for the necessity of an infallible iudge in spirituals , because otherwise if the people should judge for themselves , in matters of religion , there would nothing follow but anarchy , and confusion in the church , and that there would be as many religions as there are men ; and so you likewise urge , that if the people may ever once come to iudge , when they are assaulted , enslaved , or opprest , and should have a right of making resistance , nothing but anarchy and confusion must follow in the common wealth . and truly i think the argument is as good for the one as the other , and as i hope we may be always good orthodox christians without such an infallible iudge in matters of faith , so i think we may be loyal subjects to our prince without investing him with an irresistible power , of doing with us what ever he hath a mind to . but since you have only repeated , what you have said at our last meeting , when we first began to debate this question , so i must beg you pardon , if i refresh your memory , and again repeat my answers . in the first place , i deny that it must follow , that if once it be made lawful to resist the supream power , where ever placed , this must dissolve civil societies , or expose them to perpetual disorder , because ( forsooth ) some factious and ambitious men will find pretences to resist good princes as well as bad . for first i have all along supposed the civil society as good as dissolved , before such resistance is lawful : and therefore , the convulsions or disorders of a civil war can scarce be worse than such a state , and until the people are under this condition , i grant factious , and ambitious men may make pretences to resist good princes , as well as bad , and may find some followers as wicked as themselves , to take the● part . yet this infection seldom , or never seizeth upon a whole nation , who hath always power , and affection enough for the supream powers to joyn with them , to suppress such rebels . i grant , we ought always to consider , whether civil government be the greater blessing to mankind or a tyrant , the greater chrs● ; but i do never suppose , such resistance to be lawful , but when the power falls into such hands , that tho' they may call themselves a civil government , yet the people are almost as totally deprived of all that security , and those blessings of peace , and order , which they may justly expect from it , as if they were in a state of war. and therefore , as you suppose that god almighty forbids the resistance of the most cruel tyrants , because this resistance , were it once allowed , by giving the people a power of iudging , would weaken the authority of human governments , and expose them to the rage , and frenzy of ambitious , and discontented states-men , or wild enthusiasts , and this , you think a sufficient answer . so on the other side , if this resistance be in no case lawful , tho' in never so great extremities , and that the people must not judge , when they are so cruelly used , as that it is no longer to be endured , not only the persons of princes are sacred , and irresistible , but also all those instruments of tyranny whom they may hire , and employ to that purpose , by which means all government whatsoever will not only be absolute , but arbitrary , and without any sufficient obligations to other mercy , justice , and the common good , than what the tyrannical will , or humour of one , or more men shall please to allow . so that the lives , liberties , and estates of a free people or nation shall be in as bad or a worse condition , than if they were slaves , if all means of defending themselves by their own resistance , or joyning with those that would assist them be wholly denyed them . and whether god can ever be the author of such an institution , i appeal to your own reason to judge , when you are in a more sedate and equal temper . m. i see 't is in vain to argue this matter any longer with you , and therefore , i must tell you , that i cannot but look upon these doctrines of passive obedience , and non-resistance , as true christian doctrines ; since the antient fathers of the church , and primitive christians did always both believe , and practise them , and in imitation of whom our own church of england ( which i think of any in the world comes nearest to the primitive ) doth likewise maintain it in her articles , canons and homilies , whereas you can shew me no express text of scripture , nor testimonies of the fathers , nor examples of the primitive christians to justifie this resistance , which when ever you can do , i shall be of your opinion ; and if you doubt the truth of what i say , i have here by me the lord primate usher's book of the power of the prince , and obedience of the subject , which you may , if you please , take home with you , and consult at your leisure , in which i doubt not but you will meet with full satisfaction in this matter . f. i have already proved at our last meeting , that resistance for self-defence against those , who have the power of the sword , is a right of nature conferred by god on all mankind , and unless you can shew me 〈…〉 place of sculpture , which takes it quite away . i think i may very well maintain , that it is still left entire to us , and is not abrogated by the law of the gospel , and that it was lawful before our saviour's coming into the world , i have proved by those defensive arms made use of by david , and the maccabers ; and as for the testimonies of the fathers , and the practice of the primitive christians , of which the reverend primate hath made so ample a collection , in that treatise you know shew me ; i thank you for your kind offer of it , but i do not now need it ; for since i began to consider this controversie with you , i have carefully read over that treatise , and i cannot find , that this vast collection out of prophane , as well as ecclesiastical writers , will prove any more , than those principles , which i own to be true , and yet will not impugne this principle i here defend . in the first part of this discourse it is proved by scripture , as well as other testimonies , that the authority of all soveraign powers is from god , which i also allow ; yet doth it not hinder , but that the consent and submission of the people , is a necessary means , or condition of conveying this authority when god doth not please , to make or nominate kings himself . dly . that the persons as well as power of soveraign , tho' wicked , princes is also sacred , and irresistible , yet this is to be understood , whilst they continue to act towards their whole people , as the ordinance of god , and by vertue of that divine commission which they have received from him . in the second part of this discourse , it is proved from scripture , testimonies of the fathers , and other authors , that particular subjects are bound to obey the supream powers in all lawful , and indifferent things , or else to submit , and suffer the punishment in case of their unlawful laws , or commands . as also to bear with any violence , and injury that may be offered to them , rather than to disturb the publick peace , and civil government of the common wealth , ly . that in the time of the primitive church , and before the christian religion was settled by law , and become part of the civil constitution of whole kingdoms and states ; it was unlawful to resist the supream powers in case of persecution , tho' to death it self , for the testimony of christian religion : which i have also allowed through this whole conversation : yet none of these quotations , as i can see , do reach the matter in controversie , between us , and assert it expresly to be absolutely unlawful for the whole people of any kingdom , or nation to make use of defensive arms , and resist the intolerable violence , and tyranny of the supream powers , if they shall happen to make war upon their people , and go about to take away and subvert the main ends of all government , viz. the preservation of mens lives , liberties and civil properties . neither do they any where assert , that in limited o● mixt governments such as most of those now in europe , where the people , by the fundamental constitutions of the government , or the aster concessions of princes , restraining their own absolute power , enjoy divers priviledges , and liberties , unknown to those who live under absolute monarchies : that the people may not upon the manifest invasion of such legal right by force , resist , and defend themselves , and their just right against the violent invasion of the prince . m. i cannot deny but you have fairly enough represented the chief heads , or principles , which the reverend primate ●ndertakes to prove in this excellent treatise : and i think you have your self granted enough to confute all you have already said for in the first place , if it be unlawful , for every particular private subject to resist the supream powers , it will likewise follow , that it will be also unlawful , for a whole nation . for a whole nation , is only a systeme or collection of particular persons , and universals have no real being in nature , but only in our ideas : so that if it be unlawful for every particular person to resist , and defend himself , in case he is injured , and opprest , it must be also unlawful for a whole people , which consists of individuals to make such resistance ; and it is a rule in logick , that nothing can be affirmed of individuals , which may not also be affirmed of the whole species . so likewise if you grant , that the primitive christians ought not to have resisted the supream powers in case of persecution for religion , i think it will likewise as well prove , that they ought not to resist upon any account whatsoever , since certainly , there cannot be greater wrongs , or violences committed in the world by supream powers , than to allow them an irresistible power of putting those to death that bear witness to the truth of the gospel , since a whole nation may be as well thereby destroyed , if they prove firm to the christian religion , and that the prince continue obstinately cruel . and you might as well argue that patient suffering without resistance ought not to be exercised in this case , because it is destructive to mankind , and the quiet of a civil society , as to argue from the same reason that a whole nation is not obliged to suffer without any resistance ; when their lives , liberties and properties are invaded by the supream powers . so that if the primitive christians might not resist the roman emperours , when they made so great a part of the people , and were so vast a multitude in the roman empire in the time of tertuliian , as that he tells the emperour sever●● in his apology for the christians to this effect , that had they a mind to profess open hostility , and to practice secret rev●nge , could they want numbers of men , or sorce of arm● ? are the moors , the marcomans , or the parthians themselves , or any one particular nation whatsoever , more in number than they , who are spread o●er the whole world ? they are indeed not of your way , and yet they have silled all you have ; your cities , islands , castl●s , towns , assemblies , your very tents , tribes , and wards , yea the pallace , senate and place of judgment . nor need i to mention at large the famous story of the th●baean legion , who all of them suffered death rather than they would either sacrifice to idols , or resist the emperour ●s forces , tho' they were between six or seven thousand men , and might have sold their lives dear enough . and if an emperour may murder so many thousands without any resistance , i see no reason why he may not put a whole nation of christians to death by the same reason . nor will one of your reasons which you bring for it , signifie any thing , that the christians were to suffer without resistance , be●ause paganism was then the religion established by the law of the empire ; for if a municipal law , as this was , ought to be over-ruled by the natural law or self-defence when they happen to clash , then the christians who lived under the heathen emperours , might lawfully have taken up arms against the government because they were deprived of their lives and ●●rt●in●s against all equity and humanity . for to persecute men so remarkably regular , and peaceable , both in their principles and practises , is as manifest a violation of the law of nature , as is possible . and if it was lawful for them to resist , then they seem bound in conscience to do it whenever they had a probability of prevailing . for without doubt , it 's a great fault for a man to throw away his life , impoverish his family and encourage tyranny , when he hath a fair ▪ remedy at hand . f. if you had a little better remembred , what i have already said on this subject , you might have spared these objections , for as to the first of them , it is rather a logical fallacy , than a true answer . for in the first place , i have all along asserted , that no man ought to give up his right of self defence , but in order to a greater good , ( viz. the publick peace and preservation of the common-wealth . ) and therefore , dr. fern , and others of your opinion , do acknowledge , that david might have made use of defensive arms to defend himself against those cut-throats , that saul send to take away his life , tho' he might not have resisted saul's own person , and you your self have already granted , that no man can want authority to defend his life against him that hath no authority to take it away . so that if this law of self-defence is sometimes suspended , it is onely in submission to a higher law of preserving the publick peace of the common wealth , or civil society , which being once br●ken and gone by a general violence upon all mens lives , liberties and properties of that nation , or kingdom , that obligation of maintaining the publick peace being taken away , every man 's natural right of not only defending himself , but his innocent neighbour , again takes place . and therefore , your logical maxim , that nothing can be affirmed of individuals , which may not be affirmed of the whole species , signifyeth nothing in this matter ; for every individual had before potentially a right of self-defence , tho they were under an obligation , not to reduce it into act , till the bonds of that civil society were dissolved , and then it is true , they do not then resist to maintain that civil government which is already gone , but to get out of a state of nature , and set up a new one as soon as they can . but as to your second objection , which i confess hath more weight in it , than the former ; i shall make this answer , that you your self have given a sufficient reason why a whole nation or church , that professes the christian religion , cannot be destroyed by all the malice and persecution that can fall upon it by persecuting monarchs , for you tell us , that it is the special priviledge of the christian church above the rest of mankind that they are god's peculiar care , and charge ; and that he doth not permit any suffering , or persecutions to befal them , but what he himself orders and appoints : and that it is a great happiness , to have our condition immediately alloted by god. so that it seems it cannot be in the power of the cruellest tyrant utterly to destroy christianity , in any country where it is truly taught , by all the persecution that he can use . this was the state of christian religion whilst it was in its infancy , and in which , we may observe more particular declarations of god's providence by miracles , and the divine inspirations of his holy spirit , than after it was grown up , and that all the world became christians . in its infancy , 't is plain that princes could not destroy it , because it was supported by miracles , and supernatural means , but in the other state , when christianity was once grown up , settled and able to shift for it self , by being made the religion of the empire , and the greatest part of mankind embracing it in those and other countries , princes then could not destroy it , if they would , because their subjects had then a right to it , and a property in it , as much as they had to any thing else they enjoyed , and consequently might be preserved by the same human means . thus during the state of the iewish church in the wilderness , and for some time in the land of canaan , we find the children of israel fed , and delivered from their enemies by miracles . but after they had been long settled in it , and had renounced the immediate government of god , they were then left to preserve themselves by the same natural means with other nations . and tho' i grant that such persecutions , when ever they fall out , are very pr●judicial to the peace and happiness of those nations that labour under them ; yet this is no sufficient reason against pa●ient-suffering for religion without resistance . for since our saviour is the author of our salvation , and hath ordained that it-shall be propagated not by force or resistance , but by sufferings , and that he hath promised us an eternal weight of glory , for our submitting our wills and natural affections to his divine commands , it is not for us to dispute the reason of it , since that he who pleased to bestow upon us so great a benefit without our desert , might propose it to us upon what conditions he pleased , tho' never so hard to be performed . yet is this to be so understood , as that this suffering for the testimony of christ may serve for that great end for which he ordained it , ( viz. ) the propagation of his own true religion , by our bea●ing testimony to it , in our couragious and patient suffering , which in a kingdom or nation , where christianity , or any true prosession of it , is become the general , and na●●onal religion , cannot now be supposed to be necessa●y . and this may serve also for an answer to your last reply ; for tho' i own , that the municipal laws of common wealths cannot abrogate any of our natural rights ; but only in order to some greater good or benefit tending thereunto , yet certainly , the revealed law of god may , and doth in some case abridge us of divers of those rights , which men by the law of nature might have made use of . but as for your quotation out of tertullian , tho i have good reason to question the very matter of fact , since i can hardly believe , that how numerous soever the christians might be , or whatever mischief they might have done privately by setting the city on fire in the night time , which he also mentions a little before , as one of the ways by which they might have revenged themselves ; yet do i not think , that they were then either for strength or number sufficient to have made any considerable resistance , if they would , against the pretorian bands , and other standing legions which were then , if not all , yet for the greatest part heathens : the most part of the christians of those times , consisting of the meaner and mechanical sort of people altogether undisciplined , and unarmed , and so perhaps these christians were under no other obligations , to non resistance , then what the particular providence of god , had brought them to , as these french protestants , who remain still in france , are now under , that is , obligations of fear , and not of meer conscience . and as for your example of the thebaean legion , tho' it is true they might have sold their lives dear before they had been killed , yet would this resistance have served them to little purpose against the rest of the army , which might consist of , or men , all heathen , and headed by the emperour himself . but what if after all this stir about this story , it should not be true ? for eusebius and socrates who lived nearer the time in which this action is supposed to be done , make no mention at all of it ; tho' they had very good occasion to do it . the first writer that ever made any mention of this story was eucherius arch-bishop of lyons , who did not write this act o● the martyrs till above years after the thing was done , and he is also followed by one ado in his martyrology , who lived likewise some time after him , when writing of legends began to grow in fashion . but granting all the matter of fact to be as you relate it , it proves no more than what i have already granted , that , the christians were at that time obliged to lay down their lives , for the testimony of christ rather than to make any resistance ; but that this precept is of a constant , and eternal obligation when the ends for which it was ordained , are no longer of any use , and when our religion is established by such laws , as the king himself cannot abrogate or dispense with , i utterly deny : and certainly , if you were not very much blinded with the prejudice of these notions of passive-obedience and non resistance , you would not leave all the people of england at the mercy of a popish king to be dragooned out of their lives , liberties and estates as the protestants have been in france and savoy , whenever the king shall please to put them to that severe tryal . m. you have given me a very long , and i wish i could say a satisfactory answer , and i see , provided it would serve your turn , you do not value how much you vilifie the sufferings of the primitive christians by making them not of ability to make any considerable resistance if they would . tho' tertullian expresly affirms the contrary , and so you likewise take upon you to follow the example of a late d●ctor ; and to question the truth of the story of the thebaean legion , which tho' it might not be committed to writing before eucherius published it , yet might be very well have received a faithful account of this matter either by tradition , or by some private memorials that might be kept of it in that church ; since they suffered this martyrdom , not far from octodurum a place now called martinach in valla●s a part of switzerland , and not far from lyons , so that he might very well have a sufficient information of such a remarkable action as this was . nor doth what you say , savour less of a latitudinarian principle , whilst you maintain , that a patient submission to the supream powers is not of constant , and eternal obligation in all circumstances which is contrary to the opinion of the primitive fathers , and also of the church of england . but if st. paul's doctrine be true , that we are not to do the least evil that good may come : and if our saviour hath enjoined us , not to resist the supream pow●rs upon any account whatsoever , and also to lay down our lives for the testimony of the truth , we ought certainly to observe his commands , let the consequence be what it will , tho' it were to the total destruction of a whole church , or nation : since god if he pleases may by the just course of his providence lay such severe iudgments upon us , who can also infinitely reward us for our patient suffering of them , in the life to come . f. i think i may without any crime , question the truth of tertullian's account of the power the christians had to make any considerable resistance in his time , for sure , he may be out in such a nice matter of fact : since he could be guilty of such gross errours in point of doctrine , for before he turned mortanist , he was like our quakers , and thought all resistance of what kind soever unlawful ; and therefore , he tells us in his apologetick , idem sumus imperatoribus qui & vicinis no , 〈◊〉 , and a little after , quodeunque enim non licet in imperatorem , ●d nec in quenq●●m , and he likewise condemned all ●light in time of persecution , as you may see in the treatise he writ upon that subject . and as for the bare practice of primitive christians , they are not of any general binding example to us , unless the principle they go upon be true , since i doubt not but many of them suffered death out of a pure desire of martyrdom of which sulpitius severus tells us , they were more covetous , than men were in his time of bishopricks , in so much , that it was a common thing even for women , and boys to offer themselves to voluntary martyrdom that the council of — was forced to make a decree on purpose to forbid it . and as for the truth of the story of the thebaean legion , it not being recorded by any writer of the age in which it is said to have been done ; i think a man may very well question its reality without any suspicion of heresie : and when i can see those arguments answered by you , or any body else , which the learned doctor you mention hath brought against it , i will give more credit to it than now i do . but you may call me a person of latitudinarian principles as much as you please in this matter , until you are able to prove to me by better arguments than you have done hitherto , that the doctrine of non-resistance in case of persecution for religion , is of constant , and eternal obligation , unless it be in the same case in which the primitive christians , were obliged to suffer , rather than resist ; and till this be done , i fear not falling under st. pau●'s censure of doing evil , that good may come of it ; and unless god had in down-right terms commanded it , i will never believe , but that i may have a very good right in such a government as ours to de●end my life , against any one that would take it away upon the bare score of religion ; nor can i think it a doctrine suitable to the iustice , and goodness of god to ordain a whole nation to fall as a sacrifice to the cruelty , or superstition of any one , or more men. but since you are pleased to urge me with examples of primitive christians , who chose to die , rather than resist , or r●b●l against their prince , pray give me leave likewise to tell you a few stories , wherein these primitive christians have not shew'd themselves , so s●aunch in this matter as you would make them . in opposition therefore to your thebaean legion , i may set those legions that composed the army in gaul , and which saluted iulian ( afterwards the apostate ) emperour contrary to their allegiance to the emperour constantius , renouncing which , they took an oath of allegiance to the former , whilst the latter was yet alive , and had certainly fought against him and resisted him with a witness , had he not chanced to have 〈◊〉 by the way , before they could meet to decide the quarrel , m. pray give me leave , sir , to interrupt you a little , tho' i cannot deny , the matter ●f f●ct to be as you say , and likewise that this army was for the most 〈…〉 yet they were , i suppose , drawn in partly ●ut of hatred to constantius , be●ause he was an arian , and p●rtly out of compassion to iulian , who was at that time upon very ill terms with c●nst●●tius ●is kinsman , the whole army suffering many 〈◊〉 for his sake , for whom they had a great love and esteem . but certainly their loyalty to iulian is very commendable , for tho' immediately after the death of constantius , he openly declared himself to be a heathen ; yet notwithstanding that , and his persecution of the christians during his whole reign we cannot find , that either the s●ldiers , or any other christian ever resisted ▪ or rebelled against him : but that they look't upon it , as unlawful to resist him may appear by several authorities out of the fathers of that time . f. since you cannot deny the matter of fact , you strive to extenuate it ▪ by their hatred to constantius for his apostacy from the catholick faith : and the severe , and rigid treatment of constantius : but if their hatred to him ▪ because he was an arian , could make them joyn with iulian to rebel against him , pray tell me why they might not have rebelled also against iulian , after he had declared himself an apostate from the christian faith ? could they have had such another leader as iulian himself ? but he reigned too small a time , and was too constantly himself at the head of his army , to give them any opportunity to serve him as he had served his predecessor . and indeed this army of iulians was but too obedient to him , since we find that tho' they had been christians before , yet at the time of iulian's death , they were then in profession heathens , for you will find in all the historians , that when after the death of iulian , they chose iovian emperour , he at first refused it , saying , that he , being a christian , would not command heathens , whereupon they conf●ssed themselves to be all christians , but certainly , this had been a very impertinent objection , had they been publickly known so at that time . and tho' i grant , iulian countenanced the doing of a great many violent things towards the christians : yet it is certain , that he never made any sanguinary laws against them , but rather forbid them to be put to death , or to suffer any hardship on the account of their religion ▪ tho' i confess the heathens , because they thought it would be acceptable to him , put many christians to death by force , and violence : so that however he might be pleased with it , and connive at it , yet did he never enact it by any publick law , or edict , or if he had , do i allow the christians a liberty to have taken arms , and resisted him upon the account of religion . for tho' i own the christian religion had been establish'd by law , by constantine the great , yet was it not so throughly settled as to forbid the free and open profession of the pagan superstition ; the heathens being admitted to all offices , and commands , as well as the christians , and might freely perform all the rites of their superstition , publick sacrifices to their false gods only excepted ; so that if constantine by his edict could without any rebellion , shut up the heathen temples , and give the christians the publick liberty of pro●●ssing ●●eir religion , why should not iulian have the like prerogati●● 〈◊〉 ●is power was alike supr●am , and absolute , to recall those e●icts , and to make quite contrary ones , if he had so pleased ? and tho' i also own that the christians did not actually rise in arms against iulian yet that there were many of them wou●d have done so , is very like●● since they openly pray'd for his d●struction , and gave him very undict●● 〈…〉 ●ay reproach●ul ●angitage , upon the account of his apostacy , whene●er 〈◊〉 came 〈◊〉 their way ▪ and thus some of those who are called fathers , were 〈◊〉 opinion that an apostate tho' an empe●our might be put to death . pray pread ▪ what i have lately transcribed out of the writings of lucifer ●a●arit●nus ( whom st. ierom calls , a man 〈◊〉 a wonderful constancy and of a mind prepared for martyrdom ) who writing to the emperour constantius says thus to him . pray shew but one of the worshippers of god , that ever spared the adversaries of his religion : and then he reads him his own doom , out of deut. . . if there rise among you a prophet , or a dreamer of dreams , saying , let us go after other gods ( for the orthodox always charged the arians with idolatry ) that prophet , or dreamer of dreams shall be put to death : you see what you are commanded to suffer . [ and again ] hear what god hath ordained by moses , is to be done with you , for perswading me to revolt from god , deut. . . if thy brother , the son of thy mother , or thy son , &c. intice thee secretly , saying , let us go , and serve other gods , thou shalt surely kill him , &c. here it is commanded that my brother shall be put to death , for inviting me to forsake god. [ and in pursuance of this doctrine , he tells him little farther to this purpose , ] " that if he had been in the hands of mattathias , or phineas , and should have gone to live after the manner of the heathens , without doubt they would have killed him with the sword , which he repeats twice for fear he should forget it . and this treatise being sent for by the great ath●●asius , and being by him perused , he was so far from condemning any thing in it , that as you may see in his letter to this lucifer , ( which is in the same volume from whence i transcribed this ) he highly praiseth him for writing it , and calls his book , the doctrine of the true faith , besides many other commendations too long here to be repeated . and as for iulian himself , sozomen the ecclesiastical historian , writing of the manner of his death , says , that it was believed by many , that he was killed by some christian soldier of his army , whom he applauds for so doing . m. i cannot deny , but the carriage of some christians of those times , even of those who are called antient writers , or fathers , might be too undutiful , and may be attributed to the morose , monastick temper of the father you have quoted , tho' a great deal of this sort of carriage may be attributed to that christian zeal , which the iews called the spirits of fortitude , and the greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which we render boldness of confidence , and which did often transport them to say those things to persecuting kings , or their governours , which had been insufferable to any man else on another occasion , and this was not only in words but actions too . thus when the emperours numerianus , or de●●us , ( for my author doth not know which it was ) would have entred into the cathedral church of antioch , in time of divine service , babylus the bishop , standing in the church-porch , shut the door against him , telling him that he would not suffer him , who was a wolf , to enter into the sheep fold of christ. and we also read that valentinian ( who was afterwards emperour ) being then an officer under iulian , and wanting upon him to the door of a heathen temple , gave the priest a box on the ear , because he offered to sprinkle him being a christian , with his prophane holy water . yet i confess , theodoret commends the action , and says , they after chose that valentinian emperour , him who had before struck the priest ▪ and therefore , i wonder to what purpose , you quote such passages ●ut of antient writers ▪ and the actions of primitive christians , which , if you are a man of that loyalty , or good breeding , as i hope you are , you will not your self approve of . f. i do not tell you i quote them for our imitation , but only to let you see , that the actions of those you call primitive christians , and fathers , are not by your own confession to be the only pattern for us to follow ; so that indeed their practices , can signifie nothing to us , unless the principle they acted by , were suitable to the laws of god , and right reason ; unless you will have no precedents to be good , but what shall suite with your humour , and those principles you have already imbibed , and if babylus the martyr , might without any sin , shut the emperour out of the church by force , and that valentinian was commended for striking the emperours priest on the face , i think here are by your own confession two sufficient primitive examples of resistance , both of the emperour's person , as also of those commissioned by him , as certainly this priest was , or else he could have had no right to have exercised his idolatrous worship , after the temples had been shut up under constantine , and constantius . but i now desire your patience to let you see , that not long after these times , the christians as well souldiers as others , were not so through , paced in these doctrines of passive obedience , and non-resistance , as you would make them , for it was by the rebellion of the christian legions in britain , that maximus took the boldness to rebel against the emperour gratian , and making himself emperour , marched into gaul against him , where the poor prince being also deserted by his christian army , and forced to fly away , with a few followers , was not long after murdered by andragathius , after which this maximus had so good success , that he possessed himself , not only of britain , but spain , gaul , and part of germany , and was also acknowledged for emperour by all the subjects in those provinces as well clergy , as laity , tho' the emperour valentinian , the son of gratian , was then alive . all the bishops making their applications to him , and desiring him to call a council in gaul , to suppress the heresie of priscillian , which he did in complyance with their desires , wherein they condemned him , and his followers of heresie , who afterwards at the instance of ithacius , and some other bishops by this usurping emperour , were condemned with dive●s other of his followers to suffer death ; being the first that ever , suffered that punishment for heresie . this maximus after five years reign was overcome , and killed in battle by the emperour theodosius , who restored that part of the empire to valentinian the ii. and farther , to let you see that the common people of these primitive times , tho' they were not able to make emperours so well as the army , yet they were not so streight-laced , as not to resist the emperours orders , whenever they thought they entrenched upon their religion , or that they went about to persecute them for it ; i can give you a great many examples out of ecclesiastical history , of which i will only here set down some few : the first is out of socrates , eccl hist. book d. when the emperour constantius at the instigation of macedonius the arian bishop , had perswaded him to send some bands of soldiers into paphlagonis , to terrifie the people ●punc ; and make them turn arrians . the inhabitants of mantinium , enflamed with a zeal for the orthodox religion , marched against the soldiers , with a good courage , and having provided themselves with the best arms they could , they gave them battle , in which few , or none of the emperour's soldiers escaped . and tho' i confess , ( the historians say ) these people were most of them novatians ; yet this action ought not to be condemned only for that cause , since they were rather lookt upon as schismaticks , than hereticks , and were in all things else , except that one point , about reconciling the lapsed , very orthodox , but in all other things were more strict and scrupulous , than the catholicks themselves . so likewise when the orthodox at constantinople , had chosen paul for their bishop , but the emperour resolving to make macedonius bishop in spite of their teeth , and had sent philip the president , to fix macedonius in that see ; as he was about to give him possession of the church , tho' they were guarded all along with soldiers ; yet when they came near the door , the people made that resistance , that they could not get in till several thousands of them were killed . and some years after , when the emperour theodosius the ii. had banished st. chrysostome about the year . the people flocked together about the palace , so that the emperour to pacifie them , was forced to recall him from his banishmen . and when st. ambros● was banished by valentinian at the instigation of his mother iustina , the people did resist such as came to carry him away ; and such was their z●al for the truth , and love to their injured bishop , that they chose rather to lose their lives , than suffer their pastor to be taken away by the soldiers , that were sent to drag him out of the church ; i could give you more instances of this kind , from the e primitive times , but these may be suffici●nt to shew you , of how little account the doctrine of non-resistance was in those times ▪ aft●● christianity was once settled , and that the people supposed they 〈◊〉 the law on their side . neither do i produce them as fit to be imitated 〈◊〉 like cases , but only to let you see , that the example of those times , you call primitive , are no sufficient argument of what was lawful , or unlawful to be done . m. since you your self do allow all , or however most of these actions to be unlawful , i think you might very well have spared the mentioning of them ; since i grant , that about the end of the fourth century , when these things happen'd , not only the common people , but also the clergy began to grow very corrupt in their manners . and therefore , i cannot much value any precedents , that you can bring in that time , to justifie resistance in christians , unless you could have shewn me any , before the time of constantine , which i am sure you are not able to do , much less any authority from any of the primitive fathers , which justifieth resistance of the supream powers , upon any account whatsoever . f. 't is a very hard matter to satisfie you by quotations , for before the time of constantine , it is evident , the christians were not only weak , dispersed and disarmed , but had also the laws of the empire against them . and i have already granted , that self-defence against persecution upon account of religion was unlawful ; but when , in the time of constantine's son and successor , the people having the law on their side , stood upon their defence against those that would have taken away their lives , as in the examples i have brought of the inhabitants of paphlagonia , then the instances come too late , and the age is grown so corrupt , that they are no longer primitive christians , than they observe your doctrines . but as for express precepts , or testimonies out of the scriptures , and fathers , to justifie resistance , i think it is very needless to bring any , for the great mr. hooker , shews us very well , that it is the intent of the scripture to deliver us all the credenda , and agenda necessary to salvation , but in other matters , within the compass of our reason , it is enough if we have evident reason for them , scripturâ non contradicente ; and if the scripture doth not forbid such resistance , for self-defence ( as i hope i have now proved to be lawful ) i do not value whether there be any express authority , to be quoted out of the fathers for it , or not . for whatever the scripture leaves free , i think the fathers have no power to forbid . m. i see it is to no purpose , to argue longer with you from primitive examples , or testimonies ; and therefore , i come now to the last thing i proposed , which is to shew you , that the doctrine of our church of england , as it is contained in the articles , canons and book of homilies , is as expresly for passive obedience , and against all resistance of the supream pow●rs , as the primitive church it self . and therefore , i shall begin with the infancy of the reformation , under henry the viii : for there i begin the restoration of religion to its purity in this kingdom . f. i pray sir , give me leave to interrupt you , for i must tell you , i will not be concluded by any thing that the king , or church in those times did publish concerning matters of faith , or practice , since unless it were in that one political , rather than religio●s article , concerning the pope's supremacy , the church in all other speculative and practical doctrines , was as much infected with pop●ry as it was before . and therefore , if you will have me to be converted by your authorities , i pray begin with the purer times of edward the vi. and queen elizabeth . m. i shall comply with your desires , since you will have it so ▪ and therefore , i shall begin with the articles of the church of england , where in the article , ( as they were past under queen elizabeth anno ) you may find it runs thus . the queen's majesty hath the chief power in this realm of england , and other her dominions , unto whom the chief government , of all the estates of this realm , whether they be ecclesiastical , or civil in all causes doth appertain , and is not , nor ought to be subject to any foreign iurisdiction . it is true , this doctrine is not limited to the particular case of subjects taking up arms , but it seems to me by two necessary consequences , to be deduced from it ; first , because if the pope , who pretended by a divine right , had no power over kings , much less have the people any such power , who pretend to an inferiour right , that of compact . secondly , because the article makes no distinction , but excludes all other power , as well as that of the pope . and in truth , the plea is the same on either side , the pope says , as long as the prince governs according to the laws of god , and the church ( of which he is the interpreter , ) so long the censures of the church do not reach him ; and say the people , as long as the prince governs according to the laws of the land , ( and of the meaning of those laws , they themselves will be the interpreters ) so long are they bound to be obedient ; but as soon as the king doth any thing that may contradict the pope , then he is ( deservedly , say the romanists ) excommunicated , deposed , and murdered ; and when he usur●s upon the peoples liberties , then he ought to be deposed by the people . the arguments on either side are the same , and for the most part the authorities . f. i must confess this is the first time , that ever i knew any man go about to prove passive obedience , and non-resistance out of the articles ; and indeed i should have thought you might have deduced any thing else from these articles , as well as that . but let us see , how , what i have sai● in this discourse , can come within the contents of this article , which only says , that the king , or queen of england , is supream governour over all persons , as also in all causes , whether ecclesiastical or civil , and is not subject to any foreign iurisdiction ; from whence you raise this argument , that if the pope , who claims by a divine right , hath no power over our kings , much less have the people , who can pretend to no such right , as he does , but only that by compact . now pray tell me , whether this be conclusive : i assert , that the people have by the law of god and nature , a right to defend themselves , against the supream powers , in case they are violently assaulted in their lives , liberties or estates . now i would very fain have you prove to me , how resistance for self-defence , doth subj●ct a prince to any iurisdiction , either foreign or domestick , and whether the people can have no right to resist such violence , unless they have also an authoritative power over them ▪ m. it is not worth while , to dispute this any longer with you to so little purpose ; and therefore , i shall come to the canons of the church , and in particular , those of the year , which i look upon as a full explanation of the belief of our church in this point , where you may see in the first canon , these two plain propositions , among others . first , that the most sacred order of kings , is of divine right , being the ordinance of god himself , founded in the prime laws of nature , and clearly established by express texts , both of the old and new testaments . secondly , for subjects to bear arms against their kings , offensive or defensive upon any pretence whatsoever , is at least to resist the powers , which are ordained of god : and tho' they do not invade , but only resist , st. paul tells them plainly , they shall receive to themselves damnation . from which you may plainly see , that this convocation , which consisted of as great men , as i think , had been for divers ages , do clearly maintain monarchy to be of divine right , and resistance to be in no case lawful . f. i should grant the canons of this convocation , to be a good proof of the iudgment of the church of england , were it not for two very good reasons , i have against them . the one i will tell you presently , and the other i will keep a while to my self ; in the first place therefore , i suppose you cannot but very well know , that this convocation sate and passed these canons , which likewise received the king's confirmation , after the parliament ( that was summoned , together with this convocation ) was dissolved : and , i suppose , you know that by the law of england , the convocation having from all times been looked upon as an appendix to the parliament , was till then always dissolved with it . for which reason all acts , and proceedings of this convocation were condemned , and declared null and void , by the long parliament ▪ that began to fit the latter end of the same year . and which is more , was likewise condemned by the first parliament after the restauration of king charles the second . and therefore , i think , i have very little reason to own th●se canons as conclusive . m. in the first place , i might reply to what you have now said , that that very parliament , which first condemned these canons , afterwards ruined the monarchy it self . in the next place that in old time the general , or provincial synods were not dependant upon the assembly of the states at the same time . and i likewise farther answer , that these canons were made , and confirmed in a full convocation of both provinces of canterbury , and york , and the making of canons being a work properly ecclesiastical , these canons were made by the representatives of the whole clergy of this kingdom . . the canons were confirmed by the king ( which was all that was of old required in such cases ) and tho' the convocation sate after the dissolution of the parliament , yet this is not without president even in the happy days of queen elizabeth , not to look back unto henry the eighth , or the primitive times . and as for your objection that these canons were reprobated since the restitution of charles the ii. i say , that i quote them not as law , but as the known sense of the church of england at that time . f. your first answer in behalf of these canons is altogether invidious . for it was not this parliament that ru●ned the monarchy , but only the rump or fag end of it , after it had suffered divers violences , and exclusions of members by the army , and that the house of lords ( being by this iunto voted useless , and dangerous ) were shut out of doors ; nor is your second answer any more true , for antiently in the saxons time , the wittena gemot , or great counsel , and the general synod made one and the same assembly consisting both of clergy-men , and lay men and then all matters of ecclesiastical discipline were enacted and confirmed by the king , as also the spiritual , as well as temporal states : nor can you shew me an example of any general , or provincial synod which met independently , and without the states of the realm , until after the reign of henry the first , when the popes took upon them to encroach upon the royal authority , as also upon our civil rights , and by his lega●s to call synods , and make ecclesiastical constitutions , in which neither the king , nor the states of the kingdom had any thing to do . and tho' , i grant , that upon the reformation the king was restor'd to those rights as supream governour of the church , which the pope had before usurped , yet is not this act of the supremacy to be so understood ▪ as to give the king all that power , which the pope unjustly took upon him to execute before , for that had been to make their case no better than 〈◊〉 was before ; and therefore , this act of the supremacy being only an act of restoration of the king to his pristine rights ( of which that of calling synods and convocations was one of the principal ) the king could not call nor continue those assemblies in any other form , or after any other manner , than they were held before the popes usurpation , in taking upon him to call such independant synods , and notwithstanding what you tell me , i am confident you cannot shew me any precedent of a convocation so turned into a synod as this was in all the reigns of henry the eighth , and queen elizabeth . but as for your last reply , that you quote not these canons , for a law that obliges the church , but as the sense of the church of england at that time ; if they do not now oblige the church neither in point of belief , nor practice as you may seem to grant , it signifieth no more to me , what was the sense of the greatest part of the members of that convocation in this matter , nor doth it any more shew me what is the true doctrine of the church of england , than if i should tell you , that because in the reign of queen elizabeth the major part of the bishops , and clergy of our church were rigid calvinists in the interpretation of that article about predestination , that therefore calvinism was then the doctrine of the church of england , but is not so now . and therefore we ought not to take that for a doctrine of any national church , unless the synod , or assembly that declares such doctrine be solemnly , and lawfully assembled according to the laws , and customs of that nation , or country wherein they are so declared . m. since you so much contest the authority of these canons , i shall no longer insist upon them , but i shall here shew you out of the books of homilies , to which all the clergy in england are bound to subscribe , by act of parliament ( as well as to the articles and canons ) as containing wholesome doctrine , and nothing contrary to the word of god , so that these homilies do indeed thereby become a part of the known laws of the land , that in these very homilies there are divers passages so very full , and plain against all resistance of the sovereign powers for any cause whatsoever , that if you are a true church of england man , as i hope you are , you can have no just reason to deny their authority . the homily , or exhortation to obedience was made an. . in the reign of king edward the sixth , in the second part of which sermon of obedience , we are told in these words , ( which i desire you to read along with me . ) that it is the calling of god's people to be patient and on the suffering side , and to render obedience to governours , altho' they be wicked , and wrong doers , and in no case to resist , and stand against them ▪ subjects are bound to obey them ( i. e. governours ) as gods ministers ▪ altho' they be evil , not only for fear , but also for conscience sake , and here good people , let us mark diligently , that it is not lawful for inferiours and subjects in any case to resist and stand against the superiour powers ; for st. paul's words are plain , that whoso withstandeth , shall get to themselves damnation . our saviour christ , and his apostles received many and divers injuries of the unfaithful , and wicked men in authority ; yet we never read that they , or any of them caused any sedition , or rebellion against authority ; we read often that they patiently suffered all troubles , vexations , slanders , pangs , pains , and death it self obediently without tumult , or resistance . christ taught us plainly that even the wicked rulers have their power , and authority from god ; and therefore , it is not lawful for their subjects to withstand them , altho' they abuse their power . let us believe undoubtedly ( good christian people ) that we may not obey kings , if they command us any thing contrary to gods commandments , in such a case we ought to say as the apostle : we must rather obey god than man ; but nevertheless in that case we must not in any wise , withstand violently , or reb●l against rulers , or make any insurrection , sedition , or tumults either by force of arms , or otherwise against the anointed of the lord , or any of his appointed officers , but we must in such a case patiently suffer all wrongs and injuries , referring the judgment of our cause only to god. and see part the third of the same homily . ye have heard before of this sermon of good order , and obedience manifestly proved both by scriptures and examples , that all subjects are bound to obey their magistrates , and for no cause to resist , or withstand , or rebel , or make any sedition against them , yea altho' they be wicked men . i could find many more such places in our homilies , but i shall trouble you , but with one other passage out of the second book of homilies , compiled in the reign of queen elizabeth , in which book the homily against willful rebellion is full to this purpose . in reading the holy scriptures we shall find in very many , and almost infinite places , as well of the old testament as of the new , that kings and princes , as well the evil as the good , do reign by gods ordinance , and that subjects are bound to obey them . the farther , and farther any earthly prince doth swerve from the example of the heavenly government , the greater plague he is of gods wrath and punishment , by god's justice unto the country , and people over whom god for their sins hath placed such a prince and governour . what shall subjects do then ? what a perillous thing were it to commit to subject 〈◊〉 iudgment , which prince is wise ▪ and godly , and his govern● 〈◊〉 good , and which otherwise ? as tho' the foot must judge of the ●ead ; a● 〈◊〉 very heinous , and which must needs breed reb●●●●●● ; and is not ●●●●llion the greatest of all misc●ief● : a rebel is worse than the 〈◊〉 princepunc ; and rebellion worse than the worst government of the worst prince , that hitherto hath been . if we will have an evil prince ( when god shall send one ) taken away , and a good one in his place , let us take away our wickedness , which provoketh god to place such a one over us . shall the subjects both by their wickedness provoke god for their deserved punishment to give them an undiscreet , and evil prince , and also r●bel against him , and withal against god , who for the punishment of their sins did give them such a prince ? and this doctrine is more strictly inforced in the second part of that homily , from the example of king david in his carriage towards saul , from which it will appear , that they did not suppose david to have used so much as defensive arms against him , as you may see by this passage in it : that when for his most painful , true and faithful service king saul yet rewarded him not only with great unkindness , but also sought his destruction , and death by all means possible , david was fain to save his life not by rebellion , or any resistance , but by flight , and hiding himself from the kings sight . from all which passages out of the homilies , i think , we may draw these plain conclusions . . that as well evil , as good governours are to be obeyed as god's ordinance . . that therefore they are not to be resisted for any cause , tho' they abuse their power never so tyrannically . . that the people are not to judge when the prince thus abuses this power , so as thereby to make any disturbance . . that not only offensive , but also defensive arms , if made use of against him , are utterly unlawful , and also against god's express command . f. i grant these homilies seem to be very strictly penned against all resistance , and ought to be ( like all discourses of this nature ) positive , and general , and perhaps if i were to preach a sermon to the common people on this subject , it should be much to the same purpose , and yet for all that i might not believe , that it was absolutely unlawful for a whole nation to defend themselves in case of such extream violence , or oppression as i have already supposed , for when preachers speak to vulgar auditors , they are not bound like casuists to tell them all the reserved cases in which they may be dispensed with in their duty , lest they might use this christian liberty for a clos't of maliciousn●ss ( as the apostle tells us . ) thus if a good preacher makes a sermon against stealing , or murder , he may very justly tell the people , ( a● the authors of these homilies do ) that they ought not in any wise , or for any cause to commit theft , or murder ; without telling them all those cases of meer necessity , in which it may be lawful to make use of the goods of another , and also to commit homicide ; as when a man is forced to take victuals tho' without the owners consent for meer preservation of life , or to kill a thief , or any other man that assaults him , to save his own life . so tho' the authors of these books of homilies do say , that we may not in any wise , and for no cause withstand violently , or resist the supream pow●rs , but that we must suffer patiently all wrongs , and injuries , referring the iudgment only to god ; yet since they have not particularly put the case as i have now done , viz. what is to be done in case a whole nation , or people are about to be destroyed , ruined or enslaved , and made heathens , or papists , by the unjust , nay illegal violence of the supream pow●rs ; we may rationally suppose , that since they were good men , and never intended to urge these things further , than what the scripture , and fathers have already done , that they never really intended that a whole people , or nation together with the religion established should be thus ruined , and destroyed , rather than that such resistance should be made . m. but pray tell me , can there be any thing more express against your interpretation , or more plainly oblige us to a patient suffering without resistance of the cruellest and most intolerable tyranny , than these words i last read . the farther , and farther any earthly prince doth swerve from the example of the heavenly government , the greater plague be is of gods wrath , and punishment , by gods iustice , unto the country , and people , over whom god for their sins hath placed such a prince and governour . and by what there follows , you will see that tho' such a prince be so great a plague to them : yet they cannot without sin judge such a prince , or rebel against him , but must patiently wait god's leisure to remove him . f. i confess , this is the strictest passage of any in the whole book , yet doth not this expressly reach the case here put ; or if it had , do i think my self , or any body else , obliged because of one , or two unwary passages in this homily , which perhaps neither the parliament nor convocation closely considered the evil consequence of , or so much as knew they were there ; things of this kind usually passing such great assemblies by the lump , as relying upon the testimony of some leading bishops or clergy men , without considering the book of homilies strictly , or reading over the whole : so that the parliament might very well declare , that they contained sound doctrine , and nothing contrary to the word of god , without asserting the literal truth of every particular passage in them , much less that all , that is contained therein is to believed upon pain of damnation ; and therefore , i must beg your pardon , if i cannot suppose that all resistance whatsoever , tho' in the most necessary cases of self-defence which i have now pu● , is absolutely unlawful , and rebellious ; or that the fathers of our church ever intended to lay so hard a yoak upon the neck of this nation , which neither they , nor their fathers were ever able to bear , much less that there is thereby taken away from this nation , defending those fundamental rights , and priviledges , which are essential to the nature of the government , and which as it distinguisheth it from a despotick monarchy , so it doth the subjects likewise from those of other nations ; for if the scriptures themselves were never intended to alter civil constitutions , much less certainly can either our canons , or homilies do it . and therefore , to deal freely with you , if the canons , and homilies had been n●ver so express on your side ; yet as long as no such consequence can be drawn from the holy scriptures , i should not much value what they say , unless you can prove the church of england to be infallible . and for this , i have the sixeenth and twentieth article of the church of england ( made in the year . ) to bear me out . the former of which concerning the sufficiency of the holy scriptures , for salvation runs thus , the holy scripture contains all things necessary to salvation . so that whatsoever is not read therein , nor may be proved thereby , is not to be required of any man , that it should be believed as an article of faith , or be thought necessary or requisite to salvation . therefore if i have plainly proved by sufficient authority , that your doctrines of passive-obe●ience ▪ and non resistance are not expresly found in scripture , nor by necessary consequence may be rationally deduced from thence , they cannot be required of any man to be believed , or practiced as necessary to salvation . and therefore , if either this church or any other , imposes such a burden upon me , i am not obliged to bear it : and this , the latter of these articles of the authority of the church expresly asserts in these words : it is not lawful for the church to ordain any thing contrary to gods word written , &c. ( after which it follows thus . ) so besides the same , it ought not to enforce any thing to be believed for necessity of salvation . where note that besides the same , is to be understood any thing , that is not found therein , or may be proved thereby , by necessary consequence as was said before ; and if the whole church it self cannot do this , certainly no particular church can . m. methinks sir , it is a great presumption in you , and those of your party to make your selves the sole interpreters of those places of scripture , which so expresly forbid all resistance of the supream powers , and then , when you have wrested the scriptures to your own mind , to cry out , that you are not bound to believe these christian doctrines , because you suppose they are contrary to men's humane reason , and the too great love they have to their own concerns , which is but the same way of reasoning , which the socinians , and arians , make use of against our saviour's god head ; because their narrow understandings cannot comprehend it ▪ but besides all this , i could shew you out of the best writers of the reformed religion , both in this , and other protestant churches , who interpret these places of scripture , against all resistance in the same sense , as our honest homilies have done , but i find it grows late , and i have not time now to shew you them , or if i had , do i believe you would be much edified by them ; since you make so slight of the authority of our homilies . f. you are very much in the right of it , and indeed , i do not desire you should put your self to that trouble , for the papists themselves , will not own any thing for a doctrine of their church , which is not expresly found in the council of trent , or the catechism , composed according to its decrees , and therefore , will not be concluded by the sermons , or theological treatises , of any of the divines of their own church , as to any thing , or matter in debate between us . and i think , i that am a protestant , may certainly claim alike christian liberty , especially , since i am very sensible upon what account , too many men have carried these doctrines of passive obedience , and non-resistance , to so great a heighth , as they have done of late years : but since you tell me , that so many learned writers both of this , and other protestant churches , have been of your mind . so i could also ( if i had a mind to cap quotations with you ) produce a sufficient number of places out of luther , calvin , zuinglius , and other first reformers , as also of our own writers at home , who have in many places of their works allowed resistance for self-defence , in case of intolerable violence , and oppression to be lawful , and of these i can give you a large catalogue , whenever you please to command me . but since they will convince you , as little as i suppose your writers would do me , i shall forbear mentioning them any further . m. i value not much , what luther , calvin , or any other violent men of that sort , may out of passion , or inadvertency , have written on this matter , and yet i can shew you a passage out of calvin's institutions , , which expresly forbids subjects , or private persons to take up arms against the supream powers , as you may see by his own words , in the fourth book , cap. . neque enim si ultio domini est essraenata dominationis correctio ideo protinus de mandatam nobis arbi●remur . quibus nullum aliud quam parendi & patiendi datum est mandatum , de privatis hominibus semp●r loquor , and tho' i grant , some divines of our church have allowed resistance in some cases , where the people by the laws , and constitutions of their country , might lawfully have made such a defence of their liberties , yet have they denyed it in ●ll other cases , and particularly in our own government , which is sufficient to shew , that what ever your thoughts may be of it , yet that they thought it absolutely unlawful , for the subjects of this realm to take up arms against the king , or those who acted by his authority , upon any account whatsoever ; and therefore , i must needs confess to you , that i look upon these doctrines of passive obedience , and non-resistance , as the distinguishing characters of the church of england , from all other churches . f. tho' i do not much value the opinion of divines in matter of politicks , since most of them that i have met with have been very unhappy , when they have undertaken to meddle with that trade ; yet i doubt not , but i can shew you , that some learned men of our church have not thought all resistance to be unlawful , in case the main , and fundamental constitutions of our government , shall happen to be assaulted , or our selves in respect of our liberties , and estates , like to be reduced to absolute vassalage , and slavery . and therefore , if your divines will own resistance , where by the constitution of the government it is allowed , to be lawful , i think i can also prove , that it is not only lawful , but necessary , in some cases in our own , for the preservation of the original constitution ; and if this should prove so , i know not what your distinguishing character of the church of england will signifie , unless you will make it necessary for particular churches to have other distinguishing characters , than the scripture requires , or the constitution of the government will allow of ; and if so , i doubt the church of engla●d would get as little credit by such distinguishing characters , as the calvinist churches abroad do by making absolute predestination one of the terms of their communions , the scriptures ( without their rigid interpretation ) teaching no such doctrine . but as for your quotation out of calvin , it amounts to no more than what i have all along granted , that single private subjects , ought never to take up arms , or resist those in power , but when the good of the whole common-wealth requires it . and therefore , he in the same book , places a power of resistance in subordinate popular magistrates , whereby you may see he grants the thing lawful , but will not leave the power of judging only in the common people , or mobile , and so far i confess he is in the right , tho i grant those magistrates are in respect of the monarch , as much subject as the people . m. i should be glad to know what divines of our church they are , who have granted resistance of the subjects of this kingdom , to be in any case lawful , for if there are any such , i confess they are authors unknown to me , nor do i know any , but one , who was seemingly in the communion of the church of england , who hath asserted this doctrine in his book of iulian the apostate ; but you see he was presently confuted , by those learned men of our own church , who undertook him , and i think have so well performed it , that i cannot tell whether it hath been more for their eternal glory , or his disgrace but as for what you say , against making passive obedience , the distinguishing character of our church , i confess , indeed , it is very bad for a church to hold evil or indifferent distinguishing doctrines , but it is as certain , that it is very convenient for a church to have distinguishing doctrines , provided they be good ones , unless a church can be obliged to err for company ; and to avoid distinction , which will not very well agree with the text , that forbids us to follow a multitude to do evil , nor with the practice of the primitive christians , when the orthodox were so few in comparison , that had there not been some names of note among them , they would hardly have been reckoned a number . but it agrees admirably well with the principles of popery , thus to avoid distinction , which hath its numbers to boast of , when nothing else is to be said . but there is one lord , one faith , one baptism , and st. paul reproves the corinthians , because one cryed , he was of paul , and another of apollos , a third of cephas , and the fourth of christ ; and must not then those that held one lord , one faith , one baptism , necessarily distinguish themselves , from all that held more than one ? and if some would say , they were of paul , and some of apollos , and some of cephas , might not others distinguish themselves from them , by saying they were of christ ? but by this doctrine , you pretend we distinguish our selves from all other churches in the world , and so from the catholick church ; and therefore , you cannot comprehend , why any one should value a doctrine , so much on that score ; but you may comprehend , if you please , that it was never pretended that this doctrine is taught no where , but in our church . and as i hope i have proved , that it was taught in the primitive church , and is taught in other protestant churches at this day ; but this is evident , by fatal experience , that passive obedience , is the distinguishing character of the church of england , by law established ; whereby it is distinguished from the separate congregations among us , both of fanaticks , and papists , and to justifie this distinction , we have the express testimony of several of our princes , since the reformation , and of the laws themselves too , that are still in force , which abundantly shew how dangerous the principles of other perswasions are to the state , as well as to the church ● yet if other churches have not so well preserved this doctrine in its purity , as ours hath done , as we would not provoke them to a comparison , so we have no reason to be ashamed of it . but that many among them have taught this doctrine , might be proved from the writings of many of the most learned , and pious foreign divines , and particularly from a book of a french protestant lately written , who in the midst of persecution , writes in defence of passive obedience , when he at the same time suffered , what we have feared . f. tho' i confess at a time , when it was made criminal for any man publickly to maintain , that it was lawful to resist , in case the king should go about to introduce popery , and arbitrary government , among us by force , and that whosoever went about to assert the lawfulness of such resistance , was sure to meet ( if not with punishment ) at least with loss of preferment , and disgrace ; when the doctrine of passive obedience ran so high , both in the press and pulpits , it was no wonder if any of our church , who consulted their own safety , durst stem so violent a current ; and yet even in these times , the learned dr. falcone● , in his treatise of christian loyalty , chap. . sect. . doth , tho' cautiously , allow resistance in such great cases , as of a prince's alienating his kingdom , or of destroying his people in an hostile manner , to be lawful , if ever it should happen ; but out of a needless fear , lest this doctrine of resistance may be made use of as a pretence for rebellion , will not allow it can scarce seem possible ever to happen in a king. compo● mo●t● , towards , his whole dominions . but i think i have already proved the possibility of it , and why they may not do the same in an absolute empi●e , where the prince would make them slaves and beggars , by invading their liberties and properties , i can see no reason , but think , i have given very good ones for it . but as for the other person you mention , who did openly in print oppose this doctrine of resistance , whether he , or his opponent , had the better in this dispute . i leave to the indifferent readers , who i believe will acknowledge , that the author of that treatise , did not so much forfeit his reputation , by asserting a right of defence , where the religion , and liberty are established by law , and became a part of the civill constitution , as his opponent did , by introducing an arbitrary imperial power in this nation , unknown to our laws , whereby a few m●r●●nar● red coats , either of th● , or a foreign nation , should have by the king's commission , an irresistible power over the lives , liberties and estates of all protestants . but since he went about to make us all slaves by his imperial law , i do not 〈◊〉 all envy him so generous a performance : and yet for all that , i had much rather have that man's reputation , whom he appyled tho with all his suffering , than the gentlemans , tho' attended with all his learning and preferments . but as for what you say in 〈◊〉 of the doctrine of passive obedience , and non-resistance in all cases whatsoever ; it signifies little , since it is grounded upon a wrong supposition , for you still take that for granted , which is the question yet to be proved , that because the primitive christians were against r●sistance , in case of persecution , therefore , this must needs extend to whole nations , a●d common we●lths in all states , and conditions whatsoever : which , whether you have well proved , or not , i leave it to your own conscience to judge ; for my own part , i cannot say you have convinced me , with what you have said on this subject : so that if these doctrines , as you have put them , are neither good in themselves , nor necessary to be b●lieved , nor practised in all cases , i doubt god may justly ask those , who either practise or impose them on others , who hath required these things at your hands ? and as for those divines of foreign churches , who you say , have writ for these doctrines , as well as ours , as i know not who they are , nor in what manner they have defended them , so do i not much value their opinion ; since there are many more altogether as learned , and pious , as they , who have held the contrary ; nor are all divines who maintain passive obedience and non-resistance of your side , who write ( which i also allow ) that for particular private subjects , to r●sist princes in revenge of private injuries , and rebel against the supream powers , for not being of their own religion , or to take upon them to call princes to an account , or pass iudgment upon them , or punish them for their actions , is altogether wicked and unlawful : ye● doth it not therefore follow , that they have maintained all resistance to be unlawful , in any case whatsoever ; tho' perhaps , if you were to make use of their authority , you would produce them of your own side . to conclude , i own my self for non-resistance , in that limited sense i have now given , as far as it extends to particular , private men : yet that this rule doth not extend to the whole civil society , or people , and therefore , altho' in my own private capacity , i ought to submit , to , and suffer the greatest injustice , rather than resist , and disturb government , yet when the main foundations thereof are once begun to be pulled up : as i am an english man , i think i am more obliged , by all ties , both sacred and civil to defend , and maintain the government , or constitution , of which i am a member , than i am to obey the king 's personal commands ; and that being the primary obligation ought to be discharged in the first place . m. i shall no longer compare , whether the divines that write for , or those that write against resistance , are the wiser , or more learned ; since you your self , it seems , at last are feign to own a limited non-resistance , which you will have extend to private persons , but not to the whole civil society , or people ; but i think i may venture still to maintain , that the supream power , where ever it is placed , must be irresistible , and that a whole civil society , or people , who are not invested with part of the soveraignty , can have no more right to resist , than single persons : for to say , that whole societies have a power to resist , and that particular private persons , as members thereof , have it also , is such a diminution of supream power , as can never be consistent with it , for all inferiours , whether private persons , or whole societies can have no power , but what is derived from the supream , and therefore , if they have a right to resist , even that must be derived from the supream power , and so that power , must destroy it self . but as for what you alledge in your iustification , that resistance may be lawful , to avoid subversion of the government : to this i may reply , that if subjects be no longer in subjection , to the supream powers , the government is hereby destroyed for what more manifest subversion can there be , than this , that subjects are now no longer in subj●ction , nor governours can be no longer able to govern ? so that this argument tends only to prove , that subjects may subvert the government one way , rather than suffer the soveraign power to do it another . so that upon the whole matter , if the government m●st be subverted , you would have no body , have the doing of it but your selves . f. however false your premises are , and however weak the proofs that you have brought for them , yet i see you are resolved to stick close to your conclusion , ( i. e. ) that all supream powers are absolutely irresistible . in which dispute , whether you or i , have been in the wrong , i dare appeal to any indifferent iudge ; for i think i have sufficiently made out , that resistance , by the whole people , or major part of it , against a general , and intolerable tyranny , is no diminution of supream civil power , nor inconsistent with it ; nor is your reason for your opinion , any truer than the rest , that private persons , whether taken single , or in a whole civil society , can have no power , but what is derived from the supream , which is by no means so , for every private man of the society , then acts by a power precedent to it , viz. the natural power of self-preservation , or defence ; which no man ever absolutely gave up neither for himself , nor his children , when he became a member of that common-wealth : tho' he was obliged for the peace of the government , or civil society , to suspend that right in order to a greater good , which once failing , upon the dissolution of the government , every man 's original right takes place . as for what you say against my notion , that resistance is lawful , when it may prevent the subversion of the government , your reply to this is really equivocal , and consists in that false , or wrong notion , you have of the nature of our english government , which you suppose only consists in the preservation of the king 's personal pow●r , without any respect to the laws , or fundamental constitutions of the kingdom , and that as long as the people are in subjection , whether to legal government , or illegal force ; it is all one , the government is still preserved , which is a great mistake , for the king receiving his power from the law , and having no authority but what that gives him , when he overthrows the fundamental constitutions of the kingdom , he doth himself destroy the government . and therefore , when in that case the people do resist , it is either to maintain it , or else to restore it to the state that it was in before ; so that it is not the people , in this case , who have subverted it , but the king. m. it now grows late , and it is high time to give over , but if you please to give me another meeting , i doubt not but to show you , that by the original constitution of this government , the king not only hath the sole supream power , but that by several acts of parliament all resistance of the king , or those commissioned by him , is absolutely against the laws and fundamental constitutions of this kingdom ; and that they are all by our laws rebels that dare presume to make such unlawful resistance : and i desire , that you would give me a patient bearing in this matter , because i have so great a kindness for you , that i would not have you lye under so dangerous an errour , which may happen to prove fatal to your happiness , not only in the world to come , but also to the safety of your self , and family in this life , if you should offer to put in practice , what you have here maintained . f. sir , i give you many thanks for your kind intentions towards me , since i do believe it proceeds from that real friendship you have for me , tho' as for the former of those judgments you mention , i hope i shall have no reason to be afraid of it ; for any thing i can yet see from th●se arguments you have hitherto urged : but as for what may happen to me in this life , i hope i have as little reason to fear it , since i believe this great revolution will not only iustifie , but for the future defend those arms that have been taken up for the restoring the true ancient government of the kingdom . m. i confess , sir , that you have now too much the advantage of me during these times of anarchy , and confusion ; but yet i hope one day to see this unhappy nation again recovered from this sad apostacy ; into which i confess too many have lapsed , and then i doubt not , but these primitive , and loyal doctrines of passive obedience , and non-resistance will be again restored to their former integrity , and vigour . f. well sir , all i can say to you is , that i see you are not only in love with slavery , but also with th●se that would bring it in upon us ; yet however i think : i may give you this good advice , that if you are not pleased with what hath been already done , since you have had no hand in the doing of it , you would be contented quietly to sit still , and enjoy those benefits , that may thereby accrue to the whole church , and nation ; since i thereby expect a firmer settlement of the protestant religion , as also of our civil liberties , than we ever yet enjoyed . m. i thank you for your advice , and you know as my humour is not to be troublesome , or clamorous against that which is not in my power to help , so on the other side , i heartily wish that the prince may now agree with his majesty upon such terms , as may prove for the good of the church , and security of the state. but pray tell me , when i may be so happy as to see you here again , that we may fully resolve this last question ? f. to morrow i shall be engaged , but the day after being one of the christmas holy-days , i shall not fail to wait on you at the same hour , and i am very well pleased to wait on you here , since i foresee a great part of our next conversation , will depend upon authorities out of books , with which your study is very well furnished , and my own are not in town . m. i shall expect your coming with impatience , and in the mean time , i am your humble servant . f. sir , i am yours . finis . bibliotheca politica : or , a discourse by way of dialogue , whether the king be the sole supream legislative power of the kingdom ; and whether our great councils or parliaments , be a fundamental part of the government , or else proceeded from the favour and concessions of former kings . collected out of the most approved authors , both antient and modern . dialogue the fifth . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms ; where also may be had the first , second , third and fourth dialogues . . the bookseller's advertisement to the readers . the author has order'd me to beg your pardons on his behalf , that he hath made bold in this discourse to deviate from the method he at first proposed for the subject of the ensuing dialogue , since instead of treating of the original of civil authority , and in what sense it is derived from god , and in what from the people ( as he promised in his epistle to the first discourse ) he hath now made the supreme legislative power , and the fundamental constitution of our government , together with the antiquity of great councils or parliaments in this nation ( whether they always consisted of bishops , barons , or temporal lords and commons or not ) the subject of this as well as of the ensuing dialogue ; so that th●se grand questions taking up two entire discourses , had the author persued the method he at first proposed , he could not have brought his whole design within the compass of eight dialogues , as he at first intended , and still hopes to do ; and therefore to ease you of the trouble of buying , or reading more discourses on these subjects , then what he takes to be absolutely necessary , he hath reduced all that he had prepared for the fifth discourse upon the subject above mentioned , into the two last dialogues , wherein he designs to treat of the justice , and lawfulness of the late revolution , and the settlement of the crown upon their present m●jesties , where the then questions he intended to treat of will properly enough fall in . but it is time to speak somewhat concerning this present discourse , since it treat of a question to be decided only from the history and laws of this nation . and the author bids me assure you , that he hath lay'd down nothing therein on either side , but what he hath produced good authorities for ; either from the histories and governments of our own or other neighbouring nations , or from the colle●●ions of our english saxon laws , and ancient as well as modern writers upon the laws of england , and lastly from our statutes or acts of parliament since the reputed conquest , which he found necessary to these subjects , without omitting any authority that he judged material to be urged on either side . but as for the quotations themselves , i hope they are truly cited , for the author assures me upon the word of a ge●tleman , that he is not conscious of any unfair dealing in that kind , either by any wilful omission , or concealment ; and as for the books , chapters or pages here quoted , if there be any error or mistake of that kind , i pray impute it to the press , and not to the author as well in this , as all the rest of these discourse ; since he could not be in town to correct them himself , but he intends god willing ) to rectifie all such mistak●s by a table of errata at the end of the whole work , to which he intends also to add an exact index of all the principal matters that are debated in it ; but though i take the author for an honest gentleman , and one who scorns the mean advantage of a false quotation , yet since many writers ( like montebanks ) are apt to cry up their own sincerity even when they deceive you most ; the best advice i can give you is , that if you have the le●st distrust of any thing here quoted , you consult the authors or books themselves , from whence he hath transcribed them , and then you will be best able to judge how far you may trust him another time . as for those parliamentary records here cited , they are either such as have been already printed from the rolls in the tower , or other offices at westminster , and so are allowed for authentic , or else are s●ch as have not yet been made publick , as for which as well as the former , if you have the least distrust of any of them , i leave you to search the records themselves , which are i hope now communicated without any reserve to all that are willing to take the pains to consult them ; i have no more to add ; but to assure you ( not from my own , but better iudgments ) that you will find more in this small treatise than ever was yet publisht at once ( or perhaps at all ) upon these important subjects . note . if the author hath made one of his opponents call the entrance of king william . into england , and his taking the crown upon the same condition as his english predecessors , a conquest ; it may be understood in the largest acceptation of that word , and for brevity sake only . authors made use of , and how denoted . . harmony of divinity and law. h. d. l. . dr. iohnstons excellency of monarchical government . i. e. m. g. . huntons treatise of monarchy . h. t. m. . sir r. filmers freeholders grand inquest . f. f. g. anarchy of a mixt monarchy . f. a. m. m. . dr. heylin's stumbling-block of rebellion . s. b. r. the folio edition . mr. petyt's preface to his ancient rights of the commons of england , asserted . p.p.r.c. . dr. brady's answer to the said treatise . b. a. p. the folio edition . the fifth dialogue between mr. meanwell a civilian and mr. freeman a gentleman . m. you are welcom sir , i pray set down by the fire ; i was thinking before you came in , of the best method of managing this important question , whether by the laws and constitutions of this kingdom , it can in any case whatever be lawful to resist the king , or those that act by vertue of his commissions . i shall therefore proceed in the next place , to the proof of the second proposition , in the argument i at first proposed , or to speak logically , the minor in the syllogism , viz. that the king of england is the sole supream , or soveraign power in this kingdom ; and therefore is irresistible , and that not only as to his own person , but also with respect to all such who act by his orders or commissions , though the things commanded be in themselves illegal . f. i do not dislike your method , though if you could never so plainly make out to me the truth of this minor proposition , yet it will come too late to prove , that all resistance of supream powers is unlawful in all cases whatever , since i think you have failed in the proof of that your fi●st proposition : but since i do not deny the truth of this second proposition in some sense ; i pray be as short as you can in the proof of it . m. i shall observe your desire , and shall briefly recite some authorities , as well ancient as modern , as also acts of parliament , which declare an absolute and imperial power , to be solely in the king. to begin with the saxon times : first , as to the title of king or emperour used promiscuously : our king edgar frequently in his charters , ca●s himself albionis & anglorum ba●ileus , and the grecians esteemed the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , to be of full as eminent a signification , as emperour ; and king ed●ar● the confessor , in a charter to the abby of peterburg stiles himself , rex anglorum , and his government a monarchy : and king ethelred in his charter to canterbury , stiles himself angligenum , orcadarum , necnon in gyrojacentium monarcha , & anglorum induperator . so that you hereby may see , that the kings of england long before the conquest , look'd upon themselves as emperors , or absolute civil soveraigns . so likewise after that time , we find w. rufus dates his charter to the monastry of shaftsbury ; secundo anno imperi● mei : and tho' the title of emperor hath bin disused , yet we shall find the substance of it , sufficiently challenged in that letter of w. rufus to archbishop anselm , telling him , that he had all the liberties in his kingdom , which the emperor ▪ challenged in the empire : and the like was challenged by henry the first , in all his disputes with the pope concerning the investiture of bishops and abbots ; and in all the statutes of praemunire , made by edward the third , the king's soveraignty independent from the see of rome , is expresly asserted ; and the statute of the th . of richard the second , expresly declares : that the crown of england hath ever bin so free , that it is under no earthly subjection ; but immediately subject to god in all things , touching the regality of the crown , and to no other . and the statutes of the th , and th . of henry the eighth , expresly declare : that this realm of england , is an empire governed by one supream head and king ; and the crown , or royal authority , is also thereby declared imperial , and the kings of england are therein sti●ed kings or emperors of this realm . so that i think , no man needs to doubt where the supream , or soveraign power of this kingdom resides . f. i will not deny any of those authorities , you have now made use of : since , titles alone are no proofs of power ; for it is very well known , that the germane emperor , yet , notwithstanding that great title , is not therefore vnaccountable , or irresistible ; since the colledge of the princes electors may depose him for male-administration , or for violating any of the fundamental constitutions of the empire . and mr. selden hath very well observed in his titles of honour , that this supremacy or freedom from all subjection is not only challenged by our english soveraigns ; but also by the kings of denmark , sweden and poland : the former of which , yet was so far from being an absolute monarch , that before the reign of this king's father , he might have bin deposed for tyranny , for misgovernment by the estates of the kingdom , as the king of poland may at this day : and therefore these titles may indeed , prove a freedom from all foreign jurisdiction ; but doth not prove that the king is endued with an absolute soveraign power within the kingdom , as you may see in these examples i have now given you . m. if you are not satisfied with these proofs ; i doubt not but to give you other authorities , both out of antient and modern lawyers , as also acts of parliament , which sufficiently declare , where the supream or soveraign power resides . in the first place , i suppose you will not deny ; but that it hath bin the prerogative of the kings of england , time out of mind , to co●● money , dispose of all offices , and create new dignities , as he should think fit , as also to make war and peace , to make laws , and in short , to do all things whatsoever that are essential to a monarch ; and that he alone , is the sole soveraign power in this kingdom , exclusive of all others : our ancient lawyers , gla●vil , and fortescue , plainly declare ; the former of which , says thus . rex nullum ●ab●re potest ▪ parem multò minùs superiorem . the same thing is also repeated by bracton , and a very good reason given for it , in these words ; omnis quidem sub eo , & ipse sub nullo , nisi tantum sub deo , parem non habet in regno suo , quia sic amitteret praeceptum , * cum par in parem non ●abe● imperium item n●c multò fortius superiorem nec potentiorem habere debe● , quia sic esset inferior sibi subjectis & inferiores pares esse non possunt potentioribus . f. but pray read what immediately follows : ipse autem rex non debet esse sub bomine , sed sub deo & sub l●ge , quia lex facit regem , attribuat igitur rex legi quod lex attribuit ei , viz. dominatiorem & potestatem , non est enim rex ubi dominatur voluntas , & ●on lex . and though i grant the king is subject , or inferior to no particular private man : yet that he hath a superior , or master within the kingdom , besides god and the law ( and so is not the sole supream power ) appears by a passage out of the same author , in the second book : rex habet superiorem deum item legem per quam factus est rex , item curiam suam , viz. comites & barones , quia comites dicuntur quasi sociè regis , & qui habet socium habet magistrum , & ideo si rex fuerit sin● froena , i. e. lego , debent ei froenum ponere . from which words , it seems apparent to me , that this author thought the king was not only inferior to the law ; but was also to his court of parliament , called here curia baron●● , who might bridle or restrain him if he transgres't the laws , which are here called the king's briale ▪ nor can i conceive how this could be done without some kind of force or constraint , if he refuse to receive this bridle , they would lay upon him . m. i do not desire at this time , to enter upon this question , concerning that power ; which i know some parliaments have pretended too , of c●●bing and resisting the king by force , if they supposed he invaded the fundamental rights and l●b●r●ies ( as they call them ) of the nation ; and that fo● two reasons : first , because it is not pertinent to our present purpose , of proving that the king is not the sole supream power , as also ▪ because you very well know , that both houses did in car. . by an act of parliament concerning the militia , solemnly renounce all coercive power over the king , or any right in either , or both of the two houses , of making offensive or defensive war against him . but if you have a mind hereafter to course further on this subject i doubt not , but to prove to you from divers other passages out of bracton , and that old treatise called fleta , that it was no political superiority in the curia baronum ; but only a directive power or moral superiority , which they had of advertizing the king of any arbitrary proceeding , or injustice he should happen to do ; and by complaint , admonition and entreating to impose upon him to amend the same , according to his oath , but not by coaction , or constraint ; and in this sense they may be said ( in a moral way ) to put the bridle of the law upon him , which may be called civil resistance ; but as for military resistance against an unjust king , it is as inconsistent with our english government , as with any other monarchy in the world. but you very much mistake , if you suppose that the king of england is not supream ; because he is limited by laws , which realy is no objection ; because a soveraign without any diminution to his soveraignty , may be limited in the exercise of his soveraign power , either by his own acts , or condescensions , or else by those of his predecessors , under whom he claims . this is so certain , that there is no supream power in heaven , or in earth , which is not limited and confined in the exercise thereof . thus the omnipotent power of god himself , is limited by his own wisdom , goodness and justice , which are himself : so likewise the powers of all absolute unlimited monarchs are only so comparatively with respect to positive laws ; but as for the laws of god and nature , which bind their consciences as firmly , as any civil laws , they are bound to observe them , and exercise their soveraign power within those limits , which they set and prescribe . for whether they have their supream power from go● , as we say , or from the people , as you alledge it ; it is all one as to this matter , for they can have no right neither from god , nor the people to make vnjust and tyrannical laws . and this political limitation of their power in the exercise of it , doth no more destroy the essence thereof , than its flowing in pipes or channels , destroys the essence of a spring , since it is still the same , whether it runs confined through pipes , or flows free and unconfined through the open field . the application is obvious . but as for the precedent words in this place of bra●ton , which seems to intimate , that the king ow● his authority to the law. he there only means the king , in opposition or contradiction to a tyrant , who makes his will , his law ; according to that of chancellor for●escue , rex est ubi bene regit , tyrannus , dum populum sibi oredi●um violentâ opprimi● dominatione , quod hoc sanxit lex humana quod leges ligant suum latorem . where you may observe , that this author makes a king's governing well , i. e. according to law , a mark of distinction from a tyrant , who oppresses his subjects by a violent domineering over them . and though he here supposes the king to be obliged by the laws , yet that this obligation is only moral , appears by what immediately follows , when he says , the laws do oblige their legislator . now if the king be the sole legislator ( as he here seems to intimate ) he must also be the sole supream power , and if so , cannot be accountable to , or under , the coercion of any superior power ; for then he would not be supream , as you your self have granted long since . f. since you are not willing to enter upon that ancient power which you cannot deny ; but the great council formerly had , of putting a bridle upon the king , and restraining his actions , in case he invaded the rights or liberties of the people : i shall not ●●sist farther upon it now , for the reasons you have given ; only i must make bold to tell you thus much , that if they have not a power of defending their just rights , if forceably invaded by the king , it would be all one ; as if they had none at all : tho' i grant , that what you have said concerning the limitation of the exercise of soveraign power , that it doth not derogate from the absoluteness of the power it self , is very true in all such limitations ; which proceed from the intrinsick nature and perfection of the being , in which it resides , as in your example of god's infinite power , being limited by his other attributes . so likewise all human powers ( i own ) are limited by the revealed laws of god , or those of nature : but as to positive laws , you your self assert , that absolute monarchs are only obliged by them , as long as they please ; and consequently , that they may alter them , or derogate from them , as oft as they think good , as the roman emperors could revoke any priviledges or immunities they had formerly granted to particular persons , cities , nay to tributary kings , or common-wealths ; and all this very justly , because as all such grants were made only for the publick good of the empire : so they being the sole judges thereof , when ever they found such confessions to prove prejudicial to it , they might justly alter or revoke them . now if the power of our kings be as absolutely soveraign , as that of the roman emperors : and only limited by their own free grants or condescensions to the people , and not from any power ab extra ; such grants or condescensions , though never so solemnly past into laws in the parliament , or assembly of the states , are still no more than positive laws : and then if the king is the sole soveraign power ( unlimited by any thing , ab extra ) how can he so tye up his own hands , as that he may not break or rescind all those concessions he had made , and those limitations which he had put upon himself , if he think , or declare it is for the better benefit of the common-wealth so to do . i cannot comprehend , if he be by the original constitution , the sole lawmaker and judge of what is for the publick good ? much less can i understand , how he can oblige his successors ( who must still be supposed as absolute monarchs as himself ) to observe them . and therefore if all our civil rights and liberties , were no other than what you would have them ( the free condescensions , or self-limitations of soveraign power ) i desire you would shew me what security we can have for the enjoyments of them , longer than the king pleases : for it seems plain to me , that when ever he shall fancy the liberties and properties of the subjects ( both which you suppose were derived from him ) to be injurious to , or inconsistent with , his prerogative , or soveraign power , he may lawfully disannul , or revoke them ; and in what case we then should be ( considering how things had like to have gone lately ) i leave any indifferent man to judge . nor is your interpretation of bracton's words , lex facit regem , &c. any more than an absolute wresting of them , from their true meaning , which is not ( as you would have it ) to distinguish a king that governs by law , from a tyrant that makes his will his law ; for every absolute monarch that doth so , is not a tyrant , provided he direct his actions according to the laws of god and nature ; as you your self assert , and a prince may as well govern thus , as the great turk , czar of muscovy , and all the eastern monarchs do at this day , who are not counted tyrants in so doing ; but certainly you will say , that he would make a very scurvy english king , who would observe no other rule . nor do you less wrest fortescue's words , when you render them , rex est , ubi bene regit , tyrannus , &c. supposing the meaning of it to be , that this author makes a king's governing ( that is , say you ) according to law , the only thing to distinguish him from a tyrant , &c. whereas he says no such matter : but only rex est , ubi bene regit , which he may do without any set laws , as well as with them , as the first kings you suppose did before they were limited by laws . but as for fortescue's supposing the king to be the sole legislator , that word sole , is of your own addition ; for if he had said so , he would have contradicted himself , as i shall shew you presently ; it is true , the king hath a great share in the legislative , yet hath he two other bodies to joyn with him by a concurrent or cooperative power in it : and i think i have all the ancient lawyers of england on my side . to begin therefore with ranulph de g●anville , who was chief justicear in the reign of henry the second , he gives us in his prologue to his treatise of the laws of england , this testimony . leges namque anglicanas lice●●on scriptas . leges appellari non videtur absurdum ( cum boc ipsum lex sit , quod principi placet & legis habet vigorem ) ●as scilicet quas super dubljs in con●ilio definiendis procerum quidem consilio , & principis accadente authoritate , constat esse promulgatas : so likewise bracton in his very first chapter , speaks much to the same purpose ; cum legis vigorem habeat quicquid de consilio , & de cons●nsu magnatum , & reipublicae comm●ni sponsione , authoritate principis pr●ce●●nte , justè fuerit defini●um , & approbatum . and also in his third book , chap. . when he speaks of the antient manner of making laws in england , he says ; quae quidem fuerint approbate concensu utentium , & sacramento r●gum confirma●ae non possunt mutari , at● destrui fine communi consensu utentium , & consilio eorum . quorum consilio , & consensu fuerint promulgata . where you may see these ancient authors plainly declare , that nothing hath the force of a law in this kingdom , but what is approved of , and consented to , by all orders of men , either by themselves , or their representatives : and which is very remarkable , bracton supposes the king's authority , or royal sanction of a law , may precede the consent of the great council ; which quite destroys that notion , that it is the kings giving his last assent , which gives it the essence and vigour of a law. and with these more antient sages of the law , fortescue also agrees in his th chap. d● laudibus legum angliae , where he says ; rex angliae populum guberna● non mera potes●● to regid sed politica , populus & enim ijs legib● guber●●tur quas ipse fert , &c. what follows , is word for word the same with what bracton had before in his first chap and therefore needs not to be repeated , so likewise in the chap. speaking of the absolute legislative power of kings in some other kingdoms , he thus proceeds : sed non sic angliae statuta oriri possunt dum nelum principis voluntate , sed & to●ius regni assensu ipsa conduntur , quo populi laesuram nequiunt , vel non eorum commodum procurare . but if they after prove inconvenient , he immediately adds : concito reformari ipsa possunt , sed non fine communitatis & proterum regni illius assensu quali ipsa primitùs emanarunt . to which i may also add an authority out of that learned author st. german , who in his dialogue , called the dr. and student , written in latin , in the th . chap. entituled de sexto fundamento legis angliae . the student thus speaks , sexium fundamentum legis angliae s●at in diversis statutis per dominum regem , & progenitores suos & per dominos spirituales , & temporales , & per communitatem totius regni in parliamentis editis ubi lex rationis , lex divi●a , consuetudines , maxima , sive alia fundamenta legis anglia priàs sufficere minimè videbantur . where you see the legislative power is here attributed to the lords and commons , joyntly with the king. and therefore my lord coke in his notes upon the statute of westminster , i ▪ calls it a compleat parliament , as consisting of all the estates necessary thereunto ; for says he , a parliament concerning making or enacting laws , consists of the king , the lords spiritual and temporal , and commons , and 〈◊〉 is no act of parliament , unless it be made by the king , lords and commons . m. i shall not much concern my self with what your common lawyers , either ancient or modern have writ upon this matter ; much less what sir edward coke , a known enemy to the kings prerogative , doth maintain : since i have as good , or a better authority than he , viz. that of the year-book of ed. . wherein it is expresly declared by divers earls and barons , and by all the justices , in the case of one headlow and his wife , who had a suit with the king , that the king makes the laws by the assent of the lords and commons ; and not the lords and commons , and that he could have no peer in his own land , and that the king ought not to be judged by them : so that it is , i think , evident , that the laws are primarily and properly made by the king , and that the two houses have a cooperation ; but no co-ordination of power with him . and though at this day , i grant that custom hath made the assent of the lords and commons necessary to the passing of all laws , yet it is still the king's word , or le roy●le veul● , that makes them so ; and i much doubt , whether even this were part of the ancient constitution of this kingdom , or not , or proceeded at first from the gracious favour and permission of former kings , as i could shew by the whole series of councils , in the saxon times , if it were not too tedious to mention them particularly , therefore i shall only select some of the most remarkable . for though i confess the english saxon kings , performed all great and considerable things by the counsel , and advice of their bisho●s and noblemen , comprehended under the general names of wits ; yet you will find by the titles of almost all the councils in spellman , lambard , and that these kings alone made their laws , though by the advice and council of their wittena gemote ; which was then no other than the king 's greater council , since he called what great men and bishops he pleased to it , and omitted the rest . and it is never mentioned , that they were made by their consent , as necessary thereunto . nay , sometimes we find that some of the ancient saxon kings , made laws without the assent of their great council . thus off● king of the mercians , being at rome , out of his royal munificence , gave to the support of the people of his kingdom , that should come thither , a penny to be paid yearly for ever , out of every family , by all whose goods in the fields , exceeded the value of thirty pence . and this he made a perpetual constitution , throughout all his dominions , excepting the lands conferred upon the monastery of st. albans . this imposition and law , continued a long while in force , though we find it not confirmed by any great councils in the time of his successors , only in the laws of king edgar , and king edward , it is enjoyned to be paid , as the king's alms ; which implies it was the king's gift , and that solely without the consent of a great council . but to give you a more particular proof of the supream and absolute power of our saxon kings , as well during the heptarchy , as afterwards , in making ad establishing laws : i shall begin with the first we have extant , which are those of ina , king of the west-saxons , who began his reign , anno. . in the preface to his laws , we find it thus express't ; which i shall render out of the saxons copy , published by mr. lambard . i ina , by or with gods gift , king of the west-saxons , with the advice or council of cenred my father , and heddes my bishop , and ercenwold my bishop ; and with my aldermen , and eldest wites , or wisemen of my kingdom do command , &c. then in the first chapter the king speaks in the first person plural , we bid or command , that all our people shall after hold fast , or observe these laws and dooms . from this preface , you may observe : i. that kings are the gift of god , and that gods gift signified the same with dei gratia , they are not the creature of the people , . that princes or the better government of their people , in the setling of laws in church and state , did then consult , deliberate , and advise with their bishops , noblemen , and eminently wise men of their kingdoms ; whom for their wisdom , they honour'd with publick imployments in their dominions . . that after such consultation , deliberation and advice to the soveraign , establisheth and makes the laws . the next instance i shall make use of , is out of the same author , in the laws of king alfred , where , in the conclusion of his laws about religion , and prefatory to the secular laws ; he saith , i alfred king , have gathered these ( sanctions ) together , and caused them to be written ; and then recites , that those that he liked not , with the council of his wits , he had rejected ; and those he liked , he had or commanded to be holden . and we may observe , that the king here speaks in the single person , that he himself collected or chose , aad also rejected what laws he pleased . the next material illustration where : the legislative power then resided may be found in the laws of king edward the elder , where after the charge given to the judges ; the first law begins , i will , and so in others ; in the fourth , it is thus expressed : edward the king , with his wits , that were at exeter , strictly enqui●ing by what means it might be better provided for peace and tranquility , &c. in the d . and d. chap. it is : we also declare , pronounce or sentence ; and in the th . and i will. in which laws we have none mentioned with the king , but his wits ; and his commanding , willing or pronouncing in the imperative mood , is observable . the next laws i find , are those of king athelstan , which begin thus : i athelstan king , with the advice of walfelm my high bishop , and other my bishops , commanded , or bid all my rieves ( i. e. praefects ) of what degrees soever to pay tythes , &c. and this he commanded his bishops , his aldermen , and praepositi ( who were the judges in the country courts ) to do the same : in these laws , we cwaedon is used ; which i suppose , is something more than somner understands by his ●uide : a saying , speech or sentence , and properly is , we will. but the absoluteness of the king , appears most in the th . chap. wherein it is expressed , t●at if any of the graeves ( i. e. iudges do not perform these commands , or be more remiss in the execution of those he hath enjoyned , he shall be punished for his excess of contumacy , according to the fines there set down . king edmund is the next of our kings , whose laws are transferr'd to us , and the proem tells us , that king edmund assembled a great synod , or council to london , on the holy easter-tide , and the persons summoned are stiled godskind , and worldskind , i. e. clergy and laicks . after the first six chapters of laws , in the proem to the d . part of them ; the king signifies to all men , old and young , that he had asks advice in the assembly of his wites ; both ecclesiasticks and laicks ; and in the laws , it is often said , thonne cwaedon ▪ these we pronounce or appoint , and sometimes the single person is used ; and in other places , us betweonan heol●an , it is holden betwixt us . here we find the great council summoned by the king , and the constituent parts of it , to be the clergy and lai●y ; yet still we find the legislative power in the king alone . so likewise in the title to king edgars ecclesiastical laws , it is thus ; the laws which king edgar in a frequent assembly or council of the servants of god hath ordained , whereby you may see , that the enacting part relates wholy to himself . the same king edgar in his charter to glastonbury abby , concludes it thus , ●a●e privilegij paginam rex edgarus xii . regni sui , sacro scripto apud londo●iam communi concilio optimatum suorum confirmavit . so that though it appears this was in the presence of a great council : yet the granting and enacting part , proceeded wholy from himself . the preface to the laws of king canutus , by sir henry spelman runs thus : these are the worldly constitutions , that i will with my wites advice , that men hold all over england . in most of the chapters it is said , we teach , we bid or command , we forbid ; and in the conclusion , it is in the single person of the king. now i command all , and bid every man in god's name . and the preface to the latin version of them , saith ; haec sunt instituta cnude regis anglorum , dacorum , norwegarum , vene rando saplentum concilio ejus , ad laudem , & gloriam dei , & suam regalitatem , &c. of this canutus ; william of malmsbury , saith ; that he commanded to be observed for ever , all the laws of ancient kings , especially those made by king ethelred his predecessor , under the penalty of the kings fine , to the observing of which , he saith in his time , it was sworn under the name of king edwards laws , not that he had appointed them ; but had observed them . so that i think upon the whole matter , nothing is more plain , than that our english , saxons and danish kings , did not only call councils , and preside in them , but that the legislative power was lodged solely in themselves . f. i perceive the authority of our ancient lawyers , is a little too hard for you to answer with your usual distinctions ; and therefore you seemingly deny their authority , though in effect , you grant it as i shall shew you by and by : but as for your quotation out of the year-book , which you think sufficient to counterballance all the authorities i have brought ; i think i may much better question the judgment of those that gave that opinion , since i can shew you , that you your self cannot allow it in all points for law ; for in the first place , it is not there said , that it was so judged by all the lords and judges who were appointed to hear the cause there mentioned ; but only fuit dit , que le roy , &c. by which it seems to have bin the private opinion only of some one , or more of the lords and judges there present ; for it is not said , fuit adjuge . and if you will have it to have bin the opinion of them all , pray read what follows after . fuit dit quen temps le roy henry , & devant , le roy fuit implede comme seroit auire homme de people . mes ed. roy son fils ordeign que home sueroit vers roy per peticion , mos unques roys ne seront adjugez si non per eu● melmes & lour iustices . so that if the former part of it ●e law , the latter must be so too , and then it will directly contradict what you have quoted before out of bracton . that in the time of henry the d , ( in which he lived ) there lay no remedy against the king , but only by petition : whereas this opinion , makes him before the time of edward the first to have been liable to the same legal process with other men. but notwithstanding this passage in the year-book , may very well bear a legal interpretation , only by supplying what is indeed to be understood after the words , non pas les peers , & le commune [ viz. sans assent du roy ] which as it was then true , so i hope it will ever be so . but i think i can give you a much better authority than this year-book , to prove , where the power of making and dispensing with laws , doth truly reside , viz. the solemn declaration of the king , lords and commons , in the th . henry . ( a prince as jealous of ●is prerogative , as any of his predecessors ) where in the preamble , read these words : it standeth therefore with natural equity , and good reason , that in all and every such human laws made within this realm , or induced into this realm by the said sufferance , consents and custom , your royal majesty , and your lords spiritual and temporal , and commons , representing the whole state of your realm , in this your high court of parliament have full power and authority , not only to dispense with those , and all other humane laws of this your realm , as the quality of the persons , and matter shall require . and also the said laws , and every of them to abrogate , annull , amplifie and diminish , as it shall seem to your majesty , and the nobles and commons of your realm , present in your parliament , meet and convenient for the wealth of your realm , &c. whereby you may plainly see , that the power of making , abrogating , and also dispensing with laws , is by this act ascribed joyntly to the king , and the two houses of parliament . but though i do not affirm , that they have a co-ordinate power with the king in making laws , yet they have a co-operative power therein , which yet is no more than your co-operation ; for what is a co-operation , but a power of working together ; and how can three distinct bodies work together , without each contribute their share , to produce the intended effect . m. perhaps i may have bin too unwary in my expression ; but pray answer the authorities i have brought from our ancient english saxon laws : wherein it seems plain to me , that the king had then the sole legislative power . f. i grant he had a chief share in the legislative power ; but not the sole power , that is , he could make no laws , but in the great council , and by their consent ; and this you might have seen as well as i , if you had not slyly past by what made against you ; and therefore in the first place , to begin with your instance of offa's giving that boon to the roman school , i think the authority you bring for it , is very slight ; for though i own that matthew paris who writes his life , relates this donation , to have been made at rome , without mentioning any consent or confirmation of his great council : yet this seems but an imperfect account of the matter , and according to the usual way of the writers of those times , who are not so exact in such matters , as they should be : and therefore , though offa did give , or vow these pence at rome ; yet the gift might receive its force from the consent of his great council , after he came home : since all his laws , and the acts of his councils are lost , unless it be one , which sir h. spelman hath given us from such remains as have bin saved out of the libraries of several monasteries at their dissolution ; and this contains no less , than the consent and confirmation of his great council assembled at calcuith , anno . for the foundation and endowment of the abby of st. albans , as also that of another council at verulam ; for the conferring of divers other lands of his own to that monastery . now i leave it to any indifferent man to judge : whether that king who could not bestow his own demesnes upon the church , without the consent of the common-council of the kingdom , could give away at once , the th , peny of all his subjects estates for ever , without their consents : i am sure the donation of the same sort of pence by king edward the confessor , which is now to be found among the laws of king william the first , is said to be granted , communi confilio regni , and that the saxon kings could not bestow their lands upon religious uses : see sir h. spelmans councils , where baldred king of kent , is an evident example , who though he had given the mannour of mallings in sussex , to christ-church in canterbury : yet because his principes and great men , that is , his great council consented not thereto , it was revoked untill king egbert , and his son ethelwulf did afterwards renew the said grant , with the consent of a great council held at kingston , an. . as you may see in the same volume , last cited . and i am sure after the heptarchy , when our kings were more powerful , the same king ethelwulf , could not by his meer prerogative , grant the tythes of his subjects estates to the clergy , without the consent of a great council of his bishops and principal men , held at winchester . an. gratia . and intituled thus , celebris il● donatio ethelwulfi regis decimae manfionis & omnium benorum per terram suam deo & ecclesiae factae confirma●●● . m. i grant , that perhaps these kings could not dispose of their own lands , or the estates of their subjects , without the consent of their great council , any more than the kings of france could formerly ; yet i hope they were absolute monarchs for all that . f. i beg your pardon , if i have bin somewhat long in answering your example of king offa. but i will now shew you , that they could no more make laws , than dispose of their own , or their subjects estates , without their consent , and which you your self might easily have seen , if you had pleased to have consulted sir henry spelman , as diligently as you have done mr. lambard ; for there you might have found that about the year . king ina , assembled a great council or parliament , wherein he made ecclesiastical laws concerning marriages , &c. and did other things , ad concordiam publicam promovendam pe● commune consilium , & assensum episcoporum , pri●cipum , procerum , comitum , & omnium sapientum se●iorum , & popillorum totius regni . so likewise , if you will please to look into the decem-scrip●ores , you will find how althesian's laws were made , by the title of them , which runs thus : haec sunt judicia quae sapientes exoniae consilio adel●●●i regis instituerunt , & iterum apud feuresham , & tertia vice apud thundresfeldium , ubi hoc definitum simul & confirmatum est . so also king ethelred held at london , a great council , and made laws , consilio iussuque regis anglorum aethelredi , procerumque suorum de tota anglia , &c. look also into the title of king ethelred's laws in bromptons chronicle , where you will read these words , hoc est concilium quod ethelredus rex & sapientes sui condixerunt ad emendationem & augmentum pacis omni populo apud wodestocam in mircena landa , id est in terra mircenorum , &c. where by concilium , must be understood law or decree . to instance in one more out of the same author still , from the title to another set of laws made by the same king ; hae sunt leges quas ethelredus rex & sapientes sui constituerunt apud venetyngum ad emendationem pacis & felicitatis incrementum . see likewise in monasticon anglicanum , the first volum . anno dom. . where canu●us , rex angliae cum consilio & decreto archiepiscoporum , episcoporum , & primatum suorum expulit clericos inhones●e viventes ab ecclesia sancti edmundi , & monachos in illâ constituit . and the same king c●●te , bestowed divers lands , and other priviledges on the monastery then called briadricesworth ( afterwards st. edmunds bury ) cum consilio , & decreto archiepiscoporum , episcoporum , abbatum , comitum aliorumque omnium fidelium . the like we find in a charter of king edward the confessor , by which he granted divers lands and priviledges to the abby of westminster ; cum consilio & decreto archiepiscoporum , episcoporum , comitum aliorumque optimatum . from all which it manifestly appears , that under the english saxon kings , the legislative or enacting power , was in the council of the sapientes or wites , conjunctly with the king ; and that none of these saxon kings could pass any laws , or make any considerable alteration in the state , without , not only the advice , but consent of their great council ; which then consisted of their bishops , great lords , principal freeholders , and the representatives of cities and towns , as i shall prove another time , and was not left to the king , ad libitum , to call whom he pleased thereunto . and as the word decretum , signifies decree or order : so likewise may the word consilium here signifie something more than bare advice , viz. agreement , or appointment , which if you please to peruse any ordinary dictionary , you may presently satisfie your self in . but before i dismiss this argument : i cannot but remark upon your instance , of king edmunds making laws alone , because he there speaks in the first person plural ; whereas if you will but consult the proem to those laws once again , you will i doubt not be satisfied of the contrary , for the words are , that having aske advice of the council or assembly of clergy and laicks ▪ that is seemed good to them all , as well as to the king , and therefore we thus ordain , by which it appears , that the last words wherein the ordaining part resides , refer as well to the whole assembly , as to the king. m the government of our english saxon kings , is , i confess , very dark and obscure ; for according to our ancient historians , they seem to have bin very absolute ; though when we come to look in o● the l●ws themselves , i confess they seem rather to have bin limited kings than ab●oli●●e monarchs , though whether that limitation proceeded from the original constitution of the government , or their own free consent and concessions is a very great question , though i rather en●line to the former ; and shall give you my reasons for it , when we come to discourse on that subject ; but in the mean time , i must tell you in reply to what you have said , that if we consider the time ; not long after the conquest , you will find the supream legislative power , to have bin then wh●ly in the king ( as it is so still ) notwithstanding some ambiguous expressions to the contrary ; or else our kings would not be , what i think they really are , absolute monarchs . but to descend to times less obscure , it is certain that when the norman conqueror first came in , as he won the kingdom by the sword , so did he govern it by his sole power : his sword was then the sc●pter , and his will the law. there was no need on his part , of an act of parliament , much less of calling all the estates together , to know of them after what form , and by what laws they would be governed . it might as well be said of him , as in the flourishing , and best times of the roman emperors : quod principi placuit , l●gis habet vigorem , that whatsoever the king willed , did pass for law. this king and some of his successors being then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and having a despotical power on the lives and fortunes of their subjects , which they disposed of for the benefit of their friends and followers ; norman , french and flemings , as to them seem'd best . but as the subjects found the yoke to be too heavy and insupportable ; so they addressed themselves in their petitions to the kings their soveraigns , to have that yoke made easier , and their burden lighter , especially in such particulars , of which they were most sensible at the present time . by this means they obtained first to have the laws of edward the confessor ; and by the same ( that is to say , by pouring out their prayers and desires unto them ) did they obtain most of the laws and statutes , which are now remaining of the time of k. henry the third and k. ed. i. from whom a● also from hen. i. and k. iohn we may derive all those priviledges we now enjoy , most of which as they were issued at the first , either in form of charters under the great seal , or else as proclamations of grace , and favour : so do they carry still this mark of their first procuring by these expressions the king willeth , the king commandeth , the king ordaineth , the king provideth , the king grants , &c. and when the kings were pleased to call their estates together , it was not out of an opinion , that they could not part with their power or dispense their favours as they thought good , or abate any thing of the soverity of their former government without the approbation and consent of their people ; but out of a just fear , least any one of the three estates ( 〈◊〉 mean the clergy nobility and the commons ) should insist on any thing which might be prejudicial to the other two . the commons being always on the craving part , and suffering as much perhaps from their immediate lords , as from their king , might possibly have asked something 's , which were as much derogatory to the lord ( under whom they held ) as of their soveraign liege the king , the chief lord of all . in this respect the counsel and consent as well of the prelates as the temporal lords was accounted necessary , in passing of all acts of grace and favour to the people ; because that having many royalties and large immunities of their own , a more near relation to the person , and a greater interest in the honour of their lord , the king ; nothing should pass unto the prejudice and diminution of their own estates , or the disabling of the king to support his sovereignty . f. i confess you have given a plausible account concerning the government of william i. whom you call the conqueror ; whereas if it be more exactly lookt into , it will be found , that he had no more power of making laws without the consent of his great council ▪ than any of his predecessors ; neither had he any such despotical power as you imagin over the lives and fortunes of all his subjects ; for whether we consider them as normans , french or flemmings , or whether as english , it will be all one ; for if as dr. b. supposes , these latter were quite turned out of their estates , and that they were by him wholely given to the former ; then these french and normans , being conquerors , together with him would never have submitted to any other government than what they enjoyed in their own countries , each of which was then governed by kings or dukes together with a great council , or assembly of the estates ; and we find , that when succeeding kings would have oppressed and tyrannized over their heirs and descendants , they together with the old english took up arms , and defended their liberties , and never laid them down , until they had obtained their iust rights and liberties contained in the great charters of king iohn , and henry the d. and which ( as math. paris himself tells us in the reign of king iohn ) contained for the greatest part the ancient laws and customs of the kingdom ; and therefore by the statute , called confirmatio chartarum , th . ed. st . it is adjudged in full parliament , that the great charter , and charter of the forest , shall be taken as common law. so that they were not any new grants , but rather confirmations of their ancient rights and liberties , as my lord coke very well observes in his excellent preface to his d . institutes , where he tells us , that magna charta is for the most part declaratory of the principal grounds of the fundamental laws of england , and for the residue , is additional to supply some defects of the common law ; so that the learned chancellor fortescue , had very good reason to affirm in his treatise , de ●audibus legum angliae , that it was then governed in all king's times , by the same laws and customs , as it is now , with whom likewise agrees one of his learned successors , the late earl of clarendon , in his survey of the levi●than , when he tells us , that those laws and customs which were before the conquest , are the same which this nation or kingdom have bin ever since governed by to this day . and as for the laws of edward the confessor , though it is true , that william the conqueror re-granted and confirmed them ; yet was it no more than what he was obliged in conscience and honour to perform and observe , since he was admitted to the crown by the general consent of the clergy , nobility , and people , and at his coronation ( as well as afterward ) swore to observe the laws of king edward ; and by the way , tho these laws are called the laws of king edward , yet william of malmsbury long since observed , that they were called his laws , non qu●●ulit , sed quas observaverit , that is , he had only collected them into one body , and ratified them with the assent of his great council . and that these laws were more than once sworn to , and confirmed by king william himself , appears by the story of frederick abbot of st. albans , who frighted him into a confirmation of them by oath , for fear of a general insurrection of the people : so that if he , or his son rufus made any bre●ches upon their liberties , they were , as it were , ex post liminio restored to them by the magna charta's of hen. i. k. stephen , k. hen. ii. k. iohn , and k. hen. the iii. and those oppressions contrary thereunto , are branded by all historians as notorious perjuries , and wrongs to the subjects . but that king william the first altered nothing material in the fundamental constitutions of the government , whatever he might do in some less material customs , or laws ; which he brought with him out of his own country , appears plainly by this , which you cannot deny that he often assembled his great council ( as his english predecessors had done ) and that in them were dispatched all the great causes and complaints of the kingdom . and for this i will give you the testimony of two very ancient historians . the first is r●dolphus de diceto , who in anno , tells us , that the plaint of wulstan bishop of worcester , was heard and ended in consilio celebrato in loco qui vocatur pedreds , coran rege , & doroberniae archiepiscopo , & primatibus totius regni . the next is gervasius dorobernensis , who thus relates it , lanfranc arch-bishop of canterbury , eligentib●s eum senioribus ejusdem ecclesiae , & episcopis , at priacipibus , clero , & populo angliae , in curia regis , in assumptione sand● mariae . here the episcopi & principes , bishops & princes , the cleri & populus , the clergy and people , or laity , were the same persons , and only expressive of one another , and all had votes in this election . m. i pray give me leave to interrupt you a little . i will not deny but that the conquerour did often assemble great councils of his bishops , and great lords commonly called in historians principes , or primates , yet i think i may boldly affirm that there were no englishmen in those councils , or that they made any laws for the benefit of englishmen , who were kept under by those normans who then enjoyed their estates ; much less was there any such thing as commons either by themselves , or their representatives in those assemblies , which then consisted wholly of the king 's feudal tenants in capite , and of no other as dr. b. hath very plainly shewn us : and when king william made laws , it is much to be doubted whether he made them so much as with the consent of his great council , or not ; for the title to the french and latin copies of his laws runs thus , put into english , these are the laws and customs which william the king granted to all his people of england after the conquest or subduing of the land : they are the same which edward the king his kinsman before him observed . in this preface we have only to note , that the laws are expressly said to be the king's grant , and the supplemental laws writ in the red book of the exchequer , are by way of charter , or grant , thus , wilhelmus rex anglorum , &c. omnibus hominibus suis francis , & anglis , salutem , and all along the authoritative parts are expressed by statuimus , volumus , interdicimus , probibemus , praecipimus . so that by these expressions in his laws , the absolute soveraignty of the conqueror in the point of law-giving is manifest . i shall content my self with a very few authorities , because the matter is so plain ; ordoricus vitalis saith thus , eamque ( i. e. england ) gulielmus rex suis legibus commodò subegit . and eadm●r , contemporary with the conquerour in his history , thus , vsus atque leges , quas patres sui , & ipse in normannia soleb●nt , in anglia scribere volens . cuncta divina , simul & humana ejus nutum expectabant . from whence you may see that all matters , as well spiritual as temporal , depended upon his sole will. and tho we have no particular account of what laws his son william rufus made , yet we may presume according to the testimony of historians , that he was altogether as absolute in those councils he called as his father , as may be seen in eadmerus his account of his transactions with archbishop anselm . so that it is certain he governed by his own absolute authority , raising what money he pleased upon his subjects : 't is true , that in the reign of his successor henry the first , the people found some little relaxation , by reason of the charter he made them , containing several mitigations of the severity of the feudal laws , as also those of forests , yet even these are said to be made , by his own single grant and authority , tho i confess it was granted in a great council . so likewise in florence of worcester , we find that in th . of hen. i. that king confirmed the acts of a synod or council of the clergy of the province of canterbury , and gave his royal assent to them . as for king stephen , tho he was a notorious vsurper , and set up , and crown'd by a faction of bishops , and some few temporal lords , and that not long after his coronation he in a great council at oxford granted to all his subjects another charter of divers priviledges , and freedoms from the former exactions ▪ yet the words of the charter are in his own name , and by his own authority solely , as appears by these words , observari praecipio , & constituo . but richard , prior of hexham , alias hagulstad in his chronicle , closes his charter thus , haec omnia concedo , & confirmo salva regia , & justa dignitate mea . from which words it is plain , that he never meant to part with any of the just and necessary prerogatives of his crown . so likewise king henry the second in a great or general council held at london , confirmed the great charter granted by king henry the first , his grand-father ; but this charter also runs wholly in the king 's own name , without any mention of its being assented to , either by the bishops or nobles : and as for the constitutions made at the great council of clarendon , tho that king made the archbishops , bishops , with all the clergy , as also the earls , barons , and nobility , all swear to observe them , yet the enacting part proceeded only from the king ; as appears by their very title thus , assissae henrici regis factae apud clarendon , &c. and mat. paris concludes these constitutions with , decrevit enim rex . from whence it appears , that it was the king alone that decreed and constituted those laws . i shall not say much of the great councils in richard the first 's time , since , he did not reign long enough to call many , but in that held at notingham , we find , that the king diseized gerard de canville and others , and that the king appointed to be given him two shillings on every carucate of land throughout england , &c. from whence i shall observe , that the words rex praecepit , consti●uit , &c. as they are in this historian , shew , that the king then had solely the authoritative power of passing all consultations of these councils into binding laws , even where money was to be levied on the subjects , and that seisure was to be made of their estates . but to come to the more troublesome and perplext reign of king iohn , in which there were many great councils holden , yet i shall instance but in some few of them mentioned in mat. paris , as that of st. albans held by ieffery fitzpeter , and the bishop of winchester in this king's absence , where ex parte regis it was firmly enjoyn'd under penalty of life and limb , that the laws of king henry his grandfather should be kept by all in his kingdom . from whence we may observe , that the laws had their force only from the king's authority , as appears by this expression , ex parte regis firmi●er est praeceptum . and when afterwards at runningmead he was compelled to sign the first magna charta , i own it was done in a great council of bishops , earls and barons , as well those who stood for him , as against him . yet that it proceeded wholly from his own good will , is plain from the charta de foresta of this king , as appears by these words , ad emendationem regui nostri , spontanea , & bona voluntate nostra dedianus , concessimus pro nobis , & haredibus nostris , has libertates subscriptas . from all which charters of liberties we may conclude , that the petitions of the people were drawn into the form of a charter , and passed under the king's seal , as his meer voluntary free grants , and concessions , without their votes , suffrages , and authority . and sometimes such rights or liberties have been bestowed and declared by our kings by way of answer to the petitions of the lords , and commons , and that this custom is not yet discontinued appears by the answer of k. charles the first to the petition of right , when no other answer would please the commons , but the king 's expressed assent to their petition in these words : sole dro●●t faict comme es● d●sire . but to return to the reign of henry the third . f. i beseech you , sir , give me leave now to answer what you have already alledged out of our hi●●o●i●ns for the supreme and absolute power of our kings , before we proceed further to less obscure times . and therefore i must tell you , that you have in this long speech of yours , made use of all the artifice of an advocate for a party , viz. in urging all that can any way make for you , and slyly passing over whatsoever may make against you . and to begin with your story of king william the first , i shall not now dispute whether there were any englishmen in those great councils , or whether they consisted only of tenants in capite , since i shall defer that question till anon . but as for the english you have put upon the french title of the laws of this king , it is not fairly rendred ; for in the french it is , apres le conquest d● la ●erre , which doth not always signifie a subduing by force , but by any other ways of acquisition different from that of hereditary succession ; which mat. paris was long since aware of , when , writing of this king , he says , rex angl●ae ex conquestu dicitur , tame● quod beatus edwardus , co quod haerede caruit , regnum legavi● willielmo bastardo duci normannorum . with whom sir henry spellman in his glossary agrees , willielmus primus conquestor dicitur , quia angliam conquisivit , i. e. acquisivit , purchased , ●on quod subegit . and the learned sir iohn skene in his book de verborum significatione , writes thus , conquestus , signifyes lands qui●ilk ony person acquiri● and possess●s , privato iure , vel singulari titulo , vel donatione , vel singulari oliquo contractu . and therefore i very much doubt , whether or no , the latin , version of these words , apres le conquest d● la verre , post subactam tetram , be as ancient as the french original , and be not rather the version of some clerk or monk who lived long after . but whether these laws were not intended as well for the benefit of the english as norman subjects , i appeal to this title it self ; tho you have omitted part of it , hae sunt leges & consuetudines quas gulielmus rex concessit vniverso populo angliae post subactam terram . so that unless the english were none of the people of england , these laws were as well intended for the one as the other . and i appeal to that charter of king william you have now quoted , whether or no , it doth not begin , omnibus hominibus suit francis & anglis ; by which words certainly the english as well as normans had an interest in those laws and priviledges therein granted . i mention this only by the by in answer to what you have said . but to return to what i am chiefly concerned to speak of , the king 's sole legislative power in the first place . i shall not deny , but as this kingdom is a limited monarchy , so it is suitable to the honour and dignity of the monarch , that all laws and constitutions should run in his name , and are often said to be made by him , tho in a political or legal sense , they could not be made without the advice and consent of his great council , or parliament . and that this was the custom in the time of william the first , as of all others his successors , i need quote only the th . law of this king in these words : prout statu●um est eis , ( scil . liberis hominibus ) & illis à nobis datum & concessum jure haereditario in perpetuum , per commune concilium totius reg●i ●●stri praedicti . from whence you may observe that this king could not then make laws , without the consent of the common council of his whole kingdom . and tho he might do many arbitrary and illegal things to the prejudice of the old english liberties , yet this was no more his right , nor any more to be quoted as a precedent , than his seizing upon the bishops , and abbots lands , and violently taking away the pla●e out of churches and monasteries ( as historians tell us he did ) could give him a right to them . i have not much to observe upon the reign of william rufus , since we have none of his laws left us , if ever he made any . but thus much we plainly find from the historians , and especially eadmerus , that he called divors great councils of all the nobility of the kingdom ; especially about his difference with anselm . whom it is plain he could not condemn without the consent of this great council . but to come to the reign of king henry the first , it appears plainly by w. malmsbury and mat. paris , that he was elected and crowned king by the common suffrages , and favour of the clergy and people ; and certainly that council whose vote● could make a king , was also necessary to all such laws as he was to make : and you your self have granted , that this charter of his was made in a great council ; and it appears in mat. paris , as also in the laws of this king published by mr. lambard , tha● the archbishops , bishops , barons , earls , vicounts , or sheriff● , optimates , & totius reg●i angliae , were witnesses to this charter . and i can tell you of a very ancient * charter of king iohn , which recites that those laws were made de communi consilio , & assensu baronum regni angliae . it being usual in succeeding ages at the coronations of our english kings to confirm , make and ordain laws , de assensu baronum regni , vel per commune concilium regni , i. e. the parliament as it was afterwards called . as for henry the second's reign it is apparent by the laws of this king in spellman's councils , that he granted his charter in a great or general council , and consequently they must likewise give their assents to it , as well as to that of his grandfather henry the first . and tho in the constitutions of clarendon , the king alone is said to have made , on decreed them , yet nothing is plainer than that the king could not make them , without the advice and consent of his great council , or else to what purpose were they to be called ; and if their assent was necessary , certainly they had also a ●●nd in making those constitutions . but that the king could not condemn any peer , or great man of the kingdom in those days , without a legal tryal in the great council of the kingdom , i need go no further than a council summoned by hubert archbishop of canterbury , as the king's commissioner in his absence , where log. hoveden tells us , that having shewed the letters of earl iohn , to the bishops , earls and barons , per commune concilium regni definitum est , quod comes iohannes dissaisietur , which interprets that passage you have quoted out of the same author , that the king in a great council disseized gerard canville , and others , that is by the authority and sentence of the said council . and so likewise in the same sense is to be understood , those words you mentioned , the king appointed to be given him , constituit sibi dari , two shillings on every plough-land ; that is , he desired it to be given him by them . for if he could have taken it without their consent , to what purpose did he propose it there ? if he could have absolutely demanded it , why should he only request or desire it of them ? so likewise for the great council in king iohn's time , nothing is more plain , than that they were parties to all the laws that were made in his time , and that even the great charter , was a statute to which their assent was likewise necessary , i shall shew you by and by , when i come to speak of the great chrrter of king henry the third , and the several confirmations of it by his successors . but if either william rufus , king iohn , or any other king , ever levyed any taxes upon the people , without consent of the great council , or parliament , it was contrary to our ancient laws , and the liberties of the subjects , and particularly to the th . law of william the first ( part of which i have already cited ) it begins thus , volumus etiam ac firmiter praecipimus & concedimus , ut omnes liberi homines totius monarchiae regni nostri praedicti habea●t , & teneant terras suas , & p●ssessiones suas , bene & in pace libere ab omni exactione injusta , & ab omni tallagio ; ita quod nihil ab ois exigatur , vel capiatur , nisi servitium suum liberum , quod de jure nobis facere debent , & facere tenentur , & prout statutum est eis , &c. so that whatsoever was done at any time contrary to this statute , was illegal , and consequently ought not to be quoted as any part of the king's prerogative . but that the nobility and people of england had divers rights and liberties before the time of king iohn , and of his granting that charter , appears by its conclusion , in these words , salvis archiepiscopis abbatibus , prioribus , templariis , hospitalar●is , comitibus baronibus , militibus , & omnibus aliis tam ecclesiasticis , personis quam sec●laribus libertatibus , quas prius hab●erunt . and as for the rest of the liberties granted by this charter , tho they are said to have been granted from the king 's meer good will , yet that is recited only to make it more strong against himself , since the nobility and people of england claimed those liberties as their ancient , undoubted right . and the same author ( as i have already hinted ) expresly tells us , that this charter contained , maxima ex parte leges antiquas . — and a little lower he relates where those liberties were to be found , capitula quoque legum , & libertatum quae ibi magnates confirmari quaerebant partim in charta regis henrici superius scripta sunt , partimque ex legibus regis edwardi a●●iquis excerpta . so that they were not only the effect of the king 's meer grace and favour , as you suppose . but if you please now to descend to the reign of henry the third , and so downward , from which time our eldest printed statutes bear date , let us see if i cannot answer all those arguments which the gentlemen of your opinion have thence brought for the king 's sole legislative power . m. tho i do not allow of your notion of the conqueror's not being properly and really so , as i shall shew you another time , when i shall more particularly consider that argument of the right of conquest in king william , and all his successors ; therefore i do at present readily assent to your proposal , and it was the very thing i was coming to . and therefore i shall begin with the magna charta of henry the third , which begins thus , know ye , that we of our meer and free will have given these liberties . the statute de scaccario anno hen. . begins thus , the king commandeth that all manner of bayliffs , &c. the statute de districtione scaccarii made the same year runs thus : it is provided and ordained . the king willeth . the statute of marlbridge , hen. . and he , i. e. the king hath appointed all these acts , ordinances and statutes to be observed of all his subjects . if we come to the reign of his son edward i. and begin with the statute of westminster i. it is there said in the preamble , these are the acts of king edward i. made at his first parliament by his council , and by the assent of the archbishops , bishops , &c. and in the first chapter 't is said , the king hath ordained , and established these acts. and tho i grant that in divers statutes of this king , at in this of westminster , it is recited that the king by the advice of his counsel or assent of the archbishops , bishops , earls , barons , &c. have made , provided , ordained , or establisht such and such laws ; yet it is plain , that the enacting or decreeing part is wholly ascribed to the king in all those statutes wherein such words are found , as i shall make it appear more plainly by the statute of act on burnel made in edw. i. where it is said , the king by himself , and all his council hath ordained and established . and in the statute of westminster , . edw. i. chap. i. our lord the king , in his parliament at westminster , at the instance of the great men of the realm , hath granted , provided and ordained . in the statute de iis , qui ponendi sunt in assizes , edw. i. our lord the king in his parliament holden , &c. hath ordained that , &c. the statute of quo warranto . edw. i. runs thus , our lord the king , at his parliament holden at westminster , of his special grace , and for the affection he beareth unto his prelates , earls and barons , hath granted , that , &c. i edw. ii. begins thus , our lord the king hath granted . the statute of gavelet , edw. ii. begins thus , it is provided by our lord the king , and his iustices . the statute of carlisle , edw. ii. begins thus , the king unto the iustices of his b●nch , sendeth greeting . whereas of ●ate we have ordained , &c. but if we come to the reign of his son edw. d. the prefaces to most of the statutes made in his reign , run thus . our lord the king , by the assent of the prelates , earls , &c. and at the request of his people , hath granted and established , or else at the request of the commonality , hath ordained , &c. the like stile continued during the reigns of richard the d . henry th . and henry th . with very little alteration , only it was commonly at the request of the prelates , d●kes , earls and barons , and at the instance and special request of the commons , the king hath ordained , &c. whereby we see a plain difference in the phrases of the statutes of those times : for it is the lords that give their assent , whereas the commons only petitioned ; but it is the king alone , who ordaineth and establishes . i confess indeed , that under some princes of bad titles , as in particular , under the minority of henry th . there began some alteration in the form of penning the enacting part of most statutes that were then made , and that unto those usual words , which were inserted ordinarily into the body of the acts , from the beginning of the reign of that king , viz. by the advice and assent of the lords spiritual and temp●ral , and at the special instance and request of the commons , there was added by the authority of the said parliament . but it is still to be observed , that though these words were added to the former clause , yet the power of granting and ordaining , was still acknowledged to belong to the king alone , as appears by these acts of parliament of that king , viz. the d. henry th . ch. . th . hen. . chap. . where it is said , our lord the king , by the advice and assent , and at the request aforesaid , hath ordained and granted , or ordained and established by the authority of this parliament . and thus , it generally stood ( but every general rule , may have some exceptions ) till the beginning of the reign of henry th . about which time , that usual clause at the special instance or request of the commons , began by little and little , to be lai● aside , and that of their advice or assent , to be inserted in the place thereof : for which i do refer you to the statute-book at large ; which form , i confess , continues to this day , yet even in hen. ths . time , in the first of that king , and the th . chap. it runs in this stile . the king our soveraign lord , of his noble and abundant grace , by the advice and assent of the lords spiritual and temporal , at the supplication of the commons in the said parliament assembled , and by authority of the same , ordaineth . and though the statutes of hen. th . do generally agree in their style , with those of his father : yet in his time also , many acts were drawn up in form of petitions , as hen. th . c. . prayen your highness , the commons in this present parliament assembled , and hen. . c. . prayen the commons in this present parliament : and in the reign of his son ●d . th . tho' i grant , that most of his acts do run in the usual form ; yet this one is very remarkable , i edw. . c. . wherefore the king our soveraign lord , &c. at the humble petition and suit of the lords and commons in this present parliament assembled , doth declare , ordain and enact by the assent of the lords spiritual and temporal , and the commons in this present parliament assembled , and by the authority of the same : which last words , though they may seem to refer to the parliament , and may make men think , that the lords and commons did then pretend some title unto the power of making laws : yet neither adviseing nor assenting are so opperative in the present case , as to transfer the power of making laws , to such as do advise about them , or assent unto them ; nor can the alteration of the forms and styles used in ancient times , import an alteration of the form of government , unless it can be shewed ( as i think it cannot ) that any of our kings did renounce that power which properly and solely did belong unto them , or did by any solemn act of communication , confer the same upon the lords and commons convened in parliament : and therefore upon the whole matter , since in almost all our most antient statutes ; it is precisely express't , that they were made by the king himself , the meaning of those general words used in latter times , that the statutes are made by authority of parliament , are particularly explained in former statutes , viz. that the king ordaineth , the lords advise , the commons consent , as by comparing the writs with the statutes that expound the writs , will evidently appear . f. in answer to those authorities , you have now brought ; i doubt not , but i shall give you others of as great weight , that prove the direct contrary to what you now assert . to begin with your instance of magna charta , i shall shew that those charters that were granted and confirmed by henry d. were not his acts or grants alone ; but the grants also of the whole kingdom , represented in parliament . we have two express declarations for the one , in the th of king edw. 〈◊〉 where is to be found in the parliament roll of that year , a confirmation of the great charter of liberties and forests , in these words which i shall render to you in english , out of the old french , for your better understanding . know ye , that the honour of god , and holy church , and for the profit of our whole realm : we have granted for us , and to our heirs , that the great charter of franchises and forests , which were made by the common assent of the whole realm , in the time of king henry our father , should be held in all points , without any blemishment . so likewise we find another confirmation of those charters in the parliament rolls , of the th . of edw. d. which being in old french , i shall render it into english : imprimi● , it is accorded and assented , that the franchise of holy church , and the great charter of forest , and the other statutes made by our said lord the king , and his progenitors , the peers , and the commons of the land , for the common profit of the people , shall be firmly kept and maintained in all points . so that you may hence plainly see , that the king himself , with the whole parliament , declare , and that in two several king's reigns , that the great charters were not only the free grants of king henry ; but also the ioynt acts of the common council of the whole kingdom , and why king iohn's charter should not be made by the like authority , being one of his progenitors : i see no reason , especially if we consider , that that charter was first drawn up by the barons in the form , in which we find it ; and was past by that king , under his great seal , in that vast general council , or assembly at running-mead . and certainly , whoever can draw up a law , and can offer it to a prince to confirm , and without which consent of theirs , it would not be good , must necessarily have a share in the making of it . as for your other instances of those old statutes made in the reign of he● . d. though i grant they begin as you say , in the kings name : yet if you would but have read a little further , you would have found that in divers of them , the bishops ▪ earls and barons , gave their consents to them . and for the proof of this , i shall begin with one of the antientest statutes we have left us , viz. that of merton , in the preamble of which , it is recited , provisum est in curia domini regis apud merton , where after the parties that were present at the making of the laws , it concludes thus in the latin copies , ita provisum est & concessum tam a praedictis archiepiscopis , episcopis , comitibus , baronibus quam ab ipso rege , & aliis , where you see the providing and enacting part ▪ is ascribed to the bishops , earls and barons , as well as to the king , who is here mentioned almost last of all . and though i confess that there was then no set form of penning of statutes in that honest and plain age , when parliaments did not last so many days , as they do now weeks , and that the king's judges and council , drew up the acts after the parliament was up , in what form they pleased ; sometimes leaving out any mention of the bishops , sometimes of the temporal lords , and most commonly of the commons : yet that they did all give their consents to such acts , appears by the statute of westminster the st . which you have already cited where the assent of the arch-bishops , bishops , &c. counts , earls , barons , and all the commonalty of the land , is expresly mentioned . so likewise the statute of . of king h. d. concerning measures , begins thus . per ordinationes totius regni angliae fuit mensura domini regis composita . but farther to convince you , that in the opinion of the lord chancellour , and those learned judges who framed the writs that were issued out upon any of these antient statutes , you will find that they who lived in those very times , believed that those statutes were made , not by the k. alone ; but by him and the common council of the kingdom , which writs as you may see in the register of writs , run thus . rex vicecom . &c. salut . si a. fecerit , &c. tunc summonias , &c. b. quod sit coram iusticiarijs , &c. ostensuris quare , cum de communi concilio regni nostri angliae provisum sit , &c. as you may see in the writs granted upon the statutes of magna charta , marlbridg , merton , glocester , &c. which have all of them this , or the like recitals , cum de statuto , or juxia formam statuti , de communi concilio regni nostri ang. inde provisi . the like instance i could give you , upon the statute of marlbridge , and divers other old statutes , in which the king by the statute it self , seems only to have enacted it , and yet you may see , that our sages of the law , were very well convinced , that those statutes were made not by the king alone ; but by the whole common council of england : so that there is no avoiding the conclusion , that the great council or parliament had then a great share in the legislative power , unless you can suppose the king alone , to have bin the whole common-council of the kingdom , mentioned in these writs . but as for the rest of your instances of edw. d . and edw. ds times : i think i can shew you , that there is no general rule to be drawn from some few examples ; for though it is very true , that the first of edw. d . begins thus , our lord the king hath granted , &c. yet it is plain by the statute it self , that it was made in , and by , parliament . the like i may say of the rest of the statutes of this king's reign , though they do not all agree in form , as you may see by the statute of sheriffs th . edw. d . our lord the king by the assent of the prelates , earls , barons and other great estates , hath ordained and established . and though you would fain draw some mighty consequence from those phrases in the statutes of edw. d. and many of his successors , by the assent of the lords , and at the request of the commons , as if the consent of the latter , were not as necessary as the former : yet indeed it is a meer difference in form , and proceeds only from hence , that that estate which found it self grieved , always petitioned the king for redress ; and which amounted to as much as a consent : for you shall always find , that the petitioning part still refers to that body which was then oppressed , without giving any other assent : for certainly their requesting to have an act made , doth necessarily express their consent . and to prove what i have now said by examples , pray see the th of hen. . c. . where it is recited in the preamble , that our soveraign lord the king , willing graciously to provide for the security and quiet of the said prelates and clergy , at the supplication of the said prelates , &c. and of the assent of the great men and commons aforesaid , hath ordained and establishs't , where you may see that the assent of the prelates , is not here at all mentioned ; because it was needless , as being made at their request . and if praying and requesting , should destroy the legislative power , i doubt whether edw. d. did not give away his , when in his th . year , in a statute concerning the subsidy of wools : the preamble runs thus , nevertheless the king prayeth the earls , barons and all the commonalty , for the great business which he hath in hand , &c. that they would grant him some aid upon wools , leather , &c. where upon deliberation being bad , the said prelates , barons and commons of the kingdom , have granted him shillings to be taken on every sack of wooll . but to return to the matter , to let you see that not only the commons but also the lords have bin oftentimes petitioners , as well as the commons , pray see these authorities . the is the statute of provisors edw. d. runs thus . our soveraign lord the king , with the assent and prayers of the great men , and the commons of the realm of england , hath ordained , &c. and in the th . of ed. th . i. e. it is recited thus . the king by the assent , advice , request and authority of his lords spiritual , temporal and commons , &c. hath ordain'd and establisht in the preamble of the statute of . edw. . c. . it is thus . wherefore the king our soveraign lord , minding and entirely desiring — at the humble petition , and suit of the lords and commons in this present parliament assembled , doth declare , ordain and enact , by the assent of the lords spiritual and temporal , and the commons in this present parliament assembled , and by the authority of the same . and that the assent of the commons , was always necessary to the making of laws , not as bare petitioners , but as assenters too , as well as the lords , appears by this protestation , or declaration of the commons , to edw. d. which is still to be found in the parliament rolls of . of that king ; which i shall read to you in english , out of the law-french ; which perhaps you are not used to ; also the said commons do petition our lord the king , that no statute or ordinance may be made , or granted at the petition of the clergy , unless it be by the assent of the commons ; neither that the said commons should be obliged by any constitution , which they may make for their advantage , without the assent os the said commons : for they will not be obliged to any of your ( viz. the kings ) statutes or ordinances made without their assent . m. i do not deny , but that the assent of the commons , as well as lords , hath bin allowed as necessary for a long time : but whether the consent of either , at first was so , is a great doubt , since we find the first ancient statutes ( as i have already observed ) to have bin made wholy by the king alone : and i think the most ancient laws , are the best interpreters of the original legislative power : and thence it appears , that many provisions , ordinances and proclamations made heretofore out of parliament , have bin always acknowledged for laws and statutes . we have among the printed statutes to this purpose , one called the statute of ireland , dated at westminster , the th . of february , hen. d. which is nothing but a letter of the king to gerard , fitz maurice , justiciar of ireland . the explanations of the statute of gloucester , made by the king , and his iustices only , were received always for statutes , and are still printed with them : also the statute made for the correction of the th . ch. of the statute of gloucester , was signed under the great seal , and sent to the iustices of the bench , after the manner of a writ patent ; with a certain writ closed , dated by the king's hand at westminster , mai● edw. i. requiring , that they should do , and execute all and every thing contained in it , though the same doth not accord with the statute of gloucester in all things . hen. d. a provision was made , de assisa praesentationis , which was continued and allowed for a law , until the statute of westminster which provides the contrary in express words . so that in the old statutes , it is hard to distinguish what laws were made by kings in parliament , and what out of parliament , especially , when kings called the peers only to parliament , and of those how many , or whom they pleased ( as it appears anciently they did ) it was no easy matter to put a difference between a council-table , and a parliament , or between a proclamation and a statute . not but that i own in old times , there was a distinction between the kings special , or privy council , and the common-council of the kingdom ; and yet his special council did sit with the peers in parliament , and were as part thereof , and were of great and extraordinary authority there , as may appear by divers acts of parliament , some of which i have already recited , as the statute of westminster i. where it is said : these are the acts of edward , made at his i. parliament , by his council . the statute of acton burnel , ed. st . hath these words : the king for himself , and by his council , hath ordained and established : and in articulis super chartas , there are these provisions . nevertheless , the king and his council do not intend : and both the king and his council , and all they t●at were present , will and intend , that the right and prerogative of his crown , shall be saved to him in all things . and before these , the commons often petitioned the king : as edw. d. where magna charta was confirmed , the preamble is thus : at the request of the commonalty by their petition made before the king , and his council in parliament by the assent of the prelates , earls and barons , &c. i could give you many more examples of this kind , but that it is needless , only these may suffice to let you see , that the king's council had a great authority in those times , and perhaps was more ancient than the great council it self . yet i cannot forbear to give you one or two author●t●es more to prove ▪ that the king with the advice and consent of a council of his earls , barons , and other wise men , hath sometimes taken upon him to rep●●● a● the statutes made in a precedent parliament , as contrary to the laws and customs of this realm ; and to his prerogatives , and rights royal , though granted by him in manner of a statute . and for this , you may see the statute of th . edward the d. at large in pulton's collection . so likewise in the preface of the statute of westminster , e. . that we , viz. the king by the assent of our great men , and other wise men of our council ▪ have ordained , &c. where you may observe , that here is no mention either of lords temporal or commons . i could give you more examples of this kind , were it not too tedious . from which statutes , it seems plain to me , that this king did sometimes exercise a prerogative of making and repealing laws , without consent of parliament . in the next place , i desire you to take notice that these words you so much rely upon ( viz. ) by the authority of this present parliament , and be it enacted by the king , lords and commons , as if they were three co-ordinate estates , was never in use , till the reign of hen. th , and hen. th . two notorious vsurpers . and that the king 's single answer to the lords and commons request , is a sufficient act of parliament , without any mention of the concurrent authority of the lords and commons enacting the same the president i gave you of king charles's answer to the petition of right , may suffice , though you have not vouchsafed to give me any return to it . so that i think these instances may serve instead of many arguments ; for the proof of this truth , that the legislative power ( as we phrase it now ) is wholy and solely in the king , although restrained in the exercise and vse thereof , by constant custom unto the counsel and consent of the lords and commons : for le roy le veult , or the king will have it so , is the imperative phrase , by which the propositions of the lords and commons , are made acts of parliament . and let the lords and commons agitate , and propound what laws they please for their ease and benefit ( as generally all laws and statutes are more for the ease and benefit of the subject , than the advantages of the king ) yet as well now , as formerly , in the time of the roman emperors , only , quod principi placet , legis habet vigorem , nothing but that which the king pleases to allow of , is to pass for law : the laws not taking their coercive force ( as judicious hooke● , well observes ) from the quality of such as devise them ; but from the power that giveth them the strength of laws . so that to determine the matter logically : the legislative power , is either largely and improperly , or strictly , and properly taken : largely taken , it signifies any power , which hath the authority to provide the materials of a law , and to judge what is iust , convenient or necessary to be enacted ; and to declare when any matters duly prepared , are made and granted into a law ; and this ministerial sort of legislative power improperly so called , the two houses have , and exercise yet by authority front the grown : but then the legislative power , is strictly and properly taken for the power of sanction , or for that commanding , ordaining , power , which gives life , and being to the law , and force to oblige the conscience of the subject ; and this is radically and incommunicably in the king , as soveraign . and therefore ( as i have already said ) all the ancient acts , run in the king's name alone ; and from the legislative power thus properly taken , the laws are properly called the king's laws , and the violation of them is punishable as such . f. you have made a very long speech , and taken a great deal of pains to perplex a question in it self very easy to be resolved ; and to which i need return you no other answer , then what bracton tells us , in his d. book , cap. . de actionibus nibil aliud potest rex in terris su●● , cum sit dei minister , & vicarius , nisi id solum quod de iure potest , n●● o●sta● quod dicitur , quod principi places , legis habet vigorem , quia sequ●●u● in fine legis ; cum bege reg●a quae de imperio ejus la●a est i. e. non qui●quid de voluntate regis te●●ere praesumptum est , sed quod consilio magistratuum suo●an rege authoritatem praes●a●●e , & bab●●a super ho● deliberat●one . so that you see in the time when this author writ , the king could do no more by his prerogative . then the law allowed him to do ; and though it is true , it is his will , and authority that gives vigour to the law , yet this only , as it is declared in parliament , and in those acts which had before received the consent of his great council , here called the kings magistrates : and therefore you have done what you can , to confound the difference between the kings declaration , or writs explaining and enforcing the common laws of england , or else interpreting former acts of parliament already made ; which was a prerogative often exercised by the king and his council in parliament , which then consisted of all , or most of the iudges , and great officers of the kingdom , of which , i shall speak more at large , by and by : and i confess we are much in the dark , because our ancient parliament-rolls are almost all lost , and consequently the statutes therein contained : so that we have almost nothing left of them , but such copies or remains , as were preserved by iudges and lawyers in those and succeeding times , whilst they were still in being . and therefore i think i may at present boldly affirm , that if that , which you call the statute of ireland , was not founded upon some former statute not now in being , it was no act of parliament at all ; but only the king 's writ , to the chief justiciar of ireland , commanding and enforcing the common law of england , in the case of coparceners , to be observed in ireland . the like i may say to the explanation of the statute of gloucester , which might be no more than the interpretation of the king and his iustices , of the sense of some articles in that statute ; and this for its greater authority . exemplified under the great seal , and so sent to all the courts at westminster , and often to the sheriffs of all the counties in england , yet without altering that statute in some points , as you would have it . the like i may say of the statute of acon burnel ; and therefore it is very rashly done , to conclude , that though we have not the original acts and records of parliament , of that time , that therefore such statutes were made by the king alone , in his privy council ; so that i must still continue of the same opinion with the great selden in this point , who in his mar● clausum , tells us . it is most certain , that according to ancient custom , no answer is given either by the king , or in the king's name to any parliamentary bill , before that bill , whether it be brought in first by the lords , or by the commons , hath past both houses , as is known to all that are versed in parliamentary affairs . which if it hath bin the fundamental law of this kingdom , it signifies very little , in what form the law is express't , whether in the king's name only , as giving the last assent thereto , or else as his concession to the lords and common's petition , as long as you grant that their assent was necessary ; for sure , whosoever petitions another to do a thing , which he cannot impose upon him without his request , must give his consent to the doing it , unless you can prove , that it could be done whether the petitioner would or not : and this by the way , will serve to answer an objection ; which though you insist much upon it , is scarce worth it , viz. the king's answer to the lords and commons petition of right , which was indeed no grant or concession of any new rights or priviledges from the king to the people ; but only a declaration of several ancient rights and liberties of the subjects , which had been very much broken and infringed of late ; and therefore the king's answer was very proper , soit droict faict comme est desire . the next mistake you fall into proceeds from your confounding the king 's extraordinary council in parliament , with the king 's special , or privy council , and in a manner making this a fourth estate ; by whom , as well as by the lords and commons laws are often made ; whereas indeed neither the one nor the other is true . for tho i grant that there is often made mention in our ancient statutes , or records of the kings council ; yet this is not to be understood of his privy council , but of a special council , with whom our king 's formerly sate during the time of parliament , and before whom , and to whom we find by divers records that both the lords and commons did often petition , as you your self do truly affirm . but that this was not the king 's privy council , but another quite different from it : and to which it seems to me , that fle●a refers in his d book , cap. . habet enim rex curiam suam in concilio suo in parliamentis suis : praesentibus praelatis , comit. &c. and this council consisted of all the great officers of the kingdom , viz. the lord treasurer , chancellor , and keeper of the privy seal , master of the wardrobe , the judges of the king's bench , common pleas , barons of the exchequ●r , justices , itinerant , and justices of assizes , with such of the dignified clergy , as it pleased the king to call : which that they were altogether distinct from the king 's privy council , appears plainly by this , that the later never included all the iudges , nor did the privy council ever exercise any iudicial authority in parliament , as this council did in those days ; but that this council consisted of the parties above mentioned , see the statute of escheators made edw. i. and in the placita parliamentaria of that year the statute runs thus , per consilium regis concordatum est coram domino rege ipso consentiente , &c. but in the close roll of this year it is clearly explained who were of this council , their names being there particularly recited , viz. all the great officers above-mentioned , together with the iudges of the king's courts , and justices itinerant , &c. which is likewise explained by the parliament roll . edw. . rex voluit quod dominus cancellarius , thesaurarius , barones , soaccarii , iusti●iarii , & alii de consilio domini regis londin ▪ existente convenirent . i could give you many more examples of this kind , but i shall give you but two more , to prove that this council in parliament could not be the king 's ordinary privy council . the first is in placit . parliament . edw. . in a cause betwixt thomas fitz-peter , and alienora wife of iohn de mowbray , coram rege . the record is long , but concludes thus , to the justices , et si difficultas aliqua subfuerit , quare praemissa facere non poss●tis , tun● placitum ill●●d usque in prox. parliamentum nostrum udjornetis , ut ibidem ●unc inde fieri valeat , quod de consilio nostro fuerit faciendum . by which we may very well gather that this was none of the king 's ordinary or privy council , or else to what purpose was this cause adjourned to the meeting of the next parliament ; since , if it had been to be determined by the privy council , it might have been done forthwith . i shall give you but one instance more out of the close roll of the of this king , wherein a cause between elizabeth wife of nicholas d'audley , and iames d'audley in a controversie between them ( touching certain lands contained in in the covenants of her marriage ) is said to have been adjudged , devant son conseil , c'est a scavoir chanceller , thresorier , iustices , & a●ires sages assemblez en la chambre des etoiles : i. e. before his council , viz. the chancellor , treasurer , justices , and other wise men assembled in the star-chamber . so that when any thing in our old statutes is said to be ordained by the king , and his council , it is always to be understood , not as if this council were a fourth estate , whose ass●nt or advice was as necessary to the making of laws , as that of the lordi spiritual ; temporal and commons , for then they would have had the same power still , but only according to the custom of those times , when most acts of parliament were drawn by them , and that the king past none without their advice ; it was then said to be done by the king , and his council ( viz. in parliament ) and i conceive the power of this council continued till the beginning of the reign of henry the seventh , when this court , being by act of parliament annexed to that of the star-chamber , where also this council of the king used to meet before ( as appears by the case i have last cited ) and having afterwards only to do with criminal causes , and that as well out of , as in parliament : and that king hen. th . not caring to exercise his iudicial power in private causes as his predecessors had done , or to make use of their advice either in the drawing , or passing of bills , which now began to be drawn by committees in either house wherein those bills were preferred , this council came by degrees to grow quite out of use , as it is at this day . i hope you will pardon this long digression , which i have been drawn into , to rectifie a common mistake of the gentlemen of your opinion , who when they find any thing in our ancient statutes , or records wherein the king's council is mentioned , presently entertain strange fancies of the antiquity and authority of the privy council . m. i am so far from thinking this discourse you have now made to be at all tedious , that i give you many thanks for it , since it gives me a light into many things which i confess i did not know before , and i shall better consider the authorities you have now given me , and if i find they will hold , shall come over to your opinion in that point , tho i am not as yet satisfied as to the legistative power of the two houses , and therefore pray proceed to answer the rest of the presidents i have brought on that subject . f. i shall readily comply with your commands ; and therefore to come to those statutes of the th . and th . of edw. . which you suppose to have been repealed by that king without the consent of the lords and common● ; i grant indeed that the statutes you mention were intended to be repeal●d by the king , without assent of parliament ; yet was this not done , by himself , and his council alone as you suppose , but by a council of earls , barons and commons , which the kings of england in those days were wont to call upon emergent occasions , and for the doing of that which they thought parliaments could not so speedily perform ; as in this pretended repeal of the statute you mention : and tho i grant this was a great br●●ch upon the fundamental constitutions of the kingdom , yet that it was done in such a great council , as i have now mentioned , i refer you to this pretended statute its self , and to your recital of it . and that the king often called such great councils appears by an agreement of exchange , made for the castle of berwick between king hen. iv. in the fifth year of his reign , and the earl of northumberland , where the king promiseth to deliver to the earl , lands and tenements to the value of the castle , by these words ( which i shall render out of french from the original which remains in the tower ) , by the advice and ●ssent of the estates of the realm , and of his parliament ( so that the parliam●nt happen before the feast of st. lucie ) otherwise by the assent of his great council , and other estates of his said realm , which the king will cause to be assembled before the said feast , in case the parliament do not happen , &c. and yet notwithstanding this high strain of prerogative king edw. iii. himself was not satisfied with this repeal of those statutes you have mentioned , but in the next parliament held in his th . year he procured a formal and legal repeal of them , as by the parliament rolls of that year , remaining in the tower , doth plainly appear . and which i could give you at large , did i not fear to be too ted●ous . but i think it fit to let you know this , because most ordinary readers seeing no more appear in print in our statute books , are apt to imagin , that the kings of england in those days did often take upon them without authority of parliament to make and repeal laws . but as for your next instance of the statute of edw. iii. it is much weaker : since , tho i confess that in the preface to these acts , there is only mention of the great men , or grantz ( as it is in our old french ) and other wise men of our council , yet i shall prove at another time that under this word grantz were meant the lords in parliament , as by the wise men of our council are understood the commons . and therefore it seems most reasonable to interpret the sense of many ancient statutes wherein the king alone is said to make and ordain laws , by those later or more modern ones , wherein the king by the consent of the lords and commons , or by authority of parliament , is said to have ordained them : since the true stile and meaning of ancient laws , which were penned with the greatest brevity , ought to be still interpreted by the modern ones , and not the modern ones by the ancient . so that i am of the learned mr. lambard● opinion , who in his arcb●ion , or discourse upon the high courts of justice in england , expressly tells us , that whether the laws are said to be made by the king , and his wise men , or by the king and his council , or his common council ; or by the king , his earls , barons , and other wise men , or after such other like phrases , whereof you meet with many in the volumes of parliaments : it comes all to this one point , namely , that the king , his nobility , and commons did ordain and enact the same . and which is more if you shall find any acts of parliament ▪ seeming to pass under the name and authority of the king only , as there be some that have that shew indeed ; yet you must not by and by judge that it was established without the assent of the other estates . as for the rest of your insinuations , rather than arguments against the antiquity of those expressions , be it enacted by authority of parliament , or be it enacted by the king , lords and commons ; which bear so hard upon you , to prove that these last have a share in the legislative , that they were introduced in the reigns of henry vi. and vii . two usurpers , and but in the nonage of the former , i think i shall be able to shew you that you are very much out in your account , for i will shew you much ancienter authorities , wherein the same words or others equivalent have been used in our ancient statutes . and first pray call to mind the statute of measures already recited , where it is said , that by the consent of the whole realm of england , the measure of our soveraign lord the king was thus made , &c. which certainly must mean the assent of all the estates assembled in parliament . and my lord co●e tells us in his third institutes of an ancienter record that he had seen of the th . of this king , wherein it was enacted by the king , the lords spiritual , temporal and commons . but since i have given you presidents enough of statutes which are said to be made or ordained , by the king with the assent of lords spiritual and temporal , and commons ; i will shew you one , where the king is not at all mentioned ; and that is in rastal's statutes , hen. ▪ cap. . concerning aulnage of clothes , wherein it is said , to be ordained , and accorded by the said parliament , without any mention at all of the king. and to let you see that these fatal words you except against were in use before the reign of hen. . pray see hen. . cap. . concerning the misprision of clerk● in writing , which runs thus , the king hath now declared , and ordained by authority of this present parliament that the iustices , &c. which must certainly refer to the lords and commons unless you can make the king alone to carry the whole parliament in his own person . but whereas that phrase had began from vsurpation it would have been first found in the statutes of henry the th . but to let you see that edward the th . tho no usurper , yet did not think that these words did abate any thing of his royal prerogative , pray see in the th . of that king , cap. . wherein it is recited , that the king by the advice , assen● , request and authority of the lords spiritual and temporall , and commons in parliament assembled hath ordained and established : but that by assent of parliament , and by authority of parliament , is all one and the same , since the assent of parliament makes its authority ; pray see the express judgment in this point of the lord chief justice crew , and justice doderidge given in the great case of the earldom of oxford , reported in judge iokes's reports . to conclude , tho i do not deny his majesties negative vote to all acts of parliament , yet this prerogative can be concluded only from his giving his last assent to a law , for when a bill begins from himself , the two houses have likewise a negative upon him , which is evident , in an act of pardon , which proceeds from the king first , and sent down to the parliament , this neither the lords nor commons can add , or alter one tittl● to ; yet may they notwithstanding his prior asent , refuse the whole bill if they please ; tho already past under the great seal . and tho i likewise grant , that it is the le roy le veult , that by yielding the highest , and last assent gives the enacting force to the law , and thus the king may in a logical sense be said thereby to make the laws according to that known maxim , quod dat formam , dat esse ●ei ; yet this does not hinder but in a legal sense according to the express declaration of our old lawyers , and acts of parliament , the laws owe their obligation to the joint consent of king and parliament , and his giving his last assent , or form to the law , no more proves his sole legislative power than it would do , that of the lords or commons , if either of them by the constitution of the government were to give their asents last thereunto . so that i think upon the whole matter , no man can reasonably deny but that legally the two houses of parliament have also their share not only in framing , but enacting of all bills that shall pass ; for otherwise they would signifie no more than the committee of estates in scotland , or the king and council of england in relation to ireland ; the former of which draws up all bills that are to pass in the parliament of that kingdom ; and the latter must approve or reject all bills that shall pass in the parliament of ireland : whereas the authority of our parliament consists in their consenting to , and enacting together with the king all statutes whatsoever . and this distinction i think may very well reconcile bracton , with fortescue , the former of which says , quod leges ligant suum l●torem ( meaning the king ) and the latter ( in the place i have already cited ) affirms , that the people are governed by those laws , quas ipse fe●t , which they themselves make ; and this i think is to ascribe to the king as much power as is requisite to a civil soveraign , and yet to leave a sufficient share to the people to secure themselves from tyranny . m. i must beg your pardon if i cannot be satisfied with your division of the legislative power beiween the king and the two houses of parliament , since it is against the sense of our old lawyers glanville and bracton , who as you your self confess make the king the sole legislator . and tho i confess fortescue gives the people a share in it , yet he is but a modern author in comparison of the other two , and writ to support the vsurped title of henry the sixth . so that i cannot comprehend how the two houses can have any share ( properly speaking ) in the legislative power , without falling into that old error of making the king one of the three estates , and so co-ordinate with the other two whereas ; if the king be a monarch , that signifies in greek the government of one person , whereas by giving the two houses a part in the legislative , you divide it into three several shares . whereas there is so close a conjunction between all the parts of soveraign power ▪ that the one cannot be separated from the other , but it will destroy the form of the government , and only set up an irregular commonwealth in its place , which will scarce be able to hold long together , without falling into perpetual quarrels , and disputes about the encroachments upon each other's power and priviledges . but it appears as well by the whole tenor of our laws , as also by divers express statutes , that the king is the sole supream , or consequently the sole legislative power : the first of these i shall prove from the common indictments of treason , murder , felony , &c. which run always , encounter la corone , & la dignitie de roy , and the process against such offences , are called the pleas of the crown ; because they are against the crown and dignity of the king. so that it is not the dignity and authority of the lords and commons , which is violated , but the dignity and authority of the king. in the next place , this opinion is contrary to the express declaration of divers of those very parliaments , which you pretend have exercised a share in the legislative : for you cannot deny , that many of our ancient as well as modern statutes , were made and drawn up in the form of a petition from the lords and commons , or both of them to the king. and it is very strange , that one fellow in the supream power , should so humbly petition the other . but . though time hath altered the form of petitioning into bills , yet both lords and commons have bin often used to call the king , our dread soveraign , our soveraign lord , our liege lord , and the like , and to stile themselves , we your majesty's most humble and faithful subjects , or most dutiful and obedient subjects ; and in that humble stile , to beseech him to enact such and such things , which sure they could have done alone , had they bin co-ordinate with him in law-making : lastly , if they were co-partners with him in the supream power , how came they to declare ( as they did in the preamble to the statute of the th . hen. . which you your self have quoted ) that the realm of england is an empire , governed by one supream head and king , unto whom the body politick of the nation , compacted of several sorts and degrees of people , divided in terms of temporality and spirituality , owe and bear next unto god , a natural and humble obedience ? now how came they here farther to declare this supream head of the clergy and laity to be furnished with plenary , whole and en●ire power by the goodness and sufferance of almighty god. certainly they can have no share in it , if it be plenary , wholy , and entirely in him , or how came they in the st . statute of queen eliz. c. . ( being a recognition of the queens s●premacy ) to acknowledge that all power temporal and spiritual , was deducted from her , as the supream head , and that they were her most faithful and obedient subjects , and that they did in parliament represent the three estates of this realm , and that she was the only supream governour thereof : which was pursuant to a statute to the same purpose , in the d ed. . c. . wherein it is declared , that all authority of iurisdiction spiritual and temporal , is divided and deducted from the kings majesty , as supream head of these churches and realms . not to mention the oath of supremacy it self , that the king or queen's highness is the only supream governour of this realm : which these statutes would never have acknowledged , had it not bin consonant to our ancient common law , by which it is expresly declared in that old law-book & written as it is supposed by bishop bre●ton ) in the very first leaf whereof it is thus expressed in the name of king edw. st . himself : we will , that our iurisdiction be above all other iurisdictions , which had been spoken in vain , if all other powers had not bin derived from , and so subordinate to , the kings . besides i could prove this farther from history , and matter of fact. f. i thank you sir , and i desire i may answer what you have now said , before you pass to another head , for i doubt the time will not give us leave to discourse much further on this subject to night . in the first place therefore , i must tell you , that the main foundation of your last arguments , is founded upon a supposition , which i altogether disown , viz. co-ordination or division of the soveraign power , between the king , and the two houses . for i have always supposed , that the king continues still supream , and that ( as the modus tenendi parliamentum declares ) he is principium , caput & finis parliamenti ; that is , he can call and dissolve parliaments when he pleases ; and likewise , that the executiv● part of the government , rests solely in him , as also the power of making war and peace : and even in the legislative it self , that the king hath more eminently ( though together with the parliament ) a supream enacting power , without which , it cannot be a law. this being considered , you will find , that here is no division of the legislative power : since neither the king , nor the two houses , have it solely and compleatly in themselves ; but it is joyntly executed by them all three , as one entire politick body or person . so that neither can they make any law without him , nor he enact any without their consent ; and he by giving his consent last , gives it the force and sanction of a law , and he is therein the supream , i. e. the last , or vltimate power ( in the true sense of that word ) nay , the only supream power , unless you could suppose two supreams , that is , two highest powers at once in the same kingdom : but that for all this , the two houses are not subject to the king in matters relating to legislature , may hence farther appear , that the king cannot command them to give him what mony , or to pass what laws he pleases : since if he should go about to do so , they might ( as i suppose , you your self will grant ) lawfully disobey him ; which they could not do without apparent disloyalty , and high disobedience , were they in this , as they are in other indifferent things , subject to his commands , when legally issued . but to return you a more particular answer , to what you have said to prove the king to have the sole legislative power as to what you pretended i have quoted out of glanville , if you please better to consider of it , you will not find , that he gives the king any more than an enacting power , together with his great council . for though he tells us , quod principi placet , legis habet vigorem ; yet mark what follows ; eas scilicet quas super dubijs in consilio definiendis procerum quidem consilio , & principis antecedente a●thoritate consta● esse promulgatas . where by the last consilio is meant , some what more than meer advice , as i have already proved . but as for bracton , it is true he agrees with glanville , in making the kings authority , necessary to the essence of a law : yet he is more express than the other in making the advice and consent of the great council or common-wealth , also necessary to its being , as you may remember by these words , cum legis vigorem habeat quicquid de c●nsilio & de consensu magnatum , & reipublicae communi sponsione , authoritate principis praecedente , juste fueri● definitum . but further to let you see , how much you are out in your argument , whereby you would prove from the form of our indictments of treason , &c. that the king hath the sole legislative power of the kingdom . i shall shew you , that all our ancient laws , as well common as statute , do declare the contrary : since divers a●ts of parliament have expresly affirmed , that such and such offences were trea●on , not only against the king , but against the king and the whole realm too ; pray take these instances , see the statute edw. . c. . wherein hugh de spencer , both the father and son , are by the king and parliament declared traitors and enemies of the king , and of his realm : see likewise hen. . c. . wherein the crown is setled by act of parliament , on the heirs of his body , begotten on queen jane , or by any other after marriage , and that the offenders that shall interrupt such heirs in their peaceable succession , they with their abbe●tors , maintainers , &c. shall be declared and adjudged , high traytors to the realm . and therefore divers ancient indictments in stanfords pleas of the crown are laid contra pacem regis & regni . and that the parliament hath reserved to it self a power , by the statute of the th . of edw. d. to determine what crime shall be adjudged treason , besides conspiring to kill the king , and those other offences specified in the same statute ; you may consult the statute at large . but that these offences can be no other than an endeavour to alter the government , or fundamental laws of the kingdom , i think is evident , since all offences relating to the lives , or honour of the king , queen , and their eldest son are there particularly specified , and it was by virtue of this statute , that the late unfortunate earl of strafford , was first impeached by the commons , and afterwards attainted by act of parliamen● , in the year . but whether justly or not , it is not my business now to determine , it is sufficient that it was then granted by the king himself , that if the earl was really guilty of destroying the government , and introducing an arbitrary power , he might have bin deservedly condemned . but that the power of making and dispensing with laws , is particularly applyed , not only to the king , but to the lords spiritual , temporal and commons , pray remember the preamble of the statute i have already cited of the th . hen. . c. . wherein it is so expresly declared , as also by the th . of this king. chap. . the preface of which statute , runs thus : and whereas the kings most noble progenitors , and the nobility and commons of the said realm , at divers an● sundry parliaments , as well in the time of king edward st . edward d. richard d . henry th . &c. made sundry ordinances , laws , statutes and provisions , for the entire and sure conservation of the prerogatives , liberties and preheminences of the said imperial crown of this realm , &c. where pray note , that the making of all these statutes , is ascribed to the lords and commons , as well as to the king : which is also farther acknowledged by the said king henry , when in a set speech to the parliament , reported by crompton ( in the case of errours ) he said these words , we being informed by our iudges , that we at no time stand so highly in our estate royal , as in the time of parliament , wherein , we as head , and you as members , are conjoyned and knit together into one body politick . and sure then , if the king's simile be true , whatsoever functions are performed by the whole body , must be done by the members , as well as by the head. i shall sum up all i have said into this syllogism , that power which cannot make or enact any new law , without the advice and consent of two other bodies , is not the sole legislative power . but the king is that power which cannot , &c. ergo , the king is not the sole legislative power . m. i shall not longer dispute this question with you : since i own the two houses have claimed for some ages past , a share in the legislative , tho' in a large and improper sense , as you your self do partly grant : and though for the more just and equal course , our kings have for a long time admitted the estates , viz. the lords spiritual , temporal and commons , into a seeming share of the legislative power : yet this was not by constraint , nor by any fundamental constitution of the government , as you suppose ; but only from their own meer grace and favour , to make laws by the consent of the whole realm , because that no one part thereof , should have any cause to complain of partiality : and though i grant the king is bound to observe these laws when made , by vertue of his coronation-oath , so as that he cannot alter them without their consent , yet is he still above the law , by virtue of his absolute monarchical power , and is not subordinate to it , or so bound by it , as to be responsible to the people , for any breach committed by him upon it ; for that were derogatory to the soveraign power , and inconsistent with the nature of monarchy ; and were to set up the law ( which is but a creature of the prince's making ) above his soveraign authority : and this would make our monarchy , a kind of government which would neither be monarchical , nor yet a republic , but some mungrel thing made up of both . so that i take the notion of a mixt monarchy , to be a contradiction in adjecto : a limited monarchy i confess there may be either by the monarch's own voluntary grant or consent , as in this kingdom , or else on conditions imposed upon a prince by others , either by a foreign power , as in tributary and feudatary kingdoms , or else by the natives of the same country , as in some elective kingdoms and principalities ; but then such limitations of monarchical power , represent a prince as it were fettered , and who cannot act as he would , and ought for the advantage and wellfare of his people , if he had his liberty , and the full exercise of his soveraign power : and therefore in most governments limited after this manner , the soveraignty still remains in the senate or p●ople that elected him ; which makes me think it solecism in politicks to affirm , that a monarch ( properly so called , and still continuing so ) could be thus limited by laws , or fundamental constitutions , as you call them at the first institution of the government : for if he were thus limited , that power that could thus limit him , must be either superior or inferior to him . superior it could not be , because both the prince and the people that could put those conditions or limitations upon him , could not be his superiors in the state of nature , before they made him king , neither could they be his inferiors , because an inferior power , can never limit a superiour : and since all our laws , ( as well as the oath of allegiance and supremacy , we take to the king ) do own him to be the sole supream governour of this realm ; i cannot understand how this limitation can consist with the king's supremacy ; for if he be thus limited and restrained . how is he supream , and if restrained by some law , is not the power of that law , and of them that made that law , above his own supream power ? and if by the direction of such law only he must govern , where is his supream power ? so that when the law must rule and govern the monarch as a superior , and not the monarch the law , he hath at best , but a gubernative and ex●cutive power . lastly , if this power of the prince , were limited at the original constitution , there must be a power appointed in some council or senate ( call it a parliament or assembly of the states , or by what name you please ) whose business it must be , to see them exactly kept and performed ▪ now these men must either have a power barely of advising the monarch , and perswading him to observe these fundamental limitations , or else they must also have a power of forcing or compelling him , if he will not hearken to their advice and remonstrances : if they have no more than the former power , that you say , signifies nothing , since the king may refute to hearken to them if he pleases , and may do what he will notwithstanding ; but if they have also a coercive power over him , and may resist or punish him for his transgressions , he will then cease to be a monarch : since he cannot be so , who is accountable to any power , either equal or superior to himself ; and this our late parliaments have bin well aware of , when they renounced all coercive power over the person of the king , and any right of making war , either offensive or defensive against him : so that besides the history of matter of fact , which i can further give you , to prove , our kings to have bin at first absolute monarchs : i think the very hypothesis of a mixt or limited monarchy ▪ labours under such insuperable difficulties and absurdities , that i cannot conceive how those limitations by which we find the king's prerogative now restrained , could ever proceed from any higher cause , than the free grants and concessions of the kings predecessors , confirmed by his own coronation-oath : which though i acknowledge , he is bound to observe , and that if he breaks it , he commits a great sin against god : yet it is only he , that must punish him for so doing , since the oath is not made to the people , but to god alone . f. notwithstanding what you have now said , i hope i am able to shew you , that all your arguments against a mixt or limited monarchy , are more subtile than true : for as to your first argument from the word monarch , i grant indeed , that strictly speaking , the word monarch and monarchy , signifie a single ruler , and the government of one alone : yet in common acceptation , or according to the laws , and constitutions of several other kingdoms , besides england , as in the empire , in denmark , and sweden , the emperor , and those kings have bin called monarchs , and those kingdoms monarchies ; though by the original constitution of those governments , those princes have not bin invested with a pure imperial authority , such as that of the roman emperors of old : yet since they had the executive and gubernative part of the government committed to them , and that they were lookt upon as the heads of those kingdoms , and that the government did therein partake more of monarchy , than of any other form , those princes have bin always reputed ( and that justly ) monarchs , notwithstanding there was a very great mixture of aristocracy in the empire , and in denmark , and both of aristocracy and democracy in sweden . the like may be said of england , france , and those kingdoms in spain , that were instituted by the goths and vandals , the francs and saxons , after the ancient gothic model of government . and though i grant this sort of mixt monarchy , is not to be reduced to any of the three distinct kinds of government layd down by aristotle , yet are they not for all that , to be condemned , but rather the more approved of , since by this mixture , they were capable of diverse benefits , and free from several mischiefs , which are incident to any of those forms of monarchy , aristocracy or democracy , when exercised purely , and without any such mixture : and that this , as to england it self , is no invention of the common-wealth-men ( as you call them ) you may read king charles the st's answer to the propositions , sent him by the parliament , for the words are remarkable . this kingdom , says he , is mixt of monarchical aristocratical , and democratical government , and that so wisely , that we have all the conveniences , and none of the inconveniences of any of those forms taken single . nor doth this at all derogate from the nature of the monarchy , nor make any division between the necessary functions of soveraign power : for i have already granted , that the executive or gubernative part , is wholy in him , as also the power of making war and peace ; and as for the legislative , as long as the king hath a negative vote in all laws that pass , and that they cannot be made without his royal sanction , the legislative power is not divided , as i have already proved . but as for your other argument against a prince's being limited by the original constitution of government , tho as i yield it is more subtile , so it is also more sophistical and fallacious than the former . for your dilemma , by which you would prove the absurdity of that nation , will not do , because a prince at the institution of the government , may be limited by those who are neither superior , nor inferior to himself : but only equal in the state of nature , as i suppose the people to be with a king , before he was made so by them ; and that equals may thus limit each other , you your self will not ( i suppose ) deny in the case of princes , who are equals in the state of nature : as queen mary ( for example ) made such conditions with king philip of spain , before she marryed him , that if he offered to meddle with the government of this kingdom , without her consent , it would be lawful for her to part herself from him , and to send him home into his own kingdom ; and might she not with a safe conscience , have done so upon the breach of the conditions on his side ? apply this to the people in the state of nature , and the person they are about to make king before the politick marriage of a coronation or admission to the crown , and see if they do not exactly agree , or whether the people can be blam'd , if they repudiate their politick husband , for invading that part of the government , which they had reserved to themselves ? nor doth this argue any more superiority in the people , over the king in the state of nature , than it doth for a creditor in the like state , to compel by force , his debtor to pay him a sum of money which he owed him , in case there were no civil iurisdiction for him to appeal to . and let us farther suppose , a council or parliament appointed , who may remonstrate to the king his transgressions , or violations of the law : yet this may be without any coercive power over his person , or of making war upon him ; since the king may , if he please , remedy all these disorders , by redressing their grievances , and punishing the authors of them . so if he will wilfully persist in such violations , as strike at the fundamental constitution of the government , and do also go about to execute them upon the people by force , this being in effect , a making war upon them ; i suppose they have then a just right to defend themselves against his tyranny . so that if these rights or priviledges we now enjoy , were not the meer concessions of the king's grace and favour , as you affirm , but reserved as part of their birth-right , at the original constitution of the government ( as i shall prove all our fundamental laws were ) the people have then as much right to defend them ( their allegiance to him being upon that condition , either express or imply'd ) as any other nation hath to defend their lives , liberties and properties , against the violence of the supream powers , or any commissioned by them , as i hope i have already proved to you : so that notwithstanding all that you have said to the contrary , i think the notion of a mixt or limited monarchy in the very institution , may be agreeable to reason and practicable too , either in this or any other kingdom : and when you can prove the contrary by history , or matter of fact , as you promise , i will give up the cause . m. you have broached a parcel of special common-wealth notions , in which you are every way out : as first , in making the king's authority derived , either from , or by , the peoples consent : whereas all our ancient lawyers call him god's vicar or lieutenant on earth , and not the people's ; and in the next place , in supposing he may be resisted by force of arms , whenever the people shall think themselves opprest , or their fundamental rights and liberties , as you call them invaded , it is contrary to the express declaration of the parliament , by two serveral statutes , in the d . year of the late king charles : and though you disclaim all coercive power of the two houses over the king , yet it is only to place this right of resistance in a more fallible and ungovernable body , viz. the whole people in their natural capacities , which as it is more consistent with your principles , so it is more dangerous to all supream powers , as well common-wealths , as monarchies , as i have partly shewed you already ; and i hope may farther convince you , before i have done . but since i have not now time to shew you the falsity and absurdity of these notions , and to urge the statute at large , against resistance in any case whatsoever : i pray go on in the method you have proposed , and let me see how you can make out , that even our parliaments do not derive that priviledge they now enjoy of giving their consent to laws , as also their very being , to the gracious concessions of our former monarchs . f. that i shall do with all my heart : but first let me tell you , that though i own the king to be god's lieutenant in these his dominions : yet i must likewise aver , that it was only by the consent and voluntary submission of the people of this nation , that the first monarch ( begin where you will ) could obtain that title . and as for those statutes you mention against all resistance in any case whatsoever , i doubt not but to shew you , that it was never the intent of that parliament , to debar us from all necessary resistance , and self-defence in cases of illegal violence , and intollerable oppression ; unless you can suppose , they were resolved to alter the government , and to put it into the king's power , to destroy all our laws and liberties ; and instead of a lawful king , to set up for a lawless tyrant , when ever he pleased . but to come to the matter in hand , i shall shew you that it is not at all impossible or improbable , that without any hinderance of that power , which is necessary to the king as supream , that he might for all that , have bin limited as to the legislative , at the first institution of the government , which i shall thus make out . i do therefore in the first place suppose , that the english saxons being a free people , after their conquest of this island , as well nobles , as commons did agree by their free consents , and publick compacts , to set over themselves a prince or soveraign , and to resign up themselves to him , to be governed by such and such fundamental laws : here is a supremacy of power set up , though limited as to the manner of its exercise . . then because in all governments after cases will arise , requiring an addition of laws , suppose them covenanting with their s●veraign , that if there be any cause to constitute any new laws , he shall not by his sole power , perform that work ; but that they will reserve in themselves , a concurrent or co-operative power : so that they will be bound by no laws , but what they joyn with him in the making of . . i suppose , that though the nobles may personally conven● : yet since the commons being so numerous , cannot meet together in person , therefore for the doing of this work , it be agreed , that every city of considerable town , should have power to depute one , or more to act for the whole body in the legislature . that the nobles by themselves in person , and the commons by their deputies assembling there , may be representatively the whole body of the kingdom , with power to execute that authority reserved for establishing new laws . . since the occasion , and need of making such laws , and expounding the old ones could not be constant and perpetual , therefore we may farther suppose , for the avoiding of the inconvenience of three standing co-ordinate powers , they did not establish these estates to be constantly existent , but occasionally , as the causes for which they were ordained , should require . . because a monarchy was intended , and therefore a supremacy of power ( as far as was necessary ) must be reserved in one , it was concluded , that these estates should be still ass●mblies of his subjects , and swearing allegiance to him ; and that all new laws , which by agreement of these powers , should be enacted , should run in his name , and be called his laws , and they all bound to obey him in them , when thus establisht . and lastly , it being supposed , that he who thus was to govern by law , and for the furtherance of whose government such new laws were to be made , should best understand when there was need of them ; and that the convening and dissolving of the assembly of the estates , was a power of great trust , it was put into the prince's hands , by writ to convocate , as also to prorogue or dissolve such meetings . but in process of time , some princes not caring much to have their government lookt into , or to have any power in being but their own , taking advantage of this power , of assembling these estates , did more seldom then need required , make use of it : whereupon provision was made , and a time set by new statutes , within which , an assembly of parliament was to be held : now when you have made these true suppositions in your mind , you have the very model and history of this monarchy , and we shall easily find , what to answer to the arguments before produced on either side . for first , it is his parliament ; because an assembly of his subjects convocated by his writ to be his council , and to assist him in making laws for him to govern by : yet not his , as other courts are , as deriving their whole authority from the king. so likewise his power of assembling and dissolving them , proves him thus far above them ; because , though as to the time of their meeting , it depends on him ; yet their power and authority quoad specificationem , i. e. the being , kind and exercise of it , is from the original constitution . for as to that , they expect no commission and authority from him ; but only for their meeting , to proceed to act , but when met , they acts according to the original rights of their constitution : and those acts proceed from their conjunct authority with , not from their subordination to , the king in the legislative , as also in laying of taxes , &c. on the people . the oath of allegiance indeed binds them , as his subjects to obey him , governing according to establisht laws : but yet it supposes them to be built upon the foundations of his legal government , and must not be interpreted to vndermine and destroy it . he is hereby acknowledged to be supream , so far as to rule them by laws already made , or to be made , but not without them . so that this is no derogation to the legislative power of parliament : and i believe of these things , no unprejudic'd man can make any question . and herein consists the accurate judgment of the contrivers of this form , that they have given so much into the hands of the soveraign , as to make him truly a monarch ; yet have reserved so much in the hands of the people , as to enable them to preserve their laws and liberties . m. i confess you have given a long and plausible account of the original and form of our government , though if it come to be examined , i doubt it will prove a meer romance , and not at all agreeable to true history , or matter of fact : since if we look to the eldest times , either after the saxon or norman conquests , we shall find the power of our kings , to have bin still more absolute , then they are now ; and i think i could easily trace the steps , by which the people have attained to all the power and priviledges they now enjoy , which as i do not grudge the nobility and people of this nation . yet they ought to exercise it with a due respect and subordination to that power , from which they were all at first derived , least if they should ascribe them to themselves , the king should be tempted to destroy those great priviledges , and taking away the very being of parliaments , to make laws without them . but to shew you farther , that this notion of an independent power in the two houses , by the original constitution of the government , is altogether inconsistent with the king's prerogative , appears from clear matter of fact , even as you your self have put it ; for when kings thought fit not to have their power controuled , you acknowledge they called parliaments , less frequently than usual ; and that thereupon there were divers laws made , appointing certain times for their meeting ; from whence it appears , that before this , the times of their meeting , were wholy left to his discretion . nay farther , that the king's prerogative of assembling them , or omitting it when he pleases , cannot be limited by any act himself can make , appears from hence , that notwithstanding all those laws that have bin made for annual and triennual parliaments , our kings have never thought themselves obliged to call parliaments , of●ner than they saw their own occasions , or the necessities of the people ( which they themselves were sole iudges of ) required : nor did any parliaments ever find fault with this , till that rebellious one in . which had the confidence to present to the king a bill to be past , whereby it was not only enacted , that there should be a parliament every third year ; but that upon the king 's omitting to issue forth writs of summons , the sheriffs , nay constables , might summon the free-holders , and proceed to election , and that the lords might also meet without any writs from the king ; which was quite contrary to the original constitution , by which ( as you your self grant ) there could be no parliaments , without his summons , he being principium , capus & finis parliament : and if so , it seems wholy improbable , nay impossible to me , that your two houses should have by the original constitution , any power of meeting or doing any thing , without his majesties consent and allowance ; and we know , that at this day , the sp●aker in the name of the house of commons , desires of the king. liberty of sp●ech : and king henry th . and queen elizabeth , did sometimes rebuke the house of commons , and sent to them to desist , when they were about to pass any bill they did not approve of , or to meddle with those things , which did not belong to them : which plainly declares , that ( contrary to your affection ) neither of the two houses have any power to proceed upon any business , or to pass any bill which the king disapproves of : and though i grant , that they do not ask the kings leave for the bringing in , or passing of all bills whatsoever in either house , or that the king can command them to give him what money , or pass what bills he pleases ; yet this priviledge must needs proceed from his grant or concession to the contrary : whereby , though he hath discharged them from an active obedience to such commands ; yet hath he not thereby divested himself of any of the essential rights of soveraignty , or at all discharged them from a passive obedience , or submission to his power , supposing the worst that can happen , that he should take away what share he pleased of the subjects estates , without their consent ; or make his own edicts , and proclamations to be observed for laws : since the king's authority is prior to all others , and that ( as the statutes of edward the th . and queen elizabeth ; which i have already quoted , expresly declare , ) all power , authority and iurisdiction spiritual and temporal , is derived wholy from the king , so that unless your legislative power of parliament be somewhat , that is neither an authority , nor a iurisdiction , it is by this very body , acknowledged to be wholy derived from him : nor have you yet answered this argument , nor i believe , can you do it . f. as for your history which you promise to give me , of the absolute power of our first saxon , and norman kings : i desire you to defer the speaking of it , till another time , it being now late : yet i do not doubt but to prove , that what i assert concerning the limited power of our kings , even by the original constitution of the government , is no romance , but true history : nor are the reasons that you have now urged to the contrary , prevalent enough with me , to alter my opinion , for i think i am able to prove somewhat more than i but now asserted , viz. that the wittena g●mote , or great council met constantly once a year , or oftner , when need was , under the saxon kings , without any summons from them , as when we come to the particular history of this matter , i shall shew you more at large ; and also , that for the first hundred years after the coming in of the normans , the great council or parliament used to meet of course at the king's court , at two or three of the great feasts of the year . without any other notice by writ or summons . the first mention we find of such writs , being in king iohn's magna charta : but that when these assemblies became less frequent , by reason of the king ' discontinuing of them ; and because of the case the nobility and people found , in being discharged from so constant and chargeable an attendance , they came to be so discontinued at last , that as you your self confess , there were fain to be express laws made for their more frequent meetings , and though the power of summoning them , was ( i confess ) left wholy in the king ; and that he did very often dispense with the calling them according to the intent of those statutes : yet doth not this prove any legal prerogative in him , so to do , but that it was a high breach of trust , and also of his coronation oath , when he thus omitted to call them ; since our kings were formerly sworn to keep , and observe those laws , quas vulgus elegerit , which the people either have , or should chuse , construe it which way you will , though i own in french , it is in the preterit , auera èleu , should have chosen ; and as it is an old maxim à facto ad ius non valet consequentia ; so it is no true way of proof , to argue from an illegal exercise , or abuse of power , to a legal right or prerogative . and though the parliament might not always actually question , or find fault with their kings for thus neglecting to call them ; because , perhaps the publick sustained no present damage from it , and that they thereby escaped the giving the king those taxes and aids which he usually demanded of them at such times : yet when the long forbearance of omissions of parliaments , became a general grievance , by reason of those encroachments , that the king and great men often made , upon the people's liberties in those intervals , and that the king lookt upon it as a piece of his prerogative , to abuse this trust as far as he pleased : i grant then ( and not till then ) there was need of a law , that there should be a parliament every year , and that in case of any failure of summons on the kings part , the people might proceed to election without it , which was not so properly a new law , as the restoration of the old constitution , since anciently the people met the king at these great councils , at such set times of the year , as i shall prove , when we come to the history of matter of fact ; which i am not at all affraid to be judged by , and then also i shall shew you , that though the king is now principium , caput & finis parliamenti ( that is , the parliament properly so called ) yet that the great council or assembly of the estates , had from the first institution of the government , a power of assembling themselves in cases of necessity , such as are doubtful or disputed titles to the crown , or the absence of the successor ; and then they have often met by their own inherent authority , and have either setled the succession of the crown , as they thought good , or else have recognized an hereditary right , in the absence of the heir , as when king edw. st . was absent , being in his return from the holy land : or else to depose the king's iusticiar , as in the case of william longchamp , bishop of ely , who was left chief iusticiar by king richard st , when he went into the holy land. and though i own that some high-spirited , and yet well-beloved princes , might take upon them a power of rebuking the house of commons when they meddled with business they did 〈◊〉 like : yet this submission proceeded from the great r●verence they had for their persons ; and confidence they placed in their government : since we find that only these princes that were wise and successful in their government , and so became the darlings of their people , such as queen elizabeth and king edward d. ( for as for henry th . i remember no instance of it ) who durst venture to act thus . as for the desire of freedom of speech , it is but a compliment : for how can the grievances of the kingdom be redressed , without speaking freely of them ? and if one great end of parliament was to redress these grievances , it were altogether in vain , for them to attempt any thing in this kind , if the king could brow-beat them from it , when ever he pleased . but bract on doth not only tell us , rex habet superiorem , legem , & curiam suam baronum , &c. in the place i have already cited ; but the old book called the mirrour of iustices , also teaches us the same lesson in his d . ●ection , where speaking of the king's power , he tells us , that though the king can have no peer in the land , yet nevertheless if by his own wrong , he offends against any of his people , none of those that judge for him , can be both iudge and party . it is therefore agreeable to right , that the king should have companions to hear and determine in parliaments , all writs and complaints concerning the wrongs of the king , queen , and their children , and of them especially , of whose wrongs they could not otherwise have common right . these companions are therefore called counts , after the latin comites , &c. not can i think , that any king would have erected a court , to have redressed the wrongs done by himself , or his family , whether he would or not . but as for your main argument , from the words of the statutes of king edw. . and queen eliz. that all authority and iurisdiction , as well spiritual as temporal , is derived from the king : i do own it true , that is , if meant of all derivative authority , such as that of all inferior counts , as well civil as ecclesiastical . for i suppose , you your self will not affirm , that the ecclesiastical authority of bishops , as to their right of meeting in publick synods or councils , is derived from the crown . but the truth is , the sense of this statute is no more , then that all such iurisdiction is immediately derived from the king , though originally from the people ( which fortesoue calls potestatem à populo effuxiam ) and by them intrusted with him , as the supream magistrate to distribute it to all inferior courts ; which yet he cannot at this day create anew , without an act of parliament : so that this will not extend to the whole assembly of the estates themselves : since i doubt not , but to prove by undeniable testimony , that that constitution is as ancient as the english nation it self . m. i see you have a mind to wrest the true sense of this statute , by a forced interpretation ; but i hope at our next meeting to prove to you , that our first saxon and norman kings were absolute monarchs , and that not only all the liberties and priviledges we enjoy , but also our civil properties were wholy derived from him ; and if so , it will also necessarily follow , that all difference and distinction in honour or power , by which the bishops and temporal lords can claim to sit in parliament , is wholy derived from those kings : for as to the commons , i need not go so high for their original ; since it is the opinion of our best antiquaries , and i think the learned dr. brady hath sufficiently proved it against mr. petyt , that they are no ancienter than the latter end of henry the ds . or perhaps the th . of edw. the sts . reign . nor do the authors you have quoted for the independant authority of parliaments ( viz. ●●acton and the mirrour ) mention any other than the curia baronum , or that of counts or earls , as the author of the mirrour hath worded it , by which can be meant no other than the house of lords ; for as to that of the commons , had they bin then in being , or had they had any thing to do in the government , it is not likely , these ancient authors , as well as our acts of parliament of those times , would have omitted particularly to mention them . so that the higher i go , and the more i look on the history of our ancient english kings , the more absolute i find their power , and the less dependant upon the people : therefore i have very great reason to believe , that our first kings were absolute monarchs , not only by the original constitution of parliaments , but also that our very liberties and properties proceeded at first from their meer grace and pavour . f. i know you have asserted the same things more than once ; all the difficulty lies in the proof . and therefore i would not have you be too positive , or rely too much upon the conciseness or silence of the ancient monkish writers of those first times . for since as i own , they have never given us any exact account of our ancient civil government , nor yet of the history of their own times : we are forced for the most part , to pick out the truth from other circumstanc●s , or such passages as we can meet withal in their ancient laws and customs , nay sometimes from those of their neighbours , who lived under the same kind of government and laws , with our saxon ancestors , as proceeding from one common stock or original , as i shall shew you before we have done . but since we are already in possession of our ancient laws and liberties , and of a right to parliaments once every year , or oftner if need be , by two ancient statutes yet in force , at farthest once every three years , by a late act of parliament it ought to be your task , to prove to me the absolute power of our first english monarchs ; and by what steps and degrees , they came to part with their power , and to be thus limited as we now find them ; and when you can shew me this , i do assure you , i will come over to your opinion . m. i shall observe the method you prescribe ; and therefore to begin with the first entrance of the english saxons into this island , i suppose you are not ignorant of so common a piece of history , that all the title they had to this island , was by the sword or conquest of their first princes or generals , who being sent by lot , together with the armies that followed them out , of their own country ; because it was too narrow or barren , to sustain such great multitudes , they came over hither to seek new dwellings . now whether these princes were made kings before they came over , or that they made themselves so immediately after their conquest , will be all one ; since if we consider them as military captains or leaders of armies , their power was absolute , as that of all generals ever was , and must be by the necessary laws of military discipline : if we look upon them as kings or princes ( as it is very likely they were also before they came over ) since they were certainly of the blood royal , all of them deriving their pedegree from woden their god , as well as first king , being thus made kings by their fathers , or other near relations , there is no ground to believe they owed their titles to the votes , or suffrages of their followers : but after they had setled a heptarchy , or seven kingdoms in this part of britain called england : we find them governing , and leading their people like absolute kings and monarchs over their little principalities : and since each kingdom was conquered from the britains under the conduct , according to the laws of nations , and right of conquest , all the lands of each kingdom , belonged to the conquerors , who though they cantoned them out into shares to their captains and souldiers , according to each man's valour or desert : yet did this wholy proceed from their bounty and favour , who might have kept the whole to themselves , if they had pleased ; and hence it is , that not only since the norman conquest , but also long before , all the lands of england were holden of the king , as the supream lord : and if , so , i suppose you will not deny , but that according to your own principle , all our other priviledges and liberties , must have been derived from him , since you have already asserted , that whoever is lord of the soil of a country , he is so also over the persons of the people . f. before you proceed any farther , i pray give me leave to answer what you have now said , i doubt with greater shew and appearance of truth , than the matter will justly bear , when well canvassed . but since i grant our earliest writers are very short ▪ in giving us the true form or original constitutions of our ancient saxon government , it is necessary we look into the roman authors who treat of the laws and customs of the ancient german nations a stirp of whom our ancient english saxons certainly were , and in those authors , you will find , that they as well as other nations of the gothic original , were never governed by absolute monarchs ; but by kings or princes limited by the laws and common-councils of their own nations as were all those that descended from this gothick original . in the first place therefore , see what tacitus says in his book de moribus germanorum , who sufficiently proves , that it was a fundamental constitution of all the german nations , to order all public affairs in general councils or assemblies of the whole people . wherefore the same author there tells us , de minoribus rebus principes consultant , de majoribus omnes ; it a tamen , ut eaqubque quorum penes plebem arbitrium est apud principes praetractentur . as also that in this council , they tryed great offenders for capl●a● crimes . licet apud consilium accusare quoque & discrimen capitis intendere . nor was the power and right of their kings , absolute or arbitrary ; but limited and elective as appears by these passages in the same author : reges ex nobilitate , duces ex virtute sumunt . nec regibus infinita , aut libera potestas , &c. and speaking of the manner of their holding these publick councils , after silence commanded by the priests , mox rex ( saith he ) vel princeps , prout aetat cuique , prout nobilitas , prout decus bellorum , prout facundia est , audiuntur , authoritate suaedendi magis quàm jubendi potestate : si displicuit sententia , fremitu aspernantur ; sin placuit , frameas concutiunt . honoratissimum assensus genus est armis laudari . so that you may here see their kings had no negative votes in their councils , whatever they might have afterwards among the english saxons ; and that they did not so much as preside in them , but the priests you may see in the same place ; silentium per sacerdotes , quibus tum coercendi jus est , imperatum . and therefore it is altogether unlikely , that they should have had that absolute power you fancy over the lives and fortunes of the people : since you plainly see , that they could neither make peace nor war , accuse or condemn any man , nor raise taxes , without the approbation or consent of those councils . now since all the english saxon nations were from germany , i leave it to the judgment of your self , or any indifferent person to consider , whether a people so free as this , who come over hither not as subjects , but only as volunteers under so many captains or generals , who went out meerly to seek new habitations , should be so fond of a government , they never knew at home , as to give these captains ( whom they made their kings ) an absolute despotick power over their lives and estates ; which they never could endure in their own country ; but that they were not then kings , i thus prove . first of all , no ancient writer that i know of , ever mentioned any such thing , but rather the contrary ; for who will believe , that before it could be known what the success would be , they should make meer soldiers of fortune , or leaders of some bands of adventurers , kings , before the country they were to govern was conquered , or that they knew whether ever they should arrive there or not ? and as for the two first of these princes that came over ( viz. ) heugist and horsa , our histories make them brothers in joynt command over those saxons , who were sent hither as auxiliaries to the britains , against the picts ; nor is hengist ever called king , or the time of his reign reckoned , till near eight years after his coming over hither , viz. after the death of vortimer , and the driving of vortiger into wales : and therefore i can give no account , how these princes should become kings , but by the consent or election of their souldiers or followers ; for , as for themselves to create themselves kings , without the consent of their army or people , is altogether improbable and absurd , and not at all to be relyed on upon your bare word for other authority you yet give me none ; but for the main part of your assertion , that the first saxon kings were absolute monarchs , because all the land was conquered for them , and to their use , and that all land was held of them , is altogether as precarious , our histories being herein wholy silent : but though we do not certainly know which way they divided their conquest to their followers ; since authors mention nothing of it : yet this i think , i may positively assert , that whatever was done in this kind , by the first saxon kings , was not as absolute proprietors of the whole country , but as publick trustees , for those over whom they were sent , for since ( as i have already observed ) these people were utterly strangers to a despotick government at home , it is altogether unlikely , that their followers would confer upon them an absolute and vnlimited power abroad , which they were never used to before : and therefore they could not be kings by right of conquest , over the estates or persons of those who were fellow conquerors with them , and set them up for what they were , nor yet over the britains : since they were either totally driven out into wales or cornwall , or else those few that were left , being reduced to a state of servitude , were by degrees incorporated with the saxons . and though for want of ancient histories , as well as letters , among so rude and barbarous a people , as these were at first , we have no records upon what express conditions these captains were by them elected to be their kings : yet thus much we may find out by those few remains we have left us in bede , and other ancient historians , that they had all of them the same kind of government , and laws with very little difference from each other , : since we find in all the several kingdoms of the heptarchy , there were the same kind of wittena gemots , or great councils , by whom they were elected , and without whose advice and consent , their kings could do nothing of moment , either in peace or war , as any one that will but read those laws that are left us , collected by mr. lambard and sir h. spellman in his saxon councils , may easily observe . m. i own indeed , that our saxon ancestors , when they had conquored this kingdom , brought in their saxon laws along with them ; but it doth not from thence follow , that they brought their popular government in with them too : and those assemblies tacitus mentions , might be councils of the german people in general , no not of the saxons , which name is not to be found in all that author . but what if it be granted , that those people which were afterwards called saxons , were governed by such councils , was not this government a democracy ? and the people so far from not having their votes and shares in these councils , as they only had voices in them . and if any had any more power here than others , they were the priests , who were a sort of chair-men in them , commanding silence , and who had a coercive power , as tacitus says . in these governments , no man can doubt of the suffrages of the people , but under such as you mention , you would i think ▪ scarce be contented to live , where the priests bare so much sway , where there were no cities or great towns , but only scattered houses , and habitations by rivers , fields and woods , made of dirt or clay , arms of trees and stubble , where there was no literature , especially among the common people , nor scarce civility , where there was no cloathing , but with garments made of beasts skins ; no food but milk , pulse and flesh , without art or cookery , where there was no propriety in lands , no money no work for lawyers , as you will find if you read on in tacitus , and the th . book of cesar's commentaries . and as for what you say concerning the beginning of the saxon kingdoms in this island . to this i reply , that hengest and horsa and those other leaders , who brought the saxons into england , were all of them of the royal line of the saxons , as appears by all our historians , and so if not kings , yet well able to subsist : and it was not the manner of those countries , to thrust out their supernumeraries by force , but to draw them out regularly by lot , at such a rate and proportion , and to give them generals and officers of great birth and degree . nor is it probable , if they had made articles with their followers , that these princes should have had such absolute authority , as they had over the lives and fortunes of their subjects , in the more early times , almost all the priviledges of the english nation , being granted long since that time , nay , most of them since the conquest ; yea , since the barons wars . but as for what you say concerning the gothick or vandal kingdoms , since they relate nothing to our government , i need not say any thing to them , nor doth it follow , that if their kings were limited , or but upon condition , that ours must be so too . f. i see you would fain evade the authority of tacitus , concerning the people's having any share of the government amongst the saxons , because forsooth , that nation is not particularly nam'd in his history ; but tho the saxons are not particularly named by tacitus : yet the angli are there mentioned among those german nations , who worship't their common goddess hertha , which that author interprets to be terra , the earth : and you very well know , that from these angli , or angles , the english nation as well as name is derived . but tho tacitus who lived about the beginning of the emperour trajans reign , names not the saxons , yet p●olomy who writ within years after expresly mentions them placing their country not far north of the river albis , and near the place where all agree the angli were seated , so that they were either all one and the same nation , or very little different . but etheliverd qu●s●or , one of our ancientest english saxon historians , in his first book , makes this nation of the saxons , of a far wider extent , and that it reacht from the river rhine all along the sea-coast up to donia , now called denmark . but since i see you cannot well tell how to evade this testimony of tacitus , but by affirming that the government in germany , was a democracy , and that the people had the only sway in it , is a great mistake , since he expresly mentions their kings and princes ; and there only speaks of the manner of transacting all publick affairs , in which it is true , the people ( as it is very well known by our ancient histories ) had formerly a greater share than now : yet doth he not thereby exclude the prince and nobility , from having also their shares in it . and as for what follows in tacitus of the royal power , auctoritate sua●endi , magis quam jubendi potestate ; i suppose you cannot deny , but that priviledge yet remains to us , since the king cannot command the parliament to make what laws , or give him what money he pleaseth ; and therefore that doth not make it a democracy , much less the priests presiding in their assemblies , which is no more to be wondred at , than that the bishops have still votes , and their share of legislature in the house of peers : or that a bishop , when chancellor or keeper should be speaker in the house of peers . or supposing that their priests had more power among them , than the christian clergy had after they were converted , doth it therefore follow , that it was not the same government , or that it must therefore be so intolerable , that i would not have bin willing to have lived under it ? since i must tell you , i am not against civil offices , though exercised by clergy-men , as far as the business of their function , and the canons of the church will permit . as for the rest which you object concerning the barbarous living of the ancient germans , it either makes nothing to the matter in hand , or else against you ; since it proves plainly , that absolute monarchy , was not the first government among all nations , as you suppose . nor doth it therefore follow , that because these people were rude and barbarous ; therefore they had not the wit to prefer absolute monarchy , before all other governments , since their conquerors the romans ( who sure were a civiliz'd people ) did likewise as much abhor it . but as for what you say against hengist , and those other leaders , who brought the saxons into britain , being elected kings by their followers , is nothing but meer guess , and conjecture . for that they were not kings at home , you your self grant ; and whether they were able well to subsist at home , or not , is nothing to the purpose : it is plain , they thought they could mend their condition , or else would never have left their country . and tho it be granted , that hengist with his followers , came not over as enemies , but auxiliaries to the britains ; yet it is not therefore more likely , that they were chosen by the king of their own nation , than that their own followers should afterwards elect them , especially when the one is agreeable to our own historians , and the other not : for mattheus florilegus tells us , that horsus being slain , the saxons fratrem suum hengislum in regnum cantiae sublimaverunt , that is , they elected or advanced him to be king , if i understand any thing by that word , and this agrees with the polichronicon of ranulph higden , who places the begining of hengists reign , immediately after the death of his brother horsus , viz. an. dom. . eight years after the coming of the saxons into britain ; and that the rest of the saxons who came hither after , had no better title then election . i could farther prove , if the time would give me leave : for they that will read the ancient accounts of the saxon nation , and what government they had among them , long after the time of cesar and tacitus , will find that it was impossible , that they should be thus created kings , before they came over ; since at that time , they had no such things as constant kings amongst them , for in those times it was rather an aristocracy , then a monarchy ; for as iohannes pomarius in his saxon chronicle sheweth us , for which i refer you to verstegan , where this passage is made use of at large . verstegan p. . so that if this were the government of the saxons ; as low as the time of charles the great , i durst leave it to any indifferent person to judge , whether the first saxon kings in this island , were made so by their own princes before they came over , or were chosen by their followers , since no historians mention the former , tho all of them agree of the latter : they commonly using this phrase , regem fecerunt , or elegerunt . and that all the first kings of the heptarchy were elective , nothing is more plain , since the great council of the nobility and people did not only elect them , but often depose them too , when they grew intolerable , through tyranny or misgovernment , as may appear by the example of sigibert , king of the west-saxons and divers others i could instance in , who were expelled this kingdom ( as brompton , and other ancient chronicles tell us ) by the vnanimous consent and deliberation of the nobility and people . many like instances i could give you in the other kingdoms of the heptarchy , but that it would be too tedious . nor doth your reason signifie any thing , that it is not probable , that the first princes were made kings upon condition , because of the absolute authority they had over the lives and fortunes of their subjects ; since it is altogether false in matter of fact ; none of the saxon kings being able alone to make laws , or impose taxes upon their people , without their consents in their great councils , much less to make war without it ; for then the war tho begun by the king alone , must have signified little in an age , when there were no standing armies , nor money in the princes power to pay them , there being then but little coyn of any sort , and their revenues being mostly paid in victuals . m. pray sir give me leave to interrupt you a little , i own indeed , that the particular laws and constitutions of each of the kingdoms of the heptarchy , are not particularly known , and perhaps some of their kings might be elective , and consequently liable to be deposed by their people ; whether by right or wrong , i will not now dispute , but if we consider the state of things , after these seven kingdoms became reduced into one ; you will find them much altered : and as egbert our first saxon monarch , reduced all those kingdoms into one , so it is to be supposed , that having no right to them , but by conquest , and the submission of their kings , when overcome in battle , both he and his successors , must needs have become far more absolute , than they were before , and if they were elective before that time , did now certainly become hereditary monarchs ; the crown descending from father to son , for divers descents : and so consequently , these princes granted divers priviledges and liberties to the people of those kingdoms they conquered : and that they were no other than the free grants or concessions of our former kings , upon petition or request of the people , and accepted by the clergy , nobility and people of the kingdom in their great councils . for this i need go no farther than the coronation oath , taken by the kings of england , when the archbishop of canterbury asks the king , sir , will you grant and keep , and by your oath , confirm to the people of england , the laws and customs granted to them , by the ancient kings of england your predecessors , and namely the laws and customs and liberties granted to the clergy , and people by the glorious king edward your predecessor ? from whence we may observe , that all the bishops , earls , barons and people there present , do own and confess ; that their most ancient laws , customs and liberties , were granted to them by edward the confessor , and other ancient kings . f. i doubt you will prove as much out in the account you give me of our king's power , after the seven kingdoms were reduced into one , as you were before . for though i grant that the title of the west-saxon kings over all the rest , proceeded from conquest , and the submission of the kings and people they conquered , yet were they not all actually reduced into one kingdom or monarchy , till a good while after ; the kings of mercia , and of the east-angles , continuing in being , till the coming in of the danes , as you will find by our saxon annals . and though t is true , the west-saxon kings made those kings tributary to them : yet that they did not become more absolute thereby , appears from the testimony of our ancient histories , since we find them transacting all affairs in their wittena gemots , or great councils , as well after their conquest , as they did before . and therefore we find in an old register of st. leonard abby in york ( cited by mr. dodsworth in the monast●●on anglic. put out by mr. dugdale ) this memorable passage : memorandum quod anno domini . egbertus rex totlin britanniae in parliamento apud wintoniam mutavlt nomen regni ( de consensu populi sui ) & jussit illud de caetero vocari angliam . and will. of malmsbury , that ancient and exact historian , says expresly of this king egbert . lib. . has omnes regnorum varietates egbertus animi magnitudine composeuit , & ea uni quadrans imperio ad uniforme dominium , servans unicuique proprias leges , vocavit [ angliam . ] it is therefore most evident , that upon the submission of those kingdoms he conquered , he promised and agreed , to govern them according to their ancient laws . and hence we find the mercian laws , called merchen lage , to have continued in force long after that kingdom was united to that of the west-saxons . nor will your inference from the coronation oath , prove of any greater moment . for tho it be therein recited , that divers of the laws , liberties , &c. we now enjoy , were granted by king edw. the confessor , and other kings : yet must it not be so understood , as if the people of england had no laws , or civil rights before his time ; for that were to contradict plain matter of fact , and the histories themselves i have already cited . but why they were called his laws , and his customs : will. of malmsbury hath very well observed , when speaking of the good laws made by ancient kings , and especially by king ethelred , which were confirmed by king c●●●e , he hath this remarkable passage , in quarum custodiam etiam ●unc temporis bonarum . sub nomine regis edwardi juratur , non quod ille statuerit , sed quod observaverit . the like i may say for the laws of divers other saxon kings , which tho they go under their names , yet were made by the assent of the great council of the kingdom , as by the titles of the laws themselves in mr. lamberts and sir h. spelman's collection of them , you may be satisfied if you please . but for a tast , pray see the laws of king alfred ( which you cited ) which tho said to be made by him ( as indeed it is true , he compiled them out of divers other laws , formerly in force in the other kingdoms of the heptarchy ) yet that they were also shewn , and assented to by the wittenae gemots , pray see the conclusion of these laws , in sir h. spelman : the words are remarkable . ego aelfredus west saxonum rex , ostendi haec omnibus sapientibus meis , & dixerunt places ea custodiri . so that the calling them the laws of king alfred , or king edward , doth no more prove , that they alone made them then our now citing such , or such a statute of k. henry th . or king charles the st . do therefore suppose , that those kings made laws by their own sole authority : such phrases among ancient historians , as well as our selves at this day , being used only for brevity sake , and signifie no more then their confirmation of them . m. i shall not deny , but that our ancient english kings , did for the most part make no laws , without the consent of their great council : yet i think i can give you an unanswerable argument , to prove that the very being and constitution of parliaments or great councils , did in the beginning , wholy proceed from the grace and favour of some of our ancient kings ; th● to which of them to ascribe , it is not easie to determine . but if we may believe your own author the mirrour , he tells us almost at the very beginning : that king alfred , for the good state of the realm , caused to assemble the counts or peers , and then ordained for a perpetual custom , that twice in the year , or oftner , for business in time of peace , they should assemble at london , to treat of the government of the people of god , and how folks should keep themselves from offences , and live in quiet , and should receive right , by certain vsages and iudgments . and according to this establishment , were made divers ordinances by divers kings , until the present king ( viz. ) edw. st . but to come to the proof of what i affirm , it is certain , that in those first times , the saxon kings conferred all the bishopricks and principal abbeys in england , per annulum & baculum , as ingulf and malmsbury expresly tell us . and as for the earls or aldermen of counties , as also the great thanes , judges or noblemen of the kingdom , they were only offices held for life in those times , which the king might discharge them of at his pleasure : and hence we find the titles of aldermanus regis , and thanus regis , so frequently to occur in our ancient histories and charters : these comprehended under the general name of wites , were the only constituent parts of the great council in those times ; for as concerning those we now call the commons of england , we do not so much as find the least mention of them , or any representatives for them , till the latter end of the reign of king hen. d. or the middle of edw. sts . reign , as i think dr. brady hath learnedly and fully proved in his last edition of his answer to mr. petyt's treatise of the rights of the commons of england asserted . now if it plainly appears , that every part or member of the parliament , did anciently receive their very being , from the meer grace and concession of our ancient monarchs ; can you , or any reasonable man assert , with any colour of truth , that our great councils or parliaments , could be a part of the fundamental constitution , and as ancient , as the government it self ? and if parliaments did thus receive all that authority they now exercise from the kings bounty , can any man doubt whether all the rights and priviledges we now enjoy , are to be ascribed to any other original ? for if the very keepers ( as you will have it ) of these liberties , did all proceed from the king , then certainly the things to be kept , must do so too ; and when you can answer this argument i have now brought , i think i may safely promise you to be your proselite , and to come over to your opinion . m. i confess , this is the most plausible argument you have hitherto urged , and if i can't answer it , i do likewise promise you to become your convert . but tho granting that parliaments might have received their being from the favours of our kings , i might deny your consequence , that therefore it will follow , that all the rights and liberties of the subjects of england , must do so too ; since they might very well have reserved to themselves both hereditary properties , as also a right to their lives , liberties and estates , which the king should not take from them , without just cause , and legal tryal ; which when they found invaded by succeeding princes , they might then ( and not till then ) find constant great councils , and parliaments to be necessary for that end , and as the firmest bullwark against the tyranny of succeeding princes : but the author of the mirrour in the section , before the place from whence you took your last quotation , expresly tells us , that upon the first election of a king to reign over the rest of the saxon princes , they first of all mad● him to swe●r , that he would maintain the holy christian faith , with all his power , and would govern his people according to right , without regard to any person , and should be liable to suffer right ( i. e. iudgment ) as well as others of his people . and tho i do not give any credit to all the story he there relates , of soveraign princes in this island at once : yet the substance of it may be true , that this election was made of king egbert , by the earls or counts of provinces , which were afterward by king alfred , called shires . but that this author ascribes the beginning of great councils , to the first institution of the government ; pray see what he there f●rther says . and tho the king can have no peer in the land , nevertheless , if by his own wrong , he offends against any of his people , none of those that iudge for him , can be both iudge and party : it is therefore agreeable to right , that the king should have companions to hear and determine in parliament , all writs and complaints , concerning the wrongs of the king , queen and their children , of which wrongs they could not otherwise have common right . these companions are therefore called counts after the latin , c●mit●e . whereby you may see , that this author and bracton , who were contemp●●aries , were of the same opinion in this important point . and i cannot imagine , how any prince who had power sufficient in his hands , to do what he pleased ( as you suppose our english saxon monarchs to have had at the first ) would ever , if they could have helpt it , have instituted a court , one of whose chief business●s it was , to examine and redress the wrongs and oppressions of themselves , their wives and children . but besides all this , what you say might be somewhat likely , that our parliaments or great councils did owe their original only to the kings good will and pleasure , did we not find the like constitution , to have bin in all the neighbouring kingdoms in europe , which have bin raised according to the gothic model of government , upon the ruins of the roman empire , now let us look into scotland , and there we shall find this institution as ancient , as any history or record they have . if we pass into france , we shall find their assembly of estates or great council , to have bin as ancient as their first kings , and to have had as much power , as any where else in europe : since they not only frequently elected , but also deposed their kings of the first race , and disposed of the succession of the crown , as they thought fit . if we look into spain , we shall find in the two greatest and most considerable kingdoms , viz. castile and arragon , the like assemblies ▪ the power of which was so great in the latter , that they could even depose the king himself , if he tyranniz'd over , or oppress 't them ; if we go more northward , we shall find in the ancient kingdoms of denmark and sweden , and norway , that their assembly of estates , or dyets , elected their kings , and could likewise depose them , till those kingdoms became hereditary , which was but of modern times . i shall omit poland , because perhaps you may dispute whether it is a kingdom , or a commonwealth . but if we pass into hungary , which was instituted by the huns , a nation of gothic original , we shall find not only the like assembly of estates , as in the other kingdoms , but also , that they had a magistrate called the palatine , who was as it were the conservator of the people's liberties , and who could resist even the king himself , if he invaded them , and which is also very remarkable in all these kingdoms ( except denmark ) the representatives of the cities , or principal towns , ( which constituted the third estate , or commons in those kingdoms ) had always a place in those great councils . so that to conclude , it is almost impossible to conceive , how these kingdoms i have now mentioned , could all agree to fall into the same sort of government about the same time , unless it had proceeded from the particular temper , and genius of the germane and gothick nations , from which they were derived . or who can believe , that all these nations , and their kings finding the like conveniences from these great councils , and inconveniences by the want of them , should all conspire to set them up in each of these particular kingdoms . m. i will not deny , but that the institution of great councils , or assemblies of the estates , might be as ancient as the government it self , in several of those kingdoms you mention , which were at first elective ; but what is that to england , where our monarchy hath bin by succession , from the first institution of it , and not elective , as you suppose . nor do i much value the authority of the mirrour , as to the great antiquity he ascribes to this assembly of counts or ( comites as bracton calls them ) and in which by the way , no commons are mentioned . ) and tho i grant the iudicial power of the house of peers , is very ancient : yet that it wholy proceeded at first from the indulgence of our kings , appears from hence , that there was always a necessity of the king's presence in parliaments , which is very well proved by sir robert cotton , in a learned treatise written on that subject ; wherein he proves , that in all consultations of state , and decisions of private plaints , it is clear from all times , the king was not only present to advise , but also to determine . and whensoever the king is present , all power of iudging , which is derived from his , ceaseth , the votes of the lords may serve for matter of advice , the final iudgment is only the kings : but indeed of late years , queen mary , and queen elizabeth , by reason of their sex , being not so fit for publick assemblies , have brought it out of use , by which means it is come to pass , that many things which were in former times acted by kings themselves , have of late bin left to the iudgment of the peers ; who in quality of iudges extraordinary are permitted for the ease of the king , and in his absence to determine such matters as were anciently brought before the king himself , sitting in person , attended by his great council of prelates and peers : and the ordinances that are made there , receive their establishment either from the king's presence in parliament , where his chair of state is constantly placed , or at least from his confirmation of them , who in all courts , and in all causes , is supream iudge . all judgments are by , or under him , and cannot be without , much less against his approbation : the king only , and none but he , if he were able , should judge all causes ( saith bracton . ) so that nothing seems plainer to me , than that the iurisdiction which the house of peers have hitherto exercised for the hearing and determining all causes , as well civil as criminal , by way of appeal , not only between subjects , but also in all accusations against the lords themselves , proceeds wholy from the kings , which may appear by an ancient precedent , mentioned by abbot brampton in his history . it is the case between king edw. the confessor , and godwin earl of kent , whom the king accused for the death of his brother prince alfred , before the house of peers , and there you will find , that after the earl had put himself upon the iudgment of the kings court , the king thereupon said : you noble lords , earls and barons ( i. e. thanes ) of the land , who are my liege-men now gathered here together , and have heard my appeal , and godwin's answer : i will , that in this appeal between us , ye decree right iudgment , and do true iustice : and upon their judgment that the earl should make the king sufficient satisfaction in gold and silver , for the death of his brother , the king being thereof informed , and not willing to contradict it ( the historian there sayeth ) he ratified all they had judged . i could give you many other precedents of latter date , were it not too tedious : but this is sufficient to shew , that what the p●ers acted in this matter , was by the king 's sole will and permission . i shall only conclude with one precedent more , in case of some what alike nature . it is that of hen. spencer bishop of norwich , rich. d . who was accused fo● joyning with the french : the bishop complained , what was done against him , did not pass by the assent and knowledge of the peers , whereupon it was said in parliament ▪ that the cognisance and punishment of his offence , did of c●mmon right , and ancient custom of the realm of england , solely and wholy belong to our lord the king , and no other . from all which i infer , that the iudicial power exercised by the house of peers , is meerly derivative from , and subservient to the supream power , resi●●ing in the king. from whence it also follows , that if the peers have no power nor honour , but what proceeds from the prince ▪ and that the commons were of a much later date ; then both the being and priviledges of both houses , had but one and the self-same original , viz. nothing else but the meer grace or favour of our kings . i have only added this , the better to enforce my former argument ; and therefore i desire you would now answer them both together . f. i am very glad your last argument doth not prove so formidable , as you suppose , for to remove that out of the way . i must tell you , that you now very much mistake the question , which is not only concerning the iudicial power of the peers alone , but the legislative power of the house of peers and commons taken together , which is the subject of our present dispute . and therefore if i should grant you , that the iudicial power of the peers ▪ is derived wholy from the king , yet would it not at all ●mpai● the legislative power of either of the houses , which no historian or law-book that i know of ( that is of any credit or antiquity ) ascribes to the king's favour , as you suppose . nor is it true , that the house of peers can give no iudgment , either civil or criminal , without the king's consent or approbation , which is never so much as askt , let the cause be what it will ; nor is his presence at such judgments at all 〈◊〉 , but indeed you confound the king's council in parliament ( where i have shewed you already , he sat and dispatched divers causes in a room or chambe● , distinct from that of the peers ) with the house of lords . but to come to your main argument , that our parliament must owe its original to the king , because each of the estates of which it consists doth so . this i hope will prove as weak , when throughly considered : for first of all , i could shew you , that those councils could not owe their original to the k. since the saxon kings rather owed their original to them , by whom they were most commonly elected , as i could shew you out of our ancient historians , if it were now a proper time for it . but as for our bishops and abbots , &c. which anciently made so great a figure in our saxon great councils ( which i can shew you , were then both civil and ec●l●siastic●l assemblies ) i have already proved out of tacitus , that among the ancient germans ( a part of whom our ancient english saxons were ) their priests ( who were their clergy ) had a considerable authority in their common councils . and can any body believe , that a sort of people so powerful and sub●ile , as the priests then were , would lose their power after they came over into england ? and we find in bede that edwin king of northumberland , consulted with a council of his great m●n and priests , concerning his embracing the christian r●ligi●n , and when it was generally received , can any body think , that the christian bish●ps and clergy would not expect to succeed in the same station , which the heathen priests before held in their councils ? and that they enjoyed this power very early , appears from hence , that the same ethelbert could not endow the church and monastery of canterbury , sine assensu magnatum & principum tam cleri quam populi . but indeed you are as much mistaken in the manner of the ancient elections of bishops , and abbots in england . for tho i own that at the time of the conquest , and somewhat before there might be no such elections of them as the ancient canons required , yet that this was not so at the first you may see in bede's ecclesiastical history , and other historians , where it is often mentioned , that bishops were chosen according to the canons by the archbishops and bishops of the province , and abbots by their convent : nor was the kings investing of them per annulum , & bacculum , then lookt upon as any derogation to their canonical election , that being no more than either a ceremony of investing them with their temporalities , or a token of the king's confirmation of the election . and that this was so , appears by king edgars charter to the abby of glastenbury , wherein he retains to himself and his heirs , jus tribuendi fratri electo baculum pastoralem . but that which so much scandalized both ingulf and malmsbury , was a custom then in use , as also long before the conquest , of confirming the bishop elect in a full synod or parliament . and to this custom , ingulf refers when he tells us , a multis annis retroactis nulla eras electio prelatorum merè libera , & canonica : sed omnes dignitates tam episcoporum quam abbatum regis curia pro su● complacentia conferebat . where by curia regis , you must not understand the king's court in the sense it is commonly taken , but for the great council or mikel synod , as it was then called , and which dispatched ecclesiastical , as well as civil affairs , in the same sense as curia regis is used by brompton , in the case of king edw. and earl godwin , which you but now cited . and in which sense it is always used by ingulph , when he speaks of the great councils under the two williams : i will not be very tedious on this subject , and shall therefore give you but one authority on this head , and it is that of walslan , who was made bishop of worcester , in the time of edw. the confessor , and that as mat. paris tells us , vnanimi consensu tam cl●ri , quam totius plebis ( rege ut quem vellent sibi eligerent praesulem annuente ) in episcopum ejusdem loci eligitur . and then he goes on thus , nam licet fratrum non deesset electio , yet that there concurred to it , plebis petitio voluntas episcoporum , gratia procerum , regis authoritas : all which amounts to no more , than that he was elected , chosen and confirmed by the king , and all the three estates . for here is the petition of the commons joyned with the good-will of the lords , and both backt by the kings authority . yet that all this did not hinder him from being invested per baculum , & annulum as the custom then was , may appear by the speech this bishop wulstan made at the tomb of edward the confessor , whither he went to resign his pastoral staff after his being deprived of his bishoprick , by arch-bishop lanfrank , and the synod . and the conclusion of this speech is remarkable , tibi , ( scil. edwardo ) baculum resigno qui d●disti , curam ●orum dimitto quos mihi commendasti . a like example i could give you of the election of this arch-bishop lanfrank himself in the kings curia , or great council not long after the entrance of k. william ; but for this i refer you to eadmerus . but admitting that the king alone had in those days conferred all bishopricks , does it therefore follow , that his nomination of bishops in the pursuance of that trust , which the kingdom reposed in him did likewise make them to derive all the right they had to sit in the great council from the king 's sole authority ? you might indeed with as much reason urge , that because the emperour theodosius ( as likewise divers of his predecessours ) did nominate bishops to sees , therefore they did likewise receive from them all the authority they had of appearing , and acting in general councils , which i am sure you are too good a church of england men to affirm . m. i must confess , i never did so closely examine the ancient form of conferring of bishopricks before the conquest , as i find you have done , and i will better examine your authorities , and if i find this custom to have been constant and uniform i shall come over to your opinion ; tho' i doubt it will not prove to have been so general as you would make it , since by the authority you have now brought out of mat. paris it appears , that it was the king who gave leave to this election of bishop wulstan in the great council , which i am not yet convinc'd did then take upon them to meddle in ecclesiastical matters without the kings consent : but since you have spoken enough concerning the right , and antiquity of the bishops sitting in our great councils , it is time you now speak of the right of the peers , or temporal lords , which certainly could have no place there but from the favour and concession of our kings : so that whether we consider those lords in the saxon time as rulers of counties , called in old english earls or aldermen , in latin duces , or comites , or else as judges or counsellors called in old saxon , wites , or wisemen , in latin sapientes ; or lastly as thanes , in latin ministri , who were either military tenants , or civil ministers , or else officers of the king in his court , or other employments , none of them were hereditary in those times , but all of them either depended upon the king's vvill , or else owed their honours and ●states to his favour , f. i hope , notwithstanding the confidence you put in this part of the argument , that it hath no more weight in it , than the former . for tho' i grant there was no such thing as hereditary earldoms before the coming in of the normans ; so that tho both the earls and aldermen might have places in the great councils , ratione officii ( as the earl mareschal of england has at this day ) and not by tenure , as they did after that time : yet i very much doubt , whether they sate there only ratione officii , and not as thanes , or by reason of their great lordships , or estates in lands , but if they sate there as earls or alderm●n ; yet might they not be the only persons that sate in those councils by that title : for there were besides these , aldermen of cities and burroug●s , who were elected by those places , and who it is very likely appeared for them as their representatives in those councils , until by succession of time those towns began to send two burgesses in their stead , some footsteps of which still remain in london , where the aldermen of every ward are first proposed to be elected parliament men before any other , and it is certain that these aldermen , in the most ancient cities , as london , york , lincoln , & ● . are not elected by any grant or charter from the crown , but by an immemo●ial right of prescription . but admitting that these earls or aldermen appeared in these councils , by reason of their offices , or dignities which the king conferred upon them , yet doth it not prove , that the very office it self proceeded 〈◊〉 from him , since we find the authority of those chief men , whom 〈◊〉 calls princes ( and which answer these earls ) to have been used among the ancient germans long before , when he tells us in the same chapter , where we cited the rest : iura per pag●● , vi●osque [ principes ] reddunt , ●enteni singulis ex plebe comites consilium simul , & auctoritas adsunt . which exactly answers our county and hundred courts , under the saxon kings , wherein the alderman of the county or his deputy the sheriff pre●ided , and the free men of the county or hundred were the iudges of all matters of fact. so that tho the king might appoint these princes or governours of provinces , or counties , yet doth it no more follow , that they owed their being and place in the great council wholy to his will , than ( as i said before ) supposing that the king had anciently the nom●nation of all the bishops and abbots in england , that therefore they must also owe their place in our great councils , or synods wholy to them , since the king performed both of them as a publick trust committed to him by the common weal in the one case , as much as in the other . but indeed , i think the greatest part of the members of this assembly ( besides aldermen , and burgesses for cities and towns ) consisted of those thanes , whose names are often found in the subscription of the an●ient charters of our saxon kings after the principes , duces and com●●●s , and that tho many of them might be the kings feudal thanes , or 〈◊〉 grand serjeanty , or knights s●rvice in chief , as mr. s●lden tells us in his titles of honour , yet that author no where excludes the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 i. e. middle , or less thanes from having voices in those assemblies who were afterward stiled vavissours , or lords of townships ( afterwards ) called maunors , with courts annexed to them under the names of sac & soc ; which were the same with our court - 〈◊〉 . and court-baron : especially if you please farther to consider , what a vast n●mber of al●dari● , or free tenants there were then , who held their lands discharged of all services , but the common burthens and taxes of the nation , none but the lands of the kings thanes , being held by military s●rvices , before the entrance of the normans . so that whoever will but consider the nature of our saxon councils , will find , that the greatest part of the persons that appeared there , did not owe their 〈◊〉 to their being the king's ministers or officers , as you suppose ▪ but to their holding such lands and poss●ssions as capacitated them , and gave them a right to have places in those great councils : and that this was 〈◊〉 we need go no further , than the laws of king athel●●an , where you will find g●mility it self ▪ annexed to an estate in land. for if you will but be pleased to consult king athelston's laws , you will there find , that if a villa●aus or c●eorl could so thrive , as to get an estate of five hides in lands , he was reckon'd a thane , i. e. a gentleman or nobleman , as they were promiscuoully reckoned at that time . so that tho i suppose , there might not be in those times that exact distinction between peers and commons , as there hath bin established since the coming in of the normans ; yet was it the same thing in effect , since the bishops . earls or aldermen of shires ( tho not enjoyed as hereditary honours ) might make then the greater nobility or peers , as the thanes were the less nobility , gentlemen or freeholders ; who all appearing in person , might together with the aldermen or burgesses of towns represent those which we now call the commons ; and supposing that then there were no knights of shires , yet these being then the only proprietors of any considerable estates of land in the nation , might very well represent all their v●ssals or vnder-tenents , as tenents for years , and at will , are at this day by the knights of shires , tho they have no votes at their el●ction . to conclude , tho i grant that the king 's of england , are the fountain of that honour , which we call peerage : yet it is only in pursuance of that ancient constitution , which their ancestors brought out of old saxony and normandy , along with them , as the firmest defence of kingly power against the insolency and encroachments of the common or meaner sort of people , as well as tyranny in their princes . and therefore in all monarchies where there is no hereditary nobility , the prince hath no surer ●ay to maintain his power , than by standing armies , to whose humours and pactions , he is more subject , and is also more liable to be murdered , or deposed by them ( when discontented with him ) than ever any limited prince yet was , or can be by his nobility or people : as i could shew you from a multitude of examples , not only from the roman , but moorish , arabick and turkish histories ; and therefore to constitute a lasting stable limited monarchy ( as ours is ) it must be according to the model i have here proposed . m. i shall not contradict the latter part of your discourse ; but i must freely tell you , that if as ( you your self grant , ) there were no knights of shires in the saxon times , i cannot see how those we call the vulgar or commons of england , had then any representatives in the great council , since those thanes or lords of mannors , whom you suppose to have represented their tenants or vassals , were never chosen by them , and consequently could not properly be their representatives : but i think it will be easy enough to prove , that none of your inferior or middle thanes , but only the chi●f or superior , had places in those assemblies . so that these feudal thanes , or such as held of the king in chief by military service , were of the sam : kind with them that were after the norman times , honorary or parliamentary barons , and their thainlands alone , were the honorary thainlands , and such as were afterwards parliamentary baronies . nor can i find any footsteps in our ancient english histories of cities and buroughs , sending any representatives to those great councils : so that admit i should own at present , that the bishops and some great abbots , had from the first setling of christianity in this island , an indisputable place in the great councils , and likewise that the earls , aldermen or great nobility , had also votes in those assemblies , and that the chief thanes , or less nobles , had also their places there , by reason of the tenure of their estates ; yet certainly the house of commons was of a much later date , and owed its being either to the grace and favour of our kings of the norman race , or else to those that had vsurp't their power : and this i think dr. brady hath very well proved against mr. petyt ; and i think i could convince you also of the truth of it by his , as well as other arguments , were it not now too late to enter upon so long a subject . f. therefore , pray let us defer any further discourse of this question , till the next time we meet , wherein i hope i may shew you , that if you owe that opinion to the doctors arguments , he hath led you into a very gross mistake . and i shall only at present take my leave of you , and bid you good night . m. i wish you the like . advertisement . a brief discourse of the law of nature , according to the principles and method laid down in the reverend dr. cumberland's ( now lord bishop of peterborough's ) latin treatise on that subject . as also his confutations of mr. hobb's principles put into another method . with the right reverend author's approbation . finis . bibliotheca politica : or , a discourse by way of dialogue , whether the commons of england represented by knights , citizens and burgesses in parliament , were one of the three estates in parliament before the th of henry iii. or th . of edw. i. collected out of the most approved authors , both ancient and modern . dialogue the sixth . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms ; where also may be had the first , second , third , fourth and fifth dialogues . . authors made use of , and how denoted . . mr. pettit's ancient right of the commons of england asserted . p.r.c. . dr. brady's answer thereunto . edit . in folio ▪ b. a. p. . the said doctor 's glossary at the end of it . b. g. . anamadversions upon treatise ianii anglorum forces novo . b. a. i. . the author of ianus , &c. his confutation of the said doctor , entituled ianus anglorum ab antique i. a. a. . dr. brady's preface to his history . b. p. h. . dr. iohnston's excellency of monarchical government . i. e. m. g. the preface to the reader . having in my last discourse treated of the legislative power of this kingdom , as also the ancient constitution of our english government by great councils or parliaments ; ( the former of which questions , i should scarce have dwelt so long upon , had i then known of a learned treatise now 〈◊〉 to be publisht on that subject ) i am at last arrived at the hardest , and most important , though perhaps in the iudgment of some , the driest , and most unpleasant part of my task , viz. who were anciently the constituent parts or orders of men who made up th●se assemblies ; that the bishops , abbots , priors , earls , and chief thanes , or barons , were principal members , is granted by all parties ; but whether there were from the very original of these great councils , ( nay , till long after the coming in of the normans ) any representatives for the commons , as we now call them , in distinction from the lords spiritual and temporal , is a doubt ; which as it was ( for ought i can find ) first raised by an italian , who writ the history of england in the last age , so hath it been continued by some antiquaries of our present age ; though the first that ever appeared to prove the contrary , was a treatise published by james howel in the cottoni posthuma , under the name of sir robert cotton , about . but whether it was his or no , i know not ; only it was supposed to be so by mr. pryn in his preface to the collection of records , which he published under the name of the same author in . and after him this notion of the bishops , lords , and other tenants in capite being the sole representative for the whole nation in those councils , was next printed in the second part of sir henry spelman's glossary , tit. parliamentum ; where king john's charter is made use of at the main argument to prove that assertion . the next who appear'd in pr●nt on this question , was sir will. dugdale in his origines juridiciales , who though he transcribed the same notion and arguments from the 〈◊〉 - mentioned glossary , yet allows the commons of england to have been always after some manner represented in parliament , though not by representatives of their own chusing ; yet agrees with the author of the passage in the glossary , that the commons first began by r●b●llion in the th of henry the third . which opinions being looke upon not only as novel and erron●ous , but dangerous to the parlamental rights and liberties of the people of this nation , were opposed by william petyt esq in his treatise , intituled , the rights of the commons of england assertio ; which was also seconded by the author of the treatise , called jani anglorum facies nova ; but it was not long before both these books were animadverted upon by dr. brady , in two several editions of his answers to them ; and these were again vindicated by the author of jani anglorum , &c. in another treatise , intituled jus anglorum ab antiquo ; which hath not been yet answered . i have been the more particular in giving an account of these authors , because the controversie having been largely debated in them , i have for the saving your trouble of reading so many several books , reduced all the material arguments and authorities man use of by both parties in this weighty controversie , into this dialogue , and the next , since so copious an argument could not be dispatch'd in a less compas● . and 〈◊〉 have not here given you all the arguments and authorities that are there made use of , but only the most material and indisputable ; yet i hope i have used this liberty with that sincerity and respect to those learned authors , that none of them shall have any just ca●●t to complain of any partiality ; and therefore i have as near as i could , confined my self to the words of those authors , as you will find by the quotations in the margin . but i must own , that having had the happiness of a long and familiar acquaintance with mr. petyt , i have been furnished by him with divers authorities ( both manus●●●p : and printed ) not hitherto taken notice of by any on this subject : and had i the like opportunity of being personally known to the dr : i should have desired the same favour of 〈◊〉 for such replies as he might perhaps make to them . therefore all i can now do in this case is , that if the dr. or any friend of his , shall think it worth their while to peruse , and impartially to consider these discourses , and shall then remain unsatisfied with any of the authorities or arguments here made use of ; if either he or they shall think fi● to m●●● any observations on them , and will communicate their papers to the publisher of these dialogues , i do here ingage to take care that they shall be fairly and truly published with answers to them , if they will admit of any , in an appendix at the end of the whole work , when it is finished . i have little more to trouble you with , than to assure you , that all the authorities here made use of from our english historians and records , are truly cited , without leaving out or concealing any thing that i thought made for or against either opinion ; but as for the records , they are either such as having been sufficiently tried , have passed for current between the dr and his antagonists , or else such as i have seen and examined with my own eyes , and considered the purport of them . but i hope you will pardon me if i seem too prolix in the beginning of this dis●●●se , in the interpretation of divers words and phrases used by the dr. and his opponents in a quite different sense from our ancient historians , records and statutes ; for if the ●●●ous use , and equivocal meaning of those expressions be truly stated , and laid open according to the several ages in which those authors lived , or such laws were made , i reck●● this great dispute as good as half ended . all that i shall farther desire of you is , carefully and diligently to peruse the arguments and authorities , and to examine the truth of them your self , if you doubt of any thing in them , weighing and comparing historian with historian , and record with record , and sometimes both together , as the subject-matter requires , and then i kept you will be able to make a right and impartial iudgment on the 〈◊〉 ; for as i have 〈◊〉 in my province fairly to report other mens arguments and notions , so it is yours to judge of them , which i heartily desire may be without any unjust byass or partiality to 〈◊〉 side . the sixth dialogue between mr. freeman a gentleman , and mr. meanwell a civilian . m. sir , you are welcome ; and since you were pleased to send me word , that you would come and sit with me this evening , i have been looking over all the saxon councils , collected by mr. lambard , and sir h. spelman , and yet i cannot find in them any mention of knights of shires , or burgesses for cities or burroughs ; the only persons there mentioned , as members of those great councils , being archbishops , bishops , abbots , and great lords , and iudges ; often called by the general 〈◊〉 names of magnates , principes , proceres , optimates , or primates regni , which were all comprehended under the saxon word , vvites , i. e. 〈◊〉 ; by whom ( as sir h. spelman shews us in his glossary ) 〈◊〉 meant only senators , or wise-men ; that is , either noblemen , 〈◊〉 great lawyers ; vvite , in somner's saxon dictionary , being first ●●endred optimas , a noble man ; and then sapiens , a wise-man . so 〈◊〉 these vvites , or sapientes ( so often mentioned in our ancient 〈◊〉 laws ) when they are put alone , signifie all the ecclesiastic , 〈◊〉 well as lay-members of the great council , such as earls , al●●●men , and thanes , and judges , as dr. b. more particularly proves , in his glossary 〈◊〉 the end of his first volume . but by principes , and optimates , can only be meant nobles , or chief men , as the word princeps , magnas , and optimas do al●●ys signifie in the latin tongue ; that is to say , such of the king 's great officers , noblemen , and judges of the kingdom , as he pleased to chuse out , and 〈◊〉 to his great councils , either for their great wisdom or estates , to make 〈◊〉 of their advice and assistance for the making of laws . therefore pray shew me where there are any commons once mentioned in any of these councils , or any that represented them . here are indeed particularly mentioned , arch-bishops , bishops , abbots , aldermen , wites , great-men , and chief-men , or noblemen . these were all the orders of men that were then the constituent 〈◊〉 of those great councils , wittena-gemotes . and if the commons , as now taken , and understood , were then members of them , they must be comprehended amongst the wites or sapientes , the wise-men . but that it cannot probably be so , i shall prove ( . ) that most of the saxon laws , in their prefaces are said to be made and ordained by their kings , with the advice and assistance of their vvites , or wise-men simply , without mentioning any particular orders of men whatsoever . and when any rank or degrees of men are particularly mentioned , they are only the same before rehearsed , both ecclesiasticks and laicks ( . ) i note , that it cannot be denied , but that in every one of these wittena g●motes , micel synods , micel gemotes , or great councils , where the laws are said to be made only by the king , with the advice of his wites or sapientes , without particularizing any degrees of persons , the bishops and abbots for the spiritual nobility , and the eorls , or aldermen and thanes , for the temporal , were present at the making of them ; as also the judges , if there were any of the higher class , other than bishops , aldermen , and gereves , or praepositi . ( . ) i note , that it follows from thence , that these all jointly were the sapientes , where there are only wites or sapientes in general named , without reciting any particular orders or degrees of men. now if you can shew me from as good authorities as i have here produced , that any of the commons sate in these great councils , at least to represent the body of the commons among the saxons , i will grant , that during the saxon government , the freemen , or commons of england , as now called , and distinguished from the great lords , were an essential constituent part of the common councils of those times . f. to return you as short an answer as i can , to those authorities you now cite , i must in the first place premise , that tho i grant all nobility among the ancient germans , saxons , and franks ( who were but so many stirps or branches of the gothic nation ) were at first wholly military ; yet it is a very great mistake , and savours of the prejudices of the age and country we live in , to imagine , that anciently there were the same distinctions between peers , or noblemen , and gentlemen , ( whom we now call commoners ) as there are now . for if we go but over into france or germany , we shall find no difference there between the greater and the less nobility ; and a gentleman is as noble as a d●ke , or a marquiss . and if we pass farther , into denmark and norway , from whence most of the danish laws are supposed to come , it is certain , that but few years ago , there were no such titles among them as earls , or barons ; every lord of a town , or district , being that which they call an adelman , or nobleman . and so i suppose it anciently was among the english saxons . the word athel , or adel , comprehending ( to speak in our present dialect ) all degrees , as well noblemen , as gentlemen ; and for this i can give you the authority of an ancient author , viz. paulus warnefridus de gestis longobardorum , who speaking of these adelmen , or adelings , tell us ; sic and eos quidam nobiles prosapia vocabantur . so likewise sir h. spelman in his glossary , tit. adelingi , tit. p. , . writes thus , anglorum legibus dici pro nobilibus in genere , quod nec dum apud germanos antiquatum est , qui omnes nobiles aedelmen vocant ▪ a saxonico aedel pro nobili ; and mr. selden in his titles of honour , makes the word aethelum to signifie all one , either gentlemen or noblemen . besides , adam of bremen , and * nitardus likewise , both ancient historians , divide the saxon nation into three different degrees , or orders , viz into athelings , i. e. nobles , frilings , i. e. freemen , and lazzos , i. e. villains , bours , or bondmen . besides which noblemen , or gentlemen , there was likewise another sort of men , who tho of an inferior rank , yet as freemen , and having a considerable share of the riches and strength of the nation in their hands , had likewise a place in the great councils , as well as the former . and these were the aldermen , or other magistrates of cities and burroughs ; and in this they resembled the german diets , whose constituent members were , according to gonterus , an ancient german poet , praelati , proceres , missisque potentibus urbes . but since this is a dispute about the signification of words , in what sense they were used in that age we are now treating of , it will not be inconvenient to examine from the most learned glossarists , the ancient signification of those words , which are in dispute between us . and therefore , since we are agreed about the meaning of all other words except these viz. aldermen , thanes , wites , magnates , optimates , and principes , preceres , or primates , let us examine each of their ancient significations . to begin then with the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 - man , alderman , which word was of a very general signification ; for sir hen. spelman in his glossary , tit. alderman , tells us , that there was aldermannus regis , comitatus , civitatis , burgi , &c. de quorum potestate non facile est definire , mr. lambard renders the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 man , in latin senator , ( i. e. one that had place in the great council ) and so doth mr. somner in his saxon dictionary , from whence you may learn , that this word is of a large signification , and might comprehend such as in latter times were called commons , * to distinguish them from the lords or higher nobility , and could not exclude them . verstegan renders this word thus , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , so written in our ancient language , is properly an elder , or senior ; yet an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 man , which we call now an alderman , was such in effect among our ancestors , as was the tribunus plebis with the romans , that is , one that had chief iurisdiction among the commons , as being a maintainer of their liberties . and if so , such persons must certainly have had a place in the great council as commoners ; and therefore must from the reason of the thing , signifie something more in those times than an earl , or great officer of the king only . so likewise , that the word thane comprehended more than the kings great feudal , or military tenents , may appear by these interpretations of it , which our antiquaries have given us . the industrious mr. somner , in his glossary at the end of the x. scriptores , as also mr. selden in his titles of honour , do both agree in the difference i now make between the greater and the less thanes , the former being called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 thani regii , the other called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 mediocres , vel inferiores thani middle , or less thanes , who were maneriorum domini , nobiles mi●●●es , vavasores & nonnunquam liberi tenentes ; with whom sir h. spelman in his glossary agrees , thanorum duo erant genera , majores quos thain●s regis appellabant , nos barones regis , & thaini simpliciter , seu thaini minores qu● iidem erant qui barones minores , hoc est maneriorum domini , nobiles minores , & nonnunquam liberi tenentes nuncupantur . so likewise mr. lambard in his glossary , thus , thani autem appellatione viri interdum nobiles , interdum liberae conditionis homines , interdum magistratus atque sup● m●ner● ministri notantur . and also in his perambulation of kent , saith , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , was usually taken for the very same that we call now from the latin word gentilis , a gentleman , that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a man well born , or of good stock and family . so that i think nothing can be more evident , than that according to the opinion of our best criticks in the saxon tongue , the word thane doth not always signify a great lord , or baron of parliament , as he is now called , in distinction to an inferior nobleman or gentleman . and that there were also burgh thanes , thanes of cities and boroughs , will evidently appear from a writ or charter of k. edward the confessor , which is still to be found in sir iohn cotton's library , in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 willem 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 alle mine 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 on 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which charter with divers other of like nature , confirming the privileges of that monastery , were collected by a monk of westminster called sulcardus , who lived not long after the conquest . in the next place , as for the word magnates , though i grant it there often signifies great men or lords ; yet not only such as were lords or noblemen by birth , but as i shall shew you by several instances , as well before as after the norman entrance , that it likewise also comprehended the gentry , or inferior nobility , and such as were eminent and considerable either in the countries or cities , for interest , office or estate . as for the word optimates , i know it signifies the better , or best sort of men , yet not always great noblemen , or lords ; for in monastic anglic. tom. . we read of one goda , who under edw. the confessor subscribed himself optimatem , & ministrum regalem , ( i. e. thane . ) and lest you should apprehend that optimas should always signifie the king's thane , or tenent in capite , du fresne in his glossary defines optimates to be vassalli barones qui ab ullo domino ratione hominu nede pendet ; but i shall speak more of this word optimates , when i come to speak of the times not long after vvilliam the first . in the next place , for the word proceres , it doth not only signifie men noble by birth , but isidore ( a spanish author in the gothic-times ) in his origines , lib. . cap. . says thus , proceres sunt principes civium ; and that this word often signified in the ancient english saxon , the chief magistrates of cities or burghs , appears by alfrick's ancient glossary , where these words proceres primates , vel primores , he thus renders 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 buph papa . and du fresne in his glossary says also , proceres app●●labantur qui in civitatibus pracipuos magistratus gerebant . as for the word principes , any man that understands any thing of the latin tongue , knows that it doth not always signifie princes , or men noble by birth ; but any chief , or principal man remarkable by place , office or dignity ; and therefore we often read in livy , and other latin authors of principes civitatis ; and in this sense i suppose every member of parliament may be reckoned inter principes , among the most considerable or chief men of the kingdom : so that when our ancient english historians , ( as well before as immediately after the norman conquest ) do often , after the arch-bishops ▪ bishops , &c. add , & caeteri toti●● regni proceres , & optimates , or principes , as members of the great councils of those times ; yet that these writers did not then mean what you would understand by these words , only princes , earls , or great lords , mr. selden in his titles of honour teaches us , when speaking of this word principes ( as the most comprehensive of any ) says , that though princeps in the singular , were proper to every earl or alderman ; yet in the plural principes is more often applied comprehensively to others also of less , though of special eminency , such as were viri primarii , or thanes . and for this he refers us to the charter of king ethelwulf ( as it is recited by w. of malmsbury , lib. cap. . and ingulph ) wherein that king granted tithes , and divers other priviledges to the church abby of malmsbury , which is said to be done consilio episcoporum , & principum snorum ; as also of hen. hunt , who relating the election of harold the son of king cnute , expresses it thus ; fuit magnum placitum apud oxonford ubi leofricus consul , & omnes principes eligerunt heraldum . lastly , as for the word wites or sapientes , there can be nothing in that word which can limit it only to men noble by birth , since it signifies no more than the king 's great council of wise men or senators , and might also well refer to the chief magistrates , or representatives of great cities and boroughs . for du fresne in his glossary tells us , that among the l●mbards , sapientes in italia appellabant , & civitatum cives primarii . quorum consilio respublicae gerebantur . hieron . rubeus lib. hist. raven . anno . — sed longe antea illud nomen abt●●uit in aliis longobard●rum civitatibus ut colligere liceret ex ottone , & acerbo morena in hist. rerum l●ndevetium , &c. nor is this authority inconsiderable , since the lombards were derived from the goths , from whom also the english saxons had their original , and had the like fundamental constitution , and were governed by much the same laws . but that the title of wites or sapientes , was often attributed to the commons of england , i shall explain to you when i come to treat of the antiquity of the house of commons , after the normans entrance ; where i shall shew you , that divers petitions were directed a tres sages les communes . and sure whosoever is chosen by a county , city , or borough , as their representative , and is by them thought wise enough to be trusted with their purses , and to make laws for them , may very well ( i think ) be called in old english a vvite , or in our modern dialect , a disercet or vvise man. but let this word vvites signifie what it will , yet it could never mean here great lawyers or iudges , as your dr. will have it ; since i very much doubt whether law was then a trade or profession , or not ; and that the iudges in those days had not any more voice in making laws , than they have now , or any more to do in it than in the bare drawing of them up . i am very well satisfied , since if they had any such power in those days , i do not believe our kings would ever have let them have lost it , since it was so advantagious to their prerogatives that they should keep it . i could give you divers other authorities , though of later date , to prove that the commons were often included under the word sapientes in our ancient statutes and records ; but i refer those for the times after the conquest ; but i beg your pardon for being so prolix already , which the abuse your dr. hath put upon these words , would not permit me to avoid . but now we have cleared most of the terms in dispute between us , i hope we may proceed with greater certainty . m. though your discourse hath been long , yet since it is so essentially necess●ry to the right understanding the matter in hand , i am well satisfied ; and i shall more fully consider the account you give of these words another time ; but a present give me leave to tell you , that suppose i should admit , that those words on which you have now given interpretation of divers authors , may sometimes be taken in the sense you have now put upon them ; and that consequently the commons might be represented under some of those general names ; yet am i not satisfied , how the aldermen and magistrates of cities and boroughs , could be included under this word vvites , since in the auctuary to the ▪ law of edw. the confessor , 't is said , erant & aliae potestates , & dignitates , per provincias , & patrias universas , & per singulos comitatus totius regni constitutae , qui heretoches apud anglos vocabantur , scilicet barones , nobiles , & insignes sapientes , &c. and gregory of tours , rodovicus , and many of the foreign , ancient historians mention , sapientes only as lawyers , counsellors , judges , and among the modern foreign lawyers , hottomon and calvin , say expresly they were such . but perhaps not of the inferior ran● , no more than the saxons sapientes were , of which their 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only consisted . and we have at this day the iudges , and king's council ▪ and other great lawyers , that sit in the lord's house , and are assistant to the parliament , when there is occasion . nor have you yet brought any proof , that the cities or towns then sent their representatives to the great councils in the saxon times , by this , or any other title . but as for the knights of shires , though i grant the treatise called , modus tenendi parliamentum , mentions such persons to have been present in parliament in the time of k. ethelred ; yet by that word parliament so often used by the author of that treatise , and divers other circumstances , it may be easily perceived that the author lived but about the time of edw. . or rich. . as mr. selden in his titles of honour , and mr. pryn in his animadversions to sir e. cook 's th institutes , have very fully proved ; so that admitting that your thanes , or lords of towns , did then appear in those councils for themselves , and their tenants , yet could they not be properly said to be their representatives , because ( as i told you before ) they were never chosen by them ; whereas now the ordinary freeholders , of forty shillings a year , and the freemen and inhabitants in cities and towns , have the gr●●test share in the election of knights , citizens and burgesses . and as for those thanes you mention , they , or those under whom they claimed , owed their estates wholly to the grants of former kings , and held their possessions from them by some tenure or other . and by virtue of this tenure it was , that all the lands of england were liable , even those that belonged to the church , to those three services , anciently called trinoda necessitas , viz. expedi●●● , castelli , & pontis extructio , that is , military service against a foreign enemy and the repair of castles and bridges ; and subject to the common services of the kingdom . and that the earls and chief thanes did hold their lands by knights or military service , appears by the reliefs of the earls and thanes , ex●●rest in the laws of king cnut . in sir h. spelman's councils . so that if all the persons who held those lands , owed them wholly to the king's bounty , it seems plain to me that they must likewise owe their places in the great council to the same original . f. i think what you have now farther urged will be of no great moment against my opinion ; for as to the authority you bring from the addition to that law of edw. the confessor ; it is plain by the word barones , that it was added long since that time , that word not being commonly in use , till some time after the norman conquest . but letting that pass , it is plain by the rest of the law , if you would have been pleased to have read it out , that these heretoches ( here called barons ) were no other than ordinary gentlemen , or thanes ( which then answered the word barones . and these ( as this law it self expresly tells us ) were chosen by all the freemen in the folemote , or county-court . and therefore tho i grant they might be men of estates , yet there was no necessity of their being lords , or noble by birth ; nor is it likely that the people would have chosen their earls , or any other of the like order to command them , when they had sufficient choice of thanes or gentlemen in their own countrey , to command the military forces of it . and tho it is true these gentlemen are called nobles , and remarkable wise men , yet this ( according to your own shewing ) doth not exclude others , and those of a far different profession , viz. counsellors , lawyers , and iudges , all which , you suppose had then places in the great council , as they have now in the lord● house . and if this word might comprehend both sword-men and lawyers , i cannot see why it may not also take in the better and richer sort of citizens and magistrates , who in that age , as was notorious , were elected by their respective corporations ; and i have already proved that these were called sapientes in other countries ; and i see no reason why they ●ny not have been called so here too . but that the king's judges and counsellors could have no votes in the saxon great councils , i have already given a sufficient reason to the contrary . but i shall now farther shew you , that the cities and boroughs in the saxon times being so much more numerous and considerable than they are now , must needs have had ( according to the custom of those times ( a considerable share in those great councils ▪ since in them consisted a great part of the strength and riches of the kingdom ; and were many more than they are at this day ; for bede 〈◊〉 in the beginning of his history , that there were in england long before his time , famous cities , besides innumerable castles , and walled towns of note ; many of which , tho now extremely decayed , or quite mined , were then very considerable , the greatest and richest part of the nation inhabiting in those times for the most part in cities , or great towns , for their greater benefit or security ; and the greater part of the lands of england in the saxon times , and long after , ●y incultivated , and over run with for●sts and bog● , so that the inhabitants of those cities and boroughs being them so considerable for estates in lands , as well as other rich●● , could not ●e excluded from having places both in the brittish , or saxon great councils ? what man of sense can believe , that the ancient and potent cities of london , t●● , c●nterbury , lincoln , &c. should ever be excluded from having any hand in the great consultation of giving money and making laws , and for the publick defence of the kingdom in the saxon times , any more than they are now ? and therefore we find , that in all the kingdom of the german , or gothick original , the chief cities and towns have still sent deputies to the diets , or assemblies of estates , as i said but now . in the next place , tho i do not positively assert , that there were knights of shires before the conquest ; yet am i not convinced that there were none . for tho i confess the treatise you mention , appears to have been written since the coming in of the normans , yet might the substance of it have been much older than the times of edw iii. and rich. ii. or else certainly king hen. iv. or his chancellor for him , would never have been at the trouble of transmitting a copy of this said modus into ireland under the great seal ( which is thought to incroach so much on the prerogative , had he not been very well informed of the antiquity , as well as authority thereof . and therefore it might very well be written about the time of hen. iii. from some ancient historians and records , not now extant , tho the copies we have of it , may be of no longer standing than the time mr ▪ selden mentions . but admitting that there were no knights of shires before the conquest , and tho the thanes ( who i suppose made the greatest figure in the wittena ge●●●er ) were not earls , or chief thanes , that is , of the greater nobility , yet they were great freeholders , and tho commoners , yet gentlemen , and of the lesser nobility , in the same sense as gentlemen , or knights of shires are now . and the not elected by the countries , yet might be as well esteemed their representatives , as they are now of freeholders , under s. per annum , lease-holders and copy-holders for years , who have no votes at the election of parliament men ; whereas these thanes were then the chief ( if not the only ) possessors of all the freehold estates in the kingdom . nor is it any material objection to say that these thanes might at first owe those estates to the grant of the first saxon kings , and might also after a sort hold their estates of them as heads of the commonwealth , by such services as were setled by publick laws ; yet does it not therefore follow , that they owed their very right of coming to the great council wholly to the kings favour . for in the first place it is to be considered , that tho the first saxon kings conquered this island from the brittains , yet those that assisted them being only voluntiers , the chief officers or commanders of them , might not only deserve , but also capitulate for their shares in the land so conquered . and these being given out by the king , according to each mans quality , condition , or desert , might constitute those who were called the king's thanes , as those who held likewise under them , were the middle thanes or vavassors . supposing ( till you can prove the contrary ) that these had places in the great council , as well as the other ; and you might as well argue that they could have no places there , but by the favour of their lords . whereas i have already proved , that an estate of five hides in land , of whomsoever holden , made a thane or nobleman of the inferior rank : and we find by the same laws of king athelstan , his weregild , or price of his head , was valued but equal with that of a mass thanes or priest , ( viz. ) at thrymsas . so that a sufficient estate in land , did not only make a man a gentleman , but also give him a place in the great council . and there were besides all these several alodoril ; who held their lands , discharged from all services , and could sell or dispose of them without the consent of the king , or any other inferior lord , and are those mentioned in domes-day book ; qui potuit ire cum terra que ●●but . nor is your argument conclusive , that because in those times as well as now , all lands were held either mediately , or immediately of the king , and were chargeable with those three general services you mention for the publick safety and good of the kingdom , that therefore not only all mens civil properties , but also their right of coming to the great councils must wholly depend upon the king's will ; since i have already proved , that the first saxon kings by their conquest of the kingdom , could not acquire the sole property of all the lands thereof to themselves , tho they might be made use of as publick trustees , to distribute them according to those mens qualities and deserts , who had helped them in the conquest . so that when they were once possessed of such estates , they had immediately thereupon a right to a place in the great council , the burthen of the government lying chiefly on such as had estates in land. and that many others besides the kings thanes , or great lords , had places in the great council of those times , appears as well by the name of mycel synods , ●● wittena-gemots , which are rendred by our ancient glossarists numerosa , or popu●●sa conventio ; as also the titles and conclusions , to divers of the titles of those great councils in the saxon times , where are often mentioned after the comites , & proceres terrae , aliorum fidelium infinita multitudo , which must certainly take in many more than the kings thanes , judges , or other of his great men , who were then but a few in comparison of all the rest of the freeholders of england . m. i will not longer dispute the probability of what you say , all the difficulty lies in the proof of the matter of fact. for in the first place i deny that any other of a less degree than the king's thanes , of chief tenents , had any places or voices in the old english councils . nor can you find ( as you your self are forced to confess ) in our saxon laws , or ancient historians of those times , any representatives of the common people mentioned ; such as are now , much less citizens or burgesses for any city or burrough in england . and therefore what you say concerning the riches or power of the cities and towns before the conquest , tho perhaps it might be true , yet doth it not therefore follow , that they must then send their representatives to the great councils . nor is it any argument to prove that they did , because great cities and towns do or did lately send deputies to the like assemblies in other countries , since our government might not only originally differ in that from theirs , but that also the sending of those deputies might be granted by some later princes , long since the time of the first beginning of those kingdoms , and i do believe will prove so , if closely look'd into . and in denmark ( which you know was an elective kingdom ) the cities and great towns never sent any deputies to their great councils at all ; and since the government of england ( as you your self grant ) did very much resemble that , why might it not be so here too ? f. i think your reply hath no more weight in it , than what you have already urged ; for in the first place it lies upon your side to prove , that none but the king 's or chief thanes had any places in the great councils of those times ; and whe●● you can prove that , you may do something . but what i have now brought to prove the great antiquity of our cities and burroughs in england , is not so little to the purpose as you would make it ; since it confirms that right of prescription , which all ancient cities and burroughs is england do claim of sen●ing members to parliament ; and therefore pray 〈◊〉 what mr. lambard , a person whom all the learned own extremely knowing in the english saxon government tells us on this subject , in his archeion in these words . that whereas in the beginning of the law , ( viz. those made by the saxon kings he there mentions ) all the acts are said to pass from the king and ●is wisemen , both of the clergy and laity , in the body of the laws , each statute being thus ; and it is the advice of our lord , and his wisemen . so as it appears that it was then a received form of speech , to signifie both the spirituality , and laity ( that is to say , the greater nobility , and the less , or commons ) by this one word witena , i. e. wisemen . now as these written authorities do undoubtedly confirm our assertion of the continuance of this manner of parliament , so is there also unwritten law or prescription , 〈◊〉 doth no less infallibly uphold the same . for it is well known , that in every quarter of the realm , a great many burroughs do yet send burgesses to the parliament , which are nevertheless so ancient , and so long since decayed , and gone to nought , that it cannot be shewed that they have been of any reputation at any time since the conquest , and much les● than they have obtained this priviledge , by the grant of any king succeeding the same . so that the interest which they have in parliament groweth by an ancient usage before the conquest , whereof they cannot shew any beginning ; which thing is also confirmed by a contrary usage in the self same thing ; for it is likewise known , that they of ancient demesne , do prescribe in not sending to the parliament ; for which reason also , they are neither contributers to the vvages of the knights of shires , neither are they bound by sundry acts of parliament , tho the same be generally penned , and do make no exceptions of them . but there is no ancient demesne saving that only which is described in the book of dooms-day , under the title of terra regis which of necessity must be such as either was in the hands of the conqueror himself , who made the book , or of edward the confessor , that was before him . and so again ▪ if they of ancient demesnes , have ever since the conquest prescribed not to elect burgesses to the parliament then ( no doubt ) there was a parliament before the conquest , to the which they of other places did send their burgesses . from whence we may conclude , that the learned author did not only believe that the lords , but that also the inferior nobility , and representatives of cities and towns were included under the word vvites , and also that these place● claimed that priviledge by prescription , and not by grant of any king since the conquest , or before m. i shall not deny but mr. lambard was a learned antiquary , yet there are others more in number , and perhaps of greater learning , who do suppose , that no cities or burroughs sent burgesses to parliament , but since the conquest ; the i confess the time is not exactly agreed on , but whenever they began to appea●● there , it is certain they could have no right of coming , but from the king's summons or grants ; since none but such cities or towns , that held of th● king in capite , had anciently any place in those assemblies , no● of them neither any other , but those whom the king pleased to call . and from thence proceeds that great variety we find in the list of those towns , which send members to parliament . but i shall omit speaking any thing farther of this at present . but as for those middle inferior thanes or vavassours ( as they were afterwards called ) whom you suppose to have made so great a figure in the saxon great councils , i do not believe that they had any votes there , and i hope i shall be able to prove to you by and by , that none but the king's tenants in capite appeared in those meetings , from the time of william the conqueror , to the hen. iii. now if it be true ( as you suppose ) king william made no alterations in the constituent parts of the great council of the kingdom , after his conquest of it , it will likewise follow , that the same sort of persons , viz. tenants by knights service , were the only members of it before the conquest too . but if you have any express authorities , out of our ancient saxon laws or histories , to prove that the commons appeared at the wittena gemotes in the saxon times , pray let us see them . f. i shall perform your command immediately ; but in the first place give me leave to tell you , that what you have said concerning cities and towns not sending burgesses to parliament , till after the conquest , is a great mistake , built upon a false and precarious hypothesis , that they all held in capite of the king ; the contrary of which , i shall make out , when i come to treat of that question . so likewise is it as precarious , that none but the king's tenants in capite , had any votes in our great councils , in the times immediately succeeding your conquest , till the th . of hen iii. and that therefore it must have been so before the conquest . for as i own that king vvilliam made no material alteration in the government of the kingdom , after his entrance , so i likewise affirm , that as well after as before that time ( if not knights of shires , yet ) all thanes the or barons , i. e. great freeholders of england , had places in that assembly before th . of hen. iii. but to proceed to the authorities you desire , i shall begin with the first , and most ancient general council we have left us in the saxon times viz. that which was held at canterbury , a. d. . by king ethelbert , not long after the settlement of christianity in this island ; which is recorded by sir h. spelman in his brittish councils , in these words ; an. incarnationis dominicae , . aethelbertus rex in fide roboratus catholica una cum beria regina silioque ipso eadbaldo , ac reverendissimo praesule augustino , caeterisque optimatibus terr● solenitatem natalis domini celebrant cantuariae ; convocato igit●r ibidem communi consilio tam cleri quam populi ; whence you may observe that the people then made a considerable part of the great council from the very beginning of the saxon times . m. pray , sir , will you give me leave to answer your questions , one by one as you go , for fear i should not only forget them , but also tire you with too long a speech . in the first place therefore give me leave to tell you , that you are very much mistaken to suppose , that by the word populus , is here meant the common people , or vulgar ; whereas , when clerus and populus are used together , in our ancient writers of those times , it signifies no more than a common council of the clergy and people or laity , and not the common people ; for then the lords , or great men would have been quite left out of this council , as certainly they were not ; and so when clerus , and populus , are used together , and thus contradistinguished , then they are expressive of two different estates or conditions of men or christians , the clergy and laity , or secular men ; and those were the optimates terrae , the chief men of the land before expressed . neither was this , council held under a sole saxon monarch , but under ethelbert king of kent only ; and that but eight years after augustin's coming hither , and above two hundred years before the seven kingdoms were united into one monarchy . f. i am not at all concerned at this answer , since i can prove , that by the word populus must be here understood somewhat more than kings , noblemen , and iudges , viz. the representatives of the commons likewise ; or else the saxon witena-gemotes were not what their titles speak them to be , common , or general councils of the whole kingdom ; that is , of all the estates or orders of it there , but only a convention of the bishops and great lords . and therefore if the word clerus did then comprehend all the clergy , both superior and inferior , i e. as well the bishops as abbots , priors , deans and clerks , for the secular clergy , and cathederal chapters , &c. i pray give me a reason why the word populus , when put alone , must be wholly confined to your earls , or chief thanes , and may not also take in the middle or less thanes , freeholders , or lords of townships , and the representatives of cities and burrough towns ; and why not with as much reason , as that the word populus amongst the romans , took in the whole body of the people of rome , both patricians , and pleb●ians , when assembled in their comitiis centuriatis , to make laws , or create magistrates . the rest of your argument is not very material ; for tho i grant this council was held before the heptarchy was united into a monarchy , yet i think it is very easie to prove , that as all the saxon kingdoms consisted of several nations of the same language and original , so were they likewise under the same form of government : and that councils consisted of the same constituent members , 〈◊〉 i shall prove to you from the kingdom of the west-saxons , from which was the foundation of our present english monarchy . and for this i shall give you the authority of will. of malmesbury , and h. huntingdon , ( who 't is highly probable ) had seen the ancient histories and records of those times ) and they both agree in the relation of the deposition of sigebert , king of the west-saxons , for tyranny and cruelty , anno. . the words are remarkable , which pray read ; unde in anno secundo ipsius regni congregati sunt proceres , & populi totius regni & provida deliberatione , & unanimi consensu omnium expulsus est a regno & kinewulfus satus ex regio sanguine electus est in regem ; where you may observe a plain difference made between the higher nobility , here called proceres , and the representatives of the people here stiled populi ; as also from another authority of a great council , held under the same king aethelbert , as it is mentioned by roger hoveden , domestick to king hen. ii. in the d part of his annals ; where among the laws of king edw. the confessor , and which he writes to have been confirmed by king william i. you will find under the title de aptb●●s , & de aliis minutis decimis ( which are there said to be given to the clergy by former kings ▪ and particularly by this king ethelbert ) these words ; haec ent●n sanctus 〈◊〉 praedicavit , & docu●t & haec concessa sunt a rege , baronibus & populo . so that it populus ●ere doth not signifie an order of men , contradistinct from the barons or great lords , it would have been a tautology with a witness . m. i must confess , if this authority you now urge , had been as ancient as the time to which it is ascribed , it would be of some weight ; but it appears by this word baronibus ( not used in england till after the conquest ) that it was added long after that time ( by some ignorant monk ) to the confessor's laws , and therefore will not prove that for which you bring it , viz. that the vul●●● understood for the people or commons , in the sense they are now taken had any place in the saxon great councils . but make the most of it , this was but the confirmation of a law made by king aethelbert , ; but how and by what words the legislators were expressed near years after the law was made ; or how they were rendred in latin after the coming of the normans transiently , and without design to give an account of them , cannot be of much validity to prove who they were ; and that the laws of king edw. were made , or at least translated into norman latin , after the norman conquest , appears by the word comites , ( besides barones already mentioned ) milite● , servientes , &c. all norman words , and not known here , till their coming hither . he that will assert any thing from a single uncouth expression in one case , and upon one occasion only , brings but a slender proof for that he says ; so ▪ will any man think , because 't is said in one of king edward's laws , ( and perhaps no where else concerning this king's coronation ) quod debet in propria persona ●●am regno , & sacerdotio & clero , jurare ante quam ab archiepiscopis , & episcopis regni coronetur ) that the priests were not clergy-men , nor the clergy-men priests ; and that the arch-bishops and bishops were neither . many other uncoath expressions do often occur in the old monks , which are to be interpreted according to the common usage and practice of the times in which they are delivered . and therefore seeing before the time of the conquest , and for two , or near three centuries of years afterward , the commons ( as at this day understood ) were not called , nor did come to great councils or parliaments as i shall prove when i come to speak of those times ) ; so that by barones must be here meant the great barons , and by populus , the communitas angliae , or which was then all one , the communitas baronum , the less barons , or tenents in capite ; and the sense of the words is farther confirmed by several undeniable authorities ; wherein , by the communitas populi , must be understood not the community of the people or commons , but the whole body of the less tenants in capite . but to give you an answer why the word populus could not comprehend all sorts of people among the saxons , as it did among the romans , but only the nobility , ( who were then , properly speaking , the only freemen ) is this , that none but the nobility possessed any lands in fee-simple ; all the rest of the meaner sort of people ( then called cheorl folk ) holding theirs in villanage under their lords or thanes , being no better than meer villains , or costagers , and who were all bound to the good behaviour , every tenth family being bound one for another , in the sheriff's torne , or court of franc-pledge , under their head , or tenth man , called the tything-man , who was to answer for them . so that the common people of england were not such a free people , nor had any share in the government , as some suppose , there being i believe no such persons as our yeomen or fa●●●ers in those days . f. tho perhaps this law might very well be transcribed from some old cop●● of king aethelbert's laws not now extant , and in which there might be the word thanes , instead of baronibus , which is but a translation of it , in the sense i● which it was used not long after the conquest . nor is it true which you affirm , that the word barones was never in use before the coming in of the normans , in ancient charters , as i shall prove to you by this charter of king edgar , to the abby of westminster , containing a confirmation of their ancient charters and priviledges , collected 〈◊〉 the aforesaid sulcardus , a monk of westminster , as it is to be found in the cottonian library ; the charter it self is long , but concludes thus , in concilio habito infra basilicam westmonast . praesidente 〈◊〉 filio suo edwardo , & archiepo dunstano , & universis episcop●● & baronibus suis ; where you may see that the word was not unknown before the time of william i. and i could give you more instances of other kings charters , where the same word is used , before the conquest , were it worth the while to trouble you with them . and so likewise populus for people or folk in the saxon ; yet take it ( as you suppose ) to have been writ not long before the time hoveden writ his history , ( which was above years before the th of hen. iii. ) this author , or whoever else added this passage to this law about tythes , did then suppose , that according to the custom then used , the people had representatives in those assemblies ; which i shall prove from your own sense of these words ; for if the word populus signifies here another sort of men different from the lords , then this word populus must necessarily signifie some that were commons , and not lords by your own concession , and who also must represent others besides themselves ; but it is highly improbable , that by this word populus should be meant the communitas angliae , or the communitas baronum ; for then since the word baronum would have included all the tenents in capite , both great and small , to what purpose should the word populus have been added at all ? therefore i am so far from believing this way of expressing the several estates of the kingdom , to have been a monkish blunder , ( as you suppose ) that ●t was rather a common and ordinary way of expression among the writers of those time● , as well in records as histories , who then very well knew the people or commons , to be an estate , or constituent part of the common council of the kingdom , quite different from the lords , and in which sense it is recited in an ancient charter of king iohn , that he being divorced , the new queen was crowned , de communi assensu & concordi voluntate archiepiscoporum , episcoporum , comitum , baronum cleri & p●puli totius regni ; where by clerus it is plain must be meant the inferior clergy represented by their proxies in this great synod or parliament ; and by populus was understood the people or commons likewise present by their representatives ; or else the words clerus and populus had been idle tantologies in this record . and in the like sense it is also used by matt. paris , in the th of hen iii. presentibus clero , & populo , cum magnatibus regionis ; where this author makes a plain distinction between the magnates , and the populus , which had been altogether in vain , if the word magnates would have comprehended all your greater or less barons , or tenants in capite . but i shall in the next place proceed to that great synod , or council , that was called by king edward the elder , anno dom. . and is mentioned by simeon of durham , and other authors quoted by arch-bishop parker , the compiler of the british antiquities , in these words ? plegmundus cantuariensis archiepiscopus , ●●● cum rege magnifico cognominato , edwardo seniore consilium magnum episcoporum . abbatum fidelium , procerum & populorum , &c. convocavit . which synod , or council was called to divide the large dioceses of winchester and sherbarn into five other ( as i have already told you ) ; where you may plainly see the words fidelium & populorum , put distinct from the word proceres , if we take that word to signifie only the greater nobility . i shall now conclude with a few words in reply to your answer , why the word populus , could not among the saxons take in all sorts of people , as well as amongst the romans ; for i cannot take it as a satisfactory answer , for these reasons : . because , tho i should grant that the vulgar sort of people were greater slaves than they are now , and that they had no hereditary properties in their estates , but at the will of their lords ; yet does it therefore follow , that all the freemen of the kingdom were noblemen or gentlemen , or else villains , as now understood ; since nitardus tells us in the place above mentioned , that there were three sorts of people among the saxons , edelingi , friling● , & lazzi , i e. gentlemen or noblemen freemen , and slaves or villains ; and this middle sort of men might also possess lands in allodio , or free-tenure , tho they did also depend upon other greater men for protection , and seem to be those who were after the conquest called in doomsday book , commenda●● , i. e. such who tho they lived under the protection , and within the district of some great men , lord or patron ; yet , as sir hen. spelman tells us , were free both as to their persons and estates , not as sworn to , or holding of any but the king ; and besides these there were also great bodies of men in cities , and burgh towns , and those very considerable for estates , and other riches ; who tho not nobly born , and yet being freemen , it was but reasonable that they should have their representatives in parliament , as well as the former . m. i shall not at present dispute the matter farther with you concerning the word populus , since i shall refer speaking more about it , till i come to the times after the conquest . and therefore to return to the matter in hand ; had you but read a little farther in the same leaf in the author you have cited , you might have found who they were , whom king edward the elder called to this council ; the words are these , edwardus rex synodum praedictam nobilium anglorum congregavit cui presidebat plegmundus . here your own author tells us in few words , the meaning of a long title of this synod now mentioned , viz. that the bishops , abbots , fideles , proceres & populus , were all nobiles , noblemen , that is , the ecclesiasticks ▪ and laies ; or the bishops and lay-nobility , as i shall make more evident hereafter , and not the vulgus , commons , or ordinary sort of people . and to this effect malmsbury , and the manuscript in the bodleian library cited by sir william dugdale , and mr. somner , from the treasury of the records , and evidences of the church of canterbury , cited by sir h. spelman , do all report of this very council , that edwardus rex congregavit synodum senatorum gentis anglo●●● cui prasidebat plegmundus , &c. that king edward convened a synod of the senators ( in the saxon , aldermen of the english nation ) that is , such as were usually called to such councils , which were only the nobles , and great men , for ought yet appears from this instance . but what if after all , there was never any such synod called , and consequently no such title to it . for it was said to have been assembled , by reason of a chiding letter from pope formosus . now this formosus died , anno . that is , ten years before this council was supposed to be called . f. i see this authority galls you , therefore i do not blame you to do what you can to be rid of it ; but i shall not give it up for all that . for that this word populorum , then signified all the lay-persons , who were actually noblemen that is , of the greater nobility , i think is a great mistake ; for to what purpose are all these different words here heapt together , since the word proceres had don● as well alone in your sense , and at once comprehended all those lord● or noblemen , that you would only have to be there . but the word nobiles did not in those times , neither doth at this day in any other countrey but england ▪ signifie none but great lords , barons , or peers ; since in germany and france , and other countries , every private gentleman is nobilis . and i think the middle or less thanes , might then as well be called nobiles , as the great ones . and the aldermen , or other magistrates of great cities and towns , might also very well be stiled nobiles , ratione officii , for the time they acted in that employment , and might also deserve the name of senators , as well as the greater aldermen , or earls ▪ and if there were no other lay-men , but your greater sort of aldermen , then what becomes of your chief , or kings thanes , which you your self grant were constant members of those councils . nor indeed doth the word senator only signifie such who were noblemen by birth , since among the romans there were senators of the plebeian as well as patrician order ; as any man who hath but read lucius florus , may quickly see . but as for your exception , that there was no such council , because pope formosus is said to have died ten years before this council was called , it is a bold assertion to annihilate a whole council , because of the mistake of the date , or time of its meeting , or perhaps in the name of the pope , or king then reigning , especially when it was assembled upon so remarkable an occasion , as the erecting of these new bishopricks , which all our historians ascribe to this council . but i shall now proceed to another authority , and that is to the great or common council held at winchester anno . where you will find in sir h. spelman's councils ; as also in ingulphus's history , that after the bishops , earls and other great men , or thanes , who subscribed to the law of tythes , granted by way of charter there mentioned , wherein these following parties are mentioned , aliorumque fidelium infinita multitudo qui omnes regium chirographum laudaverunt , dignitates verò sua nomina subscripserunt ; and the learned commentator upon king alfred's life , published in latin at oxford , is so well satisfied , that the commons were meant by this expression , that he hath this remarkable observation upon this king 's granting of these tythes . bis videtur rex decimas ecclesiae concessisse . primum anno , & ▪ vero . vel ut alii , è tota regione , & cum assensu omnium nobilium , & totius populi ; where this author rightly supposes , that the words at the conclusion of this council , did comprehend the consent of the people or commons , as well as of the lords , or noblemen . or else this reciting of this word populus ; as distinct from the nobiles , had been altogether in vain . so that tho i do not affirm , that the meer vulgar , or plebeian sort of people . did appear personally in the great council of those times , any more than they do now , yet they were there by their representatives , viz. either by knights of shires , as now , or else the chief thanes , or freeholders of the kingdom ; as also by the aldermen , or chief burgesses of great cities and towns , who i suppose did then represent those politick bodies , since all men could not appear there in person . but i shall give you another authority out of the same author , viz. arch-bishop parker's british antiquities , where when he relates the calling of the council of calne ▪ for the turning of married priests out of monasteries , and cathedral churches , and putting monks into their places ; he tells us a remarkable accident that then happened , viz. the falling down of the room where the council was assembled . so that there fell together all of a sudden ; ( pray take the words themselves out of the authors there cited ) praesules , proceres , equites , nobiles , pariter & ignobiles corruerunt . so that you see here were other sorts of men present in this council , beside the prasules , ( i. e. bishops and abbots ) ; and the proceres , ( i. e. the earls and chief thanes ) viz. the knights , or inferior thanes , noblemen or gentlemen ; as also ignobiles , those that were not noble by birth , such as were the representatives of cities and burroughs ; and of this opinion the arch-bishop himself seems to be ; for at the end of this relation , he makes this remark ; sed nec hujus domus in qu● 〈◊〉 ordinum , tam conspicui clarique viri , consulto convenerunt tam repentina rui●●●pe diabolica carere potuit ; where by omnium ordinum , he must certainly mean the three estates of the kingdom , in the same sense as the word ordines is used by camden , and other latin writers , who call our parliament conventus ordinum , that is , the assembly of estates . m. i pray give me leave to answer this authority before you proceed farther ; i must beg your pardon , if i cannot believe that all the persons whom the historian relates to have perished by this fall of the council chamber , to have been all of them actual members of that assembly , since there might have been there divers persons , who tho of an inferior rank , might have been presents auditors , or lookers on ; it not being then the custom to hold those councils so privately , as we do now , so that divers of the common or ordinary sort of people , called here ignobiles , and perhaps of the inferior gentry too being there , might all partake of this common ruin , and so pay dear for their needless curiosity . f. i must beg your pardon if i do not assent to your opinion in this matter ; for i cannot believe ( unless you can shew me very good authority for it ) that ever the common people , or vulgus in the sense you take them , were let in only to gaze at such assemblies . for what room could have contained so great a croud , and if they were in those days so great slaves , as the gentlemen of your opinion please to make them , it is not likely that they should be admitted to croud into the great councils then , any more than now , when you allow them more liberty , and greater priviledges than they then enjoyed . and therefore i think i may very well stick to the arch-bishops opinion , who supposes them to have been the whole assembly of the three estates , who were all involved in this ruin. but letting this pass , i shall now give you an authority of a great council held under king ethelred , which will farther confirm our sense of the word populus ; which council you may see in the st volume of monastic●● anglic contains a concession and confirmation of divers priviledges to the monastery of wolverhampton in these words ; haec decreta sunt sigerich archiepiscopi in placito coram rege ethelredo , & eboracensi archiepiscopo , & omnibus episcopis , abbatibus regionis britanni● , seu senatoribus , ducibus , & pop●lo terrae : where it seems plain to me , that the populus terrae are here put as a distinct order of men from all the rest a●oregoing . to come now to the time after the danish invasion , and the settlement of the crown upon king knute , who after he was made king , partly by conquest , and partly by election , yet altered nothing of the ancient constitution and therefore florence of worcester tells us , that anno being the first year of his reign , he divided the whole kingdom into four parts , and also foedus cum principibus & omni populo , ipse & illi cum ipso parcus cess●runt ; where you see the populus or commons is put distinct by this author from the great lord● or noblemen here called principes ; and this council is called by abbot bromton in his history parliamentum apud oxoniam ; and also in his charter to the abby of briadricesworth ( since called st. edmundsb●ry ) which is still to be seen in the office of the king's remembrancer of the excheq●er , it is thus recited , ego cnut rex totius albionis insulae , & aliarum nationum plur●marum , in cathedra regali promotus , cum consilio , & decreto archiepiscoporum , episcoporum , abbatum , comitum aliorumque omnium fidelium eligi sanciend : whence it plainly appears , that under the word fideles , was then comprehended other persons of an inferior rank , or order to the comites , or earls , there mentioned ; and these could mean no other , than the representatives of the commons , whom i have proved to have been present in these councils . m. i cannot believe you have yet proved it ; for tho i have hitherto omitted to give you my thoughts of this word fidelium , yet i must now tell you once for all , that by this word is not here meant , or any where else in our saxon laws , to be understood the ordinary or common sort of people , or any that represented them , but only tenants in capite , or in military service , which were then called the king's thanes , and were afterward the same with the barones minores , mentioned in king iohn ▪ s charter . but i shall plainly prove , when i come to it , that the word fideles , after the conquest , signified only the king ▪ s tenants in capite , and were the same with the mi●ites , whom we find to be witnesses after the dukes , or earls , to this charter of king cnute . and tho i confess this word fideles , doth in a common , or larger acceptation , signifie all such subjects as owe fealty and allegiance to the king ; yet in a strict and legal signification ( as it is here to be taken ) it signifies only the barons or tenants in capite , as dr. b. hath very well shewed us in his glossary . and therefore sir henry spelman himself distinguishes between these and all other subjects , in these words , inter●um specialiter dicuntur ●dem , qui vasalli , qui f●udo acc●pto in patron ▪ fide , & cli●ntela sunt , vicissimque suamci certi obsequii nomine fidem astrinxerunt but indeed it is impossible to understand it in your sense , for then all that swore fealty to the king ( and so were called fideles ) should have had a place in parliament , and all the men in england above fourteen years of age , must have been there in person , which would have been a pretty large assembly , and such a multitude , as no one place could have contained them . f. if what dr. b. in his preface to his norman history , pag. . as also in his answer to mr. p. pag. . be true , that fendal tenures owe their original to vvilliam the conqueror , tho in other places he is of another mind ; then certainly this word fideles , must have been used in a larger sense , in the times before the conquest , and must have extended to all those who were bound to take the oaths of fealty and allegiance , in the folk mote , or county court : as they did long after the conquest , and ought to do so still , if required ; and therefore this word fideles could be then no more limited to tenants in capite in that time , than it is now ; who tho i grant they could not all be present in the great council in person , yet they might be there by their delegates ( as well as they are now ) and who might also consist of far greater numbers than they now do ; since we find in the council of vvinchester , ( but now mentioned ) that after the dukes , earls , and great men of the kingdom , there is also added , alior●mque fidelium infinita multitudo ; which great multitude sure must have signified somewhat more than your chief thanes , or tenents in capite alone ; or else the words comites , and proceres , might very well have comprehended all the degrees of lay-men ; and therefore i desire you to shew me by some better authorities than you yet have done , that before the conquest , the word fideles must needs signifie tenants in capite and no other ; but that it did not signifie only so after that time , i shall join issue with you by and by . i shall now proceed to my next authority , which is from ailrid , abbot of rievallis , who lived not long after the conquest , who , in his life of edward the confessor , relating the manner of that king's election in his mothers vvomb , tells us , how ethelred his father called a great council about appointing a successor , that hereupon says thus , fit magnus coram rege episcoporum procerumque conventus , magnus plebis p●lgique consensus ; vvhere you see apparently , that the abbots made a distinction between the assembly of the bishops and great lords , and that of the plebs , vulgus , or common people . m. pray give me leave to interrupt you a little before you proceed to any fresh authorities . i grant it is true , that the abbot in the place you mention , tells such an idle tale , that this edward was chosen king whilst in his mothers vvomb , and so his father made the nobility swear fealty to him before he was born . he is the only author of this legend , that i know of ; and sure you your self must own that it is a little too gross to be believ'd ; and therefore i wonder that you should urge that to me for a sufficient authority , for the people or commons having any place in the great council in those times . f. pray , sir , observe to what purpose i make use of this authority ; it is not to make good the election of edward the confessor in his mothers vvomb , but only to prove who were then supposed ( when this abbot writ ) to make up the constituent parts of the wittena-gemot , or parliament , in the saxon times , which was then believed by all men , to consist of the clergy , higher nobility , and com●●● , unless you can suppose that the abbot should mention the commons by prophecy . and granting that it was only according to the custom of his own time ( which the author of the preface to the decem scriptores , makes to be about the middle of king henry ii. reign ) it will sufficiently prove the antiquity of the commons in parliament , to be near a hundred years older than the earliest time you assign for it , ( viz ) the th of hen. iii. but i shall now conclude with the conclusion to king edward the confessor's third charter to the abby of vvestminster , in a great council held in the last year of his reign , as you will find it thus recited in sir h. spelman's councils in these words , hanc igitur chart●● meae donationis & libertatis , in die dedicationis praedictae ecclae . recitari jussi coram episcopis , abbatibus , comitibus , & omnibus , optimatibus angliae , omnique populo audiente , & vidente ; where by the optimates angliae , i think can be understood no other than the thanes , or freeholders of all sorts , as well the kings as others ; as also the deputies of great cities and burroughs , the words being optimates angliae ( non regis ) and tho it is not likely that the populus , who are here mention'd to be present , should be the mob , or common people , only admitted to stare and harken at such a great assembly ; yet since the words are in respect of them only , audiente , & vidente , i shall not insist upon the word populus here , as a part of this common council of the kingdom . but yet that the word populus does oftentimes refer to the representatives of the commons , i shall conclude with the answer of k. harold , the last saxon king , to the message of vvilliam , duke of normandy , demanding the kingdom of england ; and that harold according to his promise should marry his daughter ; the words are remarkable , and therefore pray read them out of will. of malmesbury , who lived near that time , contra , 〈◊〉 scil . heraldus ) quae dixi de puellae nuptiis referens , de regno ( addebas ) praesumtuosum fuisse quod absque generali senatus , & populi conven●● & edicto alienam illi hereditatem iuraverit ; now that by the word senatûs is to be understood the higher nobility , such as the bishops , abbots , earls , &c. and by populus , the representatives of the people , we have mr. selden's authority on our side , who in his dissertations on fleta , speaking of the great question that arose in parliament in k. edward iii. reign , concerning king iohn's donation of his kingdom to the pope , gives their conclusion to this debate , in these words , ordine universi ●am generis hieratici , quam proceres , & senatus populus , s●l●●niqu● in it a deliberatione in comiciis illis responderunt unanimes irritam plane fuissi 〈◊〉 donationem illam ut pote tam sine ordinum assensu , quam iuran ento ina●gu●a●i advers●n ; but of this great authority i shall speak more hereafter , when i come to it in order of time. since therefore it is apparent that the commons had a share in the great councils before the conquest ( as you call it ) i desire that you would be pleased to shew me how they came to lose it after the coming in of the normans , and to be so long without it , as until the th of henry iii. or th of edward i. if your authors are to be credited . m. i must confess the authorities you have brought out of the saxon councils , would seem to be of some weight , were i not sensible , that the monks , who were the only recorders of these councils , are very short and careless in giving a true account of them , and if we go to the councils themselves , we might be sufficiently convinced , that all those that are said to be present at them , could not have any places or votes in those assemblies , as members of them ; for in some of them ( as in this example ) we find the queen to have been there , and to have given her consent to the king's charters ; and yet i suppose you will not allow the queen to have been there as an estate by her self , much less to have been a member of any of the three estates . the like we may say for those abbesses we find mentioned to have been present in divers of those councils , and particularly in that of winchester , you so much insist upon , wherein tythes were granted ; and these are said to have approved of the royal charter , as well as any of the rest ; and sure you do not make women to have had voices in our great councils in the saxon times . so that it appears plain enough to me , that persons being mentioned as present in these assemblies , or being witnesses to charters there granted , do not make them to have been constituent members thereof : and therefore since the saxon times are so dark and obscure , and so little to be collected of certainty from what we find in the old monkish histories , and those fragments of laws and charters they have left us ; i think it is time that we pass over this to the next period after the conquest , wherein i doubt not but to shew you , that for above an hundred years after that time , none but the bishops , abbots , earls , barons , or tenants in capite , were summoned by the great council or parliament till the time i have so often mentioned : f. i see you do all you can to perplex very plain and evident proofs ; for as to the queens being often present at the great councils of those times , it is no more than what was usual in these elder times ; and that in france as well as here , as any man that will but peruse the charters of some of the kings of france , of the second race , as they are in father mabilion de rediplomatica , may easily satisfie themselves ; and as for the abbesses , whom we find sometimes mentioned to have been there before the conquest , they might also according to the custom of those times have appeared in person in the great councils , in the right of their monasteries , and of those great possessions they held , or else they might have been often represented by their oecomi , or stewards , who transacted all business for them ; and your own civil law doth always suppose , that what any persons perform by their lawful proxies , it is said to be done by themselves ; and that the abbesses and prioresses , did together with the other spiritual tenants in capite , joyn to grant scrutage upon the knights fees they held ; i shall shew you before we have finished this discourse . but since i think i have sufficiently proved , the commons being in possession of this right by a long prescription , i shall now leave it to you to prove , that they did not enjoy it after the conquest , and that not until the time you suppose . m. since you are pleased to impose this task upon me , i shall willingly submit to it ; and therefore before i proceed farther , pray let us see how far we are agreed . in the first place i think you will grant , that till about the latter end of edward i. reign , there is no express mention made in our records , or historians , of any representatives for the commons , either by knights of shires , citizens or burgesses of towns ; much less the word commons , mentioned by them in the sense it is now taken ; for if we peruse ingulph , or eadmerus , or any other ancient historian of william the conqueror , or his sons time , when they have occasion to mention the great councils of that age , we can find none mentioned ( besides the bishops ) but principes , proceres , primates , or optimates regni ; or else in the following age , under the titles of optimates , or magnates regni , by matt. paris , and matt. of westminster , who are often comprehended under the more particular titles of comites & barones , or baronagium regni , or else by the more general of nobilitas , universitas , or communitas regni , that is , the whole university , community , or body of the kingdom , represented in parliament , by the bishops , abbots , earls , and barons thereof . as for most of these words , i have given you my sense of them already , in the times before the conquest ; and tho i grant there may be other persons , sometimes mentioned after the barons , as milites , liberi homines or tenentes , yet i think dr. b. very plainly proves , by those authorities he produces in his answer to mr. p. as also in his glossary at the end of it , that by all the words before-mentioned , which are used in our ancient historians , can only be understood either the greater barons , or else the less , who were tenents in capite , and were a part of the baronage or nobility of those times , and whose votes did then conclude all their subfeudotaries , or mesne tenents , who held of them ; and these together with the bishops and abbots , &c. did represent all degrees of men in the kingdom , and being often comprehended under the general titles of clerus and populus , or else pleb● , or valgus ; or else under these titles , as yet more generally expressed by regnum , and sacerdotium , i. e. the clergy and laity of the kingdom ; the words populus , and plebs , or vulgus , signifying no more in those days , in our historians ( when they treat of parliamentary affairs ) than the lay-earls and barons , with the other less tenants in capite : so that the vulgar or common people , neither by themselves , nor their representatives had then any place in our great councils : and therefore i think i may boldly affirm with dr. b. first , that the commons represented by knights , citizens , and burgesses in parliament , were not introduced , nor were one of the three estates in parliament , before the th of henry the third . secondly , that before that time the body of the commons of england , or freemen ( as now understood , or as we now frequently call them ) collectively taken , had not any share or votes in making of laws for the government of the kingdom , nor had any communication in affairs of state , unless as they were represented by the tenents in capite . and these two propositions i think i shall be able to prove by undeniable evidence , drawn from our ancient historians , the laws and charters of our kings , as also from those parliament rolls , records , and acts of parliament , we have yet left us . f. i confess you have made a very bold challenge , and if you can make it out , i grant you will carry the day , and i shall then willingly submit to your opinion ; but since i find the greatest part of our arguments do consist in the equivocal use of those words , by which i confess the commons in parliament are generally expressed in our ancient historians : i shall in the first place shew you ( to avoid all unnecessary dispute about words ) that by every one of these expressions you have mentioned ▪ the commons might very well be comprehended as well after the conquest , as before . and therefore to take the words in the same order as you have recited them , i shall begin with the word principes , which i have already proved signified before the conquest no more than chief , or principal men ; and that it means no more after the conquest , i shall shew you by several authorities ; and though i grant that word is most commonly used by eadmerus , yet could it not be meant in the sense it is now understood , there being then never a prince , nor so much as a duke in england ; but what was understood by this expression in after-times , we must appeal to historians . mat. of westminster , in his flores histor. anno dom. . ( being the th year of edward the first , which was but years after the hen. . ) thus reckons up the constituent parts of that parliament , rex , pontifices , & principes anglicani convenerunt in unum , &c. yet in rot. claus. . edward . it is called a parliament ; and at which the statute of mortmain was enacted . and that the commons were there as well as they are now , i shall prove when i come to those times . but as for the word proceres in the ancient manuscript chronicle of walter of coventry o. hen. . anno dom. . you 'll find these words ; purificatione beatae mariae convocantur apud london proceres angliae ibique tractatu habito diffusiore cum clero , & populo ibidem convocato rex concessit libertates tam ecclesiae quam regni , quam forestae sicut cartae suae inde confectae & singulis comitatibus liberatae plenius testantur ibidemque con●●ssa domino regi a comitibus , & baronibus , & clero & populo ibidem praesentibus , quintadecima omnium mobilium de communi assensu , praeterquam de ecclesiis . but as for the word magnates , mat. paris in his history of this year relates it thus : rex hen. ad natale tenuit curiam suam apud westm. praesentibus clero & populo , cum magnatibus regionis solemnitate igitur ut decebat completa , hubertus de burgo ex parte ejusdem regis proposuit coram archiepiscopis , episcopis , comitibus , baronibus , & aliis universis ▪ &c. but to give you the rest in english ; the king here demanded the fifteenth part of all their movable goods ; upon which the parties above mentioned , with one accord answered , that they would willingly yield to the king's desire , if he would confirm the great charters . to which the king having assented , and sealed them ; they granted the said supply . from which we may observe , that as all the inferior clergy were comprehended under the word clerus ; so must , by a like parity of reason , the commons be under populus ▪ or else it would have been an idle tautology when it is put , as it is here , distinct from magnates . now though there be no other persons expresly mentioned by these two historians to have been at this parliament of the laity , but the earls and barons , comprehended by them under the general names of proceres , populus & magnates ; yet do but read the conclusion to the great charter of th hen. . and you will find , that besides the arch-bishops , bishops , earls and barons , there were also present , the knights , freeholders , and all others of the kingdom , by their lawful representatives , as i shall shew you more at large when i come to make use of this charter , as an argument to prove the commons to have appeared in parliament before hen. . so likewise the statute of fines made edward . . was ordained de communi concilio regni , and yet no mention made either of the assent of the lords or commons ; and yet this statute was made but years after the th of that king. since which time the dr. himself acknowledges the commons to have been always represented in parliament , as they are at this day ; and yet mat. westminster speaking of this parliament , mentions it's orders only in general words , thus ; dominica secunda quadragesima citatis magnatibus regni apud westmonasterium ; and yet it is certain all the estates of the kingdom were there : so that it is not safe to conclude from the general , and equivocal expressions either of ancient statutes , or historians , that the commons were not in parliament , because not particularly mentioned . i could give you more instances of the like kind , but i will not tire you : but shall now proceed to shew , that notwithstanding the use you make of the testimony of mat. paris , as to the sense of the word magnates , yet , that all those historians that writ immediately before or after him , and continue his history , do frequently make use of the word magnates & primates , to signify the commons , as well as the lords assembled in parliament . and for the proof of this , i shall give the testimonies of two approved authors . the first is thomas vvalsingham , in his history of england , who in anno dom. . edw. . hath these words reced●ns : ( rex ) de berewici partibus pervenit eboracum , ubi magnum 〈◊〉 clero tenuit concilium , & regni magnatibus universis . so likewise mat. of vvestminster , in his flores histor. in the th of edw. . anno dom. . relates a parliament held at st. edmondsbury , at which appeared primates , ac magnates sui regni , &c. a quibus novum tallagium postulavit , &c. i could give you more of the same kind out of this author , but i fear lest i should tire you ; and therefore i shall conclude with the testimony of hen. de knighton in his history , de eventibus angliae , where in hen. . he thus speaks concerning this king 's granting the great charters , post haec rex henricus concessis magnatibus terra duas chartas , unam de foresta , & aliam de libertatibus , ob quam causam communes regni concesserunt quintam decimam partem mobilium , & immobili●m . from all which you may observe , that in the time when this author wrote , it was generally believed , that this term magnates comprehended all the estates of the kingdom , and likewise supposed the commons ( whom he here calls communes , to have had a principal share , not only in the paying , but granting this great tax . and forthe farther proof of this , pray see what vv. malmesbury says in his history , when reciting the speech of the bishop of vvinchester , then the pope's legate , speaking of the londoners , hath this remarkable passage , londinenses , quì praecipui habebantur in anglia sicut proceres ; so that if the chief citizens of that famous city , were reckoned sicut proceres , sure those they chose to represent them in parliament , might much better deserve that title . and thus likewise vvalsingham , in his history in the th of edw. . tells us , that he summoned to a parliament at london , regni proceres , & praelatos ad tractandum de variis regni negotiis ; but in the close roll of this very year it appears by the expensis militum , that the commons were there , as as well the lords . so that you see they were all then comprehended by our historians under the general term of proceru regni . i come in the next place to the words nobiles & nobilitas . vvalsingham , edw. . gives us this account . post natale dominicum convenit universa multitudo regni nobilium ad parliamentum londoniis . now what is here meant by this multitudo nobilium may be proved by the parliamentary writs of this year , as appears by the close roll of this year , wherein there are writs of summons for the commons directed to the sheriffs . and that the house of commons were often stiled noble in latter times appears by a speech recorded in the rolls of parliament th of rich. . to be spoken by sir mich. de la pool , then lord chancellor , to the lords and commons , which begins thus , ydist vous ( i. e. i say to you ) messeurs prelats , & seigneurs temporelx , & vous mes compaignons les chivalers , & autres de la noble commune de angleterre . and to prove that this word was then used in this sense amongst civilians , from whom we derive most of our titles of dignities , you may see in the large work of barthol : cassaanaeus , called catalogus gloriae mundi , written on this subject ; where , in his th . part , consid . . he hath this amongst other comments on the word nobilitas ; nobilitas etiam causatur ex loco , quoniam civis ex urbe splendida oriundus , nobilis est ; for which he there gives many authorities . and this title he looks upon as due also to countrey gentlemen , living upon the husbandry of their own estates , or annual rents . and that by the word magnates , are often understood the knights of shires , commonly called in old french , grantz des countees ; i can give you sufficient authorities : now this word magnates is always rendred in our old french , by grantz ; for the proof of this , i desire you in the first place to take notice , that rot. claus. e. . in . dorso , you will find this title , inhibitio ne qui magnates , viz. comes , baro , miles , 〈◊〉 abqua alia notabilis persona transeat ad partes transmarinas . where you see the word magnates is applied to knights at least , as well as earls and barons . and amongst the common writs of michaelmas . term , anno edw. i. in the keeping of the remembrancer of the treasury of the exchequer , the knights of shires , and barons of cinque-ports are called magnates . so also in the statute , e. . de servientibus , it is there enacted , per assent de les ditz prelatz , countes 〈◊〉 ; & autres grandes de la dite communalte , illonques assemblez . also in the statute-book printed in french , in the statute of the staple , e. . the knights of the shires are expresly called , grantz des counties . and lastly , as for the word optimates , which is derived from the superlative optimus , it signifies no more than the best sort of men in any commonwealth or city . and in this sense , william of malmesbury , in his history , speaking of the rich citizens of london , hath this remarkable passage , londinenses qui pro magnitudine civitatis optimates sunt . and that not only knights , but also such citizens , as were remarkable and eminent for their estates or offices in cities , had the appellation of magnates , appears from an ancient manuscript book , kept in the archives of the city of london ; where in anno dom. . being the th . of hen. . an act of common council was made , per omnes alderman●aes , & magnates civitatis , per assensum univer-sorum civium , quod nullo tempore ●ermitterent aliquem vicecomitem admitti in vicecomitem per duos annos continuos , sicut 〈◊〉 extiterant . so likewise in the same book , anno dom. . . h. . mention is there made of a dissention that then arose about the choice of a sheriff ; and the book says , that quidam de vulgo elegerunt , nichol. bat. per assensum majoris , & magnates elegerunt adam de ●ently . i could give you more of a like nature ; but i will not tire you ; but no doubt but the eminent citizens of york and other cities , were called magnates in those times . from all which we may safely conclude , that not only knights of shir● were stiled magnates , but also the representatives for the cities were often stiled proceres , magnates , and nobiles , in our ancient rolls , and acts of parliament , and other publick writings . i beg your pardon for being thus long ; but i could not make an end sooner , and prove the true sense of these words in question , from ancient historians , acts of parliaments and records ; by which i hope you will be satisfied how unsafe it is to depend upon the general and various expressions of our english historians ( especially , as understood by those of yo●● opinion ) ; since if we should depend upon them alone , the commons would not oftentimes be found to have been present in parliament , even when the records themselves expresly prove they were there . m. i must confess you have made me think more on this subject , than perhaps otherwise i should have done ; yet i must observe , that most of the quotations you have made use of , concerning the meaning of the words proceres , magnates , and nobiles , &c. are from authors who writ after the time that i 〈◊〉 the commons , as now represented , to have been constantly summoned to parliament ; so that they might very well , through haste or inadvertency , confound them with the earls and lords , and so stile them by the same titles . for i will prove to you , before the conclusion of this discourse , by undeniable records , that by the words magnates and proceres , are understood the bishops , earls , and barons , as distinguished from the commons . but i think i can sufficiently prove from mat. paris , and the ancient laws of our first norman kings as also from the magna charta of king iohn , that by the words bartne● i● meant the tenents in capite , who are there only mentioned to ha● constantly appeared in parliament , till the th . e. . the greater and less ●●●ons , or tenents in capite , together with those of higher degree , ( viz. the earls , bishops , and abbots ) , being the only persons who represented the who●e body of the nation , in our great councils , or parliaments . and i take this to be 〈◊〉 evident and clear , that i cannot quit this opinion , without you can shew 〈◊〉 better reasons to the contrary , than hitherto you have done . f. i see nothing will satisfie those who have once received a prejudice ; 〈◊〉 otherwise i think it may be proved sufficiently , from that clause in magna chart● i have mentioned , that other persons were there before the th . of henry 〈◊〉 besides your great barons , and tenents in capite . and as for the use of 〈◊〉 words you mention , in historians after the reign of hen. iii. nothing can be a plainer proof for me : for if those historians did comprehend the common under those general words , or phrases , we have been now disputing about , i de●sire to know why they might not have been likewise comprehended under th● same terms , by mat. paris , and those other historians who writ other historie● from the norman conquest to his time ; and why thy might not have then con●founded the commons with the lords , as well as they did afterwards . but since i see you insist so much upon your barones , and tenentes in capite , whom you wi● have alone to constitute the baronagium , or the communitas , or universitas bar●●gii angliae , pray give me leave to ask you a plain question , were your less● tenents in capite , ( or barones minores ) lords or peers of parliament , or were they commoners only ? m. to give you mr. selden's opinion , in his titles of honour , cap. . he supposes , that from the time of the conquest to about the middle of king iohn , every tenant by reason of his tenure of lands he held in capite , was indifferently an honorary or parliamentary baron ; but that about the end of king iohn's time , some only that were most eminent of those tenants ( sometimes stiled barones majores regni ) were summoned by several writs directed to them as lords or peers of parliament ; and that the rest , being the lesser or lower tenants in capite , ( sometimes stiled barones minores ) , were for some time before this summoned by general writs directed to the sheriffs or bayliffs , as appears by king iohn's magna charta . now whether these men were ever really peers or not , i have reason to doubt ; since i do not find but it was they alone who for some years after the conquest served upon juries in county courts , and dispatched all the publick business of the country , which was then ( as at this day ) a drudgery beneath the peers to perform , and therefore i shall not insist upon it . but thus much i think is certain , that they were a sort of persons much above any other lay-men of the kingdom ; since they held their estates immediately from the king , and were so considerable , as that by the constitutions of clarendon , they were not to be excommunicated without the king's leave ; and so were then in some sort of the same order , ratione tenurae , with the great barons or peers , being commonly stiled barones , and made up but one estate or order of lay-men in parliament . and from thence i suppose proceeds that common error of sir ed. coke , that the lords and commons did anciently sit together , and made but one house . now if you have any thing to object against this notion , pray let me hear it . f. i think you and i are come pretty near an issue in this question ; for you confess that these lesser tenents in capite , and whom you comprise under the word barones , were not truly and properly barons ; and so far you are in the right ; but yet you will have them to be somewhat more than mere commoners ; as if there had been some degree or order of men in england , in those times , who were neither lords nor commons , but an amphibious race between both . but to prove that they were indeed no more than commoners , and not lords nor pee●s at all , nor equal with them , we need go no farther than their way of trial in cases of treason or felony , which was by mere commoners , who were not tenants in capite , as well as those that were ; so that a person who was no tenant in capite , and might serve upon a jury of life and death upon them ; and as well as the dr. in his answer to mr. p. as you asserted , that they only served in the country upon all iuries ; and that before the time of king iohn . so after all this noise of none but lords and tenants in capite , appearing for the whole commons of england , we find by your own showing , that three parts in four of the lay members of that council were as meer commoners as our knights of shires , and barons of the five ports at this day ; nor can i see any reason why these latter might not be as well comprehended under the word barones , as the former , who were meer commoners likewise ; if we consider that it was neither nobility , nor birth , nor the king's writs of summons , but only the meer tenure of their lands that gave them a particular right to a place in that assembly in those ages ; or if a meer citizen could get money enough to purchase such an estate in capite , he was as good a member of parllament as the best of them all : so that the question then amounts to no more than this , whether the commons of england were then represented by tenants in capite , or by knights of shires , and others , as they are now . but since you will have none commoners , but tenants in capite to have had places therein , pray tell me whether you allow that priviledge to all who held in capite , or not ? m. yes , i allow it to all who held in capite by knights service , and who also enjoyed a whole knight's fee , or so much as was sufficient to render them able to sustain the dignity of that place ; not but that the king had also a prerogative of summoning or omitting whom of them he pleased , to his great council or parliament , till the less tenants in capite thinking it a wrong to them , it was provided by king iohn's charter , that all of them should be summoned by one general writ of summons , directed to the sheriff . but i exclude from this concil all tenants by petit serjeanty , who tho 't is true held of the king in capite , yet was it not by knights service . so likewise i exclude all cities and towns , tho the citizens or burgesses of divers of them held their lands and tenements by that tenure ; since being neither noble by blood , nor having estates sufficient to maintain the port of a gentleman , or knight , they had no right to appear there in person among the other tenants , who were owners of one or more knights fees. yet do i not affirm , that the commons were not after some sort represented in parliament by their superior lords , tho not as commoners , since the bishops , abbots , and other barons did then make laws , and give taxes , not only for themselves , but their feudatory tenents also , tho of never so great estates ; and tenure in capite was then looked upon as the only true freehold of the kingdom , and the tenents by it as the only true freeholders . f. i shall shew you by and by the falsity of this notion , but in the mean time pray tell me when a great council or parliament was called , who represented those persons , who you say did not appear there ; and made general laws , and granted general taxes for themselves , and the whole kingdom , when there was occasion . for i see you shut out the greater part even of these your true freeholders from this assembly . m. as for the tenents in petit serjeanty , i at present conceive ( tho i am not sure of it ) that many of them might hold lands , and perhaps divers knights fees , by grand serjeanty , or knights service also ; since those estates which were given by the conqueror to his servants , to be held of him ; by such and such petit services , might in process of time fall by purchase , or descent , into the hands of such great tenents in capite , as had sufficient estates to maintain that dignity ; and as for the rest , they might , for ought as i know , before the statute de tallagio non concedendo , have been taxed by the kings writs , according to the proportion of the knights fees , or parts of knights fees , which they then held ; and according to the rate of the sums imposed in parliament , either by way of aids , upon every knights fee ; or else by way of subsidy , by so much a yard , or plow land throughout all england ; which has been the only way of taxing ever since that of knights fees hath been disused . f. then i find after all you have said , that scarce half your tenents in capite had any votes in prrliament , either by themselves , or their representatives ; and so having laws made for them , and being taxed at the king's will , were as errant slaves and vassals , notwithstanding their tenure in capite , as the meanest person of the kingdom , who was taxed ( as you would have it ) at the will of his superior lord ; which , whether so great and powerful a body of men would ever have sufferd , i leave to any indifferent person to judge . m. i grant this may now appear somewhat hard ; yet since it was the receiv'd law and custom of the kingdom , it was not then look'd upon as a grievance ; and it was then no more unjust than it is now , that persons under forty shillings a year , tho of never so good estates in money , or stock ; or that tenants for years , or for the life of another , should at this day have no votes at the election of knights of shires , and consequently be without any representatives in parliament of their own choice , and yet be subject to all laws and taxes ( tho never so great ) when made and imposed by the king in parliament ; and i am able to give you divers good authorities to prove , that even london it self , and all other cities and towns which held of the king in capite , and were called his demesnes , were often taxed by the king and his council out of parliament , before the statute de tallagio non concedendo ; and i think dr. b. hath proved this beyond exception , in his animadversions upon mr. a's iani anglorum facies no●e ; and he there gives us the record it self of hen. iii. now in the keeping of the king's remembrancer of the exchequer : that the king did that year ( as he had divers times before ) talliate or tax all his demesne lands in england , and then likewise demanded of the city of london the sum of marks , in name of the talliage or tax so laid ; and the mayor and citizens at last yielded , after a great contest ; it appearing upon search of the rolls in the ezchequer , that the citizens of london had been several times before so taxed in the reigns of king iohn , and the king himself ; and so they payed at last the sum which the king demanded . by which you see , that the greatest and richest cities and towns in england were taxed at the king's will ; nay , i think i am able to prove ( were it now necessary ) that the whole kingdom was often taxed by the king and his council only , before the granting of king iohn's magna charta ; and the statute de tallagio non concedendo , above mentioned . but to return to the matter from which you forced me to digress . i think nothing is more plain , than that our ancient parliaments were only the king's court baron for the dispatch of the publick affairs of the kingdom , and in which ( as in the lesser courts baroa , or courts of mannor , the suitors or tenents were , together with the lord , or his stewards , the sole judges ; so that at first , after the conquest , it belong'd to the king alone , as the supreme lord of the kingdom , to appoint or call which , or what sort of those tenants be pleased , to attend him with their aid and advice , at his common councils , or parliaments ; and i think nothing is more evident ( as i shall prove more at large from our ancient histories , records and statutes ) then , that before the th hen. iii. and some years also after that time , none but the bishops , abbots , earls , and greater barons , and some of the less , called in king iohn's charter , the other tenents in capite , then constituted the whole body of the parliament , under ●he titles of baronagium angliae , or communitas , or universitas baronagii angliae ; and for this i can give you so good authorities , that nothing but more cogent and evident proofs can bring me from this opinion ; and therefore i must tell you , i do not value those loose and inconsiderate expressions of historians either before or after that time . f. i see the testimonies of historians are of no credit , if they make against your hypothesis ; but i shall show you your mistakes about the king's taxing anon , but the main force of your argument lies in the signification of those latin words you have last mentioned , and which i must needs tell you , i think you take in too strict a sense ; for first , as to the word baro , i grant it was not much in use before william i. obtained the english diadem ; baro , says camden , britanni pro suo non agnoscum , in anglo-saxonicis legibus nusquam comparet , nec in a●frici glossario saxonico inter dignitatum vocabula habetur . for the english saxons called those in their own language , aealdermen , which in latin were named comites , and by the danes , earls ; but it was of so extensive an import in its signification , that we read of aldermani regis , aldermani comitatus , &c. as i have already shewed you ; so that according to the strict sense of this word , we had whole regiments of earls , whose titles seldom , if at all , descended hereditary , till the confessors time ; and after william i. the saxon words , aealderman , and thegnes , began to be changed ; and in the room of aldermanni & thani , we find comites & barones , as in all our ancient laws and histories ; nor was the word barones only taken in those days for great barons ; and tenents in capite , but also for the inferior barons , or free tenents , which held great estates of other mesne lords , as well as of the king , by certain services , and to whom the great lords or earls ( as sir h. spelman shews us in his glossary , title baro ) often directed their charters , barombus , & fidelibus nostris tam francis , quam anglis ; and we there also read some quotations from the old book of ramsey abby , wherein the barons of the church of ramsey , as also the milites , and liberi homines thereof , are particularly mentioned ; all which ( as this learned author tells us ) non de magnatibus sunt intelligenda , sid de vassallis feodalibus , note scil melioris . and the same author says a little lower , that barons are often taken pro liberè tenentibus in genere , hoc est tam in soccagio quam per servitium militare . m. what then ? do you suppose that all the freeholders in england , by whatsoever tenure they held , appeared in person in parliament , before the time sir h. spelman in his glossary , and dr. b. assign for the summoning of the commons to parliament ? at this rate every yeoman , or petty freeholder was a baron ; so that this assembly might then consist of above or thousand persons ; since spot in his chronicle tells us , that william the conqueror reserved to himself the service of about knights fees , which by the time , i suppose , might have been divided into many more lesser ones , by co-heirship , or by sale ; and otherwise parcelled out by the king's license into half-knighs-fees , third part of fees , fourth part of fees , eight parts , sixteen , twenty , thirty and forty parts of fees , and so have been increased into as many more ; and these , besides the tenants in soccage , must needs have been so numerous that what room , nay what field or place was able to contain so great a multitude ? or how could any business have been transacted therein , without the greatest confusion imaginable ? f. so then you your self must also grant , that when all your greater and less barons , or tenents in capite appeared in person , parliaments were much more numerous than they are now ; since according to the dr.'s catalogue , out of dooms-day-book , ( in his appendix to the english history , vol. . ) of all the tenants in capite , or serjeanty that held all the lands in every county of king william , they did ( besides the bishops , abbots , earls , and barons ) altogether amount to about . and these in the th of hen. iii. by forfeiture , and new conveyances from the crown ; or by those other ways you have now mentioned , might be multiplied into twice as many more , and those also of sufficient estates to maintain the port of a member of parliament , or knight ; since pounds a year was in the reign of king iohn , and henry iii. reckoned as a knight's fee , and he that had it , was liable to be knighted : and if so , i pray according to your own hypothesis , how could so great an assembly be managed , as of about or persons , without strange confusion and disorder ? but upon our principles there will follow no more absurdities or inconveniencies than in yours ; for either these barons of counties , burgesses and inhabitants of towns and cities , were always represented by knights and citizens , as they are now ; or else these barons of counties , appearing for themselves , were lords of mannors , or freeholders of good estates , who were not so numerous or inconsiderable as you imagine ; the freehold lands in england , being in those days but in a few hands , in comparison to what they are now . and for this opinion i have sir h. spelman of my side ; who in the place already quoted , under barones c●●itatus , expresly tells us , hoc nomine contineri videtur antiquis paginis , omnis 〈◊〉 ●eodalium specier , in uno quovis comitara degentium ; proceres nempè , & 〈◊〉 domini , nèc non liberè quique tenentes , hoc est fundorum proprietarii , anglicè freeholders ut superiù● dictum est . normidum autem est hoc liberè tenentes , nec tam ●iles 〈◊〉 fuisse , nèc tam vulgares ut hodiè deprehonduntur ; nam villas , & dominia , in 〈◊〉 hareditates non dum distrahebant nobiles ; sed ( ut vidimus in hibernia ) penes se retinentes , agros , per precarios excolebant , & adscriptitios . so that you see sir h. spelman then believed , that the mannors , and great freehold in england , were not then parcell'd out into so many small shares as you imagine ; and that such inferior barons , whether they held in ca●●●e , or not , were also called proceres ; see the laws of henry i. chap. . the title whereof is de privilegits procerum angliae . the law runs thus , si exurgat placitum inter homines allcusus baronum foenam habentium , tract●tur placitum in curia domini sui ; now that this socha was no more than soc. in old saxon , see spel. gloss. tit. soc. i. e. secta de hominibus in curia domini secundum consuetudinem ; so likewise in titulo socha vel dicitur soc. a saxon soc● . i. e libertas franchesia & vide manerium qd . dicitur etiam soca dictum est . from all which we may observe , that these lords of mannors ( here called proceres & barones ) had court barons , which took their name from their lords , tho feudatory tenents or vava●ours . but granting that about the end of king iohn , or beginning of the reign of hen. iii. supposing that these lords of mannors , and great freeholders , whether tenents in capite , or others , might amount in all to on persons , i do not see why such an assembly might not be as orderly and well managed as one of . or . ( supposing your greater barons and less tenants in capite to have than made about that number ) ; especially if we consider , that most business , or acts of any consequence , ( and for which parliaments were called ) might be prepared , and drawn up by the king and his council before they met . so that take it which way you will , fewer inconveniences and improbabilities attend my hypothesis , than yours . m. that the earls and greater barons , both spiritual and temporal , together with the tenants in capite , then made the body of the baronage of england , i have very good authority on my side ; but that any feudatory barons or tenants of a lesser degree , ever had any places or votes in those assemblies , i think you can give me no sufficient authority for it . 't is true mr. p. in his treatise of the rights of the commons asserted , gives us two modern quotations ; the one out of mr. c●●den's britannia , the other out of mr. selden to prove it . as for the former , it is in the introduction to the britannia , first published in quarto ; the words are these , verum baro ex illis non imbus videatur , qua tempus paulatim moliara , & molliora reddidit ; nam longo post tempore non milites , sed qui liberi erant domini , & thani saxombus dicebantur , barones vocari caperunt , nec dum magni honoris erat , paulo autem postea ( meaning after the normans entrance ) eò honoris pervenit ut nomine baronagii angliae omnes q●●dammodo regni ordines continerentur . but he doth not tell us that this learned author , in his last edition of this work in folio , being sensible of his mistake , hath added the word superiores before ordines ; whereby it is plain he now restrains it only to the earls and barons , as they are now understood . mr. p's other quotation is out of mr. selden's notes upon ra●●●rus , where commenting on the word barones , he saith , vocabulum nempe alio notione usurpari quam vulgo , neque eos duntaxat ut hodie significare , quibus peculiaris ordinum comitiis locus est , but then conceals this that follows , which makes directly against him ; sed universos , qui regiae munificentiae , ad formulam iuris nostre clientelaris quod nullius villae regiae glebam , sed ipsum tantum modo regem spectat , tenure en chief ( phrasi forensi dicimus ) sive tenura in capite lati fundi● pessidebant ; whereby you may see that he expresly restrains this word barones to tenents in capite only ; tho your author takes no notice of it ; nor indeed in his title of honour doth mr. selden give us any other description of a baron , ( i mean such who had a vote in parliament ) but such in the sense that is taken in henry i. his charter , as it is recited in matt. paris , siquis baronum meorum , comitum vel aliorm qui de me tenent mortuus fuerit , i. e. one who was either one of the earls , or greater barons ; or otherwise , held in capite . f. mr. p. is not at all to be blamed ( as you make him ) in these two quotations , since in that out of camden , you cannot deny , but he hath truly quoted that author , as it was in his first edition ; and if he afterwares altered it , it may very well be questioned whether he did not add the word superiores , rather out of fear of displeasing the greater nobility , ( whom that quotation had before shockt ) than out of any sense of his being in the wrong ; as it appears by the words immediately following , when he tells us out of a nameless manuscript author ; that henry iii. out of so great a multitude of barons , which was seditious and turbulent , called the best and chiefest of them only by writ to parliament . by which it plainly appears , that he supposed all those less barons , or tenants in capite , tho no lords , as now understood , who were thus excluded to have been only nominal , and not real barons ; and if so , commoners ; or else he must extend the peerage of england to at least three or four thousand persons ; for so many tenents in capite might very well be at that time . the same i may likewise say as to the quotation out of mr. selden ; for by the words , quibus peculiaris in ordinum comitiis locus est ; 't is plain he supposed that all the rest of those tenents in capite were but meer commoners ; yet he no where affirms , that none but these appeared in parliament for all the commons of england ; for he very well knew the unreasonableness of that supposition ; since besides these barons or tenants in capite , bracton in his first book tells us of divers other orders of men , of great dignity and power in this kingdom , about the time when you suppose this marvellous alteration to have happened ; his words are these , et sub iis ( viz. regibus ) duces , comites , barones , magnates , sive vavassores , & milites , & etiam liberi , & villani & deversa potestates sub rege constitutae ; and a little farther , sunt & alti potentes sub rege qui dicuntur barones , hoc est robur belli ; sunt & alii qui dicuntur vavassores viri 〈◊〉 dignitatis . from which words i desire you to observe , that he here makes the magnates , and the vavassores , or feudatory tenants to be all one , and also ranks them before the milites . now whether these vavassores and milites , who did not all hold of the king in capite , were men of so great dignity and power as these whom he here reckons immediately after the earls and great barons , should have no votes in parliament , neither by themselves , nor their representatives , is altogether improbable . and agreeable to this of bracton , du fresne , in his lexicon tit. vavasor tells us , that vavassorum duo erant ordines , sub majorum apellatione implectuntur , qui barones apellantur , sub ●norum vero , quos vulgò vavassores dicunt ; ut leges henrici i. reg. ang. thaines minores , respectu thainorum majorum qui baronibus aequiparantur . but that these lesser thanes or vavassors were also stiled barones , sir h. spelman tells us expresly in his glossary , tit. baro ; etiam barones comitum , procer umque , hoc est barones subalterni , & baronum barones s●pissime leguntur ; and of this he gives us many examples , and particularly of the chief tenants of the abby of ramsey , above mentioned . so likewise the same author , a leaf or two farther , speaking of the barones of london , mentioned in the charter of king henry i. understands them , pro civibus praestantioribus qui socnas suas , & consuetudines , i. e. curias habuerunt , & privilegia , eorum instar , qui in comitatu barones comitatus dicuntur , &c. nor did this title of barones extend to london alone , but he also immediately tells us in the same place , sic barones de ebaraco , de cestria , de warwico de soe feversham , & plurium villaram regiis privilegiis insignium , cum in anglia tum in gallia , &c. and that barons of counties were no more than lords of mannors , i have just now proved ; for socna means no more than a court baron , or court of a mannor ; so that here arises a plain distinction between the barones regis , the king 's great barons or tenants in capite ; and these lesser barons , we now are here speaking of , called medmesse thegnes , and burgh thegnes , by the saxons , till they 〈◊〉 on the word parliamentum , to signifie the common council of the kingdom ; who , tho no peers , yet were barones regni , barons or noblemen of the kingdom , according to the general acceptation of the word nobiles , in that age ; and is such made up the body of the baronage , called by matt. paris , and other authors , baronagium , or communitas baronagit totius angliae . m. i see you do all you can from the equivocal use of the word barones , to croud in new and unknown men into the great council of the kingdom , viz. your barons of counties , cities , and towns , whom ( since you dare not affirm there were then any knights of shires ) you suppose to have served instead of them ; and these you would have to be , not barones regis , but regni , or terrae , forsooth , i. e. of the land or kingdom ; whereas we never had any true barones held by mean tenures here in england ; this if you deny , you must deny all history , and all our ancient laws , and law-books too ; and if you grant it , you must confess that every baron was a tenant in capite , and by your own concession he must then be the king's baron , or baro regis : i grant indeed , there were nominal or titular barons ( such as you mention ) many in those times , such as were tenants to great lords , bishops , or abbots , of whom we find frequent mention in our ancient histories , records , and charters . but these are not the men who had ever any place in our great councils , and i desire you would prove to me , that ever they appeared there before the times i assign ; and i would also have you inform your self of the gentlemen of whom you borrow this notion , if they can prove that there were any such kind of tenure , as tenura de terra , or de regno ? or whether there was ever any man that held an estate de regno ? whether forfeitures or escheats were to the kingdom ? and whether fealty was sworn , or homage done to the kingdom ? or whether an earl was invested or girt with the sword of the county by the kingdom ? or whether the ancient ceremonies used at the creations of earls and barons , were done by the kingdom ? thus all the barons of england held of the king , and thus all these things were performed and done to our ancient kings , and by them ; which are most manifest notes of the king 's immediate jurisdiction over the barons , and that they were his tenants in capite , and by consequence his barons only , which you cannot deny ; and of which tenants in capite the earls and greater barons always created by investiture of robes , or other ceremonies , were summoned by particular write , and the other less barons , or tenants in capite ever since the th of king iohn , were summoned by one common writ , directed to the sheriff of the county ▪ since which time ( if not some time before ) i grant these tenants in capite were not look'd upon as barons or peers of the kingdom , properly so called ; yet did their votes in parliament still conclude , and charge their tenants in the making and imposing of taxes or laws , which they alone , together with the bishops and greater barons still , performed , until the times i assign . f. i see you are in a wood , and do not know well under what class to rank your tenants in capite ; for if they were at first all lords or peers , how could they serve upon . juries in hundred or county courts ? if they were meer commoners , then there were commons in parliament before the th of henry iii. and why might not others as considerable commoners , have places in the great council as well as they ▪ whether they were the kings barons , or tenents in capite , or not ? but in answer to this , you tell me , that we never had any barons held by mean tenure , here in england ; this is plainly equivocal ; for if you mean it of baronies in capite , it is true ; if of other baronies , it is false by your own confession ; and sir h. sp●lman tells us , in the title last quoted , that the barons of burford pleaded to hold of the king per baroniam , and yet he was never any baron of the kingdom . now i desire you to shew me , if he and such like barons as himself , had no place in parliament , who it was represented them there ? and therefore in answer to your dilemma , i grant that every baron by tenure , was a tenant in capite ; but every tenant in capite was not a baron ; and this i think is so plain , that you your self cannot deny it . but in answer to your next question ; i can answer it without asking the gentleman , from whom you suppose i borrow the notion , that there might be other barons , or lords of mannors , who by reason of their estates might have places in parliament ( supposing knights of shires were not introduced till after henry the ii. or king iohn's time , when such freeholders became too numerous all to appear in person ) and yet these might not be barons by tenure ; and therefore all your questions conclude nothing ; for you suppose that which is still to be proved , that because all the barons of england , properly so called , held of the king in capite , and were consequently his barons ; that therefore none but b●rons , and tenants in capite , had any place in our great councils ; which is the thing you only suppose , and i as positively deny . m. well sir , since you put it to that issue , i hope i shall fully convince you , that none but the persons i have mentioned were the constituent members of the common council or parliament , before th hen. iii or th edw. i and who done gave assent to all laws that were made , and all taxes that were to be imposed on themselves , and their under-tenants , who were then concluded by the acts of their superior lords . but not to wrangle with you any longer , about the signification of the word barones , i grant there were nominal or titular barons , very many , such as i have mentioned ; nay , that there were several other great subjects , who had tenants that held , , , 〈◊〉 nay more knights fees under them , and who had the name and title of barons . but what is this to the purpose ? i desire you would prove to me , by any direct proof , that these sort of men had any voices , either by themselves , or their representatives in our great councils , till after the time we allow them ; and this ( besides the proofs i have already brought ) i think is sufficient ; since it is plain , that the barones regni , or terra , and the milites , and homines sui , are all one and the same persons ; that is , they were the king 's great barons , or tenents in capite ; who alone constituted the baronage , or university of the baronage of england , or of the kingdom , in our great councils , or parliaments : and for the farther proof of this , i need go no farther than those very arguments your own author , mr. p. hath made use of , in his right of the commons asserted ; wherein he would prove from certain letters that were sent from the baronage , or university of the baronage of england to the pope , against the church of rome's exactions here in england . and therefore i shall not bring only fragments , phrases , or single words out of the records or histories which seem to countenance my opinion ▪ contrary to the true meaning of those records , and the sense of the historians , as some of your men do , but shall give you the quotations out of those authors whole , and entire ; and shall make such reasonable deductions from them , as i think you will have no reason to deny to be fairly raised from the words themselves . and also , as matt. paris relates , in the th hen. iii. the earls , and barons sent letters to the pope , then at the council of lions , to complain of the pope's exactions ; which letters are said by this author to be directed a magnatibus , & universitate regni angliae . and tho it is also true , that in the same year there were other letters sent thither , from the same parties , to the cardinals there assembled , which are recited by the old manuscript to have sent messengers to the cardinals ; and the old manuscript in the cottonian library ; that they sent to the cardinals , assembled at the council of lyons ▪ let●ers a baronibus , militibus & universis baronagii regni angliae per procuratores 〈◊〉 rogeram bigod comitem norff. willielmum de cantelupo , iohannem silium galfri●●● radulphum filium nicholas philippum basset , barones , procuratores baronagii ang●●● tunc temporis . innocentio papa quarto celebrante concilium ibi generale . anno gratia . and the letters are thus directed ; venerabilibus in christo fratribus uni●●sis , & singulis dei gratia salutem . barones milites , & universitas baronagii regis angliae . and that matt. of westminster does likewise agree in this relation ; only stiles the persons last named , milites , whom matt. paris calls viri nobiles , & discreti ; but this will make no difference , as i shall shew you by and by ; and to these matt. of westminster adds mr. william powic clark , who seems to have been their secretary . but notwithstanding it will appear that all these persons so sent , named barones & milites ▪ & universitas baronagii , did not represent the commons of england at all , but only the great earls , barons , and tenants in capite . for first it appears from sir w. dugdale's baronage of england , that every one of the persons here named , was either an earl , baron , or great tenant in capite , and n●● common persons , as your author would have them ; and tho it true , the cottonian manuscript , and matt. of westminster calls some of them milites ; yet this makes nothing against our opinion ; for as i proved before , the great milites were often stiled barons , and the barons milites . nor was this earl , and the four barons here mentioned , chosen or sent by the baronage of the kingdom assembled in parliament to represent them at the council of lyons , but were only pitch'd upon by a body of military men , or barons , at a tornament intended to have been held at dunstable ; which was forbidden by the king , and these took upon them to warn mr. martin , the pope's clerk , out of the kingdom ; as appears by the account matt. paris gives us of this business in the paragraph immediately following : so that the history of the thing makes it plain , who were the universitas regni ; to wit the barons , or the universitas armatorum , who were met to hold the tournament , and these the king there called his barons . and after this , in the th of hen. iii. when the pope did not give satisfaction to their grievances , the king called ( as this author tells us ) 〈◊〉 parliamentum generalissimum , totius regni anglicani totalem nobilitatem londini ( viz. ) prelatorum tam abbatum , & priorum , quam epi●coporum comitum quoque & baronium ut de statu regni jam 〈◊〉 efficatiter prout exegit urgens necessitas contrectarent . in this very parliament the king conferr'd with the bishops by themselves ; and the earls and barons by themselves about this business of the pope's not keeping his promise : and certainly if there had been then any commons in this parliament , he would have also conferred with them about the same matter . the result of all these conferences was , that yet for the reverence due to the apostolick see , they should again supplicate the pope by letters , to remove their intolerable grievances , and insupportable yoak . and this they do in separate conferences . the bishops write by themselves ; the abbots and priors by themselves ; and the earls , barons , &c. by themselves , to the pope ; and if there had been any commons , as at this day , they most certainly would likewise have wrote to the pope , as well as the other constituent parts of this parliament did . f. i hope i shall be able to answer what you have now said : in the first place , tho i should grant that these commissioners sent by the baronage of england , were all of them barons , and no commoners among them ; doth it therefore follow that the persons that sent them , must have been all lords too ? for if those commissioners were all peers , who represented your barones minores , or tenants in capite , ( who , as you your self have granted , were no lords at all ) and why might not those lords as well represent all the commons of england , as they did these lesser tenants in capite ? so that it seems plain to me , that these words , universitas baronagii angliae , must needs then comprehend somewhat more than your barons , and tenents in capite only ; since the words barones & milites alone and sufficiently expressed all the constituent members of your parliament , without adding & universitas baronagii , which would have been a tautology , but that it was very usual for the great lords in those days , to write letters in their own names , as also for all the commons of england . i shall shew you by and by , when i shall make use of two other instances of a like nature , in the reigns of edw. i. and edw. iii. and therefore it is no good argument to prove , that the commons had no hand in this message , or letters , because they did not write by themselves ; much less is it so , because it is not expresly mentioned by matt. paris , that the king consulted the commons as well as the bishops , earls and barons ; that therefore they were not there . since this author writing very concisely , comprehends all the lay estates , under the words comites , & barones , or else magnates alone . so likewise matt , of westminster , when he mentions divers parliaments in the reign of edw. i and edw. ii , expresses them under the same title . and tho' this author often mentions the earls and barons to have done this , or that ; yet it is no argument to conclude , that the commons were not then there . and for this , pray take these examples our of matt. vvestminster , when anno dom. . the th of edw. i. he tells us , the king held his parliament at lincoln , where the comites & barones demanded a confirmation of the great charters , and they further askt ; that the deforestations made by the king should be confirmed ; and then he tells us , that thereupon the charters of liberties and forests , were again renewed ; and being past under the great seal , were proclaimed before all the people , in every country ; where you see that the complains were made by the earls and barons ; yet it is certain , that the confirmation of these charters , must have proceeded from all the estates ; for the bishops ; and abbots , and priors , are there no more mentioned than the commons , who were then as barones , majores , constituent members of this parliament . so also henry de knighton , anno dom. . the th . edw. i. tells us of a parliament this king held at stamford , where met the earls and barons , and with great courage persisted until they had got the charter of forests fully granted and confirmed to them . where note , that tho by way of excellency , the earls and barons ( who then bore the greatest sway , are here only mentioned ) yet it is certain , that the commons were also summoned to this parliament ▪ now if these later historians pass by the commons , tho then constituent members of parliament , without any one express mention , why might not matt. paris do so too ? but that he did do so , appears very plainly from the letters of the parliament held in th hen. ii. to the pope and cardinals , being still at the council of lyons , to remove the intolerable grievances above mentioned , that to the pope is tecited at large by matt. paris , tho that to the cardinals is omitted by him ; but in an ancient manuscript of the time extant in sir iohn cottons's library of both letters , are said to have been sent to the cardinals at lyons , a baronibus militibus & universitatib●● b●●●nagii anglia ; now who these were the subsequent letter to the pope in matt. poris will inform us , which begins thus ; sanctissimo , &c. 〈◊〉 filii sui richardus comes cornubia , &c. together with divers other earls there named ; but the barons and commons are not particularly recited , but are comprehended under these general words , barones , proceres , & magnates , ac nobiles portuum , marishabitatores , necnon & clerus & populus universus salutem ; and pray note , that matt. paris had before called this a parliament , convenientibus igitur ad parliamentum totius regni magnatibus ; which words take in the knights of shires , as the nobiles portuum maris habitatores , doth the barons of the cinq●● ports ; ( which by the way are here called noble , tho meer commoners ) ; and to obviate your objection , that the word clerus after barones , may refer to the bishops , abbots , and priors , that could not be ; for they at the same time had already writ letters apart to the pope , concerning this matter ; as you may see in the same author , immediately before . and therefore nothing seems plainer to me , than that by these words , clerus & populus universus , must be meant the inferior clergy , and commons , appearing by their representatives in this parliament , and that so became generalissimum parliamentum , as this historian calls it . m. pray give me leave now to reply . in the first place i must tell you , that the instances you have brought out of matt. vvestm . to prove that under the words comites and barones , & baronagium angliae , were comprehended the commons of england , and that after the time i allow them to have been there , will not do your business . and as to the instance about the pope's nuncio , it seems to have been an order of the lords only ; the words being in latin , de assensu comitum & baronum . as to the third instance , out of knighton , he said indeed , that the comites & barones met at the parliament at stamford ; and that might very well be , since they alone then insisted upon the confirmation of the charter of forests . but as for the argument you draw from the direction of this letter to the pope ; the learned dr. in his treatise against mr. p. hath given us a very good answer to it , to this effect ; that tho it is true , that after the barones , & proceres , there are divers other parties mentioned , yet was this troop of words put together in this letter to no other purpose , than to make an impression upon the pope , and make him sensible what a general dislike the nation had of his exactions and incroachments ; and to induce him to a compliance with their desires , the multitude or commons not being any-ways parties , or privy to the writing of the letters ; for the clamour of the people was a great argument used in all these letters , to affect the pope , how ungrateful his impositions were to the nation . but in this of the temporal barons more especially , who address themselves to the pope by petition , inforcing it by the clamour of the people , against those injuries and oppressions upon the whole kingdom ; it is to no purpose to repeat all that follows , only observe this clause , alioquin necesse est ut veniant scandala clamore populi , tam dominum regem , quam nos intolerabiliter impellente ; and the king likewise in his letter to the pope and cardinals aggravates the matter , by the like arguments ; as appears by this clause , in his letter to them ; verum clamorem incomperabilem magnatum angliae tam cleri quam populi non possumus obaudire . from this general clamour of the people , and not from their being parties , it was that the beginning of the letters from the baronage , or the university of england , was stuffed with so many words and phrases , to awaken his holiness , and invite him to redress their grievances . f. in return to what you have said , i must tell you , that i am not convinc'd , that in the parliament mentioned by mat. vvestm . that the demand for the confirmation of the charters was made by the lords only ; since it is not likely that the commons ( who are there stiled divites plebis , and are said to have been grieved by their infringement ) should not have been parties to the complaint for their redress ; especially since we find that in all succeeding parliaments , the commons are mentioned as most eager for the confirmation of these charters . but as for the most material part of your answer to my authority from the parliament's letter to the pope , i know the dr. endeavours all he can , to avoid the force of this objection , by making the parliament top upon his holiness meer empty words , instead of matter ; that is , according to the dr.'s own phrase , they only laid an airy ambuscade to intrap him . but whether the old gentleman was thus like to be catch'd , i give you leave to judge . for certainly both he and his consistory of cardinals , knew as well as the parliament it self , what were the constituent parts thereof , and they could quickly have answered them ; that they put a meer sham upon his holiness , in mentioning the noble inhabitants of the sea ports , and all the rest of the people , both clergy and laity in their letters ; whereas they had nothing at all to do with the matter , nor had shown any dislike of his holiness's proceedings . for if they had no representatives in parliament , how could it be known whether they were aggrieved or not ? or is it likely that the pope had no nuncio , or friends among the clergy , to give him an account of the cheat they there put upon him ? and they might as well have talked of the clamours of the tinners in cornwall , as of those of the inhabitants of the sea ports , if it was only put in to augment the clamour , or to fill up the number of the complainants ; if the people ( i mean both nobility and commons ) had not been parties of these letters ? but you your self have but now recited a clause in the king's letter to the pope and cardinals , which makes it plain it was so ; when he tells them , that he could not stop his ears against the clamour of the magnates , tam cler● , quam populi , i. e. as well of the clergy , as of the laity , as the dr. renders it . so that these words , clamorem magnatum , must signifie here the clamour of the whole people in parliament ; or else they signifie nothing at all . and i may as well say that the clerus and populus never appeared in parliament at all , but that these were also meer empty words to frighten the pope . but what say you to the next precedent mr. p. produces to prove that the lords and commons together have writ letters to the pope , when he attempted to invade the right of the crown or kingdom , viz. the letter from the parliament at lincoln to the pope , in the th of king edw. i. wherein they assert the king's superiority over the kingdom of scotland , and desire that his holiness would desist from medling farther with it . vvhich letter , tho subscribed by above a hundred earls and barons , as it was the custom of that age , yet it is said expresly in the conclusion , in cujus rei testimonium sigilla tam pro nobis , quam pro tota communitate praedicti regni angliae praesentibus su●t op●pensa . m. tho this authority is after the time we acknowledge the commons to have been summoned to parliament , and therefore i need not speak particularly to it ; yet tho i grant your argument hath some weight in it , since it here seems that the lords did sign this letter , for the commons as well as themselves , i shall endeavours to answer it . i confess it appears very specious at first sight ; but what if i shew you , that this letter was written by the lords only from lincoln , after the commons had been dismissed from thence by pro●ogation or adjournment . for tho it is commonly story'd , but erroneously ) that this whole parliament , or at least the temporal lords and the commons wrote to the pope concerning the jurisdiction and superiority of the kings of england over the kingdom of scotland : yet it cannot be so , for this parliament met on the octaves of hillary , or the th of ianuary , and sate but eight days ; the writs for the commons expences bear date ianuary the th of the same year , and the letter to the pope signed by the temporal lords for themselves , and the whole community of the kingdom of england is dated feb. th next following at lincoln , after the commons had been discharged days . so that you see the barons still continued to stile themselves the community of england ; and both spiritual and temporal barons , and other of the king's council , did stay and dispatch much business , after all others were dismissed , according to the tenor of the there recited proclamation , and may be fully proved from the proceedings of that pa●liament , as they are to be found in ryley's pl●cita parliamentaria . so that nothing seems plainer to me , than that the whole community of england , for whom the barons there named set their seals to that letter you mentioned , were the community of the barons only . f. i confess mr. pryn in his animadversions upon my lord coke's th institutes was the first who started this objection , that the commons could not be present as parties to this letter ; yet he still supposes that the lords who stayed behind , and made a kind of a great council at lincoln , signed it not only for themselves , but for the commons also , tho not actually there ; and is not so extravagant as your dr. to suppose , that by the words in this letter , tam pro nobis , quam pro tota communitate , &c. are to be understood the community of barons only ; for that would have been a tau●ology indeed : for so the last word communitas , &c. would have signified no more than that they subscribed for themselves , and themselves , and that the word cumma●●tas regni , ( which i can prove to you by many examples , did then signifie the commons of england ) must here mean more than your community of the earls and barons . for pray take notice , that the tenants in capite had now by your own concession left off to appear in parliament in a body , as being now represented by the knights of shires , &c. so that sir edward coke very well observes in his fourth institute , that this letter was sealed by above earls and barons , by the assent of the whole commonalty in parliament ; and mr. pryn is so far convinced of this in his exact history of papal usurpations , that he ●tiles this letter , the memorable epistle of the earls , barons , great men , and commons of england , &c. but to shew you farther that there was no change , neither of the constituent parts of our ancient parliaments , nor of the terms by which they are expressed our ancient records , appears by a plea among mr. ryley's printed pleas of parliament , in th of edw. i. where it is recited , that in a parliament at carlisle , will. de testa , the pope's clerk , was impeach'd , per comites , barones , & alios magnates , & communitatem totius regni ; concerning divers new and intolerable grievances laid upon them by the pope ; where you see there is no change of this word communitas , after the commons were ( as you suppose ) certainly present in this parliament ; and why the same word should not signifie the same thing in the beginning of this king's reign as well as now , you had need give me very good authority to prove the contrary against such clear evidence as this ; but this record goes on , and farther recites , that these letters were sent to the pope , ex parte communitatis praedictae , and in which , clerus & populus dicti regni set forth the said grievances to the full . now as the word clerus here expresses all sorts of degrees of clergy , as well superior as inferior , represented in parliament and convocation , so much populus here signifie the laity of both orders , as well the commons as lords , since the commons were certainly present at this parliament ; and why the word populus should not signifie the same thing long before , i can see no reason for it , but the dr.'s bear assertion . and as for what you say , that the commons could be no parties to this letter , because it appears by the writs of expences , that they were discharged before this letter was written ; admitting it were so , it makes nothing against my assertion ; for why could not the commons agree upon the substance of the letter , and leave the lords to draw it up , and subscribe it for them , after they were gone home ? and that it was so , appears by the letter if self , which recites , that the king had caused the pope's letter , in medio , or pleno parliamento exhiberi , ac scriose nobis fecit exponi unde habito tractatu , & deliberation● diligenti super c●●tentis in literis vestris memoratis , communis concors , & unanimus omnium , & singul●r●m consensus suit , &c. now every one knows , that understands any thing of parliamentary affairs , that when any thing is said in an act of parliament , or other record , to have been agreed upon in full parliament , that is always understood to have been done , all the estates being there present ; nor can i see any reason why this letter should not be called the letter of the commons , as well as of the lords , since the very statutes of that age were often said to have been assented to by the commons , tho it is clear they , were not drawn up into form till after the parliament was dismissed . but that the commons were certainly parties to this letter , appears by a record of the beginning of edw. iii. time , printed by mr. pryn , keeper of the records of the tower , ( and which he tells us he found among the rolls in the white-town ) which record contains the heads of a defence compiled by the king's council , in order to a stronger defence against the pope's taking cognizance in the court of rome , concerning the king of england's superiority over scotland ; in the conclusion of the d . of which records , there is a remarkable article relating to this very letter now before us , in these words , item ad finem quod nobiles regni angliae & procuratores cr●munitatis subditorum regni praedicti admittantur per ipsum domi●●● regem ad hujusmodi defensiones propenend prout corum antecessores ab avo dicti dom●●● regis nostri ●rant admissi : now to what transaction of this kind , in the reign of edw. i. this king's grandfather , can this passage refer , but to this very letter , which was assented , as well per procuratores communitatis regni , as by your barons , here called nobiles regni : and this application thereof is given by mr pryn himself , when he makes use of these records . but to let you see farther , that the lords and commons for all this author opinion to the contrary , might joyn in a letter ro the pope , i shall shew you by that which was writ in the name of the whole parliament to the pope , in the th of edw. iii. about the provisions of benefices , which then grew so exorbitant , that walsingham tells us in his history , quod rex & tota nobilitas regni pati noluit , &c. which phrase the letter it self will best explain ; the beginning and conclusion of which i shall give you in english , as you may find it in mr. fox's book of martyrs . to the most holy father in god , lord clement , by the grace of god , of the holy church of rome , and of the universal church , chief and high-bishop , his humble and devout children , the princes , dukes , earls , barons , knights , citizens and burgesses , and all the communalty of the realm of england , assembled at a parliament holden at westminster the th day of may last past , &c. in witness whereof we have hereunto set our 〈◊〉 ▪ given in the full parliament at westminst . on the th day of may , anno dr● . and it still appears by the parliament roll of this year , viz. th edw. iii. n. . that the commons petitioned the king , that the lords might stay at the parliament till they had perfected and seal'd this letter ▪ and that there was such a letter then written by the parliament , appears by the king's letter to the pope about the same matter , still among the tower records ; ( in which he imitated his grandfather edw. i. and great grandfather hen. iii. who also se● letters to the pope on such like occasions ) but in those to excuse the arch-bishop of canterbury from being the author of those complain , he had this passage that since it was the judgment , tam procerum & nobilium , qua● communitatis regni in ultimo parliamento contra provisorum exercitum . to conclude ; i think nothing is plainer , than that under the universitas reg●● , in the first letter to the pope th hen. iii. and under the communitas regni mentioned in the letter of the th edw. i. were meant the same estates or orders of men , as were more particularly recited in this present letter , viz. the 〈◊〉 lords and commons in parliament assembled . m. i must freely tell you , i am not yet satisfied with the sense you now put ●pon these words , universitas , and communitas regni , before the commons were summoned to parliament ; for you your self must grant , that as the word universitas regni takes in the whole representative body of the kingdom , so likewise the word communitas signifies no more than the same whole body or community thereof . therefore if i prove to you , that in those times this univers●●y or community consisted only of the earls , barons and tenants in capite , that word communitas regni ought never to be interpreted by the english word commo●●lty or commons of england , till after the time that i allow the commons were admitted to make a constituent part of the great council or parliament , nor always then neither ; and mr. p. in his book which we have so often cited , hath done very unfairly to make the universitas and communitas regni to comprehend the commons of england , before they everappeared in parliament at all ; and so hath he likewise abused the word populus , as i have already observed , to signifie the commons , when indeed there is no more thereby meant , than the whole assembly of the laity , which at that time consisted of no more than the earls , barons or other tenants in capite ; and tho i grant that by communitas praelatorum , or baronum , are often understood the body of the prelates or greater barons only , called by way of eminency , proceres & magnates ; yet most frequently , these with all the other tenants in capite did make the whole body of the king 's immediate tenants in military service , and were altogether called the baronage of england , the community of the land , or community of the kingdom ; and for this i think i shall give you undeniable proofs by and by . f. i am very well aware that the word populus often signifies the whole body of the laity , yet not excluding the commons , as i have already sufficiently proved ; for then the word must signifie quite contrary to its genuine signification ; instead of people , the greater nobility only ; yet that when it is put after ▪ as distinct from magnates , it must mean the commons , as now understood , i shall shew you by and by . but that this word populus does not always signifie the whole body of the nobility only , but takes in oftentimes the commons too ; pray see matt. vvest . who tells us king edw. i. in the th year of his reign , making his son a knight , pro hac melitia silii regis concessus est regi zomus denarius a populo & clero , mercatores vero vices●mum concesserunt ; upon which your dr. in his glossary very well remarks , that it is evident upon record , who were the populus meant by the historian , viz. the comites , barones & alii magnates , nec non milites comitatuum . so that unless the knights of shires were lords , it is plain populus takes in the common● too . but universitas regni , and communitas regni , called in french le commun● dangletterre , is often taken for the whole community or body of the whole parliament ; and this sir edward coke owns expresly in his d . instit. upon these words , in articulis sup●● chartas : thus here le commune is taken for people ; so astout le commune is here taken for all the people ; and this is proved by the sense of the words ; for magna charta was not granted to the commons of the realm , but generally to all the subjects of the realm , viz. to those of th● clergy , and to those of the nobility , and to the commons also . and this is a rational as well as grammatical interpretation ; for as the word universitas is derived from the adjective universus , which signifies the vvhole , 〈◊〉 universal ; so the word communitas is derived from the adjective 〈◊〉 common or general . so that these two words when used simply in a political 〈◊〉 legal sense , ought to take in the whole body of the kingdom , or all sorts and conditions of freemen appearing themselves , or their lawful proxies or representatives in parliament . but i have already sufficiently proved , that under those general words used in our historians and records , viz. principes , proceres , nobiles , magnates , barones , & alii de regno , were then comprehended either all the considerable freeholders , o● lords of manners , or else the knights of shires , citizens and burgesses : so that if the sense of these words have been sufficiently explained , i think no reasonable man can have any cause to doubt whether these abstract words nobilitas , universitas , and communitas , should be taken for all sorts and degrees of men , when thus represented in the great council ; or whether they shall be confined to the greater or lesser nobility only , viz. the great lords , bishops and tenants in ca●ite as you would make me believe which requires stronger proofs than what you have yet brought . besides which sense of this word communitas , or le commune , it is also more commonly used at this day , and often then too , in another more restrained and yet legal sense ; and that is when it is used for the commonalty or commons of england , distinct from the peers ; and this may very easily be distinguished , by observing , that when it is taken in this sense , it is always set after the particular enumeration of the other orders of the lords or peers , viz. the arch-bishops , bishops , abbots , priors , earls and barons , or when it is put contradistinct to the word magnates . i shall give you some authorities and examples from historians and records of both these , and that in the times preceding those that you allow the commons to have been summoned in parliament . of this sort is that which matt. vvestm . mentions as a parliament held th hen. iii. and which is thus recited in the patent roll of this year ; where after the excommunication denounced against all infringers of magna charta , there is this solemn clause a●ded , that if to the writings concerning the said sentence , any other thing , or in any otherwise should be added thereunto , besides the forms of the said sentence then to be denounced and approved of , that then dominus rex , & praedicti magnates , & communitas populi pretestantur publice before all the bishops , that they would never consent thereunto ; and conclude thus , in cujus rei testimonium , & in posterum veritatis testimonium , as well the king as the earl of norff. heref. essex and vvarwick , as peter de saba●dia , ad inslantiam aliorum magnatum & populi praescripti sigilla sua apposuerunt ; where you may see that it was usual before the th hen. iii. for those that were peers to sign for the communitas populi , or commons . m i pray give me leave to answer your authorities as you bring them , lest i not onely forget some of them , but also tire both you and my self with too long a discourse . i hope i am very well able to prove , by the learned dr.'s assistance , that the communitas populi here mentioned do●h signifie not the commonalty or commons , but the community of the laity there present , consisting of the greater barons , or else the less , or tenants in capite . and for proof of this , pray take notice that matt. paris called this council tota angliae nobilitas ; and in this parliament the king demanding a great sum of money of them , after much contest , and upon promise to reform all abuses , according to the tenour of the great charters , thereupon the same author tells us , the church granted the tenth of the revenue for three years , and the knights or nobility granted for that year scutage ; to wit , three marks of every scu●u● , or knights 〈◊〉 : and then the arch-bishops and bishops in their pontificalibus , with light-candles in their hands , in the presence , and with the assent of the king , the earl of cornwal his brother , and several earls there named , & aliorum optimatum regni angliae , and other chief men of the kingdom excommunicated , and cursed all those that from thence forward should deprive the church of her right , and all those that should change , alter or diminish the liberties of the church and anci●●t customs of the kingdom , especially those granted in the great charter of the common liberties of england , and charter of the forest granted by the king ; ar●hi●piscopis , episcopis & cateris angliae praelatis , comitibus , baronibus , militibus , & ●●berè tenentibus , &c. i. e. to the arch-bishops , bishops and other prelates of ●●gland ; and to the earls , barons , knights and free-tenants , or tenants in military 〈◊〉 knights service ; for they only were such a● paid scutage , which was at this ●ime a kind of composition with the king , for the confirming magna charta , and was never charged but upon knights fees ; and these were such that held perhaps one narrow or scanty knights fee only ; or some part of a knight's fee ; as an half , d th th th part , &c. who all paid a proportionable share of scu●age to the great lords , or tenants in capite , for the land they held of them in military service ; which was paid first to the great lords , and by them paid to the king. and from thence i collect , that besides the barones majores that came to this great council or parliament , there were also the tenants in capite , according to the directions and law for summons in king iohn's charter , who were comprehended under the words tota nobilitas , & milites ; and that other tenants but held of the tenants in capite by knights service , were bound by their acts , 〈◊〉 they all knew how many knights fees they held of the king in capite ; and if ●●ey had given any away to others , they held of them as they did of the crown , ●●d answered a proportionable rate towards this tax , for the fees , quantities 〈◊〉 parts of fees they held of them ; about which there could be no mistake 〈◊〉 the scutage was ascertain'd . so that in so great an assembly , where all the nobility of england were called together by the king 's writ , and upon so great 〈◊〉 occasion and solemnity , as confirming the great charter of liberties , after such an extraordinary a manner , it cannot be doubted , but besides the barons , all the 〈◊〉 in capite , both great and small , which were then very numerous , were ●resent , or at least , most of them ; from whence it is not difficult to tell you to the communitas were ; after the prelates , barons and magna●●● , they were no other than the small tenants in capite , who were all summoned by one general writ , nor chosen and sent by the people , but summoned as the great barons in general , by king iohn ' magna charta , as i shall shew you hereafter . f. i hope i shall be well enough able to prove , that what you have now alledged is pure imagination , or in the dr. phrase , an airy ambuscade , and quite contrary to the sense of matt. paris , as also of the lawyers and historians of those times . for in the first place , nothing is plainer , than that this author by the words communitas populi , must understand an order of men distinct from the magnates ; or else if the word magnates might have comprehended them all , it would have been to no purpose to have mentioned any more . but to answer those authorities you bring from mat. paris ; as for the word nobilitas , since you still insist upon it , i have already proved that the whole parliament , as well the lords spiritual and temporal , as commons , were both before and after this time comprehended under these words , nobilitas angliae ; and if you yet doubt of it , i can give you a plain authority out of vvalsingham , for it is in his life of edw. ii. anno . where relating the manner of that king's deposition , he tells us , that when the queen and prince came to london , there then met tota regni nobilitas , to depose the king , and chuse his son in his stead ; and then there was sent to the king , being prisoner in kenelworth castle , on behalf of the whole kingdom , two bishops , two earls , two abbots , and of every county three knights ; and also from london and other cities and great towns ( especially the cinque ports ) a certain number of persons who informed him of the election of his son , and that he should renounce the crown and royal dignity , &c. this proof is so plain , it needs no comment . as for the rest of your argument , the strength of it chiefly consists in this , that the tax there mentioned is said to be granted à militibus , or tenants in capite ( as you would have it ) of three marks upon every knight's fee. but in the first place i desire you to take notice , that this scutage is not scutage service , but a general land tax , or manner of taxing according to knights fees , and which was continued long after hen. iii. reign , as it appears by this passage in sir henry spelman's glossary , tit. scutagium ; edwardus primus habuit soli de quolibet 〈◊〉 anno regni dom. . pro expeditione contra vvallos . and it was also granted by the lords and commons after the th of edw. i. when you and the dr. supposes the commons to have then came to parliament ; and if so , i desire to know why a militibus here mentioned by this author , must only signifie tenants in capite by knights service , and not the knights of shires , since it is not here said a militibus qui de rege tenuerunt in capite ; and therefore it is a forced interpretation of the dr.'s , and without any authority , to limit these words militibus , & libere tenentibus , & omnibus de regno nostro ( which you omit with an , &c. ) as also the omnibus hominibus liberis regni nostri , only to the arch-bishops , bishops and other prelates of england , and to the earls , barons , knights and free tenants , or tenants in military or knight's service ; because they were only such as paid scutage ; vvhereas you have already acknowledged that magna charta was granted to all the people of england , who had all a benefit by it , and who paid towards the aid there granted , as well as the tenants in capite . but if knights fees alone were taxed , and that by the tenants in capite only ▪ i desire to know by what right all tenants in petit serjeanty , and by burgoge o● s●occage tenure ( who made a greater body of men in this kingdom in those times ) could pay this scutage , since they held not by knights service , but by certain rents or other services , and so not appearing in person , could have no representatives in this or any other parliament of those times . but if you will tell me they might pay according to the value that knights fees were then reckoned at , viz. for every l. a years estate , i desire to know how this could be called scutage , or how the tenants in capite , or other lords from whom they held those lands , could give away their money for them ? and in the next place i desire also to know how all the cities and burroughs in england could be charged with this tax ; a great many of them ( is you your self grant ) holding of the king in capite , or else of bishops , abbots or other mes●e lords by soccage or bargage tenure so that this tax , if granted only by the tenants in capite , by knights service , could reach them , and no other persons ; but if by this word a militibus may be understood knights of shires , then the tax was general , as well upon soccage tenants , as those by knights service . but for the other words you insist upon , viz. the liberi tenentes , which you translate tenants by military service ; if that had been the meaning of these words , then they had been altogether in vain , since you have already told me , that the ●●lites were so called non a militari cingulo , sed a feodo ; and if it were no name of dignity , then certainly the word milites would have served to comprehend all your liberi tenentes , or tenants in capite , without any other addition . but that these words laberi tenentes , do not here signifie tenants by military service , pray see sir henry spelman's glossary , tit. liber homo , & liber tenens ; where he there gives us a more general signification of thesewords thus : ad nobilesolim spectabant isti 〈◊〉 , à majoribus ortos omnino liberis ; and then ends thus , vide ingenuus , legalis , 〈◊〉 francus , tenens liberè , alias liber tenent quo etiam sensu occurrit interdum homo 〈◊〉 ; which upon every one of these titles he makes to signifie all one ●●d the same thing , viz. an ordinary freeholder . and therefore it is a very forced interpretation of yours , to limit these words communitas populi , only to the community or body of the earls , barons , and tenants in capite . tho i confess you are very kind in one main point , in únderstanding the communitas populi to mean the community of the lesser tenants in capite , that were no barons ; and then do what you can , these words must here signifie meer commoners , or commons , unless you can shew us a third sort of men , who , tho neither lords nor commons , yet had a place in parliament . so that these gentlemen , notwithstanding their tenure , were no more noble than their feudatory tenants , or vavafors themselves ; my , than the knights of shires are at this day : and then granting ( as i doubt not but i shall be able to prove ) that the cities and boroughs had then also their representatives there ; i pray tell me whether or no there were not commons in parliament before hen. iii. or not ? which is contrary to your dr.'s assertion in divers places of his answer● to mr. p. and that the word populus must here signifie the commons , and not the whole body of the laity , appears plainly by this place you have quoted ; since it is restrained by your self , to mean not the whole community of the kingdom , but only the community of lesser tenants in capite , who were not lords . but that matt. paris doth also in another place take the word populus for the commoners , and not for the whole body of the laity , pray again remember what he says in anno . where relating the manner how magna charta came to be confirmed in th hen. iii. he tells us rex henricus ad natale tenuit curiam suam apud vvestm . praesentibus clero , & populo , cum magnatibus regionis ; which pray let us put into english , and see if it will not prove what i say , viz. the clergy and people being present with the great men of the kingdom . now if the word magnates ( as you affirm ) did then comprehend all the barons and tenants in capite ▪ to what purpose is the word people put here as a distinct member of this parliament ? but to shew you father that this word populus is not always to be understood for the whole body of the laicks , but lords and knights of shires , 〈◊〉 shall shew you out of walsingham , anno . th edw. i. where he mentions a parliament held at st. edmundsbury , in quo a civitatibus , & burgis concessa est reg● octava , a populo vero reliquo duodecima pars bonorum : where by populus 〈◊〉 not only meant the peers , but knights of shires , or grands des 〈◊〉 also . m. i am not prepared at present to answer all the queries and difficulties that you can make or raise against the dr.'s arguments ; yet i think i am able to give you a very satisfactory answer why all tenants in soccage should be boun● by the acts of those of whom they held their estates . for since ( as i have a ready proved ) all the land in england ( except what belong to religious houses ) was granted out by king william the conqueror , to be held in capite by knights service , and was again granted out by these head-tenants , to their feudatory o● mesne tenants by the like services , there being very few lands granted in free soccage at the first ; and tho it is true that in process of time , ma● of those estates and lands became free tenements , or were holde in soccage , that is , were freeholds ; yet the lords still retai● the homage ( which in the times we speak of was no idle insignificant word and by that a dominion over the estate , whereby upon disobedience , treachery or injury done to the lords , the lands were forfeited to them ; and the● neither the lands nor the tenants to them ( which were termed freeholder● were subject to any base services , or servile works ; yet the lords had still great power over these tenants , by reason of their doing homage to them ; 〈◊〉 ●o nominè , their lands were many ways liable to forfeiture ; and therefore it wa● but reason , that the chief lords being tenants in capite , should conclude that tenants in soccage also , and both make laws and give taxes for them , without their being at all privy to it . but admitting i grant , that before th 〈◊〉 there were in some sense commons in parliament , tho not as knights , citizen and burgesses , chosen by the common people as their representatives ; yet 〈◊〉 it not destroy mine , or the dr.'s assertion ; who in the introduction before the answer to mr. p. only affirms , that before the th aforesaid , the body of the commons of england , or ordinary freemen ( as now understood , or as we now call them collectively taken , &c. had any share or votes in making laws , unless as they were 〈◊〉 presented by the tenants in capite . f. be it so ; but i am sure in many places of the dr's boo● he absolutely denies that there were any commons in parliament till the time he assigns . but as for what you alledge in answer to my queries , how tenants in soccage could have laws made for them , and taxes laid upon them 〈◊〉 ●heir lords or tenants in capite ? your answer is wholly grounded upon mistakes ; for in the first place king vvilliam did not grant all the lands in england to be held of him by knight's service ; since ( as i shall prove hereafter ) there were many subordinate tenants to bishops , abbots and other great lords , who never forfeited their estates at all , nor were disseiz'd of them by your conqueror , ●ad who had also great numbers of considerable freeholders under them ; as in 〈◊〉 at the greatest part of the land was gavelkind , which was soccage te●re . in the next place , neither were all the lands he bestowed upon his followers granted to be held by knight's service , since you your se●f own that a great deal ●land was given by him to his inferior servants , to be held by petit serjeanty ; and besides this , a great deal of other lands was regranted by that king himself , 〈◊〉 some of those old proprietors who had been dispossessed , to be held in soccage is appears from fleta , who speaking of these sort of men , says expresly ; in 〈◊〉 maneriis [ seilicet regis ] erant liberi hemines , lab●ri tenentes , quorum quida●i 〈◊〉 per potentiores a tenementis fuerant ejecti , eadem post modum in villenagium tenen●● resempserunt ; & quia hujusmodi tenentes cultores regis esse d●gnoscuntur , provisa 〈◊〉 quiet , ne sectas facerent ad comitatum , vel hundredum , &c — quor●m ●●gregationem tunc soccam appellarent , hinc est quod sokemanni bodie dicun●● , &c. where you may see that these socmen , or soccagers were then created by a ●ew tenure from this king ; nor did all the tenants in capite grant their lands ●o others to be held by knights service , since they as well as the king did at first , 〈◊〉 also in process of time , grant lands to the old english proprietors to be held of ●●em in soccage ; nor was homage the proper , or only badge of soccage tenure , but ●ealty ( unless the land had been held by knights service at first ) as you may see in littleton's d . book , sect. . nor did this soccage tenure give the lord any more right over his tenants estate , to tax him de alto & b●sso , at his will , by ●eason of the subjection he was in to the lord , in respect of forfeiture ; since ●hen the king should have had for the same reason the same rights over all his 〈◊〉 in capite , to tax them likewise at his pleasure ; and this right of forfei●●● in case of felony , or for want of heirs , continued to the lords as well of soccage tenants , as others , long after the time you assign for the coming of the commons to parliament , even to our own times ; and yet for all that those lords could not give taxes for such tenants in soccage at their pleasure . but that we may proceed , pray consider also the form of the peace agreed upon between the king , the prince his son , and the whole body of the kingdom assembled in parliament , to compose all differences between the king and the ●arons : the title of which in the record is thus ; haec est forma 〈◊〉 a domino rege & domino edwardo filio suo , praelatis , & proceri●●●●●●●ibus , cum communitate totâ regni angliae communitèr & con●●●ditèr approbata . which articles were signed by the bishop of lincoln , the bishop of ely , earl of norf. earl of oxon , humphry bohun , william de monte canisio , & majore london ; in parliamento london mense iunii anno domini . haec autem ●rimatio facta est london de consensu , voluntate , & precipto domini regis , nec . non ●●●datorum , ba●onium , ac etiam communitatis tunc ibidem praesentium . m. i think the dr. hath given us full satisfaction as to this record , in his answer to mr. p. the substance of which i shall here give you in short . first , it is certain , that at the making of this forced peace simon mountford and his faction then held the king and prince , as also richard earl of cornwal , the king's brother , as good as prisoners , and made them do what he pleased ; and he carried the king and prince along with him , until he had taken in all the strong places of the kingdom ; and when he had done , then he called this parliament , which could not be one , in the sense it is now taken , since there was none there but the earls , barons , and heads of the rebels , which had the king and prince in their power , and ( as you your self set forth ) were the same persons that sealed it for themselves and the other barons , and the whole community of the kingdom of england , which community must be the community of the barons and great men , or tenants in capite by military service , and no other ; for how can the lords and barons sign any thing for the commons , as at this day understood ? they did not then nor now do represent them . but i shall give you another authority to make this clearer , of some years before , related in matt. paris , viz. anno dom. ●● ▪ d hen. iii. where letters are said to be sent , a communitate angliae , to the pope concerning aymer de valence , bishop elect of wachester , the direction is thus , sanctissimo in christo patri , &c. communitas comitum procerum , magnatum , aliorumque regni angliae cum subjectione debita , pedum osr●●● , &c. and to put the matter beyond all doubt , it is certain that these letters were sealed by six earls , and five barons onely ; vice totius communitatis . i need 〈◊〉 give you their names , since you may find them in the author himself , as also cited by the dr. and as for h. bigod , the chief justice , and the four persons named after him , they are proved by sir vvilliam dugdale in his baronage of england , to have been the greatest barons in the kingdom . now pray let me ask you this question ; did these eleven persons , all great earls and barons , represent the whole commons or community of england , as at this day understood , or did they represent the community of the barons only , together with the alios , the milites , which held by military service of the great barons , and the less tenants in capite ; for the whole community here intended , must be one of them ; take which you please , you 'l lose the cause ; for certainly these great 〈◊〉 and barons that sealed this letter , vice totius communitatis , were not chosen nor sent by the commons to this parliament or meeting , nor were the commons represented as at this day by them , as you your self have already granted . f. i hope i shall not need to make any long reply to this answer of you●● ▪ or rather of your dr.'s since it is built upon the same false supposition with the other , viz. that the words cum communitate tot â regni angliae , must always mean only the community of the tenants in capite ; which supposition , if it be false in your former argument , is also as falfe in this of the lords and commons too ; and therefore it is impertinent to repeat my answer to it . but if this were no true parliament , because simon mountford had then the king and prince in his power ; this would likewise serve to unparliament that of the th of this king ; from whence the gentlemen of your opinion date the first coming of the commons to parliament ; since the king and prince were as much in simon mountford's power then , as now ; and yet no man as i know of , ever questioned the validity of it , tho i cannot also omit , that you pass by in this letter , the words magnatum aliorumque regni ; under which words , ( as i have already proved ) might very well be comprehended all the knights of shires as well as citizens and burgesses , unless the words had run thus ( as they should have done to have made out your assertion ) aliorumque qui de rege tenent in capite . but to come to the main point you insist upon , which is , how these great earl● and barons could seal this form of the peace , and these letters to the pope , in the name of all the commons of england . before i answer to that , i pray give me leave to ask you one question ; you have already allowed that the ordinary tenants in capite , ( of which that numerous body chiefly consisted ) tho called by courtesy barones minores , were really no barons , nor peers of the realm , and if so , were but commoners . now pray tell me how these great earls and barons you mentioned to have signed this peace , and this letter to the pope , could put their seals for those who were no barons themselves , by your own confession , and you cannot say they represented them , for they were as good tenants in capite as the greatest lords ? but if you say , they did it by their order and consent , pray why might not these great lords or barons as well do the like for the knights of shires and burgesses , by their appointment ? since i have already proved , that the lords did act thus in the letters which were sent to the pope concerning the business of scotland . and besides i must here observe , that the dr. and you do not deal fairly with your adversaries , in citing this authority of the lords and barons signing these letters to the pope , vice t●tius communitat●s angliae ; since i acknowledge in this place the word communitas being put alone , doth mean no more than the community of the whole kingdom . but in the authority i have quoted , it is put after the earls and barons , and so then must mean the whole commonalty or body of the commons , in the sense they are now taken , and as it hath been always used in french as well as in latin , when it comes after the earls and barons ( as i have already noted ) ; and for this pray see the stat. of westm. i. made d edw. i. but eleven years after the th of hen. iii. per l'ass●ntments des aechievesques , evesques , abbes , priors , counts , barons & tout le comminalty de la terre illonques summones ; which phrase i can shew you to have continued the same in most of our french statutes , during the reign of this king , and all his successors in many records and acts of parliament , whilst they were writ in latin or french ; which i shall omit reciting , because i suppose you your self will allow it . i have a great deal more to say concerning the true sense of the words communitas , le commune , & le communalty , which because it is long , and it now grows late , i shall defer till another time . but i think i shall be able to shew you from undoubted records , and acts of parliament from the reign of hen. iii. as low as richard ii. that these words when used as i have now said , after the earls and barons , cannot refer to them , but to another distinct estate or order of men , then called les communer or les communes in english the commons of the kingdom , distinct from the bishops and lords . m i shall nor now dispute with you concerning the sense you have put upon the words , you mention but i grant they often signifie the commons , after the th edw. i. in some acts of parliament and parliamentary records ; but i must beg your pardon , if i cannot allow communitas to signifie ▪ the commons at this time in your sense ; and therefore am not yet convinced that the words la communalty de la terre , mentioned in the statute of westm. i. ought to be understood or englished by the word commons ; who i do not suppose were then above once called to parliament , till the th of this king. but as for what you argue from the knights of shires being often called magnates , and grantz des countees , i allow they are often so stiled in our statutes and rolls of parliament ; but if you consider the reason of it , this will do you little service , since they were so called from their being most commonly at the beginning of their election , chosen out of the greatest and most considerable tenants in capite , under the degree of barons in each county , and no other , who were chosen to represent the omnes alios qui de rege tenent in capite mentioned in king iohn's charter ; or them and all the other military tenants by mean tenure ; for 't is scarce to be believed that those tenants in capite , who made such a noise for their liberties , would part with this main point of being personally present ; or else the body of them represented by some of their own number in every county . and it may be upon this account they had the title of notable knights , &c. in the ancient writs of summons , directed to the sheriffs ; so that only the tenants by knights service , as suitors to the county courts , were the electors . and this was very likely the reason of the statute of the th hen. iv. that the election should be made in the county court by all the suitors ; and also why the statute th hen. vi. by which any man that had s. per ann. of any tenure , who was before permitted to be an elector , was altered by th hen. vi. and so explained , that none but freeholders of s. per ann. should afterwards be electors with respect to the least part of a knights fee , viz. s. per annum , which were now come into the hands of very ordinary men. for anciently , soon after , or near the conquest , there were very few , or no great soc●ag● , that is , such as held great estates in soccage , and neither the small ones , nor the nativi , or copyholders , were reputed liberi , ot legales homines ( as before mentioned ) or performed the service proper to such military tenants , or those to whom they had alienated part of their fees. but since i have tired you as well as my self , in wrangling about the sense and meaning of the words in dispute between us , i shall for the future take a shorter cut , and give you two or three authorities from our ancient laws of vvilliam the conqueror , and hen. ii. and rich. i. which together with king iohn's magna charta , will i think , make it plain enough in conscience , that the commons , as now represented , were not summoned to parliament during the reign of king iohn ; and whether they were so summoned before th h. iii. ( when they were called but once , till above twenty years after ) will be the other part of my task . f. i approve of your method very well , and i assure you i love pedantick disputes about the grammatical signification of words as little as your self , unless where it is absolutely necessary , as indeed you have rendred it so , by raising the greatest part of your arguments from the equivocal use of those general words whereby our ancient laws and historians have stiled the constituent members of our great councils , which if they are well cleared , i think it is high time to fall upon some more solid arguments . but before you come to that , i cannot forbear observing that your self do allow , that in all acts of parliament and records after the th edw. i. the words communitas and l● commune , when put after the earls and barons , do signifie the commons in the same sense in which they are now taken ; but i must confess it seems incredible ( nay almost impossible to me ) that these words should signifie the community of the tenants in capite . in the th hen iii or th of edw. i. ( begin where you please ) and yet that the next parliament after those the same words should be taken in quite another sense for the knights of shires , citizens and burgesses , and that no statute , record or historian of that or succeeding ages should take the least notice of it is understood . but before i conclude this part of the question , i cannot but rectifie a great mistake you have fallen into by adhering to the dr. with too implicite a faith ; for whereas you suppose , that the reason why our knights of shires were called anciently grantz des countees , was because they were at first elected out of the tenants in capite only , and who with the other tenants by military service were also the only electors of them at first , till the statute of th hen. iv. ordained the election should be made in the county court by all the suitors , as if it had not been many ages so before ; whereas if you please to peruse that statute a little better , you will find it was not made to enlarge the number of the electors of parliament men , for long before that time all sorts or degrees of freeholders , as well tenants in capite , as their tenants by any kind of tenure , or whether holding of such tenants in capite , or else of others , as abbots and priors , and other mesne tenants , did alike owe suit and service to the county court , and consequently were all alike capable of giving their voices there , at the election of knights of shires , however small their estates were ; nor was that statute of hen. iv. now cited ( which requires the election of knights of shires to be made by those that were summoned , and all other that were there present ) made to confer any new right upon such feeeholders but only to prevent the abuses of sheriff● , who were wont before that statute , to procure knights of shires to be chosen clandestinely , without any due summons , or notice given to the freeholders of the election ; much less doth the statute of th hen. vi. confer any new right or priviledge upon freeholders of s. per annum , to give their voices at such election ( as you suppose ) but only takes away the right which the smaller freeholders of under s per annum ( whether tenants in capite or not ) had before , and restrains it only to such as shall have lands or tenements to the va●● of s. by year above all charges . and it is yet a much greater mistake to suppose , as your dr. doth , that this statute of th hen. vi. was at all altered by that of the th of this king , which is no more than an explanation of it , viz. that by s. per annum , was meant s. freehold , and that of lands lying within the county , where the election should be made . so that nothing can prove more expresly , that all freeholders , as well tenants in capite , as by any other tenure , were all alike capable of elections ; and being elected by the ancient law and custom of england , long before those statutes , and consequently were all alike freeholders in the eye of the law. but if you have nothing at present to object against what i have now said , pray pursue the method you have undertaken , and let me see those convincing proofs you so much rely upon , and which you hope may also serve to convert me . m. before i undertake this task , pray permit me to give you my opinion , in answer to the difficulty you have now proposed , which i confess seems to carry some weight with it ; but those prejudices will soon vanish , when we consider that the first time this alteration was practised , it was done in the king's name , tho by the absolute power of simon mountfort , in the th hen iii. and after a discontinuance of above twenty years was again renewed by edw. i. at the desire of the earls and barons . as i hope i shall shew you before we have finished our conversation . and therefore it being first done by the king 's absolute power , and after with the general consent of the lords , there needed no statute to introduce it any more , than there was in the reign of vvilliam the conqueror , to give the bishops and abbots that held by knight's service places in parliament among the temporal lords , and to bring their lands which were held before in franc almoigne , under the yoak of military service . but to proceed in the design i have undertaken ; it is necessary that i shew you first of all who were those freemen or freeholders properly so called , upon whom the whole burden of the subordinate government of the kingdom chiefly relied , and who then constituted the legal university or community thereof , immediately after the norman conquest , and during many king's reigns after that time . i suppose you are not ignorant that king vvilliam the conqueror having outed all the english nobility and gentry of their estates , gave them away to his french and norman followers to be held of him and his successors in capite , either by knights service , or petit serjeanty , reserving to himself the ancient demesnes of the crown , and adding more thereunto for the maintenance of the royal dignity ; and for this i need refer you to no better author than doomsday's book it self ; and then after he had thus distributed the lands of england as aforesaid , he composed a body of laws still extant , and which are in great part addition to the ancient laws of king edward , and his predecessors . i shall give you three or four of these new laws , and then i shall leave you to judge who were the true freemen or freeholders of the whole kingdom . the first is the d law of this king , tit. de fide , & obsequio ergo regem . statu●mus etiam ut omnes liberi homines , faedere & sacramento affirmarent quod intra & extra regnum angliae , ( quod olim vocab●o regnum britannie ) vvil●ielmo regi domino suo fideles esse volunt , t●ras & honores illius omni fidelitate servare cum eo , & contra inimicos & alienigenar difendere . now who these freemen were that were thus to maintain the king in his lands and honours , we shall see in the th law following ; tit. de clienteleri seu feudorum iure , & ingenuòrum immunitate ; volumus etiam ac firmiter praecipimus , & concedimus ut omnes liberi homines totius monarchiae regni nostri praedicti habeant & ●● meant terras suas , & póssessiones s●●s ; benè & in pace , libere ab omni exactione injusto , & ab omni tallagio , it a quod nihil ab eis exigatur , vel capiatur , nisi servitium suum liberum , quod de jùre nobis facere debent , & facere tenentur ; & prout statutum est in & allis , a nobis datum & concessum jure hereditario imperpetuum per commune consilium votius regni nostri ; whereby you may see , that all the freemen here mentioned who were to hold their lands and possessions in peace , and free from all unj● . exaction and taillage , were only such who were to perform free service , ( i. e. knight's service ) which was before appointed and granted them in hereditary right by the king in the common council of the kingdom . so that none were properly freemen , or exempt from tax or talliage , but such as held by military tenure , tho not knighted . and pray also by the way take notice , that by this commune consilium regni , you are not to understand a council of english men , or of english and french together , but one wholly made up of frenchmen or normans , who as well bishops and abbots , as temporal earls and barons , held almost all the lands in the kingdom by knights service . which is also farther made out by the th law ; tit. de clientum seu vassallorem prastationibus . statuimus etiam & firmiter praecipimus , ut omnes comites , & bermes , & milites , & servientes , & universi liberi homines totius regni nostri pr●●●●tihabeant & teneant se semper benè in armis , & in equis ut decet , & oportet & qud sint semper prompti , & benè parati ad servitium suum integrum , nobis explendum & p●●●gendum cum semper opus adfuerit secundum quod nobis debent , de feodis & tene●●●tis suis de iure facere ; & sicut illis statuimus , per commune consilium totius regni nostri praedicti & illis dedimus , & concessimus in feodo , iure haereditario , hoc praeceptum non sit violatum ullo modo super foris facturam nostram plenam ; so that here all the freemen of his kingdom were to perform their military services , with horse and arms according to their fees and tenures . therefore they were tenants in military service onely ( which in those times were the only great freemen , and that service the only free service ) which were meant in this law ; and ●ow different they were from our ordinary freeholders at this day ( for whom neither of these laws were made ) i dare leave it to the judgment of every indifferent person . these then were the men , the only legal men that named and chose juries , and served on juries themselves , both in the countrey and hundred courts , and dispatched all countrey business under the great officers , as will appear by the next law with a little explication : ut iura regia illaesa , servare pro viribus c●entur subditi , statuimus etiam & firmiter praecipimus ut omnes liberi homines totius regni praedicti sint fratres conjurati , ad monarchiam nostram & ad regnum nostrum , pro viribus suis & facultatibus contra inimicos pro posse suo defendendum , & viriliter serva●um , pacem , & dignitatem coronae nostrae , integram observandam , & ad iudicium rec●um , & iustitiam constanter omnibus modis pro posse suo sine dolo , & sine dilatione fa●endam . now the judgment they were to give , and the justice they were to do by this law ( besides that in their own courts and jurisdictions ) was principally as they were jurors or recognitors upon assizes , &c. ( tho some of the greatest of their milites were often sheriffs , hundredaries , and other under - iudges and ministerial officers of justice in their several counties ) as may be seen in glan●ille every where , but especially lib. . c. , . lib. . c. . c. . & lib. . throughout . this of being suitors to the county and hundred courts , &c. being a service incident to their tenures ; and before them many times anciently in the county and hundred courts , and not privately in a chamber , were executed deeds , grants and donations of lands contained in very small pieces of p●rchment , witnessed by thomas of such a town , iohn of another , richard of a third , &c. which were knights , and liberi tenentes in military service in those towns of considerable estates , and not the lower sort of people : and this execution of sales and assurances in open courts , was as publick and notorious , and as secure , as if at that time there had been a publick register for them . f. before i answer your conclusion from king vvilliam's laws , i must tell you , i am not at all satisfied neither with the account you give , how the common● of england could come in to be a part of the parliament , without any noise or notice taken of it , either by our acts of parliament , or historians ; since it is not only improbable , but also quite contrary to matter of fact , and history it self ; as i shall , i hope , make good , when we come to treat of that subject . nor is your argument of any weight , since it doth not follow , that because vvilliam the conqueror so subjected the lands of bishops and abbots to tenure by knights service ; that therefore this was done by his sole power , without any law for it , made by the common council of the whole kingdom . since i observe in the first law of king vvilliam , which you have now cited , that the very services which ( you say ) were reserved upon the lands he had bestowed , are said to be so appointed or setled , by the common council of the whole kingdom ; and therefore certainly the services of the bishops and abbots must be so likewise ; and therefore i must confess my self to be of mr. selden's opinion in this matter , who presumes there was a law for it , tho now lost ; and cannot believe that this king ( how powerful soever ) should attempt to introduce so great a yoak upon all the bishops , and so many of the abbots and p●●ors of england , without their consents expresly given to a law , and made in the great council concerning it , tho that law ( as many others of this king ) is not now to be found . but to come to the main design of your present discourse , which is to shew that none but tenants by military service in capite were in the first times after the conquest properly the only true freemen or freeholders of the whole kingdom . i shall shew you that first the notion is quite new , and never heard of , till the dr. ( from whom you have borrowed it ) first broach'd it ; neither mr. lambard , mr. somne● , nor sir henry spelman , nor any of our english antiquaries or lawyers ever discovered any such thing , before your dr. arose to disperse these clouds ; every man of the kingdom , who was no villain , being look'd upon as a freeman , and every owner of lands of inheritance , though of never so small a proportion reckoned a freeholder , and his estate called his franc tenement , or freehold , as well in our ancient , as modern laws ; and that freehold was not restrained only to military service , within a hundred years after the conquest , appears by king iohn's magna charta ; in which it is expresly recited , that nullus distri●●tur ad faciendum majus servitium de feodo militis , nec de alio libero tenemento qu●● inde debetur ; and that socage tenants , tho by villain services , were as much freemen as your tenants in capite , see spelman's glossary , tit. socman , where he says thus , socmannus in natura brevinan ( brevi de recto ) propriè talis est , qui li●e est , & tenet de rege , seu de alio domino in antiquo dominico terras suas seu tenement● in villenagio . libro sancti albani tit. honcton , chap i. rege angliae manerium de h●●cton tenuerunt in dominico ; omnes tenentes liberi , scil . & custumarii per sokam defendebant tenementa . sua , &c. ex quo patet sokmans liberos 〈◊〉 significare . but since you seem to make a distinction between freemen and freeholders , properly , or improperly so called ; since king vvilliam's laws you have now cited , do not warrant any such distinction ; i must beg your excuse if i am not of your opinion ; for the first law you have quoted warrants no such thing ; it only says , that all freemen in general , shall take an oath of fealty to the king , to maintain him , his lands and honours , against 〈◊〉 enemies and strangers . now it is apparent that this law extended to all freemen , ( who were by the ancient saxon laws recited in the addition to the laws of king edward ) to take the very same oath in the folkmote , as they were after your conquest to do according to this law , either in the county courts , or sheriffs tourne . nor will the next law do the business any more than this ; for the words are , that all freemen of our said kingdom may have and hold their lands and possessions free from all ●njust taillage exactions , &c. which word possessions extends not only , to lands of inheritance , ( much less to lands held by knights service ) but also to estates for life , and all other chattels or possessions , as well real , as personal : nor doth the words servitium liberum , extend only to those services which were reserved upon lands held by knights service in capite , but also to those common services ( called trinoda necessitas ) which i have formerly mentioned , ●iz . the building and repairing of castles and bridges , and expedition against foreign enemies , which all the lands in england were liable to , as well after , as before your conquest : nor will the th law make more for you ; for tho it ●●ly says that all earls , barons , knights , and their servitors or esquires , and all freemen of the kingdom shall always be fitted with horses and arms as they ●●ought to be , and which they ought to do according to , and by reason of their ●ees and tenures . now it is plain that this law cannot extend to the less 〈◊〉 capite only , since they , according to your own sense , are comprehended ●●eder the word milites , and their servientes , which seems to mean their feudata●y tenants , are as much tyed by this law to find horses and arms , as the t●●ants in capite themselves . so that whereas the law says expresly , uni●●rsi liberi ●●mines totius regni , it should have been , to make good your sense , univers● libe●● homines qui de rege tenant in capite ; and as for the other freemen who were ●f lesser estates than to find horses , they were to be ready with such arms as be●●ed their condition , as we see it explained by the assize of arms of henry ii. which i have now cited ; so that this law of king vvilliam is not to be taken in 〈◊〉 sense you put upon it , that all the true freemen of the kingdom were obliged to be ready with horses and arms , as if none were freemen that did not ; but referring the words horses and arms to those who were to ●ind both ; and the word arms to those freemen who were only obliged to keep arms ●it for foot●en , which sense the words will very well bear , tho expressed generally and concisely according to the mode of those times , which abhor'd more words than ●eeds : and if these laws will not prove what you bring them for , much less till the last you have cited ; for if the words omne● liber● homines totius monar●● , in the first law , who were to take an oath of fidelity to the king must ●●tend to all the freemen of england , ( as certainly it did ) all freemen being a●●e obliged to be sworn in the court leer , and county court ; so must this too , 〈◊〉 title being , that omnes subditi , all the subjects should endeavour to main●●in the king's rights with all their power ; and tho i grant that subditi here are the same with liberi homines in the first law ; yet since by that law all freemen were to take the oath of fidelity to the king , these must be also the very same freemen , who were to be sworn brothers to defend the kingdom , according to their power and estates . so that all that you have said to prove your tenants by knights service in capite , to be the only freemen that served o● juries , &c. being built upon a false interpretation of these laws of king vvilliam , are but the meer fancies and imaginations of the author from whom you borrowed them . but taking the words liberi homines in the strictest sense , and as they are is the magna charta of king iohn , and h. iii. chap. . where it is ordained , that liber homo non amercietur pro parvo delicto , nisi secundum modum illius delicti , salv●●h contenemento suo , & mercatar eodem modo , salva marchandiza , & villanus salv● vv●nagio ; upon which words sir edward coke in his d. inst. observes , that 〈◊〉 homo is here meant such a one as enjoys a franc tenement , that is , any sort of free●● hold . but pray go on to prove by some plainer authorities , that the arch-bishop● bishops and abbots , &c. together with the earls , barons , and other tenents in capita , were the only council of the kingdom , for the assessing of taxes , and making laws in the times immediately succeeding the reign of king william the first . m. i shall perform your desires , and will begin with the great council 〈◊〉 parliament held at clarendon , of which matt. paris tells us , 〈◊〉 dom. . th of king h. ii. in presentia regis henri●s 〈…〉 rendon calend. febr. &c. de mandato ipsius regis , presentibus 〈◊〉 archiepiscopis , episcopis , abbatibus , prioribus , comitibus , 〈◊〉 & proceribus regni , facta est recognitio ; and which quadrilogus , and gervas● 〈◊〉 canterbury , comprise under the general terms of brasules , & pr●ceres regni ▪ the bishops and great men of the king●dom . what can be more clear by this enumeration of the constit●●ent parts of this full parliament ( as mr. s●lden and other autho● agree it to be ) than that the commons were then none of the● and that the clerus and populus in hoveden , were only the 〈◊〉 and lay nobility . so likewise when these constitutions were again renewed by this king at ●●thampton , the same author tells us , ( tho by a mistake it is writt●● nottingham ) that rex pater ibi celebravit magnum consilium de 〈◊〉 t is regni , & coram rege filio suo , & coram archiepiscopis , episcop●● comitibus & baronibus regni sui ; which council is more parti●●larly recited by benedictus abbas in his manuscript history ( 〈◊〉 in the cottonian library ) anno. . ( which was the th h. 〈◊〉 circa festum conversionis sancti pauli , venit dominus rex usque ●●●thampton , & magnum ibi celebravit concilium de statutis regni sui 〈◊〉 episcopis , & comitibus , & baronibus terrae suae ; & coram eis per 〈◊〉 regis henrici filii sui , & per concilium comitum , & baronum & nilit●● , hominum suorum hanc subscriptam assisam ●ecit &c. and ralph de diceto , dean of st. pauls ( a. d. . ) a diligent searcher into the histories and transactions of his own and former times , doth yet more fully declare the meaning of abbot benedict , in the account he gives of this great council , thus ; rex juxta consilium filii sui regis , coram episcopis comitibus , baronibus , militibus & aliis hominibus suis in hoc consentientibus , &c. hoc autem factum est apud northamptonam , ●ino kal febr. from all which authorities we may collect , that this council at northampton , as well as that at clarendon , was a great or common council of the whole kingdom ; to which were summoned of the laity , only the earls and barons of his , ( viz. the king's ) land , to which is also added for the better explaining , who were understood under these titles of baronum , militum , & hominum suorum ; that is , such tenants in capite as were knights , and such as were his men or tenants , that is military tenants as were not knighted , and who held lands either of the king , or his son , to whom the king might assign divers of these barons and tenants in capite to atturn tenants to him , and to maintain his court and kingship ; and the king 's comites , and barones terrae suae , were the earls and barons of his kingdom that held immediately of him , or were his immediate tenants in capite ; and that homo suus & homines sui , doth for the most part signifie the king's , or any other lord 's immediate tenants by knights service ; for you may consult spelman's glossary , and du fresue's lexicon , under these titles . but farther to confirm , who were then the constituent members of our great councils , pray see the title to the assize of forests , under king richard the i. which hoveden recites in these words ; haec est assiza dom. regis , & haec ▪ sunt praecepta de forestis suis in angliae facta , per assensum & consilium archiepiscoporum episcoporum , & abbatum , comitum , & baronum , & militum totius regni . where by militum is to be understood not only those tenants in capite that were knighted , but also all other tenants in capite ; and if the word ever signifies any other persons . they were not ordinary freeholders , but liberè tenentes in servitio militari , freeholders in military service , as you may find in the dr.'s glossary , tit. probi homines , milites , &c. but pray remember also what sir h. spelman tells us in his glossary , tit. miles , that these milites ( when put alone ) were properly the liberi tenentes , or tenants in capite ; qui non à militari cingulo , sed a frodo nomen sumpserunt . so that i think no ingenious man but will confess that all these councils were general councils or parliaments of the whole kingdom , consisting of no other persons than tenants in capite . f. to return an answer to all your authorities together , i must now repeat what i often said , that there are no firm arguments to be drawn from the doubtful words , and general expressions of our ancient historians ; and i doubt not but to shew you , that all the whole strength of your reasons consists in this alone . but since i have already spoken so much of the various signification of the word barones regis & regni , i shall omit that , and now proceed to the rest of the words , which you think make so plain for you , and shall only observe at present , that these words barones and milites , are always stretch'd or contracted , according as the gentlemen of your opinion find it best to suit with their hypothesis . as for example . if the word barones is put alone , then it must signifie none but great barons , and tenants in capite ; if it be joined with milites , then by barones must be only meant the great barons or peers ; and by milites , those tenants in capite who were not lords . if any other words follow milites , then this word must signifie only such tenants in capite as were knighted . so likewise you deal with all other words , tho of never so comprehensive a signification . but why may not i with as much reason affirm , that by barones mentioned in these authorities , is to be understood the barones properly so called ; and by the milites , the knights of shires , whether they were tenants in capite , or feudatories to others ; for radulphus de diceto in anno . in the laws of malcolm the second , king of scots , mentions milites vavasores , qui tenent de baronibus tetras suas ; and that not only tenants in capite , but all others of whomsoever they held , who were able to maintain themselves like knights , might be then forced to receive knighthood , appears by two writs of th and th h. iii. as they are found in the close rolls , under this title , forma de molitibus faciendis ; and i desire you would read the writ it self . rex vicecomiti northampton , salutem praecipimus tibi quod per totam ballivam tuam in singulis bonis villis , & similiter in pleno comitatu tuo clamari facias , quod omnes illi de comitatu tuo qui tenent feodum militis integrum , vel etiam minus quam feodum integrum , dum tamen de tenemento suo tam militari quam socagio p●ssint sustentari , & milites non sunt , sicut tenementa sua deligunt , citra festum omnium sanctorum anno regni nostri . arma capiant & se milites fieri faciant . et si qui fuerint tales qui citra terminum illum se milites fieri non fecerint , omnia nomina eorum statim à termino illo , & quantitatem , & valorem tenementorum suorum nobit scire facias teste rege , apud lewes die iulii . similiter scribitur omnibus vicecomitibus . and as for the words homines sui , which you will have only to mean the king's tenants in capite , those words have so equivocal a signification , that there is no argument to be drawn from them ; for they may as well signifie all the king's subjects sworn to him by fealty and allegiance , as tenants by homage , or knights service only , as sir h. spelman in his glossary observes upon the word homo , dicitur de quovis praediorum tenente , sive socmanno , sive militari ; and for this he cites the book of ramsey , and if suus be added to homo , it doth much alter the case , as appears by the words following , in the same place , dicitur praeterca de quovis ministro , & subdito , & saepe occurrit hoc modo in antiquis privilegiis , non solum vassalos , & tenentes , sed famulos , & subditos quoslibet significans ; and for this he gives us several authorities . so that you see these words do not only signifie tenants in capite , but also any other subjects , and so might take in the knights of shires ▪ with the citizens and burgesses likewise , at least the representatives of such cities and burroughs as held of the king in capite , by your own sense of these words . but i shall however say something of the rest of the words you insist upon , out of abbot benedict . viz. barones terrae suae , which means no more than regni sui before mentioned , and then it will signifie no more , than that all the barons of his kingdom were summon'd to this assembly ; which word , tenents in capite , i can give mr. selden's authority for , who in his first edition , d part , hath his remarkable passage , speaking of the several kinds of barons , he says , that besides the barones regis , there were barons of subjects holding , not of the king , but by mesnalty , who made a third rank of such as were lords of mannors , &c. out of this may be understood why , and in what sense baronagium angliae , rex & baronagium suum , & sine assensu baronagii sui , so often occur in our old stories , taken as well for the king , and the whole state sometimes , as for the greater nobility . but if your dr. had been pleased to have compared the authors he quotes with others , nay with the title to the very constitutions of clarend●n themselves , as he hath given them , as in his appendix to his history out of quadrilogus , this objection would have been needless ; for if you consult gervase of canterbury , he stiles the parties to this council praesules , and proceres anglicani regni . and as for matt. paris , pray observe that after the word cl●rus ( which there ) coming immediately after the bishops , abbots , and priors must needs signifie the inferior clergy ) , he expresses the lay orders thus ; cum comitibus baronibus ac proceribus cunctis , where we may observe the word proceres here put distinct from barones , which may very well signifie not the less tenants in capite , but the knights , citizens and burgesses , as i have already proved the word proceres does often signifie , both in our historians and records ; but quadrilogus gives us the title of these constitutions more exactly in these words , facta est ista recognitio , coram archiepiscopis , episcopis , & clero , & comitibus , & proceribus regni ; and in the next line he says , that those customs were thus recognized , per archiepiscopos , episcopos , comites , barones & per nobiliores , & antiquiores regni ; where he likewise distinguishes between the bishops and inferior clergy ; and those who in the first place he calls proceres regni , in the next he calls nibilores & antiquiores regni , by which he might mean the knights of shires , citizens and burgesses , who were called in the saxon times seniores & sapientes , as i have already proved ; now if the inferior clergy appeared by their representatives at this council ( since they could not then all come thither in person any more than now ) ; to imagine that the commons of england should not be likewise there by their representatives of their own order , is to deprive the commons of that right , which you cannot but allow to the inferior clergy . to conclude ; you your self confess , that your less tenants in capite , sometimes called barones minores were only nominally , and nor properly barons of the kingdom , in the sense that word is now taken ; and if so , pray give me any satisfactory reason , why other commoners as well as they , viz. the knights of shires , citizens and burgesses , might not then likewise have had places in our great councils or parliaments . m. i see you use your utmost endeavour from the various and equivocal sense of the words in question between us , to prove that the commons in the sense they are now taken might be comprehended under the words barones , mii●a , & homines sai , which it is very certain could not be , according to the constitution of the government at that time . and therefore i shall give you a very plain answer to your question , why other commonrss as well as the lesser tenents in capite could not be present , or have places in those great councils , because it was contrary to the received custom and law of the kingdom at that time , appears by those clauses of king iohn's charter , which dr. b. hath made use of with so good success against mr. p. and the author of ianus anglorum , &c. and therefore i desire you would read them along with me 〈◊〉 they stand here in the appendix to the dr's compleat history of england ; and as he hath transcribed them from an ancient manuscript in bennet colledge , and divided them into so many distinct articles or chapters ; but those we chiefly insist upon are these . article . nullum scutagium vel auxilium ponam in regno nostro nisi per commune consilium regni nostri , nisi ad corpus nostrum redimendum , & ad primogen●● 〈◊〉 filium nostrum militem faciendum , & ad primogenitam filiam nostram semel n●●tandam , & ad hoc non siet nisi rationabile auxilium . . simili modo fiat de auxiliis de civitate londinensi , & civitas londinens● habeat omnes antiquas libertates & liberas consuetudines suas , tam per terras qu●● per aquas . . praeterea volumus , & concedimus quod omnes aliae civitates , & burgi , & villae , & barones de quinque portibus , & omnes portus habeant omnes libertàtes , & omnes liberas consuetudines suas ; & ad habendum commune conclium regni de a●●liis assidendis , aliter quam in tribus casibus praedictis . . et de scutagiis assidendis submoneri faciemus archiepiscopos , episcopos , abbates , comites , & majores barones regni singillatin . per literas nostras . . et praterea faciemus submoneri in generali per vice comites , & ballivos nostr● omnes alios qui in capite tenent de nobis , ad certum diem scilicet ad terminum quadra ginta dierum ad minus , & ad certum locum , & in omnibus literis submonitionis ca● sam submonitionis illius exponemus . . et sic facta submonitione negotium procedat ad diem assignatum secund●● consilium eorum qui praesentes fu●rint , quamvis non omnes submoniti venerint . from which ancient monument we may draw these conclusions . . that the king exercised a royal prerogative before this charter , of assessing aids , and scutages upon all sorts and degrees of men , without the assent o● the great or common council , ( since called the parliament ) from doing which for the future , the king by this charter tyed up his own i●●and , unless i● the three cases here particularly reserved . . that there is no mention of any other members to be summoned to th●● council , but the archbishops , bishops , abbots , earls , and greater barons b● particular writs , and all the other lesser tenents in capite by one general summons by the sheriff . so that it is apparent that the grea● councils before this time only consisted of such earls grea● barons and tenents in capite , as the king by special writ wa● pleased to summon ; and this new way brought in a greate● number of the tenents in capite than ever had appeared before ; so that if i● should be true , which you assert , that this charter was no new grant to the people of england , but a confirmation of their ancient rights and liberties , it mu●● then necessarily follow , that great lords and tenents in capite , called sometim●● barones minores , were then the only representatives of the commons . and that the inferior tenents consent was included in t●● assent of his immediate superior lord , whose presence was r●●quired in those great councils or parliaments , need not , think , be doubted , and i can give you , if need be , several authorities to prove it . but pray observe further , that here is no mention at all in this charter of any citizens or burgesses to be summoned to the great council , unless you will have them included under the general title of all others who hold in capite , and then none but such cities and towns who held in capite could pretend to send any members ; much less is there any mention of any knights to be chosen for counties , which certainly would have been particularly provided for by this charter , had they then had any place in this assembly . so that , i think , it is very plain , that the commons were not otherwise represented than by these tenents in capite for the rest of king iohn's , and most part of king henry iii. reign , for ought i can yet discern : for though this charter was confirmed in the second and ninth year of that king last mentioned , per commune consilium 〈◊〉 regni ; yet there is likewise no mention made of any knights and citizens 〈◊〉 burgesses . f. before i answer this main argument of yours , ( which i freely grant carrieth the greatest shew of probability of any you have yet brought ) give me ●●●ve to take notice , that i think you are very much out in your first conclusion ; that before this charter , the king exercised a royal prerogative of imposing taxes without the assent of parliament ; for if you mean that this exaction was exercised de facto , and from thence you would make it a prerogative of the crown , i grant this was true , not only before , but after this charter , before the statute de tallagio non concedendo was made ; but if you mean de iure , i affirm that our kings were as much tyed up by the th law of william the first , ( which you have already cited ) from levying any unjust taxes , or exactions , 〈◊〉 communi consilio totius regni , as they could be afterwards by any other subsequent law that could be made . but i shall proceed to answer the authority you have now brought from this clause in king iohn's charter to prove , that none but tenants in capite had any place in our great councils , or parliaments . but though i confess the charters of henry iii. and confirmation of edward i. are the same with this in the most material parts , yet there are several clauses ( of which this clause in question is one ) which are in king iohn's charter , and yet are totally omitted out of both those of henry iii. as i shall shew you hereafter . so that let ●●e sense of this place be what it will , i defie you to shew me any great council of the kingdom , that was ever summoned according to this imaginary model of yours ; and that i do not speak without book , that parliament or council of . henry the third , when but years after king iohn's charter was con●●●med ; m●t. paris ( as i have already observed ) tells us , it consisted of cle●● , & populus cum magnatibus regionis . but give me leave to read this clause , according as your dr. himself hath printed , and transcribed it , and as your self have now read it ; and i doubt not , but it will appear plain enough , that the clause you insist on in this char●●r , doth not at all concern the great council of the kingdom ; and for the proof of this , i desire you only to observe , that by the th and th clauses of this charter you have now read , both the city of london , and all other cities . bar●●ghs and towns , had a right to have a great council of the kingdom for the ●●●essment of aids , ( otherwise than in the three cases there expected . ) and ●ay take the dr's paraphrase to this clause along with you in his appendix to his compleat history of england , viz. that they , viz. the citizens , burgesses , and cinque ports shall send their representatives or commissioners to the common council of the kingdom , for the assessment of aids ; so that according to his concession , there must have been citizens and burgesses in the great council , in the reign of king iohn ; and if so , i desire you to tell me whether those gentlemen were commoners or not ? but i will not insist too much upon his concessions , for i think it is very plain from the words themselves , which point out a distinction between the common council of the kingdom , mentioned in the first clause which was to meet , to grant , or assess aids or subsidies ; and that other ( tho not common ) council or assembly , consisting of all the tenants in capite , which by the th . and th . clauses of that charter , are to meet to assess escuage , and to do such other business as was express'd in their summons . so that nothing seems plainer to me , than that this assembly mentioned in this charter , for assessing escuage , was a distinct council from the great council of the kingdom , which was appointed for the granting of other taxes , called auxilia , and for the making of laws . m. i confess this gloss of yours seems at first sight very plausible , and agreeable enough to the way of reading and pointing , with which the dr. himself published this charter ; but for all that , i much doubt whether you are in the right , or not , therefore pray give me leave to put off this debate till our n●●t meeting , since it now grows late ; and in the mean while i will take time to consider the arguments and authorities you have now made use of . f. pray take your own time , but do not defer it above a day or two ; for i have a great mind to have this question dispatch'd off our hands : i am your servant . m. good night sir. finis . books printed for richard baldwin , near the oxford-arms in warwick-lane . a brief disquisition of the law of nature , according to the principles and method laid down in the reverend dr. cumberland's ( now lord bishop of peterborough's ) latin treatise on that subject . as also his confutation of mr. hobb's principles put into another method . with the right reverend author's approbation . the gentleman's iournal : or the monthly miscellany . by way of letter to a gentleman in the country , consisting of news , history , philosophy , poetry , musick , translations , &c. compleat for the year . printed for rich. parker ; and are to be sold by richard baldwin , near the oxford-arms in warwick lane. where are to be had the single iournals for each month ; or compleat setts bound . the tragedies of the last age , consider'd and examin'd by the practice of the ancients , and by the common sense of all ages ; in a letter to fleetwood shepherd , edq a short view of tragedy ; its original , excellency , and corruption : with some reflections on shakespear and other practitioners for the stage . both by mr. rymer , servant to their majesties . bibliotheca politica : or , a discourse by way of dialogue , whether the commons of england represented by knights , citizens and burgesses in parliament , were one of the three estates in parliament before the th of henry iii. or th of edw. i. the second part. collected out of the most approved authors , both antient and modern . dialogue the seventh . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms ; where also may be had the first , second , third , fourth , fifth and sixth dialogues . . authors made use of , and how denoted . . mr. petut's ancient right of the commons of england asserted p. r. c. . dr. brady's answer thereunto . edit . in folio , b. a. p. . the said doctor 's glossary at the end of it . b. g. . animadversions upon mr. atwood's treatise , intituled , iani anglorum faces nova . b. a. i. . mr. atwood his confutatin of the said doctor , intituled , ius . anglorum ab antiquo . i. a. a. . dr. brady's preface to his history . b. p. h. . dr. iohnston's excellency of monarchical government . i. e. m. g. the seventh dialogue between mr. meanwell a civilian , and mr. freeman a gentleman . f. you are welcome sir , but i did not expect to see you again so soon . m. i beg your pardon if i come unseasonably , but the truth is , i have so great a desire to conclude what we began upon , that important subject we last discoursed of , that i could not be at ease till i had done my endeavour to give you satisfaction therein , if it be possible . but to come to the matter that we now meet about , i must now tell you again , that tho' this your gloss upon king iohn's charter , seems plausible at first sight , nay , is agreeable to the dr's own way of dividing and reading the several articles of this charter ; yet upon better consideration , i can see no good reason for making a full , or at least , a half stop in the th article , after these words , omnes liberas consuetudines suas ; adding the rest that follows , & ad habendum commune concilium , &c. to the following clause , & de seutagiis assidendis , &c. much lest for supposing as you do , without any ground , that there were two sorts of common councils , one for assessing escuage , and the other for granting all other aids and taxes ; and then , if read otherwise , it will plainly appear that it was one and the same council of the kingdom that did then both grant aids to the crown , and assess escuage ratione tenurae , which i am the more inclined to believe from the fourteenth clause here cited , which says . that no scutage , or aids shall be imposed , unless by the common council of the kingdom . now to what purpose is this so-express'd , if there was to be one council for the granting of aids , and another for the assessing of escuage : so that if this common council of the tenants in capite might grant aids , and assess escuage upon the subjects ( unless in the case before excepted ) i see no reason why they should not be the only council , for the giving their assent to laws also ; and consequently of concluding not only their own tenants , but the king's tenants in petty sergeanty and socage , nay , the tenants of any other persons whatsoever . and though i have seriously considered mr. p's append●x to the rights of the commons asserted , and dr. b's answer to it , as also his animadversions upon iani anglorum . &c. yet can i not see any colour of an argument for making any distinction between the king 's curia of his great lords , and tenants in capite ; and the great or common council of the kingdom , but that they were then all one and the same . it would be tedious to me , as well as you , to run over all the particular authorities and examples which have been urged pro and con in this question . but i desire you , or your friend mr. p. to shew me that there was any bishops , earls , barons , or other members of parliament in the times we now treat of , that had any place , or vote therein , but according to their tenure , and the ancient custom of all feudal tenants , who by the german ▪ gothic and lombard feudal laws ( which in substance were the same with ours ) were always summoned to the court of the king their supreme lord. but farther to prove that this council for assessing escuage , was no other then the great council or parliament of those tenents in capite , appears from li●tleton's ●enures , where in his second book , sect. . he tells us , that after an expedition royal into scotland , escuage shall be assessed in parliament upon all those who failed to do their service in that expedition : so that if the parliament did then assess escuage , i desire to know why they might not do it in the reign of king iohn ? i● this great council of the arch bishops , bishops , great lords and tenants in capite , were not the common council of the whole kingdom in those times ? yet that escuage was not always assessed in parliament after this charter of king iohn , but that the king by his own prerogative did often grant his tenants in capite a power to take scutage of their tenants without any assent in parliament , the dr. hath given you above a dozen examples in the reigns of hen. iii. and king iohn . thus it was for aids and scutage service , but if it was for scutage imposed in parliament as a tax upon land by the common council of the nation , then the tenants in capite were not only the sole grantors , but the collectors of that scutage too , from their mesne tenants : and the writs to the sheriff was different from these in scutage service , though the same in substance ; as likewise appears by those records the dr. hath there given us . f. i doubt not but i shall make good my assertion , and shall be able to defend what mr. p. hath in his learned treatise asserted concerning this matter . in the first place , i must stick to that way of reading and pointing of this clause in dispute , since it is not only agreeable to the dr's manuscript copy , but also to the old french copy , published by father d'achery in his spicilegium , vol. . which is written in the french of tha● time : but to answer your objection against this interpretation , you your self have in great part helped me to do it , by that true distinction you have now made between a scutage as an aid , or tax , and as a service , the latter of which you assert might be granted to the king , to be raised by his tenants in capite upon their under-tenants , whereas the former was only grantable in parliament by the common council of the whole nation . which tax , i affirm , was always granted to the king , and imposed by the common council of the kingdom only , and not by the tenants in capite alone , before the expedition was undertaken . whereas scutage service ( considered as a payment of so much money ) was never due or payable , till the expedition was ended ; and then only upon such as had failed to serve in person , or by sufficient deputies ; and was then to be assessed by the tenants in capite alone . and though i grant it may seem to have been a prerogative as you call it , exercised by some of our kings , sometimes to grant his tenants in capite a license to take scutage of their tenants , without the assent of the great council of the kingdom ; yet such payments or assessments were either according to law , and the express grant of this charter it self ; as is that writ of king iohn to the sheriff of glocestershire for the assessing of an aid or scutage service of three marks on each scute upon the tenants of saber , earl of winchester , for making his eldest son a knight , and which the said earl , might have claimed of his tenants by the common law , as also by the th article of that charter ; but for scutage tax littleton tells us , lib. . sect. . that because such tenements came at first from the lords , it is reason they should have escuage of their tenants , and the lords in such case might destrain for the escuage so assessed by parliament ; or in some cases they may have the king 's writ directed to the sheriffs of the same county , &c. to l●vy such escuages for them , as appears by the register . but if either king iohn , or king hen. iii. granted writs to levy escuage upon the under-tenants of the great lords , and tenants in capite , without their own consent in parliament this ought to be no more cited as a precedent , than any other illegal acts committed by those kings ; since , as our records and histories tell us , it was such illegal proceedings which were the cause of the barons wars . and it is expresly against the words of this charter of king iohn , which you have now quoted , viz. nullum se●●agium vel auxilium p●nam in regno nostro , nisi per commune consilium regni nostri . so that notwithstanding all you have yet said , it doth not appear to me , how scutage , when given as a tax upon knights ●ees alone , and to be levyed not only from the tenants in capite themselves , but their under-tenants as also from the tenants of them , who though they held in capite ; yet held not by knights service ; such as were the tenants in pe●●y serjeanty , and those who held of the king in chief , as of several honors , and not of hi● crown , as in capite , could ever charge such tenants without their consent● given either by themselves , or their lawful representatives ; much less could your tenants in capite tax or charge such as did not hold in capite themselves , viz. those abbots and priors who held lands in right of their monasteries in franc alm●igne , and who together with their tenants made at least two third parts of all the abby-lands in england ; as also tax'd those , who not holding by knights service at all , but by tenure in socage , or fee farm , did not hold their lands , as knights fees , and therefore could never be taxed by your tenants in capite for so many knights fees , or parts thereof . and braecton ( who lived at this very time ) has distinguish'd to no purpose between those common services which all tenants owe their lords , and the general taxes , or charges imposed by the common consent of the whole kingdom . the words are very remarkable , pray read them . sunt quaedam commun●s praestationes quae serv●cis non di●u●i●● , nec de consu●tudine ven●um nisi cum necessita● intervenerit , vel cum * rex venorit , sicut sunt hidagia . corraag●● , carvagia , & alia plura de necessitate & ex consensu communi torius regni introducta & quae ad dominum fe●di non pertinent . and therefore i cannot see any reason why the great lords , and tenants in capite should ever have power to lay a general tax upon the whole kingdom , not the tenth part of which did then hold of them by knights service . so that nothing seems plainer to me , than that there was ( us our ancient historians tell us ) a distinct court , which was held anciently three times every year , viz. at easter , whitsuntide and christmas ; and then the king was attended by all the bishops , great lords , and other tenants in capite , and this was called curis , or concilium regis ; and if any difference of right did arise between the king and his tenants , or between tenant and tenant ; here it was to be heard and determined ; and many other things were there u●ted and done , in relation to the king's barons , or tenants in capite only . but under favour , this was not the commune consillum regni , or parliament ( as we now call it ) for the king held this court ex more ; or by custom , without any summons , as simon of durham , and florence of worcester , and divers other writers of the lives of our first norman kings do shew us . but when they take notice of the meeting of the commune consilium totius regni , their expressions after , and then they say , that , rex ascivi , as it is in ordericus vitalis . ex praecepro regn convenerunt : or as e●●merus — rex sanctione sua adunavit . and mat. westminster of later times takes notice of this union , or meeting of this c●ria , or assembly of tenants in capit , together with the great council or parliament , in his history of hen. iii. where relating how the king again confirmed the great charter in a parliament , anno domini , . being the th of his reign , he hath these words , in quinden● paschae ( adunato magno parliamento , &c. ) so that it seems plain to me , that this uniting of the great or whole parliament , must be understood the conjunction of both councils together ; and therefore , when this council of tenants in capite , that thus met ex more took upon them assess escuage , and transact other matters of consequence , without the consent of the major part of the tenants in capite , who often failed to appear at these courts , or assembl●es held ex more , it was then and not before expresly provided by this charter of king iohn , that escuage should not be assessed for the future , without summons , or notice given of it to all the tenants in capite , who had right to be there . m. i see you would fain prove that there was a council or assembly of great lords and tenants in capite , distinct from the parliament , and which met ex more , and that these were the persons who were by this charter to assemble for the assessing of escuage , which is a meer precarious hypothesis , nor can you , or those , from whom you borrow this notion , make it out from any good authority ; for i have already proved , that the barones regis & regni , were the same persons , and that usually the barons or tenants in capite of what quality soever , did repair to the king's court , at christmas , easter , and whitsunday , doth appear to have been the custom of those times , from the testimonies of our ancient historians . but to prove by examples , out of the authors you your self have made use of , that the bishops , great barons , and tenants in capite , were then alone the great council of the kingdom , pray read eadmerus speaking thus . celebratum est concilium in ecclesiâ beati peiri in occidentali par●e juxta l●n●inum sita communi consens●● episcoporum abbatum , & principum totius regni , & bui● conventui assuerunt primates regni utriu●que ondinis . and at this meeting were present , the prime men of the whole kingdom of both orders , in this council , the bishops and barons are called the principal or chief men of the kingdom , yet these were all the king's barons , they all held of him in capite , and so did all the chief men of the kingdom . so likewise in another meeting under this king hen. ● , when arch-bishop anselm was to give his answer to the king , according ●o the advice of the bishops , and chief men of the kingdom : the same author tells us of anselm , that in pascha . ad curiam venit , communis concilii vocem unam accepit , &c. now pray tell me what common council was this ? of the bishops and chief men of the kingdom , that anselm referred himself to ? was it not ex more by custom ? you cannot find in eadmer any summons to it , neither rex as●ivit . , nor praecep●o regis convenerunt , nor rex sanctione suâ adunavit . in short , not to multiply examples , look where you will in eadmerus , or any other of the ancient historians you have cited ; and you will still find , that the persons who met ex more , and without any summons , were the same who assembled by the kings summons at other times , that is the principes and episco●i regni , or terrae , or called more generally , pri●ates utriusque ordinis , or the barones , or majores regni , who did at these great ●easts pro more , go to court , and hold a solemn curia , or great council there ; and that these made up the vniversity , or whole body of the kingdom ; pray see what matt. paris says . in die pentecostes dominus rex anglorum lo●dini festum tenens magnum , & serenissimum , ●unc compositâ per regni vniversitatem eleganti epistolâ , &c. this was about the pope's exactions as hath been before delivered : and hen. iii. in his letter to the pope , calls the same persons magnates angliae , which in his letter to the cardinals , about the same matter , he calls magnates nostri , as you may see in the former citations of them . f. but pray give me leave to ask you this question , might not our first norman kings often summon the common council of the kingdom at one of the said usual feasts , since it was so much for the conveniency of the bishops , great lords and tenants in capite ( who i grant , were then all members of the great council , ) to meet all the rest of the kingdom , or representatives of the commons at the same time : though the writers you have quoted may not mention their being summoned at all . and as for the writs of summons , those of much later parliaments being lost , how can it be expected we should now prove their being summoned so many year before ? m. i confess it might be so , that upon extraordinary business , and when the occasion was great , and the king desired a great and full appearance , they might also receive an express summons at those times . but then i must desire you to shew us any mention of a summons to any of these common councils , which when called at other times , are most constantly mentioned in this author . and i desire to know of you what you will say to those words pro more convenit , which is spoken of the most general councils , when the community of the kingdom met at the king's court ? you cannot deny , but that the tenants in capite , were the kings barones , milites , magnates , &c. upon this we will joyn issue ; and i affirm ( without bringing proofs which are infinite in this case ) that all the bishops , earls and barons of england , did hold their lands , earldoms , and baronies of the crown , or ( which is all one , ) of the king , as of his person , and that was in capite . william the conqueror , as i said before , divided most of the lands in england amongst his great followers , to hold of him ; he made earls and barons , such as he pleased : they and their descendants held upon the same terms with the first grantors , which was , to find so many horse and arms , and do such and such services ; both titles and lands were forfeitable , for treason or felony to the king , did homage for them , and every bishop , earl and baron of england was in those circumstances , and held of the king after this manner . other lands were given to other persons for meaner services ; as to his woodwards , foresters , hunts-men , faulconers , cooks , chamberlains , gouldsinlibs , bayliffs of mannours , in his own hands , and many other officers , which in doomsday-book , are called , terrae thanorum regis , and sometimes servientium regis ; and i doubt not , whatever the notion of petyt sergeanty now is , but that originally , this holding of lands was the true tenure ; not but presenting the lord with a bow , an arrow , a pair of spurs every year , &c. might also be called petyt serjeanty , though not so properly as the other . f. not to multiply words to no purpose , i think your reply is far from being satisfactory ; for in the first place , it is very unreasonable to demand , that we should now shew the express summons to these common councils which were not held de more ; since you know that all antient records of that kind are destroyed and lost ; for if we could produce them at this day , the difference between us , and those of your opinion , would quickly be at an end , as appears by those great councils , which are said expresly , by the historians i have cited , to have been summoned , and yet no such writs of summons are to be found ; nor is it any good argument , that because our ancient historians mention no distinct summons to the great councils , when met at the usual times of the meeting of the tenants in capite , that therefore there were none such , since we find they often pass by much more material matters than this . and though i grant that the tenants in capite were then part of the great council of the barones , milites & magnates regni ; yet does it not follow for all this , that none but the kings barons , and tenants in capite were members of this great council , since there might be in those times other barons , or great freeholders , who ( though they held their lands of the tenants in capite , yet ) might be there as knights of shires , or else appear in person at those assemblies as well as the other ; and besides , there were others , who , though they did not hold of the king in capite , but of some great honor or castle , or else of some abbot or prior ; yet were men of very great estates , and very numerous , all which must otherwise have had their estates tax'd , and laws made for them , without , nay , against , the consent of themselves , or any to represent them : nor is your assertion at all true , that william the conqueror divided most of the lands in england to be held of him in capite . for besides those servants and officers you last mentioned , above two third parts of the lands of the abbies and priories in england were not held , as also much other lands in kent , and other countries , per baroniam , or knights service , but in libera elecmosina only , or socage , as i have already prov'd ; and consequently neither they nor their tenants could , according to your hypothesis , have any representatives in parliament . and farther , you your self grant , that those lands you mention which were given out by your conqueror , to his woodwards , foresters , &c. did not capacitate them to appear in parliament , since their tenure was only by petyt serjeanty , and not by knights service : nor could they become the king's tenants in ancient demesne , because such tenants held wholly by socage tenure ; whereas it appears plainly by littleton , that tenants in petyt serjeanty were subject to wardship , marriage and relief : so that whoever will but consider , that near half the lands in england were held by bishops , abbots , priors , &c. and of whom not a third part held by knights service of the crown ; and will then likewise consider what a vast number of tenants those abbots , priors , deans and chapters ( who were not tenants in capite at all ) must have had ; and who either held estates in fee , or else for life , under them in socage , as well as by knights service ; as also all the other sorts of tenures i have already mentioned , which either held of the king as of some honor or castle , or else of other mesne lords by other tenures than knights service , must certainly conclude , that not above one half of the lands of the whole kingdom was held either immediately of the king , or else of other mesne lords by that tenure : so that if all these persons which were far the greater number of the free-holders in england , should have been thus excluded from having any thing to do in our great councils , i doubt not but we should have found sufficient clamour in our histories against so unjust a constitution ; and when the whole body of the kingdom was in arms against king iohn at running-mead , they would likewise have inserted a clause for themselves , if they had not had their suffrages there before , either by themselves in their own persons , or by their lawful representatives . and therefore upon the whole matter , i durst leave it to the consideration of any unprejudiced man , whether it is not much more probable , that the constitution of knights of shires , citizens and burgesses appearing in parliament , should be much more antient then the time you assign , than that so small a body of men as the bishops , lords and tenants in capite should represent all the freeholders and people of england , who never held of them by knights service at all . nor have you yet answered the quotation i have brought out of bracton in my last discourse to the contrary . and whoever will but consult that author in his chapter of tenures , will find , that the tenants in capite were so far from having a power of charging all the mesne tenants at their pleasure , that in his chapter de tenuris , it appears , that a mesne tenant in capite having purchased an estate for a valuable consideration , was lyable to no other services and conditions , than what his tenure express'd ; which once performed , the lord had no more to say to him : and if so be he laid any further burthens upon him , he might have had a writ of acquital out of the king's court against him directed to the sheriffs ; several forms of which you may see in glanville , and in the old register . m. we are not to rest upon meer probabilities , for some things that now appear to us unreasonable at this instant of time , might then be very just ; for if the feudatary tenants of the bishops , barons and other tenants in capite were well enough contented with the constitution of the kingdom , as it then was ; and that it plainly appears by matter of fact , that there was but one common council for the whole kingdom ; and that of the bishops , abbots , great lords and less tenants in capite only , it is in vain to argue of any unreasonableness in , or inconveniencies that might arise from , such a constitution , though perhaps a great part of the kingdom did not hold in capite , nor yet by knights service ; and therefore though the feudatary tenants of the tenants in capite , were upon the performance of their services acquitted of all other charges ; yet this was still to be understood only of such ordinary services as those tenants were to perform by virtue of their tenures , such as was scutage service , or the attending upon their lords when they went out to war along with the king ; but did not extend to such scutages as were granted in parliament , or as a tax upon land by the common consent of the nation ; for then the tenants in capite were not only the grantors , but the collectors too , of such scutage tax , from their military tenants ; and the writs to the sheriffs were different from those for scutage service ; and for proof of this , i desire you would peru●e that writ which the dr. quotes of the th of hen. iii. which is still to be seen in the close roll of that year . rex vice comiti sussex salutem . scias quod archiepiscopi , episcopi , abbates , pri●re● , comites , barones & omnes alii de regno nostro angliae , qui de nobis tenent in capite , spontanea volu●●●te su● , & sine con●uetudine , concesserunt nobis efficax auxilium ad magna negotia nostra expedienda , unde provisum 〈◊〉 de consil●o illorum , quod habeamus de feodis militum & wardis , quae de nobis tenent in gapite du●s marcas ad predictum auxilium faciendum , & unde provi●erint reddere nobis unam medietatem ante festum sancti mic●aelis , anno regni . & aliam medictatem ad pasche , anno regni ●osir● , . ideo tibi precipimus quod * ad mandatum venerabilis patris r. cicestren . episcopi cancellarii nostri , sine dilatione distringas omnes milites & liberos tenentes , qui de eo tenent per servitium militare in balliva tua , ad redlendum ei de singulis feotis militum , & wardis duas marcas , ad predictum auxilium nobis per manum suam reddendum in terminis predictis . sic scribitur pro aliis episcopis , abbatibus , prioribus & magnatibus . now i desire you to tell me whether any thing can be more plain , than that this tax was granted by a common council of the kingdom , according to that clause of king iohn's charter , i have now cited : wherein it is first especially provided , that no aid , or scutage shall be imposed upon the kingdom , unless by the common council thereof ; and yet you see by this writ , that the archbishops , &c. with the barons there mentioned , together with the other tenants in capite alone , granted an aid or scutage tax of two marks for every knights fee which they held of the king ; and that by virtue thereof not only those knights fees they held in their hands , but also all those subseudatary tenants called here freeholders , who held of them by knights service , were likewise charged for every knights fee , so held , the like summ of two marks . now i think nothing can be more plain from this record , than that this was a common council of the whole kingdom , and yet consisted of tenants in capite only ; and therefore i desire you to shew me some better proofs than you yet have done , that these tenants in capite ever made a distinct council different , from the common council of the whole kingdom . f. i grant this seems at first sight to be a good authority for you ; but i doubt not for all that , to prove , that it makes wholly against you ; and will , together with those proofs i shall urge , make out this difference between the two sorts of councils , i have already asserted ; and therefore i must tell you , that there is no necessity of understanding the words de consilio illorum ( mentioned in this record ) to refer to the common council of the whole kingdom , it not being here said to be granted per commune concilium regni , and then there can no more be proved from this record , than that a common council of the tenants in capite , took upon themselves an unusual power , sine consuetudine as the writ here mentions in those times , to charge not only themselves , but their under-tenants also , and that even this was an encroachment appears by the statute , de ●●lagio non con●edendo , made th . of ed. . whereby it is expresly forbid that any talliage or subsidy should be laid upon the kingdom sine volun●a●e & ●ssen●● archiepiscorum , episcoporum , comitum , baronum , militum , burgensium & aliorum liberorum hominum de regno nostro . now pray read my lord cooks reason in his d . inst. why this statute was made , the d . cause ( says he ) was that the king the year before , had taken a talliage of all cities and burroughs , without assent of parliament , whereupon arose a great murmuring and discontent among the commons , for pacifying which discord between the king and his nobles , and for the quieting of the commons , and for a perpetual and constant law for ever after , both in this and other-like cases , this act was made , &c. being no other ( then as the same author tells us in the conclusion of this comment on this statute ; ) then a restitution general to the subjects of all their laws , liberties , and free customs as freely and wholly as at any time before , in better and fuller manner than they used to have the same . but yet , that this was no general scutage or tax upon the whole kingdom , but only upon the tenants in capite , and their tenants by knights service , appears by the writ it self . so that not only all the persons i have already mentioned , who being tenants to monasteries and priories , did not hold by knights service , and all tenants in petys sergeanty , and all cities and burroughs , who did not hold in capite ( who if they had not then representatives in the great council , were wholly free from this tax ) and not only these , but all tenants in fee socage , whether holding of the king , or of other mesne lords were wholly exempt from this scutage ▪ so that nothing seems plainer to me , than that this assembly that gave the king this tax for themselves and their tenants , was a common council only of tenants in capite , charging themselves and their tenants only , and not the whole kingdom ; and that done in a case of great necessity , sine consuetudine : for if it had included all the rest of the kingdom , there would certainly have been some mention made , how all the rest of the kingdom ( which did not hold by knights service ) should be taxed . and that this was a council consisting of the tenants in capite only may appear by a record of the d . of this king , which i pray read . rex bar. &c. quia per commune concilium com. baronum & aliorum magnatum nobiscum in walliâ nuper existentium provisum est ; quod nos & ipsi qui servitium nobis fecerunt , ibidem habeamus scutagium nostrum , viz. de scuto sol. pro exercitu nostro wall. anno regni . vobis mandamus quod de omnibus feodis militum quae tenentur de nobis in capite vel de wardia in manu nostra existentibus ( exceptis feod . illorum qui brevia nostra habuerunt de scutag . suo babendo ) l●vari fac . scutag . nostrum . from which record , it appears , that this was only a common council of tenants in capite , who had attended on the king , and done their service in this welsh expedition , and concerned none else but such tenants by knights service and their tenants who had fail'd to do their service ; and is just such a tax as is expresly reserved by the last clause of king iohn's charter , which you have before cited : whereby scutage is to be assessed by all the tenants in capite . and that not only the spiritual and temporal barons , and tenants in capite did thus meet , and hold distinct councils , or assemblies for the granting of scutage , but also that the spiritual barons and tenants in capite , did also sometimes hold separate assemblies , appears by the patent roll of the . of this king , thus . cum peteremus à praelatis angliae quod nobis auxilium facerent , pro magnâ necessitate nostrâ de quâ cis conflabat , viz. epis. abbatibus , abbatissis , prioribus & priorissi qui de nobis tenent in capite ipsi nobis liberaliter concesserunt auxilium tale , viz. de singulis feodis militum suorum ● . de tos feodis , de quot ipsi tenentur nobis respondere quando nobis faciunt servitium militare . where you see not only the bishops , and abbots , but the abbesses , and prioresses granted a scutage of ● . upon every knight's fee ( not which was held of them ) but for which they were answerable to the king before , and though i do not suppose that these women left their nunneries , and appear'd in person at such meetings , yet they might very well do it , by their oeconomy or stewards , as their lawful proxies for assemblys of that nature . but when a general tax or subsidy was granted by the whole kingdom , the stile of these councils runs much otherwise , as appears by the close roll , of the th . of this king , where it is recited in the record ; that , omnes mag●ates , & fideles totius regni nostri , granted de qualibet carucatâ duos solidas . now it hence appears that this was a grant of caruage , which not being a scutage service , nor yet a tax by way of scutage : and was therefore to be granted by the common council of the whole kingdom , assessed , not only upon tenants in capite and their feudatory tenants , but upon each plough-land of the whole kingdom , must have bin granted ( as i have already proved out of bracton , speaking of this caruage , ) de consensu & communi consilio totiut regni ; for otherwise these tenants in capite could never have charged all the lands of england ; of which , not half was held by knights service . and to make it yet plainer by other records , pray see another of the th . of this king , in these words . rex vice-comiti devon. salutem sciatis quod archiepiscopi episc. abbates , priores & clerici t●ras habent●s , quae ad ecclesias suas non pertinent , comites , barones , milites , liberi homines , & villani de regno nostro , concesserunt nobis in auxilium quadragessmam pariem omnium m●bilium suorum : so that it is plain here who made the commune concilium regni , and gave this aid of a th . part of their goods , viz. the arch-bishops , bishops , abbots , priors , inferiour landed clergymen , the earls , barons , knights , freemen , &c. it being a subsidy granted upon goods , and not laid upon land , and that it may fully express all the parties to the grant , the record tells us , there were also the villani , the inhabitants of every village or burrough town . and to let you see that our ancient manuscript chronicles of this age , give the same sense to the expressions of this record , and that in the same terms . pray read this quotation which a friend of mine took out of an ancient manuscript , called , chronica monasterii de hageny , in the cottonian ● library , as ancient as the times are we are now treating on : the words are these , anno . henrici regis ti . where note that the year is mistaken for . but the king is the same : ) henry the third being often in that age called the fourth , in respect to king henry , son to henry the second , idem rex accepit ab archiepis . epis. abbatibus , prioribus , clerici● terras habentibus , quae ad eccles. sua non pertinent , & ab comitibus , baronibus , militibus , liberis hominibus , & villanis de regno angliae in auxilium quadragesimam partem omnium mobilium suorum . and to let you see that this author makes a plain distinction between the tenants in capite and the rest of the kingdom , pray observe what immediately follows in the same place [ ut ] anno. viz. vo . a quo communi assensu , & voluntate magnatum suorum , quam aliorum laicorum totius regni quintam decimam catalorum suorum universaliter accepit . where note by accepit is still to be understood he received it , after the peoples grant of it , as before in the record of the . and that by magnatum suorum is meant the great lords and tenants in capite ; and by aliorum laicorum ( put here as distinct from them ) all other orders or degrees of men . now pray , how could these taxes upon the goods of the whole kingdom have ever been given , but by the general representatives thereof ( since all could not be there in person ) unless you can shew me , that men in those days , held their goods and chatels by tenure in capite . m. i think you and i may so far agree , that this council i instanced in , consisted of tenants in capite only , and likewise that they imposed scutage upon no others than their tenants , by knight-service , yet doth it not therefore follow , that they were not the common council of the kingdom , or might not have tax'd all others , though they were not their immediate tenants as well as they did those that were : and therefore i am not convinc'd , but that these persons mentioned in the records you have cited ( which you grant constituted a common council of the kingdom ) were no other , than the same tenants in capite already mentioned , for as for the fideles mentioned in the record of th . hen. . i think the dr. hath very well proved , both in his answer to mr. p. as also in his glossary , that they were no other than the king's tenants in capite , and for this , pray consider the authorities he there gives us . for though i agree with you , that the word fideles doth sometimes signifie generally , all those who are under the power or subjection of their prince ; yet hottoman also tells us , that , fideles interdum specialiter dicuntur iidem qui vassalli ▪ qui feudo accepto in patroni fide , & clientel● sunt , vicissimque suam ei certi obsequii nomine fidem astrinxerunt , and in this sense , i suppose , this word is to be taken in most of our histories and records . i shall therefore give you one which will sufficiently clear the true signification , not only of the word fideles , but of liberi homines too . it is in william malm●bury in these words , willi●mo filio suo cum vix . annorum esset omnes liberi homines , &c. cujuscunque ordinis , & dignitatis , cujuscunque domini fideles , manibus & sacramento se dedere coacti sunt . by which you may see that by the words liberi homines & fideles are here meant only the feudal , or military tenants , either of the king or of any other lord ; and to prove it farther by records , pray see here ●hose that the dr. hath given us in the same place . the first is that of the patent rolls of the . of king iohn . rex baronibus , militibus & omnibus fidelibus totius angliae , salutem . they were to hear what the bishop of winchester was to say to them about the releasing the interdict ; and that these milites and fideles were only the king's tenants in capite , is clear from the latter part of this record : vnicuique vestrum si fieri potest literas nostras super hoc transmissemus , sed negotium majori festi●atione , &c. teste meipso apud rupel . &c. the king had writ to them all particularly , but that the business required greater haste . it seems before the granting of magna charta , this king sent special summons , and particular letters to his barons , and other tenants in capite , to meet upon any occasion . so likewise in these writs there mentioned to the tenants in capite of several counties , as they are found in the close roll there cited . rex omnibus comitibus , baronibus , militibus & aliis fidelibus sui● de com. ebor. northumbr . cumbr. &c. vobis mandamus quod prompti sitis , & par●ti cum equis & armis , &c. these were the feudataries and tenants in military service . but to speak somewhat of the clerici terras habentes , &c. as also of the liberi homines & villani , mentioned in the record of hen. . you have now cited . . i cannot allow your version of those words clerici terras habentes , qua ad ecclesias suas non pertinent , by inferior landed clergy-men , since 't is more than you can make out ; for i take them to be such clerks , as had mannors and free , or military fees belonging to their benefices , and that held of the king in capite , the fee whereof was in the crown , and not in the church , and therefore did not belong to it . but mat. paris , fol. . informs us better who they were that gave this tax , when he speaks concerning this very council — ad coloquium coram rege convenerunt episcopi , & aliarum ecclesiarum praelati , cum proceribus regni concessa est regi quadragesima pars honorum . now what the liberi homines were in this record , you have cited , we may easily guess from the other records i have made use of in hen. . viz. such of those , omnes alii qui de nobis tenent in capite , which were not milites in a strict sense , or had not received the order of knighthood . and i shall make out this sense of the words , as also of the true meaning of these villani by another record , dated but two years after this of yours . viz. hen. . rex vic. kant . salut . sci●s , cum octavis sancti hillarii , &c. ad mandatum nostrum convenirent apud westm ' archiepiscopi , episcopi , abbates , priores , comites & barones totius regni nostri ut tractatum haberent nobiscum de statu nostro , & regni nostri , iidem archiepiscopi , episcopi , abbates , priores & clerici terras habentes , quae ad ecclesias non pertinent , comites , barones , milites & liberi homines pro se & suis villanis nobis concesserunt in auxilium tricessimam partem honorum . from this record we may observe , . that the king's writ was only issued to the arch-bishops , bishops , &c. earls , barons of the whole kingdom . . that in the recital of this tax , the sheriff is told , first , that the arch-bishops , bishops , &c. and the clergy which had land not belonging to their churches ( a certain sign that they granted by themselves , and out of nothing else , but that ) and then that the earls , barons , knights and free men for themselves , and their villains granted a thirtieth part of their moveables . and from this record it is also manifest , these liberi homines had villanos ( if not bondmen ) villagars or rusticks , colonos , or husbandmen at least ; of whose estates by publick assent , and for the publick benefit , they might in part dispose of ; which liberi homines according to the tenor of all our records and histories were tenants in capite ; and that the villani mentioned in the other record of . hen. . to have given a fortieth part of their moveables , did grant by their lords ; that is , their lords paramount , that were tenants in capite , did grant for them , though they held it not immediately of them , but of other tenants in military service , which immediately held of the tenants in capite , who did charge them by publick taxes , hath been shewn from divers records : so that it was frequent in those times to say , such , and such , concesserunt , granted such a taxe , that is , by those who had power and authority to do it for them ; and without their consent too , when those for whom they granted were not capable of being members of parliament themselves . i could give you more examples of the like nature , but i will not tire you . f. i pray sir give me leave to answer this long speech , and to begin with your interpretation of this word fideles , first then , we are so far agreed , that the word fideles had two , or three , different significations . first , it signified all the subjects in general ; in the next place , all vassals , or feudatary tenants whatever , whether of the king , or any other lord , as appears by the passage you have cited out of william of malmsbury , as also divers antient charters , particularly those of king william i. and maud the emperess , and king stephen , which are divers of them directed , fidelibus suis , francis & angl● , which cannot mean tenants in capite ; since the doctor and your self will scarce allow any english men to have then held lands in capite of the crown . lastly , i grant this word fideles may sometimes signifie the tenants in capite of the king ; all which being so , i think you cannot deny , that it is not the bare word , but the sense it bears in the places where it is used , that must direct us to its true signification , and that the fideles there mentioned to have granted caruage in the th of hen. . could not be the king's tenants in capite only , i have given you a sufficient reason which you do not think fit to answer , viz. that caruage was a general tax imposed upon all the lands of the kingdom , as well what was held by knights service , as what was not ; and how your tenants in capite could tax those lands which were never held by knights service , i desire you would resolve me . and therefore by the fideles here mentioned in this , and many other records , are not to be understood the tenants in capite only , but all other subjects who did fealty ; who , though they could not all appear in person in our great councils or parliaments , yet were there by their representatives the great freeholders , lords of mannors , or else by the knights , citizens and burgesses . but i must now make some remarks , upon your interpretation of ●he writs of the th and th of hen. . wherein you have certainly very much mistaken the sense of all the main words . for in the first place , as for the clerici terras habentes non ad ecclesias pertinentes , which you interpret to have been clerks having mannors , and military fees not belonging to their ●enefices , but held of the king in capite , seems to be altogether forced . for whoever heard of clerks ( that is inferior clergy men ) parsons , or vicars of churches , who held benefices of the king in capite , and not in franc almoigne ? or if they had any such , that therefore those lands so held should be called , lands not belonging to their churches ; for at this rate the lands of bishops , all abbots , priors , &c. which held of the king in capite , would have been in your sense , lands not belonging to the church ; but who but you and your doctor ever gave such an unreasonable comment on those words ? nor will that passage you cite out of mat. paris , at all favour your interpretation ; for either these bishops and prelates there mentioned , gave this sortieth part of their moveables in parliament , with the rest of the kingdom , or else as clergy men in convocation : if the former , then these clerici could have no votes there in person ; for i believe it would puzzle you to prove , that at this time any ecclesiastical person below the degree of an abbot or prior , had any place in parliament , by reason of his tenure by knights service in capite , for those lands he held in right of his church ; but if you 'll have this tax to be granted by the whole clergy in convocation , then such clerks as you mention could not be there in person : first , because they are said to be such as had lands , qu●e ad ecclesias suas non pertinent , and so could not have any place there as clergy-men ; nor could they be included under the praelati , since that word takes in none beneath the degree of a dean . and therefore if these clerks gave any thing in parliament , they must do it by their lawful representatives , the knights of shires ; or if in convocation , by their clerks of the lower house , then called procuratores cleri : so that take it which way you will , those clerks could not be present themselves at these parliaments , when those taxes of the th and th part of their moveables were given to the king ; and therefore either as lay-men or clergy-men , must be taxed by their representatives ; but in deed the words proceree regni , which immediately come after episcopi & pralati in matth. paris , sufficiently shews this grant was made in parliament , that the word proceres often includes , not only the knights of shires , but citizens and burgesses too , i have already proved , when i spoke of the various significations of that word . nor is your interpretation of liberi homines , for tenants in capite , who taxed their villani , any other than a meer wresting of these words ; for , if they were only those who gave for themselves and their villaines , whom you suppose were either their bondmen , or else their rusticks or husbandmen , it is absolutely contrary both to law and reason ; for whoever heard that villains or bondmen , who had no property either in lands or goods , ever payed taxes ? and if you suppose that these villani were only the rustick tenants in socage by villain service of the tenants in capite , then it is plain , that all the military or feudatory tenants of the tenants in capite , and all tenants in free socage by certain rent , were exempt from both these taxes , since they are not so much as once mentioned in these writs , neither can be comprehended under these villani , as your self must acknowledge : for if these villani were meer rusticks , pray tell me what reason there was to put them check by jole with their lords , as they are in the record of the th of hen. . as if they had given by themselves as well as the rest of the freemen of the kingdom : or what reason is there why the lords ( as the words are in your record ) gave pro se & suis villanis , if the liberi homines there mentioned , had not represented them ; which could never have been said with any sense , had they been only so many freemen , or masters over their slaves : where , as it here appeares , every one of these orders or degrees of men here mentioned , had an equal independent power to give for themselves , and not one for another : or else this word may be meant in a larger sense , as in the record of the th of hen. . where they are put in the nominative case ( as equal to the rest of the orders of men there recited ) and so could not be husbandmen , or meer villagers , but the inhabitants pof cities and burroughs , and which sense sir henry spellman allows in his glossary ; villanus est qui i● villa habitas ut vrbanus ab vrbe , &c. villa autem propria ●●●at viculum rusticanum ▪ sed a ●e more gallici idiomatis eraducitur ad insignia oppidu , & ad ipsas vrbes : but take it in what sense you please , it is plain , it could never here mean meer villagers ; nor could all your liberi homines ●e only tenants in capite ; for then the record would have concluded thus ; & liberi homines , qui de nobis tenent in capite ; as it is in the record you have cited of the th of hen. . to the sheriff of suffex , and may be found in many other records , which respect only tenants in capite : and for further proof of this sense of the word villanus , we need go no farther than these very records themselves , of the th and th of hen. . which you and i have now made use of ; in both which writs there are certain persons appointed to ass●ss and collect the aids in every county , and who , by vertue of these writs , did cause to be elected four of the best and most lawful men , de singulis villis of each hundred in the counties there mentioned ; and then the villani will signifie in these writs , not villaines or meer rusticks who were not then reckoned inter l●galea homines . and though 't is true you have brought some presidents to prove , that the tenants in capite gave taxes for their feudatary tenants ; yet that was only where the tax was raised upon knights fees alone , and not upon all the ●ands of the kingdom in general , much less upon goods and chattels ; so that either the liberi homi-nes mentioned in these records , must mean all the freemen of england , who by their representatives gave these taxes of a th or th pa●t for themselves , and all such of their tenants , who held estates of copy-hold leases , for years , or at will , or had estates in stock , money , or other chattels ; nor otherwise could these taxes ever have been general , not charged upon moveable goods of the whole kingdom . i have but one thing more to remark upon your observations of this writ , which is , that whereas you take notice that the king's summons was directed to none of the laity but the earls and barons of the kingdom ; and if so i desire you to prove to me , that your less tenants in capite were at all present at those parliaments ; for you have already granted that they were no barons , and consequently could not be included under that title ; so that if these liberi homines who granted this tax for themselves , and their tenants , were not only tenants in capite , but their under tenants also by military service ; ( as the doctor himself grants in his answer to argumentum antinormannicum . ) p. . as also in his glossary , p. . therefore unless you can prove that your liberi homines were all tenants in capite , you will never make out that none but they , and the less tenants in capite had a right under that title , to appear at our great councils or parliaments ; and to grant aids , and joyn in the making of laws for themselves , and the rest of he nation , before the times you allow . to conclude , unless you can also prove that there was a tenure in capite of goods and chattels , as well as of lands , it will appear by these aids granted in parliament of personal estates , that all freemen or freeholders were alike free , and consequently had the same right to appear in parliament , either by themselves , or their representatives . m. but pray make out if you can , by some more evident proofs , that any others besides tenants in capite , were admitted into our great councils ; and that these liberi homines were not tenants in capite . f. i think i need go no further than the first words of the agreement between king iohn and the barons which is still extant on the close rolls of the th of this king , ( m. . dorso . ) beginning thus , has est conven●io inter dominum iohannem regem angliae ex una parte , & robertum filii walteri , marescalli exerci●us dei , & sanctae ecclesia angliae , & ric● . comi●em d● clare , &c. and here follow the names of divers of the rest of the earls and barons , & allos comites & barones , & liboros homines totius angli●e ; so that it is clear , this charter was granted in a great council of the whole nation , in which were assembled not only the bishops , earls and barons , with all your less tenants in capite , but also all the clergy , as well the inferiour as superiour , and all the freemen or considerable freeholders of the whole kingdom ; or , as mr. selden words it in his titles of honour , fol. , . it was made by the king and his barons , and the freemen of the kingdom ; which assembly matt. paris expresses more succinctly by these words , tota nobilitus angliae in unum collecta , quasi sub numero non cadebit ; so that nothing can be plainer than that many other , besides your tenants in capite , appeared at this great council . m. in the first place , before i answer the main of your argument , give me leave to tell you , that i cannot allow this assembly at runne mead to have been truly a great council of the nation , but rather a rebellious armed rout met together without the king's writs of summons , and indeed , whether he would or not ; and i suppose you will not assert that any representatives had votes therein ; nor can you shew me that any knights , citizens or burgesses were summoned to it . f. i grant indeed that that assembly was not properly a parliament , i mean such as we have at this day , as not being called by the king's writs ; yet since almost all the bishops , earls , barons , tenants in capite , and all the rest of the kingdom , were then in arms , it may very well be reckon'd a common council or solemn convention of all the freemen of the whole nation , and that after the most antient manner ; since all , or the greatest part of the freeholders of the kingdom were there present in parliament ; and that this council is look'd upon as a parliament in the eye of the law , appears by a writ to the sheriff of northampton-shire , which is found in the close rolls in the th of hen. . to this effect , that he should not permit any one in his bailiwick to use any liberties belonging to the crown , unless they had formerly been used ad tempus parliamenti de runne mead ; quod fuit inter dominum johannem regem patrem nostrum ▪ & barones suos angliae . m. i see that you are forced to confess , that this assembly was no parliament in the sense we now take that word , nor indeed could be any more than a rebellious rout there met , whether the king would or no ; and therefore the word parliament is not to be understood in this record , in the sense we now take it , since that word came not in use here ( instead of magnum concilium , & commune concilium & colloquium a conferrence ) until about the middle of henry iii. reige , and doth no more point out the constituent members of it , than that word did at that time : and so the meaning of the word parliamentum is to be taken in this record . f. i think i have very good reason , notwithstanding what you have now said to affirm , that this was a great council or parliament accoding to the mode of those times ; and tho i grant it was not called by the king's writs , since it is certain he avoided calling any , because he utterly refused to grant this charter at all , yet that is not material , since they , being a general and full assembly , or convention of all the estates of the whole nation , had a just right to meet and vindicate their liberties then out-ragiously opprest , and trodden under foot by the king ; and the king himself owned them as a lawful assembly , by sending to them , and appointing them to meet in runne mead between staines , and windsor on the th . of iune , which our historians tell us , they joyfully obeyed , so that he himself admitted them to be a lawful assembly of estates , and consequently for his parliament as appears by the agreement now cited . m. i shall not much trouble my self , whither this was properly the great council or not : but however , i cannot see how mr. selden could make out , that this charter was made by , or to all the freemen of england ; for it seems to me that there was not the least ground for it . for if under the words liberi homines , all the freemen , or free-tenants of what condition soever , were comprehended ; yet her is nothing in this record that any way proves that they had any hand in making this charter , but the liberi homines , here were only those whom the king calls liberi homines nostri in his charter , and immediately grants them several relaxations of their rigid feudal tenures , by which 't is apparent , these liberi homines were the tenants in capite , and yet neither was the charter made by them , as is before intimated ; tho i confess these were the freemen which made such a cry for their liberties ( most of which were but an abatement of the rigour , and a relaxation of the feudal tenures , as appears by the charter it self ) the rest were only followers , and helped to augment the noise , they were no law-makers as you imagine ; for 't is not probable , that those men that had the force of the nation in their hands , would permit men of so small reputation to share with them in law-making : those that had the power of this , and other nations de facto , always did give laws and tax the people . f. supposing this , ( as i have already proved it , ) to be a lawful common council , or parliament of the whole kingdom , i think i may still affirm that this charter was made , not only by the king , but by the bishops , earls , barons , and all the freemen of the kingdom , who certainly gave their assent to it by drawing it up into form , and by accepting it from the king , when past under his seal , as truely as the magna charta's of king hen. iii. and edw. i. are called statutes for the same reason , as i have already proved to you , or as much as the petition of right granted by king charles i. was a statute , tho past under no other form. nor were the liberi homines totius regni to whom king iohn granted this charter , no other than the tenants in capite as you suppose since in the time of henry ii. this kings father , the word liberi homo was taken in a much larger sense , as appears by the assize of arms , ordained by this king ( as it is recited in hoveden's history ) where after it is appointed , what corcelets , helmets and other arms , every tenant in capite should find , it immediately follows thus ; quicuncque liber laicus habuerit in catallo vel in redditu ad valentiam . marcarum habeat loricam , & cassidem & clypeum & lanceam ; quicunque liber laicus habuerit in catello ad valentiam . marcarum habeas habergellum , & capelet ferri , & lanceam : & omnes burgenses , & tota communia liberorum hominum habeant wambais , & capelet fervi & lanceam ▪ where you may observe , that every freeman who was worth in rent or goods to the value of marks , was to find as much arms for the defence of the kingdom as he that possessed a whole knights fee ; and the meanest townsman , and the whole commonalty of freemen ( for so i translate the words , 〈◊〉 libe●orum hominum ) were to find a caplet or head piece of iron , besides other weapons . and the d . article of king iohn's charter says expresly , concessimus etiam & omnibut liberis hominibus nostris regui anglia , pro nobis & hae●elibus nostris in perpetuum omnes liberates subscriptas , ●abe●das & ●enandas eis , & haeredibus ●uit de nobia & h●rodibus nostris : which the dr. himself renders thus . we have also granted to all our freemen of the kingdom of england , &c. and sure then this charter could not be made to none but tenants in capite , unless you will suppose that none but they were freemen , and all the rest slaves . nor was this charter only made to relax the severity of the feudal tenures as you suppose , since there are divers other clauses in it which concern all the rest of the freemen , and free holders in england as well as they , for besides the first and second chapters of this charter , which grants and confirms to the church of england , and to all the freemen of the nation their rights , and liberties ; if you please better to consider it , you will find , that there are several other chapters in this charter , which all other freemen , as well as the tenants in capite have thereby an interest in , as you may see by the , , . , . , , , . and above other chapters , or clauses therein exprest which are granted , not to tenants in capite alone , but either to ecclesiasticks , or other lay freemen of the whole kingdom . but to prove this a little further , i shall give you but one or two instances out of this magna charta ; and that too in the drs. own translation , article . no freman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his free tenement , or liberties , or free customs , or out-lawed , or banished , or any ways d●stroyed , nor will we pass upon him , or commit him to prison , unless by the legal judgment of his peers , or by the law of the land ( i. e. by legal process . ) the other is the . article of this charter , that we will not sell to any man , we will not deny any ma● , or delay right or justice : now judge your self , whether these two articles were made to the tenents in capite alone , or to all the freemen of the whole kingdom . and hence it also plainly appears that the same body of freemen to whom this charter was made , were likewise present and gave their assents to the making of it : nor were vavasors , or fendatary ten●nts of the bishops , abbots , great lords and other tenants in capite , persons so inconsiderable as you would make them , that they only should come hither , but as followers , to augment the noise , since i have already proved from bracton , that there were divers of them , men of great estates , and power in their countries , besides the tenants of those abbots and priors who ( as i have already mentioned ) did not hold in capite of the king at all , and yet made a great part of the kingdom , besides tenants in pety● serjeanty , and those that held of great honours , who could never be represented by the tenants in capite at all . and therefore i must ( notwithstanding what you affirm to the contrary ) look up● on all these persons , for as good law-makers as the greatest lords or t●nants in capite of them all ; since the main force of the nation did not lye in them , but in their feudatary tenants , who would never have followed their lords in this assembly , if they had not look'd upon themselve as having as good an interest in the rights and liberties they demanded ( as appears by this silvo of all their liberties ) as their lords themselves ; and also as good a right as they in giving their assent to them , when they were to be pass'd into a law , as they were by this charter ; since these feudatary tenants were not at all obliged by their tenure to obey their lords summons at any other warlike expeditions , but where the king , or his lieutenants went out in person . m. i am very well satisfied , that this could be no parliament for the reasons already given , and tho i grant that these charters were made to , and in the presence of the greatest part of the clergy , earls , barons , and freemen of the kingdom ; yet this proves not that they had any vote , or suffrage in making of them , nor indeed could they , for the great charters were only the petitions of the people drawn into the form of a charter , and passed under the king's seal , as his meer voluntary free grants and concessions , without any votes or authority from the people : and therefore the great charters of henry iii. recites them to have bin made of his meer grace and free will , as it is in the preface to it . but pray answer me a few plain questions concerning king iohn's charter ; which if you can resolve , i may be inclined to believe there might be some other great council besides that of tenants in capite . the first is , if this common council of tenants in capite , were for assessing of aids and escuage only ( as you suppose it is provided by the last cl●use of this charter ) why was the cause of the meeting to be declared in every writ of summons to the great barons and tenants in capite ; if they were only summoned about aids and escuage , or other ordinary business of course , sure then the cause of summons need not to have been declared as it is here provided . in omnibus lit●er is submonitionis causam submonitionis illius exponemus ? f. i will give you an answer to this question immediatly , but before i do it , let me tell you that you are much mistaken , in saying , that the great charters ( because they were the kings free concessions ) were therefore passed without any votes , suffrages , or authority of the people of england : since i have already proved in our discourse concerning the legis ●●tive power , that the matter of those charters was no more then an affirmative of the common law of england long before your conquest ; and that the peoples consent , and suffrage was sufficiently given in their drawing them up ; and offering them to the king to be sealed , and accepting them from him when he had done it : and therefore that the great charters are always called statutes in our ancient records and a●●s of parliament . but to answer your question , i suppose that the king , besides the ordinary business of their assessing escuage had often other affairs of great moment to be transacted with , and communicated to his bishops , great lords , and tenants in capite , in which the rest of the kingdom were not at all concern'd , such as giving the king their advice , as a great council , concerning divers weighty affairs ( as in the business of sicily , mentioned in the first record i have cited ) as also about undertaking forraign wars against france , scotland , wales , &c. in which they were bound to follow , and assist him together with their under-tenants according to their respective tenures , and therefore it was but reason that they should have timely notice that they might give their advice in it , as also that they might either come , or stay away , according to the greatness or urgency of the occasion , and might also give their under-tenants notice to provide themselves with horses and arms , and all things necessary in case a war should be agreed on , which i think are sufficient reasons for thus expressing the causes of their meeting in the writs of summons . m. admit this were so , ( which i shall yet take further time to consider of ) pray tell me in the next place , if all your inferiour barons , vavasors , or lords of manours , &c. supposing them either to have appeared in person , or else as chosen for knights of shires , or else as citizens and burgesses , who were the members of the great council of the nation ; i pray tell me why there should not have been the same care taken , that they might be also summoned as well as the tenants in capite ; certainly they came not to them by instinct , nor is it scarce probable that they would leave their country busine●s to travel from one remote part of england to another , to these great councils , which seldom continued above three or four days , if they had had a right so to do ? f. i shall answer you in few words , because it was not at all necessary to express that clause you mention for them all : since it was sufficient therein to follow the old course of summoning the common council of the kingdom ; for doing which it had always been the custom to give sufficient notice by writs of summons of their meetings , whereas in this council of tenants in capite , since there was by this charter some alteration in the manner of their summoning , so there was also for expressing the cause of their meeting : for whereas before that ( as the dr. himself allows ) all the lesser tenants in capite , had particular letters or writs of summons expressing the cause of their meeting , they were for the future to be summoned by general writs directed to the sheriffs , and therefore it was but reason , that there should be a particular clause reserved for their general summoning , which there was no need of in those writs that were issued for the summoning therest of the people , or commons to the great council or parliament , as i doubt not but it would appear , in case we had those writs to produce , in which likewise there was anciently often exprest the particular cause of their meeting , as there was , for instance , in those famous writs to the lords and commons of the . hen. iii. which the dr. hath given us in his answer to mr. p. m. but i have still a greater objection behind than either of the former . you cannot deny , but that by the first clause of king iohn's charter ( which i have made use of ) all aids , and escuages , were to be imposed by the common council of the kingdom ; and littleton himself tells us , in the second book of his tenures , that escuage is always to be ass●ssed by parliament upon those that failed to do their services after the expedition was ended . now if this had not been a right inherent to the great , or common council of the kingdom , but that the tenants in capite alone assessed it in king iohn's time ; how came they to lose that priviledge , and the great council of the kingdom , or parliament to get it , if the former had not been the only great council at the first ? f. i hope to give you as satisfactory an answer to this , as i have to the rest of your demands . this alteration might have fallen out two ways , either according to camdens old manuscript author , cited in his introd●ction to his britania ; the summ of which is , that when king henry iii. after his great wars with sim. momford , and the barons had ruined many of them , he out of so great a multitude which was before seditious and turbulent , called the best and chiefest of them , only by writ to parliament , who after that time became barons by writ , and not by tenure as they were before . and as for the l●sser sort of them , called ●●ones minores , they might be wholly resolv'd into the body of the commons , or ordinary sort of ●ree-holders , and the king being fearful of any farther encrease of power in these barons and tenants in capite might no more desire their company at the usual feasts of the year , whither before they used to come ex more , and so their power fell of course to the council or parliament , of which , before , they only made a part . or else it might happen from the negligence of the tenants in capite themselves , who growing weary of their attendance might neglect to come to those councils , because of the great trouble and charge of those journeys ; and the king being as willing to dispense with their presence , this court was lost by non-usage ; and so the judicial part of it remained in the house of peers , and that of assessing escuage , and advising and giving aids in matters of war , fell wholly to the great council of the kingdom , of which these tenants in capite , by their being capable of being elected knights of shires , soon became the principal members . but , admit i should take this council for assessing escuages for the com●on council of the kingdom ; pray give me leave to ask you one or two questions likewise in my turn . pray tell me therefore , if this council had been such as you would have it , to what purpose is there a full stop in all the old coppies , at the end of this clause , & ad babendum commune concilium leg●l de scutagiis assidendis ali●er quam in tribus casibus praelictis , and why ●ould the next clause begin with , & de scutagiis assidendis submoneri faci●●us , 〈◊〉 if they had been both one and the same councils . since it had been easier to put it all under one clause , if the matters ther● treated of had been the 〈◊〉 ? in the next place , pray tell me if this were the great council of the kingdom or parliament as it is now called ; why are there no other rights or priviledges reserved to this council , but this of assesing escuage ? were not the powers of granting other taxes ( which could not be included under the word escuages ▪ ) and also of giving their assent to laws , things of as great ( say greater ) moment than this of assessing escuage ? m. i shall give you as short and satisfactory an answer as i can to those queries . in the first place , i will not deny , but that both the clauses you mention might have been contracted into one , supposing them to be read without any full stop between them , as sir h. spellman in his glossary supposes them to be . but what is this to the purpose ? must these therefore be two distinct councils , because the charter it self words them a little more loosely than it needed to have done ? and as for your next query , there was no need of inserting any clause to this charter of reserving or conferring any power to this common council , of granting taxes and giving their assent to laws , because they were things which at that time they had no reason to complain of , since we do not read that king iohn ( as arbitrary as he was ) ever took upon him to make any new laws without their consents ; and besides , it was implicitly reserved to them by the last clause of this charter , viz. saving to the arch●bishops , bishops , &c. earls , barons , knights , and all others , &c. the liberties and free customs which they had before . so that there was no need of any other clause than this , because it had been , not only the custom , but the law of the kingdom , for the king to lay taxes , and assess escuage upon the nation without the consent , or assistance of this great council , which grew now so great a grievance , that they would not be contented , untill the king by this charter had renounced it . f. i shall not now trouble my self or you , to confute this mistake of yours ; that the kings of england could legally raise taxes upon all their subjects without consent of their great council , or that they ever exercised such a prerogative , unless it were in the violent reigns of the two williams , and then if it was ever done , it was only upon their english , and not their norman subjects ; the latter being exempt from it by the very magna charta of king william i. by your own confession : nor would they , i believe , have born it at his hands ; but i shall speak more particularly of this another time . only pray give me leave to ask you this one question ? if this charter of king iohn had been intended as a constant standing rule or form , not only for this , but all succeeding common councils or parliaments , what could be the reason that this clause you so much insist upon , of summoning all the tenants in capite , should be omitted in the great charter of hen. iii. granted in the d . year of his reign , and but three years after the . of king iohn , ( when these charters were first granted ) as also when it was again confirmed in the th . of hen. iii. for can any one of sense imagine , that so material a clause as this , and so express for the rights and priviledges of the whole body of tenants in capite , as the sole representatives of the whole nation could have been omitted , had they alone in those times constituted the common great council of the whole kingdom ? how comes it to p●s● , that in all the records of hen. iii. reign , wherein this charter is mentioned ; it is always recited magna charta nostra , viz. his own charter , without taking notice of his fathers ? i should be glad to receive a satisfactory answer to this question from your self or any other intelligent person . m. i hope i may give you a satisfactory answer to this scruple , which i think may be thus satisfied ; i conceive that the first great charter we have , which is commoly attributed to henry iii. and stiled his charter in our statute-books was properly the charters of edw. i. or perhaps , rather his explication or enlargement of those charters of king iohn and henry iii. for we find not the great charter , either of that or king iohn's , in any of the rolls , until the th . of edw. i. and he had a greater summ of money for confirming this charter than henry iii. had . now in this charter then confirmed , there is no provision made for any summons to great councils or parliaments , and the reason may well be , because the constitution of great councils or parliaments was lately changed , from what it was in the beginning of king iohn's time , and till the . of henry iii. nor perhaps was it so fixed and peremptorily resolved on at this time , what it should exactly be for the future , as to have it made an article of the charter , and to this conjecture the frequent variations of summons to parliaments in those times do give a probable confirmation . f. i am not at all satisfied with this supposition of yours . for i doubt not but to prove that it is altogether vain , and grounded upon no good authorities , either from history or records , but i shall shew you before i have done , that the magna charta which we have still upon record , by inspeximus of edw. i is the very same , word for word , in all the material parts of it , with that of hen. iii. both of the d . and th . year of his reign , and that there was no alteration at all made as to the manner of it , a summoning or chusing members of parliaments from the beginning of this kings reign to the very end of it : nor yet in the time of edw. i. as you suppose . m. i should not be displeased to see that proved , though i think i am able to shew you the contrary . but before we proceed to that , i must needs tell you , i am not yet satisfied , that there ever were anciently two councils , one of the tenants in capite , and the other , of the whole kingdom ; for methinks not only your self , but mr. petyt and mr. atwood his second have fallen very short of their proofs they have brought in this point ; and there is nothing in the drs. whole answer to them , in which ( in my opinion ) he hath obtained a clearer victory , therefore pray give me some better proofs of this distinction , if you have any . f. i did not imagin i should have needed to have spoken any further upon that head ; yet since you now require it , i shall obey your commands : since therefore you tell me that the times before your conquest are obscure , and the authorities uncertain ; i will give you a short history of these councils , beginning with king william i and so going down as low as henry iii. so f●r then we are agreed ; that the council of tenants in capite met ex more at the great feasts of the year ; and that they also granted the king aids , or subsidies to be levyed upon themselves alone ; as i grant , appears by the writ of th . of henry iii. which you have but now cited , directed to the sheriff of sussex . but that this council which was thus held ex more , was also often summoned to meet at other times when the kings occasions required it , it also as certain as appears by this writ of the . of the same king , which i shall read to you , rex vice-comiti northampton , &c. praecipimus tibi sicut alias praecipimus , quod summoniri facier archiepiscopos , episcopos , comites , barones , abbates , priores , milites , & liberos homines qui de nobis tenent in capite eodem modo scribitur omnibus vice-comitibus angliae : which writ extending only to those who held in capite could never be a summons to the common council of the whole kingdom ; for then this restriction had bin needless , qui de nobis tenent in capite , and it would have been known who had a right to come to this council , if these words had not bin inserted , so that this seems to me to make a plain distinction between these liberos homines qui de nobis tenent in capite , and the rest of the freemen of the whole kingdom . but when eadmerus and other ancient historians mention the great or common council of the whole kingdom ( afterwards called the parliament , ) then their expressions are more general and comprehensive ; for proof of which , pray consult the old english saxon annals , continued down to the time of henry i. wherein anno. dom. . ( being the last year of william i. ) there is a remakable passage which i shall here give you in english ; , at christmas , the king ( viz. william i. ) was at gloucester with his nobles , and there held his curia or court ( in saxon ( his hired ) five days ; and immediately after it follows thus : ) after this he held a great council [ in saxon , mycel getheat ] where he had many great discourses with the nobles , &c. now it seems plain to me , that this court ( here called his hired ) could not be the great council of the kingdom ; for to what purpose should it meet again so quickly , if it had the great council of the whole kingdom ? or , why are they here called by different titles , the one his hired or court , and the other the mycel gathea● , the great council ; which is also called commune concilium totius regni , in sir henry spellmans councils in this very year . and to shew you more plainly the difference between this great council of the whole kingdom , and the lesser council of the kings barons and tenants in capite : pray see eadmerus , who relating what was done in a great council held at easter , immediately before the invasion of robert duke of normandy , in the d . year of henry i. says , there met tota angliae nobilitas , cum populi numerositate , and then arch-bishop anselm engaged for the king that he should govern the kingdom according to the just laws thereof , where you see , that besides the noble men and gentlemen here called , regni nobilitas ; there was also a great number of the commons here termed in the barbarous latin of that age , populi numerositas . but when the king held his curia of the great lords and tenants in capite alone , the expressions are more particular , as may appear by many charters of our first norman kings to several abbeys of their own foundation , which are said to be made consilio , & assensu baronum nostrorum tam presulum quam laicorum , as you will ( for example ) find it in the charter of hen. i. to the abby of abington ; as it is exemplifyed in the ancient manuscript register of that abbey now in the cottonian library , in which book you will find more of the like nature , which plainly make out this difference between this less council of the kings barons and tenants in capite , and the great council of the kingdom . and for further proof of this , pay see the instrument of king iohn's resignation of his crown to the pope , as you will find it at the end of dr. b's . compleat history : which is recited to have been done communi concilio baronum no●tro●um , that is , by the common council of the kings barons and tenants in capite , who were all there present in arms against the landing of the french king then expected . and yet this was never looked upon to have been done per commune concilium ragni , since this resignation was declared void by the bishops , lords and commons in full parliament in the th . of edward iii. because done sa●z lour assent as it is in the parliament roll of that year . but when ever the whole great council , or parliament was summoned to assemble , then this lesser council of the tenants in capite , must needs meet also , as being a principal part of it . and then the expressions were more comprehensive , as i have already noted ; and our ancient historians do in my opinion , by their expressions , plainly signifie an union of both these councils , to make up the common-council of the kingdom ; as appears by the letters which the priory of canterbury wrote to the pope upon the election of ralph , bishop of rochester , in the th of hen. . to the see of cantebury , as you will find them in eadmerus , ( lib. . fol. . ) and which is there said to have been made adunato conventu totius angliae ; that is , in the united assembly of all england , viz. the episcopi , abbates & principes regni , & itgens populi multitudo . so likewise hovelen in his history . ( fol. . ) anu ( being the th of hen. . ) relates the kings marriage with the lady adeliza , daughter to the duke of lovain , to have been celebrated at windsor , adunato concilio totius regni , i. e. in the united council of the whole kingdom . m. i am not yet satisfied with your proofs ; and i doubt not but to shew you that this distinction of your friends , mr. p. and mr. a. his second , between the common council of the kingdom , and the council of the great lords and tenants in capite , will prove but a meer chymra of those gentlemen , from whom you have borrowed it ; for there was indeed but one common council of the kingdom in those times , viz. that of the bishops , earls , barons , and other tenants in capite . and therefore in answer to your first authority from the saxon chronicle , i shall shew you another of the same king's reign , which will shew the different expressions of this great council by hired , and mycel getheat , to have been the particular fancy of that monkish writer , and it is from gervas do●●bornensis , de actis pontisicum cantuarens . ecclesiae , where you may see in the decem scriptores , this passage anno. . regis wilhelmi i. anno. dom. . lanfrancus cadomensis ahlu electus fuit archi●piscopus cantuariensis a senioribus ejusdem ecclesiae cum episcopit & principibus , clero , & populo angliae in curia regis in assumptione sanctae mariae , where you may see that this confirmation of the arch-bishop was made in the great council of the kingdom which is here called collectively or altogether ( and not one part of it only curia regis . ) as for the words which make up the constituent parts of this council , we have sufficiently debated them ; and therefore i need say nothing more concerning them . but tho the dr. has given us more authorities to prove this , yet i shall make use of but one more from badmerus it is in the reign of henry i. thus , in subsequenti nativitate dom. christi regnum angliae ad curiam regis lundoniae pro more convenit , & magna solemnitate habita est , &c. this instance is full in all points , here is the whole kingdom , that is the whole baronage or university of england ( for bracton tells us the whole kingdom consisted of earldoms and baronies ) who met according to custom at the kings court ; and hence it is manifest that at those times the common council of the kingdom was held , and from this also as from the former instances , that the barones , principes & optimates , & mayres regni did at those great feasts pro more according to the custom frequent the kings court , and were the only persons that constituted that great assembly . f. but pray give me leave to interrupt you a little ; did not i tell you but now , that the king did often convene the common council of the whole kingdom to meet the bishops great lords and tenants in capite at one of these feasts ; and so it might be an assembly ex more in respect of them , but extraordinary to all the rest of the kingdom , and this often happened at other times as well as at these feasts according as the kings occasions required , when all the others were summoned on purpose . m. i have already answered that objection ; and granting it might be so , it does not prove it was so : but i desire you to tell me what you can say to this expression in the authority i have now made use of from eadmerus . regnum●ombre convenit ▪ which is spoken of the most general council when the kingdom of england then met at the kings court. so that your small criticism upon the words adunato conventu or concilio , as if they signified this union or conjunction of two councils into one , is but a meer pancy of your authors , those words signifying no more than a gathering or meeting together of all the persons that constituted that assembly , as appears by these words in eadmerus , adlinatis ( without either praecepto or sanctione regis ) ad curiam e●us in pascha terrae principibus , i. e. the chief men of the nation being at his court at ●aster . but as for your main instance of king iohn's resigning his crown to the ●ope in a common council of the great lords and tenants in capite , but not of the common council of the kingdom , i confess it were very considerable if it were true , for tho i grant that in all the charters of this kings resignation , the words you mention , viz. communi concitio baronum nostrorum ●re inserted , yet it could not be a great council ; since tho i grant that all the tenants in capite were at that time summoned to appear in arms against the king of france ; yet it being a military summons for the gathering together of an army , and not for the meeting o a great council , and the five proscribed bishops being in france , and the barons that sided with them , fled beyond sea , and not dar●ng to appear ; so that this resignation having been executed before so small ● number of barons as appears by the witnesses to it , viz. but two bishops , the chief justidiary , seven earls , and three barons without subjoyning , & aliu episcopis , comitibus , & baronibus , or & communitate , or ●ota communitate , it does not appear that there were any more present , so that this could not be such a council as was constituted by king iohn's charter , that is , it was not a parliamentary council , or general representative of the whole nation ; and therefore the parliament in the th . of edw. iii might very well say , the resignation was made without their assent ; and so i think this great argument of yours comes to nothing . f. pray do not triumph before the victory . for i doubt not but to prove , notwithstanding what you have said , that this was a real common council of the barons and tenants in capite , in which king iohn resigned his crown , tho not of the kingdom ; which i prove thus . first it appears by all our historians , that king iohn had just before summoned all the earls , barons , knights and freemen of the kingdom , whoever they were , and of whomsoever they held , to appear in arms , which made so vast an army , that after all the ordinary rabble were sent home ; matt. parls tells us , that the knights , esquires and freemen that stayed behind , made an army of thousand men , who were encamped at barham down , not far from dover , where this resignation was executed : so that this being almost as great a meeting as that at runne mead , not long after , the king might very well have summoned at least a great council of all his tenants , in capite , to countenance this resignation , and that he did do so , the charter it self says expresly ; which had it been otherwise , would have appeared a notorious lye to the whole world. nor do your objections to the contrary prove considerable . first , you say this was only a military summons , and not to a common council , yet such a one as was constituted by this kings charter , which sure could not be at this time , when that charter was not yet made till the year after , before which , you grant , that the great councils might have met without the days summons , expressing the cause of their meeting ; and if they could meet ex more , as you grant this council did at the great feasts of the year , without any summons at all , sure they might as well meet now on such an exigency : the king had , 't is true , summoned them at first upon another occasion ; but say you , there was so small a number of barons at this meeting , that it could not be a common council of the kingdom , neither do i say it was , but the contrary ; but how does it appear it was not ? why say you , five of the bishops were then fled into france , and a great many of the barons of their party . the latter is not true in fact : few or none of the barons siding with these bishops but as for the bishops , what if five were absent ? were there not enough left to have made a common council of the rest of the tenants in capite ? well , but there were but two bishops present , and seven earls , and three barons , as appears by their names at the end of this charter , without any mention of more , or of the whole communities being there ; a special reason , as if no more could be present at this assembly than whose names are to it ; by this rule the great charters of king iohn , and th . of hen. . were not made in a great council of the whole kingdom ; for there are no witnesses names expressed at the end of them ; it is true at the beginning of these charters it is said they were done by the council of certain bishops , earls and barons , which yet were but a very few more of all sorts then there are mentioned at the end of this charter of king iohn's resignation : so that this appearance of the bishops , earls , barons and tenants in capite is meerly precarious ; for if more might very well have been there , it is most certain they were , notwithstanding the paucity of the witnesses to this charter , since those were added only for form sake , and were commonly those who were nearest the throne when the seal was put to it . i confess your first objection is more material from eadmerus , of the whole kingdoms meeting the king at christmass ex more , without any summons mentioned ▪ to which it may be reply'd , that there might be a summons to the whole kingdom to meet , as well as to the tenants in capite ; and this happening at christmass , one of the usual times of their meeting , this author might apply the title of this court to the council of the whole kingdom : and that this was so , will appear from an anonymous author , who wrote in h. . his time , published by mr. sylas taylor , in his history of gravel-kind , ( p. , ) who relates this election of arch-bishop lanfranc to have been made communi consensu & consilio omnium baronum suorum , omniumque episcoporum , & abbetum tostusque populi , which certainly must mean somewhat more than your council of tenants in capite alone . and this also is confirmed by matt. pari● , who has been so careful , as to mention a summons to a great council immediately after the holding of the curie of tenants in capite at christmass ; the words are thus : anno dom. , i. e. the th of hen. . senuts rex curiam suam ad natale apud win 〈…〉 , autem continuo per omnes fines angliae scripta regalia praecipiens omnibus ad regnum spectantibus , archiepiscopis , episcopis , abbatibus , prioribus , comitibus & baronibus , ut omnes in octabis epiphaniae londentis convenirent . now pray tell me if this curia held ex more at christmass , had been the great council of the whole kingdom , consisting of the arch-bishops , bishops , abbots , earle and barons , and other tenants in capite , to what purpose should the king coptinus ( i. e. immediately ) issue out his writs for summoning the very same persons to meet him at london on the octave of st. hillary , when they were then all with the king at winchester , and that he might have communicated what he had pleased to them . or what have you to say to the curia , or common council held before , in the ninth of this king , but eleven years after king iohn's magna charta , when the great charters were confirmed , and an aid granted by the whole kingdom , which matt. paris , anno dom. . relates thus ; ( which tho' i gave you at our last meeting , it will not be amiss to repeat again : ) rex henricut ad natale termis ●●●iam suam apud westmon , praesentibus clero , & populo cum magnatibus regionis , which words ( as i have already urged ) must comprehend some other persons then your tenants in capite alone ; otherwise the word populus had been altogether in vain : so that you see the common council of the whole kingdom was often held at the same time with the ordinary curia , and is by way of excellency , called by the same name as we at this day call the great council of the kingdom , the high court of parliament ; and curia and court differ no more then a latin name from an english , which is likewise very well confirmed and explained in the chronicle of walter of civentry ( to be found indivers private hands ) who lived in the reigns of king iohn and henry . and speaking of this 〈◊〉 , council or parliament ( which though it might begin at christmas with the curia , yet it seems held on till candlemass ) when the commons were joyned to it . he 〈◊〉 thus ; in purtsicatione beatae marlie convocaniur apu● lond●n , proceres angliae ibiq ; tractatu babito dissustere , cum claro , & populo ibi●●m conv●cato , rex 〈◊〉 libertates tam eccles●●e , quam regni , quam forest●● , sicut cartie suae sunt ●● confect●● . now i leave it to your self to judge , whether by these words , tracta● diffusure babi●o cum clero . & populo , &c. ( put after the calling of the proceres , i. e. great lords and tenants in capite ) any thing can be meant but the inferior clergy and commons ; all which being joyned in one body , made up the commune concilium regui : and that this was so , appears by the date of this great charter it self : februaril anno regui nono h. . but that the whole council or parliament , when thus joyned , was likewise called caria regis . i can prove by several examples ; among which see the stat. of m●●on in hen. . beginning thus ; provisum est in curia domini regis henrico , &c. coram will. cant. archi piscopo & episcopis suffragane●s suis , & coram naure parte comitum & baronum auglie ibidem exillentium pro coronatione qu dem regis , pro qu● omnes vocati fuerunt , ita provisum fuit , & c●ncessum 〈◊〉 ● predictis archi●pise . epise . commitibus , baronibus , quam ab ipso rege , & aliis . now who can these alii mean , coming thus after barones , but the commons as now understood ? m. i confess these authorities you have now brought carry some colour of in argument , but if they are lookt into , will signifie little : to begin with your first quotation from matt. pari● , suppose i grant that there was a curia 〈◊〉 more held at westminster , at which there then appear'd at court only a small number of the bishops , lords , and great tenants in capite ; but the king not finding them enough for the great affairs he had then to communicate to them , immediately issued out his royal writs to all the orders of men there mentioned to appear at london on the octave of st. hillary ; but how can you affirm there were any commons then summoned in the sense in which they are now taken , the barons being the lowest order here expresly mentioned : but if you would but have read the words that immediately follow in its place you have now cited , you would easily see that your knights of 〈◊〉 , and burgesses could not then be there ; the words are these , venti i●i●● sancti hi●●arii londoni●s insini●um n●bilium multitulo ; how could these representatives of the commons have been elected and returned in so short a time as between christmass , and eight days after twelfth-ti●● ; so that there could have been scarce three weeks time from the date of the writs presently after chistmass-day ▪ to the meeting of the parliament ; but the truth is , by this infinita nobilium multitudo , who are here said to have come to london , is to be understood the great number of the smaller tenants in capite , who all appeared at this council according to king john's charter : whereas your knights of shires , citizens and burgesses , if they had all come at that time , could not be called infinita nobilium multitudo , as not consisting at this day of persons ; and sure would have been fewer then . but as for your other authorities , if this be true i have now laid down , they will be as easily answered , since by the word populus put before , and distinct from the magnates in the passage you have now quoted from mat. paria ; these smaller tenants in capite are to be understood ; and by magnates the bishops and great lords ; and this also explains the like phrase you now cite from walter of coventry ; where by proceres & populus are to be understood the same orders of men as by magnates & populus in mat. paris ; so that it was with the smaller tenants in capite , and the inferior clergy , with whom the king had this larger or more diffusive treaty , as this author words it . f. i confess you have now put a very fair gloss upon these places i have now made use of ; but 't is an hundred pitties that such a fine hypothesis should have no better proofs than your bare surmises to support it ; for that is all the authority that i can see you bring for your sense of this word populus for the smaller tenants in capite , and not for the rest of the people ; but i see no good authority as yet brought by you to prove it , except that clause in king john's charter , which if as i have lately shewed you , it will beat a quite different interpretation , all that you have said upon that head will signifie nothing ; therefore as for the main argument you raise from the words infinita multitudo nobi●ium in mat. paris , that they could not be the knights of shires , together with the citizens and burgesses , because they could not be such an infinite multitude as this author here mentions to have me ; at london ; as also because of the shortness of the time of the summons : if these are material objections against our opinion , so it will be likewise against yours ; for how could this be a great council according to king john's charter , which expresly provides for forty days summons for the tenants in capite to come to this assembly ; and if so be , this usage was broken at this time upon some urgent occasion in respect of them , it might be so also as to all the rest of the kingdom , for the knights of shires might be chosen at the next country-court , and their names returned immediately before , or together with their meeting at london ; and as to the citizens and burgesses , it was yet more easie for them to be chosen and returned in three weeks time , since every body knows the cities might have called common councils ; and the towns and burroughs by the notice of their proper officers to whom the writs were delivered , might have assembled at their common halls or town-houses , immediately upon the receipt of the writs ; and these , together with the knights , citizens and burgesses joyn with the great lords and tenants in capite , made up the infinita nobilium multitudo , mentioned by mat. paria . but your main objection i confess is behind , how these representatives of the commons here called infinita nobilium multitudo , could be the knights , citizens and burgesses , whose number could not be at that time above persons : as for this , pray consider if the difficulty will not bear as hard upon you ; for if your tenants in capite made such a vaft multitude , all those difficulties will arise that you press me with upon my hypothesis of the meeting of all the chief free-holders or lords of manors in england in parliament , before knights of shires were introduced in the room of them , viz. how it was possible for so great a multitude to debate , vote , or do any business ; and what room or church was able to hold so many , and the like ; so that granting all your smaller tenants in capite ( who had but one knights fee apiece ) to have met there , these might have made a body of or men ; which how they could have been managed any better then or , which would have more then taken in all their feudatary tenants too , i desire you would resolve me if you can ; so that at last upon your own hypothesis , this populus consisting of the tenants in capite were as much commoners as the knights o● shires at this day ; for , as for the word nobilium , i have already proved ( and you must needs here grant it ) that it takes in the inferior nobility or gentry , under the degree of lords , as well as the superior ; and if so , why not all the considerable measu tenants of those tenants ; so that you have hitherto brought no proof but your bare assertion , that under this infinita multitudo nobilium & populus , must be understood only the great lords and tenants in capite , since either this author speaks hyperbolically , or else all the chief gentry of england , of whatsoever tenure ; might have appear'd at this great and extraordinary assembly . so that you are under this dilemma ; either this curia ( which you confess met ex more ) was the great council of the kingdom , or it was not ; if it was not , then there was some other greater council besides that ; but if it was , then it will plainly follow ( though you do all you can to mince the matter ) that this great council of the kingdom or parliament met of course by ancient custom three times in the year without any summons at all from the king ; which if i should have affirmed , you would have called it a common-wealth notion , since nothing can be a greater proof , that this assembly of the whole nation in parliament did not upon your hypothesis immediately depend on the kings writs of summons for their assembling and acting when met . m. well , since you can bring no direct proof that these were any other besides the tenants in capite , who met at this great council , i have still more reason to suppose them to have been so , then you can do for the conorary opinion ; therefore pray give me if you can , some clearer and later proofs for this difference between the two councils . f. i shall comply with your desires , and in order to it , shall conclude with two or three of those very authorities the doctor has given us in his answer to mr. p. where he gives us this passage out of mat. paris , in the ●●th of hen. . ( which plainly proves the tenants in capite not to have been the common university , or sole rep. esentative of the whole kingdom ; ● pray read it : e●●● in anno convenerunt regis summonitione convocati londinum magnates totius regni arci●pis●ori , episcopi , abbates , priores , comites & barones , in quo concilio portis rex o●e proprio in presentia magnatum ( i. e. of all the parties above mentioned ) in refectorio westmonasteriensi axilium sieri pecuniare , cui fuit responsum qu●d super ●oc tractarent ●recedentesque magnates de r●fectorio convenerunt archiepiscopi ●● episcopi , abbates & priores seorsim per se superque hoc diligenter tractaturi , ●and●m requisiti fuerunt ex parte eorum comites & barones , si vellent illis unanimiter con●entire in responsione & previsione super hi● facienda , qui responderunt ( sc●licet comites & barones ) quod sine communi universitate nihil facerent , ture de communi diss●nsu electi fuerunt ex parie cleri , electus cant. &c. now i think here is as manifest a distinction as need to be between the lords and commons , as members of the great council and the common university of the whole kingdom ; for it is obvious that when all the lay lords , earls and barons ( to whom you may also add your tenants in capite if you please ) being met together , were asked by the bishops , abbots and priors then present , whether they would agree with them or not ? the ea●ls and barons answered for themselves , that they would do nothing without the common vniversity , which could not possibly be only the lords spiritual and temporal , and tenants in capite , since it is plain they were now all here , and referred themselves to another distinct order of men , different from themselves ( who were not there present . ) as also from the bishops , abbots and priors , who demanded there . consents to what they had agreed upon . now if the temporal lords and tenants in capite had concurred , here had been the consent of the common vniversity of lords and tenants in capite ; but besides the consent of all these , there was , notwistanding , it seems , required the consent of another body of men , called here the communis vniversitas , by which must be meant the commons , or no body , since otherwise they might have all agreed together without any more ado . m. i confess this story out of mat. paris looks somewhat plausible at the first on your side , but i doubt not if it be better considered , it will do you little service ; for what if by this common vniversity is to be understood the whole body of lesser tenants in capite , who not ●itting with the lords at that time , they would do nothing without their consents , till it was proposes to them ; but that they did afterwards all agree , pray read the rest of this narration , and it will make it clear enough , that this common vniversity of tenants in capite did also agree with the lords , bishops and abbots , the words immediately following in mat. paris , are these ; tunc de communi assensu electi fuerunt ex parte cleri blectus cantuariensis , wintoniensis , lincolniensis , & wigoriensis episcopi ex parte laicorum , richardus comes frater domini reg●● , comes bigod , comes legr . s. de monteforti , & comes mares●ballus ex parte vero baronum richardus de montfi●hes & iohannes de baliol , & de sancto edmundo , & rameseit abbates ; ut quod isli duodecim provider●nt in communi recitaretur , nec aliqua forma domino regi ostenderetur authoritate duodecim nisi omnium communis assensus interveniret ; from which last passage it appears plain to me , that in this parliament the several orders of men that were the constituent parts of it , were only the bishops , abbots , priors , earls and barons ; and that all these put together were termed the common vniversity , which is more comprehensive then university simply taken ; now if the commons , as at this day represented , had been there , we must have had some mention of them one way or other , as well as of the committees of the other orders which made up the general committee of twelve ; so that it is plain beyond doubt , that the commons were not part of the common vniversity . f. then pray tell me who they were , for the historian tells that when all these bishops , abbots , priors , had now met together with the earls and barons , yet these last ●ell them that without the common university they could do nothing ; which had been nonsense , if , as your doctor supposes , the whole university , or community of the kingdom had been all present . m. i must confess , this is a material objection , but what if to help him out , i should tell you that by the common university here mentioned , is to be understood the body of the inferior tenants in capite under the degree of barons ; and this common university of tenants in capite might not have been present and sat with the earls and barons at that time when the bishops and abbots made this proposal ; therefore the lords might very well answer , that till they had consulted the common universty , or body of tenants in capite , they could do noth●ng ; and though this body of tenants in capite did not then actually sit with the earls and barons , yet doth it not follow , that they made a distinct estate by themselves , different from that of the lords or greater tenants in capite ; for then the arch-bishops , bishops , abbots , &c. ( who are here expresly said to have consulted by themselves , ) must have done so likewise ; therefore though our author is not so particular as he might have been , yet certainly this common university were thereupon consulted , and gave their assents to the choice of this committee of twelve , who were to draw up their answer to the king , for the words are , tunc ex communi assensu electi fuerunt ; which seem to refer to the common university or body of tenants in capite , or else the lords excuse , as well as the election of these persons by the bishops , earls , &c. had been very insignificant . f. this seems to me to be a precarious assertion , and without any due proof , for tho the words are tunc ex communi assensu , yet i very much doubt , whether these words do refer to the common vniversity of the whole kingdom , or not ; for your self confess , that mat. paris is short in this point ; and that it was not so , seems most likely to me by this material circumstance , that not one person of the twelve , but was either a bishop , earl , or great baron . ( for that richard de mon●sichet , and iohn de baliot were so ; sir william dugdale hath proved in his baronage of england ▪ ) whereas , if the university or body of the tenants in capite had joyned in this election , it is not likely , but they would have chosen some of their own body to represent them in this committee , who were not earls or barons : since your self must confess that they then were a great body of men , who were not lords , nor did at this time sit , or act joyntly with the lords , or greater barons in this assembly ; and likewise it farther seems highly probable , that this common vniversity of tenants in capite ( take it in your sense ) did not give any resolution in this matter , since we do not find any mony given in answer to the king's request , but only complaints of , and orders about , redressing of grievances which was in those days often done in a great council of the bishops , lords and tenants in capite . but i shall shew you now by some other records which the dr. himself hath made use of , that there often was a distinct assembly or council of the lords , and tenants in capite different from that of the commons or commonalty of the whole kingdom : the first record is to be found among the patent rolls of the . hen. iii. beginning thus . rex omnibus , &c. cum negotiis nostris arduis , nos & r●gnum nostrum contingentibus , proceres , & fideles regni nostri ad nos london . in quindena paschae proximae praeterita faceremus convocari , & cum de nego●iis supra dictis , & maxime de prosecutione negotii sicili●e diligenter cum iisdem tractaremus , ac ipsi nobis responderum quod si statum regni nostri , per concilium fidelium nostrorum ratificandum duxerimus , & dominus papa conditiones cirea factum siciliae appositas melioraverit , per quod nige●ium illud prosequi poss●mus cum effectu , ipsi diligentiam fideliter apponent erga communitatem regni nostri , quod nobis commune auxilium ad hoc praestetur , &c. the rest i shall not trouble you with , because it is not to our present purpose . but you may here see , that taking the words proceres and fideles in your own sense , the former for the bishops and lords , &c. and the latter for the tenants in capite , who were called to consult about the business of sicily ( which kingdom the king had before too rashly accepted of from the pope . ) yet tho they were all met , they could do nothing but give him advice , and could give him no commune auxilium , i. e. common aids , or subsidies , without the consent of the commonalty of the kingdom . now what can this community signifie but the commons , for your lords and tenants in capite were all met already , and if they alone made up the common vniversity or body of the kingdom ( as you suppose , ) why could they not have immediately granted the king the assistance he desired ( if they had a sufficient power so to do ) without putting him off with a promise , that they would use their endeavour with the community of the kingdom , as a distinct order or body of men : that this aid or subsidy should be given him ; and upon this condition it is , that at the end of this record , the king promises them , that before christmas , he would mend the state of the kingdom , per consilium proborum & fidelium hominum nostrorum , which can mean nothing less than a parliament ; which the next record in the same roll recites , was to meet at oxford after the feast of pen●icost , which record since it not only recites the king's oath , whereby he had bound himself to observe the direction of a committee of ● fideles . i. e. faithful or loyal man , of which were to be chosen out of the kings council , and the other . by the procore● or magnates regni which as i have already proved may take in the commons as well as the lords ; but whether by these word● were meant the lords or commons : the conclusion of this record sufficiently confirms my argument from the precedent record , that the lords and tenants in capite , could not then tax the whole kingdom at their pleasure , without the consent of the commons ; or else to what purpose are these words in the conclusion of this last record : promiserun● etiam nobis comites , & barones memora●i , quod expleris negotiis superius tacti● , bon● fide labora●unt ad hoc quod auxilium nobis commun● praest●●ur à communitate regni nostri in cujus rei , &c. dat . die maeii : and it appears by the date , as also by the entry on the roll , that both these records were perfected at once , and concerning the same business , and further to prove that the parties appointed in the record to be chosen ex part● procerum , were not chosen by the great lords or peers only , may be seen from a patent roll of the same . hen. iii. whereby henry de wengham dean of st. martin le grand , and then keeper of the great seal , and iohn manse● , provost of beverlay , were two of the said commissioners , tho they were neither barons nor tenants in capite ( as i know of ) hue only eminent lawyers , and men of great abilities ( and so meer commoners . ) yet mat. westminster calls these men , proceres , as you may see by this passage , speaking of this whole committee , videntes ergo proceres antedicti viginti quatuor , ad regis & regni regimen 〈◊〉 electi , &c. i shall only now conclude with a french record , which the dr. himself hath also given us at large and which refers to the said committee of . above mentioned ; it begins thus . henry par la grace de dieu roy d' engleterre , &c. a touz ceus , &c. sachiez ce pur le profit de nostre re●ume é a la requeste de nos ●auz homes é prodes homes , é du commun de nostre r●aume , otreyames es vinc quatre homes eus●ent p●●r , perq● tous ce quil ordencirent del estat de nostre reaume fust serm , é stable , the rest being very long , you may read at your leasure , only i shall take notice of the date of this letter , to which the king also put to his seal : the conclusion being thus : coste chose feu feite a lundre landemaigne prochein apros la gaule bau●●l'an de nostre corronement quarente secundo , and tho the dr. ca● make nothing of the words gaule baut , this happened i suppose either from the bad writing of the record , or from the ignorance or mistake of the transcriber ; for it should be gaeule d' aut , that is , the gula of august ; which is a great holy day in the church of rome upon the first of august , ( called also st. petri ad vincula ) in the memory of st. peter's chains , curing of a roman virgin by her kissing them . i shall only observe from this record that the hauz or prodes homes mentioned in this record , being taken in the dr● . own sense , for high and wise men ; that is , the earls and barons , yet the words è du commune that immediately follow them , must needs signifie some body of men , different from the former , or else it had been a notorious piece of nonsense ; since if the former words had taken in all the lords and tenants in capite , that is ( in your sense ) the whole community of the kingdom , to what purpose are these words è du commune , that are immediately subjoyned since the hauz & prodes homes would have served to express all the lords and tenants in capite , whether taken as great or as wise men. m. i confess what you have now said , would carry some , weight with it , were i not very well satisfied , that you impose upon your self , by taking ( as i told you at our last meeting ) these words communitas , le commune , & communalti in a wrong sense ; for the commons as they are now , when indeed these words before the th . of hen. iii. nay the th . of edw. i. ( as the learned dr. shews us in his d . edition against mr. p. ) are always to be understood , either of the whole representative body of the kingdom in general consisting of the bishops , abbots , earls and barons , together with all the tenants in capite , called by mat. paris and other historians communitas baronagii , or else for the community of the tenants in capite alone , stiled communitas regni in our ancient records . and this i think i can prove to you , by undoubted testimonies ; but since you are now upon the proving part , pray shew me that these words i now mentioned , did ever signifie the commons of england in the sense they are now taken before the times we insist on , and i have the more reason to desire this from you ; because it is chiefly from the mistaken application of these words , that the gentlemen of your opinion have imposed their false notions upon the world. f. i shall undertake what you desire ; and i hope if i cannot satisfie you , the fault will not lie in my authorities , but you prejudices against them . in the first place therefore let me mind you , how far you and i agreed at our last meeting , when i granted you that these words now in dispute were very equivocal , and were often taken in different senses , as sometimes you say true , for the whole representative body of the kingdom , sometimes for the community of the barons , and sometimes for the community of the bishops and clergy ; but never as i know of for the community of the bishops , lords and tenants in capite , much less for the body of tenants in capite alone , nor were you then able to prove to me , that these words must necessarily be understood in your sense for the community of the tenants in capite : and tho you should prove them sometime to be taken in that sense , yet would it rather make against , then for your opinion , since they must then signifie a different body of men from your great lords , and consequently as meer commoners as your knights of shires at this day , which is against your first general assertion , that by these words are always understood the community of the baronage only . but to come to my proofs ( which i shall divide in two parts ; ) first i will prove that these words communitas , le commune , and communalty , when coming immediately after comites & barones , or counts and barons or proceres in our old statutes and records , do always signifie the commons in the same sense in which they are now taken : and for proof of this , i will begin with the reign of hen. iii ▪ when these words came first to be generally in use , and so descend to his successors as low as rich. ii. and if i can shew you , that these words ( so put ) always signifie the commons , as well before , as after that time : i think you have reason to be satisfied , that these was never once upon a time such a strange alteration in the constituent parts of our great councils as you supposed , yet none of our ancient historians or statutes should ever take any notice of it , till these modern antiquaries took upon them to disperse these clouds . to begin first with the words le commune , pray remember the patent roll of the th . of henry iii. which i mentioned at our last meeting ▪ viz. the ●or● of the pea●e between this king , the prince his son , and the whole body of the kingdom assembled in parliament ; the title of which is thus . haec est forma pacis à dom. r●ge , & dom. edw. filio suo , praelatis , proceribus omnibus cum communitate ●ota r●gni angliae communiter , & concorditer approbata . now pray what can these words communitate ●ota here signifie , but another body of men distinct from the earls and barons , or else it would be a gross tautology . and pray compare this form of the peace now mentioned , with the writs of summons of the th . of this king ( when your dr. grants the commons were summoned to parliament after the same manner as they are now ) and see if there be any change in the terms ; and for proof of this , we need go no further then the very writ of expences ( for the wages of the knights of shires , which the dr. himself has given us at large in his answer to mr. ● . ) it is the th . of hen. iii. to the sheriff of yorkshire , wherein , after other recitals , it follows thus , cumque communitates comitatuum dictorum vari●s hoc ann● . ●●cerin● prastationes ad defensi n●m regni nostri , &c. he therefore commands the said sheriff , quod danbus militibus qui pro communitate dicti comita●●s praefa●o parliamento interfuerunt , &c. should be paid their reasonable expenses . de communitate comitatus praedicti : for going to , and staying at , and returning from the said parliament , &c. from whence it appears , that the words communitas and communitates in this writ , cannot signifie the community of tenants in capite alone , but the commons of the co●nty in general ; unless you can prove to me that none but tenants in capite had performed these varias praes●a●iones in the writ , and that none but they then contributed to these expences of the knights of shires ; otherwise these words must plainly signifie the commons in general , as they did in the like writ of the th of king edward i. which i shall give you by and by ; but i shall first shew you a few other records of this kings reign , concerning the word la c●mmun● ( which mr. p. has given us ) they are in the patent roll of the st . of this king , wherein he by the council and assent of the king of the romans , & des coun●s , & des barons , & la commune , de la terre , pardons the earl of gloucester and all his company : so likewise in the same roll , the king by the council , and assent of the said counts , & barons , & de la commune de la terre , pardons the city of london , all manner of rancour and ill will. now pray tell me a reason , why should not the word la commune in these acts of pardon , signifie the same thing as the word communitas in the form of the peace ▪ and in the writ of expences of the th now cited : since they come immediately after the counts & barons , and so must needs signifie a body of men , distinct from them ; for there is the same reason , why the words la commune de la terre , should here signifie the comm●ns of the land ; as that the word communitates comitatus should signifie the community or commons of the whole county . m. will you give me leave to answer this question presently , because i confess it is very material , before you proceed farther ? there may ( in my opinion ) very good reasons be given . . why the words communitas & la commune , may signifie the community of the tenants in capite in the form of the peace , and acts of pardon ; and yet signifie the commons of the county in general , in the writ for expences you have now mentioned : as first , because the subject matter is different in the form of the peace , and acts of pardon , from that in the writs of expences ; the one being the communitas regni , and the other communitas comitatus only , called also in the plural number , communitates comitatuum , and then i grant when thus used , it always signifies the commons in general ; and there may be likewise a sufficient reason given , why this great change might have been made in the constituent parts of our great councils , and yet no change of phrases or expressions might be made in our records and statutes , nor any notice taken of it by our historians ; which is , because the first knights of shires , being chosen out of , and by , the tenants in capite only ; the change was imperceivable at first , there being still men of the same order , appearing in parliament , for the whole body of those tenants , the difference being only in the number , viz. two , for a whole county ; whereas before all the chief tenants in capite came in person , and i am the more inclined to be of this opinion , because in this writ of expences of the th . of henry iii. ( which you have now cited ) there is no such clause as is in the following writs of like nature , prout in casu consimili fieri con●uevit , which shews it to have been a new thing for the knights of shires to have their expences allowed them , that being the first time of their meeting in parliament . f. i confess what you say is very plausible , were there any colour of a proof brought by you for it , but i shall shew you further , that your distinction between the communitas regni , and the communitas comitatus signifies nothing , unless you can prove that this communitas regni was not the representative of the communitates comitatuum mentioned in this writ , and did not consist of persons of the same degree or order ; for the writ of summons of th . hen. iii. says no more then that these knights should be de legalioribus & peritioribus militibus comitatus , without limiting them to tenants in capite . but as for your reason , why these great alterations might be made in our great councils or parliaments , without any notice taken of it , it is altogether false and precarious , for you have not yet , nor can , i believe , give me any sufficient authority ( beside the drs. bare assertion ) that ever none , but tenants in capite , were capable of being elected knights of shires , or that none but such tenants by military service were the electors . and i think i have sufficiently confuted the vanity of that assertion at our last meeting , when i shewed you the false interpretations you gave of those statutes of th . of hen. iv. and th . of hen. vi. whereby you would have proved , that there was some alteration thereby made , as to the electors of the knights of shires at the county court : whereas , indeed before those statutes , all persons of whatsoever tenure , and of howsoever small an estate of free-hold , who owed suit and service to the county court , were capable of being electors ; and consequently of chusing whom they pleased as well tenants in capite as others , to be knights of the shire ; and that those who were not such tenants were frequently chosen ; in the reigns of edward the third , and richard the second ; i could bring sufficient proofs , were it worth while to insist upon a thing so certain . but i shall go on to prove that the same words , viz. communitas le commune , or la communalie , were used in many of our statutes and records , to signifie the commons . i come therefore to the reign of edward the first , and i pray , in the first place , remember , what i took notice of at our last meeting concerning the statute of westminster the first , made in the third year of this king , beginning thus in french , per l'assentement des archesques , evesques , abbes , priors , counts , barons & tout la communalty de la terre , illonques summones . now every one knows that communalty is but french , for the latin communitas , as appears by the first writs we have left us ( except that of the th . of henry the third , now mentioned ) de expensis militum , being of the th . of this king directed to the sheriff of somersetshire to levy the expences of the knights for that county ( who had served in the last parliament ) le communitate comitatus praedicti ; i. e. of the commons of the said county in general , the same clause is also in the writs which were then issued for the expences of the citizens and burgesses who served in this parliament ; which were also to be levyed de communitate civitatis vel burgi , which sure must mean the commonalty , or commons of all those cities and burroughs there mentioned , for the record is , eodem modo scribitur majoribus , & ballivis pro burgensibus subscriptis : and which is also more remarkable , these writs contain this clause , that the said knights and burgesses should have their expences allowed , pro veniendo , manendo , & redeundo a parliamento praedicto prout alias in casu consimili sieri consuevit ; which words relating to a former custom , not then newly began ( as this word consuevit in a legal sense still imports ) must needs relate to some time much more ancient than the th . of henry the third ; or the th . of this king , the former of which was but years , and the latter but years before this th . of edw. the first , in which time there were not above thirty parliaments called , if so many . and further , that the word commonalty signified the body of the commons , and not tenants in capite in the reign of this king , appears by the statute or ordinance ( the year is uncertain ) intituled , consuetudines can●iae , which you may see in french in tottles collection ; the title of them is thus , ceux son● les usages les queax la communalty de kent clayment avoir en tenements de gavel-kind . now every body who knows any thing of geval-kind , know also it was generally a socage tenure , there being but little of it held by knights service , and consequently the owners of such lands who were then the greatest part of that county , are here called la communalty de kent . so likewise in the reign of edward the second the same words are used in the same sense ; as in the statute of pardon for the death of pierce gaveston made in the seventh of this king ; which is granted per nous , ( i. e. the king himself ) per archievesques , ev●sques , abbes , priors , counts , barons , & la commonal●● de nostre rolaume illonques assembles . so also in the latin records , as appears by an act of pardon granted in parliament , in the th . year of this king : consentientibus praelatis , & pr●ceribus , & communitate regni . so likewise the statute of york of the same year , writ in french , is recited to have been made per ass●nt des pre●us , counts , barons , & la commune du royalme illonques assemblez . where you see that the latin word communitas , and the french le commune signifie the same order of men . in the reign of edward the third , i can give you these remarkable examples of the same words , in the parliament roll in the first of this king , andrew de ha●iford , a principal citizen of london , was de assensu praelatorum , comitum & totius communitatis regni ▪ pardoned all homicides . the very like words are also used in the same roll in the act of pardon granted to the city of london . i shall trouble you but with one m●re in this kings reign ( but it is so remarkable i cannot omit it ) of the th . of this king and is to be found in the old edition of statutes printed in french ; the title begins thus , ceux sont les choses , queux nostre seigneur le roy , prelats , seigneurs & la commune ount ordaines & establé●s . to conclude with the reign of richard the second , the like expression is found in the parliament roll of th . of richard the second , where the statutes begins thus : pur commune prosit du r●yalm● d' angleterre cient fai●es per nostre seigneur le roy prelats , seigneurs & la commune de le royalme esteantes en cest parliament ; from the titles to which two last statutes , i pray observe that the word le commune , is not only used for the commons in the same sense as it was in the f●rmer kings reigns ; but also that these statutes were made by the joint assents of the king , lords and commons : so likewise in the same roll are recited , concordiae , sive ordinationes factae de communi ass●●su regis procerum , & magnatum , & communitatis regni angliae ; which i give you , to shew that the words communitas & le commune , always signifie the same thing in our statu●es and records , viz. the commons as now understood different from your great lords and tenants ; and if they are to be taken in this sense after the th . of edward the first , i would be glad if you could shew me any sufficient reason , why they should not be so understood a● along before that time , as well as in the th . of henry the third only . m. tho i grant that these words you mention are to be understood for the commons , as now taken in many records and acts of parliament after the th of edward the first ( and therefore you need not to have taken the pa●ns to have gone beyond that time ) yet notwithstanding i think i can prove to you by very good authorities , that the word communitas ( which i grant is the same thing with le commune in french ) tho put after the words , comites & barones , does not signifie the commons of england in general , but the community of the tenant ; in capite alone , or at least the community of all tenants by military service ; and that as low as the reign of edward the third ; but for proof of thi● , i pray peru●e this writ , which the doctor hath given us in his answer to mr. p. rex archiepiscopis , episcopis , abbatibus , priotibus , comitibus , baronibus , militibus , & omnibus ali●s de comitatu cantiae salutem . sciatis qu●d cum p●●mo die junii anno regni nostri decimo octavo , praelati , comites , barones & caeteri magn●tes de regno nostro concorditer p●o se , & pro tota communitate ejusdem regni in pleno parliamento nostro nobis concesse ▪ unt quadraginta solidos de singulis feodis militum in dicto regno in auxilium , ad primogenitam filiam nostram mari●andam , &c. cujus quidem auxilii levationi faciendae pro dictae communitatis aisimento hucusque supersedimus gratio●è , &c. by this record it is clear , that such as p●id scutage , that is forty shi●●ings for a knights fee , were then the tota regni communitas , and no others , and of these the tenants in capite granted , and paid it first for themselves and tenants , and then their tenants in military service , by vertue of the kings precept paid it to them again for so many fees as they held of them , so that this tax being raised wholly upon knights fees , must be granted only by those that held by knights service . but further , that the communalte de royaume , the community of the kingdom , as represented by the tenants in capite , did still so continue as above mention'd , till almost the middle of king edward the third's reign is as clearly proved by this record of that king : rex dilectis & fidelibus ●uis vicecomiti wygorniae ●homae b●tt●ler de upton supe●●abrinam , militi & thomae cassy de wych salutem ; ●●●atis quod cum in pleno parliamento nostro apud westmonasterium ad diem lunae proximo post vestum nativitatis beatae mariae virginis proximo praeteritum tento , praelati , comites , barones & magnates de regno nostro angliae &c. p●o se , & to a communita e eja●dem regni nobis concesse●unt quadraginta solidos de singul●s ●eodi● militum in di●●● regno angliae , &c. so that the whole community of england in this record were military men , such as held knights fees , or parts of knights fees , and such as paid scutage , and they were neither the ordinary freemen , or free-holders , nor the multitude , nor rab●le . f. i pray sir give me leave to answer your arguments from these records as you ●ut them , least i forget what you have said , in the first place as to this record of the th . of edw. i. which relates to a tax given in the th . year of his reign , and recites an aid of s. upon every knights fee through the whole kingdom to have been given by the b●shops , earls , barons and other magnates , or great men of the kingdom in full parliament , for themselves and the whole community thereof to marry the king's daughter ; and which subsidy he had deferred to levy till now , and therefore because this was a tax granted only upon knights fees , that those only who payed this scutage , were then the communitas or whole body of the kingdom , which is no argument at all , since from this we may plainly collect the clean contrary ; for if none had been to pay to this tax but those that held by knights service in capite , then the king would have had no need to have had it granted in parliament ; since by the th . article of king iohn's charter , he might have taxed his tenants in capite for the knighting of his eldest son , and the marriage of his eldest daughter without the assent of the common council of the kingdom , and according to your hypothesis , and the authorities you have brought to prove it , these tenants in capite might also , by the like reason have made their tenants by knights service , have contributed to this tax , which yet you see they could not do without the consent of parliament , and therefore this aid or subsidy being granted in parliament , must needs extend to all the lands in the whole kingdom , as well those that held by knights service , as well as those that did not , for it is not here said as in the writ to the sheriff of sussex , qui de nobis tenent in capite , and then the words pro se , & ●ota communitate regni cannot mean ( as you would have them , ) viz. that the lords and tenants in capite had granted it for themselves and the community of their tenants by military service only , who ( say you ) represented the whole community of the kingdom , for then ( as i have already observed ) this needed not to have been granted in parliament at all ; but at this rate no tenants of those abbeys and monasteries ( which were a great many ) who did not hold in capite , would have payed any thing to this tax , nor yet the kings tenants , who did not hold in capite , but of some castle or honour : nor lastly , any tenants in socage , who were very numerous in kent , as well as in other counties ( as mr. taylour proves in his history of gav●l-k●nd , ) so that if your tenants in capite and other under tenants by military service had been then the community of the whole kingdom . this community had not consisted of above one half , or at most a third part of the kingdom . but in my sense of this word communitas , here will be no difficulty at all , for these magnates mentioned in this record , being taken as ( i have prove● ) they often are , for knights of shires , then these words are thus to be understood ▪ viz. that all the parties mentioned in this record , gave for themselves and the whole community of the kingdom , consisting of all the free holders of england , who all contributed to the marriage of the kings daughter according to their respective estates ; and tho the sense of this word had been otherwise in this place , yet it would not have contradicted my sense of the word communitas , which i do not aver always to signifie the commons , but when it comes immediately after the words comites & barones , as it does not in this record you have now cited . m. but pray tell me how this could be , since the record says expresly , that this aid was to be raised by s. upon every knights fee , which could only extend to tenants by knights service , nor could this word communitas here signifie the commons as now understood ; since the citizens and burgesses are not at all mentioned , who you know do at this day make up the greatest part of the representatives of the commons of england . f. this proceeds from your not knowing , or else not consi●ering the ancient manner of reckoning estates ; and consequently of taxing by knights fees , not only lands held by military , but socage tenure also , as appears by those writs of the th . and th . of hen. iii. as they are still upon the close rolls , being ( both almost the same , word for word , ) which i gave you at our last meeting , yet since you may have forgot them , pray read them again , rex vice-comiti northampton salu●em , praecipimus tibi quod per totam ballivam etiam in singulis bonis villis , & similiter in pleno comitatu tuo clamari fa●ies , quod omnes illi de comitatu tuo , qui tenent feodum militis integrum , vel etiam minus , quam feodum integrum dum tamen de tenemento suo tam militari quam socagio possint sistentari , & milites non sunt , si●ut tenementa sus diligunt citra festum omnium sanctorum , anno. regni nostr . xxv . arma capiant & se milites ●i●ri faciant . where you may note , that all men who held the value of a knights fee , either by military or socage tenure were liable to be made knights , provided they could maintain themselves of their estates ; which could never have been , had not the custom of reckoning and taxing estates of all sorts , as well by knights service as otherwise , according to the value of so many knights fees ( that is , at ● per an. ) been then commonly used : but as for your next objection , that the citizens and burgesses are not mentioned in this record , and so could not be comprehended under the words communitas regni , this proves no more then that which will easily be granted you , that this word communitas used in your record , is there to be understood restrictively , and according to the subject matter , viz. the community of free-holders , or land-holders of the whose kingdom only ; since this tax being wholly upon lands , the commons of cities and burroughs then called communitates civitatum , & bu●gorum , whose estates lay in money or goods , could not be taxed by knights fees ; nor do i doubt but that if we had the records of that parliament of the th . of edw. i. now left us ( which are lost ) it would appear , that they also contributed to this tax according to their estates as they did in the th year of this king to make the king 's eldest son a knight : as for your record of the th . of edw. iii. it is but the same in effect with this of the th . of edw. i. and the same answer will serve for both , only i cannot but observe , that whereas you have often asserted that this word communitas , did only signifie the community of tenants in capite , now you fall a peg lower , and it must at last take in the whole community of tenants by knights service , whether in capite or not . m. well then you g●ant that this word communitas does not always signifie all the commons of england as you supposed ; but farther , that it must mean the community of the tenants in military service only : p●ay see this very record of the th . of edw. i. which mr. p. has given us at large in his appendix , which being long , i sha●l t●ouble you with no more then what makes to our present purpose , viz. that the king in●ending to make his son , prince edward a k●ight , summoned the arch-bishops , bishops , abbots , priors , earls , barons and other great men of the whole kingdom to appoint what aid they would grant the king towards it ; and then it follows thus , that the prelates , earls , barons and others , as also the knights of shires being mer , treating together with deliberation upon this matter , consi●ering that an aid was due to make his son a knight , besides the burthen that lay upon they king , by reason of the scotch war , at lengh they unanimously domino regni conc●ss●runt , p●o s● & ●●tâ communitate r●gni ●ricesimam partem omnium bun●●um suorum ●●mporalium mobilium , for making his son a knight , and toward his expences of his war in scotland . a●d then the cives & ●u genses civit ●●um , ac burgorum , ●c caeteri de domini●s r●gis congregati , treating about the premises , and considering the burthens lying upon the king ( not mentioning any aid for making his ●on knight , as not holding of the king by knights-fee , o● ser●ice , and ther●fore none of the community of the kingdom , nor li●ble to it ) d●mino r●g● un in●mit●● ob cau●as supra dictas conc●sserunt vic. sim●m pariem bono 〈…〉 mobilium . here the p●elates , earls , barons , and great men , with the knights of shires , consulted together , and gave for themselves , and the community of the kingdom , a thirtieth part of their goods , and the citizens , burgesses and tena●ts of the king's demeas●s ( which we●e likewise none of the community of the kingdom ) gave a twentieth part ; for if they had been of the community , they had ●aid a thirtieth part as well as the rest ; and therefore 〈◊〉 most certain that even at this time , viz. the th . of edw. i. they we●e not taken to be part of the community of the kingdom , and that the tenant in c●pite , serjeanty , or at least the military men , and tenants in military se●vice were only such . f. as to this last record you have cited , i need give you no other answer to it , than a like writ of the th . of this king , which the ●●ctor himself hath also given us in his ●l●ssa●y ; which i shall here read you at large , together with his learned comment upon it ; it is for the collecting of this twentieth and thirtieth part granted in the thirty fourth you have now mentioned ▪ t●e writ runs this , militibus , libe●is hominibus , & ●oti communitati comitatus middlesex tum in●ra liberta●●s , quam ●xtra s●lutem : cum archi●pi●co●i , epis●●pi , abbates , priores , comites , bar●nes , milites , lab●ri homines , ac communit●t●s , co●itatuum , regni nostri tricesim●m ●m ●um bo●orum suorum t●mpor●lium m●bilium , civ●sque & burgen●●s , ac communita●●s omnium civit●●●m & burgorum ejusd●m reg●i , 〈◊〉 tenentes de d●minion nos●●is vicesim●m bonorum suorum mobilium , curi●liter concess●runt , & gratantur , &c. and least we should happen to mistake the meaning of these words , th● doctor himself has furnish'd us with this learned comment upon them as follows in the same place . it is said in this record that the archbishops , bishops , earls , barons , abbots , priors , kn●ghts and freemen , and communities of counties , gave a thirtieth part of their goods , as if they had been all members , and sat in this parliament : and so it is said of the cities and burghs , that the citizens , burgesses and the communities of the cities and burghs gave a twentieth part of their moveables , as if they had been all there . but these words signifie no more , than that the knights and freemen gave by their representatives , and that the communities of counties , and the citizens and burgesses ▪ and communities of cities and burghs gave by their representatives , as is most clear from the writ of expences for the knights of lincoln-shire , and so consequently for the rest . now i desire you would tell me whether there can be a plainer record against the doctors opinion than this ; for in the first place who were these knights , freemen and commons who granted this th . and th . part of their moveables in the th . year of this king ; but the knights , citizens and burgesses , the lawful representatives of the whole kingdom in general , as well those who held in capite , or else by inferior military service , as those that held by any other tenure ; or who were these representatives , but men chosen out of all so●ts , a● well those that held by knights service , as those that did not ; unless you can prove ( as you have not done hitherto ) that all the cities and buroughs in england held of the king in capite ; and that none but tenants in capite , or military service at least , were chosen either for counties or cities , and though i find your doctor has an utter aversion to the word commons , and the●efore will needs translate the word communitates , by communities , and not commons , yet if you were to render those words , the commons of the coun●ies , cities and buroughs , into our law-latin : i desire to know what other words you could make use of but these in this record , viz. communita●es 〈◊〉 , civi●atum & burg●rum ? so that to conclude , if in the ▪ and th . of edward the first ▪ a●l the commons gave by the same repres●ntat●ves as they do now , i can see no reason why they might not do so too , thirty or forty years before that time ; and pray take notice also that here the tenants in ancient deme●n gave likewise by themselves ; and could not be charged by the knights of shires . and therefore as mr. l●mbard in his arche●on very well observes , this prescription of not being chargeable with the rest of the county must be very ancient , si●ce the●e was no land at that time reckon'd as ancient demesne , which had not belonged to the ●rown before the making of dooms-day book . m. i must confess what you have now said concerning the constant use of the words communit●s , and 〈◊〉 c●mmune ( coming after comi●es and barones ) to express the commons in parliament in our statutes and records , would we●gh much with me had i not good reason to believe there were no such thing as commons in parliament in the sense now taken before the th . of henry the third ; and from which time i suppose it was discontinued ●till the th . of edward the first ; for which , i can give you very good proofs , when it comes to my turn ; but in the mean time pray shew me by any record , or statute , that there were any knights , citizens and burgesses summoned to parliament till the times i allow ; for in the first place , you cannot shew me any mention of commons in the plural number ; in any old statute before edward the first 's time , and as for the words communitas and le commune , which i grant were of●en used to express the commons after that time , your self own they are equivocal ; and therefore when put after the earls and barons in the instances you have given , may signifie the community of the smaller tenants in capite , which were the only representatives of the commons that appeared in parliament in those days ; and i am the more incline● to be of this opinion , because i have searched the old statutes very exactly ; and cannot find any mention of the word commons in the plural ▪ much less of knights , citizens , or burgesses , till the statute of th . of edward the first , 〈◊〉 tallagio n●n conced●●do ( made in the th . of edward the first ) wherein i grant they are expressly mentioned ; and as for writs of summons you can produce none till the d. of this king , to summon them to parliament ; though i shall shew one by and by that the doctor has found out of the th . of edward the first , whereby he proves they were then summoned after about twenty-six years discontinuance ; therefore pray shew me if you can by any sufficient proof that they were there in henry the third's reign except once , or in edward the st's till the th . f. i confess your doctor has not only ex●eeded all other men but himself too in this rare discovery , for whereas in his first edition of his answer to mr. pety●'s book , he was content to follow sir william dugdale , and make the commons to have been first summoned to parliament in the th . of henry the third , and to have commenced by m●●ford's rebellion , and so to have still continued on ; now the doctor upon second thoughts , in ●is edition in folio , will have them never to be summoned any more than that once , because forsooth he cannot find them mentioned in such express words as that he cannot evade them , by saying the sense is equivocal ; and if the commons not being expressly mentioned in our statutes were a sufficient reason to prove them not to have been there ; were the writs of summons lost as well after as they are before the ● of edward the first , you might as well have faced us down , that there were none in all that time till the statute de tallagio non concedendo , you now mentioned . and for proof of this pray see the statute called articuli super char●●s , made in the th . of this king , which is said to be made and granted by the king at the request of the prelates , earls and barons , who are only mentioned in this statute , and yet certainly the commons were then at this parliament , as appears by the writs of summons and expences i but now mentioned , and sure their assents were given to it , as well as the bishops and lords , i could shew you the like in many other statutes of this king , nor are the words communit●s , or commonalty , ever mentioned above twice in all the statutes of this king's reign , viz. in that of westminster the first , and that against bearing of arms ; neither is the word commons to be found above once or twice in all the statutes of edward the second ; in the statutes made at lincoln , in the th . of this king , 't is said to be done by the king , the counts , barons and other grands of the kingdom ; now if these general words did comprehend the commons in those times , you grant they were constantly summoned to parliament , i desire you would give me any good reason why the same words may not as well comprehend them long before ? and if the bare omission of the distinct orders or states of men that gave their assents to the making of any statute , and the different penning of acts of parliament were a sufficient reason to prove they had no hand in it ; i doubt two parts in three of the old statutes of henry the third , and edward the first , would have been made without the consents either of the bishops or lords ; since in most of them there is no mention made of either ; and that what i say is true , pray at your leisure peruse these statutes following , viz. de distriction● , scacarti of the of henry the third , with other statutes made in the latter end of that king's reign , as also that of acto● burnel made in the th . of edward i. that of winchester made in the th . of this king ; that of merchants in the same year ; as also those of circumspecte agatis , and quo warranto , and see if you can find any mention either of the lords or commons in them . but to come to direct proofs , tho i grant the words knights , citizens and burgesses was not expressly mentioned in our old statutes ; yet i shall prove to you by other words of a much more comprehensive signification , that they appeared in parliament in the very beginning of henry the third's reign ▪ for this we need go no farther than the old manuscripts , as well as printed copies of magna charta ; which was first granted in the second year , and again confirmed in the th . of henry the third , both which conclude thus , pro hac autem donatione & concessione , archiepiscopi , episcopi , abbates , priores , comites , barones , milites , libere tenentes & omnes de regno nostro ded●iun● quint●m decimam pa●tem omnium mobilium suorum . now can any thing be more express than this clause , viz. that the archbishops , bishops , abbots , priors , earls , barons , for themselves and the inferior orders , viz. the knights and freeholders , and all others of the kingdom by their lawful representatives , gave this th . of their moveables , at both those parliaments , in which this charter was first made , and afterwards confirmed . m. i confess this authority looks very plausible at first , but if it be strictly looked into ; i believe it will prove nothing at all : for as to your interpretation of these words , i do not allow it for reasons i shall shew you by and by ; but in the first place give me leave to dispute the antiquity of this charter , which i do not take to be so ancient as you make it , for tho i grant there was such a charter made in the d . and again confirmed in the th . of hen. iii. yet you have already had my thoughts of this charter which you suppose to be henry the thirds , viz. that this which we now have is not properly his , but his son edw. i. since it concludes this : his testibus bonifacio-cantuari●n●is archi●pi●copo , e. londinensi episcopo , &c. anno. regni-nostri ( scil. henrici . ) nono ; whereas this bonifac here mentioned , was not arch-bishop of canterbury before the . hen. iii. nor was there any one whose name began with e. bishop of london , during the time that boniface held the see of cant●rbu●y . f. i am very glad you have made these objections against the validity of this charter ; for if i can prove to you , that what you have now urged from your friend the dr. is a meer evasion against the charter it self , i think you have reason to be my convert . in the first place , pray give me leave to confirm the vali●ity of the charter it self ; i therefore freely grant that the original of this charter is not to be found among the statute rolls in the t●ner , where there is nothing left of it on record , except this confirmation of it by a charter of impeximus of edw. i. ( the conclusion of which is as you have now given ) and i think there cannot be a greater p●oof of the careless keeping or voluntary im●ezlement of the ancient statutes and records of the kingdom , than the loss of this great charter , which certainly must have been inrolled at the time when it was made , as well as every common grant made by the king to ordinary persons of markets and pairs , since we find copies of it still ex●ant in the ancient annals of divers monasteries , where they were formerly kept ▪ as in particular in the annals of the abby of barton , published in the first volum of ancient english writers , lately printed at oxford , which fully answers your objection , for instead of boniface it is there witnessed by s. archibis . cant. i. e. stephen langton who was then arch-bishop of canterbury , near years before boniface ; there is also an &c. after the name of this arch-bishop : and the same charter is likewise recited , word for word with the former , and hath the same conclusion concerning the granting of this th . by all the parties above mentioned in the chronicle of walter hemingford published by the learned dr. g●●e in his d . volum of english historians , only it hath no , witnesses names at the end but the king himself te●●e meipso , and farther both agree in all things material , with four ancient manuscript copies of this charter of the d . of hen. iii. when he was in minority , one of which is in the cuttonian library ; a d . was lately in possession of sam baldwin serjeant at law ; a third is in the hands of iohn cooke esq chief prothonotary of the court of common-pleas , and a th . is at this present with mr. peryt of the inner-temple , which i my self have seen . but to put this out of all doubt , there is still extant a fair original of this charter of confirmation of the th . of hen. iii. ( when he was of full age ) under the great seal of this king ( which is supposed to have belonged to b●●●ail abby ) and is now to be seen in the hands of sir nathaniel powel benches of the inner-temple , who is so civil as to communicate it to all , who have the curiosity to see so great a rarity , so that tho it is not to be denyed , but that the charter published by sir edward coke in his d . institutes , is properly the charter of confirmation of edw. i. since boniface was at that time arch-bishop of canterbury , and ●ulk bishop of london ( e. being by ●●stake put for f. yet i think no man has any cause to doubt whether that clause we dispute about be not in all the copies of this charter , as well as in this of edward i. m. well , admitting this charter to be as ancient as you please , yet let me tell you ▪ if your sense be , that the words at the end of this charter , viz. omnes . de r●gon , those who gave , or granted this subsi●y , were members of that parliament ; if you wi●● understand it so , and according to the literal meaning of the words then om●es de r●gn● , as well those th●t had estates in land , as those that had not , all c●py holders , all tradesmen , all bondmen and villains ( of which there were great store in those days ) and all servants were members of parliament . and so then i would willingly understand where ●ll these people should meet , how their council shoul● be managed , and how it is possible in such meetings ( i any such there can be ) to prevent the greatest confusion imaginable . the meaning then of the words , must be , that the arch-bishops , bishops , abbot , ●ar● , barons , knights , free-tenants , and all of the kingdom , or all the king's su●jects dederunt , that is paid a fifteenth part of their moveables to the king , for his granting these charters , not that they themselve● gave , or granted this subsi●y ; and 't is reasonable to conclude , that all the king's subj●cts paid the fifteenth part ▪ because one way or other , little or much they enjoyed the benefit of them . i take this to be the ge●uine sense of the words , but mat. paris , whom you now quoted , makes it very apparent , who were the constituent ●orts of this parliament , for if you please to observe , the men to whom the chief justice proposed this fifteenth , and those who consulted about the king's demands , and those that returned an answer to them ; and also granted the fifteenth part of the movables , as well of the ecclesiasticks , as lai●s o● the whole kingdom , were only the arch-bishops , bishops , earls , barons , abbots , priors ; and therefore they were the only constituent parts of this parliament , as they were also of the parliament , or great council held at mer●on in the th . year of this king's reign : whither says m●t. paris , consummato cum gaudio nuptiali convivio rex recedens a londoni●s venis merero●●m , ut ibi revocati magnaies unà●um rege de regni negotiis e●ntractarent . f. i think i can as easily answer this small objection against on meaning of these words at the end of this charter . pray do , i affirm that these words are to be taken literally or the contrary ? therefore you do ill to put a sense upon me which i do not allow of , but pray tell who ever was so mad as to believe that these words are to be understood litterally ; or that all those persons who you here give us a bed-roll of , could all appear in parliament , in person , or had all votes at the elections of parliament men ; and yet for all that , this clause is true in a legal , tho not in a litteral sense , that all the freemen of the kingdom granted this th . viz. that the prelates and temporal lords in their proper persons , and all the rest of the kingdom by their respective representatives granted this fifteenth ; i hope it is a good rule in your civil , as well as our common law , that he who gives , or grants any thing by his sufficient proxy or representative is said to perform it by himself ; and in this sense , all the men in the kingdom gave , or granted , a fifteenth for the confirmation of this charter ; and so at this day , it may be said in a legal sense , that all the men of the kingdom do joyn in granting the king a tax by themselves , or their representatives in parliament , tho none but such as are free-holders of ● . a year , can have votes at the election of knights of the shire , nor any but the aldermen of divers cities and towns , and the freemen of corporations , and the scot and lot-men of buroughs , who have any votes at the election of citizens , or burgesses . and that your dr. himself , tho he hath misled you in the sense of this word dederunt , yet can grant this to be a reasonable interpretation of this clause , when he is in a good humour : pray remember his comment upon the record of the th . of edw. i. which i gave you but now ; wherein , after the barones it follows , that milites liberi homines & communitates comitatuum granted a th . part of their moveables , and the communitates civitatum & burgorum a th . whereupon he tells you these words are so expressed as if they had been all there in person ; but these words signifie no more , then that the knights and freemen gave by their representatives and that the communities of counties , and these citizens and burroughs gave by their representatives . and why these milites liberi homines & omnes de regno might not do it as well in the same sense ? when this charter was granted and confirmed , i should be glad if you could give me a sufficient reason , so that i shall refer it to your own ingenuity , to consider when the charter says expresly , that all the persons therein mentioned , gave a fifteenth , whether it be not a manifest wresting of the grammatical signification of this word , dederunt to render it they pay'd ; for at this rate a man may make words signifie just what he pleases . but our ancient english historians are the best judges in this case , for the ancient annals of waverly-abby published in the same volume i last mentioned , under the year . having given us a short account of the granting th●se charters , hen. iii. recite the conclusion of the great charter in the same words as they are in the charter it self , only before dederunt there is also added the word concesserunt , which shews that the author of this part of those annals , who might very well write at the same time , or presently after the charter was granted , by his paraphrase of concesserunt , seemed to intend to prevent any such mistake in the the signification of the word dederunt . and that this was the constant opinion of all historians and antiquaries to this day ; i will shew you from henry de knighton , who lived within years after this charter was granted , in his history hath this passage in this yera , viz. . of hen. iii. post haec rex henricus concessit magnatibus terrae duas chartos unam de foresta , & aliam de libertatibus ob quam causam communes regni concesserunt . partem mobilium , & in mobilium : from whence it appears plainly that at the time when this author writ , it was generally believed that the commons ( called milites & libri tenentes in this charter granted this th . of all their goods . i shall conclude with a modern authority of a person , who you will own to be a man of great judgment and learning , viz. sir henry spelman , who in his discourse of magna charta , inserted in his glossary , hath this remarkable passage , demum anno. . regis henrici concedente clero , & populo cum magnatibus q●intodeceimam partem omnium rerummobilium totius regni angliae ; renovantur chartae lib rtatum , prout sub rege iohanne prius erunt conditae , where it is plain , that by populus he meant the commons as distinct from the lords and clergy . as for what you say further , whereby you would set up the authority of mat. paris against the express ●ords of the charter it self : i suppose you or the dr. from whom you borrowed this n●tion , are the first who interpret ancient statutes and records , according to the general words of historians : whereas i always thought till now , that the sense of historians ought to have been understood by records , and not vice versa , since the former differ one from another in their manner of expression of the constituent parts of our great councils or parliaments , and for brevity sake , express themselves in as few words as they can . but notwithstanding the conciseness of those expressions which we find in mat. paris , and other ancient authors ; yet i think even in this place now cited , there are words enough to prove there were other lay persons at this council , besides earls and barons there mentioned , or else , what is the meaning of these words aliis u●iversis immediately after baronibus , to whom hubert de ●urgh proposed the kings demands , and who also gave their answer to them ? and if these gentlemen were not barons , as certainly they were not ( or else to what purpose was this distinction made ) then they were meet commoners , and so we find that there were commons in parliament from the authority of mat. paris before the . hen. iii. which is likewise proved by the statute of merto● ( which i have lately cited ) in the conclusion of its preface runs thus , ita provijum fui● , & conc●ssum t●m à predictis archi-piscopis , episcopis comi●ibus , baronibus , quam ab ipso rege , & aliis . now pray tell me who these & alii were if not the commons , for you did not answer this question when i last mentioned this statute . m. i shall tell you my thoughts of these alii by and by , when i come to these words omnes de regno ; but in the mean time , give me leave to give you the drs. interpretation of this word milites put here after barones , which milites were not knights of shires ( as you suppose ) but tenants in capi●e by military service , as appears by the assize or statute of richard the i. quoted by r. hovelen in his history , which is said to have been made , per assensum & consilium archiepiscoporum , & episcoporum , abbarum , c●miutum & baronum , & militum . now these milites were often stiled barons , and the barons , milites . nam miles ( saith sir henry spellma● ) quem baronem vocibant non à militari cingulo ( quo equite crebantur ) sed a militari ●edo quo alias possessor & liberè teneus , num upatus est , nomen sumpsit , that is , such as had lands given them for , or such as held lands by , military service and did homage and fealty to those of whom they held their lands , and in this sense , mat. paris calls all the temporal nobility milites , when in the parliament . of hen. iii. he says a militibus concessum est scutagium illo anno. ad scutum tres marc●t . f. i think your interpretation of the word milites i● forced , and quite contrary to the true meaning of this charter ; now pray shew me the consequence , that because the barons were anciently stiled milites ; that therefore your tenants in capi●e were then stiled barones too ; which is not true , and quite contrary to this charter it self , where these milites ( whoever they were ) are put after the barones , as a distinct order of men from them , whereas if the terms had been then reciprocal the words baron●s , or milites ( chu●e which you please ) would have comprehended both ; but indeed this title of miles was then of a much larger signification , and took in all knights of whatsoever tenancy , whether by military service or socage , as appears by those writs of the th . and th . of henry the third , which i have already cited , whereby those that held estates sufficient to maintain themselves de tenemento , ●o tam militari , quam soc●gi , were a like summoned in to take the order of knighthood , and when knighted were certainly as good milites as the best of your tenants in capit● , and so might very well be reckon'd amongst the milites in this charter : but pray tell me what say you to these following words , liberi tenent●s & omn●s de regno ? m. these likewise bear a like interpretation , for by these libere tenentes , that immediately follow in this cha●ter after milites i suppose were mea●t no other than the lesser tenants in capi●e , who having scanty knights fees , or part of knights fees , desired not knighthood , or had compounded , or fined for it , that they might not be made knights , and who not being actual knights , are here called free tenants or freeholders , as i have already told you at our last meeting . f. pray give me leave to answer this interpretation of the word liberi tenentes , before we proceed farther . you may remember that i have answered all your authorities , whereby you would prove that the tenants in capi●e were at this time the only proper freeholders of the kingdom ; which is false , since i then proved to you from sir henry spelman's glossary , that any freeman having an estate of inheritance , was as much libere tenens , a freeholder as the best tenant in capite in england . indeed if the words had been milites & libere t●n●ntes , qui de rege tenuerunt in capite , you had said somewhat , but otherwise it is all meer supposition , without any ground . but pray go on to the last wo●ds in this charter , & omnes de regno nostro ; what can they mean ●ut that all the freemen of the kingdom gave this fifteenth by their lawful representative . m. if you do not like our sense of these words , milites and libere terentes : i cannot help it , nor shall i dispute them longer with you ; but as for this last clause in the charter , & omnes de regno , it only means , all these who were tenants in capite in general in the same sense , as when our ancient historians mention regnum , & s●cerdotium ; by regnum is to be understood both the temporal and spiritual barons , great and small ; the kings justices , or any other that exercited any share or ministerial part of the government ; as perhaps all those di● one way or other by coming to our great councils or parliaments , &c. all which is evident from the words of the quadri parti●e history , concerning thom●s becket , thus , rex apud clarendun . regnum convo a● universum . quò com venis● ut prasules , & proceres , &c. i. e. the whole baronage called together by the kings writ , or a full meeting of the spiritual and temporal barons , both great and small . i pray also remember that passage you your self made use of but now , out of mat. paris , whereby you would prove that the common council of the whole kingdom was distinct from that of the tenants in capite ; because that after the curia held at christmass , the king immediately issued out his writs , commanding omnibus ad regnum spectantibus , to appear at london ; and yet you see there are no more mentioned to be summoned than the archbishops , bishops , abbots , priors , earls and barons . so that we may hence learn the true meaning of these words , omnes de regno , at the end of this charter ; for these omnes de regno , were the same with the omnes ad regnum spectantes , in mat. paris , the regnum , or government , the communitas regni , the totalis regni universitas , the insluita nobilium multitudo ; and also gives us the meaning of those words omnes alii de regno , in the close roll of the th . henry the third , to the sheriff of somersershie , scias quod comites & barones , & omnes alii de toto regno nostro , &c. concesserunt , &c. which are further explained by a writ in the same roll about the same business , directed to the sheriff of sussex ( which you have likewise cited ) beginning thus , sciatis quod arohiepiscopi , episcopi , abbates , priores , comites , barones & omnes alii de regno nostro angliae , qui de nobis tenent in capire nobis concesserunt , &c. here the omnes alii de regno , were the omnes qui de nobis t●nent in capite ; which were then all the regnum , or communitas regni . so likewise it may be farther proved from a record of the th . of henry the third , rex omnibus , &c. cum venerabiles patres g. e. eborum archiepiscopus , &c. & alii praelati , magnates , milites , libere tenentes & omnes alii de regno nobis nuper in articulo necessitati● servitium fecerunt , & sulisidium , &c. and i may also put you in mind of the writ i cited but now directed , archiepiscopis , episcopis , &c. comitibus , baronibus , militibus & omnibus aliis de comi●aru kanciae , &c. for the levving of forty shillings upon every knights hee in that country . now this writ could not be directed to all the men in kent , but to all such as paid scutage , for not a fortieth part of them were tenants in capite , or military service : so that these omnes alii de regno , and omnes alii comitatus , were the same one with the other , and otherwise it could not be : for by omnes de regno , or omnes alii de regno , the inhabitants in general could not be understood , for they never were summoned , no not the hundredth part of them to meet in great councils ; for 't was impossible they should , and perhaps not above a fourth part of the kingdom paid to this fifteenth , if we consider how many servants , villain● , bondmen , and many such people there were than in the nation that paid nothing . f. you have taken a great deal of pains to perplex and darken words in themselves very clear and perspicuous ; for methinks it is a strange piece of confidence in your doctor , when the charter says expresily , that omnes d● regno ; all the freemen of the kingdom gave this th , to restrain this act only to the tenants in capite , who were but a few in comparison to the whole kingdom ; this is indeed to make words signifie any thing he fancies . but to answer your authorities , which are founded all upon false suppositions , without any proof . as to your authority from the quadrilogus history of thomas b●ecket ; it is true , that the praesules and pr●ceres are there called regnum , the kingdom ; but i have already proved at our last meeting ; that this word proceres was of so comprehensive signification , that it took in all the principal men of the kingdom , as well those that were lords , as those that were not ; so that the chief citizens and magistrates of our cities and great towns , are often stiled proceres & magnates civitatum , in our ancient historians and records , and certainly the great free-holders , or knights of shires did much more justly deserve that title . as for the other passage out of mat. paris , where the bishops , abbots , earls and barons , are called omnes ad regnum spectantes ; this is but a general way of expression in this author , and proves nothing : for either the word barones , takes in all the smaller tenants in capite , or it does not , if the latter , then this author does not exactly recite all the orders of men , whom your self must acknowledge to have appeared there ; since the great barons alone could never make this infinita nobilium multitudo mentioned in this author ; if the former , then it is plain , that he thereby comprehended more then those who were really barons . since it is certain that the smaller tenants in capite were not so , nor are so much as called so in king iohn's charter ; and then make the most of this word barones , it may in a large and common acceptation , take in all the chief free-holders , or lords of mannors , which ( as i have already proved ) were often called barons in our ancient historians , and laws of the first norman kings ; and mr. cambden tells us that under the word baronagium , omnes regni ordines continarentur : this i say , supposing that by this infinita nobilium multitudo , is to be understood , all the cheif gentry , or free-holders of england , called often nobilitas angliae , as i have already made out , and which may also take in the representatives of cities and towns ; but if we should suppose , that by the barones here mentioned , are to be understood only the tenants in capite ; yet , since they , together with the great lords , made the chiefest figure in the government ; it was easie for him to over-flip the particular mention of others , it being enough to comprehend them with the representatives of the rest of the kingdom , under the general phrase of infinita nobilium multitudo , as i have already said , but i always thought that the conciseness of historians , was to be explained by our statutes and records , and not that their express words should be interpreted by the concise phrases and expressions of historians ; and if by omnes de regno are to be understood all the tenants in capite in general ; how could this be without a notorious tautology , since if it be as you say , that the bishops , abbots , earls and barons comprehended all the greater nobility , and the milites & libere tenentes , all the lesser , or tenants in capite , ( who made then the whole kingdom ) if so , what can these words omnes de regno here signifie , but so many idle words without any sense or meaning ? but it will be now more easie to answer your false interpretation of these words , omnes alii de regno , which you will needs have to signifie only the tenants in capite ; and it will be no hard matter to shew you the drs. prevarications on these words ; for as to the first writ directed to the sheriff of somerset-shire , tho i confess these words at the beginning of the writ , are omnes alii de toto regno nostro ; yet the dr. has in his glossary concealed the words that follow , which plainly restrain them , to tenants in capite , and their under tenants by military service ; but if you please but to turn to the writ which he has given us at large in his appendix , numb . . you will find first , that this writ recites , that the earls , barons and omnes alii de regno , had granted the king an aid to two marks on every knights-fee , quae de nobis tenent in capite : secondly , that at the command of the earls , barons and all others that held in capite , the sheriff should distrain omnes milites & libere tenentes qui de eis tenent per s●rvitium militare , who were likewise to pay the king the like summ of two marks for every knights fee , so that you may here plainly see that this could be no general tax granted by the whole kingdom , since none but tenants in capite and their under tenants by knights service were chargeable with it , which , if given with their consents , must have been done in full parliament , and in which they had representatives of their own choosing , and if without their consents , was directly contrary to law. but you need go no farther then this writ you have now cited , to prove that the milites & libere tenentes , were not at this time only tenants in capite , as you suppose but their feudatory tenants also , as appears by the express words of this writ , which orders the sheriff to distrain omnes milites . & libere tenetes qui de ci tenent p●rservitium militare ; but as for the other writ to the sheriff of suss●x , which ( as you say truly ) relates to the former , to the sheriff of somerset-shire ; it sufficiently interprets those general words , omnes alii de r●gno , and expresly restrains them to omnes alii qui de nobis tenent in capite , who in a council of themselves alone , granted this tax for themselves only , as i have already proved , which , whether it was according to law or not , we shall inquire by and by . but in the mean time , give me leave to answer to your next record of the ●th . of hen. iii. which recites an extraordinary service and aid done by the prelati , magnates , lib re tenentes , & omnes alii de regno : now that this was not a service performed , or an aid given by the tenants in capite only for the whole kingdom ; the word subsidium may teach you , which was never granted otherwise , then by the whole kingdom in parliament . but let us first consider the substance of this record , which is indeed but the kings declaration or a right to all his subjects in general , or the freemen of the whole kingdom , that what they had lately performed in articulo nec●ssitatis praedictae non sibi cedat in prajulicium , n●c ad posterum tra●atur in consuerudimen , vel consequentiam nec ad bujus modi servi●ium compellentur ; which being the effect of this record , now see the cause why it was granted , which you may find in another record of the same year , and on the roll , and to which this rcord you cited relates , which is a general summons directed , archiepiscopis , episcopis , abbatibus , comitibus , baronibus , vice-comitibus , militibus , liberis hominibus , & vniversae communitati comitatus lincolniae , commanding them all , even the citizens and townsmen immediately to appear with such arms as are there expressed ( and were proper for each mans estate and condition ) for the common defence of the kingdom , against strangers then ready to invade it , and this record also says , eodem modo scribitur caeteris vice-comitibus angliae . now since it appears by this writ of summons by which this service and aid was performed , that not only the tenants in capite , but all the subjects of the whole kingdom were engaged in the performance of it ; can any body , but one who will take things by halves , suppose that by these omnes alii de regno there mentioned ( and who must certainly be the same parties intended in the drs. own record , viz. all the freemen of the kingdom ) could be meant no more then the lesser tenants in capite , taken altogether , when they had been ( according to our sense ) all particularly named before ? but that by these omnes de regno cannot be here meant only the tenants in capite , but all the freemen of the whole kingdom , i shall prove by another record of the th . of hen. iii. and is the very writ i gave you before , wherein it is recited , that the villani together with the rest of the liberi homines had given a th . of their moveables , in consideration of which , this writ concludes thus , concessimus etiam archiepiscopis , episcopis , abbatibus , prioribus , comitibus , baronibus , & vobis omnibus aliis de regno nostro , quod tam charta nostra , de foresla , quam alia charta nostra de libertatibus , quas eis , & vobis fieri fecimus de caetero in omnibus teneantur ; so that it plainly appears , that by these words in this record omnibus aliis de regno , must be understood all the freemen of the kingdom in general , unless you will allow none to have had any share in these charters , or to have received any benefit by them , but the drs. tenants in capite alone , which sure you will not affirm . but least i tire you as well as my self , in dwelling so long upon things so plain and obvious , were not they by too much industry , rendred obscure , i come at last to the conclusion of your discourse , which is no more then a repetition of what you had said at first ; that because all the kingdom could not be summoned to appear in parliament , and that villains and servants &c. never paid to this tax ; that therefore the words omnes de regno are not to be understood literally ; ( a doughty discovery ) and therefore you have found an expedient to help this contradiction by your tenants in capite , and thy knights , citizens and burgesses for the laity , and by the procuratores cleri for the inferiour clergy ; whose interpretation is most agreeable to truth , i durst leave to any indifferent judge ; for i must needs tell you once again , i cannot see any manner of reason , either from authorities , or from the nature of the thing , that your tenants in capite could be the omnes de regno in a legal sense , and as such did represent all the freemen of estates in the whole kingdom ; therefore if you can prove this , it may go far to convince me , otherwise not . m. since you will not rest satisfied with those authorities i have already produced to prove it ; pray let me discourse with you a little more particularly of the nature of tenures by knights service . i therefore suppose that the dr. hath very well prove by several records , as also the two writs of th . hen. iii. to the sheriffs of somerset and sussex , that the king anciently by his prerogative , and his original power and right , reserved upon knights fee , did tax the military tenants , of his tenants in capite , and their other ordinary free tenants , and by his writs caused them to pay both ●cutage tax and scutage service , and other reasonable aids , as often as necessity required . f. i grant indeed , the matter of fact to have been sometimes as you say , since there is no averring against express records ; but i say likewise , that as for those writs the dr. has given us concerning the kings ordering the sheriffs to distrain the mesne tenants of the tenants in capite for scutage service , as to marry their daughters , or for the finding of men in any warlike expedition , it was no more then those mesne tenants were bound to do by the tenures of their estates ; if they had failed to serve their lords in person , or by sufficient deputies ; and therefore the king might legally grant them scutage upon such tenants , and perhaps might also change their service in person into a pecuniary aid , as appears by some of those writs the dr. has given us ; and this not by his prerogative , but by law ; so likewise , tho your tenants in capite could tax themselves in their distinct council , or else in the common council of the whole kingdom at what rate they pleased , for the knights fees they held of the king ; and tho the king might sometimes undertake by this pretence , to i evy a scutage of two marks on their under-tenants also ; yet does it not appear by either of those records you have now cited , that they gave for more then themselves alone , the words in the writs being only , that they had given the king esse●ax auxilium of two marks upon every knights fee ( as well wards as others ) who held of him in capite , without any mention of their mesne tenants ; so that if the sheriff was afterwards ordered to distrain these mesne tenants also , for two marks for each knights fee they held of their lords ; this was straining a point of prerogative , and was expresly against law ; for at this rate the king might by the l●ke prerogative have taxed all the bishops , abbots , great lords and all other tenants in capite without their consents , as well as their mesne tenants , tho it was contrary to the express words of the charters of king william i. and king iohn , which you your self cited at our former meeting , so that granting the matter of fact to have been practised sometimes as your records make out , this is no proof that this was a constant law , or settled custom , much less that the king had a right so to do . m. i do not doubt , but that i can prove to you , that what this king then did in charging these mesne tenants was according to his ancient prerogative , and what himself and his predecessors had frequently done both before and after the clause in king iohn's charter of nullum scut●gium , vel auxilium ponam in regno meo , & ● . was granted , nay after it was granted hen. . and edw. . taxed their demeasns through england , tho not the whole kingdom by the advice of their privy council until the statute de tallagio non concedendo was made in e●w . . and both rich. . and k. iohn had taxed the whole kingdom without common assent before the grant of magna charta ; as also in the reign of rich. . as you may find in hoveden , who lived at that time , the passage is long , and therefore i shall only give you the beginning of it , viz. that this king anno ( regno . ) accepit de unaquaque carucata terrae totius angliae v. solidos de auxilio , &c. and then goes on to shew us the manner how it was raised and collected ; and 't is observable , that he uses these words auxilium and tallagium for the same tax , so we find in mat. paris , that king iohn took a seventh part of all moveables without common assent , and another time a thirtieth , the great men and clergy grumbling at it . k. hen. . also taxed all his demeasn in the d year of his reign , as appears by a writ in the close roll of this year , whereby he also commands the sheriff of bu●ks that he make philip basse● a rati●nabil● tallagium de hominibus suis de eo tenentilus in mannerio de wycumb , quod aliquando suit dominicum praedec●ssorum r●gis , &c. in the th . year this king ( as the doctor shews us at large by a reco●d in the keeping of the remembrancer of the exchequer ) he taxed all his demeasn ; and among the rest the city of london at marks ; which tho with some contest mentioned in this record , they were at last forced to pay ; because it was found upon record that this king and his father had several times ●alliated or taxed the sai● city in like manner , at the sums therein mentioned ; so that at last the mayor and citizens were fain to acknowledg themselves th●s talliable by the king. so in the . year of his reign he taxed all his demeasn lands beyond tren● by his escheators ; and this right was acknowledged by all the bishops , earls and barons in the d year of edw. i. as app●a●s by their petition to him in parliament , in these words , al p●ti●ionem arc●iepiscoporum , episporum , praelatorum , comitum & baronum & aliorum proborum hominum de terra p●tentium quod rex concedere veli . quod ipsi p●ssunt ta●●i●re antiqua dominica , unde sunt in tenantia , ●icut r●x dominica sua taliavit ; it● respon●um est , fiat ut petitur . from all which you may plain see that the kings of england had anciently a prerogative of laying taxes not only upon their own tenants and their mesne tenants who held under them , but upon the whole kingdom too ; and it their successors have acted otherwise it has proceeded from their meet grace and favour who have tyed up their owne hands from exercising this prerogative . f. i confess you have muster'd up a great many authorities ; but for what end i know not unless it be to prove that some former kings stretcht their prerogative to act directly against law , and their own charters to the contrary ; and to justifie them in it when they have do●e , as if all things were done according to their lawful prerogative , because they did it ; if this be law or reason either much good may do you with it ; for at this rate the king notwithstanding all laws made and sworn by him to the contrary may take what he pleases out of our estates without our consents , because his predecessors broke the laws and their coronation oath into the bargain ; but you might have remembred that a de f●cto ad jus non datur consequentia ; but i doubt the precedents you have now brought , will not come up to the proof of the assertion you have laid down ; for it is plain as well from king iohn's charter , as by that passage in bracton , i but now cited , whereby it appears that extraordinary taxes such as hidage , corage , and carvage , & alia ( under which i suppose was included your scutage-tax also ) could not be imposed without the consent of the common council of the whole kingdom ; when the king met his people in parliament ; if then this were law whatever k. iohn o● henry the third , or any other king acted contrary to this rule , was illegal , and produced among other mischiefs the general revolt of all the baronage , i. e. as well the inferior as superior nobility of the whole kingdom , till such time as our kings , finding they could do no good by force , were fain at last to content themselves with the legal prerogatives of the crown , and by new laws and fresh declarations of the ancient law to declare it unlawful for them to impose any taxes upon their subjects without their consents in parliament . but let me tell you that by thus setting up the kings illegal prerogative of taxing the mesne tenants of their tenants in capite , you quit the question ; for i asked you by what right the tenants in capite ( whom you suppose ) could grant by this great charter a fifteenth of the moveables of the whole kingdom as well of those who did not hold of them by military service , as of those that did , nay of those who never held of them at all ; and you then fly presently to i know not what unknown royal prerogative of taxing the mesne tenants of the tenants in capite at pleasure ; which was either according to law , or it was not , if the former , i have already proved he could not do it by law at all ; but if against law , there was the like reason why he should have had the like prerogative over his tenants in capite too ; even over the very bishops , abbots and temporal lords ; and then i desire to know whether the great council of the kingdom had not been long since destroyed and given up . but to examine your authorities , it is true , hoveden says of richard the first , that accepit de unaquaque hida terrae v. solidos , yet does it not therefore follow , that he took this tax without consent of his great council , it was the ordinary phrase of writers in those times to say , rex accepit , i. e. received such a tax , when indeed he took nothing but what was given him by his parliament . and therefore tho we find this tax not mentioned in any other writer , but only hoveden , and so cannot give you an express proof that this tax was granted in a great council , yet it is most likely ( nay certain it was ) for the word accepit does not in its own nature import any violent or illegal exaction ▪ and therefore considering the nature of the thing , it is greater reason to suppose that this aid was granted by consent ; since this same author tells us in the relation of this affair , that this money was received by the hands of two lawful knights of each hundred , and that they did answer this money to the exchequer , coram episcopis , abbatibus & baronibus ad hoc assignatis , who would never have undertaken it , had not this tax been granted by the common council of the kingdom ; but that this king could not tax the whole kingdom at his pleasure may appear by a relation out of this very author : in the very same year , but a little before , viz. that when the king demanded by hubert archbishop of canterbury , that homines angliae the men of england should find him milites , i. e. knights to stay one whole year in his service , or else would give him so much money as that he might therewith maintain those knights in constant pay , viz. to every knight three shillings of english money wages a day , and that to grant this , all the rest were willing , as not daring to resist the king's will , only hugh bishop of lincoln as a true servant of god abstaining from all evil answered , that he would by no means agree to the kings desire , because it would redound to the detriment of his church , &c. and so it seems the business fell and came to nothing . now it is plain that this request must have been made in the great council of the kingdom ; or at least in that of the tenants in capite , and if he could not charge his subjects with the keeping but of horsemen for one year without their assents can any body believe that he should presently after extort a much greater sum , viz. five shillings out of every plow-land in england . but as for all your precedants for king iohn's reign , he was such a notorious tyrant and breaker of his coronacion oath , and common faith both to god and man , that i hoped that neither your self nor any good english man would have fetcht precedents for prerogative , from so pros●igate a reign as his , and in which i grant there were more than once illegal exactions of this nature , which yet are branded by those very historians that relate them for great oppressions and unjust exactions ; as particularly in this first instance of out of mat. paris of k. iohn's taking away by force the seventh of the moveable goods of the whole kingdom ; which is by this author called by no better than rapinam , rapine or robbery . the same i may say to the like exactions of his son h●n . the third , which are branded by all writers as horrible and illegal oppression● , nay are owned to be so by this kings frequent confirmations of magna charta , and acknowledgments of his breach of them , and promised to observe them better for the future ; but i am sorry to find your doctor , whom you follow , both in his answers to mr. p. and mr. a. as also in his compleat history still to cite the most violent and illegal actions , nay the very perjuries for ●lowers of the crown , and royal prerogatives . but as for the authorities you urge for this kings talliating his demesnes without consent of parliament , you your self grant that this talliage was not general upon the whole kingdom ; and if so , could only concern his own tenants in ancient demesn , and none else ; who were always exempted from being taxed with the rest of the nation ▪ because they were lyable to yield the king a reasonable talliage ratione tenurae whensoever he needed it ; yet this was counted rather a priviledge than otherwise , since they were not only free from all other burthens and parliamentary attendance , but were also taxed much less than the rest of the nation in regard of their tilling the kings lands ; but when this reasonable prerogative grew to be abused , and the exactions levyed upon them became intollerable , then they would no longer suffer it ; but got it taken away by the statute de tallagio non concedendo ; after which we find the tenants in ancient demesne frequently giving their shares of aides and subsidies in parliament by delegates of their own , as in the record of the th . of edward the first , which you have now cited ; till at last they came to be resolved into the common body of the kingdom , but a● for the city of london ▪ it was never taken for part of the kings demeans , and so is not to be found in dooms day book , but as appears by record held of the king in capite , and therefore could be no otherwise taxed then as the rest of the tenants in capite , that is , by the common council of the kingdom . and this made the londoners deny to be otherwise talliated , as appears by this record of henry the third , which you have now cited . but the truth is they had this exaction first laid upon them in the exorbitant reign of king iohn ; and this was afterwards trumped again upon them in all the ill part of his sons government , because his father had done it before ; and i doubt not but if ship-mony had passed unquestioned , and been as often paid in the reign of k. charles the first , but that it would have been urged as a precedent in the reign of charles the second . but as for your last authority of the d. of edward the first , pray take notice , that it is before the statute de tallagio non concedendo , and extends only to such estates in ancient demesn as were held of the king by noblemen or gentlemen , either by gift , or purchase ; and which , for all that still kept the ancient custom of being talliated by the king , as their under tenants were by them , to enable the lords to pay the kings talliage ; and in this sense i understand these words in this record , unde sunt in tenantia ; i. e. of which they are in tenancy to the king. nor does the record call them dominica sua , as it does the kings demesns that follow ; so that this could not be a tax upon all under tenants by knights service as you suppose : sin●e their estates were never called antiqua dominica , and therefore i think after all , you cannot shew me any legal precedent that our kings claimed a right under colour of their prerogative of taxing the whole nation de alto & ●●sso , at their pleasure . m. i shall not now dispute it longer with you whether the kings of england had not anciently a power of taxing the lands held of them , without the consent of their great council ; but thus much i think i may safely aver that when this great charter was made the tenants in capite as the common council of the kingdom gave taxes and made laws not only for themselves but their mesne tenants , and the whole nation also . nor was this at all unreasonable , that those who thus held estates by mesne tenure under the tenants in capite , should be bound by the acts of those of whom they held them ; since we see in scotland that at this day none sit there , either as commissioners of shires , or burgesses for the royal buroughs , but such as hold in capite of the king ; for anciently before the law for excusing the smaller barons and free tenants in capite , and sending commissioners of shires in their stead , was introduced by a statu●e made in the seventh parliament of k. iam. . a. dom. , it consisted all of tenants in capite , viz. of the bishops , abbots , priors , earls , barons ; & libere tenentibus qui de r●ge t●nent in capite ; as appears by the very words in the latine titles to divers of those statutes , as you may find them in slenes collection of scotch laws . now if this law did anciently , and does still prevail in scotland , that the tenants in capite should be the sole representatives of that whole kingdom ; i cannot see any reason why it might not have been so anciently in engl●nd also , especially since i can give you so good reasons to back this opinion . m. i will answer your argument from scotland by and by ; but in the mean time give me leave to tell you why i think it could never have been the custom in england ; and that for two reasons , first because it was against reason ; and ly , because it was against the known law of the kingdom ▪ that it was against reason , is apparent ; since what reason was there that if a man in those times purchased an estate for a valuable consideration of a lord , or any other tenant in capite ( as certainly thousands did ) to be held either by knights service , or in socage that such a tenant should lye at the mercy of his lord , to dispose of his estate in taxes , and make laws for him at his pleasure ; however exorbitant those taxes were , or inconvenient those laws might prove , the lord being no representative of his own choice ▪ or appointment . in the next place , that this was contrary to the received law and custom of the kingdom in those times , i can prove by two very sufficient authorities , the one of the earl of chester , the other of the bishop of durham . now it is certain that both this earl and bishop hel● their county palatines in capite immediately of the king , nor had those counties any representatives in parliament , till long after that they had knights of shires and burgesses , granted them by particular statutes made for that purpose ; now according to your hypothesis , all the freeholders and inhabitants of those county-palatines should have been bound by all acts of parliament , and taxed with the rest of the kingdom as often as there were laws made , and taxes given when their bishop or earl was present , which was not so ; for in the first place as for the county of chester if the earl had been the representative in parliament of his tenants by knights service , or otherwise , as also of all the abbeys , and the city of chester it self , and all other great towns in that county , his vote in parliament would have obliged all of them ; and there would have been no need of a common council or parliament of the states of the whole county in which they then made laws , and taxed themselves as a separate body from the rest of the kingdom , as may appear from these following records which mr. a. hath given us ; the first of which is a writ of k. edw. i. directed , archiepiscopis , episcopis , abbatibus , priori●us , baronibus , militibus & omnibus ●liis fidelibus suis in comitat. c●striae ; reciting that whereas the prelates , counts , barons , & alii de regno , had given him a th . of their moveables . he desires that they also would of their benevolence and courtesie ( in latin curialitate ) grant him the like subsidy , which note could not be done out of a common council . so likewise in another writ of the th . of this king , reciting that whereas the probi homines , & communitas cestriae sicut caeteri de regno nostro mam partem omnium mobilium suorum nobis concesserunt gratiose : now supposing ( as the doctor always does ) that these probi homines were the earls tenants in capite , what can this word communitas here signifie but another sort of men distinct from them , viz. the communalty or commons of that county : and which is also remarkable , this county was now fallen to the crown for want of heirs male of the last earl ; and so according to the doctors notion , the king being their sole representative needed not to have been beholding to them for these subsidies ; since , tho not as king , yet as earl of chester , he might have taxed them himself , which yet he thought not fit to do , because he knew it was contrary to the rights and priviledges of that county , which had ever since the grant of it to hugh lupus by will. i. always been taxed by themselves . which priviledges are also expressly set forth in a supplication of all the estates of this county palatine to k. henry the sixth , which mr. p. has given us from an ancient copy of it then in the hands of sir thomas manwaring of that county , baronet : wherein the abbots , priors , and clergy , barons , knights , esquires , and commonalty set forth , that they with the consent of the earl did make , and admit laws within the same , &c. and that no inheritors , or possessors within the said county were chargeable or lyable , or were bounden , charged or hurt of their bodies , liberties , franchises , lands , goods , or possessions , unless the said county had agreed unto it . now what can here be meant by county but the common council , or parliament thereof , since otherwise they could make no laws , nor do any other publick act ? the like i may say for the county palatine of durham , which from the grant thereof by william rufus to the then bishop , had always been taxed by themselves , and not by the bishop in parliament , and that as low as the reign of edw. . as appears by this record of the th . of that king ; containing a letter or commission to r. bishop of durham ; reciting , that whereas the prelates , earls , barons and the commons of counties , had given him a th . of their goods there mentioned , that therefore the bishops should convene , the magnates & communitatem libertatis vestrae ( to wit , of his county palatine ) ad certum diem , & locum , with all convenient speed , and that done to perswade and excite the said magnates & communitas to grant the king the like , or a larger subsidy , or aid towards the maintainance of his wars , which had been altogether in vain , if the bishop , or the king could in those days have taxed this county at their pleasure . now if these great tenants in capite could not tax their mesne tenants without their consents , much less could the rest of the tenants in capite in england impose taxes on their tenants in military service , or in socage without their consents , which last had a much less dependance upon them . m. i must confess i never considered these precedents of the county palatine of chester and durham ; and therefore can say nothing to them at present , since it is matter of fact , but as to reason and law ; i think it is consonant to both , that not only tenants in military service but socage tenure should be found by the acts of their superior lords , of whom all the lands of england were formerly held by knights service : and tho in process of time many of these estates and lands became free tenements , or were holden in socage , that is , were free holders ; yet the lords retained homage ( which in the times we now write of , was no idle insignificant word ) and by that a dominion over the estate ▪ whereby upon disobedience , treachery , or injury done to the lords , &c. the lands were forfeited to them , and although the lands , nor the tenants of them ( which were termed free-holders ) were subject to any base services , or servile works , yet the lords had a great power over these tenants , by reason of their doing homage to them ( which tho now antiquated ) yet eo nomine their lands were many ways liable to forfeiture , and taxes too . so that upon all thes● accounts , it was then as reasonable that the tenants in capite should in those days make laws , and grant taxes for all the rest of the kingdom ; as the tenants in capite in scotland should do so to this very day , for all the inhabitants of that kingdom of never so great estates , and to this argument which is certain in matter of fact , you have yet answered nothing , nor do i believe can . f. i cannot see notwithstanding what you have now said , that the superior lords , by reason of homage should have an absolute power over their tenants estates : for tho in the profession of homage to the lords , i grant the tenant thereby promised to become the lords man ; yet he never thereby meant to become his slave , and there were mutual duties on both sides ; so that if the lord failed to protect his tenant in his estate , or unjustly oppressed him , he might have refused ( nay renounced ) his homage , till the lord had done him right ; nor can i see how a bare right of having the forfeiture of the estate in the cases you have put which yet let me tell you , were never so strict in respect of socage as military tenure as i could shew you , were it worth while ; for if this right of forfeiture alone ▪ could give the superiour lord a power over his tenants estate , to make laws for him , and tax him as he pleased , then by the same rule , the king as supream lord over all his tenants in capite , should have had the like power over them , of making what laws for them , and imposing what taxes he pleased upon them without their consents : and so there would have been no need of common councils or parliaments at all , since upon your hypothesis , the tenants in capite were the only persons that had any right to appear there . but if neither the wardship , marriage nor relief of the heir ▪ could give the king such a power over his tenants in capite , much less could they attain the like right over all their mesne tenants by knights service , for that would have given them a greater power over their tenants then the king himself had over them ; therefore if those great tyes of wardship , marriage and relief of the heir , could neither give the king , nor yet any tenant in capite power over the estate , or liberty of his tenants by knights service , much less over their tenants by socage tenure , who were not under this subjection ; and farther , if a right of forfeiture alone , in some cases , could have given the lords a power of making laws ; and granting taxes for his tenants in socage , then they should have kept that right by this rule , since all lords had a right of forfeiture even upon their tenants in socage in some cases , before the statute of taking away knights service ; and the court of wards , and liveries in the second year of king charles the second , as i could prove , were it worth while . as to scotland , i shall not deny the matter of fact to be as you say , that it hath at this day no other representatives in their parliament , but the tenants in capite , yet whether it was so or not anciently . i very much doubt , since i find the very same words and phrases made use of in the titles of their old statutes , as also in their records to express the constituent parts of the great council of that kingdom as were used in england , to express those of england at the same time : for proof of which , pray see the old charters of king malcolme iii. and david i. as you may find them at the end of the d . vol. in mr. dugdales mon●st . angli● . and you will see the former to have bin made by the assent of the comites & barones regni , clero adquie cent que populo , &c. and as i shall also shew you from sir iohn skenes collection of scotish laws , to begin with the most ancient there extant , ( viz. ) an assize , or statute made in the time of king william , sir named the lyon , who began his reign anno. dom. . in the fifth of our hen. i. to the observance whereof it is there expressed , that the epi●copi , abbates , comites , barones , thani & tota communitas regni tenere firmiter juraverunt , so likewise king alexander ii. who began to reign anno. . which was the sixteenth year of our king iohn , and he made his laws de confilio & assensu venerabilium patrum episcoporum abb●tum , baronum ac proborum hominum suorum scotiae , and who these were may also farther appear by the begining of certain statutes made by the said king alexander in the same year , which begin thus : statuit rex per consilium , & assensum totius communitatis suae , &c. i shall next produce the title of a parliament holden the th . of rob. i. who began his reign anno. dom. . the d. of our edward i. in dei nomine , amen . rober●us dei gratia rex scotorum anno regni suo decimo tertio die dominica proxima , &c. habito solenni tractati● , cum episcopis , abbatibus , prioribus , comitibus , baronibus , & aliis magnatibus de communitate totius regni ibidem congregatis , and which title concludes thus , de communi consilio & expr●sso con●ensu omnium prelatorum , & libere tenentium predictorum ac totius communitatis predicte ordinavit , condidit , &c. statuta infra scripta , &c. so likewise in an ancient manuscript , called , scoto-chronicon , formerly in the possession of the right learned and honourable arthur earle of anglesey and now in the herald office ; you will find the entail of the crown of scotland to have been made by this king robert , anno. dom. . in a general council or assembly of the whole kingdom of scotland , as well clergy as laity , which as this author tells us ( who lived within sixty years after ) was held , dominica proxima ante festum apostolorum congregati apud aere in ecclesia parochiali ejusdem laici , episcopi , abbates , priores , archidiaconi , nec non diaceni , & caeteri ecclesiarum praelati , comites , barones , milites , & caeteri de communitate , regni , scotiae , tam cleri quam laici , &c. from which it is apparent : there was a great council of the whole kingdom ( as in england ) more comprehensive then that of tenants in capite alone . and that our english records also agree with these scotch statutes you may see by records which mr. pryn has given us in his history of papal vsurpations , out of the rolls of the th . of edw. i. it is a letter to eric , king of norway , concerning the marriage of his son edward with his grand-daughter then heiress of scotland and norway , reciting that the custodes ( scil. regni scotlae ) magnates , praelati ac tota communitas predicti regni scotiae unanimi , & expresso consensu had agreed to the said marriage : so likewise in another letter of this king edwards about the same marriage , he declares that he had by his procurators therein named , treated and agreed with the custodibus , episcopis , abbatibus , comitibus , baronibus , & tota communitate ejusdem regni , and it presently follows , ac praedicti nobiles & tota communitas regni scotiae praedicti . now whom can this word communitas signifie , put here distinct from the earls , barons and nobles , but the commons of that kingdom . so likewise in the th . year of king robert i. there was a letter sent from the parliament of scotland to the pope , complaining against the violence of the king of england ( which is to be seen in manuscript and is also printed by dr. burnet , in his history of the reformation ; and by which it plainly appears , that the comites , barones , libere tenentes , & tota communitas scotiae agreed to this letter . and that the cities and burrough towns were at that time part of this communitas appears by the league made betwen this king robert and the king of france in the th . year of our edw. i. which is to be seen in a roll of this year , still extant , in the tower ; which league was ratified and confirmed in their parliament , by king iohn de bayliol , ac praelatos , & nobiles vniversitates , & communitates civitatum , & villarum praedicti regni scotiae , and i suppose you will not deny that in scotland , the cities and burroughs from times beyond all memory , sent their proxyes and representatives to the parliament in scotland , and that each citizen and burgess so sent , had as good a vote in their parliament , as the greatest bishop or earl of them all . m. i desire no better proofs then what your self have now brought to make out , that the tenants in capite are not only at this day , but have been from the very beginning of parliaments in that nation . for i shall appeal to those very statutes and records you have now cited , which compared with divers subsequent statutes of that kingdom , will make the matter plain enough ; that the communitas and these probi homines mentioned in these laws you have cited , were the community of the tenants in capite only . in the first place , therefore let me observe from that very law of king alexanders , the title of which you have but now quoted , that these words per essenssum communitatis cannot here signifie the commons , since they alone could neither advise , nor give their consent to make laws , and therefore they must needs refer to the whole community or assembly of estates , consisting of tenants in capite only , as i shall prove by a parliament of king rob. iii. who began to reign anno. dom . ( in the th . year of our richard ii ) the title is thus . parliamentum domini nostri roberti iii. scoto●um regis , &c. vocatis & summonitis more solito episcopis , prioribus , du●ibus , commitibus , baronibus , liberis te●entibus & burgensibus qui de domino rege tenent in capite ; and this is also confirmed from the title to a parliament held at perth anno. dom. . being the d . of king iames i. summ●nitis & vo●atis m●re solito episcopis , abbatibus , prioribus , comitibus , baronibus & liberi t●nentibus , qui de nobis tenent in capite , & de quolibet burgo certis bu●genfibus , so that i think nothing can be plainer from these ancient statutes then that the scottish parliaments did anciently consist of no other members then the bishops , abbots and priors , dukes and earls , barons , free-holders and burgesses , which held of the king in capite . having thus shewn the ancient costitution of the scotish parliaments for your satisfaction , i shall farther shew when , and how it was altered . in the seventh parliament of king iames the first , held at perth , a. dom. , there was a law made ( which i shall contract ) that the small barons and freeholders need not to come to parliaments , and that for the future out of each schirefdome there should be sent two or more wise men after the largeness of the schirefdome the which shall be called commissaries of the shire , and that these should have full power finally to hear and determine all causes to be proposed in the great council or parliament , and that the said commissaries should have costage of them of each shire that ought to appear in parliament or council . i have only given you an abstract of this statute because it is pretty long , and pen'd in old scotish english , but you may consult it at your leisure . and this is farther confirm'd by a subsequent act of parliament of king iames the sixth , holden at edinburgh , iuly the th . , wherein after a repetition of the former act of king iames the first , and a confirmation of the same , it follows thus : and that all freeholders of the king , under the degree of prelates and lords of parliament be warned by proclamation to be present at the choosing of the said commissioners ; and none to have voit in their election but sik as hes fourtie shillings land in free tenandrie halden of the king , and hes their actual dwelling and residence within the same schire , &c. i need give you no more of this act , but i think it is most clear from this as well as the former act of parliament , that the commons in scotland were only the kings tenants in capite , and are so at this day , since none but they can either choose or be chosen commissioners for the shires , but as to the buroughs who do each of them send but one commissioner or burgess ( except the city of edinburgh which sends two ) all which are chosen by the common council of the towns. now there are in scotland three sorts of these burghs , that is to say , royal burghs , burghs of regality , and burghs of barony ; but only the royal burroughs , the burgi dominici regis , or qui de rege tenent in capite , send commissioners to parliament , and are in number sixty . to conclude , that i may apply what hath been said concerning the constituent parts of the scotish parliament to ours anciently , it seems to me that from the great affinity there was between ours and theirs , 't is certain , that our and their communitas regni , was the same , that is , they were the small barons and tenants in capite . f. i cannot deny but that the parliament of scotland hath for above these two hundred years consisted of the bishops , abbots and temporal lords , together with the lesser tenants in capite , or their representatives the commissioners for shires , and burgesses of cities and towns till the reformation that the bishops and abbots were quite taken away , tho the former were restored to their places in parliament by a statute made in the latter end of king iames the first ; yet i cannot allow that from the beginning of that government , the scotch parliaments have consisted of no other members than those , since the word communitas coming as it does in these old statutes and records ( i have now cited ) immediately after the praelati , comites , barones , & milites , &c. must signifie a distinct order of men from the tenants in capite , called in the statute of king iames the first the small barons , and since the citizens and burgesses though none of those barons , were also comprehended under this communitas ( and whom you grant to make the third estate , ) why this word might not comprehend all the other great freeholders , i can see no reason to the contrary . and therefore i suppose that in the reigns of k. david d. or robert the d. or else the beginning of robert the d. there was a great alteration in the constituent parts or members of the scottish parliament ; and about that time the chief freeholders or lords of mannors who held of bishops , abbots , and other temporal lords , as well as of the tenants in capite , or else of the king by petty serjeantry , or socage tenure , as also many of the small towns , or baronies might either forbear coming at all , or else desire to be excused because of the great trouble and charge of attendance ; ( as you see the smaller tenants in capite afterwards did when commissioners for shires were appointed in their steads ) and so might by degrees leave off coming or be excluded by some law not now extant ; and thus the tenants in capite , might become the sole representatives of the whole nation in parliament ; and i am of this opinion because in many of the old statutes before the time of robert the d. we find the communitas totius regni coming immediately after the earls and barons ( as in our own ancient statutes and records ) but after those reigns we find no more mention of this communitas , but only of the dukes , earls , barons , liberi tenentibus , & burgensibus qui de rege tenent in capite , as in the titles to those statutes of k. robert the d , and iames the th . you have now cited . and yet that liber tenens was not anciently taken for a tenant in capite only ; pray see the th . chap. of the laws of k. alexander the d. made anno dom. . with your doctors comment upon them ; statutum est quod nec episcopi , nec abbates , nec comites , nec aliqui liberi tenentes , tenebunt curias suas nisi vicecomes regis , vel servientes vicecomitis ibidem fuerant , upon which words the doctor in his answer to mr. p. hath this remark , viz. this again shews us , that the freeholders were lords of mannors at least . so that unless you will suppose that none but tenants in capite were lords of mannors , or held courts , ( as certainly very many of the mesne tenants did ) this word liber tenens must extend to any other great freeholder or lord of a mannor , of whatsoever lord he held it ; and as such might anciently have had a vote in that parliament , so that if i have ( as i think sufficiently ) proved that the word communitas coming after the earls and barons in our ancient statutes and records did certainly signifie another order of men distinct from the tenants in capite , i i have the same reason to believe it was so in scotland too ; not only because these general words communitas totius regni , must needs be more comprehensive than to express the tenants in capite only ( who could never represent all the great freeholders in scotland any more than they did in england ) but also because it is acknowledged by the scotch lawyers that the fundamental laws and constitutions are the same in both kingdom● , for sir iohn skene in his epistle to k. iames before his scottish laws ▪ says thus , intelligo tuas tuorumque majorum leges , cum legibus regni tui angliae magna ex parte consentiunt , which is also acknowledged by the king himself in the speech he made in parliament concerning the union of both kingdoms . to conclude , i cannot but admire your doctors strange partiality who does allow the commons of scotland to have even been a third estate , when he expressly grants that the commons of scotland were , and are at this day the kings tenents in capite , and that the kings royal burroughs were such as ever did , and do at this day in scotland only send burgesses to parliament : now why the cities and burroughs in england should not have always had the like priviledge as well as in scotland , i wish you could give me any sufficient reason . m. since you own that the tenants capite , or else commissioners in their stead have been the sole representatives for the whole kingdom of scotland for above years , i doubt not but they were so long before that time ; since you confess you cannot shew any law by which this ancient custom came to be changed ; though i grant that the statutes before k. david and robert the d , are said to be made by the communitas totius regni , yet you must not suppose that constitution of the kingdom altered , when the clerks altered their phrases in penning their statutes and records , so that this communitas was the community of the tenants in capite only , and not of the freeholders , or of the citizens and burgesses of the whole kingdom ; since as for the former you cannot say that all the people in scotland had ever a right to chuse the commissioners for the shires ; for then 't is most likely they would have kept to this day , whereas we see that none but tenants in coplie have votes at such elections . and as for cities and burroughs , i cannot find ( nor do i believe you can shew me ) any instance of a city or burrough-town in scotland that ever sent deputies to parliament , but what held in capite of the king. for though there are , at i said already , besides the royal burghs , two other sorts , viz. burroughs of regality , and burroughs of barony , who hold of the king , but not in capite ; or else of some bishop or temporal lord ; and though divers of these are considerable for trade and riches , yet none of them send any burgesses to parliament ; so that though i confess there are three estates in the scotch parliament , called in the statutes of k. david and robert the d , the tre● communitates regni , yet did these always consist of the tenants in capite only , who therefore sit together , and make but one assembly . now that we may apply what hath been said to england , i desire you to take notice that the doctor and we that are of his opinion , do not positively affirm that that the commons of england were not at all represented before hen. . but that they were not represented in parliament by knights , citizens and burgesses of their own choice , but by the greater and lesser tenants in capite , the greatest part of which i grant were not lords ; and admit that i should grant you that some cities and burroughs sent members to parliament , before the th . of henry the third ; yet were they only such as held in capite , and no other , as the doctor has very well observ'd in his answer to mr. p's argument from the petition of the town of st. albans ; so that upon the whole matter there will be no more gain'd by you in this controversie than that perhaps some citizens and burgesses appear'd in parliament , and constituted a third sort of men , which you may call the commons , if you please , though i cannot find they were so called , till after the time of edward the first ; but supposing this to be so , it is very far from your republican , levelling opinion , who do suppose that all the freeholders of england , had an ancient indisputable right of appearing in parliament by reason of their propriety in lands , or other estates , whereas by our hypothesis we suppose the great council or parliament to have anciently been the kings court-baron consisting of his immediate tenants call'd thither by him their supreme lord to advertise him of the grievances of the nation , and to propose what new laws were necessary for the publick good of the commonweal , and together with him to raise such publick taxes both upon themselves and their tenants as the necessities of the state requir'd ; yet notwithstanding there is a vast difference between your notion and mine concerning the rights which such tenants in capite might claim of coming to parliament , since before king iohn's charter , ( whereby i grant all the lesser barons or tenants in capite were to be summonld by the sheriff to come to the common council of the kingdom ) the king might have only call'd some of the greatest and wisest of them , and such as he thought most fit to advise him in making laws , and imposing taxes upon the nation . and the like prerogative his son henry the third resumed during the greater part of his reign , as i shall shew you from divers old statutes by and by : and that our kings did often take upon them to call whom they pleased , and omit whom they pleased of these tenants in capite , may appear by those who were called pares baronum , or alios magnates , who are put after the barons ; and of these there are many instances of their being called to parliament , and again omitted in several kings reigns after the commons were a third estate , as represented as at this day . f. i must beg your pardon , if i cannot come over to your opinion , notwithstanding what you now have said ; since i do not find your reason to come up to what you intend therein , for you only suppose , ( but without any proof ) that the words populus and communitas must signifie only tenants in capite , in the ancient scotish charters and statutes . all the argument you bring to the contrary is that i cannot shew you any law by which it was altered to what it is now , and therefore that the constitution has been always the same as at this day . now pray consider whether this will not press altogether as hard upon you in relation to england ; for you cannot shew me any law whereby the tenants in capite were excluded here , and knights of shires introduced in their fleads ; and therefore by the same rule let the scottish parliaments have been of what they will , yet ours have been still the same they are now . but if you say that this contrary usage hath been introduced either by the kings prerogative , or by the silent consent of the people , or by some law that is now lost are not all the same arguments to be made use of in the case of the scotish parliaments ; which i may upon as good grounds suppose to have deviated from their original constitution as you do that our english parliaments have done it . so that if those arguments are of any weight they will serve for england , as well as scotland ; but if they are not , it is in vain to make use of them at all . the like i may say as to burroughs in scotland , since it is as easie to suppose that divers burroughs in scotland might voluntarily desist from sending their deputies to parliament , that did not hold of the king in capite ; as it is that divers burroughs in england did petition to be exempted from sending burgesses to parliament , by reason of their inability to pay the expences of their burgesses ; as i could shew you by divers precedents , ( some of which are in print ) had i now time . as for the rest of your discourse i cannot imagin to what it tends ; for if the tenants in capite had any place in , or right to come to parliament , how came they to have it , but by reason of the great freehold estates they held of the king ? and if so , i can see no reason why those that had as good or better freehold estates than they should be all excluded ; or why a small tenant in capite of but one knights fee held of the king in capite , should give him a right to a place in parliament , and get that a mesne tenant , or vavasour ( as he was then called ) who held ten knights fees of some bishop or abbot , who perhaps did not hold in capite at all , should have no right of appearing there , nor of choosing any representative for him ; since notwithstanding all you have now said the doctor either contradicts himself , or you , when he tells us expressly in his answer to mr. p. that the tenants in capite , who were no barons represented only themselves , and not the commons ; but how this will agree with what he says in his introduction , that the body of the commons had no share in making laws , &c. before th . of henry the third , unless they were represented by thd tenants in capite : and if so must then certainly represent those that he here calls the body of the commons of england collectively taken . but as for your notion of the parliament's being the king's court baron ; tho you have borrowed it of a learned scotch lawyer sir george me●●ensy , yet let me tell you it was never true , for it is well known that the great or common councils both in england and scotland are much more ancient than the tennres of lands by knights service ; or then the very institution of mannors in this kingdom ▪ which the doctor tells us are of no higher an original than the norman conquest . but admit i should allow your notion of the parliaments being anciently the kings court baron , then certainly all the tenants in capite had a right to appear there , and to be not only suito●s , but judges of all differences arising among the tenants in the lords court , where neither the lord himself nor his steward were judges , and that of right and not by savour ; whereas you suppose such a court-baron as was never heard of , where the lord could admit or exclude whom of his tenants he pleased , to which if they had a right ratione tenurae , certainly he could never do . so that instead of a court-baron and a common council according to king iohn's charter , whereby all the tenants in capite were to be summoned to this council , or pretended court baron ; you suppose the king still retained a prerogative of calling or omitting whom he pleased , which instead of confirming the validity of the charter , and that it was to be a rule how such councils should be called for the future ; you make to signifie just nothing , and that no common council was ever called according to that model . but pray shew me a court-baron , wherein the tenants ever took upon themselves a power of giving taxes out of their estates , that did not hold of the mannour , though they were resident within it : but indeed you are out in the whole matter , for the doctor himself grants in his answer to mr. p. when he gives us king iohn's letters of summons to a council directed to the barons and knights ( and as he translates eidelibus ) feudatories , or vassals of all england wherein he lets them know , that he had sent his letters to every one of them , if it might have been done : now what reason had he to write thus , if these gentlemen had no right to be consulted , or that the king might have called or left out whom of them he pleased . but the barons and tenants in capite , were in another mind , when in the th . of king hen. iii. as mar. paris tells us , they refused to act or proceed upon any thing , without all the rest of their peers , divers of whom , it seems the king had for some reasons then omitted to summon . but as for your instance of the barons peers , or alios magnates , which were somtimes summoned , and sametimes omitted in the reigns of our three edwards : you do well to put in , that it was after the times that the commons were a third estate ; for indeed , it was only after that the tenants in capite had left off making a distinct council by themselve ; which i suppose was about the end of henry iii. reign , and then it is true , the king called several of these tenants in capite , ( as also others that were not so ) by writ , to the house of lords , as pares baronum , i. e. not as real barons , but barons-peers , since a ba●e summons by writ did not as yet , ( nor long after ) vest a peerage in their heirs , so that upon the whole matter , i see no reason from any thing you have urged from the example of scotland to make me change my opinion , that the tenants in capite were anciently the sole representatives , either of this or that whole nation in parliament ; for pray take notice that i do not find the tenants in capite , so much as mentioned in the ancient statutes of that kingdom , or charters of their kings , as the common council or parliament of scotland before the reign of king robert iii. which was but late in comparison of the antiquity of those councils in that kingdom . m. i could say more as to the antiquity of the tenants in capite their coming to parliament as the sole reprensentatives of the nation before the time you mention ; but it grows late , and therefore i shall wave it at present , and so shall only proceed to remark that great part of the errour of the gentlemen of your opinion , proceeds from this false ground , that you suppose that the parliaments , both of england and scotland were a perfect representative body of all the free-houlders and freemen of those kingdoms , which is a meer chymera ; for in the first place , if we will consider , it never was , nor indeed is so at this day ; since you your self must acknowledge , that all copy-holders and lease-holders under forty shilling a year , all freemen in towns corporate ▪ where the elections lies wholly in the major , and aldermen , or common council ; and lastly all that will not pay scot and lot in divers burrough towns , are utterly excluded from giving their votes in the choice of parliament men ; and consequently from having any representatives in parliament , though sure as much freemen as the rest of the kingdom ; and this either by general statutes , or else by the particular charters and customs of those cities , towns and burroughs ; all which are lookt upon as good and lawful representatives of those cities and burroughs ; so that i am clearly of the doctor 's opinion , that the tenants in capite as well those who were barons as those that were not , only represented themselves , and not the commons , as being ( as you truly observe ) never chosen by the people ; and as no man can believe that a great lord or bishop could represent his mesne tenants , so neither could the smaller tenants in capite who were no barons , be properly said to represent theirs ; and yet , these might according to the custom of feudal tenures , and the power they then had over their tenants estates , very well make laws for them , and tax them at their pleasures , because the main interest and strength of the kingdom , lay almost wholly in them ; and these ( as the doctor very well observes ) having the power of this , or any other nation de facto , always did make laws for , and tax the rest of the people . but to say somewhat to the authorities you have brought from the county palatines of chester and durham ; i know not what old priviledges they might pretend to , of not being forced to give voluntary aids or subsidies of their moveable goods without their consents ; yet this much i think may be made out , that as for all land taxes , and the general laws and statutes of the kingdom ; they were as much bound by the one , and as much liable to pay to the other , as the rest of the subjects of england or else how came they afterwards to be bound by our general statutes at all , as certainly they were from all times since the conquest ; though chester had no representatives in parliament , till the reign of henry viii . and durham had none till our times . f. you gentlemen who hold this general notion of tenants in capite are so intoxicated with it , that you do not care what absurdities or contradictions you fall into , provided you may maintain your dear opinion , as i shall shew you by and by : but first let me tell you your reply to what i have now said , is very fallacious , and in some points mistaken as to the matter of fact : for in the first place , i doubt not but our common councils or parliament were in their first institution , the main body or representative of all the freemen of the nation ; and though it may by long continuance of time to deviate from that institution ; yet , that it is to be attributed either to some prevailing custom , or else positive law to the contr●ry ; for it is certain that in the saxon times , all the free holders of england had a right of coming to parliament in person ; and hence it is , that liber tenens , liber homo & ingenuus were synonimous , and of the same signification , as i have proved from sir henry spelman's comment , in his glossary upon those words ; and hence it is , that the members of those councils were so numerous as they were in those times , and long after , till they became so vast and unmanageable , that they were fain by degrees to pitch upon this method , of sending knights of shires to represent them , which is certainly a very ancient institution , since the tenants in ancient demean , claimed to be exempted from the expences of knights of the shires by p●esc●iption , as i shall shew you more particularly by and by ; and likewise since all riches consisted in those days in land , or else in stock , or trade , therefore the cities and burroughs , and towns , by reason of their riches , had always a share in the legislative power , as well as in giving of taxes ; and since all such citizens and burgesses , not being able to come in person , as the free-holders could , were represented either by their chief magistrates , called their aldermen , or else by burgesses of their own chusing as at this day ; so that all freedom , or ingenuity being in this , as in all other common-wealths , reckon per censum , by the estates of the owners ; our common councils were , and that truly , the representatives , not only of the estates , but persons of all the freemen of the nation , for i am so far of the doctor 's opinion , that the cheorl folk ( as they were then termed ) were little better than the scotch vassals or french peasants at this day ▪ and so were not reckoned among the freemen ; all freedom consisting then in so much freehold lands , held in a man 's own right , or being freemen of some city or burrough town ; and this gives us a reason why copy-holders and tenants for years , have no vote in parliament at this day ; since it is certain , ( and all our law books allow it ) , that at the first all copy-hold estates were held by villenage , and the owners of them at first the villani , or tillers of the demefnes of the lord of that town , there being at first no free-hold less then that of a whole township , since a mannour ; and therefore all copy-holders and tenants for years , or at will , though freemen are not admitted to have votes at this day , because ( as i said before ) freedom anciently consisted in the inheritance or free-hold estate of land , or in riches , in trade or traffick ; leases for life and years , being not known , or at least not commonly in use in those days ; and hence it is , that when estates of free-hold came to be divided into small parcels , all free-holders till the statutes of henry iv. and vi. ( which we have before cited ) were as much capable of giving their votes at the election of knights of shires , as the best and greatest tenant in capite in england , till it was reduced by those statutes to s. freehold per annum ; these freeholders and burgesses of towns being anciently looked upon in the eye of the law as the only freemen ; and it was these freeholders alone who owed suit and service to the county , court , and were amerced if they did not appear . this being premised , and sufficiently understood , will give us a very good account , why copy-holder and lease-holders for years do not give any votes at elections of knights of shires ; and yet the parliament may still continue the representative of all the freemen of the nation , as the people of rome and the territories about it were of all the romans , though there were a great many liberti , and in inqui lini , who sure were freemen , and not slaves , and yet had no votes in theirs comitiis centuriatis , or general assemblies of all the roman citizens . but that the liberi homines , & libere tenentes de regno , must take in more than your tenants in capite the doctor himself is at last forced to confess in his glossary ( notwithstanding his maintaining the contrary in the body of his book ) viz. that the liberi homines , & libere tenentes mentioned in iohn's magna charta , were not only the tenants in capite , but their retinue and tenants in military service also , and whom he there supposes to have been then the only men of honour , faith and reputation in the kingdom , and if so might certainly have been chosen knights of shires as well as any of the tenants in capite ; though this is but argumentum ad hominem ; for the truth is that the mesne tenants by military service were not the only men of faith , and honour in those times , since it is certain the kings tenants in pe●yt serjeantry , and of some honour or castle , or else his tenants in socage , besides those who held of other mesne lords ; and the tenants of those abbots and priors , who did not hold in capite , and yet were very numerous , were men of as much faith and honour as those that did ; since many of them possest as good if not better estates than the tenants in capite themselves ▪ so that you are certainly mistaken in matter of fact when you say the whole force and strength of the nation lay in their hands ; for if you mean legal force , i have already proved , that the tenants in capite had no legal right to give away the estates of their mesne tenants , or to make laws for them without their consents , who were altogether as free as themselves , servitiis suis debitis solum-modo exceptis , as bracton tells us , much less for so great a body of men as i now mentioned , who never held of them at all , and consequently could not upon your own hypothesis , be ever represented by them ; but if you mean a physical strength , or force , though this can give no natural , much less legal right for one man to lord it over another : yet even this was much farther from truth , since the mesne tenants of all sorts , as well by military service as in socage , together with those above mentioned : who never held of the tenants in capite at all , made six times a greater body of men , both for numbers as well as estates , then all the tenants in capite taken together . but to conclude , neither is your remark upon my authorities from gheller and durham at all to the purpose ; for i have sufficiently proved , that those county palatines , were not at first concluded within the general laws and taxes of the kingdom ; since they had their particular councils for both within themselves , as the supplication of the estates of the county palatine of chester , sufficiently declares ; and certainly durham had the like priviledges , since i never heard that the men in that county were more slaves to their bishop , then the cheshire men to their earl ; and tho i grant that about the confused times of king hen. vi. there was a great breach made on the ancient liberties of these two counties palatines , and if the king and parliament made laws for , and levyed taxes upon them , though they had no representatives therein , this proceeded partly from their being over-powered by the rest of the nation , and partly by the ease they found in being excused from the expences of knights of shires , and burgesses , which all the rest of the kingdom , was at that time liable to , and which came to a great deal of money ( four shillings per diem , being in those days , more then forty shillings now , ) and yet you see at last they were aware of their errour , and at their request , got the priviledge of having representatives in parliament of their own choosing , as well as the rest of the kingdom ; and if this had not been a certain right of english subjects , how came the welsh counties , which were anciently no part of the kingdom of england , to have been admitted to choose one knight for each county , and burgesses for each burrough town , as well in north wales , as south wales , though both these were conquered countries at the first , and incorporated to england by particular statutes ; and therefore we have no reason to deny the truth of bracton's and fortescue's assertion , that no laws are made nor taxes imposed in england , sine consensu communi ●uius regni ; or as the latter truly adds in parliamento ; and certainly this word common assent must take in all their assents , who had estates either in land or other riches at that time when this law was established . but leaving this dispute about scotland , and the county palatines , pray make an end ( for it grows late ) and give me the rest of your reasons , why the commons could not be represented in parliament before the th . of hen. iii. and th of edw. i. m. i will proceed to do it , and for this end shall reduce my arguments to these three heads , the first is , some writs found out and produced by the doctor , whereby he proves that the commons were not summoned during the reign of hen. iii. till the th . secondly the general silence of all statutes in h●n . iii. reign ; wherein is not one word mentioned of the commons , but rather to the contrary , thirdly the critical time ( viz. in the th . of hen. iii. ) when the commons were first called , during monsfords rebellion , fourthly , their discontinuance from that time , till the th , of edw. i. there being no mention made of them in all the rest of the reign of hen. iii. nor yet of ed. i. till the th . in which the doctor shews you a writ ( not taken notice of before ) by which the commons were summoned , a new to parliament : lastly , from the uncertainty of the manner of the writs of summons , whether for one knight or two knights , and sometimes no citizens and burgesses at all , which sufficiently prove the novelty of the institution , as also of some parliamentary forms relating to the commons , which shew that neither their number nor manner of election was settled long after the reign of edw. i. to begin therefore with the first head. i know the gentlemen of your opinion make a great noise about the loss , or rather defect of the writs of summons , and parliament rolls of all the kings , till the d . or th . of edw. i. so that we cannot be so well assured what was done in parliaments of those times , as we may be afterwards : yet there are still some writs of summons extant upon the close rolls before and in those times , by which the bishops , earls and barons , were summoned to parliaments or great councils . and we have all the close rolls of king iohn and henry iii. on the dorse● . of which anciently , most of the writs of summons to the commons in other king's reigns , are entred ( few on the patent rolls which we have likewise . ) 't is therefore very strange , if the commons were then represented by knights , citizens and burgesses , and summoned to parliament as at this day , that there cannot be found any summons to them upon these rolls , as well as to the lords . but the learned doctor hath for our satisfaction , found out three writs of summons to the lords , one in king iohn's reign , and two other of hen iii. the first is in the close roll ▪ th . of king iohn directed to the bishop of salisbury , which is needless here to be repeated verbatim , only pray take notice of the material words of this writ , where after the cause of the summons particularly expres'd , it concludes thus , expedit habere vestrum consilium & aliorum magnatum terrae nostrae quos ad diem ilium & locum fecimus convocari . the second is in the close roll of the th . hen. iii directed to w. arch-bishop of york , wherein he is likewise summoned ad tractandum , nobiscum una cum caeteris magnatibus nostris quos similiter fecimus convoca●i de arduis negotiis nostris statum nostrum & totius regni nostri specialiter tangentibus ; with this note underneath eodem modo scribitur omnibus episcopis , abbatibus , comitibus & baronibus . the third is of the th . of the same king directed to boniface arch-bishop of canterbury , whereby he is summoned to be at westminster within fifteen days after hillary next coming before the queen , and richard earl of cornwail about the affairs of gascony ; and this very council mat. paris anno. dom. . calls a parliament , to which all the magnates or great men of england came together ▪ the day of which meeting he makes to have been the th . of the calends of february , being st. iulian's day , and which fell one within fifteen days after st. hillary's day , which was that appointed for the meeting of this parliament by the aforesaid writ of summons , and who were the constituent parts of this parliament may be be farther made out by a letter of the queen , and earl richard to the king then in gascony , which is recited by mat. paris in his additaments in these words ; domino regi angliae , &c. regina & richardus comes cornubiae salutem , recipimus literas vestras ad natale domini proximae praeteritum quod in crastino sancti hillarii convocaremus archiepiscopos , episcopos , abbates , priores , comites & regni angliae ad ostendendum , &c. whereby it appears who were then the constituent parts of members of our english parliaments , viz. the archbishops , bishops , &c. earls and barons of the kingdom . so that there is no such universal silence concerning the constituent parts of our parliaments , as you and those of your party , suppose from the loss of the parliament rolls of those times , most of which , though i confess are lost , yet there are enough left to satisfie any reasonable person , that there were then no commons in parliament in the sense they are now taken . f. you cannot give me a better demonstration of the loss of the parliament rolls and writs of summons than what you now offer , for if we have all the close rolls of king iohn and henry iii. on the dorses . of which you tell me , the writs of summons use to be entered , then certainly those to the lords were there entered also , and if so ; how comes it to pass that in above eighty years time , in which there must be above eighty parliaments , you can shew me but three writs of summons , and those only to as many bishops , and to no temporal lords at all : if so be these were parliaments and not great councils of the bishops , lords and tenants in capite only , as i rather believe they were , for you rely too much upon you doctors credit , when you alledge that we have all the close rolls of king iohn , and henry iii , which is a great mistake , for i have had a friend who has given me a note of what close rolls are still extant in those reigns , and what are lost which you may here see . to begin with king iohn , pray observe that all the close rolls of the first five years of his reigns are gone , and so they are in the th . th . th . th . and th . for certainly , there were some in those , as well as in the succeeding years : in the next place till the th . there is but one roll left of each year , but then there are three ; and after that but one or two in a year to the very end ; now pray tell me , how we can be assured that there was not more then one roll in every precedent year , as well as in the th . the like i may say for the reign of hen. iii. which though i grant are more entire then those of king iohn ; there being some left us of every year but the d . yet they are but a few ; and for the greatest part but one in each year , never but two in any year in all this long reign , unless it be the th . in which there are four , which is very strange , that in so busie a time , as most of this kings reign was ; there should be no more rolls left , and therefore it seems very probable , that at least half are lost , and in which might be many summons , as well to the commons , as to the lords , and if they are not lost , pray tell me what is become of all the writs of summons to your lesser tenants in capite , who certainly often met in this long reign according to king iohn's charter , but if you will tell me they are lost , or omitted to be entred upon the close rolls , i may with like reason and certainty affirm the same of the writs of summons to the knights , citizens and burgesses , for if the one may be lost , sure the other may be so too . but what if after all , these writs you have produced were not any summons to a common council or parliament at all , but only to a great council of the tenants in capite , which i have great reason to believe , not only because the title to the last writ is only summonitio ad concilium , and not commune concilium regni , but also because mr. selden and mr. pryn , who certainly must have seen all these writs as well as the doctor , and were as able to judge of them , never cite them for summons to parliament , and mr. pryn observes of several writs , in which the like words of summoning the lords to give their advice , are likewise found , that they were only to such councils , or treatises which were frequently used as low as the reign of richard ii. but if these writs had been summons to parliament , sure mr. selden and mr. pryn had no reason to bewail ( as they so often do ) the loss , of not only of parliament rolls , but of all writs of summons , both to lords and commons ( except those of th . hen. iii. ) till the d . of edw. i. but pray go on if you please to make good the rest of the positions you have now laid down . m. i doubt not but in the next place to shew you ( though 't is true , most of our parliament rolls are lost ) both from our ancient historians and statutes , that there were no commons in any parliament , during all the long reign of king hen. iii. except in the th . of that king. i shall begin with the first act of parliament we have of the time of henry iii. which was made in the th . of this king at merton , where though it is said , to be provided and granted , as well by the arch-bishops , bishops , earls , barons , as others , yet the words & aliis and others are to be understood of the tenants in capite , distinct from the earls and barons , as i have already proved . f. i shall answer your authorities as you go , you may say you have proved it , but i know not when ; and why may not i with as good a face maintain , that these words & aliis do here signifie the commons , if the word barons must take in all the great lords and lesser tenants in capite , as sometimes you suppose it doth , when no other lay-members are mentioned ; but i have already observed , that this barones is a cheveral word , and to be stretch'd , or contracted as best suits with your hypothesis . so i think i may with greater reason , suppose the earls and barons to be all comprehended under the word barones , and the commons under aliis , as i have already proved ; and which is also most suitable to the last clause of magna charta of king henry iii. but you forget that i have i think sufficiently made out , that the commons had their representatives , both at the making and confirming of magna charta in d . and th . of henry iii. and therefore whatever proofs you bring to the contrary , will come to late ; though i shall patiently hear what you have to say , but if you have no more authorities to produce from statutes and records , which have not been already considered : pray proceede to the th . of this kings reign , and give me some reasons why the commons were called in that year , and never before nor after , till the th . of edw. i. for they both seem to me very improbable suppositions . m. i shall observe your commands , and shall give you as short an account as i can of this transaction : first , therefore i desire you to take notice , that after simon mon●fort and the rest of the barons of his faction had taken king hen. iii. and richard earl of cornwall the king's brother , with many other of the nobility prisoners at the battle of lewes . he carried them about with him , till they had taken in all the strong forts and castles of the land , and when this was done , mat. paris tells us , that calling together at london , the bishops , earls and barons of that faction , which so seditiously held their king prisoner , they began to set up a committee for the government of the kingdom consisting of twelve lords , who were chosen out of the whole community or body of the baronage , without whose advice and consent , or at least of three of them no affairs in the king's houshould , or in the kingdom should be transacted ; and to these ordinances , the king and his son were forced to agree ; and though the record of this agreement recites that this ordinance ▪ was made at london , by the consent , good●liking and command of the king , and also of the prelates , barons , and of the community there present , yet i am not yet convinc'd , that by the word communitas in the latin record , is to be understood the commons , but the community of the whole kingdom , since this agreement is signed only by some great earls and barons , and no commoner witness to it , but the mayor of london , whom your self will grant , was no parliament man. after which , simon montfort , the better to settle himself in his usurpt power , and in those lands and castles which himself , and those of his faction , had unjustly wrested from prince edward , who was now also a prisoner , having delivered himself as a hostage for the performance of this forc'd peace ; they in the first place sent out writs in the king's name , unto divers bishops , abbots and priors , and to such of the noblemen as were of their own party ▪ to appear at westminster on the octaves of st. hillary next ensuing and the doctor hath given us a copy of the writ of summons to the bishop of durham , as it is found in the close rolls of the th . of this king , and at the end of it , it is thus recited , ●eodem mo●o mandatum est episcopo carleol : as also to divers bishops and abbots , all of their own party and faction , there being above an hundred abbots and priors then summoned ( more than ever were i believe before or since ) and then follows a short writ to the sheriffs of counties , to summon two knights de legalioribus & discretoribus singulorum comitatuum ● though it doth not appear by the writ , whether the sheriffs of the counties were to elect , and send these knights , the sheriffs being then of the faction , and made by them , for 't is there said only quod venire faciar● . there are also other writs recited to have been directed to all the great cities and towns of england , as also to the cinque ports , to send two of the most legal and discreet of each of the said cities , burroughs , towns and cinque ports to the said parliament at westminster , at the time aforesaid . so that without the history of this ni●k of time , these writs ( which are said to be for the delivery of the prince out of prison , and for the settling of tranquility and peace in the nation , ) cannot be understood . but prince edward's release could not be agreed upon in this parliament , whatever other business might be dispatched : so that things still remained in this uncertain condition ( the king being all this time a meer shadow ) until such time as simon montfort , and gilbert de clare earl of glocester falling out , the latter , at last took up arms , and joyning with the earles of surry and pembroke , to whom also came prince edward , after he had made his escape from hereford , they altogether raised considerable forces against monfort , who meeting them , and joyning battle near evesham , monfort with one of his sons , and many other lords and knights were slain , and all his party routed . now pray tell me if this is not a very clear account from the history of the matter of fact , why the commons were first called to parliament by monfort during his rebellion ; and i think i can also give you very good reasons ( and authorities to back them ) why they were again discontinued all the rest of this kings reign , untill the th . of edward . i. f. i shall tell you my opinion of your narrative by and by , but in the mean time pray satisfie me in one or two questions , pray sir , what may be the reason , that we can find but twenty three earls and barons summoned , of that great number there was then , and only to thirteen bishops in this parliament , and yet at the same time there should be summoned above an hundred abbots and priors , and but five deans of cathedral churches ; pray why might not these numerous barons be trusted as well as all the abbots and priors ? m. as for his not summoning all the the earls , barons and tenants in capite , but putting knights of shires and burgesses in their rooms , there may be a very good reason given for it , viz. the danger that simon monford and his privado's apprehended from the too great concourse of the nobility , and their great retinue● ▪ and the example of his own and the barons practices at oxford in the parliament of d. of henry the third might be the cause why they altered the ancient usage ; and of their sending writs out , commanding the sheriffs of each county as also the cities and burghs to send two knights . citizens and burgesses respectively . but the reason why there was so many abbots and priors summoned was , because simon monfort thought himself sure of them ; he was a great zealot , and a godly man in those times , and a great minion of these religious men ( as then called ) as also of the bishops and clergy , and they were at least seemingly great favourites of his . f. i must confess there is some colour of reason , why simon monfort should summon so many abbots and priors to this parliament if he were sure of all their votes before hand , but there is no certainty of this , for if he had been so sure of them , there was as much reason why he should have called them all likewise to the parliament at london , which you say he summoned the year before , when with the consents of the bishops , barons and others , he made the new ordinances you mention ; but you cannot find in any historian , or record , that he then summoned so many of them , and it seems pretty strange , that all these abbots and priors . and deans , not a fourth part of which were tenants in capite should all take the trouble to come to this parliament without any scruple , if neither they nor their predecessors had ever been summoned before . but the other reason you give why so many earls and barons should be omitted , is much more unlikely , for if the numerous barons factious practices at oxford had before frustrated , monfort's designs , there had been indeed some reason why he should have done , all he could to have hindered their coming again ; whereas on the contrary the earls and barons at the parliament at oxford , though they came thither with arms and great retinues , yet it was only to joyn with him , and to force the king to agree to the oxford provisions . but if the commons were now summon'd ( as you suppose ) to curb the extravagant power of the lords , yet it could not be his interest , or indeed in his power so to do , not the latter , because the earls , barons and tenants in capite , were too powerful and numerous a body to have suffered such an affront and breach on their right , as this was . nor could he and his two and twenty companions have ever dared , to have displeased so great and powerful a body of men , as you must allow your great barons and tenants in capite ▪ both great and small then were , and who made such a powerful opposition for their liberties in king iohn's time , or that they would have thus tamely permitted men wholly of the sheriffs choice to have thus taken away their places in parliament , and made laws for them , much less the citizens and burgesses , most of whom were certainly not noble by birth , nor yet held lands in capite ; nor could it be for monfort's interest so to do ; for the greatest part of the earls , and barons were of his side already , and thus to ●●clude them , had been the only way to disoblige them , and make them leave him , and go over to the king's side : so that i must needs tell you upon the whole matter , granting monfort to have been such a knave and hypocrite as you make him , yet certainly he was no fool , but a great politician and i leave it to your self , or any indifferent person to judge whether it was possible for him to do so silly and unpolitick a thing as this . for granting all the abbots and priors to have been of his side ( as you suppose ) they could no way counterballance the great power of those earls and barons , and numerous tenants in capite , that were all hereby excluded . so that let the commons have been summoned when you will , it was certainly before this ●h . of henry the third , or not at all . but to give you my opinion why so few earls and barons are mentioned in this record of the of hen. d to have been summon'd to this parliament ; i conceive it was not out of any jealousie or suspition in simon monfort of those who were then his fast friends but out of pure carelesness , or omission of the clerks ; who i suppose through hast , inadvertency , or multiplicity of business omitted to enter the names of all the rest of the earls , bishops and barons , to whom writs of summons were likewise sent , and that i do not speak without book , i appeal to the record it self ; where there is a blank space left unfill'd of about four inches breadth which could be left for no other end than to add the names of all the rest of the earls and barons who were certainly summoned to that parliament as well as those whose names are there expressed . m. i shall not longer dispute this point , but i think you must grant that the commons are never mentioned in any record or statute of this king ; for after his victory at evesham he called a parliament at winchester , whereto we do not find any commons summoned , as before , but the king by the advice of his magnates alone , seised the liberties of the city of london , and also they gave him all the lands of the late rebels . and then there was after this a parliament summoned at kenelworth , in the th . of this king , where it was agreed by the common assent of the bishops , abbots , priors , earls , barons , and all others , that six persons who were all ( except one ) either bishops or barons , should chuse six others and the whole twelve were to judge concerning those who were disinherited for their late rebellion , and their determination or award , is call'd dictum de kenelworth , and was made to better the condition of the disinherited , and to turn the forfeitures and loss of their estates into a composition for them after the value of five years purchase , to be paid at two or three short payments , yet we do not find that to this parliament the commons were at all summoned , but to the contrary ; for though it is true that the statute gives us all their names . yet the doctor further proves to you from sir william dugdale's baronage , that there was not one of them , but what was either a bishop or a great baron of the kingdom ; whereas had there been any commons in this parliament , they would certainly have had commissioners of their own order as well as the bishops and lords . f. i shall give you a short answer to your authorities from the parliaments of winchester and kenelworth ; as for the former you must own that all the rolls of it are lost ; and that there is no more left of it on record than that writ or commission which the doctor has given us , which recites that by the unanimous consent of all the magnatum , or great men ( as the doctor renders it ) the king had the seisin and possession of all the rebels estates given to him ; which is no argument to prove that no commons were there ; since i have so often made out that under this word● magnatum not only the knights of shires , but citizens and burgesses were often comprehended : 't is true there are no writs extant to prove the commons were now summoned ; neither is there any reason to believe the contrary ; since if it were a cunning invention of montfort to summon the knights , citizens and burgesses to abate the power of the tenants in capite , it was sure as good policy for this king to continue so politick an institution , which would for the future serve for so good a ballance ; not only against his tenants in capite , but his great lords . also , as for the parliament at kenelworth , i shall admit all the matter of fact to be true as you have related it from mat. westminster , who says , that the twelve commissioners appointed to draw up the statute of kenelworth , were chosen de potentioribus procerum , & prudentioribus praelatorum , and also that the french record ( cited by the doctor ) together with sir william dugdale's comment upon it make it out plain enough that the lay ▪ commissioners who were chosen by all the parties there named , to make this statute , were all great earls and barons , though in the record it self only stil'd knights . well , what follows from all this ? that the commons could have no hand in this choice , because the tous autres , or omnes alii mentioned in this , and other records must needs always signifie the smaller sort of tenants in capite ; and i say it signifies the commons as now taken ; whether you have made good your interpretation by any cogent proofs i must leave to your own ingenuity ; for to tell you the truth , i think your doctor has led you astray in this point ; and till you can make it out better than you have done , i must beg your pardon if i keep my old opinion ; and if your argument be good , that no commoners were there , because none of them were chosen commissioners , then by the same argument none of the small tenants in capite were there neither ; because none under the degree of an earl or baron were elected . as for the want of writs of summons to these parliaments if that were to be the rule , that makes as much against the rest of the tenants in capite , who were no barons , nay the very bishops and abbots , and lords , since there is no writs of summons found for their appearance at either of these parliaments ; and so the king might call whom he pleased . m. in the first place it does not follow that because montfort had summoned some of the tenants in capite to appear for all the rest ; and that he also called some citizens and burgesses to this parliament of the th . yet the king might have very good reasons ( though we cannot now positively tell what they were , ) nor to follow this new invention of monforts , however it might then serve the turn ; for perhaps the king did not like it because introduced by a rebel . and he had also by his victory at evesham so quelled the power of the great lords and tenants in capite , that i believe he was afterwards able to call or omit whom of them he pleased , according to the testimony of mr. cambden's nameless manuscript author , cited in his brittania ; that after the horrid troubles and confusions of the barons wars , only those earls and barons , quibus rex dignatus est brevia summonitionis dirigere venirent ad parliamentum suum , & non alii . and that this was true in matter of fact , i shall prove from the next statute of hen. . which is extant , viz. that of ma●l●bridge , made in the d. year of this king to which there were no more summoned than some of the more discr●●t of the greater and less●r barons , as appears by these words in the preface to that statute , convocatis discretioribus ejusdem regni tam majoribus quam minoribus , brovisum est ; & statutum ac concordatum , &c. which seems to have been done by the king 's particular direction since by the general writ of summons provided by king iohn's charter , the sheriff of each county was to summon all the minor barons , and tenants in capite , which could not be , if only the more discreet were then summoned , nor is there in this preamble , the least hint or intimation of any writs directed to counties , cities or burghs for the choice of members . i desire you in the next place to take notice that britton ( who lived about that time ) supposes this statute to have been made , per la purveance de robert walerand & per commune assent des graunts seigneurs du realme . by the procurement or forecast of robert walerand , and by common assent of the great lords of the realm , without any mention of the commons . i have a great many more such statutes to instance in which are said by m. paris to have been made in several parliaments of this king , by the community , or common vniversity or baronage of the whole kingdom , but i pass them by because we have sufficiently debated most of them already . f. if only some of your great lords and tenants in capite could thus meet , and make laws to bind all the rest , and they so tamely put up this strange infringement of their priviledges as you suppose , it seems their power was much abated since the th . year of this king , when ( as i said ) mat. paris tells us , that the barons would do nothing without the rest of their peers , whom it seems the king had then omitted to summon ; and therefore i must needs tell you , that i am not of your doctors opinion , nor yet of cambden's nameless author , that this king after his victory over montfort and his adherents could by his prerogative call , or omit what peers he pleased , since it is contrary to the declaration of all the bishops , abbots , and priors in full parliament , rich. . wherein they claimed , that holding per baronium ▪ it did belong to them , de iure & consuetudine r●gni angliae ( that is , by rights of prescription ) to be present in all parliaments as peers of the realm , and to treat , consult and ordain concerning the affairs of the kingdom ; and if the spiritual lords claimed this priviledge , sure the temporal barons might with the like right have made the like claim , and i am sure it is highly derogatory to the rights of the peerage of england to maintain that the king either hath , or ever had the power of calling and leaving out what lords he pleased , and so to make pack'd parliaments to serve a turn when ever he pleases . but to come to the main strength of your argument , that because the more discreet men of the kingdom of the greater as well of the less●r are only mentioned in this statute ; that therefore there were only called to it such lords and tenants in capite , as the king pleased to summon , and that all the rest were left out ; which is a very idle supposition ; for at this rate , may as well say , that there were no temporal barons there at all , and that by the greater discreet m●n are to be understood some of the bishops and judges ; who tho no peers ▪ yet were then the most learned in the laws and customs of the kingdom of any persons at that time , and consequently the most wise and discreet to draw up laws , and by the lesser sort of discreet men , shall be understood such great clerks and lawyers , tho not tenants in capite ; as the king pleased to chuse , as being likewise most able to advise him . but if you tell me that this interpretation is forced ; i may as well say the same of yours , and that with greater reason . yet i shall prove that this parliament was summoned in no other manner , and consisted of no other persons than those that used to appear in all other preceding great councils or parliaments . in the first place therefore i must put you in mind of what i have already said , that there is no conclusion to be drawn from the bare penning of the different forms of ancient statutes , who were summoned to the making of them , nor by what power they were enacted ; some of them it is true , being drawn in the form of the kings charters , or writs ; without any mention of the assent either of the lords or commons , and others are said to be enacted by the whole realm without any mention of the king at all ; and i have given you a list of divers old statutes from the reign of king henry iii. to the time of king edward iii. in which there is no mention at all made , either of the king , or any other of the three estates ; and yet no man i think but will grant that these statutes were all made , and agreed to by them according to the usual forms , tho it be not particulaly expressed , and therefore to give a better account of this law , it is fit we consider , that these words convocatis discretioribus regni , are no more restrictive to some particular persons , then if it had been in the superlative degree , and instead of discretioribus , it had bin discretissimis , or sapientissimis regni , which no man would interpret to mean only a few of those whom the king should judge the wisest and most discret men of the whole kingdom ; and therefore we must not mind the grammatical , but legal sence of these words , and then it amounts to no more than this , that by the greater discreet men , were meant the lords spiritual and temporal , as under the lesser discreet men were included the commons . but that these minores descreti cannot be understood of the tenants in capite only , appears by the conclusion of the preface to this statute of marle-bridge in these words : provisiones , ordinationes , & statuta subscripta ●b omnibus regni ipsius incalis , tam majoribus , quam minoribus , firmiter & inviolabiliter temporibus perpetuis sta●neri● observari ; so that if by the majores i●colae , who were to observe these statutes , the lords spiritual and temporal are meant , then by the minores incolae regni must be understood by the same reason the whole commons of england ; and so likewise for parity of reason by the minores discreti , mentioned before in the preface , must be also meant the representatives of the commons in parliament . and that this alone can be the genuine sense of these words , may appear by comparing this statute with another made at gloucester the th . of edward i. where in the preface it is recited in these words , purvenant m●sm le roy , pur amendement de son royalme , & pur pluis plenier exhibicion de droit sicome le profit d'office demande , appelles les pluis discretes de son royalme auxibien des greindres , come des meindres , establie est , & acordan'ment ordeine . so that if the commons were there called to this parliament , and if by the greindres discretes were understood the lords , then by the like reason under meindres discretes must be meant the commons as at this day . but that this statute was made by the common council of the kingdom , and not by a conventicle of a few of the lords and tenants in capite , summoned ad libitum regis , appears by all the original writs , founded upon several branches of this statute , wh●ch are to be seen in the register ; reciting that this statute was made de communi concilio regni . now the word commune signifies no more than general ; and how could this be call'd a general council , which only consisted of a few of the wiser sort of bishops , lords and tenants in capite ? as for what you and the doctor cite out of cambden's nameless author of king henry's , sending writs of summons , and culling out a few of the earls and barons out of a great multitude that were seditious after the war with the barons was ended ; if you will have it extend to those who never forfeited by reason of montfort's rebellion . i need not say much to it , since mr. selden in his titles of honour hath sufficiently baffled that authors authority , for if it was never true as to earls , it was not like to be truer in respect of the greater barons . but as for your lesser barons or tenants in capite ; i know not but he might be much more in the right in respect of them . what you say as to robert walrand is not much material , for tho he was never so great a baron or lawyer , yet he could draw up this law , but as being one of the kings council , who in those days drew up , and prepared all bills that were offered in parliament . and thus britton might well say , that this was made by the common assent of the grand seigneurs ( this act being so highly for their advantage ) and yet the commons might be also there as well as the great lords ; for otherwise if britton must be literally understood , what becomes of your minores discreti mentioned in this statute to have given their consents as well as the majores , whereas this author mentions none at whose request it was made , but the great lords only : but that by these minores incolae regni , mentioned at the end of this statute , were meant the knights , citizens and burgesses ; pray see a writ of summons the th . of edward i. with the doctors note upon it in his answer to mr. p. the writ is directed to the arch-bishop of canterbury , and concludes thus , that he should warn the procuratores cleri there mentioned to appear with him , ad tractandum , ordinandum & faciendum no●iscum , & cum ceteris praelatis , & pro●eribus , & aliit ●nc●lis regni nostri in the margin over-against these last words , the doctor gives us this note , the incolae regni were the knights , citizens and burgesses mentioned in the former writ , but not here particularly enumerated . now , though it is true , that this writ is after the time that the doctor will acknowledge the commons to have been constantly summoned to parliament , yet if these words could mean the commons in this writ . why they should not signifie the same in this statute , i can see no reason , but the doctors strong prejudices to the contrary . but if you have no more authorities to alledg from the reign of henry the third , pray go on , and shew me the rest of your arguments ; why you suppose the commons were never called in above half the reign of edward the first , till the th . and i desire this the more , because as i have already proved from the statute of west . . ed. . the words & tout le communalty de la terre , coming immediately after the counts , barons ; and those other words foregoing , must needs signifie the whole commonalty of the land ; and so the doctor himself has rendered it in his answer to mr. p. m. but first pray observe what the doctor there tells you , that by the word commonalty he means not the commons in the sense they are now taken , but the community of the tenants in capite only ; and for this , pray consult the writ of summons to the archbishop of canterbury to come to this parliament , ( which i confess is the only writ of this kind that is left upon the rolls from the th . of henry the third to the d. of this king ) in which you will find the archbishop summoned ad tractandum , ordinandum una cum prelatis , & magnatibus regni ; that is , as the doctor explains it , with the prelates and great men of the kingdom , which great men very frequently comprehended as well the barons majores as minores , the earls , barons , and greater tenants in capite , and the less which then were the community of the kingdom ; so that your interpretation of the words des greindres , & des mendres in the statute of gloucester ( by which you would interpret the like words in the statute of marlbridge ) for the commons , as now understood , will signifie nothing , as being before the time we allow the commons to have been summoned to parliament in this kings reign . f. it were a very easie thing for any man of a confident undertaking temper to frame what interpretations he pleases from the general or equivocal of histories or records , if he could as easily find authorities to support it ; but i see nothing like a proof for it , but the doctors bare assertion : since i have already sufficiently proved , that the words communalty and communitas coming in our statutes and records immediately the counts and barons after do always signifie the commons as now understood , and why they should not signifie so here , i can see no reason ; for as to the words in the writ to the arch-bishop of canterbury , they prove nothing at all , who were the constituent parts of that parliament ; for if the word magnates must need signifie the greater and lesser tenants in capite only , pray why do they not signifie so in the writ of summons to parliament , of the th . of henry iii. to the bishop of durham ( which the doctor has printed ) where there is no mention made of his treating or advising with any other persons then the other prelates , & magnatibus nostris , yet the doctor within two leaves after gives us the writs of summons for the knights , citizens and burgesses to this parliament . but it seems in his first edition of his book against mr. p. he had not made those rare discoveries he did afterwards ; where he pretends not to carry this opinion beyond the th of hen. iii. therefore pray go on to shew this new light , by which the doctor discovered , that the commons were never summoned to parliament all the reign of edward i. till the th . m. in the first place , you cannot shew us any mention of the words communalty , or communitas in any of the parliaments of this kings reign ; not in the statute de bigamis made in the th . of this king ; the preamble thereof runs to this effect : that these under-written constitutions were recited before some of the bishops and others of the kings council , and afterwards heard and published before the king and his council , here is no express mention , who were the constituent members of parliament at this time , or of this parliament in particular , more then that it is said in the close of this statute , that the aforesaid constitutions were published at westminster in the parliament after the feast of st. michael . so likewise by the statute of westminster the d . made in the th . of edw. i. it appears that the prelates , earls , barons and the kings council , were the constituent parts of the parliament at gloucester you but now mentioned ; for it recites that the king in the th . year of his reign , convecatis prelatis , comitibus , baronibus , & concilio suo apud glocestre , &c. and thus ; the statute of mortmain made by this king in the th . of his reign , is recited to have been made de consilio pralatorum , comitum , baronum & aliorum fidelium regni nostri de concilio nost●o existentium , &c. the statute of acton burnel , was made in the th . of this king , by himself and his whole council , le roy per luy , & per tout son council ad ordein & establie ; though this was done in parliament , as appears by the statute of merchants of the th . of the same king , which recites , that the king had made by himself and his council at his parliament at acton burnel these establishments . i have been the more particular in the recital of these statutes , not only because here is no mention made of any commons in these parliaments , but also because it farther confutes your position in your th . dialogue , that the king had not then the sole legislative power . f. you have said almost nothing now ( i except that of the kings being the sole legislative power , ) which i have not already freely acknowledged , viz. that the words communitas , and communalty are not above twice mentioned in the enacting part of any statute in this kings reign ; and the knights , citizens and burgesses not once mentioned , till the th . of this king , nor any mention again of the commonalty till the statute of lincoln , made in the th . of edward ii. and yet it appears by the writs of summons and expences , beginning at the th . of edward i. that the commons had been summoned to parliaments , ever since that time ; and that they were so , also before that time ; i have already proved both by acts of parliament and records , but by yours , and your doctors method of arguing ; if the writs of summons to the commons of the th . of henry iii. had happened to have been torn off , and lost , as they easily might have been , since it is only affixt to the roll by a loose schedule , and also that all the writs of summons to the commons had been lost , from the d . of edward i. to the th . then there is no denying the commons to have been there , because particularly named ; and if these writs had also happened afterwards to have been lost till the th . of edward . ii. when they are expresly named in the statute of lincoln which i now mentioned ; then the commons should have been again excluded by the same argument , as they are after the th . of henry iii. because no writs of summons are found for them , nor any mention made of them in any statute , first for above years , and after that for above years together , since you will not allow the words communitas and communalty to signifie the commons , till you please to allow them in that sense . this may serve as a general answer to all you have said ▪ concerning the omission of the commons in all statutes till the th . of this king , and may serve not only for them , but against the bishops and tenants in capite . being all present at divers parliaments , where the acts are recited to have been made by the common assent or accord , without at all specifying whose assent , and sometimes without naming the king at all . this being premised , it will be easie to return you a short and particular answer to the statutes you have cited . as for that de bigamis , you confess that the statute only mentions its being recited before the kings council , and publish'd in parliament without relating what were the constituent parts of it ; ergo , no commons were there , and i may with as good a fa●e say , no bishops , abbots , nor your smaller tenants in capite were there , because not particularly named : as for the rest of the statutes you have cited of gloucester , mortmain and act●n burnel ; 't is true , the prelates , earls and barons are the only particularly mentioned , because they then bore the greatest figure in the government , your lesser tenants in capite being quite lest out ; for that they could not then be comprehended under baronum , i have sufficiently made out . but to conclude , give me any sufficient reason , why the commons might not be at these parliaments as well as they were after the th . tho most commonly no otherwise mentioned then they were before that time , if you say the writs of summons make it out they were there : you confess l●ke your prejudice , since the two writs of summons before that time would , if they had not been lost have made out the same thing . as for what you say for the kings being the sole legislative power in those times . i have long since proved , that no king could ever legally make laws without the consent of the common council or parliament , and after that , all that you can say for the kings making laws alone with the advice of his council signifies nothing ; for if the words are litterally to be understood , then this council of the king , whether you will have it to consist of the whole parliament , as the statute of mortmain seems to intimate , or else of his particular council in parliament , as in the statute of acton burnel , where those constitutions are said to be ordained by the king and his council , if by ordain'd , you mean only drawn up , and prepared for the parliaments assent ; it is no more then what i shall easily grant to have been often used in those times , but if you will have ordained to signifie enacted , then pray tell me how you will avoid the kings council , having a joynt hand with the king in his legislative power , since the words are the king by himself and his council had ordered and established : but you have carried both your self as well as me , too far from the main question ; therefore pray give me some better reasons why you are of this opinion , that the commons were not summoned again to parliament till the th . of edward i. m. i am now coming to it : but first remember that about an hour or two ago , i cited a record of the th . of edward i. which related to an act of the th . of this king ; by which record it appears , that the prelates , earls , barons and other great men of the kingdom had then in full parliament on the first of iune , granted him s. on every knights fee to marry his daughter ; and it thence also appears , that tho this tax is said to be given for themselves and the whole community of the kingdom , yet it was by the community of tenants in capite alone , because it was to be raised wholly upon knights fees ; so that hitherto in this kings reign , there appears nothing that can plainly evince , either the summoning , or being of any commons in parliament , as now understood ; we are at least left at great uncertainties , nay in my opinion , the proof is more strong on the negative , that there were none . f. i wonder you should mention this writ any more , since i have already confuted the doctors notion about it , and proved that it was a general tax granted by the parliament upon the whole kingdom , and not laid either by , or upon , the community of the tenants in capite alone , nor does the way of taxing by s . upon every knights fee at all prove it ; for if it is to be understood of lands only held by knights service ; then this tax could not have extended to any other estates , as certainly it did , since the king could by king iohn's charter , have forced his tenants in capite to grant him an aid towards this marriage of his daughter , and ( if what you say be true ) could also have made all the mesne tenants of the tenants in capite , to have contributed to it according to the knights fees they held , and this without calling a parliament at a● ; therefore pray give some better authority then this , for i●e assure you i am not at all satisfied with it . m. i will now give you the writ the doctor has discovered , and by which , it will plainly appear , that this tax granted in the th of this kings reign , was given before ever the commons were summoned to it ; and for this , the learned doctor has found out a loose bundle of writs of this year , directed to the sheriffs of most counties of england , and they are the ancientest extant , or perhaps that ever were ( for in probability , the calling of knights , citizens and burgesses according to that example was discontinued from the th . of hen. iii. unto this time ) by which two or three knights were directed to be chosen for each county ; pray read the writ it self , since i look upon it as the first pattern of this kind , that of the th . of henry iii. seeming to have been written in haste without those forms , that were afterwards required in writs of this kind , and particularly in this : edwardus dei gratiâ rex angliae , dominus hiberniae ▪ & dux aqui●aniae vice-comisi westm●rlandiae salutem . cum per comites , barones & quosdam alios de proceribus regni nostri , nuper fuisse●us super quibusdam speci●liter requisiti super quibus , tam cum i●sis , quam cum aliis de comitatibus regni illius colloquium ha●ere volumus & tyactat●m , tibi praecipimus quod duos , v●l tres de di●cretioribu● , & ad laborandum potentioribus militibus de comitatu praedicto ●ine delatione eligi , & eos ad nes usque west monasterium venire facias ita quod sint ibidem à die sancti iohannis bapt. prox . futur . in tres septimanes ad ultimum cum plena potestate pro se , & communi●ate comitat. praedicti adconsulendum , & consentienoum pro se & communitate illâ hiis quae comites , barones , & pro. ere 's praedicti , tunc dixerine concordanda , & habeas ibi h●c breve . teste meipso apud westmonast . die jun. anno. regni nostri . whereby you may see in the first place , that there was yet no certain number of knights of shires settled , who were to be summoned to appear at this parliament : and you may in the next place remember from a before mentioned record of the th . ed. i. that on the first of this month , the king had scutage then given him in full parliament ; and now fourteen days after , at the instance of the earls , barons and other great men of the kingdom , upon certain matters by them moved and propounded to him ; he issued his writs of summons to the sheriff● of the several counties , to cause to be chosen two or three knights of each counties , to come to him at westminster , three weeks after st. iohn baptist at farthest . we may also further observe from this writ , that it is most probable ( though it is not here absolutely said so ) that the king was moved by the earls , barons and great men of the kingdom , to call these knights to this parliament , and that as this writ is the first to be found after that of the th of henry iii. so it really was the first writ of summons after that time , for the election of knights to represent the several counties . in the next place , that there could ●e no citizens nor burgesses chosen , or sent to this parliament by vertue of this writ , as they were afterwards by directions contained in the writs sent to the sheriffs for electing knights of the shires . lastly , that by this writ , the knights were to come to the king at westminster , three weeks after st. iohn baptist at furthest . which was the th . of iuly ; also , that in the same year , between the time of the date of the writ , and the time appointed for meeting of the knights , the statute of westminster the third was made as may appear by this clause at the beginning , dominus rex in parliamento suo apud west monasterium post pascha-a●o regni sui decimo octavo , videlicet in quindena sancti iohannis baptist. ( that is the th . of iuly ) ad instantiam magnatum regni sui concessi● , providit . & statuit , quod de caetero liceat unicuique libero homini , &c. so that this was the same full parliament , which gave the king scutage on the first of iune , and then the king and barons , without the commons , made this statute , or the knights had another summons after the date of this writ ( for before that they were not in parliament ) or the knights came a week before they had need to have done , but neither of the latter are probable , seeing the knights then were great husbands of their time and expences , and were not very forward to undertake this service , as being constantly bound with , or engaged by sureties , or manucaptors for the performance of it , and their appearance in parliament , and therefore it seems reasonable to conclude , that this law was made without them , and before their coming to parliament . so much of this writ , from which , as well as divers following writs and other records ; it is evident that it was from this kings authority , and at this very time that the house of commons came to be fixed and establish'd in the present constant form , it is now , and hath been in , for many kings reigns , and than the king in this age was not altogether confin'd to any number of knights , citizens or burgesses , nor were several strict forms and usages now practiced ever then thought of , nor some legal niceties and punctilio's now in use , then judged absolutely necessary . f. pray give me leave to answer what you have now said from this writ , before you proceed to any other record . first as to your argument from the variety or uncertainty of the number of knights of shires , which you at first suppose to have been summoned to parliament , that i doubt will prove a gross mistake , for if we closlely consider the writ it self , it will prove no more then a summons of these knights to a great council , colloquy or treatise ( as the writ here cal'● it ) and not to a parliament , the words colloquium & tractatum mentioned in the writ , not then signifying a parliament ; but such a collequy treatise , or great council as is mentioned i● the statute of the th . of this king , forbiding all men coming with arms to such assemblies wherein there is also a plain difference made between parliaments and such treatises as i have already proved from the statute of the staple of the th . of edward iii. which was first made in such a treatise or council as appears by the title to the said statutes , and was afterwards confirmed by the next parliament , in the th . year of the same king , cap. . whereby magna charta , and all other statutes before made are also confirmed ; for had this summons been to a parliament , sure there would have bin also writs of summons found for the electing ▪ and returning of citizens and burgesses , as well as knights of shires to this assembly , and these writs of summons would have been entered on the dorse of the close rolls according to the rules , your self have laid down ; whereas this writ is only found , in a loose bundle of writs of divers other matters ; neither is there any title in the margin of the record ( as is usual in writs of summons ) to parliament , whereby it may appear , what kind of assembly this was , to which these knights were summoned , nor is your argument from the date of the writs of summons any convincing proof , that the commons were not in this parliament at the time of the writ issued ; since during the session of this parliament , the earls and barons might make this request , for calling of those knights out of the counties , to give their opinions and advice in the matters to be proposed to them by the king , and that thereupon , the king at their request , thought fit to summon two or three more of the knights of shires to have their advice also . and as for your last argument , that the same parliament which gave the tax above mentioned on the first of iune , must be sitting , even to the very time of the return of the writ , because the statute of westminster , the third was mane on the quindene of st. iohn baptist : ( viz. the th . of iuly ) so that the king and the barons , without the commons , made this statute , and that these knights were summoned after the act was passed . there is no necessity of making these consequences , for this parliament might very well be dissolved that very day this act passed , and this council or colloquy might be summoned to meet within three weeks after mid-summer ( i. e. about the th . of iuly ) according to the writ you have cited . and so i believe it would appear were the rolls of that parliament now extant , as th●y are lost , as well as those of divers succeeding parliaments . m. well then you are forced to confess , that this writ was issued whilst the parliament was still sitting ; and if so , i cannot see any need there was of another less council or colloquy to meet , after the parliament was ended , since as long as it was sitting , that could have much better dispatch'd all such business as the king had to do , and how the king could foresee that he should have need of another council before he had any business for it , seems very improbable ; and therefore i think i may very well suppose with the doctor , that this writ was a summons to parliament , though it does not ( i grant ) expresly call it so ; but your argument is of no weight , that because this writ was not entred upon the close roll , that therefore , it is not to be look'd upon as a summons to parliament , as also because the title to it is only summonitio ad consilium ; since the doctor in his answer to mr. p. gives us several parliament writs upon the close rolls with this title ad consilium , which proves that the king had in those days a larger power of calling what number of knights of shires he pleased to parliaments , as appears by two other writs he there gives us of the d . of edward i. which are entred in the close rolls to the sheriff of northumberland , to cause two knights to be elected for that county , bearing date the th . of october , and the next day after the king , as appears by another writ to the same sheriff , ordered him to cause to be chosen two other knights besides the former , and to cause them to appear at westminster the morrow after st. martin's day , to hear and do such things as the king should more fully enjoyn : the like writs ( with bot● the former ) were sent to all the sheriffs in england . now though it is true ▪ that the title to the first of these writs , is only de melitibus eligendis & mittendis ad concilium ; yet these words well considered must certainly here mean a parliament , both these writs being entred upon the close rolls where all writs of this kind are wont to be found , as i have already observed ; and besides the words in the first writ are the same with those which are found in several other writs of summons to parliament , viz. ad consule●dum , & consentiend . pro se & comm●nitate illà biis qua comites , barones & proceres pr●dict● : concorditer ordinaverint in praemissis . f. i confess we are at a loss in this affair , for want of the records of this parliament , which if we had i doubt not but there would appear very good reasons why the lords did then desire the king should consult more of the knights of the shires then what had appeared at this parliament , as that lords might refuse to give their advice in the matters proposed by the king , without he would also consult more of the best and ablest knights of counties , who were to come up with fresh power , and further instructions , what answer to give the king in the matters he should propose , which , that it was neither to give money , nor make laws , is plain ; since ( you say ) the tax of s . on even knights fee was given , and the statute of westminster d. made before they came up to parliament ; but indeed the words in the writ plainly prove that this was no parliamentary meeting , since they are here only summoned , ad con ulendum , & cons●●iendum ; whereas in all writs of summons to future parliaments , the words are ad faci●ndum quod ●unc de communi consilio ordinabitur ; or the like , as appears by the writ of summons of the d . of this king , which the doctor has printed , whereas the words in this writ are ad consentiendum , &c. ●iis qua comites ▪ barones & proceres ●radicti rune duxerint concordanda , &c. and if this had been done at the request of all the tenants in capite ( as you suppose , ) how come the bishops , abbots and priors , who held also in capite to be omitted , and not mentioned in this writ , to have joyned in this request , as well as the earls , barons and great men ? but as for the doctors next precedent , viz. a writ to the sheriff of northumberland , to return two knights of the shire , and then the next day after , other two for the same county , i am not at all satisfied , that those writs were a summons to a parliament and not to a great council , for besides the title of the writ is de militibus eligendis & mi●tendis ad consilium , and the words in the writ are not the same with those which were commonly used in writs of summons to parliament , as i have already shewn ' you in this writ of summons we are now upon : whereas in the summons to parliaments of the d . of this king , the ordaining part doth as much refer to the commons , as to the lords , the commune consilium consisting of both ; whereas in these writs you have cited , they were to consent to such things which the earls , barons and great men , should think fit to agree to ; but that i may shew you a little more plainly , the absurdity of this fancy of your doctors , that these knights of shires were now summoned , the parliament sitting ; pray let me ask you one or two questions concerning this business , pray who were these gentlemen that the king you say thus summoned to parliament ? m. according to the doctors account , they must have been all tenants i● capite , since he often tells us , that out of these alone , the knights of shires were chosen at the first . f. well , but then who were these magnates and alii proceres mentioned in the statute of westminster , and in this writ of the th . of edward i. ? m. i must own my self at a loss , certainly to define who they were ; for if i say they were the smaller tenants in capite , who are here put as a distinct order from the comites & barones immediately foregoing ; i foresee you will ask me how these gentlemen could be ●ummoned , since all the tenants in capite were at this parliament already ; therefore i must tell you , i think there were only some of the greatest and wisest of the tenants in capite who were no barons now summoned , and whom the doctor tells us , were often called to great councils , as barons , peers , and who , though sometimes called to sit among the lords , were often again omitted in several kings reigns , so that this parliament was composed ( as those of marlbridg and glouces●er ) not of all , but only of the more discreet of these lesser barons or tenants in capite . f. if this be all you have to say to extricate your self out of this difficulty , i think it will not amount to much , for in the first place , all you have here said is meer conjecture without any proof ; since this statute of westminster d. says only in general , that it was made at the instance of the magnates under which title your doctor , when he explains the writ of summons to the arch. bishops of canterbury tells us , were frequently comprehended the barones majores , the earls and barons , as under minores , the lesser tenants in capite , which when the statute of westmister the first was made he will have to be the whole commonalty of the land therein mentioned ; and why this parliament of westminster the d. should not consist of the same members now , needs some better reasons than your bare affirmation to the contrary . besides this prerogative of calling these barons peers to parliament , did not only extend to tenants in capite , but to other mesn tenants also ; if the king thought them considerable enough for estates , or wisdom to do them that honour , and so was not confined to summon none but tenants in capite , who according to your interpretation of k. iohn's charter had all a right to appear by general wr●ts , at the common council of the kingdom : but you may put what sense you please on these words magnates & proceres , yet i am sure your doctor can take them in no other sense than for the community of all the tenants in capite both great and small ; and so he tells us in his glossary when he comments upon the writ of the edw. . which you now mentioned , and which refers to this very parliament of the th . when forty shillings was granted on every knights fee to marry the kings daughter ; and there the doctor immediately tells us , that such as payed that scutage were tota communitas regni , and no others ; and of these the tenants in capite granted . and payed it first for themselves and tenants , &c. and which must certainly relate to this very parliament of the edw. . or none at all . m. i confess i do not see how the doctor can solve this difficulty ; but by denying what he has already said ; and affirming , as i do now , that all the lesser tenants in capite were not summoned to this parliament , but only some of them at last ordered by this writ to be chosen and returned by the counties . f. yes , he might do it , if bare affirming were to pass for proof ; but i shall not give up my reason upon no better grounds either to him , or you ; not to mention the improbability of the thing , that the king should be now over-perswaded by the earls , barons , and other great men to call these knights of s●ires which had been now omitted ever since the hen. . for above twenty year● , when he had no need at all of them ▪ but rather the contrary advantage of governing without them , since it is the policy of princes rather to diminish than increase the number of the members of their great at well as private councils , who certainly are most easily managed when they are a few than a great many . m. but what if we should go from the doctors position , and say , that perhaps these knights were chosen out of the mesn tenants of the tenants in capite , many of whom i grant might be considerable for interest as well as prudence ; and with whom the king at their request might desire to treat of certain matters which had been before moved and propounded by him . f. this is all that can be said , and yet is much more unlikely then the other ; since to believe that the earls , barons and tenants in capite should be now grown so weary of their power of imposing taxes ▪ and making law● for the whole nation as to , intreat the king to admit their under-tenants to partake of so large a share in both , is so extravagant a fancy , that if it had not suited with the doctor 's present hypothesis , he would never have asserted it in cold blood ; since himself affirm● that upon the making of king iohn's charter , that the earls , barons and tenants in cap●●e , were the only parties to it , and that all the rest of their tenants who were there present were only their retinue and tenants in military service which were with them at runnemede , and were hardly to be reckoned among the freemen of the kingdom , all the rest being only followers who helped to augment the noise ; and were not law-makers , for 't is not probable ( says the doctor very well ) that those men that had the force of the nation would permit men of small reputation to share with them in law-making , those that had the power of this or any other nation de fac●o , always did give laws , and tax the people . but it seems these great lords and tenants in capite , are either very stiff to maintain ; or else easie to give up their priviledges just as it best suits with the doctors present occasion ; but the doctor may contradict himself as much as he pleases ; since it is not his fault , but his hypothesis that hath lead him into it . m. i confess it does seem somewhat hard at present to conceive it , but we know not what reasons the lords and tenants in capite might have had to desire the concurrence of these knights of shires at this juncture of time ; but that their coming to parliament looks like a new institution , may farther appear from hence , that the king for a good while after the introducing knights of shires to serve in parliament , was wont to use the liberty of nominating the same members of parliament who were formerly chosen , appears by a very remarkable writ the doctor there likewise gives us of the th . of the same king , directed to the sheriff of cumberland , whereby he is commanded to cause to appear at the parliament at lincoln on the octive of st. hilary the very same knights , citizens and burgesses who had before appeared at the last parliament , unless any of them were sick or dead . from which we may collect , that our kings in those days often made use of their prerogative of summoning such members to parliament , as were not then actually chosen to serve in that parliament ; and for a farther confirmation of this , there is still extant upon record in the same roll the returns of several of the sheriffs upon the same writs . whereby it appears that the same members were returned to appear in this parliament who had before served at the precedent , unless in the case of some that were sick or dead . and that our kings had not yet a long time after lost their prerogative of nominating how many knights , citizens and burgesses they would have chosen and returned to appear in parliament , may appear by a writ of the . edw. . whereby one knight for a county , and one citizen and burgess , and those too , named by the king to the sheriff were to be summoned to appear at winchester to do those things that are appointed in the same writ , which were likewise directed to all the sheriffs in england ; and that this was a parliament appears from hence , that the knights , citizens and burgesses had writs for their expences at this meeting at winchester . and tho in these writs it is only expressed by these words ▪ magnum consilium nos●rum , yet from this writ of ●ummons it is evident , it did the business of a parliament , and so no great matter for the name . f. if th●se be all the arguments you have to produce against the ancient right of the commons being part of the parliament before the edw. . i doubt they will not be sufficient to do the business . for as to this record of the ● of edw. . whereby the king is supposed to have had a power to cause those knights of shires to be returned who were elected to serve in the parliament before going without any new ele●tion , this is altogether pre●ar●ou● ; for if you will but read the writ it self , and the reason of the king 's thus acting , it will plainly prove the contrary . for the king re●ite● in that writ , that having resolved that the charter of forests should be observed and that his subjects had made a perambulation thereupon ; yet that he would conclude nothing in that matter , without the counsel of the prelates , earls ▪ barons , and other great men ; and therefore desiring to hasten that business , as far as he could without any delay . he thereby orders him to cause to come before him to the parliament at lincoln the same knights , citize●n , and burgesses as were before elected . now the king might have very good reason for it , why he would rather treat with them than with any other , because they had been privy to all the precedent transactions concerning this business of forests , and therfore were most likely to come to the speediest conclusion with the king in that affair , as being better instructed in it , than it was possible for any new members to be , who had not before been privy to the whole affair . yet that the king never intended hereby to impose representatives upon his people without their free consent , appears by this clause at the end of the said writ . 〈◊〉 qu●d milites , c●ves & burgenses praedicti dictis die , & loco n●●dis omnibus inter●ut eum plena potestate aud●endi , & faciendi ea quae ibidem in praemiss●● ordinaeri con●ingent pro cummuni commodo dicti regni . now how these knights , citizens and burgesses could appear in parliament with full power of acting therein , without the new election or confirmation at least of those whom they represented , i should be very glad ●f the doctor or your self could inform me ▪ but to come to your next record of the edw. . whereby you would prove that the king in those days had a power of appointing not only how many citizens and burgesses should appear in parliament for each county , but also could name the persons that should appear therein . i wonder how the doctor could so impose upon your , or his own , understanding since nothing is more apparent than that this council at winchester to which they were summoned , was no parliament at all but a great council , as appears by the very words of the writ it self , which recites , that whereas a parliament lately at westminster had given the king a su●sidy of sh. and d. upon every parish in england , that the king being willing to be better inform'd after what manner the levy of this tax might be soonest performed , and because it would be burthensom for all the great men , knights , citizens and burgesses , who came to the said parliament to meet together again for this matter , therefore he ordained for the sparing their pains and expences , to have a colloquy and treatise with some of the same members , and therefore names the very persons whom he commands should appear before him at winchester to in●orm him and his council of the best manner and form whereby the said tax might be soonest and most conveniently levyed , according to the intent of the said grant. so that nothing is more plain from the writ it self , than that this assembly was no parliament ; the proper business of which is always to make laws , give money , or re●ress grievances , none of which ●ut it is apparent were the cause of this meeting . to which these that were summoned did not appear as knights of the shires ( their power being expired at the dissolution of the parliament ) but only 〈◊〉 so many particular private men , who by reason of their interest in the country the king supposed could best inform him in the business above mentioned . but that in the reign of this king there were several councils of this kind , which tho no parliaments as having but one knight , one citizen , and one burgess , and only making temporary constitutions concerning trade , and other things of less moment , which were to be put in practice for a time till they could be confirmed by the next parl●ament , appears by the ordinance or statute of the staple above mentioned . and of these mr. pryn in the first part of his parliamentary register of writs gives us divers precedents ; which he rightly so that i hope i have now fairly run through , and examined all the precedents which you or your doctor have been able to urge in this great question ▪ and i think , if you are a● candid and ingenuous as i take you to be , you will not assert , that any of them do amount to a proof ▪ either that the commons were never summoned from the ● th . of henry iii. to the th . of edward i. or that the writs of summons he there produces , was to a parliament and not to a great council , or that the king ever took upon him to appoint what number of knights , citizens and burgesses , should come to parliament , or could nominate who they should be , or could discharge whom he pleased from serving as members therein . all which your doctor , i think with greater confidence , than right understanding of the true meaning of the ancient writs and records of parliament , hath undertaken to assert ▪ i beg your pardon for troubling you so long on these heads . since the length as well as diversity of records you have now cited , could not be answered in less compass . m. i must confess , you have given pretty plausible answers to most of the authorities and records i have now cited , yet i cannot assent so far as to come over to your opinion , without a longer consideration of the strength of the answers you have now given me to the doctors authorities . but in the mean time you would oblige me , if you could give me the rest of your arguments , whereby you would undertake to prove that the commons have been always an essential part of the parliament ever since the conquest , for it seems to me , by what i have read out of our ancient historians , that there is no express mention made of them by name . in any historian or record , till the reign of edward i. and as for those arguments mr. p. hath given us to the contrary , methinks the doctor hath given satisfactory answers to them . f. i think i have made it clear enough , that the commons of england were a constituent part of the wittena g●●ote , or common council of the nation before your pretended conquest ; and if it doth not appear that they were deprived of that right by the normans entrance ( which you have not yet proved ) i think we may very well conclude , that things continued in the same state as to the fundamental constitution of the government ▪ as well after your conquest as they did before . nor have you as i see proved any thing to the contrary . since you confess that as much a conquerour as king william was , yet he altered nothing in those fundamental constitutions , the most that you pretend he did , being only in an alteration of the persons , who were the legislators from english to french men or normans ; so that upon the whole matter , i think there is no need of any new arguments to confirm this truth , since the commons of england , claiming a right by prescription , of having their representatives in parliament ; if you nor your doctor , nor none of those whom he follows , can prove by sufficient authorities when this began , then i am sure you ought if you were of the jury in th●s matter , to find for the tenants in possession ; since that , together with a constant usage , time out of mind is as well by your civil as our common law a sufficient title to any estate ; yet i doubt not but to shew you the next time we meet , that the doctor has no● given such satis●a●●ory answers as you imagine to most of mr. p's best arguments , proving this right of prescription to have been the constant opinion of an succeeding ages ; to which i shall also add divers new authorities , as well from ancient historians , as parliamentary records and statutes , but since it is grown now very late , i beg your pardon till another opportunity . m. i thank you sir for the pains you have taken to satisfie me in this gre●t question ; but pray come again within a night or two , that we may make an end of this weighty controversie , and then we may proceed to wha● we at first intended , viz. whether the king can ever lawfully be resisted , or whether by any act he may commit , he can ever 〈◊〉 to be king. f. i accept of your proposal , and shall wait of you again as you appoint , but in the mean time pray consider well of the authorities i have now urged , and the answers i have given to your argument , and then i hope there will be the less need of new ones . m. i shall not fall to do it , but in the mean time am your humble servant . f. and i am yours . advertisement . the publisher begs your pardon for letting a term pass without giving you this dialogue , which has so close a dependance on the former ; but it has been his own unhappyness , and not his faul● . in the next place he hopes you will not take it ill of him , that he has ●welled this to a bigger bulk than the other , since the author , by reason of the weightiness , as well as multiplicity of the arguments could not make it 〈◊〉 , w●thout doing a considerable injury to this important subject . and to let you se● that i do not dissemble , the author was forced to reser●● two or three sheets more of the same argument ( because he would not ●ver tire you ) for the next discourse . and the author also desires the learned doctor brady's pardon , if through his own hast , or the inadvertency of the compositor , there have been some omissions of the marginal references to his answer to mr. petyr , but since the doctor knows very well how to distinguish his own from the authors matter , and that those who are conversant in his w●itings , may do so likewise ; he hopes , both the doctor and the reader will the more easily forgive it ; especially , since you will find him so fair a representer , as not to curtail the doctors arguments , but rather to enlarge them wh●● he thought he had a just occasion . finis . bibliotheca politica : or a discourse by way of dialogue , being a continuation of the former discourse , concerning the antiquity of the commons in parliament ; wherein the best authorities for it are proposed and examined . with an entrance upon the question of non-resistance , &c. the third part. collected out of the most approved authors , both antient and modern . dialogue the eighth . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms ; where also may be had the first , second , third , fourth , fifth , sixth and seventh dialogues . . the authors chiefly made use of in this discourse , and how denoted in the margin . p. r. c , mr. petyts rights of the commons asserted . b. a. p. dr. bradyes answer to mr. petyts treatise . b. a. a. dr. bradyes answer to mr. cookes treatise intitled , argumentum antinormannicum . the preface to the reader . i must beg your pardon , if i have made my publisher tell you an untruth before i was aware , in the advertisement at the end of the last dialogue ; when he told you there were , but two or three sheets behind upon this subject ; whereas indeed this dialogue is almost wholy taken up in discussing these reasons , and authorities , that have been formerly brought by mr. petyt or are now newly added by me ; to prove that the commons had representatives in parliament long before the th of henry the d , in doing which , if i have been too long , i hope you will pardon it , since so weighty a question could not be dismist without saying the most , i could find had been alledged ; as well for as against it . and since i was to explain the meaning of those words clerus & populus , in the times immediately after the conquest , it was fit to let you know that anciently the inferiour clergy , ( who did not hold in capite ) had places and made a part of the d estate , as well the bishops and abbots , in our general councils or parliaments . there was likewise a necessity of shewing , that the commons of england claim to appear in parliament by prescription , time beyond memory , and consequently of shewing how that time is to be understood in all our law books ; which are the onely proper interpreters of that law term of time , of which there is no memory to the contrary . and since there is no writer that i know of , who hath opposed this notion of the right of prescription in the commons , but mr. prin. i have impartially consider'd , what he has writ against it , in his d and d. part of his parliamentary register , and put down the substance of it in this discourse , with what may be reasonably replyed thereunto ; so that considering the many fresh authorities from historians and records that are here inserted , and that have never been publisht altogether before . i think i may safely affirm , that there hath never been so much hitherto put together of this kind ; nor perhaps will be till mr. petyt shall please to publish at large his learned and elaberate collections from ancient monuments of antiquity , histories ; ( both manuscript and print ) as also from parliamentary and other records on this important subject , many of which you will here find abbreviated ; and to whose learning and knowledg in matters of this kind , i must own my self beholding for the arguments from the inferior clergy's ( who were not tenants in capite ) being anciently part of the great council of the whole kingdom , as also that of applying the right of prescription to the house of commons . but if dr , brady or any friend of his shall think fit to animadvert upon any thing that hath been here laid down , i shall be so far from being concerned at it , that i shall rather be very well satisfied ; s●nce as a fair representer of other mens opinions , who write not for victory , but the discovery of truth , i shall be glad if the dr. or any other learned person shall think fit to give the world greater light on this subject , by publishing somewhat that is now , and more convincing ; then what hath been heretofore done . for had it appeared so to me , i declare i should not have taken so much pains to set down the arguments on both sides ; which i shall still continue to do , if any thing shall be performed material in this kind . i have to make up this discourse just entred upon the question of non-resistance , but cannot go far in it now ; but shall leave what is to be f●rther said upon that important subject to the next dialogue , which will be speedily published . the eighth dialogue between mr. meanwell a civilian , and mr. freeman a gentleman . m. i am glad to see you again so soon ; for indeed i am very impatient to make an end of this great question concerning the antiquity of the commons appearing in parliament ; and therefore pray go on where you left off , and give me those plain proofs you promised me , whereby you would make out that both the knights of shires , as well as the citizens and burgesses had a right to be there ever since the conquest ; for i desire to go no higher . f. i thought i had said enough on that subject at our last meeting to satisfie any reasonable person : i am sure more than you were able fairly to answer , especially as to my replies to the best authorities you brought from the doctor ; and therefore pray before we proceed farther , tell me your opinion upon second thoughts of those authorities and arguments i then gave you . m. i must confess they do somewhat shock me ; but i hope you will pardon me if i cannot come over to you , without first hearing what may be said by the other side , and to this end i have writ to the learned dr. for his solution to several difficulties , that i confes● upon his hypothesis i know not how to solve ; but doubt not but to receive farther satisfaction from him as to those points in a short time ; but in the mean while , let us proceed in our intended design , and examine the rest of the arguments you have to produce on your side . f. i shall obey your commands ; and therefore in the first place you cannot expect more than is in our power to give you : for since all the parliament-rolls and writs of summons , ( except those of the th of henry the third ) are lost till after the times in question between us , you must be contented with what other proofs we can produce , provided they are sufficient to satisfie any unbyast , indifferent person : and to this end i shall sort the authorities i intend to make use of into these three heads . first , i shall give you divers quotations out of the most ancient writers , who lived in , or nearest the time you prefix ; viz. the coming in of the norman william ; and shall descend down in order of time as low as your drs. th of edward i. . i shall shew you from the authorities and testimonies of the judges of almost all our courts ; of the house of commons ; nay of several whole parliaments , and the king himself , that the commons had an undoubted right of s●tting there by prescription . . from the consent of all our neighbouring kingdoms who being governed by a king , and a great council or assembly of the estates according to the gothick model , the commons had always from the institution of the government their representatives in those assemblies . m. i much doubt that ; but pray begin with your ancient historians ; for as for my own part ▪ i must freely tell you , though i have looked them over very warily , yet i can find nothing in them concerning the particular constituent parts , or members , of our great , or common councils , but the magnates , optimates , or principes , comites and barones ; all which tho' you have at our last meeting shewed me from some authorities , that they may take in others , tho' not nob●● by birth ; yet since these words have been most commonly taken in another sense ; it needs some better proof than to say in general , that meer commoners were there , because those general words may sometimes be taken in that sense ▪ and as for the words clerus and populus , which i confess are often mentioned to be present at those assemblies ; the learned dr. in several places of his answer to mr. p. as also in his glossary hath plainly proved , that as the word clerus sometimes signifies the bishops , and sometimes the inferiour clergy ; so populus does also neither great nor little people , but only the layety ; and therefore as it is used , and restrained signifies the lay plebs ; or the lay magnates . what i mean by plebs , i shall shew you by and by ; but that the word populus does not signifie the inferiour sort of people , or such as were inferiour to barons , tenants in capite , or noble-men , the dr. has very well proved from that passage made use of by mr. p. to prove the commons to have been in that great council which made henry the first king , because it is said by mat. paris , that congregato clero , & populo universo , &c. by which word populus he would understand the commons alone distinct from the great lords : but the dr. very plainly shew● him the falseness of this interpretation from the same author within three lines of the place himself had cited ; where the same body of men , which is but just before called populus , is presently after called magnates , ad haec clero respondente & magnatibus cunctis ; not one word in this place of any populus , but the great , or noble-men , ( that is the tenants in capite ) must be the people or lay-men here mentioned , and this same clerus and populus is by eadmerus , speaking of a great council held at westminster in the second year of this king called primates regni u●riusque ordinis ; or as florence of worcester words it , the orders of men assembled in this very council , omnes principes regni sui ecclesiastici , & secularis ordinis ; the which the dr. also proves from several like passages in eadmerus ; in all which , as also in all other authors the dr. hath there cited : this populus is explained to be the earls , barons , and great men of the kingdom only , that is , all the greater , as well as smaller tenants in capite . and tho' i confess at our last meeting you brought very good proof , that the word populus was more comprehensive among the romans ; yet tho' the roman populus comprehended all the people , as well nobility as plebeians ; and that in scotland it took in the burgesses of the royal burroughs , which hold immediately of the king ; yet does it not follow that this word must needs signifie so in this kingdom too , since in all countreys not all the people , but only the governing part of it is used for the populus in all histories , publick acts , and laws of those kingdoms ; thus in denmark formerly , and still in poland , the populus consisted solely of the great councils , of the nobility and senate , in which there were no plebeians at all . f. i hoped we had done wrangling about this word populus ; but since i see you are not yet satisfied , i shall shew you more plainly that by this word used in our ancient english historians , is not only meant the great lords and tenants in capite , but another larger , and more comprehensive body ; and whereas you say that the word populus is still restrained by our ancient historians to the magnates , primates , & principes regni ; all which words do in their genuine signification signifie great or noble-men ; and that tho' they are sometimes taken in a different acceptation , yet that it lies upon me to prove that they are to be taken in my sense , to this i must tell you , that the proving part ought to lie wholly of your side ; for since the commons of england have been for above these four hundred years constituent members of our parliament , ( as is agreed on all hands ) and that they also claim to be so by right of prescription , it lies still upon your door to prove the contrary , and to shew at what time , and upon what occasion they were first introduced , which if you have not been able hitherto to perform , so as to give me any tolerable satisfaction ; you cannot blame me if i still keep my own opinion , and believe them as ancient as kingly government it self in this our island . but since i grant these words clerus and populus are of a general , and equivocal signification , their true sense and meaning is best to be understood from the subject matter that is treated of , as i shall shew you first from the nature and signification of the words clerus , and populus , according to the ancient constitution of our government , that they must signifie many more than your tenants in capite alone ; and then i shall confirm my interpretation by the authority of such ancient historians as lived either in , or very near the times i mention : and therefore i shall first prove it from the great analogy there was between the clerus , and the populus , so that if the clerus took in more than your tenants in capite in our common councils , by the same reason the populus must do so too . now that this word clerus , when used by it self , does not originally signifie either the bishops and abbots alone , or the inferiour clergy alone , ( as your dr. asserts ) is evident , because clerus is a general word , and comprehends all the clergy of whatsoever sort or degree : now that all the clergy as well the superiour as inferiour , had either themselves in person , or else by their representatives a place in the saxon witten gemots , or mycel synods , and made together with the laity one entire council , or general assembly , without the joynt consent of both which no laws or constitutions , whether ecclesiastical or civil , could be enacted ; for proof of this , we need go no farther than sir h. spelman's first volume of saxon councils , and particularly in the councils or synods of clovesho first and second , that of kingston , a. d. . that held under king egbert , and withlafe king of the mercians , and that of winchester under the same king egbert , in which tithes were first granted ; in all which you will find that both the clergy , as well the inferiour , below the degree of bishops and abbots , as also the laity below your earls , and great aldermen and wites had a share . and that this continued so both in , and after the norman times , appears by the first great councils we have left us , that were held under the first kings of the norman race . m. i should be very glad to see that proved ; for i always hitherto believed that none of the clergy had then any votes in the great , or common council of the kingdom , but those bishops , abbots and priors , who all held in capite of the king alone ; and tho' it is true , there was also a synod , or convocation of the clergy often held at the same time when the common council of the kingdom was assembled , yet was it no part of that council ; and as the clergy had nothing to do in the making of temporal laws ; so had the laity no hand in the making of ecclesiastical canons , or constitutions for the popes legate or arch-bishop of canterbury often held these synods at other times when the common council of the kingdom was not assembled at all ; and thus it continued till the th and th of henry the th , when the king was first by the clergy in convocation , and afterwards by the whole parliament recognized and declared supreme head of the church of england under christ ; and from that time the king reassumed the power which the pope had before usurped ; and his consent alone under the great seal is the only ratification of all canons or ecclesiastical constitutions passed in either of the convocations of canterbury , or york , at this day . f. i grant that for between three hundred , and four hundred years the matter of fact hath been as you say ; but that it was not so from the beginning , is also as certain ; for first in the saxon times before the popes usurpation came in , it is evident from the councils , or synods i have now cited that the king had no more power to make or confirm any general ecclesiastical laws or constitutions without the consent of the wittena gemot or mycel synod consisting of the clergy , as well as laity , than he had to make temporal laws without it . so far were they in those times from having any notion of any personal supremacy in the king in spiritual , more than in temporal matters ; and that this continued so till the pope did not only usurp upon the king 's right , but that of the whole kingdom in general , may appear by those memorial● we have left us , of such common councils or synods in the reigns of our first norman kings . for the proof of which , i shall begin with the reign of william l. in whose th year , the priviledges of the abby of westminster were confirmed by that king in a common council , as well of all the clergy as laity of the whole kingdom , as may be proved by a charter , still to be sound at large in the old char●ulary of the abby of westminster , now in the corronian library ; collected by sulcardus an ancient monk of that abby , the conclusion of which charter of priviledges , makes it very plain of what members this council then consisted , and who gave their consents to the acts of it ; which pray read , in solemnitate pentecost● : haebito consilio in celeberrino loco praescripti westmonast , & a nostra regia maj●s●ate conventis in unum , cunctis regni nostri primatibus , ad audiendes , & confirmandas quosdam synodalis decreti causas necessarias communi consensu maxime episcoporum abbatum , & alio●um insignium procerum , &c. scripta est haec charta , & sigillata & ab ipso reg● , & supradic●is personis testificata confirmat . & auctorizata in dei nomine , &c. this being one of the first , and most remarkable councils of this kings reign . i cannot let it pass without observing , first , that all the chief men of the kingdom were there , as well of the clergy as of the laity ; and that the words primates , and proceres here mentioned are very comprehensive ; and may take in many others , besides your great lords and tenants in capite , i have already proved at our last meeting but one : secondly , pray observe , that this charter of priviledges , tho' all of them concern meer temporal things , is authorised , confirmed by the common consent , and subscriptions of all the chief men , as well of the clergy as laity ; from all which nothing can appear more plain to me , than that in the reign of this king , the clergy and laity made one common council , without whose joynt consents , nothing could be transacted in the legislative : whether of ecclesiastical , or civil concernment . i could give you more instances of this kind in this king's reign , but i make haste to that of his son william ii. in whose th year eadme●●s tells us , there was a common-council held at rockingham , about the difference between archbishop anselme and the king ; at which were present , episcopi , abbates , principes , ac clericorum , ac laicorum numerosa multitudo ; no● that by principes or chief men , may be here meant many more than your tenants in capite , i have already sufficiently proved : and that this numerosa multitudo must mean somewhat more than those , i shall prove f●rther by and by . in the long reign of henry i. i could give you many instances of this kind , bu● let these suffi●e : in the th year of this king , bromton tells us in his history ( speaking of the council in which this king gave up his right of investitu●es ) clero & populo ad concilium londoniae congregato ; and who this clerus and populus then were , he immediately explains himself ; thus , astantibus archiepiscopis , episcopis , caeteraq , multitudine maxima procerum , & magnatum ; under which words i have already proved , that divers others besides your tenants in capite might be comprehended , and their great number shews them to have been more than those . but tho' this author does not here expresly say it , yet that the inferiour clergy were likewise at these councils , appears from sim. of durham , and the c●ntinuator of florence of worcester , a. d. . being the . of this king , where they both make mention of a synod or council held at london , at which were assembled the archbishops , bishops , abbots , &c ( the pope's legate presiding over the clergy , ) and besides these , cum innumera cloi , & populi multitudine , and the continuator of florence shews us the manner of their giving their consents to those constitutions , as well civil as ecclesiastical , there made , and published : they being proposed , with a placet vobis , and the answer to them is , plaecet , placet , placet , thrice repeated ; which is very like the form still observed in the bishops and lords giving their consent to all matters proposed in their house by saying content . so likewise the continuator of florence , in anno dom. . being the th of this king , mentions such another general council , or great synod ; wherein william archbishop of canterbury presided over the clergy , and after the recital of all the superior clergy as before , he thus proceeds , confluxere quoque illue ( i. e. to westminster ) magnae multitudines clericorum & laicorum , tam divitum , quam mediocrium , & sactus est conventus inaestimabilis sedit etiam tribus diebus , acta sunt ibi de negotiis saecularibus nonnulla , quaedam quidem determinata , quaedam dilata , quaedam vero propter nimium aestuantis turbae tumultum ab audientia judicantium pro●●igata : and tho' the author gives us the ecclesiastical constitutions only , yet it is plain from him , that civil matters were also transacted in this very council which consisted as well of the superior as inferior clergy ; as also of the nobility , and commons ; which are all expressed under the general words of divitum & mediocrium , and resemble the phrases of the majores , & minores ; and the des greindres ; & des meindres , mentioned in the statutes of marlbridge and glocester ; which words were debated at our last meeting . in the reign of k. stephen , there were also several councils held of the same sort : and particularly that of his third year , in which was granted a charter of confirmation of this kings , of the priviledges of the abbey of westminster , which is also to be found in sulcardus's chartalary above-mentioned , wherein after the general words of habito universali totius angliae consilio , and a mention of the pope's legate ( who presided over the clergy ) : it follows thus , ●ffuerunt etiam comites , regni mei & barones quamplurimi , & innumera cleri & populi multitudo qui his omnibus interfuerunt , & religioso favore voluntatem & assensum , authoritati nostrae paginae , & privilegio praebu●rent , &c. so likewise in an ancient manuscript chronicle of the abby of ely , under a. d. . being the th year of k. stephen , there is a remarkable passage , when speaking of a great council then held at london , he expresses it in these terms ▪ concilio adunato cleri , & populi , ( and then explains of what members these did consist ) viz episcoporum atque abbatum , monachorum , & clericorum ) plebisque infinitae multitudinis : now pray give me leave to make some observations from these passages in all these ancient charters , and historians : that besides these bishops , abbots , earls and barons of the kingdom , there were also an innumerable multitude of clergy and people , or ( as the ely chronicle words it ) an infinite number of clerks , and commons . now , pray tell me , what can be meant here by all these put distinct from the rest of the higher orders , but the inferior clergy , as the deans ▪ arch-deacons , and procurators of the chapters of cathedral churches ; as also those of the secular clergy of the whole diocess ? and who can be meant by this infinite multitude of people , or plebis , ( which naturally signifies the common people distinct from the higher nobility ) but the most considerable free-holders , or lords of manners , whether tenants in capite , or not , under the degree of the higher nobility , together with the citizens and burgesses of cities and towns , and who came not only as idle spectators , since the charter i last cited , expresly mentions that they were not only present , but also gave their assents to this charter of king stephens ? m. and may i not with as good reason ask you why these words populus and plebs may not in the historical barbarous latine of that age serve only to express ( not the multitude , or rabble , or meer common people ) but the whole body of lesser tenants in capite , beneath the dignity of the greater barons ? f. i will give you two very good reasons for that ; first , from the great analogy there was then between the members of the inferior clergy , and those of the inferior laiety or commons ; the former of which , even all the abbots and priors ; ( except those few that held in capite ) with all the rest of the inferior clergy already mention'd , holding only in frank alimoign , and not by any military tenure at all . now pray give me any sufficient reason why the layety should not also consist of all other orders of men who did not hold in capite neither , and by whom i do not mean the meer vulgar , or rabble ; tho' freemen , of free-holders of small estates , but the most considerable free-holders or lords of mannors in england ; or else the knights of shires , who , i suppose , represented not only themselves , but their inferior tenants ; whether copy-holders , or for term of years ; as also the representatives of all the cities , and borough towns in england : now these might together with your tenants in capite , make so great an assembly as might very well deserve the title ( with an easie hyperbole ) of infinita or innumera multitudo as our ancient historians express it . whereas your drs. tenants in capite , could never in these first times after this conquest , amount to so great a multitude , not being by his own confession , above persons , besides the bishops , abbots and priors ; who did not make above more , which could never deserve the title of an infinite and innumerable multitude . m. i must confess , that neither your notion nor your authorities to prove it do any way satisfie me , for in the first place your argument from the analogy between the clergy and layety , who , you say , made up this assembly does not hold ; for , tho' i grant there might be in that part of it which we call the convocation , and was then called the synod , all the bishops , abbots , and great dignified clergy-men ; ( nay , procurators of the inferior clergy too if you please ▪ ) yet were not these ( who i grant , were not tenants in capite ) members of the great council of the kingdom ; but a distinct assembly from it , which treated only of spiritual matters , and together with the bishops and abbots made ecclesiastical canons , as the two houses of convocation do at this day ; yet medled not at all in matters of a meer civil , or temporal concern ; any more than the lay council could meddle with spirituals : and to let you see that this was true , it is evident beyond dispute that this ecclesiastical synod was often assembled by the authority of the pope or archbishops of canterbury and york , when the common council of all the layety were not summoned at all : and so vice versa the common council of the kingdom often met , when the synod of the clergy was not convened ; as appears by the most ancient writs of summons to the bishops we have left us ; as particularly , the first writ of this kind that is upon the rolls , viz. that for the bishops ( which mr. prin has printed , in the first part of his parliamentary register ) in the th of k. iohn , and which i have cited from the drs. answer against mr. p. at our last meeting , in which writ , tho' i grant there is a clause for summoning the abbots , and conventual priors , yet there is none for the inferior clergy . but in the next writ , which the same authors have likewise published , viz. that to the archbishops of york there , there is no clause at all for summoning any of the clergy as such , tho' it is true , there is underneath an eodem modo scribitur omnibus episcopis abbatibus , &c. comitibus & baronibus ; which shews that this writ was not to summon them in their spiritual but temporal capacities . so likewise in the next writ of summons to parliament , we have left us on the roll , which is cited in mr. selden's titles of honour : as also in the same parliamentary register , and in dr. b. against mr. p. viz. that of the th of henry the third , to the bishop of duresme without any clause of summons to the clergy , whether abbots or others . so likewise in the next writ of summons that is left us , viz. that of the d of edward the first , ( published also by mr. prin ) to the archbishop of canterbury , in which there is no clause of summoning any of the clergy ; and tho' there immediately follows another writ of the d of this king , in which i grant there is this clause of praemunientes priorem , &c. viz. the prior , chapter , and other of the clergy of his diocess to appear in parliament ; yet that they were no necessary part of it , but only of the convocation , appears by the rest of the writs of summons to bishops , which mr. prin has also given us in that chapter ; all which if you please to peruse , you will find , that in near writs to parliaments or great councils , the clause of praemunientes clerum , is to be found in scarce half of them ; which shews that the summoning or omitting them depended wholly upon the king's pleasure , and so were no constituent part of the great council or parliament , as you suppose they were under the first norman kings ; for then sure they would not have been omitted , to have been constantly summoned in all parliaments , as well as the bishops and abbots . but to come to your next argument from the numerousness of these assemblies , which you say could not be properly called numerosa , or infinita multitudo , whereas all the tenants in capite as well ecclesiasticks as lay-men , did not amount in all to , there may be an allowance made for this to the monkish way of writing of those times , who might call such a great , or more than ordinary assembly of the clergy , and tenants in capite , an innumerable , or infinite multitude , when indeed they were but few more than our lords and commons are at this day . f. i pray sir , give me leave to answer what you already said , before you proceed any farther , because what i have to reply to it , will be pretty long ; in the first place , you cannot with any reason ( if you better consider of it ) deny , that the clergy , as well the superior as inferior , did , before your conquest as well as long after , make but one assembly or body of a general council ; tho' sitting in several places ( as the lords and commons do at this day ) for the words in the old book of ely , are adunato concilio cleri , & populi , which is to be rendred , the council of the clergy and layety being united and joyned together , as i already shewed this word adunato does always signifie ; as also by the confirmation of that charter of king william's to the abby of westminster , and to which , ( tho' a matter of meer temporal concernment ) all the clergy , as well as layety , gave their joynt consents , as appears by the conclusion of that charter , as also to that of k. stephen , but now cited which they could never have done , had they not then made a part of the same general council , or assembly . having proved to you that the inferior clergy did anciently make a part of the general or common council of the whole nation , i shall now proceed to answer your objection : 't is true , that for a great part of some kings reigns , for want of the writs of summons to the superior , as well as to the inferior clergy , we cannot certainly tell , tho' we may presume it from the general words of the historians , whether the inferior clergy were summoned or not ; yet this , i think , i may boldly aver● , that wherever any ancient author makes mention of the clerus , and populus in general , being present at any such common council , it must necessarily mean not the bishops , and abbots ; or the superior clergy alone , or the great lords and tenants in capite onely , but those and the representatives of the whole nation both clergy , and layety taken together ; as i think i have sufficiently made out . nor is your objection considerable , from that writ of the th of king iohn , that no inferiour clergy were summoned , because onely the abbots and priors are mentioned at the end of it , to this i answer , that ( granting it to be a writ of summons to a common council of the kingdom , which is not yet proved ) the omission of the inferiour clergies being summoned , is no cogent argument to prove they were not there ; since for ought as you and i know there might be other writs issued to the inferiour clergy , distinct from those to the bishops and abbots : which last used to have distinct writs to each by themselves , and i may as well suppose these writs to be lost as you do , that all the general writs to the smaller tenants in capite , who were no barons and yet were to be all summoned , according to king iohns charter are all lost ; and as for the abbots and priors mentioned at the end of this writ of king iohns , they were such as held onely in capite , or else such as did not ; if the former , this might be onely a council of tenants in capite , and none other , of which i grant there were many held in those times upon occasion of wars , scurages , and other matters ; but if by these conventual abbots and prio●● summoned by this writ , you will mean all abbots , and priors of whatever tenure ; then it appears plainly that this great council consisted of many other ecclesiasticks , than what held in capite , and if so , why might not the inferiour clergy as well make a part of it ? but as for your next authority , the writ of the th of henry the d , which is certainly a summons to parliament , in which is no clause of summoning the inferiour clergy ; this is no more an argument than the former , since it might not then be the custom to insert them in the same writ with the bishop , to be summoned by him ; but they might have general writs of their own directed to the clergy of each dioces● ; but that all the inferior clergy as well as the superior appeared at divers common councils or parliaments during this kings reign , ( which they could never have done without the kings summons , tho the writs are lost ) may appear from that great council or parliament of the th of henry d : whereto as , mat. paris tells us ( in the place , i have so often mentioned ) were summoned clerus & populus cum magnatibus regionis , or regni as mat. westminister words it ; and in this council was given by omnes de regno the th of all the moveables of all the whole kingdom . so that certainly these omnes de regno must take in all degrees of men , and consequently the inferior clergy too ; since it is certain the bishops , and abbots did never represent them in the house of peers , or in convocation , so as to lay any taxes upon the inferior clergy without their express consents ; and this is the more evident , because this tax was a th upon moveables ; and not a tax upon land , and consequently could never be imposed upon those of the clergy , ( who held in frank almoign as all the inferior clergy then did and do at this day ) by the bishops and abbots that held in capite , and that these charters were made by the common consent of the whole kingdom ; ( and then certainly by the inferior , as well as superior clergy , ) may appear by the confirmation of the great charters , as also in the preamble to the statute of articuli super chartas ( made the one in the th , the other in the th of edward i. ) in both which it is expresly recited that the great charters of liberties , and the charters of forrest were made per commun assent de tout le royalme , en temps nostre pere ; and if by the common assent of the realm , then sure by that of the inferior as well as superior clergy , since the bishops and abbots , who sa●e there only by their baronies could never represent them . that the inferior clergy were also summoned to parliament , in the th of of henry d. appears from the annals of burton , in anno dom. . where that author ( who lived at that time ) relates that the inferiour clergy then appearing in parliament , sent messengers to the pope concerning the intolerable grievances they then lay under ; among which , the first grievance set forth by the procurators of the clergy , for the diocess of lincoln is this , quod decima bineficiorum suoram domino regi fuit concessa ipsis non vo●atis , maxime cum agitur de aliquo obligando necessarius est ejus expressus consensus : by which it appears , that the inferior clergy then claimed it as their undoubted right by the law of the land , not to be taxed either by the king , or the pope without their express consents , and they contended so hard for it , that they have preserved this right even to this day , when they now give their votes to the choice of knights of the shires ; tho till the late king charles's reign , they were never taxed without the consent of their own procurators in convocation ; and this may serve to enlarge your understanding , and to shew you in what sense the whole clergy , as well the inferior as superior did anciently make the third estate in parliament , which was more comprehensive than the bishops and mitred abbots alone , who sate in the upper house only per baronian , by reason of their baronies ; tho in the synod or convocation of the clergy , as ecclesiastical persons only ; where they also joined in the making of ecclesiastical laws and giving taxes ; which last you cannot deny , but to be a meer temporal thing . m. i grant you are so far in the right ; yet tho the inferior clergy often joyned with the common council of the kingdom , in giving the same taxes , yet this was by , and upon themselves alone , and they had no hand in making of temporal laws ; and giving taxes for all the rest of the kingdom ; and i challenge you to shew me any precedent within these years , that the inferiour clergy ever made the third estate in parliament , or that their consents was ever asked to the making of temporal laws ; since the bishops have been always lookt upon till of late , as the onely representatives of the inferior clergy in parliament , how else could they be obliged by general statutes or acts of parliament ; since according to your own confession , they gave no votes at the election of knights of shires , but since the return of king charles ii. so that if they had ever joyned in this legislative power ( as you suppose they anciently did ) i cannot see why they should not have kept to this day . f. i grant indeed , it has been otherwise between , and years , but for that it was not so from the original institution of the government , is also as certain ; for that the english common councils consisted of all sorts and degrees of ecclesiasticks you must allow ; since before the coming in of the normans , the bishops and abbots did not sit in the mycel synods , as temporal lords , is generally acknowledged , and yet even after they came to sit among the lay peers in the great council of the nation by virtue of their baronies ; the inferior clergy also gave their assents to the making of temporal laws , and giving taxes ; i have proved by such authorities , as i do not see you are able to answer ; and for further proof of this , to shew you their coming was continued down to the reign of henry third , see sir h. spelmans councils , second volume , where you will find that they were in that great council at clarendon , when those famous constitutions were made , as appears by these words in mat. paris at the end of these constitutions . hanc recognitionem , sive recordationem de consu●tudinibus & libertatibus iniquis archiepiscopi , episcopi , abbates priores , clerus cum comitibus & baronibus , & proceribus cunctis juraverunt . so likewise at the council of gaintington in the th of this king. roger hoveden has in his history these words . dominus vero rex statin postquam in angliam applicuit magnum congregavit concilium , episcoporum , abbatum , comitum & baronum , & aliorum multor●m clericorum , quam laicorum , apud gaintington . and mat. paris in the year , ( being the st of this kings reign ) mentions a common council of the kingdom then called at clerkenwel , where convocatus est clerus , & populus , cum tota nobilitate , which dr. heylin in his stumbling block of disobedience thus translates ; the clergy , and commons together with the nobility being summoned . and in of richard i. r. hoveden also tells us of a great council held at pipewel abby in northamptonshire , where the archbishop of canterbury produced a charter of king william i. coram rege , & vniversis episcopis clero , & populo . and an ancient charter of primo of king iohn , ( now in the archbishop of canterbury's library , ) entituled , charta moderationis seod . magni sigilli , recites the said king to have been crowned , mediante tam cleri quam populi unanimi consensu , & savore , and tho the rest of his reign was turbulent , yet the author of the manuscript eulogium , quoted by mr. selden in his titles of honour , mentions a great council at london in the th year of king iohn , where the archbishop of canterbury was present , cum toto clero , & tota secta laicali , i. e. ( says dr. heylin in the same place ) the clergy of both ranks and orders , with all the laity ( called here secta laicalis ) and the lords and commons had then their places in parliament ; and the dr. proceeds thus , and in possession of this right the clergy stood when magna charta was set forth by king henry the d. wherein the freedom , rights , and priviledges of the church of england ( of which this evidently was one ) was confirmed to them ; ( i. e. the whole clergy in general ) . i have here shewed you , what dr. heylins sense was , to let you see that a person of great learning , and a high churchman thought it no heresie to be of our opinion , and to maintain as he does all along in that chapter ; that the inferior clergy and the commons were a constituent part of the common council or parliament long before the th of henry d , and that the inferior clergy continued to be so , till the reign of henry the th at least . but that their consents was also anciently asked in the making of laws , we need go no farther than the authority i have now given you from the continuation of florence of worcester . and farther , that they were once a part of this great council or parliament , besides the testimony of the modus tenendi parliamentum , ( who tho he be exploded , as an ancient author , yet certainly is a good witness for his own time , viz. that of edward the third ) where the procuratores cleri are reckoned among the constituent members or states of parliament , which is also confirmed by the two first writs of summons , we have left us on the rolls , viz. the d of edward i. where in this clause of praemun●entes clerum is particularly exprest ; which pray read from your drs. answer to mr. p. praemunientes priorem & capitulum ecclesiae vestrae , archidiaconos totumque clerum vestrae diocaesis facientes quod iidem prior & archidiac . in propriis personis suis , & dictum capitulum per duos procuratores idoneos plenam & sufficientem potestatem ab ipsis capitulis , & clero habentes , una vobiscum intersint , modis omnibus tunc ibidem , ad tractandum , ordinandum , & faciendum nobiscum , & cum coeteris praelatis , & proceribus , & aliis incolis regni nostri qualiter sit hujusae modi periculis obviandum , ( viz. the dangers in the writ mentioned to be threatned from france ) and that this was not the first time this clause of praemunientes was inserted in the writs of summons to bishops , might be easily proved , had we all the writs of summons before the d of edward i. as well as since : but we may hence observe , that the inferior clergy are not onely summoned to treat with the prelates , but are as well as they , here authorised to treat , ordain , and act with them , and the lords , and knights , citizens and burgesses ( for so your dr. himself here in the margin translates , aliis incolis regni ) and how they could thus consult and act with them , if they had not bee● then , as well as the prelates , a part of the same body of the great council or parliament of the kingdom . i confess surpasses my capacity to understand ; nor is this clause found in this writ alone , but is also in most other writs of the bishops summons to parliament as low as our own times ; and that these writs were not to convocation , but parliament , appears in pryns parliament register , plainly by the letters of procuration made by the prior , and chapter of bath to william swynham and iohn de merston , appointing them to appear , and act for them , as their lawful procurators in the parliament summoned , ann. dom. . being the th of edward i. which is of a different form from another letter of procuration of the same prior and chapter , ann. dom. . ( . edward i. ) to their procurators therein named to act for them in the convocation then summoned at westminster , the same difference is also observed in all the writs of summons to convocation different from those whereby the same persons are summoned to parliament ; the former being directed onely to the two archbishops , or their vicar generals to summon all the bishops , abbots , priors , and clergy of their respective provinces ; without any particular writs issued to any other bishops , abbots , priors or clergy-men , as in summons to great councils or parliaments ; wherein there are commonly particular orders to the bishop to warn all the inferior clergy in the manner but now mentioned ; as mr. pryn very well observes , in his first part of his said parliamentary register ; where you may see , there is a writ of summons to parliament , of the st edward d ; to the archbishop of canterbury , reciting that he intended a parliament ; for divers arduous , and urgent businesses concerning himself and crown , and the necessary defence of the kingdom and church of england . and then proceeds thus , et quia negotia praedicta perquam ardua sine maxima deliberatione tam praelatorum & cleri quam magnatum , & communitatis ejusdem regni ; &c. and therefore it behoved him to summon the said clergy , great men , and commons ; and then requires him to summon all the bishops , abbots and deans , and priors , and arch-deacons to appear personally , and the rest of the clergy by two procurators ; with full power ad tractandum , & consulendum super praemissis una vobiscum , ad consentiendum . illis quae tunc ibidem super dictis negotiis divina savente clementia contigerit ordinari . m. but what can you say to their being omitted to be summo●ed in divers writs to parliament , as appears in pryns register you now cited ; and from whence himself has there made this observation , that there is no clause of praemunientes , &c. in any writs of summons to councils of state , but onely to parliaments , and that not always but at the kings pleasure . which shews plainly , that tho they were sometimes summoned as a part , yet were certainly no essential , constituent part of this general council , since they were omitted in so many of them ; and had they been always a part of this council ; pray tell me , how they came to lose this right ; since the clergy in those days were not wont to lose any right , or priviledge they enjoyed ? f. i have already granted , that tho the inferior clergy have been , no necessary constituent part of parliament , for divers ages last past , yet does it not follow , that therefore they never were so ; since they have lost this right by degrees ; and i shall now shew you by what steps it happen'd : first , therefore pray observe , that anciently all abbots , and priors whatever , as well those that held in capite , as those that held in frank almoign were all summoned alike to the general councils of the kingdom ; as appears by the first councils after your conquest , that we have any monuments of ; nay it also appears from that very writ of the th of king iohn , ( if it were a writ of summons to parliament ) which as i have already proved at our last meeting it is most likely it was not whereby the bishop is to summon all the abbots and priors of his diocess none excepted ; and tho i grant that in the next writ of summons of the th of henry the d , to the archbishop of york , there is no clause expressed of summoning the abbots and priors , and other clergy of his diocess , yet it is much to be doubted , whether this were a summons to parliament or not● being without any title of ad parliamentum or concilium . but that the abbots and priors , as well those that held in capite , as those that held in frank almoign were summoned to the great parliament of the th of henry the d , appears by that list of their names , which both mr. pryn , and the dr. have printed from the roll , nor ' do i believe that this was the first time that all these abbots and priors being in all were summoned to parliament , notwithstanding your drs. fancy , that simon montsert summoned so many of them , onely because he was sure of them , since if we had the rolls of the foregoing years , as well as of this ; we should ( no doubt ) find little or no difference ; for by another list of the abbots and priors , which the dr. himself has given us of the d of edward the i. to the same parliament above mentioned , when the inferior clergy were likewise summoned ; there appears to have been seventy abbots and priors summoned to this parliament , of which not a third part ever held in capite ; and tho divers of them then pleaded exemptions ; yet they were many of them such as held in capite as well as those that did not , as the abbots of st. edmunds bury , waltham , st. albans , evesham , &c. all which , as it is notoriously known , held in capite , and were commonly summoned to all parliaments afterwards ; now pray see how all this numerous train of abbots and priors ( which mr. pryn confesses to have sometimes amounted to . ) who were summoned to some parliaments and great councils ; came to be omitted is to be ascribed chiefly to their own petition and desire , when their constant attendance in parliament when held every year ; and frequently oft●er was counted a burthen rather than an advantage , by reason of the great charge , and trouble of coming to those assemblies ; and their being bound to contribute to the general aids that were then given the king ▪ and thence it is we find on the rolls so many discharges upon their petitions in parliament , that they did not hold of the king by barony nor in capite ; nay the abbot of leycester after serving in no less than parliaments , yet in the th of edward the d procured a writ of exemption from the king , quod non compellatur venire ad parliamentum ; the lords in parliament easily giving way to it , since they knew that the fewer hands , the legislative power was reduced to , the greater still was theirs that remained ; to which may be added the kings pleasure , who by degrees began to omit summoning of divers of the smaller abbots , and priors before summoned ; since it has been the policy of our kings to reduce their great councils or parliaments , especially the peers into as few hands as they could , because they are then most easily managed ; and the abbots and priors never complained of it , for the reasons already given ; thus most of these came to be struck off by degrees , till at last of all this numerous company of abbots and priors there were in the reigns of edward the d. richard d. and edward the th . and even to the dissolution of monasteries under henry the th , no more than abbots and two priors , viz. the prior of coventry , and of st. iohn of ierusalem summoned to parliament . i have dwelt the longer on the history of these abbots and priors , because it sufficiently confutes your drs. notion of none but tenants in capite , appearing in parliament . but to give you some account of the inferiour clergy , how they likewise might come to be often omitted out of the writs of summons to great councils , and not to make a constant part of the parliament , but onely of the convocation ; this might happen two or three ways , and that without any positive law for it : as in the first place , pray consider the vast increase of power , which fell to the bishops , after king henry the first , had given up his right of investitures to the pope ; by which means they depended not at all on the state , and so took upon themselves a greater power of imposing upon , and making temporal laws for the inferior clergy in parliament , as if they had been their representatives ; yet they could never represent all the abbots and priors , who held in frank almoign for the reasons already given , as also because most of them were exempted from their jurisdiction ; but that the bishops could never impose taxes upon the inferior clergy at their pleasure without their express consents in parliament , or convocation ; appears by this memorable writ of th of edward d , to the archbishop of canterbury , which mr. pryn has likewise given us ; by which it appears that divers of the clergy had consented to grant the king a subsidy in the precedent parliament , but onely by reason of the absence of the said archbishops , and others of the prelates , and clergy it could not then be done , and therefore the archbishop is thereby ordered to call a convocation for that purpose , which had been needless , if the bishops alone could have taxed the inferior clergy in parliament or convocation without their express consents ; so that it is plain , that in that age they still retained a great share of the supream power , viz. of not being taxed , unless by representatives of their own either in convocation , or parliament ; as it continues to this day . but to shew you further , how the presence of the inferior clergy , and consequently their summoning to parliament became less necessary , we must have recourse to the bull of pop● boniface the th in the th of edward i. by which he forbad all the clergy of the western church , as well superior as inferior to give any more taxes of subsidies to temporal princes , without his holinesses licence ; whereupon the king summoned the bishops and clergy to parliament , at st. edmunds-bury in the th of ●is reign ; where when they then re●used to grant him any supplies , he then , ( as all the historians tell us , ) held his parliaments at westminister , cum baronibus suis , excluso clero , without either bishops , abbots , or inferior clergy , which was the first precedent of this kind , that we ever read of in this parliament ; the king with the consent of the lay lords and commons seized all the temporalities of the clergy , as well bishops as others , and put them out of his protection , untill they were forced to redeem themselves by paying a th part of their moveables ; for doing of which , they were afterward forced to procure the popes absolutions , some of which mr. pryn has given us in this said register ; and yet for all this , the pope maintain'd this power over the clergy for the future ; so that they could not be taxed without his express license ( which since it could not always be obtained ) no wonder if our kings did more frequently omit summoning any more than the bishops , and abbots , who were bound to appear in parliament by their tenures , and so left out all the inferior clergy as useless ; the main business , and cause of their summoning to parliament , viz. giving of money , being now taken away by the popes usurped power ; tho whenever his licence was obtain'd , yet that their own express consents in parliaments or convocation was necessary , appears by that passage in the annals of burton in anno . already cited ; when the inferior clergy being extravagantly opprest between the pope and king , they sent express messengers when they met in parliament , who were to set forth their greivances to his holiness . i have given you as good an account as i am able , how the inferior clergy , which as well as the superior did once make a constituent part of our great councils , before the conquest , nay for above years after , did at last cease to be so , partly by the prevailing power of the bishops , partly by the usurpation of the pope ; tho chiefly by their own silence and consent not complaining of their want of summons to parliament , as long as they could 'scape scot free , and all the rest of the kingdom pay taxes , notwithstanding which the clause of their acting , and consulting with all the rest of the estates in parliament , still remaining in the writs of summons is a sufficient monument to posterity to prove their ancient right . and the clergy of the lower house of convocation was so sensible of this , that among certain petitions by them made to dr. cranmer then archbishop of canterbury , and the rest of the prelates in the higher house of convocation in the reign of king edward the th , the d article of which runs thus , also that according to the ancient custom of the realm , and the tenor of the kings writ for summoning of the parliament , which now , and ever have been directed to the bishop of every diocess , the clergy of the lower house of convocation may be adjoyned ; and associate with the lower house of parliament , or else , that all such statutes and ordinances as shall be made concerning all matters of religion , and causes ecclesiastical may not pass without the sight , and assent of the clergy , and there is in the same place a second petition ; as also a paper of reasons offered to queen elizabeth , and after to king iames to the same effect . and lastly to shew you , that the government of the church and state of scotland was anciently all one and the same in respect of their clergy , as well as laity with that of england in their great councils or parliaments ; appears by the agreement between king edward the ● . and the states of scotland concerning the marriage of his son , prince edward with the princess of norway then heiress of scotland , which is publisht at large in mr. pryns st . vol. of the popes usurpation , where you will find this agreement to have been made between the said king edward ex una parte , & venerabiles patres custodes , ( scil . scotiae ) episcopos , abbates , & totum clerum ; nobiles viros , comites & barones , totamque communitatem regni scotiae ex altera de matrimonio contrabendo , &c. from whence you may observe , that as the same stile was observed there in the titles of their general councils or parliaments as with us ; and as the inferior clergy there put after the bishops and abbots did not hold in capite , but frank abnoign in that kingdom ; so likewise by the same analogy between the lowest temporal state , with the spiritual , the commonalty of scotland here stiled communitas scotiae could not then consist onely of tenants in capite as your dr. and those of this opinion suppose it did . m. i must confess you have shewn me more , for the inferior clergies being once a constituent part of the parliament than ever i knew before ; i will take time farther to consider them , but that the word populus must needs then take in any more than the tenants in capite , i much doubt , since the other word plebs , which you so much insist upon from the old book of ely , signifies no more , than populus which as the dr. shews us in his glossary , in it self signifies neither great nor little people , but only laity , and therefore as it is used and restrained , signifies either the lay plebs , or the lay magnates , as i can shew you by several examples , as particularly out of mat. westminster , ann. dom. . d edward i. where speaking , how the popes legates were received in england who came to make up the differences between england and france ; he thus relates their reception , quos in regn● angliae applicatos excepit plebs debito honore , accita per regem apud westmonasterium primatum , & optimatum suorum caterva . here the plebs were the kings great or chief men , that is , the earls and barons , which he had called to westminster , who so honourably received these two cardinals . so likewise the same author , ann. dom. . . edward i. the king and barons being at some difference about the observation of magna charta , and the charter of forrest , speaking how the king declared that he intended to observe those charters , after this he relate● , that the king thereupon required to be given him by the incolae or inhabitants , the eighth penny , and says thus , articulos in praedictis chartis contentos , innovari insuper & observari rex mandavit , exigendo pro hac concessione ab incolis octavum denarium sibi dari , qui mox concessus est a plebe , in sua camera tunc circumstante ; petit etiam a clero susidium . qui respondit se velle summo pontifici literas supplicatorias dirigere pro conferendi licentia obtinenda . so that the plebs here mentioned by the historian were only the lay-nobility that stood about the king in his chamber . now pray consider , that the word plebs is of a much more vulgar signification than populus , so that if the former did not signifie the commons as now understood , the latter cannot do so . and therefore i see no reason to suppose that there words must signifie the commons . the like error i must tell you by the way , the gentlemen of your opinion have fallen into , concerning the word vulgus in the old coronation oath in latine , when they ignorantly translate these words in the old french oath , les leys les quelles ly la commuante aura eleu leges & consuetudines quas vulgus elegerit to the great confusion of this nation in the beginning of the late troubles ; whereas the community here understood in this oath , was the community of the bishops and abbots , earls and barons , and great men , and the whole body of tenants in capite ; expressed before in this oath by clerus , and populus ; for by them alone could these demands be made , for the vulgus , i. e. the multitude or rabble , could never come near to make these demands at so great and splendid a solemnity . f. this is but to urge the same thing over and over again , for that under the word populus were also comprehended the commons , i have already sufficiently proved , and can yet prove it further , from divers historians and records , both of henry the d , and edward the st , and edward the ds reign ; in the first place , therefore i must still put you in mind of that passage so often cited , from mat. paris in th of henry , where the members of that common council in which magna charta was granted , is said to be clerus & populus cum magnatibus regionis , or as mat. wistminster in the same year , almost in the same words clerus & populus cum regni magnatibus ; with both which also agrees the manuscript history of walter of coventry , who speaking of this very council of th henry the d , relates it thus , at the purification of the virgin , there assembled at london the proc●res angliae ibique tractatu diffusiore habita cum clero & populo , the king then granted the liberties of the great charter , and that of forests ; and that there was granted a comitions & baronibus , clero , & populo ibidem praesentibus quinta decima ●mni●m mobilium de communi assen●●● . whence pray observe , what i before minded you of , that this tax as it was a general upon all the moveables of the kingdom , and took in all sorts of persons , and so could not never be given by the particular order of the drs. tenants in capite , since it did not concern tenures at all ; and was levied on those knights service , as well as upon those that did . but the author of the annals of the abby of burton is more full in this point , for in ann. dom. . being the th of henry the d , he tells us a parliament was held at westminster , convocatis ibidem episcopis abbatibus prioribus comitibus , & baronibus , & totius regni majoribus in quo , petebat [ rex ] a clero & populo , de laicis feodis suis sibi suffragium exhiberi , &c. ( viz. for the business of sicily ) and then goes on thus , disponens de suo iniquo consilio hoc prius a clero , & postmodum a pop●lo majori & minori extorqueri ; from which passage , i shall observe , first , that all the clergy in general , as well the bishops and abbots , as inferior clergy are here stiled clerus . secondly , that the nobility and commons or whole body of the laity are altogether called populus . thirdly , that this populus is there also distinguisht into the major , and minor , now as by the major can be meant none but the greater nobility , so the populus minor can signifie none , but the commons in general , unless you will suppose that the kings design was onely to extort money from the tenants in capite , and no others . but to put it farther out of all dispute , that this word populus when put after , and distinct from magnates , barones , and the like in our ancient historians and records , does signifie the commons alone ; i shall prove to you by the patent roll of th of edward i. ( the year after your dr. supposes the commons were called to parliament ) where there is a writ directed , baronibus militibus , & liber●s hominibus de wallia , reciting that the comites barones & populus de regno , had lately freely granted a th of all their moveables , and therefore desires like aid from the welch ; now nothing can be plainer than that by populus in this record must be meant the commons ; and yet it is also as evident from another record now in the keeping of the remembrancer of the exchequer , that this th was granted the year before in the th of this king ; for by this writ , or commission he appoints commissioners for the collecting of that th of all moveables ; which the king thus recites , the archiepiscopi , episcopi , abbates priores comites barones , & omnes alii de regno , nunc sicut alias de nobis & progenitoribus nostris liberaliter fecerunt , to have lately freely granted him ; which can be no other than that mentioned in the record of the th , unless you can suppose that there was a th granted two years together , which is very unlikely , and more than the nation could then well pay . so likewise by the parliament roll of edward the d , appears that hugh le dispencer jun. had been in the reign of his father , per considerationem parium , & populi regni , & per assensum domini edwardi tune regis angl. exiled and disinherited for ever , as a traytor , to the king and kingdom ; that is , he was banish by the joint consent of king , lords and commons ; now if populus in these records signifies the commons after the time you own they appeared in parliament ; i would be glad to see some better reasons than you have hitherto given me to prove that it could not have the same signification before the th of henry the d , or th of edward i. yet that populus does also sometime● signifie both lords and commons appears from , mat. westminster where relating how king edward i. in the th year of his reign , made his son a knight , then he tells us , pro hac militia filii regis concessus est regi trigesimus denarius à populo & clero , mercatores verò vicesimum concesserunt . yet that the commons had also a share in this grant , the dr. himself acknowledges in his glossary , under the same heads in these words ; it is evident from this record , ( meaning that of the th of edw. i. abovementioned ) who were the populus , or people intended by the historian in this place , to wit , the comites , barones , & alii magnates nec non milites comitatuum . now i desire to know whether the knights of the shires were not then commoners as well as now , tho' reckoned among the magnates , and as a superiour order to the citizens , and burgesses here called by a general word mercatores , who then gave a th part of their moveables by themselves ? but that the word plebs does not only signifie the lay nobility , but the commons too , in both the quotations you have made use of out of mat. westminster , is also as plain , for in the first instance concerning the reception of the legates , is it to be imagined that none but earls , and great lords accompanied them , and that there were no knights or gentlemen amongst them ; and as for the words primates , and optimates , i think i have sufficiently proved that those do not only signifie the lords , or greater nobility , but the lesser also : nay , the chief citizens , and magistrates of cities and great towns. as for the next authority concerning the plebs that granted the eigth penny it is much more evident that the commons as well as the lords must be comprehended under that term ; and that this is so , i need go no further than the dr's own concession in the same place a little farther ; which you may read , in these words ; and that the agreement for the confirmation of the charters here mentioned was made , and the eighth penny granted by the earls and barons , and perhaps the knights of shires ; and that they were the plebs that stood about the king in his chamber , is clear from the writ of summons of parliament for two knights in every county , dated septemb. the th . immediately following , to come and receive the confirmation of the charters and his letters , that the paying of this eighth penny should not prejudice the commons for the future , and to do further what by his son and his council should be ordained . so that the dr. himself is forced to confess , ( tho' sparingly ) that the knights of shires were likewise there , and comprehended under the word plebs at the time of this grant : the king held this parliament at his pallace of westminster , in some of the halls or great rooms , and the commons might very well sit in the now court of requests , ( then called the alba aula , or white hall ) ( where parliaments have been frequently held ) and from thence be sent for by the king into the painted chamber , or now house of lords , where the king then sate ; and which might in respect of the hall from whence they came be very well called , camera regis , for none can imagine his presence chamber or bed-chamber could hold all that company , and in that room the king might make that speech to them which this author mentions , and then upon his promising to renew the charters , followed the granting of the eighth peny ab incolis , by the whole people immediately granted the said subsidy : now the dr. grants in this place , that the incolae here meant by the historian were the incolae regni , such inhabitants as used to pay subsidies and aids , only the plebs must here signifie the lay nobility . now , if the incolae regni were such us used to pay aids and subsidies , who made this concession , can any man doubt , but that this grant was made by their representatives of the knights , citizens and burgesses ; for if the tax was general upon the whole kingdom ( as it appears it was ) can you imagine that the citizens , and burgesses , were not there present when this tax was given , as well as the knights of the shires ; since it was to be levied upon all alike ? nor is the dr's objection of any weight , that because the king not long after summoned another parliament when he was beyond sea , to meet his son prince edw. at westminster : that therefore it was not probable , that if the commons had been at the agreement , and granting of the eighth penny in the king's chamber they would have been dismissed , and called again about the same business in so short a time , seeing the confirmation of the charters was dispatched in six days , when the parliamement ●et october the sixth . for the dr. is very much mistaken to imagine that this was the same business they met about before , when the very writ of summons shews the contrary . for the tax was given already , and therefore they could not meet about that , but the truth was , the king went away in haste into flanders without confirming the charters : so that before the people would give any more money , his son prince edward was forced to confirm them , ( as the dr. himself confesses in the same place ) after the confirmation of these charters , and that the earls and barons were satisfied . but as for the dr's wondrous discovery of the false bad translation of the old french coronation oath , i do so far indeed agree with him , that the words le commune aura elu , are not to be translated ; which the commons , or vulgar people , but the whole community shall chuse ; rendered here by the word vulgus , by the old monkish translator : yet this can by no means signifie only the bishops , abbots , lords , and tenants in capite ; ( for who ever knew the word vulgus to signifie the superior clergy and nobility ? ) and so to exclude the whole body of the people in general . but mat. westm. tells us , concessus es● ( viz. to e● . i ) novenarius dena●ius à vulgo , à clero vero denus ad scotorum p●rtinaciam reprimendam , who had then invaded northumberland , and harrassed the other northern countries . now pray read the dr's comment upon these words in his glossary . here vulgus is the same with populus and plebs when opposed to clerus , or joyned with it as a distinct body of men , and clerus & populus , clerus & plebs , clerus & vulgus , are the clergy and layety , in the meaning of this historian ; whether the earls and barons alone , or the temporal earls and barons with the commons were understood by them , that is , the commons represented in parliament , and not the multitude or rabble . which indeed is a worthy discovery of the dr's . nor do i know any body so mad as so to render it in the coronation oath : but that this word vulgus , when put for the whole layety of the kingdom is very ancient in that oath : see the old coronation oath in to●tle's collection of old statutes , who transcribed it out of some ancient latine copy of that oath , or else from that clause in the coronation oath of r. richard ii. which is still to be seen upon record . i beg your pardon for speaking these so long upon the true signification of these words clerus and populus , plebs and vulgus , since there was a necessity for it , by reason of those false glosses that that dr. has with so much artifice put upon them , still using them like charms to bewitch and impose upon his unwary readers : especially since a right notion of these words is absolutely necessary for the right understanding the true sense and meaning of our ancient english historian 〈…〉 after all this pother the dr. makes about the signification of those words populus , plebs , & vulgus , as synonimous as he grants them to be , they must all signifie the whole body of the people , as well the commons as the lords represented in parliament , by his own confession ; or else , i leave it to your self to consider who of the two is guilty of levelling notions , your dr. or mr. p. since one does but allert with the general consent of ancient and modern writers , that the words barones and baronagium angliae did anciently take in more than the lords , and tenants in capite : and the dr. straight calls him a man of levelling principles , and that jambles the commons together with the lords , whereas your dr. can when he pleases make the words plebs and vulgus to to signifie the great lords and tenants in capite contrary to the subject matter on which he discourses , and to their genuine signification either in ancient or modern latine . m. i must consess you have now told me more than i ever yet heard or read of , or indeed thought could have been urged , for the inferior clergies having been once a part of the civil , as well as ecclesiastical council of the kingdom ; and i will consider farther of it : but in the mean time let me tell you ; you have not been yet so clear in your explanation of the other opposite word populus ; for admitting i should grant you , that there were in some sort commons in parliament as represented by the lesser tenants in capite , who were not lords , yet does it not therefore follow that there must have been another rank , or order of persons beneath , or different from them , since ( as i said it is , but how ) 't is only the custom ; and law of each countrey that can determine what is the community or representative body of the people , so that there is no such certain analogy between the clerus , when taken for the inferior clergy , and the populus when taken for the lesser nobility ; or tenants in capite . since in scotland , tho' their great council or parliament might consist of the abbots , and inferior clergy as with us , who did not hold in capite ; yet you cannot deny , but that the temporal estate or layety ; ( at least of late ages ) wholly consisted of the earls , barons , lairds , or smaller barons , together with the burgesses of royal boroughts , all which held in capite ; and for ought as i can see from any clear proofs you have brought to the contrary did so from times beyond all memory ; and so it might have been in england too , for ought as i know , for tho' you have taken a great deal of pains to answer the dr's . and my arguments against the tenants in capite , being the representatives of the whole kingdom in parliament before the th of henry the third , and th of edward the first : and also to prove that the words made use of in our ancient historians , records , and acts of parliament , are of a more comprehensive signification than to be confined to them alone : but you have not as yet proved that these gentlemen who you suppose to have had places in our great councils , besides the tenants in capite , were knights , citizens , and burgesses ; or whether all the lords of mannours , or great freeholders in england appeared there in person for themselves , and their under tenants ; therefore i pray be a little more clear in this point , and shew me some authorities that the knights of shires , citizens and burgesses have been always constituent members of parliament ever since the conquest : for methinks you waver in this matter , and sometimes you seem to assert the former , and sometimes the latter . f. i confess it is not my humour to be positive in any thing that is in the least doubtful , or obscure , and therefore as i will not maintain that knights of shires always a constituent part of parliament , before your conquest , or presently were after , tho' it is positively asserted by the author of the modus tenendi parliamentum ; since the antiquity of that piece is justly questioned by mr. selden and other modern antiquaries ; so on the other side , i shall not assert , that they were not there at all ; but this much i think i am able to prove , that they were summoned to parliament long before the th of henry the third , or th of edward the first . but as for the cities and boroughs that they had their representatives in parliament at , or presently after your conquest i think i can prove from as undeniable testimonies as can be expected : since all the most ancient rolls , and records of great councils and parliaments are long since lost , and destroyed . yet to shew you , that we have some very ancient authors that seem to mention not only the citizens , and burgesses , but knights of shires to have been summoned before the times you insist upon ; and if it prove so , whether they were there from the very time of the conquest is not material ; since if i confute your , and your dr's . opinion of the th of henry the third , and th of edward the first , i carry the cause , and you may then invent if you can some other epocha whereon to fix their first appearing at our great councils . i shall therefore give you another quotation out of the same old monk sulcardus , which immediately follows the conclusion of the charter of k. william the first , to the abby of westminster , but now cited : and it has been made use of not only by mr. p. in his ancient rights of the commons , &c. but by sir william dugdale himself in his origines iuridiciales ; as also by the author of argumentum a●tinormaunicum , to prove the commons to have been summoned to a great council , in the th year of k. william the first , anno dom. . the words , as cited in sir william dugdale are these , that after the king had subscribed his name to this charter , with the sign of the cross ; adding many of the bishops , abbots , and temporal nobility , instead of cum multis aliis , hath these words , multis praeterea illustrissimis virorum personis , & regni principibus diversi ordinis omissis qui huic confirmationi piisimo affectu testes & ●autores fuerunt : hii autem illo tempore à regia potestate diversis provinciis ; & urbibus ad universalem synodum pro causis cujuslibet christiane eccles●e audiendis , & tractandis ad praescriptum celeberriumum coenobium quod westmonasterium dicitur convoceti . now i shall only observe from this author , that mr. selden in his titles of honour , and sir henry spelman in his glossary , do render provincia for a county or shire . m. i pray give me leave to examine this quotation , because i confess it seems very specious at first sight , but if it be throughly examined will make nothing at all for you . and to this end , pray let us read the dr's . observations on this passage at the end of his answer to argumentum antinormaunicum . f. but you need not read from the beginning of that paragraph , since i so far agree with the dr. as that by principes diversi ordinus , are not to be understood ( as this author renders them whom the dr. here writes against ) the chief , or principal men of several ranks or conditions ; but the chief , and principal men of both orders ; viz. of the clergy and laity ; yet will it not therefore follow ( as the dr. here would have it ) that these principes diversi ordinis were only bishops , ● abbots , and great dignified clergy-men only ; and the procenes , and magnates , the earls , barons , and temporal nobility alone ; for though i grant he produces several quotations out of florence of worcester , malmsbury eadmer , to prove that principes regni ecclesiastici & secularis ordinis ; primates regni utriusque ordinis , &c. were at these councils , yet i have already proved that the words principes , and primates do not in their proper signification signifie none but bishops , or dignified clergy-men on the temporal nobility only ; since these words mean no more than chief , principal , or most considerable men both of the clergy , and laity , who had by reason of their offices , dignities or estates any place in our general councils at that time ; and which did certainly comprehend the inferiour clergy also , tho' the dr. has made bold to pass them by without any notice taken of them ; and if they were then there , by the same rule the lesser nobility or commons were also summoned from divers provinces , cities , and great towns. m. well , but pray see here ; does not the dr. prove plain enough , that this gentleman he writes against is mistaken in his translation , and applying the words provinciis , & vrbibus , for chief lay-men from divers countreys , cities , and burroughs ; whereas the dr. here proves that the words mentioned in this passage cannot here mean lay-men sent from county to cities , but only the bishops , whose seats are here called vrbes , and which , as the dr. shews us , were by a great council held at london in the year . being the th of king william , translated from villages to cities , as were sherburn in dorsetshire removed to sarum , selsey to chichester , litchfield to chester , which was before this council at westminster cited by sulcardus , which this author places in the th of this king. and the dr. here farther proves from these words following , pro causis cujuslibet christianae ecclesi●e ; that this universal synod being called for hearing and handling the causes of every christian church , that these words every christian church must certainly mean many churches in england , which in reason and probability could not be meant of the small parish-churches all the nation over , and therefore must be understood of cathedrals or churches , where bishops seats then were , or where they had been , or were to be removed . f. pray give me leave to answer this comment of your doctors , before we proceed farther . in the first place , suppose i grant him that by vrbes may here be meant such cities as had bishops seats , yet does it not therefore follow that it shall signifie no other cities or towns but bishops seats only ; for tho' i grant in the modern acceptation of this word vrbs , here in england , a city , and a bishops seat are one and the same ; yet it is plain , that at first it was not so , for then there had been no need of the law you mention , whereby it was ordained that bishops sees should be removed from villages to cities ; nor it seems were all of them so removed at this council you mention ; since the dr. shews us from this very place here cited , that some of them still remained in villis & vicis , in villages and small towns ; and therefore it is here said , dilatum est ad regis audientiam qui in partibus transmarinis tunc temporis bella gerebat : ●and tho' the dr. here supposes ( tho i know not on what grounds ) that the persons summoned by the king to this synod from provinces and cities , were such as were concerned , or able to advise the king in this matter , of the conveniency of the places whither the removals were to be made , as deans , arch-deacons , and other dignified persons , and church officers as well of the clergy , as laity , &c. and also the principes regni , the great nobility who were in those days present in those assemblies . now i shall only observe from these words of the doctors , that even in his own supposition all cities had not yet bishops seats annext to them , and therefore the word vrbibus cannot mean bishops seats alone , but any other great , or walled towns. but the worst of it is , it falls out very unluckily for the dr. that this charter we now mentioned bears date a. d. . two years before this law for removing bishops sees to cities was made ; so that all his learned comment on that matter signifies just nothing , and this is one of the doctors very rational conclusions , which have no other ground than his own fancy to support them . in the next place pray observe , the dr. owns that by these principes universi ordinis , were meant the chief clergy-men and nobility he there musters up , but passes by , or else did not consider the whole context of these words , hii autem illo tempori diversis provinciis , & vrbibus ad universalem synodum convocati ; which must certainly refer to the principes regni diversi ordinis , to the chief and considerable men both of the clergy and laity of the kingdom , who were alike summoned from divers countreys and cities , and great towns to this synod . now pray do you or your dr. tell me ( if he can ) what earls , barons , or great noble-men , were then summoned from cities , or great towns , as well as the bishops and deans of cathedrals , which if you cannot do , i see no reason why we may not understand these principes regni , who were also summoned from the countreys and cities for the representatives of the commons of those cities and towns at that time . in the next place ▪ i think the dr. is as much out in his interpretation of the word pro causis cujuslibet ecclesiae , for the causes of every cathedral church , since it must certainly mean not only cathedral churches , but all other churches , whether parochial , or conventual ; for that it takes in the latter , appears by one great cause of the summoning this council , which was chiefly for the confirmation of the priviledges of the abby of westminster , which sure was no cathedral church , and yet must be some church or ecclesiastical corporation , or else this synod could have had nothing to do with it ▪ and i doubt not but this general synod might , if it had pleased ; have either made more parish churches , or united others where there were many , as we find was done in divers great councils of this nature ; and should it not then have been said to have met pro causis cujuslibet ecclesiae , for the business of each parish , as well as cathedral church ? lastly , the dr. will have all these great clergy 〈…〉 lay-men , only to meet at this council , to advise the king about what farther removals were to be made of bishops bees ; as if thereupon he had had the sole power of making what laws about them , without their consent , or that of the lay-nobility , who tho' he will have to be always present in such synods and assemblies , yet does he not give them any votes therein ; whereas it appears by this charter in sulcardus , but now cited , that the bishops , abbo● , earls and barons , whose names are to it consenserunt & signaverunt ; and it was ab ipso rage & supra dictis personis testificata , consixmata & auctoxi●ata ; which if i understand latine , signifies not only that they witnessed , but also assented to ; authorized , and confirmed it ; which also more plainly appears more fully by the conclusion of the charter of king stephens but now cited , all which the dr. passes by as slily as a commentator does those words in a text of scripture that make against his sense ; for this had quite ruined and destroyed his fine notion of the great councils of the kingdoms then wholly consisting of a few bishops , abbots , dignified clergy-men , and great noblemen who had nothing else to do there but to look on whilst the king alone made the law. to conclude , to shew you that this assembly was not only an ecclesiastical synod , but civil council also ; or parliament as we now call it ; i will give you two good testimonies for it , that we are not alone in this opinion , the first is from mr. somners glossary , parliamentum synodus magna vo●atur ; and to confirm this there is written in an old hand in the margin of this manuscript of sulcardus over against the passage now cited , this note ; nota hic amn●s com●rari at rege sua auctoritate ad causas religionis tractandas tam nobitas de clero , quàm principes regni cum aliis inferioris gradus , quorum 〈◊〉 videtur essa parliamentum . m. yet i suppose you cannot deny but that the dr. has plainly proved from several quotations from gervas of canterbury , rich. of ha●ulstad , and the continuator of florence , that the word pr●●i●●ia in this place signifies a bishops diocess ; and therefore that the principes regni who were summoned out of those provinces or diocesses were only the bishops , abbots , and other great clergy-men . f●punc ; i will not deny but that this word provincia does sometimes in our ancient authors signifie in an ecclesiastical sense the diocess of a bishops , us these authors ( the dr. has here cited ) shew us ; yet that it must be taken in a more unlimited signification in this place , is also as certain ; since besides that this word provin●sia does most commonly signifi● a shire or county ( as i have already shown ) the very context sufficiently proves it , since bulcardus says expresly , that the chief persons of both orders were summoned from the coun●ies , or provinces , as i already said , which when it refers to lay-men us well as to the clergy , i hope you will not affirm that it can signifie diocesses only ; but that besides the bishops , and abbots , there were a great 〈◊〉 more persons prosess at this council , both of the clergy and laity , the dr. himself confesses . let us therefore , consult the authors themselves which dr. brady has cited for the sense of this word provincia , and let us see how fairly he has dealt with them . now pray sir observe , it is true , the same words are almost repeated verbatim in every one of these historians , r. hagulstad , gervas of canterbury , and the continuation of florence , who all speak of a general synod held at westminster . a. d. being the third of king stephen , in those words , decima terti● die decembrie celebraetae est synodus apud westmona●● . cui praesu● albericus hostle●sit episcopus domini papae legatus , cum epis●opis diversarum provi●oiarum numero xvii . abbatibus sere xxx . here the dr. concludes with an &c. now see what lies hid under this &c. in r. of hagul●●ad , and the continuator of florence , it follows thus , cum cleri & populi multitudine numerosa , in gervase of 〈◊〉 almost in the same words , cum innumera cleri & populi multitudine . now pray tell me ingenuously what could be the doctors meaning ( who pretends to be so exact in all his quotations ) to leave out this so material a passage in every one of these authors with this , &c. unless it were that he was afraid his readers should take notice how numerous this council was both of the clergy and people ; which if he had done , it would have quite overthrown and destroyed his notion of tenan●● in capite , and let the world have known that this council consisted of a far greater number both of the clergy and laity than bishops , and abbots . now had such a thing been done by mr. petyt , it would have been branded by the dr. with the hard terms of taking away , or leaving unrecited such words and matters as he thought would either advance or destroy his assertions , as he ( how justly i leave it to you to judge ) accuses mr. p. in his title to his first edition of his answer to him . but , turpe est doctori , cum culpa redarguit ipsum . m. i cannot believe the dr. had any sinister meaning in leaving out this passage , but did it either because ( as i said but now ) he supposed these expressions as only hyperbolical phrases , by which these monkish writers used to express all the ecclesiastical or lay-members of those councils , or else because he did not think it worth while , since he might not look upon this innumerable company of clergy and people here mentioned to have had any share or voice in this great council , but only to have come thither as idle spectators , a● the dr. shews us the populus did at the making of lanfrane arch-bishop of canterbury ; nor yet that they , or the bishops and noble-men chose him , but only all applauded the king's choice , but that the dr. was not afraid to take notice of the great multitude of people that in those hospitable days was wont to flock to such assemblies , pray see what he says in his series of english great councils , or parliaments , at the end of his introduction to english history , where speaking of the election of arch-bishop anselme , he recites this passage out of an epistle in eadmerus , hui● electioni assueruns episcop● , abbates & principes regni , & ingens populi multitude : the ordinary people ( says the dr. ) came to shout and make a noise at such meetings , and only for good victuals and drink . f. very well : i think i shall easily answer your and the dr's . learned observations : first , as for the monkish hyperbolical phrases of innumerae or numerosa cleri & populi multitude ; i confess , you might suppose there was somewhat in them , if they had been peculiar only to one , or two of them ; but when all these writers do with one consent agree , in almost the same words , to express all the members of such councils ; i cannot see how they could have writ thus , unless they intended to be understood literally , that there were great numbers both of clergy-men and laicks , who appeared as members of those assemblies , far more than the dr's . tenants in capite , & that they had also votes therein , appears by that passage in the conclusion of king stephen's charter , which i quoted but now out of sulcardus ; when speaking of this very council in the d of king stephen , which we last mentioned ; that not only the comites , & barones regni , but the innumera multitudo cleri & populi , were not only present , but religioso favore voluntatem , & assensum authoritati nostrae paginae , & privilegio praebuerunt , i. e. yielded their good wills and consents to this charter of priviledges to the abby of westminster . and to shew you farther that this infinite multitude of clergy-men and laics were also part of this council ; pray remember the passage i but now cited out of florence of the council held at london , cum innumera cleri & populi multitudine , who all alike gave their consents to the constitutions by placet , placet , placet , and consider what the same sulcardus has said in the next council of the th of king stephen , when after concilio adunato cleri & populi , and a recital of the bishops , he concludes with monachorum & clericorum plebisque infinitae multitudinis , as all alike members of it . now i shall leave it to your self , or any sober , unprejudiced person to consider , whether it is likely that so grave and august a thing as the r. charter of a prince should take notice of the frothy consent and applause of the meer rabble , or mob ( whether of the clergy or laity ) or so judicious a writer as this author , and the rest of the historians , ( now cited ) should have nothing else to do , but to record to posterity for a very remarkable transaction , that a great multitude of the o●●uary , or vulgar sort of people came to these assemblies only to shout , and make a noise , for good victuals and drink ; and therefore the dr. and you , i hope , will pardon me if i still keep my former opinion , that both the arch-bishops lanfranc , and anselm , were not only named or proposed by k. william the first and second in the common or general council of the kingdom , but were also therein elected , or chosen by the citrus and populus , according to the manner of that age , and the literal meaning of those ancient authors , whose words the dr. either leaves out of strives to wrest to quite another se●ses ▪ nor to his objections against the election of lanfranc at all considerable : for as to the first objection against the literal sense of the old author ●●●nted at the end of taylor 's gavel kind ; that he could not be elected consensu totius populi angliae , because , who can believe that all the people of england , or the hundredth part of them , ever knew or understood of lanfranc's being made arch-bishop . now pray let me ask you this question ; supposing this election had been made in a general 〈◊〉 , of the clergy alone , and the words had been instead of totius populi , totius cleri anglicae , would it not have been meer cavilling to ask how all the clergy of england could leave their livings , and come up to give their consents at this election , or that the hundredth part of them ever knew of it , since every body is sensible those words are not to be understood in a literal , but legal sense , that is , the whole clergy are said to give their consents to a thing when they do it by their lawful representatives , the bishops and procurators of the inferiour clergy ? and why may not the whole people of england be as well said to give their consents to this election by their lawful representatives at that time ? but that we are not singular in this opinion , pray see what arch-bishop parker says in his antiquitates brittannicae of this election of lanfranc's ; celeberrima est autem hujus , prae caeteris electio , &c. electus est enim à majoribus cantuarensis ecclesiae , t●n access●t procerum , atque praesulum , totiusque quasi populi consensus in aula regis , quod sanè est inslar senatus seu parliamenti anglicani . as for the next objection against this election of lanfranc's , it is yet weaker than the former , because the dr. has answered this question himself how the english saxon bishops , barons , and the whole people should chuse a stranger , a person they had never known , and postpone all their deserving countrey-men ? now pray read a very good solution to this difficulty ( if he may be believed ) in his answer to mr. p. wherein he tells us , that king william had taken away from the english their estates , and gave them to his normans , and that this he did from his very first coming in , and then reckons up the earldoms he gave to his norman followers . now if the english had then no estates , they could sure have no places or votes in that great council when lanfranc was chosen ; but if to solve this you will say as the : dr. does in his answer to antin●s mannicum , that this council was held about the fourth year of the conqueror , some years before he had made an absolute conquest , and that the english bishops , and barons , and freemen had still some estates left , and therefore might then make the major part of this great council , when lanfranc was made bishop , so would never have elected him had it been left to their choice : pray tell me if the fear of refusing be a sufficient objection that he was not elected , whether or no it will not be as strong an objection against his being elected by the seniors of the church of canterb. a● gervase tells us expresly he was , because ( says the dr. ) they did it by order and direction from king william , and their proceeding no other than it is now by the chapters of other churches upon a conge dé estire , they could not refuse him ? and now supposing his power to have been as great ( as a conqueror ) in the common council of the kingdom , as in the chapter of canterbury , why may we not say almost in the same words they could not ; they durst not refuse him ( who was already elected by the prior and chapter of canterbury ) for fear of ●●●ing their estates : but if an election that cannot be refused , is none at all , the dr. may do well to consider whether there was then , or is now , any canonical elections of bishops in england at this day . m. i shall not farther dispute this matter at this time , therefore pray go on to the rest of your authorities out of our english historians , proving that any knights , citizens and burgesses appeared in parliament before the times we allow them to have been there . f. tho i think i have sufficiently at our last meeting from the charters of king iohn , and henry the d , as also from the words communitas and le commune , that the common council of the kingdom consisted of many more members than your tenants in capite ; yet to let you see that the historians and armalists of those times did comprehend all the several orders under the general titles of clerus , and populus , or magnates and proceres you may see in the chron. of thom. wikes , a. d. . where it is only said in general that the clerus and populus regni did in that year being the th of henry the d grant the king a th of all their moveables for the confirmation of magna charta , and which is more remarkable , the parliament which was held in . being th of this king ; is onely thus mentioned by this author , in an historical way transacto siquidem vice●mo die n●tivitatis dominicae sacta est london pes comitem ( seil , leyeestriae ) convocatio non minima procerum anglicorum , &c. where in the annals of waverly in this year it is onely said , factum est parliamentum magnum londonia , &c. now pray observe , that either the commons are mentioned by wikes under the name of proceres or not at all ; and that under the word parliamentum the commons were then comprehended , appears by the agreement between the king and the barons there extant , which is said to be made , de unanimi assensu , & voluntate nostra ( s●ili regis ) edwardi filii nostri praeletorum vomitum , & baronum & communitatis dicti regni nostri ; now it must be granted , since it appears by the writs of summons of h. . that the commons were there ; and consequently must be comprehended under this phrase of communitatis regni , and if this had been the first time they had been summoned ; 't is strange none of these authors should take any notice of so remarkable an alteration , and change of the constituent parts of our english parliaments . but that the knights , citizens and b●rgesses were also summoned in the next year in a parliament of the th of this king , you may see in the said wikes chronicle , ann. dom. . where he sets down all the constituent estates of parliament , which were summoned to meet at westminster , at the translation of st. edwards reliques in these words , convocatis universis angliae praelatis & magnatibus nec non cunctarum regni sui civitatum paritir , & burgorum potentioribus ut translationis solemnia celebrius illustrarent , wherethe knights of shires are comprehended under magnates and the citizens and burgesses are here stiled potentiores civitatum & burgorum . and that this was not only for a meer ceremony , but for parliament business also , see the next page , where he tells us , celebratae tundem tuntae translationis solemnitate ●●perunt nobiles ( i. e. all the estates above mentioned ) ut assolent , parliamentationis genere de regis & regni negotiis pertracture , &c. and in which parliament the king so far prevailed as to obtain a th part of all moveable goods of the laity . and yet the continuator of mat. paris in the affairs of this year takes no notice of this parliament , but only says in general that st. edwards body was this year translated into its new shrine . and the annals of waverly printed in the same volume under this year make mention of this parliament in general terms , thus facta convocatione episcoporum , comitum , baronum , abbatum , priorum & multerum aliorum . so uncertain a thing it is wholly to depend upon the general expressions of monkish writers without comparing them and the records together , and considering the subject matter about which they treat ; nor can we suppose that the constituent parts of our parliaments were shope and changed as often as they did their phrases ; and ways of expressing the parts of them . for they not foreseeing the differences that might arise about these matters , had no reason particularly to recite the constituent members or estates of parliament , as often as they had occasion to mention them , it being very well known who they were at that time . but to prove further , that it was not likely there was any alteration in the constituent parts of the parliament , from what it was in the th , may appear by his writ still extant among the parent rolls of the th of this king , where it is expresly recited , that it not seeming safe to the praelatis , magnatibus , & communicati regni nostri that both himself and his son prince edward should be both out of the kingdom at once in the holy land , and that therefore he gives the whole subsidy of a th granted him by the whole kingdom to his said son : and that it continued so in the beginning of edward the firsts reign , appears by a protestation in the th of this king ; as it is found in the patent rolls , wherein he recites a th , to have been granted him of all moveables , by the comites , barones , ac alii magnates , & communitas regni nostri . so that unless the sense of these words communitas regni must alter every year , there is no reason for us to believe any change to have been in the constituent parts of parliament since the th of henry the d. this i think may be sufficient to shew you that before the time you mention nor only the knights of shires , but the citizens and burgesses did appear in parliament both before your th of henry d , and th of edward i. m. i believe the commons might be comprehended under the general words magnates & proceres by wikes's chronicle in the th of henry the d , or else not be mentioned at all , which i rather incline to believe , and i must also confess that the other passage out of the same author concerning the citizens and burgesses being summoned either to a great council or parliament in the reign of henry the d , is more than i before ever took notice of . yet since this author does not tell us , whether it was to the one , or the other ; nor how many of them were there , whether one onely , or more for each city and burrough town , or whether they were elected by the people or nominated by the king to appear there , does not appear from this author , but as for the words communitas regni mentioned in the agreement of the th of henry d , tho it might signifie the body of the commons in that record ; yet if they were not again summoned to parliament , till the th of edward the i. it signified onely the body of the lesser tenants in capite , till after the th of that king. f. i am sorry to see prepossession and prejudice has so much overrun you as to hinder you from closing with the truth , for pray tell me , if this author could in the th of henry the d , ( when the commons were summoned without dispute ) comprehend all the estates of that parliament under the general words of pro●eres , and magnates , and the knights of shires are understood by the same word in the next passage cited out of the same author , why might not other writers do so too in other parliaments ? as for your next exception it is a very small cavil ; for it appears that this summons of the citizens and burgesses at the translation of king edwards relicks was to a parliament by the words that follow , nobiles ut assolent , parliamentationis genere de regis , & regni negotiis pertractare ; and why these citizens and burgesses should not be as well elected by their respective cities and burroughs this year as well as the last , as it appears they were by the writ to the cinque ports ; which the dr. and mr. pryn has given us ; i desire you would give me any satisfactory argument to the contrary . as for you objection against the words communitas regni being to be understood for the body of the commons in th henry d , it is altogether as unreasonable ; since this is to make the constituent parts of the parliament , alter not onely when writers shift their phrases , but when they do not ; and that without any other reason , but because the writs of summons and parliament rolls of those times are all perisht , and to deny the commons were there onely for that reason ; is altogether as unjust as for any court of justice to turn a man out of the actual and long possession of an estate meerly because his writings and evidences by the carelessness or roguery of his servants have happen'd ( a great many ) of them to be lost or burnt . but fully to convince you ( if possible ) that dr. bradyes opinion of the commons not being again summoned from the th of henry the d , till the th of edward the first is a meer fancy of his own , and contrary to the express authorities both of historians and records . and to come to plainer proofs , pray in the first place take notice , that it appears by a writ of the th of king edward the i. to the archbishop of canterbury acquainting him with the rebellion of lewellyn prince of wales , that he had de consilio praelatorum , procerum & magnatum regni , nec non totius communitatis ejusdem , resolved god willing to put an end to this welch rebellion ; so that this war seems to have been resolved upon at the parliament held the year before , and now mentioned in this record ; a war which that valiant , and fortunate prince effectually concluded by the total subduing of wales , and killing of lewellyn , whose head was cut off and sent to london , the particulars of which war knighton , as well as other historians relate at large ; and also that presently after david the brother of this lewellyn , the cause of all these mischiefs was ( as this author shews us ) in magno parliamento at shrewsbury condemned , and afterwards hang'd , drawn and quarter'd . walsingham is more short in the relation of this parliament , onely says , that in the th of edward the i. habitum est parliamentum at shrewsbury , in which this david was condemned and executed as before . but thomas wikes , who lived at this very time in his chronicle , but now cited , will better instruct us than either walsingham or knighton , and his account of this parliament is as follows . anno . circa festum sti michaelis rex convocari fecit apud salopesberiam majores regni sui & sapientiores tam de civibus , quam de magnatibus & fecit illuc addaci david , qui apud rothelan fuerat captivatus ut super exigentiam delicti ' sui corpore subiret iudicium , &c. and then relates at large the manner of his execution , from which passage we may observe , that this author makes it plain who were the communitas regni mentioned in the record of the th of this king ; and who constituted this great parliament at shrewsbury , viz. majores & magnates regni , which last , as i have now often proved , takes in the knights of shires , and the wisest of the citizens . m. but yet this author says no more but that the majores regni & sapientiores tam de civibus , quam de magnatibus , were called to this parliament wherein lewellyn was condemned : now it doth not appear that these ci●es were elected , or that there were any burgesses chosen for the burroughs , or that there were any knights chosen by the counties ; there were indeed magnates called to this parliament , but they might be all tenants in capite . f. well then , since you will not be satisfied without direct , and evident proof , such as neither your self nor dr. b. will i hope deny ; pray take this which mr. petyt has not long since communicated to me ; and which he has lately discovered in rotulo walliae , in a bye roll not taken notice of by any body as i know of before ; it is a formal writ of th edward i. for summoning the temporal lords to be with that king at a collequy ( or parliament ) opud salop in crastino sti. michaelis ; and there is in the same roll a second writ directed to several cities , and burroughs for electing two citizens ; and two burgesses to this parliament with a void space to insert more names . and also a third writ is there directed to the sheriff of every county in england to cause to be chosen two knights , pro communitate ejusdem commitatus . and lastly , there is a th writ directed to the justices and others of the kings learned council . with the same preambles to each of them , all being commanded to appear at the same time and place ; now what can dr. brady say to this , that he who was so long keeper of these records , and sure ought to have perused them , ( as he did many others of the same reign , ) yet has either willfully or carelesly passed by this so memorable a record . and so i hope , this will convince you for the future of the danger of being over positive in an opinion , because it could not presently be confuted ; and let you see that it is not at all improbable , but that the like writs of summons would appear as well before the th of henry the d , as in the rest of the years of his own , and his sons reign , had not those records been lost and destroy'd , which considered , we have reason to thank god for those that the iniquity of the times have yet le●t us . m. i must confess you have told me more than ever i yet thought could be produced against the drs. opinion ; and i should be throughly convinced could you shew me any writs of expences for the knights , citizens , and burgesses , who appeared at this parliament . f. i hope you will not averr against an express record , tho the writs of expences for that year are lost ( being never entred upon the roll ) by the omission of the clerks , who as mr. pryn acknowledges , oftentimes neglected the entries of writs of summons themselves , as well as of expences ; but if this were any material objection , then there should have been no commons summoned to any parliament from the th of henry the d. to the th of edward the first ; when the fist writs of expences ( except those of the th of henry the d ) do first appear upon the rolls , and so you must then go from the drs. new notion of the commons being again summoned in the th of this king ; but to shew you that these expences for the knights , citizens and burgesses could be no new things ; pray peruse the clause in this second writ . de expensis militum & burgensium , of the th of edward i. we have upon the rolls , the writ is to the sheriff of sammershire to pay to the knights of that county , venientibus ibidem nobisoum de diversis negotiis nos , & populum regni nostri specialiter tangentibus rationabiles expensas su●● in veniendo ad nos ibidem , morando , & inde ad propria redeando ( and now observe what follows ) prout , alias in casu consimili furi consuerit : now pray tell me , how this last clause could ever be true , if the knight of shires , citizens and burgesses had never been summoned to parliament , since the th of henry the d , which was but years , or the th of this king , but years before this writ , was published all over the kingdom . m. i confess what you now say , seems to carry some weight with it ; but yet in my opinion falls far short of a prescription , since a thing might be said to be done ; as in like cases was accostomed , tho it had never been practised above , or times . f. i see neither you nor your dr. by reason of your different imployments had ever any true knowledge of the nature of tenures and prescription ; according to the laws of england , which he is not to be blamed for , had he not taken upon him to be so great a master in both ; but i hope he will for the future remember , that old adage ne sutor ultra crepidam , therefore to set you right for the future , you must know that the knights , citizens , and burgesses have ever claimed , being summoned to all parliaments by prescription , as i shall prove by and by ; but as for that part of it called custom , my lord cook● tells us in his notes upon littleton , that in every custom there be two essential parts ; time and usage , time out of mind , and continual peaceable usuage without lawful interruption . now the common● have in all times beyond the memory of man , challenged to have enjoyed , both those essential parts of common law or general custom . so that these words praut c●su'cons●mili consuevit must be by implication of law extend beyond the times of henry the d , and edward the st . and for proof of this , i shall shew you what claimes the commons have made to this usage from time immemorial ; therefore i shall begin with mr. p's first argument in his rights of the commons , asserred , where the burgesses of st. albans in their petition to king edward ii. in parliament , a. d. . say , that they sic●t caeteri burgenses regni ad parliamentum regis ( when it should happen to be summoned ) per duos comburgenses suos venire debeant , prout totis retroactis temponibus venire consueverunt , tam tempore domini edwardi , nuper regis angliae patris regis , & progenitorum suorum , as in the time of edward ii. s●mper ante instans parliamentum , &c. and farther declare that the names of such burgesses coming to parliament were always inrolled in the rolls of the chancery ; notwithstanding all which the sheriff of hertford at the procuration and favour of the abbot of st. albans and his council , refused , burgenses praedictos praemunire sou nomina corum 〈◊〉 prout ad ipsum pertinuit , &c. and therefore they pray remedy , the king and councils answer whereunto was thus , scrutentur 〈◊〉 , &c. de cancellari● si temporib●s ●rogenitorum regis burgenses praedicti solebant venire vel non ? & tunc siat t is supe● hoc iustitia vocatis evocandis si necesse su●vit . where by the words totis retroactis temporibus , &c. must be understood that they and their predecessors were always accustomed to send two burgesses to parliament in all former ages , not only in the time of edw. i. but his progenitors ; therefore in king iohn's time , his grand-father at least , and so long before the th hen. iii. m. i confess the gentlemen of your party make a great deal of noise with this quotation , but if it be strictly lookt into , i believe it will prove of no such great consequence as you would make it . for mr. p. hath concealed the main cause of these burgesses pretending a right of sending members to parliaments , and therefore 't will not be amiss to give you the rest of it at large . ad petitionem burgensium villae de sancto albano sugg●rentium regi , quod licet ipsa tenent villam praedictam de rege in capite & ipsi sicut caeteri burgenses regni ad parliamen●a regis cum ea su●●noniri contigerit per duos comburgenses suos venire debeane prout totis retroactis temporibus venire , consueverunt pro omnibus servitiis regi faciendis , &c. by which words , as the dr. very well shews us it is evident , that the burgesses of st. albars claim'd not , nor prescribed to come to parliaments as meerly from a burrough , but as from a town that held in chief of the king , and this service was incident to their tenure , and was such as the king's progenitors had accepted in lien of all services due by reason thereof . and farther , the answer to this petition is remarkable , which amounts to no more than this , that if it did appear by the roth of chancery , that the burgesses of st. albans were wont to come to parliaments in the time of the king's progenitors , then such as have been called ( i. e. to parliament ) should be called when there was necessary for it . hence 't is clear the king and his council were equally judges when it was necessary to call them , and for them to come ; as they were of their rights and pretences to come . f. i very much wonder a gentleman of your understanding should be so much imposed upon by such weak inferences ; for in the first place it is a great mistake in matter of fact● ▪ that these burgesses of st. albans claimed to come to parliament no otherwise but as 〈◊〉 in capit● ▪ for tho' the said petition re●ues that they hold the said town of the k. in capite , yet they do not likewise say , that they claim'th to appear there only by that tenure , for then they should have re●ired that they sicut caeteri burgenses tenentes in capite , and not sicut caeteri burgenses regni ad parliamenti regis venir● debeant . and tho' it is true they set forth that they appeared there for all services , yet do they not say , that their tenure in capit● was the only cause of their appearance in parliam . since divers towns and burrought of the kingdom , which held not in capite at all , had the like priviledge before , of which i can give you divers instances , which i shall read to you ou● of this note , which a lear●ed friend of mine slace decea●'d hath taken out of the rolls in the tower , tho' when he sent it me , he thorough hast , 〈◊〉 , hath forgot to set down the number of the roll to most of such burroughs , who never held in capite , and yet have always sent burgesses to parliament by prescription ; as first the burrough these of arundel , which always held of the earls , and never of the king , being granted by henry i. to hugh montgomery earl of arundel . secondly , the city of bath appears to hold of the bishop of bath and wells . thirdly , the city of wells it self , which always held of the bishop , and never of the king , and is therefore called villa episcopi in all publick writings belonging to that church , and was made a free burrough in the third of king iohn . fourthly , beverly was made a free burrough by thurston arch-bishop of york , which was confirmed by king henry iii. hi●●hly , badmin , which always held of the earls of cornwall . sixthly , bridgwater for king iohn granted it to william brewer , quod brugwater sit liber burgus . seventhly , coventry , which was always held of the earls of chester , and pleaded in the reign of edw. i. to have never been taxed with the king's demesnes , but with the body of the county . eighthly , bishop linne for king iohn granted to iohn bishop of norwich ; quod burgus de lenna sit liber burgus inperpetuum ; all which by the writs we have left us , sent burgesses to parliament as early as any that held in capite . these i give you only for a taste , but i doubt not , but , if i had time , i could give you three times as many , especially in cornwall , where the burroughs did almost all hold of the earl of cornwall , and not of the king. but besides , the doctors errour in supposing that no ancient cities or burroughs had any right of sending members to parliament , but only as they held of the king in capite , his mistake is yet much more gross in his construing those remarkable words in the king's answer to the burgesses of st. albans , et tunc fiat eis super hoc iustitia , vocatis evocandis si necesse fuerit . thus , and then let them have iustice in this matter , and such as have been called , may be called , if there be necessity . upon which words you have also from the dr. put this pleasant gloss ; hence 't is clear the king and his council were equally judges when it was necessary to call them , and for them to come ; as they were of their rights and pretences to come . but i must needs tell you ● think nothing can be more absurd , and contrary to the genuine sense of this record , than the doctor 's construction , who will needs have the words evocatis evocandis , only to mean a calling , or summoning to parliament , which is quite contrary to the true sense of the king's answer to this petition ; for if that had been his meaning ▪ that those only should be summoned to parliament whom the king pleased to call , to what purpose were these words , scrutentur rotuli , &c. de cancell . si temporibus progenitorum regis burgenses praedicti solebant venire vel non ? for if their coming to parliament had been a matter of meer grace and favour , and not of right , & so wholly left in the king's breast whether they should come , or not it , was in vain for him to command the rolls of chancery to be searched whether the said burgesses us'd to come to parliament or not in the times of his progenitors ; or if it had not been a matter of right , why should it be here said , that upon search of the rolls , tunc fiat iustitia , let justice be done , i● there never was such a right of prescription by which they claimed ? but i much wonder that the dr. ( so great a critick in records ) should ever construe them evocatis evocandis , a summoning or calling to parliament ; and i desire you would shew me in what parliament roll , or ancient record you can find eveca●● ad parliamentum , to summon to parliament : but i more admire that you who are a profest civilian , should no better understand the sense of your own terms ; whereas if you would have but consulted any civil law dictionary , you might have found evoca●e testes always signifies to summon wi●nesses ; and i can shew you by twenty precedents both from our common law records , as well as your canon law forms , that evocatis e●ocandis does always signifie the summoning such witnesses as are to be summon'd in a cause , and in this sense it is to be understood in this record , that not only the rolls should be search'd , but also witnesses summon'd to prove their claim , if any dispute or doubt should arise about the matter of fact . m. i shall no longer contend with you about the genuine sense of these last words , since perhaps you may be in the right ; but yet for all that , it does not appear , that the king and his council did by this answer allow this petition of the town of st. albans to be true , that they had sent burgesses to parliament in the time of his predecessors , much less that any other city of burrough in england were then allowed such a right by prescription . f. i grant indeed that this petition doth not absolutely allow the matter of fact , ( as it concerns the matter in dispute between them and the abbot ) to be true , as it is there set forth , neither yet does it condemn it for false ; but whether it were true , or false , it matters not , for both the petition and the answer do sufficiently prove the point for which we make use of it ; ( viz ) that it was then received for a general custom , or law , time out of mind , that the cities and burroughs had sent members to parliament according as in the petition is set forth , otherwise it can scarce be supposed ( much less believed ) that the burgesses of st. albans , or the pen-man of this petition should dare to tell the king , and his learned council , in the face of the parliament , so great , and ridiculous a novelty to be recorded to posterity , as that they and their predecessors in the time of king edward i. and his progenitors , had sent two burgesses to every parliament , or that the king and his council should have ever received this petition without indignation , and a severe rebuke for their impudence ; if all the world the● knew , ( as certainly they must ( were it true ) that there was never any election of burgesses to parliament before the th of henry iii. ( which was but fifty years before the th of ed. ii. ) who from thence had appeared no more till the th of ed. i. which was but years before the delivery of this petition , a time which must have been then fresh in the memories of most of the kings council there present : whereas they allow this general claim of prescription , and every person , ( tho' but meanly skill'd in our law ) does understand a general prescription ; viz. à tempore cujus contrarium memoria hominum non existit , what it was then , and so remains , by the law of england at this day , as appears by our ancient records , law-books , and judicial proceedings . and surely the burgesses of st. albans did not ground their petition of right upon an affirmation in nubibus , but the justice & certainty of their claim , as they very well knew , which so they prayed it might be examined by uncontroulable proofs : the rolls of chancery , and the king , chancellor and all the council , did no less know there were such entries on the rolls , and therefore order their search ; whereas if the very ground of their petition had been notoriously false , and idle ( as it must have been if neither this , nor any other burrough had sent burgesses to parliament before the th of henry iii. ) then instead of recording this petition and answer , to future ages , they would with contempt and indignation have rejected it , nor would the abbot of st. alban's council , and the sheriff of hertford against whom this petition was exhibited , have been wanting in their own defence to have shewed that this ancient prescription not only of this , but of all other burroughs was a meer chimera and fable : but instead of this we do not find they made any opposition against it , because they knew they had been summoned and appeared at divers parliaments before that time , as you may see in prins parliamentary register they were in the th of edward i. which is almost as early as we have any writs of summons left us , to the commons of this king's reign : and tho' it is true , the sheriff of hertford in this th returns that the bailiffs had made no return of the precept sent them ; yet this plainly proves that they were then looke upon as a burrough , and that it was very well known , that it was wont to send burgesses to parliament , or else it had been a vain thing for him to have sent them any such precept at all : and tho' it is also true , there are no more returns from st. albans left us till the th of edward the first , yet that is no good argument against their appearance in the former years , since the writs and returns upon them being in loose bits of parchment , might very well be lost , as well as they are for many other places : but that the burgesses of st. albans were summoned , and appeared in parliament in the th of edw. i. appears ( tho' the returns be lost ) by the writs of expences of this year ( being the first we have left us in prin's parliamentary register ) for the cities and burroughs ; in which lift the burgesses of st. albans are first upon the roll ; and that they were in parliament before this time , may further appear by that clause at the end of the writ which i have already taken notice of , viz. that they were to have their experces for coming , staying , and returning , prout in casu consimili fieri consuevit ; which words relate to ancient custom , and extend to st. albans , as well as no any other burrough there mentioned : and that they also were summoned , & appeared in primo & jecundo of edward the second , ( in whose reign this petition was exhibited , ) you may see in prin's parliamentary registers , both third and fourth parts ; in the last of which you may find the names of the burgesses returned in the first and fifth of this king , as they might have been seen also in the second : had not the return ( as mr. prin then acknowledges ) been torn off ▪ tho' it is plain that they appeared there ; and so may be likewise lost for all the rest of the years of this king till the second of edward the third , when we find they appeared again , and so continue to send burgesses to this day . and if it be a good argument of their non appearance from the defect of records , i 'll undertake to prove that london and several other cities did not send any citizens to parliament in several kings reigns , as you may see in this list of towne ( whose writs of expences we now mentioned ) of the ● th of king edward the first● where london , and most other great cities are omitted , and yet st. albans is in . to conclude , it is certain that this was no new claim of this burrough , as appears by a writ of the th of edward the second to the sheriff of hertford , that the bailiffs of the abbot had refused to levy the expences for ralph and peter picot , who had served as burgesses for the said town in the last parliament ; whereupon the said ralph and peter set forth before the king , that the said town used not to be taxed with other burroughs of the said county for the expenses of knights , totis temporibus retroactis ; but that it is a free burrough , and used to be summoned to parliaments , which have been summoned by the king and his progenitors temporibus retroactis ; and that the burgesses of the said town used to receive their expences as the burgesses of other burroughs of the kingdom ; to which plea and petition of the said burgesses ; when the king had appointed a day both to the said burgesses and bailiffs of the abbot , to appear before him in chancery , they failing at the day appointed , the king therefore issued out this writ to the sheriff of hertford to summon the said abbot and bailiffs to appear again before him , to shew cause why the said ralph and peter should not receive their expences as aforesaid . m. i will consider further of this argument ; for i must ingeniously confess i never heard or understood so much of this matter before : but pray proceed to the rest of your authorities . f. but that it was not only the opinion of the burroughs of st. albans , and admitted by the king and his council , but that also that it was the belief of succeeding parliaments , that the commons were part of the great council of the kingdom long before the th of henry iii. for proof of which , i desire you to call to mind that king iohn in the th of his reign made himself and crown tributary to the pope . but anno edw. iii. when the pope demanded the arrears of this tribute from the king , the prelates , dukes , count barons and commons , upon their full deliberation in parliament , resolved with one accord , that neither the king , nor any other could put the realm , nor people thereof into such subjection , sanz assent de eux , without their assent ; viz. as well of the commons , as of the lords ; and that it appeared by many evidences , that if he had so done , it was done , sanz lour assent , and contrary to his coronation oath , &c. now what can be more plain than that above three hundred years ago there was not the least dispute that the commons of england , ( of which the citizens and burgesses were then undoubtedly a part ) ought to have been present in the commune concilium regni , or parliament of king iohn's reign , and to have assented to that king's resignation , to make it legal , and valid , as well as the prelates , earls , and barons . m. as for this argument i need trouble my self no further than to give you the dr's . answer in his own words ; viz. all that the resolution of this parliament in this case proves , is that king iohn could not subject himself , his realm or people , without their assent , but proves not , who they were that in such cases at that time gave , or denied their assent , or how they did it , or whether years before this resolution , the commons were represented by knights , citizens , and burges●es as at this day . the prelates , and barons gave their answer first , that such a subjection could not be made without their assent , and then the commons were asked what their thoughts were , and they answered in the same manner , and in the same words , the barons had done , and when they answer altogether , they do it in the same form of speech conceived first by the barons , without any consideration , whether the commons were the same body of men , at the time of executing the charter of king iohns subjection , &c. as at that present , or no. f. i must freely tell you , i am not at all satisfied with this reply of the drs. for if there is no heed to be taken of the house of commons answer to the pope , given in so solemn a manner as this was , there is no credit to be given to any thing they could say , if they are once suppos'd to speak like parrots by roat , and only as they were taught by the lords without any consideration of the truth or falshood of what they averred . and tho the first proposal of this matter was by the king to the lords , yet the pope then threatning to excommunicate the king , and put the whole realm under an interdict ; it was certainly the interest as well of the commons as the lords to avoid the blow by a wary and true answer to the popes demands ; for had their answer been so idle and frivolous , as you would make it , it had been advantage enough for the pope to have return'd in answer to this letter , ( had what the dr. alledges been true ) that the upstart house of commons had nothing to do to meddle or treat of any such matter , since they were none of the parties to the agreement , nor one of the estates , at that time when king iohn resign'd his crown , and made himself and kingdom tributary to his holinesses predecessours , nor was the space of an hundred fifty three years from the time of king iohn , to the th of edward the d , so far beyond the memory of man , as that so memorable a transaction could not be well known to the pope , as well as to the house of commons then in being , since the making them a d estate , fell out but in the time of all their grandfathers at farthest , so that it is scarce possible that the memory of so remarkable a transaction of which the whole world then rang , should be lost in two or three generations . but i shall now proceed to shew you , that as it was the express judgment both of the lords and commons , that king iohn could not make the kingdom tributary to the pope without their consent in parliament ; so was it the judgment also of the whole house of commons in the d of henry the th , and admitted by that noble prince and the house of lords , that they had ever been a member of parliament , and that no statute , or law could be made without their assent , as appears by a petition or protestation presented by the said commons to the king in parliament , a copy of which i shall now read to you , as far as it concerns the matter in question ; our soveraign lord , your humble and trewe lieges , that ben come for the comune of your lond , bysechin unto your riht twissness , that soo as hit hath ever be thair libertie and freedom , that there should noo statute , noo law be made , of less than they yaf thereto their assent , considering that the comune of your lond , the which that is , and ever hath be a member of your parlement ▪ been as well aslentirs as petitio●ers , that fro this time forward by compleint of the comune of eny misch●ef , asking remedy by mouth of their speaker for the commons , outher else by petition written , that there never be no law made thereupon and ingressed as statute and law , neither by additions , neither by di●●inutions by no manner of term , ●e terms , the which that should change the sentence and the intent asked by the speakers mouth , or the petitions by foresaid ●even up in 〈◊〉 by the foresaid without assent of the foresaid comune , &c. this petition is so plain that it needs no comment , therefore pray tell me what you think of it . m. in the first place give me leave to tell you , that i do not find at all by the kings answer to this petition , that the king allowed the matter of fact therein set forth to be true , but rather the contrary , as you may see by the answer it self in these words , the king of his grace especial granteth , that fro hensforth nothing be enacted to the pet●●ions of his comune that be contrary of their asking , whereby they should be bound without their assent , saving alway to our leige , i. e. royal lord his real prerogatys to grant , and deny , what him lust of their petitions , and askings aforesaid . and i shall farther give you the drs. answer to this argument , which is to this effect ; the design of this petition was not to set forth the antiquity of their existence , but their right , that nothing might be enacted without their assent contrary to their intent and liking ; and to shew that it was never done since the commons were a third estate , or ( as they say ) a member of parliament , therefore 't is needless to prove that which no body denies , that the assent of the commons was then and is now required to the making of all statutes , and laws , but pray give me leave to ask you ( with the dr ) what'were the commons of england as now represented by knights , and citizens , and burgesses , ever an essential constituent part of the parliament from eternity , before man was created ? or have they been so ever since adam ? or ever since england was peopled ? or ever since the britains , romans and saxons inhabited this island ? certainly there was a time when they began to be so represented , and that is the question between us , concerning which , whether you or my self be in the right , i durst leave to any impartial judge . f. but notwithstanding your drs. answer , i think under favour the king , and lords did here allow the substance of this petition or claim , as the main ground and foundation on which it was built , viz. that the commons had ever been members of parliament ; and therefore that no law , or statute should be made without their assents ( which encroachment upon their liberties , 〈◊〉 seems had been before endeavoured by the king and lords ) and therefore let me tell you , that the answer of the king in parliament , is rather a full concession of the truth of the commons claim ; otherwise it is not to be imagin'd that the king and lords would have left such a claim as of ancient right without any denial or protestation against it , but instead of this , the kings and lords allow the whole to be true ; onely the king reserved to himself his negative voice of granting , or denying what he pleased , which the commons themselves do also allow him in the conclusion to the petition it self , as you may see if you please to read it at large . and father , that this affirmation of the commons was no other , then a renovation , or memorial of the ancient law of the land in that point is more fully explained , and confirmed by a petition to king edward d in parliament , of all the bishops , prelates , counts , barons , and others of the commonalty , in the th of his reign about an ● . years before this of th henry the th , setting forth that they held their mannours of the king capite , as well within the forests as without , to which mannours they held gasz . ( i. e. wast . ) appendant , and of which the seignories had been rented out by the acre , half acre , and rude in improving their said mannours , and that thereupon the officers of the king had made seisure thereof , because they had not the kings license so to do , and therefore pray that they may improve their said mannours , &c. to which petition it was answered by the king and his learned council in parliament ; that this could not be done without a new law , to do , which the commonalty of the land will never assent , and concludes , infra coram rege , from whence i make these observations that the king and his council do here declare it , ( as the ancient custom of england , ) that no new law could then be without the assent of the commons or commonalty of the land ; and also that this commonalty was a distinct body from the commonalty of the tenants in capite , before mentioned . and besides this , i can shew you divers precedents to the same purpose and particularly , a declaration , or protestation to edward d. by the commons in parliament , that they would not be obliged to any statutes , or ordinances , without the assent of the said commons ; which is also farther confirmed by another petition of right or a protestation of the commons to king richard the d . as it is to be found in the parliament rolls of th richard d . ( pt. . m. . ) wherein they pray against a pretended statute made by the king and the lords , against those who in the statute of henry the th are called lollards in which they set forth that the said statute was never assented to by the commons ; and therefore pray , that it be annulled : and pray observe the reason , for that it was not their intent , to be justified , nor to oblige themselves , or their successors to the prelates , more than their ancestors have been in times pass'd . from all which , we may observe that the commons do by all these petitions and protestations make as strong a claim by prescription for themselves , and their ancestors not being bound by the acts of the bishops and lords , as the king could make for himself , and his ancestors , touching his own prerogative by prescription . but as for your queries on this petition , since they are not your own , give me leave to tell you , i look upon them as impertinent , for who ever suppos'd that the commons claim'd a right by prescription ever since the creation , or ever since the first peopleing of this island , since any body may see , that this word ever is to be understood according to the nature of the subject in hand , viz. from the first institution of the saxon government in this island , now pray give me leave to put you a case ; suppose you should affirm , that the crown of england hath ever been successive , and not elective , wou'd it not be meer cavilling to ask you , whither it was so , pure divino ever since adam ? but as you will leave it to any impartial judge , who is in the right , you or i , so shall i likewise leave it to them to consider , which is most likely , that your self , your dr. and some of our modern antiquaries , should make the house of commons no ancienter than about the latter end of henry the d , or middle of edward the st reign , or the constant judgment of both houses of parliament , with the assent of the king , and his learned council , who have insisted upon the consent of the commons , as their ancient and undoubted right beyond all time of memory . m. i must confess you have proved it plain enough , that it was the constant opinion of more than one parliament ; that the commons had been before the th of henry the d , members of the great council of the nation : but how long before that they do not set forth : but since parliaments , are no more infallible than general councils , i hope you will pardon me , if i do not give absolute credit to their testimony , since in an illiterate age , as that was in which the commons make this petition ; it might happen that not onely they but the king himself , and his council at that time might not certainly know , how long , or how little a time the commons had been summoned to parliament , therefore since all the writs of summons to them before the th of henry the d are lost ; i pray shew me from this general right of prescription , you so much talk of , that there must have been any commons summoned to parliament before that time ; for i have now somewhat very material out of mr. prins parliamentary register to object against mr. lambard's argument from the plea of the tenants in ancient demesne being exempted by prescription , from paying to the wages of knights of the shires ; ( as you told me at our last meeting but one ) but first let me hear the rest of your arguments from this prescription of knights , citizens , and burgesses appearing in parliament , before the th of henry the d ; for since you have now proved they were there by an undeniable record in the th of edward i. i shall now confine my self to sir henry spelmans and sir william dugdales ( as well as the drs. first ) term of th of henry the d. f. i shall observe your desires , and in performing of which , i shall pursue this method ; i shall first give you a general definition of prescription , and shall then prove that the knights , citizens , and burgesses have always claimed to appear in parliament by vertue of this general right of prescription . now the terms of the law tell us , that prescription is , when a man claimeth any thing , for that he and his ancestors and predecessors , whose estate he holds , had , or used any thing in all times whereof no memory is to the contrary ; now pray let us see to what time this is limited , that shall be said to be within memory , and what was anciently counted beyond time of memory in a prescription , which may be best learnt from a petition of the commons to king edward the d , in the d of his reign , which is to be found in the parliament rolls of that year , wherein among other petitions of the commons , this is one , which i shall render and abridge out of french. item , because the whole time of king richard i. is held for temps de memorie , that it would please the king farther to limit this time ; so that it do not pass the coronation of king edwards grandfather to the king that now is ; ( but mark the kings answer to this petition . ) let the law continue as hath been hitherto used , until it be otherwise ordain'd ; so that since there has been no alteration in this point from the reign of edward the d , then the time beyond memory , or whereof there is no memory to the contrary , continues still beyond the time of richard the i. for littleton tells us , that all the time of richard i. is time of memory ; and therefore sir edward cooke in his comment upon him , says , that this was intended from the first year of his reign , for ( from that time ) being indefinitely doth take in all the whole time of his reign , which is to be observed . having fixt the certain time of a general prescription beyond memory , i shall now proceed to shew you , that the claim of the commons appearing at the common council or parliament of the kingdom is beyond that time ; which since i cannot do directly , ( by reason of the loss of the records of parliament of those times ) any farther then has been already in the case of the burgesses of st. albans ( which alone is , i think , sufficient to satisfie any reasonable man ) we must therefore make use of such collateral proofs , and records , which tho they not directly , yet by undeniable consequence will prove the point in question , i shall therefore in the first place make use of a writ in the exchequer of the th edward i. directed to the barons thereof , reciting , that whereas the men of coventry set forth in their petition to the king , that the said to all is not a city , burrough , nor demesne of the kings , so that the townsmen were not wont to be taxed as citizens , and burgesses , or tenants in ancient demesne , in any taxes granted to the king , and his progenitors , but only with the community of the said county of warwick , and yet that the taxers and collector ; of the said county have endeavoured to levy a th of their goods ( towards an aid granted by the communities of the cities and burroughs to the king ) to their damage and impoverishment ; and therefore pray remedy : the king therefore orders , that the rolls be searcht concerning , such taxations in the said town ; and if it evidently appear by them , that it is as they set forth ; and that the said men were always taxed with others without the towns , burroughs , and mannors aforesaid ; in all payments of this sort , that then they should not permit the said taxers , and collectors to distrain the said inhabitants to pay the king by reason of the said concession of a th otherwise , quam in totis temporious retroactis in hujuscemodi casu fieri consueverit , &c. from which record we may draw these conclusions , first , that this town of coventry did not hold of the king , and yet was a burrough , and as such sent members to parliament , in the th , th , and th of edward i. as appears by the return of writs of that year . secondly , that yet it prescribed , totis temporibus retroactis , in all times pass'd to be taxed with the body of the county , and not with the communities of the cities and burroughs in all taxes granted to the king and his progenitors ; which plainly shows , that the cities and burroughs granted taxes by themselves in the times of his progenitors , that is , in the time of king iohn at the least . lastly , that the king orders the rolls to be searcht , which had been idle direction , had it then been known , or believed , that the cities and burroughs never gave any taxes for themselves in parliament before the th of henry the third , but little above forty years before the date of this writ . i shall shew you a like writ ( which is to be sound in the same place ) for the towns-men and tenants of beverly in the county of york , in vo . of edward the second , seting forth in their petition , that altho' they had been taxed to to the th lately given to the king per communitates comitatuum , by the taxers and collectors of a subsidy of the th in the said county , altho' they and their ancestors had been accustomed to be taxed to all aids , as well to the king , as to his propenitors , granted per communitates comitatuum ejusdem regni , with the community of the county , and not with the communitates civitatum & bargorum ; yet that the taxers and collectors of the th , lately granted by the commons of the cities and burroughs do grievously distrain them to their great damage , and therefore pray remedy ; whereupon the king commands that the rolls be searcht of such like taxations , and if it appear that the said town has always been hitherto taxed , as they in their petition set forth , that then they shall be discharged from the said th . from which record we may conclude that this town of beverly , tho' an ancient burrough , ( and as such was summoned to send burgesses to parliament in the th of this king ) yet did not hold o● the king in capite , nor in ancient demesne . secondly , that aids had been given the king and his progenitors per communitates comitatuum , i. e. by the commons of the counties , which could not be done but by their lawful representatives , and that in parliament ; but how far these progenitors must extend , i need no repeat to you ; the ground of which petition being admitted by the king in parliament . m. these authorities , tho' material , yet do not in my opinion reach the point you were to prove ; viz. that the knights , citizens and burgesses appeared in parliament , before the reign of richard i. for both these authorities , ( tho' admitted for good ) yet reach no higher than king iohn's time , which is within memory , as your self have now set forth , since the word progenitors need not be extended any further than the time of that king , who was great grand-father to edward the first and second , to whom these petitions were made by these towns-men , and so do not clearly amount to your full time of prescription ; viz. before the reign of richard i. f. well , pray remember , that if you grant this , you have lost your cause , since certainly the reign of king iohn is long before the th of henry iii. but since you will be so over-critical , i will shew you some claims by prescription beyond all time of memory , made by the tenants in ancient demesne , from being taxed to contribute to the wages of knights of shires ; and if they thus prescribed , it is plain there must have been knights of shires chosen , against paying whose wages they prescribed to have had this priviledge : now this prescription must be very ancient , since , as mr. lambard shews us in the place i have quoted , there has been no new tenants made in ancient demesne , since the time of william i. but pray see the writ it self in the old register of writs , which is there put down only as a form for drawing of all other writs of this kind there to be found for other towns , ( and particularly the tenants of odiham in hampshire ) whenever there was occasion ; and therefore it is not to be wonder'd that neither the name of the king , nor of the place be expressed in words at length . the writ it self is not very long , therefore i shall give it you in latine as far as is material : rex vicecomiti l. salutem monstraverunt nobis homines , & tenente● de manerio de f. quod est de antiquo dominico co●one . angliae ut dicitur quod licet ipsi & corum antecessores tenentes de eodem manerio a tempore quo non extat memoria semper hactenus quieti esse cousueverunt de expensis militum ad parliamenta nostra & progenitorum nostrorum regum angli●e pro commanitate dicti comitatus venienium , &c. and then proceeds that whereas the said sheriff distrains the said tenants to contribute to the expences of the knights that came to the last parliament , to their great damage , otherwise than totis retroa●tis temporibus fieri consuevit ; therefore commands him that he desist from his said distress , and do not compel the said tenants to contribute otherwise quam omnibus temporibus retroactis . and now tho' this writ be without any kings name or date , yet it appears at the bottom it was issued by g. l. e●●rope then chancellour , and william de holston , clerk of the chancery ; and this must have been before the th of that king , because it appears by the close rolls of that year , that in december the great seal was delivered to william d' ayremyn , under the seals of william de clyffe , and the said william de herlston , clerks of chancery , who are often mentioned in our records to have been keepers of it pro tempore , till the second of edward the third , when the said william de herlston had the sole custody thereof committed to him . but there is yet a perfecter writ of this kind in the th of edward the third extant on the rolls directed to iohn de cobham , and four other knights therein named , reciting that whereas simon arch-bishop of canterbury claims as well for himself as his predecessors , and their tenants hitherto , à tempore quo non extat memoria , for certain lauds held in gavel-kind in the county of kent , which ought to be free from the expences of knights coming to our parliaments , as well as those of our progenitors ; and concludes with a supersedeas to the said sheriff not to molest the said tenants until such time as the king be further informed and that he by the advice of his council has ordained what is to be done in the premisses ; from both which writs we may draw these conclusions ; first , that there was at the time of the granting these writs a claim by prescription time out of mind allowed for all tenants , holding of the arch-bishop in gavelkind to be exempted from contributing to the wages of knights of the shire , or else these petitions , and the writs upon them had been idle and ridiculous . lastly , that this claim of being thus exempted time out of mind ( which as i have already proved , extend , beyond the time of richard the first ) is allowed by the king himself for good in both these writs , only in the last the king will be informed whether they are tenants in gavel kind or not ; so that the conclusion must be , that if these tenants in ancient demesne , and gavel-kind were always exempted from paying to the wages of knights of the shires beyond memory , i. e. by prescription , then certainly those knights must have been chosen time beyond memory . i could give you several other writs of like nature , but i will not over charge you . now certainly if the knights of shires were thus elected time beyond memory , the citizens and burgesses must have been so too , since in scotland where there were for a long time no commissioners for the shires , yet the cities and burroughs ever sent delegates to parliament , as your dr. himself allows . m. i must beg your pardon if i cannot come over to your opinion , concerning this prescription of knights of shires , citizens and burgesses appearing in parliament before the th of henry the third ; since mr. prin in his second and third part of his parliamentary register has proved ; . that all the words you insist upon to prove this prescription , are to be understood in another sense than what you would now put upon them ; so that tho' mr. lambard and others of great note lay the original title and right of all our countreys , ancient cities and burroughs electing and sending of burgesses to parliament , and to be by prescription time out of mind long before the conquest ; yet against this opinion mr. prin argues thus ( whose arguments i shall contract because it would be tedious to recite them all verbatim . ) first , that as for the wages of knights of shires ( which is the principal thing you insist on in this last argument ) the ancientest writs extant for their wages , are those of th and th of edward the first , and no records or law-books i have seen derive their title higher than the reign of edward the first : the first statute concerning them is that of the th of richard ii. which only enacts that the levying expences of knights shall be as hath been used of old time . the next statute is of of h. th , and enacts that knights of shires unduly returned , shall lose their wages of the parliament of old time accustomed , not at , or before the conquest accustomed : yea no man can prove there were any knights for counties elected , and sent to parliaments by the king's writs before the th of henry the third , not to the reign of the conquerour , or before the conquest , as mr. lambard would strain it . now as for the words antacessores & progenitores in the writs you have cited , the former may very well signifie the ancestors of those inhabitants of burroughs or towns , and the latter the predecessors of the king that then was , which in the time of edward the second , and edward the third , when those writs were granted , need extend no higher than the th of henry the third ; and as for the other words in these writs , as totu timporibus retroaclis ; and a tempore quo non ixtai memoria , they must have the like interpretation , or what is equivalent to it ; viz. in all times passed , or time out of mind , i. e. before there were any knights elected for the countreys , they were always free from contributing to their wages , so that this prescriptions need not extend higher than the th of henry iii. above mentioned ; since which time it is true ( as they there set forth ) that they and their ancestors in all times , or time beyond memory , have always used to be quit from such expences of knights : now there were many prescriptions and customs in use in edward the third's time , and since , which may be well said to be 〈◊〉 out of mind , yet certainly had their original not before , but long since the conquest , as you may read in brooks , fitzherbert , and other law-books , title , custom , and prescription , and cook 's first instit. my lord hobard in his reports ; that which hath been used , or 〈◊〉 but two , or three ages only , or out of the memory or mind of men then being , is reputed a legal custom , or prescription henry vi. brook 's tit. prescription , therefore this prescription of tenant's in ancient demesne to be exempted from contributing to knights wages , will no ways warrant mr. lambard's conclusion from it ; ergo , there were elections of knights of shires before the conquest . i am certain that at this day tenants in ancient demesne can plead that both they , and their ancestors , time out of mind , never were accustomed to pay excise for any thing for which excise is now paid ; will it therefore follow , ergo , all other places , now subject to pay excise , were liable to it before the conquest , when it is a duty imposed but since the late wars . so that mr. prin here proves , that your , and mr. lambard's argument from the tenants in ancient demesne , and gavel-kind , not paying in all times passed , or time beyond memory to the wages of knights of the shires , is altogether fallacious , and inconclusive . f. pray sir give me leave to reply to your answer before you proceed to speak of borroughs . first , let me tell you , mr. prin very much forgot himself when he here says , that the first writs for wages of knights of shires are but of the th , or th of edward the first , since you know better ; for your dr. has printed the writ of expences for the knights of shires that served in this parliament of the th of henry iii. and you your self have urged it to me , that this was the first time , that these knights had their expences allowed them , because there was no clause of , prout in casu simili , expressed therein ; which i told you might be only through inadvertency of the clerks , since the dr. there gives us another writ of the d of that king , whereby it appears that the four knights of counties who had appeared before the king and his council at the foregoing parliament , were ordered their expences , for going , returning , and staying at the said parliament , which shews that these writs were no new things , and if so be these knights had their expences allowed them only for their attendance at a parliament , it is much more reasonable and likely they had their expences allowed , when they made a part of it . but to put this out of all doubt , mr. prin himself has cleared this point not only by printing this very writ in the th part of his parliamentary register , but by declaring in the very first section of that volume , that tho' after this writ no more are to be found of this sort extant upon the rolls of henry iii. till the th of edward i. yet they were constantly issued but at the end of every parliament held after the th of henry the third , till the th of edward the first ( being years space ) as this clause in the writs of , , and th of edward i. prout alias in casu consimili fieri consuevit assures us ; but all the bundles of writs from the th of h●nry the third till the th of edward the first , being lost , and no writs of summons from h. entred in the clause rolls till e. . tho' returnable into chancery , no wonder that these writs de expensis ( not returnable at all ) were not enrolled till e. . after which they were usually endorsed on the clause rolls till the second of henry the fifth . so that by mr. prin's own confession , the loss of the writs from the th of henry . till ed. . is no argument at all to prove that there were no such writs before the th of hen. . unless you could prove to me that the writs and records of all those parliaments had been so well preserved , that there are none lost or imbezell'd , which mr. prin acknowledges to the contrary ; for if they were lost after the th of h. . pray give me a reason why the like writs of summons and expences , might not be lost as well before that time . having , i think , sufficiently answered mr. prin's argument from the not finding any writs of expences before the th of edward . from what he himself sold afterwards upon better consideration ; i shall now proceed to reply to that other part of his argument from the equivocal use of the words , old times accustomed , and in a tempore quo non extat memoria ; which he will have to signifie a space of time only beyond the memory of any man living , whereas the words custom and accustomed , when used of any general custom or usage all over the realm is still to be taken in much larger acceptation , as all our law-books will teach you : but i shall not dwell upon this , but shew you that those authors whose works you have read , had no true notion of this expression in our ancient records and pleadings ; viz. a tempore cujus contraii memoria non existit ; which has been always understood ( as littleton here tells you ) for a time beyond the reign of king richard i. so that where-ever you find these words , totis temporibus retroactis , or de temps dont momorie des homes ne curg● al contrarie , in any records , they are always to be understood of a time older than that now mentioned ; you may prove a contrary usage if you can ; but before that time no deed can be given in evidence , nor custom alledged beyond it : and that this is not the sense of littleton alone ( who indeed makes a query about this time beyond memory ) i appeal to all our year-books , and if you please to see all the considerable law-learning at once about this point , pray consult roll's abridgment ( or com-mon-place-book ) title , prescription , where he gives you these conclusion , from the year-books which i shall here read to you in english. . it is clear enough , that there was a certain time called time of memory in a prescription , and for this he cites the year-books of h. . . per newton e. . . b. h. . . h. . . . the said time of memory in a prescription was from the time of king richard i. h. . . d. mar. . . . . . b. the time of k. iohn is within memory , lit. sect. . . h. . . b. . so that the said time of memory was from the beginning of the reign of k. richard i. ( who was brother to king iohn , who was father to henry the third ) for the whole time of his reign was within time of memory , h. . per newton again , h. . . b. where the seisin of king richard is allowed for a good title , and so a warranty in his time . so it seems by these words a tempore cujus contrarii memoria non existit , is properly and generally intended for all the time before that ; and before the statute of limitation , was meant of that against , which no proof could be made to the contrary either by testimony , or evidence in any time before , without any limitation of time , the h. . . b. , seems to prove this : so that the time of all prescription was in those days the same with the time of limitation of seisin in a writ of writ , as littleton tells us . and since you have not as yet brought any considerable proofs ( but only bare negative ones which have been answered , ) against this prescription of the election of knights of shires time beyond memory ; what you have said to the contrary is little to the purpose ; for all the modern as well as ancient law-books are against this notion of mr. prin's ; for in judge telverton's reports , gibson and holcrose's case you will see , that whereas unity of possession is by the statute of the dissolution of monasteries a good discharge of tithes ; yet if the monastery were founded deins temps de memoire ( as this abby of vale royal was in the time of ed ▪ i. ) a constant unity , since the foundation was held by the whole court for no good discharge of tithes by prescription as the plaintiff had laid it ; for the defendant shewing that the said abby was founded since time of memory ( tho' above three hundred years old ) was a sufficient confessing and avoiding . so that mr. prin's arguments whereby he would have the words , all times passed , and time of which no memory is to the contrary to signifie a much less space of time in these writs i have now cited ; and to be restrained within the th of henry the third , will not signifie much : since they are expresly against all our law-books , neither doth he cite any cases for his opinion out of brook or fitzherbert , tho' he quotes their titles ; but as for this quotation from cook 's first institutes , there is nothing there to countenance his notion , more than he tells us that from bracton , and fleta , ( upon the words de temps dout memorie , &c. ) docere opertet longum tempus & longum usum ; viz. qui excedit memoriam hominum , tale , enim , tempus sufficit pro iure ; but without telling us what was then understood by this memoria hominum , and a little after upon these words , ascun proof al contrarie ; for it there be any sufficient proof of record , or writing to the contrary , albeit it exceed the memory , or proper knowledge of any man living , yet it is within the memory of men : for memory is twofold ; first , by knowledge by proof , as by record or sufficient matter of writing . secondly , by his own proper knowledge , and for this he cites divers . year-books in the margin : but as for all that , long quotation mr. prin has here given us , i know not whence he had it ; for there is not any thing in hobart's reports to that purpose in the places he has cited : and as for the year-book of henry the sixth , and brook , they are both directly against his notion , as you may see by what rolls has been already quoted from the same places : and tho' it is true in prescriptions of ways , & commons , and other such petty thing , laid time beyond memory , the judges , or jury are not so exact as to make the plaintiffs prove their prescription beyond the time of any man then living ; yet if they prescribe for never so long , it is still in the power of the defendant to prove that there was no such prescription , and this as high as before richard the first , but no higher ; and thus high we assert the coming of knights of shires to parliament : for i do not pretend to lay it as high , as the conquest or before , as mr. lambard does ; if it prove beyond the time now specified , it is sufficient to disprove mr. prins notion . but to let you see , i am a fair adversary , i will admit for once that this time beyond memory , shall be taken in a sticker , litteral sense , for only as far as is beyond the memory of any man living . now pray see what you will get by it , if you remember that the writ i but now cited from the register for the tenants in ancient demesne their being discharged from contributing to the wages of knights of the shires , was laid , a tempore cujus contraii memoria non existit , and these writs are proved also to have been issued within the th of edward the d . and if so , pray reckon onwards , and see if the th of henry the d. ( when you suppose knights of shires to have been first chosen ) does not fall within the memory of most men then living , for henry the d reigned somewhat more than seven years , after this th , to which seven years , if you add the almost years reign of edward i. it makes years , then add these years of edward the ii. and ( if you please ) see if whole makes above years ; which certainly was within the memory of many men then living , and it had been a sensless thing for the chancellor and clerks of chancery that then were , to have granted these writs of exemption for a time beyond memory , when they themselves might have remembred when wages for knights of shires first began . m. as for what you have said for this prescription of knights of shires , i will not dispute it farther with you , since it is a point of your common law , ( in which i confess my self but meanly skilled ) but i shall take farther time to advise with those that know better ; in the mean time , as for the cities and burroughs let them have appeared when you will , their coming to parliament , could not be so ancient as before the time of richard i. much less the conquest , as you suppose ; since mr. pryn hath in the same second part of this parliamentary register traced the summoning of the burroughs to their very original ; and proved it could not be ancienter then the th of henry the d. i shall here contract his arguments , and give you them , as i did the former . first , he here proves that there were never but cities and burroughs , who sent any members to parliament ; of which ( in his catalogue ) nine of them never had but one or two precepts , and others but four precepts of this nature sent them , upon none of which precepts the sheriffs made , any returns of burgesses , as these ballivi libirlatis nullum mihi dederunt responsum , or nihil inde secerunt , attest ; whereupon they never had any more precepts of this kind sent them to this day , christ-church in hampshire onely excepted , which of late years hath sent burgesses to parliament , so that in truth there were only cities and burroughs in england , that ever sent members to parliament , during all the precedent king● reign , viz. from the th of edward i. to the th of edw. the th . secondly , that more here named of these , never elected and returned burgesses but once , and no more during all the said time . thirdly , that many more of these ancient burroughs here named never sent members , some of them more then twice , others thrice , others four , others five , others six , others seven , others eight times and lancaster has but elections and returns of burgesses , and no more during all the above mentioned reigns . fourthly , that altho some of these burroughs here named , who seldom sent any burgesses , tho they were summoned by the sheriffs precepts to elect burgesses without any great intervals of time to six or seven succeeding parliaments , yet most of them had along discontinuance of time , some of above , others above years distance between those few respective returns , of which he here gives you several instances , and referrs you to his precedent catalogue of returns for the proof of it . so that there were but cities and burroughs ( taking in the cinque ports , and all ) who sen● members to parliament in the reign of edward i. seven of which made onely one return , and no more , for ought i can discover before or after edward st reign , till of very late years . yet that in edward the ds reign , there were precepts issued by the sheriffs and returns of burgesses for new burroughs here named , which ( for ought i can discover ) never elected any burgesses before . fifthly , that under this long reign of edward the d. there were sheriffs precepts issued to new borroughs returns made upon them to serve in parliaments or great councils who never sent any members before ; and precepts to more , that made no returns at all thereupon ; as for the cinque ports of dover , romney , sandwich , winchelsey , hastings , h●the and rye ; though there be no original writs for , or returns of their electing and sending barons to parliament now extant , before the reign of edward the d , yet it is apparent by the clause rolls , that they sent barons to parliament in th of henry , and during the reign of edward st and d . of which more anon . sixthly , that king richard the d , henry the th , and henry the th , created no new burroughs at all , neither were there any writs or precepts issued to , or election of citizens , or burgesses by any new cities or borroughs , but such as elected them before their reigns . seventhly , that about the midst of king henry the th long reign there were precepts issued to , and returns made by five new burroughs and no more , which never sent burgesses to parliaments before , viz. gatton , in surrey , h●ytesbury , hyndford , westbury , and wootton basset all in wiitshire , yet very poor inconsiderable burroughs , tho they elect burgesses at this day . that during edward the th reign , there was one new burrough , ( here named ) which began to send burgesses to parliament under him , though it never sent any before . f. well but how came this about , that so many new burroughs were made in some kings reigns , and few or none in others ● and so many omitted , that had served before in other parliaments . m. pray read on and you will see , this author gives us a very good account of that ; and impures it to two causes . first , the partiality , and favour of the sheriffs , and the ambition of the neighbouring gentry , who desired to be elected in such new burroughs . secondly , the meer grace , and favour of the king , who by divers charters to new corporations have given them the priviledge of sending burgesses to parliaments . for proof of which , pray see what this author here farther says . it is evident by the precedent sections , and catalogue of ancient cities , burroughs , ports , and their returns of writs and election , before specified with these general clauses after them , non sunt aliae , or ullae civitates nec burgi in balliva mea , or in comitatu praedicto , praeter , &c. as you may see by the return of the sheriff of bucks , anno of edward i where he denies there were any cities or burroughs , in his whole county , and yet the very next parliament but one , within two years after , the sheriff of bucks returns no less then three burroughs , viz. agmundesham , wycombe and wendover , with the burgesses names that were returned , so that the new burroughs here named were lately set up in the counties , since edward the ths reign by the practice of sheriffs , and the ambition of private gentlemen seeking to be made burgesses for them , and consent of the poor burgesses of them , being courted and fe●sted by them for their votes without any charters from the king ; and are all me in poor inconsiderable burroughs set up by the late returns and practices of sheriffs . and tho others may conceive , that the power of our ancient burroughs or cities electing , and sending burgesses , and citizens to our parliaments proceeded originally from some old charters of our kings heretofore granted to them , and to which opinion i once inclined ; yet the consideration of the new discovery of the old original of writs for electing knights , citizens and burgesses i found in caesars chappel , hath rectified my former mistake herein and abundantly satisfied me that neither bare ancient custom , or prescription before or since the conquest , not our kings charters but the sheriffs of each counties precepts and returns of elections of burgesses and citizens for such burroughs and cities , as they thought meet by authority and power , granted to them in , and by this general clause in the writs of summons issued to sheriffs , for every county before every parliament enjoyning them in these words , tibi praecipimus firmiter injungentes , quod de comitatu praedicto duos milites , & de qualibet cititate duos cives , & de quolibet burgo duos burgesses at discretioribus , &c. sin● dilatione eligi ▪ & eos ad nos ad dictos diem , & locum venite facias , &c. by vertue of which general indefinite clauses used in all writs of summons ever since d of edward i. without designing what particular cities , or burroughs by name within each county , the sheriff should cause to elect ▪ or send two citizens or two burgesses , but leaving it wholy to each sheriffs liberty and discretion to send the writ directed to him to what cities and burroughs he pleased ; thereupon every sheriff used a kind of arbitrary power in the execution of this general clause , according as his judgment directed or his assertions , favour , partiality , malice , or the sollicitations of any private burroughs to him , or of competitors for citizens or burgesses places within his county swayed him ; this is most apparent by some sheriffs in several counties returning more burroughs , and burgesses then their predecessors , others fewer , some omitting those burroughs returned by their predecessors , others causing elections , and returns to be made for such new burroughs , which never elected or sent any before , nor after their sherivalties , as is evident from the returns , annis . . e. . and . of e. . for div●n . anno . e. . for yorkshire . anno , e. . for oxfordshire . anno . of e. . for hampshire . annis . and . of e. . for sommerset . annis . . and . h. for wilts , &c. so that the first writs or memorials of any extant on record for electing knights , citizens , and burgesses to come to parliament are those of th of henry d , but these writs onely commanded that the sheriffs cause to come two knights , &c. of each county ; and the like writs were directed to the cities of london lincoln , and other burroughs of england to elect two citizens and two burgesses for each of them , and the rest of the cities and burroughs in england ; the like writs were also issued to sandwich and the rest of the cinque ports ; without expressing their names , or number in each county ; and this form i conceive ( says mr. pryn ) continued till d of edward i. when the aforecited general clause authorizing , and intrusting every sheriff to cause two citizens , and two burgesses to be elected , &c. out of every city and burrough in his county ; was first put into the writs , by authority and colour whereof every sheriff sent precepts to what cities and burroughs of his county he pleased . f. i have with patience heard this long history of mr. prins concerning the election of citizens and burgesses , from which i must notwithstanding make bold to differ , for tho i own him to have been a man of great learning and industry in matter of records , yet i doubt he was often too quick in taking up of opinions upon slender grounds ; therefore for the answering of him , i shall first shew you the improbability of his suppositions , and in the next place shall make use of no other confutations then what his own book will afford us , as to the writs of summons , returns and other things he lays so much stress upon ; in the first place , for the notion of sheriffs sending precepts to what cities and burroughs they pleased ; and consequently making as few or as many send members to parliament as they would , that this was not so at first ; is evident from those very writs of th of henry the d , by which it appears that they were not then directed to the sheriffs , for any more then to the counties ; but as for the citizens and burgesses , and barons of the cinque ports , they were then directed to themselves ; and he also confesses , that this continued so from that time till the d of edward i. so that all this while ( being about years ) it seems the nomination of what cities and towns should send members to parliament did not depend upon the will of the sheriffs , but upon somewhat else ; and i have asked you once ( tho without receiving any answer ) what rule simon montfort went by to tell what cities and burroughs , were to send members and what not ; since the words are onely in general , de quolibet burgo , &c. and therefore pray answer me now if you can . m. i conceive in the first place , as for the cities , simon montfort sent to those that were anciently esteem'd so , viz. such as had bishops sees annext to them , such as london , lincoln , and particularly named in these writs and others of the same rank , and as for the burroughs , tho we have not the returns of them left us ; yet i suppose they were such walled , or other towns ; as were of some considerable note in england ; such as he thought were most proper for his turn . f. that this could be no rule , appears by this clear proof , first ▪ that neither coventry and litchfield , tho the sees of the bishops , were not counted cities in the time of edward the first nor long after ; nor yet ely , for it appears by the lists , that mr. prin hath given us , that it never sent burgesses , but only once and that to a great council till of late years . so that the sees of the bishops was it seems no general rule to make places capable of sending , or not sending of citizens to parliament . and in the next place as to burroughs , that is pure imagination , that none but considerable or walled towns sent any burgesses at first ; whereas in the first list of returns , which mr. pryn has here given us of the th and th , of edward i. which are the first extant ( for ought i know , except those of d , which i have never yet seen ) besides the shire towns of the counties , there are returns of a great many small burroughs , which never had any walls , nor yet ( for ought as we can find ) had any thing remarkable to make them be pircht upon to send burgesses more than others ; but of these i shall speak more by and by , onely shall remark this much , that there must have have been some other rule besides montforts own will , for all this ; and what this rule could be , unless an ancient prescription in those towns to send members , i desire you or your dr. would shew any good reason , or authority to the contrary . and after the d of edward the i. when mr. prin supposes that the sheriffs by this general clause in the writs began to take upon them , this new authority of sending precepts to , and making burroughs of what towns they pleased ; this could not in the first place extend to such as were before that counties of themselves , such as london , york , bristol , &c. nor yet such as were ancient and opulent cities , such as canterbury , lincoln , exeter , &c. who were not made cities by having bishops sees annoxt to them , but were such long before christianity was preacht to the english saxons , as i have already proved ▪ nor could this power of the sheriff extend to the cinque ports , whose rights of sending two barons for each port was sure very well known and setled in the th of henry the d , as appears by these general words at the foot of the writ , similiter mandatum est singulis portubus pro se , without naming them in particular ; so that if it had not been sufficiently known what ports were thus to send , all the sea port towns in england might have had precepts sent them , as well as the cinque ports ; who had at first their summons directed to the barons and baylifts in general ; nor is there any writ found directed to the warden of the cinque ports to summon each of them to send burgesses , till the th of edward ad , as mr. prin here shews you , so that in all these elections and returns ( being above ) the sheriff could have no power ; and therefore did not depend upon his good will and pleasure alone , as this author would have it . but to come to that , which mr. prin chiefly insists on , viz. the putting in and leaving out divers of the smaller burroughs in so many kings reigns , and which he attributes wholy to the favour or partiality of the sheriffs . i shall first argue against the improbability of the notion , and then shall confute it by plain proofs from mr. prin himself . first , it is not at all likely , that the king should ever trust the sheriff with this great prerogative of making what , or as many burroughs as he pleased in a county : since that could not be then done without some particular writ or charter , for otherwise this had made the power of the sheriffs more arbitrary than that of the king himself , it he had in those reigns , you treat or , no other rule to go by than his own humour , passion , or interest● nor would the king have ever endured such an innovation , since it would have been in the power of the sheriff● to have made as many burroughs as they pleased , and to have encreased the house of commons to an unreasonable bulk , wineh was against all rules of policy for him to suffer . lastly , neither would the house of commons themselves have suffered this encroachment ; for since most of the cities and burroughs of england sent members in parliament before this innovation of the sheriffs began , they would never have quiet●● permitted new men to be sent in among them from obscure places they never heard of , without either turning them out themselves , or complaining to the king in parliament of so great an abuse . m. but what can you say against direct matter of fact ? has not mr. prin here plainly proved to you , that the sheriffs did in those times exercise an arbitrary power in this matter , returning some towns out of ill will only , to charge them with electing burgesses , to make them liable to the payment of wages to them , omitting others also out of spight , as appears by this petition of the towns-men of st. albans you have now cited ; a great many of which were so long omitted , that they came at last to lose all right of sending any more , till it came to be again revived of late years ( as in the case of divers burroughs whose names mr. prin has here given us ) who by orders of the long parliament in . again sent members to parliament after some ages intermission . pray now tell me what other satisfactory account can be given for the making of so many new burroughs , and omitting so many old ones , but the arbitrary power of the sheriffs , who then took upon them to do what they pleased in this matter , as appears by so many instances he has here given us ? f. well , since the improbability , ( i may say impossibility of the thing ) will not satisfie you , i doubt not but to shew you that tho' the sheriffs might sometimes abuse the trust committed to them in sending precepts to the burroughs that were not liable to them , yet that for all this they never exercised that arbitrary power you fancy of making and unmaking . what burroughs ( and consequently as many parliament-men ) as they pleased . now to prove this from mr. prin's own instances and authorities , i shall reduce all the causes of this abuse to these heads : . the favour , or malice of the sheriffs . . the ambition of the neighbouring gentlemen who desired to get to be elected at such burroughs . or lastly , from the desire of those towns themselves to get this priviledge among them of electing and returning members to parliament . to begin with the first of these , it could never proceed from the favour of sheriffs to such towns , because the charge of wages to the burgesses was then so great ( when two shillings a day was more than ten shillings is now ) that they could never look upon it as a favour to have this charge imposed upon them , unless it were some few who were very large , and in a rich and flourishing condition , and those always sent burgesses to parliament before the sheriffs had this power committed to them , as you supposed by that general clause in the writ of sending summons to the cities , and burroughs ; nor could the sheriffs ( if they would ) have long continued to lay this burthen upon any town out of malice ; for if such towns could not afford this extraordinary charge of sending burgesses to parliament , they might have 'scaped it whenever they would , either by making no returns at all to their precepts sent them , as mr. prin here shews in the lists he has given us of returns , very many of them did ; or else they might have taken that remedy against it , which ( as this here author expresly acknowledges ) divers towns did , who being maliciously charged by the sheriffs to send burgesses , when both unwilling , and unable ; and who upon their refusal to elect , returned burgesses for them against their wills , whereupon they complained to the king or parliament of the abuse , and so were eased of this charge and trouble , or else eased themselves ; other burroughs growing very poor , and unable to send burgesses to parliament , and defray their expences , were thereupon discharged by the sheriffs who made special returns in their favour ( and of these he gives you several instances in his collection of returns for the county of bucks , or else for poverty , as in the case of lancaster ) others procured perpetual , or else temporary exemptions from the king , or the king and his council from sending burgesses to future parliaments ; and upon some one , or more of these precedent grounds they quitted , waved , or lost their ancient priviledge of sending burgesses , which they rather reputed a charge , burthen , and oppression , than an honour ; and of this he gives as a remarkable instance in toriton in devonshire , which after having elected and returned burgesses to no less than thirty two parliaments , yet in the d of edward . upon their petition to the king in parliament obtained a patent to be exempted for ever , which he here gives us , as also a temporary exemption from king richard the second to the town of colchester for five years in regard of their great charge in building their town-walls ; which shews that the burgesses wages was then a great burthen upon towns tho' rich and flourishing in trade , as appears by colchester , which was then able to wall their town at their own expence : and i could shew you more such exemptions as these , were it not too tedious ; and i doubt not but there were many more such than what are entred upon the rolls . now that we may apply what mr. prin has here said to our present purpose , it is plain , that tho' the sheriffs might sometimes oppress some towns by sending precepts to them to elect , which ought not have sent members to parliament at all ; yet that he could not make new burroughs without the inhabitants consent is plain by his own shewing , since they could be eased of that charge whenever they pleased : and i desire you , or any one selfe , to shew me any city , or considerable town in england , that thus began first to send citizens , or burgesses to parliament by the sheriffs arbitrary power ; not but that some towns might complain of this abuse of the sheriffs without any just cause , as in this petition of toriton now mentioned , where they set forth , quod villa praedicta ad mittend . aliquos homines pro dicta villa ad parliamenta nostra onerari non debtat , nec aliquos homines praedicta villa , ad parliamenta nostra vel progenitorum nostrorum miserit , nec mittere consueverit ante annum regni nostri vicesimum primum , &c. now , tho' this petition was false in matter of fact , since it appears by the returns that they had sent burgesses to parliament long before , in the reigns of edward the first and second ; yet the ground of their petition was right , that they ought not to send any men to parliament , unless they had been accustomed so to do in the time of this king's progenitors , which had been a vain plea , if it had been in the sheriff's power ( as of right ) to have summoned what towns they pleased to parliament , since then there could have been no custom pleaded against it . this being once granted by mr. prin , or proved from the nature of the thing , we shall now come more particularly to give an account how several towns might come to be put in or lest out of the sheriffs lists of the burroughs without granting them this arbitrary power of making what burroughs they pleased . now these cities and towns mr. prin has given us , and which have had precepts sent them at any time , may be divided by him into these three ranks ; the first is of those ( being nine in number ) which he says never made any returns to the precepts sene them , and so continue to send no members to this day ( except christ-church . ) now these nine towns either had a right to send burgesses to parliament in the king's reigns , in which they received those precepts , or they had not ; if they had such a right , the sheriff's did but their duty to send them precepts as well as to the rest of the burroughs of the county , for sure they had some rule for doing it , more than their own private fancies , since the very writs of summons ( from whence you would deduce this power to the sheriffs ) only recite a● qualibet civitate , &c. & de qualibet burgo , &c. which had been mighty uncertain if it had not been then very well known what towns were then cities , and what burroughs ; and sure these nine towns must have then been burroughs ( in reputation at least ) or else they could never have had one , two , or more precepts sent them ( as mr. prin here owns they had ) and they might have had many more such for ought we know , had all the sheriffs precepts , and the returns upon them been preserved , as most of them are lost , or mislaid , as i shall shew more at large by and by : or if these towns had no right at all to send burgesses to parliament , it was not in the sheriffs power to impose it upon them , since they might have refused it if they pleased ; and so take it either way , nothing can be argued from the loss or omission of the returns for these burroughs , that they either had , or had not any former right to elect , since this might happen from the negligence of the bailiffs , or constables of the town , or else from their own desire to be excused from the charge . thus in the th of edward i. the sheriff returns that the bailiffs of st. albans had made no return of his precept ; neither is there any returns of such precepts to this burrough all the reign of this king ; does is therefore follow , that this town had no more . precepts sent them in all his reign , when i have shewed you the contrary by the writs of expences in the th of ed. i. or that they had no other right to appear in parliament as a burrough , but what the sheriffs precept first gave them , when you see they claimed by their petition to ed. the d . to send burgesses to parliament in the reign of this king and his progenitors . the second rank of towns are such for which are found for some one , for some three , and for others more precepts , with returns of elections made thereupon , and yet those that have made most returns do not amount to during the reigns of ed. , , and . rich. . henries the th , th , and th , to above thirteen returns . well , granting all this , will it therefore follow , that they had no other right than the sheriffs good will and pleasure ; since if they had a right , and were willing to preserve it , they might have petitioned the king in parlialiament against this abuse of the sheriffs ? and if they were willing to give up their right by reason of the great charge and trouble of sending their members , volenti non sit injuria , does it therefore follow that no others liad any other right to elect , but what the sheriffs precept gave them ? only forsooth , because no more returns appear either in the loose bundles of returns , or upon the clause-rolls ; or that therefore there were never any more elections and returns made than what mr. prin has here given us ; which is a very fallacious argument , considering how imperfect those bundles of returns are , out of which he has extracted them , a great many of the precepts and returns being no doubt lost and broke off the files in the removing of the records from one place to another ; besides the whole bundles of returns of several years in divers kings reigns , that are quite lost , or so mislaid , that no body can find them . and for the truth of this appeal to mr. petyt , who assures me he found the returns of the knights , citizens and burgesses to parliament of the d of ed. i. in an old chest in the exchequer among other things of a quite different nature , which mr. prin never saw , or else certainly he would have given in the returns to this parliament , as well as he does the writs of summons to it ; and yet that even these were not always entred upon the clause-rolls , but lay scattered up and down the chappel of the white-tower ; mr. prin himself confesses ( in his introduction to his third part of his parliamentary register ) that he found no less than ninety five loose original writs for elections and returns of knights , citizens and burgesses to parliaments and great councils in the reign of ed. . which were never entred on the clause-rolls , and lay there until he found them buried in dust and rubbish , as well as oblivion in a confus'd chaos scattered from each other , and intermixed with many hundred thousands of other writs and records of various kinds . now what if these writs and returns had never been found ? so that by his own shewing it is no ways certain that there were never any such writs issued , or returns made for the counties , cities and burroughs , than those he had before sound and published ; and he himself also here confesses , that by reason of the negligence of record-keepers , there are more writs and returns of elections extant from some counties than for others , tho' all had the like writs sent them : and if this was so as to the counties , it was likewise so as to the cities and burroughs ; the returns of which are commonly endorsed on the back of the precepts ; and where they were not so endorsed , were much more likely to be lost ; and farther that the clause rolls are no exact rule , for the summons of knights or barons of the cinque ports and burgesses , appears by mr. prins own shewing , viz. that there are no writs of summons to the cinque ports entred on the clause rolls ; for most part of the years of edward , , and d. in the list he has here given us of those years ; now if so many considerable burroughs , as the cinque burroughs , could be thus omitted , what can we expect for most of the smaller , and most inconsiderable burroughs in england . to conclude this head , if by mr. prins own consession , the entries of elections , and returns upon the clause rolls are so very imperfect ; and that the loose bundles of summons , precepts and returns are far more imperfect ( so many of them being lost ) pray tell me , how can mr. prin or any one else can frame any argument from these that remain , that there were never no more precepts and returns from any burroughs than those he has published us . but to come to his third rank of burroughs , viz. such as for whom their appear no precepts nor returns till the reigns of edward the d . edward the d. and other succeeding kings ; all which burroughs he therefore supposes to have been all newly made in those kings reigns , because there are no precepts or returns from them sooner ; it must there follow that the sheriffs made all these burroughs at their pleasure ; but mr. prin has done well here to adde , that they never elected or returned any before , for ought he can find to the contrary , since it might appear to the contrary ( for ought he could tell ) if the returns of the sheriffs in the reigns of the former kings had not been so many of them lost , since he here confesses , there are no original writs and returns for the cinque ports to be found before the reign of edward the d , who yet sent members to all parliaments in former king reigns ; or how can he tell , but divers of these towns might have been created burroughs by the kings special writs or charters tho now lost ; or perhaps unknown to this author , who could not be supposed to understand the original of all the burroughs in england their sending members to parliament ; but that he is certainly mistaken in making several burroughs to have been but new , because no returns are to be found from them before the reign of edward the d , may appear by these , for example , first , litchfield which was long before that time a bishops see ; and sure then if not a city , yet an ancient and considerable burrough . secondly , old sarum , which was in the reign of henry the d , a bishops see ( till it was removed ) and so consequently by your rule new sarum , ought to pass for a city , and if not , was certainly a very ancient burrough ; and as such sends burgesses by prescription to this day , tho the town be quite destroyed ; the like i may say of gatton in surrey , which tho mr. prin will have but to be a new burrough , because no returns appears to have been made for it , by the sheriffs till the reigns of henry the th , yet this is no certain rule ; since it was a very old burrough and had anciently been so considerable as that we find several great councils held at it in the saxon times ; tho it be certainly now reduced to a small hamlet of half a score houses ; now i will leave it to your self to judge , whether the sheriff , would have pitcht upon so small and inconsiderable a place as this , to make a burrough of , had it never sent any burgesses to parliament before that time. and i doubt not , but those gentlemen that know the rest of the towns , he has there mentioned with gatton ; could say as much for the antiquity as burroughs , if you please to inquire about them . but i have held you too long upon this head , and therefore shall proceed to those two that remains , viz. the ambition of neighbouring gentlemen to make as many burroughs as they could , that they might be chosen at them ; and the desire of such towns to be made burroughs to receive the advantages of the money spent among them at such elections ; the first of these in the times we are now speaking of , could be no cause of their sending members to parliament ; since it is certain that before the reign of henry the th , none were elected for any city or town , but persons free of , or actually resident in such cities and burroughs , as appears by the statute of henry the th , which does but recite and confirm this ancient custom , so that this trick of chusing members for bee● and ale , has been introduced but of late ages , viz. since the time of henry the th , when gentlemen began first to be chosen for cities and burroughs ; and if that is so , the last cause falls off it self , viz. the desire of such small towns to elect , since if they could get nothing , but rather loose by their sending burgesses to parliament , and paying them their wages ( as they must do as long as they chose from among themselves ) it is unreasonable to believe , that they ever should desire this as a priviledge ; and therefore it is onely , since the neglect of this good old law for wages , that so many burroughs ( which mr. prin here mentions to have had precepts again sent them of late years to elect members after some ages intermission ) desired to have this priviledge renewed to them ; as was done in the case of those burroughs he here mentions ; which yet certainly had been very gross , and contrary to all common right , if the house of commons had not then believed those burroughs to have a had higher right by prescription than the sheriffs precepts gave them ; as for the last rank , viz. those burroughs created by the writs or charters of our kings , i need say but little , since this author here grants such creations to have been good before the statute of th of richard the d , but not since tho i cannot see any reason for it ; why he should give the sheriffs such power of making new burroughs after this statute , in the time of henry th , as he does in the case of gatton , and those other burroughs he there mentions with it ; and yet deny this king the like prerogative . but yet for all this , as i will not say there were none ; so are there but very few examples of charters , that conferr upon any city , or burrough a power to send members to parliament , who had it not before by prescription , tho i grant that priviledge may be mention'd in the charter , and so put it in the power of the major , and aldermen to elect for the future , when it was the whole populace , or all the inhabitants of that town that were to elect before . but to shew you from the very statutes themselves , that mr. prin has here cited , that the right of the cities and burroughs to appear in parliament , was not anciently looked upon to have had no other original then the favour of the sheriffs . pray read these clauses of the statutes he has here quoted ; the first is that memorable statute of the th of richard d . d . parl. c. . ( now mentioned , and which i have already cited ) which expresly enacts , that all , and singular persons and commonalties which from henceforth shall for time to come have summons of parliament shall come from henceforth as before to parliaments , in the manner as they be bound to do ; and hath been accustomed within the realm of england of old time , and whatever person of the said realm ; which from henceforth shall have the said summons ( be he archbishop , bishop , abbot , prior , duke , earl , baron , banneret , knight of shire , citizen of city , burgess of burgh , or other singular person or commonalty ) do absent himself and come not at the said summons , ( except he may reasonably , and lawfully excuse himself to our soveraign lord the king ) he shall be amerced , and otherwise punished according as of old times hath been used to be done within the said realm in the said case ; and if any sheriff of the realm be henceforth negligent in making his returns of the writs of the parliaments , or that he shall leave out of the said returns any cities , or burroughs which be bound , and of old times were wont to come to parliament , he shall be punished in the manner as was accustomed to be done in the said case of old time , in the french ( d' anciente ) from which statute we may draw these conclusions . first , that the knights , citizens and burgesses ; are as supposed by this statute to have a like right to have summons to parliaments as hath been accustomed of old time , as well as the lords , spiritual and temporal here mentioned . secondly , that by these words have been accust●med of old time ( or d' anciente ) we are to understand a general custom of the realm ; time out of mind , that is by prescription ; so that if the bishops , abbott , and temporal lords , are here acknowledged to have had a right to sit in parliament by prescription ; so have the commons likewise by the same words equally applyed to all the orders here mentioned ; lastly , that if the sheriffs shall neglect in making return to any such cities and burroughs , which were thus bound to come to the parliament of old time , he shall be punished , as hath been accustomed to be done in all time past ( or d' anciente ) now pray tell with what colour of justice , the sheriffs could be thus punisht , if there had been no certain rule to know what c●ties and burrough were bound to come to parliament of old time , but it had been wholy left at the sheriffs discretion , which they should summons , and which they would omit ; let us next compare this with the statute of d of henry th , c. . ( which mr. prin has here also given us ) reciting , that divers sheriffs of counties have sometimes returned none of the knights , citizens and burgesses lawfully chosen to come to the parliaments ; but such knights , citizens and burgesses have been returned ; which were never duely chosen , and other citizens and burgesses than those which by the mayors and bailiffs were to the said sheriffs returned , and moreover by no precepts to the mayors , and bailifts , or to the bailiff or baili●●i , where no mayor is , for the electing of citizens and burgesses to come to the parliament ; and then appoints the penalties , for the said abuses and neglects . now pray let me ask you , whether this bare abuse of the sheriffs , and neglect of the duty of their office here condemned by this statute ( and for which the former statute of richard ii. declares them punishable at common law , ( as this act makes them liable to it by statute law ) could give them such an arbitrary power , as this author fancies . much less can serve to corroborate his opinion ( as he here supposes it does ) concerning the true original , continuance , discontinuance , reviving and antiquating parliamentary cities and burroughs , not by charters , and patents from the king , or prescription time out of mind , but by the sheriffs arbitrary power and returns , by the forecited general clauses in the writs ? but since i confess i have dwelt too long on my answer to mr. prin's arguments , i shall conclude with only giving you one record , which i hope will sufficiently satisfie you , that not only st. albans , but several other antient burroughs claimed to send burgesses to parliament by prescription , which appears by a writ or commission , reciting a pe●ition of the town of barnstaple to king edward the third , and his council in parliament , which is to be found in the patent-rolls of the th of this king , seting forth that the said town had been a free burrough à tempore c●jus contrarii memoria non exis●it ; and as such enjoyed divers liberties , and free customs by a charter of king athelstan , and this among others , ac quod ad singula parliamenta n●stra , & dictorum antecessorum nostrorum , ( among which the said king athelstan must certainly be reckoned for one ) duos burgenses pro communitate ejusdem burgi mittere solebant ; and therefore that charter being lost , they desire a confirmation of it from the king , whereupon he by this commission directs a writ of enquiry to several gentlemen and others therein mentioned , to enquire if the said burgesses had enjoyed all those liberties so granted by the said charter of king athelstan , or not ; which would have been ridiculous if the king and council had been satisfied that no cities and burrough● sent any members to parliament under the saxon kings , and not before the th of henry the third ; and this authority is the more remarkable , because bar●staple is one of mr. prin's modern burroughs , for which he can find no precepts or returns earlier than the th of edward the third , tho' , no doubt , ( as appears by this their petition ) in the th of this king , it had sent burgesses to parliament many ages before , tho' the precepts and returns upon them be all lost . and that not only the cities and burroughs do thus claim by prescription , but that the knights of shires have always claimed the same priviledge , may appear by another petition of the commons house extant on the parliament-rolls of the th of edward the third , which i shall contract and put into english out of french , reciting thus , because of common right ( in the roll de commune d●oit ) of the realm there are , and shall be elected two from every county of england to come to parliament for the commune of the said counties : and also the prelates dukes , barons , counts barons , and such as hold by barony , which are , and shall be summoned by writs to come to parliament , except the cities and burroughs who ought to elect from among themselves such as ought to answer for them . whence we may conclude , that the commons then claimed to come to parliament of common right , ( that is , by common law , or general custom of the realm , time out of mind ) as much as the bishops , abbots and great lords . . that neither the bishops , lords , nor tenants in capite had any authority to impose taxes , or make laws for the commons of the counties , or these for the cities and burroughs , without their consents , because they had each of them representatives of their own order to answer for them in parliament . m. i must confess this would have been absolutely convincing , could we have seen this charter of k. athelstans ; but since the towns-men of barnstaple do only in their petition ( among others ) set forth this priviledge of sending burgesses to parliament ; now who can tell whether there was any such thing in their charter or not , since they confess they had lost it ? or granting it was as they set forth , yet is will sufficiently evince that the right of cities and burroughs to send their representatives to parliaments , was not , as you suppose , as ancient as the government , but had its original from the grants and charters of former kings . f. as to these objections , we can have but all the proof that this subject is capable of at such a distance of time ; but if i were a jury-man in this matter i should rather believe that the town of barnstaple had such charter not long before they made this petition to king edward the third ; and that there was such clause therein as they here set forth , than that these towns-men should be so impudent as to desire a new charter of confirmation from him of all their priviledges ( of which this of electing burgesses was one ) if there had never been any such clause in it at all . but as for the other objection , that if it were so , then it appears that all the right of cities and burroughs sending members to parliament , is derived from the grants and charters of former kings , it is very fallacious ; as you will find if you consider and compare the ancient right of the bishops , and abbots ; as also of all the temporal nobility to come to the great council of the kingdom , which as to the first of them i proved to be as ancient as christianity it self , among the english saxons : and as for the priesthood and nobility in general , to have been as old as the institution of the government it self . now , tho' you grant that long before the conquest our kings had the nomination of bishops , and abbots , and also the making of aldermen , earls and thanes , who made the temporal nobility in those great councils ; will it therefore follow that because our kings were thus entrusted by the people with this prerogative of naming and investing bishops and abbots per annulum & baculum , and also of creating those great men now mentioned , that therefore all the right either order had to appear at those councils , not only proceeded from , but depended wholly on the king's good will and pleasure ; and that he could have chosen whether he would have named any bishops , or abbots to vacant sees , and abbeys , or made any aldermen , earls , and thanes , or not , but have changed the whole frame of the government into an absolute despotick monarchy , by destroying the great council of the kingdom ; whether you believe the clergy , nobility and people would have suffered any of those kings to have made such an innovation ? apply this to the right of the most of ancient cities and burroughs in england ; and see if it do not exactly agree with this parallel case of the bishops , abbots , and temporal nobility ; since as there were priests and nobles , who from the very first institution of our great councils did not owe their original to the king , but brought it with them out of germany , and to whose suffrages the first saxon kings owed their elections ; so no doub● were there divers cities and towns in england so considerable from the time of the expulsion of the britains , that it was thought ●it to pitch upon them as most able to send representatives to the great councils of the nation , that so they might imitate their old government in their own countrey , in which the great cities and towns had always a considerable share , as they have in the german diets to this day ; tho' the king might then ( as he is now ) be entrusted with the prerogative of making new cities and burroughs with like priviledge , with the old ones ; tho' this was but rarely practised till the reign of king iames i. the two vniversities , being some of the first corporations on which he conferred this priviledge by charter , of electing and sending two burgesses to parliament ; which power has , i confess , been exercised even to a grievance in the reigns of his son , and grand-sons ; so that it were to be wisht , that there was a law passed , that no new city or burrough should be made for the future without an express act of parliament . now i would very gladly hear what you can further say to so many weighty authorities , which i have now given you ; for evident it is , that if they are compared and considered in series of time , that neither edw. d or d , nor their judges or learned council , no nor the parliaments of their , and succeeding times , had ever heard any thing of dr. brady's annus mirabilis , or th of henry d. which was but years before the reign of edward . his grand-child , and little above years before that of edward his great grand-son . m. well , notwithstanding all this , whosoever will reflect upon what the doctor hath writ , may suspect that the judges ( nay parliaments ) were very ignorant in the history of this nation , or that they spoke out of design . and it is a great argument that the lawyers studied and knew only popular and lucrative law , and not the constitutions of the nation before their own time . and tho' i must confess what you have now said may seem to me to carry some weight with it ; yet since i do not easily change my opinion , upon the first hearing of a new argument , or authority ; give leave better to consider what you have said ; but in the mean time , since you have now mentioned the german dyets , pray sir , before we leave off , shew me what you undertook to prove at the first entrance on this subject ; viz. that in all the great councils , or assemblies of estates in europe , which are derived from the germans and goths , there are found representatives for the plebeians or commons distinct from the clergy , and greater , and lesser nobility . f. i readily agree to your desires ; but since my own notes concerning this matter are very long , and that i have them not about me , pray give me leave to make use of the authority of dr. heylin an author , you have no reason to look upon a● partial , since he was not only remarkable for his great skill in history , but also ( as being a great friend and disciple to sir robert ●ilmer in politicks ) was a vehement assertor of absolute monarchy , and an utter enemy to the power of parliaments ; yet this very person in his treatise called , the stumbling of disobedience and rebellion , &c. printed . in his th chapter ( i have already quoted for the inferiour clergy's being anciently a part of the great council or parliament of the kingdom ) proves the uniformity of the three estates to have been the same in all the christian kingdoms on this side of europe , he runs thorough them all , beginning with germany ; which i shall contract , because he there says a great many other things not so material to our present purpose . and first beginning ( as of right ) with the german empire , thuanus gives this note in general , imperium in tria omnino membra dividitur , that the empire is divided into three estates , over all which the ▪ emperor is the head or supreme prince . of these the first estate is ex sacro ordine , of the holy hierarchy , composed of the three spiritual electors , together with the residue of the arch bishops and bishops , and many abbots , priors , and other prelates . the second is of the nobility consisting of the three temporal electors , the dukes , marquesses , lan●graves , b●tgraves , earls and barons , of which there is no determinate number ; the emperor having power to add daily to them , as he sees occasion . the third estate is of the free or imperial cities , in number sixty , or thereabouts , who repres●●t themselves at the general di●ts , by such commissioners or deputies as are authorized to that purpose . next pass we over into france , and there we find the subjects marshalled into three estates , whereof the clergy is the first . rex coactis tribus ordinibas , sacerdotio , nobilitate , plebe , subsidia rei pecuniariae petiit . so paulus aemilius doth inform us : out of these three are chosen certain delegates or commissioners , some for each estate , as often as the king's occasions do require their meeting , the time and place whereof is absolutely left unto his disposing ; and these thus me : do make up the conventus ordinum , or l' assemblie des estats , as the french men call it , in form much like the english parliament ; [ and of the meeting of these three estates , not only this author , but all the other french historians ; and in particular phil. de commines make frequent mention . ] pass we next over the pyren●●s , to the realms of spain , and we shall find in each the same three estates , whose meeting they call there by the name of curia . the court , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , by way of eminency ; consisting of the clergy the nobility , and the commisioners of the provinces and most ancient cities . for proof of which we need but look into the general history of spain translated out of french by grimston , and we shall find a court of parliament for the realm of aragon , consisting of the bishops , nobles , and deputies of towns and commonalties , having place in the said estates convened by k. iames at saragassa anno . for setling the succession , and declaring the right heir . also for castile , we find a parliament of lords , prelates , and deputies of towns summoned at toledo by alfonso the noble , anno . upon occasion of an invasion made by the moores ; another before that at burgos , under the same king , anno . for levying of money on the people to maintain the wars : also that great convention of the states held at toledo by ferdinand the catholick . for swearing to the succession of his son don iohn , in which the prelates , the nobility , and almost all the towns and cities which sent comissioners to the assembl● , are expresly named . thus finally do we find a meeting of the deputies of the three estates of navarre at the town of tosalla , anno . for preserving the kingdom in obedience to king francis pl●eo●s , being then a minor , under age : and for portugal that the deputies of the clergy , nobility , provinces and good towns of portugal , assembled at toma●a , anno ● . to acknowledge philip the second for their king , and to settle the government of that kingdom for the times to come . now let us take a view of the northern kingdoms , and still we find the people ranked in the self same manner , and their great councels to consist of the clergy , the nobility , and certain deputies , sent from the provinces and cities , as in those before . in hungary , before that realm received the gospel , we read of none but nobiles & plebeii , the nobility and common people who did concur to the election of their kings ; but no sooner was the faith of christ admitted , and a clergy instituted , but instantly we find a third estate , episcopos & sacerdotum collegia , bishops and others of the clergy super added to them , for the election of the kings , and the dispatch of other businesses which concerned the publick , as it continueth to this day . in danemark we shall find the same , if we mark it well . for though pontanus seem to count upon five estates , making the regal family to be the first , and subdividing the commons into two , whereof the yeomanry makes one , and the trades man or ci●izen the other : yet in the body of the history we find only three , which are the bishops , the nobility , and civitatum delegati , the deputies or commissioners of towns and cities : for sweden , it comes near the government and forms of danemark , and hath the same estates and degrees of people as amongst the danes , that is to say , proceres & nobiles , the greater and the less nobility , episcopi & ecclesiastici , the bishops and inferiour clergy , civitates & vniversitates , the cities and towns corporate ( for so i think he means by vniversitates ) as t●uanus mustereth them . [ to which we may also add ( tho here omitted by this author ) the delegates of the rusticks or husbandmen , who make a fourth estate in the assembly of estates of this kingdom . ] and in this realm the bishops and clergy enjoy the place and priviledges of the third estate ( notwithstanding the alteration of religion ) to this very day ; the bishops in their own persons , and a certain number of the clergy out of every sochen ( a division like our rural deanries ) in the name of the rest , having a necessary vote in all their parliaments . [ and this swedish great council is the more remarkable ▪ because it comes very near our constitution in england , in which i proved the inferior clergy ; and the commons ( not excepting the meanest freeholders ) anciently had their representatives . so that it had been the strangest thing that could have been observed in all the political constitutio●s on this side of europe , if that of england , tho descended from the same gothick original ; and founded according to the same model should have had no representatives for the commons or plebians in their great councils , or parliaments . the dr. here concludes with scotland and england , the former of which since you agree to have had from all times , citizens and burgesses in their great councils or parliaments , i need not repeat what is there , since it is no more than what you your self have granted ; and as for england he owns , ( as appears by the passages i have already cited out of this chapter , ) that the clergy , nobility and people were called to a parliament held under henry the ad . at clerk●nwell . m i will not deny , but there were representatives of the cities , and great towns in the great councils or assembly of estates of all those kingdoms you have now mention'd out of dr. heylins treatise ; yet whether they were there from the very first institution of those governments is much to be doubted . but since i have not now leasure to inquire into the original of all these kingdoms ; nor at what time each state began to come to these great councils ; give me leave in the mean time to remark , that all these kingdoms ( except sweden ) came nearer to that constitution ; which we suppose to have been anciently in england , and scotland , and also other kingdoms where feudatory tenures were observed , and consequently none but the chief lords or barons by knights service , and that held of the king ; so that all those foreign councils , or dye●s , &c. at first were all the same , as consisting of emperours or kings with their earls , and barons , bishops , and great officers , as is evident from all the old german , and french authors , and since cities sent deputies in germany , and italy , they were only from imperial cities ; the like i believe would be found in france , and those other kingdoms you have now mentioned ; but you cannot shew me , ( unless in sweden ) any representatives elected by the common people , or rusticks distinct from the nobility and gentry ; like our knights of shires in england . so that i still doubt , whether all the representatives of the great lords , and other nobility that appeared in the councils of these kingdoms were not all tenants in capite and no other . f. that this is a meer surmise of yours , i think i can easily prove ; for in the first place , as for the bishops , abbots , and clergy , who still made the first estates in all these kingdoms ; nothing is more certain , than that they never any of them held of the king by knights service , and therefore could not 〈◊〉 in their great councils by that tenure ▪ that institution being for ought as i know peculiar to england , and introduced by your conqueror , as you your self acknowledge ; and as for the temporal nobility , you will find , that in france not onely those noblemen , that held of the king by military service , but those who held in libero alodio without any such service , at all , had places , either by themselves or their deputies in the assembly of the estates , so likewise for the cities and towns that sent deputies to it : i believe you will not find that any of them held of the king in capite : and to come to germany ; you are likewise as much mistaken in fancying , that all the imperial cities were subject immediately to the emperor before they became so ; for hamburgh and lubec were subject to their own princes , the former to the duke of holstein and sleswic , and the latter to earls of its own ; till at last they either purchased their liberties they enioy from their princes ; or else cast them off and were after received into the body of the diet by the bulls or charters of several emperors ; and so likewise brunswick was always a f●●e city , till it was united to the empire by its own consent : i could shew you the like of several other cities , now called imperial , who held anciently not of the emperour , but either of their own earls , or bishops , tho i grant it was the charters of the emperor with the consent of the dyet , that gave them a place in those assemblies : and tho it is true , that in all the rest of these kingdoms , the meer rusticks or paisants have no representatives in their great councils ; yet this makes no alteration in the case , if you please to consider it , for the nobility and gentry are the only true and proper owners of the lands , of those kingdoms , all the rusticks or paisants being meer vassals , and in france almost slaves to their nobility , and gentry who ( as i have already said ) had all alike votes in their assembly of estates , as well those who held of the king in chief by knights service , as those that did not ; whereas it was always far otherwise in england , where the meanest freeholder was always as free as to his person , and estate as the greatest lord of whom he held , and hence it is , that we have had from all times those of the degree of yeomen , so peculiar to england , as fortiscut in his treatise de laudibus legum angliae , takes notice , who if they lived on their own lands , had no more dependance on the noblemen , and gentlemen than they have now ; and therefore it was but reason , that these should have their representatives in parliament ; as well as the inhabitants of the cities and burroughs , who had most of them a far less share in the riches ; and real estates of the kingdom . secondly , pray take notice , that in the rest of the kingdoms of europe , except england and scotland , there was no difference in point of priviledges as to being taxed , or having voices in the great council of the kingdom between the higher nobility ; such as had the titles of dukes , marquesses , and counts ; and simple gentlemen , whereas in england it has been always otherwise ( at least since the conquest ) and the earls , and barons , had by 〈◊〉 tenures places , as lords or peers in the great council of the kingdom , and so made a distinct body from the rest of the people ; whereas in other countreys , the higher nobility and gentry are reckon'd as all one estate , and therefore it was but reason , that the rest of the inferior nobility or gentry should have their representatives in this great council or parliament , or otherwise they would have been as very vassals as to their estates , to the great barons , and tenants in capite , as the boors in germany , or the paisants in france were to their lords , by whom they were taxed a● their pleasures ; which they never were in england , as we can find either from history or records . so that tho i grant that it is the municipal laws of each kingdom , or nation , that must determine what are the governing part of the people in those countreys ; yet tho that was not absolutely the same in all of them as it is in england , yet we find it so in the main ; and the representatives of the cities and towns do sufficiently assert the right of the plebians or common people , who make the d estate in those great councils . but i must here except sweden in which it is certain that the meer rusticks or boors had always their own deputies in their dyets , as well as the cities and towns ; and if sweden had this priviledge , i cannot see why the english gentry , and yeomanry ( who make but one body of commons ) might not have had the like , till you can shew me more sufficient proofs to the contrary . m well si● , i shall consider of what you say , but since it grows late , that we may wind up this conversation as fast as we can , give me leave to tell you , that tho' i should admit all that you have hitherto averred for truth , and that we should grant the commons of england to have been as ancient a part of the great council , or parliaments , as any of the other two ; what is that to the main point in question between us . viz that of non-resis●ance of the king upon any account whatsoever ? or how can you justsfie those of the clergy , nobility , and gentry of the church of england , for taking up arms against the king , and contributing so much as they have done to the driving him away and in bringing things to this confusion they are now in ? since , let your constitution of great councils and parliaments be never so ancient , let us also for once suppose them ( as you do ) to have a share in the legislative power of the nation , yet how can this authorize them ( much less any private persons out of parliament ) to take up arms against the king , or those commissioned by him , since the whole current , both of common as well as statute-law runs directly against you , and all with one consent assert that the disposal of the militia , or military force of the kingdom has been even so absolutely in the king's power , and at his disposal , that no man can without being guilty of treason , take up arms ( whether offensive or defensive ) without his commission to authorize him to do it ; so that no government in the world is more averse to all forcible resistance than our own , the king having been even from your time beyond memory so fully possest of the whole militia , or power of raising offensive or defensive arms in this kingdom , that it is expresly forbid by the statute of the th ed. i. against coming to parliaments and treatises with force of arms , in which the king sets forth , that in the last parliament the prelates earls , barons , and the commonalry ( in latine communitas or body of the realm ) have said that to us , ( i e. to the king ) it belongeth , and our part it is through our royal seign●ury to defend ( that is , in old french , to forbid ) force of armour , and all other force against our peace , at all times when it shall please us , and to punish them according to our laws and vsages of our realm , and hereunto they are bound to aid us as their soveraign lord as oft as need shall be . from whence you may observe , that it is the king's prerogative to forbid all manner of arms or armed force within the realm ; so that no man can lawfully arm himself without his authority : and this is further confirm'd by the statute of ed. the third , concerning treasons , wherein it is declared ( without any excepted cases to the contrary ) that to levy war against our lord the king in this realm , or to be adherent to the king's enemies in his realm , giving them aid or comfort in the realm , or elsewhere , is treason . and sir edward coke upon this statute saith thus , that this was high treason before by the common law , for no subject can levy war within the realm without authority from the king ; and if any man levy war to expulse strangers , to deliver men out of prisons , to remove wicked councellors , or against any statute , or to any other end , pretending reformation on their own heads without warrant , this is levying of war against the king , because they take upon them royal authority . from which statute , as also from your own oracles ( sir ed. coke 's ) interpretation of it , you may observe that it is not only treas●n to make war against the king's person , but to take arms to make any reformation or alteration in church , or state , without the king's authority ; nor can any subject of england justifie the taking arms upon any account whatsoever , unless it be by the king's commission ; and therefore all the judges of england in the case of dr. story , who was executed for treason in the reign of queen elizabeth , did with one consent agree , that the very consultation concerning making war against the queen , shall be interpreted a making war against her person , and supposes a design against her life : so that nothing seems plainer to me , than that by the ancient as well as modern laws of england , all defensive as well as offensive arms are expresly forbidden and condemned . f. i think i shall be able to make out , notwithstanding what you have now said , that all resistance of the king , or those commissioned by ●im , is so far from being treason , as you suppose , that it is every mans duty to oppose him in case he goes about to set up , instead of a legal monarchy , a tyrannical arbitrary power in this nation , since this is but to preserve the original constitution of parliaments , which in some cases cannot be maintained without such a resistance be allowed . but to proceed to the authorities you bring from our statutes ; as for the first , you urge from that th edward the first ; i think that can by no means do the business for which you design it ; for in the first place , this is only declaration of the bishops , lords and commons of the land , that it belongs to the king to defend ( i. e. forbid ) all force of arms ; but mark sir , what force ? sure it is only meant of such force as belongs to the king's prerogative to forbid ; viz. force of arms against the publick peace , and such as he might punish according to the laws and usages of the realm ; and therefore the statute expresly declares ▪ that ( as subjects ) they are hereunto bound aid him their soveraign lord the king at all times when need shall be ; but does this act any where say , that he hath an irresistible power to disturb this peace by his own private illegal commissions , or that any men are bound to assist him in it ; or because ( for example ) he hath authority to punish all men according to law that shall come to parliaments with force of arms , that therefore he hath an unlimited power of raising what forces he would , and in prisoning or destroying the whole parliament if he pleased , and that no bod● might resist him , if he had gone about so to do . the like may be said , if the 〈◊〉 should notoriously , and insupportably by force invade all the civil liber●●●● and properties of his subjects by levying taxes , and taking away the●r estates by down-right force , contrary to law , now can any body in his senses believe that the act of th of ed. . was made to prevent all resistance of su●h tyrannical violence and that the resistance of those forces ( whether forreign or domestick ) that might be sent by the king 's private commissioners to murder or enslave us , is making war against his person , or that it comes within any of the cases expressed in that statute , and therefore cannot fall within the compass of sir edw. coke's comment upon this sta●ute , all the offences therein specified being treas●ns at common law before that statute was made ; nor is the reformation there mentioned , to be understood of a just and necessary defence of our lives , liberties , religion , and properties , as setled and established by the laws of the land , to be looked upon as making war against a weak or seduced king , but is rather in defence of him , and the government , by opposing tyranny , which will certainly bring both him and us to ruine at last ; so the reformation he there mentions is only to be be understood of such insurrections and rebellions as have been made under the meer pretence of religion , or obtaining greater liberties for the common sort of people than they had by the law of the land , such as were the rebellions of wat tyler in king richard the second , and mortimers in h●●ry the th reigns , not to mention the other rebellions raised by the papists in the times of king henry the eighth , edward the sixth , and queen elizabeth's reigns ; all which being begun by seditious or superstitious men , were certainly rank rebellions , and so are and ought to be esteem'd by all good subjects . m. i grant these pretences seem very fair and specious , yet notwithstanding this your pretended right , or a necessity of resistance of the king , or those commissioned by him in case of tyranny , has been still looked upon as rebellion in all ages , and the actors dealt with accordingly where ever they were taken . f. i do not deny but as long as arbitrary and tyrannical princes could get the better of it , and keep the power in their own hands , they still executed for traytors whosoever opposed or resisted their wicked and unjust actions , tho' they were never so near relations to them ; thus both edward and richard the second put their uncles the dukes of lancaster and gloucester to death meerly because they joyned with the rest of the nobility and people to prevent their designs . so that it is not the execution of the man , but the cause that makes the traytor , since princes are seldom without a sufficient number of judges and jury-men to condemn whomsoever they please to fall upon . but that the clergy , nobility and people of england have always asserted this right of self-defence in case their liberties and properties were uniustly invaded by the tyrannical or arbitrary practices of the king , or those about him ; i think i can prove by giving you the history of it in so many kings since your conquest , as will render it indisputable , if you please to give me now the hearing , or else to defer it till the next time we meet . m. i confess i was so weary of sitting up so long at our last conversation , that i made a resolution not to do so any more ; and therefore since it grows late , let us leave off now , and i promise to meet you here again within a night or two , and then i will hear how well you can vindicate your right of resistance from law or history ; but if you have no better proofs for it than the rebellion of the barons in king iohn and henry the third's reigns , you will scarce make me your convet , since impunity does never sanctifie a wicked action , or render it the more lawful ; and you have already given it me for an axiom , that a facto ad ius non valet consequentia . f. i accept of your appointment with thanks ; but pray do not for●judge my arguments till you hear them ; and as for the axiom , i allow it for good , provided i may urge it in my turn ; but in the mean time i shall wish you good night . m. and i the same to you . finis . bibliotheca politica : or a discourse by way of dialogue , upon these questions ; whether by the ancient laws , and constitutions of this kingdom , as well as by the statutes of the th and th of king charles the ii. all resistance of the king , or of those commissioned by him are expresly forbid , upon any pretence whatsoever . and also , whether all those who assisted his present majesty king william , either before , or after his coming over , are guilty of the breach of this law. collected out of the most approved authors , both antient and modern . dialogue the ninth . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford arms ; where also may be had the first , second , third , fourth , fifth , sixth , seventh and eighth dialogues . . authours chiefly made use of in this dialogue , and how denoted in the margin . dr. sherlocks case of resistance . s. c. r. mr. iohnsons reflections upon it . i. r. s. dr. hick's answer to iulian : intituled iovian . h. i. i desire the reader to remember , that whenever i make use of the word people in this , or the following discourse : i mean thereby the whole diffusive body of the nation , consisting of the clergy , nobility , and commons . the preface to the reader . i must beg your pardon , if i have exceeded my intended design , ( in the preface to the first of these dialogues ) of reducing what i had to say on the subjects there laid down into eight discourses ; since being obliged to vindicate the antient constitution of parliaments , from the cavils of some late writers ; there was a necessity of considering what dr. brady had with so great industry heaped together against the house of commons , being antiently a constituent part of our parliaments , before the th of henry the iii. in the doing of which , if i have proved too prolix , i can only say i could not avoid it , without baulking those arguments the doctor has made use of to support his opinion . but having already treated in the third and fourth dialogues , upon the questions of passive obedience , and non-resistance , as a moralist , and a divine ; i come now to handle the same question as a lawyer ; and to examine whether by the ancient laws , and constitutions of our english government , and by the late statutes of the thirteenth and fourteenth of king charles the ii. all taking up of arms against the king , or those commissioned by him , be absolutely forbidden , and declared treasonable ; in the doing of which i can assure you , i have not failed impartially to set down , whatever i have either heard or read materially urged for one or the other opinion , and i have also consulted some of the wisest and most iudicious members of the long parliament of king charles the ii. to learn what was then the sense of both houses of parliament , concerning the words of that oath ; but whether i have any ways mistaken the sense of those august assemblies ; i humbly submit it to the judgment of this present parliament . for cujus est condere , ejus est interpretari : and i hope for the like ingenuity from those , who give a different and stricter interpretation to the words of those statutes , and the oath therein contained ; which tho' it be now no longer enjoin'd , yet since it may still be thought to bind such as have taken it , it was very necessary to inquire what was the true intent of those that imposed it ; that is indeed , what is the legal sense of the words of that oath . but as to the inconveniencies , and mischiefs that may arise from the peoples judging what commissions of the kings are legal , or illegal ; and either resisting them : or yielding obedience to them , as they shall see cause : i have only this to say , that i desire those of the contrary opinion , seriously to consider all the inconveniencies and mischiefs that may happen on the other side ; if the king is invested with an absolute irresistible power not only to issue what commissions , but to whom and to what ends he pleases , tho' never so illegal , and arbitrary : and that the whole nation must yield an active obedience , or at least a passive submission to them without the least resistance , no , not so much as to assist any foreign prince , who should come in to their assistance ▪ as his present majesty ( when prince of orange ) generously did : and when any man has without prejudice and passion considered consequences ; i shall freely leave it to him to embrace which side he pleases , since i hope it is neither heresie , nor treason , to be of either ; and therefore i only desire the reader to peruse this discourse without passion , or prejudice , and then it is indifferent to me what party he takes ; since i think men may be honest and , conscientious who believe either way ; and i do not expect , nor desire any man to be of this , or that opinion , farther than his reason shall guide him in which if he be mistaken he has no body to blame but himself ; since he is not sit to judge who is to be trusted with arguments only for that , which he already believes to be the right side . i have no more to mind you of at present , but to suppose these papers to be written before their present majesties were declared king and queen ; ) and in a time when every body not only thought , but spoke freely . the ninth dialogue between mr. freeman a gentleman , and mr. meanwell a civilian . f. sir , i am glad to see you again so soon , for i was just now looking over some of our old historians , that lie here upon the table , to rub up my memory for sufficient instances and authorities , that it hath been always the received and constant custom and practice of the clergy , nobility , and people of this nation , to defend the ancient government of this kingdom by general councils or parliaments , as also their just liberties and properties , not only by remonstrances , and petitions to , but by force too , against the king● and those commissioned by him , in case they found them evidently , and violently invaded , beyond what any fair , or gentle means , and intercession were able to redress : and for proof of this , i shall go as high as the times of the kings of the west saxons , from whom all the kings of england before the conquest were descended , after the kingdom of the west saxons had prevailed over all the rest . i shall therefore begin with the reign of sigehert king of the west saxons , who , as i told you in your sixth conversation , breaking the laws and constitutions of the kingdom , and tyrannizing over all form of people , was in a general council of the whole kingdom deposed , and expelled into the forrest of audredswald , where he was afterwards slain by a hogheard . as the saxons annals under the year . as also huntingdon , and mal●sbury relate . i shall not mention the deposition of king edwin , by the mercians and northumbrians , and their chusing his brother edgar in his stead , because not done by the common council of the whole kingdom ; and that also for slight , and insufficient grounds . therefore since the times before the conquest do afford us no more examples of this kind among the kings of the west saxon race ; ( to which i only confine my self ) since those kings being for the most part at wars with the danes to the time of edward the confessor , had somewhat else to think on than the making themselves absolute , or tyrannizing over their subjects ; but indeed , there is scarce to be found in history a succession of more mild , just and valiant princes , than egbert the first king of all england , and his descendants . m. pray sir tell me to what purpose you cite these instances of the nobility and people of england deposing and casting off their kings in the times before the conquest ; is it that you would justifie that common-wealth principle , that the parliament hath the like power to depose the king at this day in case of any infringement of the fundamental laws , of the kingdom , or breach of the original contract ( as those of your party now term it ? ) if you do , pray speak plain , and then i shall know what answer to give you . f. tho'l assert it ( as undeniable in matter of fact ) that the english saxons did often exercise that power they had reserved to themselves , of electing and deposing their kings , when they became insupportable for tyranny or misgovernment , as appears not only in the kingdom of the west saxons , i have now instanced in , but in almost all the other kingdoms of the heptarchy ; in which there are to be found many more instances of the deposition of their kings , tha● what were in the west saxon kingdom ▪ & this wa● then very just and necessary , since these kingdoms were all elective ; and none of them hereditary ; and that the general meeting of the great council of the nation was always at set , and constant times ; and did not depend upon the will , and pleasure of the king , either to call or dissolve them , as i have already proved ; and that this power was no unusual thing ; i appeal to all the antient kingdoms of europe founded after the same model as ours ; and which i mentioned at our last meeting ; so that nothing is more frequent in their histories and annals , than the deposing of their kings for the above-mentioned crimes of tyranny , or misgovernments ▪ but that some of these gothick kingdoms , as denmark , and sweden ▪ whilst they continued elective , have exercised this power even till of late , is so notorious in matter of fact , that it needs no proof , since the kings of those kingdoms held their crowns at this day by that title , and on those conditions , which the nobility and people gave them , after the deposition of their predecessors . but tho this were so anciently also in england , it does not therefore follow that it must be so now , for since the crown of this kingdom became hereditary , and that the calling and dissolving of great councils or parliaments came to depend wholly upon the king's will ; i must allow , that the case is quite altered and that the two houses of parliament have now no power to depose the king for any tyranny or misgovernment whatsoever . the first parliament of king charles the second in the act for attainting the regicides have actually disclaimed all coercive power over the king ; and yet for all that , the nobility ▪ and people of england may still have a good and sufficient right left them of defending their lives , religion , and liberties against the king , or those commissioned by him in case of a general , and universal breach and invasion of the fundamental laws of the kingdom , or original contract , ( if you will call it so ) and not to lay down those defensive arms till their said just rights and liberties are again restored , and sufficiently secured to them : so that tho' i will not bring the custom of the english saxons as a precedent for the parliament's deposing of the king ; yet i think i may make use of it thus far , that this nation has ever exercised this necessary right of defending their liberties , and properties , when invaded by the king , or his ministers , either by colour of law , or open force : and that this hath been the constant practice from almost the time of the conquest down to later ages , i think i can make out from sufficient authorities , both from histories and records . m. tho' your doctrine is not so bad as i expected , yet it is still bad enough ; and i never knew this right of resistance carried home , but that it always ended in deposing , and murdering of the king at the last ; as we have seen in our own times : but let the constant practice have been as it will , i am sure such resistance hath been always condemned by our ancient common ▪ law , as well as modern statutes , as i shall prove farther to you by and by ; and therefore pray give me leave to tell you , that the never so constant practice of an unlawful thing , can no more justifie the doing of it , than that constant usage , time out of mind , for thieves to rob between london , and st. albans ; not that i fore-judge you , or refuse to hear any instances and authorities from histories or records to make good your assertion . f. i thank you for your patience ; what therefore if i prove that such resistance has been not only actually exercised by the clergy , nobility and people in former ages , but that it hath been also allowed by our kings , and approved of by great councils or parliaments in those times for lawful , and the actors in it wholly indemnified and saved harmless , nay , a power given them , and that by the king himself , to resist him , and defend themselves in case he broke his charters , and agreements made to , and with his nobility and people , or else with some forein prince ; may appear from this remarkable instance of king henry ii at the end of whose reign hoveden in his annals , gives us the conditions of the peace made in the last year of this king between him , and philip king of france , with the consent of their bishops , earls , and barons , where among other articles you will find this for one , particularly relating to the barons of england , who were also to swear to the peace , in these terms , et omnes barones angliae jurabunt , quod si rex angliae noluerit has conditiones tenere , quod ipsi tenebunt cum rege franciae , & comite richardo , & cos adj●vabunt pro posse contra rege● angliae , &c. whence we may without doubt conclude , that the resistance of subjects in some cases against their kings , was then allowed of , even by the king himself , and thought not inconsistent with the allegiance they bore him , tho' it might suspend it for a time . m. i confess this instance would be of some weight , were it not for the critical time when this peace was made ; viz. when richard earl of 〈◊〉 , the king 's eldest son , had rebelled against his father , and taken part with the king of france ; and had drawn over a great many of the norman , and pictavian , and english barons to his party ; which when king henry perceived , this very author you have quoted here , tells you , quod rex angliae in arcto positus pacem fecit cum rege philippo ; that is , was constrained to make peace with him ; so that king henry being in this streight , the king of france , and earl richard , with the barons of his party , forced king henry to sign what conditions they pleased ; for there it no such clause so much as mentioned for the french barons . but make the most of it , it is but a temporary relaxation of allegiance from king henry to his barons , and the king might surely thus release them if he pleased : but it is plain , they could not have acted thus without this condition had been expresly inferred . f. well , supposing king henry to have been never so much constrained to the making of these conditions , and that it was his own act that rendred it lawful , it still proves , as much as i urge it for , viz. that neither the kings of france , or england , then thought this resistance absolutely unlawful ; for then the king 's own act could never have dispensed with it . but to shew you farther , that the people of this nation have ever maintained this right of resistance , even with the allowance of our kings themselves ; and for the doing of this , i shall proceed with the earliest instances of this kind after the conquest ; viz. in the time of king richard the first , during whose absence in the holy land , he had committed the government of his kingdom to william bishop of ely , who abused his power by an arbitrary and insolent carriage , affronting and oppressing iohn earl of morton , the king 's own brother , and geoffry arch-bishop of york , the king 's base brother , whereupon they rose up against him ; and having the bishops , the earls and barons of their side , appointed the said bishop a day to answer to his crimes in the king's court , or great council of the bishops , lords and tenants in capite , then called curia regis , where when he refused to appear , they all with one consent came to london , and fought with the followers and adherents of the said chancellour by the way ; when they came to town , earl iohn , with the arch-bishops of york and rouen , with all the earls and barons , together with the citizens of london , met in st. paul's church-yard , and there it was proposed , that the said chancellour should for his evil government he deposed and banisht the kingdom , and so he immediately was by the general consent of the common council of the kingdom ; so that you see the nobility , clergy and people , had then no notion of an irresistible power in the king ; and those put in commission by him , when they found their power to grow tyrannical , and insupportable . m. but if i forget not , you omit one material circumstance in this aff●ir , which seems to make against you , which is , that arch-bishop of rouen , and william the earl mareschal did at that time produce the king's letters , signed with his 〈◊〉 , wherein he had appointed that they two should be associated in the government with the bishop of ely , and that he should do nothing without their privity and consents ; and of those associated with him in the business of the kingdom ; and that if he offered to do otherwise , he should be deposed : so that it seems what they now acted , was not so muchin opposition to the king's commission as to the bishops , who had refused to obey his commands . f. i confess it was as you set forth ; yet this makes nothing against my opinion ; since it is apparent that arms were taken , and this resistance made by the major part of the bishops , earls and barons , together with the londoners , before ever it was known that such letters were written by the king : and so it seems they would have done much the same thing if there had been no such letters sent by the king at all . you may also remem●er that all these proceedings also were approved of , and confirmed by the king himself . but that i may proceed in my history of non-resistance , i come to the reign of king iohn his brother , who when he had refused the arch-bishop of canterbury , and all the bishops , earls and barons of the kingdom , to confirm the great charter of king henry the first , they , together with the rest of the great men and people of the kingdom , of all degrees and conditions , took up arms , and made a vast army , resolving never to lay them down , till he had new granted , and confirmed the charters of liberties , and forrests ; till at last the king finding himself almost quite forsaken , so that he had scarce five knights left about him ; he was at last forced to meet the said bishops , earls , barons and people at runne-mead , and there to grant them that great charter , which has been the subject of so much discourse between us ; so that you see here that the church of england in those times ( if the bishops and clergy are the representatives of this church ) had then no notion of this doctrine of passi●e obedien●e to the king 's absolute will and commands . m. i cannot deny the matter of fact to be as you say , but yet you may remember that the same author tells us , that the pope thought the king , hardly dealt withal in this matter , so that he gave audience to the king's ambassadors concerning the rebellions , and injuries , which the barons of england had committed against their king ; and that upon a solemn hearing of the whole business , and after a consultation with his cardinals , he did as supreme lord of eng●and , ( after king iohn's resignation of his crown to him ) by his bull then published make void the said great charters of liberties , and forrests ; and condemn all the barons proceedings , as against their duty , and allegiance to the king their soveraign lord ; so that it seems this was not approved of any where but by the actors , the pope thereupon excommunicating the barons , and suspending the arch-bishop of ca●terbury for joyning with them . f. i believe you will make nothing of this objection ; for it appears from the same author , that the pope had before this excommunicated the king ; and as far as lay in his power , depriv'd him of his kingdom , and absolved all his subjects of their allegiance ; so that it is plai● , it was not out of any true principle , or hatred of rebellion , and resistance in subjects , that the pope had thus acted ; but purely to gratifie the king at this juncture of time , and to defend him in his tyranny ▪ and breach of his own charters , because he was then become his vassal , and so he cared not how much he oppressed his subjects , because he was thereby the more able to pay him the tribute , before promised ; and he could also expect the more securely to extort money from the whole kingdom : but that this bull of the popes was contrary to the king 's own express act and agreement , appears plainly by that clause , which is still to be found in a charter under the seal of this king ; and which seems to have been the heads of the great charter , ( according to which it was drawn into the form we now find it in mat. paris ) in which it is expresly provided , and granted by the said king , that in case he should go about to break or infringe any clause in the said charter , and shall not amend it within the space of forty days that then i●li barones cum communia totius terrae distringent & gravabunt nos modis omnibus quibus pouerint , aut ( scil . ) per captionem castrorum , terrarum , possessionum , & aliis modis quibus potuerint , donec fuerit emendatum secundum arbitrium eorum , salva persona nostra & regin●e nostra , & liberorum nostrorum , & cum ●uerit emendatum intendent nobis sient prius fecerunt . so that you see here in the judgment even of the king himself , they might freely resist , and take up arms against him , till he made good every article of these charters , if violated ; and were not to return to their obedience till it was amended ; and the like clause almost word for word is also to be found in the conclusion of the great charters published in mat. paris . m. i grant the clause is there as you quote it ; yet i much doubt whether it was of any validity , being no doubt drawn up by the barons then in arms , and which the king durst not at that time refuse , and so he was indeed under a kind of dures● when he did it . and besides , pray mark the conclusion of this clause ▪ this resistance was to be salva persona nostra & reginae nostrae , & liberorum nostrorum , cum fuerit emendatum , intendent nos sicut prius fecerunt . now how this security here reserved for the king's person could consist with that open war the barons made afterwards against his very person , and casting off all their allegiance to their natural prince , and calling in prince lewis , son to the king of france , i cannot understand . f. i think all this may very easily be solved , : for in the first place , k. iohn was no more compelled to agree to this clause , than he was to the charters themselves ; and if those were lawful , and reasonable , so was this resistance too , since there was no other way or means lest to preserve them , in case the king should go from his own acts , and break through all he had done ; so that if the ends were lawful , the means to preserve it must be so too ; or else those charters would have signified nothing any longer than the king pleased : as for the other part of the objection , that this resistance was still to be , saving the person of the king and queen , &c. and that this did not consist with the barons , after making war against his person , and casting off all allegiance to him : it was not their faults , but the king 's , if they could not perform this agreement , since the king by making war upon the clergy , nobility and people , by his open , and notorious breach , and recalling of these charters , calling in strangers to his assistance , and declaring he would no longer govern according to law , had made it absolutely unpracticable to preserve their allegiance to him any longer ; so that they never cast off their duty as subjects , till he had cast off his duty as a king , and then what was there else left to be done but to provide for their own safety , by calling in a forein prince to their assistance , as soon as they could ? since there was no other way left them to defend themselves against those troops of strangers the king had invited over ; and though many of them with their captain hugh de boves , had been cast away , and drowned in a tempest at sea , yet more were daily expected : so that if tyrants should suffer nothing for the breach of their own charters , and oaths , they would be in a better condition , by their violation , than the observing of them ; ●or by the making them , they for the present quiet the minds of their discontented subjects , and when they please may break them all again , when they have got power , if no body must presume to resist them ; or not think them as much kings when they destroy , and oppress their people , as when they protect , and preserve them by governing according to the laws of the kingdom . but pray what have you to say against that general resistance that was made by almost all the bishops , barons , and great men of england against his son henry the third , about the frequent and notorious violations of the great charters which his father and himself had so often sworn to , and confirmed , and for which he had received such great benevolences and subsidies from the nation ? m. before i answer this question , pray take notice that i am not at all satisfied with your arguments ; that when ever subjects shall think themselves injured , and oppressed by their soveraigns , that then they may cast off their allegiance to them ; if they cannot have the remedy they desire ; since this were to make them both judges and parties too in their own cause ; which is altogether unjust , and unreasonable , between private men , much more between kings and subjects . but passing by this at present , i shall tell you my opinion of this resistance of simon montfort , and the earls and barons his adherents , that it was down-right rebellion , and tended only to dethrone the king , and make him a meer cypher , and to devolve the whole government upon themselves ; as appears by the oxford provisions recited by so many authors of that age ; and which were afterwards condemned , ( and consequently those violent means by which they were obtained ) by lewis the ninth king of france , who in an assembly of his estates , upon a solemn hearing of the whole difference between king henry the third , and his barons , declared these oxford provisions null , and void . so far was this good and pious king from countenancing any rebellion ( or resistance , as you term it ) of subjects against their lawful soveraign . f. for all this , i cannot find that the king of france did then at all condemn this defence the earls and barons had before made of the liberties granted them by the great charters ; for tho' he restored the king to his former power , by avoiding the oxford provisions , yet at the same time when this was done , ( as the continuator of mat. paris tells us ) he expresly excepted the ancient charters of king iohn , vnivers●li [ seil . angliae ] concessae , and from which per illam sententiam in nullo intendibat pen●tus derogare ; and if he did not in the least intend to derogate from them , he could not with any justice condemn the only means the barons had to maintain them ; after so many trials , and fresh promises and oaths of this fickle inconstant king all broken , and laid aside ; so that you may as well or better alledge the pope's shameful absolution of this king from this oath he had made to observe the great charters , as an argument why they should not be any longer bound by them , nor the barons obliged to defend them ; as this sentence of the king of france to render the resistance the barons had made in defence of the great charters to be unlawful : and that king henry himself did afterwards allow this resistance for good and lawful ; pray see the agreement which was not long after made in full parliament , in the th between the king , the prince , and all the prelates , earls and barons of england ; whereby he obliged himself to observe all the articles and ordinances which had been before agreed upon at london in the th year of his reign : and then follows this clause in the record ( which the doctor himself has printed in his appendix at the end of the first volume of his introduction to english history ) which i shall here translate out of french , because it is very old and obscure , it is thus : and if our lord the king , or monsieur edward ; ( viz. the prince ) shall go against the peace and ordinance aforesaid , or shall grieve the earls of leicester or gloucester , or any of their party by reason of any of the things aforesaid ; that then the great men , and commons of the land , ( in french hauz homes , & comun de la terre ) shall rise against them to grieve them to the utmost of their power , and shall be obedient to them in nothing , and in doing all things as if they were bound to them in nothing , until these things shall be amended and maintained according to the ordinance of the peace aforesaid ; and to this our lord the king , and monsieur edward , and the great men of the kingdom , have sworn upon the holy gospels , to keep and maintain the things aforesaid . and with this record agrees this king's latine charter , much to the same purpose recited in the annals of waverly , an. . only the words there are more general , that if the king or prince should break the said peace by hurting or falling upon any of the said earls of leicester , or gloucester , or any of the persons above-mentioned , liceat omnibus de regno nostra contra nos insurgere , & ad gravamen nostrum , opem & operam dare juxta posse , ad quod ex praesenti praecepto nostro omnes & singulos volumus obliga●i , fideliter & homagis nobis , facto non obstante . so that you see here , that by the judgment of the king himself , and the whole parliament , this resistance might be exercised notwithstanding the homage they had done him . and this is that form of the peace which i have before cited to you to have been made ( as appears by a writ to the sheriff of yorkshire , to be seen upon the same roll , and in the same membrane ) unanimi consensu & voluntate nostra , & edwardi filii nostri primogeniti , praelatorum , comitum , baronum , & communitatis regni nostri , &c. which doctor brady thought fit to conceal , and not publish with the former record , because the word communitas did not at all suit with his notions in this place . m. i must confess this so solemn an agreement upon the record would have been very considerable , had it been made , whilst the king and prince had been free , and in their own power : whereas the dr. has made it plainly appear , that the king and prince were at this time in the power of simon montfort , and his adherents , who called that famous parliament of the th , to which we suppose the commons were first summoned ; and therefore the prince was not delivered at this time ( any more than the king his father ) out of their power , and was only taken out of dover castle , and made a prisoner at large under a guard ( as his father was ) until he made his escape from his keepers at hereford castle : so that i do not at all value this agreement , because made by duress ; tho' i confess the words of the records are express , that it was de unanimi co●sensu & voluntate nostra , &c. edwardi filii nostri . but it appears plainly , that by this agreement the king had discharged himself of all royal power , and confirmed this agreement , whereby the whole government of the kingdoms , and nomination of all the great officers of the crown was put into the hands of nine earls and barons . f. at this rate no act that a king can do when he hath the worst of it , tho' confirm'd by a solemn oath ( as this was upon the holy gospels ) can ever be binding ; for it is but alledging that it was done by duress , and it is sufficient to render it null and void : but be it as it will , this was certainly the general consent , act and declaration of the whole nation assembled in parliament , and that owned by the king himself , and his son the prince , and all his party . and farther , that this resistance of the earl of gloucester ( who was one of these barons ) was not after counted for treason , or rebellion , appears by that pardon of the said earl which we have before cited to have been made by this king , with assent of the king of almaine ( his brother ) and the counts and barons , and commons of the land , in which he pardoned the said earl , and all his company , ( and also all the londoners ) all rancour and ill-will ; and in the same manner as the king quits and discharges the earl , and his company ; so does the said earl hereby for himself , and all his company , remit to all those that were of the party of the king , any thing done since that moment ( that is , that civil war in which the earl of gloucester , had so great a share ) so that you see this resistance of the earl of gloucester was within two years after the battle of evesham so far from being looked upon as rebellion , that the pardon is made mutual , not only for the earl , and those that followed him , but also for those that had taken the king's part . but i shall come now to his son , and successor , king edward the first , where we shall find this doctrine of resistance asserted more than once , not only by private men , but by the whole parliament , as appears by those letters that were written by the king's command or ( permission at least in the th of his reign ) in the name of all the earls , barons , & tota communitas angliae , to pope boniface the eighth , in vindication of the king's superiority over scotland ; to which you will find this remarkable passage , nec etiam permittimus , nec permittemus , sicut non possumus nec debemus praemissa tam insolita , indebita , & praejudicialia , & alias inaudita , praelibatum dominum nostrum regem , etiam si vellet facere , modo quolibit attemptare : which restraint of the king's will must certainly mean some what more than a bare remonstrance or declaration against it ; since we have seen in our own times , kings make nothing of meer verbal declarations of the two houses of parliament , if they had a mind to do a thing they thought belonged to their prerogative , tho' the parliament declared against it . and to let you farther see that this doctrine was at this time generally believed , and practised all over europe , you will find almost the same clause in the letters which were written in the reign of philip the fair king of france , anno . ( which falls about the th of our king edward the first ) and were sent to the same pope boniface , upon the occasion of his manifold usurpations upon the church of france , in the name of the whole clergy of that kingdom ; whereby it not only appears that this was done in a general assembly of estates , viz. of the clergy , barons , &c. & communitates villarum ; but they also there declared , expressius , viva voce , quod si praesatus dominus rex ( quod absit ) tolera●● , v●l dissimula●e veilet , ipsi ( scil . episcopi , & barones , &c. ) nullot●nus sustinerent . so that here you see not only the temporal estates , but the very clergy declare , that they would by no means suffer the king to act thus no not ) if he would . but the barons and people of england , did actually put this doctrine in execution , some few years before this letter , i now mentioned , was writ to the pope ; which transaction i shall give you almost verbatim out of mat. of westminster , and henry de keyghton , in anno . ( being the th of edward the first ) when the king having extorted a great sum of money from the clergy , and people , contrary to law , and being then going into flanders , he called a parliament at westminster , where most of the earls and barons refused to appear , until such time as their petitions for the ease of their countrey were heard ; and that the king would again confirm magna charta : yet nevertheless the king upon his confession of his male administration , which he made before all the people , with tears in his eyes , and promise of amendment , then obtained of the commons an aid of the eighth penny of their goods : but as soon as the king was gone over , the constable , and earl mareschal , with other earls and barons , went to the exchequer , and there forbad the judges to levy the said tax upon the people by the sheriffs , because it was done without their knowledge , without whose consent no tax ought to be exacted , or imposed ; so that the said earls and barons being thus gathered together , and the greater part of the people joyning with them ; at last prince edw. then lieutenant of the kingdom , was forced to call a parliament ; to which the earls and barons came attended with great multitudes , both of horse , and foot , but would not enter the city of london , till the prince had in his fathers name confirmed the great charters , and had passed the statute de tallagio non concedendo ; both which were afterwards again confirmed by the king his father some time after his return . and this will serve to explain the last article in this statute , which comprehends the king's pardon or remission to humphrey earl of her●ford and ess●x then constable , and roger bigot earl of norfolk mareschal of england ( the two principal leaders in the late resistance ) with all other earls , barons , knights , and esquires of their party , all leagues and confederacies ; as also all rancour , and ill-will , with all other transgressions against them , & and pray see sir edward coke's comment on these words , you compare our english histories with this act of parliament , the old saying shall be verified , that records of parliament● the truest histories . the king had conceived a deep displeasure against the constable , mareschal , and others of the nobility , gentry , and commons of the realm , for denying that which he so much desired ; yet for that they stood in defence of their laws , liberties , and free customs , &c. ( i suppose he refers to the resistance but now mentioned ) whereupon he did not only restore the same to them as aforesaid , but granted special pardon to those against whom he had conceived so heavy a displeasure , &c. and such a one as you will scarce read the like ; and after a short gloss upon the words rancour and ill-will , he thus comments on these words , etiam transgressiones si q●as fec●in● ; here the words , si qua● sic●i●t , were added , lest by acceptance of a pardon , they should confess they had transgressed . so careful were the lords and commons to preserve their ancient laws , liberties , and customs of their countrey ; so that it is plain that sir edward coke then thought the lords and commons had not transgressed in thus standing up , tho' with force of arms , for their just rights and liberties ; and which sufficiently proves that this author did not conceive such a resistance to be making war against the king , and so treason at that time at common law , and consequently not to be afterwards treason by the statute of th of edward the third ( as you would have it ) since that statute d●es not make any other overt-acts to be treason , but what had been so by common law before this statute was made . but in the reign of this king's son edward the second , there were much more pregnant , and fatal proofs of the exercise of this right of resistance by the earls , barons , and people of england against peirce gaveston , whom having been before for his mis-government of the king , banisht the realm by act of parliament , and coming over with the king's license , but without any reverse of the said act ; thomas earl of lancaster , the king's uncle , with the rest of the earls , barons , and commons of the land , took up arms against him : and tho' he raised some forces by the king's commission , yet they fought with him , and took him prisoner , and beheaded him , near warwick . some years after which the said thomas earl of lancaster , with humphrey de bohun earl of hereford , together with divers other earls and barons , took arms , and spoiling the lands of the two spencers , father and son , came up to london , where the king had called a parliament ; in which the king was forced to banish the said spencers out of the kingdom , tho' they quickly returned again ; against whom when the said earls above mentioned , and divers other barons and knights again took arms ; but being fail'd by some of their consederates , were over-power'd by the king's party , and the earl being taken prisoner , was attainted , and beheaded at portfract ; yet was the this judgment against the earl ; and those of his party afterwards reversed in parliament , in mo . edward the third , and their heirs restored in blood ; as also to the lands of their fathers ; as besides the act it still to be seen upon the rolls , appears more plainly by a writ of this king 's reciting ; that whereas at a parliament at westminster , among other things it was agreed by the king , the prelates , earls , barons and commons of the kingdom , that all those who were in the quarrel with thomas e. of lancaster against the spencers , should have their lands and goods restored , because the said quarrel was found , and adjudged by the king , and the whole parliament , to be good and just ; and that the judgments given against them were null and void , and therefore commands restitution of the lands and tenements now in the crown to the executors of the said earl ; and the like writs are found for the other lords and gentlemen that had been of his party . and further , that not only this resistance made by this earl , and the rest of his followers , but also that which this king himself made together with queen isabel his mother against the mis-government of the king his father , through the evil counsel of the two spencers , appears by the act of indemnity passed in the first year of this king , in the preamble of which there is recited a short history of the wicked government and banishment of the spencers , father and son ; and also how thomas late earl of lancaster , was by their procurement pursued , taken , executed , disinherited ; and how the said spencers , and robert baldock , and edmund earl of arundel , by the royal power they had usurped , had caused the king that now is , and the queen his mother , to be utterly forsaken of the king his father , and to be exiled from the realm of england ; and that therefore the king that now is , and the queen his mother , being in so great jeopardy in a strange countrey , and seeing the destructions , and disinherisons which were notoriously done in england , upon holy church , the prelates , earls , barons , and the commonalty of the same , by the said spencers , robert baldock , and edmund earl of arundel , by the encroachment of royal power to themselves ; and seeing they might not remedy the same , unless they came into england with an army of men of war , and have by the grace of god with such puissance , and the help of the great men and commons of the realm vanquished and destroyed the said spencers , &c. therefore our soveraign lord the king , by the common council of the prelates , earls , barons , and other great men , and of the commons of the realm have provided , and ordained &c. as follows ; that no great man , nor other of what estate , dignity or condition soever he be , that came in with the said king , that now is , and with the queen in aid of them , to pursue their said enemies , and in which pursuit the king his father was taken and put in ward , &c. shall be impeached , molested or grieved in person , or in goods , in any of the king's courts , &c. for the pursuit , and taking in hold the body of the said king edward , nor for the pursuit of any other persons , not taking their goods , nor for the death of any man , nor any other things perpetrated , or committed in the said pursuit , from the day of the king and queens arrival , until the day of the coronation of the said king. this act of indemnity is so full a justification of the necessity , and lawfulness of the resistance that was then made against king edward the second , and his wicked councellors the spencers , that it needs no comment : and tho' king edward the third took warning by the example of his father , and was too wise then to follow the like arbitrary courses ; yet richard the second his grandson , being a wilful , hot headed young prince , fell into all the errours of his great grand-father , and found the like , if not greater resistance from his nobility and people ; for when he had highly mis-governed the realm by the advice of his favourites , alexander arch-bishop of york , the duke of ireland , and others ; a parliament being called in the th year of his reign , the government of the kingdom was taken out of their hands , and committed to the bishops of canterbury , and ely , with thomas duke of gloucester , the king's uncle , richard earl of arundel , and thomas earl of warwick , and nine or ten other lords and bishops ; but notwithstanding this , the king being newly of age , refused to be governed by the said duke , and earls , but was carried about the kingdom by the said duke of ireland and others , to try what forces they could raise , and also to hinder the said duke and earls from having any access to him : but see what followed these violent , and arbitrary courses , as it is related by henry de knighton , who lived and wrote in that very time , and is more exact in this king's reign than any other historian ; he there tells us , that when thomas duke of gloucester , and the other bishops and earls now mentioned , sound they could not proceed in the government of the king and kingdom , according to the ordinance of the preceding parliament , through the hinderance of mich. de la poole , robert de vere , duke of ireland , nich. brembar , and robert tresillian chief justice , and others , who had seduced the king , and made him alienate himself from the council of the said lords , to the great damage of the kingdom ; whereupon the said duke of gloucester , and the lords aforesaid , with a great guard of knights , esquires , and archers , came up towards london , and quartered in the villages adjacent ; and then the arch-bishop of canterbury , the lord lovat , the lord cobham , the lord eures , with others , went to the king in the name of the the duke , and earls , and demanded all the persons above-mentioned to be banished as seducers , and traitors to the king ; and all the lords then swore upon the cross of the said arch-bishop , not to desist till they had obtained what they came for ; the conclusion of this meeting was , that the king not being able to withstand them , was forced immediately to call that remarkable parliament of the th year of his reign , in which mich. de la poole , and the duke of ireland were attainted , and tresillian , and divers other judges sentenced to be hanged at tyburn upon the impeachment of the said duke of gloucester , and the earl of arundel , for delivering their opinions contrary to law , and the articles the king had not long before proposed to them at nottingham . i shall omit the resistance which henry duke of lancaster made after his arrival by the assistance of the nobility and people of the north of england against the arbitrary government of this king , being then in ireland ; not only because it is notoriously known , but because it was carried on farther than perhaps it needed to have been , and ended in the deposition of this king. only in the first year of henry the th , there was the same act of indemnity almost word for word , passed for all those that had come over with that king , and had assisted him against richard the second , and his evil councellors , as was passed before in primo of edward the third . i shall not also insist upon the resistance of richard duke of york , in the reign of king henry the th , who took up arms against the evil government of the queen and her minion the duke of suffolk : because you may say , that this was justifiable by the duke of york as right heir of the crown ; nor will i instance in the resistance made by the two houses of parliament , during the late civil wars in the time of king charles the first , since it is disputed to this day , who was in the fault , and began this civil war , whether the king or the parliament : only thus much i cannot omit to take notice of , that the king in none of his declarations ever denied but that the people had a right to resist him in case he had made war upon them , or had introduced arbitrary government , and expresly owned in his answer to one of the parliaments messages , that they had a sufficient power to restrain tyranny , but denied himself to be guilty of it ; and still asserted that he took up arms in defence of his just right and prerogative , to the command of the militia of the kingdom , which they went about to take from him by force . m. i have with the greater patience hearkened to your history of resistance in all the kings reigns you have mentioned , because i cannot desire any better argument to prove the unlawfulness of such resistance , than those acts of pardon , and indemnity : you cannot but confess , have still followed it even when the barons proved most fortunate , as in that of henry the third , to the earl of gloucester , and those of his party ; and that of edward the first , to the constable and mareschal , and their followers ; nay , after the former kings had been unjustly deposed , we still find the actors and complices of such wicked actions , did not think themselves safe till they had an act of indemnity passed to them , of all the robberies and murders they had committed in the war , as your self have recited in the two acts of parliament in the reigns of edward the third , and henry the fourth . now if these resistances had not been downright rebellions in the eye of the law , to what purpose were these acts of indemnity passed , since no man needs a pardon , but rather merits a reward for defending the government establisht according to law ? f. in answer to this objection ( for which i am already prepared , since i foresaw you might make it ) pray give me leave to ask you whether you can find the words treason , rebellion , robbery , or murder , in any of these acts of pardon ? and if you cannot , whether you think treason , or murder , could be pardon'd by general words or not ; and the reason why i ask this question , is , because if they could not , then the consequence will be , that none of these parliaments supposed that the resistance that had been made , or all the other acts performed in pursuance of such resistance , were looked upon by those that had done them , no nor by the parliament it self , to be treason , rebellion , or murder , since certainly those that were actors in such resistances , and taking up of arms , having the power in their hands , would not have fail'd to have had those words inserted into those acts of indemnity , if they had supposed themselves guilty of those crimes . m. i cannot say that the words treason , and rebellion , or murder , are expresly mentioned in these statutes , since even the actors in them did not think it for their credits to own themselves to have been guilty of any such crimes ; yet all the particular words and expressions in these acts amount to the very same thing , for the taking up arms with one that is not king , against him that is , & the actually seizing upon his person , and keeping him in hold , was treason at common law before the statute of the th of edward the third ; and is not taking mens goods by force , and destroying their persons in time of peace , rebellion , and murder at common law ? so that if these were the facts , they had been guilty of ; and if these acts were treason , rebellion , robbery , and murder , then certainly all treasons , rebellions , robberies and murders are likewise pardoned by those statutes : and tho' 't is true , the law is now , that no pardon of treason or murder shall be good , unless those offences are particularly named ; yet this was so ordained by the statute of the th of richard the second , by which it is particularly provided , that no pardon shall be allowed before any justice for the death of a man , &c. treason , &c. unless the same murder , treason , &c. be specified in the said charter , before which statute sir edward coke in his second instit. tells us , that by the pardon of all felonies , treason was pardoned , and so was murder , &c. f. i cannot deny but that these facts you mention were treason , in strictness of law , before the making that statute ; yet does it not follow that even these may be in some cases justifiable ( as well as binding a king , when he is out of his wits ) if the publick peace of the kingdom , and preservation of the government according to the fundamental laws of the kingdom require it : thus for example ; suppose king iohn , after he had made actual war upon his barons and people , had happened to have his forces routed in the field , can any one believe that it had been unlawful for them to have secured his person to prevent his making a new war upon them ? and yet this by the letter of the law had been treason . now there are many actions , which in strictness of law are treason , yet being for the publick defence and security of the nation , deserve a pardon of course : thus if forein enemies should land in england , and a neighbouring nobleman or gentleman , who has no command over the militia of the countrey , should raise on the sudden such a force of his tenants and neighbours , as were sufficient to make ahead against them till the militia of the countrey could come in to their assistance ; tho' this taking up of arms without an express commission for it , be a high misdemeanour ; ( ●ay treason , according to your principles ) yet i suppose you will not deny but that the persons engaged in it , do not only deserve pardon , but thanks for their courage , and so speedy assistance of the government . and i remember i have read a famous instance of this kind , that when the traytors concerned in the powder-plot found themselves discovered , they fled into warwickshire , and thence into worcestershire , and were pursued and taken by the high sheriff of that county in staffordshire ; which tho' a great misdemeanour , since no sheriff can justifie carrying the posse comitatus out of the county ; yet this was so well taken ▪ that king iames the first rewarded him , and ( as i take it ) knighted him for his pains . but to apply this to the matter in dispute , tho' it is true , taking , and imprisoning the king's person is treason in the eye of the law ; yet ( as in the case of edward the second ) if the government could not be restored to its pristine state without that extremity , it must , and will ever deserve a pardon ; and therefore you see the parliament in the first of edward the third , not only pardons , but justifies the doing of it , because done for that end . so likewise the statute of the th of richard the second , chap. . not only indemnifies , but justifies the duke of gloucester , the earls , lords , and all others of his party , for taking up arms against the persons above-mentioned , tho' maintain'd and back'd by the king himself , as being done for the weal , and safeguard of the king● the maintenance of the crown , and salvation of the realm : so much for the point of making war against the king , and imprisoning his person ; so that if taking up arms for the safeguard of the king , and salvation of the kingdom , were just , and necessary to be done , the consequences of it , viz. the taking of mens goods , and killing of these that resist them , cannot be robbery , or murder , because done in a state of war ; which can never be carried on without such acts of hostility : and therefore you see in the act of pardon to the earl of gloucester , and to the londoners granted in parliament of the th of henry the third ( which i have now cited ) those that took part with th● king are as expresly pardoned , as those that were with the earl ; and in the like pardon to the constable and mareschal in the time of edward the first ( which i now also quoted ) those lords would not own they had transgressed ; but the words are only , etiam transgressiones si quas fecerit : so that since such reformations could not be brought about without violence and blood-shed ; and some irregularities , which in times of peace could not be justified by the strict letter of the law , it was but reason , that for the quieting of mens minds , and their future security , they should be indemnified for what they had done with so good an intent , and for the common good of the kingdom : but that such acts of pardon do not relate to the titles such kings had to the crown , but only to their being kings in the eye of the law , appears by a like act of pardon passed in parliament in the first of henry the seventh to pardon , and save harmless all those that came over with the king , and all that helped him to recover his just right to the kingdom against king richard the third , there called , that vsurper : so that you may see such acts of pardon do not concern the just titles of princes , nor the justice of the war , but are to quiet mens minds under the new government ; whereas those that took part with the usurper , were not pardoned , but left to the law , since the present government would not take care for their security that had obstructed its settlement . so the act of oblivion of the second of charles the second , tho' it pardons treasons expresly , yet it as well pardons the treasons of them that had commissions from king charles the first or second , as well as those that acted by commissions from other pretended authorities : so that you see in the judgment of this so modern a parliament , men might be supposed to be guilty of treason , tho' they had taken part with the king , and had acted by ●is commission , if the things commanded were illegal . m. i confess you have taken a great deal of pains to justifie taking up arms against , nay , imprisonment of our kings , when that which you call the preservation of the government requires it ; that is , when there is a ●action in the kingdom strong enough to make a disturbance ; for it was very well said by tacitus in the speech he makes for otho to the souldiers , to take up arms , and kill galba , then emperour , that it was in vain to speak more for the justification of that action ; quod laudari non potest nisi peractum : treasons , if successful , have never wanted a sufficient party in the nation to make up a parliament to countenance them , and to pardon , nay justifie all those that have been actors in them ; as we may see by those acts of indemnity you mention ; and therefore i am not the more convinced , that such resistance was lawful , notwithstanding those specious declarations of parliament , of their being made for the publick good , and preservation of the king and kingdom . but you have done very warily to pass by without any justification , the deposition of king edward the second , as also , that of the resistance ( as you call it ) of henry duke of lancaster against king richard the second ; as also his deposition , tho' done in parliament ; since all the proceedings against this king were repeal'd in parliament , in the first of edward the th , as appears by the parliament rolls of that king's reign , wherein the taking up arms against king richard by henry earl of derby , is said to be done contrary to his faith , and legiance , and his taking the crown called usurpation , and the killing of king richard his soveraign lord , termed ( as it justly deserved ) murder ▪ and tyranny , which does ( tho' not directly , yet ) by consequence , condemn his deposition too , since he is after that here called king ; and you do as warily pass by the late rebellious war of the long parliament against king charles the first , as also his horrid murder before his own gates ; because you know cry well , that this doctrine of resistance seldom stops with a bare reformation of what is amiss ; but commonly ends with the murder , or deposition of the king , or else driving him from his throne , as we now find it by woful experience in the person of our unfortunate king , who was so lately forced to quit this kingdom for the security of his person ; and therefore to put an end to this part of the dispute , the parliament of the th of king charles the second were so sensible of the great mischiefs that attended this rebellious doctrine , as having been the destruction of one of the best princes that ever reigned , and the occasion of the loss of so many brave men ; besides the ruine of so many great and noble families , that they were resolved to do their utmost to prevent it for the future ; and therefore the king and parliament in the th and th of king charles the second , passed those remarkable acts concerning the settlement of the militia in the king and his successors , to take away all dispute about it , tho' they declare it to have been his ancient right ; and therefore to take away all pretence for taking up arms either by the two houses of parliament , or any other person whatsoever ; they , in preamble to both these , that these acts thus expresly declare , forasmuch as within all his majesties realms and dominions the sole supreme government , command and disposition of the militia , and of all forces by sea and land , and of all forts and places of strength is , and by the law of england over was the undoubted right of his majesties and his royal predecessors , king and queens of england ; and that both , or either houses of parliament cannot , nor ought to pretend to the same , nor can lawfully raise , or ●evy war offensive or defensive , against his majesty , his heirs ▪ or lawful successors ; and yet the contrary hereof hath of late been practised almost to the ruine and destruction of this kingdom ; and during the late usurped governments , many evil and rebellious principles have been distilled into the minds of the people of this kingdom , which unless prevented , may break ●orth to the disturbance of the peace and quiet thereof , &c. and in pursuance of this statute , it was likewise ordained by the authority aforesaid , in the d statute for the militia in the th year of the same king , wherein not only the same preamble is recited verbatim , as before in the former statute , but it is also enacted , that no person , ( no not a peer of the realm ) shall be capable of acting as lieutenant , deputy lieutenant , officer , or souldier , by vertue of this act , unless after the oaths of allegiance and supremacy they take this oath following ; viz. i a. b. do declare and believe , that it is not lawful upon any pretence whatsoever , to take arms against the king ; and that i do abhor that traitors position , that arms may be taken by his authority against his person , or against those that are commissioned by him in pursuance of such military commissions ; and it is also to be noted , that all mayors of cities , or other corporations , were obliged by a former statute of the th of this king to take the same oath : from both which statutes , and declaration , we may draw these conclusions ; first , that the militia ( i. e. the command of all military forces and war-like affairs ) are declared to be wholly in the king. secondly , that either , or both houses of parliament cannot make any war offensive or defensive against him , &c. pray mark that . thirdly , that the contrary practice hath tended almost to the destruction of this kingdom , and that many evil and rebellious principles ( whereof this without doubt is intended for the chief ) have been instilled into the minds of the people , &c. and lastly , that in pursuance thereof , all persons above-mentioned were not only obliged to renounce taking up arms against the king upon any pretence whatsoever ; but also against any that shall be authoriz'd by the king 's military commissions , without any exceptions . and it is farther enacted , that all clergy-men should be obliged to take this oath as well as the laity ; and it is likewise there ordained , that all clergy-men who were to enjoy any livings or preferments in the church , were likewise for the space of twenty years next ensuing , obliged to subscribe this declaration ; so that it is no wonder if the loyal clergy of the church of england , think themselves not only tied by the express rules of scripture , but also by the laws of the land , strictly to observe this great law of passive obedience , and non-resistance : now pray see here the doctrine of non-resistance in its full amplitude ; yea , this very doctrine declared to be the law of this kingdom , and that by two express acts of parliament . and can you think the two houses were not in earnest when they made this declaration ; surely had they not been so , they had been very ridiculous to jest with all our laws and liberties , had they not been , i say , verily perswaded of the truth of this doctrine by law as well as by scripture : so that i hope you must now be forced to confess , that even our own representatives have solemnly renounc'd for themselves and the whole nation , all right of resistance , so much as defensive , against those commissioned by the king , upon any pretence or occasion whatsoever ; and we have left us nothing whereby to defend our selves against our kings , or those commissioned by them ( no not if they never so much abuse their power ) but the old primitive artillery of preces , and lachryma . f. as for what you have more than once said , that this doctrine of resistance , if carried home , always ends in the deposition ▪ and murder of the king , tho' it hath i grant sometimes happened , yet that has not been always so , but most often to the contrary , as appears in those resistances that were made in the reigns of king richard the first , henry the third , edward the first , and divers times in edward , and richard the second's reign , before things were driven to that extremity , as they afterwards were ; and as i will not justifie the deposition of those princes , tho' done by parliament , yet will i not absolutely condemn them , since no act of parliament hath , as i know , ever done it : and tho' it is true , all the proceedings in parliament against edward the second , are taken off the rolls , yet was it not done by order of parliament , but by richard the d alone , when he by his exorbitant courses feared to be served after the same manner ; but that there was in those times some ancient law extant , which was also destroyed by that king , appears by that remarkable declaration of the lords and commons in parliament , sent by way of message to the king ( then wilfully absenting himself from the parliament ) by the duke of gloucester his uncle , and the bishop of ely , who sure were too great to tell so notorious a lye : the speech you will find at large in knyghton , beginning thus ; domine r●x . and after many petitions , and good advices , at last thus concludes ; which i shall give you in latine , — sed & unum aeliud : de animo nostro superest nobis ex parte populi vestri vobis intimare , habint enim ex antiquo statuto , & de facto non longe retroactis temporibus experienter quod dolendum est habito , si rex maligno consilio quocunque , vel inepta con●●macia aut contemptu , seu protervae voluntate singulari , aut quovis modo irregulari se alienaverit à populo suo , nec voluerit per jura regni , & statuta , & laudabiles ordinationes cum salubri consilio dominorum , & procerum regni , gubernari , & regulari , sed captios● in suis in●anis confiliis propriam voluntatem suam singularem proterve exercere , tunc licitu● est iis cum com●uni assensu populi regni , ipsum regem de regali solio abrogare & propinquiorem aliquem de stirpe regis loco ejus in regni solio sublimare . from whence you may observe , that the lords here relate to an ancient statute or law then in being , tho' the execution of it on the person of his great grand-father edward the second , was but of times not long passed ; and that king richard might as well destroy the record of that law , being not then commonly known , or in private mens hands , as well as he did divers other records , as appears in the th article against this king , wherein it is set forth , that the said king had caused the rolls of the records touching the state , and government of this kingdom to be defaced and razed , to the great prejudice of his people , and the disinherison of the said realm , &c. so that nothing is more certain , than that the two houses of parliament , at that time , did look upon it as their undoubted right to depose the king in case he violated the fundamental laws and constitutions of the kingdom ; tho' how this could consist with that power which the king then exercised , of calling and dissolving parliaments at his pleasure , i do not understand , since it can never be supposed that a king , if in full power , would permit a parliament , called in his name to sit , to depose himself for evil government . as for the resistance made by the two houses against king charles the first , i shall not undertake to justifie , for the reasons already given ; as also because it it was not a war undertaken by the general consent of the whole kingdom , but carried on chiefly by the puritan or presbyterian party : for tho' the city of london , and many other great towns were for the parliament ; yet it is also certain , that the major part of the nobility and gentry of england fought for the king , and were so considerable a number , as to make an anti-parliament at oxford ; so that this war could never have happened , had not the king parted with the power of disobeying of the parliament out of his hands ; much less will i justifie the murder of this king , or of any others above-mentioned , as being no necessary consequences of that resistance i only allow for lawful , viz. that of the whole or major part of the nation ; nor were edw. the second , or richard the second put to death by any act or order of parliament , but were murdered in prison ; and the murderers of edward the second were afterwards attainted by act of parliament , and executed as they deserved : but as for the murder of king charles the first , it is not to be taken into this account , it being not done by the authority of the lords and commons in parliament , but by a factious rump or fag-end of the house of commons , who fate by the power of the army ; after far the major part of the members who were for the king were shut out of doors , and the lords voted useless and dangerous . m. i confess you have made as good an apology for these actions as the matter will bear ; but that neither of the two houses can at this day have any coercive power over the king , or to call him to an account for any thing he has done , appears by the express declaration of both houses in the statute of the th of charles the second , as also in those but now cited , in which they utterly disclaim all making war , whether offensive or defensive against his majesty ; much less can he be subject to any other coercive or vindictive power , or ought any ways to be resisted by private persons ; therefore supposing i should grant ( as i do not ) that the parliaments had formerly a power of deposing of their kings , or that the clergy , nobility and people had formerly a right of taking up arms against the king in case of notorious tyranny , and misgovernment ; yet is all such resistance expresly renounced , and declared unlawful by the oath and declarations now cited ; so that tho' in the dark times of popery such resistance might be counted lawful , not only by laity , but also by the bishops and clergy , who ought to have taught the people better doctrine ; yet i think it had been much better for the nation to have endur'd the worst that could have happen'd from the tyranny of kings , than to have transgrest the rules of the gospel , and the constant doctrine of the primitive church by resistance , and rebellion against the supreme power of the nation . f. i shall not now maintain that the two houses of parliament have any authority at this day to depose the king , or maintain a war against him , upon any account ; yet that they have still a power to judge of the king's actions , whether consonant to law or not , and whether he has not broke the fundamental constitutions of the kingdom , is no where given up , as i know of : but that resistance in some cases is not contrary to the doctrine of the gospel , i have already proved , and that it was not directly contrary to the laws of the land before these statutes , you do partly grant . but since the main strength of your cause , lies in this oath appointed by these acts of parliament , therefore if i can give a satisfactory account of the true meaning and sense of these acts , to be otherwise than you suppose , i hope you will grant that resistance may still be lawfully made by the whole body of the people in the cases i have now put , against any persons , who under colour and pretence of the king's commission should violently assault their persons in the free exercise of their religion , as it is by law established , or should go about to invade● their just liberties , and properties , which the fundamental laws of england have conferr'd upon every free-born subject of it . and in order to the clearer proof of this , i shall make use of this method : i shall first explain the terms of this declaration , and then i shall proceed to shew you that in a legal sense all defensive arms , or resistance of the king's person in some cases , or of those commissioned by him is not forbidden , nor intended to be forbid by these statutes and declarations : first then ; by taking arms against the king , is certainly meant no more than making war against the king , according to the statute of the th of edward the third , which declares making war against the king to be treason , and this is unlawful upon any pretence whatsoever . secondly , the clause by his authority against his person , is only to be understood of the king 's legal authority ; and by his person is meant his natural , and politick person when acting together , for the same ends , as i shall shew you by and by : so that both these statutes are but declaratory of the ancient common law of england against taking up arms , and making war against the king , and do not introduce any new law concerning this matter ; so that whatever was treason by the statute of the th of edward the third , is treason by these statutes , and no more ; viz. all taking up arms , or actual making war against the king in order to kill , depose , or imprison him , &c. as sir edward coke shews us in his third institut . in his notes upon this statute ; yet notwithstanding after this statute of the th of edward the third , the clergy , nobility and people of england assembled in parliament , did suppose it still lawful to take up arms against those illegally commissioned by the king in case of notorious misgovernment and breach of the fundamental laws of the nation , as appears by that general resistance made by reason of the evil government of the duke of ireland , and those concerned with him , in the th of richard the second , which , as i have already proved , was allowed for lawful by act of parliament , and consequently by the king 's own consent , without which it could never have been so declared : the like i may say for that resistance which was made in king henry the sixth's reign by richard duke of york , and the earls and barons of his party agaist the evil government of the queen , and the duke of sommerset , who governed all affairs in an arbitrary , and yet unsuccessful manner , by reason of the easiness and weakness of king henry : but tho' this resistance was also approved of in the next parliament of the d year of this king , yet i shall not so much insist upon it , because i know you will alledge that this was made by the lawful heir of the crown against an usurper , since the crown was not long after adjudged to be his right , tho' king henry was allowed to wear it during his life ; yet however it shews the opinion of the clergy , nobility and people of england at that time concerning the lawfulness of such resistance , before this declaration of the estates of the kingdom concerning the legality of the duke of york's title was made in the parliament above-mentioned . thirdly , that the parliament by these statutes of the th of charles the second for the militia , never intended thereby to enable , or leave it in the power of that king or his successors , to make this kingdom an absolute despotick monarchy instead of a limited one , as they must have done , had they declared that the king , and those commissioned by him , might do what they pleased with the religion , lives , liberties , and estates of the people of this nation , and that it was treason to resist in any case whatsoever ; sure they could not but remember that commission of sir phelim oneals , in the year — . whereby he pretended to be impowered , to drive the english protestants out of ireland , and to set up the popish religion in that kingdom , and restore the irish to their estates ; and sure divers of them could not be unmindful that this was to give away all right of self-defence in case any future king should by his own innate tyrannical temper , or the evil counsel of wicked men be perswaded to use force upon the persons of the lords and commons , either whilst they were actually sitting , or in their passage to the new houses , since by this act or oath , if understood in your sense , they must have barred themselves , and the whole nation , of all right of self-defence , in any case whatsoever , tho' of the greatest extremity ; and therefore i doubt not , but the intent of this parliament was to leave things as they found them ; and as it was absolutely unlawful for the people of this nation to take up arms against the king , so it is also as unlawful in him , or those commissioned by him , to make war upon the people , or to disseize them by force of their religion , just rights , liberties or estates ; and if the king hath a right to defend himself , and his crown and dignity against rebellion , so must the people of this nation have a right likewise to defend themselves against arbitrary power , in case of an invasion of any of the fundamental rights above-mentioned ; or else all bounds between a limited and despotick power will be quite taken away , and the king may make himself as absolute as the king of france , or great turk whenever he pleases . m. i will not dispute with you about bare matter of fact , or that a prevailing faction might not in turbulent times , and during the reigns of weak and ill advised princes , take upon them by force of arms to remove evil counsellors , and to put the government of the kingdom in what hands they pleased , and then procure acts of parliament to indemnifie themselves for so doing ; yet i cannot allow that even such acts could make it lawful to take up arms against the king , or those commissioned by him , upon any pretence whatsoever : so that tho' i grant that the intent of this parliament of king charles the second , was not to make any new law against resistance , or taking up arms against the king , yet was it their design so to explain the ancient statute of the th of edward the third , that none should for the future doubt in the least , that all taking up arms , or resistance of the king , or those commissioned by him , upon any pretence whatsoever , was unlawful and treasonable ; and for this we need go no farther than the very words of these declarations , which the parliaments of the th and th of charles the second have made concerning this matter ; as first , in the statute of the th of car. . cap. . for attainting the regicides , that two houses of parliament expresly declared , that by the fundamental laws of this kingdom , neither the peers of this realm , nor the commons , nor both together in parliament , nor the people collectively , or representatively , nor any other persons whatsoever , ever had , hath , or ought to have any coercive power over the persons of the kings of this realm : whereby not only all the traiterous examples of the depositions , and imprisonments of king edward , and richard the second , are expresly condemned , but also all taking arms to force the king to redress our grievances , whether he will or not : and farther , that all arms , whether offensive or defensive , are expresly forbid . pray mind that clause in the preamble to these acts of the militia i now mentioned , wherein that parliament expresly renounces all taking up arms , as well defensive as offensive , against the king ; and the words of the oath it self are yet more strict , that it is not lawful upon any pretence whatsoever , to take up arms against the king : now can any thing be plainer than that all defensive arms , tho' for our religion , lives and liberties , or whatsoever else you please , are expresly declared to be against the fundamental laws of this kingdom . but as for the dreadful consequences of this law , if never so strictly taken , they are not so bad as you are pleased to fancy ; for as to your instance of sir phelim oneal's pretended commission from king charles the first , you may be very well satisfied , that it was a notorious piece of forgery , since besides that good king 's constant denial of any such commission granted by him , sir phelim , when he came to suffer in ireland , for raising that horrid rebellion , did voluntarily at the gallows acknowledge , that he had forged it himself , by putting the seal of an old patent which he had by him to that pretended commission you now mention : nor indeed can it ever enter into my head , that any king should grant a commission to destroy or make war upon his people as long as they continue in their duty to him , tho' of a different religion from himself ; tho' perhaps he may think fit for some reasons , to disarm them , or deny them the publick exercise of their religion , or render them uncapable of bearing any offices of publick trust in the kingdom ; but if these should be lawful causes of resistance , why the papists should not be allowed it as well as the protestants , i can see no reason to the contrary . as for your other instance , that the parliament by renouncing all defensive arms , must be supposed likewise to give up all right of self-defence in case the king , or any commissioned by him should use any violence to the persons of the lords and commons assembled in parliament , or in going thither , this is so unlikely , and remote a case , that it hardly comes under the consideration of a bare possibility : but however , let the worst that can be happen , i am very well satisfied that the parliament was then so thoroughly convinced of the mischiefs had befallen this nation by this republican doctrine of resistance , having been the cause of the destruction of the best constituted church and government in the world ; as also of the murder of one of the best princes that ever reigned , that they were resolved rather to trust to the coronation oaths , and innate goodness of our present and future kings , than to suppose any war could be lawfully made against them , upon any account whatsoever , which would have been expresly contrary not only to the doctrine of the church of england , but the known laws of the land. f. i do not deny but the persons of the kings and queens of this realm , are , and ought to be sacred , and inviolable , and yet no man will therefore say , that they are irresistible too in all cases whatsoever ; as if the king ( for example ) should attempt to ravish women , or rob , or murder men upon the high-way , or in the streets , as the ancient historians relate of nero and commodus the emperours , and as is reported of the last king of portugal , and which was one of the reasons of the estates of the kingdom removing him from the government : and as our henry the fifth is related by our historians to have robbed men upon the high-way before he was king ; so if he had gone about to continue the same frollick after he came to the crown ; i do believe his person , and all those that robbed by his commission , had not been irresistible ; nor would it have been treason within the statute of the th of edward the third , tho' he was then actually king , any more than it would have been treason had the like happened when he was prince , tho' he was expresly within that statute , and yet this would not have contradicted the parliament● declaration in the th of car. the d . that neither the parliament nor the people having coercive power over the persons of the kings of this realm ; since by coercive power must be here understood , his being subject to the penalties of the law , or being called to an account by any ordinary jurisdiction ; but there is a vast difference between that , and resistance for self defence , since i may use this against the violence of my father in the state of nature , as i have already proved ; tho' i cannot justifie the punishment of my father , or calling him to an account as his superiour ; therefore it is only in the king 's politick capacity that he can be said to do no wrong , since you see he may personally commit the greatest crimes imaginable , tho' his person is unaccountable for want of a superiour power to call him to an account ; yet is it not so with those who act by his illegal commissions or commands , since having delegated the executive part of his regal power to his subordinate ministers , and officers ; 't is they that are accountable and punishable too by the law of the land in case they any way transgress , or violate it , by his illegal commissions or commands , as i shall prove more at large by and by . and as no war properly so called can be made against a single person , but against a man as he is aided or assisted by many others : so this war against the king can only be interpreted of such wars or rebellion as are made against him in his politick capacity as he is king , and supream governour of the realm , and the commander of all the militia thereof to legal intents , and for the defence thereof against forein or domestick enemies ; nor was there any great fear according to the ancient legal constitution of this kingdom , that this could often fall out , or indeed he put in practice by the kings of this realm , if we consider the ancient form of ordering the forces , or militia of this kingdom . for in the first place i desire you to observe , that by the common law of england before these acts of the militia , the king himself could not but in case of invasion or insurrection levy or keep on foot any standing forces in england , unless for forein succours , which was usually by contract with some great lord or other person , or by tenure against the scotch and welch ; and as for the militia , it was never reduced into troops , companies , or regiments , till the spanish invasion , as will appear by all acts of parliament in the statutes at large where acts for the assize of arms were made only for men , to provide and have in readiness such horses and arms , to shew them before the king's commissioners when they should be required to take view of them , a regimented militia , being of no elder date than queen elizabeth . king iames the first did by act of parliament in the first year of his reign repeal all former acts for assize of arms , and never established any thing in 〈◊〉 thereof . so it stood till king charles the seconds time , that these new acts for the militia wer made . and ( to confirm this point beyond all dispute ) in all the quarrels between the king and the barons , and york and lancaster , the parliament still refused to meet unless the forces were disbanded that were raised upon those occasions . nor had any king standing forces or guards , till king henry the seventh● time , when that of the yeomen was settled by a special act of parliament ; and what is most remarkable , the commons in the long parliament of charles the second did by their votes entered upon their journals declare and assert , that by law no armed force could be kept up in time of peace , except the militia ; and as for foreign succours , they were obliged to be carried immediately to the port of their discharge , and were not to exceed one month at furthest from the time of their first muster ; as for castles and forts within the realm , they were all supplied and defended by tenures ; but for the militia , of old time , it was in the sheriffs of the counties to make use thereof for the execution of the laws , and defence of the kingdom , except in the cases aforesaid ; and it was treason for any subject to levy souldiers , except by the king's commission , and in the cases aforesaid ; or so much as to ride or go arm'd , as may appear by the statute of northampton , in the d of edward the third ; much less was it lawful for them to take up arms , unless in their own defence against illegal violence , and in such manner as the law directs ; and it was one of the articles that was adjudged to be treason in parliament against mortimer , that he rid armed to parliaments , and threatned the prelates and peers that did any thing against his will , and caused the king to make war on his nobles , who advised the king to levy war upon his subjects . see coke's th institutes title council-board , where the th article against the spencers is , that they falsly and maliciously had counselled the king to raise horse and arms in destruction of the good people , against the form of magna charta , and so by their evil counsel would have moved war within the realm to the destruction of holy church and of the people for their proper quarrel ; so that taking arms by the king against his subjects , and the subjects against the king , was both alike against law. ly , that taking arms against the king in construction of law , is levying war ; but this by no means extends to defensive arms in maintenance of the law , which is allowed and enjoyned ; and that nothing else was here mean , is plain , since by the subsequent words in this oath it is restrained to the taking arms by his authority against his person , or those commissioned by him ▪ which shews that nothing here is intended to be forbidden , but taking up offensive arms upon popular pretences without and against the authority of the law , which is further explained in another test by the authority of both houses of parliament . thirdly , 't is observable , this is but a test upon some that were to come into offices , and can by no means make any change in the ancient law , which cannot be changed by implication ; nor does this amount to so much ; the first part of this oath requiring only that the party admitted into office , shall so declare and believe , ; and tho' the second clause call it a traiterous position , yet this is restrained only to these two particulars , that arms may not be taken up by the king's authority against his person , or those commissioned by him , which can have reference to nothing but that distinction taken up in the late times of civil war , when the parliament pretended to take arms , and grant commissions in the name of king and parliament , by vertue of that authority which they supposed he left with them at westminster ; so that this clause can by no means exclude any arms made use of for legal defence according to law. fourthly and lastly ; tho' the words against those commissioned by him may seem to extend the matter further , and is mistaken by some , as if ●t required at least passive obedience to all commissions of the king , tho' never so illegal ; yet there is not the least colour for it , since nothing is a commission but the king 's legal command or authority pursuant to some law , and for putting the same in execution , which is the legal definition of a commission ; and when this test was first brought in to the second parliament of king charles the d , and that the word legal was offered to be added to the bill ; upon a long debate it was only left out , because it was declared by all the lawyers in the house , ( even by sir hen. finch , then the king's sollicitor ) and agreed to by the whole house , that it was clearly implied , and could bear no other construction , but that all illegal commissions were null , and void , and in no legal sense could be called commissions ; so that taking up arms in the defence of the law , and pursuant thereunto , cannot in any wise be called a taking arms against the king's person , or those commissioned by him ; and farther that by the words , in pursuance of such military commissions are meant such as are warranted by that act , & such as the king may issue , by his royal authority which is bounded by law , and consequently cannot grant any commissions , but what are according to law ; so that if these commissions are granted to persons utterly disabled by law to take them , as all are that will not take the test appointed by the act of the th of k. charles the second , intituled , an act to prevent the dangers that may arise from popish recusants ; as also all commissions to do any illegal , violent action , are absolutely void , and consequently may be resisted ; or else our magna charta , with all the other laws that establish liberty and property , as also our very religion it self established by law , may be either undermined by the king 's new dispensing power , or else subverted by open force ; and every commission ▪ officer in a red coat , will be as sacred , and irresistible as the king himself . but to conclude ; that the instances i have given , that the king's commission may be abused to the destruction of the nation , nay of the whole parliament , are not so unlikely and remote as you imagine . pray let me put you in 〈◊〉 , that as for that pretended commission to sir phelim oneal , tho' it is true , it did prove afterwards to be forged , yet was it not known to be so till long after ; and therefore having all the signs of a true commission under the king 's great seal , the poor protestants in ireland were to have had their throats cut according to this oath , before ever they could be satisfied whether it were true or not : but that a popish king persecuting and destroying his protestant subjects only for matters of religion , is not so improbable a thing as you would have it ; the french king 's late dragooning , imprisoning , and sending to the gallies all that refused to renounce heresie , ( as they call it , ) and subscribe to the articles of the romish religion , has given us but too sad , and recent an example ; and how you can assure me that the king acting upon these very principles , and being governed by like confessors , will never do the same things , i should be glad to receive some better satisfaction than his bare word to the contrary . nor yet is my other instance of its being left according to your doctrine in the king's power to make a violent assault upon the persons both of the lords and commons assembled in parliament , whenever he pleased , without any resistance whatsoever , so remote and improbable as you are pleased to make it ; since you may find it still upon record among the articles exhibited in parliament against robert de vere , duke of ireland , robert tresilian chief justice , and sir nicholas brembur in the parliament of the th of richard the second , ( which i have already mentioned ) the th article of which was , that they by their false council had caused the king to command the said nicholas , being then mayor of london , suddenly to rise with a great power to kill and put to death the said lords ; ( viz. thomas duke of gloucester , and the other lords there named ) and the commons ( viz. of the parliament of the th of this king ) who were not of their party and conspiracy ; for the doing of which wickedness , the said grand traitors above-said were parties and presents to the destruction of the king , and his realm : so that if this treason had not been discovered , and that no private persons might then resist those commissioned by the king , it would have been treason according to your principles , for the said lords and commons , to have resisted those that were thus sent to assault them , and take away their lives ; and what hath once happened , 't is not impossible but it may happen again . and we may remember how about little more than years since that the k. of denmark shut up the senators , and nobility of the great council of that kingdom in coppenhagen , and threatned them with death , or imprisonment if they refused to give up all their liberties , and from an elective king make him and his successors absolute hereditary monarchs , as they are at this day by means of the bishops and clergy of that kingdom , who then basely gave up , and betrayed the liberty of their countrey ; and what they have now got by it , they best know ; therefore this is a thing to be considered as a necessary consequence of your sense of this oath : so that upon the whole matter , and considering the late scene of affairs , i darst leave it to the judgment of any indifferent foreiner , tho' a papist , which was most likely before the unexpected coming of the prince of orange into this kingdom , that the people should rise up in arms , and expel the king from his throne , or that he should by vertue of the pretended sense of this oath , backt by your doctrine of passive obedience , have enslaved this nation , and set up what government and religion he pleased . m. i must confess you have given a very cunning , and specious gloss upon the words of this oath , and declaration of the parliament of king charles the second ; but whether it is legal or not , i very much doubt , since i never heard of it before ; and i could have wisht , that if they designed not to lay a snare upon mens consciences in this great point , that they would have been more clear in expressing all those cases wherein it might be lawful for us to resist the king , or those commissioned by him ; as also who should judge when the king's commissions are so illegal and violent as to require resistance ; for if every private subject may judge of the legality , or illegality of the king 's military commissions , and can raise a party strong enough to make opposition against those that are commissioned by them in the execution of the king's orders , a discontented party of this nation may soon find a pretence to raise another rebellion , and civil war as dreadful as the former ; and notwithstanding your great care and concern for the king's person , which you grant to be sacred and inviolable , could it long continue so ; for if the king himself appeared at the head of his men to command , and encourage them in their duty , it would be much worse , as long as the matter they took up arms for , should be by them accounted a violation of the laws . thus we may remember , that tho' the parliament of — . did pretend to take up arms for defence of the king's person , and only to take away evil councellors ; yet did they for all that , order their generals and officers to fight a● much when the king was personally present , as at any other place or time ; so that his majesties person ( had not god thought fit to order it otherwise ) might have been as well destroyed in the battles of edg-hill , or naseby , as his great grand-father king iames the third of scotland was in that battle against his rebellious subjects headed by his own son : so that according to your interpretation , instead of mending the matter , this parliament of king charles the second had only left it far worse than they found it : for whereas the long parliament made themselves the sole judges , and redressers of the king's violations of the peoples rights : now according to your interpretation of this oath , and declaration of the parliament of king charle●'s the second , every private man may not only judge of the king's violation of the law by his military commissions , but also make resistance against them when-ever they think themselves able so to do ; and then notwithstanding , that parliament utter renouncing all arms , whether offensive , or defensive , to be raised by themselves against the king , they would have still left a power in any part of the people strong enough to make this resistance which they had renounced for themselves , who are their lawful representatives . thus for example , supposing the last civil war had begun upon the account of raising of ship money , which whether it was lawful , i will not now dispute ; it was sufficient that all the judges except two gave their opinions for it ; and if any county in england strong enough to make an insurrection , had rose in arms upon the levying of this tax ( as it has several times happened even about taxes granted in parliament ) this tax ( tho' small ) yet being lookt upon against law , must have engaged the whole nations in a civil war , and also endangered his majesties person in case he had appeared in the field with those men he had raised to subdue that rebellion ; so that i am still satisfied that it is far better to suffer a mischief than an inconvenience ; that is , it is better to trust to the king's conscience , and discretion , what commissions to grant , tho' sometimes perhaps they may chance to be illegal , than to leave it in the power of the people to rise in rebellion when-ever they think such commissions to violate their supposed , or pretended liberties and properties . f. i see you will not argue against the resistance of the king's person in case he should go about to ravish , rob , or murder his people : but now you raise another difficulty who shall judge , and consequently make this resistance against the king's commissions , when executed by illegal persons , to illegal and violent ends ; for if the people may judge for themselves of the illegality of such commissions , a rebellion may be raised , and his majesties person endangered , notwithstanding all the provision the parliament have made against it . but before i answer this argument of yours , pray give me leave to ask you one or two questions ; do you think the king 's late declaration for the dispensing power , and the commissions granted thereupon to be according to law or not ? m. i must confess i think they are unlawful , yet it does not follow that they may be therefore resisted . f. i do not ask you that now ; but only tell me whether you think the bishops are obliged in conscience to disperse that declaration , or the clergy to read it in their churches ? and whether those have done well who have refused to read it ? m. i must tell you , i am so good a protestant , and so true an englishman , that i cannot allow the king that power ; and therefore i must grant that the bishops did nobly , and like true christian bishops to refuse to disperse it ; and where it was dispersed the inferiour clergy have done very well not to read it . f. well then , notwithstanding all the dreadful mischiefs proceeding from private subjects juding of the legality , or illegality of the king's declarations , and commissions , or commands ; yet they may , it seems , not only judge whether they are lawful , or not ; but a disobedience to them may not only be lawfully exercised , but is very commendable : now what is this disobedience to these commands , but a moral , or civil resistance of the king's power in this matter ? and why may not such a judgment he made by the people in as plain a case , and also resistance follow thereupon against such violent illegal commissions ( suppose to raise money without act of parliament , or to dragoon men to go to mass ) since the violence is more evident and apparent in this case upon mens persons , than in the other upon the bare consciences of the bishops and clergy ? for the force being more immediate , and pressing upon their persons and estates , there is no other means left but to resist it if they are able . m. i can give you very good reasons to satisfie you , why , tho' i grant private subjects , may judge of the legality or illegality of the king's commissions , and also refuse to obey his illegal commands , and also that all publick officers ought to take care at their peril how they act by or execute such illegal commissions ; yet that it does not therefore follow that such illegal commissions or orders though executed upon the whole body of the people , may be resisted by them ; for all limitation of the royal power being only voluntary , and proceeding from the meer grace , and favour of our kings , they are not compellable by force , or resistable if they should impose their own proclamations , or edicts upon us instead of laws . for tho' i grant that the king hath no just , or legal authority to act against law , and that if he knowingly put any subject to death contrary to law he is a murderer ; and no prince can have any such prerogative , as to commit open downright murders ; either in his own person or by those who act by commission from him ; but what follows from hence ? that they may resist or oppose them if they do . this i absolutely deny , because god and the law have commanded us , not to resist , and i see no inconsistency between those two propositions ; that a king hath no authority to act against law , and yet that neither he , nor those commissioned by him though acting against law may be resisted . both the law of god , and the laws of our countrey suppose these two to be very consistent . for notwithstanding the possibility that princes may thus abuse their power , and transgress the laws whereby they ought to govern , yet they also command subjects in no case to resist , and it is not sufficient to justifie resistance if princes do what they have no just authority to do , unless we have also a just authority to resist , he who exceeds the just bounds of this authory is lyable to be called to an account for it , but he is accountable only to those who have a superior authority to call him to an account . no power whatsoever is accountable to an inferior , for this is a contradiction to the very notion of power , and destructive of all order and civil government . inferior magistrates are on all hands acknowledged to be lyable to give an account of the abuse of their power , but to whom must they give an account ? not to their inferiors , not to the people whom they are to govern , but to superior magistrates , or to the soveraign prince who governs all . thus the soveraign prince may exceed his authority , and is accountable for it to a superior power ; but because he hath no superior power on earth , he cannot be resisted by his own subjects , but must be reserved to the judgment of god who alone is the king of kings . f. in the first place i deny ( and i have sufficiently proved the contrary ) that all limitation of royal power proceeded at first from the meer grace , and favour of our kings , since the crown of england , has been from its first institution limitted by laws , and the people have likewise always enjoyed a property in their lives , liberties and estates by the same laws : tho' i grant , you and i are thus far agreed , that the king hath no just and and legal authority to act against law , and that if he put any man to death , or take away his estate contrary to it , it is murder , and robbery : and likewise that the subjects may be capable of judging concerning such illegal commands ; but you will not allow , that if such a limitted monarch should send his mercenary forces to take away our estates , or to dragoon us till we will own our selves of his religion , that those instruments of his tyranny may be resisted ; or that i have brought any reason for it . whereas if you had but attended better to my discourse at our d and th meetings , you might have remembred that i plainly enough proved to you , that god hath not given princes , nor those commissioned by them , any authority to murder , or enslave their subjects ; and your self then granted , that every man hath power to defend his life against him who hath no authority to take it away ; which holds more strongly in our constitution ; where if the king give a man a commission to act contrary to the law of the land , it is altogether void , and the people may as well justifie their resistance of those officers , or souldiers who should come to dragoon , or persecute them , for professing the religion established by law , as if he had sent them downright to cut their throats ; and this being their right by the laws of god , and nature , whether god hath taken away this right by any express precept in the holy scripture , i also examined at those meetings ; but whether any municipal law of the land hath restrained us from it , i have also now considered , and proved it contrary to the true intent and meaning of these acts concerning the militia . and therefore to say , that it is not sufficient to justifie resistance if princes do , or command what they have no legal authority for , unless we can also shew an authority to resist , is a mistake , if by authority you mean an express civil law for it , because such resistance in absolute monarchies is justifiable by that which is prior to all civil laws , the right of self-defence , or preservation : and so likewise in limited kingdoms there is the same necessity of defensive arms upon a general breach , or violation of any fundamental constitution of the government , since it cannot be kept , or maintained without such resistance be allowed . so that if the king hath no authority to act contrary to law , he cannot sure delegate that to others , which he had not in himself ; and consequently such commissions to persecute , or murder men contrary to law , being in themselves void , the persons that execute them being no officers , may be justly resisted , and the resistance of such an illegal act doth not at all derogate from his soveraignty as king , since ( as i told you before ) that is limited only to the performance of legal acts , and extends not to illegal orders , or commands ; and as for the rest of the reasons you give against this resistance , viz. because he who exceeds the just bounds of his authority , is liable to be called to an account for it , only by those who have a superiour authority to do it ; whereas no power whatsoever is accountable to an inferiour : you do but impose upon me and your self , the same fallacy which you have so often made use of , in making , being accountable , all one , with irresistible , which are vastly different , and therefore your conclusion is as false , that because the soveraign prince may exceed his authority , and is only accountable for it to god ; that therefore he cannot be resisted by his own subjects ; for he may be resisted , and yet be still unaccountable , those two differing as must us self-defence does from punishment , as i have more than once told you . m. i cannot rest satisfied with this reply ; for though i so far agree with you , that an act without a legal authority carries no obligation at all along with it , and therefore cannot oblige the subject to obedience : now this is true , if by obedience you mean an active obedience ; for i am not bound to do an ill thing , or an illegal action , because my prince commands me ; but if you mean passive obedience , it is as manifestly false ; for i am bound to obey , that is , not to resist my prince when he offers me the most unjust and illegal violence . nay it is very false and absurd to say , that every illegal is an inauthoritative act , which carries no obligation with it . this is contrary to the practice of all human judicatures , and the daily experience of men , who suffer in their lives , bodies , or estates , by an unjust , or illegal sentence . every judgment contrary to the true meaning of the law is in that sense illegal ; and yet such illegal judgments have their authority , and obligation , till they are rescinded by some higher authority . this is the true reason of appeals from inferiour to superiour courts , to rectifie illegal proceedings , and reverse illegal judgments , which supposes , that such illegal acts have authority till they are made null , and void by a higher power : and if the higher powers , from whence lies no appeal , confirm and ratifie an unjust , and illegal sentence ; it carries so much authority , and obligation with it , that the injured person hath no redress , but must patiently submit , and thus it must necessarily be , or there can be no end of disputes , nor any order , or government observed in human societies . and this is a plain demonstration , that tho' the law be the rule according to which princes ought to exercise their authority and power ; yet the authority is not in the laws , but in the persons that execute them : for otherwise why is not a sentence pronounced according to law by a private person , of as much authority as a sentence pronounced by a judge ? or how doth an illegal sentence pronounced by a judge come to have any authority ? for a sentence contrary to law cannot have the authority of the law : and why is a legal , or illegal sentence reversible , and alterable , when pronounced by one judge , and irreversible and unalterable when pronounced by another ? for the law is the same , and the sentence is the same , either according to law , or against it , whoever the judge be : but indeed the authority of the person is not the same , and that makes the difference . so that there is an authority in persons in some sense distinct from the authority of laws , nay superiour to it : for there is such an authority , as , tho' it cannot make an illegal act legal ; yet it can , and often doth make an illegal act binding and obligatory to the subjects when pronounced by a competent judge . f. i think notwithstanding all you have now said your distinction of a supreme authority in persons above , and distinct from the authority of laws will prove a meer notion , for you grant that the king hath no just or legal authority to act against law , and that if he put any man to death contrary to it , it is downright murder ; but you will not allow that if the king should thus murder never so many thousands , either he , or those instruments of tyranny may be resisted ; and therefore you would fain top upon me your old distinction of an active , and passive obedience : the former of which i very well understand , but as for the latter i have long since proved , that it is so far from being any obedience , that it is indeed downright disobedience , or a refusal to do that which the prince commands , so that truly your self have taught me to distinguish between the king 's personal authority and his legal , for otherwise , why are you not as much obliged to yield an active obedience to the king 's personal illegal commissions or commands as to his legal ones , if there were no difference between them ? so then all the difference between us lyes in the measure of the disobedience , you maintaining that it is sufficient not to yield obedience to such illegal commissions and commands ; and i that besides this denyal of obedience , ( if it be in a fundamental point , and that which generally concerns the whole body of the kingdom ) that they may not only be disobeyed but resisted too , if forced upon us with violence ; and therefore all that you have said to prove that the authority to which we are bound to submit , consists not in the laws , but in the persons tho' acting contrary to law ; is according to your own way of reasoning altogether unconclusive . and farther , when you say , that it is false , and absurd to affirm , that every illegal , is an unauthoritative act which carries no obligation with it ; i shall prove , that this absurdity lyes wholly on your side . for . legal and authoritative , are all one in our law , for that which is not legal carries no authority along with it ; so that illegal authority is in plai●● english , unlawful , lawful power ▪ nor had k. charles . any such extravagant notion of his royal authority , ( who certainly understood his own power better than you or i , ) when he owns in his declaration to the long parliament dated , from newmarket . that the law is the measure of his power , which is as full a concession of the thing i affirm as words can express ; for if the laws be the measure of it , then his royal power , or authority ( which is all one ) is limited by it . for the measure of any thing is the limits or bounds of the thing limited , and when it exceeds those bounds it is an illegal , and consequently an unauthoritative act , which carries no obligation either active or passive along with it . so likewise in the said king's answer , to both houses concerning the militia , speaking of the men by them named to him to be commissioners for it ; he thus replyed , if more power shall be thought fit to be granted to them than by law is in the crown it self , his majesty holds it reasonable , that the same be by some law first vested in him , with power to transfer it to these persons ; &c. in which passage it is granted , that all the power , or authority of the crown concerning the militia is by or from the law , and that the king hath no more authority than what is vested in him by the law of the land. . your argument from the practise of human judicatures is also very fallacious , for you argue from the bare abuse of a trust , or commission , with the execution of which all judges & officers must be intrusted , to that which is quite of another nature , ( viz : ) when the person intrusted acts directly contrary to his commission , or without any commission at all : and therefore you are quite out in your law , when you tell me , that an absolute illegal judgment is valid , till it be reversed , for if it be appearantly contrary to the known forms of law , and practice of the kingdom , it is so far from being valid , that tho' it be put in execution , it would be lookt upon as null , and done without any authority at all : as suppose the king in person , or any inferiour judge , should condemn a man to die , either contrary to the verdict of his jury , or without any jury at all ; this is so far from being authoritative , or valid , that such a judgment is void in it self , and those are guilty of murder , who execute it , and it will need no writ of error to reverse it : but i suppose by illegal judgments , you mean such judgments , which have some error in them , either in matter of law , or form , for which they may be reversed : i grant if these should not be lookt upon as valid , and hold good till they are reversed in a higher court , there could not be any judgment given at all , since all human judicatories whatsoever are subject to errors and mistakes ; and there is sure a great deal of difference between such actions as are done by that authority which the law entrusts them with , tho' not duly exercised , and those violent and illegal acts which a prince , when he persecutes , and enslaves his subjects , performs by his wicked instruments , contrary to all divine and human laws : so that the validity of such an erroneous judgment , is not from the judges personal authority , above the law , nor from his mistake or ignorance of the law , but from that high credit and authority which the law hath given to all courts and judicial proceedings , which if they are done in due form , are to be taken for law , however unjust and must be presumed to be free from error , till they are reversed in some higher court. m. but if you please better to consider of it , you will find a necessity of owning a supreme power in the king beyond all appeal , or resistance , and that there must be a personal authority in him ; antecedent , and superiour to all civil laws ; for there can be no laws without a law-maker ; and there can be no law-maker unless there be one , or more persons invested with the power of government , of which , making laws is one principal branch ; for a law is nothing else but the publick , and declared will , and command of the law-makers whether they be a soveraign prince , or the people . and hence it necessarily follows , that a soveraign prince does not receive his authority from the laws , but laws receive their authority from him : and i must be still of the same opinion as to bracton's words , which you before quoted , lex facit regem , the law makes the king ; by which i cannot believe that that great lawyer meant that the king received the soveraign power from the law , for the the law hath no authority , nor can give any , but what it receives from the king ; and then it is a wonderful , riddle , how the king should receive his authority from the law. and therefore i must stick to my former interpretation , that when he says the law makes the king , that is , it distinguisheth him from a tyrant , as appears from the reason he gives for it , i. e. non est enim rex ubi dominatur voluntas & non lex , he is no king that governs by his arbitrary will , and not by law , not that he is no soveraign prince , but he is a tyrant and not a king. and hence it as evidently follows , that the being of soveraign power is independent on laws , that is , as a soveraign prince doth not receive his soveraign power from the law , so should he violate the laws , by which he is bound to govern : yet , he is not to be resisted , much less doth he forfeit his power . 't is true he breaks his faith to god , and his countrey , but he is a soveraign prince still . and now i hope it plainly appears that every illegal act the king doth , or illegal commission that he grants , is not an inauthoritative act , or commission , but layes on the subject an obligation to yield if not active , yet a passive obedience . and in the king 's most illegal acts , tho' they have not the authority of laws yet they have the authority of soveraign power , which is irrisistible , and unaccountable . in a word it doth not become any man , who can think three consequences off , to talk of the authority of laws in derogation to the authority of soveraign power ; the soveraign power , made the laws and can repeal them , and dispense with them , and make new laws ; the only power , and authority of the laws is in in the power , that can make , and execute laws ; soveraign power is unseparable from the person of a soveraign prince ; tho' the exercise of it may be regulated by laws , and tho the prince doth very ill who having consented to such a regulation , breaks the laws , yet when he acts contrary to law , such acts carry soveraign , and irrisistible authority with them , while he continues a soveraign prince . f. i am very well satisfied , notwithstanding all you have hitherto said , that the government of england owns no such thing as this arbitrary power with which you would invest the king ; since i have already proved at our ●th meeting that the king is not the sole legislator , and consequently not the sole supreme power . so likewise our law it doth as little understand any such thing as a personal authority in the king , antecedent and superiour to all laws . for since god hath now left off making kings by his own special appointment , as he did among the jews , every king must either be so by the law , or custome of that countrey , or else a bare possession of the throne is sufficient to make him so ; and then every usurper hath as much right to a crown as the most lawful prince , and oliver cromwell was as rightful a prince as king charles the second . it is true the first king of any race could not be invested with the crown by the same law , as his successors are , that is , by an hereditary proximity of blood ; yet such a king , whenever he began to be so , could have no legal right , without the election , recognition , or consent of the people . and as for an hereditary right , that is but a right by the law of the land , or general consent of the people , ( testified by an uninterrupted custom ) to entail the crown on such a family , so that in either case they are kings by law ; and therefore i conceive it can be only in this sense , that bracton says lex facit regem , i. e. the law of the kingdom , makes the king , which more plainly appears , by what immediately follows , attribuat igitur rex legi , quod lex attribuit ei , viz. dominationem , & potestatem , in which words nothing seems more plain , than that the king ought to yield the like dominion , and power to the law , as the law had given him before ; or else how could bracton call the law ( in the place i have already cited , ) the kings superiour ? and if the kings title to the crown were not by law ? how came it to pass that the stewards for example had a better tittle to the crown of scotland than the bayliols ? but only that the laws of scotland , that is the consent of the states of that kingdom , made them so , for otherwise any man that looks upon the pedegree of both those families , will see , that bayliol according to our rules of descent was the nearer of blood to the last king david than bruce , and was so ajudged , upon a solemn hearing by our king edward . ih parliament . and as for william whom you call the conquerour under whom all our present king 's do claim at this day , he could have no just right , or title to the crown of england by conquest , but by the election , or submission of the people declared by them at his coronation . and therefore that law by which he was made king must be precedent , or at least concurrent with his being so ; and upon whatever terms , or conditions he then accepted it , his successours are bound both by the laws of god , and man to observe them . and therefore whatever you have built upon , or would infer from these principles is of no force . and if the king be the sole soveraign power , that makes the laws , repeals them and dispenses with them when he pleases ; i would be glad to know upon what grounds so many of the bishops and clergy refused to read the king's declaration of indulgence , since certainly if he alone made the laws , he also could dispense with them ; but i shall say no more of these points now because they are not directly to the matter in hand . m. as for what you say concerning the king 's not being the sole supreme legislative power , i confess you and i have discoursed long upon that point ; and if i were thoroughly satisfied of it , i could much easier assent to what you have said ; as also if you could prove to me , that the king received his power from the people , and not from god , the matter would be yet plainer ; for then it would evidently appear , that the people might have reserved to themselves such a right of resistance as you now maintain ; but that they never could have such a power in england , from the constitution of this monarchy , i need go no farther than your own instance of william the conqueror , who owed all his right to this kingdom to the power of the sword , and not to any hereditary right , much less election , or confirmation of the people , as i think doctor brady has proved beyond dispute in his learned answer to argumentum antinor manleum ; so that since we owe all the rights and liberties we enjoy to the gracious concessions of our kings of this norman race , we ought not in reason , or gratitude to resist them , if they should sometimes encroach upon what we take to be part of those liberties so granted ; no not if the king ( who derives an indefeasible right to the crown from the title of the first conqueror ) should go about to take away all those liberties , nay our very religion and property too from us . but i have not time to pursue this argument further now , and therefore shall leave it to another opportunity . f. as for what you have now said concerning william the first 's having no right to the crown of this kingdom , but what he owed to his sword , is false in matter of fact , it being more than that prince himself ever asserted or pretended to ; and in the next place , as for your dr's . proving him an absolute conqueror over the english nations , supposing he had done it ( which yet i positively deny ) yet will not this serve to do the business for which the doctor urges it ; viz. to set up an arbitrary , irresistible power in that king , and all his successours , but may be urged against him to a quite contrary purpose , as i shall shew you more at large , whenever you please to discourse farther upon that subject : and as for all those things we call legal , our rights and priviledges , which you say were wholly granted us by the charters of his successours , i have already proved that to be false in matter of fact at our fifth meeting , where i shewed you that the english nation had the same liberties , as to their persons and properties in their estates before your pretended conquest , as they enjoyed afterwards ; and that magna charta was but the recital and confirmation of our ancient english laws , as mat. paris affirms in the place i here formerly cited ; but admitting these liberties and priviledges you mention had been owing to the favour and bounty of former kings , yet can i see no rebellion or ingratitude the people of this nation are guilty of , if they keep and defend them now they have them , but would rather betray a servile , base spirit if we part with them : for since it is a maxim in law , concerning all grants , as well from the crown as private persons , that they ought so to enure ut res magis valeat , quem pereat ; i. e. that the parties to whom the grant is is made , may not lose the benefit of it ; when ever the grantor pleases . therefore it is also a rule in such grants , that they are still to be interpreted in favour of the grantee against the grantor , and also , that the grantee shall not be left without some means or remedy of keeping , and defending his right against the grantor whenever he goes about to take it away ; nor do i know any exception there is for the kings grants more than those of private subjects ; since both bracton , and flita tell us non debet esse rege major in exhibitione iuris , minimus autem esse debet in judicio suscipiendo si pecatur ( which i take to be the true reading of that place , and not peccat , parcat , or petat ) ( as divers copies have it . ) that is , as the king is the greatest in distributing of right , or law to his subjects , so ought he to be no more than the least of them in submiting to right judgment if he be petitioned to , and that it be required of him , ( either of which senses this word will well bear , ) but if he absolutely refuses to do this , but will take away their rights and liberties by force , and will deny them the benefit of the laws , what other remedy is there left them but a general resistance ? since otherwise the king may alter the government and take away all our legal rights and liberties , whenever he pleases . m. i confess this dispute concerning the resistance of those commissioned by the king ; and the kings being the sole legislator , and original of all the civil liberties , and priviledges we now enjoy : hath carryed us from the main points in this question : pray therefore satisfie me ( if you can ) those great objections i have made . first how this resistance can consist with with that sacredness , and inviolableness which you your self suppose to be due to the kings person , for either this resistance in case of an invasion of our civil rights must be made even when the king's person is actually present , to back those illegal commissions , or it must be forborn out of that due reverence , and care of his royal person , which the law enjoyns . if the former , the king's person is in danger to be destroyed whenever a factions party is strong enough to rise in arms and oppose the king's commissions upon pretence of their being against law : but if on the other side this resistance is not allowable when the king's person is present , then all such resistance will signifie nothing , since as soon as ever the king in person shall appear in the field to back his commissions ; all your defensive arms ( as you call them ) must be immediately laid down , unless they mean to destroy the sacred person of the king : so that take it either way , all resistance is either illegal , or else unpracticable . secondly , i can as little understand ( as i told you before ) how the two houses of parliament should renounce all taking up arms , as well offensive as defensive against the king for themselves , and yet should leave a power in the diffusive body of the nation ; nay , in any part thereof strong enough to make a rebellion , which they thought unlawful to exercise themselves . lastly , by what legal authority the people , or any part of it , can justifie the taking up even defensive arms , since you your self acknowledge that no arms can be taken up regularly , but by the king's authority ; and you have also disclaimed all taking up of arms by his authority against his person , or against those commissioned by vertue of such authority ; tho' i confess , you except the cases of self-defence , and in maintenance of the law ; yet i cannot find those exceptions allowed of in any of our law-books , either ancient or modern . f. i hope to give you such satisfaction to every one of these objections you have made , as may serve any indifferent person ; therefore as to the first , concerning the sacredness of the king's person , which i allow of as well as you , we must in the first place distinguish between such commissions as the king ●ssures by colour of law , when the judges for example had given their opinions in the case of ship-money ; for they being the sole interpreters of the law in the intervals of parliament ; i do acknowledge that their determinations are not to be opposed by force ; but legally reversed when the next parliament mee● , and they are then to answer in parliament for their false interpretations and opinions ; as tresillian and his companions did in the th of richard ii. and as the ten judges did upon the two houses declaration against ship-money , and their impeachment thereupon . thus , tho' mr. hammpden refused to pay ship-money when demanded of him , and rather chose to lye in prison than pay it , yet it had been downright rebellion , in case any resistance had been made by him against the levying of it : but had this tax been laid by the king 's sole power , without such colour of law , i doubt not , but resistance might have been made even against those that were commissioned by him to levy it ; and if any one town , or hundred , were not strong enough to seize such officers as presumed thus to levy it against law , the sheriffs of every county in england might have raised the posse comitatus , and seized all such offenders and carried them to jayl ; since the king's commissions never did , nor can indemnifie the persons so commissioned , in case the thing they were about to execute was contrary to law : and for this , i need go no farther than the old mirror of iustices , which is owned for good law at this day , which speaking of robbery , and the several kinds thereof , has this passage , which i shall here render out of the old law french ; into this offence ( viz. robbery ) all those fall , that take other mens goods by commandment of the king , or any great lord , without the owners consent . where you see there is no difference at all made between those that took away other mens goods by the command of the king , or any other , but it was robbery in all of them alike , and consequently the actors might be alike seized , and punished as robbers : the same is also allowed , by the statute of the th of henry the th . whereby the king's purveyors are forbid to take any thing to the value of s. or under , without ready payment in hand , of any person 〈◊〉 that it then should be lawful for every one of the king's liege-people to retain their goods and chattels , and to resist such purveyors and buyers . so likewise the last clause in this oath , viz. in pursuance of such military commissions seems to restrain it to such commissions as were granted by the king's authority , that is according to law , and no other . so that you see by the old law of england the king's commission did not render any man irresistible , unless he executed it according to law : since the constable of each town might raise the inhabitants thereof , to seize such wrong-doers ; and if they were not strong enough , the high-constable of the hundred might raise the whole hundred ; and in case they were not sufficient ; the high constable might crave aid of the sheriff , and assemble all the several hundreds of the county till these malefactors were seized : so that as long as there were no standing forces kept up , in the nation , ( as i have shown you there was not till the reign of king charles the second ) there could never be my clashing between the king 's civil , and military commissions ; and this is one great reason why no king of england , since the act de tallagio non concedend● was so hardy as to issue any commissions to levy money without colour of law ▪ because they knew they were void in themselves , and consequently would be resisted by the whole nation . so that this would not have been taking up arms by the king's authority against those commissioned by him , but only in order to bring those to justice who had not any commissions at all to do what they did ; the law taking no cognizance at all of the king 's personal commissions , when absolutely against law. nor if the king had joyned his own presence to such illegal commissions , would it have mended the matter , or rendered these robbers of other m●●● goods , any more irresistible than they were before ; since the king can give no m●n authority to do that which he has not power to do himself , and therefore face his single person may be resisted in case he go about to ravish , rob , or murder people ; then sure his joyning himself with such men , tho' never so numerous , can never make him more irresistible than he was ; unless you will suppose that the king may not rob with a few , without resistance ; but may justifie the doing of it with an army : and if so , pray tell me , what number they must be to render the king , and all those with him , thus irresistible ? and therefore it is no wonder if our law has made no express provision for resisting the king's person , since it had so high a regard for his honour , as not to suppose he could be guilty of making war upon his people : but if the king shall be among such wrong doers , either by force , or fraud , the case will be otherwise . thus when k. edward , and richard the second , joyned their own presence to the illegal actions of the two spencers , and robert de vere duke of ireland ; yet the nobility and people took no notice of that , but prose cuted them , notwithstanding the kings personal joyning himself with them ; and thomas earl of lancaster , tho' he had the worst of it , and was taken and executed , yet was his attainder reversed in parliament , as i have already said ; and his quarrel with the spencers declared to be good and just ; as the like resistance was also declared to have been for the safety of the king , and safeguard of the realm , in the parliament of th of rich. the second , wherein the duke of ireland , and the rest of his faction were con●emned , as i have already shewn you : and tho' i grant that in such a division between the king and his people , his person may run a great hazard ; yet it is his own fault , and not theirs , if it so fall out ; and they are not to lose their lives , liberties and properties , in case the king will fully joyn himself with murderers , or robbers , since this is not to resist royal authority , but illegal force , without any authority at all ; and if he will thus expose himself to the mercy of blind bullets , charge is to be given to all , not to kill him wilfully , or wittingly , since we are never to despair of his repentance , till he absolutely renounces all reconciliation with his people : and thus , even in the midst of such a resistance , the king's person may be as safe as he can be in such circumstances , though not so safe as if he were in his own pallace . but if an army of wicked and lawless men must not be resisted because they have got the king's person on their side ; then prince edward ( afterwards k. edward the first ) could not have justified his fighting with simon montfort , and those of his faction , who had , as you your self acknowledged , 〈◊〉 the person of king henry the third into their power , and acted all things in ●is name , and by his seeming authority ; as the historians of those times expresly tell us : and the king being in montfort's army at the battel of ev●sham , was in great danger , being then wounded in the neck with an arrow : so that if this oath had been then to be taken in this sense , this rescuing of the king by his own son out of the hands of these wicked councellors , had been taking up arms by his authority against his person . m. pray give me leave to answer this instance you have now brought , because i think it does rather make against , than for your opinion : i grant prince edward might well justifie his fighting with simon montfort , tho' he had the king's person then in his power , because the prince very well knew that his father was carried about with them as a prisoner against his will ; and therefore ought to release him , tho' with some hazard to his father's person ; since it could not be otherwise brought about . but sure there is a great deal of difference between fighting to release my prince , when made a prisoner against his will , and fighting against him to take him away from evil councellors , whether he will or not ; as the long parliament did against king charles i. tho' they knew he was in the head of his army with his own consent ; and this was sure taking up arms by the king's authority against his person , and is that which is to be expresly disclaimed by this oath ; and will be also treasonable , if done in any case whatsoever where the king shall think fit to be at the head of his forces , whether the thing be lawful or unlawful for which they are raised . f. well then , it seems the fear of endangering the king's person is nothing , if the end for which it be done be lawful . and why it may not hold in other cases as well as this , i can see no reason . i grant that what the parliament did was unlawful , because the occasion of the war began on their side , as it was then said ; but supposing the king made war upon the people , i doubt not but the case had been otherwise . and for proof of this , pray give me leave to put you a case which may well happen , now we have a standing army distinct from the militia : suppose that in a suit with a great favourite of the king 's , a man recovers a house and lands against him by a judgment at law , and he also by course of law put into possession thereof by the sheriff ; afterwards the king's commission is obtained by the interest of this favourite , to command an officer , and some companies of souldiers of the standing army , to take possesion of this house , and deliver it back to the person who first had it . the man in possession being a stout , and powerful person in his country , hearing of it , resolves to maintain the possession of his house according to law , and therefore gets in good store of his tenants , & neighbors to defend it : the officer comes with his soldiers , & summons the house ; they within , refuse to yield up the possession ; whereupon an assault ensues , in which a great many are killed ; the man in possession is by the king's command , indicted for treason or murder for fighting against those commissioned by the king. now , pray tell me , whether the judges ought , according to their oaths , to direct the jury to find this man , and those of his party guilty of the crimes above mentioned , or not ; and whether the officer and his souldiers are not rather to answer for this offence . m. truly i cannot deny but this military commission to put a man out of his freehold is illegal , and consequently void ; and so may be resisted ; since i know the law says , that a man's house is his castle , and he may justifie the defence of it against all subjects whatsoever ; but what is this , to resisting the king's person , who was not there ; for if he had , i doubt not but this person ought to deliver it up to the king , rather than endanger his majesties sacred person . nor is this resistance considerable , it being only in a particular case , which can no way by a general rebellion alter this government over the whole nation . f. you speak agreeable to your own principles . well , but suppose the king should be perswaded by some very ill men about him to play this or the like trick , whenever he had a mind to favour one party more than another , and so should hinder the execution of the law whenever he pleased , can you think the nation would long endure this , without any resistance : or suppose , to make the case more general , the king should undertake to lay a tax upon the whole nation without consent of parliament , and fearing it should not be levyed , should resolve to do it by his officers and soldiers of his standing army ; and lest they should be resisted , should march with them in person , from one county throughout to another to see the money raised : do you think the whole nation out of pure deference to the king's person were bound to permit him to do whatever he pleased , and let the soldiers take this tax , which they were certainly not obliged to pay , had he not been personally there ? m. yes , i am of that opinion that they ought ; for it were better to pay it , then that a civil war should happen about it , in which the king's person , as well as the government , may be destroyed . f. i see you are of this opinion , because you fancy that the whole government consists in the king's person alone , which it does not ; but in the legislative power , which is not in the king alone ; but in the king together with the lords and commons assembled in parliament : therefore you are mistaken in supposing that this resistance must needs alter the frame of the government , since it is undertaken to maintain the fundamental constitution of it ; for if the king may take what money he pleases from the people , and make what laws he will without the parliament , and without supposing it lawful to resist him if he does , the fundamental constitution of this kingdom will be but a jest , considering how light some princes make of their most solemn declarations to their people ; nay , their very coronation oaths now adays : and it is a strange paradox that one man may defend his life and property against the king's single person , in case he go about to rob or murder him ; and yet that a whole nation should not have the like right ; and that a prince may not rob or murder men by himself , yet may do it without any resistance , in case he can raise an army to back him . m. let what will happen , i am for understanding this oath and declaration , in the strict literal sense , which you by your false glosses go about to destroy ; therefore to tell you plainly my mind , i think , neither one single person , nor yet the whole nation can justifie resistance of the king's person , no , tho' he should go about to rob or murder me ; it were better i were killed , or lost all i had , than that the sacred blood of my prince should be shed by my hands : since the whole parliament have on behalf of the people actually renounced all defensive arms against the king , ( by which i suppose they mean all defensive arms against his person ; ) nor have you as yet answered my two last objections , concerning that renunciation of the two houses , and the want of a competent authority to raise the arms of the whole nation in case of that which you call a general invasion of mens religion , liberties , and properties ; if ever any such thing should happen , as it is not likely it ever will. f. your principles and mine are so diametrically opposite , that it 's no wonder we may draw quite contrary conclusions ; for whereas you suppose that nations were made for princes to govern , and dispose of at their pleasure , without any resistance on the peoples side , let them do what they will : i suppose that princes are made for the common good of their people ; and where their happiness and preservation do not interfere , ought inviolably to be preserved ; but when through the folly , negligence , or tyranny of princes , that which was ordained for their protection proves their ruin and destruction ; i think the preservation of the princes person ought to give place to the publick good ; and better that he than the whole nation should perish ; which though it was the opinion of calaphas in relation to our saviour , yet it is so well approved of , that it is said by the evangelist st. iohn , that he spake not that of himself , but being high priest that year he prophecyed . for there may be a common civil government without a king , but there can be no king without a people . of this opinion our english ancestors always were , who though they often resisted , and sometimes deposed their kings ; yet they still maintained kingly government , though with the change of the person . and if it fail'd in the last civil war , it was because it was at last managed by a faction of men of quite different principles both in religion and politicks , and not by the nobility and gentry of the nation , whose interest it was , and ever will be to maintain the ancient government of a limited monarchy ; without falling into a common-wealth or giving up their just rights , and liberties to an arbitrary power . but to answer the rest of your objections , which , if what i have already layd down be law , and reason too , may be easily done . as to the first objection , the two houses might very well renounce the power of making any war offensive or defensive against the king , and yet leave the right of resistance for self defence and preservation to the whole nation in general ; since the former was necessary unless they would have asserted a right in themselves of sitting whether the king would or not , and waging a war against him whenever they pleased ; after he had actually dissolved them ; which would be to set up two equal absolute powers at once in the kingdom . but that they did not renounce it for the whole kingdom , is plain ; for though by the statute of the th of charles the ii. they disclaim all coercive power over the kings person for themselves and the people either collectively or representatively , yet do they neither there nor in any of these acts for the militia renounce all defensive arms for the defence of their religion , liberties , and properties : there being a great deal of difference between such a defence and a coercive power over the king , as i have already sufficiently proved ; nor indeed was it in the power of the parliament to have done it if they would , since they are but trustees for the people to preserve their just right and had no power so really to give up their religion , lives , liberties , and properties to the kings mercy . so that this renunciation of all defensive arms on the behalf of the whole people had been absolutely void in it self : and since it would have rendered the legal constitution of the government of this kingdom wholy precarious , if notwithstanding the illegality of the kings commissions , and their being void if granted to illegal purposes ; the king's presence shall render it downright treason to resist them . and if this be so , the last difficulty will be easily answered , viz. by what authority or commission the people may make this general resistance ? to this i say , that in the first place all commissions granted to persons uncapable by law to take them , or for illegal purposes , are to be supposed to be issued contrary to the kings will and knowledge , and therefore are to be look'd upon as void in law ; and consequently the persons not to be commissioned at all , and so may be resisted by the kings legal officers all over england , as i have already proved ; but if once the king should countenance and abett such robbers by his own personal presence , this resistance may then be made , and justified by the whole nation , not by the king's authority against his person , but by another higher and precedent right , viz. the right of self-defence , and the common-safety of the whole nation ; which the people must have reserved to themselves at the first institution of the government , or else all monarchies would be alike and there would be no difference at all between absolute and limited kingdoms . m. i shall not trouble my self about other kingdoms , but this much i firmly believe that our kings are absolute monarchs notwithstanding they have limited themselves by law to the manner of their administration of these grand essentials of government , the making of laws , and raising of money ; so that since the supremacy of the government is still in themselves as gods vicegerents here on earth , and not as the peoples deputies ; i cannot but still understand this oath in the strict litteral sence in which i am confident this parliament meant it , and therefore since they have expresly declared the law to be so , i will not be wiser than the law ; especially since it is most agreeable to the scriptures , and the known doctrine of the church of england , that the kings person is not only unaccountable , but irresistable too upon any pretence whatsoever ; and i think i am able to shew you that it is much better for this nation or any other of a like constitution to suffer the worst that may happen from the ill government , nay tyranny of our kings , than to involve themselves in blood and confusion by rebellion and civil wars ; as often as the people shall judge , though never so falsly , that their fundamental rights and priviledges are forceably invaded by the king. f. i think i have very expresly proved at our th meeting , and that from undoubted testimonies from our ancient histories , and writers of the laws of england , as also from the whole constant tenour of the statute law of this nation that the kings of england are not limited by their own concessions in the manner of the administration of their soveraign power , but from the first constitution of the government ; and if the king be not the sole supreme legislative power , i care not what some divines have writ to the contrary ; and since it is a law question , the supreme authority alone ought to decide it . and therefore it is no matter in this case what the scriptures say , nor yet the church of england , the former hath not , and the latter cannot determine what is the legal constitution of the government in this nation ; and where the supreme power resides : and therefore suppose it to have been the intent of this parliament never so much to bar all resistance of the kings person in any case whatsoever , yet i am sure it was not in their power to do things absolutely inconsistent and contradictory in themselves , as they must have done had they made the persons of all officers however commissioned by the king absolutely irresistible ; and much more if they had induced the kings presence with an absolute power for them to commit the most violent and illegal action ; and yet have supposed they had thereby altered nothing in the constitution of the government , though they had rendred it instead of a limitted , an absolute despotick monarchy ; which as i am not yet convinced it was in their will , so neither was it in their powers to grant if they would : and therefore as i do not desire to be wiser than the law , so i cannot allow this to be any law at all in the sense you would put upon it ; so that make the most of it this was but the unwary declaration of a parliament of very young men , not long after the king 's coming in ; who thorough the great abhorrence they had of the late civil war raised by the parliament , under colour of the king's authority , were drawn in before they were aware , to be a little too free in their expressions , not considering the consequences that might follow : but when this sond fit was over , and that a standing army had been raised in england under pretence of the dutch war , and that the king had by his declaration of indulgence made some approaches to an arbitrary power , and in order thereunto , would in that very parliament in . have imposed this very oath or test , not only upon those who were to take it before , but upon all peers and parliament men before ever they sate in the two houses , as also , upon all officers in church and state , to the very justices of peace ; so that the disguise being now seen thorough , it made divers of the peers , even those of greatest loyalty and wisdom stiffly to oppose the laying this test upon all the clergy , nobility , and gentry of the whole nation , as it was then the design of the bishops and court-party to have done : which vigorous opposition , tho' in the smaller number , yet met with such good success , that the bishops and lords of the contrary opinion , could not then carry it ; and the eyes of the whole nation were afterwards so much opened , that the king durst never offer this test any more to either of the two houses : so that if you will but consider this matter of fact , how this test was first obtain'd ; and how afterwards , when it was thought to be intended to set up arbitrary power , was also as vigorously opposed by them ; and their being sensible that the parliament had gone too far already in doing what they had done : i think none can take this oath in your sense except those clergymen , who will allow none to be of their church , but those who are for this passive obedience ; according to their prejudicate notions of loyalty , or else some few mercenary lawyers , who in hopes of preferment ( which they can never otherwise obtain ) would interpret this oath in such a sense as should make us all papists , and slaves too , whenever the king has a mind to it . now which of these extreams are worst , that the people should judge for themselves ( tho' perhaps erroneously ) when the king , or those acting by his illegal commissions , shall violently assault them in their religion , lives , liberties and estates ; that thereupon they make resistance with one consent , when they find themselves brought to this extremity ; or else that the king should be thus invested with an irresistible power of doing whatever he pleased with us ; i durst leave to any indifferent person to judge . m. i confess you have told me more concerning the history of this oath , than ever i knew before ; but let the legal sense of it be what it will , and setting aside the precepts in scripture for absolute submission without any resistance , i think i am able to prove from your own grand topick of the common good and preservation of mankind ; that it is much better to submit to the worst , and greatest tyrant that ever was , than to resist him , if he be our lawful prince , for if you consider what is the subject of all humane happiness and contentment , it is certainly life ; now what tyrant ever in his whole reign destroyed so many mens lives by force , or unjust prosecutions , as a civil war , if carried on with violence and animosity does in a years time ; so vast a distance there is between the evils of tyranny and rebellion , and so much is the remedy worse than the disease ; the cruelty of a tyrant ( says one ) is like a clap of thunder , it strikes with great terrour ; but civil war is like an inundation , it sweeps away all before it , without noise : thus one man brought to the scaffold by the arbitrary command of a tyrant , makes more noise than ten thousand killed in the field in a civil war , but that does not make the evil the less , but the greater evil while we are made willing to destroy our selves , and do it more effectually in one day , than the bloodiest tyrant could find in his heart to do in his whole reign : all the men put to death by the arbitrary commands of tyrants since the beginning of the world in all the kingdoms of it , will not amount to half the number of those who have perish'd in the roman , or english civil wars ; so much safer are we in god's hands than in our own , and in theirs under whom god hath placed us ; and tho' he often makes them like the sun , and sea , ( tho' highly useful in themselves ) scourges for our sins , yet he has promised to keep their hearts in his hand , and to turn them as seemeth best unto him ; we have more promises of safety there , than when we are delivered over to the beasts of the people , whose madness david compares to the raging of the sea. in short , the strict restraint of the people by government is their truest liberty and freedom , since if they were at liberty from government , they would be exposed to combat one another : which would be worse than the greatest slavery in the world : the great mistake is in the foolish notion we have of liberty , which generally is thought to consist in being free from the lash of government , as school-boys , from their master , and proves in the consequence only a liberty to destroy each other ; and yet it is for such a liberty as this , that men most commonly begin civil wars , and fall a cutting of each others throats . therefore tho' i grant it were much better for all princes to let their subjects live happily , and enjoy a competent share of ease and plenty ; but on the other side , if they will not permit them so to do , but will tyrannically oppress them , it were much better for them to sit down contented with poverty , nay , slavery it self , rather than to destroy so great part of a nation , as may be lost in a civil war , whenever it begins . thus even the poet lucan , tho' of cato's party , reckoning up the miseries of the civil wars of rome , which were all for liberty , as if envying the happy condition of those , who lived under absolute tyrants , crys out , faelices arabes , medioque aeaque tellus , quos sub perpetuis tenuerunt fata tyrannis . i could give you instances of the truth of this in most nations , enough to make a history : and if such a history were written , of the mischiefs of this false and pretended liberty , and good of the people , i durst undertake the comparison , that more visible mischiefs come upon the people , more destruction of the publick good , and greater loss of liberty and property by this one method , than by all the tyranny and violence of mankind put together : and consequently , that there is no comparison 'twixt the evils of tyranny , and of a civil war , for publick good ; and that the mischiefs of this pretence of publick good , is infinitely less tolerable , and a more universal ruine to the people , than any tyranny of lawful governors , that ever was in the world ; whereas this is by many degrees the greatest , and most lawless tyranny , and always brings greater mischief along with it , such as confusion , rapin , violence , contempt of all laws , and legal establishments , with more intolerable evils of all sorts , than those it pretends to remedy . but of all pretences for rebellion , religion is the most ridiculous ; since a man's religion can never be taken from him , or a false one imposed upon him , whether he will or not ; and also because a civil war introduces greater immorality , and more loosens the reins of discipline , and is more contrary to the spirit of true religion , than any other thing in the world : true religion is not propagated by the sword , it is a small still voice that cannot be heard in war ; war confounds it , and debauches it , the most profligate , and licentious court bears no proportion in wickedness to the lewdness , blasphemy , and contempt of all that is sacred , which reigns , and overflows in camps . it was an old and true saying , nulla sides , pietasque viris qui castra sequuntur . f. i see when neither the scripture , nor the law can justifie your absurd doctrine of passive obedience ; then you fly back to your old topick the law of nature and common good of mankind : i allow your principles , but not the deductions you draw from thence , which are indeed but paralogisms , as i will shew you by and by ; but i see there is nothing so false and absurd , which prejudice and education will not make men swallow ; i confess , you have made a long and ingenious harangue in a commendation of the benefits of tyranny and slavery : which had you done only for an exercise of your wit , i should have ranked it with cardan's panegyrick of nero , and the praise of the government ; but if you vent such notions in good earnest , i cannot forbear shewing you the absurdity of them . first therefore admitting what you say for truth , that a civil war does destroy more men in one battel , than the greatest tyrant hath ever done in his whole reign ; is this an argument that no man may defend either his life or liberty against arbitrary power ? if this were true reason , it were the greatest folly in the world for the poles , or any other nation that are at wars with the tartars , ever to resist them ; for their emissaries might thus make use of your argument to make them submit to them : life is the only state of happiness in this world ; and without which nothing can be enjoyed : it is therefore better for you to be made slaves than to venture a battel ; for in the fight god knows how many of you may be destroyed , whereas if you quietly submit , we promise to hurt none of you , we will only carry you away , and sell you for slaves , and sure slavery is better than death ; for even slaves enjoy a great many comforts of life , tho' with some hardships , and you may be redeemed again , or make your escape ; but life once lost can never be recovered : the same argument a tyrant may use for the exercise of his arbitrary power over mens lives ; that he will not ( nay , cannot ) destroy the whole nation , but only use them as butchers 〈◊〉 their sheep , cull out the fattest , and let the poor ones live , thrive and grow fat , till they are likewise ready for the knife : this perhaps may be a proper life for those beasts that cannot live without man's protection ; but what man of any courage or sense , would be willing to live under a government where his poverty was to be his only protection ? who would not venture his life in one brisk battel , rather than live in such a vile and slavish condition ? and who would not rather argue thus , it is great odds , if among so many thousands , i am the person ordained for death ; or if i am , i may perhaps purchase victory for my countrymen , and liberty for my posterity ; but let the worst happen , i venture my life for the publick good ; and it is better once to die , than always to live in fear . but if the calculation of the number of mens lives , that may be lost in the recovery , or maintaining any right whatever , should be the only rule to render war either reasonable , or lawful ; i doubt whether most of the wars princes make for small territories , or punctilio's of honour ; ( as lowering the flag for example ) nay , even for the recovery of their crowns , when unjustly detained or taken from them , can upon your principle ever justifie either princes in conscience to make such wars , or oblige subjects in prudence , ( according to your rule of the publick good ) to fight in such quarrels ; since none of them but often cost more lives to defend , or regain them , if lost , than the things are worth that the princes of the world usually make war about , against each other . but if you tell me , that men are bound by the law of god , and of their country to assist their prince in any wars he shall command them ; without inquiring into the consequences of it : and let what will happen as to the loss of mens lives , estates or liberties ; that we are likewise to obey and submit to lawful princes ; because , let them tyrannize , enslave or destroy us never so much , yet god has put us into their hands ; and we are safe in god's hands whilst we are in theirs ; this is all a meer fallacy , for what is this to your main argument from the destruction of mankind ; for , if so many men are to lose their lives in the war , what difference is it as to them , whether the war be made by a lawful or unlawful power , it is still upon this principle unlawful to be made , and consequently unlawful to be fought for ; and if you once grant that princes may tyrannize without resistance , kill or enslave any of their subjects ; what difference is it , as to the people that are to suffer it , whether he be a lawful prince or a tyrant or usurper that does it : for as for being delivered by god into the hands of a lawful prince to be dealt withal as he shall think good , it is all meer jargon : pray prove to me ( if you can ) that whil'st a prince thus tyrannizes , oppresses , and enslaves his people , that god ever thus deliver'd the people into his hand for that design , or that whil'st he does so , he acts as god's minister . this i have urged you to prove at our th meeting ; but since you could not do it , i take the case for desperate . but to answer your comparisons of the sun and sea , to which , you compare lawful princes that turn tyrants ; they are as easily retorted upon you : if the rays of the sun are too hot , we may resist them , and put on thicker cloaths : or set up shelters to defend our selves from them : the like we may say of his malignant influences or effects upon mens bodies , could there be any means found out as easily to avoid them . so likewise for the sea , suppose the breaking in of it upon any country to be sent by god for their sins , you will not say it is unlawful for the people to make banks or dikes , or use any other natural means to keep it out , or to drain it away ; and the case is the same as to tyranny , for if resistance be as natural a means against it , as these i have mentioned are against the too violent heat of the sun , or breaking in of the sea , i cannot see why we may not as lawfully exercise it ; but since we are ●alking of waters , this puts me in mind of the place you have now cited out of proverbs , that the heart of the king is in the hand of the lord ; which without doubt is a great truth : but then you should have added what immediately follows ; as the rivers of waters he turneth it whithersoever he will ; now , how does god turn rivers of waters ? it is not by any super-natural means , but either by a strong vvind , or else by the hands of men. so likewise that solomon's comparison of god's turning the hearts of kings like waters , is but an allusion to the custom of those eastern countries , that as a gardiner draws the streams of water through the trenches he cuts , into what part of the garden he thinks good ; so doth god turn the hearts of princes to act , or do quite contrary to their first intentions , nay , to what they have actually done before ; but how , is this performed ? it is only as he makes use of the gardiner to turn the streams of water ; it is wholy by humane means , such as advice of good and wise counsellors , and a prudent consideration upon it ; to which also may be added , the resistance of their subjects , when after all remonstrances and intreaties to the contrary , princes still go on outragiously to oppress them ; when they see they will no longer bear it , and find themselves engaged in a troublesom war with them , they then see their errour , and send to their subjects and offer them terms of peace . thus divers of our kings hearts were turned , when they saw the nation would all as one man resist their tyrannical arbitrary proceedings , they came to terms with them , and granted them magna charta , and other good laws for the security of their just rights and liberties : but as for what you say of our being safe in the hands of tyrants , as being in god's hands ; i grant we are still in god's hands even when we fall under the power of thieves and robbers ; but is our safety then so great , as when we are out of their hands ? or , may we not get from them by force , if we are able ? especially if what bracton tells us be true , in these words in his third book , exercere igitur debet rex potestatem juris sicut dei minister , & vicarius in terrà , quia illa potestas solius dei est ; potestas autem injuriae diaboli non dei , & cujus horum operum facit r●● , ejus minister erit cujus borum operum facit , igitur dum ●acit justitias vicarius est regis aeterni , minister autem diaboli cum declinet ad injuriam . now pray tell me , if the king can thus cease to be god's lieutenant , and become the devil's officer ? whether he can properly be said to be under the power ordained by god , or that we can be very safe in such hands , i cannot very well see . as for unnecessary wars undertaken , without any such cause , for meer pretences of liberty , and the publick good ; and which may have sometimes caused many more mischiefs and inconveniencies than those they pretended to cure ; meerly does it therefore follow that no wars , tho' against insupportable tyranny , and for self-defence have never been nor may be undertaken by any nation in the world ? and that the state they are in after such a war , is always much worse than it was before ; which is notoriously false , as you may see by so many instances i have given you from our own histories ; as i could also shew you from other countries , such as the switzers and dutch , who have by defending their liberties when unjustly oppressed , brought themselves into a state of plenty , liberty , and safety ; and therefore notwithstanding your making so light of mens just rights , liberties and properties , there are certainly such things that distinguish a free people from slaves , as any who will but travel into france , turkey , or any other arbitrary government , may easily satisfie themselves : and if these things ought to be really esteemed , as the causes of all the earthly happiness we enjoy , then certainly they may be defended , and fought for ; and if in the purchase of them many mens lives happen to be lost , this is no necessary consequence ; since such reformations are often brought about with very little bloodshed ; as appears by many instances i have now given of such resistance , and may more evidently appear by this late great and wonderful revolution ; but admitting it should happen , ( as you say ) and that a great part of a nation should be destroy'd in a civil war for their just rights and liberties ; yet it is still upon your own topick better for mankind that ●t should be so , if true liberty ( i do not mean from lawful authority ) may be but obtain'd at last thereby , since life is not to be esteemed only for meer living , but living happily , non est vivere , sed valere vita ; and life is enjoyed by slaves in galleys , as much as by the greatest prince , yet no rational man but will allow that men may venture their lives , rather than suffer themselves , and their posterity to fall into that miserable condition ; the like he may , if they were only to be reduced to the condition of the meer peasants in france , or ordinary christians in turkey ; and if so , i think i may then safely affirm , that it is better that half the people of any country should be destroyed by a civil war , if their just rights , and liberties may be preserved to them , and their children at the last , then that slavery , with all its consequences , such as ignorance , baseness of mind , cowardice , beggary , &c. should ever be entailed upon a nation ; for as for the loss of men , it may be made up again in some generations ; but when mens civil liberties and properties are once lost , they cannot without some rare and unexpected revolution be ever regained ; as we see in the subjects of all sorts in france , turkey , and muscovy , &c. at this day : and therefore if you please better to consider , the real liberties of a people ( such as we contend for ) are not that of school-boys to be free from the lash of their masters , however that if such a discipline were to be exercised upon men all their life-times , i think no man but would say it were worth venturing his life , rather than to fall into so miserable a state ; so that what you cite from the poet lucan , is only to be taken as a poetical exclamation against the miseries that civil wars often bring upon a nation ; but to say that it was lucan's opinion that subjection under the severest tyrant was better than the liberty the people of rome enjoyed , is to suppose that either you or i have never read that author since nothing is more plain , than that the main design of that poem is to magnifie cato and pompey , who fought for the liberty of their countrey above caesar , and those that joyned with him to destroy it : as for all the rest that you have said , that you could make a history of greater miseries , as loss of liberty , &c. that have come upon whole nations by fighting for their just rights and liberties against tyrants , than by all the tyranny , and violence of mankind ; i think you would have a hard task to make it good , since i suppose under absolute monarchies it is unlawful for the people to take up arms , till they are either like to be enslaved , or destroyed by the tyranny of their prince , or else so intolerably opprest by his souldiers , that they can scarce even in a state of war live in a much worse condition ; and if they are ever subdued and reduced to their former condition , they cannot be worse than what they were under before : the like i may say as to limited monarchies , or common-wealths , that degenerate into tyrannies , the people may perhaps better their condition by resistance , and recover their liberties , but cannot be in a worse , if , they are overcome ; for i do not allow such resistance lawful till the very fundamental constitutions of their government , whereby it is distinguisht from an arbitrary despotick power , be actually invaded , or taken from them ; so that let the worst that can happen , they can scarce fall into worse condition than they were before : and as for england , we may speak it experimentally , that of all the resistances that have been made by the major part of the nation , or greater part of it in defence of their just rights and liberties , every one of them have happened for the b●●t , and been a means of restoring this kingdom to its former estate ; except the last , in which i grant we lost it by that war ; yet that was not from the doctrine it self , but because the war was begun and carried on by a violent faction upon unjust grounds , and , which was worse , the government and discipline of the church as establisht by law was altered without any legal power ; all which could never have happened had not that war been not only begun , but continued to the very last by a standing army , which could give what laws they pleased even to those that pretended to command them : so that why the abuse of this right once in a thousand years should be made any just argument against the ever using it at all , i can see no reason in the world for it . as to the rest of your discourse against making any war about religion that is also as fallacious ; for tho' i grant that true religion is not to be propagated , yet i think it may lawfully be defended by the sword , especially where it is the received establish'd religion of a nation , or else the defence of religion against infidels would be no argument at all to fight against a turkish or popish prince that unjustly invaded us : for tho' it is true that religion cannot be taken away from any man without his consent , yet a man may be taken from his religion ; and when the professors are destroyed either by martyrdom , or violent persecution , as bad , or worse than death , what will become of the church and religion establisht by law , when all the persons that constitute that church are driven away , destroyed , or made to renounce it ? and for this we need go no farther than over the water to our next neighbour . it is likewise as fallacious what 〈◊〉 urge of the great corruption of manners by civil wars , which if it be any argument at all , is so against all standing armies whatever , whether raised by lawful or unlawful powers : and i think there was much more debauchery in the king 's late camp at hounslow-heath , as also in all places where they quartered , than was lately at york , or nottingham , among those that took up arms in defence of their religion or civil liberties unjustly invaded by the king and his ministers ; nor does it always happen that armies raised for defence of religion and civil liberty must prove debaucht , since we may remember that the parliament army ( to its praise be it spoken ) was infinitely more sober , and outwardly religious than the king 's ; but if you will say that this proceeded from their principles , as well as good discipline , i know no reason why men who fight in defence of their religion and civil liberties , may not upon church of england principles as to church-government and common-prayer , and also by a strict discipline , be as little debaucht as any standing armies the most lawful monarch can maintain ; who if they lye idle , as ours have done all this king's reign till now of late , are more likely to fall into all the wickedness that attend a loose discipline , and want of imployment , and consequently may also corrupt the places where they quarter by their ill example . m. i shall not longer argue this point since i see it is to no purpose . but you have not yet told me what these fundamental rights and liberties are , that you suppose the people may take up arms to defend ; nor yet what number of the nation may thus judge for themselves , and take up arms when they please ; for it may so happen that the whole nation may be divided as to their opinions concerning these things : and the south part of england ( for example ) may think their religion , and liberties in great danger , and that it is very necessary to take up arms for it , when the north parts are not under those apprehensions , but lye still ; as was lately seen in the riseings for the prince of orange . f. as to the first of these queries i think i can easily give you satisfaction and such as you can have nothing material to reply to : and as for the other though i do not say i can give you such an answer as will bear no exception or reply , yet i doubt not but it will be that which may very well be defended and may serve to satisfie any indifferent and unprejudiced person ; and which if not allowed will draw much worse consequences along with it . and therefore as for the just rights and liberties we contend for , they are only such as are contained in magna charta , and the petition of right , and are no more than the immemorial rights and liberties of this kingdom , and that first . in respect of the safety of mens lives and the liberties of their persons : aly . the security of their estates and civil properties . and ly . the enjoyment of their religion as it is established by the common consent of the whole nation . all which i will reduce to these plain propositions . . that no freeman of england ought to be imprisoned , or arrested contrary to law , without specifying the cause of his commitment in the warrant or mittimus , whereby he is sent to prison : and he ought not to be sent out of the body of the country , or jurisdiction where the crime was supposed to be committed , unless he be removed by due course of law : neither ought he by the law of england to be detained in prison without trial only for a punishment ; but ought to be tried the next assizes or goal-delivery , or within some reasonable time to be allowed of by the court. and this was common-law many ages before the act of habeas corpus made in the st of king charles the second , which does but ascertain that law concerning bailing men for all manner of crimes in case no prosecution come in against them : much less can the king or any court below the whole parliament banish any man the kingdom in any case unless by some known law already made whereby he is bound to abjure it upon a lawful trial by his peers and conviction by his own confession . . nor can the king nor any courts of justice condemn a man to loss of life , or members , without due trial by his peers , and legal judgment given thereupon . and for proof of this i need go no farther than magna charta , and the petition of right which are both but declaratory of the common-law of england● see therefore magna charta cap. . whereby it is declared , and enacted , that no freeman may be taken and imprisoned , or be disseised of his freehold , or liberties , or his free customs , or be outlawed , or exiled , or in any manner destroyed but by the lawful judgment of his peers , or by the law of the land , which is also farther confirmed and explained by these statutes , viz. the , , . of edward iii. and . of richard the ii. all which are summed up , and more particularly declared against , contrary to the fundamental laws of the land in the petition of right exhibited to king charles the i. in parliament in the thirtieth of his reign ; wherein the late imprisonment of the kings subjects without any cause shewed , and the denial of habeas corpus are expresly resented ; as also putting souldiers and mariners to death by martial law in time of peace : and the king's answer to this petition is remarkable , the king willeth that right be done according to the statute● and customs of the realm , &c. which not satisfying as too doubtful and general , the king at last gave this full and clear answer in legal ●orm , soit droit fait comm● il est desirè . the second point in relation to our civil properties is this , that no tax , taillage or aid shall be laid or levy'd by the king without the consent of the arch-bishops , bishops , earls , barons , knights , burgesses , and whole commonalty of the realm in parliament ; this was first of all granted by the th law of william the first , which i have already cited ; as also more particularly forbid by the statute de tallagio non concedendo in the th of edward the first , which was but a revival , or explanation of the former law of william the first , and also by the th of edward the third , whereby it is enacted , that no person should be compelled to make any loans to the king against his will , because they are against reason , and the franchise of the land ; and it is also provided , that none should be charged by any charge or imposition called a benevolence , nor by such like charge , which is also more fully set forth in the said petition of right , to have been lately executed by certain commissioners ; ) as also that divers other charges have been layed and levyed by lords-lieutenants , deputy-lieutenants , &c. contrary to the laws and free customs of the realm . the third point declared against in this petition of right , is against quartering of soldiers ( tho' they pay for their quartors ) contrary to the will of the owners and inhabitants , much more when they did take free quarter in time of peace , as hath been too much practised of late : so that by the common law of england , not only private-houses , but inns , and ale-houses are not compellable to quarter soldiers , unless they will : so much was this nation anciently a stranger to standing armies ; and quartering of soldiers in time of peace ; that there was no provision made for it , either at common-law , or by any statute that i know of . thly , that no new law can be made without an express act of parliament ; or the joynt-consent of the king , lords and commons : and therefore that parliaments ought to be duely summon'd and held for the good and safety of the kingdom , by common as well as statute law , once every year , and according to more modern statutes , once in three years at least ; or whenever there is a just and necessary occasion for it : and for proof of this , i need go no farther than the old english saxon law , which ordains , that the great council , or mycel synod should be held twice in the year , as the ancient mirrour of justices recites , and the constant custome long after the conquest , in which there never passed a year without a general council of the whole kingdom ; and when this came by degrees to be discontinued , then were those statutes of edward the third , and richard the second made ; whereby it was enacted that a parliament should be held every year , and oftner if there were occasion . thly , since the legislative power of parliaments is the very soul , and essence of the government , the election of knights , citizens and burgesses to sit and serve in parliament , ought to be free ; and all the members of parliament who have places there , either by patents or writs of summons , as the lords ; or else by election or writs , as the bishops ought to be present , and there to have freedom of speech and votes , without any guards to over-awe or terrifie them ; and none to be forced , threatned , bribed or tamper'd with to give their votes contrary to their consciences ; either by the king or any of his ministers : this is ordain'd by the stat. of westm. chap. . whereby it is expresly provided that all elections ought to be free ; which sir edward cook in his notes upon this statute extends to elections of knights of shires as well as other elections since . i have sufficiently proved , that the commons elected members to parliament , when this statute was made ; and that this was the ancient law of england , you may see in the rolls of parliament . hen. . wherein it is alledged as by the parliament , as one of the articles against richard the second in these words : item licet de stato & consuttudine regni sui in convocatione enjuslibet parliamenti populus suus in singulis comitatibus regni debeat esse liber ad eligendum , & deputandum milites pro hujusmodi comitatibus ad inter ●ssendum parliamentis , & ad exponendum corum gravamina , & ad prosequendum pro remediis superinde prout videntur expedire . tamen praefatus rex ut in parliamentis suis liberius consequi valeat suae temerariae voluntatis effectum , direxit mandata sua frequentius vicecomitibus ejus ut certas personas per ipsum regem nominatas , ut milites c●mitatuum , venir● saciant ad parliamenta sua ; quos quidem milites eidem regi faventes induc●re poterat , prout frequentius fecit , quandoque pro minas varias , & terrores , & quandoque per munera ad consentiendum illis qu●a regno praedicto pr●ejudicialia fuerant , & populo quam plurimum onerosa , &c. so that you here may see , that it was then judged by the whole parliament to be a brench of one of the fundamental liberties of the nation , for the king to make false returns to be made of parliament-men , as also , to corrupt , or over-awe their votes , either by promises or threat●ings . but to conclude , that we have such things as fundamental laws , and priviledges , i shall go no farther than king iames i. his speech confirmed by an act of parliament of the first year of his reign ; wherein it is recited , that the king hath vouchsafed to express many ways , how far it is , and ever shall be from his royal , and sincere care , and affection , to the subjects of england to alter , or innovate the fundamental laws , priviledges , and good customs of this kingdom , whereby not only his royal authority , but the peoples security of lands , livings , and priviledges ( both in general and particular ) are preserved and maintained , and by the abolishing , or alteration of which it is impossible , but that present confusion will fall upon the whole state , and ●rame of this realm . so that if this judgment of the king and both houses of parliament was true ; sure we may justly suppose , that things of such vast concernment deserve our contending for , by all means possible and lawful to preserve them ; for what the nobles of the land upon occasion once said with one voice in full parliament , every free-born subject of england , may as well say at this day , nolumus leges angliae mutari ; which is a maxim that ought to be imprinted upon the hearts of all true englishmen ; who , ( as my lord bacon very well observes ) take themselves to have as good title to their laws , as to the common air they breathe in ; and king charles the first , somewhere says , that it was his maxim , that the king's prerogative is to defend the peoples liberties , and that the peoples liberty strengthens the king's prerogative : for indeed , if the foundations are destroyed , the superstructure cannot stand ; and if this rule had been well observed by this king's sons , we had not been reduced to this great confusion we now lye under . for my lord bacon calls those flatterers who put the king upon such dangerous courses , as great traitors to him in the court of heaven , as he that draws his sword against him : and king iames i. in his speech in parliament , . calls all those who perswade kings not to be confined within the limits of their laws , vipers , and pests , both against them , and the common-wealth . m. for my part , i shall not go about to defend such ill men , whoever they be ; yet since such insinuations are done privately , and in a corner it is very hard for subjects to judge when such evil councils are in●used into the ears of princes ; and much more unjust for them to make any resistance on pretence to remove them : and therefore besides the absurdity of making subjects both judges and parties , you have not yet told me , what number of men must be at once oppressed in their fundamental rights ( as you call them ) and who may make this resistance ; for methinks it is very absurd to give one county , for example , upon the account of free quarter , a power of rising in arms and resisting the king's officers and soldiers , when perhaps all the rest of the nation where no soldiers are , feel no such thing . f. i am not so unreasonable , as to maintain that subjects ought to take arms merely because the king gives too much ear to flatterers and wicked ministers , or is too much led by them ; let him be so , provided the people do not smart for it . but if once it comes to that pass , that they grow intolerable , and set the king upon a general invasion of the peoples rights in any of the great points i have now laid down , let them look to themselves , if they will not permit a parliament to sit , and redress those grievances ▪ they must expect the nation will rise at last against them , as they did against gaveston , and spencers ; and make them undergo that punishment they so well deserve : but as for what you say of making the people judges , when their rights and liberties are invaded ; the consequence is as bad if the king alone shall judge , as for example in the case of ship-money , the judges gave their opinions that the king might raise money for ships of war in case of necessity , without any controul ; but if he be sole judge of this necessity , he might lay this tax as often , and raise it to what degree he pleased . therefore as i shall not deny that the king may judge it fit to do a great many things against the strict letter of the law , in cases of urgent necessity ; but it will be at his peril if he judge amiss ; as for example , every man's house is his castle , and he may lawfully defend it against all illegal commissions : yet i think no man will deny , but that in case of a fire in london , the king may by common law command his officers to break open some of the next houses , and blow them up with gun-powder to stop the fire ; but admit he should out of malice , or mis-information command some houses to be blown up that stood a mile off , under pretence of stopping the fire , do you think the owners were bound to stand still , and let them do it ? but if the people must not judge when their fundamental rights and liberties are invaded , because they will be both judges and parties ; then no man whatever by this argument ought to defend himself against the violence of another ; for who can be judge , but he that feels the blow ? nor indeed could princes make so much as defensive wars , since whenever they do so , they are themselves both judges and parties , as i told you at our third meeting , when i answered ( as i then thought ) all your arguments against the peoples ever judging for themselves . so that if it be proved that the people in a limited kingdom remain , as to the defence of their lives , liberties , religion , and properties , always in the state of nature , in respect of their prince as well as all the rest of mankind , they must certainly make use of defensive arms when necessity requires it , or else become slaves whenever he pleases to make them so ; may people have no right to judge of his violence and oppressions ? but as for the number that are to make this judgment and resistance thereupon ; i grant in most cases this is not to be done , as long as the oppression is begun by colour of law , without actual violence . secondly , when it concerns only some particular bodies of men ; thus if free quarter should be taken in one or two towns or counties i do not allow it a sufficient cause for all the neighbouring towns , much less the whole county , or the neighbouring shires to take an alarm , and rise in arms upon it , since , perhaps , the king may know nothing of it : and if he were once informed of it , would redress it ; but can you affirm the case would be the same if this grievance should become general , all over the nation ? and that the king should be so far from redressing it , that he should put out a declaration , setting forth that it was his prerogative so to do ; would not the whole nation then take it for granted , that the king's design was to govern by a standing army , who should live upon the people , and devour them ( as they do in france ) to the very bones ; and might not they make resistance against these robberies and oppressions ? the same i say for all other breaches made in any other of our fundamental rights ; i do not allow any resistan●e to be made , till it become a general oppression upon all , or the major part of the nation , and without all hopes of being otherwise remedied , and this must be also so evident , that there can be no doubt or denial of the matter of fact : for so long as the case is disputable , or the grievance is not of a general concern , i grant the people ought never to stir ; but of this they alone must judge ; since our constitution has left us no other judges of these breaches , but the diffusive body of the whole people in the intervals of parliament . but for your last question , as to the number that may thus rise to make this resistance , i answer thus , that when once the mischief becomes general , and without all other remedy ; any part of the people who think themselves strong enough to defend themselves against such violence , may begin to rise if they can , till the rest of the kingdom can come into their assistance ; as i told you the town of brill did against the tyranny of the duke d'alva , in the beginning of the belgick wars , and it was soon after seconded by the revolt of divers other cities and towns in those provinces ; till the spaniards were quite driven out . m. i do not deny but you speak more moderately on this subject than most of your opinion , who think every private man has a right to take up arms and raise a rebellion , whenever he judges his person or estate is invaded ; or injured by the government . and indeed this remedy of resistance seems at first sight prety tolerable , if it were not that we very well knew that this many-headed beast , the multitude , is very apt to be deluded by the cunning speeches , and sly insinuations of factious and ambitious men , whose interest it will always be to fish in troubled waters , and raise disturbances to make themselves the heads of a party : thus in the year — . what lies and stories were there raised to incense the people against that good king , to make them take up arms against him , as an invader of their liberties ; and one that was about to make war upon them ; and who that is not over-partial to his own opinions , does not see , that the nation has been blown up into a flame by the lying reports of a french league , and a supposi●irious prince of wales ; neither of which , i durst pawn my life , have the least tittle of truth in them ; so that this doctrine can scarce fail ▪ almost every time it is put in practice , to bring all government to anarchy and confusion . f. i have already in part answered this objection at our third meeting ; but since you will urge it over again , i shall in the first place admit the matter of fact to be as you say , that the people may , by some turbulent demogogues , be sometimes so far incensed as to take up arms when there is no just occasion ▪ but let me tell you ▪ i doubt that neither of the instances you have given , will make good your assertion ; for in the first place , as to king charles the first , it is said by all writers on the parliaments side , that the king by leaving his parliament , and going to york , and there taking a guard when no enemy was near , and when the parliament had as yet , raised no forces at all ; as also by his going to hull to remove the magazine of arms that lay there , in order to put them into the hands of an army , to make war upon the parliament , who then demanded the settlement of the militia , to be in commissioners of their nomination ; that he thereby broke his coronation oath , whereby he was sworn to govern according to law , and not by force . but as for what you say , as to the present juncture of affairs : i never can desire a more plain proof of the peoples necessity of ●aking up defensive arms ; since admitting that neither of the reports concerning the french league ; and the false birth of this supposed prince be true ; yet , i think , the nation has had sufficient provocations to rise as one man , and joyn with the prince of orange for the obtaining of a free parliament to set all things right , which the king 's violent illegal administration has so much discomposed . but admitting the utmost you can suppose , that sometimes the people may judge amiss , as well as the king , and through that mis-information may take up arms against their prince , when there is no real occasion ; shall this abuse of a right be a sufficient cause against there ever exercising of it at all ; i am sure this is no good argument against the natural right of self defence between private persons in the state of nature , that some men do often abuse it ; nor can i see how upon these grounds , even soveraign princes may be allowed to make so much as defensive wars , ( as i said but now ) since they may pretend that themselves are wronged , and invaded , or at least are like to be so , when no such thing was really done , or intended ; and so by their mis-judgment or false pretences , many millions of lives may be lost ▪ what then ? must no princes ever make war at all , till all the world be satisfied of the justice of their quarrel ? if so , i doubt the last war of king charles the second made against the dutch , and this late war the king of france , has now made upon the empire , should never have been by your principles so much as begun ; much less carried on with so great an effusion of blood , and the destruction of so many cities and towns : and whether this , as well as tyranny at home , is not more often put in practice by princes , than any resistance this nation , or all the subjects of the world have made against such tyranny , and arbitrary power , i leave it to your self , or any indifferent person to judge . m. i doubt not but i may very well join issue with you upon this point , for i think that upon those very conditions , and grounds you have now laid down the clergymen , lords , gentlemen , and commons of this kingdom , who have either come over with the prince of orange , or have taken up arms in defence of his late declaration cannot justifie themselves by any of the instances you have given for joyning themselves with him in arms , for tho' i grant his majesty by hearkning too much to popish counsel● may have done many things which in strictness of law cannot be justified ; yet since they do not strike at that which you call the fundamental constitution of the government , and has been also done without any force on the people of this nation ; but hath been either transacted by judgment of law , or the colour of it at least , viz. by the opinion of all or the major part of judges ; all the parties above mention'd , ought ( according to your own principles ) to have waited for the meeting of the next parliament , to whose determination they ought , by the law of the land , to have referred all such grievances , and violations of laws which they had to complain of ; and if then the king had refused to have remedied them , they might have had some colour ( i do not say right ) for taking up arms ▪ and doing what they have done ; whereas i cannot see how you can , even upon your principles defend the late risers from wilful rebellion against the king. and for proof of this , i need go no farther than the prince of oranges late declaration , which being drawn by the best advice of the male-contents then in holland ; would not fall to mention all the violations of law , which they thought his majesties government had been guilty of ever since his coming to the crown , and therefore not to insist upon the want of right , which i conceive the prince had to concern himself with the affairs of another kingdom , which he had no right to : i shall however mention every article , in which his highness conceives the religion , laws , and civil liberties of this nation to be endangered . in the first place as to the dispensing power , which the king has lately assumed to himself in matters of religion ; and thereby putting into offices and commands persons uncapable by law of bearing them , without taking the test ; as i shall not now dispute the legality or illegality of the kings declaration concerning it , so as to that part of it that concerns liberty of conscience , or dispensing with the papists and dissenters to meet in assemblies for their religious worship notwithstanding all the acts made against mass and conventicles , it was no more than what king charles the iid . had done before with the advice of his privy-council ; in which if it had been rebellion to have opposed him , sure it is the same crime in the reign of his brother . . as for the commission for causes ecclesiastical f. since i foresee your discourse upon this subject is like to be long ; and to consist of many more heads than i doubt my memory will serve to bear away ; pray give me leave to answer all your instances one after another as you propose them . first then as to the late declaration concerning the dispensing power , it was so far from being done by law , or so much as the colour of it , that besides its being against divers express acts of parliament , which tye up the kings hands from dispensing with the act against publick mass and conventicles ; as also that disable all persons whatever to act in any publick imployments , till they have taken the test appointed by the said act , ( in which all non obstances are expresly barred . ) but this declaration was never so much as shewn to the privy council , till it was ready to be published , and then indeed the king caused it to be read in council , declaring that he would have it issued forth , tho' without ever putting it to the vote , or so much as asking the consents of the privy councellours there present ; though i grant the title of it sets forth , that it was done by his majesty in council , to impose upon the nation that stale cheat , whereby this king , ( as well as the last ) would have had us believe , that their declarations had been issued by the consent of the council , when god knows there was no such thing . and as for any judgment , or opinion of the judges to support it , and make it pass by colour of law , it was never , as i can hear of , so much as propos'd to them in their judicial capacities , though perhaps it might be propos'd to the lord chancellor , and some of the judges who were of the cabal , which is nothing to the purpose ; all that i ever heard to have been brought judicially before them , was the case of sir edward hales taking a commission for a collonel of a regiment ; after he had openly declared himself a papist ; in which great point though i grant the major part of the judges gave their opinion for the dispensing power , yet was it only in the case of military commissions , as several of them afterwards declared , and not of all sorts of imployments , as well civil , as military , much less for popish heads of colledges , parsons and bishops to hold their livings , headships , and bishopricks , if they pleased to turn to the romish religion ; or that the king should please to bestow them upon popish priests , it would have been as legal in the one case as in the other ; since as for popish heads of colledges , and parsons , we have had too many instances of it , and if we had none for bishops , we must thank either the constancy of most , or the timorousness of some of them , if they have not openly declared for the romish religion , and yet might have kept their bishopricks , notwithstanding ; but i do not at all doubt but that such a general dispensation for professed papists to take and hold all sorts of offices , and places of trust , not only military , but ecclesiastical and civil , would have in a little time brought all offices and imployments into their hands . nor is this dispensing power in matters of religion , the sole thing aimed at by this declaration , as appears by the very words , and whole purport of it , which is not confined to matters of religion only , but claims an unlimited power of dispensing with all sorts of statutes in all cases whatever , none excepted : and if so , pray tell me , what magna charta , or the statute de tallagio non concidendo , or any other law , will signifie , whenever the king pleases to dispense with them , either as to raising money , or taking away mens lives , or liberties , or estates , contrary to law ; nay the papists already give out ( and that in print ) that all laws for taking away religious orders , and suppressures of monasteries , are against magna charta , by which holy church ( that is , the popish religion then in being ) is to injoy all her ancient rights , and liberties ; and the abbots , and priors , do thereby , as well as the bishops , and lay lords , reserve to themselves all their ancient rights , and free customs : now whether this unbounded prerogative would not quickly have destroyed not only the ecclesiastical , but civil constitution of this kingdom , as they now stand establisht by law , and would have soon introduced both popery , and arbitrary government on this nation , i leave it to your self , or any indifferent person to consider . and though i do not say , that the bare giving of papists or protestant dissenters a liberty of religious meetings , or assemblies for mass , or preaching , is an infringment of the free exercise of our religion establisht by law , yet pray take one thing along with you , which is a matter of great moment both to the dissenters , and to our selves ; that if the king can thus by his prerogative give both papists , and fanaticks a liberty to meet publickly contrary to law ; let the latter look to it ; for he may by the same prerogative ( whenever he pleases ) dispense only with the papists , and keep the laws still on foot against the dissenters ; nay , he may by the same unbounded prerogative , dispense with all the laws for the publick exercise of our religion , and under pretence of dispensing with them only in some particular cases , shut up our church doors one after another , beginning with the cathedrals , and so proceeding by degrees to parish churches : and though i grant king charles the iid . did assume a power of dispensing with all statutes concerning religious meetings contrary to law ; yet the nation had not then any sufficient reason to rise in arms against this declaration ; since it did not extend the kings prerogative beyond those acts concerning religious worship : and farther the nation was not out of all hopes of having it redressed by the next parliament , and so was not in that desperate condition in which it was lately , before the prince of oranges coming over . and you may remember that the late king upon the joint address of the lords and commons against that declaration was forced to call it in , and cancel it , which certainly ought to have been better considered by his majesty , and those of the popish ●unto that advised him to issue out the late declaration , so expresly contrary to law , and the sense of both houses of parliament , and which gave the archbishop of canterbury , and the rest of his brethren a sufficient ground of petitioning against it ; and this was so evident , that a jury in which the greatest part were high prerogative men could not upon a fair trial , but acquit them . m. i shall not further dispute this point , since you have dwelt so long upon it , though i must still tell you , i do not look upon this as a sufficient cause for the nations taking up arms for a reason i shall shew you by and by ; and therefore i shall now proceed to the next head complain'd of in the princes late declaration , ( viz. ) the late commission for erecting a new court for causes ecclesiastical , but as i will not enter upon the question of the legality of it ; so on the other side it was also done by colour of law ; and the king as supream head of the church , was told by his ministers that he had power to erect what new court ecclesiastical he pleased , provided it was not of the same kind with the high commission court , which had been abrogated by the stat. of the th of king charles the i. as likewise particularly excepted in the proviso , in the stat. of the xiith of king charles the ii. for restoring ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the bishops courts : so that admitting that court was not legal ; yet the persons who advised the king to erect it , and the commissioners who sate in it were only answerable for it ; in the next parliament ; and though the bishop of london was suspended , and the president , and fellows of magdalen colledge were unjustly expelled by this court , yet sure none of these miscarriages could give the subjects of this kingdom any just pretences to take up arms to redress them , being done ( as i said before ) by colour of law , without any force or violence ; and was also submitted to by the parties against which these decrees were given , and was at the most but a matter of particular concern , and reacht no farther than the said bishop and colledge , and did not touch the religion and civil liberties of the whole kingdom : and consequently was not of that general importance , as to be any just cause of the whole kingdoms taking arms , much less for the kings officers and souldiers to run over to the prince of orange , as they lately have done . f. to answer what you have now said concerning the ecclesiastical commission ; that i must also tell you was issued forth without so much as any colour of law for it ; and though the late chancellor , and some of the worst , and most mercenary judges countenanced it by appearing for and acting in it , yet it is very well known that it was never proposed to all the judges to be argued in the exchequer chamber , as it ought to have been , before a thing of that great importance to the whole nation had pass'd the seals ; as to what you say , that the kings ministers told him it was according to law , and that they alone ought to answer for it in the next parliament , and that no publick disturbance ought to have been made about it , because the things that , that pretended court did , were but of a particular concern , and only reacht the bishop of london , and one single colledge ; that is but a fallacy which you put upon your self ; for sure if you had better consider'd of it , you would find that what these commissioners have already done is of a little more publick concernment than you are aware of , for pray tell me , why by the same law , by which the bishop of london was suspended for his refusal to silence dr. sharp , all the bishops in england might not have been suspended one after another by that pretended court , if they had refused to obey or execute any letters or orders from the king , tho' never so illegal or unreasonable ? since what command could be more illegal , than the king 's positive order to the bishop to suspend a clergyman from his diocess , without first hearing him , or giving him leave to answer for himself ? so likewise for the case of magdalen colledge , by the same law by which these ecclesiastical commissioners took upon them to turn out the president , and fellows for disobeying the kings mandamus , by the same law the king might put upon any other colledge in either university , popish heads , and popish fellows , till instead of nurseries for the education of our youth in the protestant religion , they may become as absolute popish seminaries , as the colledges of doway , or st. omers ; and though i grant that the persons concerned in these unjust decrees , might have patiently submitted to them without any protestations against the jurisdiction of that pretended court , since they might for some prudential reasons have thought fit to submit to them , without making any such protestation , and yet for all that not allow their authority ; but indeed the matter of fact was far otherwise , for when a part of these commissioners sate at magdalen colledge to expel the said president and fellows from their places contrary to law , and the express statutes of the colledge , they did all severally protest against their whole proceedings , and appealed to the kings courts at westminster . and it is a plain proof how willingly dr. h. the president of this colledge submitted to this sentence , by his locking the doors of his lodgings , and leaving the commissioners to break them open before they could get in , and put in his pretended successour by force . but as to what you say , that the king was told he might as supream head of the church , set up what new court he pleased for the execution of his ecclesiastical jurisdiction : it is certainly a great mistake , for i utterly deny , that the king has power to erect any new courts either ecclesiastical or civil , unless by authority of parliament : the kings power to make a vicar general , being only confirmed by the statute of king henry the eighth , as was also the authority of the high commission , by the statute of the first of queen elizabeth , and if either of those high spirited princes had● believed themselves to have been invested with such an unbounded prerogative , they would certainly have exercised it , without being beholding to the parliament , but indeed it is but a subterfuge , to alledge that this court was not of the same nature with that of the high commission , because it did not take upon it to ●●ne , or commit men to prison , nor to administer the oath , ex officio , to those that were convened before them , since it is not the different name , or some small difference in the manner of the judicial proceedings , but the causes or matters that a court pretends to take cognizance of , that can make it a court of a quite different nature ; now it is notoriously known that this late ecclesiastical court took upon it to judge of matrimonial causes , about alimony , and concerning ●lmoniacal contracts , and all other misdemeanours both of clergy and layety , against religion and good manners , which were the same things the late high commission court took upon them to determine ; and if they did not meddle with popish , or non-conformist meetings , it was because their hands were so tied up by the late declaration of indulgence , that they had no power to meddle either with papists or dissenters . m. i shall make no farther reply appresent to what you now say , till i come to answer once for all , therefore i shall go on to the next things excepted against in the princes declaration , ( viz. ) the erecting of publick chappels for mass , the protecting of priests , and the making a jesuit a privy councellor , all which tho' i confess they are against the express letter of divers statutes , yet since all these things depend upon the kings dispensing power , set forth in his majesties late declaration , which as i will not assert , so i will not positively deny ; since the said declaration of indulgence , and all proceedings thereupon have issued out and executed under colour of law , viz. of the kings ecclesiastical jurisdiction , without any force or violence upon the conscience , religion , or properties of the kings protestant subjects , whom the king in his said declaration solemnly promises to protect in the free possession , and enjoyment of their religion establisht by law : and i cannot see how a liberty granted to popish priests to say mass , or the putting in a jesuite into the privy council ; or making popish judges , or putting a papist into the ecclesiastical commission , can be lookt upon as any invasion of the protestant religion , the free , and publick profession of which we have ( god be thanked ) as quietly injoyed as we did in the reign of this king ; or in that of his brother . f. since you cannot directly justifie the kings setting up publick mass houses in london , and in most other parts of the kingdom ; and his so publick protecting and countenancing papists and jesuits , even to the making a jesuit a privy-councellor , tho' they are all in judgment of law alike publick enemies and traytors to the king and kingdom , and that all these ( as you cannot deny ) are contrary to the express words and intent of all statutes against priests , and popish assemblies , so you endeavour to palliate it under the kings dispensing power , which you suppose to have had a colour of law ( at least ) to support it , but tho' the giving liberty to popish assemblies , and the conventicles of the dissenters was no direct hindrance of the free exe●ercise of the protestant religion establisht by law , yet i must utterly deny that the king has any such prerogative , as to dispense with those laws , and by his sole authority to declare those that the law calls enemies and traytors , to be good subjects , and you may as well tell me , that the king has not only a prerogative power to pardon high-way-men ; but may also protect them , and put them into his guards , with a commission to rob whom they pleased , as to give papists power to bear arms , or to protect , and imploy declared traytors , ( as popish priests , and jesuites are by law , ) as the king had done ; not the like i may say for putting in popish judges and justices of peace , ( viz. ) that it was all done by force of the kings personal orders , without his legal authority , which is that alone we can take cognizance of , or render any obedience to ; and tho' 't is true , i do not deny the king a power of making whom he pleases judges , yet this prerogative is still to be exercised according to law , and therefore if the king should make an illiterate man a judge , who could neither write nor read , the writ or patent would be void in its self ; the same i may say of a popish judge , the law making no difference ( as i know of ) between a natural and a legal disability : but however the turning out honest and able judges , because they would not give up our religion and liberties to the kings arbitrary will , is certainly a much greater breach of the trust committed to him by his coronation oath , wherein he swore he would maintain the laws of the land , and mix equity with mercy in all his judgements : now where is the equity , or justice of this , that whereas the judges anciently held their places quam diu se bene gesserint they should now ( by a notorious encroachment of the prerogative ) not only be made durante beneplacito : but that the king should stretch this prerogative so unreasonably , as to examine the judges before hand , whether they would agree to the dispensing power , and to turn out those that refused to comply , meerly because they would not serve his arbitrary designs ? and then to put in the meanest and most mercenary lawyers at the bar , ( nay some who never come thither at all ) into their places , for no other merit , or good qualities , but because they would serve a turn , is so notorious a breach of his oath , that it could not fail in a little time to destroy all our common , as well as our statute laws , since these were all lately lodged in their breasts and resolved into their arbitrary determinations , which yet ( as all the world knows ) were wholy managed by the influence and commands of the court ; and this i say again was as notorious an abuse of the kings prerogative , as if he had put in high-way-men into his guards with commissions in their pockets to rob whom they pleased , since these gentlemen in scarlet have taken the same liberty under colour of law , to raise taxes upon the subjects against the express letter of an act of parliament , as may be seen in their late determination concerning chimney money , making cottages built for the use of the poor , and houses of persons exempted from payment liable to chymney money , contrary to the express words of that statute . m. i cannot deny but the things you now mention have been great abuses of prerogative , but whether so great as to require resistance i must still disagree with you , therefore i shall now proceed to the next particular complain'd of , ( viz. ) the examining of the lords lieutenants , deputy lieutenants , sheriffs , and justices of peace , to know whether they would concur with the king in the repeal of the test , and penal laws , and turning all such out of commission as refused to comply with the kings desires in this matter ; now tho' i will not say it was well or prudently done , yet it was no more than ( what i think ) the king by his prerogative might justifie the doing of ; since he may by law give a quietus est to what judges he pleases , and put in or out of commissions , whether civil , or military , what persons he thinks fit , and as for the persons so examined they might have chosen whether they would have given any positive answers to the questions put to them , by the lord chancellor , and lord lieutenants , and if they had refused to answer positively to those questions proposed to them , i know no other penalty they had been liable to , more than being put out of commission , which sure is no punishment , but rather an ease ; and tho' i do not defend those evil ministers that put the king upon this method of distrusting , and disobliging his best protestant subjects ( i mean those of the church of england ) by putting them out , and putting in either papists , or fanaticks in their steads , yet all that own themselves of that communion , ought to have been of more loyal principles than to have taken up arms as some of them have done , upon pretence of standing by the prince of oranges declaration , against these abuses . f. i see though you cannot directly justifie the examining of the lords lieutenants , and deputy lieutenants , and justices of the peace , about taking away the penal laws and test , and turning those out of commission that refus'd ; yet you strive to mitigate it ( as far as you can ) by making it part of the kings prerogative , to put in and out what judges , justices , and other officers he pleases : well , granting this to be so , yet sure you cannot deny but that the clositing of judges , and all other officers you have now mention'd , and putting those out of commission , that refus'd to comply with the kings will , ( and that for no other reason ) was sure a strange abuse of that prerogative ; and the excuse you make that the persons examin'd had a liberty to refuse whether they would give any positive answer , or not , is yet more trivial , since it is very well known , that as well those who gave doubtful answers , or refused to make any answer at all , were as much turned out , as they who positively denied to comply with the kings demands ; so that no answer was looked upon as satisfactory , but such as seemed to give up all freedom of elections , and votes in parliament ; none being to be chosen by the kings directions but such as would engage before hand to repeal the test , and penal laws : and i think you will not deny but that the king by thus examining all these magistrates and officers you now mention , and by turning those out that refused to comply , did all he could to hinder the free election of members to serve in parliament , and the freedom of giving their votes when they came thither , and the king might as well another time have declar'd that he would have no members chosen but such as would agree to take away the statute de tallagio non concidendo , or any branch of magna chart● , which he should think fit to have repeal'd ; and as this strikes at the very fundamental constitution of the government , ( viz ) the free election of parliament men , so it was inserted among the articles against richard the ii. that he had caus'd the sheriffs to return whom he pleas'd for knights of shires , as i have already shewed you . but what say you to the kings late calling in almost all the charters of cities , towns , and corporations in england , and putting in popish or fanatick officers and magistrates , into the rooms of those that were turn'd out , only to influence elections , and to procure what persons he desired to be return'd for parliament men ; is not this a grand breach of the fundamental constitution of the kingdom , thus to take away the legal rights and priviledges of these corporations , for no other cause than to procure the king such parliament men as he had a mind to ? m. i beg your pardon , i forgot to mention this sooner , and though i will not take upon me absolutely to defend the legality of it ; much less the design for which it was done , since i grant that it was in order to destroy , or at least to humble the church of england : yet since i● was done by colour of law , and judgment of the court of kings bench , and no more than what has been formerly done in the reign of king charles , i cannot see how the noblemen , and gentlemen lately in arms , could defend their rising upon that ground , unless they would also at the same time justifie the lawfulness of the plot , and rebellion intended in the same reign , and in which so many of the whig nobility , and gentry , were deeply engaged . f. to answer what you have said in vindication of this great violation of one of the fundamental rights and liberties of the kingdom ; i must in the first place tell you , that as i shall not now examine into the matter of law , whether a corporation can forfeit it's charter for misdemeanours or not ; much less shall i concern my self whether it were done by , or without colour of law , or the judgment of the court of kings bench , since it is notoriously known that none of the judges were permitted to sit there , nor any new ones put in , but such as would blindly agree to all the court would have done , and therefore i value nor any thing they did , nor think it one ●ot the more legal for their judgments : nor is it any excuse , that the same thing was done in king charles reign , and therefore might as well be done now without any rising against it ; for though i must tell you i look upon the taking away of the charters from the city of london , and the other cities and corporations of the kingdom , one of the most arbitrary , and illegal acts of that kings reign , yet there were several reasons which made it unlawful for the nation to rise then ; yet it might not be so now , as in the first place , because most of those charters , were either willingly surrender'd by the members of those corporations , or else were declared forfeited by due trial and judgment of law , whereas it was much otherwise in this kings time , when notwithstanding that all the cities and towns corporate in england , had but a few years before taken out new charters to their great trouble , and expence , they were now summon'd anew to surrender these again , for no other reason but because it was the kings pleasure it should be so , for who can imagine that all the corporations of england could have forfeited their charters in so short a time as three or four years ? and they were plainly told , that the king must and would have them , and that it was to no purpose to stand out , and therefore it was no wonder , if all the cities and corporations of england were forced to submit patiently to this violation , since they found by experience the judges were ready to give judgment against them , right or wrong . and besides this i have already laid it down as a maxime , that no resistance whatever is to be made , till matters become desperate , and all other means are become absolutely ineffectual , which i think they were not , as long as king charles lived , who besides the inconstancy of his humour , which seldome persisted long , either in well or evil doing , ( especially if the ill consequences of it were well laid open to him ▪ ) was too timorous then to have put in any magistrates into corporations , but such as were for the protestant religion , as it stands by law establisht ; and such however angry they might be with those they call'd whigs in respect of their opposing the dukes succession to the crown , yet i believe most of them would never have given up the freedom of elections of parliament men , or have done any thing to bring in popery among us ; so that as long as things remained in this state , there were some hopes still lest of a redress of our grievances , whenever a parliament had met , and that the nation was grown more cool , and had come to it self again after those heats which had risen in the late parliaments about the succession , and other things ; whereas now the case was far otherwise in this kings reign ; wherein we found not only our religion , but the fundamental rights and priviledges of the nation , struck at by the kings dispensing power , and the arbitrary proceedings of the judges : and not only the freedom of elections of knights of shires , but of cittizens and burgesses endeavour'd to be taken from us : either by threatning the electors , or else by open force ; as i shall prove by and by ; when i shall have occasion to speak farther upon that head ; so that unless a great part of the nation had declared for the prince of orange , he had been repuls'd with shame and ruine and our chains tyed faster upon us , than ever they were before . m. i shall forbear replying further to what you have now said , till i come to conclude , but in the mean time i cannot omit another material grievance , set down in the princes declaration , ( viz. ) the turning out and disarming the english protestant magistrates , officers , and souldiers in ireland , and putting of irish papists in their rooms , as also the late declaration of indulgence in scotland ; but as i will not defend the justice or prudence of those councils , so i think none of them could give any sufficient cause for the people of this kingdom to rise in arms , for sure it is enough ( if not too much ) for them to concern themselves with the grievances , and miscarriages of their own country , without taking upon them to take up arms to reform those of their neighbours , since they are not only ignorant of the laws and constitutions of those kingdoms , but may also mistake the true reasons and grounds on which those alterations were made . f. i see you can as little defend what has been illegally acted in scotland , as in ireland , only you would sain put me off by telling me that the people of this nation have nothing to do to take notice of what is done in other kingdoms ; and you may as well tell me , that a man ought not to take any warning as to defend himself against thieves , though he see 's another man robb'd by them before his eyes , or that the protestants of england should not take warning by the sad example of those in france , from ever suffering a popish king from having the same power here as the french king has in france , for fear of the like fatal effects , since i never found papists give protestants the least forbearance , or shew them any mercy longer than whilst it was not in their power to hurt them . but to come to the matter in hand , we cannot but concern our selves with what has been so lately done in scotland and ireland , for the introducing of popery and arbitrary government in those kingdoms , since the latter is notoriously known to be govern'd by the same laws as england , and it is as much against the laws of that kingdom , as it is of ours , for the irish papists to be put in arms , and the protestant militia disarmed , and for popish judges , and justices of peace to be put in commission , as hath been practised under the government of the lord tyrconnel ; and if english protestants in ireland , cannot enjoy their estates and liberties , without being turned out of them by the papists , how could we in england expect better treatment whenever they shall think themselves strong enough ; and as for scotland , tho' it be not wholy governed by the same laws as england , yet the fundamental constitution of the government is the same in both kingdoms , and the king can no more make , abrogate , or dispense with laws in scotland without the parliament , than he can here , and therefore for the king not only to issue out such a declaration of indulgence , and suspension of all the penal laws in scotland against papists , but also therein to declare that he expected an obedience to all his commands without reserve ( whether legal or not ) was so bold a stroke , that we could not but expect the like in england , tho' his majesty thought it not fit at present to discover his mind so plainly to us . m. i shall not any longer dispute these points with you , but own that the abuses you mention , were indeed of great concern both to the protestant religion and our civil liberties , yet however besides the laws of the land , ( which i still suppose do expresly forbid all resistance of the king upon any account whatsoever ) i think there ought to have been no such thing done by any subject of this nation , even upon your own principles , which seem not to allow of such resistance , but in case of an actual and violent assault upon mens religion , lives , and properties , and that by open force of armes ; now i desire you to shew me , whom it is that the king has ever yet dragoon'd , or persecuted till they would become of his religion , or whose life his majesty hath taken away , even of the most notorious traytors , but by due trial , and course of law , nay he has pardon'd divers , several after they were condemn'd , meerly because he was inform'd they were not really guilty of the crimes whereof they stood condemn'd ; and as for mens civil properties , i defie you to shew me any persons estate that has been taken from him without due course of law , or any taxes that have been assessed upon the nation , but what have been granted by parliament : or else raised by the opinion of the judges , by whom if his majesty hath been misinform'd , they only ought to answer for it in the next parliament , who are the only proper judges of their miscarriages without having any course to force , which the laws of this kingdom so much abhor , and therefore make the worst of it you can , all these greivances already mentioned were no more than some breaches upon the outward splendour of our church religion or some of our civil liberties ; whilst the main & essential parts of both continu'd untouch'd , since , god be thanked , we have hitherto enjoy'd the free & publick profession of our religion , together with our lives , liberties and estates in perfect peace , and undisturb'd by any outward force , or violence from the king , or any commission'd by him ; and as for those grievances you mention , viz. the turning out the president and fellows of magdalen colledge by the late ecclesiastical commission , as also the turning out of the deputy lieutenants , and justices of peace , and all other magistrates out of cities and corporations , the king has sufficiently redress'd them by restoring the first to their places , and by putting all the rest into commission again ▪ and turning out those that came in their rooms , and all this before the prince of orange came over , and i doubt not but his majesty would have been content to have given the nation any other reasonable satisfaction they could have desired in the next parliament : which ought to have been patiently waited for untill his majesty thought sit to call it , without going about to right our selves by force . f. i confess you have made not only the most plausible defence you can of the kings late actions , but have also urg'd the utmost that can be said against those defensive arms , that have been lately taken up by those lords , gentlemen , and others who have associated themselves to stand by the prince of orange , till our grievances were redrest by a free parliament ; but if what you have said be strictly lookt into , i doubt it will prove but a mere subtersuge to hide the nakedness of the cause you have undertaken : in the first place therefore let me tell you , that though i confess the king has not yet dragoon'd us to mass , nor has made an actual war upon the lives and properties of the people of this nation ; yet that he has not only invaded our liberties , but also endanger'd the protestant religion of the church of england establish'd by law , you your self have not the confidence to deny ; only you will not suppose it to have been done by any armed force , and therefore ought not to have been resisted by force , but to have waited for their redress by parliament ; which is but an evasion , for in the first place it is plain , that the things complain'd against , in the prince of oranges declaration do most of them strike at the fundamental constitution , both of the church and state , as i have sufficiently prov'd , and shall do it more particularly hereafter when there is occasion : all therefore that remaines to be prov'd is this , that all these breaches , and violations of our religion , and civil liberties , tho' done under colour of law , yet were acted and maintain'd by force ; and secondly , that all other hopes of remedy or redress , unless by joyning with the prince of orange , was wholy taken from us ; the first of these i prove thus : it is notoriously known that for the king to maintain a standing army in time of peace , has been always declar'd against in parliament , as contrary to law , and dangerous to the religion , civil rights , and liberties , of this nation ; now it is also as certain that the king has ever since the duke of m●nmouths coming over , set up , and maintain'd a standing army in this kingdom ; in which he has also put in as many popish officers , and they as many popish souldiers ( contrary to the laws of the land ) as ever they could find , besides the many irish papists that have been of late sent over , for no other purpose than to be listed here , & whilst protestant souldiers were turn'd out of several regiments to make room for them , not to mention the listing of vast numbers of loose , and pr●●ligate fellows , and some of them pardon'd highway men , who provided they had their pay would not have ●luck to rob or murder any body they had been ordered , as may be sufficiently prov'd , not only by their common taking of free quarter , but by their frequent taking it in the houses of gentlemen , and other private persons in divers places of this kingdom ; and that without any amends or redress as i know of , tho' frequently complain'd of at court , all which being done by the kings arbitrary power , without the least colour of law , and in contempt of the militia , the only legal forces of this kingdom , what was this but plainly to declare that as the king had thought fit to act so many arbitary things clean contrary to law ▪ so he was likewise resolv'd to maintain 'em by force , since it is plain that the king never dur'st undertake to do all these illegal and arbitrary things we have now mention'd , untill such time as his standing army was raised ; and tho' it is true , mens lives , liberties , or estates cannot be taken away unless by some force or other , either legal , or military , yet as for those civil rights , and priviledges , which are the main bulwarks and defences of the former , they can only be invaded or taken from us by illegal judgments , and declarations , which if supported by a visible force beyond what the nation ( in the circumstances it was in ) was able to resist , this is as much a taking them by force as if there had been resistance made about them . thus if souldiers come into my house , and say that the king hath given them orders to quarter there upon free cost , i suppose you will not deny , but this is a forceable taking of my goods , nowithstanding i dare not , ( because i cannot ) resist them ; the same i may say for a whole nation , when once opprest in their civil liberties , and those oppressions are once back'd and defended by a standing army contrary to law : but that this army was raised cheifly to this intent , i can give you a remarkeable instance from the mouth of the late cheif justice wright , who sent for officers , and soldiers to make the scholars keep silence , because they hum'd at what the president , and fellows of magdalen's had just before done against the authority of this pretended court ; so that to conclude , from that very time that the king beagn to keep up an army , and to list popish officers and souldiers , ( tho' utterly disabled by law to take commissions , or to bear arms ) by vertue of his dispensing power , and all this in order to back and support his arbitrary proceedings , i look upon this nation under such a force , as that they might lawfully remove it by force , when ever they could . and that either by joyning with some foreign prince , or else by their own domestick arms. but to come to the second point to be prov'd , viz. that there was no other means but force lest us to redress these mischiefs and to retrieve us out of that sad condition in which we lately were , as also to hinder us from falling into worse ; i shall only suppose , ( that which i think you will readily grant ) that there could be no other means to cure these evils but either by some sudden change in the kings inclinations , or else by a free parliament ; the former you must acknowledge was not possible , as long as he continued of the religion he is of , and suffer'd himself to be manag'd by the counsels of the jesuits , and french king ; and as for a free parliament what hopes could there be of that , as long as the king had done all he could to hinder free elections , and due returns of parliament men , by making either popish , or fanatical sheriffs , and putting mayors and other officers of the like principles into most of the cities and corporate towns in england ? nor can i tell but that force would also have been used , if they found they could not have compassed their designs without it , in those places where souldiers were quarter'd ; since i am credibly inform'd that at the late intended elections of burgesses for northampton , and brackly , the officers and souldiers quarter'd , at those places declar'd , that none of the towns-men should be admitted to give voices at the election , unless they would promise to vote for those that the court would set up ; and the like instances i beleive i might give you of other places had i time to enquire into it : and as for the house of peers , pray consider how many of the bishops and temporal lords the king might have gain'd either by threats , or fair promises to the kings party , or at least prevail'd upon to stand neuters , and not to oppose his designs , and if these had fail'd , it had been but calling up some popish , or high tory or fanatick gentlemen to the house of lords , and to have sate their as barons , peers , pro tempore , till this jobb was done , and i doubt not but there would have been enough found out , of each sort , for that purpose , and that i do not speak without book , i have had it from persons of very good intelligence , that such a design was lately on foot , and the court party thought they had very good authority for it ; since mr. pryn , and sr. will. d●dgdale pretended to show us several examples of this kind , as low as the reign of king henry the th . and a great part of the design of your dr. bs. late books seem to have been only to prove , that the king might not only have summon'd to parliament what of the commmons he pleased , but what lords too , and have omitted the rest , as i have already shown you at our two last meetings , and sure if the king had such a prerogative two or three hundred years ago , these gentlemen would not have deny'd his present majesty the like power ; since they have in all their writings and addresses declar'd him as absolute as any of his predecessours . but to make an end , as for what you say of the kings redressing the grievances of the nation before the prince of orange came , it is very true , he did by the advice of some of the bishops , endeavour to put things into the same state they were in at his first coming to the crown ; but i very much mistrust the sincerity of his majesties intentions , since it is plain he never offer'd to do it till the prince of orange was ●ust upon coming , and that his declaration had been spread about the kingdom , and then he did it so unwillingly , that when the news came of part of the princes fleets being shipwrack'd , and that his design was quite put off , the bishop of winchester who was then but newly gone down to restore the president and fellows of magdalen colledge , was immediately call'd back , under pretence of being present as the examination of the birth of the prince of wales , and did not return again to finish that business , till such time as fresh news came that the prince was certainly come , notwithstanding his late disaster . and which is also more remarkable , his majesty in none of his declarations ever disowned his dispensing power , or so much as put out father peters from the council , or disbanded one popish officer , or souldier out of his army , which is another great argument of the sincerity of his intentions . so that i think this was sufficient to convince any reasonable man that there was no other means left us but resistance , and that by force , and a hearty joyning with the prince of orange at his landing . since this resistance was not made either in opposition to the king , or the laws , but for defence of both , against a standing army kept up contrary to law , and headed by officers , the greatest part of which , by not taking the sacrament and test , according to the act made for that purpose , had render'd themselves wholy uncapable of holding those commissions , and consequently whilst in arms were to be look'd upon as common enemies to the nation . but as for his majesties gracious and mercifull disposition ; as i shall not make it my business personally to reflect upon him , so i must needs tell you the execution of mr. cornish , mrs. lisle , mrs. gaunt for treasons falsly alledg'd ; or else for such as women could scarce be capable of knowing to be so , were no great evidences of such highly merciful inclinations . m. i confess you have taken a great deal of pains not only to set forth the late miscarriages of the government , but also to prove that the army which the king raised upon the duke of monmouth's rebellion , and which he hath since kept up to prevent either fresh rebellions at home , or invasions from abroad , has been meerly maintain'd to support all these late breaches upon our laws , and civil liberties , which you say were made upon them : now this is very uncharitably done for as his majesty was forc'd to raise that army at first because the late rebellion in the west was too powerfull to be quell'd by the ordinary train'd bands of the kingdom whom he had too much reason to suspect , by the running over of several of them to the rebels , not to be so loyal as they ought to have been ; and if his majesty had not had a small body of an army on foot , the last summer before the prince of orange came over , he must upon his landing have yielded to his terms , had they been never so unreasonable ; and though i will not defend the listing of popish or irish souldiers , or the granting commissions to popish commanders , yet it is very hard to prove this to be a making war upon the nation , unless you can suppose there may be war made without fighting , and as for those violations of the laws which you suppose were made only upon the presumption of this standing army , this is likewise very hard to affirm , since how can you tell that the judges and ministers would not have given the same opinions and advices concerning the dispensing power , chimney money & the ecclesiastical commission , had there been no army at all rais'd , since they might for ought i know have presum'd that the people of this nation , had been sufficiently convinc'd of the truth of the doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance , as not to have needed a standing army to back what he had already done , tho' contrary to law : but as for the latter part of your dicourses , say the people ought to have waited till the king had call'd a parliament , and then if they had betray'd their trust and given up our religion and liberties as you suppose they would have done , it had been then time enough and not till then for the nation to have call'd in the prince of orange , and his dutc-hmen to their deliverance ; so that till this parliament had been try'd , you could not say that matters were altogether desperate . f. i see you do all you can to prove that the kings raising an army , wherein he had listed so many popish officers and souldiers , ( and which were like to be daily increas'd upon us ) was no making war upon the nation , because they had not yet actually robb'd or murder'd people ; and you may with as much reason tell me that a thief upon the high-way do's not use any violence upon the party he robbs , if he should only clap a cok'd pistol to his breast without asking him to deliver his money : now i suppose you will not deny , but that the passinger would quickly understand the meaning of that sign and wo'd soon deliver his purse for fear of loosing his life ; apply this to the chimney money that has been rais'd upon the poor part of the nation , and the taking away the charters from the corporations , merely through the terrour of this standing army , and see if the similitude do's not exactly fit , and for what you say concerning the presuming upon the doctrine of passive obedience , and so might have done the same arbitrary things whether he had raised an army or not , tho' i am very glad you confess that those doctrines encouraged the kings arbitrary proceedings , yet i must beg your pardon if i cannot beleive the rest whatever thoughts the king might have of the major part of the clergy , nobility and gentry : yet certainly he had no such good opinion of the ordinary people who compos'd the militia , ( and indeed are the hands of the kingdom ) since you confess the king did not look upon them as sufficiently loyal , and therefore was forc'd to maintain a standing army for fear of them ; so that it seems the nation was not yet thorough pac'd in your doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance as you would have had them , but that even this standing army when it was to fight against the religion and liberties of their own country , it was not to be trusted , the king himself was convinc'd of , when he so lately ran away from them at salisbury ; and because some of them deserted him he feared the rest wo'd not fight , in so unjust a quarrell . but as for the rest of tour speech , that the people sho'd have ●arried till matters had become altogether desperate , and that a parliament had actually given us our religion , civil liberties and properties to the kings arbitrary will , that had been indeed intalling slavery upon us by a law , and would have made good the proverb , of shu●●ing the stable door after the horse is stolen , and puts me in mind of a story i have heard of a gentleman whose house being beset by thieves , who were actually breaking in at a window , and that he was about to shoot at them , his over scrupulous chaplain ( who i suppose had nicely study'd your doctrine of nonresistance ) desired his patron to forbear , because the thieves had not as yet sufficiently declar'd their wicked intentions by assaulting or robbing any body in the house , but i suppose the gentleman was not such a fool as to take his chaplains advice , and a great part of the nation was too sensible of the dangers they saw hang over their heads than to follow your opinion . m. i see you are very free in your comparisons , in making the kings late army little better then thieves , and then what opinion you have of the king himself who headed 'em , i leave it to your self to consider ; but since similitudes are no arguments ; i shall not trouble my self to argue this point any longer with you , since i see it is to little purpose ; but yet let your right of resistance be what it will in desperate cases , yet i am sure that diverse lords and gentlemen of your opinion can no way justify their renouncing all allegiance to his majesty , by adhering to a foreign prince , and by their late advising the same prince to call a free parliament , without taking any notice of the king : or making any more addresses to him about it , than if he had never been their anointed soveraign ; and indeed it was a burning shame , as well as a crying sin , for the nobility , gentry , and people in and about this great and populous city to let their king be hurryed away prisoner by a handful of dutch-men , though his majesty hath had since the good fortune to escape out of their hands , when he saw there was no other means to fail him . f. in answer to what you have now said , i must freely tell you ; that if the resistance that hath been made against the army commission'd by the king was lawfull , so has all that has been done in pursuance of that resistance been alike lawfull and necessary ; and therefore what if i tell you that the king by breaking the fundamental constitution of the kingdom , and by twice going away without ever offering to repair those breaches , and give the nation any sufficient satisfaction for the same , has not only put himself in a state of war against the people , but has also thereby ceas'd to be king ; or if you will have it more plainly , has lost and forfeited his right to the crown . m. this is rare commonwealth doctrine , and of the same batch with that of bradshaws , and cooks speeches against king charles the first , but i thank god i have learn'd loyaler principles , and do firmly believe , that a king of england cannot for any tyrrany or breach of laws whatsoever forfeit his crown or royal dignity , as you suppose . but since this is a new doctrine i shall not be unwilling to hear what you have to say upon this subject another time , since it is now too late to pursue this argument any further . f. before i make any reply to what you have now said , i desire not to be misunderstood as if i call all the kings late army thieves or himself the captain of them , since in similes it is sufficient if they agree in some common propertie without being the same things to which they are compar'd , tho this much i may safely say that those that take free quarter without consent of the owners in time of peace , and those who support 'em in it are no better than thieves ; but since you desire to hear my reasons for this opinion i have now given you , i desire that we may have another meeting to debate this weighty question : and then i will likewise hear whatever you have to say against it ; but i must tell you by the way , that you are very much out in making my opinion of the same batch with that of the regicides ; for it appears plainly by the printed tryal of the king , that they acknowledged him for king of england at the same time , when they read his indictment to him , whereas i affirm the contrary , and say that the king cannot be judged or deposed by the parliament or people ; and that he has without any effect of ours absolutly abdicated the government , and deposed himself : but that i may not seem to speak out of any prejudice to this kings person or government , i desire we may first debate it in general whether a king of england can ever fall from , or forfeit his royal dignity let him behave himself never so like a tyrant : and when that is despatcht it will be then time to consider whether the king has so behaved himself or not . m. i like your proposal well enough only let me desire you to come again as soon as you can , for since i hear there is like to be no terme , i intend to go visit some friends in the country , till i see the times clear up a little better . f. i will not fail to wait on you , within a night or two , and in the mean time am your humble servant . m. and i am yours . finis . bibliotheca politica : or a discourse by way of dialogue , on these questions ; i. whether a king of england can ever fall from , or forfeit his royal dignity for any breach of an original contract , or wilful violation of the fundamental laws of the kingdom . ii. whether king william ( commonly stiled the conqueror ) did by the conquest acquire such an absolute unconditioned right to the crown of this realm , for himself and his heirs , as can never be lawfully resisted ; or forfeited for any male-administration , or tyranny whatever . collected out of the most approved authors , both antient and modern . dialogue the tenth . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms ; where also may be had the first , second , third , fourth , fifth , sixth , seventh , eighth and ninth dialogues . . authors whose sense is made use of in this discourse , and how denoted in the margin . dr. hick's iovian . h. i. mr. petyt's right of the commons asserted . p. r. c. dr. brady's answer thereunto . b. a. p. his answer to mr. atwood's ianus , &c. b. a. i. his answer to mr. cook 's argumentum antinormanicum b. a. a. mr. atwood's treatise called ius anglorum ab antiquo . i. a. a. i desire the reader to remember that i do not make use of the word people , for the meer vulgar or mobile , but for the whole community , consisting of clergy , nobility and commons . the preface to the reader . i am come to one of the last parts of my intended task , ( which in pursuance of the last discourse of resistance , ) is whether the late king james by any breach of the original contract made between his predecessors , and the people of this nation , expressed by a notorious violation of the fundamental laws of this kingdom , hath forfeited his crown , and royal dignity , and hath thereby discharged the nation from all allegiance to him ; in the discussing of which to let the world see i do not write any thing out of particular spleen , or prejudice to the late kings person , or government , i have chose to handle this question in general , without making any mention at all of him , and therefore have urged all that i think can be spoken on either side , in this question , without applying it to any king in particular ; but because i find the cheif argument ( next that of a divine right ) for the absolute , and unconditioned power of the late king , is a right of conquest over this kingdom , and nation from k william i. ( commonly called the conqueror ) whereby he is supposed to have acquired an absolute indefeasible right to the crown of this realm , both for himself and such lawful heirs of his body as shall succeed thereunto ; i have also examined all things consider●ble that have been or may be urged on either side on this question , as well from ancient as modern authors : tho' i confess it is the more difficult to be resolved , because not only our later antiquaries , such as sir h. spelman , sir roger twisden , and mr. selden , are p●int blank against sir william dugdale's and dr. brady's notion of king william's title by conquest ; but also the ancient english and norman historians do extremely differ in their relations , for tho' they both agree to found the best title he had on the testamentary donation of king edward the confessor ( which they also call an hereditary right ) yet do they very much differ about the manner of his government . some of the most ancient of the norman and english historians , setting him forth as a iust , and pious prince , and others of them , and especially mat. paris , making ●im a m●er tyrant that observed neither oaths nor laws , farther than stood with hi● own convenience ; i have not therefore omitted to my knowledge any considerable authority or argument , that hath been made use of ; and not to seem partial , have added several new ones that have not been taken notice of before ; and tho' this subject may seem antiquated , and trivial to divers nice readers , yet i doubt not but it will prove sufficiently pleasant and instructive to those who are studious in our english history and laws . but as for the authorities i have given you on either side , i have confined my self wit●in the space of years , after the reputed conquest ; because the authors that writ wi●hin that time , may be supposed to speak either on their own knowledge , or else from the then recent tradition of their grand-fathers , or great grand-fathers at farthest ; as for the arguments ; they are the best i could find among our pretended authors , and where they fell short i have added the best i could think of , or have heard in those conversations i have frequented ; and if these do not satisfie , i hope the reader will not blame me , since it is not my fault they are no better : but if the reverend dr. hick's or the learned dr. brady , ( whom these questions may cheifly concern ) shall vouchsafe to peruse this discourse , and will take the pains so far to consider them , as to shew me my omissions , or wherein the person whom i have all along introduced to oppose their sentiments , has either argued falsely , or is mistaken in matter of fact , i shall be so far from taking it ill , that i shall thank them for their pains , provided it be done with that civility and candour , which may be expected from persons so eminent as they are for knowledge and civility ; i have no more but to beg the readers pardon , for the length of this discourse , which i could yet have enlarged farther , but that i leave him to satisfie his appetite to the full upon this subject of the norman ●onquest , whenever mr. petyt and mr. atwood shall think fit to publish their laborious and learned collections on this subject : till when i hope the reader will stay his stomach with these remainders , tho' they have in great part been served up already in the learned entertainments of those authors mentioned immediately in the title page . the tenth dialogue between mr. meanwell a civilian , and mr. freeman a gentleman . m. oh ! are you come at last ; i have looked for you these two nights ; and now began to fear you were not well , or else had distrusted your cause , and declined another conference . f. i beg your pardon for disappointing you ; which yet i had not done , had no● some business hindred me ; but however to let you see i do not decline another conference with you upon this subject , pray let us go on where we left off ; and tell me freely your sense of my notion of the kings forfeiture , or abdication of the government by his violation of the fundamental laws of the kingdom , and refusal to repair those breaches , when he might have done it ? m. in answer to your demand , i will deal freely with you , and must tell you , that i have perused all writers , that have writ any thing considerable concerning the laws of government , or of nations ; and cannot find in any of them , any thing to countenance your notion of forfeiture , or abdication of an absolute sovereign prince , a● i must still take ours to be , notwithstanding all you yet said to the contrary ; unless what you have cited at our third meeting , out of barclays third book , contra monarches ; where he allows the subjects to resist their prince , in case he go about to destroy the body of the people or common wealth , whereof he is the head : to which i may also add another case which you have omitted , viz. if the prince make over his kingdom to another , without the consent of his people : and i confess that both grotius , and pufendorf , agree with barclay in this notion : because they look upon both these cases , as their plain downright renunciations of their civil authority , over those whom they were obliged to govern : but indeed , the first of these cases is so improbable , nay , almost impossible to happen , that were it not for the over-great niceness of these writers , it need not to have been so much as mentioned ; since none but a mad-man , can ever go about to destroy his whole people ; and therefore as a man out of his wits , such a prince may be resisted ; and lockt up , if ever it should so fall out ( as you your self have confessed it hath very rarely ) for a nation to be so unhappy , as to have such a prince ; but as for the second , viz. the making over their supream power to a foreign prince ; that likewise so very rarely happens , that it is scarce worth the while , to make any dispute about it ; but in all other cases , they held the supream power of every nation , to be absolutely irresistible in any case whatsoever ; and if irresistible , then certainly uncapable of forfeiting their right to govern , by any pretended , or real violation of the liberties and priviledges of the people . and bodin in his first book , de republica ; tho' he grant that absolute princes are obliged in conscience , to keep and maintain all such priviledges , which have been granted to the people by either themselves , or predecessors , which are for the good of the common-wealth ; yet since the prince is sole judge , whether these priviledges are consistent with his supream right to govern , and protect his people , he may therefore have occasion sometimes , not only to detract from them , or dispense with them in some cases ; but may wholy break and lay them aside , by turning tyrant : yet nevertheless in all these cases , people are still bound not to resist them : and that he looked upon the king of england , as such an absolute monarch , as well as others he there mentions , pray read me the place i now cited , where after he has allowed resistance to be lawful against those princes , who were not properly monarchs , as enjoying but a share of the supream power , and among which , he reckons the german emperor , and the kings of denmark , sweden , and poland : but then , when he comes to speak of real and absolute monarchies , his sense is quite different , as you may see by these words . quod si monarchia quaedam est , summâ unius potestate constituta , qualis est francorum , hispanorum , anglorum . scotorum , &c. ( i shall slip all the rest , because not to our purpose ) ubi reges sine controversia jura omnia majestatis habent per se ; nec singulis civibus , nec universis fas est summi principis vitam , famam , fortunas in discrimen vocare , seu vi , feu iudice constituto id fiat , etiamsi omnium scelerum , ac flagitiorum quae in tyrannis convenire antea diximus , turpitudine infamis esset ; where you may observe that force or resistance , by which such an absolute princes life or regal power ( here called fortunas ) are as much forbid , as calling him in question , by appointing judges to sit upon him . and he there gives us a very good reason for it , because all subjects of what degree soever , cannot pretend to any coercive power , over the person of a sovereign prince . f. we have discoursed enough concerning the resistance of absolute monarchs , at our third and fourth meeting , and therefore i desire we may not fall into that subject , which can produce nothing but needless repetitions ; and i have already proved , at our th conversation , that the king is not an absolute despotick monarch , but is limited and tied up by the fundamental laws of the kingdom , from making of laws , or raising taxes without the consent of his people in parliament ; and that our government is mixed , and made up of monarchy , with an allay of aristocracy , and democracy in the constitution ; the former in the house of lords , the latter in the house of commons , as k. charles the first himself confesses in his answer to the parliaments propositions ; and i have farther inforced this from divers authorities out of our an●ient as well as modern lawyers ; viz. glanvill , bracton , fortescue , and sir edward coke : so that since we have such clear proof for our constitution from our own histories and authors , nay from the king himself , besides the whole purpor● and style of the very laws and statutes of the kingdom ; i do not value the authority of bodin a foreigner , whose business it is to set up the authority of the french king to the highest pitch he could ; and therefore being sensible that antiently the government of france and england were much the same , he could not with any face make his own an absolute despotick monarchy , unless he had made ours so too : but this is not the only errour he has been guilty of in our history and constitution , as i can shew you when there is occasion . but arnisaeus , who , as well as bodin , is so much for absolute monarchs , yet does in his treatise of government called his confess that a tyrant in an hereditary monarchy , who violates all the laws of justice and equity to the endangering the ruine of the common-wealth , doth ixcidere iure haereditario , fall from , or forfeit his hereditary right . but pray make it out by some convincing proofs either from history , or law , that our kings are such absolute monarchs as you would make them , that by the fundamental constitution of the government they cannot be resisted , nor can fall from their regal power , let them carry themselves never so tyrannically ; for i do not see you have been yet able to do it by any arguments you have hitherto made use of . m. i have already at our th , as well as at our last meeting , given you divers arguments and authorities whereby i proved the kings of this realm to be compleat , and absolute monarchs ; especially that place from bracton , where he thus speaks of the king , that every one is under him , and that himself is under none but god ; that he has no peer in his kingdom , because so he would lose his power , since an equal has no command over an equal ; much more has he any superiour , because then he would be inferiour to his subjects , and inferiours cannot be equal with their superiours , which sufficiently destroys that notion of yours , that subjects can be in any case equal with their princes , so as to judge and resist their actions ; which is also farther inforced by another passage just aforegoing , de chartis vero regiis , & factis regum , non debent , nec possunt iusticiarii , nec privatae personae disputare , nec etiam si in illis dubitatio ulla oriatur , possunt eam interpretari ; & in dubiis , & obscuris , vel si aliqua dictio duos contin●at intellectus , domini regis erit expectanda interpretatio & voluptas , cum ejus sit interpretari cujus est concedere ; from which we may conclude , that the king's actions were above all censure and dispute , much more forcible opposition of his subjects . and i defie you to shew me any passage in bracton , fleta , or even your beloved author fortescue , that in the least countenances your doctrine of resistance , much less your opinion of the king's forfeiture of his crown and royal dignity for tyranny , or the highest violation of laws ; but rather the contrary in all those passages that i have either observed my self , or found quoted out of them by others : for tho' i grant both bracton and fleta call the king , if he prove a tyrant , or one that governs contrary to law , not god's , but the devil's minister ; yet for all that , they no where maintain , that then he ought , or may be resisted by his subjects , or that they are discharged of their allegiance towards him : for bracton tells us in the same place , that if the king do any man wrong or injury , locus erit supplicationi quod factum suum corrigat , & emendet ; quod quidem si non fecerit , satis sufficit ei ad paenam , quod dominum expe●tet ultorem ; nemo quidem de factis suis praesume● disputare , multo fortius contra factum suum venire : the same he says likewise word for word in another place of any other king or prince , who has no superiour lord , against whom there is no remedy by assize ( or legal trial ) as against an equal , but only place left the injured subject for petition : and bracton gives us a very good reason for it in this maxime , omnis qúidem sub eo , & ipse sub nullo nisi tantum sub deo. so that tho' i grant this moral obligation , which the king hath to observe the laws , is farther increased by his coronation-oath , as bracton observes in his third book de actionibus : but then , as in the oath of allegiance , the people swear nothing to the king but what they are bound to observe unsworn ; so the king in his coronation-oath promises nothing to the people , but what in justice and equity he is bound to perform whether he swear or not ; for , ad hoc ( saith the same author , of the king ) electus , & creatus est ut iudicium faciat universis , &c. and separare debet rex , cum sit dei vicarius , ius ab injuria , &c. but then if he will pervert this great end for which god made him king , if he will not act as it becomes god's vicar , if he will obstruct or pervert the laws , and govern never so tyrannically ; yet still there is left no remedy to his subjects by the law , but moral perswasion ; for the laws imperial of this realm have declared him to be a free , unconditioned , and independent sovereign exempted from all coaction , and outward force , much more from any forfeiture of this crown , or regal authority . f. i hope i shall be able to return you a satisfactory answer to the authorities you have now brought ; for , as for reasons , i see none in the first place ; as to what you say concerning barclays , and all other writers agreeing , that in these two cases you mention , the people may resist their prince , because he does as good as renounce the government of them , and abdicate the crown he wore . pray observe that they also allow the people to judge for themselves when the king thus goes about to destroy them , to make over his crown to a foreign prince : now i desire you to shew me , why the people in a limitted , or mixt kingdom ( as ours is ) cannot as well judge when the king has broke the fundamental laws of the government , whereby it is distinguished from an absolute despotick monarchy ; and hath either actually set up , or is going about to bring in tyranny , or arbitrary power ; since according to the rules i have laid down at our last meeting , the matters to be judged of may be as plain and evident , not only to a single person , but to a whole nation : all that you have to say against this is , only an hypothesis you have laid down without any just grounds , that the king is a sovereign prince , who holds his crown without any condition whatever , and therefore free from all forfeiture of his crown , or regal authority , which is the point to be prov'd : now if i have already made out ( as i suppose i have ) that the king of england is not an absolute monarch , as not having the two main parts of it , viz. the power of raising money , and making laws , in his own disposal , without the consent of his people , and these so reserved by his own concessions , or that of his predecessors , from the very beginning of kingly government in this island ; and if i have also proved at our last meeting , that if we have such fundamental rights , we have also some means left us to keep , and preserve them inviolable , and that this means is only a forcible defensive resistance , in case they are forcibly invaded by any of the king's officers , or souldiers , nay , by his own personal power , in case he shall be so ill advised as to joyn himself with such instruments of tyranny ; it will then also follow , that such a resistance is really a suspension of their allegiance to the king for the time it lasts ; and till they can see whether there be any hopes lest of a reconciliation with him , and that he will amend his errours , and misgovernment ; and if so , and that he will give his people any sufficient testimony of his amendment and sincerity , by giving up such evil ministers to punishment , that put him upon such desperate courses ; i do then readily grant , that the people ought to lay down their arms , and be again reconciled to their king , and submit themselves to him as before , according to that clause in king iohn's magna charta i have already cited , wherein there is a power left for the barons in case of any breach of it , to take arms , and constrain the king by taking of his castles , lands , and possessions , to amend those transgressions ; and when all was thus amended , the charter says , tunc cum fuerit emendatum ( then , and not before ) interdent nobis sicut prius fecerunt ; they shall be subject to us as they were before ; but what followed upon this , the king not only refused to observe this charter , but procured the pope's dispensation to be absolved from the oath he had taken to observe it , and also did all he could to bring in foreigners into this kingdom to support his tyranny ; and raised what forces he could of his own subjects to that end ; whereupon the barons at last were forced to renounce all allegiance to him , and to declare he had forfeited all right to the crown by his tyranny and perjury towards his people , as mat. paris and other authors shew us at large . now what the barons did in the case of king iohn , may be also done by the people of this kingdom in all succeeding times ; or otherwise the king will be in a better condition after he has done the worst he can by force of arms against the people , than he was before ; for if ( as i have already proved ) he may be resisted , till he give the kingdom satisfaction that he will surcease from such tyrannical courses ; and that such resistance is really a suspension of allegiance for the time it lasts ; it will likewise follow , that if the king will still persist in these wicked courses , he must at last forfeit his crown , and discharge his subjects of all allegiance to him ; or else he would be in a better condition , by his wilful persisting in his tyranny , than he could by quitting it , and reconciling himself to his people : for whereas by this method the best he can expect is to return to the exercise of the same limited power ●e before enjoyed : if he push things to the utmost extremity , he may perhaps get the better of his people , and then he may set up for an absolute king by conquest ; or if he fail in that , and be beaten , or taken prisoner by them , he can still lose nothing , since by your principles he still continues an absolute sovereign prince , as he was before , and must be immediately put in the same state and ability of destroying the government , and enslaving the nation ; but your civil , as well as our common law , has a very good maxim , nemo ex proprio delicto beneficium c●piat , no man may take advantage of his own wrong , and therefore such a prince ought certainly to lose , and not to get by his own illegal and tyrannical actions ; and therefore i grant , that the king is not tyed to observe any new things that he was not , before he was crowned , bound to do ; only there is the higher obligation of an oath added thereunto ; so if the king be a limited prince , whose authority depends upon the right exercise of it , and that he can claim no allegiance of his subjects but upon that condition ; if such a prince wilfully breaks all those conditions , and a●solutely refuses to amend , he must at last forfeit his crown , and lose all allegiance from his subjects , or else all their resistance would signifie just nothing , and they would after all be in a much worse condition than they were before . now if this be so , all your quotations out of bracton and fleta will signifie nothing ; for as pufendorf very well observes , a supreme power may reside in a limited king in respect of all his particular subjects , yet they may have a right to disobey him in those things to which his power does not extend ; for , says he , it does not follow , that because i am not bound to obey him in all things , therefore i must be his equal , or superiour , or because i cannot in any wise command him , therefore he may enjoyn me what he pleases ; for supreme and absolute are by no means one and the same , for the former denotes the absence of a superiour , or an equal in the same order , but the latter a faculty of exercising all the rights of government according to his own judgment and will ; and therefore this author in the next chapter says very rationally concerning resisting of tyrants in extreme cases , that their scruple is nothing , who will not admit any liberty of resisting the most cruel tyranny of rulers , because there cannot be supposed any lawful call of subjects taking arms against the supreme power , since no jurisdiction can belong to any subject toward such a power ; as if ( says he ) that self-defence were an effect of jurisdiction , or that there is required any peculiar call or precept for men in case of extream necessity to defend themselves , and to repulse any unjust force from taking away their lives or estates , any more than there is for those who are like to starve , to allay their hunger by eating ; tho' it may be the meal they eat is not their own but another man's ; so far he ; and if this be lawful even in absolute monarchies , in case of defence of life ; the same , i say , may be exercised in limited kingdoms , when the king goes about by force to take away the religion , lives , estates , or liberties of the people contrary to law ; since they both act upon the same principle , that a king , by destroying the fundamental laws and conditions by which he is to govern , renounces the government , and indeed so far dissolves it , that he ceases to be king. and tho' i grant bracton and fleta , and other old lawyers have no● in express words taught this doctrine , yet they do it in effect , since the former tells us , non est rex , ubi dominatur voluntas , & non lex ; that is , he is not a king , when his own will , and not the law governs : and in another place , rex est dum bene regit , tyrannus dum populum sibi creditum violentâ oppri●it domination● ; and in the very same place , ( as you have also observed ) he tells us , exercere debet rex potestatem iuris , ut vicarius & minister dei , potestas autem injuriae diaboli est non dei ; cum declinat ad injuriam rex , diaboli minister est : now , if what bracton says be true , then the king , when he does injury , is the devil's minister , and not god's . i cannot see how he can then act as god's lieutenant ; or why it is not as lawful to resist the devil's minister as the devil himself : and as to what you alledge out of the same author , that there is no remedy lest against the king in case he does wrong , or oppresses any man , but only petition , and after that , the only remedy is expectet deum ultorem , in case he refuse to do right ; this is to be only understood of remedy in ordinary courts of justice , and by ordinary means , for otherwise this author would contradict himself , whereas he tells us expresly , ( as i have already noted out of bracton and fleta ) in populo regendo rex habet superiores , legem per quam factus est rex , & curiam suam , viz. comites & barones , that is the highest court of parliament , called by way of eminency , the earls and barons ; who , he here says debent ei s●●●num imponere , in case he transgress the law ; and therefore if he go on still wilfully to violate all the fundamental laws of the kingdom , by the same power by which they may put this bridle upon him , by the same power may they also declare ( in case of manifest and down-right tyranny , ) that he has forfeited his crown ; and tho' they cannot depose him as his superiours , yet they may declare that he hath by violating the original contract between him and his people ceased to be king ; and that both themselves and all his subjects are discharged of all allegiance to him . and agreeable to this opinion , the old mirrour of justices tells us in the place i have formerly cited at our third meeting , that tho' the king have no peer in the land , nevertheless if by his own wrong , he offends against any of his people , none of those that judge for him ( i. e. none of his justices ) can be both judge , and party ; therefore it is agreeable to right , that the king should have peers , or companions to hear and determine in parliament all writs , and complaints , concerning the wrongs of the king , queen , and their children , of which wrongs they could not otherwise have common right : now can any one imagine that any private person might have right against the king , or his queen , and children , and that there should be no remedy left for the general oppression , and violation of the laws and rights of the whole nation in general , and that whether the king would or not ? for if it had lain in his power to have hindred it by dissolving the parliament , this law had been wholly in vain ; so that this will serve to answer your other quotation out of bracton , concerning the king's charters , or grants , ( for so i suppose factis is to be rendred in this place ) that no private persons , no not the kings justices could in those days take upon them to dispute about , or interpret their meaning , but it was to be left to the king himself ; but how ! not to his private interpretation in his chamber or privy council , but to his interpretation in his great council in parliament ; which as i proved in our fifth meeting consisted of all the great officers of the crown , together with the judges ; who , the king being present , were in the nature of counsellors or assessors to him , and there all matters not determinable in ordinary courts were heard , and determined ; and of this nature were the king's charters , tho' now that power since the dissolution of that great court , is fallen partly to the chancery , and partly to the king's bench , who do both of them at this day judge of the king's grants , whether they are according to law , or not ; and can declare them to be void if they are not . m. this is right rum● parliament doctrine , or rather worse ( if worse can be ; ) for whereas bradshaw and those mock-judges appointed by that pretended iuncto plainly asserted an inherent right in the people of england , and the parliament , as their representatives , to call the king to an account , and to judge and condemn him as his superiours ; you , to evade that doctrine , as being expresly condemned both by the first and second parliaments of k. charles the second , in the statutes i have already cited , do fall into a much more dangerous errour ; for whereas those men supposed it was only in the parliament ( and in themselves as their commoners ) to judge and depose the king , and to put him to death for tyranny ; you take this power out of their hands , and place it in every private person , which you call the diffusive body of the people , which are not only more fallible , but more dangerous judges , as being more apt to errours and mistakes ; but if you would have better consider'd the words , and meaning of that act i have formerly cited of k. charles the second , for attainting the regicides , you would there find these words in the preamble to that act expresly against you ; whereby it is by both houses of parliament declared , that by the undoubted , and fundamental laws of this kingdom , neither the peers of this realm , nor the commons , nor both together in parliament , nor the people collectively , or representatively , nor any other persons whatsoever ever had , have , hath , or ought to have any coercive power over the persons of the kings of this realm . where you see by this act , that all power of judging or deposing the king is expresly renounced , not only for the two houses of parliament , but for the whole people , whether collectively , or representatively , or for any other persons whatsoever : but as for what you say , that the king in case of a wilful , and constant violation of the fundamental laws of the kingdom , is not then deposed by the people , but deposes himself , and thereby renounces the government over them ; this is but a meer fallacy , and an evasion , which you , and those of your party have now found out to make the king to have forfeited his crown without any judgment of the parliament or people ; for who can believe a king will ever depose himself , or do any act , besides an evident destruction of the people , or a making over his royal power , or else an express resignation of the crown , whereby he can ever be construed to have parted with it ; and therefore your notion is no better than the equivocation of the jesuits , who if they are asked whether it be lawful or not for subjects to murder their kings , will tell you by no means ; but it is still with this mental reservation , that princes excommunicated and deposed by the pope do thereby cease to be kings ; and therefore their subjects being thereby discharged of all their allegiance to them , they may not only be resisted but murdered by them as tyrants , and usurpers . put the people here instead of the pope , and see if the parallel does not hold exactly . but as to your argument , from a necessity of resistance , to a necessity of laying the king aside , because he has forfeited all rights to the crown , upon his persisting in the violation of the fundamental laws , and refusing to make the people satisfaction , and this upon the account of i know not what original contract ; for as to the coronation oath , i see you dare not insist upon it , so that i do not now wonder that the gentlemen of your principles are so violent for this right of resistance , since it is only in order to introduce your darling doctrine of the peoples power of deposing or laying aside their kings ( as you term it ) whenever they shall judge they turn tyrants , and have thereby forfeited their crowns , which is a most dangerous doctrine : and if it should take effect , the princes of the world had need look about them , since the people may make up such a pretence ( for ought i know ) even against the very best of them , that are now regnant in europe . but sure absolute monarchs ought not to be outted of their crowns by strained consequences or forced interpretations of laws , therefore pray shew me this original contract you so much insist upon , and those conditions on which you suppose our limited monarchs hold their crowns ; i confess if you could shew me any clause in our laws , or ancient forms of the coronation of our kings , as there was at the coronation of the kings of arragon , wherein the chief justice on the behalf of the people plainly told him that they made him king upon this condition , that they would have more power than himself : or that in the conferring of the regal power it was expresly reserved in what cases it should be lawful for them to resist the king ; or to absolve his subjects from their allegiance ; as bodin tells us , it was expresly inserted in the coronation oath of henry ii. duke of anjou ( afterwards king of france , ) when he was made king of poland : that if he broke his oath and violated the laws , and priviledges of the clergy and nobility of poland , then the people of that kingdom should not be obliged to render him any obedience : i grant then that the liberties of such a people might be preserved , but the king that took upon him the regal power upon such conditions , would not be properly a monarch , but liable to the judgment of his people , whenever he really did , or that they imagined he had thus violated their laws , since the supream authority would still reside in them . but indeed the case ( god be thanked ) is much otherwise with our monarchs who are kings by right of inheritance , whether ever they take any coronation oath , or not : as k. edward the first was , whilst he was in the holy land , almost two years before he could come over to be crown'd ; and k. henry the sixth was not crowned till the eighth year of his reign , as well as of his age. but that our kings are so by inheritance , and by the laws of god , and man previous to any coronation oath , or consent of the people , is expresly declared by the act of recognition of k. iames i. and that treason could be commited against him before he was crowned , sir edward cooke tells us in calvin's case , was the opinion of all the judges of england in the plot wherein watson and clerk the priests were executed , and sir walter rawleigh condemned . so that what you have now urged from reason , or authority of our antient lawyers , is either quite mistaken , or else does not reach the matter in hand ; that it cannot be made out from reason , is plain ; since your whole argument is built upon this false foundation , that it is lawful in some cases to resist the king , in case of a notorious breach of the fundamental laws , and therefore it is necessary also to declare him to have forfeited his crown , if he persist in this violation ; whereas i deny your assumption , for i hold it utterly unlawful to resist , on any pretence , or for any cause whatsoever ; and therefore it is impossible for the king who ( as i said but now ) is an absolute unconditioned monarch , to forfeit his crown for any such violation of your original contracts , or fundamental laws of government : so that let me tell you , that the citations you have brought out of history , as also bracton , and fleta , do not prove either the one or the other of these : for first as to the clause in king iohn's charter concerning resistance , and the barons having a power thereby to constrain the king to amend his violations of it , by making war upon him , and that they should not return to their former allegiance till all was redressed ; make the most of it , it could be no more than a particular concession for himself alone , and was not intended to reach his successours , who are not at all mentioned in this clause ; and that it was never intended to reach them , may further appear , because that this clause of resistance is omitted out of all the subsequent great charters , that were granted by henry the iii. or his son edward the i. and instead of this , it was thought a sufficient security upon the last confirmation of these charters in the year of king henry iii. for the king , bishops , earls and barons to agree , that the arch-bishop of canterbury , and all the rest of the bishops should declare all those , that wilfully transgressed or infringed the great charters in any point , excommunicated ipso facto , not excepting the king himself , according to the form of it , which you will find in mat. paris ; and other writers of this transaction . but for the places you have cited out of bracton , there is none of them reach the point in question ; for as to the first , non est rex ubi dominatur voluntas & non rex ▪ the meaning of it is not that he is no king , but that he does not act as a king , but a tyrant , when he thus governs by his meer will , and not by law ; and to the same effect is the next passage , rex est , dum bene regit ; tyrannus , dum populum fibi tradi um violenta opprimit dominatione ; all which we readily grant ; yet since he is still an absolute monarch , all writers hold , that his governing without or against law , cannot give the subjects a power to resist him , much less can it be construed as a renunciation or forfeiture of his imperial power ; and therefore tho' it is true , that as bracton , and fleta tell us , whilst he thus acts , he does not act as god's lieutenant but the devils minister ; yet does it not follow that we may therefore resist him with carnal weapons , or force , since we cannot so resist the devil himself ; and tho' he may in this matter of breach of the laws , which he has sworn to observe , act as the devils minister , yet notwithstanding in all other points of government , as in the punishment of robbers , and other notorious offenders , and in the due administration of justice between man and man , he still acts as gods lieutenant ; and it is much better that we should have some civil government tho' mixt with tyranny , and oppression , than that we should fall into all the mischiefs and confusions of a civil war ; nay , that anarchy too which has been often produced by it : and tho' i confess the last place you have made use of , to wit , rex habet superiorem , legem , & curiam suam , viz. comites & barones , &c. who ought , if he transgress the law , to put a bridle upon him , yet by this ( as i have already proved ) neither bracton nor fleta could mean any co-active ●orce , but only a moral restraint upon the king by petitions , remonstrances , or denial of aids , till he would be reform'd by fair means ; but that it does not go farther , appears by the parrallel bracton there makes between our saviour christ and the virgin mary , who being both free from the law of moses , yet voluntarily chose to be obedient to it ; which sufficiently proves , that those authors never designed that the parliament should oblige the king by force , or whether he would or no , to amend his faults ; since that was as you your self must acknowledge against their very institution ; since both their mee●ing , and their dissolution , wholly depend upon the kings will. f. i confess you have made a long , and elaborate speech in answer to my notion , that a king may forfeit his crown , that is , by his own act , cease to be king ; but i shall be able to give you a satisfactory answer to all this , if you please to take it ; in the first place therefore , i cannot but observe , that all your discourse depends upon two principles , alike false ; first , that no absolute monarch , can by his own act forfeit , or lose his right to the government , without a formal resignation of the crown ; or , secondly , that the kings of england have ever been such absolute monarchs : which if they are both great mistakes , all that you have said on this head falls of it self . now that a king , tho' an absolute monarch , may do such an act as shall make a forfeiture of his crown , without any solemn resignation of it , you your self are forced to allow , in the two cases you have put , viz. that of such a monarchs becoming an enemy to his people , and going about to destroy them ; and that of his making over his kingdom , to another without the peoples consent : now if the diffusive body of the people in an absolute government , can judge of these two cases whenever they happen , without appealing to any general council , or assembly of the whole nation ; i desire to know why it may not be as easie and lawful for the people to judge without a parliament , when the fundamental laws of the constitution are generally and wilfully broken and violated ; and that violation persisted in by the king , for the introduction of tyranny and an arbitrary government ; since the rules i have laid down to know it are but a few , and easie to be known and judged of by the most common capacities . now that a superiour or governour may lose all that power and authority he once had , and that without any act of the party governed , may appear by those great and natural relations of a husband , and a master : in the former of which , if a husband , in the state of nature , use his wife so cruelly , that she can no longer live or co-habit with him , without danger of her life , i doubt not but she may quit him ; and may also when she is out of his power , marry her self again to another man that will use her better : so in the other relation of a master , if such a one , in the state of nature have a slave , and will not allow him sufficient cloaths , victuals , or will beat him , or use him so cruelly for no just cause , that he cannot enjoy the ordinary comforts of life ; no man will deny , but that such a slave may lawfully run away from such a master , and ●s at liberty either to live of himself , or to chuse another master if he think good : and this instance is much more strong in an hired servant ; who is to serve his master , for such and such wages , or to do such and such work , and no other ; if in this case the master refuse to pay him his wages , or put him to do other work than what was agreed upon between them ; or instead of an hired servant will make him his absolute slave ; in these cases no man can doubt , but by this unjust treatment of the master , the servant is discharged of his service , and may go whether he pleases ; and of these actions , i have already proved at our first meeting , the party injured , be they wife , or servant , must be the only judges in the state of nature , where there is no civil power over them ; or else if the husband or master shall judge for himself , the wife or servant is never like to get any redress ; apply this to the case of a limited , or conditional king , and his subjects , and see if it be not absolutely the same , upon the total breach of the original constitution of the government ; and whether the bond of allegiance is not then as absolutely dissolved , by the sole act of the prince , without any authoritative power in the subjects , as it is in the case of such a wife or servant , by the sole act of the husband , or master without any superior authority in such wife or servant , to quit them , and so to discharge themselves of their wedlock , or service . therefore as to your accusation , that my notion is worse than that of the rump parliament , that put the king to death , i deny it ; for they supposed that there was no way of being rid of a tyrannical king , but by making the people , ( and consequently the parliament as their representatives ) his superiours or judges , to call him to an account , and judge and punish him for his tyranny ; this i abhor , as much as your self , for i grant that a king cannot be properly the supream , and at the same time own another power above him , to punish , or call him to an account for his miscarriages ; but this power that i insist on , is not ( as i have all along told you ) a power of punishment , but a right of resistance for self-defence , in the first place , and of judging and declaring the king to have forfeited his crown or right to govern , if he persist in his tyranny , without any amendment , or satisfaction given to the people . nor is this doctrine of the peoples thus judging for themselves , so dangerous as that of the rumpers ( as you suppose , ) who put this right of judging , when the king had thus forfeited his power in the parliament , of which they thought themselves the only lawful , or necessary members ; but indeed it was not so , for they still supposed him to be their lawful king , and yet at the same pretended to arraign him , as you may see by the title of the charge , or indictment they drew up against him ; all which i grant to be altogether unjust and illegal ; but it is not more , but rather less dangerous to put this power of judging , when the king has thus dissolved the government , and forfeited his crown , upon such notorious and wilful breaches of the fundamental laws , in the whole or diffusive body of the people , rather than in the parliament , or great council of the nation ; for as to your assertion , that the whole people are more fallible , and consequently more dangerous judges in such a case , than the great council , i deny it , since all the matters of fact must be so evident and notorious to the senses and feeling of the greater part of the people , that there can be no doubt or denial of it , by any reasonable and indifferent judges ; and the greatest part of the people are willing to live in peace , without making any disturbance or alteration in the government , if it may be avoided ; whereas in any great assembly or council , there are , many and those of the most eloquent and leading men , who commonly carry the rest which way they please , who are governed by faction , ambition , or self-interest ; and upon all , or some of these , &c. may be desirous to raise civil wars , or to declare the king to have done things that require resistance , or to have forfeited his crown , when indeed he has not ; and for this the very long parliament you mention is an evident example , since you cannot but grant , that if the differences between the king and that parliament had been left to the judgment of the whole people , there had never been any civil war at all , nor had the king ever been beheaded ; since it is notoriously known , that before the parliament stirr'd up the people to war , by seizing of the militia , they were not at all inclined to it . it being a restless , and factious , ambitious party of men on both sides , who brought on the last civil war : not but that i defer much to the judgment of a free , and unbyast parliament , who may confirm , and declare what the diffusive body of the people have already justly done , to be right , and lawful , which may be as great a satisfaction to private mens consciences in civil disputes , as a general council is in spiritual controversies about matters of religion ; wherein tho' such a council cannot make new articles of faith , yet we protestants hold that it may declare what were anciently believed : but if the people have a right of judging during the intervals of parliament , when the king has notoriously broke the fundamental constitution , and so may make resistance accordingly ( as i have already proved they have ; ) since otherwise the king may absolutely refuse ever to call any parliament at all , or at least may not let them sit , till all grievances are redressed ; so that i cannot see why they may not also judge , when the king has so wholly broke his original contract , and so obstinately persisted in it , as to create a forfeiture of his crown , since the one is not harder to judge of , than the other ; nor is your parallel between our opinion , and that of the jesuites at all true , unless you could also prove , that i had put the same authority in the people to depose their kings by a right conferred on them by god , as the jesuites do in the pope by such a pretended power , as superiour to that of all the monarchs in the world , but there is nothing like it in my hypothesis . since i do neither allow the people to judge , or depose the king , much less to put him to death , tho' a tyrant , but only to judge , and declare , when he has made such notorious breaches on the fundamental constitution , as do necessarily imply a forfeiture , or rather an implicite abdication of his royal power , and whereby he deposes himself . but to come to the second point , to prove , that our kings were never absolute monarchs , or had the sole and absolute authority over the people of this kingdom , and if so , that there was somewhat still reserved by the people at the first institution of the government ; and which the king by the original contract , when he or his ancestors took the crown , must be still supposed as bound to maintain ; now that there must have been such a thing as an original contract ( however light you are pleas'd to make of it ) i thus make out ; you may remember that at our fifth meeting , i proved , that at the first institution of kingly government in this nation , it was not by right of inheritance , but election . . that this election was made either by the whole body of the people in person , or by their lawful representatives in the great councils , or mycel synods of the english saxons . . that this great council did then reserve to themselves these material parts of government . first , a right of meeting or assembling at stated times of the year ; and that without any previous summons from the king. . a right of proposing or at least o● assending to all laws that should be made in all future times . . a right of granting general aids , or taxes for the people , and that without their consent no taxes could be imposed . . and as subsequent to all these a right of agreeing to all wars , and treaties of peace ●o be made with foreign nations : but the first and last of these tho' i could prove to have been constantly observed , during the saxon government , and long after , yet since the people have parted with their right to their kings in these matters , i shall not now insist upon them , only that this people have still a right to parliaments , once in three years at least , and oftner if necessity require . these then being the original constitutions of the kingdom , the king must have either entred into a compact with the people for the maintenance and observation of these fundamental rights , or else it must have been left to his discretion , whether he would suffer the people to enjoy them or not : if the latter had been true , then i grant they had made him an absolute monarch , and had left it wholly at his discretion , whether they should enjoy these fundamental rights and priviledges or not ; but it appears plainly to the contrary that they did not , for i shall prove ( if need be ) that the succession to the crown was at first elective , and not hereditary ; now in all elective kingdoms of the gothick model , it is very well known that their kings were so far from being absolute , that the assembly of estates , or great councils of those kingdoms reserved to themselves a power of deposing their kings for tyranny and mis government ; as i have already proved was frequently done , not only in england , but in all the neighbouring kingdoms without any imputation of rebellion : and i have also given you a quotation out of the ancient mirrour of justices ; which tells us , that upon the election of the first king of this whole island . the princes that chose him then caused him to swear , that he would maintain the holy christian faith with all his power , should rule his people justly without regard to any person , and should be obedient to suffer right , or justice , as well as others , his subjects . and now that upon a failure to perform these things , a forfeiture of the crown would follow , and that thereupon he would cease to be king : pray see those ancient laws in lambards saxon laws , and sir h. spelman's councils which go under the name of king edward the confessors : ( tho' they were made as hoveden shews us in the time of king edgar his grand-father ) where among those laws of king edward that were confirmed by k. william i. this is one . rex autem qui est vi arius summi regis ad hoc est constitutus ut regnum terrenum , & populum domini , & super omnia sanctam veneretur ecclesiam , & ab injuriis defendat , & m●leficos ab ea evellat , & penitus dispendat , quod nisi fecerit nec nomen regis in eo constabit , that is , not so much as the title of king shall remain to him : and in the same sense bracton is to be understood , as an explanation of this law , in his second book ; est enim corona regis facere iustitiam , & iudicium , & pacem tenere , sine quibus confistere non potest , nec teneri ; which may be thus rendered ; that it is the royal office or dignity , ( for so i construe corona regis ) to do justice , and judgment , and to maintain peace ▪ without the observation of which , his crown or royal dignity cannot hold ▪ nor consist : so that this is but an explanation of my sense of that other passage i have already cited out of this authour , non est rex ubi dominatur voluntos , & non lex , i. e. he is not a king , ( that is , ceases to be a king ) when his will , and not the law governs ; and he gives the reason for it in another place , speaking of the king , when he was not then hereditary , for , ad hoc electus est rex , & constitutus , ut faciat iustitiam universis . therefore if he thus totally deviate from the end of his creation , his authority ceases , and is at an end . so that nothing is plainer , than that our ancient laws have declared , the king to have lost the title and right of being king in case of notorious tyranny , and breach of this original contract ; and that the ancient lawyers , bracton and fleta , gave the same interpretation of this law , is also as plain . so that what you have said to evade or misinterpret the authority of these authors , as to the points of non-resistance and forfeiture of the regal power , will signifie nothing ; for as to what you say of that clause of resistance being left out in all subsequent charters after this of k. iohn's , and therefore that it was no binding law to his successours , i do not deny the matter of fact , that it was so omitted ; yet that does not prove , that the whole nation ever renounced their right of resistance in the cases mention'd ; since as they exercised it before that charter was given ; so also they continued to do it in the reigns of his successours , as i have shewn in the history i have given you of this resistance at our last meeting , and therefore constant practice is the best interpreter of this fundamental law : as for our evasion of that place of bracton , non est rex , &c. i have sufficiently confirmed my sense of it , by this law of k. edward , as also by other passages out of this author : and i will leave it to any man to judge which is the most genuine interpretation of this place ; he is not a king , ( that is ceases to be so ) when his will , and not the law rules ; or that he does not act as a king , as you interpret it : but you grant such a king is really a tyrant , yet may not be resisted , nor can lose his power ; and why ? because it is absolute and unconditional ; this is to take that for granted which we deny , for he that hath not the full and sole power of making laws , and imposing taxes , is not absolute monarch ; but the king of england has neither of these , ergo , &c. and if this be so , see what grotius says expresly of such a prince , ( as high as he is for the non●resistance of absolute monarchs , ) si rex partem habeat summi imperii , partem alteram populus , aut senatus , regi in partem non suam involanti vi● justa opponi poterit , quia tatenus imperium non habet ; quod locum habere cense● , etiam si dictum sit , belli potestatem penes regem sore ; id enim de bello externo intelligendum est , eam alioqui quisquis imperis summi partem habeat , non posset non jus habere eam partem tuendi , quod ubi fit , potest rex etiam suam partem belli jure amittere ; where you see , that the opinion of this learned author , is , that a king may not only be resisted in case he invade that part of the supream power that does not belong to him , but may also lose his own share of the empire by right of war : now further that our ancient lawyers believed , that our king had not the whole power , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in their hands , appears by that passage so often cited out of bracton , rex habet superiores , legem per quam factus est rex , & curiam baronum , &c. which you strive to evade by supposing i know not what moral superiority which the court might only exercise towards the king by remonstrance , or pe●●●on , in setting forth his deviations against a law ; but what if he had refused to hearken to them ? why then , say you , all the remedy was , expectet deum vltorem ; now if this was all , then every private subject had such a moral superiority ; for bracton says of them , locus erit supplicationi , ut factum corrigat , & emendet , quod sinon fecerit , &c. then he was to look for god to revenge it : but bracton and fleta are more express in this point , and say , that this curia baronum , were not only socli , but magistri ; for say they , qui habet socium , habet magistrum , so that surely this bridle must have been somewhat more than bare prayers , remonstrances , or denial of money ; nor is your reason to the contrary cogent , since it is only drawn from a simile between christ , the blessed virgin , and the law of moses : now you know very well , that similes are not arguments , nor can any argument be drawn from them , but indeed it plainly appears by what follows in bracton , that he supposed this power to be somewhat more than meerly moral ; for he there says , that if the people cry to god for want of justice against the king , he will send for a foreign nation who shall come and destroy both them ( viz. the barons ) and their king , which would have been a vain threat , if he might have chosen whether he would be reformed by them or not . to conclude , if the first king of the saxon race took the crown upon condition to maintain the fundamental laws , and constitution of the government , and that he was never invested with an absolute despotick power of making laws , and raising money at his pleasure , but the people reserved to themselves their share of both , at the first institution of the monarchy ; all those princes that claim by vertue of their right , are tied by this first original contract , whether they ever took any coronation oath , or not ; nor tho the crown now become no more elective , does it , at all alter the condition or the limitation of his ancestors , as long as the present king holds by , and under the same title , and by vertue of the same original contract ; since , as it was by the peoples will , that it was at first elective , so it was also by their will , that it became successive ; since every entail of the crown upon heirs , can only proceed from the peoples agreement or consent to maintain it as a standing law , or else every king might alter it at his pleasure . as for your next reply , that if we resist the king , because when he turns tyrant , he acts not as gods lieutenant , but the devils minister ; for , so that tho' it is lawful to resist the devil , yet we cannot use carnal force against him , this assumption is false , since if we can suppose the devil does ever use carnal force , we may also repel the same by force , or else those famous stories of witches , and spirits being afraid of , and flying from naked swords are all false : i beg your pardon for speaking so long ; which i could not well contract into less compass without passing by your arguments and answers to my quotations . m. you have indeed out-done me in making long speeches , but i have heard you patiently , because i cannot deny , but that you have argued fairly , had it been upon a right foundation ; but since it is not , pray give me leave to set you right , and shew you , that notwithstanding all you have urged to the contrary , yet all our kings since the conquest were absolute monarchs ; and if so , not only irresistible upon any breach of their coronation oaths , but also have been invested with such an absolute unconditioned power , as can never be lost or forfeited upon account of the highest acts of tyranny ; but before i come to my proofs , give me leave to say somewhat to those last citations you have brought from king edwards laws , as also from bracton and fleta . first , as to that law you have cited , that passes under the title of one of those confirmed by king william the conquerour ; give me leave to tell you , that i much question whether it be genuine , and not foisted in by some of the monks that had the keeping of the copies of those laws in their monasteries , after the original it self was no more to be found ; for in the first place i must observe , it does not savour of that absolute power , that i take k. william to have acquited by his sword , to own his royal dignity forfeitable , or that he could lose the name of king upon any account whatsoever , at this pretended law seems to intimate , by these words , nec nomen regis in to constabit ; now that it strongly savours of the ignorance of the monks , i shall shew you by the very law it self , wherein the chief points , for which the king must lose his royal title , is not only if he does not defend his earthly kingdom , but also the people of god , that is , the clergy , and also shall fail to reverence holy church , that is , the bishops and clergy , of whom the monks looked upon themselves as the chief , and most considerable part ; as also if he fail to destroy evil doers , ( that is hereticks out of the church ) then ( forsooth ) not so much as the name of king must remain to him ; now pray see the consequence of this , and whether you will own this to be a fundamental law of the kingdom , for then at this rate , henry the viii . who suppressed monasteries , and took away abby-lands , and let injurious persons spoil the church by sacriledge , and also all other princes , who have not extirpated those , who , when this law was supposed to have been made , would have passed for hereticks ( that is all protestants ) must have all forfeited their royal dignities , and consequently the pope did henry viii . and queen elizabeth no wrong , if in pursuance of this law , they excommunicated them , and declared they had forfeited their crown , since this law says , that pope iohn testified this truth quod nomen regis perdet . .. but nothing makes out more evidently to me the forgery of this pretended law , than the notorious faults there are in the chronology , where the sentence of pope iohn against king childerick is mentioned as an evidence to make it good , whereas indeed it was not pope iohn , but zachary who gave this sentence ; but in hovedens copy of this law , there is yet a more gross errour ; for it makes pipin , and his son charles to have writ to william the bastard , upon their hearing this definitive sentence , so wisely given by him concerning the title of king ; all which is so notorious a piece of folly , and ignorance , that it needs no other confuration ; but granting that part , containing the law it self , to be genuine , it does not at all set forth your original contract , or make it a forfeiture in the king to do any of those things which you supposed to be main parts of the fundamental constitution ; only says in general , that unless he defend his earthly kingdom , and the people of god , and reverence holy church by defending it from injurious persons , and removing evil doers from it , name of the king will not belong to him ; now all this the most absolute monarch in christendom , even the king of france himself will say he performs to a tittle ; and therefore there is no fear of a forfeiture for any king , tho' never so absolute and tyrannical upon these terms , unless he will do that which i think he is too wise ever to go about , to destroy his people wilfully , or to fall upon the church of rome and its clergy . as for the rest of the places you have cited out of bracton and fleta , to prove this notion of a forfeiture , i must freely tell you that they do not seem to me to come up to the point for which you bring them ; for as to that place you have cited out of bracton , non est rex , &c. you and i differ about the sense of it , and i see no reason why i may not still keep my own opinion : the other place i confess seems more express , viz. that it is the crown or dignity of the king to do justice or judgment , without which it cannot hold or consist ; this also does refer only to such justice and judgment as the king is to give and distribute between man and man , without any relation to his own actions towards his subjects ; and if a prince will not do this , either by himself or deputies , i grant his crown , or royal dignity cannot long subsist to be maintained , since this will bring all things to utter confusion , so that strangers will soon be encouraged to invade the kingdom , nor will the people be at all concerned to assist such a king against them ; since they can be in no worse a condition under a stranger than under him ; but as for the ancient superiority of the law and court of barons , there mentioned , to be over the king , that still seems to me to be only a moral , and not a co-ercive power ; since the law alone is but a dead letter , and can force no man of it self , without the power of men to support it ; and there can be no interpreters of this law but the king , and his judges out of parliament ; and the parliament sitting , that alone , that is , not the house of peers or commons alone , or both together , but the king , lords , and commons that can interpret laws : but let the power of this court of barons have been anciently what it will , it seems to relate only to the peers or tenants in capite and not to the commons at all , since none ever heard them called the kings companions ; but suppose it so , it is now gone , and as for any co-ercive power in the two houses over the king , i have already shewed you , that the two first parliaments of king charles the second , have expresly renounced it from themselves and the whole nation ; and therefore i must still stick to my first conclusion , that the king is not to be resisted upon any terms whatsoever , neither can forfeit his royal dignity by certain general , antiquated laws , or by the forced interpretations of some doubtful obscure passages in our ancient lawyers : but i shall now proceed to prove , f. i pray give me leave to reply to what you have now said , before you go to any new head , first , in answer to what you have now objected against the genuineness of this law of edward the confessors , it is certain , that it is found in these very words , with very little alteration in all the copies of king edwards laws ; only in hoveden , instead of rex quia vicarius summi regis , it is , rex atque vicarius ejus , which is no great difference , and may relate to the kings lieutenant in his absence beyond the seas , as there was often occasion for our kings , after their accession to the crown of england ; and therefore tho' i grant some clergy-men ( they having then all the learning of the nation among them ) might draw up this law into the form it was made , and so render it as advantagious for the church as they could , yet that this clause was not the addition of any ignorant monk ( as you suppose ) will appear from this , that it is recorded by hoveden , who lived and wrote about a hundred years after it was thus confirmed ; and we cannot suppose all the copies of these laws to be lost , and one single copy to be left and corrupted in so short a time ; and tho' it is true , this law is not found among those set forth in the last edition of iugulph , yet does it not therefore follow , that there was no such law ever made or confirmed by king william , since those laws in ingulph seem to be more like an epitome of the criminal and feudal laws confirmed , or added by that king , than an exact body of all the laws of the confessor , those having been writ in latine , and confirmed by k. william in the fourth year of his reign ; whereas this copy was published in french for the use of the kings norman and french subjects , and that long after k. williams coming to the crown ; for ingulph tells us , that after domesday book was made , he brought those laws down from london in the french tongue ( in which they were put forth , lest he or any of his monks , should through ignorance happen to offend his royal majesty by an unwary breach of them ; ) but as for the faults in the chronology in the story of charles and pipin in all the best copies of these laws , this letter is said to be written by them to the pope , and not to k. william at all , and then it will be at most but a miss-nomer or errour of the transcriber putting in pope iohn , for zachary ; but if you will have my opinion of this matter , i do freely grant that this passage in the law concerning princes writing to the pope about the deposition of k. childerick might be an addition of those monks who first transcribed those laws , and made short glosses upon them , and yet the law it self might be genuine notwithstanding ; and if the law it self be so , it must be understood in a larger sense than what you would put upon it , for sure by defending of his kingdom must be meant , not only the bare defending it against foreign enemies , but also against the wrongs and oppressions of his own ministers , and officers , which if he suffer by a wilful negligence , or on se● purposes , he will as much offend against this law , as if he had done it himself , and so will lye under the same penalty . much less will these passages concerning defending the clergy , and reverencing the church , render this law either void , or impracticable ; for suppose , you take populus dei , in the strictest sense to signifie the same with servu dei , ( which i grant always to signifie the clergy in our ancient saxon laws and charters ) yet all this does not make this law void and impracticable ▪ since , sure maintaining the worship of god is one part of the duty of a christian king , nor can this be well performed without some men set up for that purpose , and that these men cannot attend their sacred function without being maintained in their just rights and liberties ; neither is it any consequence that these clergy must always consist of the very same orders of men , as when this law was made , so that suppose the monks were then held as a necessary part of this clergy , it will not follow ; that it was not lawful for the state to alter or take them away ; for then no religious order that was then in being , could have been suppressed afterwards , which no papist will say ; so that the meaning of this clause in the oath , is no more than that the king should from time to time defend all those clergy , such which the nation , that is , the legislative power should think useful , and necessary for gods service , without being tyed to any certain orders or degrees of men ; provided those that are particularly ordained by christ and his apostles , for the service of his church , be inviolably maintained and preserved ; so likewise for the church it self , granting ( which may also be questioned ) that at the time when this law was made or confirmed , popery was come to its height , and so was the established religion of the nation : and consequently that by the church here mentioned , was then to be understood the romish church or religion , ( as we now call it ) yet does it not follow , that the king by this law is to forfeit his crown , if he ever alter ; for the law only says in general , that he shall reverence the church of god ; that is , that profession of christianity , or way , which he , and the great council of the nation , shall upon the most mature judgment and deliberation think to be so ; so that all that can be deduced from this clause is , that the king shall reverence the church , that is , maintain the profession of religion , which shall be established by law , and shall make no alteration therein , without the general consent of the whole nation in their great councils or synods , consisting as well of ecclesiastical as secular members ; and so likewise he shall defend it from all injurious persons , that would invade the rights of the church and its clergy , contrary to law , and shall root out all evil doers ; that is , all debaucht , and wicked professors of christianity ; for so malesicos properly signifies , and not hereticks ; as you would render it ( who are not evil doers , but false believers ) or if it should be interpreted for hereticks , it is not those that then might be looked upon as such , but what the present church shall so determine ; or else we must own the former church to have been infallible in all her determinations . so that i can see no reason upon the whole matter , why this law should now become void ; or unprofitable by reason of any alterations in religion , or of those men that were then to exercise the functions of it ; as long as all the necessary and material parts of both are preserved , as they are to this day : for otherwise this law would have tyed up the king and nation , from making any reformation in religion , tho' never so much for the better , or tho' the national church had never so much required it , which i suppose no true protestant will affirm . but as for those passages out of bracton and fleta which i have brought to confirm and support our sense of this law ; and which you labour to avoid by putting too general and loose an interpretation upon them ; whereby you would make them only to signifie that the king is to maintain right judgment and justice between man and man , without which his royal dignity cannot hold or subsist ; but that he is not obliged upon any penalty to observe the same things in respect of himself , or his own officers , or ministers ; this is all one , as if a shepherd , who had a flock of sheep committed to his charge by the owner , having first fleeced , and then killed , and destroyed them , and converted the wooll and carkasses to his own private use , should then tell the owner , that he was indeed to defend the flock from thieves , wolves , and foxes , but that it was no part of his bargain to keep them safe untoucht from himself , or his servants : or so much as his own dogs ; but that the sense of bracton and fl●ta is quite otherwise , sufficiently appears by these places i have now cited , and if those will not do , pray consider these that i shall nere add ; for bracton also in the same chapter tells us , ad hoc creatus est [ rex ] & electus , ut , iustitiam faciat universis , and he also there recites the ancient coronation oath in these words . debit enim [ rex ] in coronatione sua nomine iesu christi haec tria promittere populo sibi subdito , imprimis se esse praecipturum , & pro virious opem impensurum ut omni populo christiano vera pax omni suo tempore observetur . . vt rapacitates & omnes iniquitates interdicat . . vt in omnibus iudiciis equitatem praecipiat , & misericordiam , ut indulgeat ei suam misericordiam clemens deus . now how can a king observe this oath , that spoils the people of their goods , and raises taxes contrary to law , or how can he continue king , who violates all the ends of his creation ? from all which it appears , that by this justice and judgment must be meant , not only the kings own observing justice towards his people , not only by not commanding , but also hindering his inferiour ministers and officers , from spoiling and oppressing them , and that no prerogative can justifie him in the doing otherwise , is as evident from another place in bracton , where he tells us , that regia potestas iuris est , n●n injuriae , & nihil aliud potest rex nisi quod jure potest . but fleta is somewhat larger on this head , tho' to the same effect , when speaking of the kings power or prerogative , he says thus ; & licet omnes potentia praecellat , cor tamen ipsius in manu dei esse debet , & ne potentia sua man●a● infranata fraenum imponat temperantiae , & lora moderantiae ; ne trahetur ad injuriam , quia nihil aliud , hoc est●in terra , nisi quod de iure potest nec obstat quod dicitur , quod principi placet legis habet potestatim , quia sequitur cum lege regia , quae de ejus imperio lata est , non qui●quid de voluntate regis tanto pere praesumptum est , sed quod magnatum suorum consilio rege authoritatem praestante , & habita super hoc deliberatione , & tractatu recte fuerit de●initum , which not only shews , that our ancient english lawyers in this agreed with the civil law , and gave the same account of the original of the royal power as that law does , viz. that it was conferred by the people of rome , on the roman emperour , by the lex regia mentioned in the old civilians i have formerly cited ; and also shews that our ancient lawyers supposed that by a like law among us , the royal authority was originally derived from the consent of the people of england ; without whose advice , and assent included in that of their representatives , here called consitium magnatum ( consilium being taken for consent in this place , as i have proved it often signify'd ) no law can ever be made : now if the king will not be ruled by this bridle of moderation , this author as well as bracton tell us , that the king then hath his superiours , the law and his court of barons ; who were as masters to put this bridle upon him . but admit he will run away with this bridle between his teeth , all this had signified nothing , if there be no other remedy left us , besides bare supplication , or remonstrances to the king of his duty ; and he might have dissolved the parliament before ever it could have any time to do either the one or the other . to conclude , if the king was at first elected , and created for this end , that he may do justice to all men ; and that this justice does not only concern his maintaining justice between his subjects one towards another , but also in respect of himself , his children and subordinate officers and ministers , that act by his commission , appears by what follows in bracton after the kings coronation oath : potestas ( scil . regis ) itaque iuris est non injuriae , & cum ipse sit author iuris , non debet inde injuriarum nasci occasio , & etiam qui ex officio suo alios prohibere necesse habet , id ipsum in propria persona committere non debet . so that it is as plain , that if he either command , or permit these willful injuries generally , or all over his kingdom , he fails to defend it according to k. edward's laws , and if he thus fail to defend it , he thereupon loses or forfeits his very title or office of a king , since he cannot keep or hold his crown , or royal dignity , for without justice it cannot subsist , and this by the original contract ; since upon whatever terms the first king of this race , took the crown , upon the same terms all his posterity who succeed either by election or right of blood , by vertue of that first compact are to hold it under the like penalty of a forfeiture , in case of a wilful neglect , or violation of his duty . m. i confess you have made a specious proof of this original contract you so much talk of , and more than ever i thought could have been said for it ; but let it be what it will , it is certain in the first place , that whatever co●ercive power the two houses of parliament might pretend to when bracton wrote , they have solemnly renounced it in two successive parliaments in the reign of k. charles the ii. therefore i shall not insist any longer upon old antiquated laws , or original contracts ; which are not directly expressed , but consequentially deduced at best : but i must now tell you , that let the first institution of this government have been what it will in the saxon times , and what original contract soever you may please to fancy between them and their subjects , yet this was all gone , and out of doors , by that absolute conquest which k. william i. made of this kingdom for himself ; and his heirs who do not at all claim under the title of our english kings . for since their ancestor had no just title to the crown but by the sword , and that he gain'd this kingdom by the conquest of k. harold ; and the people of england who had elected him , and fought for him ; as also by the subsequent recognition of this right , by all the people of england , in their oaths of allegiance so often repeated to himself and his successors , have thereby acknowledged it to be as absolute a monarchy by conquest , as ever was instituted by any prince in the world ; and tho' i grant that several of the conquerours have been graciously pleased to grant divers priviledges to the people of this nation , and some of them perhaps the same they enjoyed in the saxon time ; yet can they not enjoy it by vertue of that original contract you suppose to have been made , between the first king of that saxon race , and the people of england ; for as i said but now k. william had no right by any title from k. edward the confessor , but wholly by his sword , as i shall prove by and by . but however these concessions ought not at all to derogate from the absoluteness of the power , or the indefensibleness of our kings title , for since these limitations of absolute , or imperial power did not proceed from any other original , than the free & voluntary concessions of our king● , & not from any compacts with their people ; they do not at all derogate from the uncontroulable and unancountable soveraignty thereof , so that we may very well distinguish between the being , and essence of imperial or soveraign power , and the exercise or emanation thereof ; as to the being and essence of it , it is in as full perfection in the limited , as in the arbitrary sovereign , tho' the law confines and limits him in the exercise thereof ; but to be confined in the exercise doth not destroy the being , nor diminish the perfection of sovereign power , for then the power of god himself could not be sovereign , because there are certain immutable rules of truth , and justice within which it is necessarily limited , and confined ; but god is nevertheless a perfect imperial sovereign over the universe , tho' the exercise of his government over his creatures , be limited by the eternal laws of truth and equity ; it is true , that this limitation of almighty god is intriasical , and proceeds from the perfection of his righteous and holy nature ; but yet it shews , that the most perfect and absolute imperial powe , may , without a contradiction , be confined within bounds , and limited in the actual exercise thereof , and that such limitation of absolute imperial power ( proceeding wholly from it self ) doth only qualifie , and temper , but not destroy the essence of it ; and therefore cooke in cawdrey's case , saith , that by the ancient laws of this realm , england is an absolute empire and monarchy , and that the king is furnisht with plenary , and entire power , prerogative and jurisdiction , and is supream governour over all persons within this realm . therefore whoever will consider the original of this limitation of sovereign power , to have proceeded wholly ab intrinsico , from the voluntary grants of our first monarchs after the conquest ; and will also distinguish the essence from the exercise of sovereign power , will find , there is no contradiction between the fulness of sovereign power in the root , or essence of it , and a legal limitation of the use and exercise thereof ; and from hence it comes to pass , that the king of england , tho' he be thus limited in the use and exercise of his power , yet he is still as much the fountain of all power , and jurisdiction within his dominions , as if he were arbitrary ; he hath none to share with him in the sovereignty , but all power and authority is derived from him , like light from the sun , in him alone it is radically and originally placed , he hath no sharers or co-partners with him in the sovereignty , none co-ordinate with him in the government , no equal , no superiour , but only god to whom alone he is subject . hence saith bracton , omnis quidem sub to , & ipse sub nullo sed tantum sub deo , non est inferior sibi subjectis , non parem habet in regno suo , and afterwards , ips● autem rex non debet esse sub homine , sed sub deo. therefore i grant the king is obliged by his coronation oath , to keep to these limitations , which both he , and his predecessors have sworn to ; yet if he any ways fa●l in the performance of i● , this failure cannot give his people any manner of right to take up arms against him , and to resist him in any such case , much less can it cause a forfeiture of his royal power ; since being at first the sole sovereign power , he did not by putting this limitation thereunto , intend to part with any share of it to the great council of the kingdom or parliament , but only to take them into a part of the care and trouble of the government , and to limit his prerogative power from passing any laws , or raising any money without their assent , unless in cases of great necessity ; and then if he is still judge of this necessity , as certainly he is in the intervals of parliament , it can never be supposed , that the first prince , or his successors , that first parted with these priviledges to the people , ever intended to be so straitly tied to them , as that in no case whatever , tho' never so pressing , they should not depart from them , much less that he should forfeit his crown if he should wholly break them , nay should persist so to do , and resolve to turn this limited , into an absolute despotick monarchy ; since the observation of these laws , being but concessions of his own , or his predecessors , can never be looked upon as conditions of his holding the crown , nor of the subjects allegiance to it , there being as you your self confess no such clause exprest in either part , neither in the kings coronation oath , nor yet in their allegiance to him , as you your self cannot but acknowledge ; and tho' it is true , the king swears at his coronation , to keep and maintain the laws ; yet grotius tells us , lib. . cap. . that an empire does not cease to be absolute , altho' he who is to rule , promise some things to god , or to his subjects , even such which may appertain to the manner of the empire , and that not only concerning the observation of the natural or divine law , but of certain rules to which without a promise he were not obliged . so that in all promises of this kind the manner of the obligation is not reciprocal , or of the same sort on both sides ; as for example , it is only moral in respect of the king , and it is lef● wholly to god to judge between the king and his subjects , and to punish him when he breaks his part ; but , to the king as god's lieutenant on earth , it belongs not only to judge of his subjects breach of their oath and contract , but also to punish them for so doing , and compel them to the performance of it : and of this judgment are all the modern civilians ; as for bodin i have given you his opinion in the chapter i last cited , concerning this matter : and he as well as grotius is clearly of opinion , that absolute monarchs , such as he reckons the king of england to be , are not to be called in question or destroyed , let their breach of laws and tyranny be never so notorious , much less can they forfeit their royal dignity for such male-administration : and tho' grotius is of opinion , that in cases of great and evident danger of life , subjects may have a right of resistance against absolute princes , and those commissioned by them , what is this to the case in hand ? viz. a resistance , against an absolute monarch for violation of those priviledges , and liberties , that were granted by himself , or his ancestors , and without which subjects may very well live , and subsist as we see they do , under the most absolute , despotick monarchies , where they enjoy no such thing ; tho' perhaps they do not live so well , and freely as we do ; nay pufendorf , the author you so much make use of , in his seventh book , will not allow subjects to take up arms or resist absolute princes , nor for too great cruelty in punishment , nor for imposing too immoderate taxes , since the presumption of justice , and necessity for the doing of these things is always on the princes side ; nay , if his promises are not kept , or priviledges formerly granted are taken away , if the prince be absolute , and will pretend any fault , necessity , or remarkable benefit thereby to the common-wealth , he shall be deemed to have acted by a right , of which the faculty of judging is wholly wanting to the subjects ; since all priviledges have this exception ; unless the welfare , or necessity of the common weal forbid them to be observed . f. since your last discourse consists of two parts ; matter of fact , and matter of right deducible from that fact , i shall speak to each of them in order : first as to the matter of fact , it is a great mistake in you , and dr. brady to maintain that k. william i. was really a conqueror , and by his sword ( without any other title ) obtain'd such an entire victory over k. harold , and the whole english nation , as gave him an hereditary right for himself , and his heirs to the absolute allegiance of the whole english nation without any reserve , or conditions whatever ; so that all our ancient liberties , and priviledges , being thereby lost and forfeited , this nation can claim nothing of that kind , but from the grants and concessions of that king or his successors : every one of which propositions contain so many notorious mistakes in matter of fact ; for in the first place , king william never claim'd the crown by conquest , but by the adoption , and testament of king edward the confessor , and i desie you to shew me any ancient law or charter , either of his own , or any of his immediate descendants , wherein he is stiled conqueror ; 't is true , in his charter to the abby of westminster , he says in one , that by the edge of the sword he obtain'd the kingdom , by the conquest of harold , and his accomplices ; yet does not found his right in that victory , alone , but on the donation of king edward his cozen : the words are remarkable ; in ore gladii adeptus sum regnum anglorum , devicto haraldo rege , cum suis complicibus ; qui mihi regnum divinâ providentiâ destinatum & beneficio concessionis domini & cognati mei gloriosi regis edwardi concessum conati sunt auferre and this donation he calls an hereditary right in divers other charters ; as particularly in one also recorded by inspeximinus , beginning thus , in nomine patris & filii & spiritus sancti . am●n . ego williel●us , rex anglorum haereditatio iure factus . so likewise his son k. henry i. in his charter to the abbot of ely , creating him a bishop , calls himself the son of william the great , ( not the conqueror ) qui edwardo regi haereditario jure successit in regnum . and in vertue of this donation ; he was after his victory against harold , by publick and full consent of the whole nation , or people of england , as also of the normans he brought with him , elected and crowned king , and at his coronation took the same oath at the high-altar at westminster , which his predecessors the saxon kings , had taken before him ; with this one clause farther , which was very necessary to be done at that time , viz. quod aquo iure anglos , & francos , tracta●t ; so that let his title by conquest have been what it would , it was either by a just right of war , to recover his due , or by none at all ; if the former , he could only succeed to such rights as k. edward the confessor before exercised and enjoyed ; since he came hither only to take the crown that was so bequeathed to him , and to hold it under that title ; but if he had no title at all , but his sword , he then could obtain no just right to the crown , of england , either for himself or his successors ; but if they will only insist upon their title by the sword without any preceeding or subsequent right , they may be as lawfully turned out again by the sword ; since it is own'd by all writers on this subject , that a conqueror in an unjust war can obtain no right over a free people . so much for the matter of fact , i come in the next place to point of right in law ; i grant indeed that a simple oath , or pact between an absolute monarch and his subjects , to do , or perform such or such a thing ; or to let them enjoy such and such priviledges , does not immediately give the people a power to compel such a monarch , and his successors , by force of arms , to the strict observance of them , in case of a violation on his part ; but our case is very different from this ; for here a foreign prince recovers a former right to the kingdom , and that by force ; and is invested with the crown in vertue of that right by which he claimed it , and is also sworn to maintain the ancient government and laws ; according to which the whole legislative power was not in the king alone , but jointly in the king , and the great council of the nation ; without whose grant , or consent , he ought not to have laid any taxe ; upon the nation , as i shall prove if there be occasion . now all our ancient rights , being granted , and acknowledged by him , and a constant common council of the kingdom appointed to meet , to see them observed , as it did many times in this king's reign , as also in those of his successors ; they were not bare priviledges conferred of favour , and which might be observed , or broken at the will of the prince that granted them ; but a form or rule of government by laws to be made and agreed upon in a standing council , appointed not only to make them , but also to see them observed ; as appears by that passage so often cited , wherein the king is expresly said to have a superiour , viz. the law , and the court of barons , who were to put a bridle upon the king ; in case of his governing without law : and this farther appears by the great charters of henry i. k. stephen , and k. iohn , &c. in the first of which it is declar'd , that the nation having been oppressed by unjust ( i. e. illegal ) exactions he therefore forbids all common money , or taxes ; not taken through all cities or counties , in the time of k. edward ; and also confirms the laws of his father , whereby his barons , and tenants in capite , should be free from all taillage or taxes ; and he also thereby restored to them the laws of k. edward , with those emendations which his father had made by the common council of his barons . now the great charter of k. iohn was but an addition , or rather explanation of this charter of k. henry i. which was at first demanded by the barons to be again confirmed by this king , at the instigation of stephen langton archbishop of canterbury , as mat. paris shews us at large . now since neither k. william the i. nor his successors , ever changed the fundamental constitution of the government , as to the legislative part of it , as ( hath been already proved ) and that those breaches that had been made upon it , by taking taillage or taxes , without the consent of the great council , are all hereby expresly forbid : these are certainly more than such meer priviledges , which the king himself is the only keeper of , and can dispense with at his pleasure ; but are indeed such fundamentals , as concern the very cos●i●uent form or rule of government ; which , as i have also proved , was mixt not limited , in that very institution ; and tho' the learned pufendo●f agree● with you in the case of compacts between an absolute monarch and his subjects ; yet as to the point in hand , he is wholly of my mind , as you may see by this passage in his academick dissertations , in his discourse de interreguis ; where arguing against mr. hobs who will not allow of any compacts between an absolute prince and his subjects , he has this passage , which i shall here read to you in english. that tho' in pacts , in which submission is wanting , certain and defined performances may be set forth , to be observed on either side , from an intrinsick impulse of conscience ; when either of these refuse to perform them , nothing but war or the compulsion of a superior lord , common to both of them , remains ; yet in pacts , by which one party is made subject to the other , it belongs to the latter to define , what ought to be performed by him ; as also a power over the other compelling him , to the performance whether he will , or not ; which power does not belong reciprocally to the other party against the former ; hence the party commanding cannot be questioned for a breach of compact , unless he either wilfully abdica●e all care of the common wealth , or put on an hostile mind towards his subjects ; or manifestly , or deceitfully , ( in latin , dolo malo ) depart from the rule of governing ; on whose observance as upon a condition , the subjects allegiance depends ▪ which is easily to be avoided by any ruler ; if he will consider , that not the highest of mortals are free from the laws of humane chance : so that let the power of your conqueror have bene never so great , or absolute , it is plain he not only renounced it himself , but several of his successors have done the same for themselves , and their heirs ; therefore make the most of it , they must still claim by ●ertu● of the contract , to maintain the constitution , as they found it ; or else resolve all their right into meer force ; and then vim vi pellere licitum est . m. it is no wonder that you and i differ in our conclusions , since we also differ so much in the premises ; and in the very matter of fact , concerning king william the conquerors coming to the crown ; you saying , he came to it partly by the sword , but founded on a donation of edward the confessor ; and partly by the consent and election of the people of england , yet you your self cannot deny , but force or conquest had a great share in the business , and indeed was all the right he had ; for as for that donation of k. edward , it is either forged , or else k. william could claim nothing by it ; since england was then either an hereditary kingdom , or elective ; and take it which way you will , this donation of the confessors cou'd signifie nothing , either to the prejudice of the people that were to elect , or the next heirs who were to succeed after k. edward's decease ; neither could he claim as heir to him by blood , for the relation between him and k. edward , was by his mother emma , sister to richard the second duke of normandy , this william's uncle ; so that the conqueror was no way descended from the blood royal of england ; therefore his true quarrel with harold , ( let his pretence be what it will ) was not , because he kept a kingdom bequeathed to him , by k. edward ; since some writers relate this king named not him , but harold for his successor ; tho' others say , that he recommended edgar to the good will of the english nobility . so that the only true and just cause d. william had of making war upon harold , was his breaking the promises and oath he had not long before made him of securing the kingdom of england for him , upon the death of k. edward ; instead of doing which , he had seized it for himself ; and which is worse , refused to restore it , or so much as to hold it of duke william as his homager . so that tho' for the strengthning of his own tide , he pretended to the will or donation of king edward , and to avoid the envy of the name , might out of modesty or to put a better colour upon this matter , refuse to take the title of conqueror ; and to insist upon the donation of k. edward : yet nothing is plainer than that he could claim by no other title , but the sword : and that he looked upon himself as no other than an absolute conqueror , may appear by these great and evident instances . . his change of the english laws , and introducing the norman customs in their stead , and also changing the tenures of lands , not only of the layety , but also of the bishops and greater abbeys . . by his debarring all those of the english nation , from enjoying any honour , office or preferment , either in church or state ; and also in taking away the estates of all the nobility and gentry ; not only from those of their heirs , that had been slain in the battle of hastings , but also of the rest ; so that they had left them , but what they could purchase of those norman or french noblemen , to whom king wiiliam had given their lands , as a reward of their good service ; for the proof of both which assertions , i have so very good authority on my side , and that of writers of , or near those times in which these things were done , that i think no indifferent man can have any cause to doubt the matter of fact to have been as i relate it ; nor did he by any after act , ever renounce this right of conquest , as you suppose , much less refer it to the election of the english , or normans ; since the former were not in a condition to make any farther resistance against him , the clergy and great men of the kingdom having been forced to submit themselves to him without any other precedent conditions , or stipulations , than for the saving of their lives ; and as for the normans they were his subjects , and they conquered the kingdom only for his use and benefit , as his souldiers , and vassal● ; and it is not likely he would owe the kingdom which he had thus acquired by the sword , to their votes , or election ; neither does any author that i know of mention any election before his coronation ; when tho' it is true , he took such an oath as you mention , yet it was in too general terms to bind him to any observation of the ancient english laws , much less to preserve their rights and priviledges , farther than he thought fit ; and therefore could never take the crown upon your conditions of resistance or forfeiture , in case of any alteration in that which you call the fundamental constitution . this being the true matter of fact without any disguise , it is easie to answer all that you have said against k. william's requiring an absolute , hereditary right to the crown of england for himself , and all his descendants by the sword ; first then , as to the justice of the war , and conquest it self , i suppose you will not deny , but that duke william had a good cause of war against harold for the breach of his oath ; and if so , against all that took his part , at the battle of hastings ; so that upon the conquest of harold , and those that were in that fight , he also acquired a right by conquest to all that they enjoyed ; and consequently had a right to harold's crown , as well as his other estate ; as also to the estates of all those that were either slain , or escaped alive from that battle , and not only to these , but also to all the lands of the whole kingdom ; since the war was made not only against harolds person , but against the kingdom of england ; the people of which , according to their allegiance assisted him in that war , either with men or money : but admitting the war to have been in it self never so unjust , yet all writers on this subject ( even grotius and pufendorf ) agree , that conquest even in an unjust war , with a thorough settlement in the conqueror and his successors , by the non claim , dereliction , submission , or exstinction of the next heirs of the former kings , together with a long uninterrupted possession beyond all time of memory , will confer as good a title ; especially when all these confirmed by a constant submission , and recognition of the people , testified not only at the first conquest , but in all succeeding times , by as absolute , and unconditioned oaths of allegiance , as can be invented ; or that were ever taken to the most absolute monarch : and such oaths are always to be interpreted in favour of the prince , to whom they are sworn , and as strictly against the people that take them ; as all writers also agree : now granting this to be the case of k. william the conqueror , that by all or some of these means he acquired a right to the crown , not only for himself , but his heirs ; this power was absolute , without any conditions to be observed on their part , for the oath of allegiance is positive , without any condition or restriction ; so that i can see no manner of pretence that the people of this nation can have , of forcing their k's . to the maintenance , or observation of those rights , and priviledges , which they or their predecessors have so freely granted to them , or their ancestors ; as pusendorf whom you now cited very rightly observes ; and consequently can have no right to repel force , by force ; since our kings do not now hold their crown by force , or right of conquest alone , but by all things required by the law of nations to create a full , and absolute right , viz. a long uninterrupted possession , and the absolute submission of the people for themselves , and all their descendants ; so that tho' i grant bare conquest considered as a force can give no right alone , yet it may often be the mother of right , and may at last grow to a right , by the means i have already mentioned . f. before i reply any thing farther to what you have now said to the matter of right acquired by your conqueror , and his heirs , pray in the first place prove the matter of fact to have been as you lay it ; and therefore produce your quotations from the authors you mention : but first give me leave to tell you , that dr b. and you are the first i have heard to make so light of this testamentary do●●tion of edward the confessor ; which the greatest part of the writers nearest that time , do suppose to have been really made on the behalf of duke william ; and that notwithstanding this bequest , harold unjustly , and contrary to his own oath , did by force set the crown upon his own head , without any precedent election of the clergy , nobility , and people , as was required at that time ; since it was impossible for them to meet in so short a time ; for king edward dying on the eve of epiphany , was buried on twelfth day , and on the same day harold took upon himself the crown , by the consent of some of the bishops and nobility of his faction , then at london ; so that he was certainly no better than an usurper : and therefore by the conquest of harold and his party , your conqueror could acquire no right upon the free people of england , since they never gave their consents to place harold on the throne ; and consequently k. william could have no just cause of making a conquest upon the whole nation , since neither did he ever in all his reign ( as i can find ) call a common council of the kingdom to recognize , or confirm his title ; and tho' it is true , harold proving a valiant and popular prince , got the good will of the common people , by divers acts of grace , ( which he had lost by his violent taking the crown while edgar atheling the only remaining male heir of the saxon race was in being ; ) and found very many who were willing to fight for him , not only against the king of norway , who had a little before invaded the kingdom , but also against duke william ; yet all those in his army could amount to nothing near the whole kingdom , who never contributed to the war by any publick vote , or tax ; and therefore did not countenance it by giving money , or raising of men as you suppose ; so that d. william could not pretend a right of making war against any body , but only harold and his accomplices ; but as for the testamentary donation of edward the confessor , tho' you make so light of it , yet ingulph says expresly , that edward the confessor some time before his death , sent robert archbishop of canterbury as his ambassador to d. william to let him know that he had designed him his successor , not only by right of kindred , but by the merit of his vertue ; and that after this harold , coming into normandy , promised upon oath to assist him in it ; and will. malmesbury says also , that edward the father of edgar atheling , dying almost as soon as he came into england , k. edward his cozen being dead , gave the succession of this kingdom to william duke of normandy ; with whom also agree , florence of worcester , and william of poi●tou , and all the rest of the historians of that age , as well english as normans : nor do i know any of them except simeon of durham , and roger hoveden , who make harold to have been appointed successor by k. edward , or to have been so much as solemnly crowned by the archbishop of york . but i confess your main objection is still to be answered , viz. what precedent right duke w●lliam could have to the crown of england by this testament of king edward ; since it was then either an elective , or else an hereditary kingdom ; and so this donation could confer no right on this duke in prejudice of the peoples right to elect ; or else of the next heir to succeed ? in answer to which i must tell you that which perhaps you may have never considered , that the crown was then neither properly elective nor successive , but a mixture of both . m. that seems a kind of a paradox , and what i never heard before , pray explain your self , for i do not understand how it could be . f. why then i will tell you , the crown of england in those times , was very like what the crowns of denmark and sweden were not long since , and as the empire is at this day ; in which tho' the estates or diet might chuse whom they pleased for king or emperor , yet they still kept to the same family or line , as long as there were any males left of i● , fit to succeed ; which custom often gave the king in being a power , which by degrees came to be looked upon as a kind of right , either upon his death bed , or else at any time before , to nominate one of his sons , or near kinsmen to be his successors , by his last will or testament : especially if he had no sons of his own , as happen'd in the case of king edward the confessor ; now this nomination , tho' it did not alone confer a right to the crown , yet it made the person so named the fairest candidate for it ; and was such a recommendation to the estate● , or great council of the kingdom , as they never passed , by or denied , as i can ever find by the best inquiry i have made ; and for proof of this , i shall appeal to the testament of k. alfred , as you will find it printed from an ancient manuscript , in the second appendix to his life , in latine , publisht at oxford . which begins thus . ego alfredus divino munere , labore , ac studio athelredi archiepiscopi , nec non totius westsaxoniae nobilitatis consensu , pariter & assensu , occidentalium saxonum rex ; quos in testimonium meae ultimae voluntatis complementi , ut sint advocati in disponendis pro salute animae meae regali electione , confirmo , tam de haereditate , quam deus at principes , cum senioribus populi misericorditer ac benigne dederunt ; quam de haereditate quam pater meus aethelwulfus rex nobis tribus fratribus delegavit , viz. aethelbaldo , aethelredo , & mihi ; ita , quod qui nostrum diutius foret superstes , ille totius regni dominio congauderet , &c. from whence you may collect first , that tho' this king in the very beginning of his testament ascribes his obtaining the crown , not to any hereditary right , but the consent , and assent of the nobility of west-saxony ; yet he also here mentions the entail of the crown by his fathers will , upon his two elder brothers , and himself successively , before any of his elder brother's sons , who were living at the time of the making of this testament of k. alfred's , as appears by the will it self , in which they are expresly mentioned : now how could this be that he was king , as well by the consent or election of the west-saxon nobility , as by his father's will , unless both these had been required to make him so ? also will. of malmesbury tells us of k. athelstan , the grandson of k. alfred , that , iussu patris in testamento , aethelstanus in regem est acclamatus : but in the beginning of this chapter , he also tells us , that aethelstanus electus apud regiam aulam quae vocatur kingston coronatus est , quamvis quidem alfredus cum factiosis suis obviare tentasset ; upon that pretence that athelstan was a bastard : so that you may see , that his fathers testament was not sufficient without the election of the wittema gemot ; who preferred him , tho' perhaps illegitimate , before this alfred who was set up against him . and i doubt not , if more of the testaments of the english saxon kings were now extant , that i could give you more instances of this nature . but that the person so nominated , and elected , tho' not the nearest always of blood , claimed jure haereditario , is also as certain , since bracton expresly tells us , that haereditamentum , or inheritance is not derived ab haerede , but heir from the inheritance ; and that inheritance is the succession to all the right which the predecessor had ; with whom also the civil law agrees , haeredis significatione omnes significare successores credendum est , etsi verbis non sint expressi . nor did this custom of thus recommending a successor prevail in england alone in those times , but also was in use among the french kings of the race of charlemain , wherein the last will or adoption of the king , in being confirmed by the election or recognition of the estates of france , gave a sufficient title to a prince of the blood royal , tho' not legitimate , nor the next heir by blood , to succeed ; but the will of the prince was not alone sufficient ; as monsiour m●ze●a● has very well observed in his chronological abridgement of the history of france , in the reign of king clotair the second . so that to conclude ; if duke william of normandy was thus adopted ; named by k. edward the confessor for his successor , by his last will and testament ; and this had been without any blows confirmed by the council of the kingdom , by a subsequent election , and coronation , and that he had received the oaths and recognitions of the english subjects , which always followed that solemnity , i doubt not but he would have had as good a title to the crown , as any of the kings of the english saxon line ; i am sure a much better than harold , who i am not satisfied came in either by the adoption of k , edward , or by the election of the people , and therefore duke william had a good title against him as an usurper ; and conquering him , and those of his party in the battle , and being thereupon elected , and recognized , and crowned by the general consent both of the english , and normans ; i cannot see why his obtaining the crown against harold by force of arms , should extinguish his former right , and create a new title by conquest , which he never claimed by ; or suppose his renouncing the confessors will , which gave him a right to be elected king , according to the custom of those times ; and to demand the crown from an usurper , who had solemnly sworn to assist him in this right . but since you so positively affirm , that no author whatever mentions d. william's election ; i doubt not but to shew it you from more than one author , and those of , or near those very times . i shall in the first place give the account that a short history , printed at the end of mr. taylor 's history of gavel-kind , from an ancient msc. in the bodlia● library , gives us of this affair , and who seems to be an author that lived very near those times . londoniam convenientibus francis , & anglis ( ad nativitatem domini ) illisque omnibus concedentibus , coronam totius angliae , & dominationem suscepit : and william of poictou , this kings chaplain in his history relates it thus ; die ordinationi decreto locutus ad anglos condecenti sermone eboraci archiepiscopus sapiens , bonus , eloquens , an consentirent eum sibi dominum coronari inquisivit ; protestati sunt hilarem consensum universi minime haesitantes , ac si caelitus unâ mente datâ , unâqu ; voci ; anglorum quam facillime normanni consonuerunt sermocinato apud eos , ac sententiam praecunctatoriam constantini praesule , sic electum consecravit archiepiscopus , imposuit ei diadema , &c. so likewise ordoricus vitalis , a norman author , alive at the same time relates it thus . die natalis domini angli londoniae ad ordinandum regem convenerunt , & g●lielmum ducem normannorum in regem anglorum consecravit archiepiscopus , &c. and goes on to relate the manner how , just as the nameless english authour had done before ; but then agrees with william of poictou in all the rest . dum aldredus praesul alloqueretur anglos , & godofredus constantiniensis normannos , an concederent gulielmum regnare super se , & vniversi consensum hilarem protestarentur unâ voce non unius linguae locutione ; with whom also agrees willielmus gemmenicensis , in the history of the dukes of normandy , who was also an authour that lived in , or very near the times of this king : his words are ; anno incarnat . domini , ab omnibus tam normannorum , quam anglorum proceribus rex est electus , & sacro oleo ab episcop●● r●gni delibutus , atque regall ●●●demate coronatus ? so that you see here are no less than four ancient authors , who all agree upon the solemn election of king william ; and yet your dr. has the confidence to tell us , that mr. petye only endeavours to prove this el●ction of king william out of some fragments of authors , who lived at some distance of time from his coming over hither . m. i confess you have shew'd me more for this mixt slight of k william's by testament , and succession ; than ever i knew before ; but you had dealt more fairly , if you had also added what dr. b. takes notice of our of guli●●●●● pictaviensis concerning king william's being advanced to the crown ; for immediately after the mention of him being crowned , he conludes thus , 〈◊〉 liberi & ●●poles justa 〈…〉 anglle terrae , quam haereditaria delegatione sacramentes anglorum firmata , & jure belli ipse possedit . so that here you see he grounds a title to him , and his postaerity , not only on his hereditary , but the oaths of the english , and the right of war ; but as for the word electus made use of by those ancient authors , dei b. hath made it very plain in his history of the succession of the crown of england , as also in his glossary , that this word does not there signifie elected , but recognized , and acknowledged , that such a one is to be king. yet i very much doubt whether this could be properly termed an election or not , since the same historians also tell us , that part of k. william's army kept guard without the church door , during his coronation , by this good token , that when they heard so great a shout given upon the peoples declaring their assents : the souldiers suspecting some treason , set fire to the houses ; so that i cannot see how that could be properly an election , when the people durst not refuse : and i know that even at this day , the king is shewn to the people on all the four sides of the scaffold on which he is crowned , and their consent is formally asked , whether they will have this man to be their king ; yet no man will say that their acclamations and crying , yea , yea , will make our kings elective , any more than it could do it in the case of k. william , who had a title by conquest precedent to this pr●tended election ; tho' i grant this custom may have been in use ever fined this coronation of the conqueror . but that king william claimed indeed by conquest , and by no other title , let us not mind his specious colourable pretences , but his actions , which are the best interpreters of the thoughts of princes ; and we shall find that thorough all his reign , he governed this kingdom as a conqueror ; and this i shall prove by making good the three instances i have already given , of his great alterations of the property , laws , and civil liberties of the people of this nation : to begin with the first of these . for the proof of which , i shall make use of the authority of gervace of ti●bury , a considerable officer in the exchequer , in the time of henry the second , and who received his information from henry of blo●s bishop of winchester , and grand-child to the conq●eror , who is most full to that purpose , which he thus delivers in the manuscript treatise , called the black book of the exchequer ; which i shall read to you according to the learned dr. b's translation of it . after the conquest of the kingdom , and the just subversion of the rebels , when the king himself , and his great men , had viewed and surveyed their new acquests ▪ there was a strict enquiry made who they were , which had fought against the king , and secured themselves by flight ; from these and the heirs of such as were slain in the field , all hopes of possessing either lands or rents were cut off , for they counted it a great favour to have their lives given them ; but such as were called and sollicited to fight against king william , and did not , if by an humble submission they could gain the favour of their lords and masters , they then had the liberty of possessing somewhat in their own persons , but without any right of leaving it to their posterity , their children enjoying it only at the will of their lords ; to whom when they became unacceptable , they were every way outed of their estates , neither would any restore what they had taken away . and when the miserable natives represented their grievances publickly to the king , informing him how they were spoiled of their fortunes , and that without redress , they must be forced to pass into other countries . at length upon consultation , it was ordered , that what they could obtain of their lords by way of desert or lawful bargain , they should hold by ●unqestionable right ; but should not claim any thing from the time the nation was conquered , under the title of succession or descent ; upon what great consideration this was done , is manifest ( says gervac● ; ) for they being obliged to compliance and obedience , to purchase their lords ●avour , therefore whoever of the conquered nation possessed lands , &c. obtained them not as if they were their right by succession or inheritance , but as a reward of their service , or by some intervening agreement . this alone were sufficient , coming from an author of such credit , and living so very near the time : but besides his , i shall give you the authority of divers other authors to the same purpose , and particularly ordericus vitalis ( whom you but now cited ) tells us how william the first circumvented the two great earls of more●a ; and that after edwin was slain ▪ and morcar imprisoned , then king william began to shew himself , and gave his assistants the best , and most considerable counties in england and made rich collonels and captains of very mean normans : and that he thus disposed of whole counties to divers great men , appears by domesday book , wherein it is seen that the whole county of chester was given by the conqueror to ●upus a norman ; so likewise the greatest part of shropshire was given to mon●gomery . and further he took away from the english their estates , and gave them to his normans ; and this he did from his first coming in ; for fitz-osbern was made earl of arundel and hereford , at his first coming in , and was lord of bettivil in normandy , and established the laws of that town at hereford ; alan earl of b●itain , had all earl edwin's lands given to him at the seige of york , about three years after his arrival ; to these i may add the mannors robert earl of mor●ton in normandy and cornwal in england , had given to him by k. william ; so likewise ●lan earl of britain and richmond mannors , and ieffery bishop of constance had mann●rs given him by the conqueror , besides many other lands of the saxon , earls , thains , &c. were all given to the normans , who took their title from king william's conquering sword. so that i think it is very evident that this king had distributed most of the lands of the nation to his norman's , long before the survey was begun , and by that infallible record it is clear , that he gave near all the lands of the nation to his followers , and very little or none to the english , who held that they had hys new title , and new services from the conqueror or his great lords , or became tenants to , or drudges upon their own lands , as we heard before from bracton and fleta . here is enough to satisfie any unbyassed person , that th● conqueror did not lay by his sword after the battle of hastings . f. in answer to what you have now said , concerning your conquerors taking away the lands of a great many of the english nobility and gentry , it is so apparent in matter of fact , that it were a high piece of impudence to go about to deny it ; yet will it not therefore follow , that what he thus disposed of were almost all the lands of england , as i shall shew , you by and by ; but in the mean time to let you see that i am a fair adversary , i will at present suppose , that k. william took away all the lands from the former owners , and gave them to his followers , who helpt him in his conquest ; but these were not only the normans his subjects , but french , flemmings , anjovins , britains , poictovins , and people of other natio●s , who made up a great part of his army , and came in with him under great and considerable men their leaders , and whom your dr. tells us came not out of sta●k love and kindness , without any consideration of sharing with , and under him in the conquest . now i desire to know by what law or act of theirs , they thus constituted k. william an absolute monarch , over them and their descendants . for as for the normans tho' they were ( it's true ) his subjects ; yet they enjoyed divers considerable rights and priviledges at home , and surely never intended to come over hither , to make themselves as great slaves as the people , they had conquered ; much less can it be supposed of these of other nations , who were not subjects to duke william before he was made king ; nor can i see how their taking of lands from him could make him become an absolute and irresistible monarch over them , and their descendants ; so that if upon your supposition , all the owners of lands in england , at this day , hold their estates either by descent or purchase from those antient normans , or french proprietors they must also succeed to the same liberties and priviledges , as those under whom they claim , did formerly enjoy . but before i conclude , i cannot but take notice of what you have said , against my proofs of the formal election of king william , for if the keeping of a guard about the place where the king is elected and crowned , should void the freedom of the election ; i doubt whether the election of any elective kings , or monarchs , no not of the german emperor himself would hold goods as for the other reason , that they could not chuse but ●lect him that is yet m●re trivial , for there being no more than one tha● stood to be chosen , they could indeed chuse no other ; but if not having a liberty to refuse , must void the right of election , pray consider ( as i told you before ▪ ) whether there be any canonical election of bishops in the church of england at this day : therefore i doubt not but that king william i. was as lawfully and freely elected as k. edward the confessor , his predecessor , whom all authors agree to have had no other title ; and willi●lmus gemeticensis in the place i now cited , tells us , he was elected king as well of the norman , as english nobles : and if the custom had not ●●en ●●cen to el●●● the king before he was crowned ; it is not likely tha● your conqueror would have introduced a new custom to the prejudice of his pretended right by conquest ; but indeed there is not only more cogent argument to prove that the crown was formerly elective , than ●he constant usage ( as you your self confess ) ever since your pre●ended conquest to this day ▪ of asking the people whether they are content to have such a one for their king ▪ as for your doctors quotation out of william of ●oicto● , pray take notice that he places your conquerors ▪ hereditary bequest together with the oaths of the english as his best title , and the right of war last , by which this author did not understand a conquest of the people of england , but his prevailing against harold ▪ m. i do own with the learned dr. b. that the descendants of those ancient . norman and fre●●h earls and ba●ons ▪ than came in with the conquerour and their posterity afterwards , seeing the yoke of feud●l tenures , and other prerogatives this king and his descendants exercised over them to press as hard upon them , as the antient english were , those that made such a disturbance for their right and liberties in the reigns of h. iohn , and henry the third ; and tho' i grant their ancestors were never conquered , and consequently could not be obliged to him as to a conqueror , 〈◊〉 may for all this maintain ▪ that they and their posterity were as much bound to an absolute subiection without any resistance , a● the english whom they conquer'd ; for they were either his own subjects in a●●mand● ▪ before his coming o●e● hither or else , were such volunteers who followed him but of hopes of estates , and br●ferment was for all those of the former 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 were his subjects before , they were tied , not only by their 〈◊〉 oaths of a regiance , which they had taken ( in normandy , but , were also bound by the same obligation of non resistance , as all other subjects must always be , both in that , and all other governments ; to all which was added another obligation in respect of those who were not his subjects before his entrance , since this whole kingdom was by conquest the conque●ors ▪ as appears in that he bestowed the 〈◊〉 part of 〈◊〉 his followe●● ( whose blood runs at this day in the veins of most of our english gen●ry and nobility ▪ ) as a reward for their service and assistance ▪ tho' he might have some part to the english natives and their heirs , yet so a● that he altered the tenure , and made it descend with such burdens , as he pleased to lay upon them ; so that as well ●his own countrymen normans , as those of all other nations , who thus became subjects and feudataries to him for all the lands they possessed in england , since he was the only directus dominus or lord paramount of the whole kingdom ; were also his vassals and subjects ; for in case of treason and rebellion , or death without heir , those lands were to return to him again ▪ and to be a● his dispossal ; so that all subjects as well normans as other foreigners , who had lands granted to them by the conqueror , thus became his homines ligei , liegemen , and did owe faith and true allegiance to him , as their supream and liege lord , as the king is called in several statutes , and the definition of liegeancy is set down to the grand customary of normandy , ligeantia est ex quâ domino tementur vasalli sui , &c , that is , liegeancy is an obligation upon all subjects , to take part with their liege lord against all men living , to aid and assist him with their bodies and goods , and with their advice and power , 〈◊〉 to lift up their hands against him , nor to support in any wise those who oppose him ; and tho' i grant that the supream or liege lord , is likewise bound to govern and defend his liege people , according to the rights , customs , and laws of the countrey ; yet is he not liable to resistance , much less forfeiture if he neglect it ; for tho' if subjects break their covenants , and prove disloyal , all their lands and other rights are forfeited to the king ; yea if the king , or supream lord break his oa●●● notwithstanding his sailing therein , neither his crown , nor any rights belonging to his royal dignity are thereby ●orfei●ed : the reason of this inequality is , because the king gave laws to the ●eople , but the people did not give laws to him , so that it is plain , that however you 〈◊〉 the conquerors entrance , whether by the sword , or ( to avoid the envy of the title of a conqueror ) by a voluntary submission of the english nation to him , as to their sovereign , the conclusion cannot vary , because the duty of non-resistance arises from their own act , they taking an oath of allegiance , to be , his true and loyal subjects ; with which oath resistance can by no means consist . f. i must beg your pardon if i cannot take what you have now said , for a satisfactory answer , since i doubt it will do you little service , whether you make use of it either in respect of the normans , or other foreigners ; for as to the so●m●r , it appears from the antient constitution of normandy , that the duke was no absolute monarch there ; but feuda●ary to the king of france ; and farther could make no laws , nor impose taxes in normandy , without the consent of the estates of that dutchy , as appears by the title to the latin customs of normandy , which are at the end of the old french edition of the constumiers de normandy ; printed at r●a● , . the title of which is thu● , iura & consuetudines ducatus no●maniae . the prologue to which , begins thus . quoniam leges , & instituta quae normanorum principes , non sint magna provisionis industria praelatorum , comitum , & baronum , nec non & caeterorum virorum prudentum consilio , & assensu ad salutem humani foederis statuerunt . whereby it is apparent , that the antient laws of normandy were made by the advice and consent of the estates , for the preservation of that humane covenant they had formerly made with their first duke , rollo , when he had that dutchy granted him by the king of france ; and whoever will consult the antient histories and laws of that dutchy will find the●● dukes of normandy no more absolute monarchs there , than the kings of norway , from whence they came ; so that if their duke should have gone about to take away their estates , or inslave the persons of the norman nobility , and people , he might justly have been resisted by them ; and therefore their taking lands from k. william after his pretended conquest here , must either have conferred an estate upon them according to the laws of england or normandy ; not according to the former ; for you assert that tenures in capite , and knight's service , were generally introduced by his coming ; so that if they were by the normans law , ( as you suppose ) they were then no farther subjects to their duke , by that tenure , when made king of england , than they were whilst he was duke of normandy , viz. only according to the laws and customs by which they held these estates : so that if their duke was not irresistible by them in case of tyranny in his own country , so he was also here by the same reason ; since whatever he did in respect of the english , he could acquire no new right over them . and that an oath of homage alone , doth not make the person to whom it is taken irresistible , if he makes an unjust war upon his vassals , appears by the dukes of normandy themselves , who tho' they held that dutchy by homage to the king of france , and took the same oath to him , upon every kings accession to the crown , of being his liegeman ; and to be true and faithful to his lord the king of france , for the said dutchy of normandy : yet might the dukes of normandy without any imputation of rebellion have resisted the king of france , in case he made an unjust war upon them : nor were ever the dukes of normandy accused of rebellion for so doing , in all the wars that they had with the kings of france ; and therefore the holding of an estate by homage , doth not suppose that the lord of whom it is held was irresistible , nor doth the word of allegiance signifie any more than that duty which the liegemen , by the old norman law , owed to their supream lord of whom they held their lands ; and therefore when the king or supream lord of the fee did not perform his part of the contract , but went about to turn them out of their estates , or to invade any of their just rights by force , it was usual for the tenants to defie the lords , and renounce their homage to them ; for which they used the barbarous latin word diffidare , in french to defie , that is , to renounce that faith and allegiance , which before they owed them ; and the supream lords also oftentimes defied their tenants , thus mat. paris tells in anno . that k. henry the third by the counsel of the bishop of winchester , defied richard the earl mareschal : and the year following we find the earl justifying himself in this manner , ( being then in ireland ; ) first i answer , that i never acted treasonably against the king ; for he has unjustly spoil'd me of my office of mareschal , without the judgment of my peers , and has proclaim'd me banisht thorough all england , he has burnt my houses , destroyed my lands , &c. he has more than once defied me , when i was always ready to stand to the judgment of my peers : from which time ( said he ) i ceased to be the kings liegeman , and was absolved from his homage not by my self , but by him : and whereas you say , that tho' the king or supream lord cannot forfeit his right , tho' he breaks his part of the compact , because of the inequality , which there is between a king , and a subject ; then this prerogative of non-resistance doth not belong to the king , as he is supream lord of the land , but as he is king , and giveth law to the subjects ; which may have some colour of truth in absolute monarchies , but was of no force , either in the government of normandy or england , where the duke or king without the consent of his estates , never could alone make laws ; but as i will not deny our government to be a monarchy , so it is as certain , that it is limited in the very constitution , either by the saxons or normans , begin where you please ; and therefore my conclusion still holds good , that if the english have now succeeded to those very lands and priviledges , which the normans anciently enjoyed , then whatsoever right or liberty the english proprietors of estates do at this day enjoy , they do not only hold them as the successors and descendants of those normans and frenchmen but are also restored to them iure postliminii ( as you civilians term it ) since they never submitted themselves , or took an oath of allegiance to king william , and his heirs , but only to himself personally , there being no such clause in any oath of allegiance , till it was so ordained many ages after in the reign of k. henry the fourth ; nor was this oath ever taken by our english ancestors to k. william as to a conqueror , but the lawful successor of k. edward the confessor ; and k. williams actual taking away the estates of a great many of the english nobility and gentry , contrary to his own oath , and without any just o●use , could no more give him a right so to do , than if henry the fourth , or henry the seventh , both which came to the crown by the assistance of a foreign force , should upon a pretence of being conquerors have govern'd by an army , and so have taken away whose estate they pleased , and given them to their followers that came over with them . m. i shall not dispute this matter with you any further , therefore pray proceed to the other point you took upon you to prove , that king william did not take away so great a share of the lands of england , as the dr. and those of our opinion affirm . f. i shall observe your commands , and therefore in the first place i desire you to take notice , that according to the doctors own shewing your conqueror never took away the lands of all the bishops and abbots of england , much less those that belonged to deans , and chapters , or to private churches , and if his nobles or followers had unjustly dissie●ed any bishop or abbot of their estates , the king caused them to be restored again , as appears by many presidents of this kind , which are to be found in ingulphus and eadmerus : this being premised , let us see in the next place what proportion the lands belonging to the church did in those days bear to the rest of the lands in england ; now we find in sprot's chronicle , as also from the old legierbook , cited by mr. selden in his titles of honour , and particularly from that secretum abbotis ( formerly belonging to the abby of glassenbury , and now in the library of the university of oxon ) that there were not long after your conquest , knights fees in england , of which the bishops abbots and other church-men then enjoyed . when it is supposed this account was taken , then it will follow that in the reign of your conqueror there were above knights fees ▪ which belonged to the church ; and in these we do not any where find that k. william dispossessed their tenants of their estates , most of which were held in fee under them , and those tenants were great and powerful men in their countries ; and hence we read in the ancient records and legier books of the barons and knights that held of divers bishops and great abbots , several examples which you will find in sir henry spellman . title baro : now it is certain that king william could not turn all these men out of their estates , and give them to his followers without committing sacriledge , and invading the rights of the church , which that king durst not commonly do ; so that the utmost that you can suppose he could do , was to take the forfeitures of all such tenants of the church , who had taken part with king harold , or had any ways committed treason against himself , which were far from the whole number of them ; so that here goes off at once almost a half of all the lands held by knights service , which the king did never dispossess the ancient owners of : to these may be also added all tenants in ancient demesne , all tenants in socage , as also all tenants in gavel kind , which in those days made at least two thirds of the lands of kent , which by the way was never conquer'd but surrender'd upon terms , to ●are their ancient customs and tenures , as mr. cambden himself acknowledges in his description of this county ; besides what was held in other counties by the same tenure , as you will find in mr. taylor 's history of gavel kind : all which being not tenures in chief by knights service , are not register'd in domesday book ; nor does it appear , that the owners were ever dispossessed of them ; to which may also be added the lands of those smaller thanes ; or officers of king edward , whose names are found in domesday book , who held their lands ratione officii . to all these we may also add , all such norman noblemen and gentlemen , who having come into england in edward the confessors time , and having honours and lands given them by him , had continued here ever since ; and these were so numerous , that it was thought worth while by king william , to make a particular law concerning them , that they should partake of all the customs , the rights and priviledges of native englishmen , and pay scot and lot as they did : of these was the earl of mo●ton ; besides many others whose names appear in doomesday book ; and not only these men , but also divers cities and towns held lands of king william by the same rents and services , as they had formerly paid in the time of king edward the confessor , as oxford for example . but to give an answer to some of your instances , as when you say that king william gave away whole counties , as all cheshire to hugh lupus , and the greatest part of shropshire to roger de montgomery , &c. it is a great error to suppose that these earls had all the lands mentioned in these counties to dispose of at their pleasure , and that they turned out all the old prop●ietors , which it is certain they did not , as i could prove to you by several instances of antient english families who have held their lands , and enjoyed the same seats they had in the conquerors time ; so that you see there is a great deal of difference between a grant of all the land of a county , and that of the whole county ; what is meant by the former is plain , but as for the latter it generally implies not any thing more than the government of that county . thus whereas your dr. would have it , that the greatest part of shropshire was given to roger de montgomery , doomesday says , only that he had the city of shrewsbury , & totum comitatum , and the whole county ; but that is soon explained by what follows , & totum dominum quod rex ipse tenebat ; where it is plain that by dominium is meant no more than that power to govern it which king edward had , for otherwise the grant of totum comitatum , had been sufficient . m. i confess this is more than i ever heard , or considered before concerning this matter , but you do not give me any positive proof that at the time when doomes day book was made , there were any englishmen who held earldoms , or baronies , or other great estates of the king , or any of his great men ; so that what you have said hitherto , tho' it carry a great shew of probability , yet is no positive proof against the doctors assertion . f. i shall not go about to deny what william of malmesbury , and henry of huntington so positively affirm , that for sometime before the end of king william's reign , there was no englishman , a bishop , abbot or earl , in england ; yet does it not therefore follow , that it was thus thorough his whole reign ; or if it were so , that it will therefore follows , that there were few englishmen , who , when domesday book was made , possessed any lands in england : but that in part of king william's reign there were many english earls and barons appears by above a dozen charters cited by sir william dugdale , in the saxon and latin tongues , in his monast. anglic. which are either directed by k. william to all his earls , and thains , or else in latin , omnibus baronibus , francigenis & anglis , or else omnibus baronibus & fidelibus suis , francis , & anglis salutem ; the like charters also appear of henry j. and the empress maud his daughter ; so that if francigena and francus signifie a frenchman , and anglus and englishman , and if fidelis does ( as your dr. would have it signifie a tenant in capite , then i think nothing is plainer than that there were , for great part of king william's reign , both earls , barons , and tenants in capite of english extraction . but to come to particular persons , it will appear by the saxon or english names in doomesday book , as also by several recitals therein , that there were divers english noblemen or gentlemen , who held lands in divers counties of england , at the time when that survey was made ; and for proof of this , since so short a conversation as ours will not permit me to run into a long bed-role of names , i refer you to what the learned and ingenious mr. atwood in his ius anglorum ab antiqua , has observed out of doomesday book upon this subject , where tho' he has not only gone thorough , but gone over fifteen counties of thirty , that are surveyed in that book , yet it will thereby sufficiently appear that your dr. is much mistaken , when he so positively affirms , that there were few or no englishmen that held lands in england : but to give you a taste of this i shall run through as many counties as mr. atwood has given us the names of ; to begin which survey , where besides the earl of morton above mentioned , ( who tho' he was a norman born , yet he was here before the entrance of the norman duke , and held estrehaw in tenrige ▪ hundred in the time of king edward ) there was also hugo de port , an englishman who was a very great proprietor , as may be found under this title in doomesday book , terra hugonis de port : many mannors he had ; and as thereby appears in hampshire , he had at least two mannors , cerdeford and eschetune , from his ancestors before king william's entrance ; and besides this gentleman , ( and the earl above mentioned , ) there are no less than ten or eleven , who as it appears either by their english names , or else by this note which so frequently occurs , idem tenu●t t. r. e. i. e. tempore edwardi regis ; the like i may say for the other counties there mentioned , as hampshire in the next place , where besides ralph de mortimer who had several lands , t. r. e. there are no less than above thirty free-holders more , who by their saxon names and want of sir-names seem to be english , divers of whom held the same thane lands , which themselves or their fathers did in the time of king edwards and tho in buckinghamshire and barkshire , indeed there are but five or six , who held the same lands which they or their ancestors possessed in the time of their conqueror ; but yet in wiltshire and dorcetshire , there appears between twenty and thirty english proprietors , many of whom held whole townships when this survey was made , in sommersetshire , devonshire , staffordshire , yorkshire and glostershire , their does appear in most of them a dozen or more english saxon names , who held whole mannors ; 't is true that in nottinghamshire , linco●shire and herefordshire , their appear fewest english names , and yet the least of these have three a piece . so much may suffice for doomesday book ; and i doubt not if any one will take the pains to look over the titles of the rest of the counties , he may find enough instances of the like nature , sufficient to prove that the english were not wholly dispossessed of their estates , at the end of k. william's reign when this survey was made . not to mention northumberland , westmor●land , and the bishoprick of durham , all which are omitted . but that the number of english , which held the lands in the time of king william , the first and second , was very considerable , may appear by william of malmesburies relating how the norman lords then in england , would have dethroned william rufus and ha●e set up his brother robert in his place , there also shews the manner how that king prevented it . rex videns normannos pend in una rabie conspiratos , anglos probos , & fortes viros , qui adhuc residui ●rant invitatoriis scriptis arcessit ; quibus super injuriis suis querimoniam faci●us , bonasque leges & tributorum livamen liberasque venationes po●licens , fidelitati suae obligavit ; where residui must certainly be meant of the residue of those english gentry , whose estates were still left ; and herein ordericus vitalis is more express , that king william as soon as he saw the contrivance against him ; lanfrancum archiepiscopum cum suffraganeis praesulibus , & comites , anglosque naturales convocavit , & conatus adversariorum , & velle suum expugnandi eos indicavit . m. as for mr. atwood's catalogue of english names from doomesday book , i have not yet examined them , and tho' i grant there are , may be divers who held the same lands that they , or their fathers did , yet they are but a few in respect of the rest ; nor are we certain that all these were native english , and not normans who held lands as well then , as before the conquest ; since the normans , and the english names were often the same ; and as for the want of sir-names , that is no argument , that they must needs be english , since in those days very few even of the normans , but persons of quality and estates , had any , as mr. cambden shews us in his remains ; but as for those expressions in the charters of king william and his sons , wherein the english ; as well as the french earls and barons , are mentioned ; those charters might be either made during the three , or four first years of king william's reign , when i grant the english were not wholly dispossessed of their estates , but that there were some of them that still held earldoms , and baronies in their own right ; but when the same expressions occur after that time , the word angli , or angligenae must be understood in another sense , tho' it seems to be put in opposition to francis ; son as by these last are to be understood such french or norman barons , who had estates in england as well as in france , so by the former could be only mean● such frenchman , or normans who had their estates in england only ; or else tho' french by original , were englishmen by birth , are here called angli , and angligenae , to distinguish them from such french barons as are above mentioned , o● from such as were born in franc●s and for the truth of this i desire you would consult dr. ●●'s learned glossary at the end of the folio edition of his answer to mr. p. and his two seconds , tit. angli and angligenae , where he tells us , that these angli and barones , anglae mentioned in these authors and ancient charters , were not english but normans , and those men of no mean or ordinary ranks , but earls or barons , for they could never have met in such numbers as were requisite for them to do , to protect and defend king william rufus , had not they been headed by such , if they had either power or estates lest , that depended not upon the normans ; and if you or any man can shew me an english saxon that was then either e●●l or baron , or had any share in the government , or any that had considerable estates , that did not hold them of the normans , or had at that time any great woods , forests , or priviledges of hunting in them , then i will confess my self mistaken . as for w. malmesbury , saying these were angli probi qui residui grant these were only the antiqui & legitimi barones , who as ordericus tells us came in with his father ▪ and setled themselves here after the conquest . but as for your quotations out of william of malmesbury and ordericus vitalis ●●ncerning the english assisting king william rufus against his brother robert , by using the common bait of liberty , ( viz. ) promising that he would alleviate the rigid laws of his father , and give free liberty of hunting in his forests ; 't is true he thereupon raised an indifferent army consisting chiefly of english , who as mathew paris tells us , were no better than mercenary or stipendary souldi●●● , and who had either no estates , or else had been turned out of them before : so that this does not prove that they were men of any fortunes who thus assisted william rufus . f. as for what you have now said against the citations of the names out of doomesday book is not material , since if english names were then common to the normans and them , then the norman names might be as well common to the english ; and then many of those in england , whom by their names we suppose to have been normans , might be native englishmen , and as for what you urge against the express words of the charters i have now cited , i think it is a downright wresting of the words francis and anglis since no author that i know of , but your dr. and is of that opinion . for that the word franci or fran●igenae does signifie such frenchmen who held baronies in england , is granted on all hands , but how angli must also signifie frenchmen , seems a paradox to me ; for how could these frenchmen or normans , be termed englishmen , only because they held estates here and not in normandy ? for if the having such and such estates in england , would have turned frenchmen into englishmen , there needed no such distinction to have been made between french and english barons in these charters ; since according to your doctors notion , the french barons could be no other ways mentioned here , but as they had estates here , and therefore could be only writ to in that capacity , since as meer frenchmen they had nothing to do here ; so that if this epithete was so in respect of the tenure of their lands , they would have been stiled english barons as well as the other ; nor is your other evasion more to the purpose , that by the angli might be meant in the charters of henry the i. such norman or french barons , who because they were born in england , might therefore be called english ; for who can believe that in so small a time , as from the beginning of the reign of king william the i. to that of king henry the i. which was but a little above years , so many of the norman nobility were dead , as should make it necessary to use this distinction of french and english barons ; since by their tenures they were both alike english ? and thus to make angli signifie normans , is to confound and make all words tho' never so plain ; uncertain and equivocal : but that a residue of the english. and as for what ordericus says of the old norman barons , it would have signified if you could have proved he had called them englishmen , as he does not ; but if you carry it further to the time of the empress maud and king stephen , when all the old race of normans were certainly dead , then there was much less need of this distinction , when all that were born in england were english alike , and therefore the word french could only extend to those few barons who being born in normandy had estates here . but since you are forced to confess , that for the first four or five years of king william the i. reign , there were both english earls and barons , till the king had by degrees rooted them out , there cannot be a better argument against your pretended right of conquest ; since it is plain , king william could never pretend to take away their honours and estates as a conqueror ; since by his coronation oath he was sworn to restrain all rapines , and unjust judgments , and that he would behave himself modestly toward his subjects , and treat both the english and french with equal right ; so that if he afterwards took away the estates of english nobility or gentry , it was either because they deserved it by rebelling against him , & then it was justly done , or else it was done without any cause at all , but only to oppress and root out the english proprietors ; and if so , such actions being contrary to his own claim from edward the confessor , as also to his coronation oath , could no more give him any such right to rob or spoil men of their estates without any just cause , then it could give him a right to rob the churches and monasteries of all the plate , money and jewels which he found in them , even to the very chalaws and shrines , as matthew paris and other authors tell us he did in the fourth year of his reign , when likewise ( according as you your self set forth ) he began to shew himself a conqueror , or rather a tyrant in the taking away the estates of the english without any just cause . but however the authors of that time do not make so great a tyrant of your conqueror as the doctor ; for william of poictou expresly tells us , who was chaplain to this king , concerning his taking away the estates of the english , and giving them to the normans , that nulli tamen gallo datum est quod anglo cuiquam injustè fuerit ablatum . and ordoricus vitalis speaking of his dealing with the english it the beginning of his reign says expresly , neminem , nisi quèm non damnare iniquum foret damnavit , and therefore sir henry spelman shews us in his glossary out of an ancient manuscript , belonging to the family of shurnborn in norfolk ; that edwin of sharborn , and several others that were ejected out of their estates and possessions , went to the conqueror and told him , that never either before , or in , or after the conquest ; they were against him the said king , either by their advice , or any other aid ; but kept themselves peaceably and quiet●y . and this they were ready to make out , which way soever the king pleased to appoint , whereupon the said king ordered an inquisition to be made throughout all england , whether it were so or no ; which was plainly proved ; therefore he presently commanded , that all those who so kept themselves peaceably in manner aforesaid , as these had done , should be repossessed of all their estates and inheritances , as fully , amply , and quietly , as ever they had or held them before this conquest . this is so plain an authority , that it needs no comment . i shall now conclude with a reply to what you have said , to evade the authorities of those ancient authors i have brought to prove , that in the beginning of the reign of king william the second , there were many english gentlemen left of considerable estates , which you and your doctor would ●ain make to be no better than meer mercenaries , which is expresly contrary to the authority of mat. paris , whom your sel● have cited in this point , as also other authors who have writ of this matter , for matthew has immediately before these words , videns igitur rex willielmus , omnes penè regni proceres unâ rabie conspiratos , anglos fortitudine & probitate insignes , faciles leges & tributorum levamen , illis venationes hibarasque promittendo sibi primò devinxit , and almost make use of the very words that malmesbury had done before ; now i desire you or your dr. would satisfie me , how men who were remarkable for their valour and honesty , and who were so considerable ▪ as to be sent for by letters writ on purpose , and when they came should be promised easier laws , and free huntings , and relaxation of taxes , all which are priviledges which belong to men of estates , could be mean souldiers of fortune ? and to make it plain that they were not the kings , but their own woods they were to hunt in , roger hoveden speaking of this very matter tells us , & concessit omnibus sylvas suas , & venationem . sed quicquid promisit parvo tempore custodivit , angli tum fideliter ●um juvabant : but that he did not keep his promise as to hunting , as well as other things , appears by a passage in eadmerus where he gives us as an example of k. william rufus harsh nature , that about fifty men of the ancient english gentry , who seemed to please themselves in those days , with some remains of riches , were taken and accused , that they had killed the kings deer ; and having for this undergone the trial of fire and water , he was in a great rage about it , which is sufficient to shew you , that there were at this time many english gentlemen left , of sufficient estates to use hunting , either in their own or the kings woods . as for what you urge farther against mr. a's instances out of doomesday book are not very considerable , since it is only an exception against the names of persons there mentioned , that they were not native english , but normans who either were born , or had lands in england , or else had the same names with the english , both which are gratis dicta ; for doomesday book plainly proves , either that they or their ancestors were here before your conquest , or else their names being wholly english saxon , it lies upon your side to prove that they were frenchmen or normans by original , which i believe is more than you or your dr. is able to do . m. i shall not say any further about doomesday book , until i have either examined it my self , or can procure it to be done by some i can trust ; but in the mean time , as for what you say concerning edwin of sharborn the learned dr. hath so confuted this story , in his answer to mr. p. that notwithstanding some learned and great men have given too much credit to it , i think it will appear to have been altogether false ; and tho' sir william dugdale in the first tome of his barronage , hath this story otherwise , and says , that notwithstanding the kings mandate , all he could get was to become tenant to warren , and william de albius of part of his own land , under certain services ; and he is there called edwin the dane , and this ( if any ) is most likely to be true , being taken out of the book sometime belonging to the family of the sharborns . here we see he applied himself to william , but got not the propriety of his estate ; what he obtained was but to hold part of it from others ; and this was then a common practice , as bracton and fleta two of our most antient lawyers , and one of them at least a judge do inform us . that are the time of the conquest , there were freemen that held their possessions by free services and free customs , and when they were thrown out of them by powerful men , afterwards returning to them , received their own , and the very same tenements or possessions to hold in villenage by performing servile works , but such as were certain and nominated ; to this may be added , what mat. paris says , that king william gave liberally to such as were with him in the battle of hastings , when he conquered england ; and that little which was left , he put under the yoak of perpetual servitude ; yet further as to this particular report of sharaborn , there could be no such thing , for his name is not to be found as any proprietor in norfolk , in sharnborn , in doomesday-book ; and the owners of sharnborn , whi●h are there only to be found , are william de warrenna ( from whom this story says it was restored to edwin ) odo bishop of bajeux , benerius arbalistarius , and william de pertenai , whence it is evident , that warren and others were possessed of these lands in the of the conqueror , not long before he died , and no edwin to be found as proprietor of any of them , or other lands ; nor is the name of william de albeni , or william pincerna to be found as a proprietor in norfolk , or in doomesday , though this manuscript of the family of sharnborn says , he had that village and several towns thereabouts , given him by the conqueror , by which it appears that this report is groundless . f. i cannot blame you if you do what you can to evade this testimony from sharnborn's book , which gives so exact an account of the original of those tenants , who held of the king , as sir h. spelman tells us per servitium dreugarii , and such tennants were called dreuches or dreuges , as this book of sharnborn tells us ; but tho' it is true , as this book it self sets forth , edwin of sharnborn was never restored to all the lands he held before the conquest ; yet it is plain that he had the kings mandate for his restitution , and if he could not obtain , it , by reason of the great power of the present possessors , yet that is no argument against his right , or king william's intention to restore him , since ingulph tells us , that ivo talboi seized the cell of spalding , and diverse lands belonging to the monastery of cr●yland , and kept them by force , notwithstand - a solemn hearing before the king and council : and if a great man could do this with the lands of the church , it is no wonder that so powerful a person as earl warren , could by his power , or perhaps by the connivance of k. william himself , keep another mans estate , and make him contented with such a share as he would allow him , when he found he could have no other remedy against those that thus unjustly detained it . but tho' in the beginning of your discourse , you seem to allow a part of the story , as it is related in sharnborn's manuscript , and produce the testimony of bracton and fleta , to prove that divers antient english proprietors , who being thrown●out of their estates , by powerful men , presently after the conquest , were ●ain to take them again upon performing of villain-services , tho' they themselves remained free men ; but your dr. from whom you borrow this , is very much out in his application of those passages he cites ; for neither of those authors do affirm this of all owners of lands whatsoever , but only there to give us the original of soccage tennants on the kings demeasnes , as appears by bracton's title to that chapter , from whence the dr. cites this passage , which is , de diversis conditionibus personarum tenentium in dominicis domini regis , and the first words of this chapter make it yet plainer , beginning thus , in dominico domini regis plura sunt genera hominum , sunt enim ibi servi sive nativi , ante conquestum , in conquestu , & post conquestum ; and under these last ranges the persons you mentioned ; but fleta is more exact in his chapter de sokemannis , where he tells us , that these men were tenants of the kings ancient mannors in demeasne ; & quia hujusmodi cultores regis dignoscuntur , provisa fuit quies , n● sectas facerent ad comitatum , vel hundredum tamen pro terra , quorum congregationem tune socam appellarunt hinc est quod sokemanni hodie dicuntur esse ; so that tho' king william might permit his ancient tenants to be thus outed of their estates they held in his own demeasnes , yet does it not therefore follow , that he took away the estates of the ancient owners , all over england , of whatsoever tenure they were , or of whomsoever held . but as for your quotation out of mat. paris it proves no more than what i readily grant , that king william after his return out of normandy liberally rewarded his followers with the estates of the english , which might he only of such as fought against him at the battle of hastings ; and as for that little which was left them , which he says , was put under the yoak of a perpetual servitude , he means no more by this expression , than that new tenure of knights service which king william imposed upon them , as this author in the very next leaf , speaking of the lands of the bishopricks and abbies , which were held before free from all secular servitude , sub servitute statuit militari , and therefore you seem to contradict your self when contrary to your own author sir william dugdale , you deny the truth of any part of the story , because that in doomesday book the name of edwin of sharnborn is not to be found , and that william de albeni is not named amongst the owners of that mannor , which is not material , since this william might obtain a share therein after this survey was made ; and as for sharnborn himself , his not being there mentioned is no argument that he had no lands within that mannor , or the other that is mentioned in that narrative ; since oftentimes the chief lords of the fee are only mentioned in doomesday book , tho' all the proprietors under them are not particularly named , but it is in vain to discourse any longer with you upon the subject of your conquerors taking away the lands of english owners ; i have given you my opinion , and the reasons against it , and if you are not of my mind i cannot help it , therefore pray go on to your next head , and shew me by sufficient authorities , that king william as a conqueror altered all the laws , and customs of this kingdom . m. i will not undertake to prove that he altered all the laws of england , and brought in quite new ones , yet that he did so in great part , and that by his sole authority , i think i can prove by sufficient testimonies ; and therefore i shall begin with that of eadmer , a monk of canterbury , a companion of archbishop lanfranc's who tells us in his history that william designing to establish in england those usages and laws , which his ancestors and he observed in normandy , made such persons bishops , abbots , and other principal men , through the whole nation , who could not be thought so unworthy , as to be guilty of any reluctancy , and disobedience to them ; knowing by whom , and to what they were raised ; all divine and humane things he ordered at his pleasure . and after the historian hath recounted in what things he disallowed the authority of the pope , and archbishop , he concludes thus . but what he did in secular matters i forbear to write , because it is not my purpose , and because also any one may from what hath been delivered , guess what he did in seculars . from which i think nothing is plainer than that k. william did not only design to alter many things in the laws and customs , of england , but did also actually do it , since to that end he made the bishops , abbots , and other principal men , who were to be judges in all courts , such as he could wholly confide in : now that k. william govern'd the nation as conqueror , and did so live and repute himself so to be , and as such brought in and imposed new laws upon the people of this nation , is as clear as i shall prove from these particulars ; first , the justiciaries , or cheif justices , the chancellors , the lawyers , the ministerial officers , and under judges , earls , sheriffs , bailiffs , hundre duties were all normans , from his first coming until above a hundred years after , as i can make it out by particular instances , and undeniable reasons were not the catalogues too long to be here inserted . if therefore the justiciaries , chancellors , earls , sheriffs , lords of mannors , such as heard causes , and gave judgment , were normans ; if the lawyers , and pleaders were also normans , the pleadings , and judgments in their several courts musts of necessity have been in that language , and the law also , i mean the norman law ; otherwise they had said , and done they knew not what , and judged they knew not how ; especially when the controversies , were to be determined by military men , as earls , sheriffs , lords of mannors , &c. that understood not the english tongue , or law , or when the cheif justiciary himself was a military man , as it often happen'd , and understood only the norman language , and 't is hardly to be believed these men would give themselves the trouble of learning and understanding the english law and language . secondly , tho' we have many laws and customs from the northern people , and north parts of germany , from whence both saxons and normans came ; yet after the conquest , the bulk and main of our laws were brought hither from normandy by the conqueror , from whence we received the tenures , and the manner of holding our estates in every respect ; from whence also have we received the customs incident to those estates : and likewise the quality of them being most of them feudal ; and enjoyed under several military conditions , and services , so that of necessary consequence from thence we must receive the laws also , by which these tenures , and the customs incident to them were regulated , and by which every mans right in such estates was secured ; according to the nature of them ; from normandy ( and brought in by the conqueror ) we received most , if not all our ancient tenures , and manner of holding and enjoying our lands and estates , as will appear by comparing our antient tenures with theirs . f. i shall not deny but that a great part of the matter of fact is true , as you have now put it ; yet tho' i grant that the bishop , abbots , chancellors , chief justices , and other great officers of the crown , were all or the greatest part of them normans , during the reigns of the two first kings of the norman race ; it do●s not therefore follow , that these men must have made a change in the very substance of our laws , tho' in matters of form of pleading or judicial proceedings they might have introduced great alterations ; for as to the civil or municipal laws of this kingdom concerning the descent and conveyance of estates , they continued the same after the coming in of the normans , and lands held by knights service , descended to the eldest son , and lands in free soccage , and gavel-kind to all the sons alike so likewise there were estates , in tail , and fee simple as now , and there were also the like customs of the courtesie of england , burrough english , &c. as there are also at this day , as i can prove to you by several passages out of our english saxon laws ; so likewise for conveyance of estates , those of the better sort of people called bookland , were conveyed by deeds , with livery and seisin , either with , or without warranty as they are now ; but that which was called fol●land held by the meaner sort , were only by livery and seisin without any writing ; and tho' i grant that the custom of sealing of deeds is derived from the normans , yet that is an alteration only in matter of forn ; and as for goods and money they were bequeathable by a man's last will , as well after as before your conquest ; and if you can have the opportunity to peruse a manuscript treatise of sir roger owen's upon this subject , you will find it there sufficiently proved : that livery of seisin , licenses , or fines for alienation , daughters to inherit , trials by juries , abjurations , utlaries , coroners , disposing of lands by will , escheats , gaols , writs , wrecks , warranties , felons goods and many other parts of our law , were here in being , long before the time of king william : this being so as to the common law , let us see what alterations there were in the criminal , or crown part of the law ; first , as to treason and wilful murther , they were punished with death in the saxon times , as well as after , as were also robery , and burglary in the night time ; but as for lesser of●ences , such as batteries , maims , robberies , and other breaches of the peace , they were punished by fine , as well before the conquest as after ; but as for the law of englisherie , which was , that if a man were found murthered , it should be presumed he was an alien or frenchman , and the town thereupon where the body was found was to be fined , unless englisherie was proved , i. e. that the person was an englishman ; this custom tho' it lasted to the reign of edward the third , when it was taken away by a statute made on purpose , tho it may seem a badge of the norman conquest , yet was it indeed a law introduced by king knute in behalf of his danes , who being often found killed , and none could tell by whom , he obtained this law to be made to prevent it ; as you will see at large in bracton , and the mirrour of justices ; but as for trial of all offences , it was either by juries , fire , or water ordinal , by dewel or battle ; or else by witnesses , or compurgators upon oath , as well before as after king william's entrance ; so that i can find nothing material as to the alterations of the laws , either in matters criminal or civil , from what they were in the saxons time ; and this being so it is easily answered , how the judges , and officers might be normans , and yet the laws continue english still ; for first it is certain that for four or five years , in the beginning of k. william's reign , he made no great alteration in the judges , and other great officers of the kingdom , and by that time those whom he was afterwards pleased to imploy in the rooms of such as either died or were turned out , might very well come to understand the laws of england , as far as they distered from those of normandy , which was not in many particulars ; since , as your self very well observed , the saxons and normans being both northern people , had many of the same laws and customs common to both , and the same persons might in three or four years time , have very well learned english enough to have under stood the evidence that the witnesses gave before them , without any interpreter . but , say you , all the pleadings and judgments were in french , and therefore the lawyers and pleaders must be frenchmen , which is likewise a false consequence ; for pray tell me , why might not the english lawyers have learnt french enough to plead in three or four years time , which must necessarily be required before so great an alteration could be made , or lawyers enough he brought out of normandy and sufficiently instructed in our laws and customs could be fitted for their employments : again supposing all pleadings and other proceedings to have been in french , it does not follow that this practice could have obtained in all the courts of england ; for tho' i grant that in the kings court at westminster , where the judges ( as you say ) were for the most part frenchmen , or normans ; yet this could only have some effect either in that great court , or curia regis , where the king often sat in person together with his chief justiciary , and other justices ; or else in the court of common pleas , which followed the kings court , till it was ordained otherwise by magna charta ; or else the court of exchequer , where in those days only matters concerning the kings debts , lands , and revenues were chiefly heard and dispatched : but as for the court of chancery , it was not then used as a court of equity , nor long after till the reign of henry the iv , v , and vi. when it arose by degrees , as you will find in sir william dugdale's origines iuridiciales . so that granting all the proceedings in these supream courts to have been in french , because the king himself , who sat there with the chief justice , and the rest of the judges were either normans or frenchmen ; yet was this of no great importance in comparison of the suits , and causes which were first begun , and try'd in the inferiour courts in the country , before ever they could be brought up to london , by writ , of errour , or appeal , which could only be in causes of great moment , or between the kings tenants in capite ; so that now to let you see that what say i say is true , we will survey all the inferiour cour●s of that time , beginning with the lowest and going up to the highest of them . the first court we find of this kind , was that of the free burrough or tything , wherein by the laws of king edward the confessor , the tythingman or head burrough was the judge ; who , as that law tells us , determined all suits and differences arising among neighbours of the same tything , concerning petty trespasses on one anothers grounds , which if they could not be there determined , might then be brought before the court baron , which was incident to every mannor , and wherein the suitors , and not the lord nor his steward , were the judges : and this , as sir edward coke tells us , was first instituted for the ease of the tenants , and for the ending of debts and damages under potty shillings at home , as it were at their own doors ; and let me tell you by the way , that sorty shillings was theo near as much as forty pound is now ; and if the business could not be ended here , or was of too high a nature , it was then brought into the hundred court , where the hundreder together with the suitors were judges ; and if they had not justice there , they might then remove it into the court of trithing or lathe , which was not the smaller court of the tithing mentioned , nor yet the court leet , but a particular court consisting of three or four hundreds ; which tho' now quite lost , was in being at the time of the statute of merton , as i shall shew you by and by ; and if the business could not be decided in the trithing , it was then removed to the shire , or county court , as mr. lambert shews in the laws of king edward ; which was then held , ( as now ) from month to month , and in which as well as in the hundred court the suitors alone were judges ; and tho' it can now only hold pleas ( unless it be by writ of justices ) of any debt or damage to the value of forty shillings , or above , yet we ●ind from ancient authors , that this court was so considerable . that we have diverse examples of causes between the greatest persons of england , and for lands of great value , begun and determined in this court : thus eadmertes relates the great trial at pinnesden-heath , between odo bishop of bayen● , half brother to your conqueror , and by him created earl of kent , and lanfrank , archbishop of canterbury , concerning divers mannors in kent , and other counties , whereof earl odo had diseized the see of canterbury , in the time of arch-bishop stigand his predecessor ; whereupon the arch-bishop petitioned the king , that justice might be done him , secundem legem terrae , and the king thereupon sends forth a writ to summon a county court : the debate lasted three days , before the freemen of the county of kent , in the presence of many chiefmen , bishops , and lords , and others skilful in the laws ; and judgment passed for the arch-bishop lanfrank by the votes of the freemen , or primorum , or probo●●● hominum , as the historian calls them . so that to conclude this head , if no suit could be begun in those days , but what was first commenced in the hundred court , no distringas could issue forth till three demands were made in the hundred , and from thence to be removed to the county court , where regularly all civil causes were try'd by the suitors as the only judges , as well as in the hundred court , and court baron ; then it will necessarily follow , that , unless you can prove , ( which i think is impossible ) that all the english were at that time slaves and villains , and had no free-hold of any sort left them ; that all pleading and proceedings in any of those courts , being before meer englishmen , must have been in english , and no other language ; so that after all this great cry , nor a twentieth part of the suits in england , were brought to london ; and as for criminal causes , unless in cases of treason , all murthers and other felonies were tryed and judged in the country , either within the particular jurisdictions of bishops , abbots or great lords , or else of such cities and towns who had the priviledges of infangthief and outfangthief together with fossa and furca , that is , a pit to drown , and a gallows to hang malefactors ; and if the offence was done in the body of the county , they were then tryed and condemned in the county court ; justices itinerant not being in use till henry the seconds reign . m i must confess you have given me a great deal of light in these matters more than i had before ; but as i shall not dispute whether in the lowest courts , such as the tythings and court barons , the smaller english free-holders might not judge of petty causes amongst themselves ; yet that in those greater causes , were brought in the hundred , and county courts , which only the greater fleemen of the hundred , or county were judges : who these freemen were , dr. b. hath sufficiently taught us in his commenes upon the conquerors laws , as also in his glossary , ( viz. ) that they were tenants in military service , who in those times were the only great freemen of the kingdom , and quite different from our ordinary free-holders at this day ; these were the men the only legal men , that named and chose juries ; and served on juries themselves , both in the county and hundred court , and dispatched all country business under the great officers ; i do not deny but that there might be other lesser freemen in those times , but what their quality was , farther than that their persons and blood was free , that is , they were not nativi , or bondmen , it will give a knowing man trouble to discover it to us : we find in every leaf of doomesday , socmen , & liberi homines , possessors of small parcels of land , but what there quality was , and of what interest in the nation , dicat apollo , no man yet hath made it out , nor can it be done by the account we have of ordinary free-men , for a century or two last past . and for further proof of this ; that none but tenants in capite or military tenants at least could be judges in the county court , appears by the laws of king henry the first , wherein it is expresly said . regis iudices barones comitatus qui liberas in t is terras habent , per quos debent causae singulorum alterna prosecutione tractari , &c. so that these barons of the county being certainly feudal tenants , this service of being suitors to the county and hundred courts , was a service incident to their tenures ; and then it will also follow , that those primores , and probi viri , who as you have now related , tryed this cause between earl odo , and archbishop lanfranc , and who ( let me tell you ) were not only of the county of kent , but of other counties in england , where the mannors and lands lay , as eadmerus shews us , and who were the jurors in this great cause , consisted of the great military tenants , that were not barons , and the less which were the probi viri ; for it can be no ways probable , that the ordinary freemen which made the greatest number , and were all bound to their good behaviour , could be the probi , & legales homines , who served upon juries ; to conclude , if i have already proved ( as i think i have sufficiently ) that k. william took away the greatest part of the lands of england , and gave them to normans and frenchmen , who were the only true free-men or free-holders of the kingdom ; and as such owed suit and service to the hundred and county court , in which ( as you your self set forth ) all the considerable actions as well real as personal were then commenced and tryed , it will also follow , that the suitors , who were the judges in those courts , being for the greatest part at least frenchmen , all the trials and proceedings therein must have been in french , and not in english , which is contrary to what you have undertaken to prove . f. if this be all you have to object against what i have now said , that all pleadings in the inferiour courts in the country , must in the time of your conqueror have been in french , and not in english , i hope i shall give you very good satisfaction to the contrary , and therefore i shall prove to you , that the very same persons who were the suitors or judges in the hundred court , were also suitors in that of the county , tho' they were of never so small estates of free-hold ; and those that were thus judges in the hundred court , were also the same persons of which the lowest court ( viz ) that of the headborough or tythingman did consist , appears by the very definition of a hundred , as you may see it in sir. h. spelman's glossary , est autem hundredus portio comitatus , quâ olim degebant centum pacis regiae fideiussores , uti decuria quâ decem , complexus est igitur hundredus decem decurias , ut centenarius numerus decies denarium : now that the county court consisted of the same sort of persons , of that of the hundred , is also as certain , since all england was then and is now divided into counties , hundreds , and tythings ; so that as the hundred court consisted of a hundred persons , who had all given pledges to the king , so did the county court consist of all the free-holders or free-men of the several hundreds of the county , who all owed suit and service to the county court , and as such were returnable upon juries in all trials in that court , tho' they had never so small estates of free-hold ; for there were no laws that limited the estates of free-holders returnable upon juries , on assizes or trials , to the yearly value of forty shillings , until the statute of west . ii. but that these suitors to the hundred court , must have been for the most english in all your conquerors reign , your dr. has given us a sufficient testimony in his answer to mr. a's ianus anglorum , p. . where he tells us , the jurors were antiently called tests , and often in doomesday-book it is thus sound , testatur hundredus , teste hundredâ , the hundred witnesseth that such lands is such a man's , or by the witness of the hundred such land is a such man's . see the claims in yorkshire , lincolnshire , and suffolk , at the end of the book . now the use that i shall make of these words of the drs. is this , that in many of these claims the issue is , that such a one held the land die quo rex edwardus suit vivus & mortuus : now i desire you to tell me , if the free-holders of the hundred , were all strangers and normans at this time , as your dr. supposes , they all were that served on jurles in the hundred and county court ; how these men could testifie who held the land at the time of k. edward's death , and by what services ? and i desire you to be pleased to read and consider the trial mentioned in doomesday-book , between will. de chornet and picot the sheriff , where the proof was by the best and most antient men of the whole county and hundred , that this land in question belonged to chornet per haereditatem sui antecessoris . so that then the best and antientest free-holders of the county of berks , were the same who were so in the time of k. edward , or else how could they witness this land to have been held by chornets ancestor . but because you have two or three small objections against this truth , i shall endeavour to remove them . the first is , that those who try'd one anothers causes in the county court , are in the law of k. henry i. ( which you now cited ) called barones comitatus qui liberas terras habent . therefore you imagine that these barones comitatus must needs have been all tenants in capite , or by knights service at least , who by vertue of that tenure owed suit and service to the county court , which is a great mistake ; since every free-holder of whatsoever tenure , who was resident within the county , owed suit and service to that court , and it is only by vertue of the twentieth of henry the sixth , which ( as i have already shewed you ) limited that service only to free holders of forty shillings per annum , or above : now that every free holder tho' of never so small estate was anciently a baron of the county , is also as certain in the ancient and larger acceptation of the word baron , which did not originally signifie only a tenant in capite , or by knight service , but any other free-holder , who could be returned upon a jury concerning free-hold in the county court ; now that every lord of a mannor , and free-holder , was anciently called a thane before the conquest , appears by this law of k. knutes , & habet omnis dominus familiam suam in plegio suo ; & si accusetur in aliquo , respondeat in hundredo , ubi compellabitur sicut recta lex , sit : quod fi accusetur , & fugiat , reddat dominus ejus regi weraem , i e. precium nativitatis hominis illius ; & si dominus accusetur , quod ejas consilio sugerit , adlegiet se cum quinque thanis , ( id est nobilibus ) & idem sit sextus , si purgatio frangat ti , reddat ei ( scil regi ) weram suam , & qui fugerit , extra legem habeatur . i shall nor trouble my self to translate this law , since the latin is plain enough ; only take notice that by this word adlegiet , he shall wage law , or make oath together with five thanes , that is noblemen or gentlemen , & idem sit sextus , whereof he himself should be the sixth ; where you may see that every free-holder , being master of a family is here called a thane , who was to give pledge or security , that all his family should answer the law in the hundred court for any offence they should commit ; and these thanes were such as mr. lambert expresses by ascitus sibi ingenuis quinque ; for what he calls ingenuus , brompton calls liber homo , that is every free-holder , so that you see thane , ingenuus and liber homo signifie all the same thing , that is the lower sort of thane , or free-holders who owed suit and service to the hundred and county courts ; and that these very men were such as after your conquest were called barones comitatus , appears in this , that those who before the conquest were called thanes , are afterwards called barons of counties , in all our ancient laws and charters ; and for this i shall give you the authority of sir h. spelman in his glossary , who tho' he does chiefly understand by this word all sort of feudal barons dwelling in each county , proceres nempe & maneriorum domini , yet nor only these , but necnon liberi quique tenentes , hoc est fundo●um proprietarii , anglice freeholders , ut superius dectum est . so that take it in which sense you will , this word cannot signifie only tenants in capite , or so much as military tenants , as you suppose , since a man might hold a mannor by other tenures than knights service , as by grand or petty serjeanty , or in soccage by a certain rent , and so likewise might he hold any other lesser estate of free-hold by the like tenures ; which if it were so , your drs. fancy of tenants in military service being then the only free-men of the kingdom , and who were capable of serving upon juries in the hundred and county court , is a meer chimera , without any ground , as i have already proved at our third meeting ; when i shewed you by the words liberi homines , so often mentioned in king william's laws , are to be understood not only tenants by knights service , but any other free-men or free holders , who held lands or other possessions , which may be also proved farther by the stat. of merton cap. . as appears by this clause , provisum est insuper , quod quilibet liber ●omoq●● sectam debet ad comitatum , trithingum , hundredum , & wapentagium , vel ad 〈◊〉 domini sui , libere possit facere attornatum suum , ad sectas illas pro eo faciendas . whereby you may see , that every freeman , who was a master of a family , and not under the power of another , was then obliged to pay suit and service to the county , trithing , and hundred courts . but , say you , these persons who were jurors in this great cause between earl odo , and arch-bishop lanfranc are there called primores , and probi viri , not only of the county of kent , but other counties where the lands lay , and it is not probable , that the ordinary free-men , which made the greatest number , and were all bound to their good behaviour , could be the probi & legales homines , who served upon this jury : well i grant it , that these gentlemen you speak of , might be lords of mannors and considerable for quality and estate , and who alone were impannelled upon juries in this , and other such great tryals of novel dissei●in ; and yet for all that those lesser free-men , or free-holders you mention , were legales homines , and as such were capable of trying all causes , of what nature soever , since sir h spelman tells us in his glossary , title legalis , that in iure nostro de eo dicitur qui stat rectus in curia , non exlex seu utlegatus , non excommunicatus , vel infamis , &c. sed qui & in lege postulat & postul●tur . hoc sensu vulgare illud in formulis juridicis ; probi & legalis homines . so that he does not make ( as you do ) that a man's legality must depend upon his tenure , but upon his being rectus in curia . so that it is no more an argument , that because in some great tryals in those times , none but the chief , and most considerable men in the county , were impannelled upon juries in the county court ; therefore none but they could ever serve there upon juries at all ; then it would be now for a man to affirm , that because in great tryals at the assises , or at the bar at westminster , only knights , and gentlemen are impannelled ; therefore none but they , and not any yeomen , or countrymen can ever serve upon juries at all . but let these gentlemen you mention have been all tenants in capite , or by knights , service , if you please , yet will it not make good your assertion , that they were only normans or fr●nchmen , who , as the only proprietors of estates , served upon this and other juries at that time , for they must have certainly been such , who of their own knowledge , knew the lauds in question , and to whom they did belong before k. william's entrance into england , and your dr. himself in his answer to mr. atwood's ianus , fully agrees to this truth , as appears by this passage , which i desire you would read ; in tryals of novel diss●isin , and for the possession of lands , customs , services , &c. the juries at the time of the conquest , and in several of the king's reigns next succeeding were impannelled out of the same town and neighbourhood , of such as did know the land and things in question , and who had been possessed of it , and for what time ; and to this purpose in an assize , if none of the jurors knew the right it self , or truth of the matter , and did testifie so much to the court upon oath , recourse was then had to others , until such were found who did know the truth ; but if some did know the truth , and others not , those that knew it not were put by , and others called into the court , until twelve at the least should be found to agree therein ; and for this purpose it was that all suitors to hundred and country courts were bound to appear there under great penalties , that th●re might be a jury of such as knew whose the land was ; and so far your dr. is very much in the right ; but then , that all the gentlemen that served upon this jury must be englishmen , is as plain from the reason he hath now given us ; and if he had not told us so , we have an undeniable authority for it , to wit the antient mss. called codex roff●nsis , quoted by mr. sel●en in his notes upon eadmerus , where speaking of this tryal ; praecipit rex comitatum totum ( viz. of kent ) absque mora considere , & homines comitatus omnes francigenas & praeciput anglos in antiquis legibus & consuetudinibus peritos in●unum convenire . but it also adds , & alii aliorum comitatuum homines , and so confirms what eadmerus says , so that nothing is more evident by your doctors own shewing , as also by the testimony of this ancient author , that this great cause was tryed either by tenants in capite , and other great free-holders were all englishmen , or such frenchmen as were here before your conquest ; so that from this famous tryal we may draw two of three confusions directly contrary to your assertions : first , that there were many great proprietors not only in kent but in other counties , as appears by eadmerus , who were a sufficient number to try causes in the county courts , a good while after your conquerors coming over . secondly , that the pleadings and verdict in this cause being before englishmen , and given by them , must have been all in english ; and if it were so in this cause , it will follow for the same reason in all other counties all over england . lastly , that these gentlemen were well skilled in the antient laws and customs of england , which had been in vain if they had been altered as you suppose . m. i will not deny but that in the beginning of the conquerors reign , many englishmen might have estates left them , which might not be taken away till some years after , and mr. selden in his titles of honour places this tryal between earl odo and arch-bishop lanfranc , about the first year of k. william , and i suppose that it happened before the fifth year of his reign ; when matthew paris tells us , that the earls eadwin , morcar , and siward together with egelwin bishop of durham , as also many thousands of clerks and laicks not being able to bear the severity of k. william fled into woody and desart places , and from thence got into the isle of ely , where they fortified themselves , and whither k. william followed them , and taking the island made them submit to mercy ; and then this author tells us , that the k. put the bishop of durham in prison ; and as for the rest , some of them he killed , some he put to ransom , and others he commited to perpetual imprisonment ; so that i reckon from this time , the king took away most of the englishmens estates , as not trusting them any more . f. if this had all happened as you have put it , yet would it not prove what you have maintained ; for if those englishmem who had not been engaged with harold , or else had been pardoned for it still held their estates ; and as you say they forfeited them afterwards for rebellion ; then it is certain k. william did not proceed against the english as a conqueror ; since if he had , he would have taken away their estates iure belli ; which since as you your self confess he did not , whatever estates he took away afterwards , was either for treason committed by the english , or else wrongfully ; if the former , he did it as a lawful king ; if wrongfully , then as a tyrant , and as such could , obtain no just right against the english nation , by his unjust proceedings . but indeed after all , you are quite out in your account concerning this matter , for as to the great tryal you now mentioned , it could not be in the first or second year of king william's reign , nor could happen sooner than the sixth or seventh of his reign , for arch-bishop stigand was not deposed till the year . which was the fourth year of k. william ; and in the next year being . the annals of mailros , as also the chronicle of thomas wiks place archbishop lanfranc's co●secration , and fetching of his pall from rome , so that it could not be until the year after this rebellion at the soonest , when lanfranc was setled in his bishoprick , that this suit was commenced by him against earl odo , and therefore a great many of the english nobility and gentry , had still estates let them after this rebellion . and that they continued to have so some years after this time , appears by those writs of k. william , which mr. atwood hath given us in his ianus a●glorum , &c. concerning the restitution of the lands belonging to the church of ely , which are also transcribed and allowed by your dr. in his answer to it ; and i desire you particularly to consider that writ of k. william's directed to arch-bishop lanfranc , roger e. of morton , and ieoffery bishop of constance , commanding them to cause to be assembled all those shires who were present at the plea had concerning the lands of the church of ely , before the queen went last into normandy ; the rest being most material to the cause in hand , i shall give you in latin , cum quibus ●tiam sinc de baronibus m●is qui competenter adesse pot●●unt & praedicto placito intersuerunt , & qui ter●●s ejusdem ecclesiae tenent , quibus in ●num congragatis eligantur plures de illis angli● quisciunt quo modo terrae jacebant praefatae ecclesiae , die qua rex edwardus obiit , & quod inde dixerint ibidem jurando testentur . from whence we may also gather , that this tryal concerning the lands which is here ordered was to be in like ma●ner , and by a jury of the same sort of englishmen , who tryed the cause between earl od● and arch bishop lanfranc , that is , they were english gentlemen of sufficient estates , or tenants in capite , if you please now. let us look into the time when this happened , since the writ doth not tell us when it was , only that it refers to a plea held concerning the church of ely , before the queens last going into normandy , so that this tryal here mentioned could not happen till after the fourteenth year of k. william's reign , which i prove thus ; this queen did not come over into england , till the year . when the king returned with his queen out of normandy after his coronation , at which she was not present ; after which k. william went not into normandy till the seventh year of his reign , when he went over and took mans , and then whether he carried the queen with him is uncertain ; but the annals of waverly tells us , he went over again the next year , and then he might carry the queen with him , which might be the first time she returned into normandy , but it appears by the same annals , that the king went over the year after ; and staying but a little while returned into normandy to fight against his rebellious son prince robert , where staying not long , he returned as soon as he had driven his son out of normandy : nor do we find he went over again till the year of his reign , being the year . and then i suppose since he stayed there for some time , he carried the queen with him , and to this last going over i suppose this writ we have cited refers , for tho' the queen went over again after this , yet she returned no more , because she died in normandy in the year . as iogulph who was then alive relates ; the use i make of these particulars is this , that long after the time you suppose the english to have lost all their estates , we here find a great jury of englishmen , summoned out of several shires in england , to try this great cause , concerning the lands which the church of ely had been unjustly disseised of ; so that here you see after the fourteenth year of this king , the english still continued to keep their estates , and to serve upon juries , and consequently the pleadings before them , as well as their verdict must have been in english. m. i shall not insist upon this point any farther , yet this much you cannot deny , but that all the pleadings and proceedings at w●stminster , as also the old law books were all in french , as appears by the mirror of justices , britton , not to mention those of latter days , as littleton's tenures , and others ; and so were also the ancient year books or reports of cases , all written in norman french , even in our own age ; so that since this proceeded from that great alteration which the conqueror made in our laws , it is also a badge of that yoak which he imposed upon the nation by his conquest : and to make this yet more plain , that very copy of k. edward the confessors laws is in old norman french , which ( together with k. william's additions to them ) ingulph tells us , he brought down with him to his monastery , and which he has inserted into his history , as you may find them in the last edition printed at oxford , and were before published by mr. seld●n in his notes upon eadmerus . f. i cannot deny but that some part of the matter of fact to be as you have here laid down ; yet it will not follow that this common use of the french tongue in our reports and laws , did proceed from the norman conquest , or is any badge of conquest ; for first , the most ancient laws of k. william , which we find in spelman and lambert's collections are in latine , as they were before the pretended conquest ; i grant indeed those you mention in ingulph are in french , but they being most of them criminal or penal laws , or else concerning tenures , it is no wonder that they were publisht in the language of his country , that the normans and other frenchmen he brought over with him might understand them ; and tho' they were written in french , yet they were proclaimed in the english tongue , that the english as well as normans might take notice of them : but after these laws , you will not find any ancient charter or statute in french , till the statute of west . i. which was above years after your pretended conquest ; for all the charters of this k. william , are in latine or saxon , as that particularly granted by him to the city of london ; so likewise were all the ancient charters and laws of the other succeeding kings , as those of k. william rufus , henry i. henry ii. king stephen , richard i. are all in latine or saxon , and none of them in french , as appears by several of them still to be seen in the arch-bishops library at lambeth , and in sir robert cotton's , and also magna charta , and all other statutes and charters of k. iohn and henry the third till the statute of west . i. above mentioned , and therefore it is not likely that this custom should have taken its original from normandy , for if it had , it would have been begun immediately after your conquest ; and as for our law books , tho' i grant those you mentioned to be written in french , yet is it not the norman french , since it differs very much from the language in which k. edward's laws are written , which are in ingulph , the french of which is so obsolete and obscure , that he that understands our law french very well , can scarcely make any sense of them ; but our first writers concerning the laws of england , writ in latine and not in french , as you may see by glanvil , bracton and flet● , who writ before horn's mirrour of justices , or britton's treatise of the laws of england . as for your books and reports , i grant they are in french ; but that this custom was not derived from normandy , is also as certain , since the first reports we have begin with the first year of edward the second , except some few memorandums of cases a●judged in the exchequer in the reign of his father , above years after k w●lliam's coming in ( as i but now noted ; ) nor could they be writ in the norman dialect , since we had then nothing to do in that dutchy , which had been conquered by the french in the beginning of k. iohn's reign , above eighty years before any report , or law book was writ in french at all ; and therefore we must ascribe the original of this custom to some other cause than the meer will and pleasure of your conqueror , and for this we must go as high as the reign of k. edward the confessor ; who as ingulph tells us , having lived long in normandy and bringing over divers normans with him , the whole nation began under this k. to forsake the english customs , and to imitate the french manners in many things , so that all great men looked upon it as a piece of good breeding , to speak french in their houses , and to make their deeds and charters after the french manner so that it was very easie for k. william after his coming in , who ( as ingulph also tells us ) abhorred the english tongue , to make the laws of the land to be pleaded in the french tongue , and to make the boys to learn at school the first rudiments of their grammer in french , and also the saxon or english hand to be altered , and the french hand to come in use in all books , and writings ; and tho' i confess most of the chief justices and judges , were frenchmen or normans , during the three or four first kings of that race ; yet that alone could not have caused this tongue to be so generally used , not only in the kings court , but also in all the courts at westminster , after englishmen began again to sit there , had it not been for the tacite consent not only of the king , and people of quality , but also of the lawyers themselves ; for the law terms being for the most part french , they did not only thereby make the law the greater mystery to the vulgar , but they also supposed that these terms being french , could not be rendered into any other language ; but for all that , it had been impossible for this tongue , which was spoke by so small a number of persons in respect of the whole nation , to have prevailed so long among the better sort of people , had not our kings for many ages enjoyed large territories in france , which occasioning their frequent going over thither about affairs of war or peace , as also the french gentry and nobilities frequent coming over hither , it is no wonder if that tongue being the language of the court , was generally understood and spoken by all noblemen , gentlemen and lawyers ; so that i have heard it from a very good hand , a person who is very well versed in antiquity , that a gentleman being returned on a j●ry in the reign of edward ii. was excepted against , because he did not understand french ; and hence it is , that not only the terms of our law , but also those of heraldry , hawking , and hunting , are almost all french to this day ; and tho' by the statute of edward the third which you but now mentioned , all pleas should be in english , and not in french , yet i desire you to take notice , that this did no way extend to any matters of process upon which suits are founded , but that the writs , declarations , and all other matters of record were always entered and enrolled in latine , from before the conquest to this very day , so that there was never any alteration as to that point ; these things being considered it is no wonder if the judges and clerks of parliament , who were in those days entrusted with the drawing up all acts of parliament , being greater masters of the french than latin tongues , chose rather to draw them up in the former , and thus it continued until the reign of henry the seventh , when our statutes began first to be drawn up , and enrolled in english. m i confess you have given me a greater light in this matter than i had before , yet i suppose you cannot deny that the tenure of knights service , with those clogs that belong to it of wardship , marriage , and relief were all derived from the normans as appears by the grand customer of normandy , which i have already men●ioned ; so that tho' it be true that all these are now taken away by a late statute of k. charles the second , yet since this tenure , and those services are not found among the saxon laws , there cannot be a greater proof of the ancient power of the conqueror , or of the servitude imposed upon the nation by him ; and therefore i look upon it as a very imprudent part of the late k. charles , to part with so great a tye , which his father and all his predecessors had over the persons and estates of all the nobility and gentry of the kingdom . f. i shall not take upon me to decide whether it were politickly done or not of k. charles the second , to part with the wardship , and services of his tenants by knights service ; but this much is certain , that considering the abuses and corruptions that had crept into that tenure by degrees , since the first institution , both by the unfit marriages of the heirs , as also by the waste that was often times commited on the wards estate during his minority , it was certainly a very great grievance and burthen to the subject , and considering how many of those wardships were begged by hungry courtiers , they were of no considerable profit to the crown ; and tho' i grant they were a very great tye , ( or rather clog ) upon the estates of the nobility and gentry of this kingdom ; yet it did not thereby produce any such love or obedience , as would retain the tenents better in their duty before than since they were granted away for the forfeitures for treason and felony , and also fines for alienations , and are reserved to the grown now as they were before ; and as for any love or respect which was anciently paid by the heir , how could there be any such thing ? since the king granted away the custody of the heir , and his lands , to persons who for the most part made a meer prey of them ; so that they were often married against their consents , and their estates were delivered to them wasted and spoiled ; besides also what was exacted from them for reliefs , and ouster lismaines we need not wonder if it were rather a cause of secret discontent and hatred of the kings prerogative than otherwise ▪ and therefore i cannot think it was not so unpolitickly done by the king , to render himself gracious , and acceptable to his people upon his return to grant their request , and pass that act for taking away wards and liveries , and to accept of a revenue by excise of treble the value in stead of it . but to come to the original of knights service it self , i do not think it was derived from the normans , since we are certain there were thane lands in england ; which were held of the king , and that by knights service , before king william's coming over , and there were also middle thanes who held of those lords above them by the like service ▪ insomuch that in the laws of k. knut● there is one concerning the heriots , which an earl , the kings thane as well as inferior thanes , were to pay not only to the king , but to other inferiour lords , which are almost the same as were afterwards reserved by the laws of k. edward the confessor , confirmed by k. william , as you will find them in ingulph ; only there is no gold reserved , but only horses and arms , whereas by the law of k. knute , each e. was to pay two hundred manenses of gold , each kings thane fifty , and each inferiour thane two pounds ; only note that he who is called e. in k. knutes laws , is called a count in these , the thane a baron , and the inferior thane a vauasor : and that which is there called a 〈◊〉 is here termed a relief . and that this tenure by knights service , which is now called escuage or servitium scuti , was of ancient time named expeditio hominum cum scutis , and was in use before the coming in of the danes , is also as certain , for sir e. coke in his fourth inst. tells us , that we may in the charter of k. kenulph , who anno domini . granted to the abbot of abbindon many mannors and lands , and reserved , quod expeditionem duodecim virorum cum tantis scutis exerceant , antiq●os pontes & arces renovent , and also he mentions a like charter of k. ethelred to a knight called athel●e● , anno domini , so that you see not only spiritual persons , and great thanes or barons , but also knights held lands by the service of so many men before your conqueror , and your dr. also himself allows it , for in his answer to mr. p. in all ancient charters in the saxon times he translates the word fidel●s by tenants in capite , or military service . m. i will not deny that military fees were in use before the conquest , and also that the feudal law did obtain here in many things , and therefore i am so far of the doctors opinion , who in his gossary tit. feudal laws tells us , the feudal law obtained to most nations of europe , and in normandy was in its full vigor at the time of the coming over of the conqueror , but afterwards grew more mild and qualified , as also the tenure it self , a perfect description of which with all its incidents of homage , relief , ward , marriage , escuage , ayds , &c. are to be found in the grand customer , cap. . , , . and although there were military fiefs , or fees , here in the saxon times , yet not in such manner as after the conquest established here by william the conqueror , and according to the usage in normandy ; when as it appears by doomesday-book , in every county he divided most if not all the land of england , amongst his normans and followers ; now that this custom of wardships is wholly derived from the norman conquest , you shall find in sir e. cookes fourth institutes in the same chapter you last cited , as you may here read , you have heard before de regali servitio , before the conquest ; but that regal● servicium , ( which was , knights service ) drew unto it relief , but neither wardship of the body or of the land , as hath been said ; it is true that the conqueror in respect of that royal service , as a badge of the conquest , took the wardship of the land , and the marriage of the heirs within age of such tenants , but this extended not to the tenures of the subjects by knights service , as it appeareth by bracton , dicitur regale se●vitium , quia spectat ad dominum regem & non alium , & secundum quod in conquestis fuit adinventum , &c. whereupon sir e. c. notes ( in the margent , ) the tenure ( as before it appeareth ) was not then invented , but the fruits of this tenure of the k. ( viz. ) wardship and marriage , which was bracton's meaning , so as the conqueror provided for himself ; but other lords at the first by special reservation , since the conquest provided upon gifts of lands for themselves , regis ad exemplum totu● componitur orbis , wherein that which we had from the conqueror we freely confess . f. i shall not dispute his matter since it is doubtful whether this custom of wardship was norman , or whether it was derived from the saxons , who possibly might have some respect to orphans in such cases , to train them up for the publick service in point of war ; especially , being possessors of a known right of relief , as well as alfred the saxon king did undertake the work for the training of some particular persons in learning , for the service of the publick in time of peace , and civil government , and tho' sir h. spelman is of opinion in his title de wardi● , that wardship of the heir came in with the conqueror , yet sir iohn his son , ( who was also a learned antiquary ) in his epilogue to his second book of k. alfred's life , printed at oxford , speaking of military fees granted to the kings thanes , has this passage . haec etiam fioda baeredibus sub hereoti , si●e relevaminis cujus piam quod haeres in terrae redemptionem regi solvere tenebatur conditione plerumque transibat ; & si haeres minor natu à patre moriente relinquebatur , regi educatio ●jus ( utpo●● regis hominis ) committebatur , in utilitatem etiam & commodum ipsius regis . but whether the wardship of the body of the heir , was in use in k. william's time or before , is uncertain ; for the land is in the charter of henry the first in mat. paris , granted either to the widdow or next heir . but let these customs be derived from whence you please , it is a plain case it could be no badge of conquest upon the people of this nation , and that by the doctors own shewing ; for were it a norman custom never so much , if your conqueror first of all imposed it upon those he brought over along with him , it could never be a badge of slavery upon the english nation , but rather upon the normans , upon whom it was chiefly imposed ; and if they afterwards granted lands to the english upon the same terms they held them themselves , they were no more slaves to whom they were granted , than they were under whom they held them ; but indeed this was so far from being looked upon as my badge of servitude , that if the dr. himself is to be believed , these were the only freemen , and their services , ( bracton says ) were so notoriously free ; that in writs of right it was never mentioned , because so well known notandum in servitio militari non dicitur per liberum servitium , & ideo quod constat , quia tale servitium liberum est . and hower rigorous the feudal law might be at the beginning , it was when your conqueror came in so far mitigated as to the rigour of it , that the tenants by knight service were not only free by k. william's law , from all arbitrary taxes and tallies . but also obtained a setled inheritance to them and their heirs , as appears by that clause in k. william's charter ; and therefore in the reign of henry the third , when william of warren earl of surrey was questioned after the statute of quo warranto by the kings justices , by what warrant he held his lands , pulling out an old sword , he answered to this effect ; behold my lords here is my warranty , my ancestors came into this land with william the bastard , and obtained those lands by the sword , and i am resolved with this sword to defend them against any whosoever shall go about to dispossess me , for the k. did not himself alone conquer the land , but our progenitors were sharers with him and assistants therein . as for what you say , that the laws in the customary of normandy , are the same with the laws of england ; it is no more than what divers french writers have taken notice of , but do not attribute their agreement to their being borrowed from the normans , but quite contrary ; for in the first place most of the learned men say , that the first establishing of the customary of normandy , was in henry the first 's time , and afterwards again about the beginning of edward the seconds time , when normandy was not under the king of england ; and s●querius a french author relates , that k. henry i , established the english laws in normandy , and with him do also agree gulielmus brito , rutilarius , and other french writers , who mention also that the laws in the customary of normandy are the same with the laws collected by our english k. edward the confessor , who was before the conqueror ; an additional testimony hereof is out of william de reville de alenson , who in his latin comment upon the customary , proves and demonstrates that the laws and customs of normandy came from the english laws and nation , either not long before or after edward the confessor's time . in the customary , there is a chapter of nampes or distresses , and it is there decreed ; that one should not bring his action upon any seisure , but from the time of the coronation of k. richard , and this must be our k. richard the first , because no k. of france was ever of that name ; and the words nampes , and withernams , were saxon words , taken out of the english laws , signifying a pawn or distress , and in the same sense are used in the customary . but if you have nothing more to object against what i have now said , pray proceed to your last head , and let me see how you will prove , that the english lost all their antient liberties and priviledges which they enjoyed under the english saxon kings . m. i never heard so much before concerning the original use of the french tongue in our reports and law books , but yet this much i think you will not deny ; first , that the norman french was never used in our courts of justice , till after the conquerors entrance , secondly , that he did his endeavour totally to root out the english tongue , by ordering of children to learn the first rudiments of their grammer in french : and as for what you have said concerning the customary of normandy being especially as to tenures derived from the english laws and customs , i do not deny but that it may be the opinion of some french writers that it was so , but i shall believe it , when they can prove that the wardships and marriage of the heir of the tenants by knights service , as also those aids they were to pay the king , or any other lord they held of towards making his eldest son a knight , and marrying his eldest daughter , were in use in england before the conqueror came over . but to observe your commands , i shall now proceed to shew that by the conquest , the english for a time lost all their ancient rights and priviledges , till they again obtained them either by their mixing with the normans , so that all distinction between them and the english were taken away , or else they were restored by the charters of k. henry the first , k. iohn , and k. henry the third ▪ i shall therefore divide the priviledges of englishmen into these three heads ; first , either such as concerned their offices or dignities ; or , secondly , such as concerned their estates ; or lastly , such as concerned the tryal for their lives : in every one of which , if i can prove the english natives as well of the clergy and nobility suffered confideracie lesses and abridgments of their ancient 〈…〉 liberties which they formerly enjoyed . i think i shall sufficiently prove the point in hand ; as to the first head ing●ph tel●s us , that the english were so hated by the normans in his time , that how well soever they deserved , they were driven from their dignities ; and strangers , tho' much less fit , of any nation under heaven were taken in their places ; and malmesbury who lived and writ in the time of henry the first says , that england was then become the habitation of foreigners , and the rule and government of strangers ; and that there was at that day no englishman an earl , bishop , or abbot , but that strangers devoured the riches , and gnawed the bowels of england , neither is there any hope of ending this misery . so that it is plain they were now totally deprived of all offices and dignities in the common weal , and consequently could have then no place in the great council , the parliament of the nation , both for the raising of taxes , and the making of laws : and tho' i grant mr. petyt and your self suppose you found a clause in the conquerors magna charta , whereby you would prove , that all the freemen of this kingdom , should hold their lands and possessions well and in peace , free from all unjust exactions and taillage , so as nothing be exacted or taken unless their free-services , which of right they ought and are bound to perform to us ; and as it was appointed to them , and given and granted to them by us as a perpetual right of inheritance , by the common council of the whole kingdom . this common council will not help you , for without doubt here were no englishmen in it ; for certainly they would not grant away their own lands to strangers ; these were the saxon lands which william had given in fee to his soldiers to hold them under such services as he had appointed them , and that by right of succession or inheritance . we will now come to the second point , viz. the priviledges the englishmen lost as to their estates , for whereas before the conquest you affirm , the k. could nor make laws , nor raise taxes without the common co●ncil of the kingdom ; it is certain k. william , and his immediate successors , did by their sole authority exercise both these prerogatives : as for his legislative power , it appears from the words of his coronation oath , ( as you your self have repeated it out of florence of worcester , and roger hoveden , ) the conclusion of which oath is , se velle re●●am legem statuere & tenere , rapinas injustaque iudicia penitus interdicire ; now the legislative power was then lodged in him , why else did he swear to appoint right laws ? for if the constitution had been setled as it is at present , the parliament could have hindered him from making any other ; and that he could do so appears by that yoak of servitude , which matthew paris ( as well as other authors ) tells us , k. william by his own authority imposed upon the bishopricks and abbies in england which held baronies , which they had hitherto enjoyed free from all secular servitude , he now , says he , put under military service sessing all those bishopricks and abbies , according to his pleasure , how many knights or souldiers each of them should find to the king and his successors : and putting the rolls of this ecclesiastical service in his treasury , he caused to fly out of the kingdom many ecclesiasticks who opposed this wicked constitution : now if he could do this upon so powerful a body , as the bishops and abbots were at this time , he might certainly as well raise what taxes he pleased upon all the people of england , and therefore henry of huntington tells us , that k. william upon his return out of normandy into england , anglis importabile tributum imposuit . lib. . p. . and that his son william rufus imposed what taxes he would upon the people , without consent of the parliament appears , by that passage of william of malmesbury , which he relates in the reign of this k. as also in his third book de gestis , pontific●m , concerning ranul● , whom from a very mean clerk he made bishop of du●ham , and lord treasurer ; the rest i will give you in latine , isle , siquando edictum regium processisset ut nominatum tributum anglia penderet , duplum adjici●bat , subinde ▪ idente rege ac dicente solum esse hominem , qui sciret sic agitare ingenium , nec aliorum curares odium , dummodo complaceret dominum . so that you may here see that the kings edict or proclamation , did not only impose the tax at his pleasure , but his treasurer could double it when he had a mind to it , without consent of the great council or parliament , as we now call it ; and this prerogative was exercised by divers of his successors , till the statute de tallagi● non concedendo was made . but to come to the last head concerning the alteration of tryals for mens lives and estates by the conqueror , from what they were before ; it is certain that whereas before the conquest there were no other tryals for mens lives but by juries , or else by fire or water ordeal , which was brought in by the danes ; the conqueror , tho' he did not take way these , yet also added the law then in use in normandy , of trying not only criminal but civil causes by duel or combat ; all the difference was , that in criminal cases where there was no other proof , the accuser and accused fought with their swords , and the party vanquished was to lose his eyes and stones ; but in civil causes they only fought with bas●oons headed with horn , and bucklers , and he or his champion who was overcome lost the land , that was contended for ; from whence you may take notice also of a great alteration in the law , not only concerning tryals , but capital punishments ; so that whereas before the conquest , all crimes , even man slaughter it self , were either ●ineable according to the quality of the person , and the rates set upon each mans pepzylo , or price of his head , as you will find them set by the laws of k. ath●lstan . i shall not insist much upon divers lesser things , which k. william as a conqueror imposed upon the people of england , as disarming them of all offensive weapons , forbidding them to hunt or kill any deer in his chases or forrests under the penalties of loss of eyes and members , as also keeping up and reinforcing the ancient laws of decenaries or tythings , whereby every ten families were bound with their tenth man or tything man , body for body of each others good abearance ; as also that law forbidding all sitting up late at night , or assemblies after eight of the clock , but that every one should go to bed , and put out both fire and candle at the ringing of the coverte● bell ; these things i think are very sufficient to prove that k. william as a conqueror did very much abridge , and in some things wholly take away the ancient priviledges and liberties of the l●gi●sh nobility , clergy and commons , and did also make many and great alterations , not only in the forms of pleadings , but also in the very 〈◊〉 of our laws , both criminal and civil ; and if he did not make more ●●●erations of th● kind , it was wholly owing to his free will and pleasure , since , a● e●dmerus tells us , he ordered all divine and secular things acccording to his pleasure . f. that i may the better answer what you have said , i shall partly grant and partly deny the matters of fact you have alledged , and also further prove , that if they had been all as you have laid them , yet would they not prove your conclusion , that k. william by his own arbitrary and tyrannical actions , could create any right by conquest , either to him or to his successors : and therefore to begin with your first head , ( viz. ) the priviledges of the english nobility as to offices and dignities , tho' i grant it was true , as the authors you have cited relate , that s●arce any englishman was , when they writ , either a bishop , earl or abbot , yet this is to be understood only of the latter end , and not the beginning of his reigns ; for as to the bishops and abbots , i do not read of any more than stigand archbishop of canterbury , and egelric bishop of durham , who being deprived of their bishopricks , had successors put in their rooms in their life times ; and yet in the place of this last , not any norman , but one walcher an english man was named by the k. to succeed : and as for the earls , of all those who had been against him and opposed his coming in , there was not one but he received them into savour , and continued in his dignity and estate , as in particular the earls eadwin and morchar brothers , together with waltheof and siward , and edgar a●●eling , whom they had named k. of england , all who kept their earldoms and estates till terrified by the kings severe and tyrannical proceedings , the three first of these ●led away as you have already shewn , tho' i confess prince edgar had for two or three years before this , fled into scotland ; but yet was afterwards restored to the kings favour and his estate ; nor do i find any considerable alteration in the kings manner of disposing of his honours or preferments , either ecclesiastical or civil , till earl waltheo being convicted of being in the plot , with ralph de waher earl of norfolk , and other lords , as well english as normans , to expel k. william ; and from that time ( being the eighth year of his reign ) i grant he changed his whole course of government , and put no more englishmen into any places of honour or profit ; tho' w. malmesbury endeavours to excuse the kings severity in these words , inde pr●positum regis fortassis meritò excusatur , si●aliquando durior in anglos ●u●rit , quod pen● nullum eorum fidelem invenerit ; tho' with this authors good leave , the k. had been the cause of this conspiracy , by his own tyranny and breach of oaths , as i shall shew you by and by . so that either this k. was moved by just provocations thus to debar all englishmen from being preferred to dignities or offices , or he was not ; if the former , and that he had just cause so to do , it was no more than what any other foreign prince who had no hereditary right to the crown , would have done in the like case ; but if the latter , it was not only contrary to justice , but also to his own coronation oath , one clause of which , as malmesbury shews us in his de gestis , pontificum was , quod se modeste erga subditos ageret , & aequo jure anglos , & francos tractaret ; so that this kings arbitrary and violent proceedings , after he had ●or some time governed as a lawful king , tho' they might prove him a tyrant , yet they could by no means make him a conqueror ; and as for the latter part of your argument , whereby you would prove that in his reign there were no englishmen in the great councils of the kingdom , that can only be understood ( in the strictest sense ) of the times after the great conspiracy i have now mentioned ; for before , it is very evident that there were many bishops , earls and barons still left , who must have been members of the great council . nor can you prove that the law i have mentioned against the king's taking the taillage or taxes , without their consent , was made after that time ; but let it be made when it will , you shall never p●rsuade me it was enacted without any englishmen's being present , till y●u can prove to me that there were no english tenants in c●pite towards the end of 〈◊〉 reign , and that there were then no knights , citizens or burgesses that represented the commons in the great council , and can give a better answer to those arguments i have given you to prove they were there ; especially that remarkable clause in the conclusion of this kings charter , to the abby of westminster , which mentions divers principal persons , both of the clergy and laity , to have been summoned to that famous synod or great council , when this charter was granted . i come now to your next head , whereby you would prove this king's abridgment of english priviledges as to their estates and properties ; to begin with that of the legislative power , which as you say , was then wholly in the king ; admit it were so , it will not prove that for which you urge it , viz. that it is a sign of the kings absolute conquest over the english ; for if the great council of the kingdom had then lost its ancient right , it was only his normans and frenchmen , as well as the english , that he bereaved of their ancient priviledge , of giving their consent to laws ; since it is very certain that neither the k. of france , nor the d. of normandy could at that time make any laws without the consent of their estates . but the truth is , that your conqueror could not do it neither ; for if the normans he brought over with him , had , as you suppose , the greatest share of all the lands in england , they would have been too powerful a body of men to be thus made slaves at his pleasure , but indeed his own laws shew the contrary , for in that very law it appears otherwise , whereby all the freemen of the kingdom were to hold their lands and possessions free from all unjust exactions and taillage , and that nothing should be exacted of them , but their free service , which they were bound to do according as it is appointed them by the k. and it is granted them by an hereditary right for ever , by the common council of the whole kingdom ; whereby you may see , that they had their lands and liberties granted them , for an hereditary right , not only by the k. but by the common council of the kingdom , and that the k. could not alter k. edward's laws without their consent ; the charter of k. henry i. says expresly , legem regis edwardi vobis reddo cum illis emendationibus quibus pater eam emendavit concilio baronum suorum ; therefore as for that authority you have brought out of h. huntington , that upon this kings return from normandy , he imposed a heavy taxe upon the english , this is either to be understood of such a tax as they gave him voluntarily , tho' perhaps they durst not do otherwise , as the states of provence and langu●doc are fain to do to the k. of france at this day , when he requires it , and yet he does not claim those countries by right of conquest ; or if k. william imposed this tribute without their consents , it was not only contrary to the law just now mentioned , but also to his own coronation oath ; whereby he swore to prohibit all unjust rapines , and that he should behave himself equitably towards his subjects , with which certainly his taking away their money without their consents would by no means consist : but to answer that part of the coronation oath which you think makes most for you , that whereby he swore only to make right laws , which must have supposed the power to have been in himself , because the parliament might have hindered him from doing otherwise , this is but a cavil , for it is already proved that he was to make laws and raise taxes by the common council of the kingdom , and therefore these words may very well bear another sense , and do only give the k. a negative voice of passing such laws as the great council should offer to him , or else such as he might propose to them for their consent ; and i suppose you ▪ will not deny but that it is very possible , that either the k. or the parliament may propose such laws as may not seem equitable , or just , and then certainly both the one and the other have a negative vote , and ought not to give their consents to them . but to answer your last instance whereby you would prove that this king as a conqueror imposed what taxes and services he pleased , not only upon the laity but the clergy too , by making the bishopricks , and greater abbies liable to knights service , which you suppose to have been done by his own sole authority , without any consent of the common council of the kingdom , this is only gratis dict●m , and is indeed altogether improbable , for if the k had done this by his sole power , he would have imposed this service upon all the abbies in england , whose lands might have been as well reduced to knights fees , as those that were put under that service , and so might have been forced to find as many souldiers as they had fees , as well as the bishopricks and greater abbies ; but indeed the clergy were too powerful a body to be thus arbitrarily imposed upon , and they would soon have complained to the pope against the k. for this new servitude he had imposed upon them ; and therefore i think we may with much more safety conclude with mr. selden in his titles of honour , that this imposition of knights service upon the bishopricks and abbies was done by the common council of the kingdom , it being too great a matter to be done without it , for it appears by eadmerus that the k. held a council this very year , tho' the laws ; and proceedings of it are all lost ; and this is the more likely to be so , because this imposition was not laid upon all the abbies in england , but only upon the bishopricks , and such abbies as were of royal foundation , and held immediately of the king before your conquest , and were only such as enjoyed whole baronies , as mat. paris there tells us . i shall now come to your last head , whereby you would prove that your conqueror by his sole power , altered the course of tryals , and introduced the custom of duel or single combat , in civil as well as criminal causes ; the chief argument you have for this , is , that there is no mention made of this tryal by duel in our english saxon laws before the conquest , which is but a negative argument at the best , and you can shew me no ancient author that says expresly that k. william introduced it , and tho' i grant it is first mentioned in his laws , yet does it not therefore prove that it was not here before , since it was certainly in use among the francs and longobards , who were german nations as well as the saxons ; but admit it were first introduced by the conqueror , this was no badge of conquest , for the normans as well as the english , were subject to this tryal , which was in use in france and normandy long before this king 's coming in ; so that admit he first establisht it here , it might not have been done by his sole power , but by some law made in the great council of the kingdom , tho' it be now lost ; as we have very few of the laws that were made by this k. now left us , besides those which are called the laws of k. edward with this kings alteration of them , all which was certainly done in the common council : the like i may say concerning the alteration of punishment for deer stealing and other crimes , which were either punishable by pecuniary mulc●s , or else by death , before the coming in of the normans ; since those alterations might be also made by the consent of the great council ▪ but that the same forest laws , were in use before the conquest as after you may see in the forest laws of king knute , as you will find in sir h. spelman's glossary , title foresta , only the punishments are there pecuniary ▪ or else loss of liberty , which after your conquest was changed into the loss of eyes and members . but as for other lesser matters , as his disarming the english and forbidding night meetings , if these things were done , ( as i do not find any express law for them , for there is no such thing mentioned in the law de nocturnis custodiis ) they were either practised by this k. for his own security , after the english had by their frequent insurrections made him use all the means he could to prevent it for the future , so that at the most they were but temporary constitutions , and did not last long ; nor could this law of the conver●e● bell be any badge of slavery on the english , since we find the same custom to have been used in scotland , whom you will not say are a conquered nation ; nor do i find the normans after they came over , were any more exempted from this law than the english natives : but i much wonder you should reckon the laws of decenaries , or tythings , among the badges of norman slavery , since if you have read any thing in our saxon laws you will find , as ingulph tells us , that k. alfred first appointed ut omnis indigena l●galis , in aliqua centuria & decima existerit , & si quis suspectus de aliquo latrocinio per suam centuriam , vel decariam condimnatus , paenam demeri●am incurreret ? so that whatever other laws you find , either of our saxon or danish kings , or else among those of k. william , concerning triburghs , and tything● , it was only to confirm or re-inforce this ancient constitution : but that not only the meanest sort of f●●emen , but the greatest and best nobility and gentry were subject to this law of tythings , may appear by that law i have already quoted of king knutes , whereby every free-holder was to have his family in his pledge , that is , was bound to answer for him to the k. and if he were accused to have let him run away by his consent , he was to purge himself by his own oath , and also the oaths of five other thanes , that he was innocent ; so likewise the laws of k. edward confirmed by k. william are very particular on this subject ; that all arch-bishops , bishops , earls , and barons , should keep their knights and servants there mentioned in their frithborg , that is , in their fran● pledg , whereof the lords themselves were to be the sureties , a● appears by what follows , viz. that if any of them offended , their lords should be obliged to do right in their courts , and to the same purpose is the th law in ingulph's copy of these laws , the words are these , echascun seniour ait sun seria●●u sun plege , que si nile rete que ait a dreit el hundred , that is , that every lord keep his servant in his pledge , that if he offend right may be done in the hundred . so that upon the whole matter , i can see nothing considerable imposed by your conqueror upon the free born english subjects , which they were not tyed to before the conquest ; or which did not reach all the normans he brought over with him , as well as they . m. i do confess i did not believe there was so much to be said to prove that william the conqueror never altered the laws of england , in any of its material parts ; but since you have gone thus far , pray proceed to shew me , that he any ways confirmed all the laws of the saxon kings his predecessors , since i conceive as a conqueror he might justly have vacated what of them he would , and i do not see any thing in his coronation oath , that could have obliged him from it . f. i doubt not but to give you very good satisfaction in this point , for not only your conquerors will was never declared , that the former la●s should be abrogated , and till such declaration all laws ought to remain in force , even in the conquest of christians against christians , according to sir ed. coke's opinion in calvin's case ; but indeed the antient and former laws of the kingdom , were so far from being abrogated , that they were all confirmed by him ; for in his fourth year , by the advice of his baronage he summoned to london , as the words are in the book of litch field , omnes nebiles , sapientes & lege sud eruditos , sut eorum leges & consuetudines audiret ; or as hoveden relates it out of a collection of laws written by glanvil , fecit , summoniri per universos consulatus angliae , anglos nobiles , & sapientes , &c. and twelve were returned out of every county , who shewed what the customs of the kingdom were , which ( as mr. selden tells us in his history of tithes ) being written by the hands of aldred archbishop of york , and hugo bishop of london , were with the request of the same barons , confirmed in that assembly , which was a parliament of that time : and then in hoveden follow the laws of edward the confessor so confirmed by k. william , among which is that law concerning the office of a king , which i have now given you ; and before this at the very beginning of his reign , he also confirmed the priviledges of the city of london , as appears by his charter in saxon , which is to be seen at this day , which is also confirmed by ordoricus vitalis , guli●lmus rex multa lundoniae postquam coronatus est , prudent●r , justè , clemen●●que disposuit quaedam odipsius civitatis commoda , vel dienitatem , alia 〈◊〉 genti proficerent vniversae ; nonnulla quibus consuleret●r eccles●is terrae ▪ ●ura quaecumquedictavit optimis rationibus , sanxit , iu●icium rectum nulla persona nequicquam ab eo postulavit ? so that nothing is plainer than that at the beginning of ●wor●●eign he strove to oblige all sorts of people as well of the clergy as laity to a good 〈◊〉 of his government . m. but yet for all 〈…〉 self have granted , that after the time of his confirmation of these 〈…〉 you cannot deny , whether provoked by the frequent 〈…〉 or else resolving to make use of his right by conq●est , 〈…〉 upon the english nobility and gentry , and outed most of 〈…〉 and forced them to flee into foreign countries ; so 〈…〉 sword , as soon as ever he came to the 〈…〉 whatsoever english he thought might be dange●ou● 〈…〉 notwithstanding his confirmation of k. edward's law he 〈…〉 by conquest . and as for your 〈…〉 c●●querors confirming these laws the 〈…〉 , whether he admitted any of the 〈…〉 consult of the weighty affairs of the 〈…〉 throughly setled himself on the english throne , especially if it be considered that k. william kept not all the promises which he made at all times ; now as your self allow , this grant was made in the fourth year of his reign , but he had not then setled himself so well as he would , nor had he then made an entire conquest of the nation ; that was not done until after the great appearance of the natural english in armes , and the great meeting which frederick abbot of st. albans with others headed at berkhamslead , which was not until above four or five years after this confirmation ; so that your testimony from the litchfield chronicle and roger hoveden , being before he setled himself as he could , and intended to do , signifies nothing : and that it was from sometime after this transaction , that mat. paris reckons the thorough conquest and subduing the nation ; as appears by this note in the beginning of the life of abbot paul successor to frederick , hic primus abbas hujus ecclesi●●suti , postquam anglia normannis penitus fuit s●bjugata . f. i will not deny the matter of fact in great part to be as you say : but whether the english were to blame to make these insu●rections , or whether they were provoked to it by the kings unreasonable severities , i have not now time to dispute ; if it were their fault , he had no doubt very good cause to do as he did , and to punish such as were guilty ; but it was altogether unjust and tyrannical , to punish the innocent with the guilty ; nor could he have any right to do it as a conqueror , since by taking his coronation oath to deal mercifully with his subjects , and to treat both english and french with equal right , he had renounced that title ; and that he looked upon himself as a tyrant , if he had governed without being crowned or taking the same oath as his predecessors , i shall prove to you from abbot bro●ton's chronicle , the author of which lived in the time of k richard , i. who has ( col . ) these words , cumque willelmus dux normannorum conquestor angliae tyranni nomen exhorresce●et & nomen legitimi principis induere vellet , a stigando cant. archiepiscopo in reg●ia petiit consecrari , &c. as but your reply that he did not shew himself a perfect conquerour till he w●n throughly setled , is very pleasant ; as if being solemnly crowned , and taking a oath to govern justly and according to law , and after four years quiet possession and a voluntary confirmation of the laws of his predecessors , were not sufficient signs of his peaceable settlement upon the throne ; unless you will have a king to be never setled until he has by the force of a standing army , got sufficient power to do all he designs , that is , to take away his subjects liberties and estates at his pleasure , contrary to his own oath , and the laws he has made ; if those be signs of a thorough settlement , pray consider whether the king that is gone away , was ever thoroughly setled at this rate tho' i confess he was in a very fair way to give us such a thorough settlement ; but since you date this thorough settlement from that great transaction of abbot frederick , i am not afraid to appeal to mat. paris , from whom you have borrowed this relation ; where he tells us thus ; that after lanfranc was made archbishop , the k. being now strengthened with both swords , began more severely and manifestly to oppress the english ; who seeing it nearly concerned their very lives , calling a great many together , they made edgar atheling their leader , in whom the english placed all their hopes ; but among all the english frederick abbot of st. albans , was the chief promoter thereof , being a generous man , and to be seared for his riches and power ; therefore the k. began to be vehemently afraid left he should lose the whole kingdom which he had gained by so much effusion of blood , and also hazard of his life ; and therefore being luckily taught by the archbishops prudence , he began to act more mildly with the chief men of the kingdom , humbly proposing tearms of peace , and with a pleasant countenance inviting them to a treaty ( tho' deceitful , as the end at last declared ) therefore the said english met him at berkhamstead thinking no harm , under the leading of abbot frederick , where after many disputes , archbishop lanfranc being present , the k. swore upon all the relicks of the church of st. albans , as also upon the holy evangelists , inviolably to observe the good ancient approved laws of the kingdom , which the picus kings of england his predecessors , and chiefly k. edward had established and so being pacified they all returned home very well satisfied . so that you see this was the third time , whereby he renounced all right of conquest ( if ever he had any ) by swearing expresly to observed all the ancient laws of the kingdom , since they found his coronation oath would not bind him , besides his so solemn confirmation of k. edwards laws , in the great council of the kingdom not long before . m. but pray read a little farther , and see how he resented this force now put upon him , and whether at all he intended to keep what he had sworn , or to divest himself of his right of conquest ; and therefore give me now leave to read the rest out of this author ; but the k. cunningly hiding his designs , within a few days after , studied how to overcome and supplant those dispersed and asunder , whom he could not , when joined and consederate together ; which he performed by killing , disinheriting , and banishing many of them , and violating the above mentioned laws ; and the english being thus spoiled at pleasure , and impoverisht , without any legal judgment , he therewith enriched his normans , to the great provocation of his natural english subjects , who had of their own accord thus exalted him ; so that you see he never intended to keep his oath that was thus forced upon him , for conquerors do not love to be made slaves to their words whether they will or no ; and therefore i may give you an answer both as to his coronation oath , as also to this now mentioned , from an old english proverb , that there was never any oath , but was either broken or kept ; more conquerors than one have used fair pretences , and made smooth promises , and dealt cunningly with the people to carry on their designs , and have at first taken plausible oaths , and broken them afterwards , nay took them when they intended not to keep them , and knew th●y could not ; and for oath breaking harold in his answer to duke william , when he demanded the kingdom of him , had given him a fair example , that stu●tum sacramentum est frangendum , many specious oaths , vows , and covenants were contrived , and taken by crafty and designing men in the late times , and imposed upon the people contrary to the oath of allegiance , they had before taken , for no other ends than to cheat them into rebellion , and to make them authors of their own slavery which was discovered too late , when they were under the power of an army , and could not help themselves ; as i could prove at large would the time 〈◊〉 . f. before i give you a positive answer to what you have said , tho' i do believe a great deal of the matter of fact to be true , as mat. paris hath related it either from tradition , or else from the legier book of his own abby , yet i very much doubt whether out of hatred to this kings severe proceedings , they did not represent k. william's cruelty and severity much greater than it was ; for tho' i grant after this time , he turned a great many more of the english nobility and gentry out of their estates , and put divers of them to death ; yet whether he did this without any colour of law or legal process , is very much to be doubted , since we find many forfeitures mentioned in doomesday book , which had been needless if the king had seised all the english estates without any legal tryal ; as for example , in essex , in barnstable hundred . in burâ de istis hidis est una de hominibus soris sactis erga regem ; and this was the way of expression in the active voice ; we find in no●folk , earl ralf held such lands quando se foris fecit ; but more particularly in cambridgeshire in wardune , hardwin holds of richard's ancestors , but ralf waders held it , die quo deliqui● contra regem ; all which would never have been inserted , could this king have taken away mens lives and estates without any colour of law or justice , and therefore you may find in all the historians of his time , that after the great plot wherein so many norman as well as english lords were concerned , and for which roger earl of hereford , and ralph earl of norfolk and suffolk both normans , had conspired with earl waltheof and other english lords to call in the danes , and dispossess the king ; yet they were convicted by a legal tryal of their peers , and suffered death for it ; so that in this he distributed equal justice to the normans as well as the english , who thereupon forfeited all their estates ; and yet notwithstanding this , there were some native englishmen still lest , who tho' they had been in arms against the king , at the beginning of his reign , yet were nevertheless reconciled to him , and restored to their estates ; as for example , ederic sirnamed the forester , who , as florence of worcester tells us , was reconciled to king william , and accompanied him into scotland soon after ; as also herward the son of leofric lord of brunne , who having lost his estate , and being out-lawed , ( as ingulph tells us ) took arms against the king william , and joyned himself with those in the isle of ely ; and yet after divers great battels , as well against the king as his commanders , yet at length having obtained his inheritance by the kings allowance , he finished his days in peace : and now here were two considerable english barons which still enjoyed their estates , notwithstanding all king william's severity ; and yet i do believe it will puzzle your dr. to shew me their names in doomesday-book ; so that that book alone is not it seems a certain rule to discover what englishmen were then barons or tenants in capite . but admit all this to be true as you your self have represented it , can this kings perjury to his subjects , and breach of all laws , after so many solemn oaths ; give him a right as a conqueror over the lives and estates of his english subjects ▪ and that after he had solemnly renounced his right of conquest , by so many solemn transactions with his subjects , with whom you suppose he still made war , after he had for so many years laid down his arms , at this rate i cannot tell when subjects may be safe ; for let kings that come to a crown by a mixt title , partly by force , and partly by right , take never so many oaths , to maintain the ancient constitution of the government , together with the rights and priviledges of the people ; 't is but his saying afterwards , when he hath sufficient power , that they were forced upon him , and that he never designed to keep them , and his business is done , and he may then take away his subjects lives and estates by this pretended right of conquest whenever he pleases ; nor does this only extend to himself alone , but to all his heirs and successors , who claim under that title , let them take never so many coronation oaths , or make never so many declarations to the contrary ; since they all claim under the same divine title of the sword , that is , as you will have it , receive their crowns immediately from god , and then can never forfeit them , let them tyrannise to the utmost degree imaginable ; for you have provided them with two easie and pleasant excuses , that all promises are either broken or kept , and stultám sacramentum est frangendum ; and i cannot but smile to see what an excellent excuse you have found out , for all the breach of oaths and covenants , of those engaged in the late civil wars , since they might very well plead they had so many royal presidents for so doing , as sufficiently authorised it ; unless you will have that to be perjury in subjects , which must be a divine prerogative in kings . and therefore let me tell you , i am very glad for your own sake , that there is no body here but you and i , since all the company would have cryed out , and said , that this way of arguing were to make open war , not only upon all the laws and priviledges of this nation , but also to put the king and people in a state of war against each other ; for if he once declares by such overt acts as these of king william's , that he will not be tyed , neither by his coronation oath , nor by any laws he has made , i doubt their oaths of allegiance will not long bind them neither , and they will be very ready to reply , that whatever power began , and is continued by force and violence , may also be cast off by the like means ; and when a king and his people are brought once into this state , it is easie to foretell what will be the event ; either he must turn out , or they must be all slaves : and i wish it was not owing to such jesuitical flattering councils as this , that the king first lost the affections of his people , and then his crown : since father peters himself with the rest of the jesuits , and arbitrary ministers of the cabal , could never have instilled worse principles than these ; therefore i pray for the future either get better reasons or keep those to your self . but god be thanked both king iames and k. charles the first , had much better thoughts of the laws and liberties of the nation , since the former hath solemnly declared in a preamble to the second act of parliament , in the first year of his reign ; that not only the royal prerogative , but the peoples security of their lands , livings and priviledges , were secured and maintained by the antient fundamental laws , priviledges and customs of this realm ; and that by the abolishing or altering of them , it was impossible , but that present confusion will fall upon the whole state and frame of this kingdom . and his son was of the same opinion in his first declaration at the beginning of the late wars . the law ( says he ) is the inheritance of every subject , and the only security he can have for his life or estate ; and the which being neglected , or disesteemed ( under what specious shew soever ) a great measure of infelicity , if not irreparable confusion must without doubt fall upon them . m. if i had no love at all for the government and liberties of my country , ( as i thank god i have a great affection for both ) yet should i not have the impudence to contradict the sense of two kings , and a parliament ; neither have i so little value for those things which are the foundations of our happiness , as to desire they should be sacrificed to an arbitrary power ; nor on the other side have i so great a value for them , as to endeavour their preservation by rebellion , and deposing the king , which since i look upon as altogether unlawful , we are then to follow the apostles rule , and not do evil that good may come of it : but as for what i have urged in excuse of the conquerors perjury , and breach of laws , i confess i have said more than the matter will well bear , but i hope you will excuse it ; since i confess the argument is none of mine , but the doctors from whom i borrowed it , and i did not consider the bad consequences of it ; yet this much i must still freely affirm that neither king william the conqueror , nor his present majesty , who is his heir by an hereditary right of succession , either could then , or can now at this day be lawfully resisted , much less can be deposed , or can forfeit their royal dignity for any male administration or tyranny whatsoever . f. pray give me your reason for that , since i think you may be very well satisfied , that this kings title by conquest from king william his ancestors can signifie nothing , tho' i should grant the utmost you can demand : and therefore tho' i am as much against rebellion and deposing of princes as you can be , and doing of evil that good may come of it ; yet the question remains still to be decided between us , whether that resistance i maintain be rebellion or not , and whether it be treason to deny obedience to a prince , who hath done his utmost to lose the very name of king ▪ by not observing those conditions on the performance of which he can only keep his royal dignity : now since i think i have fully proved the two points i undertook , ( viz. ) both that of the kings forfeiting the crown in the cases i have put , as also that of the matter of fact , whereby you would maintain that the king has an indeseasable right to the crown of this realm , ●as an absolute monarch by the conquest : now since you decline arguing this point any farther , because you find it is not to be maintained , pray let me know what other reasons you have why you cannot come over to my opinion . m. though i am not yet satisfied , but that a great deal more may be farther urged by those who are better versed in this controversie , to prove that his majesty hath an unforfeitable right to our allegiance by the conquest of king william and his predecessors ; yet i shall not now insist any longer upon that title , which tho' our kings have by so many gracious condescentions to the people of this nation , seemed to wave , yet have they never renounced it as i know of ; but since his majesty was setled in the throne as an absolute and lawful king , without any competitor , by a long series of a● , hereditary succession of above six hundred years standing , and confirmed by the oaths of allegiance of the people of this nation both to him and his ancestors , he is not only our king by the laws of man , but god also ; to whom , and not to the people , he owes his crown ; and can therefore neither forfeit it , nor be accountable to them for it ; and when you can prove the contrary you may then convince me to be of your opinion . f. we have already partly argued this point at our third and fourth discourses , concerning the lawfulness of resistance , but since perhaps you may have still somewhat farther to urge upon so important a question , i desire to hear the utmost you can say , to prove that kings owe their crowns to none but god , and therefore ought never to be resisted , neither can forfeit their crown upon any pretence whatsoever , and therefore pray appoint me some other time when i may wait on you again , and fully discuss this point , since it is now very late . m. i am sorry i cannot appoint you any certain time , for since i see so great a confusion reigns every where , and that there is like to be no term , and consequently no business for men of my profession , i am resolved to retire for two or three months into the country , till i see things a little better setled than they are at present , and i heartily wish that the convention ( which i hear is like to meet in some time ) may endeavour the peace and settlement of the nation , by sending for the king and the prince of wales , out of france ; since i do not desire any more conquests , nor the government of a foreign prince , as long as we have a lawful king of our own , who will govern us again if he might , but as soon as i return to town you shall be sure to know it ; in the mean time i am your servant . f. i am yours and wish you a good journey . finis . bibliotheca politica : or a discourse by way of dialogue , on these following questions ; i. in what sense all civil power is derived from god , and in what sense may be also from the people . ii. whether his present majesty king william , when prince of orange , had a just cause of war against king iames the ii. iii. whether the proceedings of his present majesty , before he was king , as also of the late convention , in respect of the said king iames , is justifiable by the law of nations , and the constitution of our government . collected out of the best authors , as well antient as modern . dialogue the eleventh . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms ; where also may be had the first , second , third , fourth , fifth , sixth , seventh , eighth , ninth and tenth dialogues . . authors made use of in this dialogue , and how denoted in the margin . the history of the desertion , h. d. the desertion discussed , d. d. some observations upon the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the kings of england , o. e. i. a discourse of the illegality of the late ecclesiastical commission , i. e. c. advertisement . on tke first day of the next term will be published the twelfth and last dialogue , and also a large index to the whole work. the preface to the reader . being almost arrived at the end of my intended design , i thought fit to let you know , that i hoped to have made this the last discourse , that i should have troubled the world with upon these subjects ; but when i came to reduce my notes into form , i found that these few sheets would not contain all that could well be said on either side upon the foregoing questions ; and therefore am forced to refer what remains to be said concerning the vacancy of the throne , and their present majesties title thereunto till the next dialogue , which i intend shall be the last ; and which i should not have drawn to that length , had it not been for the benefit of those gentlemen and others , who have not time or money to buy or peruse the vast quantity of pamphlets that have been written upon these subjects ; as also that such as have perused them , may find together in this and the following discourse , all that hath been urged on the one side or other upon these important subjects . and since the great number of treatises of this kind , have rather served to confound than instruct ordinary readers , i resolved to make use of the words of very few of them , only to take the chiefest and strongest arguments on either side , and fairly to represent them at once to the readers view , who i hope hath the discretion to judge which are best , since i declare i write for no party but purely for truth ; and therefore i have now , and shall still endeavour to avoid all personal reflections in this as well as the ensuing dialogue , not only on their present majesties , but also on king james , since i remember he was a crowned head , and is still the father of our illustrious queen , let his failings have been what they will. but i hope the reader will not be scandalized , if i have so far followed the opinions of the ablest divines as well as lawyers , of this and other nations , in making one of the parties in this dialogue assert the consent of the people , us the only just and natural means of conferring a just right to civil power , since the learned mr. hooker in his first book of ecclesiastical policy lays it down as a principle , that in every politick society●●●t is impossible that any should have compleat , lawful pow●● , bu●●y the consent of men , or the immediate appointment of god ; and chancellor fortescue in his discourse de laudibus legum angliae , ( , and . chapters ) supposes all kingly ●ower , as well what is absolute , as that which is politick or limited by laws , to have proceeded at first from the peoples consent , not that the power it self is otherwise than from god , only he has made use of the people as an instrument whereby to convey it ; and i hope none of those who are still for king james's interest will be offended at this doctrine , since those that have writ with the greatest iudgment for his absolute indefeasible title to the crown , have placed it in his legal right to it , by the laws of the land , which all must own , could not have been made without the peoples consent . i have but one thing more to desire of you , which is your patience and attention , if some of the speeches in this dialogue are longer than ordinary , since they are upon subjects that would not well bear interruption ; and to tell you farther , the press staying for the sheets , i had not time to make them shorter . the eleventh dialogue between mr. meanwell a civilian , and mr. freeman a gentleman . f. dear sir , you are welcome to town , you have been absent a long time , and indeed i wonder how you could stay away so long , when such grea● things , as the king to have abdicated , and placing his son and daughter in the throne have been transacted . m. i thank you kindly sir , but yet i must tell you , that i have been so little satisfied with what your convention has done in these matters , that the very hearing of it hath been a great affliction to me , and it would have certainly been a much greater , had i been upon the place and seen such horrid things as the deposition of a king , the disinheriting of his right heir , and the setting up the prince and princess of orange , who certainly could have no right to the crown as long 〈◊〉 the king lives , nor yet after his death as long as the prince of wales is in being . f. i confess these are very high charges if they would hold , but if you please to consider the hypothesis i proposed at our last meeting , that the king had by breach of the original contract made between his ancestors and predecessors , and the people of this nation , to observe the fundamental laws and constitutions of the kingdom , forfeited his right to the crown : all that hath been done in this great affair , i suppose may be very well maintain'd and justified from the necessity of the thing , and of maintaining the fundamental constitution of the government ; and therefore pray give me leave to put you in mind how far i have proceeded in the p●oo● of this assertion : first , i have made out that the king of this real● is not the sole supreme power thereof , neither ever was so from the very institution of kingly government in this island . secondly , i have also prov'd that the king , not having the sole power , must hold that share thereof which he enjoys upon this imply'd or tacit condition , that if he usurp , what do's not belong to him , and the people do assert their right by opposing his unjust violence and usurpations , and that he still obstinately persists in this violation , he certainly thereby loses , and forfeits not only that part of the power which he so unjustly usurped , but also his own too ; and for this i gave you the authority of the learned grotius at our last meeting . thirdly , i have also answered your main argument of king william the conquerors obtaining by the sword , and conquest ▪ of king harold an absolute right , and uncondition'd power fo● himself and his successor● descended from him , over the people of this kingdom ; for i think i have sufficiently made out , that king william had no other right to the crown of england than by the testament of king edward the confessor , and the e●ection and recognition of the people ; and this i have prov'd from the unexceptionable authorities of the best historians of that time ; so that if he afterwards acted otherwise , and contrary to his coronation oath , it was not as a lawful king , but as a tyrant and an usurper on the rights and liberties of the people , and could not by his own unjust act acquire any lawful power so to govern this kingdom ; and therefore whatever title king william or his successors can pretend to , it must be by vertue of the election of the first king of the saxon line , from whom all the kings of england since henry y. are descended , and consequently a●e oblig'd to hold the crown under the same conditions on which it was first conferr'd : and tho' i grant , that ever since the reign of edward i. the crown has been no longer claim'd by election , but by succession of him that really was or else was presum'd to be the right heir ; yet this different way of ac●uiring the crown do's not at all alter the condition or manner of holding it , s●●e ou● kings have always after that time as before been , tyed to the same , or rather ●●●cter ter●● in their coronation oaths , to observe and keep the laws and customs of this realm ; and also that the power of the great council of the kingdom or parliament making laws , raising taxes , and redressing of grievances arising 〈◊〉 the unjust exercise , and illegal encroachments of the kings prerogative , hath been exerted ever since the crown became elective , as much as ever it was before . lastly ; i think i have sufficiently made out that king iames hath violated the fundamental constitution of the kingdom , in those several instances i have already given , and am also ready farther to make it out if you require it ; so that this being the case , i can see no reason to the contrary , why the crown or legal authority should not become forfeited to the people who at first conferr'd this power on the first king of the west saxons . m. i must confess you have done your indeavour to prove those assertions you have now laid down , but i am not yet satisfied that you truly have done it : but however , not to run into unneccessary disputes , and repetition of what has been already argued , and which i see you are too obstinate to recede from , i shall now only oppose what you last asserted concerning the crown 's being forfeited to the people upon the king 's pretended breach of the original contract ; for besides the absurdity of making the crown forfeitable to the people , who are and ever were subjects , and not princes or governours ; whereas all forfeitures still supposed a right in the persons who are to take it as superior to the party forfeiting ; there is also a greater error and mistake in your supposing all civil and legal power to be deriv'd from the people , and by them conferr'd upon their kings or governours ; whereas the scriptures plainly affirm , and all divines so interpret them , that all civil power and authority is wholly from god , and not from the people , who even in elective kingdoms , though they may name and design the person whom they will have to be their king , yet is the power wholly from god , who alone hath right to govern mankind ; and therefore as the people do not confer the power , so neither can it be forfeitable to them from whom it was never derived ; and so much i told you at the conclusion of our last meeting , though i had not then time fully to urge this argument , as now i have ; and this will press the more upon you , because you your self have already granted at several meetings , that all civil and regal power is deriv'd from god , and not from the people ; and therefore your notion of a prince or monarchs forfeiting to them , is wholly false and precarious . f. if this be all that you have to object against our assertion of the king 's forfeiting his royal authority to the people , i think i can easily answer those objections ; for as to the first absurdity which you lay to our charge , how an authority can be forfeited by a king or superior to his subjects or vassals , the absurdity lies on your side ; for i do not suppose this forfeiture to be made to the people as subjects , but to them consider'd as a community of masters of families , and freemen , who as the descendants and representatives of those who made the first king upon a certain contract , or condition upon the non-performance of this original contract , do thereupon cease to be subjects , as a servant ceases to be so , and becomes again sui furis upon his masters non-performance of the bargain made between them ; and so this authority thus forfeited , returns to the community of masters of families and freemen , who once conferr'd it upon the first king ; nor needs this forfeiture any more suppose a superiority in the persons who are to take it over the prince that commits it , than when by the law of england tenant for life aliens in fee , he in reversion may immediately enter upon the estate as forfeited to him , though the person that held it was perhaps his own father . m. but is not this then to recede from your former concession , whereby you grant that civil authority is deriv'd from god , and not from the people at all , whereas you now suppose them the only original or fountain of civil authority , and from them to be deriv'd to all princes and monarchs ? f. this difficulty wholly proceeds from your not rightly understanding the manner of god's conferring civil power or authority upon those that exercise it : for the better clearing of which difficulty , pray let me ask you two or three questions ; first , pray tell me whether you are still of the op●●ion that monarchy is so much of divine institution , as that no government but that may be lawfully instituted by men ? m. i will not now affirm , that monarchy is of divine right ; but this much i may safely over , by what we can find in scripture , that god instituted no sort of government but that ; and he did not make saul or david to be only like those equivocal kings , who might be deposable at the will of the estates , but conferr'd part of his own divine power upon them without any conditions or limitations whatsoever ; but as for those governments call'd common-wealths , though without doubt they are not of divine institution , yet certainly the power of life and death which they exercise , is wholly from god ; since , as i have already said , a man not having power over his own life , cannot confer that upon another which he had not in himself . f. well , i am glad we are so far agreed , that common-wealths are endued with real authority or majesty as well as monarchs , and that from no less author than from god himself ; so that whatever you have said concerning god's institution of no other government than monarchy , is either not true , or not to the matter in hand ; for in the first place , i have already prov'd at our thi●d meeting , that the first government god instituted among the jews , was an aristocra●y , under moses , ioshua , and the judges , reserving the kingly power over them to himself : and though it is likewise true , that god divested himself of great part of this kingly power when he anointed saul king , yet god's institution of monarchy among the jews , do's not render it unlawful for other nations to institute such other sorts of government as may best suit with the ge●ius of the people , and the publick good and safety of the whole community : but as for your argument whereby you would prove the necessity of all civil powers being deriv'd from god , because otherwise they could not be endu'd with the power of life , and death over their subjects ; i have sufficiently taken off that difficulty at our second meeting , and shewn you , that a man in the state of nature has not only power over another man's life , but also over his own ; not only to hazard it , but also to lay down or lose it for some greater publick benefit to mankind , which is also acknowledged by the apostle paul himself , for a good man some would even dare to die . but further , to shew you the absurdity of this principle , let me put you this case ; suppose that a kingdom or common-wealth were so instituted at the first , that no subject , or freeman should suffer death for any crime how great soever , which that i do not suppose as a thing impossible it was , for divers ages exercised in the roman common-wealth , wherein no civil magistrate could lay any greater punishment upon a roman citizen , than banishment or deportation : and if that copy we have of the laws of king william the first , be authentick , it is by the th law in his charter ordain'd , that no english or french subject should suffer death for any crime whatsoever , but only be punisht either by pecuniary fines , imprisonment , or else by loss of ryes hands , feet , or members , which law , though i do not say was ever observ'd ; yet it shews it was then supposed to be both possible and lawful . now if this could be so , there would be no necessity of supposing the authority of the common-wealth of rome , or of king william i. to have been deriv'd from god , since they had renounced and refused the great character thereof ; viz. the inflicting capital punishments ; but if for all that , they still con●inued to be lawful civil governments , then it is evident that this power of life , and death , is not that which alone constitutes a civil power , and makes it owe its original to god. but to return to what your notion concerning this power of life and death hath made me digress from , pray let me ●sk you another question ; after the expulsion of king tarquin , and before the common-wealth of rome was form'd , where was the supream authority lodged ? m. why in the same body it was afterwards the people of rome , comprehended under the patritions and plebtians , that is , the nobility and commons , who yet retained the power of life and death over those of their own children and slaves , though they communicated a great part of their power to the senate and consuls . f. very well ; was this authority they so conferr'd on the senate and consuls the same which they themselves could have exercised ? or was it any new authority immediately deriv'd from god , and created for that purpose ? m. i do not think it was any new created authority , but only a part of their former power , which they so made over to the senate and consuls , since they reserv'd one great part of it , ( viz. ) the legislative power wholly in themselves ; but however , this power which the fathers of families , and freemen among the romans had over the lives of their children , and slaves , as also over others who were declar'd publick enemies , was deriv'd wholly from god ; yet there arose likewise a new power which these fathers of families were not invested with before , ( viz. ) that of making laws , as also of war and peace ; all which powers were deriv'd from god for the common good , and defence of the whole people or community . f. herein i also agree with you , but then mark what follows ; it then plainly appears , that the natural subject of civil authority was the fathers of families , and freemen of rome ; and that what share thereof was committed to the senate and consuls , it was wholly personal , and as their representatives ; this being so , pray answer me another question ; when the senate and people of rome did afterwards confer their whole power upon the roman emperors by that law ( mention'd in your institutions ) lex regi was there then created or produc'd any new authority from god to the first emperor ? or was it the same authority or majesty which the senate and people were endued with before ▪ for either it must be the same , or else god must create a new parcel of this royal majesty or authority wherewith to endue this first emperor , which if you suppose , i can shew you a great many difficulties and absurdities that will follow from this opinion ; for then i might ask you , whether this royal majesty be like the stoicks anima mundi , whose parts are distributed among all the kings in the world ? or whether each king has his particular majesty to himself ? or whether the king dying , his majesty also dies with him ? or whether it exist without him , as the soul do's when separated from the body , and by a certain kind of metempsychosis is transferr'd to the new monarch ? m. i shall not flick at present to affirm , that this authority or majesty of the roman emperors was originally deriv'd from god , though not immediately , but by the mediation of the people of rome as his instruments , especially ordain'd for the derivation of this imperial power . f. well then , i see you and i are at last agreed ; for i suppose all civil power to be so deriv'd from god to the people , and by them as an instrumental cause convey'd to the person whom they agree to make their king : but if this were so in the roman common-wealth , why are not all the rest of the nations of the world indued with the like priviledge ; so that no man may justly make himself king over them without their election , or recognition at least . m. perhaps in those nations where the people have from the first institution of the government retain'd the whole civil power in themselves , or else by the extinction of the royal family they became possest of it ; this power ●●y afterwards by them be transferr'd or made over to one single person or more ; but this can by no means hold in divers other cases , where god immediately bestows a civil power or authority without the consent of the people , as it is in the case of kingdoms acquired by a conquest in a just war , ( for as to unjust wars , or conquests , i freely own they confer no right at all ) but since you will not ( i suppose ) deny that such a rightful conquest confers an absolute power on the conqueror over the lives and estates of the conquered , as also an obligation in them to submit to , and obey the conqueror , hence must arise a new civil power without any consent of the people intervening ; which authority , since no man can confer it upon himself , must necessarily be immediately conferr'd by god ; since , as i said before , the people are only passive , and have no hand at all in the conveying of it ; and this is the more remarkable , because i suppose you will not deny , but that where one kingdom or empire has owed its beginning to the election or consent of the people , i could name ten that have begun from conquest : so that it is evident , the people are very rarely the efficient causes of civil power . f. though this question concerning conquest do's not immediately concern our kings , who , as i have already proved , do not owe their regal authority to conquest , but to the consent of the people : yet since the title to a great part of our kings dominions begun at first from conquest , i shall now say something of it : first , then you grant that only conquest in a just war can confer a right to the peoples obedience . and therefore since the greatest part of the governments have commenced from unjust conquests ; it will therefore follow that the right of such princes to those kingdoms territories so unjustly acquired , could not owe its original to conquest ; but either to a long possession , the extinction , or at least dereliction of the right heirs ; together with the consent of the people to confirm their titles . so that it is not only my opinion , but that of the most learned writers in your own faculty , such as grotius and pufendo●f ; that conquest alone , though in the justest war can confer no right over a free people without their recognition or consent ; i have added , of a free people because i much doubt , upon the conquest of a kingdom or territory ( as for example ) where the people do own themselves meer slaves to their sultan : whether their consents be at all necessary or not , since they fall to the victor as the movable goods of the prince conquered ; but then the power he has over them is not properly a civil authority , but that of a lord over his slaves . and hence it is that in all kingdoms and territories obtained by conquest among us in europe , princes do not think themselves to have any title to their subjects allegiance before they have acknowledged them for their lawful soveraign● , by some publick act either of the estates or representatives of the kingdom ; or else by the particular oaths of all the chief subjects or inhabitants of those places . m. i shall not at present dispute this point any farther with you , but yet there remains one great difficulty behind concerning the manner of gods conferring this supream power upon princes , and states : for you your self have already granted that the power of fathers and masters of families is not of the kind , but somewhat specifically different from civil power or authority : and if so , since they had not this civil power in themselves , i cannot see how they could confer it upon another ; since nemo dat quod non habet . and therefore there still seems a necessity of gods conferring a new power upon that prince , or upon those persons whom they shall pitch upon to rule over them . f. i hope i shall as easily remove this difficulty if you will please to consider the manner how god confers this civil authority upon men , which is certainly by natural means , and is to be found out by natural reason without any divine revelation ; since civil government was instituted , and men were obliged to obey it long before the old testament was written : but the true original of it is thus to be traced . first , it is without doubt that right reason sufficiently taught mankind when it began to multiply , and that they were sensible from the great wickedness and corruptions of mens natures that their common peace and safety could not be well maintained unless common-wealths were instituted , which could not subsist without a supream authority placed in some one , or more persons . this being a dictate of the law of nature or right reason , and so highly conducing to the good of mankind ; it must needs owe its original to god the author of all truth , and the giver of every good and perfect gift : from whence it follows , that not only the institution of common-wealths themselves , but also the supream power with which they are indued , do's not proceed meerly from men , but from gods command exprest by the law of nature or right reason . so that the same legislator who first prescribed civil society , also prescribed the order of that society ; but a supream civil authority either in one or more persons , is the life and soul thereof ; without which it cannot live or subsist . now it is certain that those things are not only said to proceed from god , which he immediately institutes without any human act intervening ; but those also which men by the conduct of right reason , and according to their present occasions and necessities have introduc'd to fulfil that obligation that lay upon them to promote the common good and safety of mankind ; and since in a promiscuous ungoverned multitude , that great law of nature which prescribes the publick peace and concord of mankind cannot well be exercised , ( the unruliness of mens passions considered ) nor be well maintain'd without some supream civil authority to keep men in order ; it is plain , that god who enjoyn'd men this , do's also command that civil societies should not be only instituted , but their authority also obeyed , as derived from himself , and as the necessary means of obtaining this great end of all the laws of nature , the common good and safety of mankind ; and hence it is that he hath not any where prescribed or instituted any particular form of government , but leaves the choice of it to the particular genius and temper of each nation and people . this being setled , your objection is easily answered , how civil power can be conferr'd without an immediate conferring of it from god , since the people in the state of nature had it not before ; which proceeds from your not considering , that this supream authority is not like the soul of man , an immaterial form , that gives knowledge and understanding to the body , and may be separated from it ; but is only a moral quality which may be produc'd by the mutual consent of those that institute it , as the productive cause thereof , tho' they had it not formally in themselves before , just as from many voices singing in consort , though in different tones there arises a harmony , which was not in any single voloe alone : therefore since civil authority proceeds from the non-resistance of the subjects , and their concession that the supream powers should freely dispose of their bodies and goods for the publick safet● , it plainly appears , that in each particular master of a family and freeman there lay ( though hidden and disperst ) the seeds or rudiments of supream power , which by mutual compacts did afterwards grow into a perfect civil authority ; and thus not only many masters of families and freemen may combine together for their mutual safety to er●ct a common-wealth by appointing one or many men to rule over them for their mutual safety ; but it is not impossible , but that from the government of a master of a family , having many villages and slaves under his power , there may ●ise ● perfect kingdom ; for though paternal power do's chiefly respect the education of children , and that of a master , the government of servan●● , for his own advan●●g● ; yet is there not so great a distance between the power of a master of a family and civil authority , that there can be no passing from one to the other , without a new authority immediately created by god for that purpose ; for suppose a master of a family , having a numerous train of children and servants , should permit both of them by way of emancipation , or manumission , to enjoy such a portion of lands , or other goods to their own use , as also to govern their own private families and affairs as they shall think fit , provided they will still obey him , and contribute the utmost assistance of their lives and fortunes for the publick safety , i cannot see any thing that would be wanting to the making such a master of a family a lawful and absolute prince , provided he was endued with such power as to be able to protect them ; yet all this while , without supposing any new divine authority to be infused by god upon his accession to this dignity . m. i confess you have given me a more exact account concerning your sense of this matter than ever i had before , and therefore i shall not further dispute this point with you ; only let me tell you , that upon this hypothesis of yours is founded that desperate opinion concerning the real authority or majesty of the people ; which the common-wealths men suppose still to reside in the diffusive body thereof after the government is instituted ; and by vertue of which they suppose there still remains a power in them to call their kings or governours to an account , and punishing them for tyranny or any other supposed faults against the fundamental constitution of the government , or the original contract , as those of your party are pleased to term it . f. well then , to let you see i am none of those common-wealths men who maintain any such desperate doctrine ▪ here i do freely own , that where the people have parted with their whole power either to a monarch or else to a supream council or senate , from thenceforth they have nothing at all to do to call such governours to an account , or to punish them for the highest tyranny or oppression they can commit : the utmost i have allowed as lawful to be done in this case in all the conversations we have had , is no more than this ▪ that the people , in case they see themselves like to be destroy'd and ruin'd both in their perso●● , consciences and estates , may even under the most absolute governments stand upon their own defence , and prevent their being thus totally ruined ; and may also cast off all allegiance to such powers , in case they refuse to treat them with greater justice and moderation for the future● but as for such limitted or mixt governments as ours are , where the people have still retain'd a share in the legislature , and also in the raising of publick taxes , yet since the king is by law exempted from punishment or rendring any account of his actions either to the people or their representatives ; the utmost that i contend for , is , that since the king receives only a limited power of ruling according to such and such laws , and will usurp that share of the government that do's not belong to him ; in such cases if he refuse to amend , then they may resist his officers and ministers , nay himself in person in the executions of such violent and illegal actions : and if he still prsist , and rce●use to amend ; that then at last they may proceed to declare that he hath forfeited his crown or regal right of ruling over them : and then in such case , i hold that it again devolves to the people from whom it first proceeded ; and that this is no new doctrine ; i have the authority of fortescut on my side ; who in his treatise de laudibus● legum angliae , where after having shewn that all political or limited governments proceeded at first from the consent of the people , proceeds thus ; addressing himself to prince henry , son of king henry the vi. ( for whom he composed this work ) hab●s ex h●c 〈◊〉 princ●●s , institutionis politici regni formam , ex q●● metiri poteris potestatem , quam rex eju● 〈◊〉 legis ipsius aut subditos , valeat exercire . ad tutelam ●amous legis , ac subdit orum , ●●rum corporum , & ●onorum rex huju●modi erectus est , & ad hanc potestatem a populo affluxam ipsi habet , quo ei●no● lic●t potestate aliâ su● popul● d●minar● . from whence we may observe , that he calls the government of this kingdom not regnum simply , but regnum politicum , that is , a politick or limited kingdom ; ( in opposition to regnum absolutum ) made up of divers parts : this he calls a ●ower flowing or proceeding from the people , and if it thus proceeds from the people , it must certainly return to them again upon the failure of the conditions to be performed on his part . no● do's this suppose any real majesty or authority in them who take this forfeiture , any more than is ●o's suppose it in the people according to your own hypothesis ; when the civill authority do's again devolve to them upon the death of a king without lawful heirs . m. i do now very well understand your hypothesis , but i think princes are not thereby in a better condition by being thus unaccountable to , and unpunishable by the people ? but that they are father in a much worse ; since you say they may resist , nay kill them when they are once entered into a state of war against them : for whereas where princes are accountable to their people or senate , they may then be admitted to be heard to make their defence in case of any oppression or misgovernment laid to their charge : as the king of poland may at this day , to the great assembly of estates or dye● of the nation . whereas in the case of the king , as you have put it , though he is not accountable to the parliament , yet he is still lyable to that which is more dangerous , ( viz. ) to be judged , censured and declared forfeit by every ●onsiderable fellow of the rabble , on pretence of violating this original contract , and having broken the fundamental constitution of the government ; and so shall be condemned unheard , and perhaps without any just cause . so that i think a man had as good be a b●●ward , as a king upon such term. f. the men of your principles i see are not to be pleased , unless princes may do whatever they have a mind to without controul ; or any mans judging or opposing the illegality of their actions . for if a parliament takes upon its self to judge of the kings actions , this is calling their princes to an account , and a thing against the laws of the land ▪ as also that of nations . if the whole body of the people take upon them to judge when he has violated the fundamental laws of the kingdom , and broken the original contract , and thereupon resist him : this is making the king liable to be judged and censured by every mean fellow of the rabble . but to let you see that both judging and disobeying the kings commands , if contrary to law , is not a thing of such dangerous consequence as you would make it , appears by the late petition of the seven bishops , wherein they take upon them to judge that the kings 〈◊〉 , declaration of liberty of conscience being against several acts of parliament , they cannot with a safe conscience publish it , or agree to the re●ding of ●t in the churches . now i desire to know whether this be 〈◊〉 a making the kings actions liable to be judged and censured by every one of the rabble , since these bishops acted thus , neither as privy councellors , no● as peers in parliament● for by the same right by which they took upon them to make this declaration , by the same right not only every curate of a parish , but also every layman in england was free to judge of the kings breach of this law , and consequently of denying obedience thereunto ; which disobedience , if it once prove general , will quickly make the kings personal commands wholly insignificant . so that it seems it is not the people● judging of the illegality of the king● actions and commands which is the thing you 〈◊〉 fault with since when these bishops acted thus , all the high men of the church of england praised it to the skie . so that it seems it is now the bare censuring and disobedience that makes it a crime , but it is the i●sisting such violent and illegal orders and commands , and at last declaring that power void and forfeited by which they were made . that sticks in your stomach , which is as much as to say , that this judging and disobedience in its self is no crime ; but the pushing it home , and doing it in such a way as that it may be mended for the future ; though this is never lawful to be done , but when things come to that extremity that all milder remedies are become ineffectual . but to answer your objections a little more closely , the consequences of my opinion are not so dangerous as you suppose them , if you will please to consider what i have already laid down at our last meeting ; as first , that this resistance is never to be made but when this violent breach of the laws becomes evident and undeniable not to the rabble alone , but to the whole nation , that is , all sorts and degrees or men ; and as long as there is any question about it , i acknowledge it is by no means to be used : and lastly ; as to declare the regal power forfeited , this likewise is never to be done , but when the king becomes so obstinately resolved to pursue those evil and illegal co●●es , as that he is utterly irreclaimable , and refuses all propositions and terms of amending or redressing them : and as to what you say , that the king is hereby depriv'd of all means of justifying himself , or vindicating his actions ; that is not so , since if a war be once begun , he may do this either by declaration or treaties , as king charles the first did in his war with the parliament , by which means he gain'd a great many both of the nobility , gentry and commonalty to his party , who were before absolutely set against him : but if you will needs have a parliament to judge and examine the reality of this forfeiture , i so far joyn with you , that though every private man may first judge thereof , yet is it not become absolute , and an act of the whole people , till the estates of the kingdom have by some solemn vote or declaration made it so . m. well , i see you do all you can to make the best of a bad cause ; but though i think nothing of what you have said can give subject● any right to resist much less to cast off all allegiance to their natural prince , yet i shall not now dispute this point any longer with you , but will proceed to the merits of the cause , and shall l●● you see , that even upon your own principles , the king has not been dealt 〈◊〉 in all this whole transaction , either like an ally by the states general of the united provinces , or like a near relation or a son in-law by the prince of orange , or like a king by his own subjects . to begin with the estates in the first place , it is apparent that they have acted treacherously with the king , and contrary to the last treaty of peace and alliance , in furnishing the prince 〈…〉 their captain general and 〈◊〉 - holder both with ships , men and money , and make this late expedition against england , without so much as ever declaring the cause of their quarrel , or demanding any satisfaction , if any occasion of difference had been given . but the prince of orange his dealing with the king his father-in law , has been much less justifiable ; for in the first place , he is not only guilty of the same fault with his masters the dutch , in beginning a war without ever declaring the causes of it , or demanding any satisfaction , or ●eparation if he had been injur'd , till it was too late to go back , and that his fleet was ready , and the army shipt for the expedition ; but which was more unkind from a nephew , and a son-in-law who had reason to expect all the satisfaction which a king , an uncle and a father-in-law could give ; though indeed to speak the truth , the whole war was , in my opinion , altogether unjust on the p●●nces side , since his chief pretences were ▪ to redress grievances , and to re-establish the bishops and church of england with the colledges in their just rights , and also restore the whole nation to the just execution of the laws by a free parliament and priviledges : now i desire to know what the prince of orange ▪ had to do either as a neighbour , or a son-in-law ▪ to concern himself with the mis-government of the affairs of england , much less to countenance and take the part of those many male contents and traitours , who have ever since the duke of manmouth's rebellion gone over into holland ▪ so that upon the whole matter i can find but one thing which he had , so much as a pretence of making war about , if it had been real , ( viz. ) the pretended suppo●●●tio●s birth of the prince of wales ; and yet even for this , he ought not to have made war till such time as all reasonable satisfaction in this matter had been demanded and denied him ; and that the next parliament , which the king had before declared should meet in november last , had been either hindered from medling in it , or that they had fa●●'d to make a due enquiry into it . but if we look home — f. pray sir , before you come to consider what has been done here , give me leave to iustifie the late proceedings of the states general , and the prince of orange in this matter ; first , as to the estates ; it is a very great mistake ; for you affirm that they made this war upon the king in their own names , or furnish'd the prince of orange with ships or men as their s●adt-holder or general , but , only as a free independent prince , whom they looked upon to have a good cause of making war against the king , of england , as one they had great cause to believe was so far engag'd in the france interes● as instead of standing 〈◊〉 in this war with the empire , which they every day expected when he would joyn with france ▪ and declare war against them , as they had reason to ●ear by several angry memorials which the french king's e●voy in holland had not long before given them ; so that indeed it was but according to the rules of self-preservation to begin first , especially when it might be done without their appearing in it at all● but granting this war had been made in their own names , it had been but a just return for what had been done to them before by the late king who made actual war upon them without ever giving them the least notice , or demanding satisfaction for any wrongs or damages receiv'd ; and this was the more justifiable , because his present majesty ▪ when duke of york , was looked upon to have a very great hand in those councils , which begun that unhappy war , in which he himself serv'd as admiral : but as to the prince of orange , there is much more to be said in his justification ; for in the first place , tho' in some respects he was a subject , by living under , and enjoying divers lands and territories , and commands within the dominions of the united provinces ; yet as he is prince of orange , he is a free independent prince , and , as such , has a right of making war and peace ; and if so , all that is to be further enquired into , is , whether the prince had any just cause of making war upon the king or ●ot ; therefore to answer your first objection against the prince's making war upon an uncle and a father-in-law , without first demanding satisfaction , and then denouncing war if he could not obtain it , i confess this were a good objection , if you could once prove to me , that the prince could have been sure to have had granted him whatever he could in reason demand , both in respect of the church of england , the security of the protestant religion , the rights and liberties of the subjects of england , and his own particular concerns in respect of the prince of wales ; but whoever will impartially consider the terms that the prince and king were upon just before his coming over , will find that he was not obliged to give the king notice of his intentions , by first demanding satisfaction , and then denouncing war if it had been denyed , since the king might then have joyned his own with the french fleet , and sent for french forces into england ; and then all that the prince could have done in behalf of himself and the nation , had been altogether in vain . and then though i grant that such satisfaction ought to be demanded in most cases , yet will it not hold in this ; where if the prince had sooner discovered his designs , the king might have easily prevented them . and how near this was to have been put in execution may appear by this , that succours were actually offered by the french king ; and if they were refused by ours , it was partly , because it was too late for the french fleet to be then put out , and partly out of a politick consideration , that besides the losing of the hearts of his english subjects , it might give the french such a footing here , that they would not be easily gotten out again . but indeed it seems as if the old formal way of making war was quite out of fashion ; since charles the second made war against the dutch ; and the king of france so lately against spain , the elector palatine and the emperor without any observation of those formalities . but if we consider the grounds and causes of this war as they are set forth in the princes late declaration ; they may be reduced to these three heads . first , the restoration of the church of england , with the bishops and colledges to their just priviledges . secondly , the securing of the rights and liberties of the subject from the dispensing power , and those other incroachments that had been made upon them by the partial judgments of popish , ignorant , or corrupt judges . and lastly , the enquiry into the birth of the prince of wales . in all which the prince was so reasonable , as to refer the decision of these differences to the judgment of a free parliament . now as for the first of these . that the prince as a neighbour , and of the same religion with us , might justly secure the interest of the protestant religion here , and also redeem the clergy from the persecution they lay under , is very evident : since it has always been held lawful for princes to take the part and espouse the interest of those of the same religion with themselves , though subjects to another prince : thus eusibius makes it a good cause of war by the emperor constantine against licinius , because he persecuted the christians living under his dominions : so likewise of later ages queen elizabeth assisted the dutch protestants of the united provinces , and those of france against the persecutions and oppressions they suffered from their own princes : as to the french protestants , king charles the i. sent a fleet and an army to their assistance in . but as to the next head , the oppressions we lay under in respect of our civil liberties , the prince had as great , or rather greater right to vindicate these than the former . for bodin and barclay , though they suppose it unlawful for subjects to take up arms against their prince , though never so highly opprest ; yet they count it not only lawful , but generous and heroick for a neighbouring prince to rescue injur'd and opprest subjects from the tyranny of their kings . so that if the king had by his dispensing power , his levying of taxes without law , and taking away the freedom of elections for parliament men , almost totally dissolved the government , and brought it to the condition of an absolute monarchy , it was high time for the prince to put a stop to those encroachments both in respect of his own particular interest , and also of the states whose general and stad●holder he is . of the former , since if this kingdom should once become of the popish religion by the means of a standing army , and those other methods that have been taken to make it so ( granting the prince of wales to be truly born of the queen ) yet should he happen to die , the popish faction here in england would in all likelihood debar the prince and princess of orange from their lawful succession to the crown ; or at least would never admit them but upon conditions of establishing of popery and arbitrary government in england ; the former of which is as contrary to their consciences , as the latter is to their principles and inclinations . so on the other side , if the prince of wales be not the queens true son , he had certainly a much greater interest as the presumptive heir of the crown to demand satisfaction in that great point , which so nearly concerned their right of succession : for then certainly they might justly demand satisfaction , especially when they desired no more but to have this business left to the inspection of the estates of the kingdom , as the only proper judges of the same . for as to the privy council , who by the kings command ( though without any president ) had taken upon them to hear and determine this matter ; their highnesses certainly had no reason to be satisfied with it , since , besides the incompetency of the judges , the king himself appeared too partial and interested in the affair for them , to set down by their judgments . and as for what you say , that the prince ought first to have tryed whether the king and parliament would give him that satisfaction he demanded : this was very dangerous for him to hazard ; for supppose the king would never have permitted this affair to have been impartially inquired into by them , or that the parliament had been ( as it was very likely to be ) packt and made up of papists , fanaticks , and time-servers , who either would not , or else durst not have examined this matter as they ought : his highness had been then to play an after-game the next year ▪ and what might have happened in the mean time god knows . and therefore he had all the reason in the world whilst the french kings arms were imployed in germany to demand satisfaction with the sword in his hand . this is what i have to say in justification of his highnesses arms , which if they are just on his side , i think i can as easily prove what has been done for his assistance by the nobility , gentry and commons of this nation to have been so too . m. i shall not any longer dispute , whether the dutch and the prince of orange may not make some fair pretences for what they have done ; since making war for security , by way of prevention , is no new thing in the world ; though i confess what you say in respect of the prince of wales , had been a sufficient cause of war , had there been any true grounds for that suspition ; but since there was no just cause given why his highness should suspect his birth not to be genuine ; and that even in the present convention it self , there could be no proof made to the contrary : i think it is now evident , that it was a wicked and unjust calumny upon his majesty and the queen , since he himself in the last paper he left behind him at his going away , appeals to all that know him , nay , even to the prince of orange himself , that in their consciences , neither he nor they can believe him in the least capable of so unnatural a villany , nor of so little common sence , to be impos'd on in a thing of such a nature as that . but as for those noble men and gentlemen , who have declar'd for the prince of orange since his expedition , i think that they are no way to be justified , since granting them to have been satisfied , that the princes demands were lawful and reasonable , yet sure they ought not to have taken up arms on behalf of a forreign prince , against their natural sovereign ; but if in their consciences they had believed his quarrel to have been just , the utmost they could have done , had been to have stood neuters , without concerning themselves either with the one or the other party ; and then if the prince had gain'd his point either by arms or treaty , they might have enjoy'd the good effects of it , without breaking in upon the church of englands principles of passive obedience and non-resistance , and so many acts of parliament made ; but as for those officers and souldiers , who so basely and perfidiously deserted the king at salisbury , and ran over to the princes army with their commissions in their pockets , they cannot possibly be justified either by the law of the land , or that of nations , since certainly they acted contrary to both . f. before i speak any thing concerning the business of the prince of wales , give me leave to say something in justification of those noblemen and gentlemen you so highly accuse ; and though we discoursed something of this matter at our last meeting , yet since you have again renewed the charge against them , i cannot but again vindicate them in what they have done ; in the first place pray call to mind , that it has sufficiently appear'd by the small forces his highness brought over with him , that he never intended to conquer this kingdom , or impose any thing upon it , contrary to the known laws and customs thereof ; and therefore as appears by his declaration , his chief hopes of success against so numerous an army , made up of the flower of three nations , depended on that assurance he had of some considerable assistance from the nobility and gentry of eng. and perhaps from some of the officers of the kings own army , and that this was lawful in both of them , i thus prove , you may remember i made out at our last meeting but one ▪ that when the nation lay under any great intollerable oppression , by reason of the violation of their just rights and liberties , the clergy nobility , and gentry thereof , did always look upon it as their right and duty , to vindicate the same by a vigorous resistance , when no gentler means could suffice : secondly , i have proved that it neither was , nor could be the intent of those oaths and declarations made in the two first parliamen●s of king charles the second , to deliver up their lives , liberties and estates wholly to the kings mercy , let him use them as he pleased ; and if they did not , it must necessarily follow , that upon the kings violation of their religion , liberties and properties , they had still a right left them to defend themselves from such oppression and tyranny : lastly , i have also proved ( as the convention also lately declared ) that the king by his exercising his dispensing power , by committing and prosecuting the six bishops , by setting up an ecclesiastical commission contrary to law , by levying mony by his prerogative , without , or contrary to express acts of parliament , and by raising and keeping up a standing army in time of peace , commanded by officers , who had never taken the test appointed by the statutes for that purpose , and consisting of so many popish souldiers , who having never taken the oath● of supremacy and allegiance , were altogether uncapable of serving in his majesties army , and by doing divers other things contrary to the known laws , statutes , and freedom of this realm , too long now to particularize , had broken the fundamental constitution of the kingdom . this being the case , i desire to know of you , how it was possible for the nation to have a firm and setled redress of these grievances , without a free parliament ? or how it was possible to obtain this parliament ( the late taking away of charters and regulation of corporations considered ) unless those obstacles had been first removed ? and how could they be removed , without some force proportionable to what the king had raised to hinder it i cannot tell ? and therefore it is a very vain project of yours , to suppose that those noblemen and gentlemen , should have stood neuters , and not have declar'd themselves some way or other in this quarrel , which is all one , as to say , they ought to sit still , and see a generous prince ruin'd , who had come in for their redemption , and to have then expected a remedy for all these illegal violations and oppressions , when the king had kill'd or destroy'd the prince of orange , and his army , or that the king would then have yielded to all the same conditions that the prince , had demanded . this would have been not to have been parralel'd any where but in a romance . but as for those officers and souldiers who you say deserted the king , and went over to the prince from salisbury ; though i grant they make a great noise , yet were they not a thousand men , soldiers , officers , and all , ( as i am credibly inform'd ) which was but a small number , in comparison with the kings whole army ; and yet these may very well be defended upon the same principles with the former ; for if the violations of our liberties were so great and dangerous , as i have now set forth , those gentlemen were certainly oblig'd to prefer the common good , and preservation of their religion and liberties , before any private interests or obligations , whatsoever , though it were to the king himself ; therefore it was more his than their fault , if they diserted him ; and as for their going away whilst they were his souldiers , and with their commissions in their pockets ; i suppose you cannot expect that the king should have ever given them leave to have quitted his service , or have accepted of their commissions , if they would have surrender'd them , unless at the same time he had clapt them up in prison for offering of it , and if then they were perswaded that it was thei● duty so to do , it is but a punctilio of honour , whether they went away with their commissions in their pockets , or had left them behind them , since their going off , was a surrender of their commissions , and a sufficient declaration , ●●at they could not with a safe conscience , serve the king any longer in this quarrel ; and you see that the going off of these few , had such a fatal effect , that it cast such a panick terrour upon the king , and the whole popish faction about him , as to make him run away to london , without striking a stroke : but that the prince of d. with the dukes of grafton and ormond , lord churchill were convinced of the danger this kingdom was in , both in respect of their religion and liberties , appears by their leaving the king , and going over to the prince , where they could never expect to be put into higher places of honour or trust , than what they enjoyed already under the king ; and therefore that expression of the lord churchill's , in his letter to the king is very remarkable : that he could no longer joyn with self-interested men , who had framed designs against his majesties true interest and the protestant religion , to give a pretence to conquest to bring them to effect . and one would be very much inclin'd to believe so , considering the great number of irish , papists which have been brought over and listed here ; though with the turning out and disbanding of a great many english officers and souldiers out of several companies , but to come to the business of the prince of wales , which you say was a meer calumny , and an unjust suspition on the princess side ; though i will not affirm any thing positively in so nice a matter , since the convention has not thought fit to meddle with it . i shall only say this much , that if there have been any jealousies and suspitions raised about it , the king may thank those of his own religion , who were intrusted with the management of the queens lying-inn : for in the first place it looked very suspicious to us protestants , who do not put much faith in the miracles of the romish church ; that immediately after the presenting of the golden angel to the lady of loretto , and the kings pilgrimage to st. winifreds well , the queen after several years intermission , should again be with child ; and when she was so , should have two different reckonings ; which though it may be forgiven young women of their first children , yet those who have born so many children as her majesty , are commonly more experienced in these matters . m. what is all this to the purpose ? was it not proved by many credible witnesses , and those of the protestant religion before the privy-council , that they were not only present in the room when the queen was delivered ; but that they had seen milk upon her linnen before her delivery ; and that they had also felt her belly immediately before it , and found that her majesty was big with child , and ready to be delivered : and the midwife swears that she actually delivered her. so that since every person is to be presum'd to be the true son of those parents that own him for theirs ; so nothing but a direct proof to the contray , and that by undenyable evividence ought to make any man believe otherwise ; much more in the concern of the heir apparent to the crown , and therefore i know not what you would have to been done , which has not been observed , in this nice matter . f. and sir , let me tell you , because it was so nice a matter , and concerned no less than the succession of three kingdoms : therefore the whole nation as well as the prince and princess of orange were to be fully satisfied of the reality of the princes birth ; since they were all suffi●iently sensible that there wanted nothing but a male heir to entail popery on us and our posterity : and therefore there ought to have been present such persons as had no dependance upon the court , and who ought to have been deligated by the prince and princess of orange , since the princess of denmark could not be there in person , but instead of this , the only two ladies ( who as i am informed ) were trusted by the princess to be present at the queens labour , were never sent for till she was brought to bed and the child drest : and as for the rest of the witnesses they were either lords , or other persons who only swear they stood in the room at a distance , and heard the queen cry out ; and immmediately after the child cry , sometime before they saw it . and as for the ladies , the greatest part of them swore no further than the lords : so that notwithstanding all that they have sworn in this matter , there might have been a trick put upon them and they never the wiser : since you may read in siderfin's reports , of a woman who pretended to have been delivered of a child by a mid-wife within the bed ; and yet many years after , this was proved to be a suposititious birth by the deposition of the mid-wife and the poor woman who was the real mother of the child , and others that had been of the conspiracy . and what has been done once , may be done again . 't is true , the king himself with one or two ladies deposed something further as to milk , and the feeling of the child immediately before the birth ; but his majesty , if it be an imposture , is too deeply concerned in it , to be admitted as a competent witness : and as for the rest of the ladies , they are likewise , being as the queens servants , and having an immediate dependance upon her to be excepted against , and under too much awe , to speak the whole truth : but it is very strange to me , that none of them deposed any thing concerning their seeing any milk come from her majesties breasts after she was delivered . and perhaps there was good reason for it , for i have had it from good hands , that she had none afterwards whatever she had before ; the reason of which deserves to be enquired into , since it is very rare . but as for the mid-wife , her deposition is equivocal ; that she took a child from the body of the queen ; she is also a papist , and consequently a suspected witness in this cause : whereas all this might have been prevented , had the queen ( were she really with child ) been perswaded to be delivered not within the bed , but upon a pallate ; where all the persons whose business and concern it was to be present , might have seen the child actually born ; nor needed there to have any men been by , though i have heard that the late queen of france was delivered of the present king , the dake of orleans not being only present in the room , but an eye-witness of the birth : and so , sure if somewhat of this nature had been done , it might have saved a great deal of dispute and bloodshed which has already , or may hereafter happen about it . and therefore i do not at all wonder that the prince of orange should not take this partial evidence that has been given for sufficient satisfaction ; so that whether this birth of the queens was real or not , i shall not now farther dispute . it is sufficient that if his highness and his princess had just and reasonable suspitions of an imposture , whilst they remain under them ; they had also a just cause of procuring a free parliament to examine this great affair , and also to obtain it by force , since it was to be got no other way . m. i need not further dispute this business of the prince of wales with you , since i durst appeal to your own conscience , whether you are not satisfied , notwithstanding these supposed indiscretions in the management of the queens delivery ; that he is really son to the queen : and i think it would puzzle you or i to prove the legitimacy of our own children by better evidence than this has been ; and i think all those of your party may very well despair of producing any thing against it ; since the prince of orange himself has thought it best to let it alone , as knowing very well there was nothing material could be brought in evidence against him . but i shall defer speaking further to this head , till i come to consider of the conventions setling the crown upon the prince and princess of orange . but before i come to this , i have many things further to observe upon the princes harsh and unjust proceedings with his majesty , and refusing all terms of accommodation with him , upon his last return to london . in the first place therefore , i must appeal to your self , whether it were done like a nephew and a son-in-law , after the king was voluntarily returned to white hall , at the perswasion of those lords who went down to attend him at feversham , when he had had scarce time to rest him after his journey , and the many hardships he had indured since his being seized in that port ; and when he had but newly sent my lord feversham with a kind message and complement to the prince ; inviting him to st. iames's , together with some overtures of reconciliation , as i am informed , the prince should make no better a return to all this kindness , than to clap up the messenger contrary to the law of nations ; as his majesty observes in his late paper i now mentioned . and should without any notice given to the king of it , order his men to march , and displacing his majesties guards to seize upon all the posts about white-hall ; whereby his majesties person became wholly in his power : and not content with this , he likewise dispatcht three lords ( whose names i need not mention ) to carry the king a very rude and undutiful message , desiring him no less than to depart the next morning from his pallace to a private house in the countrey , altogether unfit for the reception of his majesty , and those guards and attendance that were necessary for his security : nor would these lords stay till the morning , but disturbing his rest delivered their message at twelve a clock at night ; nor did they give him any longer time than till the next morning to prepare himself to be gone ; and then the king was carried away to rochester under the conduct , not of his own , but of the princes dutch guards ; in whose custody his majesty continued for those few days he thought fit to stay there , till his departure from thence in order to his passage into france , by which means the prince hath render'd the breach irreconcileable between his majesty and himself ; for whereas if he had come to st. iames's in pursuance of the kings invitation , and had renewed the treaty , which was unhappily broke off by the kings first going away , there might have been in great probability , a happy and lasting reconciliation made between them , upon such terms as might have been a sufficient security for the church of england , as also for the rights and liberties of the subject , which you so earnestly contend for ; whereas by the conventions declaring the throne vacant , and placing the prince and princess of orange therein , they have entail'd a lasting war , not only upon us , but our posterity , as long as his majesty lives , and the prince of wales and his issue ( if he live to have any ) are in being . f. i confess you have made a very tragical relation of this affair , and any one that did not understand the grounds of it , would believe that king iames being quietly setled in his throne , and the prince of orange refusing all terms of reconciliation , had seiz'd upon his pallace , and carried him away captive into a prison ; whereas indeed there was nothing transacted in all this affair , which may not be justified by the strictest rules of honour , and the law of nations : for the doing of which , it is necessary to look back , and consider the state of affairs immediately after the kings leaving salisbury and coming to white-hall , where one of the first things he did after he was arrived , was to issue out a proclamation for the calling a new parliament , which was so received with great satisfaction by the whole nation ; and immediately upon this , the king sent the lords hallifax , nottingham , and godolphin , to treat with his highness upon those proposals of peace which he then sent by them , and to which the prince return'd his answer , the heads of which are very reasonable without demanding any other security for himself , and his army , than the putting of the tower and forts about london into the custody of that city : now pray observe the issue of all those fair hopes , before ever the terms propos'd by the prince could be brought to town , the king following the ill advice of the popish faction , instead of suffering the elections for parliament-men to proceed , as he had promised , and as was hoped for by us , all on a sudden he order'd the rest of the writs for elections that were not sent down , to be burnt , and a caveat to be entred against the making use of those that were sent already into the country ; and at the same time he sent order to the earl of feversham , to disband the army , and dismiss all the souldiers with their arms. but i had forgot to put you in mind , that just before this , the king had sent away the queen with the prince into france , and that she carried the great seal of england along with her ; whereby it was plain the king intended to put it wholly out of his power , to issue out any writs , or pass any publick act wherein the great seal should be used ; and that this seal was carried away appears by its being not long since drawn up out of the thames by a fisherman's net near lambeth bridge , where it 's supposed to have been thrown in by the queen , or some of her attendance , in her passage over the water ; and farther , that the king was resolved wholly to quit the government of this kingdom , ( at least for the present ) appears by his so speedy following of the queen , within three days after , stealing from his pallace by night in a boat to gravesend , and from thence in a small vessel to feversham , where how he was seis'd by the mob of that town , and afterwards return'd to london , as you have set forth , i need take no further notice . now this being a true and fair narrative of the whole matter , i shall only offer two or three questions to your consideration , and desire you would give me a fair and satisfactory answer to them . first , pray tell me whether it was not the kings fault that it was rendered impossible for parliament-men to be elected , by burning of the writs , and sending away the great seal ? secondly , whether the king by first stealing away , did not plainly confess himself conquer'd by the prince , and did thereby abdicate the government ? also by his obstinate refusal to redress the grievances of the nation , hath forfeited his crown and all allegiance from his subjects , and was not after this to be own'd as king of england , either by the prince of orange , or any body else ; and therefore whatever treatment he after this received from the prince , it was not to be looked upon as done to a lawful king , but a conquered prince ; and his highness might not only justly refuse to treat with him any more as a crowned head , but might also have justified not only the taking him prisoner , but sending him into holland , if he had pleas'd ; but instead of this , the prince only desir'd his removal out of town from that conflux of papists that flocked to him , and by securing his person to put it out of their power to play an after-game , and rally the late disbanded army , of whom there was at least twenty thousand of the scotch , irish , and english , who would have stood by the king till the last ; and therefore the english as well as the dutch counsel about the prince , did not think it safe for him to come to town as long as the king had his guards about him at white-hall , since they might have been increased to an army whenever he pleased . and though i grant good breeding and manners , especially to kings , as also respect from a son-in-law to a father , are duties incumbent upon princes , as well as private men , yet when these lesser things stand in competition with their own welfare and safety , as also of the whole nation , for which the prince was now engaged ; if he might for these ends justly require the removing and securing the kings person , it was no great matter what time of night he had notice to remove , though this was not done neither with any design to affront or surprise him , but happen'd indeed through pure accident ; for when it was resolved that the princes guards should march to london and secure white-hall , it was also resolved that the king should have notice to remove ▪ and since it was not thought fit to let him know it till the posts were all secur'd ; the ways being very deep and dirty between windsor and london , the dutch guards commanded by count solms could not reach the town till past ten at night , and after that it was near twelve before the english guards about white-hall could be drawn off without fighting , and till that was done it was not thought at all proper , or safe to deliver to the king the princes message for his departure : so that indeed it was not of any design that either the prince and his counsel who ordered it , or of these lords ( who very well understand good breeding ) thus to deliver their message to him at that time of night . but tho he was in bed , yet that he was not a sleep is very probable , since he had not been above half an hour in bed , and it is not very likely he should be a sleep , when he very well knew before of the arrival of the princes troops about white-hall , and therefore could not be without too much concern about it , presently to compose himself to sleep . but as for his removal from london , it is plain that his highness was so far from owning , or receiving the king in the same capacity he was in before his departure , that as soon as ever he heard he was at the earl of winchelsea's , and about to return to london , he sent away monsieur zulestein with a letter to let him know , that he desired him not as yet to come to london , but to stay at rochester till he himself should come to town ; but monsieur zulestein missing of the king by the way , he came to white-hall : yet could not but know that his being there was not with the princes consent , since the same gentleman followed him thither , and there delivered him the princes letters ; so that this second message by these lords could be no new thing , or surprise to him ; yet that his highness never intended , or acted the least violence towards the kings person , may appear by this , that he left it to the kings choice what place he would go to , as also what guards or other attendance he would take with him , and the king refused to take his english guards with him , though they were offer'd him : and indeed these dutch guards that attended him , might in his majesties judgment be very well trusted , they being ( as well as their officers ) for the most part papists ; but that the prince did not intend either to detain his majesties person as a prisoner , may appear in this , that whilst he remain'd at rochester , none that would were debarr'd from access to him , and that the officers and souldiers of the guards were order'd to be under his command , and every night to take the word from him ; and had it not been for the kings commanding a centry to be drawn off from his usual post , he could never have gone away without being discovered ; and if he would have gone away at noon day , i know not who unless the rabble would have hinder'd him ; so that i think it is evident that this was the civilest , and mildest usage that a vanquisht prince could expect from him that had so much the better of him , and in whose power he now was ; and i doubt more than the king would have allowed the prince , had it been his fortune to have got him as much in his power ; nay the king was so far from being confin'd , that it is plain he had the liberty given him to go whither he pleased ; nor were these guards plac'd so much about him for his confinement as to secure him from the insults of the rabble , who otherwise there , as well as they did at feversham , might have expressed too violent a resentment against his person . m. i cannot deny but you have given a very-fair , and as far as i know , a true account of this transaction , and have told me some things which i never heard before ; but however , i cannot depart from my first opinion , that it was neither , honestly nor wisely done of those who took upon them to advise the prince to push things to extremities in this conjuncture , and therefore i impute it chiefly to those english , who supposing they had by taking arms and joyning themselves to the princes party , provoked the king beyond all possibility of pardon , were resolved to do their utmost to put it out of the kings power ever to call him to an account for it : and tho' perhaps his first sending away the queen and prince , and then going away himself , in the middle of a treaty with the prince , and thereby leaving his affairs in such confusion , may seem to deserve blame , yet certainly his majesty is to be excused in a great measure for what he then did ; for as he tells the earl of feversham in his letter to him to disband the army ; that things being come to that extremity , that he was forced to send away the queen , and the prince his son , that they might not fall into the enemies hands , and was also constrained to do the same thing himself , and follow them , since the troops of his army were not to be relyed on , that it was not adviseable for him to fight the prince of orange in the head of them ; for it was but reasonable that princes as well as other men , should provide for their own security , as well as they can . but yet i can never believe that his majesty's first going away was any abdication of the government , much less a forfeiture of his crown or royal dignity any more than the second ; for in the first place it could be no forfeiture according to your own principles , because he had already dissolved the ecclesiastical court , and restor'd the cities and corporations to their former charters and freedom in elections of parliament-men , and putting again in commission , all lords , lieutenants , and justices of the peace , who had been before turned out ; and if he could not give an intire redress to all our grievances by a free parliament , it was only because he durst not stay to hold it , since he thought he could have no security for his person , the whole nation being in a manner poisoned and prepossessed against him by those malicious artifices of a french league , and a suppositious prince , and that his majesty had so many unfortunate disappointments , and so surprizing and unparallell'd accidents ; part of his army deserting him , and the rest too apparently unserviceable , when there were such terrible disorders in the kingdom , and all places were either flaming , or about to take fire . so likewise could it not be properly any wilful desertion or abdication of the government , since he was forced to quit it , like the master of a ship , who when the vessel is like to sink is forced to leave her , and escape in a cock-boat ; and that his majesty did not act thus without an intention to return , and again to vindicate his right , when opportunity served , appears likewise in that passage in the above mentioned letter , wherein he desires both the officers and souldiers of his army then to be disbanded , to continue their fidelity to him , and to keep themselves from associations , and such pernicious things ; from whence it plainly appears , he went not away without a prospect of returning to his throne when time should serve : and if he left no orders at all for the government of the kingdom in his absence , nor named any commissioners or lieutenants to represent him , it was because he thought it to no purpose ; since besides that , he could find no body , who durst undertake so difficult an employment ; so they that had taken it would have found no body who would obey them , the generality of the people , and also of the kings army , being more inclinable to the prince of orange , than to himself . yet however you see upon his return to town , the king was so well persuaded of the prince of oranges kind intentions towards himself and the nation , that i verily believe that his majesty would have yielded to any thing that could in reason have been desired of him ; and upon this ground i suppose he writ so kindly to the prince , and invited him to come to st. iames's with what troops he should think fit for his security ; therefore i must needs tell you again , i think it was a great oversight of the prince of orange , thus to let slip this opportunity , by refusing all terms of accommodation with the king his father , and by clapping up my lord feversham , then seizing the kings person , and sending him out of town , to let all the world see he was resolved to treat no more with him : and this being the true state of the case , it is not your saying that he had forfeited his crown by going away , and consulting his own safety , that will convince any unprejudiced man : for as to your notion of a forfeiture , that they were not then entred into the thoughts of the peers , and others of the privy council , appears by the order they made for sending the lords feversham , alesbury , ●armouth , and middleton , most humbly to intreat the king to return to white-hall , so that he was received very joyfully and with great acclamations of the common people as he passed through the city ; and when he came to white-hall he called a council , where he made an order to stop the demolishing and plundering of houses by the rabble : so that he was not only receiv'd , but also acted as a king after his return to town . this being the true state of the case , i shall not dispute the point whether his majesty and the prince were in a state of war or peace , after his return to town , or what the prince might have done as an enemy and a stranger to the kings person , but what might be expected from him as a generous prince , a nephew , and a son-in-law , and one who was bound in conscience and honour , to consult the lasting peace and happiness of the nation , more than his own private interest , or the ambition of wearing a crown . f. you have made the utmost defence that i suppose can be brought for the king 's first going away ; yet if it be better consider'd , i doubt it will not serve the turn : i see you are forc'd to lay the whole fault of the kings departure in the midst of the treaty with the prince , and his refusing to call a parliament according to his own promise and proclamation , upon his want of security for himself , the queen , and prince , if he had stay'd , by reason of the want of fidelity in his army , the general prejudice of the nation against him , and the great firmness and resolution there was in the princes army to adhere to him . now i shall shew you that every one of these were but pretences , and that the real cause of his departure was , because he fear'd to leave the inquiry into the birth of the prince of wales , and the free examination and redress of our grievances , and those violations he had committed upon the fundamental constitution of the government , to the impartial judgment of a free parliament . for in the first place , as to want of fidelity in his army , that can be no just excuse for his deserting , and disbanding them as he did , without any pay ; since he himself in his said letter to the earl of feversham , expresly owns , that there were a great many brave men , both officers and souldiers among them ; and therefore if he was satisfied of this , he ought to have first sent for all his officers , both collonels and captains , and have examin'd them how far they would stand by him , in the defence of his person and cause , against the prince of orange ; and he might have also order'd those officers to have examin'd every regiment , troop and company in his whole army , how far they would engage in his defence ; and if he had proceeded thus at salisbury , before he fled away in that confusion to london , i have been credibly inform'd by divers officers of that army , that the king might have found above ▪ twenty thousand men , that would have stood by him to the last man , in his quarrel against the prince , and therefore i impute his going away as he did from salisbury , to some strange pannick fear that god had cast upon him , and all the popish faction about him , since he has been known not to want sufficient courage upon other occasions ; but though he had omitted it there , yet he certainly ought to have tryed this last experiment after he came to london , rather than have quitted the kingdom so dishonourably as he then did , and thereby giving the p. of orange's friends an opportunity of seizing or getting delivered into their power , all the garisons and strong places in england , besides portsmouth , in those three or four days time , that he was not heard of , besides great part of the army that was not disbanded , had in that time gone in to the prince , in hopes of their pay , and future preferment : now that the king might with safety have resided with his army somewhere about london , he himself grants , in his proposals to the prince , to this effect , that in the mean time , till all matters were adjusted concerning the freedom of elections , and a security of their sitting ; the respective armies may be retained within such limits , and at such distance from london , as may prevent all apprehensions that the parliament may be in any kind disturbed ; which proposals being made not long after the kings arrival at london , we may reasonably suppose that he was then well enough satisfied with the fidelity of the greatest part , at least of his own army , to him ; and if he were not , he might have been better satisfied if he pleased : but as for the next difficulty , the nations being poisoned and prepossessed against him ; admit it were so , as long as he had a sufficient army about him ( as i suppose he might have had ) he need not have feared any thing the people could do ; but indeed this was a needless fear ; for before the parliament could sit , it was not the peoples interest to hinder it , or to fall upon the king or his army when matters were in a fair way of accommodation ; so after the parliament sate , there would have been less cause of fear , since the reverence of that court would have kept them in awe ; but as to the firmness and resolution of the princes army , the fear of that was also as needless , as long as the kings army continued as firm to him , and if the princes army had been the first agressors , i doubt not but the people would have taken part with the king against them : but after all it was certainly ( and you must grant it so ) much more safe and honourable for the king to have treated with the prince , and held a parliament with an army about him , than to have yielded the same things ( as you suppose him willing to have done ) after his return to town , when his army was disbanded , and london had received the prince , and had joined with him and when almost all the strong places of england were in the princes power ; so that upon the whole matter it evidently appears that the king chose to trust his own person together with that of the queen and prince , to a foreign monarch rather than he would relye upon the justice or fidelity of his own nation . you say in the next place , that nothing the king has done in all these exorbitances he committed that can in any wise amount to a forfeiture , or abdication of the government ; not to the former because the king redress'd all our grievances before he went away ; 't is true , i grant he redressed some of them , by putting divers things in the same state they were before ; yet for all this , the greatest still remained unredressed , ( viz. ) the raising of mony contrary to law , and the dispensing power , both which ( as i have already shewed you ) at our last meeting he never disclaimed , neither took any sufficient course , by calling a parliament to prevent its being exercised for the future ; besides his going away , without giving the prince and nation any further satisfaction about the birth of the prince of wales , all which not being done , i must still affirm , that this wrought a forfeiture of the crown , or an abdication of it , at least by his refusal to hold and govern it according to the fundamental laws thereof ; for he that destroys the law or conditions by which he holds an estate , does tacitly renounce his title to it : as i shewed you in the case of tenant for life , altering in fee : so that this being considered , as also that the city of london and the whole nation , had surrendred themselves to the prince of orange ; and that even the arch-bishops of canterbury and york , together with the bishops of winchester and ely , with divers other earls , bishops and lords then in town , had sent an address to the prince , immediately upon the kings departure , and sent three lords and one bishop with it , desiring his highness to come speedily to london , and to take the government upon him ; and having before declar'd , that they would with their utmost endeavours , assist his highness for the obtaining of a free parliament ; so that the prince had no reason upon the kings return , to surrender that power which the nation as far as it was able to do without a parliament , had put into his hands ; and that to a king , whom he had very little reason to believe , would use it any better than he had done before . but i see you wilfully decline entring into the merits of the cause , and arguing the main point in the controversy , ( viz. ) whether the king was in a state of war or peace with the prince upon his return ; for if he were still in a state of war , the prince might certainly very well justifie his clapping up the earl of feversham ( his late majesties general ) for offering to come within the limits of the princes quarters , without his leave ; especially , since he was still answerable for doing his endeavour to disband an army ( a great part of which , consisted of papists and forreigners , with their arms in their hands ) whereby they might have robb'd and spoyl'd the countries , or at least have kept those arms , to renew the war again with the first opportunity ; so that certainly it could not be so slight a thing , as a bare invitation to st. iames's , whither the prince could have gone without his leave , ( being now master of the city ) which could so far ef●ace all the princes just resentments , and make him so far confide in the kings word , as to come to london , whilst he remained there with his guards , and all those papists and tories in and about london , ready to take his part , and rallie again into a new army , upon the first signal . but as for any proposals of peace or accommodation , which you say the lord feversham brought with him , i neither know , nor have heard of any such thing : 't is true , the king says in the said paper he left behind him , that he had writ to the prince of orange by the lord feversham , and also mentions some instructions he had given him ; but what they were , he does not tell us ; but sure they were not propositions of peace , since it is to be supposed , that the king would not have sent any thing of that consequence , without first acquainting the privy council with it , before it was sent : but since we hear of nothing concerning them , we may very well suppose there was no such thing , or if there were , his highness was the fittest judge , whether they were reasonable or not ; and if the king had any desire to propose any just or reasonable terms , whereupon he might have hoped to have been restored again to his royal dignity , he had a very ●air opportunity for it , when a great council of the nobility were met at st. iames's , in order to sign an association to stand by the prince in the calling of a free parliament , for the king might then ▪ if he had pleased , have made his proposals by such of the lords and bishops , as he could most confide in , and have conjured all the peers there assembled , to have interceeded with the prince of orange , to renew their treaty with the king , which had been before unhappily broken off ; and then if either the peers had refused to do this , or the prince had refused to hear them , the king might then ( i grant ) have had sufficient reason to declare to all the world , that he was not fairly dealt with ; but for him again to go away only upon pretence , that his person was under restraint , when really it was not , plainly shew'd , that he had no real design , of making an amicable end of those differences , or really desir'd to be restored to his throne , by the general consent of the nation ; but either hoped for it from those civil dissentions he expected we should fall into upon his departure , or else to the arms of france ; and this being the case , i think nothing is plainer , than that the king both by his first and second departure , hath obstinately refused all those means , whereby the nation might have been setled with a due consideration of his person , and authority whilst he lived , and of the prince , when his legitimacy shall be sufficiently proved , and made out before a free parliament . so that since i have already proved that the king had before the princes arrival , committed so many violations upon the whole constitution of the government , and that these violations , if wilfully and obstinately persisted in , do at last produce an absolute loss and forfeiture of the crown it self ; i think the late king has done all that could be required to make it so . but i have forgot to answer one objection you made , ( viz. ) that the peers and bishops , when they invited the king to return to white-hall , had no notion of this forfeiture , nor the people of london , who you say , received him with great joy and acclamations , and that therefore it is wholly a new invention . to this i answer ; that if the lords you mention , did send this message to the king , it might be , because they were surprised with his unexpected return , and had not well considered all the circumstances of the case , and thereby did more then they could well justifie , having before declaed , they would stand by his highness , in procuring a free parliament , which must certainly be without the king , since he was then gone away ; and they had also invited him to come to london , as well as the city ; and how that could consist with their inviting the king thither , without the princes consent , i do not well understand ; but it seems they quickly , altered their sentiments as appears by their presently after subscribing a paper in the nature of an association , to stand by the prince , without taking any notice at all of the king , and the very day of the kings departure , they met to consider upon the princes speech , he had a day or two before made to them , desiring them to advise on the best means , how to pursue the ends of his declaration , in calling a free parliament ; and within two days after , they presented the prince with their advice , to call a convention on the th . of ianuary , which was also the next day agreed to , by one hundred and sixty persons , who had served as knights , citizens and burgesses , in any of the last parliaments , in the time of king charles the second , without taking any notice at all of the king ; for though it is true , he was then gone away , when the commons and city , two or three days after , made their addresses to the prince : yet , when the peers met both the first and second time , on the st . and d . of december , he was still here ; for the king did not leave rochester , until the d . in the morning ; so it is plain , it was not their design to own , or take notice of him any more as king , and that which makes it more remarkable , is , that several of the bishops ( viz. ) the arch-bishop of york , together with the bishop of st. asaph , and others joyned with the rest of the peers in these addresses , which was a plain sign , they all looked upon the kings power to be now at an end : but as for the acclamations of the people , or any great joy the city expressed upon the kings return to town , i doubt you have had a false account of that matter , for i cannot hear that any of the citizens went out to meet him , or set any lights in their windows , though he came into london after it was dark , or that any of the better sort , bid him god speed : i grant indeed , there was a great many of what you call the mob ; but more boys than men , who followed his coach , making huzza's , whilst the rest of the people silently looked on . m. i cannot deny , but you may have given a true account of these matters , since you may have observ'd them better than i ; yet as you your self have related them , sure the king had sufficient cause to consult his own safety , and make his escape as soon as he could ; for what could he expect , when once the prince had secured his person under a guard , and had refused to treat with him as king ; and that also the peers , and divers of the bishops had made an association to stand by the prince of orange , and had made a fresh address to him , without taking the least notice of him , as if there had been no such thing as a king in being ? i say , what could his majesty now expect , but either a more close confinement , or else , being taken off privately by poyson , or some other ways , since he could not be forgetful of the king his fathers saying , that there is no great distance between the prisons and the graves of princes ; or admit he had lived till this convention sa●e , what could he have expected more , than the retaining the bare title of king , whilst the prince of orange , or some others appointed by him , had wholly managed the government at their pleasure ? or else they might according to your doctrine , have either declared the crown forfeited , or else , that he had abdicated it by his going away ; or who can tell , but they might have again renewed the villany of . and have made him undergone the same fate with his father ? f. i grant you have urged the utmost that can be , to justifie the kings second departure ; and as i would not deny , but that he was the best judge of his own danger , so were the prince , peers and common , together with the city , the best and only judges , we could then have of the true means of our settlement and safety , since after so many breaches that the king had made upon his first declaration , and coronation oath , as also his going from his late promise of calling a free parliament ; i cannot see what farther security he could have given us , that he would not repeat the same things over again ; or admit the prince had suffered him to continue at white-hall , and to call a third parliament , what assurance could he have given , that in the end of another forty days , we should not have the same trick play'd us ? and then in march or april , have been left in the same state of confusion we were in , in december , to the certain ruine of these three kingdoms , and holland into the bargain ? and then by that time , the french king might have got ready an army and a fleet , and under a pretence of redeeming his majesty from the constraint he lay under , and of restoring him to the free exercise of his regal power , have invaded this kingdom ; and i suppose you cannot deny but the king would then have sound papists and high tories enough , to have joined with him in this pious design ; for certainly the scruples of the high church-men would have been the same they are now , the obligations of the oath of allegiance the same , and the supposed sin of deposing a lawful k. the same , though he had utterly refused to give the prince and nation any satisfaction : so that then if we had been forced to take arms , and to declare he had forfeited his right to the crown , all these things would have given as great , or rather greater scandal , than for the nation to take him at his first offer ; and since he had thus rashly deserted the throne by a needless departure , to resolve he should ascend it no more . but suppose ( what might also as well have happened ) that the prince and his party had been killed , or expelled the kingdom by the king , do you think he would have granted us then , what he would not grant us now ? would he not think you , have disbanded his protestant army , and have kept only irish , scotch , and french forces in pay , and have every day encreased them ? what respect can we hope he would ever after this have shewn to our laws , religion , or liberties , when he had now no longer any thing to fear ? the memory of what happened after the duke of monmouth's defeat , ( though effected only by those of the church of england ) will certainly never be forgotten by others , whatever you bigots of loyalty may pretend , or say . so that for my part i stand amazed to see you , and so many others scruple the submitting to the present king ; for if ever man had a just cause of war , he had , and that creates a right to the thing gained by it , the king by withdrawing and disbanding his army , yielded him the throne ; and is he had without any more ceremony ascended it , he had done no more than several princes formerly have done on the like occasions ; for the prince was no longer then bound to consider him as one that was , but as one that had been king of england , yet in that capacity he treated him with great respect and civility , how much soever the king complained of it , who did not enough consider what he had done to draw upon himself that usage : but as for your insinuation , that if he had stayed he might have run the same fate with his father ; i think it is fuller of passion than truth ; for besides that , the lords and commons would never had the impudence to have committed such a villany ; and the prince himself as a nephew , and a son-in-law would never have suffered it . m. well , god only knows the event of things , and we ought to judge charitably , and still to hope , that if the king might have been restored upon terms , that he would have been the better for his affliction , and have amended all those errours he committed , since he had seen that neither the nation , nor yet his neighbours the dutch would permit him to make himself an absolute monarch ; i believe he would have been too much afraid of the king of france , ever to have made use of his forces , to have setled popery and arbitrary government ; and without his assistance , i suppose you will grant it never could have been done , since he plainly found that a protestant army would never have joined with him to act in such pernitious designs ; but however , let the worst have happened that could be , i think it had been much better for the nation to have endured it with patience , than to have done that which was evil , though for the procuring of the greatest seeming good , tho' for the advantage of our religion , and civil liberties : and therefore it had been better for us in this extremity , to have trusted god than men , since he always promises to protect those that relye upon him , and strictly perform his will ; and admit the worst that could have happened , god would either have removed those afflictions from us in due time , or have given us patience to have born them ; since i suppose you will not deny , that god oftentimes brings persecutions and afflictions upon a sinful church and nation , either for a punishment for their sins , or else to give an occasion for those that are truly pious and sincere , to shew their courage and constancy in suffering for the truth , and by withstanding , not by force , but passive obedience , all the kings illegal and arbitrary commands , if he should after his re-establishment in the throne , have again renewed his former courses ; these are the only remedies which we of the church of england , as obedient subjects to the king and his laws , must think could have been lawfully taken in this case . f. i do not deny , but what you say is in the main very pious and honest , were the case as you have put it ; but the greatest part of your discourse depends wholly upon those old principles and prejudices , of the unlawfulness of all resistance of the supream powers , and that the king is the only supream power in this kingdom ; both which propositions i have sufficiently confuted at our third , fourth , and fifth meetings , and also at our last save one , in which i gave you a true account of the legal sense of those oaths and statutes of king charles ii. concerning resistance ; as was also given by the best lawyers , and most considering men of the then house of lords and commons ; so that if the means we have used are lawful , both by the laws of god and man , i think we are not bound to bring afflictions upon our selves , but to avoid them all we can , especially when they come evidently attended with the utter loss and ruine of what ought to be most dear to us , our religion , civil liberties , and properties , and that not only for our selves , but our posterity ; who perhaps would never have regained them when they were once lost ; of which the french nation is an evident example before our eyes , who by not opposing the arbitrary power of their kings in due time , have fallen into a government almost as despotick as that of turky ; for when once the common good of the subjects ceases to be the main end of the governours , the government then ceasing to be gods ordinance , degenerates into tyranny : which i think may be always lawfully opposed by a free-born people , who at first agreed to be governed , not as slaves but subjects . but as for the first part of your speech , it needs not any long answer ; it first supposes the king might have been again restored upon terms ; now since it is plain , these terms must have been imposed upon him against his will , and as necessary conditions of his restoration , i would be glad to know who it was should undertake to impose them upon him , and to see them kept , when they had been made , whether the prince of orange or the parliament ? if the former , i grant indeed he might have made such conditions with the king , that the church of england , as well as the whole nation , should for the future enjoy their just rights and liberties ; but then the prince must either have trusted wholy to the kings honour , or else he must have had some strong places put into his hands for a security , that the king would not again make the same violations upon our laws , religion and liberties , as he had done before ; if the former , i suppose you will not deny , but that the king might , if he had pleased , have broken them all again , as soon as ever the princes back had been turned , and that he had been once engaged in a war with france , which could not have been long avoided , considering the necessity there is at this juncture of time for the states of holland ( and consequently the prince as their general ) to engage with the emperor and king of spain , to drive the french out of the empire , and to hinder him from making himself universal monarch of europe ; which it is plain , is the thing he now drives at . but if the prince should have kept any strong places here as cautionary towns , for the kings performance of the terms agreed upon , this must have been done either by english or forreign forces ; if by the former , this would have been looked upon as inconsistent with their duty , and allegiance to the king , if he should have commanded them to be delivered up into his hands ; since you tell us , the king has the sole command of the militia , and consequently of all garrisons man'd by his subjects , within his dominions : but if the forces that should have held these places , had been dutch-men , or other forreigners , it would never have been endured , either by the king or the nation , that forreigners should possess the strong holds and keys of the kingdom , and the king might soon have wrought ( by some jealousies and suspitions , which he would not have failed to have raised ) that the nation it self , should have joyned with him to drive them out ; and then the king might have done what he pleased without controul ; but if you will place this power into the whole people or nation , or else their representatives the parliament , of holding the king to these terms agreed upon , this could not have been done without their constant siting , and a power of resisting him , in case he infring'd them ; and then either they must have given up all their liberties to the kings will , or else farewell to the darling doctrines of passive obedience , and non-resistance ; so that take it which way you will , all imposing of terms upon the king , either by the prince of orange , or the nation , would in a short time have become either unpracticable or insignificant . nor is your other supposition any whit truer , that the king would never have made use of the forces of france , to subdue and keep under the people of england , for fear he should not be able to get the french out again . ti 's true , this would be a very good argument to a prince , who were no bigot , and was not resolved to introduce his religion , by all the ways and means he could ; but how near the french forces were to be brought over into this kingdom the last summer , is very well known to those who were then in france , and saw them upon the sea coast , ready to imbark ; nor was their coming over put off by any other motives , than that two of the cabinet-council represented to the king , that it would be the only means to make the whole nation rise up against him , and joyn with the prince of orange , as soon as he landed ; which i suppose was the only reason that hindred it ; for that the french king offered to send them , is very certain . yet it does not follow for all that , but the king might take an opportunity of doing it another time , and bringing them over in their own ships , if ours would not do the business . and though i will not affirm , that there is any private league with france , for the extirpation of the protestant religion ; yet this much i think may be sufficiently made out , that long ago , the king was wholly in the power and interest of france , as appears by coleman's letters ( whilst he was his secretary ) when duke of york . the first passage , is to sir william throgmorton feb. . / . you well know , that when the duke comes to be master of our affairs , the king of france will have reason to promise himself all things that he can desire . the next is to father la chaise , the french kings confessor , in these words ; that his royal highness was convinced , that his interest and the king of france's , were the same ; and whether the duke by his accession to the crown , has shewed any alteration in his inclinations to france , either in respect of religion or interest , i appeal to the world. nor is your next supposition less out of the way , that the king could have made use of no forces but french , to settle popery and arbitrary government here , as if he had not scotch and irish papists enough in his dominions for this occasion ; and as for arbitrary government , we have found to our grief , that there are too many mercenary souldiers in the kings army , who fought only for pay , and would have assisted the king to have raised money without the parliament , nay , to pull the very parliament out of doors , if he had bid them ; and if some of them were discontented , when the prince came over , i do not so much impute it to their honest principles , as fear , lest they themselves should be cashierd , and scotch and irish , to be listed in their rooms ; so that upon the whole matter , considering the temper the king was in ever since his last coming to town , and that as soon as he arrived , the priests and jesuits flocked about him as thick as ever , that they and the french envoy were his chief ( if not his only cabinet councellors ) i cannot see ( unless he had taken new measures ) how we could have been secure , or could have relied on any thing he could have farther promised ; nay , swore to perform ; since no oath could be more sacred than that at his coronation , when he swore to maintain the church ( that is , the doctrine of the church ) of england , and the laws of the kingdom , if that be a true account of the form of it , which we have in print . m. at this rate of arguing , i know not what to say to you , since this argument amounts to no more than this ; that the king could upon no account be trusted , and therefore was not any more to be treated with ; if this were so , to what purpose did the prince of orange declare , that he came not to conquer the kingdom ; but only to procure a free and legal parliament , which could not be called , without the kings consent , and owning his authority ? neither could they have done the least act for the amendment of our grievances , without his majesties consent ; or to what purpose did the prince enter into a treaty with the kings commissioners at hungerford , if his royal word and promises , were not to be believed ? but if his majesty could ever be trusted , i see no reason why he could not have been so , as well since his last coming to town , as before , since he came voluntarily ? and as i have great reason to believe with real intentions , to grant and perform what ever the nation could reasonably expect for the redress of their grievances , and would have given any reasonable security of his performance for the future , without devesting himself of his royal power of making laws , and protecting his subjects ? but as for the former part of your speech , whereby you would prove it lawful to resist the king , because you say it conduced to the common good and interest of the nation , both as to the protestant religion , and civil liberties , this is no more than the old common-wealths maxim in other words , which i grant is so far true , as when the safety and preservation of the king or other supream powers of a common-wealth ( who according to your own principles , are the representatives of the people , and consequently part of it ) are likewise comprehended and maintained ( as they ought to be ) in their due power and authority : for bishop sanderson in his learned lectures , hath very well proved , that those cannot be separated from each other , without destroying the civil government , which is all the security we have for our civil properties and liberties ; and we see in those few days in which his majesties person was withdrawn , when that there was no civil government exercised , that there was greater infringment of them , both by plundering and destroying of houses , and spoiling of parks and forests in three or four days time , by the violence and fury of the mob , than have been committed by the most arbitrary kings , from the conquest to this day . f. you very much mistake me , if you think i maintain , that there was never any time after the princes landing , that the king might not have been treated withal ; and likewise trusted with the administration of the government ; but then it must have been upon such terms , as should have secured us for the future , from his acting the like , or worse things over again ; as in the first place , he should have renounced his dispensing power , and that of levying chimny mony upon small cottages and ovens , directly contrary to law. next he should have disbanded his standing army , and kept up no forces in time of peace , besides the necessary guard● of his person , the number of which , should have been agreed upon by parliament ; which should also have s●te once every year , or two years at least ; and lastly , that in respect of the church , as long as he or his successors continued of the roman catholick religion , the nomination of all bishops , arch-bishops , deans , with other ecclesiastical preferments , which are not in the immediate disposal of the lord chancellor , should have been in the arch-bishops , and bishops of each province , they choosing two , out of which his majesty should have chosen one , for to supply each bishoprick , &c. as they became vacant . and therefore for my own part , i was so far from believing all agreements with the king to be unpracticable , that there was no body rejoyced more than i , when upon his majesty's first return to london , he so far complied with the desires of the whole nation , as to issue out his proclamation for a free parliament , and that he sent down his commissioners to treat with the prince , and i had then great hopes of an accommodation ; but when instead of this , the king had burnt the writs for the election of parliament men , and had sent away the queen and prince , together with the great seal , that no more writs might be issued , and that before ever the commissioners could return to london , or before any answer to the princes proposals was given by the king , he had withdrawn himself , and done all he could to get away into a foreign kingdom ; it was then , and not till then , that i saw all hopes of agreement absolutely desperate : and though you put a great stress upon the kings last return to town , which you suppose , was with a design to agree with the prince in every thing , that could be in reason demanded : i can see no cause for your drawing such a consequence from it ; for if he did not look upon himself as safe here before his army was disbanded , he could not think himself more so , when it was either wholly dissolved , or else was gone over to the prince ; and therefore i have much greater reason to believe , that his return again to town , was only to comply with the present necessity , and to wait for a fitter opportunity to get away , there being never a vessel then ready to transport him ; especially if that be true which i have heard , that the king declared to a person of credit : that the queen had obtained from him a solemn oath on the sacrament , on the sunday , that if she went for france on monday , he would not fail to follow her on tuesday ; and if this were so , though he was disappointed in his intended passage ; yet still was he under the same obligation to the queen ; nor do i see any transaction of his with the prince of orange , or with these of the church of england , that can perswade me to believe otherwise ; sin●e his long consultation with the french envoy , and the priests and jesuits could only tend to the taking new measures for his departure , or else how he might imbroil us further while he stayed , by some faint hopes of new treaties and agreements . but as for the other part of your answer , whereby you would confute my notion , of the lawfulness of resistance for the defence and preservation of our religion established by law , as also of our liberties and properties ; i hope i shall let you see , that it is not i , but your self , who are mistaken in this matter : for st . all writers on this subject , and even dr. sanderson himself , in his lectures of the obligation of conscience , do acknowledge that all civil government is principally ordained for the good and preservation of the people ; and that the good of the governours , is only to be considered , secondarily ; and in order to that ; which if so ; i pray tell me whether the good and preservation of the people , ought not to be considered in the first place ; since the end for which a thing is ordain'd , is always more worthy than the means , by which it is procured ; and therefore i shall freely grant , that as long as the safety , and interest of the supream power , and that of the people are all one , and can any ways consist together ; and that they make the happiness and preservation of the people to be the main end of their government ; i so far agree with you , that the good , or preservation of the prince or supream powers , cannot , ( nay ought not ) to be separated from that of the people ; but when they once set up a separate interest quite different from that of the people ; ( as all princes do , who turning tyrants go about to inslave them ) they then cease to be the true heads of that political body the common wealth , and thereupon the community or people become free , and at liberty , either to oppose or remove these artificial heads , and to set up new ones in their rooms ; so that since similies are not arguments , your comparison between a natural and political body , hath only served to impose upon your judgment in this matter ; and therefore i affirm that a natural and political body do wholly differ in this matter ; for in a natural body , the real good of the head cannot be separated from that of the body , nor the good of the body from that of the head , nor yet can the body alone judge of the proper means of it's own preservation , nor when it is hurt or assaulted , but by the head , which is the principle of sense and motion ; but in a political body it is quite otherwise ; for first , the supream powers of a common-wealth , which you suppose to be head of this political body , do often pursue and set up an interest quite different from , ( nay contrary to ) that of the body or people , and that not only to their prejudice , but also sometimes to their destruction ; and that when they do this , the politcal body , or the people will in evident and apparent cases judge for themselves , let this political head say or declare what it will against it , and will when they are thus destroyed , opprest , and inslav'd , by those that they have submitted to as their political heads , and in such cases of extremity , endeavour to free themselves from the severity of their yoke . m. notwithstanding what you have now said , i am not yet convinced , that the king had no real design to redress our grievances , and to make a final agreement with the prince ; for though i do not deny but his majesty did converse with some priests , and others of his own persuasion , as also with the french envoy after his coming to town , yet might this be for no ill intent , and he did also converse with divers reverend bishops and lords of our own religion , to whom he still expressed a great desire of making an end of all differences between himself , the prince , and the whole nation ; and this i suppose is the true reason why the arch-bishop of canterbury , though it is true he signed the first and second addresses to the prince , upon his majesty's first wth-drawing himself , yet has been ever since so sensible of that mistake he then committed , that he has never appeared or acted in any meeting of the peers , nor yet in the convention ; and that his majesty , even at rochester , did not lay aside all thoughts of agreement , and making up all breaches between himself and his people ; i could give you another demonstration , which is not commonly known , and which i had from a particular friend , ( viz. ) that the king during his confinement there , sent a lady i could name , on a message to two reverend prelates of our church , ( together with an emrauld ring from his finger , as a testimony of the truth of her commission ) to this effect , that his majesty being sensible of the sad condition the church of england as well as he himself was in , and that there was no way so likely for him to get out of it , as by granting his subjects , and particularly the church of england , such securities for the enjoyment of their just rights and liberties , as they could in reason demand ; therefore he wholly left it to the discretion of those bishops , to make to the peers and bishops that were then to meet suddenly , whatever proposals they should think reasonable on his behalf , for the satisfaction of the church , and safety of the nation , and that he would be ready to grant and ratifie them whensoever he should be required . f. this is indeed more than ever i heard before , and can scarce believe ; but did the lady go and deliver her message ? and pray what answer did those bishop give to this fair proposal ? m. yes , the lady did deliver her message , and these bishops answer'd both to the same effect , that they had a real duty and affection for his majesty , and a great desire to serve him ; but that considering the great power of the prince of orange , and his present aversion to any agreement with his majesty , they very much feared that the peers would not venture to give the prince any such advice , or to interpose with him on his majesties behalf , which in my opinion was very meanly , and cowardly done of them ; who considering their duty to him as king , and also those particular obligations they owed him as their benefactor , and who had been the greatest means of their being raised to those dignities in his brothers reign ; now i desire to know if this message had received its intended effect , what greater demonstration his majesty could have given to satisfie the world that he really intended to set all things right again , had he been permitted to do it . f. i will not farther question the truth of this relation , though perhaps i might have sufficient reason for it , since you say you had it from a person of good credit , and who was privy to this transaction ; nor yet will i be so inquisitive as to know the names either of the bishops , or of the lady , since you make it a secret ; but yet notwithstanding , i do still very much question , whether the king did ever really design to do what he then offer'd , and did not intend to put a sham upon their lordships , to serve his present occasion , and to see if he could divide the bishops and peers of the church of england , from the prince of oranges interest : and so by making them offer such proposals as the prince should not think fit to agree to , might make them declare against his proceedings , which would have created great divisions , and heart-burnings between those of the high church of england party , and the prince : and thereby have involved us again in fresh disturbances , of which no doubt the king and the popish faction were like to receive the greatest advantage ; for you know the old saying , divide , & impera . but to let you see that i do not speak without just grounds for my opinion , let us examine every circumstance of this matter ; first , if the king had meant really , is it likely that he would have trusted a business of that high moment to a woman ? when he had then the lords of alesbury and arron , besides other protestant gentlemen then waiting on him , and they were much fitter to be trusted than this lady , let her be whom she will ? or can any one believe if the king had meant really , that he would not have sent his proposals in writing , since he very well knew from the princes declaration , as well as the bishops petition and addresses to him , what the whole nation , and the church of england in particular required , at his hands : but that he must send a loose and uncertain message , which it was in his power to disown whenever he pleased , by saying , the foolish woman mistook his meaning ; and she also might be so much his creature , as to take the fault wholly upon her self , whenever it should serve the kings turn so to do ; and therefore i think it was very wisely and honestly done of those reverend prelets to refuse medling in such a ticklish affair , since it is plain by his not making any such proposals to the prince of orange himself , or the lords about him , that he was not to be made privy to it , but rather it should be carried on , whether he would or no , and without giving him any satisfaction in his particular concern as to the prince of wales : and lastly , i desire you farther to consider , whether the king might not hereafter , when ever he had power , have made void whatever agreements or concessions he should have then granted either to the church of england , or to the nation , by pleading afterwards , that they were obtained by decrees whilst he was not sui juris , but under the power of the prince of orange ? i have but one thing more to add , which i before omitted , which is to make some reply to what you said concerning the mischief that the mob has done upon houses , forests , and praks , since his majesty's first departure ; and therefore granting the matter of fact , that much mischief and spoil has been committed ; yet i deny that it is more than has been done by the most arbitrary kings , since the conquest to this day , as you are pleased to affirm ; for i believe you forget the thirty parish churches , and towns , which our historian tell us , your william the conquerour , and his son ru●us destroyed , when they inlarged new forrests , and therein acted contrary to their oaths , like true despotick tyrants ; you likewise forget the miserable spoil and waste which king iohn and henry the iii. made upon the houses , castles and estates of the barons , and gentry of england , who opposed them in their unjust and illegal violations of magna charta , besides other tyrannical actions of the same kind committed by king edward and richard the ii. too long here to relate ; but if these mischiefs were done you speak of , who have we to thank for it , but the king , who stealing away on the sudden , without leaving any orders for the government of the kingdom ; all persons in commission either civil or military , doubted whether their commissions were no● at an end by the kings deserting the government as he did ? besides , you very well know that the common people were so enraged against the popish faction , for so many insolent actions they had committed in king iames's reign , and so many apparent breaches , and contempts of all the laws made against them , that you cannot wonder if when they were rid of the fear of the irish , and of king iames's army , they kept their arms in their hands , and took that opportunity of revenging themselves upon those , that they looked upon as the authors of all this confusion ; so that except the rifling of the house and chappel of the spanish ambassador , which i grant was contrary to the law of nations , there were very few popish houses plunder'd or spoiled ; but such as had before rendered themselves some ways or other obnoxious to the laws , by their apostacy and accepting of commissions , which they were utterly disabled by law , to take ; and though to my knowledge the deputy lieutenants , and justices of the peace , did their utmost in most counties of england , to quell those riots and disorders , yet the mobbile were too much enraged , and too numerous to be commanded , when like a vicious horse , whose rider is cast off , they run away with the bridle in their teeth . m. i confess you have made the best apology for the mob that the matter will bear ; and i cannot deny in comparison of what has been done in other nations on the like occasions ; it was a very civil mob , but yet this may serve to let us see the danger of your doctrine of resistance , since by the same law by , which they then pulled down , and plunder'd the popish chappels , and roman catholick houses , by the like right they might have done the same violences upon any other noblemans or gentlemans house in england , whether a papist or protestant , that they had a spleen to , since it was but their crying out , that he was a papist , or at least a favourer of them , and then it had been enough to make them suffer , as if they really had been so ; as i could tell you of my own knowledge , of a very honest gentleman of my acquaintance , who because he was a true son of the church , and had been always a loyal subject to his majesty , and a great enemy to the whig faction in the countrey , and had also put the laws severely in execution against the dissenters , was like to have had his house plunder'd by the phanatick mob of a certain town , from which this gentlemans house was not far distant . f. if you please to consider it , this is a very unjust inference from our doctrine ; for these actions were not any resistance of the supream powers of the nation , but certain violent actions or revenges , which the rabble thought they might take upon those whom they looked upon as publick enemies , when there was no civil or military power in being , that was of sufficient strength to keep them in order ; but if you please to call to mind my positions ; i do by no means allow the rabble or mob of any nation to take arms against a civil government , but only the whole community of the people of all degrees and orders , commanded by the nobility and gentry thereof : and though i grant the people may be sometimes mistaken in the exercise of this right ( as what is there , though never so lawful , that may not be abused , ) yet i think you will grant that the bare abuse of a lawful thing , is no sufficient ground for the taking away the liberty of exercising it ; and i think i have sufficiently proved , that the total denial of this liberty , would be of far worse consequence to whole nations and kingdoms , nay to all mankind , than the allowing of it , ( as those of my opinion do ) only in cases of extream necessity , and when no other remedy will serve . m. i will not renew this old dispute again , about resistance , we sufficiently know one anothers minds about it , and are not , as i can see , like to bring over either of us to the others opinion ; but since i know you have studied the common laws , and histories of this kingdom better than i , i cannot forbear making divers just reflections upon the late proceedings of the convention ; for tho' indeed they had no legal authority to assemble upon the circular letters of a foreign prince , yet since this was the greatest ( if not the only liberty we had left us ) i will not quarrel or dispute the legality of their meeting , but then they must use it only for lawful ends , and such as in their private capacities they were obliged to pursue if they were able ; therefore when they assembled , if they would have maintain'd the due rights of monarchy and succession in this kingdom , sure they ought in the first place , to have inquired what was become of the king , where he was , and who forced him to go away ? and when they had known that , they ought then to have joyn'd in addressing to the prince , that since he had declared that he came not to conquer this nation , but only to free it from arbitrary government , and restore it to its just laws , that there could be no sure enjoyment of these without the king , therefore he would join with them in sending to him , to desire him to return to the government of these kingdoms , and to govern them according to law ; but instead of this they not only neglected taking any notice of the king , as if he were not at all in being , but have also refused to receive those gracious letters he sent them , in which he promised to amend all former errours , and to govern according to law ; which certainly deserved to be taken notice of , since coming from their lawful prince , they ought at least to have proposed some terms to him , before they had proceeded to that rash and unparallell'd vote , which i desire i may read to you , word for word , because i intend to examine every clause of it . resolved , that king james the ii. having endeavoured to subvere the constitution of this kingdom , by breaking the original contract , between king and people ; and by the advice of iesuits and other wicked persons , having violated the fundamental laws , and having withdrawn himself out of this kingdom , hath abdicated the government , and that the throne is thereby vacant . i shall make bold to consider each of these clauses , one alter another ; and therefore first pray take notice , that this vote of the two houses , cost above a weeks debate in the house of lords , which past in the house of commons in two or three days ; because divers of the lords , as well temporal , as spiritual , did with great honour , reason and resolution , oppose and protested against it to the last ; and it was carried at last by a very small majority : but that we may examine each clause in this vote ; first , it is here only said , that king james ii. endeavoured to subvert the constitution of this kingdom , not that he really did it , which is as much lower , than you are pleas'd to put it as endeavouring , a thing falls short of actually doing it ; and therefore it is very hard to declare a prince to have forfeited , or abdicated his kingdom , for bare designing and indeavouring , since those things that you bring to prove it , may bear a much more favourable interpretation , especially with subjects , who are no fit judges of the private designs of princes , which may oftentimes tend to quite other purposes , than what we suppose . as for the next clause , by breaking the original contract ; i have heard that divers of the lords and bishops , who were for the king against this new invention of an abdication , put the other side very hard to it , to make out this original contract , and desired them to shew in what part , either of our common or statute law it was to be found ; for they knew no such maxim in the common law , nor no such clause in any statute , aucient or modern . and though i confess , you have undertaken to prove to me , that there is such a thing ; yet it has been only by far-fetch't consequences , and from the old form of government among the saxons , of above years standing ; which i● there were any such thing , it is now become so antiquated , and out of date , that neither the king himself , nor yet our lords , bishops or judges , except some few lawyers of your kidney , ever before now , thought of any such thing . i pass by the next clause , by the advice of jesuits , &c because i cannot say , by whose advice those things which you call breaches of the fundamental laws were acted ; but as for the next , wherein the violation of these fundamental laws is lay'd to his charge , i confess you have given me a prety large catalogue of these fundamentals , at our th meeting , which yet you cannot say , are to be found together in any one law ; but are to be picked up here and there , out of magna charta , and divers other old statutes ; but since the king and parliament have declar'd in the first year of king iames i ▪ that there are such things as fundamental laws and priviledges ; i will not deny there are none ; yet certainly any breach of them by the king , was never intended to create a forfeiture of the crown ; for if it had , i think there would have been but few kings or queens of england , which would not have forfeited , who for some one or more of these breaches committed in their reigns , by the advice of their judges and councellors , as these were lately by the king ; for i suppose , you cannot expect that princes should see any otherwise in matters of government , than by other mens eyes , nor hear , but by other peoples ears : and therefore if the wilful breach of these fundamentals , must cause a forfeiture or abdication of government ( call it which you please ) methinks it had been reasonable for the parliament to have given a list of these fundamentals in some one law , that the king might have been sure to have avoided the transgressing of them ; and fear of losing both his royal dignity , and his penalty ought also to have been declared . but the next clause deserves more particular consideration , ( viz. ) and having withdrawn himself out of the kingdom , hath abdicated the government ; now i must confess , it is the first time that ever the kings going away , for fear of losing both his royal dignity , and his life , and that with a declar'd design and intention , to return again to the exercise of the government , when ever he might do it with safety , should be judged a wilful dessertion or abdication . i am sure , there is nothing in our common or statute laws , that can at all warrant this notion ; for common law , is nothing but ancient usage , and immemorial custom . now custom supposes presidents , and parallel cases : but it 's granted of all hands , that the crown of england was never judged to be abdicated , by the withdrawing of the prince , before now : and therefore it follows , by undeniable consequence , that this opinion can have no foundation in the common law ; because there is not so much as one ruled case to prove it by . but if we come to those presidents we have in our english history , i shall give you such of them as i can remember : we read in the reign of edward the d . that when he fled from the forces of his wife and son , who had seized the kingdom by force , the king being deserted by his souldiers and followers , indeavoured to get into the isle of lundy for safety ; but not being able to make it , was driven back , and taken in disguise at the abby of neath in wales ; ( as the king was lately at feversham ) now it is certain , that king edward went away , without appointing any governour of the realm in his absence , and if this notion of an abdication , had been then taken for law , the parliament needed not to have been put their to shifts , to find out so many other matters for which to depose him . the next is the like case , of king edward the th . who when the earl of warwick had raised a great army against him on a suddain , and forced him to fly , with a few followers to the duke of burgundy his brother in law , though henry the th . was again put into the throne ; yet was it not objected against king edward , that he had lost his title to it , or that it was become vacant , by his deserting it ; and if these two are not parallel cases , and do not reach the matter in hand , i desire you to shew me , wherein they differ from the present case of the king. but i am come now to the last clause of all , that the throne is thereby become vacant , which seeming only to refer to the clause of abdication : i think i have said enough already against that notion : therefore we will admit at present , for discourse sake , that the king had really abdicated the government , by deserting the kingdom , and thereby wholly lost his regal power . now according to the fundamental laws and customs of this realm , which is ( you know ) an hereditary monarchy , the eldest son , or other next heir , either male or female , immediately succeeds the king his father , or other predecessor , and that without any inter-regnum at all , so that the reign of the successor , immediately begins from the very moment the last king or queen deceases ; this being the setled law , i cannot see any one step the convention has made in their whole proceeding that can be justified by the fundamental laws of the land , or the laws of equity and justice ; for equity has no quirks in it , nor ever lies at a catch . reason is always just and generous , it never makes mens misfortunes an accusation , nor judges in favour of violence ; for indeed what can be more unrighteous ( though in the case of a private person ) than that any one should suffer , yet worse for being injured , and be barred his rights for the injuries of others ? if a man should forfeit his house to those who set it on fire , only because he quitted it without giving some formal directions to the servants ; or be obliged to lose his estate for endeavouring to preserve his life ; i believe it would be thought a strange piece of justice in any law whatever ; and if this be proved illegal , the title of your present king and queen being wholly founded upon the validity of this vote , will prove so likewise . f. well , you have made a pretty long discourse in defence of king iames's actions , as well as his late desertion , and i have heard you patiently , because i grant you have collected together a great deal of matter in few words ; and i think all that can be justly urged in your kings defence ; i shall therefore begin with the first false step that you say the convention made , in not inquiring after the causes of the kings departure , whither he was gone , and their not voting of an address to the prince , to desire his return ; as for the first of these , they were not at all obliged to do it , since a great many of the peers and bishops , who were then in town , very well knew the causes of the kings departure , and that he either went a way voluntarily , or at least without any other necessity than what he had brought upon himself , by his own evil government , or the ill council of others , which may be easily proved by several circumstances ; for it is very well known , that above a formight before the king went away , the lord d — and mr. brent did not stick to declare that it was necessary that the king should withdraw himself ; so that it is plain the popish faction knew of it long before it was done , and that it proceeded wholly from their advice appears further , by a letter to the king , when he was at salisbury , which can be yet produced ; he was there told that it was the unanimous advice of all the catholicks at london , that he should come back from thence , and withdraw himself out of the kingdom , and leave us in confusion , assuring him , that within two years or less , we should be in such confusions , that he might return and have his ends of us . now if the king was pleased to take such a desperate counsellors advice , and thereupon to do all he could to quit the kingdom , the cause of his going is too evident , as well as his design of returning , to have his ends of us ( as they phrase it ) that is in plain english , to have both our religion , liberties , and properties wholly at his disposal ; nor in the next place needed they inquire where he was , for every one knew he was gone into france , to the greatest enemy of our religion and nation , as well as the princes ; and therefore it had been altogether unsafe and indiscreet for them to have joined in any address to the prince for his return ; for whilst he was in such hands , what hopes could we have of his returning to us with better ( but rather worse ) affections towards the church of england and this nation , than what he carried with him ? but you say they refus'd to receive his letters ▪ for my part i do not know that he ever sent any , at least to the house of commons . i heard indeed , that one of the kings ordinary servants , was at the door of the house with such a letter , but that he was so inconsiderable , that no body would receive the letter , or make any mention of it in the house : and it was very strange , that the king should have never a friend there , who had so much courage and kindness for him , as would take the letter and move for the reading of it , though he had run the risque of being committed for his pains ; so that the house of commons is not to be blamed for not receiving a letter which was never offer'd them ; but as for the house of lord● , i have been told it was moved to be read there , but it was carried in the negative , because it was not brought by a person of sufficient quality and credit ; and therefore it was the kings fault if he would imploy such mean persons in a matter of that great moment , and indeed if we may give credit to those copies of these letters which i have seen , they retain'd rather a justification of his past actions , than an acknowledgement of those violations he had committed upon our laws , for as to his promising to govern by law , there is nothing in that , for he never yet own'd that he govern'd otherwise ; 't is true , there is in one of those letters , an expression of his amending past errours ; but those are general words , and may mean such errours , as he had committed in the ill management of his designs , which he would have mended , when ever he was to do the like things again ; this may very well be the true sence of a letter , it i● very likely written , with the equivocation of the jesuits and french advice of a cabal . but you would have him sent for to return upon certain terms ; i wonder you should be so undutiful , as to urge it , since if he is an absolute king , without any conditions what ever , he ought certainly to be restored , as king charles , the second was , without any terms or conditions at all ; and rather so , than with them , since he cannot give us greater assurances for his keeping them , than he has already broke , unless you can suppose , he would give us the guarranty of the pope and the king of france for their performance ; the former of whom believes , that there is no faith to be kept with hereticks ; and for the latter , supposing the king and him to pass his word , for the performance of these conditions , pray consider whether the bond of two bankrupts , can ever pass for a good security ; and so much for the letters and address . i come now in the next place , to consider your exceptions against that fundamental vote of the house of commons , concerning king iames's abdication of the government , and thereupon declaring the throne vacant : to begin with your first exception , i think it is a very small one , that because this vote declares the king to have endeavour'd to subvert the constitution of this kingdom ; that it was very unjust , to declare him to have abdicated the government for a bare endeavour , because we are ignorant of the true ends of the actions of princes ; to which i answer , that in this case , a bare endeavour ought to be sufficient ; if it be so evident , that there can be no dispute about it ; for if he had once actually subverted it , the two houses could never have met to have made this vote ; and if in the case of kings , the very bar● design or endeavour to destroy them be sufficient , though it be never reduced into act ; i cannot see why by the same rule the endeavours of kings to destroy the fundamental constitution of a mixt or limited kingdom should not have the like construction in respect of them ; since according to the maxime you but now cited , ( and which i have sufficiently justified ) that in all such governments , the safety and preservation of the people ( that is , of the government they have established ) is to be preferr'd before that of the king alone , when acting in a direct opposition thereunto , or otherwise , it would be in the kings power to destroy the constitution whenever he pleas'd , since according to your doctrine , the bare endeavouring it would be nothing ; and after he had once brought it to pass , it would be then too late to retrieve it . but that the king did really endeavour thus to subvert the fundamental constitution , appears not only by his closeting and threatning members to turn them out of their places , if they would not submit to his will in taking off the penal laws about religion , whereby all freedom of voting would have been quite taken away ; but when the king saw this would not do , he then fell a new modelling of corporations , and by bringing quo warranto's against their charters , to get it into his own power to nominate , or approve of all mayors , aldermen , and common council men , who in those corporations having the sole elections of parliament men , he would thereby have had the naming of them also in his power : your next exception is against their declaring him to have broke the original contract between the king and the people , for that you are not yet persuaded there was any such thing , because we cannot shew it you in any common law or statute book , written in express words , as for the statute law , i grant that there is no such express contract to be found in any statute ; yet doth it not therefore follow , that there is no such contract by the antient common law of the kingdom . now that our fundamental laws are not all to be found in writing is no wonder ; since it is a maxime of our common law , that it was not a law , because it was written , but it was written because it was a law , for it was a law when it was only in the breast and heads of the king and people of this nation , without any writing at all ; and you your self must grant , that if the hereditary succession to the crown , be a fundamental constitution , it is notwithstanding no where to be found in writings as i know of , but the contrary asserted by divers acts of parliament ; but that there is such a thing as an original contract , i shall prove from such a necessary consequence as i think cannot be denied ; for as that statute of king iames. i. sets forth ( which i have now cited ) and your self have already acknowledged , there are such things as fundamental laws , ( that is , laws that are as antient as the constitution of the government ) there must have been also an implicit fundamental covenant or contract on the kings part , that he would maintain them , without any violation , and this is that we mean by an original contract ; and if it were not so , it had been the most foolish and unreasonable thing in the world to require every king to swear before he was crown'd , that he would maintain the rights of the church , and the antient laws and customs of the kingdom ; and that this was antiently looked upon as a renewal of this original contract appears by all our antient historians , who till the reign of king ed. i. never give the next heir the title of king , but of duke of normandy , till he was actually crown'd , and had taken his coronation oath : and for this i desire you would consult all our antient histo●ians since your conquest , beginning with ingu●● and eadmerus , ending with thom. walsingham . but as for your exception against his violating of the fundamental laws is yet more trivial , for you cannot deny that there are such things , and if so , surely a king may violate them , if he pleases ; and therefore your excuse for the kings breach of them , because they are not to be found together in any one place , but are to be pick'd up here and there from magna charta , and other statutes , makes nothing against the validity or the possibility of his knowing them ; for as before they were reduced to writing by those statutes ( which only declare and confirm the antient common laws , and liberties of england ) they existed ( as i said but now ) in the heads and hearts of the king and people : so when divers kings of england by their tyrannical and illegal practices had made divers violations of these fundamental rights and priviledges there then grew a necessity of new granting and confirming those liberties , and consequently of reducing them into writing , which there was not before , and that is the true reason why magna charta , and other statutes , made in the time of henry the iii. ed. the i. and divers others of their successors were made , either for their explanation , or ratification , according as occasion requir'd ; and as several princes , had more or less violated these fundamental laws of the government , for before they had so done , there was no need of the parliaments making , or declaring any law about it . but if the king would have but read and considered the articles exhibited in parliament against edward and richard the ii. he might easily have seen the laws altogether , that will make a prince to be declared by his subjects to have forfeited his crown . but that king iames had before his desertion endeavour'd to extirpate the protestant religion , the laws , and liberties of the nation , appears by those several articles , the convention has given us in their late declaration , which they presented to king william upon their declaring him and his princess , k. and queen of england , to which i shall refer you , since it is commonly to be had ; you know it consists in the recital of divers things , the violation of which has been always counted in all kings reigns a breach of the original contract . i come now to the last clause save one you except against , viz. that having withdrawn himself out of the kingdom , hath abdicated the government . now your main argument against it is , that the kings desertion of the government being only for fear of his life , or of being depos'd from his royal dignity , could not by his going away be said to abdicate , or renounce the crown , since he went away with an intention to return , and repossess it as soon as with safety he might ; to which before i make any answer , i must freely own , that were this the case as you have put it , i think there would be no great dispute in it ; since i grant that a king who is thus forc'd to fly for fear of his life ought not to have any such injustice put upon him ; but if you please better to consider it , the case was quite otherwise ; for i have already proved that when king iames i. went away , he had then an army about him , was free , and in his own pallace , and was at that time in actual treaty with the prince ; nor had london , nor any considerable strong place in england then surrender'd it self to the prince ; so that if there was any necessity for his departure , but what he had brought upon himself by his refusing to call a parliament , burning the writs , and sending away the queen and child , together with the main instrument of government , the great seal of england ; this must certainly be looked upon as a wilful forfeiture or abdication of the government ; and it is from this first going away , that i suppose that the convention dates his abdication , since though it is true , after his return to london he took upon him to make an order in council to stop the further pulling down and plundering popish chappels , and papists houses ; yet was it sign'd by very few of the council , and almost only by those who had been in some office or place of trust ; so that though he was then own'd by them ; yet since that order did only serve to shew his zeal for the popish party , and was never obey'd or taken notice of by those to whom it was directed ; and that neither the prince nor the city of london owned him afterwards ; since it had already delivered it self up to the prince , and had as well as the peers invited him to repair to that city ; i cannot see that so slight an act as this order of council , should be counted a return to , or a re-establishment in the throne ; since the king had not only lost the crown by his wilful departure , without calling a parliament , or giving the p. any satisfaction in the great business of the pretended prince of wales , or the nation by repairing up those desperate breaches he had made upon our fundamental laws , but had also lost his title to the crown , by being conquer'd by the prince in open war , as i shall prove more at large another time ; so that if you please better to consider this vote of the convention , you will find , that these words had abdicated the government , do not only refer to the last clause of his having withdrawn himself out of the kingdom , but to everyone of the foregoing clauses , ( viz. ) his having endeavour'd to subvert the constitution of this kingdom ; his breaking the original contract , and his having violated the fundamental laws ; so that it is plain their notion of abdication was not fixt only in the kings desertion , or bare withdrawing himself out of the kingdom , but from his renouncing the legal title , by which he held the crown ; and setting himself up as a despotick soveraign , and ruling by a mercenary army ; and therefore all that you have said about the kings quitting the government with a design to return to it again , as soon as with safety he might , is altogether vain ; for as he went away , because he would not govern any longer as a king by law ; so hath he yet given us no satisfaction that he would not return again to govern otherwise , or rather worse than he did before , had he an opportunity so to do , that is ( as the letter i cited but now , phrases i● ) to return , and have his ends of us ; so that this being indeed the case , i think i can very well justifie the last clause in this vote , that the throne was thereby vacant . m. sir , you have spoke a considerable time , and i doubt more than i can distinctly remember to answer as i should ; therefore before you proceed to this last clause of the vacancy of the throne , the dispute about which i foresee may hold longer than upon any of the former ; pray give me leave to reply to what you have already said in justification of all the other parts of this vote ; in the first place i will not deny , but that if the king had once got the power of making what mayors , aldermen , and other officers in corporations at his pleasure , it would have gone a great way towards the making the majority of the parliament-men ; nay , i likewise grant that by his dispensing power , he might have made what papists or other person he pleased sheriffs in any county , who would have made such return of knights of shires as he should have thought fit : yet i suppose this would not have been to the subversion of the constitution of the kingdom , which i think i have proved to consist originally in the k. alone , before any great councils or parliaments were instituted . and as for those violations of the fundamental laws and liberties of this kingdom , the declaration instances in ; i think several of them may very well be justified by antient presidents , and ad judged cases in law ; and therefore were so far from being violations , that they are no more than the kings exercising of his due prerogative ; and though at our ninth meeting , i had not time so well to consider these matters , as also because i was not then prepared to defend the kings proceedings ; i shall therefore make bold to examine the most considerable of those articles , which the late declaration supposes did so highly tend to subvert the protestant religion , and the laws and liberties of this kingdom . i shall begin with the first , ( viz. ) his assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with , and suspending of laws , and the execution of laws , without consent of parliament ; which power , let me tell you by the way , was not asserted to dispence with all laws or statutes whatsoever , but only such as the subject has no particular cause of action in ; and where the damage that may arise by it doth not concerns , the publick safety of which the k. is sole judge , and not any particular mans interest . i suppose you cannot but have read , that learned and short account of the authorities in law , upon which judgment was given in sir edw. hales his case written by sir edward herbert , lord chief justice of the common pleas , in vindication of himself , wherein i think he proves beyond any possibility of a just answer , that the dispensation granted to sir edward hales to receive a commission , and act as a collonel of foot was good , notwithstanding his not having received the sacrament , and taken the oaths and test , appointed by the act of the statute of the of charles ii. where he first proves from my l. cock's authority , that it belongs to the kings prerogative to dispence with all positive , or penal laws ; the penalty thereof is only popular and given to the king ; and to shew you that my lord cook ( who was never counted any great friend to the kings prerogative ) was not single in this opinion ; he gives you also the authority of the year book of henry the vii . where it was own'd by all the judges , that the king can dispence with all things which are only mala prohibita , and not mala ●n se , though expresly forbid by act of parliament , for though ( says the year book ) before the statute , coining of money was lawful , but now it is not so , yet the king can dispence with it ; so that , say i , if he can dispence with that which is now made treason by eà . the iii. he may certainly dispence with all other penal statutes of a less nature . but because i grant there is some difference between common penal laws , which barely prohibit the doing of some things , under a penalty ; and this act , in which there is also an express clause of non-obstante , that all licences or dispensations contrary to this act , are declared absolutely void , yet the said lord chief justice likewise proves , that this clause of non-obstante is void , and he makes this out not only from constant practice in other statutes of like nature , but also from the opinions of plowden , and the said lord cook ; first as to the statutes , there is a statute of the . of henry the vi. that no man shall be sheriff for above a year . . that all letters patents , made for years or lives shall be void , . that no non-obstante shall make them good , ( which shews that the parliament thought the king could otherwise have dispenc'd with this act by a non obstante ) there is likewise in this act a penalty of l. and the party is also disabled from bearing the office of sheriff in any county of england ; and also every pardon for such offence shall be void ; so that in all respects this statute answers that of king charles the ii. now in dispute , only in this the penalty to the prosecutor is higher , viz. l. and the disability is not only from holding that office , but any other whatsoever for the future . and yet it was resolved by all the judges of england in the second of henry the vii . in the exchequer chamber , upon the kings power of dispensing with this statute of the . of henry the vi. that the kings dispensation with that statute was good : and so it hath been held ever since , for it is very well known that the king hath not only exercised this prerogative of dispensing with this statute , for divers sheriffs holding more than a year , but hath also granted this office for life , a● appears by the same case cited by plowden ( in his commentaries ) between grendon , and the bishop of lincoln , where he expresly says , that notwithstanding this statute of henry the vi. the kings grant to the earl of northumberland , to be sheriff during life , ought to have a clause of non-obstante , because of the precise words of the statute before mentioned : and with such a clause of non-obstante the patent to the earl was good . but yet my lord cook is more express in his opinion concerning these dispensations , for in his twelfth report he has these words ; no act can bind the king from any prerogative , which is sole and inseparable to his person , but that he may dispence with it by a non-obstante , as a sovereign power to command any of his subjects to serve him for the publick weal ; and this solely and inseparably is annext to his person ; and this royal power cannot be restrained by any act of parliament , neither in thes● , nor in hypothesi , but that the king by his royal prerogative may dispence with it ; for upon the commandment of the king , and obedience of the subject do's his government consist ; and therefore for this reason he allows this judgment of all the justices in england , in the second of henry the vii . to have been according to law , that judg'd the kings dispensation with this statute of henry the vi. to be good ; and he also instances in another statute , in the fourth of henry iv. in which it is ordain'd , that no welshman should be justice , chamberlain , &c. nor any other officer whatsoever , in any part of walts , notwithstanding any patent made to the contrary , with clause of non-obstante licet sit wallicus natus , and yet without question the king may grant those now offices to welshmen with a non obstante , and the said lord cook in calvin's case tells us , that the same was resolved by all the judges of england , ( viz. in . of hen. vii . ) that every subject is by his natural allegiance bound to serve and obey his sovereign , &c. and he then proceeds to recite the statute of the . of henry the vi. and the opinion of the judges above mentioned , and gives us this reason for it , for that the act could not barr the king of the service of his subject which the law of nature did give unto him ; this is there reported as the sense of all the judges of england in king iames his time ; and therefore since this has been ever the opinion of the judges , and a constant prerogative exercis'd by the king ever since ; i desire you would shew me any difference why the kings dispensation to a sheriff should be good for the holding of his office for above a year , norwithstanding the statute of henry the vi. and yet a dispensation for the taking or holding any office or command civil or military , without taking the oaths and tests , appointed by the . of charles the ii. should be declar'd a breach of our fundamental laws ; for i can see no manner of difference between them ; since their preambles set forth the designs of the law , much to the same purpose , ( viz. ) that of making the statute of henry the vi. is the insupportable damage of the king and his people , perjury , man-slaughter , and great oppression ; and in the statute of king charles the ii. the mischiefs recited are of a much less nature , ( viz. ) for preventing dangers which may happen from popish recusants , and quieting the minds of his majesties good subjects . so that the subject of neither of these acts being mala in se , but only mala prohibita , if the king might dispence with the one , he may certainly do as much with the other for the same reasons . therefore if this be so , i need not say much against the second article in the declaration of the convention against the kings proceedings , ( viz. ) his committing and prosecuting divers worthy prelates , for humbly petitioning to be excused from concurring to the said assumed power ; for if by the opinion of all or most part of the then judges , the kings power of dispensing with this statute of king charles the ii. was good , it was certainly much more lawful in dispensing with all other statutes against papists and non-conformists , since they are no more than bire penal statutes , without any clauses of non-obstante ; and though i grant that king charles's declaration giving a toleration to papists and dissenters , by dispensing with all the acts against masses and conventicles were declared illegal by the house of commons , in the year . and that the king , to get a good lump of money , did recal that declaration , yet was it never declared by him to be illegal ; only that it should not be drawn into consequence for the future ; and you know an address or declaration of the house of commons alone , was never looked upon as a declaration of parliament ; and the opinion of the judges hath ever been , that no statute or judgment of parliament can bar the king of his lawful prerogatives , ( of which this of dispensing with such penal laws is one ) so that it was certainly very undutifully done of the bishops not only to deny distributing his majesties late declaration for liberty of conscience in their several diocesses , but also to have the confidence to give him a petition , wherein they desir'd him not to insist upon the distribution and reading of it , because it was against law ; tho' admit it were , being no way contrary to the law of god , they ought to have obeyed it , since their bare distributing of it had not rendered it the more lawful ; so that it being a great misdemeanour in these bishops to deliver this petition ; their commitment and prosecution at law for the same was also legal , and what the privy council told his majesty he might well justifie ; so that if the king was too severe in this matter , they were to bear the blame , and not he . f. i cannot deny but you have given a just account of the main arguments made use of by the late lord chief justice merbert in defence of the kings dispensing power , and of giving his own opinion for it ; but i think notwithstanding all that gentleman has written in defence of it , that the kings declaration of indulgence , and his dispensation grounded thereupon , to be both of them void and contrary to law ; and for proof of this i shall first give you the opinion both of those divines and civilians , concerning this matter , as first sware● in his learned book de legibus , saith , that he hath the power of dispensing , qui legem tulit , quia ab ijus volontate & potentia pendat ; but vasques another learned spanish casuist holds , that no prince whatever hath a power to dispence with his laws according to his pleasure , or because that they are his laws ; nay , he also denies such an unlawful dispensation to be valid ; but to come to those of your own faculty , h. grotiu● saith expresly , dispensare , hoc est , lege solvere , le solus potest qui serendae abrogand●●que legis potestatem habet . pusendors affirms , that none can dispence with a law , but such as have the power of making it ; and the very reason of the thing sufficiently shews it , for to dispense is to take away the obligation of the law in respect of them to whom it is granted , and whoever takes it away , must have the power of laying it on ; and there is no difference between the dispensation of a law , and the abrogation of it ; but that a dispensation is an abrogation of it to particular persons , while others are under the force of it ; and an abrogation is a general dispensation , that being no more than a relaxation of the whole law to those persons who were bound by it before ; therefore if the king have not the whole legislative power of this kingdom ( as i think i have already proved he has not ) he neither can have the sole power of dispensing with laws . but to answer your main argument , that the constant practice hath been otherwise for the space of above years , and that confirm'd by the judgment and opinions of all the judges and most considerable lawyers in england ever since that time ; to answer this i say , it is necessary , that i give you a short history of this dispensing power , and the original of dispensations , with non obstantes , which are so far from being as old as your conquest , that the first news we hear of them , is from mat. paris , who expresly tells us , they were first introduced by the pope , and were afterwards inserted into the kings patents and protections , in imitation of them by king henry iii. so they were never made use of by any of our kings to ellude acts of parliament , till after the statute of mortmain , which was made in the seventh of edward i. which first attempt , must needs be illegal , because contrary to magna charta , ch . . which is the first law which prohibits alienations in mortmain , and was not only sworn to when enacted , but is also confirmed by many after acts of parliament , and ordered to be observed in all points , insomuch that when the clergy petitioned king edward i. for a relaxation of this statute of mortmain , his answer was , that he could not do it , because it was enacted , communi consilio magnatum suorum , & sine eorum consilio non erat revocandum ; and i grant that such was the misguided devotion of those times , that such non-obstantes were often obtained , as appears by the patent and charter rolls in the tower , from the eighth of edward the i. downwards , abounding with special licenses to purchase and hold lands , &c. statuto de terris & tenementis in manum mortuum non ponendis non obstante . and yet were not these licenses accounted legal , or the clergy safe in purchasing such lands , rents , advowsons , &c. by vertue of them , till it was enacted and ordained in parliament , in the eighth of ed. iii. to this effect , that if prelats or other religious people have purchased lands , and the same have put to mortmain , and be impeached upon the same before our justices , and they shew our charter of license , and process thereupon , by an inquest of ad quod damnum , or of our grace , or by fine , they shall be freely lest in peace , without being further impeached for the same purchase , &c. but non-obstantes with the statute of mortmain having been introduced , as afore-said , tho' undeniably illegal at first , and gaining afterwards a countenance from this act of parliament , have i suppose given occasion to the dispensing with other acts of parliament also , tho' at first they were very rare , and seldom occur in the old books , but are more frequent in the new ; and that our judges and courts of justice have invented little distinctions betwixt malum in se , and malum prohibitum , betwixt laws made pro bono publico , and laws of more private regard ; betwixt laws in which the king's profit and interest is concerned only , and laws in which the subjects have an interest , and are intituled to an action , as the party grieved ; yet the cases that have hitherto come before them judicially , have been questions upon dispensations granted to particular persons , to exempt them pro hic & nunc , from incurring the penalty of such and such a law ; but a dispensation and suspension of so many laws at a lump ( as the late declaration of indulgence did take upon it to do ) has been so far from receiving any countenance from courts of justice hitherto , that it has always been a fatal objection against any particular dispensation of it ; it was such as consequently eluded and frustrated the whole law , for that such a dispensation is in effect a repeal of the law it self . and therefore in that great case of thomas and sorrel , in the lord vaughan's reports , where dispensations with penal statutes are in some cases allowed : yet it was then agreed by all the judges , that the king had no power to suspend a law. but to let you see how jealous the parliament , and in particular the house of commons have ever been of trusting the king with an unlimited power of dispensing with penal statutes , with non-obstantes appears also by several other laws of great moment , and in particular from the statutes of provisors and praemunire ; and i could shew you from divers records of parliament , in the reign of richard ii. henry iv. and henry v. that they never intru●ed the crown with an absolute power of dispensing with those statutes but only for a time , as till the next parliament or longer , as they thought fit . but since i have not now so much time to give you so many presidents at length , i shall only tell you , that as to the main instance you relye upon , ( viz. ) the kings dispensing with the statute of sheriffs , that at first it was not taken for law appears by several acts of parliament , as in . of henry the vi. whereby those sheriffs that had held their offices for more than a year are pardon'd ; likewise in the act of edw. iv. there is a like statute pardoning those sheriffs , who by reason of the late troubles in the realm , had held for above a year , yet nevertheless confirms all former acts concerning sheriffs for the time to come ; and this held as far as the sixth of henry viii . which is long after the judgment you mention in the exchequer . chamber , of all the justices in england to the contrary ; for there was then an act made , which reciting all the former statutes about sheriffs as then in full force ; it enacts that the sheriffs , and under sheriffs of the city of bristol may continue to occupy their offices ; in like manner as the under sheriffs and other sheriffs officers in london do , without any penalty or forfeiture for the same , the said acts or any other acts to the contrary notwithstanding . from all which statutes i think it sufficiently appears , that neither the sheriffs of those times , nor the city of bristol , nor the whole parliament when that act was made , did believe the king had power to dispense with the act of the ▪ of henry the vi. concerning sheriffs , for if they had , certainly it had been much easier and cheaper for them to have obtain'd the kings dispensation , than to have got an act of parliament for it . m. i believe you may have cited these statutes right enough , but yet i think they are not sufficient proof against so solemn an opinion , as that of all the judges in the exchequer chamber d of henry the th . and whatever the parliament might have declared in the case of this , or that particular statute , i confess carries some authority with it , yet ought it not to be counterval'd by so solemn a judgment as that of all the judges and lawyers of england , together with the king 's constant exercise of this prerogative , not only since , but before that time , and that without any question or dispute with the parliament about it , as in the case i have already put of the statute that forbids any welchman , being an officer in wales ; to which i may add divers other cases of like nature ; such as the statute against a judges going the circuit in his own country ; as also those statutes that prohibit the king from granting pardons to persons convict , nay , condemned for murther , with several other penal statutes i could name , were , though the king's hands are tied up by particular clauses of non-obstante , yet has his majesty , and his predecessors at all times exercised their prerogative of dispensing in all those cases , notwithstanding those acts of parliament , with non-obstantes to the contrary : and though i grant you have given me several presidents of the parliaments sometimes restraining the king in this exercise of the dispensing power , yet they are all , or the greatest part of them , before the beginning of henry the vii th's reign , when i grant the law first began to be setled in this matter ; and since the judgment of all the judges in the exchequer chamber , is the only rule of law we can have in the intervals of parliament ; and that this case of dispensations being by them adjudged , and ever since setled and own'd for law , without the least dispute , i can see no reason we have to question it now . but as for the statute of the th of henry the viii . , which you urge as a president to the contrary , since the reign of henry the vii . i think it will not reach the point in question ; for the act you now cited , seems to me no more than a private act for the sheriffs of brestol alone , who being it seems afraid to rely upon the king's dispensations , because they thought them too chargeable to be taken out as often as they should have need of them , did think it a great deal less charge and trouble to pass an act of parliament to indemnify themselves ; which i grant , put that matter beyond all dispute : but since this act of henry the viii . i find no contest between the parliament and the king about his power of dispensing with penal laws , till the reign of king charles the ii. when i grant the house of commons did address to his majesty , that penal statutes in matters ecclesiastical , cannot be suspended but by act of parliament ; as also the last address of the house of commons in . against the king's dispensing with the officers of the army , their holding employments without taking the oaths and test according to the act , whereby they were appointed : but these being only against the king's power of dispensing with laws ecclesiastical , as concerning liberty of conscience , can no ways be extended to their excepting against the king's power of dispensing with divers other penal laws ( i will not say all ) which have non obstantes in them . f. since i see not only your opinion , but also that of most of the judges and lawyers of england , concerning this matter of the king's dispensations with penal laws has been chiefly ( if not only ) founded upon that opinion of all the judges in king henry vii . i me , give me leave to examine the validity of that judgment ; for if that can be proved not to have been according to law , or el●e never given at all , i suppose you must grant that my lord coke , and all others who have founded their opinions upon this adjudged cause of hen. the vii . were mistaken . now pray give me leave to argue a little with you in point of reason ; if a non obstante from the king , be good , when by act of parliament , a non-obstante is declar'd void , what doth an act of parliament signifie in such a case ? must we say it is a void clause ? but then to what purpose was it put in ? did the lords and commons , who drew this act of the d of henry the vi. as also those acts concerning sheriffs understand this clause of non-obstante to be void when they put it in ? if it were so , and contrary to the king's prerogative , why did the king pass this act without any refusal or protestation against it ? certainly it was then thought otherwise ; and if so , we have the authority of the two houses of parliament against the opinion of the judges . but if it were not a void clause then , how came it to be so afterwards ? pray say what alteration has been made in the laws of england by act of parliament , as to this point , since the time that these acts have been made ; for if not , how comes a clause that had force in henry vi. to have none in a henry vii . could the twelve judges in the exchequer chamber , by giving their opinions , destroy the force of an act of parliament ? m. i do not say they can , only i affirm with my lord coke , and all the judges , that no act can bind the king from any prerogative which is inseparable from his royal person ; but he may dispense with it by a new obstante , as a sovereign power to command any of his subjects to serve him for the publick-weal . nor can this royal power be restrain'd by any act of parliament : and upon this ground it is , that my lord coke in the th report ( from whence i have taken this conclusion ) maintains that such dispensations made by sheriffs , are good ; and upon the same ground , the dispensation lately granted by the king to sir edward hales , and all other popish officers and ministers , as well civil as military must be also good . f. but admit i shew you that there was never any such judgment in the exchequer chamber , in the of henry the vii . as my lord coke , and late lord chief-justice herbert supposes , will it not then follow , that all their arguments that are wholly founded upon this statute will fall to the ground ? m. yes , indeed that will be something ; but how will you prove that ? can you believe so many learned judges should be mistaken in this matter , and those of your opinion only should make this discovery ? f. i do not desire you should believe me , but your own eyes ; and therefore look upon the year book it self ; here you see that it is indeed so far true , that all the justices were of opinion , that the grant of the sheriffdom of the county of northumberland to the e. of that county for life was good , but do not tell us all the reasons whereon their judgment was grounded , tho it seems to have been because the sheriffdom of that county had been commonly granted for life , before this statute of henry the vi. was made ; as appears by these words in the year book iudgment ; for it is such a thing as may be well granted for term of life , or inheritance , as divers counties have sheriffs by inheritance , which began by the king 's grant ; then was shewn a resumption , ( i suppose it meant an act of resumption of the sheriffalty , ) as appears by the following words ; and then was shewn a proviso for it : count. de n. and if so , the king had a right to grant it only for life again : but none save radcliff ( one of the barons of the exchequer ) cites the statutes of the th . and d. of edw. the iii. against sheriffs holding for above a year , but doth not cite this statute of the d of hen. the vi. at all ; nor doth he , or any other of the judges , nor the court ground their opinion upon any non-obstantes express'd in the said acts ; for if you please to consult them , you will find there is no clause of non obstante in any of them , before the d of henry the vi. which is not at all mention'd here ; therefore i wonder how fitz herbert in his abridgment comes to vary so far from the year book , from whence he must have took it , as to make the judgment to have been grounded upon the non obstante in that statute of henry vi. for none but radcliff speaks any thing of the patents being good with a non-obstante to those statutes ; and the court in all the rest of the case , agree the patent to be good , by reason of the said proviso in an act of resumption , and then fall into debates concerning the other point , how this patent was to be understood . m. i must confess if this be so as it seems to be , prima facie , i wonder my lord coke , and other learned lawyers have laid so great a stress upon , and drawn so many arguments from this judgment of the judges ; tho i must needs also tell you , that tho only radcliff insists upon the non-obstante ; yet since the rest of the judges did not contradict him , it seems to me that they all concurr'd with him ; since according to the proverb ; silence often gives consent . but this much i suppose you cannot deny , but that ever since henry viii . time at least , sheriffs have been frequently continued for above a year , and the judges have been also dispenced with to go the circuit in their own county ; and welchmen have been commonly made judges and other officers in wales , by vertue of the king's dispensations , notwithstanding the particular clauses of non-obstante , in the statutes of richard the ii. henry the iv. and hen. the vi. by which they are expresly prohibited . f. i do not deny what you have now said , as to matter of fact ; only let me tell you i conceive , that the reason why the king has taken upon him to dispence with those statutes you mention ; was because that the causes for which they were first made , have long since ceased : for when those statutes against judges going the circuit in their own counties , and sheriffs holding for above a year were made , both the judges and sheriffs were found ( the one by going their circuits in their own counties , where they had great interest and acquaintance ) to have too much awed the common-juries ; and the other , ( by their great estates and commands in the country ) to have made partial returns of jurys , and also by their long continuance in their office , to have learnt a trade of oppressing the people ; so when by the stop that was put to those abuses , by these statutes ( you have mentioned ) there was no need of a strict observation of these laws ; and also when after the civil wars between york and lancaster , and all things became setled under king henry the vii . ( who was of a welc●● family , there was then no more need of observing the statute of henry the iv. against welchmens beating offices , especially after the stat. of the th of henry the viii . when wal●s became incorporated with england , and had by that statute a right conferr'd upon it , of sending members to parliament , tho the parliament might not think fit , or at least forgot to repeal them ; and yet finding that the kingdom received no prejudice , but rather benefit by such dispensations ; and not caring to quarrel with their kings , for sometimes using a prerogative by which they were rather benefited , than grieved ; those dispensations have ever since passed , without any complaint in parliament , which would certainly have been before this time , had they sound the same grievances and reasons to have still continued for the strict observance of those laws , as there were at first for the making of them ; tho if they will have my private opinion , i think it had been much better for avoiding all disputes between the king and parliament ; as also for preventing the evil use that has been made of those presidents , to advance the king's prerogative to what height he pleased , rather to have repeal'd all those obsolete statutes , than to have suffered them still to continue . but to let you see that the distinction of mala in se , and mala prohibita often fails , i think i can prove it to you by divers undeniable instances ; for there are divers things which are neither mala in se ; that is , neither natural , nor moral evils , either by common or statute law , and yet being declar'd common nusances , are only mala politica & introducta , and are no ways mala in se , which the king cannot dispense with at all , only because they are prohibited : thus the king cannot dispense with the least nusance to the high-ways , as by laying dung in them , or the like ; tho men may very well pass through them : so likewise by the statute of the th of king charles the ii. the bringing over of irish cattel , is declared a publick nusance , and therefore the king cannot dispense with it ; yet no man will say it was so before that statute was made ; and therefore it is very well observ'd by the late chief-justice vaughan , in that case of thomas and surrel i now mention'd , that publick nusances , are not mala in se , but mala politica & introducta ; and when a thing is said to be prohibited by the common law , the meaning is no more , but that the ancient record of such a prohibition is not to be found . m. i grant indeed the author you have now cited in that case , very well restrains the kings prerogative , as to things that concern the right or property of others , and therefore the king cannot pardon the damage done to particular persons , where the suit is only the king 's ; but for the benefit and safety of a third person , the king cannot dispence with the suit , but by consent and agreement of the party concerned . and again , penal laws , the breach whereof are to any man's particular damage , cannot be dispensed with ; and the chief-justice herbert himself owns , that the king cannot dispense with laws which vest the least right of property in any of his subjects . f. very well then , we see the prerogative is bounded where the interest of particular persons is concerned ; but doth the law take more care of them , than of the publick interest , and the concernment of the whole nation ? and this act against papists holding of employments was certainly made pro bono publico , to prevent the danger that may happen from popish recusants , who were before prohibited by divers statutes , to hold any offices or employments , before they had taken the oaths of supremacy and allegiance : therefore i cannot see how such a dispensation can be good , the breach whereof must tend so much to the danger of the common-wealth ; and if according to the rule you have laid down but now , that no law can be dispensed withal , that is for the benefit and safety of a third person , or where the breach thereof are to other mens particular damage . now whatsoever is prejudicial to the publick safety of the common wealth . must be also prejudicial to the safety of every private person , and the breach thereof does tend to each man's particular damage in the nation , if they are once generally dispensed with . m. i grant this is the most natural objection you have made , against the king's power of dispensing in this case ; but my lord chief-justice vaughan in the case already cited , answers this objection very well ; no offence , says he , against a penal law could be dispensed with , if the reason of not dispensing were because the offence is contra bonum publicum ; for all offences against penal laws , are such ; and tho such laws are pro bono publico , they are not laws pro bono singulorum populi ( which are the laws which the king cannot dispence with ) but pro bono populi complicati , as the king in his discretion shall think fit to order them for the good of the whole . in this nation the estate of every pater-●amilius may be said to be pro bono communi of his family , which yet is but at his discretion and management of it , and they have no interest in it , tho they have benefit by it . and therefore it is but reasonable , that as to the bonum publicum singulorum the king should not dispence , because every man hath a particular interest in , and they are judges of it themselves : whereas in those acts that are pro bono populi complicati , as these acts of sheriffs , and for taking the oaths and tell are , the king is the sole judge in what cases they concern the publick good of the common-wealth , and where they do not . f. i confess this is a subtle piece of learning ; but pray let us take it a little out of these latin terms , and then the meaning of it is no more than this , that the king can do nothing to the prejudice of the people in their private capacities , but he can do what he will with the publick . i thought indeed a prince had been , in the first place bound to regard the good of the publick , and to take care of the sa●us populi complicati , ( as you call it ) that is , ( as they are imbodied together ) above the private good or interest of particular men , which you call bonum singulorum populi , which can never be preserved but where the laws and statutes ordain'd for the publick benefit and security of the common wealth , have been generally broken and violated by common and easie dispensations , and have been abused to that degree , that we lately saw every popish lawyer that was thought any thing fit to be a judge , might sit upon the bench , upon the lives and estates of protestants ; every deputy lieutenant , justice of peace , or other officers , either civil or military , might be sure of being preferr'd , if he either was a papist or fanatick ; every minister or parson of a parish , who would renounce the orders of the church of england , might hold his living without doing any of the spiritual functions , and all this by vertue of these dispensations , grounded upon the distinction of the publick good of the whole people taken together , as different from that of the publick good of each particular person . but it seems strange to me that our ancestors should take such care of the laws concerning the measures of bread , drink , and flesh , as that the king cannot dispence with them , because they respect the common good of the whole people , and of every particular person ; but yet as to the laws which concern the publick good of the whole nation in general , they were content to leave them to the sole will and pleasure of their prince . no one that reads the history of our ancestors , and the contest they had with their kings to obtain these publick liberties , could ever entertain such a thought concerning them ; but to let you see , that the law concerning the oaths and tests , are not only for the publick good of the common wealth ; and that the king is not the sole judge when they may be dispenced with , appears plainly by this , that the law for taking of the oaths and test , has given every particular person a right to prosecute any one that hath acted contrary to it , and the penalty of l. is given wholly to the prosecutor , which shews plainly , that the intent of the law , was to make it every mans particular care as well as benefit to see it observed . m. since it grows late , i shall not further dispute this point with you , of the kings dispensing power , though i had a great deal more to urge in defence of it ; for notwithstanding all you have said against it , it is now counted so inherent a prerogative , and in many cases so necessary for the benefit of the subject , that the convention it self , after a great deal of dispute about it , though they had condemn'd the king for assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with , and suspending of laws without consent of parliament : yet in this very declaration , when they assert their antient rights and liberties , they only declare , that the pretended power of dispensing with laws , or the execution of laws , by regal authority , as it hath been assumed and exercised of late is illegal ; which shews that they do not go so high as you , who seem to be absolutely against any such thing . f. you very much mistake me if you say so ; for though i maintain that antiently , till about the middle of the reign of king henry the iii. there were no dispensations at all , either because they were not thought necessary , or else that penal laws were not then multiplied to that degree they have been since ; yet since they have been now so long in use , and do ( i grant ) often tend not only for the benefit of the king , but also of the subject , i do no way 's condemn them , provided they are restrain'd within those due limits prescribed by the lite chief justice vaughan in the case above mentioned ; and when they do not tend to the common mischief and ruine of the protestant religion establish● by law , and the rights and liberties of the subject ; nay , i grant in times of necessity , as in the coming over of the duke of monmouth , ( for example ) the king might justifie the granting commissions to popish officers , and therefore the parliament did very well to offer the king to prepare an act to indemnifie them from the penalties they had incurr'd by acting without taking the test ; so that when the king utterly refused this reasonable proposition , and chose to dissolve the parliament rather than he would permit them in the least to question on this usurpt power , what could be farther expected , than that he was resolved to execute it whether the parliament would or not , as we afterwards sound he did . but admitting he really had been indued with this prerogative , yet was it still under a trust , not to abuse it , so notoriously as he did , by granting it to every apostate person , officer , or judge that required it ; and i doubt not but if he had govern'd a little longer , but we might have found it granted to bishops , likewise , as soon as he had thought fit to make them of his own religion ; for tho' the king ( for example ) has an undoubted prerogative of pardoning robbers , and highway-men , yet if he should so far abuse his prerogative as to pardon every robber that was taken , i leave it to you to consider , whether such a government could long subsist ; i shall not apply this case to these dispensations , because they say comparisons are odious . these things being apparent , i think it would be very easie to vindicate that clause in the declaration concerning the bishops ; for if the kings declaration was unlawful ( as certainly it was ) not only by reason of the dispensing power , ( we have been now disputing about ) but also for one main clause in it , which i have yet but lightly touched , which is this ; we do likewise declare , it is our royal will and pleasure , that from henceforth the execution of all and all manner of penal laws in matters ecclesiastical , for not coming to church , or not receiving the sacrament , or for any other non-conformity to the religion establisht , or for , or by reason of the exercise of religion , in any manner whatsoever , be immediately suspended , and the farther execution of the said penal laws , and every of them is hereby suspended . so that by this clause in the declaration , not only the laws of our reformation , but all the laws for the preservation of the christian religion in general were suspended , and become of no force , since every man might not only chuse whether he would come to church or not , but also all priests and ministers were hereby indemnified from either praying or preaching in the churches , as well as their parishioners freed from hearing them ; so that not only all the laws of our reformation were at once suspended , but those of christianity it self by these words ( or for , or by reason of the exercise of religion in any manner whatsoever ) nor is it confined to the christian religion , but all other religions ( even mahometanism it self ) were thereby permitted . but perhaps it may be urged , that the execution of the law is only hereby suspended , and not the law it self , which is a meer evasion ; for what is the external obligation of any law but it's execution in order to obedience ? which if it be once taken off there can only then remain the naked internal obligation in foro conscientiae , and with how sew this is of any weight you understand so well , i need not tell you . so that by this declaration ●he king took upon him to suspend above forty statutes at once concerning our religion ; and if he could do so , i desire to know whether he might not the next week have suspended forty more , even concerning our civil properties likewise ; and so might have proceeded till he had suspended all the laws in the statute book ; nor are those laws suspended for any limited time , but during the kihgs pleasure ; and this not only a bare suspension for a time , but in effect a down right abrogation of them ; for what is an abrogation of a law , but the taking away the force of these statutes , without any time limited ? and if this be not to usurp the sole legislative power , i know not what is ; and if this were once commonly put in practise , parliaments would signifie nothing , and the legislature would be wholly in the king ; this was so evident , that it was granted by one of the judges at the trial of these bishops . if therefore this were the truth of the case , i cannot see wherein the bishops that presented this petition to his majesty acted at all undutifully towards him , as you suppose : for being by the king's order in council , commanded to distribute this declaration to their inferior clergy , which they knew in it self to be unlawful , their distribution of it would not only have been looked upon as the owning of an unlawful thing , but would also have drawn the inferior clergy into the same snare ; who if it were unlawful , ought not to have published to their parishioners a licence to act directly contrary to law ; and therefore the bishops were not only under an obligation of that dreadful charge and imprecation express'd in the statute of uniformity , in the first of q. elizabeth , if they did not endeavour the utmost execution thereof , through all their diocesses and charges ; but being also pressed upon to distribute it contrary to their consciences , what could they do less in order to excuse themselves from this unlawful command , than privately to tell the k. the reason of their disobedience ? and also humbly to petition him not farther to insist upon it , either in respect of themselves , or their inferior clergy ? and you know that it was allow'd by your civil-law , for any judge , or prator , rescribere principi , if he were by him commanded to act contrary to any former law or edict of the emperor . m. i will not deny that , but yet methinks the bishops in this case would have acted more respectively and discreetly , if they had forbore petitioning ; and though they had refused to obey the kings declaration , yet needed they not to have declar'd against it till the parliament met ; when i grant they might have freely and safely done it : or else if they would have petitioned at all , it should have been in more dutiful and respectful terms , than by telling the king , that his declaration was illegal , and that they could not in prudence , honour or conscience , so far make themselves parties to it , as to distribute it ; and it was this alone which was looked upon as seditious , and for which his majesty thought fit to have them indicted in the kings bench , as a matter of high misdemeanour . f. i confess you have said in short the sum of what was urged against them by the kings council at their trial , but all this was very well answered by one of the judges themselves ; first , that it would have been too late to have stayed for a parliament , because the declaration was to have been distributed by such a time , neither could they have acquies●d under it and submitted , for that would have been to run into contempt of the kings command , unless they had also shewn the reasons why they could not obey him ; and since this could be done no other way than by address or petition , what other reasons could they give , but that they thought it had been more than once declar'd illegal in parliament ; and therefore that they could not in prudence , honour , and conscience obey it ; not in prudence , because they were liable to answer it in parliament , if they did ; not in honour , because it is unworthy the character of bishops and peers to act any thing that may make them look like flatterers , or time servers ; not in conscience , because of the imprecation they lay under by the act of queen elizabeth ; as also because no man can with a safe conscience give his approbation to that which is contrary to law. and therefore i must needs tell you , that it was very severely and unjustly done in the king to give up this petition ( which was deliver'd him with all the privacy imaginable ) to the privy council , in order to have the bishops prosecuted for it ; but which made a great deal more noise and heart-burning against his government , to commit them prisoners to the tower , and then to bring them to their tryal , and prosecute them with the utmost rigour ; where tho they escaped punishment , yet was it no thanks to the prosecutors , but to the directions of the judges , two of whom ( for their honour ) differ'd from the late lord chief-justice , and his popish companion , as also to the honesty of the jury , who found them not guilty . m. i cannot deny but you have given a pretty fair account of this matter , and i cannot but own , that it was one of the worst advis'd things that happen'd under the king's government ; but i cannot impute this to his majesty's innate disposition , which was wont to act with greater temper and moderation towards those who differ'd from him in judgment , and therefore must impute it wholly to the wicked instigations of father peters , and the other popish ministers . but as for divers other articles mention'd in the conventions declaration ; such as the issuing out , and causing to be executed a commission under the great seal , for erecting a court called , the court of commission for ecclesiastical affairs , and levying money for , and to the use of the crown by pretence of prerogative , for other time ; and in other manner than the same was granted by parliament , with all the rest of the articles in that declaration , relating to civil affairs ; since they are to be looked upon as the sole acts of the judges , and not of the king , they , and not he ought to suffer for th● illegality of them ; since as you your self have own'd , the king in his judicial capacity can do no wrong , that power being wholly committed to his judges ; and therefore it was very hardly , nay unjustly done , to lay this to his charge , which he is not to answer for ; so that if any thing have been done amiss in this kind , they and not he are to answer for it , and not to run such things up to a forfeiture or an abdication , as you and your covention have done . f. i need not say much more to this objection , because i have in great part answer'd it already , and prov'd that most of the things found fault withal , were the king 's own acts , as well as those of his ministers and judges ; for as to the commission for ecclesiastical affairs , which is directly contrary to the statute of king charles the i. which took away the court of high commission , as also to a clause inserted in the act of the th of charles the ii. wherein the act for taking away that court , is not only confirm'd , but also the erecting any other like court by commission , is expresly forbid ; this being the case , the fault of the issuing out of this commission cannot be laid upon the judges ; who though some of them acted in it , yet was it never formally brought before them to determine whether it was illegal , or not ; and no man can imagine , that unless the king had a passionate desire for this power , that he might thereby be able to suspend , deprive , and turn out whom he pleas'd of the bishops , and inferior clergy , with the heads and fellows of colledges , whom he should find irreconcil●able enemies to his religion , or obstinate in refusing to obey his illegal commands , as too plainly appear'd by the suspension of the bishop of london , the turning out of the president and fellows of magdalen colledge , and that prosecution that was lately order'd against all those bishops , and inferior clergy , who had refused to distribute , or read the king's declaration ; though i confess there was a stop put to this , upon re-calling this commission : immediately before the princes arrival . so likewise for the other article of levying money contrary to law , that was also without any opinion of the judges at all dema●ded about it , for the illegal collection of chimny money , by making cottages and ovens pay , that were exempted by the acts concerning it ; and also the illegal levying of excise , by making small-beer pay the duties of strong , were all of them acted and done by particular directions from the treasury , or by the private abuse of the farmers of the excise , without any opinion of the judges ; and of these orders his majesty could not chuse but be the author , or approver at least ; since 't is very well known he constantly sat● there when any great business was to b● transacted , and the lord treasurer , or commissioners of the treasury , would certainly never have presum'd to have issued out their orders in a case of so great moment , if they had not been very well satisfied that it was his majesty's express will and pleasure to have i● so . and i my self have now by me a copy of the then lord treasurers directions to the officers appointed for the levying of chimney-money ; commanding them to levy it upon all cottages and ovens whatsoever , which was done accordingly with the utmost rigour ; which though it was a very great oppression , yet since it chiefly concern'd the poor and ordinary sort of people , who had not purses to go to law with the king ; or else such gentlemen and others , who though they were forced to pay for their poor tenants , yet did they not think it worth their while to bring i● before the barons of the exchequer , where , as things then went , they could not expect to find much justice . i shall not insist upon the king 's taking the additional customs contrary to the act of parliament , by which they were granted to the late king charles only for life ; and though in his last sickness there was a contract for the new farming of them , by vertue of which , i grant the king might have justified the taking of them till the end of the farm ; yet since that contract never passed the seals during the king's life-time , it was certainly against law for the king to take them before they were re-granted by act of parliament ; i say , i shall not insist upon this ; since the parliament were so easy as to pass it by without declaring it to have been illegal ; only it sufficiently shows , that from the very beginning of the king's reign , he was resolv'd to govern arbitrarily , and to levy money upon the subject , whether the law gave him any authority to do it or not . but as to what you say concerning the judges being wholly in fault , for all the unjust and illegal proceedings exercis'd in their courts , and that the king was wholly faultless , i should be of your mind , had i not seen , that all those judges who would not agree to the dispensing power ( , and other illegal judgments i could name , ) were turn'd out , and others , either papists , or of less consciences than papists , were put in their places , which were not conferr'd for any longer time , than durante bene placito , and therefore no wonder if such men were absolute slaves to the king's will and pleasure . m. i had much more to say in defence of the king 's raising and keeping up a standing army , and his disarming protestants , in , and after the duke of monmouth's rebellion , which are laid to his charge as endeavours to destroy the rights and liberties of this kingdom . but since it grows late , i shall only now take notice of something which i forgot to insist upon , concerning your notion , of the king 's obdicating the crown by a wilful breach of the laws , which is quite different from the sense in which this word is taken in roman authors ; as also in our civil-laws ; for when cicero uses the expression , itaque tutela me abdicare togito . brison tells us his meaning was se nolle esse tutorem : but pompenius in his book de orig . iuris , gives us the true sense of this phrase ; abdicare se magistratu , est ante tempu● magistratum deponere : which plainly shows the romans had no notion of a tacit , or imply'd abdication of a charge or majestracy , without a man's express consent ; and therefore if the kings bare desertion of the kingdom was not an abdication of the throne ( as you your self are forced to grant ) i cannot imagine how the king's violation of the laws , or endeavouring to subvert the government ( both which you lay to his charge ) can properly be call'd an abdication of it ; so that indeed the king hath not abdicated the government , but your convention hath abdicated him ; and tho we often read in our civil-law , that a father might abdicare filium ; yet i never read , or can you show me any example , that a son might abdicate a father , or subjects their prince . f. you discourse upon a wrong ground ; for i never affirmed , that subjects had any authority to abdicate or depose their prince ; nor hath the convention assum'd any such power to themselves ; what they have done in this affair , hath not been authoritative , or as taking ●pon them to call the king to an account for his actions , or to depose him for his misgovernment , but only declarative , to pronounce and declare as the representatives of the whole nation , that by endeavouring to extirpate the protestant , religion , and to subvert the fundamental laws , and liberties of the kingdom , he had wilfully ( i do not say willingly ) abdicated the government , that is , renounced to govern this kingdom any longer as a lawful king , which i take to be a tacit , or imply'd abdication of it , as i have already proved ; and to shew you farther that even tully himself allows in our sense of an imply'd abdication , in his third philippicks , when he says thus concerning mark anthony , that for his offering a crown to caesar , eo●die-non modo ▪ consulatu , sed etiam libertate se ab●itavit , &c. where you see mark anthony is said to have abdioned the consulsh●p without any express renunciation of it ; for caesar might have continued him in it after he had been declar'd emperor . m. i grant your authority to be good , yet even in this sense this abdication of the consulship could only take its effect from anthony's ow● will , for offering a crown to caesar , if he did not expresly , yet he effectually renounced his consulship ; for had caesar accepted in he could no longer have been the consul of a popular state , but must thenceforth have acted by authority from caesar , or not at all : but then this would not have agreed with your no●on of a forfeiture , which always supposes a crime , and a depriving the party offending from his office , or dignity , whether he will or not ; so that if the convention have adjudged the king to have abdicated , they must suppose it to have been by his own consent , or not at all ; but if they suppos'd him to have forfeited , why did they not down right declare so , as well as the scotch convention had done , and then i could have ●old better what to have said to them , and have proved that only subjects and not kings are liable to forfeitu●e . f. i will not deny but that the word forfeited had been more proper than abdicated in this vote of the convention ; but yet i think i have sufficiently proved , that there is no great difference between a mans abdicating an estate by a wilful disposing of it otherwise than the law requires , and ● forfeiture of it , as i shewed you , that tenant for life aliening in fee , doth not only forfeit his estate to him in reversion , but is also an abdication of it , though perhaps he had reserved to himself a lease of the estate for years , and this is call'd a forfeiture of the estate , though he committed no other crime , than the wrong done to him in reversion , and therefore ( as i said before ) this forfeiture doth not always suppose any crime for which the party may be punished , otherwise than by the loss of the estate ; nor yet doth it suppose any superiour power in the party that takes it . but your exception against my authority from tully or mark anthony's imply'd abdication of the consulship without any express renunciation of it , is very ●rivolous ; for you your self own , that anthony did not expresly , but only effectually renounce the consulship , when he offered caesar the crown ; and if he did not do it expressly , then it seems anthony could renounce the consulship without ever intending it , by doing an act that in effect abrogated his own power ; and why king iames might not do so too with his crown , i desire you would shew me any sufficient 〈◊〉 : but that the convention did also look upon this abdicati●● of king iames as a forfeiture , appears plainly by their declaring the throne vacant● without troubling themselves to find out who was the next heir to be placed therein . but to conclude , there might be a very good reason why the convention did not think fit to make use of the word forfeiture , as the parliament of scotland have done in the like case ; for some of the most wary and prudent members of the house of common● , considering that this word forfeiture might prove of very hard digestion to a great part of the house , and also might give great offence to divers of the bishops and lords in the house of peers , they found out this word , abdicated is an expedi●●● to solve that difficulty , a●d which might not only express the kings wilful desertion of the government by his first departure , but also his renunciaton of it , upon those legal conditions he was to hold it ; 〈…〉 i have already observed the word abdicated in their vote refer , not only to his having withdrawn himself out of the kingdom , but to all the rest of the clauses foregoing , or else they would signifie nothing in that place , both the abdication , and the vacancy of the throne being grounded upon all of them alike , i should now proceed to your last exception against this vote of the conventions , ( viz ) that the throne is thereby vacant . but i see it is now very late , and therefore it is best to defer the farther discussing of that matter till ●●other opportunity , which i desire i may have as soon as you please . m. yea , and then we will also confides ▪ that part of the conventions declaration , whereby they resolve that the prince and princess of orange be declar'd k. and queen of england , &c. which if you can prove to me to be according to the laws of england , i will then acknowledge them to be lawful king and queen of england ; but till i am convinced of it , i must beg their pardons . f. well , i could wait on you again two or three days hence , and then i hope i shall make out those points as well or better than any i have done hitherto ; and in the mean time i am your humble servant . m. i pray do it better if you can , or else you will not very much edify me ; but however i wish you good night . finis . bibliotheca politica : or a discourse by way of dialogue , on these following questions ; i. whether the vote of the late convention , wherein they declared the throne to be vacant , can be justified from the ancient constitution , and customs of this kingdom . ii. whether the said convention declaring king william and queen mary to be lawful and rightful king and queen of england , may be justified by the said constitution . iii. whether the act passed in the said convention after it became a parliament , whereby roman catholick princes are debarred from succeeding to the crown , was according to law. collected out of the best authors , as well antient as modern . dialogue the twelfth . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms ; where also may be had the first , second , third , fourth , fifth , sixth , seventh , eighth , ninth , tenth , and eleventh dialogues . . authors most commonly used in this discourse , and how denoted in the margin . the succession of the crown discussed . s. d. dr. brady's exact history of the succession to the crown , b. h. s. an enquiry into the nature and obligation of legal rights , e.l.r. the preface to the reader . the ensuing discourse being upon so weighty a subject as their present majesties title to the crown , it is requisite that i give you some account of the method i have pursued , and what authors i have made use of for the proving of it . as to the former , since the main questions in this great affair are , whether the convention can be iustified in declaring the throne vacant , and then placing their present majesties thereon as the next heirs , it was necessary to shew from an exact history of the succession of the crown of england , that the late parliament whilst it was a convention , have done no more in this great affair , than what former parliaments or great councils have done ever since the time of king william i. on the like occasions ; when they have not only declared the throne vacant , but have also judged which of the royal family were fittest to fill it , and the persons so placed therein have been still taken for lawful kings , and as such have had true allegiance paid them by all the subjects during the time they continued possest of the royal power and dignity . as for the authors cited in this disquisition , i have made use of the antientest , and those who lived nearest the times in which the matters we treat of were transacted ; and therefore i have studiously forborn quoting any authors in latin or english who lived in more modern times , unless when there are no other to be had that treat of those affairs . but not to be partial to one opinion , i have faithfully recited all those authorities and arguments made use of by the author of the treatise , intituled , the hereditary succession discuss'd ; as also by the learned dr. brady , in his exact history of the succession of the crown ; wherein those authors endeavour to prove , that the crown of england is , and hath always been hereditary from the very beginning of our monarchy , notwithstanding the many and various breaches that have been made upon it : which authorities and arguments , whether they prove the matter in debate , i shall leave to your better iudgment ; but hope those gentlemen will not take it ill , if i cannot let all they write pass for clear demonstration ; and therefore have taken upon me to cite all those arguments and authorities that either have been , or ( as far as i know of ) may be made use of by those of the contrary opinion ; in the performance of which , if i have not dealt candidly with both parties in fairly representing the utmost that they had to say ; i shall be obliged , if any friend to truth will shew me my failings . but tho it is true , i have not gone higher in this history than the coming in of k. william i. yet i hope i may be excused looking farther back , for these reasons : first , because an examination of the succession before that time , would not only be tedious , ( by swelling this discourse to an unreasonable bulk ) but would also be superfluous ; since the gentleman whom i suppose freeman here argues against , makes k. william i. to have been an absolute conqueror , and to have altered all the former laws in the saxon times ; and if so , sure then those concerning the succession of the crown . and i desire them to shew me any reason , if he and his descendants held the kingdom as absolute monarchs by conquest , why they might not bequeath or make it over ( as is justifiable in patrimonial kingdoms ) to which of their sons , kindred , or relations they should think fit ? and if so , what will then become of this fundamental right of a lineal hereditary succession ? and besides all this , it is needless upon another account , since i have already proved in the tenth dialogue , from no less authority than k. alfred's will , that before the conquest , the crown was partly testamentary , and partly elective , sometimes wholly elective , as in k. edward the confessor ; and whoever doubts of this , i shall only desire them to read impartially dr. brady's above-mentioned history of the succession , and then i shall leave it to them to consider , whether he does not grant in effect what he takes upon him to confute ; viz. that there was no lineal descent of the crown known or setled in those times , but what was alterable by the testament of those kings . but since the rest of this discourse ( besides the enquiry into bare matter of fact ) is chiefly the applying those precedents i have here made use of to the case of their present majesties , i hope neither they nor any that wish well to their government , will resent it , if i have not gone in the common road of former writers , in supposing the titular prince of wales to be an impostor , without any other proof than those bare suspitions that have been publish'd in the printed pamphlets ; yet since however they may incline a man to doubt , they cannot make a child illegitimate whom his father and mother have hitherto bred up , and owned for theirs : and therefore i have rather chosen to suppose him at present to be the lawful son of king james and queen mary ; and yet that what the late convention have done in passing him by without taking any notice of his title , was all that they could or were obliged to do , his present circumstances considered . but , if it be here made out that king william and queen mary are lawful and rightful king and queen of this realm , no man can doubt whether allegiance may be sworn too them or not ; and perhaps there was no need of writing any thing farther ; yet since i find a great many of the clergy as well as laity of this nation , could not go higher than their swearing allegiance to them as king and queen de facto , and that even this has been violently opposed by the s●iff asserters of k. james's right , i have thought fit to add in the next discourse ( which i promise shall be the last on this subject ) all that hath been said pro and 〈◊〉 upon that question , and to make it of the same bulk with the rest , i have , for the satisfaction of those of the church of england , as well as royal interest , endeavour'd to shew the great difference between this late revolution , and that fatal civil war , that ended with the deposition and murder of king charles the first . these two questions , together with an index to all the dialogues , being dispatch'd , ( as i hope they will be shortly ) shall be the last i shall trouble the world with upon these subjects ; since i know nothing more that can be well added to what i shall there set down . the twelfth dialogue between mr. meanwell a civilian , and mr. freeman a gentleman . m. i am glad , sir , you are come , for i was wishing for you ; pray sit down , and let us begin where we left off ; you may remember you promised me when we last parted , that the next time i saw you , you would make out to me from undeniable proofs and precedents from our antient histories and laws , that the present convention had done nothing in voting the throne vacant , and then placing the prince and princess of orange therein , but what may be justified by the fundamental laws and constitutions of the kingdom ; for i must still believe ( till i am better instructed ) that there can be no inter regnum in england , but that it hath been from the first institution of the government an hereditary monarchy , where the next heir by right of blood ( unless in some manifest usurpations ) has always succeeded to the last predecessor ; as also our best lawyers with one consent maintain in their books of reports , and the learned finch in his description of the common law lays it down as an undoubted maxim , that the king never dies , and therefore it seems altogether new and unheard of before ; for the convention thus to declare the throne vacant ; for admitting that king iames had ( never so ) justly forfeited or abdicated the kingdom ( term it which you please ) yet certainly there could be no vacancy of the throne , since the next heir by blood ought immediately to have been declared king , or queen , and so placed therein ; whereas we heard in the countrey , that there was almost ten days time before the lords and commons could agree whether the crown should be declar'd vacant , or not ; and when it was so declar'd , it took up almost a weeks time more , before they could agree who should be placed therein ; whereas it was a difficulty only of their own making ; for sure the prince of wales ( though it is true he is carried out of england ) ought to have been immediately declar'd king , as was done in the case of edward the d. who was so declar'd upon the deposition or resignation of king edward the d. f. though i grant ever since the crown has been claim'd by descent , the law has gone as you have cited it ; and that finches law lays it down for a maxim , i shall not deny ; but that from the beginning or original of kingly government , whether ( we look before or after you conquest ) it will appear , that the throne was often vacant , till such time as the common council of the kingdom had agreed who should fill it ; and to shew you i do not speak without good authority , pray tell me ( if this maxim had then obtain'd , ) why after the death of william the first , his eldest son robert duke of normandy , did not immediately take upon him the title of king of england , or at least had done it after the death of william rufus ? who , you know , was placed on the throne , ●not by right of inheritance , but by his fathers testament confirm'd , and approv'd of ( according to the antient english-saxon custom of succession ) by the common consent of the great council of the whole kingdom ; and yet notwithstanding after the death of this william , henry his younger brother succeeded him by the free election and consent of the same common council , and yet that duke robert should never in all his life-time take upon him the title of king ? pray tell me likewise ( if this maxim had been then known ) why maud the empress , immediately upon the death of her father king henry the first , did not take , ( nor yet her husband the duke of anjou in her right ) the title of king and queen of england , though she had had homage paid her , and fealty sworn to her in the life-time of her father , as the immediate successor to the crown , and yet notwithstanding the utmost title she could assume was that of domina anglorum , lady or mistress ( not queen ) of the english ; whilst stephen , who had no other title , but the election of the great council of the nation held both the crown and title of king as long as he lived ? as also why arthur duke of britain , who according to the now received rules of succession , was the next heir to the crown upon the death of king richard the first , never took upon him the title of king , unless it were , that he very well knew that his uncle king iohn had been placed in the throne by the common consent and election of the great council of the kingdom ? so likewise after the death of king iohn , why henry his son was not immediately proclaim'd king , till such time as the great council of the clergy , nobility and people had met and agreed to send back prince lewis , whom they had chosen for their king , ( though not being crowned , he never took upon himself that title ) and so chose henry the third ( then an infant ) for their king ? lastly , why all these princes , viz. henry the second , richard the first , and henry the third ; who according to your notions were undoubted heirs of the crown , never took upon them the title of kings of england , nor are so stiled by any of our historians , till after their elections and coronations , if it had not been then received for law , that it was the election of the people and coronation subsequent thereunto , that made them kings , and till this was performed ( though they might look upon themselves as never so lawful successors ) the throne was notwithstanding esteem'd in law vacant ? therefore as for your i●stance of king edward the third 's immediately succeeding upon the resignation of his father ( if you please better to consider of it ) that makes against you ; for it is plain from th. walsingham , and h. de knyghton , that prince edward succeeded not to the crown by succession , but the election of the great ▪ council , or parliament ; the words are express , huic electioni universus populus consensit ; and this was also owned by edward the second himself , who when the commissioners of all the estates of parliament came in all their names to renounce their homage to him ; yet in the midst of all his sorrow he gave them thanks , quod filium suum edwardum post se regnaturum eligissent ; which plainly shews , that the parliament had then such a notion of a forfeiture proceeding from his deposition , for violating the fundamental laws of the kingdom , that the eldest son and successor could pretend no other right to it ( even in the judgment of the late king himself ) but what proceeded from their election . m. i cannot deny but what you have now urged from matter of fact , may appear very plausible to your self , and those of your notions , yet if it be looked closer into , i doubt not but the known laws then receiv'd , and the notions the people had then of a lineal succession by right inheri●ance , will prove directly contrary to the matter of fact : for you know very well à facto ad ius non valte consequentia ; but that all the princes you mention'd , except the three last , were really usurpers , and not lawful kings ; i shall let you see by evident authorities from the historians of those times : for in the first place , though i grant william rufus succeeded to the crown by his fathers last will , which was certainly unlawful ( as being contrary to the receiv'd laws of succession in normandy as well as england ) yet was it not by election of the people as you suppose , but by the kindness of arch-bishop lanfranc his god-father , and the favour of the greater part of the norman barons , who came over with his father , as well as out of hatred to duke robert his elder brother , that he was thus made king ; so that william rufus claimed as a testamentary heir , and by reason of that claim was advanced to the throne by the assistance of lanfranc's and the bishop's faction , who then swayed the people , but yet never owned any election from them ; so that if you rightly consider this story , you cannot call it an election , but a designation or nomination by his father william the conqueror , and consented to by the major part of the bishops and lords of the kingdom , but not by their election or decree as a common council , as you suppose . but that for all this , duke robert his brother being assisted by odo bishop of bayenx , and earl of kent his uncle , as also divers other norman lords , who being satisfied of his right , raised a war in england against william , and great mischief was done on both sides , till at last a peace was made between them upon these conditions ( among others ) ( as matthew westminster relates it ) that because of the manifest right duke robert had to the crown , he should have a yearly pension of three thousand marks out of the revenue of england ; and he , of the two brothers that surviv'd the other , if he died without children , should be heir to the deceased : and so far were they from thinking this agreement stood in need of ratification of a great council , that there was but twelve of the principal men on each side sworn to see it duly observed . but if we come to consider the next putting by of duke robert from his right to the crown , you will find it to have been done with a far less colour of right than the former ; for he being then absent in the holy land at the time of rufus's death , henry his younger brother laid hold of the opportunity , and assembling divers of the great men of the kingdom , he promised them to make a full restitution of all their antient laws and liberties , and confirm them by his charter , and abrogate such severe ones as his father had made ; thereupon they did unanimously consent to crown him king : now i cannot see how this , ( managed with so much artifice ) corruption can properly be call'd an election , since that ought to be a deliberate sedate action , and at which all the persons concern'd ought to be present ; but this could not possibly be , for king william was kill'd on the second of august , and buried the next day , and the day after that , being sunday , this pretended election was made , and the saxon chronicle tells us , that those great men who were near at hand chose his brother henry king. so that this looks more like the combination of a faction of bishops , lords , and great men than the free election of a king , since it was impossible for all that were , or ought , to be present from all parts of the kingdom to have notice to assemble and dispatch that great business in two days time . but to let you see that duke robert did not fit down contented with this usurpation upon his right ; for as soon as ever he came from the holy land , he straight made war upon his brother , and many great men of the normans took his part ; and this war was eagerly carried on for some time , and duke robert landing in england with an army , k. henry marcht against him with all his forces , ( but as the saxon chronicle also tells us ) some principal men going between them , brought them to an agreement upon conditions that k. henry should pay duke robert marks pension yearly , and that he of the brothers who surviv'd the other , should be heir of all england and normandy , unless the party deceas'd should have children of his own ; so that though i grant king henry recites in his charter in matthew paris , that he was crowned king by the common council of the barons of england , yet his saying so could not give him a right ; and he must say this , or nothing , for no other , pretence or title he could have ; and there never was any other usurper in his circumstances , but must say that , or some such thing , to make out a title , and therefore to answer your question , why duke robert took not upon himself the title of king , neither upon the death of his father , nor after that of his elder brother , i think this may serve for an answer , that he parting with his right to both his brothers successively , he then lookt upon it as needless to take the title of king upon him , as not looking upon himself then to be so . f. i confess you have from your dr. together with some assistance of your own , made a very cunning gloss upon these two great instances of vacancy and election , to evade , if it were possible , that right which the common council of the kingdom then challeng'd to themselves ; and therefore i shall make bold strictly to examine what you have now said . in the first place as to the title of king william rufus , though i grant it was founded upon his fathers testament , yet you see that this was not good alone without the consent and approbation of the common council of the kingdom ; i think i have sufficiently prov'd at our last meeting , but one , when we discourst of the force of the like testament made by king edward the confessor to king william the first , which according to the english saxon law ( that ●as still observed ) was never valid until confirm'd by the consent of the wittena gemot , or great council ; and he that had both these , whether next heir by blood or not , was always esteem'd as lawful king , as i have also proved from the testament of king alfred ; and though you will take no notice of it , yet was this testament of king william i. then produced and read in the common-council of the bishops , earls and barons of the kingdom , as appears by all the antient historians who treat of this matter . i shall only give you a taste of them , matthew paris expresly relates the circumstances of it , in these words , optimates frequente● , ●d westmonasterium in concilium convenere , ubi loci post long am consultationem gulielmum rusum regem fecere , and abbot brompton tells us , that it was done in a full council , convocatis terrae magnatibus , so that here was nothing wanting to a full election or confirmation at least of king william's title , and till this was done it is plain the throne was vacant . but as for the claim that duke robert made to the crown , though i do not deny but he might think himself to have a just title to it , by a received custom among divers nations , by which the eldest son is looked upon to have a right before the younger ; yet that this is no law of nature , or reason , and consequently not divine , i think i have sufficiently prov'd at our second meeting : but that this right of succession of the eldest son ( to be no fundamental law of this kingdom ) i think i can sufficiently prove from our english saxon histories , as well as laws ; and as for what you say concerning those norman lords and bishops who joyn'd with duke robert after his brother was crown'd king , it is call'd no better than treason by all the writers of those times , for florence of worcester , and sim : of durham , both tell us , that the king thereupon call'd together the english , and open'd unto them the treason of the normans , and the saxon chronicle● , who seem'd to have lived about that time , compares the treason of bishop odo to that of iudas iscariot against our lord ; and though i grant king william might make such an agreement with his brother duke robert , as you mention , yet as for the marks pension , which you say he was to pay him , i very much doubt it , since no historian but matthew of westminster , who lived between two and three hundred years after , makes mention of it , and therefore i think it is to be referr'd to the following agreement betwixt this duke and his brother king henry , which the saxon chronicle expresly mentions . having now examin'd and clear'd the title of king william rufus , i come next to justifie that of king henry i. to the crown , notwithstanding all you have alledg'd against it , which yet is no more than what you said before , that duke robert had an hereditary right , and therefore he could not be put by , which is to beg the question , for you cannot prove to me that he had this right either by the law of nature , the law of england , or the law of normandy , not by the two former , as i have already prov'd , for your conqueror himself being a bastard , had no better title to the dutchy of normandy than his father's last will , before he went to the holy land ; which was not good without the consents of the nobility of that dutchy , as appears by the historians of that time ; so that the greatest objection you have to make against king henry's being elected in a true common-council of all england is this , that the time was so short between the death of william rufus and his election , that it was impossible for all the parties that had votes to be there present , which is a very bold assertion ; for how can you or your doctor tell that at the time when king william was kill'd , he might not then have held a great council at winchester ( where he then lay ) who might immediately upon his death chuse his brother henry for their king ; for it is certain the election was there the day before his coronation at london , and therefore it is very rashly done to affirm that this election was not in a common-council of the kingdom , when all the historians , and particularly w. malmesbury tells us the manner of it , and the disputes there were about it , viz. that henry was elected king as soon as king william's funerals were over , aliquantis tamen ante controversiis inter proceres agitatis , &c. and h. de knyghton reciting the cause , why duke robert was set aside , viz. because he had been always contrary and unnatural to the barons of england ; therefore quod plenario consensu & consilio totius communitatis regni , ipsum refutaverunt , & pro rege omnino recusav●●●nt , & henricum fratrem in regem erexerunt ; which plainly shews that it was the opinion of all the antient writers out of whom knyghton took this passage , that this election was made by the free consent , and in a full council of all the whole community of the kingdom ; nor does the after claim of duke robert to the crown at all alter the case , for the reasons already given , as also because the agreement that was made between them , that he that surviv'd should succeed the other , was never confirm'd or agreed to by the great council of the kingdom ; and therefore those norman lords that join'd with duke robert here in england are justly taxed by william of malmesbury , and the saxon chronicle , with infidelity and rebellion : and though i grant that mat. paris ( or rather roger of wendover whom he transcribes , ) seems to condemn king henry's taking the crown as unjust , and contrary to right , and that he therefore feared the justice of god ; eò quod fratri suo primogenito , cui jus regni manifestè competebat temere usurpando injustè nimis abstulcrat ; yet this author writing about the middle of the reign of king henry iii. who had succeeded his father by a pretended right of inheritance as well as election , it is no wonder if he who writ near a hundred years after this transaction , should give his judgment in this matter according to the common opinion and prejudice of that age , and must certainly speak by guess ; for how could he otherwise affirm ( unless he had been acquainted with that kings thoughts ) as he doth in the same place , that he felt conscientiam suam in obtentu regni cauteriatam ; since no other writer either of that time , or after it , does thus blame king henry for taking the crown . but as for the account you give why duke robert never took upon him the title of king , if the throne had not then been looked upon as vacant , because of the agreement which he made with his brothers , by which he parted with his right for a pension , during his life , is not at all satisfactory ; for in the first place neither of these agreements were made till above a year after his pretended title did acrue to him by the death of his father , and brother ; and therefore he ought , if he had look'd upon himself as true king , to have immediately taken the title upon him , which he never did ; so likewise the agreement it self makes wholly against your notion of any hereditary succession to the crown , to be then setled , since the main clause in both these agreements is , that the survivor should be heir to him that died first , unless he left children of his own to succeed him ; which plainly shews that in the opinion of both those princes , and of the great men that swore on either side to see it observed , they knew of no such setled right of succession in their heirs , which they themselves could not part with , or else this clause had been wholly in vain ; since both king william and king henry's children were to have succeeded to the crown of england , by vertue of both these agreements , before the sons of duke robert , had his son william ( who was only earl of flanders ) survived him . but now if you please you may proceed with your other exceptions against the rest of the instances i have here given you of the vacancy of the throne , till such time as the common council of the kingdom had agreed whom to place therein . m. as to what you have said in defence of the vacancy of the throne after the death of king henry i. carries less shew of reason than what you urged in the former cases ; since all writers agree that this was a manifest usurpation in stephen , who could pretend no sort of title to the crown himself , as well as perjury in the bishops , lords , and great men of england , who having sworn fealty to king henry's daughter maud in his life-time , made stephen earl of blois their king ; therefore william of malmsbury , and all the writers of those times do accuse stephen of down-right perjury and usurpation , and likewise relate that he was advanced to the crown through the power of the londoners and citizens of winchester ; but yet all these endeavours had been in vain , unless he had been assisted by his brother henry bishop of that city , and then the popes legate in england , and favoured by the arch-bishop of canterbury , who crowned him ; and yet for all this there was but a very small faction of the bishops and lords who were for his croonation ; for w. malmsbury tells us , coronatus est ergo in regem angliae stephanus , tribus episcopis praesentibus , nullis abbatibus , paucissimis optimatibus . and many of the nobility and great men of england were so sensible of this , that being headed by robert earl of gloucester ( the empresses base brother ) they raised a war against stephen , which after her coming over hither was carried on with great vigour ; and though i grant that after divers changes of fortune the empress was at last forced to quit the kingdom , yet her son duke henry did not fail to continue his claim to the crown in right of his mother , and coming over into england renewed the war against king stephen , which was at last compos'd by an agreement between them , which as matthew paris and mat. westminster relate it , was thus ; that king stephen acknowledged in an assembly of bishops and other great men of the kingdom , that duke henry had an hereditary right to the crown , and the duke thereupon as kindly granted , that king stephen should peaceably possess it during his life ; so that it is certain , till this agreement ( even by his own acknowledgment ) he had no right to it ; and though i grant that the empress maud for some reasons we are not able to give a true account of , never took upon her the title of queen , yet it is very certain that she acted as such during all the time she was in england , receiving homage and fealty from those lords and others who came over to her side , and also granting charters and conferring honours by the title of anglorum domina ▪ which shews she look'd upon her self to be the supream governess of the kingdom , though not under the title of queen : so that i think you can find nothing in this transaction that can support your notion of vacancy . f. pray give me leave to answer what you have now said , before you proceed farther ; first i cannot excuse neither king stephen for taking the crown , nor the bishops and great men that set it on his head , from perjury and injustice ; since the emperess maud had been before in a common-council of the whole kingdom , declared the lawful successor , and that fealty had been sworn to her as such : all that i insist upon in this affair is this ; that quod furi non deb●t , factum valet . and though this ought not to have been done , yet when once done did stand good ; and therefore if whilst the throne was vacant , king stephen by the election and consent of the bishops and great men of england was placed therein ; he was there looked upon as true , and legal king as long as he lived : and this was the reason why the emperess never took upon her the title of queen of england , no not when she had taken king stephen prisoner ; and one would have thought might have justly done it as a conqueress : but yet she forbore it , because that title was not then to be taken without the consent of the great council of the kingdom ; which i cannot find she ever held , her party being not great enough to make one : and though i cannot deny , but that she might in some particulars exercise some prerogatives of royal power ; yet this was only upon a pretence of her being elected and stiled by this title of lady of the english , in a synod of the clergy at winchester , by the procurement of henry the then bishop of that see , and the popes legat , who was now turned against his brother king stephen . for she was never generally received nor own'd as queen , nor did she ever exercise those great prerogatives of sovereign power , viz. calling of great councils , making of laws , raising of taxes , or coining mony. but whereas you represent king stephen to have been elected but by a very small party of the bishops and noblemen of england ; yet it is very much to be doubted , whether william of malmesbury ( who dedicated his history to robert earl of gloucester king stephens greatest enemy ) being no friend to his title , is to be altogether credited in this matter . for henry of huntington , ( who lived not long after ) tells us expresly ; that , omnes qui sacramentum juraverant tam praesules quam consules & principes assensum stephano praebutrunt & hominium fecerunt : and it is also as certain that the earls of gloucester and chester ( the two greatest men of england ) did then likewise swear allegiance to him , and own his title , though they afterwards revolted from him again ; yet could they do nothing considerable against him , till his own brother the bishop of winchester revolted also from him ; upon pretence that the king had violated the rights of the church . and though it is true that after the empresses departure out of england , duke henry her son came over and prosecuted the war against king stephen ; yet could it not be in his own , but his mothers right , who was then alive ; nor could the agreement you mention , be made between the king and the duke as having then a right to the crown in his own person , since we read of no concession the empress his mother had made to him of it : and therefore whatever title henry could claim thereunto . upon the death of king stephen it was wholly due to this kings adopting him for his son , and declaring him his successor upon condition , that he himself should enjoy the crown during his life , which agreement was solemnly confirmed and ratified , and that by oath . in a full assembly of all the bishops , lords and great men of the kingdom : for ordericus vitalis in his annals , ( p. . ) is very express in the manner of this great transaction ; in these words : sic tamen in praesentiarum ipse rex & caeteri potentes sacramento ●irmarent quod dux post mortem regis , si tempore eum superviveret , pacifice , & a●●que cont●ad●ctione regnum haberet ; therefore as long as the empress maud lived ( who died after her son king henry's coming to the crown , ) ' ●is plain he could have no hereditary right to it , notwithstanding what matthew paris , and matthew westminster ( who lived long after these transactions , have said to the contrary ) and therein are to be looked upon as authors that speak their own sense , rather than that of the writers of those times . m. i confess what you have urged in this matter concerning duke henry's being admitted as heir of the kingdom during the life of his mother the empress maud seems to the purpose , and there could be nothing said against it , but that this was done by the concession of the empress her self , who surrender'd all her pretentions to her son , tho' we have no particular account of it , or else ( which is more likely in my opinion ) that the government of women being then unknown in england and normandy , and consequently odious to the english and norman nobility , and for which reason chiefly they had before set this empress aside , they thought they did in effect perform their oath to her , when they acknowledged her title in her son duke henry , who is said by the historians of those times to have succeeded stephen iure haereditario , which could not at all agree with your notion of his receiving his title from the consent or election of the great council . but i shall pass over this , and come to your next instance of the vacancy of the throne , which you pretend to have been upon the death of king henry the ii. now your only argument to prove this is , that king richard , tho' his eldest son alive , was only call'd duke of normandy , and never king of england till after his coronation ; but whoever will but consider the circumstances of this matter , will find that he was indeed own'd for king of england , before his pretended election or coronation ; for before his coming into england to be crown'd , rocer hoveden tells us , that every freeman of the whole kingdom , by the command of his mother queen elianor , swore , quod fideni portabit regi angliae richardo regis hen. filio , which plainly shews , that he was then by common intendment looked upon as king before his coronation ; and though i confess that this very author also relates that all the estates of the kingdom being assembl'd at london , by whose council and assent the said duke was consecrated and crown'd king of england ; and though ralph de diceto , then dean of st. paul's ( who in the vacancy of that church then supplied the office of the bishop at king richard's coronation ) hath this passage , comes itaque pictavorum richardus hereditario jure praemovendus in regem , post tam cleri , quam populi solemnem & debitam electionem involutas est triplici sacramento , &c. now what can this solemn and due election here signifie ? or what can it mean farther than that richard being king by hereditary right , was so owned and recognized by the clergy and laity ? f. i desire i may reply to this before you proceed farther . i confess what you say about the empress maud's surrender of her right to her son duke henry would be considerable , if you had any authorities from our antient historians to support it , but since you have not , i look upon it as no better than a meer surmise of those of your opinion , that the crown was then enjoy'd by an hereditary right without any consent or election of the people ; and so likewise is your other fancy , that because women were then looked upon as uncapable to govern , therefore the bishops and great men of the kingdom , suppos'd they had sufficiently perform'd their oath of allegiance to her by acknowledging her son duke henry for the right heir of the crown ; now if this had been so , pray tell me to what purpose king henry i. ( father to the empress ) should have made all the estates of england swear fealty to his daughter , if a woman had been then lookt upon as uncapable to govern ? or to what purpose should the clergy in the council at winchester chuse this empress as the king's daughter , lady both of england and normandy , as william of malmesbury tells us expresly that they did , and that he was present at it ? or how could the great council of the kingdom believe that they had sufficiently satisfied their oath to the daughter in conferring the allegiance that was due to her upon her son ? i am sure no heiress of the crown would look upon that as a good performance of their oath at this day ; when you can answer me these queries , i shall be of your opinion in this point ; but till then i beg your pardon . but as to what you say against the vacancy of the throne upon the death of king henry the ii. till king richard was elected and crown'd , i desire no better authority to the contrary than those very authors you have now cited for your opinion ; for first hoveden in the very place you have quoted him , says , that the duke was to be crown'd king by the council and as●●nt of all the parties there present ; now if i understand any thing of grammar or sence , he was not king before , and therefore needed their assent to make him so ; likewise in the next quotation from ralph de diceto , the duke is said hereditario jure promovendus in regem , which words being in the future tense , shew he was not then , but was to be promoted to that dignity ; now if his hereditary right alone could have done it , then to what purpose are all these words aforegoing ? so that though this right gave him the fair pretence to succeed to the crown , yet it is plain from both the authors you have quoted , that he was not so till after the due consent and election of the clergy and people , so that after , all your questions , ( what can this solemn and due election signifie ? or what can it mean farther , than that richard being king by an hereditary right was so own'd and recognized by the clergy and laity ? ) will receive a very easie answer from what has been already said , till you can shew me out of any dictionary that consilium and assensus ( which are the words of hoveden ) and the words solemnis & debita electio , ever signified an owning , or recognition of an hereditary right . i confess the only colour you have for your interpretation of those words in hoveden which you have now cited of queen elianors making every freeman of the kingdom swear fealty to richard king of england , as to their liege lord ; from whence you would infer , that by common intendment of law he was looked upon king of england before he was crown'd , and consequently there could be no vacancy of the throne : now admit that he was commonly call'd king before he was crown'd , or that the queen his mother would make the people swear to him as such , yet that could not make him so , since the same historians also tell us , that hubert archbishop of canterbury , and william earl mareschal made the people of england take a like oath to earl iohn as their lord , ( not king ) immediately after the death of king richard his brother , and yet i suppose you will not affirm that their swearing fealty to him as their superiour lord , made him king , or gave him a just title to the crown ; and i desire you or any indifferent man to tell me which was hoveden's opinion , whether this swearing fealty was a sufficient declaration of his ●eing king , or else all those other expressions which signifie the contrary , when immediately before his coronation he only calls it ducem richar●m qui coronandus erat in regem , which i think is as plain a distinction , of his being a duke before he was crown'd , and a king afterwards , as words can make . m. i see it is in vain to urge this point any longer , and therefore i shall proceed to your next instance of the vacancy of the throne , after the death of king richard until king iohn was placed therein : now though it is certain that this prince was an usurper , upon his nephew duke arthur , yet whether he was ever elected in a common council of the bishops , earls and barons of the kingdom , is very doubtful . but suppose he were , it was done wrongfully , and to the prejudice of arthur duke of britain , the right heir to the crown , who being young and a stranger , it is no wonder if he were put by , and his uncle who was a man and better acquainted with england , and having the interest of the arch-bishop of canterbury , and most of the great men were of his party , and yet for all that hoveden , who was alive at this time , speaks not a word of his being elected , but only that upon his coming into england he was received by the nobility , and crown'd by hubert arch-bishop of canterbury ; so that there is not one word there of any election by , but only a submission from the lords spiritual and temporal to king iohn ; and a recognition that he was their king : nor indeed could he need it if it be true what the same author tells us . that when king richard despar'd of life , he devised to iohn his brother , the kingdom of england , and all his other lands , and caus'd all those that were present to do him fealty ; and this is related by hoveden , in all probability an eye witness of these transactions . so that the first author we find to mention any thing of the particulars of this pretended election is m●tthew paris , who has given us the speech which the arch-bishop made at this supposed election , and also reciting the arch-bishops , bishops , earls and barons , and all others who ought to be at his coronation ; the arch-bishop standing in the middle of them , said thus , hear all of you , your discretion shall know , that no man hath right to succeed in this kingdom , unless , after seeking god , he be unanimously chosen by the university of the kingdom ( that is , those that are here said to meet at london ) the rest of the speech needs no repeating , only he lays it down for law ( which i think was never heard of before ) that if any of the progeny of the dead king did excel others , they ought more readily to consent to the election of him ; and so upon this speech made in behalf of earl iohn , and full of a great deal of fulsom slattery , he was declar'd king. but to let you see what a sort of man this arch bishop hubert was , here see what the same author tells us in the same place , that being asked afterward , why he said these things ? answer'd , that he guested , and was thought ascertained by certain prophecies that iohn would bring the kingdom and crown into great confusion ; and therefore , lest he he might have too much liberty in doing , he affirmed , he ought to come in by election and not by hereditary succession . now though this learned doctrine of the arch bishop asserts a right of election in the convention of bishops , earls , barons , &c. yet by his own answer when he was asked why he said these things , it clearly discovers it to be only a design and artifice in the archbishop , to cause them to set up , and make iohn king : and in which also he denies any such right of election , but since hoveden , nor any other of our antient historians make mention of this election but only of his coronation , and the bishops , earls and barons assisting at it , not giving their consents to it , it may very well be , that that story of an election and this speech of arch bishop hubert might be only an invention of matthew paris , or rather of roger of wendover from whom he took most of his history : but that this doctrine of the arch-bishop concerning the election of our kings , if meant according to the modern understanding of it , was then new . gervase a monk of canterbury in the year . who also speaking of the coronation of henry the first , says , it was manifest and known almost to all men , that the king 's of england were only obliged , and bound to god for the possession of the kingdom , and to the church of canterbury for their coronation , manifestum est autem & omnibus fire notum ; reges angliae soli deo obligari & teneri ex ipsius regni adeptione & ecclesiae cantuariensi ex coronatione . but that king iohn was looked upon as an usurper is very certain , since besides some of the honest english nobility , that took duke arthurs part , the king of france did also make war upon king iohn upon his nephews account , because he looked upon him as true heir to the crown , and therefore when k. iohn had privately made away his said nephew in prison , the k. of france summon'd him as duke of normandy , and peer of france , to answer for the murther in an assembly of the peers of france at paris , where for his refusing to appear , he was condemn'd to death and his dukedom of normandy declar'd for●eited to the king of france . f. i confess you have said as much as can be , to prove that king iohn had no hereditary right to the crown , nor was so solemnly elected to it ( as matthew paris relates ) but yet for all this , i think i may very justly oppose all that you have now said upon this head ; for in the first place , it was then very much disputed ( as it hath been also since that time ) if an elder brother died and left a son a m●nor , whether his younger brother or the son should succeed ; for though the people of anjou and those of guienne own'd duke arthur for their prince , yet the states of normandy were of another mind , and as well by vertue of king richard's testament , he was immediately after his death invested with that dukedom , nor was he then at all opposed in it by the king of france , though suprea● lord of the fee , and as for england besides his brothers testament , whereby he left him heir of all his territories ; it was also then generally held in england as most consonant to the antient english saxon law of succession , that the uncle should succeed to the crown before the nephew , therefore it is no wonder if duke arthur found so small a party here , not any bishop , earl or baron ( as i read of ) owning his title , and as for the king of france it is also as certain , that he did at first own king iohn for lawful king of england , and duke of normandy , and entred into a treaty of peace , and made a league with him as such ; though it is true that afterwards , when he had a mind to pick a quarrel with that king , he then set up duke arthur's title ; and though this duke was made away in the beginning of king iohn's reign , yet did not the king or peers of france ever take any notice of it , till about twelve or thirteen years after , when he had now unjustly conquered all normandy , and almost all that kings other territories in france , and then wanting a title to keep them , he began this prosecution you mention against him , and upon his non appearance he was condemned unheard ; but that the king of france himself , and all the great men of that kingdom did look upon him to have been lawful king of england , appears by that speech , which matthew paris relates to have been made after king iohn's deposition by the barons of england , by a knight whom prince lewis of france had made his procurator , to treat with the popes legat about his coming over hither ; where , when he had recited that king iohn had been condemn'd by his peers for the death of his nephew arthur , and that he had been also for his great cruelties and other wickedness deposed by the barons of england ; and farther reciting that the said king , without the assent of his nobility had resign'd his kingdom to the pope to hold it of him , at an annual tribute of a thousand marks , ( the rest i will give you in latine , because you your self shall translate it , ) etsi coronam angliae sine baronibus alicui dare non potuit , potuit tamen dimittere tam ▪ quam statim cum resignaverit , rex esse desiit , & regnum , sine rege vacavit , vacans itaque regnum sine baronibus ordinari non debuit , &c. so that you may see that by the order of prince lewis , and the allowance of the king of france himself , every one of our opinions are maintain'd for good ; first , that king iohn was before the resignation of his crown to the pope , true and lawful king. secondly , that by that resignation to the pope , he did dismiss or abdicate his right to it , ( for so i suppose the word demittere regnum , is here to be render'd . ) thirdly , that upon this dismission of the crown , the throne became vacant . fourthly , that upon this vacancy the kingdom could not be conferr'd without the consent of the barons ▪ that is , the great council of the kingdom . but let king iohn's right to the crown have been what it would , it is certain , that he could not take it upon him , until such time as this great council had both heard and allow'd his title , and that this was in the nature of an election , notwithstanding his brothers will , appears by that account which roger wendover and matthew paris have given us of it , which though hoveden and other writers have omitted , yet doth it not therefore follow , that this was all the pure invention of roger of wendover or matthew pari● , since the former , he living near that time , might write from the relation of ●o●e that were then present ; and as for the latter , i look upon him , though a monk , as a man of too great integrity to invent any thing of his own head ; and though i confess the account that arch-bishop hubert gives , why he put king iohn's title rather upon election than succession , looks very suspicious ; since the arch-bishop must thereby have made himself a knave and a hypocrite , and seems also to contradict what matthew paris had before said , viz. that all those that heard his speech , dares not so much as doubt of these things , knowing that the arch-bishop had not th●s judged of this matter without cause ; and therefore i grant that this part of the relation concerning the arch-bishops vindicating of himself , for thus giving his judgment , might be a story commonly taken up , and being told to this authour , was by him inserted in his history at a time when i grant the crown of england began to be thought successive by reason that king henry the iii. had succeeded as the eldest son of his father , though he was no● for all that admitted without election as i shall prove by and by ; but that king iohn was made king by election , though he claim'd it from his brother by successi●n likewise appears from his own charter still to be seen at this day , in the arch-bishops archives at lambeth , wherein he recites , that he came to the crown , iure hereditario & mediante tam cleri quam populi unanimi consensu & favore : where you see plainly that he derives his title from the consent and favour of the clergy , and people , as well as his own hereditary right . m. notwithstanding what you have now said , i cannot agree with you , that by these words you have now cited from this charter , is to be understood any formal election of the clergy and people ; but that this unanimous consent mention'd in it , was rather their acknowledgment of his title , and submission to him , than any thing else ; for according to hoveden's relation of his coming to the crown ( which i think the most exact extant ) the whole nation submitted , and swore fealty to him against all men , before he came over into england . but as for his son henry the iii. it is much more plain that he succeeded by succession , and not by election , as being the eldest son of the late king his father , as appears by the relation of his coronation in matthew westminster , who tells us thus . henricus iohannis primogenitus in regem inunctus & solemniter coronatus est ; and tho ▪ from the speech which was made to the clergy and nobility that was then at gloucester by the earl mareshall , 't is pretended , that henry was elected , yet i dare say if any one do but impartially consider the tenour of it , he will find that the design of it was rather to persuade all those then present to return to their duty and acknowledge him for their king , whom god and nature had designed for that great charge ; for the earl begins his discourse to 'em thus , ( as it is in knighton ) ecce rex vester , ( which certainly could not then be true if an election was necessary to make him such ) but amongst the rest of his arguments he urges this , hunc igitur libeat , regem dicere cui ipsum regnum debetur , you ought to chuse him to whom the kingdom is due , ( which surely it can be to none if it be not hereditary ) and what puts all out of doubt that the kingdom was not then ( and if not then i am sure never since ) elective , is the answer of hubert de burgh to lewis when he summon'd him to deliver up dover castle to him , since his master for whose use and service he held it was dead ; but see his answer , if my old master , say's he , he dead , he has left behind him sons and daughters to succeed him . a thing he never would have asserted , had he not thought there had been a divine right somewhere else than in the people . f. before i speak any thing to king henry the iii ds . election ; give me leave to reply to what you have said against the express words of king iohns charter ; for if favor and consensus does not signifie somewhat more than a bare acknowledgement and submission , i understand neither english nor latine . nor is this any answer to the express testimony of roger of wendover , and mat. paris to the contrary . and as for roger hoveden , he does not say he was not elected , but only omits the manner of it , as divers other historians do : so that ( at the best ) this is but a negative argument : and yet that hoveden himself did not look upon him as king even after the whole nation had sworn fealty to him before his coronation , may appear from this passage a little before his coming over : w●●ielmus rex scotorum misit nuncios ad iohannem ducem normandiae , &c. where you see he calls him no more than duke of normandy . but to come to the election of his son prince henry ; if this be all you have to prove a divine right of succession in henry the iiid . i doub . it will do you but little service ; for according to your own principles it must have been lodged some where else than in this prince : for when king iohn his father died eleanor the sister of duke arthur was then alive , and died not till the th . year of king henrys reign a close prisoner in bristol castle , as matthew paris relates . so that it is apparent he could have no such divine hereditary right as you suppose ; and therefore perhaps his father , to strengthen his title , and to recommend him the more to the peoples savour , appointed him his successor by his last testament . and matthew paris , and matthew westminster tell us , that when king iohn died henricum primegenitum suum , regni constituit haeredem . so that it seems there was then no such hereditary right , for if it had , what need had there been of this testament ? but for all this divine right i do not find that this poor princess eleanor had any of the bishops or great lords to take her part , but all the dispute then was at this great convention at gloucester ; whether they should abjure prince lewis , whom most of them had before chosen for their lord , and adhere to prince henry , there present before them , as matthew paris tells us : erat autem tâ tempestate inter optimates angliae fluctuatio maxima , cui se regi committe●ent ; iuvenine henrico , an domino ludovico ? so that it seems by the relation our historians give us of this matter , it was not from any great sense that the clergy and nobility had of the justness of prince henry's title , that made them agree to chuse him king ; but the hatred they then bore to prince lewis when they found he had broken his contract with them , and put all the strong places of the kingdom in the hands of french men ; and treated the english nobility with scorn and contempt : and therefore no wonder if they preferr'd an innocent young prince of their own nation , who had never been guilty of his fathers faults ; before a stranger whose fraudulent dealing with them , they had found not to answer their expectations ; and therefore mat. westminster tells us , that omnes nobiles terrae in brevi ipsi iuveni regi hemico , qui nihil culpae versus tos merueras fideliter adhaeserunt . but to prove farther that this king came in by election and not by succession , appears , by what our historians relate concerning the manner of it . henry de knyghton in his chronicle tells us , that on the feast of st. simon and iude , henry son of king iohn in regem erigitur viribus , & industria gualonis pap●e legati ; which plainly shews that he was not king before ; and i desire no better an authority than your own author matthew westminster , who says that he was in regem inunctus , anointed to be king , which shews , that he thought him not so before his coronation ; and though i grant mat. paris makes the earl marshal to begin his speech with those words , ecce rex vester , as you relate them , yet this was no more than an allusion to that place in st. iohn ch . . behold your king ▪ it being usual in those days to begin their speeches with a text of scripture . so that the earl did not intend to be understood literally , for then he should have in this speech contradicted what he had said b●fore ; for though to prepossess their minds , he says of the young prince there present , behold your king : yet it is plain , that how much soever he thought the kingdom his right , yet that it could not be conferred upon him without their choice ; as appears by these words , which you your self have made use of , viz. you ought to chuse him to whom the kingdom is due . and it is evident by the assent , which the whole assembly gave to the reasons declared by him in this speech , that it was their choice alone that made him king ; their votes being given in these words , fiat rex ; which had been altogether needless , had they looked upon him as king already : and therefore the speech of hubert de burgh , which you mention ; may very well be reconciled to this hypothesis of supposing a necessity of an election and coronation to confer a full and legal right in those times : for when he said , " that the king if dead , had yet left behind him children who ought to succeed him . this , if strictly taken , is altogether false ; for eleanor the true heiress of the crown ( according to your rule of succession ) was then alive : but if taken in a limitted sense is true , that is , the children ought to succeed if the great counsel of the nation thought fit ; without whose consent , though they might have ius ad rem , yet had they not ius in re : this election and coronation being then looked upon as livery and seisen at this day is to an estate in fee , without which , though the writings are sealed and delivered , the land will not pass . to conclude , i pray answer me that question i have so long put , though without any reply , viz. why , before this election and coronation was perform'd , none of those princes that came to the crown by your supposed right of succession , are call'd by any higher title than dukes of normandy , or earls of poictou ? so that from what has been here said , i think it plainly appears , that no less than seven of the eight princes from your william the conqueror ( reckoning him for one ) to king henry the iii. have owed their title to the crown , not to any right of succession ; but either to the election of the people alone , or else to the will or designation of the last king , confirm'd by the general consent of the people given thereunto ; and without which it would not have been good according to the ancient custom of the english , saxons before your conquest ; where besides the testament of the king deceased , there was also required the consent or election of the great council . so that you see here was no alteration made in the form of our chusing our kings after your conquest from what it was before ; for no less than seven or eigh● descents ; and when you can answer this , i shall then come over to your opinion . m. in answer to your question , i shall not deny but that all our historians give all the kings you mention no higher titles than dukes of normandy , or earls of poictou before their coronations ; which though i suppose they might do from a foolish superstition of that age , which made them fancy that none were properly to be called kings until they had been anointed , and solemnly crown'd by a bishop ; yet that they looked upon them as kings indeed , appears in that they ordered and disposed of all publick affairs , conferr'd offices and bishopricks as if they were lawful kings before your pretended election , or the ceremony of their coronation , and also had ambassadors sent to them from foreign princes ; as appears from your own quotation out of hoveden : of those that were sent by the king of scots to king iohn before he was crowned , though it is true he there stiles him no more than duke of normandy : and this also may further appear by that passage i have cited out of the same author ; that king richard had fealty sworn to him as king of england by all the freemen of england before he was crown'd , and you your self acknowledge the same oath to be taken by the same persons to king iohn before he came over to take the crown . and lastly , to make it yet plainer that there was no vacancy or inter-regnum in all these successions you have mention'd ; consult what chronologer you please , or look into the most ancient tables of the succession of our kings of england , or into our old printed statutes or law books ; and you will still find the reign of the suceeding prince to commence from the death of his next predecessor without any vacancy or inter-regnum between . and these i think to be a great deal surer marks of their succeeding to their royal dignity , by a pretence at least of a right of inheritance from their father or brother ; rather thau this fancy of yours that you lay so much stress upon : that because of their not being stiled kings by our historians till their pretended election and coronation was over , they were not so indeed . and i hope this may serve to satisfie this mighty objection . f. i must beg your pardon if i still declare my self not satisfied with your answers , for though i grant , that if this argument of the historians not stiling them kings , had stood single without any thing else to support it , that your answers might have signified something . but if you please better to consider it , you will find that of these princes ( taking in william your conqueror ) claimed , as your self must acknowledge , not by any hereditary right , but by the testament of the deceased predecessor : and if so , where was your setled right of succession by right of blood ? secondly , it is likewise as plain , that these four were never admitted or acted in england as lawful kings , till those testaments were confirmed by the election of the great council , before whom they declar'd their rights : and till this was done , how the throne could be otherwise than vacant , i cannot for my life conceive . but as for two of them , ( whom you call downright usurpers , ) ( viz. ) henry the i ▪ and king stephen ; it is certain they could have no colour of a title till their elections , and if not till then , and that neither your next heir of the crown , nor yet they themselves took upon them the title of kings ; was not this a vacancy of the throne in the mean time ? suppose that time to have been but for the space of three or four days , as it was after the death of king william rufus . in the next place pray consider , that upon the death of every one of these princes we do not find the great council of the kingdom , which still assembled to elect the successor , was ever call'd in their names , but met by their own inherent authority ; for how could they be summon'd by the king before he took that title upon him , which as your self are forced to acknowledge , he never did till after his coronation . lastly , pray remember farther , that whoever was thus elected and confirm'd by the great council , whether he was next heir by blood or not , was always looked upon as lawful king , and has always passed for such in all our chronicles and laws , and not those that claimed as the right heirs by blood ; and if this be not sufficient to prove that these princes had no true and compleat right to the crown till this election was past , i desire you would shew me my mistake . these things premis'd i think it will be very easie to reply to every one of those answers you pretend to have made to my query . therefore as to your first , that they were really kings before their election or coronation , because they order'd and dispos'd of all publick affairs i do not deny ; but that some of them , who succeeded either as heirs by testament , or by right of blood , might do many publick acts , by reason that they looked upon themselves as heirs apparent to the kingdom , and whom the great council i grant could not without high injustice set aside , and upon this account they might also receive ambassadors from foreign princes , in affairs relating to peace or war , that they might know how to deal with them , or what to expect from them , after they were setled in the throne ; yet that they sent not to them by the title of kings , appears by that passage i cited out of hoveden ; but i defie you to shew me any one instance that any of these princes above mention'd ever took upon them to exercise any of those prerogatives of sovereign power , such as making war or peace , enacting laws , coining of money , before their election and coronation ; which though in some of them was done both at once , yet in others it appears plainly to have been at different times , and not upon the same day , as it happen'd in the case of henry i. whose election was at winchester upon saturday , and his coronation was not till the next day ; as also that of henry the d. whose election was upon st. simon and iude's day , but his coronation not till the day after . but as for your next reply , which i grant to have been the strongest you have made , that king richard i. and king iohn had both of them homage and fealty sworn to them , as kings by all the freemen of england , before they were crowned ; this were a material argument if it were made out , as i think it cannot : for in the first place , the bare swearing of homage and fealty to a prince , doth not make him immediately king , though i grant it might give him in that age a right to be looked upon as heir apparent to the crown : thus henry the i. made all the lords and great men of england to swear homage and fealty to prince william his son , and so after his being drown'd , to the empress maud his daughter , which was the true reason why she looked upon her self afterwards as heiress to the crown ; so likewise king stephen a little before his death ( at the great council i have mention'd ) caus'd all the great men of the kingdom to swear homage and fealty to henry duke of anjou , as his immediate successour : so that you see this swearing of fealty was in those days often perform'd , ●efore the persons that received it were kings indeed ; and so i believe it was done in both those instances you now give me ; for though i grant , that hoveden ( as you cite him ) relates that homage to be made , and fealty sworn to richard the i. by the title of king ; yet is it very much to be doubted whether this was not only by a prolepsis , or perhaps a slip of the pen in this author ; since he writ this history long a●ter king richard's death , and therefore without we had the very words of this oath , there is no certain conclusion to be drawn from thence ; and i think we may as well credit the chronicle of abbot brompton , who likewise lived about the same time and recites all this affair almost in the same words with those in hoveden , but there the oath does not run exactly in the same words as in this author , but thus , quod unusquesque liberorum hominum totius regni iuraret quod sidem portaret domino richardo , domino angliae filio domini regis henrici , &c. ficut legio domino suo contra omnes mortales , where you see the oath is not made to king richard as king , but only as lord of england , and that there is a great deal of difference between those two titles not only in name but in substance , i have already prov'd when i spoke of the empress maud's stiling her self domina , and not regina anglorum , tho' she had homage rendred , and fealty sworn to her , not only in her fathers life time , but also after her coming over again into england , in the reign of king stephen , by all that own'd her title , and that hoveden himself meant no more than this , appears by that passage i have already taken notice of ( viz. ) that hubert arch-bishop of canterbury , and william the earl marshal being sent over to keep the peace , made all the men of the kingdom , as well of cities as burroughs , with the earls , barons , and free-holders , iurare fidelitatem & pacem iohanni normanorum duci , filio henrici regis , filii matildis imperatricis contra omnes homines ; where you see the oath is taken to him only as duke of normandy , and not as king at all ; and therefore you are mistaken to say that hoveden mentions the like oath to be taken to duke iohn , as it was before to king richard. but i come now to answer your last argument whereby you would prove that there was no vacancy or inter-regnum in this age , which is , because that our chronicles and tables of successions do still begin the reigns of each king , from the day of the decease of his predecessors , without any vacancy or inter-regnum between them ; to which i reply , that none of our antient chronicles or historians reckon thus as i know of , but rather acknowledge a vacancy of the throne to have been between each succession ; and as for the tables of the succession of our kings , when you can shew me one more antient than the time from which i grant the crown of england began to be looked upon as a successive , and not an elective kingdom , i shall be of your opinion : but admit it were so , since the succession to the crown has been for the most part mixt , partly elective and partly hereditary , our kings might , to maintain the honour of their title , still reckon their coming to the crown immediately from the death of the last predecessor , tho' there has been oftentimes some days and weeks between the one and the other , as i have now proved , and shall prove farther by and by , which being but small fractions of time , are not taken notice of in the whole account , which may be notwithstanding very agreeable to law , for both my lords dyer and anderson in their reports do agree , that the king , who is heir or successor , may write and begin his reign the same day that his progenitor or predecessor dies . m. it will be to no purpose to dispute this point with you any longer , since i must confess that there were so many usurpations in the succession of most of those first kings after the conquest , that it is a difficult matter to prove any setled rule of succession to have been then observed in england ; and therefore i only desire you to take notice , that though it is true , king henry the d was an usurper , for the first twenty five years of his reign , yet for all the rest of it , which was near thirty more , he was a true and lawful prince , for elianor his cousin being dead in prison without issue , and there being no more of that line left , her right wholly devolved upon king henry , and he and his children are to be from henceforth reckon'd to have a true hereditary right to the crown without any competitors . and that this was so , will plainly appear from the testament of king henry the d. ( a copy of which i have by me ) where tho' he bequeaths a great many of his jewels to the queen , and a great deal of money to charitable uses ; yet for this kingdom , and other territories in france and ireland , he makes no bequest of them at all , either to prince edward his eldest , or to edmund his youngest son , tho' his father king iohn had bequeathed the kingdom to him , by his will , ( as you have already shewed ) and what could be the reason of this ? but that there being now no title left , to contest with his son , there was no need of it ; and therefore tho' prince edward was absent in the holy land when his father died , yet a great council being call'd in his name at london , he was there only recognized and acknowledged to be their natural leige lord and lawful successor to his fathers throne ; pray read the words as they are in walsingham's life of this king , edwardum absentem dominum suum leigium recognoverunt , paternique successorem honoris ordinaverunt : we meet not here with any thing like election , which no doubt we should not fail to do , if there had been any such thing practised . so likewise upon this king's death , his son king edward the d. by the like right succeeded as heir to his father ; and tho' this prince by suffering himself to be too much guided by his minions , fell at length into such arbitrary and irregular courses , as procured him the hatred and ill will of his subjects to that degree , that by the disloyal and ambitious practices of his lascivious queen , he being made prisoner , a parliament was call'd in his name , who took upon them to depose him for his misgovernment contrary to all law and right ; and though his son prince edward had hitherto join'd with his mother against his father , yet is he herein so far to be commended , that tho' the crown was offered him , by election of the great council ; yet the same author tells us , he swore , that without his father's consent he would never accept it ; whereupon divers messengers or delegates being dispatched from the parliament to the king , then prisoner at kenel-worth castle , who told him what had been done , and concluded of at london , required him to resign his crown , and permit his son to reign in his stead ; which though with some reluctance he at last agreed to ; and thereupon prince edward took the crown not by election as you set forth , but by the cession and resignation of his said father , as appears by the account which this king gave of it to the sheriffs of all the counties of england , within a few days after his taking upon him the crown , which writ or letter is still to be seen among the roll's in the tower , and is also published in walsingham as a proclamation , which because it will give very great light in this matter , i pray now read it at length . rex . vicecom . ebor. salutem quia dominus edwardus nuper rex angliae pater noster de communi confilio & assensu praelatorum com. baron . & alior . magnat . necnon communitat . totius regni praedict . spontanea voluntate se amovit a regimine dicti regni volens & concedens , quod nos tanquam ipsius primogenitus & haeres regni gubernationem & regimen assumamus , nosque ipsius patris nostri bene placito in hac parte de consitio & avisamento praelator com. baron magnat & communitat . predict . onnuen●es pubernacula suscepimus dicti regni ; & fidelitates & homagia ipsorum praelitor , & magnat . recepimu● , ut est moris , teste rege apud westmonast . . ian. so that you here see this king takes no notice of the deposition of his father , or the election of himself , but only that by the common council and assent of the prelates , earls , barons , &c. the king his father had by his own free will. removed himself from the government of the kingdom , and that therefore he had by the good will of his said father , and by council and advice of the said prelates , earls , &c. taken the government of the said kingdom upon him . but king edward the d. being dead , his grandson richard the d succeeded him , having been before recognized by act of parliament , as heir apparent to the crown in his grandfather's life time , immediately upon the death of his father edward the black prince ; so that he succeeded to the crown , though an infant , and having great and powerful uncles then alive , and though by his ruling too arbitrarily , and being too much govern'd by flatterers , be became hated of his subjects , and thereupon gave occasion to henry duke of lancaster ( whom he had before banished ) to come over and take the kingdom from him , without striking a stroak ; and having taken the king prisoner , call'd a parliament in his name , who took upon them most unjustly to depose king richard , tho' 't is true he also made a solemn resignation of it by his own seeming consent ; but it is certain it was forced from him , for fear of worse usage if he refused it . f. pray give me leave to answer what you have now said , before you proceed farther in this history of the succession . in the first place i shall not deny , but that from the reign of king edward i. the crown has been always claim'd ( tho' not constantly enjoy'd ) by right of blood ; yet that the custom was otherwise before , i think the instances i have given from the time of your conquest , are more than sufficient ; it is likewise as certain that this succession by right of blood , was never setled by any positive law , and therefore must be purely derived from that tacit consent of the people called custom . secondly , that the two houses of parliament have often notwithstanding this claim , placed or fixed the crown upon the heads of those princes whom they very well knew could have no hereditary right to it . thirdly , that such princes have been always obeyed and taken for lawful kings ▪ all their laws standing good as this day without any confirmation by their successors , tho' they pretended to a better title . now if i prove every one of these three propositions , i think the case will be very plain , that though the crown has been claim'd and often enjoy'd by right of blood , yet hath it been held near as often otherwise since that time ; so that the succession to it hath been still declar'd under the direction and limitation of the present king , and parliament . this being premis'd , i shall proceed in the next place to answer what you have said concerning king edward the first 's being only recogniz'd and not elected king by the parliament , it is plain from this history , that the great council still maintain'd their an●ient right of assembling upon the death of the king , and of judging who should be his successor , and that without any summons from him , which will serve to justifie ( as do all the other instances aforegoing ) that the late convention meeting , and setling the crown without any writs or authority derived from king iames was no new thing ; but that they have therein done no more than what hath been antiently practised in like cases ; and tho' ( 't is true ) the words in walsingham is recognoverunt , yet there is also other words which seem to intimate , that it was then in the power of the great council whom to declare for lawful successor ; the words are , paternique successorem honoris ordinaverunt , that is , they ordain'd or decreed him successor of his fathers dignity , which sure is somewhat more than a bare declaration of an undoubted precedent right , and what power the great council was then looked upon to have in the ordering of this kingdom appears by that writ of dedimus , for all mens taking the oaths of allegiance in the country , which is still to be seen in the close rolls , and begins thus ; quia defuncto jam celebris memoriae domino henrico patre nostro ad nos regni gubernaculum successione haereditaria procerum regni voluntate & fidelitate nobis praestita sit devolutum , &c. where besides the hereditary succession , the good will and fidelity of the great men is reckon'd as one of the means by which the kingdom came to him ; and that this course was also observed upon the accession of his son edward the d. to the crown seems likewise as evident from the same author , who tells us in the beginning of the life of this prince , that he succeeded his father king edward , non tam jure hereditario quam unanimi consensu procerum & magnatum ; which observation had been altogether needless , had an unalterable hereditary right to the crown been the setled . but as to what you say of king edward the ds . right , whilst his father was living , to have been wholly due to his resignation , tho' the place i cited out of walsingham be express in this point ; yet against this you urge a writ , or declaration , as also a proclamation of this kings , wherein he thus sets forth his title , viz. that by the voluntary resignation of king edward his father , and by the council and advice of the prelats , earls , and barons , &c. he had taken upon him the government of the kingdom ; and consequently that succeeding immediately upon his said fathers resignation , there could be no vacancy of the throne ; to which i answer , that i do not deny that after this king was once setled in the throne , but that he might think it most to his honour , and the independency of his title , to relye wholly upon his right of succession as eldest son , and heir without taking any notice of the parliaments election of him ; tho' this be also convertly expressed in these words , which are in this writ , and proclamation , viz. ` that consenting to his said fathers pleasure , he had taken the government , de consilio & advisamento praelator . com. baron . magnat . & communitat . praedict . which though you translate by council and advice of the prelats , earls , barons and commonalty : yet i do suppose that by consilio is here meane not council , but consent , as i have already proved the word consilium often signifies in our antient statutes ; for otherwise if this word must here signifie council , it would be a plain tautology , for advice and council are the same thing . but to shew you also that there must needs have been a vacancy of the throne , either upon the deposition or resignation of edward the d. ( take it which way you will ) appears from matter of fact , for it is plain , that when prince edward refus'd the crown upon the parliaments electing him , unless his father would willingly resign it , he did at their request resign his title to it , by certain commissioners sent down to him to kenelworth castle to take it ; now that place being at least two days journey from london , it is certain there must be as many days vacancy of the throne if not more before the said commissioners could get to london , and that prince edward had agreed to take the crown upon his fathers resignation ; for till then the throne was vacant , since till the prince had declared his assent to take it , he might have chosen whether he would have accepted of it or not ; as not being satisfied whether his fathers resignation were voluntary , and not by constraint . now if there were a vacancy of the throne in this case , though but for two or three days ; it serves to prove the matter in question as well as if it had been for two years . so likewise let the reign of king henry the ivth . begin either from the resignation or deposition of king richard the ii d. ( take it which way you please ) there must have been a vacancy of the throne ; as appears by the parliament roll still extant . for it is there plain , that after the instruments of king richards resignation and deposition were solemnly read , that the throne continued void for some space : till such time as henry duke of lancaster stood up and made his claim to it , in that form of words which stands to this day to be seen upon the parliament roll , and that the arch bishop of canterbury taking the duke by the hand , had led him to the throne , and placed him therein . m. i cannot deny but as you have set forth the matter of fact , there must have been a vacancy of the throne in these two cases ; but since the depositions of both these kings were contrary to law , and their resignations extorted from them by constraint whilst they were in prison ; they are neither of them looked upon as valid , or to be urged as presidents in future times . but however the throne might seem then to be vacant in point of fact , yet in law it was otherwise ; for edmund earl of march ought to have immediately succeeded upon the death or resignation of king richard , as being lineally descended from philippa only daughter and heir to lionel duke of clarence , third son of king edward the iiid . but to let you see that henry duke of lancaster , ( as much an usurper as he was ) yet was so sensible that the crown could not be then enjoyed by election , but by right of blood ; and that the parliament also thought themselves in duty bound to submit to him to whom by right of blood the crown did belong : will appear from this dukes manner of laying claim thereunto : which , since you have not particularly mention'd , i will. for no sooner was the throne vacant by the pretended voluntary resignation of king richard. but duke henry having fortified himself with the sign of the cross ; stood up , and made his demand of the crown in his mother-tongue in this form of words ( as i have extracted them out of the parliament roll. ) in the name of the father , son and holy ghost . i henry of lancaster challenge this reawme of inglonde , and the corone , withall the members and appurtenances ; also that i am descendit by right line of the blode , comyng fro the gude lord king henry the third : and thorghe that right , that god of his grace hath sent me with the help of my kyn , and of my friends to recover it : the which reawme was in poynt to be undon for default of governance and undoyng of the gude laws . and after which challenge and claim , ( says the record which i render out of latine ) as well the lords spiritual as temporal , and all the states there present being all severally interrogated , what they thought of the aforesaid challenge and claim ; the above named states , with all the commonalty , without any difficulty or delay unanimously agreed ; that the aforesaid duke should reign over them . where you may see that this whole parliament admit the dukes claim for good without proceeding to any formal election of him . and by vertue of this pretended right , and claiming as heir of earl edmund ( sirnamed croutch-back , brother to king edward the ist. ) ( whom he falsly pretended to have been the eldest son to king henry the iiid . and put by for his deformity ) did not only himself , but also his son henry the ivth . and his grandson henry the vith . ( though usurpers ) succeed as right heirs to the crown till the th . year of henry the vith . when richard duke of york did in a full parliament lay claim thereunto ; in right of his mother , being only sister and heir of edmund earl of march. and because the judgment of the parliament in this case is very remarkable , pray read this part of it , as it stands recorded in the parliament roll. whereupon consideration of the answer , and claim of the duke of york ; it was concluded and agreed by all the lords that his title could not be defeated : and therefore for eschewing the great inconveniences that may ensue ; a mean was found to save the kings honour and estate , and to appease the said duke if he would : which was , that the king , ( viz. henry the vith . ) should enjoy the crown during life , the duke to be declared the true heir , and to possess it after his death , &c. and note that all this was done after a solemn hearing of all that could be said on both sides . f. i confess the matter of fact concerning king henry the vith . coming to the crown is truly recited by you from the parliament roll ; yet for all that it doth not follow that the parliament allowed this kings seigned and false claim to be good by their not contradicting it : for though the record says , that upon the hearing of this challenge or claim , all the estates of the kingdom being then asked their judgments severally ; they declared , that the same states without any difficulty or delay , unanimously agree'd that the said duke should reign over them . for considering the dukes great power , it was not safe telling him to his face , that he had no true right by inheritance ; therefore they only declared in general words without expresly denying or affirming his said claim , that he should reign over them : which words do rather amount to an election of him to be king , without declaring what title he had to be so : and this they thought they might very well justifie , not only for his having delivered them from the tyranny of king richard , but also because they then looked upon it as their right not only to depose the king in case of an apparent violation of the fundamental laws of the kingdom , but also to place in his stead any of the blood-royal , tho' not next heir by blood ; according to the message the whole parliament had formerly sent to k. richard in the beginning of his reign by the arch-bishop of canterbury and his uncle the d. of gloucester ; which i gave you at our ninth meeting ( as i remember : ) and pray take notice the words were , et propinqai rem aliquem de stirpe regia , loco ejus in regnisolio sublimare : where observe that the words were not the next of blood , but some near kinsman of the blood royl . and though it is true that both king henry the vth. and vith . might both seem to succeed to the crown by right of blood , yet i do rather attribute their right of succession to an act of parliament made in the seventh , and confirmed in the eighth year of henry the ivth . whereby the crown was entailed upon all his sons by name , and the right heirs of their bodies : by vertue of which settlement both henry the vth. and vith succeded thereunto . for if he had thought his own feigned hereditary title to have been sufficient , he would never have troubled himself to have procured the crown to be setled upon himself and his children by act of parliament . m. all this signifies nothing , for i have already sufficiently proved that in the th . year of henry the vith . upon a solemn hearing before the paliament of the claim of richard duke of york to the crown , the said act was set aside , and it was there expresly declared that the said dukes title could no ways be defeated : and this agreement is still on record , between henry the then possessor of the crown , and the said duke ( whose right it was ) and the judgment of the parliament was then given in the behalf of proximity of blood , as to have always been the foundation and ground of succession to the crown of england ; and of taking it from the son of henry the vith , and restoring it to the duke of york and his issue as right heirs thereof : as appears by the title and pedegree of the said duke set down at large in the first article of this agreement confirmed by parliament ; that is , by king henry the vith . himself , who was then king de facto , tho' not de iure . f. i will not deny the matter of fact to be as you have set forth , yet if you will but please to consider the time when this declaration and agreement was obtained , and the manner how it was done ; you will quickly find , that it was rather got by force and constraint upon that poor prince henry the vith . than by any real right the duke of york had to the crown , after its being setled for three descents in the house of lancaster . for the proof of which i desire you in the first place to take notice that at this time the whole kingdom was under general discontent , no● only for the loss of all our conquests in france , but also for the great mismanagement of affairs at home ; by reason of the exorbitant power of the queen and her two favourites the dukes of somerset and suffolk ; who made the king a meer cypher , and had without his consent made away humphrey duke of gloucester ( the kings only uncle then living ) contrary to law ; so that affairs being in this ill posture , it was very easie for the duke of york and the earl of warwick , to procure a sufficient interest in the nobility and great men of the kingdom , to raise an army upon pretence at first , only of reforming the grievances of the kingdom , and bringing the said dukes of justice , the issue of which war was , that the duke not being strong enough at first to oppose the kings forces , was forced to surrender himself , and to obtain his pardon , took a solemn oath never to rebel against the king again ; but being afterwards attainted at a parliament held at coventry for new conspiracies , he then again rebelled , together with the earl of warwick ; and then that king henry being carried to head his army , was by the duke of york taken prisoner in the battle near northampton , and being thence by him brought up to london , a parliament was call'd in the kings name ( though without his consent ) wherein the duke of york had the confidence to seat himself in the royal throne , and to make that challenge of the crown you have recited ; and under how great a terror all the friends and servants of this poor prince was at that time , appears plainly from this , that neither the kings attorney , nor any of his council durst undertake to plead his cause before the parliament , nor yet would the judges give their opinions in a matter of such great moment , but they all answer'd , that this matter passed the learning of the justices ; and also that they durst not enter into any communication in that matter , and besought all the lords to have them excused for giving any advice or council therein ; but the lords would not excuse them ; and therefore by their advice and assistance it was concluded by all the lords that the articles following should be objected against the claim and title of the duke ; so that you see from the record it self that the judges were with much ado prevail'd with to object any thing against the dukes title . therefore considering the great contempt the kings person was then under by reason of his weakness , and the great hatred and weariness the nation had then of the evil government , of the queen and her favourites , it was no more difficult for the duke of york to procure this judgment in parliament in savour of his title , than that henry the th should after he had put richard the d in prison get him depos'd , and make his own title to be allow'd for good ; and certainly if it were rebellion for the duke of lancaster to take up arms against king richard the d and to depose him , i cannot see why ( according to your own principles ) it should not be the same crime in the duke of york to take up arms against king henry the th , to whom he had more than once sworn faith and allegiance , and having taken him prisoner , to call a parliament whereby himself was declared protector of the kingdom , and the son of king henry disinherited after a quiet possession in three descents , during the space of above sixty years , which if it will not give a thorough settlement after two acts of parliament to confirm it , i know not what can . m. i confess you have given me a more exact account of this transaction than ever i had yet , and i should very much incline to be of your opinion , were it not that i am satisfied that our kings have a right to the crown by gods law as well as mans , as also by the law of nature , and that more than one parliament have been of my opinion in this matter , i shall shew you from several statutes and declarations of parliament , which though not printed , are yet to be seen at this day upon the parliament rolls ; for after that henry the th or rather his queen for him , had broken the aforesaid solemn agreement made between this king and duke in parliament , whereby it was accorded , that if king henry made war again upon the duke of york , he should then forfeit his present right to the kingdom during his life , whereupon queen margaret and her son prince edward , who would not submit to this agreement renewed the war , and fighting another battle at wakefield , the said duke was slain ; but though he did not live to enjoy his right , yet his son edward earl of march again , recovered it ; and having in the second battle of st. albans taken k. henry prisoner , triumphantly marching to london , he there declar'd himself king , and having immediately call'd a parliament , it was therein declar'd , that all the proceedings against k. richard the ad are repeal'd , and the taking him prisoner by henry earl of darby was declared against his faith and allegiance , and that with violence he had usurped upon the royal power and dignity , &c. and that he had by cruel tyranny murther'd and destroy'd the said king richard his liege and soveraign lord , against gods law and his own oath of allegiance . and then they proceed further to declare in these words , that the commons being of this present parliament , having sufficient and evident knowledge of the said unrightwise usurpation , and intrusion by the said henry late earl of derby , upon the said crown of england ; knowing also certainly , without doubt and ambiguity , the right and title of our said sovereign lord ( viz. king edward the th ) thereunto true , and that by gods law , mans law , and the law of nature , he , and none other , is , and ought to be their true , rightwise , and natural leige , and sovereign lord , and that he was in right from the death of the said noble and famous prince his father , very just king of the said realm of england , and will for ever take , accept , and repute , the said king edward the ●ourth , their sovereign and liege lord , and him and his heirs to be kings of england , and none other , according to the said right and title . and that the same henry unrightwisely , against law , conscience , and the customs of the said realm of england usurped upon the said crown ; and that he and also henry , late call'd k. henry the th . his son , and henry late called henry the th . his son , occupy'd the realm of england , and lordship of ireland , and exercised the governance thereof , by unrightwise , intrusion , usurpation , and no otherwise ; that the ●motion of henry late called king henry the th from the exercise , occupation , usurpation , intrusion , reign and governance of the ▪ said realm and lordship , done by our sovereign lord king edward the th . was and is rightwise , lawful , according to the laws , and customs of the said realm , and so ought to be taken , holden , reputed , and ●ccupied . i have been the larger on this point , because it is a full and free declaration of the whole parliament , nor only against all past as well as future parliaments having any thing to do in the disposal of the crown , but is also as express a declaration as words can make , against any vacancy of the throne upon the death of the predecessor ; and therefore i hope you will pardon me , if i have been a little too tedious in reciting these records . f. i cannot blame you for being very exact in this point , because the whole strength of your cause depends upon it ; but yet i doubt not but to shew you , that this parliament was as much awed by king edward's power , being now conqueror , as ever those parliaments were that depos'd edward and richard the d ▪ for you your self have sufficiently set forth the manner of it , that it was not till after a great victory obtain'd against king henry the th . and i never found in all my reading , that a victorious prince ever wanted power enough to get a parliament call'd to settle himself in the throne , and declare his competitor an usurper ; as i shall shew you more fully by and by : but that this act of parliament , which thus posi●ively declares edward the th to be their sovereign lord , by god's law , man's law , and the law of nature , i think can no ways consist either with scripture , reason , or matter of fact ; for in first place , i think i have sufficiently proved , that there is no divine right of succession for the heirs of crowns , any more than of other inheritances , either by the law of god , or that of nature ; and as for man's law , i think i have here also proved , that the succession to the crown by right of blood alone , was never establisht by any positive law , nor yet setled by any constant or interrupted custom , when this declaration was made ; for the crown had then never descended from father to son. for above two descents , without a deposition , or possessed by those who claim'd by right of blood , without any other title ; for as for the three kings of the house of lancaster , i have already proved ( and your self must also own it ) that they could have no title to the crown , but from the acts of entail of the th and th of henry the th above mention'd so that according to man's law , that is custom , and also the statute law of this kingdom , the house of lancaster , had all that time the better title . but to shew you what uncertain things parliaments are , when king edward the th had reign'd ten years , he was driven out of the kingdom , by the earl of warwick's turning suddenly against him , and in his absence he replaced king henry the th upon the throne , who had been all this while kept in prison ; and the first act this king did after his restoration , was to call a parliament , which revoked all the former statutes and declarations of the th of henry the th . and st . of edward the th . and then entail'd the crown anew upon the issue of king henry , the remainder to the duke of clarence , who then took part with king henry against his own brother . 't is true indeed that king edward the th returning again not long after into england , and regaining the crown from king henry the th . the said king was not only murther'd , together with his son prince henry , but in the next parliament , was also attainted of treason , with all others of his party , and yet lot let you see that this very act is now null and void against king henry the th . and his son prince edward ; see an act of parliament of the first of henry the th . ( not printed ) which because it is not commonly known , i will read it almost verbatim , the king our sovereign remembring , how against all rightwiseness , honour , nature , and duty , an inordinate , seditious , and slaunderous act was made , against the most famous prince of blessed memory king henry the sixth his uncle , at the parliament holden at westminstey , the fourth day of november , the first year of the reign of edward the th . late king of england , whereby his said uncle contrary to the due allegiance , and all due order , was attainted of high treason , wherefore our same sovereign lord , by the advice and assent of the lords spiritual and temporal , and commons in this present parliament ▪ assembled , and by authorities of the same , ordaineth , enacteth , and establisheth , that the same act , and all acts of attainder , forfailure , or disablement made or had in the said parliament , or else in any other parliament , of the said late king edward against the said most blessed prince king henry , or against the right famous princess margaret late queen of england , his wife , or the right victorious prince edward , late prince of wales , son of the same blessed prince k. henry and margaret , &c. are void , annulled , and repealed , and of no force , nor effect ; so that by vertue of this act , the title of the house of lancaster was again declared to be good . but to conclude , i cannot but take notice of one mistake you have fallen into , by saying , that all proceedings against king richard the d. are repeal'd by that parliament of the first of edward the th . which is not so ; for though i grant that the dealings of henry earl of darby ( as he is there call'd ) in imprisoning the said king , and usurping the royal power , is there expresly condemned , and his murthering of him said to be against gods law , and his own oath of allegiance ( as certainly it was ) yet the deposition of the said king richard by parliament is no ways repeal'd by this act , for then all the records thereof would have been quite cancell'd and taken off the rolls , whereas they still remain to be seen at this day ; and you see by this act i now recited , that the attainder of king henry the th is declar'd contrary to due allegiance , and all due order , and all forfeitures , and disablements of the said king and prince are quite annull'd and made void . m. i must confess you have so stagger'd me with this act , that i know not what to say to it , but that it was made in the first parliament of king henry the th . and before he had married the princess elizabeth , and consequently had no good title to the crown himself , therefore till then i look upon him as an usurper ; but i shall now proceed to sh●w you , that that very king , nay , even richard the d. himself , chiefly relied , not upon any parliamentary election , but upon their own pretended titles of being right heirs by blood ; for after the death of edward the th . his son edward the th . was proclaim'd king and might have quietly enjoy'd it , if his ambitious uncle richard duke of gloucester had not plotted to defeat him of it ; and knowing very well that he had no way to bring it about , but by inciting a corrupt party of the bishops and lords , together with the lord mayor of london , and some of his party in the city , to set forth by way of petition to the duke then protector of the king and realm , that all the children of k. edward the th were bastards , supposing that king to have been contracted with a certain woman called eleanor boteler , before he married queen elizabeth ; moreover , that the blood of his elder brother george duke of clarence deceased , was attainted ; so that none of the lineal blood of richard duke of york could be found uncorrupted but in himself ; and there was at the conclusion of that roll , an address to him from the lords and commons of the kingdom ; that he would take the government upon himself : this fine artifice assisted on one side with his feigned excuses , which induced the less thinking sort of people to believe , he desir'd not the royalty , and prompted on the other side with the fear of his power , procured his accession to the throne , so that at last , he and his wife anne were solemnly crowned king and queen at westminster ; and by these steps did that inhumane prince , who had no title to the crown , either by descent , or by merit ascend the english throne ; see you that not by election , but by pretence of blood , and by bastardising and attainting his nephews , he set himself up for the only true heir of the crown ; and therefore in the parliament he call'd immediately after his coronation , when they had declar'd almost the very same things as were before in the said petition , they proceed further ; to declare that the right , title , and estate which king richard the iii d had to , and in the crown and royal dignity of the realm of england , with all things thereunto , within the said realm , and without it , annexed and appertaining , was just and lawfull , as grounded upon the laws of god and nature , and also upon the antient laws and laudable customs of this said realm , as also taken and reputed by all such persons as were learned in the above-said laws and customs , ( and proceeds farther thus , ) therefore at the request and by the assent of the three estates of this realm , ( that is to say ) the lords spiritual , and temporal , and commons of this land , assembled in this present parliament , and by the authority of the same , it is pronounced , decreed , and declared , that our said soveraign lord the king was and is the very undoubted king of this realm of england , with all things thereunto belonging within the said realm , and without it , united , annexed , and appertaining , as well by right of consanguinity , and inheritance , as by lawfull election , consecration , and coronation . so that you see tho' they put in his election , as also his coronation , as means of obtaining the crown , yet the pretended hereditary right of blood was the main ground of his establishment . but as for king henry the vii th , tho' he could claim the crown by no true right of inheritance , yet would he never own it to be an election by parliament ; for as soon as king richard was slain in the battle of bosworth , the lord stanley put his crown upon henry's head ; who immediately stiling himself king , as well by right of conquest , as by being sole heir male of the house of lancaster , he as such , caused himself to be crowned king ; and though he afterwards call'd a parliament , in which he procured his title to be recognised , yet , as my lord bacon very well observes , he was afraid to take the crown ( by his only true title ) in right of the lady elizabeth his queen , for fear he should only be king by courtesie , and must upon the queens death have resign'd it again ; and should he take it by election , he knew there was a very great difference between a king that holdeth his crown by a civil act of the estates , and one ( mind that ) that holdeth it originally by the law of nature , and descent of blood ; and therefore upon these considerations , he resolved to rest upon the title of the house of lancaster as his main right ; and thereupon he caus'd an act of parliament to pass , wherein his title was acknowledged ( as my lord bacon there tells us ) not by way of declaration , or recognition of right , as on the other side , he avoided to have it by a new law of ordinance , but chose rather a kind of a middle way , by way of establishment , and that under covert and indifferent words , that the inheritance of the crown , should rest , remain and abide in the king , &c. which words might be equally applied , that the crown should continue to him ; but whether as having former right to it ( which was doubtful ) or having it then in fact or possession ( which no man denied ) was left fair to interpretation either way . i speak not this to justifie all his actions , but to let you see that he chiefly insisted upon his right of inheritance , and absolutely disown'd any title by election from the people . f. i cannot deny the matter of fact concerning king richard the iii ds deposing his nephew , and usurping the crown to have been very wicked , and contrary to the received law of england concerning the succession at that time ; and likewise that by bastardizing his brother the late king's issue without due course of law , and by attainting the blood of his other brother the duke of clarence , he would have made the world believe that he was lawful heir by right of blood ; yet you will not deny but that for all this , he was so sensible of the weakness of his title , that though ( it is true ) his right by blood is declar'd in the first place in that act of recognition , yet it is plain he would not rely upon that alone , and therefore you see the parliament there also insists upon his right by election , and coronation , which they would never have done , had it not been that they looked upon it for good law , that whoever was crowned king , and call'd a parliament , and had his title therein recognized and confirmed , was thenceforth true and lawful king to all intents and purposes ; therefore though you have omitted it , i shall proceed to shew you , what this statute also farther declares : for after they had declar'd the said king's title , as grounded upon the antient laws and laudable customs of the realm , according to the judgement of all such persons as were learned in them ; they proceed thus : yet nevertheless , for as much as it is consider'd , that the most part of the people is not sufficiently learned in the aforesaid laws and customs , whereby truth and right in his behalf , of likelihood may be had , and not clearly known to all people , and thereupon put in doubt and question ; and over this , how that the court of parliament is of such authority , that a declaration made by the three estates , and by the authority of the same , maketh before all other things most faithful and certain quieting of mens minds , and removeth the occasion of doubts , and seditious language ; therefore they also declare that he was the undoubted king. whence 't is evident , that the reason of this law supposeth that the subjects in general are not capable of understanding the laws and customs upon which the titles of our kings depend ; and that the best satisfaction that the generality of the people can possibly have in those high matters , was to rest on the judgment and determination of the kingdom , declared by act and authority of parliament , and therein to acquiesce for the preventing sedition , so much as in language : therefore what i said before in the case of king stephen , is also true in this , quod fieri non debuit , factum valet ; and all the acts made in the reign of this king richard , though ● horrid usurper , were never repeal'd , but stand good at this day . as to what you say concerning the manner of king henry the vii ths coming to the crown is also true , but as for his title to it by right of succession , that was certainly false ; for his mother the countess of richmond was then alive , by whom he claim'd the crown , and liv'd divers years after he was king ; so that though i grant that it is recited in the parliament roll that he claim'd the crown in parliament , tam per justum titulum haereditantiae , quam per verum dei judicium , in tribuendo sibi victoriam de inimico suo in campo ; tho' the latter of these titles may be true , viz. the conquest of king richard , especially when once he was confirm'd and recognized in parliament , yet that the former could not be so , is plain from what i have now said ; so that it is certain that king henry the vii ths best title was neither by inheritance nor marriage with the princess elizabeth , but by the act of parliament , as appears by the unprinted statute it self , still upon the roll , which since you did not repeat , i will ; the title is titulus regis , and it runs in these words , to the pleasure of almighty god , the wealth , prosperity , and surety of this realm of england to the singular comfort of all the kings subjects of the same , and in avoiding of all ambiguities and questions , be it ordained , established , and enacted by authority of this present parliament , that the inheritance of the crowns of the realms of england , and of france , with all the preeminence and dignity royal to the same pertaining , and all other seignouries to the king belonging beyond the sea , with th' appurtenances thereto in any wise due or pertaining , be , rest , remain and abide in the most royal person of our now sovereign lord king henry the vii th , and in the heirs of his body lawfully coming perpetually with the grace of god so to endure , and in none other . now this was done some time before he married with the princess elizabeth , for as soon as this act was made , the commons requested the king to marry elizabeth the daughter of king edward the fourth , that by god's grace there might be issue of the stock of their kings ( as their own words were ; ) and that this was rather to preserve the blood royal , than to give any new confirmation to his title appears from hence , that there was never any other act after the marriage to declare the right of the crown to be in the king , and queen , or so much as to entail it on the issue of their bodies ; so that it is plain he enjoy'd it not in his wives , but in his own right , since he held it after her death , by vertue of this statute , which plainly shows , ( that in the judgement of that parliament ) the house of lancaster was lookt upon to have the better title : and ( though it is true ) that the king procured the pope's bull now in the cotton library , to strengthen his title , threatning all those with excommunication that should offer to rebell against him ; yet even that bull ( tho' his right by inheritance and conquest be first mentioned ) concludes with his title by the election of the prelates , nobility , and people of england ; and the decree or statute of the three estates in their convention , call'd the parliament , as this bull it self expresses it . m. i must confess you have told me more of these matters , than ever i heard of before , for i always thought that there had been no act of settlement upon king henry the vii th , until after his marriage with the princess elizabeth ; for till then i look upon him as an usurper upon her right , as he was also after her death upon his sons successively ; so that if you will have my opinion , i conceive that this statute being made before he had a lawfull right to the crown is wholly void , as is also that of the repeal of the attainder of king henry the vi ths for the same reason . but let his title be what it will , it is ce●●ain , his son king henry the viii th succeeded to the crown , as heir rather to his mother , than his father , and so was in by remitter ; but as for king edward the vi th , he was undoubted heir by right of blood , as being the only heir male to his father ; and though it is true , that king henry made divers statutes whereby he alter'd the succession of the crown as to his two daughters mary and elizabeth , sometimes declaring them both illegitimate , and then again giving them a right to succeed by act of parliament ; yet these acts of succession were obtained purely by the king's sollicitation , and command ; and tho' at last he got himself impower'd to make a will , whereby he might settle and entail the crown on whom he pleas'd , yet all these acts of parliament , as also this , will signifie just nothing after his death ; for tho' his said daughters queen mary , and elizabeth , did one after another succeed his son king edward the vi th , yet was it not by vertue of any of these acts of parliament , or by the aforesaid will , but by pure right of inheritance ( or colour of it at least ) and therefore in the first of queen mary , there is an act declaring the queens highness to have been born in most just and faithful matrimony , and also repealing all acts of parliament , and sentence of divorce made or had to contrary . now certainly the intention of this act was to declare her succession to be inheritance by right of blood ; so likewise in the first of elizabeth , the lords spiritual and temporal , and commons do declare and confess that queen elizabeth is in very deed , and of meer right , by the laws of god , and by the laws and statutes of this realm , their most rightfull and lawfull sovereign queen , and that she was rightly , lineally , and lawfully descended and come of the blood-royal of this realm of england ; all which ( whether it were true or not in her ) yet the lineal and lawful descent of queen elizabeth , was the ground upon which she was declar'd to be their rightfull and lawfull queen . and though i grant that king henry the viiith . had by his last will and testament post poned all the issue of his sister margaret queen of scots , and preferred the children of his younger sister the queen dowager of france , ( which she had by charles duke of suffolke before them : yet was this will afterward cancelled , and torn off from the rolls in chancery where it was recorded ; and that by order of queen mary ( as is supposed . ) so that iames the vith . king of scotland was by right of blood declared and proclaimed king of england immediately upon the death of queen elizabeth , as right heir of the crown . and in the first parliament after his coronation , his title is by them particularly recognized in the words which i desire you to read with me : where after setting forth his pedigree as lineally descended from the lady margaret , eldest daughter of king henry the vii th , and queen elizabeth his wi●e , daughter of king edward the iv th ; they farther acknowledge king iames their lawful and rightful leige lord , and sovereign ; and farther say , as being bound thereunto both by the laws of god and man , that they do recognize and acknowledge that immediately upon the dissolution and decease of elizabeth late queen of england , the imperial crown of the realm of england , and all kingdoms & dominions belonging to the same , did by inherent birth-right , and lawfull and undoubted succession descend and come to his most excellent majesty , being lineally , lawfully , and justly , next , and sole heir of the blood royal of this realm ▪ and thereunto they do most humbly and faithfully submit and oblige themselves , their heirs and posterities for ever , until the last drop of their bloods be spent . i have been the more particular in the recital of this act , because it stands not only as a perpetual declaration of the sense of the representatives of the whole nation for an hereditary succession of the crown without any vacancie or election , but also because it contains , their solemn engagement for themselves and their posterities for ever to king iames , and his issue , and consequently to his right heirs for ever ; so that nothing can be more directly contrary than this act to the late proceedings of the convention , first in declaring the throne vacant , and then placing the prince and princess of orange therein . f. i will not deny but that king henry the viii th , and edward the vi th , both succeeded by right of inheritance , but whether the former claim'd it as heir to his mother or his father , is much to be doubted ; since being heir to both of them , he never declar'd by what title he held the crown : but as for his two daughters , queen mary , and queen elizabeth , it is certain their best titles were from these acts of parliament ; for as to queen mary , it is plain , that at her coming to the crown , she could not be looked upon as heir by right of blood , because by the statute of the th of henry the viii th , his marriage with queen catherine her mother was declar'd unlawful , and the crown setled upon the king , and the heirs of his body lawfully begotten on queen anne bullen ; and besides all this , she was but sister by the half blood to king edward the vi th , and so could not inherit as heir to him ; and though in the first year of her reign , the parliament ( t is true ) took off her illegitimation , and repeal'd the acts of the th , and th of henry viii . whereby she was declar'd illegitimate ; yet in this , the parliament seems rather to provide for the honour of her descent , than ( as you would have it ) to declare her succession to be inheritance by right of blood , because the statute of the th of henry the viii th , whereby the crown was setled upon prince edward , and the heirs of his body , the remainder upon the ladys mary , and elizabeth ; and whereby the king had also power given him , of disposing the crown by letters patents , or by will , was not at all repeal'd ; and for which , a memorable reason is given in both these acts , least if such heirs should fail , and no provision made in the king's life , who should rule and govern this realm , for lack of such heirs , that then this realm should be destitute of a lawful governour ; whereby it seems plain , that the parliament then esteemed no heirs to have a right by law , farther than had been declar'd by these statutes . so likewise for queen elizabeth , her title was more apparently by act of parliament , and that she looked upon her self sufficient to have succeeded , by vertue of the limitation of the statute of the th of henry the eighth , last mention'd , appears in that she never procured her mothers marriage to be declared good , and consequently her own illegitimation to be taken off ; so that take it which way you will , it is certain that either queen mary's or queen elizabeths title must have been only by act of parliament , since she was born whilst queen catherine , king henry's first wife was living ; and therefore , when the parliament you mention , in the first year of queen elizabeth , declar'd , that she was rightly , lawfully , and lineally descended , and come of the blood royal of this realm , yet these words can only be understood of such a lineal and lawful descent as is here declar'd to be so by vertue of this , as well as the former statute ; and not according to any hereditary descent at common-law , since it is very well known , that as long as the popes dispensation for king henrys marriage with the princess catherine his brothers wife was allowed for good , as it was till the latter end of henry the vii ths , and all the first years of henry the viii ths reign , the princess mary was looked upon as the only presumptive heiress of the crown ; this i tell you , not to invalidate queen elizabeths title , but to let you see that acts of parliament , if they declare that which is apparently false in matter of law or fact are not to be credited , unless you will give them more power than god himself , who cannot ( as all divines agree ) make that to have been done which was never done , or that not to have been done , which hath once come to pass . i come now in the last place , to examine the act of recognition of king iames the firsts title to the crown , which i will not dispute to have been by right of blood , since none of the descendants of king henry the vii th could have any title before him ; for though it is true it was otherwise ordain'd by king henry the viii ths will , yet that ( as you your self show ) was not only cancell'd in queen marys time , but was also void in it self ; for , whereas by the statute of the th of henry the viii th , there was a power given him to dispose of the crown , either by his letters parents , or else by his last will signed with his hand , yet was this power never legally executed ; for those that have argued against this will , have told us , that he never sign'd it in his life time , but that a stamp of his name was put thereunto after his decease , as most manifestly appeared by open declaration made in parliament of this matter by the lord paget , and others , that king henry did never sign it with his own hand , as was also proved by the pardon obtain'd for one william clerke , for puting the stamp unto the said will , after the king was departed . so that though i grant that king iames had a very good title to the crown of england by inheritance , yet whether it was from king henry the vii th alone , or from queen elizabeth his wife , is not there declar'd ; only that he was lawfully descended of lady margaret , eldest daughter to king henry the vii th , and queen elizabeth his wife , eldest daughter of king edward the iv th , and therefore , that they are bound both by the laws of god and man to recognize his majesty as sole heir of the blood royal of this realm ; all which is so far true if by gods law , and mans law , you will thereby understand such laws as god impowers the king and parliament to make , for otherwise , there is no more heed to be taken of this declaration , than that which was made before to richard the iii d , which also declared him to have a good title to the crown by the laws of god , and nature , and the laws and customs of this realm . so that i see nothing in all this act of recognition , that at all contradicts my notion , that king iames's title is wholly derived from the act of settlement made on king henry the vii th , from whom he was lineally descended ; so that though his pedigree be also derived from queen elizabeth , eldest daughter to king edward the iv th , yet this was only ex abundanti , to show that he had every way a title to the crown , and if she her self had any title , it was wholly by vertue of those acts of parliament of the th of henry the vi th , and st of edward the iv th , which vested the crown in richard duke of york , and king edward the iv th his son , and which last act first declar'd that the three henrys of the house of lancaster were only kings in deed , and not of right ; for before that time i defie you to show me in all our histories or law-books any such distinction . in all foregoing times he that was solemnly annointed and crown'd king in deed , was also looked upon so to be in point of right , and therefore let those statutes you so much insist upon , talk never so much of any kings being so , by any fundamental hereditary right precedent to , and independent from the power of the two houses of parliament : i am very well satisfied that such a declaration must be void in it self , since i have sufficiently proved that there was no such law of succession ever setled by any general custom , or common law , since it hath been near as often broken , as observed ; and as for any positive or statute-law enacting any hereditary right of succession you do not so much as pretend to show it ; so that i think i have sufficiently proved the three propositions i laid down , viz. that ever since the time of edward the first , though the crown has been claim'd by right of blood , yet has it not been very often enjoy'd by princes who had no just pretence to that title secondly , that the two houses of parliament have often , notwithstanding that claim , placed , or at least fixed the crown upon the heads of those princes who they very well knew could have no hereditary right to it . thirdly , that such princes have been always taken for lawful kings , all their laws standing good at this day , without any confirmation by their successours . m. i did not think that you who were so great an admirer of the two houses of parliament , should now be so much against their power in joyning with the king to declare what the true right of succession to the crown is , and hath ever been from time beyond memory : but i see acts or declarations of parliament signifie nothing with you if they are against your hypothesis , or else you would never go about thus to expose those acts of parliament of king edward the ivth . and king iames the ist. whereby they are declared both by the law of god and man undoubted heirs of the crown . and the last act i cited , ( viz. ) that of king iames the ist. doth sufficiently confute your notion of a vacancy of the throne : where it is expresly declared , that immediately upon the decease of queen elizabeth , the crown of england with all the dominions belonging to the same , did by inherent birth-right , and lawful and undoubted succession descend and come to his majesty king iames. so that if there then were no vacancy of the throne , i cannot see how there could be any such thing now ; the next heir to the crown ( be he who they will ) being certainly not so far removed from king iames the ist. as himself was from king henry the viith . under whom he claimed . f. i must still confess my self to have a great veneration for the solemn declarations of king and parliament , made by any statute ; yet not so as to idolize them , or to look upon all their declarations as infallible : i grant indeed that whosoever is by them declared and recognized for king or queen of england , is to be acknowledged and obeyed as such , by all the subjects of this kingdom ; without farther questioning his title : but if not content with this , they will also take upon them to declare that such kings or queens have an undoubted hereditary right by the laws of god and nature , when i plainly find from the holy scriptures , as well as the history of matter of fact , and the knowledge of our laws , that they have no other ti●le than what the laws of the land have conferred upon them ; and therefore you your self cannot deny , but that it was gross flattery in the two houses of parliament to declare , that richard the iiid ( for-example ) had a true and undoubted right to the crown , by the laws of god , and nature , and also by the laws and customs of this realm , when you know he was a notorious usurper upon the rights of his brother king edward's children . now how can i be assur'd that the like declaration made to k●ng iames the i. was not l●kewise a piece of courtship of the representative of the kingdom to this king then newly setled in his throne ; since we find the people of this nation , when they are in a kind fit , never think they can say , or do too much for their princes ; and therefore i must freely tell you , that it is not the bare declaration of a parliament that this or that has been always the law or custom of this realm , when we can find from history that it has never been so held for above four hundred years at least , and therefore not beyond the memory of man ( as you suppose ) since that must be before the reign of richard the first as i have already proved to you at our eighth meeting . but to answer your objection against the vacancy of the throne , i do freely grant , that a● often ●s the crown descends by lineal succession , there can be no vacancy of the throne , as it did in the case of king iames the first : yet doth it not therefore follow , that there can never be any such vacancy in any case whatsoever , since certainly it may so happen , that all the heirs male of the blood-royal may fail , as it happen'd in the case of scotland , when iohn balioll and robert bruce contended for the crown , which not being to be decided by the estates of the kingdom , they were forced to referr it to our king edward the first ; and as also happen'd in france , when philip of valois , and our edward the iii d , both claim'd the crown , which was decided by a great assembly of the estates of france in the favour of the former , who claim'd as heir of the male line , against king edward ▪ who was descended by a woman ; and if king iames's abdication , or forfeiture ( call it which you will ) is good , pray give me a sufficient reason , why the convention of the estates of england should not have as much authority as those of france , or scotland ; this being as much or more a limited kingdom , thau either of the other ever were . m. i do not deny that , but pray shew me any sufficient reason why the convention should now vote a vacancy of the throne , since there was certainly an heir apparent not long since in england , and i hope is now safe in france , who ought to fill it , or at least there should have been some sufficient cause alledged against him , to prove that he was not true son either of the king or queen ; and till this was done , they could not with any right or good conscience , place any other relation of his in the throne , since every person ought to be esteem'd the son of that father and mother that publickly own him for such ; for it is a maxim in our as well as your law , filiatio non potest probari . f. how this could be performed without first declaring the throne vacant , i cannot apprehend ; for you your self must grant , that there have been great doubts and suspitions of the realty of this prince of wales ; and therefore , that being one great reason of the prince of orange's coming over , the truth of this child whether he was really born of the of the body of the q. is first to be examin'd and determin'd , before he can be declar'd k. of england in the room of his supposed father , whom we will also suppose civilly ( though not naturally dead ) and till this be done , ( unless you would have had him been declar'd king without ever examining the truth of the matter ) the throne must have continued vacant till it could be decided , whether he or his half sister the princess of orange were to fill it ; and if so , whilst the convention remain'd in this suspence , they could do no other than vote the throne vacant till they were sufficiently satisfied who had the best right to it . but to answer your argument , that unless something could have been presently alledg'd against this infant to have proved him not to have been born of the body of the queen , he ought to have been declar'd king : the maxime you mention may be well allow'd in the case of common inheritances , but not in that of crowns , for in those we have read that common and violent presumptions have been looked upon as sufficient proofs to set aside a suppos'd heir of the crown : as for example , something above two hundred years since , henry king of castile , call'd the impotent , ( because he was not able to get his queen or any other woman with child ) did out of hatred to his sister isabella , permit a favorite of his to lye with his queen , and get her with child , she was brought to bed of a daughter , but the estates of the kingdom would by no means admit her for legitimate , because the queen had before declar'd her husband to be impotent , and therefore they did not only protest against her legitimacy in the kings life time , in an assembly of the estates , but also as soon as he died , they set this pretended princess quite aside and declared the sister of the late king , queen of castile , who was married to ferdinand king of arragon . now tho' i will not say , that either the suspitions or proofs against the present prince of wales are as pregnant as those against that princess ; yet certainly they were sufficient to debat him from being placed in the throne , till such time as it shall be made apparent that he is really son to the queen . m. if the convention had gone this way to work , i grant there might have been some colour for what they have done , but then they ought before they had placed any body else in the throne , to have first examin'd the truth of the queens being with child , and her being truly deliver'd of this prince , before ever they had declar'd the prince and princess of orange king and queen , and till this had been done , certainly the throne should have still continued vacant ; therefore i doubt your convention have made more haste than good speed in this matter , which certainly requir'd much more deliberation . f. come , i will for once admit that they ought in the first place , to have examin'd your princes title , but this is still to be understood , as far as it was possible for them to do it , as it ought : now pray tell me , how this could be done , when the infant was not only carried away into a foreign kingdom , but also the midwife , the nurse , and several other of the queens near servants and attendants , went away along with him ? who if they had been here to have been cross examin'd , might have declar'd the imposture ( if it be one . ) m. but pray sir , are there not protestant ladies enough left behind , who have already depos'd before the council ( as appears by their depositions published by the kings express command , and enrolled in chancery , in perpituam rei memoriam ) not only that her majesty was with child , but that also she was really deliver'd of this prince ; so that the prince of orange and the convention , ought to have in the first place summon'd those witnesses you mention to be now in france to have appear'd before them , and if they had not come , then to have proceeded as the matter had required . f. you must then grant that the protestant witnesses alone , who are now in england were not sufficient , for if they should have depos'd , that this child had been an impostor , i suppose , you would not have rested satisfied that they had spoke nothing but the truth : since the witnesses now in france ( who best know the matter of fact ) might have sworn the contrary ; but as for sending any summons for them into france it was altogether in vain , and also that which the convention were not at all oblig'd to do ; it was in vain , because neither king iames nor his q. did ever own the power of the convention to hear or determine this affair , and therefore would not have let the witnesses come over ; for after the throne was declar'd vacant , the king must by sending those witnesses have racitly own'd the authority of the convention , in declaring himself to have abdicated the throne , as also that they might place his son therein : so that any such summons would certainly have been only rejected with scorn , and we should gain nothing , but the loss of so much time , and hindred our present settlement and defence , a whole summer . nor was the convention oblig'd to do it , since the parliament it self is not bound to take cognizance of any person or thing that is not within the kingdom of england or the territories belonging to it ; and therefore it was not their business to enquire ( without it had been brought before them ) what was become of this infant , whether he was legitimate or not , or whether he was alive , or else had been cast away at sea , or taken by pyrates , any of which might very well have been ; and therefore indeed this business could never have been decided , unless the infant himself were actually present and sufficient proof made , not only that this was the same child that was born of the queen , but which was also carried away into france , all which could never have been examin'd as it ought , without the child 's personal presence here , which i suppose you will grant that king iames and his queen would never admit of as things now stand ; therefore since a thorough examination into this business was impossible to have been perform'd , the convention have done no more than what can be justified , in first declaring the throne vacant , and then who should fill it . m. well , but admit the case were so as you have put it , the kingdom ought however to have remain'd without a king , till the succession had been duly setled . since according to the act of recognition to king iames i. the nation did not only oblige themselves but their posterity ( that is , we that are now alive ) to that king and his right heirs ; and therefore till this princes right had been determined , either the convention should have govern'd , or else they ought to have made the prince of orange only governour or regent of the kingdom , and not to have placed him and his princess in the throne , till the young prince had died , or else had been proved to be an impostor . f. i doubt not but i can shew you not only the unreasonableness . but also the unpracticableness of this supposition . first , its unreasonableness , since you are very much mistaken to alledge that the whole nation , by that act of recognition to king iames obliged themselves , and their posterities , to him and his right heirs . 't is true they there tell him , that they made that recognition as the first fruits of their loyalty and faith to him , and his royal progeny and posterity for ever , and also when they have acknowledged him to be justly and lawfully next , and sole heir of the blood royal of this realm . and that they thereunto submit and oblige themselves , their heirs and posterities for ever , &c. there is no more meant or expressed in all this , than that the whole nation did by their representatives in parliament oblige themselves and their children to king iames and his posterity for ever , and i think that this part of the recognition is sufficiently perform'd , by placing two of his great grand-children in the throne , for as to the words rightful or lawful heirs , they are not to be found in all this statute . but as for your notion of a regency , it is plain it could have signified nothing , either for our present security , or future settlement ; not to the former , since this regent ( be he whom he would ) must have governed in the right of some body or other , since i never read of a regency in england during a vacancy of the throne ; therfore i will at present admit that the vote for king iames's abdication had never been made , only that the prince of orange had been declar'd regent of the kingdom , till such time as king iames would have given the nation sufficient satisfaction of his reforming all past miscarriages , and that his future government should be according to law. now i would very fain know how it can be justified according to your notion of the king 's absolute irresistible power , to place a regent over the kingdom to govern in his stead , whether he will or not , when it is certain he is neither a minor , an ideot , nor a lunatick : so that then he must have return'd again to the government whenever he had pleas'd , or else the convention must have been judges whether the security or satisfaction he offered was sufficiently satisfactory or not , for if he himself was to be sole judge in this case , i suppose you will grant this regency would quickly have been at an end ; but on the other ●ide , if this right of judging had been left in the convention , whether the king's proposals were satisfactory or not , they might also have voted them not to be so ; and till this was done , they might very well have justified there keeping him out of the kingdom by force , now how that could have consisted with your doctrine of the kings irresistible power i desire you would satisfie me if you can ; so that by this regency , the king must either have been deprived of his whole power , or he must not ; if the former , that would have been as good as deposing him from being king , and had left him no more than the bare title , and whether this had not been a great deal worse , ( as more hypocritical ) than the conventions declaring him to have abdicated the government , i leave it to any indifferent person to judge . but if you will suppose that this regent must have govern'd in the name of your prince of wales , as being declared king , that would have been to have granted his title to be good without hearing of it , and had been indeed to have given up the main point in dispute . m. i see you would fain find out any shifts for this pretended vacancy , and placing those in the throne to whom it doth not belong ; yet though i grant that the word right heirs are not expresly recited in this act of recognition to king iames i. yet for all that , it is implyed , for the oath of allegiance is enacted by i. eliz. to be taken to the queen , her heirs , and lawful successors ; and by the oath of supremacy ( enacted in the ivth of king iames ) we are likewise obliged to swear , that we will bear true allegiance to his majesty , his heirs , and successors : now who these heirs are , this very act of recognition doth sufficiently declare , viz. the next heir by descent of blood ; for as king iames is hereby acknowledged to be heir by inherent birth-right : so when they oblige themselves , and their posterity's to king iames , and his progeny , it is to be understood ( by parity of reason ) that they oblige themselves and the nation , for all future generations to him and his issue in that sense , as that their allegiance should be only due to him , or her who should be lawful heir to their father , brother , or uncle , according to those rules of succession , that had been commonly received for above four hundred years last past , that is to say the eldest son , brother , or daughter , being still to be prefer'd before the younger , and sons before daughters , and the same rule must also hold for their descendents ; since upon this ground it was , that the title of the house of york was prefer'd by parliament before that of lancaster , and the title of the king of scots who was descended from the eldest sister , before that of the house of suffolk , who came from the younger , and this being never alter'd by any subsequent statute , ( or if it had , i think it would not have been good ; ) the convention ought either to have declar'd the prince of wales king immediately , or at least to have continued the throne vacant , let the difficulties or inconveniences that you suppose might have followed , to be never so great ; and therefore it was their duty to have fought out king iames and the prince , where-ever they had been , and to have desired him to have sent over the prince , together with the witnesses that went away with him ; and till this had been absolutely refus'd , or else that upon a fair hearing , this prince had been proved an impostor . i say till one of these had been done , the throne ought still to have continued vacant ( if it were so at all ) nor till this had been clear'd could they have justified the placing any body else upon the throne , though never so nearly related to the king ; whom i will suppose for discourse sake , to have really abdicated the kingdom . f. i will not deny that the legal and common course of succession ought to be inviolately observed according to the rules you have now laid down , when ever it may consist with the publick good and safety of the kingdom ; and yet for all that i cannot believe , that the king himself , much less any other , that only pretends as next heir to him , can have such an absolute right to the kingdom , as that no considerations whatsoever can make them lose or forfeit their right thereunto ; therefore i look upon the government of a kingdom not to be like that interest which a private man hath in an estate , which is his right let him be what he will , or let him mannage it how he will. whereas in the right to a kingdom , i take it to be a true maxim , that the representatives of a nation ( as the convention was ) ought to have more regard to the happiness and safety of the whole people , or common-wealth , than to the dignity or authority of any particular person whosoever , or howsoever nearly related to the crown , when it is evident that the advancement of such a person to the throne , will prove destructive to our religion , civil liberties and properties . now give me leave to apply what i have said to the point now in question ; let us therefore at the present suppose , that your prince of wales is true , and lawful son to king iames and queen mary ; and let me also farther suppose , that in his late passage over sea , he was taken by the pyrates of argiers , or tunis , and by them been carried to one of those places , and been bred up in the mahometan religion , and after he had been circumcised and fully grounded in that abominable superstition , the grand seignior , together with the kings of argier , and tunis , should send this nation word , that if they would not admit him quietly for their king , and allow him all those priests he should bring with him a free exercise of their religion in england , they would then make war upon this nation with all the forces they could raise . i ask you what we ought to do in this case , whether we should receive him for our king , or keep him out ? m. i must confess it is a nice question , and since it is a thing that never did yet , nor i hope will ever come to pass , i think i may freely answer you , that supposing this prince could be proved to be the very same who was carried away so many years ago , we ought , notwithstanding his false belief , to receive him ; especially if he would solemnly swear , only to worship god in private after his own way ; and that he would swear not to violate our religion , or invade our liberties and properties ; and this being done , i think we ought then to admit him for our lawful sovereign ; since , as you your self have already acknowledged at our third meeting , the supreme powers are not to be resisted , because they are of a different religion from that of the people or nation they govern. f. very well : but let me tell you , in this you are much more kind to mahometan and heretical princes , than the church of rome , who have decreed , that no prince ought to be received as right heir to a crown , who is a pagan , turk , or heretick ; and upon this ground it was , that the states of france , during the time of the league , by the pope's decree , refus'd to own henry king of navarre for their sovereign ; and also , that the papists of the nuntio party in ireland during the late rebellion , refused to own the late duke of ormond for lord lieutenant of that kingdom , because the king was a protestant . but pray answer me a question or two further ; suppose this prince refus'd to promise these or such things , or else if he did promise , and swear them , pray tell me how could we be assured , that according to the principles of that religion he had been bred under , and those arbitrary notions he had learned concerning the absolute power of kings in barbary , and which he would believe due to himself , as being as absolute a monarch as any of them ; i say , how such a prince ever could be trusted ? since if he had the whole power of the militia in his hands , he might bring in what number of turkish or moorish guards he should think fit , who might easily set up that religion and government too , in this nation , since , according to your principles of passive obedience and non-resistance , no man ought to lift up so much as a finger against him , though he went about to make us all turks and slaves . m. well , supposing all this , as long as it is his right he ought to have it , let the consequence be what it will. f. you have said enough , i desire no more ; but i hope every true protestant and english man will be of another mind if ever such a case should happen ; but indeed , it appears very strange to me , that a natural disability , such as ideocy or lunacy , should be esteem'd sufficient in all kingdoms to debarr the next heir from the government , and yet that a moral or a religious disability should not have the same effect ; and though i grant that a king ought not to be rebelled against , or resisted , meerly because he is of a different religion from that of his subjects , for i was never for resisting king iames meerly upon that score ; yet it is another thing when a prince is not actually possessed of the throne , but is to be admitted to it upon such conditions as may appear safe for the religion and civil constitution of a kingdom . in this case , if a prince be certainly infected with such pernicious principles either in relation to religion or civil government , it is much otherwise ; as for example , that no faith is to be kept with hereticks ; that his own religion is to be propagated by arms , blood , or persecution ; that no government can be safe for the prince , or in which he can appear great or glorious , but as an absolute monarch ; let such a prince be either a christian or a mahometan , i think it would be a certain ruine to a kingdom to be obliged to receive such a prince , when they were morally sure , that he would not only subvert their religion , but destroy the very professors of it , and not only those , but alter the civil constitution too , by turning it from a limited kingdom into an absolute despotick tyranny . to conclude , i shall only desire you to consider , into what a country your prince of wales is carry'd , and what instructors he is like to have , and what principles he will receive from them : and then pray tell me , if he continues there till he is a man , what difference there will be between this young prince bred up in such a religion and such principles , and the same , if he had been carried away by pyrates to argier , as i at first suppos'd ? m. this is a very invidious comparison ; for though i do not approve of the roman-catholick religion , yet sure there is a great deal of difference between that which professes all the articles of our creed , and in which we of our church own salvation may be obtained , and the mahometan superstition , which denies that fundamental article of our creed , ( viz. ) that jesus christ is the son of god ; and as for civil or political principles , i hope the king his father will take care to have him instructed by some of those english noblemen or gentlemen who are now with him , in the customs and constitutions of the english government , and wherein it differs from the french , as we read chancellor fortescue did prince henry , son to henry the vith . and i hope he will come over again to practise them in his own country before he comes to be infected with the arbitrary principles of the french government ; but as for those of not keeping faith with hereticks , and a propagating his religion by persecution , i doubt not but the king his father will take care not to commit his education to any of those who are infected with such principles ; and i am the more inclin'd to believe it , because it is very well known that his majesty's tenderness and moderation in matters of religion , and not persecuting any body for the belief or bare profession of it , as it was the greatest cause of his late declaration of indulgence , so it was the main original of all his late misfortunes ; nor can i see any reason why a king by being a roman catholick , must necessarily be a tyrant and a persecutor , since you cannot deny but that we have had many good and just kings of that religion , and it is from those princes that professed it that we derive our magna charta , and most of the priviledges we now enjoy . f. though i would not be thought to affirm , that the romish religion is every way worse than the mahometan , yet this much i may safely affirm , that there is no doctrine in all that superstition , so absurd and contrary to sence and reason , as that of transubstantiation , held by the church of rome , in which the far greatest part are certainly idolators , which can never be object●d against the turks ; and therefore though i will not deny but that a man may be saved in the communion of the romish church , yet it is not for being a papist , but only as far as he practises christ's precepts , and trusts in his merits , that he can ever obtain that favour from god. but as for those evil principles both in religion and civil government , which you cannot deny but are now commonly believed and practiced in france , and which you hope king iames will take care that the prince his son shall be bred to avoid ; i wish it may prove as you say ; but if you will consider the men that are like to be his tutors and instructors in matters of religion , viz. his fathers and mothers confessors the jesuits , and for civil government , those popish lords and gentlemen of notorious arbitrary principles and practises , who are gone over to king iames , you will have small reason to believe , that there is ever a fortescus now to be found among the english-men in france , or who is likely to instill into him those true english principles you mention . and though i do not affirm , that every popish prince must needs be a persecutor , yet since that wholly depends upon those priests that have the management of their consciences , shew me a prince in europe who has a jesuit for his confessor , and tell me , if he hath not deserved that character . but though i am so much of your opinion , that king iames ownes the greatest part of his misfortunes to his declaration for liberty of conscience ; yet was it not so much to the thing it self , as to his arbitrary manner of doing it by assuming a dispensing power contrary to law ; and you may be very well assured by the little opposition which the late acts met with for taking off the penalties against conventicles and not coming to church , in respect of all dissenters , except the papists , that king iames might have as easily obtain'd a like act to pass in respect of those also , as to the free profession of their religion , and having mass in their houses , which is more than the papists will allow the protestants in any country in europe . and therefore i must beg your pardon if i still find great reason to doubt whether k. iames his tenderness towards those that differ'd from him in matters of religion , and the indulgence he gave them were purely out of consideration of tender consciences , and not rather thereby to destroy the church of england established by law ; since the dispute began between king iames and his parliament , was not about liberty of conscience , but those offices and commands which the king was resolved to bestow upon the papists , whether the parliament would or not . and certainly there is a great deal of difference between a liberty for a man to enjoy the free profession of his own religion , and the power and benefit of having all the chief imployments of honour and profit in the common-wealth . but that the indulgence of popish princes towards those that dissent from them in matters of religion , may not always proceed from pure tenderness and compassion , appears from a manuscript treatise of f. parsons , that great jesuit in queen elizabeth's time ) which i have been told was found in king iames's closet after his departure . this ( if you can see it ) will shew you , that the subtil jesuite doth there direct his popish successor in order to the more quiet introducing the romish-catholick religion , to grant a general toleration of all religions , out of a like design . thus did iulian the apostare long ago , tolerate all the sects and heresies in the christian religion , because he thereby hoped utterly to confound and destroy it . but as to what you alledge concerning magna charta's being granted by popish princes , and that there has been many good kings of that persuasion : as i will not deny either the one or the other ; so i desire you to remember with what struglling and great difficulties this charter was at first obtain'd and afterwards preserved , though it was no more than a declaration of most of those antient rights and liberties which the nation had always enjoy'd . and you may also remember that they were popish princes , who more than once obtain'd the pope's dispensation to be discharged from those solemn oaths they had taken to observe those charters ; and though there hath been divers good princes before the reformation , yet even the very best of them made the severest laws against protestants , and were the most cruel in their persecutions , witness king henry the ivth , henry the vth , and queen mary . and indeed , it is dangerous to rely upon the faith of a prince , who looks upon it as a piece of merit to destroy all religions but his own ; and when he finds it cannot be done by law , will not stick to use any arbitrary means to bring it about . to conclude , pray consider whether the strict observing or violation of magna charta and his coronation oath , hath been the cause of king iames's abdication . pardon this long discourse which your vindication of the opinion and practises of popish princes hath drawn from me . m. pray sir , let us quit these invidious subjects , which can do no good , since princes must be own'd and submitted to , let their principles and practice ▪ be never so tyrannical , and let us return again to the matter in hand . i will therefore at present suppose the prince of wales to have been either dead , or justly laid aside . now make it out to me how you can justifie the placing the prince and princess of orange in the throne , when the crown is really her right after the prince of wales , and not her husbands ; as also the putting the government solely into his hands , since this can no ways agree with the act of recognition to king iames the first , which you your self cannot deny but ought to be observed , when it may be done without any apparent hazard or prejudice to the protestant religion and the constitution of our government , which i think might have been as well , if not better secured , by letting it have gone in the right line , that by placing the crown upon the head of a prince , who , though it is true , is of the blood-royal by his mother , yet being a foreigner ▪ is a meer stranger to our government and laws , and has been bred up in calvinistical principles , and upon that score is not like to have any good intentions towards the government and ceremonies of the church of england , as appears by his late agreeing to abolish episcopacy in scotland , upon his accepting that crown from the presbyterian convention . f. if these be all the objections you have to make against placing king william and queen mary in the throne , i hope they will not be of any great moment to your self , or any other considerate man ; for if that upon the abdication of king iames and the impossibity of determining your prince of wales's title ( if it be one ) a regency was impracticable and unsafe for the nation at this conjuncture of time , when we want a king to hold a parliament , as well to raise money to defend us against the power of france , as also to make new laws for the ease and reformation of the kingdom , all which a regents acting without royal authority could never do , by the constitution of this kingdom : so that if there was now a necessity of placing some body in the throne , for the common good and safety of the whole common-wealth , i think you your self cannot but acknowledge , that the princess of orange had an hereditary right to the crown , and if her highness had , the prince her husband also ought to govern the kingdom in her right during her life , and those who deny king henry the viith to be lawful king before his marriage with the princess elizabeth , will yet grant he was so in her right after his marriage ; and this has not been only the custom in england , but also in other kingdoms of europe , as i can give you several instances . for upon this ground it was that ferdinand king of arragon , by marrying with isabella queen of castile , governed that kingdom during his life ; so also anthony duke of bourbon marrying with iane queen of navarre , did in her right administer the government of that part of it , which was left unconquer'd by the spaniards ; and here at home philip prince of spain by his marriage with queen mary , had certainly in her right govern'd this kingdom , and had enjoyed something more than the bare title of king , had he not by the articles of marriage , confirm'd by act of parliament , been expresly debar'd from it . m. admit all this to be true , yet this was only the enjoyment of a bare matrimonial crown , and held no longer than during the lives or marriage with those queens you mention . but pray tell me , how can the convention according to the antient constitution of this kingdom , justifie the settlement of the crown , not only on king william during the queens life , but for his own life also , to the prejudice not only of his own issue ( if ever he have any by the princess ) but also of the princess of denmark and her heirs ? f. i doubt not but to shew you , that this may be easily justified by the constitution of the kingdom , and former precedents of what hath been done in the like cases . first , as to the constitution , i have already proved that upon the deposition of a king , ( which is all one with a forfeiture of the crown ) the great council or parliament hath taken upon them to elect or admit either the next heir by blood , or some prince ( tho' more remote ) of the royal family to the crown ; thus king henry the ivth upon the deposition or resignation of king richard the ild. was placed in the throne by the arch-bishop of canterbury , after the two houses had voted and consented he should reign over them ; though i grant that by right of blood , edmund earl of march ought to have succeeded to it ; but he being then a child was passed by unmention'd , duke henry being then powerful , and having deliver'd the kingdom from the tyranny and evil government of richard the ●id . i shall pass by richard the iiid . because i own his government to have begun by unsurpation and to have been established by the murther of his nephews . but as for henry the viith . i have already shew'd you , that the parliament before his marriage with the princess elizabeth , setled the crown upon him , and the heirs of his body , by vertue of which he held it all his reign : whereas there is no such thing done in the present case of king william , since he hath only the crown setled upon him during his own life , with the remainder after his decease without issue by the queen to her , and not his right heirs ; and as for such children as he may have by her , it is agreeable to reason , that he should hold the crown by that which we call the courtesie of england during his life , and not from a king to become a subject to his own children , in case he should desire to live here after her majesties decease , which i hope god will prevent . m. i confess you have drest up a pretty plausible title for king william ; but yet all that you have said amounts to no more than this , that because other kings have been usurpers he may be so too ; for as to all the instances you have brought , they have been only from depositions or manifest usurpations , both which our laws have condemned as absolutely unlawful , as i have shew'd you hath been declar'd by two acts of parliament , against the title of henry the ivth , and his descendents ; but since you will not insist upon the right of richard the iiid . i pass to that act of henry the viith . which ( as i told you before ) so i must repeat it again , that it was done upon his supposed right by blood , as heir to the house of lancaster , and upon that pretence he claimed the crown as his right , in his speech to the first parliament he called ; besides the princess elizabeth , the queen de iure made no claim to the crown , and so did tacitly resign it , which seemed to make him de iure as well as de facto king , and if it were done otherwise , i look upon that whole act as void in it self , because made by him before his marriage with that princess , and whilest he was and usurper upon her right ; so that certainly it is no argument that since parliaments have acted illegally , therefore your convention may do so too ; for it is a known maxime in our civil law , a facto ad ius non valet consequentia , therefore whatever they have done toward creating a good title to king william in respect of the queen his wife , and his issue by her , yet this doth no way excuse the wrong done to the princess of denmark and her issue , in case they survive your king. f. 't is very wonderful to me , to see how ingenious some men are in finding faults with the present settlement of things , though never so much for the best , if not done exactly according to suit with their humour , or hypothesis , when indeed there can no fault be justly found with it , for you agree that if the queen hath a right , king william hath so also , during his life , and whether the princess of denmark and her issue may survive the king , is yet uncertain ; but if either she or they should happen to survive his majesty , yet since she hath made no claim or protestation in the convention , against the kings holding the crown after the decease of the queen . i cannot see why this should not pass for a tacit resignation o●●er right , as well as in the case of the princess elizabeth you but now mentioned . but admit his present majesty according to the late received rules of succession , hath not a title by descent ; yet according to those principles i have already laid down , he certainly has not only a right to the crown , from that inherent power which i suppose doth still remain in the eslates of the kingdom , as representatives of the whole nation to bestow the crown on every abdication , or forfeiture thereof , on such prince of the blood royal , as they shall think best to deserve it ▪ and upon this account i conceive there is none of the blood , that can stand in competition with his present majesty for prudence , valour , moderation , and all other royal vertues ; and therefore it is not at all to be wonder'd at , if the convention hath in this case exercised that original power , which the people reserved to it self , at the first institution of kingly government in this island ; especially if we consider his present majesty not only as a conquerour over king iames , but as our deliverer from his oppression , and that arbitrary government that we were so lately under , and which was like to be much worse , had his reign continued a little longer . therefore i cannot but here take occasion to vindicate his present majesty from those exceptions you have made against his country , and civil , as well as religious principles , first , as to his country , 't is true he is a foreigner ; yet that can he no exception against his admission to the throne , since it was none against his great grand-father king iames , and i doubt not but his majesty may understand as much of the english constitution and government , as his said grand father did , when he first came to the crown . but as for his principles in religion , i cannot see any reason to suspect him more inclinable to the church government of holland , then that of england , since he was bred up under a mother , who was always firm to the religion and discipline of our church , and ever since he was married to the princess , he hath always shew'd a very great respect to its liturgy and ceremonies , by his so constant frequenting his princesses chappel ; so that besides his majesties interest to maintain episcopacy , as most agreeable to the monarchy , and antient constitution of this kingdom , it is likewise ( if he were able ) not in his power to destroy the church of england , since the main body of the clergy , nobility , and gentry of this nation is to zealous for its preservation , that if he had any such inclinations , it would not be easie for him to effect it , and he is too wise a prince to let others persuade him so visibly against his own interest , and having so late an example before his eyes , that it was king iames's ruine to attempt it . as for what you say of scotland , 't is true , presbitery is for the present set up there , but it is uncharitable to impute this to the kings inclinations ; for it is notorious , that of them which call themselves episcopal in that kingdom , a very great number did either out of prejudice to the princes cause , or in contempt of his power , refuse to be chosen members of the convention , or else after they were chosen , did so far adhere to king iames's interest as to desert it ; as did my lord dundee , and many others , and by that means gave the presbyterian party an advantage to carry all things as they pleas'd ; and this party finding the king not well settled here , and the irish in ireland in arms against him , took hold of that opportunity to put the abolishing of episcopacy into the very instrument of government , and to press it upon him at a time when an unavoidable necessity and the obstinacy of too many of the episcopal party forced him to consent to it . wherefore this no way shews his majesties inclinations to set up presbytery even in scotland ; much less doth it prove he would set it up here , where the circumstances , are quite different ; for here the main body of the people hate that government , and will be so far from desiring it , that they will never endure it ; so that as to this , your fears of king william are as vain , as your hopes of king iames. i shall conclude with a few words in answer to your reply against those examples wherein i have shewn you that the crown hath always been under such a disposition as the two mouses of parliament should appoint , to which you have nothing else to object , but that their admission of henry the iv th to the crown was condemned as unlawful by two acts of parliament , which i have already answer'd , by showing you that those acts were obtain'd by richard duke of york , and edward the iv th his son , by actual rebellion , and by as great a force upon king henry the vi th , as ever was used against king richard the ii d , by henry the iv th , and as for the statute of the first of henry the vii th , you have found out a very easie way of answering it ; by affirming that it was done whilst he was an usurper , and before his marriage , or that he had any right to be king. but by this way of arguing , no act he ever passed would be good , since it is certain he did never take upon him to govern in right of his queen , as all those that have writ his life do acknowledge ; and therefore if the parliament would then settle the crown upon him and his right heirs without any respect to his queen , or her issue or sisters , in case she should die childless , i cannot see why the convention may not as well now settle the crown upon king william and queen mary , and their issue , with remainder to himself for life ; especially since he hath also another title of his own to confirm it ( viz. ) that of a conqueror over king iames , and our deliverer from his arbitrary government . m. i shall not go about to derogate from king williams personal vertues , which you so highly extoll ; only i wish i may not prove too true a prophet , since that is not the main question between us . i shall only take upon me to answer in the first place what you have urged on the behalf of king william's pretence to the crown as a conquerour over king iames , and deliverer of the nation ; for whatsoever he may pretend to in respect of the latter , i am sure he cannot justly pretend to the former ; since sure he can never have any right by conquest : who expresly sets forth in his first declaration , that he only came to obtain a free parliament , and to redress our grievances . much less can he be properly call'd a conquerour , who never overcame his enemy in any pitched battle , but by false stories made the king's army desert him , and then , when this was done , having forced the king to leave the kingdom for fear , he has in the day of his power by these means obtain'd the crown ; and as for a deliverer , you must pardon me , if i cannot think him so , since i am not yet satisfied that the worst of king iames's oppressions ever deserved that the prince of orange should take the pains to come over to redress them . and therefore your paralell between your king's title , and that of henry the iv th , and henry the vii th doth not at all agree , since both of them claimed not so much by conquest , or force of arms , as by a pretended right of inheritance , as you may see by both their claims . and as for henry the iv th , 't is plain , he looked upon his title by descent of blood ( having been allow'd in parliament ) to be so good , that for the first seven years of his reign he never thought it worth while to pass an act for the settlement of the crown upon himself , and his issue ; but for richard the iii d , and henry the vii th , they were so far from owning their titles to any act or declaration of parliament , that they first clap'd the crown upon their own heads , and after they had done it , they immediately call'd their parliaments ; which tho' they recogniz'd their titles , yet did not make them kings , but found them so . whereas the convention has by their sole authority , made the prince of orange , and princess , king and queen of england , to the prejudice of the right heirs of the crown . f. i doubt not , but what i have already said , may very well be desended , notwithstanding the utmost you have now argued against it . in the first place , as to what you say against king william's title , as a conquerour over king iames , is very trivial ; for though it is true , the prince declar'd before he came over , that his coming was for no other end but to obtain a free parliament , redress grievances , and to remove evil councellors from king iames , yet that is still to be understood , that the king would agree to those reasonable demands the prince then ●a●e ; for if by his own obstinacy he would bring things to that pass , as that instead of redressing those violations he had made upon our fundamental laws , he raised an army to support himself in them ; and when he thought this army would not sight in his so bad a cause , he then disbanded it ; and by that , as well as the desertion of the throne , owned himself vanquish'd : can any body deny the prince of orange a right of making what advantage he could of his successes ? and therefore i doubt not but that the prince might if he pleas'd have taken upon him the title of king immediately upon king iames's first departure ; and have summon'd a parliament to recognize his title , as henry the vii th did after his victory at bosworth field ; nor would this have made him a conquerour over the kingdom , since he never made war against it , but came to deliver it from tyranny and oppression . nor did william the corquerour himself by his victory over king harold , ever pretend to a right by conquest over the whole kingdom , but only over the estates and persons of those who had fought against him , as i have fully proved at our tenth meeting ; nor did henry the vii th in the first speech he made to the parliament after his taking upon him the crown , claim a right to it by conquest over the kingdom , as his own words were in that speech you mention to this first parliament , but only that by the just judgment of god in giving him the victory over his enemy in the field ; and he then farther declar'd , that all his subjects of whatsoever state and condition , should enjoy their lands and goods to them and their heirs as they did before , except such persons who were to be attainted by act of parliament . nor is it any objection against his right by conquest that he obtained no victory in a pitch'd battle ; since i never heard or read , that to make a prince a conquerour , it is necessary that so many thousand men should be kill'd upon the spot ; for admit the adverse prince against whom he fights , will through cowardise desert his army , or that his army will desert him , either through fear , or a sence of the greater justice of the adverse princes cause , or an affection to his person , so that it never come to a battle , yet it has been in all ages looked upon as all one with a victory , as i can show you from several examples in history : and particularly in plutarch concerning pyrrhus king of epyrus , who making war against demetrius then king of macedon , and both armies being encamped near each other , the army of the latter forsook him , and went over to pyrrhus , as well out of hatred to him , as esteem for his enemy ; so that demetrius being forced to steal away in disguise , pyrrhus thereupon was immediately in the field proclaimed king of macedon . and i doubt not but the prince of orange might have done the same , had it not been for his great moderation , and least it might give his adversaries occasion to traduce him , that he came over for no other end but to drive the king out of his kingdom ; and therefore he chose rather to owe the crown to the free act of the nation , than to his right by conquest over king iames ; but yet i do not think he hath at all lost that right , though he doth not think fit ( for fear of giving offence ) to insist upon it ; and therefore certainly the convention might very well justifie the setling the crown upon his highness during his life , not only as a conquerour over k. iames , but a deliverer of the nation from his oppression , though the prince was pleas'd to accept it upon those terms expressed in the late declaration of the convention , and upon his free promise to preserve preserve our religion , laws , and liberties , which he has since also confirm'd by his coronation oath . but as to what you say , that the prince made the kings army desert him , and wrought the people into hatred of his person by lying stories and mean arts , is altogether untrue ; since i know of no reports he made of the king , or his government , but what are in his first declaration , and that is certainly true in every part of it , and as has been justified by the express declaration of the convention in every particular , except that concerning the prince of wales , which i confess is left still undecided because ( as i have already proved ) it is impossible to give any certain judgement in it , unless the witnesses as well as the infant himself could be brought over hither . nor doth the prince in his said declaration say any more concerning that business than that there are violent suspicions that the pretended prince of wales was not born of the queen ; but for the report of the secret league with france for the extirpation of the protestant religion , as there is no such thing in his highnesses declaration , so the spreading of it cannot be laid to his charge , since he never gave it out as i know of ; yet there are certainly great presumptions , and too much cause of suspicion that it may be so , as i proved at our last meeting . but though you will not allow the prince the title of our deliverer , yet i am sure the greatest part both of the clergy , and laity of the church of england were once of opinion , that king iames's violations both upon our religion and laws were so great , that nothing could preserve the kingdom from a total subversion in its establisht religion , and civil constitution , but his highnesses coming over ; and most of the bishops were of that opinion , who , now the government is setled , refused to take the oath of allegiance to their present majesties . but to answer what you say , that the manner of henry the iv ths , and henry the vii ths coming to the crown , doth not at all agree with this case of king william , because they claimed by right of blood , which you say king william cannot do ; that is not so in respect of the queen , who has certainly a right to succeed her father by right of blood , in case the prince off wales be not the true son of the queen , and untill he can be proved so , we must at present look upon him as if he were not so at all ; so that the convention hath done no more in setling the crown upon the king , during his life , than what the great council of the kingdom have frequently done before upon other vacancies of the throne , as i have proved from the examples of william rufus , and henry the first , king stephen , king iohn , and henry the third . and it is very hard to suppose the whole nation to have been guilty of perjury and treason , up●n their swearing to , and fighting for those princes after they were so solemnl● elected , crowned , and invested with the royal power . but as for edward iii. his first and best title was from the election of the great council of the kingdom , who i doubt not but if they had found him unworthy of the royal dignity by reason of folly or madness , or tyrannical principles , would have set him aside , and have made his young●● brother king , a protector to govern in the king's name with royal power having never been known in england till the reign of henry the vi th ; but as for henry the iv th , notwithstanding his claim by right of blood , i have already proved that the pa●liament by their placing him in the throne did not at all allow it , nor is any such right recited in the act of the th of henry the iv th , which by the crown is entail'd upon that king and his four successive sons . and though it is true henry the seventh also claim'd the crown by right of inheritance , in his speech in parliament , yet they were so far from allowing it , that they do not so much as mention it in that act of setlement , which , as i have recited , they made of it upon that and the heirs of his body : and therefore i think i may still maintain , that the convention hath done nothing in the present setlement of the crown , but what hath been formerly done upon every vacancy of the throne , either by deposition or resignation of the king , or abdication , or forfeiture of the crown ; as in the case of king iames , in which the convention have done no more than exercised that power which has always been suppos'd to reside in the great council of the kingdom , of setling the crown upon such a prince of the blood-royal as they shall think best to deserve it . thus much i have said to preserve the antient right of the great council of the nation . but to put all this out of dispute , i have been credibly inform'd , that the princess of denmark her self did by some of her servants in both houses , as well of the lords as commons , declare upon a great debate that arose about securing her highnesses right to the crown immediately after her sister the queen ; that her highness had desired them to assure the convention , that she was willing to acquiesce in whatever they should determine concerning the succession of the crown , since it might tend to the present setlement and safety of the nation : which i think is a better cession of her right to his present majesty , than any you can prove that the empress mawd made to her son henry the second , or than the countess of richmond ever made to her son henry the seventh . m. you have often talked of this forfeiture and extravagant power of your convention , by whom you suppose they are not obliged to place the crown upon the head of the next heir by blood , which i shall prove to be a vain notion ; for if there be an absolute forfeiture of the crown , the government would have been absolutely dissolved ; for since there is no legal government without a king , if the throne were really vacant , and that the people might place whom they pleas'd in it , yet the convention can have no power to do it , as their representatives ; since upon your suppos'd dissolution of the original contract between the king and the people , there was an end of all conventions and parliaments too . and therefore if a king could have been chosen at all , it ought to have been by the votes of the whole body of the clergy , nobility , and commons , in their own single persons , and not by any council or convention to represent them , since the laws for restraining the election of parliament-men only to freeholders , are upon this suppos'd dissolution of the government , altogether void ; and if you say such a way of election is now impossible , i shall do so too ; but however , it plainly shews the absurdity of supposing a king could ever now be fairly elected were all the blood-royal totally extinct . as for what you say concerning that cession which the princess of denmark made of her right to the crown , i never heard any thing of it before ; but admit it were so , this could only serve in relation to her self , and she could not give up the right of her brother the prince of wales , no , nor that of her own children , if god shall give her any . f. this objection concerning the total dissolution of the government proceeds from a wan● of your consideration of what the antient government of england was , not only before , but a good while after your pretended conquest ; which was not a setled hereditary monarchy , but a testamentary , or elective kingdom , where the kings , being often recommended by the testament of the precedent king , were chosen out of the royal family , though not according to the ruler of succession now in use ; and therefore in all such governments , it is very well known , that there was at the first institution of kingly government among them , a great council , or assembly of estates of the whole kingdom appointed , who upon the death of the last king and vacancy of the throne , were still to meet of course to appoint a successor , which was commonly one of the sons of the last king , or at least some other prince of the royal blood. thus it was , till of late years , in denmark and swe●den , and so it was antiently in france during the succession of the first race ; as also in spain during the government of the vandals ; and so it likewise was in england during the whole succession of our english saxon kings , and so i have also proved it continued till edward the first . and though since his time that the crown hath been claim'd by right of inheritance , yet in all times precedent it is apparent that the great council of the kingdom upon the dea●h of every king , assembled by their own inherent authority , to consider whom they should place in the throne , which they then looked upon as vacant . and therefore though i grant in the case of edward the first , the parliament did not only ordain him successor to his father , but also recogniz'd his ●ight by blood ; yet for all this , they still remain'd their an●ient power of meeting without summons from the king ▪ he being in the holy land , and they not knowing whether he was alive or dead ; so that it is a false assertion to affirm , that there can be no government without a king , since in all those vacancies of the throne , it is plain , the government devolved of course upon the geat council of the nation . and though it is true , there can be now no parliament without a king , according to the present notion and acceptation of that term , yet before that word was ever in use , ( which is no older than about the middle of the reign of henry the third ) it is plain , that our great councils often met by their own inherent authority without any king , and preserved the pe●ce of the kingdom till a new king was either chosen or declared . and though 't is true the crown hath been long enjoy'd by those who have claim'd by inheritance , yet there is no reason for all that , if the like cases should fall out as have done in former times , why the government should devolve to the mix'd multitude now , any more than it did then ; since it may be as well suppos'd , that the same tacit contract still continues of maintaining the original constitution of great councils , which i have proved to be as antient as kingly government it self . and though perhaps the form of chusing or sending th●se representatives of the nation may have been alter'd in divers particulars by for ●er laws , or received customs , yet this is nothing to the purpose , as long as the thing it self remains the same in substance as it was before ; for it can never be thought to have been the intent of the people who established this form of government , that upon the extinction of the royal family , the government should be so quite dissolved , as that it should be left to the confused multitude to chuse what form of government they should think fit . therefore to conclude , i wish you would be perswaded to own this government as it is now established , and to take 〈◊〉 oath of allegiance which is enjoyn'd by the declaration of the convention , who are the only proper and legal judges we can now have of conferring the rights of those to whom our allegiance is due . and if in case a dispute about the right heir of the crown , the people of this nation were not all bound to the decision of this assembly , we must necessarily fall together by the ears , and fight it out as they do in the east-indies ; where upon the death or deposition of a king , he has still the right who can conquer his competitors in battel . m. well , i wish there were not something very like it practised here of late ; for i think you will grant , that if the prince of orange's party had not prevail'd over the king 's , the convention would never have placed the crown upon his head . but i must beg your pardon if i cannot agree to your proposals of taking the new oath of allegiance to king william and queen mary , since i have already taken the oaths of supremacy and allegiance to king iames , and i do not believe that any power on earth can disengage me from that oath as long as he and his son the prince of wales are alive : for as to your doctrine of abdication or forfeiture , they are too hard for my reason to understand , or for my conscience to comply with ; and therefore it is all one to me whom your convention places on the throne , since i am very well satisfied , that none but the king can have a right to it . f. i wish i could see some better reasons for this opinion of yours , than those you have already given , for if you could convince that me the nation hath done any thing in this revolution which cannot well be justified by the antient customs and constitution of the kingdom , i should come over to your opinion ; but if king iames has truly abdicated or forfeited the crown ( as i hope i have sufficiently made out ) and that your suppos'd prince of wales either is not really , or else cannot now be proved to be the true son of the queen , by reason of those obstacles and impediments i have shewn you ; i cannot see any thing to the contrary why you should not be wholly free , and discharged from your former oath of allegiance to king iames ; so that king william and queen mary being now placed on the throne , your allegiance to king iames , and the suppos'd prince of wales is lawfully determined : pray tell me therefore , why you cannot take this new oath of allegiance ; since you have the judgment and declaration of the convention , which is the representative of the whole nation , to justifie you in so doing ? m. i must tell you once again , that i think allegiance is not only due to the king by the law of the land , but also , by the laws of god and nature , and consequently cannot be dissolved by any subsequent judgment of a convention , who are and always ought to be subjects to him and his right heirs , as long as they are in being ; and therefore i should not allow the prince and princess of orange for such , were the king now actually dead : nay if king iames himself had stayed in england , and had been so over awed by fear , or overcome by persuasions , as to have declar'd in parliament , that the prince of wales was not his true and lawful son born of the queen , and had thereupon setled the crown upon the princess of orange as his heir apparent ; i could never have thought my self oblig'd to swear allegiance to her , or to own her for my lawful sovereign , as long as the prince of wales , or the heirs of his body are in being ; since i am very well satisfied , and that by unexceptionable proofs that he is really the son of the king and queen ; for i think i have sufficiently made out by several declarations of parliament , that the hereditary right of the crown can never be defeated nor alter'd by any statute whatsoever , but according to the act of recognition of king iames , the first 's title ( which i have already urged ) the crown ought to descend to the next heir by blood , according to the rules of descent , i have now laid down . f. i cannot but admire your obstinacy in this matter , which proceeds from your old errour of believing , that there is a natural or divine right of succession to crowns different or abstracted from the civil and political laws , and constitutions of particular kingdoms , which i think i have already confuted , by shewing you that there was no such thing in nature as a patriarchal right in adam or noah , or their heirs ; nor yet to any other king as their assigns , or representatives ; and therefore though i grant that allegiance to every lawful king is due by the laws of god and nature , yet who that king is , or who is to be his lawful successor in limited or mixt monarchies ( as ours is ) can only be determined by the assembly of estates of the whole nation : for notwithstanding all you have said , there is a very great difference between the legal rights of princes , and the natural rights of fathers and husbands , which yet may cease and be dissolved in some cases , as i have already sufficiently proved : for i think it is evident that not only a legal title , and legal authority may be parted from each other ; but that legal titles and legal authority may be rightfully separated from the persons to whom they were once due , which natural rights can never be . a king may cease to be a king , though a father can never cease to be a father ; for laws have not the same force and power that nature has . now all men confess this separation may be made by a voluntary resignation as also by conquest in a just war , both which will divest such a prince of all right and authority to govern ; and if it may be done by either of these ways , his right and authority is not inseparable from his person ; since then there is no natural inherent property in lands or kingdoms , but what proceeds from the particular laws of each kingdom , or common-wealth : therefore who ever the supream power appointed by the constitution of such kingdoms shall judge or determine to have a true and legal right to the same are to be own'd , and esteemed as the true legal owners and possessors thereof , by all the subjects : so that if a king can part with his kingship , it is possible he may lose it too ; since there are more ways than one , of parting with that which may be parted with , if then a voluntary resignation of a crown , or conquest in a just war , can give another prince a just title to it , i cannot see why a ●acit abdication or forfeiture of a crown upon a limited kings total breach of the fundamental laws and constitution of the kingdom , should not as much discharge all the subjects of their allegiance to him , and also give the great council , as the representative of the nation , a like right of ordaining a successor upon such a vacancy of the throne , and who being once placed therein , all the people of the nation ought to pay the same allegiance to him as they did to his predecessors . but as for the latter part of your supposition , that the right heirs of the crown by blood , must always necessarily succeed to it , that is likewise sounded upon two very false principles , first , that a lineal hereditary succession to the crown , is established by the fundamental laws and customs of the kingdom . secondly , that the succession to it cannot be limited by the parliament or great council of the nation , the former of which suppositions i have confuted at our last meetting : and as for the other , you cannot deny but the crown has been frequently setled and limited by act of parliament , contrary to the common rules of succession , as hath been sufficiently proved by the statute above mentioned of henry the vii th , as also by those several acts concerning the succession in henry the viii ths time , and so it continues at this day by the statute of the th of queen elizabeth , whereby it is declared treason during the queens life , for any person to affirm that the queen and parliament had not power to make laws to limit and bind the descent and inheritance of the crown : or that this act was not of sufficient force , to bind , limit and govern all persons , their rights , and titles that in any way claim any interest or possibility in or to the crown of england in possession , remainder , succession , inheritance , or otherwise howsoever ; and every person so holding or affirming after the decease of the queen , shall forfeit all his goods and chattels : so that i can see no just reason you can have to refuse swearing allegiance to their present majesties , and their successors , according to the limitation in the said act. m. well , i see it is in vain to argue these points any longer with you , since it would only force me to repeat the same things over again , which will neither edifie you , nor my self ; only give me leave to tell you this much , that the last part of your argument ( which is the only thing that is new in all your discourse ) is founded upon a very wrong ground ; for though i should grant , as i do not , ( since this act you last mentioned is expired ) that the crown may be limited , or intail'd by act of parliament , contrary to the due rules of succession , yet even that will not hold in respect of the present settlement thereof by the convention , upon the prince and princess of orange for their two lives ; since you cannot but know that no parliament yet , was ever so presumptuous as to take upon them to settle or limit the succession of the crown without the consent of the king or queen then in being . whereas the present settlement was first made by the convention , upon the making of the prince and princess king and queen ; tho' i grant it was afterwards confirmed by another pretended act , whereby all princes that are or shall be roman catholicks when the crown shall descend unto them , are debarred from their right of succession ; this though i grant to be made after the prince and princess of orange took upon them the title of king , and queen ; yet since that statute was not made in a parliament call'd by the king's writs , but in a convention , who owe their meeting wholly to the prince of orange's letters , it is not only void in respect of the subject matter , but also in the manner of making it ; and therefore i cannot believe that the throne was ever vacant . and i have as little reason to be satisfied , that the prince and princess could be lawfully placed therein , or that all roman catholick princes can ever be barred from their right of succession , when ever it may fall to them . f. if this be all you have farther to object , i think i can easily answer it ; for in the first place , i have already told you , that the convention did not take upon them to create or make any new form of succession to the crown , but only to declare that the prince and princess of orange are rightful and lawful king and queen of england ; for upon supposition of king iames's abdication of the crown , and that the prince of wales cannot be taken for the lawful son of the king 'till he can be brought over , and that his legitimacy be duly proved , it must 'till then certainly be their right , and no others ; and as for king william's holding the crown during his own life , i have already told you it was not done without the tacit consent of the princess of denmark her self , though i doubt not but it may also very well be justified upon those suppositions of the forfeiture of the crown by king iames , and the conquest the prince of orange made over him ; which are sufficient in themselves to barr any legal claim of those that either are or may pretend to be right heirs . but as for the other part of your objection , whereby you would prove , that popish princes cannot be excluded from the succession , because the act was made not in a parliament , but a convention ; this wholly proceeds from your want of consideration , , that at the first institution of the government , and long after , whilst the kingdom continued elective , there was no difference between a great council or convention , and a parliament ; for pray call to mind the four first great councils after your conquest ( reckoning that for one wherein king william i. was elected or declared king ) whether it was possible for those councils to be summon'd in the kings name , before any body had taken upon themselves the title of king ; the like i may say in the case of king iohn , and henry the iii d , and that this continued after the succession was setled in the next heir by blood , appears by that great council that was summon'd after the death of henry the third , which recognized or ordain'd his son prince edward to be his successor . so likewise the parliament that deposed king edward the second , sate both before and after his deposition , and resignation , and elected his son edward the third to be king , and appointed his reign to begin from the time of their election , and not of his fathers resignation of the crown ; so also upon the deposition of king richard the second , the same parliament that deposed him , placed henry the fourth in the throne ; and though the writs of summons were in the name of king richard , and they were never re-summon'd or new elected in the reign of henry the fourth , yet did they still continue to sit , and made divers new acts , and repealed several old ones , all which hold good to this day . and that the parliament are the only proper judges of the right of succession , even without the king , you your self must grant , or else how could they declare in the thirty ninth of henry the vi th , that the claim which richard duke of york made to the crown could no way be defeated ? and certainly if that unfortunate prince king henry the sixth had had sufficient power or interest in that parliament , they might , and would have adjudged the duke of york's claim to have been groundless and contrary to law , and then i believe it would scarce have ever been heard of again . but to make it out beyond exception , that a convention may become a lawful parliament , though never call'd by the king's writs , when the king's authority and presence come once to be added to and joined with it , appears by the first parliament of king charles the second ; which though summon'd in the name of the keepers of the liberties of england , yet nevertheless continued to sit and make several acts which hold good to this day ; and i doubt not but they might have made the like limitations of the crown in respect of roman-catholick princes , as the convention have now done , and that it would have held good at this day , since it is so much for the security of our religion , liberties and properties that it should be so , since we have found by a dear bought experience in the reigns of the four last kings of the scotch line , that still as they began to favour the popish religion and interest in this kingdom , so did the protestant and true english interest in respect of our religion , liberties and properties still decline , 'till at last they were like to be totally ruin'd , and extirpated ; for that restless and dangerous faction very well know , that there is no means possible for them to re-establish their superstition among us by due and legal methods , but only by introducing arbitrary power , taking away parliaments , or else making them wholly to depend upon the king's will , as we see was labour'd and almost effected in the reigns of the two last kings ; and therefore i cannot but believe that the present parliament has not only acted wisely , but also legally , to enact that for the future no prince who is actually a roman catholick shall succeed to the crown though he be next heir by blood . m. i must still tell you i am as little satisfied with your suppositions of the forfeiture of the crown by king iames , and the conquest to the prince of orange , as i am with your instances out of history concerning the power of the great councils meeting and chusing a king by their own inherent authority , since besides that it was done by usurpation in those rough and unsetled times ; yet i believe if the antient writs of summons were now in being , you would find that they were called by those usurpers , though not by the title of kings ; but i defie you to show me since the reign of edward the first any parliament ever call'd without the king's writs of summons ; and though upon the deposition of edward and richard the second the parliaments you mention might continue to sit , and transact publick business , yet was it during a plain usurpation upon those princes whom you your self must grant to have been unlawfully deposed ; and therefore we find upon the parliament roll of the st of richard the second , that an act of the first of edward the third confirming the judgment given upon the two spencers , was not only repeal'd in parliament , but declared to be unlawful , because edward the second was living , and true king , being imprison'd by his subjects at the time of that very parliament of edward iii. but as for your last instance of a conventions declaring it self a parliament in the reign of king charles the second , there is a great deal of difference between them , and the present convention ; since they did not take upon them to declare or make a king ( as this convention has done ) but only to recognize him to be their lawful sovereign which ( as i have already told you ) being that which was their duty to do , they might very well justifie , though they were not summon'd by the king's writs ; but however , all their acts were looked upon as made without legal authority , and therefore were confirmed in the first legal parliament of king charles's reign . but as for the authority of the statute of the th of eliz. whereby you would prove , that the parliament has at this day power to alter or limit the succession of the crown ; besides , that such an act being against the fundamental rules of succession , was void in it self , yet if you please to look upon the act in rastal's statutes , you will there find it was only made to serve a present turn , and to keep the queen of scots and her party from enterprizing any thing against queen elizabeth ; and therefore it is there only declar'd to be treason during the queens life , for any persons to maintain , that the queen could not riot with the authority of the parliament limit the succession of the crown ; and as for the last clause , that makes it forfeiture of goods and chattels , to maintain the contrary after her decease ; this was made to strengthen and confirm the former part of the statute , which was a provision and security against such pretences and practices as had been lately made against her by the papists , on the behalf of the queen of scots title ; and this clause could not take effect after her death , but was added to preserve queen elizabeth's memory from being defamed after her decease , or being slanderously charged with the heinous crime of usurping the crown , which must have been the inevitable consequence of affirming , that she , and her parliament could not limit the succession . for to confess the truth , i think queen elizabeths best title was by act of parliament , since her legitimacy might be justly question'd , by reason that her mothers marriage was declar'd unlawful by the th of henry the viii th , and she was as good as declar'd illegitimate by her father in that very act that setled the crown upon her ; but that this statute of the th of queen elizabeth is now looked upon as expired , appears in palton's , and all other late collections of the statutes since her time ; wherein the title of the statute is barely mention'd with exp. immediately following it , to shew it is looked upon as expired : so that you are mistaken to affirm that the convention has done nothing in the late limitation of the crown , but what may be justified from that statute ; therefore if it be not law at this day , i think they had no authority to alter the succession of the crown from the right line , let them be of what religion they would . f. i see you do all you can to evade the force of my authorities from history , and direct matter of fact ; and therefore as to what you say , that those were rough and unsetled , and therefore no precedents to be drawn from thence , this is to beg the question ; for what could be the law concerning the succession of the crown for the first hundred and fifty years after the conquest , but the constant usage of the great council of the nation , as low as the reign of henry the third ; and it is a bold assertion to accuse the whole nation of perjury , and rebellion against their lawful kings during all those successions i have now instanced in ; nor have you any thing to say against those parliaments that met in the st of king edward iii. and charles the ii. but that their meeting was lawful because it was only to recognize those kings , and not to make them , which is indeed to beg the question , since you cannot deny but those parliaments are held for good , notwithstanding they were not call'd by the king's writs . but as for making a king the present parliament have not taken upon them to do it ; since they do not in the act for the succession elect king william and queen mary to be our lawful king and queen , but only declare or recognize them to be so , upon supposition that the prince of wales is either an impostor , or else his legitimacy impossible to be tried and determined by them . nor are your objections material against the authority of those acts of parliament which were made in the st . of king henry the iv th and charles the ii d. which were never summon'd by those kings writs . for as to the first of those instances most of those acts of henry the iv th . stand good at this day , without ever being confirm'd by any subsequent parliaments . and tho' i grant that the publick acts made in the first year of king charles the ii d. were confirm'd in the next parliament of that king , yet this does not prove that they would have been void without it ; since divers private acts passed in that parliament which were never confirm'd in any other , and yet are held for good : as particularly an act of that parliament for making the church of st. paul's covent-garden parochial . and this act , though never confirm'd , was yet adjudged to be in force by the lord chief justice hales and the rest of the justices of the court of king's bench , in a case concerning rate tythes between the minister and some of the parishioners of the said parish . nor is what you have now said to prove the statute of the th . of queen elizabeth ( whereby the crown is declared capable of being limitted by act of parliament ) to be now expired ; since it is plain by the purport of the act , that it is declaratory of the former laws of england made in king henry the vii th . and viii ths . and other kings reigns , whereby the succession of the crown had been frequently entail'd upon those who were not the next heirs by blood ; and tho' the queen be only mentioned in it , yet it certainly as much concerns her successors , as all future parliaments : as the oath of allegiance , in which the queen is only mentioned , does all future kings and queens : and it is not only made treason during her life , but also there is a loss of goods and chattels to be inflicted on all those who shall maintain after her decease , that the queen and parliament had not power to limit the succession . and if the parliament in her reign could do this , i desire to know whence it is that the present parliament may not have the like power ? as to what you alledge concerning the judgment against the two spencers being revers'd in ● th . of richard ii. because done whilst edward ii. was still alive , i desire you would take notice , that this parliament of richard the second was wholly made and pact by king richard after the banishment of the dukes of lancaster and norfolk ; and that as well the lords as commons , were in such fear of the arbitrary power he then exercised , that they past whatever he would : and in this parliament it was that the proceedings against the chief justice tresilian and his fellow judges , who had been condemned and executed by judgment in parliament in the th . of this king , were reverst . and no prove the illegality of this parliament , you need but consult the statute-book in st . of henry the iv th . where you will find one of the first statutes after his coming to the crown , is to repeal all acts and proceedings made in that last parliament of richard the ii d. m. i doubt this will not do the business ; for we maintain , that henry the iv th . also his son , and grand-son , were usurpers ; and consequently all the acts made in their reigns were null and void . f. i will grant you for once , that henry the iv th . was an usurper , and that edward the iii d. was so also during his fathers life-time ; but then it doth not follow , that all the laws and statutes made during those times , were null and void , since you must needs know the contrary ; for even in that parliament of the th . of richard the ii d. though 't is true that judgment against the spencers was revers'd for the reason you have given , yet did that repeal extend to no other statutes but that , tho' made in the same parliament of edward the iii d. whilst his father was yet living : but they are all of them held for good at this day , as are also all the statutes of the three henry's , whom you suppose to be usurpers , which have not been repealed by any subsequent statutes , as i can assure you those of the first of henry the iv th . are not , and therefore are good laws at this day : so that nothing can be a plainer proof than this , that let the king's title to the crown have been it would , yet allegiance was due to them as long as they continued in the throne . therefore to conclude , let me tell you , i think it behoves you , if you mean to keep that office you hold under the government , to take the oath of allegiance to their present majesties , since you owe your protection to their government , which certainly deserves a temporary allegiance as long as you enjoy the benefit of it . and indeed , the oath it self is so loosly worded , that methinks any man may take it without any scruple , since it doth no ways declare , that the present king and queen have an hereditary right to the crown , but only the person swears to bear true allegiance to their majesties king william and queen mary ; which i think even strangers and denizens are bound to take as long as they continue in the kingdom . m. i am sorry you should think me , after so long an acquaintance , capable of doing any thing against my conscience for any worldly advantage whatsoever ; and therefore i must freely tell you , that as for the imployment i hold , i will rather part with it , if it were never so great , than do any thing against my conscience , and that reputation i have hitherto maintained in the world of being an honest man. and therefore i cannot take the oath as a meer denizen that owes protection to the present government : not only because this oath is inconsistent with that i have already taken , but also there is much more required of those that owe a natural allegiance to their rightful king , than can be required of strangers , till they become naturaliz'd by act of parliament . and therefore it is , that when any war breaks out between neighbouring princes , all such denizens who do not become absolute subjects of this kingdom by naturalization , if they will act like honest men , must look upon themselves as oblig'd either to quit the kingdom in case a war be declar'd against their natural prince , or at least are oblig'd not to act any thing to his prejudice , though they may still inhabit and traffick here ; which is a quite different case from those who are not only born the king's subjects , but have also taken the oath of allegiance to him . and therefore i can by no means think it lawful to take this new oath to king william and queen mary , though it were required in no higher a sense than as king and queen de facto ; since it can no ways consist with that oath which i have already taken to king iames and his right heirs ; as i shall prove to you another time ( since it is now very late ) from the true sense and meaning of those words , i will be faithful , and bear true allegiance , &c. which can only be sworn to such kings and queens , who besides a bare possession , have also a legal and hereditary right to the crown . f. i shall be very glad to hear you farther upon this question ; for if that can be made out , i fear too many of the clergy as well as laity , by mistaking the true sense of this oath , have been forsworn . but pray tell me when i shall wait on you , and hear what you have further to say upon this important subject . m. pray let me see you two or three days hence , and then i shall be at leisure , in the mean time am your humble servant . f. and i am yours . finis . bibliothera politica : or a discourse by way of dialogue , on these following questions ; i. whether an oath of allegiance may be taken to a king or queen de facto , or for the time being . ii. what is the obligation of such an oath , whether to an actual defence of their title against all persons whatsoever , or else to a bare submission to their power . iii. whether the bishops who refused to take the oath of allegiance to their present majesties , could be lawfully deprived of their bishopricks . collected out of the best authors , as well antient as modern . the thirteenth and last dialogue . london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms , where also may be had the first , second , third , fourth ; fifth , sixth , seventh , eighth , ninth , tenth , eleventh , twelvth , and thirteenth dialogues . . authors most commonly used in this discourse , and how denoted in the margin . a discourse concerning the signification of the word allegiance , as it is made use of in this new oath of allegiance . d. a. animadversions on the modern explanation of the statute of the th of henry the seventh , chap. . a. th , h. th . an enquiry into the nature of legal rights , &c. e. l. r. the case of allegiance , &c. c. a. an essay concerning obedience to the present powers . having not the treatise called the title of a king in possession by me at the writing of this discourse , i could not quote it ; yet all the chief arguments in it being either the same that are made use of by the authors of the two first treatises above mentioned , are answered in this discourse , either by my self , or the reverend author of the case of allegiance . advertisement . by the first day of march next , will be published a general title-page , with a large alphabetical index to the whole work. the preface to the reader . having in the two last discourses considered the lawfulness and justice of king jame's abdication , as as also of the late conventions place king william and queen mary in the throne ; it might have seem'd needless to add any thing farther on this subject , had it not been for the satisfaction of so many of the clergy , as well as laity , who not being satisfied with the rightfulness of their majesties title , nor with the declaration of the said convention , whereby they are recognized to be of right , and by the laws of this realm , king and queen of england , &c. have taken an oath of allegiance to them only as king and queen de facto , or for the time being . for the justification of which , it was necessary to consider all that can reasonably be said upon this question , according to those several heads set down in the title page of this discourse ; for the performance of which , i shall only tell you , that it is a collection out of the best treatises that have been written on this subject , and from the best reasons that i could gather by discoursing with divers learned men who have refused this oath ; who if they have done it out of conscience ( as we ought charitably to believe they have ) are infinitely to be preferred in the opinions of all honest men , before divers others , who i doubt have taken the oath with dissastisfied consciences , for meer gain , or the consideration of worldly advantages , and with a design to return to their former allegiance to king james , as soon as with safety they may ; and who , though they have taken this oath themselves , yet do more highly applaud and favour the refusers , than those that have taken it with truly satisfied consciences , and intend to keep it when they have done . but though i confess i have here urged all the cogent reasons i could collect , either from the law of the land , or that of nature , for the taking this oath to their present majesties ; i must also acknowledge , that though i have taken some answers out of a learned drs. case of allegiance , yet i must confess i absolutely waved entering into the defence of that hypothesis , upon which that treatise is built ; since it would not only be tedious , but unnecessary ; tedious , because it would be too long for such a short discourse as this , to repeat all the arguments he has made use of , together with all the answers that have been made to it in so many treatises that have been written against it ; unnecessary , not only because i take a different method from his , and have ran into all those dark labyrinths of law and history , which he sedulously avoids ; but also because his hypothesis of making allegiance due to the meer possession of power , as to the ordinance of god , let the possessor come by it which way he will , ( and that without any election , or recognition of the people , ) is that which satisfies no party of men concerned in the present dispute ; not the jacobite , for he cries out , that it is but the same argument new vamp'd , which john goodwyn , and ascham set up for obedience to oliver , and the rump ; and that upon this ground , the great turk , should he once conquer england , would have as much right to our alegiance as king james himself ; whilst those who have acted out of a principle on the behalf of their present majesties , say , that by his thus setting them up with an absolute irresistible power ; we do but change hands , and it is no thanks to his hypothesis , if we fall not into the same arbitrary government , which by king james's abdication we have so wonderfully escaped . i have therefore confined my self in this discourse only to such arguments as can be deduced from reason , history , or the law of the land ; since i must freely confess , that the arguments that reverend author has made us of from scripture , for the support of his opinion seem to me a much darker labyrinth than what he endeavours to shun . but as to point of time , i have resolved to look no farther than the first six weeks of their majesties reign , to avoid either the arraigning or defending any thing that has happen'd since that time . and tho' i have taken no notice of this present parliaments recognition of their majesties title , as being done after the time to which i limit this discourse ; though what was done by the former parliament , may be sufficiently defended upon the grounds i have laid down in this , and the former discourse ; yet do i not deny , but that the solemn recognition of a free parliament summon'd in their majesties name , has taken away those obejections which were made against the conventions declaring them to be rightful king , and queen , and then voting themselves a parliament , when they were not summoned by writs issued in the name of the king , or queen , according to the usual form . only i must confess i have made bold in one point to look beyond the time prefixt ; and that is , in relation to the late schism began by some of our clergy , and carried on by some of the laity who refused the present oaths : but since i have made use of some reasons against it , which have not ( as i know of ) been yet hit upon by any former writers on this subject . i wish they may prove for their satisfaction ; but if not , since i write only to discover truth , i desire that any of the present new dissenters will shew me my mistakes ; and i shall take it kindly , not only for my own sake , but that of others , who may otherwise be misled by my arguments . i have only one thing more to add , in relation to somewhat i promised at the end of the preface to the last dialogue , concerning the late revolutions being different from the last civil war , and murther of king charles the first ; which though i have finish'd , and thought to have inserted into this discouese , yet since it proves rather too long without it , and that the bookseller urges for its speedy publication ; i have thought fit to omit it ; since also the greatest part of it relates to matter of fact , which is variously stated by those who write the history of those times , yet i shall make bold to give you the heads of those inquiries i have made , and shall leave you to satisfie , your self in these points following ; first , if after king charles the first had not only passed all bills for redressing those grievances the nation lay under at the beginning of the parliament in . but had also passed the bill to make it not to be prorogued , or dissolved without their own consents ; i say , whether there were then any such violations of our religion , and fundamental laws which should require the parliament and nations puting themselves in a posture of defence against the king's arbitrary power . secondly , whether the fears and jealousies of popery and arbitrary government which ( notwithstanding all that the king had done ) still troubled many mens minds , were a sufficient ground for the two houses to demand the put●ing the whole militia of the kingdom out of his own power , into such hands as they should nominate and appoint . thirdly , whether upon his refusal of their adresses for the militia , their going about to take it out of his hands by force , and particularly their shutting him out of hull was not an actual making war upon the king when he was as yet un●armed , and had given out no commissions to raise men , or arms. fourthly , when the war was begun , whether the king did not in all his messages to and treaties with the parliament , propose and seem to desire peace upon equal and reasonable terms . fifthly . whether the two houses did not instead of complying with those reasonable proposals , still insist upon higher terms , as their victories and successes over the king increased . sixthly , when the king was deliver'd up by the scots , whether the parliament and army did not keep him as good as a close prisoner , and vote no more addresses to be made to him , meerly because he refused to pass whatever bills they brought to him . seventhly , when at last he was forced by necessity to grant them at the isle of wight almost whatever they demanded , whether he was not hurried away from thence by cromwell's army ; and for the major part of the house of commons , who had voted the king's concessions satisfactory , excluded the house by force ; till the far less party had reversed all that the rest had done , and then voted the king should he called to an account for making war upon the parliament , and for treason against the kingdom . eighthly , whether in pursuance of this , they did not appoint iudges to trie the king , who upon his refusal to own their authority , condemned him to death , and cut off his head before the gates of his own palace . ninthly , whether this fag end of a parliament did not alter the whole frame of the government both in church and state , destroying both monarchy , and episcopacy , and voting the house of peers useless , and dangerous ; and setting up a democratical commonwealth , or rather an oligarcy in their stead , consisting of about fifty or sixty men , wholly governed and awed by cromwell , and the officers of the army . now let any man but impartially consider all these transactions with the late revolution , and read what hath been said in the three last dialogues , and then let him tell meingenuously , whether he thinks this revolution hath been begun upon the like grounds , and carried on by the same violent courses , or has ended with the same direful effects as the late civil war , and murther of king charles the first . i have no more to propose on this subject , but only to wish that these discourses written with a real design for the publick good and peace of my countrey , may be read with the like affection with which they were written , and may really promote that end for which they were designed ; but if not , that they may at least serve as an impartial history to posterity of those principles and opinions on which this late great revolution hath been brought about in england ; and also those on which it hath been so violently opposed by the dissenting party . the thirteenth dialogue between mr. meanwell a civilian , and mr. freeman a gentleman . f. sir , i hope i do not interrupt you by coming too soon , for the truth is , since i intend that this shall be the last dispute i shall ever have with you upon this subject , i was very desirous to have it dispatched as soon as i could , that when i have once discharged the duty of an old friend and acquaintance , my mind may be at rest which side soever you take . m. dear sir , i thank you , and though i intended to go abroad this evening upon an appointment , yet i will not put it off , that i may enjoy your better conversation , therefore pray begin where you left off , and prove to me that i may lawfully take this new oath of allegiance to king william , and queen mary . f. i cannot see any reason why you may not safely do it , since our best common lawyers are of this opinion ; for my lord coke in his third institutes in his notes upon the statute of treason , the th of edward the iii d gives it for law , that this act is to be understood of a king in possession of the crown , and kingdom ; for if there be a king regnant in possession , although he be rex de facto , & non de iure , yet is he seignior le roy within the purview of that statute , and the other that hath right , and is out of possession is not within this act , &c. and if it be treason to levy war against him , or to conspire his death as long as he continues king , it can only be so , because the subjects allegiance is then due to him , for that all men have either taken the oath of allegiance , or else are supposed to have done it . m. i must beg your pardon , if i cannot come over to your opinion , neither in point of law or reason ; for as long as i am perswaded in my conscience that king iames is king de iure , so long must the obligation of my former oath last ; and i suppose that you will grant that it is as impossible to owe allegiance to two kings at once , as it is to serve two masters , and therefore you must pardon me , if i suppose that my lord coke depending too much upon the commonly received sence of the statute of the eleventh of henry the vii th , which he quotes in the margin , may be mistaken in this great point , and may have also given occasion to divers others of his profession to fall into the same errour . f. i doubt not but my lord coke , and others of his profession who maintain the same opinion , may very well be defended , as well from that statute , as other authorities ; but to pass by that at present , i shall first discourse with you upon this point , of the lawfulness of taking this oath to their present majesties king william and queen mary , and therefore you misunderstand me , if you believe that i think this oath doth require from you the performance of all those duties of allegiance and subjection which i my self am oblig'd to , who am fully satisfied of their title , and therefore must venture my life and fortune in their quarrel , to the utmost of my power against all persons whatsoever ; but all that i think can be required of you is , that whereas king william and queen mary are actually in possession of the regal power so long as they continue thus possessed of it , you may i think swear that you will be so far true and faithful to them , as not to enterprize any thing against them , but that you will pay them that obedience and submission which may be lawfully paid to an actual sovereign ; not engaging hereby to uphold them in the possession of the throne against king iames , and without debarring your self from exerting that allegiance you have sworn to him upon any emergent safe opportunity for the recovery of his right . m. i must beg your pardon , if i cannot assent to take this oath in this low and qualified sence that you would now put upon it , since besides the signification of the words themselves , i am very well satisfied that the imposers of this oath do intend something more than a bare negative obedience to the present power , since it is the only oath which is required from those who take imployments either civil or military , and from whom certainly , not only a passive obedience or submission , but also an active obedience and assistance is required in defending the crown and dignity of the present king and queen de facto , with their lives and fortunes , against all persons whatsoever ; or else how could the present government ever trust them ? and all this cannot be sworn to , without a breach of that oath they had formerly taken to king iames ; and therefore if i should take it in this sense ( as the oath itself seems to imploy ) i should be perjur'd ; besides , by these words of being true and faithfull , i should look upon my self as oblig'd to reveal all plots and conspiracies which i may any ways happen to know of against king william and queen mary , which i think would be derogatory to my allegiance to his majesty , since i should thereby discover and accuse such of his good subjects as endeavour'd to restore him , and should thereby hinder him as much as in me lay , from being restor'd again to the throne . but if we consider the word allegiance , it is yet more strict , and if i should perform it to king william and queen mary , according to the true intent and legal sence of that word , i think it could no ways consist with that oath of allegiance i have already taken ; since allegiance is thus explained in the next following words of the oath i have already taken ; and him , and them ; viz. ( the king , and his heirs ) i will defend to the utmost of my power against all conspiracies and attempts whatsoever , that shall be made against his , or their persons , crown , and dignities . now what kind of assistance is here meant by the word defend , may be understood from all the writers of our feudal laws , who expound the jus defensorium , by telling us that the word protegere implies a necessity of defending by arms as due from the supream lord or sovereign ; and further , that subjects are in the same sence reciprocally bound to defend the honour and dignity of their sovereign : and these words allegiance , and the defence that follows it may be likewise understood from our feudal laws , whereby the vassals were bound by their oath of allegiance , as also by vertue of the tenure of their lands to a military defence of their supream lord the king , from whom all the lands in england are held , and this is according to glanvil , and all our old lawyers ; and though i grant that military tenures are all now taken away by a late statute , yet am i still obliged to the like defence of the king and his heirs , not only from the words of this oath , but from the municipal laws of this kingdom also ; which oblige all the subjects that are capable , to take up arms for the king , when need shall require . which my be thus further proved ; first , from the antient laws of edward the confessor , and william the conquerour , by both which , all the people or freemen of the kingdom were to affirm upon their faith and oath , within the whole kingdom , and without , that they will be faithful to to their sovereign lord king william , and every where preserve his lands and honours with all fidelity , and with him will defend them against all his enemies . to this , succeeded that , which the lord coke calls legal ligeance , or the common-law-oath of allegiance , which he cites out of britton ( who wrote under edward i. ) which all the subjects were oblig'd to take at twelve years of age at the sheriffs-court , and at the leete , and without the taking of which , they had no warrant to abide in the kingdom ; and the form of it was this effect : you shall swear , that from this day forward you shall be true and faithful to our sovereign lord the king , and his heirs ; and truth and faith shall bear of life , and member and terrene honour , and you shall neither know nor hear of any ill or dammage which you shall not defend , ( that is , oppose ) to the utmost of your power . and my lord coke also here informs us , that five things were observed by all the judges from this oath in the debate of calvin's case . first , that for the time of its obligation , it is indefinite ; and without limit . secondly , two excellent qualities were required , that is , to be true , and faithful . thirdly , to whom ? to our sovereign lord the king , and his heirs . fourthly , in what manner ? and saith and troth shall bear of life and member ; that is , untill the letting out the last drop of our dearest heart blood . fifthly , where , and in what place ? in all places whatsoever ; for you shall neither know nor hear of any ill which you shall not defend ; such is the ligeance which the law has prescribed in that antient oath , which is still in force ; it is neither circumscribed by time , nor place ; it is unconditionate , and unreserved ; it is not a lazy passive allegiance , requiring nothing but pure submission , but an active and vigorous loyalty , exacting all that is in the sphere of moral possibility , and engaging us to spend our dearest blood in the defence of our sovereigns person , and the preservation of his crown and dignity . for it is to be observed , that by the law , this allegiance is due to the kings person ; so the same author says it was then resolved by all the judges , that that ligeance was due to the natural person of the king , ( which is ever accompanied with the politick capacity ; and the politick capacity as it were appropriated to the natural ) and not due to the politick capacity only . to conclude , if my former oath of allegiance to king iames doth still continue ( as i am satisfied in my conscience it doth ) i cannot take a new oath of allegiance to king william and queen mary , since i should thereby be obliged by the force of these words in the oath ( viz. ) i will be faithful , and bear true allegiance , to yield it as much to those that are not my lawful sovereigns , as i am to those that are so , which will be contrary to my first engagement ; for though i grant that there is no express declaration of the right of the present possessors of the throne , and that i have heard that the word rightfull ( which was at first inserted into this oath was struck out ) because as many as could be might be drawn in to take it ; yet as long as the words that remain import the very same thing , it is all one as if the word rightfull were there ; for though the deliberate omission of the word rightfull , does necessarily infer that we are not obliged in this oath to a recognition of their right to the crown , yet it does not infer , that we are not obliged to pay as high a degree of allegiance as to any rightful king whatsoever ; that omission indeed is an argument that the word king in the oath does not necessarily signifie a king de jure ; but it is no argument , that true allegiance does not signifie true allegiance , that is an obligation to adhere to the king against all his enemies ; for there was no debate , that we know of , about the sense of the word allegiance , neither is there the least intimation given that they design'd to restrain it to a lower signification , though it was plainly necessary to do it , if they intended to alter the commonly received meaning of it ; wherefore , as the striking out of the word rightfull would not have proved , that they did not intend to oblige us to an active assistance of king william , against all men living ; if those words had been expresly inserted in the oath ; so neither will it prove that the same duty is not now required of us , if the word allegiance do , as i have proved in terminis import it ; and that as fully , as if it had been in express words requir'd in it . and that this word allegiance implies something more than a bare passive submission or neutrality from all subjects , as well as magistrates and officers , appears by that passage in the statute of the th of henry the viith , which you have now cited ; where 't is plainly and expresly declared , that every subject by the duty of his allegiance , is bound to serve and assist his prince and sovereign lord at all seasons when need shall require ; this is so express and authentick a declaration of the true duty of allegiance , that no art or sophistry can possibly evade it . f. i confess you have argued this point of taking this new oath of allegiance , not only like a civilian , but a common lawyer also ; and i cannot deny the force of what you have said , that this oath must extend to an active obedience , and defence of their present majesties in their right to the throne , and not only to a bare sluggish submission , or a luke-warm neutrality . and therefore i cannot say but you are justly scrupulous in not taking this new oath , untill you are satisfied of their majesties right as well as present power ; but if you will please to observe the purport of this act of the th of henry the viith , ( which you now mention'd ) you will there find it as good as expresly declar'd that allegiance is due to him who is lawful sovereign , and the king for the time being is still to be looked upon as such ; for the words in the statute are , that no man shall suffe for assisting the king for the time being , without specifying by what title he holds the crown , whether by an hereditary right , or by conquest , election , or the solemn recognition of his title by all the estates in parliament ; so that by this act , all that allegiance that was once due to the former king de iure becomes thereby wholly transfer'd to the king de facto . m. i grant what you now say would go a great way to satisfie me , could you once prove that this statute is now in force , and is not now either , abrogated , or expired ; or else ( which i rather incline to believe ) is not absolutely void in it self . in the first place therefore i hope to shew you that this was not law before this statute was made , and therefore not declaratory of what was law , but endeavours to make that to be law , which was not so before ; so that the king for the time being there mention'd , must be a king de jure , or at least one that was presumed such ; because at that time the constitution knew no other , for that possession was not a sufficient title before the th of henry the viith , will evidently appear from these following remarks . first , that all the kings of the house of lancaster are declared in the statute of the first of edward the ivth , to be kings in deed , but not of right , and pretended kings , and particularly henry the vith is said to be rightfully amoved from the government , and his reign affirmed to be intrusion , and usurpation , and himself attainted for being in arms against edward the ivth . secondly , all patents of honour , charters , and priviledges , which were granted by the house of lancaster ; all acts of royal authority which the kings of england have a right to execute by vertue of their sole prerogative , ( nay , acts of parliament themselves , particularly those relating to shrewsbury , and some others , which by parity of reason supposes the rest in the same condition , ) all acts of this nature were confirmed by the first of edward the ivth , which is a good argument that this parliament believed the authority by which they were performed to be defective and illegal ▪ for we never find any such general confirmation as these pass upon the grants of the king de jure . thirdly , in the first year of henry the viith , richard the iiid was attainted of high treason in parliament , under the the name of duke of gloucester ; from whence 't is plain , that as there was no statute , so neither was there any common law to support the title of a king de facto , for treason is an attempt against the kings person , his crown and dignity , but no man can commit treason against himself ; therefore if richard the iiid had been a king in the sence of this law , we may be sure he would not have had such an infamous censure past upon him after his death . bradshaw , and his high court of justice , were the first that were so hardy as to pronounce a king of england guilty of treason . fourthly , if this notion of a king de facto had been allowed in the th of henry the viith , the principal assistants of richard the iiid could not have been attainted ; for richard being actually in the throne , he was according to your modern way of arguing , rightful king ; and consequently the people ought to own him as such , and defend him against all opposers ; and if so , certainly they ought not to be condemned as traytors for doing their duty , as we find many of those were who fought for king richard. fifthly , at the end of this parliament , henry the viith granted a general pardon to the common people who had appeared against him in the behalf of richard the iiid , now pardon supposes a fault , and the breach of a law , which they could not have been charged with , if the plea of a king de facto had been warranted by the constitution . f. i must freely tell you , that you do not argue so much like a lawyer in this argument as you did in your former , and you have in that forgot to what end those statutes you mention were made , and what is the purport of them , or else some body hath misinformed you ; for though i grant that all those hard expressions you mention , are given of the kings of the lancastrian line in those statutes of the st of edward the ivth , yet do none of these expressions prove , that they were not true and legal kings in the eye of the law all the while they reign'd ; since divers persons were attainted for high treason against them , whose attainders were never reversed , but stand good to this day ; as in particular the attainder of the earls of kent , salisbury , and of huntingdon , who were all attainted by act of parliament , in the second of henry the ivth , and also the earl of northumberland , and his son the lord piercy , attainted in the th of this king , all which attainders were never reversed : so likewise richard earl of cambridge was found guilty of treason by his peers , and his attainder confirmed by act of parliament in the second of henry the vth , and though it is true this attainder was afterwards reversed in the first of edward the ivth , because the said richard was not only his grandfather , but was also condemned for endeavouring to make edmund earl of march his brother-in-law king of england , from whose sister king edward the ivth claimed the crown ; yet the very reversing this attainder by act of parliament , declares it to have been good untill that repeal , since it was not declared void ; all which are plain and evident proofs , that treason may be committed against the king de facto , and consequently that allegiance is also due to him , and not to the king de jure . i have likewise also proved that all those statutes which were made by those kings , and are not repealed , stand good at this day without any confirmation by king edward the ivth ; and this you have no way to answer , but by instancing in patents of honour , or charters of priviledges granted by those kings , and confirmed by edward the iv th , from whence you would inferr , that some other acts of like nature were in the same condition ; which , let me tell you , in no good argument against them ; for if you please to read that statute of edward the ivth you mention , and you will there plainly see , that the grants , patents , and other things there confirmed , or either judicial proceedings in the courts of justice , or else such charters , or patents which being thought to the prejudice of the crown were ex abundanti cautela , thought necessary to be confirmed by those particular persons , religious houses , and corporations who thought themselves concerned , nor were all others of like nature who were not so confirmed , thereby void , since they hold good at this day ; and if you understand any thing of our law , you cannot but know , that no grants of the king can be made void by implication ; and to shew you farther , that the letters patents made by henry the vith were looked upon as good in the reign of edward the ivth , appears good from bagot's case in the year-book of the ninth of that king ; where a patent of naturalization granted by henry the vith , though it were not confirmed by that statute of edward the ivth , was by the greatest part of the judges held to be good , and the reasons there given for it are very remarkable ; since it was urged by the council in behalf of the plaintiff , that king henry was then king in possession , and it behoves that the realm should have a king , and that the laws should be kept and maintain'd ; and therefore though he was in only by usurpation , nevertheless every judicial act done by him , concerning royal jurisdiction shall hold good , and bind the king de jure when he returns , &c. so likewise a charter of pardon of felony , and licenses of mortmain shall be good , and also the king that now is shall have the advantage of every forfeiture made to the said king henry , &c. and mark this farther , it is there also held that a man shall be arraigned for treason done against the said king henry in compassing his death ; and the reason is very remarkable , because the said king indeed was not meerly a usurper , for the crown was intail'd upon him by parliament ; and this being not at all contradicted by the court , is still taken for law ; and upon this report , and not only upon the statute of the th of henry the viith , did my lord coke found his opinion i now mention'd , that a king de facto was within the statute of the th of edward iii. and though now it is true , that the farther arguing of this case of bagots adjourned to a farther day , when the justices did not argue , but the serjeants and apprentices at law , ( that is the baristers as we now call them ) yet it seems to have been allowed by the whole court , that if king edward who was then king , had made his charter before he was declared so , it should be void at that time ; for every one who shall make a charter of pardon , ought to be king in deed , at the time of the making thereof . m. pray sir give me leave to reply to what you have now said against my first two arguments , before you go on to answer the rest ; for i confess the authorities you bring seem so express against me , that if i cannot take them off , there will be no further need for your answering the rest ; i will not therefore deny , but that all publick acts and proceedings at law , which are for the publick good and safety of the kingdom , do hold good though made under usurpers , and that for this reason ; because such acts being for the publick benefit , it is to be suppos'd that the king de jure did give his tacit consent to them ; for ( as it is well observed in the case you have now cited ) that it behoves the realm should have a king ( that is some civil government ) and that the laws should be kept and maintain'd , but then those laws can extend only to such things as are for the publick good , and do not tend to the disinheriting of the king de jure , or barring him or his heirs of their right , as did that act of the th of henry the ivth , whereby the crown was intail'd upon himself , and his sons , which was declar'd to be void by the th of henry the vith ; so likewise this act is void for the same reason , since it would give a right to the subjects to defend the king for the time being , though an usurper against the true and lawful king , who would be thereby not only defeated of his right himself , but also his right heirs would be so too , which would be directly contrary to the intent of the said statutes of the th of hen. vi , and st of edw. ivth but now mention'd , but also to the act of recognition of king iames the firsts title . and therefore i must still maintain that my lord coke is mistaken in supposing a king de facto to be within the intent of the statute of the th of edw. the iiid , for sure it would seem a very odd question for any one to ask touching the laws that are made in any setled monarchy for the defence of the kings person , crown and dignity , who is meant by the king in those laws ; whether the lawful and rightful king of that realm , or any one that gets into the possession of the throne , though he be not a rightful king , but an usurper . so likewise as to that clause in this statute , which makes it treason to conspire the death of the kings eldest son and heir ; it could be never intended for the son of a king de facto , since that would be to own him for right heir of the crown for ever , and thereby intail it upon his family , to the prejudice of the right heir of the king de jure ; and therefore , though i grant some of the judges and lawyers held the law to be so as you have cited it in bagot's case , and that a king de facto may enjoy those prerogatives in some respects , yet cannot this be extended to the prejudice of the king de jure , and his right heirs ; and though i also grant that divers acts of parliament made by kings de facto , have for the most part held good without being confirm'd by any subsequent statute of the king de jure , yet have they been also repeal'd sometimes ; meerly because made whilst the king de jure was alive , as i shall prove more at large by and by . f. i shall also take the boldness to reply to these answers of yours , before i proceed to answer the rest of your arguments ; in the first place , let me tell you that this notion of a tacit consent in the king de jure suppos'd to be given to all statutes made for the publick good is to serve upon all occasions , when those of your party cannot tell how otherwise to answer the arguments that are brought against them , and you may as well tell me that they do also give their tacit consents to all other acts that usurpers may do ; and i may as well suppose that queen elizabeth the wife of henry the viith , the lawful heiress of the crown , did in the person of her husband give her tacit consent that this act of the th of henry the viith should hold good for ever , since it is so much for the publick good and peace of the nation , that the statute declares it to be against law , reason , and good conscience , that subjects should suffer for fighting for the king for the time being ; but i very much wonder if this suppos'd tacit consent were given to all acts of parliament by the kings de jure , why upon their return to the government , he did not also express this consent by confirming all those acts which were made by his predecessors the kings de facto , or else declare them void : but since they neither did the one nor the other , it is plain it was because even they themselves looked upon it as altogether needless . nor is your reason at all satisfactory , why a king de facto cannot be intended by the statute of the th of edward the iiid , because that maketh it treason to conspire the death of the king 's eldest son and heir , which say you can only be meant of the eldest son of a king de ●ur● , which is to beg the question ; for though it is true , this clause in the act was intended for the preservation of the king 's eldest son , yet it doth no where determine that this must be the eldest son of a king de jure ; for though i own this clause was made to preserve the crown in the right line from father to son , yet does it make no difference between the son and heir of a king de facto , and one de jure ; nor have you yet answer'd the authorities i have brought from the acts of attainder of those lords , who conspired against the three kings of the house of lancaster , which stand unreversed unto this day : and which also confirm the opinion given in bagot's case , where it is said expresly , that a man may be arraigned for treason committed against the king de facto , by the king de jure ; and therefore i think my lord coke may very well be justified in his opinion , notwithstanding the question you put , whether the statute could mean him who is lawful and rightful king , or any other who gets into the possession of the throne ? now this seems to me no such odd question ; for when the law only mentions the king , and the law-makers certainly knew that kings without an hereditary right had often ascended the throne , if they had intended to except all such usurpers , they should have expresly said so . but indeed that distinction of a king de facto , and a king de jure , was not known 'till many years after , being first heard of in the reign of edward the ivth ; for a king de facto ( as the late chief justice rightly asserts ) is seignior le roy , within that statute , and there is no other king but he whilst he continues so . for king signifies that person who has the supream government in the nation ; and a king de jure , is he who should have the government , but has it not ; that is , who of right should be king , but is not ; and the statute of treason tells us what is treason against him who is king , not against him who should be , but is not king ; and reason good it should be so ; for it is not meerly a legal title by descent , but a legal investitute , and recognition by parliament that makes a legal king , or a king in law , as it makes a legal magistrate ; and then all kings de facto , who are placed in the throne by a legal authority , and with all legal and acustomed ceremonies , are legal kings , and as such , may require a legal allegiance : so that all those hard words in the statute of the first of edward the ivth , that call those kings of the house of lancaster , kings in deed , and not of right or pretended kings , mean no more than this , that they were kings for the time being , and according to the laws which had made them so , though not according to that hereditary right of succession which those statutes require : if you have any thing to reply to this , tell me , or else i will proceed to answer your two other arguments . m. i will not at present say more to this than i have done , and therefore you may proceed if you please . f. your two next arguments are from the attainders of richard the iiid , and his principle assistants which were by act of parliament , as to that prince himself , as also his adherents , the attainders of kings de facto , and their assistants in after parliaments , do not prove that subjects cannot be guilty of treason against a king in possession ; nor does the statute of treason relate to a king de jure only , for that statute was not made to secure princes titles , but the quiet of their government whilst they sate upon the throne ; for though a king , if he be an usurper , when ever the rightful king regains the possession of his throne , if he were a subject before , may be attainted of treason for his usurpation , as was richard the iiid , for treason against his own nephew king edward the vth ; yet this does no way prove that richard the iiid was no true king during his usurpation ; but only shews the parliaments abhorrence of his treason , and to deterr others from falling into the like , attainted him , and several of his accomplices who had assisted him in his said usurpation ; for that they were not barely attainted for defending king richard's title , appears from this , that the earl of surrey son to the duke of norfolk , and divers other noblemen and gentlemen who fought for king richard at bosworth-field were never attainted at all . but as for the pardon that you say passed in that parliament of the st of henry the viith , you are very much mistaken in the purport of it ; for if you please to look upon it again , you will find , that it was not a general pardon for the common people who had fought on the behalf of richard the third , but of all those who had come over with henry the viith himself , or who were with him in the field against richard the third , for all manner of murthers , spoils and trespasses committed by them , in taking part with king henry against his enemies ; so that you see the assisting of a king de facto was not only justifiable , but those that had fought against him , thought themselves not safe till they had their pardons . nay , farther , that attainders passed in parliament , are no proof that the princes against whom they were passed were not lawful kings , appears from hence ; that when edward the fourth was driven out of the kingdom and dispossessed of the throne , the next parliament under henry the sixth , passed an act of attainder against him , and his adherents . but as for the attainder of henry the sixth , you are very much mistaken to suppose , that it was for any treason committed against edward the fourth , but it was for breach of the agreement made with his father the duke of york , and in making war again upon him ; for had he not done this , he had continued lawful king during his life , by the duke of yorks own consent ; for in the parliament roll you your self have already cited , it is thus expressed ; that considering the possession of the said king henry the sixth , and that he had before this time been named , taken , and reputed king of england , and france , and lord of ireland ; the said duke is content , agreeth and consenteth , that he be had , reputed and taken for king of england , and of france , with the royal estate , dignity and preheminence belonging thereto , and lord of ireland , during his life natural ; and for that time , the said duke , without hurt or prejudice of his said right and title , shall take , worship and honour him for his sovereign lord : so that you see that by the judgement of the parliament , and by the express consent of the right heir of the crown , a king de facto was to be own'd by this right heir for his true and lawful sovereign , and therefore could not be attainted for detaining the crown from him , or his son. m. i will not dispute this point any further ; but yet methinks though treason might be comitted against the king de facto , whilst he continues king ; yet this is not for any allegiance due to him , but because such treason being against the due order of government , and the common peace of the nation , such actions are therefore treason from the presumed or tacit consent of the king de jure . f. i grant indeed , that such acts are against the order of government , and very destructive to it , which is the only reason why they are made treason by law ; and this is as good a reason why the law should make them treason against a king de facto , as against a king de jure , for they ere equally against the order of government , and destructive to it , whoever is king ; and that is the only reason why they made it treason at all . now this presumed or tacit consent of the king de jure is a very pretty notion , and serves you for a great many good turns , it makes laws , and it makes treason , and gives authority to the unauthoritative acts of a king de facto ; that is to say ( or you say nothing ) that the presumed consent of a king de jure , invests the king de facto at the time with his authority ; for if he have no authority of his own , unless what the presumed consent of the king de jure give him , that cannot make any treasonable act done against him to be treason ; for it cannot alter the nature of things , nor make a man guilty of treason against any person to whom he ows no duty of allegiance . and if the presumed consent of the king de jure can invest the king de facto with his authority , it must transfer the allegiance of the subjects too ; and then subjects are as safe in conscience , as if the king de jure were on the throne ; for it seems there is his authority and tacit consent , though not his person . but indeed , this is all meer trifling , the king de facto has authority , or else none of his acts of government can have any ; for that which is done by a person who has no authority , can lay no obligation upon us ; whence then has he this authority , since he has no legal right to the throne ? not sure from the presumed consent of the king de jure , which is nonsence to suppose , but from the possession of the throne , to which the law it self , as well as the principles of reason , have annexed the authority of the government . m. i am so far of bishop sanderson's opinion in his case , concerning taking the engagement , that when usurpers or kings de facto have taken upon them the government , they are obliged to administer it for the common good , and safety of the people ; and as far as that comes to we are also obliged to live peaceable under them , and to yield obedience to them in things absolutely necessary for the upholding civil society within the realm , such as are the defence of the nation against foreigners , the furtherance of publick justice , the maintenance of trade and commerce , and the like . but sure this is no argument for transferring our allegiance from the lawful king and his heirs whilst they are alive ; and therefore i must still suppose that this statute of the th of henry the viith can do no service to the present government , because it s vertually repeal'd by several statutes ; as first , by the th of henry the viiith , concerning the succession of the crown , wherein it is expresly provided , that if any of his children should usurp upon each other , or if any of those to whom he should bequeath the crown by his last will , or letters patents , should take the crown in any other manner than what should be thereby limited , that such children or others should be guilty of treason for so doing . now it is plain such treason must only have been committed against the right heir , and consequently the person so taking the crown , was not to be looked upon as king de facto . it is also vertually repealed by the statute of o elizabeth , by which we are obliged to swear to be true to the queen , her heirs , and lawful successors ; ( i. e. those who have a right to the crown by proximity of blood ) as also by the oath of supremacy , enacted in the th of king iames , by which we are likewise sworn to bear true allegiance to his majesty , his heirs , and successors ; from which oaths i argue , first , that if we are sworn by act of parliament to pay allegiance to the heirs of a king de fure , who never were in possession , than a fortiori to a king de jure ; who besides the legality of his title , had been actually recognized as sovereign , and enjoy'd an uncontested administration of the regal power . secondly , if our laws oblige us to swear subjection to the heirs &c. of a rightful prince , than by undeniable consequence we are bound not to translate our allegiance to those who are unjustly set up by the people ; for without all question the words heirs and lawful successors , were made use of on purpose to secure the hereditary rights of the monarchy , and to prevent all usurpations upon the direct line . and since by vertue of that statute which framed the oath of allegiance and supremacy , we are not to acknowledge any pretended governours to the prejudice or disinherison of the heirs of the king de jure , then most certainly we ought not to do this in opposition to the king de jure himself ; so that now we can have no pretence to make right the necessary consequence of meer possession of the crown , any more than in private estates . f. in the first place , i agree with you in what you have said , that kings de facto are to be obeyed in all things tending to the publick good of society ; but then it will also follow , that allegiance is due to them , from that great law of prosecuting the same publick good , since it were much better that kings de jure should lose their right , than that a nation should be involved in a long and cruel war to the weakning and impoverishing thereof , and to the destruction of so many thousands of ordinary as well as noble families ; as was seen in the long civil wars between the families of lancaster , and york ; so that i cannot but think it would have been much better for this nation , if that family had continued to govern us unto this day , rather than that edward the ivth should have obtained the crown with so great a destruction of the people of this nation , and so great cruelty as was then exercised upon king henry the vith , and the prince his son , as you may read in the history of those times . but i come now to answer the rest of your arguments , whereby you will prove this statute of the th of henry the viith to be vertually repeal'd ; and here by the way i must tell you , gentlemen of this opinion , that i cannot but admire your wondrous sagacity , in discovering this act to be repeal'd , when my lord coke , and all the rest of our lawyers do still suppose it to be in force ; but indeed , the reason you give for it is not urged like a common lawyer , and therefore i think it will signifie little ; for though i grant that an act of parliament may be vertually repeal'd by a subsequent act , yet it is only in such cases where they are absolutely contradictory , and inconsistent with each other ; but if they are not so , an act of parliament can never be said to be vertually repeal'd : and therefore i shall now show you , that notwithstanding the statute of henry the viiith , and the oaths of supremacy and allegiance you have now mention'd , this statute may very well continue in force , and unrepeal'd . first , as to the statute of henry the eighth , whereby it was declar'd treason for any one of his children , upon whom the crown was setled , to usurp upon each other ; yet that part of the statute which makes this treason , was repeal'd by the first of edward the the sixth , and by the first of queen mary ; or admit it had not been so , yet this clause in the statute of henry the eighth would haue been absolutely void in it self against any such usurper when actually possessed of the crown , since it was held by all the judges in the case of henry the seventh , who at the time of his coming into england stood attainted by act of parliament , that this attainder need not be reversed , since possession of the crown takes away all precedent defects . but as to the statutes of the first of queen elizabeth , and the fourth of king iames , by which the oaths of allegiance and supremacy were enacted ; i conceive neither of these oaths can amount to a vertual repeal of this act , for though i grant one end of these oaths may be to secure the right of the king or queens heirs by lineal descent , yet it will not therefore follow , that a king de facto , or for the time being may not be legally defended in the throne ; for as for that part of the oath which was taken to king iames himself , it can hold no longer than whilst he continued king : if therefore the estates of the kingdom have adjudged him to have forfeited or abdicated the crown , the whole nation ought to take this as to have been legally done , since it was done by the judgment of the highest authority in the nation , when king iames had deserted the throne ; the like i may also say for the other part of the oath of allegiance , whereby we are obliged to his heirs and lawful successors , for since there has been a dispute concerning the succession of the crown between the princess of orange and your prince of wales , if the convention who are the sole proper judges in this case , have thought fit for the reasons i have already given you at our last meeting , to declare king william and queen mary the lawful king and queen of england , all the nation ought to accept them for such , since it was done by the highest authority at that time extant in the nation , and the only proper judges of that right ; and if disputes about legal rights ( of which certainly that of succeeding to the crown is of the highest importance ) ought to be decided by law , and not by the sword , ( which is not the decision of civil authority but of force ) the sentence of competent judges must end the dispute ; and if the estates of the realm be not the proper and legal judges of such disputes that concern the right to the crown , there can be none ; and if they be , subjects must acquiesce in their judgments , or it is all one as if there had been none ; for if men may pretend conscience , and adhere to their own private opinions as sole judges , the dispute must end in blows , which is contrary to the reason and nature of humane societies , which were instituted to prevent civil wars , and to end all controversies by a legal judgment without the sword. and to let you see farther , that as to the allegiance of the subjects it is all one in respect of us who are subjects , whether the convention have judged right or wrong in this case . let us suppose a person who has only a pretence , but no true right to an estate , should commence a suit of law for it , and at last obtaine a verdict of the jury , and also a judgment of the court of kings-bench for his title ; can any man deny , but that the sheriff is by vertue of this verdict and judgment oblig'd to put this abator into possession of this estate , notwithstanding he may know of his own knowledge , that the person who has obtain'd this judgment has no true right to the estate , or will any lawyer doubt whether all the tenants of the mannour are not oblig'd to swear homage and fealty to this suppos'd lord if they are required by him so to do . now though the true heir or owner has the legal right to the estate , yet by the supream law of all societies , which refers the decision of all personal rights to a legal authothority ; he who by a legal judgment is possessed of it , has the legal right in the estate , against all other claims , and legal authority must desend him in it ; and all who will submit to laws and legal authority , must acquiesce in it . and thus it must be with respect to the rights of princes , as well as of subjects , the right to the crown has been often disputed , as we all know , and to say that when such disputes happen , there is no authority in the nation to decide them , is to say that princes have no rights to their crowns by the laws of that nation ; for there can be no civil rights of which there neither are nor can be any civil judges ; for no man , no not a prince can be judge in his own cause , and if princes have no legal rights , they can lose no legal rights when they lose their crowns ; and i doubt their natural rights swill affect the consciences of very few subjects : therefore every independent civil society which is not wholly governed by the sword , must from the nature of such societies , and the reason of their institution , have authority within it self to decide all controversies which may arise about the rights of every member of that society , and to preserve it self from falling into a state of war , which is a dissolution of all civil government ; and if there ought to be such an authority in every civilized nation , when this supream authority has given sentence in such disputes , this must also determine all the subjects , and ought likewise to have the same effect upon the contending princes themselves , and no right , or pretence of right ought to affect the conscience after such a final judgment ; unless civil rights can oblige subjects to dissolve civil governments , and to dispute civil rights , not by the law , but by the sword ; which is to overthrow all civil rights , and put an end to the authority of laws . i hope this may serve to shew you how much you are mistaken to suppose that there can be no king in an hereditary monarchy , but the next lineal heir ; and tho' i grant no allegiance can be due or ought to be paid to him who is no king ; yet will it not follow that none can be due to any prince if he be not the next heir ; for that no obedience can be due to him who is no king i readily grant , but yet he may be a legal king in this kingdom who is not the next heir by blood , as almost half of the kings of england since the conquest were not , and yet have been always own'd and obey'd as legal kings . m. i confess what you say would go a great way to satisfie me , could you prove , that there was no difference between the succession to crowns and private inheritances , where i grant that the judgement of the supream court of the nation is to determine not only the possession , but the right too , in respect of the person who loses his estate by an unjust verdict , or illegal judgment ; whereas it is otherwise in the title of crowns , to which princes have a right , as well by the laws of god and nature , as also by the receiv'd setled laws and customs of the kingdom concerning the succession by descent , which is call'd in the th of queen elizabeth , in the statute ( we have so much debated at our last meeting ) the common laws of this realm , and it is there declared , that it ought to direct the right of the crown of england ; and it is there made treason during the queens life to affirm the contrary ; and this course of lineal succession at common law was also declar'd by solemn judgment in parliament , in the case ( i have so often urg'd of the duke of york's title to the crown against henry the vith , ) that it could no way be defeated by act of parliament ; and therefore i must still tell you , that you go upon a wrong ground , when you suppose that there can be now any dispute who is rightful king of england , since i have often told you , that he can neither abdicate or forfeit his right to the crown , and that no parliament whatever ( much less a convention ) could have any power to declare he had abdicated the government , and that thereby the throne was become vacant ; for though i grant the judgement of the estates of the kingdom when legally assembled , ought to be received with great submission and respect ; yet must it be only in such matters which they have a legal cognizance of , and which they are impower'd by the laws and constitutions of the kingdom to determine ; but since their voting him whom you your self cannot deny to have been their lawful king , to have abdicated the throne ( when indeed he had not ) and then not only to declare the throne vacant , but also to place those therein , whom you your self dare not affirm to be the next heirs by blood , are things quite out of their element , and beyond the sphere of their authority ; and though i grant that they may sometimes judge concerning the succession of the crown , and who is next heir to it , yet is this only to be understood as far as they judge according to the common laws of the succession already laid down at our last meeting , and not when they go quite contrary to them ; and therefore , though i own the parliament might justly declare henry the vith to be an usurper , and consequently might be deposed , yet doth it not therefore follow , that they had a like right to declare edward the ivth an usurper , and to pass an act of attainder against him , as i confess they did after that prince had held the crown for ten years together , since that was beyond their power to enact or declare by the fundamental constitution of the government . f. i am sorry your answer can afford nothing new but only the repetitions of the same false principles and arguments that have been already so often answered in our former conversations ; for in the first place i have sufficiently proved that neither the laws of god nor nature have ordain'd any such thing as a lineal succession of kings , or any irresistible or unforfeitable power in them which they can never fall from let them act never so tyrannically ; for i think i have sufficiently prov'd , that not only in absolute monarchies , but also in limited kingdoms , where the king has not the sole supream power , a king may not only be resisted , but may be also declar'd to have abdicated or forfeited his right to govern in case of any apparent obstinate violations of the fundamental constitution in those great points that make that government to differ from a despotick monarchy , and that if they had not this right , all their liberties will signifie nothing , and their lives , liberties , and estates , would lie wholly at the kings mercy , to be invaded and taken away when ever he pleas'd . i am forced to repeat this , to remind you of the reasons upon which those principles are founded , and therefore you do but fall into your old mistake , when you affirm , that by the fundamental constitution of the government , the great council of the nation ( which was but the same with our late convention ) had no power to declare the king to have broken the original contract between him and his people . therefore what you say concerning the want of authority in this great council , to declare the throne vacant is altogether precarious , unless you could also prove that it is against the fundamental constitution so to do : whereas i have so far proved the contrary , that the throne has been declared vacant no less than eight times since the conquest , which makes up almost a third part of the successions of all the kings and queens that have reigned since that time ; so that if the custom and practice of great councils or conventions ( and those not condemn'd by any subsequent statutes ) can be the only rule or guide for the consciences of all the subjects of this nation , we have certainly had that as solemnly declar'd now , as in any other great council or convention that has been ever held in this kingdom ; but as to what you say concerning the want of power in those councils , to declare or recognize who are the right heirs to the crown , but not to make them so , is very pleasant : since that were all one as if two men who contended for an estate , should bring the matter before the house of peers , and when that was done , and the case solemnly heard by council on both sides , that party who had lost the cause , should declare that this court ( tho' the highest in the kingdom ) had no power to judge in prejudice of himself , who had an undoubted right to the estate , which were only to give the lords power to give judgment only for one side ; and why the other party if the judgment had been given against him should not have made the like plea , i cannot understand : so that such a judgement would be altogether in vain . therefore to apply this to our purpose , though the parliament being prevail'd upon by the strength and faction of the duke of york , did as i granted ( at our last meeting ) declare that his title could in no wise be defeated , yet henry the vith being then in the throne , they might have certainly given a contrary judgement if they had pleased , and then i suppose the title of the house of york might have been so defeated as that the nation had never been troubled with it again ; and so also , when by the power of edward the ivth , a parliament met , and declared him to be lawful king from the time of his fathers death ; yet when the said king was driven out of the kingdom by the earl of warwick , and king henry the vith restored to the throne , a parliament was summon'd in the th of this king , wherein edward the ivth was declared an usurper , and himself attainted and to which parliament the duke of clarence , brother to king edward the ivth is first summoned , as well as the arch-bishop of canterbury , with all the other bishops , temporal lords , and judges , ( of whom littleton the authour of the book of tenures was one ) so likewise upon king edwards recovery of the crown the year following , king henry was again deposed , and a parliament called , wherein all the dukes , earls , and barons , with the arch-bishops of canterbury and york , and most of the rest of the bishops swore to prince edward , after called edward the vth , as right heir of the crown . now i desire to know what other law or rule there was then for the subjects allegiance , but the solemn judgement or declaration of the estates of the kingdom assembled in parliament , since their acts and judgements were in this dispute directly contradictory to each other ; so that it is evident from the constant practice of those times , that the king de facto was always own'd as lawful sovereign , and had allegiance still paid him by all the people of this kingdom , except those who being the heads of one or the other party were either attainted , or else forced to ●lye the kingdom . but as for all others , though different and contrary oaths of allegiance were impos'd upon the people , sometimes by the one , and sometimes by the other of those kings , according as they got possession of the throne ; yet i can no where find , that ever any body suffer'd for barely swearing allegiance to the king then in being , for it was always taken for law , that allegiance was due to the king de facto , since ordinary subjects are not suppos'd to understand the legal right or justice of the kings title . m. i must still say that there was some colour for the peoples thus acting ( as you say they did ) during the contest for the crown between the two families of yorke and lancaster , when i grant it was somewhat a difficult matter to judge which of the two had the best right to the crown , by reason that the house of lancaster had held it for three descents , as also from the speciousness of their title , since it was founded upon a pretended claim by right of blood , upon supposing that edmund , sirnamed cronch-back ( who was one of the ancestors of this house of lancaster ) was the eldest son to henry the third , which had it been true , would have given henry the fourth a good right to the crown , not only against richard the second , but his own grandfather edward the third likewise ( had he been then alive ; ) and this descent falling out long before the memory of any man then living who could confute the falsity of this pretended pedigree . the people of england might very well be excus'd for owning an usurper , and paying allegiance to him , since they did not know but his claim might have been right , especially since it was approv'd of in full parliament without any contradiction , as i have already shewn you at our last meeting . but what is all this to the matter now in debate between us , when the lineal succession of the crown has been so often declared to be the only means of acquiring a just title to it ; and every one knows very well who was own'd for lawful king of england within these three months , and also who was pray'd for in all our churches as his son and heir apparent ; and therefore i must still tell you , that your parallel between those kings de facto of the house of lancaster , and those princes whom the convention have now voted to fill the throne does not at all agree , since every subject of this kingdom who has but sence enough to go to market , can very well tell ( if they will deal sincerely ) to whom their allegiance is due . f. as to what you have now said , it is no more than a repetition of what you have already urged to evade the force of these clear authorities ; but indeed it was all one when a prince had been once recognized for lawful king by act of parliament , whether the people knew his title not to be good by right of blood or not . and this i have plainly proved to you from the instance of richard the third , who though both his elder brothers children were then alive , and the eldest of them had been proclaim'd king , and also own'd for such by himself , and whose title he had also sworn to maintain in his brother king edwards life time , as appears by the clause roll of the th of edward the fourth ; yet when he had once depos'd him , and had call'd a parliament which recognized his title , his acts and judicial proceedings stand good at this day ; and though he himself was attained , and declar'd a tyrant and an usurper , yet all the subjects who acted under his authority , and had taken an oath of allegiance to him , never needed an act of indemnity for so doing ; whereas those that came over with henry the viith were sain to have an act of pardon past to indemnifie them for fighting against richard the third ( as i have now show'd you . ) and though this parliament of the first of henry the seventh agreed to repeal divers acts which the king found fault with ; yet as for all other statutes made in the reign of king richard the third ( which have not been since repealed ) they are still in force without any confirmation ; likewise when henry the seventh had prevail'd over richard the third , and that he was slain in the field , though all the nation very well knew that henry the seventh could not be heir of the house of lancaster , because his mother was then alive , and had never formally given up her right , if she had any , as certainly she could have none , as being descended from iohn earl of somerset , who was base son to iohn of gaunt duke of lancaster , by catherine swinford , whilst his wife was alive ; and though i grant after his marriage with the said catherine , the children born of that bed were made legitimate by act of parliament in the th of richard the second , yet that legitimation only respects such private priviledges and inheritances which they might enjoy or succeed to as subjects , and not in respect of the crown ; the succession of which they were expresly declared uncapable of by that very act of legitimation , still to be seen upon the parliament roll. but for all this , when henry the seventh had called a parliament , and was therein recogniz'd for their lawful sovereign , and that the crown was setled by statute on the king , and heirs of his body ( without any mention of the princess elizabeth , who ought to have been queen by right of blood ) yet none of the subjects of this kingdom ( as i can find ) ever scrupled to swear allegiance to him , before ever he married that princess ; though they as well knew that he could have no right by blood as you can suppose , that the people at this day can know whether king iames has abdicated or forfeited the crown or not , or whether your prince of wales be his true and lawful son ; for since they are both nice and difficult points , and having been determined by the convention , the supream judges in this case , in favour of their present majesties , and that they also recognized their title after they became a parliament ; i can see no manner of reason why all the subjects of this kingdom may not as well justifie their taking this new oath of allegiance to them , notwithstanding their former oath of allegiance to king iames , and his right heirs , as well as the people of england could justifie their taking an oath of allegiance to henry the seventh , notwithstanding their former oath to edward the fourth , and his right heirs , before ever henry the seventh had married the princess elizabeth , the heiress of the crown ; especially since this act of the th of henry the seventh ( which we are now disputing about ) was made expresly to secure and indemnitie all those who should attend upon the king for the time being , and do him true and faithful service of allegiance , &c. and therefore it lies upon you still to prove , that this statute is either expired , or else void in it self ; otherwise ( besides the constant practice of former times ) we have here an express act of parliament declaring it every mans duty to pay allegiance to the king for the time being , and then certainly he is as much oblig'd to swear it too . m. i doubt not but i shall prove to you that this statute expired with henry the seventh , from a clause in the act it self ; for if you please to read immediately after those words you have now cited , that all those who do the king for the time being true and lawful allegiance , &c. [ it follows thus ] shall be secured from all manner of forfeitures and molestations relating to their persons or estates ( but mark ) provided always that no person or persons shall take any benefit or advantage by this act , which shall hereafter decline from his or their said allegiance : now we know a proviso is an exception or restraint upon the latitude and comprehensiveness of the law , and that all statutes are perfectly null so far as the proviso reaches . having premised this , i shall endeavour to prove that this act was design'd only for the security of that reign in which it was made , and cannot be stretched any farther . to make this appear , let us now suppose a competition between the king de jure , and henry the seventh ( that is one de facto ) and that the subject engages for the latter ; in this case if the king de facto prevail , there is no need of the assistance of this statute ; for we cannot imagine any prince could be so impolitick as to punish those who have ventur'd their all to maintain him in his government ; this besides the ingratitude of the action , would proclaim the injustice of his cause , and would serve only to ruine his interest . f. notwithstanding this objection , you have now made , i doubt not but this clause will bear a very fair and legal interpretation , and that not in respect of the allegiance that might be due to the king de facto , but to the king de jure ; since if it were not for the indemnity provided by this statute , the king de facto would have been oblig'd to have punished them for opposing their lawful prince . m. this is easily answer'd , for pray do kings de facto always perform that which the law requires ; if so , they never would have been kings de facto , since they could not make themselves masters of the sovereign power without dispossessing those who are supposed the right owners of it . secondly , the possessour would not so much as seem oblig'd to punish his adherents upon a competition , except he own'd himself to be no more than an unjust usurper , but we have neither example nor reason to expect such singular concessions as these , for no usurper will own himself in the wrong , so long as he intends to enjoy the advantages of his injustice : upon supposition therefore , that the victory had fallen on the side of a king de facto , the act would be wholly superfluous . f. but why may we not also suppose that this clause was inserted , not only to secure those who had assisted the king de facto against your king de jure , but also to debar all those who had fallen from their allegiance to the king de facto , from receiving any benefit by this act if ever they should plead it in their own justification , after the king de jure had prevail'd , and was again setled in the throne . m. you may take it in this sence if you please , but if you do , it will not at all mend the matter , for tho' those that stood by the king de facto , will have great occasion for an act of indemnity , yet this act will be as helpless to them now , as it was needless before ; for either they must submit to the king de jure or not ; if they do not submit , it 's easie to imagine the consequences , how a victorious and irresistible prince will treat the obstinate and rebellious opposers of his just title if they do submit ( as of necessity they must ) then they can claim no manner of priviledge and indemnity from this act ; for they cannot come into the party of the king de jure , without deserting that de facto ; i. e. without declining their allegiance to him , who was king when this statute was made ; by declining which allegiance , the proviso expresly excludes them from all manner of benefit or advantage by this act. in this condition the law would have left the de facto party , if the sovereignty had been disputed between henry the seventh , and the house of york ; and that the prince de jure of the house of york had been successful : from whence it 's undeniably plain , that neither the design nor words of this statute can be drawn to such a monstrous construction as to enact bare possession to be a good title , and make might and right the same thing . the only design of this parliament was to continue the crown to henry the seventh during his life ; which both by the body and proviso of the act was effectually done as in them lay , for divers reasons that might then prevail with the two houses to consent to a temporary alteration of the succession to the crown , such as these , that though henry the seventh had no just title in his own right , yet in the right of his wife he had , which he did no way disavow by this act ; and you must also remember that at this time henry the viith had several children by his queen , viz. prince arthur , henry , &c. so that now the contending families of yorke and lancaster being thus hapily united , there was no reason to sear , that a security ( though an unusual one ) to the present possessor , could be prejudicial to the right line , especially since the force of that act was confined to the reign of that prince , as has been already proved . f. you may fancy if you please , that you have prov'd this act to be expired , but i think if you better consider of it , you will find your self mistaken , for though i may very well suppose that the king and parliament to deter men from falling from their allegiance to the king for the time being , might insert this clause upon a supposition that the next king whoever he was , whether by right of blood , or only de facto , would out of a generous aversion to traytors and deserters hinder them by vertue of this clause , from enjoying any benefit by this act ; yet i shall not longer insist upon 't , whether it be insignificant or not , and therefore will at present grant it to be so , but what then ? will a void clause vitiate or render expir'd an act of parliament which is made indefinitely , without fixing it to any time , or person ? the words in the act are , the king for the time being ; which must certainly extend to any other king as well as henry the viith ; for i suppose that an act of parliament , and a deed agreed in this , that an unnecessary clause can by no means render the whole void . but as for what you say in relation to this acts being a security for the title of the queen , and her children ( whom you suppose to be the right heirs of the crown ) this rather serves to strengthen the act than otherwise ; for if this king had a good title in her right , then it may be also very well suppos'd that she gave her assent to this act in the person of her husband , and that not for the benefit , but to the prejudice of her own issue , since if after her death ( which happen'd some years before his ) her son henry prince of wales had set up his present title to the crown in the right of his mother , and so would have dethron'd his father as an usurper ; i suppose no reasonable man will deny but that this act would have indemnified all those who had taken up arms in defence of king henry the viith against his son , though ( in your sence ) king de jure ; and if it would justifie the subjects then , i cannot see why it may not do the same thing now in their swearing allegiance , nay , fighting for the king in possession , against him whom we will for the present suppose to be king de jure . m. well , however i think i can prove that this act was no more than temporary from the judgement of the judges in the case of iohn duke of northumberland , who when he was tryed for treason , for leading an army against queen mary , to settle the lady iane gray in the throne , desired to be informed by the judges , whether a man acting by the authority of the great seal , and the order of the privy council ( or princes council , as stow and heylin word it ) could become thereby guilty of treason ; to which , all the judges answer'd , that the great seal of one that was not lawful queen , could give no authority or indemnity to those that acted by such a warrant , upon which the duke submitted ; though without question he did not want lawyers to inforce his plea with this statute likewise , if his cause would have born it ; from whence i infer against sir edward coke , that treason lies against a king de jure , tho' out of possession ; for it 's plain by all our historians , that queen mary was so far from being possessed of the crown when the duke of northumberland acted against her , that the lady iane was not only proclaimed queen in london , and most of all the cities and great towns in england , but the tower of london , with all the forts and naval forces were under her command ; and she had also allegiance sworn to her by the privy-council , and by the lord mayor , and aldermen , and she had also the seals in her power , by which all patents and commissions were granted and issued in her name ; and if all this be not sufficient to constitute her queen de facto according to this statute of henry the viith , i know not what was . f. yet i can tell you what was yet wanting , which because she had not , she was certainly neither queen de jure , nor de facto , and that was a solemn coronation , and recognition of her right by parliament ; which legal investiture since she never had , she was not the queen for the time being , and consequently not intended within this statute of the th of henry the viith ; for though it is true , she was appointed successour of the crown-by the letters patents of king edward the vith , yet since she could not claim by right of blood , there being so many before her , all the kingdom looked upon it as an usurpation , and an artifice of the duke of northumberland ( whose son she had married ) to get the government of the kingdom into his sole power : so that it was no wonder if the greater part of the people were so averse to her title , and that those of the nobility who took her part , so quickly revolted from her , when once the fear they were in of the duke of northumberland's power was removed ; for had this bequest of the crown to the lady iane held good , this kingdom instead of being hereditary , would have become wholly testamentary , and disposable by the last will or letters patents of the king or queen for the time being , without the consent of the great council of the nation , which is contrary not only to the then receiv'd laws of succession , but also to the antient constitution of the kingdom , as well before as after the conquest . but notwithstanding all this , i doubt not but that if the lady iane had so far prevail'd against queen mary as to have been able to call a parliament , and to have had her title own'd and recogniz'd therein , as it was in the case of richard the third , and henry the seventh , but that she would have been true and lawful queen according to the intent of the statute we are now discoursing of , and then the duke of northumberland must likewise ( if he had fair play ) have been indemnified for taking up arms in her defence against queen mary , since queen iane would have been then within the letter of this statute , as much as king henry the seventh himself . m. you must pardon me , if i cannot be of your opinion in this matter , since if the bare coronation and recognition by parliament could confer a legal right to the crown upon one who had no hereditary right to it before the consequence of it would be , that the crown would be so far from being elective ( as you suppose it to have antiently been ) that it would be in the power of every bold usurper or rebell who had but the confidence to call himself king , to gain a legal title to be so , according to your principles : and then if oliver cromwell could have found a party strong enough in the army to have declar'd him king , and had call'd a parliament in his own name , who had recogniz'd him for their lawful sovereign , he would then have had as much right to our allegiance as king charles the iid , which certainly was not only contrary to the settlement of the crown upon henry the viith , and the heirs of his body , but also to that solemn recognition of king iames the firsts title , as lineally descended as right heir to the said king henry , which i insisted on at our last meeting . and therefore if you will have my sence of this act , it is either expir'd ( for the reasons i have already given ) or else was void ab initio ; since it is not only contrary to the setled course of succession of the crown according to the laws of lineal descent for divers hundred years last past , but also to those of justice and right reason , for an usurper not only to seize the throne by force , but if he can once get himself solemnly crown'd , and then recogniz'd by an act of parliament of his own calling , ( which your self cannot deny but to have been ever too obsequious to the will and power of usurpers , as appears by those instances you have given me in henry the ivth , henry the vith , and richard the iiid , ) the consequence will then be , that the whole nation would not be only bound to swear allegiance to him , but would be also oblig'd by this act to desend him in his tyranny and usurpation to the utmost of their power , and it would also indemnifie them for so doing ; which would be to establish iniquity by a law , and would destroy all the setled foundations of right and wrong , which i affirm god himself is not able to alter , without departing from those great attributes of immutability and justice , so essential to his divine nature . f. it will not be very difficult to reply to these arguments , since they are grounded on such false principles as are already answer'd . as first , that this kingdom is by the fundamental constitution of it an hereditary monarchy , and that consequently none but he who has a right by inheritance can require our allegiance , but pray tell me where you can find this fundamental constitution ? for i think i have sufficiently prov'd that there never was any such thing known in england till between four and five hundred years since that king edward the first succeeded to his father henry the third , without any bequest of the crown by his testament , and before any election , or coronation , since he was then in the holy-land . but suppose it now to be an hereditary monarchy , it doth not therefore follow , that the monarchy should continue always in such a family , for that may sail , or may be changed by conquest or usurpation , as has often been , and the constitution continue . so that the most that can be said is , that when any particular family , by the providence of god , and the consent and submission of the people , is placed in the throne , of right the crown ought to descend to the heir of that family ; but suppose it does not , must we pay allegiance to no other person though p●ssessed of the throne ? pray sir , shew me that fundamental consti●ution ; for its being an hereditary monarchy does not prove it , and according to the judgement of the best lawyers , the laws of the land require the contrary ; viz. that we must pay our allegiance to him who is actually king , not to him who ought to have been king , but is not , and to think to confute this , by pretending this fundamental constitution of an hereditary monarchy , is to take that for granted , which is still to be proved . and therefore i am not at all frighted at the dreadful consequences which you suppose must follow if this statute of henry the viith should be law , ( viz. ) that it would be in the power of every rebell and usurper who could get himself crown'd , and then own'd to be king by a parliament of his own calling to have a legal right to our allegiance , and that cromwell if he could have got himself once crown'd , and recogniz'd , might have been defended in his unjust usurpation against king charles the second . but , admit this to have been so ; yet it is still to be understood , that at this coronation he had taken the oath anciently taken by our kings , and that the parliament he had summon'd to recognize his title , had consisted of the antient lords and commons , consisting of knights , citizens , and burgesses , which never was observ'd in any of those mock-parliaments which cromwell call'd ; had all these conditions been observ'd , i believe he would have been as legal a king within this statute of henry the viith , as he himself ever was before he married with the princess elizabeth , which was not till near half a year after he had the crown setled upon him by act of parliament . so that though upon every translation of the crown from one family to another , the first prince of that family could have no hereditary right to it , yet we find such princes to this day taken for lawful kings ; thus your william the conquerour , king henry the ivth , and king henry the viith , are each of them looked upon as true and lawful kings ( according to our constitution ) as if they had been right heirs of the crown by lineal descent ; and though you may say , that as to william i. he had a good right by conquest ; that is , only gratis dictum , since i have already prov'd that he could be really no conquerour . and if the english saxon monarchy was hereditary before the conquest ( as the gentlemen of your opinion suppose ) he could be no other than an usurper upon edgar athling the right heir of the crown by blood ; and as for henry the ivth , and henry the viith , though they both pretended a feigned title to the crown as heirs by blood , yet it is plain by the very acts of recognition i have cited , that they durst not insist upon that title , since i have already prov'd there is no such thing mention'd in that act of parliament wherein the estates of the kingdom unanimously agreed that henry duke of lancaster should reign over them , nor yet in the subsequent act , whereby the crown was intail'd upon himself , and his four sons successively ; so likewise the statute of the first of henry the seventh , it is only drawn in general terms ; declaring that the inheritance of the crown of england , &c. shall rest , remain , and abide in the person of king henry the viith , and the heirs of his body lawfully coming , &c. nor is there indeed any breach made upon this statute ( as you suppose ) nor yet upon the act of recognition of king iames , which you so much insist upon , since the crown is certainly setled upon two princes , who are not only lineally descended from them , but who are also to be looked upon as right heirs unto them , since the great council of the nation , who are the supream judges have declar'd them to be so . but as for the rest of your speech , whereby you would prove that this act must needs be void , because contrary to the laws of justice and right reason ; this also depends upon your former errour , in supposing that princes have a divine or natural right to their crowns ▪ antecedent to the municipal laws of their respective kingdoms , which is already sufficiently confuted ; so that tho' i grant it is not in the power of god himself to alter the natural foundations of right , and wrong , just , and unjust ; yet it is likewise as certain that the civil rights of princes , as well as those of subjects , can no ways be accounted for according to those natural laws ; since all civil property , as well in crowns , as other possessions , must depend upon the particular laws and constitutions of each kingdom and nation , as i have already sufficiently made out . and therefore though i grant that all legal authority ought still to go according to just or rightful titles , yet since god makes no kings at this day . ●ut those who are made kings by some humane acts , and have a legal right to kingship by some humane laws : now how can you prove from hence , that in england none can have a legal right to govern , but those who have the rightful title of a lineal succession ? for if the title alone does not conferr the the authority , but that the law says a legal investiture by coronation and recognition by parliament shall also conferr it , it is evident that an hereditary title , and a legal authority , may be separated , and yet the authority continue legal still ; for legal authority must be conveyed in such manner , and by such forms as the law has prescribed , or appoints to that purpose ; for there is no other way of conveying it ; and then that authority which is so given in form of law ( and that only . ) is the legal authority . if then the estates of the realm , who are the only proper judges of such disputes , have adjudged the crown to one , whom we will at present suppose to have no antecedent legal title to it , yet he thereby becomes legally possessed , not only of the external force and power , but of the legal authority of the government also ; and therefore he may challenge as his due , all legal obedience , ( which is the true notion of allegiance , for nothing more than legal obedience can be due to a meer legal authority ) so that because he is invested with the legal authority , the crown is his legal property , against all other claims , and his subjects must defend him in it , as the legal properties of private persons being once determined by judgements of inferiour courts of law , are also to be defended by the civil power against the force of him who perhaps may have the better title to the estate by right of blood . and if god makes kings by humane acts , i hope it is no injustice in god to make him a king , whom the law makes a king ▪ and to enjoyn our obedience to a legal king ; which legal authority may be said to be annexed to the legal title , while there is no legal judgement against it : which was not the case of queen mary , and the lady iane her competitor ; nor yet of king charles the second , and oliver cromwell : since neither the one ' or the other were ever crowned or acknowledged as lawful queen , or king by parliament , and therefore could obtain no legal title against the right heirs ; but on the other side , when one is solemnly declar'd king or queen , being crown'd or plac'd on the throne by the estates of the realm , he is then legal king , and has the legal authority , as the royal estate and dignity , was owned to be in henry the vith , when the duke of york claimed the right to the crown . m. i am not yet convinc'd i am mistaken in this matter ; for waving at present any natural or divine rights of princes , i think this act of henry the viith , ( if suppos'd to be now in force ) is no ways to be reconcil'd with the former declar'd laws and statutes of the kingdom ; much less can this last pretended act of recognition of king william and queen mary reverse the statute of recognition made to king iames the first , whereby the parliament does not only own him for true and lawful king by descent from henry the viith , and edward the ivth , but also engaged themselves and their posterities to his majesty , and his royal progeny for ever . and they do likewise conclude in these words ( i have not yet mention'd ) which [ act ] if your majesty shall be pleased ( as an argument of your gracious acceptation ) to adorn with your majesties royal assent ( without which it can neither be compleat and perfect , nor remain to all posterity according to our most humble desires , as a memorial of your princely and tender affection towards us ; ) we shall add this also to the rest of our majesties unspeakable and inestimable benefits . here they plainly acknowledge these two things . first , that the crown descend● by proximity of blood , and that immediately , even before any ceremony of coronation , or otherwise ; so that there can be no inter-regnum , or vacancy of the throne ; and accordingly it is a maxim in law , that rex non meritur . secondly , that the assent of the king is that which gives the life , being , and vigour to the laws , without which they are of no force ; therefore i shall plainly prove these acts to the contrary to be void . it is a maxim in our civil as well as your common law ' that every s●natus-consultum , or decree of the senate as also every statute or act of parliament must be abrogated and repeal'd by the same authority by which it was made ; since therefore that act of the first of edward the ivth , whereby he was declar'd to be lawful king , as descended from l●●nel duke of clarence , third son of edward the third , by philippa his daughter , and heir ; and that henry the fourth , and henry the sixth , who had successively held the crown were usurpers , and only pretended kings ; it would necessarily follow , that none can after this so solemn law and declaration , lawfully succeed to the crown of this realm , but such as have a true and just right as heirs by blood , according to the course of descent allow'd of by the common laws of this kingdom ; and therefore henry the viith being an usurper , and enjoying no more than a matrimonial crown , could not joyn with a parliament in making any law contrary to that of the first of edward the ivth , which had been so solemnly past , and setled in parliament by a king whose title was by descent indisputable . so likewise in the matter now in dispute between us , i can never apprehend how a pretended statute made in a convention , and not in a lawful parliament summon'd by the king , can first declare the throne vacant , and then appoint those to fill it , who certainly can have no just title to it , according to that act of recognition of king iames ; which expresly declares , that they themselves could not have made that act to be compleat and perfect to remain to all posterity , without his royal assent ; which being once past into a law. by a king whose title was indisputable , can never afterwards be alter'd ( if ever it can be at all ) but by a parliament as legally call'd , and that by a king whose title is also as legal as that of king iames the first 's ; this objection , though i have often urg'd in other words , yet could i never yet obtain a satisfactory answer from you . f. though i have already in part answer'd this objection at our last meeting , and have also partly done it already in this ; yet since i see you so much insist upon it , and do also urge it again in other words , with a fresh addition of new arguments ; i hope you will not think me tedious , if i am also necessitated to repeat the same things again , and put you in mind of what i hayh already prov'd ; which when i have done , i doubt not but this argument of yours will signifie very little . your first mistake therefore is , that king henry the viith being an usurper , had no power to alter the course of hereditary succession , setled by the statute of the first of edward the ivth whereby he was declar'd lawful king ; in answer to which , i must put you in mind , that this was the first time that ever this point was so setled before , and that not till after a long war , and that by subduing all those that held with the house of lancaster , he had made such a perfect conquest of all that oppos'd him , that there was no lords or commons in this parliament but what were intirely of his party ; yet we see that when henry the vith got the upper hand again , and his party revers'd this statute of edward the ivth , and declar'd the crown to belong to henry the vith , and his heirs , which act was to revers'd again by the next parliament , in the eleventh of edward the ivth ; when he again recover'd the crown by another battle against henry the vith , so evident it is , that whoever is once seated in the throne , and is recognized by act of parliament tho' of his own summoning , all his acts till they are repeal'd do hold good , though he were declar'd an usurper , and himself attainted by act of parliament ; and therefore admitting that henry the viith was an usurper at the time when this act we now discourse of was made , yet would it not render this act void as you suppose , since it was never yet repeal'd by any subsequent statute . but indeed , henry the viith was no usurper at the time when this statute was made ; for you your self have already granted that he had a good title in right of his wife , which he never renounc'd , or disavow'd ; and therefore we may very well suppose that she , though queen de jure , gave her tacit consent to this act in the person of her husband ; and if so , i cannot see any reason why it should not stand good , not only against her self , and her own children , 〈◊〉 also against all others who should claim under her title ; but if you say she could not do this in prejudice of her own right heirs , because the crown had been already declar'd by act of parliament to be hereditary , and not to be acquir'd by usurpation ; this is to beg the question , and to suppose an hereditary descent to have been the fundamental law , and constant practice of the succession of the crown before that time ; whereas i have already prov'd , that till the reign of edward the first , the crown was partly hereditary , and partly elective ; and ever since that time , though it has been still claim'd as hereditary , yet has it been always believed to be the right of the parliament to declare who was lawful king : and that whosoever was so declar'd and recogniz'd , has been always looked upon in the eye of the law as the only rightful and legal king , to whom the allegiance of the subjects was due , and whose statutes are obligatory at this day . this being so ( as it cannot be deny'd ) your argument from the act of recognition to king iames the first may be easily answer'd , though i should grant at present ( for discourse sake ) that their now majesties king william and queen mary are only king and queen de facto , for if all the statutes of these three kings of the house of lancaster , and of richard the third ( nay even those statutes by which themselves were declar'd to be lawful kings , and the crown setled upon them and their issue ) have at all times held good , till they were lawfully repeal'd i desire you would shew me any sufficient reason why the late act of recognition of their present majesties title , and for the settlement of the crown upon their right heirs of the protestant religion , should not have the like force and effect in respect of our allegiance to them , as it had been to all other kings de facto , who have hitherto sate upon the throne , though perhaps it may derogate from the intent of that statute of recognition of king iames the first ; nor does it make any difference , though we suppose that this act was made by a king by descent , and that we now discourse of only by a king and queen de facto , and a parliament call'd or own'd by them ; since the law allows no difference as to their legislative power between acts made by a king de facto , and one de jure . and therefore , though i grant that those conclusions you draw from this statute are true , that there is no inter-regnum or vacancy of the throne . and secondly , that the assent of the king is that which gives the life , being , and vigour to the laws ; yet as for your first conclusion , that there can be no vacancy of the throne , it is only to be understood , that ordinarily , and according to the common course of succession there can be none , and yet extraordinarily there may , as you your self must grant : since upon the death of queen elizabeth there might have happen'd a contest between king iames , and the then earl of hartford , as heir to mary the french queen , second sister to king henry the viiith , upon whose heirs the crown was setled by henry the viiith's will , as i have already mention'd at our last meeting ; and if it had been a doubt whether this will had been rightly made , or not , could have been no otherwise decided but by war , or else the solemn judgement and recognition of parliament of that title they had judged to be best ; and he who had been so declared , would certainly have been lawful king , and all the nation had been oblig'd to swear alleglance to him . apply this to the present case , admitting king iames to have truly abdicated the throne , and see whether it be not exactly the same ; supposing ( for once ) your prince of walts to have been indeed the son of the late king and queen ; and though it is true , he is not yet declar'd an impostor , yet is he neither acknowledged as their right heir , for the reasons i have already given . but as for your next conclusion , that it is the assent of the lawful king that gives force and vigour to a law ; from whence you would infer , that the late act of recognition and settlement is void , because not made by those who were lawful king and queen at the time of the making this act ; this is also to beg the question ; for though it is true the act of recognition to king iames declares this act could not be compleat without his majesties royal assent , yet it is not there said , that no other king but he who claims by descent ( as king iames did ) could pass an act that should be good in law ; since we find by the whole course both of law , and history , that the statutes made by kings de facto , are as truly and as much laws , as those made by your kings de jure ; and attainders for treason committed against them , have been so far from being declar'd void , that they could not be revers'd by any other means than by particular acts of parliament made for that purpose , as i have already shewn you from divers instances , both from history , and records . nor is your exception against the present parliaments not being call'd by the kings writ of any force , since i have already prov'd at our last meeting , from the example of the great council that assembled to recognize and ordain edward the first to be king when he was in the holy-land ; as also by the parliaments of edward and richard the second , by which they were deposed , and edward the third , and henry the fourth declar'd to be their successors : that those parliaments could not be summon'd by those princes whom they so recogniz'd , and therefore though they were call'd by the writs of the former kings ; yet their authority determin'd as to be the parliament of that king that call'd them , upon his ceasing to be king ; and therefore must owe their sitting longer , wholly to the authority of him they had already declared king , whose presence and authority was then looked upon as sufficient to give them power to sit and make laws with the succeeding king , though they were never summon'd by him . to these parliaments i may add that of the first of king charles the second , which called home the king , and after his return , made several statutes both publick , and private , which stand good to this day ; so that to conclude you have no reason either from law or history to maintain that there can be no vacancy of the throne , or that none can be declar'd king or queen , but in a parliament summon'd by the writs of that prince , whose title they are to recognize . m. i shall not deny the matters of fact to have been as you lay them , as to the great councils or parliaments you mention ; but in answer to this , you may remember , that as for those parliaments call'd in the name of edward , or richard the second , there is no procedent to be drawn from them , because they serv'd only to depose their lawful kings , and to set up those who had no right , at least as long as they liv'd ; and you very well know , that any coersive power in the two houses of parliament over the king , is expresly renounc'd and declar'd against in the parliament of the thirteenth of k. charles the second , as i have already shewn you ; but as for the convention which was call'd in the first year of that king , i have also given you my judgement of it ; that though they might lawfully meet to vote the return of their lawful sovereign , and to recognize his title , yet were they not for all that a lawful parliament , as to the raising of moneys or making of laws ; and therefore what ever they did to both these , they were fain to be confirmed by the parliament of the th i now mention'd . but indeed i cannot but admire as this mungrel hodge podge course of succession which you now suppose to take place in england ; for you cannot deny but the crown is hereditary , and has been always claim'd as such for near years ; and yet for all that , when ever an usurper and a parliament shall agree together , he to take the crown by force , and they to recognize his title as soon as he pleases to call them , he must then be looked upon as a lawful king , and the just and rightful title of the true king , or lawful heir of the crown shall be so far destroy'd , as that allegiance must be due to this usurper , though perhaps he obtain'd the crown by the most horrid vilanies in the world ; as the deposing and murthering of his lawful sovereign , as henry the ivth did , and which would also have been the case of oliver cromwell , had he ever taken upon him the title of king ; so that is to set on foot at once two contrary legal rights , a legal right and title to the crown by descent of blood , without a right to exercise the authority belonging to a king , and a legal right to wear the crown , and exercise the authority belonging to it , without any antecedent legal right to the crown it self ; which would indeed render the legal authority in england to be like the right that men have to those creatures that are ferae naturae , which belong to him who can get them into his power ; for as to the consent or recognition of parliament , i look upon that as a meer ●auble , since your self cannot shew me any usurper since the conquest , though never so wicked and notorious , who ever fail'd to have his title so recognized and confirmed by parliament , as you your self cannot deny , which methinks is a high derogation from the dignity of a true hereditary monarchy , such as ours either is , or at least ought to be . f. i shall reply but this once upon this head , since i see there can be nothing new said upon it : and therefore you your self are for●ed to repeat what you have already ●urged at our last meeting ; only you strive to support it by fresh authorities ; therefore as to the parliaments which deposed king edward and richard the second , i cannot blame you for denying them to be lawful precedents , because they make directly against your opinion ; but you say nothing to that of the first great council or parliament of edward the first , which not only ordain'd he should be king , but also appointed all the great officers of the kingdom which were to govern it in his absence ; but you may deny the authority of those parliaments of the first of edward the third , and first of henry the fourth , as much as you please in a chamber , but if you should do the like at westminster-hall against any act of parliament , because made whilst edward or richard the second were living , you would soon be over-rul'd , and told that those laws had still continued in force , and unrepeal'd , and it did not belong to private men to question those acts that have been hitherto receiv'd for law. but as for what you have said against the authority of the acts of that parliament that brought in the king , i have already prov'd that they were only confirm'd 〈…〉 cantela , and that they had been good without it , appears by this , that all their private acts , though never confirm'd in the following parliament , are still in force . but if the solemn recognition of a kings title by parliament be such a bauble , and so easily obtain'd ( as you suppose , ) i may say the same of that act which recognized king iames the firsts title ; that it was done meerly out of flattery upon his accession to the crown ; nor can you reply that they might do this , because he was the only right heir , this is to beg the question , since if he had not been so , it would have been all one , as you your self confess . as for the rest of your arguments which you draw from the different means which our law allows for princes succeeding to the crown , which you call a mungrel hodge podge course of succession , and that it derogates from the dignity of a true hereditary monarchy ; to which i shall only say , if now our law has established it so , no private man ought to judge otherwise ; for nemo debet esse sapientior legibus , is a maxime as old as true ; but indeed , though our laws do establish a legal right in the present possessor of the crown , when once crown'd , and recogniz'd by parliament , since they will not allow the parliament to judge of or examine the kings title . or by what means he attain'd the throne ; yet this does not to alter the ordinary hereditary course of succession for the law still looks upon the crown as hereditary , and the change of the person or royal family does not make the crown cease to be so ; and therefore whoever has possession of the crown , has an hereditary crown , and as such , may leave it to his heirs as long as they can keep it ; as is plain from the example of the three henries who succeeded each other , and who had not only allegiance sworn to them , but they who acted contrary thereunto , were judged and executed as traytors ; so that the law did all it could to maintain the crown in the right line of succession ; and if any kings have gain'd it by usurpation , though the parliament have own'd the authority of such an usurper , yet have they not thereby approv'd the action ; and you your self must acknowledge a great difference between these two , since you have more than once acknowledged that an usurper , or king in possession , has a good title to a crown , in case all the right heirs are extinct , or by their not claiming it for any long time , are suppos'd to have made a ●acit cession of their right ; since it is not so much to the person as to the authority ( which we grant to be from god ) that we pay our obedience . but let us also for once suppose that there may be a legal title to a crown without a right to exercise the authority belonging to it ; and a legal right to wear the crown , and exercise the authority belonging to it , without an antecedent legal right to the crown it self ; this is no such absurdity as you suppose , if you please to consider that allow'd distinction between jus ad rem ▪ and jus in re , with the reason of it ; for t is an approved distinction in law , that one may have a right to a thing , and another a right in it ; the one is a right of a legal claim , the other of a legal possession : and that this may and must be in all civil governments , and meer legal rights , appears from the different laws and customs on which such different rights are founded . this i have hinted before , but must now explain it more particularly ; in all civil societies there must be particular laws to determine personal and particular rights ; and whatever is due to any man by such laws , is his legal right . but yet we know these laws can determine no controversie without a living judge ; for if every man were to judge for himself , every man will make the law to be on his side , and then we had as good have no laws at all ; and therefore the fundamental laws of all societies , which is superior to all particular laws , is this , that the last and final judgment of authority , shall be taken for law , and that shall be every man 's right as to all the effects of law , which is thus adjudged him ; whoever calmly considers these things , will find that it is impossible it should be otherwise without overturning all civil governments . and this i have proved to you from the example of a right owner of an estate , when outed of his possession by a verdict of a jury and an unjust judgment in one of the king's courts , that no man ought to restore him by force to his possession , till he has again reverst that unjust judgment given against him . m. though i grant this is true in the case of private persons , and their inheritances , yet is it not so as to princes who hold their crowns by a title superior to the ordinary municipal laws , and therefore are not only kings by law , but by divine right , and a fundamental constitution of the government ; and so cannot have their title adjudged by parliament , as you suppose ; for our best divines have unanimously concluded out of scripture , that all lawful kings and their royal power is from god , by divine right , and is not from the people , no not in elective kingdoms , ( such as poland , for example ; ) for even there , the conferring of the royal authority is from god , and not from any law made by the people , and neither they nor their representatives have any thing to do to judge of it ; for i would gladly know who made that law which made the king , certainly the king did not make it , for that law which made the king , must ( of necessity ) precede and be before the king , who had his royal power and kingly office from that law. f. i see you are very hard put to it , since you are again forc'd to flie back to your old covert of a divine right in kings , which is , not to be deriv'd from any law made by the consent of the people , and if this be true , i desire you would show me , how kings can at this day owe their crown● immediately to god , and not to the law , since god does no longer confer kingdoms by any express designation of the person , but by the ordinary course of his providence ; and then pray tell me , why all princes whatsoever , when they are once seated in the throne , let them come by it which way they will , must not derive their power alike from god ? and consequently , kings by an unjust conquest , or usurpation , are as much from god , as those who ascend the throne by the consent or election of the people ; for if the peoples consent , do no more then design the person , but that it is god alone which gives him his authority , then which way soever he obtains this power of the sword , which is the onely sign of god's conferring this authority , it will be also the ordinance of god , and consequently their present majesties being once seated in the throne are upon , these principles as much to be obey'd as the ordinance of god ; as king iames or any other hereditary monarch whatever . but if you do not like this doctrine , and tell me of a legal successive right which king iames and his right heirs have to the crown , according to the fundamental constitution of the nation ; this is plainly to own the king to be so by the law of the land , though in words you deny it ; for every hereditary right is either a continued usurpation by force , which can give no right at all ; or a right by law , which is by the consent of the people to entail the crown on such a family , which certainly is to make a king by law , that is , by the consent of the people . but if you will suppose that it was the authority of the first king alone who thus intail'd the crown upon himself , and his right heirs , i desire you would shew me how the crown could be so intail'd without the consent of the people , so as that his successor may not alter it , and give it by his last will or testament to which of his sons or daughters he pleases ; since sir robert filmer himself acknowledges that a testamentary heir to a crown in an absolute monarchy , is as much by divine right , as if he had come in by succession , as appears by the instances he gives in seth , who could have no right to succeed his father adam in the government of mankind , while cain his elder brother was alive , by the will of adam his father ; the like i may say of solomon , who by his fathers crowning him king in his life time , and thereby making him his successor , gave him a right to rule over adon●jah his elder brother ; so that i may very well ask you , if the present law of the land did not proceed from the free consent of the people testified by long custom , or express declaration of the people by their representatives in parliament ; i desire to know why the king of england cannot as well settle the crown by his last will upon which of the blood-royal he pleases , as that it should be lawful for the english saxon kings to exercise this prerogative , as dr. brady supposes they did before the conquest , without the consent of the great council of the nation ? so that i think i may much better ask you what that law was , and who made it , which you suppose to make kings prior to , and independent from the consent of the people ; since if there be any such law , it is either as yet unknown to mankind , or else all those who are once possess'd of kingdoms , have an equal title to them by divine right ? but indeed , it is only some divines who were more scrupulous than knowing in politicks , who first started this question , whereas indeed there is no such great mystery in it ; for that law by which the first king of england for example was elected , was not in being before the king was made , nor yet was the king in being before that ; but when the first king was made so , by the consent and election of the people , the king , and the law that made him so , began both together ; that is , the people by chusing of him to govern upon certain conditions , and he by accepting the crown upon those conditions , was that law by which he then took the crown , and by which it has been held ever since that time . so that if the crown ought to be enjoy'd according to a legal right , and that there must be some judges appointed of this right , when ever any disputes may happen about it , either every pretender to the crown must judge for himself , and then he will be both judge and party in his own cause , or else it must be left to the conscience of every individual subject in england to side part with what party he pleases , that may thus pretend to it : and so there may be a dozen competitors for the crown at once , and all with equal right as for ought that any body knows ; or lastly , this right must be left to the determination of some civil judges to judge whose right it is ; and who can these judges be who shall thus judge what are the antient laws of succession , and rules of allegiance , but the great council of the nation ? therefore , if they have already declar'd and recogniz'd king william and queen mary to be lawful king and queen of this realm , i think every subject of the same may very well justifie their swearing allegiance to them ; not only by vertue of this statute of the th of henry the viith , which requires allegiance to be paid to the king in being , but also from the equity and reasonableness of the thing it self , to hinder the nation from falling together by the ears , and to entail civil wars from generation to generation , if the subjects were oblig'd by their former oath of allegiance to the king de jure , to endeavour to restore him by force of arms ; and therefore the preamble to this statute very well and truly sets forth , that it is not reasonable , but against all law , reason , and good conscience , that the subjects going with their sovereign lord to the wars , any thing should lose or forfeit for doing this their true duty and service of allegiance to the king for the time being . m. but pray tell me , is not this very strange and unjust , and that by your own showing , that a prince should have a legal right and title to the crown , without a right to exercise the authority belonging thereunto ; for they must now pay allegiance to the king in being , let him be never so great an usurper ; so that indeed the preamble to this act is expresly false , since i think it is very unreasonable , nay against all law , reason , and good conscience , to swear allegiance to an usurper ; since by that means , not only all good subjects would be put out of a capacity of endeavouring to restore the king de jure to his throne , though never so unjustly depos'd , or driven out , as in duty they ought ; but also those who were instrumental in this rebellion , and in depriving the lawful prince of his just rights , may not themselves endeavour to restore him , which would put them out of all possibility of making amends for the wrong they have done him , and of making restitution , by again restoring him to his throne . f. if this be all the difficulty that is left upon your mind , i doubt not but to prove to you , not only from the law of the land , that allegiance may be lawfully sworn in this case , but also that it is for the common happiness and peace of the nation , which is the main end of all government that it should be so ; and therefore i shall first freely grant , that though it is rebellion unjustly to deprive a king and his right heirs of the crown , and that those who had a hand in it , are bound in conscience to endeavour to restore him or them to their just rights again ; yet this must be done by no other methods but what are consistent with the publick peace and safety of the common wealth ; for if a king de facto , has once got possession of the throne , and has been crown'd and recogniz'd by parliament , from what has been already proved , i think it is very plain , that they ought to obey him , not only from the very letter of this law , but also , because i have now said , all private persons ought to submit their judgements in this matter to that of their representatives , who if they have judged falsely , are 〈◊〉 bear the blame , but yet their judgement for all that is to be held for good , 'till it be reversed in the same way in which it was given , since if after such a recognition every private person should still be free to pay his allegiance to him whom he suppos'd king de jure , it would certainly follow , that the civil society or common-wealth must of necessity fall into civil wars , which is against the nature of civil societies , and inconsistent with the duty of self-preservation , which obligeth men not to expose their lives and fortunes , but to obtain a greater good than both those , which can only be the publick good of the community , and not the single interest of any one person or family ; and though i grant it is a great sin in those who are instrumental in raising rebellion , and who are thereby guilty of a very enormous crime , yet that which made it so , was not barely the injury they committed against the prince to whom ( if alone consider'd ) the breach of an oath , ( in withdrawing their allegiance , could be no greater a sin than the breach of an oath to another person ) but indeed the fatal mischief and irreparable dammage they did the common-wealth , is that which aggravates the sin ; and if a new commotion to restore the king de jure , would in all probability , prove yet more destructive , and a nation by being so much weakned by a former civil war , be less able to bear a new civil war , which may happen so far , to the weakning of it , as to expose it to the invasion and conquest of a foreign nation , who may be enemies both to our religion and civil constitution in such a case i cannot think it our duty to restore a prince by force , though never so unjustly driven from his throne . and therefore if i had been then a man , tho' i should have been as much for bringing home king charles as any body ought to be , yet i should have been only for it in the way in which it was brought about , and should never have desir'd it , if it could not have been done but by an army of french or irish papists ; and the like i say now , as to king iames , as long as he is joyn'd with the interest of france , and is already gone into ireland on purpose to renew the war , by the arms and assistance of those , whose fathers , as well as several of themselves , did all they could to destroy , not only the royal power , but also the english religion and government in that nation . and therefore i must freely tell you , that if even rebels have put it out of their power to make reparation for all the wrongs they may have done by rebelling against their lawful prince , because he in possession is too powerful to be driven out again without a violent civil war , and a general concussion of the whole common-wealth ; this reparation to the injur'd prince being not to be made without a greater evil than that they endeavour'd avoid , it ought to be omitted till it may be done with more safety to the nation , or else not at all . i say , if there be no other way to make reparation to their injur'd king , but by engaging the nation in fresh civil wars , they ought not to attempt it by such unlawful and destructive means . m. i confess the discourse you have now made , carries the greatest appearance of truth , of any thing you have yet said ; since it is drawn from the publick good of the nation , which i grant to be comprehended under the common good of mankind , and you have done well to own it to be rebelion , to deprive a lawful prince and his heirs of the crown ; yet that it is unlawful to restore them again to it , if we think it cannot be brought about without a general subversion of our religion and civil liberties , may be a question ; i grant indeed , if we could be absolutely certain of this , there would be some colour for this argument : but since future things are not capable of demonstration , if the restoring our lawfull prince be a duty incumbent upon every good subject , we ought to endeavour it , though with some danger and hazard of what ever is dear to us ; for god will either protect us both in our religion and civil liberties , for thus honestly performing our duties ( according as we are bound by our allegiance ) or if he has call'd us to suffer for the truth he will either find us patience to bear it , or else provide us a way to escape ; this i speak in relation to the french and irish , whose conquest and malice you are so much afraid of , in case the king should happen to be restor'd by their assistance ; but indeed , i think this a needless fear , since i suppose the king will be too wise to bring over so many of either nation , as shall be able to make an entire conquest of this kingdom , least thereby both he and his crown may lie wholly at their mercy , when the business is done ; nor do i think it either in the power of the french , or irish , to perform these dangerous things , not of the former , because ( as i now said ) i suppose the king will never bring over more of them along with him , than what may serve to make a stand against the prince of orange's forces , till his good and loyal subjects can come in and join with them to his assistance ; and as for the irish , they are also the king's subjects , and though ignorant they are , very inveterate against the protestant religion , and the english nation and interest ; yet they may be so govern'd , and over-rul'd by the king , as not to be able to do us any considerable damage but as to the king of france , i do really believe he is far from intending to make an entire conquest of this kingdom for himself , much less desiring to make the king as absolute a monarch here , as himself is in france , for us to the form● , he has too much consideration of his own glory , and reputation in the world , to seize upon the kingdom of a near kinsman and allie of his own religion , and who had been driven from his throne chiefly for being too much in his interest ; and besides all this , he may very well fear , that if he went about any such thing as an entire conquest of this nation , all parties may join against him as a common enemy , and drive him out again , as the english barons did prince lewis in the time of king henry the iii d. nor can it be the french king's interest to make our king absolute here ; for then having the persons and purses of his subjects wholly in his own power , king lewis might justly fear , that either this king , or his successors may prove as dangerous enemies to the crown of france as ever they have been in former times , if ever our kings should go about to revive their ancient pretentions to france or normandy , or make war upon some other quarrel ; and thefore i think it will be more far the interest of france , to leave us our laws , liberties and priviledges as we now enjoy them ; nay , to make an express capitulation for them , and when he has done to foment those jealousies and disputes , that are still like to arise between the king and us about them , thereby to hinder us from joining against him ; then by rendring the king absolute to take them quite away , and put the sole power of the purse as well as of the sword wholly into his hands . to conclude , you do also very much misrepresent the matter in supposing , that though the king cannot now be restor'd without falling into a new civil war , yet that , does it not therefore follow , that such a war is not to be desir'd for the publick good of the nation ; since we shall thereby not only restore the crown to its right owner , and the succession of it to the lawfull heir ; but also shall restore episcopacy in scotland , and prevent the church of england from falling into a dangerous schism , by depriving the arch bishop of canterbury , and as many other of the bishops , who are so honest as not to take the new oath for standing out against it , by the temporal power of a pretended parliament , without the judgment of a lawfull convocation , who are the only proper and legal judges . you likewise as much mistake , in supposing that this war can no ways be finisht , but by so great a concussion as shall so much weaken the kingdom , as to render it expos'd to the invasion● of foreign enemies , in which you may be very much deceived ; for who can tell but the hearts of this nation may come to be so inclin'd to receive their lawful king , and his right heir , and may be so weary of the present usurpation , as upon his first appearance in england , with an army sufficient to defend those who shall come into him ; so many of his subjects will take this advantage , as will be more than enough to restore him with as little blood-shed , as when he was driven out , and then i think no indifferent man but will acknowledge that such a war would prove for the best , since it will not only setle the government upon in ancient foundation of a lineal succession , but will also extinguish those fatal causes of war , not only from among our selves , but also from foreign princes , as long as the king , and the prince of wales , and his lawful heirs shall continue in being , which i hope will be much longer then those upon whom your convention has setled the crown , either in present or reversion . f. i doubt not but to show you , that all you have now said , is either built upon false principles , or else deduced by very uncertain consequences ; for in the first place , though you doubt my principle , that the people of this nation , are not bound to restore king iames to the throne , if it cannot be done without the evident destruction both of our religion and civil liberties , which certainly is true ( granting it to be never so much our duty to restore him , when with safety we may ; ) for if the obligation of all moral duties whatsoever , is only to be judged of according as they more or less conduce to the happiness or destruction of the common good of mankind , ( whereof this particular nation makes a part ) it will necessarily follow ; that this duty of restoring king iames , is not to be practised , if it cannot be brought about without the destruction of our religion and civil liberties , since it is only for the maintenance of those , that even kings themselves were first ordain'd in this nation ; and it is evident , that this kingdom may be sufficiently happy and subsist in the state it is now in , though neither king iames nor your prince of wales be ever restor'd to reign over us . so that then all the difficulty that remains , is , that since his restoration being not otherwise to be brought about without the assistance of great numbers of french or irish forces , whether it be not only so small a hazard as you make it , but twenty to one , that his coming in upon these terms will produce those dreadfull effects , which i say , will certainly happen from it ? and though i grant that future things , especially , in the revolutions of government are not capable of demonstration as mathematical propositions , yet if all the circumstances of time , and the temper and disposition of the king himself , and those who are to join with him in bringing him in again be considered , it shall appear , that morally speaking nothing less then the evident destruction of our religion and civil liberties will follow . i think i may still positively affirm , that we are not oblig'd to restore him till this temper of mind be alter'd , and that he can be restor'd without these fatal consequences i now mention ; and if these cautions are not observ'd , i deny that god hath any way promis'd to protect either our religion or civil liberties , or that he is bound to provide us a way to escape as you suppose ; if to perform this suppos'd duty of allegience thus unseasonably , we slight the onely means god has ordained for our preservation . but as for the patience under those sufferings that may then happen , that is a very sorry reason to embrace them , since god may give us that grace , if he pleases , as the only comfort we can have left us , when by our own folly and mistaken notions of duty , we have brought all those evils upon our selves . i shall therefore now proceed to show you , that these evils i speak of , must necessarily happen to us , in case king iames be restor'd by the french or irish papists . in the first place therefore , it is very falsly suppos'd , that this alteration can be brought about without an entire subduing , or conquest not only of their present majesty's , but the whole nation , is apparent since none but the papists and some few of the clergy , nobility and gentry desire his restoration , and who if they were put altogether , will not i believe amount to the hundredth man , who would be either willing or capable to come in to his assistance with men or money ; and therefore it is a vain supposition to believe ( as you do ) that this new revolution can be brought about without any more dificulty or blood-shed then the last , as long as the present king and queen continue to govern us according to the declaration they subscrib'd upon their acceptance of the crown , and the coronation oath they have since taken ; which i hope they will always do , since nothing but following king iames's example , as well as to religion , as civil liberties can ever make this nation willing to receive him , or your prince of wales with so little difficulty , as you are pleased to imagine . since therefore the business must be wholly done by force , i shall in the next place consider all those suppositions you have laid down , as well in respect of the french as irish , who are the only hands that i see likely at present to do this work. first , as to what you say , that the king would be too wise then to bring over along with him so great numbers of the french and irish nations , as shall be able to make an entire conquest of this kingdom , least thereby both he and his crown , may lie wholly at their mercy , when the business is done : you have hereby granted as much as i desire . for if their majesties are never like to be without an army in england , of at least fifteen or twenty thousand men as long as this war lasts , and that the militia of this nation , which are almost totally against king iames's interest , and do amount altogether to above a hundred thousand men , i think you your self will grant that king iames cannot attempt coming over hither with an army of less then or veteran soldiers of the french and irish nations , though you should reckon the papists and others who should come into his assistance at more , who if they should be ( altogether ) able to beat not only king william's standing army , but the militia of the kingdom to boot ; i desire to know what shall hinder them from making as perfect a conquest of this nation , as ever cromwell's army did , either of england or scotland ? and consequently , of seting up what religion or government they please in this kingdom ; which , that it will not be , that which is now exercis'd either in church or state ; i think any unprejudiced man will easily grant me . but your next suppositions are altogether as precarious , that it is not either the design , or interest of the french king , to make an entire conquest of this kingdom for himself , nor yet to make king iames an absolute monarch here , one of these i must needs believe will happen ; for though perhaps that king may at present stand so much upon his glory , as not seize the kingdom of a kinsman , and an allie wholly to his own use and benefit ; yet it is most likely , that he will retain french garrisons in all or most of the strong places of england , not only for the security of the charges he will have been at to place king iames in the throne ; but also as a tye upon us that we shall never endeavour to drive him out again , let him use us as he pleases ; so that tho' i grant , he may not make an absolute conquest of us now , yet it may be in his or his sons power to do it hereafter , if ever king iames his son shall go about to shake of that yoke when once the present obligation is forgot , or the near relation between the two kings shall be farther remov'd : nor is what you say less precarious , that it will not be for king lewis's interest to destroy our liberties and make king iames an absolute monarch , because the kingdom will be then weaker and more divided-then it is now , by those jealousies and disputes we shall then maintain with the king about our civil rights , which is indeed so far true , if he governs when he returns in the same arbitrary manner as he did before ; but if he govern according to law ( which no wise man can expect ) there needs be no more divisions among us then was for a great while after king charles the seconds coming in ; but that the french king should fear , if he once made the king of england an absolute monarch , and put the whole power of the purses as well as swords of his subjects in his hands , he might then become so formidable as to be an equal match to france it self , and to be able to demand either the whole kingdom , or any part of it , is yet more pleasant , since france is now in comparison with england , not only in respect of men , but also the revenues belonging to the king as ten to one ; and i think i may very well maintain , that if england should once come to be govern'd as france is , it would be so far from growing richer , or more powerful thereby , that from the intestine grieviances , and discontents that such a violent course of government would cause in the minds of the people , of all sorts and conditions by those excessive taxes and oppressions , that would follow from such an arbitrary government the kingdom would quickly diminish and decay , as well in people as trade and riches , and so consequently in power too ; which is but the product of both these , notwithstanding whatsoever the fair appearance of an outwardly magnificent court , and a great standing army may produce in the minds of those that do not truly consider or understand the true grandure and safety of the prince , and happiness of the people . but granting all this to be as you suppose , pray tell me what shall become of our religion and civil liberties , not only 〈◊〉 respect of the french king , but of king iames himself ; 〈…〉 believe , that either of them will cease to be instigated by the jesuits their confessors to destroy the northern heresie ( as they term our religion ) as well in england , as it has been in france ? no , the poor vaudois in savoy have been too recent an example , that the king of france would carry the persecution to the same degree here , as he did there , and that king iames being wholly in his power , will not be able to withstand his commands ; besides , the constant solicitation of his confessors of the 〈◊〉 order and principles of those of the french king , to which holy fathers , the protestant religion in france and savoy do chiefly owe its destruction . to conclude , let us suppose that king iames shall now prevail in this war by the help of the irish army , now rais'd by the earle of tirconnel , can we ●●pect better quarter if the king prevails by their arms and assistance , then if they were intirely french ? for having once conquer'd this nation , it will not be in the king's power to govern them so easily as you expect , but being inve●●●te enemies to the english , they will not only possess what estates they please of the english nobility and gentry in ireland , but in england too , which will be declar'd forfeited by their owners opposing of king iames , and then i will leave it to your self to judge in what a condition we shall be in , both as to our religion , and civil liberties , when the king shall come to be manag'd by men who are declar'd enemies to both ; neither will it be in the power of those few moderate men , either of the popish or protestan● religion , who take king iame's part , to hinder it , since the other party will by means of the priests and jesuites , and the interest of france , run down all sober councils , and they will be but looked upon but as trimmers ( at best ) that oppose it . but as for king iames himself , i desire to know of you what trust there can be put in him , or what assurance he can give us for the maintenance of our religion , and civil liberty , more than the renewing of those promises , and that oath which he has already broken ; this being most likely to be the consequence of things , if king iames prevail . i shall leave it to your self , or any indifferent person to judge , if what i have undertaken to prove , be not as clearly made out as future things are capable of , and are sufficient to deter any man that loves his religion or country , from joyning in such pernicious designs . m. i confess you have made a long and tragical narration of the dreadful consequences that may follow both upon our religion , and civil liberties , if the king prevail by the present assistance of the french or irish arms ; and were i sure of all this , i should so far agree with you as to this point , as never so joyn with them for the kings return , and yet for all that i can never look upon my self as freed from that allegiance i owe the king , as well by being born his subject , as from the oath i have already taken to him and his heirs , as long as they are in being ; for i think i have already prov'd as well from law , as reason , that first the bond of allegiance ( whether sworn , or not sworn , ) is in the nature of it perpetual and indispensable . secondly , that it is so inseparable from the relation of a subject , that although the exercise of it may be suspended by reason of a prevailing force , whilst the subject is under such force , ( viz. ) where it cannot be imagined , how the endeavour of exercising it , can be effectually serviceable to restore the sovereign power to the right owner , for the establishment of that publick justice and peace wherein the happiness of common-wealths consists , yet no outward force can so absolutely take it away or remove it , but that still it remaineth vertually in the subject , and obligeth to a vigorous endeavour ( whenever the force that hindereth it is over ) & to the actual exercise of it for the advantage of the party , to whom of right it is due , and the advancement of the common good thereby , upon all fit occasions . thirdly , that no subject of england , that either hath by taking the oaths of supremacy or allegiance , acknowledged , or that not having taken either oath , yet otherwise knoweth , or believeth that the true sovereign power in england to whom natural allegiance is due , is the king , his heirs , and lawful successors , can without sinning against his conscience , take any new oath , or do any other act whereby to transfer his allegiance from the king or his heirs , to any other party who have no right to it , and thereby put himself into an incapacity of performing the duties of his bounden allegiance to his lawful sovereign , when it may appear to be useful and serviceable to him . this is the express opinion of the learned bishop sanderson in his case of conscience concerning the lawfulness of taking the engagement ; which though he did not think absolutely unlawful , because it might be interpreted in a dubious and qualified sence , without abjuring the kings lawful right to the crown ; yet cannot this new oath be taken in the like doubtful sence , because ( as i have already prov'd ) the words in the oath being to bear true allegiance to king william and queen mary , would be indeed a transferring of our allegiance from our lawful prince , to others , which is absolutely unlawful . f. i am somewhat pleas'd to see you are so far come off from your bigotry , as not to think your self bound to assist for the restoring king iames , as long as it is no otherwise to be done but by the evident destruction of our religion , and civil liberties ; but yet you say you cannot take the oath , because it is bishop sandersons opinion , as well as that of our best lawyers , that allegiance is perpetual , and untransferrable to another , whilst the king or his heirs are in being . which let me tell you ( speaking as a lawyer ) since it may well be proved from this statute , as from the constant practice before that time ; that allegiance was due to the king de facto , and that by the judgement of all the judges in the reign of edward the ivth ; but to speak of this matter , either as a civilian , or a divine , i think we are freed from the former oath both by the law of nations , as well as the law of god. for as for natural allegiance , by which you suppose a man is indispensably subject to the king in whose territories he is born , and that as long as he lives , i can by ●o means understand , that being born in a country , makes one a subject for all his life to the government of that country ; or why being when born in a country , it , should make one become a subject , more than being in the same countrey at another time . besides , common experience shews this to be false , because whoever is born in a country , where his parents are foreigners , may , ( as it is allow'd by all ) leave that country when he pleaseth ; but perhaps i● may be said , he is a subject to that prince where his parents were born ; but what if they were born under the same circumstances ? or suppose his parents are of different countries , as if a dutch woman , and an english man have a child in france , since france does not pretend to him , which of the nations can claim him for their subject ? or must he be divided ? so that i can see nothing at all in this notion of natural allegiance , that can oblige any body in conscience to observe it . m. if then natural allegiance signifies nothing , p●●y tell me is no body oblig'd to obey the king , or not to plot against him until he has taken an oath of allegiance to the contrary ? this would make mad work indeed , and upon these principles no man were bound to obey the king or his laws , and not to conspire against his person , or government , untill he had taken the oath of allegiance ; so that three parts of four of the kingdom would be absolutely free from this great duty . f. no , sir , you are very much mistaken , since i think i can found allegiance to the king and government upon a much firmer foundation than that of being born his subject , that i am so far from supposing that our obligation commences from our taking the oath of allegiance , that though i think it may serve to inforce our former obligation to our king and country , yet does it not super-induce any new obligation thereunto ; for indeed our obligation to any particular government may be made out from much surer principles , viz. that every person though he be born free , yet is he for the sake of his own safety , obliged to part with his liberty , and put himself under the protection of some government ; nor can he be secure in what he enjoys but by it ; nor can he have a right in a countrey ( that is already possess'd ) to property , but by owning the government of that countrey ; and when by enjoying the rights and priviledges of the subjects of that common-wealth , he has own'd himself a member of it , and a subject to its government , he is then bound to maintain this government , and also the king that administers it , from a double obligation : the one particular in respect of himself , and that protection he receives from him ; the other more universal proceeding from that duty which is incumbent upon every particular subject to maintain the peace and happiness of the common-wealth , as long as he continues a member thereof . so that he is bound never to disturb it as long as the main ends of government can be had and enjoy'd therein ; and this is the only means that i know of , by which any man ( except by express oaths and promises ) can consent to become subject to any single person , or government : now this tacit consent of particular persons being separately and singly given , unthinking people take no notice of it , and suppose they are as naturally subjects as men ; and consequently that they have no more right to free themselves from their subjection , than from their humane nature ; nay , must suffer themselves to be destroyed rather than endeavour it , let the government oppress them never so unmercifully ; which is indeed to reduce men to the condition of brute beasts , who belong to this or that owner ; because he either bought them with his money , or else because they happen'd to drop from their dam● upon his ground . from what has been here spoken , i think we may deduce this general conclusion , that every ordinary subject who enjoys the common benefits and protection of any government , i● bound in gratitude , not only to obey it ; but also to be true and faithful to it during the time he lives under it , and is bound likewise not to conspire against it ; and therefore that oaths do not alter the nature of allegiance , or make it due where it was not before , or any ways extend it , but only add a new tye to pay that allegiance which is due upon the account of protection . he that lives under a government , though he has not sworn to it , ow● it the same allegiance as he that has ; and if he should deny his allegiance to it , would be equally guilty of treason , though not of per●ury . it is evident by the universal practice of mankind , that no subjects ever thought themselves obliged by those oaths of fidelity ( which all governments have constantly imposed on them ) when they could not be protected by them , and that this failure of protection did not proceed from any fault in the whole nation , or people themselves . and this may be prov'd by the common and constant practice of all the subjects of europe ; for who does not know that the subjects of the king of france's last conquests in flanders , have been forced to swear allegiance to him , though they were satisfied that his title was unjust , and that their natural sovereign the king of spain , to whom they had formerly sworn allegiance , is still living ? we have had also a late example of the subjects of the duke of h●ls●ein go●torp , who having both his person taken prisoner , and his territories unjustly seiz'd upon by the king of denmark , in time of peace , the subjects of the said duke were forced to swear allegiance to the king , notwithstanding their former oath to their master ; nor do our modern casuists as i know of , blame them for so doing . and why the people of england should be tied to harder terms than all the rest of europe , i wish you could give me a sufficient reason ; since the legislative power of england ( wherein it is certain the people have a share ) are presum'd to recede as little as possible from natural equity , and therefore design by imposing such oaths , only the good and preservation of the civil society ; whose interest it is , that they who have the publick administration of affairs should not be disturbed ; but it is not at all material to that end , whether this or that man hath this power provided they are well managed ; nor can it without the greatest absurdity be suppos'd , that such numbers of men as societies are compos'd of , who are by nature equal , should oblige themselves by the most solemn ties to become most miserable by living without protection ; nay , to lose even their lives , rather than own the government that can and does protect them ; for no other reason , but such an extraordinary fondness to this or that person , or family , as to fancy to be inseparable from him : not to the necessaries or real conveniencies of life but only an office ( for government is no other ) which is but an imaginary happiness ; i grant therefore , that people should be true to those that have the present administration of civil affairs , is all that all oaths of fidelity require ; and it is evident from the intent of it , that the late oath of allegiance required no more , and to extend it farther than the king in being , is not reconcilable with the reason , end , and design of paying obedience ; which is the peace and happiness of the civil society ; which can never be maintain'd , if people may , for the sake of a single person disturb him that has the administration of their common affairs ; and it would require impossibilities ; because private persons are incapable of paying allegiance to a king when out of possession of the government . m. notwithstanding what you have said , i think i am able to convince you of divers great mistakes you have now committed in this discourse of natural allegiance , as also in the obligation we are under by the oath of allegiance to king iames. for first , as to natural allegiance , you are very ●old to suppose there is no such thing , when all your law-books hold so expresly that there is ; i am sure this is to be guilty of the fault for which you have already reprov'd me of being wiser than the laws ; you are also much mistaken to suppose that this natural allegiance meerly springs from hence , that the persons oblig'd by it are only such as are born within the kings dominions ; for persons born without the realm may be also his natural subjects , as are the children of embassadors born beyond sea , and the children of aliens born within the kingdom are not therefore natural subjects of the king ; so that the meer circumstance of birth does not alone entitle any one to the priviledges of a natural subject , nor consequently bind him to all the duties of natural allegiance : but it is therefore called natural in our laws , because , as the best lawyers have affirm'd , it is ●ounded upon the law of nature , which gives the sovereign power a right to the allegiance of every one who is born under the jurisdiction of it . as every son is born a subject to his parents , and is by the law of nature oblig'd to honour , obey , assist and support : so also is he born a member of the body politick , and by consequence a subject to the sovereign of it , and accordingly by the same eternal law , is bound to pay all faithful service and obedience to him , when he in a capacity to perform them . but your next mistake is yet worse , when you confound that common obligation of a foreigner or meer denison to be true and faithful to the common wealth wherein he lives , with this natural allegiance of every english subject ; for though i grant the taking the oath of allegiance does not inforce any new obligation upon him that takes it , more than he was subject to before ; yet for all that , i think you will not deny , but that there is a great deal of difference between that common obedience or submission which such a foreigner pays to the king , and his laws in a country where he sojourns , and that more perfect allegiance arising either by birth or from such a strangers being naturalized , and by taking the oath of allegiance , becoming as true and perfect a subject as a natural english man ; and hence it is , that in all wars declar'd between neighbouring princes , whatever subjects of theirs shall presume to stay and reside in each others dominions after once they are recall'd home , may be justly executed as traytors when ever they shall be taken ; and therefore though i grant that every person now living in england , and of ripe age , is oblig'd to obey your king and queen , de facto , in all ordinary and lawful things which tend to the publick benefit and defence of the civil society or common-weal , and which being for the benefit of the king de jure , and his leige people ; it is to be morally suppos'd they have his tacit consent for what they do as long as it tends only to this end ; yet does it not therefore follow , that the bare protection of this usurpt government , and the enjoyment of the common priviledges of a subject , should give such a king de facto , or government a right of exacting an oath of allegiance to them , since i have already prov'd from the true signification of being true and faithful , as also from the legal signification of the word allegiance , that no true subject can lawfully take it without renouncing his allegiance to his natural prince ; since not only a bare neutrality or obedience in not transgressing the laws , is thereby required of them , but also an active obedience and duty in performing the king de facto's commands , and the de●ending him when ever there is occasion in his ill-gotten power . but since the only difficulty is , how a strict observation of this oath can consist with the quiet and happiness of the subjects , when ever a new oath of allegiance comes to be impos'd by the king de facto , since the subjects may be all ruin'd that do not take it , if it be once offer'd to them . this difficulty might be easily remov'd , if the whole nation would ●lick firmly to the duty required by their former oath of allegiance , and resolve never to take a new one , for then the numbers of the refusers would be so great ▪ as that they would be more than could be made to suffer for their refusing it . i speak of such subjects as are in our case , and who are not forced by a prince , who either has the right or power of a conqueror to compel them by force , and therefore your instances of the subjects of the king of spain , or of the duke of holstein , who were conquer'd , or else as good as conquer'd by the power of france and denmark ; whereas , we are only over-aw'd by an inconsiderable number of dutch and germans and might set our selves free , if we would give but a vigorous effort towards it : for that king william is a conqueror over the whole nation , i think you dare not affirm . and without he were so , he could challenge no right to our allegiance as such ; and therefore i must still believe , that the oath of allegiance i have taken to king iames and his heirs is perpetual , unless you could show me , that their right is determin'd which you have not done by any thing you have yet said ; and therefore i cannot be of your opinion , that the bare protection of an usurpt power , can justifie our swearing allegiance to it , either in law or conscience , for then all men had been oblig'd to pay as firm an allegiance to the rump parliament , and also to oliver cromwell , as to king william and queen mary , since both the former protected the people as much in their religion , civil liberties and properties , as the latter i fear will ever do . and that the bare protection of a government does not give it no absolute right to the allegiance of all those that enjoy their protection , i think may be sufficiently prov'd from the instance of a frenchman , or any other foreigner : who though by his living here , and enjoying the common protection of the government , i grant he is oblig'd to be obedient to its laws , and is not to act or conspire against it , yet this does not discharge him from his natural allegiance which he still owes to his former prince , so as to do any thing which may prejudice that allegience he owes to him , either by conspiring , or fighting against him . and this was solemnly declard to be law by the judges of the kings-bench , in the case of dr. story , in the th . year of queen elizabeth ; he being a violent papist , fled over into flanders to the duke of alva , and there conspiring with him , to invade this kingdom , and being afterwards taken and brought over prisoner , was tryed as a subject of england , though he refused to plead as such , because he said he had sworn allegiance to the king of spain , notwithstanding , which plea he was executed as a traytor , as you will find at large in my lord chief justice dyers's reports ; which judgment is also confirm'd by the lord chief justice coke in calvins's case , where he expresly asserts , that a person born under the dominion of the king of england , owes him perpetual faith and allegiance , and this by vertue of the law of nature , because iura naturalia sunt immutabilia ; from whence will also appear the falsity of your conclusion , that oaths of allegience extend no further then to the king in possession , or to that government to which we do at present owe our common protection , and therefore that our law has a much higher consideration of this inherent allegi●nce that belongs to a king de iure , as to his particular person , and his heirs ; so that it cannot be indifferently paid to any body else who can by seizing of the government , force us to owe our protection to them . which appears by what my lord coke hath also laid down , to have been agreed by all the judges upon this oath of allegiance , in calvins's case as i cited it to you at the beginning of this evenings conversation ; so that i confess , i much wonder , considering what he has there said , how he can so positively maintain as he doth ( in the place you have also quoted ) that allegiance is due to the king de facto , and not to him de iure , whilst the former is possest of the crown , since it seems a flat contradiction to me how a subject is to pay allegiance as long as he lives to the king and his heirs , of life and member ; that is , until the letting out of the last drop of our dearest hearts-blood , and that in all places whatsoever . and yet that this obligation should last no longer , then whilst the king de iure is in actual possession of the throne , and therefore i think i have still very good reason to maintain that we are still oblig'd by our former oath of allegiance to king iames , so as not to take a new one to any other king , unless we had been constrain'd to it by an absolute conquest , which you your self will not maintain to be our present case . f. i confess , you have now argued this point very stifly , and i confess , what you have said , carries with it the greatest appearance , both of law and reason of any thing you have yet urged upon this subject ; and therefore , if i can fairly answer it , i hope you will come over to my opinion , and take the oath which is now required of you . in the first place therefore , i cannot deny , that all you have said concerning a natural allegiance due by birth to the king , is true according to our laws , and i do my self allow the thing , viz. that allegiance is due to him , though not for the reasons upon which our lawyers have founded it , but upon those i have already given ; and therefore though granting it was held to be law in the case of dr. story , that his plea of his becoming a subject to the king of spain , was over-rul'd by the judges , and he refusing make any other plea , was condemned upon a nihil dicit . yet this being only a penal law , i think obliges the subject to the penalty if he be taken , but does not oblige him in conscience never to change his prince or the government he was born under without their consent , let his circumstances become never so uneasie under it ; and that this is so , i need go no further then the late case of the french refugees , who thought they are strictly commanded by their king , not to stir out of france whatsoever persecution they may suffer , yet i think no man of sense , can blame them if being persecuted there , they remove themselves into other countries , and become perfectly naturaliz'd subjects or denisons at least in that government whereunto they remove ; and this is so known a thing , that no casuist as i know of , thinks it a sin in such subjects of england , as finding it for their advantage go over into another country , to settle and make their fortunes , or are there naturaliz'd , or made free denisom in those kingdoms or common-wealths whereunto they remove ; nor are such persons oblig'd in conscience , to return home upon the command or summons of that prince , to whom you suppose them to be subjects by birth ; nor is your argument at all convincing , that because a mans owes a duty to his parents by the law of nature , and by being born their child , that therefore the subjection to the prince under whose government he is born , must be alike perpetual , since the ground upon which you found this consequence is altogether false , since i have already prov'd at the first meeting we had to discourse of these matters ; that a man's being begotten , and bred up by his parents , does not make him become their subject or servant in the state of nature as long as he lives , so that he may never withdraw himself from their subjection without their leave . but in the next place , i think i am as little mistaken in my notion of allegiance , which i suppose every person who is a true and perfect subject of the government , owes to the king or sovereign power thereof ; for tho' i grant there is a great deal of difference between that imperfect allegiance or bare submission which every foreigner owes the king or government under which he resides , and that more perfect allegiance which every subject owes the king , who enjoys all the rights and previledges of a true english man ; yet to let you see that this distinction proceeds not from the bare protection of his person and goods by the government under which he lives , but by his being naturaliz'd and becoming thereby a perfect member of this civil society , is plain from your own showing ; and therefore whosoever not only enjoys the common protection of an inhabitant , but also all the rights and priviledges of a true english subject is bound to swear allegiance if requir'd to the king or queen de facto , without enquiring into their right or title ; for if they are strangers , or have never taken any oath of allegiance before , they cannot be under any former oath ; and as for natural allegiance , i have already prov'd it to be a meer legal notion , and this allegiance i have also prov'd to to be due to the king and queen de facto , not only from the opinion of the judges in bagots's case , but also from my lord cokes interpretation of the statute of treason , which though you suppose to be contradictory to what he had before laid down in calvins's case ; yet if you please better to consider of it , you will find it not to be so ; for though it is true , the judges do there assert , that the obligation of the oath of allegiance is indefinite and without limitation , as being made to the king and his right heirs ; and also that it extends to the venturing of life and members , and to the letting out of the last drop of our blood ; yet is this still to be understood only of such a one , and his heirs who still continues to be king in a legal sense , which can be only he who is king for the time being , as he is stil'd in this statute of the th . of henry the th . and only during the time that he continues in actual possession of the throne : and therefore the word king or majesty being indefinite and without having any respect to his title , whether by descent of blood , or else by his being crown'd and recogniz'd by parliament ; it is no contradiction to suppose this allegiance is only due to the king in this limited sence , according to this statute of henry the th . where pray take notice that i have made this allegiance to be only due to kings and queens de facto , because they only are within intent and letter of this statute , as also of that of treason , according to the legal government of this nation by the fundamental laws thereof , and can no ways be extended to any other powers under other titles , such as the rump parliament under the title of a common-wealth , or oliver cromwell under that of a protector ; who though they took upon them to protect the people after a sort in their lives , and estates , yet since it was not according to the true rights and priviledges of the subjects of this nation , which they highly violated , and in some points quite destroyed ; and that they also took upon them this protection without the free consent of the lawful representatives of the nation assembled in a full and lawful parliament ; i can by no means allow them to have given the people such a true and legal protection as the law requires to constitute a true and perfect allegiance , or can make them to be the supream power of the nation , and within the statute of the th of edward the third ; so that this statute , and that of the th henry the seventh , must be our rules in this case . but i cannot but smile at the expedient you have found out to hinder the people of this nation from being ruin'd if they do not take the oath of allegiance to their majesties . which is by a general and absolute refusal of it ; and this you suppose , if unanimously agreed on , would hinder them from suffering any thing by this their refusal ; and you think they are also strong enough to oppose it , because the king has only a small army of foreigners which he still maintains here , and this you think may lawfully be done , because their majesties do not claim by conquest , but by the election of the convention ; and therefore that this case does not come up to that of the subjects of flanders , and holstein ; in which argument i doubt not but to shew that every one of your suppositions are false , for though the nation is not conquer'd , yet it is certain that all priva●● subjects are under as great a restraint by this legal change of the government , as if they were in the power of a conquerour ; for to resist would be equally fatal to them in both cases , and there is no visible power nor authority that can defend them against the present power , in case they should go about to refuse this oath when it is offer'd to them ; and therefore though i grant the king 's standing army of foreigners is but small , in comparison of the whole nation , since he does not intend to keep us in subjection by force , but only to hinder any sudden insurrection of those of your party ; yet besides all this , god be thanked , their majesties have the main body of the common people of the nation on their side , who are sufficiently able to destroy all those that shall go about to make those vigorous efforts you so much desire ; so that you have nothing else to plead , but that which i hope never to see , that we are not under a force , because we still entirely enjoy our religion , liberties , and properties ; and though the king out of his great goodness and modesty , did not think fit to insist upon his title by conquest over king iames , and his adherents , yet i think i have already prov'd at our last meeting , that he may as justly claim by conquest , as his name-sake william the first , since he came not over to conquer the nation , but to vindicate his former right , and after his conquest of king harold , could have no just title to the crown , till he had been solemnly elected and recogniz'd for king , according to the laws and customs us'd at that time : and why the nation might not do the same thing now for their deliverer from king iame's arbitrary power , i should be glad if you could shew me a sufficient reason ; but if the whole nation should have been as pevish and discontented as those of your principles , and should not look upon the king as their lawful sovereign , because he does not claim by conquest , it would be altogether as grateful and reasonable , as if a woman having by the assistance of an honest gentleman , been rescu'd from being ravish'd , and he afterwards falling in love with her himself , should court her to marry her , she should refuse him , because he had not ravish'd her when he might , or at least have forced her to marry him whither she would or no ; apply this comparison to the case in dispute , and see if it does not hold ; and therefore i must still maintain that the parallel cases of the subjects of flanders , and holstein , are still good , as to those of your opinion , who have no notion how allegiance can be transfer'd , unless by perfect force , and conquest ; since if you please to desire it , i 'll undertake the government shall seize upon your estates , and imprison your persons , till you do take the oaths , as the kings of france , and denmark , did those that refus'd to swear allegiance to them . m. i have heard you a great while upon this subject , and i wish i could say i were fully satisfied with your reasons ; however , since it grows late , i will not dispute this point any farther , but will take time to consider what you have now urg'd , but only i must needs tell you thus much ; i could wish that princes could find some other way of securing themselves of their subjects fidelity , besides this test of an oath of allegiance , which serves as a snare to many pious and conscientious men ; whereas those of none , or at least of very loose principles , will swallow any oath that can be imposed upon them ; and i am sorry to see so many of those , who i know are in their hearts of my principles , prevail'd upon to take it , not out of conscience , but meer worldly interest , and advantage ; and whom i am satisfied will never serve this government the more heartily or sincerely for having taken it ; and therefore to tell you the truth , i begin very much to incline to grotius's opinion , that promissary oaths are absolutely unlawful ; yet considering the several changes and turns of government which we have seen in england for above forty years last past , i am so far for the good and happiness of my country , as to think every true english man oblig'd so far to obey the powers in being , as may tend to the common good and defence of the nation , by the administration of justice between man and man , and in the punishment of offenders , and for defence of the nation against foreign enemies . but , sure methinks this might very-well be done without the imposing any oath at all , either upon magistrates , or officers , and much less upon ordinary subjects ; since if they are perswaded in their consciences that it is lawful to act under this present government , let them do it if they will ; but a for the common people , i confess they are so stupid , that they have seldom any other measures of the justice or lawfulness of any government , or princes title , than the ease or advantage they find by it ; and therefore upon the whole matter , i think it were much better for the government in the unsetled state it is in , to follow cromwell's example , and to impose no oaths of allegiance at all , since the government may be as secure without it , ( as for all that i can see ) they can be with it ; and as it is now managed , i see little it can serve for , but to distinguish and divide us one from another ; and besides , its being a snare to the consciences of so many that take it , it is like also to prove the ruine of divers of our bishops , and other honest men , both of the clergy , and laity , who will certainly rather lose their dignities and imployments , than ever take it ; which will also cause a great schism in the church , as i doubt you will find when it is too late ; whereas if these men might have held their bishopricks , and all other preferments and offices without having this oath impos'd upon them , i doubt not but they would serve both the church and state in their several stations , according to their duties , and as far as lawfully they could . f. i cannot deny but you have spoken very honestly , and like a good english man , in many things you have now said , in case your intentions towards the present government were real , as your words are fair ; and therefore i cannot wonder that you have been formerly a stiff asserter of the lawfulness and necessity of the oath of allegiance , should now be for taking it quite away , now it grows too hard for you self , and those of your opinion to digest . as if to oblige subjects to defend their governours , were a necessary security for your rightful princes , but were unnecessary for those whom you shall think fit to suppose to be usurpers . and though i confess i must very much pity the over-nice principles of those of your way , who are truly peaceable , and consciencious , and are like to be ruin'd by their refusal of it ; yet for all that , i very much doubt whether it would be for the best to take this oath quite away , since it would make a strange alteration in the government , to admit all persons into ordinary charges , much less into imployments of trust and profit without taking any oath at all . your only objections against it are these : first , that you doubt that it is unlawful to impose promissary oaths , and the next is , that it will not perform the end for which it is intended ( viz. ) to distinguish those who will serve the government faithfully , and those that will not ; since you confess that a great many who are not at all satisfied in their consciences , will for interest , not only hold their old imployments , but will also take new ones under it , which i grant is not to be avoided , if men will venture to be damned . so likewise on the other side , i must tell you , that the quite taking away the oath of allegiance will not at all mend the matter , but make it much worse ; since then , not only those whose consoiences will give them leave to take the oaths , but also those who think they ought not to take them , will be alike capable of imployments ; and when they are in them , though i grant they may be both alike free to act as they please against the present government , and for restoring of king iames ; yet i must needs tell you for all that , that i am much more fearful of the ill will or malice of those who think themselues oblig'd in conscience to overthrow the present settlement , and who continue stiff to their first principles , than of those who will so far comply with this present government and their own interest , as to take the new oath of allegiance in whatever sence they please : for i am very well satisfied , that such men , though they are not so right for the government as i could wish them , yet either fear of punishment , or else the consideration of their own self-interest , will always make them desire to retain those imployments they have already got , since they can never be assured of bettering their condition under king iames , and a popish government , should he ever return ; whereas those that are bigotted to principles , will always think it their duty by vertue of this notion of a natural allegiance , as well as their former oath , to endeavour to restore him by all the ways and means that can ever lie in their power : but as for the unlawfulness of a promissory oath , since you your self speak doubtfully of it , and few casuists , except grotius , have been of that opinion ; i think it is not safe to quit our antient laws , which particularly prescribe , that not only all magistrates , and officers , but also all other of the kings subjects , should take the old oath of fidelity or allegiance ( as we now stile it in the court leet , or sheriffs torne , when they come to the age of fourteen years ; which oath as appears by what we can find of it in edward the confessors , and king william's laws ) which we have already recited ) as also you may find it in sir h. spelman's glossary , ( tit. fidelitas ) was made to the king as their leige lord , of life , and limb ; and which implies an active obedience to defend him against all his enemies , without any exception of such as may claim by inheritance , or right of blood. now this being so , i cannot be perswaded that the government ought to quit any lawful means whereby it may preserve it self , and distinguish those who would really serve it , from those who will not ; and though perhaps the government may find it self mistaken in its account , in some men whose consciences are large enough to swallow any oath whatsoever , yet i think i may still safely maintain , that it is still in less danger from a few such libertines , than from those of your opinion , who would not only keep their places under this government , but will also continue in a perfect state of war against it , let them be treated never so kindly ; and therefore , as to those dreadful consequences of schisms in the church , and the lessening and dividing our party ; as to the former , we must run the hazard of it , since it was never heard of , that the bishops , who are in some respects temporal barons , held their bishopricks under any king since the conquest , without owning his authority : and i can also shew you , that the king and parliament have either actually deprived , or else declared such bishops traytors to the government . so that if any such a schism be made , it will proceed from a scandal unjustly taken by some scrupulous men , and not by the government . and as for the other inconvenience , i think it is much safer for the government to imploy fewer men then by not knowing who are friends or foes to trust all promiscuously , though perhaps notwithstanding their utmost care , some men of little or no consciences will places in this as well as they have done formerly , which can by no other means be prevented as i know off , but by chus●ing men of honest principles , and sober morals , and of a quiet different interest , to those imploy'd in the two last reigns ; and therefore i am so far from taking away the present oath of allegiance , that i rather wish that there were a new one more strict and full then the present ordain'd to be taken by all those who shall take offices , and employments of trust or profit , whereby they should not only declare their present majesties to be true and lawfull king and queen of this realm ; but also , that they will defend them against all their enemies , king iames himself not excepted . m. i confess i cannot expect so great a tenderness from this government , which has been introduced by so much artifice , that they should absolutely take away all oaths of allegiance whatsoever , since i doubt not but it will assume to it self all those advantages which any former usurped power could pretend to ; yet this much i must needs tell you as a friend , the depriving those bishops and dignified clergymen who shall refuse this new oath , will be highly ungrateful ; since many of them have been as violent opposers of popery and arbitrary government as any men in england , as appears by their late petition to the king ; if therefore the arch-bishop of canterbury , and those other bishops i know to be so averse to this oath , should be deprived upon the refusal of it , since it will be done uncanonically , by the temporal power of an act of this convention , without the sentence of the two houses of convocation , i doubt that it will be thought by many to be a sufficient cause of departing from the present church communion , and of seting up distinct congregations by those who will be deprived , and turned out of their livings for refusing this oath , and what the consequence of that may prove god knows . but whereas you think this present new oath not full enough , and therefore wish there were another made , declaring the present king and queen to be lawfully and rightfully so , &c. since this would amount to as good as an oath of abjuration of king iames , and his title , i doubt it were better let alone ; for i do not think the present government will get any thing by it , since the intent of the oath you propose , can only serve , either to gain the present government more new friends , or else to fix the old ones faster to it , or else to discover secret enemies ; now if i can prove it will not serve for any of these three ends , i suppose you will grant that it were better to let it alone ; now that it will be so far from gaining it more friends , that it will rather serve to drive away a great many from it , is apparent ; since many men are now in offices and imployments , who think they may lawfully take this new oath of allegiance , as long as the present king and queen are not therein declared to be lawfully and rightfully so , and i believe may serve them faithfully enough in their several stations , who if they should come to be put to it , to declare and swear that they were rightful and lawful king and queen , would rather lose their places than take it ; neither will it fix those that are for this government faster to it , since those that are zealous for it , will be so whether they took any oath or not ; and i have already proved , that by the word allegiance in this oath , it is implied , that the present king and queen are to be defended as lawfully so , by the swearer to it , which is the main reason , that i , and those of my opinion , can by no means think it lawful to take it . nor lastly , will it discover any secret enemies to your government ; since those who being rightly instructed in the true sence of this oath , and what is thereby required , shall notwithstanding , take it against their conscience , will i doubt take any oath whatever the convention shall think fit to impose ; since nothing but the fear of losing their present imployments , or else the desire of getting new ones , could have made them take the oath as it is , since to my knowledge , it hath been taken by many now in places much against their own judgement ; and i doubt the conviction of their consciences too . i speak this only in relation to some of loose principles , but as to my self , and many more of my acquaintance , who refuse this oath , we should be so far from taking any place of trust under this government , that we should not do it tho' no oath were at all required of us ; since i think it not only wicked and dishonourable for any honest man to serve a party only to watch an opportunity to betray it ; but i also believe my self obliged by my former oaths , as well as the duty of a natural allegiance which i owe the king and his right heirs , not to serve those whom we look upon as usurpers of their just rights . but if you would also have this new oath to be an absolute abjuration of the king and his title , it will not only be unjust , but impossible ; since who can tell but either by the help of a foreign force , or the general consent of the nation , tired out by a long expensive war , either his majesty , or the prince of wales may be again placed upon the throne ; and then sure , whenever they shall call a parliament to recognize their title , they will be even according to your own hypothesis , more lawful and rightful kings than king william , and queen mary ; since they will not be only kings de facto , but de jure too ; and therefore i believe it was out of this consideration ; that in all those long and various contests which so often happen'd between competitors for the crown , they never presumed to proposed to the parliament the passing any act to impose an oath to abjure the title or person of the rival prince . thus in all the long wars between king stephen , and maud the empress , as also between the two houses of york , and lancaster , each of whom , as they prevail'd in their turns , were very well contented to make the subjects take the ordinary oath of fidelity to themselves , without abjuring each others title ; and even in the later times of the rump parliament , when the most violent and hot-headed commonwealths-men would have imposed an oath of abjuration of charles stuart , and all his family , ( as they then termed his late majesty ) the most wise and moderate men among them , such as lenthal their speaker , and others , stifly oppos'd it , saying it would be a fighting against providence , to take an oath never to own his majesty for their king , if once he should come in again without their assistance ; and i think there is as much , if not more reason now against such an oath of abjuration , as ever there was then . f. i cannot deny but you have spoken like an honest man , in absolutely refusing to act under this government , though without an oath , unless you could be satisfied of the lawfulness of the powers to whom it is taken . and i must acknowledge , that you therein act with much more sincerity and honour , then divers of your party , who tho they have been , and are of your opinion , as to the justice of king iames's title , yet think they may take this oath well enough in that looser and more qualified sence you grant they put upon it ; and therefore to answer in the first place , what you have said against the imposing any more explicite or stricter oath of allegiance , then what is already appointed , though i think i can very well answer all the arguments you have now brought against it : yet to let you see i am a fair adversary , i will shew you how far i agree with you , and wherein i must differ from you . in the first place therefore let me tell you , that you very much mistake me , if you believe , that by this new oath i propose , i'do design an express abjuration of king iames , or the prince of wales , in case that king should ever happen to recover the throne , and call a parliament who shall again recognize him for lawful king , and the prince for the right and undoubted heir of the crown . i am too sensible of the frequent alterations that have happened in this nation , even to desire or propose any such thing , since a man may as well abjure the having a feavour , or the small pox. change of government , and consequently our submission to it , when ever it happens , being no more in our power to prevent then the having those diseases ; all therefore that i intend by a stricter , and more explicate oath of allegiance , is , only for men who shall undertake any imployments of trust and consequence , either spiritual , civil or military in the common-wealth , since i grant the oath as it is now worded may be sufficient for all ordinary subjects , from whom a passive submission , and true obedience is a sufficient performance of their duty ; but as for all others that either now have , or expect to enjoy places of trust , i could wish a stricter oath asserting their present majesties to be lawful and rightful king and queen of this kingdom , and that the taker will defend them in the present possession of it , to the utmost of their power against all persons whatsoever , king iames and the prince of wales not excepted ; and this i must think necessary , not only from that low and qualified sence of this oath , which i gave at the beginning of this nights conversation , and in which sence you cannot deny , but that many if not the greater part of those , who still hold such imployments have lately taken it , and as long as they do so , how they can ever think themselves obliged to defend their majesties against king iames , nay , or any french or popish forces that shall act by his commission , i cannot understand ; for since they now look upon the present king and queen , to have no other right to the crown than what their bare power and present possession of it gives them , no wonder if such men take the first opportunity to revolt , and joyn with king iames as soon as ever he lands with an army , or appears upon our coasts with any fleet formidable enough to oppose ours , and ( must also , if they are true to their principles ) in the mean time do all they can to protect , and indemnifie those who being of tender consciences , cannot stretch it as far as themselves , and who under-hand do act as far as they dare for king iames's interest ; and though it is true you have very solidly proved , not only as a civilian , but like a lawyer that the word allegiance inserted in this oath , does of its own nature imply , not only that the king or queen to whom it is taken ought to be rightly and lawfully so , but that more than a bare neutrality , viz. a reall and vigorous defence of them , and their right against all their enemies is required , and implyed by it , and that is one great reason why you say you cannot take it . now though i confess the reason you have given are very weighty , and convincing , yet since the words are in themselves too general , and doubtfull for every person that takes or holds such offices or imployments of trust , to understand it in that sence , i could be glad there were another more plain and explicite oath to be administred to those who expect to keep or hold such imployments . since the present government cannot well be safe without it , as long as such persons are imployed , who can take the oath with a mental reservation of serving king iames as soon they safely may by vertue of that former oath of allegiance they have taken to him . this being the case , i shall now answer all the objections you have brought against it , which indeed are rather framed to keep those men in places that they may serve your designs when ever they are able ; than to do any service to tender consciences . first then i think i may maintain , that such an oath will notwithstanding what you have now said , have contrary effects than what you are pleased to allow ; for in the first place , it will gain the present government more new friends amongst these neuters , who steer their allegiance to it only from its present settlement , and the hopes of its continuance when they find that none can be imployed in places of publick trust , who will not take an oath to acknowledge their present majesties to be lawfull and rightfull king and queen , and who will also swear to defend their just right , which will for the most part put place● of trust into their hands , who will think themselves oblig'd faithfully to perform what they have sworn . secondly , it will also fix the old friends of this government faster to it , when they see none but themselves , or those who will really come into the government upon their principles admitted to such places of profit and trust ; and whoever will take this oath , are to be presumed to take it willingly and wittingly , and understanding what they do , since the words will be of themselves so plain and evident , that they will admit none of those loose , and doubtfull sences in which so many have taken the present oath of allegiance ; but your main objection against this is , that a new oath will not discover secret enemies to the government , because that most of the same persons that have taken the former oath will take any other that can be requir'd of them ; which i suppose is not so , since you your self do grant that such an oath would be a snare to a great many , who if it were not for that , would serve this government faithfully enough , that is to say , as long as there is no necessity of shewing their good-will to king iames , or have no opportunity given of returning to their former allegiance to him with safety to themselves : and you your self cannot deny , but according to their principles they must needs perform it when ever they think they may ; now certainly it were very well to be rid of such false friends ( if it were possible to discover them ) by such an oath , then to keep them where they are , only to take an opportunity not only of doing a mischief , but of serving this government very carelessly and lukewarmly , whilst they are in those places they enjoy ; as also of favouring and assisting those that are the declare asserters of king iames's right as far as they dare ; so that then all the dispute remains about those who having consciences large enough to swallow any oath whatever , provided it will suit with their present advantage ; no oath can tye them , or serve to discover their private sentiments ; as i cannot deny but that there too many men of such large consciences as you describe , and could heartily wish they were fewer , yet though i grant an oath alone will not keep them out ; yet it might be in great part prevented , if the king would take a true character of the men fit for publick imployment , from those about him of whose worth and former intergity he is already fully satisfied ; but admitting , some such men shall get into places , and consequently when they are in , manage things for their own advantage , ( that is , vilely and corruptly ; ) yet even these will not prove half so fatal to the government as those men of half consciences , who think they may take this oath in their own sense , and for their own present advantage , and also believe it no breach of it to assist king iames whenever safely they may , because they hold their present oath to be only temporary , but their former to have a perpetual obligation upon them . whereas those of no principles at all never espouse any interest longer then it serves their own turns ; so that as long as they can make their fortunes under this government , they will never desire to change it for another , in which they cannot but expect a much less free enjoyment of their liberties , and properties , which are things that all men ( as well those who have no principles , as well as those that have ) desire to to enjoy . and lastly , some even of these men that have been formerly notorious asserters , of , and advanced in the arbitrary government of king iames out of shame and as well as fear of the loss of their credits with those of their own party ( which they are not assur'd but may again prevail ) will stick to take this stricter oath , though they do not this that is now enjoyned , since they can find an evasion for the one , but will scarce be able to do it for the other . m. but pray tell me , will not this new oath declaring king william and queen mary to be lawfull , and rightfull king and queen of this realm ; and that all men that take it shall assist them against all their enemies , prove an implyed oath of abjuration of king iames , though not in express words , and you have not yet shewed me that such an oath hath ever been administred during all the various contests that have been for the crown since the conquest . f. i grant that such an oath would be a vertual , and implied abjuration of king iames's present claim to the crown , and would also oblige all persons to fight against him , and hinder his regaining it● which though i grant to be the design of it ; yet would not such an oath oblige us at all to abjure the obeying king iames , should he ever by an irrestible providence be again set over us , since it is not abjuring of a future , but a present right which i now contend for ; and that , all the antient oath of fidelity or allegiance ( as it is now called ) were of the like nature , and taken in the same sence with this i propose : i shall shew you from the form of the oath of fidelity , which all freemen were to take at fourteen years of age , as appears by king william the firsts law which i have so often cited , whereby all freemen were to affirm upon oath , that within the realm and without , they will be true and faithfull to king william their lord , and preserve his lands , and honour with all fidelity ; together with his person , and defend them against all his enemies . so likewise in the ancient oath of homage , which was taken by all the earls , barons , and tenants in capite in england , at the coronation of our kings : it was in these words , i n. n. become your leigeman of life and limb , and earthly honour , and faith and troth to you shall bear to live and die , so help me god ; and in the latter oath of fidelity or allegiance , which sir h. spelman gives us out of the customary of normandy , the words were much the same , only the person is there sworn to be true , and faithful in the king and his heirs ( which they were not before edward the firsts time . ) and also what they would hear of no evil or damage against them , which they would not hinder to their power ; now pray tell me , were not all these oaths taken to the king for the time being , as lawfull and rightfull king ? and since they were thereby to yield him life and limb , that is , were to defend him with their lives against all his enemies , then certainly all others who might pretend to , or claim the crown were included within this number ; and though it is true in these ancient oaths , there is no swearing to the present king , as lawfull and rightfull king , yet these words were needless in that age ; when ( as i have proved at our last meeting ) there was no difference between a king de iure , and one de facto ; and whoever was crowned king , and elected , or recognized by the great council of the kingdom , was looked upon as lawfull and rightfull king , and as such , was to be defended against all his enemies ; so that it was till that distinction was broacht , that there might be a king de de facto , different from the king de jure , ( which i have proved was not elder then edward the iv ths . reign . ) there was no need of any mention of such words in the oath of allegiance as lawfull king , and lawfull heirs , which are first found in the oaths of allegiance and supremacy , prescribed by the statutes of queen elizabeth and king iames ; in the latter of which , ( it is needless to recite it verbatim ) it is first sworn , that the king's majesty is lawfull and rightfull king : secondly , there is an express abjuration of the pretended authority of the bishop of rome , which shews that the abjuration of the temporal as well as spiritual right of a foreign prince ( who claims it ever since king iohns resignation ) is no new invention ; and lastly , there is an express abjuration or engagement to defend the king's person to the utmost of the swearers power against all conspiracies at attempts whatsoever , and why the same words may not be inserted into this new oath , as well as it was in those . i can see no reason since they are only declarative and persuant to the late act of the convention , whereby after the declaration of the rights and liberties of the subjects , king william and queen mary are declared , that they were , and of right ought to be by the laws of this realm , our soveraign leige , lord and lady , and king and queen of england , &c. m. well , it is late , and besides to no purpose to argue this point any longer , since it concerns not me , nor any of my principles what new oaths you make and impose upon those whose consciences will never permit us to take them . what i have said , was only to shew you the folly , and weakness of such oaths , and consequently , that they can be subservient to no other end then a renewal and aggravation of the sin of perjury among us , which god forgive this sinful nation , among the many crying sins it now growns under . yet give me leave still to mind you , that you have not given any answer to the objection i have made concerning the schism that is like to follow from the depriving of all such bishops and clergy that shall refuse to take the new oath by such a time , which deprivation being uncanonically ordain'd by the meer lay power of the convention , without the authority of a convocation or synod ; such proceedings are sufficient cause for all of our way to break off all church communion with you , as soon as the arch bishop of canterbury , and those other bishops shall happen to be deprived and new ones put in their places , since all church communion wholly depends upon the lawfullness of the bishops , who are the supreme pastors of our church . f. i forgot to say any thing of this , because i said so much to answer concerning the new oath i proposed as sit to taken by those in places of trust ; but since you desire it , i shall say somewhat though not so large as i could speak upon this subject , first , i must tell you it is altogether a new notion , and contrary to the doctrine of the church of england , whereby it is declared that the kings of this realm have the same power with persons in the church , as the kings of iudah and israel had among the jews ; therefore you must either depart from the doctrine of this canon , or else the king and parliament , ( who are certainly as much the supreme power of the nation , as the kings of iudah were to that of the jews ) may as well deprive the arch bishop of canterbury ( for example ) for treason , or disobedience to the government , as solomon did abiathar for anointing his brother adonijah king ; and besides this , i can shew you many examples of the like power exercised by the roman and greek emperours , in depriving and banishing not only bishops , but patriarchs ; for the matters of state without any sentence or judgment of a synod , or general council of other bishops ; if your doctrine were true , the poor greek church would be in a sad condition and all her members in a perpetual schism for some ages past ; that there hath been scarce any canonical elections or deprivations of the patriarchs of any of the great seats , viz. constantinople , antioch , and alexandria , but they are all nominated , and put in and out at the grand seigniors , nay , visiers will and pleasure , as any man who will but pe●u●e sr. paul rycauts account of the greek church may easily see . but indeed you fall into this errour for want of considering the original of bishop-pricks in england , and the true meaning of this intended deprivation ; for pray take notice , that though episcopacy was setled in england in the time of the britains , yet all the seas , and jurisdictions of the bishops of this realm , in respect of such and such diocesses , have been wholly oweing to the bounty of our kings , and the authority of our great councils , which were also confirmed by the popes bulls ; and since the reformation to the authority of the king and parliament , as were all the bishop-pricks erected in henry the viii ths . reign ; so that let the bishops meer spiritual power of ordaining , excommunicating , &c. be derived immediately from christ if you please ; yet the exercise thereof as limited and appointed to this or that precint or see , is as meer a temporal institution , as that of parishes which was not introduced till long after christianity was settled in this island . so that the exercise of this ecclesiastical jurisdiction within the see of canterbury ( for example ) being a civil institution , it hath anciently belonged to supream powers , not only to confer this power , ( as appears by their ancient investitures of our bishops per baculum & annulum ) but also to take it away , for treason or disobedience against the state ; since the king and parliament do not pretend to deprive them of their spiritual character , or episcopal orders , but only of their right to exercise it within such sees , or diocesses ; thus , although the arch-bishop of york and the bishops of london and wichester , with the rest of the popish bishops , were deprived by act of parliament in o th . of elizabeth , for not taking the oath of supremacy ; the queen and parliament never took upon them to degrade those bishops of their episcopal orders , but only to forbid their acting as bishops in their former respective diocesses , and therefore i doubt not , but that notwithstanding this depriviation , those bishops might ( if they had pleased ) have ordained priests , and confirmed children , and that such ordinations and confirmations , would been good even in our protestant church , if such priests or children had afterwards turned protestants ; since 't is very well known that the church of england ownes the orders of the church of rome to be valid which is more then we do for the ordinations of meer presbyters coming from those protestant countrys where there are no bishops at all ; the like i may say for their confirmations too . but pray sir , consider how upon your principles , this schism can be so universal as to influence and involve all england in it , for if the arch bishop of yorke ( for example ) will rather take this oath then suffer deprivation , and that the rest of the bishops of his province should be of the mind ( as i am credibly informed they will ; ) pray tell me how the people of that province ( being a distinct church , or body ecclesiastical from that of canterbury , as to all spiritual matters , as having a distinct convocation of their own , ) can ever be involved in this schism , by the deprivation of the arch bishop and bishops of the province of canterbury ? and pray also tell me in the next place , how all the members of the two universities can ever be involv'd in this intended schism , since they owe no canonical obedience to the arch-bishops of canterbury or york , nor to any other bishop , but only to their chancellour and the vice-chancellour as his deputy , who exercise all ecclesiastical jurisdiction within the said universities ; and therefore their church communion cannot depend upon the canonical or uncanonical deprivation of any bishops in england i desire you to consider these things as a canon-lawyer , and give me your answer if you can , against the next time we meet , and then tell me whether the causes of this threatned schism be so just and apparent that it is like to involve so many of the wisest , and most considerate of the clergy and laity into open separation from the church , as you suppose it will ; not but that i will grant there be many of the clergy of this opinion ; who as well out of conscience , as for their own interest , will be contented to set up and encourage such a separation , thereby to make themselves heads of separate congregations , when they shall be deprived of their present benefices and imployments , upon their refusal of this oath . m. i must confess i never heard so much said upon this head before ; and if you could make out to me all the matters of fact you have now instanced in , i know not but that i may come over to your opinion ; tho' let me tell you , this is the first time that ever you can shew me that any bishops were deprived in england by the meer lay authority of the king , and a great council or convention of the laity , whilst they continued of the same church-communion with those bishops ; for as to your instance of the popish bishops deprived by parliament in the reign of queen elizabeth , i doubt you will find it does not come up to the point in question , since the queen and parliament having then newly declared themselves protestants , did not own them for true and orthodox bishops , and consequently thought they might justly depart from their communion , and upon the same account might deprive them , and the queen might then nominate others of their own religion in their places . f. i cannot but differ from you in the matter of fack as you now relate it ; for queen elizabeth , and the parliament were when they made this act , so far from being separated from the outward communion of the church of rome , that mass was then said , and the romish priests still continued in all the parishes and churches of england , and yet they still maintain'd an outward communion , though their bishops were deprived by the civil ●ower , and others ordain'd in their stead . so that it is plain , the papists themselves had then no notion of this new cause of schism , by reason of their bishops being uncanonically deprived ; nor indeed can we well vindicate the honour or legality of our reformation , if the protestant bishops who succeeded in the places of those who were thus deprived by act of parliament , could not be canonical , because their predecessors deprived by the lay power , were still alive . but admit this was the first time that ever it had been thus practiced , yet if it were then reasonable , and done upon good grounds ; i cannot see but when the necessity of the church and state require it , and that the clergy in convocation are so wilfull , and wedded to some old false notions , as not to consult the peace and safety of the church and kingdom ; why the king and queen ( who are acknowledged to be supream over ecclesiastical as well as temporal persons ) may not together with the two houses of parliament make the like law now , as was done in the first of queen elizabeth , for a less matter ; for none of those popish bishops , though they believed queen elizabeth to have no better than a parliament title to the crown , yet ever denied her to be their lawful and rightful queen ; only they would not own her supremacy in spiritual matters . but leaving the farther discussion of this point , to those who better understand it , i would gladly know of you what you intend to do , and what you would have us do , who are like to be made deputy lieutenants and justices of peace ; for if as you your self allow , there be a necessity that some civil government be maintain'd during king iames's absence , i desire to know of you how it can be managed , and who shall manage it , in case all the gentlemen of england were of your principle , and should positively refuse the oath of allegiance to their present majesties ; for if king iames be never so much our lawful king , it is not now possible for us to be govern'd by him , since he is go●e , and god knows whether ever he may return again ; since then you cannot have him if you would ; and that there is a necessity we should be govern'd by some body . and since it is also as certain , that those who actually govern us , will exact this , or the like oaths of allegiance from us , as were due to their predecessors , and that no man must expect to enjoy or execute any place or office , not only of profit , but of burthen and charge , for the necessary execution of justice , and the maintenance of civil government ( without which we cannot live or subsist ) without taking this new oath of allegiance , as the only means to qualifie them for it ; if then the end ( viz. ) civil government , be absolutely necessary , and the taking of this oath is the only means allow'd of to qualifie men for it , this seems as evident to me , that taking of this oath is not only justifiable by law , but by reason , and good conscience ; since it is done for the highest and noblest end ; ( viz. ) the publick good of the whole nation , or common wealth ; which you grant cannot subsist without some kind of civil government amongst us . m. i will say something in answer to what you have now alledged concerning the necessity of taking of the oath , in order to the maintenance of some civil government , without which i grant the kings good subjects cannot subsist till his return ; since i confess this is the strongest argument you have yet brought ; all i can say to it at present , it , that if all your country gentlemen , and all the lawyers in england , would be so firm in their loyalty to his majesty , as unanimously to declare that they cannot take this oath with a safe conscience , the consequence then would be , that either the present usurped power must be forced to give up the government to the right owner , or else they must at least desist from pressing this oath upon you . f. you know well enough this is altogether a vain supposition , since you cannot but be sensible that their majesties have not only a sufficient force both of native englishmen , and foreigners on their side , who can force those that should make any opposition to the taking it ; and that there are also many fanaticks , and common-wealths men , who not looking upon themselves as at all oblig'd by your notions of natural allegiance , and the obligations of any former oath of allegiance , will get into all the offices and imployments of the kingdom , to the great prejudice and destruction , not only of the church , but the monarchy it self , which is as yet preserv'd , tho the person that administred it is alter'd ; so that it would conduce nothing to king iames's affairs , if all the gentry and lawyers of the kingdom should go about to refuse this oath , which , as i have already proved , they are also obliged to take by the law of the land , and also that greater law of prosecuting the publick good of the nation , to the utmost of their power - m. well , since i cannot expect so great firmness of mind and courage from your country gentlemen , and especially the lawyers , who have been always but too forward to comply with all governments , how unlawful soever , and since you , who think that you may lawfully take this oath , not only by the law of the land , which you have interpreted to countenance your opinion , but also from a higher and nobler law ( viz. ) that of the common good of the nation , or civil society , which i grant must be maintain'd during the kings absence , since you say there is a necessity for it , though i am not fully satisfied of the lawfulness of it , so far as to take it my self , yet will i not absolutely condemn you or any other sincerely and honest men , who do only take it out of a good intent , to maintain some civil government amongst us , and also to keeping out the phanaticks from having any share in it ; so i hope the government will excuse me , if my conscience will not give me leave to take it my self , since there are enough of you who are free to do it without us ; so that if i cannot keep that small imployment i have without taking this new oath , i will freely give it up , since as long as i am not satisfied in my conscience of the lawfulness of it , and whatsoever is not of faith , is sin , as the apostle has truly defin'd it . f. i confess you speak very honestly , and charitably in this matter , and i could wish all those of your opinion had the like moderation , and that they would not condemn of wilful perjury so many good bishops , noble-men , gentlemen , and others , both of the clergy , and laity , who have been perswaded that they might take this oath with a safe conscience , and therefore pray , however we differ in opinion about these matters , let us maintain the same friendship for each other as we had before . m. sir , i readily embrace so fair and kind an offer , and as i hope you will do me what kind offices you can whilst you continue to act under this government , so i will promise to do the same for you , when ever the king shall come to be restor'd to his throne again . f. i willingly and thankfully accept the proposal of the continuance of your friendship , since i look upon your dissenting from me , not to proceed from any wilfulness or obstinacy , but out of a tender conscience , and too great and high a sence of your duty , which i must still confess are errours on the right hand ; and therefore now taking my leave of you , shall only desire you to believe me your real friend , and humble servant . m. i hope you think i have the same esteem for you , and therefore must always own my self yours . finis . a general alphabetical index , of the matters and questions debated in the thirteen dialogues of bibliotheca politica : london , printed for r. baldwin in warwick-lane , near the oxford-arms , where also many be had the first , second , third , fourth ; fifth , sixth , seventh , eighth , ninth , tenth , eleventh , twelvth , and thirteenth dialogues . . a general alphabetical index of the matters and questions debated in the thirteen dialogues of bibliotheca politica . the reader is desired to take notice , that these dialogues being written discursively , and not determinatively , this w. signifies the question , by the word whether . note , d. signifies dialogue , p. page . a abel w. subject to his brother cain by divine institution . d. . p. . to . abesses often present in saxon and french great councils . d. . p. . abbots , w. all that were anciently summoned to parliament held in capite , d. . p. . and how many came to be by degrees omitted , ibid. abbots , and abbesses sometimes granted aids by themselves , d. . p. . abdication of the government , w. a king can do it any other way , than by some express act , d. . p. , , , to the end . abuses of governours , their several kinds , d. . p. . to . kings acts illegal , w. also inauthoritative , d. . p. . to . acts of parliament w. they to hold good , tho' not called by the king , d . p. . to . adam w. he had conferred on him by god the dominion of the whole eaath , and of all creatures therein , d. . p. . to . w. by being a husband , and father , he was also absolute lord over eve , and all her posterity , ib. p. . to . adel , and adelman , their signification among the saxons , and danes , d. . p. . alderman , its signification among the same , ib. p. . aldermen of countries , who . d. . p. . king alfred his testament , d. . p. . st. albans burrough p●tition to king edw. the second , d. . p. to . allegiance w. due by law to a king de facto , d. . p. . to the end . the word alij in antient statutes , and records , w. it signifies only the lesser tenants in capite , d. . p. , . . arch-bishop of canterbury hath been sometimes elected in the great council of the kingdom , d. . p. , . standing army in time of peace , against law , d. . p. , . great assembly at runne-mead , w. it was a great council of the whole kingdom , p. , . attainders of treason against kings de facto , have always held good till repeal'd , d. . p. . authority of parliament , the phrase how antient in our statute-books , d. p. . to . b babel when built , d. . p. , . banneret , its ancient signification , d. . p. . baro. the title . w. it antiently signified no other person than a baron of parliament , d. p. . to . barones angliae , w. tenants in capite only , ib. p. p. . to . barones comitatus , who they were antiently , d. . p. , . barnstaple burrough , its ●lea to send burgesses to parliament , by grant from king athelstan , d. . p. . bishops w. they derive their right of sitting in parliament from the saxon kings , d. . p. . to . they sometimes granted aids by themselves , d. . p. . seven bishops w. their petition to king james , against his declaration , and his commitment of them , were justifiable by our laws , d. . p. . to . bishopricks , and abbeys , anciently con●erred by the king , per annulum , & baculum , d. . p. . . eldest brother , w. lord of all brethren , by the law of god , or nature , d. . p. . to . bracton , that passage in his book interpreted . viz. rex habet superiorem deum , & legem , d. p. . burroughs , w. any of them send members to parliament by prescription , d. . p. , . d. . p. , . w. all burroughs that sent members antiently held in capite of the king , d. . p. , . w. they sent such members by an inherent right . or at the discretion of the sheriffs , ib. p. . . c cain w. he forfeited his birth-right by the murther of his brother , d. . p. . w. his eldest son was a prince over his brethren , ib. canons of . their validity discussed , d. . p. . to . king charles the firsts pretended commission to sir philim . o neal , considered , d. . p. , . great charter of king iohn● w. it was the sole act of that king , or else made by the advice and consent of all the freemen of england , d. . p. . d. . p. , . great charter of hen. the third , w. all the copies we have now of it were his , or else edward i. his charters , ib. . children how far , and how long bound to be subject to their parents , d. . p. . to . christians w. as much obliged to suffer for religion now , as in the primitive times , d. ● p. . to . chester its county , w. the earl thereof could charge all his tenants in parliament , without their consent , d. . p. . church of england , w. passive obedience be its distinguishing doctrine from other churches , d. . p. , . cities and burroughs more numerous in the saxon times than now , d. . p. . to . w. they had any representatives in parliament before the th of henry the iiid . d. . p. , . whether cities and burroughs had not always had representatives in the parliaments of scotland , d. . p. . clerici terras habentes quae ad ecclesias non pertinent , who they were , d. . p. . . clergy a part of the great council of the kingdom in the saxon times , and long after , d. . p. , to . w. none of the clergy but such as held in capite , appeared at such councils , ibid. w. the inferiour clergy had their representatives in parliament , different from the convocation , ib. , to . commandment vth , in what sence princes are comprehended under it , d. . p. . to , & . communitas regni , w. that phrase in ancient records , and acts of parliament , does not often signifie the commons as well before the th of henry the third , as afterwards , d. . p. , to . w. that phrase does not also signifie the whole body of the kingdom , consisting of peers , and commons , d. . p. . the drs. proofs to the contrary considered , , to . w. it does also often signifie the commons alone , d. . p. . to . their declaration to the pope in the th of edward the third , d. . p. , to . their petition to henry the fifth . their protestation in parliament in richard the seconds time , . commons of cities and great towns had their representatives in the assemblies of estates of all the kingdoms in europe , founded by the ancient germans , and gothes , ibid , , to . commons their request , and consent , when first mentioned in old statutes , d. . p. . w. ever summoned to parliament , from the th of hen. the third , to the th of edw. the first , d. . p. . commons w. part of the great council before the conquest , d. . p. , . the words commune , de commune , & les communes , do frequently signifie the commons , before the th of henry the third , d. . . d. . , to . common-council of the whole kingdom , w. different from the common-council of tenants in capite , d. . p. . to . communitas scotiae , w. it always signified none but tenants in capite , ibid. p. . to . conquest alone w. it confers a right to a crown , d. . p. , . w. it it gives a king a right to all the lands and estates of the conquer'd kingom , d. . . to . w. any conquest of this kingdom was made by king william the first , d. . p. . to the end . constitutions of clarendon ▪ their title explained , d. . p. , . contract originel , w. there were ever any such thing , d. p. , to . d. . p. , ● . convention , w. its voting king james to have abdica●ed the government be justifiable , d. . p. , to . w. its declaration of king james's violations of our fundamental rights be well grounded , ibid. p. , . w. it s voting the throne vacant , can be justified from the ancient constitution of the government , d. . p. , to . w. whether its placing k. w. and q. m. on the throne may be also justified by the said constitution , ibid. p. , to . w. it s making an act , excluding all roman catholick ▪ princes was legal , ibid. p. , to the end . convocation book drawn up by bishop overal , its validity examined , d. . p. , & . copy holders , why they to have no votes at elections to parliament . d. . p. . great councils or convention the only iudges of princes titles , upon any dispute about the succession or vacancy of the throne , d. . p. . d. . p. . to . council of the king in parliament , what it was anciently , d. . p. . great council , or general convention of the estates of the kingdom , w. legal without the kings summons , d. . p. . d. . p. . to . curia regis , what i● anciently was , and w. it consisted of none but tenants in capite , ibid. . crown , w. it can by law be ever forfeited , d. . p. , . d defence of a mans self , in what case justifiable , d. . p. , . declaration of the convention setting forth king james's violation of the fundamental rights of the nation , w. justifiable , or not , d. . p. . to the end . private divines , their opi●nions about passive obedience , and resistance , of what authority , d. . p. , . w. many of them have not quitted the ancient doctrine of the church of england declaring the pope to be antichrist , vid. append. dispencing power , w. justifiable by law , d. . p. , to . dissolution of all government , w. it necessarily follows , from the conventions declaration of the vacancy of the throne , d. . p. , . durham , w. its bishop could lay taxes in parliament on the whole county palatine , without their consents , d. . p. , . e earls of counties , their ancient office and institution , d. p. , to . king edward the second being deposed , w. any vacancy of the throne followed thereupon , d. . p. , to . queen elizabeth , w. she had any title to the crown but by act of parliament , ibid. p , . england , when first so called , d. . p. . english-men , w. they lost all their liberties and estates by the norman conquest , d. . p. . to the end . english bishops , earls , and barons , w. then all deprived of their honours , and estates , ib. , to . english saxon laws , w. confirmed , or abrogated by k. william , d. . p. . estates of the kingdom the only iudges of all disputes about the succession of the crown , d. . p. , to . d. . p. . d. . p. , to , . eve , w. by being subject to adam , all her posterity became so likewise , d. . p. . to . f fathers , w. by right of generation , or of education , lords over their children in the state of nature , d. p. , . w. any such power was given by divine grant to adam , and in him to all other fathers , ib. p. , , to . w. fathers of families have power of life and death over their children by the law of nature , ib. . to . w. they may sell their children , ib. . to . w. they may be resisted by their children in case of any violent assaults upon their lives , ib. p. . w. perpetual masters over their children as long as they live , ib p. . to . fideles , the signification of the word before the conquest , d. . p. , . d. . p. . to . sir r. filmers principles , w. they do not rather encourage tyranny , than fatherly affection in princes towards their subjects , d. . p. . w. they do not also favour vsurpers , ib. . to . g common good of mankind the main design of all government , d. . p. . to . civil government the end of its institution , d. . p. . . . w. there had been any necessity of it , if man had never sinned , ib. p. . what it is , and its prerogative , d. . p. . w. it can be setled without liberty , and property in estates , ib. . government of families and kingdoms , its original , and necessity , d. . p. . to . supream governours , in what cases they cease to be gods ordinance , d. . p. . government among the ancient germans and saxons always by common councils , d. . p. . to . grands , or grants in parliaments , what those words signifie in ancient statutes , and records . w. the lords alone , or the commons also , d. . p. . vid. append. guards of the king , when when first set up , d. . p. . h k. harold , w. william of normandy had a just cause of making war upon him , d. p. . what title he had to the crown , ib. p. . haereditamentum , its derivation , ib. p. . hengist , and all the rest of the kings who founded the saxon heptarchy , w. so by election , or conquest , d. . p. . to . king henry the ivth , w. his title to the crown were by right of blood , or election of the estates in parliament , d. . p. . to . king henry the vi. w. his son were not unjustly disinherited by the duke of york , and himself unjustly deposed by edward the ivth , ib. p. . to . king henry the viith , w. he had any title to the crown by right of inheritance , ib. p. . to . king henry the viiith , w. the several alterations he made as to the the succession , were legal , d. . p. , . homage , w. it rendred the prince , or lord irresistible , d. . p. . . homines liberi , its signification in english histories , d. . p. . to . homilies of our church , the the chief passages therein , against all manner of resistance of governours considered , d. . p. . . w. it be heresie or schism to deny their authority in any point there laid down , ib. . . vid. append. mr. hookers opinion concerning the original of civil government , d. . p. . . w. the two houses of parliament , or the whole people of england have any coercive power ove the king , d. . p. . w. the two houses have on the behalf of the whole people , renounced all right of self-defence in any case whatsoever , ib. p. . to . i king james the firsts speech in parliament , against tyranny , d. . p. . the act of recognition of k. james's hereditary right , how far it obliges posterity , d. . p. , to . king james ii. w. he violatid the fundamental constitution of the government before his desertion , d. . p. . to . or w. he had amended all those violations before his departure , p. . to . w. his setting up a standing army , and puting in popish officers , and souldiers , were an actual making war upon the nation , ib. p. . . w. he abdicated the government by his breach of the original contract , or else by his deserting it , d. . p. . to . w. he might have been again safely restored to the government upon reasonable terms , ib. p. . to . w. he really intended to redress all the violations he had made upon it , p. . to . w. he resumed the government upon his return to london , from feversham , ib. . to . iesus christ did not alter civil government , neither by taking away the prerogative of princes , nor yet by abridging the civil liberties of subjects , d. . p. . to . jews often rebelled , and sometimes killed their kings , d. . p. , to . their resistance of antiochus considered , ibid. p. . to the end . jewish government before saul , w. aristocratical , or monarchical , d. p. . to . judah , and thamar , the history considered , d. . p. . iudges over israel , their power w. monarchical , d. . p. , . w. some of them were not iudges of some particular tribes , p. , . iudgements divine , w. they may be removed by humane means , or force , d. . p. , . k kings , w. to be reputed fathers of their people , as the heirs or representatives of those who were once so , d. . p. . w. they derive their power from god , or from the people and laws , d. . p. . to . d. . p. , to . saxon kings of england , w. absolute , or limited princes , d. . p. . w. they were endued with the sole legislative power , ib. p. , to . kings of the english saxons , elected , and often deposed by the great council , ibid. p. . the same done also in other kingdoms of the gothic model , ib. p. . kings of england ever since king william i. w. they derive their title to the crown from conquest , or some other title , d. . p. . their concessions to subjects do no ways derogate from royal prerogative , d. . p. . . kings of the roman catholick religion , w. many of them have not observed magna charta , and their coronation oath , d. . . . king by sir r. filmer's principles above all laws , and alone makes them , d. . p. . . in what sence he is head of the politick body of the common-wealth , d. . p. . to . w. he could have anciently by his prerogative taxed all the tenants in capite at his discretion , d. . p. . to . w. he could call , or omit to summon to parliament what earls , lords , and tenants he pleased , ibid. p. , to . . w. he could also summon those knights of shires who served befere , without any new election , ib. . w. he could by his prerogative discharge what knights of shires he pleased , after they were chosen , ibid. p. . . king , how far gods lieutenant , d. . p. . w. his authority is different from his personal will and commands , ib. p. . to . his person how far sacred , and inviolable , ibid. p. . . to . kings commission , how far , and in what cases resistible , notwithstanding the declarations of of the two first parliaments of king charles the second , ib. p. . to . w. he hath any authority to act against law , ib. p. , to . kings commissions , how far good in law , ib. p. . kings since the conquest w. endued with the sole legislative power , d. . p. , to . d. . p. , . hath no peer or equal in the kingdom , d. . p. . his presence , w. it will authorize all illegal actions , so as to render them irresistible , d. . p. , . his officers in what , case resistible , ib. the kings being irresistible , how far different from being unaccountable , d. . p. , . kings of england , w. absolute , and unaccountable , or w. limited by law , d. . p. , to . most high in their state-royal when they appear in their great councils , or parliament , d. . p. . the first eight kings after the conquest never were so stiled till after their coronations , d. . p. . to . . king , though he have no peer , yet he had anciently comites , or companions , d. . p. , . w. he can at this day abdicate or forfeit his crown by the wilful violation of our fundamental laws , d. . p. , to . d. . p. , . kingly power , the end of its institution in this kingdom , d. . p. . king de facto , or for the time being , w. within the statute of the th of edward the third , and whether allegiance be due to him by the statute of the eleventh of henry the seventh , d. . p. . to . what constitutes a legal king in england , d. . p. , . kingdoms of judah and israel , w. when given by gods appointment , it gave the issue of that king a like divine right to succeed , d. . p. , . kingdoms patrimonial , and hereditary , their difference , ib. , . knights of shires frequently stiled magnates , and grantz in ancient records , d. . p. . vid. append. w. they were anciently chosen out of the tenants in capite , and none others , p. . knights , citizens , and burgesses , w. the first writs of summons of them that can be found , is the th of henry the third , d. . p. . w. this was the first time that they were summoned , ibid. p. , to . w. they were summoned no more till the eighteenth of edward the first , ibid. p. . to the end . d. . p. . to . p. , to . l lancaster , w. that families pretended title to the crown , claim'd by inheritance , d. . p. , . laws , how far they oblige princes , according to sir r. f's principles , d. . p. , . laws imperial of all go●vernments , w. they require a passive obedience , or non-resistance in all cases whatsoever , d. . p. . . law of nations , w. it differs from the law of nature , d. . p. , to . laws of english saxon councils , the titles to most of them , d. . p. . to . laws of normandy , w. the same in most things with those of england , d. . p. . . laws fundamental of the kingdom , w. there are any such things , and where to be found , d. . p. . to . d. . p. . d. . p. . to . law of edward the confessour , concerning the kings ceasing to be so , if he prove a tyrant , and w. it be genuine or not , d. . p. . to . private league with france , what reasons there are for and against its reality , d. . p. . to . liberi homines , and liberi tenentes mentioned in ancient statutes and records , who they were anciently , d. . p. . . to . w. they were only tenants in capite , or chose by military service to them , d. . p. . to . . m magna charta , w. obtained by rebellion , d. . p. . magnates , w. the commons were not sometimes comprehended under that title , d. . p. . , . queen mary , w. she had any title , save by the statute of henry the eighth , d. . p. . our present queen mary , w. she hath a right to succeed upon her fathers abdication , ib. p. . . maud the empress , why she never stiled her self queen of england , notwithstanding fealty had been sworn to her , d. . p. . several maxims in the civil law considered , and explained , d. . p. , , . . the ancient members of the german diets or great councils , d. . p. . the milites mentioned in ancient statutes and records , who they were , d. . p. , . w. they were only tenants in capite , or any other tenants by military or socage service , d. . p. . , . mischiefs that may befall a people from their resistance of the supream power considered , d. . p. . to . monarchy , w. of divine right from any precepts , or examples in the old or new testament , d. . p. , . or from adams patriarchical power , d. . p. . to . monarchies or commonwealths which are most tyrannical , d. . p. . . mixt monarchy , w. it be a contradiction , d. . p. . to . sim. montfort . w. he first called the knights , citizens , and burgesses to parliament , in the th of henry the third , d. . p. . . moses and joshua , w. monarchs over the children of israel , and successors to the patriarchical power , d. . p. . to . multitudo cleri . & populi , the signification of those words in our ancient histories , d. . p. . to . n w. a whole nation may resist the supream power in some cases of extremity , but not particular persons , d. . p. . to . , . d. . p. . to . . to . negative voice , w. the two houses of parliament have it not in some cases as well as the king , d. . p. . noah , w. he was sole proprietor of the earth , or else was tenant in common with his own children , d. . p. , . w. his grandsons were all alike princes over their several families , ib. p. . to . w. from noahs seven precepts may be deduced the law of nature , d. . p. , . nobilis , & nobilitas , the several significations of those titles , d. . p. , . . w. meer commoners were not often comprehended under the title of nobiles , ib. , . non obstantes , the clause when first inserted in our kings charters , d. . p. . non resistance , w. the doctrine tend to make princes better , or else more tyrannical to their subjects , d. . p. , . normandy , w. its dukes were absolute , or limited princes , d. . p. . o oath of the king at his coronation , how far obliged according to sir f's . principles , d. . p. . . it s ancient form , according to the mirour , d. . . w. the taking the coronation oath renders the crown forfeitable , if it be not observed , d. . p. . the form of the oath since the conquest , ib. p. . oath of allegiance its interpretation , d. . p. . oaths in the acts for the militia , of the th , and th of king charles the second , their true intent and meaning considered , d. . p. . to . . new oath of allegiance , w. it may be taken to their present majesties as king and queen de facto , without acknowledgment of their right , d. . p. . to . how far it obliges the takers , ibid. p. . . w. due to the king in possession by reason of his protection , ib. p. . to . promissory oaths , w. lawful , or not , ib. . to . w. any other stricter oath be necessary , ib. p. . to . obedience passive . w. it be not a bull , d. . p. . the necessary consequences of that doctrine , ib. p. . to . officers and souldiers who deserted king james w. , justifiable in so doing , d. . p. , to . omnes de regno , mentioned in magna charta , w. only tenants in capite , d. . p. , to . w. the oppressions of princes , or the ambition & rebellion of subjects , have caused the greater disturbances , d. . p. , . optimates , its ancient signification in histories discussed , d. . p. , to . w. it ever signifies meer commoners , . orange , w. that princes making war upon king james was justifiable , d. . p. . to . w. all his other carriage towards the said king were as it ought to be , ib. p. . to . original contract , w. there were ever any such thing , and where to be ●ound , d. . p. , . d. . p. . . w. broken by king james , ib. , . . . p pares baronum , or alii magnates , who they anciently were , d. . p. . . parliaments or great councils , w. they are as ancient as the government , or owe their original to some kings favour , d. . p. , to . how often anciently held , d. p. , d. . . it s power when met , ib. . no laws to be made , or taxes to be raised without it , d. . p . to have freedom of speech , and not to be bribed , or awed , ibid. paternal power not to be acquired by conquest , &c. d. . p. , . patriarchs before the flood , w. lords of all mankind , or or masters of their own families , d. . p. . to . st. pauls epistle to the romans , when written , d. . p. , to . peers , their power in parliament , w. derived from he king , or the institution of the government , d. . p. . to the end . persons of princes , w. they may be resisted without resisting their authority , d. . p. . to . whether so in england , d. . . to . people , w. the original of civil power asserted by fortescue . d. . p. . power r●gal , w. paternal , d. . p. . to . people , w. they can judge when their fundamental rights are invaded , d. . p. . w. if they may judge , they may also resist , d. . p. , . what numbers required to justifie this resistance , d. . p. . to . power oeconomical , w. of the same kind with civil , ibid. p. . . . power over mens lives whence derived , d. . p. . to . . power civil , whence derived , w. immediately from god , or from the people , d. . p. . to . power legislative , w. in the king , and parliament , d. . p. , . power of dispencing with penal laws , w. it be an inherent prerogative of the kings , d. . p. . to . supream powers , w. irresistable , because ordain'd by god , d. . p. . to . plebs and populus , what those words anciently signified , d. . p. . to . d. . p. . to . primitive christians , w. men are now obliged to the same strict rules of non-resistance , as they were in the primitive times , d. . p. , to . divers of their resistances of the roman and greek emperours instanced , to . primogeniture as a power over brethren , w. of divine right , d. . p. . to . princes , w. bound to treat their subjects like their children , d. . p. . to . princepes regni , its signification anciently , d. . p. . . . . w. all the priviledges and liberties english subjects now enjoy , were owing to the favour of our former kings , d. . p. . d. . p. , to . . , . prelates and peers claim their places in parliaments by prescription , d. . p. , to . prescription beyond time of memory , how high it goes , ibid. , to . proceres regni , its ancient signification , d. . p. . w. the commons were not often comprehended under that title , ib. , . d. . p. . protection of the government , how far it may require allegiance to it , d. . p. , to . civil property , w. derived from adam , or noah , d. . p. . to . provincia , its ancient signification , w. a province , or a county , ibid. , to . punishments for offences , w. alter'd , and new ones ordained by king william the first , d. . p. . q queens often present in english saxon councils , d. . p. . r rebels , w. bound to make their lawful prince amends by restoring him to the throne , d. . p. . to . records in the tower , and elsewhere , cited in these dialogues . rot. cart . iohan. d. . p. . rot. clause . edw. ii. ibid. . rot. parl. rich. ii. ibid. . rot. claus . , & of hen. iii. ib. . rot. claus . hen. iii. d. . p. . inter com. brevia , mich. . hen. iii. ib. . rot. pat. . h. iii. rot. claus . . h. iii. ib. . rot. pat. . iohan. ibid. . rot. cl . . h. iii. ibid. . rot. cl . . h. iii. ibid. . rot. cl . . h. iii. ibid. . rot. pat. . h. iii. p. . rot. pat. . h. iii. rot. cl . . h. iii. rot. pat. . h. iii. ibid. . rot. cl . . edw. i. ibid. . rot. par. . edw. . p. . rot. par. . edw. iii. rot. parl. . rich. ii. ib. . rot. pat. th edw. . rot. fin. . edw. iii. ib. p. . rot. cl . . edw. . ib. p. . rot. cl . . h. iii. rot. pat. . h. . ibid. p. . rot. pat. . h. iii. ibid. p. . rot. cl . . h. iii. ib. p. . rot. cl . . h. iii. . rot. cl . . h. iii. rot. cl . . h. iii. rot. cl . . h. iii. ib. p. . rot. pat. edw. i. rot. pat. . e. . ib. p. . rot. pat. , . ed. i. ib. p. ● . rot. cl . . iohan. . h. iii. . h. iii. ib. p. . rot. pat. . h. iii. rot cl . . h. iii. ib. . rot. cl . . edw. i. ib. p. . rot. cl . . ed. iii. rot. cl . . h. iii. ibid. p. . bundel : brev. edw. i. p. , . rot. cl . . e. . ib. . rot. cl . . e. i. rot. cl . . ed. iii. ib. . rot. stat. . e. . d. . p. . rot. cl . . e. i. ib. p. . rot. cl . . ed. iii. ib. p. . rot. pat. h. iii. ib. . rot. wal. . ed. i. ib. . . rot. cl . . e. i. rot. pat. . ed. ii. ib. . rot. pat. . h. iii. ib. p. . bundel brev. . ed. ii. rot. pat. . ed. iii. ib. p. . rot. pat. . h. v. ib. p. . placit . parl. . e. i. rot. parl. . ed. iii. ib. p. . inter com. brev . in scac. . ed. i. prins . par reg. p. . . . ed. i. ib. p. . parl. reg. . ed. ii. . rot. cl . . e. ii. rot. cl . . e. iii. rot. cl . . e. iii. p. . rot. pat. . e. iii. p. . rot. pat. . ed. iii. rot. parl. . e. iii. p. . a regency , w. legal , or practicable in england ▪ upon king james's departure , d. . p. . religion , in what cases we are bound to suffer for it , without any resistance , d. . p. . to . the remedies against tyranny , the people of england can have without resistance , considered , d. . p. . to . resistance of fathers , husbands , and masters , by their wives , children , and servants , w. ever lawful , d. . p. . to . to . . resistance of the supream powers , in what cases absolutely lawful , d. . p. . to ▪ d. . p. . in what cases absolutely unlawful , d. . p. , . all the evil consequences of such resistance considered , d. . p. . to . d. . p. , to . w. all resistance be forbidden by god in the old testament , d. . p. . to the end . w. forbidden by the word of god in the new testament , d. . p. . to . w. contrary to the doctrine of the church of england , ib. p. . resistance of the king , and those in commission by him , w. absolutely ●orbid by the statute of the seventh of edward the first , against bearing of arms , d. . p. . w. contrary to the th of edward the third , concerning treasons , ib. to the end . resistance of arbitrary power in our kings , w. lawful both before , and since the conquest , d. . p. , to . such resistance granted to be lawful by some of our kings themselves , d. . p. . . . rights and liberties of the subject , what they are . d. . p. , to . rolls clause , how many wanting in the reigns of king john , and henry the third , d. . p. , . s sapientes , its signification in ancient histories , d. . p. . late schism upon the deprivation of the bishops , w. justifiable , d. . p. , to . scotland , w. it s ancient constitution were the same with england , d. . p. . to . d. . p. . w. none but tenants in capite ever appeared at the great councils of the kingdom , ib. to . scutage service , w. different from a scutage tax , d. . p. . to . . to . sermons for the kings absolute power , censured in parliament , d. . p. . servants , and sons , w. all one in the state of nature , d. . p. . sheriffs pardoned by act of parliament , for holding above one year , d. . p. . states general of the vnited provinces , w. their making war upon king james the second were justifiable , d. . p. , . ancient statutes , w. the three estates have not always given their assent to them , as well as the king , d. . p. . to . notwithstanding the different forms of penning them , ibid. d. . p. , . . , . statue of the eleventh of henry the seventh , cap. . w. still in force , d. . p. . to . statute of the thirteenth of elizabeth , chap. . w. still in force , d. . p. . to . all statutes though made by vsurpers , w. they hold good till repeal'd , d. . p. , , . doctor stories case , d. . p. . subjects , how different from slaves , d. . p. . to . w. particular subjects may resist the supream powers for satisfaction of their own private injuries , d. . p. . succession to crowns , no certain procepts to be found about it in scripture , or the law of nature , d. . p. . to . succession to the crown of england , w. always hereditary since the conquest , without any vacancy of the throne , d. . p. , to . sufferings of christ , how far an example to us , d. . p. . to . suffering for religion without resistance , when necessary , ib. p. . t tenants in capite , w. they were all barons , d. . p. . . w. they could anciently tax , the whole kingdom at their pleasure , as well the lands held of them , as what was not , d. . . . to . . w. they , or else tenants by knights service , were anciently the only persons who served upon iuries , d. . p. . to . w. they represented all their under tenants in parliament , d. . p. . tenants in s●●age , w. they were bound by the acts of those of whom they held their estates , d. . p. . tenants in demesne claimed to be discharged from the knights wages by prescription , d. . p. , . tenure by knights service , w. in use before king wil. i. d. . p. , . a new test oath opposed by a great party of the poe●s in the reign of king charles the second , d. . p. . testaments , w. valid in the meer state of nature , d. . p. , , . the several texts of scripture made use of for , or against absolute non-resistance , examined ; viz. in the old testament , d. . p. . to the end . texts of scripture out of the new testament , urged for the like purpose , d. . p. . to . thanes , the ancient signification of that title discussed , d. . p. . to . the divers sorts of them amongst the english saxons , d. . p. . treason against the kingdom , anciently as well as against the king , d. . p. . trials by combate , w. in use before the conquest , d. . p. . trust committed by the people to the supream powers , w. unaccountable , and irrevocable , d. . p. . . insupportable tyranny , w. worse than the state of nature , ib. . tyrants , w. ordained of god , d. . , . u vavasors , or mesne tenants , w. anciently reckon'd as part of the baronage of the kingdom , d. . p. , . universitas baronagii angliae , & regni , what it signified , and w. the commons were comprehended under that title , d. . p. , , , . universitas communis , the meaning of that phrase in matthew paris , d. . p. . w. it comprehended no more than the less tenants in capite , ib. . primate ushers opinion in his treatise of the power of the prince , and obedience of the subject considered . d. . p. , . vsurpers by sir r. filmers principles , to be obeyed before the lawful prince , and his heirs , d. . p. , . when vsurpers may be obeyed before the lawful prince , and his heirs , d. . p. . usurpation , w. it gives a rightful title after three generations , d. . p. . vulgus , what that word signified in the latine translation of the old coronation-oath , d. . p. . to . w wales , w. it s titular prince be really son to king james the second , and queen mary , d. . p. to . w. he ought to have been received as the true son and heir of the said king , d. . p. . to . and that , let the consequences be what they will , ib. p. . to . wardship , marriage , and relief , w. wholly derived from the normans , d. . p. . . its advantages and inconveniencies considered , ib. a wife , w. she can ever be discharged from the power her husband hath over her in the state of nature , by any means , but by his express consent , d. . p. . king william the first , why stiled the conquerour , d. . p. . w. he claimed to be king of england by donation of king edward the confessor , or by conquest , d. . p. . , . w. he was ever elected , and took the same coronation-oath , as the english saxon kings had done before , d. . p. . . to . w. he might justly have seized all the lands in england to his own use , d. . p. . w. he gave most of the lands of england to his followers , ibid. p. , to . and to . w. he alter'd any thing in the fundamental constitution of the government , d. . p. . to . w. he altered all the old laws of england , or confirmed those of king edward , d. . p. . to . his second oath upon the relicks of st. alban , ib. , . his laws concerning all freemens exemption from taxes upon their finding arms , d. . p. , . w. he and his son william rufus made laws , and imposed taxes , without the consent of the great council , d . p. , . king william the third , w. he hath any title by conquest over king james , or else from his marriage with the princess , and the act of the convention , d. . p. . to . his religion , and principles vindicated , ib. , . wites , or wise-men in the english saxon councils , the true signification of that term , d. . p. . to . wittena à gemots , or great councils among the english saxons , w. they consisted of more than the higher nobility , ib. p. . wives , how far obliged to be obedient to the commands of their husbands , d. . p. . writ of summons to the commmons , of the th of henry the third , w , it was the first of that kind , d. . p. . to . w. any writs of summons of bishops or lords , to parliament , are to be found before that time , ib. p. . writ of the th of henry the third to the s●eriffs , to levy two marks scutage upon tenants by knights service , holding of tenants in capite , ib. ▪ writ of the th of henry the third , commanding all men holding a whole knights fee of whatsoever tenure to be knighted , d. . p. . writs of summons to knights , citizens , and burgesses , to parliament at shrewsbury , in the th of edward the first , d. . p. . writ of summons to knights of shires ( cited by dr. b. ) in the th of edward the first , w. it was to a parliament , d. . p. . to . writ of the d of edward the first , w. a summons to parliament . d. . p. , . writ of the th of edward the first , commanding the levying of forty shillings upon each knights fee , which had been granted ever since the eighteenth , ibid. p. . w. the commons granted that tax , ibid. writs of the th of edward the first , and th of edward the third , w. of summons to parliaments , ib. . writs for expences to knights of shires , how ancient , d. . p. . to . y duke of york , richard his title declared in parliament , d. . p. . edward duke of york , recognized by parliament , to be lawful king , from the death of his father , richard duke of york , ib. p. . duke of york james , w. he was not intirely in the french interest , and designs , before he came to the crown , d. . p. . an appendix , containing some authorities sit to be added , for farther confirmation of some things laid down in the foregoing dialogues . to be added to dialogue the fourth , p. . at the end of f — s speech , [ after these words ] no particular church can , read thus , and that divers of the most eminent divines of our church have used the same freedom with several other doctrines contained in these homilies , may appear from dr. hammonds , dr. heylins , and dr. taylors , with several other eminent writers , expresly denying , that the church of rome is guilty of idolatry , or , that the pope is antichrist ; tho' both these doctrines are as plainly laid down in the homilies , as the doctrine of non-resistance . and yet none of these men are ever taxed by those of the church of england , for quitting her ancient orthodox doctrines ; and i desire you to give me a good reason ( if you can ) why it is more lawful and excusable to part with the former of these doctrines , than the latter ? the like i may say also for the doctrine of predestination ; which tho expresly asserted in the articles of the church of england , as interpreted by all the bishops , and writers , in the reign of queen elizabeth , and king iames , as also the bishops and divines sent as delegates from our church , to the synod of dort , who joyned in the interpretation of that article , in the strict calvinistical sense ; you find in all the determinations of that synod against the doctrines of the arminians , which then began to prevail ; yet since the time that arch-bishop laud had the nominating of what persons he thought fit to be made bishops , deans , &c. not one in ten of them but have been arminians in all those points , wherein they wholly differ from the doctrine of calvin , which is but the same with that of our articles so interpreted ; yet none of the divines of our present church , who hold these opinions , are branded with apostacy from its ancient doctrine ; but if any well meaning divine , out of love to his country , and to prevent popery and slavery from breaking in upon us , have but preach'd or publish'd any thing in derogation to these darling doctrines of passive obedience , and non-resistance , he is straight branded with apostacy from the church , in quitting its main distinguishing character ; and we have lately seen degrading , nay , the most cruel whipping , and imprisonment thought too little for such a man ; but one may say of some men with truth enough , dat veniam corvis , vexat censura columbis . so dialogue the sixth , p. . at the bottom , [ after these words ] in those times , read this , but that the house of commons were anciently often comprehended under the stile of grantz ( which is the same with magnates in latine ) pray consult the parliament rolls of edward the third , where you will find in the th of that king , this passage ; & est assentu , & accorde per nostre & seigneur le roy , & tous les grantz in pleyn parliament ; ( that is , in full parliament , where both lords and commons were present ) that the proceedings of the lords against those that were no peers should not be drawn into example , &c. now pray see the commentaries of the most learned and reverend author of the grand question , upon these words in this record ; this hath all the formality of an act of parliament , and therefore all the estates were present , so likewise in the same year ; in the next roll but one ; accorde est per nostre seigneur le roy , & son counsell in plein parliament ; which was an act of parliament , concerning those that had followed the earl of lancaster . so in the th of this king , we have the particular mention of the bishops , as some of those who make a full parliament ; accorde est per nostre seigneur le roy , prelates , counts , barons , & autres grands de roia●me in pleyn parliament . so in the th of edward the ill d , the arch-bishop of canterbury made his oration in pleyn parliament , which is thus explained , en le presence nostre seigneur le roy , & tous les prelats , & autres grantz . and in another roll , si est accorde & assentu per tous in pleyn parliament ; and who these were , we are told in the same roll ; viz. les prelats , counts , barons , & tous les autres summons à misme parliament . now this is the clearest explication of these words in full parliament , viz. in the presence of all those who were summon'd ; so that if the commons were then summon'd to this parliament , ( as certainly they were ) they must have given their assents under the title of grantz ; since the prelats , earls , and barons were particularly mention'd before . to dialogue the th , p. . after these words , be reformed by them , or not , read thus , and that king iames the first , himself was satisfied of this original contract , may appear by his own words , in a speech to both houses of parliament , . where he expresly tells them , that the king binds himself by a double oath to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom , tacitly , as being a king , and so bound to protect , as well the people , as the laws of his kingdom ; and expresly by his oath at his coronation ; so as every king in a setled kingdom , is bound to observe that paction made to his people by his laws , in framing the government as agreeable thereunto , according to that paction which god made with noah after the deluge , &c. to dialogue . p. . after their successors , add this . so that all the modern acts of parliament for intailing the crown , being made and ordained by the counsel and assent of the lords , and commons , are so many plain declarations , and evident recognitions , what the fundamental constitution of the english government was in that grand point . to dialogue the th , p. . after the words of the said parish , read thus ; and that not only all the private acts of that parliament , but some publick ones also , tho' never confirmed in the following parliament of the th of charles the second , are yet held good in law , appears by these that follow , viz. . an act for continuance of process , and iudicial proceedings , continu'd . by which , all writs , pleas , indictments , &c. then depending , were ordered to stand , and proceeded on , notwithstanding want of authority in the late usurpers ; and therein it was farther ordained , that process and proceedings in courts of justice , should be in the english tongue , and the generall issue be pleaded , till august . . as if the acts made during the usurpation , for that purpose , had been good and effectual laws . and upon this foot only , stand many fines , recoveries , judgments , and other proceedings at law had and passed between april , , and august . . . an act for conforming and restoring of ministers . this act is usually to this day , set forth and pleaded in quare impedits , tho' it was said to be refused upon debate to be confirmed in the house of commons , th of car. ii. when divers other acts of the same time were confirmed ; yet both these acts having no other authority but from that convention ( as you call it ) have been judged and constantly allowed to be good laws , for above these years . to dialogue the th , p. . after these words , were still alive , read this , and to shew you that the king and parliament have deprived even bishops of their own communion , and that such deprivations have been held good , and that the king hath nominated new bishops upon the vacancy , you may see in dr. burnets history of the reformation , and in the appendix to it , where you will find a memorable act of parliament of the th of henry the viii , ( before his departure from his obedience to the see of rome ) whereby cardinal campegio , and hieronimo de ghinicci were deprived of the bishopricks of salisbury , and worcester , which they had held for near years , and campegio had without doubt been installed in it when he was in england . the act it self being so remarkable , i shall give you some passages out of it verbatim ; first the preamble sets forth , that whereas before this time the church of england by the kings most noble progenitors , and the nobles of the same , hath been founded , ordained , and establish'd in the estate and degree of prelacy , dignities , and other promotions spiritual , &c. ( which sufficiently confirms what i but now asserted , that all the bishopricks were founded by our kings , with the consent of their grand councils , or parliaments ) and then it proceeds to recite , that whereas all persons promoted to ecclesiastical benefices , ought to reside within the realm , for preaching the laws of almighty god , and keeping hospitality ; and since these prelates had not observed these things , but lived at rome , and carried the revenues of their bishopricks out of the kingdom , contrary to the intention of the founders , and to the great prejudice of the realm , &c. in consideration whereof , it is enacted by the authority of this present parliament , that the said two sees , and bishopricks of salisbury , and worcester , and either of them , henceforth shall be taken , reputed , and accounted in the law to be void , vacant , and utterly destitute of any incumbent , or prelate , and then follows a clause enabling the king , his heirs , and successors , to nominate and appoint successors ( being the natives of this realm ) to the said sees , and the king did nominate successors according to the said act. a table of errata . the authors occasions not permitting 〈…〉 town whilst most of these dialogue ▪ were in the press , begs pardon for the many erratas in some of them , and desires you to correct such gross ones , that alter or disturb the sense , viz. dial. . p. ● . l , . for author , r. authority . p. . l. . for th , r. th . p. . l. . for rights , r. rites . dial. . p. . l. . del . hundred , r thousand , p. , l. . d. greek . p. . l. ● , . d. trogus pampilus , r. iustin , p. . l. . after to be , r. heir . p. . d. thought , r. got . p. . l. . for durate . l. ● . after exercised , r. not . p. . l. . after no , r. other . p. . l. ● . for valentino , r. valentiniano . p. . l. . this whole paragraph is misplaced , as no where said , and which should be inserted . p. . l. . after the words absolute monarchy . ● . l. . d. paul , r. peter . p. . l. d. but as for the other . p. ●●● . l. after us that , ● . in the time of p. . l. . d. i would readily do it . d. . in advertizement works , r. words . p. ● . l. . d. but , ● . by . d. . p. . l. . d. ends , r. hands . d. . p. . at l. . d. m. r. f. d. . p. . l. ● . d. is plain by , r. is may be . p. ●● . l. . part of c●●●erunt , r. percu●●erunt . p. , l. . for soli , r. solido● . p. . l. . d. which i now cited , p. ● , l. . which , r. of which . d. . p. p. . d. m. r. ● . p. . after equivocal , r. words p. ●● . l. . d. other matters , r. of summons . d. . p. ● . l. ● . d. government , r. go●t . ● . ● ● , for the judges , ● . some of the judges . d. . in the preface . p. . l. i● . d. pretended . ● . late . p. . ● . . for monarcho● , r. monarchomachos . p. ● . l. . for volu●tas , r. volunt●● p. l. ●ule ● . so kings . . . l. . d. as r. for which . l. . after our r. norman kings . p. ●● . l. . ● r. that ib. l. . after english , r. saxon. ib. their r. the ib. after an●●●fter . r. of our kings , . l. . indefensible , ● . indefeasibleness . p. . l. . d. power . p. . gemminicen●●s , r. gemeticensts . p. . l. . after hereditary , r. right . p. ●● . l. . after these . d. of p. ● . l. . d. not . lr . r. resistible . p. . l. . d. not only gone through , but. p. . l. . there , r. who there . p. , l. . d. but that a residue of the english. ib. l. after signified , r. something . p. . chalow● , r. chalices . l. ulr . hiberasque r. liberas● ▪ p. . albi●● , r. albint . p. , l. . dreugari● , r. drungarii . dreuch●● , r. drenches , l. . r. drenges . p. . l. . after leaf , r. observes . p. . l. . ordinal , r. 〈◊〉 . p. . l. . d. that . r. it so . p. . l. . tests , r. teste● . l. . d. by vertue of p. . ● a that , r. then that . l. . were , r. who were . p. . l. . ● . not . p. ● ● l. ● . d. that we may in ● . of l. . d. so as , r. these . p. . d. provided , r. reserved . p. ●● . l. ● . d. as well as , r. thus . lb. the work , r. this work . p. . l. . d. peptilo , r. weregild , ib. after a●●●sta● , 〈◊〉 , ● . thus , after that time , instead of fines . corporeal punishments came in use . p. ● . l. . d. either . p. . l. . d. that , r. falfity . d. . p. . l. . after you , r. affirm , p. . d. decrees , r. duresse . p. . l. . d. act , r. first . d. . p. . l. ● . d , vi , r. iv. p. . l. to after a● , r. as well as d. . preface , p. . l. . for , r. 〈◊〉 p . l. . d. their , r. his . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e vid● bilson of christian subjection , edi● . . p. ● , . hooke●'s ecclesias . policy , l. . p. . r. h. c. p. . ib. . vide archbishop abbot 's narrative , r. h. c. p. . f. p. c. . § , . see cowel 's interpreter titles king , parliament , prerogative . r. f. a. m m. p. , . ibid. t. t. g. c. . p. . b. p. p. § . ib. § . ib. § , . ib. § . § . tim. . , § . cor. . , . § . b. p. p. § , . gen. . . f. a. m. m. p. . f. p. o. a. gen. . . ephes. . , . gen. . . * de oblg. consc . prael . . §. . dig. . tit. . l. . cod. tit. . l. . dig. tit. . l. : b. p. p. § . ibid. f. a. mm. p. . gen. . . tract . memarim . de clem. chap. . . matth. . , . verse . s. . iust. l. . § . t . plutarch in lycurgo . * vi. p. aerodius rerum judicatarum l ▪ vi. cap. . de emendatione liberorum . f. o ▪ , ▪ p. n. m. p. . l. . c. . ibid. luke . . b. p. p. sect. . vid. jos. ant. lib. . c. b. p. p. sect. . p. n. m. p. . b. p. p. sect. . b. p. p. ibid. b. p. p. c. . sect. . f. o. g. p. . . p. n. m. . . b. p. p. §. . p. n. m. p. . p. n. m. p.n. m. p , euseb. l. . cap. . rom. . v. . f. p. c. . §. . notes for div a -e f. p. ch. . § . ibid. b. p. p. c. . § . gen. . , . bpp . § . ib. c. . § . rom. . v. . v. , . gen . v. . b. p. p. § . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . v. ▪ . f. o. g. p. . l. . c. . ioseph . antiq. iud. lib. . cap. . § . oxon. edit . gen. . , , . t. t. g. c. . p. . ib. p. . f. o. g. p. . l. . c. . b. p. p. § . gen. . , . f. p. p. § . f. a. mm. p. . b. p. p. § . l. . c. . f. t. g. c. . p. . b. p. p. § . ib. . l. . c. . f. p. c. . § . gen. . . t.t.g. c. . p. . ib. p. . t.t. g. p. . ib. p. . gen. . . b. p. p. § . ibid. § . f. p. c. . v. . § . v. . § . herod . polym . iustin. l.xi. iustin. l.ii. g. i. b. lib. ii. cap. . § . lucan . § . gen. . , . gen. . . ver . . tt . g. c. . p. , . g. i. p. l. . c. . § , . b. p. p. § . vid. hotoman franco-gallia . cap. . p. n. m. ib. . vi. hect. boeth . l. vid. marian hist. hisp. p.n.m. ib. p. . vid. mezeray in the reign of philip de long. f. p. c. . § . deut. . . b. p. p. § . numb . . , . deut. . , . b. p. p. § . iosh. . , . b. p. p. § . v. . . iosh. . sam. . . sam. , . f p. c. . § . iudg. . . ver . , . king. . . chron. . . f. p. c. . § . vid. io●an . marshami chron. can. sect. xi . p. , , & . kings . . acts vii . . tt . g. p. . chron. . . f. p. § . f. d. o. p. . ib. p. . f. p. a. p. b. c. p. § . f. p. § . f. o. g. p . lib. . cap. . b. c. p. § . f. p. § . b. p.p. § , . corinth . . . chap. . p. , . page th . l. . lib. . t. . c. de legibus l. . lib. . t. . rastal , s. . rot. parl. h. . n. . act pour garder , les leys . miscel. p. . pag. . ib. p. . hooker's eccl. pol. lib. . § . matt. . . f. p. o. iude . s. p. p. vers. . . vers. . f. o. g. p. . ib. notes for div a -e * vid. mocquets travels , lib. . p. . h. i. chap. . p. . * lib. . cap. . §. . . † lib. vii cap. §. . h. i. ib. v. i. r. p. . b. d. f. p. . id. pag. ● . t. t. g. part . p. . id. p. . ib. . s. c. r. p. . vi. meterani histor . * pet. ep. . ch . . v. . † eph. . v. . col. . . gen. . , . vi. sir jo. chardins travels l. . martial . pag. . cap. . t.t. g. c. . sam. . . pag. . . pag. . l. o. cicero orat . pro lege manil. s. c. r. ch. . p. . numb . . iude v. . ib. p. . d●ut . . v. . , , , . exod. . s. c. r. p. . ibid. p. . iosh . . sam. . . exod. . . maccab. . v. . mac. . , , . s. r. s. p. p. . sam. . . , . sam. . . , . v. . s. c. r. p. p. , . v. . v. , , . ver. . chap. . ver. . . ver. . . ver. . ver. . king . v. . s. c. r. . . sam. . — . — . . — . . ib. p. . rom. . , . isa. . . sect. . . sam. . . . . chron. . . s. ● . r. p. . sam. . . sam. . v. . sam. . . ● sam. . sam. . , . . s. c. r. p. , . kings . . . . deut. . v. , , . chap. . v. . * chap. . . v. . . chron. . ver . . vide st. chrysost . ecloga at imperio , & potestate , where you 'l find that he both owns & justifies this resistance in the high-priest . kings . . s. c. r. p. . kings , , , . chro. . . v. . k. . s. c. r. p. . ier. . . esther . . . s. c. r. p. , . esther . . , . esther . . dan. . , . eccl. . , , . esther . . esther . . . chap. . . macc. . . cap. . th . cap. . §. . v. . notes for div a -e s. c. r. ch . p. . ib. . mat. . . s. c. r. p. . ib. p. . ib. p. . ib. p. . s. c. r. p. . matth. . . &c. deut. . . ib. p. . ib. p. . rom. . . s. c. r. p. . ib. p. . s. c. r. p. . mat. . . ib. p. . rom. . . luk. . . ibid. p. . ib. p. . ib. p. . iohn . . iohn . . luk. . . de iustitia , & iure lege ius . acts . acts . s. c. r. p. . ib. p. . pet. . . rom. . . ibid. p. . tim. . . heb. . . rom. . , , . ib. p. . ib. p. . ib. p. . ib. p. . ib. p. , . ib. p. . ib. p. . . s. c. r. p. ch. . p. . rom. . , . ibid. p. . ib. p. . ib. p. . ib. . . ib. p. . ib p. . ib. p. . pet. . . vid. lexicon scapulae . s. c. a. p. . u. s. a. s. p. . ib. . ib. p. . s. c. r. p. . isai. . . . ibid. p. . ierem. ● . v. . . s. c. r. p. . ib. p. . ibid. p. . v. , . pag. , . ib. p. . mat. . , , , . ver. . : s. c. r. p. , . prov. . ch. . . b. p. p. §. . ibid. §. . chap. . , &c. s. c. r. ch. . p. . ib. . s c. r. p. , . ibid. s.c.r. p. . s.c.r. p. . ib. p. . vi. ammian . marcellin . lib. see biblioth . vet patr. tom. . colon. ch. . ibid. cap. . hist. tripartit . l. . cap. . hist. ruffini l. . cap. . h. p. o. c. . h. p.o. ch . . h. p. o. p. , . bo. sparrow's collection of canons , &c. p. . vid. rush. collect. d. part . vol. f. . h. p. o. ch . . h. p. o. p. . . traité du pouvoir absolu des souverains , &c. cologne , . notes for div a -e i.e.m.g. ch . . p. . et . ●ein . cad . vigorn . & mon●st . ang. part . . p. . vi. mat. paris in vita will. ● . lib. . c. . lib. . c. . * i. e. his power of commanding . c. . h. d. l. p. . h.d.l. p. . p. . a. b. i. e. m. g. p. . vi . mat. paris in vita offe p. . vi. spelman 's councils . i. e. m. g. p. . & dein . vi. l●mbard . archaionom . in the laws of k. ina. p. . ibid. . ibid. p. . spel. concil . p. . spel. concil . p. . . an. ch. . spel. concil . p. . an. ch. . spel. con. . concil . . gest. regum lib. . ● . . chap. . spel. concil . vol. p. . ibid p. . vid. vol. p. . spel. con. tom. . p. . vid. chronic. bromp . col. . lin . . flor. wigorn a. d. . brompt . ut sup. col. , . id. col. . vi. goldmans dictionary . h. s. b. d. p. , . & d●in . an. . chap. . p. . hist. ang. script . x. col. . ib. col. . b. a. p. i.e.m.g. pag. . fol. . fol. . eadmer . hist. novel . l. . pag. . i.e.m.g. pag. . vid. x. scrip. col. . anno . viz. spelm. concil . tom. . fol. . in r. hoveden . pag. . fol. . i. e. m. g. p. . matt. paris , pag. . sir hen. spell . gloss. tit. conquestus . pag. . tit. conquest . v. leges guil. i. edit . ad sinem lambardi archaionom . per rog. twisden . ibid. p. . p. p. r. c. pag. . * charta moderationis feodi magni sigilli . an● , . iohan. in ar●hivis cant. archiepiscopo . in mat. paris in vita r. johannis , pag. , . idem . s. b. r. p. . s.b.d. p. . f.f.g.i. p. . mem. . n. . dorso . h. . vi. regist. brev. p. . & dein . per tot . titulum brevia de statuto . n. . f. f.g.i p. . ibid. p. . e. . stat. . preamb. i.e.m.g. p. . pult. p. . h.s.b.d. p. . h.d.l. p. . in rastals & pultons stat. fol. . . pla. parl. edw. i. fol. . rot. claus. ed. i. m. dorso . numb . . ro● . . m. . . numb . . pag. . edit . . pag. . pag. . ibid p. . p. . h. t. m. h. . rot. claus. . e. . m. . pars vnica . vi. walsingham & mat. westminst . in the beginning of this ks. reign . vi. hen. of hunt and ro. hoveden . vide grotis prolegomenain historiam gothicam . cap. . id. cap. . cap. . cap. . pag. . vid. polychron . rad. higden an. . b. a. p. p. . b. p. p. §. , . math. westm. ad annum . vi. verstegan restitution of decayed intelligence . p. . tacit. de mor. germ. vi. ptol. in tab. . europ . vid. earl of stamfords speech at the general quarter sessions at leicester , . and the notes thereupon . vide bromton f. . chron. de mailros . f. . vol. . p. . ch. . fr. nequidant vi. hottoma● franco gallia . f.f.o.i. p. . vi. script . x an. . col. . l. . c. . vi. spel. coun. p. , . ingulph . hist. fol. . b. p. . . vi. dugdale 's preface to his baronage of england . seld. tit. ●on . ●ol . , , . vi. lamb. p. . notes for div a -e pol. virgil. p. . notes for div a -e tit. wites . b. g. pag. , . et sparsim . b. a. p. p. , . cap. . pag. . * lib. . in his glossary tit. alderman . * tit. alderman . p. . p. . spel. council . in leg. canuti p. . p. . sub effigie faustinae . a. . f. . ex cartulario canobi westmin . pag. . pag. . pag. . p. . edit . frank. p. . edit . ibid. tom. . p. . vi. grotius prolegomena in histor. gothicam . b. g. p. . vi. holli●sh chro. p. , ▪ where he sufficiently prov●s thi● assertion from diviri ●●nc authors pag. . pag. &c. b. a. b. pag. . pag. . b. a p. pag. . b. a. a. pag. , . ex cartulario caenob à west . bib cotton sub effigie faustin●e . c . s. . rot. cart. . johan m. . n. . p. . b p. h. pag. . b. a. p. pag. . pag. . pag. . vol. . fol. . col. . fol. . bromton fol. . gloss. tit. fideles . pag. . script . x. col. . vi . spel. coun. fol. . vvill. malm. de gestis anglorum lib. . fol. . cap. . fol. . pag. . pag. . pag. . vi . b. g. b. a. p. introduct . fol. . in bib. cotton . fol. . rot. claus . . e. . m . dorso . mr. pryn's part of the r. of par. vv. rot. parl. . rich. . part . n. . p. r. c. p. , . pag. . liber de antiquis legibus , p. . p. . b. a. p. p. . b. a. p. . & deim , p. r. c. pag. . pag. . spel. gloss. tit. alderman . pag. . vid. glossar . tit. b. a. p. pag : . lamb. arch. pag. . fol. . fol. . chap. v. chap. . pag. . pag. . b. a. p. pag. . b. a. p. pag. . b. a. p. pag. . fol. . ibid. pag. . . toine . fol. . & dem . matt. paris . . b a. p. pag. . col. . bib. cott. sub effigie cleopatrae . mat. paris , , . pag. . pag. . p. r. c. pag. . matt. westm. ann. dom. . b. a. p. pag , . vi . pryn's th part of the regist. of parliament writs . fol. , &c. pag. : pag. . fol. . pryn 's exact history . pag. . p. r. c. pag. . vita edw. iii. fol. . vol. i. pag. . tit. rot. rome edw. iii. m . b. a. p. pag. . fol. . pag. . p. r c. pag. . pag. . b. a. p. pag. . & dein . fol. . b. a. i. vi . b. a p. p. , , , , , . lib. . c. . th h. iii m. dorso . b. a. p. b. a. p. pag. . fol. . b.a.i.p. . b. a. p. pag. . cha. . cha . . ll : hen. i. chap. . b. a.a. pag. . lamb. arch. pag. . & dem . b.a.p. p. . ibid. b. a. p. pag. . fol. . ● . lib. . c. . x. script . ●oll● . n. . a. d. . hoved. fol. . a. n. . sub effigio iulii . imag. histor. coll. . n. . b. a. i. pag. . hoved. fol. . b. n. . b a. i. pag. . pag. . rot claus. th h. iii. m. . dorso rot. claus. th h. iii. ps . . m. . dorso . p. , . pag. . col. . fol. . p. . i. e. m. g. p. . b. a. p. pag. . ● . notes for div a -e b. a. p. p. . ib. p. . b. a. p. p. . bract. lib. . c. . p. . * i. e. when the king comes to parliament . p. r. c. p. . p. . b. a. p. pag. . fol. . n. . fol. . fol. . n. . b.a.p. pag. . cl. . h. . m. . dorso . * this mandate was not given him as chancellor , but as a tenant in capite . pag. . inter communia de term. sancti . mich. anno. . h. . rot. . de scut . levand . rot. pat. . h. . n. . rot. claus. . h. . m. . rot. claus. . hen. . m. . dorso . sub essigie vespasiani b. . fol. . b. g. pag. . hottoman in verbis feud . col. . d. speaking of prince william son to henry the ft . f. . a. n. . pat. . iohan p. . m. . n. . b. g. . b. a. p. p. , . b. g. p. . cl. . h. . m. . dorso . b. a. p. p. , . rot. pat. m. . dors . b. a. i. . cl. . h. . m. . dorso . b. a. p. p. . vi. matt. pa●is b.a.g. p. . b. g. pag. . b. a. l. p. . b. a. p. p. . b. a. p. p. . b. a. p. . pag. . rot. claus. m. . dorso . lately published at oxford , . in saxon and latin. p. . in the printed copy . vol. f. . lib. . f. . col. . fol. . p.r.c. p. . fol. . b. a. i. vi. mat● . pag. . fob . . a. d. ▪ i. a. a. p. , . tom. . b. a. p. p. . m. . m. . fol. . ibid. . ibid. vi. spell . glos. tit. gula augusti . p. r. c. rot. pat. h. . m. . ● . a. p. rot. cl. . h. . m. . d●rs● . r. r. c. rot. pat. h. . m. . vi. dict. th . pag. . see the old fr. statutes in tottle . rot. cla● . th . of ed. . m. . dorso . viz. th . part of mr. pryn 's parliament . register , p. . see tottle 's collection . rot. parl. . el. . m. . tottle 's stat. p. . m. . m. . m. . b. g. p. . rot. pat. . ed. i. m. . rot. ●in . . ed. . m. . see it at large b. c. p. . . h. . m. . dorso . . h. . par. . m. . dorso . tit. de militibus faciendis . pag. , . pag. . b. g. p. . claus. . e● . . annals burt. pag. . & dein● . printed at oxon . b. a. p. p. , . vid. christi . ●crip ores cot. . . pag. . fol. . b. g. p. . ibid. pag. . b. g. p. . m. . dor. ibid. m. . rot. pat. n. . m. . dorso . rot. cl. . mem. dorso . b. a. p. . e●d●in . ibid. . b. ● . a. pag. , . rot. . hen. . m. . fol. . f. . a. d. . . m. . b. a. i. . rot. cl. . h. . m. . dorso . ryleys placit . parl. pag. . b. vid. chron. thom. wikes . & annales de waverly in anno . published at oxford . b. i. a. pag. . i. a. p. . ro● . pat. . e. . m. . rot. bat. ▪ e. . m. b. p. r. c. p. , . rot. aleman . ed. . m. . b. a. p. pag. . vid. chart. fund●● monast. de dunferling . b. a. p. p. . & dein statut. williel . reg. fol. . cap. . stat. alexan. r●g . fol. . cap. . stat. rob. . fol. . chap. . rot , par. . e. m. . rot. par. . e. . m. ● . an. do. . part. . fol. . n. . p. r. c. pag. . b. a. p. p. . stat rob. . fol. . statut. iacob . . ibid. b. a. p. f. . vid. present stat. of scotland , p. . ibid. p. . b.a.p. p. . b. a. p. b. a. p. p. . b. a. p. pag. . b. a. p. pag. . tit. liberi homines & libere ten. p. vid. fortis . de l●us . leg. ang. cap. . pag. . b. a. p. p. . & dein . m. . dors . m. . dors . cl. . hen. . m. . dors . de magnatibus vocatis al concilium . b. a. p. pag. , . additament . fol. . n. . b. a. p. p. . & dein . rot. pat. . hen. iii. m. . dorso . b. a. p. p●g . . rot. claus. . hen. iii. m. . dorso . in sch●dula . b. a. p. p. . ibid. . b.a.p. p. . b. a. p. , . b.a.p. pag. . ibid. sir r. cotton 's collection of records in this year . fol. , , . fol. . rot. cl. m. . dorso . b. a. p. pag. . b.a.p. p. . claus. . ed. . in . die veniendo ad parliamentum . ibid. p. . cl. . h. . m. . dorso . b. a. p. pag. . b. a. p. pag. , . b. a. p. pag. . b. a. p. p. . & dein . ● . a. p. pag. . claus. . e. . m. . dorso . b. a. p. pag. . tir. communi●as regni . b. g. pag. , b.g. glo. p. . b. a. p. p. . cla●● . . ed. ● . m. . dors. claus. . ed. . m. . dors. cl. . ed. . m. ●● ▪ dors. t. r. ● . ●i● ▪ iunii . p●g . . notes for div a -e b. a. p. p. , tit. clerus & populus . p. r. c. fol. . b. a. p. p. , . anno d. ibid. p. , . vide spelman's counc . vol. from p. . to . anno domini . . sab essigie fausti●ae , a. . a. d. . ead. hist. nov. l. . f. . spelmani concil . vol. . f. . an. d. . col. . spel conc. t● . . f. . vid. spel. concil . vol. f. . a. d. , . vi. anglia sacra . f. . b.i.a. p. . p. . ibid. p. . p. . p. . ibid. p. . rot. stat. . e. . m. . p. . ann. dom. . p. . p. . p. . rot. claus. m. . dorso . b. a. p. p. . p. . p. . p. . . rot. claus. . edw. . m. . dorso . p. . parliament regist . part . p. . , , . b. a. p. p. . . ibid. . . parliament regist . . ibid. p. . vi. seldens titles of honour , p. . to . ibid. . ibid. p. . vi. mat. westm. ann. . p. . to . chron. will. thorn. co● . . walsingham . ann. dom. . . vi. dr. burnets history of the reformation in the collection of records , ex ms. dr. stillingfleet , p. . ibid. p. , . p. . b. g. p. . fol. . n. . fol. . b. g. p. . p. . p. . m. . m. . ibid. p. . fol . n. . p. . p. . tit. provincia . b. a. a. . ibid. . ibid. ibid. p. . ibid. p. . ibid. b. a. a. p. . p. . b ▪ a. a. p. . p. , . p. . gervas . dorob . in act. povet . cant. col. . glossary , p. , . annal. waverly , p. . p. ● . rot. pat. . h. . m. . b. a. p. p. . prins parliament register . rot. walliae . m. . n. . dorso . col. . walsing . hist. aug. fol. . chron thom. wikes , fol. . rot. walliae . e. . m. . dors . id. ibid. id. ibid. vi. th part of parliament register , p. . r●t . claus. . e. . m. . dorso . p. . page . rot. pat. . e. . n. . pro burgensibus de sto. albano . b.a.p. p. . par. . h. . m. . chart. antiq. . ioh m. . cart. anno . ioh. p.r.c. p. . ibid. p. . parl. . p. . parl. . p. . b. . p. p. . vide breve ed. . in bend●llo . p.r.c. p. . vide mat. paris anno . rot. parl . ed. . n. , . b.a.p. p. . p. r. c. p. . rot. part. . h. . ps. . n. . b. a. p. p. . p. r. c. p. . ryleys placit parl. p. . pet. parl. . e. . n. . rot. parl. . ed. . m. . rot. parl. . e. . n. . lib. . sect. . p. . inter communia in scaccario penes rememorat . vi. prins parliament regist. part d . p. . . vide prin's parliam . reg. part . p. . fol. . rot. claus. . e. . m. . dorso in scedula . rot. claus. . ed. . m. . dorso . claus. . e. . p. . m. dorso . vide observations on writs of summons , part . p. . & part . § . per totum . part . p. . cap. . cap. . fol. . . p. , , , . r.a.p. . p. . p. , . p. . p . part . p. . ibid. p. . . ibid. p. . . ibid. p. . , . ibid. p. . ibid. p. . . ibid. p. . vide parliam . reg. sect. . ibid. . ibid. p. . ibid. p. , . ibid. p. . rot. pat. . e : . part . m. . ibid. p. . vide the patent of exemption , parl. regist. part . v. parl. regist. part . p. . ibid. p. . parl. r●gist . part . p. . parl. regist. d. part. p. . ibid. p. . ibid. p. . p. , . part. . m. . dorso . m. . n. . b.a.p. p. . august . thuan. hist. lib. . bodin . de repub . lib. . gen. hist. of spain . l. . id. lib. . id. lib. id. lib. . id. lib. . bonfinius in hist. hungar. dec. l. . id. ibid. dec. . l. . id. decad. . l. . pontan in doriae discript . id. in histor . rerum danic . l. . id. lib. . page . b. a. p. p. . vi. recoldus discursus polit. p. . vi. i. angel. we●denhagen de rebus hans●aticis , cap. . p. . vide dyer's reports . notes for div a -e pa●●● poster . vi , r. hovedens annal , parte posterior . . mat. paris , a.d. . p. . & dein . ibid. p. . ibid. p. . p. . p. . rot. pat. h ▪ . m. . p. . rot. claus. h. . m. . r.a. p. . & dein . ibid. . rot. pat. h. . m. vide mat. westminist . anno . p. . prin's second vol. of pap. usurpations , p. . d instit. . p. . rot. claus. . e. . p. . col. . ibid. . stat. . chap. . p. . rot. parl. ed. . m. . &c. car. . chap. . chap. d. iov . p. . col. . vid. graston's chronicle , p. . vide parliam . roll. of ed . de reg. de mort. mar. art. the d . vid. rot. parl. rich. . pars secunda . s. c. r. p. . & deinde . s.c.r. p. . s. c. r. p. , . i. r. s. p. . i.r.s. p. , . s.c.r. p. . & deinde . ibidem . & deinde . bract. l. c. . fleta . l. . c. . chap. . sect. . chap. . vid. an answer to dr. king's state of the protestants in ireland , p. , , . ps. . . vid. dr. patrick's paraphrase , and annotations on this text. cap. i. f. . vid. pryns st . part of the vindication of the rights of english freemen . cap. . . . cap. . vid. ru●hwaths hist. col. pt . . p. . . . n. . lord bacon's letters p. . ibid. p. . notes for div a -e vi. grot . de j. b. l. . cap. . §. . . pufendorf de iure nat . l. . cap. . §. . . cap. . lib. . cap. . lib. . cap. . lib. . cap. . h. i. p. , . cap. . l. . c . § . . lib. . cap. . lib. . c. . lib. . c. . car. . c. . vid. cooks th rep. mirrour . p. . spel. concil . leges g●il . cap. . hoveden's annals part . p. . cap. . lib. i. cap. iv. § . lib. . cap. . lib. . cap. . it. i. p. . ibid. lib. . c. . l. vii . cap. . §. . per inspex . . e. iv. part. . m. vi . selden's review , p. . carta . . ed. iv. m. . per inspexi . vi. seldeni ad eadmer : notae , &c. fol. . p. , ▪ p. . vi. hoveden pars prima , p. . will. malms ▪ lib . vi. grot. l. ii. cap. . pufendorf , l. vii . cap. . § . cap. . § , . p. . edit . oxon. p. . lib. ii cap. . lib. iii. pa. . p. . b. a. a. p . b. a. p. p. . b. a. p. p. . vi. spelman's glossary verbo diffidare . p. . ibid. p. . p. . vi. leges guliel●i . a. a. vi. , . p. . & deinde , ad p. . b. a. a. b.a.p. p. . p. . lib. iv. p. , . title dreuges p. . b. a. p. p. , . fol. . coll. out of the book of the family of sharborr . glossary title drenches . hist. p. . . . edit . oxon. i. a. a. p. . hist. nov. fol. . n. . , . b.a.p. p. . gl●a 〈◊〉 . lib. . cap. . vi. coke proem . vi. spelman's glos. tit. fribargus . vi. iv. inst. cap. , , . vide spel. glossary tit. hundredus & comitatus . vide hist. ead. lib. p. , . b.a. p. p. , . glos. glos. p. , . cap. . b. i. a. p. . t it hundredus . cap. . i. a. a. p. , . cap. . i. a. a. p. p. . lamb leges ethelred● . cap. i. tit. barones comitatus . b. a. i. p. . p. . page . b. i. a. p. ibid. p. . cap . cap. . p. . p. . p. . p. . glossary . tit. liberi homines . vid. an ancient msc. in the bodlian library cited by sir will. dugdale in his baronage of england , page . vid. mr. whitlock's speech in parliament , . printed in his memorial , p. . vid. coke . preface . p. , . edit . oxon. p. . b. a. p. p. . pag. . lib. . p. . l. l. guil. . vid ingulph history . vi. hoveden . p. . id. lib. iv. fol. , and . b. a. a. p. . vi. mat. paris in vita frederici abbatu . b. a. a. p. . i. a. a. p. , . f. . p. , . i a. a. . . iacobi . cap. . fol. . p. . notes for div a -e p. . notes for div a -e vide cook up●● litt. p. . vid. grot. annot . in mat. cap. p. . vid. ll. will. . vi. pufendorf de iure gentium . l. . c. . cap. 〈…〉 . siderfin's reports . temp. car. . fol. , . the king against buckworth , tuckee , gill , &c. h.d. p. . i. d. d. h. d. p. . h. d. p. . . h.d. p. . ibid. p. . vi. sand. de oblig . conscien . pralect . v. §. . pralect . vii . §. . d.d. p. . d. d. . p. , . chap. . fol. , . chap. . vi. the year book . . h. . t. m. p. . pag. . chap. . rep. . p. . i.e.c. p. . l. . c. . disp. , . c. . de aequit . ind. c. . de iure nat. & gentium . l. . c. . o. e. i. p. . & dein . vi. mat. par. p. , . ibid. p. , . p. . p. . hen. knighton , p. . in dec. scrip. chap. . i. e. c. p. . vi. h. vii . ter. m. case . fol. . vaughan's rep. f. . f. . f. . f. . p. , . i.e.c. p. . i.e.c. p. . mr. justice powil . chap. . chap. . chap. . l. §. . notes for div a -e b.h.s. p. . s. d. p. . f. . s. d. p. . anno . ibid. b. ● . s. p. . p. . col. . an. d. . l.v. p. . col. . anno . l. . p. . m. par. f. . m. west . . p. . vid. hen. hunt. p. . richard de hagulstad . col. . ioh. de hag. p. . p. . col. . hov. p. . hov. f. . matt. paris f. . ibid. col. . n. . fol. . vi. charta moderationis feodi magni sigilli . fol. . s. d. p. . col. . mat. paris f. . mat. paris . f. . mat. westm. f. . p. . col. p. . f. . b. h. s. p. . rot. cl. . e. . p. m. . part of it is also in walsingham . f. . m. . b. h. s. p. vi. rot. parl. . hen. . . vi. rot. parl. . hen. . m. . h. knighton . col. . vi. . hen. iv. cap. . b. h. s. p. . vi. grafton's chronicle . vi. record . h. . n. , , . vi. grafton's chron. par. rolls . ed. . n. , , , , , . b.h.s. p. . ibid. id. p. . vi. grafton's chronicle . rol. par. . h. . n. . restitutio henrici sexti . vi. grafton's chronicle . vid. collection of records . richard iii. vid. lord bacon's life of k. henry the th . fol. . rot. parl. . hen. vii . vid. buck 's history of richard the iii d. b. h. s. p. . b. h. s. p. . mar. chap. eliz. c. . b. h. s. . chap. . vi. lethington's letter to sir will. cecil . appendix to the d vol. of the history of the reformation . fol. . vi. marianas history of hispan . vid. fortescue de laud. leg. angl. in proem . in vita pyrri . e.l.r. p. . chap. . vide rot. parl. o henry iv. rot. par. n. . . ric. ii. b. h. s. p. . notes for div a -e p. . d. a. p. . ib. p. . vid. lambardi , l. l. edwards & l. l. will. i. c. . stat. ibid. calvin 's case . cowel's inst. l. . tit . . § . d. a. p. . ib. a. . h. . p. . . vid. lord bac. henry viith . ibid. p. . p. . . c. a. p. . e. l. r. vid. hen. vii . cap. . rot. parl. edw. iv. hen. vi. n. . c. a. p. , . sess. chap. . e.l.r. p. , . ibid. p. , . rot. claus . h. vi. m. . rot. claus. ed. iv. m. mem. . vid. the act printed at large in bucks history of richard the iiid . a. . h. . p. . ibid. p. . a. . h. . p. . c. a. p. . e. l. r. p. , . e. l. r. p. . e. o. p. . e. o. p. . ibid. p. . ibid. p. . d. a. p. . . eliz. p. . b. l. . cap. . vi spelmans's gloss. f. . h. vid. dr. burnet ' s hist. of the reformation . d part. notes for div a -e vide d vol. of homil. st , d , and d part of the sermons against idolatry , especially the last , p. . , . n. . p. . n. . n. . n. . n. . . car. . c. . . car. . c. . . car. . c. . &c. . p. . modern policies taken from machiavel, borgia, and other choice authors by an eye-witnesse. sancroft, william, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing s ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) modern policies taken from machiavel, borgia, and other choice authors by an eye-witnesse. sancroft, william, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing s ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread [ ] p. printed for tho. dring ..., london : . written by william sancroft. cf. dnb. "an indictment of the religion and politics of the commonwealth"--dnb. reproduction of original in huntington library. eng machiavelli, niccolò, - . borgia, cesare, ?- . political ethics -- early works to . political science -- early works to . a r (wing s ). civilwar no modern policies, taken from machiavel, borgia, and other choice authors, by an eye-witnesse. the fourth edition. sancroft, william f the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the f category of texts with or more defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion modern policies , taken from machiavel , borgia , and other choice authors , by an eye-witnesse . hom. {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} salust . fragm. libidinem dominandi , causam belli habent , & maximam gloriam in maximo imperio putant . plautus in captivis . nam doli , non doli sunt , ni si astu colas , sed malum maximum , si id palam pervenit . trinummus . ambitio jam more sancta'st , libera'st a legibus , petere honorem pro flagitio , more sit : mores , leges perduxerunt jam in potestatem suam . the fourth edition . london , printed for tho : dring , at the signe of the george in fleet-street neer cliffords inne . . to my very good lord my lord r. b. e. my lord , i was never so proud , as to think i could write any thing that might abide the test of your judicious eye ; what i now send , appeales to your candor , intreating you to lay aside the person of a iudge , for that of a friend . it is at best but a pamphlet , whether you consider its bulke , or worth . the result of a few pensive houres spent in recollecting what the memory had registred from publike observance , or private reading , in a theme so sadly copious as this is . if it be not impertinent to tell you what hinted to this trifle , it was this ; having had opportunity to looke abroad into the world , i tooke some notice of the contrastos of the italian princes ; i remark'd the spaniards griping portugal ; his grounds for the challenge of that kingdome , & his way of managing those grounds ; i lookt upon his method of propagating christianity in the west : ( where one saies the indian is bound to be religious and poore upon pain of death . ) moreover , i observed with what artifice the pope moderated in the european quarrels , and with what devices he twisted the gops●ll , and the advantage of the chaire toge●hir ; and in all the struglings and disputes , that have of late years befalne this corner of the : world , i found ●hat although the p●letence was , fiue and spirituall , yet the ultimate end , and ●●●●sedpe , was gold , and greatnesse , and secular glory . but ( my lord ) to come nearer , when i saw kingdomes tottering , one nation beeding against another , yea , one piece of a nation justling the other , and split into so many parties , and petty enmities : and each of these quoting bible to palliate his mad , and exorbitant opinions ; i sigh'd , and it grieved mee to see popular easinesse , and well-meaning abus'd by ambitious self-seeking men ; for there is a generation that is born to bee the plague , and disquiet , and scourge of the age it lives in ; that gladly sacrifice the publike peace to private interest ; and when they see all fired , with joy warme their hands at those unhappy flames , which themselves kindle , tuning their merry harps ; when others are weeping over a kingdomes funerall . but above all , it pierced my heart to see the clergy in such an high degree accessory to the civill distempers , and contentions that have every where shak'd the foundations of church and state ; so that ( as a catholike noted ) there hath been no floud of misery , but did spring from , or at least was much swel'd by their holy-water . i searched evangelicall records , and there was nothing but milde and soft doctrines , i inquired into the breathings of the spirit , and they were pacificatory ; i wondered from what precedents and scripture incouragements these men deduc'd their practises ; and at last was forced to conclude , that they were only pretended chaplaines to the prince of peace ; those torches that should have been for saving light , were degenerated into firebrands ; those trumpets that should have sounded retreats to popular furies , knew no other musicke but martiall all-armes . i have endeavoured in the sequell to represent to you the arts of ambition by giving you the picture of a person over covetous of glory , the peice is course , but yet like ; drawne onely in water colours , which some of greater leisure and abilities may possibly hereafter lay in oyle . you know that the desires of man are vast as his thoughts , boundless as the ocean , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a bored tub is not more insatiate . t is pity that greatnesse should at any time be out of the rode of goodnesse ; and i would sometimes , if i durst , with socrates , curse him that first separated profitable and honest ▪ ● it does to me a little relish of paradox , that where ever i come , machiavell is verbally curs'd and damn'd , and yet practically imbraced and asserted ; for there is no kingdome but hath a race of men that are ingenious at the perill of the publike ; so that as one said of galba in respect of his crooked body : ingenium galbae malè habitat ; so may i say of these in regard of their crooked use ; that wit could not have chosen a worse mansion , then where it is viriated , and made a pander to wickednesse . if you aske mee what i mean to trouble the world , that is already under such a glut of books ? you may easily perceive that i consulted not at all with advantaging my name , or wooing publike esteeme by what i now write ; i knew there was much of naked truth in it , and though it might possibly be of some caution to prevent the insinuation of pious frauds , and religious fallacies into my native country : if any plaine-hearted , honest man shall cast away an houre in perusing it , he may perhaps finde something in it resembling his owne thoughts , and not altogether strange to his owne experience . it is not the least of our misfortunes , that sins and vices are cost times endear'd to us by false titles and complements : being couzened with a specious name , though much incoherent to the thing we ascribe it : or el●e , omi●●ing the vice which is the maine , it intimates onely the ●e●i●e which is the by ● as for example , we call an ambitious man {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , a person of notable aime and high enterprize whereas in truth , signifies , an indirect affectour of grandeur : and i finde that by incautelous intertainment of these phrases , our judgments are often brib'd to misapprehensions , & we seduced to bad actions . i have endeavoured in the ensuing discourse to wipe off the paint and fucu● : that so things may appeare in their true complex●o● , unadulterated with the slights and subtilties of deluders . my lord , that your lordship may be one of those which the darke poet calls {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , that the youth of your honours may be renewed to you , that your happines may be acquainted with no other season but a spring , is the earnest vote of your bounden servant . the name of prince , which i often use , must be understood , as convertible with any person , or persons , whom god hath intrusted with a just supremacy ; all the dialects of government being concerned in the abuse ; i have made the cheife , and most familar , to represent the rest . i am not ignorant that the quotations may justly seeme more numerous than method , and the rule of art will conveniently allow ; i have this to say , to vindicate me from affecttednesse ; that i have been little studious of elegance , and curiosity in the composure ; esteeming nakednesse to be the best dress of truth : and if i mistake not , those attendants i have here procured for her , may afford some material , though litle ornamentall advantage . a praemonition . it is farre from the designe of this treatise , to derogate from the honour of the calling , or worth of the person of any sober statesman ; 't is a knowledge that no man observes with more due respects then my selfe ; because , i know it is no meane degree essentiall to the peace , and flourishing condition of a kingdome or common-wealth . 't is a jewell to be lock'd up in some few rare cabinets , and not to be made cheape , and expos'd to irreverence , by being bared , and prostituted to every vulgar eye . the pseudo-policy here mention'd is contradistinct to that science , which is ever built upon piety and prudence ; for upon these solid bases , your wise architect delights to raises he glorious superstructure of government in a prince , and subjection in a people : so knitting the interest of both with reciprocall mixture , that the welfare of the one may be involv'd in the good of the other : the majesty may be preserv'd in its just splendor , and ye● the liberty of the subject remaine inviolate : hee is the atlas of the falling state , cures it when sicke , sets it when dis-joynted , meets it in its severall pressures with sutable reliefs . such was philip de commines , of whom one said , it was a measuring cast , whether lewis were the wiser king , or philip the wiser counsellour : such was burleigh to our late queen elizabeth , whose advise had very eminent influence into the prosperitie of her reign , which was such , as i beleive few ages can parallel , and future times will read her happy annals , as written like xenophon's cyrus , non ad historiae fidem , sed ad exemplum justi imperij ; so that if we love peace , or plenty , or liberty , we are bound in way of acknowledgment to owne that in plutarch , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} pav . but as the corruption of the best things makes them worst , so this noble knowledge has been abused to loose and ambitious ends , by some men who seem to have suck'd the venome out of all politicks , misapplying what was good , and creating new according to the urgency of their own occasions , like the lawes that were made in causinus his babel , to beru'd by manners , and not manners by lawes . they vex true policy by misinterpreting , and false glossing ; framing in their hearts diana's of hypocrisy and subtilty , and worshiping them in their actions . the rules following there are few so silly as to beleive , though too many so wicked as to practise ; and not only so , but by a bold imposture to perswade that such actions as are deduc'd from these principles , are justifiable , and if fortunate , commendable . that all may see these rocks , and shun them , and detest knavery though never so specious , and nauseate sinne , though robed in successes and triumphs , is my daily prayer . first principle . the polititian must have the shadow of religion , but the substance hurts . there is no superstition in politicks more odious , then to stand too much uponniceties and scruples : and therefore machiavel cut the haire , when he advis'd , not absolutely to disavow conscience , but to manage it with such a prudent neglect , as is scarce discernable from a tendernesse : not permitting it to be techy and relucting , nor yet prostituting it , unlesse upon solemne and insuperable occasion : hee notes it from papirius in livy , who slighted the pullarii handsomly , and was rewarded ; whereas appius pulcher did it grosly , and was punished . but because the polititian is best able to tell his own documents , you may please to conceive you found these broken discourses in his study : to each of which i shall adde an antidote . externall holinesse invites awfull regards ; there is no mask that becomes rebellion and innovation so well as religion ; nothing that so much conceals deformity , & pretends beauty . 't is an excellent thing so to dissimulate piety , that when we act strongly against it , in that very article of wickednes the people saint us : herod would faine worship , when he means to worry . — ipso sceleris molimine tereus creditur esse pius : this is that which leades the world in a string , that hallowes the most hellish enterprises : for the common people ( which are the {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ) never see behind the curtain , a handsome glosse is with them as good as the text : i believe the great naturalist was in the right , when h● call'd a● deity a jolly inven●ion , irridendum , agere curam rerum humanarum quicquid est summum , sed credi ex usu vitae est , let me enjoy the temporall advantages of religion , and let others take the eternall ; let me use it for a cloak or a crutch , and let others expect from it a crowne . the river in athenaeus is my emblem , whose upper waters were sweet and gratefull , but towards the bottome brackish . let me be a superficiall , let others be fundamentall christians : i like the humour of the samseans in epiphanius , that were neither iewer , nor gentils , nor christians , but preserving a commodious correspondence with all ▪ whatsoever i act in reference to heaven is meerely theatricall ; and done in subordination to some other interest . lycurgus could never have ingratiated his lawes so effectually , if he had not pretended a dialogue wth his goddesse . 't is to me indifferent , whether the religion i personate be true or false , so it be but popular : and if the people i meane to juggle with err fundamentally , i can by no means court them more , then by imbracing their delusion ; it buckles them very close to me in morall observance , to assist them in their spiritual soundnes , and mix with their distemper ; and therefore i commonly lead the van in the faction , and call it iure divino , though i never found it but in hells blacke canons . how comfortably the pope and cardinall confer'd notes , — quantum nobis lucri peperit illa fabula de christo ! o the rich income and glorious result of hypocrisie ! this , this must be diligently studyed and practis'd . — da justum sanctumque videri , noctem peccatis , & fraudibus objice nubem . privacy for a sinne , and cleanly conveyance for a cheat , make it to common eyes seeme as white as innocency it self : the strictness of that thiefe was very notable , who alwayes before hee went about the worke of his calling ( for so he call'd stealing ) went to prayers that god would blesse and prosper him : so i say grace to the design , be it never so wicked , and give thankes for the successe , bee it never so bloody . but further in subserviency to a loose interest , there must bee no such puling thing as conscience ; hell , and heaven , and scripture , and what else the christian esteems most sacred , must all truckle under the plot , but not be observ'd when they come to oppose it : had alexander boggled at invading other mens kingdomes , hee had never wept for the scarcity of worlds . there is noe greater obstacle to generous actions , then a coy and squemish conscience ; t is pretty that some tel us that it strikes surdo verbere , and then how can it bee heard in the noise and bustle of a clamorous world ? had your mighty conquerours , and your valiant captaines , and your thriving popes , listned to this inward charmer , their names had never swell'd , and look'd bigg in the rolls of fame . colasterion . but let all sober christians know , that this shell of religion , though it may be of external conducement , yet there is nothing that gods pure and undeluded eye looks on with more abhorrency : we may possibly deceive men , but t is in vaine to put ironies upon god . a counterfeit religion shall find a reall hel , and t is pitty that such a sacred thing should be violenced , & made to obstetricate to rebellious irregular designes . as for such who have conspir'd with the wrath of god in the stupefaction of their consciences , though they may for a time struggle with those inward checks , yet there will bee a day ( if not in this life ) when that witness , that judge , that jury will not bee bribed . god hath fixed it in the soul as an eternall register , as an impartiall diary as the censor of the affections , and paedagogue of the passions . it does not only illustrate divine justice in an autocat●crisy , but was meant by god for a bridle and restriction : and he that hath by an inveterate wickedness conquer'd the opposition which god seated in his heart to sin , may possibly consult well with his present advantage and greatnesse , but not at all with his future comfort ; for besides the losse of that intimate pleasure which writes upon innocency ; hee ●eels sometimes those bosome quarrells that verberate and wound his soule , — for {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . principle ii. thè politician must by all means make the most insinuating applications to the people that hee can ; and lock up his owne designe , in pretence for religion , liberty , restitution of laws , reformation of gabels , &c. the prosperity of innovation depends in a high measure upon the right knack of kindling and fomenting jealousies and dislikes in the people ; and then weilding those grudges to the favour & advantage of private ends ; for the people are to the polititian like tools to the mechanick , he can performe nothing without them , they are his wings , his wheels , his implements , the properties that he acts with . that this may be done effectually , there must be an excellency in these following slights . first , to assign such a cause of grievances , and such a course for redress , as may open a way to the alteration he ayms at : as if he means to alter the government ' , or to ingross the supremacy , he must artificially convince of a necessity to arme , . defensively , and if that succeeds , . offensiv●ly ; this hee may do by false alarmes of danger , inventing horrid news , and plying the people with such fictitious perils , as may make them beleive , religion and liberty , and all is at stake , and that they are the geese that must save the capitoll . secondly , when hee sees opportunity to reveale his own designe , he must doe it gradually , and by peece-meale ; for that which at one view would bee a mormo to fright them , give it them in small parts , and they will digest it well enough . thirdly , hee must compose his very garbe and gesture : 't is a great matter to tell a lye with a grace ; as , if religion be the mode , he must in his tales knock his breast , attest god , and invoke imprecations upon himselfe , if hee does not doe that , which hee never intends . fourthly , hee gives them good words , and bad actions , like those the historian brands with a crudelitatem damnatis , crudelitatem initis , ravishes them with apprehensions of liberty , under the highest strain of oppression : for it is most certaine if , you please them with the name , they will imbrace it for name and thing . something like this had beene imposed upon rome , when the orator writ to his friend atticus , — nominu rerum perdidimus , & licentia . militaris libertas vocatur , that they were cheated in names , for military licence was miscal'd liberty ; this is wel describ'd by plautus in truculentu . in melle sunt lingu● sitae vestrae , atque orationes , lacteque : corda felle sunt sita , atque acerbo aceto . elinguis dicta dulcia datis , at corde amare facitis . fifthly , he observes that they receive probabilities wisely propounded , more greedily then naked truths : and therefore he is very studious to glase and polish his impostures , that so they may to a loose eye dissemble truth , according to that of pindar , — {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} — {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : or that of menander : {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . sixthly , when hee hath by the assistance of the people got the sword into his owne hands , he awes them with it , and frights them into future complyance . hee tha● courted them before with all the adulator● termes , that ambition could invent , or they receive ; as if he had bee● vow'd their martyr , and ready to sacrifice his dearest enjoyments upon the altar of publick liberty and freedome ; as if his veines knew no other blood , but such as he would be proud to spend in their service , having now served himselfe of them , he forgets the bosome that warm'd him , they hear from him now in a palinode , he curles up his smooth complements into short laconicks , and exchanges his court-ship for command . colasterion . first , we may be assured that there is no greater index of ambition , then an affectation of popularity : which appeares in meek addresses to the people , wooing and familiar condescentions , bemoaning thei● sufferings , commending a more vigorous sense o● them ; that of the comit● is no bad rule , non temerarium est ubi dives ble● de appellat pauperem , aitera manu fert lapicadem , pa●● ostentat altera : nemini crede , qui longe blandu'st 〈◊〉 ves pauperi . or that which livy notes of a crandee , credebant haud gratuitam in tanta superbid comitatem fore , the extreame kindnesse or fawning of great persons , is alwaies suspicious , because often fraudulent : remember the sileni , that use to kill with huggs , and embraces . secondly , know it 's very usuall for men to personate goodnesse , till they have accomplished their ends ; 't is observed of appius , when he had his wish , finem fecit gerendae alienae personae ; t is an old note , maxima pars morem hunc homines habent , quod fibi votunt , dumid imperiant ▪ honi sunt , se●● ubi iam penes sese habent , ex bonis pessimi , & fraudulentiss●● sunt . athon●●s tells a pretty story , of one atheni●● born obscurely , who 〈◊〉 long as hee was priva●● and poor , excelled in 〈◊〉 soft and tractable disposition , but when by jug●ling he had obtained th●athenian governmen● there was none more ●dious for a cruel , cove●ous , & barbarick tyra●ny : as it is reported 〈◊〉 caligula , there was nev●● a better servant , and a worse master . thirdly , we know that a good aime , much ●ess a good pretence cannot justifie a bad action , and therefore we ought to be as solicitous about the lawfulnesse of the meanes , as about the goodnesse of the end . it ●s a maxim in morality , that bonum oritur ex inte●●●s , and in christianity , ●hat wee must not doe ●vil that good may come ●f it ; & we may possibly ●escue our selves from ●uture cousenage , if we ●xamine the lawfulnesse ●f every circumstance leading to the end propounded , before we are tickled and transported with the beauty of the pretence . principle . iii. if the supremacy be invaded , the lapses of the former magistrate must be inculcated with the greatest advantage , and what is wanting in reality , must be supplyed in calumny . it cannot easily be imagined of what singular importance the aspersing and blotting of a prince is , to boyl up popular discontent to that height which is requisite for a rebellion ; and here it must diligently be enquired if there have not beeene indeed such lapses , as have gal'd the people ; and though they be old sores and skin'd , yet they must be searcht and refreshed , and exasperated with all the urging circumstances , that come within the invention of scandal ; it must be remembred , if any persons of publick note have suffer'd under the sword of justice , whose crimes can by art or eloquence be extenuated , whose hard measure must be mentioned with teares , that so old traytors may be propounded for new martyrs . this hath been the ordinary method of ambition , as you may find it noted by a great scholar in these words , — fuit haec omnibus saeculis , & adhuc est ad occupandum tyrannidem expeditissima via , dum summo se amore ; ac pietate in patriam esse simulant , principum vitia , & populi miseriam , apud suos primum , deinde palam queribunda voce lamentantur , non quo plebem , cuius solius commodis inservire ●ideri volunt , ab illo servitutis jugo asserant in libertatem ; sed quo populari aura subnixi , aditum ●ibi & januā ad eam ipsā dignitatem , nequiora aliquando ausuri patefaciant . and therefore if the prince be severe , he gives him nero's brand , a man kneaded up of dirt and blood : if he be of parts and contrivance , he calls it pernicious ingenuity : if he be mild and favourable to tender consciences , he declaims against his toleration : if he urge uniformity , and decency in divine service , he railes at his superstition . and because there is no such aequilibrious vertue , but has some flexure to one of the extreams he is very carefull to publish the extream alone , and to silence the vertue . but if the prince hath by carriage of extraordinary innocence , vindicated himself from obloquy ( wich shall scarce be , if small faults be rightly improved ) then machiavels advice must be follow'd , to calumniate stoutly , till the people have entertained something to his prejudice : 't is a figure in politicks to make every infirmity a fault , and every faull a crime : and if the people be disposed to alteration , these must be first urged against a monarch to depose him , or if need be to murther him ; which is commendable , if you can dresse him up like a tyrant , as you may find it justified by an honest scot , who complaines that there are not some glorious rewards appointed for tyrannicides : and by the best of orators , — graecos deorum honores tribuisse iis , qui tyrannos necaverunt : and by the tragedian , victima baud ulla amplion potest . magisve optma mactari iovi , quam rex iniquus . and secondly , these personall faults must be artificially devolved upon monarchy it self . there remaines to disperse the commendations of that government which is intended for a successor : if arstocracy , the long-liv'd prosperity of sparta and venice , is a very plausible evidence of its goodnes : if democracy , the happines of the romanes under their tribunes is very memorable ; to which may be added this out of machlavel : that they are the most sutable guardians of any thing , who are least desirous to usurp it : and without doubt considering the designes of the nobility and the people , we must confesse , that the first are very ambitious of rule , the last desire onely not to be opprest . colasterion . i presume that person is very rare , that can boast of such an absolute saint-ship whilst he is amongst mortals , but that there will now and then some actions fall from him , which confesse humanity , and require candor : some leaves in the volume of the fairest life , that are legenda cuno venia : if this be a common frailty , why do we six such rigid censures upon the miscarriages of princes or why do we deny them the same mildness which we use , when wee commiserate the infirmities of other men ? 't is yet much more disingenious to revive and pore upon a few bad actions , which it may be have been long ago expiated with many good : take this from no mean statist . — iniqua in omni re accusanda , praetermissis bonis , malarum enumeratio , vitiorumque selectio ; namne ullus quidem isto modo magistratus vituperabilis no●erit . as greatnesse gives a glosse to the vertues of a prince , so it mitigates his vices ; for if we look upon him as circled with honour , and all outward enjoyment ; we see withal that variety of temptations he hath to struggle with above others , having no other guard , no other weapon then his meer vertue ; sometimes we are defended from a sin by our very impotency , it may be above our sphere , or out of our reach ; we do not , because we cannot ; how often are our wils offenders , when our hands are innocent ? wee are checked from without , he commonly from within , having nothing to dispute with his immoderate desires but himselfe . this is that which inhances the goodnes of a prince , as that excellent poet leads his temperate knight through al the delicacies and charms of pleasure , and delivers him a conquerour . but suppose a magistrate really tyrannical ; it is no contemptible question , whether the evils of the redresse may not be equivalent to the mischiefe . i remember livie's , nec morbum ferre possumus , nec remedum : and plutarchs , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : and tacitus , ferendae regum ingenia , neque usui esse crebras mutationes : vitia erunt , donec homines , sed neque haec continua , & meliorum interventu pensantur ; and seneca , infaeliciter aegrotat , cui plus periculi a medico quam à morbo . poise the miseries of a civil war with the grievances of an unjust magistrate , and the polititian must take many granes of allowance from fallacy to make the scales even . for though the fury of incensed tyranny may fal heavy upon many particulars , yet the bloody consequences of an intestine sword , are more epidemicall , and more permanent . as to the charging the faults of a governour upon the government its self , i see nothing in it but delusion , nor can there be a more grosse abuse , then {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . for king-killing , because i know it a techy subject , i shall wholly omit all discouse of it ; only i finde it damn'd by an able english divine jesuiticall ; and tacitus commends to subjects rather scutum then gladium , the shield of patience and toleration , rather then the sword . principle iv. the polititian must nourish some mercenary iesuits , or other divines , to cry up his aymes in their churches , that so the poyson may insinuate more generally into all the parts . he that peruses history , will finde that there hath beene no innovation so grosse , no rebellion so hideous , but hath had some ecclesiasticall fomentors : for such as want worth enough of their owne to reach preferment in a regular way , are most apt to envy the just honours of better men ; and despairing to obtain their end by learning and piety , they aspire to it by the crooked meanes of faction and schisme ; nor are these despicable instruments to the polititian ; for the sharpest sword in his army cannot vye services with a subtle quill : you may see his businesse in the comick , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . the jesuite reckons it in the number of his merits , if he may by any sinister wayes ruffle and disorder heretical kingdomes ( so he cals them ) encourage weak and unstable mindes to slight magistracy ' , irritate divisions , tumults , rebellions , absolve from oaths , and al sacred ties ; so that it is hard to find any tragicall scene , or bloody theatre , into which the iesuite hath not intruded , and been as busie as davus in the comedy , contributing in a very high measure to every fanatick insolence , justifying the old lemma of loiola's picture , cavete vobis principes : these are the firebrands of europe , the forge and bellows of sedition , infernall emissaries , the pests of the age , men that live as if huge sinnes would merit heaven by an antiperistasis . . nor is any nation without some turbulent spirits of its own , the dishonour of the gown and pulpit , the shame , and sometimes the ruine of their countrey ; you would thinke they had their text from a gazet , because you heare so much of a curranto in the application● : that these may be fit implements for the polititian , there are th●se requisite qualifications . . there must be a principall gift of wresting the scripture , vexing & urging the holy text , constraining it to patronize the design ; the great apostle expresses this in three very emphaticall termes ; . cogging the dye , making the word speake what they list ; . crafty applications , and expositions of it ; . all the methods and arts of consenage , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , gilding and varnishing rotten doctrines , and this must be done . . in publick , vomiting out flames and sulphur from that sacred pegma , where he should deliver none but milde and soft , that is , evangelicall embassages . . in private , at parlour sermons , and meeting houses , where he is listened to as an oracle , and here commonly he is more euthsiuast then scripturist , and his auditors beleive his dreams to be as canonical as the revelation ; like those melancthon speakes of , quicquid somniant , volunt esse spiritum sanctum , or those that the father chides , when he tels them that every whimsey is not prophesie {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . . hee ought to be of some abilities in disputing , and what he wants in logick , he must supply in garrulity : for whatsoever hee affirmes , the interest he hath in his seduc'd hearers improves into a syllogisme ; if you ask after his topicks ; ex officina carnificum argumenta petit : if after his weapons , armat se ad latrocinium per christi nomen , and the woun●● hee makes is faction ; those consciences which will not surrender to his parly , his master takes by storme : and thus hee abuses christ , by pretending his favour to unwarrantable actions ; hee abuses his prince , by alienating the affection and allegiance of his subjects ; he abuses the church , by shattring it into rents and schisms ; wounding it with a feather from its own wing , snatching a coale from the altar , to fire both church and state ; and lastly he abuses himselfe , for when the polititian hath made his best use of his seditious spirit , hee leaves him to his owne wilde distempers , having directed his owne thoughts to another goale . colasterion . although we have caution enough against these in sad and frequent experiences , these latter ages groaning under the effects of an exorbitant clergy ; yet such is the easinesse and credulity of the vulgar , such the subtlety and dissembled sanctity of the impostor , that hee meets with as great a pronenesse in the people to be couse●d , as he brings willingnesse to delude ; for it is a true observation , that these clancular sermocinators beare as great sway in popular mindes , and make as deep impression upon their consciences , as the loyolists doe , when they impose upon their blinde laity . i dare onely subjoyne these few advises . first , i should suspect ● clericall statu● , i meane such a one as in the dispensation of sacred oracles , tampers with secular affaires , unlesse it be in case of high concernment to his auditors soules . secondly , i should beleive him a jugler , that sprinkles his sermons with murmurs against the lawfull magistrate , ecclesiasticall , or civill , unlesse he hath some better ground for his dislike , then a th warting his humour , in things controversiall and adiaphorous . thirdly , i should more then doubt his knavery , that should suborn scripture , to attest , or incite to illegall actions , as a kin to that , which salvian calls religiosum scelus . ly . all newes in religion , whether in doctrine or discipline , is 〈◊〉 common skreene of private design ; let {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} tell it , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} which is noted by the great causabon in his epistle before his baronian exercitations , thus ; cupiditas novandi haec secum mala semper trahit , christ● inconsutilem tunicam lacerat , sectas novas parit , & statim multiplicat , ecclesiam & populum concutit &c. t is sad to see vra●ti● divine vrania inroll'd i● blood , the stars and luminaries of the church , to shed such blacke and malignant influences ; in lieu of pious documents , to heare none but furious incentives ; ite a●acres , tantaeque precor confidite causae ; the cause they serve , is the doctrine and the use , the egg , the apple , the head and foot of all their discourses ; if you like to confer notes , you may finde a peice of their sermon in barclay to this effect , se evangelij libertatem praedicare , ●ill●m christianis animis vim inferre , suam cuique conscientiam liberam relinquere , verbo ducere , non vi quemquam adigere ; ea● esse evangelij doctrinam , u● omnes conscientiae fruantu● libertate : sibique ut id liceat , votis omnibus postulare . principle . v. if successe waites upon his enterprises , he urges it to authenticate his cause . there is no argument more popular then succes , because the bulke of men is not able to distinguish the permission of god , from his approbation : and although it be in its selfe fallacious and feeble , yet the misery of the conquer'd denies them the opportunity to dispute it ; for the opposition of the sword will never be confuted by the bare fist of logick . nor doth the victor commonly permit any ventilation of his dictates ; for when the body is a slave , why should the reason be free ? {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ; as the souldiers in plutarch wondred any would be so importunate to preach laws , and morall reasons to men with swords by their sides ; {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : and if armes knew not how to descend to rationall inquiries , but were enough justified by an odd kinde of necessity of their owne creating ; like those in livy , in armis jus ferre , & omnia fortium virorum esse . i have often considered with my selfe , what should move tyrants to print justifications of themselves , and assertions of their proceedings , which i suppose never made an understanding man a convert , nor met with a cordiall reception in any ; unlesse the abuse of a few , poore , shallow beleivers , be thought a tryumph worth their paines . i have sometimes thought they do by these papers please themselves in their abilities to delude , and so gratifie their tyranny over the noblest part of man , by denying the liberty of the thought , and subduing the powers of the soule to an implicit coherence with their owne magisteriall opinions . but our polititian , by quoting the successe of his undertakings , besides the plausibleness ▪ and insinuating nature of the proposition its self , hath the advantage of power to make us beleive him . nor ▪ is this bait contemptible , many of parts and prudence , yea and of religion , have been stagger'd by it ; some question whether diagoras deserv'd the brand of atheisme , considering the wilde conceits they then had of their gods ; or differ'd from the common creed , crying out , o how the gods favour sacriledge ! when he had a merry gale , after a sacrilegious atempt . the best of the roman historians calls the victory , the just arbitresse of the cause , eventus belli velut aequus iudex , unde jus stat , ei victoriam dabit : so hard it is to perswade meer reason , that vertue may b● unfortunate , and vi● happy . he was no small po●● that argued himselfe o●● of his gods , by seei●● wickednesse honoured , 〈◊〉 worth slighted : whi●● he expresses thus ; memtor to li●●us tu mulo iacti● at cato parv● , pompeiusnullo , guis putet esse de● in english . licinus does in marble sleep , a common urne does cato keep pompeys ashes may catch cold , that there are gods , let dou● 〈◊〉 there may be so●● use made of that in se●●ca , honesta quaedam scelera successus facit , prosperous mischiefes are cardinall vertues in the worlds ethicks ; & therefore the tragedian repeates it , prosperum ac faelix scelus , virtus vocatur . the unwarrantablenesse is hid and concealed in the glory of the successe : wee often praise the macedonian conquest , but seldome mention their boundlesse and unjust ambition . on the contrary , if an undertaking really good miscarry , we censure it : so that according to the vogue of the world , 't is the event that gives the colour to the action , and denominates it good o● bad . to {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . colasterion . there is some of this leaven in the judgments of most , notwitstanding those brighter discoveries , in the noone of christianity we live under . a bible throughly observ'd , would expound to us much of the riddle , and dark passages of providence : we are so short-sighted , that we cannot see beyond time , we va●ue things , and men , by their temporall prosperities , and transient glories ; whereas if we put eternity into the othe● seale , it would much out-poise that worldly lusstre , that so much abuses our eye , and cousens our understandings . i finde not in holy writ that god hath in separably annex'd goodness and greatness , justice and victory : hee hath secur'd his servants of the felicities of a better life , but not of this . ch●ists kingdome was not , our happinesse is not of this world . nor doth my bible shew me any warrant for appeal to heaven for th●● decision of this , or that ●ntricacy , by bestowing successe upon this party , or that cause , according to its righteousnesse , and due merit . there is a vast difference betwixt {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} and {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , even in scripture construction . the great turke may justly exult , and prune himselfe in discourses of this nature , if they bee once admitted , & own'd by christians : and i shall forbeare any longer to think mahomet an impostor , and must receive the alcoran for gospel ; ●f i shall bee convinc'd that temporall happiness and triumph , are a true index of divine favour ▪ our religion hath something more to invite our closure with it ; it proposes a conveniency on earth , but the crowne● and garlands are reserv'd for heaven . the mony-god in aristophanes pretends a command from iupiter to distribute as great a largesse to the wicked , as to the good ; because if vertue should once impropriate riches , that faire goddesse would be more wooed for her dowry ▪ than for her native beauty : so if religion were attended with those outward allurements that most take the senses ; we should be apt to follow christ for the loaves , and over-look the spirituall charmes , and more noble ends of christianity . the heathen could say , foelix praedo mundo exemplum inutile , happy pyracy is a thing of unhappy presidency ; fortunate sinnes may prove dangerous temptations ; but to say that god doth signally at test the actions of such a person , or the justice of such a cause , by permitting it to prosper , and taper up in the world , is such a deceit , as deserves our serious abhorrency — i leave it with ovids wish , — careat successibus opto , quisquis ab eventu facta not anda putant . principle vi . the polititian must change with the times . that alterations & revolutions in kingdomes are the rods with which god scourges miscarrying princes , is resolved by my lord of argenton : to which may be added out of aristotle in the fift of his politicks — per fraudem & dolum regna evertuntur , that the ruines of a kingdom are often derived from fraud and subtleties : i shall omit inquiry into other causes , as forrein to my present purpose . the polititian knows best how to improve these popular gusts , because hee caused them ▪ such a storme is his seed time . 't is the boast of a dutch man , that he can saile with all winds ; the aspiring man observes the quarter whence the fairest gales of preferment blow , and spreads the sailes of his ambition to entertaine them ; nor can the compasse breath more varieties , then his dextrous soul has changes and garbs , and suitable compliances . what the orator cals his top and perfection , to make happy application to the severall humours and genius of all sorts of men , qualifying his addresse with what he knowes will most charm the person he treats ; that the polititian does not only with his lip , but life you may finde all those figures and tropes digested into his actions , and made practicall , that are in the other only vocall . he remembers that of an english marquesse ●awlet of winchester ) who having succesfully served four princes , and still in the same room of favour , unshaken with the vicissitudes he had run through , being ask'd by one , by what meanes he preserv'd his fortune , he replies , that he was made , ex salice , non ex quercu , of the pliant willow , not stubborn oak , alwaies of the prevailing religion , and a zealous professor . this easmesse and bending is of absolute necessity ; for , if the same temper , which insinuated in violent times , were retained in a composed and setled government , it would be altogether distastfull ; and so on the contrary . therefore if religion be fashionable , you can scarce distinguish him from a saint : he does not only reverence the holy ministers , but if need be , he can preach himselfe : if cunctation prevailes , he acts fabius : if the buckler must be chang'd for a sword , he personates marcellus : if mildenesse be usefull , soderini of venice was not more a lamb then he : if severities are requisite , nero's butcheries are sanctities , compared with his : as alcibiades in plutarch , shifted disposition as he alter'd place ( being voluptuous and jovial in ionia , frugal & retir'd in lacedaemon ) so he proportions himselfe to time , place , person , religion , with such aplausiblenesse , as if he had been born only to serve that opinion , which hee harbour'd but as a guest whilst it continued in sway : having a room in his heart , if occasion be , to lodge the contrary , and to cry it up with as much ardour ; as hee once us'd to extoll the former . and thus like a subtle proteus , he assumes that shape that is most in grace , and of most profitable conducement to his ends , in eo stant confilia , quod sibi conducere putat . he abounds in that which varo cals , ver●atile ingenium , a voluble wit , like the changling derided by plautus , as more turning then a potters wheele . he hath this advantage of the camelion , that he can assume white ness ; for i finde him often wearing the vest of innocency , to conceale the uglinesse and blacknesse of his attempts . finally , he is the heliotrope to the sun of honour , and hath long since abjur'd his god , religion , conscience , and all that shall interpose , and skreen him from those beams , that may ripen his wishes and aymes into enjoyments . colasterion . but the true statesman is inviolably constant to his principles of vertue , and religious prudence ; his ends are noble , and the means he uses , innocent : he hath a singl eye on the publick good ; and if the ship of the state miscarry , he had rather perish in the wrack , than preserve himselfe upon the plank of an in-glorious subterfuge . his worth hath led him to the helme , the rudder he uses , is an honest and vigorous wisdome the star he looks to for direction is in heaven ; and the port he aymes at , is the joynt welfare of prince and people . this constancy is that solid rock upon which the wise venetian hath built its long-liv'd republick : so that it is not improbable the maiden-queene borrowed her motto of semper eadem , from this maiden common wealth . 't is true , something is to be conceded to the place , and time , and person ; & i grant that there are many innocent compliances ; virgils obliquare sinus is observable , there may be a bending without a crookednesse : we may circumire , and yet not aberrare ; paul became a jew , that hee might gaine the jewes , but he did not become a sinner , that he might gain sinners ; he was made all things to all men , but he was not made sin to any : that is , his condescensions were such , as did we● consist with his christian integrity . greatnesse , and honours , and riches , and scepters , those glorious temptations , that so much inamour the doting world , are too poor shrines for such a sacrifice as conscience , which the polititian hath so much abus'd by an inveterate neglect , that it is become menstruous , and ephemerall . principle vii . if the polititian find reason to impose oathes , let them be of such ambiguity as may furnish with a sense obliging to the design , and yet so soft as the people may not feel the snare . it appeares by sad experience , that in propounding of oaths , requiring promises , and other solemn tyes ; there have been multitudes induced to bind themselves upon some secret loose , and men tall reservation ; w●ch they have framed to themselves as a salvo in case of breach : so apt we are in affaires of greatest importance , to advise more with corrupt ▪ wit than sound conscience . in the catalogue of self-delusions , you may possibly finde these ; . we are ready to interpret the words too kindly , especially if they be ambiguous ; and 't is hard to find terms so positive , but that they may be eluded indeed , or seem to us to be so , if we be disposed . . some are invited to illicite promises qu● illicit , because they know them to be invalid . . some are frighted into these bonds by threats , and losses , and temporal concernments , and then they please themselves that they sweare by duress , and so are disingaged . . some are oathproofe ; i mean there are such sear-soul'd men , as will swear pro and con. . some have learn'd from the civilians , that though wee sweare to a thing not materially unlawfull , yet if it impedes a greater morall good , it becomes void . some take liberty to sweare , because they judge the person to whom they sweare incapable of an oath : as cic●ro defends the breach of oath to a theife , from perjury , and brutus to a tyrant : as it is in appian , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . the first sort of thes● fals most properly under the notice , and practise of our polititian ; though he may also use the last , but at different times . it is not difficult for him to cast his desire into such soft glib expression as will down with most ▪ yea , with many that would absolutely disavow the same thing in rough language . if he be unskil'd in this black art , i commend him to the paedagogy of the delphick devill . now it is most certaine , there is no other tye of such security , and establishment , to a person that hath ravished greatness , and acquired it by violence . usurpation hath only these two pillars , it s owne armes , and militia , and publick oath and acknowledgement ; and it is scarce worth quaerie , whether , when the grosse of a nation is thus bound , the oath be not as valid , and the conscience as much concerned , as if it had beene sworn to a lawful prince . it is reasonable that a● usurping power cannot upon any prudent perswasion have the same confidence in the love of the people that a just hath : nor is the following government inticing , as tacitu● notes , nec qu●squam imperium malis artibus quaesitum benè administravit . the same with guazz● , where one objecting the vices of princes , receives this answer , perchè non erano prencip● per natura , ma per violenza , & erano più temuti che amati : and therefore if the polititian can by the blessed meanes forementioned gaine a superiority , there is no trusting to those ingenuous guards , his own goodnesse , and the love of others : his best defence is awe , and feare , and scaffold , and gibbet , and the like . for he that hath noe voluntary roome in the hearts of his people , must use all meanes to gaine a coercive . for his own promises he puts them into the same bottomlesse bag , which the poets say iupiter made for lovers asseverations : his word is as good as his oath , for they are both trifles , as it is in plautus . — pactum non pactum est , un pactum pactum est , cum illis lubet . 't was he that first invented that useful distinction of a lip-oath , and a heart-oath ; you may find him in euripides . iurata lingua est , mente iuravi nihil he makes good use of that in plutarch , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} that children are to be cousn'd with rattls , and men with oathes . 't is an huge advantage that man hath in a credulous world , that can easily say and sweare to any thing ; and yet withall so palliate his falsifications and perjuries , as to hide them from the conusance of most . the polititian mast be furnished with handsome refuges , that may seemingly heal miscarriages this way . hee need not spend much time in inquiry after such helps ; these declining ages wil abundantly furnish his invention . colasterion . an oath is in its self a religious affirmation , a promise with gods seale ; and therefore it concernes christians to be cautelous before swearing , to sweare liquidly , and to observe conscionably . 't is pity such slender evasions should satisfie us , as have bin scorn'd by heathens . we are bound ( sayes one of them ) to the sense of the imposer , or else we do {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , we are bound to the performance of what wee have thus sworn , or else we do {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} : t is much , that a morall conscience should more check them , than a clearer light can awe us : as if they more honour'd the genius of a caesar , than we revere the presence of a god : or else wee should never ingage in new protestations , that do interfere , yea , and somtimes positively quarrell with old . they had their {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , their perjury revenging gods ; to whose vindictive powers they referr'd their offenders : they punished such as swore falsely by their prince with fustigation ; but such as abus'd their gods , were left to the dispose of their injur'd deities , as if they were at a loss how to finde a punishment equall to the sinne . hear how soberly plato mentions it ( out of the noble commentator upon philostratus ) en toutes manieres sà este un fort belle ordinance & institutition , de n' user point du nom des dieux legerement , de peur de les contaminer ; ca● la majeste des dieux ne se doit imployer , qu' en un saincte & venerabile puretè . see what reall honour they gave to their counterfeit gods : let us have a care that we ascribe not counterfeit honour to the true god . our god hates every false oath : it appears in his severity to zedekiah , for breaking covenant with the babylonian monarch , though a tyrant of the first magnitude . were all subjects duly solicitous about the weight of this bound , we should be lesse prone to take , and more studious ●● observe it ; i remember the scholiast upon aristoyha●es , derives {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , it hedges in and shuts up a man , and tyes his hands behind him ; i know not how some conquerours may cutt this knot with the sword ; or how some sampsons may shake off these cords ; or what gaps the licentious may make in this hedge ; but such as value god , or heaven , or prince , or peace , can discover it no way better than in a sincere use of so divine an ordinance . there can be no certain rule given , when to beleeve , and when not , what such as are , or would be great , please to inculcate to us : i finde more wracks upon the rock of credulity : and ●tis no heresie to affirme , that many have beene saved by their infidelity ; i commend that of epichar●●●● {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} principle viii . necessity of st●te , is a very competent apology for the worst of actions . it has been observ'd , that in all innovations and rebellions ( which ordinarily have their rif●● from pretences of religion , or reformation , or both ) the breach and neglect of laws hath been authorised by that great patroness of illegal actions — necessity . now the polititian is never without such an advocate as this ; for he cares not to distinguish whether the necessity be of his own creating , or no , as for the most part it is ▪ being indeed an appendix to the wrong he undertakes : and signifies no more , then that he is compelled to cover wrong with wrong , as if the commission of a second ●in were enough to justifie the first . he changes that old charitable advise — benefact a benefactis al●js per●egito nè perpluant ; into vitia vitijs alijs pertegito nè perpluant : that so heapi●g one crime upon another , the later may defend the former from the stroke of justice . hee adores that maxime in livy , iustum ●●t bellum quibus necessarium , & pia arma quibus in armis spes est : it were very incongruous to desire that man to leave his crutch , that cannot walk without ; 't is no lesse unnaturall to invite him to quit his sword , whose life and fortune leans intirely upon it . if he can insinuate the scope of the warr to be legall , a little dawbing will serve to legalize the circumstances : that of the civilians must be remember — licere in bello quae ad finem sunt necessaria , the oracles of the gown are too tender for sword-men ; and it may bee he had wit in his anger , who affirmed , that martiall law was as great a solecisme , as martiall peace . if the people be once possest that his aime and intention is faire , they wil never expect that the media for attainment of his end should be retrench'd by the strict boundaries of law : hee manages that rule very practically , rem alienam , ex quâ certum mihi peri●ulum eminet , citra culpae alienae considerationem invadere possum ; now he can very plausibly make this periculum , certum , or incertum , as shall best sute with his affairs . 't is a broad liberty that grotius concedes , quare si vitam aliter fervare non possum , licet mihi vi qualicunque arcere eum qui eam impetit , licet peccato vacet ; & hoc ex jure quod mihi pro me natura concedit . when life , and liberty , and safety come in question , there ought no confideration to be had of just or unjust , pittifull or cruell , honourable or dishonourable : now when the people have according to his desire got over the great obstacle , and digested the plot for pious ; it is easie to set all future proceedings upon the score of liberty , safety , religion : and if he be constrained to use means grosly unlawfull , 't is but to make them seem holy in the application , and all 's well ; for it is the humour and genius of the vulgar , when they have once rush'd into a party implicitly , to prosecute it as desperately , as if they were under demonstrative convictions of its justice . finally , he must make a vertue of necessity , because there is no other vertue will so easily be induc'd to serve his proceedings as this ; she may well smile upon licentiousnesse , who hath her selfe no law . colasterion . let that great rule be received , that no man can be necessitated to sinne : our divines generally damne an officious lye ; and the equity bindes from any officious sinne . it would soon cut the nerves of the eighth commandement , if necessities and urgencies , though reall , were pronounced a sufficient excuse for stealing . but that which our polititian calls necessity , is no more than necessity of convenience , nor so much , except we interpret that convenience , which may favour his own ends , and so is convenient for his design . he uses necessity , as the old philosophers did an occult quality , though to a different purpose ; that was their refuge for ignorance , this is his sanctuary for sin . those civilians that are most charitable to necessity , make it no plea at all except it be absolute and insuperable ; as by the platonick laws onely those persons are allowed to drink at their neighbours well , that had in vaine sought a spring , by digging fifty cubits deep in their owne ground . we allow the disburdening of a shipp in imminent perill of wrack ; but this will not excuse those , who upon a fond or feigned prevision of a state-tempest , shall immediately cast lawe and conscience over-board ; discard , and quit hudder and steerage , and so assist the danger , they pretend to fear . pausanias tells of a chappell in acrocorinth , dedicated to necessity and violence ; those twingoddesses may be fit objects for the worship of heathens ; but 't is pitty they should be so much adored by christians . if i mistake not , the fundamentall deceit lyes in a greedy entertaining those first pretences , and seemingly candid propositions are made to us , before they have passed those scrutinies , and severe inquiries , they deserve ; or been examined by the test of gods word , and nationall lawes : all the rest are but ugly consequences of that absurdity we first granted , according to the ancient philosophick maxime , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . principle ix . the polititian must wave all relations , both sacred and civill , and swim to his design , though in a sea of bloud . such as study to be great by any means , must by all means forget to be good ; and they that will usurp dominion over others , must first become slaves to the worst of tyrants , a lust after greatnesse . crescit interea roma albae ruinis , begins one of the decads , that the wals of rome were cemented with bloud , is known and commended by machiavel ; although the superstructure was brave , yet if we search the foundation , we shall finde it laid in the rod ruines of her wasted neighbours ; that the first founder became a fratricide upon reason of state , to guard his new conquest , by freedom from a competitor ; is not onely vindicated from cruelty , but asserted to be a piece of meritorious policy . nor did this happen to the city in its structure alone , but after in its reparation ; when the sons of brutus were sacrific'd to the design of their father : so that rome was not only nurs'd with bloud , but after grouth and ripenesse , she sustained her selfe ; iived and thrived upon magna & sanguinolenta latrocinia ; so that our polititian can scarce want examples in the applauded actions of this city , to patronize the most crimson and skarlet sin , that ambition can prompt . he admires the generosity of neroe's mother , who is reported to have said of her sonne , a {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , let my son be my murderer , so he may be a monarch ; according to the advice of an high-spirited fury , pro regno velim patriam , penates , conjugem flammis dare , imperia pretio quolibet constant bene ; an empire cannot be purchased too dear , though it cost the blood of millions . he is much taken with the gallantry of the mammalukes , who abused the easinesse of the egyptian sultan , and wore the supremacy three hundred years , upon the length and keennesse of an usurping sword . and rather than want a bongrace , he commends the ottoman wisdom ; for the great turk rivets himself to the imperiall chair , with the bones of his murdered brethren . aspiring desires are not only insatiate , but admit of any sin ; that will promote their ends : see bass●anus murthering his brother geta in his mothers armes ; andronicus strangling his cousin alexius , lest he should have a part in the empire that had right to all : see caesar slighting the oathes by which he had obliged his obedience to the roman senate . finally , ambition knows no confinement , nothing so sacred but it violates . the gods must bow and yeeld to it , as tertullian , id negotium sine deorum injuriâ non est , eadem strages manium & templorum , tot sacrilegia romanorum , quot trophaea ; tot de diis quot de gentibus triumphi . colasterion . the italian polititian seems to intimate a scruple , when he saies , — si jus violandum est , regnandi causâ violandum est , his ( if ) dictates an uncertainty ; and if we appeale to the bar of nature , or divinity ( though possibly the entire assertion may have something of truth ) yet we shall find that wicked ( ●f ) absolutely banished . 't is true , we may more justly pity him , that swallows a bait fair and glistring , than a person that tempts temptations to deceive him ; or catches at flies , and trifling allurements because in the first case a greater reluctancy is requisite , and the dart may possibly be so sharp , as to pierce through the armour of a sober resolution ; but all this will little succour ●im , who knows it to be a bait , and hath before-hand designed its beauty , and fairenesse , to apologize for the foulnesse of the sin : for here the greatnesse of the temptation will not at all extenuate ●●e grossenesse of the ●rime : no more than he mitigates his robbery , who shall plead , that hee stole nothing but gold and jewels . the world is much mistaken in the value of a scepter or crown ; we gaze upon its brightnesse , and forget its brittleness , we looke upon its glory , and forget its frailty ; we respect its colour , and take no notice of its weight . but if all those gay things which wee fondly fancy to our selves were really to be found in greatnesse , yet still he payes too deare , that pawn●● his heaven for it● he that thus buys a shor● blisse , gives not twenty , or an hundred years purchase , but ( if mercy prevent not ) eternity . it will be little advantage here , to introduce the example of a roman , or turk , or christian , if unlawfull ; such presidents may perchance baffle the vulgar ( in whose creede you may insert what you please ) but wil be very cold answers , when we appeare before a severe tribunall : it concernes us rather to observe how ambition claimes kindred with every other vice , stoops , and takes up every sinne lies in its way ; and , if upon enquiry we finde it to bee indeed such a complicated mischiefe , it will become us studiously to shun it our selves , and seriously to detest it in others . principle x. a generall innovation contributes much to the growth and security of vsurpation . wee may receive this as a tradition , handed to us from the great patriarchs of policy , attested by the practice of the subtilest times ; i presume it may be grounded upon these , or the like perswasions . . because such an innovation raises the dust , and begets a cloud for the main design ; for when the waters are troubled , t is hard to see the bait . . because the parenthesis betwixt an old and new government , flatters the hopes of all parties , soothing those desirs that are for a relapse into the old , and yet incouraging those that wish for the establishment of a new . . because when all things are reduced into a chaos and rude heape , when all the lines and lineaments of the former government are blotted out , that which is new written will be more legible , and the old sooner forgotten : for suppose a kingdom made a lump , without shape and void , and it is like materia prima , prone to imbrace any form ; when an instrument is distun'd , you may set it to what key you please ; and he that cannot sometimes lo●s●n the strings , will never make good musick upon synesius his harp. . because by n●w moulding of jurisdictions , and offices of state , there may be a fair opportunity offered , of gratifying those that have serv'd us ; and for others its very familiar to see some stubborn and rigid opiniators , who have continued long unshaken either by threat or argument , at length to surrender their principles , and bow the knee before the dagon of honou● and riches ; such is the flexanimous power of golden eloquence , as it is in the adage , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} besides , we can find no better way to breed an absolute dependance , and make others adhere to our fortunes , then by winding the concernments of other men upon the same bottom with our interest ; we may observe this from the practice of great favourites , who alwayes delight in these props , and are carefull to set their whole tribes in the sunshine of favour . . because such a general deordination gives a taste and rellish to the succeeding government , though in its selfe not so delectable ; for aristotle notes , that democracy is better than anarchy . there are many other advantages to be made by a due improvement of these turbid intervals ; as the occasion of subdividing , and parcelling out your great end ; for by this meanes they which refused to close with it in grosse , will receive it in retaile : and having entertained some portions of it , the grudge they bore to the whole will be by degrees quieted and appeas'd . besides , when all things are ruffled and confused , it is then the devils holy-day , and therefore our work-day : the noise is so loud , that it drowns the voice of the lawe ; and there may be some truth in his waggery , who sayd , that such as mean to commit a rape upon the body politick , must put out the lawes ; as others upon a like occasion use to put out the lights . finally , if wee ever hope to sin with impunity , to usurp prosperously or to govern arbitrarily ; wee must take out that lesson in plantus : idem facere , quod plurimi alij , quibus res timida aut turbida est ; pergunt turbare usque , ut ne quid possit conquiscere . colasterion . t is most certain , that sinister ends are promoted by innovations ; but it lyes in our bosomes to promote or quench the innovations themselves , which we can no way better do , than by a strict adherence to the laws ; for as long as we maintain them , they will maintain us : if we observe these , it will rescue us from the hands of state-novellists ; for we are not fit for their turns , till we are cross-byassed with faction . as a caution against changes in government , give me leave to repeate , what was long since told us by an ingenious lord , — that all great mutations are dangerous ; even where what is introduc'd by that mutation , is such as would have been very profitable upon a primary foundation : and it is none of the least dangers of change , that all the perils and inconveniencies which it brings , cannot be foreseene ; and therefore such as make title to wisdome , will not undergo great dangers , but for great necessities . but further , let me appeale to generall experience , yea , let me ask thee ( reader ) if thou hast never before heard , or read of a nation , that was once the gaze and envy of its neighbours ; and yet being insensible of its happiness , or possest with fond hopes of bettering its condition , has closed with pretended friends , and reall enemies , and gladly contributed to its owne ruine . so apt men are to catch at the shadow , though they hazard the substance : we may guesse at the morall of the frogs in the fable , who could finde no satisfaction in a still prince , and were after forced to abide the severities of a tyrant they prayed for . but if there be such distempers in a state , as shall necessarily require amendment ; let it be done with the pruning-hook of the law , and not with the sword of violence : for i never read , that illegall , or tumultuous , or rebellious , were fit epithets for reformation . and 't is fit christians should forbear the use of such surly physick , till they have levied a fine in the court of heaven , and cut off the intail of the seventh beatitude . this may suffice to reveale in some measure , arcanum ambitionis , {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . i could add much more , but that i judge it a fitter task for our nephews , when pens shall be infranchised . and now ( reader ) let us mix our prayers , that god would for ever banish this cursed policy out of europe , and the whole christian world ; and damne it downe to hell , from whence originally it came , and let such as delight to abuse others , thinke of that self-cousenage , with which in the interim they abuse themselves ; god permitting the devill to revenge the imposture . and whilst we are busie with politick stratagems , and tortious armes to invade the rights of others ; let us all consider that this is not the violence which takes heaven . let it be a piece of our daily oraisons , that god would guard our pulpits from such boutefeus , as like a●tna and vesuvius , belched out nothing but flames , and fiery discourses ; using the scripture as preposterously and impertinently , as some pontificians , who transported with the vehemence of hildebrandian zeal , think the temporall monarchy of popes sufficiently scripturall , from the saying of christ to peter — pasce oves . farr be it from us to intitle the spirit of god to exorbitant doctrines , it is easie to distinguish the vulture from the dove . the miscarriages of the clergy have a deeper stain from the sacredness of their function , as probably he that invenomed the eucharist has the more to answer for his triple crown . it is manifest , that wee are fallen into the dregs of time ; we live in the rust of the iron age , and must accordingly expect to feel , v'tima se●escentis mundi deliria , the dotages of a decrepit world : what is become of truth , sincerity , charity , humility , those antiqui mores , whither are they gone ? did they attend astraea into heaven ? and have left such degenerous successors , as cruelty , pride , fraud , envy , oppression , &c. such qualities as abundantly justifie the worst of heathens , and dishonour the name of christians : i thinke it may safely be affirmed , that if a new europae speculum were sincerely written , it might be contracted into this short summary ; novi ego h●c seculum quibus moribus sit ; malus bonum , malum esse vult , ut sit sui similis ; turbant , miscent , mores mali ; rapax , avarus , invidus , sacrum prophanum , publicum privatum habebit ; hiulca gens , &c. that eternall majesty , which raised so brave a fabrick , out of such indisposed materials ; that weilds the world with his finger , ever since it was made ; that controules the wave , and checks the tumult of the people : that sits above , and laughs at the malignant counsels , and devices of wicked men : let his mercy be implored for the speedy succour of his distressed church ; that the rod of aaron may blossome ; that the tabernacle of david may be raised ; that the subtle may be caught in their own snares ; and that the result of all afflictions , may be the greatning his glory , and exalting of his scepter . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a e- cato maior . ophyogenes , & pfylli . furialibus commentariis illustraut . notes for div a e- plin. l. . . . fons in mileto , cuius proflue●s aqua dulcissima , guae vero in imo falsa . origen . vinum i● pectore . notes for div a e- {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ingeniosi muse pulatores . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . notes for div a e- barclay contra monarch ▪ . candida vita . buchanan . pro mil●ne . hercules furens . ●pon livi p. . spencer . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , arist. pol. . isocrates . io. goodwin , in his anticavalerism . notes for div a e- aristoph. concutiunt populos , vexant regna , solicitant bella , diruunt ecclesias . classica canere . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . evangelioptho . ri . populi . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ●l● . st. h●erom strada . ecclesiae nomine armamini & contra ecclesiam dimicatis . aug. {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} apud . dion . cass. papirius . con. monarc . p. . notes for div a e- in pompeio . hipp. her. eur. old. {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . notes for div a e- comin . nantons regalia . rota figulari versatilior . notes for div a e- grot. de iur . belli , . de civil converse . l. . p. . aulular . apoph . causabon exercitat . . p. . notes for div a e- {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} ●eva ne●essitas victor . de iure belli , nu . . . de iure belli , l. . mach. on livy , ●ess . l. , . ●ub . . 〈◊〉 . caelius rhodig. . notes for div a e- upon livy l. . c. ●thebe maritum , t●moleon fratrem , cassius filium hoe jure interfecore . in apologer . notes for div a e- po● , faulkla● trinummus . the compleat statesman, or, the political will and testament of that great minister of state, cardinal duke de richilieu from whence lewis the xiv ... has taken his measures and maxims of government : in two parts / done out of french. richelieu, armand jean du plessis, duc de, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the compleat statesman, or, the political will and testament of that great minister of state, cardinal duke de richilieu from whence lewis the xiv ... has taken his measures and maxims of government : in two parts / done out of french. richelieu, armand jean du plessis, duc de, - . du chastelet, paul hay, marquis, b. ca. . [ ], , [ ], , [ ] p. printed for r. bentley ... j. philips ... and j. taylor ..., london : . also attributed to paul hay, marquis du chastelet. cf. nuc pre- imprints. reproduction of original in the edinburgh university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- france -- early works to . state, the. france -- politics and government -- - . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the compleat statesman : or , the political will and testament , of that great minister of state , cardinal duke de richilieu . from whence lewis the xiv . the present french-king has taken his measures and maxims of government in two parts . done out of french . london : printed for r. bentley , at the post-house in russel-street , covent-garden , j. philips at the kings-arms , and j. taylor at the ship in st. paul's-church-yard . . advertisement to the reader . the world would have reason to wonder , that this political testament of cardinal de richelieu , could have been conceal'd so long , did not the consequence of it , and the use to which it was designed , convince us that he never intended the publishing thereof . but whereas it is the fate of mysterys to have a certain date , and that it is impossible not to confide things of this nature to some indiscreet persons , there is no reason to wonder at their falling at last into liberal hands , who are glad to impart them to the world. it would be a reflection on the judgment of the public , to imagine that they could mistake this work ; for tho men can never be too cautious to avoid being imposed upon ; it is impossible to read this without discovering all the characters of that great man's mind . the elevation and beauty of his genius , joyn'd to the nobleness of his expressions , appears clearly in this ; but moreover what variety of matter is not found in it ? they are all handled with so much solidity , that it is obvious that he knew them by a profound meditation , seconded by a consummated experience , and that none but himself was capable to write them . if it be very delightful to read the reflections and political precepts which the best authors make on the principal events they relate , that satisfaction , is considerably lessen'd , when we consider that most of them only reason after the fact , and in their study's , and that they would be at a great loss themselves to overcome the difficultys of the least negotiation , or of the least dangerous intrigue . but this political testament is of a different nature . it is a ●…ite and a first minister of state , who has gove●…d upwards of ▪ years one of the most considerable kingdoms of europe , who has guided it ; and as it were held it by the hand in the first years of its rise : who prescribes no councel● but what he has often practis'd himself ; and finally who by his steadiness and courage has overcome an infinite number of obstacles , and intrigues , which would have overwhelm'd any other man. therefore there never was a work of more use for th●se who are called to the administration of great affairs , kings , princes , favorites , ministers , councellors of state , ecclesasticks , nobles , magistrates ▪ courtiers , and in fine , all sorts and degrees of men , sind instructions here , of an inestim●ble ▪ value . not that this work is in the condition in which 〈…〉 would undoubtedly have been had he had leisure to revise it ; but tho some carelesness is discovered in it , and some expressions less happy than o●hers ; nevertheless all the parts of it compose so fine body , that those little faults can only be look'd upon , like those strokes in fine pictures , which tho' careless , discover the skill of the artist . it would be an extraordinary presumption to endeavour by words to inhance the excellence of a work , which sustains it self so well , and is infinitely above the elogys that could be given to it . the reading of one chapter of it will speak more in its behalf , than whatever we could say . the first edition of this book , and the two others which follow'd it close , have been taken from a manuscript which seems to be of thirty years standing , and to have been written with great precipitation , by two different hands , without any blots , but with many faults : the most essential have been mended in this fourth impression , and we thought fit not to alter the rest , for fear of mistaking the sence of the author . as there is no reason to believe , that the copy we have made use of , is the only remaining one , we intreat those who have a better , and who shall observe any capital faults , to impart the same to us , in order to correct them in a fifth edition . the very contents seem to be written by the cardinal de richelieu himself ; as he was a very methodical man , it is very likely that he begun his work by the said contents , lest the matters should anticipate upon each other . the world will certainly be surpris'd at the title of the first chapter , which speaks of the general peace , of which he design'd to mention the year which he has left in blank ; since there was no general peace at that time . but we have been oblig'd to follow the manuscript , and it is apparent that he design'd it , and thereby to conclude the relation of the king his master 's great actions . as for the time when this work was written , it is very likely that he did it at several times . in the first chapter he prosecutes the relation of the king's actions until the year , . yet in some other places he seems to write in . since he gives the king but years reign . it may also be question'd whether what he writes of the jesuites , is before , or after the intrigues , which father causin , the king's confessor , and father monod , confessor to the dutchess of savoy , set on foot , to remove him from the court , which had like to have succeeded . if he writ the said chapter after he had defeated the said intrigue , no body can sufficiently admire his moderation in speaking so soberly of them ; and if he writ it before , it is impossible to praise him enough , to have left his work in its first state , without expressing more marks of his resentment in the same . that which seems most surprising , is , that he does no wise mention the birth of the present king in his political testament ; from whence we may inf●r , that it was written before ; that event being too considerable , to pass it under silence . moreover , we must conside● , that he had given over writing long before his death ; by reason of the mischance of his arm , being oblig'd to dictate all his dispatches ; and whereas it is very likely , that he would not trust his political testament to any other hand , he was no longer in a condition to do it himself , and that may be the reason of the said omis●ion . all the notes of the present edition are in the manuscript , but the historical observations on the first chapter , were lately communicated to me , and are peculiar to the fourth edition : if ever any work deserv'd to be adorn'd with remarks , it certainly is this . the life and memoirs of this great man , will furnish abundance ; but that is not sufficient , it requires something more particular yet , to heighten the intrigues of that court , which have not been divulg'd , which would be of great use for the better understanding of the history . several useful remarks might also be made upon the then state of france , and that to which it is grown since : wherein the councels and maxims of that great minister have been follow'd , and in what they have deviated from them , and several other remarks not only curious , but important . if any body will be so kind as to impart all those things to us , we will willingly communicate them to the public . to king lewis xiii . sir , as soon as your majesty was pleas'd to admit me into the management of your affairs , i resolv'd to use my utmost endeavours to facilitate your great designs , as useful to this state , as glorious to your person . god having bless'd my intentions , insomuch that the virtue and happiness of your majesty have astonish'd the present , and will be admir'd in future ages , i thought my self obliged to write the history of your glorious successes , both to hinder many circumstances , worthy to live for ever in the memory of man , from being bury'd in oblivion , thro' the ignorance of those who cannot know them like me ; and to the end that the time past might serve as a rule for the future . therefore i forthwith apply'd my self to it , being perswaded that i could never begin that too soon , which was only to end with my life . i did not only carefully collect the matter of such a work , but moreover , i reduc'd part of it into order , and put the transactions of some years in the form i design'd to publish them . i own , that tho' there is more pleasure in furnishing the matter of history , than in putting it into form , yet i found a great deal of satisfaction in relating what had been perform'd with great labour . while i began to relish the delights of that performance , the illnesses and continual inconveniences which attend the weakness of my constitution , join'd to the weight of affairs , forc'd me to lay it aside , because it requir'd too much time . yet tho' i cannot possibly perform , upon this subject , what i so passionately desir'd , for the glory of your person , and for the welfare of your state , i think my self oblig'd in conscience at least to leave your majesty some memoirs of those things i think most necessary for the government of this kingdom . two reasons oblige me to undertake this work. the first is , the fear and desire i have of ending my days before the expiration of yours . the second is , the faithful passion i have for your majesty's interest ; which makes me not only desirous to see you attended with all sorts of prosperities during my life , but also makes me earnestly wish to see a prospect of the continuation of the same , when the inevitable tribute we are all oblig'd to pay nature , shall hinder me from being a witness of them . this piece will appear under the title of my political testament ; because it is made to serve after my death , for the polity and conduct of your kingdom , if your majesty thinks it worthy of it : because it will contain my last desires in relation thereunto ; and that in leaving it to you , i bequeath to your majesty the best legacy i have to dispose of , whenever god will be pleas'd to call me out of this life . it shall be conceiv'd in the most concise and clearest method i am capable of , as well to follow my own genius , and my usual way of writing , as to comply with your majesty's humour , who ever lov'd , that men should come to the point in few words , being as much pleas'd to hear the substance of things , as apprehensive of the long discourses most men use to explain them . if my spirit , which will appear in these memoirs , can after my death contribute any thing towards the regulation of this great state , in the management of which your majesty has been pleas'd to give me a greater share than i deserve , i will think my self infinitely happy . to that end , judging with reason , that the success god has hitherto been pleas'd to grant the resolutions your majesty has taken with your most faithful creatures , is a powerful motive to invite you to follow the advices i will give you for the future : i will begin this work with an abstract of the great actions you have perform'd with so much glory , which may justly be stil'd , the solid foundation of the future felicity of your kingdom . this relation will be made with so much sincerity , according to the judgment of those who are faithful witnesses of the history of your time , that it will induce every body to believe , that the counsels i give your majesty , have no other motives , but the interest of your state , and the advantage of your person . i am , and will remain eternally , sir , your majesty's most humble , most faithful , most obedient , most passionate , and most oblig'd subject and servant , armand du plessis . the political testament of the famous cardinal duke de richelieu . part i. chap. i. a short relation of the king 's great actions , until the peace concluded in the year — when your majesty was first pleas'd to admit me into your councils , and to repose a great confidence in me for the direction of your affairs ; i may affirm with truth , that the huguenots shar'd the state with you ; that the grandees behav'd themselves as if they had not been your subjects ; and the most powerful governours of provinces , as if they had been soveraigns in their imployments . i may say , that the ill example of both was so prejudicial to this kingdom , that the best regulated communities were tainted with their behaviour , and in some cases lessen'd your majesty's lawful authority , as much as in them lay , in order to extend their own beyond reason . i may say , that every man measur'd his merit by his presumption ; that instead of valuing the favours they receiv'd from your majesty by their intrinsick worth , they only valued them according as they were suitable to the unruliness of their fancy ; and that the most daring were esteem'd the wisest , and often prov'd the most happy . i may also say , that foreign alliances were despis'd ; private interest preferr'd to publick good ; in a word , the dignity of royal majesty was so much debas'd , and so different from what it ought to be , by the defect of those who had then the principal management of your affairs , that it was almost impossible to distinguish it . the proceeding of those to whom your majesty had intrusted the helm of your state could no longer be tolerated , without ruining all ; and on the other hand , it could not be alter'd all at once , without violating the laws of prudence , which do not allow the passing from one extream to another , without a medium . the ill posture of your affairs seem'd to constrain your majesty to take precipitated resolutions , without election of time or of means ; and ●●t choice was necessary in both , to improve the alteration which necessity exacted from your prudence . the w●… were of opinion , that it was impossible , without ● shipwrack , to steer through the rocks that appear'd on all sides in times of such uncertainty : the court was full of men , who accus'd those of rashness , who should dare to attempt it ; and all of them knowing that princes are apt to impute the ill success of things that have been well advis'd , to those that are about them ; so few expected a good event of the alterations , it was said , i design'd , that many concluded my fall , even before your majesty had rais'd me . notwithstanding all these difficulties which i represented to your majesty , knowing what kings can do , when they make a good use of their power , i presum'd to promise you without temerity , in my opinion , what is come to pass in your state ; and that in a short time your prudence , your power , and the blessing of god , would alter the affairs of this kingdom . i promis'd your majesty that i would use my utmost endeavours , and all the authority you were pleas'd to give me , to ruine the huguenot party , to abate the pride of the grandees , to reduce all your subjects to their duty , and to raise your name again in foreign nations , to the degree it ought to be . moreover , i represented to your majesty , that in order to compass a happy end , it was absolutely necessary you should confide in me ; and that notwithstanding for the time past all those who had serv'd you had thought no way so proper to obtain and to preserve your confidence , as to remove the queen your mother from it , i would take the contrary way , and that nothing should be wanting on my side to keep your majesties in a strict union , so necessary for your reputation , and for the welfare of the kingdom . as the success which has attended the good intentions which god has been pleas'd to inspire me with , for the settlement of this state , will justifie to future ages the steadiness wherewith i have constantly pursued that design ; so your majesty will be a faithful witness that i have us'd my best endeavours , lest the artifice of some evil-minded persons should be powerful enough to divide that , which , being united by nature , ought also to be united by grace . if after having , for many years , happily resisted their divers efforts , their malice has finally prevail'd ; it is a very great comfort to me , that your majesty has often been pleas'd to express , that while i was most intent on the grandeur of the queen your mother , she labour'd for my ruine . but i refer this matter to another place , to keep to my present subject , and not to break the order i am to keep in this work. the huguenots , who have never slipt any occasion to increase their party , having in . surpriz'd certain ships which the duke of nevers was preparing against the turk , afterwards rais'd a potent navy against your majesty . notwithstanding the care of the sea had been so far neglected till then , that you had not one ship , your majesty behav'd your self with so much address and courage , that with those you could get among your subjects , from holland , and from england , you defeated the army the rochelois had put out to sea. which prov'd the more wonderful and happy , in that this advantageous effect proceeded from a succour which was only granted to serve you in appearance . you took the isle of ré by the same means which the rochelois had unjustly made themselves masters of long before : you routed or men they had put into it to defend it , and forc'd soubise , who commanded them , to fly to oleron ; which your friends not only drove him out of , but also forc'd him to fly the kingdom . this happy success reduc'd those rebellious souls to make a peace so glorious for your majesty , that the most difficult were pleas'd with it ; and all agreed , that it was the most advantagious that had been made till then . the kings your predecessors having for the time past rather received from , than given a peace to their subjects ; though they were diverted by no foreign wars , they were losers in all the treaties they made with them ; and tho' your majesty had many other occupations at that time , you then granted it to them , reserving fort st. lewis , as a citadel at rochel ; and the isles of re and of oleron , as two other places which serv'd as a good circumvallation about it . at the same time your majesty secur'd the duke of savoy from the oppression of the spaniards , who had attack'd him openly ; and notwithstanding they had one of the greatest armies that had been seen of a long while in italy , which was commanded by the duke of feria , a great man ; you hinder'd them from taking verua , of which your arms , jointly with the duke of savoy's , sustain'd the siege with so much glory , that they were finally forc'd to raise the siege shamefully . the spaniards soon afterwards making themselves masters of all the passes of the grisons , and having fortify'd the best posts of all their vallies , your majesty , not being able by a bare negotiation to free your ancient allies from that invasion , in which those unjust usurpers had the more success , by reason that the pope favour'd them , upon the vain hopes they gave him of procuring some advantages for religion , did that by force of arms , which you had not been able to obtain by strength of reason . your majesty had by that means for ever freed that nation from the tyranny of the house of austria , had not fargis your ambassador in spain , at the sollicitation of cardinal de berulle , made ( as he has confess'd it since ) without your knowledge , and contrary to your majesty's strict orders , a very disadvantagious treaty , to which you adher'd at last to oblige the pope , who pretended to be concern'd in that affair . the late king your father of immortal memory , designing to marry one of your majesty's sisters in england , the spaniards thought themselves oblig'd to break that project , by marrying one of their infanta's there . the treaty thereof being concluded , the prince of wales was so ill advisd , as to expose himself to the discretion of a prince , who being master of his person , might impose whatever law he thought fit upon him , and pass'd through france incognito , in order to go into spain to marry her . as soon as the thing was known here , such negotiations were set on foot , that notwithstanding the great ▪ honours he receiv'd in that court , where the king gave him the right hand all the while he tarry'd there , altho' he was no crown'd head at that time , the marriage was broken off , and soon after it that of france was treated of , concluded and accomplish'd , with conditions three times more advantagious for religion , than those which were design'd to be propos'd in the late king's time . soon after that powerful cabals were form'd at court , into which the duke of orleans your brother was engag'd by those who had the care of his conduct , before his age made him capable of it . being constrain'd to say , with great regret , that a person of the greatest consideration was insensibly drawn into it , with several others , who formented and follow'd her passions . i cannot omit the merit you acquir'd before god , and before men , in suppressing the noise her imprudent conduct would have made , had you not wisely wink'd at what you might have repress'd , with as much safety as reason . the english blindly engag'd in those cabals : many of the grandees of the kingdom enter'd very far into them : the duke de rohan and the huguenot party were to wage war within , while the english with a potent navy were to attack the isles and coasts of this state. the plot seem'd to be so well laid , that most men were of opinion , that it was impossible to resist the force of the conspirators . nevertheless , the taking off colonel dornano , the duke de vendome , and the grand prior ; the chastisement of chalais , and the removal of some princesses , broke that cabal , insomuch that all the designs projected in your majesty's court were dissipated , and had no effect . as it was not without a great deal of goodness and prudence together , your majesty consented at nantes to the marriage of monsieur your brother ; so the sincerity of your true servants in taking the boldness to represent to you before-hand the inconveniences which might attend it , was a very great proof of their fidelity , and a certain testimony they had no design to surprize you . all these disturbances which seem'd to weaken your power , did not hinder you from putting a stop to the course of duels , by the chastisement of the sieurs de bouteville and des chapelles . i own that my mind was never more agitated than it was on that occasion , in which i had much ado to forbear yielding to the universal compassion , which the misfortune and valour of those young gentlemen imprinted in the hearts of all men ; to the prayers of the greatest persons of the court ; and to the importunities of my nearest relations . the tears of their wives mov'd me sensibly ; but the sluces of blood of your nobility , to which nothing could put a stop but the effusion of theirs , incourag'd me to resist my own inclinations , and to persuade your majesty to cause that to be put in execution , for the good of the kingdom , which was almost against the sense of every body , and against my particular sentiments . as it was not possible to stop the course of , and to hinder the great preparations the english had made for a war , your majesty was oblig'd to oppose them by force of arms. those ancient enemies of the state landed in re , and there besieg'd the fort st. martin , while it was god almighty's pleasure to afflict france , by the illness wherewith he visited your majesty at ville-roy . this dismal accident , and the ill conduct which le coigneux and puy laurens endeavour'd a-new to inspire into monsieur , did not hinder your good subjects from opposing the efforts of that warlike nation , by the influence of your bare name . and your majesty no sooner recover'd your health , but you reliev'd the place they had besieg'd , defeated their land-army by a signal combat , and forc'd their naval forces to quit your coasts , and to make for their own ports again . after which you besieg'd rochel , and took it after a years siege : and your majesty behav'd your self with so much prudence , that tho' you were sensible that the spaniards neither desir'd the taking of the said place in particular , nor the prosperity of your affairs in general ; judging that the bare appearance of their union would be of use in the opinion of the world ; and that it would be no small matter to hinder them by a treaty from joining with the english , who were your declar'd enemies at that time● ; you made one with them , which produc'd the only effect your majesty expected from it . the spaniards , who only design'd to deceive you , in order the better to cross your majesty's designs , and the taking of the said city , did animate the english as much as in them lay to relieve it . and the cardinal de la cueva promis'd them positively , to that end , that his master would send your majesty no succours , until you had no further need of it , and that he would recall it before it could annoy them : which was so religiously perform'd , that don frederick admiral of spain , who sail'd from the coronna with ships , after he was inform'd of the defeat of the english in ré , refus'd to tarry one day at rochel , upon the report that a new fleet was coming to relieve the said city . this assurance incourag'd the english at two several times to attempt the relieving of it , and afforded your majesty the glory of taking it with your own forces , in sight of a potent naval army , which , after two useless engagements , had the disgrace to see it self wholly frustrated of its end . thus at one and the same time the infidelity and cunning of the spaniards prov'd ineffectual , and the english were over-reach'd . during this siege the spaniards attack'd the duke of mantua in italy : they took that time on purpose , thinking your majesty would not be able to succour him . cardinal de berule , and marillac the lord keeper , advis'd your majesty to abandon that poor prince to the injustice and insatiable avidity of that nation , which is an enemy to the repose of christendom , lest they should trouble you ; the rest of your council prov'd of a different opinion ; both because spain durst not have taken such a resolution immediately after your having made a treaty of union with the english ; and that tho' they should have follow'd so ill an advice , they could not have been able to stop the progress of your designs . they represented to your majesty , that it would be sufficient not to declare for the duke of mantua while you were engag'd in that great siege ; and that you could do no more , without committing a baseness unworthy of a great prince , who must never consent to it , whatever advantages might accrue to him by it . i should commit a crime , if i did not observe in this place , that your majesty , according to the sentiments of your heart and your usual practice , took the best and most honourable party on that occasion ; which was attended with so much success , that soon after it rochel was taken , and your arms in a condition to assist that prince fo unjustly attack'd . although at that very time monsieur your brother , who was become a widower a year after his marriage , had a mind to marry the princess mary ; he was so ill advis'd , that instead of favouring the duke of mantua her father , he cross'd him more than his enemies , by withdrawing from your majesty , and retiring into lorraine , at a time when it was his interest to be strictly united with you , in order to make your power the more considerable . this ill conduct did not hinder your majesty from continuing the journey you had undertaken , for a design so glorious ; and god bless'd you so visibly , that as soon as you came to the alps , you forc'd all the passages of it in the midst of winter , beat the duke of savoy , assisted by the spaniards ; rais'd the siege of cazal , and constrain'd all your enemies to agree with you . this glorious action , which restor'd peace in italy , was no sooner atchiev'd , but your majesty , whose mind and heart never found any rest but in labour , pass'd directly into languedoc , where after having taken privas and alez by force , you reduc'd the rest of the huguenot party throughout your kingdom to obedience , and by your clemency granted a peace to those who had presum'd to wage a war against you ; not by granting them advantages prejudicial to the state , as had been done till then ; but by banishing him out of the kingdom , who was the only head of that miserable party , and who had all along fomented it . that which is most considerable in so glorious an action , is , that you ruin'd that party absolutely , at a time when the king of spain endeavour'd to raise it again , and to settle it more than ever . he had newly made a treaty with the duke of rohan , to form in this state a body of rebellious states to god and to your majesty at once , in consideration of a million of livres which he was to pay him yearly , for which he made the indies tributaries to hell. but their projects prov'd ineffectual : and whilst he had the mortification to hear , that the person he had employ'd to be the bearer of so glorious an establishment , was executed upon a scaffold by a decree , of the parliament of thoulouse , before whom he was try'd , your majesty had the satisfaction and advantage to pardon those who could no longer defend themselves , to annihilate their faction , and to use their persons well , when they expected nothing but the chastisement of the crimes they had commited . i am sensible that spain thinks to excuse so ill an action ; by the succours you granted the hollanders ; but that excuse is as ill as their cause . common sense will convince every body , that there is much difference between the continuation of a succours established upon a lawful subject , if natural defence is so , and a new establishment manifestly contrary to religion , and to the lawful authority kings have received from heaven over their subjects . the late king your father never enter'd into a treaty with the hollanders , until the king of spain had form'd a league in this kingdom to usurp the crown . this truth is too evident to be question'd ; and there is no theology in the world , but will grant , without going against the principles of natural reason , that as necessity obliges those whose life is attempted , to make use of all helps to preserve it ; so a prince has the same right to avoid the loss of his state. that which is free in the beginning , sometimes becomes necessary in the sequel : therefore no body can find fault with the union your majesty maintains with those people , not only in consequence of the treaties of the late king ; but moreover , because spain cannot be reputed otherwise than as an enemy to this state , whilst they retain part of its ancient demeans : it is evident that the cause which has given a rise to those treaties not being remov'd , the continuation of the effect is as lawful as necessary . the spaniards are so far from any pretence of being in the same case , that on the contrary , their designs are so much the more unjust ; that instead of repairing the injuries they have done this kingdom , they increase them daily . moreover , the late king never join'd with the hollanders , until they were entred into a body of state ; and was constrain'd to it by an oppression which he could not wholly avoid : he neither occasion'd their revolt , nor the union of their provinces . and spain has not only often favour'd the revolted huguenots against your predecessors ; they also endeavour'd to unite them in a body of state in yours : a holy zeal has induc'd them to be the authors of so good an establishment ; and that without any necessity , and consequently without reason ; unless the continuation of their ancient usurpations , and the new ones they design , rectifie their actions so much , that what is forbidden to all the world besides , is lawful in them , upon the account of their good intentions . having treated this matter more at large in another treatise , i will leave it to continue the sequel of your actions . the ill faith of the spaniards having induc'd them to attack the duke of mantua again , to the prejudice of the treaties they had made with your majesty , you march'd the second time into italy , where , by the blessing of god , after having gloriously cross'd a river , the passage whereof was defended by the duke of savoy with an army of foot and horse , contrary to the faith of the treaty he had made with your majesty the year before : you took pignerol in sight of the emperour 's and king of spain's forces , and of the person and all the power of the duke of savoy ; and that which renders that action the more glorious , in sight of the marquess de spinola , one of the greatest captains of his time. by that means you took susa , and overcame at once the three most considerable powers of europe , the plague , famine , and the impatiency of the french , of which there are not many examples in history . after which you conquer'd savoy , driving an army of foot and horse before you , which had a better advantage to defend it self in that mountainous country , than to attack them . soon after which the combats of veillane and of coriane signaliz'd your arms in piemont : and the taking of valence , fortify'd by the duke of savoy , in order to oppose your designs , made the world sensible , that nothing could resist the just arms of a king as fortunate as powerful . cazal was reliev'd , not only against the opinion of most men , but even against the very thoughts of the duke de montmorency , who had been employ'd to that end ; and against the opinion of marillac , who was substituted in his place , who both publickly declar'd , that it was an impossible enterprize . the relief of the said place was the more glorious , in that a stronger army than your majesty's , retrench'd at the head of the milaneze , which furnished them with all sorts of conveniencies , and shelter'd under the walls of cazal , which had been consign'd in their hands , was constrain'd to quit it , and five other places at the same time , which the spaniards held thereabouts in the extent of mont-ferrat . those who know , that in the very height of that design your majesty was reduc'd to the utmost extremity by a fit of sickness ; and that tho' your person was dangerously ill , your heart was yet in a worse condition . if they consider , that the queen your mother , at the instigation of some malicious persons , form'd a potent party , which , weakning you , considerably strengthen'd your enemies : if they also consider that they daily receiv'd advice , that your majesty's most faithful servants , whom they both did hate and dread , would not much longer be in a condition to do them any harm ; they must needs acknowledge , that the goodness of god has contributed more towards your good successes , than the prudence and force of men. it was at that very time the queen your mother us'd her utmost endeavours to change your majesty's council , and to establish one to her own mind . it was at that very time also the evil spirits which possess'd monsieur's mind , were labouring in his name , as much as in them lay , to ruine me . the mother and the son had made an agreement , which was more contrary to the state , than hurtful to those whose ruine they openly prosecuted , since in the present state of affairs it was impossible to alter without ruining them . the son had promis'd not to marry the princess mary , which the mother dreaded to that degree , that in order to prevent it , she had put him into the castle of vincenne in your absence , where he tarry'd until that agreement procur'd his liberty ; in exchange of which ▪ the mother had promis'd to put me out of your majesty's favour , and to remove me from court. in order to render these promises the more inviolable , they were put in writing ; and the duke de bellegarde carry'd them long between his shirt and his skin , to shew that they touch'd his heart ; and to make those that had made them sensible , that he would never lose them without his life . there never was a stronger faction in any state ; it would be easier to name those who were not concerned in it , than those that were . and that which encreas'd the wonder of your conduct on that occasion , is , that being sollicitous my self to withdraw from your majesty , to oblige the queen , who desir'd it passionately ; your majesty being destitute of all other counsel at that time , had no body to consult with , and to help you to resist the authority of a mother , the artifices of all her adherents , and my earnest sollicitations against my self . i say this , because the marshal of schomberg , who was faithful to you , was absent at that time ; and that the lord keeper marillac was one of those , who , seconding the queen in her designs , serv'd her against her self . your prudence was such , that in removing the lord keeper of your own accord , you deliver'd your self of a man , who had so great an opinion of himself , that he thought nothing well done , unless done by his order ; and who thought many ill ways lawful , to compass the ends which were suggested to him , out of a zeal which may be styl'd indiscreet . in fine , your proceeding had so much wisdom in it , that you granted nothing to the queen to the prejudice of your state ; and yet refus'd her nothing that could be granted without wounding your conscience , and without acting as much against her as against your self . i might forbear speaking of the peace which was concluded at ratisbonne between your majesty and the house of austria , by reason that as it was agreed on by your ambassador on conditions , which the emperour himself was sensible he had no power to grant ; for that reason it cannot be plac'd in the number of your actions . but if the world considers , that tho' the fault of your ambassador could not be imputed to you ; as it requir'd a great deal of goodness to suffer it , it requir'd no less address to repair it in some measure , and not to lose the fruit of a peace which was so necessary to this state , at a time in which your majesty had so many crosses . this action will be look'd upon as one of the greatest you ever did , and consequently such as cannot be omitted in this place . reason and conduct of state did require an exemplary punishment of him , who had exceeded your orders in so nice a point , and in so important an occasion : but your goodness ty'd up the hands of your justice , by reason that tho' there was no ambassadour but himself , he had not acted alone in that affair , but with an associate of such a quality , as made you rather consider the motive of the fault , than the fault it self . they were both surpriz'd to that degree with the extream illness you fell into at lions , that they acted rather according to the condition into which the kingdom would have been by your loss , than that in which it was , and according to the orders they had receiv'd . notwithstanding the ill conditions of their treaties , the imperialists were soon after forc'd to restore mantua ; the dread of your arms oblig'd them to restore what they had usurp'd over the venetians and grisons ; and after your majesty had suffer'd the duke of savoy's forces to enter into pignerol , and into the fort and valley of perouse , according to the treaty of querasque : you agreed so well with him , that by vertue of a new treaty those two places did remain in your majesty's hands , to the general satisfaction as well as advantage of all italy , which for the future will be less in dread of an unjust oppression , since it sets a door open to its relief . at that very time the discontents the duke of bavaria had receiv'd from the emperour and from the spaniards , and the dread which all the other electors both catholicks and protestants were in of being divested of their states , like many other princes at their sollicitations , having induc'd them secretly to desire your assistance , your majesty treated so dexterously with them , and with so much success , that they hinder'd , even in the emperour's presence , the election of the king of the romans , notwithstanding the dyet of ratisbone had only been conven'd to that end . after which , to pleasure the said duke of bavaria , and to satisfie the electors , as well as to confirm them in their resolution , of rendring the catholick league not only independent of the empire , but of spain also , which usurp'd the direction of it ; your ambassadors kept so good a correspondence with those princes , that they facilitated the means to them of depriving walstein of the command of the armies of the empire , which prov'd very prejudicial to his majesty's affairs . your majesty's credit prov'd as great towards the north , since the baron de charnau , without the title of ambassador , procur'd almost at the same time a peace between the kings of poland and of sweden ; a peace which had been attempted in vain by many other potentates . the said peace gave way to the enterprize the king of sweden made soon after , to prevent the oppression of the princes of the empire , in germany ; which design was no sooner known to your majesty , but to prevent the prejudice the catholick religion might receive by it , you made a treaty with him , which oblig'd him not to interrupt the exercise thereof in all the places of his conquest . i am sensible that your enemies , who endeavour to justifie their own actions , by crying down yours , have us'd their best endeavours to render that agreement odious ; but their design had no other effect , than to discover their malice . your majesty's innocence is the more apparent , in that your ambassador never enter'd into any treaty with that conquerour , until six months after his entring into germany ; which evidently justifies , that the conditions that were made with the said prince were the remedy of the evil , of which they could not be esteem'd the cause . the treaties that were made not only with that great king , but also with many other princes of germany , are the more just , in that they were absolutely necessary for the safety of the duke of mantua unjustly attack'd , and for that of all italy , over which spain had no less right , than over the dominion of that poor prince , since they thought their convenience a sufficient right . the danger this kingdom had been reduc'd to by the division the spaniards had openly fomented in your royal house , oblig'd your majesty to seek out proper expedients to resettle it . monsieur having left the court of france for the third time , by divers artifices , which the spaniards certainly were the principal authors of ; and the cardinal infant having receiv'd the queen your mother in flanders , as he did at that time ; it is natural to conclude , that unless those good neighbours had been employ'd at home , they would have proceeded farther , and would have employ'd themselves at your majesty's cost in this kingdom . it was absolutely necessary to remove the storm , and moreover to prepare to sustain the effort of it , in case it could not be avoided . for that reason , after your majesty was assur'd of a potent diversion , you did like those , who , in order to prevent the plague , which the corruption of the air threatens them with , carefully purge themselves ; being perswaded that the best and safest way to secure themselves from external injuries , is to cleanse the inside . god's providence prov'd so favourable to you on that occasion , that those who , animating the queen and monsieur against france , thought thereby to put them in a way to do it a great deal of harm , only rendred them incapable of doing any ; and your conduct appear'd so much the more wonderful on that occasion , that in recalling the one , and desiring the return of the other , your goodness towards them was evident to all the world , while the effects of your justice fell upon those who had advis'd them to take such ill measures . the duke de bellegarde was depriv'd of the government of burgundy , and consequently of the keyes of the gates he had open'd to monsieur , to let him out of the kingdom . the duke d' elboeuf was likewise turn'd out of that of picardy , which your majesty had lately given him . the duke of guise being conscious of his faults , retiring into italy , when you call'd him to court , there to give an account of his actions ; that criminal retreat made him lose the government the late king your father had honour'd him with . thus your majesty was deliver'd of ungrateful faithless governours , and burgundy , picardy and provence , provinces of great consideration , remain'd in your hands , free from those dangerous spirits . you gave the first to the first prince of your blood , who was passionately desirous of it ; and thereby you prudently interess'd him in the affairs of the time , and fill'd monsieur with anxious thoughts , who , with reason , dreaded nothing so much in the world , as the establishment of a person who came up so close to him . you bestow'd the second on the duke of chevreuse a prince of lorrain , to shew , that faults are personal ; and that your indignation extended only on those of that family , who had made themselves guilty by their ill conduct . you gratify'd the marshal de vitri with the third , as well upon the account of his loyalty , as because that being upheld by your authority , he was naturally capable to oppose him who had lost it . in the mean time the declarations you caus'd to be register'd in the parliament , were highly approv'd of by every body ; seeing that in condemning the authors and adherents of the queen and of monsieur's flight ▪ you excus'd those two persons , who are as dear as nearly related to your majesty , altho' the contrary had been done formerly on the same occasions . your majesty eluded with a great deal of vigilancy divers designs , and many enterprizes meditated and attempted in the queen and monsieur's names ; and you shew'd so much patience on those unhappy occurrences , that i may almost affirm , that you made nothing known of their ill conduct , but what you could not dissemble . nevertheless , in order to stop the course , and remove the license wherewith all things seem'd lawful to be undertaken under their shadow , you caus'd the marshal de marillac's head to be cut off , with so much the more reason , that being condemned with justice , the present constitution of the state requir'd a great example . those great and vexatious affairs did not hinder you from repressing , with as much authority as reason , certain enterprizes of the parliament of paris , which had been tolerated in many other occasions ; which is more remarkable , in that it was done during the heat of the discontents of the queen and of monsieur , and of ▪ all their adherents , than for the thing it self . afterwards monsieur enter'd france with sword in hand , at the instigation of the spaniards , and of the duke of lorrain , with forces , of which those good neighbours had furnish'd the greatest part . one should have thought , that the news your majesty receiv'd at that time of his being expected in languedoc by the d. de montmorency , who had a great authority in that province , which he was governour of , should have put a stop to the design which had led you in lorrain to disingage that duke out of the ill party he had espous'd ; but finishing what you had begun to so good an end , you caus'd monsieur your brother to be pursu'd so close by the marshal de schomberg , and you follow'd him so soon your self , after having receiv'd three places from the duke of lorrain as pledges of his faith , that all the efforts of those who were leagu'd against you prov'd ineffectual . the victory which your majesty's forces , commanded by that marshal , obtain'd at castelnaudari , was as certain an argument of the blessing of god on your majesty , as the favours you afterwards granted to monsieur , and to his followers , when the ill state of his affairs might have induc'd you to use them otherwise , was an evident testimony of your goodness . the sincerity wherewith you observ'd all the promises , which were made to them in your name at beziers ; tho' you were sensible that puy-laurens's only design was to avoid the danger he was in , under the pretence of repentance , which he could avoid no other way , was also as authentick a proof of your majesty's great courage , as of your inviolable faith ▪ the chastisement of the duke de montmorency , who never could contain himself from making an inlet to all manner of dangerous rebellions at all times ; and particularly , when an heir apparent of the crown made himself , by ill counsel , head of those who swerv'd from their duty , shew'd all the world that your steadiness equal'd your prudence . that punishment also shew'd , that your servants preferr'd publick good before private interest ; since on that occasion they resisted the sollicitations of several persons , whom it behov'd them to have a great deal of consideration for , as well as the threatnings of monsieur , which puy-laurens carry'd to that degree , as to declare , that in case montmorency were put to death , monsieur would find a time to make them suffer the same fate . the patience wherewith you have born the new conspiracies which puy-laurens form'd in flanders , in monsieur's name , who retir'd thither for the third time , is altogether like that which induces a father to excuse the bahaviour which one of his children is inspir'd with , after having laid aside his obedience . that which has induc'd you to bear as long as the good of the state and your own conscience would permit you , the malice and levity which have often induc'd the duke of lorrain to arm against you , is a virtue which has but few examples in history . the goodness which has prevail'd with you to be contented , for the reparation of his second faults , with the deposition of some places , capable to keep him within the bounds of his duty , had not his folly equall'd his breach of faith , will be found perhaps the more singular , in that there are few princes who lose the opportunity of making themselves masters of a neighbouring state , when they have a lawful subject and power at once so to do . after so many relapses committed by the duke your vassal , after he had snatch'd away from you , contrary to his faith , against divine and humane right , a pledge almost as precious as your state ; the prudence wherewith you divested him , when his malice and inconstancy could receive no other remedies but the utmost extremities ; is the more to be commended , because , that had you done it sooner , your justice might have been call'd in question . neither could you tarry longer , without shewing your self insensible , and without committing by omission a fault , equal unto that which a prince should commit in divesting another without a cause . what ought we not to say of the good nature , which has enclin'd you to procure monsieur's return into france for the third time ; when there seemed no longer to be any reason to trust his faith , after the divers relapses and extraordinary infidelities of his followers ? many thought with reason , that he could never come back again , without exposing your most faithful servants ; and yet they were the only persons who did sollicit your majesty to draw him out of the peril into which he had expos'd himself . that action will meet but few examples in antiquity , if we consider the circumstances of it ; and perhaps but little imitation of it for the future . as no body could , without a great deal of boldness , advise your majesty to grant monsieur , contrary to your own sentiments , a notable augmentation of power , the government of a province , and a strong place , in order to recall him out of lorrain , the first time he went out of the kingdom ; so it requir'd a great deal of firmness to resist the instances he made for a whole year together , to have one given him upon the frontier , where he design'd to retire in quitting flanders . it was no small happiness that those two counsels succeeded so well , that the concession of the first place occasion'd his first return ; and yet prov'd so innocent a cause , that being useful on that occasion , they could not make ▪ an ill use of it since , when his adherents endeavour'd it . and that the refusal of the second was so far from hindring him to return to his duty , and into his native country , the only place of his safety ; that on the contrary , it induc'd him to return back again with as good an intention , as he and his have confess'd since , it was bad , when under pretence of the safety of his person , he desir'd a retreat to disturb the growing peace of france anew . the extraordinary favours your majesty granted to puy-laurens , to induce him to inspire a good conduct to his master , are so worthy of remembrance , that they must not be forgotten in this place . the punishment he receiv'd , when you discover'd that he continu'd to abuse your favours , was too just and too necessary not to insert it afterwards . i am persuaded that posterity will observe three things , which are very considerable on that subject : an entire resignation of all interests , but such as related to the publick good , in your creatures ; who having receiv'd him by your express command into their alliance , nevertheless advis'd you to secure him , because the good of the state requir'd it : a great prudence in performing that action in the presence of monsieur , who could not near hand disapprove a council which he would have dreaded for himself at a distance ; had not experience made him sensible , that he was not aim'd at . a great boldness , in allowing him as much liberty as he enjoy'd before ; grounded barely upon this , that as ill counsels only had seduc'd him , the effect would cease with the cause ; and that he would be no sooner destitute of them , but he would follow by his own sentiments a method quite different from that he had been put upon . this action , and many others transacted during your majesty's reign , will , i am sure , make this pass for a certain maxim , that it is necessary on certain occasions , in which the welfare of the state is concern'd , to assume a male virtue sometimes , to exceed the bounds of common prudence ; and that it is sometimes impossible to avoid certain evils , unless something be given to fortune , or rather , to divine providence , which seldom refuses its assistance , when our exhausted wisdom can no longer furnish us with any . moreover , your conduct will be acknowledged the more just , in that those who will read the history of your life , will find , that your majesty never punishes any body , without having first endeavour'd by some extraordinary favours to retain him within the bounds of his duty . the marshal d'ornano was made marshal to that end . the grand prior was certain of the command of the sea , when he perverted his brother's mind ; and both gave you cause to deprive them of their liberty . the marshal de bassompierre only subsisted by your favours , when his way of speaking and of behaving himself at court oblig'd you to confine him to the bastille . the lord keeper marillac was the more oblig'd to perform his duty , because the height to which his good fortune had elevated him , left him no room to desire any thing , tho' never so ambitious . the marshal his brother settled in verdun , and elevated to an office of the crown , had all the reason imaginable to avoid the fate he deserved by his ingratitude , and by his evil behaviour . the several commands the duke de montmorency had had in your armies , tho' he was as yet very young to deserve them , the office of marshal of france , the free access your majesty gave him to your person , and the familiarity he had with your creatures , were ▪ favours and privileges sufficient to hinder him from flying to his ruine . chateauneuf had been so lately honour'd with the seals , when his ill proceedings were first discover'd , that there is reason to suspect , that at the beginning of his magistracy he had the same intentions , as when he ended it . nevertheless , that first place of justice to which your majesty rais'd him , contrary to his expectation , an hundred thousand crowns he receiv'd from your liberality in one year , the government of one of your provinces , which are extraordinary favours for a man of his profession , were not sufficient considerations to hinder him from being the promoter of his own ruine . the several and great favours puy-laurens receiv'd in a short time from your majesty's goodness are so extraordinary , that those who will know them , will perhaps be more surpriz'd at them , than at his ill proceeding , which is usual enough in persons whom fortune raises in an instant without desert . the indemnity of his crimes , which your majesty granted him at his return from flanders , will not be thought inconsiderable by posterity . the immense sums he receiv'd from your liberality , the government of bourbonnois , the quality of duke and peer , and my alliance , were sufficient engagements to keep any other man within the bounds of his duty ; but he was not capable of prescribing any to himself . when count de cramail was put into the bastille , he had lately receiv'd , by his being recall'd to court , an instance of the remission of his first faults . but that favourable treatment did not hinder him from resuming his former course , in acting against the present state of affairs , and in endeavouring to make your majesty alter your ancient conduct , of which the events justify'd the happiness , and the blessing of god the justice . the choice that was made of the marshal de vitry for provence , oblig'd him to live very warily in so great an employment , which his courage and fidelity had procur'd him . but his greediness and haughty insolent behaviour did not contribute little to deprive him of it , to place him in a government of less extent . if i must speak of those that were barely remov'd from court , what obligations had not the duke de bellegarde receiv'd from your majesty , and from your servants ? the goodness of the one , and the address of the other , had freed him out of some troubles into which his exceeding vanity , and the unruliness of his passions had engag'd him . he was a duke by your favour , and the more oblig'd to behave himself well with monsieur , when he assisted him to get out of the kingdom , because you had setled him in the first places of his houshold , which he stood in great need of . from being a poor ordinary gentleman , thoiras was seen to rise in an instant to the degree of a marshal of france , so loaden with favours , that he receiv'd not only the best employments , and the greatest governments of the kingdom , but over and above upwards of six hundred thousand crowns in gratifications . la fargis had all the reason imaginable to beliave her self well ; since your majesty , by placing her with the queen your consort , had put her above the discourses that were made of her . the dukes de guise and d' elboeuf have receiv'd , to the knowledge of all the world ; incredible favours from your majesty . while the princess of conty was most zealous in forming of cabals , she drew a great deal of money out of your exchequer for the sale of chateaurenault ; but that was not sufficient to keep her within the bounds of her duty . the duke de la valette's removal , tho' voluntary , and not forc'd , giving me an occasion to put him in this classis ; i cannot forbear observing , that a little before his solliciting monsieur your brother , and the count of soissons , to employ your army , which they commanded at that time , against your person , your majesty had honour'd him with the quality of duke and peer : neither can i forbear adding , that in order to engage him the more in your service , you were pleas'd to allow his alliance with those who were altogether inseparable from it ; and that in consideration of my said alliance , you had granted him the survivorship of the government of guyenne , and added livres to the revenue of his place of colonel of the infantry . to which i may add , that the pardon your majesty was pleas'd to grant him , out of an extraordinary goodness for so foul and so shameful a crime , averr'd by the mouth of two princes , whose testimony was undeniable , could not hinder his weakness and jealousie against the prince of conde and the archbishop of bourdeaux , or his design of crossing your affairs , from doing a very shameful thing , in losing the occasion of taking fontarabia , when the enemies could no longer defend it . if it be an effect of singular prudence to have withstood all the forces of the enemies of your state , with those of your allies , by putting your hand into your purse , and not to your arms. to have made an open war , when your allies were no longer able to subsist alone , is another of wisdom and courage together , which justifies sufficiently , that managing the repose of your kingdom , you have done like those oeconomists , who having been careful to lay up money , know how to spend it prudently , to prevent a greater loss . to have at one and the same time made divers attacks in divers places , which was never done by the romans or ottomans , will undoubtedly be look'd upon by many as a great piece of imprudence and rashness . and yet as it is a proof of your power , it is a greater yet of your judgment ; since it was necessary to cut out so much work on all parts to your enemies , that they might be invincible in none . the war of germany was somewhat forc'd , since that part of europe was the stage on which it was begun long ago . altho' that of flanders had not the success which might have been expected , yet it was impossible not to look upon it as advantagious in the project . that of the grisons was necessary to engage the princes of italy to take arms , by removing their dread of the germans : and to encourage those that had taken them in germany , by shewing them , that italy was not in a condition to succour the enemies they had in their country : that of italy was no less material ; both because it was the ready way to engage the duke of savoy , and by reason that the milaneze being as it were the heart of the territories that are possess'd by the spaniards ; it was necessary to attack that part. moreover , considering that your majesty had allies on all parts , who were to join their forces to yours ; it must be concluded , that it was evident by that union , that the spaniards being attack'd in divers places , should be forc'd to submit to the effort of your power . and yet during the course of that war , which lasted five years , no ill accident ever befell you , but what seem'd only to be permitted for your glory . in . the army your majesty sent into the low countries , as soon as they came there , won a famous battel , before their being join'd with that of the states general : and if the prince of orange , commanding both , had no success suitable to those great forces , and to what was expected from a captain of his reputation , the fault of it cannot be imputed to you . having submitted your arms to the command of that prince , it was his part to pursue the point of an army he receiv'd victorious . but the slowness of a heavy nation could not improve the eagerness of yours , which requires execution rather than counsel ; and which by dallying , loses the advantage which their fiery nature gives them over others . that very year the forces of the empire having pass'd the rhine at brisac , came so near your frontiers , that tho' you could not free them from fear , yet you freed them from the losses your enemies sustain'd . one of the finest armies the emperour had put on foot for a long while perish'd in lorrain ; and their loss prov'd the more considerable , in that the bare patience of those who commanded your forces in those parts occasion'd it . at the same time the duke of rohan , favour'd by the principal heads of the grisons , who desir'd their liberty , enter'd happily into their country with open force , seiz'd the most considerable passes and posts , and fortify'd them , notwithstanding the opposition which the neighbourhood of the milaneze enabled the spaniards to make conveniently . the dukes of savoy and of crequi , who did command your armies in italy , took a fort in the milaneze , and built another upon the po , which prov'd a dangerous thorn to your enemies . in . the cowardise of three governours of your frontier towns having given the spaniards a footing into this kingdom , and cheaply enabled them to acquire considerable advantages : without being discourag'd , when all seem'd to be lost , in six weeks time you rais'd so powerful an army , that it might have been able totally to destroy your enemies , had those to whom you entrusted the command of it , employ'd it as they should have done . their failures oblig'd you to put your self at the head of it ; and god assisted you to that degree , that that very year , in the sight of those who had only taken those places because you were distant from them , you retook the only one which was of importance to your state. you overcame many difficulties in that expedition , which were created by your own men ; who being prejudic'd by ignorance or malice , highly disapprov'd so great a design . if you did not succeed in the siege of dole , the reason which obliges every one to run to that which is most pressing , was the only cause of it . your majesty remov'd your forces from thence with great prudence , since it concern'd you more to retake corbie than to take dole . at that time galas entring this kingdom with the main forces of the empire , to which the duke of lorrain join'd himself with his . they were both driven out of burgundy with the shame of raising the siege of st. john de laune , a weak place , and the loss of part of their cannon , and of so great a number of men , that out of wherewith they entred this kingdom , they did not march out ten. the river tosino was witness that very year of an action no less fortunate in italy , where your forces gain'd a famous and bloody combat . and you had advantages in valtelina , which were the more considerable , by reason that your enemies , having often taken the resolution to engage your forces , in order to drive them out of it by force , they never attempted to put their design in execution , but fighting and being beaten , prov'd one and the same thing to them . in , you took two places from your enemies in flanders , and retook one of those which had been deliver'd up to them the year before by the cowardise of the governours . a third being besieg'd in the country of luxemburg , was taken soon after ; and your enemy suffer'd as much damage by the entrance of your armies in their country , as they design'd to make you suffer the same way . if the panick fear of him who commanded your forces in valtelina , and the infidelity of some of those , for whose liberty you had sent them thither , made you lose , through cowardise and treachery together , the advantages you had acquir'd there by force and reason : that year was happily crown'd by the retaking of the isles of st. margaret and o●… st. honorat ; and by the relief of lucare , besieg'd by the spaniards . by the first of those two actions , two thousand five hundred french landed at noon-day in an island , kept by as many spaniards and italians ; an island fortify'd by five regular forts , joyn'd to one another by lines of communication , which enclos'd it almost entirely by a good parapet . your men fought at their landing , and beat your enemies which oppos'd them ; and after having forc'd the major part of them to retire into their ramparts , they forc'd them out of them in six weeks time , foot after foot , by as many sieges as there were forts ; tho' one of them was compos'd of five bastions royal , so well provided with cannon , and with men , and all other necessaries , that it seem'd a rashness to attack it . by the second , a potent army , so well retrench'd , that there was but one head of a thousand fathom by which it could be attack'd ; a head so well fortify'd , that at every distance of two hundred paces there were forts and redoubts , garnish'd with cannon , and lin'd with infantry , was attack'd in the night , and forc'd by an army , which , tho' inferiour in number , did nevertheless defeat it wholly , after several combats . those two actions are so extraordinary , that one cannot say they are signal effects of the courage of men , without adding , that they were seconded by the providence and hand of god , who visibly fights for us . in . tho' the beginning of the year prov'd unfortunate to you in italy , at st. omer , and at fontarabia , by the ill fate of arms , and by the imprudence , cowardise , or malice of some of those who commanded yours , the end crown'd the work by the taking of brisac , after a long siege , two battels , and divers combats attempted to relieve it . moreover , as soon as you had notice of the ill event of the siege of st. omers , your majesty repair'd in person to the place , where there was reason to expect some dangerous events : you put a stop to the course of the misfortunes of your arms , by taking and demolishing renty , which greatly incommoded the frontier . after which le castelet , the only place of yours then remaining in your enemies hands , was taken by force in sight of them , without their daring to oppose the effects of your arms. the naval engagement , in which gallies and ships of dunkirk , all retir'd into the bay of gattary , under five land-batteries , not daring to keep the sea before of yours , were all burnt or sunk , with the loss of five or six thousand men , of guns , and a considerable store of ammunitions of war for the relief of fontarabia , are great amends , not for the losses you sustain'd at st. omer and fontarabia , which were not considerable , but for the gains you missed in not taking the said places . if to this advantage we join that which you had before , when your arms made your enemies lose , in the port of passage , great ships , a great number of guns , colours , and all sorts of ammunitions , it will be found , that if the spaniards mark this year as being favourable to them , they esteem themselves happy when their misfortunes are less than their fears . finally , the combat of the gallies , perhaps the most famous that ever was fought at sea , where of yours attack'd as many of spain , and fought them with so much advantage , that your enemies lost between four and five thousand men , and six gallies ; among which the admiral and two patrones did not a little signalize that action . this combat , i say , shews , that the prudence of your conduct has not only been accompany'd with good fortune , but also , that the boldness of your commanders has been seconded . several things are observable in this war. the first thing is , that your majesty only engag'd into it , because you could not avoid it ; and that you only laid down your arms when it was proper so to do . this remark is the more glorious for your majesty , in that you were often sollicited by your allies to take arms , and still refus'd to do it ; and that during the war your enemies often propos'd a particular peace to you , which you would never hearken to , because you could not forsake the interest of your allies . those who shall know , that your majesty has been forsaken by several princes , who were engag'd with you , without abandoning any of them ; and that notwithstanding some of those who did remain steady in your party , fail'd you in many important things , they have still receiv'd effects from your majesty suitable to your promises ; those , i say , will acknowledge , that if your majesty's good fortune has appear'd in the success of your affairs , your virtue equals your good fortune . i am sensible , that had you broken your word , it would have lessen'd your reputation considerably , and that the least loss of that kind in a great prince is irreparable . but it is no small matter to have perform'd ones duty in sundry occasions , in which vengeance , and the quiet which is naturally desir'd after a war , induce one to do the contrary . it requir'd no less prudence than force , nor less effort of mind than of arms , to persist almost alone in the same design , which was to have been prosecuted by the union of many . nevertheless it is most true , that the defection of several princes * of germany ; that the duke of parma's being oblig'd to abandon your party through the necessity of his affairs ; that the duke of mantua's death , and the levity of his dowager-mother to the young duke , who was no sooner mistress , but forgetting all her obligations to france , she turn'd publickly against it ; that the decease of the duke of savoy , and the imprudence of his widow , who lost her self , because she would not receive the assistance that was offer'd her ; i say , it is most true , that all these accidents never shook your majesty's resolution ; and tho' they alter'd the state of your affairs , they did not hinder you from persisting in your designs . the second remark worthy of great consideration on this subject is , that your majesty never would condescend to free your self from the perils of war , by exposing christendom to that of the ottoman arms , which were often offer'd to you . your majesty was not ignorant , that you might have accepted such a succours with justice ; and yet that knowledge could not prevail with you to take a resolution dangerous for religion , but advantagious to obtain a peace . the example of some of your predecessors , and of divers princes of the house of austria , who do particularly affect to appear as religious before god , as they are in reality to their own interests , prov'd too weak to induce you to do that , which history informs us has often been practis'd by others . the third circumstance , which has caus'd a great deal of wonder in this war , is , the vast number of armies , and of sums , which were requir'd to sustain the same . the greatest princes on earth having ever made a difficulty of undertaking two wars at once , posterity will have much a-do to believe , that this kingdom was capable to keep up separately , and at their own charge , three land , and two naval armies , besides those of their allies , towards the subsistence of which they contributed considerably . yet it is most certain , that besides a potent army of foot , and between and horse , which you kept all along in picardy , to attack your enemies , you had another in the same province , compos'd of foot and horse , to defend the entrance of that frontier . it is moreover true , that you kept one all along in champagne of the same number with this last . one in burgundy of the same strength . one no less powerful in germany . another as considerable in italy , and another in valtelina at certain times . and what is most to be admir'd , the major part of them were design'd more to attack than to stand upon the defensive . although your predecessors despis'd the sea to that degree , that the late king your father had not one ship , your majesty nevertheless during the whole course of this war , kept gallies and ships in the mediterranean , and about well mann'd in the ocean . which has not only prevented your enemies designs upon your coasts , but has done them as much harm as they design'd to do us . moreover , you have yearly assisted the hollanders with livres , and sometimes more ; and the duke of savoy with upwards of a million . the crown of sweden with the like sum. the landgrave of hesse with rixdollars ; and divers other princes with divers other sums , according as occasions did require it . by reason of which excessive charges , the expences of every one of the five years , during which france has supported that war , has amounted to upwards of millions ; which is the more to be admir'd , in that it has been done without taking the sallary of officers , without touching the revenue of private persons , and even without demanding any alienation of the fund of the clergy , all extraordinary means , which your predecessors have often been oblig'd to have recourse to , in less considerable wars . thus millions of expence every one of those five years ; an hundred and fifty thousand foot both in your armies and garrisons , and upwards of thirty thousand horse , will be an immortal argument to posterity of the power of this crown . if i add , that these different occupations did not hinder you at the same time from fortifying your frontiers to that degree , that whereas they were open on all parts before to your enemies , they cannot look on them now without amazement , i shall touch a new point no less considerable to posterity , since that as this kingdom is thereby secur'd for ever , it will receive as much benefit by it for the future , as your majesty has endur'd labour and pain iu the performance . those whom history will acquaint with the crosses your majesty has met with in all your great designs , through the envy your prosperities , and the fear of your power , have created in divers foreign princes , by the want of faith of some of your allies , by the treachery of some of your subjects , by a brother ill counsell'd at some times , by a mother always possess'd by ill-dispos'd minds , after her having depriv'd her self of your majesty's councils , and separated her interests from those of your state ; being sensible , that such obstacles are no small heightnings to your glory ; being sensible also , that great hearts having form'd great designs , cannot be with-held by the difficulties they meet in the same : if they consider besides the natural levity of this nation , the impatience of the souldiers , little us'd to the inevitable fatigues attending the course of wars ; and finally , the weakness of the instruments you were forc'd to make use of on those occasions , among which i take the first place , they will be forc'd to own , that nothing could supply the defect of the tools , but the excellence of your majesty , who was the workman . moreover , if they consider , that overcoming all those obstacles , you have attain'd the conclusion of a peace , in which the defect of some of your allies , and the affection you have had for them , have oblig'd you to relinquish part of what you had conquer'd by your own forces , they will needs be oblig'd to acknowledge , that your goodness is equal to your power , and that in your conduct , prudence , and the blessing of god , have kept an even pace . these , sir , have been your majesty's actions hitherto , which i will esteem happily ended , if they be attended with a repose , which may allow you to bless your kingdom with all manner of advantages . in order whereunto , it is necessary to consider the several orders of your kingdom , the state they compose , your person , which is charg'd with the conduct thereof , and the means you must follow to perform it worthily ; which requires nothing in general , but to have a good and faithful council , to esteem their advice , and to follow reason in the principles it prescribes for the government of your kingdom : 't is to that i will reduce the remainder of this work , treating those matters distinctly in divers chapters , subdivided into divers sections , in order to explain them the more methodically . reformation of the divers orders of the state . one might make whole volumes upon the subject of the several orders of this kingdom ; but the scope of my design not being the same with many others , who aim at nothing but to discourse well upon all the parts of a state , without considering whether the publick will receive any benefit by their discoursing , or not . i will only endeavour to represent to your majesty in few words , what is necessary to procure the welfare of all your subjects in their several conditions . chap. ii. of the reformation of the ecclesiastical order . section i. which represents the ill state of the church at the beginning of the king's reign ; the present state thereof ; and what is necessary to be done to put it in that in which it ought to be . when i remember to have seen gentlemen and other lay persons , in my youth , who held not only the major part of priories and abbies , but also of cures and bishoprick in commendam ; and when i consider that in my first years there was such a licentiousness in monasteries of both sexes , that nothing but scandals and ill examples were met with in places where edification was to be look'd for , i own that it is no small satisfaction to me , to see those disorders absolutely banish'd under your majesty's reign ; and that the said tenures and the disorders of monasteries are scarcer than lawful possessions and orderly communities were at that time . the best method , in my opinion , for your majesty to continue and to increase that blessing , is to take a particular care to place persons of merit and of exemplary lives , in bishopricks ; to bestow abbies and other simple benefices of your nomination on persons of probity ; to deprive those who lead licentious lives in so holy a station , as that is which unites men particularly to god ; of your sight and favours , and to make an exemplary punishment of the scandalous . i might propose many other expedients for the reformation of the clergy ; but provided your majesty will be pleas'd to observe these four conditions , and to use virtuous men of that profession favourably , you will discharge your duty , and will render the ecclesiasticks of your state either such as they ought to be , or at least so prudent , as to endeavour to become so . to that end it is my duty to represent to your majesty , that it is very necessary to take care not to be mistaken in your judgment of the capacity of bishops . a man may be learned , may be capable , and yet not fit for that function ; which besides science , requires zeal , courage , vigilancy , piety , charity and activity together . it is not sufficient to be an honest man , to make a good bishop ; for he must be good for others as well as for himself . i have often had a dread that men of quality would hardly contain themselves within the bounds of their duty , and that they are less regular in their lives than others : many others being mov'd with that fear , are of opinion , that doctors of a good life , and low birth , are fitter for those employments , than those who are of higher extraction : but there are many things to be consider'd on that subject . a bishop ought to be learned , full of piety , zeal , well born ; by reason that the authority requir'd in such places is only to be found in persons of quality . but as it is difficult to meet all those qualifications in one and the same person , i will be bold to say , that good manners , which must be consider'd above all things , being suppos'd , quality and authority , which are commonly companions , are to be preferr'd before great science ; having often seen very learned men who made very ill bishops , either for not being able to govern , upon the account of their low extraction , or for living too near , according to their birth , which borders upon avarice ; whereas nobility , which is attended by virtue , commonly has a particular desire of honour and of glory , which produces the same effects as zeal , occasion'd by the pure love of god ; that they generally live with a splendour and liberality conformable to that dignity ; and better understand the manner of behaving themselves in , and conversing with the world. above all things , a bishop must be humble and charitable , have learning and piety , a steady courage , and a great zeal for the church , and for the salvation of souls . those who aim at bishopricks out of ambition and interest , are commonly those who make their court best to obtain that by importunity , which they cannot pretend to by merit ; and therefore such must not be chosen , but those whom god calls to that vocation ; which is easily known by their different way of living ; these applying themselves to the ecclesiastical functions , that are practis'd in seminaries . and it would be very proper for your majesty to declare , that you will chuse none but such as have spent a considerable time after their studies , in applying themselves to the said functions in seminaries , which are places appointed in order thereunto ; since it is not reasonable , that the most difficult and most important profession in the world should be undertaken without having first studied it ; since no man is allow'd to exert the meanest and the most vile , without a prentiship of many years . after all , the best rule in that choice is , to have no general one ; but to chuse sometimes learned men , sometimes men that have not so much learnig , and are better born ; young men on some occasions , old ones on others ; according as men of divers conditions may be thought most fit to govern. i have always had this consideration ; but yet whatever care i have taken to make a good use of it , i own i have been sometimes mistaken ; and indeed it is very difficult not to be mistaken in judgments , which are the less easie , in that it is almost impossible to penetrate into the hearts of men , or to fix their inconstancy . they change their humour with their condition ; or rather , they discover what they dissembled till then , to obtain their ends . while such men live in misery , they make it their business to be thought much better than they are ; and when they have obtain'd their ends , they no longer constrain themselves to conceal the ill qualifications they have had all along . nevertheless , in using the precautions i propose in the said choice , you will discharge your conscience before god : and i maintain boldly , that your majesty will have nothing to fear , provided , that obliging those who shall be chosen with the said caution , to reside in their dioceses , to establish seminaries there for the instruction of their ecclesiasticks , to visit their flock , as they are oblig'd to do by the canons , you put them in a way to perform that duty effectually . i say this , sir , because it is absolutely impossible for them to do it at present , by reason of the daily encroachments your majesty's officers make upon their jurisdiction . six things are likewise to be wish'd , that the souls which are committed to their care may receive all the assistance they can expect from them . three of them depend on your own authority ; one on rome only ; and the other two on rome and your authority together . the three first are , the regulations of appeals , that of priviledg'd cases , and the suppression of the regalia , pretended by the holy chappel of paris , over the major part of the bishopricks of this kingdom , until those who are nominated for the same by your majesty have taken the oath of allegiance . the fourth is , a regulation of the plurality of the sentences requir'd by the canons , for the punishment of a crime committed by an ecclesiastick ; to the end , that the guilty may not be able to avoid the punishment they deserve , by the delays of the formalities that are practis'd . and the other two , which relate to the authority of the church and yours together , are the exemptions of the chapters , and the right of presenting to cures , which belongs to divers abbots and seculars . we must distinctly examine these cases one after another . sect . ii. of appeals , and the means to regulate the same . i do not design in this place to explain the original of appeals , as a thing , the knowledge whereof is absolutely necessary ; provided it be known how to apply a proper remedy to the said evil , it matters but little to know when it first began . i am sensible , that it is so difficult to discover the true source of that practice , that the advocate general servien us'd to say , that had he known the author of so good a regulation , he would have erected his statue . nevertheless , there is great reason to believe , that the first foundation of it arose from the confidence which the ecclesiasticks repos'd in the king 's regal authority , when being impos'd upon by the anti-popes , clement the th , benedict the th , and john the d , who fled to avignon for a refuge , they had recourse to king charles the th then reigning , to be discharg'd of the first fruits , pensions and extraordinary subsidies they often impos'd upon them . the complaints of the clergy of france having induc'd that king to make an ordinance , prohibiting the execution of the rescripts , mandates and bulls which the popes might give for the future , to the prejudice of the franchises and liberties the gallick church injoyn'd . this order gave way to the first enterprises of the king's officers over the ecclesiastical jurisdiction . nevertheless , it was no sooner made , but the fear they had of being prejudiced by it , instead of receiving the advantage they desir'd , prevail'd with the king to defer the execution of the same for some years . afterwards , the continuation of the vexations benefices were afflicted with , made it to be put in execution for some years ; after which , it was finally suppress'd by king charles vii . at the beginning of his reign , by reason of the divers abuses that were committed in the practice thereof . the experience of the abuse of such an order , oblig'd the clergy for a while patiently to bear the ill treatments they receiv'd from the officers of the court of rome . but finally , the redoubling of the exactions that were laid upon them , oblig'd them to assemble at bourges , in . to consult aboutthe means to free themselves of the same . that assembly , which was famous for the number and merit of the prelates which compos'd it , carefully examin'd the many grievances the church was afflicted with ; and concluded , that the best remedy they could apply to them , was to receive the decrees of the council of bale ; which reducing most things to the constitution of the common and canonical right , disabled the officers of the court of rome from attempting any thing against the clergy . after which , they form'd a pragmatical sanction of the decrees of that council , which they resolv'd to put in practice by the king's leave , whom they petition'd to be protector of the same . the king adhering to the supplications of his clergy , enjoyn'd his * judges royal , to cause the said pragmatical sanction to be religiously observ'd ; and 't is from thence the grievances the church labours under at this time in this kingdom , by the interposition of the king's officers ; receiv'd a new force , after the beginning they had had under the reign of charles vi. and it is also from thence the parliaments have taken an occasion to assume the cognisance of the greatest part of what only belongs to the tribunal of the church of god. it was very easie for them to attribute to themselves , to the exclusion of subaltern or inferiour judges , what had been at first only committed to them , and to extend their power under that pretence beyond its lawful bounds , since they had none but inferiours to encounter with . in the establishment of the first order , made to remedy the infractions of the pragmatical sanction , * appeals were not allowed of : they only chastised such as did obtain rescripts , or mandates , from the court of rome , against the common right , upon the bare complaint that was made and averr'd of the same , and that without taking cognisance of the merits of the cause . after which , time , which changes all things , being join'd to power , which , like fire , attracts all to it self , made them proceed from that order , establish'd for the preservation of the common right , and the franchises of the gallick church , against the attempts of rome , to the appeals ; the abuse of which , utterly annihilates the jurisdiction of the french prelates , as well as of the holy see. i am sensible , that the most subtile adherents of the parliaments , to authorize their practice , may say , that the prelates assembled at bourges , having petition'd his majesty to hinder the holy see , by his officers , from infringing the pragmatital sanction , have tacitly given him a right to oppose the contraventions that might be made to the same by themselves , which authorizes them to take cognisance of the sentences which are daily given in their tribunal . but the proverb may be alledg'd in this place , which is most true , that a bargain is nothing but what it is made ; and that it is as certain as evident , that the gallick church assembled at bourges , never thought on what these gentlemen pretend ; and moreover , that they had no reason to do it . they had recourse to the king , against the enterprizes of rome , by reason that the holy see having no superiour tribunal on earth , temporal princes alone , as protectors of the church , can put a stop to the course of the exorbitances of the officers of rome , whereas the attempts of the bishops may be repress'd by their superiours , to whom one may and ought to appeal . finally , he that gives his friend arms to defend him , can never be suppos'd to give them for his own destruction . the parliaments cannot pretend , that the protection which the prelates assembled at bourges , desir'd of the king , gives his officers a right to oppress their jurisdiction . nevertheless , as evils are greater in their progress , and in their periods , than in their beginning , the design of the parliaments , cover'd with divers pretences for a time , began to appear without a mask in the last age * under king francis i. who was the first that ever made use of the name † of appeal in his ordinances . many knowing the illegality of that practice , which the church complains of at present , will think perhaps , that since it may be abolish'd with justice , it would be proper to do it : but i 'm of opinion , that such an alteration would do more harm , than the evil they would avoid ; and that nothing but the abuse of such an order is prejudicial . whatever ground the said practice may have , it is certain , that when it was first publickly establish'd , it was only with a pretence to put a stop to the encroachments the ecclesiastical judges might attempt upon the king 's royal jurisdiction . in process of time , they have not only made use of it against the transgressors of the ordinances of the kingdom , which include many matters besides jurisdiction , but they have also extended it to the infractions of the holy canons , and of the decrees of the church , and of the holy see ; and finally , by excess of abuse to all sorts of matters , in which the laicks pretend a lezion of polity , which they maintain only belongs to the king's officers . one might reasonably desire to have the effect of this remedy reduc'd to its first foundation , which had no extent beyond attempts upon the royal jurisdiction , which is sufficiently regulated by the first article of the ordinance of . but to remove all pretence of lezion from the officers of the prince , and to hinder them from pretending with any appearance , that it is impossible for them to get the ordinances observ'd , by reason of the enterprizes of the church ; i am of opinion , that they may consent to the said appeals , when the judges shall pronounce directly against the ordinances ; which is the only case in which charles ix . and henry iii. by the th article of ▪ the ordinance of blois required them to be admitted . provided they be not extended under that pretence to the transgression of the canons and decrees , because many ordinances , particularly the * capitularies of charlemagne , often contain the same substance with those of the church . i am sensible , that it will be difficult to make so exact an indiction of the ordinances to this end , but that sometimes there will be abuses in whatever regulation may be made . but it is certain , that there is no difficulty in the will of the king's officers , who shall be employ'd to put his in execution : the order which he will be pleas'd to give them , will serve them as a rule without any trouble . the pretence which the parliaments use , that when ecclesiastical judges judge against the canons and decrees , of which kings are the executors and protectors , they have the power to correct the abuse of their sentences , is a pretence so void of all appearance of justice , that it is altogether insupportable . should the whole church judge against the canons and decrees , one might say , that the king , who is the protector of the same , might and ought to maintain them in an extraordinary manner by his own authority : but since , when a judge gives a sentenee against their tenor , the said sentence may be revers'd , and he corrected by his superiour , the officers of the prince cannot , without invading the priestly office , and without a manifest abuse , do that which only belongs to those that are particularly consecrated to god : and when they do so , before the last sentence of the church is given , their attempt is not only void of justice , but even of all appearance of justice . the endeavours of the parliaments also to translate all the spiritual and ecclesiastical jurisdiction , to the tribunal of princes , under pretence of temporal justice , is no less void of ground and of appearance : and yet there is no presidial or judge royal , but will ordain the time of processions , the hour of high masses , and many other ceremonies , under colour of publick convenience ; thus the accessary becomes the principal : and whereas the service of god should preceed all things , and be the rule of civil actions , it will no longer be in force , than while the temporal officers of princes will be pleas'd to allow it . i am very sensible , that sometimes the male-administration of justice of those who exert the ecclesiastical jurisdiction , and the tediousness of the formalities prescrib'd by the canons , give a specious pretence to the incroachments of the king's officers ; but it cannot be with reason , since one inconvenience does not establish another , but obliges to correct both ; which is what i design to shew hereafter . i would willingly pass under silence the pretension which the parliaments have to render every thing abusive which is judg'd against their decrees , to which , by that means , they would give the force of ordinances , if i were not oblig'd to shew , that this abuse is the less supportable , in that they endeavour by that encroachment to equal their authority to that of their master and of their king. the detriment the church receives by such encroachments , is the more insupportable , in that it hinders the prelates absolutely from performing their office. when a bishop designs to punish an ecclesiastick , he strait removes from under his jurisdiction by an appeal ; if in making his visitation he makes any ordinance , the effect of it is immediately stopt , by reason , that tho' in matters of discipline appeals are only by way of devolution , yet the parliaments make them suspensive against all manner of reason . in fine , we may affirm with truth , that the church is fetter'd ; and that , if her ministers are not blind , yet their hands are tied ; insomuch that tho' they know the evil , it is not in their power to redress it . that which comforts me in this extremity , is , that what is impossible to the church on this subject , will be very easie to your majesty , on whose bare will the remedy such disorders depends . the first thing that is to be done in order thereunto , is , to prohibit those appeals for the future ; unless in the case of a visible attempt upon the royal jurisdiction , and of an evident transgression of the ordinances , which only relate to the temporal authority of kings , and not to the spiritual authority of the church . this ordinance being suppos'd , if in order to have it regularly observ'd , your majesty will be pleas'd to make a regulation containing six heads . you will at once put a stop to the incroachments of the church , and of the parliaments . the first head of that regulation must order all appeals of this kind to be seal'd with the great seal , for the parliament of paris ; and that in all others , which the distance of your court obliges to make use of the privy seal , they may not be seal'd before three ancient advocates have affirm'd under their hands , that there is cause of abuse , submitting to a fine , in case it be found otherwise . the second must declare , that all appeals made in point of discipline , shall be only by way of * devolution , and not of suspension . the third must order the abuse complain'd of to be specify'd both in the appeal , and in the sentence that shall be given upon the same ; which is the more necessary , in that it often comes to pass , that tho' there is only an errour in point of formality , or in some particular head of the sentence , which contains many , when the parliament declares that there is an error or abuse , the sentence is held void in all things ; tho' it ought only to be so in one of its circumstances , which commonly is not very material . the fourth must oblige the parliaments to enter the causes of the said appeals upon the rolls before any others , and to call and judge them preferrably to all others , without referring the same , to avoid the delays ; which are often desir'd by those , who only aiming to elude the punishment of their crimes , endenyour to tire out their ordinaty judges , from whom they appeal ; and because it is not reasonable to deprive the publick of the administration of ecclesiastical justice , by making those who are the principal officers of it bare sollicitors before a tribunal which is inferiour to theirs . the fifth must impose a necessity on the parliaments , to fine and to condemn those to pay the costs , who shall appeal without a legal cause , without the power of remitting the same , on any account , or upon any pretence whatever ; and to send them back again before the same judges , from whom they have appeal'd without a cause ; which is the more necessary , because that without this remedy all criminals would be at liberty to free themselves of the common jurisdiction , by appealing without a cause the best ordinances and the justest regulations being often despis'd by those who ought to observe them most religiously ; and the licentiousness of soveraign courts often proceeding to that degree , as to violate or reform your orders , according to their pleasure ; the best way to render your will effectual , and to make your self to be obey'd in a point of such consequence , is to add a sixth head to the five foregoing , which will be as effectual a remedy to oblige your officers to perform their duty on that subject , as that of appeals is excellent to hinder the ecclesiastical judges from being wanting in theirs in the exercise of their jurisdiction . this remedy requires nothing but to grant the humble petition of your clergy , that your majesty would be pleas'd to allow them to appeal from you to your self ; by applying themselves to your council , whenever your parliaments shall be wanting in the observation of your orders and regulations . this is the more reasonable , in that whereas , in order to suppress the incroachments of the church , by appealing to your judges , application is made to a tribunal of an order different and inferiour by its nature ; and that in having recourse to your council , to put a stop to those of your parliaments , application is made to an order of the same kind . and undoubtedly , even those who envy the franchises of the church , can find no fault with it , since that instead of making it independent of temporal jurisdiction , it adds a degree to its subjection . finally , it will be the more advantagious to your majesty in that , as it will keep the power of the church within its own bounds ; it will also restrain that of the parliaments within the just extent , which is prescrib'd to them by reason and by your laws . and if besides your majesty's commands to your council , to exert the power they have by your authority to hinder the encroachments of all your subjects , and particularly those of your officers , who administer your justice in this kingdom , you take care to fill it , not with men , whose pretension and importunity are the best titles they can produce to obtain their ends , but with persons chosen for their merit , from among all your subjects ; you will have the satisfaction to see , that those who will not contain themselves within the bounds of their duty by reason , will be constrain'd to it by force of justice ; which will not be continu'd long , but you will find clearly , that what was forc'd in the beginning will become voluntary . sect . iii. of priviledg'd cases , and the means to regulate the same . those who consecrate themselves to god , by devoting their lives to his church , are so absolutely exempted of the temporal jurisdiction of princes , that they can only be try'd by their ecclesiastical superiours . divine right , and the law of nations , establish the said immunity clearly . the law of nations , in that it has been acknowledg'd by all nations . divine right , by the confession of all authors who have treated of it , before the modern jurisprudence of the last age. the church has enjoy'd it until the male-administration of ecclesiastical justice has open'd a way to the ambition of the officers of temporal princes to take cognizance of the same . the church also being sensible , that the misfortunes of the times hindred them from being able to redress by their own power , many disorders , which those who were under her jurisdiction were fallen into , resolv'd in order to remove all cause of complaint , upon the account of the impunity of the crimes , which were committed under the protection of her authority , to give secular judges the power to take cognizance of thm in certain priviledg'd cases ; † because they could not do it otherwise , than by virtue of the priviledge that was particularly granted them to that effect . it must be noted , that there is a difference between the cases that are styl'd priviledg'd in all states , and those that are particularly pretended such in france . the first may be reduc'd to two , which are voluntary homicide with premeditation , and manifest apostacy , as to perswade clerks to despise , and to forsake an ecclesiastical life , to quit the habit of it , and to live with scandal in the world , either in bearing arms , or in doing any other action directly contrary to their profession . the number of the second were inconsiderable at first . when the pragmatical sanction was establish'd , there were but two ; the bearing of arms , and the infraction of the king 's safeguard ; but by degrees they have been extended farther . all trespasses against the pragmatical sanction have been deem'd criminal cases . that of the * concordats has been put in the same rank . the verification of cedules before the judge royal is also deem'd of the same kind . ravishments , robberies upon the high ways , false witnesses , coining , high treason , and all enormous crimes are deem'd to be of the same nature by the parliaments . in fine , if we believe them all the faults of ecclesiasticks , even common injuries are priviledg'd cases , there are no longer common trespasses . such crimes as are granted to be priviledg'd cases , in all states , are own'd as such by the unanimous opinion of the whole church ; and many of those that are deem'd such in this kingdom , are so by abuse , and by the incroachments of the officers royal. they have been the bolder in assuming the cognizance of all the deportments of clerks , by reason that , according to the order of the canons , which requires three conformable sentences for the condemnation of their faults , it is very difficult to punish even the most notable , and impossible to do it in a short time . altho' this pretence is plausible , and that it requires a reformation of the formalities observ'd in the administration of the justice of the church ; nevertheless , the ancient lawyers could not forbear blaming the said incroachment publickly . and it is no argument to urge , that those crimes which render ecclesiasticks unworthy of their character , deprive them at the same time of their immunities ; since by such arguments many conclusions would be inferr'd as false as prejudicial , even to those ▪ who draw such consequences . the only consequence that can be inferr'd of the delays and irregularities observ'd in the administration of the justice of the church , is , that it is necessary to remedy the same ; and that as the ecclesiasticks are oblig'd so to do , so kings are oblig'd to maintain them in the immunities which god has been pleas'd to confer on his church . in order to discharge these obligations , the church is oblig'd to remedy , by the means we shall propose hereafter , the intolerable delays of these sentences , requir'd by the ancient canons ; and in the next place , to become so exact in the punishment of the crimes committed by those that are under her jurisdiction , that as soon as a scandal is discover'd , the exemplary punishment of the same may be known as soon as the offence . and the king making a declaration to express all the priviledg'd cases , which may be reduc'd to those which may be committed by such , and in all states , and in all orders ; and besides , in the bearing of arms , the infraction of the king 's safeguard , the verification of cedules , manifest apostacy , as it is above explain'd , robberies on the high way , coining , and all crimes of leze-majesty , must absolutely forbid his officers to take cognizance of any other cases , until the accus'd be sent to them by the judges of the church ; and that in case they infringe the said order , their punishment may be known almost as soon as their trespass . now since justice requires an exact knowledge of a fault before it can be punish'd ; and that kings cannot administer justice themselves to all their subjects : his majesty will discharge his obligation , in ordering his privy council to receive the complaints of the infractions made by his officers of what quality soever , to such a regulation , and to punish their incroachments severely : in which case the church being satisfy'd with such an order , will be the more careful to administer justice , when they do receive it from their prince . sect . iv. which shews the consequence of the regalia pretended by the holy chappel of paris over the bishops of france , and opens a way to suppress the same . altho' the canons of the holy chappel * of paris maintain , that the regalia was given them by st. lewis their founder : yet it is most certain , that the first grant we find of it is of charles the th , which allows them for three years only the right of enjoying the temporal revenue of the vacant bishopricks , over which the regalia should be found to have a right . the time of the said grant being expir'd , he continu'd the same for three years longer , and for the four following ; the whole on condition , that one half of the money arising thereby should be imploy'd for the maintenance of the chanters who were to perform the service ; and the other , for the reparation of the glass windows and ornaments , and for the maintenance of the choiristers , according as it should be ordain'd by the chamber of accounts of paris . charles the th being dead , his son lewis the th continu'd the same favour to the holy chappel , during his life , which was look'd upon to be so extraordinary , that the chamber of accounts would only verifie the letters patents thereof for nine years . after the reign of lewis the th , his successors charles the th , francis the st , and henry the d continu'd the same favour during their lives . charles the th went farther , * and granted to perpetuity to the holy chappel , what his predecessors had only granted them for a time . the intention those princes had is praise-worthy , since they gave a right which did belong to them to a good end . but the use those of the holy chappel have made of it can never be sufficiently blam'd , since that instead of being satisfy'd with what was given them , they have endeavour'd under that pretence , to make all the bishopricks of france subject to the regalia . the parliament of paris , which pretend to be the only judges of the regalia , have been blinded to that degree by self-interest , as to make no scruple to declare even all those bishopricks , † which in our days have been united to the crown , liable to that servitude ; and to order the advocates in proper terms no longer to question , but that the extent of the regalia was as large as that of the kingdom . this incroachment being too visible to produce any effect , induc'd the churches which were not liable to that right no longer to acknowledge that tribunal for judges , and the kings to refer all such causes to their council . the extent of that right over all the bishopricks of the kingdom , is a pretension so ill grounded , that in order to discover the injustice thereof , it will be sufficient to read a deed * , the original of which is in the chamber of accounts , which the president le maitre caus'd to be printed , which gave an account of the bishopricks that are subject to the regalia , and of those that are free from it . formerly the common opinion was , that there was no regalia beyond the river loire † , the kings lewis le gross and lewis the young exempted the archbishoprick of bourdeaux , and the suffragan● thereof , of the same . raymond count of tholouse granted the same favour to the bishops of provence and of languedoc , which was afterwards confirmed to them by philip le bell ; and st. lewis yielded the regalia of all brittany to the dukes of the country , by the treaty he made with peter ma●-clerc ; which shews , that he did not give it to the holy chappel when he founded it . several other bishopricks , as lyons , autun , auxerre , and divers others , are so undoubtedly free from that subjection , that no body calls it into question . the ordinances made at divers times shew clearly , that the kings of france never did pretend to have a regalia over all the bishopricks ; and that truth is so evident , that pasquier the king's advocate in the chamber of accounts , is forc'd to confess , that he who maintains that doctrine , is rather a court flatterer than a french lawyer . these are his very words . the ignorance , or rather the want of spirit , and interest of some bishops , has contributed very much towards the vexation the prelates of this kingdom suffer at this time , who , to free themselves of the presecution they did receive in their own particular , have made no scruple to receive acquittances from the holy chappel for sums they never paid . the opinion they had , that in disputing their right before judges who were their parties , they would be condemn'd , has perswaded them that they might innocently commit such a fault , the consequence of which would be very dangerous , if your majesty's goodness did not repair the harm done by their weakness . common right requiring the disposition of the fruits of a vacant benefice , to be reserv'd for the future successor ; the contrary cannot be done without an authentick title to impower one so to do . yet we find none of that kind to justifie the pretensions of kings , to dispose of them according to their pleasure ; for want of which they are forc'd to have recoutse to custom . this truth is so certain , that all the ordinances made upon that subject only maintain their ancient possession . as it is very easie for soveraign princes , by divers pretences , to attribute that to themselves which does not belong to them ; and that thereby an unjust usurpation in the beginning , may in process of time be deem'd lawful , by virtue of possession : there may be a great deal of reason to question , whether custom can have the force of an authentick title in the case of soveraigns . but not designing to dispute your majesty's rights , but only to persuade you to regulate them , insomuch that they may not endanger the salvation of souls ; without endeavouring any farther to examine the source and the foundation of the regalia's , which i suppose valid ; i only design to examine what the holy chappel can pretend by virtue of those concessions of your predecessors , and to propose the remedy of the abuse which is committed in the enjoyment of such a grant. it often happens , that a bishop who is rich in all the qualifications requir'd by the canons , and which the piety of good men can desire in him , but poor by his birth , remains two or three years incapable of performing the duty of his office , both by the payment of the bulls , to which he is oblig'd by the concordates , which often sweep away a whole year's revenue , and upon the account of this new right , which takes away another . so that adding to these two expences the charge he must be at to buy the ornaments he stands in need of , and to furnish his house according to his dignity ; it will often be found , that three years are pass'd , before he can receive any thing for his maintenance : for which reason , many of them do not go to their bishopricks , excusing themselves upon necessity ; or laying aside house-keeping , deprive themselves of the reputation they ought to have to feed their flock , as well by acts of charity , as by words . it also often comes to pass , that to avoid these inconveniencies , they engage themselves so far , that some are prevail'd with to practsie illegal means to acquit their debts : and those who do not fall into that extremity , live in perpetual misery , and finally frustrate their creditors of what they owe them , for want of power to pay them . the remedy to that evil , is as easie as necessary , since it only requires the annexing to the holy chappel , an abbey of equal revenue with that which they can receive by that settlement . some perhaps will say , that it will not be easie to clear this point as it should be , by reason of the difficulty the said society will make of disclosing that which they design to conceal : but if your majesty orders them to justifie in two months time , by the acts of their registers , what they did enjoy before the perpetual concession made to them by charles ix . and that on pain of forfeiting the said right ; this lawful proceeding will soon discover what is necessary to be done , to recompence the grant they have receiv'd from your predecessors . i am sensible , that the said chapter will pretend , that the revenue they receive by the regalia , ought to be consider'd , according to what they enjoy by it at present ; but whereas it is certain , that they were no sooner certain of the perpetuity of that grant , but they extended it on divers bishopricks that were not liable to it , it is evident , that the fine i propose is that on which you may justly take your measures . if your majesty will be pleas'd to do this , you will easily procure an incredible advantage to your church , by which means the souls will more easily receive the food that is so inecessary for them , and which they ought to expect from their pastors . if , in the next place , you continue the resolution you have taken and which you have practis'd for a considerable time , not to grant any pension on bishopricks , which is absolutely necessary , you will admit nothing in your power , to put bishops out of danger of not being able to perform their duty for want. sect . v. of the necessity of protracting the delays that are us'd in the course of ecclefistical justice ; from whence it happens , that three crimes remain unpunish'd . every body knows , that the orders which me meerly political in the church , may and ought often to be chang'd , according to the altaration of times . in the purity of the first age of christianity , some establishments of that kind were good , which at present would be very prejudical . time , which is the father of all corruption , having render'd the manners of ecclesiasticks different from what they were in the fervor of their first zeal ; it is certain , that whereas during the course of several innocent years , the church , in which the zeal of the prelates made them as severe in the punishment of crimes , as they are slack and negligent in that performance at present . it is certain , i say , that whereas in those days the delays of the formalities , observ'd in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction , were of no ill consequence , they are very prejudicial at present ; and reasou does not permit the continuanco of the same . this consideration makes it very necessary to abolish the ancient order prescribed by the canons , which requires three conformable sentences for the conviction of clerks . the ill use that has been made , for a long while , of the said order , author of all impiety , and consequently of the disorders of the church , obliges it to do it self justice in that point , to remove all pretence from temporal judges , to follow the opinion of certain theologians , who have made no scruple to say , that it were better the order should be revers'd by an incompetent judge , than to see disorder reign . it is impossible to take away the right of jurisdiction of the archbishopricks , of the primates of the holy see ; but whereas it often comes to pass , that six or seven sentences are given , before three of them happen to be conformable to one another , the said inconvenience may be remov'd , by ordering the sentence of the judges delegated by the pope , upon the appeal of the primate , or archbishop , to be definitive and absolute ; and to the end this last judgment may be obtained speedily , and that the zeal of the church may appear in the good administration of their justice , it will be fit his majesty would be pleas'd to joyn with his clergy , to obtain from the holy see , that instead of having recourse to rome , in all the particular cases that are to be tried , his holiness would be pleas'd to delegate , in all the provinces of the kingdom , persons of capacity and probity , with a power to judge soveraignly of all appeals made in his tribunal , without any new rescripts . this proposition cannot be odious at rome , since the concordate obliges the pope to delegate in partibus , for the decision of the causes that are depending there ; this difference will only be found , that whereas at present there is a necessity of having recourse to rome in every cause , for the delegation of those judges , they will then be all ready nominated for the decision of all the causes of the kingdom ; which facilitating the punishment of the crimes of the ecclesiasticks , will remove all pretences of the parliament's incroaching , as they do , upon the justice of the church , and all subjects of complaints from the ecclesiasticks against them . and thereby the mouths of those that are open enemies of the church , or envious of her immunities , will be shut ; and her best children who have been silent hitherto upon that subject , will maintain her cause , and speak boldly and freely to defend her liberty , against those who would oppress it without reason . i am sensible , that the holy see will fear , left those delegates should become perpetual dictators in time ; but the changing of them from time to time , which i think to be fit and necessary , will remove the fear of that inconvenience ; and continuing . to sue out the appeals at rome in every cause which may be suffered , the rights of the holy see will remain entire , without any diminution . it may be urg'd , that it will require no more time to obtain a new delegation of judges from rome , for every crime that shall be committed , than to sue out an appeal to remove the cause , before those that are already delegated ; but the thing is very different , since it is certain , that one of the principal abuses which hinders the punishment of the crimes of the clerks , consists in that the appellant commonly obtains at rome his removal , before such a judge as he thinks fit in france , by collusion with the benchers , who for money serve their clients as they please . sect . vi. which represents the prejudice the church receives by the four exemptions several churches enjoy , to the prejudice of the common right ; and proposes means to remedy the same . exemption , is a dispensation , or relaxation of the obligation we lay under to obey our superiours : they are of different kinds ; some are of right , others of fact. the exemptions of right , are those we enjoy by the concession of a lawful superiour , who grants them upon mature deliberation , and for certain reasons . the exemptions of fact , are those we are in possession of without a title , * but only by the use thereof time out of mind . the exemptions of right are approv'd of by all casuists , as granted by a lawful authority . those of fact , though not lawful in themselves , are not always condemn'd by them ; because those that have enjoy'd a priviledge time out of mind , had formerly bulls for the same , though they cannot produce them . there are three different exemptions of places ; the first is that of mendicant monasteries , which the bishop does not visit , though he is receiv'd solemnly there , whenever he goes thither , may hold his orders there , and perform all the episcopal functions , whenever he thinks fit . the second is of many other places , in which they are not receiv'd , and can perform no episcopal function , unless they make a declaration , that it is without prejudice to the rights and privileges of the said places . the abbeys of marmoutier , and of vendosme , and many others , are of this kind . the third is of certain territories , in the extent of which , the bishop exerts no jurisdiction , not even over the laity ; over which , those who enjoy such exemptions , have the sole jurisdiction , and the power commonly call'd , lex diocoesana : the abbeys of s. germans des prez , or of the fields , of corbie , of s. florent le vieil , of fescamp , and many others are of this kind within the whole extent of their territories , the monks themselves exert all the episcopal jurisdiction . they give dispensations of banes ; they appoint monitories ; they publish jubilees , assign the stations after the orders are come from rome ; the visa's are expedited in their names . moreover , they pretend a right to chuse whatever bishops they think fit to give orders , without leave from their diocesan bishop . finally , they give demissories to receive orders from any bishop . the chapter of chartres enjoys this exemption ; by virtue of which , the bishop cannot make his entry into the church , without giving an act , by which he promises to preserve the priviledges of the church , nor make any visitation , either of the holy sacrament , or of the holy oyls . those persons are so far exempted from the jurisdiction of the bishops , that when a canon becomes a delinquent , the chapter nominates the judges that are to try him ; and if there be an appeal of judgment , they apply themselves to rome , to have judges in partibus , because that church ad sanitam romanam ecclesiam , admisso nullo ●edio , pertinet . they publish indulgences ; they have a hundred and odd parishes ; they exert all the diocesan jurisdiction , and the appeal of all their sentences is carried to rome : they ordain all general processions . st. martin of tours enjoys the same priviledges . four sorts of persons are particularly exempted in the church ; the archbishops of the primates ; the bishops of the archbishops ; the monks , and the religious of the bishops ; and the canons of the bishops and archbishops . those exemptions differ in many circumstances ; some only exempt persons , and others also exempt the place of their abode , and that differently . anciently the archbishops were subject to the primates * , to whom the pope sent the pallium to exert power and authority over the metropolitans . but since those of france , excepting those of tours , of sens , and of paris , have obtain'd , either by bulls , or by prescription , leave to have no dependance on the primates . some bishops † have also obtain'd the exemption of their subjection to their archbishops from the pope . the monks are almost all exempted from the common jurisdiction , and their right is grounded on the free concession of their bishops , or of the popes ; their most ancient exemptions , are those that were granted them or old , ears ago , by the bishops and archbishops ; bu●… those they have obtain'd since , have been granted by the popes , to one of these ends , either least the presence and court of the bishops should disturb their solitude , or to free them from the rigour of some , by which they were , or pretended to be severely us'd . the last that have been exempted from the jurisdiction of their superiours , are the canons . in their first institution they were so strictly bound and united to their bishops , that they could do nothing without their leave ; and to endeavour to free themselves of their obedience to them , would have been look'd upon as the greatest crime they commit in those days many have been of opinion , that they have obtain'd all their exemptions from the anti-popes , or that they are evidently surreptitious , or barely grounded on the possession of a time out of mind ; but it is most certain , that some of them are more ancient than the schisms , and more authoriz'd than those which draw their force and virtue from the anti popes . the most lawful have granted some ; * either in confirmation of the concessions of the bishops , or of the agreements made with them ; or of their own accord , under pretence to secure the canons against the ill usages they did receive from them . in order to penetrate into the bottom of this matter , and clearly to distinguish the good exemptions from rome ▪ , ●ad , we must consider the bulls ●y which th●… authoriz'd differently . those ▪ that were granted by the popes before the misfortune of the schisms are different from those which were granted since the extinction of the same . the first sort must be look'd upon as good and valid ; but yet such bulls being an exemption from the common right , which is always odious , must be carefully examin'd , for fear of being mistaken in the tenor of them ; since it is certain , that many are produc'd as bulls of exemption , which are only bulls of protection , which were obtain'd anciently ; and bulls , which grant some particular priviledges , but not an exemption from the usual jurisdiction ; or bulls , which only authorize chapters to erect a jurisdiction inferiour to that of the bishops ; like unto those of the arch-deacons , who in some churches have a right to exeommunicate , to interdict , and to injoin publick penances , tho' they are still subordinate to the bishop's jurisdiction . as for the second sort , as they are void in themselves , for want of a lawful authority in those who did grant them , particularly by the constitution of pope martin the th , * which annihilates all bulls obtain'd during the schisms , no body can ▪ pretend , without malice or ignorance , to make use of them to the prejudice of the common right . the third sort have been granted , either to serve for new exemptions , or to confirm preceding ones . the first must be reputed void , either because they are directly opposite to the decree mention'd by martin the th ; or because they have been surreptitiously obtain'd , as the parliament of paris and tholouse have adjudg'd it , against the chapters of anger 's and cahors . the second being only granted to confirm an ancient right , which is never found to be lawfully establish'd , must , in the judgment of all impartial persons , be look'd upon as of no effect . it now remains to see whether the exemptions * grounded on the bare concessions made by the bishops , or on the agreements and arbitral sentences interpos'd upon that subject against them and their chapters , are good and valid . if it be never lawful for bishops to alienate their temporal without an evident advantage and profit , much less can they renounce their spiritual authority , to the great prejudice of the church , which thereby sees her members divided from the head , and the rule whereby it subsists chang'd into a confusion , which destroys it . the nullity of agreements , mutual promises , or arbitral sentences is very visible by that principle : no man can compromise or transfer a thing , the disposition whereof is not in his power ; and if there be any authors who are of opinion , that spiritual things may be transferr'd , all in general except some , among which the subjection of this nature is the first : and indeed those sort of titles are so invalid in the case in question , that tho' they were confirm'd by the popes , they would not be sufficient to deprive of their right the successors of the bishops , who have parted with their superiority in one of the three ways above specify'd . as reason shews that none of these ways can be of force against common right ; it also shews , that bulls barely confirming the said concessions , agreements , or arbitral sentences , give no right to those who would make use of them , because they can have no more force than the foundation they suppose . one point only remains liable to examination , viz. whether the custom and ancient possession which chapters claim against the authority of their bishops , is a title sufficiently valid to make the church undergo the prejudice it suffers by exemptions . * custom is a very deceitful rule ; the ill ones , tho' ne-never so ancient , are universally condemn'd ; and all those that are against common right , and destroy an order establish'd by ecclesiastical constitutions , must be reputed so , and can be no just ground of prescription , much less in what relates to ecclesiastical than to civil laws , since the settlements of the church are grounded on a more certain principle ; and the difficulty propos'd must be decided every where , by saying , that custom may serve as a title in those things which may be possess'd by common right , but never in those in which possession violates it ; in which case it is absolutely void , unless it be accompany'd with a title so authentick , that it may be liable to no manner of suspicion : whence it results , that common right submitting all canons to their bishops , there is no custom sufficiently powerful to exempt them from that subjection . it is impossible to imagine the many evils exemptions are the source of . they overthrow the order the church has establish'd consonant to reason , which requires inferiours to be subject to their superiours . they ruine the concord which ought to be between the head and the members ; they authorize all sorts of violences , and leave many crimes unpunish'd , as well in the person of the priviledg'd ; as in that of many libertines , who take the advantage of them to secure themselves : there are two ways to redress that evil , either by annihilating the exemptions absolutely , or by regulating them . i am very sensible that the first expedient , as the most absolute , is the most difficult : but since it is not impossible , i will nevertheless propose it to your majesty , who has ever delighted in doing that which your predecessors durst not attempt . however , i do not think it proper in relation to the exemptions which monks and their monasteries enjoy . as they are dispers'd in divers dioceses , the uniformity of mind , which ought to reign among them , requires , that instead of their being govern'd by divers bishops , whose minds are different , they should be under the government of one regular chief ; upon which foundation i affirm boldly , that it is as necessary to allow them the possession of the lawful exemptions they enjoy , as it is just to know the validity of them , by the examination of their bulls , which they extend sometimes farther than reason requires . but i say moreover , that the other exemptions may be abolish'd with so much advantage for the church , that that universal motive is sufficient to make one despise particular interests on that occasion . when a thing is just , it is a sufficient inducement for us to undertake it ; and we are absolutely oblig'd to do it when it is altogether necessary . the church having subsisted hitherto without the alteration i propose , i do not suppose it has this last quality ; but i say , that it would be very useful , in that it would leave no subject of excuse to the bishops , in case they were wanting in their duty . to make use of this first expedient would only require a revocation made by his holiness of the exemptions and priviledges in question , and a power given to the bishops to exert their jurisdiction over their chapters , and all other priviledg'd persons , except those above mention'd . such a bull , accompany'd by a declaration from your majesty , verify'd in your parliaments and in your council , would break the fetters which tie the hands of the prelates of your kingdom , and would make them answerable for the disorders of their dioceses , which it is almost impossible for them to do at present . the obtaining of the pope's bull would prove the easier in my opinion , in that it is consonant to the overtures of the council of trent , which declares particularly * , that the chapters and canons cannot by virtue of any exemption , custom , possession , sentence , oath and concordat whatever , be excus'd of being visited , corrected , and chastis'd by their bishops , or other persons deputed by them : and tho' this expedient were not relish'd at rome , where novelties , tho' useful , are commonly odious , and where the least opposition generally obstructs great advantages ; your majesty causing the decree of the council to be observ'd on this subject , will have no need of any new expedition . i am sensible that this remedy will be dislik'd by the parliaments , with whom use and practice is far more prevailing , than whatever reasons can be urg'd ; but after having foreseen that good , and consider'd all the obstacles which may be met in it , i declare boldy , that it would be much better to pass over all of them , than to stop at any opposition whatever : and your majesty may undertake the said alteration the better , and with more reason , because that in restoring things upon the foot of common right , you will restore them in their own nature ; and that it sometimes becomes sovereigns to be bold on certain occasions , which are not only just , but of which the importance cannot be question'd * . the canons keep their titles so conceal'd , that it is impossible to come to the knowledge of them , unless by the king's authority : moreover , they often suppose them , when they have none ; which peter de blois and peter le venerable openly complain of . tho' the advantage of these two expedients , which indeed are but one and the same , ought to prevail with the world to approve them ; yet the fear i am in , that the difficulties which would be met with , to put them in execution , would make them ineffectual , makes me pass to the second , which consists in the nomination of commissioners , bishops , canons and monks , which being joyn'd to deputies of the council and of the parliaments , shall take an account of all the exemptions and priviledges of the church ; to the end , that being represented to your majesty , those that will be found good and valid may be regulated ; and those that have no lawful foundation , retrench'd and abolish'd : and the said expedient is the more practicable , in that the ordinances of orleans * , made under francis the d , have a particular article for the regulations of exemptions . if , in the next place , the pope would be pleas'd to impower in every metropolis the delegated judges we have above propos'd , to regulate by the authority of the holy see , what the bishops will not be able to do of themselves , by reason of the exemptions , which will remain in their force and vigour , and your majesty to command your council to take cognizance of the differences which will arise upon such a subject , you will absolutely remedy all the evils the said priviledges occasion . sect . vii . which represents the inconveniences that arise from the bishops not having an absolute power to dispose of the renefices that are under them . it now remains to speak of the evil which proceeds from , that the bishops do not dispose of the major part of their cures of their dioceses , to which the ecclesiastical or lay-patrons have a right of presentation . the ecclesiasticks began to enjoy the right of patronage * in the council of orange , where it was ordain'd , that the bishops , who should build churches in another diocese , should have a right to put such priests there as they should think fit , provided their capacity was approv'd of by the diocesan bishop . * the same right was also given by justinian to the lay-men , who should be founders of chappels , which they obtain'd afterwards even in respect of monasteries , which they should be founders of . * the ninth council of toledo moreover extended the right of laick patronage to parochial churches , allowing the founders to nominate curates , lest the negligence wherewith bishops would serve their foundations should discourage them from making any new ones . in the beginning this right was of no longer continuance than the founders life , gregory and pellagius extended it to their children ; and finally , under charlemayne it pass'd to the heirs , whoever they were , which has continu'd ever since . this right , which is approv'd of by several fathers of the church , being confirm'd by divers councils , particularly that of trent , must be look'd upon as holy and inviolable , by reason of its ancientness , for its authority founded on the canons of the fathers and of the councils , and for the advantage which accrues to the church by the same , in favour of which many foundations are made , thereby to acquire the power to nominate those that are to enjoy them . but when i consider , that necessity has no law , and that the use of a priviledge , which was good during the fervour of the founders , is at present so prejudicial by the corruption of those who are heirs of their estate , but not of their zeal and of their virtue , nor even sometimes of their religion , that it is impossible to continue it , without exposing many souls to their ruine : i dare affirm boldly , that a disorder of that consequence can no longer be conniv'd at , without being answerable for the same before god. many are of opinion , that the best remedy for this evil , is wholly to abolish the cause of it ; but when i consider , that a legacy of this nature cannot be possess'd with justice , without performing the conditions on which it has been given ; and that the fathers of the council of trent , who were sensible of the abuses of the same , durst not alter them , i am at a stand ; and i do not think that a private man can , without temerity , propose such a remedy : it will be better to have recourse to a milder way , in some measure propos'd by the council of trent * though not directly . that way is , † that the synod should elect examiners , by which all the pretenders to benefices , which have the cure of souls , shall be carefully examin'd , to the end that their capacity and probity being known , they may afterwards propose two or three of the most capable , to the patrons of the cures which shall be vacant , for them to chuse , and present to the bishop the person which shall be most agreeable to them . i am sensible that this expedient takes off something of the liberty patrons enjoy in france at present ; but since in restraining it , it nevertheless leaves it them , and hinders incapable persons from being put into cures , it ought to be receiv'd ; and that the more willingly , in my opinion , since that in redressing the evil which arises from the presentations to cures , if the order of the council be observ'd , it will also redress those that are caus'd by the facility wherewith the archbishops often receives the priests , whom their suffragans have refus'd ; in that as the council's orders , that the examiners , propos'd by it , to be the judges of the capacity of those that are to be nam'd for cures , shall be oblig'd to give an account of their proceedings to the provincial councils ; so it will not allow the archbishops to pass by their judgment , without so just a cause , that no body may disapprove it . sect . viii . of the reformation of monasteries . after such just regulations , as are above mentioned , it will suit with your majesty's piety to authorize the reformation of monasteries as much as is possible . i am very sensible , that many considerations may give cause to fear , that those which have been made in our days , are not so austere in their progress , as in their beginning ; but yet it is very necessary to mind , and to favour them ; since good does not change its nature in not being lasting , but still remains good ; and that he who does what he can with prudence for a good end , performs his duty , and answers what god expects from his care. it is true , that i ever was of opinion , and am so still , that it were better to establish moderate reformations , in the observation of which , both bodies and minds may subsist with some ease , than to undertake such austere ones , that the strongest bodies will hardly be able to bear the rigour of them . temperate things are commonly constant and lasting ; but it requires an extraordinary grace to make that subsist , which seems to force nature . it is also observable , that the reformations of religious houses in this kingdom , must be different from those of other states , which being free of heresies , require rather a profound humility , and an exemplary simplicity in the members thereof , than doctrine , which is altogether necessary in this kingdom , in which the ignorance of the most vertuous monks in the world may prove as prejudicial to some souls who stand in need of their learning , as their zeal and vertue are useful to others , and to themselves . i must needs say by the bye on this subject , that as to what relates particularly to the reformation of the monasteries of women , to restore the elections , and particularly the triennial , instead of the king's nomination , is not always an infallible expedient . the brigues and factions which reign sometimes amidst the weakness of that sex , often rise to that degree , that they are not supportable , and i have seen your majesty oblig'd twice to alter it , in places where you had setled it , to restore things to their former state . as it behoves your majesty's piety to labour about the regulation of ancient monasteries , so it behoves your prudence to put a stop to the progress of the over-great number of new monasteries which are daily establish'd . in order whereunto , it is necessary to despise the opinion of certain persons , as weak as devout , and more zealous than prudent ; who often fansie , that the salvation of souls , and the safety of the state , depends on that which is prejudicial to both . as none but such as are wicked or blind , can be insensible or disown , that religious houses are not only very useful , but also necessary ; so none but those who have an indiscreet zeal can be ignorant , that the excess of them is inconvenient , and that it might come to such a point as would be ruinous . that which is done for the state being done for god , who is the basis and foundation of it ; to reform the houses that are already establish'd , and to put a stop to the excess of new establishments , are two works very agreeable to god , who loves rule in all things . sect . ix . of the obedience which is due to the pope . the order which god requires in all things , gives me an occasion to represent to your majesty , in this place , that as princes are oblig'd to acknowledge the authority of the church , to submit to their holy decrees , and to pay an entire obedience to the same , in what relates to the spiritual power which god hath placed in her hands for the salvation of mankind ; and that as it is their duty to maintain the honour of the popes , as successors of st. peter , and vicars of jesus christ ; so they ought not to yield to their attempts , when they endeavour to extend their power beyond its bounds . as kings are oblig'd to respect the thiara of the soveraign pontifs , the same obligation lies upon them to preserve the power of their crown . this truth is acknowledged by all theologians ; but it is very difficult to distinguish the extent and subordination of these two powers aright . in such a matter , princes are neither to credit the gentlemen of the long robe , who commonly measure the king 's by the form of his crown , which being round , has no end ; nor those who by the excess of an indiscreet zeal , declare themselves openly in favour of rome . reason advises us to hear both the one and the other , in order afterwards to resolve the difficulty by persons of so much learning , that they may not be liable to mistake through ignorance ; and so sincere , that neither the interests of the state , nor those of rome , may prevail with them against reason . i may declare with truth , that i have ever found the doctors of the university of paris , and the most learned monks of all orders , so reasonable on this subject , that i have never observ'd the least weakness in them , that could hinder them from defending the just rights of this kingdom ; neither have i ever observ'd any excess of affection in them for their native country , which could induce them , contrary to the true sentiments of religion , to diminish those of the church to augment the others . in such cases , the opinion of our fathers must be of great weight ; the most famous and most impartial historians and authors , who have written in all ages , must be carefully consulted on those occasions , in which nothing can be more dangerous than weakness or ignorance . sect . x. which sets forth the advantage of learning ; and shews how it ought to be taught in this kingdom . having represented , that ignorance is sometimes prejudicial to the state ; i am now to speak of the necessity of learning , one of the greatest ornaments of states , this being the most proper place for it , since the empire of it is justly due to the church , by reason that all sorts of truths have a natural relation to the first , the sacred mysteries of which , eternal wisdom has been pleas'd to make the ecclesiastical order depositories of . as the knowledge of letters is absolutely necessary in a commonwealth , it is certain , that they ought not to be taught without distinction to every body . as a body having eyes in all its parts , would be monstrous ; a state would be the same , if all the inhabitants thereof were learned ; we should find as little obedience in it , as pride and presumption would be common . the commerce of letters would absolutely banish that of trade , which enriches nations ; would ruine husbandry , the true mother of the people ; and would soon destroy the nursery of souldiers , which encreases more in the rudeness of ignorance , than in the politeness of sciences : finally , it would fill france with litigious persons , more proper to ruine private families , and to disturb publick peace , than to do the state any good . if learning were prophan'd to all sorts of minds , we should see more persons capable to form doubts , than to resolve them ; and many would be fitter to oppose truths , than to defend them . 't is this consideration which induces politicians to say , that a well regulated state requires more masters of mechanick arts , than masters of liberal arts to teach letters . i have often heard cardinal du perron , for the same reason , earnestly wish the suppression of part of the colledges of this kingdom ; he was desirous to have four or five famous ones establish'd in paris , and two in every metropolitan city of the provinces . he added to all the considerations i have urg'd , that it was impossible to find a sufficient number of learned men in every age to supply a great number of colledges ; whereas being contented with a moderate number , they might be fill'd with worthy persons , who would preserve the fire of the temple in its purity , and would transmit by an uninterrupted succession the sciences in their perfection . i cannot forbear thinking , when i consider the great number of men who profess the teaching of letters , and the multitude of children that are instructed , that i see an infinite number of sick people , who only aiming to drink pure and clear water for their cure , are press'd with such a disorderly drought , that receiving without distinction all those that are presented to them , the major part drink such as are impure , and often out of payson'd cups ; which encreases their drought and their distemper , instead of easing either . in fine , this great number of colledges , indifferently establish'd in all places , produces two evils ; the one , by the mean capacity of those that are oblig'd to teach , there not being a sufficient number of eminent persons to fill the pulpits ; the other , by the want of natural disposition in those whose fathers oblige them to study , by reason of the conveniences of it , without examining their capacity ; which is the reason , that most of those that study have only a mean tincture of learning ; some for want of more capacity , others for not being well instructed . tho' this evil is of great consequence , the remedy is easie , since it only requires to reduce all the colledges of such places as are no metropolitans to two or three classis , sufficient to free the youth from gross ignorance , prejudicial even to those who design to follow arms , or to spend their lives in trading . by that means , before children are determin'd to any condition , two or three years will discover the capacity of their minds ▪ after which , those that have a good genius , being sent to great cities , will succeed the better in their learning , both upon that account , and by their being instructed by ab●er masters . having thus provided against this evil , which is much greater than it seems to be , we must also provide against another into which france would infallibly fall , if all the colledges that are establish'd were in one hand . the universities pretend , that a great deal of wrong is done them , in not leaving them exclusively from all others the faculty of teaching youth . the jesuits on the other hand would not be displeas'd , perhaps , of being the only persons imploy'd in that function . reason , which ought to decide all sorts of differences , does not permit the frustrating of an ancient possessor , of what he possesses with a just title : and publick interest cannot suffer a society , not only recommendable by their piety , but famous for their learning , as the jesuits are , to be depriv'd of a function , which they are able to perform with great advantage for the publick . if the universities should teach alone , there would be cause to fear they would in time resume their former pride , which might prove as prejudicial for the future as it has been heretofore . if on the other hand the jesuits had no companions in the instructing of youth , besides that the like inconvenience might be fear'd , there would be moreover a just subject to fear many others . a society which is govern'd , more than any ever was , by the laws of prudence ; and which , devoting it self to god , without depriving themselves of the knowledge of the things of this world , lives in so perfect a correspondence , that the same spirit seems to animate the whole body : a society , which by a blind vow of obedience is submitted to a perpetual chief , cannot , according to the laws of sound policy , be much authoriz'd in a state , in which a powerful community must be formidable . if it be true , as it is most certain , that men have a natural inclination to advance those they have receiv'd their first instructions from ; and that parents have always a particular affection for those who have educated their children . it is also true , that the absolute education of youth cannot be committed to the jesuits , without being expos'd to give them a power , which would be the more obnoxius to states , in that all the places and honours which give the management thereof , would be fill'd by their disciples ; and that those who take an ascendant early over the mind sometimes retain it during their whole life . if we add , that the administration of the sacrament of penance gives that society a second authority over all sorts of persons , which is of no less weight than the first : if we consider , that by those two ways they penetrate into the most secret motions of hearts and families , it will be impossible not to conclude , that it is not fit to leave them the said ministry alone , without competitors . those reasons have been so powerful in all states , that we have no example of any hitherto , who have been willing to yield the empire of letters , and the absolute education of their youth to that society alone . if that society , good and harmless in it self , created so much jealousie in the arch-duke albert , one of the most pious princes of the house of austria , who only acted according to the motions of the council of spain , that he thought fit to exclude them out of certain universities , in which they were actually settled , and to oppose the new settlements they design'd in flanders . if they have behav'd themselves so , as to induce some republicks to remove them absolutely out of their dominions , tho' with too much rigour , it is the least that can be done in this kingdom , to give them some check , seeing not only that they are submitted to a foreign and perpetual chief , but moreover , subject and at the devotion of princes , who seem to desire nothing more , than to humble and ruine this crown . as in point of faith all the catholick states of the world have but one doctrine ; in that which does not relate to it , there are many who differ , from whence the source of their fundamental maxims is often deriv'd ; for which reason , standing in need of some theologians , who may on certain occasions couragiously defend the opinions , which have been always receiv'd there ; and preserv'd by an uninterrupted transmission , they require some free from any ingagement with any suspected powers , having no dependance to deprive them of liberty in things , in which faith allows it to all the world. history informs us , that the order of st. benedict was formerly so absolutely master of the schools , that no body was taught in any other places , and that it decay'd so absolutely in point of science and of piety together in the tenth century of the church , that it was call'd unhappy upon that account . it also informs us , that the dominicans have afterwards enjoy'd the same advantages which those good fathers were first possess'd of ; and that time has depriv'd them of it like the others , to the great prejudice of the church , which happen'd to be infected at that time with many heresies : it also informs us by the same means , that letters are like passing birds , which do not always remain in the same country . and therefore policy requires the preventing of the said inconvenience , which being come to pass twice , is with reason to be fear'd a third time ; and which probably will not happen , if that society has companions in the possession of letters . all parties are dangerous in point of doctrine ; and nothing can be more easie , than to form one under pretence of piety , when a society thinks it self oblig'd to it by the interest of their subsistance . the history of pope benedict the th , against whom the cordeliers , nettled upon the account of the perfection of poverty , viz. of the revenue of st. francis , were animated to that degree , that they did not only declare open war against him by their books , but moreover by the emperour's arms ; by favour of which an anti-pope arose , to the great prejudice of the church , is too great an example to require any thing more to be said upon that subject . the more societies adhere to their chief or superiour , the more they are to be fear'd , particularly by those to whom they are not favourable . since then prudence obliges not only to oppose whatever may be prejudicial to the state , but also to prevent whatever might contribute thereunto ; since the power of so doing often creates a desire so to do . since also the weakness of humane nature requires a counterpoise in all things , and that it is the foundation of justice ; it is more reasonable , that the universities and the jesuits should teach in emulation of one another , to the end that the said emulation may whet their vertue , and that sciences may the better flourish , and be certain in the state , in that being deposited into the hands of two guardians , if the one should chance to lose this sacred pledge , it may be found among the others . sect . xi . means to regulate the abuses which are committed by graduates in the obtaining of benefices . whereas it would be prejudicial to a state , if men of all capacities should apply themselves to the sudy of letters , it is to be wish'd that men of sense may be encourag'd in it . your majesty cannot do a more useful thing to that end , than to put a stop to the abuses which are committed in the distribution of benefices , which ought to be reserv'd for those to whom they are due , as a reward of their labours . none but such as are enemies to learning and vertue can question that right . the council of basle * , and the concordate which pass'd afterwards at the council of lateran , between leo x. and francis i. have setled it too clearly , for any one to have such a thought ; but yet , at the same time , men must be void of justice and reason , not to be desirous to correct the abuses of the same ; which are so great by fraudulent permutations , by suppos'd resignations , by the artifice of patrons , and by the authority of the indultaries , who are more powerful than the graduates , and by the industry of those who are only indebted to their purse for their degrees ; that the said priviledge is so far from being the reward of vertue at present , that it is only the recompence of the craft and villany of those , who being ignorant of letters , are only learned in litigiousness . the true remedy to that evil , is to prefer , conformably to the holy canons , doctors and batchelors in divinity , to all those who have the same degrees in other faculties . that among theologians equal in degrees , those who have preach'd the word of god , or theology longest , be provided before the others . that doctors and batchelors at law may have the same advantage over such as are only masters of arts ; and that among the last , those who have been longest regents , be preferr'd first . that none be allow'd to take out his letters for the mastership of arts , nor his degrees in civil or canon law , but in the universities where he has studied . that none of the said letters be granted to any , but such as have actually made an entire course of philosophy ; nor any degrees in civil or canon law , but to such as have studied for the space of three whole years in law-schools , and have made their exercises publickly , with the intervals requir'd . in case this order be carefully observ'd , the merit of letters will certainly be rewarded ; and ignorance will no longer be protected by it , and receive what is only due to learning . if , in the next place , your majesty will be pleas'd to free those , who shall make themselves famous for learning , from the persecution of the industaries , it will encourage many to redouble their labour , in order to receive the deserv'd reward of the same . sect . xii . of the right of * indult . the right of indult being deriv'd from a bull of pope eugene † , which is not to be found ; if it should be examin'd with rigour , we would find that the foundation of it is not solid ; since , according to reason , such things as cannot be prov'd , ought to be put in the same classis with those that are not . i am sensible , that paul iii. being willing to oblige the presidents and counsellors of the parliament of paris † , who did oppose the concordates , gave them a power of nomination to regular and secular benefices . i am also sensible , that the chancellor of france , as president of the said parliament , receiv'd the same privilege by the same bull : but if we consider that the said bull is grounded on that of his predecessor , which is not to be found ; that consideration will have no force , since lawyers inform us clearly , that a reference can have no force , unless the thing referr'd unto , is clear and evident * . the less the foundation of that privilege is certain , the more the abuses which are committed in it , are insupportable . notwithstanding the said right is personal ; that is , though it was only granted to the person of the officers , specified by the bull of pope paul. iii. it passes now to the widow , and to the heirs , as a temporal heritage : and tho' the said favour was only granted them , in order lawfully to gratifie either their children , or some of their relations or friends , capable of the benefices to which they should be nominated ; they often , contrary to divine and human laws , constrain those who obtain benefices by virtue of their indults , to resign them to whomsoever they think fit ; abusing the said priviledge to that degree , that often those who will not hold them in commendam , can only avoid that crime , by committing another , which makes them guilty of simony before god. the weakness of the foundation of the said grant , and the number * of abuses committed by virtue thereof , might lawfully induce your majesty to abolish it ; which would be the easier , in that it would be sufficient in order thereunto , to refuse the indultaries their letters of nomination , without which , they can pretend to no benefices : but experience teaching us , that an accustom'd evil is often more supportable than a good , the novelty of which is vexatious ; it will be sufficient for your majesty to make so good a regulation , that those who are to enjoy the benefit of the said grants , may not be able to make an ill use of the same , as they have done heretofore . if you hinder the same officer from having his nomination upon several benefices : if you order those that shall be presented by him to be nominated , not to be admitted before a good examination , according to the ordinances , without favour . if you make an order , that the letters of their nomination shall express positively , that the benefices to which they are nominated , shall be really for them : that it shall not be allow'd for them to be constrain'd to resign them to any body ; and that if it be discover'd that if they lend their names to any to possess the said benefices in commendam , they shall not only be made incapable of ever possessing any benefices for such a crime , but moreover be liable to punishment . if , in the next place , you are pleas'd to order the said right , which is only personal , from being transmitted to heirs ; the observation of such a regulation , will produce this effect , that your officers not being depriv'd of the favour your predecessors have obtain'd for them , learned men will receive a great advantage under your reign , and will be deliver'd of the great vexation they receive from them . you might also refuse to allow your officers , after having nominated a man to an indult , to substitute another in his room , in case he should die before it be fill'd . chap. iii. of the nobiity . sect . i. divers means to advantage the nobility , and to make them subsist honourably . after having represented what i esteem absolutely necessary for the re establishment of the first order of your kingdom ; i proceed to the second ; and say , that the nobility must be respected , as one of the principal sinews of the state , capable to contribute much towards its preservation and settlement . they have been so much depress'd of late years , by the vast number of officers , which the misfortune of the age has elevated to their prejudice , that it is very necessary to protect them against the attempts of such men. the wealth and pride of the one , triumphs over the necessity of the others , who are only rich in courage , which induces them to employ their lives freely for the state ; of which your officers reap the advantage . as it is necessary to protect them against those who oppress them ; so a particular care must be taken to hinder them from using those that are under them , as they are us'd by the others . it is a common fault in those that are born in that order , to exert violence against the people , to whom god seems rather to have given arms to get their livelihood , than to defend themselves . it is absolutely necessary to stop the course of such disorders , by a continu'd severity , to the end that the weakest of your subjects , though unarm'd , may be as safe under the protection of your laws , as those who are arm'd . the nobility having shewn in this war , happily ended by a peace , that they have inherited the vertue of their ancestors , which induc'd caesar to prefer them before all others ; it will be fit to discipline them , to the end that they may acquire a new , and preserve their former reputation , and that the state may be usefully serv'd . it is most certain , that the nobility which does not serve you in the war , is not only useless , but a burthen to the state ; which in that case may be compar'd to the body which supports an arm which is troubled with the palsie , as a load which burthens it , instead of affording it any ease . as the gentry deserves to be well us'd when they do well , it is necessary to be serve against them , when they are wanting in what their birth exacts from them : and i make no scruple of saying , that those who degenerating from the vertue of their forefathers , do not serve the crown with their swords and lives , with all the constancy and courage which the laws of the state require , deserve to be depriv'd of the advantages of their birth , and to be reduc'd to bear part of the burthen of the people . as honour ought to be dearer to them than life , it were better to chastise them , by depriving them of the first , than of the last . to take away the life of men who expose it daily upon a meer notion of honour , is much less than to take away their honour , and to save their life ; which in that condition , is a perpetual torment to them . as all means must be us'd to maintain the nobility in the true vertue of their fathers ; so none must be omitted to preserve them in the possession of the estates they have left them , and to help them to acquire new ones . as it is impossible to find out a remedy against all evils ; so it is very difficult to find out a general expedient to the ends i propose . the many marriages which are contracted in every family in this kingdom , ( whereas in other states , seldom any but the eldest marries ) are one of the true causes which ruine the best families in a short time . but if that custom improverishes private families , it enriches the state , the main force of which consists in the multitude of men ; insomuch that instead of complaining of it , it must be encourag'd ; and instead of opposing it , means must be found out for the subsistance of those it brings into the world , according to the purity of heart they derive from their birth . in order thereunto , it is necessary to distinguish the nobility which is at court , from those who live in the country . that which is at court will be considerably eas'd , by retrenching the state and insupportable expences which have been introduc'd there by degrees ; since it is most certain , that such a regulation will do them more good than all the pensions they receive . as to those who live in the country , though such an order will not ease them so much , by reason of their misery , which will not allow them to make superfluous expences , they will nevertheless find the benefit of the said remedy ; so necessary for the whole state , that , without it , it can never avoid its ruine . if your majesty be pleas'd to add to the regulation of that disorder , the establishment of fifty troops of gens d'armes , and the like number of chevaux legers , to be paid in the provinces , on the conditions hereafter specified , it will be a great help for the subsistence of the most indigent nobility . if , in the next place , you suppress the sale of the governments of the kingdom , and of all military imployments , which the said order pays sufficiently for , at the rate of their blood. if you observe the same method in what relates to the places of your houshold : if whereas at present all manner of men are admitted into the same , by the dishonourable traffick of their purse , you prohibit the receiving of any person into them , but such as have the happiness of being of a noble blood : if , moreover , the entrance thereof be no longer allow'd , even to those who have that advantage , unless by your majesty's choice of them , in consideration of their merit , the said good regulation will prove both advantagious and honourable to all the nobility . whereas at present gentlemen can only purchase places and dignities at the rate of their ruine , their fidelity will be the more certain for the future , by reason that the more they will be gratified , the less they will think themselves indebted , for the honours they will receive , to their purses , and to their creditors , who never put them in mind of what they owe them ; but at the same time they are troubled for being rais'd that way . if , moreover , you will be pleas'd to extend your favour so far , as to be careful to gratifie their children ( who shall be found to have as much learning and piety as is requir'd ) with part of the benefices that are in your gift ; that order will be the more oblig'd to you , in that discharging them of part of the burthen which overwhelms them , you will put them in a way to keep up their families , since the support and preservation of the best , depends often on those who espousing an ecclesiastical life , commonly look on their nephews as their own children , and place their chief delight in bringing up some of them to learning and vertue , in order to their being promoted to some of those they are in possession of , if they prove capable of them . i might mention many other things to ease the nobility ; but i suppress the thoughts of it , upon consideration , that as it would be very easie to write them , it would be very difficult , if not impossible , to put them in practice . sect . ii. which treats of the means to prevent duels . so many edicts have been made hitherto to no purpose , to put a stop to duels , that it is very difficult to find out a certain way to stop the course of that rage . the french despise their lives so much , that experience has taught us , that the most rigorous proceedings have not always prov'd the best to stop their frensie . they have often fancy'd , that it was very glorious to violate the edicts ; and to shew by such an extravagance , that they valued their honour more than their life : but the dread of losing the conveniency , without which , they cannot live happy in this world , having a great influence over them than the fear of dying without the grace of god , without which they will be unhappy in the next ; the fear of losing their places , their estates , and their liberty , has prov'd more prevailing than the fear of losing their life . i have us'd my utmost endeavour to find out some proper remedy for the cure of this dangerous distemper . i have often consulted to know , whether as it is lawful for kings to make two private men fight , to prevent a battel , and thereby to decide the difference which has oblig'd them to take arms , they might not also grant some combats , to avoid the multitude of duels that are daily fought . i urg'd , that it was very likely that this proceeding might free france of this frensie , which is so prejudicial to it , since that in putting those in hopes of obtaining leave to fight , who should have a just reason to claim the combat , every man would freely submit to the judges deputed to examine the nature of the offence ; which probably might prevent the misfortune of duels , since most quarrels would be determin'd by a good accommodation . the better to favour this thought , i added , that formerly many duels had been allow'd of in this kingdom , which had also been practis'd in divers states . i thought it might be a means to abolish the barbarity of the custom , which wills , that every man that is offended , should do himself justice , and find his satisfaction in his enemy's blood : but after having perus'd , over and over , what the most authentick authors say upon those matters , and often mus'd on this important subject , i have found by the advice of the least scrupulous and most resolute theologians of the time , that kings being establish'd to preserve their subjects , and not to ruine them , they cannot expose their life without some publick use , or particular necessity : that they cannot permit private combats , without exposing the innocent to receive the punishment of the guilty , seeing that god not having oblig'd himself always to render reason victorious , the fate of arms is uncertain : and that notwithstanding such permissions have been authoriz'd sometimes , at least in divers states , and even with the approbation of some particular churches , they have ever prov'd abusive ; which appears evidently , since finally the universal church has prohibited and condemned them , under very great penalties . i have discover'd , that there was a great deal of difference between making two particular persons fight , to prevent a battel , and to put a period to a war , and making them fight to prevent a duel . the first is lawful ; because nature teaches us , that part ought to be expos'd for the whole ' and that reason requires , that particular persons ought to be hazarded for the general good ; by reason that besides that the said expedient has been practis'd at all times , we find examples of it in holy writ ; and that the effect of it is wholesom and certain , in that whatever event a duel allow'd of in this case may have , it saves the lives of abundance of men , who may serve the publick in other occasions . but it is not so with the second , which is unlawful in its nature , since that instead of certainly saving the generality , by the hazard of some private persons , and thus to prevent a great loss by a small , it exposes private men directly to their ruine , upon the bare imagination of a publick good , which has no certain foundation : this method is the less allowable , since that instead of preventing duels , it is capable to increase the licentiousness of them ; because the blindness of the nobility is such , that many being of opinion , that to demand a combat thus , would be to seek out a way to avoid it , would think themselves oblig'd in honour to find out a shorter way to right themselves , and to shew their courage . the late king attempted this way , in . with all the circumstances that could make it useful : he depriv'd all those of estates , places , and life , who should fight without leave ; but all in vain : and that oblig'd your majesty , after having made the same trial at the beginning of your reign , to have recourse by your edict of march . to another remedy , which has prov'd more effectual , by reason that though the penalties of it are more moderate , yet they are more smarting to those who value their lives less than their estates and liberty . now whereas the best laws in the world are useless , unless they are inviolably observ'd ; and that those who commit those kind of faults , use so much art to invalidate the proofs of it , that it is almost always impossible to convince them . i presume to tell your majesty , that it is not enough to punish averr'd duels and challenges , by the rigour of your edicts ; but when there is a notoriousness without proof , it will be absolutely necessary to imprison the delinquents at their own charge , for more or less time , according to the divers circumstances of their faults : otherwise , the common negligence of your attorneys-general to inform against them , the indulgence of your parliaments , and the corruption of the age , which is such , that every man esteems it as honourable to assist those who have fought to disguise their crime , as an honest gentleman would think it shameful to conceal the theft of a robber , will make the edicts and your cares ineffectual . 't is in such a case , that nothing but the way of fact can oblige men to observe your laws and ordinances ; 't is on those occasions your authority must pass over forms to maintain rule and discipline , without which a state cannot subsist ; and it will enable your officers to punish crimes according to forms , since it is more probable that the cause and proof of a fault will be sooner found when the guilty are seiz'd , than when at liberty to use their utmost endeavours to stifle the discovery of the same . if , in the next place , your majesty will be pleas'd to order rancounters to pass for duels , and to be punish'd as such , until those who have been guilty of them , surrender themselves prisoners , and are absolv'd of the same by law ; you will do whatever is probable to stop the course of that frensie ; and your care to preserve the lives of your nobility , will make you master of their hearts , and will engage them to so strict an allegiance , that they will pay with usury , whatever your majesty can expect from them , in all the imployments they are gratified with . chap. iv. of the third order of the kingdom . to treat of the third order of the kingdom with method , and to see clearly what is proper to be done to make it subsist in the state in which it ought to be , i will divide it into three parts . the first shall contain the body of the officers of justice . the second , of those who have the management of the finances . and the third , the people , which commonly bears the burthen of the state. sect . i. which relates in general to the disorders of the courts of justice ; and examines in particular , whether the suppression of the sale of offices , and of hereditary offices , would be a proper remedy for such evils . it is much easier to discover the defects of the courts of justice , than to prescribe remedies for the same : every body is sensible , that those who are appointed to hold the scale even in all things , have inclin'd it so much themselves on one side to their own advantage , that there is no longer any counterpoise . the disorders of the courts of justice are come to that pass , that they can go no farther : i would enter into the particulars of the said disorders , and of the remedies which may be applied to the same , if the knowledge i have both of the person of him who has the first office of justice at present , and of his design to render it as pure , as the corruption of the world will allow it , did not oblige me barely to propose certain general remedies to your majesty , to stop the progress of the principal disorders . in the opinion of the generality of the world , the chief consists in suppressing the sale of offices , in extinguishing the inheritance of the same ; and in giving them gratis to persons of such known capacity and integrity , that even envy it self may not be able to contest their merit . but whereas it is a thing which cannot be done at this time ; and that it will be difficult to practice this expedient at any other , it would be useless at present to propose means to that end. whenever the said design is undertaken , some will certainly be found , which cannot be foreseen at present ; and those one might prescribe , would be no longer in season , when the thing might be attempted . in the mean time , though it is commonly dangerous to be singular in advising , i cannot forbear saying boldly , that considering the present state of affairs , and that which may be foreseen for the future , it is better , in my opinion , to continue the said sale and inheritance of offices , than absolutely to alter the settlement thereof . so many inconveniences are to be fear'd in such an alteration , that as though the elections for benefices are more ancient , and more canonical than the nomination of kings ; nevertheless the great abuses which have been committed in the same , and which it would be impossible to prevent , render the nominations more supportable , as less subject to ill consequences . so , notwithstanding the suppression of the sale , and inheritance of offices , is consonant to reason , and to all the constitutions of right ; yet the inevitable abuses which would be committed in the distribution of offices , depending so much on the bare will of kings , and consequently on the favour and craft of those who should have most power with them ; would render the present proceeding in the same , more tolerable than that which has been us'd heretofore , by reason of the great inconveniences which alway attended it . all reasonable men must needs see the difference between these two parties , and heartily desire the suppression of the sale and inheritance of offices , supposing that in this case places would be distributed by the pure consideration of vertue . neither can they be ignorant , that in such a case , the artifices of the court would prevail before reason , and favour before merit . nothing contributed more to make the duke of guise so powerful , in the league against his king and country , as the great number of officers his credit had introduc'd in the greatest employments of the kingdom . and i have been told by the duke of sully , that the said consideration was the most powerful motive which induc'd the late king to the establishment of * the annual duty : that that great prince had not so much regard to the revenue which accru'd to him by it , as to the means to secure himself for the future against such inconveniences : and that notwithstanding treasure had a great influence over him , reasons of state were more prevailing on that occasion . in the new establishment of a commonwealth , it were a crime not to banish the sale of offices , because in such cases , reason obliges to establish the most perfect laws human society can permit : but prudence does not allow it in ancient monarchies ; the imperfections of which are turn'd to use , and the disorder of which ( not without advantage ) composes part of the orders of the state. in such cases , men must submit to weakness , and prefer a moderate regulation , to a more austere settlement , which perhaps would be less proper , the rigour of it being capable to shake the fabrick which one would strengthen . i am sensible that it is a common saying , that he who buys justice by the lump , may sell it by retail ; but yet it is certain , that an officer who lays out the best part of his estate upon a place , will be kept from doing ill in a great measure , for fear of loling all that he is worth ; and that in such a case , the price of offices is not an ill pledge of the fidelity of the officers . the complaints which are made against the sale of offices , have been the same in all the ages of the monarchy ; but though they have ever been look'd upon as reasonable in themselves ; yet the disorders , upon which they are grounded , have been tolerated , supposing that we are not capable of the austere perfection which is the scope of them . those who are not ignorant of history , must needs know , that some writers , not even sparing the king st. lewis , have upbraided his reign , because places were not bestow'd gratis in his time : that they condemn others after him , because the traffick of offices was already so publick , that the money arising by the same was farm'd ; and that they cast an odium upon the memory of the great king francis , because he was the first , who upon the account of the necessity of the age he liv'd in , made a regulated commerce of them , which has lasted ever since . i own that it is a misfortune for that great prince , to have been the first author of that evil establishment ; but perhaps he would not be blamable , if the reasons which constrain'd him to do it were known . the knowledge he had that his favours were sold by private persons without his leave , and the importance : of the affairs which overwhelm'd him , persuaded him that there was no better nor more ready way to get the estates of his subjects voluntarily , than to give them honour for money . the late king , assisted by a very good council , in a profound peace , and in a reign free from necessity , added the establishment of the annual duty , to the sale of offices , introduc'd by that great prince : it is not to be presum'd that he did it unadvisedly , and without having foreseen , as much as humane prudence could permit , the consequences of the same ; and it is most certain , that those things which have been done by princes , whose conduct has been judicious , cannot be chang'd without a reason ; unless experience discovers the prejudice of them , and that it is evident that one might do better . the disorders which have been establish'd by publick necessities , and strengthned by reasons of state , cannot be reform'd without time : it must be done by degrees , without passing from one extream into another . an architect , who by the excellence of his art corrects the defects of an ancient building , and who without pulling of it down , reduces it to some supportable symetry , deserves more praise , than he who ruines it absolutely , to erect a new edifice perfect and accomplish'd . it would be very difficult to change the order establish'd for the disposition of offices , without altering the hearts of those that are in possession of them ; in which case , there would be reason to fear , that whereas in times past they have been serviceable to keep the people within the bounds of their duty , they would contribute more towards their debauches for the future , than any others . prudence obliges sometimes to weaken remedies , to make them the more effectual ; and those orders which are most consonant to reason , are not always the best , because they are not always proportion'd to the capacity of those that are to put them in practice . whereas the suppression of the sale and inheritance of offices , ought to make way for vertue , it would only make way for brigues and factions , and would fill places with officers of low extraction , often more loaden with latin than estates ; which would produce many inconveniencies . if men could obtain places without money , merchandise would be forsaken by many , who being dazled with the splendor of offices , would sooner embrace offices and their ruin together , than addict themselves to merchandise , which inriches families . moreover , it is very well known , that the weakness of this age is such , that men yield more to importunities , than they are guided by reason ; and that instead of being rul'd by justice , favour oftentimes sways us . the experience of what is past , should make us fear the future ; both because it has ever shewn us , that the most powerful in credit often gain their cause , to the prejudice of vertue ; and that as the prince and his confidents can only know the merit of men , by the judgment of others , they are often liable to take the shadow for the body . a low birth seldom produces the parts which are necessary in a magistrate ; and it is certain , that the vertue of a man that is well-born , has something more noble in it , than that which is found in men of meaner extraction . the minds of such men are difficult to manage ; and many of them have such a nice authority , that it is not only troublesome , but also prejudicial . it is with the first , in respect to the second , as with trees , which being planted in a good ground , produce better fruit , and finer , than those which are in an ill one : and therefore the sale of offices ought not to be condemn'd , because it excludes many persons of low extraction from places and offices ; since , on the contrary , 't is one of the reasons which rather makes it tolerable . a good estate is a great ornament to dignities ; which are so much heightned by exteriour lusture , that one may boldly affirm , that of two persons of equal merit , he whose circumstances are the most easie , is preferrable to the other ; since it is most certain , that a poor magistrate must have a world of vertue to withstand the temptations of interest . experience also informs us , that the rich are less liable to extortion and bribes , than the others ; and that poverty constrains an officer to be very careful of the revenue of the bag. it may perhaps be urg'd , that though these inconveniences may induce to suffer the sale of offices ; yet it is most certain , that the annual duty ought to be suppress'd , because it puts offices out of price , and hinders vertuous men from obtaining them even for money . the late king foreseeing that evil , had incerted , in the edict he made upon that subject , precautions capable to prevent it ; excepting not only from the annual right the offices of first presidents , attorneys , and advocates general , but moreover reserving to himself the disposal of the offices that are compris'd in the same , when they were vacant , paying in lieu thereof , to the heirs of those who were in possession of them , the price they should be valued at . those precautions were as equitable as necessary ; and to say the truth , the evils which the annual duty causes at present in the state , do not proceed so much from the defect of its nature , as from the imprudence of those who have remov'd the clauses which that great prince had included in it . had the edict been kept in its first purity , offices had never come to the excess of price they are at present . the alterations that have been made in it , have made the use of it as prejudicial , as it would have been innocent , had it been left in the first from in which it was made ; and therefore it is fitter to correct the abuses of it , than to reverse it . the revocation of the annual duty , would oblige the old officers to quit their offices , when the experience and maturity of their age would render them most capable to serve the publick . yet it is necessary to have both old and young ones , by reason , that as the prudence of the first may be of great use to direct the others , the vigour of the younger sort is necessary to revive and animate the old ones . if i had a mind , by this work , to acquire the inclination of the people , rather than to deserve their good-will , by making my self useful to the state , i would maintain , that it is necessary to suppress the sale of offices and the annual duty at once ; all men are so prepossess'd that they are the two sources of the disorders of the kingdom , that the publick voice would decree crowns for me , without examining whether i deserve them or no. but being sensible , that those who endeavour to gain reputation , by the overture of a reformation , more conformable to the rigour of the laws , than proportion'd to the strength of the state , only seek their own interest , and can never excuse a vanity , which is not only blamable , but criminal also ; and that in such a case , their cares , though specious , are as prejudicial to the publick , as the negligence and malice of others . i will take special care not to commit such a fault ; the suppression of those two edicts is attended with too many inconveniences , to conclude it necessary to be done . if they did really contribute towards negligence and vice , as it is commonly suppos'd , i would give my vote immediately for the revocation of them : but when i consider , that if any persons are admitted into offices , not being qualified for the same , it is only the fault of the attornies general , who are to enquire into their lives and conversation , and of the courts ; which being judges of their capacity and vertue , ought to refuse them when they want the qualifications requir'd . i cannot forbear saying , that the remedy of the evil consists more in the observation of the ordinances , than in the suppression of the sale of offices and annual duty , which are not the causes thereof . perhaps it may be urg'd , that if places of judicature were not sold , justice might be administred gratis ; but provided the charges of it be regulated , they cannot be consider'd as a great grievance . i am sensible , that examining the thing with rigour , that very price which is due for the administration of justice , is paid for the loss of the liberty of those who have voluntarily submitted themselves to the observation of laws ; and therefore , that to oblige those who go to law , to give money , is obliging them to buy that a second time , which they have already dearly purchas'd by their subjection . nevertheless , the said custom has prevail'd so far , that though the spice is sharp by its nature , yet no body dares complain of that which is paid in the * palace ; and should any body propose to abolish the use of it , they would expose themselves to the laughter of all the world. there are abuses which must be tolerated , for fear of falling into inconveniences of worse consequence : time and occasion will open the eyes of those who will succeed in other ages , to perform that usefully , which we dare not undertake in this , without exposing the state imprudently to a great deal of danger . all the reasons abovesaid , and many others being maturely consider'd , though the sale and inheritance of offices are not canonical ; though it were to be wish'd that merit were the only price of offices , and vertue the only title to transmit the succession of them to the heirs of the officers , instead of concluding for the alteration of those two settlements , the present constitution of the state obliges me to say three things determinately . the first is , that by the reversion of the act for the sale of offices , the disorders which would proceed from the brigues , and the sollicitations which would be made for the obtaining of offices , would be greater than that which arises by the liberty of selling , or buying of them . the second , that if the inheritance of the same were only abolish'd , besides that the abatement it would daily occasion in the price of the offices which would become vacant , would render the revenue , which accrues to the king by the sale of the same , wholly insignificant ; and that thereby a base commerce would be introduced , which would enable many men of little merit , secretly to share the favours , which kings only design for their officers , we would relapse into the evil the late king endeavour'd to free the state from , when by the establishment of the * paulette , he depriv'd the grandees of the kingdom of the means to make many creatures at his cost , to serve them on all occasions , to the prejudice of the publick good. the third is , that since the virtue of men is not always strong enough to induce them to prefer merit before favour ; it is better to leave the sale of offices and the annual duty , than to abolish those two settlements , which are very difficult to alter all of a sudden , without endangering the state. but , i add , that it is absolutely necessary to moderate the price of offices ; which is risen to that degree , that the excess of it is intolerable . if the excellence of a council consists in its being useful and easie to put into practice , this ought to be receiv'd , since the benefit of it is evident , and the practice easie ; since the execution of it only requires to restore the edict of the annual duty to the first terms of its settlement . in so doing , offices being reduc'd to a reasonable price , which will not exceed one half of that , to which the extravagance of the age has brought it at present ; and the king having the liberty to pay it to the heirs , to dispose of the said places according to his pleasure , the state would be so far from receiving any prejudice by it , that , on the contrary , i dare repeat , that a considerable advantage would accrue by it . moreover , things may be reduc'd to that point , without affording the least cause of complaint to the parties concern'd ; since it is easie to make them amends for the prejudice they have done themselves by divers means i do not specifie at present , by reason that if they were discover'd , they would lose their force , before they could be put in practice . sect . ii. which proposes the general means which may be us'd to put a stop to the disorders of the courts of justice . after what is abovesaid , i have nothing to add before i eonclude this chapter , but what i have represented to your majesty , upon the subject of the first order of your kingdom . if you encourage those officers of justice , who are men of an unspotted reputation ; if you discourage those , who being destitute of all merit , have nothing but money to obtain the magistracy ; if you deprive all those of your favour , and cause them to be punish'd who do not perform their duty , and do sell justice to the prejudice of your subjects , you will absolutely do whatever can be usefully done for the reformation of that body , which , as well as that of the ecclesiastical order ▪ depends more on those who have the administration of them , than on laws and regulations ; which remain useless , unless those who are employ'd to see them observ'd , are willing to perform it . although the laws were defective , if the officers are men of honour , their integrity will be capable to supply that defect and let them be never so good , they prove ineffectual , when the magistrates neglect the putting them in execution ; much more when they are so wicked as to pervert the use of them , according to their passions : since it is difficult to be a judge , and young at the same time , i cannot forbear observing , after what i have said , that it is a thing of no small consequence , in order to reform the courts of justice , to put the ordinances in execution , in what relates to the age of officers . in my opinion , it is impossible to be too exact in it , nor consequently too severe towards the attornies general who shall be wanting in their duty , in taking care that the parties concern'd may not be able to surprise the judges on that subject , nor to elude the good intentions of the prince , by suppositions or concealments . thereby the evil of youth , which is considerable , will be avoided , as well as that of ignorance , which is the source of many others . officers not being able to precipitate themselves , as they do at present , in their reception , will study more ; since otherwise they would remain idle , which seldom happens to those who have study'd until they have obtain'd the end they propose . i must not omit saying on this subject , that it would be fit absolutely to retrench the practice of certain doctors , who , prompting the young ones like parrots , often teach them to say things they do not understand , and only make them learned in cheating the publick , and themselves also . such men may be compar'd to fencing-masters , who are only good to instruct men to their own ruin , and to hinder them from learning the true exercises of soldiers , which are only learn'd in armies , with a great deal of time and fatigue . the banishment of such , would be of great use ; which in the practice would be found as difficult , as it is easie in the proposition . therefore i rather chuse to condemn the fathers in this place , who suffer their children to be instructed thus , and to advise them no longer to commit any such faults against their own blood , than to intreat your majesty to prescribe new laws upon that subject ; which would be no sooner made , but a thousand ways would be found out to elude the effect of the same , and to avoid the putting of them in practice . the experience which twenty years of continual occupation i have had , in the administration of publick affairs , has given me , obliges me to observe , that though it were to be wish'd , that the sedentary courts , which are absolutely establish'd to administer justice to every one , and to prevent and regulate all the disorders of the kingdom , should acquit themselves so well of their duty , that there might be no necessity to have recourse to extraordinary commissions to maintain them in the same . it is nevertheless so difficult to hope for that , which is to be wish'd on that subject , that i dare be bold to say , that in order to maintain this great state in the policy and discipline , without which it can never flourish , nothing can be of greater use , than to send from time to time in the provinces chambers of justice , compos'd of counsellors of state , and masters of requests , well selected , to avoid the thorns of parliaments , which foment difficulties upon every thing ; to the end that the said court receiving the complaints which may be made against all sorts of persons , without any exception of quality , may remedy the same immediately . i am sensible , that the soveraign courts will be loth to suffer any such establishments to be made : but as they must needs know , that a soveraign is not oblig'd to suffer their negligence , and that reason obliges him to remedy those defects ; i am not afraid of saying , that it is safer on that occasion to acquire their esteem in performing one's duty , than to preserve their good-will , in being wanting in what is due to publick good. but whereas it is impossible to send such commissions at one and the same time in all the provinces , and that it will suffice , for one of that nature , compos'd of the same officers , or different , to make the circuit of france in six years time ; i am of opinion , that it will be necessary to send often counsellors of state into the provinces , or masters of requests well selected , not only to perform the function of intendants of justice in capital cities , which may serve more toward their vanity , than be of any use to the publick ; but to go into all the parts of provinces , to enquire into the behaviour of the officers of justice , and of the finances ; to see whether the impositions are rais'd according to the ordinances ; whether the collectors commit no injustices in vexing of the people ; to discover how they perform their offices ; to know how the nobility behaves it self ; and to put a stop to all disorders , especially to the violences of those who , being powerful and rich , ●ppress the weak , and the king 's poor subjects . sect . iii. which represents the necessity of hindring the officers of justice , from incroaching upon the king's authority . after having represented what ought to be practis'd , and may be done with ease , to render the officers of justice such as they ought to be , in relation to private persons , i cannot , without a crime , abstain from proposing what is necessary to hinder so potent a body , as that which they compose , from being prejudicial in the whole to the state. one would think there were a great deal to be said upon that subject ; and yet i will say as much as is necessary in three words , if i set forth that it only requires to restrain the officers of justice from medling with any thing but the administring of the same to the king's subjects ; which is the only end of their establishment . the wisest of your predecessors have made it their busmess , and have found the benefit of it ; your majesty has follow'd their example as long as i have had the honour to serve you . and indeed it is a thing of such moment , that unless a strict hand be kept over those powerful societies , it would be impossible afterwards to keep them within the bounds of their duty . it would be impossible to hinder the ruin of royal authority , in following the sentiments of those , who being as ignorant in the practice of the government of states , as they presume to be learned in the theory of their administration , are neither capable to judge solidly of their conduct , nor proper to make decrees upon the course of publick affairs , which exceed their capacity . as nothing must be suffer'd from those great companies , to wound soveraign authority , it is prudence to tolerate some of their defects of another kind . it is necessary to wink at the imperfections of a body , which having several heads , cannot have the same mind ; and which being influenc'd by as many different motions , as it is compos'd of different subjects , cannot sometimes be inclin'd to discover , or to suffer its own good. every body must needs blame their proceeding , when they act contrary to justice and equity ; but in condemning it with reason , it is difficult to find a remedy for it ; by reason that in great companies the number of the wicked always exceeds the good ; and that though they were all wise , yet it would not follow , that the best sentiments would be found in the majority ; judgments being so various , even in those who only designing good , do neither differ in their intentions , nor in their ends. it is a thing so common in such bodies , to pry into , and to find fault with the government of states , that no body can wonder at it . all subordinate authority looks upon that which is superiour to it with an envious eye ; and not daring to dispute the power of it , they take the liberty to exclaim against the conduct thereof . the mildest government is in some measure odious , even to the most reasonable : and upon that consideration , one of the ancients said , with a great deal of reason , that among men who are equals by nature , there are few who do not repine at the difference which fortune puts between them ; and who being oblig'd to submit , do not blame those who have a command over them ; to shew , that though they are inferiour to them in power , they exceed them in merit . sect . iv. of the officers of the finances . the officers of the finances and the * partisans , are a separate classis , prejudicial to the state , but nevertheless necessary . thesesort of officers are an unavoidable evil ; but they must be reduc'd to supportable terms . their excesses , and the disorders which have been introduc'd among them , are come to that heighth , that it is impossible to suffer them any longer . they cannot raise their fortunes higher , without ruining the state ; and without undoing themselves , by giving the prince a just pretence of seizing their estates , upon the bare knowledge of the excessive riches they have heap'd up in a short time , upon the difference which will be verified between what they had when they were first employ'd , and what they are found to be in possession of . i am sensible , that such a proceeding may be liable to great mistakes , and that it may serve as a pretence for very unjust violences : neither do i mention this , by the bye , to advise the putting it in practice , which would occasion great abuses ; but i maintain , that no body could justly complain of it , if it were manag'd with so much caution , that in punishing those who do inrich themselves of a sudden , by the sole industry of their fingers , no prejudice were done under that pretence , to the estates of those who are grown rich and powerful , either by their patrimony , one of the most lawful means to rise ; or by the gratifications receiv'd from the favour of their master , which exempts them from crime ; or by the rewards which have been given to their services ; which is also one of the most lawful , since that in being useful to private persons , it is also advantageous to the state ; which will be the better serv'd , when those who serve it usefully are well rewarded . it is absolutely necessary to remedy the incroachments of the financiers , otherwise they will finally occasion the ruine of the kingdom ; which is so much impair'd by their robberies , that unless a stop be put to the same , it will be quite undone in a short time . the gold and silver they abound in , affords them the alliance of the best families in the kingdom ; which are so much bastardiz'd by that means , that their issue proves as different from the generosity of their ancestors , as they often differ in the resemblance of their faces . i may affirm , as having been an eye-witness of it , in many occasions , that their negligence , or malice , has been very prejudicial to publick affairs . after a serious consideration , on all the remedies of the evils they occasion , i dare say , that the best is to reduce them to as small a number as is possible ; and to employ , by way of commission on important occasions , men of probity and capacity , instead of persons whose places being for life , or hereditary , think it a sufficient title to rob , without the least fear of punishment . it will be very easie , in time of peace , to suppress many officers of this kind , and thereby to free the state of those who , without doing it any service , suck up all its substance in a very short time . i am sensible that it may be urg'd , that they are commonly us'd like leeches , who with a grain of salt , are often made to disgorge all the blood they have suck'd up , and , like spunges , which are easily squeez'd dry again , though never so full before . but , in my opinion , it is an ill expedient ; and i look upon the agreements and compositions which are sometimes made with the officers , as a remedy which is worse than the disease ; since , proproperly speaking , it gives them a title to rob anew , in hopes of a fresh pardon ; and that if any thing be got out of their purse that way , they do not only recover the principal they have given , but also the interest at a much higher rate than is allow'd of by the law. wherefore i conclude , that besides certain necessary officers , as a treasurer of the exchequer , a receiver general , two or three treasurers of france in every generality , and such others as are absolutely necessary , it will be no small piece of service to the state , if in satisfying those who have , bona●fide , given their money in hopes to advance themselves by such employments , according to the course of the times , all the rest are suppress'd . without this remedy , whatever regulation may be made , it will be impossible to preserve the king's money , since all punishments , tho' never so great , are not capable to hinder many officers of that kind from converting part of the money , which will pass through their hands , to their own use . sect . v. of the people . all politicians agree , that when the people are too easie , it is impossible to keep them within the bounds of their duty . their reason is , that being more ignorant than the other orders of the state , which are much more cultivated , or better instructed , unless they are kept under by some necessity , they will hardly keep within the bounds prescrib'd to them by reason , and by the laws . neither does reason allow their being exempted from all charges , since that in losing thereby the badge of their subjection , they would also lose the remembrance of their condition ; and that if they were discharg'd of tribute , they would also think themselves discharg'd of obedience . they must be compar'd to mules , which being us'd to burthens , are spoil'd more by rest than by labour ; but as the labour must be moderate , and that the burthens of those animals must be proportion'd to their strength ; so unless the subsidies which are impos'd on the people are moderate , even when they are useful to the publick , they are unjust . i am sensible , that when kings undertake publick works , 't is said with truth , that what the people gets by it , returns to them again by the payment of the taille : but then one may also maintain , that what kings get out of the people , returns to them again ; and that they only advance itto get it again by the enjoyment of rest , and of their estates , which cannot be secur'd , unless they contribute towards the maintenance of the state. i know moreover , that many princes have ruin'd their states , and their subjects , by not keeping sufficient force on foot for their preservation , for fear of over-burthening them ; and that some subjects have been expos'd to the servitude of their enemies , by desiring too much liberty under their natural soveraign . but there is a certain point which cannot be exceeded without injustice , common sense teaching every man , that there must be a proportion between the burthen and the strength of those who beat it . that proportion must be so religiously observ'd ▪ that as a prince cannot be esteem'd good , if he exacts more from his subjects than is necessary , those are not always the best , who never raise but what is absolutely necessary . moreover , as when a man is wounded , the heart , which grows faint by the loss of the blood which flows from it , does not draw that of the lower parts to its assistance , until the greatest part of that which lies in the uppermost is exhausted ; so in the urgent necessities of states , soveraigns must , as much as in them lies , make use of the abundance of the rich , before they bleed the poor extraordinarily . 't is the best counsel your majesty can take ; which you may easily put into practice , since for the future you may draw the principal subsistence of your state , out of your general farms , in which the rich are more concern'd than the poor , by reason that as they spend less , they do not contribute so much to the product thereof . chap. v. which considers the state in it self . sect . i. which represents how necessary it is , that the several parts of the state should remain every one within the extent of their bounds . after having spoken separately of the divers orders the state is compos'd of , i have but little to say in the main ; but that as the whole only subsists by the union of its parts in their order and natural situation ; so this great kingdom can never flourish , unless your majesty takes care to keep the bodies which compose it , in their order ; the church having the first rank , the nobility the second , and the officers , which are at the head of the people , the third . i speak this boldly , because it is as necessary as just , to put a stop to the incroachments of some officers , who being puf●'d up with pride , either upon the account of the great estates they are possess'd of , or by the authority they derive from their places , are so presumptuous as to challenge the first rank , whereas they can only pretend to the third ▪ which is so contrary to reason , and to the good of your service , that it is absolutely necessary to put a stop to the progress of such enterprises ; since otherwise france would no longer be what it has been , and what it ought to be , but a monstrous body , which as such , could never subsist or be lasting . as it is most certain , that the elements which are capable of weight , have none when they are in their place ; so it is certain , that none of the orders of your state will prove burthensome to the other , while each do remain in the place which their birth has assign'd them . and as neither fire , air , nor water , can sustain a terrestrial body , because it is heavy out of its place ; so it is certain , that neither the church , nor the nobility , can support the burthen of the officers , when they endeavour to move out of their sphere . as i am very sensible that your majesty knows how to keep all orders within their bounds , without enlarging any farther upon this subject , i will proceed to two questions , which i incert in this chapter , because they have an equal relation to the threedifferent orders of the state. sect . ii. which examines , whether it is better to make the governments triennial in this kingdom , than to leave them perpetual , according to the use which has been practis'd hitherto ? every body will fancy at first , that it will be better to make them triennial ; but after having compar'd the advantages which may thereby accrue , to the inconveniences that are to be fear'd ; perhaps it will be thought , as i have already observ'd it , that though the nomination to benefices is not so canonical as the elections , the use of it is nevertheless more advantagious at this time , for several reasons ; as also that notwithstanding the suppression of the sale of offices is to be desired for several reasons , yet the not tolerating the use of it would occasion many inconveniences express'd in their proper places . so it is impossible to render the governments of provinces and of towns triennial , without being expos'd to far greater inconveniences , than those which may be fear'd by the perpetual settlement of governours . i am sensible , that some may urge , that a man having a government only for three years , will , in all probability , endeavour to quit it with reputation , and to behave himself with so much prudence , that his administration may be preferr'd before his predecessor's ; whereas having it for life , the certainty of it gives him more licence . but it is much more likely , that he who knows he is not long to continue in his office , will endeavour to draw as much profit out of it , as he might expect during his life , if he were to enjoy it to his death . moreover , considering the inconstancy of our nation , there might be some reason to fear the employing of some , who foreseeing the end of an agreeable administration , might resolve to perpetuate it , by receiving those as masters , whom they ought to look upon as enemies . if the practice of spain be urg'd , which often changes governours , after having answer'd , that example shews us , that nothing can be more dangerous than that government ; i will add , that as there are fruits , the use of which is excellent in one country , and a poison in another ; so there are settlements , the practice whereof is good in one state , but yet would prove pernicious in another . some may say , to prevent the objections which may be made against the practice of the order of spain in this kingdom , that those who will lay down an office , after the expiration of the term of their administration , will have no reason to be dissatisfied , since they will be employ'd in others which will prove better ; but such great difficulties will be met with in the practice of such an order , that it will be impossible to overcome them . a man may be fit to govern in piccardy , by reason of his being born there , who will not be fit to be employ'd in brittany , where he has no acquaintance , and where the place which will be given him , will hardly be able to maintain him . the governments of france are , for the most part of so little profit , that unless they are given to persons who are more desirous of them upon the account of honour , and for the convenience of their neighbourhood , than out of any other consideration ; there are few who are able to bear the expence of them : besides , there are not men enough in the provinces , for the alterations which must needs be made , if employments are made triennial . those mutations are not only practicable , but absolutely necessary in the great employments of spain ; as those of the viceroys of naples , of sicily , of sardinia , the government of mi●an , and other employments of the like consequence : and all of them are so profitable to those that possess them , that in quitting the abundance of the one , they enter into the wealth of the other . places which are distant from the abode of princes , require a change of governours in places of the consequence of those i have mention'd , by reason that a longer residence than that of three years , might enable them to form projects to settle themselves there for ever ; seeing particularly that the ambition of men is so prevailing , that they are easily inclin'd to change the condition of subject into that of master . but the case is different in france , where the governments are not so distant from the abode of the kings , as to fear such inconveniences ; nor the said employments so great , as to give the possessors a sufficient authority to make themselves masters of the same . therefore provided your majesty , and your successors , keep the power of changing the governments as you shall think sit , upon real cause given so to do , which you may always do with justice , provided they are given gratis , and not sold ; i dare be bold to say , that it is better in that point to follow the ancient custom of france , than to imitate that of spain ; which is nevertheless so politick and so reasonable , considering the extent of its dominion , that though it cannot be usefully practic'd in this kingdom ; yet it will be proper , in my opinion , to make use of it in those places , of which france will preserve the possession in lorrain and in italy . sect . iii. which condemns survivorships . the survivorships in question in this place , are granted either against the will of the possessors of places , or by their consent . all men are sensible , that it is very unjust to nominate the successors of a man , while he is alive , against his will ; since it exposes his life to the artifices of the person that is to profit by his death , and that the dread which may justly seize his mind , is a kind of death to him . that practice which was formerly very much in vogue in this kingdom , is at present banish'd from thence . it is so dangerous , that the councils , and the best constitutions of temporal princes , do condemn it , as well as reason . neither can the consent of the possessors any ways justifie that proceeding , since that whatever confidence they may repose in those who are appointed to succeed them , they are often mistaken : though it is impossible to satisfie every body in a state by grants , yet it is necessary at least to afford hopes to those to whom nothing better can be given : which can never be done , if places , offices , and benefices are given to children , who in the height of their merit , and of their age , would perhaps hardly dare to expect those honours and dignities which are granted them in the cradle . such favours , in which the state is greatly concern'd , hardly oblige any body . a man does not think that that is given him , which his father , or another relation is in possession of , he looks upon the survivorship of it as a right of inheritance , rather than as an effect of the prince's goodness . notwithstanding that the good of the state requires , that in the promotion of offices , merit should be preferr'd to all other things ; in what relates to survivorship , a greater regard is had to the service of him who demands a successor , than to the persons that is to succeedhim can do . the favour of the one on such occasions , often serves in lieu of merit in the others , who have nothing but their importunity to recommend them . therefore i conclude , that the less favours of that kind are granted , is certainly the best ; and that it would be better yet never to grant any ; seeing that whatever particular considerations can be alledg'd , the consequence of them is dangerous in states , where examples have often more force than reason . if any one observes that i condemn a thing in this article , the practice whereof i have suffer'd even in respect to my own relations * , i am sure that he will remain very well satisfied , if he considers , that while a disorder is in vogue , without any possibility of a remedy , reason requires that order should be extracted out of it : which was my intention in preserving places , which had been establish'd by my cares , to persons whom i could more strictly oblige to follow my intentions and my steps . if it had been possible , during the troubles of a reign agitated by divers storms , to settle the regulation i propose , i would have been a very religious observer of it . chap. vi. which represents to the king , what men think he ought to consider , in relation to his person . god being the principle of all things , the soveraign master of kings , and he who makes them reign prosperously ; if your majesty's devotion were not known by all the world , i would begin this chapter , which relates to your person , in representing to you , that unless you follow the will of your creator , and submit to his laws , you must not expect to have yours observ'd , and to find your subjects obedient to your orders . but it would be superfluous to exhort your majesty to devotion ; you are so naturally inclin'd to it , and so much confirm'd in it , by the habit of your vertue , that there is no reason to fear that you will ever deviate from it . therefore instead of representing to you what advantages religious princes have above others , i will content my self with saying , that the devotion which is necessary in kings , must be free from scruples : i say it , sir , because the niceness of your majesty's conscience often makes you dread to offend god , in doing things , which certainly you cannot abstain from without sin. i am sensible , that the faults of princes , which are of this nature , are much less dangerous for the state , than those which incline to presumption , and to the contempt of those things they ought to reverence . but since they bear the name of faults , it is necessary to correct them , particularly if it be true , as it is most certain , that many inconveniences may arise from thence , very prejudicial to the state. in consideration of which , i make it my humble petition to your majesty , that you would be pleas'd more and more to fortifie your self against scruples ; calling to mind , that you can never be guilty before god , if you follow ( on occasions which will prevent themselves of difficult discussion , in what relates to your conscience ) the advice of your council , confirm'd by that of some good ▪ theologians , unsuspected , in the case in question . this first foundation being laid , as nothing can be more material towards the welfare of your affairs , than the preservation of your majesty's health , i cannot forbear resuming so important a subject . the careful and diligent observations i have made on all that relates to you , makes me say boldly , that nothing is requir'd to so important an end , but your own will , which nevertheless is the greatest enemy you have to encounter with on this subject ; since it is often very difficult to prevail with princes to will that , which is not only very useful , but absolutely necessary for them . your majesty's mind has so absolute a sway over your body , that the least ▪ of your passions seize your heart , and disturb the whole frame of your person ; many experiences have convinc'd ▪ me of this truth , with so much certainty , that i have never seen you sick by any other principle . god has been pleas'd to give your majesty force enough couragiously to bear those things , in which you are most concern'd , in affairs of the greatest consequence ; but as a counterpoise to this great quality , he has permitted your being so sensible , to those things which concern you , in subjects of far less consequence , that even things which one should think at first could not displease you , trouble you to that degree , that it is impossible to ease you on such occasions , according to one's desire : time , which makes those fumes that surprise the sense to evaporate , has hitherto been the sole remedy to such distempers in your majesty , who has no sooner been seiz'd by them , but the consequence has prov'd a corporal indisposition . in that , you are like those , who despising the points of swords , through the greatness of their courage , cannot , nevertheless , by a certain natural antipathy , bear the pricking of a launcet . if it were impossible for all men to prevent , by reason , the surprises they receive by their passions ; yet i would not think it so in your majesty , who has many excellent qualities which others have not . and therefore i am of opinion , that the first heat of your eager youth being past , the flegm of a riper age will assist you , to secure your self by reason , against an enemy , which is the more dangerous , in that it is internal and domestick ; and which has done you so much harm , particularly twice or thrice , that it had like to have cost you your life . as it is a thing very important for your health , it is no less considerable for your reputation and glory , which cannot suffer that any thing , which is nothing in reason , should have an influence over your sentiments , which ought to be regulated by it in all things . neither can i forbear , on this subject , to reiterate a petition i have often made to your majesty , conjuring you to apply your mind to great things , important to your state , and to despise little ones , which are unworthy of your cares and thoughts . it will be advantagious and glorious to you , often to meditate on the most considerable designs which the course of affairs will put in agitation ; whereas you will be so far from deriving the least advantage , by applying your mind too much on those which are not of that nature , that , on the contrary , you will receive great prejudice by it ; not only in that such occupations will divert you from others of more consequence , but also by reason that as small thorns are more capable of pricking than great ones , which are easily perceiv'd , it would be impossible for you to avoid many vexations , of no use to the affairs of the state , and very prejudicial to your health . the great disquiets wherewith i have seen your mind agitated on divers occasions , oblige me to represent to you , in this place , as i have done on several other occasions , that as certain cares are necessary for the welfare of human affairs , there are some which can produce no other effects , than to alter the good disposition of him who applies himself too eagerly to them ; and such a surprise to those who serve , that the trouble of their mind renders them the less capable to perform what is expected from them . the experience which a reign and government of twenty five years affords your majesty , does not permit you to be ignorant , that in great affairs , the effects never answer the orders that have been given exactly . it also informs you , that you should rather pity those to whom you commit the execution of your will , when their labour does not succeed , than to impute to them the ill events which they are not guilty of . god alone can render his resolutions infallible ; and yet his goodness is such , that , letting men act according to their weakness , he suffers the difference there is between their events , and his dispositions ; which teaches kings to suffer that patiently by reason , which their creator only indures out of his goodness . your majesty being naturally of a tender constitution , not very healthy , of a restless impatient humour , particularly when you are in an army , of which you take the conduct upon your self , i should think my self guilty of a crime , if i did not make it my humble request to you , to avoid war for the future as much as it is possible ; which i do upon this foundation , that the levity and inconstancy of the french , can only be vanquish'd by the presence of their master , and that your majesty cannot , without exposing your self to ruin , fix upon so lasting a design , nor consequently expect a good success from it . you have sufficiently shewn your valour , and the power of your arms , to think on nothing for the future , but to enjoy that peace and tranquility ▪ which you have acquir'd to the kingdom by your labour , keeping your self in a posture to defend it against all those , who , contrary to publick faith , would offend you anew . as it is very usual to many men to have no action , unless they are animated by some passion , in which they may be compar'd to incense , which never smells sweet but when it is put into fire , i cannot forbear telling your majesty , that this constitution , which is dangerous in all sorts of men , is particularly so in kings , who ought to be guided by reason above all others . and indeed whenever passion inclines to good , it is by chance , seeing that by its nature it makes us swerve so much from it , that it blinds those in whom it reigns ; and that though a blind man may chance to hit upon the right way , yet it is a wonder if he does not lose himself ; and he must needs stumble often , unless he has an extraordinary fortune . so many misfortunes have befallen princes and their states , when they have follow'd their own sentiments to the prejudice of reason ; and that instead of consulting publick interest , they have been guided by their passions , that it is impossible not to intreat your majesty to reflect often upon it , in order to confirm your self more and more in what you have all along practis'd to the contrary . i also humbly crave you would be pleas'd often to call to mind what i have represented several times to you , that no prince can be in a worse condition , than he who not being always able to do those things himself which he is oblig'd to do , is loth to permit others to do them for him ; and that to be capable to suffer himself to be serv'd , is not one of the least qualities a great king can have ; seeing that otherwise occasions are often sooner fled , than men can dispose themselves to take hold of them , whereby favourable conjunctures for the advancement of the state are lost , for subjects of no consideration . the late king your father being reduc'd to a great necessity , paid his servants with good words ; and made them do things by caresses , which his necessity did not allow him to incline them to any other way . your majesty not being of that constitution , has a natural driness , which you take from the queen your mother , as herself has often told you in my presence , which hinders you from imitating the late king on this subject . i cannot forbear representing to you , that it is your interest to do good to those who serve you ; and that at least it is reasonable to take particular care not to say any thing to disoblige them . as i shall have an occasion in the sequel to treat of the liberality which is necessary in princes , i will say no more of it in this place ; but i will enlarge upon the evils which attend those who speak too freely of their subjects . the wounds which are receiv'd by swords , are easily cur'd ; but it is not so by those of the tongue , particularly by the tongues of kings , the authority of which makes them incurable , unless the cure comes from themselves . the higher a stone is thrown from , the more impression it makes where it lights ; many would freely expose themselves to be run through by the swords of their master's enemies , who cannot bear a scratch from his hand . as a fly is not meat for an eagle ; as the lion despises those animals which are not of his force ; as a man attacking a child would be blam'd by all the world ; so i presume to say , that great kings ought never to wound private persons with words , because they bear no proportion to their grandeur . history is full of the ill events which have been occasion'd by the liberty great men have formerly allow'd their tongues , to the prejudice of persons they deem'd to be of no consideration . god has been pleas'd to favour your majesty so much , that you are not naturally inclin'd to do harm ; and therefore it is reasonable you should regulate your words so much , that they may not do the least prejudice . i am certain , that you will not willingly fall into that inconvenience : but as it is difficult for you to stop your first motions , and your sudden agitations of mind , which do sometimes transport you , i should not be your servant , unless i acquainted you , that your reputation and interest requires your taking a particular care to suppress them , seeing that though such liberty of speech should not wound your conscience , yet it would very much prejudice your affairs . as to speak well of one's enemies , is an heroick vertue . a prince cannot speak licentiously of those who would venture a thousand lives for his service , without committing a notable fault against the laws of christians , as well as against sound policy . a king whose hands are undefiled , whose heart is pure , and whose tongue is innocent , has not a common vertue ; and those who possess those two first : qualities eminently , as your majesty does , may easily acquire the third . as it suits with the grandeur of kings to be reserv'd in their words , that nothing may come out of their mouths capable to offend private persons ; so in prudence it behoves them not only to take care never to say any thing to the disadvantage of the principal communities of their state , but moreover , to speak in such a manner of them , that they may have reason to believe they have an affection for them : the most important affairs of the state oblige them so often to cross them , for publick good , that prudence requires they should be satisfied in things which are not of that nature . it is not sufficient for great princes , never to open their mouths to speak ill of any body ; but reason requires they should shut their ears against slanders and false reports , and that they should turn out , and banish the authors of them , as dangerous plagues , which infect the courts and hearts of princes , and the minds of all those who come near them . if those who have a free access to the ears of kings , without deserving it , are dangerous , those who possess their hearts out of pure favour , are much more so ; seeing that in order to preserve such a treasure , they must needs make use of art and malice , to supply the want of vertue which is not in them . i cannot forbear adding upon this subject , that i have always dreaded for your majesty the power of such men , more than the power of the greatest kings of the world ; and that it behoves you more to beware of the artifice of a menial servant , than of all the factions the grandees could form in your state , though they should all tend to the same end. when i was first introduc'd into the management of affairs , those who had had the honour to serve you before , were prepossess'd that your majesty believ'd whatever was reported to their prejudice ; and upon that foundation , their principal care was ever to keep some of their confidents about you , to secure themselves against the evil they were afraid of . though the experience i have of your majesty's steadiness in relation to me , obliges me to acknowledge , either that their opinion was ill grounded , or that the reflections which time has allow'd you to make upon me , have remov'd that easiness of youth ; yet i must needs conjure you to settle your self so firmly in the conduct you have been pleas'd to use towards me , that no body may have reason to dread a contrary fate . in the next place , i must also tell you , that as prince's ears must be shut against calumnies , so they must be open to hearken to the truths which are useful to the state ; and that as the tongue must have no motion to say any thing to the prejudice of any body's reputation ; so it must be free and bold to speak , when publick interest is concern'd . i mention these two points , because i have often observ'd , that it was no small trouble to your majesty to have the patience to hearken even to that which was most important to you ; and that when the welfare of your affairs oblig'd you to express your will , not only to persons of great quality , but also to those of mean condition , you had much ado to resolve to do it , when you suspected that it would be disagreeable to them . i confess , that the said dread is a sign of goodness ; but to be no flatterer , i must also tell you , that it is a sign of weakness , which though tolerable in a private man , cannot be so in a great king , considering what inconveniences it may be attended with . i lay no stress upon that such a proceeding would lay all the odium and hatred of resolutions upon your majesty's council , because that is inconsiderable , if it could prove beneficial to the affairs of the state ; but that which is worth considering , is , that there are often occasions , in which whatsoever authority a minister can have , it cannot be sufficient to produce certain effects , which require the voice of a soveraign , and an absolute power . moreover , if the grandees were once persuaded , that an unseasonable shame would hinder a king from performing the office of a king , in commanding absolutely , they would always pretend to obtain by importunity , the contrary of what has been order'd by reason ; and finally , their audaciousness might proceed so far , that finding their prince apprehensive of acting like a master , they would grow weary of acting as subjects . princes must have a masculine vertue , and do every thing by reason , without being guided by inclination , which often leads them into dangerous precipices , if those which blind them , and induce them to do whatever they please , are capable to produce mischief , when they follow them with too much inadvertency , the natural aversion they receive sometimes without a cause , may cause greater yet , unless they are temper'd by reason as they ought to be . in some occasions your majesty has stood in need of your prudence to check the tendency of those two passions ; but more in the last than in the first , since it is easier to do mischief , following the dictates of aversion , which requires nothing but a command in a king , than to do good according to one's inclination ; which cannot be done , without depriving one's self of one's own , which many persons can hardly resolve to do . those two motions are contrary to the genius of kings , principally if reflecting little upon them , they oftener follow their instinct than their reason . they often induce them to engage in the divisions , which are frequent in courts , among private persons , which has occasion'd great inconveniences in my time . their dignity obliges them to reserve themselves for reason , which is the only party they ought to espouse on all occasions ; they cannot do otherwise , without divesting themselves of the quality of judges and of soveraigns , to take that of parties , and submitting , in some measure , to the condition of private men. they thereby expose their state to many cabals and factions , which are form'd afterwards . those who are to defend themselves against the power of a king , are too sensible that they can never do it by force , to attempt it otherwise than by intrigues , artifices , and cabals , which often occasion great trouble in states . the sincerity which is necessary in a man who makes a testament , does not permit my pen to end this section , without making a confession as true as it is advantagious for your majesty's glory , since it will testifie to all the world , that the law of god has always been a bound capable to stop the violence of any inclination or aversion , which could have surpris'd your mind ; which being liable to the least derect of human nature , has always thanks be to god , been free of the most notable imperfections of princes . chap. vii . which represents the present state of the king's houshold ; and sets forth what seems to be necessary , in order to put it into that in which it ought to be . the order of arts , and of all good discipline , requires that a man should begin his work by that part which is most easie . upon this foundation , the first thing an architect does , who undertakes a great building , is to make a model of it ; in which the proportions must be so well observ'd , that it may serve him as a measure and foot for his great design : and when he cannot compass the said project , he lays aside his enterprize ; common sense making the dullest sensible , that he who cannot perform the least , is altogether incapable of the most . in that consideration , as the meanest capacities are sensible , that as the structure of man is an abstract of that of the great word , so private families are the true models of states , and of republicks ; and every body being persuaded , that he who either cannot , or will not regulate his family , is not capable to order a state reason did require , that in order to compass the reformation of this kingdom , i should begin by that of your majesty's houshold . nevertheless , i confess , that i never durst under take it , by reason that your majesty having ever had an aversion for the orders you reckon'd to be of small consequence , when any private persons were concern'd in them , no body could propose such a design , without openly shocking your inclination , and the interest of many men , who being continually about you in great familiarity , might have prejudic'd you against those orders which were most necessary for your state , to put a stop to those of your houshold , the irregularity of which were useful to them . but as a testament sets forth many intentions , which the testator durst not divulge during his life , this will petition your majesty towards the reformation of your houshold , which has been omitted , both by reason that though it did seem more easie than that of the state , yet it was in effect much more difficult ; and also because prudence obliges to suffer in some measure small losses , to gain considerably in others . as it is obvious to all the world , that no king ever carried the dignity of his state to a higher degree than your majesty ; so no body can deny , that none ever suffer'd the lustre of his houshold to be more trampled upon . the strangers who have travell'd in france in my time , have often wonder'd to see a state so exalted , and a houshold so debas'd . and indeed it is insensibly decay'd to that degree , that some are in possession of the first places of it , who under the reigns of your predecessors , durst not have presum'd to aspire to the least : all things have been in confusion there , from the kitchen to the cabinet . whereas in the king your father's time , the princes , the officers of the crown , and all the grandees of the kingdom , did commonly eat at your tables ▪ in your time they seem only establish'd for servants , common chevaux legers , and gens d'●●rms . moreover , they have been so ill serv'd , that some of them have been so nice as to despise them , instead of being fond of them . strangers have often found fault , even with your own , being serv'd by common nasty scullions , whereas those of other kings are only serv'd by gentlemen . i am sensible that this custom has not been introduc'd in your time ; but it is never the more tolerable for being ancient , since it is absolutely derogating from the dignity and grandeur of so great a prince . i am also sensible , that the said practice has been suffer'd hitherto , under pretence of the safety of kings , saying , that it is impossible for officers to answer for what they have done , unless they carry , or see it carried themselves to your majesty . but this reason seems inconsiderable to me , since there is no reason to believe , that a scullion will be more faithful to his master , than a gentleman , who in divers other occasions might betray him , if he were so minded . fourscore young gentlemen , whom your majesty maintains pages of your chamber , or of your stables , would be much better employ'd in that service , than in barely serving your first gentlemen , or queries who command them ; and without doubt as they would do it with more dignity , they would not perform it with less fidelity . the neatness , which is becoming in all places , is consequently more requir'd yet in the palaces of kings : the magnificence of furniture is the more necessary there , by reason that foreigners only judge of the grandeur of princes by what appears externally ; and yet though your majesty is vastly stor'd with the same , both fine and rich , which are destroy'd in the places where they should be preserv'd : your majesty often uses such in your chamber , that those to whose share they fall when you lay them aside , do not think fit to use them after you . the entrance into your cabinet has been allow'd to all men , not only to the prejudice of your dignity , but also in contempt of the safety of your person . ambassadors have been crowded more by footmen , by pages , and other inferiour officers , than by the grandees of your state , in their audiences ; and nevertheless , your dignity , and the ancient custom of this kingdom , require on such occasions your being attended by the princes , dukes , and peers , the officers of the crown , and other grandees of your state. i am sensible , that most kingdoms have different customs : that in spain , the greatest see their king oftner than in england : there are such good orders there upon that subject , that though all the doors are open , none are seen in the chambers or cabinets , but such as have a free entrance there , by their dignities and employments . i know moreover , that it is a privilege of those who bear your crown , to be crowded by their subjects ; but it should be with this distinction , that usually it ought to be by your nobility , and on the occasion of receiving foreigners by qualify'd persons , of which there is a sufficient number in your state , to make them observe the grandeur and singularity of it , by that prerogative . in a word , disorder reigns so universally in all your majesty's houshold , that there is no particular place free from it . though all great princes are careful to have an equipage of great horses , suitable to their grandeur , your majesty never had one in your great stable , which you could use on occasion ; though you are at a greater charge about it , than ever any of your predecessors were . i might easily specifie many other defects , no less remarkable than this ; but i will not enter into the particulars of so great a disorder , both because it would be a very difficult task , without descending too low for the dignity of this work ; and that it is sufficient to know a distemper without publishing it , to prescribe remedies for the same . i will perform my duty , in proposing to your majesty the true means to afford as much lustre to your houshold , as there is meanness and disorder in it at present . the first thing which is necessary to that end , is , that your majesty should be strongly bent to the said reformation ; since it is certain , that in affairs of this nature , the will of kings is like the will of god , in relation to the most difficult things , in which to will and to do , is one and the same thing . the second is , that you would be pleas'd , for the future , to employ none but persons of quality in the first places of your houshold , having all the qualifications which are requir'd to discharge their trust worthily . let an officer be never so great , he will apply himself to the least dependencies of his office , if he be capable of it ; because he will judge them to be of consequence , as indeed they are . unless the stewards , for instance , take a particular care , to cause those places to be cleans'd , morning and evening , where people eat , as soon as the tables are remov'd , they will be wanting in one of the most material points of their charge . i may say the same of all the principal officers , and particularly of the first gentlemen of your chamber , who must be careful to keep all your majesty's apartment so neat and so clean , that it will not be too much to sweep and perfume them three or four times a day , by reason of the vast concourse of people which cannot be avoided there , though it be never so well regulated . provided every man be qualify'd for his office , every thing will be done according to your majesty's desire ; and the regulation of all the rest , depends on this point : for whatever rule be establish'd , it will prove useless , unless there are men capable to see it perform'd ; and if they are , they will have wit enough to cause that to be done , which reason will shew them to be necessary for the dignity of their place , and for the service of their master . the third consists in that your majesty should employ none but gentlemen in all the places of your houshold , unless in the lowest ; which contributing much towards your dignity , will create the more affection into your nobility , in that they will have more means to advance themselves near your person . by this means , your majesty may make the four troops of your gens d'arms of the body , the four best troops of gens d'arms in your kingdom ; it being most certain , that there are many gentlemen who would be over-joy'd to have a means to live in that quality ▪ provided those places be given them gratis , which are now sold at who gives most . in that case , many will be glad to have that employment , who would by no means accept of it at present , because it is usurp'd by persons who do not deserve it . and all gentlemen will willingly accept of it , upon the account of the access it will give them at court ▪ where a chance and some acquaintance may advance their fortune in an instant . your majesty will also receive another benefit by the said establishment , in that as it will lessen the number of the * roturiers , who are freed of the tailles by the places they enjoy in your houshold , it will encrease the number of those who are to help the people to bear the burthen they are over-whelmed with at present . the fourth is , that your majesty should give all the places of your houshold gratis , without allowing them to be sold upon any consideration whatever . it may be urg'd , perhaps , that it is not reasonable , that those who have bought places very dear , should not be allow'd to sell them again ; but as it is impossible to make any settlements of great use for the publick , without their being attended with some inconveniencies for private persons , the said inconvenience is not considerable , seeing that as they did not buy their places with an assurance of leave to sell them again , like those officers who pay an annual duty to the king , they may be depriv'd of the hopes they had fram'd to themselves , without any injustice . and though some private persons may find themselves griev'd by such an alteration , all the nobility and the greatest will find a notable advantage by it , in that whereas they were formerly oblig'd to sell a considerable part of their estates to get places , which has often ruin'd the best famiies of the kingdom , there will be no means left to expect them , but merit ; which will hinder them from ruining their estate , and will oblige them to acquire vertue , which is despis'd in this age , because the price of all things only consists in money . moreover , there will be so many means to satisfie those who upon the account of any particular consideration will deserve to be exempted from the general rule , that the publick will receive the benefit of the advantage your majesty will be pleas'd to procure them , and yet such private persons as might have cause to complain with justice , will receive no prejudice by it . as it is impossible to question the usefulness of these propositions , the facility to put them in execution is evident , since , as abovesaid , it only requires a firm and constant resolution in your majesty , to reap the benefit of the same , and to restore your houshold to its former greatness . chap. viii . of the prince's council . sect . i. which shews that the best prince stands in need of a good council . it is no small question among politicians , to know , whether a prince who governs a state by his own head , is more desirable than he who not confiding so much in his own abilities , relies much on his council , and does nothing without their advice ? whole volumes might be compil'd of the reasons which might be alledg'd for and against it : but referring this question to the particular fact which obliges me to introduce it in this place ; after having preferr'd the prince who acts more by his council , than by his own opinion , to him who prefers his own head to all those of his counsellors ; i cannot forbear saying , that as the worse government is that , which has no other spring than the head of a prince , who being incapable ▪ is so presumptuous as to slight all counsel ; the best of all is that of which the main spring is in the sense of the soveraign , who , though capable to act by himself , has so much modesty and judgment , that he does nothing without advice , upon this principle , that one eye does not see so well as many . besides that reason discovers the solidity of this decision , truth obliges me to say , that experience has convinc'd me so much of it , that i cannot forbear affirming it , without doing my self a violence . a capable prince is a great treasure in a state ; a skilful council , and such as it ought to be , is no less considerable : but the concert of both together , is of an inestimable value , since thereon depends the felicity of states . it is certain , that the most happy states are those , in which princes and counsellors are the wisest . it is also certain , that there are few princes capable to govern states alone ; and , moreover , though there were many , they ought not to do it . the almighty power of god , his infinite wisdom , and his providence , do not hinder him from making use , in things which he might do by his bare will , of the ministry of second causes ; and consequently kings , whose perfections are limitted , instead of being infinite , would commit a notable fault ▪ in not following his example . but whereas it is not in their power , as in god's , to supply the defects of those they employ , they must be very careful to chuse them as perfect and as accomplish'd as possible can be . many qualifications are requir'd to make a perfect counsellor ; nevertheless they may be reduc'd to four , viz. capacity , fidelity , courage , and application , which includes many others . sect . ii. which represents what capacity is requir'd in a good counsellor . the capacity of counsellors does not require a pedantick knowledge : none can be more dangerous in a state , than those who will govern kingdoms by the maxims they find in books : they often ruin them thereby , because the time past has no relation to the present , and that the constitution of times , places , and persons , is different . it only requires goodness , steadiness of mind , solidity of judgment , true source of prudence , a reasonable tincture of letters , a general knowledge of history , and of the present constitution of all the states of the world , and particularly of that in which they are . whereupon two things ought particularly to be consider'd : the first , that the greatest wits are more dangerous than useful in the management of affairs ; unless they have a great deal more lead than quicksilver , they are no ways fit for the state. some are fertile in inventions , and abounding in thoughts ; but so variable in their designs , that those of the morning and of the evening , are never alike ; and have so little connexity and choice in their resolutions , that they alter the good , as well as the ill ones , and never remain constant in any . i may say with truth , as knowing it by experience , that the levity of such men is no less dangerous , in the administration of publick affairs , than the malice of many others . much is to be dreaded from minds whose vivacity is accompanied with little judgment ; and tho' those who excell in the judicious part should not have a great reach , yet they might be useful to states . the second remark to be made on this subject is . that nothing can be more dangerous in a state , than to give a great authority to certain men , who have not sense enough to govern themselves , and yet think they have too much to stand in need of any body's . they are neither capable to take a good counsel from their own head , nor to follow the advice of those who are capable to direct them ; and thus they commit gross faults . presumption is one of the greatest vices a man can be guilty of , in publick employments ; and if humility is not requir'd in those who are design'd for the conduct of states , yet modesty is absolutely necessary ; since it is most certain , that those who have the greatest parts , are sometimes the least capable to admit society and counsel ; qualifications without which , even those to whom nature has given most knowledge , are not fit for government . without modesty , men of great parts are so wedded to their own opinions , that they condemn all others , though better ; and the pride of their natural constitution being join'd to their authority , renders them altogether insupportable . the wisest man in the world ought to hearken to the advice of those whom he thinks less capable than himself . as in prudence a minister of state ought to speak but little , so it behoves him to hearken much . a man may profit by all sorts of advices ; the good are useful in themselves , and the ill ones confirm the good. in a word , the capacity of a minister of state , requires modesty ; and if with that quality he has a good genius , and solidity of judgment , he will have whatever is necessary . sect . iii. which represents the integrity that is requir'd in a good counsellor . it is a different thing to be an honest man in what relates to god , and in relation to men. he who takes a particular care to observe the law of his creator , performs his duty in the first ; but to do it in the second , he must observe that which is prescrib'd by the honour of men. those different integrities are necessary in a counsellor of state ; but it is uncertain yet , whether he who possesses all the qualifications which are requir'd in order thereunto , as to those of the world , also commonly has those which make him an honest man before god. a man might be very careful to regulate his conscience according to the will of his creator , who being depriv'd of some of the conditions of that integrity , will be less fit to be employ'd in the ministry of publick affairs , than he who having them all , may be subject to some particular defects , in relation to the first . however , as the disorder of conscience is the true source of all the imperfections of man ; i declare boldly , that the two integrities i am speaking of , are equally necessary for the perfection of a counsellor of state , and that he cannot have the second , if he be destitute of the first . in a word , a states-man must be faithful to god , to the state , to all men , and to himself ; which he will be , if , besides the qualities above-mention'd , he has an affection for the publick , and has no private ends in his counsels . the integrity of a publick minister , does not suppose a fearful scrupulous conscience ; on the contrary , nothing can be more dangerous in the government of a state ; since that as the want of conscience may occasion many injustices and cruelties , scruples may introduce many emotions and indulgences , very prejudicial to the publick : for it is most certain , that those who tremble in the most certain things , out of fear to ruin themselves , often ruin states , when they might save themselves with them . as the integrity of a counsellor of state can never agree with a certain rigour , which is accompanied with injustice , it is not contrary to the severity which must be us'd of necessity in many occasions ; on the contrary , it advises and prescribes it sometimes , and often obliges to be pitiless . it does not hinder a man from minding his own business , in serving the state ; but it only forbids him to think on it , to the prujudice of publick interest , which ought to be dearer to him than his own life . that integrity does not allow a certain good-ness , in those who are employ'd in publick affairs , to hinder them from boldly refusing those who have unjust pretensions ; on the contrary , it requires , that in granting that which is reasonable , they should be steady in denying what is not so . i cannot proceed on this subject , without saying what ferdinand great duke of florence , who liv'd in our time , was us'd to say on the said subject , that he would prefer a corrupted man , before one whose facility was extraordinary ; because , added he , a corrupted person cannot always be wrought upon by his interest , which does not always come in play ; whereas he who is of an easie temper , is easily sway'd by all those who press him ; which happens the oftner , by reason that it is known , that he is not capable to resist those who press him . the said integrity requires that all those who are employ'd in the government of a state , should walk an even pace ; and that as they act to the same end , they should hold the same language ; otherwise , if any one be found , who , though he behaves himself well in effect , speaks less resolutely than the rest to decline envy ; besides , that he will be wanting in the integrity requir'd in a minister of state , he will load those with hatred whose freeness of speech is consonant to the steadiness of their actions . there are men , whose vertue consists more in bewailing disorders , than in applying a remedy to the same , by the establishment of a good discipline . those are not the men we seek for ; their vertue is only in appearance ; and as it has no action which can be of use , it differs but little from vice , which has none but what may be hurtful . the integrity of a counsellor of state must be active ; it disdains complaints , and fixes on solid effects , which may be useful to the publick . there are others , who having nothing but the good of the state in their mouth , have so extravagant an ambition in their heart , that no end can stop their desires , and nothing can satisfie or content them . others proceeding farther , not contented with never being so , convert , under specious pretences , publick interests to their own ; and instead of guiding particular interest by that which is publick , they do the contrary , with as much injustice as boldness . such men are not only destitute of the integrity which is necessary in the employment of publick affairs , but they are moreover true plagues to a state ; they are the wild boars of the scripture , in the vineyard , in a full vintage , who do not only fill their bellies with it , but spoil and destroy all the rest . those who are of a wilful temper , and follow their passions more than reason , and who , instead of chusing men barely upon the account of their capacity , in those things in which they are to be employ'd , chuse them only because they are sensible that they have an affection for them , and that they are link'd to their interest , cannot neither be reckon'd men of the integrity which is requir'd in the administration of states . if a man be revengeful , to put him in authority , is to put a sword in the hand of a fury : if he follows his appetite , and not reason in his elections , it is exposing the state to be serv'd by men of favour , rather than of merit ; which will occasion many inconveniences . a man of true integrity must never revenge his own injuries , unless when he rights those of the state : moreover , he must not be induc'd to publick vengeance , upon the account of his particular interest ; and when he does it , as those who have a scrupulous integrity , often injure themselves by a good principle , it may be said with truth , that he does good by an ill one . as the integrity of a counsellor of state requires his being proof against all sorts of interests and of passions , it also requires his being so against calumnies ; and that all the crosses he may meet with , may never discourage him from doing well . he must know , that the labour men undergo for the publick , is seldom acknowledg'd by private persons ; and that no other reward is to be expected for it on earth , than that of fame , which is the true reward of great souls . he must also know , that the great men who are employ'd in the government of states , are like those who are condemn'd to suffer ; with this difference only , that those receive the reward of their faults , and the others of their merit . moreover , he must know , that none but great souls are capable to serve kings faithfully , and to support the calumnies which the wicked and ignorant impute to men of honour , without disquiet , and without slackning in the service they are oblig'd to do them . he must likewise know , that the condition of those who are call'd to the administration of publick affairs , is much to be pity'd ; by reason that if they do well , the malice of the world lessens the glory of it , pretending that one might do better , though it were absolutely impossible . finally , he must know , that those who are employ'd in the ministry of the state , are oblig'd to imitate the stars , which notwithstanding the barking of dogs , lighten them , and follow their course ; which ought to oblige him so far to contemn such injuries , that his integrity may not be shaken by it in the least , nor he hinder'd from prosecuting those ends steadily , which he has propos'd to himself for the advantage of the state. sect . iv. which represents what courage and force is requir'd in a counsellor of state. the courage which is necessary in this case , does not require so much boldness in a man , as to dispise all sorts of perils ; nothing can be more likely to ruin states : and a counsellor of state ought to be so far from behaving himself so , that , on the contrapy , it behoves him to be very wary on all occasions , and to undertake nothing without great consideration , and in proper time. neither does the courage requir'd in a perfect counsellor of state , oblige him to think on nothing but great things , which happens often to the most elevated souls , when they have more courage than judgment ; on the contrary , it is absolutely necessary , that he should stoop to the meanest , though they may seem below him at first ; because great disorders often arise from small beginnings ; and that the most considerable establishments , have sometimes principles which seem to be of no consideration . but the courage in question requires a man to be free from weakness and fear , which render those who are tainted with those two defects , not only incapable of taking good resolutions for the publick good , but also from putting those in execution which they have taken . it requires a certain fire , which makes men desire and prosecute great things with as much eagerness , as the judgment embraces them with wisdom . it requires moreover a certain steadiness , which makes men undergo adversities bravely , and hinders them from appearing , and from being alter'd in the greatest alterations of fortune . it ought to give the minister of state an honest emulation of glory ; without which , the most capable and the most worthy seldom signalize themselves by an advantagious action to the publick . it must give him the force to resist , without being daunted , envy , hatred , calumny , and all the crosses which are commonly met with in the administration of publick affairs . finally , it must justifie the saying of aristotle in his person , who affirms , that whereas those that are weak make use of cunning and of craft , those who are strong despise both equally , by the just confidence they have in themselves . to this end , we must observe , that to be valiant , and to have courage , is not the same thing . valour supposes a disposition to expose one's self willingly on all occasions to the perils which present themselves , which courage does not require , but only a sufficient resolution to despise peril , when we are ▪ engag'd in it , and to support adversity patiently when we are involv'd therein . we may even proceed farther , and say , that besides the disposition above specify'd , valour requires another , which is corporal , and which enables men ▪ to shew their valour by their arm. i am sensible , that those who have spoken of the principal vertues of man heretofore , did not understand those distinctions ; but if you consider them maturely , you will find the first absolutely necessary , and the second not superfluous ; because most men only judge of a man's valour , by the performances of his arm , which shew his worth. whatever sence you take valour in , it is not necessary in a counsellor of state ; there is no need of his having a disposition to expose himself to perils , nor even a corporeal aptness to shew his worth by the virtue of his arm ; it is sufficient for him to have so much courage , that an ill-grounded fear , and the crosses he may chance to meet with , may not be able to divert him from his good and generous design ; and as the mind governs , and not the hand , it is sufficient that his heart should sustain his head , though it cannot influence his arm. sect . v. which represents what application is requir'd in counsellors of state. application does not require that a man should labour incessantly in publick affairs ; on the contrary , nothing is more capable to make him useless , than such a proceeding : the nature of state-affairs requires respite , by reason that the weight of it is greater , and more burthensom than all others ; and that the forces of the mind and body of men being limitted , a continual labour would exhaust them in a short space of time . it allows all manner of honest divertisements , which do not divert those who take them , from those things to which they ought to be particularly apply'd . but it requires , that he who is engag'd in publick affairs , should make them his particular care , and should fix his mind , his thought and affection on them ; it requires that the greatest of his pleasures should be the good success of his affairs . it requires that he should often surround the world , to foresee what may happen , and to find means to prevent the evils which are to be fear'd , and to execute those enterprises which reason and publick interest advise . as it obliges not to lose one moment in certain affairs , which may be ruin'd by the least delay ; it also requires , that we should not precipitate our selves in others , in which time is necessary to take such resolutions as one may have no reason to repent of . one of the greatest grievances of this kingdom is , that most men apply themselves more to those things to which they cannot apply themselves without a fault , than to those they cannot omit without a crime . a soldier speaks of what his captain ought to do ; the captain , of the defects he imagines in his colonel ; the colonel finds fault with his general ; the general disapproves and blames the conduct of the court ; and none of them move in their own sphere , or think of performing those things which their station particularly obliges them to . there are persons of so little action , and of such weak constitutions , that they never apply themselves to any thing of their own accord , but barely receive occasions , which influence these more than they do them . such men are fitter to live in a cloister , than to be employ'd in the administration of states , which require application and activity together ; so that when they are in them , they do as much harm by their languishing conduct , as another may do good by an active application . we must not expect great effects from such minds ; no body is oblig'd to them for the good they do ; neither can they be blam'd much for the harm they do , since properly speaking , chance acts more in them than themselves . nothing can be more contrary to the application which is necessary in publick affairs , than the inclination which those who have the administration of them have for women . i am sensible , that there are minds so absolutely superiour and masters of themselves , that though they are diverted from what they owe to god by some unruly affection , yet it does not divert them from what they owe to the state. there are some , who not giving those an influence over their will , who sway their pleasures , only apply themselves wholly to their business . but there are but few of this nature ; and it must be granted , that as a woman lost the world , nothing is so capable to ruine states as that sex ; when influencing those who govern them , they often make them move as they please . and consequently ill . the best of women's thoughts being commonly ill , in those who are govern'd by their passions , which generally usurp the empire of reason in their mind , whereas reason is the only and true motive which must animate and influence those who are employ'd in publick affairs . whatever force a counsellor of state may have , it is impossible for him to apply himself as he should do to his trust , unless he be free from all such engagements . he may chance to perform his duty with them ; but heing free of them , he will do much better . whatever station he is in , in order to do well , he must divide his time so , as to have hours to work alone about the expeditions which are requir'd by his place , and others to give audience to every body ; reason obliges him to treat every one courteously , and with as much civility as his staition , and the distinct quality of men who have business with him requires . this article will give posterity a testimony of my integrity , since it prescribes what i have not been able to perform in every point . i have always liv'd civilly with those who had business to treat with me ; the nature of affairs , which obliges to refus● many persons , does neither allow ill looks , nor ill words , when we cannot satisfie them by effects : but the illness of my health has not allow'd me to give access to every body , as i could have wish'd ; which has often troubled me to that degree , that that confideration has sometimes made me desirous to retire . nevertheless , i may affirm with truth , that i have husbanded the weakness of my forces so well , that if i have not been able to answer the desires of every body , they have never been able to hinder me from performing my duty in relation to the state. finally , application , courage , integrity , and capacity , form the perfection of a counsellor of state ; and the concurrence of all those qualities must meet in his person . a man may be very honest , who having no talent for affairs of state , would be altogether useless in them ; and would keep places he were not able to discharge . another might be capable , and have the integrity which is requir'd , who not having courage enough to sustain the divers casualties which it is impossible to avoid in the government of states , would be prejudicial instead of being useful . another might mean well , be capable , and have courage together , whose laziness would prove destructive to the publick , he not applying himself to the functions of his office. another may have a good conscience , be capable , have courage and application to his employment , who being more sensible to the object which touches him , than to what concerns the interest of the publick , though he serves often usefully , is nevertheless much to be fear'd . capacity and probity produce such a perfect agreement between the understanding and the will , that as the understanding knows how to chuse the best objects , and the properest means to acquire the possession of them ; the will also knows how to embrace them with so much eagerness , that it omits nothing within its power to compass the ends propos'd by the understanding . integrity and courage produce an honest boldness , to tell kings what is useful for them , though it be not altogether pleasing to them . i say , an honest boldness ; because unless it be well regulated , and always respectful , instead of being reckon'd among the perfections of a counsellor of state , it would be one of his vices . kings must be spoken to with silken words . as a faithful counsellor is oblig'd to mind them in private of their faults with caution , he can never represent them to them in publick , without committing a great fault . to speak that aloud which ought to be whisper'd , is a reproach which may become criminal in the mouth of him who utters it , if he publishes the imperfections of his prince , to advantage himself by it ; being more desirous , out of a vain ostentation , to shew that he disapproves them , than that he has a sincere desire to correct them . courage and speculation produce so much steadiness in the designs chosen by the understanding , and embrac'd by the will , that they are prosecuted with constancy , without being liable to the changes which the levity of the french often produces . i have not spoken of the force and health of body necessary in a minister of state , by reason that though it is a great advantage , when it meets with all the qualifications of mind above-mention'd , it is not , nevertheless , so necessary , but that counsellors may perform their functions without it . there are many employments in the state , in which they are absolutely necessary , because the body is to act as well as the mind , in repairing to divers places , which often must be done with speed ; but he who holds the helm of the state , and whose sole care is the direction of affairs stands in no need of that qualification . as the motion of heaven only stands in need of the intelligence which moves it ; so the force of the mind alone is sufficient to conduct a state ; and that of the arms and legs is not necessary to move all the world. as he who governs a ship has no other action than that of the eye to see the compass ; after which , he orders the turning of the helm , according as he thinks fit ; so in the conduct of a state , nothing is requir'd but the operation of the mind , which sees and orders at once what it thinks fit to be done . if it be true , that the sun which heats all things is not hot in it self ; it is evident , that in order to make the world act corporeally , the action of the body is not requir'd . i own nevertheless , that i have often wish'd my self rid of the government of the state , upon the account of my want of health ; the line of which has been so short , that it has almost been impossible for me not to exceed the measure of it often . finally , after having serv'd your majesty many years in the most difficult affairs that can be met with in a state , i may confirm by experience , what reason teaches all the world , that it is the head , and not the arm , which conducts states . sect . vi. which represents the number of counsellors of state that is requisite , and that one among them ought to have the superiour authority : after having examin'd and discover'd the qualifications that are necessary in those who are to be employ'd in the ministry of state , i must also observe , that as the plurality of physicians sometimes causes the death of the patient , instead of contributing towards his cure ; so the state will receive more prejudice than advantage , if the counsellors are in great number : i add , that no benefit can be deriv'd by them , if their number exceeds four ; and moreover , that one of them must have the superiour authority , to be as it were the primum mobile , which moves all the other heavens , without being mov'd by any thing but its intelligence . i am loth to set down this proposition , because it will look as if i design'd to maintain my own cause ; but considering that it would be easie for me to prove it by several authorities of scripture , of the fathers , and of politicians ; and that the confidence your majesty has always honour'd me with , while you have been pleas'd to give me a share in the administration of publick affairs , wants no other principle for the defence of it , but that which was necessary for its establishment ; i mean , your will ; whick will be look'd upon by posterity as a just reason of the authority i have had all along in your councils ; i find that i may speak upon this subject without being suspected ; and that it is my duty to do it , to prove that by reason , which the honour i have always receiv'd from your goodness will authorise by example . the natural envy which is commonly met with among equal powers , is too well known to every body to want a long discourse , to shew the truth of this proposition . divers experiences have made me so knowing in this matter , that i should think my self answerable before god , if this present testament did not declare in proper terms , that nothing can be more dangerous in a state , than divers equal authorities in the administration of affairs . what the one undertakes , is cross'd by the other ; and if the worthiest men is not the most capable , though his propositions should prove the best , they would always be eluded by the most powerful in sense . each will have their sectators , which will form divers parties in the state , and will divide the forces of it , instead of uniting them together . as the distempers and death of men only proceed from the discord of the elements they are compos'd of ; so it is certain , that the contrariety and the want of union , which constantly reigns among equal powers , will ever disturb the peace of the states they have the management of , and will produce divers accidents , which finally may ruin them . if it be true , that monarchical government is more consonant to god's than any other ; if all politicians , both sacred and prophane , teach us , that that form surpasses all those that were ever put in practice ; we may boldly affirm , that if the soveraign cannot , or will not have a continual eye himself upon his map , and upon his compass , reason requires that he should give the peculiar charge thereof to one above all the rest . as divers pilots never put their hands at once to the helm ; so there must be but one at the helm of the state. he may receive the advice of others ; moreover , he ought sometimes to desire it ; but he is to examine the goodness of it , and to turn his hand to the right or lest , as he thinks it best , to avoid the storm , and to steer his course . the main point consists in making a good choice on that occasion , and never to be deceiv'd in it . nothing can be more easie than to find a primum mobile to move all , without being mov'd by any superiour authority but that of his master ; but nothing is more difficult than to find one to move well , without being able to be mov'd by any consideration which might its motion . all men will think themselves , by their own sence , capable of that function ; but as no man can be a judge in his own cause , the judgment of a thing of this importance , must be referr'd to those who have no interest to blind them . such a man will not be capable of being wrought upon by the practises and presents of the enemies of the state , who may be mov'd by their artifices . another may be capable of being wrought upon by interests ; which though not criminal , might nevertheless prove very prejudicial to the state. there are many , who would rather die than act against their conscience , who nevertheless would not be useful to the publick , because they are too apt to yield to the importunities , and to the tenderness they have for those they love . some may be incapable of being mov'd by any interest whatever , who may be mov'd by fear , by astonishment , and by a panick terrour . i am sensible , that the capacity , integrity , courage , and , in a word , all the qualities which we have attributed to counsellors of state , may remedy such inconveniences ; but , to speak the truth , as the minister we are speaking of must be above all the rest , so he must have all those qualities in an eminent degree , and consequently he must be carefully examin'd before he is chosen . the prince must have a personal knowledge of the person he intrusts with so great an employment ; and though the said person must be elected by himself , yet the choice he makes of him , must if possible , be accompanied with publick approbation ; for if he has the liking of every body , he will be the more capable to do good . as those who are the best skill'd in astronomical supputations , can never be deceiv'd of one minute , but the judgments they make afterwards must be liable to all manner of falsities ; so it is certain , that if the qualifications of the person who is to govern others , are only good in appearance , his conduct will prove very bad ; and that if they are but mean , his government will not prove excellent . it is is easie to represent the qualifications that first ministers ought to have ; but it is difficult to meet them all in one subject . nevertheless , it is certain , that the happiness , or unhappiness of states , depends on that election ; which lays a strict obligation on soveraigns , either to take that care themselves , which the weight of their crown charges them with , or to make so good a choice of him on whom they will disburthen themselves of it , that their opinion may be approv'd by heaven and earth . sect . vii . which represents what the king's behaviour is to be towards his counsellors ; and shews , that in order to be well serv'd , the best expedient he can take is to use them well . your majesty having thus chosen your counsellors , it is your business to put them in such a state , that they may be able to labour towards the grandeur and felicity of your kingdom . four things are particularly necessary to that end : the first , that your majesty must confide in them , and that they should know it , which is absolutely necessary , because that otherwise the best counsellors might be suspected by princes ; and that the ministers not being certain that their sincerity is known , would restrain themselves in many occasions , in which their silence might prove very prejudicial . 't is a common saying , that a physician who is lik'd by his patient , and is belov'd by him , will be able to do him more good than another : and 't is also certain , that there is none who could apply himself boldly to the cure of his patient , if he were persuaded that he was diffident of him . the second is , to command them to speak freely to him , and to assure them that they may do it without peril . that condition is absolutely necessary , not only for some weak and timorous minds , who want to be encourag'd , but also for those who not being naturally timerous , employ their zeal the more usefully for the advantage of the publick ; in being certain that their boldness cannot be prejudicial to them . the soldier who fires behind a breast-work , is more confident than he who knows that in shooting he may be shot ; and indeed , few men would expose themselves to ruin to serve the publick . it is true , that an honest man must never consider his own interest , when the publick is concern'd ; and that the highest point of fidelity that can be desir'd in a servant , is , to speak that ingenuously which he knows to be for his master's interest , without the least fear of incurring the hatred of those who have most interest with him , nor even of displeasing him : but there are but few who have so much zeal as to run such a risque . the third , to be liberal towards them , and to give them reason to think , that their services will not be unrewarded . which is the more necessary , because there are but few men who love vertue naked ; and that the only way to hinder a servant from thinking too much on his own interest , is to practice the advice of that emperour , who recommends to his son , to have a great care of the affairs of those who are very mindful of his . no honest man ever endeavours to enrich himself at the cost of the publick , in serving it ; but as it would be a crime to have such a thought , nothing can be more shameful in a prince , than to see those who are grown old in his service , loaden with years , with merit , and with poverty together . the fourth is , to authorise and maintain them so openly , that they may be certain , that they need neither fear the artifices , nor the power of those who would ruin them . the interest of the prince obliges him to behave himself thus , since no man can serve the publick effectually , without incurring the hatred and envy of every body ; and that few would be found so vertuous as to do well , if they thought it would prove prejudicial to them . there is no town in the world , though never so strong in it self , but will be taken in process of time , unless a particular care be taken to defend her out-works . it is the case of the greatest kings , who can never preserve their authority entire , unless they take a singular care to maintain it in the least of their officers , near or distant from their persons , which are outworks that are attack'd first ; the taking of which , imboldens men to make efforts against those within , though they seem to be impregnable , as sacred and fix'd to the very person of kings . few men will be so presumptuous as to attack those by open force , whom the prince will make choice of to serve him ; because all are sensible that their power cannot cope with their soveraign , who is too much concern'd to protect his servants , to neglect it to his prejudice ; but there are always some who endeavour to ruin them by artifices and indirect means , difficult to be discover'd . men behave themselves commonly with so much cunning in those occasions , that when the least prospect is observ'd in such designs , they must be look'd upon as certain ; not to harm those who are suppos'd guilty before they are convicted , but toprevent them with prudence . the artifice of men makes them disguise themselves a hundred different ways to compass their ends : some speak openly , under pretence that their silence would be criminal ; but there are few of that kind : others feign to be friends to those they design to ruin : others employ a third person to speak , and reserve themselves to second the ill offices they have begun . finally , there are so many ways to do harm in that kind , that a prince can never be too much upon his guard , to secure himself against surprises , in a thing of that importance . whenever any body speaks to him in private against the government of the state , under any pretence whatever , he may assure himself that it is to ruin and to undo him . we may compare those who behave themselves so , to those who have fevers , which are the more malignant , in that the external fire seems little , when they are almost parch'd up within . such distempers must be prevented in time , without staying for a perfect knowledge of them , because it often happens that we can only have it by the event , and the effect of the ill design which is projected . those who make such enterprises , are too sensible of the danger to which they expose themselves to begin them , without a resolution to go thro' with them . on such occasions , men begin slowly and fairly ; but afterwards , the nature of such affairs obliges them to double their pace , and to run for fear of being surpris'd by the way . in that , they imitate the stone which is flung from the top of a mountain ; its first motion is slow , and the more it descends , the more weight it receives , and redoubles the swiftness of its fall : and as it requires more force to stop it in the midst of its fall , than in the beginnig ; so it is very difficult to stop a conspiracy , which not being stifled in its birth , has already made a great progress . the more considerable a place is , the more the enemy endeavours to seduce the governour of it ; the more a woman is beautiful , the more men endeavour to engage her affections : so likewise the more a minister is useful to his master , powerful in his mind and favour , the more men envy him , and are desirous of his place , and endeavour to supplant him to come in his room . among faithful governours , those are most esteem'd , who do not only resist the propositions which are made to them against their duty , but also refuse to hear them , and who immediately stop the mouths of those who will tempt them by such means . among chast women , those who have no ears to hearken to the ill discourses which men would make to them to seduce their purity , are , by the judgment of the wisest , preferr'd to those who open them , even when they shut their hearts . so among masters who have servants , whose fidelity has been tried on so many occasions , that they cannot question it with reason , those are the wisest who stop the mouths of those would speak ill of them . whatever virtue there may be in resisting temptation ; princes and husbands are esteem'd too indulgent , when they allow their governors and their wives , to give ear to those things which they would not have them adhere to , and to which they cannot consent without a crime ; and ma●●ers must condemn themselves , when they give ear to what men would tell them against those , whose fidelity is unreproachable . the primitive reason of this decision consists in that , as to expose ones self boldly to danger in a just and useful occasion , is an act of valour ; so to do the same without cause or reason , is an act of temerity ; and it is in that sence , it has been said with great reason , that whoever gives ear to calumnies deserves to be deceiv'd . perhaps some will say , that there is a great deal of difference , between the duty of the governor , of the woman , and of the prince , in the case which is represented : that it is true , that the governor and the woman , do a great deal better not to hearken , because they can in no wise consent to what is to be propos'd to them ; but that the case is different in relation to the prince , who must keep his ears open , since he may be told truths of that consequence , that he will be oblig'd to provide against them . to that i answer in the first place , that in speaking only of such servants whose fidelity is unreproachable , and whose conduct has heen try'd on many occasions of that importance , that it is impossible to meet with greater ; the difference will be so inconsiderable in the comparison aforesaid , that in reason it must be look'd upon as none ; the rule of moral things , obliges to look upon those things as nothing , which are of slight consequence . i add in the second place , that the some inconvenience might attend the closing of ones ears against what any body would say against a servant of approv'd fidelity ; it is so inconsiderable in respect to those which are inevitable , in opening them to the prejudice of persons thus qualifi'd , that i may say absolutely , that the governor , the woman , and the prince must equally shut them in the occasions above-mention'd . there is no ground to presume , that he who has been faithful all his life , would become unfaithful in a moment , without cause or reason , principally when the interest of his fortune is joyn'd to his master's . an evil which can happen but seldom , must be presum'd not to happen at all ; particularly , when to avoid it , we must expose our selves to others which are inevitable , and of greater consequence , which is the case in question : it being certain , that it is almost impossible for a prince to preserve his most faithful and most assured servants , if under pretence of not shutting his ears against truth , he opens them to the malice of men ; besides , that it is certain that he will lose more , in losing one thus qualify'd ; than if for want of giving ear , he should tolerate in any one , faults which cannot be of great consequence , if he finds him faithful in the most important occasions . if he who gives a free entrance to the murtherers who kill a man , is guilty of his death , he who receives all sorts of suspicions , and of calumnies , against the fidelity of one of his servants , without examining the case to the bottom , is answerable before god for such a proceeding . the best of actions are deem'd ill by two sorts of men ; by the malicious , who impute every thing to ill by the excess of their malice , and by those who are naturally suspicious , who explain every thing ill by their weakness . there is no man on earth , though never so vertuous , that can pass for innocent in a master's mind , who not examining things himself , gives ear to calumny . as there are but two ways to resist vice , either by flight , or by combat ; so there are also but two to resist the impressions which are made by calumnies ; the one consists in rejecting them absolutely , without hearkning to them ; the other in being so careful in the examination of what is told , that the truth or falshood thereof may be averr'd . to avoid all inconveniences , to secure one's self against the artifices and snares that are laid by the wicked , to ruin honest men , and not to be depriv'd of the means to discover the ill behaviour of those who serve ill ; the prince must look upon all those things as calumnies which are only whisper'd to him ; and upon that account , refuse to hear them : and if any man will maintain what he has to say in the presence of those he accuses , then he may give ear to them thus , on condition of a good recompence , if he says any thing material to the publick which proves to be true ; and of a great punishment , if his accusation prove false , or not considerable and important , though it should prove true . i have always begg'd of your majesty to follow this method in relation to my self , in order to give those who would censure my actions an opportunity to do it , and me means to defend my self . i may say with truth , that your majesty never had the least disgust against my conduct , but when you have not practis'd this council , which is the more to be receiv'd , in that it is altogether innocent . the end of the first part. the political testament of the famous cardinal duke de richeliev . the second part . the rules i have set down in the first part of this book , being well establish'd ; it is the duty of counsellors to use their best endeavours like men of honour according to certain general principles , onwhich the good administration of states depends . it would be easie to propose many , which would seem very useful ; but as the excellency of sciences consists in a small number of principles by reason that they are the sooner and better understood , i will reduce those i look upon to be most advantagious for the government of this kingdom to nine ▪ which in my opinion are absolutely necessary . tho some of them may have divers ▪ branches , they will not increase their number , as those of trees do not multiply the stems . chap. i. the first foundation of the happiness of a state is the establishment of the reign of god. the reign of god is the principle of the government of states ; and indeed it is a thing so absolutely necessary , that without that foundation it is impossible for any prince to rule well , or for any state to be happy . it would be easie to write whole volumes upon so important a subject , for which scripture , the fathers and all sorts of histories furnish us an infinite number of examples , of pretences and exhortations which all tend to the same end : but all men are so sensible by their own reason , that their original does not proceed from themselves , but that a god is their creator , and consequently their director , that they all feel that nature has imprinted that truth in their hearts with undefaceable characters . so many princes have undone themselves , and their states , by laying the foundation of their conduct upon a judgment contrary to their own knowledg ; and so many have been loaden with blessings in submitting their authority to that from whom it was deriv'd , for having only sought their grandeur , in that of their creator ; and for having taken more care of his reign than of their own , that i will enlarge no further on a truth too evident , to stand in need of any proof . i will only say this , that as it is impossible that the reign of a prince , who suffers disorder and vice to reign in his state , should be happy ; so god will not easily permit his to be unhappy , who takes a particular care to establish his empire within the extent of his dominion . nothing can be of greater use to such an establishment than the regularity of princes lives , which is a law that speaks and persuades with more efficacy than all those they could enact to induce people to follow the good they would procure . if it be true , that whatever crime a soveraign may fall into , he sins more by the ill example he gives than by the nature of his fault : it is no less certain that whatever laws he may make , if he practises what he prescribes , his example is no less useful towards the observation of his will than all the penalties of his ordinances , tho never so grave . the purity of a chast prince will banish more impurity out of his kingdom than all the ordinances he could publish to that end . the prudence and discretion of those who avoid swearing will sooner put a stop to the oaths and blasphemies , which are too common in states , than all the rigors they can exert against those who addict themselves to such execrations . not but it is absolutely necessary at the same time to chastise scandals , swearing and blasphemies with the utmost severity ; it is a thing in which princes can never be too exact ; for let the life of a prince or of a magistrate be never so godly and regular , they will never be reputed to have perform'd their duty , unless while they invite people to it by their example , they also force them to it by the rigor of their laws . all the soveraigns of the world are oblig'd by that principle to promote the conversion of those , who living under their reign , stray out of the road to heaven . but as man is reasonable by his nature , princes perform their duty , in practising all reasonable means to attain so good an end ; and prudence does not allow them to attempt any so hazardous , as to run the risque of pulling out the good wheat in endeavouring to remove dissention , which it would be difficult to purge a state of by any means but those of mildness , without exposing it to a tottering condition capable to ruin it , or at least to cause a notable prejudice to it . as princes are oblig'd to establish the true worship of god , they must be very careful to banish the false appearances of it , so prejudicial to states , that one may truly affirm , that hypocrisy has often serv'd as a veil to cover the deformity of the most pernicious attempts . many persons , whose weakness is equal to their malice , sometimes use that kind of varnish , which is the more common in women in that their sex is more inclin'd to devotion , and that the little force it is attended with makes them the more capable of such disguises , which suppose less solidity than cunning . chap. ii. reason must be the rule and conduct of a state. natural knowledg convinces us , that man being created reasonable , reason ought to be the guide of all his actions , since otherwise he would act against his nature , and consequently against him who is the author of it . it also teaches us that the greater a man is , and the more he is elevated , the more he ought to respect that privilege , and to avoid abusing that reason which constitutes his being ; because the advantages he has over other men , oblige him to preserve , whatever relates to the nature , and to the end , which he whom he derives his elevation from propos'd to himself . it follows clearly from those two principles , that if man is soveraignly reasonable , it is his duty to give reason an absolute empire ; which does not only require his doing nothing without her , but obliges him moreover to use his best endeavours to oblige those who are under his authority to reverence and follow it religiously . this consequence is the source of another , which teaches us , that as we ought never to will any thing , but what is just and reasonable , so we must never will any thing , without putting it in execution , and without exacting an intire obedience to our commands ; since otherwise reason would not reign soveraignly . the practice of that rule is the easier in that love is the most powerful motive to oblige men to obey , and that it is impossible for subjects not to love a prince , when they are sensible that reason is the guide of all his actions . authority constrains to obey , but reason persuades to it , and it is much safer to guide men by ways which insensibly ingage their will than by such , which for the most part only prevail by force . if it be true , that reason ought to be the light to guide princes in their own conduct , and in the management of their states , it is also true , that as nothing in nature is more inconsistent with it than passion , which blinds men to that degree , that it often makes them mistake the shadow for the body ; a prince must above all things avoid to act by such a principle , which would render him the more odious , in that it is directly opposite to that which distinguishes men from animals . men often repent at leasure what passion has induc'd them to do in haste , and we never run that risque when we act by reasonable considerations . we must be positive on what we resolve by such motives , since it is the only way to be obey'd , and that as humility is the first foundation of christian perfection , obedience is the most solid ground of subjection , and so necessary towards the welfare of states , that they can never flourish while it is defective . many things are of this nature , that there is no difference between the will and the performance , by reason of the facility we meet in the execntion ; but we must will them to the purpose , that is , with so much firmness as never to desist from them , severely chastising those who shall refuse to obey , after having commanded them to put them in execution . those that appear most difficult and almost impossible are only so upon the account of the difference , wherewith we seem to will and to command them ; and it is most certain that subjects will always be religious in obeying , while princes are steady and persevering in their commands , from whence it follows that it is most certain , that their indifference and weakness is the cause of it . in a word as to will a thing positively , and to do what one has a mind to , is one and the s●me thing in a lawful prince ; so to will weakly , and not to will , are things so different from 'em , that they tend to the same end. the government of a kingdom requires a manly vertue and an unmoveable steadiness , contrary to the irresolution , which exposes those who are govern'd by it , to the enterprises of their enemies . men must behave themselves in all things with vigor , principally seing that tho success should not answer our expectation , at least we will have this advantage , that having omitted nothing in order to make it succeed , we will avoid the shame , when we cannot avoid the misfortune of an ill event . tho men should absolutely miscarry in performing their duty , the disgrace would be happy ; and on the contrary what ever success a man could have , in deviating from that which he is oblig'd to out of honour and conscience , he ought to be esteem'd unhappy , since he can gain nothing thereby to equal the disadvantages he receives by the means wherewith it has been procur'd . heretofore , most of the great designs of france have miscarry'd , because the first difficulty that oppos'd the putting of them in execution , put a stop to the proceedings of those who in reason ought nevertheless to have prosecuted them ; and if it has prov'd otherwise during your majesties reign , it is to be imputed to your perseverance . when a time proves improper for the execution of a good design , we must expect another , and when we have once set our hands at work , if the difficulties we meet with oblige us to any suspension reason instructs us to resume our first designs , as soon as time and occasion prove more favourable . in a word , nothing ought to divert us from a good enterprise , unless some accident happen , which renders it altogether impossible , and we must omit nothing to further the execution of those we undertake with reason . that obliges me to mention secresy and good discipline in this place , which are so essential towards the good success of affairs that nothing can be more . besides that experience justifies it , the reason of it is evident , seing that whatever surprises , commonly astonishes somuch that it often deprives men of the means to oppose it , and that the prosecuting the execution of a design slowly , and the divulging of it , is just like the speaking of a thing not to do it . this is the reason , that women who are naturally lazy and have not the gift of s●cresy , are so unfit for government , and if we consider moreover , that they are very subject to their passions , and consequently little capable of reason and of justice , that principle will exclude them from all public administrations . not but some might be found so free of those defects that they might be admitted to it . there are but few rules without exceptions ; this very age has produc'd some which can never be sufficiently commended ; but yet commonly their natural weakness renders them incapable of masculine vertue , so necessary for administration , that it is almost impossible for their government to be free either of lowness or of diminution , which the weakness of their sex is the cause of : or of injustice , or cruelty , which the unruliness of their passions is the true source of . chap. iii. which shows that public interest should be the only end of those who govern states , or at least that it ought to be perferr'd to particular advantages . public interest ought to be the only aim of the prince , and of his councelors , or at least both ought to have so singular a respect for it , as to prefer it to all particular advantages . it is impossible to conceive the good a prince , and those he imploys in his affairs are capable of doing in following this principle religiously , neither can any one imagin the miseries a state is lyable to ; when private interest is prefer'd to public good : and that the last is regulated by the first . true philosophy , the christian law , and policy give such lively demonstrations of this truth , that the councellors of a prince can never sufficiently make him sensible of the necessity of this principle , nor the prince be too severe in the chastisement of such members of his councel , as are so wretched as not to put it in practice . i must needs observe on this subject , that the prosperity which has constantly accompany'd spain , for some ages last past ; is wholy to be imputed to the care of their councel , to prefer the interest of the state to all others , and that most of the misfortunes which have befallen france , have been occasion'd by the application which many of those , who have been imploy'd in the administration , have had to their private interest to the prejudice of the public . the first have all along follow'd public interest which by the force of its nature , has inclin'd them to do that which was most advantageous to the state. the others suiting all things to their private interest or capricio , have often diverted it from its own end , to apply it to that which was most agreable or most advantagious to them . neither death nor the alteration of ministers have ever occasioned any mutation in the council of spain . but it has been otherwise in this kingdom , in which affairs have not only been alter'd by the removal of councellors , but they have taken such variety of forms under the same persons , by the variety of their councils , that such a proceeding had undoubtedly ruin'd this monarchy , did not god out of his infinite goodness extract out of the imperfections of this nation , the remedy of the evils it creates . tho the diversity of our interests and our natural inconstancy incline us often to dangerous prejudices , the same levity does not permit us to remain firm and constant even in those things which are for our good , and turns our mind with so much swiftness that our enemies not being capable to take just measures upon such frequent varieties , have not time enough to improve our faults to their advantage . the proceeding of your council being alter'd of late , your affairs have also taken a new face to the great advantage of your kingdom ; and if your successors take care to follow the example of your majesty's reign , our neighbours will not have the advantages they have had for the time past : but this kingdom sharing wisdom with them , will undoubtedly share their good fortune , since that notwithstanding men may be wise without being happy , the best means we can use not to be unhappy is to tread the path which prudence and reason direct us to , and not to follow the irregularities to which the minds of men are subject , and particularly the french. if those to whom your majesty will confide the care of your affairs , have the capacity and probity above mention'd , you will have no further care in what relates to this principle , which of it self will not prove difficult , since the particular interest of a princes reputation and those of the publick have the same end. princes easily consent to the general regulations of their states , by reason that in making them , they follow the dictates of reason and of justice , which men easily embrace when they meet no obstacles to lead them out of the right way . but when occasion offers it self to practise the good settlements they have made , they do not always show the same steadiness , because that is the time when divers interests , piety , compassion , favour and importunities solicite them and oppose their good intentions , and that they have not always force enough to vanquish themselves , and to despise particular considerations whith ought to be of no weight in respect to those of the publick . it is on those occasions it behoves them to muster up all their force against their weakness , considering that those whom god appoints to preserve others , must have none but such as may serve to discover what is advantagious for the public , and proper for their preservation . chap. iv. how much foresight is necessary for the government of a state. nothing can be more necessary for the government of a state than foresight , since thereby we may easily prevent many things , which cannot be redress'd without great difficulties when they are come to pass . thus a physitian who has the skill to prevent distempers , is more esteem'd than he who only labours to cure them . therefore it is the duty of ministers of state to represent to their master , that it is more necessary to consider the future than the present , and that distempers are like the enemies of a state against whom prudence obliges us to march rather than tarry till they are come to drive them out again . those who do not follow this method will fall into great confusions , which it will be very difficult to remedy afterwards . yet it is a common thing among weak men to drive off time , and to chuse the preserving of their ease for a month rather than to deprive themselves of it for a while , to avoid the trouble of many years which they do not consider , because they only see what is present , and do not anticipate time by a wise providence . those who never consider to morrow live happily for themselves , but others live unhappily under them . those who foresee at a distance , never do any thing rashly , since they consider betimes , and men seldom miscarry when they consider before hand . there are some occasions on which we are not allow'd to deliberate long , because the nature of affairs does not permit it . but when they are not of that kind , the safest way is to slumber over them and to recompence by the prudence of the execution , the delay we use the better to digest it . there was a time in which no orders were given in this kingdom by way of prevention , and even after the evil was come to pass , none but palliating remedies were apply'd to it , because it was impossible to proceed absolutely against it , without wounding the interest of many particular persons , which was then prefer'd to publick good . for which reason they only endeavour'd to ease the wound , instead of curing it , which has caus'd a great deal of harm in this kingdom . of late years , thanks be to god , this way of proceeding has been alter'd with so much success , that besides reasons inviting us to continue the same , the great benefit we have receiv'd by it , obliges us strickly so to do . we must sleep like the lion , without closing our eyes , which must be continually kept open , to foresee the least inconveniencies which may happen ; and to remember that as phtysick does not move the pulse , tho' it is mortal : so it often happens in states , that those evils which are imperceptible in their original , and which we are least sensible of , are the most dangerous , and those which finally prove of most consequence . the extraordinary care which is requir'd not to be surpris'd on such occasions , is the reason that as all those states have always been esteem'd very happy which were govern'd by wise men ; so it has been thought , that among those who did govern them , the most unwise were the most happy . the more capable a man is , the more he is sensible of the weight of the government that lies upon him . publick administration takes up all the thoughts of the most judicious , insomuch , that the perpetual meditations they are obliged to make to foresee and prevent the evils that may happen , deprives them of all manner of rest , and contentment , excepting that which they receive in seeing many sleep quietly relying on their watchings , and live happy by their misery . as it is very necessary to consider before hand , as much as is possible , what success may attend the designs we undertake in order not to be mistaken in our reckoning . the wisdom and sight of men having bounds beyond which they can see nothing , god only being able to see the ultimate end of things ; it often suffices to know that the projects we form are just and possible , to undertake them with reason . god concurs to all the actions of men by a general co-operation which seconds their designs , and it is their part to use their freedom in all things , according to the prudence divine wisdom has indu'd them with . but when men are ingag'd in great undertakings which concern the conduct of mankind after having discharg'd the obligation they are under to open their eyes doubly , the better to take their measures ; after having made use of all the considerations human minds are capable of , it is their duty to rely upon the goodness of the spirit of god , which sometimes inspiring those thoughts into men which are set down in his eternal decrees , leads them , as it were , by the hand to their proper ends . chap. v. punishment and reward are two points absolutely necessary for the conduct of states . it is a common but a very true saying , which has ever been in the mouths and minds of men , that punishments and rewards are the two most considerable points for the conduct of a kingdom . it is most certain , that tho' no other principle be us'd in the government of states , but that of being inflexible in chastising those who act against them , and religious in rewarding those who procure them any notable advantage . they cannot be govern'd amiss , since all men may be kept within the bounds of their duty , either by fear or hope . i place punishment before reward , because that if there were a necessity to be depriv'd of one of them , one might better dispense with the last than the first . as good is to be imbrac'd for its own sake , there is no reward due to those who perform it , taking it in the strictest sence . but as there is no crime which does not violate that , to which men are oblig'd , there are none but what require the punishment which is due to disobedience , and that obligation is so strict , that in many occasions a fault cannot be left unpunished , without committing a new one . i speak of faults which affect the state , and are committed with premeditation , and not of many others , which happen by chance and by misfortune , for which princes may and ought to use indulgence . tho' to pardon in such cases is a laudable thing ; not to punish a considerable fault , the impunity of which opens a door to licenciousness , is a criminal omision . theologians allow it as well as politicians , and all agree that on certain occasions in which the prince would be to blame not to pardon those who are intrusted with the government of the publick , they would also be inexcusable , if instead of a severe punishment , they should use lenity . experience teaching those who have had a long practice of the world , that men easily lose the remembrance of favours , and that when they are loaden with them , the desire of increasing them often makes them ambitious and ingrateful together , shows us also that punishment is a more certain way to keep men within the bounds of their duty ; since they are not so soon forgotten , by reason that they make a stronger impression on the sences of most men than reason , which has but little power over many . to be severe towards private men who make it their pride to despise the laws and ordinances of a state , is to be kind to the publick . and the greatest crime one can be guilty of against the interest of the publick , is to be indulgent towards those who violate them . among many combinations , factions and seditions that have been made in my time in this kingdom , i have never observ'd that impunity ever inclin'd any one naturally to correct his evil inclination . but on the contrary that they return'd to their old vomit , and often with more success the second than the first time . the indulgency hitherto practis'd in this kingdom has often reduc'd it to very great and very deplorable exremities . faults not being punish'd , every man has made a trade of his place , and without regarding what he was oblig'd to do to discharge his trust worthily , he only consider'd what he could do to get the more by it . if the ancients have been of opinion , that it was dangerous to live under a prince , who will remit nothing of the rigor of right , they have also observ'd that it was more dangerous to live in a state in which impunity opens a door to all sorts of licenciousness . some princes or magistrates will be afraid of being faulty by too much rigor , who would be accountable to god , and must needs be blam'd by all wise men , unless they exerted that , which is prescrib'd by the laws . i have often represented it to your majesty , and it is my humble petition still that you would be pleas'd to remember it carefully , by reason that as there are princes who want to be persuaded from severity , to avoid cruelty , to which they are naturally inclin'd , your majesty wants to be diverted from a false clemency , more dangerous than cruelty it self , since impunity obliges to use a great deal in the end , which can only be prevented by punishment . the rod which is the emblem of justice must never be useless ; i own at the same time that it ought not be so much accompany'd with rigor , as to be destitute of goodness ; but that last qualification does not consist in the indulgency which authorizes disorders , which tho never so inconsiderable , are often so prejudicial to the state , that they may prove it's ruin . if any are so ill advis'd in this kingdom as to condemn the severity which is necessary in states , because it has not been practis'd hitherto , let them only open their eyes , and they will find that impunity has been too common in it hitherto , and the only cause , that order and rule have not been observ'd , and that the continuation of disorders obliges to have recourse to the utmost extremities , to put a stop to them . the only source of all the parties that have been form'd heretofore against kings , has been their over much indulgence . finally , those who are acquainted with our history , cannot be ignorant of this truth , of which i produce a testimony which is the less to be suspected , in this case , because it is taken from the mouth of our enemies , which almost in all other occasions would make it suspicious . cardinal sapata a man of good sence , meeting baraut and bautru in the king his master's antichamber , a quarter of an hour after their having receiv'd the news of the duke de montmorency's execution , put this question to them ; which was the chief cause of that duke's death ? bautru answer'd immediately according to his fiery temper , in spanish ; sus falsas . no , reply'd the cardinal : pero la clemensia de lors royes antepassados : which was as much as to say , that the punishment of the said duke was more to be imputed to the faults the king's predecessors had committed , than to his own . in crimes of state , it is absolutely necessary to banish pity , and to despise the complaints of persons concern'd , and the discourse of an ignorant multitude , who sometimes blame what is most useful to them , and often absolutely necessary . christians ought to bury the remembrance of private injuries ; but magistrates are oblig'd not to forget those which concern the publick ; and indeed to leave themunpunish'd , is rather to begin them anew , than to pardon and remit them . there are many whose ignorance is so stupid as to imagin that a new prohibition is a sufficient remedy to any evil , but they are so much in the wrong , that i may affirm with truth , that new laws are not so much a remedy for the disorders of states , as testimonies of their illness , and certain proofs of the weakness of the government ; by reason that had th' antient laws been put in execution ; there would be no necessity to revive them , nor to make others to prevent new disorders , which would no sooner have appear'd , but it would have been easy to punish the evil committed . ordinances and laws are altogether useless unless thēy are put in execution , which is so absolutely necessary , that notwithstanding in the course of common affairs , justice requires an authentick proof , it is not so with those which concern the state ; in such cases , that which appears by pressing conjectures must sometimes be held as a sufficient conviction , seeing that the factions and conspiracies that are form'd against publick safety , are commonly carry'd on with so much art and secresy , that we have seldom any evident proof of them , but by the event , which is past remedy . in those cases it is sometimes necessary to begin by execution , whereas in all others , proving the fact evidently either by witnesses or undeniable authorities ought to precede every thing . those maxims seem to be dangerous , and indeed they are not altogether void of peril , but they will most certainly be found good , if not making use of the last , and extream remedies , in faults which will only be verify'd by conjectures , the course of them is barely prevented by innocent means , as the banishment or imprisonment of suspected persons . the good conscience , and the penetrat of a juditious mind , who being learn'd in the course of affairs , is able to know the future almost with as much certainty as the present , as well as a meaner capacity , by the very sight of things , will secure that practice from ill consequences ; and at the worst , the abuse that can be committed in it being only dangerous for private persons , whose life will not be in danger this way , it ought not to be rejected , since their interest is not to be compar'd to that of the publick . yet it requires a great deal of prudence not to make it an in-let to tiranny , which will be avoided undoubtedly , if , as i have said , in doubtful cases , none but innocent remedies are practis'd . punishment is so necessary in what relates to publick interest , that we are not so much as allow'd to commit faults of indulgence in this kind , recompensing a present evil , for a past good ; that is to leave a crime unpunish'd , because the person that has committed it , has done good service on other occasions . nevertheless this has hitherto been often practis'd in this kingdom , in which not only light faults have been forgotten , in consideration of important services ; but the greatest crimes abolish'd , by services of no moment , which is altogether insupportable . good and evil are so different in their nature , that they can never be put in parallel one with another ; they are enemies , among which there is no quarter to be given , nor exchange to be made ; if the one is worthy of reward , the other deserves punishment , and both ought to be us'd according to their merit . altho' conscience would allow the leaving of a signal action unrewarded , and a notable crime without punishment , reasons of state could not allow it . punishment and rewards relate to the future more than to the time past ; a prince must be severe of necessity , to prevent the mischiefs that might be committed , in hopes of a pardon , if he were known to be too indulgent ; and very kind to those that are of use to the publick , to encourage them to continue their endeavours , and every body to imitate them and follow their example . there would be a great deal of pleasure in pardoning crimes , if the impunity of the same had no ill consequence ; and the necessities of the state would sometimes lawfully excuse a prince from rewarding a service , if in depriving him , who has done it , of his reward , he did not at the same time deprive himself of the hopes of receiving others for the future . noble souls taking as much pleasure in good , as they are loath to do harm , i quit the discourse of punishments and executions , to conclude this chapter agreeably , by favours and rewards ; whereupon i must needs observe , that there is this difference between the favours which are bestow'd as a reward of service ; and those that have no other foundation than the inclination of kings , that these ought to be greatly moderated , whereas the others ought to have no other bounds than those of the services they have done the publick . the good of states does so absolutely require that their princes should be liberal , that when at any time it is come into my mind , that there are men , who out of a natural propensity are not inclin'd to do good ; i have always concluded , that this natural defect , blamable in all men , is a far greater imperfection in sovereigns , who being in a more peculiar manner the image of their creator , who by his nature does good to all the world , cannot fail of imitating him in that point , without being answerable for the same before him . the reason of it is , that it is his pleasure they should follow his example , and bestow their favours handsomly ; for those who oblige without that condition , are like the misers , who serve good meat in their treats , but so ill dress'd , that those who are invited to them , eat them without any pleasure , and without thinking themselves beholden to those that have been at the charge of it . i would enlarge more upon this subject , if i had not done it already in one of the preceding chapters , representing the necessity of princes being kind to those of their council , who serve them faithfully . chap. vi. a continual negotiation contributes much towards the good success of affairs . states receive such advantages by continual negotiations , when they are manag'd with prudence , that it is almost incredible to any but those who have had the experience of it . i own that i had been imploy'd five or six years in the management of affairs before i discover'd this truth : but i am so certain of it at present , that i dare affirm boldly , that to nagotiate continually , openly , or secretly , in all places , altho no present benefit be received by it , and but little prospect for the future , is a thing absolutely necessary for the good of states . i may say with truth , that in my time , i have seen the affairs of france and of christendom quite alter'd , by having put that principle into practice , by the kings authority , which till then had been absolutely neglected in this kingdom . among the seeds of them some produce fruit sooner than others ; some are no sooner in the ground but they sprout while others are a long while without producing the same effect . he who negotiates finally finds out a proper moment to compass his ends ; and tho he should not find it , at least , it is certain , that he can lose nothing , and that by the means of his negotiation , he is inform'd with what passes in the world , which is a thing of no small consequence for the good of states . negotiations are innocent remedys , which never do any harm ; it is necessary to act every where , far and near , and particularly at rome . among the good councils , which anthony perez gave the late king , he advis'd him to make himself powerful in that court , and not without reason , since the ambassadors of all the princes in christendom , who repair there , judg that those who have most credit and authority in that court , are in reality those who have most power in themselves , and most fortune ; and indeed their judgment is not ill grounded , since it is certain , that tho popes ought to respect reason above all other men , yet there is no place in the world in which power is more consider'd than in their court , which is so evidently true , that the respect which is paid to ambassadors there , increases or diminishes daily according to the good or ill state of their masters affairs , from whence it often comes to pass that those ministers receive two different faces in one day , if a courier who comes at night brings different news from those that came in the morning . it is with states as it is with human bodies , the fresh colour which appears in our faces , makes the physitian conclude that all is well within , and as that good complection proceeds from the good disposition of the noble and internal parts , so it is certain that the best way a prince can put in practice , to be in favour at rome , is to settle his affairs well at home , and that it is almost impossible to have a great reputation in that city , which has been long the head , and is the centre of the world , without having the same throughout the universe , to the great advantage of publick interest . natural reason teaches us , that we ought to have a great regard for our neighbours , by reason that as their neighbourhood gives them an opportunity to annoy , it also puts them in a condition to serve as the out-works of a place , which hinder the immediate approach of the walls . persons of mean capacity limit their thoughts within the extent of the states in which they are born , but those to whom god has been pleas'd to give more knowledg , learning from physitians , that in the greatest distempers revolutions are made with most violence in the most distant parts , they use their best endeavours to fortify themselves at a distance . it is necessary to act in all places ( which is to be observ'd ) according to the humour and by suitable means to the capacity of those with whom we negotiate . different nations have different wayes , some speedily conclude what they design to do , and others are very slow . republics are of the last kind , they proceed slowly , and commonly they do not at first grant what is desir'd of them , but one must be satisfy'd with little in order to obtain more . as great bodies do not move so easily as small ones , those kind of states being compos'd of several heads , they are much slower in their resolutions and in their executions than others . and for that reason , prudence obliges those who negotiate with them to give them time , and to press them no more than their natural constitution permits . it is observable , that as strong and solid reasons are excellent for men of vast genius , weak ones are better for men of meaner capacitys , because they are more suitable to their reach . men conceive affairs according to their capacity , the greatest seem easie and small to men of good understanding and great courage , and those who want these qualifications commonly find every thing difficult . such men are incapable of apprehending the weight of what is propos'd to them , and sometimes slight what is most considerable , and also often set a great stress on things which deserve no consideration . it is necessary to act with every man according to his capacity : on some occasions to act and to speak couragiously , when we have fight on our side , is so far from making a breach , that on the contrary , it is rather the way to prevent and to stifle it in it's birth . in others , instead of resenting unseasonably , certain imprudent expressions spoken by those we treat with , we must suffer them with prudence and address together , and have only ears for those things which may conduce to our ends. there are men who are so presumptuous , as to think they ought to shew their bravery on all occasions , hoping thereby to obtain what they cannot get by reason , and what they cannot constrain people to do by force . they think they have done harm by threatning it ; but besides , that this proceeding is contrary to reason , it never succeeds with persons of honor. as fools are not fit to negotiate , there are minds so very nice and refin'd , that they are as unfit for it as they , by reason that subtilizing upon every thing they are like those who break the points of needles in whetting them . the most proper men are those who keep a medium between those two extreams , and the most subtle making use of their wit , to avoid being deceiv'd , must take care at the same time not to use it to deceive those they treat with . men are always diffident of those that act craftily , and give an ill impression of the frankness and fidelity they ought to behave themselves with ; that never advances their affairs . the same words have often two senses , the one depends on the sincerity and ingenuity of men , the other on art and subtlety by which it is very easie to turn the true signification of a word to voluntary explications . great negotiations must not have one moments intermission , it is necessary to pursue what we undertake with a perpetual chain of designs , never ceasing to act , unless with reason , and not by a relaxation of mind , indifference , wavering thoughts and contrary resolution . neither must men be disgusted by an ill event , since it often comes to pass , that what is undertaken with most reason , succeeds with least happiness . it is difficult to combat often , and always to be conqueror , and it is a sign of an extraordinary blessing when success is favourable in great undertakings , and only contrary in those that are of little moment . it is enough that negotiations are so harmless , that one may receive considerable advantage by them , and never any harm . if any body urges , that some of them prove prejudicial sometimes , i give him leave to reject my judgment , if he does not find , in case he will open his eyes , that instead of having any reason to impute the ill success he has observ'd in the remedy i propose , they are only to be imputed to those who did not know how to make a good use of it . tho it should produce no other advantage than to gain time on certain occasions , which happens commonly , the practice of it would be very commendable and useful in states , since a moment often serves to avoid a storm . notwithstanding the alliances , which are often contracted by marriages between crowns , do not always produce the effect that might be desir'd , yet they must not be neglected ; and they often prove the most important matters of negotiations . they always produce this advantage , that they retain states for some time in some considerations of respect one towards another ; and to have a value for them , it is sufficient that they prove sometimes advantageous . as the way to get good fruit is to graft ; the princes of france , who derive their birth from parents of equal and high quality , must in reason be more elevated , and without doubt , their blood remains the more illustrious , in being less mix'd with other . moreover alliances serve sometimes to extinguish leagues and ingagements among princes , and tho they do not always produce that good effect , the advantages the house of austria derives by them , shows that they are not to be neglected . in matters of state , all things must be improv'd , and what may be useful , must never be dispis'd . leagues are of that kind , the benefit of them is often very uncertain , and yet they must be respected : however i would not advise a great prince , to ingage himself voluntarily , upon the account of a league in a design of difficult execution , unless he finds himself powerful enought to make it succeed altho his colleagues should fail him . two reasons oblige me to advance this proposition . the first draws its original and force from the weakness of unions , which are never very certain among divers soveraign heads . the second consists , in that petty princes are often as careful and diligent , to ingage great kings into great enterprises , as they are slow in seconding them , notwithstanding they are strictly oblig'd so to do , and that there are some , who save their own stake , at the cost of those they have ingag'd against their will. altho it is a common saying , that whoever has force , has commonly reason , it is true nevertheless , that two unequal powers being joyn'd by a treaty , the greatest is in danger of being forsaken by the other ; the reason of it is evident . reputation is a thing of so much importance to a great prince , that no advantage can be propos'd to him , to recompense the loss he would suffer by it , in case he should forfeit the engagements of his word and faith : and such terms may be offer'd to him , whose power is inconsiderable , tho his quality is sovereign , that according to all probability he will prefer his advantage to his honor , which will make him fail in his obligation towards him who , foreseeing his infidelity , cannot resolve to prevent it ; by reason that to be abandon'd by his allys , is not of somuch consequence to him , as the prejudice he would receive in violating his faith. kings must take a great deal of care what treatys they make ; but when they are made they must keep them religiously . i am sensible that many polititians teach the contrary ; but without considering in this place what the christian faith affords us against those maxims ; i maintain , that since the loss of honor is greater then the loss of life , a great prince should sooner venture his life , and even the interest of his state , than to break his word , which he can never violate without loseing his reputation , and consequently the greatest force of sovereigns . the importance of this place makes me observe , that it is absolutely necessary to be exact in the choice of ambassadors , and other negotiators ; and that a prince can never be too severe in punishing those who exceed their commissions ; since by those faults , they expose the reputation of princes , and the well-fare of the commonwealth at once . the easiness , or corruption of some persons , is sometimes so great , and the desire of others , who are neither so weak nor so wicked , to do something is often so extraordinary , that if they are not kept within the bounds which are prescrib'd them , out of fear of absolute ruin , there will always be a greater number of those who will be drawn in to make ill treatys , than to make none at all . i have had so much experience of this truth , that it forces me to end this chapter , saying , that whoever shall not be rigorous in those occasions , will be wanting in what is necessary to the subsistance of states . chap. vii . one of the greatest advantages , that can be procur'd to a state , is to give every one an employment suitable to his genius and capacity . such misfortunes befal states through the incapacity of those that are imploy'd in the principal places and most important commissions , that the prince , and those who have a share in the administration of affairs , can never be too careful to employ none but such as are fit for the places they are design'd for . the most clear sighted being sometimes blind , and there being but few men , who are willing to impose bounds to themselves , according to the rules of reason ; those who are in credit about princes always think themselves worthy of all sorts of imployments , and upon that false foundation , they use their utmost endeavours to obtain them . nevertheless it is certain , that a man who is capable to serve the publick in certain functions , may be capable to ruin it in another . i have seen such strange inconveniences proceeding from the ill choice that have been made in my time , that i cannot forbear exclaiming upon that subject to avoid the like for the future . if physicians will not suffer experiments to be made on persons of any consideration , it is easy to conceive how dangerous it must be to put unexperienc'd persons in places of the greatest trust , since thereby you give way to learners to make essays on occasions , in which masters and master pieces are so necessary . nothing can be more capable to ruin a state than such a proceeding , the true source of all sorts of disorder . an ambassador ill chosen to make a treaty may cause a notable prejudice out of ignorance . a general of an army incapable of such an imployment is capable of hazarding all his master's fortune , and the happiness of the state unseasonably . i dare say on the contrary , that if all those who are imploy'd in public trusts were worthy of them , states would not only be exempted from many accidents , which often trouble their quiet , but they would enjoy unexpressible felicities . i am sensible that it is very difficult to meet subjects , which have all the qualifications requir'd for the places they are design'd for ; but at least they must have the chief , and when none that are accomplish'd can be found , it is no small satisfaction to chuse the best that can be found in a barren age. if the mask most men put on , and if the artifices they usually practise to disguise themselves , and to conceal their defects , deceive us , insomuch that being once settl'd in great-places , they appear as malicious as they were esteem'd full of virtue when they were chosen ; the said mistake must be rectifi'd immediately , and tho indulgence may induce to tolerate some small incapacity , it must never excuse malice which is so to prejudicial to states , to be tolerated in consideration of private interest . it is on this occasion our duty obliges us to represent freely to princes , to what degree they are answerable before god , when they give places of great trust out of pure favour , which can never be possessed by mean capacitys , without prejudice to the state. it is on the said occasion , we are oblidg'd to show , that tho we do not absolutely condemn particular affections , which have no other foundation but that natural inclination , which men have rather for one person than for another ; we cannot excuse princes who suffer themselves to be prevail'd upon so far , as to give those , they love thus , places , in the administration of which they show themselves as prejudicial to the state , as useful to themselves . those who have the happiness to injoy the favour of princes , by the force of their inclination , must not be depriv'd of receiving advantages from them , tho they have not all the qualifications requir'd to make them worthy of the same , and the public can not complain of it with reason , unless they are immoderate . but it is a sinister omen for a prince , when he , who is the most considerable for his interest , is not the most consider'd by his favour , and states are never in a worse condition , than when the inclinations the prince has for some particular persons , prevail before the services of those that are more useful to the public . in such a case , neither the esteem of the soveraign , nor the affection one has for him , nor the hope of reward do any longer excite virtue . men remain on the contrary in an indifference of good and evil , and envy , and jealousie , or spite , induce all men to neglect their duty , because that in performing it , they have no prospect of reward . a prince , who desires to be belov'd by his subjects , must fill up all the places of trust , and the first dignitys of his state , with persons so much esteem'd by every one , that the cause of his choice may be found in their merit . such men must be carefully sought after throughout the state , and not receiv'd by importunities , or chosen in the croud of those who press most about kings , and about their favourites . if favour has no hand in elections , and merit be the sole foundation of them , besides that the state will be well serv'd , princes will avoid a great deal of ingratitude , which is often met with in certain men who are the less grateful for the favours they receive , in that they least deserve them : it being most certain , that the same qualifications , which render men worthy of favours , are the same which make them capable and desirous to acknowledg them . many have good sentiments in the moment you oblige them , but the constitution of their nature sways them soon after , and they easily forget what they owe others , because they only love themselves ; and as fire converts all things into its own substance , they only consider public interests , to convert them to their one advantage , and equaly despise those who do them good , and the states in which they receive it . favour may innocently be allow'd in some things ; but a kingdom is in a sad case , when the throne of that false goddess is raised above reason . merit should always turn the scale , and when justice is on our side , favour cannot prevail without injustice . favourites are the more dangerous , in that those who are raised by fortune seldom consult reason ; and whereas it seldom favours their designs , it proves commonly ineffectual to stop the course of those they form to the prejudice of the state. in my opinion nothing is more likely to ruin the most flourishing kingdom in the world , than the apetite of such men , or the inordinate passions of a woman , when a prince is possessed by them . i am the bolder in advancing this proposition , because there are no remedies against those evils , but such as depend altogether on chance and time ; which often suffering the sick to dye , without any assistance , must be look'd upon as the worst physician in the world. as the greatest light in nature cannot make the blind perceive one glimpse of their way , so there is no ray capable to unseal the eyes of a prince , when they are seal'd by favour and passion . those whose eyes are blinded , can never make good choices unless by chance , and therefore since the welfare of the state requires them ever to be made with reason , it also requires that princes should not be possessed by persons who deprive them of the light , they stand in need of to see the objects , which are put before their eyes . when the hearts of princes are ingag'd by such means , it is almost useless to do well ; because the craft of those who are in possession of their affections , tarnish the lustre of the purest actions , and make the most signal services pass for offences . many princes have undone themselves , by preferring their particular affection to public interest . such misfortunes have befallen some , by the unruly passions they have had for women . some are fallen into the like inconveniences , by such a simple blind passion they have had for their favorites , that in order to raise their fortune , they have ruin'd their own . there have been others , who having no natural inclination for any thing , have nevertheless been sway'd with so much violence in favour of some particular persons , that they have occasion'd their ruin. men perhaps will wonder at this proposition , which is nevertheless as true , as it is easy to be conceiv'd ; and if men consider , that such motions are distempers to the minds that are influenc'd by them , and that as the cause of feavours is the corruption of humors ; one may also say , that those sorts of violent affections , are rather grounded on the defect of the person in which we find them , than on the merit of those who receive the effect , and advantage of them . such evils commonly carry their remedy along with them , in that being violent they are not lasting ; but when they continue they often occasion death , as well as the feavers of that kind ; or a want of health , which is seldom repair'd afterwards . the wisest princes have avoided those divers kinds of evils , in making reason the guide of all their affections . many have cur'd themselves of them , after having found to their cost , that unless they did it , their ruin was inevitable . to return precisely to the point of the question proposed in this chapter , the scope of which is to show how important it is to discern those who are the fittest for employments ; i will conclude it , saying , that since interest is that which makes men guilty of male-adminnistration in the places that are committed to them : ecclesiasticks are often to be preferr'd to many others , in what relates to places of great trust : not that they are less subject to their own interest , but because they have a great deal less self interest than other men , since that having neither wives , nor children , they are free from the bonds which ingage men most . chap. viii . of the evil which flatterers , detractors , and intriguers commonly occasion in states , and how necessary it is to remove them from kings , and to banish them from their courts . there is no plague so capable to ruine a state , as flatterers , detractors and certain men , who apply themselves wholly to form cabals and intrigues in their courts . they are so industrious to spread their venom , by divers imperceptible ways , that it is difficult to scape it , without abundance of care . as they are neither of a quality , nor merit , to have a share in the management of affairs , nor good enough to be concern'd for the publick good , their only aim is to disturb both ; and expecting great advantages from confusion , they omit no means to overthrow , by their flatteries , by their crafts , and by their detractions the order and rule which deprives them absolutely of all hopes of fortune , since it is impossible to build any in a well disciplin'd state , unless it be upon merit , which they are wholly destitute of . besides that as it is a common thing for those who have no share in affairs , to endeavour to ruine them , those sort of men are capable of doing all manner of evils ; and therefore it behoves princes to take all the precautions imaginable against the malice , which disguises it self in so many different dresses , that it is often difficult to ward it . there are some , who notwithstanding they have neither courage nor wit , have nevertheless so much of both as to feign as much steadiness , as a profound and severe wisdom , and to set off themselves , in finding fault with every body's actions , even when they are most to be commended , and that it is impossible to do better , in respect of the thing in question . nothing is so easy as to find apparent reasons , to condemn what cannot be better done , and what has been undertaken upon such solid foundations , that one could not have done otherwise without committing a notable fault . others having neither mouths nor spurs , dislike by their gestures , by shaking of their heads , and by aserious grimace , what they dare not condemn with words , and cannot be blam'd with reason . not to flatter in what relates to such men , it is not enough for the prince to refuse them his ear , he must also banish them from the cabinet , and court together ; because that as their facility is sometimes so great , that to speak to them and to persuade them , is the same thing ; even when they cannot be persuaded , there still remains some impression , which has its effect another time , when the same artifice is renew'd : and indeed the little application they have to affairs , induces them often to judge the cause , rather by the number of witnesses , than by the weight of the accusations . i could hardly relate all the evils , those evil councelors have been the authors of , during your majestie 's reign . but i have so lively a resentment of it for the interest of the state , that it forces me to say , that there can be no room for mercy for such men , in order to prevent the mischiefs that have been done in my time. tho a prince be never so firm and constant , he cannot without great imprudence , and without exposing himself to ruin , keep ill men about him , who may surprise him unexpectedly , as during a contagion a malignant vapor siezes in an instant the heart and brains of the strongest men , when they think themselves soundest . those public plagues must be remov'd , never to return , unless they have cast all their venom , which happens so seldom , that the care we ought to have of repose , obliges more to the continuation of their removal , than charity can invite to recall them . i boldly advance this proposition , because i have never seen any of those lovers of factions bred in the intrigues of the court , lose their ill habit , and change their nature , unless for want of power , which , properly speaking , do's not change them , since the will of doing ill remains in them , when the power has left them . i am sensible that some of those men , may be sincerely converted , but experience teaching me , that for one who persists in his repentance , twenty return to their old vomit ; i decide boldly , that it is better to use rigor against one person who deserves favour , than to expose a state to some prejudice by being too indulgent , either towards those who keep their malice in their heart , only acknowledging their fault in letters , or towards those whose levity may give a reason to dread a relapse , worse than their former evil. 't is no wonder that angels should never do any evil , since they are confirm'd in grace ; but that those who are obstinate in that kind of malice should do any good , when they may do harm , is a kind of miracle , which must be wrought by the immediate powerful hand of god , and it is certain that a man of great probity , will find much more difficulty to subsist in an age corrupted by such men , than one whose vertue they will not stand in dread of , his reputation not being so intire . some are of opinion , that it suits with the goodness of kings to tolerate things which seem to be of small consequence in the beginning ; but i say , that they can never be too careful to discover and to extinguish the least intrigues of their cabinets and of their courts , in their birth . great conflagrations being occasion'd by small sparks ; who ever puts out one , do's not know what mischief he has prevented : but to discover it , if he leaves any one unextinguish'd , tho the same causes do not always produce the same effect , he will perhaps find himself reduc'd to such an extremity , that it will no longer be in his power to remedy the same . whether it be true or no that a little poyson stops a great vessel , the course of which it cannot advance of one moment , it is easy to conceive by what naturalists relate to us of that poyson , that it is absolutely necessary to purge a state of that which may put a stop to the course of affairs , tho it can never advance it . on such occasions it is not sufficient to remove great men upon the account of their power , the same must be done to the meanest , upon the account of their malice : all are equally dangerous , and if there is any difference , mean persons , as those that are most conceal'd , are more to be fear'd than the others . as the bad air , i have already mention'd , lock'd up into a trunk often infects a house with the plague , which afterwards spreads throughout the town , so the intrigues of cabinets often fill the courts of princes with partialities , which finally disturb the body of the state. as i may affirm with truth , that i have never seen any troubles in this kingdom , but what did proceed form thence , i answer once more , that it is more important than it seems to be , to extinguish not only the first sparks of such divisions , when they appear , but also to prevent them , by the removal of those who make it their whole business to kindle them . the peace of the state is too considerable , to neglect that remedy , without being answerable for it to god. i have often seen the court in the midst of peace , so full of factions , for want of practising this good counsel , that they were very like like to overthrow the state. that knowledg , and that which history has given your majesties of the like perils , to which many , and particularly the last of your predecessors , have often been exposed upon the same account , having oblig'd you to seek out a remedy , i have seen france so peaceable at home , while she had wars abroad , that considering the repose it injoy'd , no body could have thought it was oblig'd to oppose the greatest powers . perhaps some may urge that the factions and troubles i have mention'd , have been occasion'd more by the invention of women , than by the malice of flatterers . but that instance is so far from being against what i have urg'd , that on the contrary it confirms it powerfully , seeing that in speaking of flatterers , and the like , i do not design to exclude women , who are often more dangerous than men , and to whose sex a world of charms are annex'd , more powerful to disturb and to imbroyl affairs , courts and states , than the most subtil and industrious malice of any others whatever . it is true , that while the queens catherine and mary de medicis , had a share in the government and that many women being influenc'd by them , meddl'd with the affairs of the state , many of them very powerful in sence and charms , have done a world of mischief , their places having acquir'd them the best . qualify'd persons of the kingdom , and the most unhappy ; they have drawn this advantage by it , that being serv'd by them according to their passions , they have often prejudic'd those who were not in their favour , because they were useful to the state. i might inlarge upon this subject , but divers respects stop my pen , which not being capable of flattery , when it condemns openly , cannot forbear observing , that the favourites i have mention'd in the preceeding chapter , often supply the place of those , whose malice i have examin'd in this . after those truths , i have no more to say , but that it is impossible to secure states against the evils those sort of persons may occasion , but by removing them from the court ; which is the more necessary , in that it is impossible to keep a snake in ones bosom , without exposing one's self to be stung by it . chap. ix . which treats of the power of the prince ; and is divided into eight sections . section . i. the prince must be powerful , to be respected by his subjects and by strangers . power being one of the most necessary ingredients towards the grandor of kings , and the prosperity of their governments ; those who have the chief management of affairs , are particularly oblig'd not to omit any thing , which may contribute to authorise their master so far as to make all the world respect him . as goodness is the object of love , power is the cause of dread : and it is most certain , that among all the princes who are capable to stir a state , fear grounded upon esteem and reverence , has so much force , that it ingages every one to perform his duty . if this principle is of great efficacy in respect to the internal part of states , it is to the full as prevailing abroad : subjects and strangers looking with the same eyes upon a formidable power , both the one and the other abstain from offending a prince , whom they are sensible is in a condition to hurt them , if he were so inclin'd . i have observ'd by the by , that the ground of the power i am speaking of , must be esteem and respect ; i add , that it is now a thing so necessary , that when it is grounded upon any other principle , it is very dangerous ; in that case instead of creating a reasonable fear , it inclines men to hate princes , who are never in a worse condition than when it turns to public aversion . the power which induces men to respect and fear princes with love , is of many different kinds ; it is a tree which has five divers branches , which all draw their nutriment and substance from one and the same root . the prince must be powerful by his reputation . by a reasonable army always kept on foot. and by a notable sum of money in his coffers , to supply unexpected exigencies , which often come to pass when they are least expected . finally , by the possession of his subjects hearts , as we may easily see . section ii. the prince must be powerful by his reputation ; and what is necessary to that end. reputation is the more necessary in princes , in that those we have a good opinion of , do more by their bare words than those who are not esteem'd , with armies . they are oblig'd to value it beyond life ; and they ought sooner to venture their fortune and grandeur , than to suffer the least breach to be made in the same , since it is most certain that the least diminution a prince receives , tho never so slight , is the step which is of most dangerous consequence for his ruin . in consideration of which i declare freely , that princes ought never to esteem any profit advantagious , when it reflects in the least upon their honour : and they are either blind , or insensible to their true interests , if they receive any of this nature . and indeed history teaches us , that in all times and in all states , princes of great reputation are always happier than those , who being inferior to them in that point , have surpass'd them in force and riches , and in all other power . as they cannot be too jealous of it , their counsellors can never be too careful , to cry up the good qualities they possess . those who will form their conduct upon the rules and principles contain'd in this present testament , will undoubtedly acquire a name which will be of no small weight in the mind of their subjects and of their neighbours , particularly if being religious towards god , they observe the same rule towards themselves . that is , in being true to their word , and faithful to their promises ; conditions which are so absolutely necessary for the reputation of a prince , that as he who is destitute of them can never be esteem'd by any body , so it is impossible for him who does possess them not to be reverenc'd and credited by all the world. i could instance many examples of this truth ; but as i do not design this work for a common place , easy to be perform'd by all sorts of men , who will extract good books ; i will only instance such as are so certain and so clear , that all sensible persons will find the proof of them in their own reason . section . iii. the prince must be powerful by the force of his frontiers . none but such as are depriv'd of common sence , can be unsensible how necessary it is for great states to have their frontiers well fortify'd . it is a thing the more necessary in this kingdom , in that , that tho the levity of our nation should make it incapable of making great conquests ; their valour would render them invincible , in their defence ; having considerable places , so well fortify'd , and so well provided with all things , that they may be able to show their courage , without being exposed to suffer great hard-ships , which are the only enemies they have to overcome . a frontier well fortify'd is capable either to discourage enemies from the designs they might have against a state , or at least to stop the course of the same , and their impetuosity , if they dare venture to do it by open force . the subtil motions of our nation stand in need of being secured against the terrour they might receive in an unexpected attack , if they did not know that the entrance into the kingdom has such strong ramparts , that no foreign impetuosity can be capable to take them by storm , and that it is impossible to overcome them , without a considerable time. the new method of some of the enemies of this state being more to starve the places they besiege than to take them by force of arms , and to ruin the country they invade by a great number of horse , than to advance by degrees into it with a considerable body of foot , as was done antiently ; it is clear , that frontier places are not only useful to resist such efforts , but also to secure states , in the bowels of which it is impossible for enemies to make any great progress if they leave places behind them to cut off the communication of their countrys and their convoys together . these considerations oblige me to represent , that it is not sufficient to fortify places , and to put such provisions and ammunitions into them , as may serve to resist brisk attacks , but also to furnish them with all things necessary for a year at least , which is a sufficient time to relieve them conveniently . i am sensible that it is almost impossible for great kings , to provide many citadels thus ; but it is not so with great towns in which the society of men produces a great store of many things , which a particular governor cannot make a sufficient provision of , and it is easie to oblige the inhabitants to provide provisions for a year , which will always suffice for six months and more , if they turn out useless mouths , as reason requires . i am so far from pretending that this order should exempt princes from having publick magazins , that on the contrary i am of opinion that they can never have too many , and that after having provided them , they must establish such good orders to preserve , them that the governors , to whom the disposition of the same belongs , may not have the liberty to dissipate them in vain , either out of negligence , or a desire to convert them to their own uses . i do not particularly specify the number of cannons* , of powder and of bullets , and of all other warlike ammunitions , which are to be put in every place , because it is to be different according to their different largeness . but i will say that provisions for the mouth are not more necessary than those of war , and that it would be to no purpose for a town to be well stor'd with victuals , if they wanted what is absolutely necessary , both to defend themselves and to annoy their enemies , seeing particularly that experience showeth us that those whoshoot most , commonly kill most when a place is besieg'd , one might better spare bread than powder . the antients having observ'd very well , that the real strength of towns consists in the number of men , i cannot forbear adding , that all fortifications are useless , unless the governor and the officers , who command in a place , have a courage equal to the strength of the walls and ramparts , and unless the number of men is proportion'd to the largeness of the place , and the quantity of the posts that are to be defended . experience has show'd us in divers occasions , that the least holds are impregnable by the steadiness of the courage of those who defend them , and that the best citadels make no great resistance , when those that are in them have not a courage suitable to their force . therefore princes can never be too careful in choosing those to whom they intrust frontiers , since the welfare and repose of the state depends chiefly on their fedelity and vigilancy , their courage and experience , and that often the lack of one of these qualifications , costs millions to states , if it does not prove the absolute cause of their ruin. section . iv. of the power a state ought to have by its land-forces . this section has several subdivisions , upon the account of the abundance of matter it contains , which will be specify'd in the margin . the most potent state in the world cannot boast of injoying a certain peace , unless it be in a condition to secure it self at all times , against an unexpected invasion , or surprise . in order thereunto it is necessary that so great a kingdom as this is , should always keep a sufficient army on foot to prevent the designs which hatred and envy might form against its prosperity and grandeur , when 't is look'd upon to be in a secure repose , or at least to stifle them in their birth . who has force , has commonly reason on his side ; and he that is weak , is commonly thought in the wrong in the judgment of most men. as a souldier who do's not always wear his sword is lyable to many inconveniences ; that kingdom which do's not always stand on its guard , and keep it self in a condtion to prevent a sudden surprise , is in great danger . public interest obliges those who have the management of states to govern them so , as not only to secure them against all the evil which may be avoided , but also from all apprehensions of it . * as reason requires a geometrical proportion , between that which sustains , and that which is sustained , it is certain that there must be considerable forces , to sustain so great a body as this kingdom . those that are necessary to so great an end , may and ought to be of a different nature , that is , that among the men design'd for the preservation of this state , some must be listed to be ready on all occasins , and others actually in arms , in order always to be in readiness to make a good defence . * in order to provide for the frontier towns , and to keep a body on foot to oppose all unexpected designs , it is necessary to keep at least four thousand horse , and forty thousand foot actually in arms at all times , and it is easie without burthening the state , to keep ten thousand gentlemen , and fifty thousand foot listed , ready to be rais'd on all emergencies . it may perhaps be urg'd that the defence of the state does not require such great preparations , but whereas the said establishment is so far from being a burthen to france , that on the contrary the nobility and the people will receive a benefit by it ; i say , that it is necessary to make war , when ever the good of the state will require it . * in the opinion of the most judicious , war is sometimes an unavoidable evil ; and on other occasions , it is absolutely necessary and advantagious . states stand in need of it at certain times , to purge their ill humours , to recover what belongs to them , to revenge an injury , the impunity of which draws on another , to free allies from oppression , to put a stop to the progress of a conqueror's pride , to prevent the evil one is threaten'd with , when there is no other way to avoid them , or , in fine , to prevent many other accidents . i maintain , and it is an undoubted truth , that no war can be happy unless it be just , and that not being so , tho the event should prove favourable according to the world , yet an account must be given for it at the tribunal of god. therefore the first thing to be done , when a prince is forc'd to take arms , is to examin the equity of the cause for which they are taken , which must be done by doctors of capacity and probity . this foundation suppos'd , the means to carry it on vigorously must be consider'd , and to time it well , is not one of the least material . there is this difference betwixt him who pursues revenge with anger , and he who does it with reason , that the first does mischief , at the venture of receiving the same , chusing rather to suffer himself than to lose an opportunity to prejudice his enemy ; and the last dissembles his resentment , until he finds an occasion to punish him who has wrong'd him , without sharing his sufferings . the first acts like a beast , according to the impulse of nature ; and the last behaves himself like a man , suffering himself to be guided by reason . in order to succeed in war , it is not sufficient to chuse a fit opportunity , to have a strong army , abundance of money , of provisions , and warlike ammunitions , the main point is to have men fit for the service they are design'd for , to know how to make them observe a good discipline , to make them live regularly , and to manage ones money , provisions and ammunitions prudently . it is easy to set down these general principles , but the practice of them is difficult , and yet in case it be neglected , the success of a war cannot be happy , unless by chance or miracle , which wise men must never trust to . there is no nation in the world so unfit for war as ours ; their levity and impatience in the least hardships , are two principles which are but too well known . tho caesar says , that the french understand two things , the military art , and that of speaking , i own that hitherto , i have not been able to apprehend upon what ground he attributes the first of these qualifications to them , since patience in labour and sufferings , a qualification absolutely necessary in war , is but seldom found among them . were this qualification joyn'd to their valour , the universe would be too little to bound their conquests , but as the great heart god has given them , makes them fit to overcome whatever opposes them by force , their levity and laziness make them incapable of overcoming the least obstacles , which the delays of a subtle enemy opposes to their eagerness . this is the reason why they are not fit for conquests which require time , nor to preserve those they might make in an instant of time. they are not only inconstant , impatient , and little inur'd to fatigues , but moreover they are accus'd of never being pleas'd with their present condition , and to have no great affection for their country : and the said accusation is so well grounded , that no body can deny , that there are more among them who are wanting in those duties which their birth exacts from them , than among all the other nations of the world. there are few who wage war against france , without having french men in their army , and when they are arm'd for their country , they are so indifferent in what relates to its interest , that they do not use the least endeavours to overcome their natural defects to it's advantage . they run an hundred leagues to seek a battle , and yet would not● expect the occasion of one a week , the enemy tires them out , even before they have begun to work . they are not afraid of peril , but they will expose themselves to it without any pains ; the least delays are insupportable to them , they have no flegm to tarry one moment for their happiness , and they are tir'd even with the continuation of their prosperities . at the beginning of their enterprise , their eagerness is not common , and indeed they are more than men that moment , but they cool by degrees , so that they become equal to those who have but a common vertue , and in process of time , they are disgustedand grow effeminate , insomuch that they are less than men. they still retain courage enough to fight , provided they are put to 't immediately , but they do not keep so much of it as to tarry for an occasion ; tho their hon the reputation of their country and the service of their master requires it . they can neither improve a victory , nor resist the fortune of a victorious enemy ; prosperity blinds them beyond other men , and yet they have neither courage , nor judgment in adversity , and in labour . in fine , they are subject to so many faults , that it is not without reason , some judicious persons wonder how this monarchy has been able to subsist from it's birth , since that as it has always found faithful children for it's defence , it has never been attack'd but it's enemies have found sectators in it's bosom , who , like vipers , have us'd their utmost endeavours to gnaw the bowels of their mother . i am sensible at the same time that the french have good qualifications to counterpoise those imperfections ; they are valiant , full of courage and humanity ; their heart is void of cruelty , and so free from rankor , that they are easily reconcil'd . but tho these qualifications are the ornaments of civil society , and essential to christianity ; yet it is certain , that being destitute of flegm , of patience , and of discipline , they are exquisite victuals serv'd without sawce to relish them . i am not ignorant that the providence of god , which is admirable in all things , is particularly so , in having counterpois'd the ill qualities of every nation , by other advantages which make amends for their defects . if the french nation is inconstant and impatient , their valour and impetuosity often makes them do that at the first onset , which others are a long time about . if their uneasiness hinders them from remaining long in armies willingly ; god's providence has made it so abounding in men , that there are always abundance of them , who being mov'd by the same principle of levity , are ready to supply the room of those who are desirous to come home again , and these are ready to go back , before those who have succeeded them , are weary . if their want of affection for their country inclines them some times to take arms against their king , the inconstancy and sudden motions , to which they are subject , not permitting any body to rely upon them , they do themselves more harm than they are capable of doing to their country . 't is most certain , that the spaniards surpass us in constancy and steadiness , in zeal , and in fidelity for their king and country ; but in exchange , that kingdom is so barren and so desart in some places , and so little abounding in men , that were it not for their constancy , it would often be abandon'd by it self . moreover , if among the french , some particular persons ingage against their master , the spaniards some times mutiny and revolt in bodys in their armys . if the emperor has the advantage to govern a nation , which is the nursery of souldiers , he has the disadvantage , that they easily change their party and religion together , besides that they are very much addicted to drunkenness , and far more unrulythan ours in the field . in a word all nations have there defects , and the most prudent are those who endeavour to acquire by art , what nature has deny'd them . it is more easy to add flegm , patience , and discipline , to the courage , valour , and courtesy of the french , than to inspire that fire in flegmatic nations , which they have not naturaly . the french are capable of every thing , provided their commanders are capable to teach them what they are to do . their courage , which inclines them to seek out war all the world over , justifys this proposition : since they live like spaniards in their armys , like sweedes in their country , like crawats when they are listed among them , and like hollanders in their states . they observe their several disciplines ; which shows , that if they keep their natural imperfections in their country , it is because they are tolerated , and that their officers do not know how to correct them . if they live in this kingdom without discipline , it is not so much their fault , as the fault of their leaders , who commonly content themselves with making fine ordinances , and do not take so much care as they should do to cause them to be observ'd . nothing can be more easy than to prescribe rules to live well , and nothing more difficult then to put them in practice ; however it is not impossible . endeavours must be us'd to show the justice of them by reason , and then no mercy must be shown to those who violate them . if one , two , or three examples of punishment do not put a stop to disobedience , the continuance of it will do 't ; and i dare assure your majesty , that if you find chiefs worthy to command , you will never want subjects fit to obey . it is most certain , that the general opinion of the world , that the french are incapable of rule and discipline , has no other foundation than the incapacity of their commanders , who do not know how to chuse necessary means for the ends they propose . the siege of rochel , in which during thirteen months an army of men receiv'd orders , and obey'd like monks bearing arms , and the expedition of pignerol , where they did the same , plainly demonstrate what i have said . but the general must be a man of resolution , and no respecter of persons , and known to be so ; for it is certain that unless he has so much steadiness as to remain inflexible in the rigor of the rule he has prescrib'd , no man will think himself oblig'd to observe it ; or at least many will venture to break it , in hopes of a pardon . but when a general persists as much in punishing as the delinquents in their faults ; his steadiness will stop the course of our excessive levity ; and without such a remedy it is in vain to expect to keep so hot and so impetuous a nation as ours is , within the bounds of reason . the punishments of marillac and of montmorency , have reduc'd all the grandees of the kingdom to their duty in an instant of time ; and i dare affirm , that the same being practis'd against ten officers , and fifty souldiers , will maintain the armys in discipline , and in a condition to perform whatever will be desir'd of them . punishing those thus , who shall be wanting in the performance of their duty , few men will be punish'd , since few will venture to expose themselves to ruin , finding it inevitable , and by the death of a small number , the lives of many will be preserv'd , and order observ'd in all things . the defects of this nation never appear'd more than under your majesty's reign , which being signaliz'd by great prosperity and power by your conduct , will also be signaliz'd in the opinion of the most judicious , for many insidelities you have suffer'd , and by a world of attempts against your service . after having made divers inquiries into the reasons of both , i am not afraid of saying , that they proceed from the weakness of your majesty's minority , during which men have so insensibly accustom'd themselves to all sorts of licentiousness , that they thought they might continue the same under your reign with the same impunity as heretofore . the first is , that as there are more colleges of religious orders , more officers of justice , and of the finances than for the time past , there are not near so many souldiers , for which reason the desertion of those who retire from the armies is more apparent , because there are not so many found as formerly , to supply the room of those who forsake their duty . the second , that souldiers advanc'd their fortune more , formerly than in these times , in which the officers of the finances , and the * partisans reap all the fat , to the great disgust of those who are constrain'd to expose their lives almost to no purpose . the third , that generals are less careful in our days of military discipline , and less severe in chastising those who swerve from it than our fore-fathers were . the fourth , that the long discontinuation the french have had of foreign wars , in which they had powerful enemies to encounter , had almost made them forget the trade , and disus'd them from the fatigues they are little capable of , tho they must go through many , when they have brisk and potent enemies to deal with . i add to these considerations , that your majesty's health has not always permitted you to be in the army , and that the injustice of the french is so great , that they are never satisfy'd in a place , where they venture their life , unless they see their king , whose presence they fancy does in some measure secure it . none but the enemies of this state can make war successfully by their lieutenants ; the flegm of their nation gives them that advantage ; but the french are the most unfit for it of any other nation , because the eagerness of their courage and the desire of fighting gives them an impatience , which can never be vanquish'd , but by the presence of their king. if at any time any great enterprise has met with success under lieutenants , it will either be found that those who have had that good fortune , were men of very great authority , by the trust repos'd in them by their master , and by their particular merit , or that those wars were not so lasting , as to oblige them in overcoming the enemies also to vanquish the humour of the french. it is no small trouble to me to be oblig'd in this place to discover the defects your majesty has often observ'd in your nobility ; yet they are so public , that it is impossible to conceal them . the affection i have for that order , obliges me to examin them , to find out examples and to endeavour to remedy the same . the esteem they were in heretofore will hardly permit one to believe , that they have committed faults on some occasions in your reign ; but i will discover the reason of them to those who have beheld their effects . all men easily apprehend , that there is a great deal of difference between the spirits , which naturally ascend on high , and the grosser parts of their bodies which remain below . the excellency of the nobility which love war , are those spirits which ascend on high , esteem'd by all the world ; and those who only follow it , because the laws of this kingdom constrain them so to do , are if not the lees , at least the wine which drops out of the cask , which is hardly fit for servants . there are no communities in which there are not more ill subjects than good ones ; and whereas a little tare is capable to spoil several heaps of wheat it is no wonder if , when the nobility is assembled , the greater number corrupts the less , tho better ; and as the best wine mix'd with the lees is nought , so the service of the best nobility is not only useless but prejudicial , when joyn'd with the lees which alters it . * this discourse ingaging me to speak of the ban , and arriere ban , i cannot forbear saying that it is an assembly of gentry , which having no head with any authority , governs it self without rule , and lives without discipline . — an assembly the subsistance of which has so little certainty , that the sickleness , cowardice , malice or disgust of three or four persons , is capable to dissipate it in a moment . an assembly which ruins the places through which it passes far more than the regular forces , which ruining your majesty's country pay part of what they spend , whereas those pay nothing at all . they never perform any guard in an army , which produces a double ill , laziness and the disgust it creates in others . unless they fight at their first arrival ; as they are quick in coming , they are speedy in going back , and threaten it every moment ; in retiring they do not only debauch many by their ill example , but the most ingenious among them , invent whatever craft can suggest to cover their infamy , and to persuade that they do not retire without reason ; so that they both weaken and astonish armies at one and the same time . your majesty being much better acquainted with these truths , of which you have seen the practice , than i am , without insisting on the defects of an order , the perfections of which i have represented , my conscience obliges me to declare freely , that princes must never have any recourse to such a succour , which is much more prejudicial than useful to the state. but that this kingdom may not be depriv'd of the service of the nobility , which has always been the principal sinew of it , and is oblig'd to serve it in time of vvar , upon the accounts of the fiefs which have been granted them on that condition , and of the advantages they injoy over the people in time of peace : it will be necessary to tax all the fiefs in every bailwick , according to their revenue , to form regular troops with the said money , into which such as had rather serve in person , than to pay the contribution of the fiefs shall be admitted , provided they ingage to perform the conditions of their obligation . prudence requires that men should be imploy'd according to their capacity , and that the defects of nature should be supply'd by art ; and for that reason it is necessary to make this use of the body of the nobility , in order to derive some advantage by them . next to this observation , proceeding on , i am oblig'd to observe , that it is almost impossible to undertake great wars with success with the french alone . * foreigners are absolutely necessary to maintain the body of armies , and if the french horse are good to fight , there is no being without foreigners to perform the guards , and to support the fatigues of an army . our nation , tho hot and eager in combats , is neither vigilant to guard it self , nor proper to form designs or enterprizes , which require toyl and labour . one half of the french armys were formerly compos'd of foreigners , and we have experienc'd how advantageous it is to use them , to supply the defect of our nation , besides that the good qualifications of those by whom we may be assisted may in some measure correct our imperfections . but whereas if we want well disciplin'd souldiers , steady and constant in their duty , we are yet in greater want of commanders , qualifi'd as they ought to be ; it will be needless to remedy one of these evils , unless we also correct the other . there are but few of them in the world , and less in france than in any other part , who do not suffer themselves to be blinded by prosperity , and do not lose their courage and judgment in adversity . nevertheless it is necessary there should be men imploy'd in the administration of the state , and in the command of armys free from these defects , otherwise we should be in danger of never improving the favourable occasions , which god may offer us , and of being considerable losers by the first frowns of fortune . tho the head guides the rest of the body , and judgment is the most essential part of him who commands , nevertheless i prefer a great deal of courage and indifferent parts in a general , before a great deal of wit , and an indifferent heart . many perhaps will wonder at this proposition , because it is contrary to the opinion of many , but the reason of it is evident . those who have a great deal of courage are never astonish'd in danger , and make use of all the wit and judgment god has indued them with on such occasions ; whereas those who have but little courage being easily astonish'd , are so much dismay'd in the least danger , that let them have never so much wit , it is absolutely useless to them , fear not allowing them to use it . i make but little difference between giving the management of the finances to a thief , and the command of an army to a man of mean courage . as avarice , and the desire the first has of getting an estate , hinders him from improving the occasions to increase his master's fund , so the second , having a desire to preserve his life , and to avoid many perils , which are only such in his imagination , commonly loses and avoids many advantageous occasions to imploy his arms ; and thus if the first is capable of committing faults out of a desire to fill his purse , the last is lyable to do the same , in order to secure his life . among men of courage , some are naturally valiant , and others are only so by reason ; the first are fitter to be soulders than captains , by reason that their valour is commonly accompany'd with brutality ; but the last are good to make commanders : nevertheless it is always to be wish'd that their reasonable valour may not be void of natural courage , because otherwise it were to be fear'd , that the consideration of many incoveniences which may happen , and yet do not happen , might hinder him who proceeds with too much caution from undertaking that which might succeed in others with less wit and more boldness . want of judgment contributes considerably towards the valour of some men , who perform actions which are the more hazardous , in that they are not sensible of the peril to which they expose themselves . judgment is of no small use to others to feign a great boldness on some occasions ; which tho dangerous in appearence , are neither so in effect , nor in the opinions of those , whom god has indued with more knowledge than others . as a general 's valour must not be destitute of judgment : so tho he be prudent and judicious to the highest degree he must have sincerity to hinder him from making artifices pass for actions of courage . men disguise themselves so many different ways , that it is almost impossible to distinguish the effects which proceed from the head from those which proceed from the heart . there are men so naturaly valiant , that they continue so to their dying day . others , which not being so , make an effort in their youth to appear such , to gain some reputation , in favour of which they may pass their life without infamy . these last have no sooner obtain'd their ends , but the effects of their valour disappear , because they have what they desire , and that artifice is the sourse of their courage , and not their natural inclination . great care must be taken not to chuse a chief of that nature , remembring that craft is as dangerous in those who command , as judgment and courage is necessary . those two qualityes ought almost to keep an even pace , but they must be accompany'd with many others . great enterprizes not being childrens play , they require a ripe age in those who perform them ; but as the maturity of judgment which advances with years is useful to form a design , the fire of youth is no less necesseary to put it in execution , and it is most certain that fortune often smiles on youth , and frowns on age. therefore it is fit to observe , that there is a great deal of difference between a novice , a young man , and an old one . it is difficult to be good and bad at once . to be excellent , it is necessary to be young in years , but not in service and experience . for tho old men are commonly the wisest , they are not the best to undertake , because they are often destitute of the fire of youth , which is requisite in such occasions . in conclusion , courage , wit , and good fortune are three qualifications so essential in a general , that tho there are but few who possess them altogether , it is difficult to expect without hazard great events from those who are destitute of either of them . but if a prince be so happy as to find any , in whom these qualifications are met , it will be easy to remedy the defects of those who shall be committed to their conduct . one of those which do's most harm , as i have observed , is the inconstancy of our nation , which rendering it almost incapable of remaining long in the same state , an army is no sooner rais'd , but one half of it dwindles away . * i have thought sometimes that the best expedient that could be taken to make souldiers subsist , and to maintain them in discipline , would be to restore the establishment of legionarys , formerly practis'd in this kingdom , adding some particular orders to it , altogether necessary to make it safe ; but reason and experience have alter'd my mind . reason , in that it shows clearly that what is committed to the care of many , is the less certain , in that every one lays the blame upon his companion , and that the elections which are made by the advice of communities , are rarely made by the bare motive of reason , because that tho there are many persons of wisdom , and probity among them , the number of fools , and of knaves is always the greatest . experience , in that it teaches every body , that no money is laid out worse than that of communities . * besides that i may say with truth , that when ever the urgent necessitys of the state have constrain'd your majesty to imploy forces sent by princes , led and paid by their own officers , which i have seen twice during this last war ; they have always cost double , and have committed as much and more disorder than the others , and have done less service than those which were rais'd at the same time , and conducted by particular persons at your charge . those considerations have convinced me that instead of charging the provinces with the raising and maintaining of souldiers ; soveraigns ought to take the care of it , and that they may make them subsist with order if they will use proper means to that end , according to the following order . all souldiers must be listed , their names , place of birth , and of abode , enter'd , that in case they should run away from their colours , they may be the sooner found again . the register of every place must be charg'd with the number of those that shall be rais'd within his precinct , and the judges oblig'd to use their endeavours for the apprehending and punishing , according to the ordinances , all those who shall come back from the armys without leave ; on pain of the said judges being turn'd out of their offices , upon proof of their having receiv'd information of the return of your souldiers without having prosecuted them for the same . for the listing of souldiers , every one must be oblig'd to serve three years without demanding to be dismiss'd , unless in the case of an evident ilness , on condition that the said term being expir'd it shall not be lawful to refuse it them , when demanded . this condition is very necessary , by reason that when the french think themselves constrain'd , and kept against their will , they commonly think of nothing but running away , tho they were to lose a thousand lives , if they had so many , whereas when they are at liberty to retire , it is likely they will freely remain in the armies , nature commonly inclining men to have a less desire for what they are allow'd to do , than to do that which is forbidden them . whatever souldier shall obtain his dismission , shall be oblig'd to enter the same into the register of the jurisdiction in which he was rais'd . the chiefs and officers of a regiment shall not be allow'd on any pretence whatever , to receive souldiers of another , on pain of being degraded of arms , nay more , of their gentility , if they are gentlemen . and the souldiers who shall abandon their captains without leave , shall be sent to the galleys without mercy , at whatever time they are taken , neither shall any change of place , or of condition exempt them from the same . no furlow or dismission shall be allow'd of , unless sign'd by the colonel , or commander in chief in his absence , and seal'd with the seal of the regiment . every regiment shall have a provost , a commissary , a comptroller , and a pay master , who shall all be obliged to follow the regiment ; on pain not only of being cashier'd , but also of exemplary punishment . in case any disorders happen , and the provost do's not punish the offenders according to the laws of arms he shall be punished himself , as soon as the said complaint is brought to your majesty , or to the generals . in case the regiment is not compleat , and the comptroller or commissary do not give notice thereof , they shall be answerable for it themselves , and be severely punished . if the men are unpay'd by the pay-master's fault , either by his imbezeling the king's money , by bare put offs or delays , or other failures , he shall be liable to pay the quadruple , and to be exemplarily punish'd . the said officers shall only be imploy'd by way of commission , experience having shewn that nothing spoils the king's officers more , particularly in military affairs , than to give them places for life , which properly speaking , is nothing but a title to steal with impunity . those who command the forces , shall be oblig'd to put them in battalia whenever it shall be requir'd by the commissaries . to the end that those who shall have such commissions , may perform them faithfully ; the commissary shall have livers a month , the comptroller livers , the provost livers , his clerk livers , and every one of his men livers . and whereas it would be to no purpose to regulate the souldiers and inferiour officers , without prescribing the order which must be observ'd by the principal officers . the colonels , captains , serj●ants major , lieutenants and ensigns , shall not be allow'd to quit their posts , without leave from their generals , and commanders of the forces , or from your majesty : and in case any shall infringe the said regulation , they shall be cashier'd , degraded of their gentility and arms , if they are gentlemen , or barely cashier'd if they are not , without any prejudice to greater punishments . it will be fit for your majesty to impose this law upon your self , never to grant them any such leave in time of war , without a lawful cause : but when they are in garison , your majesty may be so kind as to grant furlows to a third part of the officers for four months , to the end , that in a years time they may have it all in their turn . if with this good rule , which cannot be thought too austere , even by those who may suffer by it , particular care be taken of the souldiers : if bread be given them all the year round , six musters and a suit of cloathes : if the military missions be continued which were practis'd in . to prevent their falling sick : if when they are ill , hospitals be provided to follow the army in all places , as it was done in the said year , and a livelyhood secur'd for those who shall be maim'd in the king's service , in the commandery of st. lewis design'd to that end ; i dare answer , that the infantry of this kingdom will be well disciplin'd for the future . * it will be the same with the horse , if raising them with the same order , ( which i do not repeat , to avoid a tedious narration ) every trooper be obliged to keep two horses for service and a sumpter : if they are made to observe the ordinances rigorously , which oblige them never to be without arms : and if in time of peace they are put in garison in close places , to prevent the disorders which it is impossible to secure the people against , when souldiers are quarter'd in the open countrey . they have behav'd themselves so ill in these last wars ; that in case they should remain in the same condition , they would be no longer fit for any service . the true cause of their decay is the vast number that has been rais'd in these latter times , to oppose the cavalry of foreigners who make all sorts of men troopers indifferently . for which reason it has been impossible to raise them among the gentrey of courage and activity as formerly , and the officers have been oblig'd to take not only old souldiers , but also raw young men of all conditions , whose courage or strength had never been try'd . if in imitating strangers who receive all sorts of men in their cavalry , ours had learnt also to support fatigues as well as theirs , tho' they had lost part of their ancient valour , which made them recommendable , we should have some reason to comfort our selves ; but the inconstancy and love of ease which reigns almost among all conditions in our nation , having quite alter'd them ; they have lost the best qualification they had without acquiring that which they had not . tho' physicians esteem the cure of a distemper in a very fair way , when the cause of it is known ; i own that notwithstanding the source and reason of the evil in question be known , the cure is nevertheless very difficult . if none but gentlemen are admitted into the cavalry , it will be impossible to raise a sufficient number of them , to oppose that of the enemies ; and if all sorts of men be receiv'd among them , it is impossible they should be such as history represents the french horse . the only expedient that can be taken in my opinion , in this extremity , is to exhort the captains to get as many gentlemen in their troops as can be got , to make an order that none of them shall be admitted to muster , unless one half of them are gentlemen . to oblige all those of that birth being years of age , to bear arms , declaring them incapable of any imployments or dignities , unless they have actually served three years in your majesty's forces . to forbid all officers of horse to list any souldiers in their troops , not being gentlemen , unless they be above years of age , and have born arms in the foot at least three years . finally , to cause the ancient military orders to be put rigorously in execution , which ordains all troopers who shall abandon their commander in a combat , to be disarm'd upon the bare knowledge of the said fault . if this regulation is religiously observ'd , i do not doubt , but the french horse will regain its former reputation , and your majesty's infantry and cavalry being well disciplin'd , you will be able to boast your being strong in arms , at any time whatever , and in a condition to give your subjects in time of peace as much safety as terror to your enemies . it now remains to know whether this state will be able to bear the expence of so great a body of men , as that which i have drawn a project of . which will be examin'd hereafter . in the mean time tho' there is reason to hope that by means of so useful a regulation , and so easie to be observ'd , as that which i propose , the armies will subsist for the future , according to our wishes ; or at least that they will behave themselves a great deal better than heretofore ; i will nevertheless make six remarks which will be the more necessary in a great war , in that prudence requires many expedients in important affairs , that men may never fall short of their measures . * the first is , that in order to have effectual men , it is necessary to raise a hundred , reckoning upon a regiment of companies which ought to consist of a hundred men , only as a thousand . the second , that it is necessary to refresh armies often by new levies , without which though they are strong upon the rolls , they will be weak in effect . the third , that such refreshments ought rather to be made by frequent recruits of old regiments , which must be preserv'd tho' absolutely decay'd , than by raising of new ones , which nevertheless must be done on certain pressing occasions , because souldiers love to list themselves under new officers . the fourth , that when forces are ruin'd , it is better to pay them on the foot on which they are , than to disband them , because it is impossible to do it without losing excellent officers and good souldiers . i am sensible , that the remaining souldiers may be put into other regiments . but it is not practicable , the kindness souldiers have for their captains , giving them a pretence to retire , or at least of covering their inconstancy in so doing . i am also sensible that in reforming regiments , one might imitate the spaniards who do not only initiate the souldiers into old regiments , but the officers also . but tho' it be easie to resolve upon such an order , no severity will be sufficient to put it in execution ; the ambitious , inconsiderate humour of our nation , not permitting them to suffer themselves to be commanded , after having commanded , whatever advantage they might receive by such an obedience , the fifth , that it is absolutely impossible in wars which require extraordinary efforts , to pay the musters of the forces that are rais'd regularly , as it may be done in an enterprize which do's not exceed the power of a state : but in such a case these : two expedients may serve to remedy such a defect , the first consists in making so good a provision that the souldiers may never want bread. the second , to oblige the commanders , who being satisfyed , have too much interest to preserve the men under their command , not to use their utmost endeavours in order thereunto ; whereas when they are misus'd their complaints and negligence give way to the licentiousness of their souldiers , and give them a desire to run away , tho otherwise they would not think on 't of their own accord . however i must not forget to observe , that to do . well , it is necessary to make three musters , during the campaign , besides five months of vvinter quarters which the forces must have regularly . and whereas nothing is more material towards the subsistance of armys , and the success of all the designs that can be undertaken , than to take such measures that provision may never fail them . i add for the sixth remark , that the said care is one of the chief that is to be taken , and that oeconomy and policy are the chief qualifications of generals . armys hardly fight once in a year : but they must live daily , and subsist with order ; which cannot be done without an extraordinary oeconomy , and policy . history affords us the example of more armys that have perished for want of bread , and policy , than by the effort of the enemys arms ; and i am a faithful witness , that all the enterprizes which have been made in my dayes , have only miscarry'd upon that account . those who have no experience , commonly think they have done all when they have rais'd armys , and provided for their pay ; but let them be paid never so well , unless they are in a place where they may live conveniently , their money is of no use to them , and cannot hinder them from perishing . therefore i must needs say , that it is dangerous to rely upon the faith of a purveyor who obliges himself to provide all the bread of an army . the life of such men is too poor a security for the mischief their negligence may occasion , to rely upon their faith. the care of the provisions ought to be committed to persons of quality , of known vigilancy fidelity and capacity , since the welfare of armys and often of states depends upon it . no men can be too great to be imploy'd in such places . * in order not to be mistaken in our reckoning , in putting an army on foot , the provisions must be settled so , that every regiment of a thousand men may have . waggons to carry bread for a fortnight which is partly as much as is required for a considerable enterprize : moreover it is necessary to have a hundred or two , over and above the common calculation , otherwise one might fall short . special care must also be taken to carry mills and ovens , for tho commonly the use of them is not good , yet it is necessary to have some , to make use of them in certain places in which it would otherwise be impossible to subsist , and in which it may happen that a stay of four days may give the enemys a great advantage , over an army which wants provision . as the least things ought to be consider'd in great designs , the general of an army must take a particular care of every thing belonging to his train . he must know that a cart is not so cumbersom as a waggon which turns with more ease in narrow passes ; but on the other hand that they are sooner overthrown , and that the overturning of one is capable to stop a train a long while . therefore it behoves him to consider the places he is to march through , to make use of the one or of the other , according as he will think it most proper . he must also know that there are two ways of carrying the bread , either in carriages which are very heavy and cumbersom , or in carts plaited on the sides and cover'd with cere cloths which are more convenient . after these six remarks , i have only two councels to give to those who command our armys . the first is , always to be the first in the field , because it is difficult for an army , tho never so considerable to make any progress , when they find another ready to oppose them , and often very easy for those that come first into the field to secure a good success . the second is to attack , when it may be done without rashness , rather than to stand upon the defensive ; by reason that , besides that he who has the boldness to attack gives some impression of fear to him he attacks , the impatient and inconstant temper of the french , is as unfit for the defensive part , as their fire and first eagerness qualifys them to perform their duty in the first . experience makes me speak thus , and i am persuaded that those who are perfect commanders will say the same . section . v : of naval power . the power of arms do's not only require that the king should be strong a shore , but also potent at sea. when anthony perez was receiv'd in france by the late king your father , and that in order to soften his misery he had secured him a good pension : that stranger being desirous to express his gratitude to that great king , and to show him that tho he was unfortunate he was not ungrateful , gave him three councels in three words which are of no small consideration , roma , consejo , pielago . the advice of this old spaniard consummated in affairs ; is not so much to be looked upon for the authority of him that gave it , as for its own weight . we have already mention'd the care princes ought to take to have a good council , and to be authorised at rome , it now remains to show how it behoves the king to be potent at sea. the sea is , of all heritages that in which soveraigns pretend to have the greatest share , and yet it is that on which the rights of every body are least agreed upon . the empire of that element was never well secur'd to any . it has been subject to divers revolutions according to the inconstancy of its nature , so subject to the wind that it submits to him who courts it most , and whose power is so unbounded that he is in a condition to possess it with violence against all those who might dispute it with him . in a word , the old titles of that dominion are force and not reason , a prince must be powerful to pretend to that heritage . to proceed with order and method in this point , we must consider the ocean and the mediterranian seperately , and make a distinction between the ships which are of use in both those seas , and of the gallies , the use of which is only good in that which nature seems to have reserv'd expresly betwixt the lands to expose it to less storms , and to give it more shelter . a great state must never be in a condition to receive an injury without being able to revenge it . and therefore england being situated as it is , unless france is powerful in ships , the english may attempt whatever they please to our prejudice , without the least fear of a return . they might hinder our fishing , disturb our trade , and in blocking up the mouth of our great rivers , exact what toll they please from our merchants . they might land without danger in our islands , and even on our coasts . finally , the situation of the native countrey of that haughty nation , not permitting them to fear the greatest land-forces , the ancient envy they have against this kingdom , would apparently encourage them to dare every thing , should our weakness not allow us to attempt some thing to their prejudice . their insolence in the late king your father's time towards the duke of scily , obliges us to put our selves in a posture never to suffer the like again . that duke being chosen by henry the great for an extraordinary embassy into england , embarking at callis in a french ship with the french flag on the main top mast , was no sooner in the channel , but meeting a yacht which came to receive him , the commander of it commanded the french ship to strike . the duke thinking his quality would secure him from such an affront , refus'd it boldly ; but his refusal being answer'd with three cannon shot with bullets , which piercing his ship , pierc'd the heart of the french ; force constrain'd him to do , what reason ought to have secur'd him from , and whatever complaints he could make , he could get no other reason from the english captain , than that as his duty oblig'd him to honour his quality of ambassador , it oblig'd him also to compel others to pay that respect to his master's flag , which was due to the soveraign of the sea. if king james's words prov'd more civil , yet they produc'd no other effect than to oblige the duke to seek for satisfaction in his own prudence , feigning himself cur'd , when his pain was most smarting , and his wound incurable . the king your father was oblig'd to dissemble on that occasion ; but with this resolution another time to maintain the right of his crown by the force , which time would give him means to acquire at sea. i represent this great prince to my mind projecting in that occurence , what your majesty must now put in execution . reason obliges to take an expedient , which without ingaging any of the crowns , may contribute towards the preservation of the good understanding which is desirable among the princes of christendom . among many that might be propos'd , the following are in my opinion the most practicable . it might be agreed upon , that french ships meeting english ships upon the coast of england , should salute first , and strike the flag ; and that when english ships should meet french ships upon the french coast , they should pay them the same honors , on condition that when the english and french fleets should meet beyond the coasts of both kingdoms , they should both steer their course without any ceremony , only sending out their respective long-boats to hail each other , coming no neerer than within cannon shot . it might also be agreed upon , that without having any respect to the coasts of france or england , the greater number of men of war should be saluted by the smaller , either in striking the flag or otherwise . whatever expedient is found out on that subject , provided it be equal on all parts , it will be just : if your majesty is strong at sea , that which is reasonable , will be thought so by the english who are so much blinded on that subject , that they know no equity but force . the advantages the spaniards , who are proud of being our enemies at present , derive from the indies , oblige them to be strong on the ocean . the reason of a sound policy does not allow us to be weak there ; but it obliges us to be in a condition to oppose the designs they might have against us , and to cross their enterprizes . if your majesty be potent at sea , the just apprehension spain will lay under of your attacking their forces , the only source of their subsistance : of your making a descent on their coasts , which have upwards of six hundred leagues circumference : your surprising some of their places , which are all weak , and in great number : that just apprehension , i say , will oblige them to be so powerful at sea , and to keep such strong garisons , that the major part of the revenue of the indies will be consumed in charges , to preserve the whole , and if the remainder suffices to preserve their states , at last it will produce this advantage , that they will no longer he able to trouble their neighbours , as they have done hitherto . * had your majesty been as weak as your predecessors , you could not have reduc'd to ashes , in the midst of the waters , all the forces spain could assemble in . on the ocean . that proud haughty nation , could not have been constrain'd to suffer the checking of their pride , not only within sight of italy , but also before the eyes of all christendom , which seeing the isles of st. marguerits and of st. honorat snatch'd out of their hands by open force , whereas they had only got them by surprize , has beheld at once and with the same eye , the shame of that insolent nation , and the glory and reputation of yours . you could not finaly have fought that famous combat of the gallies , on the seas of genoa , which striking your enemies with terror , increas'd the love and esteem of your allies , and imprinted so much reverence in the indifferent , that the weight of respect ingag'd them absolutely on your side . your majesty having allies so distant from this kingdom , that it is impossible to have any communication with them but by sea , if they found france destitute of necessary means to succor them on certain occasions , it would be easie for those who are enemies of the happiness of both sides , to sow the same division in the minds , which is between the states ; whereas your naval forces being considerable , tho' divided as to place , they will remain strictly united in heart and affection to this state. nature seems to have offer'd the empire of the sea to france , by the advantagious situation of her two coasts , equally provided with excellent havens , on the ocean , and on the mediterranean . britanny alone contains the finest in the ocean ; and provence , which has but miles extent , has many larger and safer than spain and italy together . the separation of the states , which form the body of the spanish monarchy , renders the preservation of them so difficult , that spain has no other way to keep them in some union , than by keeping a great number of ships on the ocean , and of gallies in the mediterranean , which by their continual going backwards and forwards , may in some measure preserve the union between the members and the head , transporting to and fro whatever is necessary for their subsistance ; as orders for whatever is to be undertaken , officers to command , souldiers to execute , money , which is not only the sinew of war , but also the fat of peace ; from whence it follows , that obstructing the liberty of such passages , those states which cannot subsist of themselves , can never be able to avoid confusion , weakness , and all the desolations wherewith god threatens a divided kingdom . and whereas the western coast of this kingdom , separates spain from all the territories possess'd by their king in italy , so the providence of god , which will keep an even balance , seems to have been pleas'd to separate the territories of spain , by the situation of france , to weaken them by their division . if your majesty constantly keeps forty good men of war well rigg'd and equip'd , ready to put our to sea on all occasions , that number will be sufficient to secure you against all injuries , and to make you fear'd on all the seas , by those who have hitherto despis'd your forces there . as men of war are necessary to that end in the ocean , gallies which are light ships , and can make great courses with their oars in calms , which are more usual in the mediterranian than elsewhere , are as useful in the levant . with thirty gallies your majesty will not only balance the power of spain , which by the assistance of their allies can put fifty in a body , but you will overcome them by the reason of union , which reodubles the power of the forces it unites . as your gallies may remain in a body , either at marseilles or toulon , they will always be in a condition to oppose the conjunction of those of spain , which are so much separated by the situation of this kingdom , that they cannot assemble without passing in sight of the ports , and roads of provence , and even sometimes without anchoring there , by reason of the storms which surprize them half way the chanel , which those light ships are not able to bear without great hazard , in a troublesome passage in which they are very frequent . the gulph of leon is the most dangerous passage in all the seas of the levant ; the inconstancy and contrariety of the winds , which commonly reign there , render the passage of it very difficult , whatever way it is undertaken . all stormy weather is very dangerous there , and unless our coasts are favourable to those who pass by them , they seldom have a safe passage . the true reason of the hazard of this passage , proceeds from the contrariety of winds , occasion'd by divers aspects of the coasts . the more a coast is mountainous and elevated , the more it raises winds , when the heat of the ground is oppos'd by the coldness and moisture of the water , or of the snow it is covered with . this is the reason that the coasts of provence which are of this nature , being ever moisten'd during the winter with rain or snow , are never free from wind , which blowing from the shore , are always contrary to those who have a mind to land there . and tho' those winds are contrary to the approach of vessels , yet they are not strong enough to carry them back to the places from whence they come , because they commonly meet with other shore winds which drive them back again ; in so much that the contrariety of winds from our coasts , and from those of spain , force the ships into the gulph , where generally by tempestuous weather their ruine proves inevitable . all ships and gallies going from spain into italy , always set sail from the cape of quiers , and from the gulph of roses , and commonly tarry for a werstern and north-west wind , safely to reach the coast of genoa , or morgues which is their first landing place ; but tho' they put out with a fair wind , it changes as soon as they come to the gulph . if the wind turns to the s. w. or s. s. w. they must of necessity make for the coast of provence , and if it turns to the south east and by east , it is impossible for the gallies and ships which are near our coasts , either to reach italy , or to turn back to spain , and in hard weather it is a miracle if they are not lost on the banks of our coasts . on the other hand , the ships which go from italy into spain , set sail commonly from morgues , which is the last port of italy . in order to have a good passage , they tarry for a north west and northerly wind , but they are never half way the gulph , before the weather changes , and without their being in peril ; because a south east or a southern storm renders their loss inevitable , unless our ports are open to receive them . therefore france being strong in gallies and in gallions , they can have no certain passage , since they can never undertake to make the middle of the chanel in the winter time , without running the hazard of being lost , either on our coasts , or in barbary , if the wind turns wholly to the north. and even when the north east and by nore drives them towards majorca and minorca , and the north west and by nore drives them into corsica and sardinia , the violence of the storms often breaks and destroys them before they can reach the shelter of the isles that are favourable to them . and if to avoid that peril they resolve to tarry for a fair wind to sail along our shores , it will not happen once in thirty times , that they will pass safely , without striking by some ill weather , within our sight . and tho' they should meet with such favourable winds , as to escape all the dangers of the sea , tho least advice we have of their passage , will enable us to cross it , the more easily , in that we may always put out to sea , and put in again without peril , whenever the weather threatens us , by reason of the neighbourhood of our ports , which they dare not come near . thirty gallies will offord your majesly this advantage , and if to such a body you add gallions , true citadels of the sea , formidable to gallies , when they have a favourable wind , because their body bears no proportion to the weakness of those light ships , and that they are not afraid of them even in the greatest calms , by reason that being provided with as good guns as their * coursiers , they are capable to do them a great deal of harm if they come too near them . tho the king of spain should increase his forces of one half in that sea , which he cannot do without a great expence , he would not be in a condition to repair the harm we could do him , by reason of the union of our forces and the division of his . such a body may attempt any thing , it may attack the spanish armies in their ports , when they are assembling there , experience having convinc'd us in the retaking the isles of st. marguerit and st. honorat , that floating fortresses , prevail over the most secure of the sea , when men know how to use them boldly . by this means your majesty will preserve the liberty of the princes of italy , who have been hitherto as it were , slaves to the king of spain . you will incourage those who have endeavour'd to cast off the yoke of that tyranny , which they only bear because they cannot free themselves from it , and foment the faction of those who are frenchmen in their hearts . the late king your father , having order'd monsieur d' alincourt to make reproaches to the great duke ferdinand , for having made a new engagement with spain , notwithstanding the aliance he had contracted with him , by the marriage of the queen your mother : the great duke after having given a patient hearing to what he said to him upon that subject ; made an answer which signify'd much in few words , and which must be consider'd by your majesty and by your successors ; had the king had forty gallies at marselles , i would not have done what i have done . the passage pignerol gives your majesty into italy , being well preserv'd , if you open another by sea , time and the steadiness which will be observ'd in your councils , the inconstancy of which is fear'd upon the account of the levity of our nation , will alter the hearts of many italians , or rather will incourage them to shew what they have been all along . italy is look'd upon as the heart of the world , and indeed it is the noblest part of the empire of the spaniards , it is the place where they dread most be be attack'd and troubl'd , and that in which it is most easie to obtain great advantages over them , provided we go about it as we should do . and consequently , tho' one had no design to do them any harm , nevertheless it is necessary to be in a condition to give them a counter-stab so near the heart whenever they shall attempt any thing against france , that their arms may no longer have strength enough to attempt any malicious designs against us . that force will not only keep spain in awe , but it will oblige the grand seignior and his subjects who only measure the power of distant kings , by that which they have at sea , to be more careful than they have been hitherto , to keep the treaties they made with them . algier , tunis , and all the coast of barbary , will respect and fear your power , whereas , they have despis'd it hitherto with an incredible infidelity . in that case the barbarians will either live willingly in peace with your majest's subjects , or if they are not so wise as to do it , they will be compell'd to do that by force , which they have refused to do by reason . whereas at present tho' we think we have no war with them , we receive all the evils of it , and we neither enjoy peace , nor the advantage we oughtto reap by it ; we will find calm and safety in war , which is very advantageous with menwhose natural infidility is so great , that there is no way to avoid it but by force . it now remains to examine the expence , which will be necessary for the maintenance of the number of ships above projected , which tho never so great will be inconsiderable in comparison of the advantages we will receive by it ; and yet it may be done with two millions and five hundered thousand livers , according as it will appear by the settlement which will be inserted at the end of this work. section . vi. which treats of trade , as a dependency of the power of the sea , and specifies those which aremost conveniens . it is a common but a very true saying , that as states often are inlarg'd by war , so they are commonly inriched in time of peace by trade . the wealth of the hollanders , which properly speaking are only a handful of men reduc'd into a corner of the earth , in which there is nothing but waters and meadows , is an example and proof of the usefulness of trade , which admits of no contestation . tho that country produces nothing but butter and cheese . yet they furnish all the nations of europe with the greatest part of what is necessary to them . navigation has made them so famous , and so powerful throughout the whole world : that after having made themselves masters of the trade of the east indies , to the prejudice of the portugueze who had been long settled there ; they have cut out a great deal of work for the spaniards in the west indies , where they injoy the major part of brasil . as in england the greatest part of those whose circumstances are the least easy maintain themselves by common fisherys the most considerable drive a greater trade in all the parts of the world , by the manufactures of their cloth , and by the sale of lead , tynn , and sea cole , which are productions of their country . the kingdom of china , the entrance into which is allow'd to no body , is the only country in which that nation has no place settled for their trade . the city of genoa which only abounds in rocks makes so good a use of its trade , that i may safely affirm that it is the richest city in italy , if the succors of spain . * — france only abounding too much within it self , has hitherto neglected trade , tho they are as conveniently seated for it as their neighbours , and might free themselves of the assistance they receive from them on that account at their own cost . the fisheries of the ocean are the easiest , and most useful commerce , which can be made in this kingdom . it is the more necessary , in that there is no state in the world so well peopled as france . that the number of those who are out of the road to heaven , is very inconsiderable compar'd to the catholics , who living under the laws of the roman church , abstain the third part of the year from the use of meat . and that none of the dispensations practised in spain are used there , to eat meat at all times under a specious pretence . trade will be the easyer for us , in that we have a great number of sea men , who heitherto have been oblig'd to seek out imployment among our enemyes , having none at home , and we have made no other use of them hitherto but to get salt fish and herrings . but having wherewith to imploy our mariners , instead of being constrained to strengthen our enemies , by weakning our selves , we will be able to carry into spain and other countrys , that which they have hitherto brought to us , by the assiistance of our men who serve them . france is so fertile in corn , so abounding in wine , flax and hemp to make cloth and riggings so necessary for navigation , that spain , england , and all other neighbouring states , must have recourse thither . and provided we know how to improve the advantages which nature has given us , we will get money of those who have occasion for our goods , without troubling our selves much with their commoditys which are of little use to us . spanish , english and dutch cloths , are only superfluous ; we may make them as good as theirs , getting wool from spain as they doe . moreover we may have them more conveniently , upon the account of our corn , and linen cloths , if we will exchange them to make a double gain . * our kings having made a shift with draps de berry , we may very well make a shift now with draps de sceau , and de meunier or millers cloth , which are now made in france , without having recourse to those that are made abroad , the use of which will be abolish'd by this means , as well as the serges of chalons and of chartres have abolish'd those of milan . and indeed the draps de sceau are insomuch request in the levant , that next to those of venice made with spanish wool , the turks preferr them to all others ; and the citys of marselles , and of lyons ▪ have heitherto driven a very great trade in them france is industrious enough , not to stand in need of the best manufactures of our neighbours such fine plushes are made at tours , that they are sent into spain , italy and other foreign countrys , the plain tafetas which are made there also , are so much in vogue throughout france , that there is no need to look for any elsewhere . red , purple and spotted velvets , are made finer there now than at genoa : it is also the only place in which silk serges are made . mohair is made as good there as in england ; the finest cloths of gold are made finer there , and cheaper than in italy so that we may easily forbear that trade , which only serves to foment our laziness , and to feed our pride , to stick solidly to that which may increase our wealth , and imploy our mariners , insomuch that our neighbours may not improve our labours at their cost . over and above those above specify'd which are the best in the ocean , many others may be made . the skinners trade of canada is the more necessary , because there is no need of carrying money there , and that they take such commodities in exchange , as scizzer-cases , knives , small pen-knives , needles , pins , bills , hatchets , watches , hat-bands , points , and other sorts of mercery wares . that of the coast of guiny in africa , in which the portgueze have long possess'd a place call'd castel de mine , which the hollanders of the west-india ▪ company have taken from them within these or years is of the same nature , in that the only goods exported there , are pedlars wares , canvass and course linen cloths , in exchange of which the negroes give golden powder . the merchants of roans have formerly driven a trade of linen and woolen cloths in the kingdom of fez and of morrocco , by means of which they got a great deal of gold. were the king's subjects strong in shipping , they might ingross all the trade of the north , which the dutch have got , by reason that the north standing absolutely in need of wine , vinegar , and brandy-wine , of chesnuts , of pruens , and of nuts ; all commodities in which the kingdom abounds , and which cannot be consum'd in it , it is easie to make a considerable trade of them , and the better in that returns may be made of wood , of copper , of pitch and tar ; things not only useful for our selves , but necessary for our neighbours , who can not get them from them without our goods , unless they will lose the fraight of their ships in going thither . i do not enter into the particulars of the trade which may be driven in the east-indies , and in persia , by reason that the humour of the french being so hasty , that they will see the effects of their desires as soon as they have conceiv'd them : long voyages are not suitable with their temper . however as abundance of silks and carpets are brought from persia , many curiosities from china ▪ and all manner of spices from divers places in those parts of the world , which are of great use to us , that trade is not to be neglected . to make a good settlement , it would be necessary to send two or three ▪ ships into the east , commanded by persons of quality , prudence , and wisdom , with patents and necessay powers , to treat with those princes , and to make allyances with the people on all sides , as the portugueze , english , and dutch have done . this design would succeed the better , by reason that those who have taken a footing in those nations , are very much hated by them at present , either because they have deceiv'd them , or because they have subdued them by force . as to the west , there is no great trade to be expected there , drake , thomas cavendish , sperberg , l'hermite , le maire , and the late count maurice , who sent twelve ships thither of tuns , on purpose to trade there , either by way of friendship , or by force , not having been able to make any settlements there ; there is but little to be hop'd for on that side , unless a military force be sent thither to take possession of the places spain possesses there at present . the little isles of st. christopher , and others seated at the head of the indies may yield some tobacco , some skins , and other things of small consequence . there now remains to know what may be done in the mediterranean . trade of the mediteranean . memorial of the different trades driven in the levant . napoli de romania . the french carry some goods there and money , and bring back silks , goats leather , wool , wax , and cheese , part of which is destributed and sold in italy . satalia . the french only carry money there , and bring back cotton , wax , and all manner of goat skins . smyrna . the french carry more goods there than money , abundance of merchandise going off there , for chio , the archipelago and constantinople . the goods carry'd there , are paper , caps , draps de paris , and of languedoc , brasil wood , cutchaneal , spices , satins made at lyons ; and sometimes they bring back persian silks , and rubarbs , which the persians bring thither , cottons spun into thred , wax , mastick , and course carpets . scala nova . sometimes our ships take in wheat and legumes there . constantinople . the french carry abundance of goods there , which are the same that are carry'd to smyrna , excepting gold , silver , and silk stuffs , and very seldom money ; they bring back leather and wool , there being nothing else ; and often not finding commodities for the goods that have been sold there , they are oblig'd to send the said money to smyrna to be imploy'd there , or else it is remitted by bills of exchange to aleppo , there are always abundance of goods to be bought there to carry into christendom . isle of cyprus . in which there are divers ports ; money is carry'd thither , some cloths and caps ; and in return we take cotton spun into thred , silks made in the said isles , and some drugs . alexandria and the port of aleppo . abundance of merchandice and money are carry'd thither from france . those goods are the same which are carry'd to smyrna . and ●ast quantities of silks and drugs are taken in there , all sorts of cottons , oak-apples , goat skins , which they stile of the levant , red , yellow , and blue , callicos , and sometimes indian goods , which are brought there from persia . before the english , and dutch went into the indies , all persian silks , drugs , and other goods were brought to aleppo , from whence they were brought to marseilles , and from thence they were afterwards sold throughout france , england , holland and germany . and now the said english and hollanders , have taken away the said trade from us , and do not only furnish all france with persian goods , but also with those they buy on the grand seignior's territories , which they carry through persia to goa , where they lade . the goods that are brought from the levant , are dispos'd of in sicily , naples , genoa , leghorn , majorca , and throughout spain , flanders , and germany . seyda , the port of tripoly , barut , and st. john d'acre . the french carry some commodities thither , and for the most part money ; they bring back from thence silks , spun cottons , ashes to make soap , drugs which come from damascus , sometimes they take in rice , and when they have a good crop of wheat , they suffer our ships to take lading of it . alexandria , the port of aegypt and grand cairo . the french carry several french commodities thither , as cloth , paper , brasil , cochaneal ; but more money than goods ; they take in their natron , drugs of divers sorts , and most of the goods which sell in italy or in spain . formerly all sorts of spices were brought to alexandria through the red sea , which were carry'd to marseilles ; but now the english and hollanders go into the indies , we must buy them of them . tunis . wine is transported thither from marseilles , hony , tartar , cloth , paper , and other goods , and seldom any money , and leather and wax is taken in there . algiers and the adjacent ports . the same commodities are often carry'd thither from marseiles which are carry'd to tunis , and leather and wax , are also brought from thence . i own i have been long deceiv'd in the trade the proveneals drive in the levant . i was of opinion with many others , that the said trade was prejudicial to the state , thinking according to the common notion of the world , that it exhausted the money of the kingdom , in exchange of goods no wise useful , and only fit to indulge the luxuriousness of our nation . but having made an exact enquiry into the nature of that trade , condemn'd by the publick voice , i have alter'd my opinion upon such solid grounds , that whoever will know them , will certainly think i have done it with reason . it is certain that we stand in absolute need of most of the commodities of the levant , as silks , cottons , wax , goat skins , rubarb , and several other drugs which are necessary to us . it is also certain that if we do not fetch them , strangers will bring them to us , and get the profit , we might get our selves . it is likewise certain that we do not carry near so much money into the levant , as french commodities : our hemp , our linen cloath , our timber to build ships are in greater request there than money . those who understand the trade of the levant , know that the money which is carry'd thither , is not of the growth of france , but spain , from whence we draw it by the trafick of those very commodities we bring from the levant ; which is very observable . they are moreover sensible that the more the city of marseilles trades into the levant , the richer it is in money . that the silks and spun cotton which are the principal commodities which come from the levant , are wrought in france ; and from thence transported into foreign countries , with a profit of cent. per cent. upon the buying of the said manufacture . that the said trade maintains a vast number of workmen , and that it preserves us . that it imploys abundance of seamen , useful in time of peace , and necessary in war. finally , that the customs of the said trade amounnt to a great deal of money . and therefore it is evident that the said trade is not only advantageous , but absolutely necessary . whatever advantages may accrue by the trade of the two sea● the french will never apply themselves to it with delight , unless the means appear as easie to them , as the end is useful . one of the best expedients to incourage them for their own good , is that your majesty would be pleas'd yearly to sell them some of your ships at an easie rate , on condition that they shall imploy them for trade , and not sell them out of the kingdom . this medium applying a remedy to their impatience , which does not permit them to tarry for the building of a ship , to make use of it , will be the more agreeable to them , in that it will enable them to reap almost as soon as they have sown . beside the profit that will thereby accrue to private persons , the state will receive a considerable advantage by such an order ; by reason that the merchants will be very considerable in six years time by the number of their ships , and in a condition to assist the kingdom in case of need , as it is practis'd in england , where the king makes use of his subjects ships , in time of war , without which he would not be so powerful at sea , as he is . moreover the number of ships your majesty designs to keep , will not be lessen'd by it , since the publick docks you have been pleas'd to re-establish , will furnish you yearly as many as you please . there is no state in europe fitter to build ships than this kingdom , abounding in hemp , linen cloth , iron , rigging , and in workmen whom our neigbours commonly debauch from us , because they are not imploy'd at home . the rivers loire and garrone have such convenient places for docks , that nature seems to have design'd them for that use . the cheapness of victuals for the workmen and the conveniencies of divers rivers which disburthen themselves into them , and bring all manner of necessaries , justifie the said proposition . if next to this expedient , your majesty will think fit to grant merchandising some prerogatives to give a rank to merchants , whereas your subjects are oblig'd to obtain it by divers offices , which are only good to maintain their idleness , and to please their wives , you will restore trade to that degree , that every one , and all in general will be advantag'd by it . in fine , if besides those two favours , you will be pleas'd , to take a particular care to clear these two seas from pirates , which may easily be done ; france will soon add to its natural plenty , what trade affords to the most barren countries . six guard ships of two hundred tuns , and six pinnaces well arm'd , will be sufficient to secure the ocean , provided the said ships keep constantly at sea. and in order to secure the sea of the levant , it will also be sufficient to put out to sea yearly towards the month of april , a squadron of ten gallies , steering their course towards the isles of corsica and sardinia , cruising all along the coast of barbary , unto the streights , steering the same course back again , not to come home again until the weather compels them to it , at which time six ships well equip'd shall put out to sea in their room , to perform their caravan in the winter time . section vii . which shows that gold and silver are one of the principal and most necessary supporters of the state ; declares the means to make this kingdom powerful in that kind : shows the revenue of the same at present , and how it may be improv'd for the future , in discharging the people of three parts in four of the burthen which overwhelms them at this time. it is an old saying , that the finances are the sinews of a state ; and it certainly is the point of archimedes which being firmly settled , inables to move all the world. a necessitous prince can never undertake a glorious action , and necessity ingendring contempt . he can never be reduced to that condition without being exposed to the efforts of his enemys and of those who are envious of his grandeur . gold and silver , are the tyrants of the world , and tho' their empire is unjust in it self , it is sometimes so reasonable , that we must suffer the dominion of it ; and sometimes it is so extravagant that it is impossible not to detest the yoke of it , as alltogether insupportable . there must be , as i have already observ'd it , a proportion between what the prince draws from his subjects , and what they can give him , not only without ruining themselves , but without a notable inconvenience . as it is reasonable not to exceed the power of those that give , neither can less be exacted than what the necessity of the state requires . none but pedants , and the real enemys of the state , can say , that a prince ought not to exact any thing from his subjects , and that his sole treasure ought to lay in the hearts of those who are submitted under his dominion . but at the same time , none but flatterers , and the true plagues of the state , and of the court , can insinuate to princes , that they may exact what they please , and that in that case their will is the rule of their power . nothing can be more easy than to find plausible reasons , to raise money even when there is no necessity for it ; neither is any thing less difficult than to produce apearent arguments , to condemn the same tho never so necessary . men must lay aside all passions , to be able to judge , and to decide , what is reasonable on such occasions , and there is no small difficulty to find the certain point of a just proportion . the expences which are absolutely necessary for the subsistance of the state , being fix'd , the less a prince can raise among the people is the best . in order not to be forc'd to raise great summs , it is necessary to spend little , and the best way to make moderate expences , is to banish all profusion , and to condemn whatever may tend to that end . france would be too rich , and the people too abounding , if it did not suffer the dissipation of the public revenue , which other states spend with rule . they lose more , in my opinion , than some kingdoms who pretend some equality with us , commonly spend . a venetian ambassador told me , one day , wittily upon this subject , speaking of the wealth of france , that in order to make us perfectly happy , he only wish'd we knew as well how to spend that well , which we dissipate without reason , as the republic knew how to lay out every quatrain , without waste , and without overmuch husbandry . if it were possible to regulate the appetite of the french , i would think that the best way to manage the king's purse , were to have recourse to that expedient ; but as it is impossible to prescribe bounds to the greediness of our nation , the only way to contain them is to use them as physicians do famish'd patients , whom they constrain to use abstinence , by keeping all manner of victuals from them . to that end it is necessary to reform the finances , by the suppression of the chief means , by which men get money unlawfully out of the king's coffers . among them all , none are so dangerous as that of the * comptans , the abuse of which is grown to that heigth , that not to remedy it , and to ruin the state is one and the same thing . tho it is useful to use them on some occasions , and that it seems necessary in others , nevertheless the great inconveniences , and the abuses which arrise by it do so far surpass their usefulness , that it is absolutely necessary to abolish them . whole millions will be sav'd by this means , and a thousand conceal'd profusions will be redress'd , which it is impossible to discover as long as the secret ways of spending the public treasure will be in use . i am sensible that some will urge that there are some foreign expences , which by their nature must be kept secret , and which the state may receive considerable advantages by , which it will be depriv'd of whenever those in favour of whom they may be made , will think they can get no more money out of them . but so many robberys are committed under that pretence , that i am of opinion upon mature deliberation , that it is better to lose some advantages which may accrue by it , than to be thereby exposed to all the abuses which may be daily committed to the ruin of the state. however not to obstruct the means of making some secret expences to the advantage of the state , a million of gold may be allowed for the said private expences , on condition that the laying of it out shall be sign'd by the king himself , and that those who shall have a share in it , shall give acquittances for the same . if any one urges that these comptans are necessary for the remitments which are in use , i say that it is one of the reasons , for which it is fit to remove them . since men have liv'd in former ages without the aforesaid compians , the same may be done again , and if in laying aside the use of them , the use of farming were also abrogated , instead of doing any harm , it will do a great deal of good . some perhaps may wonder , why , since i know the use of the * comptans to be of ill consequence , i did not retrench it in my time . the great henry was sensible of the evil establish'd in his predecessor's time , and could not remove it . the troubles , and intestine broils , the foreign wars , and consequently the great expences , and the extraordinary farms the king has been oblig'd to make and to let out to raise money , have not permitted the thinking on the execution of so good an advice . the ruining the huguenot party , abating the pride of the grandees , maintaining a great war against powerful enemys , in order to secure the future . tranquillity of the state by a good peace , are all means which have been used to reach the ends proposed , since that is the way to remove the causes of the toleration of those abuses . the subject of the comptains , having given me an occasion to speak of the letting out of extraordinary farms , i cannot forbear saying that the great augmentations of the revenue , which may be made that way are so far from being advantageous to the state , that on the contrary they are very prejudicial , and inpoverish it , instead of inriching it . perhaps this proposition may be looked upon at first as a paradox ; but it is impossible to examin it carefully , without discovering the justice and truth thereof . the king's revenue can only be increas'd by the augmentation of the impositions which are laid on all sorts of commoditys , and therefore it is evident that increasing the revenue that way , expences are increased at the same time , since those things must be bought dearer , which were bought cheaper before . if meat grows dearer , if the price of stufs , and of other things rises , the souldiers will not be able to maintain themselves , and consequently it will be necessary to augment their pay , and the salary of all workmen will be greater than it was before , which will make the increase of the expence answerable to the augmentation of the revenue and tho it will be a great grievance to the people , the prince will be but very little the better for it . poor gentlemen whose estates consist in land will not improve their revenue by such impositions ; the fruits of the earth , will hardly rise in price , at least for their advantage , and if the times make them dear the less of them will be sold , so that at the year's end , the poor gentry will find no augmentation in their revenue , tho a very considerable one in their expences , by reason that the new subsidys will raise the price of all those things which are necessary for the maintenance of their families , which they will make shift to maintain at home , tho' poorly , but they will be no longer able to send their children into the armies , to serve their king and country , according to the obligation of their birth . if it be true , as it is most certain , that the sale of those commodities which your subjects deal in , diminishes according to the increase of impositions , it may happen that such augmentations will lessen your majesties duties instead of increasing them . if we consider such as are imploy'd in the kingdom , it is certain that when goods are at a reasonable price , people buy , and really spend more , than when the price of them is excessive , for then they retrench even those which are most necessary . if on the other hand we consider those commodities which are carry'd out of the kingdom , it is plain that foreigners who have hitherto been incourag'd to buy them because they were cheap , will provide their stores elsewhere , if they can better themselves , which will leave france abounding in the fruirs of the earth , but unprovided of money : whereas the impositions being moderate , the great quantity of fruits which will be exported by foreigners , will recompense the loss some may fancy by the moderation of subsidies . moreover the increase of impositions is capable to reduce a considerable number of the king's subjects to idleness , since it is certain that the major part of the poor people and workmen imploy'd in manusactures , will rather be idle and do nothing , than consume their whole life in an ungrateful useless labour , if the unreasonableness of the subsidies hindering the sale of the fruits of the earth , and of their labour , hinders them at the same time from receiving what they have earn'd by the sweat of their body . to resume the thred of my discourse , after having condemn'd the abuse of the * comtans , and demonstrated that the augmentation of subsidies , is sometimes not only uselss , but often prejudicial ; i say that there ought to be a geometrical proportion between the subsidies and the necessities of the state , that is , that no impositions ought to be made but such as are absolutely necessary for the subsistance of the kingdom , in its grandeur and glory . those last words signifie much , since they show not only that it is lawful to raise that upon the people which is requisite to preserve the kingdom whatever condition it may be in , but also to raise that which may be necessary to maintain it with lustre and reputation . nevertheless care must be taken not to extend those last conditions so far , as to think that the prince's bare will should be , under that pretence , the rule of those impositions , reason must be the only rule in those cases ; and if the prince exceeds those bounds , exacting more from his subjects than he ought to do , tho' even in that case they owe him obedience , he will be answerable for it before god , who will call him to a strict account for the same . moreover reason and policy , can never allow the increasing of the peoples burthen , to receive no benefit by it : those that do it , draw publick maledictions upon their heads , which are attended with very ill consequences , since it is certain that the prince who exacts more than he should do from his subjects , only exhausts their love and fidelity , which are far more necessary towards the subsistance of the state , and the perservation of his person , than the gold and silver he may hoard in his coffers . i am very sensible that in a great state it is always necessary to have a fund to supply unexpected occasions ; but that fund must be proportion'd to the riches of the state , and to the quantity of the coyn'd gold and silver which is in the kingdom ; and unless it be regulated by that , the riches of the prince , would prove his poverty , since his subjects would no longer have any fund themselves , either to keep up trading , or to pay the lawful duties they owe their sovereign . as a prince ought to be careful to lay up money to supply the necessities of the state , and religious in preserving it , when there is no necessity to lay it out , he must be liberal in imploying it when publick good requires it , and in doing it in due time ; for delays in such cases are often dangerous to the state , and time thus lost , is never to be retriev'd . we have examples of princes who to preserve their money , have lost both it and their states together , and it is most certain that those who lay out their money with regret , commonly spend more than others , because they do it too late : it requires a great deal of judgment to know the most important hours and moments , and some may be capable to lay up , who not knowing how to lay out , may occasion unutterable misfortunes . but whereas general maxims are always useless , unless a proper application be made of them ; there now remains to see , what the revenue of this kingdom may amount to . what the expence of it may be . what fund is necessary to be kept in the coffers ▪ and to what degree the people may be eas'd . the revenue of this kingdom may be consider'd in two respects . either as it may be in time of peace , without altering the advance of money which is drawn at present out of the general receipts and farms , making no other augmentation save that which may be made in reducing the old rents which will be preserv'd , to six per cent , as well as the salary of certain officers , who will rather suffer the diminution of the same , than the suppression of their places with reimbursements . o● ▪ as it may be , in making certain alterations , thought so reasonable , and so useful , by those in whose hands i have seen the management of the finances , that in their opinion no other opposition is to be fear'd but that of novelty . * by the first settlement , the exchequer m●y expect to receive millions of livers yearly , according to the following ac●●nt . by the taille . millions livers . by all the gabelles , millions livers . by the aids , one million livers . by the reduction of rents to per cent , one million . by the reduction of the treasurers of france to two thirds of their salary ; which they will willingly consent to , provided they are freed from the new taxes they are daily plagu'd with , livers . des parties casuelles , which is the income the king receives by the sale of offices , and the annual duty paid him out of the same , two millions . by the farm of bourdeaux , livers . by livers per muid of wine for the entrance into paris , livers . by the ancient pence and the new addition of ten more for entrance upon every muid of wine brought into paris , livers . by the farm of pence instead of the tolls , livers . by the livers pence per tun of picrady , livers . by the farm of brouage , livers ▪ by the exportation of goods from languedos , spices and drugs from marseilles , and two per cent from arles , livers . by the third additional tax of lyons , livers . by the five great farms , two millions livers . by the new impositions of normandy , livers . by those of the river l●ir● livers . by the farm of iron , livers . by the sales of common woods , livers ▪ by the demeans , livers . by the second settlement , discharging the people absolutely of the millions of livers , which the king receives at present by the tailes , the receipt may amount to millions , as the following account will clearly justifie . by an imposition to be put upon salt , or upon the fens , in all the provinces of the kingdom , the king may receive all charges being paid millions . by a penny per liver upon all the merchandise and commodities of the kingdom , millions . by the aids , one million livers . by the reduction of the price of the rents constituted on the * hostel de ville , six millions . by the reduction of the treasurers of france thousand livers . by the income the king receives by the sale of offices and the annual duty paid him for the same , two millions . by the farm of bourdeaux , livers . by the three livers per muid of wine entrance into paris , by a new imposition , livers . by the ancient pence , and the new addition of ten more for the entrance of every muid of wine into paris , livers . by the farm of pence instead of the tolls and grants , livers . by the livers pence per tun of piccardy , livers . by the farm of brouage , livers . by the exportation of goods from languedoc , spices and drugs from marseilles , two per cent from ●●ies , livers . by the additional tax of lyons , livers ▪ by the five great farms , two millions livers . by the new impositions of normandy , livers . by those of the river loire , livers . by the farm of iron , livers . by the sale of common woods , livers . by the demeans , livers . summ total , millions livers . i am very certain that this settlement being well understood , will be found just and reasonable by all those who have any experience and capacity in the direction of states . among the several super-intendants of the finances in my time , i have known some of the most learn'd in what relates to the treasury , who equal'd the bare imposition upon salt , or upon the fens , to the king of spain's indies , and who preserv'd that secret as the true foundation of the ease of the people , of the reformation , and of the wealth of the state. and indeed let men be never so dull , they must needs be sensible that it is impossible to express the discharge , and satisfaction the people would receive , if they were allow'd to use salt as they do wheat , every one buying no more than he thought fit , and could imploy . it is certain that the suppression which would be made of the great number of officers , which are established for the imposition of the salt , and the deliverance of the disputes and law-suits they often commence to discharge their trust ▪ and sometimes out of malice , to constrain the people to take the salt that is impos'd upon them , would be a wonderful ease to them . it is moreover certain , that one might easily recompence the provinces , which hitherto have injoy'd the exemption of salt , by such a discharge of tailles , that if for the future they were oblig'd to buy it dearer than they have done heretofore , the diminution of the taille would be equivalent to the augmentation of the price of the salt , to which they would be liable , tho' they should buy it freely . it is also certain , that tho' it may be said , that the diminutions of the tailles only relate to the people , and that the augmentation of the price of salt , which has hitherto been sold in the provinces without any imposition , would concern the clergy , the nobility , and those who are free . all of them would receive the benefit of the diminution of the tailles , bp reason that the revenue of the tailles being taken off , the revenue of estates would increase according as the farmers who rent them were discharg'd of the impositions which are laid on the estates , they farm. finally , it is certain , that notwithstanding the difficulties of such an establishment , might prove great , yet they might be overcome . if after having consider'd this establishment of the salt , we examine that of the penny per liver , it will be found the more just , in that it is established in many countries , and that it has already been resolv'd upon twice , by the body of the state , under the great king francis , and in the assembly of the notables at roans , under the great henry of eternal memory . nevertheless whereas suspicions are so natural in the people , and in communities , that they commonly place their principal safety in their diffidence , which ever induces them to fear that what is most useful for them , will prove disadvantagious , and that great alterations are for the most part liable to dangerous revolutions . instead of advising such an establishment . i presume to advise the contrary , and the more boldly , because such novelties must never be attempted , unless they are absolutely necessary . now france is so far from being under such circumstances , that on the contrary i am of opinion that it will be much easier to ease the people , and to inrich the state , without having recourse to such expedients , than in putting them in practice : seeing that tho' there is no difficulty , in it but what may be overcome ; yet undoubtedly much greater would be met with , in having recourse to such alterations . in order to verifie this proposition , it will be sufficient to examine the expences one may make a shift with in time of peace , and to see what improvement may be made with the money the times will allow to lay up . the safety and grandeur of the kingdom will allow no diminition of the expences of war , above mentioned , which will amount near unto twelve millions . the charge of the usual garisons , which amounts yearly to three millions , might be suppress'd , both because the major part of the forces which will then be maintain'd by the state will be quarter'd in the said garisons , and by reason that the best part of the said three millions are only taken out of the king's purse , to inrich the governour 's , who commonly keep but ten men , when they should have a hundred . but whereas it is difficult , not to have some privileg'd places of such consequence , that it would be impossible to refuse the governors of the same , some particular garisons , to enable them the better to answer for them , as being of their own choice ; in my opinion it will be proper to retrench two thirds of the said expence , to reduce it to one million . the expence of the western and eastern sea , cannot be less than of two millions livers , as it appears by the particular settlements of the same . that of the artillery will amount to livers . that of the king 's , the queen's , and monsieur's housholds , to three millions livers . the pensions paid to the switzers , which cannot be retrench'd in honour , amounts to livers . the buildings will cost livers . ambassadors livers . the fortifications livers . all the pensions might absolutely be retrench'd , which cost the king four millions ; but as it is impossible to pass from one extream to another without a medium , and that the court of france is not us'd to resist importunities , tho' never so unjust ; i am of opinion that it will be sufficient to retrench one half of them . which is the more necessary , in that it is advantagious for the publick , that the idleness of courtiers may meet with no reward , and that they may be all annexed to the perils of the war , and thus pensions and salaries will only amount to two millions for the future . the king's gentlemen in ordinary , livers . warrants for the payment of certain summs livers . casual accounts , and the king's progresses , two millions . arrears of duties , livers . the king 's privy purse , livers . all these expences amount only to millions , which being deducted out of to which the receipt amounts ; there will remain ten , which for the first year shall be imploy'd towards the diminution of the tailles . the true way to inrich the state , is to ease the people , and to discharge both of their burthens : in lessening the charges of the state , the tailles may be diminish'd , and no otherwise ; and therefore it is the chief end which ought to be propos'd in the regulation of this kingdom . * in order to take true measures in an affair of that consequence , it is necessary to know that tho' all the levies which are made in this kingdom amount to near millions ; upwards of of the same are imploy'd in charges , which may be so well husbanded , that whereas we may say at present , that the said charges prove the king's ruine : i dare affirm that the king will be eas'd and inrich'd by the means thereof . many without doubt will be of opinion , that it would be fit to ease the state of all that burthen , but as it is impossible to make agreat body subsist without divers expences absolutely necessary for its maintenance . a● the weight of all these charges together cannot be born by the state , so the intire suppression of the same cannot be desir'd with reason . three means may be propos'd for the diminution of the said charges . the first is grounded on the over long injoyment which private persons have had of the king's money , open the fund they have disburs'd to acquire the rents , offices , and rights they enjoy . i am sensible that it would be easie to dispossess some of the said persons of the rents and duties they receive , by making a true supputation of the summs they have receiv'd , in which besides the interest allow'd by the laws , it would be easie to find the reimbursement of the price at first laid down by them for the same . but tho' the justice of the said expedient were allow'd of , reason wouldnot permit the making use of it , since that in so doing , it would be impossible for the future to find out money to supply the necessities of the state , whatever securities were offer'd . therefore it is necessary to observe that a thing may not be unjust , and yet contrary to reason , and sound policy , and to take care never to have recourse to any expedient , which without violating reason , would nevertheless violate publick faith. if any urges that the publick must be preferr'd to private interest , allowing his proposition , i desire him to consider that in the discussion of this point , those different kinds of interests are not in the least concern'd but that those of the publick , are counter-pois'd by others of the same nature , and that as the future has a far greater latitude than the present , which passes in an instant , those interests which relate to the time to come , must be respected before those of the present , contrary to the custom of sensual men , who prefer what is at the least distance from them , because the sight of their reason has no greater extent than that of their senses . if we consider publick faith in this point , as i think it absolutely necessary , the state will be far more eas'd by it than it would be , tho' part of its charges should be suppress'd without making any new lives , in that it will remain master of the purses of its members on all occasions , and yet will considerably increase its revenue . the second means to diminish the charges of the kingdom consists in the reinbursement of the money which was actually paid by private persons ; but the verification of it would prove difficult , since that in order to facilitate the sale of what the necessity of the state has oblig'd to alienate that has often been given at four years purchase which appears to be ingag'd at six . this medium tho just in it self , is not practicable without giving a pretence to many complaints , tho' ill grounded . the third means for the diminution of the charges of the state , consists in reimbursing those that are not necessary , at the same price at which they are sold among private persons : reimbursing the owners of the offices of the rents and of the duties which will be thought necessary to be suppress'd in this manner , they will receive no prejudice , and the king will not make use of the common advantage he has with private persons , who have the liberty to free themselves of the said debts , when they are able to pay them at the rate they are commonly sold at . this medium which is the only one that can be us'd , may produce its effect divers ways , either in many years time , by the bare management of the injoyment of the said charges , or in one only , by an immense sum of money which must be had ready by the supply of an extraordinary fund . the natural impatience of our nation , not allowing us to hope , that we will be able to persevere or years in the same resolution : the first way which requires so much time , is nowise receivable . the great fund which is necessary to reimburse all at once such immense charges as those of the state , would make this second proposition as ridiculous as impossible , and so the third only remains practicable . in order to make use of it , with so much justice , that no body may have cause to complain , it is necessary to consider the charges which it will be necessary to suppress in three different manners , according to the divers rates at which they are sold . * the first rents constituted upon the taille which are commonly sold at five years purchace , ought only to be consider'd and reimburs'd at that rate , according to which their injoyment of the same makes the reimbursement of them in seven years and a half . the other rents constituted upon the taille since the late king's death , which are paid either in the elections , or in the general receipts , must be reimbursed at the rate of six years purchace , which they are sold at , the injoyment of which will only reimburse them in eight years and a half . the offices of elections with salaries , taxations of offices and other rights which they injoy must be reimbursed at the rate of eight years purchace , which is the common price of such places . reason requires the taking of the same method for the reimbursement of the charges constituted upon the aids , upon all the gabelles , upon the five great farms , upon the foreign farm of languedoc and of provence , upon the customs of lyons , upon the convoy of bourdeaux , the custom of bayone , the farm of brouage , and such reimbursements can only be made by the bare injoyment in eleven years time . i am sensible that rents of that kind are daily sold for less than eight years purchace ; but i propose the reimbursement of them at this rate , for the satisfaction of the partys concern'd , being sensible that if in an affair of that importance , there must be a loss , it is better it should fall upon the king than upon them . the rate of all the reimbursements which can be made , being justly establish'd ; it is necessary to consider that there are some charges so necessary in this kingdom , or ingaged at so high a rate , that i do not place them among those of which the reimbusement is to be thought on , by the way i am proposing . those are the salarys of the parliaments and other sovereign courts , of the presidials and royal courts , of the king's secretarys , of the treasurers of france and receivers general . not that i think that no suppression ought to be made in those kind of offices ; that 's far from my thoughts : but to proceed with order towards the diminution of the charges of the kingdom , reason requires that one should begin by the reimbursement of those which are sold at lower rates , and which are inconvenient to the public . for that reason , i prefer the suppression of the rents establish'd upon the tailles , and that of many places of assessors , to all others . that of those sorts of rents , by reason of the lowness of their price , and that of the assessors , because those offices are the true source of the people's misery , both upon the account of their number which is so excessive , that it amounts to upwards of four millions in exemptions , as also of their male-administrations which are so common , that there is hardly any one assessor who do's not discharge his own parish ; that many draw considerably out of those they have nothing to do with , and that some of them are such abandon'd wretches , that they are not affraid of loading themselves with crimes , by adding impossitions on the people , which they convert to their own use . that very consideration is the only one which hinders me at present from speaking of the suppressions of many offices of judicature , the multitude of which is useless their price being as extraordinary as their salarys are inconsiderable , it would be an ill piece of husbandry to meddle with them , upon the account of the present necessity . when it will be thought fit to lessen the number of them , the best way in order thereunto will be to make so good a regulation of the * paullette , that the said offices being reduc'd to a moderate price , the king may be able when they become vacant , to reimburse them to the owners , and suppress them at once , neither do i as yet include in the number of the suppressions , the colleges of the king's secretarys , the offices of the treasurers of france , and the receivers general , not upon the account of the smalness of their profit , which is pretty considerable , but upon the account of the summs they have paid for the same which are not small . neither do i put in the old rents which have been created in the time of your majesty's predecessors which are paid in the office of the city of paris , both by reason that the actual summs disburs'd by the purchacers , are greater than that of all the rest , and because it is fit that the interest of subjects should in some manner be mix'd with those of their soveraigns , as also because they are devolv'd to several religious houses , hospitals , and communitys , towards the maintenance of which they are necessary ; and that having been often divided in familys , they seem to be settled there in such a manner that it would be difficult to remove them without disturbing their settlements . nevertheless in order not to omitt any husbandry that may be made with reason , to the advantage of the state , i must observe two things in this place . the first is that the office of the treasurers of france remaining , a third part of their salarys may be retrench'd , since they will think themselves very favourably used in the general reformation of the kingdom , if in securing them against all new taxes their salary is redu'd to two thirds of what they have injoy'd hitherto , and had by their first creation . the second is that in not suppressing the rents establish'd upon the town house , in the late king's time , which are all created at the rate of eight per cent , which will be the more reasonable in that as no private persons do allow above six , the owners of the said rents settled upon the town-house , will by your majesty's favour get two per cent more , in the injoyment of those of this nature . and as they will find an advantage by this , the king will do the same by reason that the rents charg'd upon the state , will be more coveted than those of private persons , supposing they be paid exactly without any deduction , as in reason they ought to be . in order to pay the said rents as well as the salary of divers officers either absolutely necessary or at least which cannot be suppressed in these times , i am of opinion that it will be fit to suppress thirty millions out of the fourty five this kingdom is at present charged with , leaving the rest to acquit the remaining charges . * out of the thirty millions which are to be suppress'd , there are near seven , the reimburstment of which being only to be made at the rate of five years purchace , the suppression of the same will be perform'd in seven years and a half 's time , by the bare injoyment of the same . as many will be found , out of the remaining twenty four , which being to be reimburs'd at the rate of six years purchace , which is the currant price of them , will be suppress'd in eight years and a half 's time , by the bare injoyment . but whereas , as abovesaid , long winded designs are not the safest in this kingdom , and that upon that account it is necessary to reduce all the suppressions which are fit to be made to a number of years not exceeding the compass of our patience ; in order to accomplish the reimbursments which will be undertaken at the same time in which the rents which are sold at five years purchace will be suppress'd by the very income of the same , an extraordinary fund must be rais'd to the value of a sixth part of the currant price of the rents , which amounts exactly to seven millions once paid , for the suppression of as much revenue . to accomplish the suppression of the thirty millions propos'd , there still remains to be reimburs'd , which must be done at the rate of eight years purchace , because it is the common price of them . and whereas the reimbursement of those sixteen millions , cannot be perform'd under twelve years time by the bare enjoyment of the same , and that it is necessary to shorten that time , to reduce the said suppression to the term of seven years , as well as that of the fourteen preceeding millions , out of eight parts three must be supply'd by extraordinary funds , amounting to millions . tho' the greatness of the said summ may surprize at first ; those who are acquainted with the facility of affairs of that nature in this kingdom , will not question the feasibleness of the same , considering that it is only to be paid in seven years time . and peace will be no sooner settled , but the practice of * parties , which is usual at this time to find out money , being abolish'd , those who are bred in those sort of affairs , not being able to alter their former way of living all of a sudden , will willingly convert all their industry , to destroy what they have rais'd , by the same means they did use to establish it at first ; that is , to extinguish and suppress by virtue of the bargains they will make to that effect , the rents , rights and offices , the creation of which they have promoted by virtue of other bargains . thus the kingdom may be eas'd in seven years time , of thirty millions of common charges which it bears at present . the people being actually discharg'd of the millions of taille , which is one half of what they bear at present ; the revenue of the kingdom will be found to amount to millions , as the following settlement will justifie . receipt of the tailles , millions . of the aids , millions . of all the gabelles , millions . of all the other farms millions . total , millions . out of which deducting millions , which will be yearly put into the exchequer , the said summ must be look'd upon to be so considerable , that there is no state in christendom which lays up half so much , all the charges of it being deducted before . if next to these suppressions , which will make many persons liable to the tailles , without their having any reason to complain of it , all offices are suppressed which are officiated by inrollment or by bare commissions ; if the number of notaries be regulated , not only such as are royal , but those of common jurisdictions , it will ease the people considerably , both in that they will thereby be deliver'd of so many leeches , and that as there are upwards of officers of this kind to be turn'd out , those who will find themselves deprived of their usual imployments , will be constrain'd to follow the wars , to ingage into trade , or to turn labourers . if in the next place all exemptions are reduc'd to the nobility , and to the officers in ordinary of the king's houshold , it is most certain that the cities , and communities which are exempted , the soveraign courts ; the offices of the treasurers of france , the elections , the salt magazines , the offices of waters and of forests , of the demain , and of the tithes , the intendants and receivers of parishes , which compose a body of upwards of exempted persons , will discharge the people of more than one half of their tailles ; it being also certain that the richest , which are liable to the greatest taxes , are those who get exemptions by dint of money . i am sensible that it will be urg'd , that it is easie to make such projects , like unto those of plato's commonwealth , which tho' fine in his ideas , is a real chimera . but i dare affirm , that this design is not only so reasonable , but so easie to execute , that if god pleases to grant your majesty a speedy peace , and to preserve you for this kingdom with your servants , of which i esteem my self one of the meanest , instead of leaving this advice by testament , i hope to accomplish it my self . section . viii . which shews in few words , that the utmost point of the power of princes must consist in the possession of their subjects hearts . the finances being manag'd as above written , the people will be absolutely eas'd , and the king will be powerful by the possession of his subjects hearts , who considering his care of their estates , will be inclin'd to love him out of interest . * formerly the kings thought themselves so happy in the possession of their subjects hearts , that some were of opinion that it was better by this means to be king of the french than of france . and indeed this nation had formerly such a passion for their princes , that some authors praise * them , for being always ready to spill their blood , and to spend their estates for the service and glory of the state. * under the kings of the first , second , and third race , until philip le bell , the treasure of hearts was the only publick wealth that was preserv'd in this kingdom . i am sensible that former times have no relation nor proportion to the present ; that what was good in one age , is often not permitted in another . but tho' it is certain that the treasure of hearts cannot suffice at present , it is also very certain that the treasure of gold and silver is almost useless without the first : both are necessary , and whoever shall want either of them , will be necessitous in wealth . chap. x. which concludes this work , in showing that whatever is contain'd in it will prove ineffectual , unless the princes and their ministers are so mindful of the government of the state , as to omitt nothing which their trust obliges them to , and not to abuse their power . in order to conclude this work happily , i am now to represent to your majesty that kings being oblig'd to do many things more as soveraigns , than as private men , they can never swerve so little from their duty , without committing more faults of omission , than a private person can do of commission . it is the same with those upon whom soveraigns discharge themselves of part of the burthen of their empire , since that honour makes them liable to the same obligations which lie on soveraigns . both of them being consider'd as private persons , are liable to the same faults as other men ; but if we regard the conduct of the publick which they are intrusted with , they will be found liable to many more , since in that sence they cannot omit without sin , any thing they are oblig'd to their ministry . in that consideration , a man may be good and virtuous , as a private person , and yet an ill magistrate , an●ilh soveraign , by his want of care to discharge the obligation of his trust . in a word , unless princes use their utmost endeavours to regulate the divers orders of their state. if they are negligent in their choice of a good council ; if they despise their wholsom advice . unless they take a particular care to become such , that their example may prove a speaking voice . if they are negligent in establishing the reign of god , that of reason , and that of justice together . if they fail to protect innocence , to recompence signal services to the publick , and to punish disobedience and the crimes which trouble the order of the discipline and safety of states . unless they apply themselves to foresee and to prevent the evils that may happen , and to divert by careful . negotiations , the storms , which clouds easily drive before them , from a greater distance than is thought . if favour hinders them from making a good choice of those they honour with great imployments , and with the principal offices of the kingdom . unless they are very careful to settle the state in the power it ought to have . if on all occasions they do not preferr publick interest to private advantages , tho' otherwise never so good livers , they will be found more guilty than those who actually transgress the commands and laws of god ; it being certain , that to omit what we are oblig'd to do , and to commit what we ought not to do , is the same thing . i must moreover represent to your majesty , that if princes , and those who are imploy'd under them in the first dignities of the kingdom , have great advantages over private men , they injoy that benefit upon hard conditions , since they are not only liable by omission to the faults i have already observ'd , but also that there are many others of commission , which are peculiar to them . if they make use of their power to commit any injustice or violence , which they cannot do as private persons , they are guilty of a sin of prince or magistrate by commission , which their sole authority is the source of , and for which the king of kings will call them to a very strict account on the day of judgment . those two different kind of faults peculiar to princes and to magistrates , must needs make them sensible that they are of a far greater weight than those of private persons , by reason that as universal causes , they influence their disorders to all those who being submitted to them , receive the impression of their movements . many would be sav'd as private persons , who damn themselves as publick persons . one of the greatest of our neigbouring kings , being sensible of this truth at his death , cry'd out that he did not stand in so much dread of the sins of philip , as he was apprehensive of the king 's . his thought was truly pious , but it would have been much better for himself and for his subjects to have had it before his eyes in the heighth of his grandeur , and of his administration , than when in discovering the importance of it , he could no longer make that use of it which was necessary for his conduct , tho' he might for his salvation . i humbly crave your majesty would be pleas'd to reflect this very moment on that which that great prince perhaps only thought on a few hours before his death ; and to invite you to it by example , as much as by reason , i promise you that i will spend no day of my life without endeavouring to introduce that into my mind , which ought to be there at the hour of my death , in what relates to those publick affairs which you are pleas'd to intrust me with . the end . historical observations . on the political testament , of cardinal de richelieu . book . chap . page . . of the first , and page . of the second and third editions , publish'd at amsterdam by henry desbordes in the year . upon these words : the removal of the duke de la valette tho' voluntary and not forc'd , giving me an occasion to put him in this classis ; i cannot omit saying , that not long before be did solicit monsieur your brother and the count de soissons to turn your forces , of which they had the command at that time , against your person : your majesty had honour'd him with the title of duke and peer ; to which i must also add that in order to ingage him the more in your service , you had thought fit to vnite him to those who were altogether inseparable from it ; and that in consideration of my allyance , you had granted him the survivorship of the government of guyenne , and were pleased to add livers income to his place of colonel of the infantry . i may say moreover , that the pardon your majesty did grant him for a crime so base , and so shameful , averr'd by the mouth of two princes whose testimony was undeniable on that occasion , did not hinder his weakness and jealonsy against the prince of conde and the arch bishop of bourdeaux , or him design to cross the prosperity of your affairs , from making him lose a great deal of honour ; in losing the occasion of taking fontarabie , when the enemys could no longer defend it . observation . the wisest ministers have much ado to defend themselves against pride . in this place the cardinal speaks to the king his benefactor and master . the duke de la 〈…〉 he speaks of , had the honor in his first marriage to w●dd . * gabrielle de bourbon , the king's sister , who upon that account always call'd him brother , either in speaking or writing to him . the cardinal nevertheless thinks he do's much for him , and that he will ingage him to be eternaly faithful , tho he had never been so before , by giving him madamoiselle de pont chateau his cousin . but the actions of great men must not be examin'd with rigor . neither would we reflect upon this thing , were it not to redress some essential circumstances of the history which we know ab origine . in order thereunto we must go back a little , since it is impossible to give a true account of the duke de la valette's voluntary removal , of his innocence , or of his guilt , without explaining the then state of his family , either in relation to the king , or to the minister . this relation which perhaps will prove some what long , and will seem sometimes to deviate from the subject , will nevertheless always return to it , and if i am not mistaken will have some curious and remarkable passages . john lewis de la valette , whom we commonly call the old duke d' espernon , who was the first of that name , father to the duke de la valette , i am to speak of , was naturaly very haughty and imperious : a great and dazling fortune made in a short space of time , had not lessen'd his courage . the unbounded favour of henry the . had heap'd honors , dignitys , governments , and great places upon him . the said prince sometimes boasted that he would make him ▪ so great that it would not be in his power to destroy him . it is very well known that in giving him the government of the three bishopricks , mets , toul , and verdun , he offered him the absolute soveraignty of the same , which he had the wisdom or cunning to refuse . his marriage with the heiress of foix , and of candale had acquir'd him all the lands of that ancient family , and the most illustrious alliances . under the two following reigns , among many contradictions , he had still kept his rank , and defended his fortune , being considered and fear'd rather than lov'd by all those who did govern , by the power he had to plague them within the kingdom . it was perhaps for that reason henry the th . seemed dissatisfied with his behaviour at first , but being reconcil'd to him afterwards , in the year . in the great war he was meditating , when death prevented him , he design'd him the honor of the command of his vanguard , untill he had joyn'd the prince of orange , and then sent him back to mary de medicis , to be her minister . however reflecting on his former favour and elevavation , he could neither forget what he was , nor what he had been , nor agree with any favourite , or minister ; less with richelieu than with another , because he had a greater esteem for him than for any other , and did look upon him as the fittest man to humble all those who had rais'd themselves . the cardinal on his side tho a far better politician , finding himself at the helm of affairs , could brook no resistance , tho' never so inconsiderable , without being wounded to the very heart by it ; nor suffer any grandeur unless subservient to his own . and indeed tho we should allow him to be above all weakness , or private interest , which humanity is never free from , his general plan , and the honor of his ministry , could hardly suit with the power and authority of a man , who under henry the th . had sustain'd an open war to maintain himself in the government of provence ; who lately , in the duke de luines time , setting out of his fortress of metz in cold blood , with his usual equipage of mules , and near two hundred horse for his guard , gentlemen and other persons of his retinue , cross'd the whole kingdom quietly , to rescue the queen mother who was confined at blois , to give her a refuge in his governments , and to make himself mediator between that princess and the king her son. the old duke had three children , henry duke of candale , bernard duke de la valette , the person in question here , and lewis . arch-bishop of toulouse , as men often were in those times , in commendam , without being ingag'd in sacred orders , and since cardinal de la valette . henry bore the names of foix and of candale , according to the fathers obligation , who had promis'd in marrying the heiress of that family , to leave all her estate , name and arms to the eldest son of that marriage : this gentleman having a lively wit , a free and agreeable humour , was likewise out of favour with the minister , by reason that not being used better than another , he sometimes let fall some free ingenious and sharp expressions which some retain'd with pleasure , and never fail'd of being reveal'd ; but in that he did not sooth the inclination of his father , with whom he was no better pleas'd than with the minister himself : he could not forgive him , notwithstanding his having added to his share abundance of lands over and above those of candale to the value of crowns a year , besides the place of first gentleman of the chamber , the governments of saintonge , aunis , angoumois and limosin , for having given his younger brother the government of mets and of the three bishopricks , in great esteem at that time ; but above all , the place of colonel general of the french infantry , which was look'd upon as a military royalty , because it gave the possessor of it a right to nominate to all inferior places , without so much as excepting that of colonel of the guards ; and that vexation particularly with some other domestic troubles , made him acquire abundance of glory , in seeking war , and the command of armys in foreign countrys . bernard duke de la valette the second son , design'd all along to bear the father's name , was indeed the first object of his affection , and of his tenderness , which he answered with a great deal of gratitude & duty , keeping measures with the minister , but without lowness , and in such a manner that the duke his father could receive no prejudice by it . lewis the last of the brothers , either as being a better courtier , or as a cardinal , or out of inclination or esteem , had contracted a friendship with cardinal de richelieu . but the father not approving his behaviour , often said ; it is no longer the cardinal de la valette , it is the cardinal valet . the only reward he had for his assiduity and for his cares , was sometimes to command armys , which he had earnestly desir'd contrary to the sentiments of the old duke his father , who had all along endeavour'd in vain to dissuade him from it . perhaps it is a thing sufficiently remarkable ( to observe it by the by ) that cardinal de richelieu has not mention'd him once in all this book , notwithstanding he did him the greatest and most signal service that ever he received from any other . for it is very well known , that in the famous day of the * duppes , when the queen mother having prevall'd with the king to dismiss him , thought on nothing in her palace of luxemburg but how to dispose of the greatest places of the state ; the cardinal being ready to be gone , seeing nothing but solitude and disgrace about him , the only cardinal de la valette stood up to incourage him , and offering to accompany him to versailles , made him resolve once more to see the king and to speak to him , as he did , which on a sudden produc'd that great alteration of affairs ; the cardinal being allow'd to continue the functions of his ministry , the lord keeper marillac , who was come to succeed him , imprison'd , and all the rest which is known without my repeating it . which shows how necessary the advice of a firm and faithful friend is sometimes even to the greatest souls , in that uncertain and floating condition , to which great passions reduce us . but let us return to our principal and real subject . those general dispositions did not promise a great union between the old duke , and the cardinal minister . add now to this a vast number of things which did divide them absolutely , some of great consequence , others which would seem to be inconsiderable , if we did not know what effect they generally produce in mens minds . in . richelieu already made cardinal , was made first minister against the king's inclination , by the earnest desires and importunitys of the queen mother . the duke who was absent from the court at that time , and who thought himself very much in favour with that princess , as he had deserv'd it by his services , was both surpris'd and vex'd thereat , because she had not given him the least hint of it . however he comply'd so far with decency and custom , as to make complements by a letter to the new minister , but less capable to oblige than to displease him . for he kept with him , as with all other cardinals , to the end of his life , the singular ▪ method he had taken , to write to them without leaving the whole line , and to conclude by , vo●●●●ien humble serviteur . the cardinal being nettled made no answer at all ; but on the first occasion , which offer'd it self soon after , to send the king's orders to him , he writ to him without hardly leaving any blank space in the line , and by your most affectionate servant , which the duke was very much offended at . those who knew how things pass'd in those days , look'd upon that beginning either as the source , or omen of all that happened since . soon after this , the duke , then governor of guienne , by his haughtiness , imbroil'd himself with the parliament of bourdeaux , under the first president de gourgues , a man of great sence and vigor , who easily persuaded the angry cardinal , to take their part . the same affairs return'd often , and others of worse consequence with henry de sourdis arch-bishop of bourdeaux , one of the cardinal's creatures , whose part he ever took as he was oblig'd to do . in . fortune presented them with a fine phantasm and great hopes , as a notable subject of discord . it was the wreck of two large portugueze carricks returning from goa : their lading of gold , silver , diamonds ambergres , and other precious commoditys , being valu'd at millions of livers ; the one was lost on the coast of medoc . the right of the wreck did belong to the duke , as it was adjudg'd since , by authentic titles of the ancient lords of candale , who had maintain'd that right in law even against their kings . the cardinal did pretend to the same right ; as well as chofet superintendant general of the navy , and commerce of france , which in effect was the office of admiral disguis'd for him under that new title . the old duke formerly admiral himself , remembred then with great regret , that he had given that great and fine place , with the government of provence to john de la valette his elder brother , to make him share his fortune , who dyed soon after it . the sea almost alone profited of those immense riches , of which the duke after often having prov'd his right did not get above ten or twelve thousand crowns . but the process which he had maintain'd with vigor befor the king's commissioners , chosen by the cardinal himself , left new impressions of spite , and animosity in the mind of that minister . in the time of the cardinal's triumph , as i may say , when after the taking of rochel , the expedition of italy the pas of susa's being forc'd , the succors of cazal , the conquest of the huguenot citys of languedoc , he thought he had wholly suppress'd that party by the reduction of montauban ; there was need of a new negotiation ; and of the councel of the most faithful of the old duke's servants , to oblige him to come to bourdeaux to pay a visit to the minister . but they all repented the giving of that advice . the said interview spoil'd all , instead of contributing towards an accommodation : not but the cardinal , without descending from his rank , which he was incapable of doing , paid the duke a great deal of respect , and caresses , even so far as to protest to him that he would stand him instead of a fourth son ; but the duke still preserved that air of grandeur with him which he could not lay aside ; and only receiv'd the arch-bishop of bourdeaux , whom the minister presented to him after an apparent reconciliation , with a haughty air , and not without some goldness . in notwithstanding the cardinal de la valette his son , had had so great a share , as i have said , in the day of the * duppes , and that in his particular he had received some considerable disgust the preceeding day from the queen mother , he went to versailles to see the king upon this great alteration , and could never be persuaded by his friends to step into the next room , where all the court repair'd in a throng to pay new homages to the restor'd minister ; he contented himself with seeing him two or three days after it , as if nothing extraordinary had happen'd to him . in the cardinal seem'd to have a mind to reconcile himself to that family ; for he prevailed for the duke de la valette , who was only a duke by breef , to be receiv'd into the parliament in that quality the same day with him , which the court looked upon as a great caress . but the following year gave him a new and very considerable cause of displeasure from the old duke . he caus'd him to be sounded by the superintendant de bullion , to try whether he would yield his government of mets and of the three bishopricks to him in exchange , upon very advantageous conditions ; to which the duke express'd a great repugnancy . those whose conjectures always go too far , or who reckon upon the easiness of human minds to pass from desire to desire , and from one ambition to another , fancy'd that the cardinal had a mind to make a great and lasting settlement in that country , to secure himself against all revolutions for the future ; to obtain next to that government , the bishoprick of mets and the great abbys of the said city , or adjacent parts : in the next place , to get that from the king's favour , which the duke had refused from henry the d's . to add to the three bishopricks , first in the king's name , and next in his own , dun , scenai , jamets , and some other places of lorrain , sed●● which might be got out of the house of bouillon , chatea●rena●d , charleville , and mount olimpus ; and finally to compose a little kingdom of austrasia capable to maintain it self against all the neighbouring powers , under a soveraign of his capacity . if this was his design , which i would neither affirm ner reject , that instance would discover as much as any thing the character of his mind more us'd to give than to receive a law. for it is certain that tho he passionately desired the success of builion's negotiation , he broke it first , because the duke , without explaining himself clearly , and without accepting , or refusing , tal●'d of adding to the proposed exchange a marshal's staf for the duke of candale his son a man who indeed deserved that honour , being famous throughout europe , for his foreign expeditions , but to whom the cardinal was unwilling to give such a reward for the jests he had made on him . shall i say moreover , what others have written and published before me , which perhaps will seem frivolous . the said negotiation was set on foot in in the journey of toulouse , which ended by the execution of the duke de montmorrency . they pretend that oh their return two things which in appearence seem'd to be inconsiderable ; nevertheless sensibly mov'd the mind of that minister . the first , as it is reported , is that he thought himself neglected by the old duk● who was too busy in receiving the queen ann of austria in his house of cadillac upon the road to bourdeaux . the queen was coming back that way to see rochel , and the cardinal to see brouage , where he had never been since he had made great expences there : the coaches which the duke had order'd to receive him at his coming out of the boat , were taken up by the numerous train of the queen , and could not come back soon enough to prevent the cardinal's arrival , who was not expected so soon . the duke after having conducted the queen to her appartment , brought them back to him himself , with a thousand excuses that his orders had not been well executed ; but he could never persuade him to use them , and the cardinal chose rather to walk the remainder of the way a foot , notwithstanding he was fatigu'd , and incommoded with a distemper , which had like to have kill'd him some days after . they add in the second place , that it prov'd a great deal worse , yet at bourdeaux , where his distemper which was nothing but a suppression of urine , oblig'd him to tarry after the queen . the duke , out of respect to that princess , and to keep no mark of command in her presence had order'd his guards to put of their coats and muskets : he ordered them to take them again , as soon as ever she was gone , and went to visit the candinal with his usual pomp of governor , and a large attendence of gentlemen belonging to him , or of the province , who did always accompany him . it is thought that the arch-bishop of bourdeaux , and some others , who were the duke's enemys , and were with the cardinal at that time , persuaded him that it was not only done to brave him , but perhaps to quarrel him , in case of need , and to attempt upon his person , so that he excus'd himself from seeing him , as being too ill ; and almost thought he had scaped a peril , when he found himself in a condition to leave bourdeaux ; the duke having accompanyed him at his departure with the same train , as it were to honour him . that which is certain , is , that the duke was inform'd some time after it by the cardinal de la valette his son , that some had endeavour'd at least to give the minister those impressions . that he took it very ill from the arch-bishop of bourdeaux , and made war against him more than ever . their quarels proceeded so far , that the duke having employ'd ways of fact , as it were to maintain his authority of governor in the metropolitan city , induc'd the archbishop to excommunicate him . the clergy of france being inspir'd by the cardinal , who put himself at their head , declar'd for the abus'd prelate , and demanded reparation for the injury . it was in that great storm the cardinal de la valette his son , and some of his friends propos'd , as a last remedy of reunion , the marriage of mademoiselle de pontchateau with the duke de la valette : for gabrielle de bourbon , one of the most lovely princesses of her time , beautiful and wise , very witty , and so mild , that she was never known to be angry , dy'd six or seven years before , a forthnight after her being deliver'd of a son , who dyed duke of candale in the year . as soon as the conditions of this new marriage were resolv'd upon and accepted , all the affairs with the archbishop of bourdeaux and the clergy of france ended much sooner than they would have done . but if ever the old duke show'd his haughtiness it was on this occasion ; he gave his son his consent by word of mouth , but he refus'd to give it in writing , and to sign the contract , saying sometimes that it was sufficient , that he had sign'd one ; and sometimes with more frankness , that it would not be handsom for him to sign it without giving some thing , nor to give any thing to redeem himself , and to get out of a troublesom affair . neither must we forget among the subjects of alienation and aversion we are speaking of , that the old duke , who thought he had formerly oblig'd the bishop of lucon , complain'd that he had found no manner of acknowledgment in cardinal de richelieu ; and that in the latter times , he could not digest his proceedings against the queen mother ; a princess for whom the duke had ever had a veneration full of tenderness , and for whom he thought himself oblig'd to expose all . the reader will perhaps conclude , that this relation was absolutely necessary to make posterity believe the secret i am going to reveal , not upon vain conjectures , but upon certain knowledg . what is it a great genius does not think possible ? or himself capable of ? the cardinal being sensible by experience , that the old duke would never be perfectly reconcil'd to him , form'd a very extraordinary design to ruin him , in ingaging nevertheless the duke de la valette his son in his interests , in whom he had never found any sentiments ▪ ! but such as were reasonable . after that marriage he show'd a great deal of affection for a time to that young lord , who was look'd upon as his son-in-law , gave him a prospect of the greatest elevation and grandeur for the future , until judging the fire sufficiently kindl'd , after having exhorted him to confide in his promises , which had never deceiv'd any body , and to look upon him as a true father , he proceeded to declare to him that in order thereunto , it was necessary , he should have no other father but him : in a word , that he should not be astonish'd , at his being resolv'd no longer to spare the duke d'espernon , and to destroy , those were his very words , a man whom he had never been able to tame . the duke de la valette , being as much surpris'd , as can be imagin'd , endeavour'd in vain to dissemble his thoughts ; part of them appear'd in his eyes , and upon his face . the obligations of blood , those he had to the best father in the world towards him , who had prefer'd him in so many respects before his elder brother , a man of great merit , crowded all in a moment in his mind . he fancy'd he already saw that old man , who was then fourscore years of age or more , whose fortune had been respected till then by his greatest enemies , leading the remainder of his life in obscurity and solitude , languishing in some place of exile ; to see himself , as a worthy recompence of his base complyance , shamefully invested with those honours , which he was only to tarry for a few years , to possess them without reproach . who knows , whether he did not add , that the most honest ingagements are commonly the safest ; and that all duty laid aside , no true prudence could ever advise him to abandon the fortune of his own family , which was so well settl'd , to run after vain hopes , and to abandon himself to the new , and perhaps false tenderness of that adoptive father ? nevertheless doing himself a great violence , he thank'd the cardinal for his kindness , as men always behave themselves towards those who govern : he expres'd his being oblig'd to him for the confidence he repos'd in him : he assur'd him of a perfect gratitude on his side . as to his father , without accusing or defending him , he added , that it was impossible to alter his mind for the little time he had to live : that his behaviour was rough and daring ▪ but that he had a great deal of honour , that his heart was upright and sincere , incapable of deceit and treachery : that taking his word once , one might rely upon it for ever ; in a word that if the cardinal would do him the honour to rely upon him , he would answer for the old duke's fidelity as for his own . the minister did very well apprehend what was not said to him , and was secretly concern'd to have said too much himself . the conversation ended in general complements on both sides , in which neither of them were deceiv'd . from that time forward a serious behaviour and cold civility succeeded the carresses and advances of the cardinal towards the duke de la valette . and in relation to the old duke , all the disgusts and mortifications that can be given to a proud heart , who will not oblige his enemy so far as to complain . he met perpetual contradictions in his province of guienne , in which it was known that he was very jealous of his authority . those who were known to be his enemies , or suspected by him , were applauded and favour'd in all things ; fables were heard against him ▪ the exchequer was wholy shut up for several years together for his salarys and pensions , under pretence of public necessity , and of the finances being exhausted : excuses that are ever ready for those that are not belov'd . and when ever foreign war threatned or attack'd his government , no succors besides words was sent to him , as if they had been glad to expose him , to the prejudice of the state. in fine , neither he , nor his son , could doubt but the first opportunity to ruine them , would earnestly be imbraced : but the times were not proper for it . ( . ) france had declar'd war against spain . ( . ) the enemys were entring into guienne , burgundy , and picardy . ( . ) the people being oppressed by new edicts to make the armys subsist , and being as yet but little us'd to obedience after the civil wars , did rise in divers places , particularly in the old duke's government , sometimes by seditions at bourdeaux , sometimes by whole armys which kept the field by the name of crocans . he commonly stifled those commotions with his own forces , and by his sole authority , being accused nevertheless to the minister , but without any ground , of exciting them secretly himself , to make himself necessary . the cardinal had not the injustice to believe it , but he reckon'd among the crosses of his life , and of his grandeur , to be oblig'd for a time , not only to keep measures with , but also to praise and to thank those , to whom he neither did , nor design'd any good , but on the contrary , their ruin. his fortune was looked upon to be very much shook , when the enemy seem'd to settle in the kingdom , within sight of the capital city , and of the thro●● it self , by the taking of catelet , of la capelle and of corbie . the success of that war which he alone had counceled , and which he was proud of being the author of , was either his fafety or his ruin : having moreover so many envious persons , enemys , and secret intrigues to oppose , he left no means unattempted to retake the places of picardy , with powerful armys commanded by the duke of orleans the king's brother , and by the count de soissons , a prince of the blood. the duke de la valette in an occasion which was look'd upon , as a great peril of the state , desir'd leave to serve as a volunteer in the army of picardy , which could not be deny'd him . but before his departure from paris , he made , rather by his misfortune than fault , being as it were , forc'd to it , a new , and very deep wound in the minister's mind . the baron du bec , governer of la capelle was the duke's friend : whether he had surrender'd it too soon out of weakness , or for want of all manner of ammunitions as he pretended , which i have not dicover'd , the cardinal thought it necassary to make an example of him , either to keep the governors of the frontier towns in awe by that severity , or to clear himself before the king and the public , for the loss of that place , which through picardy had given the enemy an entrance into the kingdom : for those who are at the helm of affairs , are never in the wrong , and the weakest is commonly the most guilty . he would have that affair examin'd in a solemn coucil , the king being present , in which all the officers of the crown were to assist . the duke excused himself three times from coming to it , to avoid the danger he foresaw . but chavigny was sent to him the fourth , to acquaint him that he must either break of with the cardinal , or not presist in his refusal . therefore he went to the council , but more faithful to friendship , or to reason , than to his own interest , he spoke for the accus'd contrary to the intention of the minister , who not being commonly master of himself in the first heat of his anger , as soon as the council broke up , calling him a side , used hard and reflecting language towards him , which a good heart can never bear , nor forget . his answer was not only firm and bold , but full of a heat , which made the cardinal sencible of his own , which he endeavour'd to aleviate , concluding with obliging words . in this condition the duke de la valette went for the army , where it is true , that the count de soissons , and the duke of orleans caused him to be sounded in secret , to ingage him to a revolt , and to afford them a retreat in guienne : but it is equaly true , that he refused both , barely assuring the princes on one hand of his respect , and moreover of secrecy ; and on the other , that the old duke , without whom he could do nothing , would never hearken to any such thing , what ever cause he had to complain of the cardinal , as well as himself . it has never been known from the dukes own mouth who made him that proposition , he kept his word but too scrupulously , and never spake of it , even when he might have done it without danger . what the cardinal sayes here , that this crime is averr'd by the mouth of two princes whose testimony is undeniable on that occasion , is easily clear'd . one of them who out liv'd that minister , has often own'd , that he had been surprised , and persuaded that the duke de la valette had accused him , so that being irritated by his pretended infidelity as well as by his refusal , he was glad to excuse himself by laying the whole fault at his door . the sequel of things naturally represented , in my opinion do's not allow the questioning of this truth . the said negotiation , whether rejected , or receiv'd , certainly was not prosecuted , and was not known in a certain time after it . but when corbie was retaken and picardy peaceable , and the cardinal's authority better settled than ever , even those who thought him undone before , were earnest to serve him , and to inbrace his interest . at that time one of the duke of orleans false servants , to whom that secret was confided , made haste to reveal it to him . the two princes who had notice given them thereof , remov'd forthwith from the court , for fear of being secur'd . the duke de la valette who was gone for guienne some days before , quietly prosecuted his journey . they sent bourdeilles and montresor , after him , to excite him , and the old duke his father , upon the account of their common danger , which both , they said , would endeavour in vain to defend themselves of , considering the opinion the cardinal had of that business , and his desire to ruin them . they both shut their ears , and the old duke after complements full of respect for the princes , gave them wise councels ▪ to regain the king's favour : the duke of orteans hearken'd to them , and made his peace . the count de soissons neglected them to his misfortune , for he never returned to court , and dyed afterwards , as it is known in arms against his prince and country . the cardinal having as good intelligence , as ever any minister had , was not ignorant of the old duke's wise behaviour on that subject , which he never boasted of himself . there still is a letter extant which that minister order'd the chevalier seguier , his constant friend , to write to him , in which praising his prudence , which he assures him the king is very well pleased with , he endeavours to make him discover more of the matter , which the old duke had the address to excuse himself from . and so far from accusing him of any thing at that time , nor la valette his son , new orders were sent to both to drive the spaniards out of guienne : for they had settled themselves in the port of secoa , where they had two forts , and five or six thousand men well retrench'd . those orders to express the more confidence , gave the old duke a power to raise such forces as he should think fit , and to make what ever impositions he thought necessary on the province , to deliver it from the enemy ; which he looked upon as a snare that was laid for him , being warn'd by ancient and new examples , and even by that of marshal de marillac . moreover he was persuaded that without oppressing the people , whom he lov'd naturally , and whom it was his interest to keep measure● with ; he would be able to perform what he was ordered . and indeed the duke de la vallette having put himself at the head of a small number of men he raised in haste , besieg'd , or block'd up , as it were , those spaniards retrenched , and much stronger than himself , but in want of all things , notwithstanding the sea was open to them : he took advantageous posts ; he made continual courses on all sides , to hinder them from receiving any subsistance out of the country , and reduced them without fighting , to such extremitys , that they abandoned both retrenchments and forts , and made no use of the sea , but for their retreat . the court which seldom applauds those who are not in favour , was very glad of it , however without seeming over much satisfied ; they could have wish'd the spaniards had been cut to pieces , their camp forc'd and pillag'd , their forts taken by assault ; and in a word that no bridge of gold had been made to the enemy . it was on that occasion the cardinal bethought himself to attack spain by fontarabie . the arch bishop of bourdeaux , or some other had inspired him with that thought , several years before : but the duke d' espernon and la valette his son , who were sent to view the place at that time , always found very great difficultys in it . the son was sent for , and repaired to court , without knowing it was upon that subject : after a much better reception , than he expected from the minister he desired him to give him an account of what had past at corbie about the proposition of the two princes ; but he had either so much credit , or so much address as to prevent his being pressed to the utmost , and they were or seem'd to be satisfied with him , without his ever saying any thing farther to the king , or cardinal , but that a man spoke to him near a mile ; that he had broken all his measures by a speedy refusal : that he had not thought it necessary , in an affair in which he saw no appearence of any success , to turn informer without proofs against two princes of the blood , whom he thought he had sufficiently persuaded to remain faithful by his reasons , and by his example . after this eclaireissement , the siege of frontarabi● was proposed to him . nevertheless i will never believe what others have written bona fide , that it was with a real design to engage him , and the old duke his father , in an enterprise in which they must needs perish . that is driving suspition too far ; and the cardinal was not capable of such a false policy against the interest of france , and his own ; but it is very probable that the said minister who ever since the siege of rochel , and the expedition of italy , thought every thing easy for him , made use of that occasion to send a prince of the blood in guienne , with considerable forces both by sea and land , which he might imploy , after that victory , as he thought fit against the duke d' espernon himself , and against all his family : it is most certain that the command of the army was only offer'd to the duke de la valette upon two conditions ; the one that the prince of conde should be generalissimo over him ; the other that the naval army should be commanded by the archbishop of bourdeaux , who was , or seem'd to be reconcil'd to the old duke , for some years pass'd . the old duke had refused more than once to command royal armys under a prince of the blood ; not said he , but he had a very great and most profound respect for that rank , but he was too old , added he , to learn towards the end of his days , to receive orders from any but the king his master . it was easy for the duke de la valette to foresee the ill consequences of a subaltern and divided command ; but the cardinal his brother , and another person less faithful , who ow'd his elevation to their familly , but yet was secretly a creature of the minister , persuaded him , with great difficulty , that it was not fit always to oppose the inclinations of a man who had an absolute power , as if they had design'd to break with him at a time when he seem'd to have a mind to be reconcil'd to all the family ; that what the court had much ado to bear from the old duke , would neither be excused , nor pardoned in his son , in the same manner ; moreover that whereas he would act more in the army than any other , the presence of a prince would nowise lessen his glory , if the siege had a good success ; but would totally discharge him , if the event should not prove favourable . these reasons induced him to ingage himself to the minister , before he had time to cunsult the old duke his father , who nowise approv'd them , but thought he ought not to find fault with what he had agreed to . if any body has written the contrary , either they were not acquainted with the whole secret , or thought they might dissemble part of it . the resolution the duke took himself , show'd sufficiently that he was not pleased . it was to ask leave to go to his house of pl●ssae in zaintonge to take milk , as he sometimes used to do ; but at that time , it was with a resolution never to return to his government , untill the siege of fontarabie were ended . however he ●a●ryed till the prince was come to bourdeaux , to pay his respects to him ; and taking his leave of him , after having represented the difficultys of the enterprise to him , which ought only to have excited him the more , by the glory of overcoming the same , he offered if it were necessary , to come back , upon his first orders , at the head of a thousand gentlemen , to serve as a volunteer under him . the sequel has sufficiently testifyed the prudence of that resolution ; for that has been known since , which he was ignorant of at that time : which is , that the prince had brought secret orders from the king , to command him to do that which he did of his own accord . the siege was begun with great hopes . the duke de la vallette was praised for that he was the first who with sword in hand at the head of his forces , cross'd the river of bidassoa , which divides the two kingdoms , through the water up to the waste ; he forced the retrenchments the enemy had made there to defend the entrance into the country . it is also known that his attack was very much advanc'd , and in a fair way to take the place , when an order in writing from the prince of conde oblig'd him to yield that post to the arch-bishop of bourdeaux ; which indeed he had much ado to digest : and from that time forward , finding an open , and always ready , contradiction to what ever was propos'd by him ▪ and being weary with giving good advices which were not follow'd , he reduc'd himself only to command in his new quarter which he thought himself oblig'd to answer for ; it is also most certainly true , that even before that incident , there was no perfect intelligence between our generals ; and that the strongest armys commonly prove ineffectual , when discord reigns among them . the archbishop of bourdeaux was far more mindful of the old differences he had had with the duke and all his family , than of a forc'd reconciliation . the prince of conde dreaded nothing more , than that all the honour of the success should be imputed to la vallette . from the very beginning , he had not answer'd , either in relation to the father , or to the son , the affection they both expected to find in him , and which they had had proofs of on other occasions , he perhaps being instructed in this by the court , and being desirous to oblige the minister . but after all , as far as ever i could hear , the true , or principal reason of the raising of that siege with so little honour , reflected upon the cardinal himself more than upon any other in his quality of admiral , without laying any stress upon his having joyn'd commanders , whom he knew could never agree . the naval army which should have appeared at the same time with the land forces , was not ready ; and whether the prince had orders to begin the siege before hand , or that the said precipitation proceeded from his own impatience , and the fear of losing the fair season ; for it was in the month of july , the spaniards who were masters of the sea took their time to succour the town twice , within sight of him , and to ▪ put a governor into it , who contributed considerably towards its vigorous defence . the spanish army appear'd to relieve it , by land. the duke de la vallette's advice , tho' often reiterated , to march against , and to fight them , was not hearken'd unto ; and the event justify'd on that occasion , as in so many others , that commonly to be attack'd , is to be half vanquish● . all things pass'd among ours with great surprise , tumult and disorder , without any of the quarters being inform'd what pass'd in the other . the prince of conde's was forc'd and taken . the french never made so little resistance ; which gave way to the vain reports of the people , which they are still possessed with in those parts to this very day , as if the prince had consented to it himself , being bribed with spanish doubloons , which were sent to him they say , in great quantity , in large bottles , in the guise of wine , for the provision of his table . the duke de la vallette had only notice of the rout , and combat , by run-aways , and soon after it by the prince himself , who retiring to bayonne , left him to perform what could be done in that misfortune . the duke approv'd what it would have been useless to condemn , and moreover he exhorted the prince to secure his person . but as soon as his back was turn'd he could not forbear smiling ; and that prov'd since , the main head of the accufation against him . after which giving his orders with great tranquility and unconcernedness , he not only put all his men in battalia , but rallying the remainder of the others , and opposing the pursuit of the enemys , he sav'd the major part of the french army , and such guns and equipages , as were not taken yet . the victorious souldiers in fontarabie boasted that they had plundered the prince's camp and that they had spar'd ▪ la vallette who was their friend : another great crime which was to be plac'd with the bottles of doubloons , and which nevertheless was afterwards laid to his charge . it is impossible to express the minister's anger against the duke de la vallette , whether it were that he only hearken'd to the interrested relations of the prince of conde and the arch-bishop , or that such an occasion kindled anew , all his resentment against the duke d' espernon's family , or that he dreaded lest the king and the public , should impute that misfortune to his conduct , in ▪ case the prince or the arch-bishop , or the delay of our naval army should seem to be the chief cause of it . he declar'd ●● altorney he would 〈…〉 general against his kinsman , than to leave his fault unpunish'd . the dutchess de la vallette had the generosity on ths occasion , as in many others , not to waver one moment between her uncle regnant , and her husband out of favour , but the cardinal , when she spoke to him upon that account , fell into such a passion , that those who were not to be acquainted with the secret , and who were order'd to withdraw on purpose , overheard it . the dutchess d' eguillon , who was the duke's faithful friend , after having used all her credit , art and addresse with her uncle , could obtain nothing but bitter complaints , and open menaces , after which she xpress'd sufficiently that it would not be safe for the duke to come , tho' on the one side he was passionately desirous to justify himself in person ; and on the other , he had been sent for , to give an account of his conduct . it is very probable that the minister designed not to spare him : at least what he said , and declar'd publicly , was not a great inducement to invite him to court. a little council was held , hercupon at paris by the duke's order , of persons he thought wholly devoted ▪ to his interest , in which was called , among a few others , one of the most zealous and most grateful creatures of his family . it was philip de cospean , then bishop of nantes , formerly bishop of aire , and since bishop of lisieux ; for whom the old duke during his favour , our of respect to his merit , being delighted with his sermons , had not only obtain'd the bishoprick of aire , without his knowledge , but ●caused the bulls of the same to be expedited at his own charge , and so sent them to him . this gentlemen who was a man of sence , and wit , after having heard many arguments upon the circumstances of the affair of fontarabie ; upon the facility the duke would have to destroy such frivolous accusations , and not only to justify his innocence , but also his services : all this , said he is good , and i believe it ; but who has told us , that they will not speak of the man and the mill. this prov'd sufficient to persuade the little assembly ; and that indeed was a thing to be dreaded in the hands of an incens'd minister . for tho the duke had clear'd himself before him and before the king about it ; and that instead of being punish'd , he was soon after honor'd , with a considerable command , it was no abolition in forms ; and the laws of the state oblige all subjects , and particularly all the officers of the crown , to reveal what ever they know against the king's service , without examining whether they have opposed it in secret , whether they could not prevent it , whether they thought the advice would be useless , finaly without distinguishing prince , friend , master or benefactor . wo to those whose fate , and that diversity of dutys put to such a terrible tryal . however the duke , contrary to his own inclination follow'd the advice of his friends , and retir'd into england . his process was made . the cardinal would needs have the information against him brought in before the king. the president de bellievre , since first president , and some others had the courage to say they saw no proofs . the greater number follow'd the false and pernicious maxim that one may always condemn an absent person , because his life is in no danger , and that it is the bare reward of his contumacy . as if it were ever allowable to betray truth and justice because they make ▪ no defence . the old duke , d'espernon who till then had been an object of envy , began to become an object of pity . ( . ) in six months time of the year he lost the duke de candale his eldest son , he saw the second condemn'd to death , on whom he had fix'd his heart and all his hopes , besides the death of the cardinal de la valette his third son , to whom it was thought cardinal de richelieu , as a recompence for his services had promis'd not to disturb the repose of his father's old age . orders follow'd immediately to confine him first to his house of plassa● , next to loches where he ended his days some years after . his constancy was such in that great age , that after having perform'd in his last sickness what ever could be desir'd of him for his conscience , without pride , or weakness , for he ever had religion and faith , he let fall never a word in relation to the cardinal , but what was at once christian like and noble . he ordered the duke de la vallette's two children to be recommended to the king , they having the honor to be related to him ; they were the children of his first marriage , for he had none by the second : and some suggesting to him that he would do well to do them the same office with the minister , whose power was so well known , he only answer'd mildly , i am his servant , without being able to resolve to request any thing of him . he dyed on the . of january , being years of age , repeating often , even in the middle of his prayers , and in the very arms of death , the name of his son de la valette , whom he look'd upon as his martyr . the cardinal de richelteu did not out-live him long : he dyed on the th of december of the same year , being only years of age , leaving to courtiers one of those ●ine , but too subtile , examples of what fortune , grandeur and favour is , never certain , never contented , and which is worse , little present , and long pass'd . the king who griev'd , in secret for having allow'd him so much power , and who had reason to dread all things from him , if he had liv'd much longer , did not think himself so much depriv'd of a faithful minister , as deliver'd of a proud , insupportable , master . it then prov'd a kind of merit at court not to have been too much his friend . but all things were soon alter'd there a second time by the king 's own death , on the th . of may . the duke de la valette call'd duke d'espernon since his father's death , came back from england , and surrender'd himself in the prison of the palace of paris , and was absolv'd by the unanimous voice of the parliament , with a general applause of the grandees , and of the people . no man of any note , that i know of , ever laid the ill success at fontarabie to his charge but the cardinal ; and as to the pretended intelligence or conspiracy with the two princes , far from upbraiding himself with it , he plac'd it among his best actions , since that tho ill us'd and oppress'd by the cardinal , to the highest degree he had been able to resist the temptation to right himself , and the duke his father , by a civil war , the greatest and most dangerous of all those of that time , if both had hearkn'd to it . as the cardinal de berulle dyed with the repute of sanctity , and that all those who have known him have testify'd the same , except cardinal richelieu ; it is a very material point to inform the public with the motives that could induce the said cardinal de richelieu to insert these words in the tenth page of his political testament . your majesty would thereby have freed the nation of the grisons for ever from the tyranny of the house of austria , had not fargis your ambassador in spain at the sollicitation of cardinal de berulle , made ( as he has confess'd it since ) without the knowledge and contrary to your majesty's express orders , a very disadvantageous treaty , to which you adher'd at last to please the pope , who pretended to be somewhat concern'd in that affair ; and in the page , the cardinal de berulle , and the lord keeper marrillac advised your majesty to abandon that poor prince , ( he speaks of the duke of mantua ) to the injustice and insatiable avidity of that nation , which is an enemy to the repose of christendom ( he means the spaniards ) to hinder them from disturbing it ; the rest of your council proved of a different opinion , both because spain durst not have formed such a resolution , immediately after the making of a treaty of vnion among the english ; and because if they should have followed so ill an advcie , they could not have been able to stop the progress of your arms. a little insight into the principal affairs transacted in the reign of lewis the xiii . is sufficient to know that the cardinals de berulle and de richelieu , were both ingag'd in the interest of the queen mother mary de medicis ; and that they liv'd in perfect intelligence until the year , when the war of the pon de cee broke out . all the queen mother's creatures did expect that cardinal de richelieu to whom that princess had given order & power to conclude an accommodation with the king her son's ministers , would mind their advantages as much as his own , and would not expose them to the vengance of their enemys , whom they had only irritated to remain faithful to the queen mother : nevertheless cardinal de richelieu only thought of obtaining a place for himself in the sacred college , and neglected all the rest . for which reason cardinal de berulle , the marshal and lord keeper marillac , monsieur and madam du fargis and several others fell out with him . in the second place , the first considerable affair which occur'd in the council of france in immediately after the cardinal's being introduc'd there , upon the marriage of madam henrietta of france youngest sister to the king with the prince of wales . the cardinal de richelieu pretended to attribute all the honor of it to himself , and negotiated with so much address that he obtained from the earls of holland and carlile , ambassadors from england more advantageous conditions for the catholic religion , than those which the king of great britain had granted to the spaniards when he desir'd their infanta for the said prince of wales . but the main difficulty was to prevail with the court of rome to approve the conditions cardinal de richelieu had made with the english ambassadors . the court pitched upon cardinal de berulle in order thereunto . he went to rome , and there began , continued , and concluded the famous negotiation , which is found among the manuscripts of lomenie in the king's library . he obtain'd what ever he desir'd of the pope , and that was sufficient to excite cardinal de richelieu's jealousy . as to the treaty which du fargis made at moncon in with the spaniard's in relation to valtelina , we must consider that the said du fargis had been six years before ambassador in spain , and that he was sent thither by the court of france before cardinal de richelieu entred into the ministry , which was in . the instructions which du fargis had receiv'd in taking leave of the court , from m. de puisieux secretary of state , son to the chancellor de sillery , oblig'd him to treat with the spaniards on the same conditions as he did since at moncon , because the council of state was resolved at that time not to break with spain . but cardinal de richelieu caused that resolution to be alter'd , and the collection of the pieces for the justification of that cardinal which were given to the public by m. du chatelet maintains in several places that the said cardinal sent m. du fargis orders directly contrary to those he had receiv'd in france . but m. du fargis persisted constantly in denying that ever he received them , and the thing remains undecided to this day . therefore it is not true that he himself confessed that he had concluded the treaty of moncon at the sollicitation of cardinal de berulle , without the king's knowledge , and contrary to his majesty's express orders . for among so many authors ▪ who have attack'd and defended the reputation of cardinal de richelieu , none ever bethought himself hitherto to write this point of history ; and there is no reason to believe the said cardinal upon his bare word , since he was so public an enemy to the cardinal de berulle that his panegyrists lose no occasion to blame him , and to push it as far as ever it can go . finally it is yet less true that the cardinal de berulle and the lord keeper marillac advis'd the king to abandon the duke of mantua to the injustice and insatiable avidity of the spaniards ; but that which is cerain in relation thereunto , as the two authors who are most devoted to cardinal de richelieu , who are those that have written his life , and the history of his ministry , do acknowledge , is ; that at the death of vincent duke of mantua , and when the duke de nevers succeeded him , it was put in agitation in the council of france , not whether the duke of nevers should be absolutely seconded ; but whether they should second him so far as to run the hazard on his account to break the peace of vervins which king henry the great had concluded with spain , and it was carry'd by the plurality of voices , that the king should not run the hazard of that risque : cardinal de berulle who was then one of the principal councellors of state , was of that opinion , he persisted in it until cardinal de richelieu , caused the said affair to be examin'd anew in the council , and made them resolve to maintain the duke de nevers against the emperor and against the king of spain . there was but six months space between those two deliberations , and they were both taken in the year . if the cardinal de berulle during the interval of the said six months pretended that it was not fit to exasperate the spaniards , in that he only conform'd to the determination of the council of state of france . but i maintain that after the second deliberation which was to protect the duke of mantua towards and against all , the cardinal de berulle never let fall any word to blame the war which france engaged into upon the account of the duke de nevers with the emperor ▪ and the king of spain , and no man can produce any printed paper , or manuscript which says any such thing . the end . the contents . chap. i. a short relation of the king 's great actions , until the peace concluded in the year — pag. . chap. ii. of the reformation of the ecclesiastical order . pag. . sect. i. which represents the ill state of the church at the beginning of the king's reign ; the present state thereof ; and what is necessary to be done to put it in that in which it ought to be . ib. sect. ii. of appeals , and the means to regulate the same . pag. . sect. iii. of privileg'd cases , and the means to regulate the same . pag. . sect. iv. which shews the consequence of the regalia pretended by the holy chappel of paris over the bishops of france , and opens a way to suppress the same pag. . sect. v. of the necessity of protracting the delays that are us'd in the course of ecclesiastical justice ▪ from whence it happens , that three crimes remain unpunish'd . pag. . sect. vi. which represents the prejudice the church receives by the four exemptions several churches enjoy , to the prejudice of the common right ; and proposes means to remedy the same . pag. . sect. vii . which represents the inconveniences that arise ▪ from the bishops not having an absolute power to dispose of the benefices that are under them . pag. . sect. viii . of the reformation of monasteries . pag. . sect. ix . of the obedience which is due to the pope . pag. . sect. x. which sets forth the advantage of learning ; and shews how it ought to be taught in this kingdom . pag. . sect xi . means to regulate the abuses which are committed by graduates in the obtaining of benefices . pag. . sect. xii . of the right of indult . pag. . chap. iii. of the nobility . pag. . sect. i. divers means to advantage the nobility , and to make them subsist honourably . ib. sect. ii. which treats of the means to prevent duels . pag. . chap. iv. of the third order of the kingdom . pag. . sect. i. which relates in general to the disorders of the courts of justice ; and examines in particular , whether the suppression of the sale of offices , and of hereditary offices , would be a proper remedy for such evils . ib. sect. ii. which proposes the general means which may be us'd to put a stop to the disorders of the courts of justice . pag. . sect. iii. which represents the necessity of hindring the officers of justice , from incroaching upon the king's authority . pag. . sect. iv. of the officers of the finances . pag. . sect. v. of the people . pag. . chap. v. which considers the state in it self . pag. . sect. i. which represents how necessary it is , that the several parts of the state should remain every one within the extent of their bounds . ib. sect. ii. which examines , whether it is better to make the governments triennial in this kingdom , than to leave them perpetual , according to the vse which has been practis'd hitherto ? pag. . sect. iii. which condemns survivorships ▪ pag. . chap. vi. which represents to the king , what men think he ought to consider , in relation to his person . pag. . chap. vii . which represents the present state of the king's houshold ; and sets forth what seems to be necessary , in order to put it into that in which it ought to be . pag. . chap. viii . of the prince's council . pag. , sect. i. which she●●s that the best prince stands in need of a good council . ib. sect. ii. which represents what capacity is requir'd in a good counsellor . pag. . sect. iii. which represents the integrity that is requir'd in a good counsellor . pag. . sect. iv. which represents what courage and foree is requir'd in a counsellor of state. pag. . sect. v. which represents what application is requir'd in counsellors of state. pag. . sect. vi. which represents the number of counsellors of state that is requisite , and that one among them ought to have the superiour authority . pag. . sect. vii . which represents what the king's behaviour is to be towards his counsellors , and shews , that in order to be well serv'd , the best expedient he can take is to use them well . pag. . the second part . chap. i. the first foundation of the happiness of a state is the establishment of the reign of god. pag. . chap. ii. reason must be the rule and conduct of a state. pag. . chap. iii. which shows that public interest should be the only end of those who govern states , or at least that it ought to be preferr'd to particular advantages . pag. . chap. iv. how much foresight is necessary for the government of a state. pag. . chap. v. punishment and reward are two points absolutely necessary for the conduct of states . pag. . chap. vi. a continual negotiation contributes much towards the good success of affairs . pag. . chap. vii . one of the greatest advantages , that can be procur'd to a state , is to give every one an employment suitable to his genius and capacity . pag. . chap. viii . of the evil which flatterers , detractors , and intriguers commonly occasion in states , and how necessary it is to remove them from kings , and to banish them from their courts . pag. . chap. ix . which treats of the power of the prince ; and is divided in to eight sections . pag. . sect. i. the prince must be powerful , to be respected by his subjects and by strangers . pag. . sect. ii. the prince must be powerful by his reputation ; and what is necessary to that end. pag. . sect. iii. the prince must be powerful by the force of his frontiers . pag. . sect. iv. of the power a state ought to have by its land-forces . this section has several subdivisions upon the account of the abundance of matter it contains which will be specify'd in the margin . pag. . sect. v. of natural power , pag. . sect. vi. which treats of trade , as a dependency of the power of the sea , and specifies those which are most convenient . pag. . sect. vii . which shews that gold and silver are one of the principal and most necessary supporters of the state ; declares the means to make this kingdom powerful in that kind ▪ shows the revenue of the same at present , and how it may be improv'd for the future , in discharging the people of three parts in four of the burthen which overwhelms them at this time. pag. . sect. viii . vvhich shews in few words , that the u●most point of the power of princes must consist in the possession of their subjects hearts . pag. . chap. x. which concludes this work , in showing that whatever is contain'd in it will prove ineffectual , unless the princes and their ministers are so mindful of the government of the state , as to omit nothing which their trust obliges them to , and not to abuse their power pag. . the end . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * saxony first abandon'd the king of sweden , brandenburg , the landgrave of hesse , several hans towns , wittemberg , parma , and mantua . * the judges royal had already begun a little to affect the cognisance of what only belongs to the church , under pretence of the possission of benefices , of which the bull of pope martin , given in the year . attributed the cognisance to them . * that first regulation never had the name , end , or effect of appeals . * ordinances of ● . † the word has its original from the practice of attornics and advocates ; who according to the order of applying themselves before the parliament by way of appeal , gave the same name to the recourse ecclesiasticks had there . * regulation of church-affairs . * the like remedy was practis'd years after the pragmatical sanction , to stop the course of the secular judges vsurpations over the ecclesiastical furisdiction ; it was ordain'd ▪ that those who had a mind to get letters out of the chancery , to oppose the res●ripts and letters of the popes , should ●● oblig'd to quote evidently the means by which they did pretend to justifie , that the pragmatical sanction was infring'd . † fifty years ago this distinction of priviledg'd cases and of common trespasses was unknown to the church : common trespasses are all the faults , the cognizance whereof belongs to the ecclesiastical tribunal . * agreement made between king francis t●● . and pope leo the . about benefices . * by letters patent of . charles the th granted that favour to the holy chappel , inj●●ad of the gift charles the ●●● had made to them of the remainder of all the ●ccounts deliver'd in the chamber , which he desir'd to be employ'd for the reparation both of the palace and of the holy chappel . * by the edict of ●ebr . . † the bishop du bellay . * the deed begins with these words , dominus rex . † the ordinance . dom episcopus a ●cujus episcopa●●● , ubi rex habet rega●●●● . philip the th in his philippines of the year ● . uses these words . io ●●quibus eccles●● reg●● . philip the th in his ordinance of the year . speaks thus , in the bishopricks in which we have a regalia . lewis the th in his ordinance of . cited by the first president le maitre , we have and do forbid all our officers in the archbishopricks , bishopricks , abbies , and other benefices , in which we have no right of regalia , or of guard , to establish any there , on pain of being punish'd as guilty of sacrilege . pasquier in the d book of enquiries , chap. . the late king henry the th , by his edict of the year . art. . we only design to enjoy the rights of the regalia , as our predecessors and our selves have done heretofore , without extending the same to the prejudice of the churches , that are exempted from it . and that good prince believing that the parliament of paris would judge to the contrary , suspended all the causes about the regalia for a year by his letters patent of the th of octob. . the king now reigning having inherited his piety as well as his kingdom , declares by the ordinance of . art. . that he only designs to enjoy the regalia as it has been done for the time past . and the clergy having complain'd , that those terms were not express enough . h. m. order'd his commissioners to make this answer . that the ordinance being refer'd to that , of . those terms were sufficient to satisfie the world , that he did not desire to enjoy the regalia in those places where it has not been enjoy'd for the time past . the ordinance , dominus rex , makes use of these words , consuevit capare regaliam . philip the th , in his ordinen●● of . says , regalias , quas nos & praedecessores nostri consuevimus precipere . and the philippine of the year . our predecessors kings upon the account of the regalia , and the nobility of the crown of france have us'd and have been accustom'd to be in possession and seisio . and since all the kings in their ordinances have only spoken of the custom and of their possessions . * quo'd enim , qua sine privilegio potest acquiri . consuctudine immemoriali , say the canons . * 't is but years age , since the archbishop of r●üen has been freed of the yoke of the primate of lyons , and has made himself primate of normandy . † the bishop du p●y is exempted from the jurisdiction of the archbishepr●●k of bourges , and so are many others in italy ; yet they are oblig'd to appear in the provincial councils that are held by the archbishops . st. gregory of tours exempted an hospital , a church , and a monastery from the jurisdiction of the bishops of autun , at the request of queen brun●halt ▪ and of her grandson king thierry . cro●bert archbishop of tours exempted the monastery of st. martin from his jurisdiction . * a letter of alexander the d to the chapter of pa●●s , shews , that the popes have granted exemptions . * the exemptions of sens , paris , bourges , bourdeaux , limoges , meaux , auxerre , and the country of mans , have been obtain'd by the anti-popes . * the exemption of auxerre , n●y●● . o ●●●ns , bea●vai● , chalo●● ▪ ang is p●irie●s and ly●●s are grounded on the concessions of the bishops , and the agreement made among them . * cypr'anus . frustra quidam qui ratione vincuntur consuetudinem nobis opponunt , quosi consuetudo major sit veritate , aut non fuerit in spiritualibus sequendum ; si . melius fuerit à spiritu sancto revelatum . * sess . . cha. of ref. . capitula & cathedralium & aliarum majerum ecclesiarum illorum persona exemptionibus , consuctedinibus , sententiis . juramentis , concordatis , feri si possint , quo min●s à suis episcopis , & aliis majoribus prelatis per se ipses soles , vel illis quibus sine videtur adjunctis , juxta canonicas sanctiones , toties quoties opus fucrit visitari , corrigi , & emendari , etiam authoritate apostolica pessint & val●ant . * i●●dorus . sape per regnum terrenum , coele●te regnum profecit , ut●… ecclesiam positi contra ●●dem & disciplinam ecclesia agunt , vigore principium conte●antur . * ordinance of orleans , art. . all canons and chapters , whether seculars or regulars , and if cathedral or collegiat● churches , shall be equally subject to the archbishop , or diocesan bishop , without being allow'd to plead any priviledge or exemption , in relation to the visitation and punishment of crimes , all opposition or appeals whatever notwithstanding , without prejudice to the same , of which we have transferr'd the cognizance and retain'd the same to our privy-council . * the year . * nouvell . . ch. . the year . * st. gregory's epistle to secundinus , ▪ in the year . justifies that point . * sess . . ch. . of reff . † idem sess . . of the same chapter . * sess . . the council of basle ordained , that one third part of the benefices should be conferr'd on masters of arts , batch●lor● . licenciates . and doctors of physick , law , and theclogy , which have studied a certain time in a priviledg'd vniversity . by the concordate , which was made since at the council of lateran , between leo x. and francis i. it was agreed , that graduates should enjoy vacant benefices the d : pa●s of the year , viz. in the months of january , april , july , and october . * a grant from the pope to confer benefices . ) † bull of pope eugene , granted to king charles th . † the bull was sent to king francis i. in . * non creditur referenti , nisi constet de relato . * aug. ipsa mutati● consu●t●di●●● etiam quae adjuvant uti●●tate no●ita●perturbat . * duty yearly paid by the judges and other officers , &c. * the place where the courts of judicature are held . * a yearly revenue which the king receives from all officers of judicature , &c. * those who farm the king's revenue . * when the command of the sea was given to the cardinal , trade was almost totally ruin'd , and the king had not one ship. * t●●men , or all those who are not of the order of the nobility or gentry . to omit nothing , i will observe in this place , that it is better to have magazins of salt petre , of brimstone and of coals than of powder ready made , by reason that it spoils in time by keeping , and that an accident of fite is the more to be fear'd . * the power of princes is the only means that can produce that effect and therefore it only remains to know what forces ought to be kept on foot in this kingdom . * the number of men which ought to be kept on foot in this kingdom . * war is sometimes necessary . * those that farm the public revenue . * arriere ban. * strangers necessary . * a remedy to make armys subsist . * this truth is so well justify'd by the male administration of the summs raised for the reparation of citys and churches . * cavalry . * remarks to make armies subsist , and to make war advantagiously . * a waggon with four horses must carry seven or eight septiers of wheat in all countrys , amounting to . pound weight . every septier weighing in bread it ought to carry rations which must weight pounds , in bisket it will carry rations , thus good waggons will carry bread for a fortnight for a thousand men , and bisket for three weeks , and consequently . waggons will carry bread for . days and bisket for for an army of men. * compat of gattary . * the guns plac'd in the gallerys of the gallies . * the manuscript is defective in this place . * the draps de sceau , are made at roan , and the draps de meunier at remorantin , and elboeuf . * persons imploy'd to pay private services . * persons imploy'd to pay private services . * persons imploy'd to pay private services . * rents created upon the city , at per cent. salt , one million livers . aids livers . 〈…〉 liv●●● . all these rents have been constituted from the year ● until . no 〈…〉 have 〈…〉 of henry the th n●r even in that of henry the ● there are ●● gen●ralities ; in every ●ffice officers , which are in all . every one of which ●aving crowns salary , the third part thereof amounts to livers . * like guild-hall . * of millions to which all the different sorts of leveys which are rais'd upon the people by virtue of the b●●ff of the taille amount ; there are millions imployed towards the payment of the charges settled upon the taille , which consist in rents , or in salaries and taxation of offices , or in rights which have been engag'd to them . tho the farm of the aids produces yearly millions , there is but livers return'd out of it into the exchequet . the rents , salaries , taxationis , and rights ingag'd upon the said aids , consume all the rest , which is upwards of three millions and a half . notwithstanding all the gabelles produce near millions , there is only five millions and odd livers of the same return'd into the exchequer , because the remaindor which amounts to near millions is imploy'd towards the payment of the rents created upon the said gabelles , or towards the salaries , taxations and duties of the officers of the magazins of salt , or towards the salaries of the parliament of paris , chamber of accounts , count of aids , grand council or the king's secretaries . although all the other farms of the state produce twelve millions , the king receives but ten of them , because upwards of two millions must be deducted out of the same which are settled for the payment of some rents . salary of officers , taxations and alienated duties . * the major part of the rents constituted upon the taille since are still in the hands of the grand-farmers , of their heirs , or of those to whom they have made them over , and they have purchas'd them at so low a rate , that they dayly expect the retrenchment of them , which would be a far greater greivance to them than the reimbursement of the same , at the common price . the new rents established upon the aids , are only sold at seven years purchase , and they amount to two millions . the new rents upon the gab●lles are sold at seven years and a half purchase , and they amount to five millions thousand livers . * the annual duty the said officers pay to the king. * the rents of which the courant price is seven years purchace , will amount justly to six millions thousand livers , viz. six millions which have been settled out of the eight allienated millions upon the tailles in the month of february . thousand livers settled by le sr. gaillard and his partners in the month of january . and thousand livers settled by an edict of the month of march of the said year , by the creditors of moyssel and payen . * farming part of the revenue . * philip de valois . * ammian marcellin lib. and . * that policy was grounded upon the saying of a great prince , who tho' depriv'd of the light which consists in faith , nevertheless was so clear sighted by reason , that he thought he could never want money in his necessities , since he was belov'd by his people , who had enough for him . cyrus and xenophon , book the th of his institution . * daughter to henry the by ●●● dutches de ver●euil . * cullys . * cullys . the arts of empire and mysteries of state discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms, grounded on authority and experience, and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations / by the ever-renowned knight, sir walter raleigh ; published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing r estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the arts of empire and mysteries of state discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms, grounded on authority and experience, and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations / by the ever-renowned knight, sir walter raleigh ; published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . milton, john, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed by g. croom for joseph watts ..., london : . first ed. published in as: the cabinet-council, containing the chief arts of empire and mysteries of state. cf. bm. advertisements: p. [ ] at beginning and p. [ ]-[ ] at end. reproduction of original in university of michigan libraries. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . monarchy. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - tcp staff (michigan) sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the arts of empire , and mysteries of state discabineted . in political and polemical aphorisms , grounded on authority and experience . and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations . by the ever-renowned knight sir walter raleigh , published by john milton esq quis martem tunica tectum , adamantina digne scripserit ? london , printed by g. croom , for joseph watts at the angel in st. paul's church-yard , . to the reader . having had the manuscript of this treatise , written by sir walter raleigh , many years in my hands , and finding it lately by chance among other books and papers , upon reading thereof , i thought it a kind of injury to withhold longer the work of so eminent an author from the publick ; it being both answerable in stile to other works of his already extant , as far as the subject would permit , and given me for a true copy by a learned man at his death , who had collected several such pieces . john milton , the principal contents . chap. . the definition and division of publick weales and sovereign states , according to their several species or kinds page chap. . of sovereign or monarchick government , with its essential marks and specifical differences p. chap. . of monarchies seignioril , exemplified in the turkish and west-indian empire p. chap. . of monarchies royal , with the means to maintain them p. chap. . of monarchies tyrannical p. chap. . of new-found monarchies and principalities , with the means to perpetuate them p. chap. . of councils and counsellors in general p. chap. . of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties and democraties p. chap. . of officers and commissioners , with their respective distinctions p. chap. . of magistrates , their qualifications and elections p. chap. . observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure and war p. chap. . extrinsick observations , shewing how to deal with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designs , and decypher their intendments p. chap. . observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor p. chap. . of the princes intimate counsellors and ministers of state , with their several requisites p. chap. . the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment p. chap. . of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated p. chap. . of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained p. chap. . of conspiracy and treason ; with the causes , and ways of prevention or discovery p. chap. . of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it p. chap. . of diffidence and dissimulation in the management of state affairs p. chap. . of war defensive and invasive ; with instructions touching laws of arms , soldiers and military discipline p. chap. . of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions p. chap. . of councils in war , and directions tactick and stratagematick ; with advice how to make an honorable peace p. chap. . of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof p. chap. . a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen , and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events p. chap. . maxims of state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policy in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narrations , and historical parallels p. advertisement . the excellent woman described by her true characters , and their opposites , printed for j. watts . the arts of empire , and mysteries of state. chap. i. the definition and division of publick weales and sovereign states , according to their several species or kinds . a common-wealth is a certain sovereign government of many families , with those things that are common among them . all common-wealths are either monarchies , or all common-wealths are either aristocraties , or all common-wealths are either democraties . or a monarchy is that state where the sovereignty resteth in the person of one only prince . an aristocraty , is where some small part of the people have in them as a body corporate , the sovereignty and supreme power of the whole state. a democraty , is where all the people have power and authority sovereign . so doth it appear , that the place and person where the sovereignty resteth , doth cause the state to be either a monarchy , an aristocraty , or popular government . chap. ii. of sovereign or monarchick government , with its essential marks , and specifical differences . sovereignty is an absolute and perpetual power in every publick state , and he is properly and only a sovereign , that acknowledgeth no superior or equal , nor holdeth of any other prince , person or power , but god and his own sword. the first mark of sovereignty , is absolute power and authority to command all subjects in general , and every of them in particular , without consent of any other person or persons , either greater or inferior to himself . the second mark of majesty is authority to make war , and conclude peace at his pleasure . the third is power to bestow all honors and chief offices at his pleasure . the fourth mark of sovereignty is appellation . the fifth mark and last , is power to pardon all subjects by rigor of law or otherwise , condemned in life , lands , goods or honors . these powers are not to be imparted to any officer , deputy or other magistrate , but in the prince's absence , and for some urgent occasion . monarchies are of three sorts , signioril , royal and tyrannical . the diversity of monarchies doth not proceed from the nature of the state , but the diverse proceedings of those princes that govern ; for great difference there may be between the nature of the commonwealth and the government thereof . that prince that giveth the magistracies honors and offices without respect of nobility , riches or vertue , may be said to govern popularly . and that monarchy may be said to be governed aristocratically , when the monarch imparteth the principal honors and offices to the noble and rich men only . the same difference there is to be found in states aristocratical and popular ; for the one and the other may be both signioril or tyrannical . a monarch signioril is he who by force of arms and just war , is made owner of mens bodies and goods , and governeth them as a master of a family governeth base servants and slaves . a monarch royal , is he whose subjects are obedient unto his laws , and the monarch himself obeyeth the laws of god and nature , suffering every subject to enjoy liberty natural , with property in lands and goods , governing as a father governeth his children . a monarch tyrannical , is he who without regard to the law of god or nature , commandeth free-men as slaves and useth their lands and goods as his own . chap. iii. of monarchy signioril , exemplified in the turkish and west-indian empire . all people subject to princes , are governed as free-men by their prince , and certain other particular lords of lands and liberties ; who not by the princes commission , but by ancient laws or custom , have inheritance and tenements ; or else they are by one prince and his ministers commanded , which ministers have not by law or ordinance , any authority or interest of themselves , but being like to the people ( base men and slaves ) they command only by commission in the princes name ; and the authority of those ministers doth cease at the princes pleasure , so that the people do not acknowledge any superior but the prince , nor owe any service to other mean lords : so as all the people stand without property in lands or goods ; for example , the empire of turky and the west-indies . the provinces of this monarchy are allotted to sundry magistrates or ministers , and they altered and removed at the princes pleasure ; but it is otherwise in a monarchy royal , because the monarch is there accompanied with many mean lords . and albeit those mean lords are subjects unto the prince , yet have they particular tenants , who may not , without just cause , be dispossessed by the prince ; and those people having had dependency of their lords and their ancestors , do ever beare unto them a certain natural love and dutiful respect ; whoso therefore compareth these principalities , shall perceive , that to conquer a state signioril there is great difficulty , but being conquered , it may easily be maintained ; for the difficulty to conquer such a state , proceedeth from the lack of mean lords to call in and assist the prince that doth invade : who therefore desireth to subdue a nation thus governed , must of force assault all the people , and rather trust in his own strength than the aid of the country . but if he can prevail , then one only fear remaineth , which is the prince's posterity , which necessarily must be extinguished , because the prince's race only hath interest both in the people and soldiers . but to enter a monarchy royal , is an enterprise of no great difficulty , when he that doth enter , hath the friendship and aid of some mean lords to take his part , and prepare the place where he is to arrive . chap. iv. of monarchies royal , with the means to maintain them . monarchies royal are for the most part ancient and hereditary , and consequently easie to be governed . for it is sufficient for the prince to maintain the old laws , and on occasion temporize with those accidents that happen : such a state cannot be taken from the prince without excessive force , and if it be , it shall be soon recovered . example , england and france . but if a monarchy newly conquered , be annexed unto an old , and not properly ancient , then it is with much more difficulty maintained . first , for that men naturally inclined to variation , are easily induced to take arms against him that newly governeth . secondly , every new prince is forced to exact as well upon those subjects that joyned with him , as those that did resist him , and therefore shall offend both . example , ireland annexed to the crown of england , sicilia and naples to spain . the means to maintain such a monarchy , is , first , to extinguish the race of him that was anciently prince . secondly , to continue all laws and customs in the former force ; for so shall the subject find nothing altered but the prince , and therefore will soon rest contented ; and the rather if that new monarchy , and the ancient dominion of the prince , be of one language : but if the people be of a contrary language and humor , then to hold it , there needeth great industry and fortune ; in that case the best way is , that the prince should inhabit there , as well to incounter all inconveniences proceeding from the subject , as to preserve the people from oppression of his own ministers . another way is , to send thither certain colonies , and plant them in fit places , or else to settle some garisons both of horse and foot ; but colonies are less chargeable to the prince . as for the people inhabitant ( who must necessarily remove , they being a small number and dispossessed ) they cannot have power to offend ; for in that case , this rule or maxim shall be found true , that men must be either kindly intreated , or with all extremity oppressed ; because of light injuries they may be revenged , but of utter oppression they cannot . a third way to hold a conquered dominion , is , to cherish and defend the neighbors of little power , and oppress or keep under those that are most potent ; and above all , to take order that no forreign prince or power do enter ; for it is ever to be looked for , that so many of the nation as are discontented , either for ambition or fear , will be ever ready to bring in strangers : and to conclude this matter of principality annexed , i say it behoveth every prince possessed of such a state , never to increase the power of any potent nighbor , never to oppress those that are of small power , never to permit any forreign potentate to enter , but ever to plant colonies and garisons , or else to make that dominion his chief habitation . chap. v. of monarchies tyrannical . tyrannical princes are not advanced by favor , neither do they trust unto fortune , but by degrees of war , or else by some other indirect means do aspire unto greatness ; and therein do maintain themselves by all ways either honest or dishonest , without respect of justice , conscience or law either of nations or nature : a prince by such impious means aspired , and desiring to hold that he hath gained , will take order that the cruelties he committeth may be done roundly , suddenly , and as it were at an instant ; for if they be executed at leisure and by piece-meal , then will the prince's fears continue long , and the terror in subjects take deeper impression , whose nature is such , that either they must be bound by benefits , or by cruelty made sure from offending : example , dionysius and agathocles . chap. vi. of new found monarchies and principalities , with the means to perpetuate them . some other princes there are , that from private estate have aspired to sovereignty , not by unnatural or impious proceedings as the former , but by vertue and fortune , and being aspired , have found no great difficulty to be maintained ; for such a prince having no other dominion , is forced to settle himself where he is become a prince : but here is to be noted , that albeit such a man be vertuous , yet wanting fortune , his vertue proveth to small purpose , and fortune without vertue doth seldom work any great effect . howsoever it be , a prince being aspired , both by the aid of the one and of the other , shall notwithstanding find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten ; because he is forced to introduce new laws and new orders of government differing from the old , as well for his own security , as confirmation of the government ; for avoiding of which dangers , he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compel his subjects to obey , or must pray in aid of others : if he can do the first , he needeth not doubt , but being driven to the other , his greatness cannot long continue ; for albeit a matter of no difficulty , it is to perswade a people ; yet to make them constant , is a work well near impossible . example , theseus , cyrus , romulus . the second sort of new princes are such as be aspired by favor or corruption , or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends : a prince by any or all these means advanced , and desirous to hold his estate , must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other ; which may be done by this means : first , to assure all enemies from offending . secondly , to win the love and friendship of so many neighbors as possibly he may . thirdly , to compass all designs tending to his honor or profit , and bring them to pass either by fraud or force . fourthly , to make himself honored and followed of captains and soldiers . fifthly , to oppress all those that would or can offend . sixthly , to be obsequious and liberal to friends , magnanimous and terrible to foes . seventhly , to cass all old and unfaithful bands , and entertain new . eighthly , to hold such amity with kings and princes , as they ought reasonably to favor him , or else they would offend ; easily they cannot . example , giovannio , torrigiani , caesar , borgi . the third and last means whereby private persons do aspire to principalities , is not force and violence , but meer good will and favor of men. the cause or occasion thereof , is only vertue or fortune , or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness , because he aspireth either by favor of the people , or by favor of the nobility ; for these contrary humors are in all common-wealths to be found . and the reason thereof is , that the great men do ever endeavor to oppress the people , and the people do labor not to be oppressed by them . of these divers appetites one of these three effects do proceed , viz. principality , liberty , or licentious life . principality may come either by love of the multitude , or of the great men ; for when any of these factions do find it self oppressed , then do they soon consent to make one a prince , hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended . example , francesco sforza , alessandro de medici . a prince in this sort aspired , to maintain his estate , must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced ; for if by favor of great men he be aspired , then must he meet with many difficulties ; for having about him divers persons of great quality , and such as were but lately his equals , hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth : but if the prince be advanced by the people , few or none shall hardly disobey him . so it appeareth that a prince made by the multitude , is much more secure than he whom the nobility preferreth ; for common people do not desire to enjoy more than their own , and to be defended from oppression ; but great men do study not only to hold their own , but also to command and insult upon inferiors . note that all monarchies are principalities . but all principalities are not monarchies . chap. vii . of councils , and counsellors in general . a senate or council is a certain lawful assembly of counsellors , to give advice to him or them that have in the commonweale power sovereign . a counsellor is called in the latine senator ; which word signifieth in effect an old man : the grecians and romans also most commonly composed their councils of ancient and expert persons ; for if they , or the greater part of them had been young men , then might the council have more properly been called a juvenate than a senate . the chief and most necessary note required in a counsellor is to have no dependence of any other prince or commonweale ; either oath , homage , natural obligation , pention , or reward : in this point the venetians have been ever most precise , and for that reason , do not admit any cardinal or other clergy-man to be either of or at their councils , therefore when the venetian senate is assembled , the usher being ready to shut the door , cryeth aloud , fuora preti , depart priest. note also that in every state , of what quality soever , a secret or cabinet-council is mainly necessary . chap. viii . of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties , and democraties . the king of spain , for the government of his dominions hath seven councils , ( viz. ) the council of the indies , the council of spain , the council of italy and the low countries , the council of war , the council of orders , the council of inquisition , and the council royal. in france are three councils , ( viz. ) the council privy , the council of judges , which they call presidents et conceliers de parlament , and the great council , which they call assemblies du troys estates . of councils in aristocraties . in venice , beside the senate and great council , are four councils , ( viz. ) the sages of the sea , the sages of the land , the council of tenn , the three presidents of quarantia , and the senate : all which councils do amount to one hundred and twenty persons , with the magistrates . the great council of ragusa consisteth of sixty persons , and hath another privy council of twelve . of councils in democraties . genoua hath three councils : the great council of two hundred , the senate which consisteth of sixty , and the privy council which hath twenty six counsellors : so it doth appear that in all commonwealths , be they monarchies , aristocracies , or popular states . the council-privy is most necessary , and often used ; also this difference is to be noted between the councils in monarchies , and the councils in aristocracies and states popular ; that is to say , that all deliberations fit to be published , are in a monarchy consulted and resolved upon in the council privy , and after ratified by common council ; but in optimacies or popular government the custom is contrary . here also is to be noted , that albeit the use and authority of every senate a privy council is most needful , yet hath it no authority to command but in the name of those in whom the sovereignty resteth : for if counsellors had power to command absolutely , then should they be sovereigns , and consequently all execution at their pleasure ; which may not be without detracting from majesty , which is a thing so sovereign and sacred , as no citizen or subject of what quality soever , may touch or approach thereunto . chap. ix . of officers and commissioners with their respective distinctions . an officer is a person publick , that hath charge ordinary and limited by law. a commissioner is also a person publick , but his charge is extraordinary and limited by commission . officers are of two sorts , and so be commissioners ; the one hath power to command , and are called magistrates : the other hath authority to execute : so the one and the other are persons publick : yet are not all publick persons either officers or commissioners . commissioners are ordained to govern in provinces , in war , in justice , in disposing the treasure , or some other function concerning the state ; but all commissions do spring and proceed from the sovereign , magistrates and commissioners . and here is to be noted , that every commission ceaseth if he that granted the commission doth dye , or revoke it , or if the commissioners during his commission shall aspire to office and authority equal to his that made it . chap. x. of magistrates , their qualifications and elections . a magistrate is an officer having power to command in the state ; and albeit that every magistrate be an officer , yet every officer is not a magistrate , but they only that have power to command . also in making officers of and magistrates in every commonweale , three things are specially to be observed ( viz. ) who doth make them , what men they are that should be made , and the form and manner how they are made . the first appertaineth to him or them in whom the sovereignty resteth ; the second also belongeth to majesty ; yet therein the laws are commonly followed , especially in aristocracies and states popular ; in the one the magistrates are chosen out of the most wealthy or most noble : in the other , elected out of the whole multitude . the form and manner of choosing magistrates in aristocracies and states popular , is either by election , by lot , or by both , and their office is to compel those that do not obey what sovereignty commandeth : for all force of commandment lieth in compulsion . commandment likewise is of two sorts ; the one may be called sovereign and absolute , above laws , above magistrates , and above people . in monarchies such command is proper to the prince only ; in aristocracies it resteth in the nobility : and in democracies the people have that power . the second commandments are subject both to sovereignty and law. here is to be noted , that every magistrate may recall his own commandment , and forbid what he did command , yet cannot revoke that which he hath judged . * also in the presence of the sovereign , all authority of magistrates ceaseth ; and in presence of great magistrates the inferior have no power ; and magistrates equal cannot do any thing but by consent , if his colleagues or fellow-magistrates be present . chap. xi . observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure and war. the first concern matter intrinsick . the second touch matter extrinsick . matters intrinsick are three . the administration of justice . the managing of the treasure . the disposing of things appertaining to war. matters extrinsick are also three . the skill how to deal with neighbors . the diligence to vent their designs . the way how to win so much confidence with some of them , as to be made partaker of whatsoever they mean to enterprise . touching administration of justice . the good and direct administration of justice , is in all places a principal part of government ; for seldom or never shall we see any people discontented and desirous of alteration , where justice is equally administred without respect of persons ; and in every state this consideration is required , but most of all in countries that do front upon other princes , or were lately conquered : hereunto the princes vigilancy and the magistrates uprightness are especially required ; for oft-tentimes the prince is deceived , and the magistrates corrupted ; it behoveth also the prince to maintain the judges and ministers of justice in their reputation , and yet to have a vigilant eye upon their proceedings , and the rather if their authority do include equity , and from their censure be no appeal ; and if their office be during life , and they are men born and dwelling in the same country ; all these things are duly to be considered of the prince ; for as to call the judges into question , is as it were to disgrace the judicial seat ; so to wink at their corruptions were matter of just discontent to the subject : in this case therefore the prince cannot do more than by his wisdom to make choice of good men ; and being chosen , to hold them in good reputation so as the ordinary course of justice may proceed ; for otherwise great disorder , contempt , and general confusion will ensue thereof . secondly , he is to keep his eye open upon their proceedings ; and lastly to reserve unto himself a supreme power of appellation . touching the treasure . the want of money is in all states very perilous , and most of all in those which are of least strength , and do confine upon nations with whom they have commonly war , or unassured peace , but most perilous of all to those governments which are remote from the prince , or place where they are to be relieved . the means to levy treasure are four. first , the customs and impositions upon all forts of merchandize and traffick is to be looked unto and advanced . secondly , the excessive eating of usury must be suppressed . thirdly , all superfluous charges and expences are to be taken away . lastly , the doings and accounts of ministers are severally to be examined . touching the matter of custom and impost thereof , assuredly a great profit is in every state to be raised ; chiefly where peace hath long continued , and where the country affordeth much plenty of commodities to be carried out , and where ports are to receive shipping . the moderating of interest is ever necessary , and chiefly in this age , by reason that money aboundeth in europe ; since the traffick into the indies ; for such men as have money in their hands great plenty , would in no wise imploy the same in merchandize , if lawful it were to receive the utmost usury , being a course of most profit and greatest security . the taking away of superfluous expences is no other thing than a certain wise and laudable parsimony ; which the romans and other well governed states did use . these expences consist in fees , allowances , and wages granted to ministers of little or no necessity ; also in pensions , rewards , entertainments and donaries , with small difficulty to be moderated , or easily to be suppressed . * by abridging or taking away of these needless expences a marvelous profit will be saved for the prince ; but if he continue them , and by imposing upon the people do think to increase his treasure or revenue , besides the loss of their love , he may also hazard their obedience , with many other inconveniences . touching war. whatsoever prince or common-weale is neighbour to any people which can , will , or were wont to offend , it is necessary to have not only all things prepared for defence of his person and country , but also to forecast and use every caution and other diligence : for the inconveniencies which happen to government , are sudden and unlook'd for ; yea , the providence and provision required in this case ought to be such as the expences all other ways imployed must stay to supply the necessity of war. chap xii . extrinsick observation , shewing how to deal with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designs , and decipher their intendments . this first point of matter extrinsick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good , but otherwise becometh dangerous ; for the proceeding must be divers according to the diversity of the ends which the prince or governor intendeth ; for if he desire to continue peace with his neighbors , one way is to be taken ; but otherwise he is to work that seeketh occasion to break , and to become an enemy to one or more of his neighbors . if he do desire to live peaceably withal , then he is to observe these rules ( viz. ) first , to hold and continue firmly all contracts and capitulations . secondly , to shew himself resolved neither to offer nor take the least touch of wrong or injury . thirdly , with all care and favor to further commerce and reciproke traffick for the profit of the subject , and increase of the princes revenue . fourthly , covertly to win so great confidence with neighbors , as in all actions of unkindness among them he may be made umpire . fifthly , to become so well believed with them as he may remove such diffidences as grow to his own disadvantage . sixthly , not to deny protection or aid to them that are the weakest , and chiefly such as do and will endure his fortune . lastly , in favouring , aiding and protecting ( unless necessity shall otherwise so require ) to do it moderately , so as they who are to be aided , become not jealous , and consequently seek adherency elsewhere , which oft-times hath opened way to other neighbors that desire a like occasion . how to prevent their designs . this point in time of war is with great diligence to be looked unto ; also in time of peace to prevent all occasions that may kindle war is behoveful ; for to foresee what may happen to the prejudice of a princes profit or reputation , is a part of great wisdom . the means to attain the intelligence of these things are two . the first is by friends , the next by espials ; the one for the most part faithful , the other not so assured . these matters are well to be considered ; for albeit the nature of man desireth nothing more than curiously to know the doings of others , yet are those things to be handled with so great secrecy and dissimulation as the princes intent be not in any wise suspected , nor the ministers made odious ; for these sometimes to win themselves reputation , do devise causes of difference where no need is , divining of things future which prove to the prejudice of their own prince . to win confidence with neighbors . this is chiefly attained unto by being loved and honored ; for these things do work so many good effects , as daily experience sufficeth without any express example to prove them of great force . the ways to win love and trust , is in all actions to proceed justly , and sometimes to wink at wrongs , or set aside unnecessary revenges ; and if any thing be done not justifiable , or unfit to be allowed , as oftentimes it happeneth , there to lay the blame upon the minister , which must be performed with so great show of revenge and dissimulation , by reproving and punishing the minister , as the princes offended may be satisfied , and believe that the cause of unkindness proceeded from thence . now only it resteth that somewhat should be said touching provision , to the end the people may not be drawn into despair by famine , or extream dearth of victual , and chiefly for want of corn , which is one principal consideration to be regarded , according to the italian proverb , pane in piazza , giustitia in palazzo , siverezza per tutto : whereunto i could wish every prince or supreme governor to be thus qualified ( viz. ) facile de audienza : non facile de credenza , desioso de spedition , essemplare in costunii proprii , & inquei de sua casa tale chevorra governare , e non esser governato da altro ; he della raggione . chap. xiii . observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor . every good and lawful principality is either elective or successive : of them election seemeth the more ancient ; but succession in divers respects the better : minore discrimine sumitur princeps quam quaeritur . tac. the chief and only endeavor of every good prince , ought to be the commodity and security of the subjects , as contrariwise the tyrant seeketh his own private profit with the oppression of his people : civium non servitus sed tutela tradita est . sal. to the perfection of every good prince , two things are necessarily required ( viz. ) prudence and vertue ; the one to direct his doings , the other to govern his life : rex eris si recte feceris . hor. the second care which appertaineth to a good prince , is to make his subjects like unto himself ; for thereby he is not only honored , but they also the better governed : facile imperium in bonos . plaut . subjects are made good by two means ( viz. ) by constraint of law , and the princes example ; for in all estates , the people do imitate those conditions whereunto they see the prince enclined : quicquid faciunt principes , praecipere videantur . quintil. all vertues be required in a prince , but justice and clemency are most necessary ; for justice is a habit of doing things justly , as well to himself as others , and giving to every one so much as to him appertaineth : this is that vertue that preserveth concord among men , and whereof they be called good : jus & acquit as vincula civitatum . cic. * it is the quality of this vertue also , to proceed equally and temperately ; it informeth the prince not to surcharge the subjects with infinite laws ; for thereof proceedeth the impoverishment of the subjects and the inriching of lawyers , a kind of men which in ages more ancient , did seem of no necessity : sine causidicis satis foelices olim fuere futur acque sunt urbes . sal. the next vertue required in princes is clemency , being an inclination of the mind to lenity and compassion , yet tempered with severity and judgment ; this quality is fit for all great personages , but chiefly princes , because their occasion to use it is most ; by it also the love of men is gained : qui vult regnare , languida regnet manu . sen. after clemency , fidelity is expected in all good princes , which is a certain performance and observation of word and promise ; this vertue seemeth to accompany justice , or is as it were the same , and therefore most fit for princes : sanctissimum generis humani bonum . liv. as fidelity followeth justice , so doth modesty accompany clemency ; modesty is a temperature of reason , whereby the mind of man is so governed , as neither in action or opinion he over-deemeth of himself , or any thing that is his ; a quality not common in fortunate folk , and most rare in princes : superbia commune nobilitatis malum . sal. this vertue doth also moderate all external demonstration of insolence , pride and arrogance , and therefore necessary to be known of princes , and all others whom favor or fortune have advanced : impone foelicitati tua fraenos , facilius illam reges . curt. but as princes are to observe the bounds of modesty , so may they not forget the majesty appertaining to their supreme honor , being a certain reverend greatness due to princely vertue and royal state ; a grace and gravity no less beseeming a prince than vertue it self ; for neither over-much familiarity , nor too great austerity , ought to be used by princes : facilitas autoritatem , severitas amorem minuit . tac. to these vertues we may apply liberality , which doth not only adorn , but highly advance the honor due to princes ; thereby also the good will of men is gained ; for nothing is more fitting a prince's nature than bounty , the same being accompanied with judgment , and performed according to the laws of liberality : perdere multi sciunt , donare nesciunt . tac. it seemeth also that prudence is not only fit , but also , among other vertues , necessary in a prince ; for the daily use thereof is in all humane actions required , and chiefly in matters of state and government : prudentia imperantis propria & unica virtus . arist. the success of all worldly proceedings , doth shew that prudence hath compassed the prosperous event of humane actions , more than force of arms or other power : mens una sapiens plurium vincit manus . eurip. prudence is either natural , or received from others ; for whoso can counsel himself what is fit to be done , needeth not the advice of others ; but they that want such perfection , and are nevertheless capable , and are willing to know what others inform , ought to be accounted wise enough : laudatissimus est qui cuncta videbit , sed laudandus est is qui paret recte monenti . hesiod . chap. xiv . of the princes intimate counsellors and ministres of state , with their several requisites . albeit the excellent spirit of some princes be such as doth justly deserve the highest commendation ; yet for that every course of life needeth the aid of men , and the mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite care appertaining to publick affairs ; it behoveth princes to be assisted : magna negotia , adjutoribus egent . tac. the assistants may be properly divided into counsellors and ministers ; the one to advise , the other to execute : without counsel , no kingdom , no state , no private house can stand ; for experience hath proved , that common-weales have prospered so long as good counsel did govern , but when favor , fear or voluptuousness entered , those nations became disordered ; and in the end subject to slavery : quiddam sacrum profecto est consultatio . plato . counsellors are men specially selected to give advice to princes or common-wealths , as well in peace as in war ; the chief qualities required in such men , are fidelity and knowledge ; which two concurring do make them both good and wise , and consequently fit for counsel : prudentis proprium munus recte consulere . arist. the election of counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among men of long experience and grave years ; for as youth is fittest for action in respect of corporal strength ; so elder folk having felt the force of every fortune , and observed the course of worldly proceedings do seem most meet for consultation : consilia senum , facta juvenum . plato . albeit we say that the excellency of wisdom should be in counsellors ; yet do we not require so quick and fiery a conceit as is more apt for innovation than orderly government : hebetiores quam acutiores melius remp. administrant . thucyd. to fidelity and experience we wish that our counsellors should be endued with piety , liberty , constancy , modesty and silence ; for as the aid and assistance of god is that which governeth all good counsels , so liberty of speech , and magnanimous uttering of what is good and fit , is necessary in counsellors . likewise to be constant and not to vary in opinion , either for fear or favor , is very commendable : also as modesty in giving counsel escheweth all offences , and gaineth good will , so secresie is the best and most secure means to govern all publick affairs : res magnae sustineri non possunt ab eo qui tacere nequit . curt. the first obstacle to good counsel is pertinacy or opiniativeness ; a condition far unfit for counsellors ; yet some men are so far in love with their own opiniastre conceits , as that they cannot patiently endure opposition . secondly , discord must from counsellors be removed , because private offence many times impeacheth publick proceedings . thirdly , affection is an enemy to counsel , the same being commonly accompanied with anger , wherewith nothing can be rightly or considerately done . lastly , avarice seemeth a vice worthy to be abhorred of all counsellors , because it driveth away both fidelity and honesty , the principal pillars of all good counsel : pessimum veri affectus & judicii venenum , utilit as . tac. to good counsel other impediments there are , which square not with wisdom ; for all crafty and hazarding counsels do seem in the beginning likely to succeed ; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil event . it therefore seemeth behoveful to be wary in resolving , and bold in executing : animus vereri qui scit , scit tuto aggredi . pub. another lett to good consultation is immoderate desire , which every wise man must endeavor to restrain : cupiditate pauca recte fiunt , circumspectione plurima . thucyd. thirdly , haste is an enemy to good deliberation ; for whoso greedily desireth any thing , proceedeth rashly ; and rash proceeding endeth ever in repentance : scelera impetu , bona consilia mora valescunt . tac. of ministers of state. having already spoken of counsellors , somewhat is to be spoken of ministers ; i mean those that either publickly or privately serve the prince in any function ; in choice of which men , care must be had ; first , that they be persons honestly born ; for no man descended of base parentage may be admitted , unless in him be found some noble and excellent vertue : optimus quisque nobilissimus . plato . secondly , they ought to be of honest condition , and of good fame ; for that common-weale is better and more secure , where the prince is not good , than is that where his ministers are evil. it seemeth therefore that ministers should be men of good quality and blameless : emitur sola virtute potestas . claud. thirdly , consideration is to be had of their capacity and fitness , for that function wherein they are to be used ; for as some men are apt for learning , so others are naturally disposed to arms. also it is necessary that every one square with the office whereunto he is appointed , in which matter some princes have used great caution ; for as they little liked of men excellent , so they utterly detested the vitious ; the one they doubted to trust in regard of themselves , the other were thought a publick indignity to the state. wise men have therefore resolved , that those wits which are neither over-haughty and singular , nor they which be base or dull , are fittest for princes secrets and services ; howsoever we may hereof say with tacitus : nescio quomodo aulica haec comitia affectus dirigit , & fato quodam ac sorte nascendi , ut caetera , ita principum inclinatio in hos , offensio in illos est . tac. and because the course and quality of mens lives serving in court , is of all other the most uncertain and dangerous , great heed and circumspection ought therein to be used ; for whoso serveth negligently , forgetting the dutiful endeavors appertaining to the place , seemeth to take a way of no good speed : quanto quis obsequio promptior , tanto honoribus & opibus extollitur . tac. it shall also become such a man to look well unto his own profit , and behave himself rather boldly than bashfully : malus minister regii imperii pudor . sen. to be modest , and closely to handle all actions , is also a course well beseeming a courtier ; neither shall he do well to attribute any good success to his own vertue or merit , but acknowledge all to proceed from the prince's bounty and goodness , by which means envy is eschewed , and the prince not robbed of his honor : haec est conditio regum , casus tantum adversos hominibus tribuant , secundos virtuti suae . prov. emped . and to conclude these precepts summarily , i say it behoveth all ministers and servants in court to be patient , wary and of few words : fraudum sedes aula . sen. chap. xv. the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment . to govern , is a certain skill how to command and continue subjects in due obedience , so as offend they ought not , or if they will they cannot ; wherein two special things are to be considered ( viz. ) the nature of men , and the nature of the state ; but first the condition of the vulgar must be well conceived : noscenda natura vulgi , & quibus modis temperanter habeatur . tac. the disposition of men is divers ; some are apt to anger , some are hardy , some fearful ; it therefore behoveth the prince to accommodate his government to the humor of people whom he governeth : principis est virtus maxima nosse suos . mart. likewise the nature of commonweals is mutable and subject to change , and kingsare not only accompanied with fortune , but also followed with hate , which breedeth a continual diffidence , chiefly towards those that are nearest to majesty : suspectus semper invisusque dominantibus quisquis proximus destinatur . tac. moreover the vulgar sort is generally variable , rash , hardy , and void of judgment ; ex opinione multa , ex veritate pauca judicat . cic. to confirm a government , force and arms are of greatest necessity ; by force i mean the guards and arms which princes use for their defence or ornament ; miles in foro , miles in curia principem comitari debet . tac. to this may be added fortification and strong buildings , in these days much used by new princes , and others also to whom people yield , not willing obedience . in ancient times princes planted colonies as well to suppress rebellion in conquered countries , as to front suspected neighbors : coloniae vera sedes servitutis . tac. the government of princes is also greatly increased by a virtue , which i call a commendable affection in subjects , proceeding of love and authority : these effects do grow from the princes own merit , but their being liveth in the mind of the people ; this love is gained by lenity , liberality , and mercy ; yet is every of them to be tempered : nec aut reverentiam terrore , aut amorem humilitate captibis . plin. affection is also no way sooner won then by liberality , the same being used with judgment and moderation . bellorum sociis , periculorum consortibus , sivi de te bene ac fortiter — — meritis . sen. by indulgence likewise , and princely affability , the love of men is gain'd ; for the multitude desire no more than necessary food and liberty , to use ordinary recreations : vulgo , sicut pueris , omne ludicrum in pretio est . sen. chap. xvi . of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated . authority is a certain reverent impression in the minds of subjects and others touching the princes virtue and government ; it resteth chiefly in admiration and fear : ingenita quibusdam gentibus erga reges suos veneratio . curt. authority consisteth in three things ; ( viz. ) the form of government , the strength of the kingdom , and the condition of the prince ; for in them all reputation and security resteth : majest as imperii , salutis tutela . curt. whoso desireth to govern well , it behoveth him to use severity , constancy and restraint ; for over much lenity introduceth contempt , and certain hope of impunity ; the condition of men being such as cannot be restrained by shame , yet it is to be commanded by fear : salutaris severit as vincit inanem speciem clementiae . cic. yet ought severity to be used with great respect and sparingly , because over great terror breedeth desparation : poena ad paucos , metus ad omnes perveniat . cic. to govern constantly is nothing else but to continue the old and ancient laws in force without change or innovation unless exceeding great commodity or urgent necessity shall so require : for where extream punishments are used , reformation is always needful : nocet interdum priscus rigor & nimia severitas . tac. also to restrain authority is a matter of great necessity and worthy a wise prince ; else he maketh others partakers of the honor and power to himself only due , the same being also dangerous : periculosam privati hominis nomen supra ( immo & juxta ) principes extolli . tac. it seemeth also perilous that great authority given to private men should belong ; for thereby oft-tentimes they are made insolent and apt to innovation : libertatis sive principatus magna custodia est , si magna imperio diuturna esse non sinas . liv. authority is also reinforced and enlarged by power , without which no prince can either take from others or defend his own : parum tuta sine viribus majestas . liv. chap. xvii . of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained . power and strength is attained by these five ways , money , arms , counsel , friends and fortune ; but of these the first and most forcible is money : nihil tam munitum quod non expugnari pecunia possit . cic. next to money arms are of most use as well to defend as to offend ; to keep , and to conquer ; for oft-tentimes occasion is to be offered as well to take from others , as to hold what is our own : sua retinere privatae est domus , de alienis certare regia laus est . tac. also of great and necessary use is counsel , to devise how arms ought to be employed or enforced : arma concilio temperanda . tac. likewise friends and confederates do greatly increase the virtue of power , the same being such as have both wit and ability to aid : in caducum parietem ne inclina . adri. the last , yet not the least part of power consisteth in fortune ; whereof daily experience may be seen ; for the success of all humane actions seem rather to proceed from fortune than virtue : omni ratione potentior fortuna . curt. to these particularities concerning power , we may add the qualities of the prince , which greatly grace his authority ; these are partly internal , and partly external : by the one i mean the virtues of the mind , by the other a certain seemly behavior and comely gesture of the body ; of the first kind i do suppose piety and providence to be the chief , for piety maketh a prince venerable , and like unto god : oportet principem res divinas videri curare serio & ante omnia . arist. providence is a forecast and likely conjectures of things to come , supposed to be in those princes that in their actions proceed slowly and circumspectly , it seemeth also a course of princely discretion to be retired aud not ordinarily to converse with many : autoritatem absentia tueare . suet. chap. xviii . of conspiracy and treason , with the causes and ways of prevention or discovery . conspiracy is commonly addressed to the princes person ; treasons are addressed against his government , authority , country , subjects , or places of srength . these mischiefs are easily feared , but hardly eschewed ; for albeit open enemies are openly encountred , yet fraud and subtilty are secret foes , and consequently not to be avoided : occulta pericula neque praevidere neque vitare in promptu est . salust . the danger of conspiracy proceedeth of divers causes , as avarice , infidelity of subjects , ambition in servants , and corruption in soldiers , therefore with great difficulty to be avoided : vitae tuae dominus est , quisquis suam contempsit . sen. notwithstanding it seemeth that either by inquisition , punishment , innocency , or destiny , the evil affection of men may be oft-tentimes discovered : . for whoso will curiously inquire and consider the actions and ordinary speechees of men ( i mean those that be persons of honor and reputation ) may oft-tentimes vent the myne that lurketh in the minds : quoniam rarò nisi male loqunti mali faciunt . lips. . punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the consideration thereof with the hope of reward doth often discover those dangerous intentions : cruciatu aut praemio cunct a pervia sunt . tac. but as it is wisdom in princes to give ear to informers , so are they not always to be believed ; for hope , envy , hate , or some other passion oft-tentimes draws them to speak untruly : quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit ? tac. . the third and likeliest defence against conspiracy is the princes own innocency ; for never having injured any man , it cannot be thought there liveth any subject so lewd as will endeauor to hurt him : fidelissima custodia principis ipsius innocentia . plin. . the last and best bulward to withstand the force of this mischief we call destiny ; which proceeding from the fountain of divine providence , may be truly called the will of god ; in whose only power it resteth to protect and defend good princes : ille erit a latere tuo , & custodiet pedem tuum ne capiaris . salo. treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous persons , who preferring private profit before fame or fidelity , do not fear to enter into any impious action : to this humor ambitious men dissentious , and all such as be desirous of innovation , are inclined : pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava struentes . hom. to these offenders no punishment is equal to their impious merit , can be devised , being persons odious as well to friends as foes : proditores etiam in quos anteponunt , invisi sunt . tac. chap. xix . of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it . having briefly touched the virtues and means whereby princes are maintained in authority and honor , let something be said of the causes from whence their ruine doth proceed ; the chief whereof seemeth to be hate and contempt : hate cometh of fear , which the more common it is , the more dangerous : nulla vis imperii tanta est , quae premente metu possit esse diuturna . cic. the causes of fear are punishments , impositions and rigor ; and therefore it behoveth a prince not only to shun them , but to eschew those actions whereby he may reasonable incur their suspision : sentias enim homines ut metuant aut oderint , non minus opinione & fama , quam certa aliqua ratione moveri . cic. yet punishment , imposition and censure are in all states necessary , although they shew and seem terrible , and consequently breed a certain desperation in subjects , unless they be discreetly and modestly used ; for extream and frequent punishments taste of cruelty ; great and many imposts savor of covetousness ; censure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences , doth seem rigour in these matters ; therefore it behoveth the prince to be moderate and cautelous , chiefly in capital punishment , which must be confined within the bounds of justice : sit apud principem parsimonia etiam viliffimi sanguinis . sen. but if for security sake the prince be forced to punish , let the same be done with shew of great sorrow and lothness : tanquam invitus & magnocum tormento ad castigandum veniat . sen. let all punishments also be slowly executed ; for they that are hastily punished do seem to have been willingly condemned ; neither ought any capital punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the commonweale , and for example sake : non tam ut ipsi pareant , quam ut alios pereundo deterreant . sen. in punishing also a specil respect must be had , that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein : forma rabiei est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere . sen. also in punishing , equality must be observed , and the nature of the punishment according to the custom : nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur , alii ne appellentur quidem . cic. but in punishing publick offences wherein a multitude have part , the execution ought to be otherwise , and as it were at an instant , which may haply seem terrible , but in effect is not : frequens vindict a paucorum odium reprimit ; omnium irritat . sen. another means to satisfie a people offended is to punish the ministers of cruelty , and with their blood to wash away the common hatred . piaculares publici odii victimae . plin. by this king david did appease the gibeonites . the next cause of discontent cometh of impositions , under which word is comprehended all levies of money , a matter nothing pleasing to people , as that which they esteem equal to their own lives : pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus . plaut . first , to remove hate conceived of this cause , there is nothing better then publick expostulation of necessity : for what commonwealth or kingdom can be without tributes ? nulla quies gentium sine armis , nec arma sine stipendiis , nec stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt . tac. the second remedy against hate for impositions is to make moderate levies and rare . for as tiberius the emperor was wont to say , a sheep should be fleeced not flead : qui nimis emungit , elicit sanguinem . tac. thirdly , also to eschew the offence of people , it behoveth the prince to have a vigilant eye on informers , promoters , and such fiscal ministers , whose cruelty and covetous proceedings do oft-tentimes occasion great hate ; but this mischief may be , though hardly , encountred , either by choosing honest officers , or ( proving otherwise ) not only to remain them but to use them as spunges : exprimendi post quam biberint . suet. in all impositions or taxations , no cruelty or force ought to be used , the second cause to kindle hate : and to meet with that mischief , nothing is better than to proceed moderately , and without extremity : ne boves ipsos , mox agros , postremo corpora servitio aut poenae tradant . tac. the fourth remedy is the princes own parsimony , not giving so largely to private persons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude : magnae opes non tam multa capiendo , quam haud multa perdendo , quaeruntur . maecaenas . the last help against hate is in taxation to proceed equally , indifferently , and without favor or respect ; and that the assessors of taxes may be elected of the meaner fort of people : populis maximam fidem rerum suarum habet . tac. touching censure , which we numbred amongst the causes whereof hate is conceived , much needeth not to be spoken , because the same is discontinued , or rather utterly forgotten ; yet doth it seem a thing necessary , being a certain observation and controlement of such evil manners and disorders , as were not by law corrigible ; these officers were of the romans called magistri pudoris & modestiae . livi. to the function of censures these two things are anciently subject manners , and excess ; under manners i comprehend wantonness , drunkenness , dicing , brawling , perjury , and all such lewdness as modesty condemneth . these disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of censors in all ages and sexes , to the end that idleness might be generally avoided . universa plebs habeat negotia sua , quibus a malo publico detineatur . salust . excess includeth riotousness , expence of money , prodigal house-keeping , banquetting and superfluity in apparel , which things are the mothers of many mischiefs . it also seemeth in some sort perilous to the prince that the subject should exceed either in covetize or consuming : nemo nimis excedat , five amicorum copia , sine opum . arist. the punishment inflicted upon these sorts of offenders , were either ignominy , or pecuniary punishments : censoris judicium damnato nihil affert nisi ruborem . tac. the first and chiefest means to remove these inconveniences , is the princes own example , whose life being well censured , easily reduceth others to order . vita principis censura perpetua . plin. secondly , those disorders may be taken away without danger , if the censures do proceed by degrees and leasurely ; for the nature of man may not suddenly be altered . vitia quaedam tollit facilius princeps , si eorum sit patiens . sen. these are the chiefest rules whereby to eschew hate ; but impossible it is for any prince or minister utterly to avoid it ; for being himself good , he incurreth the offence of all bad folk , if he be evil , good men will hate him ; this danger therefore wise and vertuous princes have little regarded ; because hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing : odia qui nimium timet , regnare nescit . sen. one other means to remove this error , is , to reward the good and well deserving subjects ; for no man can think him cruel , that for love to vertue useth austerity ; which will appear , when he bestoweth bountifully on the good : praemio & poena respublica continetur . solon . the other vice which indangereth the state of princes , we call contempt , being a certain base and vile conceit , which entereth into the subjects , strangers or servants , of the prince and his proceedings ; for the authority of a king may be resembled to the powers of mans mind , whereunto the hands , the feet , the eyes , do by consent obey : vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt . livi. the causes of contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of government , fortune , or the prince's manners ; the form of government becometh contemptible , when the prince , desiring to be thought merciful , ruleth rather pitifully than justly ; which manner of proceeding taketh away all reverence in the people , and in lieu thereof , entereth liberty , or at least a certain boldness to offend : facult as faciendi quod cuilibet visum , non potest comprimere ingenitam singulis hominibus pravitatem . tac. also to be mutable , irresolute , light and inconsiderate in bestowing the honors and offices of state , maketh the prince contemptible : qui praesentibus fruitur , nec in longius consultat . arist. but if contempt be caused by fortune , or as may be said more reasonably , by destiny , and that those friends do fail , who ought in duty to defend the prince and his authority , then is there small hope to eschew contempt : fato obnoxia virtus . plaut . the prince's manners do breed contempt , when he yieldeth his affections to sensuality and sloth , or if he incur the suspition of simplicity , cowardise , or any such vice , unworthy the dignity he beareth : common people do sometimes also disesteem the prince for external and light causes , as deformity of person , sickness or such like : mos vulgi est , fortuita & externa ad culpam trahere . tac. chap. xx. of diffidence and dissimulation in the management of state affairs . albeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy praise , chiefly in private persons ; yet because all men in their actions do not so proceed , it behoveth wise men and princes , above others , at occasions to semble and dissemble ; for as in all actions a prince ought to be slow and advised ; so in consent and believing , haste and facility is most dangerous ; and though credulity be rather an error than a fault , yet for princes it is both unfit and perilous . wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this caution , nihil credendo , atque omnia cavendo . cic. notwithstanding he must not shew himself diffident or distrustful utterly ; but as i wish he should not over-slightly believe all men , so ought he not for small causes distrust every man : multi fallere docuerunt , dum timent falli . sen. dissimulation is as it were begotten by diffidence , a quality in princes of so great necessity , as moved the emperor tiberius to say , nescit regnare , qui nescit dissimulare . the necessity of dissimulation is chiefly to be used with strangers and enemies ; it also sheweth a certain discretion in magistrates , sometimes to disguise with friends when no offence doth thereof follow : doli non sunt doli , nisi astu colas . plaut . this kind of craft , albeit in every mans conceit not praisable , is nevertheless tolerable , and for princes and magistrates ( the same being used to good ends ) very necessary . but those cunnings which are contrary to vertue , ought not of honest men to be used ; neither dare i commend adulation and corruption , though they be often used in court , and are of some learned writers allowed : decipere pro moribus temporum , prudentia est . plin. by great subtilty and frauds , contrary to vertue and piety , i mean perjury and injustice , which though all men in words detest , yet in deeds are used of many , perswading themselves , by cavillations and sophistications , to excuse the impiety of their false oaths ; as it is written of lysander , pueros talis , viros juramentis circumvenire solebat . plut. chap. xxi . of war defensive and invasive ; with instructions touching laws of arms , soldiers and military discipline . the art military is of all other qualities most necessary for princes , for without it they cannot be defended ; force of men only sufficeth not , unless the same be governed by council , and martial wisdom : duo sunt quibus resp . servatur ; in hostes fortitudo , & domi concordia . tac. military knowledge concerneth war , and every war is either forreign or domestical . touching forreign , it must be considered when it must be begun , how to continue it , and when to be ended ; to begin war , a prince is to take heed that the cause be just , and the enterprise advisedly entred into : sunt enim & belli sicut pacis jura , justeque ea non minus ac fortiter gerere debes . livi. the laws of arms are in all common-weales to be duly observed ; for to enter fight rashly and without respect to reason , were beastly ; also to kill or slay would work no better effect , than that all nations should without mercy murder one another : barbaro ritu coedem coede , & sanguinem sanguine expiare . sal. no war therefore is to be made , but such as is just ; and in every just war these three things are to be looked into ( viz. ) that the author be of authority , that the cause be good , and the end just ; for in all states , the prince , or they in whom the sovereignty resteth , are the just authors of war ; others have no such authority : si quis privatim sine publico scito , pacem bejumve fecerit , capitale esto . plato . wars are of two sortt ; defensive and offensive ; the one to resist , the other to invade ; against defence nothing can be said , because it is natural and necessary . est non modo justum sed etiam necessarium cum vi vis illat a defenditur . cic. defensive war is of two sorts , either to defend thine own , or thy friends ; for it is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth ; and therewith also by arms to defend the liberty of country , parents and friends : nullum bellum a civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro fide aut pro salute . cic. the like reason leadeth us to assist and protect friends ; for the common obligation of humane society doth so require : qui enim non obsistit si potest , injuriae , tam est in vitio , quam si parentes aut patriam , aut socios deserat . cic. invasion is also just and allowable , but not ever ; for whoso hath been robbed , or spoiled of his lands or goods , may lawfully seek repossession by force ; yet so as before any force be used , he first civilly seek restitution , wherein if justice be denied , then is the use of arms necessary : justum bellum quibus necessarium ; & pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes . liv. likewise invasion is lawful against barbarians , whose religion and impiety ought to be abhorred , chiefly if they be potent and apt to offend ; for the cause of such war is compulsion and suppression of evil : cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur , utiliter vincitur . august . finally , to conclude this matter of invasion , i say , that no revenge , no desire of honor or empire , are any lawful causes of war ; but the intent thereof ought to be directed only to defence and security : for wise men do take arms to win peace , and in hope of rest they endure travel : it a bellum suscipiatur ut nihil aliud quam pax quaesit a videatur . cic. having said somewhat against unjust war , let us speak of temerity and unadvised war , an enterprise worthy discommendation : omnes bellum sumunt facile , agerrime desinunt ; nec in ejusdem potestate initium & finis est . sal. a wise i rince therefore ought neither to undertake any unlawful invasion , nor without sober and mature deliberation enter into any war , as he that is unwilling to offend , yet of courage enough to defend : nec provoces bellum , nec timeas . plin. to make war three things are required , money , men and arms ; and to maintain a war , provision and council , are needful : therefore a wise prince , before he begins a war , doth carefully consider what forces and charge thereunto belongeth : diu apparandum est bellum , ut vincas melius . pub. above all other provisions , care must be had , that bread be not wanting ; for without it neither victory nor life can be looked for : qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non praeparat , vincitur sine ferro . vegetius . lastly , it behoveth a prince always to have arms in readiness , i mean , harness , horses , weapons , artillery , engines , powder , and every other thing necessary either for service on horse or foot : we may add hereunto ships , and shipping of all sorts , with every furniture of offence or defence ; for these preparations make a prince formidable , because no man dare do or attempt injury to that king or people , where preparation is ever ready to revenge : qui desiderat pacem , praeparat bellum . cass. by men we mean a multitude of subjects armed , trained to defend or offend : these are of two sorts , captains and soldiers ; and soldiers are either footmen or horse-men ; the one of great use in the champion , the other in mountainous places ; also for defence or assault of towns or grounds fortified most necessary , and consequently meet for service in all places , which moved tacitus to say , omne in pedite robur . tac. for sudden service , horses do seem most meet , and the execution of any enterprise is by them most speedily performed : nevertheless the actions of foot-men do seem most certainly executed , chiefly if they be well armed , and skilfully lead ; for so experience hath of late time proved ; besides , that they are of less expence and of greater number : in universum aestimanti plus in pedite robur . tac. having thus proved , that both horse and foot be necessary , let us remember , that unless they be serviceable , great numbers are to small purpose : manibus opus est bello , non multis nominibus . livi. to make soldiers serviceable , consisteth in good choice and good discipline ; the one at this day little regarded : emunt militem , non legunt . livi. soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able number of bodies , and every company composed of men known one to the other ; for thereby they are made the more confident : but hereof is small heed taken , for commonly they are purgament a urbium suarum . curt. touching discipline , it seemeth that thereof the external form , and not the certain substance , is observed : for as in former ages soldiers endeavored to be vertuous and modest , so now they rather study to excel in riot than in martial knowledge : exercitus lingua quam manu promptior , praedator est sociis , & ipsa praeda hostiam . sal. for as much as soldiers are made good by election and choice , it seemeth that the foundation and ground of service consisteth in the discretion and judgment of those that have authority to make election ; yet will we add , that they must be chosen of natural subjects , for strangers are covetous , and consequently corruptible ; they are also mutinous and cowardly : their custom likewise is to rob , burn and spoil both friends and foes , and to consume the princes treasure : ossa vides regum vacuis exsucta medullis . juven . but the native soldier is faithful and obedient , resolute in fight , loving to his country , and loyal to his prince : gentes quae sub regibus sunt , pro deo colunt . curt. native soldiers are of two sorts , ( viz. ) they that be in continual pay , and they that are trained ready to serve , but do notwithstanding attend their own private affairs , until they be called : the first are for all princes necessary : in pace decus , in bello praesidium . tac. of this sort no great number ought to be , as well to eschew disorder , as also to save expences . the second kind of foot soldiers are to be levied in villages , as people more patient of pains , and fit for the wars ; yet so judiciously disposed as the citizens : odio praesentium & non cupidine mutationis . tac. touching the number of these extraordinary soldiers , that must be referred to discretion : bellum parare , simul & aerario parcere . to conclude , i say these numbers of ordinary and extraordinary foot ought to be according to the number of the people , not inserting any gentlemen ; for service on horse-back is to them only proper : alas rusticis non tribuo ; in nobilitatem & in divites haeo a pauperibus onera inclines . livi. the most certain notes whereby to conceive the disposition of men fit to become soldiers , are these five , the country where they are born , their age , proportion of body , their quality of mind , and their faculty . touching , first , their country , it is a thing apparently proved , that mountainous regions , or barren places , and northern habitations , do breed wits well disposed to the war : locorum asperit as hominum quoque ingenia durat . curt. secondly , the age most apt for the war , was anciently observed to be about eighteen years , and so the romans used : facilius est ad virtutem instruere novos milites , quaem revocare praeteritos . veget. thirdly , the stature of a soldier ought to be observed : marius liked best the longest bodies ; pyrrhus preferred large and well proportioned men ; but vegetius in his choice , rather esteems strength than stature : utilius est fortes milites esse quam grandes . veget. fourthly , the mind or spirit of a soldier ought to be considered , for that mind which is quick , nimble , bold and confident , seemeth apt for war : he is also of good hope , that loveth honor more than ease or profit : in brief , is qui nihil metuit nisi turpem famam . sal. lastly , it is to be marked in what art or faculty a man hath been bred ; for it may be presumed that fishers , fowlers , cooks , and others trained up in effeminate arts , are unfit for martial endeavor : and as these men were , in respect of their trade , thought unmeet , so in old time , slaves and masterless-men were repulsed from arms , as persons infamous : sed nunc tales sociantur armis quaeles domini habere fastidiunt . veget. how soldiers ought to be chosen , these few words we have spoken , may suffice . let us therefore say somewhat of discipline . choice findeth out soldiers , but discipline doth make and continue them fit for service : paucos viros fortes natura procreat , bona institutione plures reddat industria . veget. discipline is a certain severe confirmation of soldiers in their valor and vertue , and is performed by four means , exercise , order , compulsion and example . the two first appertain to valor , the third to vertue , the last to both : but of exercise , first , i say , that a soldier being chosen ought to be informed in arms , and used in exercise and action ; the word exercitium importeth nothing else : exercitus dicitur , quod melius fit exercitando varro . order consisteth in dividing , disposing , and placing of men aptly on all occasions to be commanded , as the leaders shall direct : this matter requireth a large discourse , and therefore i refer it to skilful captains and writers , as polybius , vegetius , de la nonne , and others . compulsion and correction , is that which bridleth and governeth the manners of soldiers ; for no order can be observed amongst them , unless they be continent , modest and abstinent ; for continency is chiefly to be shewed in their diet , and moderate desires : degenerat a robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum . tac. the modesty of a soldier is perceived by his words , apparel and actions : for to be a vaunter , or vain-glorious boaster , is far unfit in him that professeth honor or arms , seeing true vertue is silent : viri militiae nati , factis magni , ad verborum linguaeque certamina , rudes . tac. the apparel of a soldier sheweth modesty , if therein he do not exceed ; for albeit it fitteth well the profession of arms , to be well armed and decently apparelled ; yet all superfluity savoreth of ignorance or vanity : horridum militem esse decet , non coelatum auro argentoque sed ferro . livi. abstinence is also fit for all soldiers ; for thereby guided , they refrain from violence and insolency ; by that rule also they are informed to govern themselves civilly in the country where they serve , and likewise in their lodgings : never taking any thing from the owner , nor committing any outrage : vivant cum provincialibus jure civili , nec insolescat animus qui se sensit armatum . the last mark of discipline we called example , under which word is comprehended reward and punishment : for men are rewarded whensoever they receive for any excellent or singular service , honor or riches : and for evil , they have their due when they taste the punishment thereunto belonging : necessarium est acrius ille dimicet , quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiae & imperatoris judicium consuevit evehere . veget. likewise as gold and glory belongeth to good and well deserving soldiers ; so punishment is due to those that be vitious and cowardly ; for nothing holdeth soldiers in obedience so much as the severity of discipline : milites imperatorum potius quam hostem metuere debent . veg. chap. xxii . of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions . of soldiers let this little suffice , we will now speak of what quality chieftains and leaders ought to be , for upon them dependeth the welfare of whole armies : militaris turba sine duce , corpus sine spiritu . curt. a chief or general in war , is either of his own authority chief , or a general that commandeth in the name of another . of the first sort are emperors , kings and princes ; of the other , be their deputies , lieutenants , colonels , and indeed all general commanders in the war : now whether it be more expedient that the prince should command in person or by deputy , divers wise men have diversly thought , therefore it may be thus distinguished ; if the war do then only concern some particular part or province , then may the same be performed by a lieutenant ; but if the whole fortune of a prince do thereupon depend , then is he to command in his own person and not otherwise : dubiis bellorum exemplis summae rerum & imperii seipsum reservat . tac. it therefore importeth the prince sometimes by his own presence , sometimes by his deputation to perform that office ; but however occasion shall require , it ever behoveth that one only commander ought to be , ( for plurality of chieftains doth rarely or never work any good effect ) yet with this caution that he be of experience , and wise : in bellica praefectura major aspectus habendus peritiae quam virtutis aut morum . arist. the qualities required in a chiestain are these , skill , vertue , providence , authority and fortune : by skill we mean he should be of great knowledge , and long experience , or to make a sufficient captain ; the information of others , or his own reading is not enough : qui norit quis ordo agminis , quae cura exploandi , quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus . cic. military vertue is a certain vigor or force both of body and mind to exercise soldiers as well in fained war as to fight with the enemy ; and summarily a captain ought to be laboriosus in negotio , fortis in periculo , industrius in agendo , celeris in conficiendo . cic. next to vertue we placed providence as necessary in great captains ; for being of such wisdom , they will not hazard nor commit more to fortune than necessity shall inforce ; yet true it is , fools and vulgar folks , that commend or discommend actions according to success , were wont to say , cunctatio servilis , statim exequi , regium est . but advised and provident captains do think , temeritas praeterquam quod stulta , est etiam infelix . livi. albeit providence be the best mean of good speed , yet some captains of that quality and in skill excelling , have been in their actions unlucky , when others of less sufficiency have marvellously prevailed ; we may therefore reasonably say with cic. quod olim maximo , marcello , scipioni , mario & ceteris magnis imperatoribus non solum propter virtutem , sed etiam propter fortunam soepius imperia mandata , atque exercitus esse commissos . cic. lastly , we wished authority to be in chieftains , for it greatly importeth what opinion or conceit the enemy hath of such a governor , and likewise how much his friends and confederates do esteem him ; but the chief and only means to maintain authority , is austerity and terror : dux authoritatem maximam severitate sumat , omnes culpas militares legibus vindicet , nulli errantium credatur ignoscere . veget. also experience hath proved , that such chieftains as were affable and kind to their soldiers , were much loved , yet did they incur a contempt ; but on the other side , those that commanded severely and terribly , although they gained no good will , yet were they ever obeyed : dux facitis inutilis . app. chap. xxiii . of councils in war , and directions tactick and stratagematick , with advice how to make an honorable peace . after men found and framed fit for the war , to small or no purpose shall they serve , unless they be imployed by wisdom or good council : mon minus est imperatoris consilio quam vi persicere . tac. council in war is of two sorts , direct council and indirect ; the first sheweth a plain and orderly course for proceeding , as to lay hold on occasion ; for as in all other humane actions occasion is of great force : occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam virtus . veget. as occasions presented are means of good success , so fame worketh great effects in the wars , therefore it behoveth a captain to be constant , and not apt to believe the vain rumors and reports of men : male imperatur , cum regit vulgus duces suos . sen. confidence is also to be eschewed , for no man is sooner surprised , than he who feareth least ; also contempt of the enemy hath been occasion of great discomfitures , therefore as a captain ought not to fear , so should he not contemn his enemy : nimia fiducia semper obnoxia . aemyl . as security , and overmuch estimation of our own vertue or valor is hurtful , so doth it import every good captain to be well informed , not only of his own forces but also of what strength the enemy is ; likewise it behoveth him to know the situation of the country , and the quality of the people , with every other circumstance . moreover , the generals honor and capacity ought to be known , with the condition and nature of the enemy : impetus acres cunctatione languescunt , aut in perfidiam mutantur . tac. temerity in war is also dangerous , for wise captains were wont not to enterprise any thing without deliberation and good opportunity , unless they were thereunto by necessity inforced : in rehus asperis & tenui spe , fortissima quaque consilia tutissima sunt . livi. some wise men , not superstitiously but discreetly , do think prodigious signs from heaven , or on earth , are not to be neglected , neither are dreams in time of war to be contemned : nam amat benignitas numinis , seu quod merentur homines , seu quod tangitur eorum affectione , his quoque rationibus prodere quae impendent . aemi . a wise captain will also wait opportunities , and spy out fit times when the enemy is wearied , or pretending fear , draw him into danger ; which advantages , with many other , are gained chiefly by observing of time : quia si in occasionis momento , cujus praetervolat opportunitas , cunctatus paulum fueris , nequicquam mox omissam querare . livi. next the observation of time , the place is to be well considered , whether it be for thine advantage or thine enemies : amplius prodest locus saepe quam virtus . veget. thirdly , it importeth much , that men be well ordered , trained , and prepared for the fight ; for the want of art is cause of many disadvantages , and many times a small supply of choice soldiers on horse-back or foot , doth seem to the enemy very terrible ; likewise a sudden shout or conceit hath amazed a whole army : milites vanis & inanibus , magis quam justis formidinis causis moventur . curt. fourthly , it were to good purpose , that in ordering of men for fight , soldiers of one country or nations , should be ranged together , and above all , to foresee that the least loss of blood be among the natural subjects , and so handle the matter , that the chief slaughter light upon strangers and mercenaries : ingens victoriae decus , citra domesticum sanguinem bellanti . tac. the generals own courage and lively disposition to fight , will greatly animate the multitude of soldiers , as a contrary countenance or appearance of fear , will exceedingly amaze and daunt : necesse estad fugam parati sint , qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare . veget. it were also for thy great advantage , that the forces should be ordered for the fight , before the enemy be prepared . first , for that thou maist the better perform , what thou thinkest fit to be done . secondly , that thereby thine own forces will thereof receive great courage , being readiest to assail the enemy , and to begin the fight : plus animi est inferenti periculum , quam propulsanti . livi. after victory it is not the best policy to execute the enemies with extream cruelty , but proceed moderately , for it shall suffice the victory is thine : clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia , & cum spei nihil est , sumit arma fermido . veget. lastly , i would advise that the general should be wary in his actions , and in every enterprise to frustrate the soldiers from spoils and pillage : saepe obstitit vincentibus pravum inter ipsos certamen , omisso hoste spolia consectanda . tac. of direct councils , let that we have said suffice . we will now speak of councils indirect , commonly called by the greek word , stratagems or subtile practices : which manner of proceeding , hath been , in times past , of divers grave writers condemned : vir nemo mentis altae clanculum velit occidere hostem . eurip. notwithstanding the opinion of this , and divers other writers worthy credit , it seemeth reasonable , and in piety allowable , that stratagems and subtilties may be used in the war , yet with such caution , as the same may stand with fidelity and honor ; for fraud being used , contrary to contracts and agreements made with the enemy , is mere treachery : as to poyson him or her , a murtherer to kill him , were plain impiety : faederatum injuste fallere , impium . livi. also out of the war covertly to kill a particular enemy by secret assault or practice , is not warrantable , either by faith or honor ; yet to use all craft , cunning and subtilty in open war , is both allowable and praisable ; and so is thought by christian writers : cum justum bellum suscipitur , ut aperte pugnet quis aut ex insidiis , nihil ad justitiam interest . aug. the same is also approved by divers authors of good credit : confice sive dolo seu stricto cominus euse . the same is also affirmed by xenophon , reipsa nihil utilius in bello dolis . thus having briefly touched what counsels are required in war , let us consider how victory is to be used , for the end of every good war is peace ; to the enjoying whereof , three things are required , wariness , mercy and modesty ; because over-great confidence may happily impeach the end of good success : res secundae negligentiam creant . livi. i also wish the victory to be handled mercifully , because all conquests are in their own nature cruel enough : and the ire of insolent soldiers , forces the conquered to become desperate : gravissime mor sus irritate necessitatis . curt. to proceed modestly , is also an honorable quality in him that conquereth ; for in prosperous fortunes , men do hardly refrain covetous and proud doings ; yea , some good and great captains have in like cases forgotten what did best become them : in rebus secundis etiam egregii duces insolescunt . tac. after victory followeth peace : for if war did ever continue , no state or government could stand : therefore how great , or how long soever the war be , the end must be peace ; the name whereof is not only sweet , but also comfortable : pax una triumphis innumeris potior . peace is not only good and profitable to him that is victorious , but also to those that are victored : pacem reduci velle victori , expedit , victo necesse est . tac. nevertheless until good and honorable peace be offered , arms may not be laid aside : wherein i wish tully's advice to be followed : bellum gerendum est ; si bellum omittemus , pace nunquam fruemur . livi. in treaty of peace , two things must be considered : first , that the conditions be honorable . to condescend to any base conditions , is unto a princely mind not only great indignity , but also intolerable : cum dignitate potius cadendum , quam cum ignominia serviendum . plut. it also importeth , the peace should be simple , true and unfeigned ; for all feigned and dissembling amity is to be doubted : pace suspect a tutius est bellum . mithrid . the fittest season to speak of peace , is either when the war beginneth , or during the time that the enemies be of equal force ; for if the war continueth , it must behove the weaker to yield to necessity : not unlike the ship-master , who to save himself doth cast the greatest part of his loading into the sea : necessitati pare , quam ne dii quidem superant . livi. finally , having generously defended thy self , and performed all things required in a magnanimous captain , and finding nevertheless thy force insufficient , it cannot be dishonorable to accept peace . wherefore laying aside hatred and hope , which are but weak supporters , thou maist recommend thee and thine to the approved discretion of an honorable enemy : victores secundae res in miserationem ex ira vertunt . livi. now for as much as every peace promiseth rest and quiet , as well to the victorious as to the victored ; we may add thereunto , that the prince victorious receiveth thereby honor , profit and security . for although his happiness may occasion hope of great success , yet in respect of fortunes mutability , it shall be good and glorious to listen to peace : decorum principi est cum victoriam prope in manibus habeat , pacem non abnuere , ut sciant omnes te & suscipere juste bellum , & finire . livi. it seemeth also the more honorable ; for who so is victorious , doth give peace and not take it : he also sheweth himself discreet by using a moderation in victory , and no extremity in spoiling , which our wise and godly writers have commended : pacem contemnentes , & gloriam appetentes , pacem perdunt & gloriam . bern. peace is also profitable for the victorious , because continual war breedeth weariness , and of violent proceeding desparation and peril cometh : maximi & mortiferi morsus esse solent morientium bestiarum . sen. likewise peace is more assured than any victory . hope of the one is in thine own power ; the other in the hand of god : add thereunto the force of fortune , which hath great power in all humane actions : in rebus secundis nihil in quenquam superbe ac violenter consulere decet , nec praesenti credere fortunae , cum quid vesper ferat , incertus sis . sen. also conditions of peace ought to be reasonably and freely bestowed : for no people can live contented under such a law as forceth them to loath the state wherein they are . misera pax bello bene mutatur . sen. chap. xxiv . of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof . the greatest and most grievous calamity that can come to any state is civil war ; for therein subjects take arms against their prince or among themselves , whereof followeth a misery more lamentable than can be described . non aetas , non dignitas quenquam protegit , quo minus stuprà caedibus , & caedes stupris misceantur . tac. the first cause of civil war proceedeth of destiny , for god in his own divine providence foreseeth many years before , that great and mighty empires shall be ruined . in se magna ruunt : laetis hinc numina rebus crescendi posuere modum — lucan . the second cause is , excess , riot , and dissolute life ; for nothing breedeth civil fury so soon as over great happiness ; also pompous apparel , banquetting and prodigal spending consumeth riches , and plenty is turned into poverty ; for by these means are men brought into desperation . rapacissimo cuique ac perditiffimo , non agri aut faenus sed sola instrumenta vitiorum manebunt . tac. now to consider how destiny might be eschewed , were in vain : for such a remedy no wit or wisdom can devise , being the decree of god , no doubt it is inevitable . ita fato placuit , nullius rei eodem semper loco stare fortunam . sen. there is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation ; the earth , heavens , and whole world is thereunto subject . certis eunt cuncta temporibus ; nasci debent , crescere , extingui . sen. touching the second causes of civil war some remedies may be used , because it proceedeth of faction , sedition or tyranny . i call faction a certain association of divers persons combined to the offence of others . it proceedeth often of private or publick displeasure , and more often of ambition . nemo eorum qui in rep. versantur , quos vincat , sed a quibus vincatur , aspicis . sen. . factions are of two sorts ; for either they consist of many or of few persons : both be dangerous , but the former more apt to take arms ; and that party which proveth weakest , prayeth arms of foreign forces . . the other faction wherein are fewer partakers , be commonly great personages or men of more importance than ordinary people ; and that proveth most perilous and bloody . nobilium factiones trahunt ad se , & in partes , universum etiam populum . arist. albeit some wise men have held opinion that factions are necessary , yet cannot that conceipt be reasonably maintained , unless it be upon confines , and in such places where conspiracy is feared , which cato in his private family used . semper contentiunculas aliquas aut dissensum inter servos callide serebat , suspectum habens nimiam concordiam orum , metuensque . plut. factions against the nobility , are sometimes suppressed by forbidding colors , or unknown bagdes to be worn , also to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is necessary , which was mecaenas counsel to augustus ; and aristotle thinketh it fit that laws should be made against the factions of noblemen . nobilium contentiones & partes etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari . arist. another cause of civil war , we call sedition , which is a sudden commotion or assembly of common people against their prince or his magistrates : the original of which disorders may proceed of divers causes , but chiefly of oppression . imminentium periculocum remedium , ipsa pericula arbitrari . arist. again , fear may be the occasion of sedition , as well in him that hath done injury , as in him that looketh to be injured , and is desirous to prevent it before it cometh . it may proceed also of over great mildness in government . non miseriis licentia sed licentia , tantum concitum turbarum , lascivire magis plebem quam saevire . livi. sedition many times ariseth of poverty , or of the artificers , whose arts are grown out of use , and consequently no means whereof they can live . semper in civitate , quibus opes nullae sunt , bonis invidem , vetera odere , nova expetunt , odio rerum suarum mutari omnia student . sab. lastly , sedition cometh of tyranny , insolency , or mutinous disposition of certain captains , cavaliers , or ring-leaders of the people ; for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation , yet doth it stand firm , until some first mover taketh the matter in hand . multitudo omnis , sicut mare , per se immobilis . livi. of these movers some are ambitious , who wanting other means to aspire , hope by practice of sedition , to compass their designs ; or else they are unthrifts , who having consumed their own , seek by violence to possess themselves of other mens : or else they are vain and light persons , that without cause or reason , attempt innovation , themselves know not for what . non tam praemiis periculorum , quam ipsis periculis loeti , pro certis & olim partis , nova , ambiguae ancipitia maelunt . thus having told the causes of sedition , i wish the remedies were prepared . omne malum nascens facile opprimitur , inveteratum fit plerumque robustius . cic. the first way to suppress sedition , is eloquence and excellent perswasion , which oft-tentimes worketh great effects among the multitude ; chiefly when it proceedeth from some reverend and grave person , for his wisdom and integrity of life honored : for the prince himself is not to take office in hand , unless necessity so inforce : integra autorit as principis majoribus remediis servetur . tac. if perswasion cannot prevail , then force must compel : but before such violent proceedings , use , art and cunning , either to appease the people , or at least to disunite them ; and rather if the prince do offer fair and promise plausibly . verba apud populum plurimum valent . tac. it is lawful also in such cases for princes to use subtilty ; and the same not prevailing , to wash away the stain thereof with clemency : for when arms laid down , and every one yielded , general punishment were needless . omnium culpa fuit , paucorum sit poena . tac. the last cause of sedition we named tyranny , which is a certain violent government , exceediug the laws of god and nature . the difference between kings and tyrants is this ; the one imployeth arms in defence of peace , the other useth them to terrifie those of whom his cruelty hath deserved hate . auferre , trucidare , rapere , falsis nominibus imperium , at que ubi solitudinem fecerint , pacem appellant . tac. the quality of tyrants is to esteem promoters more then good ministers , because those men are the scourge of infinite others . they are also protectors of impious . persons , and stand in daily doubt of noble and virtuous men. nobilitas , opes , amissi gestique honores , procrimine : et ob virtutes certissimum exitium . tac. tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of letters and civil life , to the end all arts should be exiled , and barbarism introduced . pellunt sapientiae professores , & omnes bonas artes in exilium agant . tac. these and such like , be the conditions of tyrants , who for the most part are deposed and slain ; for as kings live long and deliver their dominions to their children and posterity : so tyrants being feared and hated of all men , cannot continue in their estate . adgenerum cereris sine ceede & vulnere pauci descendunt reges & sicca morte tyranni . juvin . the remedies of these mischiefs which proceed from the violence of such a prince , are persecution or patience . many generous spirits have used the first ; perswading themselves rather to dye , than endure the sight of a tyrant . also the grecians did think it a service acceptable to murther the person of such an impious prince . graeci homines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui tyrannos necaverunt . cic. nevertheless , in christian consideration , the other course is to be taken : let patience therefore incounter this mischief ; for seeing all kings , as well the bad as the good be sent by god , they must be indured . res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem . homer . persecution is not only perilous , but for the most part infortunate : for therefore present revenge is taken by that prince that succeedeth . facinoris ejus ultor est , quisquis successerit . tac. the murther of tyrants is also followed with many inconveniences worse than civil war it self . principes boni , votis expetendi , qualescunque tolerandi . tac. for as fire , floods , and other inevitable plagues are necessarily to be suffered : so evil princes in their covetousness and cruelty ought to be patiently indured , because their office is to command , and subjects must obey . indigna , digna habenda sunt , rex quae facit . sen. and as it is the use of vulgar people to find faults in the long reign of princes ; so the ambition of great subjects is desirous of novelty . praesens imperium subditis semper grave . thucyd. to conclude , we say that the best remedy against tyranny , is patience : for so long as men are , so long will vices be . regum ingenia toleranda , neque usui crebrae mutationes . tac. chap. xxv . a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events . to the perfections of men , three things are necessarily required ; nature , nurture and use : the first giveth capacity , aptness and understanding ; which are graces from above . nurture , is learning , knowledge , art , or order . use , is practice , experience , and orderly observation ; whereof may be conceived , that nature alone sufficeth not ; nor can nurture work any good effect , where natural aptness wanteth ; and they can frame no perfection , unless experience be also conjoined . nemo nascitur sapiens , sed sit . sen. ambassadors , negotiants , and generally all other ministers of mean fortune , in conversation with princes and superiors , must use great respect , shewing themselves rather ceremonious than presumptuous , and acknowledge their obligation great , for the favor and grace , they find in those which might command them . it is no wisdom ever to commend or discommend the actions of men by their success ; for oft-tentimes some enterprises attempted by good counsel , end unfortnately ; and others unadvisedly taken in hand , have happy success . who so then commendeth inconsiderate counsels for their fortunate event , thereby encourageth men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know , and by experience have proved . in actions publick , and every other matter of great moment , the beginning is well to be considered : for afterwards it lieth not in our power , without dishonor to abandon what was begun . the time doth not always serve , nor is apt occasion always offered to enterprise what would ; yer who so doth expect every opportunity , shall either attempt nothing at all , or if he do , the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvantage . when any resolution is taken , either with over great haste , or too much affection , seldom it receiveth good success : for he that doth the one , hath no leisure to consider ; the other transporteth the mind so as it cannot conceive more than that which presently presseth . to these we add others , i mean some of them that have leisure , and are void of affection , yet for want of natural capacity , or for continual negligence in their doings , never bring any thing well to pass . who so desireth to be beloved in a commonwealth , must rest content with that which men do give , and the laws allow him to take : so shall he neither incur danger nor envy : for indeed , that which is taken or extorted from others , and not that which is given , doth make men hated . arms , laws and religion , may not in any well governed state be disjoined ; every one of them in particular maintaineth them all united . in actions of war , courage and conduct are of great necessity ; yet all good government consisteth in using the virtues moral ; and in handling the matter of martial policy , it is fit to imitate the proceedings of ancient and approved captains . among mortal men , there is nothing more common than to believe the estate of one man to be better than another ; for hereof it cometh , that every one endeavoreth rather to take from others with travel , than to enjoy his own with rest . the state of princes is good , being well used ; so is the fortune of private men , if therewith they be contented . the rich man liveth happily , so long as he useth his riches temperately ; and the poor man that patiently endureth his wants , is rich enough . whensoever a man is so dangerously distressed , as either proceeding or standing , he liveth in like peril , then doth it behove him in any wise , to resolve upon action . the reason is , that so long as nothing is done , the same accidents that caused his dangers , do still remain in their former force ; but if he endeavor to enterprise somewhat , either he may meet with means to make him secure , or at the hardest , shew himself of so great courage and wit , as he dare and can attempt a way to do it . it seemeth a thing of great difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince or magistrate to eschew the evil speech and bad report of men ; for if they be good and virtuous , then they incur the backbiting of lewd persons ; if evil , then will all good men exclaim against them . all commonwealths ought to desire peace , yet it is necessary ever to be prepared for the war ; because peace disarmed is weak , and without reputation : therefore the poets feign , that pallas the goddess of wisdom did always appear armed . every prince ( well advised ) ought to govern his subjects and servants in such sort , that by his affability and virtue they may be induced rather to serve voluntarily , then for pay or hope of preferment . for otherwise doing , whensoever the prince shall want means to pay , the subjects likewise will fail of good will to serve . but he that faithfully loveth , doth neither in prosperity become arrogant , nor in contrary fortune retire , or complain of the small favor he findeth : for ( till death ) love and life remain at the princes commandment . where poor men find justice , evil men are punish'd , measures and weights be just , youth well nurtured , and old folk free from avarice , there is the commonwealth good and perfect . in war between neighbors , neutrality is commendable ; for by that means we eschew many troubles and great expences , so long as the forces of either side be so equal in strength , as we need not to fear the victory of any : for so long their discord is our security , and oft-tentimes offereth us means to increase our own state and reputation . the chief reasons to move war , are , the justice of the cause , the facillity of success , and the profit of the victory . in all humane actions it behoveth to accommodate the council of men unto present necessity , and never to expose security to manifest peril , nor hope of that which without great difficulty or impossibility cannot be obtained . it is the nature of men , having escaped one extreme , which by force they were constrained long to endure , to run headlong into the other extreme , forgetting that vertue doth always consist in the mean. the multitude is inclined to innovation , and easily induced by false perswasion , and consequently easily transported by seditious leaders . men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten danger and terror ; yet unless these perils , by some new accident , be daily revived , that fear by little and little vanisheth , and security recovereth the place . whoso findeth himself contemned , or not respected , becometh discontent ; which humor in generous minds , breedeth oftentimes adventerous imaginations , whereof audacious attempts have followed , chiefly in persons of authority and reputation ; for he that hopeth no good , feareth no evil : yet true it is , that dangerous enterprises , the more they be thought upon , the less hope they give of good success , for which reason conspiracies not suddenly executed , are for the most part revealed or abandoned . all people do naturally imitate the manners of their prince , and observing his proceedings , resolve to hate or love him : but if they happen once to hate the prince , then his doings , good or evil , are afterwards not good ; but if at the beginning he gained the love of the people , then every bad action is reputed a vertue ; as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good cause or reason . greatly are princes deceived , if in the election of ministers , they more respect their own particular affection , than the sufficiency of the person elected . a prince having conquered any new dominion , is thereby rather incumbered than strengthened , unless the same be after well governed ; and seldom is it seen , that a principality , by ill means gotten , hath been long enjoyed . as to the perfection of the whole body , soundness of head only sufficeth not , unless the other members also do their office ; even so it is not enough that a prince be faultless , but it behoveth also that the magistrates and ministers should perform their duty . great princes rarely resist their appetites , as for the most part private men can ; for they being always honored and obeyed , do seldom with patience indure the want of any thing reasonable , as being perswaded that what they desire is just , and that their commandment hath power to remove all difficulties . all men are naturally good , when no respect of profit or pleasure draws them to become evil. but this worlds corruption , and our frailty is such , as easily and often for our particular interest we incline to the worst ; which was the cause that wise law-makers found out reward and punishment ; the one to incite men to good , the other to fear them from being evil. a tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his estate by three means . first , he practiseth to hold all subjects in extreme awe , and to be basely minded , to the end they should want courage to take arms against him . secondly , he kindleth diffidence and discord among the great men ; thereby to remove occasion of conspiracy and combination . lastly , he holdeth them disarmed and idle , so as they neither know nor can attempt any thing against him . to govern , is nothing else but to hold subjects in love and obedience ; for in respect of the end , they ought not , and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the governor's will and their duty . the laws and ordinances of a common-weale made at the beginning thereof when men were good , do often prove unprofitable when they are become evil ; and therefore new laws are made according to the accidents which happen . the discontent and disorder of people is ever occasioned by the inequality of their goods , because the poorer sort would be made equal to the rich ; but the offence that grows among great men is the desire of honor ; for they being equal , do endeavor to aspire to equal authority . a prince that desireth , by means of his ambassador , to deceive any other prince , must first abuse his own ambassador , to the end he should do and speak with more earnestness , being indeed perswaded that the intent and meaning of his master is simple , which happily would not , were he privy that his prince's meaning were to dissemble . this course is also commonly holden by those , that by imployment of a third person , would perswade any thing feigned or false . for the performance of conditions of treaty of peace , or league of amity , the promises , vows and oaths of princes are of great effect ; and because fidelity in a man is not ever certain , and time doth daily offer occasions of variation , there is no assurance so secure and good , as to stand so prepared , as the enemy may want able means how to offend . to resolve in matters doubtful , or answer requests which we are not willing to grant , the least offensive way is not to use direct denial , but by delays prolong the time , and so in effect , afford good expectation . the old proverb saith , magistratus virum ostendit ; which is no less true than ancient ; for men in such fortune , are occasioned not only to make proof of their sufficiency , but also to discover their affections ; and the more their greatness is , the less respect they have to contain those passions which are natural . albeit great troubles and continual adversity seem insupportable , yet is there nothing more dangerous , than overmuch prosperity ; and being pressed by new appetites , they disturb their own security . in speaking of occurrents doubtful , it is always wisdom to feign ignorance , or at least alledge that we believe them not ; for most commonly they are utterly untrue , or far other than vulgarly is believed . the actions of men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good success ; attributing that to council which sometimes is due to fortune . the multitude of men were wont to be more pleased with sudden than slow resolutions ; and many times account those enterprises generous , which are rashly and inconsiderately attempted . great difference there is between subjects desperate , and others which are only discontented ; for the one desire nothing but present alteration , which they endeavor with all hazard ; the other wish for innovation , inciting any motion or practice , because their intent is to attend time , and that occasion may present it self . a benefit bestowed on him who thinketh himself greatly injured , doth not suffice to raze the same out of his memory , chiefly if the benefit be given at such time as no mere motion , but necessity may seem the occasion thereof . that peace ought to be desired , which removed suspition , which assureth us from peril , which bringeth quiet certain , and acquitteth us of expences ; but when it worketh contrary effects , it may be called a dangerous war , covered with the name of deceitful trust , not unlike a perilous poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsome medicine . the effect of things , and not external show , or seeming , ought to be regarded ; yet it is credible what great grace is gained by courteous speech and affability ; the reason whereof is , as i suppose , that every man believeth he doth merit more than indeed he is worthy , and consequently holdeth himself injured , whensoever he findeth men not to afford him like estimation . men ought in any wise , to refrain to do or say any thing which may offend , for which respect it were great folly , either in presence or absence , to utter displeasing speech , unless necessity inforceth . the matters whereof counsellors are chiefly to consider , are five , the prince's revenue , peace and war , defence , traffick , and what laws are to be made . in giving council divers things are to be observed ; but amongst them are two of most importance : first , it behoveth , that he who is counselled should be wise ; for seeing counsel is nothing else but a certain considerate discourse of things to be done or not done , if he who is to take counsel be not of discretion , then will he refuse all good advice offered , and rather incline to that which his own fancy affecteth , because the want of judgment draweth him to take pleasure in vain things ; and as one incapable of what is good and true , will follow that which is evil and false : so on the other side , if he that giveth counsel be not faithful , then will he a thousand ways disguise and dissemble the truth , and consequently miscarry the mind of him that is counselled ; yea in the end utterly abuse him . the affairs and proceedings of the world , are so variable , and accompanied with so many chances and changes , as impossible it seemeth to judge what is best ; theresore experience informeth , that the conjectures of the most wise , prove vain and uncertain . i therefore mislike the judgment of those men , that will let slip opportunity of present good ( though it be small ) for fear of a future evil , notwithstanding it be greater unless the evil be very near at hand , or certain . for if that do not follow which is feared , then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was desired . whensoever a general opinion is conceived , of the singular vertue and knowledge of any man , although he be indeed ignorant , and far unworthy that account , yet it is hard to remove such a settled conceit : the reason is , that men having at the first given credit to common report , do make thereof so deep an impression , as afterwards , without great difficulty , cannot be removed . the bodies of men , munition and money , may justly be called the sinews of war , yet of them the two first are more necessary , for men and arms have means to find money and meat ; but money and meat cannot so easily find soldiers and swords . one wise general having but a thousand men , is more to be feared and esteemed , than twenty commanders of equal authority ; for they being commonly of divers humors , or judging diversly , do never , or very rarely , what is to be done , and consequently lose much time before any resolution can be taken . a prince of mean force , ought not in any wise to adventure his estate upon one days fight ; for if he be victorious he gaineth nothing but glory ; but if he lose , he is utterly ruined . the most part of men are delighted with histories , for the variety of accidents therein contained ; yet are there few that will imitate what they read , and find done by others ; being perswaded that imitation is not only hard but impossible , as though the heavens and men were changed in their motion , or order and power , which they anciently had . the nature of men is such , as will not endeavor any thing good , unless they be forced thereunto ; for where liberty aboundeth , there confusion and disorder follow . it is therefore supposed , that hunger and poverty make men industrious ; but good laws inforce them to be honest ; for if men were of themselves good , then laws were needless . there are two kinds of adulation : the first proceedeth from a subtle malice : the second cometh by an ordinary use of conversation ; the one tendeth to profit and deceiving ; the other hath no farther design , than a respect or fear to offend ; whereunto the most honest are in some sort bound . whoso bindeth himself to flattery , doth thereby bewray his intent , either to gain , or not to lose that he hath . for the person flattered , is always superior to him that doth flatter , or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead . it may therefore be inferred , that only men of base and miserable condition , and such as cannot help or hurt , be free from flatterers . and contrariwise , magnanimous and fortunate folk , proud men , and such as content themselves with their present estate , are seldom found to be flatterers . every wise prince doth presuppose , that times of trouble may come , and that all such occasions he shall be forced to use the service of men diversly qualified . his study therefore is , in the mean time so to entertain them , as when those storms arise , he may rest assured to command them ; for whosoever perswades himself , by present benefits , to gain the good will of men , when perils are at hand , shall be deceived . in ancient times princes and governors were wont , when peace and security were most like to continue , to find or feign occasions to draw their subjects to fear , to the end that doubt might move them to be more careful of their own well-doing ; for well they knew it a general defect in men , to be reachless , and never willing to use industry ; unless by necessity they were constrained . all histories do shew , and wise politicians do hold it necessary , that for the well governing of every common-weal , it behoveth to presuppose that all men are evil , and will declare themselves so to be , when occasion is offered ; for albeit some inconvenience doth lye hid for a time , it proceedeth from a covert occasion , which for want of experience , was not found , until time the mother of truth discover it . neutrality is always a thing dangerous and disallowable , because it offendeth all parties : he that is strong looketh to be assisted in his greatness ; and he that is weak , not being defended , holdeth himself offended ; the one is not assured from foes , and the other holdeth no friends . albeit neutrality procure present quiet and security , during the troubles of others ; yet after the same falleth out a disadvantage , because it entertaineth a certain falseness , and so in short space will be perceived ; not unlike those men that borrow upon usury ; for albeit they enjoy a certain time , without trouble or charge , yet the same being spent , and the day of payment come , they then feel the great danger which their short pleasure hath purchased . whoso examineth all humane actions shall find , that in eschewing one inconvenience , we presently incur another . as for example , if we endeavor to make our dominions mighty , it behoveth to have the same fully replenished with people , and well armed , and so being , they are not easily governed . on the other side , if our country be not well peopled , or disarmed , then it is easily holden in obedience ; yet therewith so weak , that it can neither increase the bounds thereof , nor defend it self . it is therefore necessary , in all our deliberations , to consider what inconvenience is least , and choose that as the best ; for to find all perfect , void and secure of suspect or imperfection , is impossible . a prince being instantly required to take part with other princes , the one being in arms against the other , if he deny both , incurreth suspicion of both , and may be thought to have secret intelligences with one or both of them ; so as either of them shall account him an enemy , and consequently he that proves victorious will be revenged ; and the other holding him suspected , will not acknowledge his friendship . it is the use of men to presume much upon their own merit , and seeing the success of some others to be such , as without cause or desert , are aspired to dignity thereby encouraged , they promised to themselves the like : nevertheless being entred into the course of their design , and finding many crosses and impeachments they do not a little repent their overweening and presumption , but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised enterprize ; neither can i think , that the vertue or sufficiency of any man without the favor of the heavens , can advance him ; for as the poet saith , nec velle javat , potiusve nocet , si fata repugnant . whoso serveth a prince far from his presence , shall with great difficulty content him . for if he commit any error , it shall be aggravated : besides that , the instructions sent unto him cannot be particularly conceived , because the state of wordly things doth daily alter . also to serve aloof , is a thing full of danger and far from reward ; which inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his prince's person . let no man that cometh to serve in court , assure himself by his wisdom to be advanced or eschew all encounters . neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to fortune , but be perswaded that this worldly life is like to a voiage by sea ; wherein albeit art with the favor of the wind may do much , yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the haven appointed ; for daily experience doth shew , that some strange ships in the calmest weather , are drowned or impeached by the way , when others much weaker and disarmed pass securely . among men worthy of commendations , those have merited best that first planted true religion : next they that framed kingdoms and commonwealths ; the third place is due to such as have augmented or enlarged their dominions ; lastly , learned men deserve fame and memory : and as every of these are worthy of fame and honor ; so ought they to be accompted infamous that introduce atheism , or the subversion of kingdoms , or are become enemies to learning and virtue . whosoever taketh in hand to govern a multitude either by way of liberty , or principality , and cannot assure himself of those persons that are enimies to that enterprise , doth frame a state of short perseverance : yet true it is that such princes be infortunate , as for their own security are inforced to hold a course extraordinary , and have the multitude their enemy ; for he that hath few foes may with small dishonor be assured ; but he that is generally hated can by no means live assured ; and the more cruelty he useth , the weaker his principality proveth . in commending another man , great moderation is to be used ; for as contumely offendeth him against whom it is used ; so great praise , besides that it is uttered with danger to his judgment that speaketh it , the same doth oft-ten-times offend him that heareth it . for self-love which commonly possesseth men , causes the good or evil we hear , to be measured with our own . and consequently every man that is touched with like deserts and defects , doth grow offended that his commendation is not set forth , and feareth lest his imperfection should be discovered . it is often , or rather ever seen , that the force of leagues not used in their first heat , becomes cold ; because suspition soon entereth , which in short space will destroy whatsoever was concluded , and may not without long time be rejoined . the power of ambition which possesseth the minds of men , is such , as rarely or never suffereth them to rest : the reason thereof is , that nature hath framed in them a certain disposition to desire all things , but not to obtain them ; so as our desires being greater than our power , therefore following discontent and evil satisfaction . hereof also proceedeth the variation of fortune ; for some men desiring to get , and others fearing to lose that they had gotten , do occasion one man to injure another , and consequently publick wars do follow ; by means whereof , one country is ruined , and another inlarged . princes of great power , and chiefly those that are inhabitants of the north , having many children , were wont to be much inclined to the wars , as well to win unto themselves honor , as also to get possessions for their sons ; which manner of proceedings did oft-tentimes remove such disturbance as the plurality of brethren bringeth . these and other reasons induced princes to attempt war against those kingdoms , which in cheir opinion seemed easily conquered , or whereunto they can pretend little ; for by colour thereof they may the rather justifie their proceedings . when a prince deferreth to answer an ambassador , it proceedeth from some of these respects ; either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat whereof he doubteth , or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded , or that he esteemeth not the prince that doth demand , or that he disdaineth the person by whom the demand is made , or else that he intendeth to hear from his own ministers to be better resolved : wherefore a discreet negotiator ought in such cases to consider which of these reasons move the prince where he is employed , to entertain him with delays , and make his dispatch accordingly . the sufficiency of good counsellors consistetd in fonr things . first , they ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their affairs , directing all doings to publick commodity . secondly , to be just in their proceedings , giving to every one that which to him appertaineth . thirdly , to be stout , and void both of partial respects and fear . and lastly , to be temperate and moderate in their desires . whoso desireth to govern well and securely , it behoveth him to have a vigilant eye to the proceedings of great princes , and to consider seriously of their designs : for it is matter of small difficulty to live in peace with him who desireth our amity , and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us . the intelligences that princes study to attain , are procured by divers means : some are brought by report , some vented by conversation and sounding , some by means of espials ; but the most sure and credibe occurrents , are those which come from ambassadors , chiefly those that either for the greatness of their prince , or their own virtue , be of most reputation . for those men conversing daily with great personages , and pondering diligently their manners , words , wisdom , and the order of each man's proceedings , yea , of the prince himself , may with commodity attain unto matters of great importance sooner than they that are writers of rumors , or that take upon them to conjecture of things to come . whensoever a people is induced to commit so great an error , as to give reputation to one only man , to the end he should oppress all those great men whom they hate , they thereby give him opportunity to become their prince ; and so being assisted with their favor and aid , he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the nobility ; and they being extirpated , he will also endeavor to tyrannize over the people , by whose help he aspired . so many as are not consenting to the tyranny , rest enemies to the person of the tyrant , who can by no means gain the love of all . for impossible it is , that the riches of any tyrant should be so great , and the honors he can give so many as may satisfie all . hereof it cometh , that those tyrants that are favored of the people , and disfavored of the nobles , are most secure ; because their tyranny is supported with a greater strength ( having the multitude their friends ) then is the tyrant whom the humor of the nobles only hath advanced . a dangerous thing it is in all commonwealths by continual punishing , to hold the minds of subjects in suspition ; for men ever fearing their ruine , will ( without respect ) determine to save themselves , and as men desperate , attempt innovation . all capital executions ought therefore to be executed suddenly , and as it were at one instant , so to assure the minds of men from further molestations . the intent of every wise prince that maketh war , either by election or ambition , is to gain and hold what is gotten : also to use the matter so as thereby he may inrich himself , and not impoverish his own people or country . he that inlargeth his dominions , doth not always increase his power ; but he that increaseth in force as well as in dominion , shall thereby grow great ; otherwise he gained no more than is shortly to be lost , and consequently he ruineth himself : for who spends more in the war , than he gains by victory , loseth both labor and cost . every prince and commonwealth must above all things take heed , that no necessity how great soever , do perswade him to bring into his dominion any auxiliary soldiers ; because the hardest conditions the enemy can offer , are more easie than is such a resolution . a prince sheweth his ruine at hand , whensoever he beginneth to break the laws and customs , which are ancient and have been long time obeyed by the people of his dominion . that prince which careth to keep himself secure from conspiracy , ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great favors , than them whom he hath much injured : for these want opportunities , the other do not ; and both their desires are as one ; because the appetite of commanding , is always as much or more than the desire of revenge . whensoever a prince discovers a conspiracy , he must well consider the quality thereof , measuring the force of the conspirators with his own ; and finding them many and mighty , the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled , until the princes power be prepared to oppose them ; otherwise he hazardeth his own security . it hath been by long experience found better to send one general to an army , though he be of mean sufficiency , than to give the same authority to two or more excellent personages with equal commission . he that coveteth to be over-much loved , oft-tentimes becomes contemptible ; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared , is ever hated : and to hold the mean between them , cannot be exactly done , because nature will not so permit . whoso aspireth to any dignity , must resolve himself to endure the envy of men , and never to be moved for any offence conceived against him , though they that be offended , be his dear friends : neither shall he for the first affront or encounter , relinquish his hope ; for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of fortune , shall after with facility arrive where he designed . in giving council to a prince or commonwealth , and therefore desiring to eschew danger and offence , no other mean is to be taken than that the counsellor shall without passion or perswasion pronounce his opinion , and never to affirm any thing as a resolution , but with modesty to defend that he speaketh ; so as the prince which follows his advice , may seem to do it voluntarily , and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the counsel . a discreet captain being in the field against the enemy , of whose virtue he hath had no proof , ought first by light skirmishes to feel of what virtue he is ; and not to enterprise any general adventure , to the end that terror or fame should not daunt nor discourage his own soldiers . albeit fraud be in all actions detested , yet is the same in martial enterprises commendible and glorious : for that captain who compasseth his designs by wit or stratagem , is no less commended than he that vanquisheth the enemy by violence and force . in times of extremity , when resolution must be taken for the having or utter loss of the state , then no regard is to be had of justice or injustice , mercy or cruelty , honor or ignominy , but rather setting aside all respects , that course is to be followed which defended the lives and liberties of men. whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter , let him think of that is past ; for the world hath ever been in a circular revolution : whatsoever is now , was heretofore , and things past or present are no other than such as shall be again : redit orbis in orbem . a prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another , must if it be possible urge a sudden answer , and lay before him that is moved , a necessity to resolve presently , giving him to understand that denial or delays may breed a perilous and sudden indignation . there is nothing more difficult , doubtful and dangerous than to attempt innovation : for he that taketh in hand an enterprize of such quality , maketh all those his enemies which lived well under the old order , and findeth them cold defenders that affect his novelties , which coldness proceedeth chiefly of incredulity ; for men are not easily induced to believe a new thing till experience hath proved it to be good . there is no art nor knowledge so seemly and necessary for a prince as the art military with the ordinances and discipline thereof : for that is the only skill required in him that commandeth , and such a virtue as doth not only maintain them that are born princes , but often advanceth private men to that dignity . the deep impressions which old injuries make in the minds of great men cannot with new benefits be razed out ; it is also to be remembred that injuries be done all together : for they offend the less , and will be forgotten the sooner ; but benefits should by little and little be bestowed , so shall the memory of them long continue . a small pleasure or displeasure presently done , doth move more than a great good turn bestowed in times past ; for the taste of things present doth make a deeper impression in the minds of men , than doth the memory of things past , or expectation of things to come . it is a matter of small difficulty to sound the discontentment of other men. for every one doth willingly tell the well and ill deserving of friends , and likewise how much or how little foes can do , if we have patience to hear , which patience is the beginning of all good speed ; but he that delighteth to speak much , and hear little , shall ever inform others more than himself can learn. among other dangers which a prince incurreth by being disarmed , the greatest is , that thereby he becometh contemptible ; for no comparison there is between men armed and them that are disarmed : and no reason there is that he that is armed should yield obedience to him that is disarmed , neither is it like that a prince disarmed can be secure from his own subjects armed . a prince ignorant of martial knowledge , among other misfortunes cannot be esteemed or trusted of his own soldiers ; it behoveth him therefore as well in time of peace as war to exercise arms , which may be done by two means ; the one by action of body , the other by contemplation of mind . the body may be exercised in hunting , hawking , and such like pastimes ; thereby to be made apt to endure travel : his mind likewise may be informed by reading of histories , and the consideration of actions performed by excellent captains , observing the occasion of their victories or losses , to the end he may imitate the one , and eschew the other . he that doth not as other men do , but endeavoureth that which ought to be done , shall thereby rather incur peril than preservation ; for whoso laboureth to be sincerely perfect and good , shall necessarily perish , living among men that are generally evil. a prince that useth liberality to his prejudice , ought not to regard the infamy of miserable , because his parsimony will in time enable him to be liberal , and so may declare himself to be , having by parsimony increased his power , and therefore without imposing upon the people , may defend himself from all such as will make war ; so shall he use liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing , who are infinite ; and use miserliness to those only to whom he giveth , who are but few . there is nothing that consumeth it self like to librality ; for if it be long used , it taketh away the means to continue it , and consequently doth make men poor and basely minded : or else to eschew poverty , they shall be forced to extortion and become odious . it is better to incur the name of covetous ( which is a scandal without hate ) then with desire to be accounted liberal , deserve the infamy of oppression ( an ignominy accompanied with hatred . ) a prince ought to be slow in believing , and advised in proceeding ; he should also beware not to make himself over much feared , but in all his actions shew great wisdom tempered with curtesie ; so shall not over much confidence induce him to be careless , nor over much diffidence render him intolerable . whoso observeth , shall see that man offended , less respect him whom they love , than him whom they fear . for love is maintained by a certain reciproque obligation , which because men are evil , useth to be by every occasion of profit broken . but fear is continued by a certain dread of punishment which never faileth . a prince that holdeth in the field an army wherein are great numbers of soldiers , ought not to care though he be accompted cruel : for without such an opinion conceived , he cannot keep his forces united , nor apt to attempt any enterprize . men for the most , do use rather to judge by their eyes , than by their hands , for every one may see , but few can certainly know . every one seeth what thou seemest to be , but few can understand what thou art indeed ; and these few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of many which have the majesty of estate to defend them . also in the actions of all men , and chiefly princes , from whom is no appellation , the end is ever observed . machiavel . a prince being forced to use the condition of beasts , must among them make choice of the fox and the lyon ; for the lyon cannot take heed of snares , and the fox is easily overcome by the wolves : it behoveth him therefore to be a fox to discover the snares , and a lyon to terrifie the wolves . a prince newly advanced cannot observe those rules , which are the cause that men be accounted good ; he being many times constrained for defence of his state to proceed contrary to promise , contrary to charity , and all vertue ; and consequently it behoveth him to have a mind apt to alteration , as the wind and variation of fortune shall direct ; yet ought he not to abandon the good , if so he can , but be ready to use what is evil , if so he shall be inforced . every prince ought to have two ears , the one intrinsick , in respect of subjects ; the other extrinsick , in respect of forreign potentates , from whom he may be defended with good arms , and good friends : also matters intrinsick will ever stand well , so long as all things abroad rest firm . a prince that is favoured of the multitude , need not to doubt conspiracy ; but contrary wise , where the people is generally discontented and hateth the prince , then may he reasonably doubt every thing , and every person ; for no man is so poor , that wanteth a weapon wherewith to offend . when any occasion is presented to have that thou desirest , fail not to lay hold thereof ; for these worldly things do vary , and that so suddenly , as hard it is to assure our selves of any thing , unless the same be already in hand : on the other side , if any trouble threaten thee , defer it so long as thou mayest ; for time may occasion some accident to remove all dangers . the prince that doubteth the fidelity of his subjects , must of force build fortresses ; but he that feareth foreign force more than his own people , were better to leave them unbuilt . howsoever it be , that prince that desireth generally to be respected and esteemed , must perform some notable enterprise , and give testimony of great vertue and valour . a prince shall do well at all times to be counselled so as no man do presume to give counsel but when the prince doth ask it . it is also to be noted , that he who is not of himself wise , cannot be well counselled of others , unless happily he yield to some wise men the government of his whole affairs . for good counsels from whomsoever they proceed , shall be thought to come from the prince , and not the wisdom of the prince to proceed from the counsel of others . he that taketh delight to be employed in publick affairs , must by all means endeavour to continue in such services : for oft one business dependeth on another , whereunto the florentine proverb may be applied , di cosa , nasae cosa , & il tempole governa . some men have not only desired , but also compassed honour and profit ; yet being in possession of both , were not therewith so satisfied , as they hoped to be ; which being believed , would happily extinguish the immeasurable ambition wherewith many men are possessed . by experience i have learned , that great folly it is to account that ours which we have not , or spend presently in hope of future gain . therefore merchants , during the adventure of their goods , do not increase domestical expences , but fearing the worst assure what is in hand . for such men as have gained unto themselves reputation and are accounted vertuous , to maintain that conceit , and eschew envy , there is nothing better than a life retired from daily conversation , and chiefly of the multitude . fugiat sapiens commercia vulgi . the end that moveth a prince to make war , is to enrich himself , and impoverish the enemy : neither is victory desired for other purpose than thereby to become the more mighty , and make the enemy weak : consequently wheresoever thy victory doth impoverish thee , or thy gain therein doth weaken thee , it followeth that either thou pass or undergo that mark whereunto the intention of war was directed . and that prince is by victory enriched , that can oppress the enemies power , and become master of his goods and possessions . and that prince is by victory impoverished when the enemy , notwithstanding he be victored , can still maintain himself , and the spoils and possessions are not taken to the use of the prince victorious , but imparted unto his soldiers . for then may he be thought in his own losing infortunate , and in victory unhappy ; for if he be vanquished , then must he endure the offence by foes : and being victorious shall be forced to abide the wrong offered by friends ; which as they be less reasonable , so are they also less supportable , because he is still by impositions forced to burthen the subjects , whereof may be inferred , that the prince , having in him any generosity , cannot justly rejoyce at that victory which causeth the subject to lament . who so desireth to obtain any thing , hopeth to compass his desire , either by intreaty , presents , or threatning ; for so shall he , to whom the request is made , be moved either with compassion , profit , or fear : nevertheless , with covetous and cruel men , and such as are in their opinion mighty , none of these can prevail . and consequently in vain do they labour , that go about by suit to stir them to pity , by gifts to gain them , or by threats to fear them . who so is persuaded that any common weal can continue disunited , doth greatly deceive himself : true it is , that some divisions do maintain the estate , but other do indamage the same . they which do harm , are such as with sects and partakings be accompanied ; they which help without sects and partakings , be maintained . a wise governour therefore , albeit he cannot so exactly foresee but some enemies will arise in the state , yet may he take order that no factions may thereby grow . it is therefore to be noted , that the citizens of every estate , may aspire to reputation , either by private or publick means . reputation by publick means , is gained chiefly in the war , either by obtaining victory in some battle , or surprising of some city ; or else by performing some ambassage diligently , prosperously : but private reputation is gotten by doing favour to this or that man , and protecting them from magistrates , giving them mony , advancing them unworthily to honour and office ; and by great feasts , entertaining the multitude ; of which manner of proceeding , sects , factions and partakings do grow : and as reputation thus gained is dangerous , so the other without faction is profitable ; because the same is founded on common welfare , and no private profit : and albeit among citizens of this sort , will oft arise great hate , yet wanting followers for their particular profit , the state shall not be indangered , but rather strengthned ; for every man endeavouring to deserve well , will hold himself within the bounds of civil life , and by vertuous merits labour to be advanced . to persuade or dissuade particular persons , is a matter of no difficulty : for if words suffice not , yet authority will prevail : but hard and perilous it is to remove a false opinion conceived by a whole multitude , for therein fair speech and no compulsion must be used . the best means which wise captains can use to make their soldiers resolute , is to take from them all hope ; which resolution may also be increased with the love of our country and confidence in the captain : for confidence groweth by the valour of men , and discipline in former victories , and trust reposed in the leader . the love of our country is natural , but the affection we bear to the captain , proceedeth rather from his vertue , than the benefits he hath bestowed . necessity also may do much , and chiefly that where no choice is left , but either overcome by arms or dye in desperation . there is nothing of so great force to hold an army united , as the reputation of the captain , which proceedeth only from his vertue ; for neither dignity nor authority without valour can work that effect . the first care that a captain must have , is to hold his soldiers well punished and paid ; for where payment faileth , punishment ought not to be inflicted : and consequently no reason it is to punish him for robbery , whom want of pay enforceth to shift ; but where the soldier is paid , and not punished ( offending ) then will he , without respect , become insolent towards his captain ; whereof ensue mutinies , discord , and utter ruin. it is a custom , very honourable , not to promise more than thou wilt assuredly perform : yet true it is , that whosoever is denied ( though justly ) doth rest ill-contented ; for men indeed are not governed by reason : otherwise it is for him that promiseth ; and so good promises shall stand in stead of performance : besides that , he may find excuse enough , because the most part of men are so simple , that fair words alone have power to abuse them , chiefly when they proceed from a person of reputation and authority . the best way , therefore , is not to promise precisely , but entertain the suitors with answers general , and full of good hope : yet not such as shall directly and absolutely bind . the greatest and most material displeasures that use to arise between the nobility and people , are caused by the diversity of humours , the one labouring to command , the other endeavouring not to obey ; so as all troubles and disorders in every common-weal , do thereof receive nutriment . the city which is maintained rather by factions than laws , so soon as one faction is become strong , and without opposition , the same of necessity must be divided in it self : for those particular causes which were at the first taken , are not of force enough to maintain it . it is the nature of men not to endure any discommodity , unless necessity do thereunto enforce them : which may apparently be perceived by their habitations ; for as the fear of war draweth them to places of strength ( for their defence ) so that peril being past , they do for the most part remove themselves to inhabit countries of more commodity and profit . it may seem strange , and no even measure ( yet approved by experience ) that where many offend , few are punished . also petty errors are severely corrected , but great and grievous crimes be rewarded . in like manner , where many receive wrong , few seek revenge . for injuries universal , are with more patience than particular offences endured . all , or the greatest part of men that have aspired to riches or power , have attained thereunto either by force or fraud : and without they have by craft or cruelty gained , to cover the foulness of their fact , they call purchase as a name more honest . howsoever he , that for want of will or wit useth not those means , must rest in servitude and poverty . the reason thereof is , that as nature hath laid before men the chief of all fortunes , so she disposes them rather to rapine than honest industry , and more subject to bad than good endeavours : hereof it cometh , that one man eateth another , and he that is weakest must always go to the worst . where necessity forceth , boldness is reputed wisdom , and in great enterprises peril is not to be made accompt of . for those attempts that begin with danger , always end with honour , or reward ; also from one peril there is no way to escape , but by entring into another . a wise man ought not to desire to inhabit that country where men have more authority than laws : for indeed that country deserves to be desired where every one may securely enjoy his own ; not that , where with facility it may be taken away ; and that friends for fear to lose their own , are inforced to forsake them . some magistrates either by over great zeal or ignorance take a course of rigour , which being for the present favoured , they are ever the more imployed , as men meet to extirpate inconveniences . but thereby the subjects are often drawn into desperation , and consequently have recourse unto arms , as their uttermost resuge . in this case a wise prince for appeasing the people is forc'd to disallow his ministers , and sometimes also to inflict publick punishment . a prince naturally suspicious , and having about him persons inclined to envy , is easily induced to mistrust those men that have served him with most sufficiency : which danger they cannot eschew , because they who are worthiest commendation are oftentimes envied by such persons as have access unto the prince . who so cannot endure both envy and hate , must refrain to enterprise great matters : for great honours being desired of many , it behoveth him that aspireth unto them , to be for his dignity envied , and for his authority hated ; which authority , albeit the same be well used , yet they who hate or envy ( persuading themselves it might be better handled ) endeavour to oppress that power , as fearing it will be worse . among other things which worketh the inconveniences of common weals , ambition and desperation are chief ; of both , desperation is worst : for ambition may attend occasion , desperation will not , as that cannot endure delays . historians desiring to write the actions of men , onght to set down the simple truth , and not say any thing for love or hatred : also to chuse such an opportunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will , and write what they think , which is a rare happiness of the time. in commending or disallowing the actions of men , it is a course very requisite to consider the beginning , the proceeding , and end : so shall we see the reasons and causes of things , and not their bare events only ; which for the most part are governed by fortune . it is a matter of much necessity , that every man , and chiefly a prince should in his first actions , give some testimony of vertue ; for falling at first into obloquie , do he well or ill , all isill-taken . the custom of the common people is to judge rather by their eyes than by their ears : which is the cause they allow more of external shew than inward vertue : and true it is , where excellency of mind , and beauty of body concur , the commendation due to such a person is far the greater . gratior est pulchro veniens e corpore virtus . a prince or great personage that constantly endureth adversity , deserveth great praise : yet greater commendation is due to him that beareth himself modestly in his happiness . for miseries are oft born with patience , but felicity corrupteth . to be descended of princes , or great personages , is a matter of meer fortune , and so to be esteemed : but adoption proceedeth from the judgment of men , therefore seemeth incorrupt , and seldom abused . it hath been long observed , and is a rule which rarely faileth , that he shall be ever suspected of the prince in possession , whom men account worthy to be a prince in reversion . it hath been a use very ancient to give credit to astrologers , and other such persons , who by their star-learning or blind divination , take upon them to tell of things to come . the reason thereof is , that the most part of men believe that soonest which they least understand ; and if they see the event of a prediction , though it happeneth by meer chance to fall out according to that was premised , thereupon they settle so firm an impression , as albeit many other fail , yet the good conceipt of their cunning cannot be removed . liberality is a vertue which gaineth love , but much are they deceived whom riot in lieu thereof abuseth . to cast away and consume is soon learned , but to give in good order few have the skill . in time of sudden mutiny , conspiracy , and offence of people , the wisest resolution is not to oppose force to prevent fury , but rather give space for the bad to amend , and the good to consent : for treasons prevail on the sudden , but good council gathers forces by leisure . mature deliberation ought ever to be used ; but when arms are to determine , speedy execution is the best : because no delay in that enterprise is fit which cannot be commended before it be ended . who so is pleased to observe the proceedings of men in authority , shall observe that some of them hold a plain course without respect ; others projecting for time to come , do forecast how to hold their present good fortune or at least to escape danger : for they mistrusting present prosperity and fearing a change , prepare beforehand some private friends to oppose against publick hatred : whereof may be inferred , that no care is taken of innocency , but every one studieth how to pass without punishment . in captains and all military commanders , three things are required , vertue , discipline , and authority ; but in private soldiers obedience and courage only sufficeth ; for by due obeying , and no curious scanning the leaders directions are maintained ; and the army in danger is alwaies most valiant , which before the danger is most quiet . let the soldier therefore be well armed and valiantly minded . to advise and direct must be the captains care . it is a matter of no great moment , yet always worthy the noting , that any exterior behaviour , or garment presenting pride or greatness , chiefly in persons lately advanced , though no man be thereby interessed or injured , doth move in others a certain offence : for the nature of man is such , as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye , and wisheth a moderation of fortune no where so much as in those we have known in equal degree with our selves . in all enterprises of war ( if present necessity doth not otherwise require ) leisure and deliberation ought to be used ; for often it sufficeth in lieu of wisdom , to take the advantage of other mens folly . all men that are to consider of great actions , ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken be profitable for the commonweal , honourable to themselves , and easie to be effected ; or at least not greatly difficult . also he that persuadeth , is to be examined whether besides bare words and counsel , he will joyn his own peril ; and if fortune favour the attempt , to whom the principal glory shall redound . the perils which accompany private enterprises , are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to principality . for in private attempts a man may pause or proceed as he will : but to him that aspires to empire there remains no middle course , but either by victory to triumph as a prince ; or being vanquished to endure death as a traytor . let no man in his prosperity , give much credit to common applause or service , assured by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience ; for the base people are learned in no lesson , only without difference of truth or falshood to flatter men in authority , and with shouts and words of great rejoycing make shew of great affection . as overmuch haste is dangerous , so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvantagious ; for albeit consultation ought to forego action , yet to dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side , or take a middle course ( which in cases of doubt and danger is worst ) was ever accompted great discretion . there is no course more comely , nor any resolution so well beseeming a wise man , having made proof of his own vertue ( and finding in age no fortune due to such effect ) as to retire himself from the court and company ; for so shall he shun the inconveniences of contempt and the discommodity of travel ( jucunda senectuti otia ) yet true it is , that whoso hath lived a prince or governed as a publick person , cannot expect security in a private estate . whensoever danger draweth near , and terror is at hand , all men look about , but none willingly adventure . for in such cases every man will give council , but few will take part of the peril . in common-wealths where sects or partialities be , the leader of any side is able to kindle civil war ; yet is he unable to moderate the victory : for to stir up dissentions and troubles , the worst man most commonly bears the stroke ; but peace and quietness are not established but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue . it may seem strange and contrary both to courtesie and christian profession , that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them , than of benefits received by them . the reason thereof is , that thankfulness is accompted a burden , but revenge is sweet , and reckoned a great gain . of reconciled foes , and such as know that our harms were caused by their means , we oft-times expect favour , as persuaded that new friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure : but the matter doth seldom so fall out ; for the quality of man's nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt , and love them whom he hath made beholding . quos laeserunt oderunt . tac. to common persons and such as are ignorant in matters of state , every taxation and imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous ; yet the wiser sort know , that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm people in peace , and peace cannot be maintained without arms , nor arms without pay , nor pay without impositions . as fortunate folk are envied , so are the poor contemned ; which rule reacheth also to princes : the one lives in plenty with war , the other in poverty with peace . for seldom is it seen , that those people are assaulted where nothing is to be gained , and whose base beings afford no other spoils than blood and beggery . wisemen have observed that in matter of state , and the managing thereof , three things are especially to be looked unto : the first is , occasion ; the second , the intentions of other men ; the third , our own affection . for there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as occasion , nothing so difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth ; nor any thing more nocent than our own immoderate desires . it hath been ever a course observed by wise princes , but much more by aristocracies and popular states , against force and fury of the multitude , to defend themselves with silver and gold. how much more it importeth all princes to lead a vertuous life , and give daily example of piety and justice , appears apparently in the proceedings of the roman bishops ; who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first , became greatly honoured ; but afterwards they became contemptible : for the reverence which men did bear to the sanctity of their lives failing , it was impossible of so contrary manners and examples to look for like effects . the success of the war chiefly dependeth on the reputation of the prince , which declining , the vertue also of the soldiers faileth : likewise the fidelity of the people decayeth , and their mony to maintain the war , ceaseth ; contrarywise , the courage of the enemy is increased , they that stood doubtful become resolved , and every difficulty augmenteth . the authority which princes give , is chiefly in respect of wisdom and valour : yet true it is , that for the most part they account them the wisest men that can best accommodate themselves to their humour . the greatest distress and difficulty which can come to any army , doth proceed of these causes : want of mony , scarcity of victuals , hatred of people , discord of captains , disobedience of soldiers , and their flying to the enemy , either of necessity or free-will . a prince or great magistrate having long maintained the reputation of wisdom and vertue , must take heed that no rash or dangerous resolution do taint the honourable fame of his former life : for to be transported with anger against his own profit , is lightness ; and to esteem small dangers more than great , is want of judgment . a prince or person of great estate , must be wary not to inure the conceit of double dealing : for little sincerity and trust is looked in his actions , of whom there is an opinion of craft and falshood conceived . experience hath always proved , that whatsoever the most part of men desire , rarely cometh to pass : the reason hereof is , that the effects of human actions commonly depend on the will of a few ; and their intentions ever differing from the greater number , the end and success cannot be other than as pleaseth the few that are to direct them . there is nothing more dangerous than to enterprise a war , or other actions of importance upon popular persuasion ; for such expectations are vain , and such designs fallible : also the fury of the multitude is great , when danger is little or far off ; but perils growing great and near , their courage quaileth , as they whose passions have no rule or measure . it is strange to see how apt men are to doubt displeasure threatned by enemies , chiefly when they draw near ; for the people do naturally over-much fear dangers at hand , and esteem less than is fit of things present : also to make small account of those that are far from them , because divers remedies may be hoped as well by time , as other accidents . the offensive words or answers of indignation , proceeding from great princes , ought never to admit displeasure into the minds of them against whom they are spoken : for having by speech uttered a great part of choler , the edge of their deeds becomes the calmer , and more easily appeased : such is the condition of noble and generous spirits . to judge right of other mens merit , seems of great difficulty ; for time and tryal is thereto required : also it is not easie to answer the expectation of men , but oft-times inconsiderate , and not measured in due proportion . it is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of affairs and vacations : for as it fitteth well a prince or person of dignity in times of audience and judgment , to be grave , heedful , and austere : so those offices performed , all shew of authority and sad looks ought to be set apart ; for by that means , neither courteous behaviour shall detract from the reverence due to his place , nor severity diminish the love which to his behaviour appertaineth . magistrates must look into all things , but not exact all things to rigor . light faults may be pardoned , but great offences severely corrected ; yet not always proceeding to punishing , but oft contented with repentance . to be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a magistrate , shewing himself sowre to the bad , and sweet to the good ; framing both countenance and condition according to the merit of men , and be persuaded that it is more honest to offend , than to hate . soldiers must be encouraged in all fortunes to stand resolved , and not to be daunted with any passed misadvantage ; ever attending a time and opportunity of revenge ; which commonly cometh to pass where mens minds are united : for common danger must be repelled with union and concord . among other reasons wherewith soldiers are encouraged , necessity and distress doth oft inforce them : for as men of vertue perform the actions of arms for honour , so the coward must do them for his security . all enterprises attempted by arms , are honourable ; but those that are done in countries remote , are more praiseable : for the less they be in knowledge , the greater is the glory to archieve them . to be truly and faithfully loved , is a thing greatly to be desired ; for terror and fear are weak works of affection : for they being taken away , he that ceaseth to fear , will soon begin to hate ; and as they that by force are kept under , obey with ill will ; so they that govern without line justly , rule against right . some men either deserving to be accounted of excellent wisdom , or singular in that skill whereof they make profession , do ordinarily love the proceedings of others ; taking that advantage of their ill success : yet sure it is , that disaster and unhappy event of some actions , proceed not of disorder , nor human imperfection , but from a certain fatal fury , which neither counsel nor constancy of men can withstand . it is a matter of much difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince to maintain the law , civil or military , without severity : for where men hope to be easily pardoned , there are they apt to offend . contrarily , where mens actions are precisely fitted , there do they live in over-great aw , and hatred doth always accompany such severity . the best course therefore is to punish offences severely , and reward vertuous merits liberally ; so shall fear be converted to reverend respect , and none have cause to complain : for as it lies in each man's power to shun offending , so is it in their power also to deserve well , and merit reward . whosoever , after mature deliberation , hath resolved what course to hold in the action he hath in hand , must not after repent , or fear any difficulty : for such thoughts would break the vigour of the mind , and impeach the proceedings of that which was resolved . and albeit some differences do happily arise , yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater impediments . young men for the warmness of their blood , and for not having before-time been deceived by fortune , more willingly enterprise actions rather honourable than severe . but old men as well for that their heat is cooled , as also for having attempted many things in vain , make choice of enterprises severe , rather than those that are followed with fame and glory . the greatness of one prince is nothing else but the ruin and distress of another : likewise his strength is the weakness and oppression of others . some conquests are of such quality , as albeit a victorious captain merit triumphal honour ; yet a modest refusal becomes his greater glory . the dignity of magistrates is not assured without arms ; for when obedience faileth , no other means is left to continue a people united . as willing obedience in subjects is the prince's strength , so is the same their own security : for as by the princes authority the people are governed , so by their consent he is maintained . three things men covet with immoderate desire , lands , riches , and honours ; but as seldom they compass their full content , so are they for the most part to endure a destiny far other than they wished . strange it is , yet by experience proved true , that in time of danger , fortune ( or rather destiny ) so much amazeth the judgment of wise men , as seldom they conceive what resolution is best to be taken . no great free-city can long continue quiet , unless the same be used to foreign assaults : for wanting foes without , some inward enmity will arise , not unlike to strange bodies of men , which being secure from external injury , are nevertheless by their own poise oppressed . as every pilot of ordinary skill knoweth in calm and quiet seas to direct the course of his ship ; so every governor of capacity doth understand how the affairs of state are in peaceable times to be handled : but when tempests are , and subjects bent to sedition ; the one requires an excellent sailer , the other the aid of some excellent wisdom . it oft happens , that publick duty is opposite to private friendship ; so as we are either forced to omit the offices due to our country , or draw our dearest friends into danger : in which case we are to prefer publick respect , before particular obligation . the nature of base people is such , as either they obey slavishly , or command insolently : for liberty being the mark whereat they aim , is by them of that quality , neither moderately desired nor discreetly continued ; and always there are some seditious leaders to be found , who of disorder are inclined to kindle the ire and offence of ignorant people . dux rebus motis , facile invenitur . salust . experience hath oft proved , that men in best fortune , and such as esteem themselves most secure , even then fall soonest into disadventure , because those dangers unfeared be as it were contemned , and not regarded . to enter needless dangers , was ever accounted madness ; yet in times of extream peril and apparent distress , bold and hazardous attempts are greatest security . the divers adventures which happen to men , may well inform , that much better it is , chiefly in arms , to be governed by reason than by fortune . a certain peace is ever accounted better security than victory hoped or expected . melior tutiorque certa pax quam sperata victoria . liv. if to our prosperity god were pleased to add the grace of wisdom , we should thereby judge not only of what is past , but also of all that can succeed hereafter . rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings , unless first we have felt the deceits of fortune . discord or dissention in any state or city , offers opportunity to such men as are ambitious to work their will : for the humor of sects and partialities is such , as the weaker faction doth ever chuse rather to call for aid of strangers , than yield to the dominion of an adverse party . ancient customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away . fortune which altereth all things , will by little and little wear them out of use . to be oft in fight , and converse much with men , breedeth a kinde of satiety : therefore it behoveth persons of great estate and authority to be retired , lest over-much familiarity should derract from the reverencc due to honorable estate . the natures of men not content to live according to their fortune and birth , are of all others most prone to envy ; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in estimation above them . great heed is to be taken , that no citizen or subject , be suffered to aspire to such greatness , as cannot be forced to obey the laws ; and no order there is of more necessity , than that every man of what quality soever , may be without respect accused and judged . for conservation of particular greatness and dignity , there is nothing more noble and glorious , than to have felt the force of every fortune . it is the quality of wise men only , to know how to use prosperity , and never to trust too much to the favors of present happiness . a man well advised in his prosperity , beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent ; nor must he believe in his own present felicity , for the day knows not what the night bringeth : he only is to be reputed a man , whose mind cannot be puft up by prosperity , nor dejected by any adverse fortune . men of cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent speeches , but wise men laugh them to scorn . the way whereby a prince eschues the hate of subjects , is , not to take from them their lands or goods ; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted , unless the same be accompanied with confiscation ( which a prince is rarely forced to use ) it seldom causeth him to become odious . a rule most cerain it is that he who commands any thing unpleasing , must by severe means cause it to be observed ; and who desireth to be obeyed , must know how to command : and he only knows how to command , that doth compare his own force with those that are to obey ; wherein finding a proportion , then he may boldly proceed , otherwise forbear . in actions of difficulty great courage is to be used , and who so compasseth any thing by violence , cannot maintain it by mildness , nor command by affability : he therefore that is of nature soft , should do best to refrain all extraordinary commands , and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his mild spirit ; because ordinary punishments are not imputed to the prince or his magistrates , but to the laws and ordinances of state. when necessity presseth , desperation is deemed wisdom , and generous minds do not account of danger , because those attempts which begin with peril , do for the most part end with glory . he that endeavours to be good among many that are evil , or will uphold that which those labour to pull down of force , worketh his own undoing . all common-wealths alter from order to disorder , from disorder to order again ; for nature having made all worldly things variable , so soon as they have attained their utmost perfection and height , they must descend ; so from good they fall back to evil ; and from evil they return to good . war begets quiet , quiet idleness , idleness disorder , disorder ruin ; likewise ruin order , order vertue , vertue glory and good fortune . wisemen have observed that arms were before learning , and captains before philosophers ; for good and well regulated armies having gained victory , established rest and security , whereof the study of letters and liberal sciences ensued . that country deserveth to be loved of all men , which loves all men indifferently , and not that country which respecting the best part , advanceth a few : no man therefore is to be blamed , if for such cause he desire rather to abandon than embrace his country . common-wealths are bodies mixt , yet have they of bodies simple some resemblance : and as in these , many infirmities grow , which without violent medicines cannot be cured ; so in the other many mischiefs arise , which a good and godly patient should offend to leave uncured , though therein he use both force and fire . those wars be most just which are most necessary ; and those arms are most merciful where no hope of help remains but in them only . in actions which promise either publick glory , or private honour , men may be reasonably persuaded to adventure life and living , because great hope there is to die with reputation , or live to recover that peace which war hath consumed : but where men are no less oppressed by insolency of commanders , than by insolency of foes , there is the calamity doubled , and of two evils the danger of war seemeth least ; for that hath end , the other is infinite . who so persuades himself to be no less esteemed in evil than good fortune , is deceived : for promises made , during distress , are rarely performed , unless the same necessity continue . the intent of every prince , or other state that makes war , is to enrich himself , and impoverish the enemy : neither is victory for other occasions sought , nor the possessions of the enemy to other end desir'd , than to make themselves mighty , and their enemy weak . it follows then , that so oft as the victory impoverishes them , or the gains weaken them , either they pass or come short of that mark whereat the war was aimed . ancient and well-governed common-wealths were wont by their conquests to fill the treasuries with gold and silver , to give reward to soldiers , to spare the people from tributes , to make triumphs and publick feasts : but in later times the wars have used , first , to consume the treasure , and after impoverish the people without assuring them from their enemies . a prince or state that leaves promises unperformed , by reason of unexpected impediments , and for no ill intent , ought not to be blamed : neither are such accidents any just cause or colour why friends should abandon their confederates . where magistrates govern justly , subjects obey dutifully ; where private persons grow rich , and princes enlarge their empire ; there is the common-wealth blessed , and the people fortunate . chap. xxvi . maxims of state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policy in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narrations and historical parallels . all cities and towns of state are builded either by people dwelling in or about the place where they are builded , or else they are made by strangers : of the first are athens and venice , of the other alexandria and florence . the fortune of every city builded , and vertue of the builder , appeareth by choice of the place , and quality of laws : for as fertile places occasion men to be slothful , unless by good laws they be forced to labour , so barrenness compels them to industry ; which reason induceth wise men to plant habitations in either : examples of the first are ferrara and rome , of the second ragusa and genoa . all laws whereby commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent man , and at an instant ; or else they were ordained at sundry times , according to such accidents as besel . example , the laws of sparta made at the beginning by lycurgus , the laws of rome at sundry times . the government of every city in time becomes corrupt ; principality changeth into tyranny : the optimacy is made the government of the people ; and the popular estate turns to licentious disorder ; which instability or alteration moved some law-makers to take order that in the government of their city there should be a mixture of all three , and was the cause that the policy of sparta continued years , when the popular state of athens endured not one hundred . example , the laws of sparta made by lycurgus , and the laws of athens by solon . whoso taketh in hand to frame any state or government , ought to presuppose that all men are evil , and at occasions will shew themselves so to be . example , the envy of the people of rome to the nobles , and their insolency towards them appeared not so long as the kings governed ; but the tarquins being banished , opportunity was thereby offered , that the malice of the one and the other became discovered . the divers honours of the nobility and people , the one desiring to command , the other not to obey , are the cause of continual troubles , unless some third mean there be of more authority than either , to bridle the force of both . example , the kings in rome expulsed , forth with arose much mutiny , and could not be suppress'd till the tribum plebis were created ; whose authority wrought the same effect which the kings had done . some states endeavour to enlarge their dominions , and some others labor only to maintain that estate they antiently possessed . example of the first was the city of rome , of the second sparta . all states desiring to live at liberty , think fit that every man should be permitted to accuse any citizen that offend eth , which manner of proceeding works two excellent effects : first , that the people should not dare for fear of accusing to attempt ought against the state ; or if they do , they shall be presently and without respect punished . secondly , by liberty of accusing , every man hath means to utter the offence where with he can charge others , which he could not ; unless it were lawful to take such an ordinary course , and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary , particular revenge , or calling in foreign forces . example , coriolanus and appius , claudius at rome , lucanncve at chinsi , francisco valeri in florence . as accusations are in every state necessary , so slanders are dangerous , and worthy of punishment ; the difference betwixt accusations and slanders , is , that the one is publickly performed before magistrates , with good proofs and witnesses to maintain the truth of the accusation ; but slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret , and places of repair , without witness and justification , so as every man may be slandered , but few are orderly accused . example , appius claudius accused by l. virginius ; furius camillus , slandered by manlius capitolinus . the only means to suppress slander is , to give authority to some persons of repute , to compel every slanderer to become an accuser ; and if the accusation prove true , then to reward the accuser , or at least not to punish him . example , manlius the slanderer of camillus for his untrue information punished . a rule most certain and assured it is , that every kingdom and state at the first well framed , or after well informed , doth take the perfection thereof from the wisdom of some excellent man , who ought not to be blind though in a matter of great moment he happily useth some extraordinary violence or proceedings ; for he that employeth force to mend and not to mar , deserves commendation . example , romulus , lycurgus , cleomenes . there lives no man so simple or wise , so wicked or well-disposed , but prefers those persons that are praiseable before those that are blameable : notwithstanding for that well-near all men are beguil'd in discerning what indeed is good , deeming that honourable which in truth is otherwise : they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a course which merits rather infamy than commendation . example , every man wisheth himself timoleon , or agesilaus , rather than dionysius or phalaris ; rather a titus or trajan , than caligula or vitellius . who reads histories treating of great actions shall perceive that good princes indeed are more secure and better defended by the love of the people , and fidelity of counsellors , than were they that entertained many legions and men of war. example , of all those emperours which reigned after caesar until maximiinus , the greatest number were for their vices taken and slain , only galba and pertinax excepted , who were good emperours . a prince of great knowledge both in arms and wisdom , so firmly setleth the foundation of government , as albeit his successor be of the less vertue , yet may he be maintained even by the memory of his predecessor : but if it happen that the third prince prove not more like the first than the second , then all that is past goeth to ruine . example , the martial valour of romulus was the cause that numa might govern safely in peace : which tullus could not have done , had he been unlike to romulus ; nor should bajazet emperour of turky have enjoyed the state of his father mahomet , and left the same to his posterity , if selim his son had not been more like to his grand - father than to bajazet his father . the succession of two excellent princes , chiesly if they be of long life , works wondrous effects : the like is seen in optimacies and popular states , where the governours successively elected be men of great vertue and understanding . example , the first appeared in philip of macedon , and alexander his son , the second in the consuls of rome . in every state , where soldiers are not , the fault thereof proceeds from the governours . wise princes were therefore wont even in times of peace to cause warlike exercises to be used ; for without them the most warlike nations become not only ignorant in martial knowledge , but also effeminate . example , pelopidas & epaminondas in thebes , and king tullus in rome as well in peaceable as troublesome times used the exercise of arms. no prince or state well advised , hazards his whole estate upon the valour of some few persons , nor ought to strength of strait places , where the enemy is to pass . example , tully king of rome , and metius king of alba , condescended that three of their nobility for either side , chosen should enter combate , and that nation which was victorious should command the other . francis the french king going to recover lombardy , was by the switzers attended into two or three places in the mountains , hoping there to repulse him , but the king taking another way , passed securely and prevailed . every state well governed doth reward men of good merit , and punish all offenders ; and if any person of good desert shall wilfully be a delinquent , the same man ought not withstanding his former service , be punisht . example , the same horatio that in combat gained the victory against the albani , having insolently slain his own sister , was notwithstanding his egregious act and the fresh memory thereof , called into trial of his life , and with great difficulty obtained pardon : and manlius who had with great glory saved the capitol , for moving sedition in rome , was after from the same cast down headlong . every wise man having performed any great service to his prince or country , ought to be content with such recompence as it shall please the prince or country to bestow : measuring the same according to the power of the giver , and not the merit of him that receiveth . example , horatius cocles for having lost his hand in defence of the bridge of rome , and mutius scaevola suffering his hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill king porsenna , were rewarded with a small portion of land ; and manlius that defended the capitol from the galleys , had no greater reward than a little measure of meal . ingratitude is a vice so natural and common , as not only private persons , but princes and states also either through covetousness or suspition are therewith infected . example , vespasian proclaimed emperor , was chiefly aided by antonius primus , and by his help prevailed against vitellius , in reward of which service vespasian removed him from the command of his army , and gave that honour to mutianus . consalvo ferranoe having taken the kingdom of naples from the french , was first removed from his command of the castles and soldiers , and in the end brought into spain , where in disgrace he ended his life . collatinus tarquinius who with the aid of brutus suppressed the tarquins of rome , and with him pub. valerius were banish'd for no other cause but for being of the name of tarquin , the other because he built a house upon mount coelio . all errors that great captains commit , are either wilful or ignorant , towards the one and the other of which offenders to use greater lenity than the quality of their offences deserves , seemeth necessary : for men of honour suffer nought by the infamy which evil service doth bring . it is also to be considered that a great captain being cumbred with many cares , cannot proceed in his actions couragiously , if he stand in daily doubt to be punish'd for every error that hapneth . example , sergius and virginius were before veio , the one part of the army on the one side of the city , the other not far from the place . sergius being assaulted by the falisci was not aided by virginius , neither would he require his help , such was the envy the one bare to the other ; and consequently their offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment . likewise when varro by his ignorance , received an overthrow by hannibal at cannae , he was nevertheless pardoned and honourably welcomed home by the whole senate . whensoever an inconvenience ariseth within or without the state , it seems a resolution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof , than to seek by sudden violence to suppress it . example , cosmo de medices having gained extraordinary reputation in florence , the citizens imagined , that to suffer the same to increase was dangerous , and therefore they banished him : which extream proceeding , so offended the friends of cosme , being the stronger , as they forced the citizens to revoke him , and make him prince of that city . the like hapned in rome , where caesar for his vertue , much admired and followed , became afterwards to be feared ; and they that feared , not considering their force to be inferior to the power of caesar , endeavouring to oppress him , were the occasion of his greater glory . in every republick , an excessive authority given to one or two persons for long time , proveth dangerous , chiefly when the same is not restrained . example , the dictatorship given to caesar for life , was an occasion to oppress the liberties of the romans . the same effect was before that time like to follow the decemvirate , by suffering appius claudius to prolong the time of his dignity . the ambition of men is such , as rarely they will obey when formerly they have commanded ; neither do they willingly accept of mean office , having before sate in higher place : yet the citizens of well-governed states , did not refuse as well to obey as command . example , the victory the romans obtained against the veienti , q. fabius was slain , having the year before been consul : nevertheless he then served in meaner place under c. manilius , and m. fabius his own brother then consul . there is nothing more strange , yet by experience proved true , that men in adverse fortune be much grieved , and in prosperity also discontented ; which is the reason , that not being forced to fight for necessity , they will nevertheless contend for ambition ; and that humour doth as well possess those that live aloft , as others whom fortune holdeth down . example , the people of rome having by the authority of the tribunes obtained to make themselves secure from oppression of the nobility , forthwith required , that the honour and office of state might be also imparted unto them . the like ambition moved them to have their part of lands by force of lex agaria , which was at last the overthrow of the roman liberty . it seemeth that people displeased with some innovations hapned in the state , do sometime without just reasons complain of those that govern : not unlike to a sick man , who deemeth that the physician , not the fever , is the cause of his grief . example , the people of rome were persuaded that the ambition of consuls was the cause of continual war , therefore required that no more consuls should be ; yet they were content that certain tribunes should command with like authority ; so was nothing altered in the government , but the governors title , which alone did content them . nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man so much , or so soon as the immoderate desire of honour ; in so much as men of honest minds and vertuous inclinations are sometimes by ambition , drawn to abuse that goodness whereunto they are inclined . example , appius claudius having lived long an enemy to the multitude , hoping by their aid to continue his authority of the decemviri in rome , became their friend , and disfavoured the factions of great men. likewise q. fabius a man of singular vertue , being also called to that dignity by appius's self , adulterated his nature and became like unto him . seldom or never is any people discontented without just cause ; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth , many times for want of some fit man to pronounce their grief , they stand silent . example , the romans at the death of virginia , were gathered together armed upon mount sacro , and being asked by the senate , for what cause they so did ? no answer was made ; until virginio father of the virgin had procured , that twenty of the tribunes might be made to be as head of the people , and confer with the senate . a great folly or rather meer madness it seemeth to desire any thing , and tell before-hand that the end and purpose of the desire is evil ; for thereby he sheweth reason why it ought not to be granted . example , the romans required of the senate that appius and the rest of the decemviri should be delivered into their hands , being determined to burn them all alive . the first part of their request seemed reasonable , but the end thereof unreasonable . a course very dangerons it is in all states , by continual accusing and punishing , to hold the subject in doubt and daily fear : for he that stands always looking for some trouble , becometh careless and apt to attempt innovation . example , the decemviri being opprest , the tribunes authorized in their place , endeavoured daily to call in question the most part of the decemviri , and many other citizens also , whereof great inconveniences arose , and much danger would have ensued , had not a decree propounded by m. duillius been made , that for one year no roman citizen should be accused . strange it is to see how men in seeking their own security , lay the injuries which they fear , upon other men ; as though it were necessary , either to offend or to be offended . example , the romans among themselves , united and strong , always endeavoured to offend the nobles ; and the nobles likewise being persuaded they were strong , laboured to oppress the people : which humours were the cause of continual troubles . to make estimation and choice of men fit to govern , the best course is to consider in particular ; otherwise it might be imagined , that among the multitude or meaner people , they being the greatest number , might be found some persons of more perfection . example , the people of rome desiring that the consulship might be given among them as men of most merit , did by all means endeavour to obtain that honour ; but being come to election , and every mans vertue particularly considered , there could not be among the multitude only one found fit for so great a place ; and therefore the people themselves consented , that the dignity should still remain as it was . to persuade a multitude to any enterprise , is easie , if that which is persuaded , doth promise either profit or honour ; yet oft under that external apparence lies hid loss or disadvantage . example , the romans persuading themselves that the slow proceedings of fabius maximus in the war , was both chargeable and cowardly , required , that the general of the horse might direct the war ; which course had ruined rome , if the wisdom of fabius had not been . likewise , when hannibal had divers years reigned in italy , one m. centenius penula , a man of base birth , yet a soldier of some repute , undertook that if he with such voluntiers as would follow him , might have authority to fight , he would within few days deliver hannibal either alive or dead : which offer was by the senate accounted rash , yet for fear to offend the people , granted ; and penula with his soldiers was cut in pieces . to appease a mutiny or tumult in any camp or city , there is no means more speedy or successful , than if some person of great quality and respect , present himself to the people , and by his wisdom lay before them the damage of their discords , persuading them to peace and patience . example , the faction of the frateschi and arratiati in florence ; the one ready to assault the other . francisco soderini , bishop of voterra , in his episcopal habit , went between the parties and appeased them : also count egremont , by the authority of his wisdom and presence , supprest a great mutiny in antwerp , between the martinists and papists . a people corrupted , do rarely or never observe any order or ordinance , unless by force of some prince's power they be thereto inforced ; but where the multitude is incorrupt and religious , all things are done justly , and without compulsion . example , camillus at the victory against the urienti , vowed that the tenth part of the pillage should be offered to apollo ; but the senate supposing that the people would not consent to so great a contribution , studied to dispense with that vow , and to please apollo and the people also by some other means : whereat the people shewed themselves openly offended , and willingly gave no less than the sum formerly decreed . when the free-cities of germany are occasioned to make mony for any publick service , the magistrates impose one or two in the hundred on every city , which done , every one is sworn to lay down so much as in his own conscience he is able ; and he with his own hand , no other witness being present , casteth the mony into a coffer prepared for the purpose ; which he would not , if his own conscience did not inforce him . when any extraordinary occasion happens to a city or province , some prodigious voice is heard , or some marvelous sights are seen . before t. gracchus general of the roman army was betraid by flavius lucanus , the aruspices discovered two serpents eating the entrails of the beasts sacrificed ; which done , they vanish'd : which vision , as they divined , prognosticated the general 's death : likewise f. savanarola foretold the coming of king charles viii . into italy : and m. sedigitus , when the gauls first came towards rome , informed the senate he heard a voice much louder than any man's , crying aloud , galli veniunt . the multitude of base people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation ; yet unless they be directed by some persons of reputation and wisdom , rarely do they joyn in any action of great import . example , the romans , when their city was taken and sack'd by the gauls , went to veio with determination to dwell there : the senate informed thereof , commanded , that upon great pain every citizen should return to rome , whereat the people at first mocked ; but when every man particularly within himself considered his own peril , all in general determined to obey the magistrates . in the employment of men for service , neither age nor fortune ought so much to be regarded as vertue ; for young men having made trial of their valour , soon become aged , and thereby either unapt or unable to serve : therefore well-governed commonwealths , preferred military vertue before any other respect . example , valerius corvinus , with others , made consul the three and twentieth year of his age , and pompey triumphed in his youth . no wise or well-advised prince or other state will undertake without excessive forces to invade the dominions of any other prince , unless he assure himself of some friends there to be a mean , and as it were a gate . to prepare his passage . example , the romans by aid of the saguntines entred spain , the aetoli called them into greece , the hediai into france : likewise the palaeologi incited the turk to come into thrace ; and ludovicus sforza occasioned charles the french king to come into italy . a republick desirous to extend the bounds thereof , must endeavour to be fully furnish'd with inhabitants , which may be done both by love and force : love is gained by suffering strangers to inhabit the city securely ; and force compels people to come thither , when other cities and towns near at hand be demolished or defaced : and impossible it is without this order of proceeding . to enlarge any city or make the same of greater power . example , the romans to enlarge their city demolished alba , and many other towns , and therewith also entertained all strangers courteously : so as rome grew to such greatness , that the city only could arm six hundred and forty thousand men ; but sparta or athens could never exceed twenty thousand , for that lycurgus had inhibited the access of strangers . a commonwealth that consumes more treasure in the war , than it profits in victory , seems to have rather hindred than honoured or inriched the state. a wise captain therefore in his actions , ought as well to profit the republick , as to gain to himself glory . example , the consuls of rome did seldom desire triumph , unless they returned from the war loaden with gold , silver and other rich spoils fit to be delivered into the common treasury . all foreign wars with princes or other states taken in hand , be either for ambition or desire of glory , or else for necessity . example , the romans for their ambition conquered many nations , with intent only to have the obedience of the people ; yet did they suffer them to hold possession of their houses , and sometimes they were permitted to live only with their old laws . likewise alexander the great endeavoured to suppress many princes for his glory , but did not disposses the people , nor kill them . otherwise it is where a whole nation inforced by famine or fury of war , abandon their own dwellings , and are forced to inhabit elswhere . example , the goths and other people of the north invaded the roman empire , and many other provinces , whereof their alteration of names did ensue ; as illyria , now called slavonia , england formerly named britain . a common conceit and saying it is , that mony makes the war strong , and is the force and sinews thereof ; as though he who hath most treasure , be also most mighty ; but experience hath apparently shewed the contrary . example , after the death of alexander king of macedon , a multitude of gauls went into greece , and being there arrived , sent certain ambassadors to the king , who supposing to make them afraid of his power , shewed them his treasure , which wrought a contrary effect ; for the gauls , before desirous of peace , resolved then to continue the war , in hope to win that mighty mass of mony. likewise darius should have vanquished alexander , and the greeks might have conquered the romans , if the richer prince might ever by his mony have prevailed . every league made with a prince or republick remote , is weak and rather aideth us with fame than effect , and consequently deceiveth all those that in such amity repose confidence . example , the florentines being assaulted by the king of naples and the pope , prayed aid of the french king ; who being far distant , could not in time succour them : and the cedicini desiring aid of the capuani against the samnites , a people of no force , were deceived . a prince whose people is well arm'd and train'd , shall do better to attend his enemy at home , than by invasion to assault his country : but such princes whose subjects are disarmed , had need to hold the enemy aloof . example , the romans , and in this age the swisses , being well armed , may attend the war at home ; but the carthaginians and italians being not so well furnished , did ever use to seek the enemy . the plurality of commanders in equal authority , is for the most part occasion of slow proceeding in the war. example , there was at one time in rome created four tribuni militares with authority of consuls , viz. t. quintus after his consulship , cajus furius , m. posthumus , and a. cornelius cassius , amongst whom arose so much diversity and contrariety of opinion , as nothing could be done till their authority ceased , and m. aemylius made dictator . a victory obtained by any great captain with the authority of his prince's commission , counsel , and directions , ought ever to be imputed rather to the wisdom of the prince , than the valour of the captain : which made the emperors of rome to permit no captains ( how great soever his victories were ) to triumph , as before that time the consuls had done ; and even in those days a modest refusal of triumph was commended . example , m. fulvius having gained a great victory against the tuscans , was both by the consent of the senate and people of rome , admitted to triumph ; but the refusal of that honour proved his great glory . all they that from private estate have aspired to principality , either by force or fraud be come thereunto , unless the same be given , or by inheritance descended : yet it is rarely seen , that force alone prevaileth , but fraud without force oft-times sufficeth . example , agathocles by such means became prince of syracusa ; john galeazzo by abusing his uncle barnabas , gained the dominion of lombardy ; and cyrus circumvented cyaxares his mothers brother , and by that craft aspired to greatness . sudden resolutions are always dangerous ; and no less peril ensueth of slow and doubtful delays . example , when hieron prince of syracuse died , the war even then being in great heat between the romans and carthaginians , they of syracusa consulted , whether it were better to follow the fortune of rome or carthage . in which doubt they continued until apollondies , a chief captain of syracusa , laid before them , that so long delay would make them hated both of romans and carthaginians . likewise the flcrentines being by lewis the twelfth required to give his army passage towards naples , mused so long upon an answer , that he became their enemy , and they forced to recover his favour full dearly . to govern a state is nothing else but to take such order as the subjects may not , or ought not to offend ; which may be done , either by removing from them all means to disobey , or by affording them so great favours , as reasonably they ought not to change their fortune ; for the mean course proveth dangerous . example , the latins being by the valour of camillus overcome , yielded themselves to endure what punishment it pleased the romans to inflict . an ingenious and magnanimous answer being made unto wise magistrates , doth oft obtain both pardon and grace . example , when the privernates had rebelled , and were by force constrained to return to the obedience of the romans , they sent certain of the city unto rome , to desire pardon ; who being brought before the senate , one of the senators asked the privernates , what punishment themselves did think they had deserved : the same , quoth they , which men living in freedom , think they are worthy of . whereto the consul thus replied , quid si poenam remittimus ? qualem nos patem vobiscum habituros speremus ? the privernates answered , si bonam dederitis , & fidelem & perpetuam : si malam , haud diuturnam . which answer was thought to proceed from generous men , and therefore they were not only pardoned , but also honoured and received into the number of the roman citizens . all castles , fortresses , and places of strength , be made for defence , either against the enemy or subject : in the first case they are not necessary , in the second dangerous . for thereby the prince may at his pleasure take occasion to insult upon the subject , when much more seemly he might settle his estate upon the love and good affection of men. example , the castle of millan made by duke francisco sforza , incited his heirs to become insolent ; and consequently they became odious ; which was also the cause that so soon as that city was assaulted , the enemy with facility did possess it . that prince or potentate which builds his severity rather upon the trust he hath in fortresses , than the love of men , shall be deceived : for no place is so strong , as can long defend it self , unless by the love and aid of men it be in time of necessity succoured . example , pope julio having drawn the bentivoli out of bologna , built there a strong castle ; the governor thereof robbed the people , and they therewith grieved , in a short time took the castle from him . so after the revolt of genoa , lewis the twelfth came to the recovery thereof , and builded there the strongest fortification of italy , as well for sight as the circumstances inexpugnable . nevertheless the citizens rebelled , and within sixteen months the french were forced to yield the castle and government to octavio fragosa . to build forts upon places of strength , either for defence of our own , or to hold that which is taken from others , hath ever proved to small purpose . example , the romans having supprest the rebellion of the latins and privernates , albeit they were people warlike , and lovers of liberty ; yet to keep them subject , built there no castle , nor other places fortified : and the lacedemonians did not only forbear to fortifie the towns they conquered , but also left their chief city of sparta unwalled . the necessity or use of fortification is only upon frontiers , or such principal places where princes make their habitation ; to the end the fury of sudden assaults may be staid , and time for succor entertained : otherwise , example , the castle of millan being made to hold the state in obedience , could not so do either for the house of sforza or france . guido ubaldo , duke of velin , driven from his dominion by caesar borgia , so soon as he recovered his country , caused all the forts to be demolished : for by experience he found the love of men was the surest defence , and that fortifications prevailed no less against him than for him . the causes of division and faction in every commonweal proceed most commonly of idleness and peace , and that which uniteth , is fear and war. example , the vejenti and elinsci having intelligence of great contention between the nobility and people of rome , thought that a fit opportunity to oppress the one and the other : but the romans informed of such an intention , appeased all domestick anger , and by the valour of their arms , conducted by gn. manlius and m. fabius , defeated the enemies forces . the means to usurp an estate disjoynted is , first before arms be taken , to become , as it were , an arbitrator or a friend indifferent ; and after arms be taken , then to send moderate aid to the weak side , as well to entertain the war between the factions , as also to consume the strength both of the one , and the other ; yet in no wise to employ any great forces , for thereby either party may discover the intents to suppress them . example , the city of pistoia fallen into division , the florentines took occasion sometimes to favor the one , and sometimes the other , that in the end both sides weary of the war , voluntarily yielded to their devotion . philippo viscount , hoping sundry times by occasion of faction to oppress the florentines , did often assault them with great forces , which was the cause that they became reunited ; and consequently the duke deceived of his expectation . a great wisdom it is to refrain opprobrious and injurious speech : for as neither the one nor the other can any whit decrease the enemies force , so doth it move him to greater hate , and more desire to offend . example , gabides , a general of the persians having long besieged amida , became weary , and preparing to abandon the enterprise , raised his camp , which they of the city beholding , began to revile the persians , and from the walls reproved them of cowardise ; which undiscreet words so highly offended gabides , as thereupon he resolved to continue the siege , and within few days won the city . tiberius gracchus appointed captain of certain bands of men , whom for want of other soldiers the romans entertained , proclaimed in his camp , that no man , upon pain of death , should contumeliously call any soldier slave , either in earnest or jest. nam facetiae asperae quando nimium ex vero traxere , acrem sui memoriam relinquunt . likewise alexander the great having conquered well near all the east , brought his forces before tyre , they fearing alexander's fury , offered upon honourable considerations to yeild him obedience , only requiring , that neither he nor any of his forces should enter the city , which motion after four months alexander accepted , and so signified by his ambassador , who arriving at tyre was by the proud citizens slain , whereat alexander grew into choler , and being ready to forsake the siege , staid his forces , and in the end sacked the city and put the people to the sword. a prince or any other state being assaulted by an enemy of far more puissance than himself , ought not to refuse any honourable compositions , chiefly when they are offered ; for no conditions can be so base , but shall in some sort turn to advantage and honour of him that accepts them . example , anno . certain florentines procured great forces of spaniards to come thither , as well to reposess the medici then banish'd , as also to sack the city ; promising that so soon as the army of spain did come into the florentine dominion , the faction of medici would be ready armed to receive them . but the spaniards being come , found no forces at all to joyn with them ; and therefore wanting victual , offered composition . the florentines finding the enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace , whereof followed the loss of prato , and many other inconveniences . the like happened to them of tyre , as before . the denial or delay of justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered , is a thing very dangerous to every prince or other state ; for that the party injured doth oft by indirect means , though with hazard of his country and himself , seek satisfaction : example , the complaint which the galli made against the fabii who sent ambassadors in favour of the tossani , not being heard , nor any punishment inflicted upon them for fighting against the law of nations , was the cause that the galli were offended with the states , whereof followed the sack of rome ; and the delay of justice in philip of macedon , for not revenging the incestuous oppression of attalus to pausanias , was the motive to murther that king. whoso endeavours the alteration of any state must of necessity proceed with all severity , and leave some memorable example to those that shall impugn the ordinance of government newly setled . example , when junius brutus had by his great valour banish'd the tarquins , and sworn the people that no king should ever reign in rome ; within short time after , many young nobles , among whom was brutus's son , impatient of the equality of the new government , conspired to recall the tarquins ; but brutus thereof informed , caused his own son not only to be condemned to death , but was himself present at the execution . as health and soundness of the hands , legs , and other outward members cannot continue life , unless the heart and vital spirits within be strong and firm ; so fortifications and frontier-defences do not prevail , unless the whole corps of the kingdom and people be well armed : example , when the emperor came into italy , and had with some difficulty past the confines of the venetians well near without resistance ; his army march'd to venice , and might doubtless have possest the city , had it not been defended with water . likewise the english in their assault of france , excepting a few encounters on the frontiers , found no puissant resistance within the realm . and anno . they forced all that state , and the king himself to tremble , as oft before they had done ; but contrariwise the romans knowing that life lay in the heart , ever held the body of their state strongest : for the nearer the enemy approach'd rome , the better they found the country armed and defended . the desire to command sovereignly is of so great force , as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of principality , but also in them that have no title at all . example , this appetite moved the wife of tarquinius priscus contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own father servius , and possess his kingdom , as being persuaded it were much more honourable to be a queen than to be the daughter of a king. the violation of ancient laws , orders and customs , under which people have long time lived , is the chief and only cause whereby princes hazard their estate and royal dignity . example , albeit the deflowring of lucrece was the occasion , yet was it not the cause that moved the romans to take arms against tarquin ; for he having before that fact of sextus his son , governed tyrannically , and taken from the senate all authority , was become odious both to the senate , nobility and people , who finding themselves well-governed , never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration . a prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy , hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over-great riches and honors , than those whom he hath greatly injured ; because they want means to offend ; the other have many opportunities to do it : example , perrenius the prime favorite of commodus the emperor , conspired his death . plautianus did the like to severus , and sejanus to tiberius ; for being advanced to so great honors , riches and offices , as nothing remained desirable but the imperial title , they conspired against the persons of their sovereigns in hope of the dignity ; but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth . an army which wants experience , albeit the captain be expert , is not greatly to be feared ; neither ought an army of well-train'd soldiers to be much esteemed , whose captain is ignorant . example , caesar going into africa against afranius and petraeus whose army was full of old soldiers , said he feared them little , quia ibat ad exercitum sine duce . contrariwise , when he went to pharsalia to encounter pompey , he said , ibo ad ducem fine exercitu . a captain-general commanding an army ought rather to govern with curtesie and mildness , than with over-much austerity and severity . example , q. and appius claudius being consuls , were appointed to govern the war. to q. was allotted one army which served very dutifully ; but appius commanding the other with great cruelty , was by his soldiers unwillingly obeyed . nevertheless tacitus seems of contrary opinion , saying , plus poena quam obsequium valet . therefore to reconcile these different conceits , i say , that a general having power to command men , either they are confederates or subjects : if confederates or voluntaries , he may not proceed to extream punishment ; if subjects , and his power absolute , they may be governed otherwise ; yet with such respect , as the insolence of the general inforce not the soldiers to hate him . honour may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory . every man knoweth glory is due to the victor , and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished , being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default . neither is it dishonourable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of war inforceth . and forced promises which concern a whole state , are not binding , and rarely or ever kept , nor is the breaker thereby to receive disgrace . example , posthumus the consul having made a dishonourable peace with the samnites , was by them with his whole army sent home disarmed . being arrived at rome , the consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto ; albeit , he and those few that promised , were bound to perform them . the senate thereupon concluded to send him prisoner to samno , where he constantly protested the fault to be only his own ; wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonour at all : and fortune so much favoured posthumus , as the samnites were content presently to return him to rome ; where he became more glorious for losing the victory , than was pontius at samno for having won the victory . wise men have long observed , that who so will know what shall be , must consider what is past ; for all worldly things hold the same course they had at first . the reason is , that as long as men are possest with the same passions with former ages , consequently of these doings the same effects ensue . example , the almains and french have ever been noted for their avarice , pride , fury and infidelity , and so in divers ages , experience hath proved even to this present : for perfidious dealing the french have given sufficient proof , not only in ancient times , but also in the time of charles viii . who promised to render to the florentines the forts of pisa , but having divers times received mony , held them notwithstanding in possession . the florentines found the like in the almains ; for in the wars of the visconti , dukes of milan , they prayed aid of the emperor , who promised them great forces ; in consideration whereof , he was to receive of the florentines one hundred thousand crowns in hand , and as much more when his army was arrived in italy , both which payments were performed ; but as soon as the emperor came to verona he devised cavillations of unkindness whereupon he returned home . a prince desirous to obtain any thing of another , must if occasion so permit , urge his demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present answer , as he who is prest may not have leisure to consider how to excuse himself in denial . example , pope julio endeavoured to drive out of bologna all the bentivoli , in which action he thought the aid of the french necessary , and that the venetians should stand neutral ; and by divers messengers did sollicite them to that effect ; but not receiving any resolute answer , he thought fit with those few forces he had to take his journey to bologna , whereupon the venetians advertised him they would remain neutral , and the french king forthwith sent him forces , as fearing the popes indignation ; likewise the tuscans having formerly desired aid of the samnites against the romans , took arms suddenly and obtained their request which the samnites had before denied . when a multitude offendeth , all may not be punish'd , because they are too many : to punish part and leave the rest unpunish'd , were injury to the sufferers ; and to those that escape , an encouragement to offend again ; therefore to eschew all extremity , mean courses have been anciently used . example , when all the wives of the romans conspired to poyson their husbands , a convenient number of them were punisht , and the rest suffered to pass : likewise at the conspiracy of the bacchanals in the time of the macedonian war , wherein many thousands men and women had part , every tenth person only was put to death by lot , although the offence were general ; by which manner of punishing , he that suffered , complain'd on his fortune ; and he that escaped , was put in fear , that offending again , the same punishment might light upon himself , and therefore would no more offend . a battel or great action in arms ought not to be enterprised without special commission or command from the prince ; otherwise the general incurs great danger . example , papyrius the dictator punisht the general of the horse in the roman army , for having fought without his consent , although he had in battle slain enemies without loss of of his own ; and caesar commended his captain silanus for having refrain'd to fight , though with great advantage he might . also count egmont hazarded the favor of the king his master for giving battel to marshall de thermes , albeit he were victorious : for upon the success of that action the loss or safety of all the low countries depended . to govern without council is not only dangerous in aristocracies and popular states , but unto independent princes an occasion of utter ruin . example , hieron the first king of sicily in all his proceedings used the advice of counsels , and lived fifty years prosperously in peace ; but his grand-child succeeding , refusing all counsel lost his kingdom , and was with all his kinsfolk and friends cruelly slain . in all monarchies the senate or privv-council is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity , or men of approved wisdom and understanding . example , in polonia no man is counsellor unless he be a palatine , a bishop , a castellan , a captain , or such a one as hath been ambassador : and in turky the title of counsellor is not given but only to the four bassaes. the two cadelesquires , the twelve beglerbegs , and kings son , who in his fathers absence , is as it were a president of the divano or senate . many princes ancient and modern have used to select out of their council , two or three , or four at most , to whom only they did impart their affairs . example , the emperor augustus had maecenas and agrippa ; julius caesar , q. paedius and cor. balbus , whom he only trusted with his cipher and secrets , being counsellors of the cabinet ( as we now call them . ) the alteration of old laws , or introduction of new , are in all states very dangerous , notwithstanding any appearance of profit or publick utility , which moved wise governours to decree , that ancient laws once established might never be called in question . example , the athenians decreed that no law should be propounded to the people without the consent of the senate : the like use is observed in venice , where no petition is preferred to the senate but by advice of the sages ; and among the locrians the custom was , that whosoever presented any new law to be confirmed , should come with a halter about his neck , and be therewith hanged if his request were rejected ; also lycurgus to prevent the alteration of his laws , did swear the people of sparta to observe them untilhis return , and thereupon retired himself into voluntary exile , with intent never to return . when necessity or good reason moves innovation or abolition of laws , a course more secure it is to do it rather by degrees than suddenly . example , the romans finding the laws of the twelve tables unprofitable , suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion , but would not publickly suppress them for fear of calling other laws into contempt : so did they continue years , and were then cassed by ebutius the tribune . but agis king of lacedemon desirous to revive the laws of lycurgus , long discontinued , enforced all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled , to the end a new partition of lands and goods might be made ; which suddain and violent proceeding proved so fatal , that it moved a dangerous sedition , wherein he was disposed and with his mother and friends put to death ; which example haply moved the venetians not to attempt any thing against the authority of augustino barberino their duke : but after his death , and before the election of lovedono , the signiory publisht new ordinances detractive from the ducal authority . whose hath won to himself so great love and affection , as thereby to become master of the forces , and at his pleasure commands the subjects apt for arms , may also without right or title assure himself of the whole estate . example , hugh capat a subject to the crown of france , being greatly honoured by the soldiers , found means thereby to prevent charles duke of lorrain of the crown , being right heir by descent from charlemain . and albeit the families of the paleologi , ebrami and turcani be of the blood royal and right heirs to the turkish empire , when the ottoman line shall fail ; yet it is like that the chief bassa having the love of the janisaries will usurp the state , because the paleologi and other competitors be far from the turks person , poor and without means to purchase the soldiers favor . a commander general in arms , ought upon pain of great punishment be enjoyned , not to imploy or retain any forces longer than the time of his commission . example , the dictators of rome were in this point so precise , as never any of them dared to transgress the time prefixed , till caesar obtained that dignity should continue in him for life ; which was the cause of his usurpation of the state. also the thebans commanded , that if the general of their army did hold his forces one day longer than the time prefixt , he should thereby incur danger of death : which justice was executed upon epaminondas and pelopidas . banishment of great lords , or citizens of great reputation , hath been in divers places diversly used : for in the one , they were inforced only to absent themselves without further infliction ; in the other , banishment was accompanied with confiscation , a course of great danger . example , in argos , athens , ephesus , and other cities of greece , the citizens puissant in friends , vertue or riches , were many times banish'd for envy or fear , but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer than ten years ; and that without loss of goods , which was the cause that never any of them warred against the country : but dion being banish'd syracusa by dionysius junior , and coriolanus from rome , did make mighty wars against their own country . the like was done by the medici in florence . honourable and magnanimous men were wont not only to enterprise great acts , but also to suffer patiently all injuries which foes or fortune could expose them to : as resolved , that no calamity was so great as to make their minds abject , or to forget the dignity appertaining to persons vertuous : example , after the defeat of the roman army upon the river allia , the galli persued the victory even to rome's walls : whither being come , and finding the gates open , without any sign of resistance they entred the streets , where all honourable palaces were also unshut , which caused the galli greatly to doubt . nevertheless looking into the houses , they found in every of them a senator set in a chair of state , and in his hand a rod of ivory ; his person was also vested with robes of dignity , which majestick spectacle did marvelously amate the galli , not having before that time seen any such reverend sight ; and therefore did not only refrain to offer violence , but highly admired the roman courage , chiefly in that fortune . nevertheless at length a rude gall hapned with his hand to touch the white beard of m. papyrius , whereat he taking great disdain struck him with his rod , in requital whereof the barbarian slew papyrius , and by that example all the other senators and persons of dignity were also slain . albeit the knowledge and study of letters be both commendable and necesssary in all well regulated states ; yet if under so honest pretence , idleness enter , such abuses most seasonably be foreseen and removed . example , when deognis and carneades , two excellent philosophers , were sent ambassadors from athens to the romans , many of the nobility that before disposed themselves to arms , allured with their eloquence and marvelous wisdom , began with great admiration to follow them : and in lieu of arms , turned their endeavours to the study of letters , which the wise cato discerning , procured the senate to decree that ( to eschew all inconveniences which so honest idleness might breed ) no philosophers should from thenceforth be received into rome . the honour due to magistrates was anciently much regarded , and contrariwise all irreverent and undutiful behaviour with great severity punish'd . example , the censors of rome degraded a citizen only for having yawned loud in their presence : and another called vectius was slain in the field , for not doing due reverence to a tribune when he past by him . it is also observed , that the son of fab. maximus when he was censor , meeting his father on horseback , and seeing the serjeans affraid to speak to him to dismount , did himself command him so to do , which command the father cheerfully and willingly obeyed , saying , domestick power must give place to publick authority . tyrannous princes having incurred the universal hate of people , found no means so meet to preserve them from popular fury , as to execute or deliver into their hands their own chief minions and intimate counsellors . example , tiberius delivered to the people his fa vourite seianus : nero , tigellinus . henry king of swede committed to their fury his best beloved servant george preston ; caracalla caused all his flatterers to be slain that had persuaded him to kill his brother . the like was done by caligula , whereby he escaped himself . a prince that rewards or pardons a person that kills another prince , albeit by that means he is aspired to soveraignty , shall thereby both incur great danger and hate , and encourage men therein to attempt the like against himself . therefore wise princes have not only left such services quite unrecompenced , but also most severely punished them . example , the emperor sever●● put all those to death that consented to the murder of pertinax ; and alexander the great executed him that slew darius , as abhorring that subject that would lay violent hands on his prince , notwithstanding he were an enemy . likewise uitellius put to death all the murderers and conspirators against galba ; and domitian executed his secretary epaphroditus for the murder of nero , although he instantly desired his aid . the vertuous and vitious examples of princes incite subjects to imitate the same qualities ; which rule never or very rarely fails . example , francis the first king of france , and other princes in divers ages and places , had great esteem of learned men ; and forth with all the princes , nobles , nobility and clergy , disposed themselves so earnestly to study , as before that time had not been seen so many and so great a number of learned men , as well in tongues as sciences . contrariwise , alexander the great , otherwise a prince of great vertue , by his immoderate use of drinking , did draw the greatest number of his court and people also to delight in drunkenness - the like effect followed the excessive intemperance of mithridates , king of amasia . the last and not the least considerable , is , to observe how great effects devotion and contempt of human glory worketh in the minds not only of private persons , but of kings and princes also , who have oft abandoned worldly profit , honour and pleasure , to embrace the con templative retired life . example , ramirus king of aragon , verecundus king of spain , charlemain son of carolus martellus , matilda queen of france , amurath king of turbay , with many others . imperio maximus , exemplo major . finis . books printed for , and sold by joseph watts at the angel in st. paul's church-yard , viz. the history of ireland from the conquest thereof by the english to this present time , in two parts : by the honourable richard cox , esq one of the present judges for that kingdom . folio . the right honourable the marquis of carmarthen's state of his case . folio . his answer to the examination of the state of his case . folio . his answer to sir robert howard's book . folio . his reply to some libels lately printed . folio . tryal of the lord russel . folio . character of a popish successor . folio . the world's mistake in oliver cromwel : by sl. bethel , esq quarto . satyr against hypocrites . quarto . no protestant plot , st . d . and d. parts . quarto . diarry of his majesty's expedition into england . quarto . hunton's treatise of monarchy , in two parts . quarto . the earl of rochester's funeral sermon . quarto . the present settlement vindicated , and the late mis-government proved . quarto . rushworth's historical collections from . to . james's corruption of popish father's counsels , &c. octavo . the true nature of the divine law , &c. octavo . reformed devotions , in meditations , hymns and petitions , for every day in the week . twelves . the excellent woman described by her true characters , and their opposites . octavo . an earnest invitation to the sacrament : by dr. glanvill . twelves . at which place may be had acts of parliament , proclamations , declarations , orders of king and council , speeches in parliament ; choice pamphlets , both ancient and new ; tryals , narratives and gazzetts . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * commissions determine in presence of him that granted them . * so henry the fourth of france by putting his courtiers to board-wages was said to make money with his teeth . * the author of the epistle dedicatory to the dutchess of suffolk , prefix'd to mr. latimer's sermons , saith , that lawyers covetousness hath almost devoured england . discipline . tam bene quam male facta praemunt . mart. effata regalia. aphorismes [brace] divine, moral, politick. scattered in the books, speeches, letters, &c. of charles the first, king of great brittain, &c. / now faithfully collected and published by richard watson, fellow of gonvile and caius colledge in cambridge. charles i, king of england, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing c thomason e _ estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; :e [ ]) effata regalia. aphorismes [brace] divine, moral, politick. scattered in the books, speeches, letters, &c. of charles the first, king of great brittain, &c. / now faithfully collected and published by richard watson, fellow of gonvile and caius colledge in cambridge. charles i, king of england, - . watson, richard, - . [ ], [i.e. ], [ ], - , [ ], - , [ ] p. printed for robert horn at the turks head near the royal exchange, london, : . the words "divine, .. politick." are bracketed together on title page. "icon animæ basilicæ" and "caroli imi monita & observata britannica" each have separate dated title page; pagination and register are continuous. first p. misnumbered . the last three leaves are blank. reproduction of the original in the british library. . effata regalia -- . icon animæ bsilicæ [sic] -- . monita & observata britannica. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng charles -- i, -- king of england, - -- early works to . political science -- quotations, maxims, etc. -- early works to . christian life -- quotations, maxims,etc -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion effata regalia . aphorismes divine , moral , politick . scattered in the books , speeches , letters , &c. of charles the first , king of great brittain , &c. now faithfully collected and published by richard watson , fellow of gonvile and caius colledge in cambridge . quid utilius potui , quam tot sententias in unum conducere , pulcras , acres , & itame salus amet , ad salutem natas generis humani ? j. lips . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . simplic . in epictel . london , printed for robert horn at the turks head near the royal exchange . . effata regalia . . icon animae bsilicae . . monita & observata britannica . to the right honourable and most noble lord wentworth , earl of kildare , &c. my lord , i cannot forget , nor yet forbear gratefully to recognizance that most kind and noble violence your lordship vouchsaf'd to practise upon me in a foreign country , where the guilt of many years undeserved exile had rendred me morosely jealous of all that had more lately breathed in english air ; and the conscience of discharging faithfully my duty in that trust , which with much affection , and obligation , was committed to me , had made me somewhat obstinate in my retirement , and half a separatist from conversation , what honour or advantage soever might be obtained by it , until your lordships more than gracious condescention had rais'd my blush at what before i esteem'd my vertue ; and your more than peremptory commands forced me to the honourable fruition of that happiness , whereof i should have been most ambitious , in a near aquaintance with your excellencies , such as i confess unfeignedly , i more admired upon my experience , and infallible observation , than i could have credited upon the most authentick character might have been given me by any whom your lordship earlier admitted to that discovery which had no veil : all which , though i must not here enumerate to affected minutes ; nor wind up , though without slattery , to the strain of reproach ▪ yet there are three i shall not omit to instance , if to no other purpose , at least ( which implies no doubt ) to oblige your lordship to perseverance , the apostasie from each being no less desperate , than frequent ; and that from one or two , sometime so countenanced or rewarded , as it has almost the impudence to plead merit , which should beg a pardon ; and to expect to have what should be most abhorred , and detested , either imitated , or commended . the first , my lord , was your conscientious and earnest care to be better satisfied in the grounds and reason of that religion , which you did , and were most inclinable to profess , and practise , when most persecuted and depressed ; and , this effected , your humble and obsequious resignation to the canon of our church , and that in some particulars , wherein few persons , ever prejudiced , have been counselable ; and such as were not , thought unnecessary ▪ or , because of desuetude , improper to be observed . the second , was your lordships generous and loyal resolution , in a time difficult to be taken , and no less dangerous to be owned , to adventure life , upon any reasonable and justifiable occasion at an age , but then mature for the gust of worldly pleasures ; and a noble estate , into the possession whereof you were but newly entered , whensoever both , or either , might be hop'd effectual toward the restitution of your banished , and every way injured king ; wherein although your lordship are most happily prevented by the powerfull hand of heaven , which , without humane assistance , has over-rul'd the change ; and , by some sweeter influence than that of a mar●ial star , hath softened the most obdurate hearts of aged rebels to a capacity of peace , and the impression of allegiance to their prince that brought it home to their doors , with so much clemency , and such munificence , as scarcely has been , or ere will be parallel'd , if posterity should play the wanton in bloud for the like reward : yet i cannot but erect upon that sincerity of your intention ( which i humbly crave your leave , without arrogance , thus publickly to attest ) a monument of honour to your lordships name and person , unto which i wish all the indulgence of royal favour , that can be expected , or may be hoped from him , who is more likely to be endowed with power , and plenty , answerable to the greater objects he has for royal bounty , and more causes for sumptuous magnificence and state , than ever had any of our preceding britannike kings . the third was your most intent and affectionate endeavour ( in the privacy you could possibly reconcile to the eminence of your honour , and the importunity of that nation ) to recover what the malignity of times , accompanied with an inveigling discouragement to all select and exquisite studies , had in part deprived you of , and wherein you had been prevented , to improve your knowledg to a degree worthy your high birth and fortune , and necessary to the future interest you may have in affairs of state , and regency of your country : unto which by the ascendent promptness of your lordships parts , and faculties , such your quickness of apprehension , variety of fancy , solidity of judgment , tenacity of memory , and all else that nature could furnish ( as if in design ) you might easily have attained , and may yet , the sphear of science you have in your aim , if your engagements otherwise could leave you free for that steady method , and those early hours , which you were prone , my lord , most exemplarily to observe , as also for the choyce of a person qualified with learning , loyalty , prudence , and integrity , for that your lordships service and assistance , and such a one , whensoever you find him , i dare assure , will be as much obliged by the singular ingenuity and peculiar sweetness of your lordships disposition ; as by the nobleness of your entertainment , to advance your purpose . for so much , or so little , as you were pleas'd , my lord , to make me concerned in it , when you found me otherwise imploy'd abroad , i confess i never was more satisfied in any thing of like nature , than when i could suggest at any time what won upon your opinion , or would be of improvement to your studies in the use . nor was i thus affected only while your stay was on the other side ; but easily induced to promise , and earnest enough to performe , some part of the same duty after your lordships departure thence . the collection i at present dedicate with much assurance , unto your honour , i am not now to certifie you , was first attempted , in compliance with your lordships kindness for such maximes , and corollaries , and sententious brevets , which by ordinary observation , and less considerable essayes , i had sufficiently discovered : and when you please to remember how much you expressed your self transported with the first sheets i sent you over , you will not wonder that the little manual , i first intended , is become a volume ; that i have reviewed and passed beyond the principal book , to a general survey of all the writings i hear of published in the name of that most wise , and now , indeed , by the merit of his intellectual , and moral ; christian , and regal ; active and passive vertues , most glorious king. the benefit i mean you by it , my lord , is not only the too-late-admiring the superexcellency of that royal soul , which was the casket of such jewels , the treasury of such divine and humane wisdom , as if he had been heir of all the concealed riches of this sort , that had been amass'd for solomon , or since for the whole succession of emperours among the greeks ; nor to give you some short diversion between the periods of your studies , or stages of your lordships most serious and urgent business ; but your modelling and forming by it , at your choicest and severest hours , a christian canon both for a practick and contemplative holy life ; a litle rationale of the doctrine and discipline of that church , into the communion whereof , ( after an unavoidable conflict , and intrinsic contestation , with the importunity of presbyterian , independent , anabaptistical , and other fallacies , the principles of all which sects and heresies had been for many years lowdly sounded by the trumpet of a bloudy rebellion in your lordships ears ) with how much devout affection , with what profess'd satisfaction , and resolution you know , you enter'd ; the best exemplar and fairest copy that was ere presented unto the princes , and great peers of the world , for regulating their councels , words , and actions , by conscience , reason , honour ; for your abominating all sacriledg , as that which would be the cancer no less of your soul , than your estate ; chusing rather , if put upon it , to part with your inheritance , than with so much breath as may form your vote to the prophaning and sequestring , what the religious charity of your ancestors dedicated to pious uses ; of adhering inseparably to the holy order of episcopacy , never questioned by any , but such wretches , as had desperately plunged themselves into either heresie , schisme , sacriledg , or rebellion ; a caveat , never to make the counterfeit of religious zeal , serve the purpose of ambition ; nor to torture your king's conscience , under a pretence to ease your own ; a monitory , how much the prudence of nobles may fix a due temperament in the commons , as likewise how their chief interest consists in their fidelity to the crown , not in their ignoble compliance with any factious party of the people . a perpetual memorial of the affronts and injuries done to so excellent a king , no otherwise now to be repaired and recompensated , than by paying and exacting all possible duty and allegiance , accumulating all honour , and state , and wealth , that each one can contribute to his royal successour , who , it may be hoped , will persevere in the happy government of his nations , according to the incomparable maxims of piety and policy , that are scattered in those sacred oracular books and papers , composed not according to plato's ideas , or other speculative conceits and fancies , but out of divine emanations , by what means , in what manner , instilled , need not be enquired ; out of the various alternate experiments of a flourishing and fading condition , a calm and stormy season of his reign ; a quiet , and scrupulous , a self-clearing , and sometimes , a self-condemning , disposition of conscience ; the sense of love and loyalty from some , of rebellion and malice from other of his subjects ; the several events from prudent results , and mistakes , in his councel ; the flattery and folly , the sincerity and sapience , in the diversity of his nobles ; the learning and ignorance , zeal and moderation , luke-warmness and absolute coldness , in his clergy ; the steady resolution and giddiness of his commons ; the courage and cowardise , the conscientious care and negligence of his s●ldiers ; the liberty and restraint , the entredeux or state of indifference , such as may be call'd the royal durance , or free imprisonment of his person ; the apprehensions of a violent death , and hope of a kind reconciling deliverance ; finally , such variety of all sorts in himself and others , that were , or should have been under his majesties dominion , that no prince of like natural endowments , of so just and pious inclinations , had such religious , civil , and military advantages , to raise such a fabrick of policy and religion , such a structure of lawes and counsells , of secur'd assertions , and weigh'd experiments , as by which not only the princes and people of our age , at whose ports and palaces the rumours and terrours of our troubles have arriv'd ; but all posterity may prevent , if they please to regard and practise whatsoever misery and mischief the infernal spirits of discord and confusion , may intend them . all these , my lord , and many more ( which i leave to your own discovery ) being the natural issue of emolument from the book ; my advice is , that you would improve and multiply them in each particular , by your lordships reading , and hearing , and observing , applying to each oracle or apharism , here presented , whatsoever may occur , relating with any significancy , unto it , whether in ancient or modern history ; in the policy of our own or other nations ; in the relations and discourses of wise and understanding men ; in the practises right or wrong , of any whomsoever your lordship may have reason and opportunity to regard . this done , my lord , and ought else your lordship may see necessary , if after some few years resolution , i have the honour to kiss your hand , i shall expect , with much confidence , your lordships thanks , which i desire not before you shall have reapt the profit of my pains ; and become sensible of the service done you by this collection ( how affectedly indigested soere it be ) toward the regulating your life ; whether in publick imployment , or private conversation ; toward the confirming you in the still-opposed , still undermined , religion of our church ; toward your conduct of any government , or command , you may have in your country , and your influence upon the well or ill-affected people there ; toward the honour may be , i hope , conferred upon you , for promoting the interest of the crown to the very uttermost extent and efficacy of your own : and after all , above all toward your reward in heaven , for your devotion to god , and fidelity to your king , which no man wisheth you , with more affectionate unfeigned zeal , than , my lord , your lordships most humble servant . richard watson . from my friends lodgings , in doctor 's commons . february . . - . to the reader . friend , having in my epistle dedicatory shewed at large the worth and use of the ensuing book , i have the less wherewith to trouble you , if that it self do not , before you read it . for although you see the design was laid in order to the private benefit and satisfaction of the noble lord , to whom addressed : yet since it becomes thus publick , i shall plainly tell you , that the common neglect i discovered ( and is by the booksellers themselves confessed ) of the most excellent piece that ever passed a monarch's pen , was a principal incentive to me , to put it again , thus trasformed , upon the world. alas ! it may easily enough be judged what has brought the original , and with whom , into disrepute ; the cry of blood is lowd , and summons the least guilt de profundis , from the depth of conscience , though the very centre , to a sentence upon it self , and what an unsufferable torture 't is , either to look upon the lively pourtraicture of that king , or hear him speak , though but in his papers , whom with axe , or pen , or tongue , or wishfull thought , they murder'd ; or negatively in not detesting , not decrying , not invective-writing , not preventive-acting , were accessory in the least degree , they alone that committed the fault , and feel the pain , can truly tell . this courtesie i have therefore done them , who would needs turn away from the salve , because it signifies they have a sore ; they are hereby no more concerned , as to what is past , than any of the antipodes , under the government of a king. the aphorismes are general , and applicable to any kingdom ; in many of which those subjects that mean to act , may read their duty , and they that do not , may expect their doom . i at first had done as simplicius saith arrian had , with those of epictetus , collected only 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the most seasonable , the most necessary , and the most motive , or operative upon the minds of men ; wherewith being so much affected , i thought the book very well worth review , as loth to leave ought behind that might have the like efficacy by the sense , though not altogether the same acuteness in the conceipt , nor elegance in the language : by which gleaning , or recollection , i recover'd many as fair and full eares as those i had before bound up in the sheaf , many aphorismes no less considerable , no less deserving an intent regard . some others if you find coincident with those of the first rank , as some you will , i pray know that the same passed me not unobserved , but having some difference in expression , though little or none in sense , they were ad led the more to oblige you , and to effect that prevalency upon you , which your hast from the former might not admit . such ( if any such there be ) as may seem flat and ordinary , they are to be set to my account , who confess my self so indulgent in my reverence of the royal authour , that nothing of his could fall so low in my esteem . others , that are not many , but borrowed , and made english , i have entituled to the high translatour , whose authority gives more weight to 'em , and more they penetrate press'd by him. in sententiâ ut penetret , valde facit robustae alicujus , & receptae auctoritatis pondus . that all were not reduc'd to heads , and ranged under common places , has reason , such as i think not fit to be mention'd here : you may know that the learned grotius ( who was wont neither to spare , nor to lose his pains ) has done the like in a greater volume . as it is , if you be not more curious , than obsequious , in what concerns you either to know , or practise , you will have for what to thank me , who confirm you in your religion and loyalty , or lead you gently to it by a royal hand . i have one thing more to require of you , that you make not too much hast to censure me , for imposing that upon you , as his majesty's , which may appear compos'd by me : some such aphorismes indeed there are , for which some little change , the inserting of some few words , was necessary to give them as well the form , as force , of rules , or dictates ; in which if you take no less pains to justifie , than i did to avoid , your censure , you will find it frustrate , and me guilty of nought but more endeavours , than you have desires , for your own advantage , wherewith i wish you well . a table shewing where the centuries begin . cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. effata regalia . the first century . . the weight of reason will counterpoise the overballancings of any factions . . the gravity and discretion of gentlemen may alay and fix the commons to a due temperament . the interest of a king and his children give him many obligations to seek and preserve the love and welfare of his subjects . the love and welfare of subjects is the only temporal blessing left to the ambition of just monarchs as their greatest honour and safety , next gods protection . wherein a king lessens his prerogative , he may gain a recompence in the affections of his subjects . no flames of civil dissentions are more dangerous , then those which make religious pretensions ground of factions . kings should not suffer their own judgments to be overborn more by others importunities , then their arguments . the great abilities of lords may make a prince more afraid , then ashamed , to employ them in the greatest affairs of state. officers of state , moving in an high sphere , and with a vigorous lustre , must needs raise many envious exhalations , capable to cast a cloud upon their brightest merit and integrity . between a kings unsatisfiedness in himself , and a seeming necessity of satisfying the importunity of some people , it discovers more a fear of men then of god , to prefer what is safe , before what seemeth just . a king is not to prefer the outward peace of his kingdoms with men , to the inward exactness of conscience before god. it is a bad exchange , for a king to wound his own conscience , thereby to salve state-sores ; to calm the stormes of popular discontents , by stirring up a tempest in his own bosom . there is a fallacy in that maxime , better one man perish though unjustly ) then the people be displeased or destroyed . ' the best rule of policy is , to prefer the doing of justice before all enjoyments , and the peace of conscience , before the preservation of kingdoms . many are terrified by tumults to concurre with the condemning party , rather then satisfied , that of right they ought so to do . a king ought to be more afraid to take away a mans life unjustly then to lose his own . suspicions , not raised out of malice , are not in reason to be smothered . no present impunity , or popular vindication , will be subterfuge to men guilty of evil machinations , sufficient to rescue them from the exact tribunals of god and their own consciences . there is an after unavoidable judgment which shal rejudg what among men is but corruptly decided , or give the final sentence , if not at all . it is a better resolution , rather to bear repulse with patience , then to use hazardous extremities . it is one of the most convincing arguments , that there is a god , while his power sets bounds to the raging of the sea : and no less , that he restrains the madness of the people . nothing port ends more gods displeasur against a nation , then when he suffers the confluence and clamors of the vulgar to pass all boundaries of lawes and reverence to authoritie . nothing more to be feared , and less to be used by wise men , then tumultuary confluxes of meane and rude people , who are taught , first to petition , then to protest , then to dictate , at last to command and over-awe . whoever hath most mind to bring forth confusion and ruin upon a church and state , useth the midwifery of the peoples tumults . what good man had not rather want any thing he most desires then to obtain it by unlawful and irreligious means . mens passions , and gods directions seldom agree . violent designs and motions must have sutable engines : such as too much attend their owne ends , seldom confine themselves to gods means . force must crowd in , what reason will not lead . it is no strange thing for the sea to rage , when strong winds blow upon it ; nor for multitudes to become insolent , when they have men of some reputation for parts and piety to set them on . such is some mens stupid tie , that they fear no inconvenience . such is some mens petulancy that they joy to see their betters shamefully outraged and abused , while they know their owne security consists in vulgar s●attery . a kings withdrawing , may give time for the ebbing of tumultuous fury , and others regaining some degrees of modesty and sober sense . it is a hardiness beyond true valour , for a wise man to set himselfe against the breaking in of a sea . a gallant man had rather ●ight to great disadvantages for number and place in the field , in an orderly way , then shuffle with an undisciplined rabble . it is safest to withdraw from the daily baitings of tumults , not knowing whether their fury and discontent may not flie so high as ●● worry and tear those in pieces whom as yet they but play with in their pawes . a king is not bound to prostitute the majestie of his place and person , the safety of his queen and children to those who are prone to insult most , when they have objects and opportunities most capable of their rudeness and petulancy . the just avenger of all disorders many times makes men and cities see their sinn● in the glass of their punishment . it is more then an even lay , that men may one day see themselvs punished by that way they offended . as swine are to gardens and orderly plantations , so are tumults to parliaments , and plebeian concourses to publick councels turning all into disorders and sordid confusions . god orders our disorders , and magnifies his wisdom most , when our follies and miseries are most discovered . such is some mens activity , that they will needs make work rather then want it ; and chuse to be doing amisse , rather then do nothing . good subjects will never think it just or fit , that their kings condition should be worse by his bettering theirs . some men know not so well with moderation to use , as with earnestness to desire advantages of doing good or evil . the kings interest lies more then any mans in the due execuexecution and vigour of preserved laws . a king ought not to desire more then the law gives him , and less the meanest subject should not have . it is ingratitude , unworthy of honour , that the more is granted them by their king , the less he should have and enjoy with them . a king may count himselfe undiminished by his largest concessions , if by them he gains and confirms the love of his people . the peoples love may increase toward their king , as they have more leisure , and lesse prejudice . people may be miserable in this only , that some mens ambition will not give them leave to enjoy what their king intends for their good . a king may be mistaken when perswaded , that he cannot grant too much , or distrust too little , to men that being professedly his subjects , pretend singular piety , and religious strictness . it argues a very short sight of things , and extreme fatuity of mind in a king , to bind his owne hands at the request of his subjects , when he shortly meanes to use a sword against them . it would be a course full of sinne , as well as of hazard , and dishonour , for a king to go about the cutting up of that by the sword , which he had lately planted to his subjects and his own content . some men fear where no fear is , whose security consists in scaring others . a king may repent his letting some men go up to the pinnacle of the temple , when it doth prove a temptation to them to cast him downe headlong . as many kingdomes as the divel shewed our saviour , and th●● glory of them ( if they could be at once enjoyed by ambitious . people ) are not worth the gaining by wayes of sinful ingratitude and dishonor , which hazards a soul worth more worlds then this hath kingdomes . it is no strange thing for men left to their own passions , either to do much evil themselves , or abuse the over-much goodnesse of others . an ungrateful surfet of others goodness is the most desperate and incurable disease . there may be an error in a king of too charitable a judgement , without any sinne of his will ▪ a king may be sorry to see other mens eyes evil because his is good . to be forced to sea by a storm unprovided of tackling and victual , is better then to venture splitting or sinking on a lee-shore . some mens hydropick insatiableness is such as no fountain of royal bounty is able to overcome ; so resolved , they seem either utterly to exhaust it , or barbarously to obstruct it . it ceases to be a councel , when not reason is used , as to men , to perswade ; but force and terror , as to beasts , to drive and compel men to assent to what ever tumultuary patrons shall project . he deserves to be a slave without pity or redemption , that is content to have the rational soveraignty of his soul , and liberty of his will and words captivated by force and terror . . kingdomes are not so considerable as to preserve them with the forfeiture of that freedom which cannot be denied to a king , because it belongs to him , as a man and christian . a king is to owne the dictates of none but god to be above him , as obliging him to consent . better for a king to die enjoying the empire of his soul , which subjects him onely to god , so farre as by reason or religion he directs him ; then live with the title of a king , if it should carry such a vassalage with it , as not to suffer him to use his reason and conscience in what he declares as a king to like or dislike . a king is not conscientiously tied to go against his conscience in consenting to such new proposals as his reason , justice , honour and religion bids him deny . so tender some men are of their being subject to arbitrary government , that they care not with how much dishonour and absurdity they make their king the only man that must be subject to the will of others . no man can think it other then the badge and method of slavery , by savage rudenesse , and importunate obtrusions of violence , to have the mist of his error and passion dispelled , which is a shadow of reason , and must serve those that are destitute of the substance . that man cannot be blamable to god or man , who seriously endeavours to see the best reason of things , and faithfully followes what he takes for reason . the uprightness of intentions will excuse the possible fallings of understanding . if a pilot at sea cannot see the pole-star , it can be no fault in him to steere his course by such starres as do best appeare to him . it argues those men to be concious of their defects of reason , and convincing arguments , who call in the assistance of meer force to carry on the weakness of their counsels and proposals . nothing should please a king more , then when his judgment so concurres with that of his prudent subjects , as he may with a good conscience consent unto them . where no absolute and moral necessity of reason , but temporary convenience in point of honour is to be considered , a king may chuse rather to deny himself then his councel , as preferring that which they think necessary for his people , before what he sees but convenient for himselfe . a king should permit no man to gain his consent to that , wherein his heart gives his tongue or hand the lie . a king should rather chuse to wear a crown of thorns , with his saviour , then to exchange that of gold for one of lead , whose embased flexibleness shall be forced to bend and complie to the various , and oft contrary , dictates of any factions . . no resolution more worthy a christian king , then to preferre his conscience before his kingdomes . . the meits of a deserving lady wil be her better protection from the barbaritie of savage indians , then from the subtiltie of some malicious christians . . all justice , so well as affection , commands a king to study the securitie of his vertuous queen , who is onely in danger for his sake . . a king can perish but halfe , if his queen be preserved . . a king , in his queenes memory , and their hopefull posterity , may survive the malice of his enemies should be satiated with his bloud . as god is able to punish the faults of princes , so no less severely to revenge the injuries done to them by those who ought to have made good that safety which the lawes chiefly provide for them . common civility is in vain expected from those that dispute their loyalty . it cannot be safe to a king to tarry among them who are shaking hands with their allegeance , under pretence of laying faster hold on their religion . 't is pity the noble and peaceful foul of a queen should see , much more suffer the rudenesse of those who must make up their want of justice with inhumanity and impudence . the sympathy of a queen in the afflictions of her king will make her vertues shine with greater lustre , as starres in the darkest nights ; and assure the envious world , that she loves him , not his fortunes . kings need not much to blame the unkindness of the generality and vulgar , when those who have eaten of their bread , & been enriched with their bounty , have scornfully lift up themselvs against them , and those of their own houshold are become their enemies . some think to satisfie all obligations to duty by their corban of religion ; and can less endure to see then to sin against their benefactors , as wel as their soveraigns . no malice can banish a beloved queen from her kings heart . a kings enemies may envy , but they can never deprive him of the enjoiment of her vertues , while he enjoyes himself . it is among the wicked maximes of bold and disloyal undertakers , that bad actions must alwayes be seconded by worse , & rather not be begun , then not carried on : for they think the retreat more dangerous then the assault , and hate repentance more then perseverance in the fault . it is the best policie , with patience to bear what one cannot remedy . to be transported with no disdaine or emotion of passion in greatest injuries , is the temper that best becomes a christian , as coming nearest to the great example of christ . better for a monarch to remember he is a christian then a king what the height of a king tempteth to revenge , the humility of a christian teacheth to forgive . what the majesty of a king might justly abhor , the charity of a christian is willing to forbear . the excess of impotent passions injures a man more then his greatest enemies can . apostacy unto loyalty some men account the most unpardonable sin . the superstitious sowrness which some men pretend to in matters of religion , so darkens their judgment , that they cannot see any thing of sinne and rebellion in the meanes they use with intents to reform . the second century . some men think all is gold of piety which doth but glister with a shew of zeale and fervencie . down-right temptations of ambition have no cloak or cheat of religion to impose upon themselves or other . clemency is a debt which kings ought to pay to those that crave it , when they have cause to believe they wil not after abuse it . god suffers us not to pay any thing for his mercy , but only prayrs and promises . the rude demeanor of a subject toward his soveraign carries alwaies its own vengeance , as an unseparable shadow with it . those oft prove the most fatal and implacable executioners of vengeance , who were the first imployers in rebellion . no punishment so stains a mans honor , as wilful perpetrations of unworthy actions . posterity not engaged in the sactions of present times , have the most impartial reflections on the actions . a rebellious army is but tumults listed and enrolled to a better order , but as bad an end . a kings recess from tumultuous subjects , gives them considence that he may be conquered . a king having a soul invincible , is sure , through gods grace , to become conqueror , when constant to fear him more than man. . they will oppose by force , who have not reason to convince . . they confess their own weakness , as to truth and justice , who chuse rather to contend by armies , then by arguments . a king may be made glorious , if no other way , by his sufferings . it is a hard and disputable choice for a king that loves his people and desires their love , either to kill his own subjects , or to be killed by them . the hazards and miseries of civil war , are but sad fruits for a king to reap after a long , just , peaceable , plenteous and religious reign . the hazards of war are equal , nor doth the cannon know any respect of persons . a kings person is in vaine excepted , by a parenthesis of words , when many hands are armed against him with swords . . unnatural motions are often the productions of a surfeit of peace , wantonness of minds , or private discontents . . ambition and faction easily find , or make , causes of quarrell . . what seems just to one man ▪ may not seem so to another . . there is an instinct in all creatures to preserve themselves . . it hath been esteem'd delinquency in some prudent men not to be over-aw'd with tumu'ts and their patrons , nor compell'd to ab●● by their suffrages or presence the designs of those men who agitate innovations and ruine both in church and state. the least hath more evil in it then the greatest affliction . . what is religious & apostolical , & so very sacred & divine , is not to be dispensed with , or destroyed , when what is only of civil favour and priviledg of honor , granted to men of holy order , may , with their consent who are concerned in it , be annulled . the noise and shew of piety , and heat for reformation and religion , may easily so fil men with prejudice , that all equality and clearnesse of judgement may be obstructed . a kings innocency and unpreparedness to assert his rights and honours , makes him the more guilty in the esteem of disloyal subjects . prayers and tears , the chiefest armies of the ancient christians , may setve a good mans turn , if not to conquer , as a souldier , yet to suffer as a martyr . he that made the greedy ravens to be elias caterers , may also make rebells surprisall of outward force and defence , an opportunity to shew their king the speciall support of his power and protection . what a pious king wants in the hands of force and power , he hath in the wings of faith and prayer . the surfeit of too much power , which some men greedily seize on , may make a commonwealth sick both of it and them , when they cannot well digest it . soveraigne power in subjects seldom agrees with the stomachs of fellow-subjects . a king having the sole actual disposing of the militia , can not protect his people further then they protect him and themselves . the use of the militia is mutuall betweene king and people . . such is the violence and fraud of some men , that being conscious to their own evill merits and designes , they will needs perswade the world , that none but wolves are fit to be trusted with the custody of the shepheard and his flock . . it can be secure neither for king nor subject , if both be not in such a way as the law hath entrusted the publick safety and wellfare . . all law is at last resolved to the just and necessary rights of the crown in point of power , while thereby it is best protected . . the honour and justice due to a kings successours forbid him to yeild to an alienation of power from them . . although a king may be content to eclipse his own beames , to satisfie their feares , who think they must needs be scorched or blinded if he should shine in the full lustre of kingly power : yet he ought never to consent to put out the sun of soveraignty to all posterity and succeeding kings . . the many-headed hydra of government , as it makes a shew to the people to have more eyes to foresee , so they will find it hath more mouths too , which must be satisfied . . in a right monarchy , counsell may be in many as the senses , but the supreme power can be but in one as the head . . those men are guilty of enforced perjury , who compell their king to take a new and strange way of discharging his trust by seeming to desert it , of protecting his subjects by exposing himselfe to danger or dishonour for their safety and quiet . . the sword and militia are but weake defenses against the stroakes of divine vengeance , which will overtake , or of mens own consciences , which alwaies attend injurious perpetrations . . god is able by his being with a king abundantly to compensate to him , as he did to job , what ever honour , power or liberty the caldeans , the sabeans , or the devil himselfe can deprive him of . the hearts of subjects are the greatest treasure and best ammunition of a king. rebels that disarme their king , and study to rob him of his subjects love , cannot deprive him of his innocence , or gods mercy , nor obstruct his way to heaven . a king cannot buy his own safety and his peoples peace at too deare a rate , unlesse by parting with conscience and honour . a king , rather than part with his conscience and honour , ought to chuse to be as miserable and inglorious as his enemies can make or wish him . . whatsoever subjects propund unto their king , ought not to be obtruded with the point of the sword , nor urged with the injuries of war. . when a king declares unto his subjects , he cannot yield to them without violating his conscience ; there may be some better method of peace , than by making war upon his soul. . when subjects require any thing of their king , they ought to offer somewhat by way of gratefull exchange of honour or requital of those favours he hath , or may yet grant them . . it is more princely and divine to be on the giving part . . the jewel of conscience is incommunicable , whose loss nothing can repair or requite . . a kings yielding too much , makes subjects over-confident he will deny nothing . . the love of truth and inward tranquillity ought to have more influence upon a king , than the love he hath of his peoples peace . . inward quiet of conscience ought to be dearer to a king , then his kingdome . . some things which a king might approve , yet in honour and policy are at some time to be denied , to some men , least he should seem not to da●e to deny any thing , and give too much encouragement to unreasonable demands or importunities . . for a king to bind himself to a general and implicite consent to whatever subjects shall desire or propound , were a latitude of blind obedience never expected of any freeman , not fit to be required of any man , much less of a king. . a king may possibly exceed any of his own subjects as much in wisdome , as he doth in place and power . . for a king to yield implicite consent to all , were as if sampson should have consented not only to bind his own hands , and cut off his hair , but to put out his own eyes , that the philistines might with the more safety mock and abuse him . . to exclude all power of denial , seems an arrogancy ill-becoming them that pretend addresses by petition . . it were very foolish and absurd , to ask what , another having not liberty to deny , neither hath power to grant . . it can be no other then extreme injury , to confine a kings reason to a necessity of granting all subjects have a mind to ask ; whose minds may be different from the soverain's , both in reason and honour ; as may be their aims , and are their qualities . . subjects propositions may soon prove violent oppositions , if once they gain to be necessary impositions upon the regal authority . . no man seeks to limit and confine his king in reason , who hath not a secret aim to share with him , or usurpe upon him in power and dominion . . nature , law , reason and religion , bind a king ( in the first place ) to preserve himself , without which 't is impossible to preserve his people according to his place . . factions in the state , and schismes in the church , get confidence by vulgar clamours , and assistance to demand , not only tolerations of themselves , but also abolition of the lawes against them , and a total extirpation of that government whose rights they made . . some moderate propositions are by cunning demanders used like waste paper , wherein their unreasonable ones are wrapped up , to present them somewhat more handsomely . . there is nothing so monstrous , which some fancies are not prone to long for . . they abuse themselves , who believe all good which is guilded with shews of zeal and reformation . . popular clamours and tumults serve to give life and strength to the infinite activity of those men , who study with all diligence and policy , to improve present distractions to their innovating designs . . armies of propositions , having little of judgment , reason , justice and religion , taking their rise from tumult and faction , must be backt and seconded with armies of souldiers . . a king is to weigh the reason and justice , not regard the number and power of contesting subjects . . tumults can be no other then the hounds that attend the cry and hollow of those men , who hunt after factions and private designs , to the ruine of the church and state. . if the straitness of a kings conscience will not give him leave to swallow down such camels as others do of sacriledg and jnjustice both to god and man , they have no more cause to quarrel with him then for this , that his throat is not so wide as theirs . . nothing of passion , or peevishness , or list to contradict , or vanity to shew a negative power , should have any byas upon the judgment of a king , to make him gratifie his will by denying any thing which his reason and conscience commands him not . . a king should not consent to more than reason , justice , honour and religion perswade him to be for gods glory , the church's good , his peoples welfare , and his own peace . . although many mens loyalty and prudence be terrified from giving their king that true and faithfull councell which they are able and willing to impart , and he may want ; yet none can hinder him from craving the councel of that mighty councellor , who can both suggest what is best , and incline his heart stedfastly to follow it . . it is no news for some subjects to fight , not only without their kings commission , but against his command and person too , yet all the while to pretend they fight by his authority , and for his safety . . rebels do alwayes this honour to their king , to think moderate injuries not proportionate to him , nor competent tryals either of his patience under them , or his pardon of them . . some with exquisite malice mix the gall and vinegar of falsity and contempt , with the cup of their kings affliction , charging him not only with untruths , but such as wherein he hath the greatest share of loss and dishonour by what is committed . . that king is a cyclopick monster , whom nothing will serve to eat and drink , but the flesh and bloud of his own subjects . . some think they cannot do well but in evil times , nor so cunningly as in laying the odium of those sad events on others , wherewith themselves are most pleased , and whereof they have been not the least occasion . . preposterous rigour , and unreasonable severity , may be not the least incentive that kindles and blowes up into horrid slames the sparks of discontent , which want not predisposed fewel for rebellion , where dispair being added to former discontents , and the fear of utter extirpation to wonted oppressions , it is easie to provoke to an open rebellion a people prone to break out to all exorbitant violence , by some principles of their religion , and the natural desires of liberty . . some men of covetous zeal , and uncharitable fury , think it a great argument of the truth of their religion , to endure no other but their own . . it is preposterous and unevangelical zeal , to chuse rather to use all extremities which may drive men to desperate obstinacy , than to apply moderate remedies . . some kind of zeal counts all mercifull moderation , lukewarmness , and had rather be cruel , than counted cold ; and is not seldome more greedy to kill the bear for his skin , than for any harm he hath done . . the confiscation of mens estates pleaseth some better , as being more beneficial , than the charity of saving their lives , or reforming their errours . . some men have better skill to let bloud , than to stanch it . . men prepared to misconstrue the actions of their soveraign , have more credulity to what is false and evill , than love or charity to what is true and good . . a king hath no judge but god above him . . god doth not therefore deny a kings innocence , because he is pleased so farre to try his patience , as he did his servant jobs . . swarms of reproaches issue out of some mens mouths and hearts , as easily as smoke or sparks do out of a furnace . . men conscious of their own depth of wickedness , are loath to believe any man not to be as bad as themselves . . it is kingly to do well , and hear ill . . a king ought to look upon the effusion of his subjects bloud , as exhausted out of his own veins . . royal bounty emboldens some men , to ask and act beyond all bounds of modesty and gratitude . . a king should not let any mans ingratitude , or inconstancy , make him repent of what he granted for the publick good . . where violence is used for innovation in religion , many feel the misery of the means , before they reap the benefit of the end . . it can not but seem either passion , or some self-seeking , more than true zeal , and pious discresion , for any forraign state or church to prescribe such medicine only to others , which themselves have used rather successfully than commendably . the third century . the same physick in different constitutions , will have different opperations : that may kill one , which doth but cure another . . it is not so proper to hew out religious reformations by the sword , as to polish them by fair and equal disputations among those that are most concern'd in the differences , whom not force but reason , ought to convince . . mens consciences can receive little satisfaction in those points , which are maintained rather by souldiers fighting in the field , than scholars disputing in free and learned synods . . in matters of religion , those truths gain most on mens judgments and consciences , which are least urged with secular violence . . secular violence weakens truth , which prejudices , and is unreasonable to be used , till such means of rational conviction hath been applied , as leaving no excuse for ignorance , condemns mens obstinacy to deserved penalties . . there is too much of man , to have much of christ , when his pretended institutions are caried on , or begun , with the temptations of covetousness or ambition . . wise and learned men think , that nothing hath more marks of schisme and sectarisme than the presbyterian way . . a king is not to repeal the laws & constitutions of the church till he sees more rational and religious motives than soldiers use to carry in their knapsacks . . a king ought to esteem the church above the state , the glory of christ above his own , and the salvation of mens souls , above the preservation of their bodies and estates . . no men may , without sin and presumption , forcibly endeavour to cast the churches under their kings care and tuition into the moulds they have fancied and fashioned to their designs , till they have first gained his consent , and resolved both his and other mens consciences by the strength of their reasons . . violent motions , which are neither manly , christian , nor loyall , should neither ●●ake nor settle the religion of king or subject , who knowes what religion means . . the proper engine of faction is force . . force is the arbitratour of beasts , not of reasonable men , much less of humble christians and loyal subjects in matter of religion . . men are prone to have such high conceits of themselves , that they care not what cost they lay out upon their opinions , especially those that have some temptation of gain to recompence their losses and hazards . . men jealous of the justifiableness of their doings and designs before god , never think they have humane strength enough to carry their work on , seem it never so plausible to the people . . what can not be justified in law or religion , had need be fortified with power . . such is the inconstancy that attends all minds engaged in violent motion , that whom some of them one while earnestly invite to come into their assistance , others of them soon after are weary of , and with nauseating cast them out . . much of gods justice , and mans folly , will at length be discovered through all the filmes and pretensions of religion , in which politicians wrap up their designs . . in vain do men hope , to build their piety on the ruins of loyalty . . neither those considerations nor disigns , can be durable , when subjects make bankrupt of their allegeance , under pretence of setting up a quicker trade for religion . . all reason and policy will teach , that the chief interest of subjects consist's in their fidelity to the crown , not in their serviceableness to any party of the people , to the neglect and betraying of their kings safety and honour , for their own advantages . . the less cause a king hath to trust men , the more should he apply himself to god. . it is hard for men to be engaged by no less than swearing for or against those things , which are of no clear morall necessity , but very disputable . . in points disputable the application of oaths can hardly be made , and enjoined , with that judgment and certainty in one's self , or that charity and candour to others of different opinion , as religion requires . . religion never refuses fair and aequable deliberations , yea , and dissentions too , in matters only probable . . the enjoining of oaths upon people must needs , in things doubtfull , be dangerous , as , in things unlawfull , damnable and no less superfluous , where former religious and legal engagements bound men sufficiently to all necessary duties . ; . ambitious minds never think they have laid snares and ginnes enough , to catch and hold the vulgar credulity . . by politick and seemingly pious stratagems of oaths , ambitious minds think to keep the populacy fast to their party under the terrour of perjury . . after-contracts devised , and imposed , by a few men , in a declared party , without the kings consent , without power or precedent from god's or man's lawes , can never be thought by judicious men , sufficient either to absolve , or slacken , the moral and eternal bonds of duty , which lye upon all subjects consciences , both to god and their king. . ambiguous , dangerous and authorized novelties , are not to be preferred before known and sworn duties , which are dispensable , both to god and king. . later vowes , oaths , or leagues , can never blot out the former gravings and characters , which by just and lawfull oaths have been made upon the souls of men . . considerations , by way of solemn leagues and covenants , are the common roads used in all factious and powerfull perturbations of state or church . . formalities of extraordinary zeal and piety are never more studied ond elaborate , than when politicians most agitate desperate designs against all that is setled or sacred in religion and lawes . . religion and lawes with the scrues of cunning politicians , are wrested by secret steps , and less sensible degrees , from their known rule , and wonted practise , to comply with the humors of those men , who aim to subdue all to their own will and power , under the disguises of holy combinations . . the cords and wit hs of solemn leagues and covenants , ( framed more out of policy than piety ) will hold mens consciences no longer than force attends and twists them . . every man soon growes his own pope , and easily absolves himself of those ties , which not the commands of god's word , or the lawes of the land , but only the subtilty and terrour of a party casts upon him . . illegall wayes of covenanting , seldom or never intend the engaging men more to duties , but to parties . . it is not regarded how men keep covenants in point of piety pretended , provided they adhaere firmly to the party and design intended . . imposers of politick covenants make them like manna , agreable to every mans palate and rellish who will but swallow them . . naboth's vineyard made him the only blasphemer of his city , and fit to dye . . while the breath of religion fills the sails , profit is the compass , by which factious men steer their course in all seditious commotions . . church-lands and revenues , issuing chiefly from the crown , are held of it , and legally can revert only to the crown , with the kings consent . . no necessity should drive a king to invade or sell the priests lands , which both pharaohs divinity , and josephs true piety abhorr'd to do . . it is unjust both in the eye of reason and religion , to deprive the most sacred employment of all due incouragements , and like hard-harted phara●h , to withdraw the straw and increase the task . . some pursue the oppressed church to the red sea of a civil war , where nothing but a miracle can save it . . a christian king ought to esteem it his greatest title to be call'd , and his chiefest glory to be the defender of the church , both in its true faith , and its just fruitions , equally abhorring sacriledge and apostacy . . a king ought rather to live on the churches almes , than violently to take the bread out of bishops and ministers mouths . . they are but golden calves that must be serv'd , when jeroboam consecrates the meanest of the people to be priests . . a king can not so much as pray god to prevent the sad consequences which will inevitably follow the parity and poverty of ministers both in church and state. because , . it is no less than a mo●●ing and tempting of god , to desire him to hinder those mischiefs whose occasions and remedies are in our own power . . there are wayes enough to repair the breaches of the state , without the ruins of the church . . as a king should be a restorer of the state , so not an opressour of the church , under the pretence of publick debts . . if a good king had not his own innocency and god's protection , it were hard for him to stand out against those stratagems and conflicts of malice , which by falsities seek to oppress the truth , and by jealousies to supply the defect of real causes , which might seem to justifie unjust engagements against him . . the worst effects or open hostility , come short of what is in disloyal close designs . . a king should more willingly lose his crown , than his credit ; nor should his kingdom be so dear to him , as his reputation and honour . . a good name is the embalming of princes , and a sweet consecrating of them to an eternity of love and gratitude among posterity . . foul and false aspersions are secret engins employed against peoples love of their king ; that undermining their opinion and value of him , his enemies and theirs may at once blow up their affections , and batter down their loyalty . . the detriment of a kings honor ( by calumnies ) should not be so afflictive to him , as the sin and danger of his peoples souls . . peoples eyes once blinded with mists of suspitions , are soon misled into the most desperate precipices of actions , wherein they do not only not consider their sin and danger , but glory in their zealous adventures . . mislead people imagine they then fear god most , when they least honour their king , and are most ambitious to merit the name of his destroyers . . a king's pity ought to be above his anger . . a king's passions should never prevail against himself , as to exclude his most compassionate prayers for them whom devout errours , more than their own malice have betrayed to a most religious rebellion . . it is a generous charity in a king , to interpret that his subjects in armes fight against his supposed errours , not his person , intending to mend him , not to end him . . it is somewhat above humanity in a king , not more willingly to forgive the seductions in his subjects , which occasioned their loyal injuries , then to be ambitious , by all princely merits , to redeem them from their just suspicions , and reward them for their good intentions . . a king should be too conscious to his own affections toward the generality of his people , to suspect theirs to him . . a king should never gratifie the spightfulness of a few with any sinister thoughts of their allegeance , whom pious frauds have seduced . . a king should never be perswaded to make so bad interpretatations of most of his subjects actions , as to judge otherwise than that possibly they may be erroneous , but not haeretical , in point of loyalty . . a king should have as sharp a sense of the injuries done to his subjects , as those done to himself , their well fares being inseparable . . seduced subjects in this suffer more than their king , that they are animated to injure at once both themselves and him . . a king sometimes hath such enemies among his subjects as to whose malice it is not enough that he is afflicted , unless by those whose prosperity he earnestly desires , and whose seduction he heartily deplores . . a king for restoring tranquility unto his people , might willingly be the jonah , if he foresees not evidently that by the divided interest of theirs and his enemies , as by contrary winds the storm of their miseries would be rather increased than allayed . . a king should rather prevent his peoples ruine , than rule over them . . a king should not be so ambitious of that dominion , which is but his right , as of his peoples happiness , if it could but expiate or countervail such a way of obtaining it , by the highest injuries of subjects committed against their soveraign . . a king should rather suffer all the miseries of life , and dye many deaths , than shamefully to desert , or dishonourably to betray , his own just rights and soveraignty , thereby to gratifie the ambition , or justifie the malice of his enemies . . a king ought to put as great a difference between the malice of his enemies , and other mens mistakes , as between an ordinary ague , and the plague ; or the itch of novelty , and the leprosie of disloyalty . . as liars need have good memories , so malicious persons need good inventions , that their calumnies may fit every man's fancy ; and what their reproaches want of truth , they may make up with number and shew . . a king should have more patience to bear , and charity to forgive , than leisure to answer , the many false aspersions which men may cast upon him . . it gives mens malice too much pleasure , for a king to take notice or remember what they say , or object . . when a king confutes calumnies , it should be more for his subjects satisfaction , than his own vindication . . mens evil maners , and seared consciences , will soon enough confute , and revenge , the black and false scandals which they cast upon their king. . rebels credit and reputation may be blasted by the breath of that same furnace of popular obliquy and detraction , which they study to heat and inflame to the highest degree of infamy , and therein seek to cast and consume their king's name and honour . . they are misperswaded who think these two utterly inconsistent , to be at once loyal to their king , and truly religious toward god. . some popular preachers think it no sin to lye for god , and what they call gods cause , cursing all that will not curse with them . . such men look so much at , and cry up the goodness of the end propounded , that they consider not the lawfulness of the means used , nor the depth of that mischief chiefly plotted , and intended . . the weakness of these mens judgments , must be made up by their clamours and activity . . it is a great part of some mens religion , to scandalize their king and his , thinking theirs cannot be true , if they cry not down his as false . . a king fights not against his own religion , who imployes subjects of different perswasions to maintain it . . differences of perswasion in matters of religion , may easily fall out , where there is the sameness of duty , allegeance and subjection . . when a king confutes calumnies , it should be more for his subjects satisfaction , than his own vindication . . mens evil maners , and seared consciences , will soon enough confute , and revenge , the black and false scandals which they cast upon their king. . rebels credit and reputation may be blasted by the breath of that same furnace of popular obliquy and detraction , which they study to heat and inflame to the highest degree of infamy , and therein seek to cast and consume their king's name and honour . . they are misperswaded who think these two utterly inconsistent , to be at once loyal to their king , and truly religious toward god. . some popular preachers think it no sin to lye for god , and what they call gods cause , cursing all that will not curse with them . . such men look so much at , and cry up the goodness of the end propounded , that they consider not the lawfulness of the means used , nor the depth of that misch●ef chiefly plotted , and intended . . the weakness of these mens judgments , must be made up by their clamours and activity . . it is a great part of some mens religion , to scandalize their king and his , thinking theirs cannot be true , if they cry not down his as false . . a king ights not against his own religion , who imployes subjects of different perswasions to maintain it . . differences of perswasion in matters of religion , may easily fall out , where there is the sameness of duty , allegeance and subjection . . different professions in point of religion , cannot take away the community of relations , either to parents , or to princes . . it is lawfull for a king in exigents to use the aid of any his subjects , of what perswasion soever . . it were a very impertinent and unseasonable scruple in a king , then to dispute the points of different beliefs in his subjects , when he is disputed with by swords points and when he needs the help of his subjects as men , no less than their prayers as christians . ; . the noise of a kings evil counsellers is a usefull device for those , who are impatient any mens councels but their own should be followed in church or state. . bold subjects give counsels more like a drench that must be forced down , than a draught which might be fairly and leisurely dran●● if their king liked it . . moderate men are sorry to see their king prone to injure himself out of a zeal to relieve his subjects . . truly humble christians will so highly prize the reward of persecutions , as rather not to be relieved , than be revenged , so as to be bereaved of that crown of christian patience , which attends humble and injur'd sufferers . . men are not more prone to desire liberty , than unapt to bear it in the popular sence , which is , to do what every man liketh best . . the divinest liberty is , to will what men should , and to do what they so will , according to reason , lawes and religion . . good men count the bounds of the lawes their ornament and protection , others their manacles ●● oppression . . it is not just that any man should expect the reward and benefit of the law , who despiseth its rule and direction . . he that seeks an unreasonable liberty , justly loseth his safety . the fourth century . . those men are the best preservers of their true liberty , who allow themselves the least licentiousness against , or beyond the lawes . . it is impossible chose men should be really tender of their fellow-subjects liberties , who have the hardiness to use their king with severe restraints . . a resolv'd king , restrain'd by subjects , will rather perish , tha● complain to those , who want nothing to compleat their mirth and triumph , but such musick . . conscientious tenderness attended with proud and arrogant activity , seeks to hatch every egge of different opinion to a faction or schisme . . lawes and scepters of monarchs should not intrench on god's soveraignty , which is the only king of mens consciences . . god gives no men liberty to break the law established , further than with meekness and patience they are content to suffer the penalties annexed , rather than perturb the publick peace . . some men , in the necessities of their fortunes , distrust gods providence , as well as their own merits . . never were any princes more glorious than those whom god hath suffer'd to be tried in the fornace of afflictions by their injurious subjects . . some men speak against their king rather what they wish , than what they believe , or know . . rude and scandalous pamphlets , like fire in great conflagrations , fly up and down , to set all places on like flames . . it is no wonder if men , not fearing god , should not honour their king. . god hath graven such characters of divine authority , and sacred power , upon kings , as none may , without sin , seek to blot them out . . from god alone , are all traditions of true glory and majesty that is in kings . . no news to have all innovations ushered in with the name of reformations in church and state. . the pride of those that study novelties , can hardly allow any share or degree of wisdom or godliness to former times . . for set and prescribed forms of publick prayer , there is no doubt but that wholsome words being known and fitted to mens understandings , are soonest received into their hearts , and aptest to excite and carry along with them , judicious and fervent affections . . constant forms of prayers are not more likely to slat and hinder the spirit of prayer and devotion , than unpraemeditated and confused variety to distract and lose it . . slight and easie legerdemain will serve to delude the vulgar . . no men are prone to be greater tyrants , and more rigorous exactors upon others to conform to their illegal novelties , than such whose pride was formerly least disposed to the obedience of lawfull constitutions , and whose licentious humours most pretended conscientious liberties . . it is impossible for a prince to preserve the state in quiet , unless he hath such an influence upon churchmen , and they such a dependance on him , as may best restrain the seditious exorbitancies of ministers tongues , who with the keyes of heaven , have so far the keyes of the peoples hearts , as they prevail much by the oratory to let in , or shut out both peace and loyalty . . the want of government is that which the church can no more dispence with in point of well-being , than the want of the word and sacrament in point of being . . scripture is the best rule , and the church's universal practise the best commentary of religion . . no frame of church-government is more agreable both to reason and religion , than that which is paternal not magisterial . . faction and confusion , emulations and contempts , are prone to arise among equals in power and function . . inconstancy is a great prejudice against novelty . . the stream of times , and the prevalency of parties , overpowreth the judgements of some men . . ministers may find as great a difference , in point of thriving , between the favour of the people , and of princes , as plants do between being watered by hand , or by the sweet and liberal dews of heaven . . the tenuity and contempt of clergy-men will soon let them see , what a poor carcass they are when parted from the influence of that head , to whose supremacy they have been sworn . . a little moderation may prevent great mischiefs . . discretion , without passion , might easily reform whatever the rust of times , or indulgence of lawes or corruption of manners may have brought upon the government of the church . . it is a gross vulgar errour , to impute , or revenge upon , functions , the faults of times or persons . . respect and observance , even in peacefull times , is hardly paid to any governors by the measure of their vertues , so much as by that of their estates . . poverty and meanness expose men in authority to the contempt of licentious minds and manners . . there is an innate principle of vicious oppression in all men , against those that seem to reprove , or restrain them . . no design or passion is to be gratified with the least perverting of truth . . devout minds restore to god in giving to his church and prophets , through whose hands he graciously accepts even a cup of cold water , as a libation to himself . . that oath may be with judgment broken , which erroneously was taken . . what a king thinks in his judgment best , he may not think so absolutely necessary for all places , and at all times . . it is far better to hold to primitive and uniform antiquity , than to comply with divided novelty . . the way of treaties is as a retiring from fighting like beasts , to arguing like men , whose strength should be more in their understandings than in their limbs . . a king may have greater confidence of his reason , than his sword. . it is no diminution of a king to prevent [ arming ] subjects with expresses of his desires , and importunities to treat . . it is an office not only of humanity , rather to use reason than force , but also of christianity , to seek peace and ensue it . . the events of all war , by the sword , are very dubious , and of a civil war uncomfortable ; the end hardly recompensing , and late repairing , the mischief of the means . . a monarch cannot part with his honour , as a king , nor with his conscience , as a christian . . jealousies are not so easily allayed , as they are raised . . some men are more afraid to retreat from violent engagements , than to engage . . what is wanting in equity , must be made up in pertinacy . . such as have little to enjoy in peace , or to lose in war [ if ill-disposed ] study to render the very name of peace odious and suspected . . in church affairs , a king having so many strict ties of conscience upon him , hath least liberty of prudence . . it argues much softness and infirmity of mind in a king , rather to part with gods truth , than man's peace and rather to lose the church's honour , than cross some mens factious humours . ; . some men have that height , as to interpret all fair condescendings as arguments of feebleness , and glory most in an unflexible stifness , when they see others most supple , and inclinable to them . . it is a grand maxime with some men , alwayes to ask their king something which in reason and honour must be denied , that they may have some colour to refuse all that is in other things granted , setting peace at as high a rate as the worst effects of war. . some men endeavour first to make their king destroy himself by dishonourable concessions , that so they may have the less to do . . the highest tide of success should not set a king above a treaty with his subjects , nor the lowest ebbe below a fight . . it is no sign of true valour , to be prodigal of mens lives , rather than be drawn to produce our own reasons , or subscribe to other mens . . what kings cannot get by their treaties , they may gain by their prayers . . the various successes of civil war , should afford a king variety of good meditations . . a kings sins sometimes prevail against the justice of his cause . . rebels may be punished by the prosperity which hardens them to continue that injustice by open hostility , which was begun by riotous tumults . . personal and private sins , may oftimes over-ballance the justice of publick engagements . . god accounts not every gallant man ( in the worlds esteem ) a fit instrument to assert in the way of war , a righteous cause . . the more men are prone to arrogate to their own skil , valour and strength , the less doth god ordinarily work by them for his own glory . . event of success , can never state the justice of any cause ▪ nor the peace of mens consciences , nor the eternal fate of their souls . . the ties of subjects to god , the church , and their king , lye upon their souls , both for obedience to , and just assistance of their soveraign . . they who lose their lives in a just cause , have the destruction of their bodies sanctified as a means to save their souls . . rebels are more afraid to encounter the many pregnant reasons , which conflict with , and accuse them in , their own thoughts , than they oft are in a desperate bravery to fight against the forces given by god to their king. . it is far more honourable and comfortable , to suffer for good lawes , than to prosper in their ruine and subversion . . the defects of piety may blast the endeavours of loyalty , when men are not as faithfull to god and their own souls , as to their king. . a good king , in a civil war , should never have any victory on his subjects , without his sorrow , nor , when he suffers a defeat , despair of gods mercy and defence . . a king should never desire such victories , as may seem to conquer , but only restore , the lawes and liberties of his people . . a king should wish no greater advantages by a civil war , than to bring his enemies to moderation , and his friends to peace . . a king should be afraid of the temptation of an absolute conquest ; and never pray more for victory over his subjects , than over himself . . the different events of a civil war , are but the methods of divine justice , by contrary winds to winnow us : that by punishing our sins , he might purge them from us ; and by deferring peace , he might prepare us more to prize , and better to use so great a blessing . . a kings conscience of his innocence may forbid him to fear a war , but the love of his kingdomes command him ( if possible ) to avoid it . . a king may commit an errour in giving advantages to some men , by confirming their power , which they know not to use with that modesty and gratitude as becomes their loyalty , and his confidence . . a king sometimes by yielding less may be opposed less , and by denying more , be more obeyed . . when we conquer gods patience by our sins , we are condemn'd by mutual conquerings to destroy one another in a civil war , where the most prosperous successes on either side impair the wellfare of the whole . . those victories are still miserable , that leave our sins nnsubdued , flushing our pride , and animating to continue injuries . . peace it self is not desirable , til repentance have prepared us for it . . when we fight more against our selves , and less against god , we shall cease fighting against one another . . no glory is more to be envied , than that of due reforming either church or state , when deformities are such , that the perturbation and novelty are not like to exceed the benefit of reforming . . the setling of religion ought to be the first rule and standard of reforming . . it is a great miscariage , when popular clamours and fury are allowed the reputation of zeal and the publick sense . . freedome , moderation , and impartiality , are the best tempers of reforming counsels and endeavours . . what is acted by factions , cannot but offend more than please . . where the scripture is not clear and punctual in precepts , there the constant and universal practise of the church , in things not contrary to reason , faith , or maners , or any positive command , is the best rule that christians can follow . . the vulgar are taken with novelties as children with babies , very much , but not very long . . if there were as much of christ's spirit , for meekness , wisdome and charity in mens hearts , as there is of his name used in the pretensions to reform all to christs , it would certainly obtain more of gods blessing , and produce more of christs glory , the churches good , the honour of religion , and the unity of christians . . publick reformers had need first act in private , and practise that on their own hearts , which they purpose to try on others . . deformities within will soon betray the pretenders of publick reformations to such private designs , as must needs hinder the publick good . . the right methods of reforming the church , cannot subsist with that of perturbing the civil state. . religion cannot be justly advanced by depressing loyalty , which is one of the chiefest ingredients and ornaments of true religion : for , next to fear god , is honour the king. . christ's kingdom may be set up , without pulling down the kings and men will not in impartial times appear good christians , that approve not themselves good subjects . ; . as good ends cannot justifie evil means , so , nor will evil beginnings ever bring forth good conclusions ; unless god by a miracle of mercy , create light out of darkness , order out of confusions , and peace out of passions . . the greatest experiments of virtue and nobleness are discovered in the greatest advantages against an enemy , and the greatest obligations are those which are put upon us by them , from whom we could least have expected them . . bees will gather honey where the spider sucks poyson . . subjects can hardly be happy , if their king be miserable ; or enjoy their peace and liberties , while he is oppressed . . a king should not only with patience bear indignities , but with charity forgive them . . subjects captivate their king , that allow him not the liberty of his own thoughts , and are unwilling he should follow the light of his own conscience . the fifth century . . it is unreasonable for subjects to expect the king should think their couns●ls good for him , who maintain a war against him . . prosperity gains the greatest esteem and applause among the vulgar , as adversity exposeth to their greatest slighting and disrespect . . good fortune is not alwayes the shadow of vertue and justice ; but oftner attends vitious and injurious actions as to this world . . no secular advantages seem sufficient to that cause , which begun with tumults , depends chiefly upon the reputation with the vulgar . . rebels think no victories so effectual to their designs , as those that most rout and wast their kings credit with his people . . the taking away a kings credit , is but a necessary preparation to the taking away of his life and his kingdomes . . it is an exquisite method of rebels cunning and cruel●y , to compel their king first to follow the funerals of his honour , and then destroy him . . few mens consciences are so stupid , as not to inflict upon them some secret impressions of that shame and dishonour which attends all unworthy actions , have they never so much of publick flattery and popular countenance . . chams curse of being servant of servants , must needs be on them , who seek by dishonourable actions to please the vulgar ; and confirm by ignoble acts , their dependance upon the people . . what providence denies to force , it may grant to prudence . . when necessity is a king's counsellor , his confidence in a rebellious people may disarm and overcome them ; and the rendring his person to them , engage their affections to him . . god must be a kings chiefest guard ; and his conscience both his counsellor , and his comforter . . no necessities should compel a king to desert his ●●●●ur , or swerve from his judg●●●● . . an univ●●sal confidence put in dissembling subjects , may make them ashamed not to be really such , as they ought and profess to be . . so various are all humane affairs , and so necessitous may the state of princes be , that their greatest danger may be in their supposed safety ; and their safety in their suposed danger . . a king ought not in rebellious times , to be less solicitous for his friends safety , than his own ; and he may chuse to venture himself upon further hazards , rather than expose their resolute loyalty to all extremity . . it is some skil in play , to know when a game is lost ; better fairly to give over , than to contest in vain . . a king that casts himself upon the kindness of subjects that have fought against him , must study to reinforce his judgment , and fortifie his mind with reason and religion that he may not seem to offer up his souls liberty , or make his conscience their captive . ; . no success should darken or disguise truth to a king , who in the greatest necessity , should no less conform his words unto his inward dictates , than if they had been , as the words of a king ought to be among loyal subjects , full of power . . reason is the divinest power : a king should never think himself weakned , while he may make full and free use of that . . no eclipse of outward fortune should rob a king of the light of reason . . what god denies of outward strength to a distressed king , his grace may supply with inward resolutions , not morosity to deny what is fit to be granted ; but not to grant any thing , which reason and religion bids him deny . . a king should never think himself less th●n himself , while he is able to preserve the integrity of his conscience , when the only jewel left him worth keeping . . when kings are deceiv'd in their confidence , it is but an essay which god will have them make of man's uncertainty , the more to fix them on himself , who never faileth them that trust in him . . though the reeds of aegypt break under the hand of him that leans on them ; yet the rock of israel will be an everlasting stay and defence . . when a king retires to god , he most enjoyes himself , which he loseth while he lets out his hopes to others . . solitude and captivity gives a king leisure enough to study the worlds vanity and inconstancy . . a king need not care much to be reckoned among the unfortunate , if he be not in the black list of irreligious and sacrilegious princes . . no restraint should ensnare a kings soul in sin , nor gain that of him which may make his enemies more insolent , his friends ashamed , or his name accursed . . they have no great cause to triumph , that have got a king's person into their power , whose soul remains his own . . should a king grant what unreasonable men desire , he should be such as they wish him , not more a king , and far less both man and christian . . restraint ought not to obtain that of a king , which tumults and armes could not , wherein though there be little safety , yet it hath not more of danger . . the fear of men should never be a kings snare : nor should the love of any liberty entangle his soul. . better others betray a king , than himself : and that the price of his liberty should be his conscience . . the greatest injuries a king's enemies seek to inflict upon him , cannot be without his own consent . . while a king can deny with reason , he shall defeat the greatest impressions of rebels malice , who neither know how to use worthily what is already granted , nor what to require more of him but this , that he would seem willing to help , then to destroy himself and his . . although rebels should destroy a king , yet let him give them no cause to despise him . . neither liberty nor life are so dear to a king , as the peace of his conscience , the honour of his crownes , and the welfare of his people . . a king's word may more injure his people , than a war ; while he gratifies a few , to oppress all . . lawes may by god's blessing , revive with the loyalty of subjects , if a distressed king bury them not by his consent , and cover them not in the grave of dishonour and injustice , which some mens violence may have digged for them . . if captivity or death must be the price of the lawes redemption , a king should not grudge to pay it . . no condition can make a king miserable , which carieth not with it his souls , his peoples , and posterities thraldom . . a monarch should rather hazard the ruine of one king , than confirm many tyrants over his people . a distressed king may by the learning , piety and prayers of his chaplains , be either better enabled to sustain the want of all other enjoyments , or better sitted for the recovery and use of them in god's good time . . a king may reap , by the pious help of his chaplains , a spiritual harvest of grace amidst the thornes , and after the plowings of temporal crosses . . when rebels confine their king to solitude , they adde a wilderness of temptations , especialy if they obtrude company upon him more sad than solitude it self . . the evil policy of men forbids all just restitution , lest they should confess an injurous usurpation . . though the justice of the law deprive prisoners of worldly comforts , yet the mercy of religion allowes them the benefit of their clergy , as not aiming at once to destroy their bodies , and to damn their souls . . to deny a king the ghostly comfort of his chaplains , seems a greater rigour and barbarity than is used to the meanest prisoners , and greatest malefactors . . a kings agony may be relieved by the presence of one good angel , such as is a learned , godly and discreet divine . . rebels , that envy the being a king , will encline to lothe his being a christian , and while they seek to deprive him of all things else , will be afraid he should save his soul. . some remedies are worse than the disease , and some comforters more miserable than misery it self ; when like jobs friends , they seek not to fortifie one's mind with patience , but perswade a man , by betraying his own innocency , to despair of god's mercy ; and by justifying their injuries , to strengthen the hands , and harden the hearts of insolent enemies . . a king looking upon clergy-men as orphans , and under the sacrilegious eyes of many cruel and rapacious reformers , ought in duty to appear as a father , and a patron of them and the church . . it is better to seem undevout , and to hear no mens prayers , than to be forced , or seem to comply with those petitions , to which the heart cannot consent , nor the tongue say amen , without contradicting a man's own understanding , or belying his own soul. . in publick devotions , a king should countenance neither prophane boldness , nor pious non-sense ; but such an humble and judicious gravity , as shewes the speaker to be at once consideate both of god's majesty , the church's honor , and his own vileness , both knowing what things god allowes him to ask , and in what maner it becomes a sinner to supplicate the divine mercy for himself and others . . a king should equally be scandaliz'd with all prayers that sound either imperiously , or rudely and passionately ; as either wanting humility to god , or charity to men , or respect to the duty . . a king should better be pleased , as with studied and premeditated sermons , so with such publick forms of prayer as are fitted to the church's and every christian's daily and common necessities ; because he is better assured what he may joyn his heart unto , than he can be of any man's extemporary sufficiency . . extemporary sufficiency , as it need not wholely be excluded from publick occasions , so is it to be allow'd its just liberty and use in private and devout retirements ; where neither the solemnity of the duty , nor the modest regard to others , do require so great exactness , as to the outward maner of performance . . the light of understanding , and the fervency of affection , are the main and most necessary requisites both in constant and occasional , solitary and social devotions . . a great part of some mens piety , hangs upon the popular pin of railing against , and contemning the liturgy of a church . . a king should rather be condemned to the woe of vae soli , than to that of vae vobis hypocritis , by seeming to pray what he does not approve . . it is infinitely more glorious to convert souls to gods church by the word , than to conquer men to a subjection by the sword. . the gifts and prayers of the clergy , are to be look't upon as more praevalent than a king 's , or other men's , by how much they flow from minds more enlightned , and affections less distracted , than those which are encombred with secular affairs . . a greater blessing and acceptableness attends those duties which are rightly perform'd , as proper to , and within the limits of that calling , to which god and the church have especially designed and consecrated some men . . confusion in religion will as certainly follow every man's turning priest or preacher , as it will in the state , where every man affects to rule as king. . a king may bear with more grief and impatience the want of his chaplains , than of any other his servants , and next ( if not beyond in some things ) to the being sequestred from his wife and children since from these , indeed more of humane and temporary affections ; but from those more of heavenly and eternal improvements may be expected . ; . in the inforced ( not neglected ) want of ordinary means , god is wont to afford extraordinary supplies of his gifts and graces . . a king that in solitude , has gods spirit to teach him and help his infirmities in prayer , reading and meditation will need no other either oratour or instructer . . some little practise wil serve that man , who only seeks to represent a part of honesty and honour . . a king cannot be so low , but he is considerable : adding weight to that party where he appears . . when the excentrique and irregular motion of the times cannot well be resisted , nor quieted ; better swim down such a stream , than in vain to strive against it . . impossible it is for lines to be drawn from the center , and not to divide from each other , so much the wider , by how much they go farther from the point of union . . professed patrons for the peoples liberties , cannot be utterly against the liberty of their king : what they demand for their own conscience , they cannot in reason deny to his . . novel injunctions cannot well be stamped with the authority of lawes , without the kings consent . . men are hardly content with one sin , but adde sin to sin , til the later punish the former . . power is above all rule , order and law ; where men look more to present advantages , than their consciences , and the unchangeable rules of justice ; while they are judges of others , they are forced to condemn themselves . . vengeance oft pursues and overtakes them that thought to have escaped and fortified themselves most impregnably against it , both by their multitude and compliance . . whom the lawes cannot , god will punish , by their own crimes and hands . . fatal blindness frequently attends and punisheth wilfullness , so that men shall not be able at least to prevent their sorrowes , who would not timely repent of their sins , nor shall they be suffered to enjoy the comforts , who securely neglect the counsels belonging to their peace . . brethren in iniquity , are not far from becoming insolent enemies , there being nothing harder than to keep ill men long in one mind . . it is not possible to gain a ●air period for those motions which go rather in a round and circle of fancy , than in a right line of reason tending to the law , the only center of publick consistency . . men are much more happy when subject to known lawes , than to the various wills of any men , seem they never so plausible at first . . vulgar compliance with any illegal and extravagant wayes , like violent motions in nature , soon growes weary of it self , and ends in a refractory fullenness . . peoples rebounds are oft in their faces , who first put them upon those violent strokes . . a king may so far esteem the valour and gallantry some time shewed by an army which hath fought against him , as to concur toward a just satisfying their demands of pay and indemnity ; and to wish he may never want such men to maintain himself , his lawes and kingdome in such a peace as wherein they may enjoy their share and proportion so much as any men . . it is some kind of deceiving and lessening the injury of a kings long restraint , when he finds his leisure and solitude have produced something worthy of himself , and usefull to his successour . . in civil warres , a kings cause is not to be measured by the success , nor his judgment of things by his misfortunes . . it is an advantage of wisdom to a young prince , to have begun & spent some years of discretion in the experience of troubles , and exercise of patience . . in troubles piety and all virtues , both moral and political are commonly better planted to a thriving ( as trees set in winter ) than in the warmth and serenity of times . . the delights which usually attend princes courts in time of peace and plenty , are prone either to root up all plants of true virtue and honor , or to be contented only with some leaves and withering formalities of them . . princes should alwayes remember they are born , and by providence designed to the publick good . . flatteries are as unseparable from prosperous princes , as flies ate from fruit in summer , whom adversity , like cold weather , drives away . . charles le bon , a more glorious name for a prince , than le grand better for him and his people he be good , than great . ; . the early exercise of gods graces and gifts bestowed upon princes may best weed out all vicious inclinations , and dispose them to such princely endowments and imployments , which will most gain the love , and intend the welfare of those over whom god may place them . . a prince ought to begin and end with god , who is king of kings , the soveraign disposer of the kingdomes of the world. . the best government , and highest soveraignty a prince can attain to is , to be subject to god , that the scepter of his word and spirit may rule in his heart . . the true glory of princes consists in advancing gods glory in the maintenance of true religion , and the church's good ; also in the dispensation of civil power , with justice and honour to the publick peace . . piety will make a prince prosperous ; at least it will keep him from being miserable . . he is not much a loser , that loseth all , yet saveth his own soul at last . . a kings affliction is gods physick , having that in healthfulness which it wants in pleasure . the sixth century . . a prince at mature age , ought if satisfied in his own judgment and reason , seal to that sacred bond which education hath written , that it may be judiciously his own religion , and not other mens custom , or tradition , which he professeth . . a princes fixation in matters of religion , is not more necessary for his souls , than his kingdoms peace . . the devil of rebellion doth commonly turn himself into an angel of reformation , and the old serpent can pretent new lights . . when some mens consciences accuse them for sedition and faction , they stop its mouth with the name and noise of religion , when piety pleads for peace and patience , they cry out zeal . . unless a king in point of religion be well setled , he shall never want temptations to destroy him and his under pretensions of reforming . . reforming matters of religion seems even to the worst men as the best and most auspicious beginning of their worst desfgns . . some reformers of religion hope to cover their irreligious deformities whereto they are conscious , by a severity of censuring other mens opinions or actions . . a king ought to take heed of abetting any factions , or applying to any publick discriminations in matters of religion , contrary to what is in his judgment , and the church well setled . . a king 's partial adhering as head to any one side , gains him not so great advantages in some mens hearts ( who are prone to be of their kings religion ) as it loseth them in others , who think themselves and their profession first despised , than persecuted by him . . a king should take such a course , as may either with calmness and charity quite remove seeming differeces in religion , and offenses by impartiality , or to order affairs in point of power , that he shall not need to fear or flatter any faction . . if a king stand in need of any faction , he may have flatterrd ( that affects him not ) or must stand to their courtesie , he is undone ; the serpent will devour the dove . . a king may never expect less of loyalty , justice , or humanity , than from those who engage into religious rebellion . . religious rebels make their interest alwayes gods. . ambitious policies march under the colours of piety , not only with greatest security , but applause , as to the populacy . . a king may hear jacobs voice from such religious reformers , but he will feel they have esau's hands . . as ill humors fall to the disaffected part , which causeth inflammations ; so all affectors of novelties adhere to that side , which hath the most remarkable and specious note of difference in point of religion . . nothing ought to seem little or despicable to a king in matters which concern religion and the church's peace , so as to neglect a speedy reformation , and effectual suppression . . errors and schismes which seem at first but as a hand-breadth , by seditious spirits , as by strong winds are soon made to cover and darken the whole heaven . . a king should never charge his head with such a crown , as shall by its heaviness oppress the whole body , the weakness of whose parts cannot return any thing of strength , honour or safety to the head , but a necessary debilitation and ruine . . a kings prerogative is best shewed and exercised in remitting rather than exacting the rigour of the lawes ; there being nothing worse than legal tyranny . . tumults , armies and prisons , are not the best arguments to convince the testimony of a king's conscience . . it is not safe for a king to gratifie any faction with the perturbation of the lawes , in which is wrap't up the publick interest , and the good of the community . . a king should never repose so much upon any mans single counsel , fidelity and discretion , in managing affairs of the first magnitude ( that is , matters of religion and justice ) as to create in himself or others , a difference of his own judgment , which is likely to be alwayes more constant and impartial to the interests of his crown and kingdom , than any mans . . a king should beware of exasperating any factions by the crossness and ●●●●erity of some mens passions , humors , or private opinions , imployed by him , grounded only upon the differences in lesser matters , which are but the skirts and suburbs of religion . . a charitable connivence and christian toleration , often dissipates the strength of factions , which rougher opposition fortifies , and puts the despised and opressed party into such combinations , as may most enable them to get a full revenge on those they count their persecutors , who are commonly assisted by that vulgar commiseration , which attends all that are said to suffer under the notion of religion . . a king is not to connive at or tolerate any faction that amounts to an insolent opposition of lawes and government , or religion established , as to the essentials of them , such ●●●tions and minings are intolerab●e . . a king must alwayes keep up solid piety , and those fundamental truths ( which mend both hearts and lives of men ) with impartial favour and justice . . a king must take heed that outward circumstances and formalities of religion devour not all , or the best encouragements of learning , industry and piety . . a king ought with an equal eye and impartial hand , to distribute favours and rewards to all men , as he finds them for their real goodness , both in abilities and fidelities worthy and capable of them . . a king by rewarding men of best deserts , shall be sure to gain himself the hearts of the best , and the most too , who though they be not good themselves , yet are glad to see the severer wayes of vertue at any time sweetned by temporal rewards . . combin●●●●actions have no sooner by force subdued what they counted their common enemy , and are secured from that fear , but they are divided to so high a rivalry , as sets them more at defiance against each other , than against their first antagonists . . time will dissipate all factions , when once the rough horns of private mens covetous and ambitious designs shall discover themselves , which were at first wrapt up and hidden under the soft and smooth pretensions of religion , reformation and liberty . . as the wolfe is not less cruel , so he will be more justly hated , when he shall appear no better than a wolfe under sheeps clothing . . to undeceive the seduced vulgar , who in simplicity follow disguises , as a king needs no palliations , if he study really to exceed in true and const●●● demonstrations of goodness , piety , and virtue towards the people , even all those men that make the greatest noise and ostentations of religion : so shall he neither fear any detection , as they do , who have but the face and mask of goodness ; nor shall he frustrate the just expectations of his people , who cannot in reason promise themselves so much good from any subjects novelties , as from the virtuous constancy of their king. . none are greater oppressours of vulgar estates , liberties , and consciences , than those men that entitle themselves the patrons and vindicators of them , only to usurpe power over them . . no passion should betray a prince to any study of revenge upon those , whose own sin and folly will sufficiently punish them in due time . . so soon as the forked arrow of factious emulations is drawn out , use all princely arts and clemency to heal the wounds ; that the smart of the cure , may not equal the anguish of the hurt . . acts of indempnity and oblivion , when desired and accepted , are to be granted not only as acts of state-policy and necessity , but of christian charity and choise . . they that deprive a king of all , cannot of a power to forgive them ; and to have a heart to do it , is a greater argument of gods love to him , than any prosperity can be . . none will be more loyal and faithfull to an injur'd king , than those subjects , who , sensible of their errours and his sufferings , will feell in their own souls most vehement motives to repentance , and earnest desires to make some reparations for their former defects . . as the quality of a king sets him beyond a duel with any subject ; so the nobleness of his mind must raise him above the meditating any revenge , or executing his anger upon the many . . the more conscious a king shall be to his own merits upon his people , the more prone he will be to expect all love and loyalty from them , and to inflict no punishment upon them for former miscariages . . an injur'd king will have more inward complacency in pardoning one , than in punishing a thousand . . we cannot merit of god , but by his own mercy . . counterfeit and disorderly zeal ought not to abate a king's value and esteem of true piety : both of them are to be known by their fruits . . the sweetness of the vine and figtree is not to be despised , though the brambles and thornes should pretend to bear figs and grapes , thereby to rule over the trees . . the publick interest consists in the mutual and common good both of prince and people . . we must not sterve our selves , because some men have surfeited of wholsom food . . god sometimes punisheth rebellious subjects with continuance in their sin , and suffers them to be deluded with the prosperity of their wickedness . . gods grace may teach and enable an injur'd king to want , as well as to wear a crown , which is not worth taking up , or enjoying , upon sordid , dishonourable , and irreligious termes . . let a king keep himself to true principles of piety , vertue , and honour ; he shall never want a kingdom . . it is a principal point of honour in a yong king , to deferre all respect , love , and pretection to the queen dowager his mother , especially if with magnanimity and patience she hath sufferr'd for , and with , his royal father , and himself . . a captive king , in the midst of rebellious subjects , may be wrapt up and fortified in his own innocency and god's grace . . the bloud of a king destroy'd by rebels , will cry aloud for vengeance to heaven , and they who shed it , will have inward horrour for their first tormenter , and not escape exemplary judgments . . they that repent of any defects in their duty toward the royal father , may be found truly zealous to repay with interest , the loyalty and love which was due to him , unto their king his son . . the mask of religion on the face of rebellion , will not long serve to hide the men's deformities that use it . . mislead subjects may learn by their miseries , that religion to their god , and loyalty to their king , cannot be parted without both their sin and their infelicity . . god may honour a king , not only with the scepter and government of realms , but also with the suffering many indignities , and an untimely death for them , while he studies to preserve the rights of the church , the power of his lawes , the honour of his crown , the priviledges of parliaments , the liberties of his people , and his own conscience , which is dearer to him than a thousand kingdoms . . a captive king hath as much cause as leisure to meditate upon , and prepare for his death ; there being but few steps between the prisons and graves of princes . . it is gods indulgence which gives him the space , but mans cruelty , that gives him the sad occasions for those thoughts . . a king in the hands of rebels , besides the common burthen of mortality , which lies upon him , as a man , bears the heavy load of other mens ambitions , fears , jealousies , and cruel passions , whose envy or enmity against him , makes their own lives seem deadly to them , while he enjoyes any part of his . . a kings prosperity should not make him a stranger to the contemplations of mortality . . the thoughts of death are never unseasonable , since prosperity alwayes is uncertain . . death is an eclipse , which oft hapneth as well in clear as clowdy dayes . . a king by long and sharp adversity , may have so reconciled within himself those natural antipathies between life and death , which are in all men , that the common terrours of the later may be dispelled , and the special horrour of it much allayed . . a king , to whom a violent death approaching is represented by the policy of cruel and implacable enemies , with all terrible aggravations may look upon those things as unpoysonous , though sharp , since his redeemer hath either pulled them out , or given him the antidote of his death against them , which as to the immaturity , unjustice , shame , scorn and cruelty of it , exceeded whatever a threatned king can fear . . a pious king never finds so much the life of religion , the feast of a good conscience , and the brazen wall of a judicious integrity and constancy , as when he comes to a close conflict with the thoughts of death . . though a king be not so old , as to be weary of life , it is happy for him , if he be not so bad as to be either afraid to dye , or asham'd to live . . it is the greatest glory of a christians life to dye dayly , in conquering by a lively faith , and patient hope of a better life , those partial and quotidian deaths , which kill by piece-meals , and make men over-live their own fates , while we are deprived of health , honour , liberty , power , credit , safety , or estate , and those other comforts of dearest relations , which are as the life of our lives . . a king lives in nothing temporal so much , as in the love and good will of his people . . a king should not think that life too long or tedious , wherein god gives him any opportunities , if not to do , yet to suffer with such christian patience and magnanimity in a good cause , as are the greatest honour of his life , and the best improvement of his death . . in point of true christian valour , it argues pusillanimity to desire to dye out of weariness of life , and a want of that heroike greatness of spirit which becomes a christian , in the patient and generous sustaining those afflictions , which as shadowes , necessarily attend us , while we are in this body , and which are less'ned or enlarged as the sun of our prosperity moves higher or lower , whose total absence is best recompensed with the dew of heaven . . the assaults of affliction may be terrible , like sampson's lyon , but they yield much sweetness to those that dare encounter and overcome them , who know how to over-live the witherings of their gourds without discontent or peevishness , while they may yet converse with god. . the life of a pious king is the object of the devils and wicked mens malice , but yet under god's sole custody and disposal . . we must not by seeming prepared to dye , think to flatter god for longer life . . triumphing enemies who are solemnely cruel , adde ( as those did who crucified christ ) the mockery of justice to the cruelty of malice . . that a king may be destroyed , as with greater pomp and artifice , so with less pity , it is but a necessary policy to make his death appear as an act of justice , done by subjects upon their soveraign , who know that no law of god or man invests them with any power of judicature without him , much less against him ; and who being sworn and bound by all that is sacred before god and man , to endeavour his preservation , must pretend justice to cover their perjury . . it is a sad fate for any man , to have his enemies to be accusers , parties and judges , but most desperate when this is acted by the insolence of subjects against their soveraign , wherein those who have had the chiefest hand , and are most guilty of contriving the publick troubles , must by shedding his bloud , seem to wash their own hands of that innocent bloud , whereof they are most evidently guilty before god and man , if not in their own consciences too , while they carry on unreasonable demands , first by tumults , after by armies . . nothing makes mean spirits more cowardly cruel in managing their usurped power against their lawfull superiours , than the guilt of their unjust usurpation . . specious and popular pretensions of justice against delinquents are applyed only to disguize at first the monstrousness of their designs , who despair of possessing the power and profits of the vineyard , till the heir , whose right it is , be cast out and slain . . it may be accounted by rebels a kings greatest fault , that he will not either destroy himself with the church and state by his word ; or not suffer them to do in unresisted by the sword , whose covetous ambition , no concessions of his can either satisfie or abate . . some men think that kingdom of brambles which they seek to erect , not likely to thrive , till watered with the royal bloud of those , whose right the kingdom is . . a king's innocency will find him both his protector , and his advocate , who is his only judg. . the greatest patrons of law , justice , order , and religion on earth , are exposed to as many dangers , as there be either men or devils which love confusion . . god will not suffer men long to prosper in their babel , who build it with the bones , and cement it with the bloud of their kings . . a king destin'd to death by rebels , may be confident they will find avengers of it among themselves ; and that the injuries he hath sustained from them , shall be first punished by them , who agreed in nothing so much , as in opposing him . . the impatience of rebels to bear the loud cry of their kings bloud will make them think no way better to expiate it , than by shedding theirs , who with them most thirsted after his . . god will not suffer them to go unpunished , whose confoederacy in sin was their only security . . a king 's greatest conquest of death , is from the power of the love of christ , who hath swallowed up death in the victory of his resurrection , and the glory of his ascension . . royal charity is the noblest revenge upon , and victory over a king's destroyers . . the will of rebels and regicides seems to be their only rule , their power the measure , and their success the exactor of what they please to call justice , while they flatter themselves with the fancy of their own safety , by the kings danger , and the security of their lives-designs , by his death : forgetting , that the greatest temptations to sin , are wrapped up in seeming prosperities ; so the severest vengeances of god are then most accomplished , when men are suffered to complete their wicked purposes . . when the will of god hath confined and concluded that of a devoted king , he shall have the pleasure of dying without any pleasure of desired vengeance . . the glory attending the death of a king sacrificed to the will of his revolted subjects , surpasseth all he could enjoy or conceive in life . . the sharp and necessary tyrany of king-destroyers , sufficiently confute the calumnies of tyranny against him . . subjects ought to know how to excuse their soveraign's failings as a man , and yet to retain and pay their duty to him as their king ; there being no religious necessity binding any subjects by pretending to punish , infinitely to exceed the faults and errours of their princes . . rebels may often see the proportions of their evil dealings against their king in the measure of gods retaliations upon them , who cannot hope long to enjoy their own thumbs and to●s , having under pretense of paring his nails , been so cruel as to cut off his chiefest strength . . the punishment of the more insolent and obstinate rebels may be like korah and his complices ( at once mutining against both prince and priest ) in such a method of divine justice , as is not ordinary ; the earth of the lowest and meanest people opening upon them , and swallowing them up in a just disdain of their ill-gotten , and worse-used authority ; upon whose support and strength they chiefly depended for their building and establishing their designs against their king , the church and state. . it is a fallacy in them who from worldly success ( rather like sophisters than sound christians ) draw those popular conclusions for gods approbation of their actions , whose wise prudence oft permits many events , which his revealed word , the only clear , safe and fixed rule of good actions and good conveniences , in no sort approves . . a good king may be confident that the justice of his cause , and clearness of his conscience , before god , and toward his people , will carry him as much above rebels in gods decision , as their successes may have lifted them above him in the vulgar opinion . . many times those undertakings of men , are lifted up to heaven in the prosperity and applause of the world , whose rise is from hell , as to the injuriousness and oppression of the design . the seventh century . . the prosperous winds which oft fill the sails of pirates , doth not justifie their piracy and rapine . . the prayers and patience of a king's friends and loving subjects , coutribute much to the sweetning of that bitter cup given him by them , whose hands are unjustly and barbarously lifted up against him . . as to the last event , a murther'd king may seem to owe more to his enemies , than his friends , while those put a period to the sins and sorrows attending this miserable life , wherewith these desire he might still contend . . if a good king suffer's a violent death with his saviour , it is but mortality crowned with martyrdom , where the debt of death which he owes for sin to nature , shall be raised as a gift of faith and patience offered to god. . the trophees of a king's charity will be more glorious and durable over rebels , than their ill-managed victories over him . . they whose sin is prosperous , had need be penitent , that they may be pardoned . . we are to look upon the temporal destruction of the greatest king , as farre less deprecable , than the eternal damnation of the meanest subject . . it is very strange , that mariners can find no other means to appease the storm themselves have raised , but by drowning their pilate . . they who themselves seem , and teach others to despair of their king's salvation , only discover this , that they do not much desire it . . uncharitable and cruel restraints of a king from spiritual assistance of chaplains , may rather enlarge , than any way obstruct his access to the throne of heaven . . when large pretenses prove but the shadows of weak performances , then the greatest labours produce the smallest effects . . when a period is put to a work of great concernment , all mens ears do ( as it were ) hunger till they are satisfied in their expectations . . no grants give satisfaction to them that pursue their own ambitious ends , more than the welfare of a miserable land. . it is an unutterable misery for him that hath ruled like a king , to be ruled like a slave . . a king knowes not what to grant , when after his concessions to subjects that have required all , they know not what to ask . . they who pretend zeal , when their thoughts are filled with bloud , are but wolves in sheeps clothing . . rebels that endeavour to rule by the sword , shall at last fall by it , for faction is the mother of ruine . . they that are of such a weather-cock-like disposition , love nothing but mutabilities . . much variety doth confound the senses , and makes them still hate one folly , and fall in love with another . . time is the best cure for faction : for it will at length ( like a spreading leprosie ) infect the whole body of the kingdom , and make it so odious , that at last they will hate themselves for love of that , and like a fish , for love of the bait , be catch'd with the hook . . it is not expedient for an army , to contradict the votes of a kingdom , endeavou●ing by pretending for lawes and liberties , to subvert both . . the time will come , when the very clouds shall drop down vengeance upon the heads of those that barrocado themselves against the proceedings of peace . . a resolute king in captivity is arm'd against the fury of rebellious subjects , having a breast to receive the arrowes of their envy , and a heart possest with patience to sustain them . . to god nothing is so great that it may resist ; nor so small , that it is contemned . . a king may rather desire his faults should be corrected by the hand of god , than that his ununjust enemies should be the ministers of god's justice . . let calamity be the exercise , but not the overthrow of a kings virtue . . the permitting a wrong way of god's worship to be set up , to the injury of the right before establish'd and practis'd , will bring shame and grief to a king by his own confession , that he therein followed the perswasions of worldly wisdom , forsaking the dictates of a right informed conscience . . they who have been false to their king , to those that gave them power , and in likelihood to their own souls , may be forgiven by him , but never trusted . . it is an humor becoming an impartial king , to be still partial for that side which he imagines suffer for the weakness of those that maintain it . . a king should suffer a divine who would rectifie his supposed errour , no less than a physician , to take his own way of cu●e . . as to the profession of religion , the king is happy , who condemns not himself in that thing which he allowes . . he that changeth for the better , ought to be sure it be better , before he change . . inconstancy in religion , without cause and colour , is both sin and shame . . there is much difference between permission and approbation . . if the practise of the primitive church , and the universal consent of the fathers be not a convincing argument , when the interpretation of the scripture is dou●●full , nothing is . . the interpretation of private spirits is the mother of all sects , and will bring , where permitted , kingdoms to confusion . . another mans will is as weak a ground for a king to build his faith on , as his own education . . when a general counce● cannot be had , several kingdomes may reform themselves . . rebels never wanted wr●ters to maintain their unjust actions . . all popular reformation is little better than rebellion . . no authority is lawfull , but that which is either directly given , or at least approved by god. . the church having any discipline not conformed to the civil policy , can neither flouris● , nor be happy . . church-ambition doth not at all terminate in seeking to be pope , it being no point of humility to endeavour to be independent of kings . . papacy in a multitude may be as dangerous , as in one . . many things may be avowable upon necessity , which otherwayes are unlawfull . . in points not fit to be discussed , instances , as well as comparisons , are odious . . reason epitomised , weighs as much with wise men , as at large . . one may lean on anothers arm , who leans more on his judgment . . the soundness of religion is not to be tried by dint of sword , nor must we judg of her truths , by the prosperity of events . . when men sit down to discourse or argue , reason should take her seat with them , and , though she be no judg , have her place , if not above their faith , in their arguments . . the envious mans seeds , are tares , although the husbandman knowes not when they were sown . . the child is not to be pour tractured greater than the nurse , nor the bishops power made to outreach the king 's , who is the nursing father of the church . . unity may consist in this ▪ when many sheaves lye in one mans field that belong to him , or be caried into his barn , though they be not bundled up in a rick with one cock-sheave above the rest . . a sum divided into several parcels is not broke , while the owner hath all in his possession . . whilst arguments do multiply , time lessens . . the seed of the word wherein is gods holy spirit , being sowen in the heart , inlivened by the heat of faith , and watered with the tears of repentance , soon fructifies without any further circumstance . . it is no strange thing to see errour triumph in antiquity , and flourish fair ensigns in the face of truth . . it will do no good to keep possession of the keyes , when the lock is changed . . though the catholick church is the white in that butt of earth at which we all must aim ; yet the scripture is the heart , centre , or peg in the midst of that white that holds it up , from whence we must measure . . that which must determine truth , must not be fallible . . when a king fears affairs of councel will meet with s●me passion and prejudice in other men , it is best for him to resolve they shall find least of them in himself . . mens well-meaning ●eal must be guided by such rules of moderation , as are best both to preserve and restore the health of states and kingdoms . . a king should intend not only to oblige his friends , but his enemies also , exceeding even the desires of those that have been factiously discontented , if they do but pretend to any modest and sober sense . . the odium and o●fences which some mens rigour or remissness in church and state may have contracted upon a kings government , he should resolve to expiate by such lawes and regulations for the future , as may not only rectifie what was amiss in practise , but supply what was defective i● the constitution . . no man should have a greater zeal to see religion setled and preserved in truth , unity and order , than the king whom it most concerns both in piety and policy . . a king's confidence in others may betray himself and his kingdomes to those advantages which some men seek for , who want nothing but power and occasion to do mischief . . when our sins ar● ripe , there is no preventing of god's justice from reaping that glory in our calamities , which we robb'd him of in our prosperity . . great abilities in a minister of state , may be prone to create in him great confidence of undertakings , and this is like enough to betray him to great errours , and many enemies . . though a king cannot in his judgment approve all a minister of state hath done , driven ( it may be ) by the necessity of times and the temper of that people he is set over more than lead by his own disposition to any height and rigour of actions ; yet he may not be convinced of any such criminousness in him , as willing to expose his life to the strokes of justice , and malice of his enemies . . when a king bears the touch of conscience , with great régret , for any act of so sinfull frailty , as discovers more a fear of man than of god , as a sign of his repentance , he should often with sorrow confess the same both to god and men. . no man is worthy to bear the name and place of god on earth , who will not avoid inconveniences of state by acts of so high injustice , as no publick convenience can expiate or compensate . . in all likelihood a king can never suffer with his people greater calamities ( yet with greater comfort ) by vindicating the innocency of his minister , at least by denying to sign any destructive bill , according to that justice which his conscience suggesteth to him ; than he wil do after he shall have gratified some mens unthankfull importunities with so cruel a favour . . it may be observed by a king , that those who counsel him to sign a destructive bill to an innocent minister of state , are so far from receiving the rewards of such ingratiatings with the people , that no me● are harrassed and crushed more than they ; when he is least vexed by them , who counsels the king not to consent against the vote of his own conscience . . a king fully conscious to his soul , of permitting an innocent minister of state to be destroyed , may so much the more welcome those judgments god hath pleased to send upon him , as he may hope them to be a means which his mercy hath sanctified so to him , as to repent of that unjust act , and for the future not to do the like . . nothing should more fortifie a king●s resolutions against al● violent importunities ▪ which seek to gain consent from him to acts wherein his conscience is unsatisfied , than the sharp touches he may have had for some such he before hath yeilded to . . when a king's enemies , of his own people , load his act of justice , because extraordinary in the method , with obloquies and exasperations , in touchy times it will fill indifferent men with great jealousies and fears ; yea , and many of his friends will resent it as a motion rising rather from passion , than reason ▪ and not guided with such discretion as the times require ▪ . though a king be furnish'd with just motives and pregnant grounds to proceed against any subjects , so that there needs nothing to the evidence he can produce against those he chargeth , save a free and legal tryal ; let that be all he desireth . . a king should not yield to any temptation of displeasure or revenge against the persons of his subjects , further than he has discovered the unlawfull correspondencies they have used , and engagements they have made to embroyl his kingdoms . . probabilities may be sufficient to raise jealousies in any king's heart , who is not wholely stupid and neglective of the publick peace . . a fair and legal tryal of men called in question by their king , can amount to no worse effect , than either to do him and his kingdom right in case they be guilty ; of else to clear their innocency , and remove his suspitions . . when once people have learned to think hard thoughts again●t their king , they will afterward abundantly vent them by words and deeds . . not any thing ( except our sins ) more ominously presageth al● the miseries incident to a kingdom by civil war , then tumults in the capital city of it , which , when at their height , are not like a storm at sea , ( which yet wants not its terrour ) but like an earthquake , shaking the ve●y foundations of all ; than which nothing in the world hath more of horrour . . in popular tumults , a short sit , or two , of shaking , as an ague , may pass away ; but when once they become a quotidian fever , allwayes increasing to higher inflammations , impatient of any mitigation , restraint , or remission , they threaten ruine . . an unsafe guard may too easily be entertain'd by such as scare themselves , and others , with unnecessary fears . . such great demagogues , and patrons of tumults , as send for them to flatter and embolden them , to direct and tune their clamorous importunities , god will in his due time let them see , that those are no fit means to be used for attaining his ends . . they are no wise statesmen , who own people in tumults to be their friends , commending their courage , zeal , and industry ; which to sober men can seem no better than that of the devil , who goes about seeking whom he may deceive and devour , . it is not alwayes an effect of pusillanimity in a man , for popular terrours to deser● his publick station . . when popular tumults are become as the breaking in of a sea ; for a king to resist at present , threatens imminent danger ; but to withdraw , gives it space to spend its fury , and gains him a sitter time to repair the breach . . a king , by all means to decline a civil war , may in many particulars deny himself , especially haveing no army to flie unto for protetection , or vindication . . a king should resolve to hear reason in all things , and to consent to it so far as he can comprehend it . . when unquiet people with unpassionate representations reflect upon any , not more princely , than friendly contributions , which their king may have granted towards the perpetuating of their happiness , he need not despair of recovering their love and loyalty unto him . . the loyal and cleared affections of mis-led people , will strive to return such retributions of honour and love to their injur'd king , or his posterity , as may fully compensate both the acts of his confidence in and his sufferings for them . . it is the injury of all injuries , wherewith some malicious people load their king , while they calumniate him as a wilfull and resolved occasioner , of his own and his subjects miseries . . a king ought not to repine at an establishment of his own making ; nor endeavour by force and open hostility to undo what by his royal assent he hath done . . a king may have a sense of injuries from his subjects , yet not such , as to think them worth vindicating by a war. . a king is compelled ●● injure him●elf by his subjects , not using favours with the same candor , wherewith they were conferred . . tumults are prone to threaten to abuse all acts of grace , and turn them into wantonness . . their own fears , whose black arts raise up turbulent spirit● ▪ may force them to conjure them down again . . though a king have iustly resented any indignities put upon him , he may be in no capacity to take just revenge in a hostile and warlike way upon those , whom he knowes to be well fortified in the love of the meaner sort of the people . . a king should long for nothing more , than that himself and his subjects may quietly enjoy the fru●ts of his own condescendings . the eighth century . . a king that knowes well the sincerity and uprightness of his own heart , in passing from himself what may exceed the very thoughts of former times , although he seem less a politician to men , yet may need no secret distinctions or evasions before god. . though a king may be content , to recede much from his own interests and personal rights , of which he conceives himself to be master ; yet in what concerns truth , justice , the rights of the church , and his crown , together with the general good of his kindoms ( all which he is bound to preserve as much as morally lies in him ) here he ought to be fixt and resolute . . a king , by no necessity , should be brought to affirm that to men , which in his conscience he denied before god. . for protestants to force their queen , because of the romane religion , to withdraw for her safety , as it will be little to the ador●ing of their profession ; so it may occasion a further alienation of mind , and divorce of affections in her from it . . an afflicted king can give no better instance of a steady affection unto his queen , than by professing himself content to be tossed , weather-beaten , and shipwrackt , so as she may be safe in harbour . . the policy of rebels finds it sometimes necessary to their designs , by scandalous articles , and all irreverent demeanour , to seek to drive their queen out of the kingdom , lest by the influence of her example , eminent for love , as a wife , and loyalty as a subject , she should convert to , or retein in their love and loyalty to their king , all those , whom they have a purpose to pervert . . some acts there are of so rude disloyalty , that a king 's greatest enemies have scarce confidence enough to abet , or own . . rebels that design the destruction of their king , will first make overt essayes , by possessing themselves of towns , how patiently he can bear the loss of his kingdoms . . a good king so injur'd , will be more affected with shame and sorrow for others ; then with anger for himself ; nor will the affront done to him , trouble him so much as their sin , which admits no colour or excuse . . they who have effrontery enough ro commit or countenance , will hardly contein themselves within the compass of one unworthy act , but the hand of that cloud will soon overspread the whole kingdom , and cast all into disorder and darkness . . one act of publick rebellion , may give a wise king to see clearly through all the pious disguises , and soft palliations of some men , whose words , though smoother than oyl , will prove very swords . . against the swords point is the defence of a good conscience . . were it not that the excess of our impotent passions , gave our enemies malice a full impression on our souls , it could not reach very far , nor do us much hurt . . it is observable how god sometimes so pleades and avengeth the cause of an injur'd king , in the eye of the world , that the most willfully blind , cannot avoid the displeasure to see it , and with some remorse and fear to own it , as a mutable stroke and prediction of divine vengeance . . it hath been known , that a leading rebel , unreproached , unthreatned , uncursed , by any language or secret imprecation of the king , only blasted with the conscience of his own wickedness , and falling from one inconstancy to another , no● long after has paid his own and his eldest sons heads , as forfeitures of their disloyalty , to those men , from whom he might have expected another reward , than so to divide their heads from their bodies , whose hearts with them were divided from their king. . a solitary vengeance will no● alwayes serve the turn ; the cutting off one head in a family , is not enough to expiate the asfront done to the head of a common weal. . the eldest son has been known to be involued in the punishment , as he was infected with the sin of the father against the father of his country : root and branch god cuts off in one day . . a king ought not to rejoyce in the ruine of any eminent rebel , ( though it were such as could give the greatest thirst for revenge a full draught , as if executed by them , who first employed him against his soveraign ) but rather pity him , especially if he thinks he acted against the light of his conscience . . signal rebels are not allwayes suffer'd to accomplish their repentance , when they begin to have inclinations toward it , and a reparation of their duty , but fall unhap●ily sometimes into the hands of their justice , who first imployed them , and not the mercy of the king they have offended . . it is no fault in a king , to be as willing to forgive a rebel , as he can ask favour of him . . that gentleman is to be pitied ( even by the king he has offended ) that becomes a notable monument of unprosperous disloyalty , a sad and unfortunate spectacle to the world. . a king should love the inward peace of his conscience , before any outward tranquillity . . some miscariages in government , may escape , rather through ill counsel of some men driving on their private ends , or the peevishness of others envying the publick should be managed without them , or the hidden and insuperable necessities of state , than any propensity of the king himself , either to injuriousness , or oppression . . those rebels must have more confidence in their cannon , then in their gause , whom their king can freely ask , whose innocent bloud during my reign have i shed , to satisfie my lust , anger , or covetousness ? what widows or orphans tears can witness against me , the just cry of which must now be avenged with my own bloud ? . some men are not willing to believe their king , lest they should condemn themselves . . to allay the insolency of tumults , it may conduce , if the king withdraw . . a king is hardly treated , when urged with an army , and constrained either to hazard his own and his kingdoms ruine by his defence , or prostrate his conscience to the blind obedience of those men , whose zealous superstition thinks , or pretends , they cannot do god and the church a greater service , than utterly to destroy that primitive , apostolical , and anciently universal government of the church by bishops . . it is no just occasion taken , to persecute with the injuries of an army , for not suffering tamely the injuries of tumults . . it is no plausible design for importunate subjects to raise an army , either to stop their kings mouth , or force his cconsent . . a king should think his innocency no whit prejudiced , or darkened , in the midst of many unfortunate successes of a civil war on his side . . how untruly a king is charged with the first raising an army , and beginning a civil war , the eyes that only pity him , and the loyal hearts that dare only pray for him , may witness , especially when not so many are on his side , as the men in armes listed against him . . a kings unpreparedness for a civil war , though it may well dishearten those that would help him , while it argues ( truly ) his unwillingness to fight ; yet it testifies for him , that he is set on the defensive part , having so little hopes or power to offend others , that he has none to defend himself , or to preserve what is his own for their proreption . . no man can doubt , but rebbels prevent the king in their purposes , as well as their injuries , who are much aforehand in their preparations against him , and surprisals of his strength . . when men of loyalty are over-awd by the numbers and terrours of the rebellious ; such as are not for the rebels , dare not be for the king. . when rebels prevent their king by surprising his castles , forts , armes and navy , with the militia , it is so far best for him , that it may drive him from putting his trust in the arm of flesh , and wholly to cast himself into the protection of the living god , who can save by few , or none , as well as by many . . it is height of charity and generosity of spirit in a disarmed king , to reckon the want of the militia not so much in reference to his own protection , as his peoples . . the many and sore opressions of loyal subjects may grieve an afflicted king , when he is above his own . . it is a strange method the men must take , who will needs resolve their riddle of making a glorious king , by taking away kingly power . even as if he should become a support to his friends , and a terrour to his enemies , by being unable to succour the one , or suppress the other . . it is a strange design some men have , who propose the new-modelling of soveraignty and kingship , as without any reality of power , so without any necessity of subjection and obedience . . a king should be much willing to bury all jealousies in his people of him , and to live above all jealousies of them , as to himself . . no concession of the king 's , how vast and large soever will be satisfactory to those men who seem enemies not to him only , but to all monarchy , being resolved to transmit to posterity such jealousies of the crown , as they should never permit it to enjoy its just and necessary rights , in point of power . . civility and duty ( no less than justice and honour ) should forbid subjests to ask of their king an alienation of power from himself and his posterity . . a distressed king should by no act of his prejudice or obstruct his successours just recovery of their rights from unjust usurpations and extorsions . . a king under restraint must not be prevail'd with to leave his subjects in a condition wholly desperate for the future , so as by a law to be ever subjected to many factious distractions . . when men have tryed the horrours and malignant in●luence which will certainly follow their king 's inforced darkness and eclipse , they will at length more esteem and welcome the restored glory and blessing of the suns light . . in the conflicts of civil war , and advantages of power , the peoples safety and quiet cannot be effected , but by some side yielding ; to which the greatest love of the publick peace , and the firmest assurance of god's protection ( arising from a good conscience ) may more invite a just and pious king , than can be expected from rebellious mens fears , which arising from the injustice of their actions , ( though never so successfull ) yet dare not adventure their authors upon any other way of safty , than that of the sword and militia . . a good king in civil afflictions is not to think that he can want any thing which providential necessity is pleased to take from him , in order to his peoples tranquillity , and god's glory , whose protection is sufficient for him . . such unreasonable propositions as are inconsistent with being either a king , or a good christian , while he has any mastery of his reason , he cannot consent unto . . for a distressed king to oblige himself by a general and implicite consent , to what ever unreasonable subjects shall desire , or propound , were as if sampson should have consented not only to bind his own hands , and cut off his hair , but to put out his own eyes , that the philistians might with the more safety mock and abuse him , which they chose rather to do , than quite to destroy him , when he was become so tame an object , and ●it occasion for their sport and scorn . . they who pretend to make their addresses in an humble and loyal way of petitioning , by that sufficiently confess their own inferiority , which obligeth them to rest if not satisfied , yet quieted with such an answer , as the will and reason of their superiour thinks sit to give . . a freedom and power to consent , or dissent , belongs to a monarch in reason , as a man , and in honour , as a soveraign king. . for a king to trust to their moderation , who pretend to it , but have it not , and abandon his own discretion , would be to verifie what representations they may have made of him to the world. that he is fitter to be their pupil , than their prince . . a prudent king should not be so confident of his own sufficiency , as not willingly to admit the counsel of others ; nor yet so diffident of himself , as brutishly to submit to any mens dictates , and at once to betray the soveraignty of reason in his soul , and the majesty of his own crown to any of his subjects . . a king ought to have one septenary , or seven years experience of yong statesmen , how well they can govern themselves , before he trusts them with any power to govern his people for him . . a king should be very foolish indeed , and unfaithfull in his trust , to put the reigns of both reason and government , wholly out of his own , into their hands , whose driving is too much like jehu's , and whose forwardness to ascend the throne of supremacy pretends more of phaethon , than of phoebus . . if subjects will take the liberty of sending propositions unto their soveraign , they ought to be such as these . . that any good lawes antiquated by the course of times , or overlay'd by the corruption of maners , may be restored to their vigour and due execution . . that any evil customes praeter-legal , and abuses personal , may be removed , . that if any injuries have been done by the king and others to the commonweal , they may be repaired . . such equable offertures should be tendred to him , wherein the advantages of his crown being considered by them , he may fairly be induced to condescend to what tends to his subjects good , without any great diminution of himself . . such moderate desires of due reformation , of what is indeed amiss in church and state , as may still preserve the foundation and essentials of government in both , not shake and quite overthrow either of them , without any regard to the lawes in force , the wisdom and piety of their ancestors , the ancient and universal practice of christian churches , the rights and priviledges of particular men . . some considerable thing should be offered in lieu or in the room of what they would have destroyed , which may at once reach the good end of the others institution , and also supply its pretended defects , reformits abuses , and satisfie sober and wise men , not with soft and specious words , pretending zeal and special piety , but with pregnant and solid reasons both divine and humane , which may justifie the abruptness and necessity of vast alterations . . a king cannot be well counsell'd by his parliament , if in the members of it , there be not so much learning , reason , religion , and just moderation , as to know how to sever betweem the use and the abuse of things , the institution , and the corruption , the government , and the misgovernment , the primitive patterns and the alterations or blottings of after-copies . . though armies of souldiers may prevail against a king's person , yet armies of unreasonable propositions which they would enforce , should never overcome him further than he sees cause , it behoving him not to look at their number and power , so much , as to weigh their reason and justic● . . it is hard at first either to discern the rise , or apply the remedy to a precipitant rebellion . . in civil wars and massacres , the sea of bloud cruelly and barbarously shed , is enough to drown any man in ete●nal both infamy and misery , whom god finds the malicious authour or instigatour of its effusion . . it is a most unhappy advantage to some mens malice against their king , that when they bave impudence enough to lay any thing to his charge , any bloudy opportunity should be offer'd them , with which he must be aspersed , although nothing can be more abhorred to him , than what is full of sin against god , disloyalty to himself , and destructive to his subjects . . the blame of bloudy and rebellious protestants must needs he greater than that of papists , by how much their principles are more for obedience to princes . . the goodness of mens intentions will not excuse the scandal and contagion of their examples . . the king's interest ties as much in the common welfare of his subjects , as some mens doth in their perturbations . . although a king can with truth wash his hands in innocency as to any guilt in a commotion objected to him , yet he should wash them in his tears , at the sad apprehensions he ought to have , to see it spread so far , and make such waste . . distractions and jealousies at home , make most men who are better politicians than christians , rather intent to their own safety , or to the designs they are driving , than to the relief of their fellow subjects abroad , though every day inhumanly butchered and massacred , whose tears and bloud might , if nothing else , quench , or at least for a time repress and smother any sparks of civil dissensions and jealousies , which some men industriously scatter in the kingdom where they are . . they who themselves have rebellious intentions or inclinations , are unwilling to part with their king upon any hazardous expedition , though to the suppressing that force which opposeth their interest , being either afraid he should have any one kingdom quieted ; or being loth to shoot at any mark less than him ; or that any should have the glory of his destruction but themselves . . next to the sin of those who begin a rebellion , theirs must needs be who either hinder the speedy suppressing of it by domestick dissentions , or divert the aids , or exasperate the rebbels to the most desperate resolutions and actions , by threatning all extremities not only to the known heads and chief incendiaries , but even to the whole community of a nation , resolving to destroy root and branch , men , women , and children , without any regard to those usual pleas for mercy , which conquerours not wholly barbarous are wont to hear from their own breasts , in behalf of those , whose opressive faces , rather than their malice engaged them ; or whose imbecillity for sex and age was such , as they could neither lift up a ●and against them , nor distinguish between their right hand and their left . . preposterous and unevangelical was that zeal of the rebuked disciples , who would go no lower in their revenge , than to call for fire from heaven upon whole cities , for the repulse or neglect of a few ; as was that of jacobs sons , whom the father both blamed and cursed for it . and so is theirs who are for utter extirpation of all , and more than all that have opposed them , that will extinguish a nation for the misdemeanours and injuries of a provoked and incensed party . . even in the case of rebellion , moderate remedies are rather to be applied than extreme severity , such as may punish some with exemplary justice , yet disarm others with tenders of mercy upon their submission , and the king's protection of them from furious and factious persons , though met in parliament , who would soon drown them , if they refused to swim down the popular stream with them . . a king hath enough to do to look to his own conscience , and the faithfull discharge of his trust . he has no leisure to make prolix apologies against injurious calumnies and reproaches . . a king that can hear with patience as bad as his worst enemies can falsly say , may hope still to do better than they deserve or desire he should . . by great effusions of subjects bloud in civil wars , no man is so much weakened as their king. . which king may hope , though mens unsatiable cruelty never will , yet the mercy of god will at length say to his justice , it is enough . . when god's mercifull justice intends not the utter confusion , but the cure ; the abatement of mens sins , not the desolating of nations , he will command the sword of civil wars to sheath it self . . a king of divers nations , may incurre the the censure or misconstruction of one , while he gratifies the active spirits among them of the other , so far as that he seems to many , to prefer the desires of that party , before his own interest and honour . . religion and liberty are common and vulgar flourishes , to disguise an other errand of that army , which invades their own kings territories , to make him and his church to write after them and theirs , though it were in bloudy characters . . presbytery seeks to suppress and render odious , under the names of sects , schisms , or heresies , several parties , which if they can get but numbers , strength and opportunity , may according to presbyteries opinion and pattern set up their wayes by the like methods of violence , representing a wonderful necessity thereof to avoid the further miseries of war , which they may first begin , and engage themselves to continue , until they obtain their end . . when god hath first taken us off from the folly of our opinions , and fury of our passion , he hath many wayes to teach us those rules of true reason , and peaceable wisdome , which is from above , tending most to his glory , and his church's good . . they that have any true touches of conscience , will not endeavour to carry on the best designs , ( much less such as are , and will be daily more apparently factious and ambitious ) by any unlawfull means , under the title of a covenant . . ties by leagues and covenants are either superfluous and vain , when men were sufficiently tied before ; or fraudulent and injurious , if by such after-ligaments they find the imposers really ayming to dissolve or suspend their former just and necessary obligations . . factious men , to whom it is enough if they get but the reputation of a seeming encrease to their party , little romember , that god is not mocked . . against the church , the king , or the publick peace , no mans lawfull calling can engage him . . the so●● and servile temper of some divines , dispose them in alterations of religion and government to sudden acting and compliance , contrary to their former judgments , profession and practise . . no man should be more forward than a king himself to carry on all due reformation , with mature judgment , and a good conscience in what things he shall ( after impartial advice ) be by god's word and right reason , convinced to be amiss . . crowns and kingdoms have a period with the life of their king : but reputation and honour may survive to a glorious kind of immortality , when he is dead and gone . . a king should never permit the malice of his enemies to deprive him of that comfort , which his confidence in the generality of his people gives him . . what a king may bear from foreign enemies , he cannot so well from his own subjects , who next his children are dear unto him . . nothing could give a king more cause to suspect and search his own innocency , than when he observes many who made great professions of singular piety forward to engage against him . . when many professours of singular piety engage with persons that take arms against their king , it gives to vulgar minds so bad a reflection upon him and his cause , as if it had been impossible to adhere to him , and not with all part from god , to think or speak well of him , and not to blaspheme god. . truly learned and religious men will endeavour to be so well satisfied in the cause of their injur'd king's sufferings , as that they may chose rather to suffer with him , than forsake him. . when popular preachers ( though but in hypocrisie and falshood ) urge religious pretensions against their king , it is not strange that the same to many well-minded men should be a great temptation to oppose him. . when a king useth the assistance of subjects of a different profession from him , they are most ready to interpret it a sighting against religion , who least of all men care whom they imploy , or what they say and do , so they may prevail . . so eager are some men in giving their soveraign better counsel , than what they pretend he hath before heark'ned to , that they will not give him leave to take it with freedom , as a man , nor honour , as a king. . no men should be more willing to complain , than the king be to redress what he sees in reason to have been either done , or advis'd amiss . . they who of pretended sufferers become zealous actors in persecution , deprive themselves of the comfort and reward , whatsoever they before expected . . the noise and ostentation of liberty , is the design and artifice some men use to withdraw the peoples affections from their king. . a good king should be so far from desiring to oppress , as not to envy his subjects that liberty , which is all he ought desire to enjoy himself , viz. to will nothing , but according to reason , lawes and religion . . lords and gentlemen which assist their king in a civil war , would not be so prodigal of their liberties , if they suspected he would infringe them , as with their lives and fortunes to help on the inslaving of themseves and their posterities . . as to civil importunities none but such as desire to drive on their ambitious and covetous design over the ruines of church and state , prince , peers , and people , will ever desire greater freedom than good lawes allow . the ninth century . . such men as thirst after novelties , or despair to relieve the necessities of their fortunes , or satisfie their ambition in peaceable times , become principal impulsives to popular commotions . . rebels will blast the best government of the best king with all the odious reproaches which impotent malice can invent , and expose him to all those contempts , which may most diminish the majesty of a king , and encrease the ungratefull insolencies of his people . . a king who is well assured that his innocency is clear before god , in point of any calumnies rebellious subjects do object , may prophesie , that his reputation shall like the sun ( after owles and bats have had their freedom in the night and darker times ) rise and recover it self to such a degree of spendour , as those feral birds shall be grieved to behold , and unable to bear . . a king cannot so much suffer in point of honour by rude and scandalous pamphlets , as those men do , who having power , and pretending to so much piety , are so forgetfull of their duty to god and him , as not to vindicate the majesty of their king against any of those , who contrary to the precept of god , and precedents of angels , speak evil of dignities , and bring railing accusations against those who are honoured with the name of gods. . they will easily contemn such shadows of god as kings are , who reverence not that supreme and adorable majesty , in comparison of whom all the glory of men and angels is but obscurity . . they who seek to gain reputation with the vulgar for their extraordinary parts and piety , must needs undo whatever was formerly setled never so well and wisely . . i could never see any reason , why any christian should abhor , or be forbidden to use the same forms of prayer , since he prayes to the same god , believes in the same saviour , professeth the same truths , reads the same scriptures , hath the same duties upon him , and feels the same daily wants , for the most part both inward and outward , which are common to the whole church . . a serious sense of that inconvenience in the church which unavoidably followes every mans several maner of officiating , no doubt , first occasioned the wisdom and piety of the ancient churches , to remedy those mischiefs by the use of constant liturgies of publick composure . . it was either the tumultuariness of people , or the factiousness and pride of presbyters , or the covetousness of some states and princes , that of late years gave occasion to some mens wits to invent new models of church-government , and proposed them under the specious titles of christs government , scepter and kingdom , the better to serve their turns to whom the change was beneficial . . as the full and constant testimony of all histories may sufficiently convince unbiased men , that the primitive churches were undoubtedly governed by the apostles and their immediate successours , the first and best bishops : so it cannot in reason or charity be supposed , that all churches in the world should either be ignorant of the rule by them prescribed , or so soon deviate from their divine and holy pattern . . since the first age , for years , not one example can be produced of any setled church wherein were many ministers and congrations , which had not some bishop above them , under whose jurisdiction and government they were . . use is the great arbitratour of words , and master of language . . not only in religion , but also in right reason , and the true nature of governments , it cannot be thought that an orderly subordination among presbyters , or ministers , should be any more against christianity , than it is in all secular and civil governments , where parity breeds confusion and faction . . i can no more believe that such order is inconsistent with true religion , than good features are with beauty , or numbers with harmony . . it is not likely , that god who appointed several orders , and a prelacy , in the government of his church , among the jewish priests , should abhor , or forbid them , among christian ministers , who have as much of the principles of schism and division as other men . . i conceive it was not the favour of princes , or ambition of presbyters , but the wisdom and piety of the apostles , that first setled bishops in the church ; which authority they constantly used , and injoyed in those times which were purest for religion , though sharpest for persecution . . tyranny becomes no christians , least of all churchmen . . the late reformed churches whose examples are obtruded for not retaining bishops , the necessity of times and affairs rather excuseth , than commendeth for their inconformity to all antiquity . . i could never see any reason , why churches orderly reformed and governed by bishops , should be forced to conform to those few , rather than to the catholick example of all ancient churches , which needed no reformation . . it is no point of wisdom or charity , where christians differ ( as many do in some points ) there to widen the differences , and at once to give all the christian world ( except a handfull of some protestants ) so great a scandal in point of church-government , as to change it ; whom though you may convince of their errours in some points of doctrine , yet you shall never perswade them , that to compleat their reformation , they must necessarily desert , and wholly cast off , that government , which they , and all before them , have ever owned as catholick , primitive , and apostolical . . never schismaticks , nor hereticks , ( except the arians ) have strayed from the unity and conformity of the church in point of government , ever having bishops above presbyters . . among those that have endeavoured or effected a change in the government of the church , such as have rendred themselves guilty of inconstancy , cause a great prejudice against their novelty in the opinion of their king , whose consent they would have . . their facility and levity is never to be excused , whose learning or integrity cannot in charity be so far doubted , as if they understood not what before they did , or as if they conformed to episcopal government contrary to their consciences , and yet the same men , before ever the point had any free and impartial debate , contrary to their former oaths and practice , against their obedience to their lawes in force , and against their kings consent , have not only quite cried down the government by bishops , but have approved and encouraged the violent and most illegal stripping bishops and other churchmen of all their due authority and revenues , the selling away , and utter alienation of those church lands from any ecclesiastical uses . . the desertors of episcopacy will at last appear the greatest enemies to , and betrayers of , their own interest , whose folly will become a punishment unto it self . for , . presbytery is never so considerable or effectual , as when it is joyned to , and crowned with episcopacy . . those secular additamen●● and ornaments of authority , civil honour and estate , which christian princes in all countryes have annexed to bishops and church men , are to be lookt upon but as just reward● of their learning and piety , who are fit to be in any degree of church-government ; also enablements to works of charity and hospitality , meet strenthnings of their authority in point of respect , and observance . . i would have such men bishops , as are most worthy of those encouragements , and be ablest to use them . . a kings good intention , whose judgment faild at any time , makes his errour venial . . it is neither just for subjects , nor pious for christians , by violents and indignities , with servile restraints to seek to force their king and soveraign , against the well-laid gounds of his judgment , to consent to any their weak and divided novelties , touching the government of the church . . i could never see any probable shew in true reason and in scripture for the government of the church otherwise than by bishops , the greatest pretenders of a different sense , either contenting themselves with the examples of some churches in their infancy and solitude , when one presbyter might serve one congregation , in a city or countrey ; or else denying these most evident truths : . that the apostles were bishops over those presbyters they ordained , as well as over the churches they planted . . that government being necessary for the churches wellbeing , when multiplied and sociated , must also necessarily descend from the apostles to others , after the example of that power and superiority they had above others , which could not end with their persons , since the use and ends of such government still continue . . ignorance , superstition , a●varice , revenge , with other disorderly and disloyal passions , have so blown up some mens minds against episcopal government in the church , that what they want of reasons or primitive patterns , they supply with violence and oppression . . some mens zeal for bishops lands , houses , and revenues , hath set them on work to eat up episcopacy . . a king solemnly obliged by an oath , agreable to his judgment , to preserve episcopal government , and the rights of the church , hath a particular engagement , above other men , so to do . . the said king being daily by the best disquisition of truth , more confirmed in the reason and religion of that to which he is sworn , no man that wisheth not his damnation , can perswade him at once to so notorious and combined sins , as those of sacriledg and perjury , in parting with episcopacy . . men of ambitious covetousness and secrilegious cruelty , will torture with their king , both church and state , in civil dissentions , till ( if he have not an invincible resolution ) he shall not be forced to consent and declare , that he does approve what ( god knowes ) he utterly dislikes , and in his soul abhors . . should a king , pressed by imperious subjects , shamefully and dishonouraly give his consent to any bold demand , against reason , justice , and religion ; yet should he not by so doing , satisfie the divided interests and opinions of those parties ( if any such be among them ) which contend with each other , as well as both against him. . the abuses of episcopacy deserve to be extirpated as much as the use retained . . a right episcopacy doth at once satisfie all just desires and interests of good bishops , humble presbyters , and sober people ; so as church-affairs should be managed neither with tyranny , parity , nor popularity ; neither bishops ejected , nor presbyters despised , nor people oppressed . . a king that can seldom get opportunities to treat with subjects in armes against him , should yet never want either desire or disposition to it , having greater considence of his reason than his sword. . a king should very unwillingly be compelled to defend himself with arms against his subjects , and very willingly embrace any thing tending unto peace . . no success should ever enhaunce with a king the price of peace between him and his subjects , which should be as earnestly desired by him as any man , though he be like to pay dearer than any man for it , so he reserve his honour and his conscience . . a king should condescend to the desires of his subjects as far as reason , honour and conscience will give him leave , having special regard to those differences that are essential to the security or prosperity of his people . to deny some other demands , may be the greatest justice to himself , and favour to his subjects . . a king willing to condescend to the setling of church-affairs , so as he may give satisfaction to all men , must have a care not to comply with such whom faction , covetousness , or superstition , may have engaged more than any true zeal , charity , or love of reformation . . although a king may be content to yield to all that may seem to advance true piety ; yet he must seek to continue what is necessary in point of order , maintenance , and authority to the church's government , especially if he be perswaded that it is most agreable to the true principles of all government raised to its full stature and perfection , as also to the primitive apostolical pattern , and the practise of the universal church conform thereto . . the king is very excusable both before god and all unpassionate men , for the distance between him and subjects in arms against him , that in treaties and transactions , endeavoureth no less the restauration of peace to his people , than the preservation of his own crowns to his posterity . . if such treaties give occasion to any mans further restiveness , it is imputable to their own depraved tempers , not to any concessions or negations of their king , who has alwayes the content of what he offered , and they the regret and blame for what they refused . . a king may presage the unsuccessfulness of any treaty with his subjects , among whom he finds an unwillingness to treat , that implying some things to be gained by the sword , whose unreasonableness they are loth to have fairly scanned , being more proper to be acted by soldiers , than by counselors . . when god gives a king victory over his subjects in armes against him , it is to try him , that he may know how with moderation and thanks , to own and use his power , who is the only true lord of hosts , able when he pleases , to repress the confidence of those who fight against him , though with great advantage for power and numbers . . a king , who for small beginnings on his part at length is attended on by an army , wherewith ▪ he may encounter his rebellious subjects , has this comfort , that he is not wholly forsaken by his peoples love , or gods protection . . when god at any time permits the same king to be worsted by his enemies , it is to exercise his patience , and teach him not to trust in the arme of flesh , but in the living god. . they who fight against their king , are forced to slie to the shifts of some pretended fears , and wild fundamentals of state ( as they use to call them ) which actually overthrow the present fabrick both of church and state. . the imaginary reasons which rebels alledg for self defence , are commonly most impertinent , and such as will fit any faction that hath but power and confidence enough to second with the sword all their demands against the present lawes and governours . . lawes and governours can never be such as some side or other will not find fault with , so as to urge what they call a reformation of them to a rebellion against them . . they are parasitick preachers , that dare call those martyrs , who died fighting against their king , the lawes , their oaths , and right religion established . for , . sober christians know , than the glorious title of martyr can with truth be applied only to those who seriously prefer god's truth and their duty , in all the foresaid particulars , before their lives , and all that is dear to them in this world. . the wounds and temporal ruines of those loyal subjects who are slain in civil wars , serve as a gracious opportunity for their eternal health and happiness , while the evident approach of death , through god's grace , effectually disposeth their hearts to such humility , faith and repentance , which together with the rectitude of their engagement fully prepares them for a better life than that which their enemies brutish and disloyal firceness can deprive them of , or without repentance hope to enjoy . . those rebels who may have often the better against their king's side in the field , will never have so at the bar of god's tribunal , or their own consciences . . the condition of loyal subjects ( in a civil war ) though conquered , and dying for their king , no question is infinitely more to be chosen by a sober man ( that duly values his duty , his soul , and eternity , beyond the enjoyments of this present life ) than the most triumphant glory , wherein their and their kings enemies supervive , who can hardly avoid to be daily tormented by that horrid guilt , wherewith their suspicious , or convicted consciences do pursue them . . in the safety and preservation of a king and good lawes established all honest men , cannot but think the wellfare of their country to consist . . not any shews , or truth of piety on their side who take armes against their king , are sufficient to dispense with , or expiate , the defects of their duty and loyalty to him , which have so pregnant convictions on mens consciences , that even profaner men are moved by the sense of them to venter their lives for him. . when providence gives a good king , or denies him victory , his desire should be neither to boast of his power , nor to charge god foolishly ; but to believe that at last he will make all things to work together for his good . . a king 's often messages for peace with his subjects , will shew that he delighteth not in war ; as his gracious concessions will sufficiently testifie , how willingly he would have prevented it ; and his total unpreparedness for it , how little he intended it . . when king and subjects are once engaged in a civil war , it may be too late to review the occasions thereof , but not to wish a happy conclusion of so unhapy beginnings ; nor to believe that the inevitable fate of their sins was such as would no longer suffer the divine justice to be quiet . . a king is not to desire that any man should be further subject to him , than he and all his people may be subject to god. . the passions and opinions of men , are not to be gratified with partiality , and popular compliance to the detriment of the publick , and scandal of religion . . it is a sad spectacle for all sober men and their soveraign , to behold the dissolutions of all order and government in a church ; many novelties , and schisms , and corrupt opinions ; many undecencies and confusions in sacred administrations all sacrilegious invasions upon the rights and revenues of a church ▪ much contempt and oppression of the clergy ; many injurious diminutions and persecutings of the king , to follow ( as showers do warm gleams ) the talk of reformation , which yet has been a known artifice to disguise some mens effecting all the fore-mentioned mischief , who have pretended authority , and been possessed of power to accomplish it . . the studies to please some parties , whose fury is accompted zeal , may injure all . . a king may offer to put all differences in church-affairs and religion to the free consultation of a synod or convocation rightly chosen , the results of whose counsels as they will include the votes of all ; so it s like they may give most satisfaction to all . . an assembly of divines applied ( though by a parliament ) in an unwonted way , to advise of church-affairs , being not legally convened and chosen , not acting in the name of all the clergy of a kingdom ; not doing any thing with freedom and impartiality ; being limited , and confined , if not overaw'd , to do and declare what they do , is to be so far disliked , nor can it be accounted the representative of a church . . many men cried up for learning and piety , met together in an assembly , being not left to the liberty of their own suffrages , have been prevail'd upon by the influence of contrary factions , who made secret encroachments of hopes and fears , to comply with great and dangerous innovations in the church , without any regard to their own former judgment and practise , or to the common interest and honour of the clergy , and in them of order , learning , and religion , against examples of all ancient churches , the lawes in force , and their soveraign's consent . . a king's consent ought never to be gained in any point against a pregnant light that shines in his understanding . . a due reformation will easily follow moderate counsels , and give content even to many divines who have been led on with much gravity and formality , to carry on other mens designs , which they may discover , though they dare not but smother their frustrations and discontents . . the specious and popular titles of christ's government , throne , scepter and kingdom , also the noise of a through reformation , may as easily be fined on new models , as fair colours may be put to ill-favoured figures . . christ's kingdom certainly is not divided nor hath two faces , as some reforming parties have had at least . . the breaking of church-windows , which time had sufficiently defaced : . the putting down of crosses , which were but civil , not religious marks : . the defacing of monuments , and inscriptions of the dead , which served but to put posterity in mind to thank god for that clearer light wherein they live : . the leaving of ministers to their liberties , and private abilities in the publick service of god , where no christian can tell to what he may say amen , nor what adventure he may make of seeming , at least , to consent to the errours , blasphemies , and ridiculous undecencies , which bold and ignorant men list to vent in their prayers , preaching , and other offices : . the setting forth of old catechisms , and confessions of faith new-drest , importing as much as if there had been no sound or clear doctrine of faith in the church , before a long consultation had matured their thoughts touching the first principles of religion . all these , and the like , are the effects of poular , specious , and deceitfull reformations . . it were to be wished , that some most pretending reformers had made it their unanimous work , to do god's work , and not their own ; they had not ( as now they have ) left all things more deformed , than when they began , in point of piety , morality , charity , and good order . . they who think that the government of a church and state , fixed by many lawes and long customs , will not run into their new molds , endeavour to melt it first in the fire of a civil war , by the advantages of which they resolve , if they prevail , to make their king and all his subjects fall down and worship the images they shall form and set up . . christ's government will confirm the king's , not overthrow it , if as he owns his from christ , so he desires to rule for his glory , and his churches good . . had some men truly intended christ's government , or known what is meant in their hearts , they could never have been so ill governed in their words and actions , both against their king , and one another . . the freedom and secresie of a king 's private letters , especially unto his queen , commands a civility from all men , nor is there any thing more inhumane , than to expose them ( if taken ) to publick view . . the king that studies to approve his heart to god's omniscience , may be content ( if providence will have it so ) that even his private letters , if taken by his subjects in arms against him , should be discovered to the world , though without any those dresses , or popular captations which some of them use in their speeches and expressions . . unquiet subjects , many times take armes against a just , prudent , and innocent king , into whose most retired thoughts , if they could by any means have a clear sight , they might discover how they are divided between the love and care he hath , not more to preserve his own rights , than to procure their peace and happiness , and an extreme grief to see them both deceived and destroyed . . no man can blame a king that by all fair and just correspondencies endeavours to avoid the pressures of his enemies , though his own subjects . . some mens design , like absoloms , is by enormous actions to widen differences between a king and his subjects , and exasperate all sides to such distances , as may make all reconciliation desperate . . a king under the misfortune of having his letters taken by subjects in armes against him , hath much quiet and satisfaction within himself , when the integrity of his intentions is not jealous of any injury his expressions can do them ; for , . although the confidence of privacy may admit of greater freedom in writing letters , which may be liable to envious exceptions ; yet it is best for a king , when the innocence of his chief purposes , cannot be so stained or misinterpreted by his enemies , as not to let all men see , that he wisheth nothing more than a happy composure of differences with justice and honour , not more to his own than his peoples content , who have any sparks of love , or loyalty , left in them . . it repaireth somewhat a king's misfortune , that his private letters being taken by his subjects in armes against him , cannot gratifie their malice , further than to let them see his constancy to his wife , the lawes , and right religion he professeth ; as likewise to convince them , that he can both mind , and act his own and his kingdoms affairs , so as becomes a prince ; especially , if his enemies have before been very loath it should be believed of him ; as if he were wholly confined to the dictates and directions of others , whom they please to brand with the names of evil counsellours . . it is the policy of rebels , to seek by all means to smother and extinguish all sparkes of love , respect and loyalty of the people to their king , that they may never kindle again so as to recover his , the lawes , and the kingdoms liberties , which they seek to overthrow . . god's unerring and impartial justice can , and will over-rule the most perverse wills and designs of men . he is able , and will turn even the worst of an innocent king's enemies thoughts , and actions to his good . . civility and humanity most become such as pretend to religion , which they ought to pay to all men , beside that respect and honour they owe to their king. . they who do but remember how god blest the modest respect , and filial tenderness , which noah's sons bare to their father , can never expect the divine approbation of any their undecent actions toward their king. . their malicious intentions can never be either excusable , or prosperous , who think by any unhandsome means to expose their king to the highest reproach and contempt of his people , forgetting that duty of modest concealment ; which they owe to the father of their countrey , in case they should discover any real uncomeliness . . they who by publishing their king 's private letters think to render him as a vile person , not fit to be trusted , or considered under any notion of majesty , will see themselves mistaken , when god makes him , as he did david , more respected in the hearts of many , who become better satisfied by knowing what he writ , than by learning what they maliciously interpret and report . . although god gives kingdoms , yet sometimes his providence permits that the king hath not any place left in them , where he may with safety and honour rest his head : shewing him , that himself is the safest refuge , and the strongest tower of defence , in which he may put his trust . . a king in extremities should look not to man so much as to god , who will have it so , that he may wholly cast himself and his distressed affairs upon god's mercy , who hath both hearts and hands of all men in his dispose . . necessity may sometimes command a king to withdraw from his chiefest strength , and adventure upon their loyalty , who first began his troubles , whom god happily may make a means honourably to compose them . when necessity constrains a king to cast himself upon them , who though they besiege him in his garrison , and encounter him in the field , yet profess , they fight not against him , but for him ; he puts himself to resolve the riddle of their loyalty , and gives them opportunity to let the world see , they mean not what they do , but what they say . . god sees it sometimes not enough to desert a king of all military power to defend himself , but to put him upon using their power , who seem to fight against him , yet ought in duty to defend him . . when a king finds it necessary to leave those that have adhered to him , he may hope such a method of peace may be more prosperous than that of war , both to stop the effusion of blood , and the wounds that were made before . . a king should never trust any nation of his subjects further than to men , that if they betray him , he may justifie to all the world they have not deceiv'd him : and if they sell him at any dear rate , he should be only sorry that his price should be so much above his saviours . the tenth century . . god sometimes sees t is fit to deprive a king of wife , children , army , friends , and freedom , that he may be wholy his , who alone is all . . a king should never permit them who have got his person , to gain his consent against his conscience . . a king's denial of unjust demands made by subjects in armes against him , which they call obstinacy , he may know god acounts honest constancy , which reason and religion , as well a honour , forbid him to recede . . it is evident sometimes , that subjects , who pretend to fight against evil counsellours with their king , , fight indeed against a good conscience within him : and whatsoever they may say of course , intend not to bring him to his parliament , till they have brought his mind to their obedience . . after-times may see what the blindness of that age will not , wherein is both practis'd and countenanced subjects fighting against their soveraign , whom , if they have a good king , god may at length shew , that he chuseth rather to suffer for them , than with them . . when providence is pleased to deprive a king of all other civil comforts , and secular attendants , the absence of them all may best be supplied by the attendance of such his chaplains , whom for their functions he reverenceth , and for their fidelity may have cause to love . . as a king never needs , so he should never desire more the service and assistance of clergy-men judiciously pious , and soberly devout , than when by misfortune sequesterd from civil comforts , and secular attendants . . a distressed king cannot think some divines , though he respects them for that worth and piety which may be in them , proper to be his present comforters and physicions , who have had a great influence in occasioning the publick calamities in his kingdoms , and inflicting the wounds he hath upon himself . . the spirits of those divines , whose judgments stand at a distance from their king , or in jealousie of him , or in opposition against him , cannot so harmoniously accord with his , or his with theirs , either in prayer , or other holy duties , as is meet and most comfortable , whose golden rule , and bond of perfection , consists in that of mutual love and charity . . the king , who is much a friend to all church-men , that have any thing in them beseeming that sacred function , will , if there be cause , hazard his own interest upon conscience and constancy to maintain their rights . . such clergy-men who so unhandsomely requite their king , as to desert him in his calamity , when their loyalty and constancy is most required , may live to repent no less for his sufferings , than their own ungratefull errours , and that injurious contempt and meanness which they bring upon their calling and persons . . an afflicted king , though he pities all clergy-men that desert him , and despiseth none of a different opinion from his , yet sure he may take leave to make choise of some for his special attendants , who are best approved in his judgment , and most sutable to his affection . . a king imprisoned by his subjects , to whom they will not permit the attendance of his chaplains , can make no more charitable construction of their denial , than that they esteem him sufficient himself to discharge his duty to god as a priest , though not to men as a prince . . i think both offices , regal and sacerdotal , might well become the same person , as anciently they were under one name , and the united rights of primogeniture . . a king cannot follow better presidents , if he be able , than those two eminent david and solemon , not more famous for their scepter and crowns , than one was for devout psalms and prayers ; the other for his divine parables and preaching ; whence the one merited and assumed the name of a prophet , the other a preacher , titles of greater honour , where rightly placed , than any of those the roman emperours affected from the nations they subdued . but , . since the order of god's wisdome and providence , hath for the most part alwayes distinguished the gifts and offices of kings and priests ; of princes and preachers , both in the jewish and christian churches , an imprisoned king may be sorry to find himself reduced to the necessity of being both , or injoying neither . . as a soveraign owes his clergy the protection of a christian king ; so he should desire to enjoy from them the benefit of their gifts and prayers . . however , as the spiritual government , by which the devout soul is subject to christ , and through his merits daily offers it self and its services to god , every private believer is a king and priest , invested with the honour of a royal priesthood , yet he is not thereby constituted priest or preacher , as to the outward polity of the church . . a king's consciousness to his spiritual defects , may make him more prize and desire those pious assistances which , especially in any his exigencies , holy and good ministers , either bishops or presbyters , may afford him . . the king is reduced to great extremities , to whom by god's pleasure and permission to his subjects , nothing is left but his life for them to take from him ; and nothing more to desire of them , which might little seem to provoke their jealousies and offence to deny him , ( as some have done ) than this of having some means afforded him , for his souls comfort and support . . when a king , reduced to extremity by his subjects , makes choice of chaplains to assist him , that are men no way scandalous , and every way eminent for their learning and piety , no less than for their loyalty , no exceptions imaginable can be made against them , but only this , that they may seem too able , and too well affected toward him and his service . . a king should count his misfortunes the greater by far , when they light also upon the young prince his son , and any others whom he may have cause to love so well as himself : and of whose unmerited sufferings he should have a greater sense than of his own . . the different education of princes , hath different success when they come to exercise their government : the evidence of which holy writ affords us in the contemplation of david and rehoboam : the one prepared by many afflictions for a flourishing kingdom ; the other softned by the unparallel'd prosperity of solomon's court , and so by flatteries corrupted to the great diminution both of peace , honour , and kingdom . . a distressed king may trust , that god will graciously direct all the black lines of affliction , which he pleaseth to draw on him to the centre of true happiness , if by them he be drawn neerer of god. . when a yong prince shall attain the crown whereof his father was injuriously devested ; he ought first to do justice to god , his own soul , and his church , in the profession and prosecution both of truth and unity in religion ; the next main hinge on which his prosperity will depend and move being that of civil justice , he is to administer to his people . . when a good king is persecuted by his own subjects for the preservation of a right religion and just lawes established , he may ( without vanity ) turn the reproach of his sufferings , as to the world's censure , into the honour of a kind of martyrdome , as to the testimony of his own conscience . . since a distressed king knowes not how god will deal with him , as to a removal of the pressures and indignities which his justice , even by the very unjust hands of some of his own subjects may have been pleased to lay upon him , he should not be much solicitous , what wrong he suffers from man , while he retains in his soul what he believes is right before god. . in civil dissentions between king and subjects , though he offer all for reformation and safely that in reason , honour and conscience he can ; yet he must reserve whatsoever he cannot consent unto , without an irreparable injury to his own soul , the chruch , and his people , and the next undoubted heir of his kingdoms . . no difficulties are insuperable to divine providence . . when a yong prince , after his fathers decease , comes to the government of kingdoms , which tumults and civil wars had put into disorder , he ought seriously to consider the former real or objected miscariages which might occasion his troubles , that so he may avoid his own . . by the sun-shine of god's mercy , and the splendour of a princes virtues , whole mountains of congealed factions may be thawed and dissipated . . acts of indempnity and oblivion should by an indulgent king be offered to so great a latitude , as may include all that can but suspect themselves to be any way obnoxious to the lawes , and which may serve to exclude all future jealousies and insecurities . . if god see fit to restore an injur'd king to the enjoyment of his kingdoms , he ought then to let the prince his son fully understand the things that belong to god's glory , his own honour , and the kingdoms peace . . a charitable king , though injur'd by his subjects , for the future peace of his kingdoms , should encourage the prince his successour to be as confident as himself , that the most part of all sides , who have done amiss , have done so not out of malice , but misinformation or misapprehension of things . . whatsoever good the royal father intended to church , or state , in times uncapable of it , should be performed by the prince his son , when possessed of his kingdom and power . . it is a prayer and benediction worthy of an afflicted king that god would after his decease so bless the prince his son and successour , as to establish his kingdoms in righteousness , his soul in true religion , and his honour in the love of god and his people . . though god permit disloyalty to be perfected by the destruction of a king ; yet he may make his memory and name live ever in his son , as of his father that lov'd him , and a king under whom his kingdoms flourished for a time . . a king in affliction should believe god's power , and have hope of his will to restore him to his rights , despairing neither of his mercy , nor of his peoples love and pity . . although a king 's domestick enemies use all the the poyson of falsity , and violence of hostility to destroy first the love and loyalty which is in his subjects ; and then all that content of life in him , which from these he chiefly enjoyed ; yet they may fail of their end , and after the many deaths the king suffers for the good will of his people , he may not be wholly dead , till their further malice and cruelty take that little of life too , the husk and shell ( as it were ) which they had only left him. . although that a king must die as a man , is certain ; that he may die a king by the hands of his own subjects , a violent , sodain , barbarous death , in the strength of his years , in the midst of his kingdoms , his friends and loving subjects being helpless spectatours ; his enemies insolent revilers and triumphers over him , living , dying , and dead ; may sometimes be probable in humane reason , nought else being to be hoped for , as to mans cruelty ; yet he is not to despair of god's infinite mercy . . it is not easie for a depressed king to contend with those many horrours of death , wherewith god may suffer him to be tempted ; which may be equally horrid , either in the suddenness of a barbarous assasination , or in the solemn cruelty of an unjust sentence , and publick execution . . a king under such a sad apprehension , must humbly desire to depend upon god , and to submit to his will both in life and death , in what order soever he is pleased to lay them out to him . . all soveraigns are obliged to own god as king of kings , not only for the eminency of his power and majesty above them , but also for that singular care and protection which he hath over them , in the many dangers they are expos'd unto . . god many times so pleads the cause of that king which he permits to be in the power of disloyal and bloudy-minded subjects , that he shewes him the sad confusions following his destruction presaged and confirmed to him , by those he lives to see in his troubles ; and god gives his enemies cause to fear , that he will both further divide , and by mutual vengeance afterward destroy them . . it may be the king's comfort who is wronged , and dethroned by his subjects , that god gives him not only the honour to imitate christ's example in suffering for righteousness sake , though obscured by the foulest charges of tyranny and injustice , but the charity both to forgive them , and pray for them , that god would not impute his bloud to them , further than to convince them what need they have of christ's bloud to wash their souls from the guilt of shedding his . . the unfortunate king that sees himself destin'd to be murther'd by his cruel subjects , may bless god , if he has the heart to pray , not so much that the bitter cup of a violent death may pass from him , as that of his wrath may pass from all those whose hands by deserting him are sprinkled , or by acting and consenting to his death are embrued with his bloud . . rebellious subjects cannot deprive a king of more than he may be content to lose , when god sees fit by their hands , to take it from him , whose mercy he is to believe , will more than iufinitely recompence what ever by mans injustice , he is pleased to deprive him of . . a miserable king shall not want the heavy and envied crowns of this world , when god hath mercifully crowned and consummated his graces with glory , and exchanged the shadowes of his earthly kingdoms among men for the substance of that heavenly kingdom with himself . . a good king overpower'd by rebbels , may notwithstanding be perswaded within himself , that he is happy in the judicious love of the ablest and best of his subjects , who may not only pity and pray for him , but may be content even to dy with him , or for him . . no subjects that pretend to punish , can reasonably therein exceed the errours of their princes , especially where more than sufficient satisfaction hath been made to the publick , the enjoyment of which private ambitions may have frustrated . . an injur'd king's chiefest comfort in death consists in his peace made with god ; before whose exact tribunal he need not fear to appear , as to any cause long-disputed by the sword between him and his causeless enemies . . a good king may look upon it with infinite more content and quiet of soul , to have been worsted in his enforced contestation for , and vindication of the just lawes of his land , the freedom and honour of his parliaments , the rights of his crown , the just liberty of his subjects , and the true christian religion in its doctrines , government , and due encouragements , than if he had with the greatest advantages of success evercome them all . . the king that suffers for christ , as he is the authour of truth , order , and peace , being forced to contend against errour , faction and confusion , shall through christ enabling him , be more than conquerour in the end . . although any violent death of an unfortunate king be the wages of his own sin , as from god , and the effect of others sins , as men , both against god and him ; yet , as he may hope his own sins are so remitted , that they shall be no ingredients to imbitter the cup of his death ; so should he desire god to pardon their sins who are most guilty of his destruction ; or that his temporal death unjustly inflicted by them , may not be reveng'd by god●s just inflicting eternal death upon them . . an unfortunate king , though us'd like jonas , should wish no other , than the safe-bringing of the ship to shore , when they have cast him over-board . . the cruelty of a devoted king's enemies cannot prevent his preparation , whose malice , by god's mercy , he may in this defeat , that they shall not have the satisfaction to have destroyed his soul with his body . . conversation is the chief joy , or vexation , of a king's life . . the conversation a king has in his troubles can be no way satisfactory or usefull , when some about him are too wise , others too foolish ; some too busie , others too reserved , many fantastick . . a king much delighted with the conversation of his vertuous queen , is hard to be pleased by any else about him , when forced to part from her , but not less to be pitied by her , who is the only cure for that disease . . a vertuous queen's kindness is as necessary to comfort the heart of her king who is separated from her by his troubles or misfortunes , as her assistance is for his affairs . . a king full fraught with expectation , need pray god to send him a good unlading , especially when some blow of importance is to be given between his and the rebels army in the field . . although a king cannot brag of store of mony in his wars ; yet a sharp sword alwayes hinders starving at least . . in civil wars , the king may make as good a shift with an empty purse as the rebels . . a generous queen whose affection to her king is truly grounded , will be in as much ( if not more ) trouble to find his reputation , as his life in danger . . when distractions in religion arise amongst rebels , and general is set against general in point of command , a treaty with their king may be most desireable , and not to be refused by him , when all means used to procure it , shall be consistent with his royal honour and safety , and all else unquestionably councelable considered . . when rebels , confident of their power , or obstinate in their purpose , become somewhat difficult to be brought into a treaty , the sound of their king 's coming to them may have some force of popular rhetorick to obtain it ; of , if refused , it may bring much prejudice to them , and be advantageous to their king. . when foolish or malicious peope shall interpret their king's desire , to treat with rebels to proceed from fear or folly ; he is to joyn such conditions with the proposition of it , as may be found to be most of the chief ingredients of an honourable and safe peace . . a king may prudently yield to a treaty with rebels in their quarters , so that the conditions save any aspersion of dishonour , if factious spirits about him are likely to infuse their malignity in his own . . when a king in some apprehension , expresseth his inclination to treat with rebels , from whence false malicious rumours may give trouble to his absent queen ; although he judge himself secure in her thoughts from suspecting him guilty of any baseness ; yet he may hold it necessary to send her some account , to the end she may make others know as well as her self this , which ought to be a certain truth , that no danger of death or misery ( which he may think much worse ) should make him do any thing unworthy of her love . . in times of rebellion , when diverse men propose several recompences to themselves for their pains and hazard with their king , the recovery of the company of a loyal and vertuous queen , may be the only reward the said king will expect and wish for himself . . a king in no extremity , should make a peace with rebels by abandoning his friends , or such a one as will not stand with his honour and safety . . although a king cannot part with the patrimony of the church , yet whatsoever shall be offered for rectifying abuses , if any hath crept in , or yet for the ease of tender consciences ( so that it endammage not the foundation ) he may be content to hear , and should be ready to give a gracious answer thereunto . . as it is the king's duty to protect the church , so it is the churches to assist the king in the maintenance of his just authority . . a king should be alwayes carefull to keep the dependency of his clergy entirely upon his crown , without which it will scarcely sit fast upon his head . . after conscience , the militia is certainly the fittest subject for a king's quarrel , the kingly power without it being but as a shadow , and therefore upon no means in any treaty to be quitted . . in the time of civil war , news at home may be too good to be told in the court of a foreign prince , though a friend to the king attacqued by his rebellious subjects : there being certainly as much dexterity in publishing of newes , as in matters which at first sight may seem of greater difficulty ; for , as the engaged king would not have his friends think that all assistance bestowed upon him were in vain●● so would he not have them believe that he needed no help , least they should under hand assist any rebels , to keep the ballance of dissention amongst them equal . . the good of ignorance of a friends danger by a storm is not known , before certain assurance of his [ or her ] escape . . it is not the least of a king's misfortunes , that his vertuous queen should run much hazard for his sake . . although a queen have expressed so much love to her distressed king as he may think impossible to be repay'd by any thing he can do , much less by words : yet his royal heart being full of affection for her , admiration of her , and impatient passion of gratitude unto her , he ought to say something , leaving the rest to be read by her , out of her own noble heart . . when rebels have once found means to build credit on the peoples opinion , they can proceed under pretence of reformation of religion to dissolve the government of a church . . politick rebels under pretence of ill ministers and councellours of estate , know how to invade the majesty of their soveraign in the prerogatives of his crown , and by pretending to remove them , to invest in themselves the domination of all ministries of estate , withdraw their king's revenues into their own hands , and confirm themselves in an absolute power of disposing all . . a king by his declarations , setting forth the sinister proceedings of any faction against him , discovering their designs of innovating the government , and falsifying the scandals they had imputed to him , hath the advantage generally to undeceive his people , and to draw to him the nobility and gentry of his kingdom . . when a great sedition is raised in one kingdom , the king may not imprudently resolve [ at adventure ] to put himself freely and cleerly , on the love and affections of his subjects in any other , the honour and safety whereof lies nearly at the stake . . in rebellious or seditious times , the king may justly expect support from the loyal part of his subjects , till the common safety be secured . . when people of one kingdom invade their king in his other , two things are chiefly considerable by his great councel for the safety and security thereof . . the chasing out the rebels . . his satisfying the just grievances of those that adhere unto him , wherein he should promise to concur heartily and clearly with them , that all the world may see his intentions have ever been , and will be , to make that a glorious and flourishing kingdom . . the dishonour and mischief must needs be great , if for want of mony , a king's army be disbanded before the rebels be put out of his kingdom they invaded . . some men , more moliciously than ignorantly will put no difference between reformation , and alteration of government . . what part soever of a king's revenue is found illegal , or heavy to the subjects , a king should be willing to lay down , trusting in their affections . . it is not fit for a king to argue the business of high treason which toucheth his principal minister of state , though his parliament countenance it , if in his conscience he cannot condemn him : nor is a parliament to expect , that a positive doctrine should best become the mouth of a prince . . if a king cannot condemn ( as a parliament would have him ) his minister of state of high treason , yet cannot say , he can clear him of misdemeanours , the said parliament may find out a way to satisfie justice , and their own fears , and not press his conscience . . although a king to satisfie the people , would do great matters , yet in that of conscience , so tender a thing is it , neither fear , nor any other respect whatsoever , should ever make him go against it . . a king should omit no occasion , whereby he may shew that affection to his people , which he desires his people would shew to him. . it is but the mark of a king's confidence , to put himself wholly upon the love and affection of his people , for his subsistence . . a king should never have other design , but to win the affections of his people by his justice in his government . . a good king can do nothing with more cheerfullness , than to give his people a general satisfaction , not offering to endeer himself unto them by word ( which should not be his way ) but by acts of setling their religion and just liberties , before he proceeds to any other . . it is no prejudice for a king a little to misreckon in time , if not deceived in his end to settle an unquiet nation of his subjects . . a king ought to seek his peoples happiness , their flourishing being his greatest glory , and their affections his greatest strength . . a soveraign ought to take that care of his son , which shall justifie him to god as a father , and to his dominions as a king. . a king ought to assure upon his honour , that he has no thought but peace and justice to his people , which he should by all fair means seek to preserve and maintain , relying upon the goodness and providence of god for the preservation of himself and rights . . in ambiguous times , a kings fears should be greater for the religion he professeth , his people , and lawes , than for his own rights and safety . the eleventh century . . it is a high thing to tax a king with breach of promise . . a parliament may have worse informations , than the king counsels , against which they except . . the king of whom the militia is demanded by his parliament , is not to part with it for an hour● nor should that be demanded of a king , wherewith his wife and children are not to be trusted . . a king is not to punish or discourage his people for petitioning to him in an humble way , though the subject do not agree with his sense . . a king sometimes cannot satisfie his people in a debt due to the country , when all the water goes not to the right mill. . when lawes are altered by any other authority , than that by which they were made , the foundations of the peoples happiness are destroyed . . when the king is oppressed , and his just kights taken from him , it is impossible for the subjects liberties and properties to be preserved . . errours and mistakes among loyal subjects proceeding from misinformation , are removed with more satisfaction and ease to them , than they were received . . a king should hold it a piece of his duty , to take the utmost pains he can , fully to inform and undeceive his people ; and rather to prevent crimes , than to punish them . . persons of ill dispositions take as great pains to do mischief , and to bring confusion , as good men should for peace and happiness in a kingdom . . when a good king sends such propositions of peace and accommodation to his parliament that contested with him , as to which he may expect they should with alacrity submit , if the unexcusable enemies of peace be not strong enough to prevail , he may reasonably hope to have no other use of his loyal peoples affections , but in their prayers , not needing their assistance , when he requireth nothing that with more justice can be denied him , than his crown or life be taken from him. . when the religion , liberty-lawes , which are good subjects priviledg and protection , become the quarrel between a king and any his people in rebellion , the taking his towns , ships , armies and money from him , should not dishearten him ; the concurrence and affection of his people with god's blessing will supply and recover all . . in time of rebellion , when any country or province have shewed much forwardness , and made great expressions of their affections to the king , he should never be satisfied with himself , till he have found some way to fix a mark of favour and estimation upon the same , which may tell posterity how good subjects , and how much gentlemen they have been . . the memory of any signal loyalty shewed by persons or provinces to the royal father , should grow up in a just acknowledgment with his sons . . in times of distraction , unquiet spirits will be abroad , and every day throw in new accidents to disturb and confound the publick peace . . rebellion that at first but fortifies it self in a town , will at length rise to that insolence , as not to be any longer confined within the walls , but make sallies out to exercise murder , cruelty and rapine upon the persons and possessions of good subjects . . the sad effects of counterfeit fears and jealousies in a parliament are such , as no men can tell the least good they do , nor the least evill they prevent . . the king against whom all advantages will be taken by persons disaffected to him , should take heed where he comes , that no eminent disorder or damage befall any man by any person of his train , or under his protection . . where a party of people have shewed themselves eminently loyal to their king , the fullest testimony of his affection to them , and to the peace of their county may be this , to pass over the considerations of honour and reproach , and not permit a provocation to provoke him to make that place be the seat of his war. . no honest man can imagine that his king will ever sit down under a bold and unexcusable treason . . a king wholly cast upon the affections of his people , having no hope but in the blessing and assistance of god , the justness of his cause , and the love of his subjects , to recover what is taken from him and them , may expect a good issue , the rather in that they are equal losers with him. . when a king desires nothing of his people , but what is necessary to be done for the preservation of god's true religion , the lawes of the land , the liberty of the subject , and the very being of his kingdom , he has reason to look for a speedy and effectual compliance with his demands . . a king has no reason to suspect the courage and resolution of those his subjects , whose conscience and loyalty have brought them to him , to fight for their religion , their king , and the lawes of their land , especially when they are to meet with no enemies but traytors , schismaticks , and atheïsts , such as desire to destroy both church and state , and who have before condemned them to ruine for being loyal to their king. . it gives courage to the soldier , when his king satisfies him that the cause is just , wherein he means to make use of his valour . . if the time of war , and the great necessity and straits a king is driven to , beget any violation of those lawes to which he hath consented , he may hope it shall be imputed by god and man to the authors of the war , and not to him , if so he hath earnestly laboured for the preservation of the peace of his kingdom . . the residence of an army is not usually pleasant to any place , and that of a distressed king caries more fear with it , who , it may be thought , must only live upon the aid and relief of his people . . it is not prudence in loyal subjects , to suffer a good cause to be lost , for want of supplying their king with that which will be taken from them by those who pursue him with violence . . whilst ill men sacrifice their money , plate , and utmost industry to destroy the commonwealth , good men should be no less liberal to preserve it . . when it hath pleased god to bless a king with success in a war , he should remember the assistance every particular man gave him , to his advantage . . however a king succeeds in his wars , it will be honour and comfort to his loyal subjects , that with some charge and trouble to themselves , they did their part to support their king , and preserve the kingdom . . the people that have been awed by a rebellious army , will be more prone to express their affections to their king , with that courage which becomes them , when his residence shall be so near , that his power shall have an influence upon the country for their protection . . no man should have more power to fright people from their loyalty , than their king have to restore them to it . . loyal subjects , in assisting their king , defend themselves , who may be sure the sword which is drawn against him , will destroy them , if he defend them not . . it will be a shame for people to venture nothing for their king , who ventures his life for them . . in a civil war , whatsoever good people shall be willing freely to contribute , their king should take kindly from them : and whatsoever they lend him , he should , having passed the word of a king , see justly repayed to them . . a king should take especial notice , of such who are backward to contribute in a time of visible necessity . . when a king considers the publick interests and concernments of his parliament in the happiness and honour of the nation , and their particular sufferings in a rebellion for their affection and loyalty unto him , he must look upon them as the most competent considerers , and counsellours , how to manage and improve the condition all are in , his and their condition being so equall that the same violence hath oppress'd them all . . it will be in vain for them who have informed the world by divers set battels against their king ▪ to boast how tender they have been for the safety of his person . . it will be hard for a king , who is to struggle with many defects and necessities , to keep a strict discipline among his soldiers . . guilt and despair make rebels sometimes more wicked than they at first intended to be . . a king should have no greater sadness for those who are his ill subjects , than he hath joy and comfort in their affections and fidelities , who are his good . . license and disorder in an army , will discredit , and may destroy the best cause . . subjects ought to remember , that moneys are the nerves of war , and accordingly expedite supplies to their king , when he needs them . . there is no profession a king hath made for the defence and maintenance of right religion , lawes and liberties , which he should not inviolably observe . . a king's opinion , wherein he differs from his subjects in parliament , should not be like the lawes of the medes and persians , unalterable , being not infallible . . nothing should so much afflict a king , as the sense-and feeling he has of the sufferings of his subjects , and the miseries that hang over his kingdoms , when drawn upon them by those , who ( upon pretenses of good ) violently pursue their own interests and ends . . such men may be supposed most apt and likely to maintain their power by blood and rapine , who have only got it by oppression and injustice . . civil dissentions that are desperate , may encourage and invite a foreign enemy to make a prey of the whole nation where they are . . plague , pestilence and famine , will be the inevitable attendants of unnatural contentions between a king and his people . . a kingdom being infested with civil war , so general a habit of uncharitableness and cruelty is contracted throughout , that even peace it self will not restore the peace to their old temper and security . . in the time of a civil war , the king should be so deeply sensible of the miseries and calamities of his kingdom , and the grievous sufferings of his subjects , as most earnestly to desire that some expedient may be found out , which by the blessing of god , may prevent the further effusion of blood , and restore the nation to peace , from the earnest and constant endeavouring of which , as no discouragement given him on the contrary part should make him cease , so no success on his own should ever divert him. . all men , who pretend to goodness , must desire peace : and all men know treaties to be the best and most christian way to procure it . . a king can never condescend unto what is absolutely destructive to that just power , which by the lawes of god , and the land , he is born unto . . as a king should make no other demands but such as he believes confidently to be just , and much conducing to the tranquillity of the people : so should he be most willing to condescend to them in whatsoever shall be really for their good and happiness . . except a king and people have reciprocal care each of other , neither can be happy . . a king should never dissemble , nor hide his conscience , when his consent is desired to the alteration of religion , wherewith he is unsatisfied . . in times of distraction and division between king and people , if the king be so unfortunate as to sall into their hands , it is ●it for him to be attended by some of his chaplains , whose opinions as clergy-men , he ought to esteem and reverence , not only for the exercise of his conscience , but also for clearing of his judgment concerning the emergent differences in religion . . a restrained king , cannot , as he ought , take in consideration the alterations in religion , that may be offered him , without the help of his chaplains or divines , because he can never judge rightly of , or be altered in any thing of his opinion , so long as any ordinary way of finding out the truth is denied him ; but when that is granted him , he should not strive for victory in argument , but seek and submit to truth ( according to that judgment which god hath given him ) alwayes holding it his best and greatest conquest , to give contentment to his people in all things which he conceives not to be against his conscience or honour . . a king under such restraint as he is not master of those ordinary actions , which are the undoubted rights of any free-born man , is not in case fit to make concessions , for give answers to his revolted subjects . . a king under what restraint soever , should not give his consent to any propositions made to him by his revolted subjects , that require the disclaiming that reason which god hath given him to judge by , for the good of him and his people , and the putting a great violence upon his conscience . . it were easie for a distressed king , who intended to wind himself out of troubles by indirect means , readily to consent to whatsoever is proposed to him , and afterward choose his time to break all , alledging that forced concessions are not to be kept : for which he would not incur a hard censure from indifferent men . . maximes of fallacy are not to be the guides of a king's actions in extremity . . it is held by some unlawfull for any man , and most base in a king , to recede from his promises , for having been obtained by force , or he under restraint . note ] according as the promises may be ; which if unjust and injurious , are not to be adher'd to . . a general act of oblivion is the best bond of peace . . the wisdom of several kingdoms , hath usually and happily in all ages granted general pardons , whereby the numerous discontentments of many persons and families otherwise exposed to ruine , might not become fuel to new disorders , or seeds to future troubles . perpetual dishonour must cleve to that king , who to obtain liberty or other advantage to himself , shall abandon those persons of condition and fortune , that out of a sense of duty have engaged themselves with and for him in his civil wars . . liberty being that which in all times hath been the common theme , and desire of all men , common reason shewes , that kings less than any should endure captivity . . a king may with patience endure a tedious restraint , so long as he has any hope , that that sort of his suffering may conduce to the peace of his kingdoms , or the hindering of more effusion of blood . . a king under restraint , finding by too certain proofs , that his continued patience would not only turn to his personal ruine , but likewise be of much more prejudice than furtherance to the publick good , is bound , as well by natural ; as political obligations , to seek his safety , by retiring himself ( if he can ) for some time from the publick view both of his friends and enemies . . no indifferent man can judg but a king has just cause to free himself from the hands of those who change their principles with their condition , and who are not ashamed openly to intend the destruction of his nobility , and with whom the levellers doctrine is rather countenanced than punished . . no reasonable man can think , that god will bless those , who refuse to hear their own king when they have him under restraint . . although a king may withdraw himself from the ill usage of such his subjects as keep him under restraint , and are deaf to the importunities of his reasonable desires : yet when he may be heard with freedom , honour , and safety , he should instantly break forth through the cloud of his retirement , and shew himself really to be pater patriae . . when a king is willing to give ease to the consciences of others , there is no reason why he alone , and those of his judgment , should be pressed to a violation of theirs . . it is the definition , not names of things , which make them rightly known . . without means to perform , no propsition can take effect . . a king , to whom honour , freedom , and safety is not allowed , can no more treat with his subjects that have usurped his power , than a blind man judge of colours , or one run a race , who hath both his feet tied together . . a king of two different nations should yield to none in either kingdom , for being truly and zealously affected for the good and honour of both , and his resolution should be never to be partial for either to the prejudice of the other . . mercy is as inherent and inseparable to a king as justice . . a king should never abuse the love of his loyal subjects , by any power wherewith god shall enable him , to the least violation of the least of their liberties , or the diminution of those immunities which he before had granted them , though they be beyond the acts of his predecessours . . in time of civil war , whosoever behaves not himself like a good subject to his king in his kingdom , should not ( if the king can help it ) receive the benefit , and advantage of being his subject in any other ; but all foreign princes should know , that as such a person hath parted with his loyalty to his king , so he must not hope for any security by him , that some example may be made , how easie it is for a king to punish their disloyalty abroad , who for a time may avoid their own king's justice at home . . in time of civil war , such who have by weakness and misunderstanding , or through fear and apprehension of danger been so far transported , as to contribute and consent to horrid intestine dissentions , should , by their free and liberal assistance of their king , express , that their former errours proceeded from weakness , not from malice . . the experience subjects have of their king's religion , justice , and love of his people , should not suffer them to believe any horrid scandals laid upon him : and their affection , loyalty , and jealousie of his honour , should disdain to be made instruments to oppress their native soveraign , by assisting an odious rebellion . . a king's obligation is both in conscience and honour , neither to abandon god's cause , injure his successours , nor forsake his friends . . a king so distressed in civil wars , as he cannot flatter himself with expectation of good success , may rest satisfied in this , to end his dayes with honour and a good conscience , which obligeth him to continue his endeavours , in not despairing that god may in due time avenge his own cause . . a king in extremity , is not to be deserted by his friends , though he that stayes with him , must expect and resolve , either to dye for a good cause , or ( which is worse ) to live as miserable in maintaining it , as the violence of insulting rebels can make him . . as the best foundation of loyalty is christianity ; so true christianity teaches perfect loyalty : for , without this reciprocation , neither is truly what they pretend to be . . a king should chuse such commissioners for any treaty with rebels , as will neither be threatned nor disputed from the grounds he hath given them . . wherein rebels strain to justifie their breaking off treaties with their king , bare asseverations , without proofs , cannot , i am sure , satisfie any judicious reader . . the penners of seditious pamphlets , to justifie the cause of rebels , seek more to take the ears of the ignorant multitude with big words , and bold assertions , than to satisfie rational men with real proofs or true arguments . . bare asseverations which bold rebels often make even against what they see , will not get credit with any , but such who abandon their judgments to an implicit faith. . the determinations of all the parliaments in the world , cannot make a thing just or necessary , if it be not so of it self . . when the reasons upon which the laying by of a king's authority is grounded , are not particularly mentioned for the worlds satisfaction ( if possible ) but involved in general big words , it seems that it is their force of armes , who do it , more than that of reason which they trust to , for procuring of obedience to their determinations , or belief to what they say . . it is evident , that the demands of bold rebels have alwayes increased with their good fortune . . a king must in no extremity , howsoever pressed to it by rebels , resolve to live in quiet , without honour , and to give his people peace without safety , by abandoning them to an arbitrary unlimited power . . reason will hardly maintain those who are afraid of her . . indifferent men may often judge of a king's innocency by their way of accusation , who rebel against him ; for those who lay such high crimes to his charge , as the breach of oathes , vowes , protestations , and imprecations , would not spare to bring their proofs if they had any . . it is a wrong to a king's innocency , to seek to clear him of such slanders , for which there are no proofs alledged : for malice being once detected , is best answered with neglect and silence . . although affection should not so blind one , as to say that his king never erred ; yet , as when a just debt is paid , bonds ought to be cancelled : so grievances , be they never so just , being once redressed , ought no more to be objected as errours : and it is no paradox to affirm , that truths , this way told , are no better than slanders . . it is most certain by experience , that they who make no conscience of rebelling , will make less of lying , when it is for their advantage . . it is the artifice of rebels , not only to endeavour to make fables pass for currant coin , but likewise to seek to blind mens judgements with false inferences upon some truths . the twelfth century . . it cannot be warranted by justice , that any man should be slandred , yet denyed the sight thereof , and so far from being permitted to answer , that if he have erred , there should be no way left him to acknowledg , or mend it . . it cannot be made appear , that our saviour and the apostles did so leave the church at liberty , as they might totally alter or change the church government at their pleasure . . mens conjectures can breed but a humane faith . . the post-scripts of st. paul's epistles though we lay no great weight upon them , yet they are to be held of great antiquity , and therefore such as in question of fact , where there appears no strong evidence to weaken their belief , ought not to be lightly rejected . . although faith , as it is an assent unto truth supernatural , or of divine revelation , reacheth no further than the scriptures yet in matters of fact , humane testimonies may beget a faith , though humane , yet certain and infallible . ; . it is not to be conceived , that the accessions , or additions , granted by the favour of princes , for the enlarging of the power , or priviledges of bishops , have made , or indeed can make , the government really and substantially to differ from what formerly it was , no more than the addition of armes or ornaments can make a body really , and substantially , to differ from it self naked or divested of the same : nor can it be thought either necessary , or yet expedient , that the elections of the bishops , and some other circumstantials touching their persons or office , should be in all respects the same under christian princes , as it was when christians lived among pagans , and under persecution . . it is well worthy the studies and endeavours of divines of both opinions , laying aside emulation and private interests , to reduce episcopacy , and presbytery , into such a well proportioned form of superiority and subordination , as may best resemble the apostolical and primitive times , so far forth as the different condition of the times , and the exigents of all considerable circumstances will admit , so as the power of church-government , in the particular of ordination , which is meerly spiritual , may remain authoritative in the bishop , but that power not to be exercised without the concurrence , or assistance , of the presbytery . . other powers of government , which belong to jurisdiction , though they are in the bishops , yet the outward exercise of them may be ordered and disposed , or limited by the soveraign power , to which by the lawes of the place , and the acknowledgment of the clergy , they are subordinate . . the succession of bishops is the best clue , the most certain and ready way by which to find out their original . . it hath been often sound , that mutual returns of long answers and replies , have rather multiplied disputes by starting new questions , than informed the conscience , by removing former scruples . . in former times , under pagan princes , the church was a distinct body of it self , divided from the common-wealth , and so was to be governed by its own rules and rulers . the bishops therefore of those times , though they had no outward coercive power over mens persons or estates , yet in as much as every christian man , when he became a member of the church , did ipso facto , and by that his own voluntary act , put himself under their government , they exercised a very large power of jurisdiction● in spiritualibus , in making ecclesiastical canons , receiving accusations , conventing the accused , examining of witnesses , judging of crimes , excluding such as they found guilty of scandalous offences from the lord's supper , enjoyning penances upon them , casting them out of the church , receiving them again upon their repentance , &c. and all this they exercised as well over presbyters , as others : but after that the church , under christian princes , began to be incorporated into the common-wealth , whereupon there must of necessity follow a complication of the civil and ecclesiastical powers , the jurisdiction of bishops ( in the outward exercise of it ) was subordinate unto , and limited by the supreme civil power . . although there be no cause to dislike their opinion , who derive the episcopal power originally from christ himself , without whose warrant the apostles would not either have exercised it themselvs , or derived it to others ; yet for that the practise in them is so clear and evident , and the warrant from him expressed but in general terms , ( as my father sent me , so send i you , and the like ) we may chuse rather to fix the claim of the power upon that practise as the more evidential way , than upon the warrant , which by reason of the generality of expression would bear more dispute . . arguments drawn from names , and words , and conjectural expositions of scripture , are subject to such frailties , as in debate will give little satisfaction to his judgment and conscience , that requites it . . the testimonies of so many writers , ancient , and modern , as have been produced for the scripture-original of bishops , may be conceived of so great importance in a question of this nature , that we are bound both in charity and reason to believe , that so many men , of such quality , would not have asserted the same with so much confidence , but upon very good ground . . one witness for the affirmative ought to be of more value , than ten for the negative ; and the testimony of one person that is not interessed , than of an hundred that are . . a prince to shew the greatness of his mind , is rather to conquer his enemies by pardoning , than by punishing . . a king may expect not to be ceusur'd for having parted with too much of his right , when the price and commodity is so great , such as security to himself , and peace to his people . . a prudent parliament ought to remember how usefull a king's power is to a peoples liberty . . a prince is never to affect more greatness or prerogative , than what is really and intrinsecally for the good of his subjects , not satisfaction of favourites . . a prince that so useth his prerogative , will never want means to be a father to all , and a bountifull prince to any he would be extraordinarily gracious unto . . all men trust their treasure where it returns them interest . . if princes like the sea , receive , and repay , all the fresh streams and rivers trust them with , they will not grudge , but pride themselves , to make them up an ocean . . subjects , who have learnt , that victories over their princes , are but triumphs over themselves , will be more unwilling to hearken to changes afterward . . a distressed king may best learn to own himself , by retiring into himself , and therefore can the better digest what befalls him , not doubting but god can restrain his enemies malice , and turn their fierceness unto his praise . . if god give an injur'd king success against rebels , he ought to use it humbly , and far from revenge ▪ . if god restore an exil'd king to his right upon hard conditions , whatsoever he promiseth , he ought to keep . . those men who have forced lawes , which they were bound to observe , will find their triumphs full of troubles . . a prince is not to think any thing in this world worth obtaining by foul and unjust means . . no earthly power can justly call a king in question as a delinquent . . a good king will not without shewing a reason seek to impose a belief upon his subjects . . there is no proceeding just against any man , but what is warranted either by god's lawes , or the municipal lawes of the country where he lives . . the true liberty of subjects consists not in the power of government , but in living under such lawes , such a government , as may give themselves the best assurance of their lives , and propriety of their goods . . the king who has a trust committed to him by god , by old and lawfull descent , must not betray it , to answer to a new unlawfull authority . . it is a great sin for subjects , to withstand lawfull authority , as it is to submit to an authority tyrannical , or any other wayes unlawfull . . a hasty sentence once past , may be sooner repented , than recalled ▪ . it is in vain , for a king to be a sceptick , by denying the power rebels have , when greater than he can resist . . a hasty judgment , passed upon the life of a king , may bring on that trouble and perpetual inconveniency to a kingdom , that the child which is then unborn may repent it . . god many times does pay justice by an unjust sentence . . conquest is never just , except there be a good just cause , either for matter of wrong of just title , and then they that go beyond it , the first quarrel that they have to it , is it that makes unjust at the end what was just at first . . sole matter of conquest is a great robbery . . those magistrates or officers will never be right , nor will god ever prosper them , who give not god his due , their king his due , and the people their due . . the regulating a church rightly , according to holy scripture , is , to give god his due , a national synod , freely called , freely debating among themselves , must settle the church , if out of order , when that every opinion is freely , and clearly heard . . a subject and a soveraign are clean different things ; and a share in government is nothing pertaining to the people . finis . to the reader . friend , this century may be complete , and others added , when more of his sacred majesty's writings shall be published . which advertisement i pray take with you , as you proceed to the other titles , under which you may apprehend the like defect at the end . icon animae basilicae : the pourtraiture of a royal soul , drawn from the transcendent meditations of king charles i. by richard watson . habebat perfectum animum ad summam sui adductus , supra quam nihil est nis● mens dei , ex qua pars & in hoc pectus mortale de fluxit , quod nunquam magis divinum est , quàm ubi mortalitatem suam cogitat , & scit in hoc natum hominem , ut vitâ defungeretur . senec. epist . . london , printed for robert horn , . to the reader . friend , philo the jew tels us , that tharra among the hebrews , and socrates among the greeks , were men so noted for meditation and retirement within themselves , that whosoever in aftertime , by such a reflex knowledge , could give an exact character of his soul , had that name as a title of hon●r in each nation . if you do right to this piece , apart presented unto your view , you must needs acknowledg that not any of our britannike kings ha's done a design , by which he merited to have his name transmitted to posterity with that advantage , as charles the first ; who in a time of such distraction , when most of his subjects acted by a very uncertain light ; some of them mistook themselves , and others took great pains to disguise and lay counterfeit colours upon their conscience , drew so exquisite a pourtraicture of a pious and prudent prince , as it appears most evident , he then took not first the pencil in hand to practise , but began to exercise , in the very dawn of his reason , what skill he perfected in the glory and luster of his reign , though he copied it not for his royal successours , and religious subjects , until the approaching twilight , or setting of his sun in bloud . the picture is not here exposed , to be onely lookt upon by a curious eye , to have the hand commended , and then the curtain drawn ; what more is mean't , will best be known by such as seriously intend to imitate , and have a devout ambition , by a like looking into their souls , and meditating on their duties , in their several capacities , to deserve the honour of that great name , which ought to be held venerable among us in all succeeding ages . of which number i wish you one , and my self likewise , your humble servant , richard watson . cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. cent. beginneth pag. errata . the reader is desired to mend the following escapes , and whomsoever he censures , to impute neither mistake nor negligence to the collectour . title page read basilicae . epistle dedicatory . page r. recognize . p. r. i● after some few years revolution , &c. effata regalia . century . num . . r. allay . n r the grounds . n r stupidity . n r conscious . n r saviour . n r merits . n r though they should be satiated . n r soul of a queen . century . n ● r praie●● . n r ●ay serve n r propound . n r streightness . n r false & evil . century n r with prejud●ces . n r considerations , nor designs n r oblequie . cent. n r upon functions . n r to christs rule . cent. n r not ●orosely . cent. n r differences in religion , and offences , by &c. n r a di●●●dence o● his own judgment n r aggravations , n r that as the greatest temptations , &c. cent. n r their pilot. n r who will avoid . cent. . n r from their pr●reption . n r philistims . n r portends . cent. n r congregations . n r he shall be forced to consent , &c. n r fixed on new models . cent. n r from which reason &c. cent. , n r rights n r will not restore the people , &c. icon auimae basilicae . century . num . ● shall be . n r to a happy , &c n ● inclined . n ● we ●ad need , &c cent. n r the handful of ●eal . cent. n ● findeth . monita , &c britannica . cent. . n r of differing , &c. n r unto the king. n r he may suspect . n r spirit of prayer . n r lest being n of sound . cent. n r the draught . icon animae basilicae . the pour traicture of a royal soul . the first century . . resolutions of future reforming , do not alwayes satisfie gods justice , nor prevent his vengeance for former miscariages . . when out sins have overlai'd our hopes , we are taught to depend on gods mercies to forgive , not on our purpose to amend . . god often vindicates his glory by his judgments , and shews us how unsafe it is to offend him , upon presumptions afterwards to please him . . for want of timely repentance of our sins , god gives us cause to repent of those remedies we too late apply . . when god gives us the benefit of our afflictions and his chastisements , we may dare account them the strokes not of an enemy , but a father , whose rod , as well as his staf , may comfort us . . gods grace is infinitely better with our sufferings , than our peace could be with our sins . . when god that over-rules our counsels , over-rules also our hearts , the worse things we suffer by his justice , the better we may be by his mercy . . sin may turn our antidotes into poyson ; and grace return our poyson into antidotes . . an act of sinful compliance , hath greater aggravations in a king , than any man ; especially when without the least temptation of envy or malice , he consents to the destruction of a peer , or meaner subject , whom by his place he ought to have preserved . . god sees the contradiction between a king's heart and his hand , against whom the sin is more immediate , when he signs any man's death , unsatisfied that he hath deserved it . . a king may learn righteousness by god's judgments , and see his own frailty in god's justice . . a king ought to prefer justice , which is the will of god , before all contrary clamours , which do but discover the injurious will of man. . it is once too much , that a king has once been overcome , to please his subjects by displeasing of god. . a king by divine permission , going against his reason of conscience , for any reason of state , highly sins against the god of reason , and judg of consciences . . god's free spirit supports the will of a king , and subjects it to none but the divine light of reason , justice and religion , which shine in his soul. . god desireth truth in the inward parts of kings , and integrity in their outward expressions . . when god hears the voyce of our saviour's bloud before the cry of others undeservedly shed , he speaks to king and people , in the voice of joy and gladness , which makes the bones he had broken rejoyce in his salvation . a king purposing violence or oppression against the innocent , may expect the enemy to persecute his soul , to tread his life to the ground , and to lay his honour in the dust . . god that sees not as man sees , lookes beyond all popular appearances , searches the heart , and tryes the reins , and brings to light things hidden in the dark . . a kings afflictions cannot be esteemed by wise and godly men any argument of his sin , in shedding bloud he would have saved , more than their impunity among good men is any sure token of their innocency that forc't him to it . . a king may expect god's protection from the privy conspiracies , and open violence of bloudy and unreasonable men , according to the uprightness of his heart , and the innocency of his hands in the matter of bloud , or destruction of his subjects . . in time of civil dissensions , a king may most safely flie to god as his refuge and defence , who rules the raging of the sea , and the madness of the people . . a king should look upon his own sins , and the sins of his people ( which are the tumults of their souls against god ) as the just cause of popular inundations , permitted by god to over-bear all the banks of loyalty , modesty , lawes , justice and religion . . god can rebuke the rebellious beasts of the people , and deliver his king from the rudeness and strivings of the multitude . . it becomes king and people , as men and christians , unpassionately to see the light of reason and religion ; and with all due order and gravity to follow it . . a charitable king will wish his rebellious people a timely sense and sorrow , that shame here , and not suffering hereafter , may be the punishment of their sin. . when god shall set bounds to our passions by reason , to our errours by truth , to our seditions by lawes duly executed , and to our schismes by charity , then we may be as jerusalem , a city at unity in it self . . a king in distress , should still appeal to his god , whose all-discerning justice sees through all the disguises of mens pretensions , and deceitfull darknesses of their hearts . . a king to whom god gave a heart to grant much to his subjects , may need a heart fitted to suffer much from them . . gods grace may teach a king , wisely to enjoy as well the frustratings as the fullfillings of his best hopes , and most specious desires . . a king sometimes , while he thinks to allay others fears , may raise his own ; and by setling them , unsettle himself . . evil for good is a bad requital ; and hatred for the good will of a king to his people . . a king needs god for his pilot in such a dark and dangerous storm , as neither admits his return to the port whence he set out , nor his making any other with that safety and honour which he designed . . it is easie for god , to keep a king safe in the love and confidence of his people . . a king needs god for his guardian amidst the unjust hatred and jealousies of them whom he suffers so far to prevail , as to pervert and abuse his acts of greatest indulgence to , and assurance of them . . a penitent king ought to know no favours of his can make others more guilty than himself may be in abusing those many and great ones which god had conferred upon him . . a king in time of publick calamity by civil dissensions , should ask of god such repentance for himself and his people as he will accept , and such grace as they may not abuse . . the king is happy , who can make a right use of others abuses , and by their failings of him , reflect with a reforming displeasure , upon his own offemces against god. . although a king for his own sins , be by other mens sins deprived of temporal blessings , yet he may be happy to enjoy the comfort of god's mercies , which often raise the greatest sufferers , to be the most glorious saints . . it is god's will a king should preserve a native , rational , and religious freedom . . god requires of kings , to submit their understandings and wills unto his , whose wisdom and goodness can neither erre , nor misguide them . . god requires of kings , so far to deny their carnal reason , in order to his sacred mysteries and commands , that they should believe and obey , rather than dispute them . . god expects from kings only such a reasonable service of him , as not to do any thing for him against their consciences . . as to the desires of men , god enjoins kings to try all things by the touch-stone of reason and lawes , which are the rules of civil justice , and to declare their consents to that only which their judgments approve . . kings should be very unwilling to desert that place in which god hath set them , and whereto the affairs of their kingdoms do call them . . a king may be content , for his peoples good , to deny himself , in what god hath subjected to his disposal . . the unthankfull importunities , and tumultuary violence of some mens immoderate demands , should never betray a king to that dangerous and unmanly slavery , as to make him strengthen them by his consent in those things , which he thinks in his conscience to be against god's glory , the good of his subjects , and the discharge of his own duty to reason and justice . . a king should be willing to suffer the greatest indignities and injuries rebellious people press upon him , rather than commit the least sin against his conscience . . the just liberties of people may well be preserved in fair and equal wayes , without the slavery of their king's soul. . he whom god hath invested by his favours in the power of a christian king , should not subject his reason to other mens passions and designs , which seem unreasonable , unjust and irreligious unto him . . the way of truth and justice , will bring a distressed king at last to peace and happiness with god , though for them he hath much trouble among men . . a king and queen scattered on earth by their despightfull and deadly enemies , may be prepared by their sufferings for god's presence . . though a king's difference from his queen in some things , as to religion , may be his greatest temporal infelicity ; yet the sincerity of their affections , which desire to seek , find , and to embrace every truth , given by god , may be acceptable unto him . . it is happy for king and queen different in religion , when either ignorance of what is necessary to be known , or unbelief , or disobedience to what they know , becomes their misery , or their wilfull default . . the great scandal of subjects professing the same true religion with their king , may be an hinderance to the dissenting queen , in the love of some truth god would have her to learn ; or may harden her in some errour he would have cleared to her . . a king 's own and his parties constancy , is the best antidote against the poyson of their example that gave such scandal . . the truth of that religion the king propfesseth represented with all the beauties of humility , loyalty , charity and peaceableness , as the proper fruits and ornaments thereof , may prevail much upon the judgment of his dissenting queen ; as the odious disguises of levity , schism , heresie , novelty , cruelty and disloyalty , which any men's practises put upon it , may intend her aversion from it . . god's sacred and saving truths , cleared from all rust and dross of humane mixtures , gain belief , love , and obedience to them , as his . . god beheld in the glass of his truth , in those mercies which he hath offered unto us in his only son and our saviour , inviteth us to serve him in all those holy duties , which most agree with his holy doctrine , and most imitable example . . the experience a king and queen separated by rebels , have of the vanity and uncertainty of all humane glory and greatness , in their scatterings and eclipses , should make them both so much the more ambitious to be invested in those durable honours and perfections , which are only to be found in god , and obtained through christ . . a king ought not to gratifie his passion by any secret pleasure in his death or destruction , who hath thereby satisfied the injury he did him , lest he make divine vengeance his , and consider the affront against himself more than the sin against god. . god often pleads the cause of kings before the sons of men , by making without their desire and endeavours , the mischief of rebels return on their own heads , and their violent dealing come down on their own pates . . an injur'd king in charity should pray that god's justice prevent not the objects and opportunities of his mercy , but that they who have most offended him may live and be forgiven by him , in that their offenses bear a proportion with his trespasses , for which he hopes forgiveness from god. . a king should pray for his rebellious subjects , that god lay not their sins to their charge for condemnation , but to their conscience for amendment . . god's exemplary vengeance shew'd in the destruction of any eminent rebel , is as the lighting of a thunderbolt , which by so severe a punishment of one , should be a terrour to all . . it may be wish'd , that they who know not they have done amiss , might have their sin discover'd to them ; and that they who sin of malicious wickedness , might be scared . . they who prevent gods judgments by their true repentance , shall escape the strokes of his eternal vengeance . . mercy and truth met together , are the best supporters of a royal throne : as righteousness and peace kissing each other the chief ornaments of a flo●rishing crown . . god sees clearly through all the cloudings of humane affairs , and judges without prejudice , his unerrable judgment having eternally his omniscience for its guide . . it is time for a king to call upon god , when the proud rise against him , and the assemblies of violent men seek after his soul , who have not set god before their eyes . . a king should have no passion , nor design , to embroyl his kingdome in a civil war , to which he has the least temptation , as knowing he must adventure more than any , and gain least of any by it . . a king ought to deplore and study to divert the necessity of a civil war , unless he will be thought so prodigally thirsty of his subjects bloud , as to venture his own life , which were better spent to save , than to destroy his people . . a king in time of rebellion , needs much of gods grace with patience to bear the afflictions , but much more to sustain the reproaches of men , especially if they make the war his , which they have raised themselves . . the confidence of some mens false tongues is such , that they would make a king almost suspect his own innocence . . a king whose innocency is known unto god , may be content ( at least by his silence ) to take upon him the imputed guilt before men , if by that he can allay the malice of his enemies , and redeem his people from the miseries of war. . god will find out bloudy and deceitfull men , many of whom live not half their dayes , in which they promised themselves the enjoyment of the fruits of their violent and wicked counsels . . god will save a king that 's his servant , and in due time scatter the people that delight in war. . it is time for god to arise and lift up himself , when the king's enemies rage and increase , conceiving mischief , travailing with iniquity , and bringing forth falshood . . the design of a civil war is either to destroy the king's person , or force his judgment , and to make him renege his conscience , and gods truth . . a king may be driven to cross david's choice , and desire rather to fall into the hands of men , by denying them ( though their mercies be cruel ) than into the hands of god , by sinning against his conscience , and in that against him who is a consuming fire : it being better they destroy him , than god damn him . . if nothing but a king's bloud will satisfie his enemies , or quench the flames of his kingdom , or god's temporal justice , he should be content , if it be gods will , that it be shed by the hands of his subjects . . when the bloud of a king , though a sinner , is wash'd with the bloud of his innocent and peace-maing redeemer , gods justice will therein find not only a temporary expiation , but an eternal plenary satisfaction , both for the king's sins , and his peoples . . a king that hath god on his side , has more with him than can be against him . . none in heaven or earth is desireable by a king in comparison of god , who in the loss of all , may be more than all to him . . when people are encouraged to fight against their king under the pretense of sighting for him , he may cast his eyes up to heaven , he has no other power to oppose them . . god needs no help , nor the king , having his , if not to conquer , at least to suffer , . if god delights not in a king's safety and prosperity , he ought to render himself up to be reduced to what god will have him , whose judgments oft begin with his own children . . a king should be content to be nothing , that god may be all . . god , who teacheth , that no king can be saved by the multitude of an host , can yet save him by the multitude of his mercies , being lord of hosts , and the father of mercies . . a king distressed on every side , having god on his side , need not fear what man can do unto him . . a king ought to give god's justice the glory of his distress . gods mercy must have the glory of a king's deliverance from them that persecute his soul. . any king that hath fought against god ( whose subject he is ) by his sins , and robbed him of his glory , god may justly strip of his strength by his own subjects , and eclipse his glory likewise . . the king whose hope and only refuge fails him , shall to his grief , hear his enemies soon say , there is no help for him in his god. . the king's footsteps will slip , whose goings god holds not up in his paths . . a king favoured by god , is kept as the apple of his eye , and hid under the shadow of his wings . . god has marveilous loving kindness to shew , and a right hand by which to save a king that puts his trust in him , from those that rise up against him ; from the wicked that oppress him ; from his deadly enemies that compass him about . . the path of life leads to god's presence , where is fullness of joy , and at his right hand are pleasures for evermore . . god is the first and eternal reason , whose wisdom is fortified with omnipotency . . god's method of grace to a king his servant is , first to furnish him with clear discoveries of truth , reason , and justice in his understanding , then so to confirm his will and resolution to adhere to them , that no terrours , injuries , or oppressions of his enemies , may ever inforce him against those rules which god by them hath planted in his conscience . the second century . . god never made a king that should be less than a man and not dare to say yea , or nay , as he sees cause ; which freedom is not denied to the meanest creature that hath the use of reason , and liberty of speech . . that cannot be blameable in a king , which is commendable veracity and constancy in others . . it is open partiality and injustice , for seditious subjects to deny that freedom to their king , which god hath given to all men , and which themselves pertinaciously challenge to themselves . . god can guide a distressed king by an unerring rule , through the perplexed lubyrinths of his own thoughts and other mens proposals , which he may have some cause to suspect , are purposely cast as snares , that by his granting or denying them , he might be more entangled in those difficulties , wherewith they lye in wait to afflict him . . a kings own sinfull passions may cloud or divert gods sacred suggestions . . a king should propund to himself gods glory for his end , gods word for his rule , and then resign himself to gods will. . a king can hardly please all , he need not care to please some men ; if he may be happy to please god , he need not fear whom he displeaseth . . god maketh the wisdom of the world foolishness , and taketh in their own devises , such as are wise in their own conceits . . a king made wise by god's truth , for god's honour , his kingdoms general good , and his own souls salvation , need not much regard the worlds opinion , or diminution of him . . the less wisdom ill-affected subjects are willing to impute to their king , the more they shall be convinced of god's wisdom directing him , while he denies nothing sit to be granted , out of crossness , or humor ; nor grants any thing which is to be denied out of any fear or flattery of men . . a king ought to take care he become not guilty , or unhappy , by willing or inconsiderate advancing any mens designs which are injurious to the publick good , while he confirms them by his consent ; nor must he be any occasion to hinder or defraud the publick of what is best , by any morose or perverse dissentings . . a king ought to be so humbly charitable , as to follow their advice , when it appears to be for the publick good , of whose affections to him he may have but few evidences to assure him . . god can as well bless honest errours , as blast fraudulent counsels . . since kings themselves must give an account of every evil and idle word in private , at god's tribunal ; they ought to be much more caresull of those solemn declarations of their mind , which are like to have the greatest influence upon the publick , either for woe , or weal. . the less unreasonable subjects consider what they ask , the more solicitous should a king be what he answers . . in time of civil war , though a king 's own and his people's pressures are grievous , and peace would be very pleasing ; yet should he not avoid the one , nor purchase the other with the least expence or wast of his conscience , whereof god alone is deservedly more master than himself . . so much cruelty among christians is acted under the colour of religion , as if we could not be christians , unless we crucifie one another . . if a king and his people love not god's truth as they ought , and practise it in charity , god may justly suffer a spirit of errour and bitterness , of mutual and mortal hatred to rise among them . . god who forgives wherein we sin , may sanctifie what we suffer . . repentance must be our recovery ( by god's mercy ) when our great sins have been our ruine . . the miseries a king and his kingdom have suffered being great , they may desire god so to account them , but withal , that their sins may appear to then consciences , as they are represented in the glass of god's judgments ; for god never punisheth small failings with severe afflictions . . they should farther desire , that their sins may be ever more grievous to them than god's judgments ; and be more willing to repent , than to be relieved : first asking of god the peace of penitent consciences , and then the tranquillity of united kingdoms . . god can drown the sins of a king and people at civil wars in the sea of our saviours bloud , and through the red sea of their own bloud bring them at last to a state of piety , peace , and plenty . . a king 's publick relations to all , make him share in all his subjects sufferings ; of which he ought to have such a pious sense , as becomes a christian king , and a loving father of his people . . god can make the scandalous and unjust reproaches cast upon a good king be as a breath , more to kindle his compassion , and give him grace to heap charitable coles of fire upon their heads to melt them , whose malice or cruel zeal hath kindled , or hindred the quenching of those flames , which may have much wasted his kingdomes . . ignorance or errour may sill men with rebellious and destructive principles , which they act under an opinion , that they do god good service . for these a king ought to pray god to lead them in the wayes of his saving truths . . a king may pray for the hand of god's justice to be against those , who maliciously and despightfully have raised , or fomented , cruel and desperate wars against him . . god is far from destroying the innocent with the guilty , and erronious with the malicious . . god that had pity on nineveh for the many children that were therein , will not easily give over the whole stock of a populous and seduced nation , to the wrath of those whose covetousness makes them cruel ; nor to their anger , which is too fierce , and therefore justly cursed . . god many times is pleased , in the midst of the furnace of his severe justice , to preserve a posterity , which may praise him for his mercy . . god will not deal with his king , according to man's unjust reproaches , but according to the iunocency of his hands in his sight . . if a king have desired or delighted in the wofull day of his kingdomes calamities ; if he have not earnestly studied , and faithfully endeavoured , the preventing and composing of the bloudy distractions in his kingdome , it is just that god's hand be against him and his fathers house . . a king that hath enemies enough of men , if his conscience do witness his integrity , may conditionally dare to imprecate god's curse upon him and his , to gain the world's opinion of his innocency , which god himself knowes right well ; provided that he trust not to his own merit , but gods mercies . . when the troubles of a king's soul are enlarged , it is the lord that must bring him out of his distress . . pious simpliciy is the best policy in a king. . they who have too much of the serpents subtilty , forget the doves innocency . . though hand joyn in hand , a king ( by gods assistance ) should never let them prevail against his soul , to the betraying of his conscience and honour . . god having turn'd the hearts of the men of judah and israel , they restored david with as much loyal zeal , as they did with inconstancy , and eargerness , pursue him . . a depressed king , in whom god preserves the love of his truth and uprightness , need not despair of his subjects affections returning towards him . . god can soon cause the overflowing seas to ebbe , and retire back again to the bounds which he has appointed for them . . he can as soon make them ashamed who trangress without a cause , and turn them back that persecute the soul of their king. . integrity and uprightness will preserve a king in distress , that waits upon the lord. . from just , moral , and indispensable bonds , which god's word in the lawes of a kingdom , have laid upon the consciences of men , no pretensions of piety and reformation are sufficient to absolve them , or engage them to any contrary practises . . nothing violent and injurious , can be religious . . god allowes no mans committing sacriledg , under the zeal of abhorring idols . . sacrilegious designs have sometimes the countenance of religious ties . . the wisest of kings hath taught all his successours , that it is a snare to take things that are holy , and after vowes to make enquiry . . a king ought never to consent to perjurious and sacriligious rapines , which set upon him the brand and curse to all posterity , of robbing god and his church of what his divine bounty had given , and his clemency had accepted , wherewith to encourage learning and religion . . though a king's treasures be exhausted , his revenues diminished , and his debts increased ; yet should he never be tempted to use prophane reparations , least a coal from god's altar set such a fire on his throne and conscience , as will be hardly quenched , . though the state recover by god's blessing of peace , yet the church is not likely in times where the charity of most men is grown cold , and their religion illiberal . . when god continues to those that serve him and his church all those incouragements , which by the will of pious donors , and the justice of the lawes are due unto them , they ought to deserve and use them aright to god's glory and the relief of the poor ; that his priests may be cloathed with righteousness , and the poor may be satisfied with bread . . rather than holy things should be given to swine , or the church's bread to dogs let them go about the city , grin like a dog , and grudg that they are not satisfied . ; . let those sacred morsels , which some men have by violence devoured , neither digest with them , nor theirs : let them be as naboth's vineyard to ahab , gall in their mouths , rottenness to their names , a moth to their families , and a sting to their consciences . . break in sunder , ô lord , all violent and sacrilegious confederations to do wickedly and injuriously . . divide their hearts and tongues who have bandyed together against the church and state , that the folly of such may be manifest to all men , and proceed no farther . . a king whose righteous dealing is favoured by god , in the mercies of the most high never shall miscary . . a king who is made the object of popular reproach , has his soul among lions , among them that are set on fire , even the sons of men , whose teeth are spears and arrowes , and their tongue a sharp sword . . those sons of men , that turn their kings glory into shame , love vanity , and seek after lies . . when wicked men on every side are set to reproach their king , if god hold his peace , the kings enemies will prevail against him , and lay his honour in the dust . . god shall destroy them that speak lies against their king ; and will abhor both the bloud-thirsty and deceitfull men . . god can make the kings righteousness appear as the light ; and his innocency to shine forth as the sun at noon-day . . a good king should pray , that god would not suffer his silence to betray his innocence , nor his displeasure his patience ; but that after his saviour's example , being reviled , he may not revile again ; and being cursed by his enemies , he may bless them . . god would not suffer shemei's tongue to go unpunished , whose judgments on david might seem to justifie his disdainfull reproaches . . hot burning coals of eternal fire should be the reward of false , and lying tongues against their king. . a king's prayer and patience should be as water to cool and quench their tongues , who are set on fire with the fire of hell , and tormented with those malicious flames . . the king is happy that can refute and put to silence mens evil speaking , by well-doing ; praying that they may not enjoy the fruit of their lips , but of his prayer , for their repentance , and god's pardon . . a king ought to learn david's patience and hezekia's devotion , that he may look to god's mercy through mens malice , and see his justice in their sin . . even sheba's seditious speeches , rabshekah's railing , and shemei's cursing , may provoke as a king 's humble prayer to god , so god's renewed blessing toward him . . though men curse , god may bless , and the afflicted king shall be blessed , and made a blessing to his people : and so the stone which some builders refuse , may become the head-stone of the corner . . if god look not down from heaven and save , the reproach of some men would swallow up their king. . god can hide the king in the secret of his presence from the pride of men , and keep him from the strife of tongues . . god's mercies are full of variety , and yet of constancy . . god denieth us not a new and fresh sense of our old and daily wants , nor despiseth renewed affections joined to constant expressions . . the matters of our prayers ought to be agreeable to god's will , which is alwayes the same ; and the fervency of our spirits , to the motions of his holy spirit in us . . god's spiritual perfections are such , as he is neither to be pleased with affected novelties for matter or manner , nor offended with the pious constancy of our petitions in them both . . a pious moderation of mens judgments is most commendable in matters of religion , that their ignorance may not offend others , nor their opinion of their own abilities tempt them to deprive others of what they may lawfully and devoutly use to help their infirmities . . the advantage of errour consists in novelty and variety ; as of truth , in unity and constancy . . the church is sometimes pest'red with errours , and deformed with undecencies in god's service , nnder the pretense of variety and novelty ; as deprived of truth , unity , and order , under this fallacy , that constancy is the cause of formality . . if god keep us from formal hypocrisie in our hearts , we know that praying to him , or praising of him ( with david and other holy men ) in the same formes , cannot hurt us . . if god gives us wisdom to amend what is amiss within us there will be less to amend without us . . the effects of blind zeal , and over-bold devotion , are such as god evermore defend , and deliver his church from them . . such should be the uprightness and tenderness of a king , whom god hath set to be a defender of the faith , and a protector of his church , as by no violence to be overborn against his conscience . . the deformation of the church , as to that government which derived from the apostles , had been retained in purest and primitive times , began when the revenues of the church became the object of secular envy , which still seeks to rob it of the incouragements of learning and religion . . a christian king should be as the good samaritan , compassionate and helpfull to god's afflicted church , which when some men have wounded and robbed , others pass by without regard either to pity , or relieve . . as the kings power is from god , so should he use it for god. . though a soveraign be not suffered to be master of his other rights as a king , yet should he preserve that liberty of reason , love of religion , and the churches welfare , which are fixed in his conscience as a christian . . sacriledg invades those temporal blessings which god's providence hath bestowed on his church for his glory . . some mens sins and errours deserve god's just permission to let in the wild boar , and the subtile foxes , to wast and deform his vineyard , which his right hand hath planted , and the dew of heaven so long watered a happy and flourishing estate . . his memory is cursed who bears the infamous brand to all posterity of being the first christian king in his kingdom who consented to the oppression of god's church , and the fathers of it ; whose errours he should rather , like constantine , cover with silence , and reform with meekness , than expose their persons and sacred functions to vulgar contempt . . their counsels bring forth and continue violent confusions , by a precipitant destroying the ancient boundaries of the churches peace , who mean to let in all manner of errours , schismes and disorders . . the god of order and of truth , doth in his own good time abate the malice , asswage the rage , and confound all the mischievous devices of his , the king 's , and his churches enemies . . the god of reason , and of peace , disdains not to treat with sinners , preventing them with offers of atonement , and beseeching them to be reconciled with himself ; abounding in mercy to save them , whom he wants not power or justice to destroy . . when god softens our hearts by the bloud of our redeemer , and perswades us to accept of peace with him ; then , as men and christians , are we enclied to procure and preserve peace among our selves . . a king should be content to be overcome , when god will have it so . . the noblest victory is over a man's self and his enemies by patience ; which was christ's conquest , and may well become a christian king. . god between both his hands , the right sometimes supporting , and the left afflicting , fashioneth us to that frame of piety he liketh best . . whe had need ask god forgiveness for the pride that attends our prosperous , and the repinings which follow our disastrous events . . when we go forth in our own strength , god withdraws his , and goes not forth with our armies . . let god be all , when we are something , and when we are nothing , that he may have the glory when we are in a victorious or inglorious condition . . it is hard measure , for a king to suffer evil from his subjects to whom he intends nothing but good ; and he cannot but suffer in those evils which they compel him to inflict upon them , punishing himself in their punishments . the third century . . a king , against whom his subjects take up armes , both in conquering , and being conquered , is still a sufferer ; in which case he needs a double portion of god's spirit , which only can be sufficient for him . . a king , in time of civil war , as he is most afflicted , so ought he to be most reformed , that he may be not only happy to see an end of the civil distractions , but a chief instrument to restore and establish a firm and blessed peace to his kingdoms . . the pious ambitions of all divided parties , should be , to overcome each other with reason , moderation , and such self denial , as becomes those , who consider that their mutual divisions are their common distractions , and the union of all is every good mans chiefest interest . . god for the sins of our peace , brings upon us the miseries of civil war , and for the sins of war , sometimes thinks fit to deny us the blessing of peace , so keeping us in a circulation of miseries ; yet even then he gives the king , if his servant , and all loyal , though afflicted subjects , to enjoy that peace , which the world can neither give to them , nor take from them . . god will not impute to a good king the bloud of his own subjects , which with infinite unwillingness and grief may have been shed by him , in his just and necessary defence , but will wash him in that pretious bloud which hath been shed for him by his great peace-maker , jesus christ , who will redeem him out of all his troubles . for , . the triumphing of the wicked is but short , and the joy of hypocrites is but for a moment . . god who alone can give us beauty for ashes , and truth for hypocrisie , will not suffer us to be miserably deluded with pharisaical washings , instead of christian reformings . . our great deformities being within , we ought to be the severest censurers , and first reformers of our own souls . . rash and cruel reformers bring deformities upon church and state. . factions kindle fires under the pretense of reforming . . god shewes the world by some mens divisions and confusions , what is the pravity of their intentions , and weakeness of their judgments . . they whom god's providence shall entrust with so great , good , and necessary a work , as is a christian and charitable reformation , ought to use such methods as wherein nothing of ambition , revenge , covetousness , or sacriledg , may have any influence upon their counsels . . inward piety may best teach king and people how to use the blessing of outward peace . . god whose wise and all-disposing providence ordereth the greatest contingencies of humane affairs , may make a king see the constancy of his mercies to him , in the greatest advantages god seems to ▪ give the malice of a king's enemies against him . . as god did blast the counsel of achitophel , turning it to david's good and his own ruine ; so can he defeat their design who intend by publishing ought they intercept of their king 's , nothing else but to render him more odious and contemptible to his people . . god can make the evil men imagine , and displeasure they intend against their king , so to return on their own heads , that they may be ashamed and covered with their own confusion , as with a cloak . . when the king's enemies use all means to cloud his honour , to pervert his purposes , and to slander the footsteps of god's anointed , god can give the king an heart content to be dishonoured for his sake , and his church's good . . when a king hath a fixed purpose to honour god , then god will honour him , either by restoring to him the enjoyment of that power and majesty which he had suffered some men to seek to deprive him of ; or by bestowing on him that crown of christian patience , which knowes how to serve him in honour , or dishonour ; in good report , or evil . . if god , who is the fountain of goodness and honour , cloathed with excellent majesty , make the king to partake of his excellency for wisdome , justice and mercy ; he shall not want that degree of honour and majesty which becomes the place , in which god hath set him , who is the lifter up of his head , and his salvation . . when a king knowes not what to do , his eyes must be toward god , who is the soveraign of our souls , and the only commander of our consciences ; to the protection of whose mercy , he must still commend himself . . god who hath preserved a king in the day of battel , can afterward shew his strength in his weakness . . god will be to a good king in his darkest night , a pillar of fire to enlighten and direct him ; in the day of his hottest affliction a pillar of cloud to overshadow and protect him ; he will be to him both a sun and a shield . . a king must not by any perversness of will , but through just perswasions of honour , reason and religion , hazard his person , peace and safety , against those that by force seek to wrest them from him . . a king's resolutions should not abate with his outward forces , having a good conscience to accompany him in his solitude and desertions . . a king must not betray the powers of reason , and that fortress of his soul , which he is intrusted to keep for god. . the king whom god leads in the paths of his righteousness , he will shew his salvation . . wh●n a kings wayes please god , god will make his enemies to be at peace with him . . when god who is infinitely good and great , is with the king , his presence is better than life ; and his service is perfect freedom . . the soveraign whom god ownes for his servant , shall never have cause to complain for want of that liberty which becometh a man , a christian , and a king. . a soveraign should desire to be blessed by god with reason , as a man ; with religion , as a christian ; and with constancy in justice , as a king. . though god suffer a king to be stript of all outward ornaments , yet he may preserve him ever in those enjoyments , wherein he may enjoy himself , and which cannot be taken from him against his will. . no fire of affliction should boyl over a king's passion to any impatience , or sordid fears . . though many say of an afflicted king , there is no help for him ; yet if god lift up the light of his countenance upon him , he shall neither want safety , liberty , nor majesty . . when a king's strength is scattered , his expectation from men defeated , his person restrained : if god be not far from him , his enemies shall not prevail too much against him . . when a king is become a wonder , and a scorn to many , god may be his helper and defender . . when god shewes any token upon an injur'd king for good , then they that hate him are ashamed , because the lord hath holpen and comforted him . . when god establisheth a king with his free spirit , he may do and suffer god's will , as he would have him . . god will be mercifull to that king , whose soul trusteth in him , and who makes his refuge in the shadow of god's wings , until all calamities be overpast . . a good king , though god kill him , will trust in his mercy , and his saviours merits . . so long as an afflicted king knoweth that his redeemer liveth , though god lead him through the vail and shadow of death , yet shall he fear no ill . . when a captive king is restrained to solitary prayers , what he wants of his chaplains help , god can supply with the more immediate assistances of his spirit , which alone will both enlighten his darkness , and quicken his dulness . . god who is the sun of righteousness , the sacred fountain of heavenly light and heat , can at once clear and warm the king's heart , both by instructing of him , and interceding for him . . god is all fullness ; from god is all-sufficiency ; by god is all acceptance ; god is company enough , and comfort enough ; god is king of the king ; god can be also his prophet , and his priest ; rule him ; teach him , pray in him , for him , and be ever with him . . the single wrestlings of jacob prevailed with god in that sacred duel , when he had none to second him but god himself ; who did assist jacob with power to overcome him , and by a welcome violence to wrest a blessing from him . the same assistance and success can god give , as he pleaseth , to the solitary prayers and devout contentions of a captive king. . the joint and sociated devotions of others , is a blessing unto a king , their fervency inflaming the coldness of his affections towards god , when they go up to , or meet in god's house with the voice of joy and gladness , worshiping god in the unity of spirits , and with the bond of peace . . a king ought to ask god forgiveness if guilty of neglect , and not improving the happy opportunities he had to meet priest and people in god's church . . a king sequester'd from the opportunities of publick worship , and private ass●stance of his chaplains , is as a pelican in the wilderness , a sparrow on the house top , and as a coal scattered from all those pious glowings , and devout reflections , which might best kindle , preserve and encrease the holy fire of divine graces , on the altar of his heart , whence the sacrifice of prayers , and incense of prayses might be duly offered up to god. . god that breaketh not the bruised reed , nor qu●ncheth the smoking flax , will not despise the weakness of a king's prayers , nor the smotherings of his soul in an uncomfortable loneness , to which he is constrained by some mens uncharitable denials of those helps , which he may much want , and no less desire . . the hardness of rebels hearts should occasion the softnings of a captive king 's to god , and for them ; their hatred should kindle his love ; their unreasonable denials of his religious desires , should the more excite his prayers unto god ; their inexorable deafness may encline god's ear to him , who is a god easie to be entreated . . god's ear is not heavy , that it cannot , nor his heart hard , that it will not hear ; nor his hand shortned that it cannot help a king , his suppliant in a desolate condition . . though god permit men to deprive a king of those outward means which he hath appointed in his church ; yet they cannot debar him from the communion of that inward grace which god alone breaths into humble hearts . . when god hath once made a king humble , he will teach him , he will hear him , he will help him ; for , the broken and contrite heart , god will not despise . . god can make a king in solitude , at once , his temple , his priest , his sacrifice , and his altar ; while from an humble heart he ( alone ) daily offers up , in holy meditations , fervent prayers , and unfeigned tears to god , who prepareth him for himself , dwelleth in him , and accepteth of him . . god who did cause by secret supplies , and miraculous infusions , that the handfull of meat in the vessel should not spend , nor the little oyle in the cruise fail the widow , during the time of drought and dearth , will look on a good king's soul , when as a widow , it is desolate and forsaken , will not permit those saving truths he had formerly learned , then to fail his memory ; nor the sweet effusions of his spirit , which he had sometime felt , then to be wanting to his heart , in the famine of ordinary and wholsome food , for the refreshing of his soul. . a captive king in solitude , may rather chuse to want the memory of the saving truths he had learned , or the sense of spiritual comforts he had formerly felt , than to feed from those hands , who mingle his bread with ashes , and his wine with gall , rather tormenting , than teaching him , whose mouths are proner to bitter reproaches of him , then to hearty prayers for him . . they who wrest the holy scriptures to their kings destruction , ( which are clear for their subjection , and his preservation ) hazard their souls damnation . . some men ( under the colour of long prayers ) have sought to devour the houses of their brethren , their king , and their god. . a distressed king may pray against their wickedness , whose very balms break his head , and their cordials oppress his heart , that he may be delivered from the poyson under their tongues , from the snares of their lips ; from the fire and the swords of their words ; and all those loyal and religious hearts , who desire and delight in the prosperity of his soul , and who seek by their prayers to relieve the sadness and solitude of their king. . though a distressed king may chance to say in his hast , that he is cast out of the sight of god's eyes ; nevertheless god may hear the voice of his supplication , when he cries unto him . . if the lord would be extreme to mark what is done amiss , who could abide it ? but there is mercy with him , that he may be feared , and therefore it is that sinners flie unto him . . a king , in the acknowledgment of his sins before god , should reflect upon the aggravation of his condition , the eminency of his place adding weight to his offences . . a king ought to beseech god to forgive as his personal , so his peoples sins , which are so far his , as he hath not improved the power that god gave him to his glory , and his subjects good . . god may justly , as to his over-ruling hand , bring a soveraign , who in many things has rebelled against him , from the glory and freedom of a king , to be a prisoner to his own subjects . . though god may permit a king's person to be restrained , yet he may enlarge his heart to himself , and his grace toward him . . god may give the comforts and the sure mercies of david to the king , who comes far short of david's piety , yet equals david in afflictions . . god may make the penitent sense a king has of his sins , become an evidence to him , that he hath pardoned them . . the evils which at any time a king and his kingdom hath suffered , should not seem little to him , though god punisheth them not according to their sins . . when the sorrowes of a king's heart are enlarged , in the importunity of his prayers , if god bring him not out of his troubles , he may expostulate with him , as having forgotten to be gracious , and to have shut up his loving kindness in displeasure . . an afflicted king may utterly faint , if he believe not to see the goodness of the lord in the land of the living . . the sins of our prosperity many times deprive us of the benefit of our afflictions . . it is happy for us , if the fiery tryal of affliction consume the dross which in long peace , and plenty , we have contracted . . though god continue our miseries , yet if he withdraw not his grace , what is wanting of prosperity , may be made up in patience and repentance . . an afflicted king , from whom god's anger is not yet to be turn'd away , but his hand of justice must be stretched out still , in the exuberance of charity , and self-condemnation , will beseech god , it may be against him , and his fathers house , pleading the innocence of his people , and asking , what those sheep have done . . though the sufferings of a king satiate not the malice of his and the church's enemies , yet should their cruelty never exceed the measure of his charity . . an injur'd king should ask grace to banish all thoughts of revenge , that he may not lose the reward , nor god the glory of his patience . . a king to whom god hath given a heart to forgive such as have rebelled against him , should beseech god to forgive them what they have done against both god and king. . an afflicted king , whom god in mercy remembers , and his kingdomes , . in continuing the light of his gospel , and setling his true religion among them . . in restoring to them the benefit of the lawes , and the due execution of justice . . in suppressing the many schismes in church , and factions in state. . in restoring him and his to the ancient rights , and glory of his predecessours . . in turning the hearts of the people to god in piety , to the king in loyalty , and to one another in charity . . in quenching the flames , and withdrawing the fewel of civil wars . . in blessing king and people with the freedom of publick councels , and delivering the honour of parliament from the insolency of the vulgar . . in keeping the king from the great offence of exacting any thing against his conscience , and especially from consenting to sacrilegious rapines , and spoilings of god's church . . in restoring him to a capacity to glorifie god in doing good both to the church and state. . in bringing him again with peace , safety , and honour , to his chiefest city and parliament , if chased from them . . in putting again the sword of justice into his hand , to punish and protect . . the soul of the said king ought to praise god , and magnifie his name before his people . . to hold god's glory dearer to him than his crowns . . to make the advancement of true religion both in purity and power to be his chiefest care . . to rule his people with justice , and his kingdoms with equity . . to own ever to god's more immediate hand , as the rightfull succession , so the mercifull restauration of his kingdoms , and the glory of them . . to make all the world see this , and his very enemies enjoy the benefit hereof . . a restored king , as he should freely pardon , for christ's sake , those that have offended him in any kind : so his hand should never be against any man to revenge what is past in regard of any particular injury done to him . . when a king and people have been mutually punished in their unnatural divisions , the king should , for god's sake , and for the love of his redeemer , purpose this in his heart ; that he will use all means in the wayes of amnesty and indempnity , which may most fully remove all fears , and bury all jealousies in forgetfullness . . as a king's resolutions of truth and peace are toward his people : so may he expect god's mercies to be toward him and his . . god will hear the king's prayer , which goeth not out of feigned lips . . if a king commit the way of his soul to the lord , and trust in him , he shall bring his desire to pass . . a king ought not to charge god foolishly , who will not restore him and his ; but to bless his name , who hath given and taken away ; praying to god that his people and the church may be happy , if not by him , yet without him . . god , who is perfect unity in a sacred trinity , will in mercy behold king and people , whom his justice may have divided . . they who at any time have agreed to fight against their king , may as much need his prayers and pity , as he deliverance from their strivings , when ready to fight against one another to the continuance of the distractions of his kingdoms . . the wayes of peace consist not in the divided wills of parties , but in the point and due observation of the lawes . . a king should be willing to go whither god will lead him by his providence , desiring god to be ever with him , that he may see god's constancy in the worlds variety and changes . . the king whom god makes such as he would have him , may at last enjoy the safety and tranquillity which god alone can give him . . god's heavy wrath hangs justly over those populous cities , whose plenty addes fewel to their luxury ; whose wealth makes them wanton ; whose multitudes tempt them to security ; and their security exposeth them to unexpected miseries . . to whom god gives not eyes to see , hearts to consider , nor wills to embrace , and courage to act those things which belong to his glory and the publick peace ; their calamity comes upon them as an armed man. . rebellious cities and p●●●● cannot want enemies who ab●●●● in sin ; nor shall they be long undisarmed and undestroyed , who with a high hand persisting to fight against god , and the clear convictions of their own consciences , fight more against themselves , than ever they did against thier king ; their sins exposing them to gods justice , their riches to others injuries , their number to tumults , and their tumults to confusion . . a depressed king should have so much charity as to pray , that his fall be not their ruine who have with much forwardness helped to destroy him . . an injur'd king should not so much consider either what rebellious people have done , or he hath suffered , as to forget to imitate his crucified redeemer ; to plead their ignorance for their pardon , and , in his dying extremities , to pray to god his father to forgive them who know not what they did . . they who have denied tears to their king in his saddest condition , may need his prayers for god's grace to bestow them upon themselves , who the less they weep for him , the more cause they have to weep for themselves . . a king should pray that his bloud may not be upon them and their children , whom the fraud and faction of some , not the malice of all , have excited to crucifie him . . god can , and will , both exalt , and perfect , a good king by his sufferings , which have more in them of god's mercy , than of man's cruelty , or god's own justice . . god that is king of kings , who filleth heaven and earth , who is the fountain of eternal life , in whom is no shadow of death , is both the just afflicter of death upon us , and the mercifull saviour of us in it , and from it . . it is better for us to be dead to our selves , and live in god , than by living in our selves , to be deprived of god. . god can make the many bitter aggravations of a soveraign's violent death , as a man , and a king , the opportunities and advantages of his special graces and comforts in his soul , as a christian . . if god will be with the king , he shall neither fear , nor feel , any evil , though he walk through the valley of the shadow of death . the fourth century . . to contend with death , is the work of a weak and mortal man , to overcome it , is the grace of him alone who is the almighty and immortal god. . our saviour , who knowes what it is to dye with a king , as a man , can make the king to know what it is to pass through death to life with him his god. . let a distressed king say , though i dye , yet i know that thou my redeemer livest for ever : though thou slayest me , yet thou hast encouraged me to trust in thee for eternal life . . god's favour is better to a distressed king than life . . as god's omniscience discovers , so his omnipotence can defeat the designs of those , who have , or shall conspire the destruction of their king. . god can shew an injur'd king the goodness of his will through the wickedness of theirs that would destroy him . . god gives a distr●ssed king leave , as a man , to pray , that the cup [ of death ] may pass from him ; but he has taught him , as a christian , by the example of christ , to adde , not my will , but thine be done . . god , by resolving the king's will into his own , can make them both become one . . the desire of life should not be so great in a distressed king , as that of doing or suffering god's will in either life , or death . . god can make a king content to leave the worlds nothing , that he may come really to enjoy all in him , who hath made christ unto him , in life gain , and in death advantage . . though the destroyers of their king forget their duty to god and him , yet he ought to beseech god not to forget to be mercifull to them . . there is no profit in a king's bloud , nor in gaining his kingdoms from him , if they lose their own souls that do it . . an injur'd king ought to pray for such as have not only resisted his just power , but wholely usurped and turned it against ●im , that though they may have d●served , yet that they may not rece●ve , damnation to themselves . . god that made his son a saviour to many that crucifi●d him , while at once he suffered violently by them , and yet willingly for them , will at the instance of a devoted king , hear the voyce of christ's bloud call louder for regicides , than the cry of the king's bloud against them . . let a king pray for his murtherers , that god would prepare them for his mercy by due convictions of their sin , and not let them at once deceive and damn their own souls by fallacious p●etensions of justice in destroying him , while the conscience of their unjust usurpation of their king's power chiefly tempts them to use all extremities against him . . the mercies of regicides are very false , and so very cruel unto their king , who , while they pretend to preserve him , meditate nothing but his ruine . . god can deal with bloud-thirsty and deceitfull men otherwise than they deserve , by overcoming their cruelty with his compassion , and the charity of their devoted king. . when god maketh inquisition for royal bloud , the souls which he sindeth penitent , though polluted , he can sprinkle with the bloud of his son , and then the destroying angel shall pass over them . . though regicides in design think any kingdom on earth too little to entertain at once both themselves and their king ; yet he ought to pray that the capacious kingdom of god's infinite mercy may at last receive them both . . when king and people be reconciled in the bloud of the same redeemer , they shall come at last to live far above the ambitious desires which begat mortal enmities between them . . when the hands of regicides shall be heaviest and cruellest upon their king , if he fall into the armes of god's tender and eternal mercies , he shall be safe . . what is cut off of a king's life in the miserable moment of a violent death , may be repayed in god's ever-blessed eternity . . the king , whose eyes have seen gods salvation , shall depart in peace . finis . caroli i mi monita & observata britannica . the prudential advice and observations of king charles i. relating to the policie of his britannike kingdoms . collected and published by richard watson . homer odys : ● . — 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 — . london , printed for robert horn , . to the reader . friend , although the aphorismes , in the two former divisions , are made generall , to serve the good purpose of any prince , and his people , to whom the like calamities are incident , as were the sad experiments of our own , which prompted the spirit of wisdome to their production ; yet the guilt of our sinnes , and remembrance of our sufferings , will make us easily sensible of their more peculiar reflexion upon our selves . this century , with the surplusage , points so directly upon our kingdome , as we have no way to avoid the seasonable importunity of the counsel and instruction ; and , knowing what it cost his majesty that left it , are inexcusably miserable , if we put not the best value upon it by our observance . we hear much of book-cases , and precedents , in contests and pleadings for mens personal propriety ; i know no reason , why such rules , and instances , as these , should not be alike positive , and prevalent for publick interest , the prerogative of the king , and priviledges of the church . one calls the sword , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , that the souldier should ever have ready and at hand ; i could wish this might be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the king-and parliament-mans manuall , not so much to reproach him with the unworthiness of some of his factious predecessours , as to instruct him , by the fatality of such examples , to a future sobriety in his votes , and moderation in his publick desires , or demands . if you and i cannot help the extravagant deviations , that may yet hereafter willfully be made from the assured steadiness of this royal canon ; we may at least be satisfied in our own aversion from the ordinances of men , that imagine mischief for law , and betray their trust , to the second ruine of their country , à dieu . your servant , richard watson . c. i. monita , &c. britannica . the first century . . the kings of england should call their parliaments , not more by others advice , and the necessity of their affairs , than by their own choice and inclination . . the right way of parliaments is most safe for the crown , and best pleasing to the people . . when some mens distempers study to kindle sparks in parliaments , the king may hope to extinguish them by forbearing to convene for some years . . the king resolving with himself to give all just satisfaction to modest and sober desires , and to redress all publick grievances in church and state , may hope by his freedom , and the members moderation , to prevent all misunderstandings , and miscariages in the parliament he calls . . elections of parliament men , are many times carried in many places with partiality and popular heat . . the king knowing best the largeness of his own heart toward his peoples good and just contentment , may please himself in the hopes of a good and firm understanding , which by a parliament may grow between him and them . . the king should resolve to reform what by free and full advice in parliament he is convinced to be amiss ; and to grant what ever his reason and conscience tells him is sit to be desired . . though the king resolve not to imploy in his affairs a questiond minister of state against the advice of his parliament ; yet he should not have any hand in his death , of whose guiltlesness he is better assured , than any man living can be . . the peoples clamours for justice in exorbitance of fury is not to be regarded , when they mean thereby the king and two houses of parliament should vote as they would have them . . a tumultuous parliaments after-act vacating the authority of the precedent for future imitation [ in case of bloud ] sufficiently tells the world , that some remorse toucheth them that are most implacable against the person , as if knowing he had hard measure , and such as they would be very loth should be repeted to themselves . . the tenderness and regret the king may find in his soul , for having had any hand though very unwillingly ) in shedding one man's bloud unjustly ( though under the colour and formalities of justice , and pretenses of avoyding publick mischief ) may be hop'd to be some evidence before god and man to all posterity ; that he is far from bearing justly the vast load and guilt of all the bloud shed in an unhappy civil war , as his rebels charge upon him . to overawe the freedom of the houses of parliament , or to weaken their just authority by any violent impressions upon them , is a design unworthy of the king , who shall not need so rough assistance , if he have justice and reason on his side . . popular tumults are not the best removers of obstructions in parliaments , which rather infringe all freedome or differing in votes , and debating matters with reason and candor . . when the obstinacy of men in parliament , resolved to discharge their consciences , must be subdued by tumults , it may be feared , that by the same all factious , seditious , and scismatical proposals against government ecclesiastical , or civil , will be backed and abetted till they prevail . . the riot and impatience of popular tumults is such , that they will not stay the ripening and season of counsels , or fair production of acts , in the order , gravity , and deliberateness , besitting a parliament ; but will rip up with barbarous cruelty , and forcibly cut out abortive votes , such as their inviters , and incouragers most fancy . . when tumults are become so insolent , that there is no securing of the king's freedom in parliament , nor of his very person in the streets , he is not bound by his presence to provoke them to higher boldness and contempts . . when , and only when , parliaments , in their first election , and constitution , sit full and free , as in all reason , honour , and religion , they ought to be , things may be so carried , as will give no less content to all good men , than they wish or expect . . it may prove unhappy to convene a parliament , where the place affords the greatest confluence of various and vitious humours . . the king , when he calls a parliament , should purpose to contribute what in justice , reason , honour , and conscience , he can , to the happy success of it ; nor should it have any other design in him , but the general good of his kingdoms . . triennial parliaments , in a kingdom , as gentle and seasonable physick , might ( if well applied ) prevent any distempers from getting head , or prevailing , especially if the remedy prove not a disease beyond all remedy . . some men , when they meet in parliament , occasion more work than they find to do , by undoing so much as they find well done to their hands . . the perpetuating a parliament is an act of highest confidence , whereby a king hopes to shut out and lock the dore , upon all present jealousies , and future mistakes , but intends not thereby to exclude himself , as some may requite him . . those subjects are unworthy of an indulgent king , who deceive his extreme confidence by ill using any act of grace wherein he declares so much to trust them , as to deny himself in a high point of his prerogative . . a continual parliament by preserving lawes in their due execution and vigour ( but no otherwise ) may be thought , until experiment shew a fallacy , the best means to keep the commonweal in tune . . the agreeing votes of the major part in both houses of parliament are not , by any law , or reason , conclusive to the judgment of their king ; nor do they carry with them his consent , whom they in no kind represent . . the king is not further bound to agree with the votes of both houses , then he sees them agree with the will of god , with his just rights , as a king , and the general good of his people . . the members of parliament , as many men , are seldom of one mind ; and it is oft seen , that the major part of them are not the right . . the majesty of the crown of england is not bound by any coronation oath to consent to whatever its ▪ subjects in parliament shall require . . the coronation oath is discharged by the king 's governing by such lawes as his people with the house of peers have chosen , and himself hath consented unto . . the king should give no ear to the importunity of his parliament , when , instead of reason and publick concernments , they obtrude nothing but what makes for the interest of parties , and flowes from the partialities of private wills and passions . . every subject is bound to stand to the sentence of parliament according to law. . where an orderly guard is granted unto the parliament , no account in reason can be given for the not suppressing tumults , but only to oppress both the king 's and the two houses freedom of declaring and voting according to every mans conscience . . the king should not by power protect any against the justice of parliament . . it is justifiable for men in parliament to withdraw , who fear the partiality of their trial ( warned by any sad president ) while the vulgar threaten to be their oppressours , and judgers of their judges . . when factious tumults overbear not the freedom and honour of the two houses ; but they assert their justice against them , and make the way open for all the members quietly to come and declare their consciences , no man should be so dear unto their king , as whom he should have the least inclination to advise either to withdraw himself , or deny appearing upon their summons . . though the king may approve ( in some cases ) mens generous constancy and cautiousness ; yet further than that he should never allow any mans refractoriness against the priviledges and orders of the houses , to whom he ought to wish nothing more than safety , fullness , and freedom . . those men that despair in fair and parliamentary wayes by free deliberations , and votes , to gain the concurrence of the major part of lords and commons , betake themselves ( when they have interest ) by the desperate activity of factious tumults , to sift and terrifie away all those members , whom they see to be of contrary minds to their purposes . . bishops ought to enjoy their ancient places , and undoubted priviledges in the house of peers . . bills in parliament are not to be brought on by tumultuary clamours and schismatical terrours , and passed when both houses are sufficiently thinned and over-awed . . the king , beside the grounds he may have in his own judgment , has also a most strickt and indispensable oath upon his conscience , to preserve the order of bishops , and the rights of the church to which most sacrilegious and abhorred perjury , most unbeseeming a christian king , should he ever , by giving his consent , be betrayed , he might account it infinitely greater misery , than any had , or could befall him ; . the king puts much to the adventure , who by satisfying the fears and importunities of unquiet subjects , both to secure his friends , and overcome his enemies , to gain the peace of all , deprives himself of a sole power to help or hurt any , yielding the militia to be disposed of as the two houses shall think sit . . the militia is the king 's undoubted right , no less than the crown . . the king should not desire to be safer than he wisheth the parliament and his people . . the new modelling of soveraignty and kingship , makes the majesty of the kings of england hang like mahomet's tomb , by a magnetique charme , between the power and priviledges of the two houses , in an ayery imagination of regality . . the body of parliament , as the moon from the sun , receiveth its chiefest light from the king. . parliament-men may remember that they sit there as their kings subjects , not superiours , called to be his counsellors not dictatours : their summons extends to recommend their advice , not to command his duty . . when the two houses have once been in the wardship of tumults , their propositions are not to be hearkned to , until they shall have sued out their livery , and effectually redeem'd themselves . . when the king's judgment tells him , that any propositions sent to him are the results of the major part of their votes , who exercise their freedom , as well as they have right to sit in parliament , ( and not before ) he may expect his own judgment for not speedily and fully concurring with every one of them . . the king cannot allow the wisdom of his parliament such a completeness and inerrability as to exclude himself . . a parliament , without the concurrent reason of the king , cannot beget , or bring forth , any one complete and authoritative act of publick wisdom which makes the lawes . . a king may satisfie his parliament and his people ; but for fear or flattery to gratifie any faction , how potent soever , were to nourish the disease , and oppress the body . . the end of calling a parliament , being to use their advice that sit , the king ought to have charity enough to think there are wise men among them , and humility enough to think it fit he should in some things hearken to them , whose counsel he may want . . the suns influence is not more necessary in all natures productions , then the king's concurrence in all lawes . . we are to take heed of , and beware the old leaven of innovations masked under the name of reformation , which heaved at , and sometime threatned , both prince and parliament in queen elizabeth's and king james's dayes . . reason , honour , and safety , both of church and state , command the king to chew such morsels as a factious parliament may present him with , before he lets them down . . the king hath not any ground of credulity to induce him fully to submit to all the desires of those men , who will not admit , or do refuse , and neglect to vindicate the freedom of their own and others sitting and voting in parliament . . i know not any such tough and malignant humours in the constitution of the english church , which gentler applications , than those of an army , raised by their scotch fellow subjects , might not easily remove . . if the scotch sole presbytery were proved to be the only institution of jesus christ yet were it hard to prove , that christ had given subjects commission by the sword to set it up in any kingdom , without the soveraigns consent . ; . if presbytery in the supremacy of subjects be an institution of christ , it is the first and onely point of christianity that was to be planted and watered with christian bloud . . the many learned and pious churchmen in england , who have been alwayes bred up in , and conformable to the government of episcopacy , cannot so soon renounce both their former opinion and practise , only because a party of the scots will needs by force assist a like party of english , either to drive all ministers as sheep into the common fold of ●resbytery , or destroy them , at least fleece them , by depriving them of the benefit of their flock . . what respect and obedience christ and his apostles payd to the chief governours of states , where they lived , is very clear in the gospel but that he or they ever commanded to set such a parity of presbyters , and in such a way as some scots endeavour , is not very disputable . ; . the effusions of blood shed for the advancement of scotch presbitery runs in a stream contrary to that of the primitive planters both of christianity and episcopacy , which was with patient sheding of their own bloud , not violent drawing other mens . . wise and learned men think , that nothing hath more markes of schism and sectarism than the presbyterian way . . the presbyterian scots are not to be hired at the ordinary rate of auxiliaries nothing will induce them to engage , till those that call them in have pawned their souls to them , by a solemn league and covenant ; . some pretenders , of late , to reformation , have intended mainly the abasing of episcopacy into presbytery , and the robbing the church of its lands and revenues . . the bishops and church-men , as the fattest deer , must be destroyed , when the other rascal-herd of schisms , heresies , &c. being lean may ( by these men ) enjoy the benefit of toleration . . if the poverty of scotland might , yet the plenty of england cannot excuse the envy and rapine of the churches rights and revenues . . there is not any exception to which the best kings may be so liable in the opinion of them who are resolved to oppose them , as too great a fixedness in that religion , whose judicious and solid grounds , both from scripture and antiquity , will not give his conscience leave to approve , or consent to , those many dangerous and divided innovations which their bold ignorance would needs obtrude upon him and his people . . there is not such an oglio or medley of various religions in the world again , as those men entertain in their service , who find most fault with the king that adheres to the establishment of the church without any scruple as to the diversity of their sects and opinions . it hath been a foul and indeleble shame for such as would be counted protestants , to inforce their lord and king , a declared protestant , to a necessary use of papists or any other , who did but their duty to help him to defend himself . . the papists have had a greater sense of their allegeance than many protestant professours who seem to have learned , and to practise , the worst principles of the worst papists . ; . the king is not to justifie beyond humane errours and frailties himself , or his councellours , who may have been subject to some miscarriages , yet such as were far more reparable by second and better thoughts , than those enormous extravagances , wherewith some men have wildred and almost quite lost both church and state. . the event of things may make evident to the people , that should the king follow the worst counsels that his worst counsellours might have the boldness to offer him , or himself any inclination to use , he could not bring both church and state in three flourishing kingdoms to such a chaos of confusions , & hell of miseries , as some have done , who most clamour against his counsels , out of which they can not , or will not , in the midst of their many great advantages , redeem either him or his subjects . . some mens unsatiable desires of revenge upon the king , his court , and his clergy may wholely beguile both church and state of the benefit of any either retractations or concessions he may have made . . some men being conscious to their own formality in the use of our publick liturgy , have thought they fully expiated their sin of not using it aright , by laying all the blame upon it , and a total rejection of it as a dead letter , thereby to excuse the deadness of their hearts . . i do not see any reason , why christians should be weary of a well-composed liturgy ( as i hold ours to be ) more than of all other things , wherein the constancy abates nothing of the excellency and usefullness . . sure , we may as well before hand know what we pray , as to whom we pray , and in what words , as to what sense when we desire the same things , what hinders we may not use the same words . ; . i ever thought , that the proud oftentations of mens abilities for invention , and the vain affectations of ●ariety for expression● in publick prayer , or any sacred administrations , merits a greater brand of sin , than that which they call coldness and barrenness : nor are men in those novelties less subject to formal and superficial tempers ( as to their hearts ) than in the use of constant forms , where not the words , but mens hearts , are to blame . . i make no doubt but a man may be very formal in the most extemporary variety , and very fervently devout in the most wonted expressions . nor is god more a god of variety than of constancy . . i am not against a grave , modest , discreet and humble use of ministers gifts , even in publick , the better to fit and excite their own and the peoples affections to the present occasions . . i know no necessity why private and single abilities should quite justle out and deprive the church of the joint abilities and concurrent gifts of many learned and godly men , such as the composers of the service-book were , who may in all reason be thought to have more gifts and graces enabling them to compose with serious deliberation and concurrent advice such forms of prayers , as may best fit the churches common wants , inform the hearers understanding , and stir up that siduciciary and fervent application of their spirits ( wherein consists the very life and soul of prayer , and that so much pretended spirits of prayer ) than any private man by his solitary abilities can be presumed to have . . what such mens solitary abilities are many times ( even there where they make a great noise and shew ) the affectations ▪ emptiness , impertinency , ●udeness , confusions , flatness , levity , obscurity , vaine and ridulous repetitions , the sensless and oft-times blasphemous expressions , all these burthened with a most tedious and intolerable length , do fufficiently convince all men , but those who glory in that pharisaïcal way . . men must be strangely impudent and flatterers of themselves not to have an infinite shame of what they so do and say , in things of so sacred a nature , before god and the church , after so ridiculous and indeed prophane a manner . . in sacramental administrations , ministers own forms , to be used constantly , are not like to be so sound or comprehensive of the nature of the duty , as forms of publick composure . . in sacramental administrations and the like , every time to affect new expressions , when the subject is the same , can hardly be presumed in any mans greatest sufficiences not to want ( many times ) much of that compleatness , order , and gravity , becoming those duties , which by the mean , are exposed at every celebration to every ministers private infirmities , indispositions , errours , disorders , and defects , both for judgment and expression . . the want of a constant liturgy of publick composure this church will sufficiently feel , when the unhappy fruits of many mens ungoverned ignorance and confident defects shall be discovered in a multitude of errours , schismes , disorders , and uncharitable distractions in religion . . the innovations which law , reason , and religion forbids , must not be brought in and abetted , much less so obtruded as wholly to justle out the publick liturgy of the church . . the severity of those men is partial and inexcusable , who cried out of the rigour of lawes and bishops , which suffered them not to use the liberty of conscience , which they deny others , having the power in their hands . . they who suddenly changed the liturgy into a directory , seem to have thought that the spirit needed help for invention , though not for expressions . . matter prescribed doth as much stint and obstruct the spirit , as if it were clothed in and confined to fit words . . this matter of the publick liturgy is of so popular a nature , as some men knew it would not bear learned and sober debates , least being convinced by the evidence of reason , as well as lawes , they should have been driven either to sin more against their knowledg , by taking it away , or to displease some faction of the people , by continuing the use of it . . they that use such severity as not to suffer , without penalty , any to use the common-prayer-book publickly , although their consciences bind them to it , as a duty of piety to god , and obedience to the lawes , i believe have offended more considerable men ▪ not only for their numbers and estates , but for their weighty and judicious piety , than those are , whose weakness or giddiness they sought to gratifie by taking it away . . one of the greatest faults some men found with the common prayer book , i believe was this , that it taught them to pray so oft for their king to which petitions they had not loyalty enough to say amen , nor yet charity enough to forbear reproaches , and even cursings of him in their own forms , instead of praying for him. ; . i wish their r●pentance may be their only punishment , that seeing the mischiess which the disuse of publ●ck liturgies hath produced , they may restore that credit , use , and reverence to them , which by the ancient churches were given to set forms if sound and wholesome words . . to such as have any jealousie , that the king is earnest and resolute to maintain the church-government by bishops , not so much out of piety as policy and reason of state , this may be said , that he being ( as king ) intrusted by god and the lawes with the good both of church and state , there is no reason he should give up , or weaken , by any change , that power and influence which in right and reason he ought to have over both . . as the king is not to incline to bishops for any use to be made of their votes in state-affairs so neither should he think any bishops worthy to sit in the house of peers , who would not vote according to his conscience . ; . the king must in charity be thought desirous to preserve that government in its right constitution , as a matter of religion , wherein his judgment is fully satisfied , that it has of all other both the fullest scripture-grounds , and , until the last century , the constant practise of all christian churches . . the king that has no temptation to invite him to alter the government of bishops ( that he may have a title to their estates ) will not easily believe their pretended grounds to any new wayes , who desire a change . . some there are , who by popular heaps of weak light , and unlearned teachers , seek to overlay and smother the pregnancy and authority of that power of episcopal government , which beyond all equivocation and vulgar fallacy of names , is most convincingly set forth , both by scripture , and all after-histories of the church . . the king should have fair grounds both from scripture , canons and ecclesiastical examples , whereon to state his judgment for episcopal government , and not permit any policy of state , or obstinacy of will , or partiality of affection either to the men , or their function , to fix him. the second century . . all the churches in the christian world , which presbyterians , or independants , can pretend to , are by so much fewer than others governed by bishops , as those in my three kingdoms will equalize ( i think ) if not exceed . . oppression will necessarily follow both the presbyterian parity , which makes all ministers equal ; and the independant inferiority , which sets their pastors below the people . . the britannike bishops are as legally invested in their estates , as any who seek to deprive them : and they having by no law been convicted of those crimes which might forfeit their estates and livelihoods , the king , without many personal injustices to many worthy men , can give up neither their order , nor revenue . . those subjects in vain pretend to tenderness of conscience and reformation , who can at once tell the king , that his coronation-oath binds him to consent to whatsoever they shall propound to him , though contrary to all the rational and religious freedom which every man ought to preserve ; and at the same time perswade him , that he must , and ought to dispense with , and roundly break , that part of his oath which binds him ● agreeable to the best light of reason and religion he hath ) to maintain the government and legal rights of the church . . it were strange , the king's oath should be valid in that part which both himself and all men in their own case esteem injurious and unreasonable , as being against the very natural and essential liberty of their souls , yet it should be invalid and to be broken in another clause , wherein he thinks himself justly obliged both to god and man. . i cannot find that in any reformed churches ( whose patterns are so cryed up and obtruded upon the churches under my dominions ) that either learning or religion , works of piety or charity , have so flourished , beyond what they have done in my kingdoms , by god's blessing , which might make me believe either presbytery , or independancy , have a more benign influence upon the church and mens hearts and lives , than episcopacy in its right constitution . . they who take part with the king in a civil war , have clearly , and undoubtedly , for their justification , the word of god , and the lawes of the land , together with their own oathes ; all requiring obedience to his just commands ; but to none other under heaven without him , or against him , in the point of raising armes . . the king should be well pleased with his parliaments intentions , to reform what the indulgence of times and corruption of manners may have depraved . . the king may be willing to grant , or restore to presbytery what with reason or discretion it can pretend to in a conjuncture with episcopacy : but , for that wholly to invade the power , and by the sword to arrogate , and quite abrogate the authority of episcopacy , is neither just , as to that ancient order , nor safe for presbytery , nor yet any way convenient for this church or state. . the contentions between the presbyterians and independants in the britannike churches , have been the struglings of those twins which one womb enclosed , the yonger striving to prevail against the elder what the presbyterians hunted after , the independants sought , and caught for themselves . ; . that the builders of babel should from division fall to confusion , is no wonder : but for those that pretend to build jerusalem to divide their tongues and hands , is but an ill omen , and sounds too like the fury of those zelots , whose intestine bitterness and divisions , were the greatest occasion of the last fatal destruction of that city . . the independants in this seemd more ingenuous than the presbyterian rigour , who sometimes complaining of exacting their conformity to lawes became the greatest exactors of other mens submission to their novel injunctions . . the king should alwayes wish so well to parliament and city , that he should be sorry to see them do , or suffer , any thing unworthy such great and considerable bodies in this kingdom . . when such bodies become restive and refractory against soveraignty , the king may be glad to see them scared and humbled , by tumults or otherwise , but not broken by that shaking ; of whom he should never have so ill a thought , as to despair of their loyalty to him , which mistakes may eclipse , but he should never believe malice can quite put out . . when parliament or city are not only divided , and separated from the king , but brought to intestine confusion within themselves , he should look upon them as christ did sometime over jerusalem , as objects of his prayers , and tears , with compassionate grief , as foreseeing those severer scatterings which will certainly befal such as wantonly refuse to be gathered to their duty . . the best profession of religion i have ever esteemed that of the church of england , as coming nearest to gods word for doctrine , and to the primitive examples for government , with some little amendment , which i have often offered , though in vain . . all the lesser factions at first were officious servants to presbytery , their great master : till time , and military success , discovering to each their peculiar advantages , invited them to part stakes , and leaving the joynt stock of uniform religion , pretended each to drive for their party the trade of profits and preferments , to the breaking and undoing , not only of the church and state , but even of presbytery it self , which seemed , and hoped , at first , to have ingrossed all . . in the administration of justice , the settled lawes of the britannike kingdoms are the most excellent rules the king can govern by , which by an admirable temperament give very much to subjects industry , liberty and happiness ▪ and yet reserve enough to the majesty and prerogative of any king , who owns his people as subjects , not as slaves ; whose subjection , as it preserves their property , peace and safety , so it will never diminish his rights , nor their ingenuous liberties , which consist in the injoyment of the fruits of their industry , and the benefit of those lawes , to which themselves have consented . . no subjects can , without an high degree of guilt , and sin , devest the king of those enjoyments , which the lawes have assigned to him. . the king , in uncertain times , is to require and entreat the prince his son , as his father , and his king , that he never suffer his heart to receive the least check against , or disaffection from , the true religion established in the church of england . . after trial , much search , and many disputes , i conclude the religion of the church of england to be the best in the world , not only in the community , as christian , but also in the special notion , as reformed , keeping the middle way between the pomp of superstitious tyranny , and the meanness of fantastick anarchy . . the drought being excellent , as to the main , both for doctrine , and government in the church of england , some lines ( as in very good figures ) may happily need some sweetning , or polishing , which might have easily been done by a safe and gentle hand , if some mens precipitancy had not violently demanded such rude alterations , as would have quite destroyed all the beauty , and proportions of the whole . . the king is not to entertain any aversation or dislike of parliaments , which in their right constitution with freedom , and honour , will never injure , or diminish , his greatness , but will rather be as interchangings of love , loyalty , and confidence between a prince , and his people . . the sad effects that have issued from the insolencies of popular dictates , and tumultuary impressions , should make parliaments more cautious to preserve that freedom and honour , which belong to such assemblies . . nothing can be more happy for all , than in fair , grave , and honourable wayes , to contribute their councels in common , enacting all things by publick consent , without tyranny , or tumults . . after the storm of civil dissension and war , wherein the folly and wickedness of some men have so far ruined , as to leave nothing intire in church or state , to the crown , the nobility , the clergy , or the commons , either as to lawes , liberties , estates , order , honour , conscience or lives , the yong prince that succeeds , should be an anchor , or harbour rather to the tossed and weather-beaten kingdoms , a repairer of the ruines by his wisdom , justice , piety , and valour . . the king cannot ( in what extremity soever ) suffer any diminution of the churches patrimony , or alienation of it , it being without paradventure sacriledg ▪ and likewise contrary to his coronation-oath . . the government of the church , according to its constitution in england , is a chief column , and support , to the monarchy and crown . . the greatest means to make a parliament happy is , that the king on his part , and the members thereof on theirs , lay aside all suspicion one of another . . the navy , and forts , are the walls and defence of this kingdom , which if out of order , all men may easily judge what encouragement it will be to our enemies , and what disheartning to our friends . . the king can no way consent that the voyces of bishops in parliament should be taken away , which they have enjoy'd since , and before , the conquest , and is one of the fundamental constitutions of this kingdom . . often parliaments is the fittest mean to keep correspondency between the king and his people . . neither queen elizabeth , nor [ my father ] king james did ever avow , that any priest , in their time , was executed meerly for religion : the inconveniences that by this severity may fall to the king's subjects , and other protestants abroad , ought to be considered by any parliament that presses it . . the parliament that takes the government all in pieces , must do like a skillfull watchmaker , to make clean his watch , who takes it asunder , puts it again together , but leaves not out one pin , if he means to have it go better . . the parliament ought not to wish more , than they can shew the king the way how conveniently it may be done . . it is the great expression of trust the king has in the affections of his parliament unto him , when before they do any thing for him , he puts a confidence in them by his gracious concessions . . if any person durst be so impudent as to move the king to alter the lawes , he ought to put such a mark upon him , as from which all posterity might know his intention was ever to govern by the law , and no otherwise . . that parliament is not to alledg against the king his deceiving their expectation in the time of his return ( having departed with their consent ) who as much , and more , have deceived him in the condition , for proceeding in his affairs . . when the king sends a serjeant at armes to his parliament ; he may expect obedience , not a message . . in cases of treason , no person hath a priviledg by being a member of the parliament . . the king should alwayes be as tender of any thing which may advance the true protestant religion , protect , and preserve , the lawes of the land , and defend the just priviledg and freedom of parliaments , as of his life , or his crown . . when the king calls his parliament together to be witnesses of his actions , and privy to his intentions , it may be certainly believed , he has not the least thought , disagreeing with the happiness , and security of his kingdom . . a loyal parliaments concurrence with the king , it may be hoped , will so far prevail over the hearts and understandings of the whole kingdom ( who must look upon the members , as persons naturally , and originally , trusted by and for them ) that it will be above the reach and malice of those , who sometimes have too great an influence upon the people , to discredit the king 's most intire actions , and sincere promises , the members being the best witnesses for the one , and security for the other . . when the king , and his parliament , have both the same ends , there will be no other differences in the way , than what upon debate , and right understanding , will be easily adjusted . . let right religion ( in which all are most nearly concerned , and , without care of which , they must not look for god's blessing ) be vindicated and preserved ; let the king's honour , and rights ( which have an inseparable relation with the subjects interests ) be vindicated , and if ravish'd from him , restored ; let the subjects liberties , properties , priviledges , ( without which a good man should not desire to be a king ) be secured , and confirmed , and there is nothing the parliament can advise the king to , wherein he should not meet them , that together they may inform posterity , how much their trust and confidence in each other , is a better expedient for the peace and preservation of the kingdom , than fears and jealousies . . during any session of parliament , the king may expect ( as most proper for the duty of subjects ) that propositions for the remedies of evils ought rather to come to him , than from him ; yet such should be his fatherly care of his people , that he should rather lay by any particular respect of his own dignity , than that any time should be lost for the preventing of those threatning evils , which cannot admit the delayes of the ordinary proceedings in parliament . . that the subjects cannot be obliged to obey an act , order , or injunction of parliament , to which the king hath not given consent , is the king 's known and unquestionable priviledg , and , being so , is a priviledg of the kingdoms . . the kings power is invested in him by the law , and by that only he should desire to maintain it . . the king that gives away the militia , parts with the power of the sword , entrusted to him by god , and the lawes of the land , for the protection and government of his people , thereby at once devesting himself , and dis-inheriting his posterity of that right and prerogative of the crown , which is absolutely necessary to the kingly office , and so weakens monarchy in his kingdom , that little more than the name and shadow of it will remain . . for the abolishing arch-bishops , bishops , &c. a britannike soveraign cannot give his consent , as he is a christian , and a king. . the britannike kings have so inseparably woven the right of the church into the liberties of the rest of the subjects , as the government by arch-bishops , and bishops , cannot be abolished . . the king cannot consent to the alienation of church-lands , because it cannot be denied to be a sin of the highest sacriledg as also , that it subverts the intentions of so many pious donors , who have laid a heavy curse upon all such prophane violations . beside which matter of conscience , it will be a prejudice to the publick good , many of the subjects having the benefit of renuing leases at much easier rates , than if those possessions were in the hands of private men : nor is it to be omitted , the discouragement which it will be to all learning and industry , when such eminent rewards shall be taken away , which now lye open to the children of meanest persons . ; . the exercise of mercy should be no more pleasing to the king , than to see both houses of parliament consent for his sake , that he should moderate the severity of the law , in an important case . . no free-born subject of england can call life , or any thing he possesseth his own , if power , without right , dayly make new , and abrogate the old fundamental law of the land. . i am confident no learned lawyer will afirm , that an impeachment can lye against the king , all the lawes going in his name , and one of their maximes being , that the king can do no wrong . . the commons of england was never a court of judicature . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e vid. h. grot. ad cap. . proverb . notes for div a -e . lips . excerpt ex comoed. & tragoed . graec. brief directions shewing how a fit and perfect model of popular government may be made, found, or understood harrington, james, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing h ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing h estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) brief directions shewing how a fit and perfect model of popular government may be made, found, or understood harrington, james, - . p. printed for daniel pakeman ..., [london : ] caption title. imprint from colophon. signed at end: "novemb. . . octavian pulleyn warden". partly inked out, perhaps indicating a printer's error. reproduction of original in bodleian library. eng political science -- early works to . a r (wing h ). civilwar no brief directions shewing how a fit and perfect model of popular government may be made, found, or understood. harrington, james c the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the c category of texts with between and defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion brief directions shewing how a fit and perfect model of popular government may be made , found , or understood . there is nothing more apparent , than that this nation is greatly disquieted and perplexed through a complication of two causes : the one , that the present state thereof is not capable of any other form , than that onely of a popular government ; the other , that they are too few who understand what is the form or model naturally necessary unto a popular government , or what is required in that form or prudence , for the sitting of it unto the use of this nation . for these infirmities , i shall offer some remedy by a brief discourse or direction , consisting of two parts . the first shewing those forms or models of popular government , or of common-wealths , which have been hitherto extant , whether fit or unfit for the present . state of this nation : the second , shewing a model form of popular government fitted unto the present state of this nation . in the first part i shall propose seven models roughly and generally : in the second , one , but more particularly and exactly . the first part . in every frame of government , either the form must be fitted unto the propriety as it standeth , and this onely is practicable in this nation ; or the propriety must be altered and fitted unto the frame , which without force hath been sometimes , but very seldom , practicable in any other nation . nevertheless , for the better knowledge of the one way , it will be best to propose in both wayes . the first model of popular government , proposed . that the nobility , the gentry , and the people , be perswaded to give up their whole lands unto the common-wealth . that if the whole people shall so give up their lands , they be divided into twelve equal precincts , called tribes . that the man of greatest quality in every tribe have about ten thousand pounds a year given unto him and his heirs , with the hereditary dignity of prince of his tribe . that some ten other men of the next quality under the prince in every tribe , have about two thousand pounds a year in the same given unto each of them and their heirs , with the hereditary dignity of patriarchs , or chief of the fathers . that the remaining part of the lands , except forty eight cities and their suburbs , be distributed unto the whole people equally by lots . that it be not lawful for any prince , patriarch , or other , to sell or alienate his land , or any part thereof , in such manner , but that upon every fiftieth year , being for this cause a year of jubile , all lands within that compass sold or alienated return unto the ancient possessors or lawful heirs . that there be one other tribe added unto the twelve ; that this tribe so added , be not local , nor suffered to have any lands at all , except the forty eight cities above reserved , with their suburbs ( that is ) with a quantity of land to each of them , being in depth two thousand cubits round . that these be setled upon them and their heirs for ever , besides the annual tithe of the whole territory , and a piece of money every year upon every head under the notion of an offering , in regard that other offerings are now unlawful ; and that this tribe consist of clergy , having one hereditary archbishop , or high-priest , for the head and prince of their tribe . that there be no other law than that of the word of god onely ; and that the clergy being best skilled in this law , be eligible into all courts of justice , all magistracies and offices whatsoever . that the prince of a tribe , together with one or more courts , consisting of twenty three judges elected by the people of that tribe for life , be the government of the same . that the people of the twelve local divisions , take by the ballot wise men and understanding among their tribes , and of these constitute a senate for the whole common-wealth , consisting of seventy elders for life . that every local tribe monethly elect two thousand of their own number ; and that these elections amounting in all unto four and twenty thousand , assemble at the metropolis or capital city , and be the monethly representative of the people . that the senate be a standing judicatory of appeal from all other courts , with power to shew the sentence of the laws of god . that besides the law of god , whatever shall be proposed by the seventy elders , and resolved by the monethly representative of the people , be the law of the land . a second model of a common-wealth . proposed . that there be a king without guards . that the word or command of this king be the law . that this king stirring out of his palace , it may be lawful or any man to slay him . in this model there wanteth but security , that while the people are dispersed , the king can gather no army ; to demonstrate , that either the people must be free , or the king a prisoner . a third model of a common-wealth , proposed . that the nobility , the gentry , and the people , having upon perswasion given up their lands to the publick , the whole territory be divided into one hundred thousand equal lots , and two more , being each of ten thousand acres . that the inferiour lots be distributed unto the people . that every man possessing a lot , be a citizen . that the rest , except onely the children of citizens , be servants unto , and tillers of the ground for the citizens . that there be no professed students . that no citizen exercise any trade , but that of arms onely ; and that the use of money , except it be made of iron , be wholly banished . that there be two kings hereditary : that each of them possess one of those lots of ten thousand acres . that they be presidents of the senate , with single votes ; and that in war they have the leading of the armies . that there be a senate consisting , besides the kings , of twenty eight senators , elected for life by the people . that whatever be proposed by this senate unto the whole people , or any ten thousand of them , and shall be resolved by the same , be the law . that there be a court consisting of five annual magistrates , elected by the people ; and that this court have power to bring a king , a senator , or other , that shall openly or secretly violate the laws , or invade the government , unto justice . a fourth model of a common-wealth , proposed . that there be a representative of the people , consisting of five thousand . that these annually elect by lot a senate , consisting of four hundred , and a signiory by suffrage consisting of nine annual princes . that each fourth part of the senate , for one fourth part of their annual term , be a council of state . that the council of state may assemble the senate , and propose to the same : that the senate may assemble the people , and propose unto them . and that what is proposed by the senate , and resolved by the people , be the law . that the executive power of the laws made , be more especially committed and distributed in various functions , and divers administrations , unto the nine princes . a fifth model of a common-wealth , proposed . that the whole nation be divided into three distinct orders ; the one senatorian , or nobility ; the other equestrian , or gentry ; and the third plebeian , or popular . that the equestrian order be the cavalry of the common-wealth , and the plebeian the foot . that there be a senate consisting of the senatorian order , and of three hundred senators for life . that there be two magistrates elected by the people ; for five years term , called censors . that the censors have power upon cause shewn to remove a senator out of the senate ; and to elect a noble man , or sometimes a plebeian , thereby made noble , into the senate . that there be two annual magistrates elected by the people , and called consuls . that the consuls be presidents of the senate , and have the leading of the armies . that the senate ( as they shall see occasion ) may nominate one person to be dictator for some short term . that the dictator for his term have soveraign power . that there be a division of the whole people , of what orders soever , into six classes , according unto the valuation of their estates . for example : that the first classis consist of all such as have two thousand pounds a year , or upwards ; the second , of all such as have one thousand pounds a year , or upwards , under two ; the third , of all such as have six hundred pounds a year , or upwards , under one thousand ; the fourth , of all such as have three hundred pounds a year , or upwards , under six hundred ; the fifth , of all such as have under the former proportion ; the sixth , of all such as pay no taxes , or have no land ; and that these be not used in arms . that the senate propose all laws to be enacted , unto an assembly of the people . that all magistrates be elected by the same . that this assembly of the people consist of the five classes , in such manner , that if the votes of the first and second classis be near equal , the third classis be called , and if these agree not , the fourth be called ; and so for the rest . that what is thus proposed by the senate , and resolved by the people , be the law . in this frame the senate , by the optimacy of the first and second classes , ( which seldom or never disagree ) carrieth all , to the exclusion of the main body of the people : whence ariseth continual fewd or enmity between the senate and the people ; who consulting apart , introduce popular debate , set up some other way of assembly , as by tribes , or by parishes , with more equality of votes , elect magistrates of their own , make decrees binding the senate or nobility , endevour to curb their power by weakning their ballance , or diminishing of their estates : all these tumultuously , and to the alteration of the government , with so frequent changes under so divers shapes , as make a very proteus of the common-wealth , till having been all her life-time afflicted with anarchy , she end her dayes in tyranny . the sixth model of a common-wealth , proposed . that the soveraign power be estated upon four thousand select men , to them and their heirs for ever . that there be a great council consisting of these four thousand ; and that their sons at five and twenty years of age have right unto the same . that the great council elect one duke for life ; that the duke have a royal palace assigned , with a guard , at the states charge , and a revenue of fifteen hundred pounds a year ; and that he bear the soveraign dignity of the common-wealth . that this duke have six counsellors annually chosen by the great council . that he have no power to sign any writing , though in his own name , nor to do any of his political functions without his counsellors . that his counsellors have power to sign any writing in the dukes name , or to do any of his political functions without him ; and that the duke with these six counsellors be the signiory of the common-wealth . that the signiory of this common-wealth have session and suffrage in all the councils of the same , with right also to popose unto each or any of them , either joyntly or severally . that one hundred and twenty elected annually by the great council , together with other councils and magistrates , to whom of course the like honour is appertaining , be the senate . that sixteen other magistrates proposed by the senate , and confirmed by the great council for the term of six moneths , be a council apart , with three weekly provosts or proposers , called the colledge . that the signiory may assemble the college , and propose to them ; that the college may assemble the senate , and propose to them ; and that the senate may assemble the great council , and propose to them . and that whatever is resolved by the senate , and not contradicted , nor questioned by the great council , be the law . that there be a council of ten elected annually by the great council ; and that this council of ten , with the signiory , and some of the college , having right of session and suffrage in the same , may upon occasion exercise dictatorian power in this common-wealth . that the rest of the people under the empire of this common-wealth , be disarmed , and governed by lieutenants of provinces . that the common-wealth have a standing army of strangers or others , in discipline and pay . and that the city wherein she shall reside , be founded in the sea , after such a manner , that it can no more be approached by a fleet , than by an army without a fleet . otherwise , this common-wealth is exposed both to the provinces , and to a mercenary army . a seveneth model of a common-wealth , proposed . that the people in every city , and in every province or county within these three nations , elect unto every city , province , or county of the same , a matter of twenty , thirty , or forty magistrates for life . that these magistrates being so elected , be the senate of that respective city , province or county . that the senates , thus elected , thence-forth have and enjoy the soveraign power within their respective jurisdiction , for ever . that every senate annually elect two or four burgomasters or consuls , to be presidents of the same . that they also elect seven magistrates , or present fourteen persons unto the governour of the province , and that he elect seven . that the seven so elected be judges , or have the executive power of the laws for their term , and within their respective jurisdiction . that in case of affairs of more publick and general concernment , as war or peace , levy of men or money , and the like , the governour of the province give information of the things to be considered , unto the nobility & to the senates of that province ; therewithall appointing a time and place for the assembly of the states provincial . that each of the senates , having debated the matter proposed , delegate one consul , with some other senators well informed and instructed with their will and pleasure , unto the assembly of the states provincial . that the nobility of the same province delegate some of their order likewise , to the provincial states . that the delegates both of the nobility and of the senates , give the vote of their principals according unto instruction ; and that neither the nobility , nor any senate or soveraignty be otherwise bound , than by their own vote . that the provincial estates elect one magistrate for life , or during pleasure , to be provincial governour : that they elect one or more other magistrates for life , or during pleasure , to be states general . that the states general being elected , and well instructed by their provinces , have the direction of the whole league : that each give not his own vote , but the vote of his province ; and that no province be othewise bound , than by her own vote . if these models ( in which i clame to be the first that hath laid the whole , and the highest mysteries of the ancient common-wealths , unto the lowest capacity of vulgar debate ) be not all in the mouthes of great men , and in pamphlets , for chymera's or utopia's , it is great chance : yet contain they no less than the whole revolution of popular prudence . nor is it more certain , that no one of them would fit the present state of this nation , than that he or they , whose contemplation and vnderstanding is not well versed in the most , or in the best of these , shall never fit a model of popular government unto the present state of this nation , or of any other . in which assurance , i come to fulfil my promise in the second part ; or to propose such a model as is fitted unto the present state of this nation . the second part , proposing a model of a common-wealth fitted unto the present state of this nation . but so it is ever , that the humours or interests of predominant parties , hold themselves to be national : and that which fitteth them , can never fit a nation ; nor that which fitteth a nation , ever fit them . this in the introduction of government , is alwayes the main difficulty . but where parties are no better founded , or fitted for vsurpation , than now in england , they are rather to be slighted than considered , as these , the stoutest whereof have but given this example unto the rest , that they , who in this state of affairs shall obstruct an equal and well-ordered government , shall but ruine themselves . for which cause it is proposed . . that all citizens , ( that is ) freemen , or such as are not servants , be distributed into horse and foot . that such of them as have one hundred pounds a yeer in lands , goods , or money , or above this proportion , be of the horse , and all such as have under this proportion be of the foot . . that all elders , or free-men , being thirty years of age or upwards , be capable of civil administration , and that the youth , or such free-men as are between eighteen years of age , and thirty , be not capable of civil administration , but of military only , in such manner as shall follow in the military part of this model . . that the whole native , or proper territory of the common wealth be cast with as much exactness as can be convenient , into known and fixed praecincts , or parishes . . that the elders resident in each parish annually assemble in the same , for example upon monday next ensuing the last of december : that they then & there elect out of their own nnmber every fifth man , or one man of every five , to be for the term of the year ensuing a deputy of that parish , and that the first and second so elected be overseers , or presidents for the regulating of all parochial congregations , whether of the elders , or of the youth , during the term for which they were elected . . that so many parishes lying neerest together , whose deputies shall amount to one hundred or thereabouts , be cast into one precinct called the hundred , and that in each precinct called the hundred , there be a town , village , or place appointed to be the capital of the same . . that the parochial deputies elected throughout the hundred assemble annually , for example upon monday next ensuing the last of january , at the capital of their hundred . that they then and there elect out of the horse of their number one justice of the peace , one jury man , one captain , one ensigne ; and out of the foot of their number one other jury man , one high constable , &c. . that every twenty hundreds lying neerest , and most conveniently together , be cast into one tribe , that the whole territory being after this manner cast into tribes , some town or place be appointed unto every tribe for the capital of the same ; and that these three precincts , ( that is the parish , the hundred , and the tribe , whether the deputies thenceforth annually chosen in the parishes , or huudreds , come to increase , or diminish , remain firm , and inalterable for ever , save only by act of parliament . the tribes are presumd throughout these propositions to amount unto fifty . . that the deputies elected in the several parishes , together with their magistrates and other officers both civil and military elected in the several hundreds , assemble or muster annually , for example upon monday next ensuing the last of february , at the capital of their tribe , for the space of two days . . that this whole body thus assembled , upon the first day of their assembly elect out of the horse of their number , one high sheriff , one lieutenant of the tribe , one custos rotulorum , one conductor , and two censors . that the high sheriff be commander in chief , the lieutenant commander in the second place , and the conductor in the third place , of this band or squadron : that the censors rotulorum be muster-master , and keep the rolls ; that the censors be governours of the ballot , and that the term of these magistracies be annual . . that the magistrates of the tribe ( that is to say ) the high sheriff , lieutenant , custos rotulorum , the censors , and the conductor , together with the magistrates and officers of the hundreds , ( that is to say ) the twenty justices of the peace , the forty jury men , the twenty high constables , be one troop , or one troop and one company a part , called the prerogative troop or company . that this troop bring in and assist the justices of assize , hold the quarter sessions in their several capacities , and perform their other functions as formerly . . that the magistrates of the tribe ( that is to say ) the high sheriff , lieutenant , custos rotulorum , the censors and the conductor , together with the twenty justices elected at the hundreds , be a 〈◊〉 for the government of the tribe called the phylarch , and that this court proceed in all matter of government as shall from time to time be directed by act of parliament . . that the squadron of the tribe upon the second day of their assembly , elect two knights , and three burgesses out of the horse of their number , and four other burgesses out of the foot of their number , that each knight upon election forthwith make oath of allegiance unto the common-wealth , or refusing such oath , the next compe●itor in election to the same magistracy , making the said oath , be the magistrate . the like for the burgesses . that the knights thus sworn , have session in the senate , for the term of three years , and that the burgesses thus sworn , be of the prerogative tribe or representative of the people for the like term . . that for the full and perfect institution of the assemblies mentioned , the squadron of the tribe in the first yeer of the common-wealth , elect two knights for the term of one year , two other knights for the term of two years , and lastly two knights more for the term of three years , the like for the burgesses of the horse first , and then for those of the foot . and that this proposition be of no farther use than for the first years election only . . that a magistrate or officer elected at the hundred be thereby barred from being elected a magistrate of the tribe , or of the first days election ; but that no former election whatsoever , bar a man of the second days election at the tribe , or to be chosen a knight or burgess . that a man being chosen a knight or burgess , who before was chosen a magistrate or officer of the hundred , or tribe , may delegate his former office or magistracy in the hundred , or in the tribe , to any other deputy , being no magistrate ; nor officer , and being of the same hundred , and of the same order , that is of the horse or foot respectively . . that the knights of the annual election , take their places upon monday next ensuing the last of march in the senate ; that the like number of knights whose session determineth at the same time recede . that every knight or senator be paid out of the publick revenue quarterly , one hundred twenty five pounds during his term of session , and be obliged to sit in purple robes . . that annually upon reception of the new knights , the senate proceed to election of new magistrates and counsellors . that for magistrates they elect one general , one speaker , and two censors , each for the term of one year , these promiscuously , and that they elect one commissioner of the great seal , and one commissioner of the treasury , each for the term of three years , and out of the new knights only . . that the general and the speaker as consuls of the common-wealth , and presidents of the senate , be during the term of their magistracy paid quarterly out of the publick revenue five hundred pounds ; that the ensigns of these magistracies be a sword borne before the general , and a mace before the speaker , that they be oliged to wear ducal robes . and that what is said of the general in this proposition be understood only of the general sitting , and not of the general marching . . that the general sitting , in case he be commanded to march , receive field pay ; and that a new general be forthwith elected by the senate to succeed him in the house , with all the rights , ensigns and emoluments of the general sitting , and this so often as one or more generals are marching . . that the three commissioners of the great seal , and the three commissioners of the treasury , using their ensigns and habite and performing their other functions as formerly , be paid quarterly unto each of them three hundred seaventy five pounds . . that the censors govern the ballot , that they be presidents of the counsel for religion , that each have a silver wand for the ensigne of his magistracy , that each be paid quarterly three hundred seaventy five pound , sand be obliged to wear scarlot robes . . that the general sitting , the speaker , and the 〈◊〉 commissioners abovesaid be the signory of this common-wealth . . that there be a council of state consisting of fifteen knights , five out of each order , list , or election , and that the same be perpetuated by the annual election of five out of the new knights or last elected into the senate . . that there be a council for religion consisting of twelve knights , four out of each order , and perpetuated by the annual election of four out of the knights last elected into the senate . that there be a council for trade consisting of a like number , elected and perpetuated in the same manner . . that there be a council of war not elected by the senate , but elected by the council of state out of themselves . that this council of war consist of nine knights , three out of each order , and be perpetuated by the annual election of three , out of the last knights elected into the council of state . . that in case the senate add nine knights more elected promiscuously , or not promiscuously , out of their own number , unto the council of war , the said council of war be understood by such addition , to be dictator of the common-wealth for the term of three moneths and no longer , except by farther order of the senate the said dictatorian power be prolonged for a like term . . that the signiory have session and suffrage , with right also joyntly or severally to propose both in the senate , and in all senatorian councils . . that each of the three orders or divisions of knights , in each senatorian council , elect one provost for the term of one week , and that any two provosts of the same council so elected , may propose unto the same council for their term and not otherwise . . that some fair room , or rooms well furnished , and attended , be allowed at the states charge , for a free and open academy unto all comers , at some convenient hour , or hours towards the evening ; that this academy be governed according unto the rules of good breeding , or civil conversation by some one or more of the provosts , and that in this academy it be lawfull for any man by word of mouth or by writing , in jest or in earnest , to propose unto the proposers . . that for ambassadors in ordinary , there be four residences , as france , spain , venice , and constantinople ; that every resident upon elction of a new embassador in ordinary , remove to the next rsidence in the order hereby mentioned , till having served orderly in all the said residences , he return home , that upon monday next ensuing the last of november , there be every second year elected by the senate some six person being above twenty five and under thirty five years of age , and not of the senate , nor of the popular assembly . that the party so elected , repair on monday next ensuing the last of march following , as an embassador in ordinary unto the court of france , and there reside for the term of two years to be computed from the first of april next ensuing his election . that every embassador in ordinary , be allowed three thousand pounds a year during the term of his residences . and that if a resident come to dy , there be an extraordinary election into his residence for his 〈◊〉 , and for the remainder of his removes , and progress . . that all emergent elections be made by scrutiny , that is by a council , or by commissioners proposing , and by the senate resolving in the manner following . that all field officers be proposed by the council of war . that all embassadors extraordinary , be proposed by the council of state . that all judges and serjeants at law , be proposed by the commissioners of the great seal . that all barons and officers of trust in the exchequer be proposed by the commissioners of the treasury , and that such of these as are thus proposed unto , and approved by the senate , be held lawfully elected . . that the cognizance of all forein negotiation , and of all matter of state to be considered , or law to be enacted , whether provincial or national , domestick or forein , appertain unto the council of state . that all such affairs of like kind as the council of state shall judge fit to be carryed with more than ordinary secrecy , be committed by them , and appertain unto the cognizance , and trust of the council of war , to this end consisting of a 〈…〉 , or committee of the council of state . that the cognizance , and protection , both of the national religion , and of the liberty of conscience , equally established in this nation , after the manner provided in the religious part of this model , appertain unto the council for religion . that all matter of traffick , and regulation of the same unto the council for trade . that in the exercise of these several functions , each being naturally senatorian of authoritative only , no council assume any other power , than such only as shall be particularly or expresly estated upon the same by act of parliament . . that what shall be proposed unto the senate by any one or more of the signiory , or of the proposers general ; or what ever was proposed by any two of the provosts , or particular proposers unto their respective council ; and upon debate at that council shall come to be proposed by the same unto the senate , be necessarily debatable , and debated by the senate . . that in all cases wherein power is derived unto the senate by law made , or by act of parliament , the 〈◊〉 of the senate be ultimate ▪ that in all cases of law to be made , or not already provided for by act of parliament , as some particular peace , or war , levy of men or mony , or the like , the result of the senate be not ultimate , but preparatory only , and be proposed by the senate unto the prerogative tribe , or assembly of the people , except only in cases of such speed or secrecy , wherein the senate shall judge the necessary slowness , or openness of like proceeding to be of detriment , or danger unto the common-wealth . . that if upon the motion● or proposition of a council , or proposer general , the senate adde nine knights promiscuously , or not promiscuously chosen out of their own number unto the council of war , the said council of war , be thereby made dictator , and have power of life and death , as also to enact laws in all cases of speed or secrecy for and during the term of three moneths and no longer , except upon new order from the senate : and that all laws enacted by the dictator , be good and valid for the term of one year , and no longer , except the same be proposed by the senate , and resolved by the people . . that the burgesses of the annual election returned by the tribes , enter into the prerogative tribe upon monday next ensuing the last of march ; and that the like number of burgesses whose term is expired , recede at the same time . that the burgesses thus entred . elect unto themselves out of their own number two of the horse , one to be captain , and the other to be cornet of the same , and two of the foot , one to be captain , the other to be ensign of the same , each for the term of three years . that these officers being thus elected , the whole tribe or assembly proceed to the election of four annual magistrates , two out of the foot to be tribunes of the foot , and two out of the horse to be tribunes of the horse . that the tribunes be commanders of this tribe in chief so far as it is a military body , and presidents of the same , as it is a civil assembly . and lastly , that this whole tribe be paid weekly as followeth , unto each of the tribunes of the horse seven pounds , unto each of the tribunes of foot six pounds , unto each of the captains of horse five pounds , unto each of the captains of foot four pounds , unto each of the cornets three pounds , unto each of the ensignes two pounds seven shillings , unto every horseman one pound ten shillings , and to every one of the foot one pound . . that inferiour officers , as captains , cornets , ensignes , be only for the military discipline of the tribe , that the tribunes have session in the senate without suffrage . that of course they have session and suffrage in the dictatorian council , so often as it is created by the senate . that in all cases to be adjudged by the people , they be presidents of the court or judicatory . . that peculate or defraudation of the publick , and all casts or crimes tending to the subversion of the government , be tri●ble by the prerogative tribe , or the assembly of the people , and that unto the same there●y an appeal in all causes , and from all courts , magistrates , or councils , national , or provincial . . that the right of debate , as also of proposing to the people , be wholly and only in the senate , without any power at all of result not deriv'd from the people , and estated upon the senate by act of parliament . . that the power of result be wholly and only in the people , without any right at all of debate . . that the senate having debated and agreed upon a law to be proposed , cause promulgation of the said law to be made for the space of six weeks before proposition , ( that is ) cause the law to be written fair , and hung up for the time aforesaid , in some of the most eminent places of the city , and of the suburbs . . that promulgation being made , the signiory demand of the tribunes fitting in the senate , at assembly of the people . that the tribunes upon such demand of the signiory , or of the senate , be obliged to assemble the prerogative tribe in arms by sound of trumpet , with drums beating , and colours flying , in any town , field , or market-place , being not above six miles distant , upon the day , and at the hour appointed , except the meeting through inconvenience of the weather , or the like , be prorogued by consent of the signiory and of the tribunes . that the prerogative tribe being assembled accordingly , the senate propose to them by two or more of the senatorian magistrates thereunto appointed , at the first promulgation of the law . that the proposers for the senate open unto the people the occasion , motives , and reasons of the senate for the law to be proposed , and that the same being done , they put the law or proposition by distinct clauses unto the ballot of the people . that if any material clause or clanses of the proposition , or law so proposed , be rejected by the people , the clause or clauses so rejected may be reviewed , altered , and proposed again unto the third time , if the senate think fit , but no oftner . . that what is thus proposed by the senate , and resolved by the people , be the law of the land , and no other , except what is already received as such , or reserved unto the dictatorian council . . that every magistracy , office , or election throughout this whole common-wealth , whether annual or triennial , be understood of course or consequence to injoyn an interval or vacation equal unto the term of the same . that the magistracy or office of a knight , and of a burgess , be in this relation understood as one and the same , and that this order regard only such elections as are national or domestick , and not such as are forein , or contained in the p●ovincial parts of this model . . that for an exception from this rule , where there is but one elder of the horse in one and the same parish , that elder be eligible in the same without interval , and where there be above foure elders of the horse in one and the same parish , there be not above half , nor under two of them eligible at the same election . . that throughout all the assemblies & councils of this common-wealth , the quorum consist of one half in the time of health , and of one third part in a time of sickness , being so declared by the senate . the use of the ballot , being as full of prolixity and abstruseness in writing , as of dispatch and facility in practice , is presumed throughout all elections and results in this model , and for the rest referr'd rather unto practice than writing . there remain the relgions , military and provincial parts of this frame . but the civil part being approv'd , they follow , or being not approv'd , may be spared . conclvsion or the use of these propositions . these propositions are so layd out to debate or examination , that a man having the mind to weigh discourse upon , or object against this model , may do it in the parts with the most convenience . any examination of , or objection against the whole , or any part in print or in writing , the author holdeth himself bound to acknowlege , or answer : but as to meer discourse upon matters of this compass it is usually narrow : besides that in writing a man must put himself upon hetter aym , than he can be obliged to take in discourse . any one objection lying in writing against any one order in this part of the model , after such manner as to shew that the part or order so invaded ought to be expunged , altered , or amended , unless it may be expunged , altered , or amended accordingly , destroyeth the whole . and any one or more objections so lying against any one or more of these orders or propositions , that thereby they may be expunged , altered or amended , must in the whole or in part make a better model . in this case therefore , or in case no objection ly , the use of these propositions will be such , as thereby any man or any assembly of men , considering or debating upon them in order , may find or make a true model of a well-ordered common-wealth . and that an assembly can never make , or frame a model of any government otherwise than in some such manner , is proveable first by a demonstration from the effect ; and secondly by a demonstration from the cause . the demonstration from the effect is , that an assembly no otherwise frameth a law , or order , than by having it first penned by some one man , and then judging upon it , and the model of a common-wealth must consist of many laws or orders . the demonstration from the cause is , that whereas reason consisteth of two parts , the one invention , and the other judgement , a man may be as far beyond any assembly for invention , as any assembly can be beyond a man for judgement ; or which is more , that the formation of a model of government requireth a strong faculty of invention , and that an assembly is naturally voyd of all manner of invention . 〈…〉 finis . london , printed for daniel pakeman , at the rain-bow in fleet-street , . policie vnveiled vvherein may be learned, the order of true policie in kingdomes, and common-wealths: the matters of justice, and government; the addresses, maxims, and reasons of state: the science of governing well a people: and where the subject may learne true obedience unto their kings, princes, and soveraignes. written in spanish, and translated into english by i.m. of magdalen hall in oxford. república y policía christiana. english juan de santa maría, fray, d. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a stc a estc s this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) policie vnveiled vvherein may be learned, the order of true policie in kingdomes, and common-wealths: the matters of justice, and government; the addresses, maxims, and reasons of state: the science of governing well a people: and where the subject may learne true obedience unto their kings, princes, and soveraignes. written in spanish, and translated into english by i.m. of magdalen hall in oxford. república y policía christiana. english juan de santa maría, fray, d. . mabbe, james, - ? blount, edward, fl. - , attrib. trans. [ ], , [ ] p. printed by thomas harper, for richard collins, and are to be sold at his shop in pauls church-yard, at the signe of the three kings, london : . a translation, by james mabbe, of: juan de santa maría. república y policía christiana. translation sometimes attributed to edward blount. another issue, with cancel title page, of: christian policie; or the christian common-wealth (stc . ). running title reads: christian policie. misidentified on slip at beginning of umi microfilm reel as stc a. reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest 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guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng allegiance -- religious aspects -- early works to . kings and rulers -- duties -- early works to . political science -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - olivia bottum sampled and proofread - olivia bottum text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion policie vnveiled : vvherein may be learned , the order of true policie in kingdomes , and common-wealths : the matters of iustice , and governement ; the addresses , maxims , and reasons of state : the science of governing well a people : and where the subject may learne true obedience unto their kings , princes , and soveraignes . written in spanish , and translated into english , by i. m. of magdalen hall in oxford . london : printed by thomas harper , for richard collins , and are to be sold at his shop in pauls church-yard , at the signe of the three kings . . to the right honovrable , iames hay , earle of carlile , viscount doncaster , lord hay of sauley , gentleman of the bed-chamber to our soueraigne lord king charles , knight of the most noble order of the garter , and one of the lords of his maiesties most honorable priuy councell . right honourable : knowing no man better verst in publique affayres , then your selfe , i could not more fitly addresse this discourse , then to you , without the rifling of any particular mans merit : for i may ascribe as much to the praise of your exercise , as any can assume to his priuate notions , or publique obseruations . to speake the story of your true and ingenious acts in forraigne , ( and in those forraigne , the most subtile and actiue parts ) would rather seeme a tract , then a dedication of a booke ; but here you are onely patron , though i know you might by your naturall gifts and obseruations , be author of a farre better piece . you haue been long the intrusted seruant of your prince , which should employ you the darling of his people , and truly you ought to bee so , whilst truth relates the story of deseruing men , or honesty reads their merit . what , and whose worke of politique gouernment this is , your eyes may at leysure looke ouer , while your quicker eyes , i meane your discerning minde , may perhaps correct , yet ( i hope ) not chide his labour , who was willing , though not able to serue you in a piece worthy your obseruation . if in the translation there be any thing that hath forsaken the originall , it was intention , and not negligence , of which there needs no accompt . my good lord , there is nothing left , but to implore your pardon for the preferring this worke ; which if it shall appeare vnworthy your graue perusall , yet at the least , forgiue his intention , who conceiued it a direct way of expressing himselfe to be your honours truely deuoted , edward blovnt . the avthors epistle dedicatorie to the king of spaine . sir , the cause why the ancients by fire signifie loue , is , for that this element is the hardest to be hid : for the more a man seekes to couer it , the more it discouers it selfe , and blabbs the place , where it is . of this quality is loue , and truly participateth of the nature of fire . i came ( saith our sauiour christ ) to put fire into the world . and the holy ghost , which is the true god of loue , came and shewed it selfe in the shape and figure of fire . so that loue is a kinde of extraordinary actiue fire . nor can it , where soeuer it be , be hid , or idle . operatur magna , si est , ( saith saint gregory ) si autem non operatur , amor non est . loue will be alwayes in action , alwayes in working ; it worketh by benefits ▪ it worketh by good workes , and by friendly offices , and charitable seruices : and when it cannot worke what it would , or when the subiect whereon it would worke , hath no need thereof , it supplyeth that defect with good desires , and words . god , who needeth not the seruice of any , contents himselfe with this in those that are his seruants , accepting ( when they can no more ) the will , for the deed . and the kings , which here vpon earth represent his person , doe not require tribute and seruice , saue onely in that , which euery one is able to giue . that which i am able to affoord , and doe here offer vnto your maiestie , forced thereunto by the loue of my seruice , ( howbeit my desire hath euermore had a larger extent ) is onely a parcell of words ; which if they proceed from the soule , and come truly and sincerely from the heart , are of some worth and estimation , and perhaps ( vpon occasion ) may proue likewise profitable and aduantagious . howsoeuer , it may serue at least to expresse that my seruice and deuotion , which euer hath beene , is , and shall be ready prest to serue your maiestie . and i am willing to shew it in this little , that i may not wholly seeme vnprofitable . and therefore with this affection of loue , sutable to my subiect , ouercomming those feares which are wont ( and not without reason ) to withhold those that treate with great kings , princes , and monarckes , and write of such and the like subiects , i presume to aduertise them , and in this paper to propone vnto them , that which i finde written of those that are past and gone , ( and seemeth very fit and conuenient for the conseruation and augmentation of the authori●y and greatnesse of those that are now liuing and present amongst vs ) and will with all possible breuity , procure a full resolution and distinction herein : and ( as seneca saith ) totum comprehendere sub exiguo ; to comprise much vnder a little . for , as that is the better sort of money , which in the matter is the lesser , but the greater in value ; so likewise that learning is the best , which is briefe in words , and large in sentences . it is maximus his counsell , that multa , & magna , breuiter sunt dicenda . matters that are many and great , are briefly to be deliuered . for this breuities sake therefore , as also for the greatnesse of your maiesties employments , and the great burthen of so many weighty businesses that lye vpon you , i will not here interpose any large discourses and long disputations , wherewith to entertaine and spend the time : but briefe , certaine , and generall doctrines , such as are of most profit , comprehend most subiects , and may be applyed to particular , both persons and things , all taken out of the politicks , the law of nature , and men that are statists , and no way contrary to the law of god , and christian religion : as likewise out of ancient philosophers , and wise men , both lawyers and law-makers . accompanied wholly for to giue credit to the cause , and that the subiect may not be disesteemed as an egge of mine owne hatching ) with the examples of kings and emperours , ( if the examples of kings may moue kings ) and with those which cannot but moue , bee esteemed , and beleeued , being drawne out of the holy scripture . which being well obserued and put in execution by kings , they shall obtaine that end for which they were intended ; to wit , to maintaine and preserue their kingdomes in peace and iustice . reade it therefore , i beseech your maiestie , and take it to heart ; for it is a piece of worke that is directed to the seruice of kings , of their fauourites and ministers . and let them not say , that they are metaphysicall , and impracticable things , or , in a manner , meere impossibilites , but rather , that they are very conformable to our possibilitie , and practised by our predecessors , princes of famous memory , for their wisedome and prudence , and in kingdomes and common-wealths , of great concernment , artifice , and policie , in matter of gouernement , and reason of state. and viewing those with these times , and that which then was , with that which now is , it will appeare vnto vs , that your present princes doe not come much behinde their good predecessours : and that which is good , stands alwayes in a way or degree of ablenesse to become better : and that which is not so , may be bettered in the end . time is a great proficient , it attaineth to all , and can doe all . and your maiestie ( whom god preserue ) may likewise in time doe the like , if you will really and resolutely affect the same ; and that you will be pleased to put in execution , what in these aduertisements shall seeme good in your eyes . and seeme they , or not seeme they good vnto you , sure i am , that my desire , in these , in the rest , and in all , shall indeuour to hit the marke whereat it aymeth . god direct it as i desire . for mine owne part , i rest well contented with my paines , and hold my selfe well paid for my labour , in hauing put them into your maiesties hands . and that you shall vouchsafe to dwell a little vpon them . for matters of state , iustice , and gouernment , and of things of this high nature , is a king-craft , and a knowledge or science that deserues your care and discourse . let others doe as they list ; particular men may follow their particular pleasures and delights . but this well becommeth kings . the argument of this booke , is the head of mans body ; beginning at the vnderstanding , till we come to the last of the senses . for therein , and thence they haue the principium or beginning of their operations . and as in mans body , so in the mysticall body of a common-wealth , kings are the head , to whom regiment & gouernment belongs ; and what choyce they are to make of those who are to assist them therein ; the qualities which they ought to haue , and how they should carry themselues towards them . how they shall come to discouer the humours , affections , mindes , and dispositions of their ministers . and in a word , how they ought to behaue themselues in all , and with all . i search not into the secret closet of any mans bosome , nor touch vpon any particular person , it being the least part of my intent and purpose . i treate onely in the generall , and manifest vnto all , that what i write , being certaine and true , and grounded vpon principles and certaine causes , may serue to reforme , amend , and correct , and ( if neede bee ) alter those fashions and customes they finde to bee amisse . this i am bold to vtter vnto your maiestie , and dedicate the same with that securitie and confidence , which mine owne knowledge doth promise and prompt vnto mee ; being not ignorant , that i talke and discourse with mine owne proper king and lord , whom i humbly beseech , that hee will bee pleased , out of his great prudence and naturall pietie , to runne all this ouer with his eye , and to cast his cloake ouer my faults . and though ( no doubt ) his maiestie may meete with some , yet my minde telleth me , that he may likewise light vpon something in this treatise , that may be of some profit for the seruice of his maiestie , and for the conseruation of that authoritie and greatnesse of place ( which he so iustly possesseth , and for the good of the common-wealth . for , there is not that booke saith seneca ) so vnprofitable , whence some good may not bee gathered . and though this in supposall , or it 's owne nature ) may be small , and of little or no price , yet is it of no lesse noble and royall a condition , to receiue a little louingly , and with a gratious acceptance , then to giue much liberally . all this your maiestie doth with all , and i assure my selfe you will likewise doe the like with me . for the naturall loue which i beare vnto your maiestie , meriteth no lesse , nor the minde wherewithall i doe it . and herewith i shall in some sort satisfie my desire ( which is to hit the marke i ayme at ) and that obligation , wherewith i was borne to serue you , whom i shall neuer willingly offend . and euermore , in all my prayers , and sacrifices , i shall humbly on my knees beseech the almighty god , to preserue your maiestie , to giue you many , and those most happie yeares , and that hee will conserue you in his diuine grace , and humane greatnesse , with much augmentation of estate , both temporall and eternall . amen . your maiesties seruant and chaplaine , fr. iuan , de sancta maria. a table containing the chapters and paragraphes of this booke . chap. . vvherein it is briefly treated , what is comprehended in this word republicke , together with it's definition . chapter . what the name of king signifieth . chapter . whether the name of king , be a name of office. chap. . of the office of kings . chap. . of the reason and vnderstanding of kings , and of their wisedome . chap. . how kings ought to carrie themselues in those businesses , which their vnderstanding comprehendeth not . chapter . a prosecution of the former discourse ; shewing how kings are to take councell : and what signes they are to marke and obserue for their better knowledge . chap. . of the diligences , which kings are to vse in the election of their ministers and councellours . chap. . of the qualities which kings one to consider in those , whom they are to make choice of for ministers and councellours . chap. . hee continues the discourse of the qualities of ministers and councellours . chap. . of other course● and meanes , which kings may take for the notice of such persons , in whom the said qualities concurre . chap. . how kings ought to carry themselues towards those ministers whom they finde sufficient for the gouernment both of peace and warre . chap. . the author prosecutes the same subiect , and shewes how kings ought to carry themselues with their councells and councellours . chap. . it is demanded by way of question , whether kings ought inuiolably to obserue the foresaid order . chap. . whether it be fit for kings , to vse much the remitting of businesses . chap. . of the sence of the ●ight●that is , of those businesses which kings ought to reserue for their owne view , and to dispetch with their owne ●ands . chap. . 〈◊〉 prosecuteth the same matter , and shewes , how kings ought to carry themsel●es towards those that finde themselues aggrieued . chap. . of the sense of hearing . and the audiences which kings ought to giue . chapter . he goes on with the same matter , treating of the audiences of ministers and councellours . chap. . of the vertue of iustice , the naturall sister and companion of kings . chap. . of the parts of iustice in common ; and in particular of iustice commutatiue . chap. . of iustice distributiue . chap. . how , and in what sort , limitation in giuing , may sute with the greatnesse of kings . chap. . of the repartment , and diuision , which is to bee vsed in the conferring of offices . and of the knowledge of such persons as ought to be nominated for the said offi●es . chap. . whether honours , offices , and dignities , are to be conferred on those , that sue for them . chap. . of the sense of smelling : that is , of the prudence of kings . paragraph . of the magnanimitie of minde , which kings ought to haue . paragraphe . of the blandure , gentlenesse , and loue , which kings ought to haue . parag. . that it much importeth kings , to haue the good loue and affection of their subiects . parag. . of sagacitie , sharpnesse of wit , and quicknesse of apprehension , which kings ought to haue . parag. . of the discretion , which kings ought to haue . chap. . of the sense of tasting ; and of the vertue of temperance ; and how well it befitteth kings : chap. . when , and at what time , sports and pastimes are worthiest reprehension in kings . parag. . of the language , and truth , which kings , and wherewith kings are to treate , and to be treated . parag. . that kings ought to keepe their faith and word ▪ parag. . of that secrecie which kings and their ministers ought to keepe . parag. . of flatterers , and their flatteries . chap. . of the sense of touching . parag. . of temperance . parag. . of another remedie against excesses , and superfluities , depending on the example of kings . chap. . whether it be fit for kings to haue fauourites : chap. . of another sort of fauourites . chap. whether it bee fit for kings , to haue any more then one fauourite . chap. of the conditions , and qualities , of fauourites . chap. how kings ought to carry themselues towards their fauourites . chap. whether the kinsfolke , and friends of fauourites , are to be excluded from offices . chap. the conclusion of the former discourse , with some aduertisements for kings , and fauourites . chap. ad●ertisements for fauourites , and councellours of state. sap : . v. . ad vos ( o reges ) sunt hi sermones mei , vt discatis sapientiam , & non excidatis : qui enim custodierint iusta iustè , iustificabuntur , & qui didicerint iusta , invenient quid respondeant . vvisdom . v. . vnto you therefore ( o kings ) doe i speake , that yee may learne vvisedome , and not goe amisse . for they that keepe holinesse holily , shall be holy , and they that are learned there , shall finde defence . chap. . wherein it is breifly treated , what is comprehended in this word , republicke , together with it's definition . many , and those of the grauest sorte , that haue beene well versed in all kinde of learning , haue written of a republicke , or common-wealth ; and hau● diuided , and sub-diuided it into many and sundry species , and defined it after diuerse and different maners ; a prolixe , and tedious businesse , and full of difficulties , and farre wide of my pretension ( which is in few both words and reasons ) to describe a mysticall body with it's head , and principall members , and the peculiar offices belonging to euery one of them , leauing ( to such as shall take pleasure therein ) the multitude of vnprofitable questions , the ornament of humane eloquence , and the magazine of prophane histories , being of little truth , & lesse efficacie . and taking thence my beginning whence all begin ; to wit ▪ from the definition , or description . i say with aristotle and plato , that a common-wealth is no other thing , saue an order of citizens , and cities ; in which and amongst whom , nothing is wanting , that is necessary and needefull for the life of man. it is a iust gouernment , and disposition of many families , and of a communitie amongst them , with a superiour authoritie ouer them . and it is a congregation of many people vnited together , fraternized , with certaine lawes and rules of gouernment . and , because i will not loose time in things not necessarie , i omit that gouernment , which the greekes call aristocratia , which is the gouernment of the nobility , as it is with the signorie of venice . and your democratia , which is popular , and consistes of the many , as that of genoa , and the cantons of the switz . which ( though approued by many ) haue their inconueniences , and those no small ones . for the nobilitie , and powerfull persons , if they not perseuere in the obseruance of the lawes of good gouernment , they presently grow to be couetous , and are much subiect to ambition . and because they are but a few , they feare the multitude ; and for to conserue themselues , exercise cruelty ; whereby in the ende it turnes to a tyrannie . for ( as mecoenas saith . ) the state of a few lords , is the state of a few tyrants . and he that is the most powerfull , the most ambitious , and best befriended , and respected of the people , vpon the least dissension , ioynes with the multitude , which being it is naturally enuious , mutable and a friend to innouation , will with a great deale of facilitie ouerthrow the common-wealth . and say ; the nobles do not side , but agree amongst themselues , yet cannot they but liue in feare of the infidelitie of the vulgar ; for ordinarily , those that haue a hand in the gouernment , are more enuied , then those that haue none at al. besides , it is a weake kind of gouernment , nor is it possible , that these few lords , can in large , conquer , & conserue a great empire , as can a king , or a monarke , because the forces are lesse vnited in them , then in him . and the people which is little interessed , & hath no share or part in those honourable places , carry a capital hatred to your great persons , and are hardly drawn to such liberall contributions , as may sustaine a war , and subdue kingdomes . your popular estate in falling from that equality , which it pretendeth , is easily conuerted into a licentious libertie , or rather loosenesse , pulling down some , & setting vp others , and is much subiect to alterations through it's inconstancie , & weake head-pieces of the popular . for ( as tully saith ) the sea hath not so many stormes , perills , & tempestes , as hath this kind of cōmonwealth . and of force ( euery one attending his owne proper good and priuate interest ) it must runne vpon one of these two rockes : either on the tyrannie of him , that is the strongest , and , vpheld by the fauour of the maior part , liftes vp himselfe aboue them all : or on the plebeian gouernment , then which none can be worse ; for all then falls into the hands of ignorant people who put ordinary people into the highest places of honour and command , without any distinction or reckoning of rich , noble , wise , or vertuous . what good counsaile , or sound aduise can all the communaltie giue ( put all their braines together ) in a doubtfull case , or businesse of importance , when ( as salomon saith ) there is scarce one to be found of a thousand , of abilitie and sufficiencie in this kinde ? but put case that such a one may happily be found amongst them , how shall he be heard with silence . what patience will their eares lend him ? what secrecie will be had in that which is treated , be it of peace , or war , that it be not divulged before it 's due execution ? your tumultes and seditions , shall be more ordinary , and greater then in other states ; because your meaner sorte of people , are gouerned more by their owne vnruly appetites , and womanish longings , then by reason and discretion . and your base and cruell vulgar , which vpon the least occasion suffers it selfe to be led away by hatred , and reuenge , presently falls to taking of stones in their hands , tearing vp the pibbles in the streetes , as cicero sets downe vnto vs , that in the popular assemblies of rome , it so fell out , that oftentimes they drew their naked swordes , & that the stones were seene to flye about their eares on all sides . and when this head strong multitude hath once broken the reines , there is no keeping of them in , nor can the wit of man deuise how to bridle them . in a monarchy , the monarke ; in an aristocratia , your noble men are supreme iudges , and arbitrators , and by this their supreme and absolute power , they many times compose the differences of the subiects . but in a democratia and popular estate , they are the supreme power , and they themselues bandy one against another , the fire of faction , setting them in a consuming flame , without acknowledging any superiour , to decide the quarrell , and compose their differences . and therefore aristotle sayd ; that there was not any tyrannie either greater or more pernicious , then that of an intire communaltie , which , of it selfe , is inclined to crueltie . the monarchy , or kingdome is freer from these burning feuers , and by all is ranked in the best place , and is stiffely maintained by the grauest authors . of this onely shall i treate at this present . it is called a monarchy , of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which , in greeke , signifieth one , and of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which is the same with prince , which is as if we should say a principalitie , or a kingdome ; where one alone is hee that commands and gouernes , and the rest all obey . all these three kindes , of popular , aristocraticall , and monarchicall gouernments were vsed in greece , and more particularly in rome . but rome neuer came to be mistresse of the world , till shee was reduced to a monarchie in the time of caesar augustus . there are found therein . differences of states : husbandmen , trades-men , merchants , souldiers , iudges cleargie-men , the nobility , and the king , which ( to speake more properly , and , as in diuers places it is deliuered by the blessed apostle s. paul ) is a misticall body , which we call a kingdome with it's head. for a king , is the supreme lord , subiect onely vnto god. that in s. augustines , and diuus thomas his opinion , as also sundry other authors of diuers faculties , amongst which are aristotle , and plato ; the most excellent gouernment , is that , which acknowledgeth a superior , one king , and one head. for all naturall , and good gouernment proceedeth from one , and that which comes neerest vnto vnitie , hath most similitude , with that which is diuine , and is by much the most perfect . by god , kings reigne , according to that of the wise man. per me , reges regnant ; per me , principes imperant . by me kings reigne , and princes decree iustice . and god being one , and most simple in his being ; and nature the head of all the whole vniuerse ; by whom , and which all is gouerned with admirable and ineffable prouidence , and is the idea of all good and perfect gouernment , it is not a thing to be doubted , but that that shall be amongst vs the best , which is most agreeable , with his . and if the members of the body , being many , and bearing different offices therein , admit to be gouerned by a head , and that god and nature , hath so ordained it , why should not a monarchicall gouernment be the best ? most certaine therefore is it , that it is mainely to be preferred before the other two . some will haue this monarchicall gouernment to be the most ancient , and that it had it's beginning from cain , adams eldest sonne , who was the first , that did gather people together , built cities , and did shut them vp , and fortifie them with walls . after the stood , nimrod , the sonne of chus , and nephew vnto cham , a man of valour , and amongst those of those times , the most able , and strongest man , was the first , that reduced men to liue in a communitie , and to be obedient to one only king , possessing himselfe of the kingdome and signorie of the world. and before these , euen in the very beginning of the creation , god began to establish this gouernment , & forme of a commonwealth . for ( as s. paul saith ) god would , that all mankinde should descend from one man. and gods chosen people did euermore maintaine a monarchie , and did ordaine , that the supreme power should reside and remaine in one. the first gouernours of the world , were monarkes , & did gouerne with this title , & all the common-wealthes of the world , haue generally desired to be gouerned by one king . as appeareth by those of the gentiles , euery particular state hauing his peculiar king. and were it not a great monstrousnesse in nature , that one body , should haue two heads ? much more were it , that one kingdome should be gouerned by two persons : vnitie is the author of much good ; and pluralitie , the causer of much ill . the roman commonwealth did suffer much miserie and calamitie , not because all would not obey one , but because many would command all. and therforein their greater necessities , they did create a dictator , so called because all did obay whatsoeuer he dictated , and sayd vnto them . for they knew well enough , and did clearely and plainely perceiue , that in the empire of one , the authoritie was the greater ; greater the obedience , freer their determinations , firmer their councells , speedier their resolutions , and more prompt the execution of their designes . in a word , command , signorie , and supreme power , does better in one head then in many . and therefore all doe vnanimously and vndoubtedly conclude , that the monarchie , is the ancientst , and the durablest of all other ; and it 's gouernment the best : yet , would i haue it to helpe it selfe with the aristocratia in that which may be vsefull for it's aduantage . that in regard of it's strength , and execution , doth by it's greater . vnion , and force excell the rest : this other which is composed of a few noble , wise , and vertuous persons , because it consistes of more , hath the more intirenesse , prudence , and wisedome ; and by conioyning and intermixing the one with the other , resulteth a perfect & absolute gouernment . so that a monarchy , that it may not degenerate , must not goe loose , and absolute ( for command , is a madd-man ; and power lunaticke ) but must be tyed to the lawes , as far forth as it is comprehended vnder the law ; and in things particular and temporall , must haue reference to the body of the councell , seruing as the brace , or ioyning peece of timber , betweene a monarchie , & an aristocracie , which is the assistance and aduise of the chiefer , and wiser sort . for , from a monarchy not thus well and orderly tempred , arise great errours in gouernment , little satisfaction to the state , and many distastes amongst those that are gouerned . all men , that haue had the estimation of ●ound iudgements , and accounted wise in all kind of faculties haue held this to be the best and perfectest gouernment , and with out it , neuer citie nor kingdome hath beene taken to be well gouerned . your good kings and great gouernours haue euer fauoured this course ; whereas on the contrarie , your bad kings , and euill gouernours , transported with their pride , haue runne another way . and therefore , in conformitie heereunto , i dare confidently affirme , if a monarke , ( be hee what he will be ) shall resolue businesses alone on his own head ( how wise soeuer he thinke himself ) without hauing recourse to his councell , or against the opinion of his counsellours , ( although he do acertar and hit right in his resolutions ) yet therein he breakes the bounds of a monarchie , and enters into those of a tyranny of whose examples , and the euill successes insuing thereupon , the histories are full . but one shall serue instead of many . and that shall be of tarquinius superbus , taken out of the first booke of titus liuius , who out of his great pride , and haughtinesse of minde , that he might rule all himselfe , and haue none else to haue a hand in any businesse , made it his master peece , to weaken the authority of the roman senate in lessening the number of senatours . which he purposely did , that he wholy and solely by himselfe , might determine all whatsoeuer that occurred in the kingdome . in this monarchie , or kingdome , there are three parts , or parties to be considered , of whom principally we are to treate . the king , the ministers , and the vassalls . and if in a humane body , the anatomie & consideration of the head , be the nicest , subtillest , and most difficult , what difficultie will it not be , and what a daintie hand will it not require to touch , talke , and treate of a king , who is the head of the commonwealth ? and hence i inferre , that for to treate of kings , and to prescribe them precepts and documents touching a kingdome , he ought to be such a wise king , as was salomon . who , considering the difficulties and dangers , which may in this matter offer themselues , aduiseth all without any difference , that they should not seeme to be desirous to seeme wise before their temporall kings . for no man , howsoeuer fulfill'd with wisedome , is ( speaking in his kings presence ) secure and safe . penes regem , noli vel●e videri s●piens . boast not thy wisedome in the presence of the ki●g . the reason is for that he that is the supreme soueraign●●n temporall power , whom all acknowledge and obey as their superiour , risenteth it much , to see himselfe inferiour in a thing of so greate esteeme , as is wisedome and discretion . xenophon , laying his foundation on this opinion , introduceth cambises , instructing his sonne cyrus , king of persia , how he ought to carry himself in his kingdome . as also alexander , who receiued his militarie precepts from his father philip and not from any other that was inferiour vnto him . it is written of agasicles , king of the lacedemonians , that he refused to learne philosophie of a famous philosopher of those times ; it seeming vnto him , that being a king , it was not fitting , he should be his scholler , whose sonne he was not . as if he should haue sayd ; that he , onely by a naturall obligation , acknowledged him alone , and that he contented himselfe with that which he had learned from him , and would not acknowledge any other inferiour vnto him in birth , though neuer so much before him in learning and knowledge . but this difficulty i purpose to ouercome by proposing , in this my treatise , vnto kings , not mine owne reasons , nor those , which i might draw from great philosophers , and humane histories , but from the words of god , and of his saints , and from histories diuine and canonicall , whose instructions kings may not disdaine , nor take it as an affront to submit themselues thereunto , be they ( being christians ) neuer so powerfull , neuer so supreme ; because the author that dictates these lessons vnto them , is the holy-ghost . and if i shall at any time alleage the examples of heathen kings , and shall make some good benefit of antiquitie , and serue my selfe with the sentences of philosophers , that were strangers vnto gods people , it shall be very sparingly , and as it comes in my way , and as one that ceazeth vpon his owne goods ( if he fortune to light vpon them ) and taketh them from those that vniustly detaine and possesse them . chap. ii. what the name of king signifieth . this name of king , in diuine and humane letters is very ancient , and so old as is the first man. for in gods creating of him ( euen before that there were many men ) he made him king ouer all the beastes of the field . and it is a most noble appellatiue , and that which is better , and more neerely representeth vnto vs the maiestie of god , who very frequently in the holy scriptures , and with much propriety , is called king. and it is the common opinion of the wisest , that it signifieth one that rules , and gouernes , being deduced from the latine word regere , which is to rule , or gouerne . reges a regendo dicti sunt , ( saith s. isidore ) ideò quilibet rectè faciendo , regis nomen tenet , sed peccando , amittit . and considering with more attention , this it 's true etymologie , he is properly sayd to be a king , who ouer mastring his passions , doth first rule and gouerne himselfe , cumplying ( as he ought ) with the obligations of his estate , without offence either to god or his neighbour ; and next hath a care to rule others , and , to procure all he can , that all may doe the like ; and he , that shall do the contrary laying his foundation on humane wisedom , and reason of state regardeth more his own temporall commoditie and proper interest , then the good of the commonwealth . this suteth not with the name he holdeth ; nor may he be called a king , neither is he so for himselfe , nor for others , because he neither knowes to rule himselfe nor others . malus , si reg●et ( saith s. austen ) servus est . he hath the appellation and honourable name of a king , but in very truth , see how many vices reigne in him , so many times is hee a servant , nay a very slaue . it was the aduice of agapitus to iustinian the emperour , that he should haue an eye ouer himselfe , and looke well to his actions ; for albeit he were a king and a great prince , yet the title of king did then convene to him , when he should be master of himselfe , and curbing his unruly appe●ites , should of a king become a vassall to reason and iustice. hee that is good , and iust , is a god vpon earth , and from thence is the name of king deriued vnto him , and is his vicar in all causes , for to maintaine his subiects in justice and truth by his empire and command , and to sustaine all things in order , policie , and peace . and therefore a law of the partida sayes thus , q●●el ●ey ●s vicario , de dios , para hazer iusticia en todos los cosas . that a king is gods vicar , for to doe iustice in all causes . answering to that his owne saying ; by me kings reigne , &c. which is , as if he should haue said ; that their power is deriued from god , as from the first and primary cause . the signification likewise of this word king , or rex , is ( and me thinks ) farre better declared , if we shall but refer i'ts originall to another word of the primitiue language , where the hebrew word raga signifies ( amongst other it's significations ) to feede . and in this sense it is to be found in many places of holy scripture . and from this raga , is deriued rex , rego , or regno . and regere , and pascere , amongst the poets , and euen also amongst the prophets , are promiscuously vsed . homer , virgil , and dauid , put no difference betwixt reges and pastores , styling kings shepheards ; & shepheards kings . and therefore in the . psalme , where the vulgar latine reades , dominus regit me ; s. ieromes translation hath it , dominus pascit me . the lord is my shepheard , therefore can i lack nothing , he shall f●ede me in a greene pasture , and leade me forth besides the waters of comfort . and homer he styles a king pastorem populi , the shepheard of his people ; in regard of that sweetnesse of command wherewith he gouerneth them , and the gentle hand that hee carries ouer them , feeding , but not fleecing of them . xenophon saith , that the actions of a good shepheard , are like vnto those of a good king. so that the name of king , doth not onely signifie him that ruleth , but him that ruleth like a shepheard . and the better to instruct vs herein , the prophet isaiah , speaking of that , which the true christian king our sauiour should doe , when he should come into the world , saith ; sicut pastor , gregem suum pascet , in brachio suo congregabit agnos , & in sinn suo levabit , foetas ipsa portabit . hee shall feede his flocke like a shepheard , hee shall gather the lambes with his armes , and carry them in his bosome , and shall guide them with young . he shall perfectly performe all the offices of a shepheard by feeding of his sheepe , and by bearing them ( if neede be ) vpon his shoulders . and of the selfe same king , christ , god said in respect of his people ; ipse pisect eos , & ipse erit eis in pastorem . i will set vp a shepheard ouer them , and he shall seed them . and in the next words following he cals him ioyntly king and shepheard . servus meus david rex super eos , & pastor unus erii omnium eorum . my seruant dauid shall bee the prince amongst them , and they shall all haue but one shepheard . and they shall dwell safely in the wildernesse , and sleepe in the woods , and none shall make them affraid . and for the clearer signification hereof , the first kings that god made choise of , and commanded to be anoynted , hee tooke them from amidst their fl●cks ▪ the one they sought after , the other they found feeding of his flocke . the prophet samuel whom god commanded to annoynt for king one of the sons of ishai , hauing scene the elder and the other seuen ( all goodly handsome men & of a good disposition ) had no great liking to any one of them , but asked their father ; whether he had no more children but those ; and he said vnto him ; adhuc reliquus est parv●lus , & pascit oves . there remaineth yet a little one behind , that keepeth the sheepe . and the prophet willed him , that he should send for him ; for we will not sit downe , till he be come hither ; shewing , that to be a shepheard and to feed the flock , was the best symbole , and most proper embleme of a king. and therfore i would haue no man to imagine that which philon did feare , that when we come to make a king , we must take away the crooke , and put the scepter in his hand . the office of a king i tell you , and the arte of ruling , will require a great deale of study , and experience . for to gouerne the bigger sort of beastes , and those that are of greatest price , a man must first haue learned to ●aue gouerned the lesser . it is not meete , to popp into great places vnexperienced persons , and such as know not what belongs vnto businesse , nor the weight of the charge that they are to take vpon them . for indeede , great matters are not handsomely carryed , nor well managed , but by such as haue beene formerly imployed in businesses of an inferiour and lower nature . and this choyse , which god made of dauid , iumpes with this our intent . he doth not say , that he tooke him on the sodaine from the sheepefold , and presently clapp't a crowne vpon his head ; but first bred him vp to feede the house of iacob , and his family , and that he should exercise himselfe therein . for a well ordered house , and a family that is well gouerned , is the modell and image of a common-wealth ; and domesticall authoritie , resembleth regall power . and the good guidance of a particular house , is the exemplary and true patterne of a publicke state. it imbraceth and comprehendeth in it all the sorts of good gouernment . it doth treate and set in order those things , that appertaine to policie , conseruation , and the direction of men , as well in regard of commanding , as obeying . what other thing is a house with his family , but a little citie . and what a citie , but a great house ? many houses , make a citie ; and many cities , make a kingdome . and in point of gouernment , ihey onely d●ffer in greatnesse , for howbeit in the one , they are busied more , and in the other lesse , yet they tend all to one end , which is the common good . and therefore s. paul and other saints , and wise men are of opinion , that hee that knowes not how to gouerne his own house well , will hardly gouerne another mans . the emperour alexander severus , visiting the roman senate , did inquire , how the senators did rule and gouerne their owne priuate houses , and families , and sayd ; that that man , who knew not how to command his wife , and his children , to follow his owne businesses , to make prouision for his house , and to gouerne his familie , it were a madnesse to recommend vnto that man the gouernment of the common-wealth . amongst those the famous gouernours , cato the roman , was preferred before aristides , the grecian , because the former was a great pater familias , or father of a familie , and the latter was noted to be defectiue in that kinde . so that the life of a shepheard is the counterfeit or picture of gouernment , as is to be seene by his assistance in his office , in the care of the wellfare of his flocke , in the obligation of the account that he is to make , in the offence that he is to finde by wolues and theeues , and in the solicitude and watchfullnesse , which those ordinary dangers doe require , wherein his flocke stands , and more especially when the shepheard is wanting vnto them . and it is so proper vnto a king to feede his flocke , that when our sauiour christ fed that multitude of people , which followed him in the desert , they no sooner saw that he had satisfied them , but they were desirous to make him a king , and to clap the crowne on his head . and for this cause in the . chapter of esay , he that saw he was vnprouided of bread , would not accept the votes of the people , that were willing to nominate him for their king , saying thus vnto them : non sum medicus , & in domo mea non est panis , neque vestimentum ; nolite constituere me principem populi . there is no bread in my house , nor cloathing ▪ i cannot be an helper vnto yee , therefore make me no prince of the people . and therefore with very good reason , and with a great deale of proprietie , a king and a shepheard , is all one . in the greeke tongue a king is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 quasi basis & fundamentum populi . as if hee were the basis and foundation of the people . and of your kings ( sayth rabbi abraham ) those words are to bee vnderstood of iob , qui portant orbem ; who sustaine the weight of a kingdome , and beare the loade thereof vpon their shoulders . and a hierogliffe heereof is the crowne which they weare vpon their head in manner of a citie , circled about with townes , and battlements ; signifying thereby , that the strong brayne , and the good and wise head , and sound sconce of a king , doth fortifie and vphold the whole weitht and burthen of all the cities of his kingdome . and this is s. gregories interpretation vpon of his place . some others conceiue that this name was giuen it , in consideration of that creature called the basiliske ; who is the king of the venomous creatures , and hath this euil qualitie with him , that he kills with his lookes onely . and doe not the kings sometimes kill their fauourites , and those that are neerest about them , with the knit of the brow , and a sower looke ? and some such kings there be ( or at least haue beene ) in the world , that take it offensiuely , if their frownes and disfauours , doe not kill like poyson . but this etymologie hath little ground for it . for the greeke word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which in that language signifies a king , is much different from that of bisiliscus , a basiliscke . for it is more proper to kings to cure and heale , then to kill , and slay . as the forecited place of esay teacheth vs , where he that would not take the crowne vpon him , excuses himselfe , not onely for that he had not bread to feede others , but also because he was not a physitian . non sum medicus , & in domo mea non est panis , presuposing , that a good king ought to be a physitian to his people , and ought to helpe and feede his subiects . and the sayd prophet , when in the person of christ , he relateth , how the eternall father had annoynted him , and crowned him for king , saith , spiritus domini super me , eò quod vnxerit me & vt mederer contritis corde . and christ himselfe being calumniated by the pharisees , because he did conuerse and eat with publicans , and sinners , hee made them this answer . non est opus valentibus medicus , sed malè habentibus . they that bee whole , neede not the physitian , but they that be sicke . patricius senensis , calls kings and princes , medicos vniuersales reip : vniuersall physitians of the common-wealth . and s. austen tell vs that to them appertaineth the remedy of all the sicke , and the cure of all the diseases , and other those crosse and repugnant humours which reigne in a kingdome , and to apply a medicine to euery particular person , agreeable to that humour , wherein hee is peccant . and the office of a shepheard , which is so proper vnto kings ( as already hath beene said ) hath with it this obligation , to cure his flocke . and therefore in the of ezechiel , god doth lay a heauie taxe vpon those shepheards , because they were faulty in this their office of curing . quod infirmū fuit , non consolidastis , & quod aegrotum , nonsanaest is , &c. the diseased haue yee not strengthened , neither haue yee healed that which was sicke , neither haue yee bound vp that which was broken , neither haue yee brought againe that which was driuen away , neither haue yee sought that which was lost ; but with force and with crueltie haue yee ruled them , yee eat the fat , and yee cloath ye with the wooll , yee kill them that are fed , but yee feede not the flocke . and heere that third signification sutes well with this name of king : which is the same as father . as appeareth in that of genesis , where the s●chemites called their king abimilech , which is as much to say ; as my father , or my lord ; and anciently their kings were called patres reip : fathers of their common-wealths . and hence is it , that king theodoricus defining the maiestie royall of kings , ( as cassiodorus reporteth it ) speakes thus : princeps , est pastor publicus & communis . a king is the publicke and common shepheard . nor is a king any other thing , but the publicke and common father of the common-wealth . and because the office of a king hath such similiancie with that of a father , plato stiles a king patrem familias , a father of a familie . and xenophon the philosopher affirmeth : bonus princeps nihil differt à bono patre . that a good prince , differs nothing from a good father . the onely difference is in this , that the one hath fewer , the other more vnder his empire & command . and certainly , it is most sutable vnto reason , that this title of father be giuen vnto kings , because they ought to be such towards their subiects , and kingdomes , carrying a fatherly affection and prouidence , towards their wellfare and preseruation . for reigning , or bearing rule ( saith homer ) is nothing else but a paternall gouernment , like that of a father ouer his owne children . ipsum namque regnum , imperium est suapte natura paternum . there is no better habit of gouerning , then to haue a king cloath himselfe with the loue of a father , and to haue that care of his subiects , as if they were so many children of his owne loynes . the affection of a father towards his children , his care that they shall lacke nothing , and to be one and the same towards them all , carrieth a great proportion with a kings pietie towards his subiects . hee is called a father , so that the very name , obligeth him to answer this signification , in workes , not in word ; but to shew himselfe a true father indeed . againe , for that this name father is very proper vnto kings , if wee shall well and truly weigh it , amongst all other attributes and epithites of maiestie , and signorie , it is the greatest , vnder which all other names are comprehended , as the species vnder their genus , being subordinate thereunto . father is aboue the title of king , lord , master , captaine , and the like . in a word , it is a name aboue all other names that denotate signorie , and prouidence . antiquitie when it was willing to throw it's greatest honour vpon an emperour , it called him the father of the common-wealth . which was more then caesar , or augustus , and whatsoeuer other name most glorious in the world : whether it were conferr'd vpon them either for to flatter them , or to oblige them to those great effects , which this name ( father ) tyes them vnto . in conclusion , by this word ( father , ) it is giuen kings to vnderstand , what they ought to doe . to wit ; that they are to rule gouerne and maintaine their common-wealths and kingdomes in iustice , and in peace : that they are to feede , ( like good shepheards ) these their rationall sheepe . that they are ( like skilfull physitians ) to heale and cure their maladies : and that they are to haue that care of their subiects , as fathers haue of their children , watching ouer them with prudence and with loue , respecting more them , then themselues . for kings , are more obliged to the kingdome , and the common-wealth , then vnto themselues . for , if we shall but looke into the originall , and institution of a king , and a kingdome , we shall finde , that a king was ordained for the good of the kingdome , and not the kingdome for the good of the king. chap. iii. whether the name of king , be a name of office ? let vs not detaine our selues in the ill apprehension of those , who conceiue , that the name of king is a title onely of honour and dignitie , and not of charge , and office , for if ( as wee said before in our . chapter ) a king in a common-wealth , holdes that place , as the head doth in a humane body , where all the corporall members haue their particular offices , and euen the most and most principall , then most certaine it is , that a king , in his kingdome , is to be the most eminent in the gouernment , so that we are not only to acknowledge that a king is an officiall , but euen the greatest of all officialls , and that of all offices , his is the chiefest and of greatest dignitie . etenim ( sayth s. chrysostome ) imperare , non solum dignitas est , imò ars est ●rtium omnium summa . to rule , is not onely a dignitie , but an art also , and of all artes , the greatest . diuine plato , & diuus thomas likewise affirme ; inter omnes artes viuendi , regendi ars amplior , & superior est . the art and office of gouerning a common-wealth , and a kingdome , is a regall knowledge , a princely science , and which particularly appertaineth vnto kings ; it is an arte of artes , the most difficile to learne , and the most dangerous to practise ; and nazianzene renders the reason . quia inter omnes animantes homo maximè & moribus varius , & voluntate diuersus . because amongst all liuing creatures , man is most various in his maners , and most diuerse in his will. he is most mutable in his opinions , most deceitfull in his words of more colours , foldings , and doublings then any other creature whatsoeuer ; worst to be knowen , and hardest to to be ruled ; and aboue all , most ingrate and vnthankfull vnto him that is set in authority ouer him . and plato more particularly tells vs , that he held it in a manner a thing impossible , for any one to haue such a wit , that alone of himselfe , he should be sufficient to gouerne well ; it being so hard a matter to do , though a man haue neuer so good partes , and abilities to performe that function ▪ ptolomy , king of aegypt , considering the great difficulties , which accompanie gouerning and reigning , began to weigh the qualitie of each difficultie , and comparing some with other some , he knew not which to ranke formost , or to preferre before his fellow . it seemed wonderfull hard vnto him , to know the talent , and parts of persons , for the conferring of offices and places vpon them ; a businesse , whereon good gouernment mainely dependeth . hee likewise found it as difficult , to make good lawes , and statutes . as also , to rule so many townes , and so many people , as are listed vnder a crowne , and name of king : as likewise to dresse so many dishes for so many different palates , so many things to the gust and content of so many sundry wills , and a thousand other difficulties which daily offer themselues in the ruling and gouerning of men . for ( as seneca saith ) nullum animal , maiori est arte tractandum , quam homo . there is not that creature , like vnto man , for whose gouernment , more arte more prudence , more wisedome , more discretion , and sagacitie is required . no man can denie , but that to beare on his shoulders the weight of a kingdome , with obligation to attend on such and so great a diuersitie of things , as of peace , and warre , and of so many graue and weightie businesse , and of so great importance , without fayling one point or tittle therein , is an intollerable trouble , a most heauy burthen , and most difficult office. and in this respect , so few haue there beene , that haue knowne perfectly to cumply therewith : and it is worthy our consideration , that there being so many histories , and bookes of the liues of kings , and emperours of the gentiles , there is not one amongst them all to be found , who hath not bin noted of many faults . alexander the great , who for his famous acts , & great courage , had the sirname giuen him of great , had many things in him worthy reprehension , and vnbeseeming royall dignitie . and howbeit xenophon in his cyropedia , would giue vs to vnderstand , that king cyrus , had all those vertues and greatnesses , which are there represented vnto vs , yet many wise men are of beliefe , that that was no true history which he wrote of that king , but an idea , or patterne , that kings might draw from thence , what they ought to bee . like vnto those bookes of cicero , which he wrote de oratore ; who painteth forth the properties , which hee that will be a good orator ought to haue , though that man was neuer yet found , that had them . besides , if we shall turne our eyes towards those ancient kings of gods people , the sacred scripture doth dis-deceiue vs. for , out of the whole packe of them , hee picks out but three onely that were good . praeter dauid , & ezechiam , & iosiam , ●omnes reges peccatum commiserunt . excepting dauid , ezechias , and iosias , all the rest of the kings committed sinne . not that these three had not their sinnes , for the holy scripture taxeth them of some , ( and those no small ones ) but because they had not sinned in the office of kings . and because in it's administration , it is an office so full of difficulties : the apostle s. paul admonisheth all the faithfull , that they alwayes make earnest prayers for them , which is still vsed to this day in all your catholike churches . moreouer that the name of a king , is the name of an office , it is confirmed by that common saying ; beneficium d●tur propter officium . and therefore kings being so greatly benefitted , not onely by those great tributes , which are giuen them by the common-wealth , but likewise by those which they receiue from the benefices , and rents of the church , it is an vndoubted truth , that they haue an office , and of offices the greatest ; and for this cause the whole kingdome doth so freely and liberally contribute vnto them . which is specified by s. paul in a letter of his which hee wrote vnto the romans . id●ò , & tributa praestatis , &c. for this cause pay you tribute also . for they are gods ministers , attending continually vpon this very thing , &c. kingdomes doe not pay their taxes idly and in vaine : so many sessements , so many subsedies , so many impositions , so many great rentes , so much authoritie , so high a title , and so great a dignitie , is not giuen without charge and trouble . in vaine should they haue the name of kings , if they had not whom to rule and gouerne . and therefore this obligation lyes vpon them . in multitudine populi , dignitas regis . the honour of a king , is in the multitude of his people . so great a dignitie , so great reuenewes , such a deale of greatnesse , maiestie and honour , with a perpetuall cense and rate vpon his subiects lands and goods , binde him to rule and gouerne his states , conseruing them by peace and iustice. let kings therefore know , that they are to serue their kingdomes , being they are so well payd for their paines , and that they beare an office , which tyes them necessarily to this trouble . qui praeest in solicitudine , ( saith s. paul ) he that ruleth with diligence . this is the title , and name of king , and of him that gouernes . not of him , that goes before others onely in his honour , and his pleasure , but of him that excells others in his solicitude , and his care . let them not thinke , that they are kings onely in name , and representation , and that they are not bound to any more but to bee adored and reuerenced , and to represent the person royall with a good grace , and to carry themselues with a soueraigne kind of state and maiestie like some of those kings of the medes and persians , which were no more then meere shadowes of kings , so wholy neglectfull were they of their office , as if they had beene no such manner of men. there is not any thing more dead , and of lesse substance , then the image of a shadow , which neither waggs arme , nor head , but at the motion of that which causeth it . god commanded his people , that they should not make any grauen image nor any feigned pictures , or counterfeit paintings which shew a hand , where there is none ; discouer a face , where there is none ; and represent a body , where there is none ; expressing therein actions to the life , as if the image or picture did see , and speake . for god is no friend of feigned figures , of painted men , nor of kings , that are onely so in shape and proportion , being in fashion like vnto those , of whom dauid sayd , os habent , & non loquuntur , oculos habent , & non videbunt , &c. they haue mouths , but speake not , eyes haue they , but they see not ; they haue eares , but heare not , and hands haue they , but handle not . and to what vse i pray serues all this ? they are no more then meere idolls of stone , which haue no more in them of kings , but onely an externall representation . to be all name and authoritie , and to be men in nothing else , doe not sute well together . woe to the idoll shepheard ( saith zacharie ) that leaueth the flocke . the sword shall be vpon his arme , and vpon his right eye ; his arme shall be cleane dryed vp , and his right eye shall be vtterly darkeneds it is written in the reuelation ; nomen habes quod viuas , & mortuus es . thou hast a name that thou liuest , and art dead : the names which god setteth vpon things , are like vnto the title of a booke , which in few words , containeth all that is therein . this name of king , is giuen by god vnto kings , and therein includeth all that , which this their office tyes them to doe . and if their workes and actions doe not answer with their name and title , it is as if one should say yea , with his mouth , and by making signes , say no , with his head . what aiest and mockerie is this ? how shall such a one bee truely vnderstood ? it were cosenage and deceit in that golde beater , who writes vpon his signe , heere is fine gold to be sold , when indeed it is but orpine , and base gold for painters . the name of king , is not an attribute of idlenesse ; a person regall , must haue reall performance . as his name soundeth , so let him serue in his place : it is the people that proclaime the king , but it is the king that must proclaime his loue to the people . hee that hath the name of ruling and gouerning , a gods name let him rule and gouerne . they are not to be reyes de anillo ( as it is in the prouerb ) that is to say ; nominall kings only , & praeter nomen nihil : hauing nothing else in them . in france , there was a time , when their kings , had nothing but the bare name of kings , their liuetenants generall gouerning , and commanding all , whilest they ( like so many beastes ) did busie themselues in nothing else , but following the delights and pleasures of gluttonie , and wantonnesse . and because it might be known , and appeare to the people , that they were aliue , ( for they neuer came abroad ) once a yeare they made shew of themselues , on the first day of may , in the market-place of paris , sitting in a chaire of state on a throne royall , like your kings amongst your stage-players ; and there in reuerence they bowed their bodies vnto them , and presented them with giftes ; and they againe conferred some fauours , on such as they though fit . and because you may see the miserie whereunto they were brought , eynardus , in the beginning of that historie which he writes of the life of charles the great , says : that those kings ( in those dayes ) had no valour in them in the world , made no shew of noblenesse , nor gaue so much as a tast of any inclination thereunto ; but had onely the empty and naked name of king. for in very deede they were not kings , nor had actually and effectually any hand in the gouernment of the state , or the wealth and riches of the kingdome ; for they were wholly possessed by the praefecti latij , whom they called seneshalls , or lord high stewards of the kings house . who were such absolute lords and of that vnlimited power , that they ruled the roste , and did what they list , leauing the poore seely king nothing saue onely the bare title , who sitting in a chaire with his perriwigge , and his long beard , represented the person of a king making the world beleeue that hee gaue audience to all ambassadours that came from forraigne parts , and gaue them their answers and dispatches , when they were to returne : but in very truth , he sayd no more vnto them , saue what hee had beene taught , or had by writing beene powred into him , making shew as if all this had beene done out of his owne head. so that these kinde of kings had nothing of the power-royall , but the vnprofitable name of king , and inutile throne of state , and a personated maiestie that lay open to nothing but scorne and derision . for the ture kings , and those that commanded all , were those their minions and fauorites , who oppressed the other by their potencie , and kept them in awe . of a king of samaria , god sayd ; that hee was no more but paululum spumae , a froathy bubble . which being beheld a far off , seemeth to be something , but when you draw neere and touch it , it is nothing . simia in tecto , rex fatuus , in solio suo . he is like vnto an ape on the house-toppe , who vsing the apparances , and gestures of a man is taken for such a one by them that know him not . iust so , is a foolish king vpon his throne , your ape likewise serueth to entertaine children and to make them sport : and a king causeth laughter in those , who behold him stript of the actions of a king , without authoritie , and without gouernment . a king , appareled in purple , and sitting with great maiestie in his throne answerable to his greatnesse , seemeth in shew , graue , seuere , and terrible , but in effect nothing . like vnto the picture of that grecians limming , which being placed on high , and beheld from a farre , seemed to be a very good peece , but when you came neerer vnto it , and viewed it well , it was full of blots and blurs , and very course stuffe . a king vnder his canopie or princely pall , expresseth a great deale of outward state and maiestie , but himselfe being narrowly lookt into , is no better then the blurred character of a king. simulachra gentium , dauid calleth those kings , that are kings onely in name . or , as the hebrew renders it : imago fictilis , & contrita . an image of crack't earth , which leaketh in a thousand places . a vaine idoll , which representeth much , yet is no other then a false and lying shadow . and that name doth very well sute with them , which eliphas falsly put vpon iob , who , being so good and so iust a man , did mocke at him , vpbrayding him , that his foundation was in the dust , that he was not a man of any solid and sound iudgement , but onely had some certaine exteriour apparences , calling him mimicoleon , which is a kinde of creature , which in latin , they call formicaleo . because it hath a monstrous kinde of composture , in the one halfe part of the body , representing a fierce lyon , which was alwayes the hierogliffe of a king ; and in the other halfe an ante or pismire , which signifieth a weake thing and without any substance . authoritie , name , throne , and maiestie doth well become lyons , and powerfull princes ; and hitherto , it is well . but when we looke on the other halfe , and see the being and substance of a pismire ; that goes hard . there haue beene kings , who with their very name onely , haue strooke the world into a feare and terrour . but they themselues had no substance in them , and were in their kingdome no better then ants , and pismires . great in name and office but poore in action . let euery king then acknowledge himselfe to be an officer , and not onely to bea a priuate , but a publicke officer , and a superintendent in all offices whatsoeuer . for in all , hee is bound both to speake , and doe . s austen , and d. thomas , expounding that place of saint paul , which treates of episcopall dignitie , say ; that the latin word - episcopus , is compounded in the greeke of two words , being in signification the same with superintendens , the name of bishop , of king , and of whatsoeuer other superior , is a name that comprehendeth superintendencie , and assistance in all offices . this , the royall scepter signifieth , exercised by kings in their publicke acts , a ceremonie vsed by the aegyptians , but borrowed from the hebrews , who for to expresse the obligation of a good king , did paint and open eye placed alofte vpon the top of a rod , in forme of a scepter ; signifying in the one the great power that a king hath , and the prouidence and vigilancie which hee is to haue . in the other that he doe not onely content himselfe in possessing this supreme power , and in holding this high and eminent place , and so lye downe and sleepe , and take his ease , as if there were no more to bee done : but hee must bee the first in gouernment , the first in councell and all in all offices , hauing a watchfull eye in viewing and reuiewing , how euery publicke minister performes his duty . in signification whereof , ieremie saw the like rod , when god asking him what hee saw , hee sayd ; virgam vigilantem ego video . well hast thou seene , and verily i say vnto thee ; that i who am the head , will watch ouer my body ; i , that am the shepheard , will watch ouer my sheepe ; and i that am a king and monarke , will watch without wearinesse ouer all my inferiours . the chalde translates it , regem festinantem , a king that goes in hast . for though hee haue eyes and see ; yet if he betake him to his ease , be lull'd asleepe with his delightes and pleasures , and doth not bestirre himselfe , visiting this , and that other place , and seeke to see and know all the good and euill which passeth in his kingdome , hee is , as if hee were not . let him bethinke himselfe that he is a head , and the head of a lyon , which sleepes with his eyes open ; that he is that rodde , which hath eyes , and watcheth : let him therefore open his eyes , and not sleepe , trusting to those that perhaps are blinde , or like moles , haue no eyes at all : or if they haue any , vse them no farther then for their own priuate profit : and therein they are quicke sighted . these , haue the eyes of the kyte , and other your birdes of rapine ; but it were better that they had no eyes at all , then haue them all for themselues . chap. iiii. of the office of kings . hauing proued , that the name of king , is not of dignitie onely , but likewise of occupation , and office , it is fit , that we should now treate of the qualities and partes thereof . for the better vnderstanding whereof , wee must follow the metaphor , or resemblance of mans body , whereof the apostle s. paul made vse , thereby to giue vs to vnderstand the place and office which euery member is to hold in the common-wealth . all the members of the body ( saith he ) haue their particular office , but the occupations and functions of euery one of them , are diuerse , and different . the most important and of greatest excellencie are those of the head ; which is the superiour part of the bodie . in which the soule doth exercise her principall operations , as those of the vnderstanding , and will , the instruments whereof haue their habitation in the head . there is seated the sensus communis , or common-sense , so called , because it 's knowledge is common to all those obiects of the exteriour or outward sences . there likewise , is the imaginatiue , the estimatiue , the phantasie , and the reminiscentia , corporall faculties , which serue to those that are spirituall , as are the vnderstanding , and the will. in the head , are likewise placed the exteriour sences . as seeing , hearing , smelling tasting , touching , and other faculties and vertues , wherewith the life of man is sustained and gouerned . and therfore s. ambrose calls it imperialem aulam , the imperiall court , because therein resides the imperiall power , or that empresse the will , which ruleth and commandeth all those powers and faculties , as being obedient and subiect vnto her . and wee may also stile it regalem aulam , the princes pallace ; for therein abideth ( assisted by it's operations ) the vnderstanding as a king in his court. for if the will bee tearmed an empresse , of it's empire and rule : the vnderstanding is called a king , because it directeth and gouerneth in man , and vnto man , all his operations , guiding them to their due and fit ends . lactantius ( contrary vnto galen ) sayth of the head , that it is the first member that is formed in man , and hath the primacie ouer all the rest . and is for this cause , called caput , which is the same with principium , ( as some doctors doe expound it . ) and in the spanish tongue , they call the first lines of a processe , cabeca de processo , the head of the processe , or the beginning of it . and it carryes the same signification in the latin. in capite libri scriptum est de me ; id est ; in principio libri . and for this , we haue not onely varro's , but also robertus stephanus his confirmation . caput dicitur , quod inde initium capiant sensus . it is called head , because from thence the sences haue their head , and beginning . as also , for that the head , is the well-head of mans life . from it , haue their originall , and in it , do all the sences liue . it sees , heares , smells , and tastes , not onely for it selfe , but for the whole body , that is , for the good and benefit of all the members and parts of the body , hence it followeth , that the institution of the state-royall , or of a king , which is represented in the head , was not ordained onely for the kings owne vse and profit , but for the generall well-fare of his kingdome . and therefore hee ought to see , heare , taste , and vnderstand , not only by him selfe , or for himselfe , but by all , and for all . he ought not onely to haue an eye to his important affayres , but likewise to the good of his subiects : being that for them , and not for himselfe onely , a king was borne to the world. aduerte ( saith seneca to the emperor nero ) rempublicam non esse tuam sed te reipublicae . consider , that the common-wealth is not thine , but thou the common-wealths . those first men who leauing solitude , assembled themselues to liue in a community knew full well , that naturally , euery one careth for himselfe and his owne people , but no man that taketh care for all in generall . and therefore they did agree amongst themselues to choose one of more especiall valour and worth , to whom all might haue recourse . and that he , who among them all should be most renowned for his vertue , prudence , and fortitude , should preside ouer all the rest , and should rule and gouerne them ; that he should be watchfull ouer all of them , that he should be solicitous of the common good and profit of them all , and to be as carefull of them , as a father would be of his children , or a shepheard of his sheepe . and weighing with themselues , that such a kinde of man , as this ought to be , imploying himselfe not in his owne , but other mens businesses , could not be able to maintaine himselfe , and his familie ( for then all did eate of the labour of their owne hands , and the sweate of their browes ) they did ioyntly resolue to finde his house , and to sustaine and maintaine him , that hee might not be withdrawen by other by businesses , but apply himselfe wholy to those of the common good , and to publicke gouernment . for this end were they established ; this was the beginning that kings had ; and it ought to be the care of a good king , to care more for the publike , then his owne particular good . all his greatnesse is at the cost of a great deale of care , trouble , vexation , and inquietude both of soule and body . he is wearinesse to himselfe ; to others , he is their ease , their sustenance , and their defence . like vnto your fayrest flowers , and fruits , which although they beautifie the tree , they are not so much for it , or for it's owne respect , as for others . let not any man thinke that all the good doth consist in the beauty and brauery , wherewith the flower doth flourish ; and in the goodly shew wherewith the great ones of the world doe gallant it ; your powerfull kings and princes , are flowers , but flowers which fade and wither , wast their life to preserue others , drawing care vpon themselues , and affording comfort vnto others , others more inioying the fruit , then they themselues . for ( as philon iudaeus saith ) a king to his kingdome , is that , which a wise man to the ignorant , a sheepheard to his sheepe , a father to his children , light vnto darkenesse , and that which god heere on earth is to all his creatures . for this title he gaue vnto moses , when he made him king , and ruler ouer his people . signifying vnto him , that he was to be as god , the common father of them all ; for to all this doth the office and dignitie of a king oblige him . omnium domos illius vigilantia defendit , omnium otium illius labor , omnium delitias illius industria , omnium vacationem illius occupatio . his subiects houses are guarded and secured by his vigilancie ; their ease procured , by his labour , their delights inioyed , by his industry , and their merry vacations , by his painefull imployments . and therfore the prophet samuell sayd vnto king saul , anon after he was annointed king ouer israel ; declaring vnto him the obligations of his office ; behold saul , now that god hath annointed thee king ouer all this kingdome , that thy office ties thee to it 's generall gouernment . thou wast not made king to sleepe and take thine ease , or to honour and authorize thy selfe by the dignitie royall , but that thou shouldest gouerne and maintaine the people in peace , and iustice , and that thou shouldest protect and defend them from their enemies rex eligitur , non vt sui ipsius curam habeat ( sayth socrates ) et sese molliter curet , sed vt per ipsum , ij qui eligerunt , bene beatéque viuant . kings are not chosen , that their whole care should be for themselues , to pamper the flesh , and to liue nicely and daintily ; but that by him , they who had elected him , might liue well and happily vnder him . they were not created , nor introduced into the world , for their owne commoditie , and their owne pleasure , and that all the good morsels should be for their owne trencher ( for if it should be so , no man would willingly be subiect vnto them ) but for the publicke profit and common good of all his subiects , for their happy gouernment , for their safe protection , their augmentation , conseruation , and in a word for their seruice ; ( and without any vnmannerlinesse , we may well tearme it so ) for albeit in outward appearance the scepter and the crowne , haue the face of empire and signiory ; yet in strictenesse and in rigour , it is but the office of a seruant . servus communis , siuè servus honoratus : the common-wealths seruant , or a more honourable kind of seruant . this is the attribute which some giue vnto a king . quia à tota republica stipendia accipit , vt serviat omnibus . because he receiues stipends from all , that he may serue all . and the pope of rome holds it no dishonour vnto him , to be stiled ; servus servorum dei the seruant of gods seruants . and howbeit anciently this name of seruant were infamous , yet after that our sauiour christ had in his own person taken it vpon him , it hath since beene accounted honorable . and as it is not repugnant and contradictory to the essenceand nature of the sonne of god , no more is it any preiudice or disparagement to the maiestie and greatnesse of kings . and this was well vnderstood by antigonu● king of macedonia , who reprehending his sonne , for carrying too hard a hand ouer his subiects , thus checkt his immoderate empire ; an ignoras ( fili mi ) regnum nostrum nobilem esse seruitutem ? wootst thou not ( my sonne ) that our kingdome , is a noble seruitude ? answering to that of agamemnon ; we liue ( saith hee ) in the opinion of the world in much greatnesse , and in high estate , but in effect are but seruants and slaues to our vassals . this is the office of good kings , to serue in this honourable manner . for , in being kings , their actions depend not on the sole will of their owne persons , but of the lawes and statutes which they haue giuen , and allowd of , and those conditions wherewith they accepted this their soueraigntie . and though they should bee wanting to these ( which are no more then a humane conuencion , couenant , or agreement betwixt prince , and people ) yet may they not be defectiue in those , which the naturall and diuine law hath layd vpon them ; the lady and mistris as well of kings as subiects . all which are in a manner contained in those words of ieremy , in which ( according to s. ieromes opinion ) god sets downe the office of kings . facite iudicium & iustitiam , liberate vi oppressum de manu calumniatoris , & aduenam , & pupillum , & viduam nolite contristare , neque opprimatis iniquè & sanguinem innocentem ne effundatis : execute yee iudgement and righteousnesse , and deliuer the spoyled out of the hand of the oppressour , and doe no wrong , doe no violence to the stranger , the fatherlesse , nor the widowe , neither shed innocent blood . &c. this is the summe wherein is cyphered vp the office of a king. these the lawes of his court , whereby he is bound to mantaine in peace and iustice , the fatherlesse , and the widowe ; the poore and the rich ; the mighty , and the weake . to his account are put the agrauios and wrongs which his ministers doe vnto the one ; and the iniustice , which the other suffer . the wretched estate of those that are necessited , the cry of the distressed , and the teares that are shed out of anguish of heart ; and a thousand other loades , euen wane-loades of cares and obligations , lye vpon the shoulders of him that is the head , and king of a kingdome . and albeit he be the head in commanding and in gouerning , yet in bearing ( if not often ouercharged therewith ) the heauie weight and loade of all , hee must be the feete or supporters to beare the burthen of the whole body of the common-wealth . of kings and monarkes , the iust men iob sayth ; that by reason of their office , they carry ( like poters ) the world on their shoulders , vnder which burthen the proudest helpers must stoope . in consideration whereof , it is sayd in the booke of wisedome ; in veste ponderis , quam habebat summus sacerdos , totus erat orbis terrarum : in the long garment , was the whole world . the latin translation in veste ponderis , carryes more weight with it ; so that , in taking vpon thee to be a king , thou must make account , to take so great a charge vpon thee and so heauie a load , as the strongest carte will hardly be able to beare it . and this moses knew well enough , whom god hauing made his vice-roy , his captaine generall , and sole liuetenant in the gouernment ; in stead of giuing him thankes for this so honourable a charge committed vnto him , made his moane and complaint for hauing layd so heauy a loade vpon his shoulders . cur afflixisti seruum tuum ? cur imposuisti pondus vniuersi populi huius super me ? wherfore hast thou afflicted thy seruant ? and wherefore haue i not found fauour in thy sight , that thou layest the burthen of all the people vpon me ? and proceedeth farther with his complaints , saying ; nunquid ego concepi omnem hanc multitudinem ? aut genut eam , vt dicas mihi ; porta eos ? haue i conceiued all this people ? haue i begotten them , that thou shouldest say vnto me ; carry them in thy bosome , as the nursing father beareth the sucking child &c. where it is worthy the noting ; that god said not any one such word vnto moses ; but only commanded him , that he should rule and gouerne his people , that he should be their captaine , and their leader . and yet he heere sticks not to say , that hee layd the burthen of all the people vpon him ; with this motto added thereunto ; porta eos : carry them &c. a man would thinke hee complaineth heere without a cause ; for god says no more vnto him ; but that hee be their captaine , and that hee take vpon him the rule , command , and gouernment of them . but to this it is answered . al buen entendedor , pocas palabras : to a wise man , halfe a word is enough . and he that is wise , and well vnderstands what it is to gouerne , and to be a head , knowes that gouernment , and charge , or loade , is all one . and that the words themselues regere , and portare , are synonomyes , and haue one and the selfe same signfication . for there is not any gouernment , or charge , which is without it's burthen , and trouble . in that repartment and diuision of offices , which iacob conferr'd vpon his children , he marked out reuben to be the first in inheritance , and the greatest in gouernment . prior in donis , maior in imperio : thou art my first in the excellencie of dignitie , & the excellencie of power : which s. ierome renders , maior ad portandum ; the greatest to beare . for empire , and bearing , are both one thing . and by how much the empire is the greater , by so much the greater is the toyle and trouble and the burthen the heauier . st gregory in his moralls saith ; that the power , dominion , and signorie , which kings haue ouer their subiects , ought not to be esteemed an honour , but a trouble . potestas accepta , non honor , sed onus aestimatur . and the blindest gentiles did attaine to this light of truth . and one of them vsed the selfe same phrase of speech , speaking of another that was much puffed vp and well contented with the charge and office , which apollo had allotted him . laetus erat , mixto ▪ oneri gaudebat honore . so that to rule , and command , is a mixture of a little honour and much trouble . and the latin word , which signifieth honour , doth not differ more then in one letter from that which signifieth a loade or burthen . onos , & onus . for ( h. ) is but an aspiration . nor was there euer that man yet wanting , nor euer will be , to take ( for honours sake ) this burthen vpon him . though all of them can be well content , to take as little of the loade as they can vpon them , but as much of the honor , as you will ; howbeit this is not the securest course . but i shall conclude this chapter with this aduiso . that the office of a king consists not so much in the outward operation , ( though in th●s hee is not to faile ) as in the inward apprehension . which in it's own nature may imbrace infinite things , not as infinite , but as such as may be reduced to a few points , nor no more then shall be pointed at in this treatise . which ought alwayes , of a wise & prudent king , to be well vnderstood , & to make vse of as many of them as hee can , and which do more particularly appertaine vnto his office , and to leaue the rest vnto his ministers . a king must be like the heart in the body , which solely of it selfe cannot performe all those offices , which all the members more particularly may . but by the helpe and meanes of diuers instruments , members , and organs , diffusing & sending forth their vertue vnto them , it findes it selfe in the operation of them all . the king , is the heart of the kingdome , and must worke therin like it , not doing all by himselfe ( for that is impossible , and instead of doing good , would do hurt ) by keeping himselfe in his proper station , without transiliating that circle which more particularly belongeth vnto him , and performing those offices , which another cannot execute for him , by his great power and vertue , he may in a diffusiue manner haue recourse to all the parts euen the most remote of his kingdome , take a care of all and haue a hand in all . and this care , is as proper to a king ; as it is to the heart ; it being impossible for the heart to liue without care . and from thence it takes it's name and appellatiue . cor ( saith isidore ) dicitur à cura , cor ( which is the heart ) is so called , à cura : from it's care . for it is that , which takes care of mans life . ego dormio , & cor meum vigilat . i sleepe , but my heart waketh . while man sleepes the heart still beates , and taketh care of the life and conseruation of the whole body , sending forth to all the parts thereof , it 's naturall vertue and heate , without the least dis-carefullnesse in the world , loosing it's owne quiet , to giue man ease . and therefore the spouse , called her beloued , her heart ; because hee performed this office with her . and the like must a king doe in his kingdome . he must watch , and forgoe his owne sleepe and quiet that his vassalls may take their ease and rest ; vpon paine of being vnfaithfull and defectiue in that fidelitie which is due vnto the office of a king. this made s. paul to say ; si quis suorum curam non habet , sidem negauit . if any prouide not for his owne , hee hath denied the faith , and is worse then an infidel . the heart likewise hath another property very proper vnto kings , which is , it 's continuall beating on the left side . the author of nature being desirous by this secret to teach kings , that they should apply themselues with more care to the weakest part , and that which hath most neede of their helpe . the right side is more assisted with naturall heate and blood , then the left , which is more stript of these fauours . and in this , the heart showes , that kings should shew their king-craft and the finenesse of their care , towards poore needy people , and such as are destitute of all humane fauour . for to the rich and mighty , blood aboundeth , and nothing is wanting vnto them . god doth illighten kings , which are the heads of the people , to the end , that they may doe in their kingdomes all that which a good head ought to doe with it's body , by whose offices wee will goe , discoursing those of the mysticall head of this body of a common-wealth , which is the king ; beginning first with the vnderstanding , and it's pertinencies , or whatsoeuer appertaineth thereunto , which is the first in perfection , and whereunto ( in regard of it's actiue beginning and end ) the rest of the sences are in ordination . according to that measure of light which he shall vouchsafe to communicate vnto vs , who is that true light , which illighteneth euery man that commeth into the world . chap. v. of the reason and vnderstanding of kings , and of their wisedome . in good and true philosophy , and the best receiued diuinity , it is auerred , that the vnderstanding and naturall reason is the most principall power that is in man , by which he is distinguished from beasts ; and is the principium & radix , the ground and root of wisedome . and by how much the more ingenious a man is , & of better vnderstanding , by so much the more is he capable thereof , and the more intensiuely doth he loue it . and for this cause did pythagoras call wise men philosophers , louers , or coueters of wisdome ; because the possession thereof doth set an edge on the desire , and makes a man to couet it the more , for it's treasure is infinite , and no man can exhaust it . and therefore the more a man hath of it , the more he desireth it . it is the retreit and receptacle of faith , and of all the arts and sciences , both practicke and speculatiue , hauing an vniuersall aptitude to receiue them all into it selfe , and vpon the apprehension of them to put them in execution . and although it be a potentia or faculty of a limited power , yet so great is it's capacity , and of that amplenesse and ablenesse to receiue and containe , that it seemeth infinite , for let a man know neuer so much , yet can he not fill vp his knowledge . for such and such notions dispose the vnderstanding for others . knowledge begetteth knowledge , and the more things a man knoweth , so much the more easily doth he apprehend those he knoweth not , till he come to the perfect inquiry and knowledge of the truth : and by conuersing with the wise , and exercise of good letters , hee goes still rising higher and higher . and by how much the more a man is aduanced in his vnderstanding , so much the more aduantage shall he haue of those which haue not the same measure . suting with that saying of the comicke poet , who wondering to see the great difference betweene man & man , cryes out , homo , homini quid praestat ! so much doth one man differ from another in wisdome and prudence , that they seeme to be different species . and hence is it that the aduantage which a wise man hath ouer those that are not so , is , to make him king ouer all the people . which lesson god taught vs in the first king he made choice of for his people , who standing in the midst of his subiects , was taller then any of them from the sholders vpwards , so that his head shew'd it selfe aboue them all . and the word melech which in the originall signifieth a king , in that large & eminent letter which stands in the midst of it , doth mistically giue vs to vnderstand the excellency that aboue others , kings ought to haue . and therefore plato stiled a prudent and wise gouernour , virum divinum , a diuine man ; presupposing that he should be somewhat more then a man ; and exceed in diuine wisedome all other gouernours whatsoeuer . vbi sapiens , ibi est deus in humano corpore . and therefore , as god by way of eminency containeth the perfections of all the creatures ; so , ( as farre forth as a creature can ) a wise king should ( and that with much aduantage ) possesse the perfections of all his people . and the holy scripture teacheth vs , that god created man after his own image and likenesse , giuing him vnderstanding , memory , and will. and hauing created him , made him king ouer all he had created . vt praesit piscibus maris , & volatilibus coeli , & bestijs vniversae terrae , &c. to haue dominion ouer the fish of the sea , and ouer the fowle of the aire , & ouer the cattle , &c. and this was granted him , and did accompany the common nature of men . but to rule , and command , to be lord , and gouernour ouer men themselues , ( as are kings ) is a farre greater matter , and such as requireth a greater measure of vnderstanding and wisedome : and he that hath most store thereof , shall reape the most profit by it , as he that wants it , shall contrarywise finde the lacke of it . solomon , the wisest of kings , as he was both wise , and a king , could better then any other informe vs , of what importance are vnderstanding and wisdome in kings . in whose name he speaketh , when he saith , per me reges regnant , per me principes imperant ; by me kings reigne , and princes decree iustice . to the wiseman the scepter and crowne of right belongeth . for wisdome her selfe , as being the most essentiall forme of kings , makes him king and monarch ouer others . and in all nations almost , they gaue the same name , and the same ensignes to empire and wisdome . and s. paul makes them synonomies , and will haue them to signifie one and the same thing . she alone ( by keeping gods commandements ) will be sufficient in a king to make him pleasing and acceptable vnto god , and to be cut out according to the measure of his own heart . and though some are of a larger heart and vnderstanding then other some ; yet ( with god ) to be wise , is that which conueneth most both to king and subiect . by esay the prophet god promiseth to all his people a golden age , happy dayes , and fortunate times , wherein all shall haue a share of happinesse , peace , equity , iustice , health , content , and abundance of fruits . but comming vnto kings , he saith no more , but that there shall not be any one that shall be a foole . non vocabitur vltrà is qui insipiens est , princeps . this is a great happinesse . but ( o lord ) let mee aske thee ; is a king of worse condition then his subiects , that thou shouldst promise so many good things vnto them , and but one alone vnto him ? the answere hereunto is , that our good god giueth vnto euery one ( according to his state and calling ) that which is fittest for him . the subiect who hath one to rule and gouerne him , hath need of one to minister iustice vnto him , to conserue him in peace , and to make such prouision , that he may haue wherewith to eate , and the like . but a king , who is to rule and gouerne , hath need of wisedome , which is the life and soule of kings , which sustaineth the weight of a kingdome , and without which ( be they neuer so rich , neuer so powerfull ) they shall be as fit for gouernment , as a body without a head , or a●● head without a soule . and as from the soule the sences are origined , and from that essence result your passions ; so in like sort from wisedome resulteth vnto king , and kingdome , all that good and happinesse that can be desired . rex sapiens , stabilimentum est ciuitatis . a wise king is the vpholding of the people . and a foolish king the ruine of his subiects . you shall not name that nation either barbarous , or ciuill , which ( where kings were made by election ) did not make choice of a wise and prudent king. in that generall dyet , whereall the nations of trees and plants met , seeing that without law , and without a king , they could not conserue themselues in peace , and iustice ; the first resolution they tooke , was to choose a wise king. and in the first place they nominated the oliue , a tree of many good parts and qualities ; and amongst other , this the chiefest , that it was the symbole or hierogliffe of wisedome , which is all whatsoeuer can be desired in a king. this alone did king dauid desire for himselfe : intellectum da mihi , & vivam ; giue me vnderstanding , and i shall liue . he did not desire life , nor health , nor riches , but onely vnderstanding and wisedom . and with this alone did he promise to himselfe eternall life , and a durable kingdome . and therefore , si delectamini sedibus & sceptris , ô reges populi , diligite sapientiam , vt in perpetuum regnetis ; if your delight be in thrones and scepters , o ye kings of the people , honour wisedome , that ye may raigne for euermore . happy is that common-wea●th ( saith plato ) which hath a wise king. and vnhappy that ( saith another philosopher ) which hath a king without wisedome . aristotle tearmed the thebans happy , all the while that they were gouerned by those that were wise . of such consequence is wisedome in a king , that vpon the very rumour that he is a wise prince , all presently obay , and sooner submit themselues , then at the noise of his power . as was to be seene in king salomon , whose wisedome was no sooner knowen to the people , but they began presently to respect and feare him . but let me aske this question : shall it suffice a king to haue vnderstanding and wisdome , vnlesse he make vse thereof , and shew a willingnesse to execute what he knowes ? no certainly . for the greatnesse of a power or faculty consisteth in it's operation . the vnderstanding without intelligence , ( like the will without loue ) serues to little or no purpose . and it is doubted ( as i toucht in the beginning ) vpon which of these two potentias , or faculties , is that arme and hand , whereby the soule operateth it's most excellent workes ? the vnderstanding alleageth for himselfe , that it is he that in the kingdome of our soule doth ordaine , dispose , and gouerne . the will , she saith , that without her nothing is done . for as the philosophers tearme it , applicat potentias ad operandum , she sets these faculties a worke , and findes them hands . the vnderstanding confesseth this is true ; but with all saith , it is he that nods and winckes vpon her , makes signes and tokens vnto her , is as it were the watch-word , & doth expose vnto her whether she will this or that , for the better ordering & disposing of it . the will , she on the other side replyes , that she likewise fomenteth and affectionates the vnderstanding , and doth excite and sollicite him , that he study , thinke , and dwell vpon that which she best liketh . but leauing the resolution of this controuersie to your thomists , and scotists , who dispute it at large ; the vnderstanding ( as i said before ) is a regall power which ruleth & gouerneth in man , and is that starre which guideth and giueth light to the whole house of the soule ; yet is the will so much mistresse , that nothing is done without her . nor can god himselfe ( by violence ) draw a yea , or a nay from it , without trespassing vpon that liberty wherewith he created it ; for in it 's owne nature it is free : and ( as philosophy informeth vs ) it cannot be forced . caeterae potentiae possunt capi , non tamen voluntas . but the common receiued opinion is , that both the one and the other must concurre for the effecting of any free worke . insomuch , that it is impossible to performe any action of importance , vnlesse that both doe intend that same . we must plucke the reynes of both , hold both of them in our hands , if we meane to rule and gouerne the soule as we ought ; the vnderstanding directing , and the will operating . and therefore a deuout king , after that hee hath begg'd vnderstanding of god , that hee may be able to study and meditate on the obseruance of his diuine law , for the conseruation of himselfe , and his kingdome ; finding that this is not sufficient if the will should draw another way , let him presently pray vnto him , that he incline his will , and so dispose thereof , that he may not onely will his will , but that hee may take pleasure to put it in practise . in strictnesse , and in rigour , that is not wisedome , nor deserueth the name thereof , which is bung'd vp in the head , and goes not from the vnderstanding to the hand , and from the will to the worke. non enim sapientia est ( saith s. bernard ) quae quod sapit , non exercet ; wisedome without practise is not wisedome . there are some of whom all men sticke not to say , that he is of great vnderstanding , a man of admirable abilities , singular wisedome , &c. and yet no man knowes wherein his knowledge lies , nor can discerne his wisdome in his actions . it is necessary that this opinion should be ratified and confirmed by exterior actions , and some publique demonstrations . of king dauid the holy ghost saith , that hee did gouerne his people with the vnderstanding of his hands . et in intellectibus manuum suarum deduxit illos . it is a cleare case that the hands haue no other particular vnderstanding in a distinct manner , or distinguished from that which the soule hath ; and this is in the head , and not in the hands . but the meaning of that place is , that in the workes of his hands , and in all his actions , the king manifested his great vnderstanding and wisedome : which if it remaine onely in the huske , or shell , it is good for nothing , sicut fides , ita & sapientia , sine operibus mortua est ; wisedome ( saith s. bernard ) is like faith , without good workes it is dead . that king therefore that shall haue wisedome inough in , and for himselfe , and shall execute and shew the same in the gouernment of his kingdome , and exercise the same amongst his subiects , he shall be great in all his kingdomes heere on earth , and great likewise in the kingdome of heauen . salomon , when god had giuen him wisedome , did not onely attend the speculatiue part , but the practicke ; which is the principall thing in him that ruleth . apposui cor meum , vt viderem sapientiam , & occupationem : ( for so the septuagint translate it . ) but rendered by the vulgar : i applyed mine heart to know wisdome , and to see the businesse that is done vpon earth ; for in wisedome , and the good exercise thereof , consisteth all the good gouernment of a common-wealth . this being presupposed , and what else in the subsequent chapters shall be spoken hereof , i say , that it is not required of kings , that they should be so wise and skilfull in all arts and faculties , as king salomon was , and others , which make profession thereof ; nor yet so illiterate , as the emperour licinius , which was such an idiot , and such a beast , that he knew not how to firme or set his hand to any de●d , or writing . or as that other michael balbo , which was such an enemy vnto learning , that hee would neither study good letters himselfe , nor suffer the children of his time to be b●ed vp therein . that which is to be required of euery good king , is ; that he haue so much wisedome , as to be able to aduise himselfe , and to make benefit of the councell of others . that he be wise enough to know what is good and iust , and what is bad and ill , that he may vse the one , and shun the other . is enim moderatus est sapiens ( saith socrates ) that hath courage to execute , and will to doe . on those bases , which the most wise king salomon placed in the temple , hee commanded lions , oxen , and cherubins to be ingrauen , in signification of so many the like qualities which kings ought to haue , who sustaine the whole weight of a kingdome . he must be in perpetuall labour , signified in the oxe ; he must be endued with courage , expressed in the lion ; and he must abound in knowledge , notified in the cherubin . wherefore cicero likewise maketh mention ; hae sunt ( saith that heathen orator ) virtutes imperatoriae , labor in negotijs , fortitudo in periculis , industria in agendo : to assist in businesses , to be stout and valiant in dangers , to be dextrous and wise in acting , and aboue all , to haue a liberall will without subiection , and readily disposed for execution , are vertues befitting an emperour . for to gouerne well , great strength , great courage , great wisedome , great power , and a great willingnesse will be required . for , though a king know much , and can doe much ; yet , if he will not exercise his knowledge , nor make vse of his power , it is all one as if he neither knew , nor could doe any thing . the leaper said to our sauiour christ , domine , si vis , potes me mundare ; if thou wilt , thou canst make me cleane . and christ made him answer , not in word onely , but in deed ; volo , mundare ; i will , be thou cleane . chap. vi. how kings ought to carry themselues in those businesses , which their vnderstanding comprehendeth not . in regard that the vnderstanding is amongst all other faculties the noblest , it is that ( without doubt ) which doth least render and yeeld it selfe , but is most sencible of the offence it receiueth in submitting it selfe . whereupon oftentimes it sticketh close to it's opinion , and what it hath once intertained , it obstinately maintaineth and defendeth . and therefore the philosopher , said ; amicus plato , sed maior veritas : plato is my friend , but the truth more . in confirmation whereof we daily see , that the dearest and neerest friends , and that are one and the same in their will and affection , in their vnderstanding and opinion are diuerse and different . each of them maintaineth his owne particular tenet , and yet without offence continew still good friends . in a word , in matter of knowledge and vnderstanding , because it is a thing that cannot be measured out by the yard , or meate out by inches , there is not that man , that can indure maioria , or that another should goe before him , or get the start of him in that kinde . euery one resteth satisfied with his owne vnderstanding , and conceiues that his reason is the best ; and few will bee brought to acknowledge , that they are in an errour . and in a manner all men flatter themselues with their owne opinion , and thinking they are in the right , they are so farre from yeelding , that they stiffely maintaine what they haue vndertaken & you shall not beate them out of it , as being perswaded that they haue the better end of the staffe in their hands . and hence arise those earnest contentions , and endlesse questions in your consultations , and debating of causes , those crosse incounters and differences in determining great businesses , persisting violently in their opinion , though it bee neuer so contrary vnto reason . and though this be a common infirmitie , and a generall fault in all of what state and condition soeuer , yet your great persons in this point runne the greatest perill . for ( as the sonne of sirach saith ) all doe approue and celebrate their sayings , not in that onely , wherein they speake home to the purpose , but when they speake foolishly , and vtter things not to bee spoken . locutus est diues , & omnes tacuerunt , & verbum illius vsque ad nubes perducent : when a rich man speaketh , euery man holdeth his tongue , and looke what he saith , they extoll it to the cloudes . for opinion being now , ( as long since ) mistris of the world ; shew ouerswaies substance , and authoritie checketh reason . it is not goodnesse , but greatnesse , that strikes the stroke . but if a prince would bee so holy , and so zealous of the good of his kingdome , haue hee neuer so able a braine , neuer so much knowledge and vnderstanding , ( acknowledging what a large extent of wisedome is required for the gouerning of a kingdome , as it ought to be gouerned ) that hee would be pleased to receiue some helpe and assistance , hee hath very secure and certaine remedies in this case , and all of them ordred and ordained by the holy ghost . the first is , to begge of god ( and that with a great deale of faith and confidence ) light , and wisedome ; conforming himselfe to that of s. iames ; si quis vestrum indiget sapientia postulet à deo , qui dat omnibus affluenter , & non improperat & dabitur ei : if any of you lacke wisedome , let him aske of god that giueth to all men liberally , and vpbraideth not ; and it shall be giuen him . and for asmuch as in kings , this acknowledgment is vsually more difficult , for that they are free , and without dependance on any in their owne kingdomes , so much the more acceptable in this kind are their prayers vnto god. as king salomon exemplifieth it vnto vs , who confessing the shortnesse of his vnderstanding , and his want of wisedome , for to gouerne so great a people that could not bee numbred , nor counted for multitude , acknowledging himselfe to be but as a little child , and that hee knew not how to goe out , or come in , and humbly beseeching god , that hee would be pleased to supply this defect , he found so much fauour in his sight that he appeared vnto him after a solemne sacrifice , and said ; postula quod vis , vt dem tibi . aske , what i shall giue thee . and this young king with a great deale of thankefulnesse and submission , sayd ; domine deus tu regnare fecisti servum tuum &c. o lord my god , thuo hast made thy seruant king in in stead of dauid my father , &c. and thy seruant is in the midst of the people which thou hast chosen , a great people &c. giue therefore thy seruant an vnderstanding heart , to iudge thy people , that i may discerne betweene good and bad , and be able to goe in and out before thy people . and howbeit this discreete young king saw the doore of gods mercie set thus wide open vnto him , and what a liberall offer he had made vnto him , to bestow fauours vpon him according to the measure of his owne desire , yet did hee neither set his eyes , nor his heart vpon gold , siluer , riches , or long life , but as one , that knew so well how to aske , desired that he would out of his grace and mercy , giue him the gift of wisedome , that hee might know how to gouerne his state and kingdomes , and to conserue them in peace and iustice. and god was so well pleased with this his petition , that he did not onely bestow that vpon him , but many other blessings with it , and ( as the apostle saith ) affluenter , in a great aboundance making him the wisest , the discreetest , and the greatest king , that euer was in the world . and besides , gaue him all that which hee omitted to desire , or might haue desired : to wit , long life , full of prosperitie , honour , and riches . he did not account of these , in comparison of wisedome , and yet all those other fauours were conferred vpon him ; quia hoc magis plaucit cordi tuo , & non postulasti diuitias , &c : because this was in thy heart , and thou hast not asked riches , wealth , or honour , nor yet hast asked long life , but hast asked wisedome and knowledge for thy selfe , that thou mayst iudge my people , ouer whom i haue made thee king ; wisedome and knowledge is granted vnto thee , and i will giue thee riches , and wealth , and honour , such as none of the kings haue had , that haue beene before thee , neither shall any after thee haue the like . this very goodnesse , this same wisedome , did his father dauid beg of god. bonitatem , & disciplinam & scientiam , doce me : teach me good iudgement and knowledge . which is all that can be wish't , or desired for to gouerne well . in a word , most certaine it is , that wisedome is the gift of god , and that it is purchased ( as was that of salomon ) with humble perseuering , and confident prayer . god can , and doth make of stones sons of abraham , which ( according to the language of the holy scripture ) are wise and prudent men . sambucus saith ; that apollo being consulted with touching the helpe of wisedome ; made answer , that hee knew no other remedie for it but silence . for he that is ignorant of a thing , by his talking , bewrays his ignorance : and by holding his peace is reputed wise . which the holy ghost confirmeth vnto vs in that place of the prouerbs , where it is said ; stultus si tacuerit , sapiens reputabitur ; & si compresserit labia sua , intelligens : a foole when he holdeth his peace is counted wise , & hee that shutteth his lips , is esteemed a man of vnderstanding . it is great wisedome in a man to know then how to hold his peace , when hee knowes not how to speake to the businesse . and great discretion in him , rather to couer his defect , then publish his ignorance : answearing vnto that which a law of the partida deliuers , speaking there of a king. esi●l no fuere home de gran seso por lassus palabras entendran los homes , lamenqua que ha del . and if he shall not be a man of great wisedome , by his words , the people will vnderstand the want he hath thereof . wisdomes defect is supplied by silence . and it is s. gregories censure vpon these words of iob : vtinam taceretis , vt putaremini esse sapientes . oh that you would altogether hold your peace , and it should be your wisedome . at least , it is the counsaile of the wise , that kings ought to striue and indeauour , that no man should know all their store , nor be able to fadome the depth of that their sea of knowledge , for the danger of the discouerie of a deceit ; for many times it importeth more in those that are led away with affection , and those likewise that are strangers , to be ignorant whither and how far , the worth and wisedome of a prince extends it selfe , then the experience and proofe thereof . and because sometimes vpon occasion kings are forced to discouer that , which otherwise were fit to be concealed , it is very meete and conuenient , that they should vse few , graue , and well-weighed words , making no shew of their owne proper satisfaction . wherein wise men haue found much greatnesse , besides an augmentation of their wisedome , and prudence . qui moderatur sermones suos ( saith salomon ) doctus , & prudens est : he that hath knowledge , spareth his words : homer saith , that in kings , and such as praeside and rule , short and full language , deliuered with maiestie , is much to be applauded & commended . and socrates giues this precept to his king ; in all that thou shalt say , thinke , or doe , beare this alwayes in thy memorie , that thou art a king , and therefore oughtst not either to doe , or say any thing , vnworthy so great a name . octauius caesar , when he was to speake to the senate or people of rome , did neuer performe that office but with a great deale of good order in his words , and deliberation in his matter , committing first to memorie that which he was to say vnto them . and if the businesse were of great weight & consequence indeed , he brought his papers along with him , and deliuered them his minde in writing , because hee would say neither more , nor lesse , then what with premeditation he had resolued to acquaint them with all . and aboue all , the particular , ( if not the onely ) remedie to solder all breaches , and defaults of knowledge and experience in businesses , is that receipt which we haue from the son of syrach , who aduiseth his sonne not to determine any thing without counsaile . fili , sine consilio nihilfacias , & post factum , non poenitebis . which the vulgar rendreth thus ; do nothing without aduice , and when thou hast once done , repent not . for if it hit right , the glorie shall be thine ; and if it miscarry , thou shalt find sufficient excuse . cicero was wont to say , that he did esteeme it a greater honor vnto him to erre , following platos opinion and counsell then to happen right , and to hit the nayle ( as we say ) on the head , by adhering to others of lesse credit and reputation . it is a rule of prudence ( saith s. hilary ) that a wise man should aske aduice in that he knowes not . for ▪ that man is very apt to erre , that is not willing to heare , & stands in his own light , that neither knowes how to aske , nor how to apply himselfe to other mens opinions . being ( as it is in the prouerb ) mas ven quatroqi ois , que dos : foure eyes , see more then two . and with so many eyes doth a man see , and with so many eares doth a man heare , by how many the more friends he hath to aduise him . doe not ( as many doe , and haue done ) perswade thy selfe , that thou knowst more then all the world besides ; ( an ordinary disease in ( princes ) who seeing themselues seated in such high thrones , to be so rich , and so powerfull , take themselues to be the wisest and prudentest men vpon earth . yet let them know that they brought not from their mothers wombe more prudence or wisedome , then other ordinary folkes . nemo enim ex regibus aliud habuit natiuitatis initium . king , and clowne , rich and poore , when they are borne , draw in the common ayre , and being fashioned to be flesh after ten monthes compaction in blood , fall vpon the earth which is of like nature . the first voice vttred by kings , is crying , as all others doe . there is no king , that hath any other beginning of birth ; for all men haue one entrance vnto life , and the like going out . we come all into the world with our bare skins on our backs , and as naked of knowledge , as cloathes ; being subiect in the rest to industrie , instruction , and others counsaile , and aduice , which is that which supplieth the defects of nature . rationall soules , are all of them equall and alike in their creation , and essentiall perfection , though they differently discouer themselues in some bodies , more then in other some , in regard of the better or not so good disposition of the organs , and by consequence , their vnderstandings come to be differenced , and the conceipts of the one , to bee of a higher straine then the other . a man shall see more clearely through a christall glasse , then that which is of a thicker and grosser mettall . our body is nothing else but a glasse ; nor haue all bodies this good disposition ; nor haue kings , ioyntly with their power , the selfe same measure in their vnderstanding , wisedome , and prudence . but say they had ; it will be no hurt to them , but a great deale of good and aduantage , to heare , and take aduice . for , audiens sapiens , sapientio rerit : a wise man by hearing , will be made the wiser . audi consilium , vt sis sapiens in nouissimis tuis . heare counsaile , and receiue instruction , that thou mayst be wise in the latter end . and neuer in hard and difficult businesses , should any man ( be he neuer so wise ) refuse to take aduise . and besides , it sauours of much wisedome ; not to doe any thing without it . qui agunt omnia in consilio , reguntur sapientia : with the well aduised ( saith the holy ghost ) is wisedome : and there is no man so wise that is wise in all things . the best and skilfullest physitian in the world knowes not how to cure himselfe , neither will he trust only to his own opinion , but calleth another vnto him , aduiseth with him , takes his counsaile , and puts himselfe vnder his cure . eurigius king of the gothes , said in the toletane councell ; that euen those workes , which in themselues were very good , and did much import the common-wealth , wereby no means to be done , or put in execution , without the counsaile of those that were good ministers , and well affected to the state , vpon paine not onely of losse of discretion , but to be condemned as the onely ouerthrowers of the action . things being so various , and so many , and weighty the businesses as are those which come vnder the hands of kings , and craue their care to bee treated of , the successe of them , must needs run a great deale of danger , when there precedeth not some diligent and mature counsaile . kings ( i assure you ) had neede haue good both counsailours and counsaile , hauing so many eyes as they haue vpon them , some of iealousie , and some of enuie , so many that goe about to deceiue , and doe deceiue them ; and many , that doe not loue them as they ought ; i say they had neede of good both counsailours and counsaile , and such a councell as is more close and priuate , as that of the councell of state , and sometimes , and in some cases with a little more restriction and reseruednesse , making choise of one , two , or more of their faithfullest and sufficientest counsellours , with whom they may freely communicate their greater , and lesser affaires , and be resolued by them in matters of greater moment , and such as importe their own proper preseruation , and the augmentation of their kingdome , such as the historians of augustus paint forth vnto vs , which kinde of course , the princes before and since his time haue taken , and now at this present , doe . from the poorest plowman , to the potent'st prince , from the meanest shepheard , to the mightiest monarke , there is a necessitie of this counsaile . and in effect , euery one as hee can , ( comformable to his estate , and calling ) must consult with his wife , his sonne , his friend , or himselfe , ( if his fortune afford him not a companion , whom he may trust , or make his confident ) . how much doth it concerne kings , who possessing such great estates , and being subiect to so many accidents , haue need of a more perfect and complete councel . and not any thing so much importeth them for the conseruation , and augmentation of their kingdomes , as to haue about them iust , prudent , & dis-interessed persons , to aduise them with a great deale of faithfullnesse , and loue , and with free libertie of language to represent the truth of that , which to them , and their common-wealth , is most fitting and conuenient . who , for this purpose , are as necessarie as great treasures , and mighty armies . that holy king dauid , was more a fraid of the aduise of one wise counsellour , which his son absolon had with him , then of all the men of warre that followed him and his fortunes . plutarke , and aristole floute at fortune in businesses that succeede well , when men doe gouerne themselues by good counsell . and for this cause , they stiled counsaile the eye , of those things that are to come , because of it's foresight . and for that wee haue treated heeretofore of the qualities of all sortes of counsailours , i now say ; that with much deliberation and aduise , kings are to make choise of those persons , which are to aduise and counsaile them . for from their hitting or missing the marke , resulteth the vniuersall good or ill , of the whole kingdome . it is the common receiued opinion , that the maturest and soundest counsaile , is to be found in those men , that are growne wise , by their age , and experience , which is the naturall daughter of time , and the mother of good counsaile . tempus enim multam , & variam doctrinam parit . it is euripides his saying ; suting with that of iob , in antiquis est sapientia , & in multo tempore , prudentia : in the ancient , is wisedome , and in much time , prudence . long time , is a great master , which doth graduate men in the knowledge of things , and makes them wary , prudent , and circumspect , which is much ( if not wholly ) wanting in young men . and therefore aristotle saith of them , that they are not good for counsaile , because wit , more then wisedome in them , hath it's force and vigour . et tenero tractari pectore nescit , saith claudian . and s. ierome is of the minde , that young witts , cannot weild weighty matters . and that their counsailes , are rash and dangerous , like vnto that they gaue king rehoboam ; by whose inconsiderate aduise hee lost his kingdome : the same course hauing cost others as deare ; as is proued vnto vs out of s. austen . and therefore the grecians , romans , lacedemonians , carthaginians , and other common-wealthes which were good obseruers of their lawes and customes , did ordaine ; that a young man how wise so euer hee might seeme to be , and of neuer so good and approued iudgement , should not be admitted to the counsell table , till he were past . yeares of age , who being adorned with vertue , and experience , might assure them that hee would keepe a decorum in all his actions , and performe his dutie in euery respect . lex erat ( sayth heraclides ) ne quis natus infrà quinquaginta , vel magistratum gerat , vel legationem obiret . in fine , for councell seneca and baldus , affirme ; that the very shadow of an old man , is better then the eloquence of a young man. but because good counsailes are not in our hands , but in gods hands , who , as dauid saith ; dissipat consilia gentium & reprobat consilia principum : the lord bringeth the counsaile of the heathen to nought , hee maketh the deuises of princes of none effect . and the wisest of kings tells vs. non est sapientia , non est prudentia , non est consilium contra dominum : there is no wisedome , no vnderstanding , no counsell against the lord. and in humane things , there are so many contingencies that mans wisedome is not alwaies sufficient to determine the best , nor to hit aright in his counsailes , vnlesse the holy ghost be interuenient , interpose it selfe , and assist in them . for let priuie-counsellours beate out their braines with plodding and plotting , let them be neuer so vigilant ; neuer so studious , they shall erre in their ayme , and shoote beside the butt , if hee direct not the arrow of their councell and wisedome ; if he do not in secret illighten their hearts ; illuminate their vnderstanding , and dictate vnto them , what they are to doe . which is done by the infusiue gift of the holy spirit co-operating in vs , which is a diuine impulsion which doth eleuate & raise vp our vnderstanding to hit the white and to choose that according to the rule the diuine law ) which is fit to be followed , as also to be avoided . and this is the gift of councell giuen by god vnto his friends , and such as serue him truly , to the end that by his helpe , they may light aright vpon that , which of themselues they could neuer come neere . and he that is not gods friend , nor studies by his actions to be so , let him shake hands with the holy ghost , let him bid this blessed spirit farewell , this diuine gift ; which is the best ( saith nissenus ) and the most perfect , that is in man : so that for to giue counsaile and aduice , yeares , experience , and gray hayres , suffice not ; vnlesse his soule be as white as his head , and his conscience be pure and cleane from corruption . cani enim sunt sensus hominis : the good abilities , and wise apprehensions of man , are those true siluer haires , those hoary locks , which countenance him , and adde authoritie , vnto him , and not those snowie flakes , nor hoare frost , that lies vpon his bearde . aetas senectutis , vita immaculata : wisedome is the gray hayre vnto men , and an vnspotted life , is old age . so the wiseman renders it of vertuous olde men : galen saith that they haue the facultie of aduising , and that of them wee must aske counsaile . god commanded moses , that he should make choise of the elders of israel to gouerne his people . de senibus israel , quos tu nosti , quod senes populi sint : gather vnto me . men of the elders of israel , whom thou knowest to be the elders of the people . hoary-headed men ( accompanied with much vertue , an approued life , soundnesse of religion , and much prudence ) are those that are worthy to giue counsaile , and those which kings are to make choyse of for their seruice . the emperour charles the fift sayd it was fit , that princes should be serued by men that were learned and vertuous , and that the counsaile , and companie of those which were not so , were very preiudiciall and hurtfull . counsailours likewise must be of that greatnesse of courage and magnanimitie , as may correspond with the dignitie royall . for kings that haue not had in themselues any great courage , haue still honoured noble minded counsailours , whereas the contrary haue bin disgraced , and degraded of their honours by kings that were naturally magnanimous . for it is the condition of cowardly hearts , and of base counsailours en cuerpo , yalma ( as they say ) in body , and soule ; to propose vnto their kings base and vnworthy meanes , for the remedying of some mischiefes , whereon others follow , that are farre greater . and let them not perswade them , that this age is barraine of vertuous dispositions , and noble mindes , which produceth , as well as former times , whatsoeuer is necessary and needefull for them . for , the diuine prudence ( to which particularly appertaineth the conseruation of kingdoms ) is neuer drawen dry , neuer waxes weary . and if such men are wanting , and appeare not to the eye of the world , it is , because they are not sought after , or not admitted to councell , for the chastisement and punishment of our great and heinous sinnes . besides , this one benefit kings haue aboue others , that all good men would be glad to serue them , and many do sue and seeke after them , and offer their seruice vnto them ; so that , they haue store of choise , and may easily make good election , if therein they will strip and cleanse themselues of their affections , and passions , which eclipse and darken the true iudgement of man. and these , that i now speake of , when they haue found them , and made choise of them to be of their councell ; let them loue them , honour them , and trust them . and as they shall receiue ease and honour by their good aduise ; so let them reward them , and conceiue of them , as king alexander did of his master , and counsellour aristotle , of whom he said , that he ought no lesse respect vnto him , then vnto his owne father . for from his father he had his life , his honour , and his kingdome ; but from aristotle , his instructions , counsailes , and directions , how he should order himselfe in all his affaires . and scipio , doth attribute all the honour of his victories to his faithfull friend and counsellour laelius . and cicero , to the philosopher publius , for those notable things of his gouernment , which he performed in his consullship : so that good and faithfull counsailours , are of great honour , profit , and ease vnto kings . but let kings take heede , least they strike a feare into their counselours , through their absolute and free condition , and make them to withdraw themselues from aduising them what is fitting , by seeing them so wedded to their owne opinion , and to excuse themselues from giuing counsaile , for that they are dis-heartned & discountenanced by them for deliuering their mindes freely for their profit , & honour . of the emperour adrian it is storyed , that hee had so noble a condition , vt libenter patiebatur admoneri & corrigivel ab humili persona : that he willingly submitted himselfe to be admonished and reproued of the meanest person . it is proper to gentile brests , & generous hearts , to listen with delight to the good reasons , & counsailes of others , though they be inferiour in qualitie vnto them : for sometimes a poore man hits right , when a rich man misses the marke . and a country clowne may aduise that , which a king knowes not of . and if he do perswade himselfe , that he knoweth all , and vnderstandeth all , and that his opinion alone is the certainest & surest , he but shuts the doore to the discouery of his errour . one of the two things ( saith hesiod ) which euery man of reason , wisdome , and vnderstanding , that shall be sufficient to gouerne that , which shall be committed to his charge , ought to haue ; is a great blandure , smoothnesse , and softnesse of heart , to follow the opinion , aduise and counsaile of those that are the wisest and know most . this blandure , and doctlitie , is likewise a part of prudence , and we shall finde it set downe in expresse words , in those two petitions , which salomon made vnto god. for in the second of the chron. it is written , that he sayd ; da mihi sapientiam : giue me wisedome . and in the first of the kings ; dabis ergo seruo tuo cor docile : giue therefore thy seruant an vnderstanding heart . vnderstanding , for to know , and an obedient heart , for to heare the aduise of others . but this second part , of being obedient to other mens opinions , is vnprofitable for gouernment , without the first , which is prudence , and wisedome , for to choose and know the best . for , by following bad counsaile , he shall erre as much , as if he followed his owne proper errour ; and sometimes more . and i should hold it the lesse euill , that a king were not ouerwise , if presuming that he is ; he should relie too much vpon himself , & scorne to take counsaile ; then if he were lesse wise , but knew how to benefit himselfe , and make good vse of the aduise of prudent and wise counsailours . a prince , of a docile and ingenious disposition , is well disposed to intertaine all good counsaile and doctrine . he easily learneth the languages of all those nations , which are vnder his empire , & doth all things with as much facilitie , as if he had beene bred vp in euery one of them . and therefore sayd heredotus ; omnia sapientibus facilia : to the wise , all things are easie . and therefore your wise men , giue the first place vnto that man , who of himselfe knowes that which is fitting . and the second , to him , that knowes how to follow good counsaile . but he that neither is wise , nor will be ruled by the wise , they know not in what forme to place him , nor what name to giue him . plato , calls them children , and further saith ; that such men as are not wise , though they be neuer so aged , are still children . and seneca proueth , that they begin euery day to liue because they vnderstand no more , then the child that is new borne . and strabo is of the same minde . omnes idiotae , & doctrinarum expertes , quodammodo pueri sunt appellandi , all idiots , and illiterate persons , are after a sort to be called children . and because in the chapters that are to follow by and by , we are to treate more at large of this matter , i conclude this with saying ; that kings for to hit the nayle on the head , and not to faile in the carriage of their businesses , must alwayes take counsaile of wisemen , such as are of knowne vertue and experience ; and not giue credit vnto any , that prate and talke with a great deale of libertie and licence of those things they vnderstand not , as if they were graduated in them from their mothers wombe ; and only for a more happy ( in shew ) then prudent wit : least that happen vnto them , which befell king ahab , who admitted to his counsell a false prophet , that made great osteniation of that spirit , which he had not . hee put the gouernment into his hands , and all was gouerned by his counsaile . and because he did not speake by the spirit of god , nor he himselfe well vnderstood what he sayd , businesses went a misse , the kingdome suffred , and it cost the king his life . * and therefore we are not more to desire any thing of god for the good gouernment , conseruation , and augmentation of kings , and kingdomes , then that he will be pleased to furnish them , with good , wise , and prudent counsailours such as are sound at the heart , cleane from corruption , and blamelesse in their conuersation . for such as these , will serue them in stead of eyes , and vnderstanding both , wherewith they may see , and vnderstand all that passeth in their kingdomes . o how without eyes , how blinde is that king , who hath imprudent , couetous , and ill inclined ministers ▪ and if he will conserue himselfe and his kingdome well , he ought not so much to flye from those physitians , who either out of ignorance , or particular hatred , approue , and consent to his eating of such meates as are hurtfull and contrary to his health , as from ignorant counsailours , who either out of adulation or for their particular interest , make all that lawfull , which his free and absolute will shall lead him vnto . for such eare-wiggs as these , will quickly spoyle , the prosperitie of the kingdome , ouerthrow the life of the king , and prouoke the patience of the subiect . chap. vii . a prosecution of the former discourse , shewing how kings are to take counsaile , and what signes they are to marke and obserue for their better knowledge . it is a prouerbe much celebrated amongst the grecians ; that consiliumest res sacra ; counsaile , is a sacred thing . and as diuus thomas declares it ; it is a light wherewith the holy ghost illightneth the vnderstanding , to chose the best . others say ; that it is a science , which doth weigh and consider , how , and when , things are to be done , that they may succeed well . aristotle saith ; that it is a well weighed , and considered reason , whether such a thing shall be done , or not done ? and the law de la partida , that it is good aduice , which a man takes vpon things that are doubtfull , that they may succeede well . and indeede counsaile is in all things exceeding necessary . for without it , can we neither treate of peace , nor war. consiliis , tractanda sunt bella : euery purpose is established by counsell , and with good aduise make war. it is the saying of the holy ghost ; ibi salus , vhi multa consilia : much counsell , bringeth much safety . nor can there be any thing more preiudiciall , nor any meanes more effectuall to destroy kings and kingdomes , then to alter and peruert counsailes . and this the prophet micah teacheth vs in a vision which he had , in this forme : god represented himself , sitting on his throne , and all the hoast of heauen standing by him , on his right hand , and on his left , consulting with them , what course he should take to destroy ahab . and euery one hauing deliuered his opinion , there came forth a malignant and lying spirit , like another cayphas , and gaue his verdit , saying ; i will goe forth , and i will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets i will instruct the counsailours of kings ahab , and with a lye cloathed with the appearance and likenesse of truth , i will deceiue and destroy him . this course was approued , and held to be the fittest & most effectuall for the kings vtter ruine and destruction . and albeit in this diuine vision , and reuelation , manifested for the dis●deceiuing of kings , and to put them out of their errour , there were many things worthy obseruation , and consideration , yet the principall note ( in my iudgement ) is ; that neither ahabs want of vnderstanding , nor his being head-strong nor wilfull in his opinion , nor his being ouer-rash , and vnaduised in what he vndertooke , but his own sins , and the sins of his people , had put him in that estate and condition , that dismeriting gods fauour , and the light of heauen , the diuel did deceiue him , guiding the tongues of his false prophets , telling them falsehoods , for truthes ; doubtfull things , for things certaine , and by perswading him , that that which was to be his destruction , should turne vnto his profit & honour . s. paul tells vs , that satan often times transformes himselfe into an angell of light , and represents lyes and falshoods vnto vs , in the shape & figure of truth . and the mischiefe of it , is ; that the same which the diuell wrought vpon ahabs counsailours , feigned friends , and professed enemies , haue , and doe the like on some occasions ; procuring by secret meanes , to introduce persons , who making profession to side and take part with the king , perswade him to do that , which is least fitting for them , and most vsefull for their own ends . this is one of the greatest darings , and insolencies , that may in matter of state be attempted . god free all good kings from such counsailes , and counsailours . when king dauid saw how his sonne absolon persecuted him ; and thought to go away with the kingdome , he feared not any thing so much , as the plots and counsaile of achitophel , who was both a subtile statist , and a valiant souldier , and by whose aduise absalon was wholly ruled and gouerned . for the repairing of which mischiefe , he got hushai the archite , who was no whit inferiour vnto him in valour , and prudence , in a dissembling and disguised manner , to offer his seruice vnto absalon , and to worke himselfe in to be of his councell of war , and state , that he might be the better able , to oppose the able and sound aduice of achitophel ; as he did euen then , when his master had most need of his seruice : by which discreete carriage , dauid was freed of his fear , and absalons businesses went backward , till himselfe , and his whole armie were vtterly ouerthrown . which story ye may read more at large in the second of samuel . two things therefore are to be considered for to know which is the best and safest counsaile : the one on the kings part , who craues it ; the other , on his part , that giues it . and on either part , that which most importeth , is purenesse of intention , & a desire to incounter with truth . not like vnto those , who hearken vnto good and disappassionated counsailes with passion , and onely desire to be aduised , that the councell may conclude , what is meerely their wil , & not otherwise . and in their sittings at the counsaile-table , which are ordained to this end , they doe not so much treate , whether that , they pretend , be iust , or no ? but with what colour of iustice , they may effect what they desire ? the vnderstanding ( saith salust ) which we will ( and with better reason , or more properly ) tearme the will , ought to be free and dis-incumbranced of affection , or particular passions , as well in asking , as giuing counsaile . and because if there be any of this reigning in the brest , it cannot alwaies , nay scarce any long time be dissembled , but will like fire breake forth from vnder the ashes that couer it ; fitting it is , that kings should seldome assist personally in counsaile ; for their voting in his presence , is done with awfulnesse , and great respect ; but in his absence , they vtter their mindes with a little more freenes , and libertie of language . and euermore your first opinions of your ministers , and counsailours of state , before they be toucht with the ayre of the kings will , are the best and the sincerest , as produced from that vnforst motion and naturall inclination , which is in their owne particular hearts , and bosomes . if the king desireth to haue this or that thing passe , and for to authorize and qualifie this his desire , he craueth their counsell , howbeit hee meete with many which conforme themselues thereunto , & follow his gust and liking , yet such counsaile or aduice in such a case , ought to be esteemed as little secure , as there is great reason for it to hold it suspected : especially , if the foresaid counsailours , by some meanes or other come to haue an inckling , that this way the king is inclined , and this is that , which will giue him content . and though we might as well out of diuine , as humane letters cite heere many examples , for that this is a thing so vsuall , and so well receiued both by princes , and by priuy-counsailours ; or to speake more truly and plainely , by those , that sooth , and flatter them ; i will onely alleadge that , which passed with that vnfortunate king ahab ; who out of his proud and haughty spirit , and the desire that he had to make warre , and to take a place of importance from the king of syria , propounded his intent , or to say better his content , to those of his counsell . the businesse was no sooner in treatie , and the proposition for the vndertaking of this action proposed vnto them , but forthwith . counsailours with a ioynt consent conformed themselues to his opinion . and to sooth vp this his humour the more , one amongst the rest bobb'd him in the mouth with an intollerable lye , affirming ; that god had reuealed vnto him , that he should haue the glorie of the day , & that the successe of the battaile should be prosperous vnto him this was apprehended with a great deale of content by the king , but was finished with his vnfortunate end , himselfe being slaine in that battaile , and his army routed and ouerthrowne . by which we may see , how much it concerneth kings , if they will receiue good counsaile , that they dissemble ( as much as they can ) their particular good will and liking in the businesse proposed . but that , which is heere of greater consideration , is the vertue , fidelitie , and truth of a counsailour , a minde without passion , disinteressed , and pure . for it oftentimes hapneth , that he that craueth counsaile , hath not his intention so sound as is requisite , nor his iudgement so strong , as to reduce him into the right way , and being set in it , to follow the best . but to grow to a conclusion , that cannot faile , which truth it selfe , our sauiour christ said in his gospell ; a good tree , cannot bring forth had fruit nor a bad tree good . and the badge or cognisance of good or bad counsaile , shall doubtlesse be the goodnesse , or badnesse , the wisedome , or ignorance of the counsailour . and therefore i importunately presse , that it mainly importeth a prince , to beware , of whom he taketh counsaile . for by how much the more profitable is a wise & vpright counsailour , by so much the more preiudiciall is he , that is vniust , and vnstreight and therefore the holy ghost saith ; consilum semper a sapiente perquire : aske counsaile alwaies of the wise . and in another place ; pacifici sint tibi multi , consiliarius sit tibi vnus de mille . amongst a . men scarce will there be found one , that is fit to giue counsaile . for some want wisedome , & prudence ; othersome , purenesse , and cleannesse of heart ; and a third sort , are so ouerswaied with passion , that they do not simply & sincerely perswade the truth . a cleare example wherof we haue in king rehoboam , the sonne and successour of king salomon , who though he succeded his father in so rich a kingdome , and so inured to peace , and obedience to their king , yet notwithstanding was in an instant vndone & vtterly lost by bad both counsaile , and counsailours . for good counsellours are the life and soule of a kingdome . and when it is not vnderpropped with such , like a body without a soule , it presently sinke , & falls from it's state wherin it stood . and therefore the holy king sayd . o culi mei ad fideles terrae , vt sedeant m●cum . ambulans in via immaculata , hic mihi ministrabit . non habitabit in medio domus meae , qui facit superbiam : qui loquitur iniqua , non direxit in conspectu oculorum meorum : mine eyes shall be vpon the faithfull of the land that they may dwell with me . hee that walketh in a perfect way , hee shall serue me . hee that worketh deceit , shall not dwell in my house : hee that telleth lyes , shall not tarry in my sight . and in this particular , kings ought to be very wary and circumspect . in the next chapter we will treate of the care which they are to take in choosing their counsellours of state ; for the errour in this one , is the fountaine of all errours , and the totall perdition of kings and kingdomes . chap. viii . of the diligences , which kings are to vse in the election of their ministers , and counsellours . it is a question , that hath beene much sifted and winowed amongst your morall philosophers , as also your diuines ; whether e●ection , be formally a worke of the vnderstanding , or the will : gregory nyssenus saith ; that it is composed of both partes ; to wit , of the act of the will , and of the vnderstanding . and hee said well . for therein is required both a fullnesse of knowledge , and a freenesse of will. and it is the doctrine of diuus thomas , who saith ; that it is not of the will alone , but also of the vnderstanding , because the electiue act of the will , conference , consultation , & iudgement , is to precede ; which is the proper act of the vnderstanding . but the mischiefe of it is ; that in elections , wee many times see the contrary , and what a strange diuorcement and seperation there is heerein , from this true philosophie . for that , which now a dayes most of all discouers it selfe in these elections , is our proper gust , will , and affection . and therefore to remedy so great a malady , it shall be requisite , that the prince , who desireth to tread sure , to hit the marke he aymes at , and to please god in those whom he electeth and calleth to his counsell : that hee follow the example of our sauiour christ , written for our instruction by the euangelists s. mathew , and s. luke , who recounting the election of s. peter and of s. andrew , and other the apostles , as his principall ministers , there preceded a long and prolixe oration , or prayer , full of feruour , of zeale , and of the spirit , and retyred himselfe into the desart , and there fasted . dayes , et erat pernoctans in oratione dei. and continued all night in prayer vnto god. which ( as s. ambrose , and other fathers haue well obserued ) christ did not doe , that hee had any neede of these dispositions , and preambles , for to iumpe right in that election ; but to teach kings , and all other princes , that if they will hit right in their elections , they are to vse the like diligences . they are by good and pious workes to procure this fauour at gods hands , and to direct all their actions to this end . nor would hee , that this election should be left wholly to the declaration of those saints , for our sauiour did declare himselfe more particularly in the . of s. luke ; where speaking with the disciples , which had nominated them , he sayd vnto them ; messis quidem multa , operarij autem pauci ; rogate ergo dominum messis , vt mittat operarios in messem suam : the haruest truly is great , but the labourers are few ; pray yee : therefore the lord of the haruest , that hee would send forth labourers into his haruest . and though in those former times , these words were very seasonable , yet now in this present age , it 's necessitie is better knowne , as likewise the truth thereof . for , the haruests being so many , and so great , i meane , so great and so many the varietie , and multitude of important businesses for the welfare of the common-wealth , the labourers are very few . but to expresse my self a little more fully , i say , that very few are they , that enter , or seeke to enter into offices , for to labour and paines , but for to liue at their pleasure , & to heape vp riches , that they may increase the more in ambition , and more freely take their ease . the remedie of this , consisteth in that , which our sauiour christ commandeth vs ; to wit : that we in defatigably pray vnto him , that he will be pleased to send forth faithfull ministers and good labourers into his common-wealth : ministers , of knowen trust , zeale , & vertue , to whom may sute the name of counsellours , and not of babblers ; of worthy men , & not of wordly men . and kings , to whom properly this office of election doth , belong must put the more force , & insist the more in this prayer begging that which the wisest of kings , salomon petitioned of god , da mihi sedium tuarum assistricem sapientiam , vt mecum sit , & mecum laboret , vt sciam quod sit acceptum coram te omni tempore : o god of my fathers , send me wisedome out of thy holy heauens , and from the throne of thy glory , that being present , shee may labour with me , that i may know what is pleasant vnto thee &c. this wise and discreete king , was not contented with that guide and light which humane wisedome might afford him , but had recourse by prayer to that diuine light and wisedome , which is that that guideth kings without stumbling , or feare of falling into errour . for as wisdome saith of her selfe ; per me reges regnant , &c : by me kings reigne , and princes decree iustice. as if shee should haue sayd : by the hand and light , which i reach forth vnto kings , they goe rightly on in their iudgements , and their elections , so that they reigne , and conserue themselues in quiet possession of their kingdomes . the drift of my discourse is this ; that when a king shall come to elect and make choise of his ministers , his first care must be , to pray heartily vnto god , that hee will direct this his choise and election . and so much the more diligence hee ought to vse therein , by how much of more importance and of greater qualitie the minister shall be , that is to be imployed . after prayer , which is diuine , other humane diligences , are to bee followed . whereof the chiefest is , that the prince informe himselfe of the good sufficiency , the honest life , and faire carriage of those , whom hee is to choose . and that heerein , he may not be deceiued , it is necessary , that with christ he goe vp vnto the mount ; that is , to eleuate his consideration vnto god and to auoide vulgar opinions ; to strip himselfe of passion , and not to strike hands with those , that are not gods friends ; to forget all kindred , and alliance ; not to take in the infectious ayre of fond affection ; not to apply himselfe to that , which the importunat intercessions and requests of a fauourite , or kinsman shall seeke to draw from him for their priuate benefit ; nor to hearken to the negotiation of cunning and subtile pretenders , but onely to the good of the common-wealth , and the quicke dispatch of businesses , and other the like offices , that are to be exercised by men of their place . and albeit , it was my purpose , not to serue my selfe , in this discourse , but with the testimonies and examples of holy scripture , and the doctors that are expositors thereupon ; yet can i not omit to exemplifie heere in one , of king don philip , the second of this name , whose soule doth rest in peace , being that for his great prudence , and zeale to iustice , and for his good gouernement , all the kings of the world may acknowledge him their master . the case is this ; a president of his time , hauing proposed a person for a place , relating vnto him the qualities , which concurred in him , for the meriting thereof , hee farther added ; that the lady infanta , did much desire this prouision should bee made him . heereunto his maiestie with a great deale of iudgement , and grauitie , made answer . y mi●hya que sabe desso ? what ? has my daughter a hand in this ? can she iudge of his worth . giuing his president by this his answer to vnderstand , that he should not haue alleaged vnto him that , for to make a good election , which should passe the bounds of the consideration of those parts and qualities , wherewith hee was to be furnished , were his pretension neuer so much fauoured by the mediation and intercession of great persons . and heereunto i farther adde , that a king should in no hand content himselfe with the bare knowledge of those onely , whom he knowes by sight , and walke dayly vp and downe in his court , but that hee should take leysure to informe himselfe of as many as hee can , and to follow the ancient custome , in giuing order to his generalls , vice-kings , prelates , and gouernours of euery prouince , to giue him information of the best and sufficientst subiects that are in their gouernment , and that after due consultation had with them , they should nominate three or foure vnto him , that from amongst many good , hee might choose the best . and the rest to bee listed , and taken notice of , that vpon occasion they might receiue imployment . from whence likewise this good will arise , that all , in all partes , great , and small , will study the science and arte of good gouernment , fly vice , and follow vertue , that they may in their due time be numbered amongst the chosen . let a king goe , con su spassos contados ( as they say ) with a slow foote , in those elections , which he is to make , giuing way vnto time , and to information . which hee ought willingly to heare , neither in all giuing credit to all ; nor being ( as many are ) too incredulous . let him remit things to tryall and examination , it being a thing needefull for him so to doe . for , if it be not wisedome , to lend a facile eare to all that we heare , for , the wise man saith : qui citò credit , leuis est corde ; so likewise doth it betoken little prudence , to liue alwaies suspicious and distrustfull . something must be left to experience . but to come to the qualifying of persons , if the one's qualities be of ten , the other of nine quilates , and all of them necessarie for the office of a counsellour , the first ought to be preferred , though the other out strip him in estate , in fauour , in riches , and greatnesse . for , in that ministry , there ought respect to be had onely to the aduantages of sufficiencie , and not of power . nor seruices , albeit two be equall in sufficiencie , must loose their place , and right . but that hee , who hath done the greater seruices for his king and countrie , ought to bee preferred before the other . now there is this difference ( amongst many others ) betwixt a good prince , and him that is not so ; that a good prince , conferrs his offices , according to the sufficiencie and vertue of the minister he maketh choise of ; the other vpon fauour , and humane respects , vsing therein his power , but not attending distributiue iustice , which rewardeth euery one according to his deserts , without respect either vnto persons , or particular intents . chap. ix . of the qualities , which kings are to consider in those , whom they are to make choise of for ministers and counsellours . we may very well answer that which is heere questioned with that which is recounted in the . chapter of exodus , where it is said ; that iethro , seeing his son in law , moses wearyed and tyred out in the gouernment of that great body of gods people , and that it was more then one mans worke , to giue sufficient dispatch to so many businesses , did aduise him , to choose but a certaine number of ministers and counsellours , that might helpe to ease him of that burthen , which was too heauy for his shoulders , vltra vires ; 〈◊〉 est negotium ; solus illud no● poteris sustinere . this thing is too heauy for thee ; thou art not able to performe it thy selfe alone . cadendo cades ( saith another letter ) by falling , thou shalt fall , and all this people , that is with thee . daras de ojos ( as they say ) à cada passo . thou must looke well about thee . and ioyntly with this ; hee propounded the qualities , which hee ought to consider in those , whom hee was to choose for that ministrie . proinde ex omni plebe , viros sapientes & timentes deum , in quibus sit veritas . or as another letter hath it ; viros veridicos , & qui oderint avaritiam : thou shalt prouide out of all the people able men , such as feare god ; men of truth , hating couetousnesse , &c. now , let vs goe pondering euery word in particuler , and in them , the qualities of ministers . the first is prouide ; which signifieth not onely to prouide , but to fore-see , and consider . for , the election of a minister is a businesse of great prouidence , and consideration , and the most important and necessarie for a king in matter of gouernment . on the good , or bad election of counsellours , dependeth the whole honour and profit both of king , and kingdome . and he that erres in this , must necessarily erre in all . for the spring of a fountaine being spoyled , all the water is spoiled . and a king failing in this principle , all goes to destruction . for without doubt , all good dispatch growes from the force and vertue of good counsai●e . then therefore is a king held to be wise and prudent , when he hath wife and prudent counsailours : hee succeedeth well with all his intentions , and inioyeth same , credit , and reputation both with his subiects , and with strangers . of the one he is beloued and obayed , and of the other dre●ded and feared ; and of all esteemed and commended : the whole kingdome resteth contented and satisfied . and though in something hee somet●me erre , none will beleeue it . but when priuie-counsailours are no such manner of men , all murmur , and proclaime to the world ; that there is not an able man in all the counsell , and if in some one thing or other hee hap to haue good successe , few or none will giue credit thereunto , but rather conceiue , it was done by chance . the sacred text says farther ; de omni plebe ; out of all the people . as if he should haue said out of all the . tribes , or families of this people ; thereby to giue vs to vnderstand ; that for to make a good election , it is requisit , that there should not remaine a nooke , or corner in all his kingdomes , where diligence should not be vsed ( as before hath beene sayd ) to search out the fittest ministers . and likewise it may in this word , be giuen vs to vnderstand , that in matter of election , wee are not to haue respect to linage , kindred , or parentage , but to vertue , sufficiencie , and courage , accompained with other good qualities , which adapt a man to be a counsellour . and therefore it is said anon after , viros sapientes , wisemen ; men of vnderstanding heads , and stout hearts , which dare boldly and plainely to speake the truth , and to maintaine and put it in execution , when they see fit time : for your pusillanimous and white-liuerd persons are not fit ministers for a state. noli quaerere sieri iudex , nisi vale-as virtute irrumpere iniquitates . he that hath not a face , to out-face a lye , and to defend the truth , let him neuer take vpon him the office of a minister of iustice. in the booke of daniel it is storyed , that king nabucodonozor was resolued to haue done some cruell chastisement vpon his princes , and counsellours , for that hauing asked them the interpretation of a troublesome dreame hee had , none of them could declare the meaning of it . and howbeit they told him , that they could not tell what to make of it , & plainly confessed the truth , yet notwithstanding the king conceiued , that hee had good reason to except against them . for ( thought hee ) if you know it , and for feare will not tell it me , yee are cowards ; and if you know it not , yee are ignorant ; and either of these is a great fault in counsailours , & afford sufficient cause , why ye should be punished ; in that yee would offer to take that office vpon yee ; which first of all hath neede of stoutnesse of courage ; and secondly , to be learned and expert in so many and various things , as a king hath occasion to vse yee in . and therefore that wise iethro , after the word viros , men , puts , sapientes , wise or as the . and others translate it , potentes sortes . because in ministers and counsellours of state , strength , courage , constancie , and wisedome , should walke hand in hand . the courts and pallaces of kings and princes , that which they are least stored with all , is truth . they scarce know her face , nay not so much as of what colour or complexion shee is , the onley minions there made of , being flatteries , and lyes . a wise and stout man , is daunted with nothing , is neuer troubled , nor altered , he stands vpon his own worth and sinceritie , & is lord and master of his reason , he speakes with libertie and freedome , hee represents the truth to his king , and maintaines it , pie quedo ( as they say ) stiffely and stoutly , without respect to any thing , no not so much as his owne proper life , hee ouerthrowes plots , discouers the impostures , deceits and lyes of flatterers ; for the which he had neede of courage and wisedome . now let vs see , what that wisedome is , which a king is to require in his ministers . not worldly wisedome , wherof s. bernard saith , that those which inioy it , boasting themselues thereof , very wisely goe to hell. the question , that i aske is ; whether , they should be philosophers , diuines , or lawyers , or in what kinde of faculties , they should be wise ? heereunto first i answer ; that questionlesse , it would be a great helpe to the making of a good counsellour to bee seene in these sciences , and to haue spent some time of study in them . but in case they haue no skill in these it shall suffice , that they are wise in that which belongeth vnto that ministry , for which they are nominated and called ; to wit : to be a counsailour , which is a person , that is fit , sufficient , and able , for that charge which he is to administer . that hee haue a nimble wit , and quicke apprehension , for without that , the rest serues to little purpose . whereas he that is furnished therewith , with a little helpe , attaineth to much ; he knowes things past , vnderstands the present , and giues his iudgement of things to come . that hee be well read in ancient and moderne histories , wherein are contained the sentences and opinions of wise men of elder times , by which they ordred their common-wealths , and maintained them in peace . for this kinde of reading , doth indoctrinate more in a day , then experience hath taught others in many yeares , which must by no meanes be wanting in a counsellour for that ordinarily in them , are found prudence , authoritie , and experience : that he haue happy memorie , which is the archiue of the sciences and treasure of truths ; for without it , to reade and studie , is ( as they say ) coger aqua en vn harnero , to gather water in a fiue ; and it importeth much , in regard of the diuersitie of businesses , and persons , with whom hee is to treate . that hee haue trauailed , and seene forraine countries . that hee be skill'd in the languages , and haue in all of them the arte and garbe of speaking and discoursing well . that he more esteeme the seruice of his king , and the publicke good , then his own priuate gaine . that hee be courteous , humble , affable , and yet of a good spirit . that hee lend an attentiue eare , and that hee keepe that gate open for great and small , rich , and poor . but aboue all these , he must be of approued vertue , for without it , all the rest are of no esteeme . hee that shall haue more , or lesse of these qualities , which are for all in common , shall bee the more , or lesse sufficient counsellour . as for vice-royes , gouernours , ambassadors and other great gouernments of the kingdome , such are to be chosen , who together with the foresaid qua●ities haue studied , and spent some yeares in the schoole of experience , and hauing beene conuersant at the kings elbow , a●d in his courte , and counsailes , not only for the greatnesse of those mindes , and stomacks which are bred there , ( a necessary qualitie for to occupie great places , and not to bee bred vp with a poore portion of treating , and vnderstanding , which begets mindes according to the same measure ) but likewise , because there by their treating with kings , princes , and other great persons assisting them in their counsells and graue consultations , communicating with great ministers , and counsellours of state , diuerse cases and businesses , the practick of all affaires , is thereby the more , and better apprehended ; as your practitioners in physicke by conferring with great physitians . he therefore , that shall haue both learning , and experience , shall amongst all men be the most remarkable . but , quis est hic , & laudabimus eum : shew mee this man , and we will commend him . for mans life is short , the arte long , and experience hard to be atchieued . but to summe vp this discourse , and giue an ende thereunto , i say : that he that is to bee made a counsellour of warre , should therein haue beene exercised many yeares . and that he , that is of the councell of state , should haue a full knowledge of all , and should be very dextrous in matters of gouernment , both publike , and particular , and well verst in military discipline , because hee is to consult both of warre , and peace . which because they are things so opposite , and contrary , a man cannot iudge well in the one vnlesse he know and vnderstand aright the other . as wee shall shew heereafter when we shall more in particular treate of this counsell . other qualities , are competible more in especiall to iudges iustices , and presidents , to whom that particularly appertaineth , which is deliuered in that word , sapientes ; that they well vnderstand the facultie of the lawes , and that corresponding with their name , they be iuris-prudentes , well seene in all matters , carrying an euen hand towards all , and administring iustice without partialitie . vt iudicent populum justo iudicio , nec in alteram partem declinent , nec accipiant personam , nec munera ▪ that they may iudge the people with iust iudgement that they wrest not iudgement , nor respect , neither take a gift . for this briberie and corruption , is that dust , which blindes the iudges , and that plague , which consumes a common-wealth . moreouer , they must bee wise men , cleane and sound at heart , and of much truth . all of them qualities , which all nations required in their ministers , expressing them in their herogliffes . of the aegyptians diodorus siculus reporteth , that they had their councell and audience in a great hall , where there sate thirty counsellors or iudges . et in medio iudicandi princeps , cuius a collo suspensa veritas penderet , & oculis esset sub clausis , librorum numero circumstante : and in the midst of them sate the president with his eyes shut , a number of bookes standing round about him , and truth hanging about his necke , curiously cut ( as aelian expresseth it ) in a pectorall saphire , like vnto that which god fashioned for the adorning of his minister and president aaron , wherein were ingrauen these words , hurim , & thummim . which some interprete to be iudicium , & veritas : iudgement , and truth . but s. ierome , would haue it to signifie doctrinam , & veritatem , learning , and truth . for these three things , iudgement , learning , and truth , are much about one , and in them consisteth the whole perfection of a minister ; in quibus sit veritas . for in the brest of a good iudge , there must neither raigne passion , nor affection , but the pure truth , which hee cannot possibly avoyd , vnlesse hee will wrong nature it selfe . for our soule is naturally inclined to truth . and it is so proper to a wise and prudent man , that hee that doth not say it , vnsaies himselfe . and certaine it is , that the gouernment of a kingdome , is so much the more good or ill , by how much the truth therein , hath more , or lesse place . for if businesses be not seasoned therewith , as meates are with salt , neither the poore shall be defended from the oppression of the rich , nor the rich possesse their goods in safety ; men and womens honors shall runne danger , and no one person can promise to himselfe securitie . and therefore it is so much the more needfull , that a iudge should treate truth , and desire that all should doe the like ; by how much the more are they that abhorre it , and seeke to conceale it ; an olde disease , which was almost borne with vs into the world . and if iudges shall not fauour truth , and plaine dealing ; treachery , and lying will reigne and beare rule . let kings take heede how they choose men that are fearefull and timerous to be their ministers , who out of cowardize and pusillanimitie , hide the truth , and dare not bring her forth to light. for , as shee is the foundation of iustice , and christian iudgement , if a iudge shall not loue it with his heart , tracke the steps of it , and draw it out of that darke dungeon wherein shee lyes , iustice will be in danger of being crush't , and falshood will preuaile . as in that peruerse iudgement in christes cause , where the iudge was so farre from being desirous to know the truth , that hee did not know what kinde of thing it was ; and therefore demanded in the face of the open court ; quid est veritas ? what is truth ? to whom , that diuine wisedome made no answer , perceiuing him to be such a foole , as to be ignorant of the first vndoubted principle of iustice ; and suffring himselfe to be carryed away with false accusitions , and feigned relations , which had no bulke nor body in them , no substance in the world , nor any shew , saue of a poore shadow , to be thus mis-led . librorum numero circumstante . the president before specified , had a great many of bookes about him ; to shew how much it importeth ▪ that iudges , and presidents bee learned , and well read in the bookes of their facultie . epiphanius saith ; that hee saw a s●atua of truth , which in it's forehead had two letters , the first , and the last , of the greeke alphabet ; in it's mouth other two ; and other two in it's brest ; and so through a●l the parts of it's body to it 's very feete . so that this was all enamelled with letters , as the other was rounded with bookes . thereby , giuing vs to vnderstand that that man , which is truly the man he ought to be , and is to aduise and gouerne others , his head , hands , and feete , must be stucke full of letters . he must be learned from the sole of the foote , to the crowne of the head , full of letters hee must bee ; for in the discourses of the vnderstanding , in the working of the hands , and in the moouing of the feete , wee may easily guesse , whether a man be wise , or no ; whether he hath studied , or doth studie ; for though a man be neuer so wise , neuer so learned , hee still forgetteth somewhat . so that , it is not enough for him to haue studyed , but it is requisit , that he still continue his study , that hee may repayre with that which he learneth , the losse of that which hee forgetteth . as in a naturall body , that , by dayly eating and drinking is restored , which is by our naturall heate consumed . et oculis esset subclausis . his eyes ( which are the windowes by which passion enters vnto the soule ) were shut . because hee should not be led away with the respect to those about him . for , hee must not haue an eye and respect to the estate and condition of persons , to doe more fauour ( when it comes to point of iustice ) to one , then another . and for this reason , the sayd aegyptians , did ordinarily paint iustice , without a head. the head , is the common seate of all the sences ; signifying thereby , that by no one sence , a iudge should open a doore to passion , but that he should place them all in heauen without respect to any thing vpon earth . and this , is not to respect persons , but iustice. plutarke in his moralls , reporteth of the thebans , that in their courts of iustice , they had the pictures drawne of certaine reuerend olde men , sitting in their due order , and in the midst the president ; all of them without hands , and their eyes fixed on heauen . to intimate that they should alwaies stand in the presence of the lord , from whence is to come that light , which is to cleare the eyes of their intentions , avoyding to cast them downe towards the ground , that the vapour of humane respects which is raysed from thence , may not cloude and darken the sight of their vnderstanding . they must be olde , and wise , because they are to iudge with mature counsaile , which accompanyeth that age . and as it is ordred by their lawes , they must haue neither eyes , to see , nor hands , to receiue bribes . and if they would cut off their wiues hands too , the cause would be the better iustified . for in them , your bribes finde an open gate , and are so easie to be knowne in this kind of trading , that there are few or none , but take notice of it . they haue the slight of hand , and ( like gypsies ) haue a fine facilitie in deceiuing , and not hard to be wrought vpon to gaine by this vngodly course . and looke what businesse they labour to effect , they are vsually the least iustifiable ; and if they are disposed to fauour this man , or that cause , and will but set their friends , and wits roundly to worke , and doe their best , they will shrewdly put a iudge to his shiftes , and driue him to that streight , that iustice shall hardly escape a fall . i would haue iudges therefore with their hands off , and their eyes out , least that befall them , which did a couple of their place , and qualitie , who came to see the processe of a famous , but false , and loose woman , who perceiuing that the reasons of the relator did worke little vpon them , appealed , para vista de ojos , that shee might appeare face to face , and in her information , when shee came ore tenus , shee cunningly discouered her beautie , by a carelesse letting fall of her mantle , and so bewitched them therewith , that allowing for good those powerfull witnesses of her eyes , and face , they released her , and gaue her for free . but to say the truth , it was her loosenesse that freed her , and their lightnesse , that condemned them ; making that fault light , which before weighed heauie . and how shal he freely administer iustice , who hath his heart captiuated , and in the power of him , and her , that can turne and winde him , which way they list and wrest him from goodnesse ? more iudges haue bin vndone by lightnesse , then by cruelty . the one begetteth feare the other contempt . and by the way , let them take this lesson a long with them , that not onely in reality of truth they conserue their credit without spot , but likewise in apparance procure to giue such good examples that the world may not iustly charge them , no not with so much as a discomposed looke , neither in the open streete , nor court of iustice ; for euery bend from their brow , or euery smile from their countenance , is the common peoples almanack , wher-by they make coniecture , whether it is like to be faire , or fowle weather ; reading in the face fauour to one , and rigour to another . wherefore , as their place is great , so is their perill ; the way is slippery wherein they tread , and therfore had need looke well to their feete . woe be vnto that iudge , which seeth , and seeth not ; sees the best , and followes the worst ; suffering his reason to be subdued by passion , and himselfe by one poore slender haire of a handsome woman , to be led by the nose whether shee will leade him . for a good face , is a tacite kinde of recommendation , a faire superscription , and a silent deceit , which troubles the clearenesse of the minde , making white appeare to be blacke , and what is iust , to be vniust : which was the cause , why god commanded the iudges of israel , that they should remoue their eies from the persons of those that were brought before them , and place them wholly on the matter which they were to iudge . and for the same reason , did the iudges of areopagus , heare all sortes of causes , were they ciuill , or criminall in the darke , by putting out the candles . and your athenians did sentence their sutes behind certaine curtaines , which might hinder their sight . the lacedemonians , they were a little stricter laced ; for they did not onely deny eyes to those that went to law , and sued in their courtes , but also debard them of eares ; and because they would prohibit them the power of informing the iustnesse of their cause , but that they should make their plea by writing . ne , si coram iudicibus loqueren●ur , facilius eos fletibus , aut actionibus , ●fficacique modo dicendi demulcerent : least , if themselues should be permitted to speake before the iudges , they might the more easily soften and mollifie their hearts , by their teares action , and words . and it seemeth that god doth approue for the better this manner of iudging , when he saith ; non secundum visionem oculorum iudicabit , nec secundum auditum aurium arguet : he shall not iudge after the sight of his eyes , neither reproue after the hearing of his eare . sed judicabit in justitia pauperes , & arguet in aequitate pro mansuetis terrae : but with righteousnesse shall hee iudge the poore , and reproue with equitie , for the meeke of the earth . with iustice and truth hee must reproue and confound those , who with fictions , with colours , and studied artifices , pretend to make that iust , or probable , which hath no shew of iustice , or truth . for there are some lawyers , so full of quirkes , and subtilties , that they wrest the true sence and meaning of the lawes , striuing to bring them to their bent , haling them ( as they say ) by the haire to that part whereunto themselues are willing to incline ; either to that , which a fauourite , or powerfull person pretendeth , or to him , that will bribe most ; whereby suites in law , are made euerlasting , much mony is consumed , mens states miserably wasted , or at least the true knowledge of the cause obscured , as well de facto , as de jure ; both in matter of fact , and of law. a iudge therefore ought to be very attentiue to all businesses , that are brought before him , and to haue lynx his eyes to watch whether the torrent will tend of a pleader transported with affection , and of a cauillous relator , armed with a . witty quillets , subtill and acute allegations , wherewith they shadow the light , and scatter cloudes of darkenesse ouer the cause that is pleaded . hee that is set ouer others , must haue wisedome and courage , to make resistance against them , and to disarme them , rebutting the blow by his arguments , and with the true and solide sence of the lawes themselues . and therefore ecclesiasticus , would not haue that man to take vpon him to be a iudge , that hath not spirit and mettall in him , to contest with the stoutest of them , and to doe iustice secundum allegata & probata , according to all right , and law . for many times there is more cunning and wisedome required for to vndoe those knots , and to facilitate those difficulties , which these wrangling lawyers put in their plea , then to resolue the doubt in the case it selfe . and if hee be to deale with persons of power , and great courtiers , he must either breake through this net which they pitch for him with force , or with some slight or other seeke to auoyd it , rather then that fauour , and power , on the one side , or subtill shiftes , and law quirkes , on the other should stifle iustice. for , in these cases it is written . dissolue colligationes impietatis : loose the bands of wickednesse , to vndoe the heauie burthens , and to let the oppressed goe free . for the sonne of god himselfe ( to be an example vnto iudges ) did proceede in this manner with the diuell . for this purpose ( saith s. iohn ) was the sonne of god manifested , that he might destroy the workes of the diuell . whereby he shewed no lesse courage , then gained reputation . and it is one of the most preiudiciall things that can befall common-wealths , to seeke to honour such persons in whom doe not concure those qualities , nor the knowledge of such ministers , and giuing them the title of counsellours , which haue neither that sufficiency of knowledge , nor wisedome , which is necessary for to giue a good and sound opinion in graue and weighty matters . and as it were a foolish and vnaduised thing in him , that hath neede of a payre of shoes to go to looke them at a barbers , and not at a shomakers shop ▪ so is the case alike , when wee leaue wise and experienced men in a common-wealth lurking in a corner , and put those into eminent places , which neither know how to begin , nor end businesses , nor what course in the world they are to take . that which is fittest for them , but much more for a king and kingdome , is to let them alone in their ignorance . quia tu scientiam repulisti , repellam & ego te , ( saith god. ) because thou hast reiected knowledge , i will also reiect thee . for one foolish minister alone is an intolerable burthen for a kingdome . arenam & salem , & massam ferri , facilius est ferre , quam hominem imprudentem , & fatuum : sand , and salt , and a masse of yron , is easier to be borne , then a man without vnderstanding . three things ( saith hee ) which are the heauiest to beare , are more easie to bee borne , and with more patience to be indured , then the imprudencies of an vnwise and foolish minister . chap. x. hee continues the discourse of the qualities of ministers , and counsellours . the last words of iethros aduice were , et qui oderint auaritiam : hating couetousnesse . a qualitie no lesse necessary , then those before specified . the . interpreters translate it . et qui odio habent superbiam : hating pride . there are some men , which rake vp a great deale of wealth , and are couetous only to keepe , and make the heape the bigger , liuing for this cause miserably vnto themselues , and deepely indebted to their backe and belly . others there are , that scrape and scratch , by hooke , or by crooke , all the money they can finger that they may afterwards prodigally spend it , and maintaine their vaine pride , and ostentation . but in what sort so euer men be couetous , sure i am ; that couetousnesse is one of the worst notes , and basest markes , wherewith kings ministers , and counsailours of state , can be branded . auaro , nihil est scelestius : ( saith ecclesiasticus ) there is not a more wicked thing then a couetous man. and from those that are toucht with this infection , kings are to flye as from a plague or pestilence , and be very circumspect and wary , that they be not admitted to the councell table ; and to remoue those from thence , that haue receiued any bribe . for it is an incurable disease , a contagious corruption , which like a leprosie goes from one to another , and clingeth close to the soule . besides to receiue , is a sweete thing , and leaues the hand so sauory , and so well seasoned , that it hath no sooner receiued one gift , but it is presently ready for another , a third , a fourth , and so in infinitum . and the end of that which is past , is but a disposition for that which is to come . like a hungry curre , who hath no sooner chopt vpone morsel , but he is ready for another . and he perhaps , who at first was contented with a little , & could say : esto basta , ●y sobra . this is inough , and too much , afterwards much , too much , and more then too much will not satisfie his hungry mawe ; infinita enim est et insatiabilis cupiditatis n-atura : infinite ( saith aristotle ) and insatiable is the gut of couetousnesse . and the holy ghost tells vs ; auarus non implebitur pecunia . he that loueth siluer , shall not be satisfied with siluer ; nor he that loueth aboundance , with increase . for it is a kind of salte and brackish water wherewith couetous mans thirst cannot be quenched , for when he hath taken this , and that other , and a world of things , he gapes still for more . he is better satisfied by denying him that which hee desireth , then by giuing him that , which he craueth . and therefore publicke ministers ( if wee will credit diuinitie ) should be so noble and so free , that they should not onely not be couetous , but quite opposite thereunto , and to hold a particular hatred , and perpetuall enmitie with couetousnesse . that they should not onely not receiue giftes and presents , but that they should hate , and abhorre them and cause those to be informed against , that either shall giue a bribe or pretend to giue . for most true is that saying of the sonne of sirack . munera & dona excaecant oculos iudicum . presents and gifts , blind the eyes of wise . how sone is a couetous man blinded , when he beholdes the baite of his passion ? nor is there any thing more often repeated in sacred and prophane writ , then the putting vs in minde of force , and efficacie which gifts haue to wrest iustice , and peruert iudgement . moses saith of them , that they blinde the eyes of the wise ; and that they turne and winde the words of good men , chopping and changing one for another , to serue their purpose . qui quaerit locupletari , peruertit oculum suum . the gift blindeth the wise , and peruerteth the words of the righteous . by which is vnderstood the intention , which is easily wrested , when interest puts to a helping hand , which is that loade-stone , which drawes the yron after it , and causeth them to erre that suffer themselues to be carryed away therewith . if a iudge be couetously giuen , he will soone varie his opinion , and make no scruple to condemne the poore , who hath nothing to giue him , and absolue the rich , who giues him all that hee hath . for mony is an able aduocate , and pleads hard . and iustice ( sayth isidore ) is strangled with gold . the times are ill , when that which cannot be obtained by iustice , must be procured by money . fiue hundred yeares and more was greece gouerned by lycurgus his lawes , to the great happinesse of the naturalls of that countrie and admiration of strangers , without the breach of any one law ; by meanes whereof , that common-wealth was sustained with admirable peace , and iustice , because priuate interest had no power with the iudges of the land. but when money came to beare sway , and that men tooke pleasure therein , and made it their happinesse , the common-wealth was made vnhappy , and the lawes , and iustice , were trodden vnder foote . he ( saith the wise man ) that is greedy of gaine , troubleth his own house . qui autem odit munera , viuet : but hee that hateth gifts , shall liue . and i doe not see , how hee can liue , who receiuing so much , so often , and of so many , sees himselfe so laden , and so inuironed and beset with obligations , which are so opposite and contrary one to another . i say ( contrary ) because the pretenders are so amongst themselues , who aspiring to one and the same thing , wherein it is impossible hee should content all of them , euery one offereth according to his talent , and the desire hee hath to obtaine his suite . and many times , though they giue neuer so much , they remaine frustrated of their pretension , and become enemies to that minister , murmuring and complayning of him , ( and that with a great deale of reason ) all the dayes of their life . woe vnto the couetous man , who ( as the scripture sayth ) sets his soule to sale . animam quoque venalem habet . it is a most wretched case , and a most lamentable miserie , that a mans auarice and couetousnesse should be so great , that hee should sell his soule for the greedinesse of money : besides , there is another great contradiction , from which it is not possible for to free themselues . for , if they will faithfully performe their office , they cannot fauour any , saue him that hath most right and iustice on his side . and this they must do gratis , and without any other kind of interest , then that , which the being of a good and faithfull minister carryes with it : againe , if they do not ayde and helpe him , who by giftes hath bound them vnto him , they fowly and shamefully deceiue both him , and themselues ; and must needes fall into one of these two inconueniences ; either to be ingratefull , if they doe not doe for him that gaue ; or vniust , if they doe contrarie vnto iustice. so that which way soeuer they receiue a gift , they goe away with it with an euill conscience , and in plaine english , are theeues by qualification . so that great lawyer , paris de puteo calls them , and sayth ; that there are more in your publicke audiences , and open courts , then in your townes , and villages . and that iust man iob affirmeth ; that the tribunalls of robbers prosper . one calls them vsurers , another , pyrates . and lucas de pena , saith , that they are farre worse , because they rob and steale vnder collour of law , and publicke authoritie . in a word , god , who knowes them better then all the world besides , calls them disloyal companions of theeues , which desire giftes , and loue retributions . and from heauen hee throwes downe his curse vpon them , whereunto on earth all the people say , amen . but let them bee called by what name or title you will , let them neuer somuch haue the name of iudges , their workes will speake what they are . if they doe iustice , and iudge according to their iust lawes , then are they iudges , and deserue so to be . but if they do the contrary , they beare the name of theeues , and are vnworthy that office. there being represented vnto dauid the rigourous chastisement of these kinde of men , hee beggeth thus of god. gather not my soule with sinners , nor my life with bloody men ; in whose hands is mischeife , and their right hand is full of bribes . let these theeuish hands ( saith the emperour constantine ) cease at last to steale ; let them cease i say ; and if they will not cease , and giue ouer stealing , let them be cut off , and set vpon the gallowes top . neither let kings cease to make diligent search after them , and to execute iustice against them in the most rigorous manner . and if they will not amend , let them ( a gods name ) be soundly punished . for it is a foule and abominable vice , pernicious , and pestilent , and which doth much marre and deface the luster of whatsoeuer minister , be he neuer so illustrious and great . and therefore in the ciuill law , it hath the name of sordes giuen it ; which signifies foulenesse , or beastlinesse . the emperour alexander severus , ( a great subduer of this vice ) when he saw any minister noted thereof , his choller rose , and his stomacke began to turne , and did prouoke him to vomit , as if hee had seene some loathsome stinking thing . and for such kinde of corrupt men he would vsually say , hee had euer a fingar in readines , to plucke out their eyes . and for the better informing himselfe of the truth of these businesses , hee made choice of some vertuous and intelligent persons , whom hee sent secretly as spyes into seuerall parts of the kingdome ( which all wise kings ought to doe ) giuing them good intertainment for the defraying of their charges , to the end , that they might truly informe him of all whatsoeuer passed , as how his ministers behaued themselues in their gouernment , how in their offices ? saying ; that if they did abuse them , it was not enough to remoue them onely , and put other in their places ; but for example sake , seuerely likewise to punish them . he gaue all his officers good honest maintenance , and sufficient allowance , and would by no meanes permit , that any magistracie , or publicke office , should bee bought and solde . for he , that buyes of me ( sayd hee ) must of necessitie sell to another , for to quit his cost , as also to make his best profit and benefit thereof . such as these , buy cheape in the grosse , and sell deare by retaile . and so it is , that hee that buyes a tree for money , can hardly afford the fruite for nothing . the emperour theodosius made heereupon a law worthy so noble a prince , and deseruing heere to bee set downe , as a patterne for kings . wee will ( sayth hee ) and ordaine , that those be appointed gouernours of our prouinces , who shall bee found worthy those places , charging and commanding , that they be not conferred either for ambition , or bribes , or promises , or for any price , that shall be giuen for them , but meerely for that they are men of an honorable and vertuous disposition , and of a good and approued life . and these , whom you ( my president ) shall choose , or we our selues vpon your report , wee will , that they who are admitted to these offices , shall solemnely sweare , and firmely promise , that for the said preferments , or places of charge and gouernment , they haue neuer giuen , nor promised any thing for them , neither shall giue heereafter either openly , or vnder hand , either directly , or indirectly . neither shall they take , or receiue any thing , but shall rest contented with their salaries , and pensions , nor shall pocket any bribe in publike , or priuate , not onely during their office , but neither before nor after , &c. these are the very words of the law it selfe . diuerse other ancient , and moderne lawes , and decrees haue beene made , generally prohibiting all kind of gifts and bribes , vpon paine of diuers very greiuous punishments , to be inflicted vpon those , that either take , or giue bribes . as paying double what was promised , or giuen ; depriuation of office ; the treble value of what was giuen ; then ( vpon the increasing of the abuse ) a quadruple value . and after that , confiscation of goods , banishment , and open infamie . iustinian , added heereunto the punishment of whipping . and the emperour valens , and valentinianus , farther increased the same , commanding , they should be burned . and the now emperours of iapan , did lately execute the sayd law vpon one of his fauourites secretaries for taking of a bribe ; and him that bribed him , ( who was gouerner of a kingdome ) he caused to be beheaded . plato , would make it arul'd case : that that iudge should dye the death , that should take a bribe , yet notwithstanding neither the feare of death , of iudgement , nor of hell it selfe , is sufficient to represse the loue of money . disputante paulo de judicio futuro , tremefactus est felix : paul reasoning of the iudgement to come , felix trembled , who was president or ruler of cesarea . and yet the feare of that terrible day of iudgement , was not able to bridle his couetousnesse . he trembled for feare , and yet his eyes , and heart , were placed vpon that money which hee hoped to receiue from that blessed apostle . feare is not of force , to detaine the couetous ; for couetousnesse , is a huge great riuer which if it once begin to make it's current , bee it which way it will , there is no withholding of it . if you stop it's course one way , it breakes out another way . so it did with that naughty prophet , who hasted with great furie to curse gods people , that he might finger his promised gold . and though an angell stood before him , and stopp't his way , hee tooke another way , and brake through thicke and thin ( as they say ) that hee might not loose his reward ; so farre ( saith iosephus ) did the promises and gifts of the moabites preuaile with him , that hee chose rather for his priuate interest , to please a king of the earth , then him of heauen . the kings of spaine haue likewise made some lawes with very sharpe and rigorous punishments , but all not worth a pinne , because they are not executed . so that this bad custome alone , is of more force , then all the lawes . these are written with inke , on paper ; those , with letters of gold on the heart . the lawes threaten with roughnesse and rigour ; money perswades with softnesse and gentlenesse , and carryes mens mindes after it without contradiction . the lawes , haue few to defend them , & to put them in execution . but this euill custome , is of more force then the law , & hath stronger abettors . in a word , terrible are the forces and skirmishes of this foule assaulting vice , become now as it were naturall vnto vs , and more vsed in these , then any other times whatsoeuer . demosthenes ask't the athenians ( & those which are , may aske of those that haue bin ) what were in those times which are not in these ? and himselfe makes the answer , that one thing was now wanting vnto them ; whereby those that liu'd then , alwayes went away with the victory , & mainned their libertie . which was ; the perpetuall hatred which they bore vnto those , who suffered themselues to be corrupted with mony . in stead whereof , it is now come to that passe , that to receiue a bribe , is onely a nine dayes wonder ; if the same be confest , it is made a matter of laughter ; if proued , he that receiues , receiues a pardon for it ; and he that informes , sent away with a flea in his eare , and in stead of a reward , receiues a round checke for his labour , & growes a hated man , and troublesome member in a common-wealth . but vnfortunate is that common-wealth , where corruption liues vncontrolled . and because this vice goes daily taking deepe roote , and grows still stronger and stronger , inuenting new impudencies , new slightes and subtilties , it is needefull that kings should hunt counter , and finde out some new tricke , to take these olde ones in the trap. and this one ( me thinks ) would be a pretty remedy for this disease ; that a law were made , that of all those , that should be nominated for ministers and officers publike and particular in any tribunall , or ministry what soeuer as well of iustice , and gouernment , as of the publike treasurie , there should an inuentorie be taken ( by some deputed for that purpose ) of all their rents , and goods moueable , and vnmoueable , and when they are to take their oath ( as the fashion is ) at their entrance into their office , the said inuentory should be presented in open court , and there they made to sweare , and take a solemne oath that this is a true inuentorie , and that their estate is thus and thus , neither more nor lesse , or much there abouts , to the end that when their states come to be increased , and their wealth makes a great noyse in the world , it may ( vpon better inquirie ) be knowen how , and which way , they came by it . for experience daily teacheth vs , that your iudges , your exchequer men , and other publike officers , enter into the office with little , and goe out with much . and i would , that the kings atturney generall , or one of like nature , should enter an action against all those augmentations of their estates whereof they should not be able to render a good account . i could likewise wish , that they might be sworne to that law of theodosius ; that they neither gaue , nor promised , by themselues , or by any other person , or persons , any thing at all , for the foresaid offices : neither that they shall receiue any thing of free gift , be it offred with neuer so good a will. which oath , the ancient romans swore vnto . and if at any time it shall be proued against them , that they haue either giuen , or taken , that they incurre the punishment of priuation of office , and confiscation of goods . and this course being taken , these cannot offend againe ; and if their dealing hath beene vpright and faire ( as good men will not refuse a iust tryall , but rather ( out of loue to goodnesse ) imbrace it , ) god forbid but they should bee well rewarded by the state , for their good and faithfull seruice . and this is no new doctrine , but shall finde it ( if we looke backe to former times ) practised long a goe . and the emperour antoninus pius , did likewise ordaine , that all liuetenants , and gouerners before they went to serue in their residencies and offices , they should bring in an inuentorie of all they had , that when the time of their gouernment was expired , by coating and comparing the one with the other , they might see how and in what manner they thriued thereupon . audist is ( saith he ) praefectum praetorij nostri antè triduum quàm fieret , mendicum , & pauperem : sed subitò diuitem factum . vndè ( quaeso ) nisi de visceribus reip. qui ob hanc causam prouincias sibi datas credunt , vt luxurientur & diuites fiant ? &c. you haue heard that our praetorian praefect , some few dayes since was a very beggar , but now sodainely become rich . whence ( i pray ) should this come but from out the bowells of the common-wealth ; who for this cause thinke prouinces are committed vnto them , that they may therein riot , and grow rich ? setting at nought the lawes , the respect vnto their kings , their feare towards god , and the shame of the world . truly ( saith plato ) that publike minister may be had in suspicion , who in his office is growne rich . for he that only gets by lawfull meanes can hardly liue at so high a rate , as some of his fellowes doe , build such sumptuous and costly houses , and leaue so faire and great an estate behind him to his heyre . and he , who heerein does more then he can , will likewise do more then he ought . for he , that will seeke to out-doe his meanes , will not sticke to out-doe his honestie . in a word , gifts haue euermore bred a iealousie of corruption ; and in iudges , esteemed the foulest fault , oh , of how little worth is a little gift ; and yet what a great hurt , to a ministers honour ? a gift ( saith nazianzene ) is a secret tyrant , which doth subdue , and tread all vnder foote . and , to giue , is of all other the greatest tyranny , and the greatest violence . it is senecas counsell ; that , he , that will inioy his owne freedome , must not receiue anothers benefit . fo● to giue , is to in-slaue ; and the receiuer , is the giuers slaue . gifts , are but gyues and chaines wrought of strong linkes : the ending of one , being the beginning of another . and where the first ends , the second begins . and this ( as they say ) dispone la trabaion para otr●s muchos ; serues but as a timber peece to couple and fasten many others . take heede therefore ( saith the emperour iustinian of receiuing giftes , which quit our libertie , blinde our vnderstanding , incline our wills , and defame our honour . but make thou much of cleane hands ; for he that shall keepe his hands cleane , and shall not suffer himselfe to be corrupted by priuate interest , shall haue much honour and fame in this life , and a great place prouided for him in that other . qui excutit manus suas ab omni munere , iste in excelsis habitabit & regem in decore suo videbunt oculi eius : hee that shaketh his hands from holding of bribes , hee shall dwell on high ; and his eyes shall see the king in his beauty . all this , and more shall they attaine to , that are truly of pure heart , and cleane hands . all this ( say they ) that you say , is true . we confesse as much . but withall we must tell you , that that which we receiue is subsidium gratuitum , a free gift , a ●eere gratuitie , with a great deale of loue , and good liking of the giuer . and we affirme , that all ( for the most part ) that is giuen , is respectiue , and is in that predicament , which the logicians tearme , ad aliquid . whereby he that receiueth a courtesie , is bound to returne a courtesie . and those which giue , hope to receiue from such ministers , that which they cannot iustly giue them . with these conditions , a gift is lawfull , and esteemed to be lawfully receiued , when it comes free , vnclogg'd , disinteressed , without pretension , and without respect of requitall , or reference to any recompence or retribution . that is a gift , which goes dis-roabed of all respects which is neither a friend nor kindsman , nor kindswoman of the party that giues it , and hath no obligation , no interest , no necessitie , but is all pure loue , and is freely giuen of grace , onely to do him good , that receiues it , the rest is vsurie , loane , br●bery , and hope of gaine . and if they will see that this is true , let them come downe from that high place wherein they are , let a visitation goe forth against them , and they sha●l quickly see , how euery man longs and desires , that that may bee returned to the owners , which they haue got by foule play . it is a great blindenesse in ministers , to imagine , that what is giuen them , proceedes from liberalitie , and out of the good will and loue they beare vnto them . god he knowes , it is no such matter , but what they do in this kinde , is only to corrupt them , and to oblige them to do that , which they neither may , nor ought . let them beleeue me , and not deceiue themselues . for to giue , and receiue , is a cunning peece of businesse , a thing of great artifice , wit , and subtiltie , and on whatsoeuer occasion it worketh , it workes miracles . but in case gifts should not corrupt , at least they appease , and moue affection . being ( as that wise king salomon saith ) like vnto the w●ues of the sea , which make the tallest ship to reele , be she neuer so we●l ballasted . and waues neuer come single . a●d , if they be strong waues indeede , they ouerturne her , and sinke her in the sea. reprom●s●io nequi●●●ma m●ltos perdidit , & commouit illos , quasi fluctus maris . let them looke well to themselues , that receiue gifts , for they run a great deale of hazard ; let them take heede , least some storme arise that may drowne their ship , euen then ( as often hath beene seene ) when she is deepest and richest laden . and let them not trust to their taking in secret , nor of such , and such a person ; for the diuine sunne of iustice , whom they offend , will discouer and bring all to light . and though no body should see or know it , it is enough that god , and his own conscience knowes it , which are two sure witnesses , besides many other , which time will produce . they likewise alleage , that they haue leaue and licence of their kings to receiue gifts . whereunto , first of all i answer ; that it is not to be beleeued , that christian kings , will grant such licences as these , which are so preiudiciall , pernicious , scandalous , and so contrary to the common good , and good gouernment of their kingdomes . secondly i say ; ( speaking with that reuerence and respect , which is due vnto the authoritie of kings ) that it cannot be grounded on good diuinitie , that they may giue any such leaue or licence vnto their ministers . againe , they vrge , that sometimes , in some particular case , gifts haue beene giuen to some great priuado , or fauourite of the king. it may be so ; but sure i am , that to no counsellour of iustice , can it euer iustly be , or may be done . but because this will fall within the compasse of our insuing discourse ; i will cite those words ; timentes deum . fearing god : which follow anon after the beginning . for well will it suite , that with these , we conclude this chapter because the feare of god is the beginning of wisedome . and from whence , as from their fountaine , are deriued all those other good qualities , that are in man. timor domini super omnia se superposuit : there is none aboue him that feareth the lord. et beatus homo , cui donatum est , habere illum : and happy is that man , to whom it is giuen . for he , that hath the feare of god hath all the good that can be desired . plenitudo sapientiae est , timere deum : to feare the lord is fullnesse of wisedome . he that would be a generall scholler in all kinde of knowledge , be well seene in all the artes and sciences , and haue all those good parts and qualities , combined and ioyned ▪ together , let him loue and feare god. for he that feares him , and hath him alwayes before his eyes , hath libertie and power to ouercome the feare and dread of the mightie , whereof the world doth stand ( and all for want of this feare ) too much in awe . among the lawes of moses , iosephus relateth one , wherein he willeth iudes that they should aboue all things preferre iustice ; and that without respect to any mans person , or dignitie , they should equally iudge all ; for they hauing ( as they haue ) heere vpon earth , the power of god , they ought not to feare any other but him . he that preuaricates iustice in relation to great persons , makes them greater and more powerfull then god ; who giues vs this short but stoute lesson ; feare not him , that can kill the body , and take away thy life , but feare thou him , that can kill the soule , and depriue thee of lifeeuerlasting . and in another place , he saith , thou shalt not forsake the poore , for feare of the rich , nor iudge vniustly , nor doe the thing that is vnequall , for feare of the powerfull , but keepe iustice in it's true weight and measure ; without any humane respect , or vaine ●eare . king iehosaphat aduiseth the iudges of israel , that in their iudgements , they feare none but god alone , and all the law-giuers , as lycurgus solon , numa , and a number of others , together with the chiefest of all , moses , who gouerned common-wealths , and made lawes , founded them with religion , and the feare of god. these are the first and last letters of the lawes of christian gouernment , wherewith that wise king did summe vp the booke of those , which hee made for the gouernment of men. deum time , & mandata eius obserua : hoc est omnis homo . feare god , and keepe his commandements : for this is the whole dutie of man. with this he receiueth the stabilitie and permanencie of man. the contrary whereof , is to be a beast and worse then a beast ; according to that of s. bernard ; ergo si hoc est omnis homo , absque , hoc nihil est homo : if this be the whole duty of man , without this man is nothing . but as a man , that hath no vse of reason , breakes all lawes , facile deuiat à justitia , qui in causis non deum , sed homines formidat : he easily swarues from iustice , which in causes , feareth not god , but man. i will heere conclude with that which esay saith ; a wonderfull counsellour is the mighty god. and he is to be our chiefe counsellour and more inward with vs then any king or counsellour . and kings and counsellours are to craue his councell . for councell being his gift , he doth not communicate the sam● to any , saue such as loue , and feare him , and take councell of his diuine law. as did that holy king. consilium meum iustificationes tuae . let euery one enter into his councell of knowledge , let him consult himselfe the best that he can ; yet when he hath done all that he can , let him aduise with the law of god ; for if he do not know well how to aduise himselfe , how shall he giue counsaile to others ? and he that knowes not how to rule & gouern himselfe , how shall he command a whole kingdome ? qui sibi nequam est , cui alij bonus crit ? he that is euill to himselfe , to whom will hee be good ? alexander said he hated that wise man , that was not wise for himselfe . chap. xi . of other courses and meanes , which kings may take for the notice of such persons , in whom the said qualities concurre . one of the greatest mischiefes incident vnto kingdomes is ; that kings haue not true notice giuen them of worthy persons , for to imploy them in his seruice . a great cause whereof is , that your vndeseruing , or ( at least ) lesse sufficient , are clapt in betwixt them , and home ; those are the men , that are most intermitted , take most vpon them , and procure by their negociating and plotting , to occupie the best places , and not contenting themselues therewith , seeke to shut the doore against men of merit , and to keepe them out , to the end that their owne defects , by this course , may receiue the lesse discouery . for this is the nature of things opposite each to other , that the neerer they are one to the other , the more excellent lays it's contraryes defect , the more open . now to occurre to this mischiefe , wise iethro aduised his sonne in law , that he should seeke out men of good parts , and choose them ( as we s●yd before ) from amongst all the people . and we shall better perceiue , what that counsaile comprehendeth , if we will but consider that other place of deuteronomy ; where moses discoursing with the people , what diligence he had vsed on his part , it is there mentioned , that he spake vnto them , and admonished them ( to the end that the election of the ministers might take the better ) that they themselues likewise would vse their diligences , and then giue him notice of those persons , which they held in greatest esteeme amongst them , and were ( in the generall opinion ) the ablest men . date ex vobis ●iros sapientes , & gnaros , & quorum conuersatio sit probata in tribubus vestris , vt ponam eos vobis principes : take yee wise men and vnderstanding , and knowen amongst your tribes , and i will make them rulers ouer you . and indeed , the best and surest course , that kings can take , to come to that notice or knowledge they desire , is to lay holde on those persons , whose approbation is so notorious , that all the people giue good testimonie of them . for , ( as a wise man hath well obserued ) the generall opinion , is that touchstone , which proueth or reproueth . for , it cannot be , that one should deceiue all. and happily from hence grew that common adage vox populi , vox dei : the peoples voyce , is gods voyce . we must giue credit to the fame and report that goes of men. for ( as tacitus saith ) she sometimes makes the choyse of ministers ; it being his meaning , that this satisfaction should be giuen to the people , that those , that are to gouerne them , should be chosen and elected by that common fame , and good report , that goes of them . and heere by the way let me tell you , that it is not much amisse , that some offices , and preferments be in a dissembled kinde of disguise ; purposely published before they be bestowed , to see how it will be intertained and receiued by the people ; to whom it is fit some satisfaction should be giuen , as being the body that is to be commanded . this is a trick of state , whereof ( vpon some occasions ) fernando , surnamed the wise , made good vse . for when he was to goe any great voiage , vndertake any warre , or attempt some new enterprise , or any other action of importance , he would not publish , nor iustifie the same to the world , till he had vsed some art and cunning , imploying some persons fit for that purpose ( before his designes were throughly vnderstood ) to giue it out ; that the king should do well to make such , or such a wa●re , to make this or that prouision , for this , or that reason . so that first of all , the vulgar were made acquainted therewith and rested satisfied with the reasons that were rendred for it . and then afterwards it comming to be published ; that the king had done , or would doe such a thing , it is incredible to beleeue , with how much ioy , loue , and applause of the people , and whole kingdome , this his resolution was receiued . but mistake me not i pray ; i do not say , that this is to be done alwayes , but on some occasions , or great preparations . and kings in this case , must haue a care , that they haue faithfull centinells , that may truly certifie them , how that newes takes , and what exception ( if any arise ) they make against it , and vpon what grounds , that if any thing had beene omitted , it might be amended a president ( not vnlike to this ) had the roman common-wealth in those it's first flourishing dayes . which did cause their lawes to be set vp in publike for . dayes together before they should be of force , to the end , that the people might peruse them , and thinke well vpon them . how much more ought this course to be taken in legibus viuentibus : in those liuing lawes which are your greater and principaller sort of ministers , and such as are to command and gouerne a common-wealth who ought to be well beloued , and well rec●iued of the people , that they may loue them , respect them , and beleeue them , in all they shall say , as they would their own fathers ? i well perceiue , that there may be much deceit in the world , and that there are some men so subtile and so cunning that only with a pen in their hand , they make themselues masters of other mens studies , and labours , and by this tricke gaine the credit and opinion of able and sufficient men , when as indeed they are nothing lesse . and this deceit takes more in matter of learning and wisedome , which ( as we said before ) cannot be measured out with the yard . and in no place is this so common , as in the courts of kings , where your purpurated persons ( saith seneca ) meaning those , that abound in riches , and other corporall ornaments , stand a loofe of from the vulgar and yet vse to be vulgar in their vnderstanding , to the preiudice of the good and true esteeme of things ; and amongst these kinde of men , those easily get the name and fame of wise , who talke boldly , and spinne out a large discourse of those things , which they well vnderstand not . and it is daily seene , that some of these superficiall fellowes haue beene preferr'd to better places by these their false ostentations , and feigned knowledge , then great learned clarkes , by shewing themselues humble-minded , temperate in their talke , and moderate in their conuersation , could euer attaine vnto . and if this did happen only in those sciences and faculties , which they call depone lucrando , which are studied for to get temporall riches , it were tolerable , because for this end , opinion is of more profit for them , then truth . but the griefe of it is , that this passeth forward euen vnto those , that are professours of that science , which , as it is in it selfe superiour , so ought it to make those , which professe the same superiour in minde and vnderstanding , and make them much more to esteeme the truth , and existency of wisedome and knowledge , then false opinion , falsly gained amongst the lesse wiser sort of men . now , for the auoyding of these inconueniences , it importeth much , that a king do not rely too much vpon the opinions of the vulgar , which in particular are various , and ill grounded , but when they shall heare it generally spoken , that such a one is an eminent man in this , or that other thing , and that he hath not his fellow in the kingdome for these and these abilities , let the counsell be called , the partie thus recommended , examined , and let the king take information from them , that are euery way as able as he , euen in that wherein he professes himselfe his crafts-master , whether they giue vp the same verdit of him , or no ; so that the fame , and opinion of a good souldiers , of a good captaine , and of a good gouernour , must be confirmed by the testimonie of those that are the best both souldiers , captaines , and gouernours . by this line , may you leuell , & by this course secure the approbation of all other offices . and in those whose sufficiencie may be seene , and measured out by the suruay of officialls , there cannot be so much deceit therein ; but in those , who are to serue a king and state , with great studies , and with the knowledge of diuers faculties , as are your greater dignities , and ecclesiasticall functions , where ( as we are taught by the apostle s. paul ) there is necessarily required great learning , great integritie of life , and great prudence and therefore had more neede of examination and triall . and i hold it for a great inconuenience , that the iudgement of things of so high a nature should be remitted to the relation of those , who are not onely farre from being able to iudge , but scarce know how to speake truly of them . by meanes whereof it is very vsuall with them , to suffer themselues to be ouercome by deceit , and ouerswaied with passion , holding those for the best and worthiest , and recommending them to the king for those high ministeries and offices , to whom , either they , or their friends , and kinse folke , beare most affection , or are most beholding . but opinion ought not to carry these things , vnlesse it be confirmed with very good , and sure testimonies . much of this mischiefe will be remedied , if for these and such like great dignities and offices , we should not rely only vpon fame , or that voice and report , which comes a far off , and somtimes painted ouer with apparencies , and in the maske and disguise of truth , being nothing else , saue meere passion , but that we should looke a little neerer into the inside of these persons , and grow by communication into a fuller knowledge of them . not that knowledge , which some ministers speake of , who are sayd to know only those whom they preferre , or are willing to preferre , and only for that they haue heard them talke in ordinary matters of complement , and base flatteries , which they vse more , which haue all their wisedome in their lips , then those that are truly graue and learned men . mens witts , are not like the water of a fountaine , which , at the first draught , our palate findes to be thicke , or thin , salt , or sweete . it is like a sea , without a bottome ; or like vnto a deepe riuer , to know whose depth , we must wade through it from side to side . sicut aqua pro●unda , sic consilium in corde viri , ( saith the holy ghost ) counsaile in the heart of a man ; is like a deepe water : sed homo sapiens exhauriet illud : but a man of vnderstanding will draw it out . and it is the learned , and wise , that must make iudgement of wise , and learned men . in the sacred history of genesis , we reade , that when the holy patriarke isaac determined to giue the benediction of the primogenitureship to his elder sonne esau , iacob came athwart him , and feigned himselfe to be esau , ( whom his aged father meant to blesse ) and in a distinct and cleare voyce sayd vnto him ; i am thy first begotten sonne esau ; to whom the patriarke made answer ; thy voyce seemeth not to be the voyce of esau , but of iacob . and therefore , accede huc , vt tangam te fili mi : come neere i pray thee that i may feele thee ( my sonne ) whether thou be● my very sonne esau , or not ? many there are , who boast themselues to be elder brothers in vertue , and learning , and with tricks and deuices , clad themselues ( to shew ) in sheepes cloathing , but inwardly are rauening wolues , and with gifts and presents , ( as iacob heere did ) incline , or peruert the mindes of ministers , that they giue them credit , and beleife , stealing by this meanes the blessing away , and getting prioritie of place , being indeed younger brothers in their deserts . and we are to consider that in this history , there did concurre two things , which were sufficient to deceiue the patriarke . the first , that he was blinde or at least very dimme sighted ; for ( as wee said before ) when this propounding or nominating of such persons , is left to the will of those , that are blinde , or ignorant in these matters , there is not any thing done therein , which is not full of deceit . the second , that the voyce was far different , from the person whom he felt . the like vsually happeneth in that matter which we haue now in hand . for there shall goe a voyce , and fame , and a true opinion of such a man , that he hath very worthy parts , but comming vpon the first sight to those ministers , which are to preferre him , he seemeth to be another manner of man , from that which hee truly is . and the reason of it is , for that ( like the blinde ) they only feele , touch , and examine these wise men , when as indeede they should conforme themselues to the settled voyce , and receiued opinion of the learned , who are better seene in these matters , and haue a deeper knowledge of them . anciently , the people did meere all together , and with a generall and common voyce did nominate him to be their bishop whom they thought to be the fittest man , and most worthy the episcopall sea. and this was then held the fairest and surest course . for ( to speake morally ) it is not likely ( as we said before ) that one single man , should deceiue so many , nor draw the votes and suffrages of all the whole multitude vnto him , vnlesse he had parts and abilities deseruing this their approbation . many most holy men , and great prelates , as ambroses , gregories , chrysostomes , and other learned , and graue diuines , haue receiued their preferments by such nominations as these . but this kinde of election ( now some yeares since ) was reduced ( esteeming it the fittest and the surest way ) to the voyces , and suffrages of your deanes and chapters of cathedrall churches . but , because in humane things there is such little stabilitie and firmenesse , your popular dissensions inforced them ( for the greater ease and quiet of the common-wealth ) that your kings ( by concession of the chiefe bishops ) should haue the nominating of them . and no doubt , but it was well ordained by them , in regard , that as those their royall persons , are of so superiour a degree , and so free from respects of humane businesses ( for these are wont to worke vpon the mindes of particular men ) so the nomination , that passeth through their hands , is by much the more certaine . for , as they are kings and rulers ouer the people , god doth inlighten them ( so as they do not dis-deserue this light , or be rebellious vnto him , for the making of a good and iudicious choise . ) diuinatio in labijs regis , in iudicio non errabit os ejus : a diuine sentence is in the lips of the king , and his mouth shall not erre in iudgement . for , if he be a good and vertuous king , god doth assuredly assist his actions , directing him by an especiall grace , and particular fauour , that he may not erre in a businesse of so great importance . and this doth oblige them to looke well what they do , and to take a great deale of care and good heed in the nomination of them . and let kings take this into their consideration , that being such , as they ought to be , they haue in some measure a kinde of propheticall gift , that they may not ( will they but strip themselues of passion , and craue gods holy assistance ) erre in their iudgement . oh , what a necessitie is there in them to liue well , since that from the innocencie of their life , ariseth ordinarily a hitting right in their actions , true intelligence , and a good dispatch in their negociations . chap. xii . how kings ought to carry themselues towards those ministers , whom they finde sufficient for the gouernment both of peace , and of warre . in the creation of the vaste vniuerse , god shewed his great omnipotencie , and his infinite wisedome in the disposition of those things , which hee placed therein , with such a concordance and harmonie , that diuus thomas confesseth that it could not be mended , without some dissonancie , and iarring . and he citeth the example of a well tuned viall , wherein it is not possible to straine a string , but the consonancie in all the rest is quite marred . this was that which the wiseman said ; that with weight , number , and measure , god had created , and ordered all his creatures . so that the parts of the vniuerse , haue amongst themselues that proportion , that in euery one , and all ioyntly , there are found these three circumstances , weight , number and measure . but that , which is spoken in the booke of wisedome , touching the gouernment of all this huge machina , is of greater consideration . for god touching ( as being infinitely powerfull ) the extremes and ends of all things in the disposing of them , he doth it with a great deale of sweetnesse . he did set an inuiolable law , a settled and determinate seate ( as being the author of nature ) to nature it selfe ; to the end , that euery thing conseruing it selfe with in it's owne proper bounds and limits , it should not be confounded with the rest . and from hence grew a most sweete and pleasing harmonie of all this great frame of the world , so well tuned , and so well ordred , that it alone voyceth and proclaymeth the wisedome , and omnipotencie of the creator . what a goodly thing is it , to see the continuall motion of the celestiall bodies ? the perpetuall influence , sixednesse , & resplendour of the planets and of other starres ? the fire , in it's sohere ? the ayre , the water , and the earth , in their most firme and stable mansions ? and only by vertue of that first law which god settled in his first creation ? out of this composture , and admirable accord , and agreement of things naturall , is to be drawne the politicall consent and attonement of a common-wealth , appointing to euery one his site , his place , and his certaine limits of iurisdiction for that office , that shall be put vpon him , without once thinking to haue it altered or changed . and it is the obseruation of the wise , and men of much experience , that if it might bee inuio●ably kept , and might bee established as an inuariable and vnchangeable decrce in the brest of the king and his counsellours , that those of one counsell should not be transferred and put ouer to another ; nor be remoued from that wherein they are already placed , vnlesse it be to your presidentships of your chanceries , and visits of the kingdome , and that they themselues of euery particular councell should haue the nominating of their presidents , it would in matter of gouernment be of great importance . first of all , by these meanes would cease those anxieties , vexations , and cares , wherewith all of them liue , of being translated from one councell to another ; as also that extraordinary negociating and labouring for this end and purpose . those that are of the councell of hazienda , pretend to be preferred to that of the indies , & de los ordines . and when they haue attained to these , they aspire to that of castile . so that out of this ambitious humour , none of them sticke fast , or keepe firme footing ; but from the very first day , wherein they enter into one of these councells , their mindes are wandring , pretending to better themselues by chopping and changing from councell to councell . and the mischiefe of it is ; that in these pretensions , they wast and spend that time , which they should bestow in studying those points , which belong to their own tribunall . for the curing of this sore , in the councell of the indies , in former times , those counsellours had a larger allowance and greater pension , then any of the other councells , obliging them thereby to settle themselues where they were placed , without pretending to budge , or to leape from one councell into another , making themselues thereby capable of all those difficult businesses of the indies , which good effect then ceased , when the salaries were made all a like . and if this order which i speake of , had beene well and truly kept , the disorder which is in these pretensions of change , had beene remedied , and men would haue beene more practicke , and better seene in those businesses , which are treated in euery one of them , being so different , and of so great consequence , and so hard to be vnderstood , that they will require the study and assistance of many yeares to vnderstand and know them aright . and ( as the holy ghost sayth ) it is contrarie to the rules of good gouernment , and of prudence , to put one vpon that he vnderstands not , and to commit weighty affayres vnto him , who vndertaking them ( as being tyed thereunto by his imployment ) knowes not whether he be in the right , or no , though perhaps he presume he is . likewise , there should be much more care had in the prouision of those places of other audiencies , and inferiour courtes of chancerie , to the end that in them might be bred vp such subiects , in qualitie , learning , and vertue , that out of them , election might be made of fit men for greater counsells . and that the presidents should be chosen out of the said councells in which they were bred vp , it is very conuenient , and grounded vpon good reason , for , hauing beene conuersant in them some yeeres , by the concourse of so many things , as dayly offer themselues , thereby will be better knowen , their talent , and capacitie , their truth , their treating , their integritie , and all the worth and parts of their person , whereby the election that shall be made , will be much the better , more certaine in the things vndertaken , and more safe and secure in matter of conscience . and who is he can doubt , but that those counsailours , which haue beene for a long time in your supremer councells will haue greater knowledge of the qualitie and substance of those businesses , which are treated in them , together with those necessary circumstances , which make for their better expedition . besides , they will more prefectly know the state , wherein the businesses of that tribunall stand , without being driuen to haue recourse vnto others to be better informed , spending and loosing much time therein . againe , they know , ( which is a matter of no small consideration ) the rest of the counsailours , as also their condition , their abilitie , their cleannesse of hands and heart , and their good , or bad parts , for there , better then else where , are they discouered . and this knowledge is very necessary in presidents , for to deliberate , and make choise vpon all occasions , of the fittest persons , that are to be trusted , with businesses of importance . and it is of no lesse consequence to take notice of the suitors and pretenders , for to know how to carry themselues towards them , & to take particular knowledge of the good customes , ceremonies , preheminencies and priuileges of those councells , that they may be kept and obserued , and that the authoritie of the tribunall may be maintained , and all discordes and competitions a voyded . all these things are learned with time , and that experience which euery one hath of his proper councell , wherein it is very requisite , that the president be a master and not a schollar , as he is , who enters newly into a councell though he haue serued many yeares in another : and of no little inconuenience are the nouelties , which they both attempt and do , who are admitted without this experience , being desirous to accommodate , and order things according to the measure of their own d●scourse . and howbeit the want of experience be in counsailours a matter of much consideration , and may be tolerated and borne withall in some ; yet in realtie of truth , the lacke thereof in a president , is intolerable , and very preiudiciall to the whole common-wealth ; and from thence arise many great mischiefes , and those remedilesse . for some out of ignorance , and some out of flatterie , do leane to their opinion , whereby many vniust decrees passe , whilest the experienced and wiser sort , ( which euermore are the fewer ) haue not power equall to their sufficiencie , to turne the course of the streame . and for this reason , so many difficulties offer themselues , so many differences are raised amongst them , and so many resolutions dela●d and put off , ( and peraduenture erre in the end too , ) which would haue required a quicke and speedy dispatch . but when a president hath that experience which is needfull , he will not g●ue way to these delayes ; but being priuie to his own sufficiencie , and confident that he is in the right , looke wha● he presseth and affirmeth , the authoritie of his pers●● and place , will make it good , and strike a great ▪ if not the only stroake , in the businesse . for these and d●uerse other reasons , in all well gouerned common-wea●ths and communities , i would haue them make choise ( for g●u●rnment ) of such subiects as haue beene bred vp , and ●u'd some yeares in them ; for they cannot but haue a great aduantage of those that are strangers thereunto , t●ough otherwise of equall parts . and this is the trace and tr●cke of the holy ghost , marked out vnto vs by ▪ s. paul ; omnis enim ponti●ex ex hominibus assumptus pro hominibus constu●itur : for euery high priest , taken from among men , is ordained for men . for it matetreth much , that the head be of the same substance as is the body , and that all the members be of one and the same kinde , not to haue a head of gold , a body of braffe , and feete of clay , like vnto nabuchodonazars image , but that all the whole body be one and the selfe same flesh and bone , all of the same matter and informed with the same forme . that bundle of sheafes which ioseph saw ; his ( like the king-sheafe ) lifting vp his head higher then the rest , and ( if we may beleeue the rabbins ) reaching as high as heauen , and those of his brethren prostrate on the ground , doing homage thereunto , is the embleme of the body of a councell & it's president like vnto that of king pharaoh . and the sacred text doth not say , that that tall and high sheafe , was different in matter from the rest , but that all were of the same eare , and stalke ; giuing vs thereby to vnderstand , that he , that is to be the head or president of the whole body of a councell , though he be to be higher then the rest , in the dignitie and hight of his office , yet for all this , god would not , that he should be made of any other kinde of matter then were the rest of the members ; that he should not besome great block-headed lord , or a man without wit , or learning , that in his carriage and manner of life , he should seeme to be cut out of another peece of cloath , but that hee should bee of the selfe same qualitie , fashion , and profession . and that the president of euery councell , should be chosen from amongst the counsailours themselues , that they be moulded out of the same masse and lumpe , as well the feete , as the head , that there goe ( as we say ) but a payre of sheares betweene them , and that they be clad all in one and the same liuerie . and god giuing order to his vice-roy ( and in it , to all kings ) how he was to choose a president , that should be the head and ruler ouer his people , saith thus vnto him ; eum constitues , quem dominus tuus elegerit , de numero fratrum tuorum : thou shalt in any wise set him king ouer thee , whom thy lord thy god shall choose ; one , from among thy brethren , shalt thou set king ouer thee . and howbeit god had heere exprest himselfe so plainely , and that he himselfe had the nominating of the person , and therefore there could be no errour in the election , yet it seemeth god was not satisfied heerewith , but comes presently with another prouiso , and a second mandatum , saying . thou mayst not set a stranger ouer thee ( hominem alterius gentis ) which is not thy brother . he must not be of another people , or of another familie ; as if he should haue said , not of another councell . doubtlesse ( saith s. chrysostome ) this is a businesse of great consequence ; and we are to insist much thereupon , considering that god himselfe , doth recommend and repeate it so often vnto vs , to the end that it may be imprinted in the hearts of kings . and in reason of state , and matter of gouernment , it is the greatest benefit they can do to their kingdomes . and therefore amongst other those great and many fauours which god prom●sed to conferre vpon his people , ( speaking vnto them in the similistude of the vine ) he indeareth this as the greatest , that he will set a guard about them , and gardiners or vineyard-keepers , that shall be within the precincts thereof . dabo ei vinitores ex eodem loco : i will giue her , her vineyards from thence , and the valley of achor , for a doore of hope . but ( my good lord ) within the precincts of a vineyard , what can be had there but hedges and vine-plants ? had it not beene better to giue vnto this vineyard a lusty strong laborour , to dresse and prune it , and to keepe and defend it from passengers ? the chalde , ●xpounds this place very well , for in stead of vinitores , he puts gubernatores , which , are rulers and presidents . and for to be , as they ought to be , we haue said already , that they should be vniforme with the members . for if they be the vine , he must likewise be a vine , that must be ●●eir head. christ himselfe , that he might be the presiden● 〈◊〉 head of that apostolicall councel where the apostles were as tender plants , and had the same proprieties , made himselfe a vine , to conforme himselfe vnto them . ego sum vitis vera & vos palmites : i am the true vine , and yee the branches : to the end that kings may vnderstand , and all the world may know , of how great importance it is , that the members and head , counsailours , and presidents , should in their qualities and conditions , be very conformable , sithence that heerein he would not dispence with himselfe , much lesse therefore with others , and for this cause presidents ought still to be chosen out of the same councells , ex eodem loco , eiusdem gentis , & de numero fratrum suorum : out of the same place , the same people , and from amongst their brethren . and if counsailours might haue the hope of such increase of honour in their persons , it would make them much better then they are , and they would study to win themselues credit , and to cumply in all things with their obligation , seruing with carefullnesse and satisfaction as well to give their kings good content , as that they againe , might take notice thereof , and in their greatest occasions imploy them in their seruice . this rule did that great gouerner of gods people moses obserue , who hauing ( as wee savd ) vsed diligence for to seeke out persons , which might helpe him , furnished with those qualites afore-mentioned , made a distribution and diuision amongst them , allotting them places and offices , answearable to their talent . and which is worthy the noting , that ( as he himselfe affirmeth in another place ) the noblest , and wisest amongst them he made rulers ouer the rest . for , when in noblemen , concurre the qualities of wisedome , and prudence , and other the vertues , there is a great deale of reason , nay a strong obligation lyes vpon it , that presidentships , and the greatest dignities , & p●aces of honour , should be bestowed vpon them ; especially , when not degenera●ing from the vertue of their ancestors , but surpassing them therein , they haue the aduantage of noblenesse of blood , vpon which vertue ( like a diamond set in gold ) shewes it sel●e the better and appeares the more beautifull . the words of that most wise law-giuer , wheron this discourse will be the better grounded , are these ; tuli de tribubus vestris , viros sapientes , & nobiles , & constitui eos principes , tribunos , & centuriones , & quinquegenarios , ac decanos , qui docerent vos singula : i tooke the cheife of your tribes , wise men and knowen , and made them heads ouer ye , captaines ouer thousands , and captaines ouer hundreds , and captaines ouer fifties , and officers amongst your tribes . out of euery tribe he chose the worthiest and most sufficient men , and made them heads and presidents in that gouernment . and he , that was so zealous of the lawes and good gouernment , valiant mattathias , in that prouision of offices , which he distributed , at his death , he said of simon : scio quod vir consilij est , ipsum audite semper . and because he was so wise a counsailour , he made him president of the councell . iudas machabaeus fortis viribus à juuentute su● : iudas machabaeus , was a valiant man from his youth , he had beene alwayes bred vp in the warres , sit vobis princeps militia ; and therefore he made him generall of the armie . for ( as plato saith ) quilibet ad ea idoneus est , inquibus sapit : euery man is fittest for those things , wherin he hath best skill . now , when kings shall haue found out such fit persons ( as haue bin by vs propounded ) they are to distribute & order their councells and counsailours , & to appoint their president , charging them to keepe euery one his proper place , and station , & that they enuy not one another nor sue to be preferred to a supremer councell , and to haue a care that each man in his owne councell be rewarded according to his good seruices . for it is impossible , but , that he that treateth in all businesses , must needs erre in some , nor can he , that is ouer charged with businesses giue good satisfaction vnto all . but there are some , that loue to double their files , & would , if they could , haue a . offices at once pretending , that there is want of fit men for those offices , seeking that they may be doubled , redoubled , and quadrupled on themselues . they are like vnto another gerion , of whom it is sayd , that he is in hell , because hee would be three , instead of one. what will become then of those , that would be twenty yea a hundred , nay inioy all the offices in a kingdome ? these had neede of another farre greater hell , if that be not hell enough , they haue already . with the foresayd distinction and diuision of councell and counsailours , farre better and more speedily will businesses be dispatched , and the king shall be at more ease in his person , and more at quiet in conscience . and the counsailours themselues , shall leade an easier life , haue lesse time of trouble , and more to study on state-businesses , whereby with moderate paines , they shall giue a quicker dispatch to those things which come vnder their debating . let this therfore serue as a conclusion to this discourse ; that in no kinde of hand , offices be doubled vpon one particular person , nor put out of their hinges , by the passion or pretension of those , that haue a hand therein , nor let counsellours bee chopt and changed , from one place , to another , nor your councells confounded . for this argues but small satisfaction in the ministers , and much distrustfullnesse in the prince . but let vs passe on . chap. xiii . the author prosecutes the same subiect , and shewes how kings ought to carry themselues with their counsells and counsailours . this order being thus settled for kings , they likewise are to haue a care , that they keepe it , by not altering businesses , nor remouing either them , or the men therein imployed , out of their proper places , for from the trucking and bartring of these things , from this chopping and changing , great inconueniences , and mightie troubles , are wont to rise in gouernment . what a strange thing would it be , nay , what would become of vs all , if that order which god placed ( as we told you ) in this machina of the world , should he altred ? if the earth should get vp aboue the ayre , and the ayre should passe beyond the spheare of fire , what were this , but to destroy the world ? so good gouernment in like manner is destroyed , by the ambition and couetousnesse of those , who not contented with their imployments and places , draw businesses out of their right current , for to make themselues lords and masters of all , and to pursue , by this meanes , their idle vanities , ambitious humours , and particular interest . the holy ghost , in that misticall booke of the canticles , compares the gouernment of the church to a well ordred army , or p●tch't field , where the pikes are ranked on the one side , the shot on the other , the horse in a third , and all the rest in their due places appointed for them . and in this well ordring and marshalling of the men , consisteth the strength of an army . a christian , and church like common-wealth , by the good order that is kept therein , is as terrible as an army with banners to it's enemies , and as beautifull as tirzah , and comely as ierusalem , in the sight both of god , and man. and when kings do hit right the distribution of their offices , and in giuing to euery one , that which is fitting for him , according to his condition and qualitie , most certaine it is , that euery man shall get aduantage thereby and proue morè excellent in his proper place and office , then those can be , who haue beene imployed in other offices and places . and that they , who haue beene deputed to such a councell and well exercised therein , shall far better know what belongs thereunto , then those that haue not had experience and knowledge thereof . euermore presupposing , that with the foresayd care and diligence , choise hath beene made of the most sufficient . for which reason , we are to giue credit to euery one in particular , and to all ioyntly in their ministries , as to selected persons , and such as are their crafts-masters , in these kinde of matters . for ( as the holy ghost saith ) vnusquisque in arte sua , sapiens est : euery one is wise in his owne art , knowing therein both how to speake , and do . according to this ground , kings cannot doe any thing better or surer for the good gouernment of their kingdomes , and satisfaction of their consciences , then to giue credit to each councell in that which appertaineth vnto them , and to leaue vnto their ordinary councellours and councels the dispatch of all your running businesses without any particular consultation , vnlesse it shall more neerely concerne the state , whereof as the king ought onely to be the iudge , and to giue his resolution , what he will haue therein to be done ; so likewise must he lend them his hand and authoritie , as far forth as is fitting , proportionable to the bulke and qualitie of their office , without which they cannot well exercise the same . where as not to giue them that , which they iustly deserue , is a great impediment to their cumplying with the occasion to which are the substantiall part of their obligation , and giues occasion to others , not to yeeld them obedience & respect , which are the raines of that bridle , wherwith the people are to be restrained and ruled . and together with this , they themselues must helpe to sustaine the weight and charge of gouernment , wherein they haue so great a portion . the emperour charles the fift of glorious memorie , was much commended for the great care he tooke in conseruing the authoritie of his ministers . and it is not to be doubted , but those ancient graue ministers , whom the people reuerenceth and respecteth for the place wherein they are , and for the opinion which they haue gained by their yeares , and experience , and for the authoritie they haue to do either well , or ill , and for that power they possesse , and which the lawes grant vnto them ouer mens liues , and goods , may doe much in authorizing , or disauthorizing not onely all that they doe , but euen the prince himselfe . hence will issue this other benefit , that a great part of your audiences ( too ordinary arrouble with kings ) will be much lessened , whereby they shall be the more disoccupied , and recouer greater force and strength for to treat of waightier affaires , not wasting and spending to times in matters of lesser moment . and this bad and old custome ought to haue it's leggs broken and heereafter be disinabled for attributing vnto kings those resolutions , that are disagreeable and displeasing to the people . for albeit those ineuitable , offences and distastes , which sometimes cannot be auoyded , ought to be indured , and passed ouer with dissimulation , for the publicke good , yet is it not safe to procure them for euery particular thing , nor that all men should know , that all their dammages and hinderances proceede from the supreme 〈◊〉 of the king. and it is as olde , as vsuall a fashion with your ministers , when the people murmure at them , ( i cannot tell whether it 〈◊〉 with that wisedome and loyaltie which they owe to their king ) to lay the fault on their superiour , and the people easily intertaineth it , and apprehends it , to be so . whereupon they throw all the stones , that they can at him , and although they cannot reach him , yet is it not fit , that they should grow to that insolency and contempt . let kings , by all possible meanes excuse those iuntas , or references , which haue lately beene introduced for the deciding of businesses ; a thing as ill receiued in common , as desired by the ministers ; and that for many reasons . first , that the people , and the parties , may not thinke , or say , that it is done to oppresse them , by putting businesses out of their course , and recommending them to a few selected persons , that they may so end them , as he desireth , who hath the nominating of them . secondly , that they may not draw vpon themselues the hatred and burthen of those resolutions they shall take , if they shall be either in offence and distast of the people , or of the partie whom it concerneth . thirdly , because there is no cause or reason , why they , that are trusted with all other publike businesses , should not likwise be trusted with particular greiuances . fourthly , be cause your ordinary councels haue more experience of those businesses , which they treate dayly , then your iuntas haue , which are formed of different councels , wherin vsually , there are many which scarce know the first principles of that , wherof they are to treate , & must be guided & directedby those , which are taken out of that councell , which is acquainted with these kind of businesses . or if they will not confesse this , by their ignorance , and by their competition , they deferre at least , if not vtterly ouerthrow the resolution that should be taken in the businesse for , being ( as they are ) composed of different tribunalls , they neither loue , nor trust one another neither know they how to yeeld each to other , but grow stiffe & obstinate , and attend onely to shew their wit & learning vpon those that are vnuerst in those affaires . whilest in the meane while it succeedeth with mens businesses , as it doth with those diseases and sicknesses , which are discust and debated by many physitians who whilst they are diuided in opinion , and one would haue this , and another that , the time of the cure is past . fiftly , for the credit and authoritie of the king , as also of the councels themselues ; for when that which belongs to these counsailours and their president , is taken out of their hands by artifice and cunning , and is recommended to others , in no hand can be excused the note and suspition , that either the king hath erred in the election which he made of these his counsellours , or that they do not do their duty , because that which did properly appertaine vnto them , is taken from them , and put ouer to others . and as it should be a fault in a prince , not to trust his ministers , if they deserue to be trusted ; so is it likewise , if they dismerit that trust , to continue them in that place . and therefore that minister from whom there can be had no good satisfaction , let him be put out of his office. for to keepe him in it , argues either weaknesse in a prince , or an euill conscience . sixtly , that that may not by your discoursists , and wits ( as they call them ) whereof kings courts are full , diuine afore hand , what is treated in those iuntas , which are no sooner had , but the end of them is knowne ; a thing which cannot but be of infinite inconuenience for all affaires , and more particularly in those , which as they are of more importance , so doe they require more reseruednesse . seuenthly , because ministers may haue time and place for to heare negotiants , which they cannot haue , nor be able to remedy matters , nor to vnderstand them , vnlesse they may haue the hearing of them . and though this complaint , be without fault on the counsailours part , i am sure it is not without punishment of those , that are to negociate with them . and lastly , because it is a great errour and intolerable burthen , to tye two or three , to the dispatch of many businesses of pea●e , and of warre , of the exchequer , & of the state , and of diuers other things , which dayly offer themselues ; for , ( as experience teacheth , reason requireth , and inconuenience proclaimes it ) it is impossible to giue a good issue and dispatch to all , nay scarce to the least part of businesses . for a man is not made of brasse , that hee should be able to indure the trouble of so many iuntas , at least his spirits will be so spent , that he will be able to doe little seruice in those that are last treated . counsai●ours know not , like angels , diuino intuitu , but as men , by way of discourse : and in this they are tyred out , and ouer-wrought ; and it is not possible , that at the latter end of the day , they should be so quicke and nimble , as at the first hower , after they haue taken paines all 〈◊〉 day long . for this vertue is granted to spirits , which know and comprehend things without measure , or wearisomnesse . mans vnderstanding is finite , and hee said not ill , that said ; the sence , which is occupied in many things is weakened by euery one of them . and in that repartment and diuision , which that euangelicall father of his familie , made of the talents amongst his seruants he gaue vnto euery one of them , secundum propriam virtutem . he measured their abilities , and conformable thereunto imposed a charge vpon them . how many doe groane vnder the burthen of those offices , which they beare , without being able to vndergoe them ; yet will not they leaue these , because their ambition does not leaue them . but rather applying themselues to the gust and palate of their king , and out of a disordinate desire they haue to grow still greater and greater , they are well content with loade vpon loade , and neuer cry ho , because they neuer thinke they haue enough . and so not complying ( as indeed they cannot ) with their obligation , businesses are retarded , and goe not on in that good way as they should , and both they themselues , and they that put them into these places , liue with little or no securitie of conscience . but if it be the kings will and pleasure , and that hee thinke it fit for his greater satisfaction that some one particular man that is eminent in the profession of that businesse , which is to be treated , shall treate thereof , and shall see and peruse it , a gods name ( if he will haue it so ) let his will be fulfilled : yet with all , let his maiestie take his opinion , as of a particular person , and hauing receiued it , let it be disputed , discussed , and debated by the body of the councell , such as haue beene beaten in these kinde of businesses , and are throughly acquainted with these matters ; for by this meanes , that which is pretended , shall the better be effected , and many the fore-mentioned inconueniences be excused . amongst those ancient romans , when that common-wealth was sole mistris of all the world , and when it was likewise vnder the empire and command of one onely monarke , we neuer read , that it euer admitted of more then the ordinary councells for the dispatch of businesses . augustus caesar , a prince of excellent prudence , and his great minion mecaenas , in matter of counsaile , can sufficiently confirme this doctrine , being that he himselfe was one of those , that treated businesses in the ordinary councells . and he had a respect and consideration thereunto in that extraordinary cause of piso touching the death of ger●onicus , wherein the iudgement of the people , and the senate was so much interessed . ti●erius the emperour who was one of the subtilest and craftiest princes , that euer the roman empire knew , would not for all his great strength of wit , & cunning dissimulation , wherein he was his arts-master , venter vpon any innouation farther then this , to passe ouer his opinion to this , or that other councell , but neuer appointed any particular iunta for the same , as one who knew very well , that onely in so doing he should haue but laded his own shoulders with the weightinesse of the case , and the successe of the cause . onely your iuntas , are to be vsed vpon some great and extraordinary occasion , and not vpon euery trifling businesse , as is now and hath these many yeares beene in vse , much more time being imployed in particular iuntas , then publicke councells touching the pe●sons of these councells . if the number be not sufficient for the dispatch of businesses , let it rather be increased , then that by this other course , he that is master and lord of all , should likewise make himselfe master of all wrongs and grieuances , and of that which the aggrieued will conceiue of him ; which hatching imagination of theirs , will bring forth ( that cocatrice of kings ) most venemous hatred . by that , which wee haue both read , seene and heard , it is easie to be collected , that this was meerely an introduction of the ambitious , who indeauoured by this meanes to haue all things passe through their hands , and depend vpon their will. and this , as if it had beene a thing of inheritance , hath gon along in descent from one age to another , euen to these our present times . that particular councell which kings formerly had , and in effect all of them still haue , that more reserued secret councell with whom they communicate their in wardest thoughts , let it ( a gods name ) be superiour to all the rest , which supplying , as in those three potentiae or faculties , the very place and soule as it were of the prince , it is very fit and conuenient , that it should iudge of the actions , and resolutions of all your ordinary councells , and that they should all wayte vpon this , and attend their pleasure , and that they should likewise treate of all those great businesses , which the ancient , and more especially , augustus caesar , called arcanaimpery , misteries of state , and secrets of the kingdome . but for the rest , let them be left to their ordinary councells for so shall they receiue quicker dispatch , and all sutes be more easily ended , and things carryed with lesse labour of the one , and fewer complaints of the other . and let it likewise suffice euen the greatest intermedlers of these ministers , that they haue a hand in publicke businesses , without offering for their priuate interest to draw things out of their ordinary course , and common tracke whereinto they were put , making themselues thereby hated and abhorred of all those that haue any thing to doe with them . for at last they will come to sent and winde out their driftes , to know all their doublings and shiftings , and to watch them at euery turne , and when they haue them at aduantage , neuer poore hare was so hardly followed by hounds , as these will be pursu'd to death by them , whom the others powerfullnesse with his prince , did seeke to crush and keepe vnder . it were well that these great ministers , would weigh and consider with themselues , that as they haue their hands already too full of worke , so haue they more complaints against them , then they would willingly heare of , and more enuie at the heeles of them , then they can well shake of , and therefore ( if they were wise ) they would anoyd ( as much as in them lyes ) to draw these mischiefes more and more vpon themselues . in great resolutions indeed , kings are not to giue way , that they should be taken out of the councells of state , and warre , nor yet that they should be conluded without them . for the g●ory of all good successefull actions shall be his , as hauing their reuolution and motion from him , as from their primum mo●ile . nor is it any wisedome in a king to lay the misfortunes and vnhappy accidents , that may befall a state , vpon his owne shoulders ; which will be qualified for such by his priuy counsellours , as finding themselues iustly offended , in that hee hath not imparted his minde vnto them , nor communicated with them in the common wealths affaires , especially if they be of consequence . the principall cause , why there was ordained a councell of state , was ; that it might serue to helpe the king ( whom principally this body representeth ) to beare the popular charge , which euermore iudgeth of things by the euents ; and though now and then they fall out ill , and the people thereupon ready to murmure and mutinie , yet are they the better bridled , and appeased by the power and authoritie of these counsellours . the office of a king hath trouble inough with it , burthen inough , and therefore they should not aduise him to lay more vpon himselfe without lawfull and necessary cause . and because , when i treated of the q●alit●es of counselours , i reserued those for this place , which more properly appertaine vnto them that are of this counsell , i will breifely deliuer what they are , and how necessarie for those that are elected thereunto ; and i will content my sel●e , with no lesse , then those of that great common-wealths man , and counsel our , pericles . and besides , to those which i shall now speake of , may be r● duced those , which are to be required in their 〈…〉 councell of state , is a councell of peace , and war ; and ( as plato saith ) is thesoule of republike , and the very anchor , wheron wholy dependeth a● the liabilitie , firmenesse & assurance , of the state , king , and king●ome , 〈…〉 , or preferuation . whose chiefe aime , and principall intent , is the good gouernment of the common-wealth , and that it , and euery member thereof should liue happily , and be conserued in peace , and iustice . and for this cause onely are we to make war. ob eam causam suscipienda sunt bella , vt sine i●iuria in pace vivatur . it is c●ero's saying . and the emperour charles the fifth was wont to say ; that the councell of state , is the whole wisedome , power , and vnderstanding of the king ; that it is his eyes , his hands , and his feete ; and that himselfe , should often sit in counsell and without it not to do , or conclude any thing that is of any weight , or moment . the qualities required to make a perfect counseller in this councell are many ; as that he be a man of much courage , truth , and integritie , and well seene in matters of state and gouernment , publick , and p●●uate , of peace , and of warre ; for he is to aduise in all ; a man of good yeares , great vertue , much authoritie , and of no meane credit and reputation ; that he be very skilful in those businesses , which he treateth ; that he vnderstand them well , and be his crafts-master in that facultie . that he be of a prompt and sharpe wit ; that his tongue be well hangd , and be able to expresse himselfe so happily , that he may be truly vnderstood . that he haue a minde free from all by respects , that neither loue , nor feare , may detaine him from vttering what he thinketh ; that he beare an especiall loue and affection to his king ; that he keepe his hands cleane , and not suffer himselfe to be ouercome by couetousnesse . for he , that in whatsoeuer is propounded , presently apprehends what is best , and vnderstands what is proffitable , and conuenient , yet neither knoweth , nor hath fi●ting words to declare himselfe , it is all one , as if he vnderstood it not . and he that can play both these parts passing well , yet loueth not his master , his conseruation and augmentation of honour , this man will hardly be true and trusty vnto him , and scarcely adiuse him to that which is fitting for him . but suppose he hath all these good qualities , yet if he giue way to be won by the loue of money , and greedinesse of gaine , all that shall be treated with him , shall be saleable , no whit weighing the benefit , and authoritie of his king , if the insatiable , hunger of riches be put in the scale . and i say moreouer , that he , that shall want these two qualities , and shall not loue his king , and yet loue couetousnesse , though he be indewed with all the rest , he shall thereby be so much the worse , and more dangerous , for hauing his will depraued , and his vnderstanding ill affected , hauing these two vices attending on him , how much the more shall his sharpnesse of wit be , and the greater his force of e●quence , the worse effects will it worke , and the more remedilesse . let counsellours therefore haue these two qualities , loue of the heart and cleannesse of the hand , together with good naturall partes , as a quicke wit , and nimble apprehension , for the speedier determining of present businesses , and not onely to giue sodaine , but sound aduise in them . and that in future cases , they may be able by naturall discourse to giue a guesse , how things are like to succeede ; as also , that they may by good discourse , and debating of businesses , attaine vnto those things , whereof as yet they haue not had particular experience . that they be prudent discerners of the better and the worse in cases doubtfull , that they may not be to seeke , but to goe through stitch therewith and be prouided for all commers . in a word , let them be excellent sodaine speakers vpon all occasions , assisted as well by a naturall kinde of gift they haue that way , as by the exercise of their wit. all which will not serue the turne , nor make the mill go so roundly as it would , vnlesse there be much amitie amongst them , and a conformitie of good agreement , and a willing helping and assiting one of another in businesses . for , from competitions and contestations amongst themselues , haue insued the losse of kingdomes , and states , and other great losses and calamities . they must bee of one accord , and one will with their king , and still aduise him to the best , hauing an eye both to him and themselues , that they doe not erre , or doe any thing contrary to that which is right and iust . and then is it to be vnderstood , that they beare true loue to their king , and countrie , and that they apply themselues to all that , which concernes the common good , and their owne particular seruice , when they take ioy and comfort , that they concurre , and runne all one way without diuision or distraction . and if this vnitie be not amongst them , it is to be imagined , that they loue not so much the king , and state , as their owne priuate interest . being thus qualified , they shall be fit ministers and counsellors for so great a counsell , for they shall therby be able to rid as many businesses as shall be brought before them , and giue them good and quicke dispatch , well vnderstanding what is needefull to be done , and knowing as well how to declare themselues in that which they vnderstand . and in this or any other councell , there ought ( according to fadrique furio ) a care to be had , to examine the merits and dismerits of euery one , informing themselues of his life , behauiour , and abilities , as also the actions , of those who without suing , deserue for their vertue , to haue fauour showen them ; and likewise to take notice of those who desire this preferment . and that for this purpose there be a register or book● kept of the merceds , and fauours to be conferred , and of the persons that are well deseruing , to the end that those honours and fauours may be thrown vpon them , according to the vertue , sufficiencie , and merits of the men . for he , that depriues vertue of that honour that is due thereunto , doth ( in cato's opinion ) depriue men , of vertue it selfe . and when fauours are afforded those which not deserue them , or are forborne to be bestowed on those that merit them , vertue receiues a great affront , and the common-wealth a notable losse . and it will proue the greater if honour be added to the bad , and taken from the good ; and that vice , shall be better rewarded , then vertue . for where she is not esteemed , and rewarded , the vertuous liue like men affronted , and that are banished the court. king nabucodonosor , assuerus , and others , haue kept such a booke as this , wherein were commanded to be recorded the seruice that were done them , and the persons deseruing , to the end they might gratifie them , and cast their gracious fauours vpon them . and this is very necessary in all well ordred common-wealth , to the end that all might indeauour to take paines , and study to deserue well . for reward inciteth men to labour ; and ( as salust saith ) were it not for hope of reward , few or none would be good . it makes much likewise for the honor and credit of kings . for in no one thing can they gaine themselues greater reputation , then by honouring those , that are good , and vertuous . the romans had likewise another councell which was called by the name of censura , or reforming of manners , which did not in the common-wealth permit publicke delinquents , which might cause either trouble , or scandall to the state , and to the end , that such ill disposed persons , might not escape punishment . for , where there is neither hope of reward , nor feare of punishment , there can we haue no good thing , no common-wealth , nor no congregation of men to last and continue ; when as the good and vertuous are not rewarded , nor the lewd and seditious punished . for if one part of the body be infirme , and be not holpen in time , the maladie extends it selfe , and goes creeping and spreading it selfe ouer all the whole body . and therefore it is sitting , that ministers should haue an eye , to see what vices , what disorders , what ill corrupted manners disturbe and molest a kingdome , and to haue a care to cleanse and cure the common-wealth of them , dealing with them for the publicke good , as wise physitians do for the bodyes-safety who , in the curing of infirmities , for the securing of the whole , cauterize this or that member , and if neede be cut it off . now your infirmities and diseases , which are quickly knowne , are as easily cured ( a great meanes of the remedy , resting in the discouerie . ) but those which with time waxe olde , grow in a manner incurable ; ( the aliment , and fomenting of them , consisting most in their concealement , ) for as in suffering and dissembling a fore , it but rankles the more , and of ill , becomes worse ; so to beare with insolent offenders , and to winke at their foule faultes , is ; as if a man should fauour a wound too much ; wherby , as it , so do they daily grow wors● and worse . for it is too too well knowne , that to malignant dispositions , the more lenitie , is but the more licence of offending , and open mercie proclaimed , crueltie . let the end of this discourse be , that the councells and counsellers being seated and setled in the forme aforesaid , the king likewise apply himselfe to treat truth with them , and to deale plainely with them , in whatsoeuer businesses shall offer themselues to be debated of . and let him not perswade himselfe , that there are too few of euery councell , for if they be chosen and selected men , few will suffice ; and many , serue to no other end but to trouble each other , and to delay businesses . for howbeit it be true , that it is euermore good to heare the opinions of all for to ventilate and sifte out a cause throughly , yet the determination ought to passe through the hands of a few , but withall good , and experienced persons , that they may not erre in their sentence . of the emperour alexander seuerus , ( who was a man of singular wisdome ) it is reported , that for the resolution of those businesses , which he vndertooke , he called onely vnto him such counsellours , to whom such businesse did more properly appertaine , and had most knowledge and experience in that , which was to be treated . vndè side iure tractaretur , solos doctos in consilum adhibebat ; si verò de re militari , milites veteres , & . senes , ac bene meritos , & locorum peritos , &c. so that if it were a law-businesse , he onely called the learned in the lawes to councell , if of warfare , olde beaten soldiers , aged and well-deseruing captaines , and of approued experience in their place . and so in the rest . for , as the philosopher saith ; impossibile est , vel certè admodum difficile , vt qui ipsa opera non tractat , peritè valeat iudicare : it is impossible , or at least certainly very hard , for to iudge iudiciously of those things , wherein a man was neuer yet imployd . but that which hath beene a mans office , and continuall exercise , in this he must needs be wise , and cannot choose but speake well to the point . quilibet adea idoneus est , in quibus sapit ( saith plato ) . some there are , that are wise , but ( like the troians ) too late ; they know what is to be done , but are too long in doing it ▪ and therefore it is necessary to adde hands to counsell and force to wisedome ; yet still allowing the councell somuch time , as things may come to their true ripenesse and maturitie ; for ( as it is in the prouerbe ) harto prestò se haze lo , que bien se haze : that is quickely done that is well done . and very necessary is that pause and breathing , wherewith kings goe ripening great businesses ; and exceeding fit it is , that they should goe soberly to worke , take time and leasure inough , and that in their consultations they should vse feete of leade , but in the execution of them , hands of steele . which being once well grounded , and both the conueniences , and inconueniences throughly weighed , ( though in these great and weighty affaires , there are neuer some wanting , that will follow that part , which hath least ground for it , and yet perswade themselues that they onely are in the right , and that all the reason in the world is on their side ) let them goe roundly to worke , and after a concluded consultation , let them shew themselues constant in the execution thereof . for , as another philosopher said ; cuncta●ter aggrediendum est negotium , verùm in suscepto , constanter perseuerandum : a maine businesse must haue a slow motion , but when the wheeles are once set a going , they must neuer stand still till it haue finished it's intended worke . and the prophet esay , ioyned the spirit of fortitude , to that of councell . for counsaile little auaileth , that is deuoid of force and strength to execute . vile est consilium ( saith pope gregory ) cui robur fortitudinis deest : that counsaile is vile and base ; that wants true mettall . let counsell i say be slow , & sauour of the lamp , but let the execution , be quicke as lightening . for , as mortall are those wounds , & those diseases , to which remedy is giuen too late , as those , to whom none is giuen at all . to what end therefore ( i pray ) serue your iuntas , vpon iuntas , reference vpon reference , your long and large consultations , your viewings , and reuiewings , if after all this great adoe , all is roll'd and shut vp in paper ? whereas in all reason , nay and right too , how much the more time there hath beene spent in consulting , so much the more speede and force ought to be vsed in execu●ing ▪ for , on good counsaile , and quicke execution , consist your good ends , and all prosperous successe . chap. xiiii . it is demanded by way of question , whether kings ought inuiolably to obserue the foresaid order . art , is natures ape , and imitates her all she can . and by so much the more perfect an artificer , and more cunning workeman is he accounted , who shall seeme to come neerest in his worke to that great master and maker of nature , and whatsoeuer is naturall , wherein ( as hath already beene sayd ) is conserued and kept that firme and constant law , and first commandement , which he imposed vpon all things in the beginning of their creation . who likewise hath , and doth still keepe a wonderfull correspondency in those very things , conseruing them in their operations , working and operating continually by their meanes and helpe , and honouring them with the name and essence of secundary causes , though he himselfe be the primary naturall cause in that working . so hat the fire , hath alwaies perfourmed that office , wherin god placed it , to wit ; to burne , or heate . and when he hath beene pleased to worke these effects , he hath made vse of them for that purpose , as well vpon occasion of his wrath , and chasticement , as of his loue , and cherishment . when he was willing to destroy and consume those cities of sodom and gomorrah , he did not make vse of water but of fire , which he sent among them to execute his iudgement vpon that occasion . and for to regular , and make much of that mirrour of patience iob , and to exercise him in that vertue , ignis cecidit è caelo , & tactas oues , puerosque consumpsit : the fire of god is fallen from heauen , and hath burnt vp the sheepe , and the seruants ; &c. for to throw downe the house , and at one blow to kill all his children , that were met together to make merry , he made vse of the winde . for to drowne the world , he serued himselfe with the water , and in the desert , he drew water out of the rocke , to quench the thirst of his people , and to preserue them from perishing . so that life , death , and health , which god can giue solely of himselfe , yet will he haue it be wrought by the helpe and meanes of those secundary naturall causes . and euen at the day of iudgement he will make vse of all these , for the punishment of the wicked , as we haue it set downe in the booke of wisedome ; et pugnabit cum illo orbis terrarum contrà insensatos : and the world shall fight with him against the vnwise . this order and naturall law , wherewith god conserueth and gouerneth the world , kings ought to imitate and follow in the gouernment of their common-wealths , giuing their ministers iurisdiction and authoritie proportionable to their office , without the which they cannot well exercise the same . and as long as these his ministers shall go on in an orderly course , or shall imitate in their constancie those naturall causes , and shall be punctuall and faithfull in their ministries , the gouernment ought not to be altered or receiue any change . but when they shall faile in their obligation , another order must be taken with them . and therfore i say , that in some cases , the best & surest course that can be taken , is ; that kings proceede after another kinde of manner , by being serued by other ministers , and counsellers that they may comply with that which tends to the seruice of god , and the good of their kingdomes . especially , when ( as hath bin said ) ministers abuse that power which is giuen them & make it the meanes to afflict the good , and to doe other wrongs and iniuries . and this , the sacred scripture teacheth vs in that history of daniel , where it is reported , that when shadrach , and his two companions were cast into the fiery fournace , the kings ministers caused the fournace to be heated so hot , that the flames of fire ascended some . cubits high . but by how much the more power the fire had for to burne those innocent children in that occasion , by somuch the more to the greater astonishment of the standers by , god slaked the force thereof , causing that in that very place , where for to consume these saints , the fire was most kindled , a coole fresh ayre entred in , and did refresh them . and the king himselfe , who came to see this wonder told them , that he espied in the companie of these three children a fourth man , which seemed to be like vnto the son of god. for indeed so it was , that this his diuine goodnesses , did not content it selfe with deading the force of that intensiue flame , but made meanes by his angell , to come & free these innocents from that torment . therein , instructing kings , that albeit it be fit , that ordinarily , they should suffer businesse to passe by the hands of those ministers , to whom they belong ; yet when the subiect is extremly wronged , & iniustice offred by them against the innocent , kings ought not to respect the order and ordinary course of law , but to take another course with them , and ( if neede be ) wholy to change and alter it , and in his own proper person , to direct things to their due ends , taking from the fire it 's actiuitie & instead thereof sen●ing a pleasing coole gale of wind , as god did . for experience teacheth vs , that this ill seede or bad race of ministers , makes post-hast , & quickly ouerrunnes a common-wealth , as ill weedes doe a ground , to the great dishonour of kings , and diminution of their credit ▪ and to the notable dammage and destruction of kingdomes . oh how doth it discouer it selfe in these our vnhappy and miserable times , how much more , and how many cubits higher then it was wont , doth the fire of ambition , and auarice , mount in many ministers , who grow by this meanes , to be so great , and so high , that they quite loose the sight of themselues , and goe beyond the reach of their own knowledge , being in a manner besides themselues puft vp with their promotion , and the high places they possesse , seeming to be another kind of men , then they were wont to be . and this their folly and madnesse extends it selfe so farre , that they will not suffer themselues ( forsooth ) to be seene , or knowne , by those , whom not long since ( god he knowes ) they adored as gods , but now are growne so proud , and into so good a conceit of themselues , that they thinke themselues to be something more then men . of these , s bernard giues this admirable good note ; you shall see ( saith he ) many in the chruch of god , as also in kings courts , without noblenesse made noble , and of poore , become rich , to be sodainly puffed vp with pride , forgetting their former estate , to be ashamed of their ancestors , and disdainfull towards their poore kinsefolke , and by a strong hand , and with lyes and falshoods , they seeke and procure that , which nature hath deny'd them , and being not noble by birth , nor innobled by vertue , set a good face on the matter and by such art and cunning as they will vse , would seeme to the world to be great princes , and to be well descended , fetching their feigned pedigrees , as farre as noahs flood : farre vnlike vnto him , who by his vertue came from a potter , to be a king ; who , that he might not forget , whence he came , and yet represent what he was , caused to be set on his court cupboord vessells of earth , with this letter ; haeac fecimus : these we once made ; and vessells of gold , with this other letter ; ista facimus : these we now make . i say , that it is a matter of much importance , ( and i purposly forbeare to speake so much as i know in this point ) for the conseruation of kingdomes . as also how fit it is , that their maiesties , both in regard of that respect which is due vnto kings , and to the right and true administration of iustice , should by their seueritie , temper and moderate the excesse of those , which cloath themselues with the kings royall command , as with a garment , and beare themselues too insolently-high vpon the title of their offices ; and vnder colour and zeale to the seruice of their kings , will make themselues their tutors , masters of their libertie , lords , ouer their vassalls , and sole commanders of the whole kingdome like vnto that great leuiathan , or huge whale in the sea , of whom holy iob saith ; before his face , is pouertie , and want , for he spoyleth and deuoureth all that stands in his way , and trusteth that he can draw vp iordan into his mouth . chap. xv. whether it be fitting for kings , to vse much the remitting of businesses ? although in the former chapter something hath beene spoken , which may tend to this question , yet shall it be necessary to answer heere thereunto in a more direct and clearer manner . and howbeit the word , remitting , or referring , doth seeme to notifie the care and poruidence , which a prince oweth vnto businesses , certaine it is , that it shall well beseeme him , sometimes so to doe . for , amongst many other the miseries of humane nature , this is one , that it's forces , as well internall , as externall , as well of the soule , as of the body are much limited , and restrained , and haue much need of many helpes . wherefore i say , that kings not being able ( as they are not ) to attend of themselues so many businesses as howerly occurre , nor to comprehend so great variety and difference of things , they ought to remit some , nay many of them , to persons deputed for their ease , and discharge of their consciences . let a king examine those businesses , which are fit to be reserued for himselfe . and those that h● cannot , let him remit them vnto others , because of himselfe he is not able to dispatch all of them . and in fauour of this doctrine , we haue iethro's counsaile to his sonne in law moses . who seeing him so ouer imployed in the businesses of his people to his intollerable trouble , said vnto him ; stulto labore consumeris , elige tibi viros , &c. thou wearyest thy selfe greatly , and this people that is with thee , prouide thee men , &c. i neede not repeate all vnto you , hauing spoken thereof largely heeretofore . i shall now therefore represent vnto you , that there are two kinds of remitting . the one for to vnloade himselfe of that charge and trouble , that he may liue himselfe at ease , and out of his authoritie lay the burthen vpon others , and command them to end such or such a businesse . which is now too commonly vsed and practised . for euery one , as much as in him lyes , striues to be superiour in this kind ; taking that to himselfe which is most p●easing , and easiest for him , and remitting the hardest and harshest to other mens hands , and hence it hapneth , that from the first remitting the king makes , your poore negocian●s , like so many tennis balls are tost from one to another . nay , their fortune is farre worse ; for the ball which is racketed by the one player , the other with great nimblenesse ▪ and care , runnes forth to receiue it : but the poore negociant , who in these remitments , serues in steed of the ball , they doe not onely not receiue him readily , but shut the doore vpon him , obliging him to solicite his entrance , one while by fauour , another while by giftes . and although this be too vsuall a practise in all tribunalls ; and with all iudges and vpon all differences of businesses , yet is it there most practised , where matters of goods , and titles of lands are treated , wherein the pretenders doe not only sweate and take a great deale of paines , but are forced to pay as much for the dispatch of . marauedis , as if they were so many ducats . and this may be confirmed with the example of a poore honest widow , who ( as it is well known ) spent much time , and that little mony which she had , in negociating the dispatch of a small debt . and when , after a long and tedious suite , she had at last got an order against her aduersarie , yet was she neuer the neerer getting of her money , for that it was ordred in court , that shee should be payd out of such rents , which vpon some pre-morgage , or some other cunning conueiance , could not be recouered . these remittings , i doe not finde how they can be defended , or salued in the sacred scripture . but there are many reasons for the condemning of them , and for the obliging of kings to referre them . the other kinde of remitting , is ▪ when either the order and qualitie of the businesse , or the lawfull impediment of him that remitteth , doth so require it . for which we haue our sauiour christs warrant in that admirable conuersion of the blessed apostle s. paul. for albeit he himselfe , by his powerfull hand threw him downe from of his horse , and made him so farre forth to yeeld himselfe his , that he vttered these wordes so full of submission ; domine , quid me vis facere ? lord , what wilt thou , that i doe ? yet did he not then giue him a present absolute dispatch , but remitted him ouer to another disciple , which was named ananias . it being held fit it should be so for those reasons which are rendred by the saints , and holy fathers . the like course hee tooke with cornelius the centurion in that great businesse of his saluation , putting him ouer to s. peter . and when he saw the petition of those ten lepers , who besought him , that he would make them whole ; how beit he granted them their request for the recouery of their health , yet did he remit them ouer to the priests , and commanded them to present themselues before them , because in those kinde of infirmities , they were to be arbitrary iudges , what was to be done in that case . and to the disciples of iohn baptist which he sent vnto him , when he was in prison , to the end that they might informe themselues who he was , and whether it was he that should come , or were to looke for another ? he remitted them backe to their master with this answer ; ite , renunciate ioanni , quae audistis , & vidistis : goe and shew iohn what things yee heare and see . as he should haue said , for as much as iohn is my voice , by him is the truth to be declared , which you seeke after touching the diuinitie of my person . all these remittings were plaine , and dispatched without reply ; and those doubtlesse condemned , which are now daily vsed , passing things ouer from one to another , as if men were to deale with children , who asking a companie of them , that are playing together ; is your mother at home ? all make answer ; this boy can tell you , or that other boy can tell you . so that many mens liues are ended , before their businesses can be ended . their suites growing older then them selues ; wasting both their wealth , and their persons to no purpose . it is recounted in the acts of the apostles ; that they being so busily imployed in the preaching of the gospell that they could not ioyntly with it attend those workes of charitie , and almes-deedes , which were exercised in the primitiue church , by feeding those that were conuerted , they did remit the care thereof to seuen deacons chosen out from amongst them all for that ministrie . and heere is to be confidered a point of doctrine of great importance . that the apostles ( as there it is mentioned ) albeit they saw what a great charge they had , and how much trouble with daily preaching , and continuall praying , they did neither omit , nor remit this businesse , but were wonderfull carefull , that those to whom this care was remitted , should be persons of great approbation , and fulfilled with the holy ghost , and with wisdome , as were s. steu●n , and others , which were elected , and ioyned in commission with him . considerate ergo , fratres , viros ex vobis boni testimonij septem , plenos spiritu sancto , & sapientia , quos constituamus super hoc opus , &c. wherefore brethren , looke you out among you seuen men of honest report , and full of the holy ghost , and of wisdome , which we appoint to this businesse . which is a lesson for kings , that when they vnderstand , that the persons , to whom they vseto remit businesses , are not such as they ought to be , either for their want of wisdome , or experience in those things , or that their minde is not cleare and free from passion , & couetousnesse , they in no manner of wise discharge their consciences in making such remitments and references , but ought rather to reserue the dispatch therof vnto themselues , or to remit them to such ministers , that are able to giue good satisfaction therein , and of whose goodnesse and sufficiencie , the world rendreth publicke testimony . in a word , i am of opinion , that to remit businesses , is a matter of necessity , in regard of the shortnesse of our vnderstanding , which is imbroiled and mightily hindred with this multiplicitie of affayres , and oftentimes choaked and stifled , and made defectiue in those matters , that are most necessary . and as for our bodily strength , the force thereof is so small , and so weake , that we had neede to preserue the same , by easing it of that burthen , which is too heauy for it to beare . yet withall there must a great care be had , that these remitmen●s , be not made meerely , that the king might liue at ease , and be idle , but because weighty businesses , and such as haue neede of new examination , and new diligencies , doe require it ; or because the king ( as already hath beene sayd ) may haue some lawfull impediment . let kings haue recourse vnto god , and he will illighten them , and their faces shall not suffer confusion , nor their kingdomes see alterations , ruines , nor destructions . erudimini , qui iudicatis terram : be wise therefore yee kings ; be learned , yee iudges of the earth . chap. xvi . of the sence of the sight ; that is : of those businesses , which kings ought to reserue for their own view , and dispatch with their owne hands . aristotle saith that the soule is , quod ad modum omnia , in a manner all things , in regard of the vnderstanding , which in it comprehendeth all whatsoeuer . and the same may likewise be said of the sence of the fight , wherin is cyphred the greatnesse of the vniuerse , for therein is inclosed all whatsoeuer is visible in the world , as the heauens , the earth , elements , birdes , plants , beastes , &c. and all that ( be it more , or lesse ) enters into our soule by this doore . it is the most principal part of the head , the most artificiall , & the most excellent , and most precious of all other the sences ; because it 's action is more liuely and spirit-full , and giues vs more to know and vnderstand the differences of things . by the eyes , are manifested a great part of the affections , and passions of the minde . in oculis animus inhabitat : the mindes habitation ( saith pliny ) is in the eyes . in them is seated clemencie , mercy , anger , hatred , loue , sorow , ioy , and the like . ex visu , cognoscitur vir : we may know a man by his lookes . as whether he be wise , or foolish ; simple , or malitious ; &c. these , are those windowes , by which the light entreth into the vnderstanding ; and which shew the good , or bad disposition both of body , and soule . and there are not some wanting , who affirme , that they are the first , which god , and nature delineate and paint forth in that tender paste and soft dough of the creature , as being the most principall , the most beutifull , and the most delicate . and therefore that diuine artizan , did place a greater gard about that for it's safetie , then about all the rest . and therfore aristotle saith ; that we make more reckoning of this sence , then of all the other . it 's site , or place , which is the highest and most eminent in the head , doth declare it's greater dignitie , and is in man , as is the sunne , and moone , in the world . quod sol , & luna in coelo , hoc sunt oculi in homine ( saith s. ambrose ) . the vse of the sight is two-fold . one materiall , and grosse , which only attendeth things , as they thus materially represent themselues , without making any farther discourse , or consideration ; and this kind of seeing is common to all creatures both rationall , and irrationall , indowed with or without reason . the other is more eleuated , and more spirituall , and flies a higher pitch , as when it discernes things with aduice , and discourse , and when it perceiues what that is , that it sees , and this appertaineth onely vnto man. but in kings , and those that are good gouernours , the consideration thereof must extend it selfe a great deale farther ; as to treate of the remedy , which those things require , and stand in neede of , which they haue seene . but not like those kings , that visited holy iob , who although they saw him , and were seuen dayes with him , yet did they not see , what they saw ; my meaning is , that albeit they did see the great affliction , and extreme miserie , wherein poore iob was , their eyes passed it slightly ouer , they did not dwell vpon it , nor tooke any course to giue him remedie . and when this is not done , their seeing , is no seeing , but are like vnto those spoken of by the psalmist ; that haue eyes , and see not , dull idolls . to this purpose , there is a prety place in the first of the machabees , where , after the author hath made report , of the great wickednesse , and tyrannies , which that accursed king antiochus , and his ministers , exercised in ierusalem , and in other cities and townes of the kingdome of iudaea , of that great captaine mattathias , and his fiue sonnes , hee speaketh thus ; hi vederunt mala , quae fiebant in populo iuda , & in ierusalem which the vulgar renders thus , now when they saw the blasphemies , which were committed in iuda and ierusalem . these ( saith he ) saw the euills , that were committed in ierusalem ; and my thinkes here must the question be asked , why all they of that common-wealth , suffering so many oppressions , and so many afflictions , in their houses in their own persons , & those of their children , onely mattathias , and his sonnes , are here said to haue seene these euills , and these blasphemies ? the answer hereunto , makes notably for our purpose , because it expresseth that , which we go inforcing , ●to wit , that to see businesses , is truely and properly , to vnderstand them , and to put our helping hand vnto them . and because mattathias , and his sonnes , were the onely men that were sensible of the hard measure they receiued , and the first that rose vp , and opposed themselues against the furie of the tyrant , for the remedying their so many and so great calamities , that sacred historian saith , that they onely had eyes , and saw the affliction of gods people . this kinde of sight best be fitteth kings , as they are heads of their kingdomes and common-wealthes , and it is likewise necessary , that they haue their sight , large , cleare , and sharpe , that they may reach to see euen those things , that are most secret , and most remote , as doth that princely birde the eagle , which houering aloft in the ayre descryes the fishes , that are in the deepe : or be like vnto that maiesticall creature the lyon , who both waking , and sleeping , keepes his eyes open . the holy ghost saith ; that a wise man hath his eyes in his head . sapientis oculi in capite eius . and it seemeth , that by contrapositions , he would giue vs thereby to vnderstand , that a foole hath his eyes in his feete . which as they discouer but little , so are they lyable to a thousand offences , and deceits . but the wise man beholds from high and as from a watch-tower discouers things a farre off ; and is thereby better able to take notice of them , and more punctually to comply with his obligation to the state , and to that which neede shall require in those accidents that may occurre . this is that sight , which ( as before hath beene said ) befitteth kings , for that they are the heads of their common-wealths , and therefore are to reserue for their own view those the more weighty businesses of their subiects ; there being a great deale of reason , that they should see them ( as they say ) with their owne eyes . for this end , are those visitations ordayned , and those entrances in state , which kings are wont to make into the cities , and prouinces of their kingdomes . when the arrogant and vaine presumption of men grew to that passe , that for to celebrate their name , they went about to build that proud tower of babel , with intent to touch euen heauen it selfe with the top thereof , and to liue free from all feare of a second ●lood , that sacred historie tells vs ; descendit autem dominus vt videret ciuitatem , & turim , quam aedificauerint filij adam : that the lord came downe to see the citie and tower , which the sonnes of men builded . god came down himself to see this their so great insollencie that he might punish them accordingly , as he did with such a confusion of languages , that one could not vnderstand another , and were amongst themselues , as so many strangers , without being able to communicate and conuerse together ; so that they were driuen to diuide themselues into different countries , and were scattred from thence vpon all the earth . and in the said historie of genesis , we read , that when that abhominable filthines of the sodomites , grew to that highth of impudencie , that it prouoked god vnto wrath , and in a manner bound him to consume them with fire from heauen , he vttered vnto abraham these words worthy the noting : clamor sodomorum & g●morrhaeorum multiplicatus est , & peccatum eorum aggrauiatum est nimis . descendam , & videbo , vtrum clamorem , qui venit ad me , opere compleuerint , an non est ita , vt sciam : because the cry of sodome and gomorrha is great , and because their sinne is exceeding grieuous , i will goe downe now and see , whether they haue done altogether according to the cry , which is come vnto me ; and if not , that i may know . as if he should haue sayd ; howbeit the abomination of these accursed sodomites and gomorrhaeans , hath so farre increased , that it doth cry aloud vnto me for vengeance and chasticement , and hath pierced the heauens , and come vnto mine eares , yet notwithstanding , ( because it is a thing that concernes a whole common-wealth , and a busines of that weight , as to deserue exemplary punishment , ) i will goe downe and see , whether it be so or no , as the report goes of it . though most certaine it is , that god hath no need to come downe from heauen , to take a particular viewe of the things of this world , for he is present in all places , here , & there , and euery where , he filleth all , seeth all , and with his infinite wisedome comprehendeth all . but the scripture speakes in this kinde of language , that it may accommodate it self to the stile and capacitie of men , for to instruct kings in this place , that graue and weighty businesses , they are not to transferre them ouer vnto others , but of , and by themselues to see and looke vnto them , nor ought they too be to facile in giuing credit to fame , and report ( especially of the vulgar ) without hauing first fully informed himselfe thereof , and that by themselues they should be able to dis-deceiue themselues , and to see , and consider things with attention , and with a desire to search out the truth , and to rectifie what is amisse . in the kingdomes of castile , there is a very commendable custome and of great authoritie , and maiestie , worthy those most prudent kings which first ordeyned it . and this is that consult● , which euery friday towards the euening , the president of castile makes with those of his maiesties councell royall , wherein an account is giuen vnto his maiestie of all the weightiest businesses , and wherein the opinion and the authoritie royall is necessarie . and this is not without example in the sacred scripture . for in the first chapter of deut. it is written ; that when that great law-giuer moses had named for good and quicke dispatch such counsellours ( as before specified ) giuing them in charge what they were to keepe and obserue , and how to administer iustice with equalitie , and without exception of persons , he told them ; quod si difficile vobis visum aliquid fuerit , referte ad me & ego audiam . the cause that is too hard for you , bring vnto me , and i will heare it , you shall consult with me in that case , that i may heare it , and take such course therein as is fitting . and if to this so commendable a consulta of euery friday weekely , there should bee added another meeting some certaine dayes in the yeare , to the end that the president , and those of the kings camaera , should carry with them the consulta of the offices , and should treate and conferre thereof by word of mouth with our lord the king , it would be one of the most important things ( in the iudgement and opinion of many graue men , whom i haue consulted with in this particular ) that could be or-ordained for the good of these kingdomes . whereby many of those inconueniences would be auoyded , which wise and christian counsellours haue found out by many yeares experience . and none of the meanest ( amongst the rest ) is the remitting by writing so weightie and important a thing , as the election of officers , recommending the same to a dead letter , which can make no replie . and that paper , which passeth through so many hands , cannot come so clean , as it shuld but be sullyed , especially if it come to such hands as are not clean , but corrupted with gifts , & presents . and because this course is taken , the loue & respect due to their kings is lost , who like creatures to their creator , ought to acknowledge althat thev hau● from his hands . wheras now , they giue this respect vnto his maiesties ministers , with whom they haue held correspondency , as knowing that their prouision must solely passe through their hands , and that their good or bad dispatch consistes in them , or in a lesse full , or more effectuall relation , inclosed in the paper of their consulta . which cannot be carryed thus , when the president , and those of the camera shall haue propounded the same , and deliuered their opinions in the presence of their king. and questionlesse , they that by this meanes shoul● be prouided for , would esteeme in more , and treat with more punctuality and truth , the things appertaining to his office , considering that the king himselfe taketh particular knowledge of them . for ( as we said before ) it is very meete and conuenient , that kings should know , and communicate with , if not all , yet at least those , who are to be placed in your greater kinde of offices , and dignities . and amongst a●l other businesses , this is that , which with most reason doth require the kings eyes and presence , his remembrance , and mature counsaile ; for such are the citizens as are their gouernours , and the parishioners , as their pastors . and though this perhaps cannot be performed so punctually and precise●y , as were to be wished , yet at least it will be needfull , that those persons , of whom they take testimonie , and receiue information in so graue and weighty a busines , should be of that prudence , learning , and authoritie , and so beyond all exception , that the world , ( which is apt to take exceptions ) may be perswaded , that the election could not but be passing good , being that it past through such iudicious mens hands . for , whatsoeuer shall come forth decreed by them , it is not fitting , that it should bee subiect to their censures , who either haue not the said qualities , or are much inferiour in them , or faile in their zeale to god , or their loyaltie and loue , to their king being narcissus-like , inamoured with their owne shadow , and led away with the blindnesse of their passion . woe be vnto that common-wealth , king , and kingdome , where one out of blindnesse , or selfe willfull-nesse , shall vndoe that , which other men haue done with many , and those the clearest eyes . for ( as the wise man saith ) vnus acdificans , & vnus destruens , quid prodest illis , nisi labor ? when one buildeth , and another breaketh downe , what profit haue they then but labour ? chap. xvii . hee prosecuteth the same matter and shewes , how kings ought to carry themselues , towards those , that finde themselues aggrieued ? hauing spoken of some cases , reserued for kings , and such as require their sight and presence , it here now offers it selfe in this place , to know how a king ought to carry himselfe towards those that finde themselues iniuryed and aggrieued . and in the opinion of vnderstanding people , it seemeth , that nothing is more properly his , then to quit wrongs , and remooue iniuries . for , if we shall but consider that first beginning which kings had , that which the ancient said of them , and that which the holy scripture teacheth vs , wee shall finde , that this occupation is very properly theirs , and that this care appertaines of right to their greatnesse . that most wise king salomon , in the fourth of ecclesiastes , saith ; that when he saw the teares of the innocent , and the wrongs they receiued , and no body to helpe them , or to speake so much as a good word for them , it seemed a thing more terrible vnto him , then to dye , or neuer to haue beene borne . vidi calumnias quae sub caelo geruntur , & lachrymas innocentium , & neminem consolatorum , neque posse resistere eorum violentiae , cunctorum auxilio destitutos , & laudaui magis mortuos , quàm viuentes , & foeliciorem vtroque iudicaui , qui nec dum natus est . i turned and considered all the oppressions that are wrought vnder the sunne ; and behold the teares of the oppressed , and none comforteth them ; and loe the strength is of the hand of them , that oppresse them , and none comforteth them : wherefore i praised the dead , which now are dead , aboue the liuing which are yet aliue ; and i count him better then them both , which hath not yet beene . and not onely king salomon , but euen god himselfe was so highly offended with those wrongs and oppressions , which the children of israel suffred in egypt , that he thought it a thing worthy his presence , and his comming downe from heauen to see the same with his own eyes . vidi afflictionem populi mei in egypto , & clamorem eius audiui propter duritiem eorum , qui praesunt operibus et sciens dolorem eius , descendi , vt liberem eum . i haue seene the trouble of my people , which are in egypt , and haue heard their crie , because of their taske-masters ; and for i know their sorrowes , therefore i am come downe to deliuer them , &c. teaching kings , that in matter of grieuances , and oppression of the innocent , they are not content to themselues , with remitting them ouer vnto others , but to looke thereunto themselues ; and ( if need were ) to come from forth their princely pallaces , and to forgoe for a while their pleasures and their ease , till they haue reformed what is amisse . the first words the diuine scripture storieth , which the first king , whom god chose for his people , said , were these , quid habet populus , quod plorat ? what ayleth this people , that they weepe ? who no soner saw himselfe crowned king , and put by gods hand into the possession of that kingdom , but applying himselfe to that which he ought first of all to doe ( as one of the mainest points of his dutie ) he hearkned vnto the cryes of the people , who were oppressed by the philistims , and with great speede , and feruent zeale , did roundly set himselfe to the redressing of that oppression . and i verily perswade my selfe , that all good kings wou●d doe the like , if they should see their subiects ready to fall into their enemies hands , with whom they wage open warre . but from those more close and secret enemies , which are together with vs subiects , citizens , neighbours , countrymen and ministers of the same kings , and of whom there is held so much trust and confidence , who goes about to free the wronged ? what reparation is there for receiued iniuries ? are they not much greater then those , that the philistims offered to gods people , and more remedilesse ? as for professed enemies , against them we may make open resistance , and euery man , that is not vnnaturall , or a traytour to his country , will put to his helping hand , and seeke to repell force by force , & reuenge the wrongs that are done them . but for these our domestick enemies , these our home-borne foes , & feigned friends , who vnder the shew of friendship , and vnder cloake and colour of being the kings ministers , oppresse the poore , and such as haue little power to oppose their greatnesse , who shall be able to resist them ? if he , that suffers , shall pretend to doe it , doth he not put himselfe in manifest danger of suffring much more ? if not of loosing all that hel hath ? and it is worthy your consideration , that in those words related in exodus , it is not said , that god went down to see , and remedy the wrongs which that tyrant king pharaoh did vnto the children of israel , but that which was offred them by his chiefe ministers ; propter duritiem eorum , qui praesunt . for the hard-heartednesse , and cruelty of those , which were set in authoritie ouer them . as if he should haue said , the affronts and iniuries done by a kings principall officers , are not so easily remedyed , as those of particular men . they require a powerfull hand , they require gods presence , and assistance , and will craue a kings especiall care . for your councells cannot doe it , nay are not able for to doe it of themselues alone , be they the greatest and the highest in the kingdom ; be they neuer so zealous of iustice , neuer such true louers thereof , and neuer so desirous to doe right . and the reason therof ( in my poore opinion ) is , for that in regard the burthen of ordinary businesses is so great , that only they are not able to attend the quitting of those agrauios and greiuances , with that speedines and efficacie , as were needefull , but rather that they themselues , without so much as once dreaming thereof , doe vse to make them farre greater then otherwise they would bee , for want of time , and strength of body , to cumply with so many and so great businesses . and it oftentimes so commeth to passe , that those that ●ue for reliefe , in stead of being eased of their wrongs , receiue further wrong , either because they cannot finde fit place and time to be heard , or because being heard , they are soone forgot , or because they that wrong them , finde meanes to couer their faultes . and if they cannot couer them , and so should be lyable vnto punishment , yet they that lent them their hand to lift them vp to the place wherein they are , will likewise lend them a hand to defend their disorders . and it hath beene already , and is yet daily to be seene , that a iudge in commission , who for his wickednesse and euill dealing deserued exceeding great chastisement ; yet , for that he hath this patron and angel of guard ( for in your greater tribunalls , these are neuer wanting ) the businesse is husht , and the party peccant neuer questioned . and because he shall not be disgraced , if the matter proue fowle against him , by putting him out of his place , he that tooke him into his protection , will intercede in his behalfe to haue him remoued from that office , and preferred to a better ; a case certainly worthy both punishment , and remedy , if there be any vpon earth . and if there be any helpe to be had , it must be by the sight and presence of the king , for without this , it is not to be hoped for . the courtes of kings , ( much more then other places ) are full of humane respects , and these haue taken so great a head and are growne so strong , that in businesses they ouerthrow that , which truth and iustice ought to vphold . and therefore my aduise vnto kings is , that being they are men , that are or may be free ( if they will themselues ) from these poore respectiue considerations , and are supreme lords , and absolute soueraignes in their kingdomes , they would be pleased , to dis-agrauiate those that are iniuryed , respecting onely wronged right , and oppressed truth . but because such as are wronged , and finde themselues agrieued , haue not that easie accesse and entrance into princes courtes , or to their persons , either in regard of their great and weighty imployments , or some other lawfull impediments , it shall much importe , that in their courtes , they should haue some person , or persons , of great zeale and approued vertue and prudence to whom those that are agrieued should haue recourse . for many suffer much , that cannot come to be admitted to the sight , or speech of their king , whereas , if there should be a person appointed for to heare their complaints , they would cry out with open mouth for iustice , and should be righted in their receiued wrongs . and that person , or persons thus deputed by their maiesties , hauing first well weighed and examined the reasons of their complaints , should afterwards represent the same vnto their kings , and giue them true information thereof , to the end that they may forthwith by expresse command , put thereunto a speedy and fitting remedie . and this ( i assure you ) would be a great bridle to restraine the insufferable insolencie , and auarice of princes ministers ; who ( questionlesse ) would carry themselues much more fairely and vprightly , when as they shall know , that their disorders shall faithfully be represented ▪ whereas ( on the contrarie ) it is not to be imagined with what a bold , nay impudent daringnes they outface goodnesse , when as they conceiue that of their kings , which was vttred by that vnwise and foolish atheist ; in corde suo non est deus . the foole hath said in his heart , there is no god. or that , which those ignorant and troublesome friends of iob , breathed forth against god himselfe ; circa cardines coeli perambulat , nec nostra considerat . he walketh in the circle of heauen , and the cloudes hide him , that he cannot see , and consider the things vpon earth . or which those other wicked villaines vented ; non videbit dominus , neque intelliget deus iacob . the lord shall not see , neither will the god of iacob regard it . so in like sorte say these bad ministers , tush this shall neuer come to our kings knowledge , hee is taking his pleasure in his gardens , he is thinking on his hawking and hunting , or some other sports and pastimes to recreate himselfe withall ; nor shall tricks , and inuentions be wanting vnto vs to stop vp all the passages to his eares ; but say open way should be made , and that the king should take notice of this , or that misdemeanour , it shall be dawbd vp so handsomely , such a faire varnish set vpon it , and so ful of excuses , that it will be all one , as if he had neuer heard of it , or any such thing bin at all . presuming , that kings , rather then they will be troubled with businesses of clamour and noyse , will ( for their owne ease ) slightly passe them ouer . wherein , as they haue oftentimes found themselues , so it is fit they should still , be deceiued . and truly to no man , can with better title his entrance be giuen , nor this golden key to the kings chamber be committed , then to him , who with the integritie and zeale of an elias , should trample and tread these monsters vnder foote ; and roundly and throughly to take this care to task , which ( without al doubt ) would be one of the gratefullest , and most acceptable seruices , which can be done vnto god both in matter of pietie , and of pitie . but what shall i say of the kings happinesse in this case ? with nothing can he more secure his conscience , then with this . as one who is bound , out of the duty of his place , to haue a watchfull eye ouer all his ministers , but more narrowly and neerely , to looke into the water of those that are the great ones ; being likewise obliged graciously and patiently to heare those , that shall complaine of them , it not proceeding out of spleene and malice , but out of a desire , to iust●fie the truth , to make good a good cause , and that the fault m●y be punished , with whom the fault is truly found . for , when the subiects iust complaints are not heard , besides that his conscience is charged and clogg'd therewith , the ministers themselues become thereby much more absolute , and more insolently imperious ; insomuch that the subiect seeing , that they are neither heard , nor eased of their grieuances , they grow desperate . and what fruites despaire bring forth , i neede not tell kings , that know either men , or bookes . there is not in holy scripture any one thing more often repeated , then the particular care which god hath of the oppressed . in the seuenty second psalme , where the greatnesses of king salomon are set forth , but more particularly those magnificencies of that true king salomon , iesus christ , whose figure he was , amongst other his excellencies , for the which he ought to be much estemed , beloued , and adored of all the kings of the earth , and serued by all the nations of the world , this which followeth is not the least . adorabunt eum omnes reges terrae , omnes gentes seruient ei , quia liberauit pauperem à potente , pa●perem , cui non erat adi●tor . all kings shall worship him , all nations shall serue him . for he shall deliuer the poore , when he cryeth ; the needy also , and him that hath no helper . and in another place he makes the like repetition . e● vsuris , & iniquitate redimet animas eorum ; propter miseriam inop●m , etgemitum pauperum , nunc exurgam dicit dominus . now for the oppression of the needy , and for the sighes of the poore , i will vp ( sayth the lord ) and will set at libertie him , whom the wicked hath snared . and in the first chap. of esay , it seemeth that god doth proclaime a plenary indulgence , and full iubile vnto those kings , and gouernours , who apply themselues to the easing of the oppressed . subuenite oppresso iudicate populo , defendite viduam , et venite arguite me ; dicit dominus , si fuerint peccata vestra vt coccineum , quasi nix dealb ab untur , at si fuerint rubra quasi vermiculus , velut lana , alba erunt . relieue the oppressed , iudge the fatherlesse , and defend the widowe , though your sinnes were as crymson , they sha●l be made white as snow : though they were red like skarlet , they shall be as wool , you see then , that all sinnes are forgiuen that king , that is a louer of iustice , and a friend vnto the poore and needy , that takes paines in relieuing the oppressed , and in defending the widowe , and protecting the distressed . they may stand with god in iudgement , & alleage for themselues his iustice & his righteousnesse , who haue dealt iustly & vprightly with their subiects , and mantained the weake and needy , against those powerfull tyrants , which seeke to swallow them vp , as your greater fishes doe the lesser . qui deuorant plebem meam , si●ut escam panis . who eate vp my people , as they eate b●ead . and howbeit iustice ought to be one and the same both to poore , and rich , yet god doth more particularly recommend vnto their care and charge that of the poore . for ( as it is in the prouerb . quiebra sa soga por lo mas delgado : where the corde is slendrest there it breaketh soonest . for a powerfull man will defend himselfe by his power , and great men by their greatnesse ; and would to god , that they had no more to backe them then a iust defence : for then the poore should not neede to stand in feare of them . but that is now to passeable in these times , which the apostle saint iames found fault with in his . quod di●ites per potentiam opprimunt vos , et ipsi trahunt vos ad iudicium : that the rich oppresse the poore by tyrannie , and draw them before the iudgement-seates . when kings doe cumply with this their obligation , when they free the oppressed , and defend the wronged orphane , and widowe , godsends downe vpon them his light , his grace , and other extraordinary gifts , whereby they and their states , are conserued and maintayned : whose ruine and perdition doth euermore succeede through the default of him that gouerneth : for if kings would gouerne according vnto equitie and iustice , they and their kingdomes should be , as it were , in a manner perpetuall and immortall . for ( as it is in the prouerbs of salomon ) rex , qui indicat in veritate pauperes , thronus eius in aeternum firmabitur : a king , that iudgeth the poore in truth , his throne shall be established for euer . whereas on the contrary , most certaine it is , that the king and kingdome haue but a short continuance , where the iudges and ministers are swayed by passion , and thereby the subiects abused . it is the saying of the holy ghost ; regnum à gente in gentem transfertur propter iniustitias , et iniurias , et contumelias , et dolos : because of vnrighteous dealing , and wrongs , and riches gotten by deceit , the kingdome is transferred from one people to another . no one thing drawes such assured and apparent perils of warre vpon kingdomes , as the wrongs that are done to the poorer sort of subiects . clamor eorum , in aures domini exercituumintroiuit : the cryes of them , haue entred into the eares of the lord of hosts . and there , before his counsell of warre , they present their memorialls , and their petitions , with such a loud language , and discomposed deliuery , that they pierce through his eares , when they call vpon him , saying ; since thou art the lord god of hoasts , raise thou armies both in heauen and earth , and reuenge thou those the open wrongs that are offred vnto vs. and these petitions , commonly finde there such quicke dispatch , that presently hee nominateth captaines , leuieth forces , and formeth a mightie armie of enemies , to disturbe , and destroy that kingdome . and though some may conceiue , that the cause of those and the like troubles , are the crosse incounters of kings and princes amongst themselues , or the greedy desire of warre for spoyle and pillage , which pardoneth no manner of persons , yet in realtie of truth it is not so , but the wrongs of ministers , exercised vpon the poore , the fatherlesse , and the widowe , are the occasion , that huge and powerfull hostes of enemies , in their reuenge , enter the gates of a kingdome and make wast and hauocke thereof . for this cause were the amalechites captiuated , and put to the sword , and for the same likewise the soldiers entred into iudaea , and sackt it . whence we draw this cleare and conclusiue truth , that the best and the safest course to conserue a kingdome , to gaine others , and to abound in riches , is ; to vndoe wrongs done , not to dissemble iniuries , to punish thefts and robberies , and to execute iustice towards all . iuitium viae bonae , facere institiam : the first step to goodnesse , is to doe iustice. for without it , the foot that sets forward , falls backward ; and a king hath not where withall to relye on his power , his forces , his wisedome , and experience in gouernment , if he be defectiue in this . for kingdomes last no longer , then iustice lasteth in them . and true it is , that there is no winde shut vp in the bowells of the earth , which causeth therein such violent effects of earth-quakes , as in those kingdomes , which thinke themselues surest and firmest doe the complaints , and greiuous sighes of the wronged poore . and therefore let none whatsoeuer , be they kings , great ministers , or counsellours of state , slightly reckon of the cries of the poore ; for they referring their reuenge to god , they draw him downe from heauen to right their quarrell . and the basest , and most barbarous man in the world , when he sees himselfe wronged , and can finde none vpon earth to pleade his cause , or to doe him right , he presently lifts vp his eyes vnto heauen , and makes his addresse vnto god , assuring himselfe that his helpe will come from thence . and it was well said of a wise man ; that the wronged are like vnto those that are ready to be drowned , who if they fasten vpon any thing , neuer let it goe : so these men , when they are in danger to be sunke by being forcibly kept vnder water by the oppressours hand , lay fast hold on complaints , cryes , sighes , and teares , as the last remedy allotted them by god ; who saith : that he will heare the petitions , and receiue the memorialls of the afflicted , which are written with teares . a maxilla enim a scendunt vsque ad caelum . for from the cheeke , they ascend vp to heauen . they trill downe the cheekes , till they fall to the ground , and from thence they mount vp as high as heauen : for being water , they rise as much as they fall . and when god sees they haue reason on their side , and that they onely call vnto him for iustice , ( it being so proper an attribute vnto him ) in the end he grants , and signes their request . nor is it much , that he should shew them this fauour , his bowells being moued to compassion , in seeing his creatures in such extremities of affliction . let kings therefore beware and take heede , and their ministers bethinke themselues ; that in such a case , an inundation of teares , is of more force , and more danger , then that of the swiftest torrent vpon a mighty flood . chap. xviii . of the sense of hearing ; and of the audiences , which kings ought to giue . pvrsuing stil the metaphore of the head , whereon hitherto we haue insisted , occasion is now offred vnto vs , to treat of the sense of hearing , which hath some certaine excellencies aboue the rest . for thereby we come to vnderstand the hidden secrets of the heart , and the most inward thoughts of the soule ; which being clad and apparrelled with that out-side , and exterior part , the voyce , and put vpon the hearing of that person , with whom we talke and discourse , it knoweth that , which the vnderstanding of neither men , nor angels once is able to comprehend . and that which we haue spoken of the sence of the sight ought likewise to be said of this , for as far forth as is the perceiuing of a voyce , or some other noyse , or sound by the hearing , so farre is it common as well to brutes beastes , as to men. but it is proper only vnto man , by hearing a significatiue voyce , to discourse thereof , and to vnderstand the inward conceipt of him that speaketh . and from hence will we draw , what ought to be heard by the head of a common-wealth : who is not onely to content himselfe with hearing the bare externall voyce , but to heare it in such maner as the holy scripture telleth vs , god heareth the voyces of those , which call vpon him in the time of their trouble , which is a vsuall and plaine kinde of language in the diuine writt . and when it is sayd , that god heareth vs , it is ioyntly sayd , that he graunteth our petition ; whereof many testimonies are found in the psalmes of dauid , and in diuerse other places . cùm inuocarem , exaudiuit me deus iustitiae meae . dominus exaudiet me , cum clamauero ad cum , &c. the god of my righteousnesse heard me , when i called vpon him . and anone after . the lord will heare , when i call vnto him . in the twentie one of genesis , it is there twice repeated , that god heard the voyce of agars childe , who was abrahams bond-woman , which the mother had left all alone in the wildernesse of bersheba vnder a certaine tree , and sitting downe ouer against him a farre off about a bow-shoote , that shee might not see him perish for want of water . dixit enim non videbo morien●em puerum ; for shee said ; i will not see the death of the childe . in the very next verse following a double mention is made , that god heard the voyce of the childe : which was in effect to say , that he did releiue him , and refresh his thirsty sou●e , and granted that , which the infant , and his mother desired . and the apostle saint paul , in that epistle which hee wrote to the hebrewes saith of our sauiour christ ; that , offerens preces ad deum cum clamore valido , et lachrymis , exauditus est pro sua reuerentia . offring vp prayers and supplications to god the father , with strong crying , and teares , he was also heard in that which he feared . which was all one , as if he should haue said , that his father dispatcht him , and granted what he petitioned in that his prayer . so that in rigour of holy writ , gods hearing , and gods granting , is all one . but in that common commerce with men , and in that style , which kings and their ministers vse , it is not so . for they heare , and hearing answer , that they haue heard that , which they neuer meane to grant . and there is no worse answer for a suitor , then to make this answer to his petition , that it hath beene heard . and it is very fit , that they should reply in this kinde of phrase : for thereby is giuen to be vnderstood the great obligation they haue to heare , as well those that haue iustice , as those that pretend to haue it , although they haue it not . in signification whereof , the two eares are placed on the two contrarie sides of the head , one opposite to the other , because affording one eare to the plaintiffe , we must reserue the other for the defendant . and because god would haue it so , that hearing should be the ordinary meanes for the receiuing of the diuine light , and attaining to the knowledge of those supreme truthes , by so superexcellent and high a gift , as that of faith , quomodo credent ei , quem non crediderunt ? how shall they beleeue in him , of whom they haue not heard ? ) as also , that kings may haue an intire light of humane truthes , it is requisite , that they should lend a willing eare to those that cra●e audience of them . for in this sense , of all other ( saith saint bernard ) truth hath it's seate , and mansion . in auditu veritas : truth is in hearing . and in example of this , hee alleageth that which passed betwixt good old isaac , and his two sonnes esau , and iacob ; who by reason of his olde age , fayling very much in all the rest of his senses , that of his hearing continued still in it's full perfection : the other deceiu'd him , and this onely told him the truth . vox quidem vox iacob , manus autem , manus sunt esau. the voyce is iacobs voyce , but the hands are the hands of esau. wherein he was out . in gods schoole , where faith isprofessed , great reckoning is made of hearing . quia fides , ex auditu . because faith comes by hearing . for a man may heare , and beleeue , though he cannot see . but in the schoole of the world , we must haue all these ( and all is little inough ) we must see , heare , and beleeue : and when kings haue both seene , and heard , and throughly informed themselues of the whole state of the busines , that they may not be deceiued in their iudgement , then let them presently proceede to touch it ( as we say ) with the hand , to fall roundly to worke , and in that maner and forme , as shall seeme most fitting , to finish , and make an end of it . dominus de coelo in terram aspexit , vt audiret gemitus compeditorum &c. the lord looked downe from the height of his sanctuary . out of the heauen , did the lord behold the earth , that he might heare the mourning of the prisoner , and deliuer the children of death . this looking downe of the lord from the highest heauens , and from the throne of his glory , vpon the earth , to heare the grieuous gro●nings , and pitifull complaints of poore wretched creatures , which call and cry vnto him for iustice ; should ( my thinkes ) be an admirable good lesson for kings , that they should loose somewhat of their sportes and recreations , and of that which delighteth the eye and the eare , to bestow them both on those , who humb●y petition him , that he will be pleased to both see , and heare their cause . of philip king of macedon ( though some put it vpon demetrius ) it is reported by plutarke in his life , that going one day abroad to take his pleasure and pastime , an olde woman came vnto him , & besought him to heare her , and to do her iustice. but he excusing himselfe , and telling her , he was not now at leysure to heare her , shee made answer . proinde , nec rex quidem esse velis ▪ sir , if you be not at leysure to heare your subiects , & will not giue them leaue to speake vnto you , leaue to be king ; for there is no reason he should be a king , that cannot finde a time to cumply with his dutie . conuinced with this reason , without any more adoe , he presently gaue a gracious audience not onely to her , but many moe besides . for kings , which doe not heare , by consequence do not vnderstand ; and not vnderstanding they cannot gouerne ; and not gouerning , they neither are , nor can be kings . the cretans , painted their god iupiter without eares , because he was that supreme king , that gaue lawes , and iudged all . and therefore ought to cary an equall eare , & indifferently to heare all parties after one and the same selfe manner . other some , did allow him eares , but so placed them withall , that they might heare those least , that were behinde him ; which was held a fault in their god ; as likewise it is in king ; not to heare any but those that stand before them , or side by side are still weighting at their elbow . kings should heare as many as they possibly can , and ( which is the onely comfort of suitors ) in that gratious and pleasing kinde of maner that no man should depart discontented from their feete , being a maine fundamentall cause , to make all men to loue , reuerence , and esteeme them ; and likewise to oblige princes , to lend the more willing and patient eare to their subiects . and of this subiect , pliny , in commendation of his emperour traiane , tells vs , that amidst so many cares of so great an empire as his was , he spent a great part of the day in giuing audience , and with such stilnes and quietnes , as if he had beene idle , or had nothing to doe . and that he knowing the content that his subiects tooke in their often seeing of him , and speaking with him , so much the more liberally , and longer , he afforded them occasion and place , for to inioy this their content . for nothing doth so much please , and satisfie the heart of a prince , as to conceiue , that he is beloued , and generally well affected of all his subiects . let a king then , ( this course being taken ) perswade himselfe , that his people loueth him , and desireth to see him , and to speake dayly ( if it were possible ) with him . and that they take a great deale of comfort , that they haue seene him , and he heard them . and that of two things which all desire , to wit ; to be heard , and relieued ; the first , intertaines , and comfortes the suitor ; and makes him , with a cheerefull minde , to hope well of the second . let him heare , though it be but as he passes by from place to place , and let him not let any day passe , without giuing ordinary audience at a set hower , and for a set time . and in case any shall require a more particular and priuate audience , a gods name , let him grant it them ; for euery one of these ( to conceiue the worst ) cannot deceiue him aboue once ; and it is to be supposed , that they will not be so vnciuill , or so foolishly indiscreete , as to craue the kings priuate eare , but in a case of necessitie , or where there is some especiall cause , or extraordinary reason for it . and i farther affirme , that audience being giuen in this maner , things will be carryed more smoothly , and with more ease on either part ; for that which breakes down your damn's in your riuers , is the detention of the water . and the detayning of a subiect from the presence & speech of his king , is that which doth dishearten , and deiect the mindes of your negociants , and supplicants . and when they see they so seldome haue audience , and are put off from day to day , and that it costes them so deare before they can be heard , they will , while they may , make vse of that present occasion , and then they talke world without end , and neuer giue ouer , because they are afraid they shall neuer haue the like opportunitie againe . but when those suit●rs shall know that they shall haue ordinary hearing , on such dayes , and such a set houre , and for so long a time , they will content themselues , with giuing much lesse trouble to their owne tongues , and his maiesties eares . in a word , no man will denie , but say with me , that it is iust and meete , that he , that is to rule , and remedy all , ought likewise to heare all and that all men should know as much ; for , for the good , and hope thereof , they principally obay , and loue their king. and besides , a great part of that concurse , and tedious trouble of negociants , will by this meane , be cut off . for , vnlesse it be in case of necessitie , or some extraordinary occasion , no man ( i assure my selfe ) will be so vnmanerly as to offer to weary and tire out his king. for it is naturally inbred in all , to feare and respect greatnesse , and therefore will not cause molestation to so great a maiestie but when they cannot finde any other meanes to negociate . in conclusion , facile audience in kings , is such a vertue , as doth supply ( and that with a great deale of aduantage ) the defect of many other vertues . and where there is no neede of that supply , it serues to giue a greater luster and perfection to the rest , the subiect not hauing any other thing , that he more craueth from , or desireth in his king. and questionlesse , vse and custome , will make it more easie , though at first it may seeme somewhat troublesome vnto him . king antigonus , who was father to the great demetrius , was a proud , ambitious , couetous , cruell , and effeminate prince , and yet notwithstanding all these vices , and other his weakenesses and infirmities , his subiects did beare with them , and did truly serue and obay him , because he did neuer refuse to giue them audience , gaue them kinde and faire answeres , suffred himselfe to bee seene often of them , and did neuer shew to any man a frowning looke , or discontented countenance . this facile giuing of audience , doth bring likewise with it another benefit not so well vnderstood perhaps , as it ought to be , by kings and their fauourites . which is : that thereby they receiue the priuate aduertisements of particular persons in such a conuenient time and season , as is fitting for them . for , in negociating , by retarding this audience , either the occasion is ouersl●pt , or he wearyed out , that should aduertise . and because the aduertiser , ( as there is great reason for it ) would be ●oath that another man should goe away with the thankes and gratification , which is due vnto himselfe for his care and diligences vsed therein , he will negociate it by his owne , rather then anothers meanes , that he may not loose both his thankes , and his labour . and because many times this aduertiser , either dareth not or holdeth it not fit , to trust a paper therewith or other mens eares , all this may easily be excused with a facile audience . king ass●erus , by knowing in time the treason which was plotted against him , by bigthan and teresh , two of his eunuches , which kept the doore , had his life thereby preserued . and publicola , the roman consull saued his country , by preuenting in time the conspiracie of tarquinius , by giuing easie accesse and audience to vindicius , an ordinary seruing man , who bewrayed vnto him the treason of the aquilij , and vitellij , together with brutus his sonnes . and the like successe had pelopidas amongst the grecians , ( as you may reade in plutarke ) where he much recommendeth in either of them , both publicola , and pelopidas , their kinde and courteous vsing of men , when they came to speak with them , and the easie and patient eare they had from them . whereas on the contrary , diuerse princes haue vtterly ouerthrowen themselues and their kingdomes by their hardnesse and harshnesse in this kinde , and haue lost many a great and faire occasion , because they would not heare , and examine in time those aduertisements which were giuen them , & recommended to their better consideration . last of all , admit that this should not be altogether so iust and conuenient a course as i haue here deliuered vnto you , yet notwithstanding , because all men wish & desire it , my thinks this one consideration , in all good reason of state should suffice , to haue it be held , to be both iust , and conuenient . for it is not possible that all both good and bad , should erre in this desire . and i dare be bold to say , that all doe hunger and thirst , cry and dye for this , except it be some few who may feather their nest by the contrary , whose thriuing , and increase of wealth doth ordinarily consist , in clapping a lock on the kings eare , & bar●ing the doore to his hea●ing , so that men can hard●y & with a great deale of difficulty come to speak vnto him . and besides the foresayd benefits , by debarring men of easie accesse to the king , all requita●l of their good seruice , either by gratious words , or deedes , is quite taken from them ; which certainly is a iewell so worthy the wearing , that euery one would willingly haue it for himself . and if kings do not know thus much , or that they are not told therof , it is by reason of that old mischeife which they suffer by not hearkening vnto truth , either in their counsellours or those auisos , that are represented vnto them , or because those that are neere about his maiestie & interessed in his fauour , will not let him be acquainted with any thing , saue what they know wil please his humour , & giue him most cōtent , till the busines it self breake out , & the errour ( like an imposthume ) beginns to grow ripe , and the wound ( as we say ) shewes itselfe ; then and neuer till then , is the smart of it felt : which is ill for the kingdom , & worse for the king. for , in these delicts and excesses , the king , ( in the peoples conceit ) shal be the only man in fault , & he that must pay for all . dangerous is the state of kings , dangerous the times , but more dangerous the remedy , & the non conueniencie for the now putting it in practise . in ordinary , and publick audiences , let not kings permit either ministers , counsellours , or embassadors to enter for it wil but make the commons complaine , that that is taken away from them , which is theirs ; and they on the other side , being principall persons , will mutter and grumble , thinking themselues wronged , and their worth vnderualewed , to haue all one audience with the ordinary sorte of people . so that with one & the same act , he discontents all of them . let there be dayes , & houres ; appointed for the one , & the other naturalls , & strangers , & let euery man know his set day , and houre . for this being without distinction , what doth it serue for , but multitude , and confusion ? and to haue all of all sortes to assist there continually to heare and nourish the complaints of particular persons , and to make report thereof by letters to their seuerall nations and countries , and to put a glosse vpon them , to shew their owne wit. and though this at the first sight , may seeme to be a thing of small importance , yet such a time may be taken , that it may proue a matter of great consequence . chap. xix . he goes on with the same matter , treating of the audiences of ministers , and counsellours . kings ( saith xenophon ) haue many eares ; for they heare by their owne , and by those of their fauourites , ministers , & counsellours . and it is no more then they stand in neede of . for they must heare all , great , and small , naturall , and stranger , without acceptation of persons , these as well as those ; and deny no man their eares , lest they giue them iust cause to grieue and complaine , that for them onely , there is neither king , fauourite , nor minister to haue accesse vnto . this rapsodye , and multitude of eares , and the difference between the one and the other , king dauid giues vs to vnderstand in that his audience which he crau'd of god. domine , exaudi orationem meam ●uribus percipe obsecrationem meam . heare my prayer ( o lord ) bow downe thine eare , and hearke● vnto my supplication . he saith , heare me , o lord ; but how , or in what maner ? with thine eares , i beseech thee . tell me ( thou holy king ) why dost thou say with thine eares . might not that phrase of speech beene spared ? or wouldst thou happely , that god should heare thee with his eyes , or his mouth ? no certainly , but because it is a vsuall custome with kings , that gouerne great monarchies , who by reason of the varietie and multitude of businesses , cannot by themselues giue eare vnto all , and informe themselues of the truth , to remit part of them to others , that they may heare the parties , and informing themselues of the busines , may send it afterwards to the consulta there to be debated . one comes with his memoriall to the king ; the king wills him to speake vnto the president , or to such a secretary , that he may inform . but dauid here saith ; remit me not o lord vnto any other , for remissions , are remissions , the very word telling vs , that to remit a busines , is to make it remisse and slow , and that there is vsed therein so much remission , that a mans life is oftentimes ended , before his busines . auribus percipe : doe thou thy selfe heare me with thine owne eares , without remitting me to the hearing of others . but to heare all , and in all partes , without remission to other mens eares , who can doe this saue onely god ? and for my part , i am of opinion , that they alluded vnto this , who ( as wee told you ) painted their god without eares ; for to giue vs thereby to vnderstand , that it is peculiar onely vnto god to heare without eares , and to heare all , without standing in neede of other oydos , or oydores ; for such a necessitie , were in god a defect . but in kings it were a defect to doe otherwise ; for they are notable to heare all of themselues , and therfore must of force make vse of other mens eares . and therefore , as nature , in mans body hath disposed different members , necessary for it's proper conseruation , as the eyes to see , the eares to heare , the tongue to talke , the hands to worke , the feete to walke , and all of them to assist to the empire of the soule . so in like manner , this mysticall body of the common-wealth , whereof the king is the soule , and head , must haue it's members , which are those his ministers , which are subiect to the empire of their king , by whom hee disposeth and executeth all that , which doth conuene for it's gouernment , conseruation , and augmentation . aristotle renders the reason , why your huge and extraordinary tall men are but weake ; and ( as i take it ) it is this . the rationall soule ( saith he ) is solely one , indiuisible , and of a limited vertue or power , and that it cannot attayne to that strength and force , as to giue vigour to those partes that are so farre distant and remote in a body , beyond measure , great . now , if the body of this monarchie , be so vaste , and exceeding great , and goes dayly increasing more and more , and that the soule of the king which is to gouerne it , to animate it , and to giue it life , doth not increase , nor is multiplyed , nor augmented , at least in it's ministers ; how is it possible , that a king of himselfe alone should bee able to afford assistance to all ? and to giue life , and being , to so many partes and members , that are set so far assunder ? so great is the office of a king , especially , if he be master of many kingdomes , that it is too great a compasse , for one mans reach , and it is not one man alone , that can fill and occupie a whole kingdome , and be present in all it's partes . and therefore of force he must make vse of other folkes helpe , and more particularly of those , which serue him instead of eares , such as are all your superiour ministers of counsells . these great officers are called in the spanish , oydores , of oyr , to heare ; and the eares of the head , are c●lled oydoras , of their hearing ; and your iudges of the land , oydores , hearers of mens causes and as they are alike in name , so ought they likewise to be alike in office , and to resemble the originall , which it representeth , to the life , and it 's true nature . now , what office is most proper and most naturall to the eares ? you will all grant mee , that it is to heare alwayes , & neuer to be shut . your eyes haue their port-cullis , which they open , or shut , as they see cause . the mouth , hath the like ; but the eares ( like bountifull house keepers ) haue their doores still open , and those leafes which they haue on either side are neuer shut , neuer so much as once wagge . and it is pliny's obseruation ; that onely man , of all 〈◊〉 creatures hath his eares immobile , and with out any the least mouing . and horace , holdes it an ill signe to wagg them ; but a worse , to stop them , sicut aspides surdae , obturantes aures suas . like deafe adders , stopping their eares , that they may not heare . sicut aspides , which are fierce and cruell creatures , and of whom it is sayd , that they are borne as deafe as a doore naile ; and to this their naturall deafenes , they adde another that is artificiall , whereby they grow more deafe , by poysoning that part , and by winding their tayle close about their head , and sometimes laying the one eare close to the ground , and stopping the other with the tipp of their tayle , that they may stop and damme vp all the wayes , by which the voyce of the charmer might enter in . vnto whom , dauid compares those who being oydos del rey , the kings eares , or ( to speake in the vsuall phrase ) oydores del reyno , the kingdomes eares , doe shut and stop their eares , that they may not giue due and fitting audience . being naturally enemies to their owne profession , which is to heare ; seeking out shiftes and tricks , that the cryes , and complaints of the poore may not come to their eares . there is not any crueltie comparable to this , to see a poore suitor trot vp and downe , a moneth or two together , labouring to haue audience , and in stead of letting him in , hath the doore still shut against him . nature would not allow doores to the eares , & yet these that are the common-wealths eares , make profit of the doores of their houses , and command them to be kept shut : your suitors they come and goe , but my sennior oydor , my lord iudge , he that should haue his doores open , to giue open hearing to all comers , is shut vp in his closet , and cannot be spoken withall vnder a couple of capons . the tribunes of the people of rome ( a magistracie ordained for defending of the communaltie ) kept their gates still open , that men at all houres , might vpon all occasions , come and treat with them . if that young man , which was saint pauls sisters sonne , who heard the conspiracie which the ●ewes had plotted against him , and went to giue aduise thereof to the magistrate , had not found such easie entrance into the tribunes house as he did , without doubt it had cost paul his life . for fourty men , had taken a solemne oath to kill him as he came forth of prison to his triall ; and bound themselues with a curse , that they would neither eate , not drinke , till they had killed him . now , when this young man came to the chiefe captaine , and told him that he had something to say vnto him ; the text there saith , that the captaine tooke him by the hand , and went a part with him alone , and asked him ; what hast thou to shew to me , &c. with this facilenes , did the ministers of that heathen-people , giue audience . how much more ought christian ministers to doe the like ? the open doore , and the giuing of audience in some open hall , or in some outward court , whereunto all are admitted to enter , would giue much content vnto many ; but these close doores , and close audience , to very few ; which is purposely done for to pleasure their friends and seruants ; for , from this their hard accesse , and difficile entrance , they likewise make their gaine , and are not ashamed now to demand that for a see , which if they were well serued should be recompenced with a halter and looke what i haue said of your oydores , which are your iudges in chanceries , and other the chiefe courtes of iustice ; i say the like of other ministers , who though they haue not the same name , yet doe they serue as eares to their king . and then are their eares shut , and growne deafe , when they will not heare ; making thereby his maiestie to be found fault withall , & to receiue a hard censure from his subiects , when he is innocent & blamelesse , and drawing a thousand other mischiefes vpon the common-wealth . and it is a most shamefull thing , and worthy reprehension , & redresse , that when kings shall bee liberall in this kind , their ministers should be so short & cutted and that a man should be at more cost and trouble to get audience of them , & to negociate a busines , then of the king himself . and the mischiefe of it is , that they procure and pretend now , as in former times , the greatest fauours the highest places , honors , & dignities , whilst in the mean while it is not thought vpon , nor taken ●nto consideratiō , that besides the offence which is done herein vnto god & the common-wealth , that it is one of the most preiudiciall things in the world for the quiet peace of states , & the conseruation of kingdomes . and this was well vnderstood by absolon the son of dauid , & pretender to the crowne of israel . who perceiuing , that the king , his father through his great imployments in the wars , could not so well attend his giuing audience to all his subiects , and that they to whose charge & care it was committed , did not cumply , therin with their obligation , he placed himselfe at the entrance of the citie , whether the suitours repaired , and seeing how much they distasted it , that they had not that quicke audience and dispatch as they expected , and desired , he insinuates , himselfe into them , and speaking very kindly , and louingly vnto them , he tolde them . videntur mihi sermones tuiboni & iusti , sed non est qui te audiat constitutus à rege : thy matters are good and righteous , but there is no man deputed of the king to heare thee . and this is it , that puts all out of frame , and order . o quoth he , that i were made iudge in the land , that euery man which hath any matter of controuersie might come to me , that i might doe him iustice ; &c. and it followeth anon after in the text ; quod solicitabat corda virorum : that by this means he stale away the hearts of the men of israel . and that thereupon there shortly after insued a great rebellion , which put the king , & the kingdom in great ieopardie . which may serue as a lesson for a good minister , to teach them what they ought to do , & not to think , they do that which they ought , when for fashion sake , they giue short and crowding audiences , where that which enters in at one eare , goes out ( as they say ) at another . but that so much time should be allowed for the hearing of them , as the qualitie off the busines shall require , without cutting those off , who go rendring their reasons ; for he that hath not the patience to heare them , either he not vnderstandeth them , or is afraid to meddle with them . with this therefore i conclude this , and the former discourse . that the first office of a king , is , to heare all his subiects . and it being supposed , that he alone cannot doe it , it is fit he should haue oydores , that should heare for him , and be his eares . and for that as by the eares of the head , there runn's along a certaine secret nerue , by meanes wherof that which is heard , is presently conuaied to the braine , there to be registred , and consulted on by the common sense . so these oydores , ought to holde their secret consulta , wherein they ought to make relation vnto the king of all that they haue heard . but let them weigh with all , what a short cut it is from the eare to the braine , and the small stay that is made in this iourney , or passage ; to the end that by this natural course , which is so quicke , & speedy , they may see their errour , and perceiue what a great fault it is , to retarde their consultations , to shew themselues thicke of hearing , & to haue their eares shut , or rather the oydores themselues shut vp , and not to be spoken withall . some would faine excuse these audiences , with the impertinencies of those that craue them , which sometimes are very large and tedious and to as little purpose , as they are too too importune , & vnseasonable . but to this answere ; that your high and eminent places , bring with them this trouble and charge ; and ( as the apostle saint paul said ) that it is a great token of prudence to know how to beare with the foolish , and to haue suffrance and patience with those , that are none of the wisest . libenter enim suffertis insipientes , cum sitis ipsi sapientes : for ye suffer fooles gladly because that ve are wise . and because he that is most wise , is most offended with ignorance , let him know , that he meriteth much in dissembling it , when it is fitting so to doe : for to say the truth ( as the same apostle affirmeth , gods good and faithfull ministers haue obligation , both to the wise , and to the foolish . sapientibus & insipientibus debitorsum . i am debtor both to the wise men , and to the vnwise . in the history of the kings is set downe the dissimulation , wherewith the womon of tecoa spake vnto king dauid , and how importunate and tedious she was in telling here tale , and withall the kings great patience in hearing her out , and his not being offended with the craft and cunning wherewith shee came vnto him ; albeit the businesse was of that weight and moment , that his great captaine ioab durst not propound it vnto him . audi tacens , simul & quaerens . giue eare , and be still ; and when thou doubtest , aske . this counsaile concerneth all , but more particularly kings , and their ministers , who are to heare , and be silent , to aske , and aske againe , till they haue fully informed themselues of the truth of the case . for this is rather an honour , then dishonour vnto kings , and great ministers . for , as the holy ghost saith ; gloria regum est in vestigare sermonem . the kings honour , is to search out a thing . of him , that speaketh not , nor asketh a question of him that speaketh , it may be conceiued , that he doth not heare him ; for these two sences are so neere of kinne , that ( as the philosopher obserueth ) he that is borne dumbe , is also deafe ; and not onely this , but likewise , that the speech being taken away , the hearing is lost with it . the cause whereof ( according to lactantius ) is ; for that the organ , by which the ayre is receiued , and wherewith the voyce is formed , holds such correspondencie with that which goes vnto the hearing , that if the first be shut or stopt , the exercise of the second is likewise hindred . vpon information , and hearing , followeth in the next place , doing of iustice , whereof we will treate in the chapters following . chap. xx. of the vertue of iustice , the naturall sister , and companion of kings . wee told you in the former chapter that hearing was the precisest , and directest meanes for the doing of iustice. and therefore falleth fitly out here to treate thereof . your ancient hieroglyfinists , as also your saints , in their writings , treating of this vertue , compare it to a payre of weights or scales with it's two ballances . and it seemeth , that nature herselfe made this ectypum , or exemplar , this portrayture or delineation , shadowing it out in euery one of vs , by giuing vs two eares , like vnto those two balances , whose truth dependeth on the examen , or aequilibrium , that tongue or needle , which stands vppermost in the beame of the ballance ; making my application in this maner , that the two eares , standing like two ballances , on either side of the head , they haue their rule of truth from the supremest and highest part thereof , where stands the tongue or needle of reason , and the iudgement of those things to their true weight , and measure , which are put into these intellectaull ballances . to discourse therefore of iustice , is very essentiall to that which hath already beene treated touching a common-wealth ; for ( as we told you in our very first chapter ) a republick , or common-wealth , is a congregation of many men , subiect to the same lawes and gouernment , which is not possible to bee conserued , if iustice therein shall be wanting . which giues to euery one , that which is his owne , keepes men within the bounds of good order and discipline , and bridles those by reason , which transported by their vnruly appetites , ( like headstrong iades ) would liue without it , admitting no curbe , no manner of controll , but following that law of viuat , qui vincit : let him weare a crowne , that winn's it . if men would but obserue that first rule of the law natural , consecrated by the mouth of our diuine master christ. quod tibi non vis , alteri ne feceris . et quaecunque vultis vt faciant vobis homines , eadem facite illis : offer not that to another which thou wouldst not haue donne to thy selfe . and therefore , whatsoeuer ye would , that men should doe to you , euen so doe yee to them . there needed no other bullwarkes , or fortifications , to liue quietly and peaceably in the world . but after this same lolium crept in , this tare , of meum , and tuum ; the cooler ( as chrysostome calls it ) of charitie , the seminarie of discordes and dissention , and the fountaine of all mischiefe ; men found themselues obliged , nay inforced , to seeke out some such meanes , or maner of liuing , whereby euery one might quietly and peaceably inioy that , which he held to be his owne . and for this cause , they resolued to leade a ioynt life together , submitting themselues to one and the same lawes , and subiecting themselues to one and the same king , who should likewise keepe and obserue them , and by iustice conserue nourish , and maintaine all other necessary vertues for the augmentation and conseruation of common wealths . and for this end , was giuen vnto kings that great power , which they haue , holding in one hand the ballance of iustice , and in the other , the sword of power . which that naked weapon doth represent , which is borne before them , when they enter with authoritie and state into their cities . and alluding either vnto this , or those ancient insignia of your iudges , the apostle saint paul saith ; vis non timere potestatem ? bonum facinon enim fine causa gladium portat ; wilt thou be without feare of the power ? doe well . for the magistrate beareth not the sword for nought . herodotus tells vs that , which cicero deliuereth vnto vs. eadem fuit legum constituendarum causa , quae regum . that one and the selfe same , was the cause and motiue , of ordaining lawes , and creating kings . whence it followeth , that there neither can be any common-wealth without iustice , nor any one that can deserue to be a king , vnlesse he maintaine and conserue it . and though he may seeme to be a king , yet in realitie of truth he is not . because he wants that principall attribute , that should make him be so ; as a painted man , which is no man , cannot properly be said to be a man. the holy scripture , styles those hypocrites , which doe not administer iustice , for they haue no more in them of kings , then the apparent , or outward shew , as the scepter and the crowne , and other their regall roabes , and ornaments . and it is worthy your consideration , and it is no more then what their holy doctors and learned interpreters of diuine letters haue obserued ; that a good king , and iustice , are brothers and sisters , and so neerely twinn'd that you can scarce make mention of the one , without the other . the prophet esay , representing the feruent desire of all the world , and the voyces and cryes of the patriarkes , who with such instance and earnestnesse did call for the comming of t●-sonne of god , saith ; rorate coeli desuper , & nubes pl●nt iustum , & iustitia oriatur simul : ye heauens , send the ●eaw from aboue , and let the cloudes drop downe righteo●snesse , let the earth open , and let saluation and iustice gr●we forth , let it bring them forth together . and in another place , as if god did answer these the desires of the iust , ●e sayth ; ecce dies veniunt , dicit dominus , & suscitabo dan●● germen instum & regnabit rex , & sapiens erit , & faciet udicium ; et iustitiam in terra , behold , the dayes come ( ●●ith the lord ) that i will raise vnto dauid a righteous ●●nch , and a king shall raigne , and prosper , and shall exec●● iudgement , and iustice in the earth . and in the third b●●ke of the kings , god being willing to grace and autorize the person of salomon , who was the type & figure of the true king of kings , our sauiour iesus christ , had no soner the crowne set on his head , & the possession of the kingdom settled vpon him , bu● there was presently offred and put into his hands a great occasion for to shew his prudence and wisedome , and his great noblenesse and courage for to do iustice . the case was a common and knowen case ; it was betwixt two women , that were friends and companions , who leading a lewd and dishonest life , were deliuered or brought to bed both at one time , and sleeping together in one bed , the one of them being oppressed with a heauie sleepe , ouer-layd her childe , and when she awaked , shee found it to be dead . and at the same instant , without being felt , or perceiued by her companion , she puts me the dead childe by her , and tooke the liuing childe to her selfe . but this theft could not be so couered , for all her cunning carriage , but that the other knew , that the dead childe which was layd by her side , was not hers , but the liuing . the other with a great deale of impudencie , and dissimulation deny'de it . and because they could not agree vpon the busines , they resolued to goe to king salomon before whom the busines was continued with the like stiffenesse , and obstinate contestation , giuing each o●●er the lye , and other the like bold and vnciuill speeches as ● vsuall with such kinde of women . the king , finding no mo●e proofe nor reason of credit in the one , then the other , commanded a caruing knife to be brought into the open cou●●e , & tha● diuiding the liuing childe in the mid●st , the one ha●● should be giuen to the one , and the other to the other . thereu●on , the true mother , trembling and quaking , and feeling that knife a ready in her owne bowels , which was to part her ●●ilde in twaine , besought the king , that this his sentence mig●t not be executed , but that the childe might be deliuered o●r whole to the other . which being well weigh'd and consi●●red by this wise king , and good iusticer , he knew thereby , that she was the true mother and so gaue order , that the childe should be restored vnto her . and the holy scripture saith ; that the same of this notable peece of iustice was divulged farre and neere , and that there grew thence a great respect in all the people of israel towards this their most prudent king , who had with so much iudgement and wisedome , administred iustice. audiait itaque omnis israel iudicium , quod iudicasset rex , et timuerunt regem , videntes sapientiam dei esse in illo ad faciendum iudicium . all israel heard the iudgement , which the king had iudged , and they feared the king ; for they saw that the wisedome of god was in him to doe iustice. so that , when they saw how iust a king he was , and with what a deale of vprightnes , he did administer iustice , the people shouted for ioy , and cryed out , that his wisdome was from heauen , and though he were then very young , they began to feare and reuerence him very much . and therefore if a king will be beloued , esteemed , and respected of his subiects , he must be a iust king. for , most certaine it is , that if kings will pretend honour , authoritie , credit , estimation , and respect , they cannot take any better course for it , then by giuing to euery one , that which appertaineth vnto him , with a iust hand . summum in regibus bonum est ( saith saint gregory ) iustitiam colere , ac suae cuique iura seruare : it is the greatest goodnesse , and highest commendation in kings , to honour iustice , and let euery man enioy his proper rightes , and priuiledges . and so it is , that there is not any thing , whereby kings doe more gaine the common voyce , for the augmentation of their authoritie , and increase of their estates , or that doth more incline the minds of their subiects to respect , & obedience , then to know , that they are wise , sincere , full of integrity , & of great zeale in the administratiō of iustice. for then all wil willingly obay him , & heartily loue him , liuing in an assured hope that all his actions , wil be measured , weighed , and crownd with equity , and iustice. let therefore the conclusion of this discourse be ; that ( according to plato ) the greatest prayse , that can be giuen to a king , is in consideration of this vertue ; for , ( as wee will shew you by and by ) it imbraceth all vertues in it selfe . and there is not any title more honourable , or that doth so quadrare , so square , and sute ; with a king , as that of lust . whereby a king is made as it were a god vpon earth , and becomes like vnto him in rewarding , and punishing . anaxagoras , and homer , called kings , iovis discipulos , iupiters schollers ; because in imitation of the gods , they did administer iustice. and anciently , they were tearmed sacratissimi , most sacred . in effect , iustice is a vertue , truely regall , and most proper vnto kings , because it appertaines vnto them by office , and doth constitute them in their being of kings ; for without it , they cannot be . and therfore your aegyptian theologians , with one and the same symbole , which was an open-eye , did signifie both a king , and iustice. for neither a king , without it ; nor it , without a king , can performe their office . and therefore plato calls her the ouerseer , and the reuenger of all things , in regard of that great vigilancie which kings ought to haue in executing iustice , and in seeing and knowing , what passeth in the kingdome : for kingdomes for this cause are content to become subiect vnto them , out of a confidence they haue , that they shall be protected by them . this is the thing ( saith osorius ) that kings must looke vnto ; this must be their cheife care and study . in studium iustitiae , omnes regis curae et cogitationes , omnes labores , atque vigiliae , omnia denique studia consumenda sunt . e● namque à principio reges creauit . the doing , or not doing of iustice , is that , which either sets vp , or puls downe kings , and that king , must make a new conquest of kingdomes , if those , which he hath already gained , be not conserued and defended by the force and power of iustice , which , is the maine pillar , and onely prop to speake of , that vpholdeth kingdomes , without which they cannot long last and continue . for god will most iustly punish them , by taking those from them , which they haue , if they dissimulate iniustices , and if they suffer themselues to be carryed away contrary to all right and reason , and permit notorious faults to passe without punishment : other faults are not so much risented in kings , and kingdomes are content to tolerate them , be they neuer so great . but should they haue neuer so many other good partes , if they be faulty in this , which is of so great importance , they shall presently see and perceiue a publicke face of sorrow , and a generall discontent in all their subiects . and god oftentimes , makes it a meanes for the punishment , and amendment of kings and kingdomes . it is the saying of iesus the sonne of syrach ; that by counsaile , and iustice , kingdomes are maintained . and for default thereof , scepters and crownes , are lost , and kingdomes transferred from one people to another . and those brought to serue , which were borne to command . but the king , that administreth iustice , without respect of persons , shall haue his succession perpetuall : for that is the very ground and foundation of a throne royall . aufer impietatem de vultu regis , et firm●bitur iustitia thronus eius . take away the wicked from the king , and his throne shall be established in righteousnes . that is , his issue , his house , and his kingdome . iustice is that which foundeth kingdomes , which enlargeth them , and conserueth them ; that which establisheth peace , and resisteth warre . without it , there is neither king nor kingdome , nor common-wealth , nor citie , nor any other communitie , which can be conserued . and all whatsoeuer that haue beene ruined and destroyed , hath beene for want of iustice. for this cause the kings of egypt , and in imitation of them , some others , did ( which all good kings ought to do ) sweare their presidents , ministers , and magistrates , that they should not obay their mandatums , nor execute their orders and decrees , if they found in them , that they commanded any thing contrary vnto iustice , and the lawes of the kingdome . philip the faire , king of france , and his successor charles the seuenth , enacted a law , that the iudges should make no reckoning of the kings letters nor those his royall scedules , vnlesse they seemed vnto them to be iust , and lawfull . the catholike kings , don fernando , and donna isabella , and their nephew , charles the fift , by their well ordained lawes , magistracies , and tribunals of so much power and authoritie , exceeded all before them , that fauoured iustice. which were augmented and inlarged by king philip the second , who was more particularly zealous of iustice. and his sonne king philip the third , was a great fauourer and louer of iustice , and obseruer of the lawes , submitting vnto them his person , and his goods , who might very well say , that which the emperour traiane said , conferring great power on his gouernour in rome ; thou shalt vse this sword , in our name , and for vs , as long as we shall command that which is iust ; and against vs , if we shall command the contrarie . for it is alwayes to be presumed of the intention of kings , that they euermore command iustice to be done , but neuer the contrary , though it make against themselues . dauid gaue thankes vnto god , that hee had set him in the way of iustice ; that is , that he had giuen him an vpright heart , and informed his vnderstanding with so right a rule , that it inclined his disposition to doe iustice , though it were against himselfe . the cause ( saith diuus thomas ) why god , for so many yeares did inlarge the empire and monarchie of the romanes , with so much power , so much treasure , and so many great victories , was ; for that their rectitude and iustice , which they obserued towards all . but in that instant , that they fell from this , their empire likewise began to fall . of these examples , all histories , both humane , and diuine , are very full ; yet all will not serue the turne , they doe little , or no good . let gods mercie supply this defect , and worke this good . and let not the poore bee discouraged and disheartened , but let them comfort and cheere vp themselues with this , that their righteousnesse , and their patience shall not perish for euer . god hath spoke the word , and he will keepe it . the poore saith the psalmist , shall not alwayes be forgotten , nor shall the hope of the afflicted perish for euer . for he will take the matter into his owne hands , and will breake the arme of the wicked and malitious , and will helpe the fatherlesse and poore vnto their right , that the man of earth bee no more exalted against them . woe vnto those , that are rules of the people . woe vnto those , that are vniust kings ; which make lawes like spiders cobwebbs ; whereinto , little starueling flies , fall and die ; but your fat bulls of basan breake through , and beare them away in triumph on their homes . but that wee may touch no more vpon this string , we will here holde our hand ; and and goe on , in treating of iustice , and it's parts ; a matter no lesse profitable , then necessary , for kings , and their ministers . chap. xxi . of the parts of iustice in common , and in particular of iustice commutatiue . to the end that we may proceede with more distinction and clearenesse in this chapter , we are to presuppose with diuus thomas , and others , that iustice may be sayd to be in common two manner of wayes . first of all vnder this generall name of iustice , is comprehended all kinde of vertue , & thereof in this sense , saith the philosopher , that iustitia est omnis . virtus ; iustice includeth in it selfe all sortes of vertues whatsoeuer so that a iust man , and a vertuous man is all one . and in this sense christ conceiu'd it , when he said , nisi abu●d●uerit iustitia ; except your righteousnesse exceede , &c. and in another place ; attendite ne iustitiam vestram faciatis coram hominibu● . take heede that yee doe not boast your righteousnesse before men , to be seene of them . of iustice , considered thus in the generall , we will not now treate of in this place ; for in rigour and strictnesse , this is not true iustice , though it haue some similitude therewith . now iustice is taken after another manner for a particular virtue . to wit , that , which is one of the foure cardinall vertues , which hath for it's obiect and end ( as we shall tell you by and by ) to giue vnto euery man that which is his right and his due . of this ( which is properly iustice ) do we here meane to treate ; of whose excellencies , all bookes are full , and whereof , the ancients said ; that it is a celestiall and diuine vertue , seated by god , in the mindes of men . vlpian saith ; that it is , constans et perpetua voluntas , quae tribuit cuique suum ; a constant and perpetuall will , attributing to euery man his owne . plato he goes a little farther ; adding , that it is , singulare , et vnicum donum , &c. the onely singular gift , & the greatest good , that god communicated vnto mortalls here vpon earth . for , from thence ariseth peace & concord . this is it's worke , & the end it pretendeth ; according to that of esay ; opus iustitiae pax . and the worke of iustice shal be peace , euen the worke of iustice and quietnesse , and assurance for euer . and god himselfe , the author , cause , & fountain of iustice , the first title , & name that he tooke , when he created the world , before that hee had created angels , men , and beastes , was that of iudge . wherby we are to vnderstand , that there was a iudge , and iustice in the world , before any other thing was created . for , to haue created a world , without a iudge , or iustice to gouerne it , and to punish humane excesses and disorders , had beene to make a denne of thiefes , and robbers . for all kingdomes and common-wealths , without iustice ( saith saint austen ) had beene nothing else , but so many armies , of out-lawes , rebells , and high-way robbers . remota iustitia , quid sunt regna , nisi magna latroicinia . take away iustice , and what are kingdomes , but latrocinations , all kind of theft's , spoyles , and rogueries ? certaine it is , that the first iudge , and minister of iustice , that was in the world , was god himselfe , who appointed lawes , and precepts , who did rule and gouerne without kings , or other their substitutes , till noahs time ; who was the first gouernour of his people , to whom he gaue order that he should liue in iustice and righteousnesse ; doing the like afterwards to moses , and after him , to his annoynted kings . and therefore esay stiles him legislatorem , a law-giuer . dominu● legifer noster ; the lord is our iudge , the lord is our law-giuer , the lord is our king , he will saue vs. &c. and then in those dayes , by the sole power & hand of their kings , was iustice administred ; and they were called iudges , because they did iudge according to the lawes ; and they tooke this name from iustice it selfe . iudex dictus est , quasi ius dicens populo : non ergò est iudex , si iustitia in eo non est : he is called iudge , of iudging the people vprightly : and he is no iudge , if iustice be not in him . his obiect is ius , or that which is iust and lawfull . and his office , to offend no man ; to doe right vnto all , to giue euery one that , which is his ; and what of right belongs vnto him . this iustice hath power to determine , how , how much , and when , the good are to be rewarded and the bad punished ; it is the harmonie of all good gouernment , and whereby the world is sustained ; and wherewith as with meate and drinke , the life of man is preserued . and if iustice should faile , the world would presently returne to that chaos , and confusion , wherein it was at the first . and for that this vertue , is so necessary for mans life , saint austen saith , that your ancient kings did build and consecrate a temple thereunto . and that on the high altar , there were ingrauen certaine letters , which spake thus : iustice , that is vpright , and free from loue , or hatred , is the strongest chaine , that a kingdome hath . which suteth with that , which one of the seuentie interpreters told king ptolomy ( as aristeas reporteth it ) who being demanded by him , how he might sustaine himselfe in his kingdome , and hold concord and good correspondencie with so great a multitude and varietie of men , as were therein , replyed : by preseruing iustice , and giuing to euery one what was fitting , and not otherwise . and this is so manifest a truth , that plutarch affirmeth ; that not iupiter himselfe , though the greatest of the pagan gods , could be a good gouernor without iustice. in it ( saith s. ambrose ) is found the concordancie of all vertues & without it , there is neither consonancy , nor harmony . it is the mistresse of mans life , the extirper of vice , the mother of peace , the defence of the kingdome , the treasure of a common-wealth , the ioy of men , the com●ort of the poore , the cure of the sicke , and the medicine of the soule . cicero , calls her the queene and lady of the vertues : plutarke would haue her to be in respect of the rest , as the sunne amongst the starres . firmaianus affirmeth , that shee is the mother of them all . and as the mother is before the daughters ; so iustice hath the precedencie of all other vertues . scotus , surnamed the subtile , together with anselmus say ; that if betweene gods iustice and merc●e , there were any precedencie , iustice would haue the prime place . in fine , it is the foundation and ground of all other vertues , and by which all ought to bee regulated and ordered . and we cannot ind●are it more , then in saying ; that if iustice should fayle , all the vertues would fayle . and if that onely be kept , there will be li●le neede of the other . so said king agesilaus . and it is aristotles tonent ; that if iustice were publickly and truly administred , fortitude , and other the vertues , would be superfluous . for one not iniurying another , all would be peace , loue , and charitie . and it is a vertue very naturall vnto man , who , in his owne nature , abhorreth vice , and loueth goodnesse , and what is honest . and therefore amongst other things that are controuerted , cicero saith , that there is not any thing more certaine to be knowne , then that man was borne for to doe iustice. it is she that ordaines things for the common good , and the good of our neighbour . and by how much the common is greater then the particular ; so much doth this vertue exceede others , that are ordayned to a particular person , or a mans owne selfe . finally , it is very necessary for the conseruation of the body , and the saluation of the soule . diuus thomas , and others , whose names i silence say ; that . vertues side , and take part with her , which they tearme ad●utrices , helpers , which doe serue and accompany her in all her actions . and making vse of them , as of counsaylours , and aduisers , she determines what is iust , the good which is to be followed , and the ill which is to be auoided , there being nothing , that hath not neede of it's fauour , and helpe . for , ( according to saint gregory ) it hath foure most potent opposites , which make the rod of iustice to bow , and turne crooked , and to falsifie the tongue and beame of the ballance . to wit ; hatred , fauour , feare and interest . now iustice is diuided into two parts , which are , the honour of god , and the loue of our neighbour . aristotle , did likewise consider two other parts of iustice. one common , which is ordayned for the common-wealth , and the other particular which is instituted for our neighbour . which by another name , they call equitie , which man vsing with reason , dea'es so with others , as he would be dealt withall himselfe , vpon the common , which imbraceth & includeth all the rest , patritius founded his common-wealth ; and pla●o his , vpon the particular . others diuide it into foure parts , or species , into diuine , naturall , ciuill , and iudiciall . which the schoolmen do define and declare at large , vnto whom i remit the reader . but laying aside these diuisions , which make not for our purpose , the most proper and essentiall diuision of iustice , is into commutatiue , and distributiue . which ( as diuus thomas saith ) are the partes subi●ctiuae or subiectiue parts of this iustice ; that is to say , it 's essential species . and therefore we will treate of these two , and that very briefly . and first in the first place of the commutatiue , and in the second of the distributiue . iustice commutatiue , contractiue , or venditiue , ( for all these names your authors giue it , for the matter of commutations , contracts and sales , wherein it is exercised , is considered betwixt two , party and party , which are a part of that whole body of the common-wealth , which giue , and take , betweene themselues , by way of contract , or sale. it 's end , and obiect , is equalitie , and proportion , betweene that , which is giuen ; and that , which is receiued ; without respect vnto the persons which buy , and sell , but to that which is contracted , solde , or commutated , that there may be an equalitie and proportion had , betwixt that , which is giuen , and taken . and when in this there is a defection , it is contrary to commutatiue iustice. the distributiue , is considered betweene the whole , and it's parts . the medium of this vertue , doth not consist in the equaltie of thing to thing , but of the things to the persons ; for , as one person surpasseth another , so the thing , which is giuen to such a person , exceedeth that part , which is giuen to another person . so that there is an equalitie of proportion betweene that , which is more , and that which is lesse ; but not an equalitie of quantitie , to wit ; so much to the one , as to the other . for those , which in a common-wealth , are not equall in dignitie , and desert , ought not equally to enioy the common goods thereof , when they are reparted and diuided by the hand of distributiue iustice ; as we shall shew you by and by , when we come to speake of the commutatiue , which treates of equalizing and according that , whch mens disordinate appetites , and boundlesse couetousnesse doth disconcerte , and put out of order , euery one being desirous to vsurpe that for himselfe , which of right appertaines , and belongs to another , whence arise your cosenages and deceits in humane contracts , and whence doe resulte those contentions , dissensions , and sutes in law. and to occurre and meete with these inconueniences , from the alcalde of the poorest village , to the highest and supremest tribunall , those pretenders may appeale , if they cannot obtaine iustice in those inferiour courts . and therefore in castile , in the counsell royal it is called by way of excellencie , conseiode iusticia the counsel of iustice. and in all well ordred monarchies and common-wealths , there is euermore carefull prouision made for this necessitie , dispersing in diuers tribunalls , the fittest men for administring iustice , as we haue formerly related of that great law-giuer moses . and in the second booke of the chro. it is said of king iehos●phat , that he appointed audiences , and tribunalls in all the principall cities of his kingdome , and those euer at their very gates and entrance , that the negociants and suitors might the more easily meete with the ministers of iustice ( for this is the chiefest prouision , which a king should make for kis kingdome ) indearing to them all the faithfull administration thereof , and that with such graue words , and such effectuall reasons , that they deserue to be written in golden letters vpon all the seates & tribunalls of your iudges . videte , quid faciatis ; non enim hominis exercetis iudicium , sed domini ; et quodcunque indicaueritis , in vos redundabit . sit timor domini vobiscum , & cum diligentia cuncta facite ; non est enim apud dominum deum nostrum iniquitas , nec personarum acceptio , nec cupido munerum : take heede what ye doe , for yee execute not the iudgement of man , but of the lord ; and he will be with yee in the cause and iudgement . wherefore now let the feare of the lord be vpon yee . take heede , and doe it ; for there is no iniquitie with the lord our god ; neither respect of persons , nor receiuing of reward . the first thing that he admonisheth them of , is ; videte , quid faciat●s . take heede , what yee doe looke well about yee , and haue an eye to what ye doe . heare , see , and consider , take time and leysure , be not ouer-hasty in sentencing a sute , till yee haue studied the case well and throughly , and are able as well to satisfie others , as your selues . vsing that care and circumspection , as did that iust man iob. causam , quam nesoiebam , diligentissime inuestigabam . when i knew not the cause , i sought it out diligently ; as if his life had lyen vpon it . alciat saith ; that the tribunes had at the gates of their houses the image of a king , sitting in his throane , hauing hands , but no eyes ; and certaine statuas about him , seeming to be iudges , hauing eyes , but no hands ; whereby they declared the office of a king , and the duty of iudges , painting him with hands , and them without them ; but with as many eyes as that fabulous argos had ; or like vnto those mysticall beastes , which saint iohn saw full of eyes within , and on euery side . to shew that they should study , see , and examine causes , and all whatsoeuer passeth in the common-wealth , and to informe the king thereof ; who , is to haue hands , and armes , courage , and power , for execution . againe , that good king puts them in minde that it is not mans , but gods office that they take in hand , whose proper office is to iudge : and therefore in the scripture , your iudges are called gods. and since that they are his lieuetenants , let them labour for to doe iustice , as god himselfe doth . for i must be so bold as to tell them , that there is a reuiewing of the businesse , and a place of appealing in the supreme counsell of his diuine iustice. and there the party pretending doth not deposite his thousand and fiue hundred ducats , but the iudge , who lyes at stake for it , and if he shall iudge amisse , he is to pay all costes and charges , and sute of courte . quodounque iudicaueritis , ( sayth that good king ) in vos redundabit . whatsoeuer yee shall iudge it shall light vpon your selfes . he threatneth that , which god deliuereth in the booke of wisedome to the kings and iudges of the earth : audite ergo roges , & intelligite iudices terrae : heare me , yee that rule and gouerne the world , and yee that glory in the multitude of nations that are subiect vnto you , & vnderstand , that the power that yee haue is from god , and that he is to make a quaere , and inquire of your actions and thoughts . and for that being his ministers , ye haue not iudged according to his will , nor kept his lawes , nor done iustice , horrendae & citò apparebit vobis : horibly , and sodainly will he appeare vnto you . he that is most low shall finde mercie with him , but the mighty , shall be mightily tormented . all these are the wordes of the wisedome of salomon and which are not to escape the memorie of kings , and their ministers . and iehosophat , as a remedie vnto all ; prescribeth vnto his iudges and counsellours , one good counsayle , and sound aduise , which is this ; that in all the sentences they shall pronounce , that they set before their eyes the feare of god. for , ( as both saint chrysostome and s. austin affirme ) it is easie for him to swarue from iustice , who feareth not god in what he doth . as likewise , that they should dispatch businesses with diligence . for there are some , that indeauour to eternize sutes . and why they doe so , god , & the world knowes . bribery and corruption are the remoras , that stop the course of iustice , and the cause , that sutes are so long depending before they be brought to a conclusion ; to the confusion and vndoing of those that follow them , who are faine , by deferring , to deferring , and putting ouer from hearing to hearing , to sell their very clothes from their backs to wage law. and when at last with much adoe , they haue sentence past on their side , they are neuer a whit the better for it , but is conuerted into gall and bitternesse , for that his sute hath cost him seuentimes more , then it was worth . to such iudges as these , suteth that of the prophet amos : conuertistis in amaritudinem , iudicium ; & fructum iustitiae in absinthium : yee haue turned iudgement into gall , and the fruit of righteousnesse into worme-wood . furthermore , saith that good king ; consider that yee occupie gods place , who wrongeth no man , nor is an accepter of persons . yee must administer iustice equally to all , giuing to euery one , that which is his , and of right belongs vnto him , without any other humane respect . for iustice acknowledgeth neither father nor mother nor friend , but meere truth . cleon tooke leaue of his friends , when he was made a iudge . and themistocles refused magistracie , saying that he would not possesse that place , where his friends could not be in better condition with him , then his foes . lastly , he tels them , that he would not haue them to be couetous , nor receiuers of rewards . and therfore are they pictu'rd without hands , because they should not haue the faculty and gift of taking . non accipies personam , nec munera . it is moses his aduise in deuteronomy . wrest not thou the law , nor respect any person , neither take reward . for the reward blindeth the eyes of the wise , & peruerteth the words of the iust. iustice should be like vnto the sunne , whose light costes vs nothing , and is neither bought , nor solde . non licet indi●i ( saith saint austin ) vendere iustum indicium : it becomes not a iudge , to sell iust iudgement : all this appertaineth to commutatiue iustice ; and to that obligation likewise which kings haue to cumply with whatsoeuer bargaines or contracts haue bin formally made , without acceptation of persons , for he is not to regard them , but the truth . to this iustice , appertaineth likewise , the giuing , and paying of soldiers , their reward , and their pay : for they doe tacitely make a contract with their prince to serue him in that ministry for so many ducatts a month ; and this is due vnto them in all iustice & right . for otherwise , there should not be an equalitie , betweene a souldiers paines and his pay . nor ought hee to put them off with delayes , remitting the remuneration of their seruice to other ministers , seeing that they serue them in their owne persons , and that the obligation is reciprocall . and therefore a certaine bolde soldier tolde augustus caesar , who thought he had done him a great fauour in recommending him by a fauourit of his to those of the counsel of warr , that they might heare him , and doe him iustice ; sir ( said he ) when your honor and authoritie ran so much hazard , and your person put to great perill , did i depute another in my place to fight for me ? and therewith all vnbuttoning his dublet , be shew'd him the wounds which he had receiued in his body in his defence . by which he obliged him to heare his cause himselfe , & to giue present order that he should be well and truly payd . and when they in the seruice of their king , shall do more then they are bound vnto ▪ a●some which vnder-go braue and noble attempts , ieoparding their fifes in such kinde of desperate enterprises , howbeit commutatiue iustice obligeth not to giue them more then their ordinary pay , yet in a iust gratification , it is required of kings , that they should reward and honour them , according to the qualitie of their persons , and seruices . for a qiust king , ought not to leaue any seruice vnrewarded nor any fault vnpunished . for praemium , & p●na , reward , and punishment , are those two plummets , which keepe the clock of the common-wealth in good order . but to giue a conclusion to this first part , i say ; that iustice ought to be in all , and with all , all equall and compleat . and for this cause she is called flos , a flower . giuing vs thereby to vnderstand , that to all she should be florida , fresh and flourishing . not being like a dry rotten sticke to some , and full of sweetenesse to others . and as in a tree , after the flower followes the fruit ; so likewise is to be conceiued , that in kings and iudges , this vertue is not true , if it consist onely in the leafe and the flower , and doe not come to beare fruit . and therefore in the sacred scripture , those that doe not as well in deede , as in shew , truly & vprightly administer ●ustice , are called hypocrites ; for that they haue no more of kings and iudges , then the bare name , & title . they ought to be vina lex , and ius anim●tum ; the very life and soule of the law , that men may come vnto them , not as to a man , but as to equitie , and iustice it selfe . they must haue their plummet & their lines runne euen and ieuell towards all : their vare , or rod of iustice , must not be too short for some , & too long for other some . let right strike the stroake , & let no man be deny'd iustice. for this is to be kings , and iudges ; this , to be common fathers to all poore and rich , great & small , meane and mighty . audite illos ( saith god ) et quod iustum est , iudicate , siue ciuis illesit , siue perigrinus , nulla erit distantia personarum , ita paruum audietis , vt magnum , nec accipietis cuiusquam personam quia dei iudicium est . heare the controuersies betweene your brethren , and iudge righteously betweene euery man and his brother , and the stranger that is with him . yee shall haue no respect of person in iudgement , but shall heare the small as well as the great ; ye shall not feare the face of man , for the iudgement is gods. chap. xxii . of iustice distributiue . it appertayneth to distributiue iustice ( as we told you in the former chapter ) to repart and deuide in a conuenient and fitting manner the goods , the honours , dignities and offices of the common-wealth . for ( as dionysius saith ) bonum , est diffusiuum : good , is a diffusiue kinde of thing , it is a scatterer , and of it selfe , a spreader of it selfe . and by how much the greater the good is , by so much with the greater force doth it communicate it selfe . and hence doth it come to passe , that god is so liberall and so exceeding bountifull as he is ( that i may not say prodigall ) with men , by communicating himselfe vnto them by all possible meanes , euen to the communicating of himselfe by that most excellent and highest kinde of manner , that he could possible deuise , which was , by giuing himselfe to himselfe , and by submitting himselfe so low as to become true man , that man might be exalted so high , as to be made equall with god , by that ineffable and diuine vnion , which the diuines call hypostaticall . so that you see , that good , in it's owne condition & nature , hath this propertie with it to be communicable , & by so much the more , by how much the more great it is . and herein , kings ought to be like vnto god , whose place they supply hereon earth ; for certainly , by so much the more properly shal they participate of good kings , by how much the more they shall haue of this communicatiue qualitie . and so much the neerer shall they resemble god , with by how much the more liberalitie they shall repart and diffuse these outward goods , whose distribution appertaineth vnto them . and to him cannot the name of king truely sute , who hath not alwayes a willing minde , and as it were a longing desire , to communicate himselfe . now , for to temper and moderate this generall longing , and inflamed desire , & this so naturall and proper an appetite , of bestowing and diuiding the riches , and common goods of the common-wealth , this part of iustice , which they call distributiue was held the most necessary . which aristotle says , either is , or ought to be in a king , as in such a lordly subiect , and person , to whom this repartition and communication , properly belongeth . wherein , aboue all other things , kings ought to vse most circumspection , prudence , and care , for that therein , they vsually suffer most cosenage , and deceit : for , in regard that to giue , is in it selfe so pleasing and delightfull a thing ; and so properly appertaining to their greatnesse , and state , they doe easily let loose the reines to this noble desire , and send giftes this way and that way , in such poste-baste , that within a few dayes they run themselues out of all , and draw dry not onely the kings particular wealth and treasure , but the riches of the whole kingdome , were they neuer so great . so that , what is done in this kinde with so much content and pleasure , ought to be done but now and then : for such great courtesies , and extraordinary kindnesses , must not be made too common , for feare of drawing on a dis-esteeme of them ; nor done but in their due time and season , not vnaduisedly , before hand , and vpon no merit or desert , but when others want and necessitie , and his owne honour and noblenesse , shall oblige him to expresse his bounty : and in good sooth , there is not any moathe , which doth so consume , nor any caterpiller or grasse-hopper , that doth so crop and destroy the power of well doing , and the vertue of liberalitie , as the loose hand , that can hold nothing , and in a lauish and disproportionable manner scatters it's donatiues , with so vnequall a distribution , that the dignitie of the gift , is drowned in the indiscretion of the giuer . and therefore , as it is in the spanish prouerb . which speakes very well to this purpose ; para dar , y tener , seso es menester : a very good braine it will craue , to know when to spend , when to saue . yet mistake me not i beseech you ; for it is no part of my meaning , nor did it euer come within my thought , or desire , to perswade kings to be close-fisted , and couetous , a vice to be hated and abhorred in all men , but in them much more . that which i say , is ; that , to the end that may not be wanting vnto kings , which doth so much importe them , and is so proper vnto them , as to giue rewards , and bestow fauours , it is fit , that they should doe these things so , that they may be able to doe them often . and according to the olde saying ; to giue so at one time , as we may giue at another . your trees in holy scripture , are sometimes taken for the hieroglyffe , or embleme of kings , for that they are in some things like vnto them ; wherof , we shall speak hereafter . but that , which makes now for our present purpose , is ; that the tree , shewing such a largenes , spreadingnes , and bountifullnesse , in discouering it's fruit through it's boughes and branches , and it 's inuiting vs , and presenting it's prouision vnto vs , first in the flower and blossome , to the end wee may come to gather that fruit , which yearely it bringeth forth in it's due time and season ; and yet notwithstanding , hideth and concealeth it's rootes all that it can , because there lyes that fountaine , from whence all this good doth spring . as also , for that if in that part it should suffer any hurt or detriment , all the rest would cease , nor would it flourish and fructifie any more . and i am of opinion , that when kings cannot content themselues with conferring of fauors , and bestowing of gifts out of those fruites and profits , which shall arise out of their yearely reuenewes , but that the very rents , a rayzes , and juros reales , shall be giuen away in perpetuitie , or for one or two lifes , which is a kinde of rooting or grubbing vp of the tree ; the king shall thereby be disinabled , and depriued for euer of the fruit of those mercedes and fauours , which he might from time to time , not onely yearely , but daily , and howerly , haue afforded many of his good and well deseruing subiects . as did that other , who , because they should not trouble him with comming vnto him , to craue of the fruite , of a very good tree which he had in his garden , caused it to bee rooted vp , and to be sent amongst them , to make their best of it ; whose fruite , had he let the tree stand , might haue pleasurd a many , and that many a time and oft , whereas now it could but content a few for the present , and peraduenture , not so well pleased neither , because thereby all hope was taken from them of hauing the like againe . alexander the great , who was very liberall in his gifts , said once to this purpose ; i like not that gardiner , that puls vp the trees of his garden by the roote : giuing thereby to vnderstand , that a king is a faire beautifull , and dainty delicate garden , wherein ( like so many trees ) are planted , the kings rents , and b juros reales , and whiles the rayzes , or roote of them , shall remaine aliue and whole , they may yeelde good store of fruit , but if they come once to be rooted vp , they presently grow dry , and wither away . in the fourth chapter of the prophesie of daniel is set downe that dreame , wherein the king of babylon nabucodonosor , saw that huge high tree whose top did reach vp to heauen , and whose boughes did stretch and extend themselues to the vttermost ends of all the earth , and so laden with fruit , that there was prouision and sustenance sufficient for all the men and beasts of the world , and was a shadow and shelter vnto all that came vnder it . and daniel , by the helpe of the diuine spirit , declaring this dreame , told him ; arborem , quam vidisti ; tu es rex . the tree that thou sawest , is thou , o king. that tree , was an expresse signification , of that king , and of the vastnes and greatnesse of his monarchie , and of that which conueneth , and is proper to such monarckes . which is : to communicate their fruit to all , to sustaine and maintaine their subiects , and to hugg , and defend them vnder the shadow of their wings ; and this is said to haue beene , and to haue contineued with that monarke ; whilest the tree stood whole and sound : but the dreame , and it's declaration , proceeded farther , and daniel told the king ; that after he had seene the beautie and greatnesse of that tree , he heard likewise a most strong and fearefull voyce from heauen , pronouncing a most heauie and rigorous sentence , that the tree should be hewen downe , and the boughes lopt off , and so wholy and vtterly destroyed , that the creatures that came thither and were fed and maintayned by it's fruit , fled thence , and forsooke it . yet the stump of the rootes thereof was left in the earth , and bound about with a bond of brasse , and yron , &c. in this dreame , were signified three things , declared by the selfe same prophet , with the same spirit of god. first , the fall of that king and kingdome , in those lopt boughes , and the hewing of it downe , and leauing it fruitlesse ; secondly , that which vsually befalls kings , who not hauing wherewithall to giue , all those doe leaue and forsake him , which before did follow him . thirdly , that when the rootes remaine , there is hope that it may be restored , and returne to it's former greatnesse : as was to be seene in this king , whom god so seuerely punished for his sinnes . for the rootes of the said tree remained still whole and sound , and were a most certaine prognostication , and assured hope , that hee was to be restored to his former estate . so that when in kingdomes , the rayzes of the rents royall , remaine whole and intire , though in the giuing away of the fruites , there be much bounty and liberalitie vsed , those breaches may be made vp againe , which are occasioned by so large a hand ; but when the rayzes are grub'd vp , when the roote that should giue sap and life , is gone , there is not any means of restauration to be made or found , though kings should charge their kingdomes with neuer such excessiue tributes , and draw ( as they say ) the very heart blood from forth their subiects bodies . in a word therefore , there ought to be had in giuing , order , moderation , and temperance ; for a prince , that giues without these conditions , is not liberall , but prodigall , a great scatterer and waster , and if not contenting himselfe with the fruites of the tree , he will haue a pull at the rootes , lord haue mercy on that land , for it is to be feared , that king will turne destroyer . giuing hath it's times , its taxe , it's limits , and it 's orderly maner in the doing thereof . the excesse whereof , doth crosse and contradict distributiue iustice. wherein is to be considered the kings abilitie ; then the seruices and merits of the persons ; and last of all the distribution it selfe , which must be done with discretion and prudence . for all must not be throwen vpon one either part , or partie ; nor kings be like riuers ; which rising out of their bedds , breaking forth beyond their bounds , vndoe some , and enrich others ; robbing many , to raise one . god free euery good common-wealth from such distributions as these , which are rather destructions then distributions , and actions of iniustice , not of iustice. and god ( i beseech him ) so illighten the vnderstanding and heartes of kings , that they may in an orderly kinde of manner conferre their fauours , and giue rather reasonable rewards to many , then extrauagant ones to a few . for the raine doth then most good , when all haue the comfort of it . but when it powres downe in one place alone , that marr's and spoyles all . some grounds for want thereof are parched and dryed vp ; and other some , by too much , are ouerflowen , and made fruitlesse . in like manner a king , showring downe all the water of his liberalitie vpon one particular person , it cannot but breede a generall discontent and languishment , in all the rest of his subiects . and more is the hurt , which resulteth from those , that are offended with the great fauours conferred on others , then the good that ariseth from those that are benefitted by them . for the first neuer forget the wrong they thinke they haue receiued ; and the second treate of that they haue receiued , as of a due debt . and all these , and a great many more inconueniences grow from the not true obseruing of this distributiue iustice. let kings conferre fauours on their publicke ministers , and vpon such persons , as haue done them great and notable seruices , both in peace , and in warre : for this will be well pleasing , and very acceptable vnto all , and will oblige them all to new seruices ; and such a generall content will it cause in all sortes of people , that it will make them to brook with the better patience those great fauours , which are vndeseruedly done vnto others , being in themselues men of no merit in the world . i would not haue kings to be too much carried away with the inclination of their own mindes , for as they are kings , they will euermore be apt to giue much . but i would haue them to place their eyes , as also their consideration , vpon the qualitie of the person , to whom they giue , according to the rules of distributiue iustice. for from that in the receiuer , and this in the giuer , is formed that temperance , moderation , and equitie , which giues liberality it's being , and makes it to be a vertue heroicall , and worthy kings ; which , if it be fayling in ether of these , the one , or the other , it shall merit no such name ; as you shall see by and by , when we come to conclude this discourse ; wherein we aduertise those that giue , that it shall be much prudence , and make likewise much for the good of the party himselfe , that receiueth , to goe leysurely along with him in these mercedes , and fauours . for this difference i finde to be betweene offences , and punishments , fauours , and benefits , that the first are done but once , because in discretion they will not goe dayly nourishing the passion of those who receiue the harme thereby , and stand in feare lest the like ill might happen vnto them selues . as for the second , it is fitting that they be done often , giuing now a little , and then a little , that it may the better penetrate the palate , and please the taste of him that receiueth them ; as in our bodily meates and drinkes , bit after bit , & draught after draught , agrees better with our health , and taste , then grosse feeding and full cups . besides , this faire and frequent distribution , cannot but cause a more settled loue in those persons on whom they are bestowed , as also in those , who liue in expectation of the like . chap. xxiii . how , and in what sort , limitation in giuing , may sute with the greatnesse of kings . now i see the reply , and the argument , which may be made against that , which we haue mentioned in the former chapter . for this same sising of kings fauours , and these same short bounds of bounty , wherein some would shut them vp , seemeth no way compatible with the authoritie and greatnesse of kings ; especially on such occasions , wherein they are forced to bestow them vpon persons that are deseruingly qualified for them , and that haue done notable seruices , who are not to be gratified with small gifts ; nor may that seeme to bee much , which is giuen but once . first of all i answer hereunto , that it stands with good reason , that they , who haue spent their meanes , and the better and greater part of their liues , in the seruice of their king and common-wealth , should be recompensed according to the qualitie of their persons and seruices , when kings are well able to doe it , without putting themselues in necessitie , or charging their subiects ( which they too vsually doe ) with extraordinary impositions . and if it be well considered , the maine drift of our former chapter was , that things might be so ordred , that kings might haue wherewithall to giue vpon such like occasions . that therefore which i say , is this ; that they ought to holde their hand in those gifts , which they giue meerely vpon their owne pleasure and humour , that they may the better cumply with those which lye vpon them by way of obligation . for they , that haue vnder their charge and command such a multitude and number of subiects , it is not meete , that they should conferre many and great fauours vpon a few , and few or none vpon many ; shewing grace vnto some with that , which in iustice is due vnto others , whose often sweats , perpetuall labour , and extreame neede , serue now for riches , regalos , intertainments , and annuall rents to those , who in all the whole course of their life , neuer knew what it was to moyle and toyle , or to take any paines for the common-wealth . nay , which is more ( and it grieueth my soule to speake it ) the sweat , and blood of poore labouring men , is conuerted into rose water , for to feede their delightes and pleasures , and that in such wastfull , riotous , & loose intertainments , as certainely beseemeth not christians but epicures and sardanapalians , who did denie , the immortalitie of the soule . woe vnto them ( saith god ) that are at ease in syon , woe vnto you great potentates and rulers ouer the people , who enter in state into the temples , and goe thence in pompe : who delight in lasciuiousnesse , lying vpon bedds of yuory : who eate the lambes of the flock & the calfes out of the stall ; who drink wine in bowles , and annoynt themselues with the chiefe oyntments ; who sing to the sound of the violls , and inuent to themselues instruments of musicke ; no man in the meane while being sorie for the afflictions of ioseph , or taking pitie and compassion of those poore miserable wretches , who must wring and smart to maintaine these their idle and vnnecessary vanities . but the world will be altred with these men one day , and a time shall come , wherein ( as that princely prophet saith . ) laetabitur justus , cum viderit vindictam ; manus suas lauabit in sanguine peccatorum : the righteous shall reioyce when hee seeth the vengeance , he shall wash his hands in the blood of the wicked . and men shall say , verily there is fruit for the righteous ; doubtlesse there is a god , that iudgeth in the earth . then shall lazarus reioyce and be glad in abrahams bosome ; and the rich glutton lying in hell , shall begg a dropp of cold water and haue no body to giue it him . and if any man should say vnto me that the grandeza , and greatnesse of kings , requireth , that great rewards should be giuen both to the one , and the other . my answer vnto him is ; that nothing better becommeth kings , for the conseruing of their greatnesse , then to know that they are but men , and that they cannot stand in competition with god , whose fountaine of riches , is infinite , and is able to fill and satisfie all , and neuer can be drawne dry , though it be imparted and distributed to neuer so many . whereas that of men , is but like vnto the water of a cisterne , which by being communicated to many is diminished and exhausted . king nabucodonosor , and other kings ( of whose falls , there is mention made in the scripture ) for default of this knowledg , fel from their estates : and let that tree , whose top touched heauen , and whose boughes did ouerspread the whole world ( whereof wee so lately made mention ) serue now the second time for an example , which going about to imbrace all in it 's owne armes , and to giue sustenance in aboundance to all , and pretending to exalt it selfe as high as heauen , did pay the price of this it's pride , autoritie , and signorie : and did so farre prouoke gods anger against it , that hee commanded it to bee hewen down , & that being layd leuell with the earth , it might acknowledge , how much limited , and how short was it's power . sithence therfore that it is not possible for kings to vse much liberalitie and bounty towards all , there is a great deale of reason , why they should forbeare voluntary donatiues for to discharge obligatory paiments ; whereunto in rigour of iustice , he is strictly bound . the apostle saint iames saith ; that the debtes , which are due vnto them , that haue done seruice , cry vnto god , and that the teares of the poore ascend vp vnto heauen , to the end that from thence may come forth a writ of execution against those , that haue beene the cause thereof . and your catholike and christian kings are not to place their greatnesse and authoritie , on that , as did your heathen kings , and those that were without the light of faith . who pretended nothing else in their gifts and fauours , but vaine-glory , and the idle applause of the world . according to that saying of our sauiour iesus christ. reges gentium dominantur eorum & quipotestatem habent super eos , benefici vocantur . the kings of the gentiles raigne ouer them , and they that beare rule ouer them , are called bountifull . true authoritie , and greatnesse , doth not con●ist , in magnificencies , and prodigalities , which are not regular , and ruled by reason : which requireth , to cumply first with what is due , and that neither kings , nor their subiects , should thrust themselues into necessity and want , to satisfie the ambition and couetousnesse of those , who ( as salomon sayth ) like vnto horse-leaches ; semper dicunt , affer , affer , still cry ; giue , giue . that , which distributiue iustice requireth , is ; that kings should repart the common goods of the republicke , conformeable to the meritts and seruices of euery one ; preferring alwayes the publicke , before any particular good , and ioyntly with this , that they goe clinching the hand for a while , that they may afterwards stretch it out more at large , when it shall be fitting for them so to doe . and this is liberalitie , that vertuous and noble meane , betweene those vicious extreames , auarice , and prodigalitie . when our sauipur christ had sufficiently fed that great multitude which followed him into the desert , they no sooner found themselues full , but they presently resolued amongst themselues to make him their king . and this their determination , grew from two things which they saw to bee in him . the one his noble disposition , in affording them such free and plentifull intertainment ; the other for his great prudence and good gouerment , in giuing order that the peeces of bread , and other the fragments that were left , should be gathered vp . colligite , quae super auerunt fragmeta , ne pereant . gather vp the broaken meate , which remayneth , that nothing be lost . nor did he doe this , that he had neede to set it vp , or keep it to serue at some other time vpon the like occasion ; for he could ( as often as he would ) haue made bread of stones ; but to instruct , and teach kings to knowe both to spend , and saue , to giue , and hoord vp , where , how and when it is fitting , in regard that their power is limited . moreouer kings are to consider that they , who at one clap receiue much from them , grow so fat and pur●ie , that they are not able to serue and follow them as they were wont , and sometimes they retire themselues , and nere returne againe , to see either king or court , vnlesse meere couetousnesse , and greedinesse of gaine draw them thither to beg , more and more , & to cramme their purses . being like vnto that crowe which noah sent out of the arke , who as soone as he had found firme footing , and whereon to feede his fill , neuer came back again . kings palaces are , like noahs arke , where there is a great diuersitie in the conditions of men ; and generally you shall meete there with more crowes , then doues . and here , i will with your good leaue , take a little libertie , to diuert my selfe from the testimonies of holy scripture , to those of great kings and monarckes , some of one nation , and some of another . and the first , that i shall begin withall , shall be king don alonso of sicily , who walking along by the sea-side , caused many gobbets of flesh , some great , and some small , mingled one amongst another to be brought vnto him , and still as the crowes ( which were many ) came about him , to some hee threw out the lesser , to other the larger morsells . those that went away with the great gobbets , came no more in sight , but fled their way ; but those that had but a small pittance , and were not so full gorged , they followed the king whether so euer he went , and neuer forsooke him . who tolde those that were then about him ; in this ( my masters ) yee may see , how much it importeth kings to distribute their fauours with moderation and temper . philip king of macedon , did much reprehend his sonne alexander for being too lauish of his fauours , and too excessiue in his giftes . telling him , that thereby hee peruerted the mindes of those , that were to serue him , who in stead of seruing him with that loue & loyalty which in duty they were bound vnto , they would now onely serue him for their owne particular interest , and proper commoditie making , by this meanes , affection and fidelitie become a kinde of trading , and merchandizing . and certainely so it is , that when mens mindes make interest their aime , and daily to get more and more , they become saleable , and tender their seruice to those , that wil giue them most . and they , which doe thus accustome themselues to craue and take , the loue of friendship and that thankefull acknowledgement , which is due to the doner , is turned into interessed loue ; which is called by the name of concupisence , and are ( as the comicke poet saith ) like vnto those lewd huswifes which , amore●carent , mun●● amantis amant ; loue not so much the man , as his money , nor his person , as his purse . you shall seldome see a man , that is ( as they say ) a pediguen●● , a crauing companion , one that is still begging one thing or other , that hath not some touch of couetousnesse , and some tincture more or lesse of vnthankefullnesse . for , in regard that these men loue themselues , and their owne interest so well , they haue not one drop of loue left for others , and if any doe remaine , they conferre it on a third person , through whose hands , that which they pretend is to passe . and the king , and prince , to whom all is due , rest depriued of two things , that are the most substantiall and of most importance for the conseruation , perpetuation , and augmentation of his kingdome , which are their subiects loue , and thankes . for the truest kinde of raigning and the likest to gods kingdome , is to gaine the heartes of their subiects , and to make themselues ( as much as in them lyes ) lordes and masters of their good wills. and it is our dayly experience , to see persons that haue beene highly and richly gratified , and extraordinarily well rewarded , to haue proud very vnthankfull . for , this fault great benefits haue with them , and such as are dis-equall to the deserts of those persons that receiue them , that they are not thankfully accepted of ; and those that are benefitted , to the end that they may not bewray this their imperfection ( being such , as it is no lesse , then so great a sinne , as ingratitude ) they soone learne to forget them ; but those that are conferred on others , neuer slip out of their remembrance . in a word , of all that that is begg'd , and of all them that begg , few there are , that forbeare to goe this way . in confirmation whereof , we may alleadge heere that question , which christ made to one of those ten leapers which hee healed , shewing himselfe not halfe well pleased with the rest of his fellowes . nonne decem mundati sunt , et nouem vbi sunt ? non est inuentus , qui rediret & dares gloriam deo , nisi hic alienigena : are there not ten cleansed ? but where are the nine ? there is none found , that returned to giue god prayse , saue this stranger . in kings pallaces , your strangers and those that are newly come to court , are your onely thankfull men ; for those , that are well acquainted with the court , familiarly attend the person of the king , and are still assistent vnto him vpon all occasion , neuer acknowledge the fauours that are done them , bee they neuer so great : they are alwayes crauing , but are neuer satisfied ; they swallow downe whole riuers , and wonder not at it ; they thinke all iordan is too little for them , and that they shall no soner open their mouth ; but they must presently sup it vp . and the reason hereof , is ; because they verily perswade themselues , that all whatsoeuer you giue them , ( be it neuer so much ) is due vnto them for their seruices , and their dayly assistencies . i therefore say , ( and therein say but the trut , ) that one of the greatest happinesses , that can befall kings , is ; to be serued by noble persons , and men of honour gente granada ( as the spaniards tearme them ) iolly , strong , lusty people , proper , comely men , and persons of best and most account both for riches and honour . but this is the mischeife of it , that this golde , which should make such a glorious shew in court , and shine both in honour and goodnesse , is canckred and rusted by auarice and ambition , which eates into all mens mindes , and wholly possesseth them . so that from the highest to the lowest , they are all well read in the schoole of couetousnesse , dissimulation , and deceit ; and your priests , and those that weare miters on their heads , are not in this kinde the meanest schollers amongst them . all complaine , they are not rewarded , that they haue nothing giuen them , & if they haue any thing giuen them they thinke it is all too litle . and betwixt this their complayning , & their thankefull acceptance , there is set vp such a strong partition , that it neither suffereth them to acknowledge a benefit , nor to intertaine it with that thankfullnesse as they ought . all now a dayes attend their own interest , and not their kings seruice ; who may say that of them , which god spake by malachie ; who is there euen among you , that would shut the doores of my house , or kindle but a coale on mine altar in vaine ? not one , i assure you , but will be well payd for his paines . there is not that sexton , that cloyster cleanser , nor scullion of the kitchen , but will haue good wages , & other ayudes de costa , or by-helps . this great traine ( saith seneca ) of seruants and attendants , seeke not so much after a master , as money , a friend , as a fortune . miserable is the condition of kings , whom none loue for themselues but for their owne ends , and the good they expect from them ; so that this their priuate interest fayling them , their seruices faile with it , & likewise faileth ( so says s. isidore ) that loue & loyalty which is due vnto them , non sunt fideles , quos munus , non gratia copulat , nam citò deserunt , nisi semper accipiant ; those whom lucre , not loue linketh , cannot bee faithfull . for vnlesse they be still on the taking hand , they vanish , and are quickly gone . yet is it not my intent and purpose in that which i haue sayd , to condemne those who demaund their pay and satisfaction for their seruices , to relieue their necessities . for therein they doe but vse that lawfull course which is appointed for them by way of petition . howbeit , aristotle , plato , and other philosophers , would haue subiects to be solicitous not in sueing , but in seruing . and i farther affirme , that princes are to take it to their charge , to content those that haue done them good seruice ; it being the principall office of distributiue iustice , carefully & vigilantly to distribute riches and honours , to those that haue deserued them . and this vndoubtedly , is one of the most effectuall meanes for the good gouernment of a common-wealth ; for , as those three diuine vertues , faith , hope , and loue , are increased and augmented by praying vnto god ; so on the contrarie , are they lessned and diminished by sueing vnto men. for when subiects serue , and not sueing obtaine that which they deserue ▪ humane faith , hope , and loue , is augmented in them ; because thereby , they are taught to rely on the vertue and wisedome of their soueraigne , who applyes himselfe to euery mans meritts , and the iustnesse and vprightnesse of his cause ; for which cause they will loue him much , but much more , when he giues without being importuned with petitions . and it seemeeth vnto them that hee giues not more willingly , then he doth wisely , in applying himselfe onely to reason and iustice , and not to the importunate petitions of pretenders . and therefore kings are not to content themselues onely with paying that which they owe , and to doe mercedes and fauours to them that serue them ; but that these should likewise goe accompanied with loue and good will ; for with remuneration are the seruices requited ; and with loue , are they obliged to doe them still more and better seruice . in that case , which the scripture recounteth of king assuerus , who , one night being not able to sleep and take his rest , commanded lights to be brought in , and some that were about him , to take that booke , and read vnto him , wherein were written the notable things that past in his raigne , and amongst the rest , there was mention made of a great peece of seruice , which mardochee did him , freeing him from that death , which two of his eunuches had plotted against him , by discouering this their treason , demanded of those there present ; what honour and dignitie hath beene giuen to mordochee for this his fidelitie towards me , and the good seruice he hath done mee ? and the kings seruants that ministred vnto him , sayd ; there is nothing done for him . whereupon , he presently bestowed vpon him such great honors and dignities , that vnlesse he should haue giuen him his kingdome , he could not well haue giuen him more . thus was this good seruant rewarded , honoured , and graced by his lord and master , who without being importuned , gratiously called his good seruices to remembrance , and honoured him aboue all the princes of his kingdome . and i could wish , that all that are rewarded by their kings , might receiue their recompence vpon the like good tearmes of reason , and iustice. but now a dayes , poore and slender seruices ( the more is the pitie ) finde copious , and plentifull rewards ; and those ( ordinarily ) accompanied with ingratitude ; a thing , which nature it selfe abhorreth ; and which tyes gods hands from giuing , who is so liberall and so rich ; and dryes vp that ouerflowing fountaine of his boundlesse mercies , from affording vs any farther fauour , or comfort . chap. xxiiii . of the repartment and diuision which is to be vsed in the conferring of offices ; and of the knowledge of such persons , as ought to bee nominated for the sayd offices . llet vs consider a king ( saith the philosopher ) in his kingdome , as we would a father of many children in his familie . societas enim patris ad filios , regni praese fert effigiem : the societie of a father towards his children , represents the true forme of a kingdome . let any man compare the power royall to what hee will , and ( according to aristotles opinion ) hee shall finde no one thing that doth fit so well with it , or giues it so much fullnesse , as the title of father , who day and night beates his braines , and imployes all his whole study on that , which is most fitting for his children regarding more the good which hee may bee able to doe them , then any profit that he expects to receiue from them . how many times whilest his children , are a bed and a sleepe , doth the father lye awake , casting , and deuising with himselfe , how he may mantayne them , and better them in their estate ? what a deale of care doth hee take to get his daughter a good husband , who is dearer vnto him , then himselfe ? great is his care ; but much more ought the care of a king to bee in giuing to their kingdome , good , faithfull , and diligent ministers , to the end that they may doe all possible diligences , ( as hath beene sayd heeretofore ) fixing alwayes their eyes on the common good , and directing likewise their owne particular in the same way . that which i would say , ( to expresse it in plainer termes ) is this ; that they are not to subiect the offices to the commoditie of the men , but to seeke out men , that are fit and sufficient for them . when saul was resolued to recommend vnto dauid that duell , or single combat against the gyant goliah , the better to accommodate him , as also therein to honour him the more , hee put his owne rayment vpon him , and an helment of brasse vpon his head , and a brigandine , and all the rest of his owne compleat armour ; but dauid , who was a man of little stature , and not accustomed to shut vp in harnesse , found the weight thereof to be too heauie for him , and very troublesome to his body ; yet notwithstanding , to obey the kings command , and that hee might not seeme to reiect the honour the king was pleased to doe him , hee was willing to make tyrall , si arma●us posset incedere ; whether hee could goe in it , or no ? for he had neuer proued it . but when hee found hee could hardly goe in it , and that he had not the free libertie and command of his body , hee sayd vnto the king ; non possum sic incedere , quia non vsum habeo : i cannot goe with these ; for i am not accumstomed . and therefore rather made choyse to betake himselfe to his sheepheards staffe , his stones , and his sling , which he knew well how to vse , then to put on the kings royall rayment , together with his rich armour , and afterward to giue an ill account of what was committed vnto him . but where shall you meete with the man in these dayes , that is like vnto dauid ? nor is it fit for kings , in this particular to imitate saul , for we dayly see notable losses in matters of warre , and peace ; by accommodating and honouring such persons with offices , as had neuer beene trayned vp in them , wanting that sufficiencie of knowledge , which is fitting for the administration of them . as for your prebends , and other ecclesiasticall dignities , whose nomination appertaineth vnto kings , they had neede take the greater care therein by so much the more , by how much spirituall things , are of more importance , then temporall . your ancient canons and councells will bee your direction in this case , and teach yee , what yee are to doe and doe inforce it , with such weighty and effectuall reasons , that they are worthy to be read , and considered by kings , when they make the like elections , or nominations , to the end that they may not erre therein : and heere will i bring to their remembrance , that which god did , when that famous and ancient tabernacle was to be built , which was to be a figure of his holy church . who ( as the scripture tells vs ) nominated bezaleel a curious workeman in all manner of workemanship , whom he filled with his holy spirit , and indewed him with wisedome and knowledge from heauen , that hee might finish that worke , and bring it to perfection , god himselfe hauing drawen the plot , and being the chiefe , and principall contriuer thereof . and if for that dead edifice , for which humane skill and dexteritie might seeme to haue beene sufficient , there was made choice of a man of such singular wisedome , and such admirable partes , as is there mentioned in exodus ; for the gouernment of a kingdome , for the ordring of a common-wealth , for to put euery thing in it's right place , and to administer iustice equally to all , giuing euery one that which is his ; things all of them of such great importance , and which doe so much beautifie and grace this mysticall body of the church , what ministers will it bee necessary , that kings should seeke out and inquire after ? namely men , that are full of the spirit of god , wise vnderstanding men , good christians , and adorned with all manner of vertues . and if they will not beleeue me , let them looke vpon that first election , which the apostles made , when iudas turned apostata , despayr'd , and hung himselfe . in which election , they made choyse of saint mathias , a man well knowen , as one that had beene bred vp amongst them , and from whom they had receiued very good satisfaction . oportet ex his viris , qui nobiscum sunt congregati , in omni tempore , quo dominus &c. testem resurrectionis eius nobiscum fieri vnum ex istis . wherefore of these men , which haue accompanied with vs , all the time , that the lord iesus was conuersant amongst vs , &c. must one of them be made a witnesse with vs of his resurrection . i say , that when kings finde sufficient partes and aduantagious abilities in those whom they know , and haue neere about them , and in their court , the election may in all likely-hood seeme to light more safely and happely vpon them , then any other . for they , who being still in our eye , discouer no faultes , it may be presumed , that they haue not any ; for if they had , in such persons they would hardly be hid . and let this be exemplified in some , nay many of those your pictures which being beheld a farre off seeme to be curious peeces , but drawing neere vnto them , appeare to be but course worke , and discouer great faultes . and therefore diogenes sayd , you must stand aloofe to looke vpon great statuas ; and i say ; that he who in his speech , seemeth to be wise and discreete , ought to be taken for no lesse . for by a mans silent reseruednesse , and holding his peace , it is not much , if he passe for a wise man ; because the holy-ghost saith ; stultus quoque si tacuerit , sapiens reputabitur : euen a foole , when he holdeth his peace , is counted wise . in like manner , may he seeme to be a good man , that is a great way from vs , because we neither see his deedes , nor heare his words . and peraduenture , for this reason it was ordayned , that the pope could not be chosen , vnlesse he had beene one of the number and fellowship of those cardinalls there present at the time of the election . and when kings , cannot meete with sufficient persons amongst those whom they know , they must looke others out , though they bee farther off . for so did the wisest king that euer was , king salomon ; who vsed diligences out of his owne kingdome , for to seeke out the best artificers , and such as were the fittest and ablest men for the building of the temple . he could not content himselfe with good workemen onely , but he sought out those likewise , that were the best , and the worthiest . the like course ought kings to take ; who alwayes , in those elections that they make , for the building and vpholding of this edifice of the church , should not content themselues with electing onely those that are good , but in seeking out the best and the worthiest . whereby their conscience shall rest the more secure , and freer from opinion . whereas in doing the contrary , those that are the wisest , and the most learned , affirme ; that their conscience is not onely charged therewith but that they are likewise bound to the restitution of the robbery , that is therein done to the church . and it is a lamentable thing , that for to pleasure a priuate subiect , that he may eate and drinke his fill , and triumph in his pleasures , a king should put himselfe in hazard of going to hell. but aboue all the foresayd diligences , kings ought to haue recourse vnto prayers & supplications , beseeching almightie god that he will illuminate their vnderstandings that they may elect the best . for so did the apostles ; who being to picke out two of of the best out of the whole pack of those that were there , at the time , when they were to proceede to the election , they betooke themselues to prayer , vttering these words so full of meekenesse and humilitie ; tu domine , qui nosti corda omnium , ostende , quem elegeris ex his duobus vnum , accipere locum ministerij huius : thou lord , which knowest the hearts of all men , shew whether of these two , thou hast chosen , that hee may take the roome of this administration , and apostleship . for , being that mens goodnesse and sufficiencie , principally consisteth in the inwardst part of the heart , which is so close , and so subiect to change , that god onely can truly know it , it is fit , that we should refer the mayne of these our elections to him , to the end that they may be guided by his holy spirit , and that hee may be the chie●e and principall elector in them . this , which we haue said touching prouision of those that are knowen in court , it seemeth , that it may open a gap for those that are tumultuous pretenders , and ambitious courtiers , to carry all before them , and let nothing that falls , scape their fingers . for these are much better knowen , then those wise and vertuous men , who ordinarily liue retyred , and attend more to the complying with obligations of their profession , and function , then to the compliments of those , who spend their whole life in pretensions . and it hapneth not once , nor twice , but dayly , and ordinarily , that they who follow the court , and frequent princes pallaces , haue not so much followed their studies , and frequented the schooles . and few there are of them , which take pleasure in reading of bookes , to informe their knowledge , and to supply that , which is defectiue in them , concerning the knowledge of businesses , and the true vnderstanding and execution of their offices . but the miserie of it is , that if a wise and prudent man shall seeke to make his entrance and accesse to the king , the porters will shut the doore against him . and fooles hauing such free entrance it is no wonder that wise men are kept out . as it hapned to that wise philosopher who being clad in a meane but honest habit , pressed amongst the rest to the kings antecamera , or with-drawing chamber , where hee vsed to giue audience , hauing very necessary occasion to speake vnto him . but as hee offered to come in , the porter still clappt the doore against him , and would not suffer him to enter . hee being a discreete man , presently entred into the reckoning of it , and seeing how the world went , shifted himselfe out of the companie , and changing his poore , for a rich habit , and being in the fashion as others vse to be , that are not knowen , to make them selues knowen in court , way was made him , and he presently let in . and at his going in , hee kissed his cloake , and sayd ; honoro honorantem me , quia quod virtus non potuit , vestis obtinuit : i honour thee , that hast honourd me , for what vertue could not effect , my costly cloathing hath obtained ; for he that is rich and well clad , is commonly the best knowen and most respected . vir benè vestitus , pro vestibus , esse peritus creditur à mille , quamuis idiota ●it ille . he that goes , in gay cloathes , a wise man is held to be ; though some know , ther 's not so arrant a cocks-combe , as he . et sapiens , non accedit ad fores , quas durus ianitor obsidet : but your men that are wise , discreete , and vertuous , beare not so base a minde , as to go thither , where they either know or haue cause to feare , that they shall be debarr●d of entrance : so that for the most part , the most deseruing , are the least knowen . to this point therefore i reply , that those men , which are to be nominated for offices , and dignities , may be knowen two manner of wayes ; first , by that good fame and report which goes of them , and that opinion of vertue , learning , and wisedome , which the world holdeth of them . which we may rightly compare to the sweete and fragrant odour of that pretious and costly oyntment , which the blessed mary magdalen powred forth on our sauiours feet ; wherof it was said ; repleta est domus ex odore vnguenti : that the whole house was filled with the sauour of the oyntment . when either in court , citie or countrie , there is found a man , who is like a sweete sauor in the nostrills of all men , and beares about him , and scatters in what companie soeuer he comes , a most odoriferous and pleasing perfume of his vertue , holinesse , and learning ( which is as saint paul says of himselfe , and his fellow labourers , the sweet sauour of christ ) there is no neede to seeke for any other knowledge , or to make any farther inquiry ; for this is sufficient of it selfe to make choyse of him , and to conferre vpon him the greatest offices of trust ; it being safer to put them into his hands , then into many of those men , that are more in his maiesties eye , and by sight better knowen vnto him . for the best knowledge of man is by the eare . and he that will not beleeue me , let him reade saint austin , who in a letter which he wrote to saint ierome , hauing expressed the great desire and content that hee should take in the knowledge and sight of him , corrects that speech of his , saying ; that he had not spoken well , in saying ; that he did not know him , because he had seene his most learned bookes wherein were represented vnto him his very heart and soule . in like manner , he that shall be knowen by the like fame , or by the learned bookes , that hee hath written ; or if he be a souldier , by the great and noble acts that hee hath done , or by his good gouernment , in those places of commaund which hee hath held ; such a one i say , is sufficiently well knowen , though he had neuer put his head within the court gates , or seene the pallaces of kings . the second kind of knowledge , is that which your ambitious and solicitous pretenders doe giue of themselues , who are ordinary attendants and assistents in the courts and palaces of kings and princes , and the houses of their ministers , seeking to insinuate themselues into their grace and fauour , by flatteries , compliments , and lyes , and oftentimes by giftes ▪ and subornations , against which the doore is neuer shut , because they carry about them ( if need be ) the master key , not a gilded key , but a key of pure golde , whose bitts and wardes are of diamonds , by which they make their way , remoue all difficulties , open the cunningst locks , and enter the strongest castles . this is not that knowledge , which is here required for conferring offices vpon them , but rather to shut them out of all : for it is to be presupposed , that these who doe thus negociate , and pay soundly for their places , must make their best profit of them and fell at deare rates , that they may the sooner get out of debt , and haue wherewith all to maintaine themselues , their wiues , their children , and their familie . but to these kinde of men , kings may ( and with a great deale of reason ) vse by way of answer , those words of our sauiour christ : amen , amen , dicovobis , nesciovos : verily , verily , i say vnto you , i know you not . i will here likewise lay open one notable conse●age and deceit , which kings , vsually suffer by the cunning plots , and bolde impudencies of pretenders , and by the fauour of those which put to their helping hand , and giue them their best furtherance ; and this it is : that when any of these pretenders is priuie to himselfe , that hee hath not the like parts of learning and vertue and other abilities , as others haue , to mount at the first flight to those high places , whereunto their ambition aspireth , they seeke to enter into the base●t and meanest offices , and that by base and vile meanes , either by buying them with their money as good cheape as they can ; and when their purse cannot stretch so farre , worke themselues in by the codpisse , by matching with this or that other courtiers kinsewoman , and other the like humane respects , making these the stepps for their preferrment . god celiuer all good kings from such kinde of prouisions ; especially if they be preferred by them to places of audience , and of iustice ; for therein shall they sinne grieuously , because they put men into them , that are ignorant , and necessitated , who , for to relieue their wants , and to maintaine their vanities , they , and their wiues take bribes , and set iustice out to sale . and so , not by degrees , and by little and little , but in all post haste , ( to the great preiudice of the common-wealth ) they goe still ascending to greater places , and higher dignities , wherein they goe on in doing greater hurt and more mischiefe . and these kinde of men , are like vnto your martinets , which if they be not raised from the earth , are not able to flye , but being raised neuer so little , they make a very high flight . so is it with these men , who not hauing sufficiencie for the meanest places , are no sooner raised a little by fauour , and by suborning , from that first office which they no way deserued , but they afterwards make a higher pitch , and goe away with the best offices in the kingdome . and the errour in this , is , for that kings doe thinke , that they are put into those places for their merit , and good partes , when as indeed it is farre otherwise . though sometimes also it cometh so to passe , that kings knowing how that such a one is not fit for such a place , or such an office , that they may put him out of that , clap him into another better and greater then the former , and which requireth greater parts , and more sufficiencie ; crossing that sentence of our sauiour christ ( who is the eternall wisdome of his father , and cannot lye : ) that hee , that is not trusty in a little , is not to be trusted with much . neither can he be held fit for the greater places , that hath not sufficiencie in him for the lesser . chap. xxv . whether honours , offices , and dignities , are to be conferr'd on those , that sue for them ? to men of much learning , vertue , and quality , and that haue beene of some vse and seruice to the state , some ministers doe , & haue sayd ; why do you not sue ( sir ) for such , or such a place ? especially seeing that kings loue to be sued vnto ; and that to sue , beg , and craue is so holy a thing , that god himselfe knowing our necessities , wil●th vs to aske petite , & accipietis , aske , and yee shall haue . besides , it seemeth to bee a certaine kinde of pride , to be willing to receiue , without being desirous to sue . for to sue , is a signe of humilitie . wherefore , to seeke to runne any other course , sauours of i know not what singularitie , rashnes and presumption . hereunto i answer , that there is a great deale of difference betwixt sueing to god , and sueing to men , and in the crauing of spirituall goods , and the crauing of temporall . for , in sueing to god , we better our selues much , and those principall vertues , faith hope , and charitie , are much increased and augmented . for our faith increaseth , when we petition god , by acknowledging him to be the vniuersall lord of all things , who onely can fulfill our requests and desires according to that of saint paul ; super abundanter quàm petimus aut intelligimus ; that is able to doe exceeding aboundantly aboue all that we aske , or thinke ; &c. likewise hope , and charitie , receiue thereby an increase , because we hope , for a good end of our petition : and for this cause doe we likewise loue god , from whom wee hope to receiue the good , we desire . and this hath the greater force and truth with it , when wee craue spirituall goods . and of these spake our sauiour when hee sayd ; pettite , & accipietis . and the apostle s. iames saith ; if any of you lacke wisdome , let him aske of god , which giueth to all men liberally , and reprocheth no man , and it shall be giuen him . but it is conditionall , and bounded with a nihil haesitans ; that he aske in faith , and wauer not . which may likewise be vnderstood of temporall goods , as they are ordayned to a spirituall , and super-naturall end . but to aske of men , produceth farre different effects . and therefore we are to consider , that for one of these two ends men may aske temporall things ; either for to raise themselues , or to remedie themselues . of the latter of these , who demand their pay and satisfaction for their seruices , for the remedying and relieuing of their necessities , wee haue already said , that they are not to bee blamed ; but in conscience , and iustice , wee are to helpe them , and make them due satisfaction , in that which of right belongeth vnto them . of the former who seeke to rayse themselues , they stand crouching and kneeling with cap in hand to obtaine their purpose , being very dextrous and diligent in doing courtesies , obsequious in their outward behauiour , kissing the hand , and making congies downe to the ground , and pro●trating themselues at the feet of those , who they thinke may doe them good , dawbing their compliments with base and seruile flatteries . of which kinde of men , the holy ghost saith ; est qui nequiter humiliate se , & interiora eius plena sunt dolo . there is some , that being about wicked purposes , doe bow downe themselues , whose inward parts , burne altogether with deceit : being like vnto your birdes of rapine , who though it be naturall vnto them to flye vp and downe in the ayre , yet are content to stoope and abase themselues , the better to seaze on their prey . which is euen to a letter or ( as they say ) to a haire the very same , that kings dauid sayd : incli●auitse , & cadet , cum dominatus fuerit pauperum : he crowcheth , and boweth● and therefore heapes of poore doe fall by his might . or , as it is in the originall : vt dominetur pauperum . he humbles himselfe , that thereby he may grow great , and come to domineere and swagger ouer the poore ▪ for all their reuerences and adorations , serue to no other end , but to raise themselues vpon the wings of their ambition , that when they are in a good place , they may stoope the freer to their pray : so that those , who but yesterday had them at their feete , see them now towring ouer their heads , and loose the sight of them ; whom they adore thus raysed , as those before adored them , when but lately , l●ke poore snakes , they licked the dust with their tongue , and trayled their belly on the ground . and growing now warme in the bosome of greatnesse , sting those most , who did most foster and cherish them . and these men , though they negociate well with men , and get what they pretend , yet doe they not obtaine any thing at gods hands , who neuer grants vnto them what they desire for such like ends . according to that of saint iames ; ye aske , and receiue not , because ye aske amisse , that ye might lay the same out on your pleasures . howbeit sometimes it is granted vnto them for their further punishment and chasticement . for , as s. austen affirmeth ; multa deus concedit iratus , quae negaret propitius ; god grant , many things in his wrath , which he denyes in his loue . and that , which is recounted of augustus caesar , is not much amisse from the purpose , who being importuned to bestow an office vpon one , who with great instance begged it of him , would by no meanes giue it him , but conferr'd it on another that neuer sued for it , but did better deserue it . and he alleadging the perseuerance of his petitions , and complayning , that he hauing beene so long and earnest a suitor , he should bestow it vpon one that had neuer sought vnto him for it ; caesar made him this answer : t●n eras dignus qui peteres ; ille , qui acciperet : thou wast worthy , to sue for it ; but hee , to haue it . there are some things which may be receiued , which may not so well be sued for , so saith vlpian in a certaine law of his ; quaedam enim , tametsi honestè accipiantur , inhoneste tamen petuntur : there are certaine things ( sayth he ) which albeit they may be honestly receiued , yet may they be vnhonestly desired . kings are to bestow their fauours , but others must not sue for them . hoc non peti , sed praestari solere , saith another law ; it is fit , good turnes should be done , but not sued for to be done . and it was the same mans saying ; inuitum , non ambientem , esse ad rempublicam assumendum : that he , that was vnwilling to receiue honour , not he that did ambitiously seek after it was to be preferred in the common-wealth . and trust me , i cannot search into the reason , why it should become a custome , not to giue , but to those that aske ; for neither they , that giue , doe gaine thereby , nor they that aske , are bettred thereby . for to giue , is so much the more worthy prayse , and thankes , by how much the more liberally and freely it is giuen . and the prouerb saith : bis dat , qui citò dat : he doubles his gift , that giues quickly . whereas he , that stays looking and expecting to be sued vnto , seemeth to giue with an ill will , and not so freely as he should . for ( as seneca truly saith ) there is not any thing that costes a man dearer , then that which is bought by intreaties , and petitionings . and therefore , as often as either offices , or rents , are bestow'd on those , which deserue them , without making suite for them , the whole body of the common-wealth doth commend and indeare the rectitude , and iust dealing of the doner . and all good and vertuous men take heart and incouragement thereby , and are fill'd with good hopes ; and those , which are otherwise , ashamed and confounded ; and becomes the meanes many times of making them turne ouer a new leafe , and leaue their former lewd course of life . but when this rigour and strictnesse is obserued , of not giuing to him that asketh not , though hee merit and deserue the same , it seemeth to be made a meritorious cause , to sue , and to negociate ; and occasion giuen , that more care should be placed in this , then in deseruing well , whereby mens mindes and courages , haue their edge abated , and are dishartened . for to aske , when it is not for the end aforesayd , it draweth on this inconuenience with it . which is aristotles opinion , and is made good in all true reason of morall philosophy . the apostle s. paul , quoteth a sentence , which our sauiour christ vsed often to repeate ; beatius est magis dare , quam accipere : farre more excellent , and more prayse-worthy is it , to giue , then to take . and if not to take , be so good a thing , much better shall it be , not to aske , for that this is , the ordinary meanes to the other . and herein did the saints of god glorie much , and saint paul saith of himselfe ; that he would rather liue by the labour of his hands , then be importunate in crauing . and that great prophet samuel , that which he did most prize and iustifie himselfe of before the people , was , that hee had faithfully performed his function , without crauing or taking any thing . there was a time , wherein the romane senate did ordaine , that the consullship , and other the chiefe magistracies , should not be giuen to any , saue such as sued for them . this law , at first was good ; for then , none durst presume to sue for them , but those , who in the peoples opinion did well deserue them , and tooke it for a great affront that they should receiue a deniall . so that by this meanes euery one did labour by his noble actions to deserue that dignitie , as also that all the people might thinke him worthy thereof . afterwards , this proued to be a very pernicious law ; for , no● those , who by their vertues , and heroicall acts , did deserue this honour ; but those , that were the most powerfull did sue for it , whilest others , for feare of these , durst not shew themselues in the busines , and so were vtterly excluded from those honourable offices . this inconuenience , was taken notice of , and publicola the consull made a law , vpon paine of death , wherewith he was to be punished , who without approbation from the people of rome , should sue for any of the said offices . and likewise , for the curbing of this vice , was the calphurnian law enacted . but now ( for our finnes ) hath crept in amongst vs that greekish infection , wherof i socrates saith , that ambition at that time , was growen to that extreamitie , and to that hight , that in stead of putting ambitious pretenders to death , those honourable places were not bestowed but vpon those , which did shame-fully sue for them , and could best negociate by their power , purse , or friends , whichis , was , and will be an occasion in all times and places , that with scandalous corruption , and simoniacall trading , offices , and benefices shall be giuen and solde , to him that will giue most . not the better person , but the better purse shall carry it . the inconueniences , that follow the so much fauouring of suitors , and being vn-mindfull of those , who tend nothing else but to serue , and deserue well , are very great , and not vnknowen to all those that are statists , and good common-wealths men . and if the shortnesse , which i desire to obserue in this discourse , did not hinder mee , a large field would here discouer it selfe vnto me , wherein to enter and expatiate my selfe , and might take occasion to treate of the false hoods , shiftes , deceits , and iniustices , which are dayly vsed in such like pretensions , and petitions , which haue beene the cause of the destruction and ruine not only of particular common wealthes but of whole kingdomes . and this which i speake , is of so much truth , that some of the hebrew doctors hold for certaine , that the monarchie of the house royall of dauid was ouerthrowne by giuing credit to the malice and deceit of a couetous pretender , and that of twelue prouinces which his heyres possessed , of those twelue tribes , two onely remayned intire vnto him : the case was this ; king dauid , hauing ( in performance of that oath and promise , which he had made vnto ionathan ) giuen vnto his sonne mephibosheth , all those heredements , messuage , and goods , which were king sauls ; and commanding ziba , that hee , and his sonnes , and his seruants , should serue him , and till his land for him , and bring him in foode to eate ; there entred into ziba's minde a diuelish pretension , to beg all mephibosheths estate for himselfe . and thereupon , tooke hold of such an occasion , as seemed fittest vnto him to worke this his treacherie and deceite . when king dauid fled from his sonne absalon to the mountaines , ziba the seruant of mephibosheth met him with a couple of asses sadled , and vpon them two hundred cakes of bread , and an hundred bunches of raysons , and an hundred of dryed figgs , and a bottle of wine , and other the like commodities for the refreshing of dauid and his followers . and hauing a lye ready at hand , which he had thought on before , hee castes himselfe downe at the kings feete , and telling him a thousand leasings , raised false witnesse against mephibosheth , informing his maiestie , that mephibosheth was in ierusalem , and tolde him ; this day shall the house of israel restore mee the kingdome of my father . is it eu●n so , sayd the king ? behold , thine are all , that pertained vnto mephibosheth . and truly , this businesse was strangely carryed . for notable was the facilitie , where with the king gaue credit to the calumniation of this pretender , and the remissenesse which he shew'd in punishing so loud a lye , and so great a treason , when the truth of the matter , and the innocencie of mephibosheth , was afterwards made knowne vnto him . and that , which i conceiue concerning this point , is ; that the cause why hee did not punish this so fowle a treacherie , was ; either for that he was conscious to himselfe of the fault , which he had committed in hauing giuen such easie beliefe there vnto : or , for that the rootes of this suspicion , and iealousie , did remaine still deepely grounded in his heart . for the calumnies , and cautelous suggestions of pretenders , carry this mischiefe still with them , that they pierce euen to the very heart , and are hardly remooued from the minde of him , that giues eare vnto them . verba susurronis , quasi simplicia , & ipsa perueniunt ad intima cordis : the words of a tale-bearer , are as flatterings , and they goe downe into the bowells of the belly . and therefore the holy ghost adviseth vs , that when such men come to speake with vs in secret , and to whisper things in our eare , that wee should not hearken vnto them . quando submiserit vocem suam , ne credid eris , ei , quoniam septem nequitiae sunt in corde illius . though hee speakes fauourably , beleeue him not , for there are seuen abhominations in his heart . which in plainer language , speakes thus vnto vs ; when a flatterer shall talke vnto thee in a low voyce , and whisper thee softely in thine eare , that hee may not be heard of the standers by , caste him out for an eare-wigg , and doe not giue credit vnto him ; for there are seuen , nay seuenty malitious purposes in that mans heart . and it would be a great ioy and comfort vnto mee , that god would discouer vnto kings , these persons and their diuelish practises , that such base and vnworthy people , might not vnder the colour and shew of good and worthy men , thus abuse and deceiue them . in a word , mens hearts , and their tongues , doe not alwayes go together . nor is the speech , and the thought all one . quia labia doloso in corde , & corde locuti sunt . they speake deceitfully euery one with his neighbour , flattering with their lippes , and speake with a double heart . but god destroy such deceitfull and lying tongues , to the end that truth may finde entrance in the courtes of kings . o , how many inconueniences would be excused , if those persons , to whom the charge is committed of distributing offices , and rewarding of seruices , would take the care , to conferre them on those that deserue them , and not on those that negociate and sue for them ; then would there not be so much libertie , nor so many tricks vsed in petitioning , nor so many orators in the courte , in whom , by this suing vnto them , couetousnesse increaseth , and the hungry appetite of taking ; whilest in the meane while all modestie and shame is vtterly lost . and i am verily perswaded , that kings many times , streightned by earnest intreaties , and the importunate prayers of such as are in neere places about them , doe vndeserued fauours , rewarding vnworthy suitors , and leauing out those that are worthy , because they doe not offer to speake and sue vnto them . and that you may perceiue that i doe not speake this of mine owne head , or that it is a birde of mine owne hatching , i will relate that here vnto you , which saint luke reporteth of an importunate woman , who finding her selfe wronged , came to a secular iudge , that was an ill minded man , and vniust , and was very earnest with him , crying still vnto him ; doe me iustice against mine aduersary : which he would not of long time , but afterwards he sayd with himselfe ; though i feare not god , nor reuerence man , yet because this woman troubleth me , i will doe her right , lest at the last shee come , and make mee weary . to begge , and sue , is an easiy office , especially , when pretenders know , that hearing breedes wearisomnesse , and that by this meanes they obtaine that which they sue for , it being the nature of many men , and more particularly of kings that loue their ease , to be quicke in their grants , for the avoyding of further trouble . our sauiours disciples , were much troubled , & their eares were euen tyred out , with hearing the clamourous voyce of the cananitish woman , and intreated christ , that he would dispatch her , that they might be rid of her . and we vsually see , that your importunate suitors , be it iust , or vniust , obtaine their purpose . and i know not , whether i may blame them most , or those that put them to it , to be importunate in this , or that , be it right , or be it wrong . god knowes where the fault lyes , and will reward euery one , as he deserues . chap. xxvi . of the sence of smelling ; that is : of the prudence of kings . the sence of smelling , is likewise in the head and the nose , it 's adioyning instrument ; which both in diuine , and humane letters beare the signification of prudence . in the seuenth chapter of salomons song , where is represented vnto vs the beautie of the spouse , amongst other graces there recommended and indeared , the nose is not the least . nasus tuus ( saith her beloued ) sicut turris libani , quae respicit contra damascum : thy nose , is as the tower of lebanon , which looketh toward damascus . and the expositors vpon this booke of the canticles , doe stand much vpon these words , for that they seeme to be much contrarie vnto that , which should extoll and set forth a beauty to its full perfection . for in very deede , a huge and disproportionable nose , both seemes , and is , a fowle and ougly thing . and therefore those interpreters say , that it is not to be vnderstood in that first sence which offers it selfe vnto vs , which is grammaticall ; but in it's mysticall and spirituall signification , which by a generall consent representeth vnto vs , the admirable prudence of the church in the gouernment of soules , a thing of greatest importance , and the most necessary , in prelates and gouernours , and more particularly , in kings , and princes . nasus tuus , sicut turris libani : thy nose is as the tower of lebanon ; which king salomon built , that from thence he might behold , and see , all whatsoeuer passed in damascus . from thence , might he discouer his enemies , and their ambushes , and the theeues lying in waite to rob ierusalem . of this tower , they say , that it was very high , euen , and streight , and for to represent the beautie of the face of the spouse , it is ( and with a great deale of proprietie ) sayd ; that her nose is like a tower ; for that , which doth most beautifie a citie , or any other place whatsoeuer , is a fayre high tower. in like manner in the face of any person , the nose , which is that , which is eleuated and lifted vp aboue all the other parts of the face , expresseth great beautie , whereas , to be without a nose , or to haue it too hooked , or too flat , extraordinarily crooked , or extraordinarily little , is a foule deformitie . and therefore , the summe of all , that hitherto hath beene sayd , is ; that , what a goodly fayre tower doth , in the adoring and setting forth of a citie , which doth exceedingly grace and beautify the same ; the same doth the nose in the face of the spouse , which is so well proportioned , that it much commendeth all the whole feature . and vpon this litterall , leaneth the spirituall sence of this place ; which is : that this tower doth denotate discretion , and prudence , which exalts it selfe aboue all other the workes of vertue , and doth grace and beautifie them all . many of the gentiles erected fortune for their goddesse ; it seeming vnto them , that shee was the onely lady , and mistris of all good , and bad successe ; but others , which drew neerer vnto truth , and reason , made a iest thereof , and sayd ; that it was not fortune , that afforded happinesse , and prosperitie , but prudence ; and that shee was rather fortunes mistris , and that her power did predominate ouer the starres . and therefore sayd another . nullum numen abest , si sit prudentia tecum . no deitie , no power , is wanting to him , that is indewed with wisedome . men of small vnderstanding , and such as are carelesse in their businesses , attribute diuinitie to fortune , that they may free them selues from the note and imputation of carelesnesse , and imprudencie . but the truth is , that fortune stays not behinde , when prudence setts forward . and therefore it was well sayd of salust ; vnusquisque est artifex fortunae suae ; euery man is the worker out of his own fortune . and the spanish prouerb tells vs , que la buena diligencia , es la madre de la buenauentura : that good diligence , is the mother of good successe . so that in very deede , there is neither good , nor bad fortune , but it is the will of god , that rules and gouerns all ; and the care , and prudence , wherewith men haue recourse vnto that , which is fit and conuenient for them . and therefore is prudence in kings , of that great importance , and ought to be , ( as we sayd of the spouses nose ) like a high tower ; and not according to that modell as they would haue it , but it must be placed vpon mount lebanon ; to the end , that being in so high and eminent a place , it may make the better discouery . kings must haue an eye as well to that which is a far off , as that which is neere at hand ; on this side , and on that ; heere , there , and euery where . they must bee ready to supply vpon this , or that other occasion ; they must see , and foresee all . istud est sapere , non quod ante pedes modo est videre , sed etiam illa , quae futura sunt , prospicere , sayd the comicke : this , in realtie , is true wisedome , not to see that onely which is before his feete , but to foresee that also which is to come . and this prouidence , circumspection , or prudencie , sound alike , and are in a manner one , and the same thing . the ancient did so artificially paint prudencie , that shee seemed to looke euery way , and to haue her eyes fixed on whatsoeuer did behold her . for prudence , as it is silent , so it is searching ; nothing escapes her knowledge . and it is a vertue that maketh kings like vnto god. for , as hee , by his diuine prouidence , doth foresee all , and gouerne all and hath all things present before him , so they by their humane prudence , which participateth of the diuine , behold things past , dispose of things present , and prouide for things to come . some call her filiam dei , gods daughter , because it seemed vnto them , that shee had something of the deitie in her , that shee was his minister in the creation of the world , and disposition of all things , and ought likewise to be the mistris of kings vpon all their occasions . for ( as aristotle , and plato avouch ) no man can gouerne well , that is not prudent . in ancient times , the common people were of opinion , that prudence was annexed vnto kings , and that they had a particular gift to fore-see that , which was to come . and such , as were prouident , and prudent , they held to bee diuine . true it is , that wisedome is the gift of god , and wee must craue it of him , as did moses , ioshua , dauid , salomon , and other wise kings . which to obtaine , wee must shunne and flye from sinne ; for , it is impossible that hee should bee prudent , that is not vertuous . and so much hath a man of prudence , as hee hath of vertue . and according to this measure , shall the authoritie , credite , and opinion bee which hee shall hold with the people . the offices and effects , which prudence doth , and causeth , are many ; and some of them are collected , out of the many and various expositions which the doctors attribute to this tower , and nose of the spouse , which we will goe disposing , by it 's paragraphes , in this chapter . §. i. of the magnanimitie of minde which kings ought to haue . by this high tower , and nose of the spouse , some vnderstand the pope ; quia in facie ecclesiae eminet : because he is an eminent man in the face of the church . but rabbi kymki , and philo iudaeus , will haue it , by the selfe same reason , to bee vnderstood of a king ; adding withall , that the nose doth betoken maiestie , grauitie , longanimitie , and excellencie of minde , wherein a king ought to exceede all other . and therefore the persians would neuer choose him to be their king , who had not a hooke nose like the eagle , well shap't , and proportioned , which is the ensigne of a magnanimous minde . and hence it is , that they say of the god of the hebrewes , that hee hath great and large nostrils . so sounds that word of the psalmist ; longanimis , & multum misericors : id est , longus naribus . the lord is mercifull and gracious , slow to anger , and plentious in mercie : that is ; of wide nostrills , full of sufferance and patience ; for the smoake of fury and choler doth not so soone runne vp the chimney , as in those which haue straight and narrow nostrils , who are soone hot , and sodainely incensed to anger . and the selfe same philo saith , that in the leuiticall law , they were not admitted to the preisthood , who had either a little , crooked , or disproportioned nose , as being lesse fit for that ministery . the one , are hot and cholerick ; the other , ill-inclined . those againe , which haue too great a nose , are naturally cruell , and proude , and these are mislik't of all ; but that , as much commended , which signifies magnanimitie , bountifullnesse , and generousnes , and is of sufficient largenesse to suffer and dissemble anger , and not to haue the chimney choaked with a little smoake . a qualitie , so much importing kings , that from thence did arise that prouerb ; qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare : hee that knowes not how to dissemble , knowes not how to rule . and there was a king of late times , which stickt not to say ; that hee would not haue his sonne know any more learning , then that which this sentence doth containe ; for that it was so good and profitable a lesson for princes . tiberius caesar , did glorie in no one thing more , then in the arte of dissimulation , wherein he was so excellent , that neuer any , vpon any , though neuer so great occasions giuen by him , could search into his intents , or diue into his thoughts . in the story of the kings , it is written ; that at the very same time , that god commaunded the possession of the kingdome , to be giuen vnto saul , which was the first king he had nominated , some ill disposed persons , that were malitiously bent against him , did murmure at him , and speake ill of him , seeming to scorne , and set light by him . but god had giuen him such a measure of wisedome , and discretion , that although all that they had sayd , came to his eare , ipse verò dissimulabat se audire : yet hee held his peace , and would not seeme to take notice of it . for , when kings come newly to their crownes , and that the things of the kingdome are not yet throughly settled , it is great prudence to reserue with dissimulation the punishment of great persons , that with better occasion , and in a better coniuncture , he may proceed against them , as reason and iustice shall require . that king shall not be accounted wise , that shall pretend execution of iustice with the danger of insurrections , and seditions ; nor shall the iustification of his intent , suffice to execute his rashnesse in the meanes , vnlesse hee first ballance the businesse , and see which way the scale will incline ; as to see , how farre hee may rely vpon the loue of his subiects , and how the end may sorte with his designes , lest the danger of the scandall & disobedience , may proue to bee greater , then the profit that can arise from the execution of iustice. for in such cases , it is great wisedome in a king , to conforme himselfe according to the times ; and that that which at one time is worthy of punishment , should be dissembled , and reserued to be punished at another time . which course ( as saluste reporteth ) was , in catilines time , taken with that great and powerfull courtier , crassus . the emperour iustinian , hee likewise aymes at this marke : and it is the counsayle , which s. isidore giues vnto kings . the like did king dauid when ioab so treacherously slew abner . onely to some few , that were very inward with him , he discouered the reason , that mooued him to dissemble the matter , and not to punish him with death for the present , telling them with a great deale of griefe ; ego autem adhuc delicatus sum , & vnctus rex : i am this day weake , ( or as the hebrew renders it , tender ) though annoynted king. as if he should haue sayd ; to see the affaires of my crowne and kingdome in that tender and ticklish estate wherein they stand , obligeth me , not to make that demonstration of rigour and iustice , as the heynousnesse of this fact doth require . but the lord shall reward the doer of euill according vnto his wickednesse . tribuat dominus facienti malum , iuxta malitiam suam . here , is much to be considered ; the great care , which this king tooke in concealing his purpose from the people , till some better occasion were offred ; for , if he should haue declared himselfe before , and manifested his meaning to the world , hee might haue put the whole campe in danger of mutining ; or at least to haue shewd themselues in defence of their captaine . this perill , he ouerpast by his great prudence , dissembling the matter for that time , and deferring it till the last vp-shut , when now the businesses of the kingdome were better settled ; for , the most important point in gouernment , is , to make vse of time , and occasion : facilitating with silence and dissimulation , those orders and decrees , which doe crosse the peoples humour , or that stand not with his liking that is powerfull with them ; for if they should be divulged before their due time and season , they would serue for nothing else , but to incense mens mindes , and peraduenture to turne them against himselfe . which certainly might well haue beene dauids case with ioab , if hee had shewed himselfe offended , and openly vented his spleene against him , whilest he had his sword in his hand , and stood so fayre in the peoples affection ; who in that hurre might haue done ( god he knowes what ) for the aduancing of his ambitious ends . in such cases , it is great prudence in a prince , ( contineuing still firme and constant in his purpose ) to benefit himselfe by dissimulation , waiting for a fit time and season , when without danger hee may vnmaske himselfe , and with the safety of his realme and person , put his resolution in execution . a word well kept , and fittly spoken is ( saith salomon ) like apples of gold , in pictures of siluer ; which doth not onely shine and giue a glorious luster , but worketh it's effect , and discouereth the art and cunning of it's master . and king dauid hauing heard the reproachfull words , and reuiling tearmes which shimei to the very face of him , and in a loud voyce , vttred in the presence of those that were with him , wisely dissembled his rayling , and was angry with abishai , because he was earnest with him , that hee might presently take due chasticement of him , and reuenge the great affront hee had done him , and would by no meanes giue consent , that any one of all his army should once moue or stirre against him . for , that holy king thought it fit in his wisedome , to leaue him to that occasion , which hee afterwards specified to his sonne salomon ; that he might teach kings these two things . first to relye on god , and to attend his leasure , who will doe that for them , which they cannot doe for themselues ; as he did in that known case of moses brothers murmuring against him , which hee himselfe so mildely and fayrely dissembled . but god , to whose account runn's the honour of his ministers , tooke the cause into his owne hands . secondly ; that it is not fit to be solicitous in appointing iudges , and informers , at all howers , and in all places , against such , as in some occasions , assume libertie of speech , and freely vtter their mindes . for , as another sayd ; in free places , and persons that are likewise free-borne , wee cannot at all times exercise that slauery vpon them , as to clap a locke and chaine vpon their tongues . who could haue done this better , then that omnipotent king christ iesus , when those licentious and loose-tongued libertines , reproached him with such sharpe & bitter taunts as toucht him to the quick in his honour , and yet euen then with what a royall minde , and princely reportment did he carry himselfe , in those few milde and moderate words , which he spake vnto them . kings ought not to expresse any alteration , turbation , or discomposure , for those things which they see , nor to be startled euery foote with that , which they heare , nor to shew themselues offended at that , which is muttred and murmured of them . but let them ( a god's name ) mend that , which is amisse , and then their muttering and murmuring will cease of it selfe . heere likewise kings are taught , not to be curious inquirers after those , that speakeill of them , nor to giue eare to euery idle complaint ; for if it be once perceiued , that their eares itche after this , infinite will the number of delators , and informers be . in the raigne of tiberius , and of nero , more then in any other were these sycophants and priuie accusers fauoured ; and things were then so glazed ouer , that they had set spies , that should curiously obserue the semblance , which euery one made of his actions , euen to the knitting of the brow , biting the lip or the like , which kind of carriage , seru'd as a condemnation , and was seuerely punished . but it is fitter for tyrants then christian kings , to stand thus in feare of the tongues of the vulgar , it being the part of a magnanimous minde , to know how to forget , and forgiue iniuries , especially those of the tongue , to whose iurisdiction , the most powerfull , are most subiect . and if they should reuenge this wrong vpon account , the number would be so great , and rise to such an infinite sum , that they may quickly bring their monarchie to an end . that which most importeth for their own and their empires quiet , is to shake all kinde of suspition out of their minde ; and whatsoeuer others thinke of them and their affaires , they ought to be so farre from being troubled therewith , that it should no whit moue them . holding it to be ( as seneca sayth ) the sweetest maner of pardon , to pretend ignorance of the delict , and to examine with care his owne care ese carriage , and open neglects , if he haue committed any , and if not , not to care a pin what they say . for the vulgar is a beast of many heads , and as it is impossible to satisfie al of them , so is there no reason , that they should haue an account giuen them of that which the prince doth . it is sufficient , that the wiser and grauer sort , know , and esteeme both him , and his proceedings . this was the doctrine of that great king , philip ●he second , who wrote vnto his viceroy in naples , as followeth : necessario es , que gouerneys de manera , quae todos buenos y malos , no se quexen de vos . it is requisit , you should so carry your selfe in your gouernment , that all , as well good as bad , may not complaine of you . and this was another of his which he deliuered to his successour , forc , oso sera , que los malos nos murmuren , y aborr●zca● ; lo que à nosotros toca , es proceder de manera , que tambien no nos aborrezean los buenos : it cannot otherwise be , but that the bad will murmure at vs , and hate vs ; but that which belongeth vnto vs , is , to proceede so , that the good may not likewise hate vs. and this king very well vnderstood , that it is proper vnto kings ( as alexander said ) to doe well , & to heare ill . yet are they not to imagine , that that which is causelesse sayd against them , can any whit diminish or lessen their honour ; for it stands not with their condition and greatnesse , that none should speake ill of them , but that they should doe no ill : and then no such thing can be sayd of them , but by the way of falshood and lying , which wil soone vanish . yet notwithstanding will i not say , nor shall it once enter into my thought , to approue the impudencie and insolencie of the licentious satyrists but rather holde them worthy of seuere punishment , especially when they touch vpon the persons of kings , whom all their subiects , both by gods law , and the law of nature , ought to respect , honour , and obey . yet withall i say , that it is great prudence , to dissemble vpon some occasions , be they neuer so great , and to be close and secret in their intentions , till they see a fit time to inflict punishment , and when it may be done with least noyse . for some men sometimes , seeking to suppresse the fire , by turning and stirring the sticks , inflame it the more . and if at any time vpon vrgent occasions , and vpon the odiousnesse and foulenesse of this or that other fact , ( reason and iustice so requiring it ) they shall be forced to vse seuere punishment , let it be mingled with moderation and mildenesse , that all men may vnderstand , that it doth not arise out of anger and displeasure , but out of zeale and loue to the publick good , which forceth them thereunto , & obligeth them in conscience thus rigorously to proceede against them . for ( as saint chrysostome saith ) qui cum causa non irascitur , peccat , he sinnes in not being angrie , that hath iust cause to be angrie . and then ( saith saint austin ) shall a prince be happy , when his subiects shall perceiue , that hee punisheth not onely vpon iust ground ; but ( as seneca saith ) non tanquam probet , sed tanquam inuit us , & cum magno tormento ad castigandum veniat : that it grieueth him to the very soule , that he is driuen , contrary to his nature and disposition , to let the sentence of death , or other torment , to passe vpon them . and when they shall know , that in this punishment , he only pretendeth the conseruation of the common-wealth , and not the reuenging of any particular wrong or offence done vnto himselfe . and that , if he doe extend his pardon , it is not for that he is willing to leaue sin vnpunished , but because hee pretendeth the amendment of the delinquent . and more especially , when they see , that he recompenceth with benefits , the rigour and sharpenesse of his chasticements by throwing fauours on a brother , a father or a sonne of that party , whose head he hath commanded to be taken from his shoulders . which gracious dealing will assure the people of the sweetnesse of the princes nature , and his pitifull disposition , nor will they attribute the iustice he shall doe vpon them to crueltie . the conclusion of this discourse shall be , this ; that it is of great importance , that all men should know , that nothing can be hid from the king , be it neuer so close and secret , for the many and priuate diligences which he vseth for intelligence , by the meanes of sundry persons of all sorts , high and low , of all estates and qualities , ( whom the wisest and the waryest cannot avoyde ) deputed by his maiestie diligently to labour to heare , and vnderstand the rumours and complaints of the people , and the good & ill , that is either said or done , and to giue him aduise thereof , that he may informe himselfe of the truth of them , and apply such remedies , as he in his wisedome shall thinke fit . and let all men know , that there was neuer any thing so closely carried , which either early or late , at one time , or other , hath not ( by good diligences vsed ) bin brought to light , & made known to the king . and therfore my aduise vnto thee , shall be that which salomon giues thee ; curse not the king , no not in thy thought : for a birde of the ayre , sha●l carry the voyce , and that which hath wings , shall tell the matter . and when thou thinkest thy selfe safest , then shalt thou be taken in the snare . and let kings likewise know , that if they haue a minde to see , and know all , they ought also to be milde , and mercifull in punishing , mingling mercie with seuerietie . for it is fit and necessary , that he that desires to know all , should likewise dissemble , and pardon much . §. ii. of the blandure , gentlenes , and loue , which kings ought to haue . this blandure , and gentlenesse , is likewise an effect of prudence , and magnanimitie , and is a lordly kinde of vertue , and which hath made many excellent , and memorable in the world . as alexander the great , whom nothing made so great , as that his excellencie of minde , which he had , in pardoning those whom not onely himselfe , but all the world knew , had iustly deserued his displeasure . hee , that is gentle of heart , and ( like dauid ) meeke spirited , nothing troubles him , nothing alters him , but alwayes keepes his iudgement firme and enytre , that hee may the more freely iudge of that , which is worthy of pardon , or punishment , and is a qualitie very proper , and well beseeming royall maiestie . many great monarckes and kings haue had this in high esteeme , and made it the top of their glory , for by this meanes , they came to be as great in the loue of their subiects , as in their rule and command . of whose examples humane histories are full ; but i shall only cite those are that diuine , which neither adde , nor diminish , by indeering things more then they deserue . where it is storyed of that great captaine and gouernour of gods people , that he was of the mildest and peaceablest condition , and of so soft and sweete a nature , that the world afforded not his like : erat moses vir mitissimus , super omnes homines , qui morabantur in terra : moses was very meeke , aboue all the men , which were vpon the face of the earth . and he of all other , had most neede of this most noble qualitie , for to beare with the bitter taunts , and reproachfull words of that stiffe-necked , and vnthankfull people . and this is indeared by saint ambrose , and philo iudaeus , both of them affirming ; that towards god onely , hee shewd himselfe as stout as a lyon , and full of courage , resisting the vengeance , that god would haue taken of his people , but with them , was as meeke and gentle as a lambe . a generous breast , and the courteous and plaine carriage of kings ouercometh all , pacifieth all , and leuelleth the vneuenest and crookedest dispositions . which we may well exemplifie in iacob , and dauid . of the former the scripture saith ; erat homo lenis : he was a smoth man. he was smooth in his countenance , sweete in his conuersation , and naturally of a generous and peaceable condition . now see , what he got by this ; hee gayned his fathers blessing , his brothers birth right , his vnckles daughters and wealth , and the good will and loue of all men . and of dauid , it is sayd ; erat rufus , & pulcher aspectu , facieque decora : that hee was ruddy , and withall , of a beautifull countenance , and goodly to looke to . he was of a louely and gracious aspect , milde , affable , and aboue all , a great friend vnto goodnesse and well doing , onely with his pleasing presence , hee drew the eyes of all the people after him , who ioyed in the fight of him ; and with this , did he winne their hearts , got their good wills , and gayned the kingdome . when by a good and painefull industrie , and a sweet behauiour , the hearts are first seazed on , it is an easie matter to conquer kingdomes . in the sacred historie of the machabees , are recounted the heroyicall acts which that great captaine iudas , and his brethren , atcheiued in spaine , the kings and kingdomes which they subdued ; the nations which they conquered , and made tributary to their empire ; and the great treasure of gold and siluer , which they purchased . and all this they effected by their good counsayle , gentlenesse , and patience ; giuing kings thereby to vnderstand , that if they be of a meeke , peaceable , and noble condition , they shall be lords and masters of mens wealths , and hearts . and this made polibius to say ; that a courteous and peaceable king , conquers all with quietnesse , euery man being willing to yeelde and submit himselfe to a soft and generous disposition , that is free from anger , and full of clemencie . and this is that legacie which god allotted and left vnto them long agoe in the olde testament . mansueti , haereditabunt terram : the meeke shall inherit the earth . and afterwards , in the new testament , he renewes this promise : ipsi possidebunt terram : they shall inherit the earth . they shall be lords of the earth ; that is : of the men vpon earth , and of their possessions . for , by this earth which god promiseth vnto them , s. bernard vnderstands the same earth , whereof men are formed . and it is vsuall in scripture , to call men earth . and thereby is likewise vnderstood , that of this world , which wee heere inhabit , the possessions thereof , it 's gouernment , scepter and monarchie , for all this , is but a patrimonie , bequeathed to a kinde , smooth , and louing nature . the best titles , that a king can present before god , for to pretend the preseruation , and perpetuitie of his kingdome , are meekenesse , and gentlenesse . these dauid represented vnto him , when hee petitioned him , that hee would be pleased to continue and confirme his kingdome in his sonne . memento domine dauid , & omnis mansuetudinis eius : lord remember dauid , and all his lowly carriage . whose heart , was not haughty , nor his eyes lofty , but behaued and quieted himselfe , as a childe that is weaned of his mother . and presently god collated this benefit vpon him , saying ; com cumpleti suerint dies tui , suscitabo semen tuum post te , & firmabo regnum eius : when thy dayes be fullfille● and thou shalt sleepe with thy fathers , i will set vp thy seede after thee , which shall proceede out of thy bowells , and i will establish his kingdome . such effects doth the smooth breast , and soft heart of a king worke ; and this is so sure a tenet , that for to keepe a kingdome secure , and to be lord of many moe , there needeth no other claime , then that which loue and gentlenesse maketh . for , in regard that the heart of man is generous , it will not be led by the necke with a halter , nor will subiects long indure the yoake of a tyrannizing and proud lord : whereas on the contrary , they are easily led a long , by a smooth and gentle hand . and reason teacheth vs as much ; for by how much the more easily is the heart of man moued by conueniences , then by menaces , by faire meanes then by foule , by so much the better is it to gouerne by meekenesse and gentlenesse , then by force and rigour . whence we draw this conclusion , that too much sharpnesse , and excesse of rigour in a prince , procuteth hatred ; and affabilitie and clemencie , loue. which is that , which kings ought most to seeke after , as by and by we shall shew vnto you , when wee come to tell you , that these two qualities of blandure , and clemencie , so befitting a supreme lord , are quite contrarie to that good expedition of iustice , and that integritie , which god doth require in a iudge ; whom hee willeth and commaundeth . that in matter of iudgement , hee shall not pittie the case of the poore : according to which instruction , it of force followeth , that a king must represent two contrary persons ; that of a kind and pittifull father ; and that of a iust , and angry iudge . for , if in his owne nature , hee be kinde , and tender hearted , there is not that offender , which will not be set free by the power of intreaties , and teares , weapons ; wherewith the hardest and cruellest hearts suffer themselues to be ouercome . and if he be otherwise , what can the delinquents hopes end in , but death and despaire ? againe , if he be vertuous , and seuere , it is impossible that he should not hate the vicious , and grow into choller , when hee shall heare of their cruell outrages and insolencies . now , what remedy in this case is to be vsed ? saint ierom , and saint austen , are of opinion , that a king , by his owne person , is to punish , and premiate , to execute chasticement with iustice , and to mitigate it with mercy . nor is it vnworthy our consideration , nor lyable to inconueniencie , that a king should represent two persons , so contrary in shew , as iudging with iustice , and mercie . for two vertues cannot bee contrary . and as the saints and holy doctors say , ( and they are in the right ) mercie doth not hinder the execution of iustice , but it moderateth the crueltie of the punishment . and it is very necessary in a good iudge , that hee should haue a true and faithfull paire of balance in his hands , and in either scale to put rigor , and equitie , that hee may know how to correct the one by the other . the kings of portugall , ( especially don iuan the third ) did vse to iudge capitall crimes , accompanied with his councell , and were alway accounted fathers of the people , because with them , iustice , and mercie , walked hand in hand ; shewing themselues iust in punishing the fault , and mercifull in mitigating the punishment . by which meanes , they were of all , both feared and beloued . and let not kings perswade themselues , that this doth lessen their authoritie , and take of from their greatnesse , but giues an addition ; and the oftner they sit in iudgement , they shall doe god the more seruice , and the kingdome more good : and in conscience , the surest and safest course , for that reciprocall obligation , which is between the king and his subiects . for they owe obedience , seruice , and acknowledgement to him , as their lord and master . and he vnto them , iustice , defence and protection . for to this end and purpose , doe they pay him so many great tributes , and taxes . nor is it enough for him to doe it by others , but he must also doe it by himselfe . for , neither that great gouernor of gods people , moses , nor any other after him , is , in all the whole body of the bible to be found , that euer yet condemned the occupation of iudging the people , to bee vnworthy royall maiestie nor contrarie to the reputation of a king. i know no other preiudice in it , saue that it is impossible for one sole man , to vndergoe so great a taske . and this impossibilitie ariseth from the multitude of subiects ; and in that case ▪ they aduise , that a king should not wholly take away his hand from the doing of iustice , but that the lesser and more ordinary businesses , hee should remit and referr them to different ministers , and the weightier causes , take to his owne charge , and be present in person , when they come to be sit vpon , and determined ; as formerly haue done the wisest and greatest monarkes , that euer were in the world . who did euer equall king salomon , in wisedome , greatnesse , and maiestie ? yet did hee hold it no disgrace vnto him , to humble himselfe to heare suitors , iudge their causes and to doe them iustice. the kings of the hebrew people , were called iudges , because they did glorie in nothing so much , as to heare , and iudge the people . and in all nations , this hath alwayes beene the principall office appertaining vnto kings . and the holy ghost saith ; that the king , that faithfully iudgeth the poore , his throne shall be established for euer . §. iii. that it much importeth kings , to haue the good loue and affection of their subiects . kings , ( as already hath beene sayd ) are the heads of their kingdomes ; their estates serue them as members ; without which it is impossible they should be that , which their name speakes them . and therefore , it is not onely conuenient , but necessarie , that they should seeke to gaine the good wills of all , suting themselues , ( though they force their owne ) to the nature of their subiects , and beholding them , as if they were his children . which is the best course to keepe them well affected , and contented , and to be beloued , and obayed by them . which they may easily doe , if they will but thinke themselues , that they are sheepheards , and fathers of those people , which god hath recommended vnto them , easing them of those wrongs and grieuances , which they vniustly suffer ; laying no more vpon them , then they are able to beare ; suffring them , when reason shall require , to take their ease and their quiet ; and helping to sustaine them , when they grow poore , and are decayd . plato tells vs , that for a prince to be good , and to be beloued of all , hee must bestow all his loue , and his whole heart , vpon the common-wealth ; his will , on the gods ; his secret , on his friends ; and his time , on businesses . for , by thus reparting himselfe with all , he shall haue a part in all , by all of them comming to vnite themselues with him . onely in this good correspondency of loue betweene kings , and their subiects , wise periander placeth all the safetie , and good fortune of kings and kingdomes . agesilaus , king of lacedaemon , was once askt the question , how a king might liue secure ; for that it is oftentimes seene , that neither multitude of seruants , nor a guard of halbardiers can defend them from violence ? to which demand , hee returned this answer : si suis populis ita imperet , vt parentes filijs ; if he so rule ouer his people , as a father doth ouer his children . the king that loueth his subiects , and is againe beloued by them , neede no guarde , they are his guard . for loue , where it is true and faithfull , plainesheth the knottiest peece of timber , smootheth the roughest and most vnhewen disposition , and makes all faire , safe , and peaceable . it is a most strong wall , and more durable , yea then kings themselues . with this , no difficulty can offer it selfe vnto them , which they may not ouercome ; no danger , whose impetuousnesse they may not oppose ; no command , which they will not obay . for as kings desire no more of their subiects , but to be well serued by them ; so subiects , pretend nothing from their kings , but to be beloued by them . and indeede , the one dependeth on the other . for , if a king loue not his subiects , he shall neither be well serued , beloued , nor obayed by them . and as little , if he loue himselfe too much . for the more care he takes of himselfe and attends his owne particular , so much the more his subiects loue departs from him . for the harmonie of a common-wealth consisteth , in that all should liue by the kings fauour , and they by their subiects loue . for they ought to be vigilant in all that belongs to their seruice : and kings most watchfull in that , which concernes their generall good ▪ so that none is to haue lesse part in the king , then the king himselfe . and because it is impossible to content all , by reason not onely of their different , but contrary natures , it is necessary at least to content the most . there are two differences of states , or two sorts of people , to be considered in a kingdome ; the citizens , ( or which comprehendeth all ) the common people : or your peeres , and such as either are persons of title , or aspire to be . it shall be good discretion & prudence , to procure to content the people , ( especially in a kings first entrance into his raigne ) in that which is reasonable and honest . and if their demaunds shall be otherwise , to dissemble with them , and to take time to consider of it , and so by little and litle , let their blood goe cooling . this was the counsayle of your olde counsailours . which had it beene followed by that young king rehoboam , his people had not rebelled against him , nor hee in the beginning of his empire , ( before he was scarce warme in his throne ) haue lost ten tribes of the twelue . the common people , are alwayes grumbling , and complayning , and ready to runne into rebellion , as being fearelesse , in regard of their multitude , and carelesse , for that they haue little or nothing to loose . the minor plinie , after that hee had made a large catalogue of the naturall vertues of the emperour traiane , after that he had shewen what great account he made of the common people , he sayth ; let not a prince deceiue himselfe , in thinking , that hee is not to make any reckoning of the common people ; for without them he cannot sustaine , nor defend his empyre . and in vaine shall hee procure other helpe , for that were to seeke to liue with a head , without a body ; which besides that it were monstrous , it must needes toter and tumble downe with it's owne weight , because it hath nothing to beare it vp . and if kings will needes know what kinde of thing the common people is , and what able to doe vpon all changes and alterations , let them take into their consideration , that which passed at the arraignment and death of our sauiour christ , where there was not that rule of reason of state in the vilest manner , which was not then practized . and the first stone that the princes of the scribes and pharisees moued against him , was the people ; for they knew well enough , that without them they could not awe , and feare pilate , nor moue him by their accusations , and false witnesses to condemne him . in the next place , they had recourse to the particular conueniency of the iudge , that he should not be a friend vnto caesar , but should loose his loue , if vpon this occasion the people should rise and rebell ; by which tricke they inclined him to their partie , and wrought him to preferre his priuate interest , before publicke iustice , and his owne preseruation , before that which was both honest and reasonable . againe , it is more secure , to procure the fauour and loue of the people , and more easie to effect his purpose by them . more secure , because without their loue and assistance , no alteration in the state can take effect . this their loue doth vphold kings , and gets them the opinion of good and vertuous princes . this qualifieth all wrongs , or makes the offenders pay soundly for them , against whom none dare seeme to be singular . lastly , for that the common people ; hauing onely respect to their particular profit & their own priuate interest , cannot desire nor pretend that , which your greater peeres , and principall men of the state do , who alwayes ( out of their ambition ) aspire to more , and stand bea●ing their braines , how they may compasse that , which their imagination tells them they want ; and by so much the more doth this their ambition increase , in how much the greater place they are , and in a neere possibilitie of that which they desire . i sayd ( before ) more easie ; because the people content themsel●es with aequalitie ( and his likewise makes well for kings ) with the administration of iustice with common ease and rest , with plenty , and with the mildenesse , gentlenesse , and peaceablenesse of him that ruleth ouer them . now , that kings may procure this popular loue , it is fit they should make choyse of such ministers , as are well beloued of the people , that will heare them with patience ; comfort , and hearten them vp , that they may the more willingly beare the burthens that are laid vpon them , the tributes , taxes , and troubles of the kingdome , which in the end must light all vpon them . for it is not to be doubted , and experience teacheth the truth of it , that the ministers and seruants of a prince , make him either beloued , or hated ; and all their defects or vertues turne to his hurt , or profit . and let not kings make slight reckoning thereof , nor let them colour it ouer with reasons of state ; for he , that once begins to be hated out of an ill conceiued opinion , they charge him withall that is either well , or ill done . for , there is nothing , be it neuer so good , which being ill interpreted , may not change it's first quali●●e in the eyes of men , who iudge things by apparences : which is another principall cause , why princes ought to procure the loue of the people . for , in conclusion , most certaine it is , that the common people , is not onely the iudge of kings , but is their attourny , also whose censure none of them can escape ; and is that minister , which god makes choyse of for to punish them in their name and fame , which is the greatest of all temporall punishments . suting with that which we sayd heeretofore of the voyce of the people , that it is the voyce of god. for his diuine maiestie vseth this as a meanes to torment those , who haue no other superiour vpon earth . and therefore it behoueth them to preuent this mischiefe , and to winne vnto them the peoples affection by as many wayes as possibly they can deuise , as by their owne proper person with some ; with other some , by their fauourites and familiar friends ; and with all by their ministers . for , there is not such a tully , nor demosthenes , withall their eloquence , for to prayse , or disprayse the actions of a king , either to salue , or condemne them , as is the peoples loue , or hatred . a great cause likewise of procuring this loue , and to winne the hearts of the people , & to giue them all good content , will be , if kings would be but pleased , who are lords of many kingdomes , and prouinces , to haue neere about them naturall ministers and counsaylours of all the sayd seuerall kingdomes , and prouinces ; for common-wealths , & kingdomes , risent it exceedingly , to see themselues cast out of administration , and gouernment , when they doe not see at the kings elbow , or in his counsell any one of their own nation , and countrie , conceiuing , that they doe either basely esteeme of them , or that they dare not trust them ; whence , the one ingendreth hatred , and the other , desireth libertie . let a king therefore consider with himselfe , that hee is a publicke person , and that he ought not to make himselfe particular ; that he is a naturall citizen of all his kingdomes and prouinces ; and therefore ought not willingly to make himselfe a stranger to any one of them . that he is a father to them all , & therfore must not shew himself a step-father to any . and therefore let him still haue some one naturall childe of euery prouince in his councel . for , it is a great vnhapines to a kingdome , not to haue any one childe of theirs ( amongst so many ) by the kings side , with whom the naturalls thereof may holde the better correspondencie . for these more speedily , & with more diligence and loue , treate and dispatch their businesses , then strangers either can or will , who must be sued vnto , and will do nothing but vpon earnest intreaty , or by force and compulsion , or like good wary merchants , by trading for ready mony . let kings weigh with themselues , that it is as naturall a worke in them to afforde fauour vnto all , as in a tree to afford fruit and it is a great glorie to a king , to oblige all nations to loue him . for that king much deceiueth himselfe , who will make himselfe king of this , or that prouince , and no more ; sithence , that god himselfe , whom he representeth on earth , professes himselfe , to be lord of t'one , and t'other , and of all . and therefore , hee that is lord of many , should not throw all his loue and affection on a few . let him in such sort conferre his fauours on the one , that he may not giue occasion of affront and disgrace to the other . for , these generall fauours , make much for the honor and estimation of kings . it faring with them , as it doth with those trees , when all sorts of passengers , goe gathering , & inioying their fruits . i say farther that for the augmentation and conseruation of the loue of common-wealths , and kingdomes , towards their kings , ( a maine and principall point , which o●ght to be esteemed in more , then other great treasures ) it will be very conuenient ( and is the counsayle of persons of great prudencie , throughly acquainted with kings , and kingdomes ) that they should haue some person , or persons of these good parts and qualities ; to wit : men of good naturall abilities , & of great wisedom , to whom in particular , they should ommit the care to heare those that are wronged , and male-content . for the graces and fauours of kings , as proceeding from humane power , which cannot doe all it would , haue euermore beene lesse in number then the pretenders . and therefore must of force follow , that there must needs bee a great number of discontented persons in all kingdomes , euen in the best , and most sweetely gouerned . some holding themselues wronged , induced thereunto by their own opinion ; others , by disfauours ; some , by bad dispatch ; others , by delayes ; and some , ( and those perhapps the most ) by finding themselues deceiued in their pretensions ; a thing that ought much to be thought on , though there be few , that take pleasure to heare on that eare . these men , i say , troubled with cares , and transported with passion , thrust themselues into all companies , great , and small , high , and low , entring into discourse with male-contents , and laying open their wounds vnto them ; which kinde of men , i would haue to be kindly dealt withall , that the kings ministers , should giue them the hearing , that they should temper and allay this their passion , that they should hearten and encourage them , and indeede make shew in some things to goe hand in hand with them , though it be in some sort against their king and master , seeking reasons to maintaine their part , and that hee cannot blame them if they complaine , hauing so much cause , laying the fault either on the iniquitie of the times , or the carelessenesse of those , through whose fingers these things were to passe ; and that , as it was no fault of the kings , for not hauing beene truly informed , so can hee not but rest well assured of their good bowells and sound intention to his maiestie and the state. this is a cunning artifice , and admirable art , against that deadly poyson , of those mens hatred and discontent , which repute themselues wronged and disgraced . and the better will this take with them , if this care be committed to such either person , or persons , that are well liked and beloued of the people , and haue together with their naturall grace , the grace of heauen , a gift which kings can neither giue , nor take away ; howbeit , they giue that grace and fauour , whence resulteth the peoples respect . for , it will not alwayes serue the turne , to bee beloued of all ; nor will this generall loue sometimes excuse him from being hated of many . and therefore in this the grace of heauen must bee sought after , and such a man made choyse of , as hath this naturall gift ; for by the helpe thereof , hee shall be the better beloued , and ouer them all haue the more commaund . this counsayle , was well esteemed and approued by that wise and prudent king , don philip the second , as a very necessary , & conuenient meanes for to temper mens mindes , & to get generall notice of all that passeth , either in word or deed , and thereupon be able to giue all possible remedie thereunto . and this aduice pleased him so well , that hee committed the execution thereof to him that gaue it him and purposely remitted some businesses vnto him , that he might haue the better occasion to sound mens mindes , and to effect what he pretended by that kinde of course : and in short time gaue good satisfaction by the proofe , and made knowen to his maiestie how much good was inclosed in this artifice , for the conseruation of kings , and kingdomes . §. iiii. of the sagacitie , sharpenesse of wit , and quicknesse of apprehension , which kings ought to haue . genebrard , and other graue authors say ; that this statly tower , and nose of the spouse , whereof wee discourse , signifieth those , which gouerne the church , or the kingdome , and such as excell the rest in vnderstanding , iudgement , sagacitie , and prudence . the egyptians likewise in their hieroglyphicks , by a high rising nose , vnderstand a wise and sage minde , that hath an eye vnto dangers , fore-sees mischiefes , and takes order for them in time , that it may not be ouertaken by them . and such a one as this , a king ought to haue . and certaine it is , that if that olde serpent had not had that hap in that first deceit , exercised on our first mother eue , it had beene needelesse for one man to watch another and to be so wary and circumspect , as now they are . but because he , with such great craft , and subtletie , did powre forth this his poyson into the originall fountaine of our nature , it was necessary that against this his venome , we should take this antidote and treacle , for a preseruatiue , and preuent one poyson , by another . and as treacle , being made of poyson , serues as a remedie against poyson it selfe , so , for to resist that poyson ▪ which that serpent by his subtletie , scattred and spred abroad amongst vs ; it is needefull , that men , following the counsayle , which our sauiour christ gaue vnto his disciples ; be yee wise as serpents , and harmelesse as doues ; should ioyne these two together . for of these two , is made that fine treacle , whereof we intend to speake . not of simplicitie alone , nor prudence alone , but of both together . this is that true and perfect confection ; for prudence , without a sound and harmelesse intention , is but meere craft and subtletie , ( as aristotle sayth ) and produceth nothing but trickes and deuises , to delude and deceiue . and a plaine and sincere intention , deuoyd of prudence , doth but deceiue and damnifie a mans selfe . i meane particular persons . for in kings this want of warinesse , and prudent sagacitie , will procure greater hurt to the generall affayres of the common wealth . too notorious and well knowen is that sentence of the glorious s. ierome ; sancta rusticitas solum sibi prodest : holy plainenesse and simplicitie , doth onely profit a mans selfe , that is ; some particular person . but kings besides their good intention , and sinceritie of minde , must haue prudence & sagacitie , for to resist the plots and traps of the ambitious , who still lye in wayte , watching a fit occasion for to deceiue them , vnlesse they be minded to loose their reputation , their authoritie , and their kingdome all at once . this is not a prognostication , broached out of mine owne braine , but vented by the holy ghost ; that an imprudent king , shall ruine a kingdome . rex insipiens , perdet populam suum : an vnwise king , destroyeth his people . the prophet esay , after he had made a recapitulation of the graces and gifts of wisedome , vnderstanding , counsayle , might , knowledge , and diuerse other wherewith the holy-ghost was to adorne the person of our sauiour christ , that king of kings , and liuely patterne and true example of all good kings , sayth ; et replebit eum spiritus timoris domini : and the spirit of the fear of the lord shall rest vpon him : now the hebrew rabins , whom pagninus , and vatablus follow , reade ; olfactio odoratus eius , erit cum timore domini : the pleasant sent of his sweete odour , shall be with the feare of the lord. that is to say ; together with the feare of the lord , and all other vertues , hee shall haue an admirable vnderstanding , and a dainty delicate iudgement : odorari faciam eum : i will make him to sent and winde out . so that hee shall nose out any thing whatsoeuer , though neuer so farre off , and without seeing , or hearing them , be they neuer so secret and hid , shall make a right and true iudgement of things . by this quicknesse of sent , they vnderstand that nimblenesse of apprehension , sharpenesse of vnderstanding , and sagacitie , which a king ought to haue : ( borowing the metaphore from your line-hound , or blood-hound , who running vpon the sent , and nosing the footing of what he is put vpon , discouers the game he pursues , be it in the thickest brakes , and closest bushes in the forrest . ) hee must be so subtill and so quicke of sent , that nothing must escape his knowledge , nothing be hidden from his vnderstanding ; he must like a surgeon , search into the depth of the wound : there is no mysterie so secret , which hee must not pry , and diue into , he must nose from a farre the impstoures , artifices , fraudulent dealings , and cunning disguises of those that go about to deceiue him . when wee will signifie such a mans trace , or which way hee tends , wee vsually say ; ya yo avia olido algo desso : now i begin to smell his drift . i haue an inckling what hee intends . but kings must haue more then an inckling ; they must haue a full knowledge of all ; there must not be that thing in the world , which mainely concernes them , and their kingdomes , which they must not winde and sift out . and from that high place , wherein they are seated , they are , like sentinalls in a watch-tower , to see , and make discouery , of all the cunning practises , and diuelish plots deuised against them , and of the slye and subtile carriage of such crafty and double-dealing men , with whom they treate , be they naturells , or strangers . for ( as it is in the prouerb ) la nistad del anno , viuen con arte y eng●nno ; y la otra parte , con enganno , y arte : one halfe part of the yeare , they liue by arte , and deceit ; the other halfe part , by deceit , and arte . and because these workers of mischiefe , arme themselues with the more care , and lye in closer ambush against kings , and their great estates ; it is necessary that they likewise should stand vpon their guard , and be very vigilant and circumspect , not only for to discouer their proiects , and to defend themselues from their designes , but to take them in the manner ; or ( as it is in the spanish prouerb ) cogerles con el hurtoen las manos . whilest the theft is yet in their hands , to lay hold on them . one of the greatest attributes and noblest titles , which holy iob , giueth vnto god , is that , where he sayes , apprehendit sapientes in astutia eorum : that hee taketh the wise in their owne craftinesse . he well vnderstands vpon what point insist the sophistries and fallacies of the wise men of this world , and at what marke their counsailes ayme ; et consilia prauorum dissipat : he disappointeth the deuises of the crafty ; and scattreth the counsayles of the wicked . and what they haue forget in their hearts , hee hammereth in that sort , that they shall not fulfill their desires . cogitationes malignorum : the cogitations of the wicked ; so sayth another letter . hee calls them malignos , that are men of a noble heart , that haue a thousand turnings , and windings . another letter hath versutorum ; variable , oft changing , subtile , shifting : being all of them true epithetes of a double disposed , and crafty generation ▪ ne possint implere manus eorum , quod coeperunt : that their hands cannot performe their enterprise , nor make an end of the web , which they haue begun to weaue , but their counsell is carryed headlong ; meeting with darkenesse in the day time , being taken in their owne net , as absalon was with his owne hayre ; neuer being able to set the same foote forward againe . christ , calls these kinde of men , foxes , which neuer goe on in a straight and direct way , but crossing from one side to another and making many doubles ; as he doth , that hath doubling thoughts , and playes , with the foxe , wyly , beguile yee . and by this beast , did the egyptians signifie that man , which vseth double dealing , and in his words and workes , is nothing but impostures , tricks , and deuices ; vae duplici corde , & labijs scelestis terram ingredienti duabus vijs : woe to the double heart , to deceitfull lips , and to the sinner , that goeth two wayes . to deale with these men will be required a great deale of prudence and sagacitie , a countermine must be made , and a pit digg'd whereinto they may fall , & that like silk-wormes , they might be wrapped and inuolued in the same bottome , that themselues haue wrought , to their vtter vndoing . in insidijs suis capientur iniqui ( saith the wise man. ) the transgressours shall be taken in their owne naughtinesse . their plots and proiects shall make for their finall perdition . when the pharisees with soft & smooth words questioned our sauiour iesus christ , what should be done with that woman , whom they had newly taken in the act of adulterie , made vse of that his admirable prudence and wisedome , accompanied with the simplicitie and harmelessenes of the doue ; saying vnto them . qui sine peccato est vestrum , pri●●us in illam lapidem mittat : he that is without sinne among you , let him first cast a stone at her . and presently thereupon , hee stouped down , and fell to writing with his finger on the ground , to the end , that without making them farther ashamed , being conuicted by their own conscience , they might one by one get them gon , and leaue the poore woman free . these men came armed with the serpentine subtletie of the diuell , and presuppossing that he would haue absolued her of that crime , they would then haue accused him for an infringer and breaker of the law ; and in case hee should haue condemned her , they would haue charg'd him with crueltie . but our sauiour was euery way well prouided for them , and to this their pestiferous poyson , he applyed the pure and perfect treacle of his prudence . the like trick they would haue put vpon him , & with no lesse cunning , when they demaunded of him ; whether it were lawfull to pay tribute vnto caesar , or no ? conuincing them with the very same peece of money , which they brought vnto him ; telling them ; reddite ergo quae sunt caesaris caesari ; & quae sunt dei , deo : render therefore vnto caesar , the things which are caesars , and vnto god , the things , that are gods. it is a great happinesse for prudent kings , and for those princes also , that haue not as yet gained with all men the opinion of wise , that some occasions might be offered vnto them , wherein they might catch these crafty & subtill foxes ; and they ought purposely to hunt after them , & to perfourme some exteriour , and publick actions in order to this end : and so to carry them , that all the people may take notice of them . for therby , they shall gaine a great deale of authoritie and reputation throughout the kingdome ▪ and of all , both subiects , and strangers , be feared & esteemed , for men of wisedome , worth , and prudence . as it befell king salomon at his first comming to the crowne , when the peop●e of israel perceiued the discretion and prudence , wherwith he had proceeded in de●iding that difference betweene the two women , touching the liuing childe , which each of them pretended . insomuch that when they saw how wisely , & how iustly it was carryed by him , they shouted a●l for ioy , saying ; surely , the wisedom of god is in him ; and from thence forth they began to respect , & feare him . yet mistake me not , i beseech yee ; for , i do not say , that kings should desire , that any ill should betide any man ; but that they ought , & may desire , that some such occasion might be offered vnto them , wherein they might shew their zeale and loue vnto iustice , and manifest to the world , that they are wise enough of themselues to execute the same . for there is nothing , that makes a king more worthy of his monarchie , as to win , by meanes of his good counsel and gouerment , greater credit and authoritie , then what he had , when he began first to gouern : for a kingdome is only the gift of fortune ; but this other , argues his owne wisedome , and iudgement . but that , which i shall conclude this point withall , is this ; that this prudence & sagacitie of the serpent , so much commended by christ , ioyned with the doues simplicitie , produceth two effects of much importance in kings , which are these neither to deceiue , nor to be deceiued . simplicitie , is without welt or garde , plaine & true , and knowes not how to deceiue any man. prudence , on the other side , is very wary & circumspect , and will not suffer her selfe to be deceiued by any man. nay , it goes a little farther ; for it perfecteth the whole essence and being of prudence , and causeth a certaine dexteritie in the dispatch of businesses , which is a great help vnto princes , and is the only mistris to make them to vnderstand & iudge things aright . and likewise to see and discerne them by outward actions , and the exterior sences . the eye , the foote , the hand , shall not wag ▪ moue , or stirre , but it shal discouer the inward thought . lastly , it is it 's proper office , ( reason assisting and the discourse of the vnderstanding ) to anticipate occasions , and to diuert in time the euill that may happen ; for , ( as tully sayth , and very truly ) nihil turpius in sapiente est , quam dicere , non putaram : nor ought it to be the language of kings to say ; i did not thinke on such a thing , i did not dreame , that things would haue fallen out thus , & thus ; or that i did not throughly vnderstand the busines . for , in kings , it is no lesse shame to suffer themselues to be deceiued , or to be ouercome by artes , and tricks , then to be subdued in the open field by force of armes . kings therefore , being necessarily to heare , and negociate with so many and so sundry persons , to free themselues from the slightes & subtleties of some , must make vse of this circumspection and sagacitie . homer representeth vnto vs a most prudent prince , who ( though vnlearned ) yet for that he was very crafty & subtile , did gouerne very well , and freed himselfe from many great dangers . subtletie and sagacity , accompanied ( i say ) with a sound intention , and a good conscience , ( for that is it , we● aime at in gouernment ) proceedeth not from sagacity , and subtletie , but from goodnesse and iustice. §. v. of the discretion , which kings ought to haue . venerable beda , and s gregory say , of the nose and it's nostrills ; that they are the instrument , or conduite , to conuay all sorts of sents vp to the head ; and that they are purposely placed in so high a station , that they may the better discerne the good and the bad . and they signifie thereby the vertue of discretion , which is the knowledge of good and ill , and by reasons helpe , distinguisheth the one from the other . per nasum , discretio exprimitur , per quam virtutes eligimus , & delecta reprobamus : by the nose , is vnderstood discretion , by which wee make choyse of vertue , and reiect our pleasures . and is of that great excellencie , that the ancient made her reginam virtutum : the queene of the vertues ; reducing all the rest vnto it . another call'd her the mother . a third , the fountaine or well-spring of the vertues ; a fourth , will haue euery particular vertue to beare the name of discretion . and there is not one wanting , who affirmeth that these did not hit the marke aright ; for farre better ( saith hee ) might they haue said , that there is no vertue at all , without discretion . for albeit the vertues in themselues be perfect and full , and doe qualifie the person that possesseth them , as fortitude , makes a man valiant ; iustice , makes a man iust ; wisedome makes a man wise . and so in the rest ; yet if the vse of discretion be wanting to any one of these , they loose their punctum & medium ; wherein they consist and light vpon the extreames . so the liberall turnes prodigall ; the valiant , foole-hardy ; the wise , imprudent ; and the iust , iniurious . discretio ( sayth s. bernard ) omni virtuti ordinem ponit : discretion , is the rule , by which euery vertue is directed . and in matter of counsell the vote of discretion strikes a great stroake ; for it distinguisheth falsehood from truth ; things certaine , from things doubtfull ; and from amidst what is ill , maketh choice of that which is good . it qualifieth all things , and puts them in their punto , and proper being . and the philosopher sayth ; that it is a vertue proper vnto kings , princes , and gouernours to whom by office it belongs to intermeddle , and haue a hand in such a world of businesses , as require their direction and discretion ; wherewith , all they must help themselues for the better disposing , and ordring to a good end the affayres of the common-wealth . it is a neere neighbour vnto prudence , and bordreth much vpon her , these vertues ( as we sayd before ) being so inchained , and interlinked one with another that we cannot touch one peece , without trenching vpon the other . and are both so necessarie , that though i should say neuer so much of them , i could not out-speake them . but to come to the point ; let the first point of aduise and discretion in a king be ▪ not trust so much to his own wise ▪ and discretion , as to forbeare , out of a presumption of his owne sufficiencie , to treate and consult businesses with persons of prudence and vnderstanding . for , being that so and so various are the cases , which dayly offer themselues vnto kings , and so graue and weighty the businesses , whereof they treate , they must be canuased to and fro , and well and throughly debated , for the better ordring and setting of them ; making former errours , to serue as land-markes , for the avoyding of those to come . and like a wise , and experienced physitian , let him apply that medicine there , and in that case , where , for want thereof he had formerly erred . out of ignorance , to draw knowledge ; out of errours , certainties , & out of bad successes , future warnings , is admirable discretion . ex praeteritis conijcientes , iudicamus : ( sayth aristotle ) by coniecturing of things past , wee come to make our iudgement of things to come . and it is a very good course to diuine by that which is past ; and in kings exceeding necessary ; to draw experience from some times , for other some ; and to beware ( as they say ) not onely by other mens harmes , but likewise by their owne . for , let a man be neuer so wary , neuer so circumspect , and let him watch and looke about , as if his life lay on it , hee must either fall , or hath fallen at some one time or other , or hath err'd in this , or that particular , whereby his designes haue beene frustrated , or hath seene , or read the downe falls of others . and therfore shall be shew himselfe very discreet , if hee shall gather a doctrine out of these , and make such good vse of them that they may serue vnto him for a warning ; castigasti me domine , & eruditus sum : o lord , thou hast chastised mee , and after that , i was instructed . for , ( as it is in the prouerb ) delos escarmentados , salen los arteros : no men , are more their craft-masters , then those that haue bin most bitten . nor is it much , that a man of reason and vnderstanding discoursing with himselfe of forepassed passages , should benefit himselfe by comparing cases past , with cases present , and by experience and knowledge of those which heretofore haue beene remedilesse , hee may apply remedy to those , which threaten future mischiefe : sithence that brute beastes ( as it is obserued , by s. isidore , and polybius ) who haue no discourse , but onely a naturall instinct , leading them to their conseruation , make vse of the like kinde of accidents , not onely when they themselues fall into some quack-mire , or otherwise haue runne the danger of this baite ; or that net ; but euen then also , when they see others fall before them , they hang an arse , and will not easily suffer themselues to be drawne into the like danger , but hold that place euer after in suspicion , where they haue seene their fellowes indangered , and shunne ( all that they can ) that hole , or bog , whereinto they haue once either fallen , or beene myred . and shall not men of vnderstanding , and good discourse , which heare , and see , what other men suffer , as likewise the great hurt , which they themselues haue receiued by the like cause , shall not they ( i say ) grow wise by other mens harmes , and their owne ; shall not they seeke to shunne and auoyd ( as much as in them lies ) the like inconueniences , but that some pleasing thing shall bee no sooner propounded vnto them , but forthwith they will suffer themselues to fall into the pit , and to be taken in the snare , that lyes before them , and will not offer to fly therfro , nor forbeare to eate of that deceiuing foode , whereunto they are inuited , and know for certaine , that neuer any did come off with safety ? he , that by the forepassed accidents , and falls of others , or of himselfe , doth not take aduise and warning , the name of beast , nay of a senselesse creature , will better befit him , then of a discreete and well-aduised man. this is that complaint , which moses made of that foolish people . vtinam saperent , & intelligerent , acnouissima prouiderent : would to god , that they would call to minde , and make vse , of the so many , and various successes , which they haue seene , and past through , and that quoting the present , with the past , they would be prouident in that , which is to come ; especially , since the wise man sayth ; that the thing , that hath beene , is that which shall be ; and that , which is done , is that which shall be done ; and that there is no new thing vnder the sunne . let the conclusion therefore of this discourse be , first ; that it is not heere required of a discreete king , that he should beare about him in his ●leeue good lucke , and drawe out when he listeth a faire lot , and a certaine and happy successe in all his businesses ; for this is only , and wholy , in gods hands , and not in his . and therefore to require any such thing of him , were great indiscretion : but that hee should enter into them ( if time will giue him leaue ) with sound aduise , and mature deliberation , and to intertaine them till hee be able to bring his purposes to passe ; and , si sit periculum in mora : if there be danger in delay , and that they will not suffer the deferring , let him call to minde the successe of former businesses , and let him well consider with himselfe , what in like cases hath vsually succeeded , and accordingly let him settle in the present , and prouide in the future , that which is most fitting , euermore hauing respect to the iustnesse of his cause , relying altogether vpon god , and humbly beseeching him , that hee will direct him in all his wayes . for ( as it is in the prouerbs ) cor hominis disponit viam suam , sed domini est , dirigere gressus eius : a mans heart deuiseth his way ; but the lord directeth his steps . suting with that common saying ; homo proponit , & deus disponit . man purposeth , but god disposeth . the second thing required of him is ; that hee looke well about him , that he diligently obserue the maner of gouernment throughout his whole kingdome , and that he haue a watchfull eye on his publike ministers , and counsailours of state ; and more particularly vpon those , that are in highest place and authoritie , and haue his eare most ; and that hee likewise labour to know the qualities , conditions , and naturall dispositions of those , that now are , and to conferre and compare them with those of former times that hee hath seene , and knowen , or hath heard , and read of in histories ; to the ende , that by the knowledge of the affections , and naturall inclinations of those , hee may prognosticate the end whereunto these tend ; and by those passages and proiects of precedent times , make a diuination of the designes of the present . for , this prudentia in principe , quodammodo diuinatio est : this prudence and discretion in a prince , is a kinde of diuination . and let them not tell mee that mens manners , are changed with their names ; nor their naturall inclinations with the declination of times , and that there is no correspondency betwixt those that are now , and those of olde , for ( as cornelius tacitus saith , who was a singular master in this science , speaking of his owne times , in respect of the former ) the men are other , but now their manners . they are now , as they were then ; and then as now . well may it be , that for some considerations , men may represse , and couer their affections moreat one time , then another , but not , that they are not one and the same , those of this time and that ; and that early or late they doe not the same worke , they antiently did . for , from one and the same causes , it must necessarily follow , that we must see one and the same effects . let kings therefore see ( once more i speake it ) and consider well the estate wherein stand the affaires of their kingdome , how it is in the gouernment , in their ministers , and their counsellours , what their affections , naturall inclinations , passions , ambitions , desires , and the like , and make a iudgement of the one and the other , of the present , and the past , and they shall finde , that these , and those , great & small , and all one with another tread in one and the same steps , and ayme all at that faire white , of their owne black and fowle interest . and weighing likewise with themselues , that some , if not most of those kings and monarkes , that haue gone along in that track and held the like course of gouernment , and made vse of the like ministers , either haue beene ruined thereby , or brought neere vnto it , let them stand aloofe from it , or them , or ought else whatsoeuer whereby they may either see , or know , other their predecessours haue beene vtterly ouerthrowne . for , most certaine it is , that by the effects of cases past , we may know what were the causes of them ; and how in the like , the like may likewise succeede . the science and knowledge of kings , is like vnto that of astrologie , wherein are better skill'd those of latter then former times , in regard of those many proofes and experiences , which they haue seene , heard , and read . historie therefore and experience , being the fountaines of humane wisedome , princes ought to peruse histories , and procure to know how it hath succeeded with others , that thereby they may take aduice and warning in cases to come ; and from this experience and knowledge of mens naturall inclinations and affections , to draw thence a doctrine , for to moderate their owne , and to know other mens dispositions , and withall , to take notice , that the naturall dispositions of the men of these times , are not more strong and able to resist their appetites , but are more weake in the naturall , and lesse perfect in the spirituall , then those of our ancestors . whence that followeth , which wee said before , that by the knowledge of the past , wee may prognosticate of the present , if wee haue once seene , and made triall , that it fell out so with other men of the like state , and condition . so that it may be collected , by what hath hitherto beene deliuered , how necessarie it is , that a king , or supreme lord , should exercise himselfe for some few yeeres , in the studie of the various lections of histories , and may ( if he will ) come by them , to know the customes , and inclinations of forraigne nations , as well of those , that are free states , as those that are vnder subiection ; with whom he must indure so many demaunds , and answeres . to the end that the varietie of accidents , may no whit afflict , nor trouble him . for it were a kinde of disparagement to a great prince , to admire any noueltie whatsoeuer , or to seeme a stranger , to the strangest accidents , that shall occurre vnto him . and hee must necessarily suffer this , and other great inconueniences and deceits in matters of state , if hee be not well aduanced in the knowledge of them , and with the people , with whom hee is to treat . for many are they , that pretend to deceiue him , and will not suffer the truth to come to his eares in it's naked nature , but shadowed with some colour , as shall make best for their pretension . for to cut off which mischiefe , histories serue the turne , which supply the want of experience , and set before his eyes in a short peece of paper the successes of an age so large and of such a length , that many liues cannot reach thereunto . a thing very necessary in kings , whereby to finde themselues prepared for the present , and prouided for the future . for hee , that hath still before his eyes what is past , is seldome deceiued in that which is to come . and hee , that shall turne ouer the histories of former times , shall meete with the nouelties of the present ; as also with those truths which sycophants conceale , and such as are not flatterers dare not to tell him . onely histories , without feare or dread , speake plaine language to kings , and yet remaine as whole , sound , and intire , as they were before . another point of discretion , is ; that for as much as the aduice and wisdome , and more particularly in kings and persons of great name and ranke , is great , they should not intermeddle in small matters , not shew themselues in your lesser occasions , where the glory is none , and the losse of reputation great , not onely if they be ouercome , but also if they doe not ouercome to their great aduantage , they ought not likewise lightly and without very good ground to thrust themselues into businesses of great consequence , and of that danger and difficultie , that they shall not afterwards know well how to winde themselues out of them : for it argues but a small talent of wisedome , to know dangers then onely , when a man is in the midst of them : and sauours of much leuitie , to put himselfe desperately vpon cases of aduenture . and this is no other counsayle , then that which a very graue and wise man , gaue the emperour vespasian , deseruing to be written in letters of gold , and in the cabbinies of kings . qui magnarum rerum consilia suscipiunt , aestimare debent , an quod inchoatur reip : vtile , ipsis gloriosum , aut promptum effectu , aut certè non arduumsit . they that aduise and consult the vndertaking of great enterprises , ought to weigh and consider with themselues , whether that they goe about , be profitable or no for the common-wealth , honourable for themselues , or whether it may easily be effected , or at least without any great difficultie ? and this is a lecture , which christ reades vnto all , aduising vs , that before wee begin any busines of importance , wee enter into an account and reckoning with our selues , whether wee bee able to goe through with it , or noe , and when hauing well weighted the difficulties , dangeres and expences wee must bee at , wee shall finde it to be of more charge then profit , to let it alone . so shall wee rid our selues of a great deale of care , and excuse the murmurings and censure of the people , who will much risent it , that in businesses , wherein the wealth , peace , and reputation of a kingdome is interessed , kings should aduenture for the gaining of a little , to put themselues in hazard of loosing much . as likewise , because thereby is giuen occasion , of measuring the extent and limits of the power of kings , and of plainely manifesting to the open view of the world , that they cannot alwayes doe what they would nor against whom they will , and therefore must not giue way , that men should enter into iudgement , that their power cannot reach whither they themselues will haue it , but ought alwayes and by all meanes they can , to maintaine the credite and estimation of their power , and greatnesse . the words of our sauiour christ , are these ; which of you disposed to build a tower , sitteth not downe before , and counteth the cost , whether he haue sufficient to performe it ? lest after hee hath laid the foundation , and is not able to goe through with it , all that behold him , begin to mock him , saying ; this man began to builde , and was not able to make an end . or what king going to make warre against another king , sitteth not downe first , and casteth in his minde , whether hee be able with ten thousand to meete him , that commeth against him with twenty thousand , &c. the like i say of competitions , whether this , or that other doth this , or that better ? though it be in matters of recreation . for all occasions of incounters with kings are in any hand to be avoyded . and it likewise seemeth ill in point of policie , that they in any kinde should haue any competition with their vassalls . and king salomon sets it downe for a point of policie ; for that it is a thing vnworthy authoritie royall . it is a mans honour ( saith he ) to keepe himselfe from strife . alexander the great , being askt the question , whether he would goe and sport himselfe at the olympick games with the rest of the great ones of his court ? made answere ; yes , if there were other kings with whom i might contend . yet would i not haue kings so farre to mistake mee , as to vnderstand that they may not enterprise great things , and haue competence with others , that are as great , or greater then themselues , following their stepps and imitating their heroycall actions ; nay , it is a point rather of discretion , and wisedome , in a prudent king , to tread in the track of their ancestors , that walked in the right way , and to set before their eyes the good things that they did , that according thereunto they may take the like resolution in the like cases . the romanes were so religious in the precedents and examples of their predecessours , that they made them the line and rule of all their actions , and made them as a law to be kept and obserued , and could not depart ther-fro without the fowle note of ignominie , gouerning new enterprises , by former old actions . neither ought a king likewise to esteeme so meanely and so basely of himselfe , as to thinke , that hee is not able to doe as much as others haue done in times past . for if they of olde , had had that minde and conceit of themselues , in calling to minde the braue and noble deedes , which they haue either heard , or read in histories of their ancestours , they would not haue imitated them , as many of them haue , in their great and glorious acts. and certaine it is , that neuer any man did any such illustrious and heroycall action heeretofore , which might not be done by another . and therfore , the actions of kings being such , as conduce to the seruice of god and the well-fare of the common-wealth , it will conuene very well ( the said circumstances being duly considered ) to commence and giue a beginning vnto them , to the end that fortune , or ( to say better ) god , putting a helping hand to our good diligence and industrie , may giue vnto them a full and perfect end . it was the saying of king agesilaus : that fortune , in great affayres , and high enterprises , neuer shew'd her selfe liberall and generous , but when shee met with noble and generous mindes . and it hath beene often seene , that men loose , at least let slip , many things , not because they are not able to atcheiue them , but because they want courage to vndergoe them . and let them not onely content themselues with the bare reading of them , but endeuour to be like those famous captaines , in matter of warre ; those great common-wealthes , in matter of gouernment ; and those christan politicians , in matter of state. for examples perswade much . and albeit that homer saith , that great enterprises are sooner spoken of , then done ; easily vttered , but hardly executed , yet let princes doe their best , which will be no small matter . for thereby , their subiects will receiue benefit , their successors beare them enuie , and their enemies stand in feare of them . now let vs draw out of this discourse that discretion , which is a vertue so necessary , that when it is wanting , good is conuerted into ill ; and vertue , into vice ; and where a man thought to winne fame , in stead thereof , growes infamous , affronted , and ashamed . for discretion , worketh in man that effect , as salt doth in flesh , which dryes vp the moysture , drawes forth the blood , and keepes it from corruption . as doth salte , so doth discretion , keepe man free from perturbations , or any vnseemelinesse and discomposure , in any action whatsoeuer he vndergoeth . christ recommended this vertue to his disciples , when hee commanded them to haue salte within themselues . this was in the gospell . but long before in the leuiticall law , it was commanded ; that euery sacrifice , should be saked with salte . the wordes , are these ; euery oblation of thy meate offering , shalt thou season with salt , neither shalt thou suffer the salte of the couenant of thy god to be lacking from thy meat offering : with all thine offring , thou shalt offer salt . giuing vs thereby to vnderstand the wisedome and discretion , wherewith hee would haue vs to serue him , and saint paul chargeth vs , not to vtter that word which shall not be seasoned with the salt of wisdome , and discretion . a qualitie very necessary and requisite in all , but more particularly , and without comparison with much more aduantage in kings , as hath wisely beene obserued by anselmus , and venerable bede . in that safe-conduct , which artaxerxes gaue vnto esdras , wherein was set downe in a list , all the allowances that they were to make him , and what prouisions he was to haue along with him , and though in the rest there was a limitation , salverò absque mensura ; yet was hee to haue salte without measure . hee was not stinted in that . for in all things belonging vnto kings , there is such a proportion , taxe , or measure set vpon them ; but there are no bounds , no limitts to be set vpon their wisedome and discretion . let them ( a gods name ) haue that without measure , without limitation . for , let them haue neuer so much , it is no more then they haue neede of . god , of his goodnesse , giue them as much as is needefull for them , and that shall suffice them . and let vs extract this , out of all that which hath beene said touching this sence of smelling , that there are two sorts , or two kindes of prudence , ( according to s. basil. ) the one good , and the other bad ; the one of flesh , and blood ; and the other of spirit , and life . of the former , doe the wise men of this world boast . for they denominate that man to be wise , that is crafty and subtill , a slye , cunning companion , that by ouer-reaching ; and damnifying his neighbour , procures his owne priuate profit . the one ( sayth saint paul ) kills , the other quickens ; this brings death , that life . nam prudentis carnis , mors est ; prudentia autem spiritus , pax & vita : for , to be carnally minded , is death ; but to be spiritually minded , is life and peace . let that then be condemned for ill , and let that suffice , which hath beene spoken thereof . and let vs set vp our rest vpon this , which is such and so good , that no vertue without it , is pleasing and acceptable vnto god , as no sacrifice was without salte . so that chastitie , and cleanesse it selfe , a vertue so high prized by god , and allianced so neerely with the angels , is of no reckoning without prudence . and that his best beloued , beautifullest , and fairest spouse , should shee be wanting in this , he would repudiate her , and abhorre her . wee read in saint mathewes gospell , of ten handsome virgines , well attyred and fitted for to attend the bridegromes comming , whereof fiue of them , for their imprudencie , were shut out , and not suffred to goe in with him to the wedding . so that , it is good for all ; and without it , all is as nothing . omnia operatur prudentia : ( saith s. ambrose ) wisedome worketh all things . it doth not onely put mans reason and will in the right way , direct his forces and faculties , and order all his actions ; but without it , man is no man , but the counterfaite , and figure of a man. fortherein consisteth the absolutenesse and perfection of man , and that similitude and likenesse , which he hath with god , in his being capable of reason , and prudence . by his memorie he makes that , which is past , present ; by his wisedome , he foresees that which is to come ; and by his counsell and aduise , he disposeth and ordereth the present estate of things , which are those parts of prudence , which we specified before . chap. xxvii . of the sence of tasting , and of the vertue of temperance , and how well it befitteth kings . amongst the many miseries , which accompaine man , euen from the cradle to his graue , and from his mothers wombe , to that of the earth , the mother of vs all , that hungry appetite and precise necessitie of eating , and drinking is not the least . it is ( as s. isidore saith ) a rigorous , a cruell and importunat creditour ; nullus hominis tam improtunus exactor est , quàm venter ; bodie suscipit , & cras exigit : there is not any so earnest and eager an exactor on man , as is the belly ; it receiues to day , and requires the same againe to morrow . it is continually demaunding that troublesome tribute of meate and drinke , of recreation and pleasure , and all other things necessary for the body ; for all these passe , and are registred , vnder the sense of the taste . which albeit it be lesse noble then the rest , yet is it more necessary then all of them . for ( as s. ierom sayth , and experience teacheth ) without it wee cannot liue long , but without the other we may . aristotle sayth , that this sence directs it's eye to these two obiects ; to the pleasure it receiueth in eating , and to the delight it taketh in drinking . both being very powerfull , and walking still hand in hand , the one seconding the other , taking their seuerall turnes . and their signorie so farre extends it selfe , that it trenches vpon the rest of the sences , and all of them are willing to accompaine him . for hearing , seeing , and smelling , neither like vs , nor last long , vnlesse they haue the fellowship of the taste , yet are they differenced in this , that the species of those things , that are to be seene , heard , and smelt , are to passe by the medium , or meanes of another kinde of transparent body , as is the ayre . whereas those that are to be tasted , are to touch immediatly vpon the tongue , and to haue their dwelling and abiding in the palate , that it may the better relish & distinguish the seuerall sorts of tastes . and it is worthy our obseruation , that in that part of the head , which is the mouth , where principally the taste hath it's seate , though it's iurisdiction be so short , and so curtall'd , that it scaree occupieth the least space of the tongue , and that it's delight is so short , that it indureth but for a moment , yet it should come to be of that power and force , that it forced the wise man to say ; that it was insatiable . and though it alwayes hath , and doth still shew it's rule and empire ouer all mortall men , yet does it make it's greatest oftentation in kings , in princes , and your great and principall persons , who are most subiect to it's command . some compare it to the fire , whereinto the more fuell you fling , the more infinite is it's power , and rests neuer satisfied . in like manner , such a tyrant is the taste , that be our riches , rents and patrimonies neuer so great , like fire , it wastes and consumes them , though it selfe remaine still whole and intire , without being lessened or diminished . nor will i heere cite the examples of prophane kings and emperours giuen ouer to the pleasure of their palate and sensuall delights , to the losse of great estates and kingdomes , and the scandall of their suiects ; because my purpose is to quote some places of the sacred scripture , dictated by the holy ghost , the author of truth . it is reported of king salomon , that being so wise , so rich , and so powerfull a prince , that hee did in such sort let loose the reines to his vnbridled appetite , as if there were not the least footing of wisedome , or reason to be found in him . hee himselfe says as much in ecclesiastes , where ( as one that saw at last his owne errour ) hee expresseth his minde in this manner ; dixiin corde meo : vadam & affluam delicijs , & sruar bonis : i sayd in mine heart , goe to now , ( for so the vulgar renders it ) i will proue thee with mirth , therefore inioy pleasure . i sayd so , and as i sayd , so i did . vadam ; i will goe ; that is to say , after my appetite , i will abound in wealth , i will inioy the good things of this world , by which are vnderstood all sortes of delights , and pleasures , as eating , drinking , intertainments , recreations , sportes , and pastimes , and whatsoeuer in that kinde may be conceiued or imagined . omnia quae desiderauerunt oculi mei non negaui eis ; &c. whatsoeuer mine eyes desired , i kept not from them ; i with-held not my heart from any ioy . for my heart reioyced in all ; &c. and at last , hee conclndeth with this saying ; quis it à deuorauit , & delicijs affluit , vt ego : who , of all the kings that euer were in the world , could eate more then i ? or who could hasten more thereunto then i , hauing the world so much at will , and more then all they had ? was it not a thousand pities ( thinke you ) to see so wise a king to become tributary and subiect to so vile a slaue as is the belly ? i haue often times mused and wondred with my selfe at the blindnesse of our noble men of these times , who making it such a point of honour , and standing so strictly vpon it , not to pay any taxe , or tribute , though it amount not to aboue a blanke , and that they will sooner loose their liues , then acknowledge themselues tributaries , and yet that these the more noble and greater lords they are , should the more glory to be tributaries , and render and submit themselues most , to this infamous tribute , and tyrannicall taxe , which is payd to the palate ? what sumptuous tables ? what costly diet ? what dainty dishes ? what exquisite curiosities ? what rich and precious wines ? what regalos ? and what recreations , more befitting heathens , then christians ? and all , for to pay the taste this vnlawfull custome ? which in plaine language , is a greater taske , and a greater tribute , then the poorest labourer , or the meanest hedger and ditcher is seassed at . for , when he pays this tribute , it is onely with a peece of houshold bread , and a dish of small drinke , and other the like poore contentments , denying to his taste those excessiue tributes , which your kings and greater persons pay , being in this particular better gentlemen then they . o the blindnesse of our christian nobilitie ! let me put this question vnto you ; when the collector of subsedyes comes to a poore husbandmans house , to demand so much of him as he is ●eassed at , if hee should pay him more then is due vnto him by the law , or any act ordained in that kinde , or should be earnest with him to take more then hee is set at , would not all men thinke him to be a foole , and a very simple fellow ? the like errour doe they commit , who consume their goods , their lands , and their whole estates in seruing the belly , and satisfying the taste with such diuersitie of delicate viands , and choyse wines , when as they may well pay this tribute with that little , or small modicum , mentioned by the apostle ; habentes alimenta , & quibus tegamur , his contenti simus : hauing foode , and raiment , let vs be therewith contented . and with this , let vs goe dayly redeeming those seassements and tributes , which were imposed vpon vs by sinne , and in particular this sinne of eating and drinking , wherewith so often euery day we make such large payments . and if wee cannot quit the whole score , let vs doe herein , like your bad paymasters , who doe huck and pinch , and pay as little as they can . but this ( the more is the pitie ) is not in vse amongst them . for men , when they are call'd vpon to pay either priuate debts , or publick seassements , they driue the demander off with delayes , and when they should make payment , fall a caffling , and refuse to lay downe what is due . but in eating , and drinking , they will pay much more then is due , and presse the belly to take more , then either it is willing , or able to receiue . when caesars collectors came to demand tribute of our sauiour iesus christ , hee put this question to saint peter ; reges terrae , à quibus accipiunt tributum , velcensum ? a filijs , an ab altenis ? the kings of the earth , of whom doe they receiue tribute ? of the children , or of strangers ? to whom peter answered ; of strangers . thereupon our sauiour persently replyes , ergo liberi sunt filij : therefore the children are free . and if kings and their children are , and ought to be free from this royall tribute ; it standeth with much more reason , that they should be freed ( as much as is possible ) from the tribute of their proper gusts and pleasures , which is much more preiudiciall vnto them , then that can be , should they pay it . for that payment is made but once yeare at most , or from halfe yeare to halfe yeare , and it is payd in money ; but this is daily and howerly , and must be payd with a mans wealth , with his health , with his life , and with his honour . a man cannot lap vp in a little peece of paper the misbehauiours and misdemeanors which princes haue fallen into , by giuing themselues to riotous banqueting , nor the excesses , which they haue beene forced to commit , when they haue broke the bounds of temperance . there are two things ( sayth the wise man ) which disquieteth the world , and turneth it topsie-turuy ; to see a slaue when he reigneth ; and a foole , when hee is filled with meate . and therefore the sayd wiseman forbiddeth wine vnto kings . and seneca doth much reproue alexander the great , and marcus antonius , for their distemper in their diet ; a thing so vnworthy the royall dignitie , that cicero did affirme , that cruditie of the stomack in princes , was a great indignitie , and altogether vnbeseeming them . for , by delighting in drinking , they dull their spirits , enfeeble their strength , and discouer a thousand weakness●s to the world , the concealing whereof did import them very much , and neerely concerne them . king salomon sayth in his prouerbs , much more strong is that man , which ouercomes himselfe , and subdues his owne affections , then hee that getteth great victories ouer his enemies : suting with that vulgar saying ; fortior est quise , quàm qui fortissima vincit moe●a . and therefore , it not so much importeth kings , to conquer others , and to make themselues lords of new prouinces and kingdomes , as not to become perpetuall slaues to their proper gustes & appetites . for this doth not fit and sute so well with the greatnesse of their office , nor is eating in it selfe so generous an act , that they ought so much to prize and esteeme it . in the booke of the iudges , we finde a parable of the trees , who hauing resolued with themselues to choose a king , to whom all the rest should owe homage , they came first to the oliue , afterwards to the fig-tree , and lastly to the vine , intreating them that they would be pleased to take the crowne vpon them , and to raigne ouer them . the first answered ; that he could not leaue his fatnesse , to goe to be promoted ouer the trees ; the fig-tree , hee excused himselfe in the like manner , saying ; hee could not forsake his sweetnesse , and his good fruite , for the inioying of a crowne ; and the vine , he plainly told them , that he would not leaue his wine , which cheereth god , and man , to become a king. the purpose and intent of parables , ( according to the doctrine of glorious s. austin , and other holy doctors ) is , to infold in them the truth . and in this is it giuen kings to vnderstand , that excesse in their tastes and delicious meates , is not compatible with their estate , nor doth it become a crowne royall , ( that wee may say all we can , though we somewhat exceede from the obiect of the tast ) to loose it's time in pleasures , and pastimes , but that in that very instant , wherin kings take them , they should as sodainly leaue them ; in regard , that they haue so many and so great businesses committed to their charge , wherein if they should bestow all their time , they haue scarce time enough . which requiring ( so much as it doth ) the assistance , and obseruation of kings , if they should mis-spend this time in sports and intertainements , they must of necessitie want time for that which is more necessary ; & be driuen ( considering that there is not any thing , that doth cause a greater relaxation , and distraction in the vnderstanding , and that more abateth the edge and vigor of graue and weighty consideration , then sports , pastimes , and pleasing of their owne gustes and palates ) to neglect state-businesses , vnlesse they will be pleased to vse them seldome , and with moderation . insomuch , that they being to repart and diuide the time betweene themselues and the common-wealth , they should so employ it , that it might not be wanting vnto them for their businesses , nor super-abound vnto them for their vices . yet for all this doe not i pretend ( it being the least part of my meaning ) to take from kings their intertainments , but rather much desire that they would take them with moderation , and without neglecting businesses of state , and after that they shall haue fully cumply'de with the common-wealths affayres . to the end , that all the world may see , that these their pleasures , are not as principall , but accessary , and as an ayuda de costa , an ayde and helpe , the better to beare their trouble , & to wade through that wearisomenesse , which the continuall assist●nce on graue and weighty occasions , causeth . intertainments and sports must be like vnto salt , wherewith if ●our me●te be sprinckled but a little , and in a moderate kinde of manner , it makes them sauoury , and seasons them in that good sort , that they doe not onely relish , but digest the better and breede better nutriment . but if your hand be too heauy , and that you lay on loade ( as they say ) without measure , or moderation , it marrs your meate , and makes it sower and vnsauory . and for mine owne part , i am of opinion● , th●t there was neuer any time , wherein kings had more cause , or greater obligation to moderate their pleasure , then at this present , it being the onely thing that is now in request amongst your great persons , and the onely talke that passeth amongst them , how they shall passe the time . my thinkes , that time is here represented vnto me , which the apostle saint paul , inspired by the holy ghost , did prophecie , & foretell vnto vs ; that in the last dayes , perillous times shall come ( which are now wholly and truly ours ) wherein men shall be louers of their owne selues , and their pleasures , more then louers of god ; and shall regard more their owne particular then either their neighbour , ●ustice , or the cōmon good . in a word , they shall take more care to fulfill their lusts and their delights , then to please god , and therefore shall fall into innumerable sinnes . the apostle saint peter and saint iude , doe much indeare the great euills which vsually arise from corporall pleasures , & the terrible chasticements which are reserued for those , that giue themselues over vnto them . the vniust ( sayth saint peter ) the lord will reserue vnto the day of iudgement to be punished ; but cheifly them , that walke after the flesh in the lust of vncleannesse , that are presumptuous , selfe willed , &c. and iude hee pronounces condemnation against those vngodly men , that turne the grace of god into lasciuiousnesse , &c. and this hath , and doth still increase dayly in such sort , that the madnesse and dotage of those wicked times seemeth to be againe renewed in the world , mentioned in the booke of wisedome , where a companie of gallants , and boone-companions , banketting and making merry amongst themselues , vttred this epicuraean ; exiguum , & cum taedio est tempus vitae nostrae : our life is short and tedious , and in the death of man there is no remedy , neither was there any knowen to haue returned from the graue , &c. venite ●rgò , & fruamur bonis quaesunt : come on therefore , let vs inioy the good things that are present . let vs eate and drinke , quaffe and carowse , and be merry , and let vs speedily vse the creatures like as in youth . vin● pretioso , & vnguentis nos impleamus . let vs fill our selues with costly wines , and oyntments . let vs be puruayours and caterers to our owne bodies , let vs prouide the pleasingest obiects for our eyes , the sauourest meates for our tastes , the sweetest musicke for our eares , the softest silkes for our feeling , and the daintiest perfumes for our smelling . coronemus nos rosis , antequam marcescant , nullum pratum sit , quod non pertranseat luxuri● nostra . let vs crowne our selues with rose-budds , before they bee withered . and let no flower of the spring passe by vs. let none of vs goe with out his part of voluptuousnesse ; and let vs leaue tokens of our ioyfullnesse in euery place . let god doe what hee list in heauen , and let vs laugh and be merry here on earth . we haue but a little time to liue , let vs therefore take our pleasures , while wee may . this is all the care , the wantons of this world take , who do not thinke , that there in an eternitie , onely they study how they may best inioy themselues and their pleasures , not once dreaming , that there is a god , or a iudgement to come to make them stand in awe of him , but as men , that make a scoffe and iest of that other world , and that other life , they wholly wed themselues to this . making that good which salomon sayd ; quod non esset homini bonum sub sole , nisi quod comederet , & biberet , atque gauderet : man , hath no better thing vnder the sunne , then to eate and to drink , and to be merry ; a language onely beseeming such men , as are to be carbonadoed for hel , and made a dish for the diuell ; for their disseruice towards god , and their seruice to their belly . which kind of men saint paul lamenteth with teares flowing from his heart , as being enemies to the crosse of christ , and abhorred of god , and his saints . chap. xxviii . when , and at what time , sports and pastimes , are worthyest reprehension in kings . to euery thing , there is a season ( saith the wiseman ) . there is a time to weepe , and a time to laugh . a time for recreation , and a time for labour . tempus plangendi , & tempus saltandi ; tempus amplexandi , & tempus longe fieri ab amplexibus : a time to mourne and a time to dance . a time to imbrace , and a time to refraine from imbracing . the chalde paraphrase reades ; opportunitas omni rei : there is an opportunitie , or fit season for euery thing . and this opportunitie is a great matter in all whatsoeuer wee doe , for it teacheth vs to take our due time and season . to weepe , when we should laugh , is a ridiculous thing ; and to laugh when wee should shed teares , is no lesse . for kings to play away so many thousand ducatts , and to spend , i know not what , meerely for their owne pleasure , whilest their souldiers are ready to perish through hunger for want of pay , and their house-hold seruants runne in debt , because they cannot receiue , their wages in due time , this sorteth not with that rule , which the wise man would haue vs to obserue . and is it not i pray you a disproportionable and vnseasonable thing , to spend the time in intertainments , and sports , which is due vnto publicke causes , and businesses of state ? in the second booke of the kings is set downe a notable case , wherewith god was highly offended . and the case was this ; factum est autem , vertente anno , eo tempore , quo solent reges ad bella procedere , misit dauid ioab , & seruos suos cum eo , et vniuersum israel , et vastauerunt filios ammon , et obsederunt rab●a . dauid autem remansit in hierusalem . dum haec agerentur , accidit , vt surgeret dauid de strato suo post meridiem , et deambularet in solario domus regiae , viditque mulieremse lauantem ex aduerso super solarium suum &c. and it came to passe , that after the yeare was expired , at the time , when kings goe forth to battel , that dauid sent ioab , and his seruants with him , and all israel , and they destroyed the children of ammon , and besieged rabbah . but dauid tarryed still at ierusalem . and it came to passe in an euening tyde , that dauid arose from his bed , and walked vpon the roofe of the kings house , and from the roofe hee saw a woman washing her selfe , and the woman was very beautifull to looke vpon &c. what a companie of aggrauating circumstances did heere precede the sinne of dauid ? it fell out about that time of the yeare when kings vsed to goe into the field against their enemies , and to muster vp their souldiars . but instead of going himselfe in person , hee sent forth his captaine ioab , with all the choyse men of israel , himselfe remaining in the meane while sporting and recreating himselfe in his princely pallace . and not thinking on those cares , which so dangerous a warre did at that time require , hee rose one day after dinner from his table , and went to walke in a gallerie or tarras , that lay open to the sunne , and from thence it was his chance to espie vriahs wife washing and bathing of her selfe in a place of the like nature , right ouer against him , who likewise on her part gaue occasion to this sinne , for that her husband being abroad in the warres , and exposing himselfe to so many troubles and perills , she should take pleasure in washing her hayre , and in the curious decking and dressing her person in a place , from whence shee might be so easily seene . whom he no sooner saw but coueted , and no soner made loue vnto , but he inioyed her . and that he might possesse her with the more safety , and cloake the adulterie the better , and the childe wherewithall shee went , hee gaue order for the making away of her husband , vpon the neck whereof an infinite number of other euills did insue . when kings wage warre , and their subiects fight their battailes , hazarding therein their liues , or when any other common calamities happen , as of famine , or pestilence , in their kingdomes , they are not then to follow their pleasures and intertainments , but to abstaine from them , and to shew and make knowen to the world , that they haue a fellow-feeling of these common euills , and generall afflictions ; for so did the king of niniue , as soone as hee was informed what the prophet ionas had preached in his court , threatning them with the punishment which god would send vpon that citie . and the holy scripture saith ; that the king himselfe was the first man that forsooke his pleasures , layd his roabe from him , and couered him with sack-cloath , and sate in ashes , and caused it to be proclaimed through nineue , saying , let neither man , nor beast , heard nor flocke tast any thing ; let them not feede , nor drinke water . but let man and beast be couered with sack-cloath , and cry mightily vnto god ; yea let them turne euery one from his euill way , and from the violence that is in their hands , &c. and this was the course , that hee tooke for to appease gods anger . when king dauid heard of the great slaughter which the pestilence had wrought in his kingdome , sorrowing exceedingly , that the plague was so hot amongst his people , and shewing , that it grieued his very heart and soule , hee cryed out vnto the lord , and sayd , ego sum , qui peccaui , ego qui iniquè egi &c. vertatur ( obsecro ) manus tua contra me , et contra domum patris mei : i haue sinned and i haue done wickedly , but these sheepe what haue they done ? let thine hand ( i pray ) be against me , and against my fathers house . king ioram reigning in israel , there was so great a famine , and so fore a death in that kingdome , that two women by consent did agree to kill their children , and to eate them by turnes . which the king had no sooner heard of , but that he was so inwardly grieued therewith , that in expression of his sorrow he rent his garments , ( according to the custome of the hebrewes on such like sad occasions ) and put on sack-cloath within vpon his flesh ; because prince ionathan did but dip the tippe of his rod in the hony-combe , when as his father king saul , and all his men of warre , were fighting against the philistins , god was much offended with it . thereby , teaching kings , that on the like occasions , they ought to be the first that should abstaine from their pleasures and delightes , signified by the hony-combe : that valiant captaine vrias , was a good master of this doctrine , who being returned from the armie to the court , called thither by the king , would by no meanes be perswaded to goe home to his owne house , to refresh himselfe , and make merry with his wife , though his maiestie willed him so to doe ; and the reason which he rendred , why he would not doe it , was this ; arca dei , et iuda habitant in papilionibus &c. the arke , and israel and iudah , abiding in tents , and my lord ioab with the whole army lying incamped in the open fields , without any other shelter , and being in that great danger that they are : shall i then goe into mine house to eate , and to drinke , and to lye with my wise ? per salutem tuam , et per salutem animae , tuae , non faciam rem hanc : as thou liuest , and as thy soule liueth , i will not doe this thing . and not only in the common calamities of a whole common-wealth , but also in those particular ones of great persons , that haue beene seruiceable to the state , it is fit and requisit , and well will it become kings , that they make shew of their sorrow , by laying aside their feastings , and all other kinde of solacings and mirthfull intertainments . when king dauid vnderstood of the death of that braue commander abner , he wept bitterly before the people , and commanded , that none should taste bread , or ought else , till the sunne were downe : saying vnto his seruants ; num ignoratis , quoniam princeps , et maximus cecidit hodiè in israel ? know yee not , that there is a prince , and a great man fallen this day in israel ? but some will say , that we do not well in aduising kings or the common people , on sad occasions , to forbeare their sports and pastimes , it seeming vnto them , that they ought rather then to seeke after them for the diuerting of melancholy , and banishing of sorrow ; vrging plutarkes authoritie , who reprehendeth those men , who when they are already merrily disposed , hunt after intertainments and pastimes , wishing them to doe that , when they finde themselues sad and heauie , for then they haue most neede of it . here vnto , i first of all answer , that the reason is not alike in a particular person , as in a king , and a common-wealth , which ( as wee sayd before ) are to be considered and vnderstood , as a body , with it 's head. and as in a mans body , the head doth naturally feele the paine of the arme , the foote , or any other member ; so kings , which are the heads of the people , are to haue a feeling of their subiects miseries , & to pittie the ill case , wherein they at any time are , as if it were their owne . and this was that , which moued the apostle s paul to say ; quando patitur vnum membrum , compatiuntur omnia membra . when one member suffreth , all the members suffer with it . this is that trauazon , or coupling peece of timber in a common-wealth , and this , both humane policie , and mans naturall disposition , doth require , that when we see others suffer we should suffer with them in our common cōpassion towards them . and the law of charitie , goes some what farther and would stretch this obligation to a greater and higher perfection , as was to be seene in the sayd apostle . quis infirmatur , et ego non infirmor ? quis scandalizatur , et ego non vror ? who is weake , and i am not weake ? who is offended , and i burne not ? and in that which the prophet ieremie sayd , who crossing the kings humour , and opposing his vaine pleasures and delights , and representing the truth of things vnto him , and what was fitting for him to doe , his heart was all on a flame , a burning fire was shut vp in his bones , and hee was weary with bearing , and could not holde , so farre was he transported , and so mightily inflamed with the zeale of the kings , and the common-wealthes good . secondly i say ; that ( as before hath beene deliuered by mee ) i do not pretend , to debarre kings and common-wealths of their pleasures and recreations ; but my desire is ( which i wish with all my heart ) that they may be such as may be harmelesse and vn-offensiue , with out remordment and sting of conscience , and without the murmuration and notice of the people . and this may easily be done , by doing of that which the glorious s. ierome aduiseth vs to doe , ex necessitate virtutem : making a vertue of necessitie ; but i doe not say ex necessitate , but ex voluptate , virtutem : that is to say ; i would haue them to place their delight and content in that , which is true vertue and godlinesse , in cumplying with the obligations of their office and calling , in giuing free and frequent audience , in hearing those that are wronged and oppressed , in disposing of offices , in dispatching of businesses , or in causing them to be dispatcht , and to spend their time , or the most part thereof in these , and the like , cumplying with that of that royall prophet : in virtute tua laetabitur rex , & super salutare tuum exultabit vehementer : the king shall ioy in thy strength , o lord ; and in thy saluation , how greatly shall hee reioyce ? and from thence will follow that , which presently followeth in the next verse ; desiderium cordis eius tribuisti ei , et voluntate babiorum eius non fraudastieum : thou hast giuen him his hearts desire , and hast not with-holden the request of his lips . king salomon sayes of himselfe , that he gaue his desires as much as they could desire , & that he gaue himself ouer to his delights & contents with that freedome and libertie , as suted with the greatnes of so powerful a king . but that which he got therby , was not the content which he sought after , but distaste , irkesomnes , wearines , griefe , & vexatiō of spirit ; which he himself hath left firmed & signed with his own name , for an example not only to all kings , but to all the whole world . vidi inomnibus vanitatem , et afflictionem animi , et nihil permanere sib sole : behold , all was vanitie , & vexation of spirit , and there was no profit vnder the sunne . who could more giue themselues to their delightes , and pleasures , then those , whom the booke of wisedome speaketh of , who with such a deale of care and greedinesse did runne after all the content , that the world could afford ? yet they say and confesse , that they were so vaine and so false , and such a wearisomnesse vnto them , that they were quite tyred out with them , and are now in hell for their labour , and shall continue there for euer . thirdly , i say ; that to the end our sports and intertainments may be the more pleasing vnto vs , it is fit that they should be vsed with much moderation , and very seldome . feastings and banquetings , when they are too frequent and too ordinary , they cause a wearinesse , and loathing ; and as the glorious s. ambrose wisely saith , gratiores post famem epule fiunt , quae assiduitate viluerant : feastings please most after fasting , which by affiduitie and continuance grow into contempt . and here by the way occasion may be taken , to aduise kings of the remedy which they ought to apply in matter of playes & interludes , as wel in the quality of that which is represented , as in the requency wherewith they are vsed ; comedies being now as common as our meate & drinke . but i see , that that succeedeth now , which did in those more ancient times ; which though they were often banished out of rome , yet the times altering , they came to be introduced and brought in again . and king philip the second who is now in glory , in the latter yeares of his raigne did wholy prohibite them , and for the better furthering of this his determination , he had many , and those very effectuall reasons for it . and that which of late hath beene obserued , is , that neuer in any time , hath there beene seene so much loosenesse and shamelesnesse in youth , as since the time , they haue beene dayly permitted to be playd and represented on the stage , and in those places , where is the greatest audience , there is the greatest dissolutenesse of manners , especially among your younger sort of people ; for those their words , accents , tunes , songs , wanton carriage of the body , idle gestures , and actions , performed with so much artifice and cunning , is no other thing ( as the prophet sayd ) but to sow tares , and vicious weedes in good ground , whence they ought with much care to be rooted out . and very blinde is that man , which doth not see the danger that there is , in prouoking and stirting vp wanton blood , with such lasciuious behauiour , being able enough of it selfe to awaken the appetite of sensualitie . euen those dishonest pictures , which neither speake , nor moue , doe catch and lay hold on our eyes , and dragge the soule after them , especially , if they be drawen to the life , and haue the true postures and expressions of a wanton woman . questionlesse , they cannot choose but leaue a liuely impression in the soule . and i know not ( i confesse ) what worke of pietie , or of charitable almes for hospitalls , ( to which vse a great part of the stage-players gaynes goe ) can recompence this harme . for of more weight and moment , is one sinne of theirs , which is there committed ; then all the almes that are giuen throughout the whole world . and we know , it is the apostles rule , that we are not either to doe , or permit an euill , that good may come thereof . and that which i know is ; that they which enter in there , doe not come thither to giue an almes , but for those ends and purposes , which haue beene sufficiently deliuered and reprehended , by many holy doctours , and famous preachers . nor doth it boote them to say ; that the people , that spend their time in seing of comedies , are there met together to see a harmelesse interlude . which were they not shut vp in that open assembly , would perhaps be wandring abroad , committing worse sinnes , which by this intercourse are excused ; for in this one particular , in this very thing , is it plainely to be perceiued , how bad playes be , since for their defence , they haue neede of the fauour of avoyding a greater euill . and in realitie of truth , they doe not excuse , or diuert sinnes , but sinnes are there rather learned , the spectators carrying them away with them conceiued in their minds , by the ones vaine apprehension , and the others fowle and wanton representation , and anon after , bring forth monstrous birthes . and in very truth , the troubles , and temporall scourges , of warre , famine , and pestilence ; the many cities that are battred and beaten downe ●o the ground , and destroyed ; the persecution and the continuall wants and necessities of these kingdomes , doe not require so many , and such contents , and reioycings ; musica in luctu , importuna narratio , saith the holy ghost ; musick in mourning , is as a tale out of season . besides , we are to vnderstand , that god sendeth these his scourges , that wee may feele his stripes , and repent , and amend our sinfull liues . and therefore the prophet esay , representeth the wrath which god had conceiued against his people , because they were not sensible of his chasticements . et non est reuersus ad percutientem se , et dominum non inquisierunt : the people turneth not vnto him that smiteth them , neither doe they seeke the lord of hostes. haue yee seene the like dullnesse in any nation ? that god chastising them , they wi●l not so much as turne backe their eyes , and craue pardon and forgiuenes of him , that is whipping of them , and goes increasing their punishment ? there is no demonstration of 〈◊〉 wi●● them , but they goe on st●ll in their pleasures and del●ghts 〈◊〉 dominus deu● , ad fletum , & ad planctum , ad caluitiem , & ad cingulum sacci , et eccè gaudium , et laetiria , occidere vitulos , et iugulare arietes , comedere carnes , et bibere vinum . comedamus et bibamus , cras enim mor●emur : the lord god of hostes calls to weeping and to mourning , and to baldnesse , and to girding with sack-cloth ; and behold ioy and gladnesse slaying oxen , and killing sheepe , eating flesh , and drinking wine ; let vs eate and drinke , for to morrow we shall dye . god hauing called them to repentance with a desire to pardon them , they answer him with quite contrary exercises , and in stead of weeping , fal into extraordinary laughing ; and in stead of sack-cloath , put on rich and glorious apparrel ; and in stead of fasting , betake themselues to feasting ; & in stead of sobbs , and sighes , to sports and pleasures . which preposterous kinde of course did offend god in that high degree , that he threatned to shut the gate of mercy against those that shut the doore of their hearts against sorrow , and repentance et reuelata est in auribus meis vox domini ; non dimittetur iniquitas haec vobis , donec moriamur , dicit dominus : and it was reuealed in mine eares by the lord of hosts ; surely this iniquitie shall not be purged from you , till yee dye , saith the lord of hosts . in the book of the prouerbs , god sheweth the like risentment , in these words ; quia vocaui , et renuistis , extendi manum meam , et non fuit qui aspiceret ; despexistis omne consilium meum , et increpationes meas neglexistis , ego quoque in interitu vestro ridebo , et subsannabo , cùm vobis id , quod timebatis , adu●nerit : because i haue called and yee refused ; i also stretched out my hand , and no man regarded ; but yee haue set at nought all my counsayle , and would none of my reproofe ; i also will laugh at your calamitie . i will mock , when your feare commeth . those , whom neither faire words , kind vsage , louing inspirations , nor the powerful hand of god , stretched out to punishment , cannot worke vpon , nor moue to mourne , nor to leaue off their sports and pleasures & their discomposed mirth & laughter ; the lord saith , that this their dis●espectfullnesse of him , and shamel●ssenes of their sins shal neuer be forgiuen them . and in stead of mourning , and grieuing for them , hee will laugh them to scorne , and make a mocke of them , when he shall see them fallen into the anguishment , and vexation of their perdition , because they would not correspond with his gentle admonitions , nor be reclaymed by those his fatherly chasticements , which were for the calling of them home , and to make them to returne from their euill waies . and if ( besides all that hitherto hath been sayd ) wee shall but consider how deceitfull and vaine are these pastimes and delights , we shall therewith likewise see , what little reason kings and men that are , ( or at least ought to be in regard of the grauitie and greatnesse of their places ) of a constant and settled disposition , to be carryed away with such idle toyes which presently dis-appeare , and do not only not giue that fullnesse & satisfaction , which they promise ; but rather , as vicious thirst & hunger , which ariseth from a corrupt and euil humour , increaseth the more , the more we either eate , or drinke ; so these temporall delights , the more we vse them , the more in seeking after them doe we finde our selues mocked and deluded , and the lesse satisfied . let vs conclude this point with the testimonie of our sauiour iesus christ , and of that most wise king , salomon , and of saint gregorie the great who citing both the other , speakes thus . voluptatum , nos fallaciae nulla decipiat , nulla vana laetitia seducat , in proximo namque est iudex , qui dixit ; vae vobis qui ridetis nunc , quia lugebitis , et flebitis hinc enim salomon ●it , risus dolore miscebitur , et extrema gaudijs luctus occupat . hinc iterum dicit ; risum reputaui errorem , et gaudio dixi ; quid frustrà deciperis ? hinc rursus ait . cor sapientium vbi tristitia est , et cor stultorum , vbi laetitia : let not the falsehood of pleasures deceiue vs , nor vaine ioy seduce vs ; for there is a iudge at hand , that pronounceth this wofull sentence ; woe vnto you that laugh now , for yee shall mourne and weepe . and hence is it that salomon sayth ; euen in laughter the heart is sorrowfull , and the end of that mirth is heauinesse . hence againe , hee that saith ; i sayd of laughter it is mad : and of mirth , what doth it ? and that hee sayth yet once againe ; the heart of the wise is in the house of mourning , but the heart of fooles , is in the house of mirth . but continuing our discourse concerning kings , and things so generally receiued and intertained , as sports , pastimes , and temporall delights ; rigorous is that qualification , which the greatest , and most approued qualifiers of heauen and earth , haue left firmed & signed vnto vs with their owne handes and names . that mirrour of wisdome , king salomon , or ( to say better ) the holy ghost speaking by him ; our sauiour iesus christ , the true wisedom of his father , and that great bishop and doctor of the church , s. gregorie , plainely tell vs , that those delights and merriments , which are so well receiued in the world , are but lyes , and mocks , and prognostications of euils to come ; and that they haue their reception and residence in the hearts of fooles , and that they remaine banished from those , that are truly wise . these authenticall persons haue sayd it , and all the saints of god haue confirmed the same , both by example , and doctrine . and i , whilest i am now writing of this subiect ( though the meanest of a thousand ) am verily perswaded , that my pen cannot doe better seruice , then to iustifie gods cause , and to make the faults of kings the more without excuse , and to let the mighty know , that they shall be mightily punished . and since that i cannot take away the vse of these things , giue me leaue to aduise you of the abuse , and if it shall not be of force to worke an amendment , yet let it so farre preuaile with you as to put you out of your error ; and to take it into your consideration , that in the way to heauen you are to meete and incounter with many dangers , and that the diuell is wonderfull busie and carefu●l in setting of his gynn's and his s●ares , without our laying in the way these new stumbling blocks , to breake our own necks , and to make the way more dangerous , and to adde new occasions of sinning , whereby to put the businesse of our saluation in the more contingencie and hazard . here , might i take occasion to say something of that temperance , which should temper and moderate the excesses of the tast . whereof we will speake , when we come to treate of the sence of touching . and now let vs passe to another ministrie , which likewise belongs vnto the tast , from the office and function of the tongue , it being one of it's principall properties , to speake , deuided by these insuing paragrahpes . §. i. of the language and truth , which kings , and wherewith kings , are to treate , and to be treated with . the braine , as minister to all the rest of the sences , sends to the tongue two sorts of members , the one soft , and smooth , for to tast our meates withall , and to know and distinguish ( as already hath beene sayd ) the seuerall sorts of sauours and relishes , which the taste intertaineth : the other somewhat more stiffe and strong , for to turne and winde the tongue , and to moue it with that nimble motion , as wee see , as likewise to hold backe the spring , and to restraine and lock it fast , when it is not fitting for the tongue to speake . this is the master-key , ( as we may tearme it ) and the ordinary mistresse of nature , which by the helpe of one onely instrument performeth diuerse offices ; as of the ayre , to refrigerate and coole the heart , to refresh and comfort it , and to make it breathe the better and with the more ease , and likewise , to forme our words , for without it , it is as impossible to speake , as without breath to winde a horne , or blow to play vpon the fi●e ; the tongue serues vs for our taste , it serues to turne and roll our meate vp and downe in our mouth ; it serues to cleanse the roofe thereof , gumm●s and teeth , it serues vs to talke withall , and to vtter those conceits , which are hatched in the braine , which is it's most proper office ; and though it be written of some , that they haue spoken without a tongue , yet this is the vsuall meanes of vtterance , and the ordinary instrument wherwith we pronounce our words , which are the thoughts interpreters . i omit here to treate , of good , or better language , or whether this , or that , ought to be in greatest request , since the master himselfe of eloquence saith ; that in euery part , and place , wee are to speake with those words , which are there vnderstood ; and that such a people , or such a nation , is lord of a language , and may by a kinde of prerogatiue power , either coyne new , or call in old words . it being like vnto money of seuerall kingdomes , and prouinces , that being currant in one countrie , which will not passe in another . and therefore that language , ought to be spoken by vs , which is generally approued , and commonly vsed and receiued . and therefore many times men alter the fashion of their language , as they do of their cloathes . and wee our selues finde , that in this our spanish tongue , wee haue made almost as many changes and alterations , as we haue of our garments , and are able to make two such different languages , that the one should not vnderstand the other . for , wee make such hast to inuent new words , and to take them vpon loane from other languages , that thinking thereby to inrich it , we come to loose and forget our own naturall language . so different is it ( to some mens seeming ) in these , from what it was informer times . for the spanish tongue in it selfe , is an humble and lowly language , if they had not painted it ouer and adulterated it with new words ; not considering in the meane while with themselues , that the best language ( according vnto tully ) is that , which wee haue beene taught by our mothers , and which chaste matrones , and those that haue beene well bred , speake familiarly at home in their owne houses . and the reason of it , is , for that they hauing not gone abroad out of their owne countrie , to forraine nations , nor treated and conuersed with strangers , they conserue the naturall phrase and speech of their own towne , or country , without sophisticating their language with new words , or those that are not of ordinary vse . and therefore it is fitting , that wee should speake in that , which is most passable , and which is best vnderstood , vsing sober , proper , and plaine words ; for words were ordayned to that end , that they might be well vnderstood . he speakes best , and in the best language , that is best vnderstood ; not hee , that shall speake in an vnco●th stile , and in words that are neither in vse , nor easie to be vnderstood . it is a common saying with vs ; delos antiquos , auemos de imitar las virtudes , y delos modernos , el lenguaje : wee are to imitate the ancient in their vertues : and the moderne , in their language . and quintilian tells vs , loquendum , vt vulgus ; sentiendum , vt pauci . we must speake , with the many ; but thinke , with the fewest . many moe therebe , which speak much in matter of tongues , and languages , vsed throughout the world . but i will onely treate of those , which imports kings , and kingdomes . such as is that truth and sinceritie , wherewith they are to treate , that faith and word , which they are to cumply withall , and that secret , which they are to keepe . two things ( sayth pythagoras ) did the moderate men of the earth , receiue from heauen , well worthy our consideration , in regard of the great fauour done them therein ; the one , that they should haue the power to be able to doe good vnto others ; and the other , to treat truth . and that in them they should hold competition with the gods. properties , both of them well befitting kings . of the power , that kings haue , to doe good vnto their friends , and to defend themselues from their enemies , wee haue already signified vnto you , how proper it is to the greatnesse of a king , and how like therein hee is vnto god. but the sayd philosopher being demanded , wherein man was likest vnto god , made answer ; quandò veritatem sciuerit : when hee shall know the truth . for god is truth it selfe : and that man that treates truth , resembles him in nothing more ; and it is so proper to our vnderstanding , that it intertaines it for it's obiect , and still goes in search thereof ; the contrary whereof , is repugnant to the nature , as likewise to the essence and greatnesse of kings , from whom wee are euer to expect the iudgement of truth . non decet principem labium mentiens : lying lipps , becometh not a prince . it is the saying of a king ; and of a king , that was a salomon , who spake with the tongue of the holy ghost ; and it is an avouched and ratified conclusion , that the pen and the tongue of a king , should alwayes tell the truth . though it were against himselfe : as likewise for to teach , and instruct his subiects that they doe the like ; as also all others , that shall treate with them . for in vaine doth hee desire to heare truth , that will not deale truly ; and perhapps for this cause , the shortest of all other your words in allmost all languages , are your yea , and nay . there can be no shifting , or doubling in them ; no going about the bush . these words will admit no other construction but a bare affirmation , or negation . in the fewest words are the least falsehood ; and the least quarrell to be pick't against them . men cannot expatiate their excuses , as they may where larger language is vsed . and therefore the other , as it is the shortest , so it is the surest way . wherefore kings ought all wayes , and in all , and with all , to treate truth ; being that it may be vttred with so much ease and facility , and to suffer himselfe to be plainely vnderstood ; contrary to the tenent of a sort of vp-start hereticks , which these times tearme politicians , who for to make good their policie , and tyrannic●ll gouernment , affirme ; that a king may , for reason of state , if hee see it may make for the conseruation thereof , dissemble , deceiue , breake his word , and plight his faith , without any purpose or meaning to keepe it ; fraud , dissimulation , and deceit , of what condition soeuer it be , being contrary vnto truth , and contrary to the law of nature , which in all that it treates , requireth truth ; and contrary to the diuine law , which condemneth him , that speakes not the truth , but goes about to deceiue . and our sauiour christ , calls king herod foxe , reprouing his wily shifts , and deepe dissimulations , and more particularly , in putting on a face of sorrow before his guestes that he feasted , when he commanded iohn baptist's head to be smitten off , it being the onely thing that hee most defired . and hee likewise condemneth those pharisaicall hypocrites , who by exteriour showes , would haue that to be supposed of them , which they neuer interained in their heart . and the angelicall docter renders the reason of this truth . to dissemble ( saith he ) is to lye in the deed , or thing it selfe . for a lye , doth not cease to be a lye , nor to alter it's nature , be it either in workes , or in words . so that a lye may be found in the behauiour , gesture or semblance , that one maketh , wherewith to deceiue , and to giue vs to vnderstand that , which is not ; as also in the manner of the word spoken , or some circumstance to be gathered out of it . now that which makes it culpable is the doublenesse in the heart . which s. austen subtlely considereth in that incounter of a mans meaning , with his wordes ; wherein there ought to be all equalitie and consonancie ; which is not truly kept , when in our words , wee shall say the contrary to that , which is in our mindes . therefore a christian king , or his minister may silence some things , cast a cloake ouer them , and not suffer themselues to be vnderstood , and cunningly to dissemble that , which they know of them , as long as they shall thinke it necessary to be kept close and secrete , for the good expedition of that which is in treaty ; but a king , or his minister may not faigne , deceiue , dissemble , or to giue that to be vnderstood by any open act of his , which he had not in his heart and bosome to doe . all which hath no place in that , which appertaineth vnto faith , wherein , by the law of god , we haue obligation , not onely to beleeue , but also to confesse , with all truth and plainnesse , that which we beleeue , without giuing to vnderstand , by the least word , or gesture , ought to the contrary ; nor for the least moment of time , though thereby we might saue our liues . whereby , kings , and christian ministers are admonished , how they may vse dissimulation , how farre , and for what time , without treading in the path of their priuate profit , through which your politicians pretend to leade them , leauing the high way of truth , wherewith accordeth whatsoeuer is iust and right , & shunneth all manner of lying , which truth and time will at last bring to light . it was the saying of king theopompus ; that kingdomes , and great estates , were conserued by kings speaking truth , and by suffring others to speake the truth vnto them . for , they being those , whom it most importeth to heare truths , none heare lesse . king antiochus , all the time of his raigne , sayd ; that he did not remember , that euer hee had heard any more then one only truth . it being the plague of kings and princes to haue that verified in their pallaces and courtes , which was deliuered by democritus , quod veritas in profundo puteo demersa latet : that truth l●es buryed in a deepe pit . you shall scarce meete with one in an age , that dare tell kings the truth , there being so many about them , that sooth them vp with lyes and flatteries . seneca saith ; that of ten hundred thousand souldiers , which artaxerxes had in his army , there was but one onely that told him the truth in a case wherein all the rest did lye . and amongst innumerable prophets , which concealed the truth from the king , only michah made bold to tell it him . and only solon did the like with king croesus . seldom times doth the truth enter into the kings priuy-chamber , and when it enters , they scare expresse it in that bare and naked maner as did iohn baptist. and for this cause , did demetrius the philosopher wish king ptolomie , to reade bookes & histories , which treated of precepts for kings , and captaines , for they would tell him that which none durst deliuer vnto him . socrates sayd ; that there was not any one , that made open protestation to speake the truth , that attained ( as he did ) to the age of . yeares . and certaine it is , that kings cannot indure to heare those plaine and naked truths , which the common people , and other their subiects are able to tel them , and proue vnto them ; nor must they that are in place presume to vtter them , for feare of indangering their authoritie , and reputation ; and therefore it is fit , that they should haue some such persons about them , which should both heare , and vnderstand them , and take their time to informe them of them . and this is a rul'd , case , taken out of those great instructions , and wise aphorismes , which mecaenas gaue to augustus , worthy to be taken notice of , and to be kept and obserued , as coming from so great a counsailour , and proposed to a prince , who was so wise in this kinde . to wit ; that kings , ought to giue libertie and way , that their subiects vpon occasion might be admitted to tell them the truth , assuring them on their part , that they will not bee offended with that which they shall say vnto them . for , it is permitted vnto a physician to prescribe corrasiues , and to cut away the dead flesh till it come to the quicke ; and it may as well be lawfull for a good subiect , a faithfull minister and counseller of state , to speake freely vnto his king with respect and reuerence to their royall dignitie ) the truth of that they thinke , and to condemne him in his iudgement , or otherwise , when he shall goe about to doe any thing contrary to iustice , and reason . nor ought this to seeme oftensiue to any man , nor to the king himselfe , who ( if he haue a christian feeling ) will approue in his minde & vnderstanding the reasons that they shall represent vnto him ; so that if he be willing to heare the truths they shall tel him , it may turne much to his profit . and if he like not well of it there is no harme done , neither doth he receiue any preiudice by it . and if he shall thinke it fit for the furthering of his ends to follow the counsaile of any , let him cōmend , & honour that person : for by that plot , which he shall haue deuised , & inuented , he shall gaine honour and greatnesse by it . and it is meete & conuenient , that he should incourage both him , and others with thankes , and rewards . because this is the sunne , which giues life , and the hea●e , which warmes good wits , and makes them actiue , & nimble . and in case he shall not admit of his aduise , let him not disgrace him , nor finde fault with him for his good will , and the desire that he hath to do him seruice . but like a great prince ( wherein he shall shew his goodnesse ) let his eye rather looke on the good desire and affection wherewith he doth it , then on the effect thereof ; as likewise , because others may not be disheartned , for there is not any the poorest plante , that hath not some vertue in it ; nor any brayne so barrene , whence at one time or other some fruite may not be gathered for the publickegood . i conclude then this first point of that plaine and sincere truth , which kings are to treate , and wherewith they are to be treated , in signifying vnto them , that their own and the kingdomes safety relyes on searching out the truth , and in hauing those about them which will freely speake it ( a thing so necessarie for to gouerne vprightly ) and to reward him ( though it cost him well ) that shall tell him . for kings shall meete with few , that will tell it them ( as they say ) for a song . for , considering the danger whereinto they put themselues by speaking the truth , it costes them much . and it is an old and ancient kinde of cosenage and deceit , which kings and princes suffer in not hearing truthes , contenting themselues with applause and adulation of that only which pleaseth their humour , though it be in thing● of much importance , and such as neerely concerne them . a notable example whereof , we haue in the tri-partite historie , ( reported by sozomenus ) of the emperour constantine the great , who being one day desirous of make tria●l of the integritie , and truth of those that seru'd him , hee called them all before him , and to●d them ; my good friends , it is now many yeares , that i haue liued vnder the obseruance of the christian law , but now i grow weary of it , for it is a very painefull and troublesome thing to submit our necke to the yoake of the gospell and to submit ou● selfe to a law , that will not allow vs so much libertie , as to swarue one tittle from it . i pray you , let me haue your opinions in it , for we , for our part , are reso●ued what we will doe . when the emperour had thus exprest himselfe , those that were flatterers & sycophants , and time pleasers , sayd vnto him ; wee thinke your maiestie shall doe well in so doing , and wee shall be obedient to what you shall ordaine therein . but those good and faithfull seruants , which desired the good and prosperous estate of their prince both in soule and body , humbly besought him on their knees , saying ; sir for gods honour , and your own , doe not doe so vile a thing , for it is neither fitting nor lawfull , nor shall wee follow you therein , or serue you one day longer . then did the emperour know by this , which were good seruants , and of greatest trust , and presently dismi●sed the other ; credens , nunquam eos , circa principem suum fore d●bitos , qui suerunt dei sui sic paratissimi proditores : perswading himselfe , that they would neuer be faithfull to their prince , that would so soone turne traytours vnto god. and if kings would know how true this is , and the errour wherein they liue , by hauing the truth kept from them , let them at some one time or other ( when they see fit ) make shew to affect the contrary to that , which before they were hot vpon , and did earnestly desire ; and then shall they see , that those very men , which approued the one , will likewise make good the other , and then will they know how in the one , or in the other , nay in all , they are deceiued by them ; or at least , that they dare not plainely and simply tell him that truth , which their hearts thinke . if they be ministers and counsellours of state , if they once finde out their kings homour , and the ayre that most delightes his eare , they play vpon that string : if they be bed-chamber men , or the like familiar attendants about his person , they haue naturally a seruile inclination , and make it their common custome to intertaine him with matters of mirth , or iollitie , and intertaynment : if they be his freinds , or his fauourites , they also are not without their applauding and adulation , and by so much the more to be suspected , by how much the greter it is . but what if all these shall ioyne to abuse a good king ? then this miserie likewise comes of it . that what a few of them shall begin to say , all the rest will approue it . and if kings ( as they cannot without being knowen ) could but heare their talke and conuersation , they might heare and know many truths , they should know the mindes of many , and the desires of all , and they would reioyce in knowing the truth of that , which none durst tell them . for some , nay many of them , will report what they heare , and amongst themselues speake plainely the truth one to another , so as they be sure that the king cannot heare them . this would be somewhat , if not much remedyed , if kings would but doe that , which we but euen now deliuered of the emperour constantine the great , who would not suffer that minister or fauourit that hee had once caught in a lye euer to see his face any more , but wholly dismist him from his seruices : for both in wisedome and christianitie , it is to be presumed , that in all or alwayes that hee can , at least as oft as it toucheth his owne particular , hee will not make him a faithfull relation , and liuing in this iust iealousie and suspicion of his truth , and plaine dealing , with much scruple of conscience , and in great danger , doth that king liue which giues him his eare , or vpholds him in his office . but let vs pause heere , and passe to that second point , which is the faith and word , which kings ought to keepe . §. ii. that kings ought to keepe their faith , and word . this word faith , in our common language , signifies credit ; and sometimes faith , is taken for that beliefe , which wee giue vnto that , which others tell vs. and other whiles , for that , which others giue vnto that , which we tell them . and to say , that a man is such a one , is hombre de fee , a man of faith , is all one , as if we should say , that he is a man of credit , and that wee giue saith and credit to that he saith . marcus tullius , who knew better then all the latinists besides , the proper signification and elegancie of the latin words , saith : that fides , is so called , quasi fiat , quod dictum est , that faith , hath it's denomination , from not fayling in our word . and hence it is , that men hauing shewen themselues honest in doing that which they had past their word they would doe , we grew in the end , to giue faith and credit vnto them . and this humane faith , being taken in this sence , is so necessary , that people were not able to liue , nor conuerse together , or hold any commerce or traffick , if they shou●d not giue faith and credit one to another . for the conseruation whereof , it is very fitting , that euery one should make good his word , by his workes , and to see that faithfully performed and indeede , for which hee hath past his honest word and promise . and by how much the more noble a man is , so much the more obligation hee hath , to keepe this his faith and word . and if not , see the offence which is taken at it , when men are taxed with this faulte , who are satisfied with no lesse , then with taking away that mans life , that goes about to take away another mans faith and credit , by telling him , hee lyes . and it is a thing much to be laughed at , ( or to say better much to be lamented ) to see the great folly and rash proceeding which passeth in this kinde , and concerning this matter for they acknowledging in these their lawes , and duels , what a great obligation they haue to maintaine this their faith , reputation , and credit , by alwayes saying , and treating truth , vpon the very least a●persion , shadowe , or note of falshood , they risent it so much , that they sticke not to fall into a worse sinne such as is a very lye it selfe , a loude lye , by lying so easily , and ordinarily , as some doe . i aske the question ; which is worse , to bee lame , or crooked , or to say such a one is so , when as there is no such thing ? certainly , it is much worse to be so , then to be sayd , to be so . and to him , that is not so , me thinkes he should make but little reckoning of what they say in that kinde ; and should rather indeauour to flye from any default in himselfe , then from the bare opinion and shadowe thereof . now a lye , being a greater ill , and a farre fouler default then all these , m●n fall so easily thereinto , and make so little scruple of lying , and more lying , vying lye vpon lye ; yea euen those , that will lay downe their life , rather then indure that men should tell them they lye , though themselues know they lye , and that they lye not , who tell them they lye , being onely offended with them , that they will not take a lye , for a truth ; or at least let them goe away with it , without the lest reproofe or contradiction , which ingenious natures can hardly indure , especially when they know that they are in the right , and the other in the wrong . certainely , of all other vices , lying , is the most vnworthy noble and gentle blood . and it is such a labrinth , that the more a man seekes to get out of it , the more he findes himselfe out of the way . so that a man striuing to get out of one lye , falls into another , and from that to a third , and all of them worse then the former . heere i will aduertise by the way , that it is a common and vsuall language with your courtiers , which may seeme to carrye a shew of truth , but indeede is full of lyes and falsehood . and this it is : when they will cumply in words , with them who recommend themselues or their suites vnto them , they say ; sir vse you your best diligences , for i will doe my part , and god knowes , that i haue , and doe that , which belongs to mee ; and true it is ; for god knowes , that his part , is to lye , and onely to compliment with this poore pretender , and to doe nothing at all in that , which he pretendeth . i apply my selfe , to that olde and ancient language of the noblemen of castile , ingrauen on the sword , of cid rui diaz . si , si , no , no , yea yea nay , nay , which is a lesson , that is taught vs by our sauiour christ in his holy gospell . this is that , which befitteth all men , but more especially kings ; for , to indeare this or that mans truth , we vsually say , que tiene palabra de rey : that a king cannot keepe his word , better then hee doth , or is more precise of his promise , and therefore i hold for certaine , that that which plato yeelds vnto kings and magistrates concerning this point , if it bee well vnderstood , is not to lye , but to vse stratagemes and politicke deuises , for to defeate and deceiue the enemies spyes , and intelligencers . and i very well remember that my selfe communicating this conceit , vpon occasion , with one of the learnedst men , and greatest platonists , that this age afforded , he approued of it , and did much commend it ; for , as concerning that truth , and faith , whereof we now treate , plato himselfe , and all other the good philosophers , teach the rigour and strictnesse , wherewith men ought to keepe their word . in the booke of iosua , is recounted the craft , wherwith the ghibeonites , mooued the princes of israel to plight them their faith , that they would doe them no harme . and though afterwards this their cunning dealing was discouered and brought to light , and that all the people were willing , that this promise should not be kept ; yet the princes of the people made answer thereunto , that they could not but cumply with their word , especially hauing confirmed it with an oath . iurauimus eis in nomine domini dei israel , & idcircò non possumus eos contingere . we haue sworne vnto them by the lord god of israel , and therefore wee may not hurt them . and because many yeares after , king saul ( out of a zeale to the good of his people ) broake that their word and promise , there fell vpon him and his people a great famine , which continued for the space of three yeares . king don sancho , whom they slew by treason , confessed ; that that death , lighted worthily vpon him , because hee had broaken his word , giuen to his father king don fernando , to passe the partition made with his brethren ; and the constancie of dauid is knowen to all , in keeping that his word , which all the while he liued hee gaue to shimei , that hee would not put him to death , according to the desert of his irreuerent language , and disrespect to his person . and both diuine , and humane letters are full of the seuere chasticements , which god hath inflicted vpon those , who haue not beene faithfull in the keeping of their faith and word . for , being that he himselfe is most faithfull , and doth boast himselfe to bee so , he will likewise that men should be so one towards another . s. isidore , with a great number of words , affirmeth ; that we ought not to deceiue any man : and that all infidelitie , is sinne ; that no man ought to faile in that which he hath promised ; that it is requisite in all men , that their workes concurre with their words , without admitting any exception more then in two cases ; as when that which is promised , cannot be performed without sinne ; or when the businesses , or the persons , admit some notable change . and hee citeth the example of saint paul ▪ who promised to go to corinth , but could not be as good as his word , for those lawfull impediments , which hindred this his intended iourney . whence , it followeth ; that things continuing in the same estate , a man may not , for the conueniences of his priuate profit , be wanting to his promise : and to maintaine the contrarie , is to lay trapps against the truth of faith , and to arme policie against the religion of an oath . in a word , all doe resolue , that all promises are to be kept , and that no deceite or faithlesse dealing ought to be tolerated . and the reason , whereupon they ground it , is common ; for that fidelitas est fundamentum iustitiae ; faithfullnesse is the foundation of iustice , and all contractation ; and that this being taken away , all commerce amongst men , must expire with it , without the which the world cannot be conserued . for they , not resting assured , that that which is promised , shall be performed , they will not trust one another . marcus tullius , sayth very well , that this humane faith is so necessary amongst men , that , euen thieues and pyrates could not liue , if they were not true amongst themselues , and kept their word one with another . and though all , euen the meanest , ought to keepe their word , yet much more carefully ought kings , and princes ; for there is nothing more vnworthy them , then to fayle in their faith , and word , which aboue all earthly things they ought to keepe , and cumply with all , because they are as gods vpon earth , and the head of their people . wherefore , their single word ought to be as an oracle , and to be more firme , sure , and of greater credit , then any bond or obligation whatsoeuer that is sealed and signed with an oath . let the politicians say what they please , and that it is good and sound aduise , that a prince , for to conserue his state , may do an act contrary to fa●th & religion , and neither keepe his word , nor oath ; yet must i be bold to tell them , that this is wicked , vngodly , and beastly counsaile , and contrary to the whole schoole of learned doctors , and holy fathers ; who affirme : that a prince is bound to keepe his word , though hee take not an oath for the performance thereof , but much more if he shall sweare , and binde it by an oath . and if they will not yeeld to this , let these politicians plucke off their maske , and let those that be their sectuaries , speake plaine language , and tell mee what they thinke of those princes , ( as of sigism●nd , and others ) who made no reckoning of that they promise and sweare , when as by the breach thereof , they haue beene vtterly ouerthrowne , when they most assured themselues of victorie . i doubt not but they will hold it for a foolish reason of state. for by this falsifying , princes shall presently loose all their credit and reputation , and all their cunning shall not profit them , for they will neuer afterwards be beleeued . as it is in one of the lawes of the partida . no le creerian los homes , que le oyessen maguer que dixessen verdad . men will not beleeue , what they heare from them , though they speake truth . titus liutus , holdes it a barbarous act , that princes should tye their faithfullnesse to fortune , to runne along with the times , and to shift sayles with euery winde . for by this meanes the word of a prince will come to be like vnto the lesbian rule , which changeth and altereth it selfe , according to the building , and is crooked , and streight , short , or long , sutable to the bignesse or proportion of the stone , or timber which the carpenter , or mason , heweth , or cutteth . but let vs conclude this second point , with this ; that realitie , and sinceritie both in words and deedes , is very necessary for all sortes of persons , but more particularly , for kings and princes , who should rather see heauen and earth to fayle , then that they should faile in their promises . let them first well weigh and consider with themselues , what they either say , or promise , that it be agreeable to the law of god , and to the precepts of the church , but afterwards , let them infallibly obserue and keepe the same . for in this , consisteth the conseruation , and augmentation of great states ; and is that true reason of state , which makes kings more powerfull , more rich , more esteemed , and more obeyed . for hee that keepes his faith , and his word , holdes the hearts of men in his hand , is master of all their wealth , and all because they rest assured , that they may confidently relye vpon his faith and word . wheras , by the contrary , hath insued the destruction of common-wealths , the distrustfullnesse of their subiects , the scorne and contempt of their enemies , and the iealousie of their friends and confederates , who all hang and depend vpon the truth of his words , and the performance of his contracts . and this being once lost , with it hee looseth his credit , and after that all goes to wracke with it . for malignitas ( saith the wise man ) enertet sedes potentium : malignitie or ill-mindednesse , ( which is nothing else , but a lye or deceit ) shall ouerthrowe the seates of the mighty . and cicero saith ; that it is a most wicked and abhominable thing , to breake that word , which conserueth a sociable life betwixt man and man. for ( as aristotle affirmeth ) pacts and couenants , being broaken & violated , there is taken away from amongst men , the vse , trading , and commerce of things . these , and the like effects , cause in a king , either the keeping , or loosing of his credit . but of no lesse importance is that third point , which followeth in the next place , concerning secrecie . § iii. of that secrecie which kings , and their ministers ought to keepe . it is likewise the tongues office , to holde it's peace . and as it is not of the least difficultie , so in nothing more doth mans wisedome and prudence shew it selfe . plato , will not haue him held to be a wise man , that knowes not how to hold his peace . diogenes laertius ; that there is no greater token of a foole , then to be loose-tongued , and lauish of talke ; n●minem stultum tacere posse : it is impossible for a foole , to hold his peace . the ancient , esteem'd him a god vpon earth , that was a friend to silence , representing him in a creature of that region , which hath no tongue . implying thereby , that that man is the liuely image and true picture of god , whose discretion teacheth him , how , when , and where , to holde his peace : alluding happily vnto that of dauid , who finding eyes , eares , and hands in god , seemeth not to finde that hee had a tongue . for , as hee is god , he neuer spake but once . semel locutus est deus : god hath spoaken once . and the spouse speaketh much of all the parts of her beloued , but of his tongue , as if hee had no such thing . and he , that shall not speake a word out of season , nor say any more then what is fitting , it may bee sayd of that man , that hee hath no tongue . and therefore did that holy king dauid so often beg of god , that hee would open his mouth with his owne hand , and so order his tongue that he might not speake , but when he would haue him , and that he would teach him what , and how to speake . illius labia aperit ( saith s. austen ) qui non solum , quod loqu●tur , sed etiam quandò , & vbi , & cuiloquatur , attendit : god opens that mans lips , who attendeth not onely what he speaketh , but also when , where , and to whom he speaketh . merito igitur sapiens est ( addeth the same holy father ) qui accipit a domino , quo tempore loquendum sit : deseruedly therefore is he to be held a wise man , which receiueth instruction from the lord , when he ought to speake . and the scripture saith ; vir sapiens tacebit vsque ad tempus : a wise man will holde his peace till hee see his time . nay christ himselfe , that king of kings saith of himselfe by the prophet esay ; that his eternall father gaue him an exceeding wise and prudent tongue . dedit mihi dominus linguam eruditam : the lord god , hath giuen me a learned tongue ; or , as the hebrew renders it , eruditiorum ; the tongue of the learned ; not an ordinary tongue , but such a tongue , wherin was to be found the wisedome , and prudence of all the wise men of the world , and from whence all might learne . vt sciam sustentare eum , qui lapsus est verbo : that i may know how to vphold him , that hath slipt in his word ; or ( as the . translate it ) vt sciam quando oporteat loqui verbum : that i should know how to speake a word in season to him that is weary . so that a wise , discreete , and prudent tongue , and such a one as is giuen by god , is that , which knowes when to speake , and when to hold it's peace . teaching kings , who are in a manner gods , at least gods liuetenants , should in this particular imitate him . that they should haue a wise tongue , to know when to open the doore of the lips , and when to shut them , what to vtter , and what to conceale . for , this is the learning and wisedome of the tongue , either to speake , or be silent , as shall sute best with time , and occasion . tempus tacendi , & tempus loquendi : it is salomons ; a time to keepe silence , and a time to speake . and in kings , this is so much the more important , by how much the more graue and weighty are those businesses , which are treated with them . for , it doth not onely benefit them , in not hauing their purposes preuented , nor their designes ouerthrowne , but likewise winn's them much authoritie and credit . for the world will stand as it were astonished and amazed , and men will wonder at that , which they both doe , and say , and out of euery kinde of gesture , or word of theirs , will make a mystery , deliuer their iudgements , and draw thence a thousand discourses , all which are but cranes and pullyes to make them mount higher in opinion , and reputation . likewise , when ministers shall take notice , that their king knowes how to heare , and how to hold his peace , and in it's due time , to execute his intentions , they liue in a great deale the more awe and feare , lest such and such things ( wherein they doe amisse ) might come to his knowledge : and when they see , that he knowes how to conceale a secret , till it 's fit time and season , it keepes them within their compasse , and is the only bridle , that restraines them from doing ill , either by way of oppression ( whereunto great ministers are too much subiect ) or otherwise . and therefore , it shall much concerne a king , not onely to be secret in those things , which might cause some inconuenience , if he should speake of them , and make them knowen , but also in those things , which bring no profit by their publication . for , if they shall once perceiue , that their king cannot conceale , what is deliuered vnto him vnder the seale of silence , in preiudice of this , or that particular party , no man will dare to informe , and aduise him of that , which may redound to gods seruice , and the good of the common-wealth . and so like bad gamesters , they will for want of keeping close their cardes , let their contrary winne the game , by discouering their hand . a kings h●art , should be so deepe and profound , that none should be able to pry into it , nor to know what is hidden there . and therefore he must haue such a secret heart , as s. austen speakes of ; coraltum : that is , cor secretum : or ( as others reade it ) profund●m , an inscrutable heart ; or so deepe , that none shall be able to diue into it . and some compare a kings heart vnto punctum , a little point or pricke , which to diuide , or to draw any thing out of it , is ( if not impossible at least very difficult . the heart of a king , must be closed and shut vp , like this punctum , whence there shal be an impossibility , or at least a great deale of difficulty , in extracting any one word or secret , recōmended vnto him . salomon sayth ; that the hearts of kings , are in the hands of god ; and are guided & directed by him . and that therfore their secretes & mysteries , are not to be divulged , and made common , no not to his neerest minions and fauourites ; & when at most , but to some one particular priuado , and that vpon very good & iust cause . our sauiour christ , once , ( vpon necessary occasiō ) discouered a secret to his great priuado , or fauourite , s. iohn , but it was with these circumstances ; that thee told it him in his eare , forbidding him to speake therof vnto any . and because , neither by signes , or any other outward demonstration , he might make it knowen , he bound vp all his senses in a deepe and profound sleepe , to the end , that by none of them , he might expresse that , which it behooued him to conceale . great is the importancie of secrecie , & the authoritie which it giues to the iudgements , & motiues of those that gouerne . for , if all might know the causes , which moue a prince to make this or that prouision , to giue , this this or iudgement , to pardon , or to punish , to craue , or to giue , many censures wold passe vpō it , & it might cause many scandalls & alterations in a cōmon-wealth . and therfore it much concerneth so supreme a maiesty not to suffer the secret which is shut vp in his bosome , to be published to the world . and in some cases , it may come to be a mor●al sin , when such things as are aduertised a king , & such memorials as are giuen him firmed & signed with this or that mans hand , he shal shew them to the parties , whom they touch and concerne , be they sters , or fauourites , in regard of the great hurt , opposition , and dissention , which there-fro may arise . but hee may doe this , in case it may well sort with the secret it selfe , to take out the pithe and substance of it , and without shewing any firme , or vttring any word whereby the author may be knowen , and shew it to the delinquent ( if so he thinke fit ) for his correction , and amendment . and when hee findes that to be true which hath beene told him , and that it cannot be denyed , let him apply a due and fitting remedy . for many times dissimulation in the prince ( not seeming to take notice of a fault ) causeth but the more dissolutenesse in the subiect . this is so farre forth , as concerneth kings , for whom may suffice , that aduice of caelius rodiginus , who tells them more at large , how considerate they ought to be in this particular . for many cities and kingdomes haue beene lost and ouerthrowen for want of secrecie . but let vs now begin to speake of ministers , and secretaries of state , in whom vsually lyes the greater fault . and to whom , by their office , secrecie more properly belongs . the name it selfe expresing as much . for , out of that obligation which they haue to be secret , they are called secretaries , and are the archiues and cabinets of the secrets of the king , and the kingdom . though this name through the soothing and flattery of your suitors , hath falsely extended it selfe to those , which neither keepe secret , nor treate of such businesses as require secrecie . and it is fit , that these names should not be thus confounded , or that that honor and title should be giuen to him , to whom by office it not appertaineth . secretaryes i say , shut vp with that secrecie , as was that booke of those secret mysteries which saint iohn found sealed with seuen seales , which none , but the king himselfe could open . sacramentum regis bonum est ( sayd the angel raphael to toby ) opera autem dei reuelare , honorificum est : it is good to keepe close the secret of a king , but it is honourable to reueale the worke of god. which is as much to say , as that the determinations of a king should be kept secret , but that the effects and execution of them should be published and made manifest , when it is fitting for the seruice of god , and the kingdome . for a kings secret , is his heart , and till that god shall ▪ moue him to expresse it by some outward worke , there is no reason that any one else should discouer it . to reueale a secret , is by the lawes of god , and nature , and by all men generally condemned , and all lawes , and nations , doe seuerely punish the same , for the great hurt , and many inconueniences , that may follow thereupon . the lawes , they are defrauded , the resolutions of kings , they are hindred ; their enemies , they are aduertised ; their friends they are offended ; mens mindes , they are perturbed ; kingdomes , they are altered ; peace ; that is lost ; the delinquents , they are not punished ; and lastly all publicke and priuate businesses are ouerthrowen . and there is not any thing , that goes crosse , or amisse in a state , or that miscarryes or is lost , but by the reuealing of the secrets of kings , and of their counsells . as that great chancellour gerson told the king of france , touching the ill successe of some things in his time , for that some of his ministers did publish that which was treated and determined at the counsell-table . and the like befell enrique , king of portugall ; who , because hee was deafe , they were faigne to speake so loud vnto him , that all men might heare what they said . valerius maximus much commendeth the secrecie of the romane senate , and says , that for this cause , that consistorie was held in high esteeme , and that it was a great occasion of inlarging their empire . and they , and the persians , did keepe with that faith the secrets of their kings , that there was no feare of plumping them , or being able to draw any thing from them , no not so much as the least word , whereby to discouer the businesse . vse , together with the feare of punishment , and hazard of their liues , had so settled and confirmed this silence in them . for , they did punish no offence with greater rigour , then that of vnfaithfullnesse , in matters of secrecie ; and with a great deale of reason , because it is in so neere a degree vnto treason ; and i thinke , i should not say amisse , if i stiled it in the highest . regis proditor , & patriae euer for aestimandus est ( saith osorius ) such aone , is to be held a traytour to the king , and a subuerter of the state . a law of the partida sayth ; that those counsellours , which reueale their kings secretes , commit treason ; yea , though secrecie be not inionyed them , nor they charged there with . but hee , that takes an oath to be secret , and reuealeth any thing contrary thereunto ; besides that he is a periur'd and infamous person , hee sinnes mortally , and is bound to satisfaction of all the harme , that shall happen thereby , and incurres the punishment of depriuation of his office. for , if hee be sworne to secrecie , or bee made a secretary , and hath silence for the seale of his office , he is iustly depriued thereof , if he vse it amisse . and the law of the recopilation saith , that hee is lyable to that punishment which the king will inflict vpon him , according to the qualitie of the offence , or the hurt thereby receiued . and the imperiall law , ( chapter the first , quibus modis feudum amittit . ) that hee shall loose the fee , which hee holdes of his lord. plutarke reporteth of philipides , that he being in great grace and fauour with lysimachus , king of lacaedemonia , begged no other boone of him but this ; that he would not recommend any secret vnto him ; as one that knew very well that saying of one of the wise men of greece : that there was not any thing of more difficultie , then to be silent in matters of secrecie . as also , for that it being communicated to others , though it come to be discouered by anothers fault , and none of his , yet the imputation is laid as well vpon him , that was silent , as on him that reuealed ; and so must suffer for another mans errour . and in case any man shall incurre any iust suspition thereof , let the king withdraw his fauour from him , dismisse him the court , and put another in his place , that shall be more secret ; for that which they most pretend , is their fidelitie in this point . and howbeit , they haue neuer so many other vertues , and good abilities , yet wanting this , they want all ; and are of no vse , no more then were those vessells in gods house , which had no couers to their mouthes . for such open vessells are they , that cannot keepe close a secret , and altogether vnworthy the seruice of kings . the substance and vertue of your flowres goes out in vapours and exhalations of the lymbecke ; and heate passeth out through the mouth of the fornace : and a secret from betweene the lipps of a foole ; it being a kinde of disease amongst those that know least , to talke most , and to vent through their mouth , whatsoeuer they haue in their heart . in ore fatuorum , cor illorum ( sayth the wise man ) & in corde sapientium , os illorum : the heart of fooles is in their mouth , but the mouth of the wise is in their hearts . cogitauerunt , et locuti sunt . looke what a foole hath in his head , hee will presently out with it . but a wise man , will not speake all that hee knowes . and therefore your naturallists say ; that nature placed two vaines in the tongue ; the one going to the heart , the other to the braine . to the end that that which remaines secret in the heart , the tongue should not vtter , saue what reason and the vnderstanding haue first registred , conformable to that order , which is betweene the faculties of the soule , and of the body , it being fit that the imagination should first conceiue , and the tongue afterwards bring forth : that thinke , the other speake . not like vnto that foole , who vnaduisedly , and without premeditation , went all day long babbling vp and downe . tota die iniustitiam cogitauit lingua tua : thy tongue , all day-long , deuiseth mischiefe . that is , whatsoeuer it imagineth , it easily vttreth , nay sometimes the tongue speaketh without booke , and runnes riot , afore euer it is a ware . but let vs conclude this with that of salomon ; that death , and life , are in the power of the tongue ; a dangerous weapon in the hands of him , that is not master thereof , and knowes not how to rule it . for all mans good , or ill , consisteth in the good , or ill vse of this instrument . the well gouerning whereof , is like a good pilot , that gouerneth a ship ; and the ill guiding of it , like a dangerous rocke whereon men split their honour , and often loose their liues . and therefore the diuell left patient iob , when all the rest of his body was wounded with sores , his tongue whole and sound : not with intent to doe him any kindnesse therein , but because hee knew very well , that that alone was sufficient , if hee were carelesse thereof , for to make him loose his honour , his life , and his soule : for all these lye in the power of the tongue . qui in consideratus est , ad loquendum , sentiet mala : he that openeth wide his lipps , shall haue destruction . and the plagues which shall befall him , will bee so remedilesse , that he shall not meete with any medicine to cure them . nor is there any defence against the carelesse negligences of a babbling tongue which are so many , that the holy ghost stiles such a kinde of tongue , the vniuersitie , or schoole of wickednesse . vniuer sitas iniquitatis : wherein is read a lecture of all the vices . whereas on the contrary , vir prudens secreta non prodit ; tacenda enim tacet , et loquenda loquitur : a wise man will not betray a secret ; but silenceth those things , that are to be silenced , and vttereth those things , that are to be vttered . it is worthy our weighing , how much importeth the warinesse in our words , for gods honour , and the kings credit and authoritie , which is much abused and lessened by futile , and flippant tongues , to the great hurt of a kingdome , and the good gouernment of the common-wealth . and let kings correct this so great a disorder in the disclosing closing of secrets , either out of their respect to such and such persons , or for their particular interests , or out of the weakenesse of a slippery tongue . let priuie-counsellours ( i say ) and secretaries of state , bridle their tongues ; if not , let kings , if they can , restraine them . and if they cannot do it of themselues , let them petition god , as dauid did ; in camo et frae●o maxillas eorum constringe : hold in their mouth with bit and bridle . for i am of saint iames his beliefe ; nullus hominum domare potest : the tongue can no man tame ; it is an vnruly euill . i say moreouer that the harmes which the tongue doth , are so many , and in such a diuerse manner , that the euill consisteth not onely in speaking , but many times likewise in being silent , and saying nothing ; by forbearing to speake the truth in that which is fitting , and when it ought to speake , ( as already hath beene sayd ) and in not reprouing and amending his neighbour , being obliged , thereunto , by the law naturall , diuine ▪ and positiue ; and in not reprehending murmurers , and backbiters ; for then , for a man to hold his peace , and not to checke them for it , is to consent and concurre with them , and to approue that which they say . and s. bernard tells vs , that he cannot determine which of the two is worser ; detrahere , an t detrahentem audire , quid horum damnabilius sit , non facile dixerim : to detract , or to heare him that detracteth , which is the more damnable , i cannot easily define . but more especially in kings & persons of authoritie , who with a blast only of their breath , or with a sower looke , may make them hold their peace . i leaue the charge of this vnto them , and charge their consciencs with it . and for the discharge of mine owne , i will now aduertise them of another sort of people , whom for their tongue and talke none can exceede . §. iiii. of flatterers , and their flatteries . amongst those infinite hurtes , and mischiefes which an euill tongue causeth , one amongst the rest , and not the least , is that of adulation and flattery . which is so much the greater , by how much the more dissembled and feigned it is . the sacred scripture tearmes it absolutely a sinne , and says , that a flatterer , is absolutely a sinner . so some doe paraphrase vpon that verse ; oleum autem peccatoris : the oyle , or balme of a sinner . for in it is included all sortes of sinne whatsoeuer , and aboue all a great neglect and contempt of god : for although this be to be seene in all kinde of sinnes , yet doth it more particularly expresse it selfe in those , which draw not with them any delight , which they doe as it were vnprofitably , and sine pretio ; for it brings them no profit at all , vnlesse ( when most ) a little vanitie , which they more esteeme , then god. these , that they may gaine the kings elbowe , or that they may not bee put from it , speake alwayes vnto him in fauour of that , which hee desireth ; and all their artifice and cunning is , to conceale the truth , and that the doore may be shut against him , that may tell it him , or those that know not ( like themselues ) how to please the kings palate . and being confident , that they will giue eare to euery word which they speake , they lay falsehoods and lyes athwart their way , fathering such actions of prowesse and valour vpon kings , that they haue much adoe to for-beare laughing , that heare their folly . for there are some prayses , that are dis-prayses , and redound much to the disgrace and dishonour of princes . for by those vntruths , wherewith they sooth and flatter them , they breed suspition of that good which is in them . and because they make pleasing the marke whereat they shoote , they neuer looke , whether it be a lye , or a truth , which they deliuer , nor haue an eye more vnto good , then ill ; iuste or vniust , against god , or his neighbour , all is one : cannonizing their king for a saint , though they know the contrary . these ( saith nazianzene ) are like to your sorcerers of egypt , which were about pharaohs person , who with feigned prodigies , did pretend to ease his heart of that griefe which those plagues did cause in him . ambitious and proud men are these , which thus resist the truth , and that they may not fall from their bias , oppose themselues to those that speake the truth , and minde nothing else , but to cast a fayre colour on those things , whereunto they see their prince stands affected . they come of the race of your cameleons , which liue by the ayre , and cloath themselues with the colour of that whereunto they approach neerest . if they see the king troubled , they are troubled ; if merry , they are merry ; if sad , they are sad ; hauing their teares as neere at hand , as their smiles , for to deceiue him ; and the better to content him , they change themselues into a thousand colours : in all they imitate him : in all doe they labour to represent him to the true life . there is not that glasse , which so liuely represents the face , the semblance , and actions of those that looke therein , as the flatterer ( who is that shadow which alwayes followes the body of him hee flattereth ) doth his kings countenance , his motions , his postures , his gestures , his saying , and his doings . for , as they see him either say , or doe , so doe they . being like vnto the echo , which answereth to the last syllable of euery word that is voyced in the ayre . these are the kings echos , which answer him in all , not onely in that which the voyce soundeth ; but in that which they imagine to be to his liking : being herein very like vnto those lying hypocrites which thinke one thing , and make shew of another . but they are presently discouered , and this their second intention soone vnderstood , which is , to lye , and flatter , to make themselues gratious , and to bring their businesses the better about , though it be to the hurt of others . with one single truth , they will dawbe ouer a thousand lyes ; as perfumers doe a great deale of leather , with a little ciuit. and thus soothing and suppling the eares of princes with a subtill softenesse , and deceitful sweetnesse , thy powre lyes into them , and working them with a gentle hand , they passe for truths , whilst these false perswaders falsifie the truth , and are worse members in a common-wealth then those that falsifie the kings coine ; and sinne more grieuously then those that beare false witnesse . for these , by their testification , deceiue onely the iudge , that is to sentence the cause ; but these with their faire and false flatteries , not only cozen and deceiue kings , but corrupt and infect them , & make them to perseuere in their errours . per dulces sermones , & benedictiones , seducunt corda innocentium ( saith s. paul ) by good words , and faire speeches they deceiue the hearts of the simple . and therefore with the greater and more grieuous punishments ought they to be punished . they are not so squezy stomackt , as to make dainty of lying , nor make they any bones to tell an vntruth , if thereby they thinke they may please . and as soone will they lay hold on a lye , as a truth , so as they rest well apayd therewith to whom they vent their flatterie and their leasings . and some are so trayned and bred vp to them , that they take delight to heare them , and doe as verily beleeue them , as they doe their creede . and so close doth this falsehood cleaue vnto them , that without any occasion or cause giuen they leane thereunto , and stedfastly beleeue , that they haue that goodnesse in them , which they want , and not that badnesse , wherein they exceede . for , being sencelesse of their owne defects , they no sooner heare themselues commended but they are presently puffed vp , and conceit themselues to surpasse all other princes . and thus doe they liue all their life long deluded , taking themselues to be othewise , then they are , being abused and vndone , by lyes , and flatteries ; whence it is now growne to be a prouerb ; princeps , qui libenter audit verba mendacij , omnes ministros habet impios : if a ruler hearken to lyes , all his seruants are wicked . for euery man will frame his tongue , according to his eare and feede him with that fruit , which they know best pleaseth his palate . it being a dangerous disease in kings , not to indure the truth ; and as mortall in the subiects , that they know not well , how to acquaint them therewith . the one , because they minde no other things ; the other because they dare not speake their minde . many seekeing to please them , most to flatter them , and some not to contradict them , being loath to distast them , of whose helpe & fauour they may stand in neede , hauing so much the kings eare , and such great power in court. they know that the bread of lyes is sauory , and that flatterers are too well heard , that they buzze into kings eares a thousand fictions and falsehoods , which they themselues inuent , and by their smooth carriage of them , perswade them to be truths . and for that kings ( vsually ) treate with few , they cannot be informed of the truth , and so are forced to beleeue those , who of purpose seeke to deceiue them . and therfore the wise men of athens did set such a watch about their kings , that flatterers should not bee suffred to speake with them . for these their smooth words , their adulations , and flatteries when they are once receiued by the eare , do not slightly passe away , entring in at one eare , and going out at another , but they cleaue vnto the soule , and make their way euen to the innermost part of the heart , and there make their seate , and abode . verba susurronis , quasi simplicia , & ipsa perueniunt ad intima cordis : the words of a tale-bearer , carry a faire shew , but they are as wounds , and they goe downe into the innermost parts of the belly . and albeit they be cast out , and doe not wholy either possesse , or perswade vs , as knowing of what stampe they are , and in what mould they are cast , yet at least they leaue behind them a kinde of guste , and content , and with that wherewith they seeme to please , they kill . as water doth those , that are sicke of a hectick-feuer , which they drinke with so much pleasure , and swallow downe with so much greedinesse : so these men come to tast that , which turnes to their owne hurt . crossing the opinion of iob ; who would haue none to tast that , which being tasted , should occasion his death . of your rich red wine , the wise man saith , that it is pleasant and sweete in the going downe , but afterwards that it biteth and gnaweth in the belly ▪ like a serpent ; in like manner , soothing is very sweete and sauory , and and seemeth least sower , to those , that are most powerfull , and , although they see the poyson that it is mingled with , yet they drinke it downe with a good will , and their seruants will be sure to serue them with the best and the strongest , contrary to that precept of gods , which saith ; noli vinum dare regibus : giue not wine vnto kings , lest they drinke , and forget the law , and peruert the iudgement of any of the afflicted . let kings therefore take heede of these flatterers , and false deceiuers , who pretend no more then to vphold themselues in their place , and grace , and to receiue thankes for doing ill . and the miserie of it is , that they finde this to be a good way for their rising in court , and to grow in fauour with princes ; and the onely sure course , whereby to shape and worke out their aduancement . plutarke sayth , that it is the fashion and language of vile and base people , and besides many other infamous names and foule attributes , that hee giues them , hee declares , them to be of as base condition , as are your slaues , which of necessitie must cumply in all their actions , and their answers with their masters liking , and pleasure . the doing whereof , were there no other slauerie , is slauerie inough of it selfe . but in some cases , it may be somewhat more tollerable , as when their flatteries shall doe little or no hurt , and when as their lyes and vntruths shall tend to no other end , but merriment , and to intertaine , and please him whom they serue . but in the rest it is treason and treacherie . king don alonso ( surnamed the wise ) in a law of the partida , sayth que si alguno , &c. that if any one should speake words of leasing and of flatterie to the king , that hee should not bee suffred to come neere him . for such kinde of men , are like like vnto their tamer sort of bees , that are housed in their hiues , which haue honey in their mouthes , but wound with their stings . they speake sweete words , but their tongues are full of poyson ; venenum aspidum sub labijs eorum : the poyson of aspes is vnder their lipps . sagiita vulnerans , lingua eorum : their tongue is as an arrow shot out . and they bend their tongue , like their bow , for lyes . they are worse ( saith saint ierom ) then scorpions , who wooe vs with their face , and wound vs with their taile . and therefore the prophet ezechiel , discoursing of kings , aduiseth them , saying ; looke well to your se●ues , for you dwell among scorpions . and well was that holy king acquainted with their ill condition , who did cast them off from him , when he said ; depart from me ye wicked . quare persequimini me , & carnibus meis saturamini ? why doe yee persecute me ( saith iob ) and are not satisfied with my flesh ? other creatures , ( though neuer so fierce , and cruell ) content themselues with feeding on dead carkasses ; but these must liue and be sustained by liuing flesh , and like your birdes of rapine , prey vpon the bosomes and hearts of kings . nullum quidem animantium genus ( saith plutarke ) assentatoribus est perniciosius : no creature so dangerous as is the flatterer . diogenes and bias , both great philosophers , were of opinion , that amongst your wilde beastes , the most hurtfull , and which did bite sorest , were the tyrant , and the tale-bearer , but amongst your tame ones , and such as are bred by hand , the flatterer . the scripture tearmes flattering , biting . they are snarling currs ; qui mordent dentibus suis : which bite with their teeth . they come towards you with a fleering countenance , but no sooner haue you in their reach , but they snap at you . and therefore a great monarch , to one that made towards him , with a feigned smile , and fawning looke , when hee came neere him , gaue him , ( as to a dogge ) a kick , saying ; cur me mordes ? why doest thou bite mee ? isocrates affirmeth , that there is not any pestilence more pernicious and praeiudiciall to kings , then the flatterer ; and aduiseth them , that they should shunne them that applaud all that they say , or doe ; but should cherish and make much of those , who in good tearmes tell them their errours ; for these are true friends and loyall subiects ; and those other , kinde enemies and familiar traytours , who with the soft silken scarfe of smooth-tongued flatterie gently strangle them , receiuing , but not perceiuing their death , like little children that insensibly fall asleepe , being lull'd in their nurses lapps . and they are by so much the more dangerous ( saith s. gregory ) by how much the lesse they are knowen and vnderstood . kings carefully guard their royall persons , with many guardes of porters , halbardeers , and soldiars . but there is no guard set , nor no doore shut against these false friends , these domesticke enemies ; for those their soft words , oyled ouer with adulation , are those darts , and brasse ordnance wherewith they kill and slay . molliti sunt sermones eius super ●leum , & ipsi sunt iacula ▪ the words of his mouth were smoother then butter , but warre was in his heart , his words were softer then oyle , yet were they drawen swords . they are men , that carry two faces vnder one hood , they are counterfaite doblones that haue two seuerall stampes , but neither of them golde , which god abhorreth , and throwes them a thousand leagues off from him , such is the hatred hee beares vnto them . spiritus enim sanctus effugiet fictum : for the holy spirit of discipline , will fly deceit , and will not abide , when vnrighteousnesse commeth in . therein , teaching discreete kings , how they ought to avoyde this kinde of vaine men , and dissembling dispositions , whose pills of poyson , are confectioned with sugar , and fairely , but falsely gilded ouer . the emperour tiberius , was such an enemie vnto them , and to whatsoeuer did sauour of flattery , that neuer either in publicke , or in secret , did hee giue way to intertayning any speech with them , and held those hearts to be base and vile , which did vse the like feigned courtesies . and the two seueri , alexander & septimus : did seuerely prosecute these beasts , and pursued them to the death , as most mischeiuous to a common-wealth . theodoricus , stabd one of his seruants , because thinking thereby to please him , and to curry fauour with him , he had changed his religion . and the athenians , beheaded an embassadour of theirs , whom they imployed to the king of persia , because in an insinuating and flattering kinde of fashion , hee made his entrance , when hee came to haue his audience , with great submissions , and thereupon enacted a law , whereby they condemned flatterers to death . and the emperours , arcadius and honorius ordeyned the like in their lawes . and good king dauid did well instruct kings , how they were to deale with these traytors , in that rigorous chasticement , which hee exercised on an amalakite , who thought to winne his fauour by bringing him newes of sauls death ; whom presently there vpon the place in his own presence , hee caused to be slaine . this kingly prophet , did hate them exceedingly , and was much the more wary and heedefull of them , as being the diuells ministers , and being instructed by him , in the trade of counterfeite gilding , and laying oyle colours on rusty yron , wherein hee had so played the cunning merchant with our first parents , & met with such good and rich indyes . and therefore did so earnestly beg of god , that not one drop of that oyle of these traders with hell , might touch his head . oleum autem pe●catoris , non impinguet capu● meum : let not their precious oyle make fatte my head . for that soft and sweete oyntment of theirs , is full of poyson . others , translate it , non srangat : let it not breake my head . for , though their words seeme to be like oyle , or balsamum that is powred forth , yet are they sharpe arrowes , and deadly darts . this oyle , or balsamum ( saith casiodorus ) is flatterie , which is an inuention of the diuells to bereaue men of their sences . he tooke this course with the first of men , and neither hath , nor will giue ouer till hee haue made an end ( if hee can ) with the last . for great is that vngodly gaine which hee maketh by this kinde of merchandise . with this pleasant bath , and mouth-oyntment hee came to our first parents , and began to smooth , and annoynt them with his inticing flatteries , telling them , that they should be no whit inferiour vnto god , if they would but taste of the forbidden fruit . they ( vnfortunate therein ) beleeu'd it , and who is he , that knowes not what a bad bargaine they made of it , and what great losse they sustained ? and what an ill market , they make , and what they loose by their trading , who by these fomentations , suffer the crowne of their head to be annoynted ? the fall of that prince , is very neere at hand , if not very certaine , that lets his eares lye open to the like lyes ; for by listning vnto sycophants and flatterers , good kings haue become bad , and by dancing after their pipe , and gouerning themselues by their aduise , kings and kingdomes haue come to ruine . commodum , iuuenem imperatorem , perdiderunt : ( saith herodian . ) they vndid thereby the young emperour commodus . they likewise ( saith plutarke ) were the cause of the disastrous death of iulius caesar , and of diuerse others . and as some wise and holy saints haue obserued , many more kings and kingdomes haue beene vndone by flatterers , then by the warrs ; for they are the rootes and beginning of all mischiefes , and all the publicke miseries of common-wealths , are to be attributed vnto them . let kings in this particular be well aduised , and not suffer themselues to be deceiued , nor to haue dust throwen in their eyes , that they may not see the hurt , which flattery causeth . s. ierom saith , that it is an vnlucky starre , and an vnfortunat fate , or constellation , that thus leades the soule and heart aside with flatteries , and carries them which way they list . for although by fits , we see the face of our owne shame vn-masked , and know our selues to be vnworthy of what we heare , yet inwardly wee reioyce thereat ; like vnto those , who by fortune-tellers , being told their good fortune , take pleasure in hearing of it , though they finde it afterwards to bee bad . the remedy against this , is that which the holy ghost setteth downe vnto vs. to wit ; that wee should sowe our eares with bushes and thornes , that they may paine and pricke his tongue that shall come to court them with flatteries . let kings haue reprehension and chasticement in readinesse against these plotters and impostors . plus enim persequitur lingua adulatoris , quàm manus interfectoris : for a flatterers tongue does more harme , then a murderers hand . seneca in his epistles , tells vs how exceedingly alexander the great was incensed against his friends , because they tolde him , that hee was the sonne of a god. hee told them they ly'd . and hee was in the right . for all that flatter , lye ; and that is not to be beleeu'd which they say , but that which euery man knowes of himselfe , and what his owne conscience dictates vnto him : and what good doth their commendation doe mee , if that accuse mee ? and in case that they doe not doe this base office , but that they themselues sooth vp themselues , and beleeue that of themselues , which they are not , this , of all other adulation , is the worst , and the most incurable , because it ariseth from selfe-loue , and a proper estimation of our owne worth , which is that inward flatterer which we all beare about vs in our owne bosomes , and are willing to intertane his false perswasions . for hee that is flattered by another , doth sometimes know , that all is lyes and adulation , which they tell him , and makes a game and scoffe of it , which hee doth not doe , when it proceedes from himselfe , but doth rather desire , that all should fauour him in this his opinion ; and it is a strange thing , and much to be wondred at , that without himselfe , and in another , a man should so easily perceiue adulation , and should not see it in himselfe . but the reason of it is ; that some doe rest so well satisfied of themselues , that all whatsoeuer they imagine in their owne conceit , they opinion it to be truly in them , and to be their due . let vs therefore conclude this discourse , with aduising kings , that it is basenesse in a brest and heart that is truly noble and royall , to suffer himselfe to be so lightly led away by men of such vile thoughts , and base pretensions , which follow more a prince his fortune , then his person . they feare not his hurt , nor pittie his paines , for that they are traytours , and easily vary from their faith and loyaltie , and passe ouer to another . they flatter this man , and backbite that : they sooth one , and flout another . their tongues , are like double sawes , which sawe on both sides , which comming and going , cut wheresoeuer they come , and slice and mince all that they light vpon , not sparing any man. there is no trusting of these men , nor can we safely haue ought to doe with them ; for , to serue their turne , they haue still two contrary weapons ready at hand , and with one and the same prince , make vse of them both . one while they lye , and another while speake truth , but flatter in both . their tongue droppeth forth words of hony , and their lips are canded with sugar ; for they know , that in kings houses much sweete meates are spent , and they hold him that shall season things with a contrary relish for their palate , to be offensiue and troublesome , and it will not goe downe with them , so harsh doth it seeme vnto them in the swallowing . king ahab renders no other reason of his hatred towards the prophet micah , but because hee did not speake pleasing things , and such as did agree with his guste and palate ; for hee that is accustomed to this kinde of diet , will hardly be brought to digest any other . quia non prophetat mihi bonum , sed malum ( saith the text . ) there is yet one man , by whom wee may inquire of the lord ; but i hate him , for hee neuer prophesieth good vnto mee , but alwayes euill . hee had signified some truthes vnto him , but hee did not like well of them ; for those eares , that haue beene accustomed to flatteries , will hardly indure to be tolde their owne , and to heare that , which may dis-deceiue them , and put them out of their errour . but this wicked king payd the price of his ●olly , at no lesse a rate then his life . for these his false prophets , and flatterers , led him along into the doores of death , as fooles by faire words are led vnto the stocks . but hee , that is a good king , will not suffer himselfe to be carried away with euery winde , nor be moued with soothing and artificiall words ; and all such , as are of a generous minde , and of a graue and constant disposition , and men of reckoning and authoritie , are enemies to such kinde of lightnesse , and meere strangers to all manner of leasings and adulation . this being so , wee ought not only to keepe the doores of our eares shut against these their accursed tongues , but of our houses against these vaine and lying sycophants , and to desire of god , that he will be pleased to illighten the vnderstanding of kings and princes , that they may get at least out of this blindnesse wherein they liue , and that he will free them from these eare-wiggs , and incroaching flatterers , who onely for to please , and for their particular interest , celebrate their euill actions , and approue for lawfull , all their disordinate appetites . whilest they , out of seelinesse , or willfullnesse , will not see the truth of that saying ; qui te beatum dicunt , ipsi te decipiunt . &c. they , which call thee blessed , cause thee to erre , and destroy the way of thy pathes . lastly , that wee may put an end to this discourse , i say , that there are another sort of flatterers , which they call iesters , and men of pleasure , very hurtfull and preiudiciall both in the common-wealth , and kings courtes ; and by so much the more , by how much the more eare is giuen vnto them . their laughters , their applause , their flatteries , and their fooleries , are all lyes ; one word crossing another , and their last reasons incountring with their first , and by laying hold on all , confound themselues in the end in all . their office is to persecute the truth ; and wheresoeuer they are , there is heard nothing but musicke , songs , and inchantments of lyes and falsehoods , wherewith they deceiue , and fill mens heads with ayre . hee hath small store of braine ( saith a wise man ) which hearkens vnto such kinde of idle companions ; who , for that they finde they haue entrance into the courtes and palaces of kings , loose all shame , and feare , and assume vnto themselues the libertie to runne this large course of life , whereby they thriue so well , and get their bread with so much ease . salomon , amongst those beasts , which represent the actions and gestures of men , which liue by their trickes , and sustaine themselues by their arte and industrie , reckoneth vp the ape . and according to the hebrew truth , and pagninu● his translation , that word stellio signifieth as much . and saith thereof , that it hath it's reception in kings houses . stellio manibus nititur , & moratur in aedibus regis . and thereby vnderstand this linage of mimick men , which liue meerely by their industry , exercising a thousand apish gestures before kings and princes to please them all they can , and to make them to laugh and be merry . they are birdes of rapine , hauing long bills , and double pawes , seazing on what they see , and you must part with something to them either by faire meanes , or by force , vpon paine of putting you in feare , that they will speake that of you , which they doe of others . these ill condition'd birdes ; are vsually bred in high places , although , like lewd women , they stoope to all , admit of all , and take of all , with a pretension to deceiue all , fitting euery one according to his humour , soothing that sinne , whereunto they see the party most affected . they are traytours of their tongue , cogging companions , and lying knaues , who , a man hath no sooner turned his backe , but they scoffe most at him , that giues them most ; and not onely rob him of his money , but his honour , and goe laughing away at their owne folly ; they are rogues by consent , villaines by permission , knaues cum priuilegio , instruments of the diuell , and hawkes-meate for hell ; deseruing to be banished for euer from the presence of kings , and men of authoritie . but the greife of it is ; that the more they lye , the more they are beleeued ; and the more impudently and vnciuilly they talke , they are the better heard . vnhappy are they in themselues , and as vnhappy they that heare them : the one , in their tongues , the other , in their eares . but they shall not remaine without punishment , for their harpes and their ghitterns , their lutes , and their vialls , their singing of new and lasciuious songs , their descanting vpon other mens liues , their lyes , and their flatteries , in that sad and miserable hower of their death , shall be turned into sighes and groanes , into roarings and howlings , and into hideous and fearefull shrikes , as they write of the syrens , to whom esay compares them ; who in their life time sing sweetly , and deceiue the hearing with their sweete notes , and murder the men that listen to them ; but afterwards die themselues , bellowing forth terrible and rauing out-cryes . for then , doth that blood faile and forsake them , which did cheere their heart . in like manner , the sea-beasts , of this sea of the world , when this their naturall heate shall goe decaying , and their blood shall waxe cold and frozen within them , they will depart hence with horrible anguish of soule , terrible gripings of the heart , stinging vexations of conscience , rauing yellings , and shreike vpon shrieke , one ouertaking another tearing the very soule in sunder , caused by their euill conscience , which neuer leaues racking and tormenting them , till it haue brought them downe to the deepe pit of hell , where they shall abide for euer weeping and gnashing their teeth . where i will now leaue them , and passe on to the sense of touching ; which though it be the first in being , yet is it the last , that comes to be handled . chap. xxix . of the sence of touching . of those fiue senses , which nature gaue vnto the creatures , in these two , tasting , and touching , man exceedeth all the rest ; but in those other three , seeing , hearing , and smelling , is exceeded by many . and amongst all the fiue , the most animall , materiall , grosse , and brutall , is the touching , as also all those delightes which by it are inioyed . aristotle saith ; that they are sensuall , beastly , and base , as likewise are those of the tast. it hath , as the rest , the originall and beginning of it's sensation in the braine , and from thence , goes to this , and to all the nerues of sensibilitie , that are either more , or lesse subtill and delicate , according to their seuerall necessities . it is a wonderfull thing , that out of this trunke onely , nay this little chip , ( man ) nature should hew and cut out so many materialls , for instruments for such prime and subtill operations , as those of the sences and so different , that it is impossible for one exteriour sense to doe that , which another doth . and therfore , speaking of the head , whence all , and euery one haue their sensible instrument ; it is fitting , that we should likewise say something of touching , and to set downe it's office ; which is , to haue a sense and feeling of the foure primarie qualities , frigiditie , caliditie , humiditie , and s●ccitie ; and some o●her , which from a mixture with these doe arise , as are hard , soft , rough , plaine , sharpe , flat ; great , little ; and in a word , all that whatsoeuer , that is knowne and discerned by touching . it hath no set place , or determinate situation in the body , but is equally scattred and diffused throughout the whole bulke of man , by vertue of a nerue , which like a fine thine net doth ouer-spread and comprehend the whole lumpe or masse , both within , and without ; by meanes whereof , it hath a feeling in all the parts , but there the more and the better , where the body is more soft and tender , whereunto assisteth the subtiller , and colder blood . aristotle saith ; that it is the first of the sences , and the foundation of all the other foure , and that there is not any creature , but hath it . and as we said of the tast , they say of this , that it is so necessary , that without it , no liuing creature can liue ; but without some of the other may . and in man , in regard of the goodnesse of his complexion , which in him is better then in other creatures , it is more subtill and de●icate , then in any-one , or all of them ; and farre more certaine , and lesse lyable to be deceiued ; and supplieth ( as nissenus affirmeth ) the defects of the other . et videtur datus a natura propter caecos : and it seemes to be giuen by nature , for the good and benefit of blinde men . for when that spiritfull sense of the sight faileth them , which should be their guide , they make vse of this more grosse and materiall sense by groping and feeling the walls . is caecus est , & mann tentans , ( said saint peter ) and s. ambrose ; quod tactu probamus , quae oculis probare non possumus : that wee proue those things by touching , which wee cannot try by the eyes . some of the qualities of this sence , which appertaine to kings , hath already beene handled in those that went before ; all of them , hauing their delight , which wee commonly call guste , or taste . that which remaineth , is to aduise them , to beware thereof , if they will not die by their owne hands ; for it is an ill and vnruly beast , and makes men brutish and beastly . s. basil saith thereof ; that of all the other sences it is the most pernicious , because it trailes and draggs the rest after it , or seemed to haue hired them , to serue it in it's pleasures and delights , making them pay it tribute and custome of all their gaines and commodities . for , that which the eies see , the eares , heare , the nose smells , and the heart desires , is onely there with to serue this sence , letting it share with them , and inuiting it to take part of their best and choysest morsells . the rest haue recourse but to one thing ; this , to all ; nothing comes amisse to it , it lays hand on all . the rest are but as the media , and breues dispositiones . but this is the finis , or end , which all doe pretend . to touch that , which is not lawfull , doth discompose and put the heart out of order and confoundeth mans soule . for thence ( saith s. bernard ) first arise euill thoughts , fowle motions , then consent , next act , and lastly death . it is not fit we should suffer flaxe to come to neere , the flame , nor is it it conuenient , that man should regalar and cocker vp himselfe with this sence ; for that presently such sparkles thence fly forth , as inflame the body , and set the soule on fire . and therefore it is requisite that we carrie a hard hand vpon this sence ▪ & looke well thereunto . for euen in the plainest and euenest way man often times stumbles , how much more where there is apparent danger . and let not kings thinke , because they are kings , that they are free from this tyrant , but in that they are kings , are so daintilie bread , so deliciously fed , and make so much of themselues , they are more subiect thereunto , for that their natural condition , conformes it selfe more to it 's guste , & pleas●re , and is a great friend of regalos , of daint●nesse , and nice vsage , of fine linnen , soft raiment , choice deliacies , and a●● that wh●ch causeth delight , & prouoketh pleasure . and in courts , and kings pallaces , and in the houses of princes and great persons , these things are in greatest request . ecce , qui in veste pretiosa sunt & delicijs , in domibus regum sunt . behold , they which are go●geously apparel ed , and liue delicately , are in kings courts . so says our sauiour christ. and many dangers doe they runne , who measure out all their life by the compasse of contents , and passe times , that goe cloathed in silkes and veluetts and are continually conuersant amidst the sweetest perfumes , the purest holland , the finest damaske , and the richest c'oathes of silke and gold. yet for all this doe not i say , that princes , and great lords , liuing in this state and pompe , cannot ●o nom●ne bee saued , but to shew that in all estates there is a great deale of danger ; but much more in your daintier , and nicer sort of people : nor will i with all my force straine this vnto kings . as well witting , what their estate and greatnesse , doth admit and require . and that as nature did d●fference them from the rest both in blood , and birth so likewise ought there to be a distinction in their diet , raiment , and in the furn●shing and adorning of their houses . but i say that which cannot be denied , that in excuse of this their state and conueniencie , they take vnto themselues heerein too large a licence , and passe to soone from the foote , to the hand ; & from the hand , to the mouth ; making of an inch an ell , and of an , elll an aker . so hard a matter is it for great princes to moderate themselues , and vse a meane . and that heathen was not much wide of the marke , who sayd in the senate , that that is an vnfortunate estate , that obligeth a man to liue alwayes vp to the eyes grazing in his pleasures and delightes : and that it is a very bad omen , for a man , to liue all his life time , according to the sauour and guste of his palate . consuetudinem nullam peiorem esse , quàm vt semper viuat quis ad voluptatem : there is not any custome so bad , as that of a mans liu●ng according to his owne pleasure . such men , are rather to be pittied , then enuied ; for there is not that hower of their contents and de●ightes , which doth not pay it's tribute of teares and sorrow . onely for to please and satisfie this sense , and to recreate that of the sight , haue so many artes beene inuented , so many sorts of trades , and trades-men set a worke , so much varietie of fashions and costly cloathes , such a world of curious silkes , lawnes , cambricks , and hollands , such large beds , rich bedding , sumptuous bed-steds , so sensuall , and so ouer nice and dainty , that it may well be questioned whether is greater , the costlinesse or the curiositie ; the richnesse , or the ryot occasioned by them ? nor ( which is the miserie of it ) is it yet known , whether or how farre this humour will extend it selfe . but sure i am , that thereby houses are disordred , much monyes consumed , ancient inheritances solde away , and a thousand other inconueniences introduced . and ( to say the truth ) this sense hath not neede of so much nicetie , but abuse hath now brought it to that passe , that it hath no sooner a liking to a thing , but it greedily runn's after it , as a beast that is put into a fresh ground , runnes vp and downe , smelling out the choice grasse , and will not bite but at the sweetest . but he that doth regalar , and pamper vp this sense most , doth most of all make it his enemie ; which will neuer giue him ouer till it haue vndone him . this is so large a theame , and so copious a subiect , that if i should heere write and set downe all that , which in this kinde would fairly offer it selfe , i must be driuen much to inlarge my pen. but it is not my intent , to set my cloath on the tenters , nor in this little loome to weaue large histories , and long discourses , but onely to giue a short touch , and away , of the effects , which this sence causeth , and of the miseries and misfortunes , which are incident to touching , and that all the worke , & paines which it does and takes for it's friends , and best well-wishers , is not so freely bestow'd , nor that good assurance giuen thereof , but that this it 's momentary pleasure ▪ makes quick payment , in groanes , in diseases , and in temporall , and eternall death ; the condition of the obligation being drawen and signed by no worse a scriuener then saint paul ; si enim secundum carnem vixeritis , morieimni : for if yee liue after the flesh , yee shall dye . wee haue examples of kings good store , and of ancient and moderne kingdomes , forraine , and domestick . the first shall be of charles the . king of france , in whom voluptuousnesse and delights , wrought so great an alteration in that his most fortunate and happy entrance , which hee made into italy ; where without putting hand to his sword , hee became master of all the whole kingdome of naples , and did so amuze and affright all the world , that the great turke was afraid of being ouer-runne by him , and many of his commaunders , which had the keeping of his fortes on that coast , forsooke them and fled . and if that king had but well followed that enterprize , hee had beene lord of all greece . but being a young gentileman , hee suffered himselfe to be ouercome by the dainties and delicacies of that countrie , spending his time in delightes , banquets , shewes , maskings , dancings , and feastings ; so that hee , who had so soone filled the world with feare , was as soone ouercome by yeelding to the pleasure of this sense . for hee and his did so glut themselues with the fruites of that country , and so followed the delights of the flesh , that hauing entred victorious , they became subiect , and were subdued by that new and loathsome disease , which possesseth the whole body , and to dissemble it's name , they call it corrimiento , which in plaine english , is the french pocks : there , and then it was , where and when it first began to rage , and from thence spred it selfe hither and thither , and now is so generally knowen in all parts of the world , and which by touching onely cleaues close vnto man. and this , had it's roote and beginning in carnall delight , as it was resolued in a consultation of physitians , which king don alonso called together in toledo ( which is another notable example ) who hauing wonne that citie from the moores , and many other places , ioying themselues in the victorie , layd aside their armes , and gaue themselues in that manner to their pleasures and delights , that within a few dayes they were growen so lazye and so weake , that they were not able to fight , nor to beare armes against the enemie ; and being forced to take them vp in a certaine skirmish , which they had neere vnto veles , they were ouerthrowen and shamefully put to flight , leauing dead in the place the sonne of their king. who being very sensible of this so great an infamie , consulted his physicians , what should be the cause of this so great a weakenesse both in the strength and courage of his soldiars , who in the first incounter hauing shew'd themselues as fierce as lyons , in this last conflict seemed as fearefull as hares . who answered him with that , which pliny speakes of the romans , who fell from their ancient greatnesse , because in their meate , drinke , and apparell , and in the delicacies of their bathes , and companie keeping with women , they exceeded all those , whom before they had ouercome . and therefore , vincendo , victi sumus : wee are ouercome , by ouercoming . and thereupon , that good king forthwith commanded the bathes to be destroyed , together with the houses of pleasure , gardens , and other the like places of recreation , wherewith that dammage was in part repayred . in these two things , daintinesse in diet , and wantoning with women , the diuell imploies his vttmost strength and force , that hee may quit those of it , and vtterly dis-inable them , that giue themselues thereunto . and this was that counsaile and aduice , which that member of satan , and false prophet , balaam gaue to the king of moab ; that in those places , through which the children of israel were to passe , hee should appoint certaine of his fayrest women to be there in readinesse , to receiue and intertaine them , to cherish and make much of them , and to inuite them to eate and drinke with them , as the onely meanes to draw them on to their destruction as it afterwards fell out . this is pointed at in numbers but set forth more at large in iosephus . where it is added , that those are not to be feared , which giue themselues to the like gustes and delights , for in waxing weary of the clattering of armour , and taking pleasure in the sound of musicke , in putting off harnesse , and putting on silkes ; in changing a field-tent , for a soft bed ; and forsaking the conuersation of soldiars , and captaines , to follow the companie of women , they stuck a naile in the wheele of their fortunes . these are examples , that cannot be excepted against ; but much lesse that which followes of king salomon , whose pompe , musick , dancings , feastings , huntings , dainties , delights , and passe times , were such , as he himselfe , inspired by the holy ghost , reckons vp . now that , which he got by all these , what was it ? onely this , that these vices , and wanton delights , made him forget himselfe , and to blot out all the good of his felicitie , and that good correspondence , which hee held with god , and in such sort did turne his braines , that hee came to committ idolatrie , and to call his saluation in question . and therefore let euery one command his flesh , as hee would command his slaue , lest it make him a slaue . for to him that yeelds himselfe thereunto , it is a fierce ; to him , that feares it , a cruell ; and to him , that deliuers the keyes of his libertie vp vnto him , a dominering tyrant , which like a haltred beast , it hales after him . there are two remedies found , for the curing of so many dammages and disorders , as we perceiue to be in this sense of touching , and that of the tast. one generall for all ; which is temperance , whereof wee will treate by and by ; the other more particular , drawne from the example of kings , whereof we will discourse hereafter . §. i. of temperance . the office of temperance , is to keepe a man from flying out , and to make him not to incline to a little more , or a little lesse , but to liue alwayes in very good order , not exceeding in any thing the bounds of reason . est moderatio cupiditatum , rationi obediens : it consisteth in a certaine moderation and mediocritie in pleasures and delights , from which a temperate man abstaineth , refrayning from superfluities and excesses , vsing things according to necessitie , and not according to his appetite . and it is that rule and compasse , which doth mete and measure out the desires of man , that they may not passe from their point and center , not suffring the heart , like the rauen , to flesh it selfe on the dead flesh of sensuall delights . s. dionisius saith ; that it serueth to incline a man to all good ; according to the rule of reason ; as well in that which appertaineth to the sense of touching , as of the taste , that it may not , like an vnbridled colte , breake out into those two vnruly appetites , whose operations are so furious and vehement , that in earth , water and ayre , they leaue nothing safe and secure ; and therefore had neede of this great vertue , to restraine their disorders , and concupiscences . these are those that make the cruellest warre against both body and soule ; and this is that , which bridleth , tempreth , and moderateth her in her excesses . temperantia ( saith prosperus ) temperantem facit , abstinentem parcum , sobrium , moderatum , pudicum , tacitum , serium , & verecundum : temperance makes a man temperate , abstemious , sparing , sober , moderate , modest , silent , serious , & yet shamefac't . it is a vertue worthy kings and princes , and much commended by the saints , and many are those vertues which accompany it ; as modestie , shamefastnesse , chastitie , abstinence , faire and comely behauiour , moderation , sobrietie , grauitie , and humilitie . aristotle calls it , conseruatricem prudentiae , & sapientiae , the conservresse of prudence and wisedome . for intemperance in eating and drinking , or in any other kinde of delight , doth ouerthrow the braine , dull the vnderstanding , darken the iudgement , blunt the best and sharpest wit , and makes man , as it were , a beast , as is to be seene by experience . quotidiano experimento probatur ( saith pope leo ) potus satietate , aciem mentis obtundi , & vigorem cordis hebetari : it is made good by daily experience , that sacietie of drinke , dulleth the edge of the minde , and blunteth the vigour of the heart . temperance like wise preserueth the health , and makes mans life more long , more sound , and more pleasing . for , to be princes , and monarkes , and lords of all the world , and whatsoeuer therein is , is not sufficient to content them , if they want their health , which is of more worth then all the world besides . melior est pauper sanus , & fortis viribus quam diues imbecillis ; & corpus validum , quàm census immensus : better is the poore , being sound and strong of constitution , then a rich man , that is afflicted in his body . health , and good state of body , are aboue all gold ; and a strong body , aboue infinite wealth . in distempering the humours , the lotts of mens estates are changed . the sicke man , be hee neuer so great a lord , would be content to change states , to haue a poore plough-mans health . to what vse serue kingdomes , signories , and great treasures , if , day and night , a king leade a more miserable life , then a day-labourer ? to what vse serue his rich bed and downe pillowes , if he can take no rest in them ? to what vse serue his delicate cates , and dainty dishes , if hee no sooner sees them , but loaths them ? to what vse serue his rich and pretious wines , if he must be driuen to drinke barly-water ? or what guste and content can hee take in any thing , whose taste is as bitter as gall ? or how can he haue contentment in these outward things , that hath it not within himselfe ? iulius caesar wearyed out with his want of health , did hate and abhorre his life . for , ( as the wise man saith ) melior est mors , quàm vita amara : better is death , then a bitter life . a sicke life , is no life ; nor is there any happinesse , where health is wanting . and all things without it , are as nothing . for to liue without paine , is more to be prized then all . and this doth temperance effect . this preserued marcus valerius more then a hundred yeares sound in iudgement , and strong in body ; and by this socrates liued all his life time free from sicknesses and diseases . it was the saying of the elder cato , that hee gouerned his house , increased his wealth , preserued his health , and inlarged his life , by temperance . in multis escis erit infirmitas ( saith ecclesiasticus ) qui autem abstinens est , adijciet vitam : excesse of meates bringeth sicknesse ; by surfeiting haue many perished , but hee , that taketh heede , prolongeth his life . king masinoja , was wonderfull temperate , his fare was ordinary and with out curiositie , which made him liue so sound and so healthy , that , at . yeares of age , hee begat a sonne , and at . wanne a battaile , wherein he shewed himselfe a very good soldiar , but a better captaine . and therefore let those dis-deceiue themselues , and acknowledge their errour , who thinke they shall preserue their life , by faring deliciously ▪ pliny saith of grasse ; that , quanto peius tractatur , tanto prouenit melius : the worse it is vsed , the better it proues . as with it , so is it with man. homo sicut faenum : man is but as grasse , or as the flower of the field ; which is no sooner vp , but is cut downe ; no sooner flourisheth , but it fadeth ; and all it's beautie no sooner appeareth , but it perisheth , and withereth away , and is no more to be seene . and the more wee make of much our selues , the lesse while we liue . we are alwayes crazy ; soone downe , but not so soone vp ; quickly fall into a disease , but long ere we can get out of it ; loosing our strength , before we come to it , and waxing olde , before euer wee be aware of it . but if a man will lay aside this cockering and pampering vp of himselfe , and habituate himselfe to labour and trauaile , he shall passe his life the better . for health neuer dwells with delights ; nor strength , ioyne hands with choice fare . nor shall hee euer doe any famous acts , and worthy renowne , that feares to take paines , and is willing to take his ease . the emperour hadrian , was singular herein . frigora enim , & tempestates , ita patienter tulit , vt nunquam caput tegeret : hee did indure colds , and all kinde of fowle weather with that patience , that hee neuer put on his hatt , but alwayes went bare-headed . and alexander the great , would tell his soldiars that it was for lazy companions , and effeminate fellowes , to apply themselues to the pleasures and contentments of this life ; but for noble hearts , and generous spirits , to accustome themselues to labour , and to take paines . in a word , temperance is a vertue very necessarie for all estates ; it will sute well with all : but more particularly with kings , and princes , and great persons ; because it is in it selfe a vertue so gentleman-like , so worthy noble persons , and so proper for royall maiestie . as likewise , for that they liue , as they doe , amidst so many regalos , and delights , so many curious meates , and a thousand other occasions , whereby , if they doe not arme themselues with this vertue , not onely their liues , but their soules , are like to incurre the great danger . for like theeues in a mans owne house , or close traitours lurking in secret corners , some while one , some while another , are neuer from their elbow , till they deliuer them ouer into the hands of death ; or at least hoxe their courage , and cut off their health . which in good kings so much importeth , and which all men desire may be long and prosperous . the want whereof in a particular person importeth little ; but in them it mattereth much , in regard of the great losse which the common-wealth thereby receiueth . for on their welfare , dependeth the generall comfort and gouernment of the whole kingdome , which when it is wanting in them , that want is common to all . let then the conclusion of this discourse be , that kings ought to keepe an orderly and temperate diet , hauing more regard to the law of nature , and vnto christian reason , then to their greatnes of state , and maiestie of empire ; and to carry themselues amidst so many occasions of pleasures and delights with that modestie and moderation , as if they were without them , if they haue a minde to preserue their bodies and their soules healths ; and to giue vnto all a good example ; which is another ( as already hath beene said ) so powerfull a remedy for to perswade other princes and potentates of his kingdome , to the embracing of this vertue . and besides that obseruation of hipocrates , quod plures cecîdit gula , quam gladius : that surfeiting hath killed more then the sword . let those that place all their care in these their delights and pleasures , consider that saying of cato , that our much carefulnesse in this , causeth much forgetfulnesse of god. and there are some that count it an honour and reputation vnto them to eate and to drinke , ( though sanitas est animae & corporis sobrius potus ) and because they are great in estate , they will also be great feeders . which indeed is not greatnesse , nor lordlinesse , but great basenesse , and vnbeseeming their authoritie , to suffer themselues to be giuen to gluttony , and to the excesse of eating and drinking . saint bernard did blesse himselfe , and much wonder , at so much time and wealth as herein was spent ; and at so many cookes , and other officers , herein employed . and that he should be the most commended , and best rewarded , that could inuent any other new kinde of choice dish , then had by gluttonies curious enquiry been as yet found out and all to giue gust to the gust , and to please the palate , with the losse of their honour , the wasting of their wealth , and to their great hurt both of bodies and soules . but these must i inroll in the list of vnfortunate persons , and account that kingdome happy ( as the wise man saith ) where the king and his peeres liue soberly and temperately . beata terra , cuius rex nobilis est , & cuius principes vescuntur in tempore suo , ad reficiendum , & non luxuriandum : blessed art thou ( o land ) when thy king is the sonne of nobles , and thy princes eate in due season , for strength , and not for drunkennesse . §. ii. of another remedie against excesses , and superfluities , depending on the example of kings . a king being ( as hath beene said ) the soule and heart of a kingdome , and like another sunne , which with its light and motion , affoords light and health to the world ; being the true picture and liuely image of god vpon earth ; and he that is most ( being iust ) like vnto him , hath a great and precise obligation lying vpon him , both by his life and example , to giue life vnto his kingdome , and to set himselfe , as a patterne , before his subiects , that , and they , being that mysticall bodie , whereof he is the head . and see what dependencie the members in mans bodie haue on the head ; the same , or little lesse , haue subiects on their kings . and if that be sound and good , it is well with all the members ; but if ill affected , all of them suffer with it . the prouerbe saith , cum caput dolet , caetera membra dolent . when the head aketh , the rest of the members ake with it . and as it is so true , as nothing more , so it it more in common-wealths , then mens bodies . for , as the humours of these are in or out of order , according to those which the head communicateth vnto them . so likewise the composition of a whole kingdome , dependeth on the good or ill composition of their king and head. whence it followeth , that the same necessitie which a body hath of a good head , the very selfesame hath a kingdome of a good king ; being that he as hee is king ( as already hath beene deliuered ) doth therein supply the office of the head. and therefore it was well said of plato , that the inclining of a king to good , or ill , is the inclining of the whole kingdome , according to his scale or ballance ; they bend all the same way , & follow him , as the shadow doth the body . mouetur cū principe mobile vulgus : as the prince moues , so doth the wauering multitude . in vaine do we seeke to rectifie the shadow , if the body be crooked . the waues of the sea , go that way as the winde driues them ; and the vulgar are led along by the example of those their kings , that gouerne them . aquae multae populi sunt : the common people are as many waters . the spirit and winde that moues them , is the king , who with great force carries the mindes of his subiects this way or that way , as best pleaseth him . by onely seeing saint peter abstaine from some meate , and eate of other some , without commanding it , or saying any thing thereof to those new conuerted christians , saint paul saith , that he carried them away , and drew them to doe the like . for , there is neither law , nor precept , nor force , can be compared with that which the example of a king works vpon his subiects , forcing them to imitate and follow him . king manasses ( saith the sacred text ) fecit malum coram domino : he did that which was euill in the sight of the lord ; for he forsooke him to follow strange gods , like vnto the abhomination of the heathen . and anon after drawes thence this consequence or conclusion : igitur manasses seduxit populum , vt faceret malum : so manasses made iudah , and the inhabitants of ierusalem to erre , and doe worse then the heathen , &c. but tell me , i pray , how came it to passe , that this king should cast such a mist before his subiects eyes , that he should thus deceiue them , and make them doe as he did ? for we doe not finde there , that he said any one word vnto them , or induced them thereunto by any other diligences , whereby to perswade them to commit the like sinne . though he did not , yet he did enough , in doing that which he did , as being their king and head. for , as the soueraigne doth , so doth the subiect . king hamor , and prince shechem his sonne , by their bare example onely perswaded their people the shechemites , to leaue that law , wherein they had beene bred and brought vp , and to entertaine that of the hebrewes , though it turned to the losse of all their liues . of kings , saith a romane philosopher , quaecunque vitia ipsi concipiunt , ea infundunt in ciustates ; plus exemplo , quam peccato nocent : whatsoeuer vices they conceiue , they infuse the same into their cities , offending more by their example then by their sinne . by the sinne , they doe but aggrauate and wrong their owne conscience ; but by the example , the consciences of all the common people , which haue no other eyes whereby they see , no other rule or square whereby to rule and gouerne themselues in their actions ; nor is there any other meanes , whereby vices are communicated with more facilitie , and larger licence . and therefore it concernes them very much , not to make any the least breach in good manners , nor to turne ( though neuer so little aside ) from the way of vertue . for they cannot build vp so fast by their good , as they pull downe by their bad example . besides , the vulgar iudge thei● vitious actions , for vertuous ; their bad , for good . and if not so , then will they iustifie their owne loosenesse , by laying the same on their king : hee doth thus and thus , and why should not i ? this same regis ad exemplum , runnes ouer all the world ; and men are willing enough to make their aduantage of it . of dionysius the siracusan , plutarch reporteth , that at first he was very studious , and much giuen to his booke , and whilest hee so continued , all his subiects applied themselues to the exercise of good letters . but growing weary of so good a worke , he left off his learning , and betooke himselfe to the vice of gaming and wantonnesse ; and presently all his subiects , as if they had beene bewitched , began to loath their bookes , and fall to vice . isidorus saith of the ethiopians , that they were such apish counterfeits of their kings , that they held it a kinde of reproach and infamie , that if their king did want a member , or were lame , all his houshold seruants were likewise of that fashion ; and would willingly mayme and dismember themselues that they might be like vnto their king. i say therefore againe ; let kings looke well vnto that which they affect , and whereunto they are inclined ; for the same will his subiects affect , and thereunto will they all be inclined . and therefore isocrates did counsell his king , that hee should loue and esteeme the arts , and such offices as might be most profitable for the commonwealth , and should abhorre the contrary ; for these would bring him augmentation of honour , when those other would bee forgotten , or but ript vp to his shame ; that he should approue good , and reproue bad customes , and euill manners , that these might fall , and those other be in vse . for in regard that the king is censor morum , he that censures our manners and behauiour , and sets downe and determineth , which we are to flie , which to follow : looke which he approueth , and keepeth , are kept and approued by all , and euery one does his best to excell therein . and those which he shall reproue and mislike , all men will shunne and auoide them . and more particularly , these two pernicious ones , which appertaine to tasting and touching , i desire to haue them be condemned and reproued by the example of kings ; such as are excesse in sumptuousnesse of apparell , and in meates and drinkes , and the like publike and common vices . for , by these two abuses , great monarchies haue beene ruined , and ouerthrowne . let vs fall a little vpon the first ; wherein is such excesse and superfluitie in this age , as neuer more . howbeit , as it was not wanting to former times , so was there a great deale of care taken for the reforming thereof . your romanes made lawes , for to moderate the expences and excesses of apparrell and diet . the imperiall lawes of the kingdome , and those of the partida prohibite it , and many other prematicas and statute lawes , which haue beene made thereupon , and confirmed by act of parliament . and the sacred scripture likewise in many places doth condemne it . and therefore a remedie in this kinde ( if possibly it can bee procured ) is very needfull : for excesse , doth not serue so much for sustentation , as for pompe and ostentation , wherewith is fomented ambition , vaineglory , concupiscence , and dishonestie , euen to the falling into those vices , that were neuer before seene , or vsed . their expence , that increaseth , and their substance decreaseth : what wealth can a man haue , that will suffice for the arraying and apparrelling of women , as also for the clothing of men , which is no lesse vicious , and expencefull then theirs ? what doth it benefit vs , that the riches of our times are greater then those of our predecessours , if our expences be more excesssiue ? by running on in this lauish course , great and ancient houses haue beene brought to nothing , and new ones haue started vp in their roome , borne and bred in bad trades , and worse manners , who alwayes haue a smacke with them , or some touch or other of their former meaner fortune . and for this cause onely , are there so many misfortunes and disorders in the houses of many your ordinary and common sort of people , and euen in some of those that are of meaner ranke . for they had rather perish and vndoe themselues , then to be accounted needy and poore . and without doubt , the most of their substance is spent in meate , and clothes . which vice shame would moderate in them . but the feare of seeming to be oflesse abilitie then their neighbours , hath quite altered the case , and serues to helpe them on to their ruine . for euery one counts it a disgrace vnto him , that he shall not go as well clad as his neighbour , and eate as good meate , and drinke as good drinke as he doth , though he pay soundly for it , both in his honour and estate . and hence proceede your briberies , corruptions , subornations , and iniustice . for necessitie , the mother of vice , and that which makes ( as we say ) the old wife trott ; putts them so hard to their shifts , that for to free themselues from want , there is not that wickednesse which they will not giue way vnto ; and all , because they will not lacke these instruments of their gustes , nor want the apparence of maiestie in their houses . and another no lesse mischiefe then the former , is the inequalitie in the estates , and qualities of the persons ; and the equalitie wherewith the said accoutrements both in meate and apparrell is vsed . for ( as plato saith ) in a well ordered commonwealth , all ought to be equall . and yet we see , that meane women , that haue neither meanes nor qualitie , weare kirtles , peticoates , and gownes of cloth of gold , and rich imbroderies , that queenes can scarce weare better . and as for our ordinary sort of men , there are very few of them , but will go in such good clothes , that kings can not bee better clad . of the emperour tiberius caesar , tacitus reporteth , that by a decree of the senate , he did prohibite men the wearing of gownes of silke , saying , that they did disgrace themselues by putting on such an effeminate habite . and of the emperour aurelius it is noted , that hee did not onely not weare silke , but would not so much as suffer any to be in his wardrope , saying , that hee would not buy clothes at the weight of gold . and lampridius saith , that the first emperour that euer had any wardrobe , was that wicked and lux●rious emperour heliogabalus ▪ scipio aphricanus , and alexander magnus , were very singular in this carelesse many weare , whereof others are so curiously carefull . and let vs say no more hereof , then what isocrates said , writing to his king , haue a care ( saith he ) of the things of particular persons , and thinke that those that liue at high and excessiue rates , waste and spend out of thy treasure ; and that those that take paines to scrape vp a little mucke , and to get into some wealth by their thrift , are the onely men that s●ll your coffers , and increase your treasure . for the subiects purse is as the kings owne purse , if he rule and gouerne well . but when men shall not haue meanes sufficient for to supply that excesse in diet , and clothes , which vice and mans foolish pride hath introduced , how is it possible that they should serue and assist their king in the necessary occasions of the kingdome ? it is impossible but that there must be a failing in the one , being that the ends are so opposite . how can they haue any heart or guste for the one , hauing placed all their care and content in the other ? and questionlesse , if these superfluities were taken away , the subiect would haue wealth enough , and then it would neuer grieue them to part with part thereof to their kings , or to spend it in his seruice . but that which is now permitted amongst vs , is the same which the romans permitted , and procured in the nations , they had subdued , for to consume and eate them out , and to keepe them in the better obedience . but in their owne commonwealth they did euermore feare it , and seeke to excuse it . what prince hath there euer beene , either of those that were held to be good or indifferent , that did not treate of this remedie ? not any , yet they did most of them erre in the manner . now , to remedie this excesse , experience hath and doth shew vnto vs , that it is not the penaltie , nor rigour of the lawes and statutes that our ancestours seemed to haue erred in , who by those penalties alone , thought to amend these extrauagancies in their subiects . but the cure of this exorbitancie is that which the ancient did prescribe , and we haue declared , touching the example of kings , and of their imitation . the desire of giuing them content , is more powerfull with them then the feare of punishment . this doctrine tacitus taught , rendering the reason of that temperance and moderation , which was in the emperour vespasian his time in clothes and diet , and in the vitious superfluitie of these vices . and after that he hath gone varying from one reason to another , he saith , that this prince was the principall author of that sparingnesse and thriftinesse amongst the romanes of those times in their wastfull expences ; by exercising himselfe in that their ancient manner of liuing in matter of maintenance , apparell and the like . and hence it succeeded , that all his subiects did the like , conforming themselues according to his fashion , their respect to their prince , and their desire to imitate him , preuailing more with them , then the punishment or feare of the lawes . and this is a sure and sound point of doctrine , and of that great consequence , that it neuer ought to slip out of the memorie and good liking of kings , and their principall ministers , as being the mirrour or looking glasse wherein the subiects see and behold whether their manners be foule or faire , become or not become them , according to the liking which they take from their superiours . of augustus caesar , dion reporteth , that because hee would not weare such clothes , as were prohibited by his lawes , there was not a man in all his empire that did offer to put them on . componitur orbis ( saith claudian ) regis ad exemplar , nec sic inflectere sensus humanos edicta valent , quàm vita regentis . the whole world shapes and fashions it selfe according to the patterne their king sets before them ; nor can edicts and decrees worke so much vpon mens humours , as the life of him that ruleth . of all the reasons whatsoeuer that the wit of man can deuise , there is not any more effectuall to perswade hard and difficult things , then the example of kings . let therefore a prince lay a more hard and cruell punishment vpon them , then either imprisonment , banishment , or some sound fine , or pecuniary mulct , as not to doe them any grace or fauour , or not to affoord a good looke on him , that shall not imitate and follow his fashion . for there is no man such a foole , that will loose the fruite of his hope , for not apparelling himselfe after this or that manner , as he sees the prince himselfe is contented to go . let kings amend this fault in themselues , and then his peeres , and other their inferiours , will not be ashamed to imitate them . i pray tell me , if men of the baser and meaner condition should onely be those , that were vicious in their meate and clothes , who would imitate them therein ? assuredly none . all would be noblemen , or gentlemen , or at least seeme to be so in their fashion and apparrell , howbeit they would bee lesse curious and dainty , if they saw those that were noble , or gentile , go onely plaine and handsome . that ancient romane , pure , neate , cleane , and comely attire of those who conquered the world , did then wholly loose it selfe , when your great and noble persons of that commonwealth left it off . for in all things , but more especially in those that are vicious , men seeke to make a fairer shew then their estate will beare , and thereby procure to content and please their kings vnder whom they liue ; knowing that there is no intercession or fauour like vnto that , as the similiancie of manners , and the kindred which this doth cause . let kings , by their example , cut off the vse of costly clothes and sumptuous banquets , and whatsoeuer in that kinde is vicious and superfluous , and they shall straightway see , how a great part of the greedinesse of gaine , and couetousnesse of money will cease , and many other euils and mischiefes which proceed from thence , which would not be sought after nor esteemed , were it not for the execution of the appetite , and fulfilling of our pleasures . and for this end and purpose , money is kept with such great anxietie and trouble , but procured and sought after with much more ; because it is the master and commander of all pleasures and delights whatsoeuer . for which we will buy and sell , and giue all that we haue . the second point concerning vices and sinnes , common and publike , the hurt that comes thereby is well knowne both to god and man , and is harder to be reformed then the former . that , is moderated either with age or necessitie ; but this , neither necessitie nor time can lessen , but with it increaseth , and shooteth forth new sprigges and suckers , neuer before seene , nor vsed in the world , against which neither suffice lawes nor statutes . and that doctrine of tacitus is now come to bee verified , that there is not any gre●ter signe of corruption of manners , then multiplicitie of lawes . and we now liue in those dangerous times , whereof saint paul speaketh ; and i know not whether i may be so bold as to say , that it is likewise an argument or signe , that the subiect is neare it's end , or at least daily growes decaying , wherein these signes and tokens are to bee seene ; one disorder begetting another , which is the order which nature keepes with things that are to perish , till at last all comes to ruine ; and this vniuersall fabricke sinkes to the bottome , neuer more to be repaired . i wot well , that whilest there be men , there must be vices , and sinnes , and that few or none will cease to bee that which they are , in regard of humane weakenesse , and mans propension and inclination to sinne , and that there are not any remedies which will serue and turne wholly to cure and cut them off , it being a thing impossible , for that their beginning and cause doth proceed from nature it selfe being corrupted . that which the worth and wisedome of kings , and their ministers , may be able to effect , is ; that they may daily proue lesse and lesse preiudiciall to the publike : and that the dissembling of abuses in the beginning , before they take head , be not a cause of seeing our selues brought to that estate , which salust writeth rome was found in in catilines time , there being so good cause for to feare it . as also that they will draw after them gods comminations and chastisements . when a kingdome ( saith hee ) comes to the corruption of manners , that men doe pamper and apparell themselues in curious manner , like women , and make no reckoning of their honestie , but deale therewith as with any other thing that is vendible , or set out to sale ; and that exquisite things , for to please the palate , are diligently sought after both by sea and land ; that they betake themselues to their ease and sleepe , before the due time of their rest and sleepe be come ; that after their bellies be as full as euer they can hold , they neuer cease crauing and cramming till it be noone ; that they doe not forbeare from eating and drinking , till they be either hungry or thirsty ; not that they ease themselues out of wearinesse , or keepe themselues warme against the extremity of the weather : but that they do all these things out of viciousnesse , and before there is neede ; well may that empire be giuen for lost , and that it is drawing neare to its last gaspe . for the people thereof , when their owne meanes shall faile them , for to fulfil their appetites , out of a thirsting and greedy desire of these things , what mischiefes will not they moue , or what villanies will not they attempt ? for the minde that hath beene ill , and long accustomed to delights , can hardly be without them . and , that they may enioy them , by hooke or by crooke , by one meanes or another , though neuer so vniust and vnlawfull , they will make a shift to get themselues into money , though they spend it afterward idly & vainly in that profuse and lauish manner , for which they did intend it . let euery good king begge of god , and let vs all ioyne in the same prayer , that in our times , it may not come to these termes , and that kings will striue and studie to quench these sparkes before they breake forth into a flame , and to put out the fire whilest it is but newly kindled , lest it take hold on the whole building , and helpe come too late . and because there are so many sortes of vices , that it is not possible to procure an vniuersall cure for them all ; that which is likeliest to doe most good , will bee that selfe same medicine mentioned before in dyet and apparrell , to wit , the good example of kings ; and in imitation of them , that of the great lords of the land , and those that are nearest in court about their persons ; ioyning herewith the feare of their disfauour : letting them both see and know , that the vicious fall backward , and the vertuous come forward in honour ; and that onely vertue is the true meanes and surest way to bring men to great place and preferrement in the commonwealth . let kings hate these idle droanes , these honey-suckers of other mens labours , that liue all vpon the waste and spoile . which kinde of people , euen in reason of state , are not good for the quiet of a kingdome , in regard of the euill cogitations and dangerous deuises that are bred in their mindes , and in their time breake out . i would haue this imitation to bee the remedie for this so great an ill ; for neither penalties nor feare of punishment will doe any good vpon them . for hee that will not forbeare to sinne for feare of gods law , will hardly refraine from mans . let kings therefore say and doe those things , that they would haue their subiects say and doe . and let their fauourites , and those that are nearest about them , runne the like course , and let it extend to the better sort , and those that are of ranke and qualitie ; for by this meane it will descend to those likewise that are of meaner condition : and then shall they see , how much more good it will worke , then either lawes or punishment . and this is the more naturall of the two ; for the one is founded vpon imitation , and the other grounded vpon feare . and men doe more easily imitate those better things which they see actually put in execution , then depart from those worser things , which they either heare or know to be prohibited . and when they shall see that their superiours , and those that are in place and authoritie , command one thing and doe another , they neither dread their threatnings , nor obey their commandements . for perceiuing that they doe but imitate their actions , they perswade themselues that none can , without blushing , punish the same sinne in them . salust did aduise caesar in the entrance to his empire , that if he would order his commonwealth aright , he should first of all begin with reformation in himselfe , and his ; ( as pliny saith ) vita principis censura est , eaque perpetua ; ad hanc dirigimur , ad hanc conuertimur . the life of a prince is a perpetuall censure ; and according thereunto doe we guide and gouerne our selues . and let it not seeme vnto any , that this remedie of the imitation of kings is slow , and long , and will aske a great deale of time ; for where there is met together , as it were in it's center , whatsoeuer may corrupt and hurt that , which is capable of being corrupted , when as neither kings nor their lawes are able to hinder it , in vaine is it indeuoured , or to be imagined , that that may bee cured in a few yeares , which hath layen sicke so many . but till such time , as men grow vp like new plants , and haue accustomed themselues to vertue , to the end , that through the tendernesse of their youth they may not grow awry ; being therein likewise holpen , by the example of their betters ; for there is not any artifice , so powerfull and effectuall , as that of imitation , which i now speake of ; for it being a cure so conformable vnto nature , it will worke by degrees ; whereof we shall not know the benefit , till we haue enioyed it . and because there are both diseased persons , and diseases ( as saint chrysostome hath obserued ) which are neither remedied by sweet potions , nor purged away by bitter pills ; a maine reason whereof is , because they themselues are not willing to be cured , nor will admit of the example of kings , nor the feare of their lawes : it is fit this other remedie should be vsed , of punishment and chastisement , without dissimulation . for many times the motiue of sinning is the facilitie of forgiuing . and it is a knowne case , that people by punishment become obedient ; but by pardoning , proud and insolent . the ill and vicious , are so possessed and inabled in their vices , by their long continuance , that if kings should not shew some mettall and courage , they would possesse the world , and carry all things away before them , in that violent manner , that the good should not be able to liue amongst thē . by chastising the bad , ( saith baldus ) the good liue in safety . and for this cause ( and not in vaine ) according to plato , and others , were lawes instituted , and regall power , the stroke of the sword , the discipline of the clergie , and the common hangmans whip , all of them as necessary for mans life , as those . elements , by which we liue & breathe . let kings take this from me , and beleeue it , that that commonwealth is in great danger , where the kings reputation goes decaying ; and the force of iustice looseth it's strength . for thereby vices assume licence vnto themselues ; and their owners perseuere , and go on in them . here a remisse prince is a sharpe sword , and doth neuer more grieuously punish then when hee doth most pardon . punishment and chastisement onely offend the delinquent ; but remission , la ley , al rey , y la grey , the law , king , and people . by remission , lawes and kings grow in contempt , and the whole commonwealth infected . whereas by chastisement the law is obeyed and kept ; the king feared and honoured ; and the kingdome maintained in peace and iustice . i doe not treat here of those cruell and rigorous punishments which some seuere iudges inflict , for remedies and cures of so much rigour , are violent , and do sooner kill , and make an end of their subiects , then heale and recouer them by little and little . wherefore in point of correction , a commonwealth must vse a great deale of caution and prudence . and for that hee who pretends by maine strength to resist the furious current of a swift riuer ; or by roughnesse , to tame a head-strong horse , shall shew himselfe as insolent , as impertinent ; rigour with gentlenesse , and iustice with mercie , will doe well : which if they go not hand in hand , and kisse each other , they are both but the occasion of greater corruption . for it is an erronious discourse in those that thinke , that publike conseruation consisteth in the execution of cruell chastisements , and sharpe and rigorous sentences , bee they of death or otherwise ; for these doe rather dispeople , and desolate , then correct and amend a kingdome . and as it is a signe of bad physitians , or of a corrupt and infectious aire , to see many fall sicke , and dye ; so likewise is it of carelesse ministers , and ill preuention , and of a contagious corruption of vices , and euill manners , when there are many criminall iudgements , many punishments , and cruell chastisements . and who is he that knowes the principall cause thereof ? it may bee this , or it may bee that , or all together , howsoeuer i am sure it is all ill . and in a word , so great , so vniuersall , and so pernicious an ill , that if christian kings carry not a very watchfull eye ouer their subiects manners , in not suffering them to flie out , they shall not , when they would , be able to refraine them , and remedie what is amisse ; for euill custome being once habituated ( according vnto galen , and others ) is an acquired nature , and engendreth an habite , which being mans naturall inclination , carries him along after it ; and so great is his inclination to delights , and so many the prouocations , and ill examples which draw him thereunto , and poure oyle as it were vpon that fire , that if there be not the more diligence and care vsed in the quenching of it , it must necessarily spread it selfe abroad , and extend it selfe daily more and more , and more especially into those cities and countries where there is much commerce and trading in merchandise , and in the courts of kings , where there is such a concourse of diuerse and sundrie nations , there being not any one of them which hath not it's proper and peculiar vertues , as also it 's proper and peculiar vices . their vertues men hardly take hold on ; but their vices , those cleaue easily vnto them of themselues : and by this their commerce and trading , remaine engrauen in their hearts . and what was before but an inclination , being now become a custome , vice engendreth vice ; and one appetite maketh way for another . lycurgus saith , that it more importeth a state to see that it's cities bee not infected with the ill customes and manners of strangers , then to preserue them from the plague , the pestilence , or other the like contagious diseases . for these , time asswageth and consumeth ; but those , are with time increased and augmented . three embassadours of the cretans , each of them being of a different sect , made their ioynt entrance into rome . the senate gaue them audience . and cato being there , whom ( for his great authoritie ) they did much reuerence , and was indeed as an oracle amongst them , gaue his vote , and opinion , that hee would haue them d●spatcht thence with all possible speed , before the corruption of their manners should corrupt the romane common-wealth . this care ought kings to take ; and so much the rather , for that they haue neuer a cato , that will tell them ; neuer a councellour that will aduise them , that in no kinde of manner , nor vpon any occasion whatsoeuer , ought they either in their court , or kingdome , suffer any man ( no though hee be an ambassadour ) to reside there , being different in his religion , manners , and ceremonies . for their treating and conuersing with vs , serues to no other purpose , but to bring in vices , and banish vertues , to worke vpon weake and wauering mindes , and to draw the naturall subiects of another prince , from gods true worship , and due obseruance of his diuine law. and this was the care of the ancients of those times , who would neuer giue consent and allowance , that there should bee any thing intertained or receiued into their commonwealths , whereby mens mindes might grow cold , or be withdrawne in any one point or tittle from the worship and adoration of their gods. and very fit for these times were that law of the persians , which did punish him with death , that should bring in any new vse , or strange custome . and the cretans , did in their ordinarie letanies desire , that no new custome might enter into their city , which is as a contagious disease , and cleaueth as close as the plague or pestilence . nor did the lawes of egypt permit any new tune in their musicke , or any new kinde of song , vnlesse they were first examined by those that were in place of gouernment . for ( as plato affirmeth ) a commonwealth , as well as musicke , admitteth changes ; and that for the auoiding of this mischiefe , it ought not to be permitted , that there should be introduced any new kinde of tunes , or musicke , together wherewith mens mindes receiue some change and alteration . aristotle did aduise those that would bee vertuous , that they should not vse musicke , nor musicall instruments , to incite them to be vicious . for musicke being a diuine gift , and very powerfull to moue the hearts of men , and to perswade the thing that is sung , if they accustome themselues to play and sing holy lessons , & honest songs , they therby accustome themselues to be honest and vertuous . and therefore anciently your kings , as dauid , the prophets , and priests , the better to apply themselues to contemplation , did vse musicke , wherewith they suspended their senses , and remained as it were swallowed vp in god. in a word , many men haue therewith beene robbed of their soules , and of their honours , and daily much hurt doth ensue thereby . for it is able to doe much , and greate is the force and power which it hath ouer mens manners . and if you will not beleeue me , obserue but the hurt , which your new wanton tunes , together with the lasciuious wordes , and gesticulations vsed in them , haue wrought of late amongst not onely the common , but better sort of people . now to shut vp all that hath beene said in three points . first of all i say , that it much importeth , that a prince bee good in himselfe ; for that all men make their imitation after that patterne that hee sets before them . and for this cause , god placed him in so high and eminent a place , to the end that by the resplendour of his vertues , hee should giue light to the whole kingdome ; and that both by his life and example , he should exemplifie and indoctrinate his subiects : for it is not onely included in the name and office of king , to rule and gouerne the kingdome by good and wholsome lawes , but likewise to teach and instruct the people by his vertues . this ought to bee ( say socrates and plato ) the end and ayme of kings , to direct their subiects in the truth , they practising it first themselues , which is the strongest and forciblest argument to perswade it . for the execution of that which is perswaded and commanded , doth secure the passage , doth make the worke sauourie , and doth facilitate the trouble . secondly , to the end that the lawes may bee the better kept , kings must obey , and keepe them ; for it will seeme an vniust thing in them , to establish and ordaine that , which themselues will not keepe and obserue . they must doe as lycurgus did , who neuer enacted any thing which he himselfe did not punctually performe . and it was a romane edict ; vse el rey de la ley , que hiziere para la grey : let the king that law keepe , which he makes for his sheepe . lastly , that they bee very carefull and watchfull ouer the whole kingdome , but more particularly ouer the court ; for from thence is diffused all the good , or ill ; as likewise in curtalling the excesses of apparrell , the superfluities of feasts and banquets , of gaming , of sports , and pastimes , of lightnesse in behauiour , of licentiousnesse in courting of women , and of those wastefull expences which might very well be excused , in weddings , in iewells , and dressings both in the women and the men . then began rome to grow ranke in luxurie , and prophanenesse , when your gilded bed-steds , your costly pauilions , your stately canopies , your ritch hangings , your curious tables , your glorious cupboords of plate , your gybing iesters , and your various instruments of musicke were brought in , which were then in great vse and request , for to prouoke and stirre vp the appetite in those their tedious and sumptuous suppers ; as if , for to go to hell , there were neede of such a wind-lace , or wheeling about , the way being ( as it is ) so easie and direct , that a man may go it blindfold . causes all of them of iust feare , and fore-runners likewise of the ruine and perdition of any monarchy whatsoeuer , as they haue beene heretofore of others that haue been ouerthrowne by the like meanes . but to conclude with this sense , and to shut vp the doore likewise to all the rest ; wee are to presuppose that , which is very common both in diuine and humane letters , that by the hands , wherein particularly consists the touching , are vnderstood workes ; because they are the instruments by which they are done , moses deliuering vnto vs , that the hebrewes did see the wonders which god had wrought in their fauour , saith , viderunt manum magnam , quam exercuerat dominus : they saw that great worke ( which the originall renders , that great hand ) which the lord exercised vpon the aegyptians . and besides this , it hath another signification ( as is obserued by pierius valerianus ) an open hand , being the symbole of eloquence ; expressing that efficacy , and perswasiue power that lies in well couched words . works and words being both very necessary in kings , execution in the one ; and elocution in the other . and because all princes cannot performe these offices of doing and saying , by themselues , they must haue another tongue , and other hands , by which they must speake , and doe ; and the tongue whereby they must speake ; and the hands , whereby they must touch , and handle all things ( for their owne are not able to doe it ) must bee their fauourites . policratus , in his booke directed to traiane , saith , that your great lords in court , and kings fauourites , are the hands of the kingdome . and , as in mans body , they are naturally disposed , and ready prepared for to succour and assist all the other members ; so they should be at hand for to helpe and reliue all the necessities of the kingdome , and to be the formost in all dangers , and a thousand other occasions that will offer themselues , which neither are , nor can bee wanting to kings and kingdomes . and therefore the philosopher said of the hands , that they are the instrument of instruments . for without them nothing can be done ; neither can kings of themselues do all . they haue need of their ministers , and fauourites , which are their feet , and their hands . in the subsequent chapters , we shall discourse somewhat a little of them . god grant , that little , or somewhat , what ere it bee , may worke some good . and first of all we will treate , whether it be fitting to haue fauourites . chap. xxxi . whether it be fit for kings to haue fauourites . fauourites being ( as they are ) the workmanship of kings , receiuing their forme and fashion from their good liking ; which creatures of their making , wee haue mentioned in the former chapter . we shall handsomely fall here vpon that which in this is put to the question . nor is the answer thereunto very easie . for a fauourite being of the same nature , as a particular friend , and friendship being to bee inter aequales , betweene those that are of equall condition , it seemeth that those that are subiects and seruants to their king and master can not hold it with him ; whom they are to behold , and treate with , with a great deale of reuerence , respecting alwayes his royall maiestie , which ( according to that other poet ) no cabe en vn saco con el amor ; is not in one and the same sacke with loue . and without loue , there is no friendship . true it is that aristotle and some other philosophers affirme , that this difference may easily bee reconciled , forasmuch as hee that is in the higher and more eminent place , may stoope so low , and fashion himselfe in that euen measure to his inferiour , that they may both remaine vpon equall tearmes . but this can hardly square and suite well with kings towards their fauourites . for , as it were an indecorum , and vnseemely thing in a humane bodie , that the head should abase it selfe , and become equall with the shoulder ; so , were it prodigious and monstrous , that kings , which are heads , and hold that soueraigntie which god hath giuen them , should stoope so low to their subiects , that the eminencie should not appeare they haue ouer them . and that other meanes which may be vsed in raysing a subiect , or fauorite to that hight that hee may be equall with his king , bringeth with that a great inconuenience . for a crowne & scepter royall , cannot endure any fellowship with equality . and therefore these two meanes may pare and fit well with friends , that hauing professed friendship , when their estates were equall , the one growes inferiour to the other , eyther good fortune , or good diligence , hauing preferred his fellow and friend . but with kings there cannot be held this correspondency and equality . and it is king salomons counsaill , who saith ; that it is not fitting for any man to entertaine friendship and communication , with those that are too mighty . ditiori te , ne socius fueris ; quid communicabit cacabus ad ●llam ? quando enim se colliserint , confringetur : haue no fellowship with one that is mightier and richer then thy selfe . for how agree the kettle and the earthen pot together ? for , if the one bee smitten against the other , it shall be broken . and againe , if you will but diligently obserue the sacred history of the kings which were ouer gods people , you shall there finde little mention of fauorites . on the other side , it will likewise seeme vnreasonable , that kings should be debarr'd that , without which ( to all mens seeming ) mans life cannot bee well past ouer . ●nemo sine amicis , spectet viuere ; ( said the said philosopher ) let no man looke to liue without friends . and the holy scriptures are full of the commoditie , and benefit , which faithfull friends afford , being as necessary for the life of man , as fire , and water ; and for no estate so important , as for that of kings , who for that they haue so many , so weighty , and so secret businesses , their estate were intollerable , and more then they were able to beare , if they might not haue the libertie of hauing friends , with whom they might communicate , and by whom they might receiue some ease , of those troubles , and care , which great offices ( ordinarily ) bring with them . now for to giue satisfaction vnto that which is here pretended to be auerred , we are to consider , that aristotle , and other , both philosophers and diuines teach ( which is no more then what experience plainly prooues vnto vs ) that there are two sorts of loue , or friendship ; the one interessall , or cum foenore , whose end , is its proper profit . the other hath with it a more gentile & noble intent , which is , to loue and wish well to that which deserueth to bee beloued : and this is called amor amicitiae , the loue of friendship . the other , amor concupiscentiae , the loue of concupiscence . and with very good reason , for that therein there is not to be found the face of true friendship . from these two loues , as from two diuerse rootes , spring forth two different sorts of fauorites . the one , who for their great parts and qualities haue deserued to carry after them , not only the good wills and affections of their equals , but euen of kings themselues . and when these abilities are so extraordinary and aduantagious , no man can deeme it inconuenient that kings should more particularly , and in a more extraordinary manner , apply their affection vnto them . nay , it would rather lay a spot and blemish vpon them , if notice should be taken , that they equally entertaine all , or not esteeme and prize them most that merit most to be esteemed . for in all good reason ; there is no greater inequality , then to equall all alike . plato said very well , that there is not any virtue of that force and efficacie , for to catch and steale away mens hearts . nor herein doe we need the testimonies of philosophers , for the holy ghost saith , vt mors , est dilectio , loue is strong as death . the coales thereof are coales of fire , which hath a most vehement flame , it beares all away before it . and in this its force and strength , friendship and loue are much alike . and building on this ground , i say ; that very well there may be said to bee friendship betweene a king and a fauorite ; for that their soules haue in their birth and beginning , or ( as i may say , their first originall ) equall noblenesse . and your noblest friendship proceeds from the soule . very famous and much celebrated was that friendship betwixt prince ionathan ( the onely heire of the kingdome ) and that worthy noble dauid . and so great was the loue that was betweene them , that the sacred scripture saith , that anima ionathae conglutinata erat animae dauid , & dilexit eum ionathas quasi animam suam . the soule of ionathan was knit with the soule of dauid ; and that ionathan loued him , as his owne soule . and i further affirme , that it is very fit and conuenient that kings should loue those with aduantage , that haue the aduantage of others in vertue , wisedome , and learning . and such should be those , that serue and attend the persons of princes ; for ordinarily , out of that nursery are these plants your fauourites drawne . when nabuchadnezzar , king of babilon , besieged and tooke by force of armes the citie of ierusalem , he carried away from thence great spoiles of gold and siluer ; but that , which hee much more prized then all this treasure , were the sonnes of the chiefest noblemen , and such as were lineally descended of the kings of that kingdome ; and gaue especiall order , that they should choose and cull out those that had the best and ablest parts , both of nature and acquisition ; those that were of the best disposition , the most learned , and best taught , to the end that being accompanied with these good qualities , they might merit to attend in the court and chamber of the king. et ait rex asphenez praeposito eunuchorum , vt introduceret de filijs israel , & de semine regio , & tyrannorum pueros , in quibus nulla esset macula , decoros forma , & eruditos omni sapientia , cautos scientia , & doctos disciplina , & qui possent stare in palatio regis : and the king spake vnto ashpenez , the master of his eunuchs , that hee should bring certaine of the children of israel , and of the kings seed , and of the princes ; children in whom was no blemish , but well-fauoured , and skilfull in all wisedome , and cunning in knowledge , and vnderstanding , science , and such as had abilitie in them to stand in the kings palace . and this election fell out so luckily , and proued to be of that profit and benefit , that amongst those which ( indewed with these qualities ) were made choice of , for to serue the king , there were three of them did excell , but one more then all the rest , not onely in vertue , but in the knowledge likewise of secret businesses , and matters of state and gouernment , which was daniel ; who so well deserued to be a fauourite to those kings of babylon , and more especially to darius , that hee did not content himselfe with making him onely a priuie councellour , but the prime man amongst them . for hauing set ouer the kingdome an . princes , which should bee ouer the whole kingdome , and ouer these , three presidents ( of whom , daniell was first ) that the princes might giue account vnto them , that the king might haue no damage ; and as hee was the greatest subiect and fauourite in the world , so was hee superiour in the vertues and qualities of his person . igitur daniel superabat omnes principes & satrapas , quia spiritus domini amplior erat in illo : therefore was daniel preferred before the presidents and princes , because an excellent spirit was in him . the holy scripture likewise tells vs , that ioseph was such a fauourite of king pharaoh , that hee gaue him absolute power ouer all his kingdome , and commanded , that in publike pompe he should ride in the kings owne chariot , and in his owne seate , and haue a crier go before to proclaime the fauour that the king was pleased to doe him . dixit quoque rex aegypti ad ioseph ; ego sum pharaoh , absque tuo imperio non mouebit quisquam manum , aut pedem in omni terra . and pharaoh said vnto ioseph , i am pharaoh , and without thee shall no man lift vp his hand , or foot , in all the land of aegypt . and well did hee deserue this honour , for by his great industrie and wisedome , he freed that king and kingdome from that terrible famine , besides those many other great and troublesome imployments , wherein he was busied for the space of seuen yeares together . in the fourth booke of kings , we reade that naaman , who was captaine of the host of the king of syria , was the onely fauourite of the king ; erat vir magnus apud dominum suum , & honoratus : hee was a great man with his master , and honourable . and rendering the reason of this his great priuacie with his king , and the honour he had done him , it is there specified ; per illumenim dedit dominus salutem syriae ; erat enim vir fortis . because by him the lord had giuen deliuerance vnto syria ; and was also a mighty man in valour . for all the life and soule that kingdome had , came from him , god vsing him as his instrument for his puisance and prudence . and when fauourites are of these aduantagious abilities , those reasons and inconueniences doe cease ( before mentioned ) touching the disequalitie of kings , with their inferiours . for vertue hath this excellence and preheminence ; that from the very dust of the earth it doth lift vp men vnto honour , and doth raise them to that height , that it equalls them , and sets them cheeke by ●ole with the greatest princes in the world . sapientia humiliati , exalta●it caput illius , & in medio magnatum considere illum faciet : wisedome lifteth vp the head of him , that is of low degree , and maketh him to sit among great men . anna , that was mother to that great priest and prophet samuel , amongst other things which shee sung in the praise of god , and his great power , this was one worthy the obseruation , and well befitting the subiect we haue in hand ; dominus suscitat de puluere egenum , & de stercore eleuat pauperem , vt sedeat cum principibus , & solium gloriae teneat : the lord raiseth the poore out of the dust , and lifteth vp the begger from the dunghill , to set him among princes , and to make them inherit the throne of glory . the like note sings that kingly prophet dauid : suscitans à terra inopem , vt collocet eum cum principibus populi sui : he raiseth vp the poore out of the dust , and lifteth the needy out of the dunghill . and king salomon his sonne , seconds this of his father in this short antheme : seruus sapiens , dominabitur filijs stultis : a wise seruant shall haue rule ouer a sonne that causeth shame . so great is the force of wisedome and discretion , that it doth not onely exalt , and raise to greatnesse , men that are free borne ( though in a poore meane cottage ) but brings euen the basest slaues to bee lords ouer their owne masters . a certaine philosopher being taken captiue , was brought forth into the open market to bee sold , and they that were to buy him , demanded of him , what hee could doe ; he told them , that the best thing that he was skild in , was , to command his masters . in many places of scripture , is repeated and confirmed the testimonie of king salomons great power and wisedome ; and amongst other things , which are mentioned of the maiestie of his house and court , it is said ; that therein he had a great many princes , whose names are registred in the third booke of the kings . and amongst them there is but one onely that is made remarkable by the name and title of the kings fauourite and friend . zabud , filius nathan , amicus regis ; and zabud , the sonne of nathan , was principall officer , and the kings friend . some translations in the place of principall officer , put priest. and these two titles of priest , and the kings friend , are therefore thus ioyned together , that they may giue vs to vnderstand , that the friendship and affection towards a fauourite , should take it's growth from that learning and vertue which is annexed to the state and condition of the priest. and in the first booke of the chronicles , in that catalogue , which is there made of those which bare principall offices in king dauids court , it is onely said of hushai the archite , that hee was the kings companion . and in the second booke of the kings , are set downe at large the great and many reasons , why hushai on his part might well deserue this title . our sauiour christ likewise seemed to make shew of his more particular affection to peter , iohn , and iames , making choice of them from among the twelue , to retire himselfe in priuate with them , and to make them witnesses of his glorious transfiguration ; and afterwards of diuers other particular things . whence it seemeth that they might haue the name of fauourites ; but not without great grounds , and those extraordinary vertues , wherein they out-shined others . howbeit the choise and election of this supreme king , is not to bee ruled and measured out by that of the kings of this world ; for they can not by the alone power of their loue better men , nor affoord them necessary parts , whereby to merit to bee their friends . but this true king and lord of all , in placing his good will and affection on those whom hee is pleased to make choice of for his friends , doth likewise indow and adorne them with strong abilities , whereby to bee accounted worthy of his friendship and fauour . whereas with the fauourites of the kings of this world , it fareth cleane contrary . for those , which before they were fauourites , were good and honest , by their priuacie , and great power with their king , haue come to be starke nought ; and the more footing they haue in the kings friendship , they are vsually the lesse worthy of it . whereof we shall more in the chapter following . chap. xxxii . of another sort of fauourites . those most learned bookes , which the glorious saint austen writ , de ciuitate dei , lay before vs two sorts of loue : that loue which man beareth vnto god , euen to the contemning and despising of himselfe ; and from this is the constitution and fabricke of that holy citie of ierusalem ; vnder which name , is vnderstood the good concord and agreement of the christian church and commonwealth , as also of all christian soules . the other loue is that which euery one beareth to himselfe , in that high manner and excesse , that it reacheth euen to the contemning and despising of god. and from this is built that city of babylon , which is as much to say as confusion ; & signifieth that , which euery sinner hath within himself , as also that which is in ill ordered commonwealths . and therefore ( as wee said in the former chapter ) that from those two loues of friendship and concupiscence , did issue forth two sorts of fauourites : the one good and profitable ; the other , bad and couetous : so , considering loue , not in respect of outward things , but in respect of it selfe , it differenceth the vse of fauourites , according to the different meanes and ends , wherewith , and for which they are made choice of : and the vse likewise , which they make thereof , when they see they are thus aduanced , and receiued into fauour . the meanes haue the denomination of their goodnesse , or badnesse , from their end . whence it followeth , that when kings shall make choice of their fauorites by good meanes , not out of a selfe-humour , or womanish kinde of longing , nor for to please his owne proper affection , but that they may comply the better with those obligations , which they haue to the good dispatch of businesse , and to haue one to helpe them to beare the burthen that l●es vpon them ; as this end is good , so of force must the meanes likewise bee . for to obtaine good ends , bad meanes are not taken . and therefore kings shall doe well , in taking such fauourites vnto them , as shall bee sollicitous , and carefull in the dispatching of businesse , faithfull in their seruices , and endowed with such parts afore specified , as were those fauourites , recommended vnto you in the former chapter . for ioseph ( as we told you ) grew in fauour with king pharaoh , for his great wisedome , and for his supernaturall knowledge of things to come , and reuealing such secret mysteries as other his ministers could not tell what to make of them . the like befell daniel , with the caldean , and macedonian kings ; for before euer he became a fauourite , they saw his great wisedome and constancie in the true seruice of his god , his singular prudence , and those other his good gifts , which are recorded in the booke of his prophesies . the extraordinary graces of peter , iohn , and iames , who is he that is ignorant of them ? being that the euangelists say of saint peter , that his extraordinary loue was examined , and proued in those so often repeated questions : petre amas me ? simon iohannis , diligis me plus his ? and againe , simon iohannis , amas me ? and the apostle saint iames was the first of the apostles , that by his bloud and death gaue testimonie of this his loue . and saint iohn shewed no lesse , at his last supper , at his passion , and at the foote of the crosse , hauing followed and accompanied his master euen to his death , when the rest fled and forsooke him . but when kings make not choice of their fauourites for the foresaid ends , and for the publike good , but for their owne particular gusts and humours , and to let loose the reines with more libertie and freedome to their owne delights and pleasures , such kinde of fauourites set vsually before them the same ends , and commonly preferre their owne priuate gustes and interests before those of their kings , or the publike good of the commonwealth , and come to be the firebrands and destruction of states . this lesson the holy scripture doth likewise teach vs , whose mysteries are so high and so deepe , that euen in that which it silenceth , it speaketh vnto vs ; and in saying little , instructeth much . i haue much obserued that which is recounted in the history of esther , touching the priuacie of that proud and vnfortunate haman , whom king assuerus raised from so low a degree , and from so wicked a race , as he came of . for ( according to iosephus ) he descended from that amalakite whom the prophet samuel caused to be hewen in peeces . and for that it is the condition of kings , when they once begin to fauour a man , to make him like froath to rise and swell , this fauourite grew to that heighth through his kings grace and fauour , that all the subiects of that monarch respected him as a god , and kneeled downe in his presence , his person being much more adored , serued , and feared , then the kings ; because the king had put the staffe ( as they say ) into his hands , giuing him the absolute command ouer all his estates ; insomuch that neither in , nor out of court , nor elsewhere , was there ought done , but by the order of haman ; and the king himselfe held him in the place of a father . and for that vanitie is the daughter of pride , all this his great fauour and priuacie with his prince , did but make the more for his owne hurt , as doth the ants wings , for hers ; or like those of icarus , which being of waxe , the nearer they came to the sunne , the sooner they melted , working then his death and downfall , when he was at the highest . for haman came to hang , and dye on that gallowes which he had prouided for mardoche , and for no other offence in the world , but because he would not bowe the knee vnto him , and adore him as the rest did . so that ( if you marke the storie ) hamans owne greatnesse and power was the axe , which did frame and hew out that gallowes , whereon himselfe was hanged . and hauing often thought with my selfe on this mans end , and considering likewise the beginning of this his priuacie , i doe not finde , that it was for the excellencie of his merits , or for any heroicall vertues that were in him ; such as were those which king pharaoh , nabuchadnezzar , and darius did consider in those their fauourites , which they made choice of , but for some particular guste and liking , that his king tooke to him . for the scripture speakes not one word , nor maketh not any the least mention of the merits of this fauourite , nor of any notable thing , that hee had done either for the good of the kingdome , or the seruice of his king ; but rather without any preambles to that purpose , in the very entrance of the third chapter we reade thus . rex assuerus exaltauit aman , filium amadathi , qui erat de stirpe agag , & posuit solium eius super omnes principes quos habebat , cunctique serui regis , qui in foribus palatij versabantur , flectebant genua , et adorabant aman : king assuerus did promote haman the sonne of amedatha , the agagite , and aduanced him , and set his seate aboue all the princes that were with him . and all the kings seruants , that were in the kings gate , bowed , and reuerenced haman . and in this so true a relation , and so fully setting forth the priuacie of this great fauorite , without any foundation or ground of desert ; the scripture thereby hath instructed vs , how inconsiderately this king did proceed in the choice which he made . but he did correct this his errour , by opening his eyes , and inflicting that punishment vpon him which he deserued , and is there set downe . i could wish that fauourites would likewise open their eyes , and consider with themselues , that the happines which they hold , is but borrowed ware , lent vnto them but for a short time , and that they neither vse , nor possesse it as their owne proper good or inheritance . and being that by one meanes or other , it must leaue them , that they would not wholly giue themselues ouer thereunto ; for it forsaketh few without their finall ruine . let them bire vpon this bit , and with the remembrance thereof , bridle their pride and insolencie , lest ( howsoeuer they flatter themselues ) that hand may pull them downe , which raised them vp . for there are some , which will neuer be able to indure this their felicitie and happinesse , but one way or other , will worke their ouerthrow , and make them pay the price of their ambition at too deare a rate : nay the king himselfe will sometimes put to his helping hand , as we see king assuerus did , who after that hee had made haman his onely fauourite , and raised him to that highth of honour , as could not well bee more , turned his face from him , and did so much distaste him , for his sower and insolent behauiour , that for to make him stoope and hang the head , he commanded him to be hanged vpon the same gallowes that he had set vp for another , who had deserued well both of the king and state. the emperour alexander did the like , who waxing wearie of the arrogancie of one of his fauourites , and not being able longer to endure it , caused him to be staked , and the stake to be set on the top of an high hill ; giuing him a death answerable to his vanitie . for , although kings loue them , and in some sort acknowledge a kinde of beholdingnesse , yet they vsually withdraw their fauour quite from them , and are oftentimes ashamed of their choice ; whereunto being added the complaints of the people , and other principall persons , offended with the iniuries offered vnto them , remoue that scandall , by remouing their fauorite , and make them satisfaction by making him be punished , neuer in this case aduising with any , nor so much as hearing what the fauourite in his owne discharge can say for himselfe ; for in such desperate cases , when things are brought to that extremitie , kings vse to take that course as your prot●medici , and skilfuller sort of physitians doe with their inferiours ; who in weightie and vrgent occasions fall speedily to worke themselues , without any further consultation ; but in ordinarie diseases , heare , resolue , and consult with others . againe , let fauourites , for their learning , reade the histories , and peruse the generall booke of time , and they shall there finde a thousand of these examples , and other as many faire warnings , worthy their sight and knowledge , for the admonishing of men , for to feare their priuacie with kings , and to tremble at humane prosperitie , and the securitie wherein they liue . and hee that shall diligently reade these things , will seeke to come fairely off from these his high fortunes and fauours . for ordinarily , from a prosperous and high-raised estate , great disasters haue had their beginning ; as from your highest places come your greatest falls . and peraduenture because this desenganno , and dis-deceiuing of our selues , doth so much import mankinde , and that men might liue in this feare , god hath and doth permit of such like examples , and admonitions . and it may likewise be beleeued , that such violent and sudden accidents haue not onely happened through the default of those that fall , or for want of wisedome , but by a diuine prouidence and permission , for their owne particular sinnes ; or for that god was wi●ling , as being the master workeman , and onely potter of these our earthen vessells , to breake these with a rodde of iron , and to choose others for vessells of honour , through which the holy liquor of his gospell , and other good graces , might be poured forth , and diffused throughout the world . chap. xxxiii . whether it be fit for kings to haue any more then one fauourite . the name wherewith the greekes named god , is deriued from a word , which signifies to see . so that to say god , is to say , hee that sees . for , as the apostle saint paul , and faith teacheth vs ; all is subiect to gods view ; and vnto kings , who are his lieutenants here vpon earth , nothing can conuene so well with them , as to seéme to the world , to haue so quicke and large a sight , that they may see all whatsoeuer mans capacitie is able to reach vnto . and because they cannot doe this alone by themselues , xenophon said very well and wisely , that it was needfull , that they should haue other eyes , whereunto to trust as much , as vnto their owne , and to see as it were by spectacles ; for kings are so vnhappy , that they cannot come to see all without them . and those ( as the same philosopher said ) are those friends and fauourites , who are to see , and know that which passeth in the world , as also what is needfull in common-wealths , and to giue notice thereof vnto their kings , and to helpe them to ordaine , and execute that , which is fitting and conuenient . and fauourites being intertained ( as we said before ) for this end , and for the publike good of the common-wealth , it is requisite that kings should not haue one onely , but many . one day , some about the person of alexander the great , shewed him a maruellous faire pomegranate , which being cut in two , discouered a great company of kernels : and one of them asking him , of what he would wish to haue such store , as of those pomegranate kernels which appeared vnto him ? he answered , that he would wish that hee might haue so many z●piri ; this zopirus being a fauourite of his , and one that was very faithfull vnto him , and of great abilities . for , it is not contrary to royall greatnesse , to haue many , but very necessary for the better dispatch of businesses . for if they should passe onely through the hands of the prince , their dispatch would bee very slow , and subiect likewise to many errours , whereinto they would ordinarily runne , for want of their care and assistance . darius , king of persia , tooke three fauourites vnto him , to whom the rest of the princes rendered an account of all the affaires of the kingdome . and from the beginning of the world , euen to this present time , kings haue had , some more , and others lesse . for this must be regulated and ordered according to the greatnesse of the kingdomes . for by how much the more they are in number and greatnesse , so much the more increase haue those weightie affaires which are necessarily to haue their recourse to their royall persons ; and according to the measure of them , is there an addition to be made of those , that are to assist and attend businesses , to passe through all , to prouide for all , and in all places . the people of israel , when moses gouerned them , were all ioyntly together in one body in forme of an armie ; and all that made not vp so much as a meane kingdome ; and they remaining ( as then they did ) without possessions , incamped in a desart , and being all israelites , it seemeth in all likelihood , that their ordinary businesses could not be either so many , or so great , as those which are incident to a king , who is lord and master of diuers kingdomes and prouinces , and of sundry seuerall nations . and yet notwithstanding , that great gouernour moses , by negotiating from morning vntill night , without diuerting himselfe , could not giue conuenient dispatch vnto all , but was forced ( as is before specified ) to take vnto him no lesse then seuenty assistants , all chosen men , and endewed with those good qualities , whereof we now treate . let kings therefore haue many for to aide and helpe them , and let them be the ministers of his minde , and the conducts whereby to conuay his will and pleasure to his subiects . for in the administration of publike affaires , it is euermore to bee indeauoured , that many beare a part therein ; as well for the common satisfaction , that shall thereby be giuen vnto all ; as also for that they may be able to make the better account of all businesses , bee they neuer so many . and likewise , for that few being instructed and experienced in them , occasion may not bee giuen ; that ( those failing ) the commonwealth and publike gouernment may thereby incurre any danger . this was augustus his conceit , deliuered by suetonius ; which that he might the better execute , and that his bounty might inlarge it selfe towards the more persons ; he inuented new publike offices , wherein to imploy them . but i do not speake this , as inferring thereby , that there should bee so many , but that at least ( for the foresaid reasons ) there should bee some : and in conclusion , more then one , because it will bee more easie to negotiate with them , and lesse costly and troublesome ; and bee a meanes , that the prince may be the better eased , and freed in great part of those cares and troubles , which otherwise must needs weary him out , and worke his vnrest and disquiet . for his body is not made of brasse , nor can he occurre to all occasions ; besides , being more then one , their competition will make them the more both carefull and fearefull : as knowing that in case they shall grow carelesse , there are persons enough besides of sufficiencie to supply their place ; whereas the opinion and conceit of the contrary , puffes him vp with pride , and vndoes it's master . for they fondly and foolishly perswade themselues , that their king and master cannot liue and subsist without the assistance of their wit , and that there is not that fault they commit , but must be forgiuen them , out of the necessitie of their seruice . forgetting in the meane while , that their king may imagine them to bee dead , and how that in such a case , though it grieue him , yet must hee prouide himselfe of others ▪ let kings therefore bee beaten from this their errour , for he that shall otherwise aduise them , and seeke to be the onely man in their fauour and seruice , and take vnto himselfe both the right side and the left , thrusting all others from thence , and gouerning both high and low , letting nothing escape his fingers , which hee pretendeth out of the necessary vse of his person , and so absolutely to become master of their wills , and to haue that hand ouer their kings , that they must not looke vpon any , but with their fauorites eyes ; such a fauourite ( i say ) pretends to tyrannize a kingdome , and by little and little will go crushing the princes of the bloud , the ancient nobilitie , and such as are of power to stand in their way , thrusting this man out of court to day , and that other to morrow , that hee alone may rule all without any contradiction or opposition in the world . let euery man say or thinke as they list , for mine owne part i am perswaded that this is his maine end and drift ; and the cause thereof is his feare of falling ; knowing ( besides his owne consciousnes ) that there are not onely one or two , but many in court , that are able to supply his place , and farre better deseruing then himselfe . your alchymists make gold : but how ? onely in the colour ; they will not let it come to the touch , nor any other reall essay ; neither will they endure to haue it compared with any other minerall gold , for feare lest it should bee discouered , that theirs hath no more but a bare shew and apparence . let princes therefore assure themselues , that those fauourites are but alchimists , that will not admit of any other companie , as being priuie to themselues , that their vnderstanding is not such pure gold , that it can abide the touch , nor any reall essay . but say it should passe for currant , and that their mindes were all made of pure gold , me thinkes they should aduise and consider with themselues , that those that are ingenious and wise men , will therefore the rather desire that there should be many : for , by comparing the one with the other , the true light shineth the more , and makes it selfe knowne whether it be so or no. and onely your fooles , and such as are vnworthy of that they possesse , are iealous of that good , which they feare to loose , when by comparing they shall come to be knowne . god did not in vaine place so many members in mans bodie , and most of them double ; had it not beene thereby to teach vs , that many are needfull in humane actions : and that one is not able to doe all , without an infinite deale of toyle , extraordinary spending of his spirits , and the sudden wasting and consuming of his body . and here will suite very well to this our purpose , that which tiberius affirmed , when feigning not to bee willing to accept of the empire , hee said , ( going about the bush to discouer the mindes of the romane nobilitie , and senate ) that he alone of himselfe , was not sufficient , nor yet with the helpe of another , for so great a gouernment . whereupon , salustius crispus taking his qu , a great fauourite of his , starts mee vp , and makes me a long harenga , or artificiall oration ; shewing that signiorie and empire could not well consist , without being conferred vpon one particular person ( which is the maine foundation and ground-worke of the good and safetie of a monarchicall gouernment ) and that therein himselfe ( if no body else would take the paines ) would bee as it were another ioseph , his faithfull vice●gerent : lest the resolution of things , depending on the will of many , it might cause a distraction in businesses , either by way of competition or of passion . in conclusion , after tiberius had heard this , and had throughly sounded their mindes , he took occasion to tell them , that in such a citie as rome was , sustained and vpheld by so many and such illustrious persons , it was not fit that the businesses of state should be remitted to one man alone , for many would much more easily execute the offices and affaires of the commonwealth by a fellow-bearing of the burthen . for , as vnitie in some degrees is both profitable and pleasing ; so in other some it is hatefull , and preiudiciall . and therefore , ( out of this consideration ) i say , that a king , as the supreme person , and principall head of a kingdome , ought to be one alone . for the couetousnesse of ruling being insatiable , and the nature of power incommunicable , it is not possible that two princes of equall authoritie should continue any long time , but both of them suffer in the end , or at least the businesses that are committed to their charge . but for fauourites , there may bee two , or three , or more , the vnitie remaining reserued for the greater and supremer person . and likewise this pluralitie will not be much amisse ; for if any one of them shall by some accident faile , there be others , whom the king knoweth , and they know him , that are fit for his seruice , and that haue good experience and knowledge of businesses , and all such matters as are current and passable in the commonwealth , without being driuen to seeke out new ministers , or to instruct them what to doe in a time of necessitie , when things go not well , but stand in ill tearmes , laying otherwise hold on the first that offer themselues vnto them , to the ouerthrowing of the businesses in hand , and the proper hurt and dammage of their lord and master ; at whose cost and by meere erring in great matters , they must come to get their learning . let kings ( a gods name ) reserue for themselues those businesses that are of greatest importance ( for in this likewise must there bee a setled course and order ) as is in all well gouerned kingdomes . referring ( as we said before ) to the ordinary councells and tribunalls , ordinary businesses , consulting with their kings those that are of most importance ; and these kings by themselues ( as before mentioned ) ought to dispatch , if therein they be not hindered by default of their health , and not to remit and referre them to their fauourites ; who , in matter of iustice ( were it but distributiue ) should haue no lande of power . for thereby they oppresse those tribunalls and seates of iustice , together with their ministers and officers , who , for that they know , they must haue much dependancy on the fauourite ; if he shall haue a hand in courts of iustice , and distribution of offices , cannot but remaine much oppressed , and debarred of their libertie , and the more , if they haue any pretension for their owne interest , or increasing of their estate and honour . and the reason of all this will plainly appeare , if wee will but weigh those words of the wise man ; per me reges regnant , & legum conditores iusta decernunt : through me kings raigne , through mee councellours make iust lawes . whereby is giuen to vnderstand , the particular fauour which god giues to the lawfull kings and gouernours of their kingdomes and commonwealths , to hit right in that which appertaineth vnto gouernment . and therefore was it well said of that wise king salomon ; diuinatio in labijs regis , in iudicio , non errabit os eius : prophecie is in the lippes of the king ; his mouth shall not go wrong in iudgement . and your diuines are of opinion , that kings haue more helpe and aide from their angels of guard , then other men haue . and besides all this , the publike prayers that are poured forth throughout all their kingdomes and prouinces , are of most great vse for gods illightning of their vnderstanding . and therefore for these reasons aforesaid , although your fauourites and more secret councellours of state may be very learned and wise vnderstanding men , yet is there a great deale of reason , why in graue and weightie causes , they should craue and attend their kings opinion ; esteeming it as the more certaine , being it comes from a head , so much fauoured by god , and so well assisted and strengthened on all sides . which doth not concurre in fauourites ; for god hath not made that promise vnto them , as he hath vnto kings ; nor ( peraduenture ) doe they deserue it . and if he bee the sole and onely fauourite , much lesse can hee presume , that either his opinion or paines can be greater or surer then that of so many learned councellours and councells , that haue met and sate thereupon , and haue spent so much time and studie in state-affaires . nor is it to bee imagined , that when councellours doe consult , and craue their kings opinion and resolution , that they doe it to that end , that they should receiue it from another inferiour person ; whom let kings loue them neuer so much , or conferre all that they can vpon them , they cannot giue them more vnderstanding , or more knowledge , nor a better minde and disposition , then what they haue already ; for this is reserued for god onely , as also it properly belongeth vnto him to giue light vnto kings , that they may giue a fitting and direct answer to that point wherein they are consulted , who alwayes supplyes them with that knowledge which is needfull for them , if they shall but begge it at his hands , and make good vse thereof . hence are two things inferred , which are very sure and true . the first , that kings are bound in conscience to attend in their owne person graue and weightie businesses ; for that this is their principall office ; which is euidently proued by this reason . whosoeuer beares an office , and hath salarie for the same , is thereby obliged to cumply fully therewith , sub poena peccati , vpon penaltie of sinning . and by so much the more grieuous shall the sinne be , by how much the greater is the office , and by how much the more the stipend is augmented . now kings ( you will confesse vnto me ) haue the greater office , and greater stipend in all things , and therefore shall they more grieuously sinne , if they do not cumply therewith . and this is made good in the sixth of wisedome , wherein these very words it is expresly said : potentes potenter tormenta patientur ; & fortioribus fortior instat cruciatio : a sharpe punishment shall be to them that be in high places ; and the mighty shall bee mightily tormented . the second ; that fauourites are obliged , on paine of the said penaltie , to serue their kings in their owne persons well and faithfully in those businesses , which they shall commit to their charge ; and that in taking their pleasure and ease , more then their kings themselues , and substituting others to performe that trust and charge which is put vpon them , they cannot iustly enioy that authoritie , nor those interests and profits which doe result from their priuacie . and let they themselues tell me , what title they haue to enioy so much as they doe , when they take lesse paines then their kings , but pleasure more ? and to conclude with that which is here questioned in this chapter , i say , that admitting fauourites , to bee such as they ought to be , it is fit notwithstanding that there should be more then one , or two . for thereby kings shall haue the more helpe , and out of that emulation and zeale , which is wont to bee amongst them , each of them will striue to bee more considerate and better aduised in commanding others , and in begging and applying things to himselfe , and his owne priuate profit , and more solicitous in doing seruice to the state , lest others might get the start of him in his kings fauour . and howbeit the name of fauourite seemeth not to indure a companion , yet , if they fixe their eyes on that which they ought , which is the common good of the common-wealth , and the seruice of their kings , it would neuer grieue them , that there should bee others to assist for the same end and purpose ; but like that great fauourite and friend of god , moses , they would say , vtinam omnes prophetarent : would to god they did all prophecie . chap. xxxiiii . of the conditions and qualities of fauourites . svpposing that that then which hath beene said in the former chapters , and that kings are to haue such persons about them , who with proprietie may hold the name of friends ( for such qualitie and condition must they be of , who possesse the bosome and soule of their master by the communication of the greatest and most secret affaires ) and performe the office of fauourites ; for , although it be true , that it cannot properly be said , that kings haue friends , for that all ( saue of their owne ranke ) are inferiour vnto them ; yet is it likewise true , that the holy scripture ( as we shewed you before ) stiles fauourites , friends . for the force of loue is of that great power , that it remoueth and lifteth vp things from their point and center , giuing the name of friend to a seruant and subiect . qui diligit cordis munditiam , propter gratiam labiorum suorum , habebit amicum regem : he that loueth purenesse of heart , for the grace of his lippes ; the king shall bee his friend . aristotle doth admit betwixt the king and his subiect , a certaine kinde of friendship , howbeit and disparitie and inequalitie bee very great , your histories doe celebrate the friendships of great princes , held with their particular subiects . and those which with other their equalls are called faithfull friends ; with kings , carry the name of loyall-subiects . which ( for that effect which wee pretend ) importeth little this altering or changing of the name . that which most importeth and conueneth most , is , that we giue you some notice of those qualities which they ought to haue , and of those signes , whereby those may be knowne , that are fittest and best for so great a ministery . there are two qualities amongst the rest , which are precisely necessarie in a fauourite . and first i will set downe the first . first of all then he must loue his king truly , and must not suffer himselfe to be ouercome by couetousnesse , and his owne priuate interest . in the first particular , all doe agree with aristotle and plato . for no man can more faithfully giue counsell , then hee that loues his king more then his gifts . which of all other is the most necessary to make one man trust another , and to beleeue that which hee saith . for who will not credit that man whom he knowes loues him , and in all that he can , seekes to procure his good , without any respect to his owne particular interest ? he ( saith saint gregory ) that is fit to be a fauourite , must haue a loue that is full , and dis-interessed . nullus fidelior tibi ad consulendum esse potest , quam qui non tua , sed te diligit : no man can be more faithfull in aduising thee , then he that loues not thine , but thee . this qualitie of loue and friendship , nazianzene likewise handleth . and a certaine law of the partida maketh mention thereof , saying , que los , que han de aconseiar los reyes , han de ser amigos bien entendidos , y●de buen seso : that those , that are to counsell kings , must bee friends that haue beene throughly knowne and tried , and that are of good vnderstanding and iudgement . salomon saith , that hee is a true fauourite indeed , that studies to walke in cleannesse of heart , and purenesse of tongue ; that is to say , when hee shall place all his care in seruing his king with loue ; and informing him nothing but what is truth , and desiring him to walke in that way , which shall make most for gods seruice , and the good of the kingdome ; qualities sufficient for fauourites to insinuate themselues into the grace and fauour of good princes . saint iohn , in the apocalypse , sets before vs ( though somewhat darkly shadowed ) a picture of good fauourites and councellers . which were certaine old men , clothed in white , wearing crownes on their heads . to bee somewhat ancient , and well stricken in yeares , was a qualitie wont to be required in those that were to aduise kings , and giue them good counsell , in regard of their great experience and mature iudgement , which commonly accompanies such kinde of men . and they are said to be clothed in white , because this colour signifies a pure heart , and a cleare conscience , wherewith they ought to bee as it were apparrelled and adorned . how can he giue good counsell that is not clothed in white ? that hath not cor candidum , a white and vpright heart , pure and cleane from those affections and passions that may smu●t and sullye it ? and it is there likewise set downe , that euery one of them had like a king , a crowne vpon his head . to giue vs thereby to vnderstand , that hee that is to giue counsell vnto kings , for the maintaining and vpholding of a kingdome , and to remedy what is therein amisse , may in some sort conceit himselfe to be a king ; my meaning is , that he is to giue counsell , as if hee himselfe were the king , and to aduise for him , as he would for himselfe , were he in his place . and that hee is to giue his vote and opinion , as if the kingdome were his . and to be so free from expecting or respecting his owne particular interest , as if he were king himselfe . who neither expecteth nor pretendeth any merced , or reward , nor any addition of honour , or otherwise in his kingdome , for that hee hath already attained to the highest and supremest dignitie , which is the crowne . in like manner , kings fauourites , and counsellours should liue as free from pretensions , as if ( hauing already got the crowne ) they had nothing more to pretend . whose breast and bosome must be as white and as pure as whitenesse it selfe and will be the better able to iudge betwixt white and blacke , right and wrong , by reason of their many yeares , and long experience . this kinde of seruants and friends , which must be the life and soule of their actions ; let kings bee very carefull how they make choice of them , and receiue them into fauour . for there is not any one thing , that doth so much manifest a kings minde , as the election which he makes of his fauourites and councellours of state. for by them is his naturall inclination as well knowne , as in a workeman , by his manufactures , is discouered the art and trade whereunto hee is most inclined . and therefore i shall make bold to aduise kings , that they make such their fauourites , that are men of worth , wise , prudent , dis-interessed , and of a noble and generous disposition . for by their choice , men make iudgement of their king accordingly . and likewise when the kings grace and fauour shall fall vpon good subiects , his owne glory will be the greater . let kings ( laying aside all affection ) choose such as are men of knowledge and experience , and that are powerfull in perswading , and disswading . that know how to go in and out , with good satisfaction , amidst those so many , so diuers , and such important businesses , as daily offer themselues ; and to giue good , subtill , and graue answers , both by word of mouth , and by writing , to such ambassadours , and other great persons , that shall come to treate and negociate with them . that haue seene and read much , and haue a generall knowledge in all things , but more particularly in the countries and prouinces that are vnder their kings command . that know what forces they are able to make , and to vnderstand the strength as well of their friends , as of their foes . let them be of a franke and liberall minde . for this vertue the common people much loue and affect , and are wonderfully well satisfied therewith . and on the contrary , couetousnesse is much hated and abhorred by them . let them ( i say ) bee bountifull , and desirous to doe good to all in common , and to euery one in particular . in a word , let them be men well knowne to be faithfull and trusty , and such as loue their kings so well , as that they will preferre their authoritie and reputation before their owne , and studie and endeuour in all , and aboue all , what may make most for their good and aduantage . that they be wise , discreet , experienced , patient , without passion , disinteressed , and more zealous of the publike good , then of their priuate profit . for if they shall regard their owne interest and proper commoditie , they are neither good for the seruice of their kings , nor for the gouernment of the commonwealth . for , in going about to measure out their priuacie by the yard of their particular profit , they will make merchandise of all ; and their doing good to others , shall bee for the benefiting of themselues . nothing comming vnder their hands , whereof ( that they may not be accounted bad cookes ) they will not licke their owne fingers . the clingenst and strongest affection , is that of couetousnesse ; it is like the head●ch , which hindereth the free vse of mans faculties and senses , not suffering him to doe any thing that is good . and though it bee true , that there are other vices , of greater offence to god , and more hurtfull to a mans neighbour , yet this hath i know not what mischiefe in it , and more particularly in publike persons , which doth shew it selfe more openly then all the rest , and doth breede , and nourish other sinnes , as the roote doth the tree . radix omnium malorum cupiditas ; quidam appetentes , errauerunt à fide : couetousnesse of money , is the roote of all euill . which while some lusted after , they erred from the faith , and tangled themselues with many sorrowes . ex auaritia profecto ( saith saint ambrose ) septem nequitiae procreantur : scilicet , proditio , fraus , fallacia , periurium , inquietudo , violentia , & contra misericordiam , obduratio : there are seuen kinde of sinnes that proceed from couetousnesse ▪ viz. treason , fraud , deceit , periury , inquietude , violence , and ( which shuts the doore to all pitie and compassion ) hardnesse of heart . vpon this foundation of couetousnesse , is built whatsoeuer tyrannicall imagination ; and many through it , haue , and doe daily loose the faith , and that loyaltie which is due vnto god , and their kings . auri cupiditas ( saith the same saint ) materia est perfidiae ; the loue of gold is the cause of the losse of faith . when this pulls a fauourite , it easily drawes him aside , and carries him headlong to all these vices ; for it is of more force then the load-ston , and drawes him more after them , then that doth the iron ; and is holpen on the more by the winde of vanitie and ambition . the philosopher her●●litus saith , that those that serue vanity and couetousnesse , suddenly depart from truth and iustice ; and hold that onely for iust and most right , which is directed aright to their owne priuate interest . and this onely doe they make their aime , in all whatsoeuer they aduise their king ; as was to be seene in that so often repeated case of king assuerus , with his great fauourite amann ▪ of whom hee demanded , what grace and fauour should bee showne to that subiect , whom for his good seruices , hee desired to honour . whereupon , the winde of vaine-glory working in the head of him , and thinking this could be no man , but himselfe , shewed himselfe very magnificent and liberall in ordaining the honours and fauours , that were to be done vnto him . the vaine conceit of a couetous man , cuts out for himselfe large thongs out of another mans leather . and when hee growes a little warme in the king his masters bosome ( poore snake as hee was ) with a false and feigned loue , hee goes hunting after his commoditie ; and this failing , his loue also faileth . for his heart stretcheth it selfe no farther to loue , then what his hands c●n come to take hold on . elpan comido , y la compania desecha ( saith the prouerbe ) no longer cake , n● longer company . of such friends , as these , the prophet michah bids vs beware . for no friend , that seeketh his owne gaine , can euer ( according vnto aristotle ) be faithfull and loyall to his king. let kings ( i say ) consider once againe , and haue an especiall care , that those fauourites , whom hee maketh choice of for his friends , be out of his owne proper election , and approued by his owne minde , and by the opinion and fame of their vertue , and not intertaining them at any time by the sole intercession of others , especially such as are great and powerfull , nor let them suffer themselues to be carried away with the secret considerations of those familiar and particular persons which are about them , nor by the insinuating and soothing perswasions of your flatterers and sycophants ; who , as they are men , worke vpon discourse , and corporall meanes , altogether framing them in order to their owne ends ; let them not giue beliefe and credit vnto them , but to the common fame and good report that goes of them ; and thereon , let them place their eares and their vnderstanding . for ( as tacitus saith ) that is it which vsually makes the best choice . for it is not to bee doubted , but that concerning such a ones vertues or goodnesse , we ought rather to giue credit to the generall report , then to the voices of one or two . for one , may easily bee deceiued , and deceiue others by his tricks , and his particular interest ; but neuer yet could one deceiue all ; nor is it possible , that all should in that their approbation , deceiue another . as for those other seruants , which are to attend and waight vpon the kings person , more for dignitie of place , and for outward apparence and ostentation of greatnesse , then for vse and conueniencie , which likewise in their kinde are very necessarie ; let kings a gods name receiue them into their seruice , either vpon the intercession of others , or out of other particular respects . for in this , there is little hazard , and may easily chop and change them , if they proue not good and fit for their turne . but in the choice of the former a great deale of care must be taken , for the chopp●ng and changing of them is very dangerous , and vnlesse there be very great cause for the doing of it , it breeds an opinion of inconstancie ; which as it cannot but be hurtfull vnto all , so is it of great dishonour vnto kings , much weakening their authoritie . but say there be iust cause of remouing them , why it is but as a vomite ; which howbeit it be true , that it remoueth the malignant humour , and expells it from the stomacke , yet withall it carries the good likewise away with it , and makes an end of that subiect it works vpon , if it be too often vsed . for our horses wee seeke bits and bridles , wherewith to make them to go well and handsomely , and if with those they do not raigne , and carry themselues according to our mind , we take others ; and when we finde once that they are fitted as wee would haue them , we neuer chop nor change , but still vse the same . in like manner , it is not good to chop and change either fauourites , or priuie councellours too often , but to seeke out such as are fit for their turne , and to carry such a hand ouer them , as to bridle their insolencie , and to reyne them in hard , if they finde them head-strong . for being that they are those horses which guide the chariot of a monarchie , if they bee not well bridled , of a gentle and tender mouth , and an easie reyne , they will play the iades , and breake both their owne neckes and their masters . in a word , euery king hath , or at least representeth two persons , one publike , the other priuate . and therefore his actions ought likewise to be of two qualities . in those that are particular , let them proceed therein as they will themselues , according to their owne guste and pleasure ; but in those that are publike , as shall make most for the publike good . hauing still an eye to it's conseruation and augmentation ; and to the common approbation of the people . and those qualities , which formerly wee required in councellers of state , wee here likewise conclude , that all of them are necessary for fauourites . and if kings peraduenture ( in regard of humane imperfection ) cannot meete with men so perfect , let them bee as absolute , as they can possibly light vpon ; at least , let them haue these two qualities , of loue , and an vnspotted life ; and let not kings content themselues that they haue them in a mediocritie , but in all perfection . for without these two , there are not any statuas so ●●profitable , as are such men , being not good enough to be slaues , or to serue in the basest and vilest offices about a house , much more vnworthy to be fauourites , and priuie councellours . and because the heart of man , which god hath hid out of sight , to the end that he might reserue it to bee the seate and mansion of his loue , is hard to bee knowne , and the thoughts thereof very secret and hid ; for that by one and the same instruments , it worketh and expresseth it's conceits , be they false , or be they true , it is necessary that by some meanes the truth or deceit of it's words may be knowne , for to difference thereby the true loue from the false . amongst other signes and coniectures whereof kings may make vse , for to know the minde of those that are to hold so great and neare a place about their persons , and to treate and communicate with them as it were the secrets of their soules ; let them consider and obserue very well , in what kinde of manner they do proceed , and haue proceeded with those with whom they haue formerly held friendship , and to whom they stand indebted and obliged for curtesies already done ; if they shall see they carry themselues well towards them , and performe all offices of true loue and friendship , then may they be induced to beleeue , that shewing themselues louing and thankfull to others , they will be so towards them . and he that loueth not him , whom hee ought to loue , out of this or that other respect , will not loue his king , do he neuer so much for him . for this difference of more or lesse altereth not the substance nor condition . the true loue of fauourites ( they being such as they ought to be ) consisteth ( as we said already ) in louing their king dis-interessedly , and to aduertile him of all that , which is fitting and conuenient for him , and that all , or the most desire , that in their workes and actions for their greater perfection , there should be credit and estimation ; and lastly , of all that which ( according to the more common opinion ) requireth reformation and amendment ( for onely the workes of the most high can be wholly inculpable ) and of that which may in some sort withdraw his subiects loue from him , and aduising him thereof , worke so with him for to gratifie them in this or that publike benefit , whereby to wedge the peoples loue the faster vnto their prince and soueraigne . but false and feigned loue , that runnes a contrarie course ; it alwayes hunts after it's owne commoditie , it commendeth all , whatsoeuer his prince doth ; he excuseth it in his presence , and qualifies it for good , iust , and conuenient . which being no other but a tricke of court-cunning , and though they may well march vnder the standard of vnknowne enemies , yet are they esteemed and rewarded as friends . and notwithstanding all this , their kings backe is no sooner turned , but they murmure at him , or set others a worke to doe it for them ; complaining , that in regard of the naturall ill disposition of kings and great princes eares ( facile enough to heare smooth flatteries , but too harsh and hard to hearken to the truth ) they dare not for their liues tell it him , not aduenture to giue him the least distaste , though it concerne him neuer so neare , and that they plainly see , the not doing of it cannot but redound much to his hurt . and the true reason thereof is , for that the former , loue more the person of their prince , then his fortune , and let him take it ill or well , all 's one , they will treate truth , especially in those things that may concerne his safetie , or the good and quiet of his kingdome ; and their good minde , true heart , and plaine-honest meaning , make them bold to speake , without fearing to offend , in that their good aduice , which they shall giue him . but this second sort of fauourites loue not his person , but his fortune ; and these , for their owne proper interest , and that they may not hazard their hopes , dare not speake the truth , though they see the danger before their eyes : as persons that would easily alter their faith and loyaltie , and take part with him whose sword is strongest , and therefore care not though their king fall , so as they may stand . and of such , it may bee suspected that they desire a change , like those which in gaming liue by baratos , who for their owne benefit would haue fortune turne from the one to the other , their good wishes no longer following their first man , as not hoping to haue any more from him , then what they haue already receiued ; not caring to see them blowne vp , one after another , so as they may get by the bargaine . and most certaine it is , that those who so much loue themselues , and their owne proper interest , there is no trusting of them ; for they haue no loue left either for their owne lord and master , or any body else . for such base soules , and vngenerate spirits , drowned and swallowed vp in those muddy materialls of interest , and auarice , cannot loue any other thing with excellencie , and in a noble fashion . and therefore it importeth much , that fauourites bee dis●roabed , and stript quite and cleane of all that , which goes vnder the name of proper or selfe-loue , priuate interest , vsefull friendship , faction or kindred ; and that they should bee clothed with a wise and discreet kinde of goodnesse , which nor knowes , nor can , nor will fauour ought , but vertue , and iustice , and that which is good and honest . it is likewise spoken by way of prouerbe , quien ama à su rey , ama à su grey : he that loues his king , loues his flocke . and he that is in the place of a fauourite , and so neare about his kings person , ought to bee as a common father to all his subiects , treating them as if they were his children , and procuring that not any one of them may depart discontented from his presence , which would be the the onely load-stone to draw all their loue and affection towards him . so did that great fauourite of the king of syria , naaman , whom all the people with a full and open mouth , called father , corresponding with him in the loue of so many sonnes , or children . for those that are seated in so high a place , haue great cause , for many reasons , to procure publike loue ; and , together with the grace of their prince , to haue the good wills and affections of the people ; for this , makes the other to be more durable and firme . for this is the naturall miserie of great and powerfull persons , that enuie and greatnesse go alwayes hand in hand : the one still accompanying the other . and there is not any poyson like vnto it , which moues and stirres vp such violent pangs and passions in the stomacke , and more especially if it worke vpon the priuacie and inwardnesse of fauourites with their kings , as if that it selfe were not a true and sufficient strong poyson . seeing that it is held for certaine , that one word of a king , nay ( which is more ) one angry looke , or bended brow , hath sent many a fauourite to his graue . for ( as salomon saith ) the life of the subiect depends on the countenance of the king. and if we will not beleeue him , let vs see and obserue how many fauourites escape , which doe not dye of that wound , or the feare thereof ; and more particularly with those kings which are of that condition ( as one said ) that there is not two fingers breadth betweene their smile and their sword ; to the end that this their priuacie might bee had in the lesse esteeme . for your best fauourites are but like your better sort of fruits , which are soonest subiect to be worme-eaten . for enuie is a very worme , and hath the same qualities as a worme hath ; and spreads it selfe so farre , that it extends it selfe euen to those that haue beene benefited by the fauourite ; the couetousnesse and risentment of that which they doe not receiue , working more vpon them then the law of thankfulnesse , or of a gratefull acknowledgement for that , which they haue receiued . so that wee may say , that few are they who loue those from whose hand they haue receiued some good , because it was no greater . and those that haue receiued none , that they are therein iniured , and wronged . so , that to qualifie and temper this inconuenience , it shall be wisedome in fauourites ( and it will concerne them to vse all the meanes they can deuise to effect it ) to procure to bee wellbeloued . and no lesse in kings to seeke out such as are modest , louing , affable , vertuous , honest , well beloued , and of a gratefull and thankfull disposition . chap. xxxv . how kings ought to carry themselues towards their fauourites . for to resolue this question , and to giue satisfaction to that which is here proposed in this chapter , it being a matter of so tender and dangerous a touch : i will first lay for my foundation , a true point of doctrine in naturall philosophie , celebrated with that sentence of the glorious saint austen ; amor meus , pondus meum , illo feror , quocunque feror : the plummet which peaseth man , and the wings wherewith the heart makes it's flight , is loue , which doth leade the dance to all the other passions of the soule . and as those that saile in a deepe sea , with full sailes , runne on their course without any danger ; but when they draw neare the shore , they take them downe and ruffle them that they may not runne their ship vpon some shelfe , or split it selfe against some rocke ; so likewise , when the heart is lifted vp vnto the loue of god , which is infinite goodnesse , it may without perill plough the seas of this world , and with full sayles cut the maine , without danger of shelues , quick-sands , or rockes . for ( according to that saying of the glorious saint bernard ) as the cause of our louing god , is god himselfe : so , the measure of louing him , is to loue him without measure . causa diligendi deum , deus est ; modus dilectionis , sine modo diligere . as the cause of our loue is infinite ; so must it be without taxe or limitation , wherein there can be no excesse . but when the heart drawes but little water , and touches too close vpon these things of the earth , which haue their goodnesse much limited , it will be high time , and very fit and conuenient , to strike the sayles of our loue , and to go on with a great deale of caution and consideration , lest this our vessell should sticke in the sands , neuer to bee gotten out againe , or fall vpon some rocke or other of vnaduisednesse and indiscretion . and this is so certaine a truth , that albeit the loue to our parents be so naturall , and obligatory , and so giuen vs in charge by god , with the promises of so many blessings on those children which shall cumply with this loue , and with so many threatnings on those that shall faile therein ; yet notwithstanding god himselfe will , that therein there should be a limitation and moderation . qui amat patrem , aut matrem , plus quam me , non est me dignus : he that loueth father or mother more then me , is not worthy of me . and the common old adage saith , that friendship must go no further then vsque ad ar as , and stop there . and howbeit some would haue the limit , which is here put to loue , to be death ; i say , that it's limit , is reason , and obedience to gods commandements . for when our loue shall come to encounter with them , it is to make a stand , and go no further . our second ground or foundation whereon we shall build , is this , that in kings , next vnto the loue of god , and his christian religion , no loue ought to be like vnto that , which they ought to beare vnto their kingdomes and common-wealths ; for the end , for which kings were first instituted and ordained , was the common good of their kingdomes . and as children haue a naturall obligation to loue their parents , because from them , they haue receiued their naturall being ; so kings owe the like to their kingdomes , and commonwealths , because next vnder god , they gaue them their being of kings , and that power and authoritie , whereby they were to protect , defend , and augment them . vpon these grounds and foundations must that loue and friendship be laid , which is to be held with fauourites . louing them , and giuing them power and authoritie , conformable to that , which for this end shall be thought most conuenient . for albeit they ( as seneca saith ) keepe the key of their kings heart , and in matters of secresie and benefits , are preferred before the rest ; yet this must be done with a christian kinde of prudence and discretion . hauing euermore an especiall care , that the force of his loue be not so violent , and so boundlesse , that to giue content to one sole fauourite , hee discontent all the rest of his subiects ; and to shew himselfe faithfull and true vnto him , breake that faith and truth , which he owes vnto god , and his diuine law. and that he proceed likewise therein with that freedome and libertie , that his loue may not passe the bounds of reason , nor bee ( like some ships that are runne on ground ) so surely setled , that he cannot get off when hee will , and to turne that loue into hatred , and a full determination and resolution of punishment , when the faults of a fauourite shall deserue his iust displeasure non habitabit in medio domus meae , qui facit superbiam , &c. whoso hath a proud looke , and an high stomacke , i will not suffer him . mine eyes looke vnto such , as be faithfull in the land , that they may dwell with mee . and whoso leadeth a godly life , he shall be my seruant ; but there shall no deceitfull person dwell in my house . and he that telleth lies shall not tarry in my sight . as likewise it is iust and meete , that on the contrary , hatred , punishment , and chastisement , should be turned into amitie , loue , and friendship , when the person hated , shall deserue well . and this is the meaning of that ancient prouerbe , ama , tanquam osurus & odio habe , tanquam amaturus . the drift and scope of all which is this ; that when wee shall place our loue and affection vpon humane things , it be done with aduisednesse , considering how subiect they are to change and alteration . so that , that which to day deserues our loue , may to morrow deserue our hate : and on the contrary , that which is disliked and abhorred , may merit our loue , and good esteeme . and we haue hereof a very good example in the foresaid king assuerus , who so soone turned that loue which he bare vnto haman , into that hatred , that hee caused him to be hanged vp ; and mardoche , that was condemned to the gallowes , he raised vnto honour , and put him into that place of priuacie and greatnesse , which proud haman so lately enioyed . nor can fauourites haue cause to complaine , if it be granted vnto them , that their priuacie may reach so farre , that their kings may loue them , as they do their owne royall persons . but it is a doctrine receiued by all the philosophers , that the rule of that true friendship and loue , which one man beareth vnto another , is to be measured and considered by that which euery man beares vnto himselfe . and that which equalls it selfe in this , is very perfect loue . amicitiae lex prescribitur , vt non minus , nec plus quisquam , amicum suum , quàm seipsum diligat . the law of friendship is , that a man should not loue his friend lesse , or more , then himselfe . nem● ( saith saint paul ) animam suam odio habet , sed nutrit , & fouet eam : no man euer yet hated his owne flesh , but nourisheth and cherisheth it . and yet notwithstanding this selfe-loue ought so to bee ordered by reason , that whensoeuer it shall desire any thing contrarie thereunto , it must sharply be denyed it . a criter reijciendus est ( saith the learned saint chrisostome ) in like manner , when fauourites shall craue or desire any thing contrary to reason , or the publike good of the commonwealth , they must bee denyed , what they demand , and kings vpon those occasions must shew themselues seuere and austere towards them . and this doctrine is so cleare and so plaine , that our sauiour christ left it for a patterne vnto princes , in that answer of his which he gaue vnto his two kinsmen and fauourites , iohn and iames , when hee told them ; nescitis , quid petatis ; potest is bibere calicem ? &c. ye know not what ye aske . can ye drinke of the cup , &c. non est meum dare vobis , sed quibus paratum est à patre meo . to sit on my right hand , and on my left hand , is not mine to giue , but it shall bee giuen vnto them , for whom it is prepared . and how beit the words in this answer haue so many sundry expositions , and diuers constructions , as the interpreters vpon this place doe render ; yet haue i noted three things therein , worthy the consideration , and of much conueniencie for kings . in the first place , i obserue the tartnesse and sharpnesse of the answer , together with the ill-aduised and indiscreete request of those two fauourites , set downe in these three words : nescitis quid petatis : ye know not what ye aske . and when fauourites shall not weigh and consider with themselues , what , and how they aske ; let kings bethinke themselues , what , and how they giue . and let them not giue so much to one , as may giue occasion to all the rest to murmure , and complaine . and let them likewise take into their consideration , that the common condition of your fauourites , is like vnto that of other particular men , still to desire to better themselues in their estate and degree . and therefore it shall bee a great point of wisedome , not to grant vnto them all that they shall aske ; as here our sauiour christ aduiseth kings . wotting well , that though they grant them their request , yet are they not contented therewith , but rather take heart and courage vnto them to craue more and more , and with greater earnestnesse then they did before . for , ambition and couetousnesse are not satisfied , nor slackened with abundance , but are like vnto those that are sicke of the dropsie , who the more they drinke , the more they thirst . and besides this heaping of honour vpon honour , and gift vpon gift , hath a greater danger with it , in regard of those persons that receiue them . for most certaine it is , that the appetite of man is hydropicall , which the more he drinketh , the more he thirsteth ; and the more he getteth , the more he desireth . and princes may giue so much , that like lucifer , they may come at last to couet and desire that , which their kings possesse . what an honorable creature was he , and of what singular parts , yet did he rebell against his creator , out of enuie and pride , and onely occasioned through those many graces and fauours which god had enriched him withall . and for that we are all of vs creatures , the like may be feared from vs ; being that we are not so incapable of this , as was that angell of that which hee desired . and it is fit , that wee should leaue our selues something to giue ; for ordinarily we do all of vs desire ( a qualitie wherewith mans appetite is well acquainted ) and which hath caused the greatest and the foulest falls . for who is he , that would not ( if he could ) haue command , and be a king ? and wee ought likewise to keepe something in our hands to bestow , that we may not grow weary of seruing , being we can expect no further fauours , nor looke for any more rewards . for this also is very naturall , and a fashion of ancient standing with most men , to waxe weary of standing at a stay , not contenting themselues to continue that grace , place , and rewards , which they haue already acquired ; but hold that for an affront , being now growne rich , which before they would haue taken for a great fauour , when they were poore . thus doe we grow vnthankfull ; and thus doe we grow forgetfull , being vainly carried away with the conceit of what we are . and we loose the sight of that low and meane estate , wherein we were , by being raised to that highth and eminencie , wherein wee see our selues to bee seated . a naturall fault in mans eye-sight , which knowes not how to looke downeward ; and as vnwilling to looke backward , but as much forward as you will. but these forward birds , doe well deserue to haue the waxe , wherewith their wings are fastened , to be melted by that very sunne , that gaue them their first warmth and light , and by their fall to be left an example to the world , to terrifie others . and in case , for some especiall respect , kings shall resolue with themselues , that all the beames of their greatnesse shall illighten and giue life to one particular person , let the foundation of their fauours bee layed vpon those qualities , desarts , and seruices , which ought to concurre on those persons on whom they purpose thus to particularize . kings likewise are to consider the petitions of those that sue vnto them ; which is my second obseruation , and taught by christ himselfe : potestis bibere calicem , quem ego bibiturus s●m ? can ye drinke of the cup that i drinke of ? iudging by himselfe , in this demand which hee makes to these his fauourites , who so rashly and vnaduisedly came vnto him to petition him for the two principall places , that for to possesse them , they should haue all sufficient and requisite necessaries ; vpon which point christ examines them ; and the like examination ought kings to make of those qualities , specified by vs , touching both pretenders and fauourites . the third thing which i recommend to your consideration , and which christ teacheth kings , is , the great caution and warinesse which they are to vse , in not being too facile , in granting all that their fauourites shall require of them . which is to bee gathered out of the last words of this his answer : non est meum dare vobis : it is not mine to giue . which , to my seeming , soundeth thus ; it will not stand with my truth and iustice , to giue for kindreds-sake , or other humane respects , that which my eternall father hath prepared for those which deserue best . kings ought to bee very circumspect in promising , and not ouer easie in granting ; for , if he shall be facile in granting what others shall desire , hee may haue cause to repent himselfe ; and if he promiseth , hee looseth his liberty . a great gentleman of qualitie , whom king philip the second much fauoured for his worthy parts , and great abilities , talking one day with him , and walking a good while with his maiestie , after that hee had discoursed with him of diuers things , to the kings so great good content and liking , that hee thought with himselfe , that there was now a faire occasion offered vnto him , to propound vnto him ( as he did ) a businesse of his owne . he told a friend of his , anon after that hee came from him , that in that very instant he proposed it , he cast such a strange and austere looke towards him , as if hee had neuer seene him before . which was no want of affection in the king towards him , for hee had had many sufficient testimonies thereof ; but because it was fitting for so wise and prudent a king to haue that circumspection , lest this his affection might minister occasion vnto him to call his discretion in question , in granting , or not granting that which either is not , or at least shall seeme vnto him , not to be conuenient for him . for kings must haue recourse to these two things ; to haue a good and safe conscience with god , and intire ●●●horitie , and good opinion with men . for with none doth that holy and prudent counsell of saint paul suite more properly , then with them ; prouidemus bona , non solum coram deo , sed etiam coram hominibus : prouiding for honest things , not onely in the sight of the lord , but in the sight of men . which cannot be , when as fauourites either doe all what they list of themselues , or get their kings to doe it for them . when the sensitiue appetite effecteth whatsoeuer it affecteth , the vnderstanding ( which is the soules king ) remaines oppressed and disgraced , and with that soule note , which the kingly prophet dauid giues it ; homo , cum in honore esset , non intellexit , comparatus est iumentis insipientibus & similis factus est illis : man being in honour hath no vnderstanding , he is like the beasts that perish . and therefore when kings out of their particular affection , or for the auoiding of trouble , and the fuller inioying of their ease and pleasure , shall giue absolute power to their fauourites to doe and vndoe , as they please , presently one blot or other ( which they will hardly euer get out ) will bee laid vpon their royall persons . nor need wee here to relate the hurt which comes thereby , and the occasion which it giues vnto the subiects , neither to thnke nor speake of their princes with that respect which is fitting ; especially when the fauourites are none of those which helpe to beare the weight and burthen of businesses , but shake them off from their owne shoulders , and lay them vpon other that are fitted to their hand , and of whom they rest well assured , that they will doe nothing but what they will haue them to doe , working their will and pleasure in all that they are able . and this is not that which kings and commonwealths need : but it much importeth , that their fauourites should bee of that good and quicke dispatch in businesses , that all the people might loue them for it ; for from the contrary great inconueniences are wont to arise . when the shechemites were so vnmannerly and vnciuill in their language against their king abimilech , amongst other things which they vttered and alledged against him , they said this in scorne of him ; nunquid non est filius ierobael , & constituit principem zabul seruum suum super viros hemor patris sichem , cur ergo seruiemus ei ? who is abimelech , that we should serue him ? is not he the sonne of ierubbaal , and zebul his officer ? why should wee serue him ? &c. they tooke it very ill , that the king should raise his seruant zabul to tha● heighth of honour and greatnesse , that he should be made prince , as it were , ouer all the people of hemor and sichem . and howbeit the naturall obligation , which subiects owe to their kings , is so great , that they are bound to obey them in all that which is not against god ; and that it is a token of great noblenes , to suffer with a good courage , whatsoeuer burthens , be they neuer so heauy , which they lay vpon them ; yet notwithstanding they haue no such obligation to their fauorites . for they may , for their pleasure , or their profit , substitute other their fauourites , and oblige the people , that they either negociate with , or buy out their negociation of them . the history of king don iuan the second of castile , doth affoord sufficient examples of the great persecutions that followed , by letting that his fauourite haue so great a hand in businesses . for the people seeing their king so led by the nose , as it were , and to yeeld to all that he would haue him doe , were verily perswaded that he was bewitch't ; for he had such power ouer the will & vnderstanding of the king , that he neither vnderstood what he gaue , nor knew not how , or at least had not the face to deny him any thing , that hee was willing either to aske , or take ; whilst like the vnthankfull yuie , he went sucking away all the iuyce and sappe of the tree , all that good kings wealth and substance , his being , his authoritie , and little lesse then his kingdome . and lost by this meanes so much of his authoritie , that some of the grandes of the kingdome , and the infantes , his brethren , and the kings of aragon , and nauarre , betooke them to their armes , and made warre against him ; he seeing himselfe vpon some occasions disobeyed by his sonne and prince , and forsaken of his wife and queene . whereupon grew many ciuill broyles , and all vnder the title and pretext of recouering their libertie , and of pulling their neckes from vnder the yoke of that slauery and subiection wherein they were , rendering that reason in their excuse , which all the whole kingdome could but take notice of , that all businesses past through his fauourites hands , and that the king did not negociate in his owne person . the prosecution whereof i remit to those histories that make mention thereof . and it cannot bee denyed , that this fauourite notwithstanding had many good things in him , that might very well deserue his kings loue ; for he had serued him valiantly in great and vrgent occasions , and had put his person and life in perill for his sake . but as his priuacie and fauour went increasing , so with it increased his ambition and couetousnesse , and that in that high degree , that he grew hatefull to the whole kingdome ; and in the end no lesse odious to the king himselfe : who comming at length vnto himselfe , fell into the account of those damages and losses , which he had receiued in his kingdome , both in his reputation and authoritie , by putting the reines wholly into his hands , taking thereby too much libertie to himselfe , and ruling the state as he listed . the grandes represented to his maiestie the abuses that insued thereupon , as the ingrossing of the greater offices , and selling of the lesser , and ouerswaying the courts of iustice ; and vsing many other effectuall perswasions , grounded vpon other iust complaints , proposing for remedie and redresse thereof , the interest & profit that might accrew vnto him , by calling him to account , and that he might thereby get into his hands an infinite deale of treasure ; the king liked very well of their propositions , and admitting their reasons , he fell off from his fauourite , waging warre against him with his owne money , wherewith hee thought , if neede should serue , to sustaine and vphold himselfe . this slippery footing haue all those things which haue not their hold-fast in god. for they turne to the hurt of those that put their trust in them . and it is his mercie to mankinde , that they should pay for it in this life , howsoeuer they speed in the life to come ; which we will leaue to gods iustice , and the strict account that will be taken of them . in conclusion , this great fauourite dyed , being fallen from his priuacie with his prince , depriued of all that wealth and treasure which he had so greedily scraped together , ending his life with a great deale of sorrow and discontent , and to the great reioycing of his opposites . though this did not serue for a warning to those that came after him , but without feare of the like terrible and desperate falls , they ranne themselues out of breath in the pursuite of the like priuacie . saint iohn baptist ( we know ) was christs great fauourite ; and the gospell stiles him to be amicus sponsi , the friend of the bridegroome . but his great goodnesse and holinesse of life did the more gloriously shew it selfe in this , that by how much the more christ did in-greaten and authorize him , by so much the more did hee lessen and humiliate himselfe ; and laboured by all possible meanes , by diminishing his owne , to increase the authoritie and credit of his lord and master , saying , illum oportet crescere , me autem minui : he must increase , but i must decrease . and this is that glasse wherein the fauourites of kings are to looke ; taking into their consideration , that by how much the more they seeke to greaten themselues , in making ostentation of their power and authoritie ; by so much the more they lessen and dis-authorise that of their kings , with whom , is so dangerous any whatsoeuer shew , or shadow , of equalitie , or competition , that euen in the highest top of priuacie , the more certaine , and lesse reparable , vsually , is the fall . how iocond , and how well contented went haman out of the palace , when queene esther inuited him to dine with the king and her selfe . when loe , the very next day after they draggd him from that banquet and royall table to the gallowes . and therefore let no man trust or relye on the fauour of kings ▪ be he neuer so rich , or neuer so fortunate ; for in them it is ordinarily seene , that all these faire shewes are commonly conuerted into manifest demonstrations of hatred . out of all this that hitherto hath beene said , let fauourites make vnto themselues this vse and instruction , to know the danger and slipperinesse of the place wherein they stand , euen then when they finde themselues most of all inthronized . for most true is that saying , of , fulmen petit culmen ; the highest towers , and the highest hills are most of all subiect to ioues thunder-bolts , and lightning . and let kings likewise take this into their consideration by way of aduice , that when they shall haue found their fauourites to be furnished with those qualities before specified , and that they are such , that thereby they may merit their grace and fauour , and so great , both place and part in their heart , it stands with very good reason , that they shou●d bee honoured by them with particular mercedes and fauours , because they helpe them to beare the burthen of their cares , and are exposed to great dangers , and greater enuyings ; as it happened to that great fauourite of the king of persia , whom the princes of his kingdome did pretend to remoue from the kings elbow , and to put him in the denne amidst the lions , that by them hee might be there rent in peeces . whereof , no other cause could be found against him , but his kings fauour , bearing enuie to his priuacie ( that common moath to high places ) from which none , be he neuer so good , neuer so honest , can escape . for , it is very naturall in men to risent , that hee should out-strip them , who but yesterday was their fellow and companion . they hold that honour for an iniurie , that is done to their equall , and thinke themselues go backward , and loose of their authoritie and reputation , if another bee preferred before them . which is such an offence , that god presently takes notice of it , and passeth it not ouer without punishment . for this priuacie with kings is a thing of his disposing , and for such ends as hee pretends ; and there is not any subiect , that rises to such great place , but that he must passe through the weights and ballance of his diuine prouidence , who chooseth these , and refuseth those , vsing them as meanes to worke his secret ends . many ( saith salomon ) seeke the rulers fauour , but euery mans iudgement commeth from the lord. the election comes from god , it is not so much the king , that chooseth them , as god , who moues his heart thereunto . and if he do vphold them with his powerfull hand , in vaine is it for others to go about to trippe vp their heeles . for ( as saint cyprian saith ) calamitas sine remedio est , odisse foelicem . to hate an happy and fortunate man , is a misfortune beyo●d all remedie ; it is a torment and putrefaction of the heart , which is euer gnawing and martyring of the soule . chap. xxxvi . whether the kinsfolke and friends of fauourites are to be excluded from offices . this place requireth that we auerre that , which amongst discreet persons , and such as are zealous of the common good , is vsually called in question , and made a doubt : to wit , whether or no , it be inconuenient , that the kinsfolke , friends , and followers of kings fauourites should bee put into places of office and gouernment ? for , it cannot but seeme an vnreasonable thing , that those who haue such parts and qualities as well deserue to bee employed in such places of charge and command , should therefore onely and eo nomine , bee excluded from them , for that they haue alliance and friendship with the said fauourites . being that this , in it selfe , is not ill . besides the loue and affection which kings beare vnto their fauourites , cannot ( like your bad-made-clothes ) so shrinke vpon themselues , or be so straight-laced , that it shall not likewise extend it selfe to the friends and allyes of those , to whom they professe so much loue . againe , a good , if not a greater part of these mens happinesse and content , consisteth in being able to do good , and to raise their friends . but for the better satisfying of this doubt , it is fit that we should first consider and distinguish of the qualitie of the persons of this alliance and friendship with those fauourites , as also of the condition and qualitie of those offices . for in your offices there are some of grace , and some of iustice. in the distribution of the former , we are to looke no further then to grace , and the kings good will and pleasure . in the latter to that distribution which is agreeable to distributiue iustice. there is likewise a great difference in the persons . for some are of better qualities and desarts , then other some . and these are in all prouisions that are made to be first preferred , be they , or be they not , of kinne and acquaintance with the fauourites . and there are many good reasons that make for their part . others there are , that are inferiour in merit , and the foresaid qualities ; and these in no wise , may or ought to be preferred for the kindred or friendship which they hold with fauourites . for it were a sinne of accepting of persons , which is contrary to distributiue iustice. others there are , that are euery way equall with the rest of the pretenders ; and on this hinge , hangs the force of the question . now if they shall stand in this equalitie , and vpon these equall tearmes with the rest , in those qualities that are fitting for office , it seemeth that they should receiue some wrong , in being excluded without any fault of theirs ; for it is no fault , to bee the friend or kinsman of a fauourite . to this doubt , the answer would be made the more difficult , if your fauourites through their too much ambition and couetousnesse had not taught vs the great inconueniences which result in a common-wealth , by opening this doore vnto them , and conferring the said offices on their friends and allyes , vnder colour and pretext that they are as well deseruing as others . first of all , for that kings , as shepherds and common parents of the whole commonwealth , are to make a distribution of honours , and of wealth , equally reparting and diuiding them , in that indifferent manner , that they may reach to all houses and families , or at least to extend t●em as farre as they are able . like a good husbandman , who , that hee may haue a good and plentifull crop , throwes and scatters his seed on this side , and that side , and euery where . secondly , for that it is a very odious thing , and which breedeth bad bloud , and ingendreth ill humours in those who onely in regard of this their kindred and friendship , see themselues depriued and debarred of that , which they might otherwise challenge by desert . and others on the other side , when they see that they can neither come to be kinsmen , nor friends , nor of familiar acquaintance with fauourites ( which are the references that must preferre them ) the first nature hauing denyed it them ; the other their bad fortune , or the fauourites disaffection , seeing themselues hopelesse of all helpe and remedie , either they runne themselues headlong into some desperate attempt , or at least fall to flagge in their vertue ; either of which cannot choose but bee of great inconuenience to the commonwealth . thirdly , for that it is not fitting , that fauourites should come to be very powerfull , either in their owne proper wealth and substance , or in the greatnes and strength of their friends and allies . for the more they increase in these , the more doe their kings decrease ; and sometimes it hath beene seene to grow to that excesse , that powerfull princes haue seene , or at least imagined themselues to be of lesser power then they could haue wisht it , or had beene needfull to haue repressed , and cut short the ambitious wings , and high flowne insolencies of their fauourites . fourthly , for that vnder this colour , occasion might bee giuen to fauourites to dispose in such sort of the gouernment of kingdomes , that kings should not come to the knowledge of ought that passeth in them , be it good or bad , more then shall stand with the good liking of their fauourites , and make most for their owne ends . so that , neither those that are wronged , shall finde meanes to bee righted ; nor those that are zealous of the common good , and of their kings authoritie and reputation , be admitted to aduertise and giue notice vnto him , of that which doth most concerne him . for kings , by reason of their retirednesse , cannot come to the full knowledge of all that passeth . one of the things wherewith they charged that great fauourite of king don iuan , in that sentence which they pronounced against him , was , that hee had put into the offices of the kings house , and without his house , and in places of gouernment , persons that were tyed and wedged to his house , either by see-tayle , or by friendship . i referre my selfe to that , which the sentence saith , speaking in the person of king don iuan the second . and it is not to be doubted , that when fauourites shall wholly apply themselues to seaze vpon all the ports , thereby to know all , and so to stoppe vp all the doores and passages , that none can come to negociate with their kings , but by their hands , it is no other but a binding of their kings hands , and to oppresse them with a palliated and cloaked kinde of tyranny , with relation to their priuate interest . and because from our very first entrance into this our discourse , our purpose was to confirme whatsoeuer we proposed , by the testimonies of holy scripture , to the end that no man vpon any false presupposall , should so much as surmise , or thinke , that we go about to tread too neare vpon the heeles of fauourites , i will likewise remit my selfe in this particular , to that letter registred in the scripture , which that great king artaxerxes wrote to all the dukes and princes , and to all his vassalls of . prouinces of his kingdomes , wherein with indeared reason hee propoundeth the insolencies and tyrannies , exercised by fauourites , who vsing amisse the fauours and mercedes , which their kings doe them , seeke to carry all things before them , with a high hand . and for that the holy ghost would haue all this set down in the sacred history , we may here very well intersert some part thereof , which is well worthy the noting , multi , bonitate principum , & honore , &c. many , the more often they are honoured with the great bounty of their gracious princes , the more proud they are waxen ; and indeauour to hurt not our subiects onely , but not being able to beare abundance , doe take in hand to practise also against those that doe them good . and take not onely thankfulnesse from among men , but also lifted vp with the glorious words of lewd persons , that were neuer good , they thinke to escape the iustice of god , that seeth all things , and hateth euill . oftentimes also , the faire speech of our friends put in trust to mannage the affaires , haue caused many that are in authoritie to bee partakers of innocent bloud , and hath inwrapped them in remedilesse calamities . beguiling with the falsehood and deceit of their lewd disposition , the innocencie and goodnesse of princes , &c. and it oftentimes commeth to passe , that the good actions and intentions of kings are hindered , and the light of their iustice eclipsed , by the interposition of some terrestriall bodie , which doth darken the glory thereof , as the interuention of the earth , obscureth the sunne . and the publike misfortunes which befall the common-wealth , and the particular wrongs and iniustices , which men by this meanes must indure , euen vnder the raigne of a iust and religious king , make his empire hatefull ; for it is a naturall property incident to the vulgar , when any misfortune shall befall a state , to remoue the blame from themselues , and to lay the fault vpon those that are of greater ranke and quality . but to returne to our intended purpose , i say , that in the offices of iustice ( i meane ) wherein distributiue iustice requireth consideration of merit , way is not to bee giuen to the friends and kinsfolke of fauourites , but respect rather to bee bad to the common good , wherein is to bee vsed the fore-specified warinesse and circumspection . and in such sort may the risentment and complaints of the kingdome increase , that howbeit the said friends and kinsmen , should in their abilities haue the aduantage of others , yet ought they to be excluded . for this reason , in point of weale publike , is of more weight and consequence , then any sufficiencie whatsoeuer in those other pretenders . marry , in those other offices which we call offices of grace , ( for that they neither haue the administration of iustice , nor gouernment , the hand may be stretched out in a freer manner vnto those that haue any reference of amitie or alliance vnto fauourites . but these offices are but few , and of no great importance ; and in case an exact consideration should bee had , there being not that office , bee it neuer so small , wherein a man shall not meete with some opposites and pretenders , wee must not be too hasty , but hold the hand awhile , that fitting prouision might be made according to the qualities and merits of the person . one , that was a principall councellour of state , certified a certaine graue and worthy person , that he being alcalde de corte , the common hangmans office fell voide , and that hee was so earnestly sued vnto , and such intercessions therein vsed , that he was faigne to make two , the better to cumply with his owne obligation , and their importunitie . and of the catholicke queene donna isabel , it is said , that when she gouerned the state , together with king don fernando , her husband , there fell by chance a paper from forth her sleeue , wherein shee had written with her owne hand ; let the cryars place of such a citie be bestowed vpon such a one , for that he hath the best voice . and if in so meane an office , these catholicke and prudent princes had such great care and respect to the qualities of the persons ; what care ought there to bee had in those of iustice and gouernment ? what in ecclesiasticall dignities , which are the pillars of our sacred religion ? when the day of that strict and rigorous account shall come , which god shall require at their hands , they will then see how much this did import them . let then the finall resolution of this question be , that supposing that the naturall inclination of fauourites , is to benefit all , and that those that are nearest vnto them , for what respect soeuer it be , are to bee preferred vnto honours and offices , i will not straighten them so much , nor my words , and counsell , and seeme to be too much republike , and intire , in condemning all their actions ; for that it hath been a thing alwayes permitted to those that are put in such high places . but i would not haue it passe for a rule , in the prouision of publike offices , through which haue past such persons as well vnderstood what belonged to state affaires , and the conseruation of kings , and their kingdomes , and that were complete in all kinde of good learning and knowledge ; who witting , that those , who had power with their kings , would fauour those that were theirs , out of that inclination which is common to all men , haue not stickt to say , that this may be done , but with this consideration , that it bee not to the hurt of the commonwealth . for there is not that ground , plant , or man , so barren , but hath some vertue in it , and is good for some ministrie or other . in confirmation whereof , wee are likewise to consider , that in naturall things , there is not any so vile , and so base , which alwayes , and at all times is vnprofitable . and there are some cases , wherein experience hath taught the profit , that may be taken therefro , for the vse and conseruation of mans life . and on the other side , there is nothing so precious , so estimable , and so wholsome , which is alwayes , and at all times , profitable . for there are some , as also some infirmities , which would proue mortall , should they bee applyed vnto them . and therefore mans prudence doth come to consist in this , to know it's qualitie , and to vnderstand aright the estate and complexion of the man , and according thereunto to make vse thereof , and of it's vertue . and therefore hee that hath ( by his kings fauour ) the supreme disposall of all , let him consider and know , either by himselfe , or by others that are his confident friends , ( being as free , as free may bee , from naturall affections ) the dispositions and inclinations of men , and together with this , the qualitie of the offices , and persons , which are to gouerne , and bee gouerned ; and let him imply euery one in that , for which hee shall bee found fit and good . and keeping this course , he shall cumply with his owne inclination , and naturall desires . and shall therein do his king and countrey good seruice . but for a conclusion and vpshot of all that is past , let those aduertisements serue , which follow in the subsequent chapter . chap. xxxvii . the conclusion of the former discourse , with some aduertisements for kings and fauourites . all those that write of the qualities of a good prince , doe agree in this , that he ought to haue his will free , independent , subiect onely to god , and his diuine law ; without subiecting , or submitting it to any other loue . for it booteth little , that he be lord of many kingdomes , if he be a slaue to that which hee extremely loueth . that he ought to bee of a good courage , and of a sound and setled iungement , not suffering a superiour , or equall in his gouernment . for ( as wee said in the beginning of this discourse ) kingdomes are by so much the more sustained , and augmented , by how much the more neare they approach to the gouernment of one . whereas on the contrary , they runne much hazard , when the reynes of the empire are diuided , and put into seuerall hands . the romanes neuer enioyed so much peace and plenty , as after that augustus caesar was declared sole lord of the empire , without dependance on any other . which aduise ( amongst many other good instructions ) the emperour charles the fifth gaue likewise vnto the king his sonne , to wit , that he should be a very precise louer of truth ; that hee should not giue himselfe ouer vnto idlenesse ; and that he should alwayes shew himselfe a free and independant king ; not onely in apparence , but in substance . for it is very proper vnto kings to rule , not to be ruled . and to administer their kingdomes themselues by their owne will , and not by anothers . for he will not be said to be a king , who being to command , and correct all , should easily suffer himselfe to be led away , and gouerned by others . and therefore it is fit , that hee should alwayes stand vpon his owne bottome , and in none of his actions expresse himselfe to depend on the aide and opinion of others . for this were to acknowledge a superiour , or a companion in gouernment , and to discouer his owne weaknesse . infirma enim est potentia ( saith patritius ) quae alienis viribus nititur : that 's but a poore power , that must bee vnder-propt by the strength of others . in stead whereof , i would haue him to fit in councell , and to treate and communicate businesses with such persons to whom it appertaineth , as heretofore i said . saying onely now , that that king is in a miserable and lamentable case , that must depend on anothers helpe . vpon a certaine occasion , alexander the great said ; se malle mori , quam regnarerogando : that he had rather die , then raigne by supplicating and intreating . and no otherwise doth that king raigne , who shewes himselfe a coward , and suffers the excellencie of his courage to bee ouerwhelmed and carried away with the current of hard and difficult things , which many times offer themselues , leauing the resolution of all to the mercie and fauour of others , by whose helping hand it seemeth that he liueth and raigneth . this ( said the emperour vespasian ) is to dye standing . and as that king is dead , which leaues that to another which hee can doe himselfe , and which doth properly appertaine vnto his office ; and as he shall not truly cumply with his obligation , if he should go about to draw solely to himselfe the gouernment of his whole kingdome ; much lesse in like manner shall he cumply therewith , if hee should cast off all care from himselfe , and relye wholly vpon others . for extreames , in all things , are ill . and an extreme thing it were , that hee should take vpon himselfe the whole weight and burthen of businesses , and to haue all things passe through his owne hands ; it being likewise no lesse , if he should shift off all from his owne shoulders , and put his hand to nothing , as did vitellius , and iouinianus , who did in such sort dis-loade themselues of their offices , and ridde their hands of all matter of gouernment , that all was ordered and gouerned by other mens arbitrement , and none of theirs . of the former it is reported , that he forgot that hee was emperour . and of the other , that hee intended nothing but eating and drinking , gaming and whoring . so that both of them came to such miserable ends , as their retchlesse and carelesse kinde of liuing had deserued . childericke , king of france , and third of that name , is ( and not without iust cause ) condemned by the writers of those times , for that hee did wholly quit himselfe of businesses , and led so idle and vnprofitable a life , that he tooke care of nothing , recommending all to his great fauourite pipine , who did rule and gouerne him as hee listed . and there was not any meeting or conuersation throughout the kingdome , wherein men did not mutter and murmure at it . for their nimble and actiue nature could by no meanes indure , that their king should be but the shadow of a king , and stand for a cypher , sheltering himselfe vnder the shade of another . which could not choose ( considering how vsuall a thing it is ) but put spirit into pipine , and adde mettall to his power . for it is very proper to the condition of men , the more high they are in place and dignitie , to desire the more honour , and the more wealth . there are but few of your great and powerfull persons , which are not hydropicall , and doe not thirst after new honours , and new aduancements ; and some haue proceeded so farre in their pretensions , that they haue presumed ( as this fauourite did ) to quit the king of his crowne . willingly hearkening vnto those flatterers about him , which did whisper this in his eare , and egge him on vnto it . it likewise began to bee treated of amongst the great lords of that kingdome , how much better command and rule were in one head , then in two : and how that all kingdomes had euermore a desire to haue but one prince ; and that all prudent and wise men , haue ( in reason of state ) held this gouernment to be the best and surest ; and that it was not fit , that the vniforme body of a commonwealth , or kingdome , should bee subiect and obedient to two heads : to wit , that one should enioy the name and title of king , and the other possesse the power . and that it were better that all should obey one , that had wisedome and experience , and that had beene bred vp in businesses , and the mannaging of state-affaires , whereby to gouerne them in peace and iustice. and sithence , that in pipine these qualities did concurre , and that on him all the businesses of importance did depend , it were good that hee should bee their king , and that childericke should take his ease and pleasure . hereupon they treated with pipine , who though hee gaue eare vnto what they said , yet would not rashly aduenture himselfe to accept of the crowne , vnlesse pope zacharias might first be consulted therein . whereupon they sent their embassadours , who had instruction to render such reasons to the pope , that might moue him to approue thereof , and iudging childericke to bee vnfit for the gouernment , might absolue the french of their oath which they had taken , and that obedience which they ought to their king , and that he should depriue him of the kingdome , and further declare , that since pipine did rule and command all , and had so many good indowments , that hee might likewise be inuested with the title of king. and the archbishop of maguncia was the man , that was nominated to set the crowne on his head , and to declare him to bee king of all france . being thus back't , they summoned a parliament , degraded the poore seely king , and thrust him into a monastery , and pipine was sworne and proclaimed king of those so many kingdomes and signories , as were then subiect to the crowne of france . hence had it's first beginning , and that hand and power giuen vnto popes , in so great a businesse , as the setting vp and pulling downe of kings ; and which is more , of creating new emperours , and depriuing the old ones of their empire . whereof there are many examples . and that which this pope did with that king , who had no more then that vmbratill , and apparent power , other popes afterwards did the like with henries and fredericks , and other tyrants of great puisance and power . the one offend in the more : the other in the lesse . the one , out of the ambition that they haue to bee kings , that they may command , and doe all , loose all , and so go to hell . and the other go the same way , for that they will not bee ( as they should be ) kings , but giue themselues wholly vnto idlenesse . it was the emperour galba's vtter ouerthrow , that he had put the whole gouernment into onely three mens hands , which he brought along with him , possessing them with so much power , that hee was not master of himselfe , depending still vpon their wil , and through that great authoritie which they had , they ouerthrew all whatsoeuer their king did ordaine , thrusting their armes ( as we say ) vp to the elbowes in all affaires , and making vse of their present fortune , and for that this vnfortunate emperour could take notice of no more , then what hee had from them ; for none ( without their permission ) could , or see , or speake with him , they made him to do that , which that other potter did , who going about to make a pot , to boyle meate in , made a larre , to put drinke in . and he thinking to substitute iudges , that should administer iustice , appointed theeues in their place , which robbed the commonwealth . all which was imputed vnto him . and for that vanity is the mother of so many vices , all this their great fauour serued to no other vse , but to cause their soueraigne to commit many actions of iniustice , and indiscretion , and of vnheard of , and vnthought of wrongs , violently breaking through the ordinary course of iustice. by which exorbitant proceedings , this imprudent emperour grew to be hated and abhorred of all , and not being able longer to beare with him , they depriued him at once of his life , and empire . and these kinde of caterpillars ( said the emperour sigismund ) make those kings vnfortunate , that put their affiance in them . at this carelesse ward , liued at first agesilaus , king of the lacedemonians , though afterwards ( like a wise prince ) hee did rectifie this errour . and the case was this ; hee let his friend and fauourite lisander carry a great hand ouer him , and did honour him in all that he could , expressing alwayes much loue vnto him ; lysander puft vp herewith , tooke great state vpon him , being attended with a great traine , and manifesting in his very gate a kinde of extraordinary grauitie and maiestie , and all did so farre forth serue and obey him , that it seemed he had vsurped the dignitie royall , and the empire , leauing good honest agesilaus onely the bare titulary name of king. which his maiestie taking into his consideration , to the end that the people might not say , that hee raigned by lysanders helpe , he withdrew the dispatch of businesses fromforth his hands , and would not remit any thing vnto him , and if he spake to him touching this or that businesse , he made as if he did not heare him , or not well vnderstand him , dispatching all himselfe , to the good contentment of his subiects . hereupon lysander began to cast vp his accounts with himselfe , and forbore from that time forward to conferre fauours , or to promise offices ; and told such suiters as came vnto h●m , that they should go themselues to petition the king , and would by no meanes permit , that they should accompany him to court , as before . and yet notwithstanding all this , he assisted very carefully in all such seruices , as were by his maiesty recommended vnto him , without any the least shew of discontentment . within a while after occasion was offered vnto him to speake with the king ; and talking with him , hee told him ; o king , how well hast thou learned to make thy friends lesse ? yes ( quoth the king ) when they will make themselues too great . the king played his part well , so did the fauourite , and all ought to doe the like . kings must bore a hole in that ship with their owne hand , to stop it's course , when it hoyseth it's sayles too high , and goes with too still a gale . for the taking notice of their fauourites ambition , is that ballast , which doth secure them against those their windes , and puffes of vanitie . let then the first aduice , and which is of greatest importance for kings and christian kingdomes , bee that which ( amongst other ) the catholicke king of spaine , and emperour charles the fifth , left vnto his sonne king philip the second , wherein with many indeared and effectuall words , he recommends vnto him the obseruing , augmenting , and defending of the christian faith , in all his kingdomes , states , and signiories , seuerely punishing with all rig●ur and iustice , without exception of persons , all such as should bee either suspected or found culpable in points of heresies , errours , and depraued sects , contrary to the catholicke saith . for therein consisteth all our good words , all of them , worthie consideration , and worthy so catholicke a prince , esteemed , approued , and perpetually obserued by his most happie sonne ( howbeit to his great cost . ) as one , that knew very well , that in the obseruance of religion , and catholicke faith , all the happinesse that we can hope for in this or that other life , dependeth thereupon , and hath it 's sure ground and foundation . and therefore saint paul calls it substantiam rerum sperandarum , &c. faith is the substance of things hoped for , and the euidence of things not seene , &c. for it is the foundation whereupon is built in our soules all our spirituall good : insomuch that the selfe same apostle said , sine fide , &c. without faith it is impossible to please god. and seeing it is a iewell of such great worth and value , kings are to make that esteeme of it , that they doe not onely retaine it , but maintaine and defend it , especially in their owne kingdomes , and in all other places , where they haue any power . for besides the obligation , which they haue , as christian kings , it concernes them likewise in their owne proper interest . for in giuing way to their subiects , that they be not faithfull vnto god , it will pull that punishment vpon them , that they shall not be loyall vnto them . and most certaine it is , that they who shall not cumply with the greater obligation , shall easily faile in the lesser . and this is made cleare vnto vs in the sacred history of the kings ; where , whosoeuer shall diligently obserue the same , hee shall finde , that after ieroboam , king of israel , had set vp those idolls in dan , and bethel , of purpose to withdraw the people from the true worship of god , were commenced and continued ( as there wee may reade ) the treasons and rebellions of the subiects against their kings . for this vnfortunate prince thought with himselfe , that for to settle and secure himselfe in the kingdome by those ten tribes , which had rebelled , and made choice of him for their king , that it would be a good meanes to induce them to his deuotion , to draw them to forgo the adoration of the true god , which they were wont to performe in the holy citie , and temple of ierusalem , and to humble and prostrate themselues before those idolls . but the iust vengeance of god ouertooke him ; for instantly thereupon he lost his eldest sonne , who dyed a violent death . for baasha , the sonne of ahijah , of the house of issachar , conspired against him , and smote him at gibbethon , and anon after all the house of ieroboam , not leauing vnto him any that breathed . and not onely hee , and his , did miscarry , but the whole kingdome was laid waste and desolate for that sinne , and led away captiue . and as when one man hath receiued from another some extraordinary great wrong , he can hardly forget it : so , vpon all occasions , wherein mention is made of the sinnes of the kings , which afterwards succeeded , and of the punishment which they deserued for them , still is the remembrance reuiued of this most grieuous sinne of ieroboams , and are attributed vnto him , as being the first that opened the gappe vnto them . and all those troubles which are there particularly set downe in those sacred bookes , befell that kingdome for a punishment to them , and a warning to all christian kings , that by how much the greater light they haue for to know the excellencie of faith , and the truth of christian religion , so much the lesse are they to be obeyed , and the more seuerely to bee punished , if they should be wanting to so great and so apparent an obligation . let christian kings therefore know , that if they shall continue firme in the faith , and cause all their subiects to continue constant therein , god will protect both king and people , and will establish their kingdomes , and all shall obey and feare them ; but if they shall faile therein , all runs to wracke , and vtter ruine . so that , as a naile , if you will haue it to hold , must be fastened in some other thing that is firme and strong , lest it , and all that hangs thereon , come tumbling downe to the ground , so in like manner , if a king will vphold himselfe firme and sure in his power , maiestie , and greatnesse , hee must be firmely fixed to the faith , strongly vnited with god , and close wedged to his diuine will : but if he begin once to sinke , or shrinke in this , all his kingdomes , or whatsoeuer depend thereon , come tumbling downe to the ground , with a sudden and fearefull fall . for nothing doth more vphold a sociable life , a monarchie , and kingdome , then religion linked with iustice. noah for his religion and iustice , was after the flood obeyed by all . the romans , for the vpholding and inlarging of their empire , held not any meanes comparable to that of religion and iustice , wherein they surpassed all of those times . the emperour seuerus being at the point of death ( which is a time for men to speake truth ) ended his life with these words , firmum impe●ium filijs meis relinquo , si boni erunt ; imbecille , si mali : a strong empire leaue i to my sonnes , if they proue good ; a weake , if bad . for the greatest force and strength of a kingdome , both for the present , and the future , is the vertue of it's king . so that with no lime and sand are the walls and foundations of states more firme and surely setled for lasting and continuance , then with a kings vertue and goodnesse . which is that recompence and reward which god promised to his most faithfull seruant dauid , for his vertue . firmaboregnum eius , & stabiliam thronum regni eius in sempiternum : i will establish his kingdome , and i will stablish the throne of his kingdome for euer . that is , the title and dignitie of a king should bee continued and confirmed vnto him , tanquam in vsum & proprietatem , for euer and euer . this firmnesse in the faith , and this obseruance of religion and iustice , are those strong pillars and columnes , which being truly cumplyed withall , do not onely vphold for the present , but doe likewise increase and perpetuate kingdomes . if good king iehosaphat had not entred into league and amitie with king ahab the idolater , it had not fallen out with him so ill as it did , nor his life beene put to that danger as it was . iudas machabeus heard tell of the great and famous deeds that the romanes had done in feates of armes , being a stranger-nation to gods people . whereupon he sent his ambassadours vnto them , to make a perpetuall league and confederation with them . wherewith god was much displeased , and so hurtfull vnto them was this amitie and alliance , that many haue obserued , that after this peace was concluded betweene them , iudas neuer after obtained any victory ouer his enemies , but was flaine in the first battell that he fought . and some say , the like succeeded to both his brothers , ionathan and simeon . let vs draw then from this discourse and sound aduice of this catholike emperour , how much it importeth kings to maintaine their faith and religion , and to conserue and vphold the same in all their kingdomes and dominions . now for to conserue the faith , it is likewise requisite , that there be great care had in procuring , that the commonwealth be purged and cleansed of it's vices and sinnes . for ( as the apostle saint paul saith ) when vices grow to that head and ranknesse , that they come to make men to be of a bad and corrupt conscience , they go disposing such to suffer shipwracke in the faith ; as it hath happened in these our times , in many parts of europe . the second aduice that i shall giue vnto kings , is , that they carry themselues so in the dispatch of businesses , that notice may not bee taken , that they are dispatched by any other arbitrement , but their owne . for most certaine it is , that if it come to be knowne , that all the orders that come forth , passe through the fauourites hands , and as hee shall giue direction , they loose much of their force and efficacie ; and the king much of his reputation and credit . his subiects will grow to contemne him ; and strangers will make little reckoning of him ; and many other mischiefes will ensue thereupon . amongst the romanes it was held for a great affront and dishonour , that the emperour should dispatch ( as they say ) porcarta-pacio , by a note booke , or some penn'd thing for him ; or ( like some young practitioner in physicke ) by his masters recipes . and therefore in those generall processions , which they made , they besought god that hee would not punish them , by giuing them princes , which had need to be ruled and guided by gouernours and tutors . for they knew well enough , that when god is angry , offended with the sinnes of the people , he punisheth them , by sending them princes without knowledge and wisedome ; that are not able to gouerne of themselues , but to doe as others shall aduise them . wherein they did confesse and acknowledge , that to be a king , consisteth in being knowne and reuerenced of all ; to be an independant lord , not relying vpon any other ; whose mandates and decrees all should subscribe vnto and obey ; whom all should seeke vnto , with whom all should negociate , that are pretenders ; from whose liberalitie , resolution , and will , they onely should acknowledge all the graces and fauours that are done them , and from no other hand . for if they should giue way thereunto , their subiects will bee induced easily to beleeue , that together with this , they will giue away their greatnesse , and minister occasion to loose that common loue and respect which solely and properly is due vnto them . for subiects vsually honour no other sunne , but that from which they receiue their light . they naturally abhorre that man , that does them hurt ; and loue that person , who does them good , bee he what hee will be , good or bad , all is one . they call god optimum maximum , because he both doth , and is able to do them good . and he himselfe doth glory therein , as being vnwilling that men should acknowledge the good they receiue , from any other . what wisedome then can there bee in that king , that shall suffer a fauourite to haue all the thankes , and all the honour and glory of those fauours and rewards , whereof he is the owner and donor ? reseruing for himselfe nothing but the scorne and contempt of his subiects , then the which there is no miserie can be greater ? god forbid that kings should permit any such lessening of their power and authoritie , which is the necessariest thing that can bee , for the conseruation of their estates and kingdomes . likewise in regard of their owne proper particular , it will be a very good lesson for them ; for if their subiects are beholding for the good they receiue , vnto another , they will loue him more then them ; and when occasion shall serue , will not sticke to shew it , though it bee to their owne hurt . examples hereof , there are good store amongst those ancient kings and kingdomes of elder times , that by this meanes haue beene ouerthrowne and brought to ruine . we finde it storied , that the emperour claudius , at the intercession and instance of agrippina , made such a one generall of his army ; cornelius tacitus toucheth vpon this mysterie , and saith of him , that hee was a man of much fame and renowne , and very expert in militarie discipline ; yet knowing very well withall , by whose good will and furtherance , that command was conferred vpon him , he could not ( when occasion should offer ) bee behinde hand for so great an honour done vnto him , but recompence it to the vtmost of his power . such great places of imployment ought to be bestowed by no hand , but by kings , and that immediately , lest another may go away with the thankes . and he shall doe well , if hee take the like course in all other offices that are in his gift ; for ( if it were possible ) it is fit that all should stand bound and obliged to him . let kings likewise bee aduised , that they carry a watchfull eye ouer those that are ambitious , which are either so naturally , or by conuersing and communicating with others , are made so ( for this is an infectious disease ) and the more , the more it taketh hold on great persons , and men of an extraordinary spirit ; for they are as dangerous as theeues , where there is store of treasure to bee had . for questionlesse such kinde of men do vsually labour to increase their estate . for it is very naturall to this passion , as to those other affections , neuer to giue ouer , till they come to the end and full satisfaction of that which their appetite or desire representeth vnto them : neither the law of god , nor of thankfulnesse , sufficing to moderate their mindes , and to keepe them within the due and lawfull bounds of their dutie . in that houre , and in that very instant of their rising , nay , before they come to that greatnesse , there is little trust to be giuen vnto them ; for nothing workes vpon them , but their proper honour and profit . and all the rest they esteeme as nothing , in comparison of bettring their owne fortune . but if of necessitie some must bee raised to honour ; si quem extollere oporteat ( saith the philosopher ) non tamen eum , qui sit moribus audax . nam huinsmodi homines aptissimi sunt ad inuadendum circa res omnes : let them not be of base and meane condition , nor such as are naturally proud and haughty , for being vainely transported with their fauour and priuacie , they thinke with themselues , that they haue already clapt a nayle in fortunes wheele , and that they cannot fall from the top of their felicitie . and being thus blinded with their ambition , there is not any thing which they dare not aduenture on . let kings therefore well weigh and consider with themselues , what manner of men they put into great places , and neare about their persons , that they may relye more on the goodnesse of their nature and disposition , then on the law of obligation and thankfulnesse ; for these are but weake bonds , and easily broken . and because i know not whether i shall hereafter come to light vpon the like occasion , i will here propose that question , which is disputed and doubted of by some ( and may likewise serue for an auiso vnto kings ) whether it be better that the great lords should be farre off from them , or neare about them ? the emperour charles the fifth ( of famous memory ) amongst other aduertisements which hee gaue to his sonne philip , one was , that he should not let the great offices of the kingdome , nor places of great command rest any long time in one mans hands , nor should put his grandes and great lords into them , but gentlemen of good qualitie , such as were creatures of his owne making . and as for his grandes , hee should honour them with some places and offices neare about his person , which would be a greater grace both to himselfe and his court. others are of a quite contrary opinion , and alledge reasons for the maintenance thereof . great men ( they say ) if they be not like those little ones , which christ speaketh of , are ordinarily of an extraordinary spirit , and endeauour , all they can , increase of honour , till they come to occupie the highest place . and then will it bee seene , of what little esteeme are those great fauours which they haue already receiued . there is not that friendship , that kindred , nor any other bond , be it neuer so strong , which is not broken , through the greedy ambition of ascending to some higher throne . for to bee a king ( saith euripides ) all law is broken . for this appetite is of that force and strength , that it breaketh all lawes , both diuine and humane . for proofe whereof , they cite many examples , which i purposely omit , that i may not offend , and tire out the reader . all of them admonishing kings , that they should throughly weigh and consider where , and in what places they put them . for if they be neare about their royall person , it is the torment of tantalus vnto them , to see the water and the fruit so neare their mouth ( that greatnesse and power i meane ) and not to enioy it ; which will but prouoke a more hungry appetite in those which doe not possesse it , and will breake through hedge and ditch , and runne ( as they say ) through fire and water transported with this so faire and beautifull a prize , as is set before their eyes ; neuer being at quiet till they come to enioy it . for there is not that loue to any thing here vpon earth , which doth so much alter , suspend , and seaze on the minde and h●art of man , as that of ruling and commanding , and to grow great therein . and when they see things succeed not according to their minde , yet at least in satisfaction of their enuie , they will be well content that the waters should be troubled , and the world be turned topsie-turuy , taking pleasure therein , though it be to their owne hurt . and what king can secure himselfe , that such ambitious persons , being neare about him , will not at one time or other attempt their ends . for greatnesse ( say they ) after that it is once possessed , quits the memory of the meanes , whereby it came to bee so great , and findes a thousand excuses for it's weaknesse in offending . and the rather , for that ill vse hath taught all men this lesson ; that the reputation of an honest man is not to be preferred before his proper profit and greatnesse . lastly , they say , that he that ouercommeth , and makes good his clayme by his sword , needeth not to study excuses , and to make apologies ; let those doe that , that haue the worst end of the staffe , and stand at the mercy of the conquerour . in conclusion , they resolue this question thus ; that it is very fit that your great noble-men should rather liue farre from court , then neare about their king. for all of them will be of good vse , for the gouernment of prouinces and armies , whereby both the one and the other will be secured . and when they cannot content them in all that they would haue , they may entertaine them with these , which will be a good meanes to diuert their thoughts , and to bridle those prouinces that are committed to their charge , with whom the maiestie and greatnesse of their gouernours will be able to doe much . and there they are not of that danger . for in kingdomes by succession , and well setled , and where there is no colour of wresting the scepter out of the bloud-royall , there is no feare of trusting the grandes , and great noblemen with these kinde of gouernments , but it is rather requisite that it should be so . for , like vnto starres in heauen , and their influences on earth , they serue for ornament and conuersation in those kingdomes and prouinces , wherein there are ancient and noble houses , for which they are to seeke out men of noble bloud , and good qualitie , and of knowne greatnesse , to bee conuersant amongst them . for the nobilitie of those kingdomes and prouinces will thinke themselues not well dealt withall , if they shall haue but an ordinary man set ouer them to be their gouernour , be he neuer so wise , or neuer so valiant . for being that they are to attend all at the gates of him that holdeth that place , they may esteeme it as an iniurie to see themselues obliged , to acknowledge homage vnto him , whom out of that place they would scarce vouchsafe him their companie . besides , that greatnesse and largenesse of minde and heart , that knowes not how to shrinke , or be deiected with aduerse fortune ( a thing so necessary in him that gouernes ) will sooner bee found in these , then men of meaner ranke . for ( as saint ierome saith ) hee that owes much to his bloud and familie , will alwayes beare that obligation about him , and neuer faile therein . againe , he that is borne to command , will be lesse insolent in his gouernment , as hauing that noble qualitie from his cradle ; and the people on the other side will more willingly obey him , whom they haue alwayes knowne to haue liued in honour and greatnesse : and his example will bee of greater importance , to reforme the disorders and abuses that shall there be offered . ouer and aboue , they further adde , that your grandes and great noblemen , may , and haue obligation to content themselues with their present estate , if they will but weigh the difference of that it was , with that which it is now , did not men that are now in honour grow forgetfull of their former meane condition . that grieuing them more , which falls short of their desire , then that doth please and content them , which fortune hath with so liberall a hand bestowed on them . for no man rests contented with his present estate and condition ; nor doe we esteeme that so much which wee possesse , as the lacke of that we desire , doth torment vs. and therefore doe they say , that they are not so good to be about kings , and more particularly those which are so qualified ; for they are like a lingring kinde of calenture , or aguish feuer , which makes an end of vs before we are aware of it , working it's effect , before wee can looke into the cause . or like vnto the hand in a clocke , or dyall , which tells out the houre , and strikes , without perceiuing how it moues or goes . or like vnto those plants of your tallest trees , which grow to their full height , whilest neither our eyes , nor our vnderstanding can scarce comprehend , how this comes to passe , so insensibly doth it sproute and shoot vp . this is the question , and these , in briefe , the conueniences , which ( for mine owne part ) i know not what they are , vnlesse such conueniences as are proper to euery one in their owne estate . but be it as it may be , and let them say what they list , let kings resolue by the illumination of that light which they haue from heauen , on that which shall be best for them . that which i say , is this , that it will well become them to liue with a great deale of warinesse and circumspection , and not to trust or relye too much vpon fortune . for this lady , howbeit sometimes shee suffers her selfe to bee commanded by them , yet now and then she ouerrules them , as she doth the rest . and therefore it shall bee good discretion and prudence , to feare both her , and her frequent mutabilities and changings , as it behoueth euery man to doe the like . for she , without any respect or distinction of persons , will oftentimes lash out from that way and course wherein she is , and runne a quite contrary bias , and commit the current of those effects to time and nature . let kings likewise take heed , that they doe not put offended persons into such places , where they may reuenge themselues ; for a receiued wrong or iniurie leaues still some roots behinde , which , when occasion is offered , will bud forth most bitter and venemous plants . nor are there any rewards , or benefits , be they neuer so great , that can blot out the print of that impression , which an iniurie stampeth in the minde and heart of man. courtesies are soone forgotten by them ; for it seemeth a troublesome thing vnto them , to endure the weight and burthen of so great a debt and obligation ; but a receiued wrong or iniurie , that shall euer be remembred , because they hold reuenge to be the character of courage , and the badge of a noble minde and braue spirit . puluere , qui laedit , scribit , sed marmore laesus : he that does a wrong , writes it downe in dust ; but he that receiues it , in marble . tacitus teacheth vs to know this minde of man , and it's passions ; telling vs that the greatest and strongest inclination in man , is to receiue satisfaction of the iniuries done vnto them , for thankfulnesse lyes as a heauy loade vpon them ; whereas they make light of those benefits they receiue . esteeming the latter to be a diminution of their greatnesse ; and the former , to wit , reuenge , to bee a great gaine vnto them ; for they imagine , that they gaine thereby in their authoritie , in their reputation , and in the manifestation of their valour , when the world shall take notice that they haue righted themselues . such as these can neither bee good as they are fauourites , nor as they are councellers . for out of the desire and pleasure they take in reuenge , they will rather aduise that which shall seeme conuenient for the execution thereof , then for the authoritie and profit of the prince , whom they aduise . they will aduise him ( i say ) to venture himselfe vpon some voyage , to enter into a warre , to go himselfe into the field with a royall army , or to vndergo some dangerous enterprise , for the better effecting of their designes , plotting a thousand mischiefes to bring him vnto ruine . and let them say what they will , yet shall they neuer perswade me , that this proceeds out of the loue which they beare vnto their king , and his increase of honour , but out of hatred to his person , & their owne proper satisfaction , thinking that by that meanes they may worke their reuenge . and hereunto i adde , that no man can bee found of so perfect a minde , of so temperate a nature , and so vertuous , but that in the first place he will treate of his owne businesse ; and that treating of this particular , the eye of his thought still ayming to hit this white , will not sticke to aduenture any danger in hope of reuenge . and therefore i shall aduise kings , that of necessitie must sometimes giue eare and credit to these or the like persons , if they chance to bee preferred to great places , that they be very carefull how farre forth they trust them , for they are a dangerous kinde of people , vnsafe , and more couetous of their owne priuate interest , then carefull of the publike perill , or common hurt . for this loue vnto themselues , and hatred vnto others , couered and strewed ouer with the cloud and ashes of iniuries and offences , either receiued or conceiued , doth reuiue and quicken the coales by those blasts of fauour and greatnesse that are blowne on them ; procuring ( though to others cost ) to vphold themselues therein , and to ingage kings in that which they pretend for their reuenge and satisfaction . god shield and protect kings from such persons , as shall with the snake take vp their poyson againe , to vent the venome of their rancour and reuenge vpon an old quarrell ; and let them likewise take heed , how they imploy their forces , and their power , in countenancing and protecting those whom they haue offended and discontented . this ( saith the said emperour charles the fifth ) is an aduice of great importance , for the safetie , quietude , and good gouernment of kingdomes , states , and signiories ; which for that they are so many , so great , and so farre distant one from another , it is impossible that they should be visited by your selfe in person , so often as is requisite : and therefore i aduise you , that you haue a great care that your viceroyes and gouernours that shall be sent thither , be such , and of such parts , as shall conuene for such an imployment , men of experience , and conscience , of wisedome , prudence , and discretion , and well seene in matters of state and gouernment : well disposed , and free from couetousnesse , briberie , and corruption ; seeking out rather men for offices , then offices for men . lastly , let them be such persons , from whom you may receiue that good satisfaction , that by their residence there may bee found no misse of their kings presence ; for this is properly to bee vice-royes . moreouer , you must instruct them in that which appertaineth vnto them , for the good gouernment of the commonwealth , and those subiects which are committed to their charge , maintaining them in equall iustice , and good manners , giuing them good example by their owne blamelesse conuersation . there is nothing that doth so much oblige vassals and subiects to keepe the statutes and lawes which are ordained , as to see them well kept and obserued by their betters ; and so it is , that it is vniustly commanded , which hee that commands keepes not himselfe , if that which is commanded be good . and being good , why should it not be good for him to keepe it , that commands it ? for ( as baldus saith ) though the king be not lyable to the law , yet is hee lyable to the rules of reason . this pious emperour goes on , and willeth his sonne , that he should strictly recommend to his vice-roys charge , the protecting , sheltring , and relieuing of the poore , the defending of the fatherlesse and widow , and those that are destitute of friends , and haue none to helpe them . whom some , that are in place and authoritie , are wont ( and i feare is too ordinary amongst them ) to disfauour and disesteeme them , making little or no reckoning at all of them . being ignorant how vile and base a thing it is , and how heroycall the contrary , and how much in imitation of god , to put forth a charitable and pitifull hand to him that is brought low , and fallen into miserie , assisting him in his afflictions and troubles , freeing him from wrongs and iniuries , whose shield and buckler , he that gouernes , ought to be . and he closes vp this aduertisement with wishing him to be very carefull , that his viceroys and gouernours exercise their offices as they ought , and not to exceed the instructions that are giuen them , nor to vsurpe beyond their authoritie , giuing them this prouiso , that in doing the contrary , he shall thinke that he is ill serued by them , and that hee giue order to haue it remedied and amended , by his displeasure , and their punishment . and howbeit it be true , that he ought not to giue credit to all the complaints which are made against such his ministers ( which are seldome wanting ) yet in no hand that he should refuse to heare them , and vnderstand them , in forming himselfe fully of the truth . for the not doing of it , will but minister occasion vnto them , to be more absolute , and to the subiects to grow desperate , seeing themselues oppressed by iniustice and vnconscionable dealing . likewise when kings send an embassadour to another prince , they must looke well into the qualitie of the person whom they send . for in such an embassage he doth not onely treate of the businesses for which hee goes , but likewise of the honour and authoritie of the king , which sends him . and therefore it is necessary that the persons that are nominated and declared to go on embassage , haue many of those qualities , which we haue mentioned in vice-roys and councellours of state. for if they shall not fill that place with the greatnesse of their good abilities , it will be a great lessening to the credit and reputation of the king , and the businesses will receiue much hinderance , if not vtterly bee ouerthrowne . the romanes did make a mocke of the teutones , counting them no better then fooles , for sending an embassadour vnto them that was a block-head , and of little or no experience . kings and great princes , all that , from which glory and greatnesse resulteth vnto them , they ought to doe it without any the least shew of vanitie , accompanying it with such circumstances and consequencies , that it may seeme onely to bee done for the common good , the exaltation of the commonwealth , and the reputation of their crowne . in all times and places they must represent much authoritie , grauitie , and maiestie in their persons , and in their treaties , mixing it with affabilitie and courtesie . to the end , that by the one they may cause feare and respect , and by the other quit and remoue that feare . it is reported of octauian the emperour , that all the embassadours that appeared in his presence , stood astonished betwixt feare and admiration ; but no sooner spake he vnto them , but they were wonderfully taken with his words , and did not then so much feare , as affect him . for albeit the maiestie wherewith hee receiued them , was exceeding great , yet was his carriage towards them very affable , and very courteous . in these two vertues , did excell that catholicke king of spaine , don philip the second , whom for the representing of maiestie , and regall authoritie , none did excell , and few equall . and in the carriage and composition of his person , there was no defect to bee found . vpon any accident that befell him , were it good or bad , fortunate or vnfortunate , there was neuer any man that could perceiue in him so much as a discomposed countenance , or any other the least alteration . and hee may be truly said to be a man , who is not proud in prosperitie , nor impatient in aduersitie . for it is a great signe of noblenesse , and the vndoubted marke of a royall minde , and princely courage , not to loose himselfe in his aduerser fortunes , but to sh●w himselfe constant against fortune , and to raise vp his spirits , as this king did , being neuer deiected with any outward crosse or misfortune , tha befell him . he did neuer ( being therein like vnto xenophons cyrus ) shew an ill countenance , or speake an ill word vnto any man. hee was not so affable and familiar with his fauourites , that any of them all durst presume to petitio● him in any thing that was vniust ; nor yet so austere and feuere towards others as to make them to forbeare to preferre a iust suite vnto him . to his owne subiects he was kinde , to strangers noble ; but withall , reseruing still his authoritie and greatnesse . for kings ought not to bee so harsh and intractable , as to make themselues to bee abhorred ; nor so kinde and courteous , as to cause themselues to be contemned . indeauouring all they can , not to fall into the extreames , by shewing too much loue to some , and little or none at all to other some . for too much seueritie ingendreth hatred , and too much familiaritie breedeth contempt . let them generally beare themselues in that respectiue manner towards all , that they honour the better , loue the meaner sort , and despise not the rest ; but as farre as they are able , extend their grace and fauour vnto all . for that being but little , which they haue to giue , in comparison of the many that are sutors , and the great rewards which they pretend , they rest better satisfied with those good words , and mannerly answers , that are giuen them , then with those fauours that are done them . for the generous hearts , modest countenances , and ingenious dispositions of those noble spirits which follow princes courts , much more risent the disfauour that is done them in receiuing courtesies with disgrace , then if they were denyed them . and therefore it is good wholesome counsell , and much importing kings , to returne a faire and equall answer vnto all , according to each mans qualitie and merit , and that they carry the same euen hand in the conferting of their fauours , and in the manifestation of their loue . and if they shall in a more particular manner , expresse the same to some one particular person , let him likewise more particularly deserue it . for neuer shall that loue be stedfast , where deserts are wanting in the partie beloued . i shall likewise aduertise kings , that they doe not make such vse of this their great both office and power , as to assume vnto themselues to be absolute , and to cumply in all things with their affections and desires , nor to exercise any other personall passion . for the vse and custome of absolute power is dangerous for kings , odious to the subiect , and offensiue both to god and nature . and for that the last kings of the romanes vsed this power , the name of king grew so hatefull , that those that afterwards succeeded in the romane gouernment , durst not take vpon them the name of kings , but that of emperours . which is by so much the more absolute , by how much imperare doth differ from regere . yet notwithstanding the people of rome did not so much feare this name of emperour , as that of king , because those , that last bore that name , exercised on them this their absolute power . so that it is not the name , nor the office , but the ill vsing thereof that makes it odious . for it is neither the title , nor the man , that moueth or altereth the honest meaning minde of the plaine downe right subiect , but deeds and actions , that are done contrary to all right and reason . whereas on the contrary , good vsage , and good treatment keepes them in loue and peace , and drawes them after him as it were in a string , and to offer vp for his sake a voluntary sacrifice of their liues . let kings consider that the crowne speakes as much , which they weare on their heads in forme of a sphericall round figure , which signifies limitem , or terminum , a limit or bound , or rather that circle , out of which it is not lawfull for them to go , no not one steppe . the crownes ( i say ) that they weare , are circles and limits , seruing to put them in minde , that their power is limited and measured out vnto them , that they may not passe the bounds of reason , nor doe any thing , but what is iust and lawfull . let the great kings and potentates of the earth moderate themselues , and refraine from making themselues gods , by exercising this their absolute power ; let them acknowledge ouer them a god , as well on earth , as in heauen . that hee may not grow wearie of their monarchies and their gouernments , as he did of that of the ancient romanes , and vtterly ouerthrow them , prouoked and incited thereunto by the abuse of humane power . for ( as seneca saith ) quod non potest , vult posse , qui nimium potest . but the god of heauen is very nice and tender in admitting companions in any kinde of manner whatsoeuer , but much more daintie in matter of iurisdiction and absolute power , punishing the same with grieuous chastisements , and many demonstrations of his fearefull anger and displeasure . aristotle saith , that through the gouernment of those that are too absolute in their rule and command , the gouernment is changed , kingdomes altered , and petty princes rise vp against them , who in such sort abate and bring downe their pride , that they come to serue those , whom before they did command . tully tearmes them , of all other , the most miserable , which make their will a law , and thinke that they may doe all that they can . nero did then leaue off to be cruell , when he vnderstood that he was permitted to doe what hee listed ; and that many did approue all his actions for good . it is the ancient language of adulation , to speake absolute power vnto princes , and to perswade them to follow their owne free will. but this is a very dangerous thing , if they once giue way thereunto , and l●t such flatteries dwell in their eares ; for the resolutions of such a power , will not suffer themselues to be so subiect , as they ought , to the iudgement of reason , nor humane discourse . in such a case , a power from heauen is more needfull . and this errour is now come to be in such request , that to agree in all things with the will and pleasure of kings , is now made in the minds of some , not onely a meanes of hope , but esteemed as a great seruice , and pledge of merit , to receiue honours and rewards . but this deceitfull meanes , whereby they thinke to thriue , shall ( when god shall see it fit ) be the onely knife to cut their throates ; for such kinde of men neuer escape punishment , and most commonly receiue it from their kings owne hand . in strange and extraordinary cases , and vpon iust occasions , and iustifiable meanes , kings may somewhat inlarge the limits of their power , so as they doe not go beyond that which reason and christian prudence permitteth . plato saith , that prudence and power are to embrace each other , and to walke hand in hand . qualities which ought to concurre in a good king , signified in that scepter with eyes , which ieremy saw , power being in the one , and wisdome in the other . and in that other old ancient portraiture of a good king , being a lion placed on the top of mercuries mace , which is a scepter with two snakes twining about it ; this , signifying prudence , and wisedome , and that fortitude ; which should neuer be separated from a king. by his power , he is feared , respected , and obeyed ; he commands , prohibites , and executes . by his wisedome , he auerreth the truth of his actions , and doth nothing , but what is lawfull . wisedome tempereth power ; and both together vphold the world . but if power forsake the fellowship of wisedome , it growes to be absolute , and runnes into a thousand indiscretions , and commits as many wrongs and iniuries , wherewith it desolateth and destroyeth euen the greatest states . for , there is not that ill , wherein power doth not exceed , if it haue not wisedome for it's bridle . and for that a powerfull hand is so dangerous a thing , nature hath ordained , and so ordered the businesse , that the braine where wisedome hath it's residence , should bee placed ouer it . which those ancient doctors amongst the gentiles did point at , when they placed minerua , the goddesse of wisedome , vpon iupiters head , who , of all the gods , is the most powerfull . and therefore it was well said of him , whosoeuer hee were that said , que vale mas saber , que auer , y poder : wealth and power are not comparable to wisedome . which saying is confirmed by the holy ghost , melior est sapientia , quam vires . et diuitias , nihil esse duxi in comparatione illius . wisedome is better then strength . i set more by her , then by kingdomes , and royall seates , and count riches nothing in comparison of her . the aduantage whereof , is signified in that hierogliffe of the cocke , who with his crowing , makes the lion to flie . as saint ambrose , and aelian haue well obserued . and that wise and iust man iob , doth much commend him for his knowledge and vnderstanding . and saint gregory declareth , that by him , is to bee vnderstood a wise , and prudent man , who taketh hold on a fit and conuenient time for businesses , and not onely aduiseth of , but preuenteth all dangers , and whatsoeuer hurt may befall . the particular and generall experience which we haue of histories , teacheth vs , how much it importeth for the conseruation and augmentation of a great empire and monarchie , that he , that is lord and master thereof ( if it lye diuided through diuers parts of the world , by seas , and enemies , in the midst thereof ) should striue and indeauour by all possible meanes to make himselfe likewise lord and master of the sea : for thereby shall he come to bee lord and master of the land. and an absolute dispenser of those things , wherewith we sustaine our selues , and liue . for by the helpe of nauigation , we passe from one part to another , and communicate of what they haue by way of commerce or otherwise . and by this meanes is made of many prouinces and kingdomes , yea , euen of the whole world , one sole citie and commonwealth . this was the counsell of themistocles , and plutarch makes it good , saying , let no man deceiue himselfe , in imagining with himselfe , that armies will suffice for to conserue himselfe , and to make himselfe lord of those kingdomes and prouinces , that haue the sea to friend . for if he be not likewise prouided , and well furnished with a strong fleete at sea , howbeit hee may with a land-armie ouercome the naturalls of those kingdomes or prouinces ; yet it is impossible for him , without the other , to make an intire conquest , and to go through with that which hee pretendeth . that disposeth the land to his will , and giueth lawes thereunto . the carthaginians ( saith polibius ) were not ignorant of what great consequence this was , for all kinde of businesses , and therefore aduiseth , that that which a prince ought to procure , whereby to come to be a great monarch , is , by a strong nauy , to make himselfe lord of the sea. for there are not any forces that worke such strange and great effects , or so much import , as these . and all your ancients held it for a maxime , that without the command at sea , there was nothing safe or secure on the land. archidamus a great captaine , and king of the lacedemonians , was wont to say ; that those that are to deale with a strong enemie , being powerfull at sea , need not to put themselues vpon the ficklenesse of fortune , but to place all their care in maintaining their nauie ; for with this alone , will they be able to wearie out the enemie , to quit him of the succour of their friends , to debarre him of nauigation , and of the commodities thereof , and vtterly by this to vndoe him . and ( which may seeme a thing impossible ) be able to beleaguer and girt in a whole kingdome , and to take it ( forcing it by famine and other wants ) as if it were onely one single citie that were besieged . for that ( as tacitus saith ) a strong fleete at sea , is the castle and magasine of victualls . and therefore the empire and signiorie of the sea , by a powerfull and commanding nauy , is held to bee of much more power and safetie , then your land-armies or citie-garisons , which of force must in the end yeeld vnto him , which shall become master of their ports , and thereby hinder them of all commerce and traffique , and humane communicat●on . and this was the aduice which that great monarch and emperour charles the fifth gaue likewise vnto his sonne , to whom hee left so many and such great kingdomes , so farre distant and diuided one from another , with such large and deepe seas . hee ( saith he ) that is or will bee master of them , must haue his fleetes still in a readinesse , well fitted and furnished , as well with good tall ships , well rigg'd and mann'd , and all other necessary prouision , as with store of gallies , for the safeguard and defence of his subiects , as also to resist and offend turkes , moores , and pyrats , because he cannot repose any confidence or assurance in those leagues and truces which he shall make with them . with this shall hee keepe them all in awe , when they shall see his great forces at sea , by which he may ( as it were in an instant ) from all parts send succours and reliefe , and whatsoeuer else shall bee needfull . and it will bee no lesse then a hard rayne , and cruell strong curbe , for to bridle and restraine the sinister intents and vaine pretensions of such as shall plot strange proiects , dangerous designes , and scandalous attempts . and vtterly to discourage them from vndergoing any enterprise , or to vndertake any action of aduenture , with hope of recouering such townes or prouinces as they haue lost , or by landing of their men to encroach vpon new . and say they should serue for no other vse , saue to hinder the excursions of pyrats , and sea-rouers , in these our seas , onely in regard of that , it could not choose but bee a matter of mighty consequence , and of wonderfull great importance , considering the daily incursions , losses , flaughters , the continuall captiuatings , and robberies , which they vsually commit vpon these our coasts ; so that if there were not a fitting preparation , and sufficient defence of ships and gallies , it were impossible for vs to occurre against those necessities , and to bee prouided against those new and strange accidents which may offer themselues in those estates , kingdomes , and signiories , seas , coasts , frontiers , ports , promontories , castles , and forts , which we hold in them . which by this our continuall nauigation , and prouision of good shipping , are well man'd and victualled , and sufficiently prouided of armes , munition , and whatsoeuer else is necessarie , in fit and conuenient both time and manner against all occasions . whereby the enemie perceiuing how well they are prouided for them , dare not approach those places , nor touch vpon them . besides this easie and short aduice , there are many other causes that may moue vs not to be wanting herein . in a word , it will put the enemy into a continuall care , and driue him to take a different resolution in those his ill-grounded motiues and pretensions : and howbeit it be true , that the charge is great , so likewise great losses are thereby excused , and some such sometimes as can neuer bee repaired . so that , there is no passing to and fro without nauigation , and the vsing and maintaining of these fleetes . they are the words of that victorious emperour , which no king for want of experience should dis-esteeme . and for the better and fuller prouision in this kinde , it is very fit that these fleetes should haue their particular rent approprietated vnto them , and that it should not , vpon no occasion whatsoeuer , be spent or laid out in any other thing . for a set and deputed treasure for this purpose , or the like , is that which most importeth for the good dispatch of businesses , and that they may bee done in their due time , and with lesse charge , and more profit . this course did the grecians take ; and after them , the romanes . and of augustus caesar , both suetonius and dyon report , that he was the first inuenter of a perpetuall militarie treasure , raised out of a certaine kind of tributes , which out of his owne curiositie he had sought and found out . for souldiers and warlike prouisions , in your great empires , require a particular treasure , wherewith to be payed ; which must not in any hand be otherwise imployed , nor go intermixed with those other expences . hauing persons of much experience and honestie , appointed for the good managing and ordering of it , vsing their best care and helpe , that it may bee preserued and continued , and that it may not be exhausted , and drawne dry . and more particularly kings themselues , the grandes and peeres of the kingdome , as also the commonwealths , and your cities , should carefully looke hereunto . being that they do most participate of the profits which issue from a warre . and most certaine it is , that nothing is more necessarie in a monarchie , then this particular treasure , or that causeth more respect in our friends , or feare in our enemies . or that with more commoditie and conueniencie , puts in execution all plots and proiects , in this , or that other enterprise , of what qualitie or condition soeuer they bee . and to this aduice i shall adde that which followeth . all wise and prudent princes in empires , that are runne out to waste , and decrease of wealth , haue euermore held it for the onely remedie of their reparation and conseruation , to excuse vnnecessarie expences ; and that their ministers take this businesse into consultation , and to cast vp all accounts , and to see what the kings rents and in-comes are for the defraying of the charge he is at , and by comparing one with the other , and seeing how they will answer each other , if they finde the expence to exceed the in-come , to cast about which way it may be best spared ; and to husband the businesse so , that there may be some ouerplus still remaining for the publike treasurie . for if by disorder & ill gouernment , the kings coffers shall come to be emptie , it will bee ( if not impossible ) at least very hard to fill them againe . for if there be daily more spent , then is to be , or can be had , that stocke will in a short time decay and come to nothing ; as wee see it fareth in euery other humane subiect , that hath not fresh supply . which lauish and vnproportionable spending , not liuing according to the rate of their rents , hath been the vndoing of many particular houses & families , as also the impouerishing and ouerthrowing of empires & kingdomes . and therefore to auoide this inconuenience , was that booke of accounts , or memoriall made , which the ancient called breuiarium imperij , a briefe abridgement of the empire , which augustus caesar left to his successours ; written with his owne hand : wherein was particularly set downe in a true and iust account , the full number of all the kingdomes and prouinces of the whole romane empire ; as likewise the number of all the citizens and souldiers which were in euery one of them , together with their forces and strength , and to what quantitie came all the rents and tributes that hee had , what aide-money and other helpes hee receiued from his confederates , and the whole charge he was at . as also his councels ordained by him , either for the inlarging or shortning of his hand in these his expences . so that hauing still before his eyes the wealth and substance of his empire , he might alwayes see how the world went , and how to make his best benefit thereof , for the conseruing and vpholding of his empire . such a register or rent-roll as this , much importeth kings . it is said of that wise and prudent king , don philip the second , that in his time he had such another as was this ; and the like ought all kings to haue , and at all times , but more especially when their power is lessened , their rents diminished , their forces wasted , and those of their enemies augmented . for we see the like care to bee taken in particular houses , and therefore ought much more to bee looked into in monarchies , which are composed of all those houses and families ; amongst which , that which spends beyond it's meanes , consumes it selfe : for supposing such a one hath an . v. ducats of rent , or set reuenue , and that euery yeare ten thousand more is spent , then the rent comes to , in a few yeares all will come to nothing , and by running still on in debt , and taking no course to come out of it , by liuing still at the same height , he must bee inforced in the end to sell and deliuer ouer the luster , maiestie , and greatnesse of his house to other families , which were before little better then dust taken out of the dunghill . and most certaine it is , that they that will not cast vp their accounts , and looke throughly into their estates , and see in what state they are , must bee either men that are willing to vndoe themselues , and their whole posteritie ; and must bee either atheists , or almost as bad ( if not worse ) meere epicures ; who carry in their mouths , and in their hearts those words of your vnthriftie gallants : comedamus is , that nothing is more necessarie in a monarchie , then this particular treasure , or that causeth more respect in our friends , or feare in our enemies . or that with more commoditie and co●ueniencie , puts in execution all plots and proiects , in this , or that other enterprise , of what qualitie or condition soeuer they bee . and to this aduice i shall adde that which followeth . all wise and prudent princes in empires , that are runne out to waste , and decrease of wealth , haue euermore held it for the onely remedie of their reparation and conseruation , to excuse vnnecessarie expences ; and that their ministers take this businesse into consultation , and to cast vp all accounts , and to see what the kings rents and in-comes are for the defraying of the charge he is at , and by comparing one with the other , and seeing how they will answer each other , if they finde the expence to exceed the in-come , to cast about which way it may be best spared ; and to husband the businesse so , that there may be some ouerplus still remaining for the publike treasurie . for if by disorder & ill gouernment , the kings coffers shall come to be emptie , it will bee ( if not impossible ) at least very hard to fill them againe . for if there be daily more spent , then is to be , or can be had , that stocke will in a short time decay and come to nothing ; as wee see it fareth in euery other humane subiect , that hath not fresh supply . which lauish and vnproportionable spending , not liuing according to the rate of their rents , hath been the vndoing of many particular houses & families , as also the impouerishing and ouerthrowing of empires & kingdomes . and therefore to auoide this inconuenience , was that booke of accounts , or memoriall made , which the ancient called breuiarium imperij , a briefe abridgement of the empire , which augustus caesar left to his successours ; written with his owne hand : wherein was particularly set downe in a true and iust account , the full number of all the kingdomes and prouinces of the whole romane empire ; as likewise the number of all the citizens and souldiers which were in euery one of them , together with their forces and strength , and to what quantitie came all the rents and tributes that hee had , what aide-money and other helpes hee receiued from his confederates , and the whole charge he was at . as also his councels ordained by him , either for the inlarging or shortning of his hand in these his expences . so that hauing still before his eyes the wealth and substance of his empire , he might alwayes see how the world went , and how to make his best benefit thereof , for the conseruing and vpholding of his empire . such a register or rent-rol● as this , much importeth kings . it is said of that wise and prudent king , don philip the second , that in his time he had such another as was this ; and the like ought all kings to haue , and at all times , but more especially when their power is lessened , their rents diminished , their forces wasted , and those of their enemies augmented . for we see the like care to bee taken in particular houses , and therefore ought much more to bee looked into in monarchies , which are composed of all those houses and families ; amongst which , that which spends beyonds it's meanes , consumes it selfe : for supposing such a one hath an . v. ducats of rent , or set reuenue , and that euery yeare ten thousand more is spent , then the rent comes to , in a few yeares all will come to nothing , and by running still on in debt , and taking no course to come out of it , by liuing still at the same height , he must bee inforced in the end to sell and deliuer ouer the luster , maiestie , and greatnesse of his house to other families , which were before little better then dust taken out of the dunghill . and most certaine it is , that they that will not cast vp their accounts , and looke throughly into their estates , and see in what state they are , must bee either men that are willing to vndoe themselues , and their whole posteritie ; and must bee either atheists , or almost as bad ( if not worse ) meere epicures ; who carry in their mouths , and in their hearts those words of your vnthriftie gallants : comedamus & bibamus , cras enim moriemur : let vs eate and drinke , for to morrow we shall dye . your atheists , they propose an end vnto themselues , thinking by this their prodigalitie to procure vnto themselues an immortalitie of fame ; but these and the like , who so inconsiderately runne out of all , are carelesse and negligent euen of this , taking care onely to eate , and to drinke , and to feast one another , without so much as thinking that there is another world , or any honour , or fame in this : and spending their whole life in belly cheare , and bezeling , they are neuer satisfied , but call in still for more , till their crawes be ready to cracke . and notwithstanding the excessiue rents , which some kings haue , and the great store of treasure that comes to their coffers , besides the tributes , taxes , imposts , and subsedies that are duely payed them , they are neuer out of debt , the crowne-land lying impawned for the payment thereof , and that for no small summes of money . ordinary expences are ill husbanded ; extraordinary , worse payed . the cities , they are consumed ; trading decayed ; the subiects out of breath and purse , and by hauing too much imposed vpon them , are growne ( like ouer-laboured oxen ) so poore , and so weake , that they are no longer able to beare so great a burthen . and yet all this to them ( though the subiect infinitely suffer ) is no more then a drop of water throwne into the sea , nor makes no more shew . which sea though it swallow vp all the fountaines of the earth , all the brookes , and all the great and principall riuers , and lesser springs , and this daily and hourely , and at all times , yet we see the sea is neuer a whit the more increased , nor growes greater one yeare then another . but what should bee the cause of this , let your naturalists , and your kings , render such reasons as pleaseth them , in their excuse ; for mine owne part , i am of opinion , that the kings exchequer is not well ordered , making him not onely a small , but a bad account ; that there is a great deale of disorder in the laying out of those monies , whereof much might bee saued , if there were some orderly course taken for the dispending of them , and imploying them for their kings best aduantage . and i feare me , ( which i could wish were causelesse ) that a great part of this water which should come directly to the kings owne cisterne , passeth through broken pipes , that is , through the hands of euill ministers , which soake and sucke vnto themselues a great part thereof , and no man the wiser , where the leake is , till it discouer it selfe . but it is now high time to grow to an end , and i will conclude this aduertisement with that common prouerbe , which speaketh thus ; quien mucho abarca , poco aprieta : the ouer-griping hand holds but little ; suting with that of ours , all couet , all loose . or answering to that which that great courtier and fauourite maecenas said , that great treasures and riches are both more and better heaped vp , and receiue a fairer accumulation , by spending little , then by scraping much . chap. xxxviii . aduertisements for fauourites and councellers of state. the aduertisements for fauourites are these , the first , that they doe not priuar too much , who pretend their kings fauour , and that they doe not beare themselues too high thereupon , nor suffer themselues to bee attended with a great traine of followers , thereby to make publike demonstration of their greatnesse . boast not thy selfe too much , nor seeme thou ouer vaine , saith the holy ghost to the fauourite , ne gloriosus appareas coram rege : put not forth thy selfe in the presence of the king. for there is neither that state , nor prince , of that dull patience , that doth not in the end grow iealous , and fearefull of the great power and authoritie of fauourites , and more especially if they once begin to waxe insolent , and abuse this their greatnesse . for kings are companions , and fellow-seruants with vs in their affections , and naturall passions ; nay ( by their leaue bee it spoken ) more subiect then we are vnto them ; saue that they suppresse them more in outward shew , and make not that exteriour demonstration of them , in regard of that diuinitie , which they pretend , and represent . and all of them will be masters of their entire will and absolute power . and that fauourite is fouly deceiued , and in a strange kinde of errour , who in court , by his secret plots , and close conueyance , pretendeth to possesse his kings heart , if hee conceiue by this course to be the more secure . for very dangerous is that fauour and place , which is built vpon such a foundation ; and very ticklish the state of a fauourite , when a king carries such respect vnto him . and the reason of this danger is drawne from mans nature it selfe ( which cannot , but in kings , be of farre greater force and strength ) for there is not that man liuing , which doth not hate and abhorre subiection . and this is so certaine a truth , that i perswade my selfe , that i may truly giue this censure , and that i am no whit mistaken therein ; that the reason , why kings doe more willingly make and raise vp men vnto honour and greatnesse for their owne proper guste and appetire , then for seruices and deserts , is , for that in the former , they shew themselues to be powefull , and to be owners of their owne cloath , which they may cut out to more , or lesse , as it pleaseth them ; but to the second , they are debtors , a thing that is hatefull euen to the best nature and disposition . and fauourites likewise on their part , are not to haue men , like swarmes of bees , to hiue themselues in their portalls , and to hang about them in clusters , lest when that day shall come ( as come it will ) wherein they shall fall , the world take notice that it was his fauour , and not his person that they followed . there are few ephestions , but may crateri , in court ; many that will follow alexanders fortune , but few his particular person . let fauourites likewise receiue this aduice and counsell from the hand of the euangelist saint iohn , which was one of the greatest courtiers and fauourites , which the king of heauen had . the thing that i shall recommend to their consideration , is this ; that when iohn fell downe to worship , before the feet of the angell , which had opened great mysteries vnto him , and showne him the things which were shortly to be fulfilled , the angell said vnto him , vide ●e feceris , conseru●s enim tuus sum , & fratrum t●orum : see thou doe it not , for i am thy fellow seruant , and the fellow-seruant of thy brethren , &c. let euery fauourite apply this counsell to himselfe , and make vse thereof ; so shall he be in grace with king and people , and when men shall go about as it were to adore him , and to make him a little god almighty , in doing him worship and honour , let him by no meanes giue way thereunto , but meekly acknowledge that he is but a creature , as they are , and preuent them with that answer of the angell , vide ne fec●ris , conseruus tu●s sum : doe not offer it , for i am your fellow-seruant . and great is that obligation which they haue , which are raised to great place , to know themselues , and not to shew themselues strangers to those that haue beene their associates and companions in their meaner fortunes , and with whom they haue held priuate familiarity and friendship . and not to be like vnto pharaohs cup-bearer , who when he saw himselfe in that fauour and priuacie , which his fellow-prisoner ioseph had foretold , and prognosticated vnto him , neuer thought no more of it , but quite forgot both in and him , as if there had beene no such matter , or man. it argues extreame lightnesse , and a naughty nature , that a man should hoyse saile and be gone , when he hath a faire winde , and not take him along with him , that hath ruune through all perills and dangers with him , and indured all brunts and stormes whatsoeuer . how shamefull a thing then is it for them , who seeing themselues in prosperitie , turne away their face from him , who ranne along with them in their aduerser fortune . especially considering they are not certaine , how long this calme will endure , and what a comfort it is in a storme , to haue a true friend to sticke close vnto him . for it is a vsuall thing , to see him lowermost to day , that yesterday stood vppermost in fortunes wheele . and the moone , when it is at full , fore-tells a wane ; and therefore that which importeth them most , is , that they carry themselues in a gentile fashion towards all men , and that their dealing be plaine , and dis-interessed ; whereby they shall not onely keepe their old friends , but gaine new , and may very well hope to be holpen by them , when they shall haue occasion to vse them . for they must thinke , that the skie will not alwayes bee cleare , clouds may arise , the sunne withdraw his light ( for kings wills and affections , like other mens , are ambulatorie ) and then in what a poore case is a fauourite , if he be left , like a single proposition , alone to himselfe : he cannot ( if he be wise ) but make this account with himselfe , that the greatest power stirreth vp the greatest enuie ; and if many combine against him ( be he the greatest fauourite that euer was , or can bee supposed ) they will shrewdly put him to his trumpes , and if they be of as noble courage and wit , as they are nobly descended , they will heaue him out of the saddle , when he thinkes he sits surest . for concealed hatred is worse then open enmitie . and therefore let him gaine new friends , keepe his old , and not loose any one , of those he hath gotten . for being left single , and alone , he shall bee like vnto that white crow in the fable , whom the crowes would not come neare , because of his colour ; nor the pigeons keepe him company , in regard of his greatnesse ; so that all will flie from him , and in the time of his greatest need hee shall be left all alone . vae soli : woe bee to him that is alone . and the holy ghost seemeth to take pittie of him that is alone , for that if he fall , he hath no body to helpe him vp . let fauourites likewise consider , that they are not , for that their king hath exprest his affection vnto them , and profest himselfe to bee their friend , to thinke , that ( like a dogge in a slip ) they may leade him whither and which way they list . for there are many things to be done , which hee is to doe without them . for ( as cicero saith ) that friendship which admitteth not exception in some cases , is not so much amicitia , as coniuratio ; amitie , as conspiracie . it is obserued by the learned saint ambrose , that true friendship is grounded vpon that which is iust and honest ; and is so limited , that if it 〈◊〉 those bounds , it doth not onely loose it's name , but affoords iust cause for a man to forgoe his friend . friendship is to be held , but alwayes with this prouiso , that the lawes of iustice and charitie bee duely obserued ; and when ought , contrary thereunto , is pretended , it is not longer said to bee friendship ; though vowes and protestations haue past , for the better strengthening and confirming of it . for if a king shall sweare amisse , and contrary to the rules of charitie , he is not bound to cumply with his oath , nor is there any reason for it in the world , why hee should in such sort make deliuery and reason of his heart to his fauourite , and let him haue so much the hand of him , as to promise to sticke vnto him , or to stand his friend in those things that are vnlawfull and vniust . as those kings . assuerus and tiberius proceeded with haman and seianus ; who , out of the fauour that they bore vnto them , gaue them leaue to reuenge themselues of their enemies , and to execute all the tyrannies and cruelties which they could deuise or imagine , to satisfie their malice . a fault which deserued rather ( and afterwards drew on ) their speedier and greater fall . and well doth that fauourite deserue to be ruined , that shall presume to pretend hazer raga ( as they say ) con suamo . to stand iust in the same streake or line with his master . for if god , who surpasseth in glory , and from whom it is impossible to take the least atome thereof , and is able to turne all that he hath created into dust , will not admit of a companion in matter of adoration and worship ; how much more will kings of the earth bee offended , and how ill must they take it , that any subiect should equall his shoulder , or share with him in his greatnesse , being his honour is so shortned , and his power so limited ? for , if out of their loue to the person of the fauourite , they beare with him for a while , either for to shew themselues thankfull for his good seruices , or haply to make him the instrument to worke their reuenge on others ; yet these affections and proofes ( which i speake of ) being once passed ouer , there enters presently in the place thereof , a natural●●● are and iealousie of their authority and greatnesse ; which doth much more sway with them , then the loue and affection which they beare to the fauourites person . enuie likewise she comes in , and playes her part ( which is a neare neighbour , and still ready at hand in princes courts and pallaces ) as if she were attorney generall of all those great places , and ●omes forth her venome , secretly lying in waite , and watching her time to doe mischiefe , stabbing suddenly , deaths wound being giuen before it be dream't on ; and great is the hurt which this so neare a neighbour to the kings elbow , doth ; and out of an in-bredspleene ) aymeth at nothing more , then the downfall of fauourites . complaints and grieuances , they also make their appearance in court , being the maine witnesses that enuie and passion bring into the court , to make good their plea. next after these , comes in the respect ( not to say the feare ) of those that are discontented in all states ; for no king will be willing , that their subiects vpon this ground should build their rebellion , and cause an alteration in the kingdome ; and will be as loath to bee ball'd on , by grieued and discontented persons , vpon iustly pretended complaints ; nor will he be so vnwise ( for feare of other claps ) to fauour one , to offend many . all of them being shrewd blowes , for to allay , if not quell the courage of the most passionate king towards his dearest fauourite ; and are such fierce and terrible conflicts , that they tosse his iudgement to and fro , with farre greater violence , then a strong raging winde doth the waues of the sea. gouernours and such as sit at the sterne of a common-wealth , and such , vnto whom kings haue deliuered vp the keyes of their heart , and hold the rudder of the monarchie in their hands , to steare and shape their course , as they will themselues , there is no question to bee made of it , but that they are in great danger vpon euery storme th●t shall arise ; for looke what misfortune shall befall the commonwealth , the blame shall be laid vpon them , and the fault imputed either to their ill counsell , or their ignorance , or their passion : for ordinarily ( nay i may say continually ) the misfortunes and ill successes of kings , and kingdomes , i say the cause of them is attributed to those that are nearest and dearest about the kings person , and possesse the highest places . and euery one running along with the common opinion ( and few are they which haue not a smacke or taste thereof ) laboureth to lay the fault on his neighbour , though he be of his owne proper flesh and bloud . and this is an inheritance which wee haue from our father adam . and no man is ashamed thereof : for we are all of vs his heires ; and therefore ought to endeuour ( as much as in them lies ) that the peace and quiet of the kingdome bee not disturbed or troubled in the time of their gouernment . as well for their glorie and reputation , to haue in all their proceedings carried themselues in such sort , that no ill accident hath betided them , or any maine disgrace ; as also for the not subiecting of themselues to the vncertaine chances of fortune , which are ordinary vpon euery alteration , and may serue to worke their ruine and perdition . let therefore those haue an eye ( i say it , and say it againe ) that are priuie-councellours to their king , and more particularly the fauourite , to whom hee shall haue deliuered vp the possession of his heart , that the aduice and counsell which they shall giue vnto him , bee good , pure , and cleare water , issuing from forth a pure , cleane , and disinteressed bosome . such is the water ( saith aristotle ) as is the earth , through which it passeth ; if through mynes of brimstone , it scaldes and burnes , if through craggy rocks , it cooles and stupefies ; and if through salt-pits , it is brinish and brackish . the like iudgement may wee make of counsell ; if it proceed from a breast and heart that is foule and filthy , it teacheth filthinesse ; if from a pure , and cleane , honestie , and cleannesse ; if from a libe●●ll , it doth good vnto all ; if from a couetous , it aduiseth nothing but gripping and wring ng of the subiect . so that counsell is figured forth vnto vs in water : which in it's softnesse , sauour , colour , and sent , is perfectly knowne , whether the myne be good or bad , through which it passeth . and such is their opinion , and that which they aduise , as is the humour that is predominant in their stomacke . euerie one casts his eye vpon his owne particular , approuing and accounting that for iust which tends to his profit , and condemning the contrary . god deliuer kings from such councellours , and let them take heed that they doe not erre in their aduise , and in those medicines and remedies , which ●hey prescribe vnto their kings , for it is as it were a remedi●●●●nd irrecouerable errour ; and theirs must bee the fault , and many times the punishment , but alwayes the note and infamie of their kings erring . nor let those that haue the kings eare , make a mockerie of my words , for it is a very dangerous and ticklish place that they possesse . where , to erre , is an easie thing ; but to hit right , hard ; and euen then , when they least thinke of it , their preciousest iewells , their richest mettalls , and their greatest treasures are turned into coales , and the like trash , like those moneyes of your hobgoblins , fairies , and robin good-fellowes . it is an old thred-bare saying , that ill counsell turnes to the councellours owne hurt . consilium malum , consultori pessimum ( saith plutarch . ) and the holy ghost , that the first , with whom ill counsell meets , is it's authour . facienti nequissimum consilium , super eum deuoluitur . for as he that casteth a stone on high , it shall fall vpon his owne head ; and as hee , that smiteth with guile , woundeth himselfe ; and whoso diggeth a pit , shall fall therein ; and he that layeth a stone in his neighbours way , shall stumble thereon : and he that layeth a snare for another , shall be taken in it himselfe ; so , whoso giueth a wicked noysome counsell , it shall come vpon himselfe , and he shall not know from whence . wicked counsell is like a whirlwinde , which turnes against himselfe , causing a very dangerous tempest against that very place from whence it came . and therefore he that giues counsell , it importeth him much , that he giue good and sound aduice ; for if it bee not good , god doth permit , that it maketh for their owne great hurt and perdition . as it succeeded with those princes of babylon , who so ill aduised their king against iust daniel ; god so ordering the businesse , that the same ill that they intended against him , fell vpon themselues , their wiues , and their children . when god is willing to put his armes athwart , and to crosse wicked purposes , little will auaile all the ill counsell in the world , be the pate , that hatcheth it , as wise and as subtill as achitophels . as it fared with that great fauourite of king assuerus , in that deuillish and malitious plot of his , which he had imagined , and contriued against poore honest mardochee . but this was to him , elsuenno del perro ( as it is in the fable ) like to the dogges dreame . there was a dogge that did dreame , that he was eating a good morsell of flesh , and as he was chopping of it vp , vttered some broken notes in his language , of the great content that he tooke therein . his master seeing him in this manner , takes vp a good cudgell , and soundly lamm's him ; the dogge awakes , findes himselfe deceiued , and runnes whining away . haman , carried away with the like conceit , prepares a gallowes for mardochee , fiftie cubits high , thinking thereon to hang him the next day ; but it was his ill lucke to supply the place himselfe . consilia enim ( saith saint basil ) quae contra bonos more 's dantur , in propria capita eorum , qui consulunt , redundant : those counsels that are giuen contrary to good manners , light vpon their heads , that gaue them . and therefore let councellours bee well aduised , what counsell they giue . aelian reporteth that there was a very ancient law , and duely kept in the kingdome of persia , that if any should aduise the king to any thing that was not beneficiall to his person , and the commonwealth , presently by the common cryer , his ill counsell was published , and himselfe taken and stript , and openly whipt vp and downe the streets . and if there were such a law in force here with vs , and as duely obserued , i assure my selfe , that neither kings would be so often deceiued , as now they are ; nor would there be so many vndertakers and proiectors , who impudently presume to put into their heads , things that are so pernicious to their owne conscience , and the publike good . supreme authoritie , kings neither ought to giue , nor fauourites take it . let them ( as much as they can ) conceale from the world , that great grace and fauour wherein they stand with their king ; but if there shall bee an impossibilitie in that , yet there is none in this , to let pretenders know , that all consisteth in the prince ; and to referre the conferring of all benefits , fauours , and graces vnto him ; and to let him haue all the thankes , in matter of pensions , offices , or rewards ; and to attribute vnto him , all those successes , that fall out well and happily , and all other good and prudent resolutions ; and to free him from the blame of those that shall otherwise succeed . to treate him with much reuerence and respect ; to beare him exceeding great loue ; and together with these , to be wonderfull solicitous and carefull in all that shall concerne his seruice . all of them being notable and necessarie qualities , for to conserue fauourites in their kings grace and good opinion , and to wedge their affection vnto them . for loue must bee the doore , by which the grace of a prince is to enter . for hee must loue , that will bee beloued . and hauing gained it by this meanes , he must keepe and preserue it , by reuerence and humilitie in his carriage , and by being faithfull and diligent in his seruice . all which will be lost by doing the contrary . and not onely ought they to carry themselues thus towards their kings , but are also to esteeme and honour all , of all estates , in a fitting proportion , according to euery mans qualitie and condition . shewing himselfe liberall , solicitous , peaceable , patient , louing , kinde , and courteous towards all . all of them qualities that conserue a kings fauour , and gaine the peoples good will. a fauourite must be modest , affable , and affoord a courteous hearing vnto all men . besides , it is a part of iustice so to doe , and a very necessarie meanes to come to the knowledge of all things , and to be the better prouided against whatsoeuer shall occurre . whereas on the contrary , to looke to be intreated , and sued vnto , and not easie to bee spoken withall , argues a kinde of pride and statelinesse , which all abhorre . this is the doctrine of tacitus , citing the example of seianus , the emperour tiberius his great fauourite ; who being growne into grace with him , the better to conserue himselfe therein , forthwith endeauoured to fauour and pleasure all your principall and noble persons in their pretensions . for in all occurrences , he conceiued , hee might expect more kindnesse from them , then from the baser and meaner sort of people ; whereby he came to bee loued of the one , and feared of the other ; and by all of them , to be serued and obeyed . insomuch that there was not any one who did not seeke vnto him to mediate and make intercession for them , with tiberius . and howbeit he was not ignorant , that hee was superiour to them all , and inferiour to none , yet did he neuer grow neglectfull of his humble carriage , and reuerent respect to his prince , and a due regard vnto all . hitherto hee proceeded fairely , and went on well , and may serue for a patterne and example for fauourites ; but in the rest for a prouiso , and admonition for kings . for after that ambition and couetousnesse entred into his heart , that consuming moath , and deuouring worme of all goodnesse , he presently procured the charge or place of praefectus praetorius , or captainship of the guard ; and within a short time grew to be so absolute therein , that he became as it were lord and master of his prince , and crusht all that stood in his way , or might be of any impediment to his priuacie . he sought alwayes to bee with him , lest others might creepe in betwixt him and home , and possesse his place : still humbly beseeching him , that he would imploy him in businesses of greatest danger and trouble , and such as might redound most to the benefit of the emperours life and state . a maine point , wherewith to oblige his prince vnto him , and to make him the more acceptable in his sight . for those that are nearest about kings , and are in greatest fauour with him , ought in the greatest dangers to set their foot formost , and to be the forwardest aduenturers . he did seeke to ouercome art , by art , inducing tiberius , to retire himselfe to places of pleasure , that were remote and farre from court , to the end that whilest he was recreating himselfe abroad , he might dispose of him , as it pleased him . he told him , that solitude was the best and onely course for the resoluing of the graue and weighty affaires of the empire , which otherwise by diuersion might receiue the same hurt and hinderance , as they were wont to haue heretofore . and what with this , and with giuing him to vnderstand , that he would quit him of all the ordinarie cares and troubles of court ( most men vsually desiring to shunne trouble , and to take their ease and pleasure ) hee perswaded him to go to capri , that hee , in the meane while , might rule and gouerne all . and in the end grew to be so great and powerfull , and to take such state vpon him , that hee would not giue audience to any , reducing them to those tearmes , that they should speake and negociate by writing , to the end that nothing might bee treated or resolued of , without his priuie saying ; that by reducing businesses to papers and memorialls , answer might bee giuen vnto them with more deliberation , and better consideration then by word of mouth . a meere artifice , & cunning trick of his own inuention , to make himselfe absolute master of all , and ( which is more ) of the heart of his prince . god deliuer vs from such ambitious , interessed , and couetous ministers , whose maine care , is their owne particular , and to heape vp riches for himselfe , and his ; and make it their whole study and onely end to keepe and continue themselues in their kings grace and fauour ; and to deale with their prince , as the ante doth with the corne , which that it may not grow againe , and that hee may the better and more conueniently make profit thereof , presently eates out the heart of it . god likewise free kings , from this base subiection , and insensibilitie , and from men of that qualitie and condition , which desire to rule and command all . for the one cannot escape a storme ; and the other must runne great hazard of being drowned therein . let the last aduertisement bee the example of a great fauourite , whose name is aurelius cassidorus , borne in the prouince of calabria , and highly aduanced in magistracies , and gouernments of both empires , rome and constantinople ; who being renowned for his cheualrie , and noble feates of armes , defended the islands of sicily and calabria from many , and those very powerfull enemies . in his younger yeares , he attained to all the liberall arts , in that perfection , that hee made the present and succeeding times , to admire him . and for his great parts and abilities , was entertained by theodoricus , king of the ostro-gothes ; hee was receiued into his seruice , and grew so farre into his fauour , by reason of his vnderstanding , wisedome , and dextrousnesse , in treating businesses , that he first of all made him his secretarie ; in which office , he behaued himselfe so well , that by degrees , he went climbing vp to the high offices and dignities in the state ; which in those dayes were not conferred out of fauour , but meere desert . from being secretary , he came to bee lord chancellour , and senatour in the citie of rauenna , being honoured besides with diuerse offices in the kings court. afterwards he was made viceroy of the prouinces of sicilia and calabria ; and for addition of honour , had the title of patritius giuen him , which in those dayes was in great esteeme . hee was lord treasurer , and master of the palace ; which was as it were a superintendent ouer the palatines , being an order of knights and gentlemen , that had offices , and other preheminences in court. he held the dignitie of praefectus praetorius , being as it were the second person of the king ; to whom , the weightiest businesses of peace and warre were remitted : and what therein he determined and resolued vpon , was receiued as an oracle that could not erre . though now adayes , little credit is giuen to the words of great persons and powerfull ministers , and not without cause ; for that many of them say , and do not ; promise much , and performe little . and your fauourites , which haue great both place and power about their kings , are in such good opinion and credit likewise with the world , that they presently beleeue whatsoeuer they say ; and see what they professe , is approued by them , as if it were a sentence pronounced from the mouth of a most iust iudge : and therefore they ought well and wisely to consider what they speake , and not to inlarge themselues in words , putting those that are pretenders in great good hopes . which if they shall not afterwards take effect , will proue to bee no other then that faire and beautifull fruite , whose sight pleaseth the eye ; but whose taste killeth the body . in conclusion , this fauourite , by round after round , clambred vp to all the honourablest offices , and greatest dignities of the kingdome . he came to bee consull , which charge hee administred with extraordinary integritie and vertue . all the magistracies , offices , and gouernments which he held , were but as so many steps one to the other ; which the princes , vnder whom he serued , went still increasing and augmenting . for he carried himselfe so wisely and discreetly in them , that there was not that office that hee bore , which did not make him the meritour and deseruer of another farre greater and better then it . and all did acknowledge and confesse , that his merits and deserts were farre greater then all the offices put together which hee enioyed and administred . in those whom he represented and recommended to his king , to the end that his maiestie might conferre some one fauour or another vpon them , he euermore had an eye to the necessitie of the office , and the qualitie of the person . things wherein fauourites ought to bee very carefull , when they imploy their fauour in furthering any man ; as whether they be moued thereunto vpon a iust or ill affection , or by the sole vertue and merit of the person , &c. and not to thinke with themselues , that because they are in great grace and fauour with their king , that it is lawfull for them to violate the law of iustice , which ought to bee equall to all , ( which in eyes , not blinded with passion and couetousnesse , she her selfe makes it plainly appeare ) and to thrust the better deseruer besides that dignitie and office which is due vnto him . which is a law that obligeth all , for that it is a naturall obligation , and hath all the lawes of reason on it's side , which are more powerfull then either the will of kings , or their fauourites . the not keeping whereof , is but a large and swift running fountaine of complaints and distasts . the one , to see themselues reiected , and excluded from publike honours : the other , to see them put forward , whom nature hath not adopted , nor learning , nor vertue , but either good or bad diligences . and that these shall haue preferments , and get the start of other men , it is because either loue or interest makes them to be held more worth ; when as the other , onely for that they are not in the like fauour , or not so fit for their ends ( for fauourites fauour few , saue such as will bee instruments of their wills ) though otherwise they bee of better parts , better qualified , and of stronger abilities , are left vnrewarded , and are quite forgotten . and these that are thus made vp in haste , and so suddenly raised from that nothing , which they were , to that greatnesse wherein they are , must of force sometimes with the same haste and speedinesse ( though fore against their wills ) for the auoiding of inconueniences , bee pulled downe from this their high seate , and placed in some other , that may seeme to sute better with them , wherein the like suspition may iustly bee conceiued of their insufficiencie . this great fauourite had likewise so good a head-peece , and knew so well how to gouerne vpon all occasions , and all the accidents of that age , as well the good , as bad , the fortunate and vnfortunate successes of those times , that howbeit many were the changes of those kings , yet was he still in the same height of esteeme , was superiour vnto fortune , being in all those alterations , her lord and master . all the kings of the gothes , whom hee serued , did him very particular fauours . and although king theodoricus was a very fortunate and valiant prince , yet did a great part of his happinesse and felicitie consist in this , in hauing his fauourite cassiodorus alwayes at his elbow , and in receiuing his good proiects , and sound aduice which ( when occasion offered ) were neuer wanting vnto him . that being ( according vnto seneca ) the best part of counsell , which comes in it's due time and season ; whereas that comes too late , and without any fruit , which is not ready at hand . for occasion ( whereunto wee must occurre ) oftentimes betakes her selfe to her wings , and flies out of our reach , if we be not quicke and nimble in laying hold on her foretop . so that all the while that this cassiodorus was in their seruice , their kingdome and signorie continued in a most flourishing estate . so much can a man of such courage and counsell doe in a commonwealth . for with such a ministers presence , all things stand vpright , and go well and handsomely on ; but in his absence , and when he is wanting , all things go backward . for , being that all these things depend next after god , on the worth and wisedome of him that hath the managing of them ; by his death or absence , they runne a great hazard of miscarrying , or suffer some great hurt or detriment ; as was to be seene in those successes of the grecian empire ; which ( no sooner was that great gouernour alexander dead , vnder whose protection it went increasing , and liued in so much peace and securitie ) but it vanished like so much froath . for of how much the more price and esteeme peace is , by so much the more is it hazarded in the losse of those that maintaine and vphold it . now this so excellent and worthy a minister , when as nothing was wanting vnto him , saue the putting on of a kings crowne , refused it , became a friar , and tooke vpon him the habite of the order of san benito . and did so exercise himselfe in continuall prayer and contemplation , that euen whilest he liued here vpon earth , they held him for a saint . and if he were so worthy a man in that age , seruing the kings of the earth , with so much punctualitie and sinceritie ; it is not to be doubted , but that hee was as precise in his sanctitie and holinesse of life , when he rendred himselfe a slaue , and seruant to his lord and master the king of heauen . for your excellent wits , which know how to make aduantage of all things , and that nothing comes amisse vnto them , when they are once resolued to serue god , they do truly humble themselues , and with a strong determination , tread and trample the world vnder their feet , and whatsoeuer therein is , and imbrace and take hold on christ. and being thus occupied in holy exercises , laden with yeares , hee departed out of this life , to that which was eternall , hauing inioyed some yeares of that quietude and abundance of peace , wherewith he did essay to die well , ( which being so dangerous , so difficult , and darke a passage , too little care is commonly had therein ) hee passed from this short stride betwixt life and death , to the eternitie of such an estate , as we yet know not what it shall be , the extreames being ( as we see ) so farre distant . all that hath beene hitherto said both in generall and particular , concerning a monarchie , and kingdome , shall not be fruitlesse , nor the time lost , that hath beene spent in the writing , or shall be spent in the reading of this treatise , if it be well and truly considered . for by the perusall thereof , kings and princes may come to know a thousand seuerall semblances of ministers , and disguised countenances of hypocriticall courtiers , and the diuers dispositions and humours , as well of the ambitious as the couetous ; their affections , conditions , and naturall inclinations , whether they be by nature of great and vnruly spirits , or whether they bee by fortune put into great places . for this , without doubt , changeth man from his first estate , and apparrelleth him with other particular affections ; and in the true knowledge of these , consisteth the augmentation , conseruation , and good gubernation of kingdomes , and commonwealths : as also the reputation , credit , opinion , and authoritie of kings . in a word , they may out of these doctrines , and aduertisements , collect and know how at one time the naturall dispositions , customes , and manners of the vulgar , stand affected , and how at another time those that are not so vulgar , and of so low a ranke , and how at all times to make vse of this knowledge , for the better increasing and inlarging of their power and greatnesse ; and how , and in what manner , they are to carry themselues towards them ; as also those other , that are to aide and assist in gouernment . for there is not any thing of more price , or more to be valued by kings , then this knowledge of the affections , as well for the discerning those of others , as the moderating of their owne . and as it were to make a iudgement , and to prognosticate by them , the end of the actions of those that 〈◊〉 about , and where they intend to make their stop , and set vp their rest , be they foes , or friends . and by the actions of those that are present ( be they confederates , ministers , and dependents ) their ends , designes , and pre●ensions . and particularly in those who cleaue closer to their kings fortune , then his person . points , whereon doth hang the hinge , and wherein are included and shut vp , all both the particular and generall passages of gouernment , and of that art , and science , which they call by the common name of reason of state. and although i know for certaine , that there will not such be wanting , that will laugh and scoffe at these my politicall aduertisements ; some because they would be accounted the onely men seene in this science , and would make themselues the onely admired men amongst the vulgar , and that there is not any one that is a professour in that art , that vnderstandeth their plots and designes : others , lesse malignant , as being ignorant of the secrets of this science , iudging it to be an art , full of impossibilities , will not trouble themselues therewithall , nor looke into the mysteries thereof , as if by the effects , they were not able to iudge of the causes of things ; and by the carriage and successe of former businesses , to diuine of the ends and designes of those which are now on foot . and others , farre worse then these , who although they come to know this truth , deny the same , and seeke many colours both for the disgracing of it , and the author ; and for no other reason in the world , but because they are professed enemies , to whatsoeuer counsell , that is not of their owne hatching , fearing that it might quit something of the glory of their ambition . and for that they will haue nothing thought to be good , but what issues from forth their owne braine , they blaspheme ( saith saint iames ) and speake euill of that which they know not ; and not onely not admit and receiue that good which is propounded vnto them ; but ( as that kingly prophet saith ) because they will neither vnderstand nor heare it , like the adder , they stop their eares with the taile of their ignorance , fearing lest they should be charmed by some superiour wit , and better vnderstanding . yet notwithstanding , fall backe , fall edge , come what will of it , i haue cumplyed with my desire , and ( which is more ) with my obligation . and if it shall proue to be of any vse , profit , and seruice , for king● , and for the great councellours and ministers of their : kingdomes ( which haue most need thereof ) to 〈…〉 goes especially directed , and perhaps may be 〈…〉 which are not in that nature . and though haply it may not bee auaileable for amendment , yet may it serue for a desenganno , and dis-deceiuing of those that are in an errour . and in case it shall not take this effect , there will be no harme done by committing it to the presse , though it bee afterwards buried in the dust , as it hath befallen other farre better things then these ; and time , which couers what is past , and discouers what is to come , will in it's time discouer this , and such other things , as are not yet come to light . and for this cause , they called archimedes the syracusan , the inuenter of new things , and the register of old . and certaine it is , that amongst the ancients , there was a great agreement and artifice in the gouernment of some commonwealths , as was that of the aegyptians , of the athenians , of the allmanes , and aboue all , of the romane commonwealth ; which saint austen did so much admire . and men looking no further then to that which is before them , haue , in a manner , quite forgotten that , and therefore it is fit that there should bee some remembrancer , that by putting them in minde of that which is past , they may the better performe things for the present , and prouide for that which is to come . for ( as plato said , though in another sence ) all our knowledge is but a recordation of things past ; and therein he said well . for a great part of those nouelties , which are daily introduced , are but old things , that haue layen long in obliuion ; and that which is done to day , we finde , is forgotten to morrow . and in the reuolution of time , comes ( in after ages ) to represent it selfe for new . and this ( amongst many others ) was the maine cause which moued me to write this treatise , and which may incourage me to go on further , though i must confesse , that my penne hath out runne my intention , finding that i haue 〈◊〉 my foot deeper into the stirrop , then ● thought to haue 〈◊〉 ; having made a volumne of that , which when i first 〈…〉 , i purposed should haue ended in a short 〈…〉 but who can put a bridle vnto loue , or restraine zeale ? and more especially , when it is so naturall and proper , as that which all , and euery one , doth or ought to beare vnto his owne king and lord adding thereunto mine owne particular respect , in regard of my nearer reference to his maiesties seruice ? and no small spurre hereunto , was my honest true meaning heart , and the assurance of a good conscience , whose whole studie and desire in this my labour hath beene , to hit as right as i could vpon that which might be most conuenient , for the augmentation , conseruation , reputation , authoritie , and greatnesse of kings ; as likewise , what i thought would bee most necessarie for the wellfare and good gouernment of kingdomes and particular commonwealths . for this doth depend on that . though i conceiue there be few that thinke thereon . for most ( i feare me ) treate onely their owne businesse , making that the principall , and all the rest accidentall . howbeit they will not sticke to say , and publish to the world , that they onely attend the conseruation of their kings and commonwealths , would to god that it might not be said of them , which he himselfe said by the mouth of that his prophet , and prince of his people ; they honour mee with their lip , cer aute● 〈◊〉 longè est à me : but their heart is farre from mee . god i beseech thee , of thy infinite mercy , that the hearts of kings and their ministers , may not be farre off from thee ; nor thou from them ; but that thou wilt vouchsafe to bee euermore neare at hand vnto them , and to fauour them , and direct them in all their wayes , to thy honour and glory . amen . laus deo. finis . errata . page . line . a cetar , reade acertar . p. . l . his family , r. it 's family . p. . l. . denotate , r. denotateth . p . l. . though , r. thought . p. . l . woorst , r. wo●'st . p. . l. . men , r. man. p. l. . sapientio rerit , r. sapientior erit . p. . l. . su spasse● , r. sus passos . p. . l . wise , r. the wise . ibid. l. . of force , r. of the force p ▪ . l ▪ . regular , r. reg●lar . p. . l. . goodnesses , r. goodnesse . p. . l. . content to , r. to content . p. . l. . subiect . r. subiects . p. . l. . sa soga , r. la soga . p. . l. . this answer , r. this i answer . p. . l. . caree●se , r. carelesse . p. . l. . seuerietie , r. seueritie . ibid. l. . are that , r. that are . p. . l. . impostoures , r. impostures . ibid. l. ● . nstad , mistad . p. . l. . cabines , r. cabinets . p. . l. . therein , r. there is . p. . l. . requencie , r. frequencie . p. . l. . or iudgement , r. or that iudgement . p. . l. . inionyed , r. inioyned . p. l. , deliaces , r. delicasies . p. . l. . of much , r. much of . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e sen. epist. . i● princip . valer. max. notes for div a -e polit. cap . lib. . cap. . arist. lib. ● . eccl. . . aug. lib. . de ciuil . dei. d. tho. de regim . li. . cap. . arist. pol. . cap. . & . plat. dial. de repub . prou. . . beros lib. . de flor. cald. secundum philon. de antiq. act. . . liv. lib. . eccl. . . aug lib . de 〈◊〉 . dei. cap. ● . lib. . & lib. . tit. . part . . psal. . isai. ● . . . ezech. ▪ . 〈◊〉 ▪ . de post foetantibus accepit eum , pascere iacob servum suum & israel haereditatem suam . iohn . . esay . . greg in iob. esay . . mat. . . ezech. . . gen. . iudg. . cassio . lib. . epist ▪ . homer . rom. . . . . cor. . . chrys. in epist. vlt : ad corin : serm. . plato dion . epist. . d. thom. de ●egi . prin. cap. . nazian : in apologetico . seneca . lib. de clem. . cap. . xenophon . lib. de cyrop . eccl. . re●ran● el beneficio s● da po●●●l oficio . rom . . rom. . . exod. . psal. . . zach. . . apoc. . ● . iob. . . aug. & d. tho. in epis. . ad tim. . ier. . v. . arist. & aly. lib. . de anima . lactan. firm. lib. de opificio dei , cap. . heb. . c. . . h. varro . r●b . steph. in thesau . . plato in tim. seneca . lib. de c●em . regall power was first ordayned for the ease of the people . seneca lib. de consolat ad polib c. . aelian . de varia hist. lib. . ier. . . iob. . . num. . & . num. . . gen. . hierom. in traduc . hebraicis in gen. gregor . lib. . moral . c. . ouid. metam . isidor . lib. . etym. cant. . . , tim. . . sam. . . gen. . . prou. . . wisd. . . iudg. . . psal ▪ . . wisd. . . plat● lib. . de repub. membrin . rosi . c●p . . eccl. . . kings . . cicero in orat. pro lege manil. eccl. . . iames. . . . king. . . chron. . . . chron. . . psal. . . sambuc . in prob . prou. . . zey . . tit. . part. . iob. . . prou. . . 〈…〉 hila● . in psal. . wis . prou. . . prou. . . concil . t●l . plut. in p. aemil arist. c. . mag. moral . eurip. lib. . seniore in prou●nciae congrega , & eos interroga , facilius namque . inuenitur quod ● pluribus senioribus quaeritur . s. aug. ad fratres in erem . ser. . heraclides in politicis . senec . epist. . bald. in cap. . de r●nun . psal. . . prou. . . greg. nyss. lib. de lib. arbitrio . galen decognosc . curand . animi morbis . cap. . wisd. . . numb . . . cicero lib. . epist. fam . epist. v●●●ma . . chron. . . . kings . . . aug. lib. . de ciuit. dei. cap. . plato . in thim . strabo . in 〈◊〉 . lib. . * it passeth so sometimes that kings put the gouernment into those mens handes which are lame , and neyther know nor can command . they require their voyce , who haue nothing but a voice : empty barrells that sound loude , but haue no fulnesse , and craue aduice , of those that are least able to giue it them . and if they themselues pay not for their folly , yet at least the kingdome suffers for it . arist. ethic. lib. . ley. . & . tit. . part . . prou. . . . kings . . . . cor. . . . sam. . . . kings . . . tob. . . eccl. . . psal. . . mat. . luk. . & . luk. . . luk. . . wised . . . prou. . ● . exod. . & . . exod. . . deut. . . . diodor. sic. lib. . rerum antiq cap. . ae●●an de var. hist. lib. . exod. . . plut. lib. . sto●●us serm. exod. . ▪ leuit. . ● . isay. . . eccl. . isay. . . iohn . . . hose . . . eccl. ● . . eccl. . . arist. . pol. cap. . eccl. . . eccl. . . exod. ● . ● . prou. . . eccl. . . paris de put. de sindic . c. . num . . iob. . . luc. de pena in l. iudices . cod. de dignitat . lib. . isay. . . deut. . . psal. . . l. ff . ad l. iul. rep . l. . ff . de recep &c. 〈◊〉 . fin . c. ad legem iul. rep . l. . & . . tit. . lib. . plat. lib. . de legibus . act. . . . num. ● . . ioseph . de antiq. lib. . cap. . bald. in l. . c. de haered : vel actione v●ndit . diseque el fiscotiens accion contra los toles bi●nes . b●l d●●ito ded ●●●cho qualqui●ra pu●de serach●ado durante el of●icio ● despues 〈…〉 . de calum●●●●● . nazian . in o●at . . sene ca. de benefi . in au●h . v● iudices sine quo● § . isa● . ● . . eccl. ● ▪ eccl. . . eccl. . . exod. eccl ▪ . . ber. ser. . in cant. isay. . ● . eccl. . ● . 〈…〉 deut. . . prou. . ● . gen. . . prou , . . heb. . . deut . . chrys. h●m . . in gen●sim . hosc. . . ioh. . . d●us . . . mac. . 〈◊〉 . cant. . . eccl. corn. tacit. 〈◊〉 . offi. lib. . plat dial. . de legibus . . ley. . tit. . part. . aelius lampr. in vita alexan. seu●ri . 〈…〉 〈…〉 ▪ diog , laert. isay . . gen. . iob. . . wisd. . . 〈…〉 iob. . . exod. . . act. . . act. . . luk. . . leuit. . mat. . . act. . . 〈◊〉 . . . arist. . de anim . ●ext . . l ct . & d. tho. vniuersae creaturae homo est praestantissimus vt inter membra oculus . d. chrys. in hom. . in ioan plin. lib. . c. . eccl. . . 〈…〉 . mac. . . eccl. . . 〈…〉 gen. . . 〈…〉 . eccl. . eccl. . . exod. . . ● . . sam. ● . . 〈…〉 iob . . psal. . . psal. . . psal. ● . . isay. . . psal. . . iam. . . prou. . . eccl. . . 〈◊〉 . . prou . ● 〈◊〉 psal. . . ibi . ver . ● . gen. ● . ●● . heb. . . rom. . . 〈…〉 gen. . . rom. . . psal ● ▪ . ● ▪ es●er . 〈◊〉 . plut. in vita public●la . psal. . ● . 〈…〉 plin. natur . hist. lib. ● . psal. . . act. ● . . ● sam. . . cor. . . rom. . . eccl. 〈◊〉 . ● . prou. . . math. . . rom. . . cicero . esay . . ● ierem. . . king. . . king. . ● . greg. lib . epist. ● ▪ di●dor . si●ul . lib. . ● . . plato lib. . delegibus . osor : lib . de reg . iustit . eccl. . . prou. . . psal. . . . . d. tho. . p. q. artic . & . ● . q. . art . . so●o de iustitiae . & iust lib. . arist : . ethic. cap : . . mat. . . & . & . lib. . 〈◊〉 de iust. & i● : esay . . aug. lib. . de ciuit . dei. cap. . isidor . lib. etymol . aug. de doctr. christ. aristeas in hist. ambr. lib. . in lu● . aug. lib. de 〈…〉 . cirero . lib. ● de officijs . plut in moral . lib de doctr. prim . lact. tirm : lib. cap. . & lib. lib . cap . scot lib. . 〈◊〉 . q. . anselm : in prosolog . plutarc . in ag● . 〈◊〉 . arist : . top. cap. . , cicero lib. . de leg ▪ s. tho . . . so. art. . gregor . . qua . tuor modus . . q. . de re iud . in . cap. . patri . de reg. lib. . tit. . ●colastici cum d. tho. . ▪ q art . . arist. . met : tit. . exod. . deut. . ch●on . . . iob. . . apoc. . . wisd. . . chrys. in serm. 〈◊〉 bapt. aug. ad fratres in erem ser. . amos . . deut. . . deut. . . a rayz . is properly the roote of a tree , or any , other plant . metophorictlly rayzes , are inheritance , or possessions , in lands , houses , or immouable goods , because these cannot be rooted out , not remoued from place to place as your moueable goods may be . bienes rayzes del reyno . is crowne land , which neither can not ought to be alienated co●arr . verb. rayzes . b iuro . reales . is a certaine royall rent , raised through out a whole kingdome ; so called ● iure for the obligation subiects haue to maintaine their kings . in consideration whereof they are bound to administer iustice truly , aud to keepe them in peace . ib. verb. iuro . dan. . . amos. . . psal. ▪ . . iames. ● . luk. . ▪ prou. . 〈◊〉 . iohn . 〈◊〉 . gen. . . luke . . malach. . . arist. lib. . eth. cap. . . kings . . ▪ exod. . . act. . . prou. . , ● . . . iohn . . cor. . . august mat. . . iohn ephes. . ▪ iames . . eccl. . ● psal. . . ●am . . ● august . vlpian . l. . versi ▪ quaedam en●m ff . d● varijs & extraor . cognitio . pomp●nius , l. ● . ad fin●m . ff . de orig. ●ur●● . isocrates orat. de pac● . sam. . . ● . sa●● . . . prou. . . ibi. . psal. . . luk. . . cant. . . 〈◊〉 satyr . salust . terentius . psal. king. . . salust : in authem : quomod oportes i●d . lib. . senten . cap. . . reg. ▪ . prou. . . 〈…〉 cap. . chrys●in mas. lib. de ciuis . dei . cap. . seneca . lib. . de clem●nt cap. . eccl. . . num. . . ambr. lib. . offi. cap. . sen ▪ . . ● king. . . mac●h . ● . psal. . ● . m●t. . . psal. . . king. . . hie● . sup. i●r●● . . aug. lib. . de ciuit. cap. . isid lib. . sent. cap. . s. th . . ● . 〈◊〉 . ad . prou. . . king. ▪ eccl. . . esay . . ita ●sido . cla●●us . iob. . . iob. . rex , qui sedet in solio , dissipat omne malum , intuitu suo . 〈…〉 . eccl. . . prou. ● . . iohn . . mat. . . king . bede : in ioh greg. pastor . p . c . ber. in cant. ser. . arist. . polit. c. . arist. lib. ● . rheto● . c. ▪ 〈◊〉 . . ● . isidor . lib. . epist. polyb. eccl. ● . . prou. . . plutar. in pompon . artic. refert . cor. tacit an●al . lib. . luk. ● . pont. . . mark. . . leuit. . . ezech. . . esdras . rom. . . mat. . ambr. lib. . de bene ● . , isidor : eccl. . . eccl. . . lbi . tim. . . prou. . . prou. . . senec. ●pist . . cicero . philip. . orat. . iudg. . . tim. . . pet. . . iude . . wisd. . . ibi. , ibi. . ibi. . eccl. . . king. , . ionah . . . ● king. . . king. . . king. ● , . king. . . ibi. vers . . cor. . . ● cor. . . cor. . . . ierem . ● . psal. . . ibi. . eccl. . . eccl. . . isay . . ibi. ▪ prou. . . greg hom. . luk. . . prou : . . eccl. . . eccl. . . cicero tuse . lib. . refert . hilar de va●ia histor . lib. ● . prou. . d. th. . . q. 〈◊〉 . art . . aug. lib. de mendacio ad consen●●●m . cap. . 〈…〉 lib. . cap. . iosh. . . isidor . lib. . synonimorum . d. th. . . q. . art . . ad . cor. . . l. . tit. . part. . august . i● apolog. wisd. . . diog. laert. de vit. philos. pliny lib. . 〈◊〉 . bis . cap. cocodri●●● . psal. . . is●y . . . eccl. . ● . august . psal. . ve● . . p●ou . . caelius . lib. . lectio antiq . c. ● he means the escri●anos , and notaries of spaine ▪ apoc. . . tobit . . . valer. lib. . mirabi . caepola ; simancus de rep . lib. . cap. . & ▪ cap. . osor. lib. . de regis institutione . ley. . tit. . p. . in fine . ibi. faria traycion . excepto encaso detraycion ● heregia , enlo qual por dottrina de santo thomas se puedes dist . . & dist . . q. . artic . . q. . ad . . l. . tit. lib. . eccl. . . psal. . psa. . . prou. ● . . prou. . ● iam. . . seneca . lib. . ae virtut . psal . iames . . ●ern . lib. . de conside . ad eugen. rom. . . prou ▪ . . prou. . . prou. . . . plut. moral . lib. de amico , & ●ff●ctatore . ● . ● . ti● . . par . . psal. . . ierem. . hieroni. epist. . iob. . . plut. in moral . lib. de educan . tiberis . gregor . in regist . lib. . cap. . psal. . . ● . wisd. . . . kings . . . psal. . . herodia . lib. . plut. in vita , mar. brut. ansel. epist. ad rom. c. . cicero lib. de a●icitia . augustin● tom. . in , psal. 〈◊〉 , . hler. ad sabian . seneca . epist. ● chron. . . esay . . ● . arist . e●hi . . cap. . 〈◊〉 lib. . de 〈◊〉 ▪ c. . & . greg. nis. de bomi . opifici ▪ pe● . ambr. lib. exam c. ● . basil. lib. de vere virgini● . bern. de inter●●● domo . c. . luk. . . rom. . . don alons the sixt of castile and leons . vide fernan perez . lib. . t●● . . cap. . lin . nat . hist. lib. . cap. . num. . . ioseph de antiq. lib. . cap. . ciccro lib. , de sin . aug. lib. de moribus . dionis . s. prosper lib. . de ●i● contemp. cap . arist . ethic. cap. . & . s. leo. serm. de leiun ▪ eccl. . ▪ eccl. ● . . plin. eccl. . . galat. . . chron. . . iulius lib. . de legibus . plin. iun. lib. epist. ad semp . rufum . chrysost. hom ▪ . in gen. bald. in l. prouinoiarum c , d●ferijs . plato dial. . de legibus . exod. . . fier . lib. . tit. opus . . reg. . . dan. ● . . dan. . . gen. . . . reg. . . eccl : . ● . . king. . ● . psal. . . prou. . . ioseph . de antiq . lib . cap. . . reg. . . esther . . prou. . . prou. . . wisd. . , . prou. . . gregor . ●x regist . li. . epist. cap. . part. . tit. . l. . . tim. . ambr. in apolog . cap. . micah . . arist. lib. . ethic. cap. . mat. . ● . senec. lib. . epist. . psal. . . aug. lib. ● . soliloq . ●a . . ephes. 〈…〉 mark. . . mark. . . . cor. ● . . psal. . . iud . ioh. . . ioh. . . prou. . . 〈…〉 esther ● . . patri , ● . . li. . tit. . there remaineth testimony hereof in the decretals . c. alui● . q. aeneas siluester de doct . sig●smund . h●b . . . . king. . . reg. . . mac. . . arist. lib. . polit . c. . bal. in l. . c. . num. . c. de . strui . sen● traged . . wis. . . & . . ambr. . exam. . c. : aelian . lib. : c. . de animalibus . iob . . greg. . moral . c. . prou ● . apec . . . plut. in moral . eccles. . ● . basil in orat . . d● faelicit . & prudentia ▪ sen lib. . epist. . the cabinet-council containing the cheif [sic] arts of empire and mysteries of state : discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms grounded on authority, and experience : and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations / by the ever-renowned knight, sir walter raleigh ; published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing r ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing r estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the cabinet-council containing the cheif [sic] arts of empire and mysteries of state : discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms grounded on authority, and experience : and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations / by the ever-renowned knight, sir walter raleigh ; published by john milton, esq. cabinet-council raleigh, walter, sir, ?- . milton, john, - . [ ], p. : port. printed by tho. newcomb for tho. johnson ..., london : . first ed., with "to the reader" signed: john milton. cf. nuc pre- . published in as: aphorisms of state, grounded on authority and experience; in as: the arts of empire, and mysteries of state discabineted; in as: the secrets of government, and misteries of state. for other issues under different titles see: brushfield, t.n. bibliography of sir walter raleigh, , [no.] . reproduction of original in yale university library. eng political science -- early works to . monarchy -- early works to . a r (wing r ). civilwar no the cabinet-council: containing the cheif [sic] arts of empire, and mysteries of state; discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms, g raleigh, walter, sir f the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the f category of texts with or more defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion tam marti , quam mercurio . the true and lively portraiture of the hoble. and learned knight sr. walter ralegh . ro : vaughan sculp : the cabinet-council : containing the cheif arts of empire , and mysteries of state ; discabineted in political and polemical aphorisms , grounded on authority , and experience ; and illustrated with the choicest examples and historical observations . by the ever-renowned knight , sir walter raleigh , published by john milton , esq ; quis martem tunicâ tectum adamantinâ dignè scripserit ? london , printed by tho. newcomb for tho. johnson at the sign of the key in st. pauls churchyard , near the west-end . . to the reader . having had the manuscript of this treatise , written by sir walter raleigh , many years in my hands , and finding it lately by chance among other books and papers , upon reading thereof , i thought it a kinde of injury to withhold longer the work of so eminent an author from the publick ; it being both answerable in stile to other works of his already extant , as far as the subject would permit , and given me for a true copy by a learned man at his death , who had collected several such peices . john milton . the principal contents . chap. i. the definition and division of publick weals and soveraign states , according to their several species or kindes . pag. . chap. . of soveraign or monarchick government , with its essential marks , and specifical differences . pag. . chap. . of monarchies seigniorile , exemplified in the turkish and west-indian empire . pag. . chap. . of monarchies royal , with the means to maintain them . pag. . chap. . of monarchies tyrannical . pag. . chap. . of new-found monarchies and principalities , with the means to perpetuate them . pag. . chap. . of councils and counsellors in general . pag. . chap. . of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties and democraties . pag. . chap. . of officers and commissioners with their respective distinctions . pag. . chap. . of magistrates , their qualifications and elections . pag. . chap. . observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure , and war . p. . chap. . extrinsick observations , shewing how to deal with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designs , and decypher their intendments . pag. . chap. . observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor . pag. . chap. . of the princes intimate counsellors and ministers of state , with their several requisites . pag. . chap. . the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment . pag. . chap. . of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated . pag. . chap. . of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained . p. . chap. . of conspiracy and treason ; with the causes and ways of prevention or discovery . pag. . chap. . of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it . pag. . chap. . of diffidence and dissimulation in the mannage of state affairs . pag. . chap. . of war defensive and invasive ; with instructions touching laws of arms , soldiers , and military discipline . pag. . chap. . of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions . pag. . chap. . of councils in war , and directions tactick and stratagematick ; with advice how to make an honorable peace . pag. . chap. . of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof . pag. . chap. . a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen , and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events . pag. . chap. . maximes of state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policy in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narrations , and historical parallels . pag. . the cabinet council : containing the chief arts of empire , and mysteries of state . chap. i. the definition and division of publick weales and soveraign states , according to their several species or kinds . a common-wealth is a certain soveraign government of many families , with those things that are common among them . all common-wealths are either monarchies , aristocraties , democraties . a monarchie is that state where the soveraignty resteth in the person of one only prince . an aristocratie , is where some small part of the people have in the● as a body corporate , the soveraignty and supream power of the whole state . a democrati● , is where all the people have power and authority soveraign . so doth it appear , that the place and person where the soveraigntie resteth , doth cause the state to be either a monarchie , an aristocratie , or popular government . chap. ii. of soveraign or monarchick government , with its essential markes , and specifical differences . soveraigntie is an absolute and perpetual power in every publike state and he is properly and only a soveraign , that acknowledgeth no superior or equal , nor holdeth of any other prince , person or power , but god and his own sword . the first mark of soveraigntie is absolute power and authority to command all subjects in general , and every of them in particular , without consent of any other person or persons , either greater or inferior to himself . the second mark of majesty is authority to make war , and conclude peace at his pleasure . the third is power to bestow all honors and cheif offices at his pleasure . the fourth marke of soveraigntie is appellation . the fifth mark and last , is power to pardon all subjects by rigor of law or otherwise condemned in life , lands , goods , or honors . these powers are not to be imparted to any officer , deputy or other magistrate , but in the princes absence , and for some urgent occasion . monarchies are of three sorts signioril , royal , tyrannical . the diver●●tie of monarchies doth no● proceed from the nature of the state , but the diverse proceedings of those princes that governe ; for great difference there may be between the nature of the common wealth and the government thereof . that prince that giveth the magistracies , honors and offices without respect of nobility , riches or vertue , may be said to governe popularly . and that monarchy may be said to b● governed aristocratically , when the monarch imparteth the principal honors and offices to the noble and rich men only . the same difference there is to be found in states aristocratical and popular : for the one and the other may be both signioril , or tyrannical . a monarch signioril is he who by force of arms and just war , is made owner of mens bodies and goods , and governeth them as a master of a familie governeth base servants and slaves . a monarch royal , is he whose subjects are obedient unto his laws , and the monarch himself obeyeth the lawes of god and nature , suffering every subject to enjoy liberty natural , with property in lands and goods , governing as a father governeth his children . a monarch tyrannical , is he who without regard to the law of god or nature , commandeth free-men as slaves , and useth their lands and goods as his own . chap. iii. of monarchie signioril , exemplified in the turkish and west-indian empire . all people subject to princes , are governed as free-men by their prince and certain other particular lords of lands and liberties ; who not by the princes commission but by antient lawes or custom have inheritance and tenements ; or else they are by one prince and his ministers commanded , which ministers have not by law , or ordinance , any authority or interest of themselves , but being like to the people ( base men and slaves ) they command only by commission in the princes name ; and the authority of those ministers doth cease at the princes pleasure , so that the people doe not acknowledg any superior but the prince● nor owe any service to other mean lords : so as all the people stand without propertie in lands or goods ; for example , the empire of turky and the west indies . the provinces of this monarchie are allotted to sundrie magistrates or ministers , and they altered and removed at the princes pleasure ; but it is otherwise in a monarchie royal , because the monarch is there accompanied with many mean lords● and albeit those mean lords are subjects unto the prince , yet have they particular tenants who may not without just cause be dispossessed by the prince ; and those people having had dependency of their lords and their ancestors , do ever beare unto them a certain naturall love and dutifull respect : who so therefore compareth these principalities , shall perceive , that to conquer a state signioril there is great difficultie ; but being conquered , it may easily be maintained for the difficultie to conquer such a state , proceedeth from the lack of mean lords to call in and assist the prince that doth invade : who therefore desireth to subdue a nation thus governed , must of force assault , all the people , and rather trust in his own strength then the aide of the country . but if he can prevaile , then one only feare remaineth , which is the princes posteritie , which necessarily must be extinguished , because the princes race only hath interest both in the people and soldiers . but to enter a monarchy royal , is an enterprise of no great difficulty , when he that doth enter , hath the friendship and aide of some mean lords to take his part , and prepar the place where he is to arrive . chap. iiii. of monarchies royal , with the means to maintaine them . monarchies royal , are for the most part antient and hereditary , and consequently easie to be governed . for it is sufficient for the prince to maintain the old laws , ●and on occasion temporize with those accidents that happen● such a state cannot be taken from the prince without excessive force ; and if it be , it shall be soon recovered . example , england and france . but if a monarchie newly conquered , be annexed unto an old , and not properly antient , then is it with much more difficulty maintained . first , for that men naturally inclined to variation are easily induced ●o take arms against him that newly governeth . secondly , every new prince is forced to exact aswell upon those subjects that joyned with him as those that did resist him , and therefore shall offend both . example , ireland annexed to the crown of england : sicilia and naples to spain● . the means to maintain such a monarchie ; is● first to extinguish the race of him that was anciently prince . secondly , to continue all lawes and customes in the former force ; for so shall the subject find nothing altered but the prince , and therefore will soon rest contented : and the rather if that new monarchie and the antient dominion of the prince be of one language : but if the people be of a contrary language and humor , then to hold it , there needeth great industrie and fortune : in that case the best way is that the prince should inhabit there , as well to incounter all inconveniences proceeding from the subject , as to preserve the people from oppression of his own ministers . another way is to send thither certain colonies , and plant them in fit places , or else to settle some garisons both of horse and foot ; but colonies are less chargeable to the prince : as for the people inhabitant ( who must necessarily remove , they being a small number and dispossessed ) they cannot have power to offend : for in that case , this rule or maxime shall be found true , that men must be either kindly intreated● or with all extremity oppressed ; because of light injuries they may be revenged , but of utter oppre●●ion they cannot . a third way to hold a conquered dominion , is , to cherish and defend the neighbors of little power , and oppress or keep under those that are most potent ; and above all to take order that no forraign prince or power doe enter ; for it is ever to be looked for , that so many of the nation as are discontented , either for ambition or feare , will be ever readie to bring in strangers ; and to conclude this matter of principalitie annexed , i say it behoveth every prince possessed of such a state , never to increase the power of any potent neighbor , never to oppress those that are of small power , never , to permit any forraign potentate to enter , but ever to plant colonies and garisons , or else to make that dominion his cheif habitation . chap. v. of monarchies tyrannical . tyrannical princes are not advanced by favor , neither doe they trust unto fortune , but by degrees of warr , or else by some other indirect meanes do aspire unto greatness ; and therein do maintain themselves by all wayes either honest or dishonest , without respect of justice , conscience or law either of nations or nature : a prince by such impious means aspired , and desiring to hold that he hath gained , will take order that the cruelties he committeth may be done roundly , suddenly , and as it were at an instant ; for if they be exe●nted at leasure and by piece-meale , then will the princes fears continue long , and the terror in subjects take deeper impression , whose nature is such that either they must be bound by benefits , or by cruelty made sure from offending ; example , dionysius and agathocles . chap. vi . of new found monarchies and principalities , with the means to perpetuate them . some other princes there are that from private estate have aspired to soveraignty not by unnatural or impious proceedings as the former , but by vertue and fortune , and being aspired have found no great difficulty to be maintained ; for such a prince having no other dominion , is forced to settle himself where he is become a prince ; but here is to be noted that albeit such a man be vertuous , yet wanting fortune , his vertue proveth to small purpose , and fortune without vertue doth seldome work any great effect . howsoever it be , a prince being aspired , both by the aide of the one and of the other , shall notwithstanding find some difficulty to hold what he hath gotten : because he is forced to introduce new lawes and new orders of government differing from the old , aswell for his own security , as confirmation of the government : for avoiding of which dangers he is to consider whether he be of himself able to compell his subjects to obey , or must pray in aide of others ; if he can doe the first , he needeth not doubt ; but being driven to the other , his greatness cannot long continue● for albeit a matter of no difficultie it is to perswade a people , yet to make them constant , is a work well neer impossible . example , thes●us , cyrus , romulus . the second sort of new princes are such as be aspired by favor or corruption , or by the vertue or greatness of fortune or friends : a prince by any or all these means advanced , and desirous to hold his estate● must indeavor by his own vertue to maintain himself without depending upon any other : which may be done by this means ; first ; to assure all enemies from offending . secondly , to win the love and friendship of so many neighbours as possibly he may . thirdly to compass all designes tending to his honor or profit , and bring them to pas● either by fraud or force : fourthly , to make himself honoured and followed of captains and soldiers . fifthly , to oppress all those that would or can offend . sixthly to be obsequious & liberal to frinds , magnanimous & terrible to foes . seventhly , to c●sse all old and unfaithfull bands and entertain new . eighthly , to hold such amitie with kings and princes , as they ought reasonablie to favor him● or else they would offend ; easily they cannot● example , giovannie , torrigiani , caesar borgi● . the third and last meanes whereby private persons doe aspire to principalities , is not force and violence● but meer good-will and favor of men . the cause or occasion thereof , is only vertue , or fortune , or at least a certain fortunate craft and wittiness ; because he aspireth either by favor of the people , or by favor of the nobilitie ; for these contrary humors are in all common wealths to be found . and the reason thereof is , that the great men do ever endeavor to oppress the people , and the people do labor not to be oppressed by them . of these divers appetites one of these three ef●ects doe proceed , viz. principalitie , ●iberty , or licencious life . principality may come either by love of the multitude , or of the great men : for when any of these factions do find it self oppressed , then do they soon consent to make one a prince , hoping by his vertue and valor to be defended . example , francesco sforz● , alessandro de medici . a prince in this ●ort aspired , to maintain his estate , must first consider well by which of these factions aforesaid he is advanced : for if by favor of great men he be aspired , then must he meet with many difficulties ; for having about him divers persons of great qualitie , and such as were but lately his equals , hardly shall he command them in such sort as it behoveth ; but if the prince be advanced by the people● few or none shall hardly disobey him . so it appeareth that a prince made by the multitude is much more secure then he whom the nobilitie preferreth : for common people doe not desire to enjoy more then their own , and to be defended from oppression ; but great men doe studie not only to hold their own , but also to command and insult upon inferiors . note that all monarchies are p●incipalities , but all principalities are not monarchies . chap. vii . of councils , and counsellors in general . a senate or council is a certain lawful assembly of counsellors to give advice to him or them that have in the comon weale power soveraign . a counsellor is called in the latine senator ; which word signifieth in effect an old man : the grecians and romans also most commonly composed the●● councils of ancient and expert persons ; for if they or the greater part of them had bin young men , then might the council have more properly bin called a juvenate then a senate . the chief and most necessary note required in a counsellor is to have no dependance of any other prince or common-weale ; either oath , homage , natural obligation , pention , or reward : in this point the venetians have bin ever most precise , and for that reason , doe not admit any cardinal or other clergieman to be either of or at their councils , therefore when the venetian sena●e is assembled , the usher being ready to shut the dore cryeth aloud , fuora preti , depart priest . ] note also that in every state of what quality soever , a secret or cabinet-council is mainly necessary . chap. viii . of councils in some particular monarchies , aristocraties , and democraties . the king of spaine , for the government of his dominions hath seven councils ( viz ) the council of the indies , the council of spaine , the council of italy and the low countries , the council of war , the council of orders , the council of inquisition , and the council royal. in france are three councils ( viz ) the council privy , the council of judges , which they call presidents et conc●liers de parlament , and the great council which they call assemblei d● troys estates . of councils in aristocraties . in v●nice beside the senate and great council are four councils ( viz ) the sages of the sea , the sages of the land , the co●ncil of tenn , the three presidents of quarantia , and the senate : all which councils do amount to persons , with the magistrates . the great council of ragusa consisteth of persons , and hath another privie council of . of councils in democraties . genoua hath councils● the great council of , the senate which consisteth of , and the privie council which hath counsellors : so it doth appear that in all commonwealths , be they monarchies , aristocracies , or popular states , the council-privie is most necessarie and often used ; also this difference is to be noted between the councils in monarchies , and the councils in aristocracies and states popular ; that is to say , that all deliberations ●it ●o be published , are in a monarchie consulted and resolved upon in the council privie , and after ratified by common council ; but in optimacies or popular government the custom is contrary . here also is to be noted that albeit the use an● authorit● of ever● senate and privie councel is most needful , yet hath it no authority to command but in the name of those in whom the soveraignty resteth ; for if councellors had power to command absolutely , then should they be soveraigns , and consequently all execution at their pleasure ; which may not be without detracting from majestie , which is a thing so soveraign and sacred , as no citizen or subject of what quality soever , may touch or approach thereunto . chap. ix . of officers and commissioners with their respective distinctions . an officer is a person publick , that hath charge ordinary and limited by law . a commissioner is also a person publick● but his charge is extraordinary and limited by commission . officers are of two ●orts , and so be commissioners ; the one hath power to command , and are called magistrates ; the other hath authority to execute : so the one and the other are persons publick : yet are not all publick persons either officers or commissioners . commissioners are ordained to govern in provinces● in warr , in justice , in disposing the treasure , or some other function concerning the state ; but all commissions do spring and proceed from the soveraign , magistrates , and commissioners . and here is to be noted that every commission ceaseth if he that granted the commission doth dye , or revoke it , or if the commissioners during his commission shall aspire to office and authority equall to his that made it . chap. x. of magistrates , their qualifications and elections . a magistrate is an officer having power to command in the state ; and albeit that every magistrate be an officer , yet every officer is not a magistrate , but they only that have power to command . also in making of officers and magistrates in every commonweale , three things are specially to be observed ( viz ) who doth make them , what men they are that should be made , and the forme and manner how they are made . the first appertaineth to him or them in whom the soveraigntie resteth ; the second also belongeth to majestie ; yet therein the laws are commonly followed , especially in aristocracies and states popular ; in the one the magistrates are chosen out of the most wealthy or most noble : in the other , elected out of the whole multitude . the forme and manner of choosing magistrates in aristocracies and states popular , is either by election , by lot , or by both , and their office is to compel those that doe not obey what soveraigntie commandeth : for all force of commandment lyeth in compulsion . commandment likewise is of two sorts : the one may be called soveraign and absolute , above lawes , above magistrates , and above people . in monarchies such command is proper to the prince only ; in aristocracies it resteth in the nobility : and in democracies the people have that power . the second commandments are subject both to soveraignty and law . here is to be noted that every magistrate may recall his own commandement , and forbid what he did command , yet cannot revoke that which he hath judged . * also in presence of the soveraign , all authority of magistrates ceaseth ; and in presence of great magistrates the inferior have no power ; and magistrates equall cannot doe any thing but by consent , if his colleagues or fellow-magistrates be present . chap. xi . observations intrinsically concerning every publick state in points of justice , treasure , and warr . the first concern matter intrinsick . the second touch matter extrinsick . matters intrinsick are three . the administration of justice . the mannaging of the treasure . the disposing of things appertaining to war . matters extrinsick are also three . the skill how to deale with neighbours . the diligence to vent their designes● the way how to win so much confidence with some of them , as to be made partaker of whatsoever they mean to enterprise . touching administratio● of justice . the good and direct administration of justice , is in all places a principal part of government ; for seldome or never shall we see any people discontented and desirous of alteration , where justice is equally administred without respect of persons ; and in every state this consideration is required , but most of all in countries that doe front upon other princes , or were lately conquered : hereunto the princes vigilancy and the magistrates uprightness are especially required ; for oftentimes the prince is deceived , and the magistrates corrupted ; it behoveth also the prince to maintain the judges and ministers of justice in their reputation , and yet to have a vigilant eye upon their proceedings , and the rather if their authority doe include equity , and from their censure be no appeale ; and if their office be during life , and they are men born and dwelling in the same country ; all these things are duly to be considered of the prince ; for as to call the judges into q●estion , is as it were to disgrace the judicial seate ; so to wink at their corruptions were matter of just discontent to the subject ; in this case therefore the prince cannot doe more then by his wisdom to make choise of good men ; and being chosen , to hold them in good reputation so as the ordinary course of justice may proceed ; for otherwise great disorder , contempt , and general confusion will ensue thereof . secondly he is to keep his eye open upon their proceedings ; and lastly to reserve unto himself a supream power of appellation . touching the treasure . the want of money is in all states very perilous , and most of all in those which are of least strength , and doe confine upon nations with whom they have commonly war , or unassured peace , but most perilous of all to those governments which are remote from the prince , or place where they are to be relieved . the means to leavie treasure are four . first , the customs and impositions upon all sorts of merchandize and traffique is to be looked unto and advanced . secondly , the excessive eating of usury must be suppressed . thirdly , all super●luous charges and expences are to be taken away . lastly , the doings and accounts of ministers are severally to be examined . touching the matter of custom and impost , thereof assuredly a great profit is in every state to be raised ; chiefly where peace hath long continued , and where the country affordeth much plenty of commodities to be carried out , and where ports are to receive shipping . the moderating of interest is ever necessary , and chiefly in this age , by reason that money aboundeth in europe ; since the trafficke into the indies ; for such men as have money in their hands great plenty , would in no wise imploy the same in merchandize , if lawful it were to receive the utmost usury , being a course of most profit and greatest security . the taking away of superfluous expences is no other thing then a certain wise and laudable parsimony ; which the romans and other well governed states did use . these expences consist in fees , allowances , and wages granted to ministers of little or no necessity ; also in pensions , rewards , entertainmens and donaries , with small difficultie to be moderated , or easily to be suppressed . * by abridging or taking away of these needless expences a marvelous profit will be saved for the prince ; but if he continue them , and by imposing upon the people doe think to increase his treasure or revenew , besides the loss of their love , he may also hazzard their obedience , with many other inconveniences . touching warr . whatsoever prince or common weale is neighbor to any people which can , will , or were wont to offend , it is necessary to have not only all things prepared for defence of his person and country , but also to forecast and use every caution and other diligence : for the inconveniencies which happen to government , are suddain and unlookt for ; yea the providence and provision required in this case ought to be such as the expences all other waies imployed must stay to supply the necessity of war . chap. xii . extrinsick observation , shewing how to deale with neighbor princes and provinces respectively , how to prevent their designes , and decypher their intendments . this first point of matter extrinsick is of such quality as being well handled procureth great good , but otherwise becometh dangerous ; for the proceeding must be diverse according to the diversitie of the ends which the prince or governor intendeth ; for if he desire to continue peace with his neighbors , one way is to be taken ; but otherwise ●e is to work that seeketh occasion to break , and to become an enemy to one or more of his neighbors . if he do desire to live peaceably with all , then he is to observe these rules ( viz. ) first , to hold and continue firmly all contracts and capitulations secondly , to shew himself resolved neither to offer nor take the least touch of wrong or injury . thirdly , with all care and favor to further commerce and reciproke traffick for the profit of the subject , and increase of the princes revenue . fourthly , covertly to win so great confidence with neighbors , as in all actions of unkindness among them he may be made umpire . fifthly , to become so well bele●ved with them as he may remove such diffidences as grow to his own disadvantage . sixthly , not to deny protection or aid to them that are the weakest , and cheifly such as do and will endure his fortune . lastly , in favouring , aiding , and protecting ( unless necessity shall otherwise s● require ) to do it moderately , so as they who are to be aided , become not jealous , and consequently seek adherency elswhere , which ofttimes hath opened way to other neighbors that desire a like ●ccasion . how to prevent their designes . this point in time of war is with great diligence to be looked unto ; also in time of peace to prevent all occasions that may kindle warr is behoveful ; for to foresee what may happen to the prejudice of a prin●●s profit or reputation , is a part of great wisdom . the means to attain the intelligence of these things are two . the first is by friends , the next by espials ; the one for the most part faithfull , the other not so assured these matters are well to be considered● for albeit the nature of man desireth nothing more then curiously to know the doings of others , yet are those things to be handled with so great secrecy and dissimulation as the princes intent be not in any wise suspected , nor the ministers made odious ; for these sometimes to win themselves reputation , do devise causes of difference where no need is , divining of things future which prove to the prejudice of their own prince . to win confidence with neighbours . this is chiefly attained unto by being loved and honored ; for these things do work so many good effects , as daily experience sufficeth without any express example to prove them of great force . the waies to win love and trust , is in all actions to proceed justly , and sometimes to wink at wrongs , or set aside unnecessary revenges ; and if any thing be done not justifiable , or unfit to be allowed , as oftentimes it happneth , there to lay the blame upon the minister , which must be performed with so great show of revenge and dissimulation by reproving and punishing the minister , as the princes offended may be satisfied , and beleive that the cause of unkindness proceeded from thence . now only it resteth that somewhat should be said touching provision , to the end the people may not be drawn into despaire by famine or extream dearth of victual , and chiefly for want of corne , which is one principal consideration to be regarded , according to the italian proverb , pane in piazza , giustitia in palazzo , siverezza per tutto : whereunto i could wish every prince or supream governor to be thus qualified ( viz. ) facile de audienza : non facil●de credenz● , desi●s● de spedition , essemplare in costunii proprii , & inquei de sua casa tale chevorra governare , e non e●●er governato da altr● ; ●e della raggione . chap. xiii . observations confirmed by authorities of princes and principalities , charactering an excellent prince or governor . every good and lawful principality is either elective or successive : of them , election seemeth the more ancient ; but succession in divers respects the better ; minore discrimine sumitur princeps quam qu●eritur . tac. the chief and only endeavor of every good prince , ought to be the commodity and security of the subjects ; as contrarywise the tyrant seeketh his own private profit with the oppression of his people . civium non servitus sed tutela tradita est . sal. to the perfection of every good prince , two things are necessarily required ( viz ) prudence and vertue ; the one to direct his doings , the other to governe his life●rex eris●●i recte feceris . hor. the second care which appertaineth to a good prince , is to make his subjects like unto himself ; for thereby he is not only honored , but they also the better governed ; facile imperium in bonos . plaut. subjects are made good by two meanes ( viz ) by constraint of law , and the princes example ; for in all estates , the people do imitate those conditions whereunto they see the prince enclined ; quiquid faciunt principes , pr●ecipere videantur . quintil. all vertues be required in a prince , but justice and clemencie are most necessary ; for justice is a habit of doing things justly , as well to himself as others , and giving to every one so much as to him appertaineth ; this is that vertue that preserveth concord among men , and whereof they be called good : ●us & ●equitas vincula civitatum : cic. * it is the quality of this vertue also to proceed equally and temperately ; it informeth the prince not to surcharge the subjects with infinite laws ; for thereof proceedeth the impoverishment of the subjects and the inriching of lawyers , a kind ●f men which in ages more antient , did seem of no necessity : sine causidicis satis ●oelices olim fuer● futur●eque sunt urbes . sal. the next vertue required in princes is clemency , being an inclination of the mind to lenity and compassion , yet tempered with severity and judgment ; this quality is fit for all great personages , but chiefly princes , because their occasion to use it is most ; by it also the love of men is gained ; qui vult regnare , languida regnet manu . sen. after clemency , fidelity is expected in all good princes , which is a certain performance and observation of word and promise ; this vertue seemeth to accompany justice , or is as it were the same , and therefore most fit for princes : sanctissimum generis humani ●onum . liv. as fidelity followeth justice , so doth modesty accompany clemency ; modesty is a temperature of reason , whereby the mind of man is so governed● as neither in action or opinion he over-deemeth of himself , or any thing that is his ; a qualitie not common in fortunate folk ; and most rare in princes . super●ia commune nobilitatis malum . sal. this vertue doth also moderate all external demonstration of insolence , pride , and arrogance , and therefore necessary to be ●nown of princes , and all others whom ●avor or fortune have advanced : impone ●oelicitati t●●e fr●enos , facilius illam reges . curt. but as princes are to observe the bounds of modesty , so may they not forget the the majesty appertaining to their supream ●onor , being a certain reverend greatness due to princely vertue and royal state ; a grace and gravity no lesse beseeming a ●rince then vertue it self ; for neither overmuch familiarity , nor too great austeritie ●ought to be used by princes : facilitas ●ntoritatem , severitas amorem minuit . tac. to these vertues we may apply liberality , which doth not only adorn , but highly advance the honor due to princes ; there●y also the good will of men is gained ; for nothing is more fitting a princes nature then bounty , the same being accompanied with judgment , and performed according to the laws of liberality ; perdere multi sci●nt , donare nesciunt . tac. it seemeth also that prudence is not only fit , but also among other vertues necessary in a prince ; for the daily use thereof is in all humane actions required , and chiefly in matters of state and government . prudentia imperantis propria et unica virtus . arist. the success of all wordly proceeding● doth shew that prudence hath compassed the prosperous event of humane actions , more then force of arms or other power●mens una sapiens plurium vincit manus . eurip. prudence is either natural , or received from others ; for who so can counsel himself what is fit to be done , needeth not the advice of others ; but they that want such perfection , and are nevertheless capable , and are willing to know what others informe , ought to be accompted wise enough : laudatissimus est qui cuncta vid●bit , sed laudandus est is qui paret rectè monenti . hesiod . chap. xiiii . of the princes intimate counsellors and ministers of state , with their several requisites . albeit the excellent spirit of some princes be such as doth justly deserve the highest ●ommendation ; yet for that every course of life needeth the aid of men , and the mind of one cannot comprehend the infinite care appertaining to publick affairs ; it behooveth princes to be assisted : magna negocia , adjutoribus egent . tac. these assistants may be properly divided into counsellors and ministers ; the one to advise , the other to execute : without counsel , no kingdom , no state , no private house can stand ; for , experience hath proved that common weals have prospered so long as good counsell did governe , but when favor , fear , or voluptuosness entred , those nations became disordered ; and in the end subject to slavery : quiddam sacrum profecto est consultatio . plato . counsellors are men specially selected to give advice to princes or commonwealths , as well in peace as in war : the chief qualities required in such men , are fidelity and knowledg ; which two concurring do make them both good and wise , and consequen●●y fit for counsel ; prudentis proprium m●nus rectè con●ulere . arist. the election of counsellors is and ought to be chiefly among men of long experience , and grave years ; for as youth is fittest for action in respect of corporal strength ; so elder folk having felt the force of every fortune , and observed the course of worldly proceedings do seem most meet for consultation : consilia senum , facta juvenum . pla●● . albeit we say that the excellency of wisdom should be in counsellors ; yet do we not require so quick and fiery a conceipt as is more apt for innovation then orderly government . hebet ●ores quàm acutiores meliùs remp. a●ministrant . thucyd. to fidelity and experience we wish that our councellors should be endued with piety , liberty , constancy , modesty , and silence ; for as the aid and assistance of god is that which governeth all good counsels , so liberty of speech and magnanimus uttering of what is good and fit , is necessary in counsellors . likewise to be constant and not to varie in opinion , either for feare or favor , is very commendable : also as modesty in giving counsel escheweth all offences , and gaineth good will ; so secrecy is the best and most secure meanes to govern all publick affairs : res magnae sustineri non possunt ab ●o qui tacere nequit . curt. the first obstacle to good counsel is ●ertinacy or opiniativeness , a condition far unfit for counsellors ; yet some men are so far in love with their own opiniastre conceipts as that they cannot patiently endure opposition . secondly , discord must from counsellors be removed , because private offence many times impeacheth publick proceedings . thirdly affection is an enemy to counsel , the same being commonly accompanied with anger , wherewith nothing can be rightly or considerately done . lastly avarice seemeth a vice worthy to be abhorred of all counsellors because it driveth away both fidelity and honesty , the principall pillars of all good counsell : pessimum veri affectus et judicii venenum● utilitas . tac. to good counsell other impediments there are , which square not with wisdom ; for all crafty and hazarding counsells do seem in the beginning likely to succeed ; but afterwards and chiefly in the end do prove hard and of evil event . it therefore seemeth behovefull to be wary in resolving , and bold in executing : animus vereri qui scit , scit tutò aggredi . pub. an other let to good consultation is immoderate desire , which every wise man must endeavor to restrain . cupiditate pauca rectè fiunt , circumspectione plurima : thucyd. thirdly haste , is an enemy to good deliberation ; for whoso greedily desireth any thing , proceedeth rashly ; and rash proceeding endeth ever in repentance . scelera impetu , bona consilia morâ vales●unt . tac. of ministers of state . having already spoken of counsellors , somwhat is to be spoken of ministers ; i mean those that either publickly or privately serve the prince in any function ; in choice of which men , care must be had , first that they be person honestly born ; for no man descended of base parentage may be admitted , unless in him be found some noble and excellent vertue ; optimus quisque nobilismus . plato . secondly , they ought to be of honest condition , and of good ●ame ; for that common-weal is better and more secure , where the prince is not good , then is that where his ministers are evill . it seemeth therefore that ministers should be men of good quality and blamelesse . emitur sola virtute p●testas . claud. thirdly , consideration is to be had of their capacity and fitness for that function wherein they are to be used ; for as some men are apt for learning , so others are naturally disposed to arms . also it is necessary that every one square with the office whereuntoh e is appointed , in which matter some princes have used great caution ; for as they little liked of men excellent , so they utterly detested the vitious ; the one they doubted to trust in regard of themselves , the other were thought a publick indignity to the state . vvise men have therefore resolved that those witts which are neither over haughty and singular , nor they which be base or dull are fittest for princes secrets and services ; howsoever we may hereof say with tacitus : nesci● quomodo aulica hae● comitia affect us dirigit , et fato quodam ac sorte nascendi , ut caetera , it a principum inclinatio in hos , offensio in illos est . tac. and because the course and quality of mens lives serving in court , is of all other the most uncertain and dangerous , great heed and circumspection ought therein to be used ; for whoso serveth negligently forgetting the dutifull endeavors appertaining to the place , seemeth to take a way of no good speed : quanto quis obsequio promptior , tanto ●onoribus et ●pibus extollitur . tac. it shall also become such a man to look well unto his own profit and behave himself rather boldly then bashfully : malus minister regi● imperii p●dor . sen. to be modest , and closely to handle all actions ; is also a course well beseeming a courtier ; neither shall he do well to attribute any good success to his own vertue or merit , but acknowledg all to proceed from the princes bounty and goodness , by which meanes envy is eschewed , and the prince not robbed of his honor . haec est conditio regum , casus tantum advers●s hominibus tribuant , secundos virtuti suae . prov. emped . and to conclude these precepts summarily , i say it behooveth a●l ministers and servants in court to be patient , wary and of few words : fraudum sedes aula . sen. chap. xv . the art of ruling , or mystery of regiment . to governe , is a certain skill how to command and continue subjects in due obedience , so as offend they ought not , or if they will they cannot ; wherein two speciall things are to be considered ( viz ) the nature of men , and the nature of the state● but first the condition of the vulgar must be well conceived ; noscenda natura vulgi , et quibus modis temperanter hab●atur . tac. the disposition of divers men is , some are apt to anger , some are hardy , some fearful ; it therefore behooveth the prince to accommodate his government to the humor of people whom he governeth : principis est virtus maxima nosse suos . mart. likewise the nature of commonweals is mutable and subject to change , and kings are not only accompanied with fortune● but also followed with hate , which breedeth a continuall diffidence , chiefly towards those that are nearest to majesty : suspectus semper invisusq●e dominantibus quisquis proximus destinatur . tac. moreover the vulgar sort is generally variable● rash , hardy , and void of judgment ; ex opinione multa , ex veritate pauca judicat . cic. to confirm a government , force and armes are of greatest necessity ; by force i mean the guards and armes which princes use for their defence or ornament ; miles in foro , miles in curia principem comitari debet . tac. to this may be added fortification and strong buildings , in these days much used by new princes , and others also to whom people yield , not willing obedience . in ancient times princes planted colonies as well to suppress rebellion in conquered countries , as to front suspected neighbors : coloniae vera sedes servitutis . tac. the government of princes is also greatly increased by a vertue , which i call a commendable affection in subjects , proceedi●g of love and authority : these effects do grow from the princes own merit , but their being liveth in the mind of the people ; this love is gained by lenity , liberality , and mercy ; yet is every of them to be tempered : nec aut reverentiam terrore , aut amorem humilitate captabis . plin. affection is also no way sooner won then by liberality , the same being used with judgment and moderation . bellorum sociis , periculorum c●n●ortibus , sive de te ben● ac fortiter — meritis . sen. by ●ndulgence likewise and princely affability the love of men is gained ; for the multitude desire no more then necessary food , and liberty to use ordinary recreation●●vulgo , sicut pueris , omne ludicrum in pretio est . sen. chap. xvi . of princely authority ; wherein it consists , and how far to be extended and delegated . authority is a certain reverent impression in the minds of subjects and others touching the princes vertue and government ; it resteth chiefly in admiration and ●ear●ingenita quibusdam gentibus ergareges ●uos veneratio . curt. authority consisteth in three things ; ( viz ) the form of government , the strength of the kingdom● and the condition of the prince ; for in them all reputation and ●ecurity resteth : majest as imperii , salut●s ●utela . curt. whoso desireth to governe well , it behoveth him to use severity , constancy , and restraint ; for over much lenity introduceth contempt , and certain hope of impunity ; the condition of men being such as canno● be restrained by shame , yet it is to be commanded by fear : salutaris s●veritas vincit inanem speciem clementiae . cic. yet ought severity to be used with great respect and sparingly , because over great terror breedeth desperation : poena ad paucos , metus ad omnes perveniat . cic. to governe constantly is nothing else but to continue the old and antient laws in force without change or innovation unles exceeding great commodity or urgent necessity shall so require : for where extream punishments are used , reformation is always needfull ; nocet interdum priscus rigor & nimia severitas . tac. also to restrain authority is a matter of great necessity ●nd worthy a wise prince● else he maketh others partakers of the honor and power to himself only due , the same being also dangerous : periculosum privati hominis nomen supra ( immó & juxta ) principes extolli . tac. it seemeth also perilous that great authority given to private men should be long● for thereby oftentimes they are made in●olent and apt to innovation : libertatis sive principatus magna imperia diuturna sse n● sinas . liv. authority is also reinforced and enlarged by power , without which no prince can either take from others or defend his own : parum tuta sine viribus majestas . liv. chap. xvii . of power and force ; and how to be raised and maintained . power and stength is attained by these ●ive ways , mony , armes , counsell , friends and fortune ; but of these the first and most ' forcible is mony : nihil tam munitum quod non exp●gnari pecuni● possit . cic. next to mony armes are of most use , as well to defend as to offend ; to keep , as to conquer ; for oftentimes occasion is to be offered as well to take from others , as to hold what is our own : sua retinere privatae est domus , de alie●is certare regia laus est . tac. also of great and necessary use is counsell , to devise how arms ought to be employed or enforced : arma concilio temperan●a . tac. likewise friends and confederates do greatly increase the vertue of power , the same being such as have both wit and ability to aid : in caducum parietem ne inclina : adri . the last , yet not the least part of power , consisteth in fortune ; whereof daily experience may be seen ; for the success of all humane actions seem rather to proceed from fortune then vertue . omni ratione potentior fortuna . curt. to these particularities concerning power , we may add the qualities of the prince , which greatly grace his authority ; these are partly internal● and partly external ; by the one i mean the vertues of the mind , by the other a certain seemly behavior and comly gesture of the body ; of the first kind i do suppose piety and providence to be the chief , for piety maketh a princk venerable , and like unto god ; oportet principem res divinas videri curare seri● & ant● omnia . arist. providence is a forecast and likely conjecture of things to come , supposed to be in those princes that in their actions proceed slowly and circumspectly ; it seemeth also a course of princely discretion to be retired and not ordinarily to converse with many : autoritatem absentiâ tueare . suet. chap. xviii . of conspiracy and treason ; with the causes and ways of prevention or discovery . conspiracy is commonly addressed to the princes person ; treasons are addressed again●t his government , authority , country , subjects , or places of strength . these mischiefs are easily feared , but hardly eschewed● for albeit open enemies are openly encountred , yet fraud and subtilty are secret foes , and consequently not to be avoided : occulta pericula n●que praevidere n q●e vitare in promptu ●st . salust . the danger of conspiracy preceedeth of divers causes , as avarice , infidelity of subjects , ambition in servants , and coruption in soldiers , therefore with great difficulty to be avoided : vitae tuae dominus est , quisquis suam contempsit . sen. notwithstanding it seemeth that either by inquisition , punishment , innocency , or destiny , the evill affection of men may be oftentimes discovered : . for whoso will curiously inquire and consider the actions and ordinary speeches of men ( i mean those that be persons of honor and reputation ) may oftentimes vent the myne that lurketh in the minds . quoniam raro nisi male loqunti male faciunt . lips . . punishment is likewise a thing so terrible that the consideration thereof with the hope of reward doth often discover those dangerous intentions : cruciaiu aut praemio cuncta pervia sunt . tac. but as it is wisdom in princes to give ear to informers , so are they not always to be believed ; for hope , envy , hate , or some other passion oftentimes draws them to speak untruly . quis innocens esse potest si accusare sufficit ? tac. . the third and likeliest defence against conspiracy is the princes own innocency ; for never having injured any man , it cannot be thought there liveth any subject so lewde as will endeavor to hurt him . fidelissima custodia principis ipsius in●ocentia . pli● . . the last and best bulwark to withstand the force of this mischief we call destiny ; which preceeding from the fountain of divine providence , may be truly called the will of god ; in whose only power it resteth to protect and defend good pri●ces . ille erit à latere tuo , & custodiet pedem tuum n● capiaris . salo. treasons are most commonly enterprized by covetous persons , who preferring private profit before fame or fidelity , do not fear to enter into any impious action : to this humor ambitious men , dissentious , and all such as be desirous of innovation , are inclined : pulcra loquentes iidem in pectore prava strue●tes . hom. to these offenders no punishment as equal to their impious merit , can be devised , being persons odious as well to friend as foes : proditores etiam in quos antepo●unt , invisi s●●t . tac. chap. xix . of publick hate and contempt , with the occasions and means to redress and avoid it . having briefly touched the vertues and means whereby princes are maintained ●n authority and honor , let something be said of the causes from whence their ruine doth proceed ; the cheif whereof seemeth to be hate and contempt : hate cometh of feare , which the more common it is , the more dangerous●nulla vis imperii tanta est , quae prement● met● possit esse di●turna● cic. the causes of feare are punishments impositions and rigor ; and therefore it behooveth a prince not only to shun them , but to eschew those actions whereby he may reasonably incur their suspition . sentias enim homines ut metuant a●t oderint , ●non minus opinio●e & fama , quam certa aliqua ratione moveri . cic. yet punishment● imposition , and censure are in all states necessary , although they shew and seem terrible , and consequently breed a certain desperation in subiects , unless they be discreetly and modestly used ; for extreme and frequent punishments taste of cruelty ; great and many imposts ●avour of covetousness ; censure of manners when it exceedeth the quality of offences , doth seem rigor in these matters ; therefore it behooveth the prince to be moderate and cautelous , chiefly in capital punishment , which must be confined within the bounds of justice . sit apud principem parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis . sen. but if for securitie sake the prince be forced to punish , let the same be done with shew of great sorrow and lothness : tanquam invitus & magnocum tormento ad castigandum veniat . s●n . let all punishments also be slowly executed● for they that are hastily punished do seem to have bin willingly condemned ; neither ought any capital● punishment to be inflicted but only that which is profitable to the commonweale , and for example sake . non ●am ut ipsi pereant , quam ut alios pereundo deterreant . sen. in punishing also a special respect must be had , that no shew of content or pleasure be taken therein . formarabiei est sanguine & vulneribus gaudere . sen. also in punishing equality must be observed , and the nature of the punishment according to the custom . nec eisdem de causis alii plectantur , alii ne appellentur quidem● cic. but in punishing publick offences wherei● a multitude have part , the execution ought to be otherwise , and as it were at an instant , which may haply seem terrible , but in effect is not . frequens vindicta paucorum odium reprimit , omnium irritat . sen. another meanes to satisfie a people offended is to punish the ministers of cruelty , and with their blood to wash away the common hatred . piaculares publici odii victimae . plin. by this king david did appease the gibeonites . the next cause of discontent cometh of impositions under which word is comprehended all levies of mony , a matter nothing pleasing to people , as that which they esteem equall to their own lives . pecunia anima & sanguis est mortalibus . plaut. first , to remove hate conceived of this cause , there is nothing better then publick expostulation of necessity : for what commonwealth or kingdom can be without tributes ? nulla quies gentium sine armis , nec arma sine stipendiis , nec stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt , tac. the second remedy against hate for impositions is to make moderate levies and rare . for as tiberius the emperor was wont to say , a sheep should be fleeced not flead . qui nimis emungit , elicit sanguin●m . tac. thirdly , also to eschew the offence of people it behoveth the prince to have a vigilant eye on informers , promoters , and such fiscal ministers , whose cruelty and covetous proceedings do oftentimes occasion great hate ; but this mischief may be , though hardly , encountred , either by choosing honest officers , or ( proving otherwise ) not only to remaine them but to use them as spunges , exprimendi post qu●m biberint . suet. in all impositions or taxations , no cruelty or force ought to be used , the second cause to kindle hate : and to meet with that mischief , nothing is better then to proceed moderately , and without extremity . ne boves ipsos , mox agros , postremò corpora servitio aut poenae tradant , tac. the fourth remedy is the princes own parsimony , not giving so largely to private persons as thereby to be forced to take from the multitude . magnae opes no● tam multa capiendo , quam haud multa perdendo , quaerunt●r . maecaenas● the last help against hate is in taxation to proceed equally , indifferently , and without favor or respect ; and that the assessors of taxes may be elected of the meaner sort of people . populus maximam fidem rerum suarum hab●t . tac. touching censure , which we numbred amongst the causes whereof hate is conceived , much needeth not to be spoken , because the same is discontinued● or rather utterly forgotten ; yet doth it seem a thing necessary , being a certain observation and controlement of such evill manners , and disorders as were not by law corrigible ; these officers were of the romans called magistri pudoris & mod●stiae . livi. to the function of censures these two things are anciently subject manners , and excess ; under manners i comprehend wantonness , drunkenness , dicing , brawling , perjury , and all such lewdness as modesty condemneth . these disorders were anciently punished by the discretion of ●ensors in all ages and sexes , to the end that idleness might be generally avoided . vniversa plebs habeat neg●tia sua , quibus àmal● publico detineatur . salust excess includeth riotousness , expence of money , prodigal housekeeping , banqueting , and superfluitie in apparrel , which things are the mothers of many mischeifs . it also seemeth in some sort perillous to the prince that the subject should exceed either in covetize or consuming . nemo nimis excedat , sive amicorum copiâ , sine opum . arist. the punishment inflicted upon these sorts of offenders , were either ignom●ny , or pecuniarie punishments , censoris judicium d●mnato nihil affert nis● ruborem . tac. the first and chiefest meanes to remove these inconveniences , is the princes own example , whose life being well censured , easily reduceth others to order . ●ita principis censura perpetu● . plin. secondly , those disorders may be taken away without danger , if the censures doe proceed by degrees and leasurely ; for the nature of man may not suddenly be altered●vitia quaedam tol●it facilius princeps , si eorum sit p● ti●n● . sen. these are the cheifest rules whereby to eschew hate ; but impossible it is for any prince or minister utterly to avoid it ; for being himself good , he incurreth the offence of all bad folk : if he be evil , good men will hate him ; this danger therefore wise and vertuous princes have little regarded : because hate may be gained as well by good as evil doing . odia qui nimium timet , regnare nescit . sen. one other means to remove this error , is , to reward the good and well deserving subjects ; for no man can think him cruell that for love to vertue useth austeritie : which wil appear when he bestoweth bountif●lly on the good . praemio & ●oena respublica continetur solon . the other vice which indangereth the state of princes , we call contempt , being a certain base and vile conceipt , which entereth into the subjects , strangers or servants , of the prince and his proceedings ; for the authority of a king may be resembled to the powers of mans mind , whereunto the hands , the feet , the eyes , do by consent obey . vires imperii in consensu obedientium sunt livi. the causes of contempt do proceed chiefly from the form of government , fortune , or the princes manners ; the form of government becometh contemptible , when the prince desiring to be thought merciful , ruleth rather pittifully then justly : which manner of proceeding taketh away all reverence in the people , and in liew thereof entereth liberty , or at least a certain boldness to offend ; facultas faciendi quod cuilibet visum , non p●test comprimere ingenitam si●gulis hominibus pravitatem . tac. also to be mutable , irresolute , light and inconsiderate in bestowing the honors and offices of state , maketh the prince contemptible ; qui praesentibus fruitur , nec in longi●s consultat● arist. but if contempt be caused by fortune , or as may be said more reasonably , by destiny , and that those fri●nds do fail who ought in duty to defend the prince and his authority , then is there small hope to eschew contempt . fato obnoxia virtus . pl●ut . the princes manners do breed contempt , when he yeildeth his affections to sensuality and sloth , or if he incur the suspition of simplicity , cowardise , or any such vice , unworthy the dignity he beareth● common people do sometimes also disesteem the prince for external and light causes , as deformity of person , sickness or such like . mos vulgi est , fortuita & externa ad culpam trahe●e . tac. chap. xx . of diffidence and dissimulation in the mannage of state affairs . albeit roundness and plain dealing be most worthy praise , chiefly in private persons ; yet because all men in their actions do not so proceed it behooveth wise men and princes above others at occasions to semble and dissemble ; for as in all actions a prince ought to be slow and advised ; so in consent and beleiving haste and facility is most dangerous ; and though credulity be rather an error then a fault ; yet for princes it is both unfit and perilous . wherefore it importeth them to be defended with this caution , nihil credendo , atque omnia cav●ndo . ci● . notwithstanding he must not shew himself diffident or distrustful utterly ; but as i wish he should not over-slightly believe all men , so ought he not for small causes distrust every man . multi faller● d●cuerunt , dum timent falli . sen. dissimulation is as it were begotten by diffidence , a quality in princes of so great necessity as moved the emperor tiberi●● to say , nescit regnare , qui nescit dissim●lare . the necessity of dissimulation is chiefly to be u●ed with strangers and enemies : it also sheweth a certain di●cretion in magistrates sometimes to disguise with friends when no offence doth thereof follow . do●i non sunt d●li , nisi ast● colas . plaut. this kind of craf● albeit in every mans conceipt not praisable , is nevertheless tolerable , and for princes and magistrates ( the same being ●sed to good ends ) very necessary . but those cunnings which are contrary to vertue , ought not of honest men to be used : neither dare i commend adulation and corruption ; though they be often used in court and are of some learned writers allowed . decipere pro moribus temporum , prudentia est . plin. by great subtiltie and frauds contrary to vertue and piety , i mean perjury and injustice , which though all men in words detest , yet in deeds are used of many , perswading themselves by cavillations and sophistications to excuse the impiety o● their false oathes : as it is written of lysander , pueros ●●lis , viros juramentis circumvenire solebat . plut. chap. xxi . of warr defensive and invasive : with instructions touching laws of armes , soldiers , and military discipline . the art military is of all other qualities most necessary for princes ; for without it they cannot be defended ; force of men only sufficeth not , unless the same be governed by council , and martial wisdom . duo sunt quibus resp● servatur ; in hostes fortitudo , & domi concordia . tac. military knowledge concerneth warr , and every warr is either forreign or domestical . touching forriegn it must be considered when it must be begun , how to continue it , and when to be ended ; to begin war , a prince is , to take heed that the cause be just , and the enterprise advisedly entred into . sunt enim & belli sicut pacis jura , j●st●que ea non minus ac fortiter gerere debes . liv. the laws of arms are in all common-weales to be duly observed : for to enter fight rashly and without respect to reason , were beastly ; also to kill or slay would work no better effect , then that all nations should without mercy murder one another ; barbarority coe●em coede , & sanguinem sangnine expiare . sal● no warr therefore is to be made but such as is just . and in every just war these three things are to be looked into ( viz ) that the author be of authority , that the cause be good , and the end just ; for in all states , the prince , or they in whom the soveraignty resteth , are the just author● of warr : others have no such authority . si quis privatim si●e public● s●ito , pacem bellumve feceri● , capitale esto . plat● . warrs are of two sorts : defensive and offensive● the one to resist , the other to invade● against defence nothing can be said , because it is natural and necessary . est non modo justum sedetiam nec●ssarium cum vi vis illata defendi●ur . cic. defensive warr is of two sorts , either to defend thine own , or thy friends ; for it is reason that every one should keep securely that which to him appertaineth : and therewith also by arms to defend the liberty of country , parents , and friends . nullum bellum à civitate suscipitur nisi aut pro fid● aut pro salute . c●c . the like reason leadeth us to assist and protect friends : for the common obligation of humane society doth so require . qui enim non obsistit si potest , injuriae , tam est in viti● , quam si parentes aut patriam , aut socios deserat . cic. invasion is also just and allowable , but not ever ; for who so hath bin robbed , or spoiled of his lands , or goods , may lawfully seek repossession by force : yet so● as before any force be used , he first civilly seek restitution , wherein if justice be denied , then is the use of arms necessary : ●ustum bellum quib●s necessarium ; & pia arm● quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes . liv. likewise invasion is lawfull against barbarians , whose religion and impiety ought to be abhorred , chiefly if they be potent and apt to offend ; for the cause of such warr is compulsion and suppression of evil . cui lioenti● iniquitatis eripitur , utiliter vincitur . august . finally , to conclude this matter of in●asion , i say , that no revenge , no desire of ●onor or empire , are any lawful causes of ●ar ; but the intent thereof ought to be ●irected onely to def●nce and security : for ●ise men do take arms to win peace , and ●n hope of rest they endure travel . ita bil●um suscipiatur u● nihil aliud quam pax ●uaesita vid●atur . cic. having said somewhat against unjust ●ar , let us speak of temerity and unad●ised war , an enterprise worthy discom●endation . omnes bellum sumunt facil● , ●gerrimè de●inunt : n●c in ejusdem pot●state in●tium & finis est . sal. a wise prince therefore ought neither to undertake any unlawful invasion nor without sober and mature deliberation enter ●nto any war , as he that is unwilling to offend , yet of courage e●ough to defend . nec pr●voces bellum , nec timeas . plin. to make war , three things are required . money , men , and arms ; and to maintain a war , provision and council are needful : therefore a wise prince before he begins a war , doth carefully consider what forces and charge thereunto belongeth . diu ●pparandum est bellum , ut vincas melius . pub. above all other provisions , car● must be had , that bread be not wanting ; for without it , neither victory nor life can be looked for . qui frumentum necessariumque commeatum non praepar●t , vincitur sine ferro● vegetius . lastly , it behoveth a prince always to have arms in readiness , i mean , harness , horses , weapons , artillery , engines , powder , and every other thing necessary either for service on horse or foot : we may adde hereunto ships , and shipping of all sorts , with every furniture of offence or defence ; for these preparations make a prince formidable , because no man dare do or attempt injury to that king or people where preparation is ever ready to revenge . qui de●iderat pacem , praeparat bellum● ca●● . by men we mean a multitude of subjects armed , trained to defend or offend : these are of two sorts , captains and soldiers ; and soldiers are either footmen or horsemen● the one of great use in the champion , the other in mountainous places ; also for defence or assault of towns or grounds fortified most necessary , and consequently meet for service in all places , which moved tacitus to say , omne in pedite robur , tac. for sudden service , horses do seem most ●eet , and the execution of any enterprise ●s by them most speedily performed : ne●ertheless the actions of ●ootmen do seem more certainly executed , chiefly if they be well armed , and skilfully led ; for so ex●erience hath of late time proved ; be●ides , ●hat they are of less expence and of greater ●umber . in universum aestimanti plus in ●edite robur● tac. having thus proved , that both horse and ●oot be necessary ; let us remember , that ●nless they be serviceable● great numbers ●re to small purpose . manibus opus est bello , ●on multis nominibus , livi. to make soldiers serviceable , consisteth ●n good choice and good discipline ; the one at this day little regarded . emunt mili●em , non legunt , livi. soldiers ought to be elected out of the most honest and able number of bodies ; and every company composed of men known one to the other ; for thereby they are made the more confident : but hereof is small heed taken ; for commonly they are purgamenta urbium suarum , curt. touching discipline , it seemeth that thereof the external form , and not the certain substance , is observed : for as in former ages , soldiers endeavoured to be vertuous and modest , so now they rather study to excel in riot , then in martial knowledge . ex●ercitus lingua quam manu promptior● praedator est sociis , & ipse praeda hostium● sal. for as much as soldiers are made good by election and choice , it seemeth that the foundation and ground of service consisteth in the discretion and judgment o● those that have authority to make election ; yet will we adde , that they must be chosen of natural subjects● for strangers are covetous , and consequently corruptible ; they are also mutinous and cowardly : thei● custom likewise is to rob , burn , and spoyl both friends and foes , and to consume the princes treasure . ossa vides regum vacui● ex●ucta medullis● juven. but the native soldier is faithful and obedient● resolute in fight , loving to his countrey , and loyal to his prince . gent●● quae sub regibus s●nt , pro deo col●nt . curt● native soldiers are of two sorts , ( viz. ) they that be in continual pay , and they that are trained ready to serve , but do notwithstanding attend their own private affairs , until they be called : the first are for all princes necessary . in pace decus , in bello prae●idiu● . tac. of this sort no great number ought to be , as well to ●schew disorder , as also to save expences . the second kinde of foot soldiers are to be levied in villages , as people more patient of pains , and fit for the wars ; yet so judiciously disposed as the citizens . odio praesentium & non cupidine mutationis . tac. touching the number of these extraordinary soldiers , that must be referred to discretion : bellum parare , simul & aerario parcere . to conclude , i say these numbers of ordinary and extraordinary foot ought to be according to the number of the people , not inserting any gentlemen ; for service on hors-back is to them onely proper . alas rusticis non tribu● ; in nobilitatem & in divites haec à pauperibus onera inclines . livi. the most certain notes whereby to conceive the disposition of men fit to become soldiers , are these five . the country where they are born , their age , proportion of body , their quality of minde , and their faculty . touching first , the countrey , it is a thing apparently proved , that mouutainous regions , or barren places , and northern habitations do breed wits well disposed to the war . locorum asperitas hominum quoque ingenia durat . curt. secondly , the age most apt for the war , was anciently observed to be about eighteen years , and so the romans used . facilius est ad virtutem instruere novos milites , quàm revocare pr●eteritos . veget. thirdly● the stature of a soldier ought to be observed : marius liked best the longest bodies ; pyrrhus preferred large and well proportioned men ; but vegetius in his choice , rather esteems strength then stature : ●t●lius est fo●tes milites ●sse quàm grande● . veget. fourthly , the minde or spirit of a soldier ought to be enosidered ; for that minde which is quick , nimble , bold , and con●ident , seemeth apt for war : he is also of good hope● that loveth honor more then ease or profit : in brief , is qui nihil metuit nisi turp●m ●amam . sal. lastly , it is to be marked in what art or faculty a man hath been bred : for it may be presumed that fishers , fowlers , cooks , and others trained up in effeminate arts are unfit for martial endeavor : and as these men were in respect of their trade thought unme●t so in old time , slaves and masterless men were repulsed from arms , as persons in●amous . sed nunc tales sociantur armis quales domini haber●●astidiunt . veget. how soldiers ought to be chosen , these few words we have spoken , may su●fice . let us therefore say somewhat of discipline . choice findeth out soldiers , but discipline doth make and continue them fit for service . paucos viros fortes natura procreat , b●na institutione plures redda● indu●●ria : veget. discipline is a certain severe confirmation of soldiers in their valor and vertue , and is performed by four means , exercise , order , compulsion , and example . the two first appertain to valor , the third to vertue , the last to both : but of exercise , first , i say , that a soldier being chosen , ought to be informed in arms , and used in exercise and action ; the word exerciti●m impor●eth nothing else . exercit●● dic●tur quod melius fit exercitando . varro order consisteth in dividing , disposing , and placing of men aptly at all occasions to be commanded , as the leaders shall direct . this matter requireth a large discourse , and therefore i refer it to skilful captains and writers , as polybius , vegetius , de la nonne , and others . compulsion and correction , is that which bridleth and governeth the manners of soldiers : for no order can be observed amongst them , unless they be continent , modest , and abstinent ; for continency is cheifly to be shewed in their diet , and moderate desires . degenerat à robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum . tac● the modesty of a soldier is perceived by his words , apparel , and actions : for to be a vaunter , or vain-glorious boaster , is far unfit in him that professeth honor or arms , seeing true vertue is silent●viri militiae nati , ●actis magni● ad verborum linguaeque ce●tamina , rudes . tac. the apparel of a soldier sheweth modesty , if therein he do not exceed ; for albeit it fitteth well the profession of arms , to be well armed and decently apparelled ; yet all superfluity savoreth of ignorance or vanity . horriaum militem esse decet , non cae●atum auro argentoque sed ferro . livi. abstinence is also fit for all soldiers ; for thereby guided , they refrain from violence , and insolency ; by that rule also they are informed to govern themselves civilly in the country where they serve , and likewise in ●heir lodgings : never taking any thing from the owner , nor committing any outrage . vivant cum provincialibus ●ure civili● ne● insolescat animus quise sensit armatum . the last mark of discipline we called example , under which word is comprehended reward and punishment : for men are rewarded when●oever they receive for any excellent or singular service , honor or riches . and for evil , they have their due when they taste the punishment thereunto belonging . necessarium est acrius ille dimicet , quem ad opes & dignitates ordo militiae & imperatoris judicium c●nsuevit evehere . veget. likewise as gold and glory belongeth to good and well deserving soldiers ; so punishment is due to those that be vitious and cowardly● for nothing holdeth soldiers in obedience so much as the severity of discipline . milites impe●atorem potius quam hostem metuere debent● veg. chap. xxii . of generals and commanders , and their requisite abilities in martial enterprises and expeditions . of soldiers let this little suffice● we will now speak of what quality cheiftants and leaders ought to be● for upon them dependeth the welfare of whole armies . militaris turba sine duce , corpus sine sp●●itu . curte. a ●heif or general in warr , is either of his own authority cheif , or a general that commandeth in the name of another . of the first sort are emperors , kings , and princes ; of the other , be their deputies , lievtenants , collonels , and indeed all generall commanders in the war : now whether it be more expedient that the prince should command in person or by deputy , divers wise men have diversly thought , therefore it may be be thus distinguished ; if the war do then only concern some particular part or province , then may the same be performed by a lievtenant ; but if the whole fortune of a prince do thereupon depend , then is he to command in his own person and not otherwise . dubiis bellorum ex●mplis summae r●rum & imperi● seipsum reservat . tac. it therefore importeth the prince sometimes by his own presence , sometimes by his deputation to performe that office : but however occasion shall require , it ever behoveth that one only commander ought to be ; ( for plurality of cheiftaines doth rarely or never worke any good effect ) yet with this caution that he be of experience , and wise . in b●●lica praefectura major asp●ctus habendus peritiae quam virtutis a●t morum● arist. the quali●ies required in a cheiftaine are these , skill , vertue , providence , authority , and fortune by skill we meane he should be of great knowledge , and long experience or to make a sufficient captai●e ; the information of others , or his own reading is not enough . qui ●orit quis ordo agminis , quae cura exploa ndi , quantus urgendo trahendove bello modus● cic● military vertue is a certain vigor or force both of body and minde to exercise soldiers aswell in fained war as to fight with the enemy ; and summarily a captain ought to be laboriosus in negotio , fortis in periculo , industrius in agendo , celeri● in conficiendo . cic. next to vertue we placed providence as necessary in great captains ; for being of such wisdome they will not hazard nor commit more to fortune then necessity shal inforce ; yet true it is● fools and vulger● folks that commend or discommend actions according to succeess , were wont to say : cunctatio servilis , statim exequi , regium est . but advised and provident captains do think ; temeritas praeterquam quod stulta , est etiam infelix . livi. albeit providence be the best mean of good speed ; yet some captains of that quality and in skill excelling , have bin in their actions unlucky ; when others of less sufficiency have marvellously prevailed ; we may therefore reasonably say with , cic. quod olim maxmo , marcello , scipi●ni , mari● & ceteris m gnis imperatoribus non solum propter virt●t●m , sed etiam propter fortunam saepius imperia mandata , atque excercitus esse commissos . cic. lastly , we wished authority to be in cheiftains ; for it greatly importeth what opinion or conceipt the enemy hath of such a governor , and likewise how much his friends and confederates do esteem him : but the cheif and only means to maintain authority , is austerity and terror . dux authoritatem maximam ●●veritate sumat , omnes culpas militares legibus vindicet , nulli errantium credatur ignoscere● v●get . also experience hath proved that such cheiftains as were affable and kind to their soldiers , were much loved , yet did they incur a contempt : but on the otherside those that commanded severely and terribly , although they gained no good will● yet were they ever obeyed : dux facilis inutilis . app. chap. xxiii . of councils in war , and directions tactik and stratagematik : with advice how to make an honorable peace . after men found and framed fit for the warr , to small or no purpose shall they ●erve , unless they be imployed by wisdom or good council . mon minus est imperator is consili● quam vi perficere . tac. council in war is of two sorts ; direct council and indirect ; the f●rst sheweth a plain and orderly course for ●roceeding , as to lay hold on occasion : for as in all other human actions occasion is of great force ; occasio in bello solet amplius juvare quam virtus . veget. as occasions presented are means of good success ; so fame worketh great effects in the wars ; therefore it behooveth a captain to be constant , and not apt to beleive the vain rumors and reports of men . mal● imperatur , cum regit vulgus duces suos . sen. confidence is also to be eschewed ; for no man is sooner surprised , then he who ●eareth le●t : also contempt of the enemy hath bin occasion of great discomfitures , therefore as a captain ought not to fear , so should he not contemn his enemy . nimia ●●ducia semper obnoxia . aemyl . as security , and overmuch estimation of our own vertue or valor is hurtfull : so doth it import every good captain to be well informed not only of his own forces , but also of what strength the enemy is ; likewise it behooveth him to know the situation of the country and the quality of the people , with every other circumstance . moreover , the generals honor and capacity ought to be known with the condition and nature of the enemy . impetus acres c●nctatione languescunt , aut in perfidiam mutantur . tac. tem●●ty in war is also dangerous ; for wise captains were wont not to enterprise any thing without deliberation and good opportunity , unless they were thereunto by necessity inforced . in rebus asperis & tenuispe , fortissima quaque consilia tutissima sunt . livi. some wise men not superstitiously but discreetly do think prodigious signes from heaven or on earth are not to be neglected , neither are dreams in time of war to be contemned . nam amat benignitas numini● , seu quod merent●r homine● , seu quod tangitur ●orum affectione , his quoque rationibus prodere quae impendent . aemi . a wise captain will also wait oportunities and spy out fit times when the enemy is wearied , or pretending fear , draw him into danger ; which advantages with many other , are gained chiefly by observing of time ; quia si in occasionis momento , cuj●s praetervolat o●p●rtunitas● cunctat●s paulum ●●eris , nequicquam mox omissam querare● livi. next the observation of time , the place is to be well considered , whether it be for thine advantage or thine enemies . amplius prodest locus ●aepè quàm virtus . veget● thirdly , it importeth much , that men be well ordered , trained , and prepared for the fight ; for the want of art is cause of many disadventures , and many times a small supply of choice soldiers on horsback or foot , doth seem to the enemy very terrible : likewise a sudden shout or conceit hath amazed a whole army . milites v●nis & inanibus , magis quam justis formidinis causis moventur . curt. fourthly , it were to good purpose , that in ordering of men for fight , soldiers of one cou●try or nations , should be ranged together , and above all to foresee , that the least loss of blood be among the natural subjects , and so handle the matter , that the cheif slaughter light upon strangers and mercenaries . ingens victoriae dec●s , citra domesticum sanguinem ●ellanti . tac. the generals own courage and lively disposition to fight , will greatly animate the multitude of soldiers ; as a contrary countenance or appearance of fear , will exceedingly maze and dant . necesse estad ●ugam p●rati sint , qui ducem suum sentiunt desperare . veget. it were also for thy great advantage● that the forces should be ordered for the fight , before the enemy be prepared . first , for that thou maist the better perform , what thou thinkest fit to be done . secondly , that thereby thine own forces will thereof receive great courage , being readiest to assail the enemy , and to begin the fight . plus animi est inferenti periculum , quam propulsanti . livi. after victory it is not the best policy to execute the enemies with extteam cruelty , but proceed moderately ; for it shall suffice the victory is thine . ●lausis ex d●speratione crescit audacia , & cum spei nihil est , sumit arma f●rmid● . veget. lastly , i would advise that the general should be wary in his actions , and in every enterprise to frustrate the soldiers from spoils and pil●age . saepe obstitit vincentibus ●ravum inter ipsos certamen , omisso hoste spolia consectandi . tac. of direct councils , let that we have said suffice . we will now speak of councils indirect , commonly called by the greek word , stratagems or subtile practices : which manner of proceeding , hath been in times past of divers grave writers condemned . vir nemo mentis altae clanculum velit occidere hostem . eurip. notwithstanding the opinion of this , and divers other writers worthy credit , it seemeth reasonable , and in piety allowable : that stratagems and subtilt●es may be used in the war , yet with such caution as the same may stand with fidelity and honor : for fraud being used contrary to contracts and agreements made with the enemy , is meer treachery : as to poyson him or her , a murtherer to kill him , were plain impiety . faederatum injustè fallere impium . livi. also out of the war covertly to kill a particular enemy by secret assault or practice , is not warrantable , either by faith or honor ; yet to use all craft , cunning , and subtilty in open war , is both allowable and praisable ; and so is thought by christian writers . cum justum bellum suscipitur , ut apertè pugnet quis aut ex insidiis , nihil ad justitiam interest . aug. the same is also approved by divers authors of good credit . confice ●ive dolo seu stricto cominus euse . the same is also affirmed by xenophon , reipsa nihil utilius in bello dolis . thus having briefly touched what counsels are required in war , let us consider how victory is to be used ; for the end of every good war is peace : to the enjoying whereof , three things are required , wariness , mercy , and modesty ; because over-great confidence may happily impeach the end of good success . res se●und●● neglig●n●iam creant . livi. i also wish the victory to be handled mercifully , because all conquests are in their own nature cruel enough . and the ire of insolent soldiers , forces the conquered to become desperate . gravissime morsus irrita●ae necessitatis . curt. to proceed modestly , is also an honorable quality in him that conquereth : for in prosperous fortunes , men do hardly refrain covetous and proud doings ; yea , some good and great captains have in like cases forgotten what did best become them . in rebus secundis etiam ●gregii d●ces insolesc●nt . tac. after victory followeth peace : for if war did ever continue , no state or government could stand : therefore how great , or how long soever the war be , the end must be peace ; the name whereof is not onely sweet , but also comfortable , pax una triumphis innumeris potior . peace is not only good and profitable to him that is victorious , but also to those that are victored . pacem reduci velle victori , expedit , victo necesse est . tac. nevertheless until good and honorable peace be offered , arms may not be laid aside : wherein i wish tullies advice to be followed . bellum gerendum est ; ●i bellum omitt●mus , pace n●nquam fr●emur . livi. in treaty of peace , two things must be considered : first , that the conditions be honorable● to condiscend to any base conditions , is unto a princely minde not onely great indignity , but also intolerable . cum dignitate potius cadendum , quam cum ignominia serviendum plut. it also importeth , the peace should be simple , true , and unfeigned ; for all feigned and dissembling amity is to be doubted . pace suspecta tutius est bellum . mithrid . the fittest season to speak of peace , is either when the war beginneth , or during the time that the enemies be of equal force ; for if the war continueth , it must behove the weaker to yield to necessity : not unlike the shipmaster , who to save himsel● doth cast the greatest part of his loading into the sea : necessiiati pare , quam ne dii quidem superant . livi. finally , having generously defended thy self , and performed all things required in a magnanimous captain , and finding nevertheless thy force insufficient , it cannot be dishonorable to accept peace . wherefore laying aside hatred and hope , which are but weak supporters , thou maist recommend thee and thine to the approved discretion of an honorable enemy . victores secundae res in miserationem ex ir● vertunt . livi. now for as much as every peace promiseth rest and quiet , as well to the victorious as to the victored ; we may adde thereunto , that the prince victorious receiveth thereby honor● profit , and security . for although his happiness may occasion hope o● greater success yet in respect of fortunes mutability , it shall be good and glorious to lis●en to peace . decorum principi est cum victoriam propè i● manibus habeat , p●cem no● ab●●ere● ut sciant omnes te & suscipere ju●●è bellum & finire . livi. it seemeth also the more honorable ; for who so is victorious , doth give peace and not take it : he also sheweth himself discreet by using a moderation in victory , and no extremity in spoiling , which our wise and godly writers have commended●pacem contemnentes , & gloriam appetentes , ●acem perdunt & gloriam . bern. peace is also profitable for the victorious , because continual war breedeth weariness , and of violent proceeding desperation and peril cometh . maximi & mortiferi morsu● esse solent morientium bestiarum . sen. likewise peace is more assured then any victory . hope of the one is in thine own power ; the other in the hand of god : adde thereunto the force of fortune , which hath great power in all humane actions . in rebus secundis nihil in quenquam superbè a● violenter consulere decet , nec praesenti credere fortunae , cum quià v●sper ferat , incertus sis . sen. also conditions of peace ought to be reasonable and freely bestowed : for no people can live contented under such a law as forceth them to loath the state wherein they are . misera pax bello benè mutatur . sen. chap. xxiiii . of civil war , with the causes and remedies thereof . the greatest and most greivous calamity that can come to any state is civil war ; for therein subjects take arms against their prince or among themselves , whereof followeth a misery more lamentable then can be described . non at as , non dignitas quenquam protegit , quo minus ●l●pra caedibus , & caedes st●pris misceantur . tac. the first cause of civ●l war proceedeth of destiny for god in his own divine providence foreseeth many years before , that great and mighty empires shall be ruined . in s●●agna ruunt : laetis hi●c numina rebus cresen●● p●suere modum — lucan . the second cause is , excesse , riot , and dissolute life ; for nothing breedeth civil fury so soon as over great happiness ; also pompous apparell● banquetting and prodigall spending consumeth riches , and plenty is turned into poverty ; for by these means ●re men brought into desperation . rapacissimo ●uique ac perditissim● , non agri aut faenus sed sola instrumenta vitiorum manebunt . tac. now to consider how destiny might be eschewed , were in vain : for such a remedy no wit or wisdom can devise ; being the decree of god , no doubt it is inevitable . ita fato placuit , nullius rei eodem semper loc● stare fortunam . sen. there is nothing exempt from the peril of mutation ; the earth , heavens , and whole world is thereunto subject . certi● eunt cuncta temporibus ; nasci debent , crescere , extingui . sen. touching the second causes of civil war some remedies may be used , because it preceedeth of faction , sedition or tyranny . i call faction a certain association of divers persons combined to the offence of others . it proceedeth often of private or publick displeasure , and more often of ambition . nemo eorum qui in rep. versantur , quo● vincat , sed a quibus vincatur , aspicit . sen. . factions are of two sorts ; for either they consist of many or of few persons : both be dangerous , but the former more apt to take arms ; and that party which proveth weakest , prayeth arms of forrain forces . . the other faction wherein are fewer partakers , be commonly great personages or men of more importance than ordinary people ; and that proveth most perillous and bloody . n●bilium factiones trah●nt adse , & in partes , universum etiam populum● arist. albeit some wise men have held opinion that factions are necessary , yet cannot that conceipt be reasonably maintained , unless it be upon confines and in such places where conspiracy is feared , which cato in hisprivate family used . semper contentiunculas aliquas aut dissensum inter servos callidè serebat , s●●pectam habens nimiam c●ncordiam ●rum , m●tuensque . plut. factions amongst the nobility , are somtimes suppressed by forbidding colors , or unknown badges to be worn ; also to inhibit names or watch-words of mutinies is necessary , which was mecae●as counsel to augustus ; and aristotle thinketh it fit that laws should be made against the factions of noblemen . nobilium contentiones & part●s etiam legibus oportet prohibere conari . arist. another cause of civil war , we call sedition , which is a suddain commotion or assembly of common people against their prince or his magistrates : the original of which disorders may proceed of divers causes , but chiefly of oppression . imminentium periculorum remedium , ipsa peric●la arbitrari . arist. again , fear may be the occasion of sedition , as well in him that hath done injury , as in him that looketh to be injured , and is desirous to prevent it before it cometh . it may proceed also of over-great mildness in government . non ●iseriis sed licentia , tantum concitum turbarum , las●ivire magis plebem quàm saevire . livi. sedition many times ariseth of poverty , or of the artificers , whose arts are grown out of use , and consequently no means whereof they can live . semper in civitat● , quibus opes nullae sunt , bonis invident , veter● odere , n●va expetunt , odio rerum suarum m●tari omnia student . sab. lastly , sedition cometh of tyranny , insolency , or mutinous disposition of certain captains , cavaliers , or ringleaders of the people for albeit the multitude is apt to innovation , yet doth it stand firm , until some first mover taketh the matter in hand . multitudo omnis , sicut mare , per se immobilis . livi. of these movers some are ambitious , who wanting other means to aspire , hope by practice of sedition , to compass their designs ; or else they are unthrifts , who having consumed their own , seek by violence to possess themselves of other mens : or else they are vain and light persons , that without cause or reason , attempt innovation , themselves know not for what . non tam praemiis periculor●m , quàm ipsis periculis laeti , pro certis & olim partis , nova , ambigua , ancipitia malunt . thus having told the causes of sedition , i wish the remedies were prepared . omne malum nascens facilè opprimitur , inveteratum fit plerumque robustius . cic. the first way to suppress sedition , is eloquence and excellent perswasion , which oftentimes worketh great effects among the multitude ; chiefly when it proceedeth from some reverend and grave person , for his wisdom and integrity of life honored : for the prince himself is not to take this office in hand , unless necessity so inforce : integra autoritas principis majoribus remediis servetur . tac. if perswasion cannot prevail , then force must compel : but before such violent proceedings , use art and cunning either to appease the people , or at least to disunite them ; and rather if the prince do offer fair and ●romise plausibly : verba apud populum plurimum valent . tac. it is lawful also in such cases for princes to use subtilty ; and the same not prevailing , to wash away the stain thereof with clemency : for when arms are laid down , and every one yielded , general punishment were needless . omnium culpa fuit , paucorum sit poena . tac. the last cause of sedition we named tyranny , which is a certain violent government , exceeding the laws of god and nature . the difference between kings and tyrants is this ; the one imployeth arms in defence of peace , the other useth them to terrifie those of whom his cruelty hath deserved hate : auferre , trucidare , raper● , falsis nominibus imperium , atque ubi solitudinem fecerint , pacem appellant . tac. the quality of tyrants is to esteem promooters more then good ministers , because those men are the scourge of infinite others . they are also protectors of impious persons , and stand in daily doubt of noble and vertuous men . nobilitas , opes , amissi g●stique honores , pro crimine : et ob virtutes certissimum exitium . tac. tyrants do also endeavor to suppress the knowledge of letters and civil life , to the end all good arts should be exiled , and barbarism introduced . pellunt sapientiae prof●ssores , & omnes ●onas artes in exiliu● ag●nt . tac. these and such like , be the conditions of tyrants , who for the most part are deposed and slain ; for as kings live long and deliver their dominions to their children● and posterity ; so tyrants being feared and hated of all men , cannot continue in their estate . ad generum cereris ●ine ●oede & vulnere pauci descendunt reges & sicca ●orte tyranni . juven. the remedies of these mischiefs which proceed from the violence of such a prince , are persecution or patience . many generous spirits have used the first ; perswading themselves rather to die , then endure the sight of a tyrant . also the grecians did think it a service acceptable to murther the person of such an impious prince . graeci ●omines deorum honores tribuebant iis qui tyrannos necaverunt . cic. nevertheless , in christian consideration the other course is to be taken : let patience therefore incounter this mischief ; for seeing all kings , as well the bad as the good be sent by god , they must be indured . res est gravis occidere regalem stirpem . homer . persecution is not onely perilous , but for the most part infortunate : for thereof present revenge is taken by that prince that succeedeth . facinoris ●jus ultor est , quis●uis successerit . tac. the murder of tyrants is also followed with many inconveniences worse then civil war it self . principes boni , votis expetendi , qualescunque tolerandi . tac. for as fire , floods , and other inevitable plagues are necessarily to be suffered : so evil princes in their covetousness and cruelty ought to be patiently indured , because their office is to command , and subjects must obey . indigna , digna habenda sunt , rex quae facit . sen. and as it is the use of vulgar people to finde faults in the long raign of princes ; so the ambition of great subjects is desirous of novelty . praesens imperium subditis semper grave . thucyd. to conclude , we say that the best remedy against tyranny , is patience : for so long as men are , so long will vices be . regum ingenia toleranda , neque usui crebrae mutationes . tac. chap. xxv . a collection of political observations ( confirmed by reason and experience ) advertising princes , statesmen , and private persons how to demean themselves in all fortunes and events . to the perfections of men , three things are necessarily required ; nature , nurture , and use : the first giveth capacity , aptness , and understanding ; which are graces from above . nurture , is learning , knowledge , art , or order . use , is practice , experience , and orde●ly observation ; whereof may be conceived , that nature alone sufficeth not ; nor can nurture work any good effect , where natural aptness wanteth ; and they can frame no perfection , unless experience be also conjoyned . nemo nascitur sapiens , sed fit . sen. ambassadors , negotiants , and generally all other ministers of mean fortune , in conversation with princes and superiors , must use great respect , shewing themselves rather ceremonious then presumptious , and acknowledge their obligation great , for the ●avor and grace , they find in those which might command them . it is no wisdom ever to commend or discommend the actions of men by their success ; for oftentimes some enterprises attempted by good counsel , end unfortunately ; and others unadvisedly taken in hand , have happy success . who so then commendeth inconsiderate counsels for their fortunate event , thereby encourageth men to jar and discomfort the wiser sort to speak what they know , and by experience have proved . in actions publick and every other matter of great moment , the beginning is well to be considered : for afterwards it lieth not in our power , without dishonor to abandon what was begun . the time doth not always serve , nor is apt occasion always offered to enterprise what we would ; yet who so doth expect every opportunity , shall either attempt nothing at all , or if he do , the same for the most part turneth to his own disadvantage . when any resolution is taken , either with over-great haste , or too much affection , seldom it receiveth good success : for he that doth the one , hath no leisure to consider ; the other transporteth the minde so as it cannot conceive more then that which presently presseth . to these we adde others , i mean some of them that have leisure , and are void of affection , yet for want of natural capacity , or for continual negligence in their doings , never bring any thing well to pass . who so desireth to be beloved in a commonwealth , must rest content with that which men do give , and the laws allow him to take : so shall he neither incu● danger nor envy ; for indeed , that which is taken or extorted from others , and not that which is given , doth make men hated . arms● laws , and religion , may not in any well governed state be dis-joyned ; for every one of them in particular maintaineth them all united . in actions of war , courage and conduct are of great necessity ; yet all good government consisteth in using the vertues moral ; and in handling the matter of martial policy , it is fit to imitate the proceedings of antient and approved captains . among mortal men , there is nothing more common then to believe the estate of one man to be better then an other ; for hereof it cometh , that every one endeavoreth rather to take from others with travel , then to enjoy his own with rest . the state of pri●ces is good● being well used ; so is the fortune of private men , if therewith they be contented . the rich-man liveth happily , so long as he useth his riches temperately ; and the poor man that patiently endureth his wants , is rich enough . whensoever a man is so dangerously distressed , as either proceeding or standing , he liveth in like peril , then doth it behove him in any wise , to resolve upon action . the reason is , that so long as nothing is done , the same accidents that caused his dangers , do still remain in their former force ; but if he endeavor to enterprise somewhat , either he may meet with means to make him secure , or at the hardest , shew himself of so great courage and wit , as he dare and can attempt a way to do it . it seemeth a thing of great difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince or magistrate to eschue the evil speech and bad report of men ; for if they be good and vertuous , then they incur the backbiting of leud persons ; if evil , then will all good men exclaim against them . all commonwealths ought to desire peace , yet it is necessary ever to be prepared for the war ; because peace disarmed , is weak , and without reputation : therefore the poets feign , that palla● the goddess of wisdom did always appear armed . every prince ( well advised ) ought to govern his subjects and servants in such sort , that by his affability and vertue they may be induced rather to serve voluntarily , then for pay or hope of preferment . for otherwise doing , whensoever the prince shall want means to pay , the subjects likewise will fail of good will to serve . but he that faithfully loveth , doth neither in prosperity become arrogant , nor in contrary fortune retire , or complain of the small favor he findeth : for ( till death ) love and life remain at the princes commandment . where poor men finde justice , evil men are punished , measures and weights be just , youth well nurtured , and old folk free from avarice , there is the commonwealth good and perfect . in war between neighbors , neutrality is commendable ; for by that means we eschue many troubles and great expences , so long as the forces of either side be so equal in strength , as we need not to fear the victory of any : for so long their discord is our security , and o●tentimes offereth us means to increase our own state and reputation . the cheif reasons to move war , are , the justice of the cause , the facillity of success , and the profit of the victory . in all humane actions it behoveth to a●commodate the council of men unto present necessity , and never to expose security to manifest peril , nor hope of that which without great difficulty or impossibility cannot be obtained . it is the nature of men having escaped one extream , which by force they were constrained long to endure , to run headlong into the other extream , forgetting that vertue doth always consist in the mean . the multitude is inclined to innovation , and easily induced by false perswasion , and consequently easily transported by seditious leaders . men are naturally disposed to fear those things which threaten danger and terror● yet unless these perils by some new accident be daily revived , that fear by little and little vanisheth , and security recovereth the place . whoso findeth himself contemned , or not respected , becometh discontent ; which humor in generous mindes , breedeth oftentimes adventerous imaginations , whereof audacious attempts have followed , cheifly in persons of authority and reputation ; for he that hopeth no good , feareth no evil : yet true it is , that dangerous enterprises , the the more they be thought upon , the less hope they give of good success , for which reason conspiracies not suddainly executed are for the most part revealed or abandoned . all people do naturally imitate the manners of their prince , and observing his proceedings resolve to hate or love him : but if they happen once to ha●e the prince , then his doings , good or evil , are afterwards not good ; but if at the beginning he gained the love of the people , then every bad action is reputed a vertue : as though he could not be induced to do amiss without good cause or reason . greatly are princes deceived if in the election of ministers they more respect their own particular affection , then the sufficiency of the person elected . a prince having conquered any new dominion , is thereby rather incombred then strengthned , unless the same be after well governed ; and seldom is it seen that a principality by ill means gotten , hath bin long injoyed . as to the perfection of the whole body soundness of head only sufficeth not , unless the other members also do their office ; even so it is not enough that a prince be faultless , but it behooveth also that the magistrates and ministers should perform their duty . great princes rarely resist their appetites● as for the most part private men can : for they being alwaies honored and obeyed , do seldom with patience indure the want of any thing reasonable , as being perswaded that what they desire is just , and that their commandment hath power to remove all difficulties . all men are naturally good when no respect of profit or pleasure draws them to become evill . but this worlds corruption , and our frailty is such , as easily and often for our particular interest we incline to the worst ; which was the cause that wise law-makers found out reward and punishment : the one to incite men to good , the other to fear them from being evill . a tyrant indeavoreth to maintain his estate by three means . first , he practiseth to hold all subjects in extream awe , and to be basely minded , to the end they should want courage to take arms against him . secondly , he kindleth diffidence and discord among the great men ; thereby to remove occasion of conspiracy and combination . lastly , he holdeth them disarmed and idle , so as they ne●ther know nor can attempt any thing against him to govern , is nothing else but to hold subjects in love and obedience : for in respect of the end , they ought not , and in regard of the other they cannot attempt any thing contrary to the governors will and their duty . the laws and ordinances of a common-weale made at the beginning thereof when men were good , do often prove unprofitable when they are become evill ; and therefore new laws are made according to the accidents which happen . the discontent or disorder of people is ever occasioned by the inequality of their goods , because the poorer sort would be made equall to the rich : but the offence that grows among great men is the desire of honor ; for they being equal , do indeavor to aspire to equall authority . a prince that desireth by means of his ambassador to deceive an other prince , must first abuse his own ambassador , to the end he should do and speak with more earnestness , being indeed perswaded that the intent and meaning of his master is simple which happily would not , were he privy that his princes meaning were to dissemble . this course is also commonly holden by those that by imployment of a third person would perswade any thing fained or false . for the performance of conditions in treaty of peace or league of amity , the promises , vowes , and oathes of princes are of great effect ; yet because fidelity in a man is not ever certain , and time doth daily offer occasions of variation , there is no assurance so secure and good as to stand so prepared as the enemy may want able means how to offend . to resolve in matters doubtfull , or answer requests which we are not willing to grant , the least offensive way is not to use direct denial , but by delaies prolong the time and so in place of effect , afford good expectation . the old proverbe ●aith : magistratus virum ostendit : which is no less true then ancient : for men in such fortune are occasioned not only to make proof of their sufficiency , but also to discover their affections ; and the more their greatness is , the less respect they have to contain those passions which are natural . albeit great troubles and continual adversity seem insupportable ; yet is there nothing more dangerous , then ouermuch prosperity ; and being pressed by new appetites , they disturb their own security . in speaking of occurrents doubtfull , it is alwaies wisdom to fain ignorance , or at least alledge that we beleive then not : for most commonly they are utterly untrue , or far other then vulgarly is believed . the actions of men are commonly liked or disallowed according to the bad or good success : attributing that to council which sometimes is due to fortune . the multitude of men were wont to be more pleased with suddain then slow resolutions ; and many times accompt those enterprises generous , which are rashly and inconsideratly attempted . great difference there is between subjects desperate , and others which are only discontented : for the one desire nothing but present alteration , which they indeavor with all hazard : the other wish for innovation , inciting any motion or practice● because their intent is to attend time , and that occasion may present it self . a benefit bestowed on him who thinketh himself greatly injured , doth not suffice to raze the same out of his memory , cheifly if the benefit be given at such time as no meer motion but necessity may seem the occasion thereof . that peace ought to be desired which removeth suspition , which assureth us from perill , which bringeth quiet certain , and acquitteth us of expences : but when it worketh contrary effects , it may be called a dangerous war covered with the name of deceitfull trust , not unlike a perilous poyson ministred in lieu of a wholsom medicine . the effect of things , and not externall show or seeming , ought to be regarded ; yet it is incredible what great grace is gained by courteous speech and affability : the reason whereof is as i suppose that every man beleiveth he doth merit more then indeed he is worthy , and consequently holdeth himself injured when soever he findeth men not to afford him like estimation . men ought in any wise , to refrain to doe or say any thing which may offend , for which respect it were great folly either in presence or absence to utter displeasing speech unless necessity inforceth . the matters whereof councellors are cheifly to consider , be five . the princes revenue , peace and warr , defence , traffick , and what laws are to be made . in giving council divers things are to be observed ; but amongst them are two of most importance . first , it behooveth , that he who is counselled should be wise ; for seeing council is nothing else but a certain considerate discourse of things to be done or not done , if he who is to take council be not of discretion , then will he refuse all good advice offered , and rather ●ncline to that which his own fancie affecteth because the want of judgement draweth him to take pleasure in vain things ; and as one incapable of what is good and true , will follow that which is evil and false : so on the other side if he that giveth council be not faithfull , then will he a thousand waies disguise and dissemble the truth , and consequently miscarry the mind of him that is counselled : yea in the end utterly abuse him . the affairs and proceedings of the world are so variable and accompanied with so many chances and changes , as impossible it seemeth to judge what is best : therefore experience enformeth , that the conjectures of the most wise prove vain and uncertain . i therefore mislike the judgment of those men , that will let slip opportunity of present good ( though it be small ) for feare of a future evill , notwithstanding it be greater , unless the evill be very near at hand , or certain . for if that doe not follow which is feared , then wilt thou repent to have omitted that which was desired . whensoever a general opinion is conceived of the singular vertue and knowledge of any●man , although he be indeed ignorant and far unworthy that accompt , yet it is hard to remove such a settled conceipt : the reason is , that men having at the first given credit to common report , do make thereof so deep an impression as afterwards without great difficulty cannot be removed . the bodies of men , munition , and mony may justly be called the sinews of war , yet of them the two first are more necessary , for men and arms have means to find mony and meate : but mony and meate cannot so easily find soldiers and swords . one wise generall having but a thousand men , is more to be feared and esteemed then twenty commanders of equall authority : for they being commonly of divers humors , or judging diversly , do never , or very rarely what is to be done , and consequently lose much time before any resolution can be taken . a prince of mean force ought not in any wise to adventure his estate upon one daies fight : for if he be victorious he gaineth nothing but glory : but if he lose , he is utterly ruined . the most part of men are delighted with histories , for the variety of accidents therein contained : yet are there few that will imitate what they read , and finde done by others ; being perswaded that imitation is not only hard but impossible , as though the heavens and men were changed in their motion or order , and power , which they anciently had . the nature of men is such as will not endevor any thing good , unless they be forced thereunto : for where liberty aboundeth , there confusion and disorder follow . it is therefore supposed that hunger and poverty make men industrious : but good lawes inforce them to be honest ; for if men were of themselves good , then laws were needless . there are two kinds of adulation : the first proceedeth from a subtil malice : the second cometh by an ordinary use of conversation ; the one tendeth to profit and deceiving ; the other hath no further design then a respect or fear to offend . whereunto the most honest are in some sort bound . whoso bindeth himself to flattery , doth thereby bewray his intent , either to gain , or not to lose that he hath . for the person flattered is alwaies superior to him that doth flatter , or at least one as may in some sort stand him in stead . it may therefore be inferred that only men of base and miserable condition , and such as cannot help or hurt , be free from flatterers . and contrariwise magnanimous and fortunate folke , proud men and such as content themselves with their present estate , are seldom found to be flatterers . every wise prince doth presuppose that times of trouble may come , and that all such occasions he shal be forced to use the service of men diversly qualified . his study therefore is in the mean time so to entertain them as when those storms arise he may rest assured to command them ; for whosoever perswades himself by present benefits to gain the good will of men , when perills are at hand , shall be deceived . in ancient times princes and governors were wont when peace and security were most like to continue , to find or fain occasions to draw their subjects to fear , to the end that doubt might move them to be more carefull of their own weldoing ; for well they knew it a general defect in men to be reachless , and never willing to use industry ; unless by necessity they were constrained . all histories do shew , and wise polititians do hold it necessary , that for the well governing of every commonweal it behooveth to presuppose that all men are evil , and will declare themselves so to be when occasion is offered ; for albeit some inconvenience doth lie hid for a time , it proceedeth from a covert occasion , which for want of experience was not found untill time the mother of truth discover it . neutrality is always a thing dangerous and disallowable , because it oftendeth all parties : he that is strong looketh to be assisted in his greatness ; and he that is weak not being defended , holdeth himself offended : the one is not assured from foes , and the other holdeth no friends . albeit neutrality procure present quiet and security , during the troubles of others ; yet after the samefalleth out a disadvantage , because it entertaineth a certain falseness , and so in short space will be perceived ; not unlike those men that borrow upon usury ; for albeit they enjoy a certain time , without trouble or charge , yet the same being spent , and the day of payment come , they then feel the great danger which their short pleasure hath purchased . whoso examineth all humane actions shall find that in eschewing one inconvenience , wepresently incur another . as for example , if we endeavor to make our dominions mighty , it behooveth to have the same fully r●plenished with people , and well armed , and so being , they are not easily governed . on the other side , if our country be not well peopled , or disarmed , then it is easily holden in obedience ; yet therwith so weake that it can neither increase the bounds therof , nor defend it selfe . it is therfore necessary in all our deliberations to consider what inconvenience is least , and choose that , as the best : for to find all perfect , void and secure of suspect or imperfection , is impossible . a prince being instantly required to take part with other princes , the one being in arms against the other , if he deny both incureth suspicion of both , and may be thought to have secret intelligences with one or both of them ; so as either of them shall accompt him an enemy , and consequently he that proves victorious will be revenged ; and the other holding him suspected will not acknowledg his friendship . it is the use of men to presume much upon their own merit , and seeing the success of some others to be such as without cause or desert are aspired to dignity thereby uncouraged they promised to themselves the like : nevertheless being entred into the course of their design , and finding many crosses and impeachments , they do not a little repent their over-weening and presumption , but also many times utterly abandon their rash and unadvised enterprize ; neither can i think th●t the vertue or sufficiencie of any man without the favor of the heavens can advance him ; for as the poet saith , ne● velle juvat , potiúsue nocet , si fata repugnant whoso serveth a prince far from his presence , shall with great difficulty content him . for if he commit any error , it shall be aggravated : besides that the instructions sent unto him cannot be particularly conceived , because the state of worldly things doth daily alter . also to serve alooffe , is a thing full of danger and far from reward : which inconvenience may for the most part be avoided by him that attendeth near to his princes person . let no man that cometh to serve in court , assure himself by his wisdom to be advanced or eschew all encounters . neither is he to bear himself so careless as to commit all to fortune , but be perswaded that this wordly life is like to a voyage by sea ; wherein albeit art with the favor of the wind may do much , yet can we not assure our selves to arrive safe in the haven appointed ; for daily experience doth shew , that some strange ships in the calmest weather , are drowned or impeached by the way , when others much weaker and disarmed passe securely . among men worthy of commendations , those have merited best that first planted true religion : next they that framed kingdoms and commonwealths ; the third place is due to such as have augmented or enlarged their dominions ; lastly learned men deserve fame and memory : and as every of these are worthy of fame and honor ; so ought they to be accompted infamous that introduce atheism , or the subversion of kingdoms , or are become enemies to learning and vertue . whosoever taketh in hand to governe a multitude either by way of liberty , or principality , and cannot assure himse●f of those persons that are enemies to that enterprise , doth frame a state of short perseverance : yet true it is that such princes be infortunate● as for their own security are inforced to hold a course extraordinary , and have the multitude their enemy ; for he that hath few foes may with small dishonor be assured ; but he that is generally hated can by no means live assured ; and the more cruelty he useth , the weaker his principality proveth . in commending another man great moderation is to be used ; for as contumely offendeth him against whom it is used ; so great praise , besides that it is uttered with danger to his judgment that speaketh it , the same doth oftentimes offend him that heareth it . for self love which commonly possesseth men , causes the good or evil we hear , to be measured with our own . and consequently every man that is touched with like deserts and defects , doth grow● offended that his commendation is not set forth , and feareth lest his imperfection should be discovered . it is often , or rather ever seen , that the force of leagues not used in their first heat , becomes cold ; because suspition soon entereth , which in short space will destroy whatsoever was concluded , and may not without long time be rejoyned . the power of ambition which possesseth the mindes of men , is such , as rarely or never suffereth them to rest : the reason thereof is , that nature hath framed in them a certain disposition to desire all things , but not to obtain them ; so as our desires being greater then our power , thereof followeth discontent and evil satisfaction . hereof also proceedeth the variation of fortune ; for some men desiring to get , and others fearing to lose that they have gotten , do occasion one man to injure another , and consequently publick wars do follow ; by means whereof , one countrey is ruined , and an other inlarged . princes of great power , and cheifly those that are inhabitants of the north , having many children , were wont to be much inclined to the wars , as well to win unto themselves honor , as also to get possessions for their sons ; which manner of proceedings did oftentimes remove such disturbance as the plurality of brethren bringeth . these and other reasons induced princes to attempt war against those kingdoms , which in their opinion seemed easily conquered , or whereunto they can pretend litle ; for by colour thereof they may the rather justifie their proceedings . when a prince deferreth to answer an ambassador , it proceedeth from some of these respects ; either because he will take time to resolve himself of somewhat whereof he doubteth , or that he intendeth covertly to deny that which is demanded , or that he esteemeth not the prince that doth demand , or that he disdaineth the person by whom the demand is made , or else that he intendeth to hear from his own ministers to be better resolved : wherefore a discreet negotiator ought in such cases to consider which of these reasons move the prince where he is employed , to entertain him with delays , and make his dispatch accordingly . the sufficiency of good counsellors consisteth in four things . first , they ought to be wise and skilful how to handle their affairs , directing all doings to publick commodity . secondly , to be just in their proceedings , giving to every one that which to him appertaineth . thirdly , to be stout , and void both of partial respects and fear . and lastly , to be temperate and moderate in their desires . whoso desireth to govern well and securely , it behoveth him to have a vigilant eye to the proceedings of great princes , and to consider seriously of their designs : for it is a matter of small difficulty to live in peace with him who desireth our amity , and provideth for others that endeavor to offend us . the intelligences that princes study to attain , are procured by divers means : some are brought by report , some vented by conversation and sounding , some by means of espials ; but the most sure and credible accurrents , are those which come from ambassadors , cheifly those that either for the greatness of their prince , or their own vertue , be of most reputation . for those men conversing daily with great personages , and pondering diligently their manners , words , wisdom , and the order of each mans proceedings , yea , of the prince himself , may with commodity attain unto matters of importance sooner then they that are writers of rumors , or that take upon them to conjecture of things to come . whensoever a people is induced to commit so great an error , as to give reputation to one onely man , to the end he should oppress all those great men whom they hate , they thereby give him opportunity to become their prince ; and so being assisted with their favor and aid● he may likewise extinguish all the rest of the nobility ; and they being extirpated● he will also endeavor to tyrannize over the people , by wh●se help he aspired . so many as are not consenting to the tyranny , rest enemies to the person of the tyrant , who can by no means gain the love of all . for impossible it is , that the riches of any tyrant should be so great , and the honors he can give so many as may satisfie all . hereof it cometh , that those tyrants that are favored of the people , and disfavored of the nobles● are most secure ; because their tyranny is supported with a greater strength ( having the mul●itude their friends ) then is the tyrant whom the humor of the nobles onely hath advanced . a dangerous thing it is in all common-wealths by continual punishing , to hold the mindes of subjects in suspition ; for men ever fearing their ruine , will ( without respect ) determine to save themselves , and as men desperate , attempt innovation . all capital executions ought therefore to be executed suddenly , and as it were at one instant● so to assure the mindes of men from further molestation●● the intent of every wise prince that maketh war , either by election or ambition , is to gain and hold what is gotten : also to use the matter so as thereby he may inrich himself , and not impoverish his own people or countrey . he that inlargeth his dominions , doth not always increase his power ; but he that increaseth in force as well as in dominion , shall thereby grow great ; otherwise he gaineth no more then is shortly to be lost , and consequently he ruineth himself : for who spends more in the war , then he gains by victory , loseth both labor and cost . every prince and commonwealth must above all things take heed , that no necessity how great soever , do perswade him to bring into his dominion any auxiliary soldiers ; because the hardest conditions the enemy can offer , are more easie then is such a resolution . a prince sheweth his ruine at hand , whensoever he beginneth to break the laws and customs , which are antient , and have been long time obeyed by the people of his dominion . that prince which careth to keep himself secure from conspiracy , ought rather to fear those to whom he hath done over-great favors , then them whom he hath much injured : for these want opportunities , the other do not ; and both their desires are as one ; because the appetite of commanding● is always as much or more then the desire of revenge . whensoever a prince discovers a conspiracy , he must well consider the quality thereof , measuring the force of the conspirators with his own ; and finding them many and mighty , the knowledge thereof is to be dissembled , until the princes power be prepared to oppose them ; otherwise he hazardeth his own security . it hath been by long experience found better to send one general to an army , though he be of mean sufficiency , then to give the same authority to two or more excellent personages with equal commission . he that coveteth to be over-much loved , often times becomes contemptible ; and he that endeavoreth to be over-much feared , is ever hated : and to hold the mean between them , cannot be exactly done , because nature will not so permit . whoso aspireth to any dignity , must resolve himself to endure the envy of men , and never to be moved for any offence conceived against him , though they that be offended , be his dear friends : neither shall he for the first affront or encounter , relinquish his hope ; for he that constantly maketh head against the assault of fortune , shall after with facility arive where he designed . in giving council to a prince or commonwealth , and therewith desiring to eschue danger and offence , no other mean is to be taken then that the counsellor shall without passion or perswasion pronounce his opinion , and never to affirm any thing as a resolution , but with modesty to defend that he speaketh ; so as the prince which follows his advice , may seem to do it voluntarily , and not forced by the importunity of him that gave the council . a discreet captain being in the field against the enemy , of whose vertue he hath had no proof , ought first by light skirmishes to feel of what vertue he is● and not to enterprise any general adventure , to the end that terror or fame should not daunt nor discourage his own soldiers . albeit fraud be in all actions detested , yet is the same in martial enterprises commendable and glorious : for that captain who compasseth his designs by wit or stratagem , is no less commended then he that vanquisheth the enemy by violence and force . in times of extremity , when resolution must be taken for the having or utter losse of the state , then no regard is to be had of justice or injustice , mercy or cruelty , honor or ignominy , but rather setting aside all respects , that course is to be follow which defended the lives and liberties of men . whoso desireth to know what will be hereafter let him think of that is past ; for the world hath ever bin in in a circular revolution : whatsoever is now , was heretofore and things past or present are no other then such as shall be again : redit orbis in orbem . a prince that desireth to obtain any thing at the hand of another , must if it be possible urge a suddain answer , and lay before him that is moved , a necessity to resove presently , giving him to understand that denial or delaies may breed a perilous and suddain indignation . there is nothing more difficult , doubtful and dangerous then to attempt innovation : for he that taketh in hand an enterprize of such quality , maketh all those his enemies which lived well under the old order , and findeth them cold defenders that affect his novelties , which coldness proceedeth chiefly of incredulity ; for men are not easily induced to beleeve a new thing till experience hath proved it to be good . there is no art nor other knowledg so seemly and necessary for a prince as the art military with the ordinances and discipline thereof : for that is the only skill required in him that commandeth , and such a vertue as doth not only maintain them that are born princes , but often advanceth private men to that dignity . the deep impressions which old injuries make in the minds of great men cannot with new benefits be razed out ; it is also to be remembred that injuries be done all together : for they offend the lesse , and wil be forgotten the sooner ; but benefits should by little and little be bestowed , ●o shal the memory of them long continue . a small pleasure or displeasure presently done , doth move more then a great good turn bestowed in times past ; for the taste of things present doth make a deeper impression in the minds of men , then doth the memory of things past , or expectation of things to come . it is a matter of small difficulty to sound the discont ntment of other men . for every one doth willingly tell the well and ill deserving of friends , and likewise how much or how little foes can do , if we have patience to hear , which patience is the beginning of all good speed ; but he that delighteth to speak much , and hear little , shall ever inform others more then he himself can learn . among other dangers which a prince incurreth by being disarmed , the greatest is , that thereby he becometh contemptible ; for no comparison there is between men armed and them that are disarmed : and no reason there is that he that is armed should yield obedience to him that is disarmed , neither is it like that a prince disarmed can be secure from his own subjects armed . a prince ignorant of martial knowledg , among other misfortunes cannot be esteemed or trusted of his own soldiers ; it behooveth him therefore as well in time of peace as war to exercise arms , which may be done by two meanes ; the one by action of body , the other by contemplation of mind . the body may be exercised in hunting , hawking , and such like pastimes ; thereby to be made apt to endure travel : his mind likewise may be informed by reading of histories , and the consideration of actions performed by excellent captains , observing the occasion of their victories or losses to the end he may imitate the one● and eschew the other . he that doth not as other men do , but endeavoureth that which ought to be done , shall thereby rather incur peril then preservation for whoso laboreth to be sincerely perfect and good , shall necessarily perish , living among men that are generally evil . a prince that useth liberality to his prejudice , ought not to regard the infamy of miserable , because his parsimony will in time enable him to be liberal , and so may declare himself to be , having by parsimony increased his power , and therefore without imposing upon the people , may defend himself from all such as will make war ; so shall he use liberality to all them from whom he taketh nothing , who are infinite ; and use miserliness to those only to whom he giveth , who are but few . there is nothing that consumeth it self like to liberality ; for if it be long used , it taketh away the meanes to continue it , and consequently doth make men poor and basely minded : or else to eschew poverty they shall be forced to extortion and become odious . it is better to incur the name of covetous ( which is a scandal without hate ) then with desire to be accounted liberal , deserve the infamie of oppression ( an ignominy accompanied with hatred . ) a prince ought to be slow in believing , and advised in proceeding ; he should also beware not to make himself over much feared , but in all his actions shew great wisdom tempered with curtesie ; so shall not over much confidence induce him to be careless , nor over much diffidence render him intolerable . whoso observeth , shall see that men offended , less respect him whom they love , then him whom they fear . for love is maintained by a certain reciproque obligation , which because men are evill , useth to be by every occasion of profit broken . but fear is continued by a certain dread of punishment which never faileth . a prince that holdeth in the fi●ld an army wherein are great numbers of soldiers , ought not to care though he be accompted cruell : for without such an opinion conceived , he cannot keep his forces united , nor apt to attempt any enterprize . men for the most , do use rather to judg ; by their eyes , then by their hands , for every one may see , but few can certainly know . every one seeth what thou seemest to be , but few can understand what thou art indeed ; and these few dare not oppose themselves to the opinion of many which have the majesty of estate to defend them . also in the actions of all men , and chiefly princes , from whom is no appellation , the end is ever observed . machiavel . a prince being forced to use the condition of beasts , must among them make choice of the fox and the lyon ; for the lyon cannot take heed of snares , and the fox is easily overcome by the wolves , it behooveth him therefore to be a fox to discover the snares , and a lyon to terrify the wolves . a prince newly advanced cannot observe those rules which are the cause that men be accompted good ; he being many times constrained for defence of his state to proceed contrary to promise , contrary to charity , and all vertue ; and consequently it behooveth him to have a mind apt to alteration , as the wind and variation of fortune shall direct ; yet ought he not to abandon the good , if so he can , but be ready to use what is evil if so he shall be inforced . every prince ought to have two ears , the one intrinsick in respect of subjects , the other extrinsick in respect of forraine potentates , from whom ●he may be defended with good arms , and good friends : also matters intrinsick will ever stand well so long as all things abroad rest firm . a prince that is favored of the multitude , need not to doubt conspiracy ; but contrariwise where the people is generally discontented , and hateth the prince , then may he reasonably doubt every thing , and every person ; for no man is so poor , that wanteth a weapon wherewith to offend , w●en any occasion is presented to have that thou desirest , fail not to lay hold thereof : for these worldly things do vary , and that so suddenly , as hard it is to assure our selves of any thing , unless the same be already in hand : on the other side if any trouble threaten thee , defer it so long as thou maist ; for time may occ●sion some accident to remove all dangers . the prince that doubtech the fidelity of his subjects , must of force build fortresses ; but he that feareth forreign force more then his own people , were better to leave them unbuilt . howsoever it be , that prince that desireth generally to be respected and esteemed , must perform some notable enterprise , and give testimony of great vertue and valor . a prince shall do well at all times to be counselled so as no man do presume to give counsel but when the prince doth ask it . it is al●o to be noted , that he who is not of himself wise , cannot be well counselled of others , unless happily he yield to some wise men the government of his whole affairs . for good counsels from whomsoever they proceed , shall be thought to come from the prince , and not the wisdom of the prince to proceed from the counsel of others . he that taketh delight to be employed in publick affairs , must by all means endeavor to continue in such services : for oft one business dependeth on another , whereunto the florentine proverb may be applied , di cosa , nasae cosa & il tempole governa . some men have not onely desired , but also compassed honor and profit ; yet being in possession of both , were not therewith so satisfyed as they hoped to be ; which being believed , would happily extinguish the immeasurable ambition wherewith many men are possessed . by experience i have learned that great folly it is to account that ours which we have not , or spend presently in hope of future gain . therefore merchants during the adventure of their goods , do not increase domesticall expences● but fearing the worst assure what is in hand . for such men as have gained unto themselves reputation and are accounted vertuous , to maintain that conceipt and eschew envy , there is nothing better then a life retired from daily conversation , & chiefly of the multitude . fugiat sapiens commercia vulgi● the end that moveth a prince to make war , is to enrich himself , and impoverish the enemy : neit her is victory desired for other purpose then thereby to become the more mighty , and make the enemy weak ; consequently wheresoever thy victory doth impoverish thee , or thy gain therein doth weaken thee , it followeth that either thou passe or undergoe that mark whereunto the intention of war was directed . and that prince is by victory enriched , that can oppress the enemies power and become master of his goods and possessions . and that prince is by victory impoverished when the enemy notwithstanding he be victored can still maintain himself , and the spoyls and possessions are not taken to the use of the prince victorious , but imparted unto his soldiers . for then may he be thought in his own loosing infortunate , and in victory unhappy ; for if he be vanquished , then must he indure the offence by foes ; and being victorious shall be forced to abide the wrong offered by friends : which as they be less reasonable , so are they also less supportable ; because he is still by impositions forced to burthen the subjects , whereof m●y be inferred , that the prince having in him any generosity cannot justly rejoyce at that victory which causeth the subjects to lament . who so desireth to obtain any thing , hopeth to compass his desire , either by intreaty , presents , or threatning ; for so shall he to whom the request is made , be moved either with compassion , profit , or fear : nevertheless with covetous and cruel men , and such as are in their opinion mighty , none of these can prevail . and consequently in vain do they labor , that go about by suit to stir them to pity , by gifts to gain them , or by threats to fear them . who so is perswaded that any common-weal can continue disunited , doth greatly deceive himself : true it is , that some divisions do maintain the estate , but other do indamage the same they which do harm , are such as with sects and pertakings be accompanied ; they which help without sects and pertakings be maintained . a wise governor therefore , albeit he cannot so exactly foresee but some enemies will arise in the state , yet may he take order that no factions may thereby grow . it is therefore to be noted , that the citizens of every estate , may aspire to reputation , either by private or publick means . reputation by publick means , is gained chiefly in the war , either by obtaining victory in some battel , or surprising of some city ; or else by performing some ambassage d●ligently , prosperously : but private reputation is gotten by doing favor to this or that man and protecting them from magistrates , giving them money , advancing them unworthily to honor and office ; and by great feasts , entertaining the multitude ; of which manner of proceeding , se●●s , factions , and partakings do grow : and as reputation thus gained is dangerous , so the other without faction is profitable ; because the same is founded on common welfare , and no private profit : and albeit among citizens of this sort , will oft arise great hate , yet wanting followers for their particular profit , the state shall not be indangered , but rather strengthned ; for every man endeavoring to deserve well , will hold himself within the bounds of civil life , and by vertuous merits labor to be advanced . to perswade or disswade particular persons , is a ma●ter of no difficulty : for if words suffice not , yet authority will prevaile : but hard and perillous it is to remove a false opinion conceived by a whole multitude , for therein faire speech and no compulsion must be used . the best means which wise captains can use to make their soldiers resolute , is to take from them all hope , which resolution may also be increased with the love of our country and confidence in the captain : for confidence groweth by the valor of men , and discipline in former victories , and trust reposed in the leader . the love of our country is naturall , but the aff●ction we bear to the captain proceedeth rather from his vertue , then the benefits he hath be●●owed● necessity also may do much , and chiefly that where no choise is left , but either overcome by armes , or dye in desperation . there is nothing of so great force to hold an armie united , as the reputation of the captain , which proceedeth only from his vertue ; for neither dignity nor authority without valor can work that effect . the first care that a captain must have , is to hold his soldiers well punished and paied ; for where payment faileth , punishment ought not to be inflicted : and consequently no reason it is to punish him for robbery , whom want of pay enforceth to shift ; but where the soldier is payed , and not punished ( offending ) then will he without respect become insolent towards his captain● whereof insue mutinies , discord , and utter ruine it is a custom very honorable not to promise more then thou wilt assuredly performe : yet true it is that whosoever is denied ( though justly ) doth rest illcontented ; for men indeed are not governed by reason : otherwise it is for him that promiseth : and so good promises shall stand in stead of performance ; besides that , he may find excuse enough , because the most part of men are so simple , that faire words alone have power to abuse them , cheifly when they proceed from a person of reputation and authority . the best way therefore is not to promise precisely , but entertain the suitors with answers general , and full of good hope : yet not such as shall directly and absolutely bind . the greatest and most material displeasures that use to arise between the nobility and people , are caused by the diversity of humors , the one laboring to command , the other endevoring not to obey ; so as all troubles and disorders in every commonweale do thereof receive nutriment . the city which is maintained rather by factions then lawes , so soon as one faction is become strong and without opposition , the same of necessity must be divided in it self : for those particular causes which were at the first taken , are not of force enough to maintain it . it is the nature of men not to indure any discom●odity , unless necessity do thereunto enforce them : which may apparently be perceived by their habitations ; for as the feare of warr draweth them to places of strength ( for their defence ) so that perill being past , they do for the most part remove themselves to inhabit countries of more commodity and profit . it may seem strange , and no even measure ( yet approved by experience ) that where many of●end few are punished . also petty errors are severely corrected● but great and grievous crimes be rewarded . in like manner , where many receive wrong , few seek revenge . for injuries universal , are with more patience then particular offences endured . all or the greatest part of men that have aspired to riches or power , have attained thereunto either by force or fraud : and without they have by craft or cruelty gained , to cover the foulness of their fact , they call purchase as a name more honest . howsoever he that for want of will or wit useth not those means , must rest in servitude and poverty . the reason thereof is that as nature hath laid before men the chief of all fortunes , so she disposes them rather to rapine then honest industrie , and more subject to bad then good endeavors : hereof it cometh , that one man eateth an other , and he that is weakest must alwaies goe to the worst . where necessity forceth , boldness is reputed wisdom , and in great enterprises perill is not to be made accompt of . for those attempts that begin with danger , alwaies end with honor , or reward ; also from one perill there is no way to escape , but by entring into another . a wise man ought not to desire to inhabit that county where men have more authority then lawes . for indeed that country deserves to be desired where every one may securely enjoy his own ; not that , where with facility it may be taken away ; and that friends for feare to lose their own , are inforced to forsake them . some magistrates either by over great zeale or ignorance take a course of rigor , which being for the present favored , they are ever the more imployed , as men meet to extirpate inconveniences . but thereby the subjects are often drawn into desperation , and consequently have recourse unto armes , as their uttermost refuge . in this case a wise prince for appeasing the people is forced to disallow his ministers , and sometimes also to inflict publick punishment . a prince naturally suspicious , and having about him persons inclined to envie , is easily induced to mistrust those men that have served him with most sufficiency : which danger they cannot eschew , because they who are worthiest commendation are oftentimes envied by such persons as have access unto the prince . who so cannot endure both envy and hate , must re●rain to enterprise great matters : for great honors being desired of many , it behooveth him that aspireth unto them , to be for his dignity envied , and for his authority hated ; which authority albeit the same be well used , yet they who hate or envie ( perswading themselves it might be better handled ) indeavor to oppress that power , as fearing it will be worse . among other things which worketh the inconveniences of commonweales , ambition and desperation are cheif ; of both , desperation is worst : for ambition may attend occasion ; desperation will not , as that cannot endure delaies . historians desiring to write the actions of men , ought to set down the simple truth , and not say any thing for love or hatred : also to chuse such an opportunity for writing as it may be lawful to think what they will , and write what they think , which is a rare happiness of the time . in commending or disallowing the actions of men it is a course very requisite to consider the beginning , the proceeding , and end : so shall we see the reasons and causes of things , and not their bare events only , which for the most part are governed by fortune . it is a matter of much necessity , that every man , and chiefly a prince should in his first actions , give some testimony of vertue ; for falling at first into obloquie , doe he well or ill , all is ill taken . the custome of the common people is to judge rather by their eyes then by their eares : which is the cause they allow more of external shew then inward vertue : and true it is , where excellency of mind , and beauty of body concur , the commendation due to such a person is far the greater . gratior est pulchro veniens è corpore virtus . a prince or great personage that constantly endureth adversity deserveth great praise : yet greater commendation is due to him that beareth himself modestly in his happiness . for miseries are oft born with patience , but felicity corrupteth . to be descended of princes or great parsonages , is a matter of meer fortune , and so to be esteemed : but adoption proceedeth from the judgment of men ; therefore seemeth incorrupt and seldom abused . it hath been long observed , and is a rule which rarely faileth , that he shall be ever suspected of the prince in possession , whom men acco●pt worthy to be a prince in reversion . it hath been a use very ancient to give credit to astrologers , and other such persons who by their star-learning or blind divination , take upon them to tell of things to come . the reason thereof is that the most part of men beleive that soonest which they least understand ; and if they see the event of a prediction though it hapneth by meer chance to fall out according to that was premised , thereupon they settle so firme an impression , as albeit many other faile , yet the good conceipt of their cunning cannot be removed . liberality is a vertue which gaineth love , but much are they deceived whom riot in lieu thereof abuseth . to cast away and consume is soon learned , but to give in good order few have the skill . in time of suddain mutiny , conspiracy , and offence of people , the wisest resolution is not to oppose force to prevent fury , but rather give space for the bad to amend , and the good to consent : for treasons prevaile on the sudden , but good council gathers forces by leasure . mature deliberation ought ever to be used , but when armes are to determine , speedy execution is the best : because no delay in that enterprise is fit which cannot be commended before it be ended . who so is pleased to observe the proceedings of men in authority , shall observe that some of them hold a plain course without respect : others projecting for time to come do forecast how to hold their present good fortune or at least to escape danger : for they mistrusting present prosperity and fearing a change , prepare beforehand some private friends to oppose against publick hatred : whereof may be inferred , that no care is taken of innocency , but every one studieth how to pass without punishment . in captains and all military commanders , three things are required , vertue , discipline , and authority ; but in private soldiers obedience and courage only sufficeth ; for by due obeying , and no curious scanning the leaders direc●ions are maintained ; and the army in danger is alwaies most valiant , which before the danger is most quiet . let the soldier therefore be well armed and valiantly minded . to advise and dsrect must be the captains care . it is a matter of no great moment , yet alwaies worthy the noting , that any exterior behavior , or garment presenting pride or greatness , chiefly in persons lately advanced , though no man be thereby interessed or injured , doth move in others a certain offence : for the nature of man is such , as beholdeth the new prosperity of others with an envious eye , and wisheth a moderation of fortune nowhere so much as in those we have known in equall degree with our selves in all enterprises of warr , ( if present necessity doth not otherwise require ) leisure and deliberation ought to be used ; for often it sufficeth in lieu of wisdom , ●o take the advantage of other mens folly . all men that are to consider of great actions , ought to be informed whether that which is undertaken be profitable for the commonweale , honorable to themselves , and easy to be effected : or at least not greatly difficult . also he that perswadeth● is to be examined whether besides bare words and counsel , he will joyn his own perill ; and if fortune favour the attempt , to whom the principal glory shall redound . the perils which accompanie private enterprises , are far unlike to those which he doth enter that aspireth to principality . for in private attempts a man may pause or proceed as he will ; but to him that aspires to empire there remains no middle course , but either by victory to triumph● as a prince ; or being vanquished to endure death as a traytor . let no man in his prosperity , give much credit to common applause or service assured by any of whom in meaner fortune he hath had no experience : for the base people are learned in no lesson● only without difference of truth or falshood to flatter men in authority , and with shouts and words of great rejoycing make shew of great affection . as overmuch haste is dangerous , so too great delay oftentimes proveth disadvantagious : for albeit consultation ought to foregoe action , yet to dispute long and in the end reject the advice of either side , or take a middle course ( whith in cases of doubt and danger is worst ) was ever accompted great discretion . there is no course more comely , nor any resolution so well beseeming a wise man , having made proof of his own vertue ( and finding in age no fortune due to such effect ) as to retire himself from the court and company ; for so shall he shun the inconveniences of contempt and the discommodity of travell ( jucunda senectuti otia ) yet true it is that whoso hath lived a prince or governed as a publick person , cannot expect security in a private estate . whensoever danger draweth near , and terror is at hand , all men look about , but none willingly adventure : for in such cases every man will give council , but few will take par● of the peril . in commonwealths where sects or partialities he , the leader of any side is able to kindle civil war ; yet is he unable to moderate the victory : for to stir up dissentions and troubles , the worst man most commonly bears the stroke ; but peace and quietness are not established but by men of rare gifts and excellent vertue . it may seem strange and contrary both to courtesie and christian profession , that men are far more mindful of injuries done unto them , then of benefits received by them . the reason thereof is , that thankfulness is accompted a burden , but revenge is sweet , and reckoned a great gain . of reconciled foes , and such as know that our harms were caused by their means , we oft-times expect favor , as perswaded that new friendship will repair the loss of old displeasure : but the matter doth seldom so fall out ; for the quality of mans nature is ever to hate those whom he hath hurt , and love them whom he hath made beholding . quos laeserunt oderunt . tac. to common persons and such as are ignorant in matters of state , every taxation and imposition seemeth heavy or superfluous ; yet the wiser sort know , that the end of all publick endeavour is to confirm people in peace , and peace cannot be maintained without arms ; nor arms without pay , nor pay without impositions . as fortunate folk are envied , so are the poor contemned ; which rule reacheth also to princes : the one lives in plenty with war , the other in poverty with peace . for seldom is it seen , that those people are assaulted where nothing is to be gained , and whose base beings afford no other spoils then blood and beggery . wisemen have observed that in matter of state , and the managing thereof , three things are especially to be looked unto : the first is , occasion ; the second , the ●ntentions of other men ; the third , our own affection . for there is nothing that slippeth away so soon as occasion ; nothing so difficult as to judge what an other man intendeth ; nor any thing more nocent then our own immoderate desires . it hath been ever a course observed by wise princes , but much more by aristocraties and popular states , against force and fury of the multitude , to defend themselves with silver and gold . how much more it importeth all princes to lead a vertuous life , and give daily example of piety and justice , appears apparantly in the proceedings of the roman bishops ; who by the well-doing of some few of them at the first , became greatly honored ; but afterwards they became contemptible : for the reverence which men did bear to the ●anctity of their lives ●ailing , it was impossible of so contrary manners and examples to look for like effects . the success of the war cheifly dependeth on the reputation of the prince , which declining , the vertue also of the soldiers faileth : likewise the fidelity of the people decayeth , and their money to maintain the war , ceaseth ; contrariwise , the courage of the enemy is increased , they that stood doubtful become resolved , and every difficulty augmenteth . the authority which princes give , is chiefly in respect of wisdom and valor : yet true it is , that for the most part , they accompt them the wisest men that can best accommodate themselves to their humor . the greatest distress and difficulty which can come to any army , doth proceed of these causes : want of money , scarcity of victuals , hatred of people , discord of captains , disobedience of soldiers , and their flying to the enemy , either of necessity or freewil . a prince or great magistrate having long maintained the reputation of wisdom and vertue , must take heed that no rash or dangerous resolution do taint the honorable fame of his former life : for to be t●ansported with anger against his own profit , is lightness ; and to esteem small dangers more then great , is want of judgment . a prince or person of great estate , must be wary not to inure the conceit of double-dealing : for little sincerity and trust is looked in his actions , of whom there is an opinion of craft and falshood conceived . experience hath always proved , that whatsoever the most part of men desire , rarely cometh to pass : the reason hereof is , that the effects of humane actions commonly depend on the will of a few ; and their intentions ever differing from the greater number● the end and success cannot be other then as pleaseth the few that are to direct them . there is nothing more dangerous then to enterprise a war , or other actions of importance upon popular perswasion ; for such expectations are vain , and such designs fallible : also the fury of the multitude is great , when danger is little or far off ; but perils growing great and near , their courageth quaileth● as they whose passions have no rule or measure . it is strange to see how apt men are to doubt displeasure threatned by enemies , cheifly when they draw near ; for the people do naturally over-much fear dangers at hand , and esteem less then is fit of things present : also to make small accompt of those that are far from them , because divers remedies may be hoped as well by time , as other accidents . the offensive words or answers of indignation , proceeding from great princes , ought never to admit displeasure into the mindes of them against whom they are spoken : for having by speech uttered a great part of choler , the edge of their deeds becomes the calmer , and more easily appeased : such is the condition of noble and generous spirits . to judge right of other mens merit , seems of great difficulty ; for time and tryal is thereto required ; also it is not easie to answer the expectation of men , but oft-times inconsiderate , and not measured in due proportion . it is a part of great discretion to divide the seasons of affairs and vacations : for as it fitteth well a prince or person of dignity in times of audience and judgment , to be grave , heedful , and austere : so those offices performed , all shew of authority and sad looks ought to be set apart ; for by that means , neither courteous behavior shall detract from the reverence due to his place , nor severity diminish the love which to his behavior appertaineth . magistrates must look into all things , but not exact all things to rigor . light faults may be pardoned , but great offences severely corrected ; yet not always proceeding to punishing , but oft contented with repentance . to be bitter in rebuking is also fit for a magistrate , shewing himself sowre to the bad , and sweet to the good ; framing both countenance and condition according to the merit of men ; and be perswaded that it is more honest to offend , then to hate . soldiers must be encouraged in all fortunes to stand resolved , and not to be danted with any passed misadventure ; ever attending a time and opportunity of revenge ; which commonly cometh to passwhere mens mindes are united : for common danger must be repelled with union and concord . among other reasons wherewith soldiers are encouraged , necessity and distress doth oft inforce them : for as men of vertue perform the actions of arms for honor , so the coward must do them for his security . all enterprises attempted by arms , are honorable ; but those that are done in countreys remote , are more praisable : for the less they be in knowledge , the greater is the glory to atchieve them . to be truly and faithfully loved , is a thing greatly to be desired ; for terror and fear are weak works of affection : for they being taken away , he that ceaseth to fear , will soon begin to hate ; and as they that by force are kept under , obey with ill will ; so they that govern without line justly , rule against right . some men either deserving to be accompted of excellent wisdom , or singular in that skill whereof they make pro●ession , do ordinarily love the proceedings of others , taking that advantage of their ill success ; yet sure it is , that disaster and unhappy event of some actions , proceed not of disorder , nor humane imperfection , but from a certain fatal fury , which neither council nor constancy of men can withstand . it is a matter of much difficulty , or rather impossible for any prince to maintain the law , civil or military without severity : for where men hope to be easily pardoned , there are they apt to offend . contrarily where mens actions are precisely fitted , there do they live in over great aw , and hatred doth always accompany such severity . the best course therefore is to punish offences severely , and reward vertuous merits liberally ; so shall fear be converted to reverend respect , and none have cause to complain : for as it lies in each mans power to shun offending , so is it in their power also to deserve well , and merit reward . whosoever after mature deliberation , hath resolved what course to hold in the action he hath in hand , must not after repent or fear any difficulty : for such thoughts would break the vigor of the minde , and impeach the proceedings of that which was resolved . and albeit some differences do happily arise , yet must he believe that every other course would have been accompanied with the same or greater impediments . yong men for the warmness of their blood , and for not having before-time been deceived by fortune , more willingly enterprise actions rather honorable then severe . but old men as well for that their heat is cooled , as also for having attempted many things in vain , make choice of enterprises severe rather then those that are followed with fame and glory . the greatness of one prince is nothing else but the ruine and distress of another : likewise his strength is the weakness and oppression of others . some conquests are of such quality , as albeit a victorious captain merit triumphal honor ; yet a modest refusal becomes his greater glory . the dignity of magistrates is not assured without arms ; for when obedience faileth , no other means is left to continue a people united . as willing obedience in subjects is the princes strength , so is the same their own security : for as by the princes authority the people are governed , so by their consent he is maintained . three things men covet with immoderate desire , lands , riches , and honors ; but as seldom they compass their full content , so are they for the most part to endure a destiny far other then they wished . strange it is , yet by experience proved true , that in time of danger , fortune or ( rather destiny ) so much amazeth the judgment of wise men , as seldom they conceive what resolution is best to be taken . no great free-city can long continue quiet , unless the same be used to foreign assaults : for wanting foes without , some inward enmity will arise , not unlike to strange bodies of men , which being secure from external injury , are nevertheless by their own poise oppressed . as every pilot of ordinary skill knoweth in calm and quiet seas to direct the course of his ship ; so every governor of capacity doth understand how the affairs of state are in peaceable times to be handled : but when tempests are , and subjects bent to sedition ; the one requires an excellent sailer , the other the aid of some excellent wisdom . it oft happens , that publick duty is opposite to private friendship ; so as we are either forced to omit the offices due to our countrey , or draw our dearest friends into danger : in which case we are to prefer publick respect , before particular obligation . the nature of base people is such , as either they obey slavishly , or command insolently : for liberty being the mark whereat they aim , is by them of that quality , neither moderately desired , nor discreetly continued ; and always there are some seditious leaders to be found , who of disorder are inclined to kindle the ire and offence of ignorant people . dux rebu● motis , facile invenitur . salust . experience hath oft proved , that men in best fortune , and such as esteem themselves most secure , even then fall soonest into disadventure , because those dangers unfeared be as it were contemned , and not regarded . to enter needless dangers , was ever accounted madness , yet in times of extream peril and apparent distress , bold and hazardous attempts are greatest security . the divers adventures which happen to men , may well inform that much better it is , cheifly in arms , to be governed by reason then by fortune . a certain peace is ever accounted better security then victory hoped or expected . melior tutiorqu●●●rta pax quàm sperata victoria . livi. if to our prosperity god were pleased to add the grace of wisdom , we should thereby judge not onely of what is past , but also of all that can succeed hereafter . rarely or never can we consider truly of worldly proceedings , unless first we have felt the deceits of fortune . discord or dissention in any state or city , offers opportunity to such men as are ambitious to work their will : for the humor of sects and partialities is such as the weaker faction doth ever chuse rather to call for aid of strangers , then yield to the dominion of an adverse party . ancient customs may not violently and suddenly be taken away . fortune which altereth all things , will by little and little wear them out of use . to be oft in fight , and converse much with men , breedeth a kinde of satiety : therefore it behoveth persons of great estate and authority to be retired● le●t over-much familiarity should detract from the reverence due to honorable estate . the natures of men not content to live according to their fortune and birth , are of all others most prone to envy ; because they hate the vertue and welfare of all such as are in estimation above them . great heed is to be taken , that no citizen or subject , be suffered to aspire to such greatness , as cannot be forced to obey the laws ; and no order there is of more necessity , then that every man of what quality soever , may be without respect accused and judged . for conservation of particular greatness and dignity , there is nothing more noble and glorious , then to have felt the force of every fortune . it is the quality of wise men onely , to know how to use prosperity , and never to trust too much to the favors of present happiness . a man well advised in his prosperity , beareth not himself towards others either proud or violent ; nor must he believe in his own present felicity , for the day knows not what the night bringeth : he onely is to be reputed a man , whose minde cannot be puft up by prosperity , nor dejected by any adverse fortune . men of cholerick humor are easily moved with insolent speeches , but wise men laugh them to scorn . the way whereby a prince eschues the hate of subjects , is , hot to take from them their lands or goods ; yet albeit the blood of some few be tainted , unless the same be accompanied with confiscation ( which a prince is rarely forced to use ) it seldom causeth him to become odious . a rule most certain it is , that he who commands any thing unpleasing , must by severe means cause it to be observed ; and who desireth to be obeyed , must know how to command : and he onely knows how to command , that doth compare his own force with those that are to obey ; wherein finding a proportion , then he may boldly proceed , otherwise forbear . in actions of difficulty great courage is to be used , and who so compasseth any thing by violence , cannot maintain it by mildness , nor command by affability : he therefore that is of nature soft , should do best to refrain all extraordinary commands , and in matters ordinary imploy the vertue of his milde spirit ; because ordinary punishments are not imputed to the prince or his magistrates , but to the laws and ordinances of state . when necessity presseth , desperation is deemed wisdom , and generous mindes do not accompt of danger , because those attempts which begin with peril , do for the most part end with glory . he that endeavors to be good among many that are evil , or will uphold that which those labor to pull down , of force worketh his own undoing . all commonwealth● alter from order to disorder , from disorder to order again ; for nature having made all worldly things variable , so soon as they have attained their utmost perfection and height , they must descend ; so from good they fall back to evil , and from evil they return to good . war begets quiet , quiet idleness , idleness disorder , disorder ruine ; likewise ruine order , order vertue , vertue glory and good fortune . wise men have observed , that arms were before learning , and captains before philosophers ; for good and well regulated armies having gained victory , established rest and security , whereof the study of letters and liberal sciences ensued . that country deserveth to be loved of all men , which loves all men indifferently , and not that countrey which respecting the best part , advanceth a few : no man therefore is to be blamed , if for such cause he desire rather to abandon then embrace his countrey . commonwealths are bodies mixt , yet have they of bodies simple some resemblance : and as in these , many infirmities grow , which without violent medicines cannot be cured ; so in the other many mischiefs arise , which a good and godly patient should offend to leave uncured , though therein be use both force and fire . those wars be most just which are most necessary ; and those arms are most merciful where no hope of help remains but in them onely . in actions which promise either publick glory , or private honor , men may be reasonably perswaded to adventure life and living , because great hope there is to die with reputation , or live to recover that peace which war hath consumed : but where men are no less oppressed by insolency of commanders , then by insolency of foes , there is the calamity doubled , and of two evils the danger of war seemeth least ; for that hath end , the other is infinite . who so perswades himself to be no less esteemed in evil then good fortune , is deceived : for promises made , during distress , are rarely performed , unless the same necessity continue . the intent of every prince , or other state that makes war , is to inrich himself , and impoverish the enemy : neither is victory for other occasions sought , nor the possessions of the enemy to other end desir'd , then to make themselves mighty , and their enemy weak . it follows then , that so oft as the victory impoverishes them , or the gains weaken them , either they pass or come short of that mark whereat the war was aimed . ancient and wel-governed common-wealths were wont by their conquests to fill the treasuries with gold and silver , to give reward to soldiers , to spare the people from tributes , to make triumphs and publick feasts : but in later times the wars have used , first , to consume the treasure , and after impoverish the people without assuring them from their enemies . a prince or state that leaves promises unperformed , by reason of unexpected impediments , and for no ill intent , ought not to be blamed : neither are such accidents any just cause or colour why friends should abandon their confederates . where magistrates govern justly , subjects obey dutifully ; where private persons grow rich , and princes enlarge their empire ; there is the commonwealth blessed , and the people fortunate . chap. xxvi . maximes ●f state , or prudential grounds and polemical precepts , concerning all estates , and forms of policie in times of peace or war , &c. confirmed by select narations , and historical parallels . all cities and towns of state are b●ilded either by people dwelling in or about the place where they are builded , or else they are made by strangers : of the first are athens and venice , of the other alexandria and florence . the fortune of every city builded , and vertue of the builder , appeareth by choice of the place , and quality of laws : for as fertile places occasion men to be slothfull , unless by good laws they be forced to labor , so barrenness compells them to industry ; which reason induceth wise men to plant habitations in either : examples of the first are ferrara and rome , of the second ragus● and genoa . all laws whereby commonwealths are governed were either made by some one excellent man , and at an instant ; or else they were ordained at sundry times according to such accidents as befel . example , the laws of sparta made at the beginning lycurgu● , the laws of rome at sundry times . the government of every city in time becomes corrupt ; principality changeth into tyranny : the optimacy is made the government of the people ; and the popular estate turns to licentious disorder ; which instability or alteration moved some law-makers to take order that in the government of their city there should be a mixture of all three , and was the cause that t●e policy of sparta continued ● years , when the popular state of athens endured not one hundred . example , the laws of sparta made by lycurgus , and the laws of athens by s●lon . whoso taketh in hand to frame any state or government , ought to presuppose that all men are evil , and at occasions will shew themselves so to be . example , the envy of the people of rome to the nobles , and their insolency towards them appeared not so long as the kings governd ; but the tarquins being banished , opportunity was thereby offerd that the malice of the one and the other became discovered . the divers honors of the nobility and people , the one desiring to command , the other not to obey , are the cause of continual troubles , unless some third mean there be of more authority then either , to bridle the force of both . example , the kings in rom● expulsed , forthwith arose much mutiny , and could not be supprest till the tribum plebis were created ; whose authority wrought the same effect which the kings had done . some states endeavor to enlarge their dominions , and some others labour only to maintain that estate they antiently possest . example of the first was the city of rome , of the second sparta . all states desiring to live at liberty , think fit that every man should be permitted to accuse any citizen that offendeth , which manner of proceeding works two excellent effects : first that the people should not dare for fear of accusing to attempt ought against the state ; or if they do , they shall be presently and without respect punished . secondly by liberty of accusing , every man hath meanes to utter the offence wherewith he can charge others , which he could not ; unless it were lawfull to take such an ordinary course , and consequently be driven to ways extraordinary , particular revenge , or callingin forreign forces . example , coriolanus and appius , claudius at rome , lucannone at chinsi , francisco valeri in florence . a accusations are in every state necessary , so slanders are dangerous , and worthy of punishment ; the difference betwixt accusations and slanders , is , that the one is publickly performed before magistrates , with good proofs and witnesses to maintain the truth of the accusation ; but slanders are as well publickly performed as dispersed in secret and places of repair without witness and justification , so as every man may be slandered , but few are orderly accused . example , appius claudius accused by l. virginius ; furius camillus , slandered by manlius capitoliuus . the only meanes to suppress slander is , to give authority to some persons of repute to compel every slanderer to become an accuser ; and if the accusation prove true , then to reward the accuser , or at least not to punish him . example manlius the slanderer of camillus for his untrue information punished . a rule most certain and assured it is , that every kingdom and state at the first well framed , or after well informed , doth take the perfection thereof from the wisdom of some excellent man , who ought not to be blind though in a matter of great moment he happily useth some extraordinary violenc or proceedings ; for he that employeth force to mend and not to mar , deserves commendation . example , romulus , lycurgus , cleomenes . there lives no man so simple or wise , so wicked or well disposed , but prefers those persons that are praisable , before those that are blamable : notwithstanding for that well near all men are beguiled in discerning what indeed is good , deeming that honorable which in truth is otherwise ; they suffer themselves either willingly or ignorantly to be carried into a course which merrits rather infamy then commendation . example , every man wisheth himself timoleon or agesilaus , rather then dionysius or phalaris ; rather a titus or trajan , then caligula or vitellius . who reads histories treating of great actions shall perceive that good princes indeed are more secure and better defended by the love of the people , and fidelity of counsellers , then were they that entertained many legions and men of war . example , of all those emperors which raigned after c●esar untill maximi●us the greatest number were for their vices taken and slain , only galba and pertinax excepted who were good emperors . a prince of great knowledge both in armes and wisdom so firmly setleth the foundation of government , as albeit his successor be of the less vertue ; yet may he be maintained even by the memory of his predecessor : but if it happen that the third prince prove not more like the first then the second , then all that is past goeth to ruine . example , the martial valor of romulus was the cause that numa might governe safely in peace : which tullus could not have done , had he bin unlike to romulus ; nor should bajazet emperor of turky have enjoyed the state of his father mahomet and left the same to his posterity , if selim his son had not been more like to his grandfather then to bajazet his father . the succession of two excellent princes , cheifly if they be of long life , works wondrous effects : the like is seen in optimacies or popular states , where the governors successively elected be men of great vertue and understanding . example , the first appeared in philip of macedon , and alexander his son , the second in the consuls of rome . in every state where soldiers are not , the fault thereof proceeds from the governors . wise princes were therefore wont even in times of peace to cause warlick exercises to be used ; for without them the most warlick nations become not only ignorant in martial knowledge , but also effeminate . example , pelopida● & epa●i●ondas in thebes , and king tullus in rome as well in peaceable as troublesome times used exercise of armes . no prince or state well advised , hazards his whole estate upon the valor of some few persons , nor ought to strength of straight places where the enemy is to pass . example , tully king of rome , & metius king of alba , condiscended that three of their nobility for either side chosen should enter combate , and that nation which were victorious should command the other . francis the french king going to recover lombardy , was by the switzers attended into two or three places in the mountains , hoping there to repulse him , but the king taking another way , passed securely and prevaild . every state well governed doth reward men of good merit , and punish all offenders ; and if any person of good desert shall wilfully be a delinquent , the same man ought notwithstanding his former service , be punisht . example , the same horatio that in combat gained the victory against the albani , having insolently slain his own sister , was notwithstanding his egregiou● act and the fresh memory thereof , called into triall of his life , and with great difficulty obtained pardon : and manlius who had with great glory saved the capitol , for moving sedition in rome , was after from the same cast down headlong . every wise man having performed any great service to his prince or country , ought to be content with such recompence as it shall please the prince or country to bestow : measuring the same according to the power of the giver , and not the merit of him that receiveth . example , horatius cocles for having lost his hand in defence of the bridge of rome , and mutius scaevola suffering his hand to be burnt for his attempt to kill king porsenna , were rewarded with a small portion of land ; and manlius that defended the capitoh from the galleys , had no greater reward then a little measure of meale . ingratitnde is a vice so natural and common , as not only private persons , but princes and states also either through covetousnes or suspition are therewith infected . example , vespasian proclamed emperor , was chiefly aided by antonius primus , and by his helpe prevailed against vitellius ; in reward of which service vespasian removed him from the command of his army and gave that honor to mutianus . consalvo ferranoe having taken the kingdom of naples from the french , was first remov'd from his command of the castles and soldiers , and in the end brought into spain where in disgrace he ended his life collatinus tarquinius who with the aide of bru●us suppressed the tarquins of rome , and with him pub●valerius were banisht for no other cause but for being of the name of tarquin , theother because he built a house upon mount coelio . all errors that great captains commit , are either wilfull or ignorant , towards the one and the other of which offenders to use greater lenity then the quality of their offences deserves , seemeth necessary : for men of honor suffer nought by the infamy which evill service doth bring . it is also to be considered that a great captain being cumbred with many cares , cannot proceed in his actions couragiously if he stand in daily doubt to be punisht for every error that hapneth . example , sergius and vi●gi●ius were before veio , the one part of the army on the one side of the city , the other not far from the place . sergius being assaulted by the falisci was not aided by virginius , neither would he require his help , such was the envy the one bare to the other ; and ●onsequently their offence is wilful and worthy of capital punishment . likewise when varro by his ignorance , received an overthrow by hannibal at cann● , he was nevertheless pardoned and honorably welcomed home by the whole senate . whensoever an inconvenience ariseth within or without the state , it seems a resolution more sure to dissemble the knowing thereof , then to seek by sudden violence to suppress it . example , cosmo de medices having gained extraordinary reputation in florence , the citizens imagined , that to suffer the same to increase , was dangerous , and therefore they banished him : which extream proceeding , so offended the friends of cosm● , being the stronger , as they forced the citizens to revoke him , and make him prince of that city . the like hapned in rome , where caesar for his vertue , much admired and followed , became afterwards to be feared● and they that feared , not considering their force to be inferior to the power of caesar● endeavoring to oppress him , were the occasion of his greater glory . in every republick , an excessive authority given to one or two persons for long time , proveth dangerous , cheifly when the same is not restrained . example , the dictatorship given to caesar for life , was an occasion to oppress the liberties of the r●mans . the same effect was before that time like to follow the decemvirat● , by suffering appius claudiu● to prolong the time of his dignity . the ambition of men is such , as rarely they will obey when formerly they have commanded ; neither do they willingly accept of mean office , having before sate in higher place : yet the citizens of well-governed states , did not refuse as well to obey as command . example , the victory the romans obtained against the veienti , q. fabius was slain , having the year before been consul : nevertheless he then served in meaner place under c. manilius , and m. fabius his own brother then consul . there is nothing more strange , yet by experience proved true , that men in adverse fortune be much grieved , and in prosperity also discontented ; which is the reason , that not being forced to fight for necessity , they will nevertheless contend for ambition ; and that humor doth as well possess those that live aloft , as others whom fortune holdeth down . example , the people of rome having by the authority of the tribunes obtained to make themselves secure from oppression of the nobility , forthwith required , that the honor and office of state might be also imparted unto them . the like ambition moved them to have their part of lands by force of lex agragia , which was at last the overthrow of the roman liberty . it seemeth that people displeased with some innovations hapned in the state , do sometime without just reasons complain of those that govern : not unlike to a sick man who deemeth that the physician , not the fever , is the cause of his grief . example , the people of rome were perswaded that the ambition of consuls was the cause of continual war , therefore required that no more consuls should be● yet were they content that certain tribunes should command with like authority , so was nothing altered in the government but the governors title , which alone did content them . nothing can corrupt and alter the nature of man so much , or so soon as the immoderate desire of honor● in so much as men of honest mindes and vertuous inclinations are sometimes by ambition , drawn to abuse that goodness whereunto they are inclined . example , appius claudius having lived long an enemy to the multitude , hoping by their aid to continue his authority of the decemviri in rome , became their friend , and disfavored the factions of great men . likewise q. fabius a man of singular vertue , being also called to that dignity by appius self , adulterated his nature and became like unto him . seldom or never is any people discontented without just cause ; yet if happily they be asked whereof their offence proceedeth , many times for want of some fit man to pronounce their grief , they ●●and silent . example , the romans at the death of virginia , were gathered together armed upon mount sacr● and being asked by the senate , for what cause they so did ? no answer was made ; until virginio father of the virgin had procured , that twenty of the tribunes might be made to be as head of the p●ople , and confer with the senate . a great folly or rather meer madness it seemeth to desire any thing , and tell before-hand that the end and purpose of the desire is evil ; for thereby he sheweth reason why it ought not to be granted . example , the romans required of the senate that appius and the rest of the decemviri should be delivered into their hands , being determined to burn them all alive . the first part of their request seemed reasonable , but the end thereof unreasonable . a course very dangerous it is in all states , by continual accusing and punishing , to hold the subject in doubt and daily fear : for he that stands always looking for some trouble , becometh careless and apt to attempt innovation . example , the dec●mviri being opprest , the tribunes authorised in their place , endeavored daily to call in question the most part of the dec●mviri , and many other citizens also , whereof great inconveniences arose , and much danger would have ensued , had not a decree propounded by m. duillius been made , that for one year no roman citizen should be accused . strange it is to see how men in seeking their own security , lay the injuries which they fear u●on other men ; as though it were necessary , either to offend or be offended . example , the romans among themselves , united and strong , always endeavored to offend the nobles ; and the nobles likewise being perswaded they were strong , labored to oppress the people : which humors were the cause of continual troubles . to make estimation and choice of men fit to govern , the best course is to consider in particular ; otherwise it might be imagined● that among the multitude or meaner people , they being the greatest number , might be found some persons of more perfection . example , the people of rome desiring that the consulship might be given among them as men of most merit , did by all means endeavor to obtain that honor ; but being come to election , and every mans vertue particularly considered , there could not be among the multitude onel● one found fit for so great a place ; and therefore the people themselves consented , that the dignity should still remain as it was . to perswade a multitude to any enterprise , is easie , if that which is perswaded , doth promise either profit or honor ; yet oft under that external apparence li●s hid loss or disadvantage● example , the romans perswading themselves that the slow proceeding of f●bius maximus in the war , was both chargable and cowardly , required● that the general of the horse might direct the war ; which course had ruined rome , if the wisdom of fabius had not been . likewise when hannibal had divers years raigned in ital● , one m. centenius penula , a man of base birth , yet a soldier o● some repute , undertook that if he with such volunti●rs as would follow him , might have authority to fight , he would within few days deliver hannibal either alive or dead : which offer was by the senate accounted rash , yet for fear to offend the people , granted ; and penula with his soldiers was cut in pieces . to appease a mutiny or tumult in any camp or city , there is no means more speedy or successful , then if some person of great quality and respect , present himself to the people , and by his wisdom lay before them the damage of their discords , perswading them to peace and patience . example , the faction of the ●rateschi and arratiati in florence ; the one ready to assault the other . francisco soderini bishop of v●terra in his episcopal habit , went between the parties and appeased them : also count egremont by the authority of his wisdom and presence , supprest a great mutiny in antwerp between the martinists and papists . a people corrupted , do rarely or never observe any order or ordinance , unless by force of some princes power they be thereto inforced ; but where the multitude is incorrupt and religious , all things are done justly , and without compulsion . example , camillus at the victory against the urienti , vowed that the tenth part of the pillage should be offered to apollo ; but the senate supposing that the people would not consent to so great a contribution , studied to dispence with that vow , and to please apollo and the people also by some other means : whereat the people shewed themselves openly offended , and willingly gave no less then the sum formerly decreed . when the free-cities of germany are occasioned to make money for any publick service , the magistrates impose one or two in the hundred on every city , which done , every one is sworn to lay down so much as in his own conscience he is able ; and he with his own hand , no other witness being present , casteth the money into a coffer prepared for the purpose ; which he would not , if his own conscience did not inforce him . when any extraordinary occasion happens to a city or province , some prodigious voice is heard , or some marvellous sights are seen . before t. gracchus general of the roman army was betraid by flavius lucanus , the aruspices discovered two serpents eating the entrails of the beasts sacrified ; which done , they vanished : which vision as they divined , prognosticated the generals death : likewise f. savanar●la foretold the coming of king charls the eight into italy : and m. sedigitus when the galls first came towards rome , informed the senate he heard a voice much londer then any mans , crying aloud , galli veniunt . the multitude of base people is naturally audacious and apt to innovation ; yet unless they be directed by some persons of reputation and wisdom , rarely do they joyn in any action of great import . example , the romans when their city was taken and sackt by the galls , went to veio with determination to dwell there : the senate informed thereof , commanded that upon great pain , every citizen should return to rome , whereat the people at first mocked ; but when every man particularly within himself considered his own peril , all in general determined to obey the magistrates . in the employment of men for service , neither age nor fortune ought so much to be regarded as vertue ; for yong men having made tryal of their valor , soon become aged , and thereby either unapt or unable to serve : therefore well-governed commonwealths , preferred military vertue before any other respect● . example , valerius g●rvinus with others made consul the three and twentieth year of his age , and pompey triumphed in his youth . no wise or well advised prince or other state will undertake without excessive forces to invade the dominions of any other prince , unless he assure himself of some friends there to be a mean , and as it were a gate to prepare his passage . example , the romans by aid of the sagu●tines entred spain , the aetoli called them into greece , the h●diai into france : likewise the palaeologi incited the turk to come into thrace ; and ludovicus sforza occasioned charls the french king to come into italy . a republick desirous to extend the bounds thereof , must endeavor to be fully furnished with inhabitants , which may be done both by love and force : love is gained by suffering strangers to inhabit the city securely ; and force compels people to come thither , when other cities and towns near at hand be demolished or defaced : and impossible it is without this order of proceeding , to enlarge any city or make the same of greater power . example , the romans to enlarge their city demolished alba , and many other towns , and therewith also entertained all strangers courteously : so as rome grew to such greatness● that the city onely could arm six hundred and forty thousand men ; but sparta or athens could never exceed twenty thousand , for that lycurgus had inhibited the access of strangers . a commonwealth that consumes more treasure in the war , then it profits in victory , seems to have rather hindred then honored or inriched the state . a wise captain therefore in his actions , ought as well to profit the republick , as to gain to himself glory . example , the consuls of rome did seldom desire triumph , unless they returned from the war loaden with gold , silver , and other rich spoils fit to be delivered into the common treasury . all foreign wars with princes or other states taken in hand , be either for ambition or desire of glory , or else for necessity . examples , the romans for their ambition conquered many nations , with intent onely to have the obedience of the people ; yet did they suffer them to hold possession of their houses , and sometimes they were permitted to live onely with their old laws . likewise alexander the great endeavored to suppress many princes for his glory , but did not dispossess the people , nor kill them . otherwise it is where a whole nation● inforced by famine or fury of war , abandon their own dwellings , and are forced to inhabit elswhere . example , the g●ths and other people of the north invaded the roman empire , and many other provinces , whereof their alteration of names did ensue ; as illyria now called slavonia , england formerly named britain . a common conceit and saying it is● that money makes the war strong , and is the force and sinews thereof ; as though he who hath most treasure , be also most mighty ; but experience hath apparently shewed the contrary . example , after the death of alexander , king of macedon , a mul●itude of galls went into greece , and being there arived , sent certain ambassadors to the king , who supposing to make them afraid of his power , shewed them his treasure , which wrought a contrary effect ; for the galls before desirous of peace , resolved then to continue the war , in hope to win that mighty mass of money● likewise darius should have vanquished alexander , and the greeks might have conquered the romans , if the richer prince might ever by his money have prevailed . every league made with a prince or republick remote , is weak and rather aideth us with fame then effect , and consequently deceiveth all those that in such amity repose confidence . example , the florentines being assaulted by the king of naples and the pope , prayed aid of the french king , who being far distant , could not in time succor them ; and the cedicini desiring aid of the capuani against the samnits , a people of no force , were deceived . a prince whose people is well armed and trained , shall do better to attend his enemy at home , then by invasion to assault his countrey : but such princes whose subjects are disarmed , had need to hold the enemy aloof . example , the romans , and in this age the swisses , being well armed , may attend the war at home ; but the carthaginians and italians being not so well furnished , did ever use to seek the enemy . the plurality of commanders in equal authority , is for the most part occasion of slow proceeding in the war . example , there was at one time in rome created four tribuni militares with authority of consuls , viz. t. quintu● after his consulship , cajus furius , m. posthumus , and a. cornelius cassus , amongst whom arose so much diversity and contrariety of opinion , as nothing could be done till their authority ceased , and m. ae●ylius made dictator . a victory obtained by any great captain with the authority of his princes commission , counsel , and directions , ought ever to be imputed rather to the wisdom of the prince , then the valor of the captain : which made the emperors of rome to permit no captains ( how great soever his victories were ) to triumph , as before that time the consuls had done ; and even in those days a modest refusal of triumph was commended . example , m. fulvius having gained a great victory against the tuscans , was both by the consent of the senate and people of rome , admitted to triumph ; but the refusal of that honor proved his greater glory . all they that from private estate have aspired to principality , either by force or fraud become thereunto , unless the same be given , or by inheritance descended : yet it is rarely seen , that force alone prevaileth , but fraud without force oft times sufficeth . example , agathocles by such means became prince of syracusa ; john galeazzo by abusing his uncle barnabas , gained the dominion of lombardy ; and cyrus circumvented cyaxares his mothers brother , and by that craft aspired to greatness . sudden resolutions are always dangerous ; and no less peril ensueth of slow and doubtful delays . example , when hieron prince of syracusa died , the war even then being in great heat between the romans and carthaginians , they of syracusa consulted , whether it were better to follow the fortune of rome or carthage . in which doubt , they continued until apollonides a chief captain of syracusa laid before them● that so long delay would make them hated both of romans and carthaginians . likewise the florentin●s being by lewis the twelfth required to give his army passage towards naples , mused so long upon answer , that he became their enemy , and they forced to recover his favor full dearly . to govern a state is nothing else but to take such order as the subjects may not , or ought not offend ; which may be done , either by removing from them all means to disobey , or by affording them so great favors , as reasonably they ought not to change their fortune ; for the mean course proveth dangerous . example , the latins being by the valor of camillus overcome , yeelded themselves to endure what punishment it pleased the romans to inflict . an ingenious and magnanimous answer being made unto wise magistrates , doth oft obtain both pardon and grace . example , when the privernates had rebelled , and were by force constrained to return to the obedience of the romans , they sent certain of the city unto rome to desire pardon ; who being brought before the senate , one of the senators asked the privernates , what punishment themselves did think they had deserved : the same , quoth they , which men living in freedom , think they are worthy of . whereto the consul thus replied , quid si p●enam remittimus ? qualem nos pacem vobiscum habituros speremus ? the p●ivernates answered , si bonam dederitis , & fidel●m & perpetuam : si malam , haud diuturnam . which answer was thought to proceed from generous men , and therefore they were not onely pardoned , but also honored and received into the number of the roman citizens . all castles , fortresses , and places of strength , be made for defence either against the enemy or subject : in the first case they are not necessary , in the second dangerous . for thereby the prince may at his pleasure take occasion to insult upon the subject● when much more seemly he might settle his estate upon the love and good affection of men . example , the castle of millan made by duke francisco ●●orza , incited his heirs to become insolent ; and consequently they became odious ; which was also the caus● that so soon as that city was assaulted , the enemy with facility did possess it . that prince or potentate which builds his severity rather upon the trust he hath in fortresses , then the love of men , shall be deceived : for no place is so strong , as can long defend it self , unless by the love and aid of men it be in time of necessity succored . example , pope julio having drawn the bentivoli out of bologna , built there a strong castle ; the governor thereof robbed the people , and they therewith grieved , in a short time took the castle from him . so after the revolt of genoa , lewis the twelfth came to the recovery thereof , and builded there the strongest fortification of italy , as well for site as the circumstances inexpugnable . nevertheless the citizens rebelled , and within sixteen moneths the french were forced to yield the castle and government to octavio fragosa . to build forts upon places of strength , either for defence of our own , or to hold that which is taken from others , hath ever proved to small purpose . example , the romans having supprest the rebellion of the latins and privernates ; albeit they were people warlike , and lovers of liberty ; yet to keep them subject , built there no castles , nor other places fortified : and the lacedemonians did not onely forbear to fortifie the towns they conquered , but also left their cheif city of sparta unwalled . the necessity or use of fortification , is onely upon frontires or such principal places where princes make their habitation ; to the end the fury of sudden assaults may be staid , and time for succor entertained : otherwise , example , the castle of millan being made to hold the state in obedience , could not so do either for the house of sforzi or france . guido vbaldo , duke of velin , driven from his dominion by caesar borgia , so soon as he recovered his countrey , caused all the forts to be demolished : for by experience he found the love of men was the surest defence , and that fortifications prevailed no less against him then for him . the causes of division and faction in every commonweal proceed most commonly of idleness and peace , and that which uniteth , is fear and war . example , the vejenti and elinsci having intelligence of great contention between the nobility and people of rome , thought that a fit opportunity to oppress the one and the other : but the romans informed of such an intention , appeased all domestick anger , and by the valor of their arms conducted by gn. manlius and m. fabius defeated the enemies forces . the means to usurpe an estate disjoynted is first before arms be taken , to become as it were an arbitrator or a friend indifferent ; and after arms be taken , then to send moderate aid to the weak side , as well to entertain the war between the factions , as also to consume the strength both of the one , and the other , yet in no wise to employ any great forces , for thereby either party may discover the intents to suppress them . example , the city of pistoia fallen into division , the florentines took occasion sometimes to favor the one , and some times the other , that in the end both sides weary of the war , voluntarily yeilded to their devotion . philippo viscount , hoping sundry times by occasion of faction to oppress the fl●rentin●● , did often assault them with great forces , which was the cause that they became reunited ; and consequently the duke deceived of his expectation a great wisdom it is to refrain opprobriousand injurious speech : for as neither the one nor the other can an● whit decrease the enemies force , so doth it move him to greater hate , and more desire to offend . example , gabides a general of the persians having long besieged amida , became weary , and preparing to abandon the enterprise , raised his camp , which they of the city beholding , began to revile the persians , and from the walls reproved them of cowardise ; which undiscreet words so highly offended g●bides , as thereupon he resolved to continue the siege , and within few daies wun the city . tiberi●s grac●hus appointed captain of certain bands of men , whom for want of other soldiers the romans entertained , proclamed in his camp , that no man upon pain of death should contumeliously call any soldier slave , either in earnest or jest . nam fac●tiae asperae quando nimium ex vero traxere , acrem sui memoriam relinquunt . likewise alexander the great having conquered well near all the east , brought his forces before tyre , they fearing alexanders fury , offered upon honorable considerations to yeild him obedience , only requiring , that neither he nor any of his forces should enter the city , which motion after four moneths alexander accepted , and so signified by his ambassador who arriving in tyre was by the proud citizens slain , whereat alexander grew into choler and being ready to forsake the siege , staid his forces , and in the end sacked the city and put the people to the sword . a prince or any other state being assaulted by an enemy of far more puissance then himself , ought not to refuse any honorahle compositions , chiefly when they are offered● for no conditions can be so base , but shall in some sort turn to the advantage and honor of him that accepts them . example , anno . certain florentines procured great forces of spaniards to come thither , as well to reposess the medici then banisht , as also to sack the city ; promising that so soon as the army of spain did come into the florentine dominion , the faction of medici would be ready armed to receive them . but the spaniards being come , found no forces at all to joyn with them ; and therefore wanting victual , offered composition . the florentines finding the enemy distressed grew insolent and refused peace , whereof followed the loss of prato , and many other inconveniencies . the like happened to them of tyre , as before . the denial or delay of justice desired in revenge of injuries either publick or privately offered , is a thing very dangerous to every prince or other state , for that the party injured doth oft by indirect meanes though with hazard of his country and himself seek satisfaction : example , the complaint which the galli made against the fabii who sent ambassadors in favor of the tossani , not being heard , nor any punishment inflicted upon them for fighting against the law of nations , was the cause that the galli were offended with the states , whereof followed the sack of rome ; and the delay of justice in philip of macedon , for not revenging the incestuous oppression of attalus to pausanias , was the motive to murther that king . whoso endeavors the alteration of any state , must of necessity proceed with all severity , and leave some memorable example to those that shall impunge the ordinance of government newly settled . example , when junius brutus had by his great valor banisht the tarquins , and sworn the people that no king should ever raign in rome : within short time after , many young nobles , among whom was brutus son , impatient of the equality of the new government , conspired to recall the tarquins ; but brutus thereof informed , caused his own son not only to be condemned to death , but was himself present at the execution . as health and soundness of the hands , legs , and other outward members cannot continue life , unless the heart and vital spirits within be strong and firm ; so fortifications and frontier-defences do not prevail , unless the whole corps of the kingdom and people be well armed : example , when the emperor came into ●tal● , and had with some difficulty past the confines of the venetians welnear without ressistance ; his army marcht to venice , and might doubtless have possest the city , had it not been defended with water . likewise the english in their assault of france , excepting a few encounters on the frontires , found no puissant resistance within the realm . and anno they forced all that state , and the king himself to tremble , as oft before they had done ; but contrariwise the romans knowing that life lay in the heart , ever held the body of their state strongest : for the nearer the enemy approacht rome , the better they found the countrey armed and defended . the desire to command soveraignly is of so great force , as doth not only work in those that are in expectation of principality , but also in them that have no title at all . example , this appetite moved the wife of ta●quinius priscus contrary to all natural duty to incite her husband to murder her own father servius , and possesse his kingdom , as b●ing perswaded it were much more honorable to be a queen then to be the daughter of a king . the violation of ancient laws , orders , and customs , under which people have long time lived , is the chief an● only cause whereby princes hazard their estate and royal dignity . example albeit the deflowring of lucrece was the occasion , yet was it not the cause that moved the ●omans to take arms against tarquin ; for he h●ving before that fact of sex●us his son , governed tyrannically , and taken from the senate all authority , was become odious both to the senate , nobility , and people , who finding themselves well governed , never seek or wish any other liberty or alteration . a prince that desires to live secure from conspiracy , hath cause rather to fear those on whom he hath bestowed over great riches and honors , then those whom he hath greatly injured ; because they want meanes to offend ; the other have many opportunities to do it . example , perennius the prime favorite of ●ommodus the emperor conspired his death●plantianus did the like to s●verus , and s●janus to tiberius ; for being advanced to so great honors , riches , and offices as nothing remained desirable but the imperial title , they conspired against the persons of their soveraigns in hope of the dignity ; but in the end they endured that punishment which to such disloyalty and ingratitude appertaineth . an army which wants experience , albeit the captain be expert , is not greatly to be feared● neither ought an army of well traind soldiers to be much esteemed , whose captain is ignorant . example , caesar going into africa against afranius and petraeus whose army was full of old soldiers , said he feared them little , quia ibat ad exercitum sine duce . contrariwise , when he went to p●arsalia to encounter pompey , he said , ibo ad duce● sine exercitu . a captain-general commanding an army ought rather to governe with curtesie and mildness , then with over-much austerity and severity . example , q. and appius claudius being consuls , were appointed to govern the war . to q. was allotted one army which served very dutifully ; but appius commanding the other with great cruelty , was by his soldiers unwillingly obeyed . nevertheless tacitus seems of contrary opinion , saying , plus poena quam obsequium val●t . therefore to reconcile these different conceits , i say , that a general having power to command men , either they are confederates or subjects : if confederates or voluntaries , he may not proceed to e●tream punishment ; if subjects , and his power absolute , they may be governed otherwise● yet with such respect , as the insolence of the general inforce not the soldiers to hate him . honor may sometime be got as well by the loss as gaining of victory . every man knoweth glory is due to the victor , and we deny not the same priviledge to the vanquished , being able to make proof that the loss proceeded not from his default . neither is it dishonorable to violate those promises whereto the necessity or disadvantage of war inforceth . and forced promises which concern a whole state , are not binding , and rarely or never kept , nor is the breaker thereby to receive disgrace . example , posthumus the consul having made a dishonorable peace with the samnits , was by them with his whole army sent home disarmed . being arived at rome , the consul informed the people they were not bound to perform the base conditions he was compelled to yield unto ; albeit , he and those few that promised , were bound to perform them . the senate thereupon concluded to send him prisoner to samno , where he constantly protested the fault to be onely his own ; wherefore the people by that peace incurred no dishonor at all : and fortune so much favored posthumus , as the samnites were content presently to return him to rome ; where he became more glorious for losing the victory , then was pontius at samno for having won the victory . wise men have long observed● that who so will know what shall be , must consider what is past ; for all worldly things hold the same course they had at ●irst . the reason is , that as long as men are possest with the same passions with former ages , consequently of these doings the same effects ensue . example , the almains and french have ever bin noted for their avarice , pride , fury , and infidelity , and so in divers ages , experience hath proved even to this present : for perfidious dealing the french have given sufficient proof , not onely in ancient times , but also in the time of charls the eighth , who promised to render to the florentines the forts of pisa● but having divers tim●● received money , held them notwithstanding in possession . the florentines found the like in the almains● for in the wars of the visconti , dukes of milan , they prayed aid of the emperor , who promised them great forces ; in consideration whereof● he was to receive of the florentines one hundred thousand crowns in hand , and as much more when his army was arived in italy , both which payments were performed ; but as soon as the emperor came to verona , he devised cavillations of unkindness , whereupon he returned home . a prince desirous to obtain any thing of another , must if occasion so permit , urge his demand so earnestly and press for so sudden and present answer , as he who is prest may not have leisure to consider how to excuse himself in denial . example ▪ pope julio endeavored to drive out of bologna all the bentivoli in which action he thought the aid of the french necessary , and that the venetians should stand neutral ; and by divers messengers did sollicite them to that effect ; but not receiving any resolute answer , he thought fit with those few forces he had to take his journey to bol●gna , whereupon the venetians advertised him they would remain neutral , and the french king forthwith sent him forces as fearing the popes indignation ; likewise the tuscans having formerly desired aid of the samnites against the romans , took armes suddenly and obtained their request which the samintes had before denied . when a multitude offendeth , all may not be punisht , because they are too many : to punish part and leave the rest unpunisht , were injurie to the sufferers ; and to those that escape , an encouragement to offend again ; therefore to eschew all extremity , mean courses have bin anciently used . example , when all the wives of the romans conspired to poyson their husbands , a convenient number of them were punisht , and the rest suffered to pass ▪ likewise at the conspiracy of the bacchanals in the time of the macedonian war , wherein many thousands men and women had part , every tenth person only was put to death by lot ; although the offence were general , by which manner of punishing , he that suffered , complaind on his fortune ; and he that escaped , was put in feare that offending again , the same punishment might light upon himself , and therefore would no more offend . a battel or great action in armes ought not to be enterprised without special commission or command from the prince , otherwise the general incurs great danger , example ▪ papyrius the dictator punisht the general of the horse in the roman army , for having fought without his consent , although he had in battaile slain enemies without loss of of his own , and caesar commended his captain silanus for having refrained to fight , though with great advantage he might . also count egmont hazarded the favor of the king his master for giving battel to marshall de thermes , albeit he were victorious : for upon the success of that action the loss or or safety of all the low countries depended . to govern without council is not only dangerous in aristocracies and popular states , but unto independent princes an occas●on of utter ruine . example , hieron the first king of sicile in all his proceedings used the advice of counsels , and lived fifty years prosperously in peace , but his grandchild succeding , refusing all counsell lost his kingdom , and was with all his kinsfolk and friends cruelly slain . in all monarchies the senate or privycouncil is or ought to be composed of persons of great dignity , or men of approved wisdom and understanding . example , in polonia no man is counsellor unless he be a palatine , a bishop , a c●st●llan , a captain , or such a one as hath bin ambassador ▪ and in turky the title of counsellor is not given but only to the four bassaes . the two cad●lesquir●s , the twelve beglerbegs , and kings son , who in his fathers absence , is as it were● a president of the divano or senate . many princes ancient and modern have used to select out of their council , two or three or four at most to whom only they did impart their affairs . example , the emperor augustus had maec●nas and agrippa , julius caesar , q ●aedius and cor. balbus , whom he only trusted with his cipher and secrets , being counsellors of the cabinet ( as we now call them . ) the alteration of old laws or introduction of new , are in all states very dangerous , notwithstanding any appearance of profit or publick utility , which moved wise governors to decree , that ancient lawes once established might never be called in question . example , the athenians decreed that no law should be propounded to the people without the consent of the senate : the like use is observed in venice where no petition is prefered to the senate but by advice of the sages ; and among the locrians the custom was that whosoever presented any new law to be confirmed , should come with a halter about his neck , and be therewith hanged if his request were rejected ; also lycurgus to prevent the alteration of his lawes , did sweare the people of sparta to observe them untill his return , and thereupon retired himself into voluntary exile , with intent never to returne . when necessity or good reason moves innovation or abolition of laws , a course more secure it is to do it rather by degrees then suddenly . example , the romans finding the laws of the twelve tables unprofitable , suffered them to be observed or neglected at discretion , but would not publickly suppress them for fear of calling other laws into contempt : so did they continue years , and were then cassed by ebutius the tribune . but agis king of lacedemon desirous to revive the laws of lycurgus , long discontinued , enforced all men to bring in their evidence and writings to be cancelled , to the end a new partition of lands and goods might be made , which suddain and violent proceeding proved so fatal , that it moved a dangerous sedition , wherein he was deposed and with his mother and friends put to death ; which example haply moved the venetians not to attempt any thing against the authority of augustino barberino their duke : but after his death , and before the election of lovedono , the signiory publisht new ordinances detractive from the ducal anthority . whoso hath won to himself so great love and affection , as thereby to become master of the forces , and at his pleasure commands the subjects apt for armes , may also without right or title assure himself of the whole estate . example , hugh capat a subject to the crown of france , being greatly honored by the soldiers , found means thereby to prevent charles duke of lorraine of the crown , being right heire by descent from charlemaine . and albeit the families of the paleologi , ebrami and turcani be of the blood royall and right heires to the turkish empire , when the ottaman line shall faile ; yet it is like that the cheif bassa having the love of the janisaries will usurpe the state , because the paleologi and other competitors be far from the turks person , poor and without means to purchase the soldiers favor . a commander general in armes , ought upon paine of great punishment be enjoyned , not to imploy or retain any forces longer then the time of his commission . example , the dictators of rome were in this point so precise , as never any of them dared to transgress the time prefixed , till caesar obtained that dignity should continue in him for life : which was the cause of his usurpation of the state . also the thebans commanded , that if the general of their army did hold his forces one day longer then the time prefixt , he should thereby incur danger of death : which justice was executed upon epaminondas and pelopidas . banishment of great lords , or citizens of great reputation , hath bin in divers places diversly used : for in the one , they were inforced only to absent themselves without further infliction ; in the other , banishment was accompanied with confiscation , a course of great danger . example , in argos , athens , ephesus , and other cities of greece , the citizens puissant in friends , vertue or riches , were many times banisht for envy or feare , but never or very rarely forced to absent themselves longer then ten years ; and that without loss of goods , which was the cause that never any of them warred against the country : but dion being banisht syracusa by dyonysius junior , and coriolanus from rome , did make mighty wars against their own country . the like was done by the medici in florence . honorable and magnanimous men were wont , not only to enterprise great acts , but also to suffer patiently al injuries which foes or fortune could expose them to : as resolved , that no calamity was so great as to make their minds abject , or to forget the dignity appertaing to persons vertuous : example . after the defeat of the r●man army upon the river a●●ia , the galli persued the victory even to romes walls : whither being come , and finding the gates open , without any signe of resistance they entred the streets , where all honorable palaces were also unshut , which caused the galli greatly to doubt . nevertheless looking into the houses , they found in every of them a senator set in a chaire of state , and in his hand a rod of ivory ; his person was also vested with robes of dignity , which majestick spectacle did marvelously amate the galli not having before that time seen any such reverend sight ; and therefore did not only refrain to offer violence , but highly admired the roman courage , cheifly in that fortune . nevertheless at length a rude gall hapned with his hand to touch the white beard of m. papyrius , whereat he taking great disdain struk him with his rod , in requitall whereof the barbarian slew papyrius , and by that example all the other senators and persons of dignity were also slain . albeit the knowledge and study of letters be both commendable and necessary in all well regulated states ; yet if under so honest pretence , idleness enter , such abuses must seasonably be foreseen and removed . example , when diogenes and carneades two excellent philosophers , were sent ambassadors from athens to the romans , many of the nobility that before disposed themselves to arms , allured with their eloquence and marvellous wisdom , began with great admiration to follow them : and in lieu of armes , turned their endeavors to the studie of letters , which the wise cato discerning , procured the senate to decree that ( to eschew all inconveniences which so honest idleness might breed ) no philosophers should from thenceforth be received into rome . the honor due to magistrates was anciently much regarded , and contrarywise all irreverent and undutifull behavior with great severity punisht . example , the censors of rome degraded a citizen only for having yawned loud in their presence : and another called vectius was slain in the field for not doing due reverence to a tribune when he past by him it is also observed , that the son of fab. maximus when he was censor , meeting his father on horseback , and seeing the serjeants affraid to speak to him to dismount , did himself command him so to do , which command the father cheerfully and willingly obeyed , saying , domestick power must give place to publick authority . tyrannous princes having incurred the universal hate of people , found no meanes so meet to preserve them from popular fury , as to execute or deliver into their hands their own cheef minions and intimate counsellors . example , tiberius delivered to the people his favorite seianus : nero , tig●llinus . henry king of swede committed to their fury his best beloved servant george preston ; caracaella caused all his flatterers to be slain that had perswaded him to kill his brother● the like was done by caligula , whereby he escaped himself . a prince that rewards or pardons a person that kills another prince , albeit by that means he is aspired to soveraignty , shall thereby both incur great danger and hate , and encourage men therein to attempt the like against himself therefore wise princes have not only left such services quite unrecompenced , but also most severely punished them . example . the emperor severus put all those to death that consented to the murder of pertinax ; and alexander the great executed him that slew darius , as abhorring that subject that would lay violent hands on his prince , notwithstanding he were an enemy . likewise uitellius put to death all the murderers and conspirators against galba ; and domitian executed his secretary epaphroditus for the murder of nero , although he instantly desired his aid . the vertuous and vitious examples of princes incite subjects to imitate the same qualities ; which rule never or very rarely fails . example , francis the first king of france , and other princes in divers ages and places , had great esteem of learned men ; and forthwith all the princes , nobles , nobility , and clergy , disposed themselves so earnestly to study , as before that time had not been seen so many and so great a number of learned men , as well in tongues as sciences . contrariwise , alexander the great , otherwise a prince of great vertue , by his immoderate use of drinking , did draw the greatest number of his court and people also to delight in drunkenness . the like effect followed the excessive intemperance of mithridates , king of amasia . the last and not the least considerable , is to observe how great effects devotion and contempt of humane glory worketh in the mindes not onely of private persons , but of kings and princes also , who have oft abandoned worldly profit , honor , and pleasure , to embrace the contemplative retired life . example , rami●us king of aragon , verecundus king of spain , charlemain son of carolus martellus , matilda queen of france , amurath k. of turbay , with many others . imperio maximus , exemplo major . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a e- * commissions determine in presence of him that granted them . notes for div a e- * so henry the of france by puting his courtiers to boordwages was said to make mony with his teeth . notes for div a e- * the author of the epistle dedicatory to the dutchesse of suffolk , prefixt to mr. latimer sermons , ●aith that lawyer● cove●ousness hath almost devoured england . notes for div a e- discipline . notes for div a e- tam bené quam malé facta premunt . mart. the counsellor of estate contayning the greates and most remarkeable considerations seruing for the managing of publicke affaires. diuided into three parts. the first contaynes the meanes to settle an estate. the secund, the meanes to perserue it. and the third, the meanes to encrease it. written in french by one of the ancient counsellors to the most christian kings, henry the fourth, and levvis the thirteenth. translated by e.g. conseiller d'estat. english béthune, philippe de, comte de selles et de charost, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a stc estc s this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the counsellor of estate contayning the greates and most remarkeable considerations seruing for the managing of publicke affaires. diuided into three parts. the first contaynes the meanes to settle an estate. the secund, the meanes to perserue it. and the third, the meanes to encrease it. written in french by one of the ancient counsellors to the most christian kings, henry the fourth, and levvis the thirteenth. translated by e.g. conseiller d'estat. english béthune, philippe de, comte de selles et de charost, - . grimeston, edward. [ ], , - , - , [ ] p., plate printed by nicholas okes, london : . one of the ancient counsellors = philippe de béthune. e.g. = edward grimeston. translation of: le conseiller d'estat. the last two leaves are blank. reproduction of the original in cambridge university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic 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pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the covnsellor of estate contayning the greatest and most remarkeable considerations seruing for the managing of publicke affaires . diuided into three parts . the first contaynes the meanes to settle an estate . the second , the meanes to preserue it . and the third , the meanes to encrease it . written in french by one of the ancient counsellors to the most christian kings , henry the fourth , and levvis the thirteenth . translated by e. g. london : printed by nicholas o●es . to the right honorable richard lord weston , lord high treasurer of england , earle of portland , and one of his maiesties most honorable priuy councell . right honorable : they were the words of the wisest king & best knowing man , pro. : . that where no counsest is , the people fall , and where many counsellors are , there is health : which words he almost reiterates to strengthen that position : chap. . . without counsell thoughts come to nought , but in the multitude of counsellors there is stedfastnesse . and it was the saying of cicero , the excellent orator , and statesman of rome : non viribus , aut velocitate , aut celeritate corporum , res magnae geruntur , sed confilio authoritate , & prudentia . cermenatus lib reg . & rer . &c. cap. . telleth vs , that it was obserued by the most skilfull architectors of the ancient times ▪ the broader and higher they proposed their buildings , the more solide and deepe they layd their basses : so ( saith he ) since none are more eminent amongst men then princes , or beare more waight vpon their shoulders then kings , meete it is they should haue the best counsellors , on whom to leane as vpon a firme and stedfast foundation , to dispose as well of matters which belong vnto state as religion : and such osorius tells vs , lib. . de reg. instit : ought to be maximo ingenio praediti , bonis artibus exculti , longo rerum vsu periti : in historijs diligentissime versati , neque praesentia tantum sagaciter odorantes , sea longe in posterum , quod vtile futurum reipub . sit , coniectura prouidentes . with a gracious king are we blest : with such a councell is he furnisht : who ( as rabanus in one of his epistles informes vs : ) in plaine things search what may be mystical and obscure . in small ( seeming ) matters what may be of moment , by what is neare , to coniecture of things remote ; and out of parts , to gather a whole , by which mature consideration they know as well readily to vndertake them , as speedily to dispatch them : now knowing your lordship to be such an one , namely , a counsellor and statesman , euery way accomplished ; after transferring these remarkeable considerations , for the management of publique affaires ; from the naturall french into our moderne english : and further being most assured , that your greatnesse hath euer bin accompanied with goodnesse , and your wisedome with clemency , it hath bin a great imboldning vnto me , to make a dutifull presentment thereof to your gracious perusall and patronage , not to the purpose that these can be either your direction or instruction , ( as being frequently conuersant in all the passages of this nature ) but rather to expresse such things to your view in our natiue dialect , which i know you to bee most expert in , in the originall . needlesse it were to teach typhis how to steare a ship , or instruct antomedon to guide a chariot , should i apprehend any such ambition , i must necessarily incurre the aspersion of impudence , or expresse such palpable ignorance as might draw me into a iust imputation of folly : but right honourable , such is my modesty , that by studying to bee free from either , i may euade the aspersion of both : onely desiring your lordships best construction of these my weake and vnpolished labours , which present themselues so rudely into your presence , whose more weighty imployments can scarcely allow any retyred houre , to cast a second eye vpon that , ( howsoeuer naturaliz'd ) which ( no doubt ) you haue formerly perused in the natiue . notwithstanding , honourable sir , presuming vpon your knowne gentlenesse and generous disposition , i humbly prostrate my selfe with these my imperfect labours to your most iudicious censure , whose least distaste is able to stifle the hope of the suruiuing thereof euen in the infancy , and whose fauorable approbation hath power to giue it life vnto all posterity ▪ your honours most humbly deuoted edward grimeston . a table of the chapters , and the contents therein contayned . chapter . of the establishment and forme of an estate , and the diuersity of the gouernments thereof . diuers sorts of principallities , a royall , seignouriall , and tyrannicall ; of the commaund of a few , and of a popular estate . chapter . of the aduantages and disaduantages of a popular estate . chapter . of the aduantages and disaduantages of a seignoury or commaund of a few . of the seignoury of venice , and by what meanes it preserues and maintaynes it self . chapter . of the aduantages and disaduantages of a principallity or royall estate . that the subiect hath no cause to desire liberty in a principallity . chapter . a consideration of the setling of the forme of an estate . chapter . of the dependancy of estates one of another . wherein the dependancy of estates one of another doe consist . the markes of soueraignty . chapter . of the forme of estates , according to the right of those which command . chapter . of aduantages and disaduantages of election in a royalty . inconueniences of an election in a royalty . aduantages of the said election . a consideration of the election . chapter . of succession diuersly practised in successions . succession of women . reason why they exclude women from gouernment in some estates . diuersity in the succession of m●les . chapter . of vsurpation , or an vnlawfull command . of the miseries which it doth produce , and the difficulties which are found in it . chapter . of the diuersity which is found among the subiects of an estate . the diuers conditions of subiects , varies the forme of an estate . of slaues . of priuiledged and simple subiects . of strangers . chapter . of the diuersity and distinction of subiects , according to their vocations and professions . the cause of the establishment of comminalties and companies in an estate . that the prince ough● not to crosse them , nor suffer them to attempt any thing aboue their power . chapter . of religion . of the efficacy and necessity of religion i● an estate . of the abuses in religion . chapter . of the meanes held in the setling of religion . extraordinary meanes for the establishing of the true religion . chapter . humane meanes for the establishing of religion . the disposition of people to be considered for the establishing of religion : barbarous people ciuillized . who are properly called barbarians : barbarous in religion . of the authors of most part of religions at this present . barbarians in their forme of liuing ; in their habits ; in their habitations , and in their gouernment . that the manner of proceeding for the establishing of religion , ought to be diuers . prophesie dispo●e●l● a people to the establishment of a new religion : charges and ouer-charges dispose the people to change religion . diuersity of religions . indifferency of religion makes way to a change . a r●uol●e and ciuill warres dispose to a change of religion ; as likewise excessiue liberty , and contempt of religion . the revnion of a countrey vnder the same prince , facilitate the setling of religion . chapter . of the parties necessary for those which will bring in a new religion . parts and quallities necessary for such as seeke to bring in a new religion . that instruction is a powerfull meanes for the establishing of a religion . that the zeale of religion must be accompanied and guided by discretion . of spirituall and temporall powers , and of their iurisdiction . that obseruing of the ceremonies of an ancient religion , facillitates the establishment of a new . chapter . that diuersity of religion is dangerous in an estate : how they ought to carry themselues , to preserue the ancient beliefe , in the diuersity of religions which are crept into the estate . diuersity of religions in egypt . there ought to be but one religion in an estate . diuersity of religions which is dangerous in an estate , ought to be auoyded , yea in the lightest matters . how they ought to gouern themselues to preserue the ancient beliefe , in the diuersity of religions which are crept into the state. of the extirpation of heresie , and a new religion in its breeding , and how they ought to gouerne themselues . that it is not expedient nor fitting to seeke to roote out heresie by armes , when it hath taken footing in an estate . the tolleration of religions in an estate , is lesse preiudiciall then a a ciuill warre . warre agaynst heretickes fortifies their party , and giues them great aduantages . it is dangerous for a prince to arme agaynst his subiects , if hee bee not assured of the euent . a good aduise to weaken the party of a new sector religion . chapter . of the disorders which happen in religion : and of the meanes to preuent them . chapter . of the establishing of the councell of estate : and of the qualities and number of counsellors . of a councell of estate . qualities of counsellors of estate . the great difference betwixt an old counsellor and a young , for that which concernes their aduice : a mixture of old and young counsellors of estate . obstinacy a wilfull vice in a counsellor . he ought to be without ambition , and not depending of any other . irresolution , a dangerous vice , and to be auoided in a counsellor of estate . hee ought not to be too confident . of the change of counsellors of estate . of the multitude of counsellors : who are to be otherwise imployed . chapter . of the plurality of councels of state : of the power of a councell , and of the order in deliuering their opinions . the power of a councell . a consultatiue voice . a deliberatiue voice . equality among counsellors . chapter . considerations for a prince who is to bee councelled . sufficiency and capacity necessary for a prince . of the manner how to demand councell . to receiue councell . to examine it . to resolue and execute it . of the flattery of councellors : and how the prince ought to auoide it . of the truth and liberty which ought to be in a councellor of estate . of the chiefe ministers of estate . a good course for a minister of estate to free himselfe duely of his charge . chapter . of the forme of commanding . of the power . of the law. diuersity of lawes . the ayme and end of the law. qualities considerable in the establishment thereof . of the breu●ty of the law. of the princes absolute command . chapter . what we must auoide in the making of lawes . of the multiplicity of lawes : and the causes thereof . of the obseruation of lawes . of the seuerity . when the prince may dispence in following the lawes . how they ought to gouerne themselues in the seuerity . chapter . of the particular commanders of the prince . chapter . of magistrates . a distinction of the officers and ministers of an estate . chapter . of the difference betwixt officers and commissaries . considerations to be made vpon a commission . of the person from whom it proceeds . of the direction thereof . of the charge of the commission . of the duty of a commissary . chapter . considerations vpon the establishing of officers and magistrates . of the number of officers : that it is more safe to commit a businesse to many , then to one : that the plurality of officers is profitable to an estate . chapter . of the creation and nomination of magistrates . the creation and choice of officers must be made by the soueraigne , and not otherwise . that the charges must be distributed proportionally to the nature and capacity of the person . principall qualities required in an officer and magistrate . the vices and defects are as well to be considered , as the vertues and perfections , in the choice they will make of magistrates and officers . chapter . of the forme and manner of creating and making magistrates and officers : and of the time of their charges . three kinds of creating and making magistrates . the time of their charges either for life , then for a limited time . reasons and considerations to make officers for a time . other considerations to the contrary . change of officers and magistrates necessary in a popular estate . meanes to hinder the vsurpation of the state , by the continuance of officers in great places . the practice of the pope , and the seignoury of venice , in the disposition of the great places of their estates , to hinder the vsurpation . the practise of kings and princes vpon the same subiect . that the change of prime officers and magistrates , is necessary for the safety of the prince , and the quiet of the subiect . prudence required in this change . that they must not giue great commaunds to those that are borne in a prouince . chapter . of the duty of principall officers and magistrates . in what the duty of officers and magistrates do consist . of their duty towards the lawes , towards the examination and interpretation thereof . how a magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the interpretation of the words of the law. in the intention of the law. of the reason of the law , and of the scope thereof . that he must hold himselfe vnto the authority of the law , and not flye subtilties vpon equity . of the execution of the lawes or ordinances . consideration for the sayd execution . from what time and when the law or ordinance doth bind . what they are whom it binds . of the force of lawes and ordinances . of custome . three things requisite to make a custome ; chapter : of the duty of the magistrates towards their soueraigne . wherein the duties of the magistrates towards the pr●nce doe consist . of the princes commaunds : and how the magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the allowing and verifying thereof . the magistrate ought to obey the will of the prince , although it should be vniust . the magistrates disobedience vnto the will of the prince , is of most dangerous consequence . that the magistrate is not allowed to leaue his place , rather then to verifie and publish the vniust commaund of the prince . causes and reasons for the which hath bin brought in the manner and custome to verifie the edicts , ordinances , and commandments of the prince by the magistrates . how the magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the execution of commandments , there hapning a reuocation . chapter . of the duty of magistrates one towards another . three degrees of magistrates , and of the power of eyther of them . the duty of the superiour or prime magistrates . that it is fitting for the prince to indur● the iudgment of the magistrates . of the kings procter . the power of a lieutenant is equall to that of the magistrate . the power of the magistrate is of no force out of his iurisdiction . of two magistrates equall in power ; and of the execution of their ordinances or iudgements , vpon one anothers territories . of the execution of sentence giu●n by the officer of a forraigne prince vpon the iurisdiction of another . of magistrates equall in power . of a body or colledge , and of their power and commaund one ouer another . the difference betwixt opposition and commandment . that they may hinder one another by opposition before the act , or by appeale after the act , but not to comm●nd . chapter . of the duty of magistrates to priuate persons . diuers powers of magistrates : of their duty to pri●ate men in giuing iudgement . of the obedience and respect of priuate men to the magistrate executing his office . of the magistrate wronged . when and how he may be iudge in his owne cause . mildnesse and patience req●ired in a magistrate . prudence and grauity without passion . the duty of magistrates . chapter . of the iustice of commandments . rules and considerations in the iustice of commandments : a mixture of the law with the will of the magistrate : of the temper which the magistrate ought to obserue in the law. of the distribution of offices and dignities , distribution of rewards and punishments : harmony in marriages : harmony in the diuision of goods . chapter . of the setling of the forces of an estate . prouision of armes and shipping : armes offensiue and defensiue . the quality of defensiue armes . that they must not be contemned : they augment courage . the quality of offensiue armes : two sorts of offensiue armes . of the beauty and ornament of armes . chapter . of forts ; and of their profit for the preseruation of an estate . the scituation of forts , necessary and profitable . they must be farre from the heart of the estate . they must be strong by scituation and fortification . great , and in a place where they may be relieued . that they must not neglect the fortification in places which are strong by scituation . chapter . of warfare . of the aduantages of horse and foote . of the choice of souldiers . that they may not vse strangers as little as may be . chapter . of the number of souldiers in ordinary traine bands . two sorts of souldiers . of subsidiaries . an order to practise them in the time of peace ; and to preuent their mutinies . of their numbers . a meanes to draw the subiects of an estate , without charge to the prince , and to hinder the reuolte and mutiny . chapter . of the forme how to make a leuie of souldiers : of the place : of the age : of the stature : and of their vocation . the particular manner of the romans . the danger of mutiny vpon the change of captaines . of the choice the captaine ought to make of his souldiers . of the place whence he should take his souldiers . of their age , stature , and vocation . chapter . of the forces at sea. chapter . of the riches of a● estate . that the power of an estate depends of its riches . what is nec●ssary for the wealth of an estate . wherein the wealth of an estate doth consist . chapter . of the causes of the abundance and wealth of an estate : that is to say , in tillage , handiworkes : and the commerce with strangers . whence the abundance of necessary things doth grow . tillage well husbandred causeth abundance . the cause of the neglect thereof . that it is not vnworthy of a prince . manufactures cause abundance in an estate . an aduice to multiply workmen . three considerations for commerce . of merchandize which we may and ought carry to strangers . of the transport of gold and siluer . of raw matterials . of the bringing in and entry of forraigne coine into an estate . that the course of forraigne coyne ought not to bee allowed . merchandi●e whereof they should hinder the entry . chapter . of the facility of commerce . trafficke at sea profitable and honourable . aduantages which the publique and priuate should receiue , if the nobility gaue themselues to the commerce at sea. an order established by the hollanders , for the continuance of the trade at the east i●dies . the great reputation which they haue gotten by the meanes of trade . a meanes to establish the trade at sea in an estate . chapter . of parsimony or sparing . that parsimony preserues the wealth of an estate . that it imports much for the safety of an estate . wherein excesse doth consist . of the excesse in buildings . the orders which they obserue in flanders & the lowe countries for their buildings in towns. of the excesse in moueables , followers , feasts , and play. chapter . of the setling of the treasure , and ordinary reuenew of an estate . of the ordinary reuenew of demeanes , and of the establishment thereof . that no alienation ought to be allowed ; much lesse ingagements . entries and issues out of the estate . tributes , gifts , and pensions . traffique in the name of the publique . to deliuer money at interest to merchants : and the aduantages which grow thereby . of the sale of offices . the so●rce and spring of their abuses . the inconueniences which grow by the sale of offices . chapter . of taxes ; and of extraordinary leuies , imposts , and loanes . diuers formes of taxes and leuies . of such as are exempt from taxes . of the place where they ought to leuie the taxe . the introduction of tolles , tributes , and imposts . of the valuing of goods practised by the romans : abollished by tyrants . imaginary inconueniences of the sayd valuation of goods , and without reason . aduantages which would grow thereby to the state. of extraordinary leuies . of the mildnesse , profits , and iustice thereof . of casuall impositions . of tolles and impositions vpon suits . of loanes . chapter . of the mannaging and good husbandry of the treasure ▪ that is to say of the regulating of the expence , and of the abatement thereof . of the order of the expence . almes . the charity of the king st. lew●s . that almes neuer impouerish . the dis●harge of necessary charges in the estate . of the wages of officers and of debts . recompences to the discharge of the treasure . gifts and gratifications . establishment of publique houses and se●inaries for the instruction of youth , as well in the liberall arts , as in mechannicke . seminaries of piety , seminaries of honour , for the instruction of the nobility . the profit of the sayd seminaries of honour for the estate . expences for the commodity and adorning of townes and prouinces . cutting off the expences . of the iustice and necessity for the abatement of debts . chapter . of such as ought to be imployed in the mannaging of the treasure . of the choice they ought to make of such they will imploy to gouerne the treasure . the commendable custome of the romans . youth is more fit to mannage the treasure then age. that experience is not so necessary . the duty of a financier or receiu●r . the forme to rule accomptants : and of those which ought to heare and examine their accompts . chapter . of the exchecquer . reasons & considerations which make the exchecquer hurtfull to the publique . reasons to the contrary . necessary considerations to lay vp treasure . prudence , wisedome and discretion necessary concerning the exchecquer . a remedy why the exchecquer should not trouble or hinder the commerce . difficulties for the guard of treasure in gold or sil●er . chapter . of treaties in generall , be it by the enter-view and conference of princes , or by their deputies and embassadours . of the care and mannaging of forraigne affaires . estates are like vnto great buildings , which should haue supporters without . of the care a prince should haue of the affaires of strangers , ●nd●of his neighbours . how ●ee should gouerne himselfe with his neighbours . generall considerations touching the manner of treating . of the enter-view and conference of princes . that there is danger then of the breach of friendship , and of the good intelligence which was formerly betwixt them . that a prince before hee conferre with another , must haue a care not to breede any iealousie or enuy against him , nor to fall into any contempt . the ●onsideration of the place of the enter-view must be great in regard of safety . which of the two princes vn●quall in quality , ought to come first to the place of conference . what princes ought to doe before their meeting , not to giue cause of iealousie to their neighbours . of deputies and embassadors to treat with a prince , and of the choice he must m●ke . the qualities of a deputy and embassadour . of secret treaties , and of the diuers intentions for the which they are made . that he must watch and stand vpon his guard more then euer , when as they propound any treaty , and especially during the said treaty . that a treaty ought not to be held firme and assured , if it be not ratified , by the prince with whom hee treates . of the place where treaties of peace , or a league ought to be made . an embassadour going to a prince to treate with him , whether the prince be bound to treate with him himselfe , or by deputies . of the sitting of embassadours : of the power of embassadours of either side , of the clauses of treaties . that they must haue a care the clause bee not ambiguous . that generall clauses are captious . chapter . of treaties of peace and truce . diuers intentions for the which they make a truce . that they must haue a great care to the conditions of a truce . chapter . of treaties of alliance . of d●fensiue leagues . diuers considerations for the treaty of a league . ordinary causes of leagues . of the time when a league should bee made , and how long it should continue . that the ioynt allies are bound to recouer the countrey of their allie conquered by the enemy . the contribution of a league . of the place where the contribution in money should bee deposited . of the head of the league . which of the confederates should ratifie and declare himselfe first . that an offensiue league and forraigne enterprize doth seldome succeed ac●̄ording to the hope of the allies . of the causes of the breach of leagues . of leagues betwixt meane estates , and of the defects which are often found . of the succours of some against others among the confederates . of the defence of one who is not allied against an allie . of the alliance betwixt princes and vnequall estates , that is to say , of protection . the difference betwixt a pension and a tribute . of protection . of the mutuall duty of the protector , and him that is protected . chapter . of the differences which grow betwixt allies and neighbours : and of the decision thereof . of hostages giuen for the assurance of the passage of a prince , passing through anothers estate . the assurance of a treaty . that it is dangerous for one that is in protection to receiue a strong garrison from his protector , to make him master of his forts , and depositor of the treasure of the alliance . appointing of iudges for the dicision of differences betwixt the allies . of a compromise betwixt allies vpon differences which may happen . of a compromise vpon a possession . when and how a prince ought to meddle to reconcile a difference betwixt his neighbours . chapter . of the rupture of treaties ; and of th● constancy and assurance of the word of a prince in his treaties . the meanes how to fortifie a treaty , to the end they fall not to any breach , pretexts of a rupture . of the obligation a prince hath to keepe his word . that force nor feare ought not to dispence a prince of his word and promise . that the constancy and assurance of a prince in his word is very beneficiall v●to him . chapter . of treaties of n●utrallities . two sorts of neutrallity . aduantages and disaduantages of a neutrallity . that a powerfull prince ought not to leaue a neutrallity without great cause . that neutrallity is more beneficial● vnto a weake prince , then if hee made himselfe ● party . a consideration to depart from a neutrallity . chapter . considerations for a prince , which desires to liue in good intelligence with his neighbours . how a prince ought to carry himselfe vpon the demand which is made vnto him by one of his neighbours of some difficult thing . hee must not bee too credulous of that which princes say , he must fauour the commerce with his neighbours : he must cunningly nourish distrusts and iealousies betwixt them ; to gayne credite with them ; and to testifie his good aff●ction . of the feeling hee ought to haue of iniu●ies receiued from his neighbours . to pierce into the d●signes of his neighbour . of the introduction of embassadours . chapter . of the charge of an embassadour or agent . of the difference betwixt an embassadour and an agent . the quallities and perfections required in an embassadour . instructions for an embassador , how he should gouerne himselfe with strangers , and in a forraigne country . of the priuiledges of embassadours . how embassadors ought to gouerne themselues towards their masters . of their dispatches . part . . chapter . of the parts and conditions in generall , necessary for a prince and so●eraigne . the preseru●tion of an estate consists in the authority of the prince . the loue of the subiect● is the cause of the authority of the soueraigne diuers meanes to gayne this loue . chapter . of the parts and conditions necessary for a prince , to purchase the loue of the people . effects of the mildnesse of a prince . the mildnes of a prince consi●ts in pardoning of offences . of the clemency of a prince . to cherish great men ; and to shew himselfe indulgent . chapter . of the liberality of a prince . two sorts of liberallities . the excesse of a princes liberallity most preiudiciall to an estate . necessary considerations in liberallity . an order to be obserued in liberallity . diuers kindes of liberallity . of liberallity which is giuen to acknowledge seruice and merite , or of free will. that the prince ought to shew himselfe liberall , by gifts and benefits vnto those which may do him seruice agaynst his enemy , yea to those of a contrary party . of the liberallity of a prince to purchase reputation . the manner of giuing . benefits ought to be proportionable to the time and persons . recompences of honour ought to be well husbandred . the princes liberallity towards the publicke . the liberaility of a priuate man towards the publicke , ought not to bee allowed . the princes bounty and liberallity towards the publicke , consists in aduancing vertue . chapter . of the princes iustice. iustice diuided into two parts . wherein the prince should shewe himselfe a louer of iustice , euen in that which concernes priuate persons . diuers kindes of fraud , agaynst the which particularly , the prince o●●ht to shewe himselfe affectionate for iustice. two kindes of violence in an estate , which the prince ought to suppresse . of the grace and pardon of princes towards offenders : and of the mis-fortu●● which many times befall . cases wherein the prince may giue pardon . that the grace and fauour of a prince must extend to the violence which is done vnto the magistrate . of the choice which the prince should make of iudges and magistrates . diuers meanes to make choice of those which ought to be established in the administration of iustice. that the prince should haue a care to to preserue integrity of such as are to administer iustice . diuers meanes to preserue the integrity of iudges . wages of officers . inquiries of their misdemeanors . of compositions made with officers , miscarrying themselues in their places , and of the inconueniences which follow . that a prince hauing pardoned an officer , ought not to leaue him in his charge . of spies in euery prouince , to inquire of the carriage of officers . secret informations practised by king lewes the twelfth , to contayne the officers in their duty . chapter . of the administration of iustice. considerations nec●ssary to a prince , for the administration of iustice. of the order and speedy expedition . of the expence of pleaders : being farre distant from their houses and families . in the vacation of iudges . in the taxe of registers , vshers , and and such like ministers of iustice. in the charges of soliciters , proctors , and aduocates . of the verification of edicts by the course of parliament . chapter . of the reputation of the prince . of the meanes by the which a prince doth purchase authority . of the princes wisedome and vallour . that a prince ought to haue an vniuersall knowledge of all sciences . the meanes to purchase this generall knowledge . the practice of many great princes . of experience . the knowledge of histories necessary for a prince . chapter . rules and necessary instructions for a prince to be held wise . chapter . of deceipt and cunning. that it is lawfull for a prince to vse fraud , cunning and deceipt , and in what manner . diuers kinds of cunning. of distrust . of dissimulation . diuers practises and intelligences of princes in one anothers estates . of equi●ocations , good words , promises , letters , embassies , and lies , to get some aduantage . proceedings of princes , to warrant themselues , and their estates from their enemies , vniust of themselues , but excusable through necessity . chapter . of the reputation of a prince , and of the meanes to get it . meanes to get and entertayne courage and vallor meanes to entertayne himselfe in health . meanes for a prince to purchase reputation . chapter . of the causes of the ruine of an estate : and of the remedies which may preuent it . of the remedies against that which may cause the ruine of an estate . the cause of the ruine of an estate . a remedy against the violence and force of strangers . chapter . of the interiour causes of the ruine of an estate . of the nearest causes of the ruine of estates : more remote causes of the ruine of estates . of the defects of soueraignes which purchase the hatred of subiects . remedies against the cruelty of a prince . remedies against auarice of the prince . of the defects of a prince which breeds contempt ; more dangerous then those which cause hatred . defects in a prince most preiudiciall . chapter . of the defects of magistrates , officers and ministers to a prince . corruption . abuse and bad vsage . that change in an estate is dangerous . a remedy against abuse and bad vsage . reformations . necessary considerations for a reformation . chapter . of the defects in generall : causes of the ruine of an estate . defects and peccant humours in generall of the people . remedies to preserue the estate from these defects and bad humours . chapter . of diuers sorts of hu●●●rs among the subiects according to the diuersity of their conditions . three sorts of persons in all estates . meanes to contayne great men in their duties . of great persons which are allied to the prince . of great men in wealth and reuenewes . of great men which haue force and credit among the people , by reason of their imployment in great affaires , and in gouernments . considerations to aduance some one in authority . inconueniences which proceed by the continuation of one person in great offices . of the poore and needy . a meanes to contayne the common people in their duties . excesse and vsury the principall causes of want and pouerty . chapter . meanes to containe subiects conquered in their duty . to giue vnto subiects conquered , a share in the gouernment of the conquerour . considerations to plant collonies . chapter . of the nearest causes of the ruine of an estate . of conspiracy against the princes person . of the discouery and pu●ent thereof . of the causes , and of the meanes to preuent it . chapter . of treason in places , townes , and armies , and other forces of an estate : and of the remedies to hinder the effects . chapter . of rebellions , and of the meanes to suppresse them . chapter . of factions , and how to stop the effects . part . . chapter . of the increase of an estate , and the enlarging of tow●●s . to increase ours by our owne . diuers meanes to enlarge and increase townes . profit drawes men to liue in townes . the principall cause of profits in a towne . chapter . of the increase of an estate by the procreation of children . of poligamy or many wiues . of celibate , or a single life . chapter . of the ●●p●ifying of an estate by the vnion of anothers to ours . diuers meanes to vnite another to ours . protection of the weaker . gifts and benefits . purchases . ingagements . alliances by marriage . adoption , and election . necessary considerations for a prince who desires to make himselfe great by way of election . chapter . of the increase of an estate by conquest . of the enterprize of a warre . iust causes of a warre . the vndertaking of a warre must be done with discretion , and not rashly . important and necessary considerations before we vndertake a war. considerations for the making of warre . finis . the covnsellor of estate . containing the greatest and most remarkeable considerations seruing for the managing of publicke affaires . part . . of the necessary meanes to establish an estate . chapter . of the establishing and forme of an estate ; and of the diuersity of the gouernments thereof . the considerations which may serue for the mannaging of publique affaires , are of two sorts . some are drawne from generall rules and maximes , the which are vsually followed and obserued in the gouernment of estates ; and the others from circumstances , which fall out in particular occurrents . for as we may not so relye vpon the first that we not examine and exactly weigh the particularities of a busines which may be obserued , be it in the person which must assist ; or in the causes , motiues , means , place , time , and other circumstances : so we must not tye our selues so confidently to these last , as wee desist from the first . if necessity doth force vs sometimes to dispe●ce , it must be in such sort , as we reserue a way to returne againe , and to repaire the businesse . wee cannot prescribe any thing certaine for these la●t circumstances , all in particulars which are infinite , and depending principally vpon the sufficiency and particular experience of him which examines such affaires . many haue written others , some of which suffring themselues to be transported with curiosity , haue mingled doubts and queres more fitting for a schoole , then profitable to make vse of . but my designe in this discourse is , to gather from the ancients and moderns , ( who haue treated vpon this subiect ) that which i haue found most fitting for vse and the present estate . that which they truely call an estate , is no other thing but an order , by the meanes whereof many families and comminalties are gouerned , hauing for their end the good of all in generall . but we may also call an estate , t●ese families and comminalties drawne together vnder o●● gouer●m●nt , and be it in the one or the other sense , we may say that all the generall considerations , which may serue for the mannaging of publique affaires , tend either to the establishing , or to the preseruation , or to the encrease of an estate . for an establishment many things are necessary , whereof some must be setled among our selues , and others with strangers ; as alliances , intelligences , and correspondenci●s , wherein consists the care of affaires abroad . among our selues there must be established and regulated the form● of the estate , religion , councell , the manner of commanding the force , and the treasure , or reuenewes sufficient to satisfie the charges , and supply the defence , of the estate . the forme of estates is diuers , according to the number ; the dependants and the right of those which command , & according to the diuers qualities & distinctions of those which obey . according to the nūber of those which command , estates are distinguished principally into three sorts . the first is tha● , in the which one command● alone without companion , the which wee call principality . the second is that where the most eminent and apparent men ( which make the least part of the estate ) haue the soueraignty , the which we call seignoury . the third is that , whereas the people , or the greatest part of them vnder the name of people command ▪ and this may be called a popular estate , or a common-weale . but euery forme of estate is gouerned d●uersly : so as of principalities one is called royall , when as some one commands according to the lawes of nature , and the lawes of the country , leauing the naturall liberty , and the property of goods to euery one in particular , hauing for their principall end the publique vtility : and in this manner most of the westerne people of europe are gouerned . the other is seignouriall , in the which the prince is made lord of their goods and persons , by the right of armes and a iust warre , or by the custome of the country , gouerning his subiects as the master doth his slaues ; yet not straying from the lawes of nature : and this gouernment ( although it be rough and tedious ) is held lawfull , if the conquest be iust . for where there is a subiect to make warre , they hold that the force is iust betwix● two soueraignes , which haue no superiour to decide their con●rouersie ; and that he may prescribe what lawe hee please to the weaker . in this manner are ruled and gouerned all the people of the east and west indies , of affrick , and a good part of the leuant ; and euen in europe the the muscouites and the turkes gouerne in this manner . the third is vnlawfull and tyrannicall , in the which he that commands , hath no other ayme but his owne priuate profit , and hath no care of that of his subiects ; and for his greatnesse , reuenge , or auarice violates all diuine and humane lawes : so as he liues in continuall distrust of his subiects , and intreates them with all rigour and se●erity against iustice. i say against iustice , for that we may not censure a prince to be a tyrant ●y his seuerity , the which a good prince is sometimes forced ●o practise against the custome of his subiects ; neyther by his guard of strangers , which they entertaine not only for ●afety , but for the obedience , ornament , and attendance of his maiesty : neyther by his absolute commands , the which are more to be wi●ht for of a iust prince , then the flattering int●eaties of tyrants , who draw after them a feare of an ineuitable reuenge . a seigncury which is gouerned according to the lawes , is called lawfull ; as that of venice ▪ and of many townes in germany . but being gouerned by few men , we call it factions ; as that of athens , vnder the thirty tyrants whom lizander established : that of rome vnder the ten men , and afterwards vnder caesar , pompey and cr●ssus , and lastly vnder the triumuirat . a popular estate is also gouerned diuersly . for either the affaires ar● in the hands of the common people ; and then it is rather a tumult and an anarch● , then an estate ; as athens was gouerned ' , after that pericles had taken from the areopagites the power of iudging : or else the pe●p●e r●ferre the gouernment to the aduice of some men whom they haue chosen amongst them ; whose power and charge is limited to a certaine time , to the end that euery man should haue meanes to command in his turne ; or else their offices continue during life , to the end that by this continuation , they may make themselues the more capeable of affaires . in certaine places , and in certaine affaires of importa●ce , or of alliances , peace , or warre , euery one of the people giues his voyce , being assembled altogether in common ; as in some cantons of the suisses ; or diuided by parishes , trades , families , companies , or cominalties , as in old time at athens and rome . chap. . of the aduantages and disaduantages of a popular estate . experience hath taught vs , that wee may subsist in all these formes of estate . but as there is nothing permanent in this world , through idlenesse and negligence the order is many times corrupted , and the state ruined , the which proceeds from the imperfections and defects which are found in all these estates . wherefore he that will settle an estate , must consider carefully of the aduantages and disaduantages which are found in either forme . the aduantages which they giue to a popular estate , is iustice and equallity , or without fauour or respect of persons ; reducing the ciuill constitution to the lawes of nature , which makes vs all equall . thus in cutting off the auarice of some , and the arrogancy of others , loue and friendship is entertained amo●gst them , euery man enioyes the publicke good ; and all being imployed in affaires , this kind of estate is commonly most fertile in great personages : the handy-crafts man by his imployment in offices makes himselfe a great orator and a great captaine ▪ yet many haue held a popular estate to be the worst , and most imperfect of all the formes of gouernment . for this equallity which they so much esteeme , is against nature , the which giues more graces to some and lesse to others : and if it be well obserued , there should be neither magistrate nor officer that should haue supriority aboue the rest : and this inequality ruines f●iendship instead of maintayning it . as for the publicke , there is no estate wo●se gouerned then a popular , there all things are sold as in a faire ( as plato sayth ) being gouerned by men bred vp and giuen to gaine . men most commonly furious , if they be not terrified , and in their feare irresolute in all their actions , nothing secret , and difficult to be drawne together at need ; and whom in many estates , they haue bin forced to inuite them to assemble for the distribution of the publicke mony amongst them . their assemblies are alwaies full of disorders , varieties and inconstancy : the ordinary defects of a multitude . wise men dare not ●peake , fearing the fury of the people , who alwayes lay their faults vpon their gouernors ; and fooles crying out loudest carry it . if you do not hold the people in some feare of strangers , stirring vp some warre against them , they will forge a ciuill ; there being neuer any quarrell or enuy so great , as amongst those which are equall ; be it to supplant one another ; or for that the one cannot liue without the other . the need which they haue one of another , being the principall bond of ordinary friendship : and they are inconstant , being of an humour which cannot continue long in quiet ; vnl●sse there be some number of citizens , who hauing credit ●nd agreeing together , stay the violence wherewith the people suffer themselues commonly to be transported . the suisses , which are gouerned in this forme o● estate , are assi●●ed by the country , to the which no man hath any great desire , and which of it selfe is strong by the nature of the people , who are very grosse and nothing ambitious ; being diuerted from dreaming of innouations by t●eir d●unkennesse , wher●in they spend more of their time , then they haue remayri●g , and would be necessary to thinke of , for the most quarrelsome and bus●e : besides going to the seruice of princes , and by the vnion made among the cantons , who being separated from the soueraignty , one cannot attempt against all the rest , for want of intelligence ; and one attempting against the cantons hee should haue to deale with them all . chap. . of the aduantages and disaduantages of a seignoury . the estate of many lords , seemes to hold a meane betwixt a principallity and a popular estate , being neither subiect to the tyranny of one alone , nor to the confusion of a multitude : and the soueraignty being giuen to the wisest , many see more then one , and few resoluing better then a multitude ; it seemes that this kind of gouernment should be-most desired . and if rich men haue the gouernment , there is no doubt , but the estate wil be better preserued : hauing alwaies bin held profitable , that such as receiued most losse by the ruine of the estate , should likewise haue the greatest share in the gouernment , as hauing the same interest with them of the estate . yet experience hath taught vs , that this forme is not more assured then a popular estate , for where there shall be many gouernours , there will alwayes be diuersity of opinions ; and euery one abounding in his owne iudgement , ( especially such as haue greatest authority ) will finde out occasions of disputes in their deliberations , and breed factions in the estate . their resolutions will be many times discouered , and being profitable to giue the gouernment to one more worthy , if in a principality they are many times troubled to find one that is capeable , with more difficulty shall they picke out many , which may be capeable and worthy of this command . and if they will say that one may supply the defect of another , this would be difficult among equals ; the voyces being numbred and not weighed : and admit this might be done , yet it were not good for the councell , which must consist of a greater number th●n ordinarily the lords are . but for the command which de●●nds vpon a resolution of diuers opinions , of men equal● in power and credit , it cannot well be but in one head . likewise in a combustion and trouble , they haue found that the command of one alone was necessary , and that it was very vnsafe in a time full of iealousies , difficulties , and distrusts to impart the gouernment of affaires to many . the lacedemonians vpon this occasion created their armoste ; the thessalians him whom they called ar●hoes ; the mitileniens their great achimnete ; at rome they created the dictator ; at venice their great prouidator . besides all these inconueniences , a seignoury as well as other formes of estates , is not onely exposed to strangers , but more to the enterprises of a multitude , whom they must content or keepe them in awe by force . to content them without yeelding vnto them part of the estate , were very difficult , and it were impossible to admit them to offices , without danger to change the seignoury into a popular estate , as it happened at rome . to retaine them by force , were no safe thing : and admit it might be done , yet the distrust they should haue of them , would be a cause that in the least warre attempted against strangers , they would make vse of this occasion , to take armes and to shake off the yoake . in this feare the lords durst not traine vp their souldiers to armes ; and entertaining strangers to mannage the the warre , it is to be feared they will get credit among the people . if they giue the charge of this conduct to one of their lords , vpon the fi●st discontentment he shal haue against the rest , or vpon the least ambition that shall creepe into his braine , he will dis-vnite himselfe from them , and make himselfe the head of a party . so as this kind of gouernment cannot safely vndertake a war , without danger of ruine . so whether for the diuision which may grow among them , or for the weakenesse of power diuided among many ; or be it for the difficulty to agree and resolue ; or be it that the subiects many times know not whom to obey ; or for that affaires which ought to be kept secret , are most commonly divulg'd : this kind of gouernment is none of the safest . and that which hath caused the seignoury of venice to continue so long , and to preserue itselfe against the enterprises of the people , hath not bin this order so much , as the policy which the magistrate hath vsed ; imparting some petty offices to the people , yea , and some of the greatest , as that of the chancellor ; contracting alliances with them contrary to the ancient opinion of the roman aristocracy , which forbad such marriages ; borrowing from them to oblige them to maintaine the estate ; disarming them wholy ; giuing them liberty in all sorts of pleasure , to make them pliable ; giuing vnto the rich the right of burgoisie , and choosing some among the cittizens to be made gentlemen , to the end they might liue in hope one day to haue an interest in the estate . and thus satisfying the nobility with honours , the people with rest and commodities , inuring their subiects to warre as little as may be , especially by land ; suppressing speedily all warre with strangers , and factions among themselues , entertaining a neutrality with princes , not wedding any quarrels ; and changing party as their interest change , thus they maintaine themselues . chap. . of the aduantages and disaduantages of a principality . a principality hath its defects as well as a seignoury or popular estate . the first is the change of princes , which bring with them new designes , new lawes , new ministers , new friends , new enemies , a new manner of liuing , and new alliances . the second is the danger of falling into ciuill warres by the diuision of such as aspire to the crowne , especially if there be a right of election : and in the succession , if the prince be an infant , there will be a diuision for th● gouernment betwixt the mother and the princes , or b●twixt the princes themselues . so as they haue beene often forced to auoid this inconuenience , to giue t●● breeding of the child to the mother , and the gouernment of the estate to the nearest kinsman . and if there be a tutor , there is danger lest he make hi●selfe maister of the estate , as hath beene often see●● among the macedonians : if there bee many , th●● are reduced to the inconueniences of many lords . if the prince be young , and freed from a gouernour , young men cause him to commit a thousand disorders , and to reiect all sorts of good councell : and if he ●● warlike , he will hazard his subiects , his estate , a●● person : if hee be subtill and wicked , hee will sett●● a tyranny : if he be cruell , he will make a butchery of his subiects : if he be luxurious , hee will troub●● the holiest marriages of his estate , which is a thing which doth most passionate the people : if he be c●uetous or prodigall , he will be an exacter ; and if he be simple and ignorant , it will be much worse , suffring ●imselfe to be gouerned by men of no merit , who for their owne priuate interest and greatnesse , will attempt all manner of villanies vnder his authority . yet not withstanding these inconueniences , it is most certaine , ( as hath beene sayd ) that a soueraigne commaund cannot subsist , ( to speake prop●rly ) but in one person alone ; as they say that many see better then one alone : but to resolue , to conclude , and to commaund , one will doe it better then many . as for alliances of princes , they doe not alwayes dye with the princes , there being treaties which are made from one estate into another . and in regard of the princes minority , when it happens , the affaires are not alwayes found disposed to ●nnouation ; and according to the occasions they may preuent the mischiefes which happen by this defect . the other inconueniences are rather particular vices of the prince , then defects of the gouernment , and vices dye with the princes person , but●not the vices and abuses of lords in a seignoury , nor of a multitude in a popular estate , for that comminalties neuer dye : but contrariwise as they are perpetuated by subrogation , so by contagion the abuses which enter into these companies , passe from one to another . and in regard of liberty , which is the foundation of other estates , being onely desired to hinder great men from oppressing their inferiours , this may be prouided for by iustice , the which being duly executed in a principality , the people hath no subiect to desire liberty : for that this desire would onely tend to an a●a●chicall licenciousnesse , which would make them mo●e miserable then a iust and lawfull subiection . but that w●ich m●kes the people vnable to iudge of the liberty which is in a iust principality , is that true liberty consisting in not to be wrong'd , no man doth acknowledge himselfe bound to him that doth not wrong him . chap. . a consideration of the setling of the forme of an estate . by their defects and aduantages which are found in these three kinds of gouernments , we may afterwards iudge ( adding thereunto the consideration of the inclination of the people ) of the particular manner of liuing , and of the condition of the people and affaires , the which ought to be setled rather in one place then in another . among men that are equall and impatient of rule , as your sea-faring men be , and such as dwell in mountaines and forrest , by reason of the austerity and roughnesse of their manners and liuing , a popular estate would be more proper then any other . themistocles desiring to settle a popular estate in athens , aduanced sea-faring men , and gaue authority to marriners . cato sayd that the macedonians deserued to be free , for that they could not be restrained vnder the rule of him that would command them . if there be an inequality , one part being richer then the other , and that wealth hath bred some dependance and respect of the meaner sort towards the great ones , a seignoury and gouernment of few may be well established amongst such men . if in this inequality there be a diuision or discord , some being vnwilling to yeeld to others ; and that there be found some one that hath more power and credit , they must of necessity settle a principality . after a battaile lost , or some other disgrace happened , a people being amazed , finding no councell in themselues , they willingly referre the disposition of their affaires to him or them which promise to preserue them . so as in such an incounter it is easie in steed of a popular estate to settle a seignoury or a principallity . as contrariwise , a multitude hauing had some good successe , and growing insolent , it fa●s out that making no a●compt of their lords , they change the commaund of few into a popular estate , or into a principallity , if he by whose meanes , this good fortune hath befalne them , hath credit , conduct , and courage sufficient to make vse of his good fortune . i will adde , that a fearefull and timerous people giuen to their pleasures , little carefull and incapable of affaires , are better gouerned and more happily by a prince , then by any other kind of gouernment . where as contrarywise , a people that is rough , auaritious , presumptuous , and hardy , do vnwillingly yeild themselues vnder a principallity , if it be not very moderate , or altogether warlicke , in the which absolute commaunds are supported by force . it may likewise be sayd , that a principallity is maintayned better in a great estate , consisting of persons of diuers qualities ; and a small estate is more fitting for a seignoury or popular gouernment : for that in a great estate , being necessary to trayne vp the subiects to armes to defend it , it fals out vsually , that he which is master of the forces , makes himselfe likewise master of the estate ; as it hath hap●ed at rome , and in many other common-weales . contrariwise , a prince in a small estate is many times for●ed to become a tyrant ; and so much the greater and s●uerer tyrant , as the extent of his tyranny , that is to say of his country , is the lesse , hauing no meanes to draw from his subiects ( without great oppression ) so much mony as he shall haue need of for his defence , to the which all his subiects would contribute willingly their persons and meanes , if they were reduced to a republique or popular estate . chap. . of the dependance of estates one of another . the forme of estates is diuers , according to the dependance of those which commaund . for although we treate onely of estates that haue all soueraignty ouer their subiects ; yet there are which depend in some sort of another , and others which doe not hold , as they say , but of god and their swords , hauing no dependance of any man. estates depend of another by tribute , duty , honour , protection , or pension . by tribute , when as besides the tribute which they owe to some other soueraignes , the other markes of soueraignty remaine . by duty , when according to some obligation they owe succours to some one , be it in money or men . by honour , when as some soueraigne owes fealty and homage to another , yet with out preiudizing the other rights of soueraignty . by protection , when as some one hath put himselfe into the protection of another to defend him ; whereby he is sayd to depend on his protector . as for a pensioner , he seemes to depend no more of him that giues the pension , nor to be inferiour to him , then the other is to him . for although he seemes inferiour receiuing the pension , yet the other in giuing it , makes shew that h● hath neede of his succours : and when as h●norius treated with the gots , and made them his pensioners . lampadias opposing himselfe , sayd , that it was a paction of seruitude , by the which they made the emperour tributary to the gots . yet i hold that this ought to be iudged by the quality and power of the estates , and by the particular con●entions . for the succours may be so great in regard of the pension , as we might easily discerne who had the aduantage in this treaty , and in like manner if there were any necessity in the one , to doe ▪ that which they had stipulated from him ; and that what they desired of another , were left to his free will : wherevpon knowledge of the cause the first shall be inferiour to the last . the markes of soueraignty which remaine , not withstanding these dependances are , to giue a law to all in generall , and to all in particular , without the consent of any that are greater , equall or inferiour : to institute the principall officers : to make leuies of money and men : to dispose of the principall affaires , not yeelding an accomp● to any man : to giue pardon to condemned persons aboue the rigour of the law : to iudge definitiuely and without appeale , to hold this power of himselfe , and from no superiour : to declare warre and treate of peace ; to dispose of the treasure : to coyne money , to cast attillery , to build fortresses and such like . chap. . of the forme of estates according to the right of those which commaund them . the forme of estates is likewise diuers , in regard of the right of such as commaund : and accordingly their commaund is called lawfull or vnlawfull , as well i● a principality , seignoury , as a popular gouernment . the lawfull is that which belongs vnto vs , be it by the bounty of him which hath power to giue it , or by a iust conquest , or else that w●ich is defer●●d by the lawes , the which hath eyther followed succession , election , or lots . the lot is more proper for a popular gouernment , for that all things are equall ; and they seldome make vse of it in the gouernment of a principallity or a seig●oury . yet saul was made king by lot : and alexanders successours after his death diuided his empire by lot. at venice they draw them by lots which are to choose the principall magistrates . but such establishments are not ordinary . succession and election are the most ordinary meanes to attayne vnto a principallity and seignoury , w●ereof it is necessary ●o know the aduantages and inconueniences , which we may hope for , or feare . chap. . aduantages and disaduantages of an election in a principallity . the election in a monarchy or principallity is dangerous , for the miseries which the interim or vacan●y doth vsually breed , whilest they are about to choose a king , the estate remayning in an anarchy , without lord or gouernour : like vnto a ship without a pylot , which owes his shipwracke to the first wind. for in the meanetime theeues and robers , vpon hope to obtayne their pardon from the new king , commit a thousand villanies : as is often seene the see being voyd at rome , or , as in poland , so as the punishment ought to be doubled , for the excesse which is committed during that time . besides this , in the pursuit of the election , you see many factions , whereof the least is sufficient to ●uine the estate : the which not able to be reconciled , they frame parties , which delay the election , and continue the int●reigne , with the disorders which accompany it . but if eyther party choose whom they thinke good , then growes a ciuill warre , which continues long after . this hath bin seene in the election of popes and emperours : and the empire hath bin voyd eighteene yeares , after that william earle of holland had bin sl●ine . for although ●hat alphonso the tenth king of spaine were chosen , yet he refused this quality , for t●e apparent danger , to take the charge of a● estate , exposed to the will of subiects , to the enuy of princes , and to the violence of the stranger : and in the meane time the wicked exceeded in all villany . moreouer in the election , an ouerture being made of many , if they fall to force , the most cunning and rash would carry it , and the most vertuous would not hazard themselues . if they make themselues competitors , and will containe themselues within the ordinary bounds , he shall neuer be chosen against the hot pursuit of others , who at need know well how to free themselues . and be the election made of one of the country , or of a stranger ; yet there are great inconueniences of either side . among those of the same country , there wil be alwaies icalousie , and the one will neuer obay the other : and although they be not all equall in wealth and vertue : yet they will still presume themselues to be such . if they make choyse of a forraigne prince , his manners being different will not be pleasing : he will aduance those of his country , in whom he hath greatest confidence . if there fall vnto him another kingdome by succession where he may commaund more absolutely , he will leaue the electife to some leiutenant : or if the two estates be neighbours , with the one he will make the other subiect . they will alwayes be in distrust , that he will aduance his country-men , and depriue them of the right of election ▪ and he on the other side , will grow iea●ous of his subiects , if he hath that dessigne : and to purchase their good wills , and reduce them to what he desires , he will giue and ingage vnto them the demeanes and reuenewes of the estate , as some emperours and popes haue done . behold the inconueniences of an election . the aduantages consist more in imagination then in effect : for to say , that they choose the better , it is a thing which indeed ought to be , but cannot be effected , by reason of practises , factions , and iealousies : and withall i will adde , that the peoples ayme , which hath followed this m●anes of election , hath not bin alwayes to choose the most vertuous and wise : but some haue had respected to nobility only ; others to age , as the arabians : others to the greatnesse of the body , as in aethiopia : and the scythians ( if we may beleeue aristotle ) made choyse of him that dranke best . notwithstanding what defects soeuer may be in an election , yet if it be receiued into an estate , it must be maintayned : and they to whom the charge is giuen to make the election must among other considerations adnise to make choyse of a successour , that is vnlike in nature and disposition to his predecessour , to the end that of two diuers dispositions , there may be a well tempered order in the estate , there being no humor , how wel compo●ed soeuer it be , which bends not towards some vicious extreamity , from the which by this meanes they retyre the gouernment of the estate : and withall they grow wear● to see continually one manner of proceeding , the which is neuer so exact , as all the subiects can rest satisfied : so as by the society of one humor some grow distasted , and others are discontented , wherby a disorder may grow . it is therefore expedient by this variety to retayne the estate . yet it is a thing wherof they think least : and we vsually see , that although the election be free ; yet they make choyse of him who naturally should succeed , if he be of age capable to command : and this they do to preuent the enuies and partiallities which the choyse of o●e of another house may breed . chap. . of succession , diuersly practised in successions . the other meanes to come vnto the gouernment of an estate receiued by the lawes , is succession the which is diuersly practized : for the commaund is referred to men and women indifferently : or to men , to the exclusion of women . the commaund which is referred inclusiuely to men and women , hath for its foundation the law of successions , and the equallity which is betwixt man and woman ; yet this is also diuersly practized : for eyther the commaund is deferr'd to women , according to the order and degrees of proximity , obserued in ordinary successions : or only in defect of males , aswell in the direct as the colaterall line , vnto the fourth degree inclusiuely : as it was resolued by the cardinals for the realme of naples , as it appeares in the inuestiture of alphonso of aragon , in the yeare . and of ferdinand in the yeare : and although that this succession of women to the gouernment of estates be receiued in a manner by all the estates of christendome : yet some haue reiected it ; there being no question of the possession of an inheritance , but to commaund a nation : the which seemes to be against the stayednes and modesty which ought to be in that sex ; agaynst the lawes of nature , which hath giuen force and prudence to men ; and against the law of god , which hath made the woman subiect to man. they adde hereunto inconstancy , fragillity , and loosnesse , vices much to be feared in this sex , and ▪ of great consequence in an estate , their weaknes exposed to the force of strangers , and to the contempt of subiects , who will not sayle to calumniate the princ●ss●●f ●he 〈◊〉 marry : and if she marries ( the which is nece●●ary to haue an assured successo● ) it must be eyther to one of the country or to a stranger . she will vnwillingly ●arry to one of her subiects , as well for that she will thinke she ●a●h dishonoured her selfe ; as for f●a●e least her other subiects , eyther equall or greater then he with whom she hath married , would grow into some iealousie ; the which would breed contempt and afterwards disorder . if she marries a stranger , he shal be enuied of his neighbours and suspected by his subiects , n●ither can he hold his life assured to commaund in a strange country , vnlesse he hath forces & forts whereof he is the master . he will likewise commaund the estate ; and the better to assure himselfe , he will aduance his owne , and keep backet those of the cou●try : an insupportable thing to all nations of the world. these are partly the reasons for the which they exclude women from the gouernment in some estates . there are also some diuersities in estates , where as the succession of men to the gouernment is only receiued , aswell for the diuision , as for the order of succeeding . for the diuision some haue allowed it : and in the first a●d second race of the kings of france , it was practized : but the diuision which grew thereby , taught the french , that the commaund ought to be in one alone , and that it could not be diuided without ruine of the estate . the same is at this day obserued in england , scotland , spaine , and hungary . for the order of succession , some haue receiued none but those that were legitimate ; others for want of lawfull i●sue , haue admitted bastards in the direct line , to the exclusion of colaterals . and for the order of succession amongst the legitimate , they haue also found di●●●●s opinions ; aswell in the direct ●ine , to know if the s●nne of th● e●dest should succeed his grand-father to the exclusion of his vncle ; as in a colaterall line , that is to say whether in the succession of a colaterall , very remote , he which is descended from the eldest branch , ought to be preferred to others which are much neerer in degree . the which baldus decided long since , for the succession of this realme , in fauour of the bourbo●s , who represented the eldest branch , tha● of vallois failing ▪ god hath confirmd it , in blessing the armes of k. henry the . with a miraculous prosperity , to attaine to this estate . chap. . of vsurpation , or an vnlawfull command . an vnlawfull commaund is called vsurpation , the which is eyther made by onealone , or by few men , or by the faction of a multitude . that which is done by one alone , is eyther practized vpon a prince , or vpon a seignoury , or against a popular estate : and he which attempts is a stranger or a subiect . i will not lay open the manner of their proceedings , nor the meanes which an vsurper should hold . it is too common a science , and too much practized in these dayes , the which deserues rather to be forgotten then taught , for the miseries which it doth procure , not only to the preiudice of those , whom they may ouermaster ; but likewise to those which are thrust on to such interprizes . for if there be difficulty to prepare the affaires , and bring them to an end , there is no lesse to maintaine himselfe . and it is most certain , that there is more difficulty for a prince which hath vsurped the liberty of another , to preserue him selfe i● his vsurpation , then it is for a multitude which haue recouered their liberty , to maintayn themselues . for if in a people custom to be guided makes most commonly the liberty where into they haue bin setv●profitable , not knowing what gouernment mea●es , nor hauing any vnderstanding of the estate ; like vnto a sauage beast , which had bin fed in a serraile or cage , being once escaped knowes not whither to goe , hauing not beene accustomed to feede like others , and not knowing whither to retire , is made a prey to the first that will captiuate him or inchaine him : yet it is more difficult to settle a principality , for this new greatnesse is subiect to the enuy of neighbours , and the hatred of subiects ; who ioyning together , chase the vsurper more easily away , then he entred into this new estate . whereas a multitude which hath recouered their liberty , hath no cause to feare the hatred of subiects , seeing that all receiue benefit by this enterprize : and the enuy of neighbours is sometimes pacified by the hatred they beare to him whom the people haue expelled in regard of his bad carriage . moreouer in a new common-weale euery man contributes freely , and thinkes that what he payes is for his owne particular profit : yea the greatest contribute willingly , for the desire they haue to attaine vnto some honour by their contribution . contrariwise an vsurper hath difficulty to finde money to maintaine himselfe , and entertaine his estate , vnlesse he vse violence , which doub●e● the hatred of his subiects against him . there are an infinite number of other difficulties proceeding from the new command of a new lord , with whom the people cannot so easily accommodate themselues . so as for the se●ling of this new principality , it is necessary that he reside himselfe vpon the place , to the end he may the better see the disorders , and preuent them speedily . for by this meanes the subiects shall haue more occasion to loue him , or to feare him if they doe ill ; and he that would assaile the estate , will resolue with more difficulty . the vsurpations which are made by many , or by the people vpon their naturall prince , are no lesse vniust ; for that they happen not most commonly , but after the bad gouernment of the prince . they are in some sort iustis●ed by the iniustice of his actions . that is likewise as vniust , which is attempted against a seignoury by the people , the which most commonly growes from the ●niury of the lords against their subiects : who being assisted by some one of the lords , who separates himselfe from the rest to ioyne with them , preuayling in their enterprizes , they commonly change the seignoury into a tyrannous principality . and it is necessary that in all these changes there should be iniustice , and likewise violence : vnlesse the change were made as at venice , the which in the beginning was gouerned by the people ; and afterwards the gate being shut to those which had retired out of the city , and neglected the offices of the estate , vnto those which had them , afterwards they made an estate of many lords , without any iealousie or violence . the same happens vsually in all popular estates , which insensibly change into a seignoury , when as they receiue strangers , and impart no offices vnto them . for these by succession of time e●crease and multiply : and contrariwise the families of he ancient inhabitants being onely imployed in the charges of the warre and state , diminish , so as the gouernment is found in the hands of the smaller number . it hath happned sometimes , that the greatest part of the lords hauing beene defeated in battaile , the people haue changed the seignoury into a popular estate : as the tarrentins did , after the battaile which was giuen against the lapiges , in the which in a manner all the nobility of tarrnetum dyed . finally it is in him that will giue a new forme to an estate , to accommodate himselfe according to the occurrents of affaires , and therein to follow that whereof the people may be most capeable . chap. . of the diuersity which is found among subiects in an estate . bvt this will not be sufficient to giue forme to an estate , to regulate and prescribe the number , with the right and dependance of those which ought to commaund : you must likewise haue a care to the diuersity which is found vsually among those which must obey , according to the which they must many tunes carry themselues diuersly . but for that it would be too long a s●arch to examine particularly the diuers qualities of subiects , it shall suffice to make mention of those chiefly which serue in the gouernment . the first distinction of subiects is , that they are all free or bond-men . the bond-man is he whom the right of warre hath made subiect , or that is borne of a father that is a bond-man . in old time the masters had power of life and death ouer them : but the cruelty they vsed , caused this power to be cut off . in the end christianity hath abolished it am●ngst vs , for the charity which ought to ●e among men , and by this meanes hath preserued estates from an infinite number of dangers , whereunto they were subiect ; for that bond-men being ill i●treated , might fortisie an alteration , or attempt themselues , as spartacus did . wherefore some of the roman senate desiring to diuersifie the habite of bond-men from such as were free , one of the wisest senators let them know the danger , if the bond-men came to number themselues : for they will soone fre● themselues of their masters , for the facility they should haue to co●●pire by the signe of their habits : yet some v●der colour ●f making priuate men to be better serued , and to cut off the infinite number of vagabonds , idle persons , and bankrupts , who after they haue consumed their estates , pay the world with nothing ; haue held it fit to bring bond-men into an estate . but this is so farre from hindring and cutting off the number , as it would augment that of theeues . for a bond-man hauing once escaped , will be alwayes forced , ( not daring to shew himselfe ) to retire among theeues : and he is no wife politician that chaseth theeues out of an estate , but he that keepes them from entring . in regard of free subiects , some are priuiledged , simple subiects and bound to all the lawes : others are priuiledged and exempt from somè one : some for their age , others for their sex ; some by particular fauour , or by the prerogatiue of their charge and vocation ; and others are bound to some duties of honour or assistance more then the rest ; as feudataries and vassals . of simple subiects , some are originaries , the rest are strangers . the originaries are those which are borne in the estate , enioying all the lawes . as for strangers , they are intreated diuersly in the world . for they draw some eyther to people the country , or townes newly built ; or to weaken their neighbours , or to gaine good wits , who may serue eyther for traffique , or in the war , or for the instruction of youth , and in this cas● they are most commonly priuiledged . others come of themselues , eyther for that they are chased out of their countrey , or with an intent to benefit their estates . in this case they are so farre from being priuiledged , as all liberty to dispose is taken from them ; and dying , that which they haue accrews to the prince and state , if they haue no heire remayning there . behold the diuersity of their conditions which obey , diuersifying the gouernment . but the forme of the estate may be also considered by the diuision they mak● of subiects , according to the diuersity of their vocation or profession . chap. . of the diuersity and distinction of subiects , according to their vocations and professions . in many estates the subiects are distinguished into three orders : as in france , into that of the clergy , the nobility , and the third estate which is the people . this distinction is followed in a manner throughout all europe , and taken from that of the ancient gaules , who were distinguished into drindes , horsemen , and the common people . in aegypt there were labourers , priests , shepheards , men at armes , and artizans . the arabians were diuided into priests , men at armes , and labourers ; who made three distinct bodies . in some common-weales they haue beene distinguished otherwise , as at venice , into gentlemen , cittizens , and common people : and the gentlemen into ancients , new and last , or more new : yet this last distinction makes but one body . at florence they had the great , the popular , and the populace . but among all distinctions those are very considerable , which are reduced vnder certaine bodies , colledges , and comminalties , whereof some are religious , as conuents , abbies , and chapters : others are politicall and ciuill , ordayned eyther for commerce , or for the safety of a towne or countrey , or for councell and iustice. other commina●ties are composed of trades and artizans , diuided by brotherhoods or companies ; the which numa brought first into rome , to quench the faction of the sabins and romans , and to re-vnite these two people into one , taking away the first diuision by this second distinction ; which being reduced into many parts , mi●gled one with another , was much lesse da●gerous . and afterwards tarquin the proud , to take away all signes of this ancient diuision , mingled their ensignes . the like course hath bin followed to re-vnite the estate of genoa , afflicted at one time by many diuisions : that is to say , by the gnelphes and gibelins ; the nobility and the people ; and that of the adornes and fregoses . for to vnite the people diuided into so many factions , they made a mixture of the one with the other , in making a department of twenty eight families , vnder the which they reduced the rest ; although they carryed not the name of the family , neyther were formerly of the same party . in other estates they haue diuided the people by parishes or quarters : and in other by families . the subiect for settling of such and the like diuisions of the people , must be eyther to let them vnderstand more easily the soueraignes command , o● to retire from them their approbation or aduice , vpon some proposition that is made vnto them : or for that factio●s haue already brought in such distinctions , as they are forced to countenance and allow them : or else as numa did , to take away the name of a distinction more preiudiciall to the estate : or to ease the prince of some part of his care : or to giue assurance to the people of good vsage , in making choise of a good number among them , for the mannaging of affaires which concerne them in particular : and these diuisions are very considerable , as also their power and aut●ority with the people , and their dependance of the prince their soueraigne , as making a part of the forme of the estate . for insome estates the soueraigne cannot resolue any thing of importance , without these comminalties , or some of them : as the king of poland without the senate . in others he resolues ; but his resolution must be allowed by them , to the end it may be imbraced by the people . in others he resolues in certaine things in the which the comminalties haue but one voyce : as likewise in certaine things the comminalty resolue without the soueraigne . but as the soueraigne ought to establish this temper in the soueraignty , according to the disposition of affaires and persons : so being once setled , he must haue a care not to crosse it vns●asonably ; lest that in shewing himselfe a concurrent in some things , he make himselfe by the same meanes equall to his subiects , whereof this comminalty is composed , which will be alwayes supported by others . as in like manner he must haue a care that they attempt not any thing that is aboue their power , hindring them vpon the least occasion ; and in the beginning : for it is the ordinary of such companies , to vsurpe as much authority as they can , and to grow bold by sufferance . chap. . of religion . after the establishing of the forme of the estate , the most considerable is that of religion : for it is the cause of good order and good fortune ; and fortune the mother of good successe : and so she is not onely the foundation , but the cause of the preser●ation and greatnesse of the estate . although a people vnable many times to be restrayned but by feare , yet there is not any thing more naturall , nor more iust , nor of greater efficacy in the minds of men , then that which proceeds from the reuerence which we owe vnto god. and whereas the feare of god is wanting , of necessity the estate must run to iuine ; or it mu●t be supported by the feare of a prince , who supplies this defect : who although he were such a one , ( the which is difficult ) yet this prince fayling , the feare would likewise be wanting , and by consequence the obedience ; for for that the successor can seldome inherite this authority which dyes with the person . moreouer many things presenting themselues in an estate , which he must doe , or hinde● , and which cannot be perswaded by any reasons which may be alledged , men by their insufficiency not able to satisfie themselues ; and force on the other side being a dangerous instrument handle , which doth harme as soone as good , the authority of man being not powerfull enough , we must of necessity haue recourse to the authority of religion , which amongst people fearing god hath no reply . wherfore most men which haue desired to effect some great and extraordinary matter ▪ haue made vse of this meanes , as the most powerfull , were it for the setling of estates , or for the reformation . which is the reason that in most part of religions they obserue infinite acts of policy , the which the people would easily flight ouer , were they not restrayned by the respect of religion . this care then for the setling of religion , is one of the chiefe in the estate , for that it ought to be established with all purity , and without abuses : and where we shall finde any brought in already , we ought to cut them off ; whereof the principall are diuersity of opinions , blasphemy , carelesnesse , and superstition . we will first treate of the chiefe meanes which haue bin obserued in the setling of religions . chap. . of the meanes held in the establishing of religions . the establishment of religion is eyther made by extraordinary meanes , exceeding the discourse of man , or by humane courses . the first haue not bin imployed but to settle the true religion ; and the latter haue serued as well to settle superstition and impiety as the truth . the extraordinary meanes are miracles and martirdome ; euery man perswading himselfe that the constancy they seein one that suffer's , cannot proceed but from the particular assistance of god. for although that in paganis●ne , they haue seene many murtherers of tyrants , and others of all conditions , which haue endured vnspeakable torments with great patience : yet one age of christianity would furnish many more examples , then all the time that paganisme continued . this constancy then which cannot be attributed but to a diuine assistance , euery man thinkes he hath reason to beleeue , that what they say that suffer so constantly , proceeds from god , and is true . as for miracles , some are reputed such , for that they are contrary to the common order of nature ; and others for that they are against the common opinion , who iudging one thing impossible or difficult , makes him to seeke by prayers , vowes , and promises , succours from aboue , the which succeeding according to our desire , we take the euent for a testimony of his power , whom as god we haue innocated to our succours , and begin to acknowledge him for such . adad king of the azimites , a people beyond aegypt , hauing promised to make himselfe a christian , if he wone the victory against the king of the homerites , who for the most part were iewes ; hauing obtained it , he sent to demand bishops and doctors from the emperour iusti ▪ nian , to instruct him and his people , who sent him marcionarius from alexandria . clouis after the battaile wone against the germans neare vnto cullen , made himselfe a christian , with the remainders of the french , who had not yet imbraced the christian faith ; according to a vow which he had made before the combat , the which he held very dangerous for him ; and thus he established the christian religion among the french , disposed thereunto by this victory , the which being vnexpected by them , considering the great number of their enemies , they could not attribute it but to his power , to whom their king had made a vow . chap. . humane meanes for the setling of religion . as for humane meanes they depend partly vpon the disposition of the people , amongst ▪ whom they meane to settle religion , and partly of the quality of such as desire to establish it . for the disposition of the people , the first consideration we must make , is of their disposition . for some are barbarous ; others ciuillized . we call them commonly barbarous which gouerne not themselues as we doe , and according to our opinion . so the grecians , and afterwards the romans , called all other nations barbarous , although that asia had ciuillized the grecians , and the grecians had taught the lawes and sciences to the romans . by the like fotly there are some italian writers , who speaking of the germans , french , and spaniards , call them by this name ; although there be not any of these nations that yeelds inciuility or policy to italy . our meaning is not to extend barbar if me so fatre , but to call those barbarians , in whom is obserued a bru●ishnesse , ignorance , stupidity , and an insupportable rudenes of manners , bei●in religion , or in their manner of liuing , and apparrell , or in their habitation , or in the form of their gouernment . of barbarians in religion , some acknowledge not any diuinity , and yet they are giuen to enchantments and sorceries : as some historians write , that anciently the huns were , when they came foorth of their country ; and that many of those northerne people are yet . and in america the brasilsens and creimeques . others haue some kind of religion or rather superstition , but so farre from reason , as it is no difficult thing to confute it . others worship a plurality of gods , yet not acknowledging any one for the soueraigne creator . others acknowledge a creator , but they worship the sunne for a creator , or some other creature , as in cusco and mexico , and these two last kinds of barbarians haue their ceremonies , feasts , and solemnities , better regulated then the two first . there are others which adore idols , whose sacrifices in like manner are ordred . besides these we may hold for barbarians , such as haue another foundation of religion then we haue . there is a rabby , which writes that there hath bin foure law-giuers , which haue diuided the vvorld by their opinions , from which most part of regions at this day proceed . the first is moses , the second iesus christ , the third mahomet , and the fourth manes : and this man supposing two principles or beginnings , the one good and the other bad , and attributing the superior part of the vvorld to the good , who can do no euill , and therefore ought not to be prayed vnto ; and the lower part to the bad , to whom they must addresse themselues to preserue them from euill , is held to be the author of that abhominable adoration of the diuell , receiued in a manner throughout all the indies , where he hath sowed his poyson . of these foure beliefes , the christian faith being the only true , we may call the rest barbarous . barbarisme in the forme of liuing , is limited by vs in those which line like bruit beasts , without any manuring of the land ; and either seed vpon wild beasts or of mans flesh : as the ' popians in america , barbarisme in the manner of their appa●rel● , consists in the nakednesse of the whole body , or the greatest part thereof as is seene in the east and west indies , and in part of affrica . we hold the habitation barbarous , not onely of those which haue no certayne place of dwelling , creeping into hollow trees , or on the top of them , or into caues , as they find commodity ; whether they liue separated or in company : but also of such who like vnto the tartarians , dwell in the fields vnder tents , or in their wagons , changing place according to their pleasure . as for barbarisme in gouerment , it is obserued by the want of heads , order , and policy , where they choose no commanders but in time of war , like some people of america . by this diuersity of barbarisme , it is easie to iudge that the manner of proceeding for the setling of religion , ought to be diuers . for it is certayne , that they which by their manner of liuing are more like to beasts then men , ought to be made capeable of humanity ; and that to such as by their nakednesse , shew that they know not what belongs to honesty and shame , they must first teach them to know it , before they seeke to make them comprehend what religion is . in like manner they which wander , scattered and dispersed one from another , must be drawne together into comminalties and policy , so farre as their nature will beare it : and they which wander sometimes in one place , and sometimes in another , must be stayed and setled in a certayne abode , to haue commodity to instruct them . then comming to their superstitions , where they may confute the absurdities by serious reasons , if they be capeable ; or by iests and scoffes they shall make them grow into contempt of their opinions , falling first vpon those whose foundation is weakest . if there be any thing good in some point of their opinions , or that hath any conformity with the religion they meane to establish , o● i● indifferent ; they need not feare to alow of it : contrariwise this may serue for the setling of true religion . s. paul at athens tooke occasion to speak of iesus christ vpon the altar , which was dedicated to the vnknowne god. the apostles to gayne credit among the pharises ( who made the greatest part of the iewes ) spake dayly of the dead : the which the pharises heard the more willingly , for that in the beleese of this article the sad●●es were opposite vnto them . it hath much auayled for the setling of the catholique religion in america , to finde amongst those idolaters certaine ceremonies , which in the outward shew doe much resemble those of the catholique . the nu●nes of the sunne at cusco , a towne of peru , made certayne cakes of the flower of mahis , mingled with the blood of white sheepe , which they offered in sacrifice , and of this cake they gaue a peece to euery stranger that was present , who eate it in signe of alliance , confederation and deuotion to the inga ; and promised neuer to doe or say any thing against the sunne or the inga : and this solemnity was performed twice in the yeare , in september and december . processions at mexico were in vse : and in peru there were priests , destinated to heare confessions after the manner of penite tiaries . they counterfeited the mystery of the trinity , worshipping three statues of the sunne , the one they call , the ●ather sunne , the second the sonne sunne , and the third the brother sunne . in like manner they had three images of cu●que ●ig●a , which is the god of thunder , the which they distinguished in like manner by father , sonne , and brother . they likewise made vse at nicaraqua of a cro●●e , which was there worshipped to obtaine raine . finally , these exteriour confor●●ties , although applyed to a bad vse , haue beene great preparatiues to imp●oy them to better vse . so must part of those which haue sought to settle some new religion , haue desired rather to borrow the name of the establishment from the ancient , or from the reformation , then to terme themselues authors of a new opinion ; which in a poynt importing the saluation of man , vnder this name of nouilty had beene suspected . and mahomet himselfe , although farre from the beleefe of christians , yet ●not to discontent them , except the principall poynt which is the diuinity of iesvs christ ) hath spoken of h●m with great reuerence : and in regard of him , he sayth , that he was come to reforme that which his disciples had innouated in the law of iesvs christ . prophesies and predictions which may haue some referrence to the setling of religion , doth likewise dispose the minds of those that are to receiue it . the promise of sending of the messias , stirr'd vp the minds of the iewes to acknowledge iesus christ to be he which had beene promised . and the oracles of the sibylles was a great meanes to make the gr●cians and other gentles acknowledge that he was the sonne of god. mahomet falsifying the passage by the which iesus christ promised● to send the paraclet or comforter , sayth , that it was of himselfe , that iesvs christ meant to speake . in many parts of america they had many predictions and prodigies , which fore-ran the comming of the spaniard , and prepared them to change religion . heauy burthens and rigours , be it that they proceed from the gouernment , or from religion , may dispose a people to a milder religion , if they thinke to be releiued by this meanes . boni●a●● , arch-bishop of mentz , laboured much in preaching to them of turnigia , to make them christians ▪ and in the end not able to win them by the hope of eternall life ; but hauing demaunded of him if making th●●●elue : christians , they should be freed frō the 〈◊〉 they payd the king of hungary ; he promised and vnder his leading hauing vanquished the hungarians , they became christians . the yoake of the kings of peru and mexico , insupportable to their subiects , made the conquest of those countryes more easie to the spani●rds , and likewise the adu●ncement of christian religion much more mild then the superstition , to the which the diuill had subiected those nations . the hebrewes which wer in aegypt , being miserably intreated , yeelded easily to the religion which moses taught them , vpon the promise he made to lead them into a land abounding in all things : although that afterwards forgetting their misery , they return'd somtimes to idolatry . the diuersity of opinions in the religion rece●ned , may open a gate to another which they would establish ; for that from this diuersity growes incertainty in the mindes of men ; whereby if another be presented , better accompanied with shew , it is more easily receiued . nothing did so much fauour the opinion of mahomet in asia and affricke , as the diuers heresies which were then crept in●o ●ll the le●ant : especially those which concerned the trinity , and the nature of iesus christ ; as that of n● mahomet●●es , nestoriens , and ariens , and the do●●ts which grew of eyther side vpon this subiect : but mahomet ●o free himselfe from these , found no shorter come , then to deny the deity of iesus christ , and by 〈…〉 to ouerthrow the beleefe of the trinity : but that which he●pt most to the aduancement of this 〈◊〉 was , that he did accommodate the rule he made for man●ers to s●nsuality , o●er-ruling whatsoeuer concerned christian or iewish authority , and forbidding nothing 〈◊〉 that which the arabians and southerne people , among whom he liued might well forbear● ; as wine . likewise to recei●e all sorts of of opinions indifferently , as they doe in china , may greatly helpe to the bringing in of a ●ew religion , for the liberty there is to treate openly without feare of blame ; the which is likewise fau●●red by the incertainty of mens minds , which is ordinary in this multiplicity of opinions . reuolts and ciuill warre doe likewise dispose a people to receiue a new religion , as well for that force helps the establishment , as for that the head of a party may countenance his armes with this pretext , and by an opinion diuers to that of others , hold those of his party more firme vnto him , and better vnited among themselues : which is a consideration which tacitus ( speaking like a pagan ) sayth that moses had in the settling of his religion among the hebrewes . an vnrestrayned liberty among a people somewhat ciuill , and to open a contempt of religion , dispose them no lesse to receiue a new , then too great rigour and austerity . for besides that man hath in him some certaine seeds of piety , the which he cannot long suffer to lye vn●iuitfull , so as he degenerates sometime rather into superstition then religion : the contempt of god brings with it so many other inconueniences in a society and ciuill connersation , to the which the magistrate cannot prescribe a remedy ; as the first which presents it selfe with a shew of sanctity , and a desire of reformation , is well entertayned and heard by a●l men : and his opinion is the better receiued , for that the contempt of the ancient giues him place in the minds of men . so the opinion of homer in the law of mahomet , being growne into contempt among the persians . ismael sophy setled that of hally , fill'd with many austerities and ●eremonies . and in the christian religion , god hath frō time to time raised vp great personages , to restore it by the holinesse of their liues , and their good examples , when as it seemed most contemned and reiected . it is likewise no small aduantage for the aduancement of a religion in a great extent of country , to finde it revnited vnder one prince , as the christians did the romane empire : for the example of the prince and the chiefe about him , which they may gaine , drawes all the rest suddainly after him : whereas if the country were deuided into many estates , there would be as much trouble in the one as in a great empire . moreouer great courts are more ciuill , and more diuersified with men of diuers sorts of condition , of which they may draw a good number , fit to receiue a new opinion . the facility they haue had to conuert the mexicains , and peruans , reduced vnder great kings ; and the difficulty there is yet to conuert the brasilians and cicimeques , which haue not any , witnesse it sufficiently . these are the principal encounters which may dispose a people to receiue a new establishment . but with this disposition the quality of those which seeke to bring it in , and the course they meane to obserue , must be proportionable . chap. . of parts necessary in those that will bring in a new religion . many parts are necessary in such men : but the principall are authority and credit , courage , knowledge , or sufficiency of wisedome . the authority or credit , growes either from dignity , sanctity or force ; for the dignity it is certaine that the example of princes and great men , strikes a great stroake in such establishments ; and the more if they themselues become ministers and labourers in such actions by publique exho●tations . ysaphat , so●ne to asa king of iuda , sent priests with some of the chiefe of his court , throughout all the prouinces of his estate , to make them receiue the law of god. osuala king of northumberland , desiring to bring the christian faith into his estate , demanded a pr●acher from douvald king of scotland , who sent him aydan : who being ignorant of the saxon tongue , this king serued him for an interpreter to his people . the like in the time of our fathers did the king of congo in affricke , seruing as an interpreter to certaine religious men , whom emanuel king of portugal had sent vnto him to preach the gospell . godscald , prince of the vandales , who depended of aldembung , deliuered vnto his people in the country language , that which the priests and bishops had preached in latine . iagellon , great duke of lituania , hauing made himselfe a christian to be king of poland , in the yeare . took such a liking to this religion , as he himselfe preached to the lituanians to conuert them . some haue written , that sicebueles king of the visigots , conuerted by exhortations fourescore and ten thousand iewes , for the which in the decretales he is called most religious . we must not doubt but the authority of moses , who was a great captaine , and had made war long against the aethiopians for the kings of aegypt , did assist him much to free the hebrewes from seruitude , and to make them receiue the true religion . holinesse of life is so corrupt and licensious an age , giues credit to him that makes profession . this meanes is particular to iesus christ and to his apostles , who being borne of an abiect condition according to the world , haue aduanced themselues by their holy and miraculous actions , aboue the greatest powers of that time . ismael sophy was desirous in the establishing of his opinion , to make vse of this voyce : but force and other humane meanes , haue contributed more then his exteriour deuotion . they which could not imitate his sanctity , haue bin forced to purchase to themselues authority , to suppose miracles and dreames , and after the manner of min●s , sertorius , and other law-giuers of times past , make the world beleeue that they had a particular communication with god , as mahomet did , who had tamed a pygeon , the which came picking in his eare before the people , to the end he might perswade them by this shew , that the holy ghost changed into a doue , did suggest vnto him the fooleries of his alcoron . but among the demonstrations of a holy life , nothing doth so much draw the people as austerity , to the which the commons will hardly beleeue , that any man will submit himselfe , for ambition , vanity , or lying . and yet ●here haue bin phylosophers in times past , which without any deuotion haue affected it , to giue credit to their opinions ; and many times the ambition of such men is greater , then of such which openly contend for crowns and kingdomes : the first doing like men that row , which turne their backes to the ports where they desire to arriue . as for force , it is of all the meanes by the which a man may purchase authority , the most powerfull ; the rest without its assistance succeeding seldome . yet we haue found by experience , that it hath bin of small vse in the setling of religion , if the force hath not bin such as it can receiue no tollerable opposition , and that the minds of men haue not bin formerly disposed to change : and yet withall this , we find not any example , vnlesse it be in some petty estates . charlem●ine , who sought to imploy it agaynst the saxon , without this preparation aduanced little , although he ioyned prudence with instruction to force , for the setling of the christian religion among those people : and after he had attempted all meanes , for his last remedy , he was forced to transferre a great number of them , into flanders and brab●nt , and to draw from thence christians to mingle amongst the idolators , which remained in the country , and continued there long after . the turke ●ath done the like , hauing drawne many of his religion which were in asia , to plant them in europe , and transported a great number of christians which were in europe into asia . and yet we see that hitherto the turke hath wholy expeld the christian religion out of his estate , although he hath imployed many other meanes . hence we may conclude , that if with force , which receiued no opposition , he could not preuaile ; it is a meere madnesse for certaine men ignorant of the affaires of the world , to propound to make vse of force against those , who fortified with intelligence among themselues , and good conduct , may not only defend their opinion by force ; but also indanger the sume of the estate . but reseruing to treate more particularly of this question hereafter , i will come to another kind of force or constraint , which depends vpon the authority of the magistrate , and concerne● the punishments and burthens , and the exclusion of hereticks and infidels from honors . as for punishments , it workes no greater effect then armed force , which is vsually ioyned vnto it ; and sometimes these punishments borne with constancy , produce a contrary effect to that which was expected ; as we will relate more particularly hereafter the reasons . as for heauy burthens , although they seeme more mild , yet we may well feare the inconuenience . from the example of martyrdome , which is in punishments , if they conuert not speedily , heauy burthens ruines them by little and little . st. gregory writing to bishop ianvyer , for the conuersion of the pessants of sardinia , aduiseth him to charge them with taxes and labour . in spaine they haue done the like with the moores , who not withstanding haue multiplied . the turke , besides the exclusion from honours , which is a meanes ioyned to that of heauy burthens , practizeth the like with the christians , taking tribute of their owne children . charlamaine vsed it against the hungarians , after that he vanquished them , leauing the idolators nothing but their liues , and giuing their goods to such as would become christians . sometimes the exclusion from honours , without any heany burthen , hath preuailed much for the conuersion of great men , and of a meane condition , among a people ambitious of honour . ingo prince of the vmides , receiued none to his table but such as made profession of the christian religion , preferring the meanest before the greatest of another religion . sufficiency consists in the knowledge and ability to instruct and dispute . instruction is made eyther by word or writing : and that which is done by word , is eyther publicke or priuate , in such places where they feare that the beliefe , which they seek● to establish be not allowed in the beginning ; or when as they desire to winne some great man , whose example may serue for the conuersion of others . they vse priuate instructions , as a preparatiue to publicke , the which is done by preaching , or by publicke lectures of bookes concerning the diuine seruice : as the law of god was anciently taught by the reading thereof before the people . and as among the christians they read the epistle and the gospell , with the simball of the creed ; simple meanes and without affectation ; and of no lesse edification ( if in this simplicity they cause them to be vnderstood by the people ) then the preaching of some , who deliuer many times their owne fancies more then the gospell . in times past they found it not strange to translate the holy scripture into the vulgar tongue . netgher , a religious man of saint gal , vnder the abbot bernard , translated the psalter in the french tongue , which was then but rude . alfred king of england did the like into his language : hestad , also king of england , caused the holy and sacred scriptures to be conuerted and turned into english : and beda , ( called the venerable . ) translated the gospell of saint iohn into english. in preaching two things are necessary : the one to vnderstand the vulgar tongue , in the place where they preach perfectly : the other is to bring some exteriour ornament to perswade . the first iesuits that went into iappon , for that they rashly vnder tooke this enterprize , before they did well vnderstand the language , in steed of instructing they were laughed at , by reason of the many incongruities and errours they committed in this language . disputation requires an actiue spirit , to satisfie all difficulties that may be encountred in such matters . but order is very necessary o● wherein two 〈◊〉 are especially to be considered . the one is , that it is more ease to oppose a religion , whatsoeuer it be then to maintayne and defend it , for all religions hauing in them something which is aboue the capacity of mans vnderstanding , it is no difficult thing ●o contrad●●t such a beliefe by humane reason . vvherefore they must first shake the opinion receiued , before they come to plant a new . the other poynt is , in such disputations to begin with things knowne , and confesse of ●yt●e● side ) , to come vnto those which are contradicted and not yet receiued . this meanes of instruction is the mildest , and most proper to attaine to the setling of religion , how much soeuer it differs from the opinion rec●iued , and amongst what people soeuer : especially if they , beginne to teach young children , before they haue bin instructed in the old beliefe . the iesuits , seeing they could not preuayle in the conuersion of the brastlians , a nation altogether brutish and in humane , they could find no other remedy , then to draw their children vnto them by gifts ; and kind vsage , and this people suffred them to go the more willingly , for that they alwayes brought backe some thing , besides instruction which they receiued . in peru , in the beginning they made vse of poore blind men , who being receiued by them and well vsed , went afterwards vp and downe repeating that which they had learned : and seeing nothing they deliuered it to all sorts of people indifferently , with more assurance then if they had bin cleare sighted . the opinion of aly in the law of mahomet , which hath beene imbraced by the persians , was divulged , ( as the histories of that country relate ) by thirty thousand slaues , which tamberlaine had giuen to tegel , predecessour to ismael sophy , to cause them to be instructed in that beliefe . charlemaine , erected many colledges and seminaries of piety among the idollaters whom he had conquered , and reta●●ed twelue children of the saxon princes , as hostages , to cause them to be instructed in the christian religion . the turke takes the fifth of all the christian children , and causeth them to be bred vp in the law of mahomet . the xerif seized vpon morocco and fez , hauing by pilgrimage , and the shew of a holy life , gotten some credit among the moores : he bought a thousand slaues , which he bred vp in his opinion , grounded ( as he pretended ) vpon a more pure interpretation of the alcoran : and hauing instructed many with such disciples ; and his sonnes hauing some aduantages agaynst the christians , turned their armes agaynst the kings of fez and morocco , and setled themselues in their places with their religion . prudence , is next to piety , the principall part which they should haue , which vndertake such an enterprize , and so much the more necessary , for that many times an indiscreet zeale hinders his function , and ruines that which he would establish . and although that the counsels of these zealous persons succeed sometimes ; which notwithstanding is but seldome , god hauing giuen prudence to men , to serue them for a guide ; all hauing not deserued that god should daily imploy his power to worke miracles . ananias hauing perswaded isates king of the adiabones , and his mother to receiue the iewish-religion , held it fit that he should forbeare to cause himselfe to be circumcised , vntill he had disposed his people . but eliazar the gallilean prest him to do it , and not to preferre the feare of men to the grace of god. which was the aduice of a diuine more zealous then discreet ; the which although it succeeded well at that time , their spirits being better prepared then the prince expected ; yet it were dangerous to follow it in all encounters . for the apostle commaunds that zeale should be guided by knowledge . we know in our time , that this rash zeale hath done more harme to the catholicke religion then good . i doubt , whether to this inconsiderate zeale we should not attribute that opinion , which some haue of the greatnes of the spirituall power , by the which and their rules , they minister cause of iealousie to all temporall powers , the which they submit vnto it , agaynst the ancient beliefe and the custome of former ages . a proceeding quite contrary to that of iesus christ ; whom the iewes desiring to surprize by this meanes in the crime of high treason , and to bandy the magistrate agaynst him , declared openly , that his kingdome was not of this world ; and commaunded to yeild vnto caesar that which was caesars , although he were a tyrant , and an vsurper of another mans liberty . after him his apostles haue spoken of the ciuill magistrate with honour and respect , commaunding to obay him ; and it cannot be found , that by vertue of the spirituall power , they haue aduised to attempt any thing agaynst the magistrate . it is true , that among christians , the spirituall power hath beene alwayes much respected ; but only when it hath bee●e practized in matters which are meerely spirituall , the which looseth the dignity and grace , which is due vnto it , when it deales in matters which are temporall terrien . these be the bounds which haue alwayes beene set in france , betwixt the ecclesiasticall lurisdiction and a regall power : and with this distinction the christian religion , hath beene preserued aboue a thousand yeares in france , without any blemish . but inconsideration or ambition , which is vsually blind , hath proceeded further , to breed a iealousie among all christian princes . for by a consequence altogether absurd and foolish , they would make the vvorld beleeue , that the obedience of the subiect towards his prince , the which being a temporall thing , cannot be reputed but temporall , may be prohibited by the spirituall power , the which notwithstanding hath no power nor iurisdiction ouer temporall things . the which is a meanes not only to hinder , that such princes as are distracted from the ancient beleife ; do not re-vnite themselues , seeing they cannot do it without dimunition of their authority and power : but also makes others , which are not yet separated ( to free themselues from this subiection ) leaue it , or fauour all which oppose themselues to this doctrine , neuer insisting vpon the errors , which they may adde thereunto . there is as little wisedome to ●rosse the rules of a receiued pollicy , if they were not altogether impious : neyther must they presse to change the religion of the conscience , if without impiety this apparence may be preserued . the ancient christians , made no difficulty to apply vnto the diuine seruice , many of the iewish and pagan ceremonies . in diuers changes of religion hapned in our time , luther in germany , and peter martyre in england , haue carried themselues more discreetly , hauing retayned the greatest part of the ceremonies of the catholicke religion , approoued therein ; then they which haue made their religion bald , and destitute of all ornament ; and to make it the more sauage , and to seeme more different from the common beleife , they haue changed the names and termes by an in●ise●ee● vanity . behold part of the principall considerations which they must obserue in the setling of a religion . let vs now see how we are to carry our selues to preserue the ancient beleife ; amidst the diuersitie of other religions which are crept into the estate . chap. . that the diuersity of religion is dangerous in an estate : how they ought to carry themselues to preserue the ancient beleife , in the diuersity of religions crept into the estate . in old time the kings of aegypt , entertayned this diuersity in religion among their subiects : some worshipping a dogge , others a bird , and some a crocadile with other things according vnto their fancies : which was a tyrannicall practize ; to the end their subiects might not agree to controule and reforme their actions . but it is certayne that if in the concord of an estate , consists the good and quiet of the subiects , it is more expedient to re-vnite themselues all in one religion when they may . for religion is the cyment which binds the quick-siluer , that drawes together all the members of the estate into one perfect vnion : and contrariwise there is nothing that doth more dis-unite a people , then the diuersity of opinions , or the vse of diuers ceremonies in matter of religion . hence haue proceeded the most violent and furious passions , that cuer troubled an estate , and the life of men : and in this poynt all other interests are so implyed , as it hath drawne with it all that , which makes a part of the honours , goods , and fortunes of men . for religion the children haue left the fathers cause ; seruants haue denied their masters seruice , and subiects their fidellity to princes . finally all naturall rights and offices of humanity haue ceased , whereas religion hath resisted : euery man esteeming that which he followes to be the most pure , and the true manner of worship , and condemning all that which is not conformable to his beliefe . vvherefore we must flye this diuersity , euen in light things : for that a multitude being vncapable to iudge of things by themselues , nor by reason or motion in religion , suffring themselues to be carried away by chance and apparent shewes , contrary to that which faith should perswade them , aboue the perception of their vnderstanding : when they haue once shaken some opinion which he had in reuerence , he presently falls into the like vncertaynty of the other peeces of his beliefe ; which haue no more authority nor ground with him , then those which they haue already shaken . finding then this diuersity in an estate we must consider whether it be little or great . if it be small , and the parties of the new opinion weaker then that of the ancient religion , be it in number of men , or in retreats of intelligences , it wil be no difficult thing to suppresse them : no more then if in a great estate , this opinion had not taken footing but in one corner , or in one or two prouinces ; as that of the albygeois had done in france . for the rest of the estate being secure , it is easie for the greater party to suppresse the lesse , by the conquest of these prouinces . but if this opinion hath crept into all the parts of the estate , although they that follow it make the lesser number , yet we must consider if we are in the beginning , or in the strongest fit of the disease . in the beginning such weeds are to be pulled vp as soon as they grow , the which must be done by secret executions , and not as they ●aue vsually practized by publicke punishments ; if it be not of some opinion that is very difficult to perswade : for that the example of martyrdome mooues many to pitty , makes others obstinate , and drawes some to be more curious to examine the reasons , for the which a new preacher , who hath nothing in shew but what is holy , suffers so constantly : and few will perswade themselues , that any man will for so small a matter loose his life with so much dishonour ; and so by this gate many enter into that comminalty : so as instead of retyring the people by the example of punishments , they inuite them : as being certayne that the terrour thereof , workes a contrary effect in a new opinion , which ha●● a shew of sanctity , and of the truth and falshood whereof they may doubt , then in other crimes , the which are generally condemned in all men . for to search the bottome of euery mans conscience , were to kindle a fire in the estate , add to discouer a mischiefe , which were more expedient to hide , and whereof the scandall were dangerous . we haue seene many realmes and principallities preserue themselues in peace , with the exercise of two different religions ; but there was neuer any but hath bin ruined by the course and continuance of ciuill wars : and the conditions by the which they may make two religions agree together , would not only be lesse hurtfull to an estate , but more supportable to priuate persons , then the lest ciuill war , which shal be attempted vpon this subiect . for although there may be some found amongst hereticks , who , eyther for want of instruction in their new opiuion , or for want of courage , thinke to be perswaded by force , that they do meritoriously suffer the paynes which they endure , and therefore were easie to reduce : yet i will say that in such affayres , for that a firme perswasion must preceede the resolution which such men haue taken to change their first manner of liuing , in a poynt which doth wholy import their saluation ; it is dangerous to imploy armes . for some striking sayle , and continuing amongst vs , serue vnderhand to those of their party by many meanes ; if it were but only in giuing aduice or dispersing of bruits , which may assist their affaires . others which haue more generosity , perswaded of the iniustice of the harme which they cause them to suffer , continue resolute and obstinate : being the ordinary of the spirite of man , to grow more resolute the more it is resisted , and giues way when there is least opposition . for the more that that man loues his liberty , and yet abuses it , the more he hates seruitude and constraynt , in the which notwithstanding he carryes himselfe better then in the enioying of his freedome . all men tend naturally to the contrary of that which is desired of them , and affect more willingly that which is forbidden . feare and necessity maintayne men best in their duties . they force them to know themselues , to resume courage , to allie themselues together , and in the end to frame a party within the estate ; which vpon the least good successe which shall befall it , ( fortune not alwayes assisting the greater number ) it fortifies it selfe , as it proceeded from the iustice of their cause , and that god fought for them , so as by this good successe many being perswaded to follow it , they encrease the number of their partizans : and it falls out most commonly , that the discontented , and such as desire to worke their owne ends , ioyne with them . moreouer , this sect , as i haue sayd , being dispersed ouer all the prouinces of an estate , and the prince not able to haue armies in them all , whilest that he assailes them on the one side , they attempt vpon another , surprizing some place of importance ; or standing vpon their defence , they cause an army to ruine itselfe most commonly before some paltry place . i will adde hereunto , that if they be the weaker in number , they will be found in effect the stronger by their vigilancy and intelligences which they haue one of another : for that vnion is most commonly stronger in a meane number , then in a greater ; and in an opinion receiued by their owne choice and election , then in that which is receiued by custome , in the which man shews himselfe vsually more negligent . besides this , the intelligence is better obserued amongst man that are assayled , or that feare to be so , by reason of the necessity of the defence , then among the assailians . for to assayle proceeding from a free will , they are sooner wearied then the defendants . moreouer , there is nothing more dangerons for a prince , then to make tryall of his forces against , his subiects , if he be not well assured of the successe . this were to arme and shew the lyon his pawes to fight against his master , to make himselfe the head of a party , making the head of the contrary faction equall to his power . and it hath bin alwayes held a rule of state , that the most powerful should neuer make an enterprize vpon the weaker , without assurance of the euent , for the weaker is alwayes in feare , that the stronger can doe any thing , vntill he hath made tryall of the contrary ; and when they finde how far the forces of the stronger may extend , he falls in his reputation . wherefore in this case the best aduised princes haue done like wife pylots , who flip their tacklings in a storme , knowing that the res●stance they should make , would be the cause of a generall shipwracke . but if he forced of necessity to goe to field vpon this quarrell , and that their courages puft vp too much , cannot be humbled but by armes ; he must before they haue gotten any aduantage , graunt them tolleration of their religion , in places where they may giue the least scandall , to such as are opposite vnto them , and in all other things make them inferiour : the which they will yeeld the more easily vnto , for that in this first beginning , there is nothing but the conscience that doth threaten them ; and hauing found their owne weaknesse , they will be content to haue gotten this point , neuer refusing places out of the way for their exercise : for that by this meanes they shall bee more assured , lesse exposed to the view of their enemies , and by consequence lesse subiect , to their surprizes . as for the ambition of commanders , it will bee easie to preuent , for that they will bee vsually few in number , in entertaining them by promises , presents , and hopes ; hauing a watchfull eye ouer them , and imploying them abroad in honourable charges and affaires , yet where they may neither get credit , nor doe much harme ; and therest which desire to bee aduanced to honours , and yet haue small power of themselues , they may feede them with hope , that in changing their opinions , they may attaine to that which they desire . this being done , the rest will bee easily maintained , in hauing a care that they which follow the princes religion , and are fauoured by the prince , may not doe them any wrong or iniury in hatred of their opinion . they may by the same meanes , erect seminaries , to breed and instruct a good number of persons in the true religion ; out of which they shall choose such as are most sufficient and capable , and whose liues may serue for an example of well liuing , to place them in eclesiasticall dignities . in certaine realmes they haue vsed to make orders of knight-hood , whose chiefe profession was ( when it was necessary to vse force ) to maintaine their religion by armes , and they had for their recompence many benefices , which wee affected vnto them ; which institution is not to bee neglected , for that there are two sorts of those which stra●e from the true religion . the one agree vpon the foundations , but they contend vpon the interpretation ; and these may bee instructed : the others doe absolutely done the grounds , whereby the doctrine of religion is supported . these not able to bee drawne by the instruction of the true religion , there rem●n●th nothing but miracles , and a diuine interpretation , which are supernaturall meanes , whereof god doth not make vse to all persons : and force amongst humane meanes . wherefore these millitary orders of knights , may profit much in an estate , and may also inuite those of a new opinion to submit themselues vnto the old , to the end they may be partakers , or their children , of these honours and recompences . moreouer , it will not be inconuenient , that a prince which raignes in an estate deuided in religion , should labour by presents and promises , to draw vnto him the most learned and capable of such as are contrary vnto his religion : and in case they will returne , to aduance some of them to great dignities , to the end he may bind them the more by the preseruation of their dignity to mayntayne the religion , and to giue experience to others , who wil be inuited by this example . for what ambition soeuer they shall discouer in him that shal be aduanced , hauing gotten authority , the example of his aduancement , will make others thinke of it . and if the prince can , deuide them in opinions , or otherwise he shall do well ; for that the weaker the body of this sect shal be , the lesse cause the estate shall haue to feare ; and there growing some diuersity of opinions amongst them , he shall fa●our that which approacheth neerest to his religion ; or by this deuision he shall endeauour to make them weaker , and more resolute what they should follow . but when he shall see a sect grow old , and that the abuses should begin to distaste most part of them which follow it : he may do like vnto theodosius , who seeing the temples of the pagans in a manner all abandoned , he caused some to be beaten downe , and the rest to be applied vnto the deuotion and seruice of the christian religion . mahomet had found a remedy to preserue his religion from these innovations , forbidding them to preach or dispute : the which if it had beene well obserued , there had beene such a diuersity of sects , in the interpretation of his alcoron . but a duke of muscouie , to keep his religion intire and vnfoyled , the which is grounded like to ●urs in the administration of the sacraments , and in the preaching of the gospell , caused all the homi●ies and sermons of the holy greeke fathers , to be turned into his language , to be rep●ated publickly in the place of preaching , and read particularly by the subiects ▪ freeing himselfe by this meanes from the ignorance of the multitude , and from the nouelties which preachers might haue brought in , in publishing their inuentions and dreames ; and by this meanes confirming his subiects in the beleife of those holy fathers . wherefore the principall end must be , to keep the anc●●nt religion , to haue but one , if it may be , to hi●der 〈◊〉 one from taking footing in an estate , and in 〈…〉 not effect it without troubling the vniu●rsall peace of the subiect , we must gouerne our selues as i haue formerly spoken . let vs come to other disorders which commonly 〈◊〉 in religion , the which w●e must fore-see in its esta●●●shm●nts , to preuent them when they shall happen . chap. . 〈◊〉 disorders which happen in religion : and of the meanes to preuent them . bl●tp●emy consists in periury , and inscandall , or de●●●ction . periury is when we call god to witnesse of a lye , scandall is when wee mocke at religion . carelesnesse regards chiefly the seruice of r●ligion , and is the more to be feared , for that by this degree they mount to impiety . for religion consisting more in affection and zeale , then in discourse ; when as the heat of zeale if growne cold , religion is lost by little and little . the third abuse is superstition , withdrawing the beliefe made to the seruice of god , and bringing in scandalous things of no moment . as for the first , which is blasphemy , , they must establish rigorous punishments : and to hinder the second , which concernes diuine seruice , it must be enioyned very strictly . but the remedy of the last , must come from the care of prelates , who for this ●ffect ought to be chosen vigilant and religious ; and they must be prohibited from bringing in of any new thing , vpon pretext of deuotio● and piety , neyther in the beleife nor in the ceremonies of religion , without exact knowledge of the cause . as for that which concernes the ground of priuate mens consciences , we must leaue it to the duty of ministers , who being chosen good men , there is no doubt but they whose consciences they gouerne , would be so in like manner . chap. . of the setling of a councell of estate , and of the quallities and number of councellors . the forme of the estate , and religion being established , there followes the setling of a councell ; wherein two sorts of persons are to be considered , that is to say , they which counsell , and they which are counselled . in those which counsell , we must know the qualities which are necessary for them ; in what number they ought to be ; the power which is giuen them ; and the order they are to obserue in giuing their opinions : for to examine affaires , it is done according to the ability and capacity of euery one of them . the first quality of a councellor of estate , is to be old , and to haue experience . i ioyne these two together , for that experience cannot be but in a man that is already ancient , and age without experience would be here v●profitable : for that in such affaires the knowledge of the particular humours of princes , of people , and of great men is most necessary : the which cannot be obtayned but by a long experience : the which although it be not repugnant vnto reason , yet it hath a different meanes of vnderstanding the affaires , whereof they cannot haue a certaine light , to make a coniecture of that , which with reason would be fitting to doe vpon the point which they will put in execution , if they haue not first seene the tryall in some other place . moreouer , age will adde much more authority and credit to the resolutions of a councell , consisting of ancient men , then if it were composed of young , how sufficient and capable soeuer they were , who cannot haue the reputation of good councellours : for such as shall be as young as they , will thinke they are as well aduised ; and such as are more ancient , will hold themselues to be wiser . and in matter of estate , opinion hauing no lesse force , but many times more effect then truth ; there is nothing more dangerous , then that the subiects should haue an opinion , to be wiser then their gouernours . so as the presumption being alwayes , that the older are wiser then the young , there is no doubt , but they are more propper for councell , and more resolute for a long exercise , to heare , weigh , and resolue of great affaires . there is another difference betwixt ancient and young councellors . these last hauing their bloud hot , and hauing neuer beene deceiued by fortune , insist commonly vpon councels , which haue more magnificence and shew then safety . whereas on the other side , old men as well by reason of their naturall coldnesse , as of their experience , the which by the course of their life they haue gotten , to haue executed many things in vaine the which they could not bring to a good effect , they , more willingly imbrace the safest party , misfortune causing them to bandy their spirits , and to open their eyes to discouer the danger . the which young men cannot , doe so well , who haue not had experience of the variety of fortune , nor haue obserued the circumstances of such particular accidents . a most necessary thing in a man that will giue councell ; a small circumstance of more or lesse , doth many times cause a great variation in affaires . this experience being onely found in ancient men , their aduice ought to be esteemed the better . yet i meane not to speake of such as are come to a decrepitage . age fit for councell , must be strong and vigorous , to the end that the resolutions of a councell of such men may not be too dull and timerous . wherefore with these ancient men that are cold and slow , it will bevery fit to mingle some of a middle age , approaching to . yeares ; and that both the one and the other past their time in many imployments , in the which they haue seene diuers sorts of affaires treated and negotiated , and haue therein made knowne their discretion , fidelity , and industry ; and by this meanes giue assurance , that they are worthy and capable to hold this ranke , without staggering or falling for a councellor of estate must be an honest man , faithfull to the estate , and firme in his resolutions ; yet without wilfulnesse and obstinacy : a most dangerous plague in a councell , where it is necessary sometimes to obey the storme , to strike sayle , to leaue the ordinary course , and retire sometimes into the hauen , to the which in the end they will sayle when they see the wind prosperous . and although there be some one thing resolued , yet if it discouer some apparent danger , it is not against custome to change opinions . for prudence doth not consist in an obstinate will , to doe a thing resolutely ; bu● amongst many different parties which fortune presents vnto vs , to choose the best and the most commodious , to attayne vnto our end . wherefore some haue bin of opinion that they should propound that a little before , which was to be resolued vpon ; least that doing otherwise , and some one hauing bin of a bad aduice , without due consideration , he should not grow obstinate vnseasonably , and striue to maintayne his opinion , rather then to leaue it . yet in affaires whereas they that haue credit , are interessed , it is not fit to make the proposition , if they be not assured to be able to resolue it speedily : otherwise it would giue them meanes to make parties and factions , and to prepare hinderances and lets . a councellor of estate must likewise be without fauour ●o some , or hatred to others , or ambition for himselfe ; hauing no other ayme but the publique good , and that he depends not of any other prince , be it by fealty or homage , or by obligation or by pension : but rather that he runne the same fortune with the prince whom he serues ; to the end he may know , that it concernes him to suffer the euill , and enioy the good , proceeding from the councell which he hath giuen . marc. anthony the philosopher and emperour , ordayned that the senators of rome , which were not italians , should at the least haue the fourth part of their estates in italy , to make them more carefull , to thinke of the preseruation of the prouince , where the seate of the empire remayned . and pl●●● writes that traian the emperour had formerly decreed , that such as sued for any benefices , should haue the third part of their lands in italy ; not holding it reasonable , that such men should make vse of rome and italy , as of a retreate , and not as of their countrey . yet i would not herein set a generall rule , there hauing bin many found , who although they had their retreate else-where then in the estate of the prince whom they serued , haue notwithstanding carryed themselues faithfully , vpon hope that if they should lose the goods which they enioyed in the estate , of their master , yet they should alwayes haue meanes to liue else-where . and contrariwise we haue seene some which had not any retreat but in the estate of their prince , whom the good fortune of the enemy hath made carefull to enter into treaty to saue their estates ; the which happily they would not haue done , if they had meanes to liue else-where . it is likewise certayne , that in affaires where we haue no interest , we iudge much better , then when as we put our interest in ballance with our opinions in councell . he that lookes ouer gamesters , and is not possest neyther with the hope of gayne , nor the feare of losse , will giue a better iudgment of the carriage of the game then he that playe● : and he that in a councell hath not any feare to lose his estate , and who brings neyther affection nor passion , will alwayes take the most honourable party : and he which hath any interest preuented by his owne opinion and feare , will willingly incline to that side by the which he thinks to saue himselfe . a councellor of estate must not be too suddaine and rash , for that precipitation of its nature , is blind and indiscreet ; a good deliberation hauing need of time , to make a good resolution , being impossible in a short time to consider & weigh the inconueniences duly : and withall pr●cipitation cannot come but with indiscretion , or little iudgment ; & both the one & the other hurtful in councel . irresolution is another vice , into the which he must be very careful not to fal ; for he must resolue vpon 〈◊〉 party , and forget all the rest ; lest that by remembring them , he doth not breake and dull the vigour of the minde , necessary for the due execution of great enterprizes , and withall the constancy which he must bring in matters that are doubtfull and difficult : neyther must he thinke that there is lesse difficulty in the party which he hath left , then in that which he hath chosen . in some one-ignorance to be able to examine affaires causeth irresolution ; and these ought to be reiected from councell . others are enemies to inconueniences : so as although that with reason they ought to imbrace the thing which is propounded vnto them ; yet being amazed with the paynes and difficulty , which doe alwayes accompany great affaires , they remayne in suspence and doubt , whether they should endeauour to attempt it . other haue such subtill spirits , that to all things that are propounded , they finde contrary reasons ; and being ( as often it happens ) of small courage , they neuer ( vnlesse it be vpon necessity ) resolue ; and they neuer want reasons to couer their fearefulnesse , the which will euer haue more power ouer them then reason , and experience to haue many times trembled in vaine . for resolution proceeds not from the spirit , but from the courage : and these men are so much the more dangerous , as they are more subtill and cunning , and haue more dexterity to couer their difficulties . but as he may not be resolute , so must he not be so confident of himselfe , as he stop his eares to the aduice of others ; or that relying vpon our owne forces , we doe not draw into consideration those of our enemies , yea sometimes hazard and fortune , which hath a good share in the greatest actions , to the end we may fore-see that which may happen . for distrust is the mother of fore-sight , and fore-sight the mother of safety . patience is another quality , very necessary in a councell of estate , not onely to endure opinions contrary to his owne , but also to haue his reasons weighed , blamed , and contradicted , and to heare many follies which grow amidst their discourses , euen from great personages . he must heare i say with patience , or without iealousie or desire to be followed in his opinions , and not to doe as many which please themselues , to be the authors of a new ouerture , who with a spirit of contradiction , full of bitternesse , trouble themselues to reprehend the reasons of such of the councell as are their enemies , be they neuer so good . a vice altogether insupportable . yet notwithstanding it is not forbidden , to draw into agitation the reasons of another : but it must be done with respect ; and thereby he shews that he doth not seeke to diuide or surprize the resolution , but it sufficeth him to haue his reasons vnderstood , and the inconueniences of a contrary opinion . besides these qualities which concerne the iudgment of integrity , a councellor of estate must know how to explicate himselfe , and to make his reasons be vnderstood : and they which of purpose obscure their reasons and intention , for the vncertaynty of the euent , are bad councellors , which vnderstand not what belongs to councell : for that good councell is measured by the reasons , and not by the euent , no man being answerable for that which happens against all discourse and reason . but aboue all things it is required to be secret : for a councell divulged , profits no more then a mine blowne vp . wherefore it is necessary that the number of councellors of estate , should not be great : for in a great number this inconuenience is ordinary . it is likewise good to charge councellors often : for that being nec●ssary they should be instructed in affaires , it would fall out that their charge would end before they should be able to see those which were begun , finished , and before they should vnderstand the course and proceedings ; the which is necessary to settle a iudgement : this course not able to be so well represented by the report which others might make , but they might faile in some particulars , whereon they might ground their opinions . but if for the quality of the estate it be necessary to change them ; at the least they must prouide in such sort , as the councell be not changed all at an instant : but hauing ordayned a certayne time for euery councellor to assist , their charges must expire at seuerall times , and the greatest part of the ancient must remayne to instruct the new in affaires , who growing ancient in their turnes , shall instruct others that shall enter . and if through the ambition of some , the councell of estate ( which ought to consist of a small number ) be too full : the which doth vsually happen in sicke and corrupted estates , it shall not be vnfitting to imploy them else-where , attributing to the greatest part of these councellors , some iurisdiction which may approach in some sort the affaires of estate ; as philip the faire king of france did of his parliament : charles the eight with his great councell , and as they doe at this present with the priuy councell . this meanes is not new , but hath bin anciently practized by tiberius , nero , and some other emperours towards the senate of rome , making them to forget by little and little the knowledge of state affaires , by the attribution of a contentious iurisdiction , which was in the end established by adrian in this senate , in forme of an ordinary iurisdiction . chap. of the plurality of councels of estate . of the power of councell , and of the order of giuing their opinions . in spaine there are many councells of estate , distinguished according to the diuersity of realmes and prouinces , which are vnited to that crowne . they may likewise in erecting many councels to facilitate the expedition of affaires in a great realme , imploy the more honest men profitably , and preuent surprizes ; distinguishing them according to the diuers parts of the estate , which are , religion , iustice , warre , policy , the treasure , the care of gouernment , and the intelligences as well without as within the estate : this last ought to be annexed to the soueraignes person ; accompanied with few , least that a great number should breed confusion , and discouer the secret . as for that of religion , it should haue care to maintayne religion in reuerence : and if there were many which they were forced to tollerate , it should serue to cause them to liue in peace one with another , and to decide their differences . that of iustice should not be imployed but to order the differences of iurisdictions , and to iudge those , whereof iustice should be forbidden to take knowledge . that of warre should serue to regulate the souldiers both horse and foot , prouiding for the munitions , places of strength , ships of war , garrisons , and generally of all that which may depend of a military order and care . that of policy should order the commerce and trade with the manufactures , and should make all establishments necessary , for aboundance , the safety , the beautifying of townes , the assurance of wayes , and the commodity of riuers . that of the treasure should regulate the leuies of money , the assignations , and all that which concernes the dispensations of the reuenewes of the estate . yet there being many affaires so vnited , as they seeme to belong as well to one councell as another ; to auoyde the contrarieties of ordinances , if many councels should take notice of one businesse , the most expedient would be , that these councels should ●aue no other charge , but to examine that which should be propounded vnto them , and to cause the diuersity of their opinions to be reduced to writing , with the reasons of eyther side ; the which should be read in a councell composed of the heads of all these councels , and of two other councellors of eyther of them , chosen by the councell it selfe , according to the quality of the businesse ; all which being assembled for the readi●g of the sayd opinions , they should haue no more to doe , but to resolue the businesse thus digested and examined . i know that in an estate , whereas all things are ouerruled by the head of one or two , who desire to gouerne the prince , he that should attempt any thing for the good of his estate , they would presently perswade him , that these councels would be so many comptrollers which he should giue vnto himselfe : that he was sufficient to prouide for all , and that all must depend vpon his will , and not oblige nor subiect himselfe to another mans reason . but vnder pretext of maintayning the princes authority , these people seeke to continue their owne to worke their ends , neuer representing the princes affaires but by a crosse meanes , which may serue their owne designes : they ingage him many times in councels , which proue very preiudiciall to his honour , reputation , and estate . in regard of the councels power , it ought onely to consist in giuing councell , and not to command , commandment being inseparable with the soueraignty : and in estates , whereas councellors commaund that which they councell , they may not onely be termed councellors but soueraignes , and if the decree or sentence seemes to haue any command in it ; yet it is certayne that without the soueraig●●s commission , no more then the sentence of the iudge it cannot be executed . in some councels they haue receiued two kind of lawes : and they haue giuen power to some to make an ouerture of some affaires , the which haui●g bin propounded by them , they retired , and left others to deliberate ; the which they call a consultatiue voice . others had power only to deliberate , and to resolue , but not to propound . wherefore to take away this superioritie in a councell , and to entertaine an equallitie among councellors , the which is of great force to maintaine the libertie of opinions ; it is fit that the councellors should haue a consultatiue and deliberatiue voyce . yet forasmuch as it is necessary to propound , and to bring some order in all sorts of companies ; it is fitting that hee which hath somthing to propound , should impart it to him that holds the first place in the councell , prouided alwayes that hee hath no interest . there is another diuersitie for the order of opening , either beginning by the greatest , and of most authoritie in councell , to the end that the younger and least capable , might more easily choose the best party , and the soundest reasons : or in beginning to take the voyces of the youngest and inferiours , and causing them of most authority to giue their opinions last ; least that the libertie of aduice might not bee cut off by the authority of great men , who are factious and ambitious , and admit no contradiction . which two kindes of deliuering their opinions may bee practized according to the equallity , that is among the councellors . for if they bee equall in power , it seemes most fitting that the most sufficient should deliuer their opinions first : whereas contrarywise if the councell be mingled with great lords , and men of a means condition ; they which haue least power , must deliuer their opinions first ; yet causing them which haue only a consultatiue voice , to deliuer their censures first , who prepare the way to such as haue a deliberatiue voice , representing vnto the councell all the reasons of either side , and propounding their owne aduice : in doing whereof if they erre , they shall bee reformed by the others without iealousie ; for that an ambition to speake , drawes after it many times the enuy of some , and the iealousie of others . augustus demaunded their opinions without obseruing ranke , or age , to the end that euery man should be● attentiue to the propositions that were made , and without staying for the aduice of next neighbour , he might be alwayes ready to deliuer his owne . i will adde one thing , whereof we must haue a speciall care in councell , which is to call into the deliberation of some businesse of hazard , they to whom we are to giue the execution . for it seemes that calling t●em , it will make them more cunning and aduised to auoyd the dangers which may fall out in the enterprize , the which they meane to recommend vnto them . yet it may be of such a nature , as the difficulties which they shall ●eare , wi●l present themselues in the execution , may discourage them and make them grow cold , in danger to giue ouer the enterprize . behold that which ought to be principally considered in those which giue counsell . chap. . considerations for the prince which is to be counsell●d . as for him that is to be counselled , we must consider his sufficiency , the manner of demaunding counsell , to receyue it , examine it , to resolue and execute it . in regard of sufficiency , they haue alwayes held that there are three sorts of persons . some haue such a vigour of spirit , as they alo●e can better resolue their affayres , then a whole company would do ; in the which besides the feare that the secret would be divulged , the number of good men would be so much the more rare , as they of whom it is composed are great . others haue not this vigour or spirit , but a naturall docillity to heare the aduice of others , and a iudgment to discerne good from euill : and these , as they are inferiour to the first , so are they superiour to the last ; who not able to take aduice in their owne heads , and contemning the aduice of others , know not how to make choyse of the sounder party . and although it seemes that the first haue not any need to seeke the counsell of another ; yet aswell to free himselfe from presumption , as to giue the more authority and credit vnto their enterprizes , they must communicate them ; and confesse that sufficiency is neuer so great in any one person , but that many may adde something vnto it . and although that this sufficiency be very commendable , yet it is dangerous in a prince , who easily fals into presumption ; and it seemes that the docillity which is found in others , yeilding an eare to counsell , is the more safe . yet if these bring not iudgment to discerne good from euill , this meane sufficiency would be as dangerous , as if he referd himselfe wholy to the counsell of others : which is an instrument , whereof they haue somtimes made vse to ruine many estates ; for that where the councell shall consist of incapable men , aswell as the prince ; a thing which vsually fals out , when as the counsellors are chosen by him , for that euery man seekes his like ; and we much acknowledge some sufficiency to iudge of that of another man , to make the election : and in this case the estate is the sooner drawne to its ruine , when as the number of counsellors is greatest . but if they whom the prince hath called to his councell , he worthy and fit to support the burthen of the estate ; & that the prince be not capable to make choise of good parties and occasions , and to adde the conduct which shal be necessary in the executions ; this councel wil be fruitles to him . besides , the counsellors of princes are accompanied with ●ealousie one against another ; and tending all to one end , they fi●de out many times publique councels , and make them serue to their owne priuate interests , striuing by many cunning practises , to frustrate the designes , and to hinder the increase of reputation one of another . whereby it happens , that the prince hauing not ( for the little sufficiency that is in him ) that authority among his councellors which were necessary to keepe them in awe , and to hinder the course of these diuisions ; nor yet iudgement to discouer the particular desig●es of euery one ; he remaynes among so many councellors , rather confounded and irresolute , then counselled . besides that in such a councell of wise men , and full of vallor , which serue a prince of little vnderstanding , there is neuer so much friendship and affection as were to be desired in cou●cellors . for that seeing their prince more inwardly then other men , and knowing his imperfections and weaknesse better , the order of nature beares it , t●at in the end they fall to contemne him , the which afterwards doth easily turne to hatred ; for that the minister which hath some merrit in himselfe , scornes to obey a man incapable of his greatnesse , and vnworthy of his fortune , long . after hatred and contempt followes the infidelity of councellors ; so as the prince must eyther be sold , or turned vp and downe according to the occasions of the will of those which shall be about him , who in their councell will haue more regard to their particular aduancement , then to the greatnesse of their master . a p●i●ce then that desires to raigne in his estate , must make himselfe capable to gouerne , and mannage affaires : not that i would aduise a prince who hath sufficiency in himselfe to haue no man about him to giue him counsel ; bu● rather i be●eeue that one of the greatest foundations of his reputation is , when they shall ha●e an opinion that his owne iudgement and proper intelligence of affaires , is assisted by a wise and faithfull councell ; which is the thing for the which he must most labour . but this councell how wise and adui●ed soeuer , must alwayes be surmounted by the iudgement and capacity of the prince , so as they must rather serue for an accessary ; then a principall in the gouernment of the estate : that in commaundments they acknowledge themselues inferiour to the prince , and not carry themselues as equals : that in occasions and affaires of importance , they may rather haue power to alt●r , and to make knowne the difficulties and inconueniences , but not to resolue : and in a word , the prince hath neede of so much spirit , as his councell may assist him to gouerne , but not teach him to raigne . we will therefore conclude , that as a prince hath neede of himselfe , to maintayne himselfe in life , so harh he neede of a good councell , to maintayne the affaires of his estate : and as without it he cannot be termed a man , so without councell he cannot be held a prince . wherefore hauing made choyce of those which may counsell him , he must carefully take occasion to demand their councell : tha● is to say , neyther too long before the enterprize , least it should be discouered ; nor too late , for feare that the councell should proue vnprofitable . and if he doubts that the businesse will not be held secret , being propounded in a full councell , or that some of his councellors for the interest of some great man , dare not deliuer their opinions freely ; and he may receiue their aduice separately and in secret , and reiect the reasons contrary to the councell which they haue giuen him , to the end he may the better iudge what party he shall embrace ; without tying himselfe to number the voices , but rather to weigh him ; for affaires of estate ought not to be gouerned according to the plurality of voices , if the reasons of eyther part be then so strong , as they are vncertaine what party they should follow . but aboue all t●ings a prince mu●t haue a care in affaires of greatest importance , nor to discouer euen vnto his councellors of what opinion he is : least that they which counsell him should rather se●ke to furnish him with reas●ns to confirme his opinion and to please him . for councellors ought to declare freely what they hold in their consciences honorable for him , and safe for his estate . some one would oblige the prince to assist himselfe at all manner of councels , asw●ll to take knowledge of all the affaires of his estate , as to discouer the capacity of his councellors , to hinder factions which grow in councell , to moderate the passions and iealousies of his ministers , to giue more authority to his resolutions , and by his presence to cause the affaires to be treated of with the respect and grauity that is requisite and necessary . yet there being many things which are treated of in the like councels , depending of iustice , policy , or the treasure ; besides that this would ouer-burthen the prince , in making him to imploy the greatest part of his time in these affaires ; he cannot do it without abasing his authority and maiesty too much , by this too frequent communication ; and it will suffice , that he assist at most important affaires , or at those whose resolution may increase his reputation , contenting himselfe to prouide for that which concernes peace or warre , with the saf●ty a●d quiet of his estate . an● to p●euent the inconueniences which happen daily in councels , where the prince doth not assist , and to draw the same aduantages without assisting , which he should haue by his presence being there , the course obserued by the grand seig●our is somewhat considerable . for in the place where they hold the diuan or counsell , there is a window , by the which ( without being seene ) he may heare all that is spoken and past in his councell : so as his councellors vncertayne whether their master heare them or not , obserue the same respect , the same modesty , and t●e same manner of proceeding , which they will do in his presence : and after they haue held the counsell , they go and make report vnto him of what hath past ; the which they dare not deliuer falsly , not knowing whether the prince haue heard them . and thus he is informed of all that hath beene propoun●ed in his councell . and heares himselfe if he will , or by some other , the reasons of all sides ; and then after the reports which is truly and certaynely made vnto him , he presently resolues without any demunition of his maiesty . the prince hauing demaunded the aduice of his councellors , he must receiue it from them all with an equall countenance ; without hating him , which hath giuen him bad counsell : vnlesse he discouer some malice . for councels hauing no force if they be not allowed by the prince , he hauing found them good , it is a signe that he hath iudged , and hath beene mooued by the same reasons , like to him that gaue them : so as the errour of iudgment hauing bin common to both , the blame and the fault ought not to be imputed vnto the councellor alone : and for that they haue neuer in any estate established ●ecompences or punishments for good or bad counsels ; which are held such commonly not by the reasons , but by the euents , whereof no man can be any way answereable . we must therefore diligently examine , an aduice or counsell ; consider the thing in its selfe , with all the circumstances and dependances ; preferre the safety of the estate to all other considerations ; and then to seeke the profit by honest courses , which consist in all the the parts which we represent in this treaty , very necessary for the establishment , preseruation , and increase of the estate . afterwards the prince must duly consider of the execution of that which they counsell him ; for the councell being of doubtfull things , he must aduise whether fortune may haue a greater share , in that which he meanes to vndertake , then wisdome : and if he finds that he hath more need of fortune , he must beware how he imbarque himselfe , especially if the contrary succeed to that which he desires , he incurres more losse , then he can hope for profit , succeeding after his desire . but if necessity reduceth him to this poynt , that he must eyther loose or hazard ; it were better to tempt fortune , the which although it did not succeed , yet at the least he should haue this contentment , to haue done what lay in him . otherwise , he may not lightly imbarque himselfe in a dangerous enterprize , although that at the first sight the perill be not so neere . for besides the danger that euery bad resolution carries with it , it drawes after it likewise to maintayne it , an infinite number of such like , for that things cannot remayne alone , but are bound one vnto another , and inchayned together . wherefore we may not haue so much respect vnto the present , as we forget the future . for althoug● that the accidents of fortune are in such variety , and so frequent , as they may hinder vs from a certayne fore-sight of the future : and that to haue regard to an imaginary feare of a thing which may be or not be , it seemes that this were to imbrace the shaddow , and to leaue the body or substance . yet the greatest part of errours which are committed in deliberations proceeds from this , that men suffer themselues too much to be carried away with the affect●ō of the present ; the which how little soeuer it be assisted by fortune , it seemes that it hath alwayes greater force and vigour , then the strongest respect we can imagine of the future . wherefore he must shew himselfe very stayed in such affections , and as for the affection of the present , he may not forget the consideration of the future : but he must accustome himselfe to set that which is to come before his eyes , with such a resentment and apprehension , as if he saw it or touch it . so he may not for a feare a farre off , forbeare to remedy a present mischiefe . he may not likewise suffer himselfe to be carried away by any example that is alledged , if all the particularities do not concurre . for although that these comparisons may ioyne at some corner , and that all things hold by some similitude or likenesse : yet there are very few examples which do not hault : and the relation which is drawne from experience , is many times defectiue and imperfect , if it be not assisted by discourse and reason . then hee must examine the quality of the person which giues the aduice , especially his interest , and aboue all things he must refuse to counsell a flatterer , and inuite him that counsels , to speake freely and with courage . if for the respect of the greatnesse of the prince who is counselled , it be necessary to flatter him ; the prince shall consider , if the flattery of him that counsels him , ( who must sometimes vse , as they say , words of silke ) proceeds from cunning and subtilty , which the councellor doth vse to perswade him to that which is for his good ; or with a designe to get credit by his pleasing , he enters into this flattery : for in this last case , the prince must stoppe his eares , and open them to him that speakes freely , there being no condition of men , that haue so great need of true and free aduertisements then princes , who vndergo a publicke life , and are to satisfie and content the opinion of so many people , which as they are accustomed to do any thing that may diuert them from their course , they finde themselues insensibly ingaged in the hatred and detestation of their subiects , for occasions many times which they might well auoyd , without any interest of their pleasure , if they had beene aduised and directed in time . but the manner whereby most princes liue at this day , few men are found that will practise this trade , being the office of true friendship towards the soueraigne , in a rough and dangerous tryall ; so as they must not onely haue much affection and freedome , but also courage . flattery is far more safe ; for that by pleasing , it seemes they draw nearer vnto friendship : and for that it is more agreeable to him whom they flatter , it is also more easie for him to practise that meanes to flatter . contrariwise truth and liberty , as if they approached neare to contempt , cannot be so safely practised with a prince . they haue their circumscriptions and limits : and many times it falls out , that ( as the world is ) they leaue truth in the eares of princes , not onely without fruite , but with preiudice to him that speakes it . if then the prince will assure himselfe on that side , he must encourage one or two of those which approach nearest vnto him , and whom he knowes to be best affected , and freest from contempt of him , to deliuer freely vnto him in what manner they receiue his actions ; and he must choose such men of a meane fortune , and are notwithstanding satisfied and content , to the end that on the one side they may haue no feare to touch their masters heart to the quicke ; least they should thereby lose the course of their aduancement ; and on the other side being of a meane condition , they may haue the more communication with all sorts of people . a prince is not to be credited , when he brags of his courage , to attend the encounter of his enemy , for the seruice of his glory ; if for his profit & aduancement he cannot endure the liberty of a friends words ; hauing no other effect nor aime but to pinch him by the eare , the rest of the operation being in his owne hands . wee reade in the turkes historie , that a bassa called by his master to the gouernment of the estate , and made vezir , which is the first charge of the empire next to the grand siegnour , holding himselfe not very capable of this charge , hee drew certaine persons secretly vnto him , who had charge to collect whatsoeuer they heard spoken in the citie of constantinople touching the gouernment of the estate , to relate it vnto him : and by this meanes being aduertized of all that was found good or bad , and of that which they desired to bee done or not done , hee gouerned himselfe in such sort , and without the helpe of any other councell , all things succeeded to his desire , and accomodating his actions to the will of the people , hee was admired by them , who before held him to bee vncapable of this charge . this may be practi●ed by the prince ; but yet hee may not forbeare to make choise of a good councell , to examine the propositions of that which by this meanes they haue discouered , to bee desired of the people . in this manner it shall bee easie for a prince to resolue , bee it that hee take the aduice of euery one secretly and apart ; or being assembled , hee cause them to deliuer their opinions openly , to the end that by the communication of their aduisoes , the resolution may bee more easie to take , either in following the greatest number of voyces , or in making choice of his opinion that seemes the best ; and the resolution taken , the execution must follow with all possible speede ; celeritie making all things easie , as well for that of it selfe , it is actiue and full of vigour , as for that it giues no leisure to crosse a businesse in the execution , before they can oppose it . chap. . of the forme of commanding . the fourth establishment to bee made in an estate , is the forme of commanding , in the which wee must consider two things ; the power of the commander , and the iustice of the commandement . the power of him which commands is either soueraigne or inferiour . the commandement of the soueraigne is , either generall , or particular : the generall consists in the lawes which the soueraigne establisheth , vnder which wee comprehend the ordinary orders , customes and statutes . the law is as it were a pledge and a generall safetie , which princes giue vnto their subiects , for the entertainement of contracts , and their course of liuing , which ought to be maintained and obserued , especially amongst them for the generall good of the estate . for reason alone which god hath put into man , being vnable to retaine him within the bonds of his dutie , and custome to liue ill , hauing made so great an impression in him , as neither prayers nor admonitions are able to retire him ; it hath beene needfull to imploy the authority of lawes ▪ and the force of the prince , to reduce euery man to reason , for feare of punishment , and by the establishment of certaine rules , to a sure order in the estate , and to confirme iudgments in iustice. in effect it were dangerous , to leaue all to the iudgment of men , in the multitude whereof will grow a confusion of opinions , if they had not some rule which they ought to follow , and they might more easily bee carried away by hatred or fauour : the which cannot happen to law-giuers , who making lawes for the future , are not transported with any priuate passion but for the publique . for although that the iudges were wise and without passion , yet it is more easie to finde a small number of wise men which establish the lawes , and the for me o●iudging , then to finde such a number as is necessary to be iudges . moreouer , the lawes are made with mature deliberation , and iudgements are giuen suddainly according to the occurrents of affaires : so as the rule is more safe taken from the law , then if the prince gaue it himselfe . the lawes are of diuers sorts , according to the diuersity of subiects , for the gouernment whereof they are made . for some rule the power of offices and magistrates , as well ecclesiasticall as ciuill ; and distinguish the function of their charges , their iurisdiction , honour , and preheminence one vpon another . others rule the treasure ; others the military discipline ; others the generall policy ; others iustice , as well in regard of the quality of persons , of contracts , treaties , and commerce among men ; as for the punishment of crimes , the order and forme of proceeding in iudgements by the parties and iudges . some are made to contayne the subiect in his duty towards the prince and magistrate , and to maintayne concord and peace . finally , the law must haue for his principall end the good of the estate , and to prouide for all the parts thereof , and for the inconueniences that may annoy it , and not for any particular profit for him that hath made it : otherwise the reuerence which hath caused it to be receiued , would part and be separated f●om such commandments , and there would remaine nothing but the sole authority and power . for although they say , that the will of the prince is a la● , yet this must not be vnderstood of all that comes into his fancy and will to doe ; but onely of that which ●e may iustly desire : for that the lawes ought to be made and published , to amend and correct the nature of things , for the which they meane to establish them , and not to second the appetite of him that makes them : we must therefore consider in making of lawes , the qualities which must concurre in a law. the first is , that it be according to publique honesty , obseruing the dignity of persons and things : that it be iust as well for the end whereunto it ought to tend , which is the publique good onely , as for the authority of him that makes it , who in establishing it , ought not to exceed the power that is giuen him . there is another quality which concernes the forme , to the end that equality and proportion may be kept , as in the imposition of iudges : for otherwise it were not a law , but a violence , to the which in conscience we are not bound to obey , but onely ●o auoyd scandall and sedition . it must likewise be peaceable and quiet according vnto nature , and the condition of such as ought to obey , and are subiects , grounded vpon naturall reason , and accommodated to the quality of affaires , and the customes of the countrey . for there are lawes which are good in one country , but would not be so in another . the lawes in like manner must be fitting for the time , being necessary to gouerne the estate , as a pilot doth his ship , according to the wind that blowes , and not lightly established . moreouer , the law must be profitable to all , or to the greatest part ; plaine , least its obscurity breeds some errour ; briefe , and according vnto some without preface , with the commandment onely . yet others are of a contrary opinion . for although that the principall intention of the law ought not to be to teach the reason for the which it is made , no more then the physitian , who is not called by the sick patient , to giue him a reason of his prescriptions , but to cure him , hauing more need of health then doctrine : yet for that they make lawes for men capable to vnderstand that which is necessary for the publique good , the prince ought ( as a common father ) not onely to make knowne vnto his people the end of the law , but also the reason , that he may know that the ordinances of his prince are no lesse full of reason then command . it is true , that when as by such mildnes●e and humanity the prince preuayles nothing with his subiects ; then he may with a sufficient excuse v●e his absolute commaund : for his duty binds him t● practise all meanes to moue and induce his subiects ▪ to well doing , yea , to imploy force , the which in it selfe is not bad , if it be well vsed . for although that the lawes ought not to be against men , yet they are made to commaund men ; and for that pleasure doth many times deceiue men , delighting in things which are pernicious and hurtfull ; the prince in making a law , must not haue any regard to the pleasure or displeasure which his subiects may take : but it shall suffice him , that those things which he ordaynes or commaunds , may be good and profitable to the publique . yet this is not to say , that he should not proceede in those courses which may breed a popular contentment ; but contrariwise he must haue this principal obiect after the good of the estate . behold what we are to follow in the establishment of a law , let vs now see what we are to fly . chap. . what we are to to a●oyde in the establishing of l●wes . among other things we must haue a speciall care not to establish any lawes but such as are very necessary . the multiplic●ty of lawes is ra●●● : then a testimony of confusion then good orders : for few lawes suffice to entertayne good men in their duties , and to punish the wicked if they be well obserued . the number of lawes proceeds commonly from two causes , the one is the ambition and vanity of , those which cōmand , who to gaine the reputation of wel ruling , will prouide for all , yea for matters of small moment . the which is a cause that being of this quallity , they are not obserued , and the people accustoming themselues not to obay lawes of small importance , they afterward do easily dispence with themselues from doing that which lawes of greater importance commaunds . wherefore it is better to leaue the care of such great and weighty things to the magistrate , who may prouide according to occurrents . the other cause , from whence the multitude of lawes do vsually proceed , is the bad inclination of the prince , who hauing an intent to domineere ouer the magistrates & publick , in his particular appetites and affayres , makes what lawes he can to offend in particular , eyther those whom he feares or such as he hates : or of that , from whence he thinkes he may draw some profit for his owne particular . i come vnto the obseruation of lawes , without the which , the establishment were fruitlesse . to this obseruation two things are necessary : the example of great men , and of those which commaund ; and seuerity . for as the lawes prescribe vnto subiects the rule of well liuing , so the prince ought to giue an example for the obseruation and entertaynment of the lawes : and the prince is called the liuing law of the estate , not only for his intelligence and power to make a law ; but also for the obseruation of that , which they teach by way of commaundment , the prince by his example commaunds it . when i say the example of the prince , i speak not of his person alone , but of those of his trayne , of his neerest fauourites , and of the greatest personages : for it would little auayle him to obserue the lawes , if he suffer the great men of his court to break them . wherefore he must haue an eye , for that the subiects of a meane condition cannot receiue a greater contentment then to see the actions of great persons conformable to the common rule , conceiuing an opinion thereby to haue some equality and participation with them , in acknowledging them equall in this obedience . as the example of the prince serues to inuite men to doe well , so seuerity retires and hinders those ( whom impunity might abandon ) from doing euill . this seuerity notwithstanding doth not extend to search out and punish the most secret offences ; but those which may be the cause of bad example . likewise it is certayne that the punishments or dayned by the lawes , are more in regard of the scandall then for the crime , whereof god is the principall reuenger , and not so much to punish the offence past , as to strike terrour into the wicked for the future , by the rigour of punishment , not to commit the like fault . and although the intention of the law be not to hinder any man , yet for that men sometimes commit errours , which deserue ( eyther in regard of the person which commits them , or for some other good respect ) compassion and mercy : in this case the prin●e may moderate the rigour of the law by a fauorable temper , or giue him an absolute pardon , if the subiect deserues it ; and that herein he cannot bri●g impunity in other things , or in equality which breeds scandall to good men to the preiudice of the estate . for this effect pardons must not be too frequent , but for a subiect that is full of merit , and they must be pleasing to the most part . but when he shall be forced to shew himselfe seuere , as it is necessary sometimes , that in the disobedience of the subiects the prince should be rigorous : if punishment may be called ●igour : this ●igour ingendring vsually feare , the which seldome accompanied with loue , he must amidst his actious of seuerity , extend his bounty to good men : and then the feare which was full of hatred , will bee conuerted in●o reuerence . this shall suffice for that which concernes the generall commaunds of the soueraigne , which are made by lawes , ordinances , and other such kinde of commands . chap. . of the princes particular commaunds . as for the particular commaunds which are made vpon occasions which happen dayly , the forme is in a manner equall : for that it ought to be constant in that which they haue first vndertaken to establish , and not to change vpon euery difficulty which may happen , but contrariwise they should striue to surmount al● the crosses which may present themselues . this forme of commaund shal be like vnto the other accompanied with seuerity , being needfull to p●euent disobedience in small matters : for that this vice like vnto others , growes by degrees . but aboue all , hee which commaunds , must deale in such sort , as the soueraigne commaund may depend wholy on him , and be tyed to his person : not that the prince should therefore draw vnto himselfe all the gouernment , and the whole mann●ging of th● estate : for besides that he should find himselfe ●uer-bu●thened , and that in the multitude of aff●ires th●re will be many ill cared for , and worse executed , ●e should cha●ge his principality with euny ; and his subiects seeing themselues depriued of the administration of offices , would grow cold in the affections which they ought to beare him . but the soueraigne authority ought not to be imparted to any one , nor the distribution of recompences and offices , nor the absolute cōmand of forces ; least that he to whom the prince hath giuen this power changing his affection and will , shou●d take occasion to a●tempt against the estate , hauing the commodity ●f such an aduantage : whereof there are but too many examples histories . we haue treated of the commandments of a soueraigne power : let vs now obserue the forme of their commaund , whose power is inferiour , and to whom the charges of the estate are distributed , to haue care and to watch ouer that part of the estate which is committed vnto them . chap. . of magistrates . it being necessary that of all the parts of an estate , there should not any remayne without gouernment ; one alone being vnable to imbrace all ; being likewise vnfit , that the soueraigne should be troubled in matters which may be done better by those which are inferiour vnto him : it hath beene held necessary to giue order , that this supreme authority , yet without suffring any demuniti●n , should be dispersed into many parts ; and that power should be giuen to a certayne number of men , to hea●e , ordayne , or prouide particularly , for affaires of least importance , and the which are all so many branches of the soueraignty , out of which they grow , and are supported as by their stemme , and by the which reciprocally the soueraignty beings forth flowers , leaues , and fruits . the distinction of these inferiour powers is diuers , according to the diuersity of the parts of the estate . for some are ordayned to free the prince from the care and particular safety of the prouinces , and to watch ouer them ; as that of gouernours : others haue the care of religion : others of war● ; others of the treasure ; others of policy ▪ others of iustice ; others of iudgements , which must be giuen vpon the controuersies of priuate persons , or fo● the punishments of crimes ; others must haue an eye to the affaires abroad ; as embassadours or agents ; others are destinated to assist the greatnesse of the prince , to d●spose of his house and traine , and to s●rue him i● his court. and as euery one of their parts is subdiuided into many others ; so according to these subdiuisions , the charges are in themselues distinguished into functions : and in this diuersity there are some which haue power to command , proceeding from the sole authority of the prince , or from that of the lawes , the which haue attributed this power to the office. others are erected for the seruice of the estate ; others for the execution of commandments . some hauing distinguished publique offices , a●cording vnto honour , iurisdiction , and command . for some are without honour , iurisdiction , or command ; and in this ranke they place all those which are destinated for the seruice or execution of the superiours commandments , as registers , notaries , cryers , sergeants , trumpets ▪ and such like . others are with honour , yet without power to command or to iudge ; as embassadours , councells , and secretaries of estate , receiuers of the treasure , and most part of the officers of the princes trayne . others haue honour and iurisdiction , but no power to command , as prelates . others haue honour and power to command , but no iurisdiction , as the consuls in old time at rome , and at this present the gouernours of prouinces , and the kings procurators . others haue honour , iurisdiction , and power to command , and these are properly called magistrates . chap. . of the differences betwixt officers and commissaries . it were a fruitlesse thing to busie my selfe here , to discourse particularly of the duties and power attributed to euery publique office : for that it is diuersly practized , not only in seuerall estates , but also in the same estate , as it is held most expedient for the publique good , to increase the power of the one , and to diminish that of another . and relating only that which is most generally obserued , i will content my selfe to adde vnto these former distinctions one ot●er , which is drawn from the forme in the which a power is giuen to those which are imployed in publique charges . for charges are gi●en eyther by office or by the way ●f commission : if in an office , he that hath the charge is called an officer : if by commission he is tearmed a commissioner . the charge of an officer is regulated by the law , or by the edict of the erection of the office : and by the letters of commission the charge of a commissioner is limitted . this difference is betwixt an officer and a commissioner , that the charge of an officer is ordinary , and hath a perpetuall course , although that in regard of the person the exercise be limitted to a certayne time ▪ and the charge of a commissioner is extraordinary , and reuokable at the good pleasure of him that hath giuen the commission . there are foure things to be considered in a commission : the person from whence it proceeds ; the direction ; the charge ; and the time when it is to expire . in regard of the first , commissions proceed either from the soueraigne , or from his officers , or from other cōmissioners deputed by the soueraigne , who may commit , there happening some lawfull let , vnlesse it bee forbidden , or there be a question of state , or of the life and honour of some persons : for in this case they cannot sub-deligate . for the direction , a commission is directed either to an officer , or to a priuate person : if to an officer , it is either a thing depending of his office ; and in this case , the the letters are neither executorie of his dutie , then letters of commission , if the time or place be not changed ; and differs from that which is mentioned in the edict of the execution of the office. in this concurrence● the ordinary knowledge is to bee preferred before the commission ; euen as the qualitie of the officer is preferrable to that of a commissioner , and the actes of the officers more assured then those of commissioners . but if it be a matter which belongs not vnto them , in regard of their office , and that there bee a difference in some circumstance ; then he cannot get it as an officer , but onely in qualitie of a commissioner . in the charge we must consider the end , for the which it is giuen vs ; and the power wee haue by it . the end concernes either the instruction , or the knowledge of some businesse : and the power regards the decision , iudgment or resolut●●n , and the comm●ndement for the execution of that which we haue resolued . i call instuction all that which is to bee done , to bring a businesse to an estate ready to be resolued and determined . the knowledge giuen vnto a commissioner , is either of factor of ●ight ; or of both together , wherein hee shall carry himselfe , as w●e will she● by and by , treating of the duty of the magistrate towards the commandement of the prince : the power to iudge is g●uen either definitiuely , & without an appeale , or without execution if there be an appeale ; or els with power to 〈◊〉 in executiō that which we haue resolued , notwit●standi●g any opposition or appelation , and without preiudice thereof . for the power of command , either it is giuen the commissioner for the execution of that which hee had ordained ; or the commissioner is commanded to execute that himselfe , which another had decreed , hauing no power to command a third : and this last kind of commission , is directed to inferior officers , who are simple executioners of the commandements of their superiors . from the consideration of that which i haue said wee may gather , that the duty of a commissioner is to r●gulate himselfe , according to the termes of his commission , the which he may in no sort exceede . for although that this generall clause bee inserted to carry himselfe according to the quality of persons , and as hee shall see matters disposed , hee may adde or diminish to the instructions that are giuen him in writing , according to his wisedome and discretion : yet this must be vnderstood of the accessary of his charge , and of the smallest matters , for of those which are important hee may not dispose without speciall command . for although they referre it to his wisedome and discretion ; yet the ignorance of a commissioner were not excuseable , this clause being to bee vnderstood according to the examination of an honest and sufficient man , especially when it concernes the publike good of the estate . it remaines now to know when the commission expires . it ceaseth , if he which granted it comes to die : if the thing or person for the which the charge is giuen , bee no m●re in being : if hee which hath giuen the commission reuokes it ; if the commissioner during the commission , obtaines an office or magistracie , equall to him who granted the commission , so as the businesse bee entire ▪ or that being begunne it may bee left , without preiudice to the publique or to priuate persons . chap. . considerations vpon the establishment of officers and magistrates . these distinctions knowne , many other poynts are to be considered in the establishment of those , to whom this power of commaund vnder the soueraigne , or to mannage other affaires concerning the estate is attributed , be it by office or commission ; but principally we must consider the number of those that are to be imployed : the authority of him which hath established and imployed them ; the qualities of those whom they put into offices ; the forme of proceeding in these establishments ; the time they ought to remayne in authority ; and finally the duty of principall magistrates , aswell towards the soueraigne and the lawes , as to other magistrates that are equall or inferiour , and towards particular persons . the number of officers or ministers in one charge is b●an●ed by many ; and yet it is more safe to commit a 〈◊〉 to many ●●en to one . first , for that they watch one another , and as it were through iealousie , euery m●nst●ies vp i● compa●●●n to execute his charge the better : and 〈◊〉 ●●uer it many times happens , that after they haue made e●●●tion of some , they do not answere the opini●n that was conceined of them ; in which case there b●i●g many , one helpes and releiues another . the more they are , the more difficulty they wil be corrupted ; and if a●y be , their corruption shall haue the lesse force to commit a bad 〈◊〉 ; ore alone , or few hauing no power to 〈◊〉 many , and it is a difficult thing that all s●ould agree together to deceiue . mor●ouer the ordinary i●conueniences , as sicknes●e or other naturall hinderances , befalling a minister , if he be alone , his charge ( which it may be is necessary for the publique ) will remay●e in suspence and without exercise , and the publique affayres by this meanes delayed , not without preiudice to the estate . as for the plurality of officers , which growes from the plurality of charges , the charges being distinguished one from another , so as they cannot be confounded ; so as this plurality is so farre from being hurtfull or preiudiciall vnto the estate , as it is profitable . by this meanes no part of the estate is neglected : you content and pacifi● the ambition of many , who liuing priuately in idlenesse , would seeke to imploy themselues in some innouation : and you bind them to the preseruation of the estate , for that they would feare that an alteration would change the order , and by consequence impayre their authority . but as in this diuersity of charges , we must prouide that confusion may not trouble , neyther the officers in their charges , nor priuate men in their businesse : we must auoyd irresolution which is ordinary in a multitude , and the tediousnesse of affayres , which happens when as many take knowledge of one thing one after another . irresolution wil be aduoyded , not in reducing the affayres to the knowledge of one alone , or of two , but to a competent number , according to the quality of businesse , and those must be vnequall , to the end that the plurality of voy●es may decide the businesse , and that they may not be subiect to be diuided in opinion . the teadiousnes would be auoyded in cutting off the degrees of those which are to take knowledge one aboue another ; and it seemes that two degrees would suffice . but they must auoyd in the one and the other , a plurality in the charge of the treasure of the estate , where the people is opprest , by the fees or rights attributed to officers : the which may be done by two meanes . the first in giuing more honour vnto offices , and lesse wages and fees : and the other in giuing them hope to ascend by degrees vnto greater dignities . this meanes likewise will serue to make the greatest affect and seeke the meanest offices , making them know that they cannot come to the greatest before they passe through the others ; and there will alwayes remayne a place for the princes fauour , making choyse of one among many which are in the same charge , to rayse him vnto a greater dignity , and this order may also serue to cause the affayres to be mannaged with more integrity . for they which desire to aduance themselues , will feare that doing otherwise they shal be reiected when they desire to rise . in like manner the capacity wil be greater in such , as shal be ad●anced to more eminent charges . for that hauing past through many degrees , they will haue more knowledge , both of the affayres and of the manner how to mannage them . chap. . of the creation and nomination of magistrates , and officers . the magistrate or officers , euen the principall ought to be made by the soueraigne , being one of the greatest markes of soueraignty . the which i meane not only for the creation and erection of offices , but for the choyse of persons : there being no greater errour ( although ordinary in princes ) then to relye vpon some other , for the choyse of a man to aduance him to so●e office. and we must not wonder if they be ill serued , although their intent be good ; nor if the lawes be so ill executed : for that hauing no will to take the paines , to search out and examine the merite of their principall subiects ; they cannot dispose of offices proportionably to their natures and capacities . for besides that there is a difference , in regard of the vnderstanding betwixt affaires of importance , and those of lesse moment in the execution : there must be more courage in the greater , and lesse subtilty in the lesse : which are two principall parts which seldome ioyne together : no more then in iron tooles , where we see that a knife for that it hath the edge finer , will doe an effect that a hatchet cannot doe ; and he that will imploy a hatchet like vnto that of a knife , he shall make it vnprofitable to cut any hard substance , wherein they imploy it vsually : so as they must imploy euery toole to the vse for which it is made . for although that affaires ought to be mannaged by discretion , and not by inclination : yet it behoues the wisdome of the prince , to know that most part of the affaires of this world are gouerned more by inclination then otherwise . wherefore he must cunningly make vse of this defect . for nature hath giuen to euery mans condition some good thing in exchange of some defect which is found in him : if it hath giuen to some one a flownesse to begin , it hath likewise imparted an obstinacy to continue and finish the worke , ballancing his negligence with pers●uerance . to those which by nature shal be suddaine and hasty , and who in regard of their impatiency , striue to doe things out of season ; she hath giuen hardinesse , by the meanes whereof they haue effected great matters . these defects being common among men , the prince shall accommodate himselfe , and distribute the charges according to euery mans humour and inclination ; and to treate a businesse , it shall suffice to informe him whom he meanes to imploy , of the grounds and substance of the businesse , and to leaue the rest to him to mannage according to his naturall inclination , be it graue , modest , seuere , or otherwise : for that they may vse diuers meanes tending to the same end ; and if it be forced , the businesse wil not succeed . but in making choyce , he must consider , that the humour and sufficiency may be proportionable to the businesse , and to the humour of those with whom he is to treate . the same must be obserued for all those whom they imploy in charges and publique affaires . and although it were to be desired that in the mannaging of affaires , they might haue men that were discreet , and of great sufficiency ▪ yet for that these two qualities doe seldome mee●e together in so high a degree as were to be desired ; it were better to choose them of a meane vnderstanding , so as they be honest men : for that his sharp subti●ty proceedes from choller , to the which such men are subiect to suffer themselues to be tran●ported for a smal matter ; and moreouer hauing a good conceipt of themselues , and a bad of others , they can hardly agree with any man. besides they are vsually of small fore-sight , for the little leasure their promptnesse giues them ; and for the passion which blinds them , they are many times desirous of nouelties . for neuer allowing those orders which are made with a mature deliberation and their quicknesse of spirit , furnishing them with others , which in their opinions seeme better ; they striue to purchase beleefe , and in this attempt they sometimes cause trouble . they which are of a meane vnderstanding , support the accidents which happen more easily ; and when as they finde themselues in an estate well ordred , and gouerned by good lawes , they maintaine themselues long . such men most commonly are inclined to fleagme . and if by a breeding contrary to their nature , they haue not beene stirred vp to ambition , they obey more willingly then the rest ; for that their humour being grosse , the impression which nature hath bred , is more firme , and the desires and appetites stronger . but in choosing magistrates and officers , they must not onely consider the vertues of men , but also the vices and naturall defects , which they may haue ; and to obserue if these defects be so powerfull , as they may hinder him in the exercise wherein they meane to imploy him . as for example , in a iudge , there is no doubt but a iust man for his iustice ought to be chosen ; but if hee be fearfull , assure your selfe , if hee be to giue sentence against some great man , he will leaue iustice to adhere to safety . moreouer a magistrate must loue and vnderstand the lawes : for louing them hee will obserue them ; and louing and vnderstanding them , hee will make others capable to obserue them . but to make the choyce of officers easily , the meanes would bee ( as wee haue formerly said ) to make many degrees , and to choose out of the last degree , him whom they meane to aduance to the next , and so from degree to degree : for they should know by their actions what they would bee before they make choice of them . this shall suffice for the principall qualities of magistrates and officers . let vs now come to the forme of making them . chap. . of the forme and manner to create and make magistrates and officers : and of the time of their charges . they are made either by election or by lot , or by both together . the election or choice is referred to one alone who names and chooseth whom hee pleaseth , which is the ordinary manner in all principallities ; or else it is referred to many ; and is done either by voice , or in lifting vp the hand and voice ; or by billets or by beans . the lot is cast , either vpon certaine citizens , out of which they will choose some one to imploy in some charge ; or vpon all those which are of the same age or the same condition , out of which they will likewise by lot draw one or two to aduance them to some office. the lot and choyce concurres together diuersly . for either they choose a certaine number by voices , out of which afterwards they desire to draw one to bee an officer ; or hauing drawne many by lot , they giue them power to choose one amongst them , which is held most capable . in this difference it is to be obserued , that the discontent of those which are not chosen is the lesse , when the lot proceeds the choyce , then when the choyce goes before the lot. wherefore in places whereas hatred is irreconcilliable , it were better to make vse of this last kind , then of the first . let vs now see what time officers ought to remaine in the exercise of their charges . this is diuersly obserued . in some estates they continue them during life : in others they are limmited to a certaine time . in some for a yeere ; in others for two ; and in others , although they were continued in their places during life , yet being many in the same charge , they made them serue alternatiuely one after another . they which haue beene of opinion to make officers temporary , and not to continue them during life , had for their principall consideration to abate the insolence and pride which a long command brought with it ; as also to haue meanes to call officers to an accompt , hauing giuen ouer their charges , fearing they should not bee able to draw them so easily , being still in authority : in like manner to preuent the impunity of those , which had transgressed in their offices . to make many pertakers of the estate , not onely to satisfie the ambitious , to cut off discontments ; but also to recompence many good men , & to make more capable of affairs , & to stir them vp to the care of the publique . some also haue beene of this opinion , to hinder that the gouernment might not bee vsurped by few men , who would make the rest subiect : hauing beene often seene by many examples , that the continuance of command hath made vsurpations easie , not onely vpon popular estates , but also in principalities and seignouries ; the offices and charges for life hauing beene made hereditary and patrimonicall in many estates . they which would perpetuate them , haue had other consideration : for that making the magistrates annall , or for a short time they leaue their offices before they are informed of their duties ; so as the estate falls alwayes into the hands of vncapable men , and by these suddaine and frequent changes , most part of affaires remaine vndecided , warrs begunne left vnperfit , suits and differences laid by , and punishments and executions delayed . there is another consideration , which is , that the time being short , the merchants study to doe their businesse speedily : and this change brings nothing , but new starued hors-leaches , which must be filled ; whereas they which are already full by their offices , might giue more ease vnto the people . and as from new seruants growes the enuie of families , so from new magistrates proceeds the fall of estates , which bring new councells , new designes , new lawes , new customes , new edicts , new kinds of liuing , and new iudgements . tiberius to withdraw the greate men of rome from the knowledge of publique affaires , and to assure those the more whom he imployed in offices , hee continued them during life . wherefore to auoid the greatest part of the inconueniences which are found in either party ; you must consider the forme of the estate , and the humour of the subiects . popular estates are maintained by the continuall change of magistrates , to the end that euery one according to his qualitie may haue his part , as they haue in a soueraigntie , and that equallitie ( the nurse of a popular estate ) may be the better entertayned by the annual succession of magistrates ; least that the custome of commaunding long , should cause some one to desire to seaze vpon the soueraignty : the which is a consideration which they ought to haue in seignouries , and estates gouerned by few persons . in principallities it is not needfull to teach subiects to command , but to obay . and being necessary to retayne them in their duties , they cannot assure themselues but of few to maintayne the rest . yet to preuent that the continuance of a great charge should not make some one dream of the vsurpation of the estate , they may in continuing other officers in their places , ballance the power of great men , in giuing them companions as great as themselues : or after the expiration of some time , to cause them to passe from one charge to another , which hath more honour but lesse power . wherfore some haue held it fit , to distinguish the charges whereon the force depends , from those to whom they wil giue authority ; and to make others aboue them , who shall haue more honour then authority or power . this course is obserued by the pope and the seignoury of venice . the gouernments depending on the church , the authority is giuen to a clergy-man for the gouernment , but the force is committed to another , who depends immediatly on the pope ; yet hauing charge , in that which shal concerne the gouernment , to assist the resolutions of him that hath the authority . in gouernments depending on the seignoury of venice , a gentleman of the common-weale commaunds : and for the forces a captayne of the seignoury , who hath charge to assist him . but in neyther of these estates , the gouernour and he which commands the forces , are not linckt together , as the one would fauour the vsurpation of his companion . for as the gouernour would not allow of his vsurpation that commaunds the forces , for that it cannot be done but against his authority : so he cannot expect and assistance from him , fearing that hauing made this ouerture , and the other making shew to yeeld vnto it , being master of the forces , the authority of the estate and gouernour being weakned by this enterprize , he would chase him away , and make himselfe master of the gouernment . and these charges being not the most honourable in an estate , but there being others more eminent , those which enioy them , ayming at the honour of the others , study not to settle themselues there ; but contrariwise some affect to be made cardinals , and to be drawne from those places , and the others to attaine vnto the chiefe offices of the seignoury . kings who haue but one sort of people to imploy in gouernments , make vse of other meanes , some make gouernments triennall , and not onely the gouernments of prouinces , but also of cittadels and forts , causing that these depend not on the others : but in certaine things , and accompany the gouernour with forces ; which are not particularly at their deuotion , but onely ●o farre forth as the gouernours shall contayne themselues in the princes seruice . but if the gouernours cannot be changed , they may change the forces which ought to assist them . but forasmuch as the prince ought to be master , and dispose freely of great places , it seemes that hee might giue them for a certayne time ; and the affaires so requiring it , they might continue them to the same persons , if he thought it fit ; if not hee might take them into his hands , and deliuer them to others , without any cause of discontentment to those from whom he had taken them . for this expresse limitation of time would worke two effects : the one that they which are aduanced to these places ; entring into them , would resolue to leaue them : the other , that being certayne they must goe forth , they will neuer thinke to become masters , and settle themselues : whereas the time not being limmited , euery one will striue to continue in his place , and there to build his designes ; but also will desire to bring in after him some one of his children or kinsmen . and if the prince desires to retire him , he must buy his place of him , or cause it to be bought by some other ; which is to bring in a venality , more shamefull and dangerous in an estate , then any other abuse that can bee imagined . we will therefore conclude , that this change in the gouernment of prouinces , and the command of great troupes or companies , be it of souldiers or others which haue great authority in the estate , is necessary for the safety of the soueraigne , and the peace of the subiect . but for that in doing this altogether , they which would desire to continue in their charges , might plot together and trouble the estate , to maintayne themselues ; he must change them one after another , causing the time of their charges to expire at diuers termes . there is another consideration which hath beene discreetly and wisely made in great estates , not to giue great commands in a prouince to those which are natiues , not onely to auoyde the iniu●tices which such persons may commit as well in fauour of their kinsfolkes and friends , as in hatred of their enemies ; but also to auoyde the contempt of his authority which giues these charges , which proceeds commonly from the iealousie of those of the countrey , who hold themselues equall , and sometimes greater then he that is aduanced . but if he that is made gouernour bee so great , as they neede not feare this iealousie , yet the prince must make vse of this meanes , to auoyde the swelling authority which hee may get in the prouince by his owne meanes , or by that of his kinsfolkes and friends , to the preiudice of his master . our ancient ordinances conformable therein to those of the romans , had therein very well prouided , especially in regard of bayleifes and seneshals , who were the ancient gouernours : but they haue beene and are yet very ill gouerned and obserued . it auayles not to say , that to facilitate the obedience of subiects , they haue beene forced to take this course ; the subiect obeying more willingly one of his prouince , who hee thinkes would haue the same affection like himselfe for that which concernes the good thereof , the which a stranger and vnknown vnto him would not doe , whom he imagines to be vnlike in humour and will. for this were to make the prince subiect to his officer , and to make the obedience of the people depend more on the credit which the officer hath , then of the authority which the prince ought to haue ouer his subiects , who obey not the prince , but so farre forth as it shall please the officer ; and the officer losing his credit , the prince shall be no more obeyed . but if in a new estate to settle himselfe , it is very fitting to make vse of those which haue most credit with his subiects , the princes authority hauing not yet taken roote in their minds ; but i will not thereby inferre that he must continue it : but contrariwise this authority being acknowledged , to settle it absolutely , the obedience must immediately depend , and they must obey the officer so farre forth as he hath authority from the prince , and not for the particular credit he hath among the people . chap. . of the duty of the principall officers and magistrates . as for the support of the body , it is not sufficient that the head be in good estate , but the other members in like manner must doe their function : so in an estate , it is not sufficient for the prince to doe his duty , but the officers , and especially the principall magistrates of the estate , should likewise doe theirs . but i should be tedious , if i would relate here all the whole duty of euery officer : onely i will deliuer in generall termes that which concernes the duty of such as haue iurisdiction and command together , or the one and the other diuided ; as those which are more considerable and worthy of obseruation in the mannaging of the estate . their duty is considered in foure diuers subiects : eyther towards the lawes , or towards the soueraignes commandments ; or towards the other magistrates ; or towards priuate persons . vnder the name of the lawes we comprehend the ordinances and customes , which oblige the generall . for the regard of ordinances , the duty of the principall magistrates is , to examine those which they will make , in that which belongs to iustice , decency , and publique profit and commodity ; and from the consequence to make their remonstrance vnto the soueraigne before they declare or publish them , if they finde any thing to bee reformed and amended . as for those which are already receiued , they must cause them to be strictly obserued , and restore the old abolished for want of vse , before they put them in execution : otherwise it would be a very vniust thing , and resenting tyranny , after they had for a long season contemned an ordinance , to proceed suddainly against those who hauing not obserued it , had made a breach : the common errour being not onely excusable , but also held for a law , if the law of nature doth not resist . but for that the lawes are not sufficient to gouerne an estate , for that they ordayne onely in generall , the law-giuer , or prince being vnable to fore-see an infinite number of particularities which happen in affaires : for this cause the magistrate is established , to examine the particularities , and to accommodate the law thereunto by a iust and vpright interpretation ; the which is taken eyther from the words of the law , or from the intention of him that made it , or by the induction or conclusion which may bee drawne from it . in regard of the words of the law , you must obserue these rules : first , not to take them nor interpret them contrary to the intention of the law-giuer : secondly , you must see if the other clauses of the law doe correspond and agree with the interpretations which we giue . but if by reason of ambiguity , and the diuers significations of words , there be obscurity , they must seeke the proper signification either from the common manner of speaking , or from that which was peculiar to him that drew the law ; if it did not plainely appeare , that the intention of the law-giuer had beene wholy contrary to the proper signification of words . if there bee found a double interpretation , taken from the propriety of words , and the common vse of speaking ; they shall follow the mildest ; and if the words bee obscure , they must haue recourse to custome , and to that which is practised in that regard . but if the interpretation be notwithstanding doubtfull , they must follow that which shal be most proper for the matter , to the which it must be referr'd . and if notwithstanding all this they cannot draw any interpretation suitable to the businesse , or to reason ; he must cause it to be interpreted by those who haue made the law ; or cause a declaration to be made by the soueraigne . thus the magistrate must carry himselfe in the interpretation of the words of the law. but in the interpretation of the intention of the law , there are other rules : eyther they restrayne the ordinances to certayne ●ases , or they extend them to many others then those which are specified . they restrayne the ordinances commonly , when as the reason which seeme to haue beene the cause of the ordinance , doth not extend but to certayne cases , and ceaseth in all the rest , in regard of certayne circumstances ; for the reason of the law fayling , the disposition can take no place . but to seeke out the reason of the law , we must consider , whether it be exprest by the law it selfe , or gathered by the interpreters ; and to draw from thence the condition of things whereof the law speakes , or if it be vncertayne . for if it be exprest by the law , eyther the law is formall in the case that it is in question , and then without doubt the law must be followed ; or if it be not altogether formall , you must consider whether there be not some contrary circumstances which hinder the reason of the law , that it takes not place in the businesse that is in questi●n : and they shall doe the like , if the reason be not exprest in the law , of the execution whereof they treate , but in another fact vpon another subiect . but if the reason be gathered from interpreters , you must see if they can yeeld no better : and then you must follow it , restrayning it ; if it be particular , and extending it if it be generall . but if it be doubtfull , and ordaynes generally , you may not in this doubt in any sort restrayne the effect of the law , vnlesse it be in things that are odious and hurtfull : and whereas the law shall bee limited in certaine cases , they must not easily extend it to others vpon pretext of equitie , vnlesse there were an identite of reasons , especially in things which concerne the rigour of the law , whereas the case not exprest is held for omitted . but in such occurrents , they shall gouerne themselues according to the common law , to the which all the ordinances , if it may bee , must bee referred ; to the end that in all the lawes of the estate , vniformitie may bee obserued , and naturall equitie followed , whereby all the actions of men should bee gouerned , and regulated . wherefore the case not being expressed in the law , but onely the reason being knowne whereon the law is grounded ▪ it shall be easie to examine if this reason may take place , in that which presents it selfe , in concluding from the generall to the particular , from the principall to the accessary , and by the other meanes of induction . thus allowing one of the contraries which haue no meane , wee may induce that the other is forbidden : and in like manner , if the law forbids one thing to auoid a mischiefe which may follow ; wee may induce that it likewise forbids all other things , which may breed the like mischiefe , although they be not exprest . and so many consequences may bee drawne from the lawes , and referred to diuers examples , whereof the reason would be easie to applie from one to another . wherefore to recollect my selfe , and to explaine more at large what i haue said , as long as the law is certaine , wee must stand firme to its authority , and make no subtile distinctions vpon equitie : for that the laws are published to be obserued in their termes and tenor , and not to bee disputed of : i say so farre foorth as it is plaine and not obscure . but if it bee obscure , they shall follow the interpretation that is most receiued by vse ; so as it bee not altogether contrary to naturall reason . but if vse failes vs , wee must in the diuersitie of opinions , follow that which is supported by example : yet wee must examine the example duly , to see if they agree in the cause , and principall circumstances . when as vse and examples faile , they shall choose the opinion which shall approach neerer to naturall equitie then to rigour ; and that which shall bee more conformable to the intention of the law , then that which shall be drawne from the subtile interpretation of words : and that which shall bee taken from the true interpretation of words , then from similitudes and coniectures : for that all similitudes halt ; and coniectures neuer conclude directly : or from that which shall bee receiued , or most conformable to that which the ancients haue held , for that we may not slightly leaue the opinion of the ancient . but when wee cannot iudge which opinion is the most iust , wee must consider which is the safest , and that which is approued by most men , and by the wisest , more sortable to the businesse that is in question , and which hath in it lesse inconuenience . behold how the magistrate ought to carry himselfe , in the interpretation of the lawes . the other part of the maiestrates duty is the execution , for the which he must enter into other considerations : and first from what time the law or ordinance ought to take place ; when they bind the subiect ; and who they are that are bound . for the first , you must vnderstand that the last ordinances , being contrary to the precedent , derogate from them : but the last cannot take place , but for differences to come , and not for those which are decided , or hanging in iudgement by appeale . and the ordinance is in force from the day of the publication , and from that time it binds euery man for the future , which is for the second point . for the third , the princes law doth not bind the subiects which are gone to reside in the territory of another prince . yet if the ordinance be prohibitiue , they must consider if the prohibition or defence bee made in regard of something , which is in the territory of him which hath made the ordinance : for then a stranger or the subiect of another prince should be bound . but if it bee in regard of persons , that the prohibition is made and in fauour of the subiects ; the princes subiect is bound not to contradict it , although hee remaine in the territory of another prince . but if it be in hatred of the subiect , hee that is out of the territory of the soueraigne , which hath made the ordinance , is not bound . if the prohibition be made for solemnitie , which they desire to haue obserued in some acte , it doth not oblige the subiect out of the territory of his prince , for that in the obseruation of solemnitie , they regard the place where the act is made . as for other persons whom the ordinance may bind , they must distinguish whether they bee named in the ordinance by their names , or specified by their quallitie and condition , or if there be no designation . the name or the condition being specified , the ordinance doth not extend to those which are of another name , and another qualitie . but if there be no qualitie specified , the ordinance bindes not only all those which gaue consent to the publication , but also such as remaine in the place where it is obserued , were they strangers : whence this distinction proceeds , that in things that are personall , proceeding from contracts , solemnities , and acts of voluntary iurisdiction ; they must follow that which is obserued in the place of their abiding , but in that which is of the realitie of things ; they shal be bound to that which is receiued in the place where the thing is scituated . ordinances are in force , not for that they are written or iust , but in regard they are commanded and made by the soueraigne . for hee that should obey the law onely for that it is iust , should not obey it as hee ought , this iustice being subiect to debate . so customs haue the force of law , for that they are re●eiued and alowed by the iudgment of the people : and although there may be some exception , so as it be not against the law of nature , the magistrate is bound to obserue them , and to cause them to be obserued by others . but it is lawfull for the magistrate to extend or restraine the law with the reason in certayne cases . yet he hath not the same power with a custome , the which consisting more in fact then in law , and in the particular vse then in reason , he must obserue it with the circumstances , with the which it hath beene receiued . to make a custome to haue the force of a law , three things are required . the first , that it hath beene brought in from the beginning to be obserued for the future . for you cannot authorize by this name that which some , ( ayming at another thing , or by the indulgence or conniuency of the magistrate ) haue sometimes done : for that a custome cannot take its beginning from a casuall or rash vse , but from an vse continued by a common obseruation . the second point necessary to authorise a custome , is the reiteration of many the like acts ; not so much to endure a plurality of examples , as a consent of opinion , by the frequency of these acts ; and by this consent two acts suffice to confirme a custome . the third and last thing required for the approbation of a custome , is the time of tenne yeares at the least ; some hold thirty yeares that the consent in this manner of liuing should continue : and that custome shal be of the more authority when it is fortified by the longer prescription of time . chap. of the duty of the magistrate towards his soueraigne . the duty of the magistrate towards his soueraign● , consists in the respect and obedience he owes , not onely to the princes person , in whose presence all the power of magistrates is held in suspence , as the stars lose their light in the presence of the sunne , ( the magistrates being not brought in , what power soeuer they haue , but to supply the presence of the prince , their soueraigne ) but also to the commandments of the soueraigne : the which as they are of diuers sorts , so the duty of the magistrate● , is to carry himselfe diuersly for the enrolling or ver●fying thereof . for eyther the cōmandment consists in the knowledge of the cause , and in this case the power of the magistrate remaines entire : or the commandment giues him knowledge of the right , but not of the fact : and in this case the officer ought notwithstanding to enquire of the fact , although the prince had assured him to be well informed of the truth : vnlesse he had expressely forbidden him to take notice : for then the magistrate may not proceede : onely he may ( the fact being notoriously false ) acquaint his soueraigne with the truth , and yeeld to that which hee should reply vpon his remonstrances . but if the letters did onely giue him knowledge of the fact , and not of the right and merite of the graunt ; the officer ought to obey , so as it be nothing against the right of nature : if notwithstanding if it be against the lawes and generall ordinances , or that it may bring some inconuenience or preiudice to the estate , or to a part thereof ; he may make his remonstrances , not once onely but twice or thrice . but if notwithstanding the prince will haue the officer proceede to th● verification , hee must doe it , although the matter were vnlawfull . for although it bee certaine , that the prince may not command any thing that is vniust , nor that is subiect to scandall or reprehension , or which may bee reiected by his officer : yet for that by the constraint , which the soueraigne is forced to vse , the ignorant multitude is moued to disobedience , and to contempt of his edicts and commaunds , as being published and receiued by force : the duty of the magistrate is , not to bandy himselfe against his prince , what errour soeuer hee commits : for this were a rebellion in the estate , and to bandie the feete against the head. it were much better to yeild vnder the souera●gne maiestie with obedience , then in refusing the commaundement of the soueraigne , to giue an example of rebellion to the subiects . there are some which proceeded farther , and hold , that if the prince commandes the magistrate to excuse some wicked acte to his subiects , it were better to obey , and thereby to couer and bury the remembrance of a wickednesse already done ; then by refusing to irritate and incense him to doe worse , and to cast , as they say , the helme after the hatchet : as papinian did , who refusing to excuse the parriside committed by caracala , on the person of geta , caused this emperour to exceede in all sorts of cruelties ; whereof hee felt the first fury : this resistance hauing preuailed nothing , but brought an irreparable los●e to the affaires of the emperour , as well by reason of his death , as of that which followed . the magistrate is not allowed to leaue his office , rather than to publish the vniust will of the soueraigne , for that it would bee a dangerous ouerture to all the subiects , to refuse and reiect the edicts and will of the prince , if euery man in his charge might leaue the estate in danger , and expose it to a storme , like vnto a ship without a helme , vnder colour of an opinion of iustice , which it may bee would bee affected by some fantastique braine , without reason , but to crosse a contrary opinion . wherefore in all councels , they hold this rule , to make the councellors range themselues to the two greatest opinions . for although it seemes strange , to force the conscience of those , to whose wisedome and religion they haue referred a businesse , to be examined , and to giue their aduice : yet for that the varietie of opinions might hinder the conclusion , it hath bin held most reasonable , yea necessary , to vse it in this manner : the rule of wise men which cannot faile , is , that of two vniust things they follow that which is most iust , and of two inconueniences to auoid the greater : otherwise there would neuer bee an end of humane actions . if the command be so vniust , as without wronging their conscience , they cannot passe it ; some magistrates to auoid the disobedience , and not to charge their consciences in verifying it , haue incerted ; by the expresse commaundement of the prince , many times re●terated . the manner of verifying the edicts , ordinances , and commands of princes by the magistrates , hath beene brought in , in some estates , to make the people more willing to obey them : who hauing not capacitie to iudge of things by themselues , and being more inclined to distrust , and to calumniate the will of the prince then approue it : and the prince on the other side being i●●roned by importune courtiers , who without any regard of duty , or of iustice , nor to the good of the estate , seeke by new inuentions to worke their owne ends , and to get them authorized by circumuenting the prince : it hath beene held conuenient for the prince , to cause his will to passe by such solemnities , to the end they might bee receiued by the people ; and that being examined and found contrary , or preiudiciall to the publique good , they might be refused by humble remonstrances ; which wipe away the disgrace of the deniall : and serue the prince for an excuse , to free himselfe from the importunitie , and iniustice of great men . it remaines now to know , how an officer ought to carry himselfe in executing a command , if there comes vnto him a reuocation , the businesse being begun . some hold opinion , that if the execution be so much importing the estate , as not being finished there would happen some inconuenience , that notwithstanding the reuocation hee ought to proceed : if not , hee must leaue the businesse as it is . but for the first , it is necessary that the danger of the estate be euedent and knowne to all men , and not to the magistrate alone , who might bee suspected to haue proceeded lightly , or with spleene , passing on after the reuocation . chap. . of the duty of magistrates one towards another . the duty of magistrates , and the manner of proceeding which they ought to hold one towards another , is regulated according to the power which they haue , whereof in most estates they make three degrees . the highest is of those , who in some part of the estate , haue power to determine without appeale . the prince only may command them ; the middle sort obeyed these , and commanding those which are of a lower degree , who haue not any command ouer the officers , but only ouer particular persons . wee may call the first superiors or principalls ; the second middle or subalterne ; and the last inferiors . the first haue power to command all magistrates and officers , without exception ; or only certaine officers subiect to their iurisdiction . they which haue power to command all in generall without execution , ought not to be brought into the estate , for the change that such a power might vsually cause . for there being but one degree to climbe , and to make themselues masters , ambition doth teach it speedily ; and euery man doth the more easily indure it , for that all men are accustomed to obey them . the dutie of a superiour or principall magistrate is , to containe those that are vnder him in the termes and duties of their charges ; of whom he may be iudge , and not they of him in qualitie of a magistrate ; but as a priuate person . and as for the soueraigne , although they may iudge in their owne cause , to whom god hath giuen power to dispose without iudgment , as xenophon saith ; yet it is much more fitting for the soueraigne , to suffer the iudgement of his magistrates , then to make himselfe iudge in his own cause ; prouided alwayes that the businesse doth not concerne the soueraignty , or his particular person ; but to the end that maiestie may not suffer diminution of its greatnesse , or that the splendor of a royall name may not dazell the eyes of the iudges : it hath bin wisely aduised in some estates , that the soueraigne should not plead but by his procuratour , and would neuer assist in person . and as in the power of the prince , the power of magistrates is held in suspence ; so in the presence of superior magistrates , the power of inferiors hath no effect . the which is vnderstood , not only of superiour heads and magistrates , but also of their lieutenants who are therein held the same thing , as being but one power distributed to two . wherefore the lieutenant cannot determine any thing , his chiefe being present . yet the magistrate may take notice of an iniury or wrong done by his lieutenant . but that which hath bin spoken of the power of superior magistrates ouer their inferiors , must be vnderstood in their territorie , their seats , and in the limits of their iurisdiction , out of which they are but priuate men , without power or command . magistrates which are equall in power , or haue no dependance one of another , cannot bee commanded nor corrected one of another . but if there bee question to execute the decree or iudgement of one in the territory of another , they must vse honest intreaties and clauses of request . yet where there shall bee question of the interpretation of a decree made by one magistrate , another that is his equall may not take knowledge : for euery one ought to bee the interpreter of his owne will. and in regard of the sentence giuen by the officer of a forraine prince , for the execution whereof in the territory of another , there should be a commission of intreatie : the iudges of this prince to whom the commission is directed , may not examine the iudgement , least the stranger bee induced another time to doe the like , an● to dissolue the iudgements whereof they should demand the execution ; the which would bee done more through iealousie of the estate , then for any iniustice in them . yet if there bee question of honour , or life , they may not execute the iudgements of forraine magistrates , if they haue not knowne the merrite of the cause , and seene the informations . and princes owe this respect one vnto another , for the good of iustice , not onely to punish the wicked , which slie from one estate into another ; but also for the exemplary punishment , which ought to be made vpon the places , are bound to yeeld the naturall subiect to his naturall prince , vnlesse the prince to whom the fugitiue is retired , ●indes that hee is vniustly pursued ; for in this case , he ought not to yeeld them : yea he is forbidden by the law of god , to restore a bondman which is fled into another mans house to auoid the fury of his master . but a●t●ough the magistrate may not command his equals , yet in a body or colledge consisting of many equall in power , the greatest part may command the lesse . for in this case they that are superior in number , are likewise superior in power . so as the lesser part cannot command the greater , nor yet hinder it . yet one tribune at rome opposing , might hinder the acts of all the rest : the romans making a difference betwixt opposition and command ; for that hinderance and opposition is lesse then a command , and doth not induce any superi●●●●● like vnto a command . but colledges hauing no superiority one ouer another , they cannot haue any command , but they may well hinder one another ; this hinderance growing rather from a contrariety in an equall concurrence , then from any superiority . this may be grounded vpon the generall rule of all those which haue any thing in common , amongst which he that hinders , hath more force , and his condition in this case is better then his that seekes to proceede ; and among many lawes , that which forbids , is of greatest force . but if before the act , a magi●trate may hinder his equall by opposition ; yet after the act he cannot doe it by any other meanes , but by appeale to the superior . chap. . of the duty of magistrates to priuate persons . the duty of officers or magistrates , to particular person hath two principall foundations . the one is grounded on the power which is giuen to the magistrate by the edict or letters of commission : the other vpon the seemlinesse which consists in the particular carriage of the magistrates person , to be able to maintaine himselfe in credit , reputation , and authority , with those ouer whom he is to command . and although that the power of all magistrates regards generally the execution of the law , the which without the magistrate were idle : yet the power of some is more strictly limited then that of others . for some are bound by the lawes and ordinances to command and vse the power that is giuen them , in that forme and manner that is prescribed them , without adding or diminishing any thing : and in this case they are but simple executioners of lawes . to others they giue more liberty , and leaue many things to their discretion and iudgement . wherein notwithstanding they must so gouerne themselues , as they doe not any thing that is extraordinary without a speciall command , or that may not be easily required , that they are not forced by some strong and powerfull necessity , or an apparent danger . but in these things where the diuersity of circumstances is a hinderance that he cannot specifie , or set downe in particular the power , as in the arbitriment of princes , the magistrate may according to his conscience decree without a speciall command . but therein he shall auoyde to affect the reputation of pittifull as well as of cruell : for cruelty although it be blameable , yet it retaynes the subiects in the obedience of the lawes : but too much clemency causeth the magistrate to be contemned , with the lawes and the prince which hath made them . wherefore the law of god forbids them to take pitty of the poore in iudgement : but one of the things most requisite in a magistrate , is to make the grauity of offence knowne , as well to make offen●ers vnderstand what they haue deserued , as to induce them to repentance : and in doing so the punishment will haue lesse bitternesse and more profit . wherefore the principall rule of the duty of a magistrate to priuate persons , is to vse the power that is giuen him , well ; and priuate men , reciprically owe him all obedience , in executing his charge , bee it right or wrong , so as he exceeds not the termes of his power or iurisdiction : for then they may contradict his ordinances by appeale or opposition ; and if he proceeds , he must make a distintion , whether the grieuance be irreparable or not . if it may be repaired , they shall not oppose by fact , but by course of law : but if it be irreparable , they may oppose by fact , yea with force ; not to offend the magistrate , but to defend the innocent . as for iniuries which priuate men doe vnto magistrates , it is certaine that the magistrate being wronged hee cannot be iudge in his owne cause ; vnlesse it bee for some vnreuerence or iniury done vnto him publiquely , in executing his office. for in this case it is lawfull for the magistrate being wronged to punish such men , for the offence done vnto the particular person of the magistrate . for this reason if a body or colledge of iudges hath bin wronged , they may censure and condemne those which haue done the offence , not to reuenge the iniury done vnto them , but to the estate , whose maiesty is wronged by the contempt they haue made of them . as for obedience , it seemes requisite , that the magistrate should carry himselfe to priuate persons with all mildnesse and patience ; yet in such sort , as the dignitie of his place be not vilified ; as it would be if he should indure any indiscreete words in his presence , and not take exception : or a countenance of little respect . but especially , as hee ought not to shew himselfe rough and difficult of excesse : so he must not grow familiar , laugh , or ieast with priuate men ; but to speake little , with discretion , without making shew of any passion of choller , enuie , iealousie , or such like , which may diminish the opinion which they haue of him . wherefore to collect in few words that which concernes the duty of magistrates , they must learne to obey the soueraigne , to bend vnder the power of their superiors , to honour their equals , to command the subiects to defend the poore , to make head against great men , and to doe iustice to all . chap. . of the iustice of commanding . as the forme of commanding is diuers , so is the diuersity of power , which according vnto iustice , obserues diuers rules to make the commandments iust . for in certayne things according to an arithmeticall proportion , it makes all the subiects equall : in others it enters into consideration of the quality , and followes a geometricall proportion : in others according to an harmoniacall proportion , it neither follows an equality altogether , nor a similitude ; but taking a consideration of other differences , it mingles the one with the other by a certayne temper and accord . and as that which they seeke most in the settling of an estate , is concord , which cannot be without some harmony or correspondence of the parties one with another : this last proportion is followed in many things ; as in the forme of gouernment , in the distribution of offices , honours , dignities , and recompences , in the establishment of punishments , and for the peace and greatnesse of families , in marriages and diuisions of successions . but in contracts and treaties betwixt man and man , and in that which concernes the performance of promises , which they make one vnto another , or the iudgement of that which belongs to euery man , whereas faith and integrity ought to be equal in all men , of what quality and condition soeuer they be ; they must obserue an arithmeticall proportion : and not to imitate cyrus , who condēned a little man that had too long a robe , to giue it to a tall man , and to take the tall mans which was too short , insisting more vpon seemelinesse then to iustice. but in the imposition of charges which are burthensome , and necessary for the support of the estate , they must obserue a geometricall proportion , charging the rich , who haue more to lose by the ruine of the estate , then the poore : the which in a manner is generally obserued . for although that the nobility seemes therin to haue more priuiledge in some estates then the country-man , by reason that he payes no subsedies , and doth not contribute any thing by way of imposition : yet the personall seruice which he doth many times performe at his owne charge , is much more then that which hee should pay by way of subsedy , if it were imposed vpon him ; besides his person which he doth imploy , the which the countrey-man doth not . and in this particular , a geometricall proportion is obserued , in that they leaue vnto the gentlemen ( who haue honour more in recommendation then the clowne ) honourable charges , the which giues them meanes to approach nearer vnto the prince , and haue some honour in them : which is the reason which makes them more willing to endure the burthen , discommodity , and charge , which is farre greater then that which is imposed vpon the country-man . but as i haue formerly sayd in other parts of the estate , they must approach as neare as may be to a harmoniacall proportion , from whence proceeds that mixture which they make in most parts of estates , of the law , with the will and opinion of the magistrate . the law is made for all in generall , and all are equally bound to the obseruation thereof ▪ but the law not able to foresee all the circumstances , the will of the prince or magistrate in its execution , must adde such a temper , as there may not follow any inconuenience or absurdity ; and to bend according to the circumstances of the businesse , and to regulate it according vnto naturall equity , which is the soule of the law , the which in a prince extends to declare and c●rrect the law according vnto reason ; and in the magistrate , to extend or restrayne it as the case shall require . and he that would haue the law only take place in an estate , he should fall into an infinite number of inconuenie●ces and absurdities . for eyther he must make a law vpon euery particular fact that may happen ; the which is vnpossible , and admit it were feazable , i● would breed a confusion of lawes : or else he must leaue many things vnprouided for , and in others commit many i●iustices , neuer insi●●ing vpon the circumstances , which are sometimes contrary to the rea●on of the law. there ●i be n●●esse inc●nuenience , if they suffered the will of the p●i●ce or magistrate to wander vncertainly , without any establishm●nt of the law , whereon as vpon a rule they might ground themselues . for besides the variety , diuersity , or contrariety of ordinances , or iudgments which might grow , the which in the end would make them to be contemned , they should open a gate to all violences and in●ustice . but as two simples in extreamity of cold and heate , are so many poysons ; and yet composed and tempered one with the other , make a wh●●es●●n● medicine . so by the mixture of the arithmetica●l and geometricall proportions , which separated would 〈◊〉 ●he estate , grows a harmoniacall accord and prop●r●i 〈◊〉 which serues to maintayne it . in the distribution of offices and dignities , an equallity cannot be obserued , without iniustice and preiudice to the e●●ate ; all being not of one quality and capacity : and it mig●● so ●a●l out , that the most important and difficu●t ch●ge migh● fall vpon him that is least capable ; and a● office of no moment to him that is sufficient . moreou●r if you will c●oo●● tho●e of one quality only , to giue them the cha●g●s , ●e●old the rest that are excluded wil be discontented ; i● a●● would be well satisfied , if they see , that the gate be n●t shut against them : and they would not take it ill , that as the capable ought to be preferred before t●e incap●ble : so the gentleman finding himselfe as capable as the plebeian , should be preferred , and the rich before the poore , in offices where there is more honour then gayne : and the p●ore before the rich , in those where there is more profit then honour . and if the offices be associated or doubled , to make a harmony of the one with the other , they must mingle those that haue where-withall to supply in one sort that which they want in the other , otherwise there wil be no more harmony then if they should separate the accords that are n time , the which would make no pleasing found if they were not together . yet in this subiect we haue a regard to merite , which is the bond , which may make the poore and country-man equall , to the rich and noble , being without merite . and therefore they must accordi●g to ●ue●y mans desarts , g●ue the purse to the most loyall : armes to the most va●liant : iustice to the honestest : censure to the most entire : toyle to the strongest ; the gouernment to wisest ; and the prelateship to the most deuout : notwithstanding preferring in the equality of merite , such as are best qua●lified to them that are lesse . we may say asmuch of rewards and punishments , weighing not only the merite of the fact , and the quallities of persons ; but also the circumstances of time and place , or such like . in regard of peace of the marriages of families , and the preseruation of houses , it is likewise very necessary to supply the defect which is in the one , with the excesse and abundance of the other . so there is no better m●rriage ( as the ancient sayd ) then of riches with pouerty : and among marchants there is no society more safe , then of a rich idle man , with a poore man that is diligent . and in the inequality of the conditions of persons , if there be not some quality to supply the defect of the meaner , there can be no accord . the marriage of a rich country woman , with a poore gentleman would hold firme , but of a poore countrey woman with a poore gentleman , they will easily disagree . in like manner in the diuision of successions , it seemes this harmony ought to be kept . for as many inconueniences follow , leauing the disposition of goods to the will of the man ; who most commonly disinherits his children vpon the first motion of choller , or makes choise of the most incapable to preferre him before the rest : so the law which requires that the succession should be equally deuided , is vniust ; for that the dignitie of families is lost , and a great succession deuided into many parts , comes to nothing . and the law which hau●ng too much regard to the dignitie of families , adiudgeth all to one , or little to the rest , without doubt is nothing iust . but that which hath regard to the quality of goods , distinguishing those that a●e ●ropper and hereditary to the house , and those which are newly purchased , giuing some aduantage to the elder aboue the younger , and to the males aboue the daughters , regulating this aduatnage according to the number of his children , and leauing something in the free disposition of the father , seemes to bee more iust , and more ap●roaching to this harmoniacall proportion , which ought to be followed as much as may be , in all sorts of commands and establishments . and this shall suffice for the forme of commaunding , as well in that which depends of power , as of iustice. chap. . of the establishing of the forces of an estate . the order which ought to bee entertained in the setling of the forces , being more military then pollitique , shall bee treated here succinctly . the forces whereof wee meane to speake , are those by the which wee may repulse the attempts of our enemies ; the which if the estate bee maritiue , would be of two sorts , to the end wee may resist both by sea and land. the prouision of armes and ships , is the first part of the force ; some hold it the greatest treasure of a prince ; and iustiue writes that phillip of macedony ▪ made himselfe thereby fearfull of his enemies . i know that many haue held , that in a great estate , there might inconueniences happen by this great prouision of armes ; for that hee that hath a will to mutine , to arme those of his faction , and to depriue the prince of the meanes to make vse of this prouision , will make a designe to sease vpon the place where it is kept . but by the same reason , wee must not draw together any treasure , to supply vs in an vnexpected necessity ; nor to fortifie any places , least that comming to loose our money and our places , our enemy should grow the stronger , and wee the weaker . but wisedome preuents these inconueniences , the which wee must imploy to keepe these aduantages , and to make vse of them before the enemy comes to seaze of them : and if hee doth seaze of them , wee may not therefore conclude , that the prouision ought not to haue beene made ; but that it is his fault that hath made it , not to bee able to keepe it . it is certaine , that a sword or a knife would cut him that knowes not how to handleit , but wee may not therefore say , that wee must neither make sword nor knife . so in all sorts of parties , there are inconueniences : but those which by foresight may be preuented , should not hinder vs from doing that , which may otherwise serue vs. vnder the name of armes wee doe not onely apprehend that which serues a man to couer him , and to assaile his enemy ; but all carriages and necessary munitions for the warre , bee it offensiue or defensiue ; as engines , artillery , powder , ladders , bridges , cordage , and such other things , whereof they haue need in many millitary exployts , and which it concernes the wisdome o● the prince or soueraigne to prouide , in such quantity , a● when he shal be assailed , or would inuade another , ther● may be nothing wanting , for not able to prouide such things in a short time , it were to be feared , that before he should recouer that which is necessary , his enemy would get such an aduantage ouer him , as he shall hardly afterwards recouer it . but laying aside the discourse of the diuersity of armes and engines of warre , i will only propound some generall considerations for the armes fit for men , whereof those which are defensiue ought to be light of carriage , ( those that be heauy or pondrous commonly hindring more then they serue ) difficult to pierce , and proportioned in such sort , as they may not hinder the necessary motions for a combat . many relying too much vpon their vallour , haue contemned this kind of armes , as fit for men that were affraid . yet the roman armies , in the time of gratian , hauing demanded leaue to abandon their cuyrasses , and then their head-pieces ; found themselues so weak when they came to fight with the goths , as they were cut in peeces : whereby it appeared that armes make a part of the force , and i will adde , of courage . for besides , that iron is more hard to ' peirce then the flesh , he that finds himselfe couered , takes more courage to ioyne with his enemy , for that he is not so much exposed to blowes . they reproacht a captaine ; who armed himselfe compleatly , that he seemed to be affraid : no sayth he , but i arme my selfe that i may not feare . as for offensiue armes , they must be light , to the end they may not tyre or weary those that vse them , and likewise easie to mannage ; sharpe and well steeled , to pierce the better , and withall to continue the longer . some demaund them long to strike a farre off . philop●mon caused his men to vse the pike ●e o● and iphicrates made his souldiers to carry them twice as long then they had formerly done . they attribute the victory of gosta●us agaynst christian king of denmarke , to the length of the swedish pikes , which were three foote longer th●n those of the danes . and gui●hard●● writes , that vitelosi vrsi●o , with pikes a foote and a halfe longer then those which the souldiers of pope alexander the sixt carried , wonne the battaile ag●inst them betwixt sarra and bassan . others haue better allowed of short armes , being of better vse in a strait or a throng ; as cyrus and the lacedemonians . besides this , there are two sorts of offensiue armes : some to shoote , cast , or dart ; and others which they hold continually in their hands ; of both which kinds they must make good prouision , being all necessary in an army . the parthia●s haue many times vanquished the romans with their bowes , fighting ● farre off : and the romans as vegetius writes , haue many times gotten great victories , by the meanes of certayne long darts , called marciobarbaz . there is another quality , which some haue desi●ed in armes , that they should be faire , gilt , and enricht , so as they may be pleasing vnto the eye , thinking that this giues courage to the souldiers ; the which xenopho● and caesar haue allowed . others holding that this was of no vse , but to kindle the auarice and courage of the enemy , haue thought it better to haue the armes without any ornament and bare , as those which strike more terrour . to resolue the most expedient in this quality and contrariety , we must know those whom we meane to arme , and those against whom we are to fight . if the first by this vanity of ornament , are to be the more encouraged , and that the same vanity may breed admiration and amazement in the enemy ; it shall be fit to vse it . but if we haue to deale with men which know what belongs to warre , we must rather seeke horror then ornament in our armes . wherefore a prince making prouision of armes , he shall doe better to choose those that are good then faire , and simple and plaine , rather then enricht , as well to auoide the charge in so great a prouision which it behoues him to make ; as for that they are more durable , and no lesse profitable then the other . chap. . of fortresses , and of their profit for the preseruation of an estate . fortresses doe also make a part of the force of an estate : and they which haue beene of opinion , that they should not build any , haue beene confuted both by reason and vse : so as there haue beene few found , vnlesse they were some petty popular estate , that will follow their councell . the grecians and romans who had lesse neede during their empires , then any other estate , for that all submitted themselues vnder their yoke , entertayned cittadels at corinth , tarentum , and rhegium : and if the capitoll had not beene strong , the empire of rome had beene smothered in the cradle by the gaules . the estates in which are no strong places , are conquered by one battaile . england hath testified it ; and the persian , relying onely in the great number of his men , hath lost in one battaile a great extent of his countrey , the which the turke hath since preserued by forts . for although that fortresses alone cannot much assist an estate , yet being seconded by armes , they make it invincible ; and there being no armies on foote , they giue you leasure to raise them , and after a route , to rally your men together to ●enew the warre . yet this is not to say , that the estate which hath most sorts is the strongest : for it is impossible to guard many w●ll ; and some being ill guarded , they proue more preiudiciall to the estate , then profitable for the defence . it must therefore haue few , but well furnished with men , victuals , and munition of wa●re . they must likewise bee in a necessary situation or at least profitable . necessary situations are those which being vnfort●fied , make the countrey to lie open , and expose it to the inuasion of enemies . profitable situations are those , by w●ose meanes they may guard a rich towne and well inhabited , and may serue for a retreat vnto the people . they must likewise be remote from the heart of the estate ; to keepe the enemy and danger farre from it , to the end that whiles the enemy bu●●es himself● in assailing them , the rest of the countrey may bee in peace , and wee may haue means to prepare our selues to resist him . and if the forts be not only farre off , but at the entrie of the enemies countrey , they will bee the more safe : for they will not only giue vs meanes to defend our selues , but also to annoy our enemy in his owne countrie . besides this , forts ought to be strong both by situation and by fortification . forts strong by situation , are those which are built vpon high and sharpe mountaines , and of hard accesse , or which are ●uironed with la●es , the se● , pooles , ri●er● , and marishes , and haue all commodities necessary for the entertainement and succour of a garr●son . those are strong by hand , which are flancked to purpose , with a good wall , a large and sound rampire of earth , with abroad and deepe ditch , and they must make more account of the rampire then of the wal● , and of the ditch then the rampire . a fort must likewise bee great ▪ to the end it may bee capable of many m●● for the defence , and to annoy the enemy the more ▪ 〈◊〉 be able to intrench themselues within . it must in like manner be situated in such sort , as it may be relieued , for soone or late they take that place by force or obstinacie of a siege which is not relieued . wherefore they haue held those places strong , which haue a port of the sea , hard to stop vp , and is not commanded . for this backe doore makes them as it were impregnable , hauing meanes dayly to receiue refreshing of victualls , munition , and men , and to discharge themselues of their wounded and vnprofitable mouthes for defence . and although that the situation of a place be strong for defence ; and such in some part as they hold it inaccessable ; yet they may not forbeare to adde what they can to make it stronger : for wee haue seene that many places haue beene taken , by those parts which they had neglected to fortifie , for that they held them inaccessable . so carthage was taken by scipio towards the poole . antiochu● the great , tooke sardis , by that part which was the strongest , where he found there was not any sentinel , s●ing birds to build their nests there without any disturbance . chap. . of the warre-like discipline . the third part of the force of an estate , consists in the warlike discipline , that is to say , in souldiers of good experience and well disciplined . and herein wee must obserue that the force doth not alwayes consist in the number , but in the resolution of the souldier , and in the experience or conduct of the commander . in all the battells which haue bin giuen , it is obserued , that few men haue fought ; and those few , according to the resistance that was made , haue won or lost the battell ; and as the kinds of armes make the souldier stronger or more feeble , so they haue demanded what force is most beneficiall ; eyther that on horsebacke or on foote . polybius sayth , that it were better that our foote were a moietie lesse then that of our enemie , so as wee bee stronger in cauallerie , then if wee were equall in all : the which may be true in a combate ; hauing bin often seene , that when as the horse are routed , the foote seeing themselues farre from any retreate , hau● beene forced to yeild sometimes in grosse , without striking stroake : but in all the course of the warre , it is most certaine that the footmen do the greatest seruice , were it but at sieges and defences of places , and that they may fight in all places , which the horsemen cannot doe . those nations which haue made vse of horsemen only , haue sometimes gotten great victories ; as the partbyans haue done : but when they were to besiege or defend a place , they aduanced little . also those people which put all their forces in horsmen , do● it , for that they cannot keepe their rancks and order which is ne●essary for footmen . and to recompence this defect , they make vse of the violence of horse in a combate , and of their swiftnesse , and readinesse in enterprizes of war , which are executed more speedily with horse then foot , who march heauily . but the better is , that the armies of an estate should consist both of the one and the other , that is to say , of footmen to serue for the body of an army ; and horsmen , for armes and leggs . wherefore the prince besides the prouision of armes , and other necessaries for war , must be carefull that the cauallery may be well mounted , & prouide that they may haue horses in his owne countrey ; for he cannot be termed strong and powerfull in horse , if he be cōstrained to haue recourse in that regard to his neighbour , who in time of war may faile him . i haue said formerly that the force did not consist in the number , but in the bounty and courage of the souldiers ; yet for that they are not all borne such , wee must chooseas neare as we can , those which promise so much ; and by discipline make them such , and indeauour to instruct and trayne vp others . for the choyce many haue made a question , whether we should draw them out of our subiects , holding that the prince , which innures the subiects to warre , thrust himselfe into danger to receiue a law from them , and haue held an opinion , that it was more safe to imploy strangers . but there haue beene princes which haue not imployed their subiects indifferently , but onely the nobility of the country , as the kings of poland and persia : the which haue made them strong in cauallery , but weake in foote . some others hauing a distrust and iealousie of the nobility , would make no vse of their seruice ; but to make head against them , haue armed and put forces into the hands of some of the common people . the turke hath put his forces into the hands of subiects of the countries which hee hath conquered ; but this hath bin in making them turkes by education . for causing the children of christians to be taken in their younger yeares , and to be instructed timely in the law of mahomet , breeding them vp to toyle and labour , vntill that they come to an age fit to beare armes , they continue as naturall turkes , not knowing other fathers then the grand seignour , who haue caused them to be sed and brought vp ; nor other countrey then that , for the guard whereof they are entertayned . to decide this question , we must vnderstand that euery estate is weake which cannot subsist of it selfe , and whose force depends of another : and he that supports himselfe wholy vpon forraigne forces of a soueraigne and independant , he makes himselfe as it were a subiect and dependant of another ; and exposeth his estate , not onely to the inuasion of the stranger of whom he depends , ( being often seene that most part of those which haue called strangers to their succours , haue beene a prey to those which succourd them : ) but also the stranger fayling him either for that he is troubled to defend himselfe , or for some other occasion , he remaines at the mercy of his enemy . besides this , the stranger fights more for gaine and his owne priuate interest , then for any good will hee beares him . as gaine drawes him , the same gaine may diuert him , and draw him to the enemy . the celtiberians subborned first by the romans , abandoned the carthaginians ; and afterwards corrupted by the carthaginians , left the romans . imploying none but strangers , the enemy not able to hinder the leuie , may slacke and stay it in the greatest necessity of the prince : the which hath fallen out too often in suisser-land , to the preiudice of france . and the enemy inuading the nation , from whence you draw your souldiers , many times in your greatest necessity , these strangers are forced to abandon you , to goe and serue their country ; as the grisons did , who were in the seruice of king francis , when as iean iaques do medices inuaded their country . finally , the treason the mutiny , ruine , and as i haue sayd , the vsurpation of an estate is more to be feared by the succours of strangers , then we can expect any aduantage . adde to all these considerations , that they are in fight , their companies ill filled , fearefull , rude , and oppressors of the subiects ; to the great charge of the prince , consuming in the leuie , and before they can ioyne with vs , much time and much money . but i doe not hereby inferre that we should altogether reiect strangers : for they may serue with our owne souldiers ; whom by this means we shall spare , and vppon whom we may settle our chiefe force ; and not as some estates doe , cause them to vndergoe all the toyle , expose them to assaults , and to all dangerous exploits , and dispence with the strangers . chap. . of the number of souldiers in their ordinary trained bands . it rests to know what number of souldiersought to be entertained in an estate . this cannot be truely regulated . for we must haue regard to that which the estate may beare , and to his forces that may assaile vs. onely i will say , that in many estates they haue established two sorts of traine bands . the one ordinary , consisting of men raised and bred vp to the war , hauing no other vocation or profe●sion . the other is subsidiary , composed of men which haue sometimes followed that profession , or are capable to do it , with the which at need they may fill the companies , or raise new , and who in time of peace shall imploy themselues in their particular affaires , being sometimes practised in military exercises , when as the commanders shall draw them together . returning then to the first , they must not be in great numbers ; but the number must be such , as they may resist , as well to auoyde the charge of their entertaynment , as the mutinies and reuolts , which happen among such men , when they feele themselues strong and in great numbers . and in a meane estate sowe haue ruled it to . foot , and . horse ; in a greater , double the number . but if they must diminish any thing , it were better to doe it in the foote , which may be easily fill'd againe , then in the horse , which cannot be so soone raised , being necessary to spend money for their furniture , and time for the exercise both of man and horse . as for subsidiaries , some haue thought that they ought rather to be retayned vnder some priuiledges , not preiudiciall to the publique , then entertayned with pay whilest they doe dot serue . but it would seeme more expedient , to make them serue one after another three moneths in the yeare , neare vnto the gouernour of the prouince where they shall liue , in giuing them pay for that time : during the which they shal be practised in all sorts of exercises , seruing to their profession : and going out of seruice after their quarter is ended , they shall leaue their armes in the towne where the gouernour remaynes , euery man returning to his owne home , leauing the place to such as are to succeed them . being thus practised three moneths yearely , you shall keepe them still in allarme , and they will be alwayes ready to march . and making them to leaue their armes after the seruice , you shall haue no cause to feare any mutiny : the which they may make more feeble in diuiding these subsidiaries into no greater troupes then of foure and twenty souldiers , which troupes shall not depend of any commander but the gouernour , or of him whom the soueraigne shall at times commit : yet euery one hauing his captaine apart , to trayne the souldiers ; and when as they meane to imploy them , they may reduce them into companies of hundreds or two hundred men , as they shall thinke good ; and may giue them a captaine to command them , during the expedition . by this meanes for the full pay of a yeare of . men , you may entertayne in your estate . subsidiaries , trayned , practised , and ready to march , and assure your prouinces against all sorts of mutinies . and if you will traine vp more without any charge , they may giue commandment vnto the youth of the towne where they shall practise , and thereabouts , vnto a certaine age , to come at the time , and to the place of the sayd exercises , where they may giue them armes to practise with the rest . this were , some one would say , to make too many souldiers in an estate , which might fau●●ur a ●euolt . but being disarmed and reduced into small t●oupes , their captaines hauing taken an oath to the soueraigne onely , and the souldiers not depending on them but for the disciplin● , and not for the pay : and moreouer , being disarmed , but when as they enter into seruice , there being but one fourth part that enters at a time in the prouinces , the other three parts may serue to oppose against such as being armed , would attempt any thing . so as with a little fore-sight which they may vse in this conduct , it will bee easie to diuert the inconueniences which they may conceiue of this order . there remaines now the forme which they ought to hold in leuies . chap. . of the forme how to make leuies es souldiers : of the place , age , stature , & vocation . the romans who could not haue their souldiers depend wholy vpon the captaines , obserued a particular forme ; which was that of a great number w●ich were enrolled , the captaines did choose one after another in th●ir turnes : and in this manner the companies were as it were equall both in force and valour of souldiers . but the captaines hauing little credit among●t them , they saw many mutinies fall out among the l●gi●ns . the which was the cause that they found it expedient that euery captaine should make choyce of those whom he was to command ; being likely that they which present themselues to be enrolled vnder a captaine , would be more obedient vnto him , then they whom they shall enroll against the●● will. the same inconu●nie●ce of a mutiny happens , when to a troupe consisting of o●d souldiers , they giue another captaine , t●en him vnder whom the souldiers haue bin accustomed to fight : for t●●s ●ew captain hauing no meanes to get credit suddaiuly , the least subiect that presents itselfe to the souldiers to mutine , they imbrace it , being not restrayned neyther by the respect nor feare of their captaine . yet an exact discipline will easily helpe and remedy this . wherefore it seemes more safe , that euery captaine make choyce of those whom he is to command . i say choyce , to make a difference from the greatest part of the leuies which are made at this day , into the which they receiue all sorts of men . the which ought not to be ; and no man ought to be admitted without an attestation from the place of his dwelling , of his quality and how he hath liued ; to the end they may exclude all theeues and robbers , which creepe into the troupes ; and that the souldier offending , they may punish him in his person or in his goods , when he returnes into his country . and to this effect the choyce being made , the souldiers ought to be presented to the officer , or commissary of the war , to see if they be of the quality required . and , although wee may finde good souldiers euery where ; yet it seemes that not onely the ordinary , but also the subsidiary ought to be chosen and taken rather out of the country then in townes ; for that in the fields they finde them stronger and more rough , be it to strike , or to endure the discommodities of the warre : and the subsidiaries which are not in continuall practice of the warre , being dispersed here and there , they cannot so easily draw together to make a mutiny ; as they might doe if there were many in one towne . as for the age , they must choose them young , aboue seuenteene or eighteene yeares , and vnto thirty or forty , as well to haue the more agility , force , and courage , as to be more venturous , pliable , and obedient to the commandments that shall be giuen them . for the stature , the greatest and most manlike make the greatest shew : but if in a little body they finde a strong complexion and courage , they may not reiect him . but for that by their manner of liuing , they may settle a iudgement of the complexion and force both of body and mind : they must haue a care not to choose souldiers ( but as little as may be ) which are accustomed to some sitting trade , that is soft and effeminate ; but rather to choose them out of trades , in the which they must be exposed to heate , and cold , to raine , winde , sun ; or which are accustomed to bloud , to strike , to march , and to labour . the leuies of men of warre thus made , they must be trayned and gouerned . and thus much for the forces at land. chap. . of the forces at sea. the like shall be also followed in the forces at sea ; in the which besides the order they must obserue for the building of ships , they must also haue a care to prouide a good number of pilots and marriners ; and for the gallies , to furnish and exercise their rowers , whether they consist of galley-slaues or voluntaries . for the which they must prouide in good time to accustome the slaues to doe their duties , and to make the souldier get firme footing at sea. these forces at sea are so necessary in an estate that is maritine , as without them the prince cannot be termed strong nor powerfull . for besides that in a short time they may seaze vpon his ports , before he shall haue any aduice of the enterprize ; and these being seazed , this port being hard to stop vp the enemy will keepe it long : he must make an accompt not to recouer any thing by the commerce at sea , but from the hands of his neighbours , who will prescribe him a law , and intreate his merchants ill . let vs now come to that which is necessary for the setling of the re●enewes of the estate . chap. . of the riches of an estate . every one agrees that to make an estate powerfull , it must be rich ; riches being the principall sinews that supports it . for although that many poore estates haue made themselues to be redoubted : yet this hath rather happened by the diuision of their neighbours , and the fault of some others , then for any aduantage there is in the pouerty of an estate . the lacedemonians in their pouerty , during the diuision of the grecians , haue beene for a time masters of all greece . but when as this diuision ceased , their greatnesse ( which could not long subsist with this defect ) decayed presently . the venetians and genois , although poore in the beginning , haue sometimes held a part of greece ; euen that which was neare to the archipelagus : but this happened , during the diuision which was in the leuant for the empire of constantinople . the romans themselues in their pouerty , had no other aduantage ; then the weakenesse and diuision of their neighbours , whereof they could make better vse then any other , receiuing some into their city , ruining others ; sending collonies to neighbour prouinces ; allying themselues to those whom they could not easily vanquish , and making vse of their succours and meanes ; and finally establishing in conquered countries , affaires , toles , and tributes , for the pay of their souldiers , and for to supply the other charges of the estate . and they haue beene so carefull to enrich their citty , as many times this care hath made them shut their eyes to an infinite number of thefts and spoyles , which were practised against their ministers , whom they imployed in the prouinces . it is then most certaine that an estate cannot be termed powerfull , vn●esse it be rich . yet euery man doth not agree , wherein the wealth of an estate doth consist . some haue measured it by the great treasures ; others by the reuenewes ; and others by the fertillitie of the countrey . but as there is no treasure so great , but a long warre may exhaust ; nor any reuenewes so abundant , but in a long and tedious enterprize , they may be forced to ingage them : so the fertillitie alone of an estate would bee vnprofitable , if the publique had not meanes to make vse of it , and by gentle leuies to draw succours from priuate persons . wherefore besides the aboundance of all things fit for the life and seruice of man ; the parcimony or sparing of p●iuate persons , is necessary to make an estate rich : as also the facillitie to make vse of their meanes . for as wee doe not call a prodiga●l man rich , who spends all he hath : so what abundance soeuer there bee in an estate , wee will not terme the subiects rich , who by their ●ot and excesse consume all this great abundance , taking from the publique the meanes to draw any succours from them . wee will therefore conclude , that the riches of an estate consists in all things ne●essary for the life and seruice of man ; in the parcimony of subiects ; in the greatnesse of lands and ordinary reuenewes ; in the facillitie of ordinary leuies ; in the gouernment of the treasure , and in the exchequer . chap. . of the causes of the abundance of the wealth of an estate : that is to say tillag● : manufactures and commerce with strangers . aboundance in an estate proceeds from three necessary things : from the earth ; from manufactures , which comprehends all manuall and mechanicke arts ; and from the commerce we haue with strangers , vnder the name of earth i comprehend the labour of the land ; the entertai●ment of woods , forrests , and trees , which may by their fruitfulnesse contribute something to the vse of man ; the digging of mines for mettall , stones , and minerall druggs . as this point is the fountaine of all the riches of the world , so it ought to bee more carefully husbanded by the publique : and yet it is that which is most neglected , hauing left a libertie to euery man to doe with his owne what he pleaseth , vnder a false proposition , that euery man being carefull to find out that which will bee profitable vnto him , knowes how to husband his ground , so as nothing well bee vnprofitable : and yet experience teaches vs the contrarie . for most part of lands being possest by the nobilitie , clergie , or others imployed in publique affaires , few reside vpon the lands ; so as they are occupied by farmes , who enter like vnto glearers , which draw what they can , hauing no interest in the future . and of those which reside vpon their lands , some through ignorance , others by negligence or bad husbandrie content themselues with the reuenewes of their predecessors , being loth to take the paines , or complayning to aduance that , that should bee necessary to plant or clense a peece of land that lieth waste to dry vp a marish , to settle a race for breeding , or to doe such like things as may better their demesus . some one it may be of little iudgement will say , that this care is vnworthy of a prince and of the publique . but to this wee may answere , that all princes haue not so held it , massisusa cleansed the greatest part of babary . and in our time we know the improuements which the venetians haue made in polesene of rouigo : that of the great duke of tuseany towards pysa and areso , and that of the duke of ferrara , in the valley of comachy● , and that which the hollanders doe daily . wherefore some haue held it fit , that the publique should take vpon them this care to quicken the diligence of some , by the orders which might be made , according to the places ; and to punish the negligence of others , by fines , amercements , and seisures of the lands neglected . as for manufactures , the number of workmen giues the aboundance ; but the good giue credit to the marchandize . the great number would not be vnprofitable , but also hurtfull , if they were not good . to haue them such , you must seeke for them : and if wee haue them not among our selues , wee may draw strangers by priuiledges , in giuing vnto some according to their industrie , some honest entertainement . to multiply the workmen , they may erect publique houses of all sorts of manufactures , as hath beene propounded , in the which they may instruct the poore . and as this establishment should bee chiefely made in their fauour , so the reuenew of these houses may bee taken vpon that whith is affected by the cannon● , and ancient ordinances for their entertainment . some one , to the end they may banish idlenesse , which is at this present in monasteries , ( many persons vnfit for contemplation and study being therein , and many against their will ) haue propounded to restore the ancient monastique discipline , which was to imploy in certaine workes and manuall arts , at houers of leasure : those that were not fit for study and preaching . the which did also multiply manufactures . others haue likewise beene of opinion , to bind the masters , who serue themselues with young boyes to cause them to passe a certaine age in learning of a trade : and so by these meanes an estate in lesse then twenty yeares , would bee furnished with more workemen then were needfull . the comme●ce and trafique which is made with the stranger , is the third point which produceth aboundance in an estate , for the setling whereof there are three considerations to be made . the first is of things which we are to carry , and not to carry to the stranger , the second is of things which wee must receiue from strangers , and their entry into our estate ; or not to receiue them and to banish the commerce , the third is the facillity and ease of commerce accompanied with safety . the marchandize which we ought to ca●ry to strangers , , with whom wee haue comme●ce , are those whereof we haue aboundance : of which after the estate is sufficiently furnished , wee may allow the trade . as contrarywise , those whereof wee haue want may in no sort be transported ; nor in like manner those , whereof our neighbours may make vse to our preiudice ; as armes , horses , sayles , and other things destinated to the●se of the sea or warre . the transport of gold and siluer is likewise forbidden in all estates ; but these prohibitions are very ill obserued . and as they are necessary , to hinder the want of these mettalls , which are fought after by all nations , depriue vs not of the meanes to make vse of them , for that they are hunted after by our friends and allies : so wee must haue a care , that it may not trouble nor altar the commerce . and to speake truth , these defences thus generall which they haue made , are impossible in the execution , seekeing to maintaine the commerce with our neighbour : vnlesse it be , that we forbid to negotiate otherwise then by exchange , and permutation of marchandize . the which may be practized , in regard of the marchandize , which is not very necessary , and not in regard of those which are necessary for vs , and whereof we cannot passe . we are forced to haue recourse to our neighbours , and to take a law from them , in eyther giuing them other marchandizes which may bee a● necessary for them as theirs for vs , or in paying them ready money . and in this last case many haue held , that the safety which might be added , was , to allow of the transport of gold and siluer , in giuing caution to bring backe within a certaine time the quantity in marchandizes , for the which the transport hath beene allowed , the publique hauing no interest therein ; presupposing the necessity of this marchandize , and that it cannot bee recouered by exchange from another . among those things which ought not to be transported out of an estate , are rawe stuffes ; but not manufactures , for that you take the meanes from your workmen , to imploy themselues and to liue ; and from your estate the meanes to enrich it selfe by the meanes of manufactures , the which in certaine workes exceede the price of the substance . and they are so farre from suffering these stuffes thus rawe to goe vnto strangers : as the estate which knowes what belongs to husbandry , not satisfied with those which grow amongst them , draw them from their neighbours , to put them in worke , and by this meanes to enrich themselues , selling them thus wrought euen to those who many times haue sold them the sayd rawe stuffes . behold the things which wee ought not to carry to strangers , by the which it is easie to iudge of those , which we ought to desire they should bring vnto vs. for if we retaine those things for the liberty which may come vnto vs , by the same reason , if wee want them , wee must seeke the meanes to draw them from our neighbours . and in regard of gold and siluer , the entire ought to be allowed : ut not the course of forraigne coyne among the people , for that there is not any assurance among princes touching coynes , euery one seeking to deceiue his companion , and to draw the gold and siluer out of one anothers estate , in raising the price of coynes more then they are worth in their neighbours estate , or in weakning the allay of their coynes , the stampe , greatnesse , thicknesse , and waight , remaineing still the same . so as giuing them entry , vpon an opinion they haue , that they are still according to the ancient standard , the people find themselues full , before the tryall can be made , and the abuse discouered : the which if you thinke to remedy in decrying them , and causing them to bee carryed to the mynt , for the price of their bounty , your subiects shall sustaine a great losse . on the otherside if you suffer this abuse to continue , they will by little and little draw all the good coyne out of your estate , to reduce it to the weake allay of your neighbours , and then returne it vnto you againe thus satisfied . wherefore to hinder this exchange of coyne , they shall hinder the course of forraigne coynes among the people , to the end that they which haue any , may carry them to the exchangers appoynted for that effect , who shal giue them the value esteemed according to their interiour bounty : and they carring them to the mynt , as they shall be charged : they shall also clipp in peeces the forraigne coyne which they shall receiue , in the presence of those that bring them , and they shal be conuerted into currant coyne . so they neede not to feare the falsifications of strange coynes , nor the raising of the prince : and they shall not be able to draw your currant money out of your estate , but in bringing merchandize to the value . the things whereof wee must stop the entry , and the commerce in our estate , are those which serue for ●yot and excesse , the which is the chiefe meanes to impouerish an estate ; as pretious stones , exquisite perfumes , spices , not much necessary , and stuffes , the which serue only for pompe and shew . but if the abuse bee so inueterate , as wee cannot hinder them by a prohibition , wee must charge them with such great customes and imposts , as the stranger may haue no desire to bring them , fearing hee shall not retire his siluer , and the subiect to buy it , in regard of the dearenesse . for although that some times this consideration doth not restraine the subiect , from buying such merchandizes ; yet by this meanes he growes poore , the publique shall bee the more rich by the great imposts , the which shall supply the place of punishments for excesse in priuate persons . chap. . of the facillitie of commerce . as for the facillitie and ease of commerce , it depends of many things , for the which it is needfull to prouide : and first for the commoditie of the carriage of merchandizes by water ▪ land , cart , or otherwise ; they must prouide to make the riuers nauigable : the ports safe , to keepe the wayes and passages in good estate , and due reparation , and free from pyrats and theeues . not to suffer any monopole which may hinder the libertie of traffiqu● : and if it bee discouered to punish it rigourously ; to inuite strangers to bring vs the merchandize which wee cannot want , by the discharge of customes and imposts , as much as the necessity of the estate will beare . to establish such lawes for affaires , as there may bee faith and assurance amongst negotiators ; and in case of difference , speedy and summary iustice , especially in that which concernes strangers , who forbeare to traffique in a place , no lesse in regard of the tediousnesse of suits , as for the treacherie of those of the countrey . and for that a permutation cannot bee made without a certaine price set downe vpon merchandizes , and that they cannot negotiate with all sorts of people by exchange , but it is needfull to make vse of money : the price and estimation thereof must bee certaine and firme ; otherwise they should bring a confusion into the commerce . but besides this , the interiour bounty and value of this coine must bee easie to iudge of , not only by the waight , but by the eye and sound if it may bee . the which may bee done , if they resolue to make vse of the mixture of mettalls , no farther then it is necessary for a remedy ; gold and siluer suffizing to make all sorts of coine . for in regard of the coine , if they will not diuide the marke of siluer into eight thousand peeces , as they haue sometimes done in lorraine , for the angeuines , which rene duke of aniou and lorraine caused to bee coined , whereof the two hundred were worth but sixe pence , and forty a souse of base french money ; they may reduce them to a third part thereof , to make the peeces more solide ; which may bee stampt with a bodkin ; making no vse of the copper , whose price is vnequall and variable in all countries , and moreouer is subiect to rust . contratiwise the price of gold & siluer , hath changed little , & they haue inmpt'vsually in proportiō , as one or two , little more or little lesse ; & the marke of gold vallewed at twelue marks of siluer . herodotus writes , that in his time a pound of gold was worth thirteene pound of siluer . i do not say , but there hath beene some ages and some prouinces , in the which gold hath beene dearer : but this hath not beene generall , nor of long continuance . wherefore makeing the coynes of one mettall , and of a certaine waight , greatnesse , thicknesse , and well coyned in the forme of a medaille that is cast ; as the grecians , latins , hebrewes , persians and egyptians , in old time did : it would be a hard thing to be deceiued . there is another thing , the which doth greatly decay trading , which is , the contempt they make in many estates of those which deale in it , holding this vocation to be sordid and base . so as they which haue gotten a little wealth , retire themselues speedily , to imbrace an other vocation , to the which the people carry more respect and honour , then to this . in truth wee must confesse , that there are certaine affaires which should be left to the poore and common people , to enrich them . but there are others which they only can execut that are rich ; as that at sea , which is the most profitable in an estate , and to the which they should attribute more honour then they doe here : for i● in all estates they haue thought it fitting to inuite the subiects by honour to the most painfull and dangerous actions , the which might be profitable to the publique ; this being of that quality , they should propound and attribute more honors to those that shall deale in it . and if nobility hath taken its foundation from the courage of men , and from their valour ; there is no vocation in the which there is so much required as in this . they are not only to encounter and striue amongst men , but sometimes against the foure elements together ; which is the strongest proofe that can bee of the resolution of a man. this hath beene the occasion , that some hath beene of opinion , that they should open this doore to marchants to attaine to nobility , so as the father and the sonne hath continued in the same trade ; and to suffer noblemen who are commonly the richest in an estate , to practise themselues ( without preiudice to their condition ) in this commerce at sea , which would be more honourable vnto them , then to bee vsurers , or banckers , as in italy ; or to impouerish themselues , in doing nothing but spend , and neuer gather . hence will grow many aduantages both to the publike and priuate . to the publike , for that they that should deale in the commerce , hauing meanes , courage , and sufficiencie for this conduct , it would bee farre greater , putting more ships to sea and better armed , whereof the estate at need might might make vse for its safety , and would carry the reputation of their nation farre . the which they cannot doe , who beeing poore , and hauing no stocke but from others , haue not the courage to hazard themselues in a great enterprize . and for the particular , this commerce being wisely managed , what hazard soeuer they run , there is more to be gotten then lost : and if the gentlemen apply themselues , without ruining themselues in expences , or importuning the prince with demaunds , they shall doe more in one yeere at sea , then in tenne at court. it availes not to say , that a gentleman will sooner turne pyrate then merchant . for holding that order which may be prescribed in their imbarquing , they may so mingle them one with another , as it would bee a difficult thing that all should agree to commit a villany . finally experience hath taught , and doth daily , that where the richest haue dealt in this commerce , it hath enrich both them , and the estate vnder which they liued : and at this day the examples of the venetians , portugalls , spaniards , and hollanders haue made it knowne vnto vs. these last being lesse rich then the others , but not lesse couragious and hardie , haue setled an order for the continuance of this commerce to the east indies , which deserues to be knowne , which is , that after they haue found by many voyages , which some priuate men haue made , that they ruined one another by this concurrence ; they aduised in the yeere . to craue leaue of the generall estates , to traffique into those parts before all others , during the space of one and twenty yeeres . the which was granted them , in regard of fiue and twenty thousand florins , which they promised to pay vnto the estate during the first tenne yeeres . thus reduced all into one company , amsterdam had a moietie , middleburg in zeland a fourth part ; delphe , rotterdam , horne , and enehusen had either of them a sixth parth : and the whole stocke of this vnion amounted to sixe million of liuers , or six hundred thousand pounds sterling . for the direction of this trade , and the interest of the associats , they haue established in either of these townes a certaine number of administratours : at amsterdam twenty , at miadleburg twelue , and in either of the rest s●auen . and if any one dies , the chamber of the place names three , of which either the estates generall , or the magistrate of the towne chooseth one . these chambers , choose seuenteene among the administratours : that is to say , amsterdam eight , midleburg foure , delphe , and rotterdam two , horne and enchusen two ; and the seuenteenth is chosen alternatiuely , sometimes at middleburg , and sometimes at north holland : the which are called together to resolue ioyntly , of how many ships , and with what equipage and furniture , they shall make the fleete which they meane to send , and to what fort or coast they should goe . this assembly is held six yeeres together at amsterdam , and afterwards two yeeres at middleburg , and then againe at amsterdam . by the conditions of the accord , the ships must returne to the same port from which they parted ; and the spices which are left at middleburg , and other chambers , is distributed amongst them by the waight of amsterdam ; and the chamber which hath sold her spices , may buy from other chambers . by this order they haue hither to continued this commerce with reputation , not as simple merchants onely ; but as if they were soueraignes , they haue made in the name of the estates an alliance with many princes of those parts ; as with the king of sian , quadaen , patam , iohor , the heire of malaca , bornean , achim , sinnatra , baretan , iocotra , and other kings of iatta . they haue made themselues absolute maisters of the iland of amboyne , where they haue setled a president which gouerns in their name . at banda they haue a fort for a retreate , where they must deliuer them the spices at a certayne price . in ternate they haue another , a mile distant from that of the portugals . at magnien● they haue three : at motire one : at gilolo they haue taken that which the portugels had built . from this example we will conclude , that the onely meanes to settle the commerce at sea in a nation , in the which the best purses will not hazard themselues in these enterprizes ; is to force the merchants which trade at sea in certaine places , to ioyne one with another , and not to make their traffique a part . for although that negotiating a part the gaine would be the greater , when the enterprize succeeds happily : yet we must consider , that the losse which may happen , would wholy ruine him that attempts alone : and if in making a company the gaine be the lesse , yet it is more assured ; and the losse being borne by many , it is lesse to euery one that is interessed . thus diuiding the trade according to the coast and places where it is made , they may make diuers companies ; that is to say , one for the trade of ginnee ; another for the leuant by the mediterranean sea ; one for the east indies ; another for the west indies beyond the line ; another for that on this side the line ; and one for england , noruage , sweden , and other northerne countries : forbidding them to attempt one vpo● another , and to all other priuate subiects which shall not be of the company , to negotiate in those places vpon great pen●lties . chap. . of parsimony or sparing , as aboundance is the sourse and fountaine of the riches of an estate , so parsimony is that which preserues it , consisting in the cutting off of superfluous and vnnecessary things , part whereof come from abroad : so as hindering the entry of those , they shall prouide in that regard for sparing . eor if excesse creepe not in among the subiects , the stranger shall not grow fat , to the preiudice of the estate , but the other subiects shall taste of the aduantage . yet this is not to say , that excesse is tollerable , although that nothing goe out of the estate , to the which the extreame pouerty of some , and the great wealth of others may breed much trouble . but if some growing poore by excesse , that which is lost , is diuided into so many purses , as the publique shall not be able to make vse of the increase of their meanes , which ●eceiu● the aduantage by this excesse ; this would be likewise worse : for the others remayning poore , it would be so much aduantage lost for the estate . whereas if he that spends , retayned his expences within the bounds of necessity , and conuenience without excesse , he should be alwayes found to haue meanes to succour the publique a●●eed . but this moderation doth likewise import much for the safety of the estate . for great men being they which vsually runne into these expences after they haue ruined themselues , they are eyther a charge to the publique to bee maintained and entertayned by it : or receiuing nothing from the publique , they abandon themselues most commonly to many innouations and enterprizes preiudiciall to the estate . and therein some princes are deceiued , who hold it a greatnesse to entertaine this excesse in their courts . it is onely meere vanity which ruines those which follow it , and depriues them of the meanes to continue the seruice , which the estate might expect from them , if they gouerned themselues otherwise : for that at the end of ten yeares at the most , a gentleman growes so poore , as he is forced to retire , and to hide himselfe in his house , and most commonly much indebted , being no more able to shew himselfe in the equipage of others of his condition . whereas if princes restrayned them , so as no man might spend more then his reuenewes will beare , they should be serued longer by their nobility , and should not bee so often importuned with demands , recompences , and reproaches , that they are ruined in their seruice . wherefore be it in regard of strangers , or inconsideration of the estate , they must cut off excesse , but especially that which brings with it the ruine of people and of great families . this excesse is principally in great and sumptuous buildings ; in moueables , apparrell , and ornaments of the person ; in the traine of seruants and attendants , in shews ; in banquets and feasts , in playes of shew and hazard . for the first , it seemes that the greatnesse and sumptuousnesse of buildings , turnes in some sort to the benefit of the publique , and that they ought not to forbid it , but rather inuite euery man to build for the ornament of cities and townes . but as a generall prohibition would be something preiudiciall to the publique ; so the free and indifferent tolleration of this expence , is hurtfull not onely to the publique but to the particular . it ought to be allowed to a great man , and a rich subiect , who hath few or no children , to spare his crowns , to imploy them in the ornament of the publique . this cannot be termed excesse . neither would i hinder many treasurers and partizans , who haue done their businesse with the publique , and profited largely , to make the like expences . but if in stead of building of priuate houses , they will raise some publique edifices , i would esteeme them the more : but yet i would desire to adde two restrictions ; the one , that they should not build with any materialls , but such as are found in the estate where they liue : the other to forbid them guilding and enriching with gold or siluer , which ought not to be allowed , yea , rather in publique buildings , there being nothing that doth so much decay gold and siluer in an estate , as the like workes . as for the common and priuate buildings , they may without this great expence prouide in building for the ornament of the publique , after the manner which they obserue in many townes of flanders and the iowe countries : where the order is such , that he which meanes to build , takes not onely the plot from those which are deputed to that end by the magistrate , but also the proiect of the front , or face of the building , the which must answere vpon the streete : the beauty whereof consists more in a certayne proportion , then in any enriching eyther of stuffe or workemanship : and it shal be most commonly made according to the front of some neare house , of small charge , according to the which they shall rule them selues for the height and fashion of the doores , and other exteriour parts . so as in succession of time all the houses of a streete ( building according to this proiect , ) are found alike , and by this resemblance and proportion , they are very pleasing vnto the eye . from this policy there redounds vnto them another aduantage , which is , that the workemen by the establishing of this order , being aduertised of the forme how they are to make the doores and other parts which must answere vpon the streete ; they haue them ready long before : so as priuate men that will build , they haue presently raised their houses , which are for the most part of bricke , finding that little stone that shall be necessary ready cut . it is therefore easie to cut off this excesse , and to prouide for the ornament of town●s , in restrayning euery man in his buildings according to his meanes , that the front may be answerable to the nearest houses , if there be obserued in them any proportion or pleasing prospectiue : making the publique places spacious , the streets large , straight , and long ; yet in such sort as neither the great heate , nor cold may annoy passengers : for therein chiefly consists the beauty of a towne . the excesse of moueables , apparrell , and other ornaments of the person , must in like manner be cut off ; as pretious stones , enamell , embroideries , stuffes of gold and siluer , and all strange manufactures of great price . if they will adorne themselues with gold , they may allow it in chaines without enamell ; in the which the losse cannot bee great : for the which the ordinances of france haue well prouided , and the magistrates very ill . that excesse which consists in a great traine of attendants , is excused vpon two considerations : the one which regards the commodity of those that will be attended , the other vpon the feeding and imploying of many men , the which being poore , and hauing no imployment , would be forced to steale or to dye for hunger , if they had not this retreate . in regard of the first consideration , if the number of seruants were regulated according vnto the commodity , it were no excesse : but to feede many vnprofitable mouthes , which wee might well spare without any want , it is vanity that makes vs doe it . as for the second , which is to imploy many profitable persons to all other things , this is so●farre from doing good to the publique , as by this retreate they inuite many to be idle : which if they wanted , they would fall to learne some trade , or thrust themselues into the warre and serue the publique the ven●tians , haue better then any other prouided for this point . for not able to regulate the number , which was necessary for the commodite of priuate persons , they haue cut off that which serued only for shew , which is the atendants in publique : not suffering a gentleman , how great and rich soeuer hee be , to be followed with aboue two seruants , giuing him libertie to haue as many in his house as hee shall thinke good . the which is the cause , that not able to make vse of this vaine traine in publique , euery man keepes but wh● he ▪ needs in his house . but as the ordinance is more easie to execute in a towne , then in a princes court , whore , for that the discommodities are greater , they haue need to be serued by a greater number , and must likewise satisfie the vanitie of the court : the italians and spaniards , who are in this regard good husbands , seeing themselues forced to this traine for a time , make vse of men whom they retaine with them , for daily wages ; and knowing how much they are to giue them by the day , they are not tied to seede them , nor to keepe open house for them , as they doe in france and germany : and going from court , this troope is dismist , there remaining none but the ordinary traine ; and thus they satisfie vanitie and good husbandrie altogether . i confesse that this point would bee hard to reforme in france , euery man des●●ing to eate his meanes in good companie . yet there might be some course taken that might diminish their disorder . the excesse of banquets and feasts , is that which is most esteemed , especially among the northerne nations : but in effect it is the most superfluous and beastly . i doe not say but vpon some occasion , as in publique reioycing & marriages , it is fit to make more expences then we doe in our ordinary cour●e of liuing ; but yet we must fly superfluity , & prouide principally for neatnesse , order , and seemelinesse , which must bee regulated according to the number and qualitie of persons whom you treate . wherefore it imports the estate and priuate men much , that this should bee reformed . in regard of playes , those of hazard are forbidden in all estates : but the defences are so ill obserued , as many great families ruine themselues thereby . as for playes of show , as tilting , turneyes , and masques ; those that may quicken the courage to vertue , as the two first , ought not only to bee allowed , but the nobility should bee inuited vnto it ; yet so , as the expence may not seeme greater then the vallour ; carrying such a moderation , as it may not ruine any man ; and in regard of those which haue no other ground then vanitie or loue , and being apish followers , whereof most part of those which haue imployed themselues therein , haue beene afterwards ashamed ; they deserue not only to b●e forbidden , but scor●ed at as ridiculous . wherefore these doores being shut , by the which the faculties and meanes of priuate men flow away incensably , there is no doubt , but those streames which runne from this abundance , whereof wee haue spoken , will so swell , that when the publique will make vse , they may well doe it without drawing priuate men into necessitie . these two foundations being laid , of the abundance of all things necessary , and of the parcimony of subiects , wee must now speake of the setling of the finances , or ordinary reuenewes , the which haue beene diuers according to the diuersitie of estates . chap. . of the establishment of the finances , or ordinary reuenewes of an estate . many haue established the principall reuenew of an estate , or publique demesus , which is the most honest , the most iust , and the most safe , there hauing beene certaine lands and demesus reserued , to bee let out to farme , and giuen to particular men for a time or in perpetuity , in paying the rents and reuenewes , wherewith they had beene charged towards the prince . in some estates this reseruation hath beene of a moietie , in others of the third part of the territory , and in others of lesse . this establishment is hard to make● vnlesse it be by the meanes of a full and absolute conquest , by the which it is lawfull for the victor to prescribe what law hee pleaseth to the vanquished ; but being once made , hee must bee maintained without any alienation ; but likewise an ingagement and no alienation , for that the ingagement in the end growes to be an alienation , by meanes of the necessity which the prince hath alwayes to be releiued vpon new affaires which happen . so as he is so farre from being able to redeeme it , as he is prest to make new ingagements , the which being made for a farre lesse value , then the alienation would be , the prince findes himselfe depriued of his reuenewes for a small relesse ; and it may be sayd , that it had beene profitable to sell , then to ingage . but to doe better , wee must not allow neither to one nor the other : and if hee cannot find money otherwise , hee must not ingage but the vse of it for a certaine time , the which expired , the prince may re-enter into his demesus . the second meanes , which they make vse of to raise a stocke of treasure , are the entries , and going forth to marchandize , hauens and ports , aswell vpon strangers as the subiects : an ancient and generall course , iu●t , lawfull and most profitable , with the conditions which we haue mentioned speaking of commerce ; which are not to suffer the tra●ique of things which are necessary for life , vntill the subiect bee furnished , nor of raw stuffes , to the end the subiect working them , they may draw profit from the manufactures : to suffer the trafique of those which are wrought , and the bringing in of that which is raw by strangers : but they must moderate the imposts , of necessary things , which are brought vnto vs from aboad . some likewise haue esteemed tributes , gifts , and pensions , which they receiue from strangers , for an ordinary reuenew . but this being not sufficient for the entertainment of charges , it cannot bee called a stocke of treasury ; although it may serue to increase the stocke . the fourth meanes is in trafique which they may make in the name of the publique or prince . as there are many trades vnworthy of a prince or publique , so there are some which require a great stocke , the which may well bee allowed them . yet it would seeme more profitable , in regard of the theft which factors doe commit , to giue the money which they haue in reserue , to those which trafique , vpon good cautions and sufficient assurance , with a meane interest ( as they say augustus did ) then to trafique . hence would grow three or foure aduantages . the first it would increase the publique money . the second , it would giue meanes to priuate men to profit and gaine : and the third , that they should saue by this meanes the publique money out of the hands of importune beggers , flatterers , and fauorites ; and preuent the facility of a prodigall prince . there is another kind of trafique which is vsed in some estates , the which is the sale of offices and publique charges , which is not onely dishonest , but most pernitious : and yet this abuse is gone so farre , as this trafique is not onely receiued but carefully handled , as an ordinary stocke of the treasure . to preuent it , it is necessary to know vpon what pretext this abuse is crept in . as all new inuentions are grounded vpon publique necessities ; so this hath beene aduanced vnder this pretext . seeing that in regard of the multitude , of those which might aspire to charges , princes referre themselues to courtiers , and to such as were about them , to make choyce of officers ; and courtiers hauing no other ayme , then to worke their owne ends , propounded vnto princes , those which promise them most money vnderhand , to bee preferred before their competitors : so as although the prince did not sell the offices , yet they were venall , the profit going to particular men that were about them : they found it more reasonable , seeing the abuse was such , and that growing from the ordinary carelesnesse of the prince , it would bee difficult to reforme ; that the publique should the trafique , by the meanes whereof it might be eased in some other charges , then to suffer it to bee done by priuate persons . in trueth this mischeife is lesse then it was , seeing the publique profits something thereby ; but yet not withstanding it is euill , and most preiuditiall to the estate : for the which there is more remedy , but to quicken the vigilancie of the prince , or of those which haue charge of the publique , to make choyce of those which are to bee aduanced : being more fit ( for the officers ) to leaue vnto them the choyce and the election , to the end that gratifying him whom they hold most fit to serue , hee should be more bound vnto them , and shew himselfe more ob●dient then he would be , if he had obtained it by his owne merrit , or for money . but for that it is impossible that the choyce could bee made in the confusion of so many competitors , which might pretend to one office : the princes seeming to haue some excuse therein , the meanes aboue propounded might serue for a remedy , establishing many degrees in the offices of euery profession , aswell in armes , iustice , the treasure ; as religion ; and prescribing a certaiue time , that euery one ought to remaine in euery degree , before hee can pretend to mount higher ; for that it would be more easie for the prince , to choose out of the number of those which had serued their time , him whom he pleaseth , to aduance him to the next degree , there being some place voyd ; then it is after the manner they now liue . and for all this they should cut off nothing of the princes fauour . for hee that is thus aduanced , should be only bound to him and not to any other . whereas hauing no meanes to bee knowne vnto the prince but by the mediation of other persons , whose knowledge he hath bought for ready money ; hee is many times more obliged to the groome then to the master , for the fauour hee receiueth ; but much more to his purse : and by little and little the affection of officers , towards the prince , is lost by these courses , there being none of all those which practise these meanes , but blames them , and esteemes the prince lesse which suffers them , then if they proceeded another way . the prince should bee better serued , not only with more affection and fidelity ; but also with more diligence and sufficiency . for the officers comming to the highest and supreame degrees , they would be much more capable , as hath beene sayd ; and euery man desireing to make himselfe knowne to his prince , to bee preferred before his companion , would serue with enuy , and indeauour to make himselfe to bee obserued by some seruice . whereas the officer in this venallity , hauing no other hope to aduance himselfe then by his purse , seekes what he can to profit , be it by right or wrong , to haue meanes to purchase some greater office , wherein hee may benefit himselfe better . but wee will leaue this reformation to another time , when they shall be more capable . chap. . of subsedies , of extraordinary leuies , imports , and loane● . the fist meanes to make a stocke for the treasure , is taken wholy from the subiects ; whom they haue shorne after diuers manners in many estates , and in some they haue flead them . this meanes cannot bee excused but vpon necessity : but if it bee necessary it is likewise iust ; the safetie of the people and the preseruation of the estate being the supreame law. the most ordinary manner to leuy vpon the subiect , is by way of subsedy , for the goods which he enioyes ; the which also hath beene diuersly practized , according to the diuersity and condition of subiects and goods . clergie m●n and the nobility in some places , are exempted with their goods , of what condition soeuer they were . in other places they made the subsedies reall , exempting the feodall , or noble-lands ; the persons aswell of nobles as ecclesiastiques , hauing submitted themselues to contribute for their rurall goods which they possesse ▪ in some estates and other places they haue exempted the nobles and ecclesiastiques , & the lands which they held in their owne hands ; but they haue not exemptted their farmers . to dispute which is the most iust of all these formes of leuies , were vnprofitable . for this establishment hath not beene made according to the rules of iudgement ; but according to the facility and disposition which they haue found in people , to receiue one forme more th●n another . yet if any ought to enioy an exemption , it seemes that gentlemen , who are bound to a personall seruice , and to contribute for the defence of the estate , not onely their goods but also their liues , may with iustice bee exempted from this kind of imposition ; seeing that the burthen which is imposed vpon them , is much more greiuous and heauy then that of the cannons . in regard of clergie men , the respect and reuerence of religion hath held them long exempt : but in the end in those places especially , whereas the subsedies are personall , iustice hath wrested out of their hands , some succours for the publique , whereof they make a great part ; which succours , although they be not called subsedy , but a chautatiue graunt ; yet vnder● a milder name it hath the same effect . as for others , some haue beene exempted , partly to preserue the respect due vnto the offices which they hold of the prince ; and partly to authorize and maintaine the leuies , and to punish the disobediences . others haue beene exempt , for the feare of some sedition and rebellion , and for the good of peace onely : so as they vse the like pollicy with them , as they doe with the clergie ; and draw succours from them vnder the names of loanes and borrowing . as for the place where the subsedy is to bee leuied , eyther at the mans dwelling house , or at the place where his lands and goods lye : many hold opinion , that the most iust were , to leuy the subsedy in euery place , where the man that is subiect to the subsedy hath goods , by reason of the fraudes which are committed vsually by such as haue goods in many places who se●ing themselues charged at the place of their abode wi●h a great subsedy , proportionable to the estimation of their goods , retire themselues either to a towne that is freed from subsedies , or into some place where they pay not so much ; whereby their subsedy is layd vpon others . but if the subsedy were layd vpon their goods , they should cut off this abuse , which doth much import the poore people . these difficulties are found in the laying of the subsedy , as well in regard of the exemptions pretended by many conditions of men , as for the inequality and disproportion in the laying thereof among such as are subiect : and the faculties of euery one vpon whom it should take hold , being vnknowne , it had ministred occasion to seeke many other courses , and to impose many duties sometime vppon proprieties , sometime vpon legacies , and testamentory successions , left to strangers ; vpon carriages as well by water as land ; vpon wine , meale , salt , and other merchandize ; vpon contract , seales , waights , and measures : of which tolls euery man insensibly payes his part ; the merchant making the aduance of those which are leuied vpon the merchandize , the which hee retires afterwards from parti●ular persons which they buy of him . yet some which disalow of this diuersity of poling and tributes in an estate , holding a subsedy the most iust , if it were well ordered , haue thought to bring in a certayne and setled order , whereby they might regulate themselues in drawing from euery man the number of his goods . this order hath beene practised in many common-weales ; but neuer more happily , nor with more aduantage to the estate , then in that of rome . to say that this expedient is more proper for a common-weale , then for a principality , there is little colour , seei●g that when it was established at rome , the estate was gouerned by king seruius tulliu● ; and continued vnder all the emperours which sought to gouerne iustly . and contrariwise the tyrants which sought by the meanes of a small number to gouerne , treade vnder foot , and oppresse others , to enrich some , and to impouerish others ; finally , to turne all topsie turuey , for that they would not discouer their iniustices , violences , and tyran●ies ; haue neglected this order , laying their exactions with more impunity vpon the weake , then if they were diuided among them all with a iust proportion . to say likewise , that it were a hard matter to expose the pouerty of some to scorne and contempt , and the wealth of others to enuy ; it is a very bad reason to hinder a good establishment : for neuer man of vnde●standing , in that which concernes his good , made any accompt of enuy or scorne . but besides this we may say , that on the other side enuy would cease against such whom they held rich , and haue nothing ; and the scorne against such as haue some wealth , who notwithstanding were held poore . it is certayne that the deceitfull merchant , who hath a designe to steale the goods of another by playing banquerout , will say , that it is not good they should know the course , traffique , and negotiations of merchants , which consist many times in papers and credit ; nor that they should discouer the secrets of houses and families . but he that is an honest man , and will be knowne for such , for a good husband , and not a deceiuer , will ground his credit vpon his discretion , and not vpon the vncertainty of his affaires ; and will alwayes take delight , they should know his estate and manner of liuing : and there is no man which doth not more willingly lend an eare to a poore man , who shall be knowne for an honest man , and a good husband , then to a rich , which shall be held for a bad husband , and of little faith . but in recompence of these imaginary inconueniences , an infinite number of aduantages redound to the estate , by the establishment of this order . for thereby they should know who are prodigall , banquerouts , cozeners , and vsurers ; how some gaine so much , and others spend : and moreouer , the penalties of iudgements and condemnations , would be easie to regulate by the iudges , according to the ability of euery mans estate . the deceipts which are practised in marriages , sales , bargaines , and in all publique and priuate negotiations , would be discouered and knowne : an infinite number of frauds which are vsed touching successions and portions , would be auerred , without inquiery , or rather charges of law ; and they should preuent falshoods and false witnesses , which are practised dayly . but besides these aduantages , to returne where we left , the facility wou●d be great in a necessity to draw succours from the subiects without iniu●tice , not oppressing one more then another ; as it falls out vsually , some bearing the whole burthen , and others being discharged . this facility of extraordinary leuies is the fourth point ; which may cause an estate to be held rich . for we shall in vaine bragge of the abundance of an estate , and of the ordinary stocke of the treasure : the which as wee haue ●ayd , how great soeuer it be , may be exhausted , and sometime i●gaged , if the publique in an vrgent necessity may not be releiued by some extraordinary leuy , which may be done without iniustice , disco●tentment , or insupportable oppression of any part of the subiects , which would draw after it reuolts , seditions , and intelligences with the enemies . t●is numbring of their goods being vnable to be brought in , to equall euery man in such sort of contributions , they must haue a recourse to other meanes , the most iust and plausible that can be deuised , according to the quality of estates , and the condition of times , the which being vnable to set downe now in particular , it shall suffice to say gene●all , that the imposition which extends it selfe vniuersally o●e● all the subiects , of what condition soeuer they be , is the most gentle , the most profitable , and the most iust : for that euery man paying , euery man payes the lesse , then if it were leuied of a lesse number ; and yet it is farre greater ; wherein it is more profitable to the estate : and it is more iust , for that euery man hauing an interest in the preseruation of the estate , euery one is likewise bound to contribute . but the principall part of iustice would be● if it be proportioned and layd equally among them that contribute , according to the proportion of euery mans estate ; if the leuy be made without rigorous executions , especially against the person . the contrary whereof doth vsually happen vpon leuie of the subsedies , the which being imposed vpon view of the countrey , as they say , and without any certaine ground , the goods of euery man being vnknowne to direct them , and leuying it vpon the poorest , they cause them many times to dye in prison , which is a pouerty resenting barbarisme : or to get some delay of payment , the poore man must satisfie the auarice of receiuers , and sergeants , which ruine him by such concussions , the which many times exceede the principall of the subsedy . but if some considerations be iust , to exempt certayne conditions of persons , or that making the imposition generall , some trouble is to be feared ▪ ; they must haue recourse to those that are casuall as after the ciuill warres at rome , they setled the twentieth part of successions and legacies , which were left to strangers or collaterals . and before in the time of warre likewise , at the request of the consul manlius , they ordayned the twentieth part of infranchised men . in scotland malcolana hauing sold all the kings demesus , the estates of the countrey agreed , that the fees changing hand , should pay vnto the king a certaine right of redemption . impositions likewise and customes may bee iustly layd vpon all that which may corrupt the manners of the subiects , eyther to contayne them , or to han●sh th●m away . this re●son was the cause that in some estates they haue charged suits with diuers duties ; and in others they haue only punished them that sled from them , imposing great amercements vpon them that sayled ; and in others they haue punished rash pleaders , which lost their causes ; as at athens and rome . those likewise which may be established without opposition , which come from some body vnited and of authority , may be receiued for the facility of their establishment , to the which they haue many times more regard in such things , then vnto iustice. but if the necessity be such , as they must prouide a speedy remedy , and that they cannot attend the time , which would be necessary for the establiment , and the leuy of an imposition : there is no other meanes , then to make vse of voluntary borrowing● , vpon those that are best able , whom they shall pay at a prefixed time without sayling , to the end they may maintayne the credit of the publique , and that whensoeuer the like necessity should happen , they might finde the purses of priuate men open to succour him . but if he cannot finde money without interest , he must to the end to stay the course , prouide for the payment both of principal and interest by the same assignation , the which shall be deliuered into the hands of such as lend , as well being assured by this meanes of their due , they might lend another time more freely : as for feare , that this assignation remaining in the hands of those which mannage the businesse , it should be otherwise disposed of , whereby the the prince should not onely ●oose his credit , but should finde himselfe at the end of the time charged with great interest . chap. . of the mannaging and good husbandry of the treasure : that is to say , of the ordring of the expences , and the cutting it off . the ground of the finances being found , we must order the mannaging , which consists in two principall points . the one concernes the husbanding of it , the other the quality of the persons which are to be admitted to this mannaging . the husbanding hath two parts , that is to say , the order and gouerning of the expences , or if it exceeds the receipt , the cutting off part of the charges . touching the order of the expence , if in all things that which concernes god , is to be preferred , the same must likewise be obserued in the treasure . wherefore the first chapter of the expence , must bee of almes , wherein he may not be sparing . the kings of france haue had goodly examples in st. lewis , who founded and endowed twenty eight bodies or colledges , as the seigniour of i●inuille sayth ; and had dayly in his traine one hundred and twenty poore , and in lent two hundred and forty , feeding them with meate from his table . so hee liued in great honour , feared of his enemies , reuerenced by his friends , adored by his subiects , and after hee had reigned forty foure yeares , hee left two sonnes , whose posterity haue reigned , and doe yet ouer the french ; and his realme exceeding rich , and flourishing to his successor , recommending especially vnto him , that hee should bee deuoute towards almighty god , and charitable vnto those who are poore and miserable . almes doe neuer impouerish an estate , nor a family , but contrariwise they enrich them with all sorts of blessings . the second chapter of the expence must be the freeing of the charges of the estate , but first of those which are necessary for its safetie ; as the pay of souldiers , munitions , artillery , shipps and vessells of warre , repayrations and fortifications of townes and important places , entertainment of spies , and finally all the expences , aswell ordinary as extraordinary , necessary to warrant the estate , against the inuasion of strangers , or the reuolt of subiects . next must follow the fees of officers , especially of those , by whose meanes they hold the rest in their duty and obedience , these making a part of the safety . then follow the debts , which i place next to the necessary charges for the safety : for that if by the meanes of these charges , the estate be not secure , the debts cannot be assured . after these come recompences ; with which they shall not charge the treasure as little as may be , for the which the king must bestow offices and dignities , and accustome all the great men not to seeke any other kind of recompence , which is of most share and more durable , then that which is made by money . for a prince which aduanceth some one to hon●r that hath done him seruice , he publisheth the merrit of him whom he recompenceth , and his fauour withall , the which remaines continually in the mind of him that receiues it ; and it lasts as long in the minds of the people , as they see him , who hath receiued it in this degree : and moreouer the remembrance which they haue , to haue seene a man gratified for his merrit , many by this meanes are inuited to serue , seeing seruices so honorably rewarded ▪ whereas to recompence in money , few know it , and the grace many times continues no longer then the money lasteth . the prince may likewise recompence his seruants , to the discharge of his treasure , in procuring eyther for them or theirs , marriages and alliances of aduantage ; not thereby to force his subiects , for that were tiranny : but he that sees himselfe debarred of the princes fauour , is glad sometimes to approach by the meanes of the alliance of one , that is in grace with his master , though otherwise inferiour in meanes , and family ; especially when the inequallity is not such , as hee may receiue some dishonor by the alliance . knowing then how to husband these kind of recompences , the greatest part of great seruices will be rewarded ; and recompences of small seruices will be of so little moment , as they will not greatly charge the treasure . after recompences follow gifts , the which must not be done at pleasure : but as recompences are made for seruices done , gifts must likewise be for seruices , according to the quality and impo●tance thereof , as also to the quallity , sufficiencie , and power of the person , the prince must moderate his bounty , and giue not to one alone , but to many , little , and often . i say to many , for that in giuing to one alone , the enuy is great , the grace little , and the ingratitude of him that rece●ues , may one day be hurtfull . i say little and often , especially in money , which is soone consumed , for that the great expence in gifts wast the treasure , and accustome those that receiue them , to moderate dem●unds . small bounties often reitterated , are as it were insensible ; the grace is the more durable in the minds of those which receiue them , and the desire and hope in continuing the seruice to receiue daily , bind men the more . i except the gifts that are made to embassadours and forraigne princes , the which are done for reputation , and to shew the magnificence of him that giues them , or of his estate , and may in no sort bee omitted where they haue beene accustomed . * the expence which followes , is that which hath beene propounded by some , for the breeding vp and instructing of youth , to that whereunto they shall be found fit , ( especially the poore ) as we haue formerly sayd , by the erecting of publique houses , for manuall arts , and all sorts of manufactures : whereunto may bee added the building of seminaries for piety , and the study of diuinity , and other learned vocations ; and some for the excercises of honor and vertue of the nobility . in many estates they haue prouided a great number of seminaries , for piety and the sciences ; but the greatest are so ill gouerned , as they are become vnprofitable , by the disorder which is found in them . as for seminaries of honor and vertue , i meane those places which are destinated for the instruction of the nobility , which are to be imployed in armes ; in long and dangerous voyages ; and in the mannaging of publique affaires : whereof hitherto they haue made small accompt . and yet the safety and reputation of an estate , especially of a principallity , consists in those of this condition : who , if with that greatnesse of courage , which is not naturall vnto them , they ioyne industry and prudence , which may be gotten by exercises and instructions , fit for their profession ; there is no doubt but many would haue beene more capable to serue the publique , then they are . it were a great art both of pollicy and wisedome , if the prince should cause the young gentlemen of his estate to be bred vp in those places , whose fathers haue not the meanes to vndergoe the charge of such an instruction , as is necessary for them of this condition : and there to entertaine thē at the charge of the publique , vnto a certaine age , to ●e distributed & do seruice in the troups and garissons , affecting c●●taine places of honor vnto them , with suffi●●●●●●●terta●ment , to the which they may bee ad●a●ced a●●r they haue se●ued some time . for besides that these m●n , gouerning all the affaires of the prince , they would be more faithfull vnto him : the gentlemen who find themselues burthened with many children , and who for feare to leaue them miserable , become house-doues , to husband both their liues and goods , would hazard the one and the other freely for the princes seruice , and not be diuerted for the care of their children , whom they knew could not one day faile of preferment , aswell by reason of the institution , as for the beginning of imployment for the princes seruice , which should bee assured vnto them . and the charge which should be made in these seminaries , would be recompenced by the seruice , which the whole nobility , would bee thereby inuited to do , willingly and freely to the publique : and the troupes , especially those of foote , would bee found with more order , discipline , fidellity , and courage , being filled with young men of good houses , bred vp with honour and obedience , then they now are , being for the most part men of no moment , ryotous , and drawne together from all parts . after all these expences , come those which may serue eyther for the commodity , or the decoration of townes and prouinces ; as conduits of water , structure of bridges , repairation of wayes , churches , royall pallaces , pyramides , tombs , statues , collosses , and other publique buildings : but with this restraint , neuer to enter into those expenses , vntill the sparing of the sōme which is necessry , be first made . for to multiply the subsedies , to make pallaces , more stately then necessary , were to leaue a remembrance of his tyranny , aad a perpetuall testimony to posterity , that they haue built with the blood of the subiects . behold the principall husbandry which consists in the order of the expence . but the stocke of the treasure being not sufficient , to beare all these charges , most part of which seeme necessary ; they must seeke the meanes to raise the farmes , and fall to the cutting off of debts , especially of interests , of fees , and of excessiue gifts , rather then to come ( as they haue done in many estates ) to make new impositions . in an estate where the prince finds himselfe ill assured of the will of his prime men , they haue obserued the course which eumenes vsed , to borrow of those that were ill affected , to the end that interessing them in the estate , and the losse thereof , for feare of loosing their debt they helpe to maintaine it . but if they finde some hinderance to assure themselues elsewhere , this meanes would be but weake . wherefore a prince must neuer borrow , vnlesse it bee in an vrgent necessity : for there is nothing that doth so much harme to a bad husband , ( as the publique is many times ) then credit . i know that many hold , that this cutting off of debts or wages is vniust : as in truth it is , if the estate hath wherewithall to pay : but if the sparing of the ordinary reuenew be not sufficient to satisfie , the necessity makes this cutting off necessary and iust . for to satisfie it by a new imposition , were to repaire one iniustice by another more generall , & to draw most commonly from the poore to giue vnto the rich ; in which cutting off part of the interest of debts , will not preiudice so much , although it be great , as a subsedie would do the poore . i doe not say , that among those to whom the prince is indebted , there may bee some one found , to whom this cutting off would bee hurtfull : but for one of that quality among the princes creditors , there would be fiue hundred of the poore reduced to beggery , if they should by that meanes pay the debts due by the estate : the which i vnderstand of estates which are already ouercharged with great impositions , and likewise with great debts . chap. . of those which ought to be imployed in the gouernment of the treasure . as for the quallity of those to whom the mannaging of the treasure ought to be committed , if men could be knowne , there is not any one , but would make choice to deliuer it into the hands of the most loyall : but making this choyce most commonly by hazard , i say that although we suppose him to be an honest man , to whom wee will giue this charge ; yet we must not take neither a poore man nor a needy , nor one that is too powerfull , nor of too great authority . the first for feare that through necessity he bee not inuited to rob vs ; and the other least that he steale from vs too boldly , and hauing robbed vs , we are not able to call him to an accompt , and to punish his thefts . there is besides this an ordinary fault which is cōmitted in this subiect in many estates , which is , that they make a trade of it apart , and profession of the managing of the princes purse . so as he that enters into it , instructs himselfe as to an art to do his owne businesse ; the which he cannot doe but with the preiudice of the publique : thus the elder they grow , the more learned they are , that is to say preiudiciall to the estate . i doe much commend that ancient custome of the romans , to imploy young men in the mannaging of the treasure , before they aduanced them to any other offices : for this is to giue them occasion to shew their discretion , and for the hope to bee one day something more , to incourage them to doe their duties well , and to mannage the publique reuenewes . besides , this youth is lesse auaritious then another age , and more innocent , and lesse hardy in deceipts , easie to be discouered : so as the romans leauing them but a short time in these charges , to bee aduanced to other honors , they came forth more innocent then they entred . to say that a long experience is necessary in these places , to mannage them well , this were to endeare the trade . the greatest pollicy in the treasure to serue the publique , is to haue no other but discretion ; and to know how to write downe that which hee receiues and paies ; to recouer that which he receiues not , hauing charge to make the recouery , and to follow exactly the commandements and ordinances of those which haue power to ordaine . there is no factor in a shop but vnderstands this . but i will confesse , that to know how to steale from the publique cunningly , and to couer and disguise his thefts , he must haue a long experience of ill doing , be it to defend the falshood of an acquittance , of the omission of a receipt , of a false reprisall , of a disguising of parties , and a secret composition with those that are to receiue ; with other courses o●dinary to those which deale in this trade ; not meaning to taxe honest men. some to make accomptants more diligent to make their receipts , and to hinder them that they may not maliciously ( as it often happens ) make reprizes , or to ease some more then others , or to vse it for their owne particular , or for some other designe ; haue held it fit to regulate their fees proportionably to that which they are to receiue , and to diminish thē , according vnto that which they shall leaue in reprizes , to the end that being interessed in their owne particular , they would be more exact to make their receipts . others haue giuen their receipt to make the abatments , with charge to make it good , and not to bring in any not soluable : the which would seeme more iust . as for those which ought to heare and examine the accompts , besides the choyce that they are to make , of the honestest men for this ●ffect ; it is necessary to bind them , to iudges accordi●g to certain● formes and orders , which haue beene held fit to hinder the abus●s which accomptants , or themselues might commit : and especially to draw particular notes of the distribution of the treasure , which they shall enjoyne the accomptant to verifie , vpon those of the receipt and expence , without any meanes of dispencing , for any occasion whatsoeuer ; but afterwards he may addresse himselfe vnto the prince , if there bee any reason to ●ase him . but as the prince is not alwayes at leasure , nor sometimes of experience to regulate & direct his owne affaires ; and that moreouer , hee is importuned by an infinit number of beggers , whom if he should satisfie , his treasure would be found too short : to free himselfe of the hatred , which the deniall of so many demaunds might purchase him , and to discharge himselfe of the importunity ; the custome is to send such sutors to a councell consisting of rough and seuere men , more inclined to refuse then to graunt ; and who know how to moderate the denialls which they make , as they doe not depriue those which are refused of all hope , to be satisfied in some other thing : for rough and contumelious denialls , may distast many , from imploying themse●ues in the princes seruice , although the prince make not the deniall : for that as they loue the dogg for the masters sake , it falls out often , that when the dogg bites too sharply , in the end they take exceptions at the master . chap. . of the exchequer or sparing of treasure . there remaines to speake of the exchequer , the which some haue held hurtfull to the publique , euen that which is made to heape vp treasure , drawing apart great summs of gold and siluer , god forbidding it deutr●nomy . this many times hath caused some to attempt against estates : as the sonne of tygranes , who besieged sop●one , a towne in armenia , which pompeys army , to haue his fathers treasure . moreouer this gathering together ruines the commerce and traffique of the subiects ; and doth not hinder the ruine of the estate , when as the affaires are thereunto disposed . sardinapalus l●ft forty millions of gold to those which slue him . darius left fourscore to alexander who vāquished him . and many times the father , who leaues much gold and siluer to the sonne , leaues him withall a speedy meanes to ruine him . for a young man relying vpon his treasure , thrusts himselfe into impossible enterprizes , which are aboue his fo●ces ; hates peace ; contemns the friendship of his neighbours ; enters into warre not onely vnnecessary ●nd of little profit , but also hurtfull . yet custome is contrary , as also reason , if we had the consideration of heaping vp of treasure : for that to gather toget●er money when as necessity doth presse , that were too late : for that the bruit of armes , causing traffique to ●●ase , tillage , and the gathering in of fruits , the customes and imposts by co●s●quence would decay ; and the sub●ect● ( imp●uerished by the lodging of souldiers , ●●d the holding of the fields ) will be vnable to p●y . but there must be two considerations added for the gathering in of treasure . the one to make it equall to the other forces of the estate , that is to say , of persons , whom we may imploy , and of munition of victualls and war , which are nec●ssary for vs ; whereof wee must make a magazine or store-house before we gather treasure . for to hope that without it , the treasure alone which we gather will preserue vs from ruine , were a vaine thing ; and the examples aboue mentio●ed shew it sufficiently . the other considerations is , not to draw together so much gold and siluer , as it may incommodate the commerce and traffique of the subiects : for this were to dry vp the spring of the treasure . if the sea should retaine all the waters of the riuers which disgorge themselues into it , and not ●eturne them to their fountaines , by conduits vnder ground ; it would dry vp the riuers , and in the end grow dry it selfe . wherefore they which will shew any discretion in heaping of treasure , haue considered in grosse the quantity of money , which goes forth and ●nters yearely into an estate : and if there enters more then goes forth , they haue held that a prince might lawfully , and without any interest of the commerce , lay vp yearely in his exchequer , as much gold and siluer , as the entry exceeded the going forth . but if the entry hath not exceeded the going forth , they haue held and with reason , that the prince ought not to lay vp any treasure . but in this case there is another remedy , of which we haue formerly made mention ▪ which is , that af●er nec●ssary charges are payed , the prince hauing meanes to spare somethi●g for his neede , he may distribute it vpon moderate in●erest to the marchants of his estate , taking necessary security , ( as we haue sayd augustus did ) to y●ild it at a c●rtaine time . for in this manner , the assuranc●s being good , this supply would bee as ready as if it were in his coffers : and the interest being such as the marchan● may gaine ther●by , the commerce is no way diminished by this sparing , but rather augmented , and the subiects and prince enricht by this meanes . but men haue beene much troubled for the guard of treasures of gold and siluer . the kings of peru , kept it in great massies , of gold and siluer : the romans in lingotis in the forme of tyles ; the kings of morocco caused massie boules to be made , which set vpon the top of their mosquees or temples ; some ( to be guarded more religiously ) haue put them into churches . as the guard in a common-wealth is not vneasie , so in a principality or monarchie it is most difficult . for they haue not so much cause to guard it from theeues , as from their owne princes , who for their priuate pleasures , or by the importunity of some flatterers , scatter that in one yeare , which their predecessors haue gathered in many . so caligula spent in one yeare , seauentie and seuen millions of gold , which tyb●rius ( as they write ) had drawne together : and carcalla consumed in one day , that which seuerus his father had spared in ninteene yeares . wherefore as it is most fitting , that few men should know what is layd vp in the treasure , least that being too much , it should prouoke some through enuy to se●ke to get it ; or being too lit●le , it should make vs to bee contemned of our enemies : so many haue held it fit ▪ to ordaine not to touch the treasure , but in the great necessity of the prince and state , and by the councell of the magistrates , of greatest autority . chap. . of treaties in generall , be it for the enter-view and parley of princes , or by their deputies and emb●ssadours . estates are like vnto buildings raised high , the which although they bee built of good m●●erials , and strong walles , yet to subsist long , they haue neede to be supported and vnderpropt without with buttresses , pillars , and arches ; for that being threatned as well without as within , they must bee rampired against all forces . wherefore the care of the affaires of strangers , especially of his neighbours , is most necessary for a prince , and for any man that shall bee called to the rule or goue●nment of the estate . this care consists in three principall points . the first is how hee shall gouerne himselfe with his neighbours . the second consists in gaining some credit among them , to haue a part in their deliberations . the third and last , being vnable to passe without them , to get meanes to pierce into their designes . the manner how to gouerne himselfe with his neighbours , depends of the manner of treating with them , and of the obseruation of treaties , according vnto the which hee must gouerne himselfe . the manner of treating depends chiefly of the condition of persons and of affaires . yet there are some generall considerations which deserue to be knowne . the first is in the ouerture , which is made to treate , it many times happening , that of two princes which are enemies , the one will not seeke vnto the other for an accord , so as the ouerture must bee made eyther by some greater prince , or by some neighbour that is a friend to both : and sometimes the ministers of two princes meeting accid●ntally together , if they be imployed . argenion , and a steward to the duke of mantoua , m●eting at creal carragio , to condole in their masters names for the death of marquesse of montferrat , made an ouerture for the treaty of peace , betwixt charles the eight and lewis sforse . king ferdinand of aragon hath imployed monkes to that effect , religion giuing a free accesse to those of this condition , and liberty to speake and propound what they will. the ouerture to enter into treaty being made , the princes resolue to parley themselues , to the end the treaty may be more secret ; or they depute embassadours to that effect . many haue not allowed of this enter-view of princes , although they were friends : and pa●ticularly philip de comiues , obserues many examples of the meeting of princes , who being fo●merly good friends , haue become ●nemies after this enter-view . yet i hold that in such affaires we cannot prescribe a certaine and g●nerall rule ; histories teaching vs , that other princes haue parled ; and yet no hatred hath ensued : so this depends rather of the estate of affaires , and of the conformity and diuersity of humours , and manner of li●i●g , of the princes and their people , then of the e●t●r-view . that of lewis the twelfth of france , and of ferdinand of aragon at sauonne , past fairely : as also that of the emperour charles the fift , with pope clement the seuenth at bolonia ; and that of the same pope with francis the first . but it shall be discretion in a prince , before he comes to that , to consider , if at this parley there may not someth●ng fall out that may breed iealousie or enuie against him , or that may draw him into contempt of him with whom hee t●eat●s . the emperour maximilian the first , hauing appointed a place and day to parley with king lewis the twelfth , came to the assignation . but fearing that he should not appeare so well accompanied as lewis the twelfth , whose trayne was in better order then the germans , he anoyded this enter-view , which might haue bred some contempt of him and his with the french ; and sought a pretext before he parted , or the king arriued , excusing himselfe vpon the warre which the venetians made in friuly , whether it was necessary for him to transport himselfe speedily . the place of parley is likewise v●ry considerable , as well for the safety , as for the honour which he receiues , whom they goe to finde in his owne pallace . the consideration of the safety is commonly the principall . and the distrust which king francis the first had , that vnder pretext of a parley with the emperour charles and the pope , whereunto hee was inuited during the hostage of his two sonnes in spaine ) they would retaine him , made him refuse to come . the same consideration hath sometimes beene the cause , that two princes being enemies , haue parlyed vpon a bridge , made to that end vpon a common riuer , with barres and shuttings betwixt them ; least that the princes which parley , or those which follow them , falling into contestation for something , should not attempt one against the other : as it happened at the parley betwixt charles the seuenth , then dolphin , and the duke of burgundy , who was slayne by tann●quin du cha●tel : which was the cause that this manner of parling was obserued betweene king edward of england and lewis the eleuenth . but lewis sforse hauing demanded to haue the same ▪ forme obserued and kept , being to parley with charles the eighth in his returne from naples , they refused him , as to one who ought not to treate with the king as an equall , to whose fidelity hee did wrong , to demand such assurances . yet this hath no certaine rules : but they goue●ne themselues in such things according to the confidence which they may take one of another . the ordinary course is to choose for these enter-viewes , eyther a neuterall place belonging to some common friend ; or a place vpon the frontire , or an iland ; to regulate the number of those which shall accompany the princes : and if the iealousie bee great , they may specifie the armes , which euery one may carry in these enter-viewes . but if of two princes , the one goes home vnto the other , he is bound to doe him the houour of his house : and if the prince be inferiour vnto him , hee must send forth the chiefe of his court to receiue him : but if he be his equall in quality , as being both kings , although there be some debate betwixt them for precedence , if he come first to the place where the treaty is to bee ●ade , hee must goe himselfe . in the enter view which was betwixt king lewis the twelfth and ferdinand of aragon at sauona , which then belonged vnto the fren●h king , lewis the twelfth at the approach of ferdinands galley , ( before he could land ) entred into it , accompanied onely with his guard ; to ●estifie his confidence , and thereby to assure king ●erdinand of that which hee should finde in h●m : and at their going to land , king lewis left the right hand to ferdinand , who lodged in the castle , as the most honourable place ; and himselfe went to the bi●●●ppricke . when two pri●ces vnequall in quality , parley , some hold that it is for the inferiour to come first vnto the p●ace of meeting , there to attend the greater . yet the contrary hath beene most commonly obserued vpon this rea●on , that the lesse ought to goe vnto the greater . so as ●e is to goe first vnto the place where the parley ●s to ●ee made : and this was particularly practised , at the enter-view of pope clement the seuenth , and king francis the first , although that marseilles were in the kings sub●ection . it is presumed that two princes doe not meete for small matters , the which doth many times put their neighbours in iealousie of these enter-viewes : they must finde out some apparant and important pretext , the which may bee pub●ished to free their neighbours from all iealousie , vnder which they may treate what else they please . when pope cl●m●●t the seuenth came to marseilles , to treate the marriage of his neece , with him that was afterward king henry the second ; this treaty might haue beene crost , if they had knowne the designe ; hee borrowed the pretezt of a generall peace , and an enterprize against infidels , the which could not put the neighbours in allarme , carrying a faire shew , and hauing in it many particularities , which deserued to be treated by mouth , be it for the taking away of all difficulties the more easily , or for the holding the businesse the more secret . if they hold it fit to treate by deputies and embassadors , as it is the ordinary , the more safe will bee to choose a man of a meane condition , experience in negotiations , and who vnderstands no lesse the estate , affaires , and dependancies of him with whom hee treates , then the estate and affaires of his owne master : neyther must he be interessed in the businesse whereof he treates . this was an errour , to commit the soliciting of the difference of the duke of ferraria , to alberto pio , embassador for france with pope iulio the second , who in steed of pacifying the sayd pope against the duke , he incensed and vrged him the more ; fearing that if the sayd duke were reconciled to the pope , hee would get the other moiety of carpy , which the sayd alberto pio enioyed . i haue sayd of a meane condition , for that the great men of an estate are not fit , as well for the iust feare they may conceiue of them , that vnder colour of treating , they should suffer themselues to bee practised by the other side ; as for that they haue sometimes interests and reasons , which concerne them in their particular , to the which they doe willingly accōmodate the affaires of their master , and to his disaduantage : besides there is seldome found so much patience and sufficiency in men of this condition , as is needfull in such negotiations . neither may they choose men of a base condition , as lewis the eleuenth did who imployed his barber ; least that he with whom we treate , or his deputies , doe not finde themselues contemned by this choyce . yet in secret treaties , they stand not much vpon the choyce , and these last are commonly most proper , as those of whom they haue least distrust : vnlesse they hold it more fit to make vse of embassadors , which reside with the prince , with whō they meane to treate ; of some prisoner take● in the war , as the treaty of the league , made betwixt ki●g lewis the twelfth and the venetians , by andrew gr●tty then prisoner to the king. these secret treaties are vsually made when there is question to make a league one with another . they are made for diuers intentions : but most commonly to entertaine and deceiue him with whom they treate , or to surprize his enemy , or to assure himselfe of two enemies which make warre , treating with one secretly , and the other openly . pope alexander the sixt , promised king ferdinand by a breife , to assist him for the defence of naples , in case that ferdinand should promise to doe the like for the estate of the church . the league which was treated betwixt lewis the twelfth and the venetians , was so secret , as neither lewis sforse , nor the pope , did euer know what had beene treated , vntill the army was ready to march . the treaty of the same french king , which ferdinand king of spaine , was no lesse secret , to breake the league betwixt spaine and england , the king of england hauing sent a herrald to the king of spaine , to summon him to performe their league , who arriued at the same time when as the peace betwixt france and spaine was proclaymed . pope lee the tenth . hauing made a league with the emperour and the king of spaine , treated with lewis the twelfth , not by a publique instrument , but by a scedule vnder his owne hand , to the end the businesse might bee carried more secretly , and that hee might assure himselfe of all sides . the same pope treated afterwards secretly with the king of spaine , for the defence of italy : yet meaning to entertaine king francis the first , to slacken the preparations continued to treate with him , sometimes demanding one thing and sometimes another , to the end that the one being denied him , hee might haue a subiect to breake when hee should see his time ; and to make the french king beleeue , that necessity more then his owne free will , had induced him to treate with the spaniard , with whom hee had long before made a secret treaty . and distrusting that the king would not yeild to that which hee should demand , hee made dluers ambiguous and irresolute answers . the same pope made another secret league , with the emperour charles the fift against king francis the first , and when he was forced to declare himselfe , made shew to treate a new with the embassadour of spaine . it is one of the ordinary policies among princes , and wherewith the best aduised doe sometimes suffer themselues to bee abused , to propound a treaty to betray his commpanion , pope iulio the second , to winne time to make his preparations against the duke of ferrara , he entertained king lewis the twelfth , making shewe that hee would agree . the proposition of peace made by lewis the twelfth vpon the difference for the du'chie of ●ill●● , was a meanes to chase the f●●●ch out of that dutchy , the generall of n●●ma●dy , hauing 〈◊〉 vpon that subiect to make a ●●uy of grysons , and thinking to spare the ki●gs money lost that estate . the same pope iulio the second , to the end nee might busie the same king , sent his nuncios to treate a peace , with power to conclude it , but with certaine limitations , which might breed a doubt of his intention . and hauing recouered his health , hee continued the same treaty , and at the same time made another offensiue league with the venetians and the king of aragon , against the sayd king. after these practises , the king of aragon , and the king of england , kept the french king in doubt , of the league made by them , to the end they might hinder his preparations . the emperour maximillian the first , to haue meanes to reuenge himselfe of the french king , by a fraudulent reconcilliation interrupted the treaty which was made betwixt the sayd king and the venetians , and hindred the preparations of warre which the sayd king might make , making shewe that he would treate a peace with him . the spaniards , to interrupt the league which was ready to bee made , betwixt the princes of italy and pope clements the seauenth , after the battaile of pauia , propounded vnto the sayd pope to treate an accord . the which not onely hindred the league , and stayed the preparations of warre which he might make ; but also caused him to discharge the troupes which he had drawne vnto him for his safety . hugo de moncada , made other prepositions of an accord to the same pope , to make him the more negligent to thinke of his defence . bourb●n , leader of the emperours troupes , entertained the pope with an accord , whilst the army marched towards rome . the goufalonier of florence , to keepe pope clement from attempting any thing openly against the citty , entertained him with hope of some secr●t pra●●ises . the spaniard ( who in matter of state make no great difficulty to breake their faith , ) doe more vsually practise this pollicie then any other nation . alexander the sixt , ( as guichardin saith , ) to busie his enemies excused those things that he could not deny , and deuised those were doubtfull , pacifiyng some with promises and good lookes , and assuring others by diuers meanes , treating with them a part , to the end hee might breed a iealousiy among them , and disvnite them . gonsalue in the treaty which hee made with the duke of calabria , sware vpon the holy host , that hee would send him into france to his father fredericke . but the interest of state preuailed more with him , then the opinion of men , or the feare of god ; so as he sent them into spaine . hee makes the like reckoning of the faith which hee had giuen to duke valentine by his safe conduct ; notwithstanding the which hee sent him prisoner into spaine ; but ferdinand of aragon his master sent him backe . for hauing sent phillip arch-duke of austria into france to treate an agreement vpon the difference , for the diuision made of the realme of naples , betwixt him and king lewis the twelfth , in regard of the limits and bounds : notwithstanding that the sayd treaty had beene sworne by the french king on the one side , and the sayd arch-duke on the other , as procurator for the kings of spaine , and that they themselues had likewise sworne , vpon the holy euangelist , and the crucifix to confirme whatsoeuer he should doe ; yet vnder diuers precepts , forbare to ratifie it , to the end that the longer the french king should remaine in this su pence , the longer hee would stay to make his preparations to succour his men : who for want of releife , hauing bin forced to abandon the countrey , the said kings of spaine , notwithstanding their solemne oath , would heare no more speech of ratifying the treaty made by his sonne in law . from all these examples we may gather , that during a treaty , wee must watch more carefully , and make our selues the stronger , not onely to frustrate our enemies of all hope to surprize vs , but to the end that the consideration of our forces may make vs obtaine conditions of more aduantage : and wee must not hold a treaty firme and concluded , vnlesse it be ratified by the prince with whom we treate ; especially if the treaty be made with a prince whom they detayne prisoner . for the force by the which he hath beene constrayned to promise , will alwayes dispence him to re-aduise himselfe . pope clement the seuenth , refused to ratifie the conditions which the duke of ferrara , when the sayd pope was a prisoner ; saying , that it was an vnworthy thing , that a man in life should approue of that which had beene done in his name , whilest he was dead . and king francis the first excused himselfe to accomplish the treaty of madrid , vppon the inhumanity which charles the fift vsed towards him , to extort from him the cessions which he made : all which tooke not place , although the king had giuen his children in hostage . as in the parlies of princes , the place where the enter-view is to be made , is very considerable ; so is it in treaties of peace , which are made by deputies . if it be to choose a league , there must be a conuenient place , not too farre from the confederates , to the end they may haue a more speedier answere of the difficulties that may happen . when as the kings of france and england were to treate a league with the princes of italy , they resolued to treate in france , to be the nearer to england . pope iulio the second , meaning to treate with the emperour and the french king , desired that the embassadours should come to rome , to the end hee might gaine the emperours minister by kinde vsage , promises , and benefits , to perswade his maister to dis-vnite himselfe from the french king. the which he of franc● refused to doe , being neyther reasonable nor honorable to treate a peace in the house of his enemy , how great soeuer he were . so as the vsuall course is to choose a neuter place . but the question is , if an embassadour hauing agreed to goe vnto the prince , with whom he is to treate , whether the prince be bound to treate with the embassadour himselfe ; or depute some of his councell for that effect . this last manner of proceeding is the most vsuall , as wel to preserue the dignity of the prince , which cannot bee maintayned amidst the contestations which happen in conferences ; as for that princes are vsually little practised in such negotiations . and the example of the bishop of gurgia is not therein to be followed ; who going to pope iulio the second vpon his request to treate with him ; and the sayd pope hauing deputed three cardinals to that effect , he deputed three gentlemen to conferre with them , excusing himselfe vpon other affaires : for therein the sayd bishop carryed , himselfe , not as a simple embassadour , but as lieutenant to the emperour , to the which quality he had beene receiued at rome by the pope . the deputies being assembled , their seats are considerable , they hauing no power to quit any thing of the ranke which their maisters ought to hold . the first place is at the head or end of the table , if there be one : the second is the first on the righthand ; and the third is the first on the left hand of him that is at the end . and if there be many deputies to one prince , they vsually sit all on one side , to haue the more facility to conferre together , if it be needfull . the seates being resolued , the deputies are to see the commissions of eyther side , and to consider of them : for that from thence doth grow the assurance which they may haue of the proceeding of the treaty ; there being commissions so generall , and so ambiguous , as thereby they may easily iudge , that he which hath giuen such to his deputies , hath no will to conclude any thing : for that vnder these ambiguous and generall termes , he hath a desire afterwards to ground a new breach . some desiring to deferre the conclusion of a treaty , whereof the motion seemed reasonable on eyther side , they haue concluded in requiring the prince of the contrary pa●ty to consent vnto them before they ratifie it . the which pope iuli● the second did , seeing himselfe prest by the cardinals , to make a peace with lewis the twelfth , who propounded certaine articles of an accord vnto him : whereupon the gaue commission to the cardinall of final , and to the bishop of tiuolly , to transport themselues to the french court , and there to treate ; promising to ratifie the sayd articles which had beene propounded vnto him , if the king consented . but he neyther gaue them commission , nor power to conclude them , hauing no will but to gaine time , and to frustrate the instance which the consistory made vnto him for this pacification . as for the clauses of treaties , there can be nothing certaine prescribed , this depending of the differences , for the which the treaties are made , the which are infinite , be it for peace or truce , for the restitution of that which they pretend to haue beene vniustly taken from them , or for the cession of rights , or else for limits and bounds ; the which if they cannot regulate , they put them in sequestration or suspence , or they make some act which may interrupt the prescription of him that holds them ; or else for a passage , with consignation of hostages , or of forts for the assurance ; or else for an offensiue or defensiu● league , or for neutrality , whereof i will treate hereafter . but the principall considerations we must haue , are not to vse , nor to speake for a person which is odious to them with whom we treate ; not to yeeld to the first demaunds though iust , but to resist them stoutly : and yet if the danger be emment , wee must not study so much to negotiate with aduantage , as to prouide for safety : and especially to haue a care , that the clauses may not be equiuocall and of a double vnderstanding , or so generall and indefinit , as they may breed a doubt in the interpretation of the treaty . the spaniards are masters in such practises . isabelle of castille , and ferdinand of aragon , circumuented charles the eight when hee restored vnto them the county of roussillon , vpon condition they should not hinder him in the conquest of naples , they adding by another clause , that they meant not to be bound to any thing that might preiudice the church : reseruing vnto themselues thereby a liberty to take armes , if they were required by the pope ; as lord of the fee of the realme of naples . and in truth after the restitution of the county of roussillon , they began to exhort the king rather to turne his armes against infidells , then to make warre against christian princes ; giuing hope vnder hand to the king of naples and to the pope , to be releiued by them ; and preparing by these e●hortations , to breake with king cha●les , when the occasion should be ready , and the pope declare himselfe . the same spaniards deceiued the french in the treaty for the diuision of the realme of naples , betwixt king lewis the twelfth of france and ferdinand of aragon , vpon the equiuocation of the denomination of the prouinces , made diuersly and in diuers times ; the french thinking the confines should be regulated according to the ancient denomination , and the spaniards according to the new , which they caused to be exprest in the treaty : they which treated on the french party , neuer considering , that in the diuersitie of names , they are gouerned according to the pr●sent vse . the protection taken by king lewis the twelfth , of bentineth , with bolonia , vpon condition he should not preiudice the rites of the church , the which was interpreted with no better faith . for whilest the king was an enemy to the pope , hee interpreted the rites of the church , for that which the church enioyed when hee tooke the protection : and afterwards being vnited to the pope , hee restrained this protection to the person and goods of bentineth . generall clauses are alwayes captions ; as those for the defence of duke sforse in the dutchy of millan , which did not free him , but that they made his proces , for that he had had a part in the practises of moroue with the marquesse of pesquiere , against the emperour charles the fift ; who in the treaty he desired to make with the pope against the french , propounded some generall clauses , to the end that vpon the difficulties the pope should make , he might haue time to prouide for his affaires . these are the most generall considerations , which they may haue in treaties . chap. . of treaties of peace and truce . the treaties which they make with neighbours , are either with enemies , or with friends ; or with persons which desire to continue neuters with vs , or we with them . the treaties which are made with our enemies , are eyther for a time or perpetuallperpetuall , as the peace which is made to compose all differences , and the warre that is vndertaken for conquest or for repairation of iniuries , or to restore the commerce and hospitality . treaties which are made for a time with our enemies , are called truces , the which are eyther generall for all the estates of the one or the other prince , for all persons , and for all sorts of commerce : or else they are particular , for certaine places , for certaine persons , and for the commerce ; and sometimes they doe not extend it but of a suspencion of armes . and when any one is bound by alliance , not to make peace or truce without the consent of his ally , and that they doubt of his consent ; they adde in the treaty , that it shall take place for all those which the contracters shall name , and they set downe no prefixed time , but that it shall continue vntill he shall refuse , and some moneths after : as that which was made betwixt king charles the eight , and the king of spaine , and that betwixt pope clement the seauenth , and don hugo de moncada , embassadour to the emperour . sometimes a generall truce holds the place of a peace , as that of a hundred yeares , betwixt the acarnaues , and the ambracoltes ; and that betwixt castille and portugall : and these are commonly made betwixt princes that are equall in power , and will not quit any thing of their rights by a peace ; and yet desire to liue quietly in the estate wherein they are , satisfying by this meanes the point of honour . such treaties are many times lesse subiect to rupture , then a peace which is made perpetuall , for that he which finds himselfe greiued with a treaty that is perpetuall , seemes to haue some reason to leaue it , seeing the greiuance cannot be otherwise repaired . but if the time bee limited , he hath no cause to complaine , for that he may ( the time being expired , ) persue that which he thinkes ought to be granted him : and if they haue a will to continue the truce , there is nothing so easie as to renew it . and admit they were well assured of the friendship , yet time causing friendship to grow cold , they haue also need to be renewed by new treaties . seeing that treaties being grounded vpon the interest of princes , which change with the time , it is needfull to change them at the end of the time , or to breake them off wholy , and it would bee● meanes to auoyd the treacheries and periuries , which are committed vsually in the ruptures of treaties . a truce is likewise made to aduance a peace and to treate it . it is in like manner sometimes for the more honest discharge of a league which they haue made with some other prince , whom they haue accustomed to comprehend therein : so as a peace following it , or the truce being not accepted by him , they take occasion to leaue the l●ague , it being not his fault that leaues it , that the warre was not ended . and although it seemes that a truce cannot by its condition preiudice the pretentions in the principall , yet it is most certaine , that if he which is chased out of a contentious estate , consents that during the truce , the commerce shall be forbidden to his subiects , hee doth wholy stop that gate ; as lewis the twelfth did in the truce which he made with g●nsalu● after the conquest of the realme of naples . chap. . of treaties of alliance . the treaties which are made with our neighbours as friends , are treaties of alliance , equall or vnequall : the equall is eyther of simple freindship only , for the entertainement of traffique , or for ayde and succour , that of succours is for the defensiue or offensiue , and sometimes for both together with or against all men , or against certaine princes and estates , and their all●●nces are contracted , either from estate to estate , and for the preseruation of the estates one of another ; in which case by the death of the prince they may not be interrupted : or else they are contracted betwixt prince and prince ; and then , after the death of one of the princes , they must enter into a new treaty to continue it , if there be not a certaine time prescribed by the treatie , to the which the alliance must continue after the death of the prince , or else they are made from an estate and prince to an estate , and from an estate to a prince ; where after the death of the prince , it is necessary , if not of a new treaty , at the least of some confirmation of the precedents : sometimes alliances are contracted for an enterprize , and for one effect only , in the which the allies are inter●ssed , and it may bee called by the name of a league . these leagues are commonly defensiue , but in effect they tend to attempt against some one ; and there are secret articles for it , as in that of cambray against the venetians , in the which they borrowed the pretext of religion and the peace of christendome . in the league which was made before against charles the eight , betwixt the pope , the king of romans , the king of spaine , the venetians and the duke of millan , they borrowed the pretext for the defence of on● anothers estate , reseruing a place for such as would enter , and in the secret articles it was agreed , that the spaniards which were in sicily , should helpe ferdinand of aragon to recouer naples ; the venetians by sea should inuade the maritine places ; the duke of millan should hinder the succours that came from france , and possesse himselfe of asti , where the duke of orleans was ; and that the kings of romans and spaine , should either of them in their parts inuade france , when as lewis the twelfth and ferdinand of aragon vnited themselues for the conquest of naples , they likewise tooke a pretext that they would afterwards make warre against the turkes . but besides the pretext , there are many things to bee considered in the treaty of a league that is to say , the cause why they ioyne in league , belt for offence or defence : the particular interest of euery one of the leaguers , and his intention which seekes to vnite himselfe : with what princes or estates they make it their courage , constancy , faith , and meanes ; the commodities of their estates to assist the league : and how they shall hinder those which present themselues to enter , which are not fit for our designe : against whom it is made . if hee be a powerfull prince of himselfe , assisted by friends , hauing ●acility to inuade the confederates , eyther by himselfe , or by the meanes of his friends , and his courage , when they are to make the league , and how they may excuse it , and whether the time of the league be precisely limited to a certaine number of yeares , or whilst the enterprize shall last . the contribution of allies how it should be ordered , as well in the leuy of souldiers , as in munitions of warre and victuals , who must first ratifie the treaty among the confederates , if there be many heads , or one alone , for the execution and ordinary causes of the common-weale of the league . the ordinary causes for the which they make a league , are eyther to facilitate a conquest ; as that which was made betwixt lewis the twelfth , and ferdinand of aragon for the realme of naples : or to ballance the forces of one that is more mighty , in hindring him that he grow not greater , or diminishing his power . the athenians vndertooke to succour the aegyptians , not o●ely to dimi●ish the power of the persian , as diodorus wri●es , but to encrease their owne by the alliance of the aegyptians . a defensiue league which hath no other benefit but a n●cessary def●nce , and in the which meane estates are in a man●er equally in●eressed , last vsually longer then an offensiue l●agu● , which is voluntary , and from the which eyther of the co●se●era●es will easily part when hee hath no more interest . so as in ballancing the interest of the one and the other , he that shall finde himselfe accompanied with distrust , and an opinion to bee irreconciliable to the common enemy , would proue the most firme in the league . but with all this we must consider the wisdome , courage , and meanes of him with home we ioyne in league . and as we may not choose him so powerfull , as hauing preuayled ouer our common enemy , he may make no subiect vnto him : so we must not choose one that is light and inconstant , and of small meanes . they write that inconstancy , irresolution , and the timerousnesse of pope clement the seuenth , ruined all the affaires of his colleagues . the venetians would not ioyne in league with pope alexander the sixt , hauing had ill successe , being ioyned in league with sixtus and innocent , for that popes comming to dye , they leaue successors which haue other intentions and designes . but the commodity or discommodity of estates neare or farre off , is very considerable , as well in regard of those which vnite themselues , as of those against whom they make the league . and vpon this consideration all the leagues which they haue propounded in christendome against the turke , haue gone to smoake : the danger of the turke being held by christian princes vncertayne and farre off , and regarding more the estates of some , then of others : being vnable but with much time and labour to possesse their minds with this necessary ardor to attempt against him . by the like reason a league with the turke is of small profit to a christian prince , who hath his estate remote from him , vnlesse it be for the trade of the subiect ; as well for the great distance , as for that the manner of liuing of the one differs so much from that of the other , as there can grow no confidence betwixt them . but if some one seekes vnto vs to bee receiued into our league , whom wee hold not fit for our designe ; they may propound such hard conditions vnto him , as hee would lose his desire . in like sort , if we be sought vnto to enter , eyther wee excuse our selues vpon the feare of some enemy , against whom we must reserue our forees ; as the venetians did for feare of the turke , when as they were sought vnto by charles the eight , or else wee will demand conditions of such aduantage for our selues , as hee which seekes vnto vs may not yeeld vnto . to say when we are to make a league , it cannot be precisely done ▪ this depending vpon the condition of affaires : but we may well say , that some haue held that we must not make a league , but after that the greatest prince had imposed hard conditions vpon those with whom they made accompt to ioyne in league , and had by this meanes prepared to vnite themselues for their discharge . this was a consideration which pope clement the seuenth had , to deferre the conclusion of the league which was treated against the gouernour of france , and the princes of italy , during the imprisonment of king francis the first ; thinking ( as it happ●ned ) that the emperour ( seeing the vncertainty of this league ) was likely to impose harder conditions vpon the king ; the which the king would neuer obserue , and so he should be forced to continue in the league of ital● , to free himselfe : whereas if the league had beene made before his inlargement , it would haue made the kings conditions more milde , and more easie for the emperour , in freeing the king to draw him from the other confederates . behold how euery man doth husband the necessity of his neighbour , the which being wisely exami●●d , may serue to iudge of the time when a league is to be made . fo● the time of its continuance , the league betwixt the florentins and luquois , against the pisans was limited by the treaty at three yeares . and the first leagues which were treated among the suizes , were also limited to a certayne time . others haue no other limitation but the ●nd of the enterprize for the which it was made . but the question is , if the enemy taking the countrey , for the defence whereof the league was made , whether the confederates be bound by the league , to assist him who hath lost it in the recouery . some haue held that the defensiue did not extend so farre . notwithstanding if there were no treaty which had co●cerned this conquest , yet it would seeme more reasonable to comprehend the recouery in the defensiue , if it be generall . for as it hath for its end to preserue the allie in his estate , and that to attaine vnto it , the forces must not onely remaine in the countrey of the allie , to attend the enemy , but after denuntiation of the wa● , and other acts of hostility done by the enemy , they must enter into his country , to the end to preuent him or to diuert him , from attempting any thing against the ally ; the offensiue being iudged by the agression , and not by that which followes : by a stronger reason they ought to enter into the country conquered from the ally for the recouery thereof . so most commonly these excuses are not pretended , but by such as eyther fayle in their faith , courage , or meanes to make the recouery . contribution is one of the points of a league most diffi●ult to regulate . it is made eyther in men or money . the men are entertayned by all ; or by him onely that hath need . the defensiue league betwixt the kings of france and england against the emperour , contayned a reciprocall succours of ten thousand men , if the warre were made by land ; and of sixe thousand if it were made by sea : and in all other occasions the french king was bound to assist the ki●g of england with twelue thousand launces , and the king of england him of france with ten thousand foot , at his charge that had the need . in the league which was made betwixt the emperour charles the fist , pope clement the seauenth with the other princes of italy ( except the venetians ) for the defence of italy against the french king , the emperour was to contribute monethly thirty thousand duckets ; the pope with the florentins twenty thousand ; the duke of ●illan fifty thousand ; ferrara ten thousand ; genoua sixe thousand ; sienna two thousand ; and luques a thousand ; and it was concluded , that besides this , there should be a stocke of the like summe , which might not be imployed vntill they saw the preparatiues made to inuade italy . in the league of the citties of greece against the persians , the cōtribution whereof aristides made the taxe , mounted to eight hundred thousand tallents . in the league which some citties of greece made with the lacedemonians against athenians , the contribution came yearely to a thousand tallents : and the order for the l●uy of souldiers was , that two lightly armed should passe for a man armed at all peeces ; and foure men armed at all pe●ces for a horse-man . the contribution concluded in money , there are difficulties sometimes found , for the place of keeping it . the citties of greece thought that the custody of their contributions was safe in the temple of dele . but the consideration of religion could not preuent it , but that vnder the pretext that dele was not strong enough , the athenian : found meanes to carry it away , and to imploy it to the particular vse of the citty . that which may be spoken herevppon , is not to deliuer the money into the hands of the strongest , for feare they shall not be able to call him to accompt , nor to lay it in so weake a place , as it may bee exposed to the force and violence of the strongest , or to him that shall first take armes . the contribution being setled by the confederates they must name a head of the league , if they will not assaile the enemy but of one side : if of diuers , they must name many . and herein they doe many times find themselues troubled for that the most powerfull of the confederates , desires commonly to haue it referred to him , or to some one of his , who gouerns the conduct of the warre , according to his maisters affaires , and not those of the other allies . the other head of the league of the princes of italy , with king francis the first , would not assaile millan after the taking of pauia , for feare that millan being taken with the duke , and the venetians , assured from the imperialists , they should retire from the league , or contribute more neg●igently : and therefore he tooke a pretext to goe and free the pope who was a prisoner . antonio de leua , in the league which was made by all the princes of italy , except the venetians , with charles the fift against the french , was made generall , with charge to stay in the dutchy of millan , which depended of the emperour . a league concluded by the deputies of the confederates , there sometimes falls out a difficulty , who shall ratifie and declare himselfe first . in the league which was made betwixt king francis the first , the pope , and the princes of italy , the king refused to ratifie , vntill the pope and the venetians had ratified before him ; and wrought so that he droue the colleagues to declare themselues , and to begin the warre , whilest that hee treated secretly for himselfe , to the end he might make his conditions with more aduantage : and for feare lest his colleagues on their side should shew him the like prancke , he preuented them . that kind of league which is made for an enterprize , succeeds seldome , according to the hope of the allies , if the enterprize be long . for besides that the preparations be long , the opinions diuers in the pursuit , the resolutions inconstant , the interests of princes or estates in league , may change with time , or by the practises of him , against whō they are in league , in withdrawing some one of thē , or making him to suffer more losse then the rest . for seeing himselfe ill defended by his confederates , as hee did hope , and that he was in more danger to loose then his companions , he studies to retire himselfe , and to make his accord apart ▪ as the venetians did with the turke after the losse of cypres . the most ordinary causes of the rupture of leagues , are distrust , and iealousie ; as if one of ●he confederates had had conference with the enemy without the consent of the rest ; if that which serueth for the safety of one diminisheth the safety of another ; if they find inconstancy , variety , or cowardize , in any one of the confederates ; if one of the confederates increaseth , and makes some vsurpation , without the consent of the rest ; if he treates with the ●nemy , not com●rehending the other al●ies , but as adherents . king lewis the twelfth left the league of the venetians , for that they had made a truce with him , and had presumed to name him onely as their adherent . sometimes to breake a league , they inuent some occasion , which puts the leaguers in diuision one against another . in which case as long as he hath hope that this diuision may make them dis-vnite themselues , he must haue a care not to assaile them . i haue sayd that leagues which are made betwixt meane estates for their necessary defences , are vsually most durable . yet they are not without great defects . for they haue not any authority among them , be it councell or otherwise , which may command them all , and reconcile t●em in case of diuersity of opinions , or a diuision ; for that holding thēselues all to be soueraignes , they will establish nothing aboue them : and to fall by degrees to an accord , in all their differences which may happen , it is a difficult thing yea impossible . on the otherside lea●ing their differences to grow old , they may bee of such a condition as they draw after them an irreconcilliabl● hatred , another defect is , that to the greatest part of their assemblies and dyettes , they send men new in affaires , fearing to giue authority to any one among them aboue the rest . so as most part of those which come to these assemblies , hauing little or no knowledge of affaires , their opinions are to make report to their superiours , and not to resolue any thing ; this power being seldome giuen them . hence grow many delayes , which in certaine encounters may bee very preiudiciall to the estate . there is another ordinary defect among them , that they seldome agree vppon the somme of the contributions necessary for their defence , nor of the keeping of the common treasure : so as when there happens any need , they find themselues troubled to prouide in time . but behold how princes allied , doe sometimes finde themselues troubled to gouerne themselues ; which is when as three princes allied , the one makes warre against another , and demands succours from the third : in this case if the treaties of alliance bee only for friendship , it is certaine he is not bound to giue any succours . but if the treaties carrie an offensiue league , hee must succour the most ancient , allied by a precedent alliance . if the precedent alliances haue beene made both at one time , hee must succour him that is allied in an offensiue and defensiue league . but if the league be offensiue and defensiue of eyther side , he may not succour any of them : but he may mediate a peace , and cause the difference to be iudged by the common allies , as it is vsually obserued : and let him know that will not enter into arbitrament , or being entred will not yeild to iudgment , that hee will succour the other . no●withstanding most commonly in such occasions , they ballance their estate : and looking more to safety then to iustice , they succour him who being succoured may weaken the powerfull , who is more to be feared . they may aide particular allies , and common allies , if they be wronged by one of the allies . but he which is not comprehended in the treaty of alliance , can●ot be defended against him that is allied without breach of the alliance : that which they may doe for to suppresse it , is to write vnto the ally : and to entreate him to vse him ●o●rteously : which is the offer which the romans made vnto the capuans , who complained and demanded succours agaynst the oppression of the samnites , allied to the romans . but if the oppressed yeeld himselfe a subiect , as the capuans did ; then the prince being obliged to the defence of his subiects against all men , he then may and ought to succour them against his allies . an vnequall alliance is that , which is contracted betwixt princes or estates , vnequall in honour or in power , and with vnequall conditions ; the one acknowledging the other not for master or lord , but by honour , as the more powerfull and the better qualified ; and some for protector : and these treaties are made with those estates which take or giue pension , or which put themselues into protection . wee haue formerly sayd , that a pension differs from tribute . for tribute is payd by the subiect , or by him who to enioy his liberty , payes that which is agreed vpon to him that hath forced him to doe it . a pension is ●eld voluntary , from him that is in our protection , or from him that is in all other things equall to the treaty of alliance , to hinder the pensioner that he ioyne not with the enemy , or to haue aide and succours from him . the true protection is that , whereas one takes vpon him the defence of another freely without reward . yet some haue ballanced honour with profit ; and haue receiued a pension from those whom they haue taken into their protection : and these men haue thought that by a pecuniary interest , they did bind the protectors more to succo●● them , then if he were o●ely bound by oath . by the law of protection , hee that is protected , owes all respect and honour to his protector : against whom if he attempt , or s●ayes from his duty , it is lawfull for the protector to assure himselfe , yea , to make himselfe maister . they of genoua hauing submitted themselues vnder the protection of the french king , vpon certayne conditions ; and being afterwards reuolted , the king changed the conditions into pri●iledges , to the end it might be in his wil to depriue them when he should think good . but if the protector for the good of his estate , finds it conuenient to leaue the protection of him , ouer whom another estate hath some ●retentions ; he may consent that the difference may be referred to iustice , and to iudges to determine it : as lewis the twelfth would doe in the difference which the pope had with the duke of ferrara , whom he had taken into his protection , and whereof by this meanes he sought to free himselfe . in like manner the protector ought to defend and succour the protected , and vse him well : otherwise if he intreate him ill , hee may withdraw himselfe from protection , and seeke another protector . chap. . of the differences which happen betwixt allies and neighbours : and of the decision thereof . and for that the alliances not onely of protection , but also those which are equall , made it with more powerfull estates , draw after them the subiection of the weaker ; and that there may betwixt equals ( be it vpon this subiect or some other ) happen many differences , which may breed occasion of breach : they must in treating prouide for the safety and the decision of differences . some haue assured themselues of the mutuall faith simply , the which at this day is but weake in many . others haue demanded hostages : the which ought to be of such consideration , as the prince or estate which giues them , may not bee long depriued of them , without preiudice by their absence . king francis the first , being freed from prison , and after many inhumanities shewed him by charles the fift , who let him goe not through courtesie , but for feare of the league of italy ; yeilded to giue his children in hostage , hoping hee might recouer them , either by accord , or by some other meanes , the delay of the recouery being the lesse troublesome vnto him , for that they were in their courage : and so being at his choyce either to giue his children , or twelue of of his principall men of his realme , he desired rather to giue his children , whom he might spare , then the others , which were more necessary for his seruice and enterprizes . sometimes they demand hostages of eyther part , when as eyther of them that treates , promiseth to put something in execution , which they doubt they would not doe without hostages : and this ought to be done according to the distrust they may haue one of another . but if the question be , that the one executes before the other , it is for him that is to execute last to giue hostages . there was a memorable dispute betwixt the embassadours of the emperour charles the fift , and those of king francis the first , after his discharge from prison , whether that the french king should retire his army our of italy , before that the emperour had deliuered him his children . they promised on the kings behalfe to put hostages into the hands of the king of england , for the penalty which should be imposed for want of retiring his army , after he had receiued his children : and the emperour made the like offers , to restore his children , when the army should be retired ; and to giue hostages for the sure payment of the penalty , which should be degreed for want of satisfying ; saying that there was no colour hee should trust the king , who had once deciued him . whereunto the french embassadours replyed , that the more he pretended to haue beene deceiued , the lesse the king ought to trust him , for that this opinion might induce him to faile the king : and besides the offers were not alike ; for that it imported the king more to haue his children , then for the emperour to see the retreate of the kings army out of italy ; and therefore the assurance were not alike . it hath happened that without any precedent treaty , then the demand of a passage , they haue willingly giuen hostages to a prince , which desired to passe through the estate of another prince , which was an enemy or susp●cted vnto him . the arch-duke phillip , to passe from spaine into flaunders ; the king sent him many of the greatest men of his kingdome , for hostages and assurance of his passage through france , the which the arch-duke caused to be sent backe againe , as soone as he entred into the realme . many haue demanded strong places , to assure the victors . and others for the safety of a passage , for a conquest which they meant to make . as charles the eight did going to naples , to many princes and potentates of italy . others haue ratified the treaties by marriage . but the greatest security , that the condition incerted in the treaty may be pleasing to both parties , and fitting for the subiects of the affaires which presents it selfe , ballancing the interest of the one with the interest of the other . and to preuent that the alliance or protection change not into subiection , we must be very carefull not to receiue a garrisson , from the allie or protector stronger then our owne ; and much lesse to make him maister of our forts , or to make him guardion and depositary of the treasure of all the alliance ; as the grecians did the athenians , who consented , the money which should be euery yeare leuied of the generall , should be put in appollos temple , and afterwards carried to athens , there to be kept . so as the athenians , being seazed of their allies purse , they made themselues protectors , and of protectors mai●ers ; and so they not onely became maisters of the treasure , but they caused the appellations of all the other citties to come before them , at whose charge they trayned vp their cittizens and made them souldiers . as for the dicision of differences , the ordinary course is to constitute by the treate a certaine number of iudges , with power of eyther side , in case they should be diuided in opinions , to name an vmpire , to decide differences , and to cause the contrauentions which they should pretend to be made of eyther side to cease ; or else to agree vpon some great person , to whom they might referre themselues . a thing which i confesse is very difficult , but yet if'it might be done would bee more conuenient . for his authority would mediate an accord more easily betwixt them , who being equalls , cannot directly refuse warre nor demand peace . they haue likewise vsually had recourse vnto compromise , when as iudges are not appointed by the treaties , or when as they are suspect to one of the parties . for although the compromise doth seldome succeed , and comes to be effected , yet it workes this effect , to cause all force to cease , and holds the difference in suspence for a time , and most commonly the intention of the party is no other , who sometimes before the comp●omise drawes a secret promise from the arbitrator , not to pronounce sentence without their consent : as in the compromise which was made betwixt the emperour maximillian , and the venetians , in the popes person , who was not limited neither for time nor power , by the publque act which was drawne ; the like secret promise hauing beene formerly made by the pope to eyther party . yet in the end the pope , seeing they could not agree , and that this delay was imputed to him , he gaue sentence , notwithstanding his promise : yet with this prouiso , that if the parties did not ratifie that which hee had decreed by his sentence should be of no effect . in this compromise made in the person of the emperour charles the fift , for the difference which was betwixt the pope and the duke of ferrara , as well for the right as for the fact , the emperour promised the pope , not to pronounce vnlesse he were prest by him ; and to the duke of ferrara , that finding that he had right to modena and reggium , he would giue sentence ; and that finding otherwise , hee would suffer the time of the compromise to expi●e . and for assurance it was agreed , that the duke should deliuer modena into the emperours hands , as sequestred . afterwards iudgment to the benefit of the duke , whereof the pope complayned much , for that the emperour had not proceeded according to his secret promise : but the emperour excused himselfe vpon the pursuit which his nuntio had made vnto him to pronounce . they seldome compromit vpon the possessory : for hee that is spoyled ought before all things to be restored . this was the answere which the florentins made to the emperour maximillian , whom he inuited to compromit to his person the difference they had with the pysans , neyther relying vpon his will , nor vppon his authority . yet they may compromit vppon the possessory , with charge to pronounce , without adding vnto it the petitory ; this being cheifly ruled , by the cōfidence which they conceiue in the arbitrator , chosen by the compromise , who in a difference of state , is not alwayes found such , as they may wholy rely vpon him . and as peace is generally to be desired , yet if there be betwixt neighbours some subiect which trouble their intelligence , as it would bee a pollicie to shew himselfe displeasing ; so it were wisedome not to grow passionate to reconcile them . they obserue a notable indiscretion in the cardinall of amboise , and very preiudiciall of france , to haue mediated an accord betwixt maximillian and ferdinand of aragon , touching the gouernment of castille , this accord hauing beene the cause that afterwards they ioyned together against lewis the twelfth : and n●thing but the vanity and ambition which this cardinall had to attaine vnto the popedome ( in making these two princes fauourable vnto him ) made him to enter into this mediation . the cause wherein we must labour effectually to reconcile our neighbours , is , when wee haue need to be succoured by them . so lewis the eleuenth treated a peace betwixt sigismond of austria , and the suisses , to vse their s●ruice against the duke of burgundy : and lewis sforse dealt in the accord betwixt maximillian and the same suisses , to bee succoured by them . but let vs return● to treaties . chap. . of the breach of treaties : and of the constancy and assurance of the word of a prince , in the treaties . to the end we enter not into the rupture for a small business● , they practise in those which great men make among them , to draw in all the rest that be lesse to be therein comprehended , as well for the assurance of their estates , as to entertaine the greatest in an equall ballance , least that the one should rise and oppresse the other . but to make vse in such treaties , the oppression must be speciall and particular : otherwise they may haue iust cause to bee ignorant , that vnder this name of allies , they which are not named are comprehended : and although that the breach of faith bee to much practised in such affaires , yet there are few princes found , which haue not sought some pretext before they breake : some haue pretended to be circumuented by error . others haue excused themselues by the charge of the estate of affaires , great wrongs , or ineuitable losse , and apparant danger of the ruine of their estates . which are the causes , wherein some say that an oath is not obligatory ; the condition by reason of the oath being impossible or vniust . to these limitations they adde , that they must not keepe their faith with an enemy of the faith , nor with him that hath broken his , nor with a subiect , nor with a theife . but if it be not lawfull to keepe a mans faith in all these cases , it is not likewise lawfull to giue it . if it be lawfull to capitulate with such men , it is necessary to hold that we promise . the which i vnderstand , when the word is giuen by him that may giue it ; and that they ●elye vpon it . for if they take hostages , he that giues them , is freed from his faith ; for that in receiuing hostages , he that receiues them , hath relinquished the assurance which he had in the faith of him that giues them : and if the promise be made by a captaine for his prince without speciall warrant , this word giuen bindes not the prince . some lawyers would iudge of treaties , as of particula● co●t●acts , and more inlarge the conscience of princes . for as a priuate man is not bound to that which he hath promised by force or feare , they haue thought ( but foolishly and maliciously ) that this maxime should take place in treaties , which are made betwixt soueraignes : which is in effect to banish faith from all such publique negotiations . for there is no treaty but is vsually made in armes , by force , or through feare to lose eyther life , or goods , or liberty , or the estate ; which are causes of iust feare , and may shake the most constant . some princes desirous to shew themselues more religious in these ruptures , haue taken subiect vpon the ambignity of some clauses in the treaty , or vpon equiuocaon , as charles the fist did vpon these words , ev●ig and euig , to retaine the landgraue the hesse : or they seeke some other occasions , attempting against those whom their allie is bound to defend : to the end that drawing him to field , hee may lay the enuy of the ●rupture vpon him . but the most beneficiall course for a prince or state is , to make himselfe to be knowne constant and firme in his word . for although such an occasion may happen , as he might get adua●tage b● h●bre●ch of his faith : yet the opinion which they may conceiue of him by this action ( which he must not trust ●nto ) will make him lose many aduantages , which a loyall prince may haue , finding himselfe discharged of many securities , which they demand vsually and iustly from one of whose faith they doubt . chap. . of treaties of neutrality . let vs come to treaties of neutrality , the which seemes naturall to princes , who neither loue nor hate anything absolutely ; but gouerne themselues in their friendships according to their interests . and in effect reason of state is no other thing but reason of interest . neutrality may be of two sorts . the one with alliance of eyther part : the other without alliance , and without any tye to the one or the other ; which is that , that may properly be called neutrality . the first rules subscribed by the conditions of the treaty . the second hath no rule , but the discretion of the neuter prince , who must carry himselfe in such sort , as he may not make shew that he inclines more to one side then to another . and for that the affaires of princes are not alwayes in one estate , the difficulty is to know when the prince should leaue this neutrality , and when hee should maintayne it . the aduantages of neutrality are , that he which is neuter , is honoured and respected of both parties , for the feare that eyther of them hath , should declare himselfe against him : he remaines arbitrator of others and ma●ter of himselfe : he enioyes the present , and according vnto occasions preuents the future . a neuter is without any profest enemy , and offends or wrongs no man openly ; so as giuing no aduantage ouer him , they are troubled to finde a pretext to doe him harme , the disaduantages are , that a neuter satisfies neither the one nor the other ; and so remaines : he doth neyther purchase friends , nor free himselfe from any enemies ; and in the end is made a prey to the victor . and many haue held it more aduantage to hazard himselfe to vanquish with a companion , then to remaine in an estate , where hee is assured to bee ruined by the one or the other . to resolue this point , a powerfull prince hath no neede of councell . for in what fashion soeuer he remains , he may maintayne himselfe , and prescribe a law to others . yet i hold that without great occasion he should not declare himselfe . for that whilest others ruine themselues by warre , he fortifies himselfe with meanes ; he may in the end make himselfe iudge of their differences , and compounding them mildely with honour , hee preserues their friendship , and maintaynes their estate . but in a weake prince , what part soeuer hee takes , it will be hurtfull vnto him ; especially if he be in the middest of two more powerfull estates then himselfe . yet i will say , that speaking generally , a neutrality is more beneficiall to a weake prince ; so as they which make warre one against another , bee not altogether barbarous and inhumane . for although a neutrality doth not please eyther party ; yet in effect it wrongs no man ; and as he which is a neuter , doth not serue , so he doth not hurt . and then the euent of the declaration which he should make , rather for the one then the other , depending vpon the vncertaine issue of the warre , he should haue no cause to say , that this part is more safe then a neutrality . and to change his resolution without an assurance to better his affaires , were not to carry himselfe wisely . but if the neuter be prest by necessity to declare himselfe , he must doe it for the most powerfull of the two parties , following the councell of that romane ; that eyther he must make himselfe the strongest , or bee a friend to the strongest : vnlesse hee saw that ioyning to the weaker , hee might ballance the power of the stronger , and by this counterpeze reduce them to reason . the safety of estates consisting cheifly in an equall counterpeze of power in the one and the other , and the greatnesse of a prince drawing after it the ruine of his neighbours ; it is wisedome to preuent . but power is considered in this subiect diuersly : eyther absolute or conditionall ; absolute power is that which wee measure by the concurrence of the greatnesse of forces , treasure : munitions , and other millitary preparations . a conditionall power is that , the which although it be lesse then an absolut , yet it is more fit to succour vs , or to doe vs harme . in this the neighbourhood is of very great consideration ; for that a neighbour prince of meane forces , may more easily or sooner hurt or succour vs , then a great prince which lies farre off . neere succours are alwayes sooner ready and with lesse charge : for wee may discharge a part when as time and occasions shall serue : if he be remote , he arriues too late after the occasions to defend vs , and too soone to oppresse vs. the greatest part perish by the way ; and when he is arriued he hath more need of rest then to battaile ; and being vnable to send them backe so farre , we must still beare the charge and oppression . hi●ron king of syracuza , could well obserue these considerations , the carthaginians being maisters of a part of sicily , he allied himselfe with them against the romans : but the romans being growne the stronger in the countrey , he fell to their side , and continued the warre with them against the carthaginians , who were then more remote from the iland then the roman 〈◊〉 ●ter we haue made consideration of the force , wee must likewise consider of the courage and constancy of the prince , with whom we are to ioyne . but if hee be light and hath no stay , how powerfull soeuer he be , it is dangerous to engage himselfe with him : but if with these aduantages hee knowes how to prosecute his designes with resolution , they may boldly ingage themselues with him . chap. . considerations for a prince that will liue in good intelligence with his neighbours . the prince that would liue in good termes with his neighbours , must first consider what treaty and capitulation he hath with him , and gouerne himselfe accordingly , alwayes shewing himselfe a louer of peace and concord ; desirous to liue in amity , and a great obseruer of treaties ; not enduring that any breach should be made , how small soeuer ; aad being done to cause it to be repaired . if any difficult thing be required of him , he shall neyther grant it , nor refuse it , but in ballancing their businesse , he shall labour to haue his goodwill allowed for the effect : and if he which seekes hath sent an expresse embassadour , they shall send him backe with presents , and promise to dispatch other embassadours to make answere , and to the end he may auoyde the discontentment , they shall ballance this delay with some benefit , if may be of more importance then that which they haue demanded : for that the iniury doth not moue so much as the benefit is pleasing . if the prince treating with his neighbours , hath need to demand or vse any thing from them , hee must haue a care to maintayne his dignity , and therefore hee may not be too hasty : for that we shew our selues to be too resolute for something ; and they seeing the instance which we make , will hold our necessity to be greater then it is : the which will make them more holding , and make them beleeue , that ● we shall be the more bound vnto them , if they grant it , although they reape the like benefit themselues . but if a more powerful man requires something of vs , which being granted doth not much preiudice vs , and being denied , may draw a warre against vs , which he had prepared against another ; we must not deny it . this was an errour which the florentins committed , seeking in the beginning to oppose the passage of charles the eight , hauing not therein followed the counsell which had beene giuen to cosmo de medicis , not to oppose himselfe agaynst iohn of anio● ; notwithstanding that the pope and duke of millan were in league with ferdinand king of naples , against whom iohn of aniou made warre . we must not lightly beleeue that which princes say , and whereof they make shew ; but consider , that their owne interest will make them forget it , and to some their faith , if they haue any collour to breake it . the prince must likewise fauour the traffique and commerce with his neighbours , for the good and profit which may redowne to the one and the other . he must consider of the meanes how he may with dexterity nourish the distrusts and iealousies which are , or may be betwixt them ; but he must be warie ▪ hee bee not knowne to be the authour . and contrariwise if they haue a conceit , he must be the first that must seeke to take it away ; and in all that which may breed some iealousie of him , hee must preuent it in time : and he must excuse the fault which is discouered , and deny that , whereof the neighbours are not , nor cannot bee hereafter assured : hee must seeke with all diligence to mollifie the most powerfull , by faire deportuments and promises , and somtimes to pacifie the one , and somtimes the other , as well to make them the more negligent , as to labour in seeking them seuerally to cast them into some distrust one of another . the priuce shall offer vnto his neighbours that which hee cannot well refuse , before they demand it , to the end they may acknowledge his good will. especially if there bee neede of succours , hee shall shew himselfe ready ; yet without giuing cause of iealousie to others , in making them knowe the iustice of these succours , and of his intention , raysing those whom hee succours from the shame , the which doth vsually accompany him that demands . this is the first precept to make them haue confidence in vs. the second , to breed confidence , is not to enter into any resentment of iniuries against those , whom wee desire to make confident of vs , vnlesse it bee a matter of great importance : and wee must suffer courage to sleepe , and awake prudence : but if our honour constraines vs to make some demonstration of an iniury receiued , wee must lay the fault vpon the minister , and complaine of him ; so as they may not thinke we hold our selues wronged by the master . for by the very opinion which a neighbour prince might haue to haue wronged vs , he would enter into distrust of vs , from distrust into hatred ; and hatred it may be , would draw after it another wrong , and an alliance with our enemies , not onely to assure himselfe , but to an●oy vs : the remembrance of an iniury being many times stronger in him that doth it , then in him that receiues it ; especially betwixt princes , whose spirits are very vncapable to take confidence one of another . aboue all wee must bee wary how wee enter into threats . for although our neighbour be weaker then we are , and that his timerousnesse might giue vs cause to hope for some aduantage by our threats : yet it might so fall out , that from feare he might passe to despaire , the which doth vsually guide timerous spirits , as well into desperate resolutions , as inconsiderations doth the rash . but misfortune carrying vs to a rupture , and hauing the embassadours of our enemies neare vs , who then may be suspect vnto vs , wee must consider of the meanes to dismisse them . some haue therein proceeded mildly , and others ●or● roughly . some to discharge an enemies embassadour , haue giuen leaue to all other embassadours which did reside with him ; and then calling backe those of his friends , suffered his enemies embassadour to depart . the emperour charles the fift , aduertised of the league which was made against him , would not dismisse the embassadours of france , england , and venice , vntill his owne were in safety ▪ but hee set guards vpon them of france , venice , and florence , causing them to bee conducted thirty miles from his court , with a prohibition not to speake vnto them , nor for them to write : to him of millan as his subiect , hee was enioyned not to part from court ; and as for him of england , there was no alteration . let vs come to the third point . it is a great aduantage to pierce into the designes of his neighbours , and to haue gained some confidence with them : for the entire is seldome found . but not able to preuaile by this meanes , he must doe it by discourse , by wisedome , and by the knowledge a prince ought to haue of the quality of their estates , of the defects and aduantages which are in them , of the humours , designe , and inclination of the p●ople , of great men , and of the prince ; and principally of this last , whose principall motions and manner of liuing hee must seeke to discouer , to iudge of his wisedome and courage ; then the discontentments , diuisions , and the heads of parties which are in the estate , their pretexts , credit , of whom they depend , and how farre it may extend , the councell , treasure , iustice how it is mannaged , and with what satisfaction of the people or great men : moreouer what the forces be , and the number of souldiers and captaines , with the sufficiency of the cheife among them : the strong townes and fortresses ; and to know the defects there are to defend them , and the aduantages to assaile them : the munitions of warre and victualls : wherein the commerce and traffique doth consist , and how it may be incommodated : the commodity or discommodity of the entries of the countrey : the fertillity barronnesse , extents or ●malnesse of the estate : and of other neighbours , his allian●es and dependances with other princes , as well neere as remote : their actions and deportments past , as well towards vs as others : their present estate , and whereunto they seeme most to incline . in which search , we must vse diligence , wisedome , and secrecie , least we giue them cause to distrust vs. all this may be learned from friends , which the prince may haue in the estates of his neighbours ; or by spyes , whose intelligences he must duly examine before hee beleiue them ; and by reason , interest , or apparance , sound if they be true . but for that all these courses are full of suspition among princes , and are dangerous for such as imploy themselues to giue these intelligences ; euery prince hauing the like interest , to know what is done with his neighbour , and desiring to shew the confidence he hath in him : princes haue agreed to receiue embassadours or agents ; who in effect ( vnder pretext to entertaine the good intelligence betwixt their maisters ) serue many times to discouer the ground of estates , and the designes of princes . wherefore seeing that by this meanes prinentertaine one another , it is fitting to know the quality , the charge , and the priuiledges of an embassadour or agent , the which we will set downe here , as they haue beene gathered by some of this age. chap. . of the charge of an embassadour or agent . an embassadour and agent is the same thing , if we consider onely the function of their charges : but they differ for the honour and respect they beare more to an embassadour then to an agent . an agent hath charge to represent the affaires onely : but an embassadour ought to represent the greatnesse of his maister , and his affaires . wherefore for sufficiency , the a●●nt ought to haue as much as the embassadour : but for wealth and that which concernes shew , it is not so necessary for him as for the other . neyther the one nor the other , for that which concernes the body , ought ( if it may be ) to haue any imperfection , as to haue one eye , to be pore-blind , squint-ey'd , lame , crooked-backe , or extreamely foule and deformed : but contrariwise hee must be of a pleasing encounter , and not counterfeit , left hee be ridiculous or contemned . he must not likewise be sickely nor dainty , lest the discommodity of the wayes , or the change of the ayre make him vnprofitable for his maisters affaires . his countenance must be graue and serious , yet mingled with mildnesse and a pleasing aspect . for his age , he must neither be too young , nor too old , as well for the force and disposition of the body , as for that of the mind . for the conditions of fortune , he ought to be chosen of an honest condition , and noble if it may be : princes holding themselues contemned , when they send men of little worth vnto them ; as lewis the eleuenth did , who imployed his barber to execute this charge . as for the profession whereon he ought to be chosen , that depends of the quality of the affaires whereon hee is to treate , or of the prince to whom he is sent . for if they treated of meanes to make warre , it would be no more proper to send a church-man or a lawyer , then if they treated of some right of bounds , or made some conference of religion , to send a man making profession of armes . for his goods , an embassadour ought to haue in a meane proportion . a poore or needy man how sufficient soeuer , is nothing fit for charges of expence and shewe . but of all things they must haue a care not to send a poore embassadour , after one that was rich , and who had made an excesse of expence ; for the first hauing accustomed those of the prouince to this expence and charge , the other comming after , and not doing the like , he will bee much lesse honoured and respected ; and by consequen●s doe his maister lesse seruice . he must not likewise be distastfull to the prince to whom he is sent , but rather they must choose one that may be pleasing vnto him : yet for all this he must not be a subject , nor dependant , nor tyed by oath , nor any other bond , to him with whom hee is to reside . the example of that which duke sforse did to the esquire merueilles teacheth vs , not to choose another mans subiect for this charge . for the sufficiency , he must haue a quicke apprehension and naturall iudgment . he must be practised in the affaires of the world , and especially in those of his owne countrey , and of that where he is embassadour . and for that the life of man is too short , to attend a fit experience for the sufficiency which is necessary : hee ought to be conuersant with all sorts of histories , which hee ought to haue read with iudgment , waighing all the circumstances of actions which are there represented : to know the diuersity of the establishment of estates , and the reasons , if it may bee , of this diuersity ; to vnderstand the right of limits , and represailes , the genalogies of princes , and the pretentions of kings vpon the estates of other men . their forces , means , alliances , and manner of liuing , he must likewise be resolute & couragious in that which he hath wisely de●iberated ; but aboue all hee must be secret in affaires of importance , and discreete in his speech ▪ hee must not detract , nor speake euill , especially of any master , nor of the prince where hee remaines : hee must speake freely of his masters pretentions , if there bee question to maintaine them . an embassadour chosen with these qualities may serue worthily and profitably . yet i will adde hereunto the manner , how some of our time haue held he should gouerne himselfe , but more succinctly . first hee must furnish his family with modest and respective men , not insolent , quarrellers , or scandalous : otherwise he is in danger to receiue an affront , either in abandoning his seruants , or not being able to stay them from punishment . this done , hee must make an ample instruction , least hee bee disauowed , the which shall follow word by word , especially in affaires whereas tearmes strike the stroake ; not promising any more , although he knew he should not bedisauowed : but before the promise , he shall hold the businesse in suspence vntill he hath power . moreouer hee shall instruct himselfe , from the mouth of him which had gone before him in the said charge , and shall retire from him the treaties , instructions , and papers of importance : and parting he shall giue to haue some one in the princes court , which may negotiate his businesse , and giue him aduice of all that passeth ; for many times the secretaries of estate are so imployed , as they haue not leisure to satisfie all . if hee goes for some particular affaire , hee must stay as little as may be vpon the way , as well to preuent the aduice , which might be giuen of the particular subiect of his embassie ; the answere whereof hee should find ready , hauing by his stay giuen them leisure , either to illude it , or to crosse it : as for that according to the quallitie of the businesse , hee might ariue so late , as they would mocke at him . as tiberius did of the embassadours which ariued to condole the death of his children se●uen moneths after : and hee in mocking lamented the death of hector , who was dead many hundred yeeres before . the same reason requires , that they should demand audience as soone as they can , vnlesse he finds the court in mourning , or in open warre , or some other accident of importance which serues for an excuse . he shall from the beginning shew his grauitie , oftentation or pride in his countenance or traine his courtesie and affability , accompanied with an honest carriage and modesty ; hisexpence according to the places where hee is . the northerne people desire a table well garnished : spaine , and italy , looke more to followers and attendants , and to that which serues for shew ; in the leuant the greatest expence is in presents : but aboue all hee must regulate his expences according to his entertainement , and the meanes hee hath to spend . for it is vnseemely to liue of borrowing in a strange countrey . the manner of treating is also diuers . in germany & suizerland , they must haue more money then words , more good cheere there then art : in other estates honor , complements , and orations , are better receiued ; and in others the consideration of religion hath more force . an embassadour ought to be wary , least by too much diligence and affection , he do not augment the suspition , which they may haue of the sub●ect of his comming , and discouer it by too much art & talke ; all things disguised aff●cted and amp●ified , naturally breeds suspition . they which demand succours doe many times make their affaires so weake , ( thinking to moue pitty , ) as they are so farre from mouing those , from whom they craue succours , as they make them affraid to embarque themselues with miserable persons . in such occasions he must march himselfe discreetly , and waigh his words : and the countenane in this doth sometime impart more then the thing it selfe . aboue all things hee must not treate with any other prince , of that which concernes his commission , but with him to whom he is sent . this was the answere of the embassadours of florence , to the emperour maximillian , to whom they had beene sent , he hauing appointed thē to conferre with the duke of millan , who should giue them an answere for him : but they refused to doe it , as a thing exceeding their commission . and although his instructions ought to be as ample as may be : yet affaires being subiect to change , in a shorter time , then there is betwixt his parting & arriuall , the embassadour must , as they say , make warre by the eye : as if hee had beene commanded to vse mild words , and yet finds it more conuenient to speake boldly or to change , or omitt something mentioned in his commission , he must gouerne himselfe with great circumspection . but he may not stray from his intention , vnlesse he see that in leauing it , he may preuaile in that which he hath vndertaken . if he be constrayned not to doe some things contained in his instructions , and that the businesse is not subiect to delay , hee shall import it to two or three of the most vnderstanding seruants , that his maister hath . ( if happily there be any in the countrey where he resides ) to the end that the businesse succeeding ill , he may auoyd the reproach , to haue done it alone and without cou●cell . there are certaine things that are subiect to disauow ; as proud & insolent words , which an embassadour might haue vsed ; or threats and practises which he attempts in the estate where he resides , if it be without command : and therefore he must containe hinselfe , within the termes of his charge and the modestie that is required . it is fitting he should maintaine the dignity of his mai●ter : but it must be without contempt , or offence to him towards whom he issent , and to the end he may discouer all the passages in an estate , hee must be frequent and daily in court , but when as the prince retires himselfe priuatly for his pleasures : for then he should make himselfe suspect or importune . and in popular estates , he must assist all dyets meetings and assemblies : or if he sees that this may breed some contempt , hee should send some one of his . besides money , which discouers the secrets of princes , the entertainment of his table is ofsome force . and although that all the intelligences which come from this sort of people which follow tables , be not alwaies current ; yet sometimes he shall meete with good ones . wherefore he must waigh them , and attend the progresse and issue before hee iudge of them ; and obserue not onely what is sayd , but what is done . he must for this effect write often , and to many parts , to the end he may be the better aduertised ; and neuer respect the charge which cannot be better imployed . he must visit the principall councellors , the secretaries of estate , and amongst others him , who hath the diuision of forraigne affaires ; he shall doe the like to those which are in credit and fauour with the prince , although but of meane condition ; applying himselfe in some sort to the custome , and manners of the countrey , and how others haue done before him . hee shall informe himselfe discreetly of the present estate of the court ; and how euery man stands in authority ; wherein this authority consists , eyther in reputation and honour , or in effect and contention , euery one according to his rancke and degree , winning vnto him if he may , the domestiques and fauorities of those which haue authority . hauing newes from all parts , he shall still find occasions to discourse and parley with the princes and great men , with pleasing subiects , to be merry with them ; or if they be otherwise , and concerne them , to condole , or to aduise them to preuent it . he must visite the embassadours and agents of other princes and common-weales , which reside in the same court ; but soberly , lest he giue them occasion of iealousie . hee must be wary not to discouer himselfe wholy vnto them , whatsouer they be ; but rather seeke to draw from them , then to leaue any thing of his owne , to the end he may alwayes be the first to send the aduice and pleasing newes . and if the affaires which he pursues , succeedes not according to his desire , hee shall make no shew of it , nor seeme to haue any distrust or bad opinion of the prince and others , with whom hee negotiates . when he shall be intreated to doe them any courtesie , he shall study to value it at as high a rate as may be ; yet he must doe it speedily and freely , letting them know , that he desires aboue all things to giue them contentment and satisfaction . he shall commend and magnifie the persons , the meanes , the greatnesse , the countrey , the lawes , the manner of liuing , and whatsoeuer concernes the nation ; yet with such modesty and discretion , as there may be no shew of flattery . he shall likewise extoll the affaires of his master with the like modesty and dexterity , to the end they may not grow iealous of him . when he shall finde some stop in that which he desires to doe , hee shall not insist too eagerly vpon it , although he had an apparent reason : but he shall with dexterity approue the reasons in part , and by other meanes seeke to attaine his designe . when it shall be needefull to doe or say any thing contrary to their will or liking , he shall excuse it in such sort , as they shall conceiue that it proceeds not from the embassadour , but from such as command him , and that hee is sor●y t● doe it , considering it doth not please him ; yet ●ustifying the businesse by the best reasons he may , and giuing them some hope of other things which shall be pleasing vnto them . if they charge him to carry bad and distastefull words , he shall doe better to cause them to giue them in writing , rather then to pronounce the words . and if he findes that by one meanes he cannot obtaine what he desires , hee shall leaue the businesse for a time , and referre it to some other occasion , which he shall finde they desire of him , or shall haue neede of something ; and then with dexterity he shall renew his demand , and so perswade them with grace and mildnesse . when he i●to obtaine any thing of importance , he shall lose no time to cause it to be dispatcht , but shall sollicite the expedition , yet with mildnesse and modesty : and if it con●sts in a promise for the future , he shall cause them to set it downe in writing , and contrariwise he shall be carefull not to oblige himselfe nor his master , but as late as seldome as may be . intreating and contracting , he must cause the treaty to be set downe in plaine termes , not ambiguous nor captious , according to the termes and clauses of precedent treaties . it is certaine that refusing flatly , or making a business full of difficulties , they offend him whom they refuse : therefore an embassadour not able to grant that which they demand of him , he must eyther giue them other counsell and direction , to attaine to that which they desire ; or he shall testifie his good-will by other gracious effects , and honest speeches which may palliate the deniall . an honest man , ( such as he ought to be that executes this charge , ) must not be found a lyer , especially in matters of importance ; for that there is nothing doth make him lose his credit more . he must therefore be wary not to deliuer doubtfull things for certaine , nor trust wholy to the word and report of others : but hee must alledge his authour , or else say , that he had learned it from a good place , when he shall not dare to name the person . he shall doe the like for things which concerne his master , the which he must deliuer on his behalfe . when they are such as there is no great certainty , or else may receiue a change , he must deliuer them with all discretion and stayednesse , lest he be reproached that they are circumuented by this meanes . and if it should happen that he could not well excuse a contrariety , yet he must couer and disguise it with some pretext , in regard of his master by all meanes possible ; and for himselfe likewise , purging and iustifying himselfe , that he had neuer any intent to doe a bad office , nor to make a bad report , nor to be authour and instrument of deceit . the which must take place , when he is constrained either through the necessity of affaires , or by the commandement of his master , to deliuer one thing for another . the which hee may not doe often , lest he lose all his credit . but it sometimes falls out , an embassadour lies without thinking of it : for that when one prince meanes to deceiue another , he first deceiues the embassadour whom hee sends , to the end that deliuering that which he holds to be his masters intention , his reasons may be more forcible , assuring that which he speaks more boldly , hauing lesse intention and assurance of that which is dissembled . wherein the embassadour is not onely excusable , but worthy of pitty , in that they are distrustfull of him , and meane to make him carry the bable , and to serue as an instrument of deceipt . moreouer he must not rely too much on those with whom he negotiates , neither yet wholly despaire for those things which happen ; for that affaires change easily , and affections likewise according to occurrents : and many times that which seemed impossible at one time , growes easie afterwards ; and so the contrary . but one of the principall points whereof and embassadour takes care , is to maintaine the ranke and dignitie of his master , especially with the embassadours of other princes . for princes doe not subsist , but by the greatnes and opinion they haue of them : it argues a contēpt if their ranke be contested , and an embassadour must must rather loose himselfe , then quit any thing● : and if the prince with whom he remaines , fauours him that makes the attempt , after that he hath made instance to be maintayned in his ranke , he ought to retire . and for this point , it is vsually obserued in many places among embassadours , that they which come first , goe to visite those which came last , although that the first commer goe before them in ranke . let vs come to the priuiledges which the embassadours haue in a strange countrey . the principall is , that by the law of nations , they are inuiolable , that is to say , in all freedome and safety : but it is in their countrey to whom they are sent . for that if they passe through the countrey of one that is enemy to their master , although allied to the prince to whom they are sent , yet it would be necessary to take this pasport , being not in that regard respected as an embassadour , if he practiseth any thing against the estate , or the princes person with whom he resides : for hee cannot defend himselfe by the law of nations . and wee must not doubt but hauing violated his faith first , wherein the law of nations doth chiefly consist , but the prince neare whom he remaines , and against whom he hath attempted , may cause him to be punished . yet for that it may be that the commandement to attempt , proceedes from the master , and that punishing the embassadour , it were to fall vpon the stone , and not on the arme that cast it . some princes haue vsed it more discreetly , content●●g themselues to seaze vpon these vndertakers expecting ●he avow or disavow of the master : and being vnable to draw eyther of them from him , to presuppose a confession , and then send them to their master . moreouer , if the embassadour commits any priuate outrage against one of the princes subiects with whom he resides , vnlesse it be to defend the dignity of his charge , or of his master , many haue held him iustifiable before the prince where he liues . for there is a great difference betwixt the dignity and authority of a prince , in the countrey of another soueraigne . hee may well retaine his dignity , but not his authority . but the most safe and the more seemely were before he doe reason to the party , to demand it from his master , who in that case would not deny it him so soone as in matters of estate , and it is a meanes to free the prince from slander of iniustice towards the ministers of another prince . as for his domestickes , there is no doubt but they may be punished if they doe ill . and if they or any other hauing sayled , retire into the embassadors house , he may be summoned to yeeld them , and to suffer iustice to search his house : otherwise after this deniall the iustice may doe it , for that the house of an embassadour ought not to serue for a retreat and sanctuary to the wicked . yet this search may not be done by simple s●rgeants , no more then the summons : but it must be executed by the iudge of greatest authority in the place , accompanied with men of honour , with excuses , intreaties , and courteous words , as well to testifie the respect which they beare to the dignity of the embassadours master , as to preuent the insolency and indiscretion which doevsually accompany archers , sergeants , and such other sorts of ministers . but in stead of punishing the domestickes of an embassadour , after they haue made their processe vnto condemnation , and caused the ciuill party to be satisfied , some haue pardoned them in his fauour whose subiects they are , sending them backe with the processe . or if there be no such intelligence betwixt the two princes , as the one will not be beholding to his cópanion , they may procure some common ally vnder-hand , to make the demand : to whom the prisoners being deliuered , he may send them to the prince whose subiects they are . some embassadours haue perswaded themselues , that they had all iurisdiction ouer their domestickes , euen to put some to death . but this is not grounded vpon a reason , if the prince with whom he resides doth not giue him leaue ; as they say the turke tollerates it with the embassadours of christian princes . yet they may detaine those prisoners in their house , which practise against the seruice of their master , vntill they haue aduertised him , and receiue an answer ; prouided that they whom they detaine , be not admitted as embassadours by the prince , or estate where they are : for in that case they are in freedome and safety . behold how embassadors ought to gouern themselues with strangers in a strang coūtry . we must now see being in those charges , how they ought to carry thēselues to their masters , to whom they serue as eyes and eares . some haue held that an embassadour ought to giue aduice to his master , of all that is spoken indiscreetly against him , for that the aduertisment may come from some other , then from his embassadour , who in such things ought to be carefull not to be preuented , wherein we cannot giue any certaine rules . yet if the word hath escaped either in ●ho●ler , or from a passionate spirit , were it the prince himselfe ; being not spoken publiquely , it were more discreetly done to conceale it from his master , then to deliuer it . for the master that neither would nor could breake , would seeme offended at such a report , if the estate of his affaires will not suffer him to demand satisfaction : and on the other side sometimes , in taking exception at an iniury , he seemes to confesse it . but if the embassadour findes it more expedient to conceale the words spoken by the prince with whom he resides ; he shall let him know , how much his master would hold himselfe wronged , if they were related vnto him : but that knowing the good which growes to both the estates , by the friendship in which the two princes haue liued , he had rather therein fayle of his duty , in not making this report , then to be the occasion of trouble , and breach for a word spoken in choller . it is to no purpose to say , that in doing this , it were to shew himselfe wiser then his master ; or that he must deliuer all , and conceale nothing . for that which offends princes , and inuites them to resentment , is not so much the offence in it selfe , as the opinion they haue , that the world knowes they haue beene wronged ; and if they doe not seeke some reuenge , they should make a breach in their reputations , and inuite others to affront and contemne them . so as the wrong being not published and knowne to all men , and the embassadour making it knowne that for the good of peace , he would conceale it from his master , it doth no way touch the reputation of the prince , who otherwise being held to be couragious , they would alwayes beleeue , that if the report had beene made vnto him , he would not haue endured it without reuenge : there are many things which princes are glad to haue concealed ; but those principally , for the which they cannot prouide , without greatly incommadating their affaires , these ought to be dissembled and concealed from them . as for dispatches , it is certaine that they seldome know what an embassadour doth in his charge● , but by that which he writes . he must therefore shew himselfe by his dispatches , which must be graue , short , close couched , and mingled sometimes according to the subiects , with passages of sentences , yet seldome : and to be the more intelligible , some hold it fit that he should articulate euery priuate action apart , not troubling himselfe with a continuance , and bond of clauses in diuers affaires , and he must acknowledge in all his letters , the reception of those to the which he makes answer . if he enforced to write many letters vpon the same subiect , and to the same place , as it happens vsually , he shall doe well to diuersifie the terms and stile as much as may be , to the end they may not bee like vnto a notaries indenture , and that they which haue receiued the like letters , comming to conferre them together , may not thinke that he hath intreated them equally ; euery man esteeming of himselfe not onely better then he is , but also more then his companion . he must haue a care not to write any thing to his master for true , concerning those with whom hee negotiates , if he hath no testimony by letters , or that he knoweth it from those in whom his master hath confidence , the which he ought to name : for that the change which may happen in a businesse , might cause a reproach and bad conceit of the minister , with his master , either of lightnesse , or of little fore-sight . he shall be alwayes esteemed to doe more then to write , and to giue them good hope when he shall see day , before he giue them assurance and certainty of the businesse . as for the particular of the embassador , as we haue said before , besides the secretary of estate , who is to receiue his dispatches , he must haue some one which may giue him aduice of that which passeth . he with some other friends , must doe him all sorts of good offices , in cōmending and praising his seruices and dexterity . and the embassadour on the other side , shall labour to haue others write ; especially men vnknowne to commend his industry and labour , absence causing a decay of opinion , and makes them sometimes forget the worth of a man , if by these practises they be not reuiued . the covnsellor of estate . or , a collection of the greatest and most remarkable considerations seruing for the managing of publicke affaires . part . ii. contayning the meanes how to preserue an estate . chapter i. of the parts and conditions in generall , necessary for a prince and soueraigne . hauing treated of that which is necessary for the setling of an estate , wee must consider of the meanes how to preserue it . it is not sufficient to build a strong ship to make a long and tedious voyage ; but we must withall prouide a good pilot to gouerne it , and to seeke meanes to calke it , and trim it when it takes water , and to be able to resist the waues of the sea , and the violence of the winds and stormes without shipwracke . that which serues for the establishment , doth likewise serue for the preseruation of an estate ; but wee must likewise haue other meanes to preserue this order , the which consists eyther in the authority of him that commands or in the remedy which they must find , against that which might ruine the estate . the authority of him which commands , proceeds eyther from the loue of the people , or from his owne reputation . loue alone would suffice him that hath once gotten it , were it not that hee cannot promise any thing to himselfe from the inconstancy of men , who loue to day and hate to morrow , without any subiect or occasion . wherefore hee which commands , must assure himselfe of men long before , and not attend vntill he be reduced to the poynt of necessity . for then the danger being eminent , it is no more time , for that their faith is then shaken , and by this search hee giues a testimony that hee feares : the which many times doth hasten the princes ruine , and makes them fly from all reconcilment with him . this loue is gotten by many meanes . the beauty , behauiour , carriage , pleasing countenance , and courtesie , are sometimes of great force . with others nobility , and reputation of their predecessors hath beene of great vse , although that they had not any other part that was recommendable . among the inhabitants of a citty or towne , riches may likewise doe something , if they vse it as they ought . chap. . of the parts necessary for a prince to purchase the loue of the people . bvt to treate in generall of the parts necessary for a prince to purchase this good-will , wee will reduce them to three , mildnesse , bounty , and iustice. from mildnesse growes the peace of the estate , the fidellity of the subiects , and the establishment of affaires , there being nothing that doth more force the people to honour their lord , then the naturall mildnesse which he shewes , and practiseth to their good . rygour makes him to be feared , and consequently not beloued , and this feare and cold friendship lasts no longer , then the occasion of feare continues . but mildnesse gouerned with discretion , remaines in the heart , and produceth its effect , whilest that men which haue receiued pleasure and profit liue . this mildnesse is practised by the prince principally , in three points . the first , is to pardon offences , but not those of the estate ; and to pardon those , who being discouered can hurt no more , and by vsing clemency vnto them , may get some reputation ; but not to those who may mutine , and who by no meanes cannot be perswaded to submit themselues to reason : mildnesse to such is cruelty to all others . it is cruelty i say to pardon a wicked man , if by the impunity which doth follow , we bee forced afterwards to dipp our hands deeper in blood . it is a stupid bounty , and a simplicity without discretion , to pardon all , and to suffer all . the excesse of clemency , conuerts it selfe into a soft and effeminate nature : and if this bounty be not mingled with rigour , and facility with authority ; it is meere carelesnesse blamable in a prince , for that in suffering one fault , it soone drawes after it another . clemency is comendable towards an enemy deiected and humbled : but whilest hee wauers and stands in tearmes against vs ; it is weakenesse , amazement and feare , not to dare to resent it , hee must therefore vse mildnesse with discretion , yet in such sort , as they may alwayes find the prince more inclined to mildnesse then seuerity . the second point , when they discouer mildnesse , is cheifly to cherrish great men , and the cheife of the estate , and according to occasions , others : for that euery man esteeming himselfe of more worth then he is , they grow easily discontented if they make no reckoning of them . the third point , by the which he which commands may testifie his mildnesse , is in shewing himselfe indulgent in things , wherein the people take delight ; prouided alwayes that they fly excesse and disorder . for by this meanes they mollisie the sauagenesse of the subiect , they diuert him from vndertaking ; and make euery one more ioyfull in his vocation . yet hee must not suffer himselfe to be carried away with this indulgence , as through negligence , and the little care hee had to prouide for his estate ; but with a designe and discretion restr●tiue in his time . for this effect he must also prouide , ( as we will shewe hereafter ) for the abundance of victualls and commodities , to the end that he may thereby testifie the care he hath of his people , and by this care the affection he beares them . for if the people should fall into necessity , or into a dearth of victualls , this mildnesse and indulgence would proue vnprofitable ; and the prince would loose much of the loue of his subiects : there being nothing that doth so much discontent them , as such discommodities ; especially when it growes eyther through the monopoles of the prince , or the excesse of custome . chap. . of the liberality of the prince . liberallity is of two sorts , the one practised to the benefit of priuate persons ; and the other to the profit and aduantage of the publique . the one and the other well husbanded , serues to purchase loue to the prince . for although hee cannot extend his bounty to all in particular , for that it would bee impossible his reuenewes should suffice : yet a liberall prince is beloued of euery man ; for that euery man hopes to taste of his bounty according to his degree , making him his friend ; although that the facility of giuing ruines the estate sooner , then too great sparing . but no man enters into consideration , how much sparing is necessary for a prince , for the generall good of his estate : for that the number of those is small which doth in particular to hinder that which belongs in generall to all . and yet as excesse is blameable in all actions , so it is most preiudiciall to the estate in this : and we haue seene in our time , that moderate giuing hath beene a weake meanes to purchase the subiects loue to the prince : for it reiects more then it gaines ; and if it be imployed without respect of merit , it proues a shame to him that receiues it , and is receiued without grace . the subiects of a prince excessiue in gifts , makes them excessiue in expences , and importune in demands . they gouerne themselues not according vnto reason but to custome : that which is receiued is no more accounted of : they loue not liberality but for the future . wherefore the more a prince doth exhaust himselfe in giuing , the p●orer he growes in friends ; and from excessiue prodigallity , doth vsually g●ow the pouerty of a prince : from pouerty exactions and hatred in like manner . for the number of those from whom he takes by exaction , being greater then the friendship of those to whom he giues ; the prince is in danger not to command long . if then he be reduced to one of these extremities , it were more expedient for the prince to bee poore and not hated of his subiects , then to be hated and rich . for although that for a time he may force obedience , yet i● cannot be durable : and although that he which spares , seemes in outward shewe to doe good to few , yet not exacting from the subiect hee doth good to all , whereas a prodigall prince doth vsually good but to few . we must therefore be carefull to vse this vertue well , thereby to purchase loue . for although that the gifts and benefits , be in some sort in the liberty and free-will of him that giues : yet it hath certaine distinctions and lawes which restraine it , and especially in that which concernes the prince ; who being but a simple dispencer of the publique treasure , he ought not to imploy it without hope of some profit to the publique . wherefore hee must consider what he giues , to whom , and when . for it is not needfull to giue to all that demands ; as if the demander and des●ruer were one and the same thing : likewise betwixt those which haue deserued , he may not giue to all that begg , for it would be found that they which haue least deserued , haue tasted of his liberality , and not the rest . and as the payment of a bond ought to goe before liberality ; otherwise it would be iniustice to giue , at the charges of those to whom we are indebted : so merit must be recompenced , before we doe good to him that hath not deserued : and before merits , seruices ought to march ; and before seruices , debts and bonds ought to be discharged . it is the law of iustice , not to doe wrong to one , to gratifie another , the which is very ill obserued by the most part of princes , who therein follow the nature of other princes , which is , rather to doe that which proceeds from their owne will , then what is commanded them by iustice , or that whereunto they are bound : for that in the first they acknowledged themselues superiours , and in the second inferiours ; the recompence shewing the merit and vallour of him to whom it is giuen . wherefore the benefit or liberality of the prince , proceeds eyther from the acknowledgment of seruice , or of merit , or of his owne free-will ; or to inuite and draw some one to loue him , or to corrupt him , or to purchase the reputation to bee liberall . concerning the first two sorts of bounty , they are necessary , as well for the satisfaction of those which receiue them , as for the contentment of the generall , who by the example would bee inuited to conforme their actions to the good of the estate . for the acknowledgement of a benefit is no lesse esteemed , then if the liberality proceeded from a free will : for that the good and pleasure which they doe , proceedes many times from the abundance of wealth , and the great power which hee hath that giues , as well as from good-will : but acknowledgement cannot come but from the desire hee had to doe good , so as although to giue and doe good , be more to be desired , yet the content which they feele , is peraduenture more commēdable , as proceeding only frō a francke & free courage . and it is that whereof among priuate persons wee haue experience , that the benefit which comes from a bond or debt , is more pleasing then that which comes vnto vs from the free-will of another : for that in this consists the contēt of the giuer , who chargeth ys with a bond which binds vs ; and which in some doth rather ingender hatred then friendship ; especially if the benefit exceeds all satisfaction . in the oth●r , besides the pleasure to receiue the benefit , we receiue content to see that we acknowledge the former good which we haue done them . and although that they which loue vs , deserue to be requited for their good-will towards vs , as being the principall part of the benefit : yet it deserues rather to be recompenced by a prince , with kind vsage and good words , then by effects ; the which hee must keepe to recompence effects , otherwise his reuenewes would not ●ustice . yet if he finds that some for want of this , withdraw themselues from him , although vniustly and with out cause , it shall be necessary that hee retaine them by the mildest meanes he can , and rather in doing them good , then in ●mploying threats , who according to their naturall disposition , might be the more incensed . the prince may also bestow gifts and benefits of those , which may serue him against his enemy ; i say to those which are of a contrary party , to draw them vnto him . for as it is a vice in them to suffer themselues to bee corrupted , so it is a vertue and wisdome in the prince to corrupt and gaine them . and as some haue not allowed of this expence , for that the aduantage which we expect is doubtfull , hauing to deale with traytors , who may as well betray the prince which giues thē , as him they serue : yet the general experience is contrary ; being most certaine that the minister which takes , sells himselfe , bee it that the money binds him , or that the shame to haue receiued , stayes him from failing of his promise ; or that the feare to be discouered makes him to be suspected of him hee serues , and to him that giues him , which were a meanes to ruine him with the one and the other , forcing him of necessity to keepe his word with him that hath corrupted him ; being in his heart growne irreconciliable to him whom he hath res●lued to betray . besides few men of quality suffer themselues to be corrupted , vnlesse they bee transported , by some hatred , contempt , or desire of reuenge , which they haue conceiued against him whom they serue : or they are not disposed in heart and a●f●ction , to loue him w●ich corrupts them , there being nor● but base spirits , or needy persons , which suffer themselu●s to be cor●upted for meere auar●ce . the liberality which is vsed to particular persons , to purchase re●utation , extends commonly either to strangers , or to subiects , which doe not know nor frequent the princes court , who ought to haue in no ●●sse recommendation tho●e which a●● remote from his court , then others which are dayly in his eye : for that the greatnes●e and maiesty of the prince doth not take its foundation and increase to know , but to be knowne of many : and the honour and reno●n● to aide and doe good to another , should b● too ●uc●●●strained , if his succours and benefi●s s●ould proceede no farther , then to such persons whom they see and know . behold wherein vsually the bounty of pri●ces to priuate p●rsons is imployed , in their manner of giuing they must ob●erue three things . the first , not to g●ue at the request of a third person , to the ●nd that he which receiues may be bound vnto him , and not to the other , by who●e importunity hee giues . the ma●n●rof giui●g must be in such sort , that although it be for an acknowledgment or recompence , yet they to whom it is giuen , receiue the benefit with an obligation ; otherwise the gift were fruitlesse , and is held for a payment , and not a liberality ; so as they enc●urage him that receiues , to demand g●ine , rather then to acknowledge that which they hau● giuen him . the t●i●d is , to giue in the view of all men , to purchase reputation . for although that in a priuate lib●tality this were not commendable ; yet this manner is necessary in the estate , where the actions of princes must be apparent and visible , neyther must they be vnfruitfull ; and it sufficeth not to doe a pleasure ; but you must make him that receiues it , acknowledge that it is done to such an intention . as for the measure of benefits , they must be proportionable to the time , and to the persons , as well of him that receiues , as of him that giues . and for the time , sometimes a small succour giuen in necessity , obligeth not onely more then a great gift would doe at anot●er time ; but sometimes causeth an enemy to fo●get all the wrongs he had receiued , there being two things in concurrence in this benefit , either of which may doe much for a reconcilliation , and by consequence for loue . the one is , for the benefit and pleasure he doth him , in the best time that could be ; i meane at need . the other is the assurance that he which receiues the benefit , takes of his good will that succours him so opportunely . thus he must obserue the time to giue esteeme to his ben●fits , to the end the debt may be the greater . as for persons , the humours being diuers , the prince must obserue the humours of his ministers , not onely as i haue sayd , to impart their offices vnto them , but also ▪ for his recompences : for that some demand honours , others ●iches , according to the which hee must gouerne himselfe . and for that there are more men found which affect riches , then honour ; and that being willing to satisfie euery mans desire , he should be forced to exhaust his t●easure : he must ( as much as may be ) encourage his subiects to seeke for honours , as recompences which can not impouerish him ; and yet vse it in such sort , as it may seeme that he doth not giue them without discretion and election . for when as honour is imparted to vnworthy men , it b●gins to be contemned , and to lose this title of honour , as likewise he may not mingle it with profit , for that many would make more esteeme of profit , then of honour . if the liberalities of princes towards priuate persons , doth get them good-will , not onely from those which taste the fruite , but also from all others which participate in hope : that which the soueraigne practiseth towards the publique , as being more profitable , and ex●nding to more persons , should pu●chase vnto him more generally the affection of the people : as the succours which the prince giues in publique calamities , in famine , plague , dearth , burning of townes , warre , inuasion of enemies , earth-quakes , inundations , and such accidents . for that the prince alone may giue this releife , being necessary to haue meanes wh●ch exceede the ordinary : the reason of estate will not allow that any priuate person , although he were able to doe it , should enter into this kind of liberality , which it may be would aduance him in the loue of the people before the prince . and in common-weales and popular estates , ●ome priuate person hauing attempted to shew their bounty , haue beene punished , as men which sought by this meanes ●o seduce the people , and to vsurpe the estate . seeing then that this liberality is fitting onely for the prince , he must practise it as much as may be , and not suffer occasion to be lost . there is another sort of liberality , which the prince may practise to the benefit of the publique , no lesse importing then the other : which is to aduance to vertue , by the establishment and foundation of seminaries of piety and religion , of schooles and colledges for all sorts of sciences which may serue the publique : of houses of honour and vertue , for the practises and exercises which may serue in warre ; and of other places for all sorts of worke-men and artizans , for the bringing in of manufactures , whereof i haue formerly treated . chap. . of the princes iustice. ivstice is generally bel●ued and desired : but when they will practise it ag●●nst priu●te persons , the commis●ration they hau● o● a con●emned man , or the colour of some contrary reasons , ioyned to interest and obstinacy , make the rigour and seuerity odious to many . wherefore in a manner in all estates , the exercise of iustice hath beene diuided into two parts . that which concernes the punishment of crimes , and the deciding of controuersies betwixt man & man , hath beene left to the magistrates and inferiour officers to the prince , to free him from the enuy and hatred which condemnations draw after them : and that which concernes the distribution of d●gnities ; honours , charges , recompences , pardons , and rewards , hath beene retained by the prince , to gaine the loue of the subiects . yet the prince , euen in that which concernes p●iuate men , may shew himselfe a louer of iustice , and by this meanes winne the affection of his p●ople , not incurring any enuy by the establishment he shall make of lawes , necessary to supp●esse the fraud and violence of his age by the choise he shall make of good men to administer iustice : and by the care he shall take to keepe them in awe , in p●escribi●g the forme of the administrati●n o● iustice. the frauds most vsually practised in an estate by priuate persons , are disloyalty , vsury , falshood , frauds , and m●nopolies ; by the which some grow suddainly rich , & some extremly poore ; whence many times grow the despai●e of those whō they thrust into innouations ; & the insol●ncy of the others which maks thē insupportable : and from the one and the other growes trouble , and in the end the ruine of the estate followes . against this kind of disorder and abuse , the prince must shew himselfe affectionate for iustice , by the o●dayning of ●igorous punishments against such as shall be surprised ; as also in blaming them in his discourses , according to the occasions which shal be offered , and by admonitions and exhortations to iudges in generall , not touching any one in particular , and of persons otherwise odious . and particularly vsury or interest , ( which cannot bee defended ) ought to be regulated at much lesse then the ordinary gaine of those which borrow , ( be they marchants or laborers ) may mount vnto ; to the end that the poore in borrowing of the rich , may lay , and pay that which they are forced to borrow ; and thereby auoyd the ruine of the poore by vsury , and that of the rich by banquerupts whereof they are the cause . as for violence which is committed in an estate , it is of two sorts , the one is of theeues and robbers , who by open force and armes , trouble the safety of priuate persons : against the which the prince hath a double reason to oppose himselfe , as well for that all force ought to be in his hands , as for that he is established to mainetaine the peace and safety of his subiects , not onely against strangers , but also among themselues , and the prince which comes and doth not giue order , looseth the loue of his subiects , and exposeth his reputation to contempt , which makes him in the end loose all his authority ; and is in danger that these theeues seeing themselues strong , will trouble him in his estate : but this is easily preuented in lending a strong hand to iustice , and causing those to assist , which are apoynted for the apprehension of such persons . the other so●t of violence contrary to iustice , is the oppression of the poore by great men , be it that it is made by the vnlawfull exactions of money , or of day workes , beating , or other ryotts , to preuent the which , the prince must n●t onely in his ordinary discourses cond●mne this ma●●er of proceeding , thr●atning them to be punished , without taking notice of any person in particular ; but also that whic● shall concerne the punishment of priuate men , he must l●aue free to the ordinary iustice , to dispose accordi●g to the lawes , without assisting the delinquents with any fauour or pardon ; as many princes vsually doe , who trouble the order of iustice by such impunities , and ruine their estates by maintayning such people . and we haue often seene , that a prince hath saued the life of some such man , who in a combustion hath beene the first to raise the subiects , and to draw his sword aga●nst him . this is the recompence which such princ●● deserue . they come by degrees to pride and disobe●●ence , as to all other vices . he that hath dared this day to coa●●●ne the law and the magistrates , to morrow will co●t●●ne the prince who hath made the law , and ha●h established the magistrate ; and if occasion be offred will attempt against him . i meane not for all this to tye the princes hands , so as he may not giue a pardon : there are cases in which iust●ce doth allow it : but besides when as some great and publique profit requires it ; as if it bee for a man , from whom the publique hath d●awne great and famous s●ruices ; or if by the punishment there will follow some trouble in the estate : the prince in this case for a gre●t●r good , or to auoyde a great mischiefe , may dispeace a●d pardon him . but before he resolue , he must examin● duely what he intends ●o doe , and he must not flatter himselfe in his considerations , to fauour some one ●g●inst iustice , which considerations he shall keepe secret , l●●t they draw vnto a consequence : and moreouer , before he comes to that , if there be any particular interest , it must be satisfied with such contentment , as there may be nothing to be desired , nei●her from him which hath offended , nor ●●om the princes ●ustice . among all the violences and oppressions which great men commit , the most dangerous to an estate , and which ought to be lesse supported by the prince , is that which is done against the magistrate , eyther in executing his charge , ●or in hatred thereof . for this is to attempt directly against the publique , and to ouerthrow the order of iustice , making ( by the impunity of such violences ) the magistrate fearefull in t●e execution of the princes will. he that endures these violences , not onely seemes to loue iustice and the publique good but little , but also makes them thinke that he feares to punish them by the ordinary course of iustice ; and in such conniuences he loseth both the loue of his people and his reputation . the second point wherin a prince may shew his ●ffectiō towards iustice , is the choise which he shal make of those which shall administer it for him : as cōtrariwise , the indifferency which he shall shew , to make vse of the first commer● , will discouer his carelesnesse . i meane to speake here not onely of those which are destinated to iudge the controuersies of priuate persons , but also of all such as vnder the princes authority , haue any power or command , according vnto which they may doe something iustly or vniustly . for iustice is mingled and practised in all actions , be they priuate or publique . euery man is a iudge in his charge . and wee must not say , that there being good iustice , we may not punish those who vnder the princes authority shall offend in other offices . for besides the difficulty which is sometimes found , the same may they say of iudges . but the princes fore-sight may passe farther , and hinder the mischiefe and iniustice as much as may be . it is the last remedy to punish ; and wee must doe what possibly wee may not to come vnto it . to preuent all this , wee must vse choyce ; whereof few princes dreame , and the contempt of this choyce in some estate● is p●oceeded so farre as offices are giuen to them that wil● o●fer mo●t . an apparent signe that these estates are neare vnto their ru●ne . some princes haue had this care , to propound in publique the names of those whom they meant to send into prouinces , to see what might be obiected before they sent them . others haue made rolles , of those that were to be imployed in offices , causing themselues to be informed sec●etly by good men : and others haue chosen them according to the opinion of the people . but the safest meanes is that whereof we haue spo●en , to cause them to ex●cute the meanest offices from deg●ee to degree , before they were aduanced to others of great importance . for then more men are able to testifie of their experience and discretion ; and their actions being as it were publique , and apparent to all the world , it is more easie to iudge 〈◊〉 petty charges they will accustome themselues to doe well , for the desire they haue to be aduanced to greater : and admit they would transgresse , besides that the euill cannot be great , it may be easily corrected . but this is not all , to haue chosen such as must attend iustice ( although that it would bee more then halfe the worke , to haue chosen them good and capeable men ) but man changeth ; and many times amidst the malice of men which are reported vnto him to iudge , he learnes to be malicious . wherefore the prince must alwayes haue an open eye to maintaine them in integrity : and this demonstration which he shall make , in reproaching them for some fault which they haue committed , will in a manner suffice in an age that is not too much corrupted : but in another , hee must according to occurrents adde to his helping hand , to pr●uent the mischiefe . one of the meanes to auoyde the euill , and to pre●erue the integrity of i●dges , is , after that h●e hath made choise of honest men , to giue them meanes to enentertaine themselues in seruing the publique : to the end he may draw them from the thought , which necessity might force them to , to gather goods by vnlawfull meanes . others haue held officers in awe by inquieries made from time to time . but the commissioners of these searches being as well subiect to corruption as the rest , this cou●se hath not beene long obserued . moreouer , princes thrust on by the harpies of the court , haue many times made vse of these meanes , rather to gather together money , then to reforme disorders : i here hauing beene ( vnder the like pretext ) a publique concussion drawne into many estates , the which hath equalled ( by the meanes of generall and particular compositions which haue beene made ) good men with the wicked ; no man how good soeuer , being desirous after a long vexation of imp●isonment , and proceeding to run the hazard of a iudgement of commissioners ; whereof some are many times partizans , or depending of partizans for such compositions , or rewarded by the fines and confiscations which they make ; and for a small matter would hang a man to haue his clothes . another mischiefe which is committed in such compositions , is , that by the meanes thereof the wicked remayning still in his office , vnder hope to be freed another time at the same rate , doe worse then they did before : and hee which is an honest man , seeing himselfe compell'd and forced to pay a fine for an oftence which hee hath not committed , resolues to doe it , as well to re-embource himselfe , as to haue meanes another time to satisfie the auarice of the authours of such searches . wherefore they must eyther make no enquieries , or else they must finish them by the course of iustice. but if in such things the prince will shew sauour , and pardon some one mans life : at the least after hee is reprehēded , he may not suffer him to continue in his place , as wel to take from him the meanes of ill doing , as not to make the charge contemptible , and himselfe ●dious , in maintayning a person therein , who hath beene held of a bad life . there are princes which haue made vse of spyes , w●om they sent throughout the prouinces , to inquire of the actions of officers : and these for that they were vnknowne , might easily enter into all places , and obserue the actions of one and another , and sometimes doe bad offices vnseasonable for the honestest men , yet the prince being wise and not relying vpon the report , but tying them to a secret proofe , and without any brute , may make vse of it , and ought not to neglect this meanes . lewis the twelfth who was called the father of the people , for that he held a strict hand ouer ●ustice , making his ordinary abode in blois , examining himselfe secretly , those which come to court from all parts of his realme , and sometimes passengers of that which was done , as they had heard spoken in the place from whence they came , and especially of great men , and of his officers ; and finding by report of many , some aduisoes conformable , against some one , he caused him to bee put into the hands of iustice , to informe of his life , and to punish him : and in this manner he contained euery man in his duty . secret delations haue beene brought into scotland , by an ancient edict of conan king of scotland , the which they say is yet practised at this day , and is called indict : but better by the ordinance of millan , by the which in all their townes there must bee a hollow trunke in the cheife church , whereof the gouernour hath the key , into the which it is lawfull for any man , to cast the lybell of accusation secretly , containing the crime committed , the time , the p●ace , the offendors , & the witnesses ; and this ordinance giues a moiety of the confiscation to the ●il●tor : which is a great meāes to facilitate the pūishmēt of crimes . chap. . of the administration of iustice. in the forme of the administration of iustice , among priuate persons , the prince ought to haue an eye of the order , to the speedy expedition , and to the putting off of charges , and ordinary expences , which they consume in pleading , the which many times exceed the principall . order is as it were an essentiall part of iustice : for where there is confusion , there can be no iustice : and to auoyd this confusion , they must prouide that no iurisdiction attempt not against another . for the which they must haue a care , not onely among those which are of equall power , distinguished by places , or by certaine kinds of causes : but also betwixt inferiours and superiours . contrarywise they must strictly bind the parties vpon great penalties , to follow their suits by those degrees , and in that place which is appointed for them by the law : and the prince must hinder , that by euocations eyther to himselfe , or to some other of his subiects , there may be ●o contrauention without great cause . in the speedy expedition , the prince shall testifie his affection to the good of ●ustice , in taking away the power of iudges 〈◊〉 p●olong delayes , and fauour those that fly from tryal● , i● shortning as much as hee may , by the adnice of the m●st iudicious of his estate , the stile , and forme of their ordinary proceeding , as well in establishing fines and amercements against those that faile and de●ay , as in diminishing the degrees of iuridiction , and other tediousne●se in p●ediang . as for the expence , the pleader suffers in three or foure sorts . the one , when he is forced ●o goe ●arre from his house and family : for besides that he is not able to attend his domestique affaires during his absence , they perish most commonly in regard thereof ; the charges as well of his voyage as of his returne , are much greater then in his house . the remedy hereof is , to settle in a great estate iudges in euery prouince , and if it may be , in the midst , to the end that the extremities may not be too remote . i meane not only of iudges , which may iudge in the first instance , but also of those to whō they will giue power to iudge definitiuely , for ordinary causes , and which dese●ue not the cha●ge of a iourney of a hundred , or sixe score leagues . another expence is for the vocations of iudges , who as we haue sayd , ought to bee honestly entertained by the publique , and priuate men freed of that charge . but if they feare that their vocations being reduced to ordinary wages , many amongst them would neg'ect to labour : they may conclude that the summe appointed by the publique for the payment of their vocation , shall bee diuided amongst them according to their labour , which shall bee taxed by the whole company . there being nothing so vnseemely for a seate of iustice , then to take money from the hands of one of the parties , yea his iust fee ; and yet there is nothing so ordinary in this age , in a manner in all estates . another expence is of registers , vshers , and such other ministers of iustice , whose taxes they must not onely regulate , but also limit the time , in the which they ought to deliuer the expeditions to the parties , and that vpo● great penalties . for a party which sees that he may spend much , will be willing to giue vnto a register halse that which it would cost him , besides his taxe , then to grow obstinate , to pay nothing but the taxe , set downe by the orders , and to be constrayned to consume twice as much in s●aying to attend his expedition . but the greatest and most excessiue expence , is that of solicitors , proctors , and aduocates , which is a very difficult thing to order : and some haue held , that we must leaue this meanes to those of this quality , to inrich themselues in seruing others , there being groomes as they say of all prizes . yet if they cou●d set downe an order , which might be easily executed , it would be a great benefit for iustice : but hauing not bin hitherto found , at the least it would require the fore-●●g tand iustice of the prince . to prouide in such sort , as poore men desiri●g to recouer their owne , might be● freed from this cha●ge . for this effect it hath bin sometimes propounded , to oblige those , which desire to come in time to great offices of this profession , before they should attaine vnto any , they should vndertake the pursuit of causes freely , and that it should not bee lawfull for them to take any fee ; vpon paine of concussion , and to be made v●capable euer to enter into any office for the future . these being commonly men of meanes , desirous to winne honor and in an age when desire is most ardent : will striue in enuy one of another to protect the poore , when as for their recompence they should propound vnto them , some place being voyd of those whereunto they aspired , to prefer●e him which had defended the greatest number . besides the benefit which the poore should reape , the publique should haue aduantage ; in that they which should enter into these charges , had giuen some testimony of their integrity and su●ficiency : whereas the custome is at this day , to place schollers comming from schoole , in the companies of iudges , with little learning and lesse experience , and hauing giuen no proo●es of their discretion . there is another poynt wherein the prince may likewise testifie his affection to the good of iustice , when he submits his lawes and edicts to the iudgment of those , to whom he hath referred the last appea●es of his iustice , before hee ●auseth him to bee executed . the kings of france , aboue all others , haue bin curious to bee held iusticers : and although that otherwise , they haue made profession of armes and warre , more then any other princes , yet they would bee in all places , in their seale , and in their throne of iustice. but aboue all others they of the last race , haue affected this name to be great iusticers ; hauing brought in the verification of their edicts , by their courts of parliament , before they wil cause them to bee executed ; stopping the mouthes of such by this formality , as would impug●e their commandements with iniustice , in giuing more authority to the execution , and preseruing themselues from surprize and importunity . chap. . of the reputation of the prince . the reputation of a prince , is the other part which giues him authority . it is gotten by many meanes . but we will begin with the principail , which are prupence , and vallour . prudence serues him as an eye to see , and to consider all things . vallour serues him as a hand . without the one he should be like a blind man , and without the other weake and vnable . prudence giues him counsell , and vallour force . the one commands and the other executes . the one discouers the difficulties of enterprizes ; and vallour breakes them . the one designes affaires ; and this finisheth them . the one sharpens the iudgment ; and this fortifies the courage . prudence to be such as it ought to be in a prince must be accompanied , with a generall knowledge of all sorts of sciences , not exactly , as to make a trade and profession ; but he must know as much as is necessary for him , to distinguish truth from falshood , and to vnderstand those which discourse according to occurrents . his profession is not to bee an e●gineere , to build houses , to make a bridge , or to be a good cano●neere : but to know those that are most fit ; and iudiciously to make vse of men of all sorts of professions . neyther must the prince bee amazed at this knowledge , which is required in him as of a thing impossible , amidst the variety of affaires and occupations , which they of this quality haue vsually ; nor to distrust his vnderstanding and capacity : for there is nothing therein but is most easie . and among other meanes to get this generall knowledge , the principall is to haue about him a good number of men , great in all sorts of sciences , as d●uines , phylosophers , mathematitians , and captaines , for whom ( be it attable or else where , ) he may in few words learne that which cannot be apprehended in many moneths at schoole : to giue them a subiect of discourse , in walking , bee it on foot or hors-backe , going a hunting , and in all other occasions ; to keepe them prepared , so as presenting themselues before him , they may be ready to deliuer something that is rare and excellent . yet he must remember , if he meanes to haue them discourse before the world in his presence , to aduertise them secretly sometime before , of that which he meanes to propound , to the end they may be prepared ; for the most sufficient may bee surprized : and not to reprehend him before the world ; the which would doe wrong to his reputation , and that of the prince would likewise suffer , for that they would conceiue he had made a bad choyce . thus the prince imploying the time onely , which others spend in the encounters of iesters , he will in a short time be as learned as shall bee necessary for him . alexander , iulius caesar , charlemaigne , charles the wise king of france , and alphonso the tenth king of castille , had not want of affaires and im●loyments : and yet they found l●isure to read , and ●ome to write . alphonso the first king of naples , who in his time had as many affaires and c●osses as any other of his quality , sayd , that a prince without learning was an asse crow●ed . experience is the mother of prudence , for that many things seeme grounded vpo● re●son , and easie in famil●●r discour●e ; the which being put in execution , ●ucceed not , as they conceiue : but contrariwise they haue found some impossible . experience is of two sorts . for eyther we get it of our selues , by that which we obs●rue , and whereof we are eye witnesses : o● by the report of others . the report of others , is eyther of the liuing , or such as are dead . in regard of the first , although it extends not farre , by reason of time ; yet it may imbrace many places , for that embassadours , spyes , marc●ants , souldiers , and such like persons , who ( eyther for pleasure , or for affaires , or for some other subiect , ) haue beene in many places , and haue found themselues in diuers encounters , may teach vs many things for our conduct . but history passeth much farther , and with much more profit : for there is seene the life of the world , the manner ▪ and fashions of nations ; the diuers establishment of estates ; the beginning , progresse , middest , and end , and the causes of the encrease , and ruine of empires . there may bee learned the causes , for the which some princes raig●e peaceably , and others in troubles and conbustion ; some in making war , and others in being prodigall ; and some stayed in their expences with dignity . but to relate here all that is necessary to prudence , we must make a repetition of all that is formerly spoken , this treaty tending onely to this point , wee will content our selues to propound some rules , which concerne onely the prudence of the prince . chap. . rules and necessary instructions for a prince to be held wise . a prince may easily iudge by himselfe what may be the deliberations of all others of his condition . interest is the part and reason which preuailes , and makes the resolutions , bend to that side where it shewes it selfe : and therefore he must neither trust to friendship , alliance , league , nor any other bond , if there be no interest . a prince must oppose himselfe against a mischiefe in its breeding , and resolutely : for that disorders grow , and fortifie the●selues in such manner with time , as they surpasse our forces . but when the mischiefe exceeds the forces of the prince , then he shall doe wel to deferre it , for that with time matters may change : & he that hath time , as they say hath life . hee may not consent t●at they put any thing in deliberation , which may cause cha●ge or innouation in the estate : for that the propositions which are made in the princes councell , giue him credit , how strange and pernicious soeuer they be it is a signe that there is some difficulty to discouer the good and euill that is in this subiect , seeing they bring it into consultation . he must not thinke in his resolutions to be able to auoide all inconueniences : for that cannot bee . there is no generation of things in this world , how good soeuer , but a corruption hath gone before it . but he must weigh the inconueniences , and choose the party wherein there are least , and most easie to preuent . he may not imbrace many enterprizes at once : for hee that imbraces too much , gripes not fast : but hee must assure his estate before hee attempts a warre of a long continuance . hee may not quarrell with one more powerfull then himselfe , but dissemble the iniuries of the mighty , and the offences which cannot be punished . to yeeld somtimes to time , and rough encounters is wisedome : and in a strong storme to strike faile , and to accommodate himselfe ●ith the strongest , yea with disaduantage , to preuaile ouer the weaker . and thus the prince shall increase the courage of his men , and make himselfe fearefull to his enemies : it being not wisedome to commit himselfe to hazard and fortune , for a light matter . the prince may not make any suddaine change , for that it cannot be done without violence ; and violence doth seldome producean effect that is durable . being ready for the execution of an enterprize , he may ●ot deferre it , vnlesse hee finds an apparrant danger in the execution : for time may breede more harme then good . hee must likewise preferre old things before new , rest before trouble , the ce●taine before the vncertaine , and safety before hazard . hee may not breake nor attempt agai●st powerfull common-weales , vnlesse it bee with great aduantage , and in a manner a certaine hope to preuaile . for the loue of libertie to such as haue it , is so strong ; as it is a difficult thing , yea impossible to roote it out : and moreouer the e●te●prizes and designes of princes , die with them ; but the resolutions of such free estates are immortall . hee may not likewise breake with the church for a small matter . for that many other princes , who would bee glad to worke their owne ends , vnder pretext of religion , and of succouring the church , will be glad to ioyne w●th it : and the warres of princes against popes , are of great expences and little profit . we haue spoken formerly of the election of ministers ; we will adde here , that he must haue a ●are they may be equall to the affaires , not superiours , nor inferiours . for that they which esteeme themselues capable of a greater matter , then that which is committed vnto them , neglect it , and contemne it ; and they which are vncapable , and cannot discharge the place , disgrace and are preiudiciall to those that imploy them . if his estate be great , to discharge himselfe of some humors , hee may entertaine a warre with some of his neighbours : yet hee may not continue it so long , as hee shall make his enemy too warrelike : but shall make a peace with him , although he himselfe were the stronger . for by this meanes hee shall giue a law to the treaty , and may preserue his aduantages , and then begin warre with another : he shall make himselfe powerfull and fearefull to all , being still armed , and hauing men inured to warre . this is the turkes vse with his neighbours , who hath setled himselfe in his conquests by this meanes : it being a great indiscretion in a prince , to forbeare to make a peace , vntill hee can make no more resistance . for then all the conditions are to his disaduantage : and admit hee would not continue the warre against some one of his neighbours ; yet hee may not wholely relinquish armes ; for that a disarmed peace is weake . but he must haue a speciall care not to attempt a war against his subiects ; and if he be prest to it , let it bee with great aduantage , and end it speedily : for the more the warre continues , the more his subiects are incensed and estranged from him ; so as they can neither obey him , nor afterwards trust in their prince . wherefore he must not oppose himselfe directly against a multitude : for admit hee should preuaile ( the which notwiths●anding would bee difficult ) it cannot be without losse of the loue which they beare him . but like vnto good marriners , hee shall take aside wind , when as that in the pope is contrary ; and shall make shew to giue that , which hee cannot hinder nor take from them . but aboue all hee must bee warie in diuisions of his estate , not to r●maine partiall ; and in the place of prince to make himselfe head of a partie . the enterprizes wherein courage is necessary , must be performed with celeritie , the which will giue vs the aduantage which wee want , and which wee cannot haue by our owne forces . celeritie strikes suddainely ; and against force if wee haue time , wee may fortifie our selues with that which is necessary to resist . the one puts an enemy in disorder , and the other breaks him : and it is more easy to disorder him and then breake him ; then to breake those at the first charge , that are in order . yet there are certaine enterprizes , in the which wee must vse time and patience , not rash violence ; for that delay weakens with time and occasion ; and it is more easie to weaken then quite ouerthrow a businesse , then to force it suddenly . aboue all things the prince must study to know the oportunity of occasions , for his enterprizes and affayres ; which is no other thing but an encounter of many circumstances , which makes that easy which before seemed eifficult . hee may not commit the executio● of a● enterprise to him , which is not of aduice , it should bee attempted ; for that the will cannot bee followed by the effect , if the vnderstanding doth not incline thereu●to , and serue him for a guide : and hee which hath not held a busi●esse easy before the execution wi● find more difficulty in the execution . hee must consult naturally of enterprises : but , as i haue said elsewhere , hee must leaue the meanes of the execution , to the discretion of him to whom hee commits it . for the execution depending for the ●ost pa●t , vpon oportunity and present occasions which vary continnally , to limit it is no other thing , then to intangle the minister , and to spoile the businesse . a prince must not thinke in flying to preserue himselfe in mischiefe and danger ; but he must oppose against it : for that in flying , he not on●ly followes , and fa●ls vpon vs ; but witha●l many other da●g●rs grow : whereas in making head wee stay him , and then we repulse him in time ; and the danger most commonly dissolues to nothing . in consu●ting of an enterprize , hee must auoid sharpe counce●l and full of subtilty ; for they seldome succeed , and a few crosses make them vnprofitable : as also those which haue mo●e shew and vanitie then a good foundation . in the estate hee must build vpon that which is solid and firme : as likewise hee m●st fly th●se which are full of expences , and aboue his forces and meanes . but hee must fo●low councell grounded in reason vpon safety , and little subiect to be crost by acciden●s . yet he that assailes , must hazard somet●mes : but when the question is to preserue , he must commit nothing to fortune . wherefore slow councels are more fitting for great princes , which haue more neede to preserue , then to get , and those which are suddaine will bee more proper for conquerours . but in doubtfull occasions which are vrgent and precipitate , there is nothing worse then slow and middle councels . courage will be alwayes more profitable , and lesse preiudiciall , vnlesse they be resolued wholy to yeeld . in affaires where the reasons are strong on all parts , and where it is in a manner impossible to see and choose that which is most commodious and profitable , ( the which breeds in vs doubts and perplexities ) the best is to incline to that party , where there is more honesty and iustice. for although it miscarries ; yet we shall alwayes haue a satisfaction remaining in vs , and a glory outwardly , and to haue chosen the best : besides , no man knowes what might haue happened , if wee had chosen t●e contrary party . finally if wee doubt which is the best , or shortest way : wee must hold the stra●ghtest . we must not in difficult affaires , diue into all sorts of inconueniences , not in accords and treaties , trouble our selues wi●h nice poynts , which grow vsually in treating : but wee must looke to the maine , and to assurances . i m●ght adde here●n●o an infinite number of other rules , the which might ●e●ue a prince to make him to be held prudent in practising them . yet i doe not hold that in matt●r of state , hee should so tye himselfe to rules and maximes , as he should not pe●ze and waigh the circumsta●ces , and particularities of affaires : for hee may encounter with such a circumstance , as he shall be forced to take a resolution contrary to maximes . but the greatest sig●e of p●udence in a prince , is to be secret : otherwise he should betray himselfe ; and none of his resol●tio●s would succeed . chap. . of cunning or pollicy . and for that they make two sorts of prudence ; the one which is guided by the ordinary maximes of honesty and iusti●e , and the other which consists mo●e in surprizes and deceipt , which they call cunning : many haue doubted , whether it were expedient for a princes reputa●ion , to make vse of this last . wherein i wi●l speake my opinion here ; but i will deliuer that of one of our time , who hath written vpon this subiect : who holds that fraud , cunning and deceipt , if they be without vice or wickednesse , may bee allowed v●to a prince for the pub●ique good , and for his defence and preseruation ; but not to offend any man. it is his duty , to procure the publique good , and the health of the people . ●his is the foueraigne law , by the which the prince ought to gouerne all his actio●s . wicked men should haue too much aduantage , if by cu●ning they mig●t not repell their cunning . it is law●ul● to ●●●e●d a● estate with the same armes , with the which they a●●aile it . it is not tollerable to turne the backe to honesty and ●ustice , but sometimes to g●e about it and coast it . but the more distinctly to explicate this , we will borrow the disti●ction which he makes , of diuers sorts of cunning and deceipts : some are light ; others great ; and some ●eane and indifferent . t●e light he not only allowes to princes but commands them . the meane he tollerates . the g●eater he fo●bidd● . amo●g the light , he puts distrust and dissimulation . distrust is as necessary in a prince , as credulity is hurtfull . so it hath beene called the strength of prudence ; that is to say , to wa●ch , to beleeue nothing lightly , and to haue an eye to all things . he must therefore trust few men , and ●hose lo●g knowne and often tryed . and yet hee may not so slipp the line in such sort , as hee doth not alwayes hold it by one end , and haue an eye to it : but hee must couer and disguise his distrust , yea , in di●r●●●i●g he must make a shew to haue some confidence . for open distrust offends , and inuites another as well to deceiue vs , as too much indiscreet confidence . they haue many times had a desire to deceiue him , whom they haue found fearefull to b●e deceiued : and on the other side , an open confidence bindes some to guard loyalty . from distrust they come to dissimulation , ●hich smothe● the fore-head , and couers the thoughts , no lesse necessary for a prince then the first . but he must learne how to play this part cunningly , without excesse or foolery , making open profession of simplicity , cherishing those that are free and open , as enemies to dissimulation ; and that in small matters the prince p●oceede openly , to the end they may hold him for such in greater . another sort of deceipt , and ordinary among p●inces , are the practices and intelligences which they haue in the estates one of another ; drawing cunningly the hearts of their neighbours , officers , seruants , and confidents , to discouer their secrets , and to crosse the designes of their masters , and sometimes to lead a hand to some enterprize against th●ir masters person . this hath proceeded so farre , as it hath sometimes corrupted euen the wiues of princes . this is done by two meanes : either by perswasion , making vse of the discontentments which great men haue of their masters : or by money which is the most vsuall course . and many haue held this manner of proceeding allowed against an enemy , a rebellious or suspected subiect , yea , against any stranger with whom they haue no alliance : but against his fri●●ds ; allies and confederates , it is treachery , which ought not to be practised as they doe at this day . there are princes to whom all sorts of meanes are iust to gaine some ad●antage , and to attaine to their designe : who haue made vse to deceiue by equiuocations , faire words , promises , letters , embassies , yea , and by lies , to obtaine that which they could not otherwise doe , by reason of the difficulty of time and affaires . plato allowes this deceipt , so as it be for the good of the subiects . yet to make this proceeding iust , there must be a necessity ; and it must be in a t●oublesome and confused time ; and not onely to adua●ce the good , but to diuert some great mischiefe , and against the wicked . there are other kinds of proceeding , frequent enough in princes , to preserue t●emselues and their estate f●om their e●em●●s ; the which cannot be excused but by n●cessity : and the prince which is reduced to this point , m●st know that it is a misery for him to ●ee him●elfe forced to leaue the ordinary course of iustice , for the safety of his estate , and he may not proceed but with some feeling of griefe ; but he must carry ●imselfe therein like a fath●r , when he is forced to cauterize , or cu● off a member of his child to saue ●is life . i will set downe here some examples : as to put those secretly to death , and without forme of iustice , which cannot be punished without trouble and danger to ●he estate . if they deserue death , the prince who may dispence with the other formes , may likewise dispence for the safety of his estate . to clip the wings , and shorten the meanes of some one which mutines and fortifies too much in the estate , and makes himselfe fearefull before he hath a commodity to attempt . t● diue by authority into the purses of his rich subiects , in some necessity and pouerty of the estate . to reuoke the priuiledges giuen to some one , or to some comminalties , or particular men , to the preiudice of the soueraigne and the estate . to seaze vpon some neighbour place , for feare that another holding it , he should make warre against vs and ruine vs. all these things are in themselues vniust ; but this iniustice is ballanced by necessity and publique profit . necessity as they say , hath no law : and the prince reduced to these termes , must know not onely how to command according to the lawes , but also how to command the lawes themselues . all is , that the prince doth not forge this necessity and constraint himselfe , for to satisfie his conetousnesse or ambition : for in stead of p●rchasing the reputation to be wise , he will cause himselfe to bee esteemed an vniust and inhumane tyrant . chap. . of the reputation of a prince ; and the meanes how to get it . vallour is another part which serues to reputation , and it is of such importance , as power is much inferiour vnto it . vallour procures power ; and without vallour power is lost . this is seene in many estates , the which with small forces haue beene conquered by valour ; and others ●or want of valour haue lo●t themselu●s with their power . and although that va●our consists chiefely in the interiour and courage : yet to maintaine this courage , he must haue care of the exteriour . a prince may well be couragiou● , if hee be sickly and incommodated of his healt● , and that as they say , his legges fai●e him : his cou●age may be commendable , but very vnprofitable for him and his estate . wherefore he must haue a care of two things . the one to entertaine this v●g●ur of spirit , and to keepe it in action , by a desire of honour and glory , be it by the reading of valiant exploits of warre , performed by great princes and captaines , or by the conuersation of couragious and wise men , putting them often vpon the discourse of great enterprizes , which they or others haue done ; or be it by the consideration of that which concernes the duty of a prince , and the shame and contempt which they of his quality ●un into , which haue beene b●se and cowards . the other care which a prince ought to haue , is to entertaine himselfe in health , and to get an able and strong complexio● . sobriety and moderation in meats , serue greatly to p●ese●ue ●ealth , as g●uttony and drunkennes altereth much . and frō thence proceed indigestions , crudities , gouts , and a●● other diseases . continency is likewise of great force ; there being nothing that doth more weaken chast men , nor that debilitates the spirit and body more , then an excessiue lasciuiousnesse . the forces likewise increase with exercise , as that of hunting , or others which consume the humours of the body . and to frame a strong and able complexion , he must in good time accustome himselfe to cold , heate , watching , hunger , to water , wine , and to all courses of life : the encounters being so diuers , to the which a prince must accommodate himselfe , that one failing , sometimes this defect makes ma●y things impossible vnto him . there are yet many things to bee done , which may serue a prince to get reputation : as to couer his defects and weak●nesse cunningly , is a great meanes to to preserue his credit : to make shew ( yet without ostentation ) of his fo●ces to those that are more weake : to flye , and shew himselfe an enemy to vanity and much talking , but to doe more then hee speakes . to talke grauely , and with a solid iudgement : to maintayne his word , the testimony of courage and a firme iudgement : to be constant in aduersity , and moderate in prosperity . not to hazard himselfe in enterprises , vnlesse he be assured to preuaile ; and ●auing attempted one , not to giue it ouer , lest he shew himselfe to haue had little iudgement in the beginning , and of as little courage to end it . not to busie himselfe in petty enterprises , but to seeke occasions of great ones , especially in the beginning of his reigne : for that thereby they settle a iudgement of that which will follow . he must not seeme to depend on the councell and will of another ; for that were to establish a superiour and companion , and to make his insufficiency knowne . he may not imploy himselfe in things which are vnder the dignity of a prince ; as nero busied himselfe in singing , to make verses , and to be a good coach-man ; d●mitian spent his time in shooting and in taking of flyes ; and aropas king of the macedonians , imployed himselfe in making of lanthornes ; valentinian to make images of waxe ; rene duke of anion , and earle of prouence to paint , chilperic king of france , and thibant king of nauarre , to time ; and alphonso king of cast●lle in astrologie : but he shall imploy himselfe to know his estate , and that which may serue for the good gouernment . the vn●formity of life in a prince , and the co●stancy in his commands doth also breede him reputation . he must likewise treat his affaires with dignity , and not by men which are of a base and vi●d condition . the basenesse of ministers doth vilefie h●s affaires , and the weaknesse ruins them ; and both the one and the other makes the world beleeue that the prince distrusts great men , or that he feares to be discouered , inferiour in affaires , by those which shall haue more vnderstanding , or that he hath ●o iudgement in making such a choice . but he may not suffer great talkers to approach neere vnto him , nor admit them to his secret affaires , for feare least they should discouer his actions and designes , by an itchi●g desire which such monckies haue commonly to babble . he must not grow familiar with all sorts of persons , nor shew himselfe to often but vpon great occasions , and with a countenance and bel auiour full of maiesty : and in his extraordinary ioy heauinesse or choller , hee shall not shew himselfe at all ; but shall passe his first motion in his cabinet , and out of the sight of his followers : his habite must be graue and modest without extrauagancy , he s●all auoyd extremities in all his courses , shewing himselfe neither slow nor rash , but he shall rather incline to the first then to the last ; for the first hath a dependance of prudence and ●rauity , and the other of lightnesse and rashnesse ; he must make more accompt of truth then opinion , and haue a care that all that proceedes from him may be great , accomplished , excellent and admirable , finally that he doe lesse and doe it well , that he suffer not any disobedience which may be drawne into example . that the affaires of importance may depend vpon him alone , without imparting it to any man what fauour soeuer he beare him , as the authority to make lawes , to giue priuiledges , to make peace or warre , to giue pardons , to make choice of his principall ministers , to impose taxes , subsidies , and other leuies of money , to fortifie places , to cast orduance , to recompence others out of his treasure , to aduance to dignities or such other things as he ought to reserue . by mag●ificence he may likewise get reputation , as by the structure of publique buildings , pallaces , churches , fountaines , fortifications of townes and such like places , which redowne to the benefit of the publique . religion likewise knowne to be in a prince , imports him much for his reputation , for shewing himselfe to be full of piety , the people will conceiue that he will be likewise iust , and that he will not vndertake any thing but with the assistance of god : wherefore it imports him much to make esteeme of church-men , which are knowne to haue probity and sufficiency in them , to retaine some about him , to procure a good reformation in the church by mild and lawfull meanes , without trouble , schisme , or deuision , to dispose of benefices to capable men , to haue care of the poore , and finally to imploy himselfe in all workes of piety . by these last meanes a prince may in time of peace maintayne his reputation , hauing no neede in time of warre to seeke for other particularities then his owne valour : the which shewing it selfe in occasions which shall present themselues , will maintaine ▪ them alwayes in credit and reputation . but if in the time of peace they desire something more of him , there being people to whom he must giue a subiect of discourse , and busie them in the consideration of their princes actions , otherwise they contemne them : the prince must imploy himselfe sometimes to reforme iustice , sometimes the treasure , sometimes the discipline of warre , and alwaies to make some new establishment which may serue the estate . augustus hauing brought all his affaires to an end , and finding no more subiects to entertaine the people of rome with his actions , he imployed himselfe to reforme the callander . so in the like encounters , the prince must seeke all meanes to quicken his reputation in the spirits of the subiects , and to make them beleeue that he is not idle , giuing them occasions to speake well of him , and hinder them from detracting and speaking ill . hauing discoursed of the meanes , by the which a prince might get or maintaine his authority ; let vs see the meanes and remedies , which may bee found for that which may cause the ruine of the e●ate . to know if the remedies bee proper , wee must likewise know the disease . chap. . of the causes of the ruines of estates : and of the remedies which may be found . the workes of nature faile by two kinds of causes : whereof some are exteriour , and others interiour . the exteriour are fi●e , sword , and such other violences . the interiour are the excesse and corruptions of the first qualities . in like manner states are ruined eyther by forraigne force and violence , or by the corruption and disorder that is with it ; but more rarely by the first alone then by the last : and we haue seldeme seene any estate ruined by forraigne force , which was not first corrupted within it . yet let vs speake something of the ordinary meanes , by the which wee may preuent a forraigne force . eyther the prince that is assailed by this force , is equall in power to him that assailes him , and in all meanes and necessary aduantages for his defence : or else he is weaker either in meanes or for that hee hath not his forces ready to oppose . if hee be equall , he may fore-see his enemies dessigne : and if hee hath any iust and tollerable pretext to make an offensiue warre , he must not stand vpon his defence . among princes which make warre , he that layes the cloth ( as the prouerbe sayes ) payes the reckoning . for , besides that his countrey is ruined as welby his owne army , as by that of his enemies , the amazement is greater among his subiects ; and hee will not dare to hazard a battaile , which would endanger his whole fortune , for that loosing it , he shall not onely loose his men but also his countrey : whereas his enemy may aduenture it with farre more aduantage , his estate beiug secure , and whatsoeuer happens he can loose but men . but if the prince be weaker then his enemy which innades him , he must procure him some greater enemy , or many which may effect that which he cannot doe alone . he must likewise practise factions and diuisions with his enemy , and get intelligence with some one of his prime councellors or great men , and with those that haue most authority and credit with his enemy ; to the end they may diswade him from this warre , or diuert it , or make it vnprofitable , in slackning the executions , or giuing aduice of his designes , to the end hee may oppose himselfe in time . but if the practises be such , as they may breed a feare in his enemy of a reuolt , treason , sedition , or a ciuill war ; they will be much better and of greater force . defensiue leagues with his neighbours , or with the neighbours of his enemy , may be of great vse , who may grow iealous of his power . for the feare which his enemy might haue , that inuading one , all the rest may goe to armes , would retaine him . besides this , the prince must keepe good guards vpon all the principall passages of his estate , and place strong garrissons in his forts , who may stay the enemy , and by a long siege cause him to loose much time , and many men ; and by this meanes consume his prouisions , and waste his army , whereby he may bee the better able to encounter him ; and if he be able to raise an army , he must choose a strong place at the entry of his countrey , and lodge it in such sort , as he may bee neither forced to fight nor to dislodge , to the end he may hinder his enemy from passing on . but hauing neither forces ' nor forts vppon the passage of this quality ; or the enemies forces being such , as they are not to bee stayed by this meanes : some in this case haue themselues wasted their owne countrey , on that side where the enemy was to enter , causing all to retire into the heart of the estate , depriuing him not onely of all prouision of victualls , but also of other commodities , mills , ouens , lodgings , and other imployments , whereof an army is seldome wholy furnished . the first against the polonians , and the second against the turkes forces , haue assured their countryes for a time , in laying a great part of the confines waste . and the muscouite being in a countrey which doth abound in wood , shut himselfe vp in a short time ; so as steuen king of poland , meaning to passe into muscouie , was forced to spend much time in cutting downe the woods to make a passage for his army . and although that he which is assailed be the weaker , yet there hath beene some , which haue carried the warre into their enemies countrey , to make a diuersion as ag●th●cles did , who being besieged by the carthaginian● in siracusa , resolued to leaue a sufficient troupe to maintaine the siege , and to imbarke with the rest , to transport the warre into affricke . boniface , earle of corsegus , did the like , in the yeare . to retire the sarasins out of sicily . the which succeeded the more happily , for that the carthaginians , the affricans , who were the inuaders , hauing not fore-seene this policy , had not prouided for their countries . and it is a generall rule , that we must assaile an enemy where he least suspects . but if the enemy be so powerfull , and hath such an aduantage ouer vs , as there is no meanes to resist him , rather then to lose all , it were better to yeeld something : and if he may be freed for ready money , in making as they say a bridge of gold to his enemy , he shall escape good cheape . the which hath beene happily practised by the florentins , venetians , and genois , or else he must seeke the protection of some prince that is neare or farre off , yet so as he may be relieued in time , or the enemies estate annoy'd . so the capouans finding themselues prest by the samnites , put themselues vnder the protection of the romans . the genois were sometimes protected by the french , and sometimes by the dukes of millan . pope iulio the second , made vse of another policy , to diuert the french from the siege of ferrara , selling it to the emperour , with hope after the warre to redeeme it againe for money : so as the french hauing no will to breake with the emperour , gaue ouer their enterprize . there haue beene some princes , who finding no meanes to resist , haue made choice rather to yeeld to fortune , and to abandon their countrey , then to see it ruined ; hoping that the affaires changing , their subiects not wholy ruined , would cal them back more willingly then if they had bin chased away by an open rebellion , or that growing obstinate to maintaine themselues , they had bin punished by the enemy : this succeeded happily to ferd●nand of aragon , chased from naples by charles the eight : to the venetians when they abandoned their townes vpon the firme land , to the league of cambrag : to the duke of vrbin , who seeing himselfe ▪ vnable to make head against caesar borgia , abandoned his countrey , hauing first ruined all the forts of his estate ; hoping that being well beloued of his subiects , vpon the first alteration they will call him backe , as they did . but for that they seeke to surprize him whō they meane to assai'e by force , and to attaine vnto it , they deuise other pretexts to arme , to the end they may circumuent their neighbour : and in like manner , when as two powerfull neighbours make warre together , and afterwards come to conclude a peace , eyther of them seekes to free himselfe of his souldiers , at the cost of some one of his neighbours : the prince which shall finde himselfe to haue such bad neighbours , must presently arme , and stand continually vppon his guard whilest his neighboursare in armes . these are the most generall and ordinary remedies against forraigne force , the exteriour cause of the ruine of estates . chap. ii. of the interiour causes of the ruine of estates . the interiour causes from whence the ruine of an estate may grow , are of two kinds : some are neare , others are remote . the nearest are conspiracies against the prince , or against the chiefe magistrate , vnder whole authority the estate is gouerned : the treason of townes , strong places . or armies : the rebellion of subiects against the prince ; and the diuision into factions and parties . but for that these causes grow from a precedent corruption in the estate , being but the effects of remote causes ; we must seeke the mischiefe farther off to prouide a remedy . the causes which produce these effects , proceede either from the defect of the soueraigne , or of the magistrates , and others which haue the chiefe charges in the gouernment of the estate ; or through the defect of other subiects , which are considered either in generall vnder the name of people , or relatiuely by the reason of their subiection ; some being borne subiects to the prince to whom they obey ; others are subiects by conquest , that is to say , borne vnder another prince , but haue beene since conquered by him to whom they obey , or else they are considered according to their condition , quality , and power , which they haue to trouble the estate . among the defects which may be found in the soueraigne person , those which may breed the subiects hatred and contempt against him , are most preiudiciall . those which ingender hatred , are cruelty and couetousnesse . cruelty shews it selfe in the executions of such which he causeth to be punished . auarice in the leuying of money and exactions vpon his subiects . to remedy the first , he must deale as little as may be with the punishments of his subiects : but referre the iudgement of such things to the ordinary course of iustice. but if for the good of the estate , and for the little assurance there is in iudges , he be forced to interpose himselfe , he must doe it seldome , and make it knowne that he doth it vnwillingly , and onely in consideration of the publique good , to the end he may retaine good men in their duties , and diuert the wicked from their bad intentions : neither must he shew any choller , and aboue all things he must forbeare to be present at executions ; that the punishments must be ordinary , and not vnusuall , and that in punishing diuers for one fact , there must be an equality of punishments obserued . but if by the death of one alone he may preserue the rest , he ought to doe it . and if there be many ●hat be put to death , he shall cause them to suffer altogether , to the end that by the continuance of execution it may not renew the hatred . some haue held it fit to sweeten the hatred of an execution , to punish the minister which hath done it , if he be of that quality that he hath deserued it . yet i hold this manner of proceeding vniust and tyranuous ; especially if it tends to death , whereof they ought not to make so flight an accompt . yet a prince may in necessity , hauing no other meanes to free himselfe from enuy , chase him away , laying the fault vpon him , and making shew that ●he hates him for the same subiect , for the which he is odious vnto the people : but wholy to abandon , him were basenesse . moreouer he must sweeten rigorous executions by benefits , yea , by gifts out of the confiscation of the parties goods which is executed , to such as be discontented with the executiō , to the end it may appeare that not couetousnesse but only iustice hath brought the prince vnto it . to remedy the second , he must make it appeare , that the leuies which he raiseth , are grounded vpon the necessity of the estate ▪ there being no estates without tributs , customs or subsedies , the which are necessary to satisfie the expences , without the which the estate cannot subsist and be maintayned . impositions must be made with equality , according to euery mans goods and faculties , without hatred or fauour , and with moderation ; not insupportable nor sordid ; not too frequent nor new , nor vnder vnusuall names ; they must be leuied with modesty , without couetousnesse , cruelty , or violence , and by honest men ; and he must punish those seuerely that mis-●ehaue themselues . finally , he must make it appeare by the expences , that the money is imployed for the necessity , good , and preseruation of the estate , and not for the princes ryot or prodigallity , to aduance men of no worth , and to satisfie their pleasures . as for the defects which ingender the subiects contempt of their prince , there are diuers sorts . some grow from weaknesse of age ; as minority or a decrepit age . others from nature ; as deformity , or a bad aspect , the naturall dulnesse of the mind , deafnesse , and other indispositions of the body . others proceed from fortune ; as to be vnfortunate and without support ; with such other defects , which can be hardly remedied . the principall remedy is , not to shewe himselfe vppon all occasions , whereas these defects may bee more visible . tyberius finding himselfe not so affab●e as augustus , would neuer come among the people to playes and theaters , as augustus did : but kept himselfe close and retired , and neuer shewed himselfe but in great actions , for the which he had prepared himselfe long before . so the prince must as much as may bee hide his imperfections ; and not shewe himselfe in publique , but well prepared according to his dignity , and if it may be , recompence the defect of nature by some aduantage of the mind . there are other defects , which breed a contempt of the prince in the subiects minds , the which proceeds only by his owne fault , and may be easily auoyded : as irresolution in his councells ; lightnesse , inconstancy , and iniustice in his commands , negligence in his affaires , and seeming to depend of another , or tying himselfe so strictly to some priuate person , as he trusts him with all the affaires of the estate ; an ordinary indiscretion in many princes . the onely remedy to preuent all this , is to doe the contrary , and to follow that which wee say must bee done to purchase reputation . these are the defects which ingender hatred ▪ whereof they which procure contempt are most dangerous . for contempt giues courage to those that desire to vndertake whereas cruelty and a●rice , although they breed hatred ; y●t such as a●e fearefull : and moreouer by cruelty you diminish the number of your enemies , and amaze the rest ▪ and by auarice and exactions you make them v●●ble . but the most preiudiciall defects are those which breede hatred and contempt both together : as lasciuiousnesse and d●unkennesse ; the one for its beastlinesse , and the other for the scanda●l and trouble of families , which it doth vsually draw after it . wherefore the prince must not onely fly from them , but auoide the suspicion . chap. . of the defects of magistrates , officers , and ministers to the prince . the defects , abuses , and disorders of those which haue any charge and gouernment in the estate , the which may further its ruine , are of two sorts . for either these abuses proceede from corruption which is found in particular persons , of whom they haue made a bad choice , or haue beene corrupted with time ; or else it proceeds from some bad custome , the which vnder pretext of good , and by a bad interpretation of the law , or of an order made in the establishment , hath beene brought in . to remedy the first , the best course will be , that seeing the choice w●s bad , to make another . but therein he must vse his discretion : for that all changes are dangerous , and that sometimes seeking to preuent a misch●efe , the remedy is found worse then the disea●e . lewis the eleuenth meaning to reforme france , changed all his predecessors officers , whom in the end he was forced to restore , to auoide a generall reuolte . if this corruption may be easily punished without trouble in some of the principall , and that the example of punishment may reduce the rest vnto their duties ; he must doe it with seuerity . but if he cannot effect it , he must draw those which nourish these abuses from their acquaintance and familiars ; and imploy them in some other places with honest men , who may serue as comptrolers and examples to doe well , and to keepe them in awe . no man is willingly bad for nothing , eyther it is to doe pleasure to some one , from whom he hopes for support ; or to reuenge his owne iniuries , or those of his friends ; or for couetousnesse , the which he cannot well practise without confident mediators . take him therefore from his acquaintance , and out of the hands of his enemies ; mantaine him against the g●eatest , to the end hee may not feare any future wrong : there is no doubt that there being no man to whom he may intrust his corruptions , nor whom hee may distrust , hee will bee indifferent in that regard , and will haue no thought but to doe well : but retire him before he may enter into strict familiarity with any man. and so of a man how corrupt soeuer , you may make good vse of him for your seruice ; if he be not altogether impudent and depraued : in which case being easie to discouer his practises , it will be as easie for the prince to cause him to be punished . but if the abuse be in the bad administration of lawes , or of the establishment which hath beene made of some order ; he must eyther by interpretation , or by change , or by abrogation of the law or order , prouide for it . but for that it would be a difficult thing , that they which made their profit by the abuse , should willingly yeeld vnto it , if they be many in number , he must make himselfe the stronger , as licurgus did . for in such affaires they are commonly ill assisted ; the partizans of the reformation being cold , and they which profit in the abuse , ( who haue the pretext of custome and the lawes for them ) are more violent to preserue that which brings them profit . but the prince must first consider duly , if that which he meanes to establish , will hold : for that abuses which haue taken a deepe roote , are hardly pulled vp ; and sometime it is mo●e fit to liue with these abuses quietly in an estate , then seeking to take them away , to put all into co●fusio● . it is a body which hath an infirmity , the which you must striue to cure , yet in such sort , as you put not the patient in da●ger of death . it is a philme in the eye ; yet the eye hath not ●wholy lost its sight : if you cannot cleare it without losse of the sight , it were better to leaue it there . aboue all in a reformation you may not make a law that looks too farre backward , and makes vs enter into the search of that which is past long since ; neither must they establish an order altogether new : but you must gently and by little and little reduce them to their first institution , and not pull vp the tree to plant another in its place ; but set it by . the string which makes an instrument out of tune , must be gently straind , vntill it be in tune , and not broken . we know the defects and inconueniences of an ancient estab●ishment ; but we are ignorant of the inconueniences of a new . but if t●e order were so perue●ted , as it were impossible to make vse of it ; yet in the establishment of a new , you must retaine the same termes , names , and qualities of the ancient● for that the people feeding themselues more with the shew of truth , the face of antiquity in such establishments hath more authority with them ; and nouelties a●e suspected vnto them , and lesse esteemed . but if you cannot retaine the ground of this antiquity , you must colour the innouatiō with the names of the ancient establishments , to giue it credit , and to make the people thinke that the●e is ●it●le alteration . an aduice which hath bin practised by all such as vnder pretext of reformation haue sought to vsurpe an estate : but this may be more iustly put in vse by a lawfull prince , for the good of his subiects , and to facilitate the reformatiō which he intends to make : in the which he hath great reason not to ingage himselfe , if he doe not confidently beleeue to bring it to effect . besides the disgrace which he shall receiue , he should by his weaknesse countenance the mischiefe , and despaire of the remedy : whereof i say that he ought to make himselfe the stronger . the which i meane not onely of an armed force , but also of the inclination of the greatest part of his subiects . and if it may be he must so worke vnderhand , as he may be required and solicited to prouide for it ; besides that it will make his designe easie , all the honour will be due to him . and if there be any enuy , he may easily discharge himselfe vpon those which haue required him . but if the prince doubting the euent of a necessary reformation , desires to make it rather by some one of his ministers , then to ingage himselfe : in this case some haue aduised rather to take but one , to whom he may giue all authority , then many . for although it seemes more conuenient , that this reformation should be countenanced by many , to the end it might carry the greater waight , and be the better receiued : yet the diuersity of opinions that is in many heads diuersly interessed , be it for themselues , or for their friends and kinsfolkes , in this reformation ; the length there will bee in making them resolue ; the difficulty in this plurality to make them keepe s●cret , many small surprises , policies , and cunning , which they must sometimes vse , to attaine vnto this good ; and in case the businesse doth not suceeed , being more difficult to dismisse many , for to free himselfe of the enuy and shame to haue attempted this reformation without successe , then they may doe in one person : wherfore it seemes more safe for the prince to imploy but one . but the preseruation of the order established , must be left to the care of many ; for that many hauing once found the benefit , will not willingly yeild to leaue it : and a multitude being irresolute among themselues , tend rather to leaue affaires in the estate they are in , then to change them , v●lesse they bee thrust on by some apparant profit , or by some man of credit and authority . hence it comes , that the companies of greatest authority in an estate , oppose themselues more willingly to all innouations , how good soeuer ; and consent not to the change of the ancient ordinances , although they be accompanied with abuses . but for that the same men , which made their profit of the abuse before the reformation , continuing still in those places where the abuse was committed , will finde meanes sufficient to frustrate ●● : some haue beene of aduice to change them , and to imploy them else where : and others to attribute the knowledge of the contrauentions which haue beene committed to the preiudice of this reformation , to other iudges , then those of that body which they meane to reforme . yet therein they must gouerne themselues , according to the facility or difficulties which are found in such establishments , these are the principall considerations , which ought to bee o●serued in a reformation ; besides those which priuate occasions , and the quality of disorders may breed in our minds . let vs now come to the disorders which proced from the subiects , and may aduance the ruine of an estate , if they be imbraced by the enemy . chap. . of the subiects defects in generall , which cause the ruins of an estates although that naturall subiects owe all obedience to their prince , and it is their good so to maintaine themselues : yet the nature of a multitude is so inconstant , as it cannot long subsist in one estate . hauing no imployment , they inuent some themselues , and forge a thousand designes to their owne disaduantage . peace and abundance , are the things which should giue a people the greatest subiect of content , and containe them , for that they cannot change this condition without impayring . but the one in the end makes them idle ; and idlenesse being tedious vnto them , they imploy their spirits to thinke ill ; and which is worse , to doe mischeife . the other makes them stately , proud , and vntractable ; who like vnto pampered iades , kicke many times at their masters that haue fed them . but in danger and feare , they are tractable and easie to mannage , louing after their owne pleasure , and fearing at the discretion of another , and neuer iudging but by passion . for although ▪ that some one haue done euill , yet if the people loue him , they perswade thēselues that the action had some good ground : and if they hate him , although he hath done well and vertuously , yet they interpret all to a bad sence , and attribute a good action to a sinister intention , and a bad dessigne . in all that which they affect , they looke rather to an app●rant profit , then to that which is iust and honourable ; and if in shewe there be any thing to hazard , or to loose , although the end may bee happy and successefull , yet they will alwayes be of opinion to abandon that party . they neuer imbrace affaires but by the shewe , without examining the importance , if it be any thing remote ; they hate the present affaires , as those wherof they are most sensible ; they forget a mischeife past , although it bee farre greater then the present ; they loue those which are turbulent in their actions and of suddaine execution . they vsually slander the actions of the prince and his gouernours , and complaine ; yet they are easie to reduce , when they see themselues forced to obey , and that they haue no head nor any seeds of diuision . they hope more then they ought , and indure lesse then they should . they attribute to want of will and iudgment , that which proceeds from the want of power and meanes . they are desirous of innouations , and easie to moue vpon the first wind ; credulous , increasing reports and newes , and publishing vsually that which is most forbidden ; they follow the multitude , not knowing why ; full of enuy , suspition , and distrust : ingratfull for the benefits they haue receiued , and reuengfull of iniuries , yea of another mans ; little carefull of the estate , and louing nothing but an vnrestrayned liberty , whereof they are soone weary : finally doing nothing by election , but all by hazard . b●hold a part of the blemishes and defects of a people considered in generall : whereon most part of those which haue attempted against another mans estate , haue grounded their designes , making vse of them by many practises , according to occasion and the condition of affaires . and although there be many among a multitude free from these imperfections : yet being drawne together with the rest , the greatest number carries it , and most commonly they houle ( as they say ) with the wolues . one foole or rash man is sufficient to stopp the mouthes of many wise , and to make them all loose the course of reason . and most commonly that which they condemne in particular , being in a throng , and with the rest they like of , and allow ; bee it that wee are restrayned through feare to oppose our selues to the common way , which is vsually the worst , and sometimes composed of the most fooles , the most imp●dent , and the most mutinous ; or be it that by this contagion , wee feele the like passions which transport the rest , and with the like heate wee suffer our selues to be carried to the same resolutions . the ancients finding all these pecant humours in the peoples minds , to entertaine and busie them , and by this meanes to diuert them from doing euill , haue sought out diuers meanes . the grecians entertayned them with sports , comedies , tragedies , wrestlings , and olimpique games . the romans added thereunto swo●d-players , representation of nauell battailes , and the combats of wild beasts . the kings of aegypt busied their subiects in the construction of pyramides and buildings , although for the most part vnprofitable . the christians in some places , when as they feare the peoples disposition to mutine , haue imployed them in processions , prayers , in the visitation of oratories and churches , with other extraordinary deuotions , as cardinall borromeo did often at millan , and others in other places . but when as all these meanes haue not beene forcible enough to retaine them , they haue stirred vp a forraigne warre , not only to diuert the peoples minds by this obiect ; but also to entertayne them a little with the feare of a common enemy , and to free the estate from those pecant humours , which being still retained might ruine it . but sometimes the estate is so composed as it would bee dangerous to entertaine a continuall warre , eyther for that they are weake of men and meanes , or for feare that giuing the commandement to some one , he should get vnto himselfe the authority of armes . the which cannot be but preiudiciall in all estates : the prince being vnable to bee still conductor of his armies , without hazarding of his person too much , and leauing a great part of his countrey ill prouided for . in a common-weale this would be of more dangerous consequence ; if they doe not gouerne themselues in that respect like vnto the s●iffes , who desiring rather to make warre for another , then for themselues , send forth their most busie and turbulent men to serue princes , to purge the countrey . behold the most ordinary remedies which are practised , to preserue themselues from these bad humours of the people , considered in generall . but there are others which are particular , according to the diuers conditions of persons , whereof the people consists ; and others which must bee practised with a people conquered . chap. . of diuers sorts of humours among the subiects , according to the diuersity of their conditions . in all estates there are three sorts of persons . great men who haue power , credit , and wealth : the poore and miserable who want all , and the meaner sort . these last are vsually more quiet and easie to gouerne : the rest are more difficult , for that great men by the commodity which riches brings with it , doe hardly abstaine from doing euill . the miserable for the necessities wherein they find themselues , are commonly vicious and capable of all parties . the credit , all●ances , and wealth of great men , makes them vntractable , little obedient , and sometimes insupportable ; and pride and presumption giues them courage to vndertake : contrariwise the miserable , are easily moued to any insolencie . the actions of great men are accompanied with violence : those of the poore and needy with fraud and malice . but the meaner sort , hauing neyther so great meanes which might make them grow proud , nor power to attempt ; neither being in such necessity , as they should be thrust into extraordinary actions , they desire rather to preserue the certaine , then to runne after the vncertaine : and so they are neither transported with ambition , nor oppressed with necessity . presupposing then that this sort of men continue in their dutyes , let vs examine the two others . there are seuerall sorts of great men : some are so neere vnto the prince by alliance or kindred , as they may in time pretend vnto the estate . others , who being lords of great possessions , enioy in the princes estate , lordships , and reuenewes of great consequence . the third kind is of those , who by their vallour or wisedome in the gouernment of important affaires of the estate , haue purchased credit and reputation with the people , or among the men of warre . the fourth are they , to whom the prince hath committed his forces , his gouernments , and his cheife places . many princes before they had any subiect of suspition of an enterprize , haue growne iealous of their neere kinsmen . alexander meaning to passe into asi● , put all his neerest kinsmen to death , except one of his base bretheren , whom hee had no cause to feare . this villainous and barbarous course hath past for a rule of state among the turkes . the kings of ormus , before they were expel'd by the portugalls , put out the eyes of all their neerest kinsmen . the which it may be they learned from some emperours of constantinople . the kings of china , & those of aethiopia , shut them al vp into one place , from whence not any one comes forth , but he that is to succeed in the estate . christendome is more happy : for although wee haue seene that phillip the second king of spaine hath bin forced to put his sonne to death , for some iealousie hee had conceiued of him ; yet this is not ordinary . and the kings entertaine themselues with their kinsmen , making much of them , and intreating them courteously , yet not trusting them with all their forces , which may giue them meanes to attempt , nor yet crushing nor disgracing them , to the end they may not dispaire : and by this honest and courteous course , they take from them both the meanes and desire to doe euill . they which are great in meanes and reuenewes , are the sinewes and strength of an estate , whom they may not in any case ruine , as some ministers of tyranny haue conceiued , but they must bee preserued to maintaine the estate . and those estates where there bee not any , are exposed in prey to the first losse of a battaile : for that hauing no man that hath credit to draw them againe together , being vnfurnished of support and councell , they presently resolue to yeild vpon the first amazement . the which hath beene often seene in aegypt . contrariwise those estates which haue beene powerfull in nobility , although they haue beene often ouerthrowne , yet they haue easily recouered themselues . france and persia , the english and spaniards , with those of tartary and the turkes , haue sometimes beene opprest and brought low : but by the meanes of the nobility , who haue more courage and conduct to maintaine the estate then the people , they haue alwayes recouered themselues . and to say that such kind of people may trouble the prince , this may sometimes happen , if the prince bee a tyrant , which seekes to oppresse them , or wants councell & courag : as they whom the carliens , and capets , caused to retire from the gouernment of the estate . but neuer an able and sufficient prince , who knew how to make vse of men of this condition , ran any bad fortune with them . the meanes to make profitable vse of them , is to countenance them with maiestie , to doe for them in occasions which may be offered ; to imploy them neare his person with honour and magnificence , rather then to commit his forces and all his authority into their hands : and they which shall be suspected of lightnesse and inconstancy , to cause them to be accompanied by men which may watch and obserue their actions . this is the councell ( as they write ) which the emperour charles the fift gaue vnto the deceased philip king of sp●ine , to imploy great men , and to retaine them neare vnto his person in the most honourable places , and giue those of command to men of a meaner condition : but his sonne neglecting this aduice , in the person of don iohn of austrea , drew himselfe into danger of an inconuenience . as for the two other sorts of great men , they cannot be such but by the princes meanes . wherefore it is easie for him to preuent the inconueniences which this greatnesse may cause ; and the fault must be imputed to himselfe , seeing it was in his power to hinder it . the meanes which may be vsed herein , are common to eyther . for some haue beene made great , and haue gotten credit , for that they had the force and authority in their hands ; and the others are great by reason of their birth . the principall meanes then to preuent the inconueniences which may grow , is in the choice , wherein the prince must obserue foure considerations . the first is , that he commit not his forces and authority to any that are borne great ; as they of whom we haue formerly spoken : for that he cannot adde so little to the greatnesse of such men , but he shall equall them vnto himselfe . the other considerations are , that he make not choice for a great command , or to lead a great army , of a man that is audacious and vnder●aking , or of one that is too cunning and subtile : much lesse of a person that is inconstant and light , inclined to f●are and hope , and subiect to follow the enterprizes of another , or to bee surprised by someone . the second meanes is , not to continue great charges , as the gouernments of prouinces , of strong places , and of a great troupe of souldiers long in one and the same person , to the end hee may auoyde three inconueniences . the first , lest that gouernments by little and little be not made hereditary and patrim●nicall , as they haue done in all places of fees ; and in france of the ancient e●rle ●o●nes , dutches , and marquesats . the other i●co●uenience is , that the prince depriues himselfe v●adu●●●ly of the meanes to make vse of a better subiect , who may i● time discouer himselfe vnto him . the third is , t●at i● may be he to whom he hath giuen this charge , may through indisposition grow vnable , or by age vnfit , or throug● pa●sion or some particular designe , be preiudiciall to the estate . the fourth meanes is , neuer to giue the great command of a prouince to any one that is borne there ; lest that by the meanes of his kindred , alliances , and friends , with the fauour he may haue from the prince , which will purchase him many seruants , he findes not meanes to perpetuate himselfe . but if eyther by a bad establishment , or some bad custome , the prince findes his estate otherwise disposed , he may gently prouide for it , in suppressing and drawing to himselfe this great authority and power ; or dismembring it into diuers charges , which may depend immediately of himselfe . and if he cannot reduce the gouernours to such termes as he holds it fit for his safety , some haue he●d opinion , that he should strip them by little and little of his forces , in prouiding for his places of strength , and causing the garrissons to be changed euery three yeares ; and in like manner to haue the gouernor assisted by one or two of his chiefe councellors , without whose aduice he might not resolue any thing : thinking that by this meanes they should not onely preuent the gouernours enterprizes , but also make them more carefull to doe that which concernes the princes seruice , seeing their actions obserued . the poore and needy are no lesse dangerous to the quiet of the estate then great men , and great men which haue had a will to mutine , h●ue made vse of them : for that the present estate being contrary vnto them , they desire a change , hoping to change their condition ; and a. midst the disorder and violence to free themselues from the necessity wherein they liue . the meanes to shelter himselfe on that side , is to hinder this necessity in an estate ; but principally excesse and vsury ; for that excesse begins pouerty , and vsury brings it to extremity . necessity may likewise be preuented , bringing in abundance ; and especially by imploying the common people in all sorts of manufactures , as vopiscus writes they did in alexandria , where the gouty and blind found meanes to get their liuing . solon in athens bound the fathers to teach their children a trade , vpon a penalty to be depriued of all succours and respect which the children owe vnto their fathers . in china the children are bound to follow their fathers trade , and for such as had not any , they imployed them about their publique buildings ; as augustus and the kings of aegypt did . to conclude , they must imploy such men , and not leaue the estate in the hands of the needy , and of men which haue nothing to loose . and thus much concerning the restraint of naturall subiects . chap. . meanes to containe conquered subiects in their duty . the subiects which haue bin conquered eyther by force , or by treaty , are vsually more difficult to gouerne then the naturall . wherefore besides t●a● whic● we haue spoken conce●ning the naturall , we must ob●erue with these more discretion and precaution . the principall and most generall meanes to containe the subiects by conquest , in the obedience of the prince which hath conquered them , is to giue them such interest in his gouernment , as they may haue a feare to change , left they should impaire their condition : otherwise the peoples inclination bei●g contrary to the c●nqu●rour , the principality will be like vnto a tree without roots , which owes his fall to the first winde . the mea●es which we haue sayd are necessary for a prince to purchase loue and reputation , will much import him with this kind of subiects : and amongst others mildnesse and clemency . hee must likewise fauour religious men , and such as be learned and vertuous , which shall be found in the countrey , for that the people doe commonly gouerne themselues to g●od or evi●● , according to the consciences of ●uch kind of men . he must in-like manner make much of great men , and imploy them in honorable charges ; y●t out of the country of c●nquest : and in like manner to giue them estates and s●ignouri●s ●●se-where : he must obserue the contracts , co●u●n●io●● , & priui●edges vnder which the country was ye●l●●ed ; for th●t one breach made by the prince , makes them to feare the lesse of the rest . hee must breed vp ●●ny y●u●g men of their conquered countrey , after the manner of his naturall subiects : as alexander did thirty thou●and young persians , of whom he m●de choice , to be instructed after the macedonian manner . the romans erected colledges and seminaries , vpon pretext to ciuillize the nations which they conquered ; but in effect it was to imploy them otherwise then in the warre , an● to traine them vp after the romans manner . and they which were best conceipted of their intentions , sayd , that it made a part of the seruitude , vnder which they reduced the prouinces which they conquered . the turke holds another course in the b●eeding vp of his ianizaries , the which although it seems violent , yet it is grounded vpon reason and iudgement . for choosing them among the christians children , he fortifies his power , in weakning his subiects which are most suspected vnto him . marriages and alliances helpe much to ioyne and vnite a conquered prouince with the naturall subiects . alexander purchased much loue of the persians , hauing married a persian lady . and as titus linius sayth , there was nothing did so much hinder the cap●uans from accommodating themselues with hannibal , then the priuate alliances they had contracted with the romans . the romans also made vse of another meanes , hauing interessed in the preseruation of their estate , the greatest part of the neighbour prouinces conquered by them , receiuing them into their citty , giuing sometimes to priuate persons , and sometimes to a whole prouince the right of burgeois●e , and making them sharers in the honours of the citty . but to reduce them wholy to the forme of naturall subiects , by little and little they brought in their owne language ; as since the arabians haue done in all their conquest . and william the conquerour , and before him the saxons in the greatest part of england , not suffering the lawes to be written or published but in their languages , nor the audiences for the dispatch of affaires and cōmissions for letters patents ; the contracts of priuate men were past in the same language , to the end they might force them mildly to learne it . as for t●e customes and ancient lawes of the countrey , w●ich co●c●rne onely the ordring of priuate mens goods , and not the estate , nor the obedience due vnto the prince , he may not change them : or if he doth , it must be done by degrees . for what iustice soeuer there be in a new law , the people being not accustomed vnto it , will suspect it . but if the change of lawes be preiudiciall to a conquerour , the change of religion is much more , there being nothing wherein the people grow more obstinate , then to retaine their ancient religion . yet this will be no hinderance , but by the erecti●g of colledges and seminaries of piety , the conquerour may bring in learning and knowledge , by meanes whereof g●●ning dayly someone , he may by little ro●te out t●at of the countrey without force . and if he cannot speedily attaine to his designe , at the least he shall haue this aduantage , that those of the conquered subiects which adhere to his religion , will be co●fident vnto him , and making shew to fauour them , the rest will be soone reclaimed . but whatsoeuer the conquerour be to bring in newly among a conquered people , be it religion , customes , tributes , or lawes : the establishments must bee made whilest the amazement of the conquest last ; and that the people are in feare of worse . for if you suffer them to k●ow themselues , and to grow assured ; besides the difficulty you shall finde to make them taste these innouations , it is to be feared they will make vse of it for a pretext of reuolt . but if all these meanes proue too weake , ( as they will be with an vntamed multitude ) to keepe such people in awe and obedience , there is no other meanes to contayne them , then to make vse of the same force which conquered them . the romans haue imployed whole armies : yet mutinies being too ordinary , and of a dangerous consequence in these great bodies , this example hath not beene followed by the ●i●est conquerours : but instead thereof they haue made vse of strong forts and good garrisons , well commanded and gouerned . and some haue therein imi●ated the romans in planting of collonies , the which are of lesse expence , and seeme more milde ; but in effect they are more vniust in their establishments ▪ for that you must ruine many people to settle them with commodity ; and moreouer , they are difficult to settle , as well for the choice of men which you are to send , as for the planting of any good order amongst them , to make them , liue in p●ace . if you send of the chiefe men of your estate , y●u vnfurnish it , if they be many in number ; if few , they will make themselues masters of the rest . if you take them all poore , as the romans did , disorders will easi●y grow amo●gst them ; and to liue at their owne pleasures , they will at neede ioyne with them of the countrey against you ; as many roman collonies haue done against the romans . but if you gather them out of diuers parts of your estate , they will hardly agree . yet if the conquest were of so great an extent , as the expence would proue excessiue , to maintaine them in their duties by force , you may make vse of this meanes with these considerations ; first your estate must be such , as sending a good number of your subiects to that end , you may not vnfurnish your selfe : that the warre had so vnpeopled the conquered countrey , as after the conquest you shoold not be forced to commit so open an iniustice , as to ruine part of the inhabitants for the planti●g of collonies . these spoyles and vnpeoplings are excusable during the time you are in armes : but afterwards they can admit no excuse , what considerations soeuer are brought to the contrary , and this vnpeopling made during the warre , giues place and excuse to a collony . the third consideration is , that you must send souldiers which haue beene accustomed to liue in discipline and order : the which must not be so old , as they cannot accustome themselues to the place where they shall be planted ; nor yet so young , as they shall be incapable of discipline ; but being mingled one with another , they may liue together with some good order and equality . besides this meanes they haue added three others to containe vntamed subiects . the first is , to abate and mollifie their courages : the second to weaken them of forces , and to take from them all meanes to doe euill , when you cannot make them loose the desire . and the third to keepe them from assembling together , or from ioyning with their neighbours . to attaine vnto the first , some as the turke hath ruined the nobility and the princes , to take from the people all meanes to assemble , and make a head vnder some commander of courage . others haue suffered them to abandon themselues to d●unken●esse , and to all sorts of incontinency and pleasure . but these meanes are tyrannicall and filthy . numa who was wis●r and more moderate , to mollifie this barbarousnesse , which romulus had entertained among the people of rome , made vse of religion , to the end he might retaine by the feare of the gods , those whom the feare of men could not contayne ; and for this effect he caused statues and altars to be erected at the corners of streets , to the end that the people might generally be retained by the presence of religion which they had before their eyes . in the christian religion diuers sorts of orders and rules haue bin instituted , the which besi●es the good which concernes religion , pu●ge the world o● many sauage humours , which happily wou●d doe much m●●chiefe . others haue inuited people to giue themselues to all mechannicke arts. for besides that the mind is diuerted from euill by this imployment ▪ most comm●●ly they which are bred vp in shops , haue no desire of troubles , nor warre : and admit they should affect it , they should find themselues vnfit , neither would it be successe●u●l there being more losse for them then ga●ne . others vnder pretext of priuiledges , exempt a conquered people from going to the warre , and by little and little make them vnprofitable by this exemption . some haue held that imbarking them in the study of sciences and learning , it was a good meanes to make them desire rest . yet in bringing in the study of sciences , you must distinguish them : for those which may serue for the warre , must in no sort be imparted to the people , nor those which teach to command : but onely such as are fitting studies , as diuinity , phisicke , astrology , or such like , the which so entertaine their minds , as t●ey ioy in no other thing when they know them , and make their spirits melancholly , depriuing them of that viuacity which is necessary for military actions . some others haue held that busying , a riotous and contentious people in suits , was necessary , not onely to imploy their minds , but also to giue them meanes to vomit out this bitternesse and bad humour , whereof euery one hath a part , without troubling the publique : and in regard thereof they haue fill'd estates with diuers offices , in some sort to content the most ambitious ; and by the iealousie of the maintaining of their authority , to binde them to the preseruation of the publique . but in the practice of all these meanes , they must first obserue the humour of the people with whom you are to deale ; and make vse of that wherunto you shall see them inclined , and accōmodate your selfe accordingly , as occasion and time wil giue you leaue . as for the disarming of a cōquered people of their forces and meanes , they proceed after diuers manners . the first is , to take from them all sorts of armes : and not onely the vse , but also the matter and making of them ; for in a mutiny and combustion , they may make vse of it : as also the vse of horses and of ships of warre . to keepe their commanders about you , eyther fo● councell or vnder collour of some charge : to imploy the youth which haue beene already trayned vp to armes , out of the countrey : as caesar did , meaning to passe into england , who carried with him all the young men , assuring himselfe by this meanes of the gaules , and making vse of them against those of great brittaine . he likewise vnder the collour of hostages , v●furnished the townes of their principall men , and of such as might either serue for conduct or councell . the emperour heraclius to weaken the sarasins , entertained foure thousa●d arabians , which were their principall force . we haue sayd that the turke weakened the christians , in taking their children to be instructed in his religion , and by this meanes fortifies himselfe . the desmaneling of townes a●d strong places , which a prince will not or cannot keepe , is also necess●ry ; for fortresses in townes haue many times incouraged the inhabitants to a reuolt , as tacitus writes of ierusalem . there remaines the third meanes , which is to hinder these p●ople from vniting themselues , and making a head ; for their vnion will hold the place of force . some kings , or rather tyrants of aegypt , haue made vse of the diuersity of religions , to keepe their subiects in diuision ; others haue entertained iealousies and distrusts amo●g them , and sometimes hatred betwixt neighbour prouinces . others haue kept their subiects in feare : by certaine secrets and hidden searches , causi●g him to bee punished speedily , which was found to haue any will to mu●ine : and some haue written that the inquisition in spaine , although in shewe it were established for r●ligio● , yet they haue sometimes made it serue for an in●●rument of estate . some haue of a conquered prouince made three or foure ; as the romans did of macedony , which t●ey deuided into foure , that is to say , amphipolis , s●lorica , pella , a●● p●ll●gonia . and besides this paulus aemillius , commanded ●he great men to passe into italy with their children , and after this diuisi●n , the prouinces were forbidden to contract any alliances one with another . others haue forbidden a conquered people all sorts of assemblies , allowing them neyther publique councell , nor comminalty , nor brotherhood ; as the romans did at capoua , leauing them no forme of publique command . the turkes in like manner hath forbidden bells , not onely to the christians , but through his whole empire , fearing ( as some hold ) that at the sound thereof , the people should gather together for some designe then for deuotion . the souldans of egypt fearing the multitude of the inhabitants at caire , crost the citty in many places with trenches , and broad and deepe ditches , to take all meanes from the people in a mutinie to assemble suddenly together . but to hinder a new conquered people , from vniting themselues with others , besides these meanes they haue restrayned them from all commerce with strangers , forbidding them to goe out of the countrey without le●ue , as some write of england , muscouie , and china , and not suffering any strangers to enter without pasport , keeping guards and secret spies vpon the ports and passages . but if you cannot preuaile by these meanes , some haue bin of opinion to transport them to other places , as they of the mountaines of genoua , were drawne into the plaine by the romans . aurelian transplanted the daces on this side the danowe ; charlemaigne the saxons into flanders , and the turke many people of asia into greece . these are the meanes , whereof they haue made vse to preuent a future mischeife , that is to say , the effects of th●se first causes of the ruine of an estate . but if they haue beene forgotten , or proue too weake to stay the subiects minds , and to keepe them from running to neerer courses to ruine the estate : th●n you must of necessity , vse remedies fit for euery one of these causes , to preserue it . chap. . of the neerest causes of the ruine of an estate ▪ of a conspiracie against the princes person . of the causes thereof : of the meanes to auoyd it : of the discouery and punishment . as the prince is the axeltree whereon the estate turnes ; so a conspiracy against his person succeeds acording to the desire of the conspirators , or drawes after it many times the ruine of the estate , to preuent the which they make vse of foure meanes , the first is , not to doe any thing that doth vsually inuite the subiects to such conspiracies , the second to cause himselfe to be guarded , and not to suffer any vnknowne person to aproach neere vnto him , the third is to obserue the actions of his guards and of his familiars and great men , the fourth to cause such as shal bee surprized , to bee duly pu●●ished . in regard of the first , the causes which draw men vsually to such wicked designes are these : an iniury receiued from the prince or a feare to receiue one ; the ambition of great men and of fauourites , the desire of liberty , and the zeale of religion . an iniury is of three sorts , for either it concerns life , honour or goodes ; and they which haue beene thrust on through feare of their liues , haue most commonly preuailed in their enterprize : for the despaire wherein they are , makes them to hazard their liues more freely , to saue it by the losse of the princes , who seekes to take away theirs , running no worse fortune in this hazard then to loose that which could not otherwise preserue : and therefore a prince should not reduce any man , be he great or small in that extremity . and iniury done to the honour is great in a person of courage , and bodille testified it , who flew childeric which had caused him to be whipt : but of all iniu●ies , that which concernes the honour of woemen and the bed , is one of the most powerfull in such enter●●ises , whereof there are many examples ; an iniury which concernes mens estates is not so violent , and few men to recouer their goods , or in reuenge of that which hath beene taken from him , will hazard their liues : and yet in a great courage , the reueng of any iniury whatsoeuer is much to be feared . as for the ambition of great men and fauourites , it doth produce more conspiracies then iniuries , for that the weake although they haue receiued an iniury from the prince , they cannot hurt him for want of comodity and support ; but great men who haue both the one and the other , and ambition withall , which is sometimes no lesse violent then reuenge , giues them more meanes to preuaile in such designes : yet there are seldome such enterprises , but when as the prince hath suffred some one to grow to that power , that hee wants nothing but the crowne . wherefore the first meanes to auoyd this danger , is to humble such men by degrees ; as if he cannot suffer them to liue without hazard to make them away speedily : as tiberius did of scianus , the second is to appoint successors after him , if he hath no childeren : be it by adoption or election , prouided alwayes that the lawes of state allow it : but these successors must not be so great and powerfull , as they may haue a● will to make the like enterprises , desiring rather to make themselues maisters of the estate , then attend the succession ; for the which augustus knew well how to prouide by the adoption of successors in many degrees , supporting and strengthning his gouerment euen by this meanes . the desire of liberty doth likewise produce a powerfull and strong effect in the minds of men , who are otherwise ill affected to the prince , and he must haue a very strong bridle to restraine them , when it is once entred into the minds of a multitude , who haue the more courage , when they constantly beleeue that all meanes are lawfull to dispossesse an vsurper , or a prince whom they hold vnlawfull : this it is which hath produced in former time , so many murtherers of tyrants , and with the like desire they were thrust on , which conspired against the dukes of florence . i am ashamed to put religion in this number , and to make it the cause of so many wicked enterprises , as hath beene practised against princes ; there being nothing so impious , nor so contrary to religion , as such murthers . yet the iewes bookes are full of such examples : and in truth it is contrary to religion , to beleeue that god would punish wicked princes , and free his people by this meanes , and that the diuine iustice make vse of such instruments , as men doe of hangmen , to execute his decrees : but if for this reason the end haue beene sometimes good , and the euent to the honour of god ; yet the action in it selfe is bad : they be rods , which after the punishment are good for nothing but the fire , so the iewes to hinder the consequence of such actions , haue represented them as done by the expresse commandeme●t of god : and yet certaine diuines , fuller of malice then piety , haue sought to draw consequences from thence : and of a religion full of piety and mildnesse , haue made an altar of impiety , pouring for the bloud of kings and princes , vpon pretext of a contrary religion , wherein they haue followed the proceeding of the old man of the mountaine , who bred vp many yong men to such enterprizes , promising them another life full of vnspeakeable pleasures and ioyes : who being transported with the hope thereof , exposed themselues freely to death : and without any other army , his estate ( although of a small extent ) kept all other mo●arches and potentates in feare to be murthered , forcing them to seeke his friendship , and some to pay him a tribute to liue in safety : so as in the end the kings of armenia were forced to roote out this race of assassins . to preserue himselfe from all these sorts of vndertakers , you must vnderstand , that all conspiracies doe not alwayes succeed , by reason of some defects , whereof some one doth vsually fall out in such attempts . the first is , for that hauing resolued to obserue a certaine order in the execution , most commonly the particularities which they haue foreseene , doe not impe , and will doe lesse , if the prince doth not impart to any man , whether he meanes to goe , or what hee intends to doe long before ; but doth so vary in his actions , as none but himselfe is able to deuine of the time when he meanes to part , nor of the place whither he intends to goe , nor where he meanes to stay , nor how he will bee accompanied . the second defect is , that many times the executioners heart failes him , either by an amazement which seizeth on him ▪ seeing the prince to looke on him , and to obserue his countenance ; or his courage failes him and grows milde by the good countenance he shews him . wherefore many princes suffering all men to approach neare vnto them , doe not forbeare to obserue such as are vnknowne vnto them : so as he which hath a will to attempt , is easily discouered in lifting vp his armes , or in approaching too neare vnto him ; and his constant looke would be sufficient to make him grow into distru●● that hee was discouered , and diuert him from his enterprize . other princes hauing suspition of some , haue purposely cast forth word● of distrust , which notwithstanding might be interpreted in a double sence , and speaking them they haue obserued the countenance of those whom they distrusted , to the end they might discouer their hearts . the third errour is the little discretion of him that attempts , as he that meant to kill commodus , entering into the ampitheater ; before he gaue the blow began to cry out , behold what the senate sends thee . for these words aduertized commodus , and gaue his guard meanes to preuent him , wherefore guards are necessary for a prince , not onely for a signe of his greatnesse , or that being accompanied with force he may haue the more authority : but likewise to preserue him , and to obserue the countenance of such as approach neere vnto him . the manner of passing before princes , although it seemes to be practised onely for honour , yet it was beneficiall to pandolpho tyrant of syenna , against whom iulio belanty , his sonne in-lawe , had laid an ambush in his house , by the which pandolph● was accustomed to passe , to goe and visite a friend of his which lay sicke ; but pandolpho staying in his lodging , to speake to some one , it gaue time to them of his traine to goe before ; who by this meanes without thinking of it , discouered the enterprize : whereas if after his accustomed manner , hee had gone first , he had beene in danger to haue beene surprized . the fourth errour is a false imagination , or an accident not foreseene . they which had resolued to kill caesar , seeing popilius one of their companions to discourse long with him , they had a conceipt that he spake of the enterprize ; which made them resolue to aduance their designe , feareing that in staying longer they should bee disco●ered . a word may sometimes diuert such men. an accident not foreseene discouered the treason intended against iames king of great brittaine ; and a letter sent by one to a friend of his , not to be p●e●ent at the assembly of the estates , not giuing him any other reason , made them carefull to visite all places about 〈◊〉 house at westmi●ster , where the prince and peeres were to assemble : where in a cellor vnder the great hall , in the which the peeres were to sit , ( where the king with the queene and their children , were to assist in person ) they found a great quantity of gun-powder , and fagots , to blow vp the chamber and the whole assembly . some princes haue gone priui●y armed when they went in publique ; as they say , cosmo de medicis did . the turkish princes after that batazet had beene in danger to be slaine by a der●is , haue not suffered any vnknowne person to approach neare vnto them , which is not accompanied by two capigies , or vshers , who hold those that goe vnto him by the armes : and this custome is practised with the embassadours of princes . there are many other meanes which are diuersly practised , according to the persons , time , and place . yet the most generall is , to haue a good eye to the enterprises which may be attempted open●y . but that which is most to be feared in princes , is poisoning : the essay which is taken of his meare and drinke , cannot warrant a prince . some haue accustomed themselues to take counter-poison , as mitridates did . but the safest way is to haue faithfull and vigilant persons about him , to haue a care of it , besides the ordinary officers , which are appointed to prepare the princes meate and drinke : and these must not be knowne if it may be , lest they should corrupt them , as they may doe the ordinary officers . he must likewise haue confident persons , to watch and obserue the actions of such as they may distrust , ( which is the third remedy to frustrate the effect of a conspiracy ) and if they be such as they ought to be , it will be a difficult thing but they will discouer what is practised . conspiracies are discouered by two meanes ; either by the report of another , or by coniecture . report proceeds either from the little fidelity , or from the little discretion of those to whom the treason is imparted . this little faith is vsually found among men : for such a businesse cannot be communicated but to him that is a deare friend to the vndertaker , or to one that is discontented with the prince , against whom they conspire . to find such a friend that will willingly expose his life to an apparant danger , it is very difficult : and admit you finde him , yet you cannot be assured of his courage , although you haue tryed him in other affaires . moreouer to measure a mans fidelity in this subiect , by the discontentment he hath of the prince , were great indiscretion . for the vndertaker hauing discouered his intent●ons to this discontented person , he giues him meanes to recouer the princes fauour . wherefore the hatred hee beares vnto the prince , must be exceeding great , or the vndertakers must haue much authority and credit with him , to make him to keepe his faith : for the malecontent desiring nothing more then the princes grace and fauour , he shall haue a good occasion to hope for it by the discouery of the enterprize . by the little indiscretion which is likewise in such men , conspiracies are commonly discouered , either in speaking too much , or before such as he ought not : like vnto brutus sonnes , who hauing conferrd with the tarqui●s embassadours before one of their seruants , they were discouered by him , to haue conspired against their countrey . cataline acquainted fuluia with his designe , who discouered it to cicero ; diuis discouered the treason which he had plotted against alexander , to a yong youth named . n●●homachus , who reuealed it to c●balinius , and ●e to alexander . the treason of sceninus against nero , was discouered by coniecture ; sceninus hauing the day before the execution of the enterprize , made his will and commanded milichus his freed man to sharpen his dagger ; he enfranchised all his bond-men , and caused many rowlers to be made for the binding vp of wounds : so as this freed man doubting that these preparations were for some such enterprize , aduertised nero , who by his meanes discouered the other conspirators . in like manner spies prying vp and downe , may by the indiscretion , lightnesse , or malice of another , or by coniecture , haue some light of that which passeth ; and they must especially obserue the actions of discontented persons , and of such as may better their condition by the princes death . it remaines now to know , ( after the discouery of such enterprizes ) how to punish them fitly and seasonably . for many times it may be done vnsitly : and instead of amazing the confederates which are not yet discouered , you shall thrust them on to effect their designe . sometimes they shall incense and inuite others to make attempts , in stead of diuerting them by the punishment of the first . the prince being aduertised of some enterprize against his person , before he publish it or seeke to punish it , he must seeke to discouer it with all the particularities and circumstances , if it be possible , measuring the condition of the conspirators with his owne . if the conspirators be strong , he must resolue vpon some other pretext to make himselfe the stronger ; and in the meane time he must dissemble , bestowing fauours and gifts vpon the conspirators , left that finding themselues discouered , they attempt not openly . in the conspiracy of the two legions ( which the romans had left for the guard of capona against the samnites ) who had resolued to sacke the caponans , the senate hauing giuen charge to rutilius the new consull to preuent it ; to kill them asleepe , he caused and commaunded it to bee proclaimed , that the senate had decreed they should continue there still in gar●isson : so as hoping they should alwayes haue time to execute their designes , they deferr'd it . but when they saw that they separated them , sending some one way , some another , they resolued to put it in execution as they did : the which they would not haue done , i● after this first policy they had taken order to haue beene the stronger before they had diuided them . wherefore a prince that wil haue time to discouer or punish a treason , hee must cause the conspirators to haue an opinion to finde a more fit occasion to execute their designes : and he must not be rash in such things , if the danger be not apparant in staying . for the punishment is made for two principall ends . the first is to free himselfe of such dangerous persons ; and the second to terrife others by the example of punishment , from attempting the like . whereas by haste the prince not onely looses the fruits of the punishment ; but also he hazards his person . and although that punishments seeme necessary ; yet if the subiect or the condition of the businesse be such , as mildnesse and clemency may bring more reputation and safety to the prince , then the impunity of the danger , he shall doe well to shew it in such an action . augustus pardoned cunia three times , and by the last assured his life more then he had done by the punishment of all others , whom he had caused to be executed for the like attempts . the vnexpected clemency of a prince to some one , the which proceeds not from feare and cowardize , doth not onely binde him to be faithfull , but doth mollisie the bit●●rnesse of his enemy , who grow the more incensed by punishments ; the which being held vniust , by such as hold the same opinion of the prince with the vndertakers , they thinke ●t lawfull to be reuenged , as they would be of an iniury or some violence done to the publique , or to some priuate person . chap. . of the treason of places , townes , and armies , and other forces of the estate : and of the remedies to preuent the effect . by the treasons which are practised vpon strong places , or vpon townes of importance , or vpon armies or principall forces , estates are brought to their ruine . the onely remedy is in the fore-sight , by meanes of the choice which they shall make of those to whom they shall giue the command : and he must haue a speciall care to choose men that are not couetous , ambitious , cunning , or dissemblers , light , or inconstant ; or easily subiect to discontentments ; or men that haue great support and credit , and are vndertakers . hauing thus prouided for the election you must not so ioyne the authority of command with the forces in one man , as when you would you shall not be able to sep●rate them : and not onely he which hath the authority , but also they which command the particular forces , must depend immediately of the prince , with charge notwithstanding to obey him , to whom the prince hath giuen the authority of command , vnlesse hee receiue a counter command . and it is of no force to say , that if they which are to depend not wholy vpon him that is to command them , he cannot answere for that which they giue him incharge . for if the prince trusts him , hee must likewise trust ; and watching ouer the forces , aduertize him if they doe not as they ought , and doe not obey that which is commanded them according to the duty of his charge . some in like manner ( as i haue formerly sayd ) haue held it fit , not to continue great commands in owne man , especially in one place , whereby the custome of obeying him , the subiects may tie themselues too strictly to him , and giue him meanes to dispose of the prouince where he commands . these are the remedies to preuent the greatest treasons : for the rest which are made by intelligences with petty companions , as in corrupting a centinell or a corporall that shall be in guard to seaze vpon a port , they may easily auoide it , in drawing the guards by lot , and by the care and dillig●nce of the captaines . and if they be aduertized of some practice which the enemy makes with the souldiers and inhabitants of a towne , they may cause some to make shew to be of the intelligence , who addressing themselues to those whom they haue reason to distrust , they may easily discouer the truth . chap. . of rebellions , and of the meanes to preuent them . conspiracies and treasons are most commonly secret and hidden , and are plotted by few men , the which makes them more difficult to discouer , and more easie to punish . contrariwise rebellions and factions are made more openly ; but as they cannot be attempted without great numbers , so they are with more difficulty pacified and punished ; and doe more vsually draw after them the ruine of the estate then the former . but to know how a prince ought to gouerne himselfe in a rebellion , he must consider whether he be stronger or weaker then the rebells ; and he must hold himselfe the weaker , although they were equall in forces ; for that he may not hazard his authority vpon a doubtfull euent , as it is ordinary among equals . if hee bee the stronger , hee must preuent it in the beginning speedily and secretly ; cutting off the heads and chiefe commanders , before they know they are taken ; and then present himselfe with courage to suppresse it , to the end he may amaze the rebels : and if he be farre from the place where the rebellion is made , he must approach ; as the emperour charles the fift did , who passed from spaine into flanders , to suppresse the rebellion of the gantois , the which succeeded happily . for to abandon the place where the rebellion begins , or to retire farre from it is held a feare , the which blemish and impaire the credit & authority of the prince , and encourage the heads of the party , and makes the people more bold and insolent . but if he findes not himselfe the stronger , and to haue some great aduantage ; without retiring himselfe too farre from the place where the rebellion is made , he must make shew to haue a will to yeeld to that which the people desire of him , to giue them time to grow cold ; especially if they haue no commanders of credit and authority . sometime a small matter may be able to reduce a people to their duty : and in such encounters subtile and in ●entiue spirits are fit , as likewise those which are popular and eloquent , to entertaine and to draw a mutinous multitude to their duty , by feare , distrust , and hope . that familiar and popular course which menenius agrippa obserued with the people of rome , by a comparison of the diuision of the members from a humane body , succeeded better to pacifie them , then if hee had falne vpon more serious reasons . the inuention which calaminus the capouan made vse of , to saue the senators of capoua from the hands of the people , was no lesse witty : for ioyning himselfe to their party , and applauding them in all things , seeing them resolute to put their senators to death , hee propounded vnto them that they should begin first with him that was most odious vnto them , but withall he let them know that the estate must not remaine without gouernment , & that before they put him to death , they must make choice of some other in his place . so not able to agree , and passing from one to another , they found that they whom they mean● to put to death , were much better then the others whom they intended to choose in their p●aces : and to the people were pacified . sometimes i● such mutinies and combustions , they haue made vse of the occasion of an eclipse , or of some extraordinary signe from heauen , or of some vnexpected misfortune ; where with the people being toucht and amazed , suffer themselues to be perswaded to returne to their duties . a ma● of authority and credit with the people , may preuaile much in such occasions . soderin arch-bishop of florence , comming f●●th in publique with his pontificall robes and his clergie pacified the florentins , who were in combustion one against a●other . and as in some places preachers haue beene the firebrands of sedition , and the trumpets of warre , in others they haue serued to pacifie them , and they haue made good vse of them . but if the people cannot be suddenly rec●aimed , and that the popular mutinie passeth into rebellion and a setled reuolte : you must then seeke to reduce them by degrees , disvniting them , and gayning some of the commanders vnderhand , by promises and benefits ; or putting them in distrust of the people , and in iealousie one of another . if nei●her of these remedies will preuaile , hee must yeild to that which the people demand , either in all , or in part : for that loue and reputation being the foundation of the princes authority , if the prince in yeilding seemes to diminish his reputation in some sort , yet thereby hee shall preserue the affection of the people , who being pacified , he may by other meanes recouer his reputation . and yet in such occurrents he may so carry himselfe , and vse such dexterity , that accommodating himselfe mildly to the peoples inclination , he shall seeme to grant that willingly which they extort from him by force ; being necessary that the prince to maintaine his authority , make shewe to will and desire that which hee cannot hinder , and so to apply his will to his power . and to the end he may make it knowne that it is a thing which he desires , he must seeke to draw some apparant aduantage for his greatnesse : there being few actions in the estate , from which the pri●ce either in effect or in shew may not draw some aduantage ; although in another thing he be damnified : and it shall be a part of wisedome to shew himselfe more ioyfull of the aduantage which he receiues , then discontented for the disaduantage which his enemies sought to procure him . the turkish emperours although they be powerfull , haue beene many times constrayned to yeeld some of their ministers to the ianizaries to be put to death : the which a well aduised prince should neuer doe , if his ministers had not otherwise highly offended ; but seeing himselfe reduced to this extremity , he should giue them meanes to escape , yet dissembling that it is with his consent . for besides that it were a cruell iniustice , to deliuer an innocent man into the hands of a furious multitude , the shame will redowne vpon him , with a disdaine , and a distrust of all others , whom hee should call to serue him , who will rather gouerne themselues , according to the will of those which had credit with the people , then to his desire . but if the ministers are found to haue carried themselues ill , the prince may take this occasion to cause them to be punished by iustice , to pacifie a popular mutinie : although it were more discreetly done to preuent it , then to stay vntill hee were vrged to doe that by force , which for his owne good he should haue formerly done . chap. . of factions and of the meanes to hinder the effects . there remaineth now to speake of factions , for the last and most ordinary causes for the ruine of estates . they are seldome framed among the people , vnlesse great men be of the party : for they grow eyther from the priuate quarrells of great men , who imbarque the people on their sides ; or from the subiect of some reformation ; or for the gouernment of publique affaires . if they grow from particular quarells , the prince must speedily force them to referre the cause to his iudges , or to arbitrators , without making shewe to fauour the one more then the other . this was that which king francis the first did , in the suit depending betwixt madame lonyse his mother and charles duke of bourbon , who reuolted vpon this subiect . but if the controuersie cannot be reconciled , for that the proofes faile on the one side , although that by strong presumptions , the fact be in some sort apparent ; or if it concernes the honour of one of the parties in the decision of the business : the prince must separate them , imploying them out of his estate in some honourable charges , the one farre from the other ; and hee must entertayne them thus diuided , vntill that eyther their credit bee diminished with the people , or that time hath made them forget , or at the least temper their hatred . if ( as it happens often ) to the priuate quarrells of great men , they adde some publique pretext , as of reformation , liberty or religion : the prince not able to hinder the course of these factions , hee must ioyne with the stronger to ruine the weaker : wherein hauing once preuailed , he must free himselfe by diuers meanes ( yet lawfull ) of the cheife commanders with whom hee had ioyned , eyther imploying them out of the estate , or causing them to bee punished for their priuate offences . but if the prince comes not in time to ruine the one nor the other , for that they are equall , and that his counterpease cannot waigh downe the ballance ; hee must attend , that by the euent of some misfortune to the one , they may find the weaknesse of that side , to ruine him wholy . yet if in this case the heads of the factions , and not the prince , bee to reape the honour and fruits of the victory of one of the two partyes ; the prince shall doe more wisely to ballance the one with the other , and to make himselfe rather an arbitrator or a iudge of their pretentions , then a party : for that hee should make himselfe to those , against whom hee should declare himselfe : and should not thereby gayne any authority or credit amongst those , whose party hee should imbrace , into the which hee should not be receiued by the partizans , but to countenance their designes , and not for any affection they beare him , hauing already ingaged themselues to him , who had first aduanced his standard , and had presented himselfe vnto them to bee their leader , and to assist them in their designes ; and they will attribute to the credit of their commander , that which the prince should afterwards doe for them . the principall remedy must bee vsed in the beginning : for that when as the parties are once framed , the prince must rather study how hee may liue in this corruption of state , then to thinke of the meanes how to take it away . for if eyther of the parties haue an aduantage , hee will not abandon his armes , vntill he haue ruined his opposite : wherein the prince shall haue a double losse ; the one is he shall lose a great part of his subiects ; the other is , that the head of the faction being fortified with credit , he may cause him to lose the rest , and vsurpe his estate . but if both parties be equall , they will containe themselues through the feare they haue one of another . and the prince hath no other remedy , then to breed a iealousie and distrust among the commanders of one and the same party , making many equall in in honour and dignity , to the end they may not agree to obey any other head then the prince ; or aduancing some of those which obey the heads of parties , to greater dignities then their generals , to the end they may disdaine to obey them . this must be practised with such as haue many followers . the covnsellor of estate . or , a collection of the greatest and most remarkable considerations seruing for the managing of publicke affaires . part . iii. contayning the meanes to increase an estate . chapter i. of the increasing of an estate by the enlarging of townes . an estate is increased either by multiplying or husbanding that which is our owne , or by adding vnto it , and drawing vnto vs that which is another mans , by lawfull meanes . our owne is multiplied either by manuring the land ; or by enlarging of townes , especially those which may serue for defence , and to make head against an enemy ; or in taking care of the procreation , breeding vp , and education of children : in regard of the manuring of the land and that which depends thereon , it hath beene recōmended formerly , in treating of the wealth and the reuenues of the estate . as for the enlarging and amplifying of townes , it is done after diuers manners , either in drawing together people disper●ed here and there in the fields , in many scattered houses and villages , and reducing them into one place , as theseus did at athens , and as they say it is practized at brazeele , as well to ciuillize that people , as to haue the better meanes to instruct them in the christian faith : or else people fearing the inuasion of some strange nation , haue reduced themselues into some place that was strong of scituation . by this meanes veni●e was amplyfied and built . the ancient spaniards retired themselues to the moun●aines of bi●●ay and aragon , when as the moores held spaine ▪ the persians flying before tamberlaine , some retyred themselues to mount taurus ▪ others to anti-taurus , and some to the ilands of the caspian sea , where they peopled many townes . pisa was en●arged by the ruines of genoua , when it was sack● by the sarrasins . the comming of attilla was the cause of the beginning and foundation of venice , the greatest part of the best families of italy being retired into the townes of the adriatique sea , to auoyd the fury of so powerfull an enemy . london and many townes in england haue beene peopled by french and flemmings , being chased out of their countries in regard of their religion . the pleasantnesse and beauty of some townes , for their scituation or their buildings , haue drawne many to frequent them . the structure of the pyramides in alexandria , the bounty of the aire of mitilene , smirna , and rho●es , made many rom●ns resolue to leaue rome , and to make their abode there : the which hath beene the cause of the increase and amplyfying of those places . but profit is that which drawes most men to liue in a place : the which although it bee of diuers sorts , yet it proceeds from three principall caus●s , the which must concurre for the enlarging of a towne ; the commodity of the sci●uation , the fertility of the countrey ; and the facility of commerce . the commodity of the scituation consists in two things ; the one to send forth that whereof wee haue aboundance ; and the other to receiue that from others which wee want , which two must concurre together in one place , to people it and make it great . otherwise if it were but a simple passage , it would not be enlarged no more then the ●●ands of the terceres , the which although they serue the portugalls for a passage to the indies , yet are they nothing the better peopled : and flushing , although it bee a great hauen , where many ships ariue ; yet it is but a very small towne . whereas venice , lisbone , genoua , and antwerpe , hauing both commodities ioyned together , haue made themselues great . the fertility of the neighbour countrie , makes not a towne to bee the better peopled , but helpes to maintaine it being peopled from other places : for wee haue seene and see daily , many townes sc●tuated in a barren soile , as genoua , who haue made and maintayned themselues great : necessity sharpening and qui●kening the inhabitants spirits to labour and industrie . the facility of cōmerce proceeds from the easie transportation of marchandize , be it by water or by land , in a plaine countrey or a hilly , they hauing the commodity of carriages : yet the conduct by water is more easie & of lesse charge . a ●auigable water is either by sea , or riuers , or la●es , or chānels , made with mens hands with some stops ; or pooles , as that of miree in aegypt , which they write , had fify mi●es in compa●se . but of al the transportation by wat●r , that by sea is much more commodious and profitable : and the towne which hath it , and is accompanied with a good port , whereas ships may ride safely from winds and the violence of stormes , may make it selfe great with little industrie . religion hath sometimes serued to inlarge the citty of ierus●lem : for the iewes sacrifice being celebrated onely there , euery man ranne thither , and many made choice of it for their abode : and many villages haue of late beene made townes , in regard of the religion which they haue tyed vnto them by pilgrimage● . the erecting of schooles and vniuersities , of all sorts of sciences , haue serued ot●ers to amplyfie them , being a meanes which princes haue p●act●●●d , not onely to stay their subiects , who going to study ●ut of their estate , carry forth the money , and bring home strong manners , most commonly pernitious to their countrey ; but also to people those places where their elections were made , by the ●ucc●●●s of their subiects and strangers . the election in like manner of some seats of iustice , whose iuris●iction hath a great extent , and is well peopled , may also serue : especially in that sort as it is vsed in most of the estates of christendome , where they must spend much time , and disburse much money to recouer t●eir owne . for the frequentation of those which come from abroad , with their long stay , cannot but bring g●●at meanes which remaines there . the erecting also of manufactures , if there bee any , or of stuffes , which are particular to a towne , and sought for by others , may also increase it . some townes haue beene peopled by the exemptions and priuiledges of princes , who haue drawne inha●itants from all parts : they ●sed this mea●es to people new-hauen ; and the duke of tuscany doth the like for liuor●e . the residence and the abode of the nobility & gentry in townes , serues likewise to enlarge and amplifie them . for besides that such townes are commonly better built ; the nobility are more curious to haue policy entertained , then when it is composed onely of merchants , who dreaming onely of their gaine , and to doe their businesse , haue most commonly little care of the publique , vnlesse there bee many rich men which haue theigouernment : for then the wealth and commodity which they enioy , giues them the same courage with the gentry , and they gouerne themselues after the same manner . but besides this , the prince must assist them with some publique reuenewes to that effect . the comparison of the townes of italy with those of france , shews what difference there is betwixt townes inhabited by gentlemen , and those which are not . and the townes of flanders and germany , which are in the hands of rich merchants , yeeld nothing in beauty to those of italy . the residence and abode of the prince for a long time in one towne , doth much encrease and amplifie it ; whereof the example is but too familiar in all estates : and the reason is for that the affaires and the treasure are brought thither as to its center ; the which doth not onely draw those which are necessary for the princes seruice , but also merchants and artizans , who goe where there is commodity and gaine . chap. . of the increase of an estate by the procreation of children . bvt they striue in vaine to increase an estate by the manuring of the land , and peopling of townes , if they doe not prouide to husband it , and to fauour the generation , breeding vp , and education of children ; being the onely meanes we haue of our owne , to people both countries and townes . augustus after the ciuill warre , found this care not onely worthy of himselfe , but necessary for the estate , propounding great priuiledges to such as had three children , and yet to fauour a single life as much as might be . some people haue thought they had prouided well by poligamy , allowing one man to haue many wiues ; as well not to tye the fruitfulnesse of a man , to the barrennesse of one wife , as to multiply generation : yet experience hath taught vs , that whether that a man being imployed in many places , cannot commonly get children which liue long ; or not able to extend the care of a father to so many children through necessity , or otherwise they cannot a●taine to ripe age ; the countrey which make vse of poligamie , finde not themselues better peopled then others . the turkes raise greater armies then the christians , but this growes from the extent of the countrey which they possesse , for that they make ●o other profession but armes . for he that shall compare the people which is now in greece , with that which it was before the turke entred , shall finde it much lesse peoled then it hath beene . it is true that celibate or a single life indifferently allowed to all sorts of men , is many times the cause of the decay of people in an estate . charlemaigne being borne in an age full of deuotion , in the which the greatest men made themselues monckes or clergie men , although that otherwise hee was much respectiue to that which concernes religion , hee held it not fit to suffer any one that would , to make himselfe a moncke . for besides that you may not allow good men to abandon the estate , it is a meanes in making profession of a single life to loose the race . good men come from good , and the valliant as they say produce their like ; and therefore they must make vse of them for the good of the estate . but as a single life is seemely for men of the church , and that there must bee some : it seemes necessary to cut off , or at the least to hinder heereafter this infinite number , which vnfurnish the state of men which would be very conuenient and fit for other places , and who for the most part become a scandall and reproach to the church ; experience shewing sufficiently , that such an excessiue multitude , is not capable to bee reduced to its first order and institution : and whereas a small number well entertayned may edyfie by their example , this great number incapable of discipline ●uines all , and are a shame to their mother which hath brought them forth and entertayned them . but for that many times they make vse of their retreates , rather to discharge families which are poore , then for any deuotion , for the which they were cheifly instituted ; and likewise that an infinite company of poore are kept from marrying , least they should leaue their children miserable : it seemes that the erecti●g of seminaries in all professions , ( which we haue formerly mentioned ) should preuēt this feare & the incōueniēces which it breeds ; ●etling them in such sort , as no one should want a retreate nor entertaynment in seruing the publike : whence would grow its encrease , and the peace of families . these are the meanes to encrease and multiply our owne , by our owne . chap. . of the encrease of an estate by the ●nion of another man 's to ours . the lawfull meanes to draw another mans , and to vnite it to our owne , are of many sorts ▪ the romans knew how to mannage them with great wisedome and dexterity . the first whereof they made vse , was to draw and vnite vnto them the people whom they had conque●●d ; as they did them of alba and the sabins . the second was to ruine the neighbour citties , and by this meanes force the inhabitants to retire to rome . the third , to grant the right of romane burgesses , to the greatest and most powerfull of their neighbours , vniting them by this mea●es to their estate , and binding them to the defence ther●of . the fourth to treate equall alliances vnder the name of society , as with the latins ; or vnder the name of friendship ; as with the kings of aegypt and asia . they haue also made vse to increase their estate by the protection of the weaker ; as they did taking that of capoua against the samnites , and of messina against hieron and the carthaginians . some princes of our time haue made good vse of this meanes , hauing changed the protection into an absolute seignoury , some vnder colour of the disloyalty of the anones ; others by the consent of the auories themselues ; some vppon pretext , that they had not beene satisfied , certaine summes of money which they had imployed for the defence thereof : and some for the onely consideration of conueniencie , and to serue for a defence to their estate . the romans haue also made vse for their encrease , of the benefits of kings , their friends , and allies , who haue made them heires of their kingdome by testament , as a●talus king of asia did ; and anichomede king of bythinia . the genois had pera in gift from michael paleologue emperour of constantinople . cabo ioanin , likewise emperour of constantinople , gaue metillin to francis cataguse , a genois . the venetians had veggia from iohn phano ; francis forse had sauonne from lewis the eleuenth . the emperour fredericke the third , gaue modena and rhegium to borso duke of ferrara : the french kings haue had dauphinie by the donation of humbert the last dauphin ; and prouenc● by the testament of charles of aniou the last earle of prouence . other princes haue enlarged their estate in purchasing from their neighbours that which lay conuenient for them , there being no traffique more beneficiall , nor more honourable to a prince , then to purchase that which cannot bee valued . pope clement the sixt , tooke auignon and the county of venice , in payment of the arrerages due by ioane the first , queene of naples , and countesse of prouence , in regard of the pention which shee ought for sicily ; others haue written for the realme of tunis . sforse attendulo had catigola from pope iohn the thirteenth . the florentins had arrezo from the seignour of c●sse , for forty thousand florens of gold ; and liuorne from thomas fregose for one hundred and twenty thousand duckets . they haue also purchased cortona for ladislaus king of naples , and pisa from gabriel visconte . some haue taken their neighbours estate in mortgage , the which lying conueniently for them , they haue 〈◊〉 restored , t●e i●g●gement being past into a meere alienation . the electors of the empire , sold their voyces to the emperour charles the fourth , to choose his sonne ●e●eselaus king of the romans , for one hundred thousand crownes a peece , the which the emperour being vnable to pay , hee ingaged vnto them sixteene imperiall townes , the which they haue euer since en●oyed with the title of soueraignty . lewes the eleauenth of france , held in mortgage the county of ro●sillo● , from iohn king of aragon for foure hundred thousand crownes , the which king charles the eight yeelded vp afterwards for nothing : whereby hee lost an occasion to enlarge his territories : but hee had a better conscience then the florentins , who retained borgo di san sepulchro , which pope eugenius the fourth had pawned vnto them for fiue and twenty thousand crownes . the polonians retaine liuenia by engagement , for sixe hundred thousand crownes , which they disbursed in the warre made for the tenton order , against the duke of musco●ie , in the yeare . but since the warre was ended , they neyther speake of re-embur●ment nor restitution . by marriages and al●iances the prince may likewise enlarge his estate , the house of austria , which comes from the earles of asourge in suisserland , who were about foure hundred yeares since of little accompt , ha●e by this meanes encreased in estate , as wee see at this day : that is to say , by the marriage of itha , heire to raoul of p●ulendorfe ; of bergantia , with albert of a●burge sir●amed the rich ; of het●ngis heire to ●lrich liburg , landgraue of alsacie , with 〈◊〉 called the wise , sonne to albert the rich ; of elizabeth heire of aus●rea , carnithia , tirol , and 〈◊〉 with the emperour albert the ●irst ; of mary the heire of burgo●dy , flanders , brabant , and other prouinces of the netherlands , with the emperour maximillion the first ; of ioane the heire of castille , aragon , sicily , and naples , with philip arch-duke of austrea ; of anne , the heire of hungary and bohemia , with the emperour ferdinand , brother to charles the fift : and of isabel of portugal , mother to philip the second , king of spaine , with charles the fift . this example shall suffice to verifie the increase of estates in a prince by this meanes . adoption is another kinde of portion , by meanes whereof they of aniou , and afterwards they of aragon haue beene made kings of naples and sicily , hauing beene adopted by ioane . the polonians haue inlarged their estate by the election of their kings , choosing them among the neighbour princes who had their estate neere vnto them : and so they of the house of iagellon being called to gouerne their estate , they haue wrought so as they haue ioyned liuonia vnto it , whereof they of iagellon were dukes , and in making the nobillity of prusia , and podolia , equall to that of polonia , they haue increased and assured their estate with these two prouinces ; but to returne to the election , if it be a prince which seekes by this meanes to increase himselfe , hee must not so much relye vpon the inclination of the people , and the considerations which they may haue for their priuate aduantage ; but hee must bring that which may assist and helpe him in this pursuite , as money , force , and intelligences : especially if there be competitors , who are to make vse of the like meanes , and that the affaires and persons are thereunto disposed . the ordinary course in the election of popes , is to giue their voice to that cardinall which is most in credit , ioyning thereunto the consideration of priuate interest , of friendship , and the remembrance of bonds for benefits receiued , with hope to be fauoured for the same election by him to whom he giues his voice , if he happens to fa●●e of it . but as they which run a race , many times hinder one another , and whilest they striue , ● third man gets to the marke before them ; so commonly we see , that they whom they thinke should be preferred before the rest , sticke fast by the way : wherefore they must not onely relye vpon credit . charles of austrea , who after was chosen emperour , to attaine vnto this dignity , he not onely distributed two hundred thousand crownes amo●g the electors , ( as king francis had done for his part ) but hee caused leuies of souldiers to bee made in germany , and his army being ready , he made it approach to frankford , vnder colour to keepe the election from being forced ; whereby hee encouraged his owne party , and caused them to yeeld vnto him which waue●ed , and he terrified brandeburge , who held the party of france , so as hee durst not discouer his intentions . as for practizes , charles carried himselfe more cunningly then francis the first , for hauing first of all laboured for the exclusion of francis , he had thereby assured himselfe of the electors , who he knew would neuer agree to choose one amongst themselues , by reason of their emulatio●s and dissentions ; and that opposing one against another , the● which should be excluded , would more willing●y giue their voices to a third man , then to him that had ●pposed against them . contrariwise the french embassad●urs labouring not for the exclusion of charles , but feeding themselues with the hope which the arch-bishop of mentz , and the marquesse of brandeburge gaue them , that this election would succeed to the benefit of king francis , remai●ed abused , wherein pope lee did in some sort helpe , yet contrary to his intention : for although he desi●ed not that king francis should be made emperour , no more then the king of sp●ine , but some third person , he entertained the first with hope , to the end that when he should see himselfe wholy excluded , despight should make him imploy his practizes against the king of spaine in fauour of some germans , and that hauing purchased no credit with him , he might not grow distasted , but might then fauour this designe openly . we will therefore conclude , that in euery election the first consideration must be , to labour for the exclusion of competitors ; being certaine that many will sooner agree for the exclusion of one , then they will for the election of another ; and yet ingaging them by this meanes to offend the competitors , you bind them to thinke no more of them . but if many agree to reiect you , you must haue recourse to time , and delay the election as much as may be , to the end they may grow weary and separate themselues . chap. . of the encrease of an estate by conquest . bvt the most ordinary meanes to enlarge an estate , is by conquest : and to attaine vnto it you must know how to attempt it , to make warre and to auoide it . for the enterprize of warre , you must fly two things : iniustice and rashnesse . to the end the warre may bee iust , he that vndertakes it must be a soueraigne , and the cause and end must be iust . the iust causes to make war are our owne defence , and that of our friends : the reuenge of our iniuries and theirs : the iust pretentions we may haue to an estate , and our diuines adde not only the defence of our religion , but its aduancement and propagation by the way of armes , and some the extirpation and rooting out of a contrary : but others hold that warre is a bad meanes to plant piety . as for rashnesse he must likewise auoide it : and for this effect before he resolue to warre , he must see eyther some apparent profit , or that he is forced by some great necessity , but aboue all things before he vndertakes it , he must assure his estate both within and without . within , in giuing contentment to his subiects , iustifying his taking armes , and making them to allow of it , to the end that if neede be , they may assist him : without in renewing the leagues with such as may assist vs , or annoy our enemies , or with those that may succour them , diuerting them from their friendship . they must also resolue , whether is most profitable , either to make warre by sea , or by land , or by both , and in what place . wherein although there be no generall rule , yet it would be of great aduantage to strike rather at the head , then at the armes or legges ; and at the place where the head of the state remaines , then at any part more remote . as likewise he must consider the place where the enemy feares most to be inuaded . the which the french vnto this day , ( in the warres which they haue had with the spaniards ) haue little obserued . for by many examples it may be verified , that the thing which the spaniards haue feared most , was left the french should inuade him by spaine . king ferdinand of aragon , although he were inuaded by the county of rou●illon , and was then stronger then the french , yet he would not entertayne the warre vpon this frontier , as guschardin sayth . and the same author writes , that the said king hauing taken nauarre , more by the amazement which the english forces gaue , then by his owne , he would proceede no farther ; holding it no discretion to begin a warre on the other side of the mountaines with the french king , least hee should remaine in the subiection of the people and great men of spaine , who being armed within the countrey , might haue sought to aduance their owne estate : and therefore seeing the forces of france turne towards italy , ●ee dismist his army which was vpon the frontier of nauarre , without inuading france as hee had promised to his colleagues , being vnited for the defence of italy against king francis the first . it serues for no purpose to pretend to the contrary , the bad successe of the voyages of perpignean and nauarre by the french : for in effect there is no history which doth not attribute that misfortune to the want of fore-sight and negligence of our kings , and to the bad conduct of their ministers : for admit they should not finde victuals sufficient in spaine to entertaine their army , yet france which ioynes to this frontier , is not so needy , nor so farre off , but by sea or land they might be easily relieued , and spaine on that side being more barren , it is certaine that the want will be greater for the spaniard then for the french. but to returne to generall considerations , they must fore-see and prouide for all the inconueniences which may happen in such an enterprize , waighing exactly , and comparing our forces with those of the enemy . and for that a prince doth seldome conquer by force onely , hee must obserue if there be in the estate which he meanes to inuade , any of those defects which is sayd might serue for the ruine of estates , to the end he may make vse of them . to make warr● , hee must haue recourse to military wisedome and ●udgement , which deserues a more ample discourse , and therefore i will now leaue it . but to auoide warre , one of the principall considerations is , to imbrace a fit time to treate a peace to his aduantage : and therefore hee must not haue an obstinate desire wholy to conquer a prouince , what hope soeuer good fo●●une hath giuen him , but hee must study how to make profit of his aduantages , and to assu●● that by peace which he hath conquered : in imitation of the turke who holding this maxime hath neuer restored any thing of importance which hee hath gotten ; but all remaining in his possession , in lesse then three hundred yeares hee hath built an empire fearefull to all his neighbours . but the consideration a prince ought to haue in his encrease , is that hee make his profit of it ; it many times falling out , that if an estate newly conquered , be not gouerned with great discretion and iudgment , it doth rather weaken , then make the new conquerour more powerfull , especially if this encrease , ministers matter of iealousie to the neighbour princes : for thence grow many designes and leagues against him . thus drawing into consideration the aduantages of a conquest , he must likewise haue a care of the meanes to maintaine and preserue it , whereof we haue formerly spoken . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e an estate what it is . of the esta●●ish●●nt o● an ●state . of the forme of an estate . diuers sorts of principalities . royall . seignouriall . tyra●nicall . o● a ●eignoury 〈◊〉 a popular ●s●ate . aduantages of a popular estate disaduantag●● of a popul●● estate . o● the suiss●s . aduantages of a seignoury . disaduantages and inconueniences of a seignoury . of the seignoury of venice , and by what meanes it maintaines it selfe ▪ aduantages & disaduantages in a principality . i hat the people haue no cause to desire liberty i● a principality . wherein consists the dependance of estates 〈◊〉 to another . the markes of soueraignty . inconu●nienc●s o● election in a pri●cipality . aduantages of 〈◊〉 ●●ecti●n . a conside●a●so ●n th●●l●ction . reasons for the which they exclude women fró the gouernment in some estates . diu●●sity ●n the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 . of the miseries it doeth procure , and the difficulties they encounter . the diu●●● condi●ions of ●●bi●●● d●ue●i●●●s ●he ●orce o●●he ●st●te . of bond men . of priuiledged subiects . of simple subiects . of strangers . diuers orders of subiects . the subiect of the establishing of comminalties and companies in an estate . that the prince ought not to crosse the comminalties , nor suffer them to attempt any thing aboue their power . of the ●s●icacy & necessity of rel●gion in on estate . of abuses in religion . extraordinary meanes for the establishing of true religion . the disposition of people cōsiderable for the setling of religion . who are properly called barbarians . barbarians in religion , of the authors o● most part of religion at this day . 〈◊〉 in the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 . barbar●●s in 〈◊〉 cloa●●ing barbarou ●es in their habitation . barbarous in gouernment . that the manner of proc●e●ing for the se●ling of ●eligion ough● to be diuers . prophesies d●● pose a people to the setling of a new religion . heauy cha●ges and bur●hens dispose a people to change religion . 〈…〉 . reuolts and ciuill warre dispose to the change of religion . as also excessiue liberty and coute●pt o● religion . the re-vnion of a countrey vnder one prince , makes the establi●●me●t religion 〈◊〉 . pa●ts and qualities n●cessary to the b●i●gers in of a new religi●n . holinesse of life . sufficiency . instruction . preaching : instructiō a powerful meanes for the bringing in of a religion . prudence . that the zeale of religion must be accompanied with conduct and prudence . of spirituall and temporall powers , and their iurisdictions . the obser●ntion of ceremoni●s of an ancient religion , facilitates the setling of a new . there ought to be but one religion in an estate . diuersity of religion dangrous in an estate . it must bee a●oyded euen in light things . how they must gouerne themselues to preserue the ancient beliefe , in a diu●●sity of religions . of the rooting out of heresie and new religion in the 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 they ought to carry them ▪ 〈◊〉 . the tolleratiō of two religions in an estate are lesse hurtful then a ciuil warre . warre against here●icks 〈◊〉 then patty , and giue , 〈◊〉 aduantages . it is dangerous for a prince to arme against his subiects , if he be not assuof the euent . a go●d aduice to weaken the party of a new sector religion . to draw vnto him the heads of a new religion . institution of commanders . orders of knigh●s his to de●end and maintaine the an●ient religion . to draw vnto them the most learned & cap●table of a new religion . to bear downe and ruine the temples least frequenced . not to 〈…〉 religion . 〈…〉 . carelesness in diuine seruice ▪ superstition . rem●dies agaynst blasphemy and n●gligence . against supersti●ion . of a coun●●● o● estate . qualities of coun●●llors of estate . age and expe●ience . 〈◊〉 a●●●ent difference betwixt an 〈◊〉 councellor of estate and young , for that which concernes ▪ councell . a mixture of old and young councellors of estate . di●cretion , fidelity , and resolution in a councellor . wilfulnesse a dangerous vice in a councell of estate . hee must be without ambition and not depending of any . a councellor must not bee rash and precipitate . irresolution a dangerous vice in a councellor and to be aucid●d . the causes thereof . subtilty . he must not be too confident . other qualities necessary for a councel●● of estate . patience . eloquence . secrecy . of the number of councellors of estate . of the change of councellors of estate . of the great number of councellors of estate to be imployde else-where . o● many councels of estate . the meanes to auoyd the contrariety of ordinances . the power of a councell . a 〈…〉 a deliberatiue voyce . equallity among councellors . order in giuing their opinions . s●ffi●●ency and capacity 〈◊〉 for a 〈◊〉 . of the manner to demaund councell . to receiue counsell . to examine . of the flattery of councellors and how the prince should auoyd them . of the truth & liberty which ought to be in councellors . of the prime ministers of an estate . a wise act of the fir●t minister of an estate to discharge his duty . of the power . of the law . diuersity of lawes . the ayme and end of the law . qualities considerable in the establishing of lawes . of the shortnesse of the law . of the absolute com●and of the prince . of the great number of lawes , and the cau●es thereof . of the obseruation of lawes . of seuerity . when the prince may dispence wi●h ●h● lawes . how he ought to gouerne himselfe i● seuerity . distinction of officers & ministers of an estate . of officers & commissioners and of their difference . consideratiō to be made vpon a cō●ission of the person from whence it proceeds . of the directi●●●● a com●ission . of the charge of a commiss●on . the duty of a commissioner . of the time when a commission should expire . ● the number o●●ffi●e● . th● 〈…〉 a 〈…〉 then 〈…〉 . i●conueniences g●owing from the plurality of officers ; and the meanes to a●oyd them . the creation and choyse of officers , must be made by the soueraigne only . that the charges must be distributed proportionably , according to the nature and capacity of them . principall qualities required in an officer & magistrate . the vl●es and defects are as well to be considered as the vertues , in the election of magistrates and officers . an easy means to make a good choice . three kinds of creating and making magistrates . by election . by lott . by lot and election together . the continuance of officers is either for life or a certaine time . reasons and considerations to make officers for a time . reasons and considerations to perpetuate offices during life . the change of offices and magistrates necessary in a popular estate , . meanes to preuent the vsurpation of the estate by the continuance of officers ingreat charges . the practize of the pope and seignoury of venice , in the disposition of great charges to preuent vsurpation . the practise of kings & princes vpon the same subiect . that the chāge of principall officers & magistrates is necessary for the safety of the prince & peace of the people . prudence required in this change . that you may not giue great commands in a prouince to those that were borne there . wherein the duty of officers and magistrates doe consist . of the duty tovvards the lavves . how the magistrate ought to carry himselfe in the interpretation o● of the words of the lavv . in the interpretation o● the int●n●ion of the law . examinat●on of the reason of the law . that wee must stand to the authority of the law , and make no questions vpon equity . of the execution of lawes and ordinances . from what time the law o● ordinance doth bind . 〈◊〉 are 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 of the ●●●ce of lawes or ordinances . of custome . three things required to giue force to a custome . wherein the duty of the magistrate to the prince consists . of the commandments of the prince , and how the magistrate must carry himselfe in the verification . the magistrate ●ught to obey the will of the prince , although it were vniust . the disobedience of the magistrate to th● will of the 〈…〉 bad con●equence . the magistrate is not 〈…〉 the 〈…〉 of his prince . reasons why the custome of verifying the princes edicts hath beene brought in by the magistrate how the mastrate ought to car●y himselfe in the execution of a commandement after a reuocation . three degrees o● magistrates and the power of either of them . the dutie of a superiour or principall magistrate . that it is fiting for a prince to indure the iudgement of the magistrate the power of a lieutenant equall to that of the magistrate . the power of the magistrate is of no effect out of his territorie . of tvvo magistrates equall in povver and of the execution of their decrees in one anothers territory . of the execution of a ●entence giuen by the officer of a forraine prince vpon another● territory . of magistrates equal in power in a body ▪ or colledge , and of their command one ouer another . the difference betvvixt ●pposi●ion and command . that they may hinder one another by opposition before the act , or by appeale after the act , but not by command . foundations of the duty of magistrates to priuate p●r●●ns . diuers powers of magistrates ▪ of their duties to priuate persons in giuing sentence . of the 〈…〉 persons to the magistrate , executing his charge . of the magistrate wronged when and how hee may bee iudge in his owne cause . mildnesse and patience required in a magistrate . discretion and grauitie without passion . the dutie of magistrates . rules and considerations in in the iustice of comandments . an harmoniacall p●op●r●ion followed in many things . an arithmeticall proportion followed in others a geometrical proportion in the imposition of burth●nsome offices for the support of the estate . a mixture of the law with the will of the prince . of the temper a magistrate shoul●●dde vnto the law . of the distribution o● 〈◊〉 and dignities . distribution of r●wards & punishments . harmony in the diuision of goods . prouision of armes and shipping . armes offensiue or d●f●nsiue . quality of desensiue armes . that they ought not to be contemned . quality of of●en●iue armes . o● the pike , two sorts of offensiue armes of the beauty & ●rnament of armes . the situation of fortres●e● n●ces●ary and proffitable . they must bee farre from the heart of the estate . forts strong by situation and art. they must bee situated where they may bee relieued . of the ●●uantages of horse and foote . an army must consist of hor●e and foote . of the choise of souldiers . wee must imploy strangers as little as may be . two sorts of traine bands . of the number ●of souldiers ●o● the trayn●●nd . of subsidiaries order for their exercise in time of peace : and to hinder their mutiny . of the number of subsidiaries . meanes to tra●ne the subiects of an estate to warre without any charge to the prince . and to hinder a reuolte and mutiny . the parti●ular ●o●●e of the romans . 〈◊〉 of a 〈◊〉 vpon 〈…〉 ●aptaine . of the choice which the captaine ought to make of his souldiers . a good order if it were well obserued . of the place whence they must take the souldiers . of the age o● the souldiers . of the statu●e . of his vocatiō . that the power of an estate depends of its riches . of the lacedemonians . of the venetians and genoi● of the romans what is necesary for the riches of an estate . 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 an 〈…〉 . whence the aboundance of necessary things proceed tillage w●ll husbaded causeth aboundance . the cau●e of the negligence thereof . that it is not vnworthy of a prince . manufactures cause aboundance in an estate . commerce with the stranger causeth aboundance in an estate . three considerations for the commerce . of marchandize which we may and ought to carry to strangers . of the transport of gold and siluer . of raw stuffes . of the beginning of str̄age gold and siluer into an estate . that the course of forra●gne coyne ought not to be allowed in an estate . marchandize whbreof wee ought to s●op the entry . the carriage of merchandize . monopolis fo●bidden . of the discharge of customes . faith and assurance in affairs-speedy iustice. that siluer & gold are sufficient for all sorts of coine . the prise of gold & siluer in proportion one of another to bring m●rchants into credit . trading at sea profitable and honourable . aduantages which the publique and priuate should receiue if the nobility gaue themselues to the commerc● at sea. and order setled by the holland●rs for the continuance of the●●r 〈◊〉 to the east indies . the great reputation which th●y h●ue gotten by the meanes of this trade . means to setle the commerce at sea in an estate . that pa●simony p●e●e●u●s the ●iches of an estate . parsimony impo●ts ●uch ●or the ●a●ety of an estate . against exc●sse whe rei● excesse deth consist . o● excesse in buildings . an order in the low countries for buildings in townes . of the excesse of moueables . excesse in a great traine . a g●od order made by the vene●●ans . ●x●ess● in fe●st● . excesse of play. of the ordinary reuenew of the demesus and of its estblishment . that an alienationis not to be allowed much l●sse an ingagement . entries and going forth o● the estate . tributes , gifts , and pensions . trafique in the name of the publique . to deliuer mon●y at ●nterest to marchants . of the ●ale o● offices . the sourse and begi●n●ng of this a●use . inconueniences which grow by the venallity of offices . of subsedie● . diuers formes of subsedies and leu●es . of those which ought to be exempted from subsedies . of the place wh●re they are to make the leuy of the subsedies . introduction of tolles , tributes , and imposts . introduction for the nūbring of goods . practised by the r●m●ns . ab●lished by ty●ants . imaginary inconueniences of the nūbring of goods . aduant●g●s which will come vnto the ●st●●● ▪ of ●x●ra●rdinary l●uies . of casuall impositions . of customes & impo●itions . of voluntary borrowing . of the order of the expences . almes . charities of the king st. lewis : almes doe neuer impouerish the freeing of charges neces●a●y for the estate . of the fees of officers and debts . recompences to the discharg of the treasure . th●●e which are made by offices and dig● ni●es are to be p●●erre● before that which is done by ●oney . gifts and gratifications . a prince must giue to many little and often . * election of publike houses and seminaries for instruction of youth , aswell in the liberall arts as mecha●●ck . seminaries of piety . seminaries of honour for the instruction of gentlemen . the profit of th● sayd seminaries of honor ●or the estate . expences for the cōmodity and decoration of towne and pr●uinces . cutting off expences . of the iustice and necessity of cutting off of debts . of the choice they ought to make of those which are to manage the treasure . a commendable custome of the romans . youth more fit for the mānaging of the treasure then age. that experience is not so much necess●ry . a forme to regulate accomptants . of accompts and of those which are to heare and examine the accompts . con●iderations which makes the ●eaping vp of treasure hurtfull to a pu●lique . considerations necessary for the gathering of treasure . prudence and discretion necesary for the gathering ●f treasure . a ●emedy to the end that sparing m●y not hinder the commerce . difficultie● for the keeping of th● trea●ure of gold and siluer . o● the car● & ●●●●ging of 〈…〉 . how a prince should gouern● himselfe with his neighbou●s . ge●●●●ll consider●t●●●● 〈◊〉 th● manner 〈…〉 . of the ent●rview o● princes , where th●y may be a●●pt●●e o● the ●●●●ndship and good 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 ●●m●●●y 〈◊〉 . a prince be●●●chc p●●he●●ust h●ue a c●r● not to p●ocur● e●●y or ●●alous●● ag●●● h●m , no● 〈…〉 . of safety . 〈…〉 . what princes ought to , doe before their enter-viewes , not to put their neighbours in iealousie . of deputies & embassadors to treate with a prince , and of the choice they are to make . qualities of a deputy or e●bassadour . not to be interested in the businesse hee treates of . of a ●●ane condition . 〈◊〉 ●cre : 〈◊〉 of the 〈◊〉 ●●●enti 〈◊〉 which 〈◊〉 made . i hat they must stand most vpon their guards when they pr●pound a treaty , and ●●pecialy during the treaty . that a treaty ought not to be held firme and assured , if it be not ratified by the prince with whom they treate , of the plate where the treaties of a peace ●ra league is to be made . an embassador going vnto a prince to treat whether he is bound to treate himselfe with him , or by deputies . of the sitting of embassador● of the power of embassadors on either side . o● the clauses of treaties . principall considerations ▪ they must haue a care th●t there be no equiu●cation in the clauses . that generall clauses are captions . t●eaties of peace . o● t●uc● that treaties of trece are lesse subiect to rupture then th●se of a peac● . diu●rs intentions for t●e which they make a truce . of defensiue leagues . diuers considerations for the treating or making of a league . ●rdinary cau●●s o●●●a●ue● . other considerations for the treatie of a league . of the time w●en wee are to make a l●●gue . o● 〈◊〉 ti●e of the ●ōtinu●nce ●o a le●gue . that the colleagu●s are bound to the r●couery of the countrey of their allie conquered by the enemy . of the contribution of a league . 〈…〉 place 〈…〉 dy● or 〈…〉 m●n●y . which of the confederates ought to verisie and decla●e himsel●e first . that an off●nsiue league , and for an ●n●erpriz●●ucc●●d● seldo●e acc●●ding to ●he hope of the allies . o● the causes of the rup●ure of leagues . o●●eagu●s ●etwi●● meane ●●tate● , and of the de●●cts w●●ch a●●●ften 〈◊〉 . of succour● one against another among confederates . of the defence of one that is no● allied against an ally . of the vnequal alliāce betwixt princes and estates ● that is to say of protection . difference betwixt pension and tribute . of protection . of the mutuall duty of the protector and hee that is protected . of hostages . hostages for the assurance of a princes passage , through anothers estate , the assurance of a treaty . it is dangerous for an ally to receiue a strong ga●●ison from his protector , or make him master of his forts , &c. ●s●●blishment of iudges , for the deciding o● differences betwixt allies . of compromise betwixt allies , vpon differences which may grow betwixt them . of a●compromise vpon the possessory . when and how a prince should deale to reconcile a difference betwixt his neighbours . meanes to assure a treaty that they may not enter into rupture . pretext of rupture . of the obligation a prince hath to hold his word . that force nor feare cannot di●pence a prince of his word or promise . 〈◊〉 pre●●xts o● 〈◊〉 . that the constancy and as●●●tance of a prince ●● his w●rd is of great 〈◊〉 . two sorts● of neutrality . the aduantages of a neutrality . di●aduantages of neutrality . that a powerfull prince should not leaue a neutrality without cau●● . that a neutral●●y is more be●eficiall to a weake a prince then to imbrace a 〈◊〉 . considerations to leaue a neutrallity . how a prince ought to 〈◊〉 himselfe in a demand made vnto him by one of his nei●hbours o●●ome diffi●ul● thing ▪ to demād somthing of his neighbours . we must not refuse that which is demanded , if it doth not much preiudice . we must n●t be too credulous in that which princes say . politiquely to nourish distrusts & iealosies betwixt them . to testifie his good will vnto them . o● the resentmen● hee must h●ue of iniu●ties ●eceiued by his neighbou● to pierce into the designes of his neighbours . of the introduction of embassadours or agents . the difference betwixt an embassadour and agent . qualities and perfections required in an embassadour . instructions for an embassadour , how to gouerne himselfe in a strange countrey . o● the priuiledges of em●a●●adou●s . how embassadours ought to carry themselues toward their master . of their dispatches . the preseruation of the estate consists in the authority of a prince . the loue of the people cause the authority of the soueraigne . diuers meanes to gaine his good-will . effects of mildnesse in a prince . to cherrish great men. two sorts of liberality . the excesse of liberality in a prince most hurtfull to the estate . considerations necessary in liberality . diuer● kinds of liberality . of the liberality which is vsed for the acknowledgment of seruice and merit . that a prince 〈◊〉 shewe him 〈◊〉 liberall to those which may se●ue him ag●inst ●is ●nemy , be th●y o● a con●r●ry pa●●y . of the liberality of the prince to purchase reputation . the manner of giuing . benefits must be propo●tio●a●le t● the time . ●ecompences 〈◊〉 li●n●ur m●●t ●ee well 〈◊〉 . libe●●lity of the 〈◊〉 tow●rds ●h● publ●qu● . the liberality of a priuate person towards the publique is not to be allowed . liberality of the prince towards the publique , which consists in aduancing vertue iustice diuided into two parts . wherein the princ● ought to shew himselfe a 〈◊〉 of iustice in ●●gard of priuate men . against v●ury . two sorts of violence in an estate which the prince ought to suppresse . of the oppression of the poor● . 〈◊〉 princes 〈◊〉 to 〈◊〉 , ●n 〈…〉 . 〈◊〉 wherein 〈◊〉 may 〈◊〉 . that the grace and sauour of the prince not extend to haue violence done against the magistrate . of the choise a prince ought to make of iudges & magistrates . i 〈◊〉 m●anes 〈…〉 t●o●e which ●re to be established in the administ●a●ion o● iust●ce . 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 must 〈◊〉 ca●e to 〈◊〉 the 〈…〉 to do● 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 meanes 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of 〈◊〉 . of the compositions with offic●rs , misbehauing ▪ themselues in their charges , ●and of the inconu●niences which follow . that a prince hauing pardoned an officer , may not suffer him in his charge . of spyes in cuery prouince to inquire of the carriage of officers . secret delations practised by king l●wis the ●w●lfth to containe his officers in their du●y . consideration● necessary for a prince , for the administration of iustice. the expence of pleaders . of the vocations of iudges of taxe of registers , vshers , and such oth●r mi●is●●●rs o● iustice. of the expence o● 〈…〉 , a●d 〈◊〉 . of the verificaion of edicts by the ●ourse of parli●●nt . of the mean●s how a prince may p●rchase repu●at●on . of prudence and vallou● in a prince . that a prince mu●t haue a general know●edge of all scie●ces . the practise of many great princes . of experience . two sorts of experience . the ●nowledge o● histo● ry necessary for a prince . diuers sorts of cunning . of dissimulation . o● the practises and intelligences ●● princes in the estates one of another . of equiuocation , faire words , promises , letters , embassies , & lies , to obtain ●o●c 〈◊〉 . the proc●eding of princ●● to defend themselues and their estates f●om their ene●ies , ●●i●st in themselues , but ●●●●●bl● by 〈◊〉 . valour the cause of a princes reputation . how important and necessary i● is in a princ● . meanes to get and entertaine this courage and valour . diuers other meanes for a prince to get reputation . the cause of the ruine of estates . a remedy against the violence of strangers . the neare causes of the ruine o● an estate . of the remote causes which ruine estates . of the soueraigne de●ects which ingender the subiects hatred . a remedy ●gainst-t●e princes cruelty . a remedy against the princes auarice . of the princes defects which cause contempt . other defects of a prince which breed contempt . the princes defects wh●●h breed contempt are more de●●gerous then tho●e which cause hatred . a change ●n●n estate is dangerous . a remedy against the ●buse of lawes . considerations necessary for a reformation . the most generall defects and pecant humours of a multitude . remedies to cure the estate of these defects and bad humours . three sorts of persons in all estates . meanes to containe great men in their duties . of great men allied to the prince . of great me● which haue force and credit with the people by reason of his imployments in great affaire● . considerations to aduance some one in authority . 〈…〉 o●●●eat p●aces in one 〈◊〉 . of the poore and needy . meanes to containe the common people in their duties . excesse and vsury the chiefe causes of pouerty . to gi●e 〈◊〉 ●●●iects in 〈◊〉 an the 〈…〉 . mildnesse and 〈…〉 〈…〉 〈…〉 . he 〈…〉 . you must make marriages betwixt them and his naturall subiects . the conqueror must bring his owne language into the conquered countrey . hee may not c●ange the law●s and relig●●● o● t●e conq●●●ed c●ūt●●y but with g●eat iudge●ent . forc● is a powerfull mean●s to containe conquered 〈◊〉 ●●●heir duty . the planting of collonies more vni●st & difficult . considerations for the ●etling of collonie . 〈…〉 cōq●e●ed subiects 〈◊〉 ●● duties . to mol●i●ie the 〈◊〉 of a co●quered 〈…〉 to weaken a conquered people . to hinder the v●ion of a conque●●d p●ople . conspiracy against th● princes person . meanes to preuen● . causes of a cons●i●acy . the iniu●y which they 〈◊〉 to receiue from the prince the desire of liberty . the inconsiderate zeale of religion . ordinary defects in conspiracies . the discou●● of 〈◊〉 . of the punishment of conspiracies . to increase our owne by our owne . diuers meanes to enlarge and amp●ifie townes . ●he pleasant●●●●● of townes . profit drawes men wonderfully to liue in townes . principall causes of profit in a towne . the commodity of the scituation . the fert●lity of the coun●r●y . of the facility o● c●●m●rce . religion a meanes to enlarge a towne . the establishment of 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 . the 〈…〉 . 〈…〉 . residence of the nobility . the residence of the prince . of poligamy . of celi●ate . diuers 〈◊〉 to vnite another mans to ours . protection of the weake● . gifts and benefits . 〈…〉 adoption . election . considerations necessary for a prince which desires to make himselfe great by election . of the enterprize of warre . the iust causes of a warre . a warre must be vndertaken with discretion , and not ●ashly . a consideration to auoide war. the works of the famous nicholas machiavel, citizen and secretary of florence written originally in italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into english. works. english. machiavelli, niccolò, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing m estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the works of the famous nicholas machiavel, citizen and secretary of florence written originally in italian, and from thence newly and faithfully translated into english. works. english. machiavelli, niccolò, - . neville, henry, - . [ ], [i.e. ] p., [ ], - [i.e. ] p., [ ], - [i.e. ] p., [ ], - p. printed for john starkey, charles harper, and john amery ..., london : . "the history of florence," "the prince," "the discourses," and "the art of war" each has special t.p. translated by henry neville. cf. nuc pre- . nicholas machiavel's letter is in vindication of himself and his writings. reproduction of original in university of michigan libraries. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic 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are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng machiavelli, niccolò, - . political science -- early works to . political ethics -- early works to . war. florence (italy) -- history. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the works of the famous nicholas machiavel , citizen and secretary of florence . written originally in italian , and from thence newly and faithfully translated into english . london , printed for iohn starkey , charles harper , and iohn amery , at the miter , the flower-de-luce , and the peacock , in fleetstreet . . licensed febr. . . the several treatises contained in this book . . the history of florence . . the prince . . the original of the guelf and ghibilin factions . . the life of castruccio castracani . . the murther of vitelli , &c. by duke valentino . . the state of france . . the state of germany . . the discourses on titus livius . . the art of war. . the marriage of belphegor , a novel . . nicholas machiavel's letter in vindication of himself and his writings . the publisher to the reader concerning the following letter . courteous reader , it hath been usual with most of those who have translated this author into any language , to spend much of their time and paper in taxing his impieties , and confuting his errors and false principles as they are pleased to call them , if upon perusal of his writings i had found him guilty of any thing that could deceive the simple , or prejudice the rest of mankind , i should not have put thee to the hazard of reading him in thy own language ; but rather have suffered him still to sleep in the obscurity of his own , than endanger the world ; but being very well assured of the contrary , and that the age will rather receive advantage than damage by this publication , i did yet think that it was fit to say something in a preface to vindicate our author from those slanders which priests , and other byass'd pens have laid upon him ; but still i thought , that it might prove a bold and presumptuous undertaking , and might excite laughter , for a person of my small parts and abilities , to apologize for one of the greatest wits and profoundest judgments that ever lived amongst the moderns : in this perplexity , i had the good fortune to meet with this letter of his own writing ; which hath delivered me from those scruples , and furnished me with an opportunity of justifying this great person by his own pen. receive then this choice piece with benignity , it hath never before been published in any language , but lurk'd for above years in the private cabinets of his own kindred , and the descendents of his own admirers in florence , till in the beginning of the pontisicat of vrbane the th . it was procured by the jesuits and other busie-bodies , and brought to rome with an intention to divert that wise pope from his design of making one of nicholas machiavel's name and family cardinal , as ( notwithstanding all their opposition ) he did , not long after . when it was gotten into that city , it wanted not those who had the judgment and curiosity to copy it , and so at length came to enjoy that priviledge which all rare pieces ( even the sharpest libels and pasquils ) challenge in that court , which is to be sold to strangers , one of which being a gentleman of this country , brought it over with him at his return from thence in the year . and having translated it into english , did communicate it to divers of his friends , and by means of some of them , it hath been my good fortune to be capable of making thee a present of it , and let it serve as an apology for our author and his writings , if thou thinkest he need any . i must confess i believe his works require little , but rather praise and admiration ; yet i wish i could as well justifie one undertaking of his not long after the writing of this letter ; for we find in the story of those times , that in the month of august following ; in the same year . this nicolo machiavelli ( except there were another of that name ) was committed prisoner to the bargello , amongst those who were taken in arms against cosimo at the castle of montemurli , notwithstanding all his compliments in this letter to that prince , and profess'd obligations to him ; if this be so , we must impute it to his too great zeal , to concur with the desires of the universality at that time , in restoring the liberty of their country , which hath so far dazel'd the judgments even of great and wise men , that thou ●eest many grave authors amongst the ancients have even commended and deified the ingratitude and treachery of brutus and cassius . but certainly this crime of his would have been much more unpardonable , if he had lived to see his own prophesie fulfilled in the persons and descendents of this great cosimo , for there was never any succession of princes since the world began , in which all the royal vertues and other qualities necessary to those who rule over men , were more eminently perspicuous than in every individual of this line ; so that those people have as little cause as ever any had to lament the change of their government ; their great dukes having been truly fathers of their country , and treated their subjects like children , though their power be above all limitation , above all fundamental laws ; but they having no law , are a law to themselves , i cannot chuse but instance in some few of their benefits to their people , first the making the river arno navigable from pisa to florence in a year of dearth , that so the poor might be set on work and have bread , and the traffick of both cities infinitely facilitated , their making at their own charge a canal from livorne to pisa , their erecting at pisa a famous university , paying the professors , who are eminent for learning , and discharging all other incidencies out of their own revenue , besides the raising stately buildings for schools and libraries , their founding a renowned order of knighthood , and keeping the chapter in the same city , and ordering a considerable number of knights constantly to reside there , both which were intended and performed by them , to encrease the concourse , and restore the wealth to the once opulent inhabitants of that place . their new building fortifying and enfranchizing livorne , that even by the abolishing their own customs they might enrich their subjects ; and make that port ( as it now is ) the magazine of all the levant trade . and lastly , their not having in years ever levyed any new tax upon their people , excepting in the year . to defend the liberties of italy against the barbarini . these things would merit a panegyrick if either my parts , or this short advertisement would admit it , i shall conclude then after i have born a just and dutiful testimony to the merits of the prince who now governs that state , in whom ( if all the princely vertues and endowments should be lost ) they might be found and restored again to the world : as some ingenious artists in the last age , retrieved the art of sculpture by certain bas relievos remaining on some pillars and walls at rome ; the prudence , magnanimity , charity , liberality , and above all the humanity , courtesie , and affability of this prince , though they exceed my expressions , yet they are sufficiently known , not only to his own subjects ( the constant objects of his care and goodness ) but even to all strangers , more particularly to our nation , he having undertaken a troublesome journey to visit this kingdom , and to make it witness and partaker of his transcendent generosity and bounty , which he hath continued ever since , as can be testified by all who have had the honour to wait upon him in his own country , or the good fortune but to see him in ours . i my self who have been so happy to be admitted into his presence , and have been honoured since in having his highness my customer for many choice books to encrease ( not his knowledge , for that is beyond receiving any addition by books ) but his curiosity , and his library , do think my self bound in duty to take this poor opportunity of testifying my gratitude and devotion to this excellent prince . as to this letter i have nothing more to say , but that thou mayest see how right this author was set in principles of religion , before he could have the information , which we have had since from the pens of most learned and rational controversists in those points , and therefore thou maist admire the sagacity of his judgment . read him then , and serve god , thy king , and thy country , with the knowledge he will teach thee . farewel . nicholas machiavel's letter to zanobivs bvondelmontivs in vindication of himself and his writings . the discourse we had lately ( dear zenobio ) in the delightful gardens of our old deceased friend cosimo rucellai , and the pressing importunity of guilio salviati , that i would use some means to wipe off the many aspersions cast upon my writings , gives you the present trouble of reading this letter , and me the pleasure of writing it ; which last would be infinitely greater , if i were not at this day too old , and too inconsiderable , and by the change of our government wholly uncapable of performing , either with my brain or my hand , any further service to my country ; for it hath ever been my opinion , that whosoever goes about to make men publickly acquainted with his actions , or apologize to the world for imputat●ons laid upon him , cannot be excused from vanity and impertinence , except his parts and opportunities be such , as may enable him to be instrumental for the good of others , and that he cannot atchieve that excellent end , without justifying himself from having any indirect and base ones , and procuring trust from men , by clearing the repute of his justice and integrity to them . but although this be far from my case ; yet i have yielded ( you see ) to the entreaty of guilio and the rest of that company , not only because i am sufficiently ( both by the restraint of our press , and the discretion of the person i write to ) assured that this letter will never be made publick ; but for that i esteem it a duty to clear that excellent society , from the scandal of having so dangerous and pernicious a person to be a member of their conversation ; for by reason of my age , and since the loss of our liberty , and my sufferings under that monster of lust and cruelty alexander de medeci , set over us by the divine vengeance for our sins , i can be capable of no other design or enjoyment , than to delight and be delighted in the company of so many choice and virtuous persons , who now assemble themselves with all security , under the happy and hopeful reign of our new prince , cosimo , and we may say , that though our common-wealth be not restored , our slavery is at an end , and that he coming in by our own choice , my prove ( if i have as good skill in prophesying as i have had formerly ) ancestor to many renowned princes , who will govern this state in great quietness , and with great clemency ; so that our posterity is like to enjoy case and security , though not that greatness , wealth , and glory , by which our city hath for some years past ( even in the most factious and tumultuous times of our democracy ) given law to italy , and bridled the ambition of foreign princes , but , that i may avoid the loquacity incident to old men , i will come to the business . if i remember well , the exceptions that are taken to these poor things i have published , are reducible to three . first , that in all my writings , i infinuate my great affection to the democratical government , even so much as to undervalue that of monarchy in respect of it , which last i do , not obscurely in many passages , teach , and as it were , perswade the people to throw off . next , that in some places i vent very great impieties , slighting and villifying the church , as author of all the misgovernment in the world , and by such contempt make way for atheism and prophaneness . and lastly , that in my book of the prince i teach monarchs all the execrable villanies that can be invented , and instruct them how to break faith , and to oppress and enslave their subjects . i shall answer something to every one of these ; and that i may observe a right method , will begin with the first . having lived in an age when our poor country and government have suffered more changes and revolutions , than ever did perhaps befall any people in so short a time , and having had till the taking of florence , my share in the managing of affairs , during almost all these alterations , sometimes in the quality of secretary of our city , and sometimes employed in embassages abroad , i set my self to read the histories of ancient and modern times , that i might by that means find out whether there had not been in all ages the like vicissitudes and accidents in state affairs , and to search out the causes of them , and having in some sort satisfied my self therein , i could not abstain from scribling something of the too chief kinds of government , monarchy and democracy , of which all other forms are but mixtures , and since neither my parts nor learning could arrive to follow the steps of the ancients , by writing according to method and art , as plato , aristotle , and many others have done upon this subject , i did content my self to make slight observations upon both ; by giving a bare character of a prince , as to the monarchical frame , and as to the popular chusing the perfectest and most successful of all governments of that kind upon earth , and in my discourses upon it , following the order of my author , without ever taking upon me to argue problematically , much less to decide which of these two gov●rnments is the best ; if from my way of handling matters in my discourses upon livy , and from those incomparable virtues , and great actions we read of in that history , and from the observations i make , men will conclude ( which is , i must confess my opinion ) that the excellency of those counsels and atchievements , and the improvement which mankind , and as i may so say , humane nature it self obtained amongst the romans , did proceed naturally from their government , and was but a plain effect and consequence of the perfection of their common-wealth ; i say if readers will thus judge , how can i in reason be accused for that ; it would become those who lay this blame upon me to undeceive them whom my papers have missed , and to shew the world to what other causes we may impute those admirable effects , those heroick qualities and performance , that integrity and purity of manners , that scorning of riches and life it self , when the publick was concerned : if they please to do this , they will oblige my readers , who will owe to such the rectifying their judgments , and not at all offend me , who have reasoned this matter impartially and without passion , nor have possitively affirmed any thing . but what if this part of my accusation had been true ? why should i be condemned of heresie or indiscretion for preferring a common-wealth before a monarchy ? was i not born , bred , and imployed in a city , which being at the time i writ , under that form of government , did owe all wealth and greatness , and all prosperity to it ? if i had not very designedly avoided all dogmaticalness in my observations ( being not willing to imitate young scholars in the●r declamations ) i might easily have concluded from the premises i lay down , that a democracy founded upon good orders is the best and most excellent government , and this without the least fear of confutation ; for i firmly believe , that there are none but flatterers and sophisters would oppose me , such as will rest aristotle , and even plato himself , to make them write for monarchy , by misapplying some loose passages in those great authors , nay , they will tell their readers , that what is most like the government of the world by god is the best , which wholly depends upon his absolute power ; to make this comparison run with four feet , these sycophants must give the poor prince they intend to diefie , a better and superior nature to humanity , must create a necessary dependance of all creatures upon him , must endow him with infinite wisdom and goodness , and even with omnipotency it self . it will be hard for any man to be misled in this argument by proofs wresled from theology , since whosoever reads attentively the historical part of the old testament , shall find that god himself never made but one government for men , that this government was a common-wealth ( wherein the sanhadrim or senate , and the congegation or popular assembly had their share ) and that he manifested his high displeasure when the rebellious people would turn it into a monarchy ; but that i may not strike upon the rock i profess to shun , i shall pass to that which is indeed ●it to be wip'd off , and which if it were true , would not only justly expose me to the hatred and vengeance of god , and all good men , but even destroy the design and purpose of all my writings , which is to treat in some sort ( as well as one of my small parts can hope to do ) of the politicks ; and how can any man pretend to write concerning policy , who destroys the most essential part of it , which is obedience to all governments . it will be very easie then for guilio salviati , or any other member of our society , to believe the protestation i make , that the animating of private men either directly or indirectly to disobey , much less to shake off , any government how despotical soever , was never in my thoughts or writings ; those who are unwilling to give credit to this , may take the pains to assign in any of my books , the passages they imagine to tend that way , ( for i can think of none my self ) that so i may give such person more particular satisfaction ; i must con●ess i have a discourse in one of my books , to encourage the italian nation , to assume their ancient valour , and to expel the barbarians , meaning ( as the ancient romans used the word ) all strangers from amongst us ; but that was before the kings of spain had quiet possession of the kingdom of naples , or the emperor of the dutchy of milan ; so that i could not be interpreted to mean that the people of those two dominions should be stir'd up to shake off their princes , because they were foreigners , since at that time lodovic sforza was in possession of the one , and k. frederick restored to the other , both natives of italy ; but my design was to exhort our country-men not to suffer this province to be the scene of the arms and ambition of charles the th . or k. lewis his successor , who when they had a mind to renew the old title of the house of anjou to the kingdom of naples , came with such force into italy , that not only our goods were plundered , and our lands wasted , but even the liberty of our cities and governments endangered , but to unite and oppose them , and to keep this province in the hands of princes of our own nation , this my intention is so visible in the chapter it sel , that i need but refer you to it . yet that i may not answer this imputation barely by denying , i shall assert in this place what my principles are in that which the world calls rebellion , which i believe to be not only rising in arms against any government we live under , but to acknowledge that word to extend to all clandestine conspiracies too , by which the peace and quiet of any country may be interupted , and by consequence the lives and estates of innocent persons endangered . rebellion then so described , i hold to be the greatest crime that can be committed amongst men , both against policy , morality , and in foro conscientiae ; but notwithstanding all this , it is an offence which will be committed whilst the world lasts , as often as princes tyranize , and by enslaving and oppressing their subjects make magistracy , which was intended for the benefit of mankind , prove a plague and destruction to it ; for let the terrour and the guilt be never so great , it is impossible that humane nature , which consists of passion as well as virtue can support with patience and submission the greatest cruelty and injustice , whenever either the weakness of their princes , the unanimity of the people , or any other favourable accident , shall give them reasonable hopes to mend their condition , and provide better for their own interest by insurrection . so that princes and states ought in the conduct of their affairs , not only to consider what their people are bound to submit to , if they were inspired from heaven , or were all moral philosophers , but to weigh likewise what is probable de facto to fall out , in this corrupt age of the world , and to reflect upon those dangerous tumults , which have happened frequently not only upon oppression , but even by reason of malversation , and how some monarchies have been wholly subverted and changed into democracies by the tyranny of their princes , as we see ( to say nothing of rome ) the powerful cantons of swisserland brought by that means a little before the last age , to a considerable common-wealth , courted and sought to by all the potentates in christendom . if princes will seriously consider this matter , i make no question but they will rule with clemency and moderation , and return to that excellent maxim of the ancients ( almost exploded in this age ) that the interest of kings , and of their people is the same , which truth it hath been the whole design of my writings to convince them of . i am charged then , in the second place , with impiety , in villifying the church , and so to make way for atheism . i do not deny but that i have very frequently in my writings , laid the blame upon the church of rome , not only for all the misgovernment of christendom ; but even for the depravation and almost total destruction of christian religion it self in this province ; but that this discourse of mine doth , or can tend to teach men impiety ; or to make way for atheism , i peremptorily deny : and although for proof of my innocence herein , i need but refer you and all others to my papers themselves , as they are now published ( where you will find all my reasons drawn from experience , and frequent examples cited , which is ever my way of arguing ) yet since i am put upon it , i shall in a few lines make that matter possibly a little clearer ; and shall first make protestation , that as i do undoubtedly hope , by the merits of christ , and by faith in him , to attain eternal salvation ; so i do firmly believe the christian profession to be the only true religion now in the world : next , i am fully persuaded , that all divine verities , which god then designed to teach the world , are contained in the books of holy scripture , as they are now extant and received amongst us . from them i understand that god created man in purity and innocence , and that the first of that species , by their frailty , lost at once their integrity and their paradise , and inta●l'd sin and misery upon their posterity ; that almighty god to repair this loss , did out of his infinite mercy , and with unparallel'd grace and goodness , send his only begotten son into the world , to teach us 〈…〉 , to be a perfect example of virtue , goodness , and obedience , to restore true religion , degenerated amongst the iews into superstition , formality , and 〈…〉 for the salvation of mankind , and in sine , to give to us the holy spirit , to regenerate our hearts , support our faith , and lead us into all truth . now if it shall appear , that as the lusts of our first paren●s did at that time disappoint the good intention of god , in making a pure world , and brought in by their disobedience the corruptions that are now in it ; so that since likewise the bishops of rome , by their insatiable ambition and avarice , have designedly , as much as in them lies , frustrated the merciful purpose he had , in the happy restauration he intended the world by his son , and in the renewing and reforming of humane nature , and have wholly defaced and spoil'd christian religion , and made it a worldly and a heathenish thing ; and altogether uncapable , as it is practised amongst them , either of directing the ways of its professors to virtue and good life , or of saving thus souls hereafter . if , i say , this do appear i know no reason why i , for detecting thus much , and for giving warning to the world to take heed of their ways , should be accused of impiety or atheism , or why his holyness should be so inraged against the poor inhabitants of the valleys in savoy , and against the albigesi for calling him antichrist ; but to find that this is an undoubted truth , i mean that the popes have corrupted christian religion , we need but read the new testament ( acknowledged by themselves to be of infallible truth ) and there we shall see , that the faith and religion preach'd by christ , and setled afterwards by his apostles , and cultivated by their sacred epistles , is so different a thing from the christianity that is now profess'd and taught at rome , that we should be convinc'd , that if those holy men should be sent by god again into the world , they would take more pains to confute this gallimaufry , than ever they did to preach down the tradition of the pharisees , or the fables and idolatry of the gentiles , and would in probability suffer a new martyrdom in that city under the vicar of christ , for the same doctrine which once animated the heathen tyrants against them . nay , we have something more to say against these sacrilegious pretenders to gods power ; for whereas all other false worships have been set up by some politick legislators , for the support and preservation of government , this false , this spurious religion brought in upon the ruines of christianity by the popes , hath deformed the face of government in europe , destroying all the good principles , and morality left us by the heathen themselves , and introduced instead thereof , sordid , cowardly , and impolitick notions , whereby they have subjected mankind , and even great princes and states , to their own empire , and never suffered any orders of maxims to take place where they have power , that might make a nation wise , honest , great or wealthy ; this i have set down so plainly in those passages of my book which are complained of , that i shall say nothing at all for the proof of it in this place , but refer you thither , and come to speak a little more particularly of my first assertion , that the pope and his clergy have depraved christian religion . upon this subject i could infinitely wish , now letters begin to revive again , that some learned pen would employ it self , and that some person vers'd in the chronology of the church ( as they call it ) would deduce out of the ecclesiastical writers , the time and manner how these abuses crept in , and by what arts and steps this babel that reaches at heaven , was built by these sons of the earth ; but this matter as unsuitable to the brevity of a letter , and indeed more to my small parts and learning , i shall not pretend to , being one who never hitherto studied or writ of theology , further than it did naturally concern the politicks ; therefore i shall only deal by the new tes●ament as i have done formerly by titus livius ; that is , make observations or reflections upon it , and leave you and mr. guilio , and the rest of our society to make the judgment , not citing like preachers , the chapter or verse ; because the reading of holy scripture is little us'd , and indeed hardly permitted amongst us . to begin at the top , i would have any reasonable man tell me , whence this unmeasurable power , long claim'd , and now possess'd by the bishop of rome , is derived , first of being christ's vicar , and by that ( as i may so say ) pretending to a monopoly of the holy spirit ( which was promised and given to the whole church , that is , to the elect or saints ) as is plain by a clause in st. peter's sermon , made the very same time that the miraculous gifts of the spirit of god were first given to the apostles , who says to the iews and gentiles ; repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of iesus christ for the remission of sins , and you shall receive the gift of the holy ghost , for this promise is to you and to your children , and to all that are afar off , even as many as the lord our god shall call , next , to judge infallibly of divine truth , and to forgive sins as christ did . then to be the head of all ecclesiastical persons and causes in the world ; to be so far above kings and princes , as to judge , depose , and deprive them , and to have an absolu●e jurisdiction over all the affairs in christendom , in ordine ad spiritualia ; yet all this the canonists allow him , and he makes no scruple to assume , whilst it is plain that in the whole new testament there is no description made of such an officer to be at any time in the church , except it be in the prophecy of the apocalyps , or in one of st. paul's epistles , where he says , who it is that shall sit in the temple of god , shewing himself that he is god. christ tells us his kingdom is not of this world , and if any will be the greatest amongst his disciples , that he must be servant to the rest , which shews that his followers were to be great in sanctity and humility , and not in worldly power . the apostle paul writing to the christians of those times ; almost in every epistle commands them to be obedient to the higher powers , or magistrates set over them , and st. peter himself ( from whom this extravagant empire is pretended to be derived ) in his firs● epistle , bids us submit our selves to every ordinance of man for the lords sake , whether it be to the king , or , &c. and this is enjoyn'd although it is plain , that they who govern'd the world in those days , were both heathen , tyrants , and usurpers , and in this submission there is no exception or proviso for ecclesiastical immunity . the practice as well as precepts of these holy men shews plainly that they had no intention to leave successors , who should deprive hereditary princes from their right of reigning for differing in religion , who without all doubt are by the appointment of the apostle , and by the principles of christianity , to be obeyed and submitted to ( in things wherein the fundamental laws of the government give them power ) though they were iews or gentiles . if i should tell you by what texts in scripture the popes claim the powers before mentioned , it would stir up your laughter , and prove too light for so serious a matter ; yet because possibly you may never have heard so much of this subject before , i shall instance in a few : they tell you therefore that the jurisdiction they pretend over the church , and the power of pardoning sins , comes from christ to st. peter , and from him to them . thou art peter , and upon this rock i will build my church . i will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven ; whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven , and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth , &c. from these two texts ridiculously applyed , comes this great tree which hath with its branches over-spread the whole earth , and kill'd all the good and wholsom plants growing upon it ; the first text will never by any man of sence be understood to say more , than that the preaching , suffering , and ministry of peter , was like to be a great foundation and pillar of the doctrine of christ ; the other text ( as also another spoken by our saviour to all his apostles , whose sins ye remit they are remitted , and whose sins ye retain they are retained ) are by all the primitive fathers interpreted in this manner , wheresoever you shall effectually preach the gospel , you shall carry with you grace , and remission of sins to them which shall follow your instructions ; but the people who shall not have these joyful tidings communicated by you to them , shall remain in darkness , and in their sins . but if any will contest , that by some of these last texts , that evangelical excommunication , which was afterwards brought into the church by the apostles , was here praesignified by our great master , how unlike were those censures to those now thundered out ( as he calls it ) by the pope ? these were for edification , and not destruction , to afflict the flesh for the salvation of the soul ; that apostolical ordinance was pronounced for some notorious scandal or apostacy from the faith , and first decreed by the church ; that is , the whole congregation present , and then denounced by the pastor , and reached only to debar such person from partaking of the communion or fellowship of that church , till repentance should readmit him , but was followed by no other prosecution or chastisement , as is now practised . but suppose all these texts had been as they would have them , how does this make for the successors of st. peter or the rest ? or how can this prove the bishops of rome to have right to such succession ? but i make haste from this subject , and shall urge but one text more ; which is the spiritual man judgeth all men , but is himself judged of none ; from whence is inferred by the canonists , that first , the pope is the spiritual man ; and then , that he is to be judge of all the world , and last , that he is never to be liable to any judgment himself ; whereas it is obvious to the meanest understanding , st. paul in this text means to distinguish between a person inspired with the spirit of god , and one remaining in the state of nature , which latter he says cannot judge of those heavenly gifts and graces , as he explains himself when he says , the natural man cannot discern the things of the spirit , because they are foolishness unto him . to take my leave of this matter wholly out of the way of my studies , i shall beg of you zenobio and of guilio , and the rest of our society to read over carefully the new tes●ament , and then to see what ground there is for purgatory ( by which all the wealth and greatness hath accrew'd to these men ) what colour for the idolatrous worship of saints , and their images and particularly for speaking in their hymns and prayers to a piece of wood ( the cross i mean ) s●lve lignum &c. and then fac nos dignos beneficiorum christi , as you may read in that office , what colour , or rather what excuse for that horrid unchristian , and barbarous engine called the inquisition , brought in by the command and authority of the pope , the inventor of which , peter a dominican fryer having been slain amongst the albigesi , as he well deserved , is now cannoniz'd for a saint , and stil'd san pietro martine : in the dreadfull prisons of this inquisition , many faithful and pious christians ( to say nothing of honest moral moors or mahometans ) are tormented and famish'd , or , if they out-live their sufferings burnt publickly to death , and that only for differing in religion from the pope , without having any crime , or the least misdemeanor proved or alledged against them , and this is inflicted upon these poor creatures , by those who profess to believe the scripture , which tells us , that faith is the gift of god , without whose special illumination no man can obtain it , and therefore is not in reason or humanity to be punished for wanting it : and christ himself hath so clearly decided that point in bidding us let the tares and the wheat grow together till the harvest , that i shall never make any difficulty to call him antichrist , who shall use the least persecution whatsoever against any di●●ering in matters of faith from himself , whether the person so dissenting , be heretick , iew , gentile , or mahometan : next , i beseech you to observe in reading that holy book ( though christian fasts are doubtless of divine right ) what ground there is for enjoying fish to be eaten ( at least flesh to be abstained from ) for one third part of the year , by which they put the poor to great hardship , who not having purses to buy wholsom fish , are sujected to all the miseries and diseases incident to a bad and unhealthfull dyet , whilst the rich , and chiefly themselves and their cardinals , exceed lucullus in their luxury , of oysters , turbats , tender crabs , and carpioni brought some hundreds of miles to feed their gluttony , upon these penitential days of abstinence from beef and pork . it may be it will lye in the way of those who observe this , to enquire what st. paul means when he says that in the latter days some shall depart from the faith forbidding to marry , and commanding to abstain from meats which god hath created to be received with thanksgiving ; but all these things , and many other abuses brought in by these perverters of christianity , will i hope e're long be enquired into by some of the disciples of that bold fryer , who the very same year in which i prophecyed that the scourge of the church was not far off , began to thunder against their indulgencies , and since hath questioned many tenets long received and imposed upon the world . i shall conclude this discourse after i have said a word of the most hellish of all the innovations brought in by the popes , which is the clergy ; these are a sort of men under pretence of ministring to the people in holy things , set a part and seperated from the rest of mankind ( from whom they have a very distinct , and a very opposite interest ) by a humane ceremony called by a divine namé , viz. ordination , these wherever they are found ( with the whole body of the monks and fryers , who are called the regular clergy ) make a band which may be called the ianizaries of the papacy , these have been the causers of all the soloecisms and immortalities in government , and of all the impieties and abominations in religion , and by consequence of all the disorder , villany , and coruption we suffer under in this detestable age , ; these men by the bishop of rome's help , have crept into all the governments in christendom , where there is any mixture of monarchy , and made themselves a third estate ; that is , have , by their temporaliti●s ( which are almost a third part of all the lands in europe given them by the blind zeal , or rather folly of the northern people , who over-ran this part of the world ) stept into the throne , and what they cannot perform by these secular helps , and by the dependancy their vassals have upon them , they fail not to claim and to usurp , by the power they pretend to have from god and his vicegerent at rome . they exempt themselves , their lands and goods from all secular jurisdiction ; that is , from all courts of justice and magistracy , and will be judges in their own causes , as in matters of tithe , &c. and not content with this , will appoint courts of their own to decide soveraignly in testamentary matters , and many other causes , and take upon them to be sole punishers of many great crimes , as witchcraft , sorcery , adultery , and all uncleanness ; to say nothing of the fore-mentioned judicatory of the inquisition : in these last cases they turn the offenders over to be punish'd ( when they have given sentence ) by the secular arm , so they call the magistrate , who is blindly to execute their decrees under pain of hell fire ; as if christian princes and governours were appointed only by god to be their bravo's or hangmen . they give protection and sanctuary , to all execrable offenders , even to murderers themselves ( whom god commanded to be indispensably punish'd with death ) if they come within their churches , cloysters , or any other place , which they will please to call holy ground ; and if the ordinary justice , nay , the soveraign power , do proceed against such offender , they thunder out their excommunication ; that is , cut off from the body of christ , not the prince only , but the whole nation and people , shutting the church doors , and commanding divine offices to cease , and sometimes even authorizing the people to rise up in arms , and constrain their governours to a submission , as happened to this poor city in the time of our ancestors , when for but forbidding the servant of a poor carmelite fryer ( who had vowed poverty , and should have kept none ) to g● arm'd , and punishing his disobedience with imprisonment , our whole senate with their gonfalonier were constrained to go to avignon for absolution , and in case of refusal , had been massacred by the people . it would almost astonish a wise man to imagine how these folks should acquire an empire so distructive to christian religion , and so pernicious to the interests of men , but it will not seem so miraculous to them who shall seriously consider , that the clergy hath been for more than this thousand years upon the catch , and a form'd united corporation against the purity of religion , and the interest of mankind , and have not only wrested the holy scriptures to their own advantage ( which they have kept from the laity in unknown languages , and by prohibiting the reading thereof ) but made use likewise first of the blind devotion and ignorance of the goths , vandals , huns , &c. and since of the ambition and avarice of christian princes , stirring them up one against another , and sending them upon foolish errands to the holy land , to lose their lives , and to leave their dominions , in the mean time , exposed to themselves and their complices . they have besides kept learning and knowledge among themselves , stifling the light of the gospel , crying down moral virtues as splendid sins , defacing humane policy , destroying the purity of the chistian faith and profession , and all that was vertuous , prudent , regular and orderly upon earth ; so that whoever would do good , and good men service , get himself immortal honour in this life , and eternal glory in the next , would restore the good policy ( i had ▪ almost said with my author livy the sanctity too ) of the heathens , with all their valour , and other glorious endowments ; i say , whoever would do this , must make himself powerful enough to extirpate this cursed and apostate race out of the world , and that you may see this is lawful as well as necessary , i shall say but one word of their calling and original , and then leave this subject . the word clergy is a term , wholly unknown to the scriptures , otherwise than in this sence ; a peculiar people or gods lot , used often for the whole jewish nation , who are likewise called a kingdom of priests in some places . in the new testament the word cleros is taken for the true believers , who are also called the elect , and often the church , which is the assembly of the faithful met together , as is easily seen by reading the beginning of most of st. paul's epistles , where writing to the church , or churches , he usually explains himself , to all the saints in christ ; sometimes , to all who have obtained like faith with us ; sometimes , to all who in all places call upon the name of the lord iesus , &c. by which it appears , that neither the word church nor clergy was in those days ever appropriated to the pastors or elders of the flock ; but did signifie indifferently all the people assembled together ; which is likewise the literal construction of the word ecclesia , which is an assembly or meeting ; in these congregations or churches was performed their ordination , which properly signifies no more than a decree of such assembly ; but is particularly used for an election of any into the ministery . the manner was this , sometimes the apostles themselves in their perigrinations , and sometimes any other eminent member of the church , did propose to the society ( upon vacancy , or other necessity of a pastor , elder , or deacon ) some good holy man to be elected , which person is he had parts or gifts , such as the church could edifie by , was chosen by the lifting up of hands , that is by suffrage , and oftentimes hands were laid upon him , and prayer made for him . these men so set apart did not pretend to any consecration , or sacredness more than they had before , much less to become a distinct thing from the rest of mankind , as if they had been metamorphos'd , but did attend to perform the several functions of their calling , as prophecying ; that is , preaching the gospel , visiting the sick , &c. and never intermitted the ordinary business of their trade or profession , unless their church or congregation was very numerous , in which case they were maintained by alms or contribution , which was laid aside by every member , and collected the first day of the week by the deacons , this was said to be given to the church , and was imployed by suffrage of the whole collective body to the poor , and to other incidencies , so far was it from sacriledge in those days to employ church goods to lay uses . from these words , church , clergy , ordination , pastor , ( which last hath been translated of late years bishop ) you see what conclusions these men have deduced , and how immense a structure they have raised , upon so little a foundation , and how easily it will fall to the ground , when god shall inspire christian princes and states to redeem his truths , and his poor enslaved members out of their clutches , to bring back again into the world , the true original christian faith , with the apostolical churches , pastors , and ordination , so consistent with moral virtue and integrity , so helpful and conducing to the best and most prudent policy , so fitted for obedience to magistracy and government , all which the world hath for many years been deprived of , by the execrable and innate ill quality , which is inseperable from priest-craft , and the conjuration or spell of their new invented ordination ; by which they cry with the poet , iam furor humanum nostro de pectore sensum expulit & totum spirant praecordia phoebum . which makes them so sacred , and holy , that they have nothing of integrity , or indeed of humanity left in them . i hope i shall not be thought impious any longer , upon this point , i mean for vindicating christian religion from the assaults of these men , who having the confidence to believe , or at least profess themselves the only instruments which god hath chosen or can choose to teach and reform the world ( though they have neither moral virtues , nor natural parts equal to other men for the most part ) have by this pretence prevail'd so far upon the common sort of people , and upon some too of a better quality , that they are perswaded their salvation or eternal damnation depends upon believing or not believing of what they say . i would not be understood , to disswade any from honouring the true apostolical teachers , when they shall be re-established amongst us , or from allowing them ( even of right , and not of alms or curtesie ) such emoluments as may enable them cheerfully to perform the duties of their charge , to provide for their children , and even to use hospitality as they are commanded by st. paul. but this i will prophesie before i conclude , that if princes shall perfom this business by halves , and leave any root of this clergy or priest-craft , as it now is , in the ground ; or if that famous reformer , fled some years since out of picardy to geneva , who is of so great renown for learning and parts , and who promises us so perfect a reformation , shall not in his model wholly extirpate this sort of men , then i say i must foretel , that as well the magistrate as this workman , will find themselves deceived in their expectation , and that the least fibra of this plant will over-run again the whole vineyard of the lord , and turn to a diffusive papacy in every diocess , perhaps in every parish : so that god in his mercy inspire them to cut out the core of the ulcer , and the bag of this imposture , that it may never ranckle or fester any more , nor break out hereafter , to diffuse new corruption and putrifaction through the body of christ , which is his holy church , nor to vitiate and infect the good order and true policy of government . i come now to the last branch of my charge , which is , that i teach princes villany , and how to enslave and oppress their subjects , in which accusation i am dealt with as poor agnollo canini was , who , as they report , being a very learned practiser of the laws , and left the only man of this profession ( one autumn ) in our city , the rest of the advocates being fled into the country for fear of a contagious disease which then reigned , was commanded by our judges to assist with his counsel both parties , and to draw pleas as well for the defendant as the plantiff , else the courts of justice must have been shut up . in the same manner my accusers handle me , and make me first exhort and teach subjects to throw off their princes , and then to instruct monarchs how to enslave and oppress them ; but i did not expect such ingratitude from mine own citizens , or to beserved as moses was , when he was upbraided for killing the egyptian , by one of his own people for whose sake he had done it , whereas he believed they would have understood by that action , that he was the person whom god intended to make use of in delivering them from the horrid slavery they were then under . if any man will read over my book of the prince with impartiality and ordinary charity , he will easily perceive , that it is not my intention therein to recommend that government , or those men there described , to the world ; much less to teach them to trample upon good men , and all that is sacred and venerable upon earth , laws , religion , honesty , and what not ; if i have been a little too punctual in designing these monsters , and drawn them to the life in all their lineaments and colours , i hope mankind will know them the better to avoid them , my treatise being both a satyr against them , and a true character of them ; i speak nothing of great and honourable princes , as the kings of france , england , and others , who have the states and orders of their kingdoms with excellent laws and constitution to found and maintain their government , and who reign over the hearts as well as the persons of their subjects ; i treat only of those vermin bred out of the corruption of our own small common-wealths and cities , or engender'd by the ill blasts that come from rome , olivaretto da fermo , borgia , the baglioni , the bentivoglii , and a hundred others ; who having had neither right nor honourable means to bring them to their power , use it with more violence , rapine , and cruelty upon the poor people , than those other renowned princes shew to the boars , the wolves , the foxes , and other savage beasts which are the objects of their chase and hunting : whosoever in his empire over men is ty'd to no other rules than those of his own will and lust , must either be a saint to moderate his passions , or else a very devill incarnate ; or if he be neither of these , both his life and reign are like to be very short ; for whosoever takes upon him so execrable an employment as to rule men against the laws of nature and of reason , must turn all topsie turvy , and never stick at any thing , for if once he halt , he will fall and never rise again : i hope after this i need say little to justifie my self from the calumny of advising these monsters to break their faith , since to keep it is to lose their empire , faithfulness and sincerity being their mortal enemies , an ugucceone della faggivola to one who upbraided him , that he never employed honest men ; answered , honest men will cut my throat , let the king use honest men , meaning the king of naples , who was established in his throne , and had right to it , but that i may have occasion to justifie my self against a little more than i am accused of , i will confess , that in a work where i desired to be a little more serious , than i was in this book of the prince , i did affirm , that in what way soever men defended their country , whether by breaking or keeping their faith , it was ever well defended , not meaning in a strict moral sence , or point of honour , but explaining my self that de facto the infamy of the breach of word , would quickly be forgoten and pardoned by the world , which is very true , nay , what if i had said that good success in any interprize ( a far less cosideration than piety to our country ) would have cancell'd the blame of such perfidy as caesar ( whom i compare to cataline ) us'd toward his fellow-citizen , not only nor detested by posterity , but even crown'd with renown and immortal fame ; insomuch as princes to this day ( as i have observed elsewhere ) think it an honour to be compared to him , and the highest pitch of veneration their flatterers can arrive at , is to call them by the name of one who violated his faith , and enslav'd his country . i hope that in shewing as well these tyrants as the poor people who are forced to live under them , their danger , that is by laying before the former , the hellish and precipitous courses they must use to maintain their power , by representing to the latter , what they must suffer , i may be instrumental , first , to deter private citizens from attempting upon the liberties of their country , or if they have done it , to make them lay down their ill gotten authority ; and then to warn the rest of the nobility and people , from these factions and malignancies in their several common-wealths and governments , which might give hope and opportunity to those who are ambitious amongst them , to aspire to an empire over them . however it prove , i hope i am no more to be blamed for my attempt , then that excellent physician of our nation is , who hath lately taken so much pains to compose an excellent treatise , of that foul disease which was , not long since , brought from the new world into these parts ; wherein though he be forced to use such expressions as are almost able to nauseate his readers , and talk of such ulcers , boyls , nodes , botches , cankers &c. that are scarce fit to be repeated , especially when he handles the causes of those effects , yet he did not intend to teach or exhort men to get this disease ; much less did he bring this lamentable infirmity into the world , but describes it faithfully as it is , to the end men may be bettered , and avoid the being infected with it , and may discern and cure it , whenever their incontinence and folly shall procure it them . i shall say no more in this matt●r ; but to conclude all make a protestation , that as well in this book , as in all my other writings , my only scope and design is to promote the interest and welfare of mankind , and the peace and quiet of the world , both which i am so vain as to believe , would be better obtained and provided for , if the principles i lay down were followed and observed hy princes and people , than they are like to be by those maxims which are in this age most in vogue . for my self i shall only say ( and call you all to witness for the truth of it ) that as by my birth i am a gentleman , and of a family which hath had many gonfaloniers of justice in it ; so i have been used in many employments of great trust , both in our city and abroad , and at this hour i am not in my estate one peny the better for them all , nor should i have been , although i had never suffered any losses by the seisure of my estate in the year . for my carriage it hath ever been void of faction and contention ; i never had any prejudice against the house of medici , but honoured the persons of all those of that family whom i knew , and the memory of such of them as lived before me , whom i acknowledge to have been excellent patriots and pillars of our city and common-wealth . during the turbulent times of piero , and after his expulsion out of florence , though my employments were but ministerial , my advice was ask'd in many grave matters , which i ever delivered with impartiality and indifference , not espousing the heady opinions of any , much less their passions and animosities ; i never sided with any party further than that the duty of my charge obliged me to serve the prevailing party , when posses'd of the government of our city ; this i speak for those changes which happened between the flight of the said piero de medici , and the horrid parricide commited by clement the th . upon his indulgent mother , joyning with his greatest enemies , and uniting himself with those who had used the most transcendent insolence to his own person , and the highest violence and fury the sun ever saw to his poor courtiers and subjects , that so accompanied he might sheath his sword in the bowels of his own desolate country . at that time , and during that whole seige , i must confess i did break the consines of my nutrality , and not only acted as i was commanded barely , but rouz'd my self , and stir'd up others haraunging ( in the streets places of the city ) the people to defend with the last drop of their blood , the walls of their country . and the liberty of their government ; taking very hazardous journey to ferruccio , and then into the mugello and other parts , to bring in succours and provisions to our languishing city ; and acting as a soldier ( which was a new profession to me ) at the age of above sixty , when others are dispensed from it . for all which , i had so entire a satisfaction in my mind and conscience , that i am perswaded this cordial made me able to support the sufferings which befell me after our catastrophe , and to rejoyce in them so far , that all the malice and cruelty of our enemies , could never draw one word from me unsutable to the honour i thought i merited , and did in some sort enjoy , for being instrumental to defend ( as long as it was possible ) our altars and our hearths . but all that i have undergone , hath been abundantly recompenced to me by the favour and courtesie of the most excellent signior cosimo , who hath been pleased to offer me all the preferments the greatest ambition could aspire to , which i did not refuse out of any scruple to serve so incomparable a prince , whose early years manifest so much courage , humanity , and prudence , and so fatherly a care of the publick good , but because i was very desirous not to accept of a charge which i was not able to perform , my years and infirmities having now brought me to a condition in which i am fitter to live in a cloyster than a palace , and made me good for nothing but to talk of past times , the common vice of old age : so that i did not think it just or grateful to reward this excellent person so ill for his kindness , as to give him a useless servant , and to fill up the place of a far better . this is all i think fit to say of this matter , i chuse to address it to you zenobio , for the constant friendship i have ever entertained with you , and formerly with your deceased father , the companion of my studies , and ornament of our city . and so i bid you farewel . the first of april , . the history of florence , containing an account of the heroick enterprizes , publick and private transactions ; with the civil dissentions , changes and alterations in that government also an account of the affairs of italy , and the actions , designs and contrivances of most of the princes and states therein ▪ in eight books . by nicolas machiavel . london , printed for iohn starkey , charles harper , and iohn amery , at the miter , the flower-de-luce , and the peacock , in fleetstreet . . the epistle to clement , vii being commanded by your holiness ( whilst in a private condition ) to writ the history of florence , i addressed my self to it with all the art and diligence wherewith nature and experience had enduced me . having deduc'd it to the times , in which , upon the death of magnifico lorenzo de medici , the whole form and model of italy was altered ; and being to describe the height and importance of what followed in a loftier and more vigorous stile , i judged it best to reduce what i had written till those times into one volume , and present it to your holiness , that you might at least have a taste of the fruit you had sown your self , and of my labour and cultivation . in the perusal of this work your holiness will see first , to what ruine and convulsions our country was exposed for many ages by the variations of governments , after the declension of the roman empire in the west . you will see how your predecessors , the venetians , the kingdom of naples , and the dukedom of milan took their turns of empire and soveraignty in this province . you will see your own country refusing obedience to the emperors , by reason of the divisions , and those divisions continuing till under the protection of your family , it began to settle into a government . and because it was your holiness particular command , that in my character of your ancestors , i should avoid all kind of flattery , truepraise not being morepleasing to you , than counterfeit is ungrateful ; fearing in my description of the bounty of giovanni , the wisdom of cosimo , the courtesie of piero , the magnificence and solidity of lorenzo , i may seem to have transgressed your holiness direction , i do most humbly excuse my self , both in that , and whatever else in my descriptions may appear unfaithful to your holiness dissatisfaction ; for finding the memoirs and relations of those who in sundry ages made any mention of them , full of their commendations , i must either present them as i found them , or pass them by as if i envied them . and if ( as some write ) under their great and egregious exploits there was always some latent and ambitious design , contrary to the interest and liberty of the publick . i know nothing of it , and am not bound to relate it : for in all my narrations i never desired to cloak or palliate a dishonourable action , with an honourable pretence ; nor to traduce a good action , tho to a contrary end . but how far i am from flattery , is to be seen in the whole course of my history , especially in my speeches , and private discourses , which do plainly , and without reservation , describe with the sentences , and order of their language , the dignity and humour of the persons . i avoid likewise in all places such words as are impertinent to the verity , or reputation of history , so that no man who considers my writings impartially , can charge me with adulation ; especially if he observes how little or nothing i have said of your holiness own father , whose life was too short to discover him to the world , & i too downright to expatiate upon it . nevertheless had he done nothing more but given your holiness to the world , that very thing outweighs all the actions of his ancestors & shall leave more ages of honour to his family , than his malevolent fortune took years from his life . i have endeavored , ( most holy sir ) as far as might be done without blemish to the truth , to please all people , and it may so fall out i have pleased no body . if it should , i should not wondder , seeing in my judgment it is impossible to write any thing of our own times , without offence to several . yet i come forth cheerfully into to the field , hoping that as i am honoured and employed by your holiness goodness i shall be defended by your holiness judgment ; and then with the same confidence & courage as i have writ now ; i shall pursue my engagements if my life lasts , & your holiness continues amongst us . the author's introduction . when i first took upon me to write the history of florence , and its transactions both at home and abroad , i thought to have begun at the year , at which time the family of the medici ( exalted by the merits of cosimo , & his father giovanni ) was in greater authority that any other in that city ; believing that messer leonardo d' arezzo , and messer poggio , two excellent historians , had given particular description of all the passages before . but upon diligent perusal of their writings to inform my self of their orders and methods , that thereby my own might have better approbation , i found that in their narratives of the florentine wars , and foreign negotiations , they had been accurate enough ; but in their civil dissentions , their intrinsick animosities , and in the effects which followed them , they were either totally silent , or where any thing was mentioned , it was with such brevity and abruptness as could yield neither profit nor recreation to the reader . which i conceive they did , either out of an opinion , that they were inconsiderable , and unworthy to be transmitted to posterity ; or else they apprehended a necessity of reflecting upon some great persons , whose family would be disobliged thereby ; both which arguments ( if i may speak it without offence ) are beneath the grandeur and magnanimity of a great person . for if any thing in history be delightfull or profitable , it is those particular descriptions ; if any thing be usefull to such citizens as have the government in their hands , it is such as represents the feuds and dissentions in the cities , that thereby they m●●be enabled to maintain their own unity at other peoples expence ; if the example of any common-wealth moves a man , certainly that which is written of ones own makes a much stronger impression ; and if the factions of any state were ever considerable , the factions in florence were not to be pretermitted ; the greatest part of other states have not had above one , which sometimes has advanced , aud sometimes ruined the government ; but florence has had many divisions . everybody knows how in rome after the expulsion of their king , there arose division betwixt the nobles and the people , which continued till one of them was oppressed . so it was in athens , and all the commonwealths which flourished in those times ; but in florence the first dissention was betwixt the nobles ; the next betwixt the nobles and citizens ; and then betwixt the citizens and the plebs : in all which , one was no sooner superior , but it divided again ; and the effects of those divisions were murders , and banishments , and dispersion of families , such as never occurr'd in any city , that can be remembred . and truly in my judgment , nothing demonstrates the power of our city so much as the consequences of those divisions , which were enough to have subverted and destroyed any other in the world . but ours grew still greater thereby ; so remarkable was the courage of the citizens , and so efficacious their industry for the advancement of their country , that those few which surviv'd the miseries of their predecessors , did more by their constancy & courage towards the advancement of their interest , than the malignity of those accidents could do to depress it . and doubtless had florence been so happy after it had freed it self from the empire , to have assum'd such a form of government as would have preserv'd it in unity , i know not any commonwealth , either ancient or modern , that would have exceeded it , or have been comparable to it , either in riches or power . for it is observable , after the ghibilins were driven out of the town in such numbers as all tuscany and lombardy were full of those exiles ; the guelfs , and such as were left behind in the expedition against arezzo ( which was the year before the battle of campaldino ) were able to drawout of their own citizens horse , and foot , and afterwards in the war against philippo visconti duke of milan being to try their fortune rather withtheir riches than their arms ( which at that time were very much weakened ) in five years space ( which was the length of that war ) the florentines expended five millions , and florens ; and when that war was composed , to ostentate and publish the power of that commonwealth , they marched out with an army , and besieged lucca i do not see therefore , for what reason these divisions should not be worthy of relation ; and if those noble authors were restrained by fear of offending the memory of such as they were to speak of , they were mightily out , and seem not to have understood the ambition of mankind , and their desire to have the names of themselves and ancestors transmitted to posterity ; nor did they remember that many people , not having opportunity to make themselves eminent by good and laudable acts , have endeavoured to compass it by any way , how scandalous and ignominious soever . neither did they consider that the actions which carry greatness along with them , as those of governments and states , what ends soever they , have and which way so●ever they are described , do still leave more honour than infamy to their family ; the consideration of which things prevailed with me to alter my design , and to begin my history from the very foundation of the city : and because it is not my intention to transcribe what has been done before by other people , i shall relate such things only as occurr'd within the city to the year ● , mentioning the accidents abroad only so far as will be necessary for the intelligence of the other ; after which year i shall give a particular description both of the one and the other . besides , for the better and more lasting understanding of this history , before i treat of florence , i shall discourse of the means by which italy fell under the dominion of those potentates which govern'd it at that time ; all which shall be comprehended in my four first books : the first shall give a short recital of all transactions in italy , from the dissolution of the roman empire to the year . the second shall give an account of all affairs from the foundation of the city of florence , to the end of the war against the pope , which commenc'd upon the expulsion of the duke of athens : the third shall conclude with the death of ladislaus king of naples : and in the fourth we shall end with the year , from whence afterwards to our present times we shall give a particular narrative of all proceedings both within the city and without . the table of the florentine history . book i. the northern nations healthful and prolifick pag. their method of evacuation upon their excessive encrease ibid. their excessive encrease , the ruine of the roman empire ib. the western gothes the first invaders of that empire ib. rome sack'd by them under the command of alaricus boniface governor of africk for the emperor ib. gallia over-run by the franks , and from them called france ib. the h●nni conquer and denominate hungaria ib. britain called anglia from the angli ib. the hanni invade italy under attila ib. attila besieges and takes aquilegia ib. he advances to rome , but retires at the request of the pope the hanni driven back over the danube , return home ib. the first residence of the roman emperors at ravenna ib. new emperors elected by the romans upon the non-residence of their old ib. the lombards invade italy ib. odoacres call'd king of rome , and the first of the barbarians which thought of fixing in italy ib. the old empire divided into cantons ib. theodorick invades italy , slays odoacres , calls himself king of rome , and held his residence at ravenna ib. theodorick dies ballasarius general for justinian the emperor ib. totila takes , sacks , and burns rome ib. nars●tes a new general for juskinian ib. longinus alters the government in italy ib. albo●ns kill'd by the conspiracy of his wife ib. the authority of the bishops of rome began to encrease ib. bishops of rome employed as ministers by the emperors and kings , and sometimes executed by them the eastern empire destroyed in the times of heracleus the emperor ib. the king of france exempts the pope from all humane jurisdiction pascal created pope ib. the original of cardinals ib. eugenius the second pope ib. ospurcus made pope , changes his name ib. the original of pisa ib. the government of italy , anno ib. agabito pope gregory the fifth pope , expelled and restored , devests the romans of their power of creating emperors , and confers it upon six princes of germany ib. clement the second pope ib. nicholas the second pope , excludes the romans , and renounces the papal elections to the suffrage of cardinals only ib. schism and anti-popes in the church ib. the difference between henricus and the pope , the ground of the guelf and ghibilin factions ib. the original of the kingdom of sicily ib. urbin the second pope ib. the first croissade ib. pascal the second pope alexander the third pope ib. a new anti-pope ib. the pope's penance to king henry of england , upon the complaints about thomas becket ib. celestin the third pope honorius the third pope ib. the orders of st. dominick and st. francis instituted , . ib. the titles of king of naples and jerusalem annexed ib. the house of the esti made lords of ferrara . the guelfs side with the church , the ghibilins with the emperor ib. innocent the fourth pope ib. clement the fifth pope ib. adrian the fifth pope ib. nicholas the third of the house of ursin . the first introduction of popes nephews . ib. martin the tenth pope ib. pope celestine resigns to boniface the eighth ib. the first iubilees ordained by boniface every years benedictus chosen , dies , and is succeeded by clement the fifth , who removed his residence into france , . ib. john the th . pope ib. the visconti a great family in milan , made princes of that city by the extirpation of the torri ib. the first duke of milan ib. the dukedom of milan falls to the flora's the original of the venetians ib. candia given to the venetians by the french benedict the twelfth pope ib. clement the sixth pope ib. the iubilee reduced to years avignon given to the pope by the queen of naples ib. innocent the sixth pope ib. urban the fifth pope ib. gregory the twelfth pope ib. the pope returns to rome after years residence in france ib. urban the sixth pope ib. clement the seventh anti-pope ib. guns first used between the genoeses and venetians ib. urban and clement succeeded by boniface the th . and benedict the th . ib. boniface dies , innocent succeeds him ; and gregory the th . innocent alexander the fifth elected , and succeeded by john the d . ib. three popes at once ib. martin the fifth ib. the queen of naples calls in the king of arragon to her assistance , adopts him , and makes braccio de montone her general the state of italy ib. book ii. the convenience of colonies the original of florence the denomination of florence ib. the first division of florence the guelf and ghibilin faction in florence ib. the union and government of the city of florence the antlani ib. the captain of the people and podesta ib. their militia ib. a generous custom ib. manfredi king of naples , a great patron of the ghibilins ib. carlo d' angio call'd into italy by the pope a new model of government in florence ib. new commotions in florence ib. a second model by the guelfs gregory the tenth pope ib. florence under excommunication ib. innocent the th . ib. the jealousie of the pope ib. nicholas the third pope ib. the ghibilins return ib. martinus pope the government of florence reformed by the citizens ib. the three priors to govern two months ; to be chosen out of the city indifferently ib. the signori ib. discord between the nobility and people ib. the priory and gonfalonier ib. persuasions to the nobility to be quiet the same to the people ib. new reformation in florence , the difference in the family of the cancellieri , the occasion and consequence ib. the bianchi and neri ib. charles of valois made governor of florence new troubles occasioned by corso donati the medici and giugni florence burned , . ib. corso donati condemned his death ib. new divisions in florence castruccio castracani the council of the signori to sit forty months , whereas before it was occasional election of magistrates by imborsation . ib. romondo da cordona general of the florentines ib. the duke of athens governor of florence ib. lodowic the emperor called into italy the death of castruccio and the duke of calabria ib. new reformation in florence ib. the florentines quiet at home ib. their buildings ib. a captain of the guards maffeo da marradi ib. lucca sold to the florentines taken from them by the pisans ib. the duke of athens ib. the speech of one of the senators to the duke of athens the duke's answer the duke of athens chosen prince by the people ib. his practices in florence ib. three conspiracies against the duke at one time commotion in france the duke expell'd his character ib. new reformation the nobility deposed ib. the nobility attempt to recover their authority the people arm against them ib. the nobility utterly depressed book iii. emulation betwixt the middle and the meaner sort of people the citizens oration to the senate new reformation gregory the th . holds his residence at avignon ib. new commission for the management of the war ib. a conspiracy of the guelfs the conspiracy defeated ib. the speech of salvestro de medici the balia ib. reformation again luigi guicciardini 's oration ib. new troubles the speech of a plebeian the people rise again the demands of the people michaele di lando , a carder of wooll . ib. michael overcomes the multitude the popular faction distinguished from the plebeian ib. another reformation the commons expelled from the government michael lando imprisoned ib. benedetto's speech to his friends upon his going into banishment ib. he dies at rhodes veri de medici 's speech to the senate donato acciaivoli confin'd a new conspiracy defeated ib. the duke of milan practises against the city of florence several families banished ib. the king of naples dies ib. book iv. peace betwixt florence and milan imola taken by the duke philip the florentines overthrown ib. rinaldo albizi's exhortation to be quiet giovanni de medici 's reply to rinaldo the factions of urano and the medici the great courage of biagio del milano ib. the cowardize of zenobi del pino ib. piccinino revolts carmignuola general of the league ib. peace betwixt the league and the duke giovanni de medici's speech to his sons at his death ib cosimo heir to his father volterra revolts ib. recovered again by the florentines ib. rinoldo persuades to war with lucca urano opposes it ib. the cruelty of astorre rinaldo accus'd his speech to the ten pagolo lord of lucca deposed the florentines defeated ib. peace between the florentines and the lucchesi ib. florence in confusion cosimo medici deposed and imprisoned federigo's speech to cosimo his prisoner ib. cosimo banished rinaldo's speech to his friends ib. eugenius the pope labours a peace cosimo recalled ib. rinaldo's answer to the pope ib. book v. the souldiers in italy distinguished into two parties the duke of milan promises his daughter to count francis sforza ib. the pope invaded , makes peace with sforza ib. wars in romagna ib. sforza general of the pope's league peace betwixt the league and the duke ib. new ordinances in florence ib. alphonso king of arragon defeated by the genoeses , and brought prisoner to duke philip the duke and his authority in genoa . ib. genoa delivered to the duke of milan how it recovered its liberty again ib. rinaldo's oration to the duke of milan ib. the speech of a citizen of lucca to the people controversies between the greek and roman churches determined at florence , by the submission of the greek ib. the pope deluded , and his country invaded by nich. piccinino the speech of neri , a citizen of florence , to the venetian senate nicolo piccinino defeated by count sforza he scapes to fenna , and from thence very strangely to his army ib. verona surprized by nicolo recovered again by the count ib. the duke of milan encouraged in his expedition into tuscany by nicolo and the florentine exiles the patriarch of alexandria general for the pope ib. the pope discovers intelligence between the patriarch and nicolo , and resolves to secure him ib. is secured by antonio governor of the castle at rome , and dies commissioners from the venetians to the count ib. nicolo makes a diversion into the territories of florence the count desirous to follow him , but is hindred by the venetians ib. of nicolo's proceeding after he left lombardy , nicolo's practices to surprize crotona brescia relieved by the venetians ib. the duke of milan's fleet defeated by the venetians ib. nicolo engages the florentines at anghiari , and is defeated by them ib. the speech of count poppi to the florentine commissaries neri's answer ib. book vi. the duke of milan proposeth a peace to count sforza , and offereth his daughter in marriage to the count the ingratitude of the venetians ib. micheletto general for the league ib. nicolo's insolence to the duke of milan peace between the duke of milan and count sforza ib. naples taken by the king of arragon florence reformed nicolo piccinino dies of grief ; a couragious , but unfortunate general ib. a new war in lombardy count sforza courted by all parties ib. the duke of milan dies ib. the count made general for the milanesi the venetians ambitious of the dutchy of milan . ib. alphonso invades the florentines ib. retreats out of tuscany the venetians fall upon count sforza in his trenches at the siege of caravaggio , and are totally routed by the count peace between the venetians and the count , by which the venetians were obliged to assist the count in his obtaining the dutchy of milan . an oration made by one of the milan embassadors to the count ib. the count's answer cosimo de medici a friend to the count the venetians assist the milanesi against the count the milanesi reduced to great straits by sforza ib. milan delivered to sforza , and he made duke thereof , enters into a league with the florentines the king of arragon and the venetians enter into a league ib. their embassy to the florentines ib. the florentines answer . ib. the florentines prepare war federigo the emperor comes into italy to be crown'd , and enter florence ib. the king of arragon invades tuscany ib. the strange conceit and undertaking of a citizen of rome peace between the duke of milan and the venetians ib. the king of arragon enters into the league the pope solicits a war against the turk ib. a prodigious tempest ib. the genoesi invaded by the king of arragon genoa delivered to the french ib the king of arragon dies ib. calisto the third dies , and pius the second chosen pope the genoesi revolt from the french ib. naples invaded by giovanni d' angio ib. the king of naples defeated ib. he recruits his army , fights and defeats giovanni ib. giovanni being defeated , and deserted of his souldiers , flies into france ib. book vii . cosimo de medici , and neri capponi , the two great citizens in florence cosimo dies his children , riches , honours , and actions described , , giacopo piccinino murdered francesco sforza duke of milan dies . the florentines invaded by the venetians peace between the florentines and venetians piero de medici's speech to the florentines ib. his death thomaso soderini in great favour with the florentines ib. lorenzo and guiliano de medici made princes of the city of florence . ib. a conspiracy of the nardi bernardo defeated , and taken the duke of milan in florence ib. tumults in volterra ib. volterra surrendred and sacked italy in two factions troubles in tuscany ib. a conspiracy against the duke of milan takes effect , and the duke slain , book viii . a nimosity between the parri ▪ and the medici in florence 〈…〉 a conspiracy to destroy lorenzo and 〈◊〉 de medici ib. rinati del pazzi disswades from the enterprize , but in vain the conspiracy miscarries the pope and king of naples make war upon the florentines lorenza de medici's speech to the florentines ib. the pope and king invades their territories genoa rebels against the state of milan ib. the gratitude of the florentines the pope's army defeated lodovico sforza governor of milan lorenzo de medici arrives at naples the isle of rhodes assaulted by the turks the duke of calabria defeated a new league ib. castello besieged by the army of the pope the coloni provoke the pope , and are 〈◊〉 in rome 〈◊〉 the company of s. giorgio 〈◊〉 aquila rebels against the king of ●●●ples 〈◊〉 is protected by the pope 〈…〉 the genoe●es 〈…〉 the venetians defeated 〈◊〉 count girolamo 〈…〉 his death revenged by his 〈…〉 galeotto lord of faenza 〈…〉 wife 〈◊〉 the character of lorenzo de 〈…〉 his death 〈◊〉 a table of the several chapters in the prince . chap. i. the several sorts of governments , and how they are obtained chap. ii. of hereditary principalities ib. chap. iii. of mix'd principalities chap. iv. why the kingdom of darius , usurp'd by alexander , did not rebel against his successors after alexander was dead chap. v. how such cities and principalities are to be govern'd , who before they were subdued , lived under their own laws and constitutions . chap. vi. of principalities acquir'd by ones own proper conduct and arms chap. vii . of new principalities acquir'd by accident and supplies from other people chap. viii . of such as have arrived at their dominion by wicked and unjustifiable means chap. ix . of civil principalities chap. x. how the strength of all principalities is to be computed chap. xi . of ecclesiastical principalities chap. xii . the several forms of military discipline , and of those souldiers which are called mercinary chap. xiii . of auxiliaries , mix'd souldiers , and natives chap. xiv . the duty of a prince in relation to his militia chap. xv. of such things as render men ( especially princes ) worthy of blame or approbation chap. xvi . of liberality and parsimony chap. xvii . of cruelty and clemency , and whether it is better for a prince to be loved , or feared chap. xviii . how far a prince is obliged by his promise chap. xix . princes are to be cautious of making themselves either odious , or contemptible chap. xx. whether the building of citadels , and other things that princes many times do , be profitable , or dangerous chap. xxi . how a prince is to demean himself to gain reputation chap. xxii . of the princes secretaries chap. xxiii . how flatterers are to be avoided chap. xxiv . how it came to pass that most of the princes of italy have lost their dominions chap. xxv . how far in human affairs fortune may avail , and in what manner she may be resisted chap. xxvi . an exhortation for the delivery of italy from the barbarians the original of the words guelf and ghibilin . the life of castruccio the relation of the murder committed upon vitellozzo vitelli oliveretto da fermo , pogolo , and the duke de gravina , ( all of the house of the ursini ) by the machination and management of duke valentine the state of france in an abridgment the state of germany in an abridgment a table of the discourses . book i. chap. i. what have been generally the principles of all cities , and particularly of rome chap. ii. the several kinds of common-wealths ; and under which kind the roman is comprehended chap. iii. upon what accidents and tumults in rome the tribune of the people was created , by which that commonwealth became more perfect chap. iv. the dissentions betwixt the senate and the people of rome , were the occasion that commonwealth became so powerful and free chap. v. where the guardianship of liberty may be most securely deposited , whether among the people or nobility : and which has greater occasion to tumultuate , he that would acquire more , or he that would defend , and keep what he has chap. vi. whether in rome such a form of government could be established , as should take away the animosities betwixt the senate and the people chap. vii . how necessary it is for the conservation of a state , that any citizen be securely accused chap. viii . unjust calumnies are no less pernitious to a commonwealth , than legal accusations are profitable and good . chap. ix . how much a single person is necessary for the establishment of a new common-wealth , or the reformation of an old chap. x. as they are to be praised who lay the foundations of any republick or kingdom , so they are to be condemned who set up a tyranny chap. xi . of the religion and ceremonies of the romans chap. xii . how necessary for the preservation of a state it is , that religion be in esteem , and how much italy has suffered for want of it , by means of the church of rome chap. xiii . how the romans pretended religion many times to regulate their city , to prosecute their wars , and to pacify their tumults chap. . the romans were wont to interpret their auspices with accommodation to their own pleasures and designs ; and when at any time they were forced to transgress , they managed it wisely , and pretended to be very precise ; and if any body rashly despised them , he was sure to be punished chap. . how the samnites in the extremity of their affairs , as their last refuge , had recourse to religion chap. . a people accustomed to the dominion of a prince , though by accident they may acquire their liberty , yet it is with great difficulty , if they maintain it chap. . a people wholly corrupted in their manners , may possibly recover their liberty , but they will find insuperable difficulty to maintain it chap. . a corrupt city having made it self free , how its liberty may be maintained ; and not having made it self free , how its liberty may be procured chap. . though a weak prince succeeds an excellent the government may stand ; but if one weak prince succeeds another , 't is impossible chap. . two good princes , immediately succeeding , may do great things ; and well-grounded commonwealths having always a virtuous succession , their conquests and acquisitions must of necessity be according chap. . how much that prince or common-wealth is to be condemned , which neglects to train up souldiers of its own ib. chap. . what is to be observed from the combat betwixt the three roman horatii , and the three alban curia●ii chap. . that our whole fortune is not to be ventured upon part of our force , and that for that reason the keeping of passes is many times dangerous ib. chap. . in well ordered governments , offence and desert are never set one against the other , but he who does well , is rewarded , and he who does otherwise , is punished chap. . though it is many times convenient to reform the old fundamental customs of a free city , yet it is convenient still to retain some shadow and appearance of their ancient ways chap. . a new prince in a new conquest , is to make every thing new ib. chap. . men are as seldom perfectly bad , as they are perfectly good chap. . for what reasons the romans were less ingrateful to their citizens , than the athenians ib. chap. . whether the prince , or the people , is most subject to be ingrateful chap. . what rules a●e to be observed by a prince or commonwealth to avoid this vice of ingratitude , and how a general or great citizen is to demean himself to elude it chap. . that the romans used no extraordinary punishments towards their great captains , when they committed an error of ignorance , or malice , pr●vided the government was not damnified by it chap. . a commonwealth or prince is not to defer his beneficence till the necessity of the object requires it chap. . if an inconvenience encreases either within a state , or against it ; it is better to temporize and comply , than to endeavour to remove it by violence chap. . the dictatorship was useful , not hurtful to the commonwealth of rome ; and how that power which is usurp'd , and illegally assumed , is pernitious to a state , not that which is conferred legally by the suffrage of the people chap. . how it came to pass that the creation of the decem-virat was prejudicial to the liberty of that state , though it was done freely , and by publick suffrage chap. . citizens who have executed the greatest offices , ought not afterwards to disdain or scruple the less chap. . what troubles and offence was created in rome by the agrarian law ; and how dangerous it is to make a new law opposite to an old custom , with too much retro-spection ib. chap. . weak commonwealths are generally irresolute , and ill advised , as taking their measures more from necessity than election chap. . divers people have many times the same accidents chap. . the creation of the decem-virat in rome ; what things are most remarkable in it ; and how far such a constitution may be useful or pernicious to a common-wealth chap. . for a mean man to grow immediately insolent , or a meek man immmediatly cruel , without just steps of gradation , is both imprudent and unprofitable chap. . how easily mens manners are corrupted ib. chap. . those souldiers which fight for their own honour are the best , and most to be trusted chap. . a multitude without an head is altogether unserviceable ; nor is any man to threaten that has any thing to desire ib. chap. . 't is a thing of ill example to break a new law , especially for the maker : and 't is no less dangerous to the governor of a state , to multiply injuries , and repeat them every day chap. . how men leap from one passion to another , and how they who at first aim at nothing but self-preservation , when secured of that , grow oppressors of other people chap. . though the people , in things that are discussed in general , are many times mistaken , yet when they are reduced to particulars , they are more sensible and judicious chap. . to prevent the advancement of mean people to the magistracy , it is particularly to be contrived that the competition be betwixt the best and most noble , and the wickedist and most abject chap. . if those cities which have been free from their foundation ( as rome ) have found it difficult to contrive such laws as might maintain them so . those which have been always servile , will find it almost impossible chap. . no magistrate or council ought to have power to check or controul the publick acts of the city chap. . a prince or commonwealth that is constrained to do a thing , is to seem to do it frankly , and without any compulsion ib. chap. . the best and most secure way to repress the insolence of an ambitious and powerful state , is to preclude and stop up those ways by which he would come to his greatness chap. . the people ( deceived with a false appearance of good ) do many times desire that which turns to their destruction : and how great hopes and large promises do easily debauch them chap. . how great the authority of a grave man is , to asswage the tumultuousness of the people chap. . how easily things are managed in a city where the commons are incorrupt ; how hard it is to erect a principality where there is not an equality ; and where it is not , a commonwealth is impossible chap. . great accidents , before they happen to any city or province , are commonly prognosticated by some sign , or predicted by some men chap. . the multitude united , is fornidable and strong , but separated , is weak and inconsiderable ib. chap. . that the multitude is wiser , and more constant than a prince chap. . what leagues or confederacies are most to be trusted ; those which are made with princes , or those which are made with free states chap. . how the consulship , and other dignities in rome were conferred without respect of age book ii. chap. . whether the virtue or fortune of the romans was the occasion of the greatness of their empire chap. . with what nations the romans contended , and with what obstinacy those nations resisted chap. . it contributed much to the grandeur of the city of rome , that they ruined the neighbouring cities , and admitted strangers to their own dignities and priviledge chap. . there are three ways which commonwealths have taken to enlarge their territories chap. . the variation of religion and languages , with the accidents of deluges and plagues , have been the cause that many great things have been forgotten chap. . how the romans proceeded in making of war. chap. . what proportion of land the romans allowed to every man in their colonies chap. . what it is that disposes some people to leave their native countries , to dispossess other people ib. chap. . what those occasions are which do most commonly create war among princes chap. . that , according to the common opinion , mony is not the sinews of war ib. chap. . 't is not discretion to enter into strict amity with a prince , whose reputation is greater than his strength chap. . upon an apprehension of being invaded , whether it be better to make war , or expect it ib. chap. . that from mean to great fortune , people rise rather by fraud , than by force chap. . many people are mistaken , who expect with meekness and humility to work upon the proud chap. . weak states are irresolute and uncertain in their councils , and slow councils are most commonly pernicious chap. . how much the souldiers of our times do differ from the discipline of the antients chap. . how the armies of our times are to judge of artillery , and whether the general opinion of it be true chap. . how by the authority of the romans , and the universal discipline of the ancients , the foot are more serviceable than the horse chap. . the conquests of commonwealths that are ill governed , and contrary to the model of the romans , do conduce more to the ruine than advancement of their affairs chap. . no prince or commonwealth , without manifest danger , can employ foreign forces , either auxiliary , or mercenary chap. . the first praetor which the romans ever sent out of their own city , was to capua , and that was years after they began first to make war chap. . how uncertain the judgment of most people are in things of greatest importance chap. . how the romans upon any accident which necessitated them to give judgment upon their subjects , avoided always the mid-way chap. . that in the generality , castles and citadels do more mischief than good chap. . to attempt a city full of intestine divisions , and to expect to carry it thereby , is uncertain and dangerous chap. . he who contemns or reproaches another person , incurs his hatred without any advantage to himself ib. chap. . wise princes , and well govern'd states , ought to be contented with victory ; for many times whilst they think to push things forward , they lose all chap. . how much it is for the interest of all governments , that all injury be punished , whether against the publick , or particular persons chap. . fortune casts a mist before peoples eyes , when she would not have them oppose her designs chap. . princes and republicks that are truly magnificent , do not make their leagues and alliances with mony , but by their virtue , reputation , and force chap. . how dangerous it is to believe exiles too far chap. . how many several ways the romans used to conquer their towns chap. . how the romans upon any expedition , gave their generals general commissions book iii. chap. . that a sect or commonwealth be long-liv'd , it is necessary to correct it often , and reduce it towards its first principles chap. . 't is the part of a wise man sometimes to pretend himself a fool chap. . the liberty newly acquired , could not have been preserved , but by the execution of brutus his sons chap. . a prince is never safe in his new conquests , whilst they are in being , whom he dispossessed chap. . how a king may lose his kingdom , though he comes to it by inheritance ib. chap. . of conspiracies chap. . how it comes to pass that in the changes of state , from liberty to servitude , and from servitude to liberty , some are very innocent , and others very bloody chap. . he who would change the form of a government , is to consider seriously upon what grounds he does it , and the disposition of the subject chap. . how he that would succeed , must accommodate to the times chap. . a general cannot avoid fighting ; when the enemy is resolved to engage him upon any terms chap. . one person that has many enemies upon his hands , though he be inferior to them , yet if he consustain their first impression , carries commonly the victory chap. . a wise general is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own army , but to prevent it to his enemies chap. . whether we are more safe in a good general with a bad army , or a good army with a bad general chap. . what strange effects new inventions have sometimes in a battel , and how new noises have the same chap. . one general is best for an army , and that to govern it by commissioners , is not so good chap. . that in times of difficulty , virtue is in esteem ; in times of ease and luxury ; men of riches and alliance are in greatest request chap. . a man is not to be disobliged , and employed afterwards in any matter of importance chap. . nothing is more honourable in a general , th●n to foresee the designs of his enemy chap. . whether for the government of the multitude , obsequiousness and indulgence be more necessary than punishment chap. . one instance of humanity wrought more upon the falisci than all the force of the romans chap. . how it came to pass that hanibal , by methods quite contrary to what were practised by scipio , did the same things in italy that the other did in spain ib. chap. . how the austerity of manlius torquatus , and the humanity of valerius corvinus gain'd each of them the same honour and reputation chap. . upon what occasion camillus was banished from rome chap. . the prolongation of commissions brought rome first into servitude ib. chap. . of the poverty of cincinnatus , and several other citizens of rome chap. . women are many times the destruction of states chap. , how the civil discords in a city are to be composed , and of the falsity of that opinion ; that the best way to keep a city in subjection , is to keep it divided ib. chap. . a strict eye is to be kept upon the citizens ; for under pretence of officiousness , and piety , there is hid a principle of tyranny chap. . that the transgressions of the people do spring commonly from the prince ib. chap. . a citizen who would do any great matter by his own authority , must first extinguish all envy . in what matter things are to be ordered upon the approach of an enemy , and how a city is to be defended chap. . powerful states , and excellent persons , retain the same mind and dignity in all kind of conditions chap. . the ways which some people have taken to prevent a peace chap. . to the obtaining a victory , it is necessary your army has a confidence not only in one another , but in their general chap. . what vogue , fame or opinion disposes the people first to favour some particular citizen ; and whether they , or a prince , distributes their offices with most prudence and judgment chap. . what dangers they incur , who make themselves authors of any enterprize ; and the more extraordinary the design , the greater the danger chap. . the reason why at the first charge , the french have been , and still are accounted more than men , but afterwards less than women chap. . whether fighting in small parties , or pickeering before a battel be necessary ; and how the temper of a new enemy is to be found without them chap. . how a general is to be qualified , that his army may rely upon him chap. . a general ought to know the country , and how to take his advantage in the ground chap. . how fraud in the management of war is honourable and glorious chap. . that ones country is to be defended by all means , and whether honourable or dishonourable , it imports not , 't is well defended ib. chap. . that forc'd promises are not binding . chap. . those who are born in the same country , retain almost the same nature thorow all the variety of times ib. chap. . confidence and boldness does many times obtain that which would never be compassed by ordinary means chap. . whether in a battel it is best to give or receive the charge chap. . how it comes to pass that in a city the same family retains the same manners and customs a long time ib. chap. . a good citizen is to forget all private injury , when in competition with his love to his country chap. . when any enemy commits any grand fault , 't is to be suspected for a fraud ib. chap. . a commonwealth which desires to preserve it self free , has need of new provisions every day ; and upon what score fabius was called maximus . a table of the art of war. ccap . i. how the seigneur fabritio colonna being refreshing himself one evening with some other gentlemen in a beautiful garden , took occasion to enter upon this discourse of war. chap. . a person of honour and condition is not to make war his profession chap. . how a commonwealth ought not ( in prudence ) to permit any of its citizens to make war their profession chap. . that a king ought not to permit his subjects to make arms their profession , for the mischiefs which do frequently ensue chap. . in what countries the best souldiers are to be raised chap. . whether it be best to choose you men out of the cities , or country chap. . of the inconvenience , and convenience of trained-bands , or a setled militia chap. . of what sort of people an army is to be composed . chap. . how the romans raised their legions chap. . whether it is best for a militia to consist of a great number or a small chap. . how the inconveniencies which follow great armies , may be prevented chap. . of the cavalry . book ii. chap. . what arms were most used by the ancients in their wars . chap. . of the arms which are used at present , and of the invention of the pike chap. . whether the ancient or modern is the best way of arming . ib. chap. . how foot should be arm'd , and of the force and convenience of men at arms chap. . the difference betwixt men at arms and foot , and upon which we are most to rely chap. . how the souldiers were exercised chap. . of what number of men , and of what arms a battalion is to consist ; and of exercising in companies to make them ready either to give a charge , or receive it chap. . of three principal ways of drawing up a company , and putting them into a posture to fight chap. . the manner of rallying souldiers after a rout , and to make them face about a whole company at a time chap. . to range a company in such order that it may be ready to face the enemy , on which side soever he comes chap. . to draw up a company with two horns , or another with a piazza , or vacuity in the middle chap. . of the baggage and train belonging to a company ; how necessary it is that they have several officers , and of the usefulness of drums chap. . a discourse of the author about military virtue ; and how it is become so despicable in our days chap. . what number of horse are to be put into a battalion , and what proportion is to be observed for their baggage book iii. chap. . the order observed by the roman legions when a battel was presented chap. . the form observed in their battels by the macedonian palanx chap. . how the swisses ordered their battalions ib. chap. . how the author would make use of both greek and roman arms for his battalion , and what was the ordinary army of the romans chap. . the way of drawing up a battalion , according to the intention of the author chap. . the description of a battel chap. . the author's reasons for the occurrences in the battel chap. . the exercises of an army in general book iv. chap. . the considerations and subtilties to be used in the drawing up an army to fight chap. . the arts which are to be used during the fight chap. . stratagems after the fight chap. . two other ways of ranging an army to fight ib. chap. . of the constraint and advantage a man may have to fight chap. , directions for a general chap. . which way a battel is to be avoided , though pressed never so earnestly by the enemy ib. chap. . how souldiers are to be encouraged to fight ; and how they are to be cooled and asswaged when their courage is too high chap. . a general ought to be skilful and eloquent to persuade or dissuade as he sees occasion ib. chap. . certain considerations which encourage souldiers , and make them as virtuous as valiant book v. chap. . how the romans marched in an enemies country , and in what manner they are to be imitated chap. . how an army is to be marshalled to march in an enemies country chap. . how to put an army presently into order , and draw it up , so as if upon a march it should be attack'd , it may defend it self on all sides chap. . of commands derived by word of mouth , by drums and trumpets , and of the nature of pioneers chap. . of the provisions that are necessary for an army ib. chap. . how the ancients divided the spoil ; and of the pay which they gave to their souldiers chap. . to know the surprizes which are contriving against you upon your march chap. . one is to know the country perfectly well thorow which he is to pass , and keep his enterprizes secret ib. chap. . of certain things which are requisite upon a march chap. . how to avoid fighting near a river , though pressed by the enemy ; and in what manner you may pass it ib. chap. . how to make your passage thorow a streight , though you be pressed by an enemy book vi. chap. . what kind of places the greeks and the romans chose out for their camps , with a short recapitulation of what has been said before chap. . the form of a camp chap. . of the several watches and guards about the camp chap. . to observe who goes and comes to the camp ib. chap. . of military iustice , and the method used by the ancients in the punishment of offenders ib. chap. . the ancients had neither women , nor gaming in their armies ; and of the manner how they discamp'd chap. . the safety and health of a camp is to be regarded , and it is by no means to be besieged chap. . directions as to provisions ib. chap. . how to lodge more or less than four battalions , and what number of men is sufficient to make head against an enemy , be he as numerous as he may chap. . certain artifices and advertisements of war ib. chap. . how to rid ones self of an army that is pressing upon ones h●els chap. . how a man may make a princes favourite suspected , and divide his forces chap. . in what manner seditions and mutinies in an army are to be appeased chap. . how the ancient●s relyed much upon their auguries , and other accidents ib. chap. . that we are not to fight with an enemy reduced to despair ; and several arts that may be used to surprize him chap. . how a suspected town or country is to be secured , and how the peoples hearts are to be gained chap. . war is not to be continued in the winter ib. book vii . chap. . how towns or castles are to be fortified chap. . what order is to be observed by him who shuts himself up in a town , with resolution to defend it chap. . advertisements for such as are distressed for provisions within a town , and for such as besiege them , and would reduce them to that necessity chap. . other advertisements both for the besiegers and the besieged ib. chap. . a man is not to depend upon the countenance of the enemy , but is rather to suspect what even he sees with his eyes chap. . how to disfurnish a garison of its men , and to bring a terror upon a town ib. chap. . to corrupt a garison , and take it by treachery chap. . good guard is to be kept in all places and times ib. chap. . ways to write privately to ones friends chap. . how to repair a breach , and the way to defend it ib. chap. . of mines chap. . good guards are always to be kept , and your souldiers not to be divided ib. chap. . that when one sees himself block'd up on every side , it is good to expose ones self now and then ; and of the advantages which have ensued ib. chap. . general rules to be observed in military discipline chap. . the way to have many horse in your country chap. . a general is to invent of himself , and not follow altogether the practises of his predecessors chap. . the author returns , and with a short discourse concludes his book ib. the marriage of belphegor the first book of the history of florence . by nicholas machiavel . to his holiness clement the vii . the people which live north-ward beyond the rhine and the danube , being born in a healthful and prolifick clime , do many times increase to such insustainable numbers , that part of them are constrained to abandon their native , in quest of new countries to inhabit . when any of those provinces are overcharged , and disposed to disgorge ; the order they observe is , to divide into three parts , so equally that each of the three consists of a just proportion of noble and ignoble , rich and poor . after which they cast lots , and that part to whose fortune it falls , marches off to new quarters where they can be found , while the other two disburden'd of their supernumeraries remain behind , and injoy their own patrimonies in peace . these inundations and redundancies of people were the destruction of the roman empire , to which the emperours themselves gave great opportunity ; for having forsaken rome , the ancient seat of the empire , and remov'd their residence to constantinople , they left the western empire more weak , as being more remote from their inspection , and by consequence more obnoxious both to their governours and enemies . and indeed , for the destruction of an empire founded upon the bloud of so many brave men , there could not be less carelesness in the princes , less treachery in the ministers , nor less force and impetuosity in those who invaded : for one inundation being unable , several conspir'd and at last effected its ruine . the first from those northern countries who invaded that empire , ( after the cimbri which were vanquish'd by marius a citizen of rome ) were the visi goti or western goths , who after some skirmishes and conflicts upon the consines of the empire , were by concession of the emperours assigned , and for a long time permitted quietly to possess a part of the countrey along the danube . and although upon several occasions , and at sundry times they invaded the roman provinces ; yet by the vigilance and power of the emperours they were always repell'd . the last that overcame them so gloriously , was theodosius , who having subdu'd them to his obedience , they did not ( as formerly ) create themselves a king , but contented themselves with his government and pay , they submitted to both , and serv'd him faithfully in his wars . but theodosius being dead , and his two sons arcadius and honorius succeeding ; not inheriting his virtue and fortune as well as his crown , the empire began to decline , and the times ( as their emperour ) to grow worse and worse . to the three parts of the empire , theodosius in his life-time had preferred three governours ; ruffinus to the east , stilico to the west , and gildo to the south ; who all of them after the death of theodosius despising the title of governours , resolv'd to make themselves kings . gildo and ruffinus miscarried in their first enterprise and were ruin'd : but stilico being better at hypocrisie than his brethren , endeavoured to insinuate and work himself into a confidence with the emperours , yet with design so to perplex and disturb their affairs , that he himself might afterwards with more ease leap up into the saddle . to incense the visigots , and provoke them to mutiny , he counsel'd the emperours to abate and retrench their former allowance ; and least they should not be sufficient for the molestation of the empire , he contrived that the burgundi , franchi , vandali and alani , ( northern people like the other , and in motion for new quarters ) should fall likewise upon the roman provinces . the visigoti as soon as they found themselves retrench'd , that they might be in better order to revenge it , created alaricus their king , under whose conduct they assayl'd the empire ; and after several rencounters and accidents , they over-ran all italy , and sack'd rome . not long after , alaricus died , and was succeeded by ataulfus , who marrying placidia the emperours sister , articled upon the match , to assist in the relief of france and spain , which provinces were at that time much infested by the vandali , burgundi , alani , and franchi upon the aforesaid occasion . ataulfus undertook only the vandali , who having possest themselves of that part of spain call'd betica , being press'd hard by the visigoti , and distressed beyond all remedy , they were call'd over by boniface ( who at that time govern'd africk for the emperours ) to come and plant there , for those provinces being then in rebellion , he was afraid his ill administration might be discovered . this invitation and their own exigence concurring , the vandals embrac'd that enterprize , and performed many memorable and brave things in africk , under gensericus their king. in the mean time theodosius the son of arcadius succeeded to the empire , who regarding but litle the affairs of the west , gave those nations the first thoughts of fixing in their new conquests . accordingly the vandali in africk , the alani and visigoti in spain , began to set up for themselves , and lord it over the natives . the franchi , and the burgundi , not only over-run and possess'd themselves of france , but according to the parts they possest , they gave it their names ; one of them being call'd francia , and the other burgundia . the success of their camrades inviting new multitudes to the subversion of the empire , the hunni fell upon pannonia ( which is a province upon the banks of the danube ) and giving it their name , have denominated it hungaria to this very day . then as an addition to the disorders , the emperour finding himself attacked in so many places , to contract the number of his enemies ; he began first to treat and capitulate with the vandals , then with the franks , which treaty increas'd the authority of the barbarians , and diminish'd his own . nor was the island of great britain ( call'd england at this day ) exempt from its troubles : for the britains grown apprehensive of the people which had conquered france , and not discerning which way the emperour would be able to defend them , call'd in the angli ( a nation in germany ) to their assistance . the angli , under the conduct of vortiger their king , undertook their defence , and at first behav'd themselves faithfully ; afterwards their opportunity increasing with their power , they drove the natives out of the island , possess'd themselves of it , and gave it their name in commutation for its liberty . being robb'd of their countrey , and made valiant by necessity , though they were not able to recover their own , the britains began to think of invading some other , and planting themselves there . in this resolution they cross'd the seas with their whole families , and possess'd themselves of those parts which lie upon the coasts of france , and are call'd britain to this day . the hunns ( who as was said before ) had over-run pannonia , being streightned and disturb'd in their quarters by other nations , viz. the zepidi , eruli , turingi and ostrogoti ( or eastern goths ) they rose again , and put themselves once more in motion for new habitations . not being able to force their way into france , which was at that time defended by the barbarians , they fell into italy under attila their king , who not long before ( to rid himself of a partner in the government ) had slain bleda his own brother , and by that means made himself absolute . andaricus king of the zepidi , and velamir king of the ostrogoti remained as his subjects . attila having in this manner made his inroad into italy , he besieg'd aquilegia , lay ( without interruption ) two years before it , wasted the countrey round about it , and dispersed the inhabitants , which ( as we shall afterwards declare ) was the occasion of building the city of venice . after he had taken , sack'd and demolish'd aquilegia , and several other towns , he advanc'd towards rome , but forbore the destruction of it upon the intercession of the pope , for whom attila had so great a reverence and veneration , that upon his single persuasion , he withdrew out of italy into austria , where he died . after attila's death , velamir king of the ostrogoti , with the commanders of other nations , took up arms against tenricus and eurius , attila's sons . one of them they kill'd , and forc'd the other with the hunni back again over the danube into their own countrey : upon which the ostrogoti and zepidi plac'd themselves in pannonia , and the eruli and turingi remain'd upon the bank of the danube . attila being departed out of italy , valentinianus at that time emperour of the west , had a design to repair that empire ; and for his capacity of defending it with more ease and convenience against the irruptions of the barbarians , he quitted rome , and setled his residence at ravenna . the calamities wherewith the western empire had been oppressed , were the occasion that the emperour residing at constantinople , had many times transfer'd the possession of it to other people as a thing of great danger and expence , many times without the emperour's permission ; the romans seeing themselves deserted , had created new emperours in order to their defence ; and sometimes other persons taking advantage of their own interest and authority , usurp'd , as it happen'd when maximus a citizen of rome , got possession of it after the death of valentinianus , and forc'd his widow eudoxa to take him for her husband , who desirous of revenge , and disdaining ( being of imperial extraction ) the embraces of so inferiour a person , she invited privately gensericus king of the vandals into italy , remonstrating the easiness and utility of the conquest ; who allured by the prize , was without much difficulty perswaded . he entred italy with his army , march'd up to rome , found it abandon'd , sack'd it , and continued in it fourteen days ; after which he took and plundr'd several other towns , and having laden both himself and his army with the spoyl , he return'd into africk . the romans returning ( upon his departure ) maximus being dead , they made avicus ( a roman ) emperour . after many occurrences both within italy and without , and the death of several emperours , the empire of constantinople fell into the hands of zeno , and the empire of rom● ( by stratagem and artifice ) to orestes , and augustulus his son , who , preparing to defend it by force , were invaded by the eruli and turingi ( plac'd as we said before upon the banks of the danube ) confederate for that expedition under the command of odoacres their general . of such places as they had thought good to baulk and leave empty , the lombards possessed themselves , a northen nation like the rest , and commanded by godoglio their king , which were the last people that plagued italy , as shall be shown in its place . odoacres having made his way into italy , he encountred , vanquish'd , and slew orestes near pavia , but augustulus got off after this victory , that the title might change with the government , odoacres caus'd himself to be call'd king of rome , and was the first chieftain of those nations ( which at that time over-ran the whole world ) that thought of fixing in italy ; for ( either suspecting their abilities to keep it , by reason of the easiness and facility wherewith it might be reliev'd by the emperour of the east , or for some other secret cause ) the rest had ravag'd and plunder'd it , but they always retir'd , and sought out other countreys for their establishment and plantation . in those days , the ancient empire of rome was reduc'd under these princes . zeno governing in constantinople , commanded the whole empire of the east . the ostrogoti commanded mesia : the visigoti , pannonia : the suevi and alani , gascoigne and spain : the vandali africa : the franchi and burgundi , france : the eruli and turingi , italy . the kingdom of the ostrogoti was devolv'd upon a nephew of velamir's call'd theodorick , who retaining an amity with zeno emperour of the east , writ him word , that his ostrogoti being in valour superiour to other nations , they thought it injust and unreasonable to be inferiour in territory and command , and that it would be impossible for him to confine them within the limits of pannonia . that being therefore necessitated to comply , and suffer them to take up arms in quest of new countreys , he could do no less than give him timely advertisment , that he might provide against the worst , and if he pleas'd assign them some other countrey , which by his grace and favour they might inhabit with more latitude and convenience . whereupon zeno partly out of fear , and partly desirous to drive odoacres out of italy , directed theodorick against him , and gave him that countrey for his pains , when it was his fortune to catch it . theodorick accepts the proposition , removes from pannonia ( where he left the zepidi his friends ) and marching into italy , slew odoacres and his s●n , call'd himself king of rome by his example , and made ravenna his residence , upon the same reasons as had prevail'd before with valentinian : theodorick was an excellent person both in war and peace . in the first he was always victor , in the last a continual benefactor , as that city and that nation experimented often . he divided his ostrogoti into several countreys , appointing governours over them , that might command in time of wars , and correct in time of peace . he inlarged ravenna , and repair'd rome , and restor'd all its priviledges , except its military discipline . without any noise or tumult of war , by his own single wisdom and authority , he kept all the barbarian princes ( who had cantonized the empire ) in their just bounds . he built several towns and castles between the adriatick-sea and the alps , to obstruct any new incursion by the barbarians ; and had not his many virtues been sulli'd and eclipsed towards his latter end by some cruelties he committed upon a jealousie of being depos'd ( as the deaths of symmachus and boetius , both of them virtuous men , do sufficiently declare ) his memory would have been this day as honourable , as his person was then : for by his vertue and bounty , not only rome and italy , but all the rest of the western empire was freed from the continual conflicts , which for so many years it indur'd by the frequent irruption of the barbarians , and reduc'd into good order and condition : and certainly if any times were ever miserable in italy , and those provinces which were over-run by the barbarians , they were the times betwixt the reigns of a●cadius and honorius , and his ; for if it be consider'd what inconveniences , and damage do generally result to a common-wealth or kingdom upon alteration of prince or government , especially if effected not by forreign force , but civil dissention : if it be observed , how fatal the least changes prove to common-wealth or kingdom how potent soever , it may easily be imagin'd how much italy and other provinces of the roman empire suffer'd in those days , losing not only their government , but their laws , customs , conversations , religions , language , habits , and even their names ! the thoughts of any one of which things ( without so great an accumulation ) would make the stoutest heart to ake , much more the seeing and feeling of them . and as this was the destruction , so it was the foundation and augmentation of many cities . in the number of those which were ruin'd was aquileia , luni , chiusi , popolonia , fiesole , and many others . among those which were new built , were venice , siena , ferrara , l' aquila , and several other both towns and castles , which for brevity sake i omit . those which from small beginnings became great and considerable , were florence , genoa , pisa , milan , naples , and bolonia , to which may be added the ruine and reparation of rome , and several other cities which were demolish'd and rebuilt . among these devastations , and inroads of new people , there sprang forth new languages , as is visible by what is us'd both in france , spain , and italy , which being mixt with the language of their invaders and the ancient roman , is become new , and clear another thing to what it was before . besides not only the provinces lost their names , but particular places , rivers , seas , and men ; france , italy , and spain , being full of new appellatives , quite contrary to what they were of old ; as the po , garda , and archipelago , for rivers and seas ; and for men , in stead of cesar and pompey , they began to be call'd peter , iohn , matthew , &c. but among all these variations , the changing of their religions was of no less impor●ance : for the custome and prescription of the ancient faith being in combat and competition with the miracles of the new , many tumults and dissentions were created , which had the christian church been unanimous and entire , would never have happen'd : but the greek , the roman , the church at ravenna being in contention , and the heretick , with the catholick as furiously zealous , they brought great misery upon the world , as africa can witness , which suffer'd more by their arrianism ( which was the doctrine of the vandals ) than by all their avarice and cruelty . whilst men lived expos'd to so many persecutions , the terrour and sadness of their hearts was legible in their faces ; for besides the multitude of calamities they endured otherwise , great part of them had not power to betake themselves to the protection of god almighty ( who is the surest refuge of all that are in distress ) for being uncertain whither their devotions were to be directed , they died miserably without any . theodorick therefore deserved no small praise , who was the first which gave them respite from the multitude of their evils , and restored italy to such a degree of grandeur in the thirty eight years which he raigned there , that there was scarce any thing to be seen of its former desolation : but when he died , and the government devolv'd upon atalaricus the son of amalasciunta his sister , in a short time ( the malice of their fortune being not exhausted as yet ) they relaps'd , and fell over head and ears into their old troubles again : for atalaricus dying not long after him , the kingdom fell into the hands of his mother , who was betray'd by theodate , ( a person she had call'd in to assist her in the government . ) she being remov'd , and he made king , to the great dissatisfaction of the ostrogoths , to whom that usurpation had made him insufferably odious ; iustinian the emperour took courage , began to think of driving him out of italy , and deputed bellisarius his general for that expedition , who before had conquer'd africa , driven out the vandals , and reduc'd it under that empire again . having first possessed himself of sicily , and from thence passed his army into italy , bellisarius recovered naples and rome . the goths foreseeing their destruction ; kill'd theodate their king as the occasion of all , and elected vitegetes in his place , who after several skirmishes was at length besieged and taken in ravenna by bellisarius , who ( not prosecuting his victory as was expected ) was call'd back by iustinian , and his command given to iohannes and vitalis , who were much short of him both in virtue and conversation ; so that the goths took heart , and created ildovado their king , who was at that time governour of verona : and being kill'd shortly after , the kingship fell to totila ; who beat the emperours forces , recover'd tuscany , and subdu'd the governours of all those provinces which bellisarius had reduc'd . upon which misfortune iustinianus thought it necessary to send him again into italy ; but returning with small force , he rather lost what he had gained before , than acquir'd any new reputation . for totila ( whilst bellisarius lay incamped with his army at hostia ) besieg'd rome , and took it as it were under his nose ; and then upon consideration that he could neither well keep nor relinquish it , he demolish'd the greatest part of it , forcing away the people , and carrying the senators as prisoners along with him , and taking no notice of bellisarius , he advanc'd with his army into calabria to encounter and cut off certain supplies which were sent out of greece to reinforce him . bellisarius seeing rome abandon'd in this manner , addressed himself to a very honourable enterprise , and entring the city , repair'd the walls withall possible celerity , and re-invited the inhabitants when he had done . but fortune concurr'd not to the nobleness of his design : for iustinianus being at that time invaded by the parthi , bellisarius was call'd back to repell the invasion . in obedience to his master , he marched his army out of italy , and left that province to the discretion of the enemy , who seized again upon rome , but us'd it not so barbarously as before , being wrought upon by the prayers of saint benedict ( a person very eminent in those times for his sanctity ) he apply'd himself rather to repair than destroy it . in the mean time iustinian had made a peace with the parthi , and resolving to send new supplies into italy , he was diverted by a new alarm from the sclavi ( another northern people ) who had pass'd the danube , and fallen upon illyria and thrace : so that totila had his full swing , and was in a manner in possession of all italy . as soon as iustinian had conquer'd the sclavi , and setled the countreys which they had invaded , he sent a new army into italy under the conduct of narsetes an eunuch , a brave captain , and of great experience in the wars . being arrived in italy , he fought , beat , and kill'd totila , after whose death the remainder of the goths retir'd into pavia , and made teia their king. on the other side , narsetes after his victory took rome , and than marching against teia he ingaged him about nocera , defeated his army , and slew him among the rest : by which disaster the very name of the goths was well near extinguish'd in italy , where they had reigned from the time of theodorick , to this teia , full seventy years . but italy was scarce warm in its liberty , when iustinianus dy'd , and left his son iustinus to succeed , who by the counsel of his wife sophia , recall'd narsetes out of italy , and sent longinus in his place . longinus , according to the example of his predecessors , kept his residence at ravenna , in other things he digress'd , and particularly by introducing a new form of government in italy , not constituting governours in every province as , the goths had done before , but deputing a captain in every city or other town of importance , with the title of duke . nor in this distribution did he show any greater favour to rome , than to the rest ; for removing the consuls and senate ( names which to that time had been sacred among them ) he constituted a duke which he sent every year from ravenna , and his government was call'd the dukedom of rome . but lie that more immediately represented the emperour at ravenna , and had the universal government of italy , was call'd esarco . this division not only facilitated the ruine of italy , but hasten'd it exceedingly by giving the lombards opportunity to possess it . narsetes was much disgusted with the emperour for calling him off from the command of those provinces which by his own vertue , and effusion of his bloud he had acquir'd : and sophia not thinking it injury sufficient to get him recall'd , had given out contumelious words , as if she would make him spin among the rest of the eunuchs . whereupon in great disdain narsetes incourag'd alboino king of the lombards , ( who at that time govern'd in pannonia ) to invade italy and possess it . as was shown before , the lombards were enter'd and had taken possession of such places upon the danube as had been deserted by the eruli and turingi , when odoacres their king conducted them into italy . they had continued there some time , till their kingdom fell to alboino , for a daring and couragious man , under whom passing the danube , they encounter'd with commodus king of the zepidi ( a people planted in pannonia ) and overcame him . among the rest rosmunda one of commodus daughters was taken prisoner , whom alboinus took for his wife , made himself lord of her countrey , and mov'd by the barbarousness of his nature , he caus'd a cup to be made of her father's skull , and in memory of that victory , drank out of it very often . but being call'd into italy by narsetes , with whom he had retain'd a friendship in his wars with the goths ; he left pannonia to the hunni ( who as we said before , return'd into their own countrey after the death of attila ) march'd into italy , and finding it so strangly cantoniz'd and divided , he possessed ( or rather surpriz'd ) pavia , milan , verona , vicenza , all tuscany , and the great part of flaminia ( call'd now romagnia ) ; so that presuming from the greatness and suddenness of his conquests , all italy was his own , he made a solemn feast at verona , where much drinking having exalted his spirits , and commodus his skull being full of wine , he caus'd it to be presented to rosmunda the queen , who sat over against him at the table , declaring ( and that so loud she could not but hear ) that at a time of such hearty and extraordinary mirth , it was fit she should drink one cup with her father . which expression touching the lady to the quick , she resolv'd to be reveng'd ; and knowing that almachilde , a young and valiant lombard , had an intrigue with one of her maids , she prevail'd that she might personate her one night , and lie with him her self . accordingly almachilde being introduc'd upon a time into a very dark place , he injoy'd rosmunda instead of her maid . the business being done , rosmunda discover'd her self , told him what was pass'd ; that now it was at his choice , whether he would kill alboino , and injoy her and her kingdom , or be kill'd himself for vitiating his wife . almachilde had no fancy to be slain , and therefore chose the other proposition of killing his master ; but when they had kill'd him , they found themselves so far from acquiring the kingdom , that they were afraid of being made away by the lombards , out of the affection they bare to the memory of alboino ; for which cause packing up with all the jewels and treasure they could make , they marched off to longinus at revenna , who receiv'd them honourably . during these troubles , iustinus the emperour died , and tiberius was elected in his place ; but being imploy'd in his wars against the parthians , he was not at leasure to send relief into italy . which longinus looking upon as an opportunity to make himself king of the lombards , and of all italy besides , by the help of rosmunda and her treasure ; he imparted his design to her , and perswaded her to kill almachilde , and take him afterwards for her husband . she accepted the motion , and having in order thereunto prepar'd a cup of poison , she gave it with her own hand to almachilde as he came thirsty out of a bath , who having drank off half , finding it work , and great convulsions within him , concluding what it was , he forc'd her to drink the rest , so that in a few hours both of them died , and longinus lost all hopes of making himself king. in the mean time at a convention of the lombards at pavia ( which they had made their metropolis ) they created clefi their king , who re-edified imola , that had been destroyed by narsetes . he conquer'd rimini , and in a manner all up as far as rome , but died in the middle of his cariere . this clefi behav'd himself so cruelly , not only to strangers , but even to the lombards themselves , that the edge of their monarchical inclination being taken off , they would have no more kings , but constituted thirty , they call'd dukes , to govern under them . which counsel was the cause the lombards extended not their conquests over all italy , nor dilated their dominion beyond benevento , rome , ravenna , cremona , mantua , padua , monfelice , parma , bolonia , faenza , furli , cesana ; some of them defended themselves for some time , other never fell at all under their subjection . for having no king , they were first render'd unapt for the wars ; and when afterwards they reassum'd their old government , and created kings again , the small relish and taste the people had had of liberty , render'd them less obedient to their prince , and more contentious among themselves , and not only put a stop to the cariere of their victories at first , but was the occasion afterwards , that they were driven out of italy . things being in this posture with the lombards ; the romans , and longinus came to terms with them , and it was agreed , that arms should be laid down on all hands , and each enjoy what was in their proper possession . about this time the bishops of rome began to take upon them , and to exercise greater authority than they had formerly done . at first the successors of saint peter were venerable and eminent for their miracles , and the holiness of their lives ; and their examples added daily such numbers to the christian church , that to obviate or remove the confusions which were then in the world , many princes turned christians , and the emperour of rome being converted among the rest , and quitting rome , to hold his residence at constantinople ; the roman empire ( as we have said before ) began to decline , but the church of rome augmented as fast . nevertheless , untill the coming in of the lombards , all italy being under the dominion either of emperours or kings , the bishops assumed no more power than what was due to their doctrine , and manners ; in civil affairs , they were subject to the civil power , imploy'd many times by the emperours and kings , as their ministers ; and many times executed for their ill administration . but theodorick king of the gothi , fixing his seat at ravenna , was that which advanc'd their interest , and made them more considerable in italy ; for there being no other prince left in rome , the romans were forc'd for protection to pay greater allegiance to the pope . and yet their authority advanc'd no farther at that time , than to obtain the preference before the church of ravenna . but the lombards having invaded , and reduc'd italy into several cantons ; the pope took the opportunity , and began to hold up his head : for being as it were governour and principal at rome , the emperour of constantinople and the lombards bare him a respect , so that the romans ( by mediation of their pope ) began to treat and confederate with longinus and the lombards , not as subjects , but as equals and companions ; which said custom continuing , and the popes entring into allyance sometimes with the lombards , and sometimes with the greeks , contracted great reputation to their dignity : but the destruction of the eastern empire following so close under the reign of the emperour heracleus , in whose time the schiavi ( a people we mention'd before ) fell again upon illyria and over-ran it , and call'd it sclavonia , from their own name . the other parts of that empire being infested first by the persians , afterwards by the saracens , out of arabia , under the conduct of mahomet , and last of all , by the turks , and having lost several provinces which were members of it , as syria , africa , and egypt : the pope lost the convenience of the emperours protection in time of adversity , and the power of the lombards increasing too fast on the other side , he thought it but necessary to address himself to the king of france for assistance ; so that the wars which hapned afterwards in italy , were occasioned by the popes , and the several inundations of barbarians , invited by them ; which manner of proceeding having continued to our times , has held , and does still hold italy divided and in●irm . but in my description of occurrences betwixt those times and our own , i shall not inlarge upon the ruine of the empire , which in truth receiv'd but little assistance from the popes , or any other princes of italy , till the dayes of charles the th . but discourse rather how the popes with their censures , comminations and arms , mingled together with their indulgences , became formidable and reverenced , and how having made ill use both of the one and the other , they have lost the one entirely , and remain at the discretion of other people for the other . but to reurn to our order . i say that gregory the third being created pope , and aistolfus king of the lombards ; aistolfus contrary to league and agreement , seiz'd upon ravenna , and made war upon the pope : gregory not daring ( for the reasons abovesaid , ) to depend upon the weakness of the empire , or the fidelity of the lombards ( whom he had already found false ) appli'd himself to pepin the second , who from lord of austracia and brabantia , was become king of france , not so much by his own virtue , as by the chivalry of his unkle pepin , and charles martel his father : for charles martel being governour of that kingdom , gave that memorable defeat to the saracens near torsi upon the river totra , in which above . of them were slain ; upon the reputation of which victor'y under the discipline of his father , and his own deportment in it besides , pepin was afterwards made king of that kingdom ; to whom , when pope gregory appli'd himself for relief against the lombards , pepin return'd answer , that he would be ready to assist him , but he desir'd first to have the honour to see him , and pay his personal respects . upon which invitation pope gregory went into france , passing thorow the lombards quarters without any interruption , so great reverence they bare to religion in those days . being arriv'd , and honourably receiv'd in france , he was after some time dismiss'd with an army into italy ; which having besieg'd pavia , and reduc'd the lombards to distress , aistolfus was constrain'd to certain terms of agreement with the french , which were obtain'd by the intercession of the pope , who desir'd not the death of his enemy , but that he might rather be converted and live . among the rest of the articles of that treaty , it was agreed , that aistolfus should restore all the lands he had usurped from the church . but when the french army was return'd into france , aistolfus forgot his ingagement , which put the pope upon a second application to king pepin , who re-suppli'd him again , sent a new army into italy , overcame the lombards , and possessed himself of ravenna , and ( contrary to the desire of the grecian emperour ) gave it to the pope , with all the lands under that exarchat , and the countrey of urbino , and la marca into the bargain . in the interim aistolfus died , and desiderio a lombard , and duke of tuscany , taking up arms to succeed him , begg'd assistance of the pope , with promise of perpetual amity for the future ; which the pope granted , as far as the other princes would consent . at first desiderio was very punctual , and observed his articles to a hair , delivering up the towns as he took them to the pope , according to his ingagement to king pepin , nor was there any exarchus sent afterwards from constantinople to ravenna , but all was arbitrary , and manag'd according to the pleasure of the pope . not long after , pepin died , and charles his son succeeded in the government , who was call'd the great , from the greatness of his exploits . about the same time theodore the first was advanc'd to the papacy , and falling out with desiderio , was besieg'd by him in rome . in his exigence the pope had recourse to the king of france ( as his predecessor had done before him ) and charles not only suppli'd him with an army , but marching over the alps at the head of it himself , he besieg'd desiderio in pavia , took him and his son in it , sent them both prisoners into france , and went in person to rome , to visit the pope , where he adjudg'd and determin'd , that his holiness being god's vicar , could not be subject to the iudgment of man. for which the pope and people together , declar'd him emperour , and rome began again to have an emperour of the west ; and whereas formerly the popes were confirm'd by the emperours , the emperour now in his election was to be beholding to the pope ; by which means , the power and dignity of the empire declin'd , and the church began to advance , and by these steps to usurp upon the authority of temporal princes . the lombards had been in italy years , so long as to retain nothing of their original barbarity but their name . charles being desirous to reform italy , in the time of leo iii. was contented they should inhabit and denominate the parts where they were born , which since then , have been call'd lombardy : and because the name of rome was venerable among them ; he appointed that part of italy which was adjacent , and under the exarchat of ravenna , should be call'd romagnia . moreover , he created his son pepin king of italy , extending his jurisdiction as far as benevento ; all the rest was continued under the dominion of the grecian emperour , with whom charles had made an alliance . during these transactions , pascal the first was elected pope , and the parish priests in rome , by reason of their propinquity and readiness at every election , to adorn their power with a more illustrious title , began to be call'd cardinals ; arrogating so much to themselves , ( especially after they had excluded the voices of the people ) that seldom any pope was created but by them , out of their own number . pascal being dead , he was succeeded by eugenius the second , of the order of santa sabina . italy being in this manner under the authority of the french , changed its form and oeconomy in some measure ; for the pope having incroach'd upon the temporal authority , created counts and marquesses , as longinus exarchat of ravenna , had made dukes before . after some few , ospurcus a roman succeeded to the papacy , who not satisfied with the uncomliness of his name , call'd himself sergius , and gave the first occasion for the changing their names , which has since been frequently practis'd at their several elections . about this time charles the emperour died , and his son lodovic succeeded , yet not so quietly , but that there arose so many and so great differences betwixt his sons , that in the days of his grand-children , the empire was wrested from his family , restor'd to the almans , and the next german emperour was call'd ainolfus . nor did charles his posterity by their dissentions lose only the empire , but their soveraignty in italy likewise ; for the lombards resuming courage , fell foul upon the pope and his romans , who not knowing to whose protection to betake himself , was constrain'd to make berengarius ( dukeof friuli ) king of italy . incouraged by these accidents , the hunni ( who at that time were planted in pannonia ) took heart , and invaded italy , but coming to a battel with berengarius , they were overthrown , and forc'd back again into pannonia , or rather into hungaria , it being at that time call'd by their name . at that time romano was emperour of greece , who being general of his army had usurp'd upon constantine , and forc'd the government out of his hand ; and because during these innovations , puglia and calabria ( which as i said before , had subjected themselves to that empire ) were then in rebellion ; inrag'd at their insolence , he permitted the saracens to possess those countreys , if they could gain them ; who invading them thereupon , immediately subdu'd them , and attempted upon rome . but the romans , ( berengarius being imploy'd against the hunni ) made alberigo , duke of tuscany , their general ; by whose valour their city was preserv'd , and the saracens raising their siege retir'd , built a castle upon the mountain gargano , and from thence lorded it over puglia and calabria , and infested all that part of italy besides . thus it was that italy in those times was marvelously afflicted towards the alps by the hunni , towards naples by the saracens ; and it continued in that agony several years , under three berengarii successively ; during which time the pope and the church were under no the less perturbation ; having no refuge to fly to , by reason of the dissention among the western princes , and the impotence of the eastern . the city of genoa , and all its territory upon the rivers , were over-run by the sara●ens , which , by the resort of multitudes ( driven thither out of their own countrey ) was the foundation of the grandeur of pisa. these accidents happen'd in the year dccccxxxi . but ottone son of enricus and matilda , and duke of saxony , coming to the empire , and being a man of great reputation for his conduct and prudence , agabito the pope addressed himself to him , imploring his assistance in italy against the tyranny of the berengarii . the states of italy in those days were govern'd in this manner . lombardy was under the jurisdiction of berengarius the third , and albertus his son. tuscany and romania under the dominion of a governour deputed by the emperour of the west . puglia and calabria were part under the greek empire , and part under the saracens . in rome , two consuls were created out of the nobility every year , according to ancient custome , to which a prefect was added to administer justice to the people . they had moreover a counsel of twelve , who provided governours annually for all towns under their jurisdiction . the pope had more or less power in rome , and in all italy , according as his favour was more or less with the emperour , or other persons which were more potent than he . ottone , to gratifie his request , came into italy with an army , fought with the berengarii , drove them out of their kingdom ( which they had injoy'd years ) and restor'd the pope to his former dignity . ottone had a son , and a grand-child of his own name , both which , one after the other , succeeded in the empire , and in the time of ottone the third , pope gregory the fifth was expelled by the romans . ottone undertook a new expedition into italy in his behalf , and having once again re-establish'd him in his chair , the pope to be reveng'd of the romans , took from them the power of creating the emperours , and conferr'd it upon six german princes ; three bishops , 〈◊〉 , treves and colen , and three temporal princes , the duke of brandenburg , the prince palatine of the rhine , and the duke of saxony ; and this happen'd in the year . after the death of ottone the third , enrico duke of bavaria was created emperour by the said electors , and was crown'd twelve years after by stephanus the eighth . enricus and simeonda his wife , were eminent for their piety , having as a testimony of it , built and endow'd several churches , and among the rest that of s. miniato , near the city of florence . in the year , enrico died , was succeeded by corrado of suevia , and he by enrico ii , who coming to rome , and finding a schism in the church , and three popes in being at the same time , he degraded them all , and causing clement ii. to be elected , was crown'd emperour by him . italy was then govern'd partly by the people , partly by princes , and partly by the emperours ministers , the chiefest of which ( to whom the rest did in all matters of importance refer ) had the title of chancellor . among the princes , the most powerful was gottifredus , husband to the countess matilda , who was sister to enricus ii. she and her husband had the possession of lucca , parma , reggio , and mantua , with all that countery which is now call'd the patrimony of the church . the popes at that time had no small trouble upon their hands , by reason of the ambition of the people of rome ; who having at first made use of the papal authority to free themselves of the emperours , as soon as the popes had taken upon them the regiment of the city , and reform'd things as they thought good themselves , of a sudden they became their enemies ; and they receiv'd more injury from the people , than from any other christian prince whatsoever , rebelling and mutining at the same time the popes by their censures , made the whole west to tremble ; nor was the design of either of them less than to subvert the authority and reputation of the one and the other . nicolas ii. arriving at the popedom , as gregory v. had taken from the romans the priviledge of creating the emperour ; so he depriv'd them of their concurrence to the election of the pope , restraining it wholly to the suffrage of the cardinals ; nor contented with this , by agreement with the princes which govern'd at that time in puglia and calabria , ( for reasons which shall be mentioned hereafter ) he forc'd all the officers sent thither by the people , to assert their jurisdiction , to pay allegiance to the pope , and some of them he displaced . after nicholaus was dead , there happen'd a great schism in the church : the clergy of lombardy would not yeild obedience to alexander ii. who was chosen at rome , but created cadalo of parma , anti-pope . enrico detesting the extravagant dominion of the popes , sent to alexander to resign , and to the cardinals , that they should repair into germany , in order to a new election ; so that he was the first prince which was made sensible of the effects of their spiritual fulminations ; for the pope calling together a new council at rome , depriv'd him both of his empire , and kingdom . some of the italians following the pope's , and some of them the emperours party , was the foundation of that famous faction betwixt the guelfs and ghibilins , in so much that for want of forreign inundations by the barbarians , they turn'd their arms upon themselves , and tore out their own bowels . enrico being excommunicated , was forc'd by his own subjects to come into italy , where bare-footed , and upon his knees he begg'd his pardon of the pope , in the year mlxxx . notwithstanding all this , not long after , there happen'd a new quarrel betwixt enrico and the pope ; whereupon , provok'd by a new excommunication , he sent his son enrico with an army , who by the assistance of the romans ( whose hatred the pope had contracted ) besieg'd him in his castle ; but roberto guiscardo coming from puglia to his relief , enrico had not the courage to attend him , but rais'd his siege and retir'd into germany . however the romans continued obstinate , and robert was forc'd to sack the town , and reduce it to its ancient ruines , from whence by several popes it had been lately restor'd . and because from this roberto , the model of government in the kingdom of naples did proceed , it will not ( in my judgment ) be superfluous to give a particular narrative , both of his countrey and exploits . upon the differences betwixt charlemain's heirs ( as is said before ) a new northern people call'd normans took occasion to invade france , and possess'd themselves of that part of it which is now call'd normandy . of this people , part went into italy , in the time when it was infested by the berengarii , the saracens , and hunns ; setling in romania , and performing very valiantly in all those wars . of tancred , one of the princes of those normans , were born several sons , among which , william call'd ferabar , and roberto call'd guiscardo , were two . william arriv'd to be prince , and the tumults in italy were in some measure compos'd : but the saracens having sicily intire , and daily invasions made upon italy , william entred into confederacy with the princes of capua , and salerno and with milorcus a grecian ( who by the emperour of greece was deputed governour of puglia , and calabria ) to invade sicily , and in case of victory , it was agreed among them , that both prey and countrey should be equaly divided . the enterprize was prosperous ; they beat the saracens , drove them out of the countrey , and possess'd it when they had done . but milorcus causing more forces to be transported privately out of greece , seiz'd the island for the emperour , and divided only the spoil . william was not a little disgusted , but reserving his indignation for a more convenient time , he departed out of sicily with the princes of capua and salerno ; who having taken their leaves of him to return to their homes , in stead of marching to romania , as he pretended to them , he fac'd about with his army towards puglia , surpriz'd melfi , and behav'd himself so well against the forces of the emperour , that he made himself master of most part of puglia and calabria , which provinces at the time of nicolas ii. were govern'd by his brother roberto ; and because he had afterward great contention with his nephews about the inheritance of those states , he made use of the pope's mediation , who readily comply'd , being desirous to oblige roberto , that he might defend him against the german emperour , and the people of rome ; and it afterwards happen'd ( as we have said before ) that at the instance of gregory vii , he forc'd enrico from rome , and suppress'd the sedition of the inhabitants . robert was succeeded by two of his sons , roger and william ; to their inheritance they annexed the city of naples ; and all the countrey betwixt it and rome ; besides that , they subdu'd sicily , of which roger was made lord. but william going afterwards to constantinople , to marry that emperour's daughter , roger took advantage of his absence , seiz'd upon his contrey , and elated by so great an acquest , caus'd himself first to be call'd king of italy ; but afterwards contenting himself with the title of king of puglia and sicily , he was the first that gave name and laws to that kingdom , which to this day it retains , though many times since , not only the royal bloud , but the nation has been changed ; for upon failure of the norman race , that kingdom devolv'd to the germans ; from them , to the french ; from the french , to the spaniards ; and from the spaniards , to the flemens , with whom it remains at this present . urban ii. though very odious in rome , was gotten to be pope ; but by reason of the dissentions there , not thinking himself secure in italy , he remov'd with his whole clergy into france . having assembled many people together at anvers , he undertook a generous enterprize , and by a learned oration against the infidels , kindled such a fire in their minds , they resolv'd upon an expedition into asia against the saracens , which expedition ( as all other of the same nature ) was call'd afterwards crociate , because all that went along in it carry'd a red cross upon their arms , and their cloths . the chief commanders in this enterprize were gottofredi eustachio , alduino di buglione earl of bologna , and peter the hermit , a man of singular veneration both for his prudence and piety . many princes and nations assisted with their purses , and many private men serv'd as voluntiers at their own charges . so great an influence had religion in those days upon the spirits of men , incourag'd by the example of their several commanders . at first the enterprize was very successfull , all asia minor , syria , and part of egypt fell under the power of the christians ; during which war , the order of the knights of ierusalem was instituted , and continued a long time in rhodes , as a bulwark against the turks . not long after the order of the knights templers was founded , but it lasted not long , by reason of the dissoluteness of their manners . at sundry times after these things , upon sundry occasions , many accidents fell out , in which several nations , and particular men signaliz'd themselves . there were ingag'd in this expedition , the kings of england and france , the states of pisa , venice , and genoa , all behaving themselves with great bravery , and sighting with variety of fortune , till the time of saladine the saracen ; but his courage and virtue improv'd by intestine differences among the christians , robb'd them of the glory they had gain'd at the first , and chased them out of a countrey , where for ninety years they had been so honourably , and so happily plac'd . after the death of pope urban , pascal ii. was chosen to succeed him , and enrico iv. made emperour , who coming to rome ; and pretending great friendship to the pope , took his advantage , clapt both him and his clergy in prison , and never discharg'd them till they had impowr'd him to dispose of the churches in germany as he pleas'd himself . about this time matilda the countess died , and gave her patrimony to the church . after the deaths of pascal and enric , many popes and many emperours succeeded , till the papacy fell to alexander iii. and the empire to frederick barbarossa a swede . the popes of those days had many controversies with the people of rome , and the emperours , which till the time of barbarossa , rather increas'd than otherwise . frederick was an excellent soldier , but so haughty and high , he could not brook to give place to the pope . notwithstanding he came to rome to be crown'd , and return'd peaceably into germany . but that humour lasted but little , for he return'd shortly into italy , to reduce some towns in lombardy , which denied him obedience . in this juncture , cardinal di s. clemente ( a roman born ) dividing from pope alexander , was made pope himself by a faction in the conclave . frederick the emperour being then incamp'd before crema , alexander complain'd to him of the anti-pope : frederick reply'd , that they should both of them appear personally before him , and that then , hearing faithfully what each of them could say , he should be better able to determine which was in the right . alexander was not at all satisfied with the answer , but perceiving the emperour inclining to the adversary , he excommunicated him , and ran away to king philip of france . for all that , frederick prosecuted his wars in lombardy , took and dismantled milan . which put the cities of verona , padua , and venice , upon a confederacy for their common defence . in the mean time the anti-pope died , and frederick presum'd to create guid● of cremona in his place . the romans taking advantage of the pope's absence , and the emperour's diversion in lombardy , had re-assum'd something of their former authority , and began to require obedience in the neighbouring places which had been anciently their subjects . and because the tuscans refus'd to submit , they march'd confusedly against them , but they being re-inforced by frederick , gave the roman army such a blow , that since that time rome could never recover its old condition either for populousness or wealth . upon these events , pope alexander was return'd to rome , presuming he might be safe there , by reason of the animosity the romans retain'd against the emperour ; and the employment his enemies gave him in lombardy . but frederick postponing all other respects , march'd with his army to besiege rome . alexander thought it not convenient to attend him , but withdrew into puglia to william , who upon the death of roger ( being next heir ) was made king. frederick being much molested , and weaken'd by a contagion in his army , rais'd his siege , and went back into germany . the lombards which were in league against him , to restrain their excursions , and streighten the towns of pavia and tortona ; caus'd a city to be built ( which they intended for the seat of the war ) and call'd it alexandria , in honour to pope alexander , and defiance to the emperour . guido the new anti-pope died likewise , and iohn ( of fermo ) was chosen in his room , who by the favour of the imperial party , was permitted to keep his residence in monte fiascone , whilst alexander was gone into tuscany , invited by that people , that by his authority they might be the better defended against the romans . being there , embassadors came to him from henry king of england , to clear their masters innocence in the death of thomas becket , arch-bishop of canterbury , with which he was publickly and most infamously aspersed . to inquire into the truth , the pope sent two cardinals into england , who ( notwithstanding , they found not his majesty in any manifest guilt ) yet for the scandal of the fact , and that he had not honour'd the said arch-bishop with the respect he deserved , they prescribed as a penance , that he should call all the barons of his kingdom together ; swear his innocence before them , send soldiers to ierusalem , to be paid by him for a twelve-month , and himself follow in person with as great a power as he could raise , before three years were expir'd ; that he should disanul all things pass'd in his kingdom in prejudice to the ecclesiastick liberty , and consent , that any of his subjects whatever , should appeal to rome , when , and as often , as they thought it convenient : all which conditions were readily accepted , and that great prince submitted to a sentence there is scarce a private person but would scorn at this day . but though his holiness was so formidable to the princes abroad , he was not so terrible in rome ; the people in that city would not be ●oaksed , nor persuaded to let him live there , though he protested he would meddle no farther than ecclesiastical matters ; by which it appears , things at a distance are more dreadful , than near at hand . in the mean time frederick was return'd into italy , with resolution to make a new war upon the pope ▪ but whilst he was busie about his preparations , his barons and clergy gave him advertisement , that they would all forsake him , unless he reconcil'd himself to the church ; so that changing his design , he was forc'd to go and make his submission at venice ; and pacification being made , the pope in the agreement devested the emperor of all the authority he pretended over rome , and named william king of sicily and puglia , his confederate . frederick being an active prince , and unable to lie still , embarqu'd himself in the enterprize into asia , to spend his ambition against the turk , which he could not do so effectually against the pope . but being got as far as the river cidvo , allur'd by the clearness and excellence of the waters , he would needs wash himself in it , and that washing gave him his death . those waters being more beneficial to the turks , than all excommunications to the christians ; for whereas these only cool'd and asswag'd his ambition , they wash'd it away , and extinguish'd it quite . frederick being dead , nothing remain'd now to be suppres'd , but the contumacy of the romans . after much argument and dispute about their creation of consuls , it was concluded , the romans , according to ancient custom , should have liberty to choose them ; but they should not execute their office , till they had sworn fealty to the church . upon this accord iohn the anti-pope fled to monte albano , and died presently after . in the mean time , william king of naples died also ; and having left no sons but tanacred a bastard , the pope design'd to have possess'd himself of his kingdom , but by the opposition of the barons , tanacred was made king. afterwards celestin iii. coming to the papacy , and being desirous to wrest that kingdom from tanacred , he contriv'd to make enrico ( fredericks son ) king , promising him the kingdom of naples , upon condition he would restore such lands as belong'd to the church , and to facilitate the business , he took costanza ( an ancient maid , daughter to king william ) out of a monastery , and gave her him for his wife ; by which means the kingdom of naples pass'd from the normans ( who had founded it ) and fell under the dominion of the germans . henricus the emperor having first setled his affairs in germany , came into italy with his wife costanza , and one of his sons call'd frederick , about four years of age , and without much difficulty possess'd himself of that kingdom , tanacred being dead , and only one child remaining of his issue , call'd roger not long after enricus died in sicily , he was succeeded in that kingdom by frederick ; and otto duke of saxony , chosen emperour by the assistance of pope innocent iii. but no sooner had he got the crown upon his head , but contrary to the opinion of all men , he became enemy to the pope ; seiz'd upon romania , and gave out orders for the assaulting that kingdom ; upon which being excommunicated by the pope , and deserted by his friends , frederick king of naples was chosen emperour in his place . the said frederick coming to rome to be crown'd , the pope scrupl'd it , being jealous of his power , and endeavoured to persuade him out of italy , as he had done otto before ; which frederick disdaining , retir'd into germany , and making war upon otto , overcame him at last . in the mean time innocent died , who besides other magnificent works , built the hospital di santo spirito at rome . honorius iii. succeeded him , in whose papacy were instituted the orders of s. dominick and s. francis , in the year mccxviii . honorius crown'd frederick to whom iohn , descended from baldwin king of ierusalem ( who commanded the remainder of the christians in asia , and retain'd that title ) gave one of his daughters in marriage , and the title of that kingdom in dower with her ; and from that time , whoever is king of naples , has that title annex'd . in italy at that time they liv'd in this manner : the romans had no more the creation of consuls , but in lieu of it they invested sometimes one , sometimes more of their senators with the same power . the league continued all the while , into which the cities of lombardy had entred against frederick barbarossa ; and the cities were these ; milan , brescia , mantua , with the greater part of the cities in romagna , besides verona , vicenza , padua , and trevigi . the cities on the emperours side were cremona , bergamo , parma , reggio , modena , and trenta : the rest of the cities of lombardy , romagna , and the marquisate of trevizan , took part according to their interest , sometimes with this , sometimes with the other party . in the time of otto iii , one ezelino came into italy , of whose loyns there remaining a son , call'd also ezelino , being powerful and rich , he joyn'd himself with frederick ii , who ( as was said before ) was become an enemy to the pope . by the incouragement and assistance of this ezelino , frederick came into italy ; took verona and mantua , demolish'd vicenza , seiz'd upon padoua , defeated the united forces of those parts , and when he had done , advanc'd towards toscany , whilst in the mean time ezelino made himself master of the marquisate of trevizan , ferrara they could not take , being defended by azone da esti , and some regiments of the popes in lombardy . whereupon when the siege was drawn off , his holiness gave that city in fee to azone da esti , from whom those who are lords of it at this day are descended . frederick stop'd , and fix'd himself at pisa , being desirous to make himself master of tuscany , and by the distinctions he made betwixt his friends and his foes in that province , rais'd such ammosites , as proved afterwards the destruction of all italy : for both guelfs and gibilins increas'd every day , the first siding with the church , the other with the emperour , and were call'd first by those names , in the city of pistoia . frederick being at length remov'd from pisa , made great devastations , and several inroads into the territories of the church ; in so much that the pope having no other remedy , proclaim'd the croifada against him , as his predecessors had done against the saracens . frederick ( left he should be left in the lurch by his own people as frederick barbarossa , and others of his ancestors had been before , ) entertain'd into his pay great numbers of the saracens , and to oblige them to him , and strengthen his opposition to the pope , by a party that should not be afraid of his curs●s , he gave them nocera in that kingdom , to the end that having a r●treat in their own hands , they might serve him with more confidence and security . at this time innocent iv. was pope , who being apprehensive of frederick , remov'd to genoa , and thence into france , where he call'd a counsel at lyons , and frederick design'd to have been there , had he not been retain'd by the rebellion of parma . having had ill fortune in the suppressing of that , he march'd away into tuscany , and from thence into sicily , where he died not long after , leaving his son currado in s●evia , and in puglia , his natural son manfredi , whom he had made duke of benevento . currado went to take possession of the kingdom , died at naples , and left only one l●●tle son behind him in germany , who was call'd currado , by his own name . by which means , manfred first as tutor to currado , got into the government , and afterwards giving out that his pupil was dead , he made himself king , and forc'd the pope and neapolitans ( who oppos'd it ) to consent . whilst affairs in that kingdom were in that posture , many commotions happen'd in lombardy , betwixt the guelfs and the gibilins . the guelfs were headed by a legate from the pope , the gibilins by ezelino , who at that time had in his possession all that part of lombardy on this side the poe. and because while he was entertain'd in this war , the city of padoua rebell'd , he caus'd of them to be slain , and not long after , before the war was ended , died himself in the thirtieth year of his age . upon his death , all those countreys which had been in his hands , became free . manfredi king of naples continued his malevolence to the church , as his ancestors had done before him , holding pope urban iv. in perpetual anxiety , so that at length he was constrain'd to convoke the crociata against him , and to retire into perugi● , till he could get his forces together : but finding them come in slowly and thin , conceiving that to the overcoming of manfred , greater supplies would be necessary , he address'd himself to the king of france , making his brother charles duke of angio , king of sicily and naples , and excited him to come into italy , and take possession of those kingdoms . before charles could get to rome , the pope died , and clement v. succeeded in his place . in the said clements time , charles with galleys arriv'd at ostia , having ordered the rest of his forces to meet him by land. during his residence at rome , as a complement to him , the romans made him a senator , and the pope invested him in that kingdom , with condition that he should pay thousand florins yearly to the church ; and published a decree , that for the future , neither charles , nor any that should succeed him in that kingdom , should be capable of being emperours . after which charles advancing against manfred , fought with him , beat him , and kill'd him near ben●vento , thereby making himself king of sicily , and that kingdom . corradino ( to whom that state devolv'd by his fathers testament ) gathering what forces together he could in germany , march'd into italy against charles , and ingaging him at tagliacozza , was presently defeated , and ( being afterwards discover'd in his flight ) taken and slain . italy continued quiet , till the papacy of adrian v. who not enduring that charles should continue in rome , and govern all ( 〈◊〉 he did ) by vertue of his senatorship , he remov'd to vit●rbo , and solicited ridolfus the emperour to come into italy against him . in this manner , the popes sometimes for defence of religion , sometimes out of their own private ambition , call'd in new men , and by consequence new wars into italy . and no sooner had they advanc'd any of them , but they repented of what they had done , and sought immediately to remove him , nor would they suffer any province , ( which by reason of their weakness they were unable themselves to subdue ) to be injoy'd quietly by any body else . the princes were all afraid of them , for whether by fighting , or flying , they commonly overcame , unless circumvented by some stratagem , as boniface viii . and some others were by the emperours , under pretence of friendship and amity . ridolfus being retain'd by his war with the king of bohemia , was not at leisure to visit italy before adrian was dead . he which succeeded him was nicolas the iii. of the house of ursin , a daring , ambitious man ; who resolving to take down the authority of charles , contriv'd that ridolfus the emperour , should complain of charles his governour in tuscany , of his siding with the guelfs , who after the death of manfred , had been receiv'd and protected in that province . to comply with the emperour , charles call'd away his governour , and the pope sent his cardinal nephew to take possession of it for the emperour ; to recompense that kindness , the emperour restor'd romania to the church , which had been usurp'd by his predecessors , and the pope made bartaldo orsino duke of romagnia : growing more powerfull by degrees , and believing himself strong enough to look charles in the face , he began to expostulate , turn'd him out of his senatorship , and publish'd a decree , that no person for the future of royal extraction should ever be senator in rome . not contented with this , he carri'd his designs farther , and was in the mind to have droven charles out of sicily ; to which end , he held secret intelligence with the king of arragon , who effected it alterwards in the time of his successor . he design'd likewise to have made two kings out of his family , one of lombardy , the other of tuscany , by whose power and assistance the church might be defended from the incursions of the germans abroad , and the oppression of the french at home . but he dying before any thing could be done , was the first pope that gave so manifest demonstration of ambition , or that , under pretence of advancing the church , design'd only to exalt and magnifie his own family ; and though from this time backward no mention is to be found of nephew , or any other of his holiness kindred , yet forward all history is full of them ; and as formerly the popes have endeavour'd to leave them princes , they would leave them popes now adays if they could , and make the papacy hereditary . but the principalities they erected , have been hitherto short-liv'd ; for the popes seldom living long , the first gust of wind shakes them , for want of their authority and courage to sustain them . this pope being dead ▪ martin x. succeeded , who being born a french-man , was a friend to the french , and charles ( in the rebellion of romania ) sent an army to his assistance , who having besieg'd furli , guido bonatti an astrologer being in the town , appointed the garrison a certain time to sally upon them ; and following his direction , they did it with such success , that the whole french army was either taken or kill'd . about this time , the practices betwixt pope nicholas and peter king of arragon , were put in execution ; the sicilians by that means kill'd all the french they found in that island ; and peter made himself lord of it , upon pretence it belonged to constansa , manfreds daughter , whom he had married ; but charles in his preparation for its recovery , died ; left charles ii. his son , at that time a prisoner in sicily , who for his enlargement , promis'd to surrender himself again , if in three years time he prevail'd not with the pope to invest the house of arragon with the kingdom of sicily . ridolfus the emperour , in stead of coming into italy himself , to recover the reputation of the empire , sent an embassadour thither with full power to enfranchize such cities as would buy out their freedom : upon which , many cities redeem'd themselves , and chang'd their laws , with their liberty . adulfus duke of saxony , succeeded in the empire , and in the popedom , piero del murone , by the name of pope celestine ; but having been a hermit , and exceedingly devout , in six months time he renounced , and boniface viii . was chosen in his room . the heavens ( foreseeing the time would come italy should be deliver'd both from the germans and french , and remain intirely in the hands of its natives ; that the pope though freed from forreign impedidiments , might not be able to usurp , and establish himself in the power which he exercised then ) rais'd up two great families in rome , the colonni , and the ursini , that by their authority and allyance they might be able to circumscribe his holiness , and keep him within his bounds . pope boniface was sensible of them , and apply'd himself very zealously to have extirpated the colonni , excommunicating them first , and then proclaiming the crociata against them ; which , though it might be some prejudice to them , was more to the church : for those swords which had been drawn in vindication of the gospel , and done honourable things ; when for private ambition they were unsheath'd against christians , they lost their first sharpness , and would not cut at all ; and so it came to pass , their immoderate desire of satiating their appetite , by degrees lessened the popes power , and disarm'd them . two of that house which were cardinals , he degraded ; sciarra ( the chief of them ) escaping in disguise , being discover'd , was taken by the spanish privateers , and clap'd to an oar ; but being known at marsellis , he was rescu'd , and sent away to the king of france , who by boniface was excommunicated thereupon , and depriv'd of his kingdom . philip king of france , considering very well that in all open wars with the popes , he had either run some eminent danger ▪ or come home by the loss ; began to look about for some artifice , and at length , pretending great readiness to comply , and counterfeiting a treaty , he sent sciarra privately into italy , who being arriv'd at anagnia ( where at that time the pope had his residence ) gathering his friends together in the night , he seiz'd upon his holiness , who ( tho inlarg'd afterwards by the people of the town ) died shortly in a dilirium with meer sense and indigation . this boniface was the first pope which ordain'd jubilees in the year m.ccc . and decreed they should be celebrated every hundred years . these times produc'd many troubles betwixt the guelfs and the gibilin's , and italy being forsaken by the emperours , many towns recover'd their liberties , and many were usurp'd . pope benedict restor'd their caps to the cardinals of the house of colonni , absolv'd king philip , and gave him his blessing . benedict was succeeded by clement v. who being a french-man remov'd his court into france , anno mcccvi . during these transactions charles ii. king of naples died , and left the succession to robert his son. the empire was in the mean time fallen to arrigo of luxemburg , who came to rome to be crown'd , though the pope was not there ; upon whose arrival many commotions followed in lombardy , and all banished persons , whether guelfs or gibilins , being restor'd to their former habitations , conspiring to supplant one another , they fill'd the whole province with the calamities of war , notwithstanding the emperour imploy'd his utmost power to prevent it . arrigo removing out of lombardy by the way of genova , return'd to pisa , with design to have driven king r●b●rt out of tascany , but not succeeding in that , he march'd to rome , but continued there a few dayes only , for the ursini by the help of king robert forc'd him to remove , and he march'd back again to pisa , where , for his more secure warring upon tuscany , and supplanting that king , he caus'd it to be assaulted on the other side by frederick king of sicily . but in the height of his designs , when he thought himself sure both of tuscany and its king , he died , and the succession went to lodovick of bavaria . about this time iohn xxii . was created pope , in whose papacy , the emperour ceased not to persecute the guelfs , and the church , but king robert and the florentines interposing in their defence , great wars ensued in lombardy , under the conduct of the visconti against the guelfs , and against the flor●ntines in tuscany , by castruccio di lucca . and because the family of the visconti were the original of the dukedom of milan , one of the five principalities that govern'd all italy afterwards , i think it not amiss to deduce it a little higher . after the league amaong the cities in lombardy ( which i have mentioned before ) for their mutual defence against frederick barbarossa milan being rescued from the ruine that impended ; to revenge it self of the injuries it had receiv'd , enter'd into that confederacy , which put a stop to the emperours career , and preserv'd the churches interest in lombardy for a while . in the process of those wars , the family of the torri grew very powerful , increasing daily more and more , while the emperour's authority was small in those parts . but frederick ii. arriving in italy , and the ghibilin faction ( by the assistance of ezelino ) prevailing , it began to dilate and spread it self in all the cities , and particularly in milan ; the family of the visconti ●iding with that party , drove the family of the torri out of that town : but long they were not banish'd , for by an accord made betwixt the emperour and pope , they were restor'd . afterwards when the pope remov'd with his court into france , and arrigo of luxemburg came to rome to be crown'd , he was receiv'd into milan by maffeo visconti , the head of that house , and guido della torre , the chief of the other . yet how kindly soever they carry'd it outwardly , masseo had a secret design , by the emperour 's being there , to drive out the torri , believing the enterprize the more practicable , because guido was of the enemies faction . he took the advantage of the peoples complaints against the behaviour of the germans , incouraging them slily to take arms , and rescue themselves from their barbarous servitude . having dispos'd things as he desired , he caused a tumult to be raised by one of his confidents , upon which the whole town was to be in arms , and pretendedly against the germans . the tumult was no sooner begun , but maffeo , his sons , servants , and partizans were immediately in arms , and ran to arrigo , assuring him that tumult was raised by the torri , who not content with their private condition , took that occasion to ruine him as an enemy to the guelfs , and make themselves princes of that city . but he desired him to be secure , for they and their party would not fail to defend him , when ever he requir'd it . arrigo believed all to be true that maffeo had told him , joyned his forces with the visconti , fell upon the torri ( who were dispersed up and down the city to suppress the tumult ) killed those of them which they met , banished the rest , and seized their estates : so that maffeo visconti made himself prince . after him , there succeeded galeazo , and aza , and after them luchino and iohn , who was afterwards arch-bishop of that city : luchino died before him , and left two sons , barnardo and galeazo ; galeazo dying not long after , left one son , called giovan galeazo , conti di vertu , who after the death of the arch-bishop , killed his unkle barnardo , made himself prince , and was the first that took upon him the title of duke of milan . he left two sons only , philip , and giovan maria angelo , who being slain by the people of milan , the government remain'd wholly to philip. he dying without issue male , the dukedom was translated from the house of the visconti , to the sforza's ; but of the manner and occasions of that , hereafter . to return therefore , where i left . lewis the emperour , to give reputation to his party , and to be formally crown'd , came into italy , and being at milan , to drain the city of its money , he pretended to set them at liberty , and clap'd the visconti in prison . afterwards , by the mediation of castruccio da luca , he releas'd them , march'd to rome , and ( that he might more easily disturb the tranquillity of italy ) he made piero della carvaro , anti-pope : by whose reputation , and the interest of the visconti , he presum'd he should be able to keep under both the tuscans , and lombards . but castruccio died in the nick , and his death was the emperours ruine , for pisa and lucca rebelled out of hand . the pisans took the anti-pope , and sent him prisoner to the pope into france , so that the emperour despairing of his affairs in italy , he left them all as they were , and retired into germany . he was scarce gone , before iohn king of bohemia came into italy with an army ( being invited by the ghibilins in brescia ) and possest himself both of that city and bergamo . the pope ( however he dissembled it ) was not averse to his coming , and therefore his legat at bologna favoured him privately , looking upon him as a good antidote against the emperours return . these under-hand practices chang'd the condition of italy ; for the florentines and king robert , perceiving the legat a favourer of the ghibilin faction , turn'd enemies to all people that profess'd themselves their friends . in so much as without respect to either ghibilins or guelfs , many princes associated with them ; among the rest were the families of the visconti & scala , philippo di gonsaga of the house of mantua , the families of carara and este , whereupon the pope excommunicated them all . the king apprehensive of their league , return'd home to reinforce himself , and coming back with more force into italy , found his enterprize very difficult notwithstanding ; so that growing weary of the business ( though much to the dissatisfaction of the legat ) he return'd into bohemia , leaving garrisons only in modena and reggio , recommending parma to the care of marsilio , and piero de rossi , who were eminent men in that city . as soon as he was departed , bologna enter'd into the confederacy , and the colleagues divided the four towns that were remaining to the church among themselves , parma to the scali , reggio to the gonzagi , modena to the esti , and luca to the florentines . but many differences follow'd upon that division , which for the greatest part were compos'd afterwards by the venetians . and now i speak of the venetians , it may appear indecorous to some people , that among all the occurrences and revolutions in italy , i have deferr'd speaking of them , notwithstanding their government and power places them above any other republick or principality in that countrey . that that exception may be remov'd , and the occasion appear , it will be necessary to look back for some time , to make their original conspicuous , and the reasons for which they reserv'd themselves so long from interposing in the affairs of italy . attila king of the hunni having besieg'd aquilegia , the inhabitants after a generous defence , being reduc'd to distress , and despairing of relief , conveighing their goods , as well as they could , to certain rocks in that point of the adriatick sea which were not inhabited , they escap'd after them themselves . the padouans seeing the fire so near them , concluding when aquilegia was taken , his next visit would be to them , sent away their goods , wives , children , and unserviceable people to a place in the same sea , call'd rivo alto , leaving the young men , and such as were able to bear arms , for the defence of the town . the inhabitants of montfelice , and the hills about it , fearing the same destiny , remov'd to the same islands aquilegia being taken , and padoua , montfelice , vicenza , and verona overcome and sack'd by a●tila's army ; those which remain'd of the padouans , and the most considerable of the rest , setled their habitations in certain fenns and marshes about the aforesaid rivo alto : and all the people about that province , which was anciently call'd venetia , being driven out of their countrey by the same calamities , joyn'd themselves with them ; changing ( by necessity ) their pleasant and plentiful habitations , for rude and barren places , void of all commodity and convenience . but their number being great , and their quarter but small , in a short time they made it not only habitable , but delightful ; framing such laws and orders to themselves , as secur'd them against miseries of their neighbours , and in a short time made them considerable , both for reputation and force . so that besid●● their first inhabitants , many people resorting to them from the cities of lombardy , upon occasion of the cruelty of clefi king of the lombards , they multiply'd so fast , that when pepin king of france at the solicitation of the pope , undertooke to drive the lombards out of italy , in the treaties betwixt him and the emperour of greece , it was agreed that the duke of benevento and the venetians , should be subject neither to the one nor the other , but injoy their liberty to themselves . moreover , necessity having determin'd their habitations among the waters , having no land to supply them , it forc'd them to look about which way they might live , and applying to navigation , they began to trade about the world , and not only furnish'd themselves with necessary provisions , but by degrees brought thither such variety of merchandize , that other people which had need of them came to them to be supply'd . at first , having no thoughts of dominion , they were wholly intent upon what might facilitate their trade , and in order thereunto , they acquir'd several ports , both in greece and syria , and in their passage into asia the french making use of their ships , they gave them ( by way of recompence ) the island of candia . while they lived at this rate , their name was grown formidable at sea , and so venerable at land , that in most controversies betwixt their neighbours they were the only arbitrators : as it happen'd in the difference betwixt the confederates upon the division of the towns , where the cause being referred to them , they awarded bergamo and brescia to the visconti . but having afterwards in process of time conquer'd padoua , vicenza , trivegi , and after them verona , bergamo and brescia , besides several towns in romagna and else where , their power began to be so considerable , that not only the princes of italy , but the greatest and most remote kings were afraid to provoke them . whereupon , entring into a conspiracy against them , the venetians lost all in one day , that in so many years , and with so vast expence they had been gaining ; and though in our times they may have recover'd it in part , yet not having regain'd their reputation and power , they live at the mercy of other people ( as indeed all the princes of italy do . ) benedict xii . being pope , looking upon italy as lost , and fearing that lodovic the emperour should make himself master of it , he resolv'd to enter into strict amity with all those who held any lands that belong'd formerly to the empire , presuming their fear to be dispossess'd , would make them faithful in the defence of italy , and zealous to keep him out : accordingly he publish'd a decree to confirm all the usurp'd titles in lombardy , and to continue their possession . but that pope died before his promise could be made good , and clement vi. succeeded him . the emperour observing with what lib●rality the pope had dispos'd of the lands belonging to the empire , that he might not be behind him in so generous a point , he gave all lands that had been usurp'd from the church , to such persons as had usurp'd them , to hold them of the empire , as the other of the pope . by which donation galeotto maletesti and his brothers became lords of rimini , pesaro , and fano , antonio da montefeltro of la marca and urbin , gentil da varano of camerino , giovanni manfredi of faenza , guido di polenta of ravenna , sinebaldo or delaffi of furli and cesena , lodovico aledosi of imola , besides many others in other places : so that of all the lands which belong'd to the church , there was scarce any left without an interloper ; by which means , till the time of alexander vi. the church was very weak , but he recover'd its authority in our days , with the destruction of most of their posterity . at the time of this concession , the emperour was at taranto , where he gave out , his design was for italy , which was the occasion of great wars in lombardy , in which the visconti made themselves lords of parma . about this time , robert king of naples died , and left two grand children by his son charles , ( who died not long before ) leaving his eldest daughter giovanna heir to the crown , with injunction to marry andr●a , son to the king of hungary , who was his nephew . but they liv'd not long together , before andrea was poison'd by her , and she married again to lodovic prince of taranto , her near kins-man . but lewis king of hungary , brother to andrea , to revenge his death , came into italy with an army , and drave giovanna and her husband out of the kingdom . about these times there happen'd a very memorable passage in rome ; one nicholas di lorenzo chancellor in the capitol , having forc'd the senate out of rome , under the title of tribune made himself head of that common-wealth , reducing it into its ancient form , with so much justice and virtue , that not only the neighbouring provinces , but all italy sent embassadours to him . the ancient provinces seeing that city so strangely reviv'd , began to lift up their heads , and pay it a respect , some out of fear , and some out of hopes . but nicholas , notwithstanding the greatness of his reputation , not able to comport with so great an authority , deserted it himself ; for being overburthen'd with the weight of it , he left it in the very beginning , and without any constraint , stole privately away to the king of bohemia , who , by the popes order , in affront to lewis of bavaria , was made emperour , and to gratifie his patron , he secur'd nicholas , and clapt him in prison . not long after , as it had been in imitation of nicholas , one francesco baroncegli possest himself of the tribuneship , and turn'd the senators out of rome : so that the pope , as the readiest way to suppress him , was glad to discharge nicholas of his imprisonment , and sent him to rome , to resume his old office ; whereupon , nicholas undertook the government once more , and caus'd francesco to be executed . but the colonnesi becoming his enemies by degrees , he himself was put to death by them , and the senate restor'd to the exercise of its former authority . in the mean time of the king of hungary , having depos'd queen giovanna , return'd to his own kingdom : but the pope desir'd to have the queen his neighbour , rather than that king , and order'd things so , that the kingdom was restor'd , upon condition her husband lewis renouncing the title of king should content himself with that of taranto . the year mcccl. being come , his holiness thought fit that the jubilee appointed by pope boniface viii . to be kept every hundred years , should be reduc'd to fifty , and , having pass'd a decree to that purpose , in gratitude for so great a benefit , the romans were contented he should send four cardinals to rome , to reform their city , and create what senators he pleas'd . after which the pope declar'd lodovic of taranto king of naples again , and giovanna , highly oblig'd by that favour , gave the church avignon , which was part of her patrimony . by this time luchïno visconti being dead , iohn arch-bishop of milan remain'd sole lord , and , making several wars upon tuscany and his neighbours , became very considerable . after his death , the government fell to his two nephews , bernardo and galeazzo , but galeazzo dying a while after , he left his son iohn galeazzo to share with his unkle in the state. in these dayes , charles king of bohemia was created emperour , and innocent vi. pope , who having sent cardinal giles ( a spaniard ) into italy , by his virtue , and the excellence of his conduct , he recover'd the reputation of the church , not only in rome and romagna , but all italy over . he recover'd bologna , that had been usurp'd by the arch-bishop of milan . he constrain'd the romans to admit a forreign senator every year of the popes nomination . he made an honourable agreement with the visconti . he fought and took prisoner iohn aguto an english-man , who with four thousand english was entertain'd in tuscany , upon the ghibilin accompt . after these successes , urban v. being pope , he resolv'd to visit both italy and rome , where charles the emperour came to meet him , and having continued together several months , charles return'd into his kingdom , and the pope to avignon . urban died , and gregory xii . suceeded , and because cardinal egidio was dead , italy relaps'd into its former distractions , occasion'd by the caballing of the people against the visconti . whereupon the pope at first sent a legat into italy with six thousand britans , after whom he follow'd in person , and re-establish'd his residence at rome , in the year mccclxxvi . after it had been kept in france , lxxi . years . after the death of this pope , urban vi. was created . not long after at fondi , ten cardinals quarrelling with his election , and pretending it was not fair , created clement vii . the genoveses in the mean time ( who for several years had lived quietly under the government of the visconti ) rebell'd . betwixt them and the venetian , there happen'd great wars about the island of tenedos ; in which war by degrees all italy became concern'd , and there it was that great guns were first us'd , they being a german invention . though for a while the genoveses were predominant , and held venice blockt up for several months together ; yet in the conclusion , the venetian had the better , and made an advantagious peace , by the assistance of the pope . in the year ( as we have said before ) there was a schism in the church , and giovanna the queen favour'd the anti-pope . whereupon , pope urban practis'd against her , and sent carlo durazzo ( who was of the royal house of naples ) with an army into her kingdom , who possest himself of her countrey , and drove her away into france . the king of france undertaking her quarrel , sent lodovic d' angio to repossess the queen , and force urban out of rome , and set up the anti-pope . but lodovic dying in the middle of the enterprize , his army broke up , and return'd into france . urban thereupon goes over to naples , and claps nine cardinals in prison , for having sided with france and the anti-pope . after that , he took it ill of the king , that he refus'd to make one of his nephews prince of capua , but concealing his disgust , he desir'd nocera of him for his habitation , which as soon as he was possess'd of , he fortified , and began to cast about which way to deprive him of his kingdom . the king taking the alarm , advanc'd against nocera and besieg'd it , but the pope escap'd to genoua , where he put the cardinals which were his prisoners to death . from thence he went to rome , and created new cardinals . in the mean time charles king of naples went into hungary , was proclaim'd king there , and not long after kill'd . he left the kingdom of naples to his wife , and two children he had by her , one call'd ladislao , and the other giovanna . iohn galeazzo visconti in the mean time had kill'd his unkle bernardo , and possess'd himself of milan , and not content to have made himself duke of milan , he attempted upon tuscany ; but when he was in a fair way to have conquer'd it , and to have made himself king of all italy , he died . urban vi. died also , and was succeeded by boniface ix . cl●ment vii . the anti-pope died likewise at avignon , and benedict xiii . was created in his room . italy all this while was full of soldiers of fortune , english , dutch , and britans , some of them commanded by princes , which upon several occasions had been invited thither , and some of them which had been sent by the popes , when their residence was at avignon . with this medly of nations the princes of italy maintain'd their wars many times , till at length lodovico da conio romagnuolo having train'd up a party of italians , call'd the soldiers of saint george , by his valour and discipline lessen'd the reputation of the forreigners , and made them afterwards more useful and considerable in the italian wars . the pope upon certain differences which arose betwixt him and the romans , remov'd to scesi , where he remain'd till the jubilee in the year . at which time , to invite him back again for the ben●fit of their city , the romans condescended that he should have the annual nomination of a forreign senator , and be permitted to fortifie the castle of st. angelo ; upon which conditions being return'd , to inrich the church , he ordain'd , that in every vacancy , each benefice should pay an annat into the chamber ecclesiastical . after the death of iohn galeazzo duke of milan , though he left two sons giovan-mari-angelo , and philip , the state was divided into many factions . in the troubles which followed , giovan-mari-angelo was slain , and philip for some time kept prisoner in the castle of pavia ; but by the valour and allegiance of the governour , he escap'd . among the rest who had seiz'd the cities which belong'd formerly to iohn galeazzo , william della scala was one , who having been banish'd , and retiring to francesco de carrara lord of padua , by his means he recover'd the state of verona , but he enjoy'd it a short time ; for francesco caus'd him to be poison'd , and assum'd the government himself . the vicentini hereupon ( having till then liv'd quietly under the protection of the visconti ) growing jealous of the greatness of the lord of padua , submitted themselves to the venetians , who at their instigation made war upon him , and beat him first out of verona , and at length out of padua . by this time pope boniface died , and innocent vii . was elected in his place . the people of rome made a solemn address to him for the restitution of their liberty and forts , and being deny'd , they call'd in ladislans king of naples to their assistance ; but their differences being afterwards compos'd , the pope return'd to rome , from whence for fear of the people he fled to viterbo , where he had made his nephew lodovic , conte della marca ; after which he died , and gregory xii . succeeded , upon condition he should resign when ever the anti-pope should be persuaded to do the same . at the intercession of the cardinals , to try whether it was possible to accommodate their differences , and reunite the church , benedict the anti-pope came to porto veneri , and gregory to lucca , where many expedients were propos'd , but nothing concluded ; whereupon the cardinals forsook them both , of one side and the other , benedict retired into spain , and gregory to rimini . the cardinals by the favour of baldassare cossa , cardinal and legat of bologna call'd a counsel at pisa , in which they created alexander v. who immediately excommunicated king ladislaus , invested luigid ' augio with his kingdom , and by the assistance of the florentines , genoueses , venetians and baldassare cossa the legat , they assaulted ladislaus , and drove him out of rome . but in the heat of the war , alexander died , and baldassare cossa was created pope , with the name of iohn xxiii . iohn was created at bologna , but remov'd to rome , where he found luigi d' angio with the forces of provence ; having joyn'd himself with him , they march'd out against king ladislaus , fought with him , and routed his army ; but for want of good conduct , not persuing their victory , king ladislaus rally'd , recover'd rome , and forc'd the pope away to bologna , and luigi to provence . the pope casting about with himself which way he might restrain and lessen the power of king ladislaus , caus'd sigismund king of hungary to be chosen emperour , invited him into italy , to which purpose they had a conference at mantua , where it was concluded , a general council should be call'd for uniting the church ; upon the accomplishment of which , it was presum'd they should be better able to defend themselves against the incroachments of their enemies . at this time , there were three popes in being at once ; gregory , benedict , and iohn , which kept the church very low , both in force and reputation . the place appointed for their convention was constance , a city in germany , contrary to the intention of pope iohn ; and though by the death of king ladislaus , the great reason was taken away that mov'd the pope to that proposition , nevertheless , things being gone so far , and he under an obligation , he could not handsomly come off , but was forc'd to go to it . being arriv'd at constance , it was not many months before he found his error , and endeavoured to have escap'd ; but being discovered and taken , he was put in prison , and compell'd to renounce . gregory , one of the anti-popes renounced by proxy , but benedict , the other anti-pope refus'd , and was condemned for a heretick ; at last finding himself abandon'd by all the cardinals , he renounc'd likewise , and the counsel created a new pope , viz. oddo of the house of colo●ma , who took the name of martin v. upon which , the schisms were compos'd , and the church united , after it had been divided fourty years , and several popes living at one and the same time . as we said before , philip visconti was at this time in the castle of pav●a . but upon the death of fantino care ( who in the troubles of lombardy had made himself lord of vercelli ; alexandria , novara ; and tortona , and contracted great wealth ) having no sons , he bequeath'd his dominions to his wife beatrix , injoyning his friends to use their utmost endeavour to marry her to philip ; by which marriage , philip being much strengthen'd , he recover'd milan , and all the whole province of lombardy : after which , to recompense her great benefits ( according to the example of other princes ) he accus'd his wife beatrix of adultery , and put her to death . being arriv'd at that height both of power and grandeur , he began to contrive against toscany , and pursue the designs of his father iohn galeazzo . ladislaus king of naples at his death , had left to his sister giovanna ( besides his kingdom ) a formidable army commanded by the chief captains in italy , and among the rest , by sforza da contignuolo , a person of particular repute for his valour in those wars . the queen ( to clear her self of an aspersion of too much intimacy with one pan●olfello which she advanc'd ) took to her husband giacopa della marcia , a frenchman , of royal extraction , but upon condition he should content himself to be call'd prince of taran●o , and leave the title and government of the kingdom to her . but the soldiers as soon as he was arrived in naples called him king , which occasioned great differences betwixt him and the queen , sometimes one prevailing , and sometimes the other . but at length the government rested in the queen , and she became a severe enemy to the pope . whereupon sforza to drive her into a necessity , and force her to his own terms , laid down his commission , and refused to serve her against him ; by which means being ( as it were ) disarmed in a moment , having no other remedy she applyed her self to alphonso king of arragon and sicily , adopted him her son , and to command her army , she entertained braccio da montone , as eminent a soldier as sforza , and an adversary of the popes , upon accompt of certain towns ( as perugia and others ) which he had usurped from the church . after this , a peace was concluded betwixt her and the pope ; but alphonso suspecting least she should serve him , as she had done her husband , began privately to contrive how he might possess himself of the forts : but the queen was cunning , and prevented him by fortifying her self in the castle of naples . jealousies increasing in this manner , and no-body interposing , they came to an ingagement , and the queen by the help of sforza ( who was returned to her service ) overcame alphonso , drove him out of naples , abdicated him , and adopted lodovic d' angio in his place . hereupon new wars ensued betwixt braccio ( who was of alphonso's party ) and sforza ( who was for the queen , ) in the process of the war sforza passing the river pescara , was by accident drowned . his death was a great prejudice to the affairs of the queen , who thereupon would have run great hazard of being droven out of her kingdom , had not her loss been supplyed by philip visconti , duke of milan , who forced alphonso back again into arragon . but braccio , not at all discouraged at alphonso's departure , continued war upon the queen , and besieged aquila . the pope looking upon braccio's greatness , as a diminution to the church , entertained francisco ( the son of sforza ) into his pay , who marching with an army to the relief of aquila , ingaged braccio , routed his army , and slew him . of braccio's party , there remained only otho his son , from whom the pope took perugia , but left him the government of montone . but he also was not long after slain in romania , in the florentine assistance ; so that of all those who fought under the discipline of braccio , nicholas piccinino was the man now of greatest reputation . being come thus near with our narrative to the times we designed , that which remains being considerable in nothing but the wars which the florentines and the venetians had with philip duke of milan , ( of which , our relation shall be particular when we come to treat of florence , ) we shall forbear to enlarge any farther , and only in short , reduce it to memory , in what state and posture italy then stood with its princes , and armies . among the principal states , queen giovanna held the kingdom of naples , la marca , the patrimony , and romagna . part of their towns belonged to the church , part to their particular governours , or others which had usurped them : as ferrara , modena , reggio , to the family of the esti , faenzi to the manfredi , imola to the alidosi , furli to the ordelaffi , rimini and pesaro to the malatesti , and camerino to the house varana . lombardy was divided , part under duke philip , and part under the venetian . all the rest who had had any soveraignty or principality in those parts , being extinct , except only the house of gonzagua , which governed in mantua at that time . of tuscany the greatest part was under the dominion of the florentine ; lucca only , and siena lived free under their own laws : lucca under the guinigi , and siena of it self . the genoueses , being free sometimes , sometimes under the authority of the french , and sometimes of the visconti ; they lived without any great reputation , and were reckoned among the meaner and most inconsiderable states of that countrey . their principal potentates were not themselves in command , but their armies managed by their generals . duke philip consined himself to his chamber , and not being to be seen , his wars were manag'd by commissioners . the venetians altering their scene , and making war by land , they disbarqued that army which had made them so glorious by sea ; and according to the custom of their countrey , gave the command of it to other people . the pope , being a religious person , and giovanna queen of naples a woman , were not so proper to command in person , and therefore did that by necessity which others did by indiscretion . the florentines were under the same necessity , for their frequent divisions having exhausted their nobility , and the government of the city remaining in the hands of such as were bred up to merchandize ; in their wars they were forc'd to follow the fortune and direction of strangets : so that the armies all italy over , were in the hands of the smaller princes , or such as had no soveraignty at all . those smaller princes embracing those commands , not from any impulse or stimulation of glory , but to live plentifully and safe . the others education having been small , not knowing what other course to take , they took up arms , hoping thereby to gain either honour or estate . among these the most eminent were carmignuola , francisco sforza , nicholo piccinino , brought up under braccio , agnolo della pergola , lorenzo , and micheletto attenduli , il tartaglia , giaccopaccio , ceccolino da perugia , nicolo da tolentino , guido torello , antonio dal ponte ad hera , and many others . with these may be reckon'd those princes which i have mention'd before , to which may be added the barons of rome , the orsini , colonnesi , and other lords and gentlemen of the kingdom of lombardy , who depending upon the wars , had setled a kind of a league and intelligence betwixt themselves , model'd it with that artifice , and temporized so exactly , that most commonly who ever were enemies , both sides were sure to be losers . by this means , the art of war became so mean and unserviceable , every little officer that had but the least spark of experience could have easily corrected it . of these lazy princes , and their despicable officers shall be the subject of my ensuing discourse ; but before i come to it , it will be necessary ( according to my promise at first ) to deduce florence from its original , and give every one a clear prospect what was the state of that city in those times , and by what means it arriv'd at it , thorough the imbroilments of a thousand years , in which italy was involv'd . the history of florence . book ii. among the great and admirable orders of former kingdoms and common-wealths ( though in our times it is discontinued and lost ) it was the custom upon every occasion to build new towns and cities ; and indeed nothing is more worthy and becoming an excellent prince , a well-disposed common-wealth , nor more for the interest and advantage of a province , than to erect new towns , where men may cohabit with more convenience , both for agriculture , and defence . for besides the beauty and ornament which follow'd upon that custom , it render'd such provinces as were conquer'd , more dutiful and secure to the conquerour , planted the void places , and made a commodious distribution of the people ; upon which , living regularly and in order , they did not only multiply faster , but were more ready to invade , and more able for defence . but by the negligence and omission of common-wealths and principalites , this method being at present disused , the provinces are become weaker , and some of them ruin'd . for ( as i said before ) it is this order alone that secures a countrey , and supplies it with people . the security consists in this , that in a new conquer'd country , a colony placed by authority , is a fortress and guard to keep the natives in obedience ; neither without this can a province continue inhabited , or preserve a just distribution of the people , because all places being not equally fertile or healthful , where it is barren , they desert ; where unwholsome , they die ; and unless there be some way to invite or dispose new men to the one , as well as the other , that province must fail ; the abandoning some places leaving them desolate and weak , and the thronging to others making them indigent and poor . and forasmuch as these inconveniences are not to be remedied by nature , art and industry is to be apply'd ; and we see many countreys which are naturally unhealthful , much better'd by the multitude of inhabitants ; the earth being purify'd by their tillage , and the air by their fires , which nature alone would never have effected . of this , venice is instance sufficient ; for though seated in a sickly and watrish place , the concourse of so many people at one time , made it healthfull enough . pisa by reason of the malignity of the air , was very ill inhabited , till genoa , and the inhabitants upon its rivers , being defeated and dispossess'd by the saracens , it follow'd , that being supplanted all of them at once , and repairing thither in such numbers , that town in a short time became populous and potent . but the custom of sending colonies being laid aside , new conquests are not so easily kept , void places not so easily supply'd , nor full and exuberant places so easily evacuated . whereupon many places in the world , and particularly in italy , are become desolate and deserted in respect of what in former ages they have been , which is imputable to nothing , but that princes do not retain their ancient appetite of true glory , nor common-wealths the laudable customs they were wont . in old time , by the virtue and courage of these colonies , new cities were many times built , and what were new begun inlarg'd . in which number the city of florence may be reckon'd , which was begun by the inhabitans of fiesole , and augmented by the colonies . it is a true story ( if dante , and iohn villani may be believ'd ) that the city of fiesole , though plac'd it self on the top of a mountain , nevertheless , that their markets might be better frequented , and their commodities brought to them with greater convenience to the merchant , they order'd them a place , not on the top of the hill , but in the plain , betwixt the bottom of the mountain , and the rivor arn●●s . these merchants ( in my judgment ) were the first occasion of building in that place , and what was originally but store-houses for receipt of their commodities , became afterwards a town , and place of habitation . after the romans had conquer'd the carthaginians , and render'd italy safe against forreign imbroilments , they multiply'd exceedingly ; for men will not incommode themselves , but where they are constrain'd by necessity ; and though the terrours of war may force them for shelter to fortify'd places and rocks , yet when the danger is over , their profit and convenience calls them back again to their houses , and they perfer elbow-room , and ease before any such restraint . the security which follow'd in italy upon the reputation of the roman common-wealth , might possibly be the occasion that this place ( from the aforesaid beginning increasing so vastly ) became afterwards a town , and was call'd at first arnina . after this there arose civil wars in rome , first betwixt marius and silla , then betwixt caesar and pompey , and afterwards betwixt them that murder'd caesar , and those which reveng'd his death . by silla first , and after that by the three roman citizens ( who revenged the assassination of caesar , and divided the empire ) colonies were sent to fiesole ; all , or part of which setled in the plain not far from the town which was already begun . so that by this occasion , the place was so replenish'd with houses , men , and all things necessary for civil government , that it might be reckon'd among the cities of italy . but from whence it assum'd the name of florence is variously conjectur'd . some would have it call'd florence from florino one of the chief of that colonie . some say it was not called florentia , but fluentia in the beginning , in respect of its nearness to the river arno ; and they produce pliny as a witness , who has this expression , that the fluentini are near to the channel of the river arnus . but that ( in my opinion ) is a mistake , because pliny in his book design'd to tell where the florentines were seated , not what they were call'd . nor is it unlikely but that word fluentini might be corrupted , because frontinus and tacitus ( who writ , and were near contemporary with pliny ) call'd the town florentia , and the people florentini , forasmuch as they were govern'd in the time of tiberius , according to the same laws and customs with the rest of the cities in italy ; and cornelius tacitus relates that embassadors were sent from the florentines to the emperour , to desire that the waters of the river chiane might not be disimbogued , or diverted upon their countrey ; neither is it reasonable to think that city could have two names at one time . my opinion therefore is clear , that whatever might be the occasion of its original or denomination , it was always call'd florentia ; that it was founded under the empire of the romans , and began to be mention'd in history in the time of the first emperours ; that when that empire was first afflicted by the barbarians , totila , king of the ostrogoti demolish'd florence ; that years after , it was rebuilt by carolus magnus , from whose time till the year . it follow'd the fortune of the rest of italy , and was subject to those that commanded ; during which it was governed first by the successors of charles , afterwards by the berengarii , and last of all by the emperours of germany , as has been shewn in our general discourse . in those days it was not in the power of the florentines to extend their bounds , or to perform any memorable action , by reason of their subjection to forreign dominion . nevertheless in the year . on st. romulus day ( which was a solemn festival among the fiesolani ) they took , and destroy'd fiesole , either by the connivance of the emperours , or by the opportunity of an interregnum betwixt the death of one emperour and the creation of another , at which time all the cities were free . but afterwards when the popes assum'd more authority , and the emperours power began to diminish , all the towns in that province began to comport themselves with less regard or reverence to their princes ; so that in the year . in the days of arrigo . though italy was divided betwixt him and the church , yet till the year . the florentines by submitting to the conquerours , and designing no farther than their own preservation , kept themselves quiet and intire . but as in the body of man , the later they come , the more dangerous and mortal are the diseases ; so florence the longer it was before it fell into the paroxysms of faction , the more fatally it was afflicted afterwards when it did . the occasion of its first division is considerable , and being mention'd by dante and several other writers as remarkable , i shall take the liberty to discourse of it briefly . among other great and powerful families in florence , there were the buondelmonti , and uberti , and not long after them the amidei , and donati . in the family of the donati , there was a lady ( a widow ) very rich , who had a great beauty to her daughter . the lady had resolv'd with her self to marry her daughter to messr . buondelmonte , a young gentleman , the head of that family . this intention of hers ( either by negligence , or presuming it safe enough at any time ) she had not imparted to any body , so that before she was aware messr . buondelmonte was to be married to a daughter of the house of amidei . the lady much dissatisfy'd with her omission , hoping nevertheless her daughters beauty might be able to dissolve the contract , seeing him pass one day alone towards her house , she took her daughter along , and went down to accost him , and opening the gate as he went by , she saluted him , and told him , she could not but congratulate his marriage , though indeed she had kept her daughter ( presenting her to him ) in hopes she should have been the bride . the young gentleman beholding the excellent beauty of the damotselle , contemplating her extraction , and that her fortune was not at all inferiour to the persons he had chosen , fell immediately into such a passion and desire to marry her , that not considering the promise he had made , the injustice he should commit , nor the ill consequences that might follow , he reply'd , seeing ( madam ) you have preserv'd her for me ( being not yet too late ) it would be ingratitude to refuse her , and without more adoe , he married her . the notice of his inconstancy was no sooner divulg'd , but it was taken in great indignity by the families of the amidei and uberti , who at that time were nearly ally'd . having consulted among themselves , and several others of their relations , it was concluded , the affront was insupportable , and not to be expiated but by the death of messr . buondelmonte ; and though some remonstrated the evils which might follow , moscha lamberti repli'd , that to consider every thing , was to resolve on nothing ; super-adding an old adage , that a thing once done , is not capable of remedy : upon which the fact being determin'd , the perpetration was committed to the said moscha , stiatta uberti , lambertuccio amidei , and oderigo fifanti . upon easter-day in the morning , they address'd themselves to the work , and being privately convey'd to a house belonging to the amidei , between the old bridge and st. stephans , messr . buondelmonte passing the river upon a white horse , ( as if an injury could as easily have been forgotten , as a marriage have been broken ) they set upon him at the foot of the bridge , and slew him under a statue of mars , which was placed thereby . this murder divided the whole city , part of it siding with the buondelmonti , and part with the uberti ; and both the families being powerful in houses , castles , and men , the quarrel continued many years before either could be ejected ; yet though the animosity could not be extinguish'd by a firm and stable peace , yet things were palliated and compos'd sometimes for the present , by certain truces and cessations , by which means ( according to the variety of accidents ) they were sometimes at quiet , and sometimes together by the ears . in this condition florence continued till the reign of frederick . who being king of naples , and desirous to strengthen himself against the church ; to corroborate his interest in tuscany , joyn'd himself to the uberti and their party , by whose assistance the buondelmonti were driven out of florence , and that city ( as all italy had done before ) began to divide into the factions of the guelfs , and the ghibilins . nor will it be amiss to commemorate how each family was ingag'd . the families therefore which sided with the guelfs were the buondelmonti , nerti , rossi , frescobaldi , mozzi , baldi , pulchi , gherardini , foraboschi , bagnesi , guidalotti , sacchetti , manieri , lucardesi , chiaramonti , compiobbesi , cavalcanti , giandonati , gianfiliazzi , scali , guallerotti , importuni , bostichi , tornaquinci , vecchietti , fosinghi , arrigucci , agli , silii , adimari , visdomini , donati , pazzi , della bella , ardinghi , theobaldi , cerchi . with the ghibilines there joyned the uberti , manelli , ubriachi , fifanti , amidei , infanganti , malespini , scolari , guidi , galli , capprardi , lamberti , soldanieri , cipriani , toschi , amieri , palermini , migliorelli , pigli , barucci , cattani , agolanti , bruneleschi , caponsachi , elisei , abbati , fedaldini , guiocchi , galigai ; to which families of the nobility , many of the populacy joyn'd themselves on each side , as their interest or affections carried them , so that in a manner the whole city was ingag'd either on one side or the other . the guelfs being driven out , retir'd into the vale upon the river arnus mention'd before , and the greatest part of their garrisons being there , they defended them as well as they could against the attacks of their enemies . but when frederick dyed , those persons who were neuters , retaining great interest and reputation with the people , thought it more serviceable to the city of florence to reconcile their differences and unite them , than by fomenting them , to destroy it . whereupon endeavouring a composure , they prevail'd at length that the guelfs should lay aside their indignation , and return , and the ghibilines renounce their suspicion and receive them . being united in this manner , it was thought seasonable to provide for their liberty , and to contrive some laws for their defence , before the new emperour should get the power into his hands . in order thereunto they divided the city into six parts ; they chose twelve citizens ( two for each part ) which , under the title of antiani , they invested with the government , but chang'd them every year . to prevent any animosity that might arise from the determination of the matters judicial ; they constituted two forreign judges , ( one of them call'd the captain of the people , and the other the podesta ) to decide all civil and criminal causes which should occur . and because laws are but transient , and of little duration , where there is no power to defend them , they establish'd xx colours in the city , and in the territory , under which all the youth was listed , and oblig'd to be ready in their arms under their respective colours , as often and whenever the captain , or antiani should require them . moreover , as their ensigns were distinct , so were their arms ; some of them consisted of cross-bows , some of them of halbards . their ensigns were chang'd at every pentecost with great solemnity , and dispos'd to new men , and new captains put over their companies . besides , to add majesty to their army , and provide a refuge for such as were wounded , or disabled in fight , where they might refresh , and recruit again , to make head against the enemy , they order'd a large charriot cover'd with red , and drawn by two white oxen , upon which their standard of white and red was to be placed . whenever their army was to be drawn out , this charriot was to be drawn into the market-place , and with great formality consign'd to the captains of the people . for the greater magnificence and ostentation of their enterprizes , they had moreover , a great bell ( call'd martinello ) which rung cotinually a month before they march'd with their army , that the enemy might have so much time to provide for his defence . so much gallantry there was then amongst men , and with so much magnanimity they behav'd themselves , that whereas now adays it is reputed policy and wisdom to surprize an enemy , and fall upon him while he is unprovided , it was then thought treacherous , and ignoble . this bell , when they march'd , was carried along with the army , and by it the guards set , and relieved , and other military orders deriv'd . by this discipline in civil and martial affairs , the florentines laid the foundation of their liberty . nor is it to be imagin'd what strength and authority it acquir'd in a short time , for it came not only to be the chief city in tuscany , but to be reckon'd among the principal of all italy , and indeed there was no grandeur to which it might not have arriv'd , had it not been obstructed by new and frequent dissentions . ten years together , the florenties liv'd under this government ; in which time they forc'd the pistoiesi , aretini , and sanesi to make peace with them , and returning with their army from siena , they took volterra , demolish'd several castles , and brought the inhabitants to florence . in these expeditions , the guelfs had the principal conduct , as being much more popular than the ghibilines , who had carried themselves imperiously during frederick's reign , and made themselves odious ; or else it was because the church party had more friends than the emperours , as being thought more consistent with their liberty . the ghibilines in the mean time , being displeased to see their authority so sensibly decrease , could not be satisfy'd , but attended all occasions to repossess themselves of the government . when manfredi the son of frederick king of naples was invested in that kingdom , and had over-power'd the power of the church , conceiving it a fair opportunity , they practis'd privately with him , to reassume their government ; but they could not manage it so cunningly , but their practice was discover'd to the antiani , who summoning the uberti thereupon ; the uberti not only refus'd to appear , but took arms , and fortify'd themselves in their houses ; at which the people being incens'd , took arms likewise , and joyning with the guelfs , drove them out of florence , and forc'd the whole ghibiline party to transplant to siena . from thence they desir'd the assistance of manfredi king of naples , who sending them supplies , by the conduct and diligence of frinata ( of the house of uberti ) the guelfs received such a blow upon the river arebia , that those which escaped ( supposing their city lost ) fled directly to lucca , and left florence to shift for it self . manfredi had given the command of the auxiliaries which he sent to the ghibilines , to the conte giordano , a captain of no small reputation in those times . giordano , after this victory advanced with his ghibilines to florence , reduc'd the city to the obedience of manfredi ; depos'd the magistrates , and alter'd or abrogated all the laws , and customs that might give them the least figure or commemoration of their liberty : which injury being done with little discretion , was receiv'd by the people with so much detestation , that whereas before they were scarce enemies to the ghibilines , they became thereby inveterate and implacable ; and that mortal animosity was in time their utter destruction . being to return to naples upon affairs of great importance to that kindom , the conte giordano left comte guido novello ( lord of casentino ) in florence , as deputy for the king. this guido novello call'd a council of ghibilines at empoli , wherein it was unanimously concluded , that florence should be razed , being ( by reason the people were so rigid guelfs ) the only city capable to reinforce the declining party of the church . upon so cruel and barbarous a sentence against so noble a city , there was not one friend or citizen oppos'd , besides ferinata delli uberti ; who publickly and couragiously undertook its defence : declaring , that he had not run so many dangers , not expos'd himself to so many difficulties , but to live quietly afterwards in his own countrey ; nor would he now reject what he contended for so long , nor refuse that which his good fortune had given him ; he was resolv'd rather to oppose himself ( against whoever should design otherwise ) with as much vigour and zeal as he had done against the guelfs ; and if jealousie and apprehension should prompt them to endeavour the destruction of their countrey , they might attempt if they pleas'd ; but he hop'd , with the same virtue which drove out the guelfs , he should be able to defend the city . this ferinata was a man of great courage , excellent conduct , head of the ghibilines , and in no small esteem with manfredi himself . these qualifications , and the consideration of his authority , put an end to that resolution , and they began now to take new measures , and contrive wayes of preserving the state. the guelfs who had fled to lucca , being dismiss'd by the lucchesi , upon the counts commination , they withdrew to bologna , from whence being invited by the guelfs of parma , to go against the ghibilines , they behav'd themselves so well , that by their valour , the adversary was overcome , and their possessions given to them : so that increasing in honour and wealth , and understanding that pope clement had call'd carlo d' angio into italy , to depose manfredi ( if possibly ) they sent embassadours to his holiness to tender their assistance ; which the pope not only accepted , but sent them his own standard , which the guelfs carry'd ever after in their wars , and is us'd in florence to this very day . after this , manfredi was beaten , dispoyl'd of his kingdom , and slain , and the guelfs of florence having performed their share in that action , their party grew more brisk and couragious ; and the ghibilines more timorous and weak . whereupon those who with count guido novello were at the helm in florence , began to cast about how they might , by benefits , or otherwise , gain and cajole the people , whom before they had exasperated by all circumstances of injury : but those remedies ( which if us'd in time , before necessity requir'd , might possibly have prevail'd ) being apply'd abruptly , and too late , did not only not contribute to their safty , but hasten'd their ruine . to coaks and insinuate with the people and their party , they thought it would do much if they restor'd them to a part of that honour and authority which they had lost . to this purpose they chose xxxvi . citizens from among the people , and adding to them two forreign gentlemen from bologna , they gave them power to reform the state of the city as they pleas'd . as soon as they met , the first thing they pitcht upon , was to divide the city into several arts ( or trades ) over each art they plac'd a master , who was to administer justice to all under his ward ; and to every art a banner was assign'd , that under that , each company might appear in arms , when ever the safty of the city requir'd it . at first these arts , ( or companies ) were twelve , seven greater , and five less ; the lesser increasing afterwards to fourteen , their whole number advanc'd to xxi , as it remains at this day . the reformation proceeding quietly in this manner , and contriving many things for the common benefit of the people , without interruption ; count guido thinking himself under an equal obligation to provide for his soldiers ; caus'd a tax to be laid upon the citizens , to raise money for their pay ; but he found such difficulty in the business , he durst never collect it : whereupon , perceiving all lost , unless something was suddainly done ; he combin'd with the chief of the ghibilines , and determin'd to take that back again by force from the people which so unadvisedly they had given . with which design , having assembled the several companies in their arms , ( and the xxxvi . reformatori with them ) causing a suddain alarm to be brought in , the reformatori being frighted , and retiring to their houses , the ensigns of the several faculties were display'd , and several armed men behind them immediately ; understanding that count guido and his party were at st. iohns , they made a stand at st. trinita , and chose giovanni soldanieri for their captain . the count on the other side , hearing where they had posted , advanced against them ; and the people , not declining , they met in a place which is now call'd loggia dei tornaquinci , where the count was worsted , and most of his party slain . being off of his mettle , and fearful the enemy would assault him in the night , and cut his throat ; his men being cow'd , and unable to defend him , without considering other remedy , he resolv'd to preserve himself by flying , rather than by fighting ; and accordingly ( contrary to the perswasion of the heads of the ghibilines ) he retired to prato with what men he had left . when he found himself safe , and his fear over , he became sensible of his errour , and being desirous to have repair'd it next morning , at break of day he drew out his men , march'd back to florence , designing to recover that honourably , which he had so scandalously lost ; but he found himself mistaken , for though it might have cost the people hot water to have expell'd him , they found it no hard matter to keep him out when he was gone ; insomuch that being repuls'd , he drew off with great sorrow and shame to casentino , and the ghibilines return'd to their houses . the people being conquerours , out of affection to all such as had a love for their countrey , they resolv'd to reunite the city once more , and call'd home all their citizens which were abroad , as well ghibilines as guelfs . hereupon the guelfs return'd , after six years banishment , the ghibilines late attempt was pardoned , and they receiv'd back again ; but yet they continued odious both to the people , and guelfs , the last not being able to extinguish the memory of their banishment ; nor the first to forget their tyranny and insolence , when the government was in their hand ; so that their animosity was deposited neither on the one side , nor the other . whil'st the affairs of florence were in this posture , a report was spread , that corradine , nephew to manfredi , was coming with forces out of germany , to conquer the kingdom of naples ; upon which the ghibilines conceiv'd fresh hopes of recovering their authority : and the guelfs being no less solicitous for their security , begg'd the assistance of king charles , in case corradine should come . charles having comply'd , and his forces upon their march , the guelfs became so insolent , and the ghibilines so timorous , that two days before the french army arriv'd , the ghibilines fled out of the city , without staying to be expell'd . the ghibilines departed , the florentines new modell'd their city , choosing twelve principal magistrates to continue in authority only for two months , not under the title of antiani , but ruoni-huomini . next to them they constituted a councel of citizens , which they call'd la credenza : after which , were chosen out of the people , which with the credenza , and the buoni-huomini were call'd the general-councel : besides which , they erected another councel , consisting of . both citiziens and nobles , which councel was to consummate and ratifie whatever was debated or resolv'd in the rest . having setled their government in this manner , and by new laws , and election of magistrates of their own party , fortifi'd themselves against the machinations of the ghibilines , the guelfs confiscated the ghibilines estates , and having divided them into three parts , one was assign'd to publike uses , another given to their magistrates and captains , and the third distributed among the guelfs , to recompense the damage they had receiv'd . the pope to preserve tuscany to the faction of the guelfs , made king charles imperial vicar of that province . by this method , the florentines having maintain'd their honour and reputation abroad by their arms , and at home by their laws , they remain'd firm and secure ; in the mean time the pope dyed , and after a two years vacancy , and a tedious dispute , gregory x. was elected , who being at the time of his election ( and a long while before ) in syria , and ( by consequence ) ignorant of the humours of the factions , he carry'd not himself with that caution towards them , as his predecessors had done . but in his way to france , being arriv'd at florence , he thought it the office of a good pastor to endeavour to compose their differences , and prevail'd with them to receive commissioners from the ghibilines to negotiate the manner of their return ; but though their peace was made , and all particulars concluded , the ghibilines were too jealous to accept them , and refus'd to come back . the pope imputed the fault to the city , and excommunicated it in his passion , under which censure it continued whil'st he lived ; but after his death , when innocent v. was created , it was taken off . innocent v. was succeeded by nicholas iii. of the house of the orsini ; and because the popes were alwayes jealous of any great power in italy ( though rais'd by the favour of the church ) and constantly endeavour'd to depress it ; great troubles , and frequent variations ensued ; for the fear of a person grown potent to any degree , was the advancement of another less powerful than he ; who growing powerful by his preferment , as his predecessor had done , became formidable like him ; and that fear was the occasion of his debasement . this was the cause that kingdom was taken from manfredi , and given to charles . this was the reason that charles became terrible afterwards , and his ruine was conspir'd : for nicholas iii. ( mov'd by the considerations aforesaid ) prevail'd so , that charles by the emperours means , was remov'd from the government of tuscany , and latino ( the popes legat ) sent thither in his place , by commission from the emperour . florence at this time was in no very good condition , for the guelfish nobility being grown insolent , and careless of the magistrates , several murders and other violences were daily committed , the malefactors passing unpunish'd by the favour and protection of the nobles . to restrain these insolencies , it was thought good by the heads of the city , to recall those who were banished , which gave opportunity to the legate to reunite the city ; and to the ghibilines , to return : whereupon instead of xii . governours which they had before , they were increas'd to xiv . ( vii . of each party ) their government to be annual , and their election by the pope . two years florence remain'd under this form , till martino ( a frenchman ) was created pope , who restor'd to king charles whatever authority pope nicholas had taken from him : so that florence being again in commotion ; the citizens took up arms against the emperours governour , and to restrain the gbibilines , and correct the insolence of their nobility , put the city under a new form of government . it was in the year . when the corporation of the arts having been invested with the magistracy and militia , had gain'd great reputation ; whereupon by their own authority they order'd that instead of the xiv . three citizens should be created ( with the title of priori ) who should govern the common-wealth for two months , and be chosen indifferently out of commons or nobility , provided they were merchants , or professed any art. afterwards the chief magistracy was reduc'd to six persons ( one for each ward ) where it continued to the year . in which the city was reduc'd into quarters , and the priori , to nine , they having been advanc'd to . by some accident in the mean time . this constitution was the occasion ( as shall be shew'd in its place ) of the nobilities ruine , who upon sundry provocations were excluded , and afterwards without any respect , oppress'd by the people . at first the nobility consented to its erection , as an expedient to unite , and accommodate all differences ; but afterwards incroaching , and interfering for the government , all of them lost it . there was likewise a palace assign'd for the constant residence of this councel , ( in which the magistrates were formerly accustom'd to confer with the commissioners of the church ) and serjeants , and other necessary officers , for their greater honour , appointed to attend : which councel , though at first it had only the title of priori ; yet afterwards for magnificence sake , it had the addition of segnori . for a while the florentines continued quiet within themselves , though they had wars abroad with the aretines ( whohad driven out the guelfs ) with whom they ingag'd successfully in compaldino , and overcame them . upon which , the city increasing both in wealth , and number of inhabitants , it was thought good to inlarge their walls , which they did to its present circumference ; whereas before its diameter was only from the old bridge to s. lorenzo . the wars abroad , and peace at home , had almost exterminated both the ghibilines , and guelfs in that city ; there remain'd only those sparks of animosity ( which are unavoidable in all cities ) betwixt the nobles and the people ; for the one solicitous of their freedom according to their laws , and the other impatient to command them , it is not possible they should agree . whil'st they were apprehensive of the ghibilines , this humour did not show it self in the nobility ; but when the ghibilines were low and depress'd , it began to exert , and the people were injur'd daily , beyond the vindication either of the magistrates , or laws ; every nobleman making good his insolence , by the multitude of his friends and relations , both against the priori , and the captain . the heads therefore of the arts ( by way of remedy against so great inconvenience ) provided that in the beginning of its office , every councel of the priori should create an ensign , or gonfaloniere di justicia , out of the people , assigning him men in companies , which were to be ready with their arms , and their gonfaloniere to see justice administer'd whenever the court , or their captain requir'd them . the first in this office , was ubaldo ruffoli , who drawing out his bands , demolish'd the houses of the galetti , because one of that family had slain one of his fellow-citizens in france . the establishment of this order by the arts was not difficult , by reason of the jealousies and emulations amongst the nobility , who were not in the least sensible it was intended against them , till they felt the smart of it , when 't was put in execution . this constitution was terrible to them at first , but afterwards they return'd to their old insolence again ; for having insinuated themselves into the councel of the priori , they found means to hinder the gonfaloniere from executing his office. besides , witness being always required upon any accsation , the plaintiff could hardly find any body that would give testimony against the nobility . so that in a short time florence was involved in its own distraction , and the people exposed to their former oppression , justice being grown dilatory and tedious , and sentence , though given , seldom or never executed . the populace not knowing what resolution to take in this case , giano della bella ( a person of noble extraction , but a lover of the liberty of the city ) incourag'd the heads of the arts , to reform the city , and by his persusion it was ordain'd that the gonfaloniere should reside with the priori , and have men under his command ; they likewise excluded the nobility out of the councel of the segnori . they made a law that all accessaries , or abettors , should be liable to the same punishment with those who were actually guilty ; and decreed that common report should be sufficient to convict them . by these laws ( which were called ordinamenti della giustitia ) the people gain'd great reputation : but giano della bella , being look'd upon as the contriver of their destruction , became odious to the nobility ; and not to them only , but to the wealthiest of the populace , who began to suspect his authority , and not without reason , as appear'd afterwards upon the first occasion was given him to abuse it . it happened one of the commons was killed in a fray , where several of the nobility were present ; corso donati being one amongst the rest , the murder was laid to his charge , as the most furicus and desperate . he was taken into custody by the captain , but ( however causes went ) whether he was innocent of the crime , or the captain fearful to condemn him , he was presently discharg'd . the people offended at his discharge , betook themselves to their arms , ran to the house of giano della bella , and beg'd of him , that he would be the means that the laws he had invented might be put in execution . giano had privately a desire that corso should be punish'd , and therefore advis'd not the people to lay down their arms , ( as many co●ceived he ought ) but incouraged them to address to the segnori with their complaints , and desire their vindication . the people full of rage , thinking themselves abused by the captain , and abandon'd by giano , went not to the segnori ( as directed ) but away they ran to the captain 's palace , and plunder'd it ; which action displeased the whole city , and was laid upon giano , by such as meditated his ruine ; whereupon some of his enemies happening afterwards to be of the segnori , he was accused to the captain as an incendiary and debaucher of the people . whil'st his cause was in agitation , the people took arms again , flocked in great numbers to his house , and offer'd to defend him against the segnori his enemies . giano had no mind to experiment the popular favour , or trust his life in the hands of the magistrates , as fearing the malignity of the one , no less than the unconstancy of the other ; but to secure himself against the malice of his enemies , and his countrey against the commotion of his friends , he resolved to give way to their envy , and banish himself from that city which he had preserv'd from the tyranny of the nobility by his own danger and charge . the nobility , after his departure , to recover their dignity , which they conceived lost by the dissentions among them , united , and apply'd themselves by two of their number , to the senate or segnoria ( which they judg'd to be their friends ) to intreat them to mitigate in some measure the acerbity of those laws which were made against them : which demand was no sooner known , but the people ( fearing the signoria should comply ) began immediately to tumultuate , and , betwixt the ambition of the one , and suspicion of the other , they fell soon after to blows . the nobility stood upon their guards in three places , at st. iohn's , in the mercato nuovo , and the piazza de mozzi , under three commanders , forese adinari , vanni de mozzi , and geri spini . the people were not got together under their ensigns in great numbers at the senator's palace , which at that time not far from st. pruocolo ; and because the people were jealous of the signori , they deputed six citizens to share with them in the government . in the mean time , while both parties were preparing for the combat , some both of the nobility and commons , with certain religious persons of good reputation , interpos'd themselves , remonstrating to the nobility , that the honour they had lost , and the laws made against them , were occasioned by their arrogance and ill government ; that now to take arms , and betake themselves to force , for the recovery of what was lost by their own dissention and ill-management , would be the ruine of their countrey , and a detriment to themselves . that they should consider in number , riches , and malice , they were much inferiour to the people . that that nobility they so vainly affected , by which they thought to advance others , when they came to sight would prove but a meer title and name , unable to defend them against the advantages which their enemies had over them . to the people it was represented imprudence to drive things too far , and make their adversaries desperate ; for he that hopes no good , fears no ill . that it ought to be considered , their nobility were they which had gain'd so much honour to their city in its wars , and were not therefore in justice to be used at that rate . that they could be content to have the supream magistacy taken from them , and endure it patiently ; but they thought it unreasonable , and insupportable to be at every bodies mercy ( as their new laws rendered them ) and subject to be driven out of their countrey upon every cappriccio . that it would be well to mitigate their fury , and lay down their arms , rather than to run the hazard of a battel , by presumption upon their numbers , which had many times fail'd , and been worsted by the less . the people were divided in their judgments , some were for ingaging , as a thing some time or other would necessarily be ; and better now , than to deser till their enemies were more powrful : and if it could be imagined the mitigation of the laws would content them , they should be mitigated accordingly ; but their insolence and pride could never be laid by , till by force they were constrain'd to 't . to others more moderate and prudent , it appeared that the alteration of the laws would not signifie much , but to come to a battel might be of very great importance ; and their opinion prevailing , it was provided that no accusation should be admitted against a nobleman without necessary testimony . though upon these terms both parties laid down their arms , yet their jealousies of one another were mutually retain'd , and they began again to fortifie on both sides . the people thought sit to re-order the government , and reduc'd their signori to a less number , as suspecting some of them to be too great favouers of the nobility , of whom the mansini , magalotti , altoviti , peruzzi , and cerretani were the chief . having setled the state in this manner in the year . for the greater magnificence and security of their signori , they founded their palace , and made a piazza before it , where the houses of the uberti stood formerly : about the same time also the foundation of the prisons were laid , which in few years after were finished . never was this city in greater splendor , nor more happy in its condition than then , abounding both in men , riches , and reputation . they had . citizens in the town ●it to bear arms , and . more in their territory . all tuscany was at its devotion , partly as subjects , and partly as friends . and though there were still piques and suspicions betwixt the nobility and the people , yet they did not break out into any ill effect , but all lived quietly and peaceably together ; and had not this tranquillity been at length interrupted by dissention within , it had been in no danger from abroad ; being in such terms at that time , it neither feared the empire , nor its exiles , and could have brought a force into the field equivalent to all the rest of the states in italy . but that diseas● from which ab extra it was secure , was ingendred in its own bowels . there were two families in florence , the cerchi , and the donati , equally considerable , both in numbers , riches , and dignity ; being neighbours both in city and countrey , there happened some exceptions and disgust betwixt them , but not so great as to bring them to blows , and perhaps they would never have produc'd any considerable effects , had not their ill humours been agitated and fermented by new occasion . among the chief families in pistoia , there was the family of the cancellieri . it happened that lore the son of gulielmo , and geri the son of bertaccio , fell out by accident at play , and passing from words to blows , geri received a slight wound . gulielmo was much troubled at the business , and thinking by excess of humility to take off the scandal , he increased it and made it worse . he commanded his son to go to geri's fathers house , and demand his pardon ; lore obey'd , and went as his father directed : but that act of humanity did not at all sweeten the acerbity of bertaccio's mind , who causing lore to be seiz'd by his servants ( to aggravate the indignity ) he caused him to be led by them into the stable , and his hand cut off upon the manger , with instruction to return to his father , and to let him know , that wounds are not cured so properly by words , as amputation . gulielmo was so enraged at the cruely of the fact , as he and his friends immediately took arms to revenge it ; and bertaccio and his friends doing as much to defend themselves , the whole city of pistoia was engaged in the quarrel , and divided into two parties . these cancellieri being both of them descended from one of the cancellieri who had two wives , one of them called bianca : that party which descended from her , called it self bianca ; and the other in opposition was called nera . in a short time many conflicts happened betwixt them , many men killed , and many houses destroyed . not being able to accommodate among themselves , though both sides were weary , they concluded to come to florence , hoping some expedient would be found out there , or else to fortifie their parties by the acquisition of new friends . the neri having had familiarity with the donati , were espoused by corso , the head of that family . the bianchi , to support themselves against the accession of the donati , fell in with veri the chief of the cerchi , a man not inferiour to corso in any quality whatever . the malignity of this humour being brought hither from pistoia , began to revive the old quarrel betwixt the cerchi and donati in such manner , that the priori , and other principal citizens began to apprehend they should fall together by the ears , and the whole city come to be divided . hereupon they applyed themselves to the pope , desiring he would interpose his authority to asswage those differences which were too great for their private power to compose . the pope sent for veri , and prest him earnestly to a reconciliation with the donati . veri seemed to be surprised at his importunity , pretended he had no prejudice to them at all , and because reconciliation presupposed a quarrel , there being nothing of the latter , he thought there was no necessity of the first . so that veri returning from rome without any other conclusion , the malevolence increas'd , and every little accident ( as it happened afterwards ) was sufficient to put all in confusion . in the moneth of may , several holidays being publickly celebrated in florence , certain young gentlemen of the donati , with their friends on horseback , having stopt near st. trinity , to see certain women that were dancing , it fell out that some of the cerchi arrived there likewise with some of their friends , and being desirous to see as well as the rest , not knowing the donati were before , they spurr'd on their horses , and justled in among them . the donati looking upon it as an affront , drew their swords ; the cerchi were as ready to answer them , and after several cuts and slashes given and received , both sides retir'd . this accident was the occasion of great mischief ; the whole city ( as well people as nobility ) divided , and took part with the bianchi and neri , as their inclinations directed them . the chief of the bianchi were the cerchi , to whom the adimari , the abbati , part of the fosinghi , the bardi , rossi , frescobaldi , norli , mannilli , all the mozzi , the scali , gerrardin● , cavalcanti , matespini , bestichi , giandionati , vecchietti , and arriguelzi , joyn'd themselves ; with these sided several of the populace and all the ghibiline faction in florence ; so that in respect of their numbers , they seem'd to have the whole government of the city . the donati on the other side were heads of the neri , and follow'd by all the rest of the before mentioned nobility , who were not ingag'd with the bianchi ; and beside them all the parzi , bisdonini , manieri , bagn●sit , tornaquinci , spini , buondelmonti , gianfigliazzi , and brunelteschi ; nor did this humour extend it self only in the city , but infected the whole countrey . in so much that the captains of the arts and such as favour'd the guelfs , and were lovers of the commonwealth , very much apprehended least this new distraction should prove the ruine of the city , and the restauration of the ghibilins . whereupon they sent to the pope , beseeching him to think of some remedy , unless he had a mind that city ( which had been always a bulwark to the church ) should be destroy'd or become subject to the ghibilins . to gratifie their request , the pope dispatch'd matteo d' aquasparta ( a portugal cardinal ) as his legate to florence , who sinding the party of the bianchi obstinate and untractable , as presuming upon the advantage of their numbers , he left florence in an anger , and interdicted them ; so that the town remained in more confusion a● his departure , than he found it . all parties being at that time very high , and dispos'd to mischief , it happen'd that several of the cerchi and donati meeting at a burial , some words pass'd betwixt them , and from words they proceeded to blows , but no great hurt done , for that time . both sides being returned to their houses , the cerchi began to deliberate how they might fall upon the donati , and in conclusion they went in great numbers to attack them , but by the courage of corso they were repell'd , and several of them wounded . hereupon the city fell to their arms ; the laws and the magistrates were too weak to contest with the fury of both parties . the wisest and best citizens were in perpetual fear . the donati and their friends having less force , were more anxious and solicitous of their safety , to provide for it as well as was possible : at a meeting of corso with the heads of the neri , and the captain of the arts , it was concluded that the pope should be desired to send them some person of the blood royal to reform their city , supposing that way the most probable to suppress this bianchi . the assembly , and their resolution was notify'd to the priori , and aggravated against the adverse party as a conspiracy against their freedom . both factions being in arms , dante , and the rest of the signori taking courage , with great wisdome and prudence causing the people to put themselves in arms , by conjunction of several out of the countrey they forc'd the heads of both parties to lay down their arms , confin'd corso , donati and several of the faction of the neri to their houses ; and that their proceedings might seem impartial , they committed several of the bianchi , who afterwards upon plausible pretences were dismiss'd . corso and his accomplices were discharg'd likewise ; and supposing his holiness to be their friend , took a journey to rome to perswade him personally to what by letters they had begg'd of him before . there happen'd to be at the popes court at that time charles de valois the king of france his brother , call'd into italy by the king of naples to pass over into sicily . the pope ( upon the importunity of the florentine exiles ) though sit to send him to florence to remain there till the season of the year serv'd better for his transportation . charles arrived , and though the bianchi ( who had then the supremacy ) were jealous of him , yet being patron of the guelfs , and deputed thither by the pope , they durst not oppose his coming ; but on the contrary , to oblige , him they gave him full authority to dispose of the city as he pleased . charles was no sooner invested with his authority ; but he caus'd all his friends and partizans to arm , which gave the people so great a jealousie that he would usurp upon their liberties , that they also put themselves in arms , and stood ready every man at his door to resist any such attempt . the cerchi and the chief of the bianchi ( having had the government in their hands and managed it proudly ) were become generally odious , which gave incouragement to corso and the rest of the neri who were banish'd , to return to florence , being assur'd that charles , and the captains of the companies were their friends . whilst their suspicion of charles had put the city in arms , corso , his comrades , and many of their followers enter'd into florence without any impediment : and although veri de cerchi was perswaded to oppose , he refus'd it , and told them , he would leave their chastisement to the people of florence , against whose interest corso did come . but he was mistaken in his measures , for in stead of being punished , he was received very kindly by the people ; and veri was forc'd to fly for his safety . for corso having forc'd his entrance at the porta pinti , drew up and made a stand at s. pietro maggiori ( a place not far from his palace ) and having united with such of the people , and his friends as desir'd novelty , and were come thither on purpose ; the first thing he did was to discharge all prisoners whatever and however committed , whether by private or publick authority . he forc'd the signori to return privately to their houses , and elected a certain number ( of the faction of the neri ) out of the people , to supply their places . for five days together they ransack'd and plunder'd the houses of the chief of the bianchi . the cerchi and the heads of that faction , seeing the people for the most part their enemies , and charles none of their friend , were retir'd out of the city , to such castles as they had , and whereas before they would not entertain the counsel of the pope , they were now glad to implore his assistance , and to let him understand that charles was not come to the advantage , but to the prejudice of the city . whereupon the pope sent his legate matteo di aquasparta to florence the second time , who not only made a peace betwixt the cerchi and donati , but fortified it by several marriages and alliances . nevertheless insisting to have the bianchi participate of the chief offices , and being deny'd by the neri who had them in possession , he left the city as ill satisfi'd as before , and again excommunicated it for its disobedience . thus both parties continued discontented . the neri , seeing their enemies so near , were apprehensive least by their destruction they should recover the honours and authority which they had lost ; and as if these fears and animosities had been not sufficient to do mischief , new affronts and injuries were offered . nicholas de cerchi , being going with some of his friends to some of his houses , as he pass'd by the ponte ad africo , was assaulted by simon son of corso donati . the conflict was sharp , and on either side deplorable , for nicholas was kill'd upon the place , and simon so wounded that he died the next morning . this accident disturb'd the whole city afresh , and though the neri were indeed most culpable , yet they were protected by the government , and before judgment could be obtain'd , a conspiracy was discover'd between the bianchi and piero terranti ( one of charles his barons ) with whom they practis'd privately to be restor'd to the government . the plot was detected by several letters from the cerchi to the said piero , though some imagin'd they were counterfeited by the donati , to divert the infamy they had incurr'd by the assassination of nicholas . the cerchi and all their clann were at this time prisoners to the donati ( and among the rest dante the poet ) their estates were consiscated , and their houses demolish'd . their party , with several of the ghibilines that had joyn'd themselves with them , were dispers'd up and down in sundry places , attending new troubles to better their condition ; and charles having finish'd what he design'd when he came thither , return'd to the pope in pursuance of his expedition into sicily , in which he managed himself with no more prudence than he had done in florence ; but losing many of his men , he went back into france , with no little dishonour . after charles was departed , for some time florence was quiet , only corso was dissatisfied , as not thinking himself in authority suitable to his deserts : for the government being in the hands of the people , he believed it managed by such as were much his inferiours . moved therefore by these provocations , to varnish over a foul design with a fair pretence , he calumniated several citizens who had had charge of the publick money , for imbeziling of it , and applying it to their private use ; giving out that it was fit they should be inquir'd after , and punished : several of his mind did the same , and many others by their ignorance and credulity were persuaded that what corso did was out of pure care and affection to his country . on the other side the persons accus'd , having the favour of the people , stood upon their justification , and so far these differences proceeded , that after several expostulations , and civil controversies , they came at length to take arms. on one side there were corso , lotieri bishop of florence , with many of the nobility , and some of the commons . on the other side there were the signori , and the greatest part of the people : so that there was sighting in many places of the city . the signori , perceiving their affairs in some danger , sent to lucca for aid , and immediately all the people in lucca came in to their assistance ; by whose supervention things were presently compos'd , the tumults asswag'd , and the people continued in their former liberty and government , without any other punishment of the author of the scandal . the pope had heard of the tumults at florence , and sent thither nicholas da prato his legate to appease them , who , for his quality , learning and behaviour , being a man of great reputation , he quickly obtained such credit with the people , that they gave him authority to reform , or model their government as he pleas'd . being of the ghibiline faction , he was inclin'd to call home those of that party who were banish'd ; but first he thought it convenient to ingratiate with the people , by restroing their ancient companies , which act added as much strength to their interest , as it took away from the nobless . when he had , as he thought , sufficiently oblig'd the multitude , the legate design'd to call home the exiles , and try'd many ways to effect it , but was so far from succeeding in any of them , that he render'd himself suspected to the governors , was forc'd out of the city , and leaving all in confusion , in a great passion he excommunicated it at his departure . nor was this city molested with one humour only , but several ; there being at one the factions betwixt the nobility and the people , the guelfs and the ghibilines , the bianchi , and the neri , at that time all the city was in arms , and many bickerings happend'd . many were discontented at the legates departure , being willing the banish'd citizens should return . the chief of them who rais'd the report were the medici and the giugni , who ( with the legate ) were discover'd to be favourers of the rebels ; in the interim skirmishes and rencounters pass'd in several places of the town , and to add to their calamity , a fire broke out in the orto s. michel among the houses of the abbati , from thence i● went to the houses of the caponsacchi , and burn'd them , from thence to the houses of the macci , amieri , toschi , cipriani , lamberti , cavalcanti , and all the new market ; from thence it pass'd to the porta s. maria , burn'd that , and then wheeling about to the old bridge , it consum'd the palaces of the gherardini , pulci , amidei , lucardesi , and with them so many other houses , that the number of all that were consum'd by that fire amounted to more than thirteen hundred . some were of opinion it began by accident in the height of the conflict . others affirm it was done on purpose by neri abbati , prior of s. piero scharagio ( a dissolute and mischievous person ) who seeing every body ingaged , thought he might commit a piece of wickedness then , which no body should be able to remedy ; and to the end it might succeed the better , and give less suspicion of him , he set the houses of his own party on fire , where he could do it with convenience . these conflicts , and this conflagration happen'd in iuly . at which time corso donati was the only person who did not arm in those tumults ; and not without reason , for thereby he presumed ( when weary of their fighting they should incline to an agreement ) he should more easily be chosen umpire betwixt them ; at length all arms indeed were layd down , but more that they were tyr'd , and weary of their miseries , than from any relentment or condescension on either side . the whole consequence of all was , that the rebels were not suffer'd to return , and the party which favour'd them was forc'd to comply . the legate being come back to rome , and understanding the new distractions in florence , persuaded the pope , that if he design'd to compose them , it would be necessary to send for twelve of the principal malecontents of that city , which being the nourishment and fomentors of their miseries , their miseries would cease as soon as they were remov'd . the pope took his counsel , sent for twelve of the chief citizens ( who came to rome in obedience to his summons ) and among them corso donati was one . upon the departure of these citizens the legate signifi'd to the exiles , that now was their time ( the city being destitute of their heads ) to return . whereupon the citizens which were banish'd , getting what force together they were able , they march'd to florence , enter'd where the walls were unfinish'd , and pass'd on as far as the piazza of s. iohn . it was a remarkable passage to consider , that those people who fought in their behalf whilst humbly and unarm'd they begged to be admitted , seeing them come forcibly into the city with their weapons in their hands , turn'd against them immediately , and joyning with the people , beat them out of the city . this enterprize was lost by leaving part of their forces at lastra , and not attending the arrival of tolosetto uberti who was coming from pistoia with three hundred horse ; but supposing expedition of greater importance to their success , than strength , they found ( as many had done before ) that delay takes away the opportunity , and celerity the force . the rebels ●epuls'd , florence return'd to its old divisions . to lessen the authority of the cavalcanti , the people assaulted and took from them the castle of stinche in the val di greve , which had belong'd anciently to that family ; and because those who were taken in this castle were the first which were put in the new built prisons , that building took its name from the castle from whence they came , was call'd le stinche from thence , and is call'd so to this day . after this , those who had the government in their hands re-establish'd the companies of the people ; gave them the ensigns which had been us'd at first under the discipline of the arts. the captains , the gonfalonieri of the companies , and the colledge of the signori were call'd , and orders were given that they should assist the signoria or senate at all times , in time of commotion or injury , with their swords , and in time of peace with their counsels . to the two old governours they added another call'd essecutore , whose office it was by conjunction , with the gonfalonieri to restrain and correct the insolence of the grandees . in the mean time the pope dying , corso and his fellow citizens return'd from rome , and might have liv'd quietly , had not the insatiableness of corso's ambition created new troubles . to gain reputation it was always his custom to oppose the sentiment of the nobility in whatever was propos'd ; and which way he observed the people to encline , thither he constantly directed his authority , to work himself into their favour ; so that in all innovations and controversies he was the head ; all persons resorting to him who had any thing extraordinary in design . hereupon he became so odious to several considerable citizens , that the faction of the neri subdivided , and fell into open division among themselves , because corso made use of private force and authority , and of such persons as were enemies to the state. yet such was the awe and majesty of his person , that every body fear'd him ; to deprive him of the peoples favour ( which , that way , was easily disingaged ) it was given out that he design'd upon the government , and meant to make himself king : which from his extravagant way of living was credible enough , and much confirm'd when afterwards he married a daughter of uguccione della faggivola chief of the rianchi , and ghibilius , and the most powerfull person in the city . this alliance was no sooner known among his enemies , but his adversaries took arms , and the people for that reason were so far from appearing in his defence , that the greater part of them joyn'd with his enemies . the cheif of his enemies ( and who were at the head of them ) were rosso della tosa , pazzino de pazzo , geri spini , and berto brunelleschi . they , their followers and the greatest part of the people , ran with their swords drawn to the foot of the palace of the signori , by whose order an accusation was prefer'd to plero bianca captain of the people , against corso , as a person who ( by the assistance of uguccione ) conspired to be king. upon this impeachment he was summon'd , and refusing to appear , was declared a rebel for his contumacy ; there having been but two hours time betwixt the accusation and sentence : judgment pronounc'd , the signori , with the several companies of the people ( their banners display'd ) went presently to apprehend him . corso on the other side not at all dismay'd either at the severity of the sentence , the authority of the signori , nor the unconstancy of his friends ( who had many of them forsaken him ) fell to fortifying his house , hoping to have defended himself there till uguccione ( to whom he had sent word of his condition ) should come to his rescue . his houses , and avenues were fortifi'd and barricado'd by him , and strengthen'd with such garrisons of his friends , that though the people were very numerous and press'd hard to have enter'd them , they could not prevail . the conflict was smart , many kill'd and wounded on both sides , and the people finding there was no entrance that way by force , got into the houses of his neighbours , and through them they brake unexpectedly into his . corso finding himself inviron'd by his enemies , and no hopes of relief from ugnccione , dispairing of victory , he resolv'd to try what was possible for his escape ; advancing therefore with gherardo bondini and several other his most faithful and valiant friends , he charg'd so furiously upon his enemies , that he brake them , and made his way thorow them ( fighting ) out of the p●●ta della croce : nevertheless being pursu'd , gherardo was slain by boccaccio cavicciulli upon the africa , and corso was taken prisoner at rouezano by certain spanish horsmen belonging to the signoria . but , disdaining the sight of his victorious enemies , and to prevent the torments which they would probably inflict , as they were bringing him back towards florence , he threw himself off his horse , and was cut to pieces by one of the company ; his body was gather'd together by the monks of s. salvi , and bury'd , but without any solemnity . this was the sad end of that magnanimous person , to whom his country , and the neri , ow'd much both of their good fortune and ill ; and doubtless had his mind been more moderate , his memory would have been more honourable ; however he deserves a place among the best citizens this city did ever produce , though indeed the turbulency of his spirit caus'd his country and party both to forget their obligations to him , and at length procur'd his death , and many mischiefs to them . uguccione coming to the relief of his son in law as far as remoli , and hearing he was taken by the people , presuming he could do him no good , to save his own stake , he return'd back as he came . corso being dead in the year . all tumults ceas'd , and every body liv'd quietly till news was brought that arrigo the emperor was come into italy with all the florentin● exiles in his company , whom he had promis'd to reinstate on their own country . to obviate this , and lessen the number of their enemies , the magistrates thought fit of themselves to reinvite all those who had been rebels , but some few which were particularly excepted . those which were excepted , were the greatest part of the ghibilines , and some of the faction of the bianchi , among which were dante aleghieri , the sons of veri de cerchi , and giano della bella. they sent likewise to desire the assistance of robert king of naples , but not prevailing in an amicable way without terms , they gave him the government of their city for five years , upon condition he would defend them as his subjects . the emperour in his passage came to pisa , and from thence coasting along the shore , he went to rome , where he was crown'd in the year ; after which , addressing himself to the subduction of the florentines , he marcht by the way of perugia and arezzo to florence , and posted himself with his army at the monastery of st. salvi , where he continued fifty days without any considerable exploit . despairing of success against that city , he remov'd to pisa , confederated with the king of sicily to make an enterprize upon naples , and marched forward with his army ; but whilst he thought himself sure of victory , and robert gave himself for lost , the emperour died at buonconvento , and that expedition miscarri'd . not long after it fell out that uguccione became lord of pisa , and by degrees of lucca , where he joyn'd himself with the ghibilines , and by the assistance of that faction , committed great depredations upon the neighbours . the florentines to free themselves from his excursions , desir'd king robert that his brother piero might have the command of their army . in the mean time uguccione was not idle . to increase his numbers , and extend his dominion , partly by force , and partly by stratagem , he had possess'd himself of many strong castles in the vallies of arno , and nievole , and having advanc'd so far as to besiege monte catini , the florentines thought it necessary to relieve it , left otherwise that conflagration should consume their whole country . having drawn together a great army , they march'd into the val di nievole , gave battel to uguccione , and after a sharp sight , were defeated . in the battel , they lost . men besides piero the kings brother , whose body could never be found . nor was the victory on uguccione's side without some qualification , he having lost one of his sons , and several officers of note . after this disaster , the florentines fortifi'd at home as much as they could , and king robert sent them a new general call'd the conte di andrea with the title of conte novello . by his deportment ( or rather by the genius of the florentines , whose property it is to increase upon every settlement , and to fall afterwards into factions upon every accident ) notwithstanding their present war with uguccione , they divided again , and some were for king robert , and others against him . the chief of his adversaries were simon della tosa , the magalotti , and other popular familes , who had greatest interest in the government . these persons sent first to france , and then into germany , to raise men , and invite officers , that by their assistance they might be able to rid themselves of their new governour the conte . but their fortune was adverse , and neither could be procur'd . nevertheless they gave not their enterprize over , though they had been disappointed both in germany and france ; they found out an officer in agobbio ; having driven out king roberts governour , they sent for lando from agobbio , and made him essecutore , ( or indeed executioner ) giving him absolute power over their whole city . laudo being naturally cruel and avaritious , march'd with arm'd men up and down the city , plundering this place , and killing in that , as those who sent for him gave him directions ; and not content with this insolence , he coyn'd false money with the florentine stamp , and no man had the power to oppose it ; to such grandeur was he arriv'd by the dissention of the citizens . miserable certainly , and much to be lamented was the condition of this city , which , neither the consequences of their former divisions , their apprehension of uguccione , nor the authority of a king was sufficient to unite . abroad they were infested by uguccione ; at home they were pillag'd by laudo ; and yet no reconciliation . the kings friends , many of the nobility , several , great men of the populace , and all the guelfs , were enemies to laudo and his party . nevertheless , the adversary having the authority in his hand , they could not without manifest danger discover themselves ; however , that they might not be deficient in what they were able to do towards the freeing themselves of so dishonourable a tyranny , they writ privately to king robert , to intreat that he would make conte guido da buttifolle his lieutenant in florence . the king granted their request , sent the conte to them forthwith , and the adverse party ( though the signori also were enemies to the king ) had not the courage to oppose him . but the conte for all that , had not much authority confer'd , because the signori , and gonfalonieri of the companies were favourers of laudo and his accomplices . during these troubles in florence , the daughter of alberto coming out of germany , pass'd by the city in her way to her husband charles son to king robert. she was very honourably received by such as were friends to the king , who complaining to her of the sad condition of their city , and the tyranny of laudo and his party , she promis'd her assistance , and by the help of her interposition , and such as were sent thither from the king , the citizens were reconcil'd , laudo depos'd from his authority , and sent home to agobbio full of treasure and blood . laudo being gone , they fell to reform , and the signoria was confirm'd by the king for three years longer ; and because before there were vii in the senate of laudo's party , vi new were chosen of the kings , and they continu'd xiii . for sometime ; but they were reduced afterwards to vii their old number . about this time ugucciene was driven out of lucca , and pisa , and castruccio castracani , a citizen of lucca , succeeded him in the government ; and being a brave and couragious young gentleman , and fortunate in all his undertakings , in a short time he made himself chief of the ghibilin faction in tuscany . for this cause , laying aside their private discords , the florentines for several years made it their business , first to obstruct the growth of castruccio's power , and afterwards , ( in case he should grow powerful against their will ) to consider which way they were to defend themselves against him : and that the signori might deliberate with more counsel , and execute with more authority , they created xii . citizens ( which they call'd buonhuomini ) without whose advice and concurrence the signori were not to do any thing of importance . in the mean time the authority of king robert expir'd ; the government devolv'd once more upon the city , which set up the old rectori and magistrates as formerly , and their fear of castruccio kept them friends , and united . castruccio after many brave things performed against the lord's of lunigiana , sat down before prato : the florentines alarm'd at the news , resolv'd to relieve it , and shutting up their shops , they got together in a confus'd and tumultuous manner about foot and horse ; and to lessen the force of castruccio and add to their own , proclamation was made by the signori , that what ever rebel of the guelfs should come in to the relief of prato , should be restor'd afterwards to his country : upon which proclamation more than of the guelfs came in and joyned with them , by which accession , their army being become formidable , they march'd with all speed towards prato , but castruccio , having no mind to hazard a battail against to considerable a force , drew off and retreated to lucca . upon his retreat , great controversie arose in the army betwixt the nobility and the people . the people would have pursued , and fought in hopes to have overcome and destroyed him ; the nobility would return , alledging they had done enough already in exposing florence for the relief of prato . that there being a necessity for that , it was well enough done , but now , no necessity being upon them , little to be gotten , and much to be lost , fortune was not to be tempted , nor the enemy to be follow'd . not being able to accord among themselves , the business was referred to the signori , which consisting of nobility and commons , they fell into the same difference of opinion , which being known to the city , they assembled in great multitudes in the piazza , threatning the nobility highly , till at last they condescended . but their resolution coming too late , and many constrain'd to joyn in it against their persuasions , the enemy had time , and drew safely off to lucca . this difference put the people into such a huff against the nobility , the signori refus'd to perform the promise they made to the rebels which came in upon proclamation , which the rebels perceiving , they resolv'd to be before hand , if possible , and accordingly presented themselves at the gates of the city to be admitted before the army came up ; but their design being suspected , miscarryed , and they were beaten back by those who were left in the town : to try if they could obtain that by treaty , which they could not compass by force , they sent eight embassadors to the signori , to commemorate to them the faith they had given ; the dangers they had run thereupon ; and that it could not be unreasonable they should have their promised reward . the nobility thought themselves obliged , having promis'd them particularly as well as the signori , and therefore imploy'd all their interest for the advantage of the rebels ; but the commons ( being inrag'd that the enterprize against castruccio was not prosecuted as it might have been ) would not consent ; which turn'd afterwards to the great shame and dishonour of the city . the nobility being many of them disgusted thereat , endeavoured that by force , which was denyed them upon applications ; and agreed with the guelfs , that if they would attempt their entrance without , they would take up arms in their assistance within ; but their plot being discover'd the day before it was to be executed , when the banish'd guelfs came to make their attack , they found the city in arms , and all things so well dispos'd to repell them without and suppress those within , that none of them durst venture , and so the enterprize was given over without any effort . the rebels being departed , it was thought fit those persons should be punish'd who invited them thither ; nevertheless though every body could point at the delinquents , yet no body durst name them , much more accuse them . that the truth might impartially be known , it was ordered that the names of the offendors should be written down ; and deliver'd privately to the captain ; which being done , the persons accused were amerigo donati , teghiaio frescobaldi , and loteringo gherardini , whose judges being now more favourable than ( perhaps ) their crime deserv'd , they were only condemn'd to pay a sum of money , and came off . the tumults in florence upon the alarm by the rebels , demonstrated clearly that to the company of the people one captain was not sufficient ; and therefore it was ordered for the future , that every company should have three or four , and every gonfalonier two or three join'd to them , which should be call'd pennonieri , that , in case of necessity , where the whole company could not be drawn out , part of it might appear under one of the said officers . and as it happens in all common-wealths , after any great accident , some or other of the old laws are abrogated , and others reviv'd to supply them , so the signoria being at first but occasional and temporary , the senators and collegi then in being ( having the power in their hands ) took authority upon themselves to make a council of the signori , which should sit forty months for the future , their names being to be put into a purse , and drawn out every two months . but for as much as many of the citizens were jealous their names were not in the purse , there was a new imborsation before the forty months began . hence it was , the custom of the purse had its original , and was us'd in the creation of their magistrats , both at home and abroad , whereas formerly they were chosen by a council of the successors , as the term of the office began to expire . at first this way of election was call'd imborsationi , and afterwards squittini . and because every three , or at most five years , this custom was to be us'd , it was thought they had prevented great mischiefs to the city , occasion'd by multitude of competitors , and tumults at every election of magistrats , which tumults being to be corrected no way ( in their judgments ) so readily , they pitched upon this , not discerning the evils which they conceal'd under so small a convenience . it was now in the year . when castruccio having seiz'd on pistoia , was grown so considerable , that the florentines ( jealous of his greatness ) resolv'd before he had setled his new conquest , to fall upon him , and recover it ( if possible ) out of his hands . whereupon of citizens and their friends they assembled foot , and horse , and encamp'd before alto pascio , by taking it , to render the relief of pistoia the more difficult . the florentines took that pass , and when they had done , they march'd towards lucca , forraging and wasting the countrey . but by the imprudence and treachery of their commander , little progress was made . this person ( call'd ramondo da cardona ) observing the florentines to have been very liberal of their liberty , and to have confer'd the government sometimes upon kings , sometimes upon legats , and sometimes upon more inferiour persons ; he thought with himself , that if he could bring them into any exigence , or distress , it might easily fall out that they would make him their prince ; to this purpose he frequently desir'd and press'd to have the same authority invested in him in the city , as he had in the army , otherwise he could not require nor expect that obedience which was necessary for a general . the florentines not hearing on that ear , their captain proceeded but slowly , neglecting his time , as much as castruccio improv'd it ; for castruccio having procur'd supplies from the visconti , and other princes of lombardy , and made himself strong , ramondo ( who before lost his opportunity of conquering for want of fidelity ) now lost the possibility of preserving himself , for want of discretion ; for marching up and down lazily with his army , he was overtaken by castruccio near alto pascio , assaulted , and after a long fight , broken to pieces ; in which action many florentines were taken prisoners and kill'd , and their general among the rest , who receiv'd the reward of his infidelity and ill counsel from fortune her self , which had been more properly bestow'd by the hands of the florentines . the calamities which castruccio introduced upon the florentines after his victory ; the depradations , imprisonments , ruin's , and burnings , are not to be express'd ; having no body to oppose him , for several months together , he went where , and did what he had a mind to , and the florentines thought themselves happy , ( after such a defeat ) if they could save the city . nevertheless they were not so desperatly low , but they made great provisions of money , rais'd what soldiers was possible , and sent to their friends for assistance ; but no providence was sufficient against such an enemy : they were forc'd therefore to make choice of carlo duke of calabria ( the son of king robert ) to be their soveraign ; if it would please him to undertake their defence ; for that family having been us'd to the supremacy of that city , they promis'd him rather their obedience , than friendship . but carlo being personally imploy'd in the wars of sicily , he sent gualtieri ( a french man and ) duke of athens , to take possession in his behalf . he as his masters leiutenant , took possession of the government , and created magistrats as he plea'sd . notwithstanding his behaviour was so modest , and in a manner so contrary to his own nature , every one lov'd him . having finish'd his war in sicily , charles came with a thousand horse to florence , and made his entry in iuly . his arrival gave some impediment to castruccio , & kept him from rummaging up and down the country with that freedom and security which he had formerly done . but what the city gain'd abroad , it lost at home , and when their enemies were restrain'd , they became expos'd to the insolence and oppression of their friends : for the signori acting nothing without the consent of the duke , in a years time he drain'd the city of four hundred thousand florins , though in the articles of agreement it was expresly provided he should not exceed . so great were the impositions which he , or his father laid upon the town ; and yet as if these were too few , their miseries were increas'd by an accumulation of new jealousies , and new enemies . for the ghibilines of lombardy were so fearful of carlos advance into tuscany , that galiazzo visconti , and the rest of the princes of lombardy , with money and fair promises persuaded lewis of bavaria , ( who had been elected emperour against the popes will ) to pass into italy with an army . being arriv'd in lombardy , he pass'd forward into tuscany , made himself master of pisa by the assistance of castruccio , and having receiv'd a considerable supply of money there , he march'd on towards rome : whereupon charles ( being fearful of his kingdom ) and leaving philippo da saginitto his lieutenant in florence , went home with the force he brought with him . upon his departure , castruccio seiz'd upon pisa , and the florentines got pistoia by stratagem : castruccio march'd immediatly to recover it , sat down before it , and manag'd his business with so much conduct and resolution , that though the florentines made many attempts to relieve it , both by insults upon his army , and incursions into his country , their attacks , and their diligences were all ineffectual , they could not possibly remove him ; for so firmly was he resolv'd to chastise the pistoians , and weaken the florentines , that the pistoians were constrain'd to surrender , and receive him once more for their lord ; by which action as he contracted much honour and renown , so he thereby contracted so much sickness and infirmity , that he died shortly after upon his return to lucca . and , because one ill or good accident goes seldome alone ; charles duke of calabria and lord of florence died at naples much about the same time ; so that in a very small space the florentines were freed from the oppression of the one , and the apprehension of the other . they were no sooner free , but they fell to reforming , null'd all the laws and ordinances of the ancient councils , and created two new , one of them consisting of three hundred of the commons , the other of two hundred both commons and gentlemen ; the first was call'd the council of the people , and the second the common council . the emperour being arriv'd at rome , he created an anti-pope ; decreed many things to the prejudice of the church ; and attempted more , which he was not able to carry ; so that at length he removed ( with no little disgrace ) from rome to pisa , where , either disdaining his conduct , or for want of their pay , eight hundred german horse mutiny'd , fortifi'd themselves at monte ariaro , and as he was departed from pisa towards lombardy , posses'd themselves of lucca , and drave out francisco castracani , whom the emperour had left governour of the town . being masters of that city , and their intentions to make what profit of it they could , they offered it to the florentines for twenty thousand florins , but by the advice of simon della tosa it was refus'd ; this resolution would have been much to the advantage of our city , had the florentines persever'd ; but changing it afterwards , it prov'd much to their detriment ; for refusing it at that time when they might have had it so cheap , they bad much more for it afterwards , and were denied it ; which was the occasion that florence chang'd its government often , to its great inconvenience . lucca , being refus'd in this manner by the florentines , was purchased for florins by gherardino spinoli a genovese , and ( because people are more slow and indifferent in accepting what is offer'd , than in conceiving what is not ) as soon as it was known to be bought by gherardini , and at how cheap a rate , the florentines were much troubled they had it not themselves , and blam'd all those who had any way discouraged them . to buy it being too late , they sought to gain it by force , and to that end sent their army to over-run and spoil the country about it . about this time the emperour was return'd out of italy , and the pope , by order of the pisani , sent prisoner into france . the florentines upon the death of castruccio ( which follow'd in the year ) till the year continued quiet at home ; intent only upon their wars abroad . in lombardy upon the coming of iohn king of bohemia , and in tuscany upon the account of lucca ; they adorn'd their city likewise with many new buildings , and particularly the tower of st. reparata according to the directions of giolto the most famous painter in his time . moreover , upon an inundation of the river arnus in the year ( in which the water swelling twelve fathoms high in some places of florence carried away several bridges , and many houses were ruin'd ) they repair'd all , with great care and expence . but in the year this tranquillity was disturb'd , and they had new occasion of alteration . the grandees of the city had two ways to maintain , and increase their authority . one was by ordering the imborsations so , as the magistracy should fall always either to them or their friends . the other was by making themselves chief in the elections of the rettori , and thereby obliging them to be favourable to them afterwards in all their determinations . and of this second way they were so fond and conceited , that not content with two rettori ( as they had forformerly ) . a while after they set up a third ; with the title of the captain of the guards , in which office they plac'd iacomo gabrieli d' agobbio , with absolute power over the citizens . iacomo in the sight of the government , committed daily many injuries , but more especially to piero de baldi , and bardo frescobaldi . being nobly descended , and by consequence proud , they could not endure , to have a stranger do them wrong , in defiance of their other magistrates . to revenge themselves of him ; and the government , they enter'd into a conspiracy with several noble , and popular families in the city , who were disgusted with their tyranny . the manner concluded upon was , that every one should get as many arm'd men into his house as he could , and that on all-saints day in the morning , when all the people were at mass , they should take arms , kill the captain , and the chief of their governours , and afterwards make new magistrates , and new laws for the state. but because dangerous enterprizes , the more considered , are always the less willingly undertaken ; it happens that plots which allow too much time for their execution , are generally discover'd : there being among the conspirators a gentleman call'd andrea di bardi , whose fear of punishment prevailing upon him , beyond his desire of revenge , he betray'd all to iacomo alberti , his kinsman , iacomo imparted it immediatly to the priori , and the priori to the governors . and because the design was so near execution , all-saints day being at hand , many of the citizens assembled in the palace , and judging it unsafe to defer , they would needs persuade the signori to cause the great bell to be rung , and the people commanded to their arms. taldo valori was at that time gonfaloniere , and francisco salviati one of the signori . being relations of the bardi they dissuaded the sounding of the bell , alledging it was not secure to arm the people upon trivial occasions , because authority given to them , without some power reserv'd to restrain them , was never known to produce any good , and that it was much easier to raise a tumult , than to suppress it . they judg'd it better therefore to inquire farther into the verity of the thing , and punish it rather civilly ( if it appear'd to be true ) than in a furious and tumultuous manner to corrected it , perhaps with the destruction of the whole city . but these arguments serv'd not the turn , but with vilanous language , and insolent behaviour the signori were constrain'd to cause the bell to be rung , upon which the people immediately took arms , and away to the piazza . the bardi , and frescobaldi perceiving they were discover'd , and resolving to overcome with honour or die without shame , betook themselves to their arms , hoping they would be able to defend that part of the city beyond the bridge where their houses were ; whereupon they broke down the bridges , and fortifi'd themselves , till they should be reliev'd by the nobility of the country , and other persons their friends . but that design was frustrated by the people which lived among them in the same part of the city , who took up arms for the signori ; finding themselves entermixt , and that design not like to succeed , they abandon'd the bridges , and retreated to the street where the bardi dwelt , as stronger than the rest , where they made a most valient defence . iacomo d' agobbio knew well enough that all this conspiracy was against him ; and having no great inclination to be kill'd , in a terrible fright , with his hair standing right up , he ran to the palace of the signori , and secur'd himself among the thickest of the arm'd men. the other of the rettori , though not so conscious , were much more couragious , especially the podesta call'd maffeo da maradi , who presenting himself where they were fighting , and passing the bridge rubaconte , threw himself undauntedly among the swords of the bardi , and made a sign for a parly . upon which , out of reverence to his person , his courage and good qualities , they let fall their arms , and stood quietly to attend him . in a modest and grave harangue he blam'd their proceedings ; remonstrated the danger they were in , if they did not yield to the indignation of the people ; he gave them hopes likewise of a fair hearing , and a merciful sentence , and promis'd his intercession for them ; then returning to their signori he persuaded that they would not use extremities , and conquer with the loss of so many citizens lives ; nor condemn without hearing . in short , so far he obtain'd , that by consent of the signori , baldi , frescobaldi and their friends left the city , and retir'd to their castles without any impediment . they being gone , and the people disarm'd , the signori proceeded only against such of the families of the baldi and frescobaldi as had taken arms , and to lessen their power , they bought the castles of mangona , and vernia of the bardi , and made a law that no citizen should for the future possess any castle within twenty miles of florence . not many months after stialta frescobaldi , and several others of that family were beheaded , having been proclaim'd rebels before . but it was not sufficient for these governours to have conquer'd and suppress'd the baldi and frescobaldi ; like other people ( whose insolence for the most part increases with their power ) they grew imperious as they grew strong . whereas , before the florentines had only one captain of the guards to afflict them , they chose another now for the country , investing him with great authority , that those persons whom they suspected , might not be suffered to live quietly either within the city o● without ▪ and besides this they abus'd and provok'd the nobility in such manner , that they were ready to sacrifice , and ●ell both themselves and city to be rev●ng'd , and watching for an occasion , they met one , and improv'd it . by the many troubles in lombardy , and tuscany , lucca was fallen under the dominion of mastino della seala lord of verona , who ingaged to deliver it up to the florentines , but did not perform ; for being lord of parma he thought himself able to keep it , and valued not the breach of his faith. the florentines , in revenge , joyn'd with the venetians , and made such war upon him , he had well ●igh lost most of his territory ; but the florentines got little by it , more than the satisfaction to have distress'd mastino : for the venetian ( according to the practice of all states when enter'd into league with people less powerful than themselves ● having taken trevigi , and vicenza ; ●ade a peace without any regard to the florentines . a while after , the visconti lords of milan , having taken parma from mastino , conceiving himself unable to keep lucca any longer , he resolv'd to sell it . the florentines and the p●san● were competitors in the purchase , and whilst the bargain was driving , the pisan● perceiving th● florent●nes like to carry it , in respect that they were the more wealthy of the two ; they betook themselves to force , and joyning with the visconti , they sat down before it . the florentines not at all discourag'd , proceeded in their bargain , and having concluded their terms , they paid down part of the money to mastino , and giving hostages for the rest , the town was to be deliver'd , whereupon naddo ruccellat , giovanni di bernardino de medi●i , and rosso d● ricci●rdo de ricci , were sent to take possession , who passing by force into lucc● , they were receiv'd by mastino , and the town deliver'd up into their hands . however , the pisan● continued their siege , and endeavour'd by all possible industry to gain it by force . the florentines on the other side were as solicitous to relieve it , but after 〈◊〉 long war , with great dishonor , and the loss of their money , they were driven out of it , and the town became subject to the pisans . the loss of this city ( as in such cases doth frequently happen ) put the people of florence into a mutiny against their governors , so that in all places they upbraided the conduct and administration of their superiors . at the beginning of the war the management of the military affairs was committed to xx. citizens , who made maletesta di rimini their general , who having executed his command with little courage , and less discretion , they apply'd themselves to robert king of naples for assistance . in complyance with their request , king robert sent them supplies under the command of gualtieri duke of athens , who ( the heavens ordaining that all things should concur to their future misery ) arriv'd at florence at the very time when the enterprize of lucca was ●tterly lost . the xx governors of the militia , seeing the people inrag'd , thought by choosing a new general , either to inspire them with new hopes , or take away the occasion of their obloquy ; and because their fears were still upon them , that the duke of athens might defend them the better , they first made him conservator , and afterwards general . the nobility , upon the reasons above said , being highly discontented , and many of them retaining a correspondence with gualtieri ever since he was gove●●or of florence in the behalf of charles duke of calabria , they began to think now was their tim● to wreck their malice , and to ruine the city , believing there was no way left them to subdue the people who had insulted so long , but by subjecting them to a prince , who knowing the generosity of the nobless , and the insolence of the commons , might recompense both according to their deserts ; besides they presum'd it would be something meritorious , if upon their motion , and by their cooperation he acquir'd the government . in pursuane of this design , they had many private meetings , in which they prest him to take the government wholly into his hands , and they would assist him to the utmost . nor were the nobility alone in this business , some of the popular families ( as the peruzzi , acciaivoli , antellesi , and buonaccorsi ) joyn'd themselves with them ; for being much in debt , and unable out of their own estates to clear themselves , they plotted against other peoples , and to free themselves of their creditors , made no scruple of enslaving their country . these persuasions exasperated the ambition of the duke , who , to gain the reputation among the people of being just and exact , persecuted those who had the management of the wars against lucca , caus'd giovan de medici , naddo ruccellai , and gulielmo altoviti to be put to death , banish'd several others , and others he fined . these executions startled the middle sort of the citizens , only the grandees , and the common people were satisfi'd ; the last ▪ out of their natural pleasure in mischief , the first to see themselves so handsomly reven'gd for the insolencies they had receiv'd from the people . whereupon , when ever the duke appear'd in the streets , he was pursued with acclamations , and applauses of his integrity , every one exhorting him to go on in finding out , and punishing the fraud● of their neighbours . the authority of the xx. was much lessen'd , the dukes reputation increas'd , and a general fear of him overspread the whole city ; so that to show their affections towards him , all people caus'd his arms to be painted upon their houses , and nothing but the bare title was wanting to make him a prince . being now in a condition ( as he thought ) of attempting any thing securely , he caus'd it to be signifi'd to the senate , that for the good of the publick he judg'd it necessary they should transfer their authority upon him , and that ( seeing the whole city approv'd it ) he desir'd he might have their resignation . the signori , having long foreseen the ruine of their country approaching , were much troubled at the message : they were sensible of the danger they were in , yet not to be deficient in any act of duty to their country , they refus'd him couragiously . as a pretence and specimen of his religion , and humility , the duke had taken up his quarters in the monastery of st. croce , and being desirous to give the finishing stroke to his wicked designs , he by proclamation requir'd all the people to appear before him the next morning in the piazza belonging to that monastery . this proclamation alarmed the signori more than his message , whereupon joyning themselves with such as were lovers both of their liberty and country , upon consideration of the power of the duke , and that their force was insufficient , it was resolv'd they should address themselves to him in an humble and supplicatory way , to try if by their p●ayers they might prevail with him to give his enterprize over , or else to execute it with more moderation . all things being concluded , part of the signori were sent to attend him , and one of them accosted him in this manner . my lord , we are come hither , mov'd first by your proposal , and next by your proclamation for assembling the people , presuming your resolution is to obtain that by force , to which upon private application we have not consented : it is not our design to oppose force against force , but rather to remonstrate the burden and heaviness of that load you would take upon your self , and the dangers which will probably occur . and this we do , that you may hereafter remember , and distinguish betwixt ours , and the counsel of such as advise the contrary , not so much out of respect and deference to your advantage , as for the venting their own private fury and revenge . your endeavour is to bring this city into servitude , ( which has always liv'd free ) because the government has been formerly given by us to the kings of naples , whereas that was rather an association , than a subjection . have you consider'd how important and dear the name of liberty is to us ? a thing , no force can extirpate , no time can extinguish , nor no merit preponderate . think , sir , i beseech you , what power will be necessary to keep such a city in subjection . all the strangers you can entertain will not be sufficient ; those which are inhabitants you cannot prudently trust ; for though at present they are friends , and have push'd you forward upon this resolution , yet , as soon as they have glutted themselves upon their enemies , their next plot will be to expel you , and make themselves princes . the people , in whom your greatest confidence is placed , will turn , upon every slight accident , against you , so that in a short time you will run a hazzard of having the whole city your enemies , which will infallibly be the ruine both of it and your self ; because those princes only can be secure , whose enemies are but few , and they easily remov'd either by banishment or death ; but against universal hatred there is no security , because the spring and fountain is not known , and he that fears every man , can be safe against no man. if yet you persist , and take all possible care to perserve your self , you do but encumber your self with more danger , by exciting their hatred , and making them more intent and serious in their revenge . that time is not able to eradicate our desire of liberty , is most certain . we could mention many good cities in which it has been reassum'd by those who never tasted the sweetness of it , yet upon the bare character and tradition of their fathers , they have not only valu'd , but fought and contended to recover it , and maintain'd it afterwards against all difficulties and dangers . nay , should their fathers have neglected , or forgot to recommend it , the publick palaces , the courts for the magistrats , the ensigns of their freedom ( which are of necessity to be known by all citizens ) would certainly proclaim it . what action of yours can counterpoize against the sweetness of liberty ? for what can you do to expunge the desire of it out of the hearts of the people ? nothing at all , no , though you should add all tuscany to this state , and return every day into this city with new victory over your enemies . the honor would be yours , not ours ; and the citizens have gain'd fellow-servants rather than subjects . nor is it the power of your deportment to establish you . let your life be never so exact , your conversation affable , your judgments just , your liberality never so conspicuous , all will not do , all will not gain you the affections of the people ; if you think otherwise , you deceive your self , for to people that have liv'd free , every link is a load , and every bond a burthen . and to find a state violently acquir'd , to accord quietly with its prince ( though never so good ) is impossible ; of necessity one must comply and frame it self to the other , or else one must ruine and destroy the other . you have this therefore to consider , whether you will hold this city by violence ( for which all the guards and citadels within , and all the friends could be made abroad , have been many times too weak ● or be content with the authority we give you , to which last we do rather advise , because no dominion is so durable as that which is voluntary , and the other ( however your ambition may disguise it ) will but conduct you to a height , where being neither able to advance , nor continue , you must tumble down of necessity , to your own great detriment as well as ours . but the dukes heart was too hard for such impressions as these . he reply'd , that it was not his intention to extirpate , but to establish their liberty : that cities divided were the only cities that were servile , and not those that were united . that if he by his conduct could clear their city of their schisms , ambitions , and animosities , he could not be said to take away , but to restore their liberty . that he did not assume that office out of any ambition of his own , but accepted it at the importunity of several of the citizens , and that they would do well to consent themselves , as their fellows had done . that as to the dangers he was like to incur , he did not consider them ; it was the part of an ignoble person to decline doing good , for fear of evil that might follow ; and of a coward to lay aside a glorious enterprize , upon the meer doubtfulness of the success . that he hop'd so to demean himself , that they should in a short time confess , they had fear'd him too much , and trusted him too little . the senate finding by this answer no good was to be done , consented the people should meet next morning , as appointed , and the government by their authority to be transfer'd upon the duke for a year , with the same conditions it had been formerly given to the duke of calabria . on the th . of september . the duke , accompany'd by giovan della tossa , all his consorts , and many citizens besides , coming into the piazza , taking the senate with him , he mounted upon the ringhieria , ( which are the stairs at the foot of the palagie de signori ) and caus'd the articles of agreement betwixt the senate and him to be read . when the person who read them came to the place where the government was mentioned to be given to him for a year , the people cry'd out , for his life , for his life . francesco rustichesi , one of the signori , rose up to have spoke , and endeavor'd to compose the tumult ; but he was interrupted , and could nor be heard . so that he was chosen lord by consent of the people , not for a year , but for ever , and afterwards taken and carried thorow the multitude with general acclamation . it is a custom among the florentines that whoever is intrusted with the guard of their palace , is to be shut up in it in the absence of the signori . that trust was at that time in the hands of rinieri di giolto , who being corrupted by some of the dukes creatures , receiv'd him into the palace without any constraint . the senate being surpriz'd , and much affronted , return'd to their houses , left the palace to be plundred by the dukes servants , the gonfalone del populo to be turn'd out , and the dukes standard to be set up , all which were immediatly done to the inestimable trouble of all good men , but to the joy and satisfaction of those who maliciously or ignorantly had consented to his exaltation . the duke was no sooner setled in his dominion , but to suppress their authority , who were the greatest propugnators of their liberty , he forbid the signori to meet in the palace , and consign'd them a private house . he took away the ensigns from the gon●alonieri of the companies of the people . he discharg'd all prisoners , he recall'd the baldi and frescobaldi from banishment , prohibited the wearing of arms ; and to defend himself within , he made what friends he could abroad : to that purpose he caress'd the aretini and all others which depended any way upon the florentines jurisdiction . he made a peace with the pisani ( though he was become a prince ) that with the more advantage he might make war with them afterward . he took away their bills and assignments from the merchants , who had lent the sate money in their war with lucca . he increas'd the old gabells , and impos'd new . he dissolv'd the authority of the signori , and in their places he set up three rettori , barglione da perugia , guglielmo da soesi , and cerretieri bisdomini , with whom he constantly advised . the taxes he laid upon the people were great , his judgments unjust , and that humanity and preciseness which he counterfeited at first , was now turn'd most manifestly into cruelty and pride , by which means many citizens of the more noble and wealthy sort , were condemn'd , executed , and some time tortur'd . and that his government might be as unsupportable abroad as at home , he instituted six new rettori for the regiment of the country , who carryed themselves with the same insolence and oppression there , as he did in the city . he was jealous of the nobility ; though he had been often oblig'd by them , and some of them had been recall'd from their banishment by him ; yet he could not imagine it compatible with the generosity of a noble spirit to submit and truckle to him . hence it was , he apply'd himself to the people , cajoling them , and scruing into their favour , by which and his power abroad , he doubted not to be able to justifie his proceedings , how unjust and tyrannical so ever . the month of may being come , in which the people were wont to make merry ; he caus'd the inferiour sort of the people to be dispos'd into several companies , gave them ensigns and mony , and honoured them with splendid titles , so that half of the city went up and down feasting and junketting among their brethren , while the other half was as busie to entertain them . the fame of his new dominion being spread abroad , many persons of french extraction repair'd to him , and he prefer'd them all , as the most faithful of his friends ; so that in a short time florence was not only subject to the frenchmen , but to the french customs and garb ; all people , men as well as women , without respect of indecency or inconvenience , imitating them in all things ; but that which was incomparably the most displeasing , was the violence he and his creatures us'd to the women , without any regret . upon these provocations the citizens were full of indignation . it troubled them to see the majesty of their government prostitute and ruin'd ; it troubl'd them to see ordinances abolish'd ; their laws abrogated ; honest conversation corrupted , and civil modesty dispised ; for they who had never been accustom'd to any regal pomp whatsoever , could not without sorrow behold the duke environ'd with his guards both on foot and on horse-back . but their destruction being in his hands , they were necessitated to dissemble , and to court and honor him outwardly whom they hated at their hearts ; another inducement was the fear they had conceiv'd upon the frequent executions , and continual taxes with which he impoverish'd and exhausted the city ; and the duke understood very well both their fear , and their anger . it happen'd that mattco di morrozzo , to ingratiat with the duke , or to disintangle himself , had discover'd to him a certain plot which the house of medici and some others had contriv'd against him . the duke was so far from inquiring into the matter , that he caus'd the informer to be put to death , by which act he discourag'd such as would otherwise have advertis'd him , upon occasion , and animated those who were dispos'd to destroy him . he likewise caus'd the tongue of b●toni cini to be pull'd out with such cruelty that he died of it , and for no other cause but that he had spoke against the taxes , which he impos'd upon the city . this last outrage compleated the rest ; the people grew perfectly mad , and the duke perfectly odious : for that city , which was accustomed heretofore to speak of every thing freely , and to do what they listed , could not possibly brook to have their hands tyed , and their mouths stop'd up by a stranger . their fury and passion increasing at this rate , not only the florentines ( who neither know how to maintain liberty , nor endure slavery ) were incens'd , but the most servile nation in the world would have been inflam'd to have attempted the recovery of its freedom . whereupon many citizens of all qualities and degrees resolv'd to destroy him ; and it fell out , that , at the same time , three conspiracies were on foot by three sorts of people , the grandees , the people , and artificers . besides the general oppression , each party had its peculiar reason . the nobility were not restor'd to the government ; the people had lost it ; and the artificers trade was decay'd . the archbishop of florence , agnolo acciaivoli , had in his sermons highly magnifi'd the qualities of the duke , and procur'd him great favour among the people ; but after he was governor , and his tyranny became notorious , they found how the archbishop had deluded them . to make them amends for the fault he had committed , he thought nothing could be more reasonable , than that the same hand that gave them the wound should endeavour to cure it , and therefore he , made himself head of the first and most considerable conspiracy , in which were ingag'd with him the bardi , rossi , frescobaldi , scali , altoviti , magalotti , strozzi , and mancini . the principals of the second conspiracy were manno and corso donati , and with them the pazzi , cavicciulli , cerchi , and albizzi . of the third antonio adimari was the head , and with him the medici , bordini , ruccellai , and aldobrandini . their design was to have kill'd him in the house of the albizzi , whither it was suppos'd he would go on midsummer day to see the running of the horses ; but he went not that day , and that design was lost . the next proposition was , to kill him as he was walking in the streets , but that was found to be difficult , because he went always well arm'd , and well attended , and his motions being various and uncertain , they could not tell where it was most proper to way-lay him . then it was debated to slay him in the council , but that also was not without danger , because though they should kill him , they must of necessity remain at the mercy of his guards . whilst these things were in debate among the conspirators , antonio adimari , in hopes of assistance from them , discover'd the plot to some of his friends in siena , told them the principal of the conspirators , and assur'd them the whole city were dispos'd to redeem themselves ; whereupon one of the siennesi communicated the whole business to francesco brunelleschi ( not with intention to have betraid it , but in presumption he had been privy to it before ) and franc●sco , out of fear , or malice to some that were ingag'd in it , discover'd all to the duke . pagolo de mazzeccha , and simon de monterapoli being immediatly apprehended , they confess'd the whole matter , with the number and quality of the conspirators ; at which the duke was much surpriz'd , and counsel being given him , rather to summon the conspirators to appear , than to secure them abruptly ( because if they fled of themselves , he would be as safe without scandal ) he summon'd adimari , who appear'd in confidence of the number of his accomplices . adimari was arrested , and the duke advis'd by francesco brunelleschi , and uguccione buondelmonti , to betake himself to his arms , and go up and down to their houses , and kill all of them they met . but , his force in the town was judg'd too small , for that resolution , and therefore he pitch'd upon another , which ( had it succeeded ) would have secured him against his enemies , and provided him with men. the duke was wont upon any great emergencies , to call the chief citizens together , and to advise with them . having first sent to prepare what force he was able , he caus'd a list of three hundred citizens to be made , and deliver'd to his sergeants , to summon them to council by their names , resolving when they were met , to kill , or imprison them as he pleas'd . antonio adimari being secur'd , and so many great citizens summon'd ( which could not be done without noise ) many of them ( and especially those who were conscious ) began to suspect , and some refus'd absolutely to obey . the list having been brought to them all , and perus'd by every one of them , they began to understand , and incourage one another to take arms , and dye manfully like men , rather than be driven quietly like sheep to the slaughter : so that in few hours all the conspiracies were known , and the conspirators united : holding counsel among themselves , it was concluded , that the next day being the of iuly . a tumult should be rais'd in the old market-place , upon which all were to take arms , and excite the people to liberty . the next day , the signal being given by sounding a bell ( as it was agreed before ) every body took arms , and crying out liberty , liberty , the people betook themselves to their arms likewise , and fell to fortify in their several quarters , under their respective ensigns , which was done by the contrivance of the conspirators . the chief of all families , both nobility , and people met , and took an oath to live and die with one another in the destruction of the duke ( except only the buondelmonti , the cavalcanti , and the four families of the people , which consented to make him prince , who , with the butchers and rascality of the city , ran down arm'd to the piazza in defence of the duke . ) the duke , alarm'd at these proceedings , fortifi'd his palace , call'd home his servants , which were lodg'd in several parts of the town , and sallying forth with them on horseback towards the market-place , they were many times assaulted by the way , and many of them slain , being forced back , and recruited with fresh horse , he was in doubt with himself , whether he had best fall upon them again , or stand upon his guard ; and in the mean time the medici , cavicciulli , ruccellai , and other families that were most disoblig'd by the duke , were in no less fear , that if he should make a sally , many who had taken arms against him in the uproar , would show themselves his friends ; desirous therefore to keep him from sallying , and by that means , increasing his numbers , drawing what force together they were able , they advanc'd towards the market , place , where some of their fellow citizens had posted themselves indefence of the duke . the citizens which were there in the front , and had appear'd first for their prince , seeing themselves so briskly confronted , chang'd their sides , left their duke in the lurch , and joyn'd with their fellow citizens , all but uguccione buondelmonti , who retired into the palace , and giannozzo cavalcanti , who retreating with some of his party into the new-market , and getting upon a bench made an earnest speech , exhorting the people to stand firm to the duke , and having got more force to him , to fright them ( if his perswasion fail'd ) he threatned to kill them all , man , woman , and child , if they joyn'd or persisted in any design against him . but seeing no body follow him , nor no body near to chastise him for his insolence , perceiving he had troubled himself hitherto in vain , he resolv'd to tempt his fortune no farther , and so retir'd peaceable to his house . the conflict , in the mean time , in the market-place , betwixt the people and the dukes party was great , and though the dukes creatures were reinforc'd from the palace , yet they were beaten , part taken prisoners , and part leaving their horses to their enemies , got on foot into the palace . whilst the contest continu'd in the market-place , corso , and amerigo donati , with part of the people broke up the stinche , burn'd the records of the potesta , and publick chamber , sack'd the houses of the rettori , and kill'd all the dukes officers they could meet with . the duke on the other side , finding he had lost the piazza , the whole city was become his enemy , and no hopes left him of being reliev'd , he resolv'd to try if by any act of kindness or humanity he might work upon the people . calling his prisoners ( therefore ) to him , with fair and gentle language he gave them their liberty , and made antonio adimari a knight , ( though not at all to his satisfaction ) he caus'd his ensign to be taken down , and the standard of the people to be set up upon the palace . which things being done unseasonably , and by force , they avail'd but little . in this manner he remain'd block'd up in his palace , not at all delighted with his condition ; having coveted too much formerly , he was now like to lose all , and in a few days was in danger of being famish'd or slain . the citizens , to give some form to their government , assembled themselves in the s. reparata , and created xiv . citizens ( half of the nobility , and half of the people ) who with their bishop should have full power to model and reform the state as they pleas'd . the authority of the potesta they committed to vi persons of their own election , which they were to exercise till he that was elected should come . there were at that time many strangers resorted to florence , in assistance to that city , among the rest the siennesi had sent six embassadors ( of honorable condition in their own countrey ) to negotiat a peace betwixt the duke and the people . the people refus'd any overture , unless guglielmo da scesi , his son , and cerrettieri bisdomini were deliver'd into their hands , which the duke obstinatly deny'd , till the threats of those who were shut up with him in the palace constrain'd him to consent . greater , doubtless , is the insolence and contumacy of the people , and more pernicious the mischiefs which they do , whilst they are in pursuit of their liberty , than when they have acquir'd it . guglielmo and his son were brought forth , and deliver'd up among thousands of their enemies ; his son was a young gentleman , not yet arriv'd at eighteen years of age ; yet neither his youth , his comliness , nor innocence were able to preserve him ; those who could not get near enough to do it whilst he was alive , wounded him when he was dead ; and as if their swords had been partial , and executed the dictates of their fury with too much moderation , they fell to it with their teeth , and their hands , biting his flesh , and tearing it to pieces . and that all their senses might participate in their revenge , having feasted their ears upon their groans , their eyes upon their wounds , and their touch upon their bowels ( which they rent out of their bodies with their hands ) their taste must ( likewise ) be treated and regal'd , that their inward parts , as well as their outward , might have a share of the ragoust . this barbarous outrage , how fatal soever it was to them two , was very lucky to cerrettieri , for the people being tyr'd in the formalities of their execution , forgot they had any more to punish , and left him in the palace , not so much as demanded , from whence the next night he was safely convey'd by his relations , and friends . the people having satiated themselves upon the blood of those two , the peace was concluded ; the duke to depart safely himself , and all that belong'd to him , for which he was to renounce all his claim and authority in florence , and to ratify his renunciation when he came out of the florentine dominions to casentino . the articles being agreed , on the vi. of august , attended by a multitude of citizens , the duke departed from florence , and arriv'd at casentino , where he ratify'd the renuntiation , but so unwillingly , that had not conte simone threatned to carry him back to florence , it had never been done . this duke ( as his actions demonstrate ) was covetous , cruel , difficult of access , and insolent in his answers . not being so much effected with the kindness and benevolence of people , as with their servitude and servility ; he chose to be fear'd rather than belov'd . nor was the shape and contexture of his body less contemptible , than his manners were odious . he was very little , exceeding black , his beard long and thin , not apart about him , but concurr'd to make him despicable . in this manner the exhorbitancies of his administration in ten months time depriv'd him of his dominion , which had been plac'd upon him by the counsels of ill men. these accidents happening thus in the city , all the towns under the jurisdiction of florence , took courage , and began to stand up for their liberty ; so that in a short time arrezzo , castiglione , pistoia , volterra , colle st. gimignano rebell'd , and the whole territory of florence ( after the example of its metropolis ) recover'd its freedom . after the duke and his creatures were removed , the xiv . chief citizens , and the bishop , consulting together , thought it better to pacify the people with peace , than to provoke them again by war , and therefore pretended to be as well pleas'd with their liberty as their own . they sent embassadors therefore to arrezzo , to renounce the authority they had over them , and to enter into an alliance of amity with them , that though they might not hereafter command them as subjects , they might ( upon occasion ) make use of them as friends . with the rest of the cities , they made as good terms as they could , retaining amity with them all . this resolution being prudently taken , succeeded very happily ; for in a few months arrezzo , and all the other towns return'd to their obedience , and it is frequently seen , to decline , or renounce things voluntarily , is the way to gain them more readily , and with less danger and expence , than to pursue them with all the passion and impetuosity in the world. affairs abroad being compos'd in this manner , they apply'd themselves to a settlement at home , and after some debates and alterations betwixt the nobility and the people , it was concluded the third part of the signoria ●r senat should consist of the nobility , and half the other magistracies to be executed by them . the city ( as is said before ) was divided into six parts , out of which sixth , six signori were chosen , ( one out of every sixth ) only by accident now and then their number was increas'd to xii . or xiii . and reduc'd it again to six afterwards ; at length they resolv'd to reform in that particular , either because the sesti or sixths were ill distributed , or else ( designing more authority to the nobility ) they thought it convenient to increase the number of the senators . hereupon they divided the city into quarters , and in every quarter , three signori were created , to superinspect it . the gonfaloniere della iustitia , and gonfalonieri of the popular companies , were laid aside , and instead of them they created xii . buon-huomini , and viii . consiglieri , four of each sort . the common wealth being setled in this method , might have continued quiet and happy , had the grandees been contented to have fram'd it themselves to such modesty of conversation as is requisit in a civil government . but their practices were quite contrary ; when they were but private persons , no body was good enough to be their companions , and being in office , scarce any too good to be their subjects , every day producing new instances of their arrogance and pride , insomuch that the people were exceedingly troubl'd , to consider with what impatience and fury they had remov'd one tyrant to make room for a thousand . in this manner things stood at that time , the insolence of one side , and the indignation of the other fermenting to that degree , that the chief of the people ( complaining of the enormity of their great ones , and their haughtiness to the people and to the bishop ) desir'd that he would be an instrument to restrain the grandees to their share in the other offices , and effect that the senate might consist only of the people . the bishop was naturally a good man , but easie and unconstant ; from that unconstancy of temper it was , that his associats first wrought upon him to favour the duke of athens , and afterwards persuaded him against him : in the late reformation he appear'd highly for the nobility , now upon the instance and solicitation of the popular citizens , he was as earnest for the people , and supposing to have found the same irresolution in other people , as was eminent in himself , he fancy'd himself able to prevail with the nobility to consent . hereupon convoking the xiv . ( who were as yet in possession of their authority , ) with the best language he could use , he exhorted them to resign the dignity of the senate to the people , if they bare any respect to the tranquillity of the city , or their own safety and preservation . but these words wrought a contrary effect in the minds of the nobility ridolfo de bardi reprehending him very smartly , upbraided the levity and treachery of his behaviour with the duke , and concluded at last , that the honours and imployments they were in , they had acquir'd with hazzard , and would defend them with the same ; and in this squable he and his brethren left the bishop , and went to the rest of the nobility to communicate with them . the people were made acquainted with their answer on the otherside , and whilst the grandees were providing what strength they could for the defence of their senators , the commons thought it no time to attend for orders , but ran immediatly to their arms , and with them to the palace , calling out to the nobility to renounce . the noise and tumult were great ; the signori found themselv●s forsaken ; for the grandees finding the people universally in arms , durst not appear , but kept themselves close at home as obscurely as they could : whereupon the popular senators , endeavouring to pacifie the people , alledg'd that they were honest and good men , and prevail'd ( though with great difficulty ) that they might be sent safe to their houses . the senators of the nobility being dismiss'd , the office was taken away from the four grand cou●sellors , and transfer'd upon xii . of the people , and the eight popular senators which remain'd . they restor'd the gonfaloniere della iustitia , and xvi . gonfalonieri of the companies of the people , and re●orm'd all counsels in such manner that the government remain'd entirely in the people . when those exorbitances happen'd , there was a great scarcity in the city , which occasion'd the discontents both of nobility and people ( the people for want of victuals , the nobility for want of command ) and gave incouragement to andrea strozzi to usurp upon their liberty . andrea selling his corn at a cheaper rate than his neigbours , had greater resort of poor people to his house , which he observing , mounted on horseback one morning , with several of the rabble at his heels , he cry'd out to the rest to take arms , and in a few hours he got together more than men , with whom he march'd to the palace of the senate , and demanded to have it open'd : but the senators partly by threatning , and partly by force , disingag'd themselves of them , and afterward , when they were gone frighted them so with their proclamations , that by little and little they dissolv'd , and went every man to his home , and left andrea alone to escape as he could . though this accident was rash , and had the common end of such desperate attempts , yet it gave no little hopes to the nobility of prevailing against the people , seeing the refuse and rascallity of the city had an animosity against them . that they might not slip so fair an occasion , it was resolv'd that they should fortify themselves with their assistance ( if they could gain it ) and recover by force , what by injustice was taken from them . and so bold they grew in their confidence of v●ctory , that they began to provide arms publickly , to fortify their houses , and send to their friends in lombardy for help and supplies . the people and their senators were as busie on the other side , they provided themselves with what arms they could get , and sent to the sanesi , and perugini for relief . the auxiliaries on both sides being arriv'd , the whole city was immediatly in arms. the nobility had posted themselves in three places on this side the river arnus , at the palace of the c●vicciulli near s. iohns ; at the palaces of the p●zzi , and donati near s. piero maggiore ; and at the palace of the cavalcanti in the new-market : those of the nobility who were on the other side of the river , had fortifi'd the bridges and streets which were in the way to their houses . the nerli possess'd themselves of the ponte alla carraia ; the frescohaldi and mannelli , of s. trimita ; the rossi and bardi were upon their guard at the old bridge ; and the rubaconte . the people in the mean time form'd themselves into a posture under the gonfalone della giustitia , and the ensigns of the people , and being drawn up in array , it was thought best immediately to fall on ; the first that march'd were the medici and rondinelli who assaulted the cavicciulli on that side which is towards the piazza de s. giovanni . the service was very hot ( great stones being tumbled upon them from above , and vollies of arrows sent liberally among them from below ) and continued three hours compleat ; but the numbers of the people increasing , and no relief like to get near them , the cavicciulli submitted to their multitudes , and surrendred . the people sav'd the house and the furniture , only they took away their arms , and commanded them to distribute and disperse themselves into such popular houses as were there acquaintance and friends . the cavicciulli being beaten from their post , the pazzi and donati ( being less powerful ) were sooner remov'd . the cavalcanti were only remaining on that side of the river , yet more considerable than the other , both in respect of their numbers & situation . but they , seeing all the gonfalonieri advancing against them , where as three of them only had overpower'd the rest , surrendred like their nighbours without any remarkable defence : and now three parts of the city were in the hands of the people , there was but one left in the power of the nobility , but more difficult and inaccessible , by reason it was so secure by the river arno , the bridges and avenues were of necessity to be clear'd before any good could be done , and they ( as is said before ) were abundantly provided . the first of them that was assaulted was the old bridge , which was as bravely defended , and the people repuls'd . finding their further attempts there would be but in vain , they try'd what could be done at the ponte rubaconte ; but finding their entertainment no better , they left four gonfaloni , and some other ensigns to block up those passes , and march'd with the rest to the ponte alla carraia . the nerli had the defence of that quarter , and behav'd themselves valiantly , yet their bridge ( as having no towers ) being weaker or else overlaid with the numbers of their enemies , ( which were much increas'd by the accession of the capponi and other families about them ) they were on every side oppress'd , forc'd from their barricadoes , and constrain'd to retire . when they were defeated , they advanc'd against the rossi , and from them against the frescobaldi , overwhelming them both , the whole populace beyond the river being come in to their assistance . the bardi was the only party remaining , but that so obstinatly couragious , neither the fortune of their comerades , the unanimity of the people against them , nor the impossibility of relief could prevail with them to surrender , but they would rather die fighting , or see their houses pillag'd or burn'd , than submitted themselves quietly into the hands of their enemies . and they defended themselves ; for though many times they were assaulted , both at the old bridge , and the ponte rubaconte , the people were alway repuls'd , and with considerable loss . there was in old time a lane to pass from the via romana , betwixt the palaces of the pitti to the wall upon s. gorges-hill . to this lane the people sent six gonfalonieri with orders to fall upon the bardi behind , who pursued them so effectually , the bardi were disheartned , and the people prevail'd ; those of the bardi who were appointed for the keeping of the barricadoes , no sooner hearing that their houses were attack'd , but they quitted their posts , and ran in in hopes to defend them . by this means the barracades at the old bridge were won ▪ and the bardi discomfitted , who ( as many as could ) betook themselves to their heals , and were received by the quaratesi , panzanesi , and mozzi . the people ( especially the baser sort ) greedy of prey , plunder'd their houses ; demolish'd their castles ; and when they had done , burn'd them all with such inhumanity , as the greatest enemy the city had would have been asham'd to have committed . the nobility being utterly subdued , the people took upon them the government of the state , and because it consisted of three sorts ( the more potent , the middle sort and the base ) it was ordain'd that the more potent should have the nomination of two senators ; the midle sort of three , and the meaner of three . the gonfalonieri to be chosen ( alternatim ) of the one and the other . besides this , all the old laws against the nobility were reviv'd and put in force , and to weaken them the more , many of them were mingl'd with the common people . the destruction of the nobility was so great at this time , and their party so irrecoverably debilitated , that not daring to take arms again , against the people , they became pusilanimous and abject , which was the occasion that florence lost not only its gentry but its generosity also . from this depression of the grandees , the city continued quiet to the year , in which interval happen'd the famous pestilence ( so eloquently celebrated by giovanni boccacio ) in which there died in florence above people . the first war the florentines made , was against the visconti , being provok'd by the ambition of the archbishop , who at that time was prince of milan : which war was no sooner finished , but new factions began in the city ; for though the nobility was so cow'd , and intimidated , there was no danger of them ; yet fortune had her ways to create them new troubles by new and different dissentions . the history of florence . book iii. the great and natural animosities betwixt the people and the nobility , arising from an ambition in the one to command , and an aversion in the other to obey , are the springs and fountains of all the calamities incident to a city : and indeed there is scarce any thing dangerous or troublesome to a common-wealth , but takes its original and nourishment from their diversity of humour . this was it which kept rome divided . this was it ( if it be lawful to compare great things with little ) which kept florence divided , though in each city with different effects . for , in rome , the enmity betwixt the people and the nobility was determined by expostulation and reason ; in florence , by the sword. in rome , those things were setled and compos'd by law , which , in florence , were scarce done by the slaughter and banishment of many of their best citizens . rome increased still in its military vertue ; but that in florence was utterly exhaust . from a primitive equality of its citizens , rome was brought to an immense inequality : whereas florence ▪ on the contrary , from a vast inequality , was reduced to a strange equality . which diversity of effects must have certainly proceeded from diversity in their designs . the people of rome desired no more than to share and communicate with the nobility in the great o●●ices of the city . the people of florence not only desired , but fought and contended to have the government to themselves , with perfect exclusion to the nobility : and the desires of the romans being more reasonable , there importunity was the more supportable by the nobles , so that they condescended without coming to blows ; and after some small controversie and dispute , it was concluded a law should be made , by which the people should be satisfied , and their dignities preserved to the nobility . on the other side , the demands of the people of florence were extravagant and unjust ; upon which score the nobility preparing for the defence , their differences determined in banishment and bloud : and the laws which ensued were fram'd more to the advantage of the victor , than the benefit of the publick . hence it proceeded , that the success of the people in rome , rendred that city more potent and considerable ; for the people being admitted to the administration of the magistracy , armies , and empire , equally with the nobles , they became inspir'd with the same vertue and magnanimity as they : and as their vertue increased , their power increased with it . but in florence the people prevailing , devested the nobility of their authority ; and if they had a mind to recover it , it was necessary by their conversation and behaviour not only to be , but to profess themselves like the people . and this was the cause of the changing their arms , the variation of their titles , and families which was frequent in those times among the nobility , to recommend them to the commons , and make them pass amongst them : so that the eminency of their arms , and the generosity of their minds , ( for both which the nobility was formerly famous ) was spent and expir'd , and not to be reviv'd in the people , where the least spark of it was not to be found ; which rendered florence every day more abject and base . and whereas rome , transported with its own vertue , grew to that height of pride , that it could not subsist longer without a prince . florence was reduced to that pass , that a wise legislator might have form'd the government according to what scheme and model he pleased . all which , by perusing of the preceeding books , will be obvious to any body . having shewn therefore the foundation of florence ; the original of its liberty ; the occasion of its dissention ; and how the factions of the nobility and people concluded with the tyranny of the duke of athens and the destruction of the nobility : it remains now , i should discourse of the emulations betwixt the people and the multitude , and several accidents which they produced . the power of the nobility being depress'd , and the war with the arch-bishop of millan at an end ; there appeared no respect of future contention in florence : but the ill fate of our city , the ill conduct of their affairs , suffered a new emulation to spring up ( betwixt the families of the albizi and ricci ) which produced as great division in the town , as was at first betwixt the buondelmonti and the uberti , and afterwards betwixt the cerchi and donati . the popes ( who had then their residence in france ) and the emperors who resided in germany , to make good their reputation in italy , had many times , upon several occasions , supplied us with multitude of souldiers of all nations , english , dutch , and britains . the wars ended , and they out of pay , being souldiers of fortune , they were constrain'd to make bold sometimes with one prince , and sometimes with another ; and force them to contribution . in the year , , it happened one of the companies came into tuscany ( under the command of monsieur real of provence ) and put the whole country into a fear : whereupon the florentines not only made publick provision of men , but several private citizens ( and the albizi and ricci among the rest ) furnished themselves with arms for their proper defence . there was a mortal hatred betwixt these two families , each of them aspiring at the government , and conspiring the destruction of the other . however as yet they were not come to hostility ; only they clash'd , and interfer'd in their counsels , and in the executions of the magistracy . but upon this occasion , the city being arm'd , there happen'd a quarrel , by accident , in the old market place ; to which the people , that were near , flock'd , as they do on all such occasions . to the ricci it was reported the albizi had fallen upon some of their family . to the albizi , that the ricci were come out in defiance of them . hereupon the whole city got together ; and no small difficulty it was to the magistrate to restrain either of the families , or to put an end to a conflict which was begun by chance , without the fault or contrivance of either . this accident , though meerly contingent , reviv'd their animosity , and put them both upon designs of increasing their parties . and because , by the ruine of the nobility , the citizens were reduced to such an equality , that the magistrates were become more venerable than formerly ; they resolved both of them to advance their interest rather by ordinary means , than private violence . we have declar'd before , how , after the victory of charles the first , the guelfs were created magistrates ; and great authority given them over the ghibilin faction : which authority and preheminence , time , accident , and their new divisions had so far enervated , that the ghibilins were grown into the government , and exercised the principal offices as well as the guelfs . uguccione de ricci being at that time the head of that family , prevail'd to have the laws against the ghibilins renewed : to which faction , it was suppos'd by many , the albizi were inclin'd ; whose original being anciently from arezzo , they transplanted from thence , and setled in florence : so that uguccione design'd by the renovation of those laws , to render that family incapable of any great office ; providing thereby , that it should be criminal for any person descended from the ghibilins , to exercise the magistracy . this practice of uguccione was discovered to piero , son of philippo de gli albizi , who resolved to connive at it ; presuming he should declare himself a ghibilin , if he opposed it . these laws , though renewed by the prevalence , and ambition of the ricci , substracted nothing from the reputation of the albizi , but were the foundation of many mischiefs . nor indeed can a republick make any law so pernicious , as a law of retro - spection . piero having rather promoted , than resisted those laws ; that which his enemies intended as an impediment , proved a means and occasion of his preferment : for , being made the chief person to super - inspect the execution of those laws , he exercised more authority than before ; and became the only favourite of the faction of the guelfs . and , because in these laws there was no definition of a ghibilin , nor no magistrate deputed to discover them , they were of little importance ; only the captains were appointed to inquire them out , and to admonish them , that they were not to take the magistracy upon them ; if they did , they should be liable to a penalty . whereupon , those who were afterwards incapacitated for the magistracy , were called ammoniti . but , at length , the captains growing bold and audacious in their office , without any regard whether they were conscious or not ; they admonished who they pleased , as their avarice or animosity directed them . so that from the year , ( in which this law was renewed ) to the year , there were more than citizens admonished . by which means , the captains , and the faction of the guelfs were grown great and considerable ; especially piero de gli albizi , lapo da castiglionochio , and carlo strozzi , for the fear of being admonished , made all people respect them . and , though the insolence of their proceedings disgusted many more ; yet none look'd upon it with so much indignation as the family of the ricci , who had been the occasion of that disorder , which was not only like to be the ruine of the common-wealth , but the promotion and advancement of their enemies , quite contrary to what they designed . uguccione therefore ( being one of the senate , to put an end to those inconveniences which he by accident had created ) obtain'd a new law ; that to the six captains , three more should be added ; two of them to be chosen out of the inferior mechanicks : and prevail'd that the ghibilins should not be convicted but by of the guelfs , deputed particularly to that office . for the time , these laws in some measure tempered the exorbitance of the captains so as their admonitions lost much of their terror ; and if any , they were but few that were admonished . notwithstanding the emulation betwixt the albizi and ricci continued ; their leagues , practices , and consultations going on with more eagerness , as their fury suggested . in this distraction the city continued from the year , , to the year ; at which time the guelfs recovered their power . in the family of the buondelmonti , there was a gentleman called benchi ; who for his gallantry in the wars against the pisans , was prefer'd to be one of the people ; and by that means qualified to be a senator . but when he expected to be admitted into the senate , a decree was made , that no person of noble extraction , that was become one of the people , should be received into the senate . this decree was highly offensive to benchi , who , upon consultation with piero de gli albizi , resolv'd with his admonitions to depress the meaner sort of the people , and make themselves governors of the city . and indeed , by his influence upon the nobility , and piero's upon the wealthiest of the citizens , the faction of the guelfs began to grow more considerable : for with their new models and regulations they ordered things so , that the captains and citizens were wholly at their disposing ; their admonitions exercised with as much audacity as formerly ; and the house of the albizi ( being head of that faction ) increased exceedingly . the ricci in the mean time were not behind hand in using all their interest and friends to obstruct their designs ; so that every one lived in great apprehension as fore-seeing their destruction was approaching . whereupon many citizens out of affection to their country assembled in s. piero scheraggio ; and having discoursed of their disorders among themselves , they went afterwards to the senate , to whom , one of the most eminent among them , made this harrangue . most magnificent lords ; we have many of us doubted , whether to assemble by private order , ( though upon publick occasion ) might not be offensive , and render us remarkable for our presumption , and punishable for our ambition . but when we considered , that daily , without the least caution or regard , many citizens do meet , and confer ; not for any benefit to the common-wealth , but in pursuit of their own private designs : we presum'd , that if they were permitted to meet , and conspire against the peace of their country , without displeasure to your lordships ; those whose design was nothing but its preservation and prosperity , needed not to fear your reproof . if therefore we have not incurr'd your lordships disfavour we are not much solicitous what others judge of us , because we find they are as indifferent what we think of them . the love we bear to our country , most magnificent lords , was that which assembled us at first , and now presents us before you , to remonstrate our distractions ; ( which ( though too great ) encrease daily upon our hands , ) and to offer our utmost assistance to remove them . how difficult soever their enterprise may appear we cannot despair of success ; if laying aside private respects , you would be pleased with publick force to exert your authority , the corruption of their cities in italy , has vitiated ours : for since italy freed it self from the yoke of the empire , all the towns ( wanting their former restraint ) ●lew out into extreams , and ordain'd laws and governors , not as free men , but as people divided into factions . from this fountain all our miseries , all our disorders do spring . in the first place , no friendship nor integrity is to be found among the citizens , unless among those whose wickedness makes them faithful , having been formerly engaged together in some villainous action , either against their neighbour , or country . religion , and the fear of god , is utterly extinguished . promises and oaths are binding no farther than they are profitable ; and used not for a tye , but a snare , and as a means to facilitate their cheats which are always more honourable , by how much their success is less difficult and dangerous . hence it is , that vitious and mischievous men are commended for their industry ; and good men , which are innocent and quiet , are reckoned for sots . and certainly , as there is no sort of corruption but may be found in italy , so there are no sort of people more unhappily adapted to receive it . the young men are idle , the old men lascivious ; all sexes , all ages , all places full of licentious brutality above the correction of the laws . hence springs that avarice among the citizens ; and that ambition , not of true glory , but of dishonourable preferment ; which , being accompanied with hatred enmity , schism , and dissention , are commonly followed by executions , banishments , affliction of good men , and exaltation of evil : for good men depending upon their innocence , and not looking abroad for any thing extroardinary , either to advance , or defend themselves do too often miscarry without either , and become the sad objects of the cruelty of usurpers . this creates inclination to parties , and increases their power ; ill people siding for covetousness , ambition , revenge , or some other sinister end ; and good people for fear : and that which renders our condition more deplorable , is , to behold the contrivers and ring-leaders of all , ( as if a word could make them innocent , and consecrate the iniquity of their actions ) guilding , or rather decking over their ill designs with some illustrious title : for , being all enemies to liberty , let them pretend as they please , either to defend an optimacy , or populacy , the result must be destruction : for the fruit they expect from their victory , is not the honour of having delivered their country , but the satisfaction of having mastered their enemies , and usurped the dominion to themselves : and being arrived at that height , what is there so unjust , what is there so cruel , what is there so ravenous as they ? hence-forward laws are made , not for publick benefit , but their private advantage , hence-forward , war , and peace , and amity is concluded ; not for common honour , but particular humor . and if the other cities of italy are repleat with these disorders , ours is much more : our laws , our statutes , and civil ordinances , are made according to the ambition and capricio of the conqueror ; and not according to the true interest of people that would be free : whence it follows , that one faction is no sooner extinguished , but another succeeds : for that city which would maintain it self by faction rather than by law , can never be quiet : when one party prevails , and depresses its rival beyond the power of opposition , it sub-divides of necessity , and falls out with it self ; and then all goes to wrack , the people not being able to defend themselves with those private laws w●ich were made at first for their preservation . that these things are true the ancient and modern dissentions in our own city can sadly demonstrate . when the ghibilins were destroyed , it was every mans judgment the guelfs would have lived honourably and quietly a long time after : and yet it was not long before they divided into the factions of the neri and bianchi : when the bianchi were over-powred , new parties arose , and new troubles attended them ; sometimes fighting in behalf of the exiles , and sometimes quarrelling betwixt the nobility and the people ; and ( to give that to others , which either we could not , or would not possess quietly our selves ) committing our liberty sometimes to king robert , sometimes to his brother , and at last to the duke of athens ; never fixing or reposing in any government ; as not being agreed to live free , nor contented to be servile . nay , so much was our state dispos'd to division , that rather than acquiesce in the administration of a king , it prostituted it self to the regiment of an agobbian , of mean and ignominious extraction . the late duke of athens cannot be mentioned with any honour to this city ; yet his insolence and tyranny may make us wiser for the future . being in arms at his expulsion , we fell to it among our selves and fought with more fury one against another , than we had ever done before ; till at length the nobility was overcome , and at the mercy of the people : and it was the general opinion ( their insupportable pride and ambition being taken down ) there could be no more faction or troubles in florence : but we have found to our cost , how false and fallacious mans judgment is . the pride and ambition of the nobility was not extinct , but transmigrated into the people ; who , by degrees , grew as impatient for authority as they ; and having no other way to attain it , but by dom●stick dissention , they reviv'd the obsolete names of guelfs , and of ghibilins ; which it had been happy for this city never , to have known . and , that nothing which is humane , may be perpetual and stable ; it is the pleasure of the heavens that in all states or governments whatsoever , some fatal families should spring up for their ruine and destruction . of this , our city can afford as many , and as lamentable instances as any of her neighbours ; as owing its miseries not only to one or two , but several of those families : as first , the buondelmonti and uberti ; next , the donati and the cerchi ; and now , the ricci and albizi , ( a shameful and ridiculous thing . ) we have not enumerated our divisions nor deduc'd our ill customs so high , to upbraid or to discourage you by them ; but rather as a memorial of their causes , to shew that they are in our memory as well as yours ; and to exhort you by their example , not to be diffident or timerous in correcting them . for in those days the power of the nobility was so great , and their alliances so considerable ; the laws and civil magistrates were too weak to restrain them : but now the emperor having no power , the pope no influence ; all italy , and particularly this city , reduc'd to such a parity , as to be able to govern our selves ; where is the difficulty ? what impediment remains , why this common-wealth ( in spight of all examples to the contrary ) may not only be united , but reform'd and improv'd by new laws and constitutions , were your lordships disposed to create them ? to which good work , we do most humbly importune you , not out of private passion , so much as publick compassion for our country . our corruption is great , and t is you only can correct the rage , and expel the contagion that spreads and luxuriates among us . the disorders of our ancestors are not imputable to the nature of the men , but to the iniquity of those times ; which being now altered , gives this city fair hopes , by the institution of better laws , to better its fortune ; whose malignity is easily to be overcome by a prudent restraint of ambition ; a seasonable inhibition of such customs as propagate faction ; and a discreet election and adherence to such things as are compatible with our freedom . and better it is you do it now legally of your selves , than by deferring it , to divert that office upon the people and make them do it by force . the signori mov'd then by these arguments , ( which they had fram'd to themselves before ) and by authority and encouragement afterwards , commissionated citizens to superintend for the safety of the common-wealth . true it is , many men are more proper to preserve good laws , than to make them ; and these citizens imploy'd themselves more in extirpating the present factions , than providing against new ; by which means they succeeded in neither : for not taking away the occasion of the new ; and one of the present factions being more potent than the other , it could not be done without great danger to the common-wealth . however , they depriv'd three of the family of the albizi ; and as many of the ricci of all magistracy ( unless of the guelfish party ) for three years ; in which number , piero de gli albizi , and uguccione de ricci were two . they prohibited all citizens for the coming into the palace , unless the senate was sitting . they decreed , that in case of batterry or unjust interruption in the possession of their estates , it should be lawful to accuse any man ( though of the nobility ) to the council , and to make them answer to their charge . these laws had greater reflection upon the ricci than the albizi ; for though they were equally intended the ricci suffered most by them : piero indeed was shut out of the palace of the signori ; but at the palace of the guelfs ( where his authority was great ) his entrance was free ; and though he and his comrades were forward enough in their admonitions before they were much forwarder now , and new accidents occurr'd to make them yet worse . gregory xi . was pope at that time , whose residence being at avignon , he governed italy by legates , ( as his predecessors had done before him . ) these legates being proud and rapacious , had brought great calamity upon several of the cities . one of these legates being at that time in bologna , took the advantage of a scarcity which was in florence , and resolved to make himself lord of tuscany : to which end , he not only omitted to supply the florentines with provisions but to deprive them utterly of all other relief , as soon as the spring appeared , and gave opportunity for his motion , he invaded them with a great army , hoping they would be easily conquered , because they were both famished , and disarm'd : and possibly his design might have taken , had not his army been mercenary , and corrupt ; for the florentines having no other weapons to defend themselves , betook themselves to their bags , and paid his army florins to draw off . to begin a war , is in any mans power ; but , alas , no body can end one . this war was commenc'd by the ambition of the legate , but prosecuted by the indignation of the florentines ; who entred into an immediate league with monsieur barnabo , and all the cities which were at enmity with the church . to manage it , they created eight citizens , whom they invested with absolute authority of proceeding without appeal , and disbursing without account . this war against the pope , though uguccione was dead , reviv'd those who had followed the fortunes of the ricci , who in opposition to the albizi , had favoured barnabo , and appeared against the church ; and the rather , because the eight were all enemies to the guelfs : whereupon piero de gli albizi , lapo da castiglionochio , carlo strozzi , and others , united to defend themselves against their adversaries . and while the eight great citizens were imployed in the management of the war , and they in their admonitions , the war continued three years , till the death of that pope . however , it was carried on with so universal satisfaction , that the eight were continued yearly in their office , and got the title of santi ; notwithstanding they had sequestred the riches of the churches , forc'd the clergy to the execution of their functions , and despised the censures of the pope , so much did the citizens at that time prefer the advantage of their country , before the quiet of their consciences : and so earnest were they to make it appear to the church , that , as when they were friends , they had power to defend it ; so now being enemies , they were as able to distress it ; having put all romagna , la marca , and perugia , into rebellion . but , though they were able to maintain war , at this rate , against the pope , they could not so well defend themselves against their captains and factions . the indignation and hatred the guelfs had conceived against the eight , augmented their insolence ; and they affronted them as well as the rest of the chief of the citizens . nor was the arrogance of the captains inferior to the insolence of the guelfs ; they had made themselves more formidable than the signori ; and men went with more awe and reverence to their houses , than to the senators palace : insomuch , that not an embassador was sent to florence , but he receiv'd audience from , and had particular commission to the captains . pope gregory being dead , this city had no more wars abroad ; yet , at home , it was in great confusion : the imperiousness of the guelfs was grown insupportable , and no way visible to suppress them : it was judged therefore necessary to take arms , and commit the superiority to the decision of fortune . on the guelfs side there were all the ancient nobility , and the greatest part of the more powerful citizens ; of whom , as ( we have said ) lapo , piero , and carlo were the chief . on the other side , were all the inferior sort of the people headed by the eight , and assisted by georgio scali , tomaso strozzi , the ricci , the alberti , and the medici . the rest of the multitude ( as it happens always in such cases ) joyned with the discontents . the power of their adversaries seemed very considerable to the guelfs ; and their danger great , if any senate should prove their enemies , and go about to destroy them : desirous to prevent it , they assembled together ; where , examining the state and condition of the city , they found the persons which had been admonished , were so numerous , that they had thereby disoblig'd most of their citizens and made them their enemies . they could propose no other remedy ; but as they had degraded them of their honours , so to banish them the city , seize upon the senators palace by force , and constrain the whole town to come over to their side , according to the example of the guelfs their predecessors ; whose quiet and security was to be attributed wholly to their banishing their adversaries . as to the design , all of them agreed ; but they differed about the time . it was in the year , in the month of may , when lapo conceiving it unsafe to defer ; acquainted them that delays were dangerous especially to them ; considering , that in the next senate salvestro de medici might be chosen gonfaloniere , who was a known enemy to their sect . piero de gli albizi was of another sentiment , and thought it best to protract ; in respect that more force would be necessary , which were not to be got together privately ; and to raise them publickly , was to run themselves into palpable danger . his judgment therefore was , that they should have patience till s. iohn's day , which was at hand ; at which time , in regard it was one of the greatest festivals , and great resort would come to the city of course , they might convey in what numbers they pleased , without danger of discovery . and to obviate their apprehension of salvestro , he proposed to have him admonished ; and if that would not do , to put the change upon him , by some fraud or artifice in the imborsation ; and foist in some other of the colledg of his quarter , to defeat him securely of that office. this last opinion being approved , it was resolved to put off ! though lapo consented unwillingly , urging , that delay was uncertain ; that no time can , in all circumstances , be convenient ; and that he who expects a perfect oportunity , seldom attempts any thing ; and when he does , it turns commonly to his own disadvantage . however , they proceeded to admonish him , but could not hinder salvestro . and , for the change , the eight had got an inkling of that , and took care to prevent it ; so that salvestro was drawn for gonfaloniere by alamanno de medici . being of a noble popular family , he could not endure that the people should be oppressed by the power of a few great persons ; resolving therefore with himself , to put a period to their insolence : seeing he was favoured by the people , and back'd by several of the principal citizens ; he communicated his designs with benedetto alberto , tomaso strozzi , and georgio scali ; all of them concurring in the plot , and ingaging their assistance . upon this they form'd a law privately , whereby the ordini d●lla giustitia against the grandees were reviv'd , the authority of the capitani di parte , retrench'd ; and the ammoniti re-admitted to the magistracy . and , because it was best to propose and enact it at one time , if it were possible ( for it was first to be presented to the colledges , and afterwards debated in the councils , ) salvestro being in his office , ( which , for the time , is , as it were , prince of the city ) he caused a colledge and council to be called both together in one morning ; and coming in person to the colledge , ( which were none of his friends ) he proposed the law to them which he had prepared ; but it was rejected as an innovation , and he could not prevail to have it pass'd . salvestro , seeing himself defeated in his first practice to obtain it , pretended some necessity to go forth ; and , without being perceived slip'd away to the council ; where , having placed himself so as he might be heard and seen by the whole assembly , he told them as follows : that , being made gonfaloniere , he did not think he had been design'd for the cognizans and determination of private causes , ( which have their peculiar iudges ) but to superintend the state , to correct the insolence of the grandees , and to moderate and rectifie such laws as were found prejudicial , nay , destructive to the common-wealth . that in both cases he had been diligent to the utmost ; and imployed himself with all possible industry : but the perversness and malevolence of some men was so untractable , and contrary to his good designs ; they did not only hinder him from perpetrating any ●hing for the benefit of the publick ; but they denied him their counsel , and refused for to bear him . wherefore , finding it was not in his power to be any way beneficial to his country ; he knew not for what reason , or with what confidence he should continue in an offic● which either he did not really deserve , or of which he was thought unworthy by others . for this cause his intention was to retire and leave the people to the election of another , who might be more vertuous , or more fortunate than he . and having said , he departed from the council towards his own house . those of the council , who were privy to the design , and others , desirous of novelty , raised a tumult thereupon ; to which , the senators and colledges immediately resorted ; and meeting their gonfaloniere , they prevailed with him , partly with their authority , and partly with their intreaty , to return to the council , which , by that time , was in great confusion : many of the noble citizens had been threatened , and injuriously treated ; and , among the ●est , carlo strozzi had been taken by the buttons , by an artificer , and doubtlesly slain , had not the standers-by interposed ; and , with some difficulty , sav'd him . but he which made the greatest hubub , and put the city in arms , was benedetto de gli alberti , who , from a window of the palace , cry'd out aloud to the people , to arm ; upon which the piazza was fill'd with arm'd men immediately ; and the colledges did that out of fear , which they had denied upon request . the captains of the parties had , in the mean time , got together what citizens they could , to advise what was to be done against this decree of the senate . but when they heard of the tumult , and understood what had passed in council , they all of them slunk back to their houses . let no man that contrives any alteration in a city , delude himself , or believe that he can either stop it when he will , or mannage it as he pleases . salvestro's intention was to have procur'd that law , and setled the city . but it fell out quite otherwise ; for their humours being stir'd , every man was distracted : the shops shut up ; the citizens assaulted in their houses : several remov'd their goods into the monestaries and churches , to secure them ; all people expecting some mischief at hand . the whole corporation of the arts , met , and each of them made a syndic . hereupon the priori call'd their colledges , and were in counsel a whole day together with the syndics , to find out a way to compose their disorders to the satisfaction of all parties ; but , being of different judgments , nothing was agreed . the next day the arts came forth with ensigns displaid ; which the senate understanding , and doubting what would follow , they call'd a counsel to prevent the worst , which was no sooner met but the tumult increased , and the ensigns of the arts marched up into the piazza with colours flying , and store of arm'd men at their heels . thereupon to satisfie the arts , and the multitude , and ( if possible ) to dispel that cloud of mischief which was impending ; the council gave general power ( which , in florence is called balia ) to the senators , colledges , the eight , the captains of the parties , and the syndics of the arts , to reform the state as they should think most advantagious for the publick . whilst these things were in agitation ; some of the ensigns of the arts , joyning themselves with some of the rabble , ( being stimulated by certain persons , who were desirous to revenge themselves of some late injuries which they had received from the guelfs ) stole away from the rest ; went to the palace of lapo da castiglionchio , broke into it , plunderd it , and burned it . lapo , upon intelligence of what the senate had done , in contradiction to the orders of the guelfs , and seeing the people in arms , having no variety of choice ; but either to hide , or to fly ; he absconded first in s. croce , but afterwards fled away to casentino , in the disguise of a frier ; where he was often heard to complain of himself , for having consented to piero de gli albizi : and of piero for having protracted their attempt upon the government till s. iohn's day . piero and carlo strozzi , upon the first noise of the tumult , hid themselves only , presuming ( when it was over ) they had relations and friends enough to secure their residence in florence . the palace of lapo being burn'd , ( mischiefs being more easily propagated , than begun , ) several other houses ran the same fate , either out of publick malice , or private revenge : and that the greediness and rapacity of their companions might , if possible out-do theirs ; they broke up the goals , and set the prisoners at liberty : and , after this , they sack'd the monastery of agnoli and the convent di s. spirito to which , many citizens had convey'd much of their goods . nor had the publick chamber escap'd their violence , had not the awe and reverence of one of the signori defended it ; who being on horse-back , with some persons in arms attending him , opposed himself , in the best manner he could , against the fury of the people ; which being appeased in some measure , either by the authority of the signori , or the approach of the night , the next day the balia indemnified the ammoniti , with proviso , that for three years , they should not exercise any magistracy in that city . they rescinded those laws which were made in prejudice to the guelfs . they proclaimed lapo da castiglionochio , and his accomplices , rebels : after which , new senators were chosen , and of them , luig● guicciardini was made gonfaloniere . being all lookt upon as peaceable men , and lovers of their country great hopes were conceived the tumult would have ceased : notwithstanding , the shops were not opened ; the people stood to their arms , and great guards kept all over the city : so that the signori entred not upon the magistracy abroad , with the usual pomp , but privately within doors , and without any ceremony at all . these senators concluded , nothing was so necessary nor profitable for the publick , at the begining of their office , as to pacifie the tumult : whereupon , by proclamation , they requir'd all arms to be laid down ; all shops to be opened ; and all persons , who had been call'd out of the country , to the assistance of any citizen , to depart . they disposed guards in several places of the town ; and ordered things so , that if the ammoniti could have been contented , the whole city would have been quiet . but they not being satisfied to attend three years before they should be capable of office , the arts , in favour to them , got together again ; and demanded of the senate , that , for the future , no citizen might be admonished as a ghibilin , by either the senate , the colledge , the captains of the parties , the consuls , or sindic's of any art whatsoever : requiring likewise , that new imborsation might be made of the guelfs , and the old one be burn'd . their demands were presently accepted , both by the senate and counsels ; supposing thereupon , their new tumult would have ceased . but those that are covetous , and impatient for revenge , are not to be satisfied with bare restitution . such as desired disorder , to inrich and wreck themselves upon their enemies , persuaded the artificers they could never be safe , unless many of their adversaries were banished , ot destroyed . which practices being remonstrated to the senate ; they caused the magistrates of the arts , and the sindic's , to appear before them , to whom luigi guicciardini the gonfaloniere spake in this maner : if these lords , and my self , had not long since understood the fortune of this city ; and observed , that its wars abroad were no sooner determined , but it was infested with new troubles at home ; we should have more admired , and more resented the tumults which have happened : but things that are familiar , carrying less terror along with them , we have born the late passages ; with more patience ; especially , considering we were not at all conscious to their beginning ; and had reason to hope they would have the same end as former tumults have had upon our condescension to their great , and their numerous demands . but finding ( to our sorrow ) you are so far from composing your thoughts , or acquiescing in what has been granted , that you are rather exasperated , and conspire new injury against your fellow citizens , and endeavour to banish them ; we must needs say , the ignobleness of your proceedings provokes us to displeasure . and certainly , had we imagin'd , that in the time of our magistracy , our city should have been ruin'd , either in siding with , or against you , we should have declin'd that honour , and freed our selves from it , either by banishment , or flight . but , supposing we had to do with people not utterly destitute of humanity , and void of all affection to their country ; we willingly accepted of the preferment , as hoping , by the gentleness of our deportment , to be too hard for your ambition and violence . but we see now , by unhappy experience , the mildness of our behaviour , and the readiness of our condescensions do but inhanse and elate you , and spur you on to more dishonourable demands . we say not this to disgust , but to inform you ; let others represent to you what will please ; it shall be our way to remonstrate what is profitable . tell me ( upon your words ) what is there more that you can justly desire of us ? you proposed to have the captains of the parties devested of their authority ; it is done . yov mov'd , the old imborsations might be burn'd , and new ones decreed to supply them ; we consented . you had a mind the ammoniti should be re-admitted to places of honour and trust ; we granted it : upon your intercession , we pardoned those who had burned houses , and rob'd churches ; and , to satisfie you , have sent several of our principal citizens into exile . to gratifie you , the grandees are circumscrib'd with new laws , and all things done that might satisfie you : what end therefore will there be of your demands ? or , how long will you abuse the liberty you enjoy ? do you not perceive , that we can be overcome with more patience , then you can subdue us ? what will be the conclusion ; or , whither will your dissentions hurry this poor city ? can you have forgot how castruccio , ( an inconsiderable citizen of luca ) taking advantage of the divisions , possessed himself of it ? do not you still remember , that the duke of athens , from a private person , became your lord and your sovereign ; and all from our own differences at home ? whereas , when we were united , the arch-bishop of millan , nor the pope himself , were able to hurt us ; but were glad ( after several years war ) to lay down with dishonour . why then will you suffer your own discords ( in time of peace too ) to bring a city into slavery , which so many potent enemies , in time of war , were not able to captivate ? what can you expect from your divisions , but servitude ? what from the goods you have , or shall hereafter take violently from your neighbours , but poverty ? the persons you plunder , are they , who , by our care and appointment , supply the city with all things ; and if it be defeated of them , what can we do to sustain i● ? what-ever you gain , ( being unjustly acquir'd ) you can hardly preserve : from whence , famine and poverty must necessarily follow . these lords therefore , and my self do command , and ( if it be consistent with our , dignity ) intreat , and beseech you , that you would compose your selves for this once , and be content with our pass'd condescensions ; or , if they be too little , and there remains still something to be granted ; that you would d●sire it civilly , and not with the force and clamour of a tumult ; and if your request be just , you will not only be gratified ; but occasion taken away from wicked men , to ruine your country , under your shelter and pretence . these words being true , had great influence upon the people , insomuch that they return'd their thanks to the gonfaloniere , acknowledged that he had behav'd himself like a good lord to them , and a good citizen to the city , and promised their obedience to what-ever he commanded . to breake the ice , the signori deputed two citizens for each of the chiefest offices , to consult with the syndic's of the arts , what , in order to the publick good , was most fit to be reformed ; and to report it to the senate . but , whilst these things were transacting , a new tumult broke out , which put the city into more trouble than the former . the greatest part of the robbery , and late mischief , was committed by the rabble , and rascallity of the people ; and of them ; those who had been most eminently mischievous , apprehended , when the greater differences were reconcil'd , they might be questioned , punished for the crimes they had committed , and ( as it always happens ) be deserted by those very persons who instigated them at first : to which was added , a certain hatred the inferior sort of the people had taken against the richer citizens , and the principals of the arts , upon pretence that they were not rewarded for the service they had done , with proportion to their deserts . for when , as in the time of charles the first , the city was divided into arts , every art had its proper head and governour , to whose jurisdiction , ( in civil cases ) every person in the several arts , were to be subject . these arts ( as we said before ) were originally but xii , afterwards they increased to xxi , and grew to that power and authority , that , in a few years , they ingrossed the whole government of the city : and because , among them , some were more considerable , and some less ; they came , by degrees , to be distinguished , and vii of them were call'd maggiori , and xiv , minori . from this division , and the other reasons aforesaid , proceeded the arrogance of the captains of the parties ; for those citizens who had anciently been guelfs , ( under whose government those offices were always preserved ) did ever indulge the chief and better sort of the arts ; and discountenance the more inferior , and all that took their parts : hence it was , all the before-mentioned troubles and tumults were derived . but because , in the ordinary companies and corporations of the arts , there were many trades ( in which the meaner sort of people were imployed ) of no distinct and peculiar company , but were incorporated with other trades , as the quality of their imployments made them fit ; it fell out , that when they were not satisfied with their work , or any other ways injured by their masters ; they had no person to repair to for redress , but to the magistrate of that company of which they were sworn ; from whom , they conceived , they had not received that justice , which ought to have been done them . of all companies of the city , the company of clothiers was the greatest , and had most of these sort of people depending upon it ; insomuch , that being the first in wealth and authority ' by the industry of its members , it maintain'd ( and does still ) the greatest part of the multitude . the baser sort of people therefore ( both of this company , and the rest ) were highly incensed upon the foresaid occasions ; and being excited , by fear of correction , for the pillaging and firing of the palaces , they met many times in the night , to discourse of what was pass'd ; and to admonish one another of the danger they were in ; and to animate and unite them , one of the most daring , and most experienced among them , made this speech : were it now to be considered , whether we were immediately to take arms ; to burn , and plunder the houses of our fellow citizens , and rob the churches ; i should be one of those who should think it worthy of further debate , and perhaps , prefer harmless poverty before hazardous gain . but , since arms are taken , many mischiefs have been done ; and much prize has been got ; it is ( in my judgment ) most natural , to advise which way our gains are to be preserved ; and how we may best secure our selves against the ills we have committed . i am certainly of opinion , if no man should do you that service , your own necessity would advise you . you see the whole city full of complaints , and indignation against us ; the citizens , frequent in their meetings ; and the senators perpetually with the magistrate . be confident , 't is to design against us ; to contrive new ways , and to contract new forces to destroy us . it remains therefore upon us , to do two things ; one is , to provide , that we be not punished for our pass'd offences : the other , that we may live with more liberty and satisfaction for the future . to justifie therefore our former misdeeds , in my thoughts , it is convenient to increase them with new ; and by the artifice of redoubling our mischiefs , our conflagrations , and robberies , to allure and ingage more companions to our party . for , where many are guilty , none are punished ; though small faults are revenged , great ones are generally rewarded ; and where the disease is epidemical , few people complain ; an universal ca●amity being always more supportable than a private . so then , to multiply our misdeeds , is the readiest way of obtaining our pardon , and prevailing for those things which we believe conducive to our liberty : nor is there any difficulty to discourage us ; it seems to me , the enterprise is not only easie , but certain ; because those who should oppose us , are divided , and rich : their divisions will give us the victory ; and their riches ( when we have got them ) shall maintain it . let not the antiquity of their blood dismay you , ( though objected so insolently . ) all men having the same original , are equally ancient ; and nature has made no difference in their contexture , strip them naked , you are as well as they : dress them in your rags , and your selves in their robes , , and you will doubtless be the nobles ; for 't is nothing but poverty and riches that discriminates betwixt you . it troubles me , to think , that there are many of you unquiet in your consciences , for what you have done ; and resolved to be guilty of no more : if it be so , i was mistaken in my judgment , and you are not the persons i thought you . neither conscience , nor disgrace , ought at all to deterr you ; they that overcome , ( let the means be what they will ) are never troubled with the dishonour : and , for conscience , you ought not to be concern'd . where the fear of famine , and death , and prisons , are so pregnant , there is no room for apprehensions of hell. observe the ways and progress of the world ; you will find the rich , the great , and the potent , arrive at all that wealth , and grandeur , and authority , by violence or fraud ; and when once they are possessed , you will see with what confidence and security they gild over the brutality of their usurpations , with the unjust ( but glorius ) title of acquests . observe , on the other side , those whose pus●llanimity or sottishness affrights them from those courses , what becomes of them ? they are choak'd up and consumed in servitude and poverty : honest servants , are perpetual servants ; good men are always badly provided for ; the bold and unscrupulous , do soonest free themselves from bondage ; and the most fraudulent and rapacious , from indigence and distress . god and nature have laid every mans fortune before him ; and we see men more naturally dispos'd to rapine , than industry ; to bad actions , than good . hence it is , we devour one another ; and he that can do least , goes always by the worst . force , therefore , is to be used , when occasion is given ; and , what fairer opportunity can be offered by fortune ? the citizens are divided ; the senate irresolute ; the magistrate frighted ; so that before they can unite , and come to any resolution , our work will be done , and we be either absolute princes of the city , or masters of such cantons , as will not only pardon us for what is pass'd , but inable us to awe our enemies for the future . i confess , this resolution is dangerous , and bold ; but where necessity urges , boldness is prudence ; and danger in great things , was never considered by men of the least courage and gallantry . those enterprises which begin with danger , do end with reward ; and men never free themselves from one peril , but by adventuring a greater . again , having prisons , and tortures , and death before our eyes , ( as we have ) it cannot but be more hazardous to stand still , than to look out for security : in the first , our destruction is certain ; in the other , contingent . how often have i heard you complain of the avarice of your superiors ; and the injustice of your magistrates ? now , in your time , not only to free , but to advance your selves into a capacity of retaliating , and giving them as much occasion of fearing you , as you have had of them . time has wings , opport●●ity flies away ; and when once pass'd , is never to be reclaim'd . you see our enemies are preparing , let us prevent their preparation : who-ever begins first , is sure to prevail , to the ruine of their enemies , and exaltation of themselves . go on therefore with courage , 't is an enterprise will yield honour to many of us , but security to us all . though their own propensity was too much , this speech push'd the people forward , with more impetuosity , to mischief ; so that after they had drawn together what company they were able , they concluded to take arms , and oblig'd themselves , by oath , to relieve one another , when any of them should fall under the correction of the magistrate . whilst they were in this manner conspiring against the government , the senators had notice of it from one , and having caused one simone to be apprehended , he confessed the whole plot , and that the next day was intended for a tumult . whereupon , fore-seeing the danger they were in , they assembled the colledges , and such citizens as sided with the sindic's of the arts , and laboured the preservation of the city , before they could be got together , it was night ; and the signori were advised to consult with the consoli dell ' arti , who agreed unanimously , that the whole city should arm ; and the gonfaloniere del populo , draw all the companies , the next morning , into the piazza . at the time when the citizens met , and simone was upon the rack , one nicolada friano being in the palace , to do something about the clock , returned with all speed to his house , put the whole neighbourhood into an uproar , and brought above a thousand arm'd men together into the piazza di santo spirito in a moment . the alar'm increasing , came to the rest of the conspirators , who immediatly took arms ; and ▪ in a short space , san piero m●ggiore , and s●n lorenza , ( as they had appointed before ) were full of arm'd men . the day being arriv'd , which was the st . of iuly , in favour of the senate , there were not above men appeared in their arms , and none of the gonfaloniere ; for they having intelligence the whole city was in arms , were affraid to stir out of their houses . the first party of the people which advanced to the piazza , was that which had met at san piero maggior ; but the forces which were drawn there before , did not remove . not long after them , appeared the rest of the multitude , who , finding no resistance , with hideous noise , demanded their prisoners of the ▪ signori , and not succeeding by threats , to gain them by force , they set fire to the palace of luigi guicciardini , and burned it to the ground ; whereupon , for fear o● worse mischief , their prisoners were ordered to be delivered . when they had recovered their prisoners , they took the standard della giustitia from the essecutore , burned many houses under it , and persecuted all people that they were angry with , whether upon publick , or private account ; many citizens , upon particular quarrels , conducting the tumult to the houses of their adversaries ; it being sufficient , to cry out in the multitude , to such an house , to such a man ; or for him that carried the standard , to direct it to such a place . they burned the accounts and books of the company of the clothing trade ; and after they had done mischief good store , that they might accompany their exorbitance with some laudable action , they made salvestro de medici , a knight , and as many more of their partners , as the whole number amounted to , among which , there were benedetto , and antonio de gli alberti ; tomazo strozzi , and several others ; some of which , received their honour much against their wills . in which accident , one thing is more then ordinarily remarkable ; that those persons , some of them , whose houses were burned ; were , the same day , knighted by the same persons which had burned them ; so unconstant are the people , and so small the distance betwixt their kindness , and revenge ; an experiment of which , was seen in their behaviour to luigi guicciardini , the gonfaloniere della giustitia . the senators finding themselves abandoned by their guards , by the chief of the arts , and their gonfaloniere themselves , were very much perplexed , no-body coming into their assistance , as they were commanded ; and , of the gonfaloni , there was only the company of the golden lion , and two more , which appeared , and they staid not long in the piazza ; for , not finding themselves followed by their brethren , they also returned to their houses : the citizens , on the other side , seeing the fury of the multitude uncontroulable , and the palace of the signori deserted , some of them kept close in their houses ; others thrust themselves into the crowd , thereby to secure there own houses , and their friends ; by which means , the numbers of the people were much increased , and the power of the senate extreamly diminished . the tumult continued in this violence all day long ; and , at night , there were above men together at the palace of stephano , behind the church of s. barnaby . before day , they constrained the several arts to send for their ensigns ; and having got them in the morning , they march'd with their colours before them , to the palace of the podesta , who refusing to surrender ; they fell upon it , and forced it . the senate desirous to compose things another way , perceiving nothing was to be done by force , called three members of their colledges , and sent them to the palace of the podesta , who found , that the heads of the people had been already in consultation with the sindic's of the arts , and some other considerable citizens , to resolve what was fit to be demanded of the senate : so that they returned in a short time to the senate , with four deputies from the people , and these following proposals . that the clothing trade might not , for the future , be subject to the government of a forreigner ; that three new companies , or corporations , should be erected ; one , to consist of carders , and diers ; another , of barbers , taylers , shoomakers , and such other mechanicks ; and the third ; of the more inferior trades , out of which companies , two should be chosen to sit in the senate ; and three to sit among the , which had the government of the artiminori , or inferiour trades . that the senate should provide halls for these new companies , where they might meet , and consult about their affairs . that no person , of any of these companies , should be constrained to pay any debt under fifty duckets , for the space of two years . that no interest should be paid out of the banks , and only the principal to be restor'd . that all prisoners , and condemn'd persons , should be discharged . that all the ammoniti should be re-admitted to all honours . many other things were demanded in behalf of their friends ; and , on the contrary , as to their enemies , they insisted , that several of them might be imprisoned , and several admonished . to give perfection to all , it was necessary they should be ratified in the counsel of the commons ; which was deferred till the next , because two counsels were not to be held in one day . in the mean time , the arts seemed all of them to be content , and the people to be satisfied ; having promised , as soon as their laws and demands were confirmed , they would retire to their houses . the next morning being come , and the counsel of the commons deliberating upon their demands ; the voluble and impatient multitude were got together , and marching , with ensigns displaid , into the piazza , with so obstreperous and dreadful a noise , as affrighted both the counsel , and senate : whereupon , guerriante marignouli , one of the signori , ( induced more by fear , than any private exception ) went down , under pretence to secure the gate below , and march'd off to his house . he could not , however , convey himself so privatly away , but the rabble discovered him , yet without any violence to him , only crying out , as he passed , that all the senators should leave the palace ; if not , they would burn their houses , and knock their children on the head . by this time , the law they urg'd , was concluded ; the senators returned to their chambers ; and the counsel gone down , ( not daring to go forth ) were walking up and down the court and the cloysters , dispairing of the safety of the city , by reason of the bruitishness , and barbarity of the multitude , and the crossness or pusillanimity of those who might have either bridled or suppressed them . the signori were likewise in no less doubt and confusion , seeing themselves not only forsaken by one of their own members , but relieved by no-body , neither with intelligence , norsupplies . whilst they were in this hesitation , uncertain what they ought , or what they were able to do , tomazzo strozzi , and benedetto alberti , ( prompted by private ambition , of being themselves the last of the senators which should remain in the palace , or else , because it was really their judgment ) persuaded them to give way , to yield to the fury of the people , and retire privatly , every man to his own house . this counsel being given by persons who had been heads of the people , ( though others seem to approve it ) displeased alamanno acciaivoli , and nicolo de bene , exceedingly , who ( recollecting their courage ) made answer ; that , if others of the senate had a mind to depart , they would not hinder them ; but , for their parts , till the expiration of their authority permitted them , they were resolved not to leave the palace , but with the loss of their lives . this difference redoubled the horror of the senate , and the rage of the people : insomuch , that the gonfaloniere , choosing to resign his office with shame , rather than retain it with danger , recommended himself to tomazzo strozzi's protection , who took him out of the palace , and conducted him to his house : in like manner , the rest of the signori departed one after another ; and alamanno , and nicolo , ( who were so magnanimous before , lest they should be thought more valiant than wise , got out also , and returned like the rest ; so that the palace , remained in the hands of the people , and the eight officers for the administrations of war , who had not as yet laid down their commands . when the people made their entrance into the palace , the ensigns of the gonfaloniere di giustitia , was carried by one michaele di lando , a carder of wooll . this michaele ( without shoes on his feet , and scarce cloathes on his back ) being followed by a great rout , ran up to the top of the stairs , and being got within hearing of the place where the senators sate , he turned himself about to the multitude , and said ; you see , gentlemen , this palace , and this city , is yours ; how shall they be disposed of , or , what is your pleasure shall be done ? to which , they universally replyed , it was their pleasure he should be gonfaloniere , and govern the city as he thought best . michaele accepted the office , being a prudent and sagacious man , more obliged to nature than fortune ; and the first thing he resolved , was , to compose the tumults , and settle the city . to hold the people imployed , and gain time for the digestion of his designs , he commanded them abroad , in search of one ser nuto , ( who had been intended for provost marshal , by lapo da castiglionochio , and most of those who were about him , went away in his pursuit . to begin ( then ) his dominion with justice , as he had acquired it by grace , he caused proclamation to be made , that no man should dare to burn , or steal any thing for the future ; and to terrifie the more , he caused a gallows to be set up in the piazza : proceeding next to the reformation of the city , he turned out the sindic's of the arts , and put new in their places ; he deprived the signori , and the colledges of their authority , and burned the bags of their office. by this time the people had found ser nuto , brought him to the palace , tyed him up to the gallows by one of his legs , and every one that was about him , having torn off a peice , in a moments time , there was nothing of him to be seen , but one of his feet . on the other side , the otto della guerra , ( supposing the government in them , upon the departure of the signori ) had designed new senators to succeed them . but michaele understanding it , sent to them to be gone out of the palace , and to let them know , it should appear to all people , that he could govern florence , without their counsel or assistance . after this , he assembled the sindic's of the arts ; and created four new senators out of the inferior sort of people ; two for the better , and two for the worser trades . moreover , he divided the state into three parts , ; one of them to relate to the new arts ; another to the less ; and the third to the greater . he gave to salvestro de medici , the revenue of the shops upon the old bridge ; to himself , the podestaria of empoli ; besides many other acts of beneficence to several citizens , and friends of the people , not so much for their own sakes , but that they might be always willing , and able to defend him . the people however , began to suspect , that michaele was partial to the better sort ; and to discern that they had not so much interest in the government , as would be necessary for their safety . whereupon , push'd forward by their accustomed insolence , they took arms again , and came marching , with their colours flying , to the piazza , in a bravado , requiring the senators to come down to the ringheria , and deliberate upon certain new things they had to propose for their security , and good . michaele was sensible of their insolence , but ( not to provoke them any farther , before he knew what they would have ) he only blamed their manner of address ; desired them to lay down their arms , and , that then , by fair means , they should obtain that , which did not stand with the dignity of the government to grant by constraint : with which answer , the people being highly incensed , they drew up at new s. maries , against the palace , and created eight commissioners , with their ministers and dependants , to gain themselves reverence and reputation : so , as at that time , the city had two tribunals ; and were governed by two distinct administrations . among the commissioners it was resolv'd , that eight persons , to be chosen by the body of the arts , should be always resident in the palace , with the senators , to give sanction to what-ever the signori resolv'd upon . they took from salvestro de medici , and michaele de lando , what-ever in their former counsels they had conferred upon them ; assigning several offices , and pensions , to many of their friends , to support the dignity of their imployments . having concluded , in this manner , among themselves , to make all the more valid , they sent two of their members to the senate , to demand their confirmation ; otherwise , to let them know , that what they could not obtain by civil application , they were able to do by force . these two commissioners delivered their message to the senate , with great confidence and presumption ; upbraiding the gonfaloniere by his office , and other honours which he had received from them ; and that , in return , he had most ungratefully behav'd himself towards them and coming , at the end of their objurgation , to threaten him ; michaele , unable to indure so great insolence , ( more sutably to the majesty of his place , than the meaness of his birth ) resolved ▪ by some extraordinary way , to correct such extraordinary impudence , and drawing his sword , he cut them very much , and caused them afterwards , to be manacled and imprisoned . this action of the gonfaloniere was no sooner known , but it put all the multitude in a flame : and believing they should be able to gain that by violence , which they could not compass without , they immediately to their arms , and march'd round about the palace , to find where , with most advantage , they might fall on . michaele , on the otherside , suspecting the worst , resolved to be before-hand , as judging it more honourable to fall upon them abroad , than to expect them within the walls , till they fell upon him , and forced him out of the palace ( as they had done his predecessors ) with great shame and dishonour . gathering therefore together a great number of citizens , ( who having found their error ) were resorted to him ; he marched out as strong as he could , on horse-back , and advanced to fight them as far as new s. maries . the people ( as i said before ) were as forward as he ; and marching about towards the palace , to take their advantage , it happened , michaele made his sally at the same time , and they missed one another . michaele returning , found the people had possessed themselves of the piazza , and were storming the palace ; whereupon , he charged them so smartly on the rear , that he brake them immediately ; some of them he chaced out of the city ; and forced the rest to throw down their arms , and hide themselves . this victory being obtained , the tumult dissolved , and the city became quiet , and all by the single valour of the gonfaloniere ; who for courage , generosity , and prudence , was superiour to any citizen of his time , and deserves to be numbered among the few benefactors to their country : for , had he been ambitious , or ill-disposed , the city had lost its liberty , and relapsed into greater tyranny than that in the time of the duke of athens . but , his goodness would not admit a thought against the good of the publick ; and his prudence managed things so , that many submitted to him , and the rest he was able to subdue . these passages amazed the common people , and put the better sort of artificers into an admiration of their own stupidity , who could not endure the grandeur of the nobility , were now forced to truckle to the very skum of the people . when michaele had this good fortune against the people , at the same time , new senators were drawn , two of which were of so vile and abject condition , every body desired to quit themselves of so infamous a magistracy . whereupon , the first day of september , when the signori made the first entrance upon their office , the people being so thick , that the palaci was full of arm'd men ; there was a cry sent forth from among them , that no senator should be made out of the meaner sort of the people ; and , in satisfaction to them , the senate degraded the other two , ( one of which was called tira , and the other boraccio ) and , in their places , georgio scali , and francesco di michaele , were elected . afterwards , they dissolved the corporations of the meaner trades , and of all their dependants ; only michaele di lando , ludovico di puccio , and some few other were excepted . they divided the magistracy into two parts ; one for the greater , the other for the lesser sort of arts. only it was concluded , the senate should contain five of the lesser arts , and four of the greater ; the gonfaloniere to be chosen sometimes out of one , and sometimes out of the other . this constitution and establishment , setled the city for a while : and , although the government was taken out of the hands of the people ; yet , the artificers of the meanest quality , had more power than the popular nobility , who were forced to comply , to satisfie the arts , and divide them from the baser sort of people . this was much approved by those who desired the faction of the guelfs ( which had handled several of the citizens with so great violence ) might be depressed ; among the rest which were advanced by this new model , giorgio scali , benedetto alberti , salvestro de medici , and tomaso strozzi were made , as it were , princes of the city . these proceedings exasperated the jealousies betwixt the popular nobility , and the meaner sort of people , by the instigation of the ricci , and albizi , of which two parties , because we shall have frequent occasion to discourse ( many sad and great actions happening afterwards betwixt them ) we shall , for better distinction , call one of them the popular , and the other the plebeian party , for the future . this government continued three years , with frequent examples both of banishment and death : for those who were at the helm , knowing there were many male-contents both within the city , and without , lived in perpetual fear . they who were discontented within , attempted , or conspired every day something or other against the state. those without , ( having no restraint upon them ) by means sometimes of this prince , sometimes of this common-wealth , raised several scandals both of the one side and the other . at that time , giannozzo da salerno , general for carlo durazzo , who was descended from the king of naples , happened to be at bologna , attending a design , which ; they said , durazzo had undertaken against queen giovanna , at the instigation of the pope , who was her mortal enemy . there were in bologna , at the same time , several exiles from florence , who held strict intelligence both with pope urban and carle : which was the cause , that those who governed in florence , living in great jealousie , gave credit easily to the calumniations of all those citizens that were suspected . during this general apprehension , news was brought to the magistrate , that gionnozza da salerno , with the assistance of all those who were banished , was to march down with his army against florence ; and that several in the city had ingaged to take arms in his behalf , and to deliver up the town . upon this information , many were accused ; in the first place , piero de gli albizi , and carlo strozzi were named ; and after them , capriano mangioni , iacopo sacchetti , donato barbadori , philippo strozzi , and giovanni anselmi ; all which were secured , except carlo srozzi , who escaped ; and ( that no-body might dare to take arms for their rescue ) the senate deputed tomaso srozzi , and benedetto alberti , with a competent number of souldiers , to secure the city . the prisoners being examined , and their charge , and answer compared , they were found , not guilty , and the captain refused to condemn them ; hereupon those who were their enemies , incensed the people so highly against them , that , in a great fury , they forced the captain to condemn them . neither could piero de gli albizi be excused , either for the greatness of his family , or the antiquity of his reputation ; he having a long time been the most feared , and the most reverenced citizen in florence . whereupon , either some of his true friends , ( to teach him moderation in the time of his greatness , ) or some of his enemies , ( to check , and alar'm him with the unconstancy of fortune ) at a great treat which he had made for several of the citizens , sent him a salver of comfits ; among which a nail was privately conveyed ; which being discovered in the dish , and viewed by the whole table , it was interpreted as an admonishment to him , to fix the wheel of his fortune ; for being now at the height , if its rotation continued , he must of necessity fall to the ground ; which interpretation was verified first by his fall , and then by his death . after this execution the city remained full of confusion , both conquerors and conquered being affraid : but the saddest effects proceeded from the jealousie of the governors , every little accident provoking them to new injuries against the citizens , by condemning , admonishing , or banishing them the town ; to which may be added , the many new laws and ordinances which they made to fortifie their authority ; which were executed with great prejudice to all such as were suspected by their party : for , by them , were commissioned , with the assistance of the senate , to purge the common-wealth of such people as they thought dangerous to the state. these commissioners admonished citizens ; several of the populace ; and debased many of the nobles ; and to oppose themselves more effectually against foreign invasions , they entertained into their pay an english man , called iohn aguto , and excellent officer , and one who had commanded in italy for the pope , and other princes , a long time . their alarms from abroad were caused by intelligence , that carlo durazzo was raising several companies for the invasion of the kingdom of naples ; and the florentine exiles joyned with him in the expedition ; but to obviate that danger , they provided not only what force , but what mony was possible ; and when carlo came with his army to arrezzo , the florentines being ready with fourty thousand florines to receive him , he promised he would not molest them . after he had received their money , he proceeded in his enterprise against naples ; and having taken the queen , he sent her prisoner into hungary . his victory there , suggested new jealousie into the governors of florence : they could not imagine their money could have greater influence upon the king , than the friendship his family had long maintained with the faction of the guelfs , who were undone by him . apprehensions increasing at this rate , enormities increased with them , which were so far from extinguishing their fears , that they were exceedingly multiplied ; and the greater part of the city were in great discontent . to make things worse , the insolence of giargio scali , and tomaso strozzi were added , who being grown more powerful than the magistrate , every one feared , lest , by their conjunction with the plebeians , they should be ruined . nor did this government seem violent and tyrannical to good men only , but to the seditious , and debauched : for this arrogance of giorgio's being some time or other of necessity to have an end ; it happened , that giovanni di cambio was accused by one of his acquaintance , for practising against the state ; but upon examination , cambio was found innocent by the captain ; and the judge gave sentence , that the informer should suffer the same punishment , which should have been inflicted on the other , had his charge been made good . giorgio interposed , with his intreaties and authority to preserve him ; but , not prevailing , he , and tomaso strozzi , with a number of arm'd men , rescued him by force , plundered the captains palace , and forced him to hide himself . this action made the whole city detest him ; put his enemies upon contriving his destruction , and plotting which way they might redeem the city out of his hands , and the plebeians , ( who , for three years together , had had the command of it . ) to this design , the captain gave the opportunity ; for the tumult being appeased , he went to the senate , and told them ; that he had chearfully accepted the office , to which they had elected him , presuming he had served persons of honour and equity , who would have taken arms to have promoted and vindicated iustice , rather than to have obstructed it : but his observation and experience had acquainted him with the governors of the city and their manner of conversation ; that dignity which so willingly he had taken up for the benefit of his country , to avert the danger and detriment impending , he was as ready to lay down . the captain was sweetned by the senate , and much confirmed by a promise made to him of reparation for what he had suffered already , and security for the future . hereupon , several of them consulting with such of the citizens as they thought greatest lovers of their country , and least suspicious to the state ; it was concluded that they had now a fair opportunity to redeem the city of the clutches of giorgio and his plebeians ; ( most people having alienated their affections from him , upon his last insolence ) and the best way would be to improve it before they had time to reconcile ; for they knew the favour of the people was to be lost and gained by the least accident in the world. for the better conduct of their affairs , it was thought necessary that benedetto alberti should be drawn into the plot ; without whose concurrence , the enterprize would be dangerous . this benedetto was a very rich man , courteous , sober , a true lover of his country , and one infinitely dissatisfied with the irregularity of their ways ; so that it was no hard matter to persuade him to any thing that might contribute to the ruine of giorgio ; for that which had made him before an enemy to the popular nobility , and the faction of the guelfs , was the insolence of the one , and the tyranny of the other , ; and afterwards finding the heads of the multitude no better than they , he forsook them likewise , and all the misdemeanors and impieties which were committed after that , were done without his approbation or consent ; so that the same reasons which inclined him to the people at first , the same reasons impelled him now to desert them . having brought benedetto and the heads of the arts to their lure in this manner , and furnished themselves with arms , they seized upon giorgio , but tomaso escaped . the next day after he was apprehended , giorgio was beheaded , with so great terror and consternation to his party , that they were so far from endeavouring his rescue , that all of them crowded in to behold his execution . being brought to die before those people who had so lately adored him , he complained of the iniquity of his fortune , and the malignity of those citizens , who , by their injury and justice had constrained him to side with a multitude which was not capable either of gratitude or fidelity ; and discovering benedetto in the midst of the guards , he said ; and can you , benedetto , consent that this wrong should be done to me ? were you in my place , i assure you , i would not suffer it : but let me tell you , this day is the last of my misfortunes , and the first of yours . after which , lamenting his unhappiness in having committed his fortunes and life to the constancy of the people , which is shaken by every rumor , or accident , or conceit , he laid down his head , and it was cut off in the midst of his armed and insulting enemies : after him several of his confederates were executed , and their bodies dragged about the streets by the people . his death put the whole city into commotion ; for at his execution , many citizens had put themselves into arms in favour of the senators , and the captain of the people , and some upon the dictates of their own private ambition and revenge . the city being full of various humors , every one had his private design , which all desired to compass before they laid down their arms . the ancient nobility called grandi , could not brook that they were deprived of publick imployments , and therefore set all their wits upon the tenters , to recover what they had lost ; and arm'd , upon pretence of re-investing the captains of the arts with their original authority . the popular nobility and the greater arts were disgusted , that the government should be communicated to the inferior arts , and the lowest sort of the people . on the other side , the inferior arts were disposed to augment , not detract from their authority ; and the meaner sort of people were as tender and jealous of loosing their colledges : which distractions caused the city to tumultuate several times in one year ; sometimes the nobility ; sometimes the better trades ; sometimes the lesser ; sometimes the common people ; and sometimes altogether betaking to their arms in several parts of the town ; upon which , many skirmishes and rencounters happened betwixt them and the guards of the palace ; the senators contending sometimes , and sometimes complying , as they judged most likely to remedy those inconveniences : so that after two treaties , and several balia's created for the reformation of the city ; after many mischiefs , and troubles , and dangers , they came to an agreement , that all who had been imprisoned after salvestro de medici was made gonfaloniere , should be discharged . that all dignities and pensions conferred by the balia lxxviii should be taken away . that their honours should be restored to the guelfs . that the two new arts should be deprived of their incorporation and governors , and all their members and dependents disposed into the old companies as formerly . that the gonfaloniere di giustitia should not be elected by the lesser arts ; and whereas before they had the disposition of half , they should hereafter be capable but of a third part of the offices of the city , and the best of them too to be put out of their power : so that the popular nobility and the guelfs reassumed the whole g●vernment and the commons were absolutely dispossessed , after they had held it from the year , to . nor was this magistracy less injurious towards the citizens , nor less grievous in its principles , than the government of the people ; many of the popular nobility , who had been eminent defenders of the people interest , being clap'd in prison , with great numbers of the chief of the plebeians : among which michaele lando was one ; nor could the many good offices which he had done in the time of his authority , protect him from the rage of that parry , when the licentious and unrestrained multitude ruined the city : so little was his country thankful for all his great actions . into which error , because many princes and common-wealths do frequently fall , it happens , that men terrified by such examples , before they can be made sensible of their princes ingratitude , do fall into their displeasure . these slaughters and these exilements had always , and did then displease benedetto alberti ; and he both publickly and privately condemn'd them . whereupon , the government were fearful of him , as believing him one of the plebeians principal friends , and one who had consented to the death of giorgio scali , not out of any disapprobation of his conduct , but that he might remain alone in authority after him . by degrees , his words and demeanor came to be suspicious , and the party that was uppermost watch'd him very narrowly , to find out some occasion to send him after giorgio . things being in this posture at home , no great action happened abroad ; that little which did happen , was occasioned more by fear of what they might , than from any prejudice that was actually sustain'd ; lodovico d' angio coming into italy about that time , to drive carlo durazzo out of the kingdom of naples , and repossess the queen giovanna . the passage of this prince put the florentines into no little distraction ; carlo , upon the old score of amity , desired their assistance ; lodovico ( like those who seek new friendships ) demanded their neutrality . the florentines , ( that they might please both parties , if possible ) to comply with lodovico , and supply carlo , discharged aguto from their service , and recommended him to pope urban , who was a professed enemy to carlo ; which artifice was easily discovered by lodovico , and he thought himself much injured thereby . while the war continued in puglia betwixt lodovic and charles , supplies were sent out of france to reinforce lodovico : which forces ( being arrived in tuscany ) were conducted to arezzo by those who were banished out of that town , where they removed all those who were of charles his party ; and just as they design'd the same measures against florence , as they had taken against arezzo , lodovic died , and the affairs of puglia and tuscany followed his fate , for charles secur'd himself of his kingdom , which he thought he had lost ; and the florentines , who were not sure to defend their own , bought arezzo of those who had kept it for lodovic . charles having secured himself of puglia , departed for hungaria , ( which kingdom was , by inheritance , descended to him ) leaving his wife behind him in puglia , with ladislao and giovanna , ( two of his children , ) as shall be shewn more fully . carlo possessed himself of hungary , but died shortly after ; hower his conquest of that country was so grateful an exploit to the florentines , that never greater expressions of joy were made for any victory of their own , as appeared as well by publick as private magnificence ; many families keeping open houses , and feasting exceedingly , but none with that pomp and extravagance as the family of the alberti ; the provision and ostentation of whose entertainments , were fitter for the condition of a prince , than for a private person . which extravagance gained him much envy , and that , being seconded by a jealousie in the government , that benedetto had designs against it , was the occasion of its destruction : for they could not be safe , whilst they thought it might fall out every day , that he ( reconciling himself with the people ) might turn them out of the city as he pleased . things being at this uncertainty , it happened that he being gonfaloniere delle compagnie , his son in law philippo magalotti was made gonfaloniere di giustitia , which accident redoubled the apprehension of the governors , as thinking benedetto grew upon them so fast , their authority must of necessity decline : but desirous to remedy it what they could , and if possible , without a tumult , they encouraged bese magalotte ( his enemy and competitor ) to acquaint the senate , that philippo not being of age for the execution of that office , he could not , nor ought not enjoy it ; and the cause being heard in the senate , philippo was adjudged incapable of that dignity , and bardo mancini succeeded in his place ; a person fiercely against the faction of the people , and a perfect enemy to benedetto . having entred upon his office , he called a balia for reformation of the state ; which balia inprisoned benedetto alberti , and banished all the rest of his family , only antonio was excepted . before he was carried away , benedetto called all his friends together , to take his leave of them ; and finding them sad , and the tears in their eyes , he spake to them as follows : you see ( gentlemen ) in what manner fortune has ruin'd me , and threatned you : i do not wonder at it , nor indeed ought it to be strange to you : seeing it so happens always to them , who , among ill men , are studious of being good , or sollicitous of sustaining that which all people are desirous to pull down . the love to my country associated me first with salvestro de medici ; and the same love divided me afterwards from giorgio scali : it is nothing but that , and the injustice of their proceedings , which have made me hate those who are now at the stern ; who , as they have had no-body that could punish them , so they are desirous to leave no-body to reprehend them . i am content with my banishment , to free them of the fear they have conceived not only of me , but of all that are sensible of their tyranny and injustice . for my self i am not so much concern'd ; the honours conferred upon me when my country was free , i can quietly relinquish whilst it is in servitude and bondage ; and the memory of my past condition will give me more pleasure , than the infelicity of my present can give me regret . my greatest affliction will be , to consider , my country is become a prey to particular men , and exposed to their insolence and rapine : it troubles me likewise for you , lest those evils which this day are consummated in me , and but commencing in you , should prove greater detriment to you than they have done to me ; however , comfort your selves , bear up against any misfortune , and carry your selves so ; that if things happen adversly , ( as doubtless they will ) it may appear to all people that you were innocent , and that they succeeded without the least fault or contribution of yours . afterwards , to give as great testimony of his virtue abroad , as he had done at home , he went to the sepulchre of our saviour , and , in his return back , died at rhodes . his bones were brought back to florence , and buried with great solemnity by those very people who pursued him , whilst he was living , with all the calumny and injustice imaginable : nor were the alberti the only sufferers in these distractions , many families beside that , were admonished , and imprisoned . among the rest there were piero benini , matteo alderotti , giovanni e francesco del bene , giovanni benchi , andrea adimari , and with them several of the lesser artificers . among them which were admonished , were the covoni , the benini , the rinucoi , the formiconi , the corbizi , the manelli , and the alderotti . the balia was by custom created for a precise time ; and being now in the execution of these citizens , who were fairly elected ; having done what they could for the satisfaction of the state , they desired to lay down , though their time was not critically expir'd ; which the people understanding , many of them ran with their arms to the palace , crying out there were several more to be admonished , and several more to be imprisoned before they renounced . the senate was much displeased , but entertained them with fair promises , till they had fortified themselves so , as they were able to make them lay by those arms , for fear , which in their rage they had taken up : nevertheless , to comply in some proportion with the fierceness of the humour , and lessen the authority of the plebeian artificers ; it was ordered , that whereas the third part of the offices of the city were in their hands before , they should now be reduced to a fourth part only : and ( that there might always be two of the most trusty and faithful persons to the state , in the senate ) authority was given to the gonfaloniere di giustitia , and four other citizens , to put a certain number of select mens names into a purse , out of which , at every meeting of the senate , two were to be drawn . affairs thus setled in the year , the city continued quiet within till ; in which year giovan galeazzo visconti ( called the comte di vertu ) took his uncle barnabo prisoner , and made himself , by that , master of all lombardy . this comte di vertu had an opinion he could make himself king of italy by force , as easily as he had made himself duke of milan by fraud ; so that in the year he began a war upon the florentines , which , though prosecuted with variety of fortune on both sides , yet the duke was many times in danger to have ruined florence ; and doubtless had ruined it , had not it been prevented by his death . however , their defence was couragious , as might be expected from a republick ; and the end of the war less unhappy , than the course of it had been dreadful ; for when the duke had taken bologna , pisa , perugia and siena , and prepared a crown , to be crowned king of italy in florence , he died in the nick , and his death permitted him not to taste the pleasures of his past victories , nor the florentines to feel the calamities which would have followed their losses . whilst this war with the duke was on foot , maso de gli albizi was made gonfaloniere di giustitia , who , upon piero's death , was become a great enemy to the alberti : and ( because in all factions , the humour and animosity does still ferment and increase ) maso ( though benedetto was dead in his banishment ) had an itching desire , before he laid down his office , to be revenged of that family , and he took his opportunity upon the examination of a certain person who impeach'd alberto , and andrea de gli alberti of intelligence with the rebels . upon this accusation they were immediately taken into custody , and the whole frame of the city altered . the senate took arms , assembled the people , created a balia , by authority of which many citizens were confined , and new imborsation of officers made : most of the alberti were confined ; many artificers admonished , and put to death . upon which provocation , the arts and inferior sort of people took arms , in as much heat as if their lives or reputation had been taken from them . part of them ran to the piazza , and part to the house of veri de medici , who , after the death of salvestro , was become the head of that family . to cajole those who were in the market place , the senate sent rinaldo gianfigliazzi , and donato acciaivoli ( as persons more acceptable to the people than any else ) to command them , and sent with them the ensign of the guelfs , and the people . those who went to the house of veri , begg'd of him to take the government upon him , and free them from the tyranny of those citizens who were enemies to every thing that was good . all those who have left any memorials of the passages of those times , do agree in this ; that , had not veri been more vertuous than ambitious , he might have made himself prince of the city , without any impediment : for the great damages justly and unjustly sustained by the arts and their friends had so incensed them , that there wanted nothing but an head , to satiate their revenge . nor was veri without those that minded him of his advantage ; for antonio de medici ( who had long time born him a grudge ) persuaded him very earnestly to take the government upon him ; to whom veri returned this answer . as your threats , when you were mine enemy , did never affright me ; so your counsels now you are my friend , shall never delude me . and , turning about to the multitude , he bid them be couragious , for he would secure them , if they would follow his direction . then , marching in the midst of them into the piazza , he went up to the senate , and told them ; that he could not be sorry his conversation had been such , as had procured him the love of the people ; but yet he was much troubled they had made a wrong judgment of him , not at all ●utable to what his conversation had deserved ; for , never having given the least example of ambition , or faction , he could not but wonder from whence they should deduce their opinion ; that , as a turbulent person , he would be the maintainer of their factions , and , as an ambitious man , the governor of their state. he begg'd of their lordships , that the error of the multitude might not be imputed to him ; for what ever was in his power , he submitted to them , with the first opportunity ; he recommended it to them to use their fortune temperately , and content themselves quietly with an imperfect victory , rather than to make it intire by the destruction of the whole city . veri was much applauded by the senate ; they desired that he would be a means that all arms might be laid down , and that afterwards they would not fail to do what he and the other citizens should advise . after his harangue in the senate , veri returned into the piazza , and having joyned his brigade with those under the command of rinaldo and donato , he gave this account to them all ; that he found the signori very well disposed towards them : that many things had been proposed , but the shortness of the time , and the absence of the magistrates had prevented any conclusion ; wherefore he made it his request to them , that they would lay aside their arms , and give obedience to the senate , assuring them , that with the senate , gentleness would prevail farther then insolence , and entreaty than threatning ; and that they should want neither security nor preferment , if they would be directed by him : upon which assurance they all returned to their houses . arms being in this manner laid down , the senate secured the palace with their guards ; then they listed citizens which were best affected to the state , and divided them equally by companies , with orders to be ready to relieve them when-ever they were called : the rest which were not listed , were not suffered to bear arms. these preparations being made , they imprisoned many of the artificers , and put several of them to death who had been most pragmatical in the late commotions ; and , to add more majesty and reputation to the gonfaloniere della guistitia , it was provided that no person should be capable of that office under years of age : to secure their government , they made several other laws and ordinances which were in supportable , not only to the persons against whom they were made , but even to those who were honest , aud of their own party ; for they could not believe a state well grounded , or safe , that was to be defended with so much violence and severity . nor were the alberti which remained in the city , the only persons dissatisfied with these proceedings ; nor the medici ( who look'd upon the people as meerly over-reach'd ) many others were with this extravagant severity exceedingly disgusted . the first man that opposed them , was donato the son of acciaivoli . this donato though he was one of the grandees of the city , and rather superior , than equal to maso de gli albizi , ( who , for service done in his gonfaloniership , was become , as it were , master of the city ) yet , among so many male-contents , it was impossible he should be pleased , nor prefer ( as many people do ) private advantage before publick convenience : and therefore his first project was , to try if he could call those who were banished , or at least restore the ammoniti to their old offices and commands . to this purpose he insinuated with several citizens , whispering it into the ears first of one , and then of another ; that there could be no other way to quiet the people , or stop the dissention of the parties ; concluding , that he attended only till he was of the senate , and then he would make it his business to bring it to pass . and because , in all humane actions , delay breeds weariness , and haste danger ; to avoid the one , he ran himself upon the other . among the senators , there was michaele acciaivoli his confederate , and nicolo ricovers his friend . donato judged this too fair an opportunity to be slip'd ; and therefore desired them , that they would move to the council for a law for restauration of the citizens . being over-persuaded by him , they proposed it to their brethren , who were all of opinion , that innovations are not to be attempted where the success is doubtful , and the danger inevitable . whereupon donato , having tryed all ways in vain , in his passion caused it to be told them , that seeing they would not permit the city to be reformed by fair means , it should be done by foul : which words being highly resented , the senate communicating the whole business with the principal governors , cited donato , who , upon his appearance , being confronted , and convicted by the person to whom he dilivered his message , he was committed to custody , and confined to barlette . with him were imprisoned alamanno , and antonio de medici , with all which were descended of alamanno's family and several others of the more inferior arts , that were in reputation with the people . all these things happened within two years after maso had reassumed the government . the city remaining in this posture , many discontents at home , and many exiles abroad ; there chanc'd to be at bologna among the banished men , piccho cavicciulli , tomaso de ricci , antonio de medici , benedetto de gli spini , antonio girolami christofano di carlone , with two more of inferior condition , all of them young , brisk , and disposed to encounter any difficulty that hindred their return to their country . to these it was privately signified by piggiello , and baroccio cavicciulli , ( who , at the same time , were admonished in florence ) that if they would come into the town , they would convey them into an house , from whence they might kill maso de gli albizi , and call the people to arms ; who being discontented , would be easily provoked ; and the rather , because they would be headed by the ricci , adimari , medici , menelli , and several other considerable families . allured by these hopes , on the fourth of august . , they arrived privately in florence ; and ( being disposed of according to agreement ) they sent out to observe the motions of maso , by whose death they presumed they should raise a tumult among the people . maso was gone out , and ( by accident ) in an apothecary's shop not far from san piero maggiore ; the messenger that was to set him , seeing of him there , repaired immediately to his comrades to give them information ; who taking their swords , ran directly to the place , but he was gone . not at all discouraged with their first miscarriage , they turned towards the old market , where they killed one of their adversaries . upon which , a great noise being raised , and a clamor of the people crying out , arm , liberty , arm ; let the tyrants die ; they marched towards the new market , where near the calimara they slew another ; and so going forward with the same shout and out-cry , no-body taking arms , they stopped in the loggia della nighitosa : and mounting there upon the highest place they could find , the multitude being round about them , ( but come rather to stare than assist ) they exhorted them to take arms , and free themselves from a bondage which so highly they abhorr'd ; they assured them , the complaints and lamentations of such as were oppressed in the city , had moved them to endeavour their liberty , and not any private injury to themselves : that they were sensible they had the prayers of many good people , that god would give opportunity to their designs . had they had an head to have commanded them , it was believed they would have succeeded at any time ; but now occasion was offered , and they had captains enough to conduct them ; they stood gaping upon one another , expecting like sots , till those persons who endeavoured their freedom , were knock'd on the head , and their slavery redoubled . they could not likewise but marvel , that they , who , upon the least injury , were heretofore ready to take arms , should not stir now upon so great and numerous provocations , but suffer so many of their citizens to be banished , and admonished when it was in their power to restore the one to their country , and the other to their offices . these words ( how true soever ) moved not the multitude in the least , either because they were affraid , or else because the death of the two persons which were killed , had made the murderers odious : so that the founders of the tumult perceiving that neither words nor actions would work any thing , understanding too late , how dangerous it is to enterprize the liberty of a people that are resolved to be slaves ; and despairing of success , they retreated into the church of s. reparata , not to secure their lives , but to protract their deaths . upon the first noise of this tumult , the senate had arm'd , and caused the palace to be shut up ; but when they heard what the business was , who were the authors , and what was become of them ; they took courage , and commanded the captain , with what fortes he could get , to go and apprehend them ; which was no hard matter to perform ; for the church-doors being broken open , and part of them slain , the rest were taken prisoners ; who , upon examination , confessed nothing , but that baroccio and piggiello cavicciulli were the only incendiaries , and they were both of them killed . after this accident , there happened another of greater importance . about this time ( as we said before ) the city had wars with the duke of milan , who finding open force was not like to prevail , applyed himself to artifice ; and by the help of the florentine exiles , ( of which lombardy was full ) he procured a treaty with several in the town , in which it was concluded , that at a certain day , from the nearest places to florence they could contrive , the greatest part of the exiles which were able to bear arms , should pass by the river arnus into the city ; and then joyning suddenly with their friends within , should run to the palace of the senate , and other houses of the chief officers , and having slain them , model , and reform afterwards as they pleased . among the conspirators in the town , there was one of the ricci called samminiato , who ( as it falls out in most plots , where few are not sufficient , and many not secure ) seeking for a companion , found an informer ; for imparting the business to salvestro cavicciulli , ( whose own injuries , as well as his relations , might have made him more faithful ) he post-poning his future hopes to his present fear , discovered all to the senate . whereupon samminiato being seized , they extorted the whole process of the conspiracy , but of his accomplices no-body was taken , but one tomaso davisi ; who coming from bologna , not knowing what was happened in florence , was apprehended by the way , before he got thither ; all the rest , upon the imprisonment of samminiato , fled away in great fear , and dispersed . samminiato and tomaso being punished according to the quality of their offence , a new balia was made of several citizens ; and authority given them to inquire farther after delinquents , and to secure the state. this balia proclaimed rebels , of the family of the ricci , of the alberti , of the medici , of the scali , of the strozzi , bindo altoviti , bernardo adimari , and several others of meaner condition . they admonished , besides , the whole family of the alberti , ricci , and medici for ten years , except only some few . among those of the alberti which were not admonished , antonio was one , being esteemed a quiet and a peaceable man ▪ their jealousie of this plot being not yet out o●t their heads , a monk happened to be apprehended , who had been observed , whilst the conspiracy was on foot , to have passed many times betwixt bologna and florence and he confessed he had frequently brought letters to antonio ; antonio being taken into custody , denied it obstinately at first ; but being confronted by the monk , and the charge justified against him ; he was fined in a sum of mony , and banished three hundred miles distance from the city ; and that they might not always be in danger of the alberti , they decreed , that none of that family above years of age , should be suffered to continue in the town . these things happened in the year , two years after giovan galezo duke of milan , died : whose death , ( as we have said before ) put an end to a war that had been prosecuted for twelve years . after which , the government having extended its authority , and all things at quiet both abroad and at home , they undertook the enterprize of pisa , which succeeded so well : they took the town very honourably , and enjoyed that and the rest very peaceably , till the year . only in the year , the alberti having transgress'd against the terms of their banishment , a new balia was erected , new provisions made for the security of the state , and new impositions inflicted upon that family . about this time , the florentines had war likewise against ladislaus king of naples , which ended in the year , upon the death of that king. during the time of the war , finding himself too weak , he had given the city of cortona to the florentines , of which he was lord ; but afterwards recovering more strength , he renewed his war with them , and managed it so , that it was much more dangerous than the former ; and had not his death determined it , ( as the other was by the death of the duke of milan ) doubtless he had brought florence into as great exigence as the duke of milan would have done ; and endangered , if not ruined its liberty . nor did their war with this king conclude with less good fortune than the other ; for when he had taken rome , sienna , la marka , and romagna ; and nothing remained but florence , to hinder his passage with his whole force into lombardy , he died ; so that , death was always a true friend to the florentines , and did more to preserve them , than all their own conduct or courage could do . from the death of this king , this city remained at peace ( both abroad and at home ) eight years : at the end of that term , their wars with philip duke of milan , reviv'd their factions , which could never be suppressed , but with the subversion of the state , which had governed from the year , to , with much honour , and maintained many wars with much advantage , having added to their dominion , arezzo , pisa , cortona , livorno , and monte pulciano , and doubtless would have extended it farther , had the city been unanimous , and the old humours not been rubb'd up , and reviv'd , as in the next book shall be more particularly related . the history of florence . book iv. all cities ( especially such as are not well constituted under the titles of common wealths ) do sometime or other alter their government , yet not ( as many think ) by means of liberty and subjection ; but by occasion of servitude , and licentiousness : for only the name of liberty is pretended by popular persons , such as are the instrument of licentiousness ; and servitude is sought for by those that are noble , neither of them both desiring to be restrain'd either by laws or any thing else . nevertheless when it does happen , ( as it happens but seldom ) that a city has the good fortune to produce , and advance some wise , honest , and potent citizen , by whom the laws may be so order'd , that the humors and emulations betwixt the nobility and the people ▪ if not perfectly compos'd , may be yet so well circumscrib'd and corrected , that they may be check'd from breaking forth to its prejudice ; then it is that , city may be call'd free , and that state pronounce it self durable ; for being founded upon good laws and orders at first , it has not that necessity of good men to maintain it . of such laws and principles many common wealths were antiently constituted ; and continued a long time . others have wanted , and do still want them ; which has frequently occasion'd the variation of the government , from tyranny ; to licentiousness ; and from licentiousness to tyranny : for by reason of the powerful animosities in all of them , it is not , nor can be possible , they should be of any du●ation , one disgusting the good , and the other , the wise. one doing mischief with ease , and the other good with difficulty ; in this the insolent have too much authority ; in another the sots ; and therefore it is convenient that both one and the other , be supported and maintained by the fortune and valour of some eminent man , though he may be taken from them by death , or made unserviceable by misfortune . i say therefore , that government which flourished in florence from the death of giorgio scali , which fell out in the year was supported first by the conduct of muso di gli albizi , and afterwards by nicolo uzano . this city from the year till the end of the , remain'd quiet , king ladis●ans being dead , and lombardy divided into several cantons ; so that neither abroad nor at home , had they the least cause of apprehension . the next citizens in authority to nicolo uzano , were bartolmeo valori , nerone de nigi , rinaldo de gli albizi , neri di gino , and lapo nicolini . the factions which sprung from the animosity betwixt the albizi , and the ricci ( which were with so much mischief reviv'd afterward by salvestro de medici ) could never be extinguish'd , and although that which was most generally succour'd , prevailed but three years , and was afterwards depress'd , yet the greatest part of the city had imbib'd so much of their humor , as could never be wrought out . true it is , the frequent exprobrations , and constant persecutions of the heads of that party from the year to had almost brought them to nothing . the first families which were persecuted , as the chief of that faction , were the alberti , ricci , and medici , who were rob'd of their men , as well as their money , and if any of them continued in the city , their imployments and dignities were most certainly taken from them ; which usage had indeed debas'd that party , and almost consum'd it . however the memory of the injuries receiv'd , and a secret desire of being reveng'd lay close in the hearts of many of them ; and having no opportunity to show it , they kept it private to themselves . those of the popular nobility who govern'd the city so quietly , committed two errours which were the ruine of their government . one was in their insolence , upon the long time of their government ; the other , that by reason of emulations among themselves , contracted by long possession of the state , they had not preserv'd that inspection which they ought to have done , over those who were able to disturb them . whereby ( dayly running themselves deeper in the displeasure of the people , and either not regarding new plots , because they did not apprehend them , or else encouraging them , to supplant one another ) the house of medici recover'd its authority . the first of them which began to rise , was giovanni the son of bicci , who , being grown very wealthy , of a benign and courteous nature , by concession of those who govern'd , was made supream magistrate ; and his advancement celebrated with so universal satisfaction and joy ( the people believing they had now got a protector ) that the graver sort began to suspect it , and observing all the old humors reviving again . and nicolo uzano fail'd not to advertise the other citizens , and to remonstrate how dangerous it was to promote one of so general a reputation ; that disorders were easily suppress'd in the beginning ; but when grown to any height , they were hardly to be remedy'd : and that he knew giovanni to be a man in parts much superiour to salvestro . but nicolo was not reguarded by his brethren , who envy'd his reputation , and desir'd more company to take him down . florence being in this manner infested with these humors , which began privately to ferment , philippo visconti , second son to iohn galeazo , becoming lord of lombardy by the death of his brother , supposing himself in a condition for some great enterprize , was very ambitious to recover the soveraignty of genoua , which was then free , under the administration and conduct of tomaso da campo tregoso ; but he durst not be too confident of success either in that , or any other design , till he had enter'd into an alliance with the florentines , the reputation of which , he concluded would carry him thorow all . to that purpose he sent two embassadors to florence ▪ to propose it . many citizens advis'd to the contrary , though they were contented the amity which had been betwixt them for many years should be continu'd , yet they had no mind to a league , as knowing what reputation , and advantage would accrue to him thereby , and how unprofitable it would be to their city . others were for the league , by vertue of which they might put such termes upon him , as ( if he transgress'd ) should discover his ill intentions to the world , and justifie any war they should make upon him for the breach of his agreement : after great debate , a peace was concluded , and philip oblig'd himself not to meddle with any thing on this side the rivers magra and panaro . having settled his alliance , philip fell upon brescia , and took it ; and after that upon genoua ; and took that contrary to the opinion of florence , who had promoted the peace , they having been confident that brescia , by the help of the venetian , and genoua by its own proper strength , would have been able to have held out . and because , in his treaty with the doge of genoua , philip had reserv'd serezana and other towns on this side the magra , with condition when ever he would part with them , that the genoeses should have the refusal ( having broke his promise ) the whole league was violated ; besides , he had made an agreement with the legat of bologna . all which things consider'd together , alter'd the affections of the florentines towards him , and being jealous of new troubles , made them look out for new remedies . philip having intelligence of their apprehensions ; to justifie himself , and feel the inclinations of the citizens , or else to lull and delude them ; he sent embassadors to florence , to let them know he was much surpriz'd at the suspicion he understood they had conceiv'd against him , and was ready to renounce any thing that might give them the least occasion of displeasure . the effect this embassy produc'd in the city , was only to divide it ; part ( and that the most considerable in the government ) was of opinion they should arm , and put themselves into a posture against the designs of their enemies . if preparations were made , and philip was quiet , no war would ensue , and they might contribute to a peace . others out of envy to the government , or apprehension of the war , concluded it no wisdom to be suspicious of a friend without great provocation ; and that what he had done was not worthy ( in their judgments ) of such rigid proceeding . they knew well enough to create the ten , and to raise men was the same thing as declaring of war , which if done with so potent a prince , would be certain ruine to the city , without any prospect of advantage ; for if they prosper'd , and got the victory , they could not make themselves masters of any thing considerable , romagna being betwixt , nor could they attempt any thing aginst romagna by reason of its vicinity to the church . however their opinion prevail'd who were for preparations ; they created the ten , they rais'd souldiers and laid new taxes upon the people ; which lying more heavily upon the common , than the better sort of citizens , fill'd the city with complaints , all people crying out of the oppression of the great people , who to satiate their ambition , and inlarge their authority , had ingag'd them in an expensive and unnecessary war : they were not yet come to an absolute rupture with the duke , but all things were full of suspition ; for philip , at the request of the legate of bologna ( who was fearful of antonio bentivogli , a banish'd man , and at that time in the castle bolognese ) had sent new forces into that city to secure it , which forces being near the dominions of florence , created no little jealousie in that state. but that which gave the strongest alarm to all people , and made the greatest discovery of the war was the dukes practices at furli . the lord of furli at that time , was giorgio ordelassi , who dying left his son tibaldo to the tutelage of philip. the mother suspecting the integrity of his tutor , would have sent him to her father lodovico alidossi lord of imola , but the people of furli constrain'd her to deliver him up to philip , in pursuance of the testament of ordelaffi . philip to disguise his designs , and give less occasion of jealousie , order'd the marquess of ferrara , to send guido torelli with certain souldiers to take possession of furli in his name , and as his lieutenant , and so that town fell into the hands of philip. which intillegence coming to florence at the same time with the news of the arrival of forces at bologna , facilitated the resolution for war , though before there had been strong opposition , and giovanni de medici did publickly dissuade it ; alleadging that though they were certain enough of the dukes inclinations yet it was better to expect him , and receive his attack , than to prevent it by advancing against him ; for it was the beginning of the war , must justifie the prosecution ; the agressor would be in the fault , and the other excusable to all the princes of italy ; neither could they demand the assistance of their neighbours with so much confidence , to invade other people , as to defend themselves ; nor would any body ●ight so chearfully to gain from others , as to secure their own . to this it was answer'd , that the enemy was not to be expected at home ; that fortune is oftner a friend to the invader , than to the invaded ; and that ( though it may be possibly more expence ) yet there is less damage and detriment in making war in an enemies country than in ones own . these arguments carried it ; and orders were given to the ten to try all ways , and turn every stone for the recovery of furli , out of the hands of the duke . the duke observing how serious and busie the florentines were in retriving a place he had undertaken to secure , sent agnolo della pergola with a considerable force , to imola , that the prince having his hands full at home , might not be at leisure to think of the defence of his grandson . agnola advanc'd with his army , near imola and ( though the florentines lay at modigliana ) took the town one night by the benefit of a great frost which had frozen the ditches , and sent lodovico prisoner to milan . the florentines seeing imola lost ; and the war publickly owned ; commanded their army to march and beseige furli , which being accordingly performed , that town was immediately beleagured , and to hinder the conjunction of the dukes forces to relieve it , they hired the comte alberigo with his squadron from zagonara , to keep them in perpetual alarm , and to make daily in-roads to the very walls of imola : agnolo perce●v'd by the strong entrenchment of our army , that furli could not without great difficulty be reliev'd , so he resolv'd to set down before zagonara presuming the florentines would not lose that place ; and that if they came to releive it , they must not only raise their seige before furli ; but fight his army upon great disadvantage . hereupon the duke alberigo's forces were constrain'd to a parley , in which it was agreed the town should be surrender'd , if in fifteen days time it was not reliev'd by the florentines . their condition being known in the florentine camp , begot great disorders there , as well as in the city , and every body desiring to wrest so great a prize out of the hands of the enemy , their host hasten'd the loss of it ; form marching from furli to the relief of lagonaria they came to an ingagement and were utterly defeated , not so much by the valour of their enemies , as the badness of the weather ; for our men having march'd several hours thorow deep ways in perpetual rain , finding the enemy fresh and drawn up with advantage , it was no hard matter to overcome them . nevertheless in a victory so famous all over italy , it was strange , and yet true , that there died no body of any eminence but lodovico albizi , and two of his sons , who falling from their horses , were stifled in the dirt . the news of this defeat put the whole city of florence into a dumps , especially the grandees who had persuaded the war ; they saw the enemy strong and couragious ; themselves without force of friends ; the people incens'd , railing up and down the streets ; upbraiding them with the great taxes , and the impertinence of the war ; girding , and scoffing at them with most contumelious expostulations , are these they which created the ten to terrifie the enemy ? are these they who have reliev'd furli , and rescued it out of the hands of the duke ? see how strangely their counsels are discover'd , and the ends to which they inclin'd , not to defend our liberty ( which is an enemy to them ) but to increase their power , which god in his wisdom has most justly diminish'd . nor is this the only enterprize they have pull'd upon the city , but several others , and particularly that against ladis●ao which was parallel exactly , to whom will they now address for supplies ? to pope martin ? braccio can be witness how they us'd him before : to queen giovanna ? she was forc'd formerly to desert them , and throw her self into the protection of the king of aragon ? such language as this , and whatever could be invented by an enraged people , was the common dialect in the streets . to prevent inconveniencies , the senate thought good to assemble several citizens , who with gentle words should endeavour to quiet those humours , which were stir'd in the people . rinaldo de gli albizi , was one of them , who ( being eldest son to maso , and by means of his own vertue and the reputation of his father , arriv'd at considerable esteem in the city ) spake to them at large . he told them that it was neither justice nor prudence to judge things by success , seeing many times good counsels miscarry , and ill ones do prosper . that to commend ill counsels upon their good success was to encourage errour , rather than virtue , which would turn to the great prejudice of the publick , because they are not always unfortunate . on the other side , to condemn wise counsels for the unhappiness of their event , is as blameable as that ; seeing thereby honest citizens are discouraged and deter'd from speaking their judgments , though the exigence be never so great . then he demonstrated the necessity of the war , and how ( if it had not been carried into romagna ) it would have broke out in tuscany . he told them , it had pleas'd god their army should be beaten ; yet their loss was not so great as it would be , if the design should be abandon'd , but if still they would bear up against their misfortune , and put themselves forward to the utmost of their power , they should not need to be much sensible of their loss nor the duke of his victory . that they ought prenot to be discourag'd at their expences and taxes , it being necessary to increase at them sent , as a way to lessen them hereafter . he told them that greater supplies are more necessary in an offensive ; than a defensive war , and in conclusion he exhorted them to the imitation of their fore-fathers , who by the manliness of their behaviour in all their distresses , did always defend themselves against any adversary whatever . incouraged by his authority , the citizens entertain'd the comte de oddo son to braccio , into their pay ; committing him to the instruction of nicolo piccinino who had been brought up under braccio , and was reputed the best of his officers ; to whom they joyn'd other commanders of their own , and certain horse officers , which were remaining of the late defeat . for the raising of more monys , they created xx. commissioners out of the citizens ; who finding the chief citizens low , and depress'd upon the late overthrow , overlaid them with taxes , and opress'd them exceedingly . these impositions disgusted them much ; yet at first in the point of honor they thought it beneath them to complain of their own private usage ; only they blam'd the taxes in general , and press , d to have them abated ; being publickly known , it was publickly oppos'd ; and so far neglected in the councils , that to make them sensible how difficult a matter they had undertaken , and to render them odious to the people , order was given that the taxes should be collected with all strictness and severity ; and in case of opposition , it should be lawful for any man to kill him who resist an officer . whereupon many sad accidents ensued among the citizens ; many being wounded , and not a few slain : so that it was believ'd the parties would have proceeded to blood ; and every sober man apprehended some mischief at hand . the grandees haveing been accustomed to be favour'd , could not endure that strictness , and the others thought it but just to have all taxed proportionably . in these confusions , several of the prime citizens met , and concluded to take the government upon themselves , because their backwardness and remisness had given the multitude confidence to reprehend actions of the state , and reincourag'd such as were wont to be the heads of the people . after many cabals , and frequent discourses among themselves , it was propos'd to meet altogether at a time , which they did above lxx . of them in the church of st. stephano , by the connivance of lorenzo ridolfi de fidi , and francesco gianfigliazzi , two of the senate . giovanni de medici was not at the meeting , either not being call'd ( as a person in whom they could put no confidence ) or refusing to come being contrary to his judgment . rinaldo de gli albizi made a speech to them all . he remonstrated to them the condition of the city ; how by their negligence the authority was relaps'd to the people , which in the year , their fathers had taken out of their hands . he represented the iniquity of the government from . to the year . and remember'd them how in that interim , many there present had had their fathers and relations kill'd . that now the dangers were the same , and the disorders no better . that the multitude had already impos'd a tax as they pleas'd ; and would doubtless by degrees ( unless greater force , or better order was taken to prevent them ) create magistrates at their pleasure . which if they should do , they would usurp their places , and ruine a state which for years together had flourish'd with much honour and reputation to the city ; and florence fall under the government of the multitude , ( one half in perpetual luxury , and the other in fear ) or else under the tyranny of some single person that should usurp . wherefore he assured himself that whoever was a lover of honor or his country , would think himself oblig'd to resent it and be put in mind of the virtue of bardo mancini , who with the destruction of the alberti rescued the city from the same dangers ; and as the occasion of that boldness and incroachment of the multitude proceeded from negligence and remissness in the magistrate , the palace of the senate being full of new and inferior men , he concluded , the best way to remedy it , would be to do as they did then ; to restore the the government to the grandees to clip the wings of the inferiour trades by reducing them from xiv . to vii . by which means their authority in the councils would be retrench'd , both by the diminution of their number , and the restauration of the nobility , who upon the old score of animosity would be sure to keep them under ; adding that it was great wisdom to make use of all people , opportunity , and according to the convenience of their time : for if their fore-fathers had done prudently to make use of the multitude to correct the insolence of the grandees ; it would be no less discretion , now the people were grown insolent , and the nobility under hatches , to make use of the nobility to reduce them to their balance ; which might be two ways effected either by artifice , or force : for some of them being in the commission of ten , it was in their power to bring what numbers they thought good into the city , and to dispose them as they pleas●d without any observation . rinaldo was much applauded , his counsel by every body approv'd ; and urano among the rest , return'd this answer . that indeed all that had been said by rinaldo was true , his remedies good and secure , when applyable without manifest division of the city ; and that might be done exactly , if giovanni de medici could be drawn to their party ; if he were separated from them , the people might rise , but could do nothing for want of a head ; but whilst he was firm to them , nothing was to be done without force and if they should betake themselves to that , he could not but foresee a double danger either of not gaining the victory ; or not injoying it when it was got . he modestly remember'd them of his former advices , and how they had neglected to prevent these difficulties in time , which might easily have been done ; but that now he thought it unpracticable , unless some way could be found to gain giovanni to their party . hereupon rinaldo was deputed to attend giovanni , and try what might be done he waited upon him , and press'd him with all the arguments he could use to joyn with them , and that he would not , by favouring and indulging the people make them insolent and sawcy to the ruine both of the city and government . to which giovanni reply'd , that it was the office of a wise and good citizen ( at least in his judgment ) to preserve the ancient laws and customs of a city ; nothing being more injurious than those alterations ; that many being offended , it must necessarily follow many must be discontented and where many are so , some ill accident or other is daily to be expected . that in his opinion this resolution of their's would be subject to two most pernicious effects . the first by conferring honors upon them , who having born none of them before , would understand less how to value them , and by consequence complain less for the want of them . the other in taking them away from those who have been accustomed to them , and would assuredly never be quiet till they be restor'd to them again . so that the injury to one party will be greater than the benefit to the other ; the author of the change gains fewer friends than enemies ; and the latter be much more industrious to do him a mischief , than the former to defend him . men being naturally more prone to revenge , than gratitude ; loss ( for the most part ) being in the one , but profit or pleasure always in the other . then , turning about to rinaldo , he said . and you , sir , if you would recollect what has pass'd , and with what cunning and subtilty things have been formerly transacted in this city , you would be cooler and less hasty in this resolution ; for who ever advis'd it , as soon as with your power he has divested the people of their authority , be will usurp upon you , and become your enemy by the same means you intend to oblige him . nor will it fall out better to you than it did to benedetto alberto , who by the persuations of those who did not love him , consented to the ruine of giorgio scali and tomaso strozzi , and not long after was himself banish'd by the same persons which inveigled him : he advis'd him therefore to consider more seriously of the busness , and rather than to proceed , to follow the example of his father , who to ingratiate with the people , abated the excise upon salt ; procur'd , that whosoevers taxes was half a floren or under , should pay it if they pleas'd , otherwise it should never be levyed . prevail'd that the day the councils assembled , should be priviledg'd ; and all persons for that time protected from their creditors ; and at last concluded that for his own part he was resolv'd to acquiesce in the government as it stood then , and to leave the city as he found it . these transactions being talk'd of abroad , procur'd much reputation to giovanni , but more hatred to the other citizens whose conversation he declin'd what he could , to give the less encouragement to those who designed new troubles , under his familiarity and favour : declaring to every body he discours'd withal about it , that in his judgment , factions were rather to be extinguish'd , than fomented at that time ; and that as to himself , he desir'd nothing more cordially , than love and unanimity in the city , though several of his own party were dissatisfi'd with him , and had advis'd him to be more stirring and active in the busness . among the rest alainanno de medici was one , who being naturally furious , egg'd him on to take this oportunity of revenging himself upon his enemies , and obliging his friends ; reproaching him by the coldness of his proceedings , which ( as he told him ) gave his enemies occasion to practise against him , without fear or respect ; which practices ( it was to be doubted ) would succeed one time or other , and be the destruction both of his family and friends . cosimo , his son , importun'd him to the same , but giovanni , neither for what had been reveal'd , nor prognosticated could be mov'd from his resolution ; however , the faction appear'd plain enough , and the whole city was most manifestly divided . there were at that time attending the senate in the palace , two chancellors , martino , and pagolo . the latter was a favourer of uzano , the former of the medici . rinaldo , finding giovanni inexorable and not to be wrought over to them , contrived to turn martino out of his office , presuming after that the senate would be more inclinable to them . which design being smelt by the adversary , martino was not only continued in his place but pagolo turn'd out to the great detriment and dissatisfaction of his party , and doubtless the effects would have been dreadful , had not the war lien so heavy upon them , and the late defeat at zagonara , put the city into such confusion . for whilst these things were agitated in florence , agnolo della pergola with the dukes troops had taken all the towns which the florentines held in romagna , ( except castracaro and modigliana ) some for want of due fortification , and some for want of courage or fidelity in the garisons . in the acquisition of these towns , two things happen'd , which demonstrate how grateful valour is even to an enemy , and how much cowardize and pusillanimity is despis'd . biagio del milano was captain of the castle call'd montepetroso , which being not only besieg'd , but set on fire by the enemy , looking over the walls , and finding no way to escape , or preserve the castle , he caus'd straw and bedding , and what other cloaths he had , to be thrown over the walls , where he saw the fire was not yet come , and then letting down two of his children upon them , he cry'd out to the enemy , here take such moveables as god and my fortune have given me ; 't is in your power to force them , and not in mine to preserve them ; but for the treasure of my mind , in which my glory , and honour consists you cannot ravish that from me , and i will never surrender it . the enemy ( amaz'd at his gallantry ) ran presently to save the children , and presented him ropes and ladders to have preserv'd himself ; but he refus'd them , and chose rather to die in the flames , than to be sav'd by the enemies of his country . an example worthy of the commendation of antiquity , and the more remarkable by how much few of them are to be found . the children were restor'd to what ever could be preserv'd and sent home by the enemy ( with singular generosity ) to their relations , who receiv'd them not with more joy , than they were entertain'd by the state , which for their fathers and their own sakes , kept them at the publick charge during their lives . the other happen'd in galeata , where zenobi del pino was podesta , who without any defence at all , deliver'd up his castle to the enemy , and afterwards persuaded agnolo to quit the alps in romagna , and betake himself to the hills in tuscany where he might spin out the war with more advantage , and less danger to himself . agnolo not able to brook such meanness and baseness of his spirit , deliver'd him over to his servants to dispose of him as they pleas'd , who after millions of affronts , and derisions allow'd him nothing but painted cards for his dyet , , declaring they intended of a guelf to make him a ghibilin that way , but what ever they intended , in a short time he was starv'd to death . in the mean time conte oddo , with nicolo piccinino were enter'd into the valdi lamona , to see if they could reduce the state of faenza to an amity with the florentines ; or at the least hinder agnola della pergola from making his incursions so freely into the territory of romagna . but the vale being very strong : and the inhabitants martial , conte oddo was slain , and piccinino carried prisoner to faenza . however as it fell out , the florentines obtain'd by this loss , what they would have hardly gain'd by the victory ; for nicolo piccinino transacted so well with the governour of faenza , and his mother , that by his persuasion , they became friends to the florentines , and enter'd into a league with them , by which he was releas'd . but piccinino follow'd not that counsel which he had given to others : for either being debauch'd by the towns he pass'd thorow ; or looking upon the condition of the florentines to be but low , and his own to be better'd in another place ; he departed abruptly from arrezzo , where his post was and stealing away into lombardy , he took up arms under that duke . the florentines weaken'd by these accidents ; and disheartened by the expence of the war ; concluded they were unable to carry it on , upon their own private account ; hereupon they sent embassadors to the venetians , to desire their assistance ( which they might easily and effectually grant ) against the growing greatness of a person , who if let alone , would be as dangerous and destructive to them , as to the florentines . francesco carmignuola persuaded them likewise to the same enterprize , who was an excellent souldier as any in those times ; had serv'd formerly under the duke . but then he was revolted from him , and come over to the venetian . the venetian was uncertain what to determine , not daring to be too confident of carmignuola , because not sure whether his animosity to the duke , was real or pretended . whilst they remain'd in this suspence , the duke found a way , by corrupting one of his servants , to cause him to be poison'd , but the poison being too weak did not kill him out-right but brought him to great extremity . the venetians having notice of this , laid their suspition aside ; and the florentines continuing their solicitations , they enter'd into league with them , by which it was agreed the war should be prosecuted by both parties , at the common expence ; that what ever should be taken in lombardy , should be deliver'd to the venetians ; and what ever in romagna and tuscany , should be put into the hands of the florentines : and carmignuola was made general of the league . by means of this alliance the war was transfer'd into lombardy , where it was manag'd by carmignuola with that discretion and courage , that in a few months time he took several towns from the duke , and brescia among the rest ; which last in those times , and according to the method of those wars , was accounted a miracle . this war continued five years , and the citizens of florence were much impoverish'd by the taxes which had been continued as long . hereupon a regulation was agreed upon , and ( that all people might be charg'd according to their estates ) it was propos'd the personal estate should be chargeable as well as the real ; and that who ever had to the value of a hundred florens in goods , should pay half a proportion . but there being law and authority to levy this tax , but not men enough to compel them , the grandees were disgusted , and oppos'd it , before it was perfectly concluded : only giovanni de medici promoted it so vigorously , that he carried it against them all . and because in the books of assesment , every man's goods were rated ( which the florentines call accatastare ) this imposition was call'd catasto . moreover this law restrain'd the tyranny of the nobles , not permitting them to strike , or terrifie such as were inferior to them , in the counsels , as formerly they had presum'd . this tax therefore though accepted chearfully enough by the commons , went much against the minds of the nobility . but it being in the nature of man , never to be satisfi'd , and as soon as possess'd of what with great vehemence he desir'd , to wish as fiercely for another . the people not content with the proportions set them by the law , demanded a retrospection , and that it might be consider'd how much the nobility had paid less in times past , than was now allotted them by the catasto , and that they might be forc'd to pay it for the reinbursement of such as had sold their estates to enable them to pay their taxes before . this proportion affrighted the grandees much more than the catasto : so that to defend themselves against both , they decry'd the catasto as unjust and unequal , in laying a duty upon goods and houshold-stuff ( which are here to day , and lost to morrow ) and exempting mony , which many people kept privatly in their hands , so as the catasto could not discover it . to which they added , that it was not but reasonable those persons who relinquish'd , or neglected their own private affairs for the better management of the publick , should be favour'd in the taxes ; for devoting their whole labour to the benefit of the state , there was no justice nor equity in the world , that the city should have the profits of their industry , and estate , and from others receive only the contribution of their estates . those who were for the catasto , reply'd that as their goods varied , the taxes might be varied too ; and to any inconvenience from that , a remedy might be found . as to the mony conceal'd , that was not to be consider'd for making no profit of it , there was no reason it should be paid for ; and when ever they imploy'd it , it would be sure to be discover'd . for the pains they took , and their solicitude for their country , if it were troublesome to them , they might have liberty to retire , for there was no doubt but some well affected citizens would be found , who would not repine to serve the city both with their counsel and estates : and that there were so many honors , and other perquisits attending those great offices , as might suffice any reasonable persons , without abatement of their taxes . but their great discontent was from another cause ; the nobility were offended that they could not make war at other peoples , charge , as they were us'd to do formerly but were oblig'd to bear their share as well as their neighbours . had this way been found out before , there would have been no war with king ladis●ao , then ; nor with duke philip now ; both which wars were undertaken to fill the coffers of some particular citizens , more than for any general necessity ; but this commotion of humours , was appeas'd by giovanni de medici , who convinc'd the people , it was not convenient to look backward . that their business now was to provide carefully for the future , and if the former impositions had been unequal and injust , they were to thank god a way was found to relieve them , and not make that a means to divide which was intended to unite the city ; as it would certainly do , if the old assesments , and the new were adjusted , for it was better to be contented with half a victory than to venture all for an absolute ; many instances making it out , that where more has been striv'd for , all has been lost . with these and such like discourses , he pacified the people , and the design of retrospection was qui●e laid aside . however the war with the duke being carried on for a while , a peace at length was concluded at ferrara by the mediation of a legate from the pope . but the duke not observing the conditions at first , the league took arms again , and coming to an engagement with his army at maclovio they defeated him quite , and forc'd the duke to new propositions , which were accepted by the league : by the florentines , because they were grown jealous of the venetian , and sensible , that the vast charge which their city was at , was to make others more powerful than themselves . by the venetians , because they observ'd carmignuola , after the duke was overthrown , to advance but slowly , and make little or no advantage of his victory , so as they could not place any further confidence in him . in this manner the peace was concluded in the year , by which the florentines were restor'd to what they had lost in romagna ; the venetians had brescia , and the duke gave them bergamo , and the territory belonging to it , over and above . this war cost the florentines millions and five thousand ducats ; the success of which , was grandeur and authority to the venetian , but poverty and dissention to themselves . peace being concluded abroad , the war was transplanted , and broke out at home . the grandees of the city could not digest the catasto ; and not seeing any way of suppressing it , they contriv'd ways of incensing the people against it that they might have more companions to oppose it . they remonstrated therefore to the officers for collection , that they were to search , and catastat the goods of the neighbouring towns , lest any of the florentine goods should be conveyed thither . whereupon all that were subjects to that city , were requir'd to bring in inventories of their goods within a certain time . but the volterrani complaining to the senate , incensed the officers so highly , they put eighteen of them in prison . this action provok'd the volterrani exceedingly , but the regard they had for their prisoners , kept them at present from any commotion . about this time giovanni de medici fell sick , and finding his sickness to be mortal , he call'd his sons cosimo and lorenzo to him , and said ; i suppose the time that god , and nature allotted me at my birth , is now expir'd i die contented , leaving you rich , and healthful , and honourable , ( if you follow my footsteps and instruction ) and indeed nothing makes my death so easie and quiet to me , as the thought that i have been so far from injuring or disobliging any person , that i have done them all the good offices i was able ; and the same course i recommend to you . for matter of office and government ( if you would live happy and secure ) my advice is , you accept what the laws and the people confer upon you ; that will create you neither envy nor danger , for 't is not what is given that makes men odious , but what is usurp'd ; and you shall always find greater number of those who encroaching upon other peoples interest , ruine their own at last , and in the mean time live in perpetual disquiet . with these arts , among so many factions and enemies , i have not only preserv'd but augemented my reputation in this city , if you follow my example , you may maintain and increase yours . but if neither my example nor persuasion can keep you from other ways , your ends will be no happier than several others who in my memory have destroy'd both themselves and their families . not long after he died , and was infinitly lamented by the greatest part of the city , as indeed his good qualities deserv'd : for he was charitable to the height ; not only relieving such as he ask'd but preventing the modesty of such as he thought poor , and supplying them without it . he loved all people : the good the commended ; the bad he commiserated . he sought no office , and went through them all . he never went to the palace , but invited . he was a lover of peace , and an enemy to war. he reliev'd those who were in adversity , and those who were in prosperity he assisted . he was no friend to publick extortion , and yet a great argumenter of common stock . courteous in all his imployments ; not very eloquent , but solid , and judicious . his complexion appear'd melancholy , but in company he was pleasant and facetious . he died rich , especially in love and reputation ; and the inheritance of all descended upon his son cosimo . the volterrani were weary of their imprisonment , and to recover their liberties , promis'd to condescend to what was requir'd . being discharg'd , and return'd to volterra , the time for the new priori's entrance into the magistracy arriv'd , and one giusto ( a plebeian but a man of good interest among them ) was chosen in the place . having been one of those who were imprison'd at florence he had conceiv'd a mortal hatred against the florentines , and it was much increas'd by the instigation of one giovanni ( a person of noble extraction ) who being in authority with him at the same time persuaded him that by the authority of the priori , and his own interest , he would stir up the people to rescue themselves from their dependance upon florence , and afterwards make himself prince : upon this incouragement giusto took arms ; possess'd himself of the town ; imprison'd the florentine governor , and , by consent of the people , made himself lord. the news of these revolutions in volterra , was not at all pleasing to the florentines ; but their peace being made with the duke , and their articles sign'd they thought they had leisure enough to recover that town ; and to lose no time , they made rinaldo de gli albizi , and palla strozzi commissioners , and sent them thither out of hand . guisto suspecting the florentines would assault him , sent to sienna , and lucca for relief . the siennesi refus'd him , alledging they were in league with the florentine : and pagolo guinigi ( who was then lord of lucca ) to reingratiate with the people of florence ( whose favour he had lost in their wars with the duke ) not only deny'd his assistance to giusto , but sent his embassador prisoner to florence . the commissioners to surprize the volterrani , before they were aware , assembled what strength they had of their own , rais'd what foot they could in the lower val d' arno , and the territory of pisa : and march'd towards volterra . giusto discourag'd neither by the desertion of his neighbours , nor the approach of the enemy , rely'd upon the situation , and strength of the town ; and prepar'd for his defence . there was at that time in volterra , one arcolano ( a brother of that giovanni who had persuaded giusto to take the government upon him ) a person of good credit among the nobility . this arcolano having got several of his confidents together , he remonstrated to them , how god almighty by this accident had reliev'd the necessities of their city ; for if they would take arms with him ; remove giusto from the government , and deliver all up to the florentines , they should not only have their old priviledges confirm'd , but be themselves made the chief officers of the town . having consented to the design ; they repair'd immediatly to the palace where giusto resided ; and leaving the rest below arcolano with three more went up into the dining-room , where they found him with other citizens ; they pretended to speak with him , about business of importance , and having ( in the variety of their discourse ) drill'd him to another chamber , arcolano and his accomplices fell upon him with their swords : but they were not so nimble but giusto had the opportunity to draw his , and wound two of them , before he fell himself , yet his destiny being unavoidable , he was kill'd , and thrown out into the palace yard . wherupon those who were confederate with arcolano taking arms , they deliver'd up the town to the florentine commissioners who were not far off with their army . the commissioners march'd directly into the town , without any capitulation , so that then the condition of the volterrani was worse than before ; for among other things , a great part of their country , was dismembred ; and the town it self reduc'd to a vicariata . volterra being in this manner lost , and recover'd at the same time , there had been no danger of new war , had not the ambition of some men pull'd it down upon their heads . there was a person who for a long time had serv'd the florentines in their wars against the duke : his name was nicolo fortebraccio , son of a sister of braccio da perugia . this nicolo was disbanded upon the peace ; and at the time of these accidents at volterra had his quarters at fucecchio , so that the commissioners made use of him , and his souldiers in that enterprize . it was believ'd , that whilst rinaldo was engag'd with him in that war , he had persuaded nicolo upon some pretended quarrel , to fall upon the lucchesi ; assuring him that if he did , he would order things so in florence , that an army should be sent against lucca , and he have the command of it . volterra being reduc'd , and nicolo return'd to his old post at fucecchio ; either upon rinaldo's instigation , or his own private inclination , in novem. . with horse and foot , he surpriz , d ruoti , and compito two castles belonging to the lucchesi ; and afterwards falling down into the plain he made great depredation . the news being brought to florence , the whole town was in uproar , and the greatest part was for an expedition against lucca . of the chief citizens which favour'd the enterprize , there were all the medici , and rinaldo , who was prompted thereto either out of an opinion it would be for the advantage of that common-wealth , or out of an ambition to be made head of it himself . those who oppos'd it were nicolo da uzano , and his party . and it seems an incredible thing , that in one city , upon one occasion , there should be such contrariety of judgments . for the same people who after ten years peace , oppos'd the war against duke philip , ( which was undertaken in defence of their liberties ) the same persons now , after such vast expence , and so many calamities as their city had undergone , press'd and importun'd for a war with the lucchesi , to disturb the liberties of other people . and on the other side , those who were for the war then , resisted it now . so strangely does time alter the judgments of men ; so much more prone are people to invade their neighbours , than to secure themselves , and so much more ready are they to conceive hopes of gaining upon others than to apprehend any danger of losing their own . for dangers are not believ'd till they be over their heads ; but hopes are entertain'd though at never so great distance . the people of florence were full of hopes upon intelligence of what nicolo fertebraccio had done and did still do , and upon certain letters which they received from their rettori upon the confines of lucca . for their deputies in pescia , and vico , writ them word that if they might have lib●rty to receive such castles and towns as would be deliver'd up to them , they should be masters of the greatest part of the territory of lucca : and it contributed not a little to their encouragement , that at the same time , they received an embassie from the senate of lucca , to complain of nicolo's invasion , and to beg of the senate that they would not make war upon a neighbour city , which had preserv'd a constant amity with them . the embassador's name was iacopo vicciani ; who had been prisoner not long before to pagolo guinigi lord of lucca , for a conspiracy against him ; and ( though found guilty ) had been pardon'd for his life . supposing he would have as easily have forgiven his imprisonment , as pagolo had done his offence he imploy'd him in this embassie , and sent him to florence . but iacopo being more mindful of the danger he had escap'd , than the benefit he had receiv'd ; encouraged the florentines to the enterprize ; which encouragement added to the hopes they had conceiv'd before , and caus'd them to call a general council ( in which . citizens appear'd ) before whom the whole project was more particularly debated . among the principal promoters of the expedition ( as i said before ) rinaldo was one , who represented to them , the great advantage that would accrue to them by the taking of that town , he insisted upon the convenience of the time , as being abondon'd by the venetian , and the duke ; and not capable of relief from the pope , who had his hands full another way . to which he added the easiness of the enterprize , the government having been usurp'd by one of its own citizens , and by that means lost much of its natural vigor , and ancient disposition to defend its liberties ; so that it was more than probable , either the people would deliver it up , in opposition to the tyrant , or the tyrant surrender for fear of the people . he exaggerated the injuries that governor had done to their state , the ill inclination he still retain'd towards them ; and the dangers which would ensue if the pope or duke should make war upon it ; concluding that no enterprize was ever undertaken by the state of florence more easie , more profitable , or more just . in opposition to this it was urg'd by uzano that the city of florence never undertook any war with more injustice , or hazard , nor any that was more like to produce sad and pernicious effects . that first , they were to invade a city of the guelfish faction , which had been always a friend to the city of florence ; and to its own danger and prejudice many times receiv'd the guelfs into its bosom , when they were banish'd , or unsafe in their own country . that in all the chronicles of our affairs , it was not to be found , that city had ever offended florence , whilst it was free ; and if at any time since its subjection , it had transgress'd , ( as indeed it had during the government of castruccio , and under this present lord ) it was but reasonable to lay the sadle upon the right horse ; and to impute the fault rather to their tyrants , than town . if war could be made against the tyrant , without detriment to the city , well and good ; the injustice would be the less . but that being impossible , he could never consent that a city of so ancient amity and allyance , should be ruin'd for nothing . however because men liv'd then at such a rate , that no account was made of what was just and unjust , he would wave so trifling an argument , and proceed to the profit and emolument of that war , which was the thing now adays most seriously considered : did believe those things were most properly call'd profitable , which carried least damage along with them ; but how that expedition could with any equity be call'd profitable , he could not understand ; seeing the damage was certain , and the benefit but contingent . the certainty of the damage consisted , in the vastness of the expence which must of necessity be great enough to discourage a city that was quiet and at peace , much more one that had been already harrass'd out with a tedious and a chargeable war as their city had been . the advantages propos'd were the taking of lucca , which he confess'd would be considerable . yet the accidents and impediments with which they might meet were so far from being to be slighted , that to him they seemed numerous and insuperable , and the whole enterprize impossible . nor ought they to presume that either the venetian or the duke would be content that they should conquer it , for though the venetian seem'd to comply , it was but in gratitude to the florentines at whose charges they had so largely extended their empire , and the other was only cautious of engaging in a new war , and new expence , and attended till they were tired and exhausted , that he might fall upon them with advantage . he minded them likewise , that in the middle of their enterprize , and in the highest hopes of their victory , the duke would not want means to releive the lucchesi , either by supplying them with mony under hand , or if that would not do , by disbanding his men , and sending them as souldiers of fortune , to take pay under them . upon these reasons he persuaded them to give over that design , and to live so with that usurper , as to create him what enemies they could , for he knew no way so ready to subdue the town , as to leave it to his tyranny , and let him alone to afflict and weaken it as he pleas'd . so that if the business was manag'd as it should be , that city might quickly be brought to such terms that the usurper , not knowing how to hold it , and the city as unable to govern it self , would be constrain'd to throw it self voluntarily under their protection . nevertheless seeing their eagerness was such that his reasons could not be heard , he would undertake to prognosticate ; that the war which they were about should cost them much mony ; expose them to many dangers at home , and in stead of taking lucca , and keeping it to themselves , they should deliver it from an usurper , and of a poor , ●ervile , but friendly city , make it free , and malicious , and such as in time would grow to be a great obstacle to the greatness of florence . this enterprize being thus canvassed on both sides , it came ( privately and according to custom ) to the votes of the whole convention , and of the whole number , only were against it . resolution being taken , and the ten men created for the carrying on of the war , they rais'd men with all speed both infantry and horse . for commissaries , they deputed astorre gianni , and rinaldo de gli albizzi , and made an agreement with nicolo fortebaccio that he should deliver what towns he had taken , into their hands , and take pay under them . the commissaries being arriv'd with their army in the country of lucca , they divided , astorre extending himself upon the plain towards camaggiore , and pietra santa ; and rinaldo with his squadron marching towards the mountains , presuming that if they cut off its intercourse with the country , it would be no hard matter to become masters of the town . but both their designs were unhappy ; not but that they took several castles and towns , but because of sundry imprudences committed in the management of the war , both by the one and the other . astorre gianni gave particular evidence of his indiscretion in the passage which follows . not far from pietra santa there is a vale call'd seraveza , rich , full of inhabitants ; who understanding the approach of that commissary went out to meet him , and to desire that he would receive and protect them as faithful servants to the people of florence . astorre pretended to accept their offer , but afterwards he caus'd his souldiers to seize upon all the strong places , and passes in the vale ; and assembling all the inhabitants in their principal church ; he kept them prisoners and commanded his men to plunder and destroy the whole country ; after a most cruel and barbarous way , prophaning the churches and religious houses , and abusing the women , as well virgins as others . these passages being known in florence , offended not only the magistrates , but the whole city . some of the seravezi , who had escap'd the hands of the commissary , fled directly to florence , telling the sadness of their condition to all persons they met with , and being encouraged by several who were desirous to have astorre punish'd , either as an evil man , or as an adversary to their faction ; they address'd themselves to the ten , and desired to be heard ; and being introduc'd , one of them step'd forth and spake to this purpose . we are assured ( most magnificent lords ) our words would not only find belief , but compassion among you , did you but know in what manner your comissary first seiz'd upon our country , and afterwards upon us . our vale ( as 't is likely your chronicles may remember you ) was always of the guelfish party ; and many times a faithful receptacle for such of your citizens as by the persecution of the ghibilins , were not suffered at home . our ancestors and we have always ador'd the very name of this illustrious republick ; and esteem'd it as the head and principal member of that party . whilst lucca was guelfish , we submitted very quietly to their commands ; but since it fell under the dominion of an usurper , who has relinquished its old friends , and joyn'd himself with the ghibilins , we have obey'd him , t is true , but rather by force , than by cons●nt : and god knows how often we have beg'd for an opportunity to express our affection to our old friends . but how blind and deceitful are the desires of man ; that which we prayed for , as our only felicity , is become our destruction . as soon as we heard your ensigns were marching towards us , supposing them not our enemies , but our ancient lords , and friends , we went immediatly to wait upon your commissary , and committed our valley , our fortunes , and our selves into his hands , relying wholly upon his generosity , and presuming he had the soul ( if not of a florentine ) at least of a man. pardon ( i beseech you ) my freedom , we have suffer'd so much already , nothing can be worse , and that gives me this confidence . your general has nothing of a man but his person , nor of a florentine but his name . he is a mortal disease , a savage beast , and as horrid a monster as ever any author ever describ'd . for having wheedled us together into our cathedral under pretence of discoursing some things with us , he mad●e us his prisoners : ruin'd and burn'd our valley ; rob'd , and spoiled , and sacked , and beat , and murdered the inhabitants ; the women he ravish'd , the virgins he forced , tearing them out of the arms of their parents , and throwing them as a prey to his souldiers . had we provok'd him by any injury ●ither to his country or himself : we should have been so far from complaining , we should have condemn'd our selves ; and esteem'd it no more than what our own insolence and unworthiness had pull'd upon our heads . but having put our selves freely into his power ; without arms or any other capacity of resistance ; to be then rob'd , and abus'd , with so much injury and insolence , is beyond humanie patience , and we cannot but resent it . and though we might make all lombardy ring with the sadness of our complaints ; and with imputation , and scandal to this city , diffuse the story of our sufferings all over italy , we have waved ●nd declin'd it , thinking it unjust to asperse so noble , so charitable a common-wealth , with the cruelty and dishonour of a barbarous citizen , whose insatiable avarice had we known , or could have but suspected , before we had try'd it ; we would have strain'd and and forc'd our selves to have gorg'd it ( though indeed it has neither bounds nor bottom ) and by that means ( if possible ) preserv'd part of our estates , by sacrificing the rest . but that being too late , we have address'd our selves most humbly to your lordships , begging that ye should releive the infelicity of your subjects ; that other people may not ( by our president ) be terrifi'd or discourag'd from committing themselves under your empire and dominion . if the infinite and unsupportable injuries we have suffer'd , be too weak or few to procure your compassion ; yet let the fear of god's displeasure prevail , whose temples have been plundr'd and burn'd , and his people betraid in the very bowles of his churches . and having said thus , they threw themselves before them upon the ground , yelling , and imploring that they might be reposess'd of their estates and their country ; and that their lordships would take care ( seeing their reputation was irrecoverable ) that at least the wives might be restored to their husbands , and the children to their parents . the cruelty and inhumanity of his behaviour having been understood before ; and now particularly related by the sufferers themselves ; wrought so highly upon the magistrates , that immediately they commanded astorre back from the army , casheir'd him , and made him afterwards incapable of any command . they caus'd inquisition likewise to be made after the goods of the saravezesi : such as were found , were restor'd , what could be found , was repriz'd afterwards by the city , as opportunity was offer'd . rinaldo de gli albizi was accus'd on the other side for managing the war , not so much for the publick profit of his country , as for his own , it was objected against him , that from the very hour of his commission , he laid aside all thoughts of reducing lucca , and design'd no farther than to plunder the country , to fill his own pastures with other peoples cattel , and furnish his own houses with other peoples goods . that his own bokty and his officers being too little to satisfie him , he barter'd and bought the plunder of his common soldiers , and , of a general , made himself a merchant . these calumniations being come to his ears , netled his honest , but haughty mind , more perhaps than a wise man would have suffer'd them to do . however they disturb'd him so , that in a rage both against magistrate and city , without expecting , or so much as desiring leave he return'd upon the spur to florence , presented himself before the ten , and told them ; that he now found how difficult and dangerous it was to serve an unconstant people , and a divided city ; the one entertain'd all reports and believ'd them . the other punish'd what was amiss , condemn'd what was uncertain , but rewarded nothing that was done well . so that if you overcome , no body thanks you ; if you mistake every body blames you ; if you miscarry every body reproaches you ; either your friends persecute you for emulation , or your enemies for malice . however for his part he had never , for fear of scandal or imputation , omitted any thing which he judg'd might be of certain advantage to his country . but that now indeed the baseness of the calumnies under which at present he lay , had master'd his patience , and chang'd his whole nature . wherefore he beg'd the magistrates would for the future be more ready to justifie their officers , that they might act with more alacrity for the good of their country . and that seeing in florence no triumph was to be expected , that they at least would concern themselves so far , as to secure them from obloquy . he admonish'd them likewise to reflect , that they themselves were officers of the same city , and by consequence every hour lyable to such slanders as may give them to understand how great trouble and disquiet honest men conceive at such false accusations . the ten endeavour'd to pacifie him as much as the time would allow , but transfer'd his command upon neri di gino , and alamanno salviati , who instead of rambling , and harrasing the country , advanced with their army , and block'd up the town . the season being cold , the army was lodg'd at capanole , the new generals , thinking the time long , had a mind to be nearer and encamp before the town , but the souldier objected the ill weather , and would not consent , though the ten sent them positive orders to that purpose , and would not hear of excuse . there was at that time resident in florence , a most excellent architect call'd philip , the the son of brunelesco , of whose workmanship this city is so full , that after his death he deserv'd to have his statute set up in marble in the principal church of the town , with an inscription under it , to testifie his great excellence to the reader . this philip upon consideration of the banks of the river scrchio , and the situation of the town , had found out a way to drown it . this invention he imparted to the ten , and so convinc'd them , that by their order , experiment was to be made , which was done , but it turn'd more to the prejudice of our camp , than to the detriment of the town . for the lucchesi perceiving the design , heighten'd and strengthned their banks one that part where the river was to overflow , and afterwards taking their opportunity one night , they brake down the sluice which was made to turn the water upon them ; so that their banks being firm and high , and the banks towards the plain open , it overflowed their camp , and forc'd them to remove . this design miscarrying , the ten call'd home their commissioners , and sent giovanni guiccardini to command the army in their stead ; who clap'd down before the town , and straiten'd it immediately . finding himself distress'd , the governor of the town , upon the incouragement of antonio dell rosso , a sienese ( who was with him as resident from the town of sienna ) sent salvestro trenta and lodovico bonvisi to the duke of milan , to desire he would relieve him . finding him cold in the business , they entreated him privately that he would at least send them supplies , and promis'd him ( from the people ) that as soon as they were arriv'd , they would deliver both lord and town into their hands ; assuring him that if this resolution were not suddenly taken , their lord would surrender it to the florentines , who had tempted him with several fair proffers . the fear of that , made the duke lay aside all other respects , wherefore he caus'd the conte francesco sforza his general , publickly to desire leave to march with his forces into the kingdom of naples ; and having obtain'd it , he went with his troops to lucca , notwithstanding the florentines , upon notice of his transaction , sent to the conte boccaccinor alamanni their friend to prevent it . francesco having forced his passage into the town , the florentines drew off to librafatta , and the conte march'd out , and sat down before pescia , where pagolo da diaccetto was governor , and in great fear ran away to pistoia . had not the town been better defended by giovanni malavolti , than by him , it had been most dishonourably lost . the conte , not able to carry it at the first assault , drew off to buggiano , took that and stilano a castle not far off and burn'd both of them to the ground . the florentines displeas'd with this devastation , apply'd themselves to a remedy which had often preserv'd them , and knowing that souldiers of fortune are easier corrupted than beaten they caus'd a considerable sum to be proffer'd to the conte , not only to depart , but to deliver them the town . the conte perceiving no man was to be squeez'd out of that city , accepted the proposition in part ; but not thinking it convenient in point of honor to put them in possession of the town , he articled to draw away his army upon the payment of ducats . this agreement being made , that the people of lucca might excuse him to the duke , he seiz'd upon their governor , which they had promis'd to depose . antonio dell rosso ( the siena embassador ) was at that time in lucca , as we said before . this antonio by the authority of the conte , meditated the destruction of pagolo . the heads of the conspiracy were pietro cennami , and giovanni da chivizano . the conte was quartered out of the town , upon the banks of the serchio , and with him the governor's son. the conspirators , about in number , went in the night to find out pagolo , who hearing of their intention , came forth in great fear to meet them , and inquire the occasion . to whom cennami made answer ; that they had been too long govern'd by him : that the enemy was now about their walls , and they brought into a necessity of dying either by famine or the sword ; that for the future they were resolv'd to take the government into their own hands , and therefore they demanded that the treasure , and the keys of the city might be delivered to them . pagolo repli'd , that the treasure was consum'd ; but both the keys and himself were at their service , only he had no request to make to them , that as his government had begun , and continued without blood , so there might be none spilt at its conclusion . hereupon pagolo and his son were deliver'd up to the conte francesco , who presented them to the duke , and both of them dyed afterwards in prison . this departure of the conte , having freed the lucchesi from the tyranny of their governor , and the florentine from the fear of his army ; both sides fell again to their preparations ; the one to beleaguer , and the other to defend . the florentines made the conte orbino their general , who begirt the town so close , the lucchesi were constrain'd once more to desire the assistance of the duke , who under the same pretence as he had formerly sent the conte , sent nicolo piccinino to relieve them . piccinino advancing with his troops to enter the town , the florentines opposing his passage over the river , the florentines were defeated after a sharp ingagement , and the general with very few of his forces , preserv'd themselves at pisa. this disaster put the whole city in great consternation ; and because the enterprize had been undertaken upon the peoples account , not knowing where else to direct their complaints , they laid the fault upon the officers and managers , seeing they could not fix it upon the contrivers of the war ; and reviv'd their old articles against rinaldo . but the greatest part of their indignation fell upon giovanni guiccardini ; charging him that it was in his power to have put an end to the war , after conte francesco was departed ; but that he had been corrupted by their mony ; part of which had been remitted to his own house by bills of exchange ; and part he had received himself , and carryed it with him . these reports and rumors went so high , that the captain of the people , moved by them , and the importunity of the contrary party , summon'd him before him , giovanni appear'd , but full of indignation , whereupon his relations interpos'd , and to their great honor , prevail'd so far with the captain , that the process was laid aside . the lucchesi upon this victory , not only recover'd their own towns , but over-ran , and possess'd themselves of the whole territory of pisa , except biantina , calcinaia , liccorno , and librafatta ; and ( had not a conspiracy been accidently discover'd in pisa ) that city had been lost among the rest . the florentines however recruited their army , and sent it out under the command of micheletto , who had been bred up a soldier under sforza . the duke having obtain'd the victory , to overlay the florentines , with multitude of enemies , procured a league betwixt the genouesi , sanisi , and the lord of piombino , for the defence of lucca ; and that piccinino should be their general , which thing alone was the discovery of the plot . hereupon the venetians and florentines renew there league . open hostilities are committed both in lombardy and tuscany ; and many skirmishes and rencounters happen with various fortune on both sides ; till at length every body being tyr'd , a general peace was concluded betwixt all parties in the month of may . by which it was agreed that the florentines , siennesi , lucchesi and who ever else during that war had taken any towns or castles from their enemies , should restore them , and all things return to the possession of the owners . during the time of this war abroad , the malignant and factious humors began to work again and ferment at home ; and cosimo de medici after the death of his father , began to manage the publick business with greater intention and magnanimity ; and converse with his friends with greater freedom than his father had done . insomuch that those who before were glad at the death of giovanni . were much surpriz'd and confounded , to see him so far out-done by his son. cosimo was a wise and sagacious gentleman , grave , but grateful in his presence ; liberal , and courteous to the highest ; never attempted any thing against any party , nor the state , but watch'd all opportunities of doing good to every body , and obliging all people with his continual beneficence . so that indeed the excellency of his conversation , was no little distraction and disadvantage to those who were at the helm . however , by that way he presum'd he should be lyable to live as freely , and with as much authority , in florence , as other people : or else being driven to any strait by the malice of his adversaries , it would be in his power to deal with them , by the assistance of his friends . the great instruments for the propagation of his interest were averardo de medici , and puccio pucci , averardo with his prudence procuring him much favour and reputation . this puccio was a person so eminent for his judgment , and so well known to the people , that he denominated the faction , which was not call'd cosimo's , but puccio's party , the city was divided in this manner at that time , when the enterprize was taken against lucca ; during which the ill humors , were rather provok'd , and incens'd than extinguish'd . and although puccio's party were the great promoters of it at first , yet afterwards in the prosecution of it many of the contrary party were imploy'd , as men of more reputation in the state. which being above the power of averardo de medici , and his comrades to prevent , he set himself with all possible art to calumniat those officers ; and upon any misfortune ( and no great thing can be managed without it ) all was imputed rather to their imprudence and ill conduct , than to the virtue of their enemies . he it was that aggravated his enormities so strongly against astorre gianni . he it was disgusted rinaldo de gli albizi , and caus'd him to desert his command without leave . he it was which caus'd the captain of the people to cite guiccardini before him . from him it was , all the other aspersions which were laid upon the magistrates and the generals , did proceed . he aggravated what was true ; he invented what was false ; and what was true , and what was false where readily believ'd by those who hated them before . these unjust and irregular ways of proceeding were well known to nicolo uzano , and other heads of that party . they had many times consulted how they might remedy them but could never pitch upon a way . to suffer them to encrease , they were sensible would be dangerous ; and to endeavour to suppress them , they knew would be difficult . nicolo da uzano was the first man that expos'd his disgust ; but observing the war to be continued without , and the distractions encreasing at home ; nicolo barbadori , desirous of uzano's concurrence to the destruction of cosimo , went to seek him at his house , and finding him alone very pensive in his study , he persuaded him with the best arguments he could use , to joyn with rinaldo in the expulsion of cosimo , to whome nicolo da uzano repli'd in these words . it were better for your self , for your family and the whole common-wealth , if both you and your whole party , had their beards ( as they say you have ) rather of silver than gold. their counsels then , proceeding from heads that were gray , and repleat with experience , would be fuller of wisdom , and advantage to the publick . those who design to drive cosimo out of florence , ought first to consider his interest with their own . our party you have christen'd the party of the nobility , and the contrary faction , is call'd the faction of the people . did the truth of the matter correspond with the name , yet in all adventures the victory would be doubtful , and we ought in discretion rather to fear than presume , when we remember the condition of the ancient nobility of this city , which have not only been depress'd , but extinguish'd by the people . but we are under greater discouragments than that , our party is divided , theirs is entire . in the first place neri de gino , and nerone de nigi ( two of the principal of our city ) have not declar'd themselves as yet ; so that it remains uncertain which side they will take . there are several houses and families divided among themselves . many out of a pick to their brothers , or some other of their relations , have abandon'd , us , and betaken to them . i shall instance in some of the chief , and leave the rest to your private consideration . of the sons of maso de gli albizi ; lucca , out of animosity to rinaldo , has engag'd himself on the other side : in the family of the guiccardini , among the sons of luigi , piero is an enemy to his brother giovanni , and sides with our adversaries . tomaso and nicolo soderini , in opposition to francesco , their unckle , are manifestly defected . so that if it be seriously deliberated , who are on their side , and who are on ours , i know no reason why ours should be call'd the faction of the nobility more than theirs . and if it be alledg'd , that the people are all on their side ; so much is ours the worse ; for when ever we come to blows , we shall not be able to oppose them . if we insist upon our dignity , it was given us at first , and has been continued to us for fifty years by this state ; and if now we should discover our weakness , we should certainly lose it . if you pretend the justice of our cause , and that that will give us reputation , and detract from our enemies ; i answer , it is fit that justice should be known and believ'd by other people , as well as our selves ; which is quite contrary , the whole cause of our present commotion being founded upon a bare suspicion , that cosimo would usurp , and make himself soveraign , of our city . though this suspicion passes among us , it does not with other people who accuse us , even for our accusation of him . examine the crimes upon which we ground our suspicion ; what are they , but that he distributes his mony freely , according to every mans necessity ; and that not only upon a private , but publick account , not only to the florentines , but to the foreign commanders : that he favour this or that citizen which desires to be a magistrate ; that by the general reputation he has among all people , he advances this , or that , of his friends to employments as he sees occasion : so that the whole weight and strength of his impeachment , lyes in this ; that he is charitable , liberal ; ready to his friend ; and belov'd by all people . tell me i beseech you what law is it that prohibits , that blames , and condemns beneficence , or love ? 't is true , these are ways by which men aspire and do many times arrive at the supremacy ; but they are not thought so by other people ; nor are we sufficient to obtrude them ; because our own ways have defam'd us ; and the city ( having lived always in faction ) is become corrupt and partial , and will never regard our accusations . but admit you succeed and should prevail so far as to banish him ( which truly if the senate concur might be done without difficulty ( how can you think among so many of his friends as will be left behind , and labour incessantly for his return , to obviate or prevent it ? certainly it will be impossible , his interest is so great , and himself so universally belov'd , you can never secure him . if you go about to banish the chief of those who discover themselves to be his friends , you do but multiply your adversaries , and create more enemies to your self : return he will , in a very short time , and then you have gain'd only this point , to have banish'd a good man , and readmitted a bad : for you must expect he will be exasperated , his nature debauch'd by those who call him back ; and being oblig'd to them so highly it will be no prudence in him to reject them . if your design be to put him to death formally , by the cooperation of the magistrate ; that is not to be done ; his wealth , and your corruption will preserve him . but admit he should die , or being banish'd never return , i do not see what advantage will accure to our state . if it be deliver'd from cosimo , it will be in the same danger of rinaldo ; and i am of their number who would have no citizen exceed another in authority . if either of them prevail ( as one of them must ) i know not what obligation i have to favour rinaldo more than cosimo . i will say no more , than god deliver this city from private usurpation , and ( when our sins do deserve it ) particularly from his . do not therefore persuade to a thing that is every way so dangerous ; do not fancy that by the assistance of a few , you can oppose against a multitude : all the citizens you converse with , partly by ignorance , and partly by malice , are dispos'd to sell their country ; and fortune is so favourable as to have presented them a chapman . manage your self therefore by my counsel for once ; live quietly , and observe , and ( as to your liberty ) you will have as much reason to be jealous of your own party , as the adverse . when troubles do happen , let me advise you to be a neuter ; by it you will stand fair with both sides , and preserve your self , without prejudice to your country these words rebated the edge of barbadoro's fury ; and all things remain'd peaceable during the war with lucca . but peace being concluded , and uzano deceased , the city was left without wars abroad , or government at home ; every man driving on his own pernicious designs ; and rinaldo ( looking upon himself was now as chief of the party ) press'd and importun'd all such citizens as he thought capable of being gonfalonieri , to take arms and wrest their country out of the jaws of a person , who by the malice of a few , and the ignorance of the multitude , would otherwise inevitably enslave it . these plots and counter-plots , on rinaldo's side , and his adversaries kept the city in a perpetual jealouse ; insomuch that at the creation of every magistrate it was publickly declar'd how every man stood affected both to the one faction and the other ; and at the election of senators , the whole city was in an uproar : every thing that was brought before the magistrate ( how inconsiderable and trifling so ever ) created a mutiny : all secrets were discover'd : nothing was so good , or so evil , but it had its favourers and opposers ; the good as well as the bad were equally traduc'd , and no one magistrate , did execute his office. florence remaining in this confusion ; and rinaldo impatient to depress the authority of cosimo : considering with himself that bernardo guadagni ( were it not for his arreers to the publick ) was a fit person to be chosen gonfaloniere ; to qualifie him for that office , he discharg'd them himself . and coming afterwards to a scrutiny , it fell out that fortune ( which has been always a friend to our disorders ) made bernardo gonfaloniere for the months of september and october . rinaldo visited him forthwith , and told him that the nobility , and all people that desir'd to live happily , were much rejoyced at his preferment ; and that it was now his business to carry himself so as they might never repent it : he laid before him the danger of dividing among themselves ; and how nothing could contribute so much to their union , as the depression of cosimo ; for he was the man , and no other , who kept them down , by the immensity of his treasure , and rais'd up himself so high , that without timely prevention he would make himself soveraign . that ( as he was a good citizen ) it was his office to provide against it , by assembling the people in the piazza ; taking the state into his protection ; and restoring its liberty to its country : he put him in mind that salvestro de medici could ( though unjustly ) curb and correct the authority of the guelfs , to whom ( if for no other reason but for the blood which their ancestors lost in that quarrel ) the government belong'd ; and what he did unjustly against so many , bernardo might do justly , and therefore safely against one . he encourag'd him not to fear : for his friends would be ready to assist him , with their arms in their hands . the people that were his creatures , were not to be regarded , for no more assistance was to be expected by cosimo from them , than they had formerly yeilded to giorgio scali . his riches was not to be dreaded ; for , when seiz'd by the senate , his wealth would be theirs , and for conclusion he told him , that in doing thus , he would unite and secure the common-wealth , and make himself glorious . bernardo reply'd in short , that he believ'd what he said to be not only true but necessary : and that time being now fitter for action than discourse , he should go and provide what force he could , that it might appear he had companions in his enterprize . as soon as he was in possession of his office ; had dispos'd his companies , and setled all things with rinaldo , he cited cosimo , who ( though dissuaded by most of his friends ) appeared presuming more upon his own innocence , than the mercy of his judges . cosimo was no sooner enter'd into the palace , and secur'd ; but rinaldo with all his servants in arms , and his whole party at his heels , came into the piazza , where the senators causing the people to be cal'd , citizens were selected to constitute a balia reformation of the state. this balia was no sooner in force , but the first thing they fell upon in order to their reformation , was the process against cosimo ; many would have him banish'd ; many executed ; and many were silent , either out of compassion for him , or apprehension of other people ; by means of which non-concurrence , nothing was concluded . in one of the towers of the palace ( call'd alberghettino ) cosimo was a prisoner in the custody of federigo malavolti . from this place cosimo could hear and understand what was said ; and hearing the clutter of arms , and frequent calling out to the balia , he began to be fearful of his life , but more , lest he should be assassinated by his particular enemies . in this terror he absteen'd from his meat , and eat nothing in four days but a morsel of bread. which being told to federigo , he accosted him thus . you are afraid to be poison'd , and you kill your self with hunger . you have but small esteem for me , to believe i would have a hand in any such wickedness : i do not think your life is in danger , your friends are too unmerous both within the palace , and without : if there be any such designs , assure your self they must take new measures ; i will never be their instrument , nor imbrue my hands in the blood of any man , much less of yours , who has never offended me : courage then ; feed as you did formerly , and keep your self alive for the good of your country and friends , and that you may feed with more confidence , i my self will be your taster . these words reviv'd cosimo exceedingly : who with tears in his eyes kissing and embraceing federigo , in most pathetical and passionate terms he thank'd him for his humanity ; and promis'd him reward , if ever his fortune gave him opportunity : cosimo being by this means in some kind of repose ; and his business and condition in dispute among the citizens ; to entertain cosimo federigo brought home with him one night to supper , a servant of the gonfaloniere's call'd fargannaccio , a pleasant man , and very good company . supper being almost done , cosimo ( hoping to make advantage by his being there , having known him before very well ) made a sign to federigo to go out ; who apprehending his meaning , pretended to give order for something that was wanting , and went forth . after some few preliminary words when they were alone , cosimo gave fargannaccio a token to the master of the hospital of s. maria nuova for ducates , a thousand of them to be deliver'd to the gonfaloniere , and the odd hundred for himself . forgannaccio undertook to deliver them ; the money was paid ; and the gonfaloniere was desir'd to take some opportunity of visiting cosimo himself . upon the receipt of this sum , bernardo became more moderate , and co●imo was only confin'd to padua , though rinaldo design'd against his life . besides cosimo averardo , and several others of the medici were imprison'd and among the rest puccio , and giovanni pucci . for greater terrour to such as were dissatisfied with the banishment of cosimo , the balia was reduc'd to the eight of the guards , and the captain of the people . upon which resolution , cosimo being conveen'd before the senate the of october , received the sentence of banishment ; with exhortation to submit , unless he intended they should proceed more severely both against his person and estate . cosimo received his sentence very chearfully . he assur'd them , that honorable convention could not order him to any place , to which he would not willingly repair . he desir'd of them , that since they had not thought fit to take away his life , they would vouchsafe to secure it , for he understood there were many in the piazza who attended to kill him ; and at length he protested that in what ever place or condition he should be , himself and his estate should be always at the service of that city , senate , and people . the gonfaloniere , bad him be satisfied ; kept him in the palace till night ; convey'd him than to his own house ; and having supped with him delivered him to a guard to be conducted safely to the frontiers . whereever he pass'd , cosimo was honorably receiv'd ; visited publickly by the venetians ; and treated by them more like a soveraign than a prisoner , florence being in this manner deprived of a citizen so universally belov'd , every body was dismay'd , as well they who prevail'd , as they who were over-power'd . whereupon rinaldo , foreseeing his fate , that he might not be deficient to himself , or his party , call'd his friends together , and told them . that he now saw very evidently their destruction was at hand ; that they had suffer'd themselves to be overcome by the intreaties , and tears , and bribes of their enemies , not considering that ere long it would be their turns to weep , and implore , when their prayers would not be heard , nor their tears find any compassion ; and for the mony they had received , not only the principal would be required , but interest extorted with all possible cruelty . that they had much better have died themselves , than cosimo should have escap'd with his life , and his friends be continued in florence . great men should never be provok'd : when they are , there is no going back . that now there appear'd no remedy to him , but to fortifie in the city ; which our enemies opposing ( as doubtless they will ) we may take our advantage and banish them by force , since we cannot by law. that the result of all this would be no more ( than what he had inculcated before ) the restauration of the nobility ; the restitution of their honors and officers in the city ; and the corroboration of their party with them , as the adversary had strengthened his with the people . and that by this means , their party would be made more strong by assuming more courage and vigor , and by acquiring more credit and reputation . at last supperadding , that if these remedies were not apply'd in time , he could not see which way , amidst so many enemies , the state was to be preserv'd , and he could not but foresee the city and their whole party would be destroy'd . to this , mariotto boldovinetti oppos'd himself , alledging the haughtiness of the nobility , and their insupportable pride ; and that it was not prudence in them to run themselves under a certain tyranny , to avoid the uncertain dangers of the people . rinaldo perceiving his counsel not likely to take , complain'd of his misfortune , and the misfortune of his party ; imputing all to the malignity of their stars , rather then to the blindness and inexperience of the men. whilst things were in this suspense , and no necessary provision made , a letter was discover'd from agnalo accinivoli to cosimo , importing the affections of the city towards him , and advising him to stir up some war or other , and make neri de gino his friend , for he did presage the city would want mony , and no body being found to supply them , it might put the citizens in mind of him , and perhaps prevail with them to solicite his return : and if neri should be taken off from rinaldo , his party would be left too weak to defend him . this letter coming into the hands of the senate , was the occasion that agnolo was secur'd , examin'd , and sent into banishment ; and yet his example could not at all deter such as were cosimo's friends . the year was almost come about since cosimo was banished ; and about the latter end of august , nicolo di croco was drawn gonfaloniere for the next two months , and with him eight new senators chosen of cosmo's party . so that that election frighted rinaldo and his friends . and because by custom it was three days after their election before the senators were admitted to the execution of their office , rinaldo address'd himself again to the heads of his party , and remonstrated to them the danger that was hanging over their heads : that the only remedy left them was immediately to take arms , to cause donati velluti ( who was gonf●loniere at that time ) to erect a new balia : to degrade the new senators ; to create others ( for their turns ) in their places : to burn the old , and fill up the next imborsation with the names of their friends : this resolution was by some people held necessary and good , but by others it was thought too viole●● , and that which would draw very ill consequences after it . among the number of dissenters palla strozzi was one ; who being a quiet , gentle , and courteous person , apter for study , than the restraining of factions , or opposing civil dissentions reply'd that all enterprizes that are contri●'d with the least shadow of wisdom , or courage , seem good at first , but prove difficult in the execution , and destructive in the end . that he had thought ( the dukes army being upon their frontiers in romagna ) the apprehension of new war abroad , would have imploy'd the thoughts of the senate , better than the differences at home . that if it should appear they design'd an alteration of the government ( which could hardly be conceal'd ) the people would always have time enough to get to their arms , and perform what was necessary for their common defence ; which being done of necessity , would not carry with it either so much wonder , or reproach . upon these considerations it was resolv'd , that the new senators should be permitted to enter ; but such an eye to be had to their proceedings , that upon the least injury , or reflection upon their party , they should unanimously take arms and rendezvous at the piazza of st. pulinare , from whence ( being not far from the palace ) they might dispose of themselves as their advantage directed . this being the result of that meeting , the new senators entred upon the office ; and the gonfaloniere , to give himself a reputation , and to render himself formidable to his enemies , caus'd his predecessor donato velluti to be clap'd in prison , as a person who had embezled the publick treasure : after this , he felt , and sounded his brethren about cosimo's return ; and ●inding them dispos'd , he communicated with such as he thought the heads of the medici's party , who encouraging him likewise , he cited rinaldo ridolfo peruzzi , and nicolo barbadori , as the principals of the contrary faction . upon this citation , rinaldo concluding it no time longer to protract , issued forth from his house with a considerable number of arm'd men , and joyn'd himself with ridolfo peruzzi and nicolo barbadori , immediately : there were among them several other citizens , besides a good number of souldiers ( which being out of pay were at that time in florence ) and all drew up ( as was before agreed ) at the piazza di st. pulinare . palla srozzi though he had got good store of people together , stir'd not out of his house , and giovanni guiccardini did the same ; whereupon rinaldo sent to remember them of the●● engagement , and to reprehend their delay : giovanni reply , d , that he should do disservice enough to the enemy , if by keeping his house , he prevented his brother piero's going forth to the relief of the senate . palla , after much solicitation , and several messages , came on horseback to st. pulinare , but unarm'd and with only two footmen at his heels . rinaldo perceiving him , advanc'd to meet him ; upbraided him with his negligence , and told him that his not joyning with the rest , proceeded from the want of ●idelity or courage ; either of which was unworthy a person of his quality or rank . that if he thought by not doing his duty against the other faction , he should save his own stake , and escape with his liberty and life ; he should find himself mistaken . that for his own part , if things happen'd adversly he should have this consolation , that he was not backward with his advice before the danger ; nor in it with his power : whereas he and his comerads could not without horror remember that this was the third time they had betraid their country . first , when they preserv'd cosimo ; the next , when they rejected his counsels ; and the third then , in not assisting with their supplies ; to which palla made no answer that the standers by could understand but muttering to himself , he fac'd about with his horse , and returned from whence he came . the 〈◊〉 perceiving rinaldo and his party in arms , and themselves utterly deserted , they caus'd the gates of the palace to be barracado'd up , as not knowing what else was to be done . but rinaldo neglecting his opportunity of marching into the piazza , by attending supplies which never came to him , depriv'd himself of his advantage ; gave them courage to provide for their defence and to several other citizens to repair to them , both with their persons , and advice . in the mean time , some friends of the senators which were least suspected went to rinaldo and acquainted him , that the senate could not imagine the reason of this commotion : that if it was about the business of cosimo they had no thoughts of recalling him . that they never had any inclination to offend him ; i● these were the grounds of their jealousie , they , might assure themselves if they pleas'd ; come into the palace , be civilly received , and readily gratified in their demands . but fair words would not down with rinaldo , who told them that the way he had prepos'd to assure himself , was by reducing the senators to their private condition ; and reforming the city to the benefit of all people . but it seldom happens that any thing is well done where there is equality in power , and difference in judgment . ridolfo peruzzi ( moved with what the citizens had said ) told them that for his part he ask'd no more but that cosimo might be kept out : that if that were granted , he had his designs : that he would not fill the city with blood , nor impose upon the senate ; that he was ready to obey them if they pleas'd , and according he marched with all his followers into the palace , and was joyfully received . rinaldo's staying at st. pullnare ; pusillanimity of palla , and ridolfo's revolt defeated rinaldo of his victory and rebated much of the first edge and vigor of his party : with all which , the popes authority concur'd . pope eugenius , being driven out of rome by the people , was at that time resident in florence ; who understanding the tumult ; and judging it incumbent upon his office ( if possible ) to appease it , he sent giovanni vitelleschi ( a patriarch and great friend of rinaldo's ) to desire he might speak with him , for he had authority and interest enough with the senate to secure and content him , without blood shed , or other detriment of the citizens : upon the persuasion of his friend , rinaldo with all his squadron march'd to st. maria novella where the pope lay . eugenius let him know the promise the senate had made him to commit all differences to his determination ; and that ( when their arms were laid down ) all things should be ordered , as he pleas'd to award . rinaldo observing the coldness of palla ; and the inconstancy of peruzzi , and having no more cards to play , cast himself into his holiness his arms , not doubting but his interest was sufficient to protect him . hereupon by the popes direction notice was given to nicolo barbadori and the rest which attended rinaldo without , that they should go home and lay down their arms , for rinaldo was in treaty with him about a peace with the senate ; upon which news they all disbanded , and laid down their arms. the senate continued their treaty by the mediation of the pope ; but in the mean time sent privately into the mountains of pistoria to raise foot , and causing them to joyn with their own forces and march into florence in the night , they possess'd themselves of all the posts in the city ; call'd the people together into the palace ; e●●●ted a new balia ; which the first time they met , recall'd cosimo , and all that were b●nish'd with him . and on the contrary faction , they banishd rinaldo de gli albizi , ridolfo peruzzi , nicolo barbadori , palla strozzi , and so great a number of other citizens , that there was scarce a town in italy but had some of their exiles , besides several which were banish'd into foreign countries . so by this and such accidents as these , florence was impoverish'd in its wealth and industry , as well as inhabitants . the pope beholding the destruction of those men who by his intercession had laid down their arms , was much troubled , complained heavily to rinaldo of their violence , exhorted him to patience , and to expect submissively till his fortune should turn . to whom rinaldo made this answer . the smal confidence they had in me , who ought to have beleiv'd me , and the too great con●idence i had in you , has been the ruine of me and my party . but i hold my self more culpable than any body , for believing that you who had been driven out of your own country , could keep me in mine . of the vicissitudes , and uncertainty of fortune , i have had experience enough . i have never presum'd in its prosperity , and adversity shall never deject me ; knowing that when she pleases she can take about and indulge me : if she continues her severity , and never smiles upon me more , i shall not much value it , esteeming no great happiness to live in a city where the laws are of less authority , than the passions of particular men . for might i have my choice , that should be my country where i may securely enjoy my fortune and friends ; not that where the first is easily sequester'd , and the latter to preserve his own estate , will forsake me in my greatest necessity . to wise and good men 't is always less ungrateful to hear at a distance , than to be a spectator of the miseries of his country ; and more honorable they think to be an honest rebel , than a servile citizen . having said thus , he tooke his leave of the pope , and complaining often to himself of his own counsels , and the cowardice of his friends , ●in great indignation he left the city , and went into banishment . on the otherside , cosimo having notice of his restauration ; return'd to florence , where he was received with no less ostentation and triumph , than if he had obtain'd some extraordinary victory ; so great was the concourse of people , and so high the demonstration of their joy , that by an unanimous and universal concurrence he was saluted , the benefactor of the people , and the father of their country . the history of florence . book v. governments in the variations which most commonly happen to them , do proceed from order to confusion , and that confusion afterwards turns to order again . for nature having fixed no sublunary things , as soon as they arrive at their achme and perfection , being capable of no further ascent , of necessity they decline . so , on the other side , when they are reduced to the lowest pitch of disorder having no farther to descend , they recoil again to their former perfection : good laws degenerating into bad customs , and bad customs ingendring good laws . for , virtue begets peace ; peace begets idleness ; idleness , mutiny ; and mutiny , destruction : and then vice versa ; that ruine begets laws ; those laws , virtue ; and virtue begets honour and good success . hence it is , as wise men have observed , that learning is not so ancient as arms ; and that in all provinces as well as cities , there were captains before philosophers , and souldiers before scholars . for good and well conducted arms having gotten the victory at first , and that victory , quiet . the courage and magnanimity of the souldier could not be depraved with a more honourable sort of idleness , than the desire of learning ; nor could idleness be introduced into any well-governed city by a more bewitching and insinuating way . this was manifest to cato ( when diogenes and carneades the philosophers were sent embassadors , from athens , to the senate ) who observing the roman youth to be much taken with their doctrine , and following them up and down with great admiration ; foreseeing the ill consequences that honest laziness would bring upon his country : he obtain'd a law , that no philosopher should be admitted into rome . all governments therefore do , by these means , some time or other come to decay ; and when once at the lowest , and mens sufferings have made them wiser , they rebound again , and return to their first order unless they be supprest , and kept under by some extraordinary force . these vicissitudes and revolutions ( first by means of the tuscans , and then of the romans ) kept italy unsettled , and rendered it sometimes happy , and sometimes miserable : and although nothing was afterwards erected out of the roman ruines , comparable to what was before ; ( which nevertheless might have been done with great glory under a virtuous prince ) yet in some of the new cities and governments , such sprouts of roman virtue sprung up ; that though they did not usurp upon one another , yet they lived so amicably and orderly together , that they not only defended themselves , but repelled the barbarians . among these governments was the florentine , though perhaps inferior in circumference of territory , yet in power and authority equal to any of them : for being seated in the heart of italy , rich , and ready upon all occasions , they defended themselves bravely when ever they were invaded , or brought the victory to their allies , where-ever they sided . if therefore by reason of the courage of those new principalities , the times were not altogether quiet ; yet the severity of the war did not make them insupportable . for that cannot be called peace , where the governments clash , and invade one another ; nor that war , in which no men are slain , no towns pillaged , nor no government destroyed . the wars of those times were begun without fear ; carried on without danger ; and concluded without detriment . insomuch , that that virtue which used to be extinguisht in other provinces , by means of a long peace , was spent and exhausted in italy by the faintness of the war , as will be more conspicuous by our description of the occurrences betwixt and . in which it will appear how , at length , a new way was opened to the excursions of the barbarians ; and italy relapsed into its old servitude and bondage . and if the actions of our governors , both at home and abroad , be not to be read ( as the actions of our ancestors ) with so much wonder and admiration of their courage and grandeur . yet , in other respects they may seem as considerable , seeing how many noble and great people have been restrained , and kept under by their arms , how weak and ill managed however . and though , in our description we make no mention of the fortitude of the souldier , the conduct of the captains , nor the love of the citizen towards his country ; yet we shall discover what cheats , what cunning , and what arts were used by both princes , souldiers , and citizens , to preserve a reputation which they never deserved . and this perhaps may be as worthy our knowledg , as the wisdom and conduct of old ; for if the examples of antiquity do teach us what to follow ; our more modern transactions will tell us what to avoid . italy , by those who commanded it , was reduced into such a condition , that when by agreements of the princes , a peace was made up , it was presently interrupted by those who had arms in their hands : so that they neither gained honour by their wars , nor quiet by their peace . a peace being concluded betwixt the duke of milan and the league in the year , the soldiers unwilling to disband , turned the war upon the church . these souldiers were at that time of two factions , the braccescan , and the sforzescan faction . of this latter , conte francesco , the son of sforza , was captain ; the first was commanded by nicolo piccinino and , nicolo forte braccio . to these two parties all the rest of the souldiers in italy joyned themselves . of the two , sforza's party was most considerable , as well for the courage of their conte , as for a promise the duke of milan had made him , to give him in marriage a natural daughter of his called madona bianca ; the probability of which alliance gained him great reputation . after the peace of lombardy was concluded ; both these parties , upon several pretended occasions , turned their arms against eugenius the pope . nicolo forte braccio , was moved by an old animosity braccio had always retained to the church . the conte was spurr'd on by his ambition . nicolo assaulted rome , and the conte possessed himself of la marca ; whereupon , the romans ( to evade the war ) turned eugenius out of rome , who fled to florence , though with no little danger and difficulty . being arrived there , upon consideration of the danger he was in , and that he was deserted by all the princes , who re●used , upon his score , to take up those arms again , which so lately , and so willingly they laid down ; made his peace with the conte , and gave him the signorie of la marca , though the conte had added insolence to his usurpation , and , in his letters to his agents , dated them in latin ( as they do frequently in italy ex girifalco nostro firmiano , invito petro & paulo . but not contented with the grant of that country , he would needs be created gonfaloniere of the church , and the pope condescended ; so much ●id his holiness perfer an ignominious peace before dangerous war. the conte , upon these terms , became a friend to the pope , and converted his arms against nicolo forte braccio ; betwixt whom , for many months together , several accidents happened in the territory of the church ; so that which side soever prevailed , the pope and his subjects suffered more than those that managed the war. at length , by the mediation of the duke of milan , an agreement ( in the nature of a truce ) was concluded betwixt them , by which both of them remained masters of several towns in the patrimony of the church . the war was in this manner extinguished in rome , but it brake out again presently in romagna , by the means of battista da canneto , who had caused certain of the family of the grifoni in bologna to be assassinated ; and drove out the pope's governor , and many others which he suspected to be his enemies ; to keep by force , what he had got by surprize , he address'd himself to philippo for aid : and the pope to countermine him , and revenge the injuries he had received , applied to the venetian and florentine . both parties being supplied , there were two great armies in romagna of a sudden . philp's auxiliaries were commanded by nicolo piccinino . the venetian and florentine , by gattamelata , and nicolo da tolentino . not far from imola they came to a battel , in which the venetians and florentines were defeated ; and nicolo da tolentino sent prisoner to the duke , where he died in a few days , either by poison or grief . the duke being either impoverished by the war , or apprehending this victory would quiet the league , followed not his advantage , but gave the pope and his confederates opportunity to recruit ; who choosing the conte francesco for their general , they sent him to drive forte braccio out of the lands of the church ; and to try if they could put an end to that war which they had begun in favour of the pope . the romans seeing his holiness in the field again , and his army considerable ; they desired to be reconciled ; and , having concluded the terms , they received a governor from him . among other towns , nicolo forte braccio had possessed himself of fiboli , montefiasconi , the city of castello , and ascesi : not being able to keep the field , nicolo was retreated into this latter town , and besieged by the conte . the siege proving long , by the braveness of nicolo's defence , the duke began to cast about , and consider , he must either hinder the league from carrying the town , or look to himself as soon as it was taken . to give the conte therefore diversion , he commanded nicolo piccinino , by the way to romagna , to pass into tuscany : whereupon , the league judging the defence of tuscany of more importance than the reducing of ascesi , they sent to the conte to stop piccinino's passage , who was at that time with his army at furli . upon these orders the conte raised his siege , and marched with his forces to cesena having , left the war of la marca , and the care of his own affairs to the management of his brother lione . whilst piccinino was labouring to pass , and francesco to obstruct him , nicolo forte braccio fell upon lione , and with great honour to himself , took him prisoner , plundered his people , and following his blow , took several towns in la marca at the same excursion . this news was very unwelcome to the conte , who gave all his own country for lost ; nevertheless , leaving part of his army to confront piccinino he marched himself against forte braccio with the rest , forc'd him to an engagement , and beat him . in which defeat forte braccio was hurt , taken prisoner , and died of his wounds . this victory recovered all that nicolo forte braccio had taken from him ; and forced the duke of milan to desire a peace , which he obtained by the mediation of nicolo da esti , marqeuss of ferrara , by which it was agreed , that the towns which the duke had got in romagna should be restored ; and his forces withdrawn into lombardy ; and battista da caneto ( as it happens to those who owe their dominion to the courage or power of other people ) as soon as the duke's forces were drawn off , despairing to remain in bologna upon his own legs ; quitted the town , and left it to re-admit its old governor antonio bentivogli , who was chief of the contrary party . all these things succeeded , during the banishment of cosimo ; upon whose return , those persons who were active in his restauration , and those who had suffered more than ordinarily before , concluded ( without regard to any body else ) to secure themselves of all the offices in the state. the senate which succeeded for the months of november and december , not satisfied with what their predecessors had done in favour of their party ; they lengthned the time , changed the places of several which were banished , and sent many new ones into banishment after them . the citizens were questioned and molested , not only for their inclinations to the parties , but for their wealth , their relations , and private correspondencies . and , had this proscription proceeded to blood , it had been as bad as octaviano's , or silla's : nor was it altogether without ; for antonio di bernardo was beheaded , and four other cizens , ( of which zanobi bel fratelli , and cosimo barbadori were two ) who having escaped out of their dominions , and being gotten to venice ; the venetians ( valuing cosimo's friend ship before their own honour and reputation ) caused them to be secured , sent them prisoners home ; where they were most unworthily put to death . however , that example gave great advantage to cosimo's party , and great terror to the adverse ; when it was considered that so potent a republick should sell its liberty to the florentines , which was supposed to be done not so much in kindness to cosimo , as to revive and incense the factions in florence ; and by engaging them in blood , to render the animosities in that city irreconcilable , the venetians being jealous of no other obstruction to their greatness , but the union of those parties . having pillaged and banished all such as were enemies , or suspected to be so to the state , they applied themselves to charess and oblige new persons to corroborate their party ; restored the family of the alberti , and who-ever else had been proclaimed rebel to his country . all the grandees ( except some few ) were reduced into the popular rank ; the estates of the rebels they sold to one another for a song . after which , they fortified themselves with new laws , new magistrates , and new elections , pulling out such as they thought their enemies , and filling the purses with the names of their friends . but , admonished by the ruine of their friends ; and thinking not enough for the security of their government , to make the imborsation as they pleas'd ; they contrived , that all officers of life and death should be created out of the chief of their party ; and that the persons who were to oversee the imborsations , and the new squittini , should ( with the senators ) have power to create them . to the eight of the guards , they gave authority of life and death . they decreed , that the banished persons should not return ( though the time of their banishment was expired ) till leave given them by four and thirty of the senate and the colledges , when their whole number amounted but to thirty and seven . they made it criminal to write , or receive letters from them : every word , every sign , every motion that was unpleasing to the governors , was punished severely ; and if any one remained suspected who had escaped these injuries , they loaded him with new duties and impositions , till , in a short time , they had cleared the city of their enemies , and secur'd the government to themselves . however that they might want no assistance from abroad , and intercept it from such as should design against them ; they enter'd into league with the pope , the venetians , and the duke of milan . things being in this posture in flore●ce , giovanna queen of naples died , and , by will made rinieri d● angio her heir . alphonso , king of aragon , was at that time in sicily , and having good interest with many of the nobility of that kingdom , he prepared to possess it . the neapolitans and several others of the lords were favourers of rinieri . the pope had no mind that either the one or the other should have it but would willingly have governed by a deputy of his own . in the mean time alphonso arrived out of sicily , and was received by the duke of sessa ; where he entertained certain princes into his pay , with design ( having capua in his possession , which was governed at that time , in his name , by the prince of taranto ) to force the neapolitans to his will. wherefore he sent his army against caietta , which was defended by a garison of neapolitans . upon this invasion , the neapolitans demanded assistance of philip ; who recommended the enterprize to the people of genoa ; the genoeses not only to gratifie the duke , who was their prince , but to preserve the goods and effects which they had at that time both in naples , and caietta , rigg'd out a strong fleet immediately . alphonso having news of their preparations , reinforc'd himself , went in person against the genoeses , and coming to an engagement with them of the island of pontus , he was beaten , taken prisoner , ( with several other princes ) and presented by the genoeses into the hands of duke philip. this victory astonished all the princes of italy , who had any apprehension of the power of philip , beleiving it would give him opportunity to make himself master of all : but he ( so different are the judgments of men ) took his measures quite contrary . alphonso was a wise and prudent prince , and as soon as he had convenience of discoursing with philip , remonstrated to him how much he was mistaken in siding with rinieri ; for that assuredly , having made himself king of naples , he would endeavour , with all his power , to bring milan in subjection to the french , that his assistance might be near him , and that upon any distress , he might not be put to it to force a way for his supplies ; nor was there any way to do it so effectuall , as by ruining him , and introducing the french. that the contrary would happen by making alphonso prince ; for then , having no-body , to fear but the french , he should be obliged to love and charess the duke above any body in whose power it would be to give his enemies a passage ; by which means alponso should have the title , but the power and authority would remain in duke philip : insomuch , that it imported the duke much more than himself , to consider the dangers of one side , with the advantages of the other , unless he desired more to satisfie his passion than to secure his state. for , as by that way he would continue free and independent ; by the other , ( lying betwixt two powerful princes ) he would lose his state quite , or living in perpetual apprehension , be a slave to them both . these words wrought so much upon the duke , that , changing his designs , he set alphonso at liberty , sent him back to genoa , and from thence into the kingdom of naples , where he landed at caietta which upon the news of his enlargement , had been seized by some lords of his party . the genoeses ( understanding how , without any regard to them , the duke had discharged the king ; and , considering with themselves , that of all their danger and expence , he had ingrossed the honour , impropriated the thanks of the kings inlargement , and left them nothing but his regrate and indignation for having defeated and taken him prisoner ) were highly dissatisfied with the duke . in the city of genoa , when it has the free exercise of its liberty by the free suffrages of the people , a chief is chosen , which they call their doge ; not with the absolute power of a prince , to determine arbitrarily of any thing ; but to purpose and recommend what is to be debated and resolved upon by the magistrates in the council . in the same city there are many noble families so mighty and potent , they are not without difficulty to be brought to any obedience to the magistrate . of all those families , the tregosi and adorni are most powerful and wealthy ; and from them spring all the divisions of the city , and all the contempt of the laws ; for differing perpetually among themselves , and pretending both to the dogeship ; they are not contented to have it fairly decided , but came many times to blows ; by which , as one is set up , the other is always depressed ; and sometimes it fals out , that that party which is over-power'd , and unable to carry that office otherwise , calls in foreign assistance , and prostitutes that government , which they cannot enjoy themselves , to the dominion of a stranger . by this means it comes often to pass , that they who have the government in lombardy , have the command of genoa likewise ; as it happened at the time when alphonso was taken prisoner . among the principal citizens of genoa , who caused that city to be delivered into the hands of the duke , francisco spinola was one ; who not long after he had been very active to enslave his country , became suspected to the duke ( as it often happens in those cases ) francisco being highly dissatisfied , left the town ; and by a kind of voluntary exile , had his residence at caietta ; being there at that time when the engagement was with alphonso , and having behav'd himself very well in it ; he presumed he had again merited so much favour from the duke , as to be permitted to live quietly in genoa : but finding the duke's jealousie to continue , ( as not believing he , that had betrayed his country could ever be true to him ) he resolved to try a new experiment , to restore his country to its liberty , and himself to his honour and security at once ; believing no remedy could be administred so properly to his fellow citzens , as by the same hand which gave them their wound . observing therefore the general indignation against the duke for having delivered the king ; he concluded it a convenient time to put his designs in execution ; and accordingly he communicated his resolutions with certain persons , which he had some confidence were of the same opinion , and encouraged them to follow him . it happened to be s. iohn baptist's day ( which is a great festival in that city ) when arismino , a new governor , sent them from the duke , made his entry into genoa . being entred into the town in the company of opicino ( his predecessor in the government ) and other considerable citizens , francisco spinola thought it no time to protract , but running forth armed into the streets , with such as were before privy to his design , he drew them up in the piazza before his house , and cryed out liberty , liberty . 't is not to be imagined with what alacrity the people and citizens ran to him at that very name ; insomuch , that if any out of interest or other consideration , retain'd an affection for the duke , they were so far from having time to arm , and make defence , they had scarce leisure to escape . arismino , with some of the genoeses of his party , fled into the castle which was kept for the duke . opicino presuming he might get thither , fled towards the palace , where he had men at his command , with which he supposed he might not only be able to secure himself , but to animate the people to a defence ; but he reckoned without his host ; for , before he could reach it , he was knock'd on the head , torn in pieces by the multitude , and his members drag'd about the streets . after , this the genoeses having put themselves under new magistrates and officers of their own , the castle and all other posts which were kept for the duke , were reduced , and the city perfectly freed from its dependance on the duke . these things thus managed , though at first they gave the princes of italy occasion to apprehend the growing greatness of the duke , yet , now observing their conclusion , they did not despair of being able to curb him ; and therefore , notwithstanding their late league with him , the florentines venetians and genoeses made a new one among themselves . whereupon rinaldo de gli albizi , and the other chief florentine exiles seeing the face of affairs altered , and all things tending to confusion , they conceived hopes of persuading the duke to a war against florence , and going upon that design to milan , rinaldo accosted the duke as followeth : if we , who have been formerly your enemies , do now with confidence supplicate your assistance for our return into our own country ; neither your highness , nor any body else , ( who considers the progress of humane affairs , and the volubility of fortune ) ought at all to be surprized , seeing both of our pass'd and present actions , of what we have done formerly to your self , and of what we intend now to our country , we can give a clear and a reasonable account . no good man will reproach another for defending his country , which way soever he defends it . nor was it ever our thoughts to injure you , but to preserve our country ; which will be evident , if you consider how in the greatest stream of our victories and success , we no sooner found your highness dispos'd to a peace , but we readily embraced it , and pursued it with more eagerness than your self : so that as yet we are not conscious to our selves of any thing that may make us doubt of your favour . neither can our country , in justice , complain , that we are now pressing and importuning your highness to imploy those arms against it , when we have obstinately oppos'd them before , in its defence : for that country ought equally to be beloved by all which is equally indulgent to all ; and not that , which despising the rest , advances and admires only a few . no-body maintains it unlawful in all cases to bear arms against ones country . cities are mix'd bodies , yet have they their resemblance with natural bodies ; and , as in these , many diseases grow which are not to be cur'd without violence : so in the other , many times such inconveniences arise , that a charitable and good citizen would be more criminal to leave it infirm , than to cure it , though with amputation , and the loss of some of its members . what greater distemper can befal a politick body than servitude ? and what more proper remedy can be applyed than that which will certainly remove it ; wars are just , when they are necessary ; and arms are charitable when there is no other hopes left to obtain justice . i know not what necessity can be greater than ours ; nor what act of charity more commendable , than to wrest our country out of the jaws of slavery . our cause then being both just and charitable , ought not to be slighted , either by us , or your highness , though it were only in compassion . but your highness has your particular provocation besides ; the florentines having had the confidence , after a peace solemnly concluded with you , to enter into a new league with the genoeses your rebels ; so that if our prayers and condition should be unable , your own just indignation and resentment should move you , especially seeing the enterprize so easie . let not their pass'd carriage discourage you , you have seen their power and resolution to defend themselves formerly ; and both of them were reasonably to be apprehended , were they the same now as they have been , but you will find them quite contrary , for , what strength , what wealth , can be expected in a city which has lately exploded the greatest part of its rich and industrious men ? what obstinacy or resolution can be apprehended in a people which are divided , and at enmity among themselves ? which enmity is the cause that , that very treasure which is left , cannot now be imployed so well as it formerly was ; for men do chearfully disburse , when they see it is for the honour and security of their country ; hoping , that peace may reprize , what the war has devour'd . but when in war and peace they find themselves equally oppressed ; and under a necessity in the one , of enduring the outrages of their enemies ; and in the other , of truckling to the insolencies of their friends ; no-body will supply our advance one farthing towards its relief : and the people suffer more many times by the avarice of their friends , than by the rapacity of their enemies ; for in this last case they have hopes some time or other to see an end of it ; but in the other they are desperate . in your last war you took up arms against an intire and united city ; in this , you have to do only with a remnant . then , you attempted upon the liberty of the city ; now ▪ you will endeavour to restore it : and it is not to be feared , that in such disparity of causes , the effects should be the same . nay rather your victory is certain , and what advantage and corroboration , that will be to your own state , is easily judged ; having tuscany obliged to you thereby , and readier to serve you in any of your designs , than milan it self . so that , though formerly this acquest would have been look'd upon as usurpation and violence ; it will be now esteemed an high piece of justice and charity . suffer not therefore this opportunity to pass , and be sure , if your other enterprizes against this city have produced nothing but expence , difficulty , and dishonour ; this will make you amends , and with great ease , turn to your great honour and advantage . the duke needed not many words to excite him against the florentines ; he had an hereditary quarel to them , which ( besides the blindness of his ambition ) did always provoke him , and now more than ordinarily , upon occasion of their new league with the genoeses . however the expences and dangers he had formerly pass'd , the memory of his late defeat , and the vanity and ill-grounded hopes of the exiles , discouraged him quite . the duke , upon the first news of the rebellion in genoa , sent nicolo piccinino , with what forces he had and could get together , towards that city , to recover it , if possible , before the citizens should have compos'd themselves , or put the government into order ; presuming much upon the castle which stood out for him . and though nicolo drove the genoeses up into the mountains , and took from them the vale of pozivori , where they had fortified themselves ; yet he found so much difficulty afterwards , ( though he had beat them into the town ) that he was forc'd to draw off . whereupon at the instigation of the exiles , he received orders from the duke , that he should attack them on the east-side of the river , and make what devastations he could in their country towards pisa ; supposing ▪ that by the success of this expedition , he should be able to judge from time to time what course he was to steer . upon the receit of these orders , nicolo assaulted serezana , and took it and then having done much mischief in those parts to alarm the florentines , he marched towards lucca , giving out he would pass that way into the kingdom of naples , to assist the king of aragon . pope eugenius , upon these new accidents , departed from florence to bologna , where he proposed and negotiated an accommodation betwixt the duke and the league ; representing to the duke , that if he would not comply , he would be forc'd to part with the conte francesco to the league ; for francesco being his confederate , was at that time under his pay . but , though his holiness took much pains in the business , that treaty came to nothing ; for the duke would not consent , unless genoa were restored ; and the league were as obstinate to have it remain free ; so that all parties growing diffident of the peace , each of them began to make provision for war. nicolo pinccinino being arrived at lucca the florentines began to apprehend new troubles , caused neri di gino to march with all speed into the country of pisa , and obtained of the pope that conte francesco might joyn with him , and their united forces take their post before st. gonda : piccinino being at lucca , desired a passport to go into the kingdom of naples , and being denied , he threatened to force it . the armies and officers were of equal number and eminence ; so that neither side being over-forward to run the hazard of a battel , by reason of the extraordinary coldness of the weather , ( it being in december ) they lay by one another several days without any action at all . the first that moved was nicolo piccinino ; who was inform'd , that if in the night he assaulted vico pisano he should easily carry it . nicolo attempted it ; but failing of his design , he plundered the country about it , and burn'd the town of s. giovanni alla ven● . this enterprize ( though for the most part ineffectual ) encouraged nicolo to proceed nevertheless ; especially , observing that the conte and neri stir'd not to molest him : thereupon he assaulted st. maria in castello and filetto , and took them both : nor did the florentine army move for all that : not that the conte was affraid to come forth , but because the magistrates in florence ( out of respect to the pope , who was mediating a peace ) had not as yet resolved upon the war : and that which was but prudence in the florentines , being interpreted fear by the enemy , they took courage , and with all the forces they could make , sate down before barga . the news of that siege caused the florentines to lay aside all compliments and respect ; and to resolve not only to relieve barga , but to invade the country of the lucchesi . whereupon the conte marching directly against nicolo , and giving battel to force him from the siege he worsted his army , and made him draw off : the venetians in the mean time perceiving the duke had broke the league , sent giovan francesco da gonzague their general , with an army as far as chiaradadda , who spoyling the duke's country , constrained him to call back nicolo piccinino out of tuscany . which revocation , with the victory they had lately obtained against nicolo , encouraged the florentines to an expedition against lucca , and gave them great hopes of success : in which they carried themselves without either fear or respect , seeing the duke ( who was the only person they apprehended ) imployed by the venetians ; and the lucchesi , by having , as it were , received their enemies into their houses , and given them cause to invade them , had left themselves no grounds to complain . in april therefore , in the year the conte march'd with his army ; and before he would fall upon any thing of the enemies , he addressed himself to the recovery of what had been lost , and accordingly he reduced s. maria de castello and what-ever else had been taken by piccinino . then advancing against the lucchesi , he sate down before camajore ; whose garison and inhabitants ( though well enough affected to their lord ) being more influenced by the terror of an enemy at hand , than their fidelity to their friends a far off , surrendered immediately ; after which , he took massa and serazan with the same dexterity and reputation ; and then turning his army towards lucca in the month of may ; he destroyed their corn , burn'd their villages , stubb'd up their vines , and their fruit-trees , drove away their cattel , and omitted nothing of outrage and hospitality that is , or can be committed by souldiers . the lucchesi seeing themselves abandoned by the duke , and unable to defend their country , retir'd into the town , where they intrench'd and fortified so well , that they did not doubt ( by reason of their numbers within ) but to be able to make it good for some time , as they had formerly done . their only fear was of the unconstancy of the people , who being weary of the siege , would probably consider their own private danger before the liberty of their country , and force them to some ignominious accord . whereupon , to encourage them to a vigorous defence , they were called together into the market-place , and one of the wisest and gravest of the citizens spake to them as followeth . you have often heard , and must needs understand , that things done of necessity , ar● neither to be praised , nor condemned . if therefore you accuse us of having drawn this war upon you , by entertaining the duke's forces , and suffering them to assault you ; you are highly mistaken . you cannot be ignorant of the ancient and inveterate hatred the florentines bear you ; so that 't is not any injury in you , nor any resentment in them , but your weakness and their ambition which has provoked them ; the first giving them hopes , the other impatience to oppress you . do not think that any kindness of yours can divert them from that desire ; nor any injury of yours provoke them to be worse ? 't is their business therefore to rob you of your liberty ; 't is yours to defend it ; and what either of you do in pursuance of those ends may be lamented , but cannot be wondred at by any body : we may be sorry our country is invaded , our city besieged , our houses burned ; but who of us all is so weak as to admire it ? seeing , if our power were as great we would do the same to them , and , if possible , worse . if they pretend this war was occasioned by our admitting of nicolo ; had he not been received , they would have pretended another ; and , perhaps , had this invasion been deferred , it might have proved more fatal and pernicious ; so that 't is not his coming is to be blamed , but our ill fortune , and the ambition of their nature ; for we could not refuse the duke's forces ; and when they were come , it was not in our power to keep them from doing acts of hostility : you know very well , that without the assistance of some considerable prince , we had not been able to defend our selves ; nor was any man more proper to relieve us , both in respect of his fidelity and power , than the duke . he restored us to our liberty , and 't was but reasonable he should secure it . he was always an enemy to those who would never be our friends ; if therefore we have provoked the duke , rather than we would disoblige the florentines , we have lost a true friend and made our enemy more able and more ready to offend us : so that it is much better for us to have this war , with the friendship of the duke ; than to have peace , with his displeasure : and we have reason to hope he will rescue us from these dangers to which he has exposed us , if we be not wanting to our selves . you cannot forget with what fury the florentines have many times assaulted us ; and with what honour and reputation we have repelled them , even when we have had no hopes but in god and in time , and how both of them have preserved us . if we defended our selves then ; what reason now is there to despair ? then we were deserted by all italy and left as a prey to the enemy ; now we have the duke on our side , and 't is not improbable the venetians will be but slow in their motions against us ; seeing it can be no pleasure to them to see the power of the florentines encrease . then the florentines were more free and unengaged , had more hopes of assistance , and were stronger of themselves and we every way weaker ; for then we defended a tyrant , now we fight for our selves ; then the honour went to other people , now it returns upon us ; then they were united and entire , now they are divided , and all italy full of their rebels . but if we had none of these reasons , nor none of these hopes to excite us , extreme necessity would be sufficient to animate us to our defence . every enemy ought in reason to be apprehended by us , because all of them seek their own glory , and our destruction ; but , above all , the florentines ought to be most dreadful , who are not to be satisfied with our obedience , tribute , nor the government of our city ; but they must have our persons and wealths , to satiate their cruelty with our blood , and their avarice with our estates ; so that there is no person nor condition among us so mean , but ought justly to fear them . let no-body therefore be dismaid to see our country wasted , our villages burn'd , and our lands possessed by the enemy : if we preserve our city , they of course will revert : if we lose our city , to what purpose will they be kept ? maintaining our liberty ; the enemy can hardly enjoy them : but losing our liberty what comfort would it be to retain them ? take arms therefore with courage , and when you are engaged with your enemy , remember the reward of your victory is not only the safety of your country , but the preservation and security of your children and estates . these last words were received by the people with such warmth and vigor of mind , that unanimously they promised to die rather than to desert their city , or entertain any treaty that might intrench upon their liberty ; so that immediately order was taken for all things necessary for the defence of the city . in the mean time the florentine army was not idle , after many mischiefs and depredations in the country , they took monte-carlo upon conditions ; after which they encamp'd at uzano , that the lucchesi being straitned on all sides , and made desperate of relief , might be constrained to surrender . the castle was strong , and furnished with a good garrison ; so that was not so easily to be carried as the rest . the lucchesi ( as was but reason ) seeing themselves distressed , had recourse to the duke , and recommended their case to him with all manner of expression ; sometimes they commemorated the services they had done him : sometimes they remonstrated the cruelty of the florentines : what courage it would give the rest of his friends to see him interpose in their defence ; and what terror it would infuse to see them expos'd : for if they lost their liberty and their lives , he would lose his honor , and his friends , and the fidelity of all those who had ever expos'd themselves to any danger for his sake : which words were deliver'd with tears , that if his obligations should fail , his compassion might move him to assist them . insomuch that the duke , adding to his old animosity to the florentines , his late engagements to the lucchesi , but above all being jealous of the greatness of the florentine , which of necessity would follow so important acquest ; he resolved to send a great army into tuscany , or else to fall so furiously upon the venetians , that the florentines should be constrain'd to quit that enterprize to relieve them : he had no sooner taken this resolution but they had news at florence that the duke was sending forces into tuscany ; which made them suspicious of their designs , and therefore , to find the duke imployment at home , they solicited the venetian very earnestly that they would attack him in lombardy with all the power they could make : but they were not only weakened , but disheartened by the departure of the marquess of mantoua , who had left their service , and taken arms under the duke . whereupon they return'd this answer , that they were so far from being able to ingross the war , they could not assist in it , unless they sent conte francesco to command their army ; and oblig'd him by articles to pass the po. with them in person ( seeing by the old agreement he was not to go so far ) for without a general they would undertake no war ; nor could they have confidence in any but the count ; nor in him neither , unless he oblig'd himself to pursue the war in all places alike . the florentines were of opinion the war was to be carried on briskly in lombardy ; yet on the otherside to remove the conte was to destroy their designs against lucca , and they were very sensible , that demand was made , not so much out of any necessity they had of the conte , as to defeat that enterprize . the conte , for his part , was by contract oblig'd to to go into lombardy whenever he should be requir'd by the league ; but now he was unwilling to forfeit his hopes of that allyance which the duke had promis'd him , by marrying him to one of his relations . so that betwixt the desire of conquering lucca , and the fear of having wars with the duke , the florentines were in no little distraction . but their fear ( as it always happens ) was the stronger passion of the two , insomuch as they were content ( as soon as uzano was taken ) the conte should pass into lombardy . but there was still a difficulty behind , which not being in their power to dissolve , gave the florentines more trouble and jealousie , than any thing else ; and that was , that the conte would not be oblig'd to pass the po , and without it , the venetians would not entertain him , there being no way to accommodate this difference , but of necessity one of them must submit ; the florentines persuaded the conte that in a letter to the senate of florence he should oblige himself to pass that river , alledging that a private promise not being sufficient to dissolve a publick stipulation , he might do afterwards as he pleas'd ; and which way soever he acted , this convenience would certainly follow , that the venetians having begun the war , would be compelled to pursue it ; and that humor be inevitably diverted , which was so much to be fear'd . to the venetians they intimated on he other side , that that letter , though private , was sufficient to bind him , and that they ought to be satisfied therewith : that whilst it might be done securely it would be best to conceal it , and indulge his respects to his father-in-law for it would be neither for his , nor their advantage to have it discovered , without manifest necessity : and in this manner the florentines concluded upon the conte's passage into lombardy ; and the conte having taken in uzano , cast up certain new works about lucca to keep from fallying , & recommended the war to the commissioners which succeded ; he pass'd the alpes , and went to reggio , where the venetians ( being jealous of his proceedings ) to discover his inclinations , put him at first dash upon passing the po , and joyning the rest of their army ; which the conte peremptorily refus'd , and many ill words passed betwixt him and andrea mauroceno who was sent about it from the venetians : upbraiding one another by their pride and infidelity ; and after several protestations on both sides ; on the one , that he was not oblig'd to it ; on the other that he should not be paid without it , the conte returned into tuscany , and his adversary to venice . the conte was quarter'd by the florentines in the country of pisa ; and they were not without hopes of prevailing with him to reassume his command against the lucchesi ; but they found him not dispos'd ; for the duke not understanding he had refus'd to pass the po , in compliment to him ( fancying by his means he might preserve lucca ) he desired him that he would be an instrument to make peace betwixt the lucchesi and the florentines , and if he could to comprehend him also , insinuating by the by , that in convenient time he should marry his daughter . this march had great influence upon the conte , who persuaded himself the duke having no heirs males might thereby in time come to the government of milan . upon which grounds he discouraged the florentines from prosecuting the war affirming that for his own part he would not stir , unless the venetians paid him his arreers , and performed the rest of their covenants ; for his pay alone would not do his business , wherefore it concern'd him to secure his own state , and therefore he was to look out for other allies , and not depend only upon the friendship of the florentines : that seeing he was abandon'd by the venetians he was obliged to a stricter regard to his own affairs ; and threatened very slily to make an agreement with the duke . these tricks and expostulations were not at all to the florentines satisfaction . they found their design upon lucca lost , and their own state in danger , whenever the duke and the conte united . to prevail with the venetians to make good their termes , cosimo de medici was dispatched to them , ( supposing his reputation might have some influence upon them ) and a long speech to their senate , he represented the posture of affairs in italy ; the power and conduct of the duke ; and concluded , that if the count and he joyned , the venetians would be confin'd to the sea , and the florentines in no small danger of their liberty : to which it was answer'd by the venetian that they had well considered the condition of italy , and their own ; and did believe they were every way able to defend themselves ; however it was not their custom to pay any body for doing other people service . it belonged therefore to the florentines to see the conte satisfied , seeing it was they had had the benefit of his service , or rather ( if they had a mind to preserve themselves in security for the future ) to correct and rebate his insolence than to pay him ; for men put no bounds to their ambition ; and if he should then be paid without doing any service , his next demand , in all liklyhood , would be more insolent and dangerous : in their judgment therefore it was high time to put a stop to his carreer , and not let him run on , till he became incorrigible ; but if out of fear , or any other consideration they had a mind to continue him their friend ; their best way would be to pay him : with which answer cosimo return'd , and nothing was concluded . the florentines nevertheless interceded very earnestly with the conte that he would not forsake the league ; who had no great inclination to it himself ; but his desire to consummate the marriage with the dukes daughter , kept him in such suspence , that upon every little accident he was ready to leave them . the conte had left his towns in la marca , to be secured by furlano , one of his principal officers : this furlano was earnestly solicited by the duke , that he left the conte's service , and joyned himself to him . whereupon laying aside all other respects to save his own stake , the conte came to an agreement likewise with the duke , and among the rest of the articles , this was one , that for the future the conte should not intermedle in the affairs either of romagna or tuscany . after he had made this peace with the duke , the conte was very importunate with the florentines to come to an agreement with the lucchesi ; and he persuaded them so far , that finding no other remedy , they came to a composition with them in the month of april , by which capitulation the lucchesi were to have their liberties preserved ; and the florentines to keep possession of monti carlo , and some other castles which they had taken before : after which they writ many sad letters up and down italy , lamenting that seeing god and man were unwilling that the lucchesi should fall under their dominion , they had been constrained to a peace with them : and so much were they concerned for their disappointment in that enterprize , that seldom has any body been known to lose their own estates with more impatience and regret , than the florentines express'd , for not gaining other peoples . however though the florentines at that time had so many irons in the fire ; they forgot not their alliances with their neighbours , nor the decoration of their city . nicolo fortebraccio ( who had married a daughter of the conte de poppi ) being dead , poppi had the command of the borgo san sepulcro , the castle , and other appendixes , which he kept in behalf of his son-in-law , whilst his son-in-law lived , ; refusing afterwards to surrender them to the pope who demanded them as usurped from the church : upon which refusal the pope sent the patriarch with an army to recover them by force . the conte di poppi finding himself unable to defend them , offered them to the florentines , who would not accept them : however upon the pope's return to florence , they interposed , and laboured an agreement betwixt his holiness and the conte . but finding the treaty difficult and dilatory ; the patriarch fell upon casentino , took prato vecchio and romena , and proffered them likewise to the florentines ; but they could not be accepted , unless the pope would consent they should restore them to the conte , which after much argumentation he did , upon condition the florentines should use their interest with conte poppi to restore burgo to him . the mind of his holiness being at quiet by this means the florentines ( the cathedral church of their city , call'd santa reparata , having been out of repair , long since begun to be mended , and now brought to that perfection , divine service might be celebrated in it ) entreated his holiness that he would oblige them so far , as to consecrate it himself : to which he willingly condescended ; and for the greater magnificence of the church and city , and the ostentation and honor of the pope , a gallery was built from santa maria novella ( where the pope held his court to the church which was to be consecrated ) four fathoms wide , and two high , covered over with very rich cloths , under which , only his holiness , his court , and such magistrats of the city as were appointed to attend him , were to pass all the rest of the citizens and people , having dispos'd themselves in the street , the church , and a top of their houses ; to behold so glorious a spectacle . the ceremony being pass'd with the usual solemnity ; his holiness , as a token of more then ordinary respect , confer'd the honor of knighthood upon guiliano de avanzati at that time gonfaloniere de giustitia but always a very eminent citizen ; to whom the senate ( that they might not seem behind hand with the pope in any point of beneficence ) gave the government of the pisa for a year . about this time certain differences arising betwixt the greek and the roman churches , they could not agree in all particulars about the divine worship : and for as much as in the last council of basil , much had been said upon that subject by the prelats of the church , it was resolved that all diligence should be us'd to bring the emperour , and the prelats of the greek church together to the council of basil , to try if there was any way to accomodate them with the romans . though it was derogatory to the majesty of the emperour , and contrary to the pride of his prelats , to yield in any thing to the romans , yet the turk lying heavy upon them , and fearing that of themselves they should not be able to resist him , that they might with the more confidence and security desire relief from other people , they resolv'd to comply , and accordingly , as was directed by the council of basil , the emperour , the patriarch , and several other prelats and barons of greece , arrived at venice ; but being frighted from thence by the plague , it was resolved they should remove to florence and all their differences be discussed and determined in that city : being assembled , and for many days together both roman and greek prelats , all of them in the cathedral ; after many and long disputations , the grecians condescended , and complyed with the church and bishop of rome . the peace betwixt the lucchesi , and the florentines , and betwixt the duke and the conte , being concluded ; it was thought no hard matter to put an end to the wars of italy , especially in lombardy , in tuscany ; for the war in the kingdom of naples betwixt rinato di angio and alphonso d' aragona , was hardly to be compos'd but by the ruine of one of them : and though the pope was discontented for the loss of so many towns ; and the ambition of the duke and venetian was sufficiently known ; yet it was suppos'd necessity would force the one of lay down , and weariness the other : but they were out in their conjectures ; for neither duke nor venetian could be persuaded to be quiet ; but on the contrary they took arms afresh , and lombardy and tuscany was filled again with their hostilities . the ambitious and haughty mind of the duke could not brook that the venetians should keep bergamo and brescia ; and the rather because he observ'd them always in arms , perpetually making incursions all over his country ; in which , he thought he should not only restrain them , but recover all he had lost , when ever the pope , the florentines , and the conte should desert them : he designed therefore to take romagna from the pope supposing when he had gained that , it would not be in his holiness power to offend him ; and the florentines seeing the fire at their own doors , would not stir for fear of themselves ; or if they did , they could not assault him conveniently . the duke understood likewise how angry the florentines were with the venetians , about the business of lucca and upon that score concluded them the less likely to take up arms for the venetians : and as to conte francesco , he did not doubt his new amity , and the hopes of his marriage , would keep him quiet and safe . to prevent scandal , and give less occasion to any body to stir ( having oblig'd himself by his articles with the conte not to meddle with romagna ) he caus'd nicolo piccinino to take the enterprize upon himself , and fall upon it as of his own ambition and avarice . nicolo , at the time of the treaty betwixt the duke and the conte , was in romagna and ( by the dukes direction ) shew'd himself much dissatisfied at his agreement with his implacable adversary , the conte . whereupon he retired with his army ( in great discontent as was pretended ) to camurata ( a town betwixt furli and ravenna ) and fortified himself , as if he designed to make good that quarter , till he could find some better entertainment and the report of his disgust being spread all over italy , nicolo took order to have his services and the dukes ingratitude , remonstrated to the pope ; and that though by the enterest of two of the principal generals , he had got all the forces of italy under his command , yet if his holiness would say the word , he could contrive things so , that one of them should become his enemy , and the other unserviceable ; for if he would provide him with monies and supply him with men , he would fall upon the towns which the conte had usurped from the church , and by giving the conte imployment for the preservation of his own countries , render him incapable of being subservient to the ambition of the duke . the pope believing what he said to be rational and true , sent him ducats , besides large promises of provision for himself and his children ; and though many times he was admonished to have a care of being deceived yet he would never suspect , nor admit one word to the contrary . the city of ravenna was at that time commanded for the church by ostasio da polenta , nicolo conceiving it no time to protract ( his son francesco having plunder'd and sack'd spoleto to the great satisfaction of the pope ) resolved to attack ravenna , either thinking the enterprize easie in it self , or else holding private intelligence with ostasio the governour ; which soever it was , he had not invested it many days , before it was surrendered upon articles ; and that being taken bologna , imola , and furli followed in a short time ; and that which was most strange , was , that of twenty strong holds which in those parts were garison'd by the pope , there was not any one but submitted to nicolo ; and not contented with these affronts to his holiness , he added contumely to his injustice ; and writ the pope word , that he had us'd him according to his deserts : for having impudently endeavoured to interrupt the old friendship betwixt him and the duke ; and fill'd all italy with letters that he abandoned the duke ; and sided with the venetian . having possess'd himself of romagna , he left it to the government of his son francesco ; and passing himself with the greatest part of his army into lombardy , he joyned the rest of the dukes forces ; assaulted the country of brescia ; and in a short time brought it under subjection , and when he had done so , laid siege to the city : the duke desirous that the venetians might be exposed , excused himself to the pope the florentines , and the conte , pretending , that what was done by nicolo in romagna , if it were contrary to their capitulations , was no less contrary to his inclinations ; suggesting privately , that when time and opportunity contributed , he would make him sensible of his disobedience : the florentines , and the conte gave no great credit to what he said ; believing ( as was true ) that it was nothing but artifice to keep them in suspence , till he conquered the venetians , who supposing themselves able alone to contend with the duke , were too proud to desire assistance of any body , but with their captain gatamelato , would wage war with him by themselves . the conte francesco desired , by permission of the florentines , that he might have gone to the relief of king rinato ( had not the accidents in romagna and lombardy diverted him ) and the florentines for the old friendship betwixt them and france , would have willingly consented , and the duke would have assisted alphonso , for the kindness he had expressed to him in his former distress : but both the one and the other had too much imployment at home , to concern themselves in any differences abroad : the florentines seeing romagna over-run , and the venetians baffled by the duke ( apprehending their own , by the calamity of their neighbours ) desired the conte to come into tuscany , that they might consider of some way to obstruct the dukes forces , which were then much stronger than ever they had been ; adding withal , that if their insolence was not suddenly restrained , there was no state in italy but would feel the incovenience . the conte knew well enough the apprehension of the florentines was but reasonable ; yet his desire that his marriage with the dukes daughter might proceed , kept him in suspence : and the duke perceiving his mind , kept him up with reiterated hopes , ( if he stir'd not against him ) for the young lady was now of age to have it consummated , and many times the treaty was so far advanced , that all convenient preparations were made for the wedding , when of a sudden some new scruple or cavil was found to protract it : however to make the conte more secure , he added some deeds to his promises ; and sent him thirty thousand florens , to which the duke had engaged himself by the articles of marriage . but this transaction hindered not the proceeding of the war in lombardy . every day the venetian lost some town or other ; the boats they sent to secure the rivers , were sunk and dispers'd by the dukes forces ; the country of bresca and verona harassed and possess'd ; and those cities both of them so straightly block'd up , the common opinion was , they could not hold out : the marquess of mantua , who for many years had been their general , left them ; and went over to the duke ; so what their pride would not suffer them to do in the beginning ; in the process of war , they were driven to by their fear ; for finding now they had no remedy but in the friendship of the conte , and the florentines , they demanded it of themselves ; but not without much diffidence and suspition , least the florentines should make them the same answer , which in the enterprize of lucca , they had received from them about the affairs of the conte : but they found them more tractable than they expected , and indeed more than their carriage towards them had deserved . so much more prevalent in the florentines was their old quarrel to their enemies than their new pick and exceptions to their friends . and having long before prefaged the distress into which the venetians of necessity would fall ; they had represented to the conte how inseparable his ruine would be from theirs ; and that he would find himself deceiv'd , if he expected the duke would esteem him more in his good , than his adverse fortune ; for it was fear of him ( whilst his affairs were uncertain ) and nothing else , had moved him to that treaty about his daughter ; and forasmuch as the same thing which necessity constrains people to promise , it constrains them to perform ; it was necessary to continue the duke in the same distress ; which could not be done , but by preserving the grandeur of the venetians . he ought therefore to consider , that if the venetians should be forced to quit their territory upon the land ; he would not only be deprived of the conveniences he might have from them , but of all that he might reasonably expect from other people who were afraid of them ; and if he reflected upon other states of italy , he would find some of them poor ; and some of them enemies ; and alone ( as they had often inculcated ) the florentines were not able to maintain him ; so that in all respects it was his interest to sustain the dominion of the venetians upon the terra firma . these persuasions , added to the hatred the conte had conceived against the duke , for his jugling about his daughter , dispos'd him to the agreement ; yet not so as to oblige himself to pass the po. the articles were agreed in february , in which the venetians engag'd to defray two thirds of the charge of the war , & the florentines one ; each of them obliging themselves at their own expences to defend the conte's lands in la marca in the mean time . nor was the league contented with these forces and allies ; for they joyned to them the lord of faenza , the sons of pandolfo malatesta da rimino and piero giampagolo ursino ; they tryed the marquess of mantoua likewise ; but they could not remove him from the duke ; to whom the lord of faenza revolted ( upon better conditions ) though he had enter'd the league ; which put them into great fear they should not be able to execute their designs in romagna so readily as they propos'd : at this time lombardy was in such distress , that brescia was besieged by the dukes forces , and reduced into such a condition , it was daily expected when by famine it should be constrained to surrender . verona was in the same condition , and if either of them was taken , it was concluded all farther opposition would be in vain , and all their expences hitherto lost : against this there was no visible remedy , but to send the conte into lombardy and in that there were three difficulties . one was to persuade the conte to pass the po , and carry on the war in all places : the second was , that the florentines seemed to be exposed thereby , and left to the discretion of the duke , who retiring into his own fastnesses , might divide his forces , and facing the conte with one party , joyn with their rebels with the other , and march into tuscany ; which was a course they were not a little afraid of . the third was , to resolve which way the conte might pass most securely into the contry of padua to the venetian army . of these three difficulties , the second relating to the florentines , took up the greatest debate ; but knowing the necessity , and tired with the venetians ( who press'd for the conte with all imaginable opportunity , and protested that without him they would give over all ) they prefer'd the necessity of their associate before any danger of their own . however , the difficulty of the way was refer'd to be secured by the venetians ; and because for the managing of this treaty , and inclining the conte to pass into lombardy , it was thought fit that neri the son of gino capponi should be dispatched to him ; the senate concluded to send for him to venice , to make the imployment the more grateful , and instruct him the more commodiously about the way the conte was to march . upon this invitation , neri departed from cesena , and came by water to venice , where never any prince was received with more honour and acclamation than he was by the senate ; for upon his coming and the resolutions which thereupon they were to take , they believed the whole happiness and safety of their government did depend : neri being introduced into the senate , spake to them in this manner . most serene prince , my masters were always of opinion , that the greatness of the duke would be the destruction of your commonwealth and their own ; and that if any thing prevented it , it must be the grandeur and prosperity of both . had this been credited in time by your lordships our condition had been better than it is ; and your state secure from many dangers wherewith it is now infested ; but you not having given us either assistance , or credit , when our necessities required , we could not make such haste to your relief ; nor you desire it so readily as you might have done ; had you known us better either in prosperity or adversity ; or understood that where we love once , our love is inextinguishable , and where we hate once , our hatred is immortal : the love and respect we have always retained to this illustrious senate , you your selves do know ; having many times seen lombardy full of our forces which was sent in to your relief : our animosity to philip is known to all the world , and we shall continue it to his family ; for 't is impossible old love , or inveterate hatred can ever be expung'd , let the new injuries , or endearments be as many as they will : we are , and have been assured , that in this war we might have stood neuter , with great favour from the duke , and no danger to our selves : for though by your expulsion he had made himself master of lombardy ; yet there would be enough left in italy to secure us ; seeing envy is always concomitant with power ; one encreases with the other ; and where envy is , war and distraction must follow . we were not insensible likewise ( by declining this war ) how great charges , and danger we should have avoided , and how easily , by our stirrings we may transplant into tuscany : but all these discouragments have been overrul'd by our affection of the state , and we resolved to assist you with the same vigour , as we would defend our selves : to this end ( most noble lords ) my masters judging it necessary above all things to relieve verona and brescia ; and imagining that impossible , but by the conduct of the count ; they sent me first to him to persuade his passing into lombardy , ( to which your lordship knows he would never be oblig'd ) and to try the same arguments with him , as wrought upon us : as he is invincible in arms , so he is not to be out done in courtesie ; and that frankness and generosity which he saw us practise towards you , he has endeavoured to exceed : he understood very well how much he should leave tuscany expos'd by his departure , but observing how we postponed our own safety to yours , he very generously has promised to do the same , and prefers your interest before his own . my business here is to proffer you the count at the head of horse , and foot , ready to receive your orders , and seek out the enemy as you please to direct . my request therefore is ( and it is the request of my masters , and his own ) that as he has exceeded the number which he was obliged to bring in to your service , so you would enlarge your reward ; that neither he may repent of his enterprize , nor we be sorry we persuaded him . these words of neri's were heard with as much attention by the senate , as if they had been delivered from an oracle , and so much was the auditory revived thereby , they had not patience to let their duke reply according to custom ; but rising all of them upon their feet , with their hands lifted up , and tears in their eyes , they gave the florentines thanks for the good office they had done them ; and him , for the diligence and dexterity of his dispatch ; promising that no time should ever obliterate it , not only in their own hearts , but in the hearts of their posterity ; and that their country and themselves would always be at the service of the florentines . but the transport being over they fell into serious debate about the way the count was to take , that bridges and all other conveniences might be provided : four ways there were before them . one from ravenna , along the shore ; but that lying most upon the sea , and the fens ; was not approved : the next was the direct way , but obstructed by a castle called the ucellino which was garrison'd by the duke , and to be taken , before they could pass ; and that could not be done in a short time without great difficulty , and to be long about it would frustrate their relief in another place , which required all possible expedition . the third way was by the forest of lugo , but the po being over-flown , that was unpassable . the fourth was thorow the country of bologna , over the bridges at puledrano , cento , and picue , and so by finale and bondeno to ferrara , from whence partly by water , and partly by land , they might pass into the country of padua , and joyn with the venetian army : this way also had its difficulties , and they were liable to be impeded by the enemies army ; yet being chosen as the best ; notice was given to the count , who departing with all imaginable speed , arrived in the country of padua on the th . of iune ; the arrival of so great a captain in lombardy , revived the whole government of venice ; and whereas before they were almost desperate of their safety ; they began now to take courage , and expect new conquests upon the enemy . the first thing the count attempted , was the relief of verona , to prevent which , nicolo marched with his army to soave ( a castle betwixt the country , of vicensa , and verona ) there he entrenched ; throwing up a ditch from soave to the marches of adice the count finding himself obstructed thorow the plain ; resolv'd to march over the mountains to verona ; presuming that nicolo would either believe he could not pass that way , by reason of its steepness and cragginess ; or let him pass so , before he believed it , that it would be too late to interrupt him . wherefore , taking eight days provision along with him , he march'd his army over the mountains , and at soave came down into the plains . and though nicolo had thrown up some works to incommode him , yet they were too weak to give him a stop . nicolo finding the enemy pass'd beyond his imagination ; and fearing to be forced to an engagement upon some disadvantage ; he drew off to the other side of the aldice , and the count , without farther obstacle , marched into verona . having overcome the first difficulty , and relieved verona , the next thing the count was to attempt , was to succour brescia . that city is seated so near the lake di garda , that though it was blocked up by land , yet the lake was open , and they could supply themselves with provisions . upon that consideration , the duke had put what force he could upon the lake , and in the beginning of his designs , had secured all the towns which were capable of supplying them by the benefit of the lake . the venetians had gallies likewise upon the lake ; but they were not strong enough to encounter the dukes . the count thought it necessary with his army to land , to give the venetian gallies some advantage upon the water ; and therefore he concluded to attempt some of those towns which lay conveniently for the famishing of brescia , he clap'd down therefore with his army before bandolino ( a castle standing upon the lake ) hoping if he took that , the rest would surrender . but in that enterprize , his fortune deceived him ; for most of his men falling sick , he was forced to raise the siege and remove his army to zemo , a castle belonging to the veronesi , where the air was more healthful , and the country more plentiful . the count retired , nicolo , not to slip the opportunity of making himself master of the lake , left his camp at vegasio , and with a select party went to the lake where joyning with the rest , he fell so furiously upon the venetian squadron , that he broke it quite , and took most of them prisoners . upon this victory , most of the castles upon the lake , surrender'd to the duke . the venetians , startled at this defeat , and fearing left the brescians should yield thereupon , they solicited the count very earnestly , both by letters , and messages , that he would attempt to relieve them . the count , perceiving his hopes of doing it by the lake , absolutely defeated , and his way by the fields impossible by reason of the trenches , and bulwarks , which were so numerous and strong , and an army to make them good , so that to venture among them would be inevitable destruction , the way by the mountains having been succesful to him at verona , he resolved to try it once more for the relief of brescia . having pitched upon his way , the count departed from zeno , and by the val d' acri , marching to the lake of st. andrea , he pass'd to forboli , and penda upon the lake di garda , from whence he advanced to tenna , and sate down before it ; it being necessary that castle should be taken before he could get into brescia . nicolo having intelligence of his design , marched his army to pischiera , and from thence ( joyning with the marquess of mantoua . and a commanded party of his best-men ) he proceeded to engage the count , who giving him battle , nicolo was beaten ; his army dispersed ; many of them taken prisoners ; and those which escaped , many of them fled to their camp , and many of them to the fleet. nicolo got off himself into tenna , and night being come , concluding if he stayed till morning he could never get farther , to avoid a certain danger , he exposed himself to a doubtful . of all his retinue , nicolo had only one servant with him , a lusty stong german , and one that had always been very faithful to him . nicolo persuaded his german , that if he would put him into a sack , he might carry him off to some secure place upon his shoulders , as some luggage of his masters . the enemy lay round before the castle , but ( transported and secure upon their victory the day before ) without any order , or guards : by which means the german found no great difficulty in the business , for putting himself into the habit of a freebooter , and mounting his master upon his shoulders , he passed thorow their whole camp , and brought him safe to his party . this victory , had it been improved as happily as it was gained , might have given more relief to brescia , and more felicity to the venetians : but being ill managed , they had little reason to exult , and brescia remaining in the same necessity as before ; for nicolo was no sooner returned to the forces which he had left behind , but he set all his wits to work which way he might exploit some new thing to attone for his loss ; and obstruct the relief of the town : he knew himself the situation of the citadel of verona , and had learned from the prisoners taken in that war : not only that it was ill guarded , but the way how it might easily be surprized : he believed therefore that fortune had presented him with an opportunity of recovering his honor , and converting his enemies joy , into sadness and sorrow . verona is in lombardy , seated at the foot of those mountains which divide italy from germany ; so that it stands partly upon the hill , and partly upon the plain ; the river adice rises in the vally di trento and running into italy , does not extend himself immediately thorow the plains ; but banding to the left hand among the mountains , it comes at length to the city ; and passes thorow the midst of it : yet not so as to divide it into equal parts , for towards the plain it is much greater , then towards the mountains : upon the rising part of the city , there are two castles , one of them called san piero , and the other san felice , which appear stronger in their situation , than their walls ; and do by it command the whole town . in the plain on this side the adice , behind the wall of the city , there are two fortresses about a thousand paces distant one from the other ; of which the one is called the old citadel , and the other the new . on the inside of one of them , there passes a wall to the other and is ( in respect of the other walls which fetch a compass ) as the string to a bow . all the space betwixt these two walls , is full of inhabitants and called the borg of san zeno. these two castles and the burg , nicolo designed to surprize , believing it would be no difficult matter , both because of the former negligence of the guards ( which he presumed after the late victory would be much greater ) and of an opinion he had , that no enterprize was so feasible as that which the enemy believed was impossible to be done . having drawn out a party of choice men in order to his design , he joyned with the marquess of mantoua , and marching in the night to verona , he scaled the new citadel , and tooke it without being perceived , and then forcing upon the port di s. antoine , the signal was given to his horse , and they marched all of them into the town . those of the old citadel who were upon the guard , hearing the noise when the sentinels in the other citadel were knock'd on the head , and when the gate of s. antoine was broken up , believing it was the enemy , cryed out to the people to arm ; and fell a ringing their bels. the citizens taking the alarm , came together in great confusion ! those of them who had most courage , got to their arms , and retreated with them to the palace of the rettori : in the mean time nicolo's souldiers had plundered the borgo di s. zeno , and advancing towards the town , the citizens , perceiving the dukes forces was entred , and no way left to defend themselves : advised the venetian rettori to retire into the fortresses , and preserve themselves and their goods , for ( as they said ) it would be much better to do so , and attend better fortune ; than by endeavouring to avoid the present danger , to be knock'd on the head , and the whole city pillaged : hereupon the rettori , and all the venetians betook themselves to the castle of s. felice ; and several of the principal citizens went to meat nicolo and the marquess of mantoua to beg of them that they would rather possess that city rich , and with honor , than poor to their disgrace ; especially seeing they had not by an obstinate defence deserved preferment from their old masters , or hatred from their new . the marquess and nicolo having encouraged them what they could , they protected them from plunder as much as was possible ; and because they were confident the count would immediately address himself to the recovery of the town , they contrived with all imaginable industry to get the fort into their hands ; but what they could not take , they block'd up with ditches and trenches cut about to obstruct the enemy from relieving them . the count francesco was with his army at tenna , where upon the first report of this surprize , he believed it but vain ; afterwards understanding the truth , he resolved by a more than ordinary speed to recompence his former negligence , and expiate its disgrace . and though all the chief officers of his army advis'd him to give over his enterprize of brescia , and verona , and retire to vicenza , least otherwise the enemy should encompass him where he was , yet he would not consent ; but resolved to try his fortune for the recovery of verona , and turning about to the venetian proveditori , and barnardetto de medici ( who assisted as commissioner for the florentines ) he encouraged them in their doubts and assured them he would retake it if any of the castles held out for him . having put all things in order , and drawn out his men , he marched towards verona with all expedition : at first sight , nicolo imagined he was marching to vicenza , as he had been counselled by his officers ; but observing him to march on , and direct his forces towards the castle of s. felice , he thought it time to provide for his defence : but all was too late , the trenches , and embarrasments were not finished ; the souldiers separated , and plundering , and could not be got together time enough to hinder the count from getting into the citadel , and from thence into the city , to the great disparagement of nicolo , and detriment of his party , who with the marquess of mantoua , retreated first into the citadel which they had taken , and from thence escaped to the city of mantoua , where rallying the remainder of their forces , they joyned themselves with the army before brescia : so that in four days time verona was won and lost by the duke forces . being winter time , and the weather very cold the count having after his victory , put in some supplies of victual into brescia , though with very great difficulty , he removed his quarters to verona , having given order for the building certain gallies to forboli that winter , to be ready against the spring , that then he might be so strong both by land and by water , as to give brescia an effectual and total relief . the duke seeing the war at a stand for a time , and his hopes of being master of verona and brescia , at an end ; all which he attributed to the counsel and supplies of the florentines , whose affection could not be alienated , by all the provocations the venetians had given them ; nor gained over to his side , by all the promises which he had made them ; that they might be sensible of their own oversight , and feel the inconveniences they had pulled upon themselves , he resolved to invade tuscany , to which he was much encouraged by nicolo , and the florentine exiles . nicolo's design was upon the possessions of braccio , and to drive the count out of la marca : the other had an itching after their own country , and a mind to be at home , so that both parties animated the duke with such arguments as were most sutable to their particular designs : nicolo told him he might send him with an army into tuscany , and leave brescia besieged ; for he was master of the lake ; was well entrenched about the town ; had several strong castles in the country ; and good officers and souldiers enough to resist the count , if he should make any attempt in another place ; which was not to be imagined till he had relieved brescia , and that was impossible : so that if he pleased , he might make war in tuscany , and not quite his enterprize in lombardy ; he remonstrated besides that the florentines would be constrained , as soon as they saw him in tuscany , to call back the count or be ruined ; and whichsoever of the two happen , his victory would be certain , the exiles , inculcated , that if nicolo came near florence with his army , it was impossible , but the people , tired out with their taxes and the insolence of the grandees , would take arms and revolt ; as to his passage to florence , they promised it should be easie , and casentino open to them , by the interest and correspondence which rinaldo held with that governor : so that the duke , inclinable of himself , was much fortified and encouraged by their persuasions : the venetians on the other side ( though the winter was very sharp ) press'd the count to the relief of brescia with his whole army ; but he refused , alledging it was not to be done at that time ; that better weather was to be expected , and that in the interim their fleet should be got ready and then it might be attempted both by land and by water : which answer giving no satisfaction , the venetians became slow , and remiss in sending them provisions , so that in their army many people died . the florentines having advertisement of all these passages , were greatly dismaid ; seeing the war brought home to them of tuscany , and that in lombardy , not turn'd to account : nor were they less fearful of the forces of the church ; not that the pope was their enemy , but that they found that army at the devotion of the patriarch who was their implacable adversary : giovanni vitelleschi cornetano was first apostolical notarie , then bishop of ricanati , after the patriarch of alexandria , and being at last created cardinal , was called the cardinal of florence ; this cardinal was a cunning and couragious person , so capable of business that the pope , had a strong affection for him , gave him command of the forces of the church , and in all the popes enterprizes in tuscany , romagna , naples , and rome , he was constantly his general ; so that by degrees he gained so great authority both over the army , and the pope , that the pope began to be afraid to command him , and the army , to refuse their obedience to any body but he . the cardinal being at that time in rome , when the news arrived that nicolo was marching into tuscany . the fear of the florentines was highly increased , because from the time of rinaldo's expulsion , that cardinal had been an enemy to their state , for the articles of agreement which were , by his mediation procured in florence , were not made good , but rather managed to the prejudice of rinaldo , he having been the occasion of his laying down his arms , & that , the occasion of his banishment ; so that the government of florence began to fear the time was come for the restauration of rinaldo , if he joyned with nicolo in his expedition into tuscany and their apprehensions were augmented by the sudden departure of nicolo , who seemed to them to leaven enterprize which he had almost compleated , to embark himself in another ther that was more dangerous and doubtful : which they presumed he would never have done , without some private intelligence , or unknown invitation : these their apprehensions they had infused into the pope , who was grown sensible of his error in having transferred so much authority upon other people . but whilst the florentines were in this suspence , fortune presented them a way , to secure themselves of the patriarch : that state had scouts abroad to intercept , and peruse all letters , to see if they could meet with any correspondence to the prejudice of the state ; at monte pulciano it happened a pacquet was taken which the patriarch had written to nicolo piccinino without the knowledg or consent of the pope . though the character was strange , and the sence so implicite and abstruse , that nothing could be made out of it , yet that obscurity , considered with its directions to an enemy , alarmed his holiness so , as he resolved to secure him . the care of his apprehension he committed to antonio rido da padoua , whom he had made governor of the castle of rome . antonio as soon as he had his orders , was ready to execute them , and expected an opportunity . the patriarch had resolved to pass into tuscany and having fixed upon the next day for his departure from rome , he sent to the governor that he would be upon the bridge next morning at a precise hour , for he had something to discourse with him : antonio thought now his opportunity was come , ordered his people as he thought convenient , and at the time appointed was ready expecting the patriarch upon the bridge , which was to be drawn up , or let down , as occasion required . the patriarch was punctual , and came exactly at his time , and antonio entertaining him a while upon the bridge , gave a sign , and on a sudden the bridge was pulled up , and the patriarch in the castle ; so that of the general of an army he became a prisoner in a moment . the people which were with him , began to swagger at first , but understanding afterwards it was his holinesses direction , they were pacified and quiet : and the governor of the castle comforting him with fair words , and giving him hopes of a better condition , the patriarch replyed , that great persons were not secured , to be discharged again ; that those who deserved to be seized , did not deserve to be dismissed , and it was his own case , for he died in prison not long after , and lodovico patriarch of aquileia was made general of the pope's army in his place ; who though before he could not be engaged in the wars betwixt the duke and the league , yet then he was persuaded ; and promised to be ready for the defence of tuscany , with horse and foot. being delivered from this danger , there was another of no less importance , and that was their fear of nicolo upon the confusion of affairs in lombardy , and the differences betwixt the venetians and the count : for better information , the florentines sent neri the son of gino capponi , and guiliano d' anazenti to venice , as also to settle the prosecution of the war for the next year , commanding neri , upon the resolution of the venetians , to repair to the count , to found his , and exhort him to such courses as should be necessary for the security of the league : these embassadors were scarce got onward on their way , as far as ferrara , before they had the news that piccinino had passed the po with horse . thereupon they made what haste was possible , and being come to venice , they found that senate very positive to have brescia relieved at that very time , not being ( as they said ) able to attend any better , nor their state to put out any fleet , so that without present supply , they would be forced to surrender , which would compleat the dukes successes , and be the loss of all their territories by land : finding them so perverse , neri went to verona , to hear what arguments the count could produce to the contrary , who with good reasons made it out to him , that to endeavour the relief of brescia in that juncture , would be not only ineffectual at present , but much to their prejudice afterwards , for considering the season of the year , and situation of the town , nothing could be done , he should only harrass and disorder his men so , as when a proper time for action should come , he should be forced to draw of to verona to supply himself with what the winter had consumed , and what was necessary for their future support ; so that all the time that was fit for action , would be spent in marching backward and forward . to adjust these things , orsalto iustiniani , and giovan pisani were sent to verona to the count , by whom it was concluded ( after much dispute ) that the venetians for the ensuing year should give the count . ducats , and . a piece to the rest of his army . that he should march forth with his whole army , and fall upon the duke , endeavouring by some smart impression upon his country to make him recal nicolo out of lombardy . after which conclusion , they returned to venice , but the venetians ( the sum being thought very great ) went on but slowly with their preparations . nicolo piccinino proceeded however , was got already into the country of romagna , and tampered so successfully with the sons of pandolfo malatesta , that they deserted the venetians and took up arms under the duke : this news was unpleasing at venice , but at florence much more ; because that way they thought to have given nicolo a stop . but the malatesti being in rebellion , the florentines were not a little dismaid , especially fearing , that their general piero giampagolo orsino ( who was then in the territories of the malatesti ) might be defeated , and they by consequence disarmed : these tidings , were also no small trouble to the count , who began to apprehend if nicolo passed into tuscany , he might be in danger of losing la marca , and ( disposed to secure his own country if he could ) he came to venice , and being introduced to the duke , he declared to him . that his passage into tuscany would be convenient for the league , for the war was to be carried on , where the general , and army of the enemy was , and not among their private , and particular towns , and garisons : because their army once beat , there is an end of the war ; but though their garrisons be taken , and their towns reduced , if their army be intire , they should be never the nearer , but the war ( as it does many times happen ) would break out more severely . assuring them that la marca and all tuscany would be lost if nicolo was not briskly opposed ; which being lost , no remedy could be expected in lombardy ; but if it might , he did not understand how he could with any excuse abondon his own subjects and friends ; for coming into lombardy a prince , he should be loth to leave it as a private captain . to this the duke of venice replyed , that it was manifest , and nothing more certain , that if he left lombardy , and passed the po with his army , all their territories upon land would be lost ; and that it would be to no purpose to consume more mony in defending it . for he can be no wise man who endeavours to defend that which he is sure to lose , and he no fool who chuses to lose his country alone , rather than his country and mony too , and if the loss of their affairs should follow , it would then be clear enough how much it imported the reputation of the venetians , to protect romagna and tuscany . but the whole senate was against his opinion , believing if he succeeded in lombardy , he should be sure every where else , and that could be no hard task ; that state , upon nicolo's departure , being left weak and infirm , so that that might be ruined , before nicolo could be called back , or any other sufficient remedy provided . that if things were curiously examined , it would be found that nicolo was sent into tuscany upon no other errand , but to divert the count from his enterprize in lomberdy , and remove the war from his own country by carrying it into another : so that if the count should pursue him without irresistable necessity , he would rather accomplish his des●gns , and do as he would have him : but if they continued their army in lombardy , 〈◊〉 shifted in tuscany as well as they could ; they would be sensible of their ill resolution when it was too late , and find that they had lost all in lombardy irrecoverably , without any equivalence or reprisal in tuscany . 〈◊〉 manner every man having spoken , and replyed , as his judgment directed him ; it was concluded to be quiet for some days , to see what the agrement betwixt nicolo and the malatesti would produce : whether the florentines might rely upon piero giam pagolo ; and whether the pope proceeded fairly with the league as he had promised he would . this ●●●●lution b●ing taken , not long after , they had intelligence ; that piero giam pagolo was 〈◊〉 towards tuscany with his army ; and that the pope was better inclined to the 〈◊〉 at that time , than before ; with which advertisements the count being confirmed , he was content to remain in lombardy himself ; that neri should be dispatched thither with a of his horse , and five hundred others , and if things should proceed so , as that his presence should be necessary in tuscany ; upon the left summons from neri the count engaged to repair to him without any delay . accordingly neri marched away , arrived with his forces at florence in april , and the same day giam pagolo arrived there also ; in the mean time nicolo piccinino having settled the affairs of romagna , was designing for tuscany ; and being inclined to have marched by the way of the alps of s. benedetto , and the vale of montone , he found that passage so well defended by the conduct of nicolo da pisa , that he believed his whole army would not be able to force it : and because of the suddenness of this irruption the florentines were but indifferently provided either with souldiers , or officers , they committed the passes of the other alps to the guard of certain of their citizens , with some new raised companies of foot , among which citizens bartholomeo orlandini had the command , and more particularly the keeping of the castle of marradi , and the pass that was by it . nicolo piccinino supposing the pass of s. benedetto insuperable by reason of the courage and vigilance of the commander ; chose rather to attempt the other way where the cowardice and inexperience of the chief officer was not like to give him so great opposition . marradi is a castle built at the foot of those alps which divide tuscany and romagna ; but on the side of romagna , at the entrance into the vale di lamona though it has no walls , yet the river , the mountains and the inhabitants make it strong . for the men are martial and faithful , and the river has worn away the bancks , and made such grotes and hollows therein , that it is impossible from the valley to approach it , if a little bridge which lies over the river be defended : and on the mountain side the rocks and the cliffs are so steep , it is almost impregnable : but the pusillanimity of bartolomeo debas'd the courage of his men , and rendered the situation of his castle of no importance : for no sooner did he hear the report of the enemies approach , but leaving all in confusion , away he ran with his party , and never stoped til he came at borgo a san. lorenzo . nicolo ( having posses'd himself of that pass : strangely surprized to consider how poorly it had been defended ; and as much pleased that now it was his own ) marched down into mugello , and having taken several castles , he staid at puliciano to refresh ; from whence he made his excursions as far as monte fiesole , and was so bold to pass the river arno , scouring , forraging , and pl●undering the country within three miles of florence . the florentines however were not at all dismaid , but the first thing they did was to secure the government , of which they were not much afraid both for the intrest which cosimo had with the people ; and the method they had taken to reduce the chief officers of the city into the hands of a few of the most potent citizens , who with their vigilance and severity kept under all such as were discontented , or studious of new things , besides they had news of the resolutions in lombardy : of neri's approach ; with the number of his forces , and that the pope had promised to supply them with more : which hopes were sufficient to support them till neri's arrival . but neri finding the city in some disorders , resolved to take the field , and restrain nicolo from foraging so freely : and therefore drawing together , what infantry he could , out of the people , he joyned them with his horse , marched into the field , and took remole , which the enemy had possess'd . after the taking of that town , he encamped his army there ; obstructed the excursions of nicolo ; and gave the city great hopes of sending him farther off . nicolo observing , though the florentines had lost many of their men , it procured no commotion ; and understanding they were all quiet and secure in the town , he concluded it vain to lose time any longer , wherefore he changed his designs , and resolved to do something which might cause the florentines to provoke him to a battle , in which he doubted not to overcome , and then all things would follow as he expected , of course . there was at that time in nicolo's army , francesco conte di poppi who ( when the enemy was in mugello ) revolted from the florentines , with whom he was in league , the florentines had a jealousie of him before and ende●voured to continue him their friend , by enlarging his pay , and making him there deputy over all the towns which were near him , but nothing could do , so strongly did his affection incline him to the other party , that no fear , nor act of kindness what ever was sufficient to divide him from rinaldo , and the rest of the brethren , who had had the government formerly : so that he no sooner heard of nicolo's approach , but he went in to him immediately , and solicited him with all imaginable importunity to advance towards the city and march into casentino ; discovering to him the whole strength of the country , and with what ease and security he might straiten the enemy . nicolo took his counsel , and marching into casentino , he possess'd himself of romena , and bibiena , and afterwards encamped before castle san nicolo . that castle is placed at the foot of those alps which divide casentino from the vale of arno ; and by reason it stood high , and had a strong garison in it , it was no easie matter to take it , though nicolo ply'd it continually with his cannon . this siege continued twenty days , during which time the florentines had got together what force they could , and had already under several officers foot at fegghine , commanded by piero giam pagolo as general ; neri capponi , and bernardo de medici as commissioners . the castle of san nicolo had sent out four persons to give them notice of their condition , and press them for relief : whereupon the commissioners examining the situation of the place , found it was not to be relieved but by the alps which came down from the vale of arno , the tops of which might easily be possess'd by the enemy , before they could come at them , in respect they had a shorter cut to them , and the florentines could not stir , but they must of necessity be seen : so that to attempt a thing which was not like to succeed , was to expose and cast away their men without doing any good : upon these considerations the commissioners having commended their courage pass'd , advised them to continue it whilst they were able , and when they found they could hold it no longer , to surrender upon as good termes as they could : hereupon after days siege nicolo became master of the castle , but the losing so much time upon so inconsiderable a place , was ( in great part ) the miscarriage of that enterprize : for had he invested florence , or but keep it blocked up at a distance , the governor of that city would have been constrained to raise mony , and men , and must have supplied it with provisions , with much more difficulty , having the enemy so near them , besids many would have been pressing for peace seeing the war so likely to continue : but the desire the count di poppi had to be revenged of that garison ( which had been his enemy a long time ) caused him to give that counsel , and nicolo to oblige him , consented to it , which was the destruction of both : and indeed it seldom happens , but private animosity , proves a prejudice to the interest of the publick . nicolo , pursuing his victory , took passina and chiusi , and the count di poppi persuaded him to continue in those parts , alledging that he might extend his quarters betwixt chiusi , and pieve as he pleased , and making himself master of the alps , he might as he saw occasion , return to the old post in casentino and the vale arno , or falling down into vale di chiana and the vale de fevere , be ready upon the least motion of the enemy . but nicolo reflecting upon the rockiness of those places , only he replyed his horses could swallow no stones , and removed to borgo a s. sepulcro where he was received with all demonstration of kindness , from whence he endeavoured to debauch the citizens of castello , but they were too firm to the florentines to entertain any such motion . being desirous to have perugia ( where he was born ) at his devotion , he went either with horse to make them a visit , and was honorably treated , but in a few days he rendred himself suspected , having been wheedling with the legate and several of the citizens , and made many proposals to them , but none of them succeeded ; so that receiving ducats of them , he returned to his army . after this he got intelligence in cortona , and was very busie in seducing it from the florentines , but being discovered before it was ripe , that also came to nothing . among the principal of that city there was on bartolomeo di senso , who going the rounds one night by the captains order , was told by a country man his friend , that if he had no mind to be killed , he should have a care , and go back . bartolomeo pressing to know his reason ; he found the whole series of the plot , and went immediately to the governor , and acquainted him : how , seizing upon the conspirators , and doubling his gurards thereupon , expected the coming of nicolo according to agreement , who came indeed punctually at his time , but finding himself descovered , returned to his quarters . whilst things ware carried on in tuscany at this rate , with little advantage to the forces of the duke , his affairs in lombardy were as unquiet , but with more detriment and loss , for count francesco as soon as the season gave leave , took the field with his army , and the venetians having repaired their fleet in the lake , he thought it best in the first place to make himself master of that , and to drive the duke out ; supposing when he had done that , the rest would be easie . whereupon he caused the venetian . fleet to set upon the dukes ; which they did , and defeated them ; after which he took all the castles which they had in their possession , so that the enemy which besieged brescia by land , understanding the destiny of their comerades , drew of from the siege ; and left the town free , after it had been straitned three years . having finished his business there , and obtained so important a victory , the count thought ●it to seek out the enemy , who was retired to socino , a castle upon the river of oglio , and dislodging them there , they retreated to cremona : where the duke made a head , and resolved to defend that part of his country . but the count advancing daily against him ; being fearful he should lose all , or a great part of his territory , he began to lament the resolution of sending nicolo into tuscany ; and to redress his error , he writ word to nicolo of the condition he was in , pressing him with all speed to come back to his relief . the florentines in the mean time had joyned their forces with the popes , and made a halt at anghiari a castle at the foot of the mountains which part val di tevere , from valdichiana , four miles distant from san sepulcro ; betwixt which places the way was plain , the country champain , sit for horse , and proper for a battle . having heard of the counts victory , and that nicolo was recalled , they thought the victory might be obtained without more hazard or labour , and therefore orders was dispatched in all haste to the comissaries to avoid an engagement by all means ; for nicolo could not stay in tuscany many days . these orders coming to nicolo's ear , finding that of necessity he must part ; that he might have left nothing untryed , he resolved to provoke them to a battle , believing he should take them unprovided , seeing ( according to their intelligence ) they could have no reason to expect any such thing ; and to this he was much encouraged by rinaldo , the conte di poppi , and all the florentine exiles , who knew well enough they were undone if nicolo departed ; but if they could bring them to a fight , there was a possibility of prevailing , and if they did lose the victory , they should lose it with honor . this resolution being taken , the army moved ; and being advanced as far as borgo before the florentines perceived it , he commanded men out of that city , who , ( relying much upon the conduct of their general , and the promises he made them , being also desirous of plunder ) followed him chearfully . marching on from thence directly towards anghiari in battalia , nicolo arrived with his whole army within two miles , when micheletto attendulo perceiving a great dust , and suspecting it to be the enemy , cryed out to have all people stand to their arms. the tumult in the florentine camp was not small ; for that army encamped ordinarily without any discipline , and being negligent besides , in presumption the enemy were further off , they were fitter to fly than to fight ; all of them being disarm●d , and straggled from their quarters into such places as the shade , or their recreations had carried them . nevertheless so much diligence was used by the commissaries , and the general , that before the enemy could get up , they were on horseback , and in order to receive them ; and as micheletto was the first that discovered them , so he was the first that engaged them ; running with his troop to secure the bridge which crossed the way not far from anghiari . micheletto having posted himself at the bridge , simomino an officer of the popes , and his legate , placed themselves on the right hand , and the florentine commis●aries , and general on the left ; having planted the foor as thick as possible upon the banks ; there was only one way for the enemy to attack them and that was by the bridge ; nor had the florentines any where to defend themselves but there ; only they ordered their foot , that if the enemies foot , should leave the high way , and fall upon the flanks of the horse ; they should let fly at them with their ; crossbows , and give their cavalry a secure passage over the bridge . the first that appeared , were gallantly received by micheletto , and repulsed ; but astor re , and francesco piccinino coming in with a commanded party , to their relief , they charged him so briskly , that micheletto was not only beat back over the bridge , but pursued to the very end of the town , and they which pursued them being charged again in the flank , were repulsed over the bridge , and all things as at first . this skirmish continued two hours compleat : sometimes nicolo , and sometimes the florentines being masters of the bridge ; and though the fight upon the bridge was equal to both , yet on this side and the other , nicolo had much the disadvantage . for nicolo's men passing the bridge were received by a gross of the enemy , which being drawn up with advantage by reason of the ground , could charge , or wheel , or relieve those that were distressed as they saw occasion . but when the florentines passed over , nicolo had no place to relieve his men for the ditches and banks in the way , as it appeared in the conflict ; for though nicolo's forces gained the bridge several times , yet by the fresh supplies of the enemy they were still forced to give back : but when the florentines prevailed , and passed over the bridge , nicolo had not time , by reason of the briskness of their charge , and the incommodity of the ground to reinforce his men , but those which were behind were forced to mix with those that were before , one disordered the other , and the whole army was constrained to fly , and every man got to bargo as well as he could . the florentines let them go , as having more inclination to the plunder , which in horses , arms , and other things afforded them a plentiful prey ; for with nicolo there escaped not above horse , most of the rest being taken prisoners : the citizens of borgo who had followed nicolo for prize became prize themselves , and were most of them taken ; with all their carriages and colours : this victory was not so much prejudicial to the duke , as it was advantageous to tuscany , for had the florentines lost the day , that province had been his ; but he losing it , lost nothing but his arms and his horses , which a little money would recruit . never was there any war made in an enemies country with less execution than in this , for in so great a rout , and so sharp an engagement , which lasted four hours , there was but one man slain , and he not by any wound or honorable exploit , but falling from his horse he was trodden to death : with such security did they fight then ; for all of them being cuirashers on horseback , and compleatly armed , they could not presently be killed , and if they found there was no likelyhood of getting off themselves , or being rescued by their friends , they surrendred before they could come at them to slay them : this battel both in it self and consequences , was a great instance of the unhappiness of that war ; for the enemy being beaten , and nicolo fled to borgo , the commissioners would have pursued , and besieged him in that place , to have made there victory intire : but some of the officers and souldiers would not obey ; pretending they would dispose of their plunder , and cure themselves of their wounds , and which is more remarkable the next day about noon without any regard to , or leave from their superior officers , they went to arezzo ; deposited their prey ; and returned to anghiari when they had done . a thing so contrary to all order and military discipline , that the reliques and remainder of any well governed army would easily have rob'd them of their victory , which so undeservedly they had obtained . and besides this , the commissioners giving order that all prisoners should be kept ( to prevent their rallying , or getting together again ) in spight of their orders , they dismiss'd them all . a thing most justly to be admir'd , that an army so constituted , should be able to get the victory , and that the enemy should be so poor spirited as to be beaten by them . whilst the florentines therefore were marching to arezzo and returning again , nicolo had opportunity to quit borgo , and draw off all his men towards romagna ; and with him the florentine exiles , who seeing their hopes desperate of returning to florence they dispersed themselves into all parts of italy , and some of them into other countries , as their conveniences prompted them , of these rinaldo chose ancona for his residence , and afterwards ( to obtain a mansion in heaven , for that which he had lost upon earth ) he went to visit the sepulchre of our saviour ; from whence being returned , as he was sitting at table very merry at the wedding of one of his daughters , he fell down on a sudden , and died . his fortune being favourable so far , as to take him away in one of the most pleasant days of his life ; a man truly honorable in all conditions , but would have been much more , had his stars brought him forth in a city that had been united ; for florence being factious , the same things disgusted there , which would have been rewarded in another place . the commissaries when their men were come back from arezzo , and nicolo departed , presented themselves before borgo ; whereupon the townsmen would have surrendred to the florentines , but could not be accepted : in this treaty and negotiation , the commissaries became jealous of the popes legate , lest he had a design for seizing it for the church ; so that they came to ill language , and doubtless some ill accident would have happened , had those proposals proceeded : the popes legate being gratified in his desires : that controversie fell to the ground . whilst they were so solicitous for the enterprize of borgo , news came that nicolo piocinino was marched towards rome ▪ but others said towards la marca , wherefore the legate , and many of the rest , gave their opinions to march towards perugia , to be ready to defend either rome or la marca , whither nicolo was fled with bernat do de medici ; and neri , with the florentine● , were to march for casentino : this being determined , neri departed with his forces to rassina ; took it , and bibi●na , prato vecchio , and romeni ; from thence he marched to poppi , and besieged it on two sides ; one towards the plain of certomondo ; and the other upon the mountain that goes along to fronzoli . count poppi seeing himself forsaken both by god and man , had shut himself up in poppi , not with any hopes of relief , but to make his conditions so much the better ; and neri coming before it , and forming his siege ; he desired a parly , and had as good terms offered , as in his state could be expected , which were to go away himself , and his children , with what ever they could carry with them , for which the town , and its territory was to be delivered to the florentines ; whilst the treaty was managing , he came down to the bridge over the arno which is at the end of the town , and calling to neri , in great sorrow and affliction he said to him , had i considered my own ill fortune , and your power as i should have done , i had been now as ● friend congratulating your victory , and not suppl●cating your mercy as an enemy . fortune at present is favourable and propitious to you : to me it is rigid and severe ; i had horses and arms , and subjects , and estate , and who can wonder if i part with them unwillingly ? but if you please ( as you may ) to command all tuscany , we must of necessity obey : i have this only to comfort me , that had not i committed this error , such would not have been that exercise nor demonstration of your generosity , for if now you should think fit to preserve me , you will leave to the world an indelible instance , and example of clemency : let therefore your compassion exceed my offence , and permit at least that this single residence may continue to those from whom your predecessors have received formerly many obligations . neri replyed , that he had unhappily placed his hopes upon people which could do him no good . that he had transgressed so highly against the republick of florence , that as things then stood , there was a necessity of yielding up all , and that he must abandon those places , as he was an enemy to florence , which as a friend he had refused to preserve ; for he had given so ill a testimony and example of himself , that he could not be continued ; and in every chance of fortune had been so unconstant and various , that they could not have any confidence but that still be would be working to the prejudice of their state , and yet it was not so much him , as his interest they were afraid of . but if he would withdraw into germany , the government of florence would intercede , that he might reside there as a prince and be a friend to him , for the obligations he said they had received from his ancestors . to which the count answered in great passion , that he would be farther off the florentines than so , and laying aside all further capitulation ( seeing no remedy ) the count delivered up the town , and all his other concerns to the florentines ; only his goods , his wife and children departed with him , very disconsolate , for having lost a dominion which his predecessors had enjoyed above years . these successes being known in florence , were received with great joy and acclamation , both by the magistrates and people . and because barnardetto de medici , found that nicolo 's marching towards rome or la marca would be of little importance , he returned with his forces to neri , and both of them coming back to florence , it was resolved that they would be entertained with the highest honors which could be conferred by that city , upon their victorious members , and accordingly they were received in a triumphant manner , by the senate the captains of the parties , and the whole city beside . the history of florence . book vi. it always was ( and 't is reasonable it be ) the design and end of all those who make war , to enrich themselves , and impoverish the enemy ; nor is conquest and victory desired upon any other score , but to magnifie the one , and to depress the other : hence it is , that when ever victory impoverishes or debilitates you , you have either transgressed , or fallen short , of what you aimed at in the war. that prince , or commonwealth is enriched by victory , when he exirpateth his enemy , and impropriats the spoil . on the other side , his victory impoverishes him , when ( though he overcomes his enemy ) he cannot utterly extinguish him , and the spoil and prey is left to the souldiers . this prince , this commonwealth is unhappy in its losses , but more in its victories ; for being defeated , it is lyable to the injuries of its enemies ; and being victorious , to the contumely of its friends , which as they are less reasonable , are less supportable , seeing it is again necessitated to oppress and disgust its subjects by new impositions and taxes : and if there be the least humanity in government , it cannot rejoyce or exult in a victory , which makes all its subjects sad . the well governed commonwealths of old , were wont to fill their bags with gold and silver ; destribute donatives , remit subsidies and tribute to the people and solemnize their victories with merriment and feasting ; but those of whom we write , drained their exchequer , impoverished the people , and never secured themselves of their enemies ; which proceeded from the disorders in the management of the war ; for having beaten , and pillaged the enemy , they neither kept them prisoners , nor killed them ; so that ( being incensed ) they forbate revenging themselves upon the conqueror no longer than he which cammanded them could recruit them with horses and arms : and the plunder and ransoms falling to the souldiers , the conquerours made no advantage of the spoils of the enemy , but were forced to tear their supplies out of the bowels of their subjects ; nothing of benefit accurring to the people , they were rendred more imperious and cruel in their taxes : and those souldiers had brought things to that pass , that both the conqueror and conquered ( if they intented to preserve their authority over their men ) were in necessity of more money ; for the one side was to be recruited , the other to be rewarded ; and as the one could not fight , unless he was newly equipped ; so the other would not engage him without recompence for what was passed ; from whence it happened , that one side had no great joy of its victory ; and the other no great sence of its loss ; for the conquered had time to recruit , and the conqueror had none to pursue . this disorder and perversness in the souldier was the reason that nicolo was recruited , and on horse back again , before his defeat was known thorow italy ; and sharper war he made upon his enemies afterwards , than he had ●ver done before . this it was , that after his rout before brescia , enabled him to surprize verona : this it was , that after he was worsted at verona , gave him opportunity to invade tuscany ; this it was , that after his loss at anghiari , recruited him again , and made him stronger in the field ( ere he got to romagna ) than he was before , which gave the duke new hopes of defending lombardy , though by means of his absence he had looked upon it as lost : for whilst nicolo was giving the enemy an alarm at tuscany the duke of milan was reduced to a condition of hazarding all , and therefore apprehending he might be undone , before nicolo ( who was sent for ) would come to his rescue , to stop the career of the count , and temper his fortune by industry , which he could not do by force ; he had recourse to those remedies which in the like case he had many times used and sent nicolo da esti prince of ferrara to peschiera to the count , to persuade him in his name to a peace ; and to remonstrate to him that the prosecution of the war could not turn to his advantage ; for if the duke should be distressed , and unable to maintain his ●eputation , the count would be the first which would suffer by it ; by reason the venetians and florentines would have no farther occasion , and by consequence no farther esteem for him : and as a testimony of the sincerity of his proposal , the duke offered to co●●mmate , his marriage , and send his daughter to ferrara to be delivered to him as soon as the peace was concluded ; to which the count replied , that if the duke did truly desire peace , he might easily have it ; for the venetians and florentines were as much inclined to it as he , but the difficulty would be to persuade them he was in earnest , as knowing he would never have proposed any such thing , had not some necessity constrained him ; and as soon as that should be removed , he would make war upon them again . as to the business of his marriage , he could not repose any confidence in his promise , having been so often baffled by him before : nevertheless , if every thing else were agreed , he should proceed in it as his friends should advise . the venetians , who are jealous of their souldiers , where they have no reason to be so , had reason enough to be suspicious here , which the count being desirous to remove , prosecuted the war with all diligence imaginable ; but his mind was so inflamed with ambition , and the venetians so slack , and intepidated with jealousie , little more was done that summer : so that when nicolo piccinino returned into lombardy , winter came on , and the armies were sent to their winter quarters . the count to verona ; the duke to cremona : the florentines into tuscany , and the popes army to romagna , which after the battle of anghiari , assaulted furli and bologna in hopes to have taken them from francesco piccinino , who kept them from his father , and defended them so well , they could not get them out of his hands ; nevertheless their coming into those parts so terrified the people of ravenna that to avoid the domination of the church by consent of os●asio di potenta their lord , they submitted to the venetian , who ( in recompence of his kindness , that he might never recover by force , what he had given them with so little discretion ) sent ostasio with his only son to spend their days in candia , where they died : in which expedition his holiness wanting mony , ( notwithstanding the victory at anghiari ) he was glad to sell the castle of borg● a san sepulcro to the florentines for ducats . things being in this posture , and all sides thinking themselves safe as long as it was winter ; all thoughts of peace were laid aside , especially by the duke , who thought himself doubly safe , both in the season of the year , and the arrival of nicolo ; had therefore broke of his treaty with the count a little abruptly ; and in great haste rigged out nicolo again with all provisions and accoutrements that were necessary for the war : the count having notice of his preparations , went to venice to consult the senate how affairs were to be ordered the next summer . when nicolo was ready ( perceiving the enemy out of order ) he never staid for the spring , but in the coldest of the winter he passed the adda , and acri , surprized horse , and took most of them prisoners : but that which touched the count nearest and startled the venetians , was the defection of ciarpellone one of his principal officers , who went over to the duke : the count had no sooner the news , but he left venice ; and coming with all possible speed to brescia , he found nicolo retired , and gone back to his former station : the count had no mind , finding the enemy gone , to follow him at that time ; but chose rather to defer , till some advantage should tempt him , and give him opportunity to revenge himself : he prevailed therefore with the venetians to recal the forces they had in the florentine service in tuscany ; and to confer the command of them upon micheletto attendulo , gattamelata being dead . the spring being come , nicolo piccinino was first in the field , and beseiged cignano , a castle some twelve miles distant from brescia : to the relief of which , the count addressed himself ; and betwixt these two generals the war was managed as formerly . the count being fearful of bergamo , went with his army and encamped before martinengo , a castle which ( if taken ) lay very convenient for the succouring of bergaino ( which city was by nicolo greatly distressed ) who finding he could not easily be disturbed , but by the way of martinengo , had supplied it plentifully with all things , so as the count was forced to besiege it with all his army : whereupon nicolo marched with his forces where he might most conveniently incommode him , and intrenched himself so strangely , the count could not ( without manifest danger ) assail him so that thereby he brought things to that pass that the besieger was in more distress , than the besieged ; and the count than the castle . for the count could neither keep the siege for want of provisions , nor rise , for fear of nicolo's army ; and every body expected victory for the duke , and destruction for his enemy : but fortune , ( which never wants ways of favoring her friends , and disobliging her enemies ) brought it about that nicolo in confidence of his victory was grown so insolent haughty , that without respect to the duke , or himself , he sent him word that he had served him a long time , and as yet not gained so much ground as would bury him when he died ; he desired therefore to know what recompence he was to expect for all his dangers , and fatigues ; for it being now in his power to make him absolute master of lombardy and to put all his enemies into his hands , he thought it but reasonable , as he was certain of his victory , to be secured of his reward ; and therefore he did propose he might have the city of piacenza made over to him , that when he had tired and worn himself out in his wars , he might have that town for his recess ; and at the last he took the boldness to threaten the duke with the quitting his enterprize , if he was not gratified in his demands . this contumelious and insolent way of capitulation , was so offensive , and detestable to the duke , that he resolved to lose all , rather than comply ; so that this arrogance in nicolo wrought an effect upon him , to which the arms nor the minaces of the enemy could never reduce him ; and that was to make peace with the count , to whom he sent guido buone da fortona with proposals of peace ; and the proffer of his daughter ; which was embraced with both arms by the count and his collegues . all being privatly agreed among themselves ; the duke sent a message to nicolo to require him to make a truce with the count , for a twelve month ; pretending his treasure was low , and had been so exhausted with the war , that he could not but prefer a certain peace , before a victory that was doubtful . nicolo admired his resolution , as not able to imagine what should make him reject so glorious a victory ; not in the least suspecting , that he bogled at the remuneration of his friends , and chose rather to let his enemies escape ; so that not obeying him readily , the duke was constrained to threaten , that without immediate compliance , he would deliver him up as a prey for his own souldiers , and his enemy . whereupon nicolo submitted , but with the same alacrity as on that is forced to forsake both his country and friends ; complaining , and lamenting his unhappiness , whose victory over his enemies was always interrupted either by his fortune , or the duke . the truce being made , the marriage betwixt madona bianca and the count was consummated , and the city of cremona given to her in dower : after which , the peace was concluded in november at which for the venetians , francesco barbadico , and pagolo frono ; for the florentines agnolo acciailo were present ; the venetians got by this peace peschiera , asola , and leonata a castle belonging to the marquess of manto●a . the wars in lombardy being ended , the only part of italy where there was any hostility , was in the kingdom of naples , which not being able to be composed , was the occasion of new troubles in lombardy . during the wars in those parts , alfonso of aragon had over-run the whole kingdom of naples , and left the king of rinato nothing at all but the country about the metropolis . whereupon alfonso conceiving the victory already in his hands , resolved whilst he besieged naples , to seize upon benevento , and the rest of the towns which were yet remaining to the count in those countries , supposing it might be done without much danger , the count himself being imployed in lombardy ; and his design succeeded as easily as he imagined ; for he took all his towns with little or no opposition . but the news arriving of the peace in lombardy , alfonso , began to apprehend lest the count ( to recover what he had lost ) should joyn with rinato , and rinato being of the same opinion , sent to invite , and solicite the count , that he would come , and revenge himself of his enemy , by relieving his friend . on the otherside alfonso was as earnest with the duke , that in respect of the friendship which was betwixt them , he would give the count some diversion , and by imploying him in greater affairs , enforce him from undertaking of this . philippo entertained the motion very readily ; not considering it intrenched upon that peace , which not long before he had concluded with so much prejudice to himself : he caused therefore to be signified to the pope e●genius , that then was the time to recover the towns which the count had taken from the churches , and for his easier success , he proffered him nicolo piccinino ( who was in his pay ) during the war , but discharged upon the peace , and was at that time in romagna with his forces : the pope received the proposition very joyfully upon a double account , both as he hated francesco , and desired his own , and though he had been cheated by nicolo once before , yet now the duke interposing , he could not suspect him in the least ; joyning his forces therefore with nicolo's , he marched into la marca : the count being much alarm'd at the news , got what strength together he could , and went to encounter them . in the mean time alfonso took naples ; and all that kingdom fell into his hands except castelnuovo : rinato having left a strong garison in castelnuovo , went away himself for florence , where he was most honorably received , but finding he was not able to continue the war , he stayed there but some certain days , and away he passed to marsilia ; during which time alfonso had taken castelnuovo , and the count was got into la marca , but not so strong as the pope and nicolo : wherefore he addressed himself to the venetian , and florentine , for assistance both of men and mony ; representing to them that unless they now looked upon them , and did something to restrain the pope and alfonso , whilst he was in being , afterwards they would have enough to do to secure themselves ; for they might joyn with duke philip , and divide all italy betwixt them : for some time both venetian and florentine suspended their answer , either because they were unwilling to make his holiness , and alfonso their enemies ; or else , because their hands were already full in bologna . hannibal bentivoglio had driven francesco piccinino out of that city , and to enable himself to defend it against the duke ( who was a favourer of francesco ) he had desired the assistance of the venetians and florentines ; and they not denied it . whilst the affairs in bologna were in this manner uncertain , they could not resolve to give the count their assistance ; but hannibal defeating francesco afterwards , so that all things there seemed to be composed , they then concluded to supply him . yet first to secure themselves against the duke , they renewed the league with him , to which the duke was not averse , for though he had consented to the war against the count , whilst rinato was in the field ; yet now rinato was routed , and his whole kingdom taken from him , he had no mind the count should be destroyed likewise : and to that end he nto only consented to the aid which they desired , but he writ to alfonso to draw his forces back again into naples , and not to prosecute the war there any longer ; to which , although alfonso was very unwilling , yet in respect of his obligations to the duke , he quietly consented , and drew off his army to the other side of trento . whilst things were in this posture in romagna , the florentines were not unanimous at home : among the citizens of chiefest reputation and authority in that government , neri the son of gino capponi was one , of whose interest cosimo de medici was most particularly jealous , in respect of the great vogue he had both in the city , and army : for having a long time had the command of the florentine forces , he had gained them exceedingly by his courage and deportment : besides the many great services performed by him and his father ( the father having taken pisa , and the son defeated nicolo at the battle of anghiari ) were fresh upon the memory , and caused him to be beloved by most people , but dreaded by such as were fearful of more companions in their government . amongst other of their principal officers , there was one baldaccio d' anghiari an excellent souldier ; not to be surpassed , either for courage or conduct in all italy at that time : having always commanded their foot , he had gained so great influence upon them , that it was generally believed , with him they would undertake any enterprize what ever , when ever he desired them . this baldaccio was a great lover of neri , of whose bravery and prudence he had all along been a witness , which to the rest of the grandees , gave great occasion of suspicion ; and thinking with themselves that to let him alone would be dangerous , but to imprison him much more ; they resolved to make him away , and fortune eflected it . bartolomeo orlandini was at that time gonfaloniere di giustitia : who having been sent to keep the pass at marradi ( as was said before ) when nicolo piccinino made his inroad into tuscany , had most basely deserted it , and exposed a country which was almost inaccessible of it self . baldaccio was so much provoked , or rather ashamed at his cowardice , that he spake slightly of him , and writ several letters expressing his contempt ; which bartolomeo resenting highly , and being conscious it was true ; he resolved to be revenged , and expiate his own fault with the death of his accuser : his resolution being known to other of his enemies , they encouraged him to proceed , and at one blow to revenge himself for the injury he had received ; and deliver the state from a person they could neither retain without danger , nor dismiss without ruine . having fixed upon his way bartolomeo shut up several armed men one day in the chamber ; and baldaccio being come to the piazza ( as he constantly did ) to discourse with the magistrats , and ●●quire orders for his conduct , the gonfaloniere sent to speak speak with him , and he presently obeyed : seeing him coming , the gonfaloniere went to meet him , and entertained him about his affairs three or four turns in the senators chamber ; but at length having drilled him near the chamber where his ambush was laid , he gave the signal , and all of them rushing upon him ( who was alone , and without arms ) they killed him , and threw him out of the palace window which looks towards the dogana ; and then cutting off his head , and carrying his trunk into the piazzo , they left it there all day as a spectacle for the people : he had only one son by his wife annalena ; which living not long after him , annalena deprived both of husband and child , and resolving to have no farther conversation with man , she made a monastery of her house , and shutting her self up with several other noble persons , which came to her to that purpose ; she spent the remainder of her days there in great piety and devotion ; calling the monastery by her own name , and immortalizing her memory , both by the one and the other . this action was no small diminution to neri ; and took away a considerable part of his reputation and friends yet it did not satisfie the contrivers , for having been more than ten years at the helm , the authority of the balia expired , and every body began to talk and act with more freedom than they thought convenient , they judged it necessary to revive that court , for the encouragement of their friends , and the depression of their enemies ; hereupon , in the year , the counsels created a new balia , which re-established the offices ; contracted the number of the officers which were to chuse the senators ; renewed the chancery of reformation ; removing philippo peruzzi out of the chancellorship , and putting one into his place who they believed would be governed by them . they prolonged the banishment of those that were refractory ; imprisoned giovanni , the son of simone vespucci ; degraded the accoppiatori as enemies to the state , and with them the sons of piero baroncelli ; all the seragli , bartolomeo , francesco castellani , and several others ; by which means they procured great reputation , and authority to themselves , and no little prejudice and disparagement to their enemies ; and having settled themselves at home in the government , they began to look about , and inquire how things were managed abroad . nicolo piccinino ( as we said before ) being abandoned by alfonso ; and the count , by assistance of the florentines , became formidably powerful , he assaulted nicolo not far from fermo , and gave him so great a defeat , that nicolo was glad to fly ( almost alone ) to montecchio , where he fortified himself so well , and defended himself so bravely , that in a short time his whole army repaired to him again , and put him into a condition of supporting easily against the count , and the rather , because winter being come , both of them were constrained to send their armies into quarters . all winter long nicolo was imployed in encreasing his army , which was much furthered by the assistance of the pope , and alfonso ; insomuch that when the spring appeared , and both armies took the field , the count was much too weak for nicolo , and indeed brought to that extremity of want , that he must of necessity have been ruined , had not the duke frustrated the advantage which nicolo had got over him . philip sent to nicolo to desire he would come presently to him , for he must needs speak personally with him about business of very great importance ; and nicolo , being greedy to know it , left his command to his son francesco , and went to milan to the duke ; relinquishing a certain victory , for an uncertain reward , which being perceived by the count he thought that occasion of engaging the son in his fathers absence , was not to be slipped , and coming to a fight with him near the castle di monteloro , he overthrew francesco , and took him prisoner . nicolo arriving at milan , finding himself deluded by the duke , and understanding the defeat , and imprisonment of his son , he took it to heart , and died with sorrow in the year of his age , a more brave , than a fortunate general . he left only two sons , francesco , and giacoppo , whose conduct was less , and fortune worse than their fathers ; so that the disciples of bracio were almost extinct , whilst the sforzeschan being more succesful , became more glorious . the pope understanding nicolo was dead , and his army overthrown ( not daring to rely much upon the king of aragons supplies ) desired a peace of the count , and obtained it by the meditation of the florentines , by which the pope was to have in la marca , osimo , fabriano , and ricanato restored , and all the rest were to remain to the count. after this accommodation in la marca , all italy had been quiet , had not the bolognesi disturbed it . there were two super-eminent families in bologna , the canneschi , and the bentivogli ; hannibal was the head of the latter , and battista of the first . to beget the greater confidence betwixt them , many matches had been made ; but among men that aspire to the same degree of greatness , an allyance is sooner made , than a friendship . bologna was in league with the venetians , and florentines , which league was made by hannibal bentivogli's means after francesco piccinino was expelled . battista understanding how earnestly the duke desired the friendship of that city , contrived how he might kill hannibal , and deliver that city to the duke ; and having concluded the circumstances , on the th of iune , battista and his accomplices set upon hannibal , and slew him , and when they had done , declared themselves for the duke . the venetians and florentine commissaries were at the same time in the town ; and at the first report of the tumult , returned privatly to their houses , but finding the people thronging in great numbers in the market place , complaining , and exclaiming against the murderers of hannibal ; they took courage ; joyned themselves with them , and putting them into a posture , they fell upon the canneschi , and in half an hours time , routed them , killed part of them , and and drove the rest out of the city . battista not having opportunity to get away , nor his enemies to kill him , betook himself to his house , where hiding himself in a chest , or bing to keep corn in , they searched for him a whole day , and could not discover him : being assured he was not gone out of town , they came back again and threatened his servants so , that one of his lacqueys betrayed him , and carried them to him ; then drawing him out of his hole in armour as he was , they killed him , and dragged him about the sreets , and burned him ; so that the victory of the duke was sufficient to encourage that enterprize , but his expedition in relieving it , was not great enough to make it good . by the death of battista , and the expulsion of the canneschi their tumults were composed ; but the bolognesi remained in no little confusion , there being none of the family of the bentivoglio's left to govern them ; for hannibal had only one son , of about six years old called giovanni ; and it was feared lest some difference and division might arise betwixt the friends of bentivoglio ( in whose power it was to restore the canneschi ) to the destruction of their party , and country . whilst they were in this suspence , the conte di poppi being by accident in bologna , sent word to the principal of the city , that if they would be governed by one of hannibals blood he could direct them where they might have one ; for about twenty years since , hercules , a cousin-german of hannibals being at poppi , had the enjoyment of a young maid in that town , who was brought to bed afterwards of a son called santi ; which , hercules affirmed to him many times , was his , nor was it to be denied , for who ever knew them both , must needs ownea more than ordinary resemblance . the citizens giving credit to what he said , dispatched some of their citizens to florence immediately , to see the youth and to desire neri , and cosimo , that he might be delivered to them : the reputed father of santi was dead , and the son lived with an uncle called antonioda cascese , a rich man , without children of his own , and a great friend of neri's : neri out of respect to his uncle , thinking the business not to be despised , nor on the other side , rashly accepted , proposed that santi might be sent for ; and that in the presence af cosimo and the bolognian embassadors , they might hear what he could say for himself ; he was sent for accordingly , and behaved himself so well , the bolognesi were ready to worship him ; so strangely prevalent sometimes is the love of a faction ; yet there was nothing concluded at this meeting , only cosimo took santi aside and told him . no body can counsel you better in this case , than your self : because you may follow your own inclination . if you be the son of hercules bentivogli , you will apply your self to such things as are worthy and sutable to the honor of that house but if you be the son of agnolo da cascese ; you will continue in florence , and spend the rest of your days basely in the ordering of wool. this speech netled the young man , and whereas before he seemed to be irresolute , he now declared he would refer himself wholly to cosimo , and neri , and do as they directed him ; and ( it being agreed with the embassadors ) clothes and horses were bought , and equipage provided , and a while after being honourably conducted to bolonia , he was made governor both of hannibals son , and the city , which office he executed so well , that whereas all his predecessors were killed by their enemies ; he lived quietly all his time and died lamented at last . after the death of nicolo , and the peace concluded in la marca ; philip wanting a new general to command his army made private overtures to ciarpellone one of the most experienced officers in the counts army ; and at last coming to an agreement , ciarpellone desired leave of the count to go to milan , and take possession of certain castles which philip had given him in the late wars . the count suspecting the business ( to disappoint the duke , and prevent his serving against him ) he caused him first to be stopped , and afterwards to be killed , pretending to have found him engaged in conspiracy against him ; at which manner of proceeding the duke was highly incensed , but the venetians and the florentines were pleased well enough , as apprehending the least amity betwixt the count and the duke ; however this indignity set all la marca in an uproar , and was the occasion of new war there . gismondo malatesti was lord of rimino ; and being son-in-law to the count , he expected to have had the government of pesaro ; but the count having reduced it , gave the command of it to his brother , which gismondo took very ill ; and to make it the worse , his mortal enemy federico di monte feltro , by the counts means , had usurped the dominion of urbino : upon these provocations gismondo joyned himself with the duke , and solicited the pope and the king of naples to make war upon the count ; who to give his son-in-law a relish of the war to which he had such a mind , he resolved to begin , and to fall first upon him ; whereupon the countries of romagna and la marca were in a tumult immediately ; for philip , the king of naples , and the pope sent all of them assistance to gismondo , and the venetians and florentines ( though they sent him no men ) supplied the count with what monies he wanted . philip , not content to make war against him in romagna only , designed to deprive him of cremona and pontremoli , but pontr●moli was defended for him by the florentines , and cremona by the venetians ; so that the war was received again in lombardy ; and many troubles ensued in the country of cremona , among which the dukes general francesco piccinino was overthrown at casale by micheletto and the venetian army ; and the venetians conceiving hopes thereupon of deposing the duke , sent their commissary to cremona , assaulted ghiaradadda , and took all that country , except ▪ cremona it self ; and then passing the adda , they made their excursions to the very walls of milan : the duke not satisfied with his condition , applied himself to alfonso king of aragon for succour ; representing the ill consequences which would follow upon his dominions in naples , if lombardy should fall into the hands of the venetians : alfonso promised to send him supplies , but their passage would be difficult without the permission of the count , upon which consideration , duke philip addressed himself to the count , and begged of him that he would not abandon the father-in-law who was both aged and blind . the count was much offended with the duke , for having pulled those wars upon him ; and on the other side the greatness of the venetians did not please him at all ; besides his mony was gone , and the league supplied him but coldly ; for the florentines were now freed from their apprehensions of the duke , which was the great cause of their caressing the count , and the venetians desired his ruine , as the only person capable of carrying the whole state of lombardy from them . nevertheless , whilst philip was seducing him to his side , and promised him the command of all his forces , upon a condition he would leave the venetians , and restore la marca to the pope ; they sent embassadors to him , promising him milan , when it was taken , and the generalship of their army in perpetuum , so he would prosecute the war in la marca , and obstruct the supplies which were sending by alfonso into lombardy . the venetian proffers were great , and his obligations to them considerable , they having made that war on purpose to secure cremona to the count ; again the dukes injuries were fresh , and his promises not to be trusted . yet the count remained doubtful which he should accept ; his obligation to the league ; his faith given , the late good offices which they had done him , and their many promises for the future , were great arguments on one side , yet he was loth on the other side to deny the importunities of his father-in-law ; but that which swayed with him most of all , was the poison which he suspected was hid under the promises of the venetians , to whose discretion he must leave himself ( if he succeeded in their wars ) both for their performance , and his own preservation ; which no wise prince would ever do , till necessity compelled him . but this suspence and difficulty of resolution in the count , was taken away by the venetians ; who having a design by some practices and intelligences in the town , to get it for themselves , upon some other pretence they caused their forces to march into those parts , but their plot was discovered by him that governed there for the count , and in stead of gaining cremona , they lost the count , who laid aside all respects , and joyned with the duke . pope eugenius was dead , niolo v. created his successor , and the count advanced with his whole army to cotegnola in order to his passage in lombardy , when news was brought to him that duke philip was dead , which happened in the year . on the last of august . these tidings much troubled the count , whose army could not be in good order because they had not had their full pay . the venetians he feared , as being in arms , and his professed enemies , now upon his revolt to the duke . alfonso had been always his enemy , and he was fearful of him ; he could have no confidence in either the pope or the florentines , for the florentines were in league with the venetians , and he was in possession of several towns which he had taken from the pope : however he resolved to bear up bravely ; look his fortune in the face ; and comport himself according to the accidents which should occur : for many times secrets are discovered in action , which dejection and despondency would have concealed for ever . it was no little support to him to believe , that if the milanesi were oppressed ; or that jealous of the ambition of the venetian , no man was so proper for them to apply to , for protection , as himself . so that taking courage thereupon , he marched into the country of bologna , and from thence passing by modena and reggio , he encamped upon the lenza , and sent to the milanesi to offer them his service : the milanesi , after the dukes death , were divided into factions ; part of them had a mind to be free , and part of them to live under a prince ; and of those which were for a prince , part were for the count , and part for alfonso : but they which were for a commonwealth , being more unanimous prevailed , and erected a republick according to their own model , to which many of the cities in that dukedom refused to conform , supposing they might make themselves free as well as milan if they pleased ; and those who were not inclined to that government , would not submit to it in them . lodi and piacenza therefore surrendered to the venetian ; pavia and parma made themselves free : upon which confusions the count removed to cremona , where certain deputies of his to that purpose , met with certain commissioners from milan , and came to an agreement , by which it was agreed that he should be general of their forces , and all conditions performed to him which were concluded in his last treaty with the duke ; to which was superadded that brescia should be put into the counts hands , till he should be posses'd of verona . and that then keeping the last , the first should be restored . before the death of the duke , pope nicolo upon his assumption to that chair endeavoured to make a general peace , betwixt all the princes of italy ; and to that purpose he negotiated with the florentine embassadors which were sent to his creation , for a diet to beheld at ferrara , to treat either of a long cessation , or a firm peace ; and accordingly the popes legate was met there by commissioners from the venetians , the duke , and the florentines . alfonso sent none , for he was at tiboli with a great army in favour of the duke , and believed ( as soon as the count could be debauched from them ) he should have a fair opportunity to fall upon both the venetian , and florentine . in the mean time the count lay still in lombardy , attending the consummation of the peace , to which alfonso would not send , but promised to ratifie what should be agreed by the duke . this peace was a long time in debate , but at length it was concluded , it should either be a cessation for five years , or a perpetual peace , as the duke of milan should chuse ; the dukes commissioners , returning to know his resolution , they found him dead , however the milanesi were willing to stand to their agreement , but the venetians would not condescend , fancying great hopes to themselves of overrunning that state , because lodi and piacenza had submitted to them soon after the death of the duke ; and believing either by treaty or force they should be able to reduce the rest , before any body could come in to their relief ; and this they fancied the rather , because the florentines were engaged in a war with alfonso . alfonso was at this time at tiboli , and being impatient to pursue his designs upon tuscany ( according to agreement betwixt him and the duke ) conceiving the waralready commenced in lombardy , would give him convenience , he had a great mind to have fome footing in the state of florence , before the war should apparently break out ; to that purpose he entred into correspondence with some persons in the castle of cennina , in the upper vald ' arno , and took it : the florentines were much surprized at so unexpected an accident , and seeing that king in motion against them , they listed men , created a new council of ten , and provided themselves for war , with as much industry as any of their predecessors . the king was marched already with his army into the country of siena , and had used his utmost endeavours to get that city into his clutches ; but it continued firm to the florentines ; refused to admit him , and all the rest of the towns , under its jurisdiction , did the same . yet they furnished him with provisions , their weakness and the kings great strength excusing it . the kings resolution was changed of invading the florentines by the way of the val d' arno , either because cennina was taken from him again , or that the florentines were too well furnished with souldiers in those parts ; wherefore he turned towards volterra , and surprized many castles in the county belonging thereto . from thence he passed into the county of pisa , where , by the assistance of arrigo , and fatio ( counts of gherardesca ) he took some posts , and then assaulted campiglia , which being defended by the florentines ; he was not able to carry ; so that the king leaving garisons in the places he had taken ; and certain troops to make excursions upon the enemy ; with the rest of his army retired and took his quarters in the country of siena . the florentines in the mean time being secured by the season of the year , provided themselves with souldiers with all possible care , and gave the command of them to federigo lord of urbino , and gismondo malatesta da rimino , betwixt whom there was some precedent difference , yet it was so prudently composed by neri de gino , and barnardetto de medici their commissaries , that they took the field together before the winter was over ; recovered the places lost in the country of pisa ; and the pomerancie in the volterran ; curbing and restraining his excursions of those who were left by alfonso upon the coasts , so , as they were scarceable to secure their garisons . as soon as the spring was come , the commissaries had a rendevous of all their army ( which consisted of about horse , and foot , at spedalletto ; and the king had another , of about , some three miles from campiglia : and when it was supposed he would have fallen upon that town , he turned about to piombino , believing it would be no hard matter to gain it , in respect that it was but indifferently provided ; and if he did , it would be no little prejudice to the florentines , seeing from thence he could harrass them with a tedious war , and by sending forces there by sea , infest the whole country of pisa. this policy of alfonso● startled the florentines , and consulting what was to be done , it was concluded , that if they could lye with their army upon the coasts of campiglia , he would run a hazard of being beaten , or be forced to draw off with no little disgrace . to this purpose they rigg'd out four galliasses which they had at ligorn , and sent three thousand foot in them to reinforce piombino , and then posted themselves at caldane a place of no easie access ; for to lie upon the coasts in the plain , they judged it more dangerous , and more subject to attacks : the florentines were to be supplied from the neighbouring towns , which being thin , and but ill inhabited , they were but indifferently furnished , so that the army was much incommoded , especially for wine , for none growing there , and coming with great difficulty from other parts , it was not possible to provide for them all . but the king ( though straitned by the florentines ) had plenty of all things by the way of the sea. the florentines perceiving it , had a mind to try experiment , whether their forces could not be supplied by sea likewise , whereupon they caused their galliasses to be brought , loaded them with victuals , and having dispatched them accordingly , they were set upon by seven of alfonso's gallies , and two of them taken , and the other two fled . this disaster cut off all hopes of relieving that way : so that of the looser sort of souldiers ran away to the kings camp for want of wine , and the rest mutiny'd , grumling that they should be confin'd to so hot places where there was no wine , and the water very bad : hereupon the commissaries took it into debate , and it was concluded that they should leave that post , and address themselves to the recovery of certain castles which remained in the hands of the king. on the other side the king , though he wanted no provision , and was more numerous in men ; found himself no less distressed , for his army was full of the diseases which those maritime countries do produce , they were grown so general and fierce , that many men died , and most of them were sick . upon this consideration , a peace was proposed , and the king insisted upon florens , and that piombino might be left to his discretion . which demands being deliberated at florence , many who desired peace , were earnest to have them accepted ; affirming they could not expect success in a war , which required so vast an expence to maintain it : but neri capponi going to florence , gave them such pregnant reasons to the contrary , that the whole city agreed to refuse them , and the governor of piombino was well entertained , and promised to be relieved both in time of war and peace , if he would defend it couragiously as he had hitherto done . the king having notice of their resolution , and perceiving his army too sickly and infirm to take the place , he brake abruptly from his siege ; left above of his men dead behind him ; retreated with the rest of his army thorow the county of siena , and from thence into the kingdom of naples , highly dissatisfied with the florentines , and threatning them with a new war when occasion offered . whilst these things passed in tuscany , the count francesco being made general for the milanesi , thought fit before any thing else , to reconcile himself with francesco piccinino , ( who had a command likewise under him ) that he might assist him in his enterprises , or at lest oppose them with more circumstances of respect : after which , he took the field with his army , and the citizens of pania , suspecting their own ability to defend themselves against so formidable a force , and yet unwilling to bring themselves under the yoke of the milanesi , they offered to surrender to him , upon condition they might not fall under their domination . the count had a great mind to that city , and looked upon it as a fine initiation , and pretence , to the rest of his designs . nor was it fear , or the imputation of breaking his faith , that restrained him from taking it , for great men think it dishonorable for to lose , but none to gain , though with fraud and injustice . his great doubt was , lest in taking it , he should disoblige the milanesi so , as they should give themselves to the venetian ; and in not taking it , he was jealous they should surrender to the duke of savoy , to which he saw too many of the citizens inclin'd , in either of which cases , his authority in lombardy would be lost . at length judging it less danger to take that city himself , than to let another man get it ; he resolved to accept it , persuading himself it would satisfie the milanesi , to let them know , how fatal it might have been for him to have refused it , seeing those citizens would certainly have delivered it to the venetian , or the duke of savoy ; either of which ways their state had been undone ; and that it was better in his possession who was their friend , than in either of theirs , both of them being too potent , and both of them their enemies . the milanesi , for all his compliments , were much unsatisfied with the business , as plainly discovering the ambition and ends of the man ; but they thought best at present to conceal it , not knowing whither they were to betake themselves ( upon a rupture with the count ) but to the venetians , whose pride , and arrogant terms , they dreaded and abhorred : so that they concluded not to break with the count , but to obviate their present miseries , with his assistance , hoping when they were freed from the former , some propitious opportunity might happen to quit them of him ; for they were not only infested by the venetians ; but by the genoeses , and the duke of savoy in the name of charles of orleans , descended from a sister of philips ; but the count defended all against them without any trouble . their greatest adversary was the venetian , who was come near with a powerful army to seize upon their state , and had lodi and piacenza already in their possession , which last , the count beleagured , and after a long siege , took it , and sack'd it : after he had recovered that city , winter coming on , he drew his army into quarters , and went himself to cremona , where all that winter he entertained himself with his wife : but as soon as the spring appeared , the venetian , and milanesi were both in the field : the milanesi had a great desire to retake lodi , and afterwards to come to an agreement with the venetian : for the expence of the war was encreased ; and the fidelity of the count suspected . in order to this , it was resolved their army would march to caravaggio and besiege it ; supposing that upon the taking of that castle , lodi would surrender . the count obeyed their orders , though his own inclination was to have passed the adda , and invaded the country of brescia . being set down before caravaggio , he intrenched and fortified his army so well with ditches and ramparts , that the venetians could not attempt to relieve it without great disadvantage . however the venetians advanc'd with their army , under the command of their general micheletto , within two flights shot of the counts camp ; continued there several days , and had many skirmishes with them . notwithstanding the count persisted in his siege , and prest them so hard , they must of necessity surrender . the venetians , believing the loss of that castle would be the loss of their whole enterprize , were much dissatisfied with the news , and calling a counsel , after many disputes it was concluded , there was no way but to attack the count in his trenches , which was not to be done without great disadvantage ; but the senate of venice , though naturally timorous , and not apt to any sudden or dangerous resolutions , was in this case so much transported , as rather to venture all than lose that , though the loss of that would be the ruine of all . it was concluded therefore to fall upon the count , and standing to their arms one morning very early , they assaulted that part of the camp which was the weakest guarded , and ( as it usually happens in such surprizes as that ) at the very first onslaught , they put the whole sforescan army into disorder . but the count so rallied them again , that after many attempts , and irruptions upon their works , they were not only repulsed , but so shattered and dispersed , that of their whole army ( in which there were more tha● horse , there were not above escaped , and their whole baggage and train of artillery taken ; so that never till that day had the venetians received so considerable a defeat . among the rest of the prey and prisoners there was found a venetian proveditore who before the battle had spoken opprobrious words of the count , calling him bastard and coward : this proveditore finding himself in the hands of his enemies , being conscious of his offence ; and expecting no otherwise , but that his reward would be sutable : according to the nature of base spirits , ( who are always insolent in prosperity , and poor and abject in adversity ) throwing himself with tears at the feet of the count , he acknowledged his fault , and beseech'd his pardon . the count took him up by the arm , and bad him be of good courage : but afterwards he told him , he could not but wonder a person of prudence , and that gravity as he desir'd to be thought , should commit so great an error , and indecorum , as to speak reproachfully of those who did not deserve it . as to bastardy he accused him of , he knew not the passages betwixt sforza his father , and madona lucia his mother , for not being then present , he was not able to order them better , and therefore he did hope nothing which they did could be imputable to him . but this he knew , that since he had been capable of any thing himself , he had carried himself so , as no body could reprehend him , to which , both he and his senate could give fresh and irrefragable testimony ; at last he admonish'd him to be more modest for the future , to have more caution in all his enterprizes , and then he dismiss'd him . after this victory , the count march'd his army into the country of brescia , possess'd himself of all wherever he came ; and then encamped within two miles of the city . the venetians upon their overthrow , suspecting ( as it happened ) that brescia would be the first thing the count would attempt , reinforc'd it as much as in so short a time they were able ; got what forces they could together with all imaginable diligence ; and sent to the florentines to desire their assistance by vertue of their league : who being freed from their war with alfonso , supplied them with a foot and horse ; with which forces having got an army together , the venetians began to think they were in a condition to treat ; and for a long time , it had been the custom and fate of the venetians to recover twice as much by peace , as they lost by the war. they understood very well , the milanesi were jealous of the count ; whose design was not so much to be their general , as their prince ; they knew it was in their own power to make peace with which of them they pleased ; for both of them desired it ; one out of ambition , the other for fear . they concluded at last to compose with the count , and to proffer him their assistance for the subduction of milan ; presuming that the milanesi finding themselves betraid by the count , in their fury would submit to any dominion but his ; and then they being most capable of defending them , were the most likely to be the persons they would chuse for their protection . upon this resolution , they sent to try the count , and found him very inclinable to a peace , as desiring the victory at caravaggio might be appropriated to him , and not to the milaneses . a peace therefore was struck up , and the venetians obliged themselves to pay to the count , ( till milan should be taken ) florens a month and maintain in his service horse , and foot during the war. th● count on the other side engaged to restore to them , all the towns , prisoners , and what ever else had been taken in that war by him ; reserving to himself only such towns as were in duke philips possession when he died . the news of this agreement , disquieted the milanesi much more than their victory had rejoyced them . the magistrates storm'd ; the people complain'd ; the women and children lamented ; all of them in one chorus pronouncing the count a traitor and an infidel . and though they did not expect to reclaim him from his ingratitude , by any prayers or promises they could make him , nevertheless they thought fit to send embassadors to him , to see with what confidence , and expressions he could receive them after such barbarous disloyalty , and being brought into his presence , one of them spake to him to this effect . those who desire to obtain any thing of other people , are wont to accost them with prayers , or promises , or threats ; that either their compassion , or profit , or poverty might move them to condescend : but in men that are cruel , and covetous , and prepossest with their own greatness and authority ; there being no room for either of the three , 't is in vain for any man to think to mitigate them with prayers , to oblige them with promises , or to fright them with threats . we therefore , understanding ( though too late ) you cruelty , your ambition , and your insolence ; are come hither , not to beg any thing of you ( for if we did , we are sensible it would not be granted ) but to commemorate and charge you with the benefits you have received from the people of milan ; and to remonstrate with what ingratitude you have requited them ; that among the many miseries which you have brought upon us , we may have at least the pleasure to reprehend you for them . you ought to remember your condition after the death of the duke ; you were at hostility with the pope , and king alfonso ; you were discarded by the venetians , and the florentines , who , upon some just and late provocation ; or else finding you useless , were become ( as it were ) your enemies : you were tried and weary of the war you had maintained against the church , you were left without men , without mony , without friends , desperate of preserving your own , much more of gaining from others ; under which exigencies , of necessity you must have sunk , had not our innocence , and plain-heartedness supported you . we , we were they who received you into our arms , moved by the reverence we retained for the memory of our duke ; with whom you had enter'd into so near and so late an allyance ; presuming ( and as we thought ) with reason , that the love you profest to him , would have been extended to his people ; and that our rewards being added to his , the amity betwixt us , would not only have been firm , but indissolvable , and for that cause to your old articles with the duke , we threw in verona and brescia . what could we give , or promise you more ? and you , what could you have ( or indeed ask ) more of us , or any body else at that time ? you received from us a kindness you could not look for ; and we , in recompence , have received a mischief we never deserved : nor was this the first instance of your falshood ; for no sooner were you in possession of the command of our army , but against all justice and obligation , you received pavia into your hands ; which , indeed , gave us the first hint of what was to be expected from your friendship ; however he swallowed that injury , in hopes such an acquest as that might have satiated your ambition . but alas ! those who must have all , will not be satisfied with a part . you promised that all your conquests afterwards should be ours , because you knew , what you should give us at several times , you could take from us at once ; this is verified since your victory at caravaggio , which though won with the expence of our treasure and blood , is by your baseness perverted to our ruine . oh! unhappy are those cities who are constrained to defend their liberty against such as invade them , but much more unhappy are they who in their defence are inforced to imploy such mercenary and such treacherous instruments as you . may we be example to posterity , though thebes and the king of macedon could be no warning to us , who having beaten their enemies , was made their general by them , and their prince afterwards by himself . we are not , therefore , to be condemned for any thing , but our confidence in you ; whose passed life , and insatiable appetite of dominion , ought to have taught us better than to have trusted a person which betraid the prince of lucca ; squeez'd the florentines and the venetians , disrespected the duke , despised a king ; and committed several injuries ( above all ) both against god and the church . and indeed we had no reason to believe that so many princes and potentates should be of less authority with francesco sforza , that the milanesi , or that he would be just in his engagements to us , when he had broke them with every body else . but our indescretion cannot excuse your treachery , nor clear you of that infamy , which our just and deplorable complaints will fix upon you all the world over . nor can any thing secure you against the stings and compunctions of your own conscience ; for inverting those arms which we had provided for our defence , against our own liberty and freedom ; you cannot think any thing so proper for you , as the reward of a parricide . and if yet your incontroulable ambition should blind you ; the evidence the whole world will give of your impiety , will open your eyes , and god himself will open them , if either perjury , or falshood , or treason , do offend him ; or if in his divine providence , for some occult good , he sees it fit to forbear it , and to show himself to us a favourer of ill men. do not therefore delude your self with the assurance of victory ; the just anger of god will oppose you ; and we are resolved to lose lives and liberties together : and if it so fall out that we should be constrained to submit , there is no prince in italy but we will choose before you ; and if our sins be so great , as to pull down the greatest misery in the world upon our heads , and force us into your hands , be assured , that dominion which you begin with infamy and fraud , will end in the destruction of you or your children . the count was netled by every part of the speech , yet without any extraordinary commotion in either gesture or words , he made them this answer ; that being injured so highly as they thought themselves , he would bear with the indiscretion of their language ; though to persons capable of judging betwixt them , there was nothing that they had charged him with , which he could not easily refel . he could make it appear , that he had not injured the milanesi , but secured himself only against their intelligence and designs . that if they reflected upon their carriage after the battle of caravaggio , they would find , that in stead of rewarding him with verona and brescia , as they had contracted , they were underhand negotiating a peace with the venetians ; that the burden and scandal of the war might be left upon his shoulders , whilst they ran away with the profits of it , and the honour of the peace : so that if they looked impartially into the matter , they would find , he had done nothing but what they had endeavoured before ; and that if he had defer'd to do it so long , the more they were oblig'd to him ; and with the more justice he might retort ingratitude upon them . that as to the truth , or falsity of what was on either side alledg'd , the end of the war would make it appear , in which , that god which they had so solemnly invocated to revenge them , would demonstrate which of the two was most tender of displeasing him , and which with most equity he opposed . the embassadors being departed , the count prepared to invade them ; and the milanest for their defence ; to which purpose they joyned themselves with francesco and giacopo piccinino , who upon the score of the old animosity betwixt the bracceschi and the sforzeschi , had been faithful to the milaneses : hoping by their means to preserve their liberties , till they should have opportunity to divide betwixt the venetians and the count , which amity they did not think would be of any long continuance . the count was of the same opinion , and thought it his best way to bind them by rewards , seeing they were ticklish in their promises . in the distribution therefore of the war , he was contented the venetians should attack cremona ; whilst he with the remainder of the army , assaulted the rest of that state : this article being proposed to the venetians was so grateful , that upon that very reason they continued their friendship to the count , till he had overrun most of the country of milan ; and so straitned that city , that no provisions could come at it . so that despairing of other relief , they sent embassadors to venice , to intreat , that they would commiserate their case , and ( according to the practice of all commonwealths ) rather support those who stood for their liberty , than a tyrant ; who if he should gain their city , would be tooo strong afterwards for them . nor ought they to believe he would be content with the terms of their capitulation , who had violated his league with that state . the venetians were not ye● masters of crema ; and being loth to discover themselves till that were in their possession ; they answered them in publick , that their alliance with the count would not suffer them to assist them ; but privatly they entertain'd them so , as they might give their masters assured hopes of their friendship . the count was got already so near milan , that he had taken some part of the suburbs ; and the venetians having reduc'd crema , they thought it time to publish their amity with milan , with whom they were secretly agreed ; and the first article they agreed to , was the conservation of their liberty . this league being rati●ied , the venetians commanded such forces as they had with the count , to march back to their army , they signified likewise to the count , the peace which they had concluded ; and gave him twenty days time to accept it himself . the count was not at all surprised at the inconstancy of the venetians ; he had foreseen it long before , and expected it should happen every day . yet he could not but regret it as much , as the milanesi had been molested at his : he desired two days to give in his answer to the embassadors , which time he resolv'd to detain the venetians who were in his service , and go on with his enterprize . he gave out publickly he would accept of the peace ; and sent embassadors to venice , with full power to ratifie it ; but they had private instructions to the contrary , to spin out and protract the conclusion by all the cavils and subtleties they could invent : and that the venetian might give the more credit to his pretences , he made a truce with the milanesi for a month ; drew of● his army , and dispers'd it into such places as he had taken in that country : this stratagem of his was the occasion of his victory afterwards , and the ruine of the milanesi ; for the venetians presuming upon the peace , were slower and more remiss in their preparations for war. and the milanesi , seeing the cessation confirmed ; the enemy removed , and the venetian their friend ; believed for certain the count would trouble them no more : which opinion was pernicious to them two several ways , in making them more negligent for their defence ; and in sowing their land , which devour'd much of their corn , and was the reason they were sooner distressed . on the other side , nothing was hurtful to them , but was beneficial to the count , and gave him time to respite , and look abroad for allies . during this war in lombardy , the florentines had not declar'd of either side : nor shown any favour to the count when he took part with the milanesi , nor afterwards ; for the count having no great need of them , had not sought their assistance ; only after the defeat at caravaggio , ( as they were oblig'd by the league ) they sent aid to the venetians . but now the count was alone , and had no body else to resort to , he was inforced to press their assistance , publickly to the state , and privatly to his friends , but especially to cosimo de medici , who in all his undertakings had counsel'd him faithfully , and freely supplied him : nor did he desert him now in his distress ; but furnish'd him with what could privatly be convey'd , encouraged him to go on in his design ; he propos'd likewise that the city would publickly own him ; but he found difficulty , in that neri the son of capponi was the most potent man in florence , and to him it appeared more for the interest of that city , that the count should accept of the peace , than prosecute the war. his first apprehension was least out of indignation to the count , the milanesi should give themselves up to the dominion of the venetian , which would be the ruine of them all : then , if the count should succeed , and milan come into his hands , so great an army , with so great a territory added to it , must needs ( in his judgment at least ) become dangerous , and formidable ; for if he were troublesom whilst but a count , when a duke he would be insupportable . for these reasons he affirmed it would be better for the republick of florence , and for all italy besides that the count should remain as he was , with his reputation in the army ; and lombardy be divided into two commonwealths , which were never like to joyn to the ruine of their neighbours ; and singly , and by themselves , they were not able to do hurt ; to compass which ; he saw no way so probable , as by preserving their old amity with the venetians , and disclaiming the count. these arguments were not approved by cosimo's friends ; believing they were not so much neri's judgment , as jealousie ; lest the count being made a duke , cosimo should grow too powerful by being his friend . cosimo on the other hand persuaded that their alliance with the count would be for the advantage both of florence , and all italy ; for it was madness to imagine milan could continue a commonwealth , seeing the humour of the citizens ; their manner of life , and the old factions and differences among them , were not capable of any form or system of civil government ; so that of necessity the count must be duke of it , or the venetians lords : and in that case no body could be so weak , but to prefer a single neighbour , competently powerful ; before an enemy that was remote , but more great and incontroulable . neither could he believe the milanesi would give themselves up to the venetians , for the count had the bigger party in the town , and when ever they found themselves unable to defend their liberties any longer ; they would more probably surrender to the count than the venetian . these varieties of opinions kept the city a long time in suspence ; but at length it was agreed that embassadors should be dispatch'd to the count , to treat about their alliance ; if they found him so strong , that there was likelyhood he should prevail , then they should conclude ; but if otherwise , they were to cavil , and protract . by the time these embassadors had got to reggio , they had news the count was become master of milan . for the count as soon as his truce was expired , and had clapped down again before it with his army , hoping to carry it in a short time , in despight of the venetians , for they could not come to relieve it , but by the river adda , which was easie to be hinder'd ; being winter , he could not fear they would remove him with their whole army , and before the spring he doubted not to carry it , especially seeing francesco piccinino was dead , and giacopo his brother remained sole captain of their forces . the venetian had sent an embassador to milan to encourage them to defend themselves , and to assure them of speedy and effectual relief ; and so far they were as good as their words , that during the winter many skirmishes and conflicts passed betwixt the venetians and the count ; till when the weather began to be open , they came down with their army ( under the command of pandolfo malatesta ) and encamped upon the river of adda ; where it being debated in counsel whether they should fall upon the count , and run the hazard of a battle , it was opposed by pandolfo , ( upon his experience both of the count and his army ) who advis'd , the town might be relieved without any such danger , the count being distressed already both for forrage and corn. wherefore his opinion was , that they should block him up where he was , and intercept his provisions , which would keep up the spirits of the milanesi and divert them from surrendring to him . this resolution was most plausible to the venetians , because they thought it safe in it self , and did hope by keeping the town in constant necessity , it would be forc'd at last to deliver up to them ; for considering how the count had provok'd them , they could not imagine they would surrender to him . in the mean time the milanesi were reduced to extream misery , for being a populous city , the poor people fell down dead in the streets for want of bread ; and this scarcity begetting murmurs and complaints in several places , the magistrats were afraid of some tumult or other , and us'd all possible diligence to prevent their assembling . the multitude is not suddenly to be engaged in any mischief ; but when once they are dispos'd , the lest accident imaginable sets them on work . it happen'd that two persons of indifferent condition being in discourse near the porta nuova about the calamities of the city , and what ways were left to preserve it ; people got about them by degrees , so as in a short time they were in a considerable number ; upon which a rumour was spred in the town , that they were in arms against the magistrats at porta nuova : hereupon , the whole multitude ( who expected some occasion ) put themselves in arms , made gasparre da vico mercato , their leader , and marching up to the place where the magistrats were in council , they fell upon them with such fury , that all which could not escape , were slain ; among the rest lionardo veneto the venetian embassador , who had laugh'd at their miseries , and was judg'd the principal occasion of their wants : having made themselves masters of the city , they deliberated which way to relieve themselves of their distresses , and it was unanimously resolv'd ( seeing their liberty was not to be preserved ) that they should throw themselves under the protection of some prince which should be able to defend them , but they were divided about the person ; some were for king alfonso , some for the duke of savoy , some the king of france , not one word all the while of the count ; so great and implacable was the indignation of the people against him ; yet at last , not agreeing in the rest , gasparre da vico mercato mentioned the count , and display'd gravely before them , that if their design was to rid themselves of the war , the count was the only person to be chosen ; for the people of milan were in necessity of a certain and present peace , not of a tedious and only possible supply . then he fell with great words to mitigate the proceedings of the count ; he accus'd the venetians : he accus'd all the princes of italy , ( who some for ambition , and some for avarice ) would not permit them to live free . and now since their liberty was lost ; and they must yield to some body or other , his opinion was , they should do it to one that knew them ; and was able to defend them ; that they might be sure of peace for their servitude , and not be engaged in greater , and more pernicious war. the people heard him with great intention , and when he had done , they cryed out with one voice that the count should be the man ; and gasparre their embassador to invite him ; who carrying him the joyful news , was kindly entertain'd , and the count enter'd into milan th of february , and was received with great acclamation , even by those persons which not long before had so highly traduced him . the news of this conquest arriving at florence , they despatched orders immediatly to their embassadors who were upon the way , that instead of treating an agreement with him as count ( which was their instruction before ) their business should now be to congratulate him as duke . these embassadors were honorably entertain'd , and bountifully presented by the duke ; who knew , against the power of the venetians , he could not have in all italy more faithful nor more potent allies , than the citizens of florence , who though freed from their apprehensions of the house of the visconti , were nevertheless obnoxious to the forces of the king of aragon , and the venetians ; for they knew the kings of aragon would be their enemies , for the amity and correspondence they had always maintain'd with the french ; and the venetians knew their old fears of the visconti were occasioned by them , and remembring with what eagerness the visconti were persecuted , and that if they came into their power , they were like to fare no better , they were bent wholly upon their ruine . for these reasons the new duke embrac'd an agreement with the florentines , very willingly , and the venetians , and the king of aragon confederated against them ; the king of aragon undertaking the florentines , and the venetians , the duke ; who being new , and scarce setled in his government , they suppos'd would not be able to confront them with all his own forces , nor all the friends he could make . but because the league betwixt the florentines and the venetians , was not yet fully expir'd ; and the king of aragon , upon conclusion of the war at piombino , had made an accord with them , it did not seem convenient to break the peace abruptly , but rather to attend some accident that might give them pretence to invade them . whereupon they sent embassadors to florence ( each of them , apart ) to let the florentines know , that the leagues which had passed betwixt them were not made to offend any body , but to defend one another . then the venetians complained that the florentines had suffer'd alexander the dukes brother to pass with his forces into lombardy by the way of lunigiana : and besides had been the authors and counsellors of the agreement betwixt the duke , and the marquess of manto●a ; all which they affirmed was done to the prejudice of their state , and contrary to the amity betwixt them ; insinuating as friends , that who ever injures another person wrongfully , gives him a right to revenge himself : and who ever breaks peace , must prepare for war. the answer to these embassies was committed to cosimo , who in a wise and eloquent oration , recapitulated the benefits the republick of venice had receiv'd from that state ; declaring what empire and dominion they had gain'd with that treasure , and forces , and advice of the florentines ; demonstrating that as the amity betwixt them was propos'd by the florentines ; they would not be the first which would break it . for having been always lovers of peace , they were well satisfied with their friendship ; and would always endeavour to preserve it . the truth was , all people wonder'd at their complaints & that so grave and judicious a senate , should concern themselves for things so trivial and vain ; but seeing they thought them worthy of their consideration , they could not but declare , that their country was free and open to any body ; and that the duke was a person of such qualifications , that he needed not the advice , or favour or any in the choice of his allies ; and therefore he was afraid there was something more at the bottom , than they had hitherto discovered ; which if hereafter it should appear , the florentines doubted not , but to manifest it easily to the world , that as their friendship had been profitable , their enmity could be dangerous . however things were smoothed over pretty handsomly for that time ; and the embassadors seemed to go away well enough content : yet the alliance the king of aragon & the venetians had made , and the manner of their deportment , gave the duke , and florentines both , more reason to prepare for a war , than to rely upon their peace : upon which the florentines confederating with the duke the venetians discover'd themselves , made a league with sienna , and banish'd all the florentines , and their subjects , out of venice and its dominions : and not long after , alfonso did the same , without any respect to the league he had made with them the year before ; and without any just , or so much as pretended occasion . the venetians were desirous to get bologna into their hands , and to that end furnishing certain of their exiles with a proportionable force , they marched thither in the night and by the common shore got into the town so privatly , their entrance was not perceived , till they gave the alarm themselves ; upon which santi bentivogli , leaping out of his bed , was inform'd the whole city was in the possession of the enemy . santi was advised by many which were about him , to fly , and preserve himself that way , seeing there was not any left to secure the state. however he resolv'd to try his fortune , and taking arms , and encouraging his servants to follow him , he went forth , and having joyn'd them to some of his friends , he charg'd a party of the enemy , beat them , kill'd several , a●d forc'd all of them out of the town ; by which action he was thought to have given ample testimony of his extraction from the house of the bentivogli . these passages made it clear to the florentines that a war was intended ; and therefore they betook themselves to their ancient methods of defence . they created a council of ten. they entertain'd new officers . they sent embassadors to rome , naples , venice , sienna , and milan , to desire aid of their friends ; to discover such as were suspicious : to gain such as were irresolute ; and to prie into the counsels of their enemies . from the pope , they could obtain nothing but general words , civility , and exhortations to peace . from the king of aragon nothing but idle excus●s for having dismiss'd the florentines ; offering his passport to any which demanded it : and although he ende avoured by all means to conceal his preparation for war , yet the embassadors found him a juggler , and peceived several of his practices against their state. with the duke therefore they renewed their league ; procured an amity with the genoeses ; compos'd the differences about the reprisal , and many other things which had formerly obstructed it : they tryed all ways to frustrate or break the treaty ; and they went so far as to supplicate the great turk , to banish all florentines out of his country ; but that emperour would not hearken . the florentine embassadors were prohibited entrance into the dominions of the venetian , because ( forsooth ) they were in league with the king of aragon , and could not send any embss●●aes without his participation . the siennesi received their embassadors , treated them well ▪ lest they should be overrun , before the league could relieve them ; and therefore they thought it best to collogue , and lull those arms a sleep , which they were not able to resist . it was conjectured then , that the venetian and king both , sent embassadors to justifie the war ; but the venetian embassador being refus'd likewise to be admitted into the territories of florence , the king 's denied to do that office alone , and the whole embassie came to nothing : by which the venetians found themselves us'd with the same rudeness and contempt , which not many months before they had exercis'd upon the florentines . in the midst of these apprehensions , the emperour federigo . pass'd into italy to be crown'd , and on the th of ianuary , enter'd into florence with an equipage of horse . he was honorably entertain'd there by the senate ; and continued with them to the th of february , upon which day he departed for rome , in order to his coronation ; where having performed that ceremony , and celebrated his nuptials with the empress , ( which was come thither by sea ) he departed again for germany ; returned by florence , ( where all the old honors were retreated ) and having been oblig'd in his passage by the marquess of ferrara , he gave him a grant of modena and reggio as a reward . but the florentines were not by all those solemnities diverted from their preparations ; for their own reputation , and the terror of their enemies , the duke and they had enter'd into a league with france , which with great joy , and ostentation they publish'd all over italy . in the month of may the venetians , not thinking it fit to dissemble any longer , invaded the territories of the duke of milan , by the way of lodi with horse , and foot ; whilst at the same time the marquess of monferrat ( upon some designs of his own , or the stimulation of the venetians ) assaulted him on the other side by the way of alexandria . the duke had got an army together of horse , and foot , with which ( after he had furnish'd alexandria , and lodi , with strong garisons , and fortified all places where the enemy might offend him ) he fell into the country of brescia , where he did great mischief to the venetians , both parties plundring the countries , and burning such towns as were not able to defend themselves : but the marquess of monferrat , being defeated not long after by the garison at alexandria , the duke was at more leisure to infest , and make his inroads into the countries of the venetian . whilst the war was carried on in lombardy in this manner , with various , but inconsiderable accidents , the wars in tuscany was commenced betwixt the king of aragon and the florentines , and manag'd with as little ardour , and success as the other . ferrando ( a natural son of alfonso's ) march'd into tuscany with men under the command of federigo lord of urbin . his first enterprize was to assault faiano in valdisciana ( for the siennesi being their friends , they enter'd that way into the florentine dominions ) the castle was weak ; the walls but indifferent ; the garison but small ; yet those they had within it were valiant and faithful ; the whole number which were sent for the security of that place , not exceeding . before this castle ferrando encamped , and either their courage was so little without , or theirs so great within ) that it took him up days before he could master it . which time gave the florentines great convenience of providing other places of higher importance , and drawing their force together and disposing them into better order , than otherwise they could have done . this castle being taken , the enemy march'd into chianti where they attempted two little towns which were held by a few private citizens , and were repuls'd . leaving them , they remov'd to castellina ( a little castle upon the confines of chianti ) and sate down before it . this castle was about ten miles from sienna ; weak in its works , but weaker in its situation ; yet in neither so weak , as the courage of the assailants ; for after days seige , and all the art , and force they could use , they were glad to draw off , and leave the castle as they found it . so little formidable were the armies in those days , and so inconsiderable the wars , that those places which are now deserted as impossible to be kept , were then defended as if they had been impossible to have been taken . whilst ferrando was with his army in chianti , he made many incursion into the country of florence , running up with his parties within six miles of the town , to the great terror and detriment of their subjects , who , having got together about souldiers , under the command of astorre de faenza , and gismondo malatesta , held off from the enemy towards the castle of colle , being unwilling to come to a battel , because they knew if they lost not their army , there was no danger of the war ; for the little castles which should be taken would be restored upon the peace ; and the great towns were secure . the king had likewise a fleet of about twenty vessels ( gallies and foists ) in the sea of pisa , which fleet ( whilst la castellina was assaulted by land ) was imploy'd by the king to batter the castle of vada that stood upon the sea ; and they did it so effectually , that in a short time by the inadvertency of the governor , they got it into their hands : from whence afterwards they ran over the whole country thereabouts , but those excursions were presently restrain'd by certain florentine souldiers which were sent to campiglia . the pope in the mean time concerned himself no farther , than to mediate an accord . but though he was so tender in engaging abroad in any action of war , he found himself at home in no little danger . there was at that time in rome a person call'd stephano porcari , a citizen born , of good extraction , and learning , but most eminent for the generosity of his mind . this stephano was ambitious ( as most are which are desirous of glory ) to perform , or at least attempt some thing that might make him memorable to posterity . and nothing occur'd so honourably to his thoughts , as to deliver his country , from the insolence of the prelats , and reduce it to its primitive liberty ; hoping if he effected it , he should be call'd either the father or the restorer of his country . his great hopes and encouragement in this enterp●ize was deduc'd from the iniquity and ill lives of the prelates ; which were highly displeasing both to the barons and people of rome . but his greatest confidence was grounded upon certain verses of petrarch's in that canto which begins , spirito gentile &c. the verses are these . sopra ill monte tarpeio canzon vedrai . un cavalier ch' italia tutta honora , pensoso piu d' altrui che di se stesso . stephano was of opinion that poets were many times inspir'd , and had perfect and divine inflations from above . so that he concluded what petrarch had prophesied in that canto would certainly come to pass , and he did not know any man fitter than himself to accomplish it , in respect of his eloquence and learning and favour , and friends . having taken up this fancy , he could not contain himself , but his words , gesture , and manner of living discover'd him , and render'd him suspicious to the pope ; who to secure himself against his plots , confin'd him to bologna , and sent instructions to the governor to have an eye over him every day . but stephano was not to be discouraged by one disaster ; it rather animated him in his design ; in so much that with the greatest caution he could , he continued his practices with his friends , and now and then would steal to rome and back again with such expedition , as he would be sure to present himself before the governor at that time he was to appear . but afterwards , having drawn in as many as he thought necessary for his work he resolved to proceed to action , without farther delay ; and sent to his correspondents in rome , that at a prefix'd time , a splendid supper should be prepar'd ; all the conspirators to be invited to it ; and each of them have private orders to bring his confident along with him , and he promised to be there himself precisely at the time . all things were ordered exactly to his directions ; and he himself was punctually with them ; for as soon as supper was ready , and serv'd up to the table , he presented himself amongst them , in a robe of cloth of gold , his collar and other ornaments about him ; to give him majesty and reputation ( and having embrac'd all the conspirators ) in a long oration he exhorted them to be couragious , and dispose themselves chearfully in so glorious an enterprize . then he appointed the way , ordering one of them to seize the popes palace the next morning , and the other to run about the streets , and excite the people to arm. but his conspiracy coming to the ear of the pope ( some say by the treachery of his confederats , others by his being seen in the town ) which way soever it was , the pope caus'd him and the greatest part of his comerads to be apprehended the very same night after supper , and put to death , as they deserved . this was the end of that enterprize , and though among some people perhaps , his intention might be commended , yet his judgment must necessarily be blam'd ; for such attempts may have some shadow of glory in the contrivance , but their execution is certain destruction . the war in tuscany had continued about a year , and in the spring both armies had taken the field , when in relief of the florentines alexandro sforza the dukes brother arriv'd with a supply of horse , by which the florentine army being much encreas'd , and the kings army become inferior in number , the florentines thought fit to recover what they had lost , and with little labour took some of their towns again : after which they encamped at foiano , which by the carlesness of the commissaries was sack'd ; so that the inhabitants being dispers'd , they were hardly got to inhabite there again : and when they did come , it was not without great exemptions and reward . the castle of vada also was retaken ; for the enemy perceiving they could not hold it , they set it on fire , and departed . whilst the florentine army was imploy'd in this manner , the king of aragons army , not having the courage to come near them , were retreated towards , sienna , from whence they made frequent excursions into the country about florence , where they made great hububs ; committed many outrages , and brought great terror upon the people , nor was the king defective in contriving other ways of assaulting his enemies , dividing their forces or detracting from their reputation . gherardo gambatorti was at that time lord of valdibagno . this gherardo and his ancestors , had always been in the florentine service , either as hired , or recommended . alfonso was tampering with this gherardo to deliver up his territory to him , and he promis'd to give him an equivalence in the kingdom of naples . this transaction was not so private , but they had news of it in florence , and an embassador was dispatch'd to remember him of his own and his predecessors obligations to that state ; and to admonish him to presevere in his amity with them , as they had constantly done . gherardo pretended to be surpriz'd at what the embassador told him ; swore a thousand oaths that never any such wickedness enter'd into his thoughts ; proffer'd to have gone in person to florence , and resided there , to secure them of his fidelity ; but being unhappily indispos'd himself , his son should go a long with him , and remain there as a perpetual hostage . his proffers , and his imprecations together made the florentines believe that gherardo was honest , and his accuser the knave , in which opinion they acquiesced . but gherardo went on with the king , and rather with more eagerness than before ; and when all was agreed , alfonso sent fryer puccio ( a knight of ierusalem ) to take possession of the castles and towns which belong'd to gherardo . but bagno retaining its affection to florence , promis'd obedience to the kings commissary , with no little regret : puccio was in possession of almost all that state , only the castle of corzano was behind , which was likewise to be deliver'd . when gherardo made this surrender , among the rest of his own creatures about him there was one antonio gualandi , a pisan , a young gentleman and brave , and one that highly detested this treachery in gherardo . pondering with himself the situation of the place , the number of the garison ; the dissatisfaction he observed both in their gestures and looks , and finding gherardo at the gate ready to introduce the enemy ; he convey'd himself betwixt the castle and gherardo and taking his opportunity with both his hands thrust him away ; and then causing the wicket to be shut , he exhorted the guards to stand faithfully to the florentines against so false and so flagitious a man : the report of this action arriving at bagno , and the towns which were about it , they unanimously took arms against their new masters ; and setting up the florentine colours upon the walls they drove them all out of that country : this news coming to florence , they immediately clap'd their young hostage into prison , and dispatch'd supplies to bagno and those parts to secure them , and made that country dependant upon themselves . gherardo ( a traitor in the mean time , both to his friends and his son ) had much ado to escape ; leaving his wife , family , and fortune in the hands of his enemies . this accident was lookt upon as a great deliverance in florence : for had the king made himself master of those parts , he might with little expenso have overrun all as far as valdi tevere , and casentino , and brought such distraction upon their affairs , that the florentines must have divided their army , and been disabled thereby from attending the aragonian forces about sienna , with their army entire . besides the provisions which the florentines had made in italy to oppose the confederacy of their enemies ; they sent agriolo acciaivoli their embassador into france , to negotiate with that king for the sending king rinato d' angio into italy , in the behalf of the duke and themselves , and to represent to him , that coming thither for the defence of his friends , when he was once entred , and had settled them , he might set up his own claim to the kingdom of naples and they would be engag'd to assist him , and so whilst in lombardy and tuscany the war was carried on ( as we have related ) in france , the treaty was concluded , and rinato oblig'd in iune to come into italy with horse ; and the league on the other side obliged at his arrival at alexandria , to pay him florens , and per men . afterwards whilst the war should continue : but being ready ( upon this stipulation ) to pass into italy , he was obstructed by the duke of savoy and the marquess of monferrat , who were friends to the venetians , and would not suffer him to pass . hereupon rinato was desired by the florentine embassador to march with his forces into provence , and for the encouragement and reputation of his friends , to pass himself and part of them into italy by sea , leaving the rest in provence , till the king of france should prevail with the duke of savoy that they might march through his country : and as the embassador advised , it was done ; for rinato went by sea , and the rest at the king of france's mediation , were permitted to pass into italy through the dominions of the duke of savoy . king rinato was received by the duke of milan with all the demonstrations of kindness imaginable ; and having joyned their forces , they assaulted the venetians with such terror , that in a little time , all the towns they had taken about cremona were recovered ; and not contented with them , they took almost all the country of brescia ; for the venetian army , not thinking it self secure in the field , was retreated under the very walls of that city . winter coming on , and the duke at verona , he thought fit , for the refreshment of his men , to put them into quarters , and consigned piazenza for the quarters of rinato ; where having remained all that winter in the year , without any action considerable ; when the spring was come , and the duke resolved to draw into the field , and drive the venetians out of all they had upon the terra firma , rinato signified to the duke , that of necessity he must return into france . this resolution of rinato's was unexpected to the duke , and gave him no little anxiety . he went to him immediately , himself , and endeavoured with all possible importunity to dissuade him ; but neither prayers nor promises could prevail with him any farther , than to leave part of his forces with them , and to engage himself to send his son giovanni , who in his room should continue in the service of the league . how unwelcome so ever it was to the duke , rinato's departure was not at all displeasing to the florentines for having recover'd what they had lost themselves , and being grown fearless of alfonso , they had no maw , that the duke should get more than his own towns in lombardy . rinato continuing his resolution , departed for france , and ( as he had promis'd ) sent his son giovanni into italy ; who staid not in lombardy , but remov'd presently to florence , where he was honorably entertain'd . this departure of rinato dispos'd duke francesco to peace ; the venetians , the florentines , and alfonso , were all weary of the war , and ready to embrace it ; and the pope desir'd it above all , by reason that that very year mahomet the great turk had taken constantinople and made himself master of all greece : which alarm'd all christendom , but especially the venetians and the pope , who imagined already they felt his talons in italy . the pope therefore desired all the potentates of italy that they would send their several plenipotentiaries to him , to negotiate a general peace . his motion being accepted and the embassadors met ; when they came to the matter , so much difficulty arose , as there was but small hopes of accommodation . alfonso required that the florentines should reinburse him for all the charges he had been at in the war : and the florentines expected the same . the venetians demanded cremona of the duke ; and the duke bergamo , brescia , and crema of them . so that these difficulties seem'd impossible to be remov'd . nevertheless , what was so desperate at rome , among so many , was easily concluded betwixt two of them , at milan , and venice ; for whilst the peace was negotiating at rome , and proceeded thus slowly ; on the ninth of april it was determined betwixt the duke and the venetians , that each of them should be restor'd to what they were possess'd of before the war. that the duke should have liberty to recover what the marquess of monferrat , and the duke of savoy had taken from him ; and that three months time should be allow'd to the rest of the princes of italy to come in . the pope , the florentines , the siennesi , and other little potentates came in within the time prefix'd , and ratifi'd it ; and the venetians , florentines and duke , made a peace betwixt them three for years . alfonso was the only prince of italy who seem'd to be refractory ; conceiving he could not concur without diminution , in respect he was to be admitted rather as an auxiliary , than a principal : upon which score he continued irresolute a good while , and would not declare ; at length upon several embassies from the pope and other princes , he suffered himself to be prevailed upon , and he and his son entred into the league for years . after which the king and the duke made several alliances and cross-matches together ; marrying their sons and daughters reciprocally into one another families . yet , that italy might not be left without feed or foundation for a new war , alfonso would not enter into the league , till he had leave by consent of the colleagues to make war upon the genoeses ; and gismondo malatesta ; and astorre prince of faenza : peace being concluded upon those terms , ferrando alfonso's son , who had been at sienna , returned into naples , having done nothing considerable in tuscany , but lost many of his men. this peace being made , and most of the princes comprehended , the only fear that remained , was , lest the differences betwixt alfonso and the genoeses might disturb it . but it prov'd otherwise , for alfonso did nothing openly to molest it ; it was the ambition and avarice of the mercenary souldier which interrupted it ; the venetians ( as their custom is upon the conclusion of peace ) disbanding their army , giacopo piccinino one of their generals , with several other considerable officers ( without leave ) departed into romagna , and from thence to sienna , where he began new hostilities , and took several towns. in the beginning of these troubles , and of the year pope nicolo died , and calisto . was chosen to succeed . this pope , to repress these new and approaching wars , rais'd what forces he could , under the command of his general giovanni ventimiglia , and joyning them with the forces of the florentines and the duke ( who were likewise got together to suppress those commotions ) they march'd together in a body against giacopo , and coming to an engagement with him near bolsena , notwithstanding ventimiglia was taken prisoner giacopo was worsted , and got off in disorder to castiglione della pescaia ; where , had he not been supplied with money by alfonso he had been utterly ruin'd . which relief made all people believe that that enterprize was undertaken , and prosecuted by alfonso's order , and direction : and alfonso perceiving he was discover'd , to reconcile himself to the colleagues , ( whom he had disoblig'd with that pitiful war ) he brought it about that giacopo should restore all he had taken in the territory of sienna , upon the payment of florens ; after which conclusion , he receiv'd giacopo and his forces into the kingdom of naples . in these times , though the pope was very intent upon the curbing of piccinino , yet not so but he had eye still upon the interest of christendom , which was then much overlaid by the turk . to this end he sent embassadors , and preachers into all the provinces of europe , to persuade them to arm against the common enemy of their religion ; and with their persons and purses to give what assistance they were able : so that in florence great store of alms were collected ; and several people wore the red corss , to intimate that they were ready in their persons to engage in that war. besides which , several solemn processions were made ; nor was there any thing in publick or private wanting , to show them among the forwardest of the christians in that enterprize , either for counsel , or money , or men. but the edge of this croisad was taken off , by a late intelligence they receiv'd , that the turk having besieg'd belgrade a town in hungary , not far from the danube ; was beaten off by the hungarians , and himself wounded : so that the terrour which all christendom conceiv'd upon the taking of constantinople , being abated , they went on but cooly in their preparations for war ; and in hungary likewise upon the death of the way-wod their general , their victory was prosecuted but faintly . but to return to the affairs in italy . the troubles commenced by giacopo piccinino , being compos'd in the year , and all humane contention in appearance at an end ; it pleased god to begin a new war of his own , and to send such a storm and tempest of wind in tuscany , as produc'd most strange and memorable effects , above the records of time past , or the credit of time to come . upon the of august , about an hour before day near the upper sea towards anconia , a thick dark cloud , of about two miles wide , was seen crossing over italy , and pointing towards pisa ; which cloud being driven by an extraordinary impulse ( whether natural or supernatural i cannot say ) was divided into several parts ; sometimes hurried up to the sky ; sometimes as furiously towards the earth ; sometimes twisting round like a cylinder , knocking and dashing one against the other with unconceivable violence , with great lightnings and flashes of fire before them ; which concussions made a noise more dreadful and loud than ever any thunder or earthquake was known to have done . the terror of this tempest was so great , every one believed the world was at an end ; and that the heavens , the earth , the waters , and the rest of the elements , were resolving into their first chaos and confusion : nor were the effects less formidable where it pass'd , especially about the castle of s. casiana . this castle is about eight miles from florence , situate upon the mountain which parts the vales of pisa and grieve ; betwixt this castle , and the town of s. andrea ( upon the same mountain ) this whirlwind passing , reach'd not to the town ; and of the castle it carried away only the battlements and chimnies ; but betwixt the said places it laid several houses flat with the ground ; tore up the churches from their foundations , and carried the roofs of the churches of san. martino a bagnuolo , and of santa maria della pace , whole and entire , above the distance of a mile . a messenger and his mules were hurried out of the way , into the neighbouring valley , and found dead the next day . the sturdiest oaks and the strongest trees , were not only blown down , but carried an incredible distance from the place where they grew . insomuch that when day appeared , and the tempest was over , the people remained stupid , and in strange consternation . the country was desolate , and wasted ; the ruines of the houses and churches terrible ; the lamentation of those whose houses were subverted and their cattel , servants , or friends found dead in their ruines , was not to be seen nor heard without great horror and compassion . but god sure intended rather to affright , than chastise the tuscans ; for had this tempest happened in any of their cities where the houses were thick , and the inhabitants numerous , as it fell upon the hills where the oaks and trees and houses were thin ; doubtless the mischief and desolation had been greater than the mind of man can comprehend . but god almighty was pleased to content himself with this essay , to make mankind more sensible of his power , if they persisted to offend him . but to return where i left . alfonso , as i said before , was not at all satisfied with the peace ; and seeing the war which he had caused giacopo piccinino to make , upon the siennesi ( without any reasonable occasion ) had produced no considerable effect ; he had a mind to try what that would come to , which by the league he was permitted to undertake : so that in the year . ( desiring to fix that government in the family of the adorni , and to supplant the tregosi who were then in possession ) resolved to invade the genoes● both by sea and by land. to this end , he caused giacopo piccinino to pass tronto with his forces and fall upon gismondo malatesta , ( by way of diversion ) who having secured his towns was not much terrified at his reproach , so that his enterprize on that side turn'd to little account ▪ but his invasion of genoa created him and his kingdom more troubles , than he ever desir'd : piero fregosa was at that time duke of genoa . this piero , finding himself unable to bear up against so powerful a king : upon consideration of his own weakness , resolv'd at lest to surrender that state to one that should be able to defend it , and perhaps sometime or other give him a reasonable reward ; he sent embassadors therefore to charles of france to desire his protection , and tender him the government . charles accepted the offer , and to take possession of the city , he sent giovanni d' angio ( king rinato's son ) who not long before was returned from florence into france ; for charles was persuaded that giovanni being acquainted with the humors , and customs of the italians , was properer for that government , than any man he could send : besides from thence he believ'd he might prosecute his designs against naples with more ease and covenience ; his father rinato , having been expel'd that kingdom by alfonso of aragon . hereupon giovanni departed for genoa , was receiv'd honorably by the town , and invested with the whole power both of the city , and state. this accident was not at all pleasing to alfonso ; he found now he had pull'd an old house over his head ; however he carried it bravely , went on with his enterprize and was advanc'd with his fleet under villa marina at porto fino , when surpriz'd with a sudden distemper , he died . the death of alfonso , put an end to the wars against giovanni , and the genoeses : and ferrando succeeded his father alfonso in the kingdom , was in no little trouble , having an enemy upon his hands of such reputation in italy ; and a jealousie of several of his barons , who being inclin'd to new changes , he was afraid might side with the french : besides he was acquainted with the ambition of the pope , and being scarce setled in his kingdom , was fearful lest he should attempt something to supplant him : his only hopes were in the duke of milan , who was no less solicitous for the affairs of that kingdom , than himself ; apprehending that if ever the french came to be masters of naples , their next enterprize of course would be against him ; for he knew they might pretend to milan as an appendix to that crown . for these reasons , as soon as alfonso was dead , francesco sent letters and men to ferrando ; the first to keep up his heart , the other his reputation . upon the death of alfonso the pope designed to give his nephew piero lodovico borgia , the government of that kingdom ; and to gloss over the business , and make it more plausible to the princes of italy , he gave out that that kingdom belonging formerly to the church , his intention was only to reduce it to that condition , and therefore he desired the duke of milan would not give any assistance to ferrando ; and offer'd him such towns as he had possess'd formerly in that kingdom . but in the midst of his contrivances calisto died , and pius . succeeded him , who was a si●nnesi of the family of the piccol huomini , and his name aeneas . this pope imploying his thoughts wholly for the benefit of christendom , and the honour of the church , and laying aside all private passion , and advantage at the intreaty of the duke of milan , crown'd ferrando king of naples : judging it a readier and safer way to compose the differences of italy by confirming him that was already in possession , than by assisting the pretences of the french ; or setting up ( as calisto did ) for himself . however ferrando took it for a favour , and to requite it he made antonio the popes nephew prince of malfi ; married him to his natural daughter ; and besides this , restor'd benevento and ferracina to the church . and now all the arms in italy were visibly laid down , and pius ( as calisto had begun before ) was moving all christendom against the turk ; when a new quarrel sprung up betwixt the fregosi , and giovanni the lord of genoa , which produc'd a greater , and more important war than the last : petrino fregosi was retir'd to a castle of his in riveria ; much discontented , that giovanni d' angio having been prefer'd to his dignity in genoa by him and his family , had not gratified them as they deserved : so that by degrees it was come to a feud . ferrando was very well pleas'd with the difference ; as being the only way to secure him in his kingdom , and therefore he sent pietrino supplies both of men and mony , hoping thereby giovanni might be expuls'd out of the state of genoa . giovanni having notice of their intelligence sent for relief into france , which having received , he march'd out against pietrino ; but pietrino by the access of more supplies from sundry places , being grown too strong , giovanni retreated , and applyed himself to securing the city ; which he did not do so carefully , but pietrino in one night surprized several posts in it , but was beaten the next morning , himself , and most of his men slain . this victory elevated giovanni so far , that he resolv'd to attempt upon ferrando ; departing from genoa in october with a great fleet , he sail'd to baia , and from thence to sessa , where he was honorably received by that duke . there had joyn'd themselves with giovanni , the prince of taranto , and the citizens of aquila ; besides several other princes and cities ; so that already that kingdom was more than half lost . upon which ferrando desir'd aid of the pope , and the duke of milan , and to lessen the number of his enemies , made peace with gismondo malatesti , which peace disgusted giacopo piccinino so highly ( gismondo being his natural enemy ) that he deserted ferrando , and took up arms under giovanni . ferrando sent mony likewise to federigo lord of urbin , and as soon as could be expected , got together a considerable army ( according to those times ) with which he march'd against the enemy , and finding them upon the river sarni , he engaged them , but was defeated and his most considerable officers taken ; after this victory , most of the towns and castles surrendred to giovanni only naples & some few neighbouring towns and princes , adher'd still to ferrando . giacopo piccinino advis'd to march directly for naples , and make himself master of the chief city , but giovanni replyed he would first ruine the country , and then the city would come with more ease ; but his rejecting the counsel of piccinino , was the loss of that design ; for he did not know that the members follow the head more naturally , than the head the members : ferrando was fled into naples , and there resorted to him diverse of his subjects who were driven from their homes , whom he receiv'd , and having with all possible gentleness , gained some monies of the citizens , he got a small body of an army together ; he sent new embassies to the pope and duke for supplies and was reliev'd with more plenty and speed than before ; for they were both of them afraid , that the loss of that kingdom would turn to their prejudice . much strengthened by their supplies , ferrando march'd out of naples ; and having recover'd his reputation , in part , he recover'd some of his towns : but whilst the war was carried on in that kingdom with such variety , an accident happen'd which rob'd giovanni of his opportunity of compleating that enterprize . the genoesi were extreamly dissatified with the insolent government of the french ; had taken arms against the governor , and forc'd him into the castle ; in this action the fregosi and adorni concur'd ; and the duke of milan , supplyed them both with mony and men : king rinato passed that way with a fleet towards the relief of his son , imagining by the help of the castle he might recover the town ; and landing his men in order thereunto , he was beaten in such sort , that he was forc'd back into provence . this news dismaid giovanni not a little : however he gave not his enterprize over , but continued the war by the help of such barons whose revolt from ferrando had render'd them desperate of pardon : at length after many occurencies , both armies came to a battle near troia , in which giovanni was routed , but his defeat troubled him not so much , as the loss of piccinino , who left his side , and went back again to ferrando . his army being broke , he got off into histria and from thence into france . this war continued years , and miscarried by the negligence of the general , when the souldiers had many times overcome . in this war however the florentines were not publickly concern'd . the truth is upon the death of alfonso , his son iohn of aragon being come to that crown , sent his embassadors to desire their assistance for his nephew ferrando , according to their obligation by their late league with alfonso ; but the florentines returned , that they did not think themselves oblig'd to assist the son in a quarrel commenced by the father ; and as it was begun without their consent or knowledg , so without any assistance from them it might be continued or ended . whereupon , in behalf of their king , the embassadors protested them guilty of the breach of the league , and responsible for all the losses which should follow ; and having done that , in a great huff they departed . during the revolutions in this war , the florentines were at quiet abroad , but at home it was otherwise , as shall be shown more particularly , in the following book . the history of florence . book vii . in the reading of the last book , it may appear ( possibly ) impertinent , and a digression , for a writer of the florentine history to have broke out , and expatiated upon the affairs of lombardy and naples . yet i have done it , and shall do it for the future ; for though i never profess'd to write the transactions of italy , yet i never bound my self up from giving a relation of such important and memorable passages , as would make our history more grateful and intelligible ; especially seeing from the actions of other princes and states , wars and troubles did many times arise in which the florentines were of necessity involved : for example , the war betwixt giovanni d' angio , and king ferrando , proclaimed in them so great a hatred and animosity one towards the other , that it was continued afterwards betwixt ferrando and the florentines , and more particularly the house of medici . for king ferrando complaining , not only that they had refus'd him their assistance , but given it to his enemies ; that resentment of his , was the occasion of much mischief , as will be shown in our narration . and because in my description of our foreign affairs , i am advanc'd to the year . ( being return'd to our domestick ) it will be necessary to look back for several years . but first by way of introduction ( as my custom ) i shall say , that they who imagine a commonwealth may be continued united , are egregiously mistaken . true it is , dissention does many times hurt ; but sometimes it advantages a state. it hurts when it is accompanied with parties , and factions ; it helps , when it has none . seeing therefore , it is impossible for any legislator or founder of a republick , to provide there should be no piques , nor unkindnesses betwixt men ; it is his business what he can , to secure them against growing into parties and clans . it is then to be consider'd , that there are two ways for citizens to advance themselves to reputation among their neighbours , and they are , either publickly or privatly . the publick way is , by gaining some battle , surprizing and distressing some town ; performing some embassy carefully and prudently ; or counselling their state wisely and with success ; the private way is , by being kind to their fellow citizens ; by defending them from the magistrats ; supplying them with mony , promoting them to honors ; and with plays and publick exhibitions to ingratiate with the people . this last way produces parties and factions , and as the reputation acquir'd that way is dangerous and fatal , so the other way it is beneficial ( if it sides with no party ) as extending to the publick . and although among citizens of such qualification , there must needs be emulations and jealousies , yet wanting partisans , and people which for their advantage will follow them , they are rather a convenience than otherwise , to a government ; for to make themselves more eminent and conspicuous than their competitors , they imploy all their faculties for its advancement , prying and observing one anothers actions so strictly , that neither dares venture to transgress . the emulations in florence were always with faction ; and for that reason always were dangerous ; nor was any party unanimous any longer than it had an adverse party in being ; for that being overcome , and the predominant party having no fear , nor order to restrain it , subdivided on course : cosimo de medici's party prevail'd in the year ; but ( the depress'd party being great , and many powerful men amongst them ) for a while they continued unanimous and supportable , committing no exorbitance among themselves , nor injustice to the people , which might beget them their hatred . insomuch , as when ever they had use of the people for their readvancement to any place of authority , they found them always ready to confer it upon the chief of that party , whether it was the balia or any other power which they desir'd : and so from the year to ( which was years ) they were six times created of the balia by the counsels of the people . there were in florence ( as we have many times hinted ) two principal citizens , cosimo de medici , and neri capponi . neri had gain'd his reputation in the publick way , and had many friends , but few partisans : cosimo on the other side had advanc'd himself both ways , and had friends and partisans both , and these two continuing friends , whilst they lived together , they could ask nothing of the people ; but it was readily granted , because unanimity went along with the power . but neri dying in the year , and the adverse party being extinct , the government found great difficulty to recover its authority , and cosimo's great friends were the cause of it , who were willing to detract from his authority , now his adversaries were suppress'd . this was the beginning of the divisions in , in which year , in a solemn counsel , where the publick administration was debated , those to whom the government at that time belonged , advised that there should be no balia for the future : that the way of imborsation should be laid aside ; and the magistrats be chosen by lots , as in the former squittini's or elections . to obviate this humour , cosimo had two ways , either to possess himself forcibly of the government by the power of his party , and depose his enemies : or to let things go which way they would , and attend till time should make his friends discern , that they did not take the government , and authority so much from him , as from themselves . of the two he made choice of the last ; knowing that according to that constitution , the purses being full of his friends , he could without any danger reassume his authority when he pleas'd . the city being thus reduc'd to its old way of creation of magistrats by lots , they thought they had perfectly recover'd their liberty , and that for the future elections were to be made not according to the influence of the nobility , but the inclination of the people . so that sometimes the friend of one grandee was rejected , and sometimes of another , and those whose houses were formerly full of clients and their presents , had now scarce housholdstuff left , or servant to attend them : those who were formerly their inferiors , were now become their equals , and their equals advanced to be their superiours : they were not regarded nor respected , but rather derided and abus'd ; all people taking the freedom to talk of them and their government as they pleas'd , even in the streets and high ways , without any contradiction ; so that it was not long after , they discovered , that as he had told them , it was not so much cosimo , as themselves which were degraded . however cosimo took no notice , but in all propositions that would please the people , he was the first who concurr'd . but that which was most terrible to the nobility , and made cosimo look about him , was the receiving of the catastro of the year by which the impositions were to be laid by order of law , and not by the capriccio's of particular men. this law being reviv'd , and magistrats already chosen to put in execution , the nobility assembled , and went to cosimo to beg of him that he would be a means to rescue them out of the jaws of the people ; and restore the state to a condition that might make him powerful , and them honorable . to which cosimo replyed he would do it with all his heart , provided it might be done legally by the consent of the people and without any force , of which he would not endure to hear . then they endeavoured in the counsels to prevail for a new balia , but they could not obtain it ; whereupon they returned to cosimo , and press'd him with all expressions of humility that he would consent to a parliament ; but cosimo ( resolved to make them fully sensible of their error ) absolutely refused it , and because donati cochi ( being gonfaloniere di giustitia at that time ) presum'd to call a parliament without his consent ; cosimo made him so ridiculous and contemptible in the senate , he was not able to continue there but as a distracted man , was sent home again to his house : nevertheless , lest things should run too far to be recovered , luca pitti ( a bold and tenacious man ) being made gonfaloniere di giustitia , ●e thought it a convenient time to have the government to him , that if any thing miscarried in that enterprize it might be imputed to luca. and accordingly luca in the very beginning of his office , urged the people many times to the restauration of the balia , threatning those of the counsels with opprobrious and insolent language ; and not long after he executed what he had threatned ; for in august in the vigil of san. lownzo , having filled the palace with armed men , he called the people together in the piazza , and constrained them by force to consent , to what they had voluntarily refused . having repossess'd themselves of the state , created a new balia , and changed the magistrats according to the pleasure of a few ; that the biginning of their government might be as terrible , as it was forcible , they confin'd girolamo machiavelli and some others , and deprived many of their honors . girolamo not being exact in observing his bounds , was proscrib'd , and wandring up and down italy to excite the several princes against his own country , by the treachery of one of the senators in lunigiana , he was apprehended , brought back to florence , and executed in prison . this government ( which lasted eight years ) was very violent , and insupportable : for cosimo being grown old , weary of business , and infirm in his body ; could not be so sedulous as formerly , so that the city was become a prey to a few particular citizens ; who in requital of his good service to the state , made luca pitti a knight , and he ( in return of their kindness ) appointed , that whereas before they were called priori dell arti , now ( that they might at least retain the title , though they lost the possession ) they should be be called priori della liberta . he ordered likewise that whereas formerly the gonfalonieri sat on the right hand of the retori , they should sit in the midst of them hereafter : and ( that god might have his share in the revolution ) he caused solemn services , and processions to be performed , by way of thanks for the honors to which they were restored . luca was richly presented both by cosimo and the senate ; after whom the whole city came in flocks , so that it was beleived he had given him that day to the value of ducats by which means he grew into such reputation , that not cosimo , but he was looked upon as the governor of city ; and he arrived at that point of vanity , to begin two stately and magnificent houses one in florence , & the other at rucina , not above a miles distance from the city : but that in florence was greater , and more splendid , than the house of any other private citizen whatsoever ; for the finishing of which he baulk'd no extraordinary way ; for not only the citizens and better sort , presented him , and furnish'd him with what was necessary about it ; but the common people gave him all of them their assistance : besides all that were banish'd , or guilty of murder , felony , or any other thing which expos'd them to publick punishment , had sanctuary at that house provided they would give him their labour . the rest of his brethren , though they built not such houses , they were no less rapacious than he , so that though florence had no wars abroad to destroy it , it had citizens at home , in its own bowels , which would not suffer it to prosper . in the mean time , as we have said before , the wars happen'd in the kingdom of naples , and the pope had difference with the malatesti in romagna concerning rimino and cesana , which they had taken from him , and desired to recover : so that betwixt the thoughts of that , and the enterprize against the turks , the time of pius his whole papacy was consum'd . but florence fell again into its old factions and dissentions . the divisions in cosimo's party began in upon the occasions aforesaid , and by his wisdom ( as is said before ) they were restrained . but in cosimo fell sick , and dyed , generally lamented , both by his friends and his enemies , for they , who lov'd him not whilst at the helm , seeing their fellow citizens so rapacious whilst he was living , ( the reverence they bore to his person making them less insupportable than otherwise they would be ) could not but fear , now he was dead , and his influence lost ; they should be utterly ruined , and in his son piero they could repose little confidence ; for though he was of himself a good man , yet being infirm , and but young in the state , they supposed he would be constrained to comply with them , and they become more head-strong and incontrolable in their wickedness : so that cosimo died universally lamented , and certainly he deserved it for he was the most famous and memorable citizen ( of a person that was no souldier ) that ever florence or any other city produc'd : he exceeded all his contemporaries , not only in authority and estate , but in liberality and prudence ; which qualities made him a prince in his country , and beloved by all people : his munificence was more eminent after his death , than before , for when his son piero came to look over his writing , and to enquire into the particulars of his estate , he found there was scarce a man of any quality in the city , to whom cosimo had not lent a considerable sum ; and many times when he heard of the exigencies of any person of quality , he supply'd them unasked . his magnificence appear'd in the multitude of his buildings ; for in florence he built the convents of s. marco , and s. lorenzo , and the monastery of s. verdiano : in the monti di fiesoli , s. giralomo , and the abbey in mugello , he not only repaired a church of the minor's , but he took it down , and rebuilt it from the ground : besides this in s. croce , in servi in agnoli , in s. mineato , he erected altars , and most sumptuous chappels , all which besides the building , he adorn'd with all the utensels and decorations required in so sacred a place . besides his religious houses , he built several private houses for himself , one in the city sutable to his quality ; four without , at careggio , fiesole , cafaggivolo , and trebi , all of them fitter for princes , than private men : and as if his buildings in italy were too few to make him famous , he built an hospital in ierusalem , for the reception and relief of poor and infirm pilgrims brought thither by their devotion ; in which fabrick , he laid out a vast sum of money : and albeit in his actions and buildings he behaved himself like a king , and was the only prince in florence , yet he was so moderate , and untransported in all things , that in his conversation , his parades , his allyances , and his whole manner of life , he retained the modesty of a citizen ; for he was sensible that ostentation and pomp in that which is every day to be seen , contracts more envy , than moderation , and gravity . being to seek for matches for his sons , he did not endeavour for the alliance of princes , but married his son giovanni to cornelia alessandri , and piero , to lucretia tornabuoni , and contracted his grand-children by piero , bianca to gulielmo di pazzi , and nannina to bernardo rucellai . among all the states , princes , and civil governments of his time ; no person came near him for sagacity and intelligence . hence it was that in all the variety of his fortunes , when the city was so uncertain , and the people so voluble ; he kept his authority years , for being a wise man and of great prospect , he foresaw any mischief at a distance , and was ready to prevent it , before it proceeded too far ; or to frustrate the effects of it , if it did whereby he did not only subdue all domestick and private ambition at home , but restrained . it so happily in several princes , that whoever confederated with him and his country , came off upon equal terms , if not worsted their enemies ; and whoever oppos'd him , either lost their money , their time , or their state : and of this the venetians can give ample testimony , who whilst in league with him against duke philip , were always victorious ; but that league was no sooner broken , but they were beaten both by philip , and francesco : and when they joyned with alfonso against the republick of florence , cosimo with his own credit drained naples and venice so dry , that they were glad to except what terms of peace he would allow . of all the difficulties therefore which cosimo encountred both within the city and without , the conclusion was still honorable for him , and destructive for his enemies ; so that the civil discords gain'd him authority at home , and his foreign wars , power and reputation abroad ; insomuch that to the territory and dominion of his country , he added the city of borgo a sepulcro , montedoglio , casentino , and valdi bagno , and by his virtue and fortune , snppress'd his enemies , and exalted his friends . he was born . on s. cosimo , and damiano's day . the first part of his life was full of troubles , witness his banishment , his imprisonment , and his dangers in being killed . from the counsel of constance , after pope iohn was ruin'd ( whom he had attended thither ) he was forced to fly in disguise , or otherwise he had been slain : but after the fortieth year of his age it was more pleasant and happy ; not only such as were employ'd with him in publick affairs , but the managers also of his private treasure in foreign parts , participating of his felicity . from him many families in florence may derive their great estates : particularly the fornabuoni , the benci , the portinari , the sapetti , and in short all that had dependance either upon his counsel or fortune . though his disbursements were vast in building his houses and temples , and in his distributions to the poor , yet he would complain sometimes among his friends , that he had not laid out so much to the honour of god , as he was oblig'd ; and that if he had done much more , he must confess himself his debtor . his stature was ordinary , his complexion worthy , his presence venerable : his learning was not great , but his eloquence admirable ; he was naturally prudent , courteous to his friends , merciful to the poor , profitable in his converse , cautious in his counsels ; speedy in his executions , and in his sayings and replies , both solid and facetious . when he went first into banishment , rinaldo de gli albizi ) drolling upon his exilement ) sent him word , the hen was hatching , to which cosimo returned , that she would have but ill hatching so far from her nest . to some of his rebels who in a threatning way sent him word . they were not asleep , he reply'd , he believ'd it , for he had spoil'd their sleeping . when pope pius was encouraging and pressing all christian princes against the turk , cosimo said the pope was an old man , but he had begun an enterprize as if he had been a boy . to the venetian embassadors , who came to florence with the embassadors of alfonso , to complain of that commonwealth , putting his hat off to them , he demanded the colour of his hair , they told him it was gray ; he replyed , in time your senators will be of the same colour . not many hours before his death , his wife seing him shut his eyes , enquired why he did so , and he told her to use them . some citizens after his return complaining to him that the city would be depopulated , and god almighty offended , if he banished so many wealthy and religious men ; he told them , the city had better be depopulated than destroyed . that two yards of cloth were enough to keep a man from the cold ; and that states were not to be preserved by the beads a man carried in his hand . these last expressions gave his enemies occasion to calumniate him , as a person that was a greater lover of himself than his country ; and one that took more care of this world than the next . many other of his wise sayings might be inserted , but being unnecessary , they are omitted . cosimo was likewise a great lover and advancer of learned men ; upon which score he entertained in florence argiropolo a grecian , as learned as any in his time , that by him the youth of florence might be instructed in the greek tongue , and in several of his tenets . he entertained likewise in his house marcileo ficino , a great patron of the platonick philosophy , whom he loved so entirely ; and that he might follow his studies with more convenience , he gave him a house near his own palace at caraggi . so that his prudence , his beneficence , his success , and his way of living made him be belov'd , and feared among the citizens , and much esteemed by all princes of europe . whereby he left such a foundation to his posterity , that by their virtue they might equal him , by their fortune transcend him , and obtain as much honor as he had in florence , in all the cities and countries of christendom . nevertheless towards the latter end of his days , he had several afflictions , he had but two sons , piero and giovanni , of which giovanni ( the most hopeful ) dyed , and piero who survived , was infirm , and by the weakness of his body unfit either for publick or private business ; so that after the death of his son , causing himself to be carried about his house , he sighed and said , this house is too big for so small a family . it troubled him also that he had not ( in his judgment ) enlarged the dominion of the florentine state , nor added to it empire , any considerable acquest : and it s troubled him the more , for that he found himself cheated by francesco , who when he was but count , had promis'd him , as soon as he had made himself master of milan , to employ his arms against lucca in the behalf of the florentines ; but his mind chang'd with his fortune , and having got to be the duke of milan , had a desire to enjoy in peace , what he had obtained by war , so that after his elevation , he never medled in foreign concerns , nor made any more wars , than were necessary for his own defence : which was a great disturbance to cosimo , who now discerned he had been at great pains and expence to advance a man who was both false and ingrateful . he perceived likewise that in respect of his age , and the infirmities of his body , he was not able to apply himself to publick or private business as he was wont ; and he saw both the one and the other decline , the city going to wrack by the dissentions of the citizens ; and his fortune by his ministers and sons . these considerations gave him no little disquiet towards his end ; yet he died full of glory and renown ; all the cities and princes of christendom sent their compliments of condolency to his son piero , the whole city attended his corps with great solemnity to the grave , and by publick decree it was inscrib'd upon his tomb padre della patria . if in my description and character of cosimo , i have rather followed the example of those who have written the lives of princes , than of an historian , it is not to be admir'd . he was a person extraordinary in our city , and i thought my self obliged to give him a more than ordinary commendation : during the time that italy and florence were in the condition aforesaid ; lewis king of france was infested with a furious war , which his barons ( at the instigation of francis duke of britan , and charles duke of burgundy ) had rais'd . this war lay so heavy upon him , he could not assist giovanni in his designs upon genoa and naples , but believing he had need enough of all the supplies he could get , he call'd back his forces ; and savona being at that time in the hands of the french , he ordered it to be delivered to the count , and left him if he pleas'd to pursue the enterprize against genoa : the count was easily persuaded to a thing so much to his advantage ; so that by the reputation of his amity with the french king , and the assistance given him by the adorni , he possess'd himself of genoa , and in gratitude to the french king , sent him a supply of horse into france , under the command of his eldest son galeazzo : by this means ferrando of aragon , and francesco sforza remain'd at quiet ; the one duke of lombardy , and lord of genoa ; the other king of the whole kingdom of naples , and having contracted alliances together , and married their children the one to the other ; they began to consider how they might secure their states to themselves whilst they lived , and to their heirs when they were dead . in order to this , it was thought necessary , the king should make sure of such of his barons as had sided against him in his wars with giovanni d' angio , and the duke should endeavour to extirpate all that had been favourers of the bracci , who were mortal enemies to the said duke , and at that time in great reputation , under the conduct of giacopo piccinino . for giacopo being the greatest captain in italy , and having no soveraignty of his own ; it concerned all who had any , to have an eye over him , and more especially the duke , who thought he could not enjoy his dominion safely himself , nor leave it to his sons , whilst giacopo was living . hereupon the king with all industry endeavoured an accord with his barons , used all possible art to reconcile himself to them ; and he succeeded with much difficulty ; for they found that whilst they were in wars with the king , they must certainly be ruined ; but by accommodation of their differences , and trusting themselves to him , there was only a hazard ; and because men do always avoid those evils with more readiness , which are most certain , princes do easily deceive , such as are not able to contend . the barons seeing nothing before them but destruction , if they continued the war , accepted his conditions , and threw themselves into his arms ; but not long after , sundry pretences were taken against them , and they were all of them extinguished . which news , was so terrible to giacopo piccinino ( who was then with his forces at solmona ) that by the mediation of his friends he immediatly practised his reconciliation with the duke : and the duke having offered him honorable terms , giacopo resolv'd to accept them , and come in ; and accordingly he went to milan to present himself to him , attended by horse . giacopo had served under his father , and with his brother a long time ; first for duke philip and then for the people of milan ; so that by long conversation in those parts he had got a good interest , and was generally belov'd , and the present condition of affairs , had much increas'd it ; for the prosperity , and grandeur of the sforzeschi had created them envy ; and giacopo's adversity and long absence had gain'd him compassion among the people , and a great desire to see him advanced : all which kindness discovered it self at his arrival ; there being scarce any of the nobility but went out to meet him ; the streets were full of people to behold him ; and no talk in the whole city but of him , and his family . but their extravagant acclamations were his ruine ; for as they increas'd the dukes jealousie , so they confirm'd his resolution to remove him , and that it might be done the more plausibly , and with less danger of detection , he ordered that his marriage with drusiano his natural daughter ( to whom he had been contracted long before ) should be consummate . after which he practis'd with ferrando to entertain him as general of his army , and to give him florens by way of advance ; upon conclusion of these articles , giacopo and his wife accompanied an ambassador from the duke to naples : where they were all very well received , and for several days entertained with all imaginable affluence and diversion ; but desiring leave to pass to his army at solmona , he was invited by the king into the castle , and after supper both he and his son francesco were apprehended , and clapped up into prison , where not long after they were murdered . thus were the princes of italy jealous of that virtue , which they had not in themselves ; and not enduring it in other people , they exposed that country to calamities which not long after afflicted and destroyed it . pope pius , having in the mean time accommodated the differences in romagna , and finding an universal peace all over europe ; thought it a convenient time to solicite the christians against the turks , and reassumed the whole methods which his predecessors had taken , by which all the princes of christendom were prevailed withal to assist either with mony , or men : matheo king of hungary , and charles duke of burgundy engaged to go in person ; & were made generals of that enterprize by the pope , who was so well pleas'd with what he had done , that he went from rome to ancona to be at the rendezvous of the army , which was to meet there , and ( by ships which the venetians had promis'd to furnish ) be transported into sclavonia . after the arrival of his holiness , there was so great a throng and confluence of people , that in a few days all their provision was devoured ; and the neighbouring towns not being able to supply , every body was ready to starve for hunger : besides which they neither had mony to pay the souldier , nor weapons to arm them ; there was neither duke of burgundy , nor king of hungary there ; the venetians indeed had sent a few gallies under one of their captains , but it was rather to show their pomp , than to perform their promise ; so far were they unfit for the transportation of an army . so that in the midst of these disasters by reason of his great age and infirmities , the pope died ; the whole a●●● disbanded and returned to their own homes . pope pius dying in the year , 〈◊〉 ( by birth a venetian ) was elected in his place . and as most of the principalities in italy had changed their governors about that time , so francesco sforza duke of milan died after he had enjoyed that dukedom sixteen years , and galeazzo his son was declared his successor . the death of this prince was the occasion that the divisions in florence encreased , & broke out much sooner than otherwise they would have done . cosimo being dead , piero his son succeeded both to his authority and estate ; and having call'd to him diotisalvi neroni as honorable and great a man as most in the city , ( by whom , cosimo upon his death bed had commanded his son piero to be governed in all his affairs ) he let him know the great confidence his father had repos'd in him , and that being desirous to obey him after his death , as he had done whilst he was living , he did intreat his advice not only in his private and domestick affairs , but in his publick administration of the government : & that he might begin first with his own particular business , he would show him the accounts and books of his estate , that he might understand how things stood ; and direct him afterwards as he pleas'd . diotisalvi promised to be ready , and faithful ; but the accounts being produced and examined , were found very disorderly and imperfect : diotisalvi ( as a person which respected his own interest , more than his professions to piero , or his obligations to his father , supposing it easie to rob him of his reputation , and divest him of the authority which cosimo had left him as hereditary ) came to him therefore with counsel very fair and reasonable in appearance , but inwardly destructive and pernitious . he represented to him the disorder of his accounts ; and what sums of mony would be necessary to have by him , if he meant to keep up his credit , or preserve his preferment in the state : he told him that those disorders were not any way so readily to be redress'd ; nor his coffers so naturally supplied , as by calling in such sums as were owing to his father both abroad and at home . for cosimo ( to gain himself an interest ) had been very ready to accommodate any body that wanted ; and the monies he had lent amounted to an incredible sum . piero was well satisfied with his advice , and thinking it but just , he called in his mony . but no sooner had he done it , but the citizens cryed out upon him ; declaimed against him as ingrateful and covetous , and used him as opprobriously , as if he had robbed them , and not demanded his own . diotisalvi finding his design succeed , and that piero was fallen into disgrace with the people , he consulted with luca pitti , agnolo acciaivoli , and nicolo soderini , how they might depose him : they were all of them ready to embrace the design ; but upon several grounds and provocations ; luca desired to succeed piero in his command , for he was grown so great , he disdained to obey him : diotisalvi , knew luca was not fit to be chief in the government , and therefore he thought , if piero was removed ; in a short time that authority would devolve upon him : nicolo sodoreni had a mind the city should be more free , and governed by direction of the chief magistrats : agnolo , had a private quarrel to the medici for several reasons , and particularly these . raffaello his son had long before married alessandra de bardi , and had a great fortune with her : this lady , either for his own defects , or other peoples , was ill treated by both father-in-law , and husband . lorenzo d' ilarione a young gentleman her relation , pitying her condition , went with certain of his comerads one night well armed , and took her by force out of the house of agnolo . the acciaivoili complained heavily of the outrage , and the cause being refer'd to cosimo , he awarded that the acciaivoili should refound her portion , and that then it should be left to the ladies election whether she would return to her husband or no. agnolo did not think cosimo in this determination , had dealt with him as a friend , and not being able to revenge it upon him , he resolv'd to do it upon his son. yet though their reasons and ends were diverse , the conspirators agreed all in their pretence , that the city should not be governed by a peculiar council , but by the magistrats . the hatred of the people , and their occasions to revile him , were much exaggerated by the failing of several merchants about that time , which was objected to piero as a great prejudice to the city , as if the calling in of his mony had broke them . to this aspersion it was added that he was negotiating a match for his eldest son lorenzo , with clarice a daughter of the orsini , which they took in great dudgeon , and upbraided him by it , declaring that it was now apparent what he drove at ; and that thinking his son too good for any alliance in florence , it was manifest he did not now look upon himself as a citizen , but was casting about how he might make himself soveraign : for he was too proud to have the citizens to his kindred , had a desire to make them his subjects ; and therefore he did not deserve to have them his friends . these conspirators believed they had all sure in their hands , for the greater part of the citizens being deluded with the name of liberty , ( with which the conspirators had guilded and embellished their designs ) had profess'd themselves on their side . there being a general ebullition of these sort of humors at that time in the city ; it was thought convenient by some that were not at all taken with them , seeing they could not be absolutely depress'd , to find out a way to discuss and divert them ; for whilst the people are idle , they are proper instruments for any commotion : to employ them therefore , and remove their thoughts from contriving against the government ( it being a compleat year since cosimo died ) for the entertainment and recreation of the city , they took occasion to make two publick and solemn feasts , or shows ( which are usual there ) one of them represented the three wise men , who were conducted by the star to the place where our saviour was born , and this was performed with so much pomp and magnificence that for several months together the whole city was employed about the pageants and preparation . the other was called a tornament ( which is a kind of skirmishing on horseback ) in which the young gentlemen of the city had challenged the most eminent knights of italy ; and among these young gentlemen , lorenzo the eldest son of piero carried the applause , not by favour or partiality , but by his own valour and dexterity . but these sports and divertisements were no sooner over , but the citizens returned to their old jealousies , and every one pursued his own fancy with more eagerness than before ; which occasioned great feuds , and they were augmented much by two unfortunate accidents . the one was , that the authority of the balia was expired ; the other that francesco duke of milan was dead ; upon whose death , the new duke galeazzo , sent embassadors to florence to confirm the capitulations which his father francesco had made with that city ; one of the articles obliging them to pay francesco an annual sum of mony : the chief of the adverse party thinking this a fair opportunity , opposed the medici in the ratification ; alledging that the agreement was made with francesco , not with his son ; and that francesco being dead , the obligation was void ; for galeazzo was not so great and considerable as his father , and therefore his amity unlikely to be so profitable ; so that though indeed there was not much gain'd by francesco , there was less to be expected from his son ; and if any citizen , to maintain his own private interest would pay him his annuity , it would be against the freedom and the safety of the city . to this piero replyed , that so important an alliance , was not so carelesly to be lost , that nothing was more advantagious and necessary ( as well for all italy as florence ) than their alliance with the duke ; for thereby the venetians would be discouraged from attempting upon that dutchy , either by counterfeit friendship , or manifest war. but should this alliance be dissolv'd , no sooner would it be known to the venetians , but they would fall immediately upon the duke ; and finding him young , without friends , and scarce warm in the state ; they would easily carry it from him , either by fallacy or force ; and in either of those cases , the commonwealth of florence must be destroyed . but his reasons could not be accepted ; the sedition began to break out openly : the adverse party assembled in several companies in the night , the greatest part of them in la pista , and the friends of the medici in the crocetta : the conspirators being impatient to have piero destroyed , had gotten the subscription of several citizens as favourers of their designs : but being got together , one night above the rest , after solemn debate in counsel which way they were to proceed ; it was unanimously agreed that the power of the medici should be rebated ; but they were divided in the way ; the most moderate part proposed that seeing the balia was extinct , they should only take care it should not be revived ; for if the government fell into the hands of the counsels and magistrats ( as it would do of course ) in small time piero's authority would evaporate ; and with that , his interest among the merchants ; for his affairs were now in such a posture , that unless he could relieve himself by the publick treasure , he would be certainly ruined : and when that should happen , there would be no farther danger of him , their liberty would be recovered without banishment or blood , which all good citizens ought to desire ; but if force was applyed , infinite hazards might occur . if one be falling of himself , no body thrusts him ; if any one thrusts him , every body sustains him . besides , if nothing extraordinary being acted against him , he will have no occasion to arm , or strengthen his party ; and if he should , it must be with great charge , and disadvantage ; for every one would suspect him , which would facilitate and hasten his ruine . others were not satisfied with this delay ; affirming that time would be more for his benefit , than theirs ; and if they would proceed by cold delatory gradations , piero would run no hazard , but they should run many . for the magistrats ( though they were his enemies ) suffering him to enjoy the priviledges of the city ; his friends would make him prince ( as had happened in ) to their utter destruction : and that though that counsel was honest and peaceable , yet this was wiser and more secure , and therefore to be executed , whilst the minds of the people were incensed : the way they proposed was to arm at home , and to entertain the marquess of ferrara into their pay abroad ; and when a senate of their friends happened to meet , then to rise , and secure themselves as well as they could . the result of all was , that they should attend such a senate , and then make the best of their time . nicolo fedmi ( who was employed as chancellor ) was one of this council ; who being tempted by greater , and more practicable hopes , discovered the whole plot to piero , and gave him a list of the conspirators , and a catalogue of the subscriptions . piero was astonished at the number and quality of his adversaries ; and upon consultation with his friends , it was concluded , that he also should take subscriptions , and having committed the care of them to some of his confidents , he found the citizens so sickle and unstable , that many of them who had subscribed to the enemy came over , and obliged themselves to him . whilst things were in this distraction , the time came about in which the supream magistracy was to be renewed ; to which nicolo soderini was advanced by the gonfaloniere de giustitia . it was a wonder to see the concourse not only of the better sort of citizens , but of the common people which attended him to the palace , and put on an olive garland upon his head by the way , ( to signifie that he was the person upon whom the safety , and the liberty of their city did depend . ) by this , and many examples of the same nature it is evident , how inconvenient it is to enter upon the magistracy , or government , with more then ordinary acclamation ; for not being able to perform as is expected ( and for the most part more is required ) the people abate of their esteem , and come by degrees to despise you . thomaso and nicolo soderini were brothers , nicolo was a person of greater spirit , but thomaso the more prudent . thomaso being a friend to piero and knowing the humor of his brother ; that he desired the liberty of the city , and that the government might be preserved without offence to any body , he encouraged him to a new squittini , by which means the borsi might be filled with the names of such citizens as were lovers of liberty , and the government continued without violence , as he desired . nicolo was easily persuaded by his brother , and suffered the time of his magistracy to expire in the vanity of that opinion , and his friends which were of the conspiracy were well enough contented , as being already emulous of him , and not desiring the reformation should fall out during his authority ; presuming they could effect it when they pleas'd , though another was gonfaloniere . whereupon his office expired with less honor than he entred upon it ; by reason he had begun many good things , but perfected nothing . this accident fortified the party of piero exceedingly ; confirmed his friends , and brought over such as were neuter : so that though all things were ready on all sides , they were delaid for several months , and not the least tumult appeared . nevertheless piero's party encreasing , his enemies began to resent it , and met together , to perform that by force , which they might more easily have done before by means of the magistrates ; in order to which they concluded to kill piero ( who was at that same time sick at , c●rreggi ) and cause the marquess of ferrara to advance towards the city ; for when piero was dead , they resolved to come armed to the palace and force the senate to settle the government as they should direct : for though all of them were not their friends , yet they doubted not but to fright them into a concurrence . diotisalvi , to disguise his designe visited piero very often ; discoursed with him about unit●●ing the factions , and advised him very frankly . but piero was informed of the whole conspiracy , and besides domenico martegli had given him notice that francesco neroni the brother of diotisalvi had been tempting him to their party , assuring him of success : hereupon piero resolved to be first in arms , and took occasion from their practices with the marquess of ferrara . he pretended he had received a letter from gicvanni bentivogli prince of bologna , importing that the marquess of ferrara was with certain forces upon the river albo , and that it was given out , his design was for florence ; upon which intelligence , piero pretended to arm , and ( attended by a great number of armed men ) he came to the city . at his arrival his whole party took arms , and the adversary did the same , yet not in so good order as piero , for his men were prepared , and the other surprised . diotisalvi's palacebeing not far from piero's , diotisalvi judged himself insecure at home , and therefore went up and down , sometimes exhorting the senate to cause piero to lay down his arms ; sometimes seeking out luca , and encouraging him to be constant ; but the briskest and most couragious of them all was nicolo soderini , who taking arms immediatly , and being followed by most of the populace of his quarter , went to luca's house , intreated him to mount , and march with him to the palace for the security of the senate , who ( he assured him ) were of his side ; by doing of which , the victory would be certain ; but if he remained in his house , he would run the hazard of being slain by those who were armed , or abused by those who were not ; and then he would repent him when too late , whereas now it was in his power by force of arms to ruine piero if he pleased : or if he desired peace , it was more honorable to give conditions , than to receive them . but all his rhetorick could not work upon luca ; he had altered his mind , and received new promises of alliances and rewards from piero ; and already married on of his nieces to giovanni tornabuoni ; so that instead of being persuaded by him , he admonished nicolo to lay down , and return quietly to his house ; for he ought to be satisfied , that the city should be governed by its magistrats : for whether he was satisfied or not , it would be so ; all people would lay down their arms ; and the senate having the stronger party , would be judges of their quarrel . there being no remedy , and nicolo having no where else to dispose himself , went back to his house ; but before he departed he told him thus . i cannot alone do this city any service . but i can prognosticate its miseries . the resolution you have taken , will deprive your country of its liberty ; your self of your authority ; me of my estate ; and others of their country . at the first news of this tumult , the senate had caused their palace to be shut up , where they kept themselves close with the magistrats , without appearing for either side : the citizens ( especially those who had followed luca seeing the party of piero armed , and the other disarmed ) began to contrive how they might shew themselves his friends , not how they might express themselves his enemies . whereupon the principal citizens , and the heads of the factions met in the palace before the senators , where many things were debated relating to the government of the city in that juncture , and the ways of reconciliation : but because piero could not be there in respect of his indisposition , all agreed to go to him to his house , except nicolo soderini , who ( having recommended his children and family to the protection of tomaso ) was retired to his country house , to attend there , the conclusion of these troubles , which he expected would be unhappy to him , and fatal to his country . the rest being arrived at piero's palace , one of them being deputed , complained to him of the condition of the city by reason of the tumults ; declared that they who took arms first , were most conscious of them ; that understanding piero was the man , and his design unknown , they were come to him to be informed from himself , and if it appeared to be for the advantage of the city , they promised to comply . to which piero replyed , that he who takes arms first is not in the fault , but he who gives the occasion : that if they considered more seriously of their behaviour towards him , they would not wonder at what he had done for his own preservation : for they would find it was their conventions in the night ; their subscriptions , and practices to defeat him both of his authority and life , which had forced him to his arms , yet having extended them no farther than his own house , he conceived it was good evidence his intentions were innocent , and rather to defend himself , than injure any body else , that he desired nothing , but his own security , and had never given them occasion to suspect him of other , that when the authority of the balia expired , he never attempted to revive it in any extraordinary way ; but was willing ( if they were so themselves ) that the magistrats should have the government of the city ; that cosimo and his sons knew how to live honorable in florence , either with or without the balia ; and that in it was for their interest , not his , that it was restored . but this was not sufficient , he found them of opinion , that whilst he was in florence , there would be no safety , no tranquillity for them : a thing truly so far from his belief , he could never have imagined or thought upon it , that his own friends and his father should not endure to live with him in the same city , seeing no action of his had ever express'd him otherwise , than a quiet and peaceable man. then turning about to diotisalvi , and his brothers who were all present , he reproached them severely by the favours they had received from cosimo ; by the confidence he had placed in them ; and the great ingratitude which they had returned ( which reprimende was delivered with so much zeal and efficacy , that , had not piero himself restrained them , some there present were so much enraged at their deportment towards him , they would certainly have killed him ) and at last he concluded , that what ever they and the senate determined , he would consent to , for he desired nothing of them but to live quiet and in peace . hereupon many things were proposed but nothing concluded ; only in general it was thought necessary the city should be reformed , and new laws created : the then gonfaloniere de giustitia was bernardo lotti , a person in whom piero had no confidence , and so resolved not to do any thing whilst he was in office , which he conceived would be no great prejudice to his affairs , because his time was almost expir'd . but at the election of senatours in september and october following , . roberto lioni was chosen gonfaloniere , who was no sooner settled in his office , but ( all others thing being prepared to his hand ) he called the people together into the piazza , and created a new balia , all of piero's creatures , who fell presently upon the creation of new magistrats , and chose them as piero directed . which manner of proceeding so terrisied the heads of the adverse party , that they fled out of the city most of them ; agnolo acciaivoli to naples , diotisalvi neroni , and nicolo soderini to venice . but luca pitti remained behind , presuming upon his late alliance , and the promises ; which he had received from piero : giovanni the son of neroni , at that time archbishop of florence ( to prevent the worst ) banished himself voluntarily to rome . all the fugitives were proclaimed rebels ; and the family of the neroni dispersed . many other citizens were banished likewise , and consined to particular places ; nor was this all ; a solemn procession was ordered , to give god thanks for the preservation of the state , and the unity of the city : in the time of which solemnity , certain citizens were apprehended , tortured , and then part of them put to death , and part of them banished . but in all the inconstancy and variations of fortune , nothing was so remarkable as the fall of luca pitti . he quickly learned the difference betwixt victory and misfortune ; betwixt honor , and disgrace , his house ( which was formerly thronged with the visits and attendancies of the better sort of citizens ) was now grown solitary and unfrequented . when he appeared abroad in the streets , his friends and relations were not only afraid to accompany him , but to owne or salute him ; some of them having lost their honors for doing it , some of them their estates ; and all of them threatned , the noble structures which he had begun , were given over by the workmen ; the good deeds which he had done were requited with contumely , and the honors he had confer'd , with infamy and disgrace . so that many persons who in his authority had presented him largely , in his distress required it again . pretending it was lent , and no more , and these very people who before commended him to the skies , cried him down again as fast , for his ingratitude and violence : so that now when it was too late , he began to repent himself that he had not taken nicolo's advice , and died honorably seeing he could not live so . nevertheless agnolo acciaivoli being than at naples , before he attempted any thing of innovation , he resolved to try piero , and see if there was no hopes of reconciliation ; to which purpose he writ to him this following letter . i cannot but smile to observe the wantonness of fortune , and what sport she makes her self in turning friends into enemies , and enemies into friends , according to her own humor a●d capriccio ; you may remember how at the banishment of your father ( resenting the injury done to him above any danger of my own ) i lost my country , and escaped narrowly with my life . in cosimo's days i refused no opportunity of honoring your family ; and since he died , i have entertained none to offend it . true it is the weakness of your complexion , aud the minority of your sons , gave some kind of disquiet , and i was willing our country might be put in such a posture , as to subsist after your death ; what ever i have done , was only to that end ; not against you so much , as for the benefit of my country : if that was an errour , i am sorry for it , and do hope the innocence of my intention , and the service of my former actions may attone it : nor can i fear but i shall find mercy in a family which has had so long experience of my fidelity ; or that one single fault will be able to extinguish so many obligations . piero having received this letter , by the same hand returned him this answer . your smiling at that distance , is the reason i weep not where i am : were you so merry in florence , i should be more melancholy at naples . i grant you have been a well wisher to my father , and you confess he gratified you for it ; so that if there be obligation on any side , 't is on yours , because deeds are more valuable than words ; and if you have been already rewarded for your good actions , it 's but reasonable you should be punished for your evil : your pretence of love to your country cannot excuse you , for no body but will believe the medici as great lovers and propagators of their country as the acciaivoli . live therefore where you are , in dishonor , since you had not the discretion to live honorably here . agnolo upon the receipt of this letter , desparing of pardon , removed his quarters to rome ; wher associating with the archbishop , and the rest of the exiles ; they consulted what was the best way of lessening the reputation of the medici ; which at that time was tottering in rome , and gave piero no small trouble to sustain it ; but by the assistance of his friends , they failed of their design . diotisalvi , and nicolo soderini on the other side , used all possible diligence to provoke the venetian senate against their country ▪ supposing its government being new , and ungrateful to many people , the first invasion would shake it , and that it would not be able to stand . there was at that time in ferrara giovan francesco the son palla strozzi , who in the revolutions in was banished with his father out of florence : this giovanni was a man of great credit , and reputed as rich a merchant as any in the city . these new rebels insinuating with him , persuaded him how easie it would be to recover their country when ever the venetians would undertake it ; and they doubted not but they would undertake it , if part of the charge could be defrayed ; otherwise it was not to be expected : giovanni was willing to revenge the injuries he had received ; believed what they said , and promised to assist with all the mony he could make ; upon which diotisalvi , and soderini addressed themselves to the doge . complained to him of their banishment , which they pretended was for no other cause , but that they were desirous their country might be governed by the laws ; and the magistrats ( not a few of their grandees ) have the powe● to put them in execution . upon this account it was , that piero de medici and his followers , having been used to a tyrannical way , had taken arms by an artifice , disarmed them by a cheat , and banished them by a fallacy , and as if this were not enough , god almighty must be brought in , and made an accessary to their cruelty , whilst in a solemn procession , and the sacred exercise of their devotion , many citizens who ( upon faith given that they should be safe ) had remained behind , were seized , secured , tortured , and executed : a thing of most execrable and nefarious example . to revenge the inhumanity of those actions , and avert the judgments which they would otherwise pull down upon their country , they knew not where to apply themselves with more hopes then to that illustrious senate which having done so much for the preservation of their own liberty , must need have some compassion for such as lost have theirs . they beseeched them therefore as , free-men , to assist them against their tyrants ; as merciful , against the merciless ; and remember them how the family of the medici had defeated them of lombardy , when cosimo ( contrary to the inclinations of all the rest of the city ) assisted francesco against them : so that if the equity of their cause did not move them , the justice of their own indignation might provoke them , these last words prevailed so far upon the senate , that thy resolved , bartolomeo coligni ( their general ) should fall upon the dominion of the florentines , and to that purpose their army being drawn together with all possible speed , and hercules da esti being sent by borso duke of ferrara , joyned himself with them . their first enterprize was upon the town of doadola which ( the florentines being in no order ) they burned , and did some mischeif in the country about it . but the florentines ( as soon as piero had banished the adverse party ) had entred into a new league with galezzo duke of milan , and ferrando king of naples ; and entertained federigo count of urbin for their general : so that being fortified by such friends , they did not much value their enemies : for ferrando sent his son alfonso ; and galeazzo came in person ( both of them with considerable forces ) to their relief ; and all of them together made a head at castracaro , a castle belonging to the florentines at the bottom of the alps which descend out of tuscany into romagna . in the mean time , the enemy was retired towards imola ; so that betwixt the one and the other , according to the custom of those times , there happened several light skirmishes , but no besieging nor storming of towns , nor no provocation to a battle on either side , both parties keeping their tents , and staring one upon another , with extraordinary cowardize . this manner of proceeding was not at all pleasing to the florentines , who found themselves engaged in a war , which was like to be expensive , and no profit to be expected : insomuch that the magistrats complained of it to those citizens which they had deputed as commissaries for that expedition ; who replyed , that galeazzo was wholly in the fault ; and that having more authority than experience , he knew not how to make any advantagious resolution ; nor would he believe them which were able to instruct him , and that therefore it was impossible ( whilst he was in the army ) that any great action should be atchieved . hereupon the florentines addressed themselves to the duke , and let him know . that he had done a great honor ( and it had been much for their advantage ) in coming personally to their assistance ; for his very name and reputation had made their enemies retire : nevertheless they could not but prefer his safety and the good of his state , before their own ; because whilst he was safe , they could not be capable of fear ; and if lost , they should be incapable of comfort . they could not therefore discharge themselves , nor express the respect they had for him better , then by remembring him , that ( besides the danger where he was ) it could not be secure for him to be any longer at that distance from milan ; for being but young in the government , and his enemies powerful and industrious ; who knew what mischief they might meditate ? and how easily execute it when they had done ? so that they made it their request to him for the safety of his own person , and the preservation of his state , that he would leave only part of his forces with them , and return himself with the rest . galeazzo was as well pleased with their counsel , as they were to give it ; and without more ado returned from whence he came . the florentine generals ( being rid of this incombrance , and that it might appear to the world who was the impediment before ) advanced against the enemy , so that they came presently to a battle , which continued half a day without any disadvantage ; for there was not one man killed , a few horse hurt , and but a few men taken prisoners . when winter was come , and the time that their armies were accustomed to go into quarters , bartolomeo rereated towards ravenna ; the florentines into tuscany ; and the forces of the king and the duke into their several countries : but finding no tumult nor commotion in florence , as they were promised by the rebels ; and the souldiers which were hired not being punctually payed ; the venetians thought fit to treat , and in a short time a peace was concluded : this peace having deprived the rebels of all hopes , they divided , and went to several parts . diotisalvi went to ferrara , where he was entertained and relieved by the marquess borso : nicolo soderini removed to ravenna , where he lived long with a small pension from the venetians , and at last died : this nicolo was accounted a just and couragious man , but slow , and irresolute : which was the cause that he slipped an oportunity when he was gonfaloniere , that he could never afterwards retrieve . grown insolent upon their success , those of the florentines who were in power ( as if they fansied they had not prevailed , unless their cruelty did testify it , ) plagued and tormented not only their enemies , but how ever else they thought good to suspect ; and obtained of bardo altovili to divest several citizens of their honors , and that others should be banished ; which was so great a strengthening to that party , and depression to the other ; that they exercised the power which they had usurped , as if god and fortune had given them that city for a prey . these practices piero understood not ; and if he had , his ilness would not have permitted him to redress them : for he was so stiff , and contracted with the gout , he had the use of nothing but his tounge , with which he could only admonish and advise them to live civilly , and enjoy their country in peace , and not be accessary to its destruction . to please and entertain the people , he resolved to celebrate the marriage of his son lorenzo , to whom he had contracted claricia a daughter of the house of ursina ; which wedding was performed with a pomp and magnificence answerable to the persons by whom , and for whom it was made ; several days were spent in balls , in banquets , and shows , and to demonstrate the grandure of the house of the medici , two martial spectacles were exhibited ; one representing horse and men charging as in a field fight ; the other the siege and expugnation of a town ; both of them contrived and discharged with the greatest glory and gallantry imaginable . whilst affairs were in this posture in florence , all italy was at peace ; but under great apprehensions of the turk , who advancing in his designs , had taken negropont , to the great scandal and detriment of all christendom : borgo marquess of ferrara died about this time , and was succeeded by his brother hercules . gismondo da rimini died ( a perpetual enemy to the church ) and left the dominion to his son roberto , who was reckoned afterwards among the best commanders of that age . pope paul died likewise , in whose place was created likewise sextus called first francesco da savona , a person of mean or rather base extraction , but for his courage made general of the order of s. francis ; and after that , cardinal : this pope was the first which shewed to the world what the papacy could do : and that many things called errors before , might not only be excused , but hid and obtected by the papal authority . he had in his family two persons ( piero and girolamo ) who ( as was generally believed ) were his natural sons , though they passed under more specious and honorable appellations . piero being a frier , was by degrees promoted to the cardinalship , with the title of sansesio . to girolamo he gave the government of furli , which he had taken by violence from antonio ordelaffi whose predecessors had a long time been princes of that city : this secular and ambitious way of proceeding , procured his holiness great estimation among the princes of italy ; insomuch as all of them desiring his friendship , the duke of milan gave to girolamo , his natural daughter catharine in marriage , and in dower with her , he gave him the city of imola , which by the like violence he had taken from taddeo alidossi . betwixt this duke and ferrando the king , a new alliance was contracted ; for elizabeth the daughter of alfonfo , ( the kings eldest son ) was married to giovan geleazzo eldest son to the duke . in the mean time italy was full of tranquillity ; no care incumbant upon those princes , but to pay their respects one to the other , and by mutual matches , new obligations , and leagues , to fortifie and secure one another . yet in the midst of this peace , florence was not without its convulsions ; the ambition and dissention of the citizens distracting their affairs ; and piero being interrupted by his own distempers , could not apply any remedy to theirs . however to discharge his conscience , endeavour what he was able , and try whether he could shame them into a reformation , he called them all to his house , and saluted them in this manner . i never imagined the time could come in which the carriage of my friends should have made me inclinable to my enemies ; or the consequences of my victory , have made me wish i had been beaten . i thought my party had consisted of men whose appetites might have been bounded and circumscribed , and such as would have been satisfied to have lived quietly and honorably in their own country , especially after their enemies were expelled . but i find now , i was mistaken ; ignorant of the natural ambition of the world ; and more particularly yours . it is not enough ( it seems ) for you to be chief and principal in so illustrious a city , and ( though but a few ) to have the honors , and offices , and emoluments , with which heretofore a much greater number was satisfied . it is not enough , to have the forfitures and confiscations of your enemies divided among you ; it is not enough that ( exempting your selves ) you load , and oppress the rest with taxes ; and appropriate them to your own private uses when they come in , but you must abuse and afflict your neighbours with all the circumstances of injury : you rob them of their estates ; you sell them justice ; you abhor the laws ; you oppress the peaceable , and exalt the insolent : i did not think there had been such examples of rapine and violence in all italy , as i find in this city . has this city given us the authority , to subvert it ? has it given us preheminence to destroy it ? has it honored us , to afflict it ? i do profess by the faith of an honest man , and declare here publickly to you all , that if you persist in these courses , and force me to repent of my victory , i will order things so , that you shall have but little comfort in abusing it . the citizens replyed modestly at that time , but not a jot reformation ; whereupon piero sent privatly to agnolo acciaivoli to meet him at cafaggiolo , where they had long discourse about the condition of the city ; and it is not doubted but if he had lived , he would have recalled his enemies to have restrained the exorbitances of his friends ; but death would not suffer it , for after great conflicts both in his body and mind , in the year of his age , he died : his virtue , and his bounty could not be perfectly conspicuous to his country , being eclipsed by his father , who died not long before him ; and these few years he survived , were wholly taken up either by his own sickness , or the dissention of his friends . he was enterred in the temple of san. lorenzo near his father , and his exequies performed with a pomp proportionable to his quality , and deserts . he left behind him two sons lorenzo and guiliano ; pregnant , and hopefull enough of themselves , but the tenderness of their age was that which made every body apprehensive , among ( or rather above ) the principal of that government was thomaso soderini , whose prudence and authority was not only eminent in florence , but in the courts of all the princes of italy after the death of piero , tomaso had the respect of the whole city , most of the citizens flocking to his house , as their chief ; and many princes directed their correspondencies to him : but he being wise , and sensible of his own fortune and the fortunes of his family , refused their correspondence ; received none of their letters , and let the citizens know , it was not upon him , but the medici they were obliged to attend : and that his actions might quadrate with his exhortations , having called all the chief families together in the convent of s. antonio , he brought in lorenzo and guiliano de medici amongst them , where after a long and solid discourse about the condition of that city , italy , and the several principalities within it ; he concluded that if ever they would live happily and in peace ; secure against foreign invasion , and dissention at home ; it was necessary to continue their observance to the family of the medici , and to give those young gentlemen the authority of their predecessors ; for men are not troubled at the promotion of ancient familes ; but upstarts , as they are suddenly advanced , are suddenly forsaken , and it has been always found more easie to preserve a family in power ( where time has worn out his enemies ) than to raise a new one which will unavoidably be subject to new emulations : after tomaso had spoke , lorenzo began , and ( though but young ) delivered himself with so much gravity and composedness ; that he gave them great hopes of his future abilities ; and before they parted both of them were perfectly adopted . not long after , they were installed in the dignities of their father ; entertained as princes of the government ; and tomaso appointed their chief mininister ; by which means they lived quiety for a while both abroad and at home , without the least prospect or apprehension of troubles ; but on a sudden , a new tumult unexpectedly arose to desturb them , and given them a hint of their following miseries . among the families which suffered with luca pitti , and his party , was the family of the nardi ; salvestro and his brothers ( the chief of that house ) were first banished , and then ( upon the war with bartolomeo coglione ) proclaimed rebels . among the brothers , there was one of them called bernardo , a brisk and couragious youth , who ( not being able to subsist abroad by reason of his poverty , and having no hopes of returning by reason of the peace ) resolved to attempt something that might be an occasion of reviving the war : ai slight and inconsiderable beginning , producing great effects many times , because people are generally more prone to assist and improve a commotion , than to contrive and begin it bernardo had good acquaintance in prato , and in the country about pistoia , but more especially with the palandre , which ( though a country family ) was numerous , and brought up , like the rest of the pistolesi , in arms and in blood . he knew they were highly discontented , as having been ill used in the time of the wars by the magistrats in florence : he knew likewise the disgusts of the pratisi ; the pride and rapacity of their government , and some body had told him how ready they were for any practice against the state : so that from all these circumstances he conceived hopes ( by debauching of prato ) of kindling such a fire in tuscany , as by supplying it by fewel , they should not be able to extinguish : he communicated his design with diotisalvi , and inquired of him , in case prato should be surprized , what assistance he could procure him from the princes of italy . diotisalvi looked uppon the business as desperate and almost impossible ; however seeing the part he was to bear in it , was secure enough ; and that the experiment was to be made at another mans cost ; he encouraged him to go on , and promised him assistance from bologna and ferrara , if he could but secure the town for a fortnight . bernardo ( tickled with his promises , and persuading himself his success would be good ) conveyed himself privatly to prato , and imparting his designs to some persons , he found them readily disposed : the same compliance and alacrity he found in the palandre , and having agreed with them both of the time , and the place , he sent the news immediatly to diotisalvi . the potesta or governor of prato at that time was cesare pretucci ; who being put in by them , preserved it for the florentines . the governors of such towns had a custom to keep the keys of the castle themselves ; yet ( especially where there was no jealousie ) if any of the town desired to go in or out in the night , they were so civil , as to suffer them : bernardo understanding the custom , came himself , and the palandre with about a hundred armed men , and lay close near the gate which goes towards pistoia , whilst those in the town who were privy to the conspiracy , armed likewise , and sent one of their number to the governor to beg the favour of the keys , pretending there was a citizen which desired to enter . to governor suspecting nothing , sent one of the servants with the keys , who being gone a convenient distance from the palace , was knocked down , his charge taken from him ; and the gate being opened , bernardo and his party were let in . having entered , and discoursed a little while with their friends in the town , they divided into two bodies ; one of them under the conduct of salvestro a pratese , surprized the castle ; the other commanded by bernardo , possess'd themselves of the palace , took the governor and his whole family prisoners , and committed them to the custody of some of his men : which done , they set up a great cry for liberty in the streets , and upon it many of the people resorted to the market place : it being now day , and the magistrats informed that the castle and palace were surprized , and the governor and all his family in prison , they could not imagine from whence this accident should proceed . the eight ( who in that city were supream ) met together in the palace to consult what was to be done . but bernardo and his accomplices , having run some time about the streats , and found few or no body come in ; upon information that the eight were assembled , they went directly to them , and bernardo took occasion to let them know , that their design was only to deliver their town from servitude ; and that if they would take arms , and joyn with them in it , they would create immoratal honor to themselves , perpetual peace to the people ; then he remembred them of their ancient liberty , and compared it with their present condition ; and promised them such assistance in a few days , as the florentines should not be able to contend withal : besides he assured them he had intelligence in florence , and they would show themselves as soon as they understood their success in this town : but the eight were not to be moved with bare words , and answered that they knew not whether florence was in liberty or bondage , nor did it belong to them to inquire ; this they knew that for their parts they desired no further liberty , then to continue under the same magistrats which had then the government of florence , from whose hands they had never received any injury that might provoke them to take arms against them : they admonished him therefore to release the governor , leave the town as he found it ; and withdraw in time from an enterprize which he had rashly begun . but bernardo was not to be discouraged so easily ; for seeing intreaties and fair means had no better success , he resolved to try how far terror would work ; and as a taste of what was to be expected , concluded to put the governor to death ; having caused him to be haled out of prison : he gave orders he should be hanged out of one of the windows in the palace : petrucci was brought almost to the window with a rop about his neck , when he spied bernardo attending to see him executed ; and turning to him , he said . bernardo you think by cutting me off , to make the pratesi follow you ; but the effect will be quite contrary . the veneration they bear to the governors which are sent hither from florence , is so great , it will incense them to see me destroyed , and your cruelty to me , will turn to your ruine ; so that 't is that 't is my life , not my death , must do your business ; if i command then what you think fit to direct , they will obey me before you , and i following your direction , your design will be fulfilled . bernardo ( who was no conjurer ) thought his counsel was good , and therefore ordered him ( out of a back window which looked into the market-place ) to require the obedience of the people , which as soon as he had done , he was carried back from whence he came . the weakness of the cospirators was by this time discovered ; and several of the inhabitants were got together , and giorgio ginori ( a knight of rhodes ) among the rest . the giorgio being the first who took arms , advanced against bernardo who was riding up and down the streets , sometimes persuading , and sometimes threatning the city . having found him and charged him with a considerable number that followed , bernardo was wounded , and taken prisoner , after which it was not hard to release the governor , and over-power the rest ; for being but few , and divided into several parties , they were most of them either taken or killed . in the mean time the news of this accident arrived at florence , and was represented much greater than the truth . the first report was that prato was surprized ; the governor and his whole family slain ; the town full of the enemies forces ; pistoia in arms , and several citizens of that city engaged in the plot : so that of a sudden the palace was full of citizens , expecting orders from the senate for what was to be done . there was in florence at that time an eminent captain called roberto san severino ; it was resolved to send what forces they could get together of a sudden under his command towards prato ; that he should advance as near it as he could , give them particular notice of all passages , and act , as he in his discretion should see occasion . roberto was presently dispatched , and marched with his party as far as the castello di campi , when he was met by a messenger from petrucci with the news that bernardo was taken , his party defeated , and all things in quite ; so that he marched back again to florence , and not long after bernardo was brought thither to be examined by the magistrats . being questioned upon several things , and particularly what induced him to that enterprize , he replyed , that choosing rather to die in florence , then to live any longer in exile , he determined to do semething which might make him memorable when he was dead . this tumult being composed almost as soon as begun , the citizens began to return to their old way of security , thinking ( without any regard or consideration ) to enjoy the profits of a government which they had so lately re-established and confirmed ; from whence all those incovenences ensued , which are too often the followers of peace ; the youth being more vain and extravagant than formerly , squandred away vast sums , in cloaths , and treats , and all manner of luxury ; and having nothing to do , spent their whole time and estates among dancing masters , and women : their whole study and ambition was to be thought glorious in their habit ; and smart and poinant in their discourse , for he that could retort or bite the most readily , was thought the gretest wit , and had the greatest applause : and yet these effeminacies were much encreased , by the arrival of the duke of milan , who with his lady and whole court was come to florence ( to fulfil a pretended vow ) where he was entertained with magnificene sutable to his quality , and the alliance betwixt them . then was the first time it ever was seen in that city that in lent when all flesh was forbidden by the church , it was eaten publickly , without dispensation , or respect to the laws of god or of men. among the rest of the shows which were made to entertain him , the holy ghost's descending upon the apostles , being represented and exposed in the church di s. spirito ; so many candles were used in the solemnity that some of them took fire , and burnt the church to the ground , which was looked upon as a judgment , and a manifest expression of gods anger towards us ; if then the duke found the city of florence full of niceness , and delicacy , and exorbitance in their manners , he left them much worse when he went away ; so that the soberer sort of the citizens thought it necessary for sumptuary laws , and edicts of restraint for the regulation of expences in cloaths , funerals , and feastings , to confine them within the compass of frugality and discretion . in the midst of the peace , there happened a new and unexpected tumult in tuscany , about this town of volterra , it was the fortune of some of those citizens to find a mine of allum , who knowing the usefulness of it , and the advantage which might accrew , that they might be the better supplied with monies , and justified by better authority , they applied themselves to some of the considerable citizens of florence , and made them sharers in the profits . the business at first ( as all things of that nature are ) was little reguarded by the volterrans , but after , when they grew sensible of their gains , they strove too late , to do what at first might have been easily prevented . they began to examine and argue it in the councils , alledging there was no reason a commodity found in the publick lands , should be converted to particular use : hereupon embassadors were sent to florence , and the cause referred to a committee of citizens , who , being either bribed , or convinced , reported that the desires of the people of volterra , were ( in their judgment ) unjust . that they could not find any reason why the defendants should be deprived of what by their own labour and industry they had acquired ; and that therefore the mine was in all equity to be continued to them : though if they pleased they might command them to pay an annual sum of mony , as a fee and acknowledgement of their superiority . this being reported it rather encreased than lessened the mutiny of the volterrans ; nothing was discoursed of in the whole city , but this affair : the people pressed hard for what they thought , themselves robb'd of : the partizans were as zealous to keep what they had got , and upon reference to the florentines it was confirmed to them ; so that in a dispute , there was one eminent citizen called picorino slain , and after him several more of his party , and their houses plundered and burned ; in the heat of their rage , they had much ado to forbear the same violence to the florentine magistrats , the sierceness , of their fury being over , they sent embassadors to florence to represent to that senate that if they would preserve to them their old priviledges , they would continue their subjection , and maintain the city in its ancient dependance . but there was great argument about the answer : tomaso soderini was of opinion the volterrans were to be received upon any terms , as thinking it dangerous as that time to kindle a fire so near their own houses : for he was fearful of the disaffection of the pope and the power of the king ; nor durst he depend upon the amity either of the duke or the venetian , as not being certain of the courage of the one , or the fidelity of the other ; harping still upon an old adage , that a lean peace was better than a fat victory . lorenzo , on the other side , thinking this a fair opportunity to demonstrate his wisdom , and his magnanimity together ; and the rather because encouraged by such as envy'd tomaso , he declared against the tumult ; resolved to punish them by force , and affirmed that if these were not corrected in terrorem , upon the least trivial and impertinent occasion , the rest of the territories would do the same , without any fear or reverence in the world. the result of all being that they should be corrected ; answer was returned to the embassadors , that the volterrans were not to expect the continuation of their priviledges , having broken them themselves , and that therefore they were either to submit to the senate without any capitulation , or to expect the consequence of war. the volterran embassador being returned with this answer ; they prepared for their defence ; fortified their town ; and sent for supplies to all the princes of italy ; but none of them gave them any encouragement , but the siennesi , and the governor of piombino . the florentine , on the other side , placing much of their success in their speed , dispatched away foot and horse under the command of federigo lord of urbin , who falling upon the country of volterra , did easily subdue it ; after which he sat down before the city ; but that standing high , and the hill being steep , it was not to be assaulted but on that side where the church of s. alessandro stood . the volterrans for their better defence had hired about souldiers , who observing the florentines resolution to carry it , and that they were very strong in their leaguer , believing it untenable , they began to be remiss and careless in their duties ; but in anything of mischief to their masters , they were vigorous enough : so that the poor citizens being assaulted without , and abused within , began to incline to a peace ; but not being admitted to conditions , they were glad to throw themselves into the arms of their enemies ; who having caused them to open the gates , the greatest part of the army marched in , and advancing to the palace where their priori were assembled , they commanded them to return to their houses ; but by the way one of them was unluckily pillaged and reviled by a souldier , and from that action ( the disposition of mankind prompting him more naturally to mischief than good ) proceeded the destruction of that city , which for a whole day together was robb'd , and rummaged by the souldiers , neither women , nor children , nor churches , nor any place being exempt from the rapacity as well of their mercenaries , as enemies . the news of this victory was entertained in florence with extraordinary joy , and being lorenzo's own enterprize , it turned highly to his reputation : and one of his most intimate friends upbraided tomaso soderini by his counsel to the contrary ; what think you now , sir ( said he to him ) volterra is won ? to whom tomaso replyed , i think it rather lost ; for had you received it upon terms , it might have been serviceable , and contributed to the security of this city but being so be kept by force it will be a trouble and weakness to you in time of war , and an expence and inconvenience in time of peace . in those dayes , the pope being desirous to keep the lands of the church in their natural obedience , had caused spoliro to be sacked , which town by instigation of the factions within it , had been in rebellion ; and the city of castello having been in the , same contumacy , was afterwards besieged . in that town nicolo vitelli was prince , who retaining a great correspondence and friendship with lorenzo di medici , had supplies sent him from florence . though not enough to defend nicolo , yet sufficient to sow the seeds of such enmity betwixt the pope and the medici , as produced most pernitious effects . nor had it been long before they had discovered themselves , had not the death of piero cardinal di s. sisto intervened . for that cardinal ( having travelled thorow all italy , and spent some time both at venice and milan , in honor ( as he pretended ) to the marquess of ferrara's wedding ) had sifted the princes to see how they stood inclined to a difference with the florentines : but being returned to rome , he died , not without suspition of being poisoned by the venetians , out of an apprehension of his power , when ever he should have opportunity to exert it ; for though his humor and extraction were mean , and his education retired , in a covent , yet upon his promotion to the cardinalship , he discovered more pride and ambition , than was becoming not only a cardinal , but a pope . for he had the vanity to make a feast at rome which cost him above florens and would have been thought an extravagance in the greatest king of his time . pope sixtus having lost his minister , proceeded more coolly in his designs nevertheless the florentines , the duke , and the venetians entred into a league ; sixtus and the king of naples entred into another , and left room for several other princes to come in if they pleased . by this means all italy was divided into two factions , every day producing something or other which augmented the feuds ; and particularly a dispute about the isle of cyprus , to which ferrando pretended , but the venetian had got the possession ; upon which the pope and ferrando confederated more strictly : the great captain of those times , and the most eminent for conduct was federigo prince of urbin , who had served under the florentine a long time : that their league might not have the advantage of such a general , the pope and ferrando resolved , if possible to debauch him from them , and to that end both of them invited him to naples . federigo obeyed , with great astonishment , and displeasure to the florentines , concluding he would run the same fate which giacopo piccinino had done before him ; but they were utterly mistaken ; for federigo returned with great honor from naples and rome , and was made general , of their league . in the mean time the pope and the king were not idle but still feeling and tempting the senats , of romagna , and sienna , to make them their friends , and enable themselves thereby to be revenged on the florentines ; of which the florentines having advertisement , they provided such remedy against their ambition , as would consist with their time ; and having lost federigo , they entertained roberto do pimino into their pay : they renewed their leagues with the citizens of perugia , and the senate of faenza . the pope and the king pretended that the grounds of their dissatisfaction was , for that they had seduced the venetians from their league , and associated with them themselves , and the pope did not think that he could preserve the honor and reputation of the church , nor count girolamo his sovereignty in romagna , whilst the venetian and florentine were united . the florentines on the other side feared that they did not desire to seperate them from the venetians so much , to make them their friends , as to enable themselves more easily to injure them ; so that for two years together italy remained under these jealousies , and diversities of humors , before any tumult broke out . the first which happened ( and that was no great one ) was in tuscany . braccio of perugia ( a person as we have said before , of great reputation in the wars ) left two sons oddo , and carlo , whilst the last was very young , his brother was slain unhappily in a tumult in the val di lamona . and carlo ( when capable for his age ) was preferred by the venetians to a command in their army , out of respect to the memory of the father and the hopefulness of the son. the time of his commission expired about that time , and carlo would not suffer it to be renewed by the senate ; being resolved to see whether his own reputation , or his fathers , could bring him back again to perugia . to which the venetians readily consented , as people which added something to their empire , by every commotion : carlo therefore , marched into tuscany , but finding the perugians in league with the florentines , and his enterprize by consequence more uneasie then he expected , that nevertheless he might do something worthy thy to be talked of , he assaulted the siennesi ( pretending an old debenture to his father for service he had done them ) and fell upon them with such fury , that their whole country was overrun . the siennesi seeing themselves so fiercely invaded ( and being naturally jealous of the florentines ) persuaded themselves , it was done by their consent , and made their complaints to the pope and the king : they sent embassadors likewise to florence ; who complained of the injuries they had received ; and remonstrated , that without their privacy and connivance carlo could never have assaulted them so securely . the florentines excused themselves , assuring them they would employ their greatest interest that carlo should not injure them any farther ; and that in what way soever their embassadors should propose , they would require him to desist : of which proceeding carlo complained as much on the other side , declaring that for not having supplied him , the florentines had robb'd themselves of a considerable acquist and him of great honor , and reputation ; for he promised them the possession of that city in a short time ; so much cowardize he had observed in the people , and so much disorder in their defence : whereupon carlo drew off , and retired to his old masters the venetians : and the siennesi ( though delivered by the florentines means ) remained full of disgust , as not thinking it an obligation to rescue them from a calamity they had brought upon their heads . whilst the affairs in tuscany were carried on in this manners , by the pope and the king , there fell out an accident in lombardy of greater importance , and threatened greater destruction . there was a person called cola ( of mantoua ) who taught the latine tongue to several young gentlemen in milan ; this cola , being a learned , but ambitious man , out of pique to the dukes conversation , or some private exceptions of his own , took occasion in all his discourse , wherever he came , to declaim against subjection to an ill prince ; and to magnifie their felicity whose fortune it was to be born , and brought up in a commonwealth , affirming that all famous men , had their education ; not under princes but republicks ; the latter prferring them as virtuous , the other destroying them as dangerous . the gentlemen with whom he had entred into more particular familiarity were giovanandrea lampognano , carlo visconti , and girolamo olgiatto , and to these he had may times inculcated the excellence of the one government , and the periciousness of the other , and by degrees he became so confident both of their courage and inclination , that he persuaded them to a solemn oath , that as soon as their age would give them leave , they should employ all their faculties to redeem their country from the tyranny of their prince . the young gentlemen , full of his documents , and a desire of observing their oaths : detesting the courses of the duke , and resenting some particular injuries of their own , were impatient to put his directions in execution . galeazzo was in his carriage both cruel and lascivious ( each of which good qualities were sufficient to make him odious ) it was not enough for him to debauch and vitiate the noblest ladies of the city , but he took delight to publish it ; no man ( in his judgment ) was handsomly punished who was not executed with some unusual circumstance of cruelty . he was suspected likewise to have murdered his mother , for not fancying himself prince enough , whilst she was in the way , he behaved himself so towards her , that she desired to retire to cremona ( which was the place of her dower ) in which journey she was surprized with a sudden sit of sickness , and died , and her death , by many people , imputed to her son. by tampering with or reflecting upon some ladies of their relations , galeazzo had highly disobliged both carlo and girolamo ; and to giovanandrea he had refused to give the possession of the abbey of miramando , which was granted to his predecessors by the pope : these private injuries , egg'd on the young gentlemen to revenge themselves , and deliver their country ; presuming if they could kill him , not only the nobility , but the whole body of the people would follow them : resolved therefore upon the fact , they met many times to consult of the way , and their old familiarity rendered them unsuspected . whilst they were contriving their business , to make themselves more dexterous and couragious when they came to it , their way was to strike and stab one another with the sheaths of those daggers which they had prepared to do the work , sometimes upon the arms , and sometimes upon the breasts of one another . at length they came to consider of the time and the place : in the castle it was thought unsafe ; a hunting , dangerous and uncertain ; a walking , difficult , and unpracticable ; in the conventions impossible ; at length it was concluded he should be assassinated at some show or publick festivity , to which he would certainly come , at which time upon sundry pretences they might have opportunity to assemble their friends . they concluded likewise , that if any of them , upon any occasion whatever should be absent , or apprehended the rest should proceed , and kill him upon the place . in the year christmas coming on , and the duke accustom'd on s. stephens day with great solemnity to visit the church of that martyr , they pitched upon that for the time and the place . the morning arriving , they caused some of their principal friends and servants to arm , pretending they were to assist giovanandrea who ( contrary to the inclinations of some of his enemies ) was to bring certain pipes of water into his grounds for his greater convenience : being armed according to directions , they conducted them to the church , alledging that they would get leave of the prince to justifie what might happen : they caused several others likewise of their friends and allies to meet there , upon several pretences , presuming when the stroke was struck , and the business done to their hand , they would hall in then without any difficulty or scruple . their resolution was , ●as soon as the duke was killed , to get all those armed men at their heels , and to march into that part of the town where they thought they could raise the people with most ease , and persuade them to arm against the dutchess , and the ministers of the state not doubting but the people would readily follow them , being much distressed for want of provisions and promised ( as they intended ) the houses of cecco simonetta , giovanni botti , francesco lucani , and all the rest of the governors , to plunder . having laid their design thus , and encouraged one another toxecute it bravely , giovanandrea with his accomplices , went to church betimes , and heard mass together , after which giavanadrea turning towards the image of san. ambrogio , he said , most , venerable patron of our city , thou knowest our intention , and for what end we expose our selves to so many dangers ; be i beseech you kind and propitious to our enterprize , and by favouring of justice , let the world see how much injustice displeases you . to the duke on the other side , before side , before he came to church , many things happened which seemed to presage his death . when he dressed himself that morning , he put on a coat of mail which he usually wore , but on a sudden thinking it unhandsome or troublesom , he caused it to be pulled off and laid by . he had a mind to hear mass in his own chappel , but his chaplain was gone to saint stephens church , and carried all the implements along with him ; having news of that , he ordered the bishop of como , should officiate for him , but he excused himself upon very reasonable impediments : so that he was necessitated ( as it were ) to go to church : before he went , he caused giovan galeazzo and hermes , his sons to be brought to him , and when they came , he kissed and embraced them , as if he was never to see them again ; at length ( and very loath ) being parted from them , he resolved to go to church , and marching out of the castle betwixt the embassadors of ferrara and mantoua , he went towards s. stephens . the conspirators in the mean time , to give the less suspicion , and avoid the cold , which at that time was very great , were go up into a chamber belonging to the arch-priest , who was of their acquaintance ; but hearing the duke was coming they went down and placed themselves in the porch , giovanandrea and girolamo on the right hand , and charles on the left . those who marched before the duke were already entred , then came the duke himself encompassed with a great multitude of people . as is usual in such pompous solemnities . the first which addressed themselves to their work was giovanandrea , and girolamo , who pretending to make room , pressed up to the duke , and with short daggers which they had ready drawn in their sleeves , they stab'd him . giovanandrea gave him two wounds , one in the belly , the other in the throat : girolamo struck him in the throat likewise , and in the belly , carlo visconti being placed nearer the door , the duke was past him before he was assaulted , and therefore he could not strike him before he was dead , however he must do his share , and with a schine gave him two deep wounds upon his shoulders ; his blows were so sudden and thick , he was cut down and dead , before almost any body perceived it . nor had he time to do or say more than to call upon the name of our lady , ( and that but once ) as he fell . the duke being slain , great hubub was rais'd , many swords drawn , and ( as it happens frequently in such cases ) many people ran in great confusion about the streets , without any certain knowledge of what had passed . however those who were about the duke , had seen him killed , and knew who they were that did it , pressed hard upon them to revenge it . giovanandrea being willing to have disengagedhimself , got out of the church , thrust himself among the women who were there in great numbers upon their knees , but being intangled , and stopped by their coats , a moor ( who was one of the dukes foot-men ) got up to him , and killed him : carlo was slain also by those who were by ; but girolamo oligato got out of the church among the crowd ; for seeing his companions dead , and not knowing whither to betake himself , he went to his own house , but was refused by his father and his brothers : his mother having more commiseration recommended him to a priest who had been an ancient friend of that family which priest changed habits with him , and conveyed him to his house ; where he remained two days in hopes some tumult or other would fall out , and he might have opportunity to save himself . but finding he was mistaken in that , and fearing to be found out where he was , he disguised himself , and endeavoured to get off , but was discover'd , secur'd , and delivered up to the magistrate , to whom he confessed the whole process of the conspiracy . this girolamo was about twenty three years old , no less couragious and resolute at his death , than at the perpetration of the fact . being strip'd and the executioner with his knife in hand ready to give the stroke , he spake these words in latine mors acerba , fama perpetua , stabit vetus memoria fac●s . this plot was carried on with strange secrecy , and executed with prodigious courage by these unhappy young gentlemen : but being neither follow'd nor defended by those whom they expected , they miscarried , and were slain . let princes by this example live so as to make themselves honor'd and belov'd , that no body may hope to kill then and escape ; and let other people have care of relying upon the multitude too far , how discontented soever ; for in their distress they will be sure to forsake them . this accident put all italy into an amaze , but much more what happen'd in florence not long after ; for that brake the peace of all italy which had continued for years , as shall be shown in the next book , whose end will be no less sad and deplorable , than the beginning is bloody and terrible . the history of florence . book viii . the beginning of this eight book falling betwixt two conspiracies , the one executed at milan , and already described ; the other at florence , and remaining to be related ; it would have been convenient ( according to my custom ) to have said something of the quality and importance of conspiracies , and i should willingly have undertaken it , had it not been done in another place , and the subject too copious to be passed over with brevity . waving therefore a matter which would require so much consideration , and is else where amply discoursed ; i shall tell , how the family of the medici ( having subbued the adversaries which openly opposed them ) to make themselves absolute in the city , and reduce the rest to a civil submission , were necessiated to disable those who were privatly their enemies . for whilst the medici were but equal in authority , and as it were but in competition with other great families ; the citizens which emulated their greatness , might oppose them publickly without danger , because the magistrats being free and independent , neither party was afraid , till one of them was suppress'd . but after the victory in the government devolving wholly upon the medici , they exercised it with so much rigor that those who were discontented were forced to comport themselves patiently under it , or by private and clandestine machinations to endeavour to remove it ; which seldom and with great difficulty succeeding , they most commonly ruined the conspirators , and augmented their grandeur , against whom they were contrived . so that a prince , according to that method to be deposed , if he be not killed dead , ( as the duke of milan ) which happens but rarely , he breaks forth into greater authority ; and how good so ever before , becomes bad any tyrannical . for the practices of those men , give him occasion to fear ; fear , to secure himself ; security , to be insolent ; and from thence springs such aversions and hatred as is commonly his ruine ; so that in conclusion treason does usually destroy the contrivers , and ruine them in time against whom they conspired . italy ( as we said before ) was divided into two factions the pope and the king of naples made one ; the venetians , the duke of milan , and the florentines made the other ; and though betwixt them war was not solemnly declared , yet daily provocations were given on both sides , and the pope very busie in his designs against florence . philippo di medici the archbishop of pisa being dead , in crossnes to that family , his holiness invested francesco salviati in that bishoprick as knowing him to be their enemy ; and the senate of florence refusing him possession , new quarrels arose which created much trouble . hereupon the family of the pazzi was encouraged at rome , and the family of the medici , affronted in every thing . the family of the pazzi , for quality and estate , was the most illustrious in florence . the chief of them was messer giacopo , who for his wealth and nobility was mad a knight by the people : this giacopo had only one natural daughter living , but several nephews by piero , and ant●nio his brothers : the chief of them , were guilielmo , francesco , rinato , giovanni , and ( after them ) andrea , galeotto , and nicolo . cosimo di medici observing the grandeur of that family , had married bianca his niece , to the eldest , guilielmo , in hopes by that alliance to remove the jealousie and animosity which was then betwixt the families . but ( so uncertain and fallacious are all humane designs ) it proved quite contrary . for those who were of lorenzo's cabal , persuaded him it was dangerous , and a diminution to his authority , to advance such citizens as were wealthy and potent ; whereupon giacopo and his nephews were not preferred to those dignities which ( in the opinion of other people ) they deserved . this gave occasion of disgust to the pazzi , and apprehension to the medici ; and the increase of the one , gave matter for the augmentation of the other . so that in all things where other citizens were entertained , the pazzi were rejected by the magistrats . the counsel of eight ( upon a trivial occasion , without respect and difference usually shown to persons of his quality ) recalled francesco de pazzi from rome , and required his residence in florence . hereupon the pazzi complained highly of the government , and spake bitterly of them wherever they came , which produced more suspition in the government , and more injury to themselves . giovanni de pazzi was married to the daughter of giovanni boromei a very rich man , who being dead without other children , his estate descended to his daughter . notwithstanding , carlo his nephew got possession of part , and refused to surrender . the controversie coming to a hearing , it was decreed that carlo should keep his possession , and the daughter was defeated : which injustice , the pazzi imputed wholly to the malevolence of the medici ; of which giuliano complained many times to his brother lorenzo , admonishing him to have a care lest grasping at too much , he rob'd himself of all . but lorenzo being young , and elated with his power , would have a hand in every thing , and all must be acknowledged from him . the pazzi being too noble and opulent , to swallow so many affronts , began to cast about how they might revenge themselves . the first who brake the ice , was francesco , who being more sensible , and couragious than the rest , determined to recover what was his right , or to lose what he had . retaining an implacable hatred to the government at florence , he lived most commonly at rome , where he employed great sums of mony , as other florentine merchants did usually do . having an intimate acquaintance with count girolamo , they complained to one another oftentimes of the inhumanity of the medici , at length they came to a solemn debate , and it was concluded that for the one's recovery of his estate and the others living freely in that city , it was necessary the present government in florence should be subverted , which could not be done , but by killing giuliano , and lorenzo . they were confident ( having first convinced them of the easiness of the fact ) the pope and the king of naples , would give their consents . having entertained these thoughts betwixt themselves , they thought fit to communicate with the new archbishop of pisa ; who being naturally ambitious , and lately disobliged , most readily embraced it : consulting themselves what measures were to be taken , it was resolved that giacopo de pazzi should be drawn in , without whose concurrence , the design was like to be more difficult . to this purpose it was concluded that francesco de pazzi should repair immediately to florence ; and the count and archbishop continue at rome to be near the pope when things should be fit to be imparted francesco finding giacopo more formal and untractable then he desired and signifying it to rome , it was resolved to apply greater authority to dispose him , whereupon the archbishop and the count communicated the whole affair with giovan baptist a one of his holiness his generals . this giovanni was a man of great reputation in war ; and particularly obliged both by the count , and the pope . nevertheless he objected the great danger and difficulties of the enterprize , which the archbishop endeavoured to refel by urging the assistance they were to expect both from the pope , and the king of naples . the hatred the citizens of florence bare to the medici : the number of relations and friends which would follow the salviati , and the pazzi ; the easiness to kill them , by reason of their frequent walking alone about the city without either guards or suspition : and ( after they were dead ) the small or no opposition to be expected in the change of the government : which allegations giovanni battista could not absolutely believe , because he had been assured the contrary by several considerable citizens . whilst these things were in this suspence , it happened that carlo lord of faenza fell sick , and was given over for dead . hereupon the count and arch-bishop conceived they had a fair opportunity to dispatch battista to florence , and thence into romagna , under pretence of recovering certain towns which carlo of farenza had taken from them . the count therefore commissioned battista to wait upon lorenzo , and in his name to desire his advice how he was to behave himself in romagna : after which he was to visit francesco di pazzi , and giacopo di pazzi , and seeing if he could engage them in the design : and that he might carry the popes authority along with him , they appointed him before he departed to receive his holiness his commands , who promised what could be imagined for the promotion of the enterprize : battista departing speedily from rome , arrived at florence ; consulted lorenzo according to his instructions , was very civilly received , and so wisely and amicably answered in all his demands , that battista was surprized , and began to look upon him as courteous , discreet , a friend to the count , and one that had been maliciously misrepresented . however , he was to pursue his orders , and visit francesco ; he being at lucca ; he went directly to giacopo , and upon the first motion found him very averse . but before he went away the popes recommendation sweetned him so that he told battista he might proceed in his journy to romagna , and by that time he came back , francesco would be in florence , and they would talk father of the business : battista went to romagna and returned ; pursued his pretended transactions with lorenzo ; when he had done with him , went to the pazzi , and ordered things so that giacopo was drawn in upon ferious consultation of the way . giacopo was of opinion their design was impossible whilst both the brothers were together in florence ; that they had better attend till lorenzo went to rome , which by report would be certain , and in a very short time . francesco was willing enough to have had lorenzo at rome , but if the worst came to the worst , and he did not go thither , they might be sure to kill them both together at some wedding , some show , or some act of devotion : as to their foreign assistance , it was thought convenient that the pope should send his forces against castello de montone , having just occasion of invading the count carlo , for the troubles and tumults he had raised in the country of perugia and sienna ; notwithstanding they came to no positive resolution at that time ; only they agreed that francesco di pazzi , and giovan battista should return to rome , and there determine of all things with his holiness , and the count. the whole matter being redebated solemnly at rome , they came to this conclusion , ( the enterprize against montone being confirmed ) that giovan francesco da tolentino ( an officer of the popes ) should go into romagna and lorenzo da castello into his country ; each of them get together what forces they were able , and keep them ready to be disposed of , as the archbishop salviati , and francesco dei pazzi should order ; who being come to florence with giovan battista , they prepared all that was necessary ; and king ferrando's embassador assured them of his masters utmost assistance . the archbishop , and francesco being arrived at florence , they persuaded into their party giacopo the son of poggio , a learned youth , but ambitious , and studious of new things . that drew in likewise two giacopo salviati's , one of them a brother , the other a kinsman of the archbishop's . they hired bernardo bandini , and napoleone , two valiant young french gentlemen , who had been much obliged to the family of the pazzi . of foreigners , besides them two , they entertained antonio da volterra , and one stephano a priest , who taught the latine tongue to giacopo's daughter , and lived in his house . rinato dei pazzi ( a wise and student man , and one who very well understood the consequences of such plots ) consented not to it , but rather detested it , and by all plausible ways endeavoured to dissuade it . the pope had maintained at pisa to study the canon-law , rafaelo di riario nephew to the count girolamo , from which place he was recalled by his holiness , and promoted to a cardinalship . it was judged commodious by the conspiracy , that this cardinal should come to florence for the better concealment of their design , seeing that in his equipage all such of their confederats as were necessary , might be conveyed into the town , which would much facilitate the work . accordingly the cardinal arrived , and was lodged by giacopo dei pazzi at a country house of his at mentughi , not far from florence . they desired by his means that lorenzo , and guiliano might be brought together , and it was resolved that the first opportunity they should be killed . it was contrived then to make an entertainment for the cardinal at ftesole , but by accident , or on purpose , it fell out that guiliano was not there ; so that that design being defeated , their next was to invite the cardinal to florence , and thither they made no question but both the brothers would come : the of april was appointed to be the day . the night before , they met all together , and prepared and disposed all things for execution the next morning ; but the day being come , news was brought to francesco , that guiliano was not there : upon that , the chief of them met together again , and concluded the business was no longer to be delayed , for being communicated to so many , it was not possible to conceal it : so that they determined without more ado , to assassinate him in the church of santa riparata , when ( the cardinal being present ) both the brothers they presumed would be of course . they appointed giovanni battista to attack lorenzo , and francesco dei pazzi and bernardo bandini , to do as much to guiliano . but giovan battista excused himself ; the former familiarity he had had with lorenzo , or some other accident having mollified his heart : he pretended his courage would not serve him to commit such an act in the church , as would add sacriledge to his treason , and his denial was the first step to the destruction of them all ; for being straitned in time , they were forced to depute antonio da volterra , and stephano the priest , to that office , two persons very unapt for such an action both in respect of their nature , and education ; and certainly if in any thing a resolute , and great mind ( accustomed by long experience , to cruelty and blood ) be necessary , it is in this case where princes are to be killed . having concluded of their time , and other circumstances , there was nothing behind but the signal when they were to begin ; which was when the priest which celebrated the principal mass , should receive the sacrament himself : at which time the archbishop of salviati with his own followers , giacopo di poggio with his should possess themselves of the palace of the senate , that , either by persuasion or force the senate might be brought over to their side , as soon as the brothers were slain . upon this resolution they went to the church where the cardinal and lorenzo were already in their seats . the church was thronged with people , and divine service begun , when it was observed that guiliano was not there , whereupon francesco dei pazzi and bernardo who were designed to murder him ; went to him to his house , and with intreaties and other artifice , got him along with them to the church . it is very remarkable , and not often to be matched , that with so horrid , and detestable a design at their hearts , they could carry themselves with that tranquillity and composedness , for all the way as they pased they entertained him with youthful and pleasant discourse ; and such was the security of francesco that under pretence of caressing and embracing , he felt about his body to see whether he was armed . guiliano and lorenzo both , knew well enough that the pazzi bore them no good will , and that with all their hearts they would depose them if they could ; but they believed whenever they attempted against them it would be legally , and without any violence upon their persons , and therefore suspecting nothing of danger in that kind , they dissembled as much kindness to the pazzi , as the pazzi did to them . the assassines being ready , ( those who were to kill lorenzo , by the help of the crowd being got up to him without any suspition , on that side , and guiliano's on the other ) the sign was given , and bernardo bandini , with a short dagger provided on purpose , stabbed guiliano into the breast , who passing a step or two forward , fell down upon the ground , francesco dei pazzi threw himself upon him stabbed him all over , and struck with such fury , that he hit his own leg , and made a desperate wound : antonio and stephano in the mean time attempted upon lorenzo , and making several strokes at him , they wounded him slightly in the throat and no where else ; for either by their own faint heartedness , or his courage in defending himself , or the interposition of those who were by , all of them were put off , and their whole enterprize miscarried : whereupon they fled in great terror , and hid themselves as well as they could ; but being found they were shamefully put to death , and their bodies dragged about the city . lorenzo on the other side , joyning with those friends he had about him , betook himself to the vestry , and stood upon his guard . bernardo bandini seeing guiliano dead , having an old quarrel to francesco nori , a great friend to the medici , he killed him into the bargain ; and not satisfied with two murders , he crowded up to lorenzo with his courage and alacrity to supply what the slackness and cowardice of his accomplices had left unfinished : but finding him barricado'd in the vestry , he could not come at him . in the midst of this great tumult , ( which was so dreadful it was thought the church would have been pulled down upon their heads ) the cardinal got up close to the altar , where by the labour of the priests he was preserved , till the tumult was appeased , and the senate sent to conduct him to his own palace , where he remained in great fear till the time he was dismissed . there were at that time in florence , certain perugians who had been banished from their houses in the time of their factions ; these perugians the pazzi had drawn to their party , by promises of restitution . so that the archbishop of salviati , marching with gi●copo di poggio and their followers to secure themselves of the palace , took them along with him ; and being come to the palace , he left some of his company below , with orders upon the first noise above stairs that they should seize upon the gate , whilst he and the rest of the perugians went up into the castle . finding the senate was risen ( by reason it was late ) after a short time he was met by cesare petrucci the gonfaloniere di giustitia , so that entring further with him , and some few of his crew , he left the rest without , who walking into the chancery , by accident shut themselves in , for the lock was so contriv'd , that without the key , it was not easily to be opened either within or without . the archbishop being entred with the gonfaloniere , pretending to impart some great matter to him from the pope , he accosted him in so confused and distracted a way , the gonfaloniere from the disorder both of his looks and expressions , began to suspect , sprung from him out of the chamber with a great cry , and finding giacopo di poggio , he caught him by the hair of the head , and delivered him to one of the sergeants . the noise running immediately to the senators with such arms as they had about them , they set upon the conspirators , and all them who went up with the archbishop ( part being shut up , and part unable to defend themselves ) were either kill'd , or thrown alive out of the windows . of this number , the archbishop , the two other salviati , and giacopo di poggio were hang'd . those who were left below , had forc'd the guards , and possessed themselves of the gate ; insomuch that the citizens which upon the first alarm had run into the castle , were not able to assist the senate either with their counsel or arms. francesco de pazzi in the mean time , and bernardo bandini seeing lorenzo escaped , and one of themselves ( upon whom the hopes of that enterprize did principally depend ) most grievously wounded , they were much dismaid ; bernardo , concluding all lost , thinking to provide for his safety with the same courage , as he had injured the medici , he made his escape . francesco being returned to his house , tried if he could get on horseback ( for orders were , as soon as the fact was committed to gallop about the town , and excite the people to liberty , and arms ) but finding he could not ride by reason of the deapness of his wound , and the great quantity of blood which he had lost , he desired giacopo to do that office for him , and then stripping he threw himself upon the bed . giacopo , though an ancient man , and not versed in such kind of tumults , to try the last experiment of his fortune , he got on horseback , and with about an hundred horse well armed , and formerly prepared , he marched towards the palace , caying out liberty , liberty , to the people as he went along ; but some of them being deafned by their obligations to the medici . and the rest not desirous of any change in the government , none of them came in . the senators who were on the top of the palace and had secured themselves as well as they could , threw down stones upon their heads , and frighted them with threats as much as possible . giacopo was in great confusion , and knew not what to do . when his cousin giovanni saristori coming to him , and reproaching him by what was done already , advised him to go home to his house , and be quiet ; assuring him there were other citizens who would be as careful of the people , and their liberties as he . being therefore utterly destitute of all hopes , lorenzo alive , francesco wounded , and no body appearing for him , he resolved to save himself if he could , and marched out of florence with his party at his heels , and went towards romagna . in the mean time the whole city was in arms , and lorenzo , surrounded by a strong party of armed men , was reconveyed to his palace . the senats palace was recovered , and all those who had possess'd it were either taken or killed . the name of the medici was with great acclamation cryed about the city , and the members of those who were slain were either dragged or carried upon the point of their swords about the streets ; every body with great anger and cruelty persecuting the pazzi . their houses were all broken up by the people ; francesco , naked as they found him in his bed , was hurried out of his house to the palace , and hanged up by the bishop and his bretheren , yet with all their contumely by the way , and all their affronts when he came there , they could not provoke him to give them one word ; only he looked grim , and fixed his eyes upon every one that abused him , and without any other complaint , he silently expired , guglielmo de pazzi brother-in-law to lorenzo , was preserved in his house , both out of respect to his innocence , and the intercession of bianca his wife . there was not a citizen in all the city , but went either armed or disarmed to lorenzo in this exigence , and proffered him both themselves and their fortunes ; so great was the kindness and interest which that family by their prudence and liberality had gained in the people . whilst this business happend , rinato di pazzi was retired to his country house , intending to disguise himself , and and escape if he could , but he was discovered , apprehended by the way , and brought back again to florence giacopo was taken likewise passing the alps , for the alpigines hearing what happened in florence , seeing him pass that way , they persued , took him , and returned him to florence ; nor could he prevail with them ( though several time he mades it his earnest request ) to kill him by the way . four days after this accident , giacopo and rinato were condemned , and put to death , b●t among all who were executed ( and they were so many that the streets , and high ways were full of their limbs ) none was so much lamented as rinato ; for he was always esteemed an honest good man , not guilty of that pride and arrogance which was observed in the rest of his family . and that this story might not pass without an extraordinary instance of the fury of the people , giacopo who was buried at first in the sepulchre of his fathers , afterwards was torn from thence as an excommunicated person , dragged out of the walls of the city , and thrown into a hole ; and being taken up again , his body was drawn ( in the same halter with which he was hanged ) naked about the streets , and having no place allowed it to be quiet at land , was at last thrown into the arnus . a great example of the inconstancy of fortune , to see a person of his wealth and authority , pulled so ignominiously in pieces , and ruined with so many circumstances of contempt . they spake indeed of his vices , and of a strange propensity in him to swearing and play , above the degree of the most profligate person ; but those infirmities were abundantly recompensed in his charity and benificence ; for he was a great reliever of the poor , and endow'd several places of devotion . the sunday before this plot was to be executed , that no man might be a sufferer by any ill fortune of his , he paid all his debts ; and all the effects in his ware houses or custody which belongeth to other persons , he consigned to their several owners with an unimaginable care , after a long examination , giovan battista montesecco was at last condemned , and his head struck off . guglielmo de pazzi , was banished , and his kinsmen which were left alive , imprisoned in a dungeon in the castle of volterra . when the tumult was over , and the conspirators executed . guiliano's funeral was celebrated with the universal condolement of the city , he having been a person of as much goodness and humanity as could be desired in one of his quality and extraction . he had only one son , born some months after his death , who was christned giulio , who proved so remarkable for his virtue and fortune , that the whole world rings of his reputation at this day ; and if god gives me life , i shall speak largely of , when i come to the description of his times . the forces which were got together under lorenzo de castello in the vail of di tevero , under giovan francesco tolentino in romagna , in behalf of the pazzi , were in their march towards florence : but hearing of the miscarriage of their affairs , they returned from whence they came , nevertheless the pope and the king of naples ( though their conspiracy had failed , and not produced those mutations which they hoped for in florence ) resolved to attempt that by open war , which could not otherwise be effected , and both the one and the other caused their forces to advance towards that city , with all possible diligence , declaring as they went , that all the design of their march , and all their desire of the citizens , was not removing but the removal of lorenzo , who was the only enemy he had in the town . the king's army had already passed the tronto , and the popes was in the country of perugia ; and lest his temporal power should be too little , he let loose his spiritual maledictions , and excommunications against him . whereupon the florentines seeing themselves invaded with such formidable numbers , addressed themselves to their defence , with all possible care . lorenzo de medici ( because the war was pretended only against him ) prest very earnestly that all the chief citizens might be invited to the palace before the senate ; and above of them appearing , he spake to them in this manner . most noble lords , and you must magnificent citizens . i do not well know whether i am to congratulate , or condole with you this day for the things which are passed ; and truly when i consider with what malice and collusion , i was assaulted , and my brother slain , i cannot but condole , and my whole heart and soul is overwhelmed with the affliction ; when after that i revolve with what promptitude , with what zeal , with what love , with what unanimity , and universal consent of the whole city , his death was revenged , and mine prevented ; i cannot but rejoyce , nay even triumph and exsult , for as experience has now taught me that i had more enemies in this city , than i suspected ; it has convinced me on the other side , i had more true friends than i could have hoped for : so that i am to congratulate your goodness , and to condole the injury and iniquity of other people , which is the more deplorable , because rare , and underserved . think , i beseech you , most noble citizens , to what point of infelicity fortune hath brought our family , when even among our friends , our relations , and in the very church we are in danger . those who are in distress , or apprehension of death , are wont to fly to their friends , and relations for shelter ; we found ours not only disposed , but armed , and prepared , and impatient to destroy us . those who are under any publick or private persecution , have usually their refuge and sanctuary in the church : where others are protected , we are assaulted : where parricides and murderers are secured , the medici are murdered themselves . but god ( who has not hitherto deserted our family ) has preserved us , and undertaken our defence . what injury have we done any body , that could deserve such vehement revenge ? sure we our selves never offended those persons who have been so furious against us ; if we had , we should not have left them in that capacity to revenge themselves ; if it be publick censure , or injury which provoked them ( and of that too i know nothing ) 'tis you , not we are offended ; this palace , this senate , and the majesty of this government , is aspersed with undeserved decrees against the citizens , in partiality to us , which to my own knowledge is far from being true . we would not have injured them if we had been able , and you would not have suffered us , had we been willing : who ever traces the truth to the bottom , will find our family was not exalted by this government for nothing , if i may speak it modestly , it was their humanity , their bounty , their munificence which constrained you to it : if then we have been beneficial to strangers , how came our relations to be disgusted ? if their appetite of dominion prompted them to what they have done , ( and the seeing of this palace . and filling the piazza with armed men , is an evident demonstration it was nothing else ) the design is sufficient conviction , and shows their brutality and ambition . if it were hatred and detestation of our authority , it was you that gave it us , and it is you were injured . but certainly , if any power or authority deserves to be regreted , 't is that which is usurped , not that which is acquired by a continued stream of kindness and liberality . i appeal to you , most illustrious senators , whether any of my predecessors arrived at their grandeur any way but by the unanimous consent , and promotion of this court , my grandfather cosimo returned not from his banishment by violence , and force of arms , but by your invitation . my ancient and infirm father , was too weak to have supported his authority against so many enemies ; it was your bounty , it was your authority which defended it . when my father was dead , and i ( though but a child ) was left to succeed him , alas ! how could i have maintained the honor and dignity of the family without your favour and instruction . our house never was , nor ever will be able to govern this state , without your cooperation , and assistance . i cannot imagine therefore what quarrel they should have had against us , or what just reason for their envy ; they should rather have turned their indignation upon their own ancestors , who with their insolence and avarice defeated them of that honor , which ours have gained by their generosity and goodness , but , let us gratifie them so far as to grant we had injured them , and that their combinations against us , were but reasonable and just ; why must they conspire against this palace ? why must they confederate with the pope , and king of naples , against the innocence and liberty of this commonwealth ? why must all italy be involved in a war ? for this they can have no excuse : if any man have offended them , they might have offended him again , and not blended and confounded private injury with publick revenge . this is it which revives our calamities , though the authors are extinct . that is it which has brought the pope and king of naples upon us with their armies , though their declaration be only against me and my family . i wish to god it were true , and that their design was no farther : the remedy would be easie , and your deliverance at hand ; i should not be so ill a citizen as to postpone the publick , to my private security ; no i would willingly quench your flames , though with my own blood and destruction : but because the injuries of great persons are alway cloathed with some plausible pretence , they have chosen this , to exasperate you against me : if you think i deserve it , i am now in your hands , to be continued or rejected as you please : you are my fathers , you are my patrons , what ever you command , i will endeavour to do ; and not refuse with my own blood to finish this war , which is begun with my brothers . the citizens could not contain from tears , whilst lorenzo was speaking , and with the same pity as they had heard him , he was answered by one deputed by the rest . that the whole city did acknowledge the merits both of his ancestors and himself . that he should be of good cheer , for with the same readiness and devotion as they had revenged his brothers death , and prevented his , they would preserve his person and reputation , and expose their whole country rather than desert him ; that their actions might be commensurate , they appointed him a guard , to secure him against domestick designs , and payed them out of the publick treasure : after which they addressed themselves to the war , and raised what men and mony they were able . they sent for aid to the duke of milan , and the venetians according to the league ; and the pope more like a wolf than a shepherd , being ready to devour them , they tried all ways to justifie themselves that they could think of , possess'd all italy with his treachery against their state , remonstrated his impieties to all the world ; and that he exercised his papacy with as much injustice , as he gained it : for he had sent those ( whom he had advanced to the highest degree of prelacy ) in the company of traitors and murderers to commit treason in the church , in the time of divine service , and the celebration of the sacrament ; and after that ( having been unable to kill all the citizens , alter the government , and sack the city ) he interdicted it with his pontifical maledictions , and threatned to destroy it . but if god were just , and the violences of men offensive to him ; he must needs be displeased at the proceeding of his vicar , and permit that men ( having no other refuge ) might resort unto him . for which reason the florentines not only refuse his interdiction , but forced their priests to celebrate divine service as before . they called a council in florence , of all the tuscan prelats within their jurisdiction , and appealed to them concerning their differences with the pope ; against which in justification of his cause , it was alledged , that it belonged properly to the pope to supplant tyrants , to suppress ill men , and to advance good ; all which he was to remedy , as opportunity was offered . but that secular princes had not right to imprison cardinals ; to execute bishops ; to kill , or dismember , or drag about the streets the bodies of the priests ; and to use the innocent and the nocent without any difference or distinction . nevertheless the florentines not at all refusing his quarrels and complaints , dismissed the cardinal which was in their power , and sent him back to the pope ; yet the pope without any regard to that civility , caused them to be invaded with all his forces , and the kings ; both their armies ( under the command of alfonso duke of calabria ferrando's eldest son , and federigo conted ' urbino ) entred chianti , and by means of the siennesi , who were of the enemies party , ●took radda ; several other castles ; and plundered the whole country . next they encamped before castellina : the florentines seeing themselves thus fiercely attacked , were in great fear , as having but few men of their own , and the assistance of their friends coming in very slowly ; for though the duke indeed , had sent them supplies , yet the venetians refused it , as not thinking themselves obliged to relieve them in their particular quarrels ; for as , they pretended , private animosities were not in reason to be defended , at a publick expence . so that the florentines , to dispose the venetian to better things , sent tomaso soderini embassador to that state , whilst in the mean time , they raised what men they could , and made hercules marquess of ferrara their general . whilst in this manner they were employed in their preparations , the enemy had brought castellina to such distress that , despairing of relief , the garison surrendered , after forty days siege . from hence , the enemy advanced towards arezzo , and sat down before monte s. senino . the florentine army was by this time drawn out , and being marched towards the enemy , had posted it self within three miles of them , and incommoded them so that federigo sent ▪ to urbino to desire a truce for some few days ; which was granted , but with so much disadvantage to the florentines , that those who requested it were amazed when they had obtained it ; for without it they must have drawn off with disgrace . but having those days allowed to recollect themselves , when the time was expired they went on with their siege , and took the town under the very nose of our army . by this time winter being come , to provide themselves good quarters , the enemy drew his army into the country of sienna , the florentines where they thought most convenient ; and the marquess of farrara ( having done little good to himself or other people ) returned from whence he came . about this time genoa was in rebellion against the state of milan , and upon this occasion , galeazzo being dead , and his son giovan galeazzo a minor , and unfit for the government , difference arose betwixt sforza , lodovico , ottaniano , ascanio , his unckles , and medona bona his mother ; each of them pretending to the tuition of the child . in which competition madona bona the dutchess dowager prevailed , by the counsels of tomaso soderini ( the florentine embassador in that court , at that time ) and cecco simonetto who had been secretary to the late galeazzo ; whereupon sforzi flying from milan , ottaniano was drawn , as he was passing the adda , and the rest dispersed into several places , roberto de san severino ran the same fortune , and fled , having forsaken the dutchess in those disputes , and joyned himself with the unckles . the troubles falling out , not long after in tuscany , those princes hoping from new accidents , or new success , every one of them attempted what he thought likely to restore him to his country . king ferrando observing the only refuge the florentines had in their necessities , was to the state of milan . determined to give the dutchess so much imployment of her own , that she should not be at leasure to send them any relief ; and by means of prospero adorno , the signore roberto , and the sforzi which were banished , he wrought so that genoa rebelled ; nevertheless the little castle remained firm to the young duke , and the dutchess sent forces to them to recover the town , but they were overthrown ; whereupon considering with her self the danger which might accrew both to her son , and her self , if the war should be continued , all tuscany being imbroiled . and the florentines in distress , she resolved , seeing she could not retain genoa as a subject , that she would have it as a friend ; and agreed with battistino fregosi ( a great enemy to prospero adorno ) to deliver him the castle , and make him prince of genoa , upon condition he would drive out prospero , and give the sforzi no assistance nor protection . after all was concluded betwixt them , the castle was surrendered , and by the help of that , and his party , battistino reducing genoa , and according to their custom , made himself dogue ; the sforzi and signore roberto being forced out of the town , they passed with their followers into lunigiana . the pope and the king seeing the troubles in lombardy composed , took occasion to infest tuscany on that side towards pisa , with those persons which were driven out of genoa ; supposing by dividing , and diverting their forces , to weaken the florentines ; whereupon the summer approaching , they prevailed with the signore roberto to march with his squadron from lunigiana , into the country of pisa ; roberto put the whole country into confusion ; took several castles from the pisans , and plundered them , and made his excursions to the very walls of pisa it self . about this time embassadors arrived at florence , from the emperour , the king of france , and the king of hungary , who from their several princes being sent to the pope , persuaded the florentines to send embassadors also , and promised their utmost endeavour with him , to conclude all their differences with an honorable peace . the florentines consented , as well to excuse themselves to the world , as that they were really desirous of it . having sent therefore their embassadors , they returned as they went , without any accommodation : and the florentines finding themselves abused or abandoned by the italians , resolved to try if they could gain themselves any reputation by an alliance with france , to which purpose they sent as their embassador donato acciaivoli , a person well skill'd both in the greek and latine tongues , whose ancestors had always born great office in that state ; but being arrived at milan in his journey he died ; and florence , in honor to his memory , and remuneration to his children , buried him magnificently at the publick charge ; gave his sons considerable exemptions ; and his daughters such portions as would marry them like themselves ; and sent giud ' antonio vespucci ( a man well versed in the imperial and pontifical laws ) to the king of france in his place . the inroad signore roberto had made into the country of pisa , ( as all sudden and unexpected things do ) gave the florentines no little distraction . for the war lying heavy upon them in the country of siena , they could not see how they should be able to defend themselves on the other side ; however they sent officers and all other provisions to reinforce the city of pisa ; and that they might keep the lucchesi from assisting the enemy , with mony or any thing else , they sent gino capponi as their embassador to them ; but he was received so ill , out of an ancient enmity to the people of florence , ( upon former injuries received , and a constant apprehension to them , that he was many times in danger of being killed by the multitude : so that his journey produced new quarrels , rather than new quiet ; and thereupon the florentines called back the marquess of ferrara , entertained the marquess of mantoua into their pay ; and with great importunity , desired of the venetians count carlo the son of braccio , and deifebo the son of count giacopo , who ( after several scruples and demurs ) were sent to them ; for having made peace with the turk , aud no pretence left to excuse themselves , they were ashamed to braek faith with the league . carlo therefore , and deifebo being come , with a considerable number of horse , and joyned to what forces they could conveniently draw out of the marquess of ferrara's army . ( which attended the duke of calabria ) they marched towards pisa , in quest of signore roberto , who was posted with his army near the river serchio ; and thought at first he made a show of expecting our army , yet upon second thoughts he removed . and retired into the country of lunigiana , to the same quarters where he lay before his expedition to pisa. upon his departure , count carlo repossess'd himself of all the enemy had taken in that country ; and the florentines being clear on that side ; drew all their forces into one body betwixt colle and santo giminiano ; but upon carlo's conjunction there being several of the sforzeschi , and the bracceschi in the army , the old feud began to revive , and it was believed , had they stayed longer together , they had fallen together by the ears : to prevent these inconveniences , it was resolved to divide the army , that count carlo should march with his forces into the country of perugia , and the rest fortifie and intrench themselves at poggibonzi . to obstruct the enemy from entring into the country of florence . by this division they supposed likewise the enemy would be forced to divide , for they thought that either count carlo would take perugia ( where he had a great party as they believed ) or that the pope would be constrained to send a good body of men to defend it ; and to drive his holiness into greater necessity , they ordered nicolo vitelli ( who had left castello , where lorenzo his enemy was predominant ) with what force he could make to approach the town , to drive out his adversary if he could , and keep it against the pope . at first , fortune seemed to encline to the florentines , count carlo advanced strangely in the country of perugia ; nicolo vitelli , though he could not get into the town of castello , yet he was master of the field , and plundered round about it without any contradiction ; and those forces which were encamped at poggibonzi made their excursions to the very walls of sienna . but at last all their hopes came to nothing , for first count carlo died in the very height of their expectations , whose death had nevertheless much bettered the condition of the florentines , had they known how to have improved the victory which it produced ; for no sooner was the death of count carlo known , but the popes army ( being all together in perugia ) conceiving great hopes of overpowering the florentines , took the field , and encamped upon the lake within three miles of the enemy : on the other side giacopo guicciardini , ( at that time commissary of the army ) by the advice of roberto da rimino , ( who since the death of count carlo , was the chief , and best reputed officer among them ) knowing what it was that set the enemy agog , they resolved to attend him ; and coming to a battel not far from the lake ( in the very place where hannibal gave the romans that memorable defeat ) the popes army was routed . the news of this victory was extreamly welcome in florence , both to the magistrates , and people ; and it would have been great honor and advantage to that enterprize , had not disorders in the army at poggibonzi spoiled all , and the victory over the one camp , been interrupted by a mutiny in the other ; for that army having got much plunder in the country of sienna , when they came to divide , there fell out great difference betwixt the marquess of ferrara , and the marquess of manto●a , so that they came to blows , and did one another what mischief they were able . the florentines finding no good was to be expected from them together , consented that the marquess of ferrara with his forces might march home ; by which means the army being weakned , without a head , and very disorderly , the duke of calabria being with his army not far from sienna , took a resolution of falling upon them ; but the florentines hearing of his advance , not trusting to their arms , their numbers ( which was much greater than the enemy ) nor the situation of their camp ( which were very strong ) without expecting their coming , or seeing so much as the face of their enemy , as soon as they preceived the dust , they fled , and left their amunition , and carriages , and artillery behind them ; and so cowardly and poor spirited that army was become that the turning of a horses head or tail , gave either victory or defeat . this rout filled the king's souldiers with prize , and the florentines with fear ; for that city was not only afflicted with war , but with so violent a pestilence , that most of the inhabitants were forced to leave the town , and betake themselves to the country . this overthrow was rendred more terrible by sickness , for those citizens who had estates in the val di pisa , and the val delsa , being driven thither , and secure ; were forced ( upon this rout ) to hurry back again to florence as well as they could , and that not only with their goods and their children , but with all their families and dependants , for every hour they were afraid the enemy would have presented himself before the town . they who had the administration of the war , being sensible of these disorders , commanded their army ( which was victorious in perugia ) that leaving their designs there , they should march into the val delsa , and oppose themselves against the enemy , who , since their last victory , over-run that whole country . and though that army had so straitned perugia , it was every hour expected to surrender , yet the florentines chose rather to defend themselves , than to gain upon any body else ; and raising their siege they were conducted to s. cassiano , a castle about eight miles from florence , as the only place where they might lie secure , till the other army was rallied , and brought to them . the enemy on the other side , being at liberty in perugia , upon the withdrawing of the florentines , took heart , and made their inroads daily into the countries of arezzo and cortona ; and the other army , which under the command of the duke of calabria , had routed them at poggibonzi , took poggibonzi , and vico , pillaged certaldo , made great spoil , and got great prize in that country , after they sat down before colle which ( in those times ) was looked upon as extraordinary strong , and being well man'd , and provided with all things , it was hoped it might entertain the enemy , till their armies could be united . the florentines having joyned all their forces at s ▪ cassiano , and the enemy proceeding very fiercely in their leaguer ; they resolved to march towards them , and post themselves as near them as they could , supposing they should thereby , not only encourage the garison to defend themselves , but make the enemy more cautious in all his attacks : hereupon they removed from s. cassiano , and encamped at s. giminiano about five miles from colle , from whence with their horse , and the lightest of their foot , they daily molested the dukes camp : but this was not enough for the garison in colle , for wanting all things that were necessary , they surrendered the of november , to the great displeasure of the florentines , but the great joy of the enemy , especially the siennesi , who besides their common hatred to florence , had a particular quarrel against this town . winter was now at the height ; the season unfit for war ; and the pope and king ( to give them hopes of peace , or to enjoy their victory quietly themselves ) offered a truce for three months to the florentines , and allowed them ten days for an answer ; which proffer was accepted ; but as a wound is more painful when cold , than when 't is first given , this small repose , gave the florentines greater sence of the miseries which they had endured ; insomuch as they began to talk freely , and upbraid one another by the miscarriages in the war , charging one another with the greatness of the expence , and the inequality of their taxes , and these exprobrations were not only in the streets , and among the ordinary sort of people , but even in their conventions , and publick counsels , in which one of them , took the confidence to tell lorenzo to his face , that the city was weary , and would have no more war , and that therefore he should bethink himself of peace ; upon which lorenzo , discerning the necessity , advised with such of his friends as he judged most faithful and able , and it was concluded by all ( that seeing the venetians were cold and uncertain ; the duke young , and imbroiled in new troubles at home ) their best way would be to seek out for new alliance . and try what that would contribute to their success . their great scruple was , into whose arms they should cast themselves , whether into the popes , or the king 's of naples ; and upon serious debate it was resolved into the king's , as a person of more stability , and likely to yield them better protection , in regard of the shortness of the popes lives , and the changes upon their successions . for the small fear the church has of any prince , and the small regard it has of any body else in all its resolutions , causes that no secular prince can repose any intire confidence , or communicate freely in his affairs , with any of the popes ; for the that associats with him in war , and in dangers , may perhaps have a companion and a sharer in his victories ; but in his distress he shall be sure to be alone , his holiness being still brought off by his speritual influence and authority . it being therefore determined more profitable to reconcile with the king , there could be no way thought of so likely , as by lorenzo himself , for by how much the more that king had tasted of his liberality , by so much the more they thought it probable he might succeed . lorenzo embracing the motion , and having prepared for his journey , committed the city and government to tomaso soderini ( at that time gonfaloniere di gustitia ) and left florence in the beginning of december . being arrived at pisa in his way , he writ to the senate , and gave them an account of his design , and the senate in honor to him , and that he might treat with more reputation , made him embassador for the people of florence , and gave him authority to conclude with him , according to his own judgment , and discretion . about this time signore roberto da santo severino , joyning with lodovico and ascanio ( for their brother sforza was dead ) they invaded the state of milan , in hopes to have re-invested themselves ; having possess'd themselves of tortona , and milan , and the whole state being in arms , the dutchess was advised ( to compose her civil dissentions ) to restore the sforzi , and receive them into the government again . her great councellor in this , was antonio tassino a ferrarese , who , though meanly extracted , being come to milan , was preferred to be chamberlain both to the duke and the dutchess ; this antonio , for the comliness of his person , or some other secret excellence , after the dukes death , grew into great favour with the dutchess , and in a manner governed the whole state ; which was very unpleasing to cecco , a man of great prudence , and long experience in publick affairs , insomuch that he used all his interest both with the dutchess , and the rest of the governors to clip the wings of his authority , & remove him . antonio having notice of his design , to countermine him , and have some body near which might be able to defend him , he advis'd the dutchess to restore the sforzi , and the dutchess following his persuasion , invited them back again without communicating with cecco : upon which he is reported to have told her that she had done a thing which would cost him his life , and deprive her of the government . and so afterwards it fell out , for cecco was put to death by lorenzo , and tassino turned out of milan , which the dutchess took in such dudgeon , that she forsook the town , and left the government of her son to his unckle lodovico , which act of her's in leaving that whole dutchy to the government of lodovico , was the ruine of italy , as shall be shown in its place . lorenzo de medici was in his journey towards naples , and the truce betwixt the parties , in a very fair way , when on a sudden , beyond all expectation lodovico fregoso , having intelligence in serezana , surprized the town , and made all prisoners whom he found any ways affected to the florentines . this accident was highly resented by the governors of florence , for they imagined it done by the order of ferrando , and therefore complained heavily to the duke of calabria ( who was with his army at sienna ) that whilst they were in treaty , they should be assaulted so treacherously ; but the duke assured them by letters , and an embassy on purpose , that what had passed was done without either his consent , or his fathers . however , the affairs of the florentines were judged in a very ill condition ; their treasure being exhausted ; their prince , in the hands of the king ; an old war on foot with the pope and the king , a new war commenced with the genoeesi , and no friends to support them , for they had no hopes of the venetian , and of the state of milan they had more reason to be afraid , it was so various and unstable : the only hope remaining to the florentines , was in lorenzo's address to the king. lorenzo arrived at naples by sea , was honorably received both by the king , and the whole city ; and though the war was begun for no other end but to ruine him , yet the greatness of his enemies , did but add to his grandeur ; for being brought to his audience , he delivered himself so handsomly , and discoursed so well of the condition of italy , of the humors of all the princes , and people therein , and gave so good account of what was to be dreaded by war , and what was to be hoped for by peace , that the king admired the greatness of his mind , the dexterity of his wit , the solidity of his judgment , more now , than he had wondered before , how he could alone sustain so great an invasion , insomuch that he doubled his respects towards him , and began to think it his interest much more to make him his friend , than to continue him his enemy . nevertheless upon sundry pretences and fetches , he kept him in dispence from december to march , not only to satisfie himself in a farther experience of lorenzo , but to inform himself of the infidelity of florence , for that city was not without those who would have been glad the king would have kept him , and handled him as giacopo piccinino was handled . these people began to complain , and spake ill of him , all over the town , to oppose themselves publickly in the councils against any thing that was moved in favour to lorenzo ; and gave out generally where ever they came , that if the king kept him much longer at naples , they would alter the government ; so that the king forbore to dispatch him for some time , in expectation of a tumult . but finding all quiet , and no likelyhood of any such thing , on the of march , he dismissed him , having first presented him so nobly , and treated him so honorably , that they had made a perpetual league , and obliged themselves mutually for the preservation of one anothers dominions . if therefore lorenzo was great when he went from florence , he was much greater when he returned ; and was received with a joy , and acclamation in the city , sutable to his quality , and the recency of his deserts , who had ventred his own life so frankly , to procure peace to his country , two days after his arrival , the articles of peace were published , by which both the state of florence and king had particularly obliged themselves to a common defence ; that such towns as were taken from the florentines during the war ( if in the king's power ) should be restored : that the pazzi which were prisoners at volterra , should be discharged , and a certain sum of mony payed to the duke of calabria , for a prefixed time . this peace was no sooner published , but the pope , and the venetians were infinitly offended , the pope thinking himself neglected by the king , and the venetians by the florentines , for both one and the other having been partners in the war , they took it unkindly to be left out of the peace . their displeasure being reported and believed at florence , it was presently apprehended that the effect of this peace , would be a greater war. hereupon the governors of the state , began to think of contracting the government , and reducing it into a lesser number of ministers , appointing a council of citizens to transact such affairs as were of principal importance . this new constitution settled the minds of those who were desirous of innovation , and to give it a reputation , the first thing they did , was to ratifie the peace which lorenzo had made with the king , and they appointed antonio ridolfi , and piero nasi , embassadors to the pope . notwithstanding this peace , the duke of calabria departed from the country of siena with his army , pretending he was retained by the dissentions of that city , which were so great , that being quartered not far off , he was invited into the town , and their defferences referred to his arbitration . the duke accepted the overture , fin'd several of the citizens ; imprisoned several ; banished some , and some he put to death ; so that he became suspicious , not only to the sienesi , but to the florentines also ; that his design was to make himself prince of that city ; nor could they devise any remedy , seeing they had entred into a league with the king , and thereby made both pope , and venetians their enemies . and this suspicion was not only got into the brains of the multitude in florence ( a subtile interpreter of affairs , ) but into the minds also of the governors , so that it was generally concluded , the liberty of that city was never in more danger : but god who has always had a particular care of it in all its extremities , averted that evil , and by an unexpected accident , gave the king , the pope , and the venetians a diversion which imported them more , than their advantages in tuscany . mahomet the great turk , was with a great army , encamped before rhodes , and had lien before it several months : though his forces were numerous , and his diligence great , yet the valour of the besieged was not to be mastered , for they defended themselves so bravely , he was forced to draw off , and quit the siege , with a great deal of dishonor . having left rhodes , he sent part of his fleet , under the command of giacometto bascia towards velona , and ( either upon consideration of the easiness of the enterprize ; or express command from the grand signore to that purpose ) coasting about italy , on a sudden he landed men , assaulted the city of otranto , took it , plundered it , killed all the inhabitants , and when he had done , fortified both the town and the harbour as much as possibly he could , and with a good party of horse , scowred the whole country about it . the king being much alarmed at this invasion , as knowing how great a monarch he had to deal with , sent his embassadors about to every body , to let them know his condition , and to beg their assistance , against the common enemy ; besides which he pressed the duke of calabria with all imaginable importunity , to leave his designs at siena , and come back with all his forces : this invasion though it was very dreadful to the duke , and all the rest of italy , yet it was welcome to florence and siena , the one thinking its liberty most miraculously preserved , and the other themselves as strangely delivered from those dangers which would of necessity have destroyed them . which opinion was much encreased by the unwillingness wherewith the duke departed from siena ; complaining and cursing his fortune , which by so unreasonable and an unexpected accident , had defeated him of the dominion of tuscany . the same thing , changed the counsels of the pope , and whereas before he would never admit any embassador from florence , he was grown now so meek , he would hear any body speak of a general peace ; and word was sent to the florentines that when ever they found themselves enclined , ask pardon of the pope , they would be sure to have it . the florentines thought not fit to slip so fair an occasion ; and therefore sent embassadors to the pope , who entertained them with diverse practices after they were arrived at rome , before he admitted them to audience : yet at length it was adjusted how all parties should comport for the future , and what every one should contribute , in time of peace , as well as in war ; after which the embassadors were admitted to the feet of the pope , who was placed in great pomp , with his cardinals about him . the embassadors , to extenuate what had passed , laid the fault sometimes upon their own necessities ; sometimes upon the malignity of other people : sometimes upon the popular fury ; sometimes upon their own just indignation ; as being so unhappy to be forced either to fight ; or to die ; and because death is the most terrible of all things , and all things will be tried , before that will be embraced , they had endured the war , the excommunications and all the ill consequences which followed ; rather than suffer their liberty ( which is the life of a commonwealth ) to be taken from them , and extinguished : nevertheless , if their necessity had run them upon the rocks , and forced them to do any thing which was displeasing to him , they were ready to make him satisfaction , and did hope , according to the example of their gracious redeemer , he would be as ready to receive them into his most merciful arms. to which excuses his holiness replyed with great heat and indignation , reproaching them by all the mischiefs which they had done to the church ; nevertheless , to preserve the commandments of god , he was contented to grant them their pardon as they desired ; but intimated withal , that they were to be more obedient for the future , and if again they transgressed , that liberty which now they were only like to have lost should be then taken wholly , and that justly , away , because they who deserved to be free , were such as practised good things , and not bad ; and liberty abused , was destructive both to themselves , and other people ; for to neglect their duty either to god or his church , was not the office of good men , but of such as were dissolute and lewd ; the correction of which belongeth not only to princes , but to all that are christians ; so that for what was to be passed , they were to lay the fault upon themselves ; who by their ill deeds had given occasion of the war , and continued it by their worse ; but now that was at an end , yet it was attributed more to the goodness of other people , than any merit in them ; after which he gave them his benediction and the form of the agreement , to which he had added ( besides what had been debated , and concluded on in counsel , ) that if the florentines expected any fruit from his blessing , they should furnish out fifteen gallies and keep them in their pay till the turk was beaten out of italy . the embassadors complained grievously to have an article of that weight superadded to what was concluded in the treaty ; but by all the friends they could make , and all the arts they could use , they could not prevail to have it expunged ; whereupon returning to florence , that senate , to perfect the peace , sent guid antonio vespucci ( who not long before was returned from france ) their embassador to his holiness , and by his prudence , he brought the terms to be tolerable , and as a greater sign of his reconciliation , received several other marks of his holiness favour . the florentines having put an end to all their differences with the pope . siena being free , they delivered from their apprehensions of the king , by the duke of calabria drawing away with his army out of tuscany , and the war continuing with the turks , they pressed the king so hard to the restitution of such places as the duke of calabria at his departure had committed to the keeping of the sanesi ; that he began to fear the florentines might desert him , and by making war upon the sanesi ; hinder the assistance which he expected from the pope , and the rest of the princes of italy ; whereupon he caused them all to be delivered , and by several new favours , reobliged the florentines to him ; from whence we may observe , that it is interest and necessity , not their hands or their words , which make princes keep their promises . these castles being restored , and the new league confirmed , lorenzo de medici gained greater reputation than the war first , and after , the peace ( when they were jealous of the king ) had taken from him . for at that time there wanted not those who calumniated him openly , as one , who to preserve himself , had sold his country , and as by the war they had lost their towns , by the peace they should lose their liberty . but when the towns were restored ; and honorable peace concluded with the king ; and the city returned to its ancient reputation , the people ( who are generally greedy to talk , and judge of things more by the success , than the counsel ) changed their note presently , and cryed up lorenzo to the skies , as one who had gained more by his management in that peace , than their ill fortune had got them by the war ; and that his prudence and judgment had done what all the armies and power of their enemies could not . this descent of the turks defer'd the war , which the pope and the venetians upon provocation of that peace , had designed against them , but as the beginning of the turkish invasion was unexpected , and produced much good ; so the end of it was unlooked for , and the occasion of much mischief ; for mahomet the grand signore died suddenly , and difference arising betwixt his sons , those who were landed in puglia , being abandoned by their lord , came to an agreement with the king of naples , and delivered up otranto into his hands . this fear therefore being removed , which kept the pope , and the venetians quiet ; every one began to be apprehensive of new troubles . on the one side the pope and the venetian were in league , and with them genoesi , sanesi , and other lesser potentates . on the other side , were the florentines , the king of naples , the duke of milan , and with them the bolognesi , and several other little states . the venetian had a design upon ferrara ; they thought they had reason enough to attempt it , and hopes enough to carry it . the reason was , because the marquess had declared himself obliged no longer to receive either their visdomine , or their falt ; for by compact after years , that city was to be exempt both from the one and the other : to which the venetians replyed that so long as he retained the polesine ; so long he was , to receive the visdomine and the salt ; but the marquess refusing ; they thought they had just occasion to take arms , and their opportunity was convenient , seeing the pope , in such indignation , both against the florentines , and king : to oblige him the more , count girolamo being by accident at venice , was honorably treated , made a gentleman of that city , and had all the priviledges and immunities of a citizen conferred upon him ; which is a particular favour , and shows always the great esteem they bear to the person which receives it . in preparation for this war , they laid new taxes upon their subjects ; and for their general , they had chosen roberto da san severino , who upon some difference betwixt him , and lodovick duke of milan , fled to tortona , and having made some tumults there , he got off to genoa , from whence he was invited by the venetians , and made general of their army . the news of these preparations coming to the ears of the league , they prepared themselves accordingly . the duke of milan chose federigo lord of urbin , for his general . the florentines costanzo di pesaro ; and to sound the pope , and discover whether these proceedings of the venetians were by his consent , king ferrando sent the duke of calabria with his army to quarter upon the tronto , and desired leave of his holiness that they might pass thorow his territories , from thence into lombardy to the relief of the marquess ; which being absolutely denied , the florentines and king thinking that a sufficient declaration of his mind , resolved to attempt it by force , and try if that they could make him their friend , or at least give him such impediments as should hinder his supplying of the venetians , who had already taken the field ; invaded the marquess ; overrun most of the country , and clap'd down with their army before figarolo , a castle of great importance to the affairs of that prince . the king and the florentines having in the mean time concluded to fall upon the pope , alfonso duke of calabria marched his army towards rome , and by the help of the collennesi ( who were joyned with him , in opposition to the orsini who sided with the pope ) he committed great spoils all over that country . on the other side , the florentines under the command of nicolo vitelli assaulted the city of castello ; took it , turned out lorenzo who had kept it for the pope , and gave it to nicolo as prince : the pope was at this time in very great anxiety . rome was full of factions within , and the enemy in the country without . nevertheless , ( like a couragious prince , resolved to overcome , not to yield to his enemies ) he entertained for his general roberto da rimino , and inviting him to rome , where he had assembled all the forces he could make , he represented how great an honor it would be to him , if he could rescue the church from the calamities which were upon it ; and that not only himself and his successors , but god almighty would reward him . roberto having taken a view of his army , and all the magazines , he persuaded the pope to raise him what foot he could more , which was done with great diligence and expedition . the duke of calabria was all this while forraging about that country , and making his inroads to the very walls of the city ; which netled and provoked the citizens so , as many of them came freely , and offered their service to remove them , which roberto with many thanks , and great expressions of kindness accepted . the duke , understanding their preparations , thought fit to draw farther off from the city , supposing that roberto would not venture to follow him at any distance from the town ; besides he had some expectation of his brother federigo who was to come to him with fresh supplies from his father . roberto finding himself equal in horse , and superior in foot , drew his army out of the town , and directing towards the enemy , he encamped within two miles of him . the duke finding the enemy upon his back , quite contrary to his expectation ; perceived there was no remedy but he must fight , or run away ; so that forced , and constrained , lest otherwise he should do a thing unworthy of a king's son , he resolved to fight , turned upon the enemy , and each of them having put their army into order , according to the discipline of those times , they fell to it , and the battle continued from morning to noon , and was fought with more courage than any in italy for fifty years before ; there dying on the one side and the other above a thousand men : the end of which fight was very honorable for the church ; for their infantry being numerous , so galled the dukes horse , that they were forced to turn tail ; and the duke had been taken , had he not been rescued by some turks , which upon the delivery of otronto took pay under him . roberto having gained so absolute a victory , returned triumphantly to rome ; but he enjoyed the pleasure of it but little , for in the heat of the battle having drunk a great quantity of cold water , he put himself into a flux , and died not many days after ; his body being interred by his holiness with all imaginable ceremony . the pope having gained this victory , he sent the count towards castello to try if he could recover it for lorenzo , and what he could do upon rimina ; for after the death of robert , there being only one child left in the tuition of his lady , he thought it might be no hard matter to get into that town ; and doubtless he had succeeded , had not that lady been assisted by the florentines , who opposed him so happily , that he could do nothing against rimino , nor castello . whilst these things were in agitation in romagna , and rome , the venetians had taken figarolo , and passed the po with their army ; the duke of milan's , and the marquess his army ( being in no small disorder , upon the death of the count d' urbino ) who falling ill was removed to bologna ; and died there ; so that the marquesses affairs began to decline , and the venetians had great hopes of becoming masters of ferrara . on the other side the florentines and king of naples , used all possible art to bring the pope over to their party , but not being able to do it by force ; they threatned him with a counsel , which the emperour had pronounced already should be held at basil. whereupon , by persuasion of his embassadors at rome and the chief of the cardinals ( who were very desirous of peace ) the pope was constrained , and began to hearken to the peace , and tranquillity of italy ; and for fear the grandeur of the venetians should be the ruine of that country , he became inclinable to the league , and sent his nuncii to naples , where a peace was concluded for five years betwixt the pope , king of naples , and florentines , reserving a certain time for the venetians , if they pleased to come in . which being done , the pope sent to the venetians to desist in their war against ferrara , but the venetians were so far from complying , they reinforced their army , and pursued it with more cagerness than before ; for having defeated the dukes forces , and the marquesses at argenta , they had advanced in such manner against the city , that their army was encamped in the marquesses park . so that the league , thinking it no dallying any longer , resolved to assault them with all the forces they could make , and accordingly the duke of calabria had orders to march thither with their army . the florentines likewise sent what men they could spare ; and for the better administration of the war , a diet was appointed to be held at cremona , where there met the popes legat , count girolamo , the duke of calabria , the signore lodovico , and lorenzo de medici , with many other princes of italy , in which council the method of the future war was debated , and having concluded that ferrara could not any way be relieved more effectually , than by a brisk diversion , they desired lodovico's permission to attack the venetians thorow the country of milan ; but lodovico would not be persuaded , as fearing to pull a war upon his back , which he could not be rid off when he pleased : whereupon it was determined that they should march with their whole strength for ferrara , and having mustered horse and foot , they advanced against the venetians , who were horse , and foot. but the first thing the league thought fit to attempt , was a fleet which the venetians had upon the po : and they assaulted it so smartly that they broke it at rondino , destroyed of their vessels , and took antonio iustiniano ( the proveditor of their navy ) prisoner . the venetians seeing all italy combined against them ; to give themselves greater reputation , they entertained the duke of reno into their pay with good horse and upon news of the defeat of their fleet , they sent him with part of the army to face the enemy , whilst roberto da san severino passed the adda with the rest , and approaching to milan , proclaimed the duke and madam bona his mother ; hoping that lodovico and his government had been so odious in that city , that the very name of the other would have begot some commotion . this inroad at first produced some kind of terror : but the conclusion was quite contrary to what the venetians had designed , for this compelled lodovico to do , what he could not be brought to before ; and therefore leaving the marquess of ferrara to the defence of his own country , with horse , and foot , the duke of calabria with horse , and foot , marched into the countries of bergona , brescia , and verona , plundering and spoiling all about them , before the venetians could send them any relief , for roberto and his army had much ado to secure that city : on the other side , the marquess of ferrara , had recovered a great part of his losses ; for the duke of reno ( who was sent to confront him ) having but horse and foot was not able to oppose him : so that all that year , things went on prosperously for the league . the next spring ( the winter having passed without any considerable action ) both armies took the field . the league , for greater expedition in their designs against the venetians , had drawn their whole army together ; and ( had the war been managed as wisely as the year before ) had easily carried what ever the venetians were possess'd of in lombardy ; for they were reduced to horse , and foot ( whilst the enemy consisted of horse , and foot ) for the duke of reno , being entertained only for a year , when his time was out , was retired . but ( as it many times happens where many are in equal authority ) diffention among the grandees , gives the victory to the enemy ; for federigo gonzagua marquess of mantona being dead ( who whilst he was living , kept the duke of calabria , and signore lodovico in good correspondence ) there grew exceptions betwixt them , and jealousies by degrees : for giovan galeazzo being of age , become capable of the government , and married to the daughter of the duke of calabria , he had a mind his son-in-law , and not lodovico , should exercise the government . lodovico , smelling his design , resolved if possible , to prevent him . this inclination of lodovico's , being known to the venetians , they thought it a fair opportunity to gain ( as they had done before ) by peace ; what by wur they had lost ; and making private overtures to him , in august they came to an agreement , which was no sooner divulged but the other confederuts were highly displeased , especially seeing all they had taken from the venetians would be restored ; the venetians lefvin the possession of rovigo and polisine ( which they had taken from the marquess of ferrara ) and invested with all the prerogatives and preheminences which they had exercised over that city before for every man judged they had made a chargeable war ; gained some honor indeed in the prosecution of it ; but in the conclusion , they had come off with disgrace ; for the towns which they had taken were restored , but the towns they had lost were kept by the enemy : yet the confederats were glad to accept the peace , being weary of the war , and unwilling to attempt their fortune any further with the defects and ambition of other people . whilst in lombardy things were managed at this rate , the pope , by the mediation of lorenzo , pressed hard upon the city of castello to turn out nicolo vitelli , who ( to bring over the pope to their party ) was deserted by the league . whilst they were intrenched before the town , those of the garison who were friends to vitelli , sallyed out upon the enemy , and beat them from the siege ; hereupon the pope recalled girolamo from lombardy ; caused him to come to rome to recruit his army , and then sent him to pursue his designs against castello : but judging it better upon second thoughts to reduce nicolo by fair means than foul , he made peace with him , and reconciled him , as much as in him lay , to his adversary lorenzo : and to this he was constrained more out of apprehension of new troubles , than any desire to peace ; for he saw ill humours remaining betwixt the colonnesi , and the ursini . in the war betwixt the pope and the king of naples , the king of naples had taken from the ursini the country of pagliacozzo , and given it to the colonnesi who followed his party . when peace was afterwards made betwixt the pope and the king , the ursini demanded restitution by virtue of that treaty . the pope many times required the colonnesi to deliver it , but neither the prayers of the one , nor the threats of the other being able to prevail , they fell upon the ursini with their old way of depredation and plunder . the pope not enduring that insolence , drew all his forces together , and joyning them with the ursini , they sacked the houses of all the colonni in rome ; killed those who resisted , and destroyed most of the castles which they had in those parts : so that those tumults were ended , not by peace , but by the destruction of one of the parties . in the mean time , the affairs in genoa and tuscany were in no better condition ; for the florentines kept antonio da marciano , with his forces upon the frontiers of serezana , and with excursions and skirmishes , kept the serezani in perpetual alarm . in genoa battistino fregoso doge of that city , reposing too much confidence in paulo fregoso the arch-bishop , was himself , his wife and children , seized by him , and the archbishop made himself prince . the venetian fleet had at that time assaulted the king of naples ; possess'd themselves of galipoli ; and alarmed all the towns about it ; but upon the peace in lombardy , all the differences were composed , except those in tuscany , and rome : for the pope died five days after the peace was proclaimed , either his time being then come , or else his indignation at the peace ( against which he was most obstinately averse ) having killed him . however he left all italy quiet when he died , though whilst he lived , he kept it constantly imbroiled . upon his death , rome was immediatly in arms : count girolamo with his forces retired to the castle : the ursini were fearful the colonni would revenge the injuries they had so lately received : the colonni demanded their houses and castles to be made good ; so that in a few days , murders , roberies , and burning of houses , was to be seen in several parts of the city ; but the cardinals having persuaded girolamo to deliver up the castle into the hands of their colledge ; to retire to his own government , and free the city from his forces ; hoping thereby to make the next pope his friend , he readily obeyed , delivered up the castle to the colledge , and drew off his forces to imola . so that the cardinals being rid of that fear , and the barons of the assistance they expected from girolamo , they proceeded to the election of a new pope , and after some little disputes , they made choice of giovan battista cibo cardinal di malfetta , a genoese , with the name of innocent the , who by the easiness of his nature ( being a man of peace ) prevailed with them to lay down their arms , and once more made all quiet at rome . notwithstanding this peace , the florentines could not be prevailed with to be quiet ; it appearing to them dishonorable , and insufferable , that a private gentleman should have taken , and keep from them the castle of serazana ; and because it was an article in the peace , that not only all that had been lost might be demanded again , but that war might be waged against any that obstructed it , they prepared men and mony to go on with that enterprize : whereupon agostino fregoso , who had surprized serazana , finding himself unable with his private force , to sustain such a war , he resigned it to s. george . and seeing we shall many times have occasion to mention s. george , and the genoesi , it will not be inconvenient to describe the orders and methods of that city , which is one of the principal in italy . when the genoesi had made peace with the venetians , after the greatest war in which they had ever been engaged , not being able to satisfie certain citizens who had advanced great sums of money for the service of the publick , they made over to them the profits of the dogana , appointing that every man should share of them , according to the proportion of his principal sum , till his whole debt should be wrought out ; and for their convenience of meeting , and better disposing of their affairs , they consigned the palace to them which was over the custom-house . these creditors erected a kind of government among themselves , created a counsel of to deliberate and order all publick matters , and another of eight citizens , to put them in execution : their debts were divided into several parts , which they called luoghi , and their whole body was called san. giorgia . having established their government in this manner , new exigences arising every day to the commonwealth , they had recourse to san. giorgio for supplies ; which being rich , and well managed was able always to relieve them : but the magistrates and community of the city ( having granted them their customs before ) were forced now when they borrowed any mony , to make over their lands to them , and they had done it so frequently , that the necessities of the one , and the supplies of the other had brought things to that pass , that the greatest part of the towns and cities under the jurisdiction of genoa , were fallen into their hands , and they governed and disposed of them as they pleased , chusing annually their rettori or governors by publick suffrage , without the least interposition or concernment of the common-wealth . from hence it happened that the affection of the people was removed from the government of the commonwealth ( which they looked upon as tyrannical ) to the government of san giorgio , ( which was well , and impartially administred ) and from hence the casic and often changes , of the state did proceed ; which submitted it self sometimes to this citizen , sometimes to that stranger , as occasion invited ; and the reason was , because it was not san. giorgio , but the magistrats which altered the government . therefore when the contention was betwixt the fregosi , and adorni for soveraignty of the city ; because the controversie was only among the governors of the commonwealth ; the greatest part of the citizens withdrew , and left the state to him that could catch it ; the office of san. giorgio concerning it self no farther , than to swear the person advanced , to the conservation of their laws , which have not been altered to this very day ; for having arms , and mony , and conduct , they cannot be subverted without danger of a destructive rebellion . a rare and incomparable example , not to be fellowed in all the visible , or immaginary commonwealths of the philosophers ; to behold in the same circle , among the same citizens , liberty , and tyranny , civility , and corruption , justice , and rapine to be exercised at the same time ; for that order alone preserved that city in its ancient and vencrable customs . and had it fallen out ( as in time doubtless it will ) that the government of the commonwealth had fallen to the management of san. giorgio , no question but before this it would have been greater , and more formidable than the republick of venice . to this san. giorgio , therefore agostino fregosa ( not being able to keep it himself ) delivered serezana : san. giorgio accepted it readily , undertook to defend it ; put out a fleet immediatly to sea ; and sent forces to pietra santa to intercept any that should go to the florentines , who were already encamped before serezana . the florentines on the other side had a months mind to pietra santa , as a town which , by reason of its situation betwixt pisa and that , would make serezana inconsiderable , though they should take it ; and in the mean time interrupt them in their leaguer , as often as that garison should think it fit to come forth . to bring this about , the florentines sent a considerable quantity of provisions and amunition , with a small party to convey them from pisa to their camp. supposing that the garison of pietra santa would be tempted to take them , both from the weakness of the convoy , and the greatness of the prize : and their artifice succeeded , for the garison could not see such a booty , and suffer it to pass . this was as the florentines desired , and gave them just pretence of hostility ; whereupon , rising from serezana , they marched to pietra santa , and encamped before it , which being well man'd , defended it self stoutly . the florentines having disposed their artillery in the plain , they raised a new battery upon the mountain , intending likewise to batter it from thence . giacopo guicardini was their commissary at that time , and whilst they were employed at pietra santa in this manner , the genoa fleet took and burned the rocca di vada , and landing some men , overran all the country there abouts . against these forces bongiami gianfigliazza was dispatched with a party of horse and foot , who restrained their extravagance , so as they did not make their excursions as formerly . however the fleet continued to moleft the florentines , and accordingly removed to ligorn , where with bridges , and other military engines , having got close to the new tower , they battered it smartly for several days together , but finding it to no purpose , they went off again with shame . in the mean time the siege at pietra santa went on very slowly ; insomuch that the enemy was encouraged , to attempt upon their battery , and sallying out when they saw their advantage , they carried it , much to their own reputation , and to the discouragement of their enemy , who immediatly drew off to about four miles distance , and the officers considering it was october , and the winter f●r on , were of opinion to put their army into their quarters , and reserve the prosecution of their siege , till a better season . these disorders being known at florence , filled all the chief officers with great indignation ; upon which to recruit their camp , and recover their reputation , they elected antonio pucci , and bernardo del nero for their new comissaries ; who being sent with a consisiderable supply of mony to the camp , remonstrated to the chief officers , the displeasure of the senate , the state and the whole city ; their commands to return their leaguer with the army ; the scandal and infamy it would be , if so many great officers , with so great an army , having nothing to oppose them but a pitiful garison , should not be able to carry so weak , and so contemptible a town . they represented likewise , the present and future advantage which they might expect if it were taken ; so that they were all encouraged to return , and the first thing to be attacked , they resolved should be the bastion , out of which they had been forced : in which action , it was manifest , what courtesie , affability , kind usage , and good words could produce in the souldiers , for antonio pucci , persuading this , promising that , assisting a third with his hand , and embracing the fourth , incited them to the assault with such fury , that they regained the bastion in a moment ; but they did not take it without loss , for the count antonio da marciano was slain from one of their great guns . this success brought such a terror upon the garison , that they began to think of surrendring . that things might be transacted with greater reputation , lorenzo de medici thought good to repair in person to the camp , where he was no sooner arrived , but in a few days the castle surrendered . winter being come , it did not appear to those officers convenient to prosecute the war , but to attend better weather , for the season of the year , by the malignity of the air had infected the army extreamly , for many of their chief officers were sick ; and among the rest , antonio pucci , and bongianni gianfigliazzi , were not only sick , but died , to the great regret of all people , so much honor and estimation had antonio , acquired by his conduct at pietra santa . the florentine had no sooner taken , and settled themselves in pietra santa , but embassadors came to them from the lucchesi to demand it , as an appendix to their commonwealth ; alledging that among the rest , there was an express article that what ever should be taken either of the one side or the other , should be restored to the first owners . the florentines did not deny the agreement , but answered that they could not tell whether in the peace they were then negotiating with the genoeses , they might not be obliged to restore it , and therefore they could give them no positive resolution , till that was determined ; and if it should happen that they should not be obliged , it would be necessary for the sienesi to think of some way to satisfie for the expence they had been at , and the damage they had received by the loss of so many considerable citizens , and when they did so , they might be consident they should have it . this whole winter was consumed , in negotiations of peace , betwixt the florentines and the genoesi , which were transacted at rome by the mediation of the pope : but nothing being concluded , the florentines would have fallen upon serezana in the spring , had they not been prevented by lorenzo's indisposition , and a new war betwixt ferrando and the pope . for lorenzo was not only troubled with the gout ( which was his hereditary disease ) but he had so great pains and affliction at his stomach , that he was forced to go to the baths to be cured . but the chiefest occasion was the war , which was originally from hence . the city of aquila was subject to the kingdom of naples , but so , as in a manner it was free . in that city , the count de mortorio was a man of more than ordinary reputation . the duke of calabria lying with his horse not far from tronto , pretending a desire to compose certain tumults which had happened betwixt the peasants in those parts ( but being really ambitious to reduce that city to a more intire subjection to his father ) sent to the count to let him know he desired to speak with him , and take his advice in the regulation of those affairs . the count , not having the least jealousie , repaired to him immediatly , but he was seized , as soon as he arrived , and sent prisoner to naples . this accident being known in aquila , altered the affections of the whole city , insomuch that the people taking arms , antonio concinello ( the king's commissary ) was slain , and with him , such of the citizens as were known to be affected to the neapolitan interest : and that they might have friends to defend them in their rebellion , they set up the banner of the church , and sent embassadors to the pope , to tender him the possession of their city , and implore his protection against the tyranny of the king. the pope was easily persuaded to their defence , as a person that hated the king , both upon publick , and private accounts ; whereupon being informed that roberto da san severino ( a great enemy to the state of milan ) was out of imployment , he sent for him to rome with all speed , made him his general , and solicited all the friends and relations of the count de mortorio to rise in his behalf ; so that the princes of altemura , salerno , and besignana took up arms against the king. the king seeing himself engaged so unexpectedly in a war , sent to the florentines , and duke of milan for their aid ; the florentines were very irresolute what was to be done ; they thought it unreasonable , to leave their own designs , for the promotion of other peoples , besides that , the taking up arms again so suddenly against the church , must needs be very dangerous ; nevertheless being in league , and under an obligation , they prefer'd their faith before either interest , or danger ; took the orsini into their pay , and sent their whole force ( under the count de pitigliano ) towards rome , in assistance of the king. by this means the king had two camps , that under the duke of calabria , he sent towards rome , in conjunction with the florentines , to attend the motion of the army of the church ; the other he kept at home , to secure his own country against any commotion by the barons , and in both places things occurred with variety of success : but at length the king remaining in all places superior , by the mediation of embassadors from spain , in august a peace was concluded , to which the pope ( being depress'd , and discouraged with his ill fortune ) consented , and all the princes of italy with him , only the genoesi were excepted , as rebels to the state of milan , and usurpers upon the territories of florence . the peace being concluded , roberto da san. severino , having been neither faithful to the pope , nor terrible to the enemy , was turned out of rome in disgrace , and being pursued by the forces of the florentines and the duke ; when he was past cesenna , finding they gained upon him , and would be presently upon his back , he betook himself to his heels , and with about horse fled away to ravenna , leaving the rest of his party either to be entertained by the duke , or destroyed by the country . the king having signed the peace , and reconciled himself with his barons , he caused giovanni coppola , and antonello d' anversa and their sons , to be put to death , as persons who had betrayed his secrets to the pope in the time of the war. by the experiment of this war , the pope having observed with what diligence and alacrity the florentines preserve their alliance , though he hated them before for their affection to the genoesi , and their asistance to the king , he began now to caress them , and show greater favour to their embassadors , than formerly he had done : which inclination being intimated to lorenzo , he improved it with all possible industry , as knowing it would gain him great reputation , if to his friendship with the king , he could add the amity of the pope . this pope had a son called francesco , and being desirous to advance him both in fortune and friends ( which when he was dead might support him ) he could not find a person in all italy , with whom he might more safely ally him , than with lorenzo de medici ; and therefore he ordered things so that he married him to a daughter of lorenzo's . this alliance being finished , his holiness had a desire that the genoesi by agreement should deliver up serezana to the florentines , and declared to them that they could not in justice retain what agostino had sold them ; nor could agostino convey that to san. giorgio which was none of his own ; but with all his arguments he could never prevail ; so that whilst these things were in agitation in rome , the genesi went on with their preparations , and rigging out many of their ships , before they could have any news of it at florence , they landed men , and assaulted the castle of serezanello , which stands upon the serezana and was garisoned by the florentines , and having sacked , and burned the town ( which lies on one side of it ) they advanced against the castle , and having planted their guns , they battered it exceedingly . this attack was new , and unexpected to the florentines , insomuch that they drew what force they were able together , under the command of urginio ursino , at pisa , and made their complaints to the pope , that whilst he was in treaty with them for peace , the genoeses had invaded them ; after which they sent piero corsini to lucca , to preserve that city in its allegiance : they sent likewise pagocantonio soderini their embassador to venice , to try the minds of that commonwealth . they desired aid likewise of the king of naples , and signor lodovico , but neither of them supplied them , the king pretending apprehension of the turkish fleet ; and lodovico with other shifts delaied to relieve them ; so that the florentines ( as they usually are ) were left alone in their necessity , finding no body so well disposed to assist them , as they were to assist other people . nevertheless ( being not strange to them ) they were not at all discouraged , but raising a great army under the command of giacopo guicciardini , and pietro vettori , they sent them against the enemy , who had lodged himself upon the river magra . in the mean time serazanello was closely besiged , and what with mines , and batteries , brought to great danger of being taken . whereupon a counsel being called , it was resolved to leave it , and the enemy not at all declining , they came to an engagement , in which the genoesi were defeated , lodovico dal fiesco , and several of their principal officers taken prisoners : yet this victory could not encline the serezanesi to surrender , they rather prepared more obstinately for their defence ; and the florentine commissaries being as diligent on their side , it was couragiously both assaulted and defended . this leaguer proving longer than was expected , lorenzs de medici thought it expedient to go himself to the camp , where his arrival animated his own souldiers , and discouraged the adversary ; for upon observation of the vigour of the florentines , and the coldness of their supplies from genoa , freely , without any capitulation , they threw themselves into the arms of lorenzo , and ( except some few who were more eminently active in the rebellion ) they were all courteously treated by the florentines . during this siege , signor lodovico , had sent his horse to pontremoli , in appearance , in our favour ; but holding a correspondence in genoa , a party mutinied against the government ▪ and by the help of those forces , secured the town for the duke of milan . about this time , the germans made war upon the venetians and boccelino d' osimo nella marca , had caused osimo to revolt from the pope , and made himself lord of it . this boccelino , after many accidents was contented ( upon the persuasion of lorenzo di medici ) to deliver up that town again to the pope , which he did , and coming to florance , he lived there ( under lorenzo's protection ) very honorable , a considerable time ; but afterwards removing to milan , and not finding the same faith as he had done at florance , he ws put to death by lodovico's command . the venetians , being set upon by the germans near the city of trento were utterly defeated , and signor roberto da san severino their general was slain . after the loss of this victory according to their usual fortune , the venetians made a peace with the germans , but upon terms as exceedingly honorable , as if they had been the conquerors . about the same time great troubles arose likewise in romagna : francesco d' orso of furli ; was a man of great authority in that city , and falling under the suspicion of the count girolamo , he was many times threatned by him : so that francesco living in perpetual fear he was advised by his friends and relations , to be before hand with the count , and seeing his intention was manifestly to take away his life , he should strike the first blow and make sure of the count , and so by the death of another person , secure himself . this counsel begin given , and as resolutely undertaken , they appointed the time to be at the fair at furli ; for several of their friends in the country coming to the town on course that day , they thought they should have enough of them present , without the danger of inviting them . it was in the month of may , in which the greatest part of the italians have a custom of supping by day light . the conspirators thought their best time to kill him would be after he had supped , when the servants were gone down to their own , and left him as it were alone in his chamber . having agreed upon the time , francesco went to the counts palace , and having left his accomplices below , and told one of his servants that he desired to speak with the count , he was admitted , and finding him alone , after some previous and pretended discourse , he took his opportunity and killed him ; then calling up his companions , the servant was slain likewise ; and then the captain of the castle coming in by accident with some few in his company to speak with the count , they fell upon him , and murdered him with the rest . having finished their work , and raised a great hubub in the house , the count's body was thrown out of the window , a great cry made of liberty and the church , and the people exhorted to arm , who abominating the cruelty and the avarice of the count , fell upon his houses , plundered them , and made the countess catherina ( his lady ) and her family prisoners : and this was done with so little opposition , that there was nothing but the castle which hindered the accomplishment of their designs : but that captain being obstinate , and not to be wrought upon by them to surrender , they desired the countess to try if she could persuade him , which she promised to endeavour , if they would let her go to him into the castle ; and as hostage for her fidelity , she would leave them her children . the conspirators believed her , and gave her leave to go to him ; but she was no sooner in the castle , but she began to swagger , and threaten them with death in revenge of her husband's ; and when they told her they would kill all her children , she bid them do their worst , for she knew how to have more . the conspirators were not a little dismaid at this accident ; they saw the pope sent them no succours , and hearing that lodovico the countesses unckle was sending forces to her relief , they pack'd up what they could , and away they went to castello so that the countess being restored , she revenged the death of her husband with all possible cruelty . the florentines had news of what happened to the count , and immediatly took occasion to attempt the castle of piancaldoli which had been formerly taken from them by the said count ; and accordingly sending their forces thither , they retook it , but with the death of ciecco , a most excellent architect . about the same time that this tumult happened in the city , another of no less importance , fell out in the country of romagna galeotto lord of faenza , was married to the daughter of giovanni bentivogli prince of bologna : this lady being jealous , or upon some other ill usage from her husband ; or else ill natur'd of her self , had her husband in such contempt , that she contrived to take away both his authority and life ; and one day counterfeiting her self sick , she laid her self upon the bed , and having hid some of her comerads in her chamber ; she ordered when galeotto came to visit her , they should rush upon him , and kill him . this lady had communicated her design to her father , who was well enough contented , hoping when his son-in-law was dead he might set up for himself . the time agreed upon for the execution being come , galeotto as he was accustomed ) came to see his wife , and having discoursed with her a while , the conspirators rushed forth , and killed him before he could make any defence . upon his death a great tumult was raised , and the lady with one of her little children called astorre was forced to betake herself to the castle , the people took arms ; giovan bentivogli ( with a bergamese who had been an officer under the duke of milan ) having got some forces together marched into faenza where antonio boscoli the commissary of florence was resident at that time , and having assembled all the chief of that party , they were in great argument about the government of the town ; when the inhabitants of the val di lamona , had taken the alarm , and being got together in a throng , they fell upon giovami , and the bergamese , they cut one of them to pieces , and took the other prisoner , and calling out upon astorre , and the florentines , they delivered the city to the conduct of the commissary . this accident being known in florence , was highly displeasing to every body ; nevertheless they caused giovanni and his daughter to be set at liberty , and took upon themselves the care of astorre and the city , by univeral consent of the whole people . after the wars betwixt the greater princes were composed ; besides these , there happened many tumults in romagna la marca , and siena , which being of no great moment , i think it supperfluous to recount them . true it is , troubles in siena ( after the end of the war , and the duke of calabria's leaving those parts in the year ) were more frequent than else where , and after several variations ( sometimes the people , sometimes the nobility having the predominance ) at length the nobility prevail'd , and of them , the persons of greatest authority were pandolfo , and giacopo petrucci , who , one of them for his conduct and the other for his courage , were made as it were princes of that city ; but the florentines from the end of the war against serazana to the year ( in which lorenzo died ) lived in great felicity . for lorenzo having by his great interest and prudence , procured peace all over italy , he applied himself to enlarging the grandeur of the city , and of his own family ; and first he married his eldest son piero , to alfonsina the daughter of cavaliere orsimo : his second son giovanni he advanced to be a cardinal , which having no president , was the more remarkable ; for he was but years old , at the time of his promotion : for his third son giuliano ( who was very young ) he could make no extraordinary provision , because he lived not long after : but his daughters were disposed of very well : one of them was married to giacopo salvati , another to francesco cibo ; a third to piero ridolfi , the fourth ( which he had married to giovanni de medici to keep his family united ) died . in his private affairs , especially in merchandizing , he was very unfortunate , for by reason of the exorbitance of his officers ( who all of them lived like princes ) much of his fortune was wasted and squandered , insomuch that he was constrained to be beholding to the state for great sums of mony . that he might be no longer lyable to the malignity of fortune , he left his trading , and fell a purchasing land , as a surer , and more durable way . in the countries of prato , pisa , and the vale , he bought such possessions , as for the revenue , and magnificence of the houses , were fitter for a king than a private person . after this he beautified and enlarged the city , and because there were many places uninhabited , he appointed new streets , and caused new houses to be erected to fill them ; which was not only an augmentation , but a great ornament to the city . that he might live quietly at home , and in time of war , keep his enemies at a distance , he fortified the castle of firezuolo , which stands towards bologna in the middle of the alps. towards siena , he began to repair poggio imperial , and make it very strong : towards genoa , he secured that passage , by the reducation of pietra santa , and serezana ; with good stipends and pensions he confirmed his friends , the baglioni in perugia , the vitelli in the city of castello : in faenza he had a particular government , all which were as so many bulwarks to keep the enemy from florence . in times of peace he caressed the city with feasting , and plays , and tournaments , and representations of ancient triumphs , to delight and entertain the people : his only design being to see them pleased , the city suppplied , and the nobles respected : he was a great lover of artists , and favourer of learned men , of which agnola da montepulciano , christofano laudini , and demetrius the greek can give ample testimony : the count giovanni della mirandola ( a person almost defied for his literature ) left all the other parts of europe which he had travelled , and ( moved by lorenzo's magnificence ) fixt his residence at florence . in architecture , musick , and poesy , he delighted exceedingly . many poetical compositions with several of his comments upon them are still to be seen . and that the florentine youth might be encouraged to study , he erected an university in pisa , and hired the best scholars in italy to read to them : he built a monastery not far from florence on purpose for frier mariano da chinazano an augustine monk , and one which he esteemed an excellent preacher . he was greatly beloved both of god , and fortune , for all his designs came to a good end , and all his enemies miscarried ; for besides the pazzi , he was set upon to have been killed by battista frescobaldi , in the carmine ; and by baldinotto da pistoia , at his country house ; but both of them failed , and were justly punished , with all their confederats . the excellence of his conversation , the eminence of his wisdom , and the happiness of his fortune , made him honorable not only in italy , but in all the courts of the world . mathias king of hungary gave many testimonies of his affection : the soldan by his embassadors and presents , visited and presented him . the great turk delivered bernar do bandini into his hands , who had murdered his brother giulian ; all which rendered him highly venerable in italy , and he added to his reputation every day by his prudence . in his discourse he was eloquent , and facetious ; in his resolutions wise , in his executions , quick , and couragious ; nor can any think be objected sufficient to eclipse these virtues , though he was indeed addicted to women , took too much pleasure in the company of witty and satyrical men ; and would play at boys play sometimes beneath the dignity of his office ; for he would play many times with his children at all the most idle and childish recreations they would put him to . so that if the gravity of his life , be considered with its levity , he will seem to be composed of two several persons , united by an almost impossible conjunction . the last part of his days was full of sorrow and disquiet , occasioned by the distempers of his body ; for he was sorely afflicted with intolerable pains at his stomack , which brought him so low , that in april he died , in the year of his age . never was there any man , not only in florence but italy , who departed with more reputation for his wisdom ▪ nor more lamentation to his country ; and because upon his death , many desolations were like to ensue , the heavens themselves did seem to presage it . the spire of the church of s. riparata was struck with thunder with such fury that a great part of the steeple was destroyed by it to the great consternation of the city . all the inhabitants of florence , and the princes of italy , bewailed him , which was particulary manifested by their several compliments of condolency , and whether they had reson or not , for what they did , the effects which succeeded a while after , did clearly demonstrate ; for being deprived of his counsels , italy could not find one remaining , able to satiate , or restrain the ambition of lodovico duke of milan , for want of which , after his death such seeds of dissention brake forth , as have perplexed and embroiled all italy ever since . the prince , together with the original of the gvelf and ghibilin , life of castrvccio castracani , murther of vitelli , &c. by duke valentino , state of france , state of germany . by nicolas machiavel . faithfully englished . london , printed for iohn starkey , charles harper , and iohn amery , in fleetstreet . . nicolo machiavelli to the most illustrious lorenzo son of piero de medici . those who desire the favour of a prince , do commonly introduce themselves by presenting him with such things as he either values much , or does more than ordinarily delight in ; for which reason he is frequently presented with horses , arms , cloath of gold , iewels , and such ornaments as are sutable to his quality and grandeur . being ambitious to present my self to your highness with some testimony of my devotions towards you , in all my wardrobe i could not find any thing more precious ( at least to my self ) than the knowledge of the conduct and atchievements of great men , which i learn'd by long conversation in modern affairs , and a continual investigation of old : after long and diligent examination , having reduced all into a small volume , i do presume to present to your highness ; and though i cannot think it a work fit to appear in your presence , yet my confidence in your bounty is such , i hope it may be accepted , considering i was not capable of more , than presenting you with a faculty of understanding in a short time , what for several years , with in●inite labour and hazard i had been gathering together . nor have i beautified or adorned it with rhetorical ornations , or such outward imbellishments as are usual in such descriptions . i had rather it should pass without any approbation , than owe it to any thing but the truth and gravity of the matter . i would not have it imputed to me as presumption , if an inferior person as i am , pretend not only to treat of , but to prescribe , and regulate the proceedings of princes : for as they who take the landskip of a country , to consider the mountains , and the nature of the higher places , do descend ordinarily into the plains , and dispose themselves upon the hills , to take the prospect of the valleys ; in like manner , to understand the nature of the people , it is necessary to be a prince , and to know the nature of princes , 't is as requisit to be of the people . may your highness then accept this book with as much kindness as it is presented ; and if you please diligently and deliberately to reslect upon it , you will find in it my extreme desire that your highness may arrive at that grandeur which fortune and your accomplishments do seem to presage ; from which pinacle of honour , if your highness vouchsafes at any time to look down upon things below , you will see how unjustly , and how continually i have been exposed to the malignity of fortune . machiavel's prince . chap. i. the several sorts of governments , and after what manner they are obtained . there never was , nor is at this day any government in the world , by which one man has rule and dominion over another , but it is either a commonwealth , or a monarchy . monarchies are either hereditary , where the ancestors of the soveraign have been a long time in possession , or where they are but new . the new are either so wholly , and entirely ( as milan was to francis sforza ) or annex'd to the hereditary dominions of the conquerour ( as the kingdom of naples , to the kingdom of spain . ) these territories thus acquired are accustomed either to be subject to some prince , or to live at liberty and free , and are subdued , either by his auxiliaries , or own forces , by his good fortune , or conduct . chap. ii. of hereditary principalities . i shall omit speaking of commonwealths , as having discoursed of them largely elsewhere , and write in this place only of principalities , and how according to the foregoing division , the said principalities may be governed , and maintained . i do affirm then that hereditary states , and such as have been accustomed to the family of their prince , are preserved with less difficulty than the new , and because it is sufficient not to transgress the examples of their predecessors , and next to comply and frame themselves to the accidents that occur . so that if the prince be a person of competent industry , he will be sure to ▪ keep himself in the throne , unless he be supplanted by some great , and more than ordinary force : and even then , when so supplanted , fortune can never turn tail , or be adverse to the usurper , but he will stand fair to be restored . of this , italy affords us an example in the duke of ferrara , who supported bravely against the invasion of the venetians in , and afterwards against pope iulius , upon no other foundation but his antiquity in that government ; for a natural prince has not so much occasion or necessity to oppress his subjects , whereby it follows he must be better beloved , and retain more of the affections of his people unless some extraordinary vices concur to make him odious , so that the succession and coherence of his government , takes away the causes and memory of innovations ; for one new change leaves always ( as in buildings ) a toothing , and aptitude of another . chap. iii. of mixt principalities . but the difficulties consist in governments lately acquired , especially if not absolutely new , but as members annexed to the territories of the usurper , in which case such a government is called mixed . the tumults and revolutions in such monarchies proceed from a natural crosness and difficulty in all new conquests , for men do easily part with their prince , upon hopes of bettering their condition , and that hope provokes them to rebel , b●t most commonly they are mistaken , and experience tells them their condition is much worse . this proceeds from another natural and ordinary cause necessitating the new prince to overlay or disgust his new subjects by quartring his army upon them , taxes , or a thousand other inconveniences , which are the perpetual consequents of conquest . so that you make them your enemies who suffer , and are injured by your usurpation , but cannot preserve their friendship who introduced you , because you are neither able to satisfy their expectation , or imploy strong remedies against them , by reason of your obligations , wherefore though an usurper be never so strong , and his army never so numerous , he must have intelligence with the natives , if he means to conquer a province . for these reasons lewis xii . of france , quickly subdued milan , and lost it as quickly , for the same people which open'd him their gates , finding themselves deceived in their hopes , and disappointed in the future benefits which they expected , could not brook , nor comport with the haughtiness of their new soveraign : 't is very true , countries that have rebelled , and are conquered the second time , are recovered with more difficulty , for the defection of the people having taken off all obligation or respect from the usurper , he takes more liberty to secure himself by punishing offenders , exposing the suspected , and fortifying where ever he finds himself weak ; so that count lodovick having been able to rescue milan out of the hands of the french the first time , only by harrasing and infesting its borders , the second time he recovered it , it was necessary for him , to arm and confederate the whole world against the said king , and that his army should be beaten , and driven out of italy : and this happened from the foresaid occasions . nevertheless the french were twice dispossess'd . the general reasons of the first , we have already discoursed ; it remains now that we take a prospect of the second , and declare what remedies the said king lewis had , or what another may have in his condition , to preserve himself better in his new conquests , than the king of france did before him . i say then that provinces newly acquir'd , and joyn'd to the ancient territory of him who conquer'd them , are either of the same country , or language , or otherwise . in the first case , they are easily kept , especially if the people have not been too much accustomed to liberty : and to secure the possession , there needs no more than to extirpate the family of the prince which governed before ; for in other things maintaining to them their old condition , there being no discrepancy in their customs , men do acquiesce and live quietly , as has been seen in the cases of burgundy , bretagne , gascogne and normandy , which have continued so long under the goverment of france : for though there be some difference in their language , nevertheless their laws and customs being alike , they do easily consist . he therefore who acquires any thing , and desires to preserve it , is obliged to have a care of two things more particulary ; one is , that the family of the former prince be extinguished ; the other , that no new laws or taxes be imposed ; whereby it will come to pass , that in a short time it may be annexed and consolidated with his old principality . but where conquest is made in a country differing in language , customs , and laws , there is the great difficulty , their good fortune and great industry is requisit to keep it ; and one of the best and most efficacious expedients to do it , would be for the usurper to live there himself , which would render his possession more secure , and durable , as the great turk has done in greece , who , in despight of all his practices and policies to keep it in subjection , had he not fixed his imperial residence there , would never have been able to have effected it . for being present in person , disorders are discovered in the bud , and prevented ; but being at a distance , in some remote part , they come only by hear-say , and that , when they are got to a head , and commonly incurable . besides , the province is not subject to be pillaged by officers , by reason of the nearness and accessibleness of their prince , which disposes those to love him who are good , and those to dread him who are otherwise ; and if any foreigner attacks it , he must do it with more care and circumspection , in respect that the princes residence being there , it will be harder for him to lose it . there is another remedy , rather better than worse , and that is , to plant colonies in one or two places , which may be as it were the keys of that state , and either that must be done of necessity , or an army of horse and foot be maintained in those parts , which is much worse ; for colonies are of no great expence ; the prince sends and maintains them at very little charge , and intrenches only upon such as he is constrain'd to dispossess of their houses and land , for the subsistance and accommodation of the new inhabitants , who are but few , and a small part of the state ; they also who are injur'd and offended , living dispers'd and in poverty , cannot do any mischief , and the rest being quiet and undisturb'd , will not stir , lest they should mistake , and run themselves into the same condition with their neighbours . i conclude likewise , that those colonies which are least chargeable , are most faithful and inoffensive , and those few who are offended are too poor , and dispers'd , to do any hurt , as i said before ; and it is to be observ'd , men are either to be flatter'd and indulged , or utterly destroy'd ; because for small offences they do usually revenge themselves , but for great ones they cannot ; so that injury is to be done in such a manner , as not to fear any revenge . but if in stead of colonies , an army be kept on foot , it will be much more expensive , and the whole revenue of that province being consum'd in the keeping it , the acquisition will be a loss , and rather a prejudice than otherwise , by removing the camp up and down the country , and changing their quarters , which is an inconvenience every man will resent , and be ready to revenge , and they are the most dangerous and implacable enemies who are provok'd by insolences committed against them in their own houses . in all respects therefore , this kind of guard is unprofitable , whereas on the other side colonies are useful . moreover , he who is in a province of a different constitution ( as is said before ) ought to make himself head , and protector of his inferior neighbours , and endeavour with all diligence to weaken and debilitate such as are more powerful , and to have a particular care that no stranger enters into the said province , with as much power as he ; for it will always happen that some body or other will be invited by the male-contents , either out of ambition , or fear . this is visible in the etolians , who brought the romans into greece , who were never admitted into any province , but by the temptation of the natives . the common method in such cases is this ; as soon as a foreign potentate enters into a province , those who are weaker , or disoblig'd , joyn themselves with him , out of emulation and animosity to those who are above them , insomuch that in respect of these inferiour lords , no pains is to be omitted that may gain them ; and when gain'd , they will readily and unanimously fall into one mass with the state that is conquered . only the conqueror is to take special care they grow not too strong , nor be intrusted with too much authority , and then he can easily with his own forces , and their assistance keep down the greatness of his neighbours , and make himself absolute arbiter in that province . and he who acts not this part prudently , shall quickly lose what he has got , and even whil'st he enjoys it , be obnoxious to many troubles and inconveniences . the romans in their new conquests observ'd this course , they planted their colonies , entertain'd the inferior lords into their protection without increasing their power , they kept under such as were more potent , and would not suffer any foreign prince to have interest among them . i will set down only greece for an example . the etolians , and achaians were protected ; the kingdom of the macedonians was depress'd , and antiochus driven out ; yet the merits and fidelity of the achaians and etolians could never procure them any increase of authority , nor the persuasions and applications of philip induce the romans to be his friends , till he was overcome , nor the power of antiochus prevail with them to consent that he should retain any soveraignty in that province : for the romans acted in that case as all wise princes ought to do , who are to have an eye , not only upon present , but future incommodities , and to redress them with all possible industry , for dangers that are seen afar off , are easily prevented , but protracting till they are at hand , the remedies grow unseasonable , and the malady incurable . and it falls out in this case , as the physitians say of an hectick feaver ; that at first it is easily cur'd , and hard to be known , but in process of time , no being observ'd , or resisted in the beginning , it becomes easie to be known , but very difficult to be cur'd : so is it in matters of state , things which are discover'd at a distance ( which is done only by prudent men ) produce little mischief , but what is easily averted : but when thorow ignorance or inadvertency , they come to that height that every one discerns them , there is no room for any remedy , and the disease is incurable : the romans therefore foreseeing their troubles afar off , oppos'd themselves in time , and never swallow'd any injury , to put off a war , for they knew that war was not avoided , but defer'd thereby , and commonly with advantage to the enemy ; wherefore they chose rather to make war upon philip , and antiochus in greece , than suffer them to invade italy ; and yet at that time there was no necessity of either , they might have avoided them both , but they thought it not fit ; for they could never relish the saying that is so frequent in the mouths of our new politicians , to enjoy the present benefits of time , but prefer'd the exercise of their courage and wisdom , for time carries all things along with it , and may bring good as well as evil , and ill as well as good . but let us return to france , and examine if what was there done , was conformable to what is prescribed here : and to this purpose i shall not speak of charles viii . but of lewis xii . as of a prince whose conduct , and affairs ( by reason his possession was longer in italy ) were more conspicuous , and you shall see how contrary he acted in every thing that was necessary for the keeping of so different a state. this lewis was invited into italy by the venetians , who had an ambition to have got half lombardy by his coming : i will not condemn the expedition , nor blame the counsels of that king , for being desirous of footing in italy , and having no allies left in that country but all doors shut against him ( upon the ill treatment which his predecessor charles had used towards them ) he was constrain'd to take his friends where he could find them , and that resolution would have been lucky enough , had he not miscarried in his other administration ; for he had no sooner subdued lombardy , but he recover'd all the reputation and dignity that was lost by king charles : genoa submitted ; florence courted his friendship , the marquess of mantoua , the duke of ferrara , bentivoglio , madam de furli , the lords of faenza , pesoro , rimini , camerino , piombino ; the lucchesi , pisani , sanesi , all of them address themselves to him for his alliance and amity ; then the venetians began to consider , and reflect upon their indiscretion ; who to gain two towns in lombardy , had made the king of france master of two thirds of all italy . let any one now think with how little difficulty the said king might have kept up his reputation in that country , if he had observ'd the rules abovesaid , and protected his friends , who being numerous , and yet weak , and fearful , ( some of the pope , and some of the venetians ) were always under a necessity of standing by him , and with their assistance he might easily have secured himself against any competitor whatever . but he was no sooner in milan , but he began to prevaricate ▪ and send supplies to pope alexander , to put him in possession of romagna , not considering that thereby he weakned himself , and disoblig'd his friends who had thrown themselves into his arms , and agrandized the church , by adding to its spiritual authority ( which was so formidable before ) so great a proportion of temporal , and having committed one error , he was forc'd to proceed so far , as to put a stop to the ambition of pope alexander , and hinder his making himself master of tuscany , the said lewis was forced into italy again . nor was it enough for him to have advanced the interest of the church , and deserted his friends , but out of an ardent desire to the kingdom of naples , he shared it with the king of spain ; so that whereas before he was sole umpire in italy , he now entertained a partner , to whom the ambitious of that province , and his own male-contents might repair upon occasion ; and whereas the king of that kingdom might have been made his pensioner , he turn'd out him , to put in another that might be able to turn out himself . it is very obvious , and no more than natural , for princes to desire to extend their dominion , and when they attempt nothing but what they are able to atcheive , they are applauded , at least not upbraided thereby ; but when they are unable to compass it , and yet will be doing , then they are condemned , and indeed not unworthily . if france then with its own forces alone had been able to have enterpriz'd upon naples , it ought to have been done ; but if her own private strength was too weak , it ought not to have been divided : and if the division of lombardy to which she consented with the venetian , was excusable ; it was , because done to get footing in italy ; but this partition of naples with the king of spain , is extreamly to be condemned , because not press'd or quicken'd by such necessity as the former . lewis therefore committed five faults in this expedition : he ruin'd the inferior lords ; he augmented the dominion of a neighbour prince ; he call'd in a forreigner as puissant as himself ; he neglected to continue there in person ; and planted no colonies : all which errors might have been no inconvenience whil'st he had lived , had he not been guilty of a sixt , and that was depressing the power of the venetian : if indeed he had not sided with the church , nor brought the spaniards into italy , it had been but reasonable for him to have taken down the pride of the venetian , but persuing his first resolutions , he ought not to have suffer'd them to be ruin'd , because whil'st the venetian strength was intire , they would have kept off other people from attempting upon lombardy , to which the venetians would never have consented , unless upon condition it might have been deliver'd to them , and the others would not in probability have forced it from france , to have given it to them : and to have contended with them both , no body would have had the courage . if it be urg'd that king lewis gave up romagna to the pope , and the kingdom of naples , to the king of spain , to evade a war , i answer , as before , that a present mischief is not to be suffer'd to prevent a war , for the war is not averted , but protracted , and will follow with greater disadvantage . if the kings faith and engagements to the pope to undertake this enterprize for him , be objected , and that he did it to recompence the dissolution of his marriage , and the cap which at his intercession his holiness had confer'd upon the legate of amboise , i refer them for an answer , to what i shall say hereafter about the faith of a prince , how far it obliges . so then king lewis lost lombardy , because he did not observe one of those rules , which others have followed with success in the conquest of provinces , and in their desire to keep them : nor is it an extraordinary thing , but what happens every day , and not without reason . to this purpose i remember i was once in discourse with the cardinal d' amboise at nantes , at the time when valentino ( for so caesar borgia pope alezander's son was commonly call'd ) possess'd himself of romagna : in the heat of our conference the cardinal telling me that the italians were ignorant of the art of war ; i replyed , that the french had as little skill in matters of state , for if they had had the least policy in the world , they would never have suffer'd the church to have come to that height and elevation . and it has been found since by experience , that the grandeur of the church and the spaniard in italy , is derived from france , and that they in requital , have been the ruine and expulsion of the french. from hence a general rule may be deduc'd , and such a one as seldom or never is subject to exception . viz. that whoever is the occasion of anothers advancement , is the cause of his own diminution : because that advancement is founded either upon the conduct or power of the donor , either of which become suspicious at length to the person prefer'd . chap. iv. why the kingdom of darius usurped by alexander , did not rebel against his successors , after alexander was dead . the difficulties encountred in the keeping of a new conquest being consider'd , it may well be admired how it came to pass that alexander the great , having in a few years made himself master of asia , and died as soon as he had done , that state could be kept from rebellion : yet his successors enjoy'd it a long time peaceably , without any troubles or concussions but what sprung from their own avarice and ambition . i answer , that all monarchies of which we have any record , were govern'd after two several manners ; either by a prince and his servants whom he vouchsafes out of his meer grace to constitute his ministers , and admits of their assistance in the government of his kingdom ; or else by a prince and his barons who were persons advanc'd to that quality , not by favour or concession of the prince , but by the ancientness , and nobility of their extraction . these barons have their proper jurisdictions and subjects , who own their authority , and pay them a natural respect . those states which are govern'd by the prince and his servants , have their prince more arbitrary and absolute , because his supremacy is acknowledged by every body , and if another be obeyed , it is only as his minister and substitute , without any affection to the man. examples of these different governments , we may find in our time in the persons of the grand signore , and the king of france . the whole turkish monarchy is governed by a single person , the rest are but his servants , and slaves ; for distinguishing his whole monarchy into provinces and governments , ( which they call sangiacchi ) he sends when and what officers he thinks fit , and changes them as he pleases . but the king of france is established in the middle ( as it were ) of several great lords , whose soveraignty having been owned , and families beloved a long time by their subjects , they keep their preheminence , nor is it in the king's power to deprive them , without inevitable danger to himself . he therefore who considers the one with the other , will find the turkish empire harder to be subdued , but when once conquered , more easie to be kept : the reason of the difficulty is , because the usurper cannot be call'd in by the grandees of the empire ; nor hope any assistance from the great officers , to facilitate his enterprize , which proceeds from the reasons abovesaid , for being all slaves , and under obligation , they are not easily corrupted ; and if they could , little good was to be expected from them , being unable for the aforesaid reasons , to bring them any party : so that whoever invades the turk , must expect to ●ind him entire and united , and is to depend more upon his own proper force , than any disorders among them ; but having once conquered them , and beaten their army beyond the possibility of a recruit , the danger is at an end ; for there is no body remaining to be afraid of , but the family of the emperor , which being once extinguished , no body else has any interest with the people , and they are as little to be apprehended after the victory , as they were to be relyed upon before . but in kingdoms that are governed according to the model of france , it happens quite contrary , because having gained some of the barons , to your side ( and some of them will always be discontent , and desirous of change ) you may readily enter : they can ( as i said before ) give you easie admission , and contribute to your victory . but to defend , and make good what you have got , brings a long train of troubles and calamities with it , as well upon your friends , as your foes . nor will it suffice to exterminate the race of the king ; forasmuch as other princes will remain , who upon occasion , will make themselves heads of any commotion , and they being neither to be satisfied nor extinguished , you must of necessity be expell'd upon the first insurrection . now if it be considered what was the nature of darius his government , it will be found to have been very like the turks , and therefore alexander was obliged to fight them , and having conquered them , and darius dying after the victory , the empire of the persians remained quietly to alexander for the reasons abovesaid ; and his successors , had they continued united , might have enjoyed it in peace , for in that whole empire no tumults succeeded , but what were raised by themselves . but in kingdoms that are constituted like france , it is otherwise , and impossible to possess them in quiet : from hence sprung the many defections of spain , france , and greece from the romans , by reason of the many little principalities in those several kingdoms , of which , whil'st there remained any memory , the romans enjoyed their possession , in a great deal of incertainty , but when their memory was extinct , by power and diuturnity of empire , they grew secure in their possessions , and quarrelling afterwards among themselves , every officer of the romans was able to bring a party into the field , according to the latitude and extent of his command in the said provinces , and the reason was , because the race of their old princes being extirpate , there was no body left for them to acknowledge , but the romans . these things therefore being considered , it is not to be wondred that alexander had the good fortune to keep the empire of asia , whil'st the rest , as pyrrhus and others , found such difficulty to retain what they had got , for it came not to pass from the small , or great virtue of the victor , but from the difference and variety of the subject . chap. v. how such cities and principalities are to be govern'd , who lived under their own laws , before they were subdued . when states that are newly conquered , have been accustomed to their liberty , and lived under their own laws , to keep them , three ways are to be observed : the first is utterly to ruine them ; the second to live personally among them ; the third is ( contenting your self with a pension from them ) to permit them to enjoy their old priviledges and laws , erecting a kind of council of state , to consist of a few , which may have a care of your interest , and keep the people in amity and obedience . and that council being set up by you , and knowing that it subsists only by your favour and authority , will not omit any thing that may propagate and inlarge them . a town that has been anciently free , cannot more easily be kept in subjection , than by employing its own citizens , as may be seen by the example of the spartans , and romans . the spartans had got possession of athens , and thebes , and setled an oligarchie according to their fancy ; and yet they lost them again . the romans to keep capua , carthage , and numantia , ordered them to be destroyed , and they kept them by that means . thinking afterwards to preserve greece , as the spartans had done , by allowing them their liberty , and indulging their old laws , they found themselves mistaken ; so that they were forced to subvert many cities in that province , before they could keep it ; and certainly that is the safest way which i know ; for whoever conquers a free town , and does not demolish it , commits a great error , and may expect to be ruin'd himself , because whenever the citizens are disposed to a revolt , they betake themselves of course to that blessed name of liberty , and the laws of their ancestors , which no length of time , nor kind usage whatever will be able to eradicate , and let all possible care and provision be made to the contrary , unless they be divided some way or other , or the inhabitants dispersed , the thought of their old priviledges will never out of their heads , but upon all occasions they will endeavour to recover them , as pisa did , after it had continued so many years in subjection to the florentines ; but it falls out quite contrary , where the cities or provinces have been us'd to a prince whose race is extirpated and gone ; for being on the one side accustomed to obey , and on the other , at a loss for their old family , they can never agree to set up another , and will never know how to live freely without ; so that they are not easily to be tempted to rebel , and the prince may oblige them with less difficulty , and be secure of them when he hath done . but in a commonwealth their hatred is more inverterate , their revenge more insatiable , nor does the memory of their ancient liberty ever suffer , or ever can suffer them to be quiet : so that the most secure way is either to ruine them quite , or make your residence among them . chap. vi. of principalities acquired by ones own proper conduct and arms. let no man think it strange , if in speaking of new governments , either by princes or states , i introduce great and eminent examples ; forasmuch as men in their actions follow commonly the ways that are beaten , and when they would do any generous thing , they propose to themselves some pattern of that nature ; nevertheless , being impossible to come up exactly to that , or to acquire that virtue in perfection which you desire to imitate ; a wise man , ought always to set before him for his example the actions of great men , who have excell'd in the atchievement of some great exploit , to the end that though his virtue and power arrives not at that perfection , it may at least come as near as is possible , and receive some tincture thereby : like experienced archers , who observing the mark to be at great distance , and knowing the strength of their bow , and how far it will carry , they fix their aim somewhat higher than the mark , not with design to shoot at that height , but , that by mounting their arrow to a certain proportion , they may come the nearer to the mark they intend . i say then , that principalities newly acquited by an upstart prince , are more or less difficult to maintain , as he is more or less provident that gains them . and because the happiness of rising from a private person to be a prince , presupposes great virtue , or fortune , where both of them concur , they do much facilitate the conservation of the conquest : yet he who has committed least to fortune , has continued the longest . it prevents much trouble likewise when the prince ( having no better residence elsewhere ) is constrained to live personally among them . but to speak of such who by their virtue , rather than fortune , have advanced themselves to that dignity , i say , that the most renowned and excellent , are moses , cyrus , romulus , theseus , and the like : and though moses might be reasonably excepted , as being only the executioner of god's immediate commands , yet he deserves to be mention'd , if it were only for that grace , which render'd him capable of communication with god. but if we consider cyrus , and the rest of the conquerors and founders of monarchies , we shall find them extraordinary ; and examining their lives and exploits , they will appear , not much different from moses , who had so incomparable a master ; for by their conversations and successes , they do not seem to have received any thing from fortune , but occasion , and opportunity , in introducing what forms of government they pleas'd ; and as without that occasion , the greatness of their courage had never been known , so had not they been magnanimous , and taken hold of it , that occasion had hapned in vain . it was necessary therefore for moses , that the people of israel should be in captivity in egypt , that to free themselves from bondage , they might be dispos'd to follow him : it was convenient that romulus should be turned out of albo , and exposed to the wild beasts when he was young , that he might afterwards be made king of rome , and founder of that great empire . it was not unnecessary likewise that cyrus should ●ind the persians mutining at the tyranny of the medes , and that the medes should be grown soft , and effeminate with their long peace . theseus could never have given proof of his virtue and generosity , had not the athenians been in great troubles and confusion . these great advantages , made those great persons eminent , and their great wisdom knew how to improve them to the reputation , and enlargement of their country . they then who become great by the ways of virtue ( as the princes abovesaid ) do meet with many difficulties , before they arrive at their ends , but having compass'd them once , they easily keep them : the difficulties in the acquisition , arise in part from new laws and customs which they are forc'd to introduce for the establishment and security of their own dominion ; and this is to be considered that there is nothing more difficult to undertake , more uncertain to succeed , and more dangerous to manage , than to make ones self prince , and prescribe new laws : because he who innovates in that manner has for his enemies all those who made any advantage by the old laws ; and those who expect benefit by the new , will be but cool and luke-warn in his defence ; which luke-warmness proceeds from a certain awe for their adversaries who have their old laws on their side , and partly from a natural incredulity in mankind , which gives credit but slowly to any new thing , unless recommended first by the experiment of success . hence it proceeds that the first time the adversary has opportunity to make an attempt , he does it with great briskness , and vigour , but the defence is so t●pid and faint , that for the most part the new prince , and his adherents perish together . wherefore for better discussion of this case , it is necessary to inquire whether these innovators do stand upon their own feet , or depend upon other people ; that is to say whether in the conduct of their af●airs , they do make more use of their rhetorick , than their arms. in the first case , they commonly miscarry , and their designs seldom succeed ; but when their expectations are only from themselves , and they have power in their own hands to make themselves obeyed , they run little or no hazard , and do frequently prevail . for further eviction , the scripture shows us that those of the prophets whose armes were in their hands , and had power to compel , succeeded better in the reformations which they designed ; whereas those who came only with exhortation and good language , suffer'd martyrdom and banishment , because ( besides the reasons above said ) the people are unconstant , and susceptible of any new doctrine at first , but not easily brought to retain it : so that things are to be ordered in such manner that when their faith begins to stagger , they may be forc'd to persist . moses , cyrus , theseus , and romulus could never have made their laws to have been long observed , had they not had power to have compelled it ; as in our days it happen'd to frier ierome savanorola , who ruined himself by his new institutions , as soon as the people of florence began to desert him ; for he had no means to confirm them who had been of his opinion , nor to constrain such as dissented . wherefore such persons meet with great difficulty in their affairs ; all their dangers are still by the way , which they can hardly overcome , but by some extraordinary virtue , and excellence : nevertheless when once they have surmounted them , and arrived at any degree of veneration , having supplanted those who envyed their advancement , they remain puissant , and firm , and honorable , and happy . i will add to these great examples , another , perhaps not so conspicuous ; but one that will bear a proportion and resemblance with the rest , and shall satisfie me for all others of that nature . it is of hiero of syracuse , who of a private person was made prince of that city , for which he was beholding to fortune no further than for the occasion , because the syracusans being under oppression , chose him for their captain , in which command he behav'd himself so well , he deserved to be made their prince , for he was a person of so great virtue and excellence , that those who have writ of him , have given him this character , that even in his private condition , he wanted nothing , but a kingdom to make him an admirable king. this hiero subdued the old militia , established a new ; renounced the old allies ; confederated with others ; and having friends and forces of his own , he was able upon such a foundation to erect what fabrick he pleas'd ; so that though the acquisition cost him much trouble , he maintain'd it with little . chap. vii . of new principalities acquired by accident , and the supplies of other people . they who from private condition ascend to be princes , and meerly by the indulgence of fortune , arrive without much trouble at their dignity , though it costs them dear to maintain it , meet but little difficulty in their passage , being hurried as it were with wings , yet when they come to settle and establish , then begins their misery . these kind of persons are such as attain their dignity by bribes , or concession of some other great prince , as it hapned to several in greece in the cities of ionia , and upon the hellespont ; where they were invested with that power by darius for his greater security and glory , and to those emperours who arrived at the empire by the corruption of the souldiers . these persons i say , subsist wholly upon the pleasure and fortune of those who advanced them , which being two things very valuable and uncertain ; they have neither knowledg nor power to continue long in that degree ; know not , because unless he be a man of extraordinary qualities and virtue , it is not reasonable to think he can know how to command other people , who before lived always in a private condition himself ; cannot , because they have no forces upon whose friendship , and fidelity they can rely . moreover states which are suddenly conquered ( as all things else in nature whose rise and increase is so speedy ) can have no root or foundation , but what will be shaken and supplanted by the first gust of adversity , unless they who have been so suddenly exalted , be so wise as to prepare prudently in time for the conservation of what fortune threw so luckily into their lap , and establish afterwards such fundamentals for their duration , as others ( which i mentioned before ) have done in the like cases . about the arrival at this authority either by virtue , or good fortune i shall instance in two examples that are fresh in our memory , one is francis sforza , the other caesar borgio ; sforza by just means , and extraordinary virtue made himself duke of milan , and enjoyed it in great peace , though gained with much trouble . borgia on the other side ( called commonly duke of valentine ) got several fair territories by the fortune of his father pope alexander , and lost them all after his death , though he used all his industry , and employed all the arts which a wise and brave prince ought to do to fix himself in the sphear , where the arms , and fortune of other people had placed him : for he ( as i said before ) who laid not his foundation in time , may yet raise his superstructure , but with great trouble to the architect , and great danger to the building . if therefore the whole progress of the said duke be considered , it will be found what solid foundations he had laid for his future dominion , of which progress i think it not superfluous to discourse , because i know not what better precepts to display before a new prince , than the example of his actions , and though his own orders and methods did him no good , it was not so much his fault , as the malignity of his fortune . pope alexander the sixth had a desire to make his son duke valentine great , but he saw many blocks and impediments in the way both for the present , and future . first he could not see any way to advance him to any territory that depended not upon the church , and to those in his gift , he was sure the duke of milan , and the venetians would never consent , for faenza and riminum had already put themselves under the venetian protection . he was likewise sensible that the forces of italy , especially those who were capable of assisting him , were in the hands of those who ought to apprehend the greatness of the pope , as the ursini , colonnesi , and their followers , and therefore could not repose any great confidence in them : besides , the laws and alliances of all the states in italy must of necessity be disturbed , before he could make himself master of any part , which was no hard matter to do , finding the venetians upon some private interest of their own , inviting the french to another expedition into italy , which his holiness was so far from opposing , that he promoted it by dissolution of king lewis his former marriage . lewis therefore passed the alps by the assistance of the venetians , and alexanders consent , and was no sooner in milan , but he sent forces to assist the pope in his enterprize against romagna , which was immediatly surrendred upon the kings reputation . romagna being in this manner reduc'd by the duke , and the colonnesi defeated , being ambitious not only to keep what he had got , but to advance in his conquests , two things obstructed ; one was the infidelity of his own army ; the other , the aversion of the french : for he was jealous of the forces of the ursini who were in his service ; suspected by would fail him in his need , and either hinder his conquest , or take it from him when he had done ; and the same fears he had of the french ; and his jealousie of the ursini was much increased , when after the expugnation of faenza , assaulting bologna , he found them very cold and backward in the attack : and the king's inclination he discover'd , when having possess'd himself of the dutchy of urbin , he invaded tuscany , and was by him requir'd to desist . whereupon the duke resolved to depend no longer upon fortune , and foraign assistance , and the first course he took , was to weaken the party of the ursini , and colonni in rome , which he effected very neatly by debauching such of their adherants as were gentlemen , taking them into his own service , and giving them honorable pensions , and governments , and commands , according to their respective qualities , so that in a few months , their passion for that faction evaporated , and they turn'd all for the duke . after this he attended an opportunity of supplanting the ursini , as he had done the family of the colonni before ; which happened very luckily , and was as luckily improved : for the ursini considering too late , that the greatness of the duke and the church tended to their ruine , held a council at a place called magione in perugia , which occasioned the rebellion of urbin , the tumults in romagna , and a thousand dangers to the duke besides ; but though he overcame them all by the assistance of the french , and recovered his reputation , yet he grew weary of his foreign allies , as having nothing further to oblige them , and betook himself to his artifice , which he managed so dexterously , that the ursini reconciled themselves to him , by the mediation of seignor paulo , with whom for his security he comported so handsomly by presenting with mony , rich stuffs , and horses , that being convinced of his integrity , he conducted them to sinigaglia , and deliver'd them into the dukes hands . having by this means exterminated the chief of his adversaries , and reduc'd their friends , the duke had laid a fair foundation for his greatness , having gain'd romagna and the dutchy of urbin , and insinuated with the people by giving them a gust of their future felicity . and because this part is not unworthy to be known for imitation sake , i will not pass it in silence . when the duke had possess'd himself of romagna , finding it had been governed by poor and inferiour lord's , who had rather robb'd than corrected their subjects , and given them more occasion of discord than unity , insomuch as that province was full of robberies , riots , and all manner of insolencies ; to reduce them to unanimity , and subjection to monarchy , he thought it necessary to provide them a good governor , and thereupon he confer'd that charge upon r●miro d' orco , with absolute power , though he was a cruel , and a passionate man. orce was not long before he had settled it in peace , with no small reputation to himself . afterwards the duke apprehending so large a power might grow odious to the people , he erected a court of judicature in the middle of the province , in which every city had its advocate , and an excellent person was appointed to preside . and because he discover'd that his pass'd ●verity had created him many enemies ; to remove that ill opinion , and recover the affections of the people he had a mind to show that if any cruelty had been exercised , it proceeded not from him , but from the arrogance of his minister ; and for their further confirmation ; he caused the said governor to be apprehended , and his head chopt off one morning in the market place at cesena , with a wooden dagger on one side of him , and a bloody knife on the other ; the ferocity of which spectacle not only appeas'd , but amaz'd the people for a while . but reassuming our discourse , i say , the duke finding himself powerfull enough , and secure against present danger , being himself as strong as he desired , and his neighbours in a manner reduced to an incapacity of hurting him , being willing to go on with his conquests , there remaining nothing but a jealousie of france , and not without cause , for he knew that king had found his errour at last , and would be sure to obstruct him . hereupon he began to look abroad for new allies , and to haesitate and stagger towards france , as appeared when the french army advanced into the kingdom of naples against the spaniards who had besieg'd cajeta ; his great design was to secure himself against the french , and he had doubtless done it , if alexander had lived . these were his provisions against the dangers that were imminent , but those that were remote , were more doubtful and uncertain . the first thing he feared was , lest the next pope should be his enemy , & reassume all that alexander had given him , to prevent which he proposed four several ways . the first was by destroying the whole line of those lord's whom he had dispossess'd , that his holiness might have no occasion to restore them ; the second was to cajole the nobility in rome , and draw them over to his party , that thereby he might put an aw , and restraint upon the pope . the third was , if possible to make the colledge his friends . the fourth was to make himself so strong before the death of his father , as to be able to stand upon his own legs , and repel the first violence that should be practised against him . three of these four expedients he had try'd●before alexander died , and was in a fair way for the fourth , all the disseiz'd lord's which came into his clutches , he put to death , and left few of them remaining : he had insinuated with the nobility of rome and got a great party in the colledge of cardinals , and as to his own corroboration , he had design'd to make himself master of tuscany , had got possession of perugia , and piombino already , and taken pisa into his protection : and having now farther regard of the french ( who where beaten out of the kingdom of naples by the spaniard , and both of them reduc'd to necessity of seeking his amity ) he leapt bluntly into pisa , after which lucca , and sienna submitted without much trouble , partly in hatred to the florentines , and partly for fear , and the florentines were grown desperate & without any hopes of relief ; so that had these things happened before , as they did the same year in which alexander died , doubtless he had gain'd so much strength and reputation , that he would have stood firm by himself , upon the basis of his own power and conduct ▪ without depending upon fortune , or any foreign●supplies . but his father died five years after his son had taken up arms , and left him nothing solid , and in certainty but romagna only , and the rest were in nubious , infested with two formidable armies , and himself mortally sick . this duke was a man of that magnanimity and prudence , understood so well which way men were to be wheedled , or destroy'd , and such were the foundations that he had laid in a short time , that had he not had those two great armies upon his back , and a fierce distemper upon his body , he had overcome all difficulties , and brought his designs to perfection . that the foundations which he had laid were plausible , appear'd by the patience of his subjects in romagna who held out for him a compleat month , though they knew he was at deaths door , and unlikely ever to come out of rome : to which place though the baglioni , the vitelli , and ursini return'd , seeing there was no likelyhood of his recovery , yet they could not gain any of his party , nor debauch them to their side : 't is possible he was not able to put who he pleas'd into the pontifical chair , yet he had power enough to keep any man out who he thought was his enemy : but had it been his fortune to have been well when his father alexander died , all things had succeeded to his mind . he told me himself about the time that iulius xi . was created , that he had considered well the accidents that might befal him upon the death of his father , and provided against them all , only he did no imagine that at his death , he should be so near it himself . upon serious examination therefore of the whole conduct of duke valentine , i see nothing to be reprehended , it seems rather proper to me to propose him ( as i have done ) as an example for the imitation of all such as by the favour of fortune , or the supplies of other princes , have got into the saddle ; for his mind being so large , and his intentions so high , he could not do otherwise , and nothing could have opposed the greatness and wisdom of his designs , but his own infirmity , and the death of his father . he therefore who thinks it necessary in the minority of his dominion to secure himself against his enemies ; to gain himself friends , to overcome whether by force , or by fraud ; to make himself belov'd , or fear'd by his people ; to be followed and reverenced by his soldiers ; to destory and exterminate such as would do him injury ; to repeal and suppress old laws , and introduce new ; to be severe , grateful , magnanimous , liberal , cashier and disband such of his army as were unfaithful , and put new in their places ; manage himself so in his alliances with kings and princes , that all of them should be either obliged to requite him , or affear'd to offend him ; he , i say cannot find a fresher or better model than the actions of this prince . if in any thing he be to be condemned , it is in suffering the election of iulius xi . which was much to his prejudice ; for though ( as is said before ) he might be unable to make the pope as he pleased ; yet it was in his power to have put any one by , and he ought never to have consented to the election of any of the cardinals whom he had formerly offended , or who after their promotion were like to be jealous of him ; for men are as mischievous for fear , as for hatred . those cardinals which he had disobliged , were among others , the cardinals of st. peter ad vincula , collonno st. george , and ascanius . the rest , if any of them were advanced , to the papacy , might well be afraid of him , except the spanish cardinals , and the cardinal of roan ; the spaniards by reason of their obligations and alliance ; and the other , by reason of his interest in the kingdom of france . wherefore above all things , the duke should have made a spanish cardinal pope ; and if that could not have been done , he should rather have consented to the election of roan , than st. peter ad vincula ; for 't is weakness to believe , that among great persons , new obligations can obliterate old injuries and disgusts . so that in the election of this iulius xi . duke valentine committed and error that was the cause of his utter destruction . chap. viii . of such as have arriv'd at their dominion , by wicked and injustifiable means now because there are two ways from a private person to become a prince , which ways are not altogether to be attributed either to fortune or management , i think it not convenient to pretermit them , though of one of them i may speak more largely where occasion is offered to treat more particularly of republicks . one of the ways is when one is advanced to the soveraignty by any illegal nefarious means : the other when a citizen by the favour and partiality of his fellow-citizens is made prince of his country . i shall speak of the first in this chapter , and justifie what i say by two examples , one ancient , the other modern , without entring farther into the merits of the cause , as judging them sufficient for any man who is necessitated to follow them . agathocles the sicilian , not only from a private , but from a vile and abject condition , was made king of syracuse , and being but the son of a potter , he continued the dissoluteness of his life , thorow all the degrees of his fortune : nevertheless his vices were accompanied with such courage and activity , that he applyed himself to the wars , by which , and his great industry , he came at length to the pretor of syracuse : being settled in that dignity , and having concluded to make himself prince , and hold that by violence , without obligation to any body , which was conferred upon him by consent , he settled an intelligence with amilcar the carthaginian , who was then at the head of an army in sicily , and calling the people and senate of syracuse together one morning , as if he had been to consult them in some matter of importance to the state , upon a signal appointed , he caus'd his soldiers to kill all the senators and the most wealthy of the people ; after whose death , he usurped and possessed the dominion of that city without any obstruction : and though afterwards he lost two great battels to the carthaginians , and at length was besieg'd , yet he was not only able to defend that city , but leaving part of his forces for the security of that , with the rest he transported into africk , and ordered things so , that in a short time he reliev'd syracuse , and reduced the carthaginians into such extream necessity , that they were glad to make peace with him , and contenting themselves with africk , leave sicily to agathocles . he then who examines the exploits and conduct of agathocles ▪ will find little or nothing that may be attributed to fortune , seeing he rose not ( as is said before ) by the favour of any man , but by the steps and gradations of war ; with a thousand difficulties and dangers having gotten that government , which he maintained afterwards with as many noble atchievements . nevertheless it cannot be called virtue in him to kill his fellow-citizens , betray his friends , to be without faith , without pity , or religion ; these are ways may get a man empire , but no glory nor reputation : yet if the wisdom of agathocles be considered , his dexterity in encountring , and overcoming of dangers , his courage in supporting and surmounting his misfortunes ; i do not see why he should be held inferiour to the best captains of his time . but his unbounded cruelty , and barbarous inhumanity , added to a million of other vices , will not permit that he be numbred amongst the most fxcellent men. so then that which he performed cannot justly be attributed to either fortune or virtue , for he did all himself without either the one or the other . in our days under the papacy of alexander vi. oliverotto da fermo being left young many years since by his parents , was brought up by his unckle by the mothers side , call'd iohn togliani , and in his youth listed a soldier under paulo vitelli , that having improved himself by his discipline , he might be capable of some eminent command . paulo being dead , he served under vitellezzo his brother and in short time by the acuteness of his parts , and the briskness of his courage , became one of the best officers in his army . but thinking it beneath him to continue in any man's service , he conspir'd with some of his fellow-citizens of fermo ( to whom the servitude of their country , was more agreeable than its liberty ) by the help of vitellesco to seize upon fermo : in order to which , he writ a letter to his unckle iohn fogliano , importing , that having been absent many years , he had thoughts of visiting him and fermo , and taking some little diversion in the place where he was born , and because the design of his service had been only the gaining of honour , that his fellow-citizens might see his time had not been ill spent , he desired admission for a hundred horse of his friends , and his equipage , and beg'd of him that he would take care they might be honourably received , which would redound not only to his honour , but his unckles , who had had the bringing him up . iohn was not wanting in any office to his nephew , and having caus'd him to be nobly received , he lodged him in his own house , where he continued some days , preparing in the mean time what was necessary to the execution of his wicked design : he made a great entertainment , to which he invited iohn fogliani , and all the chief citizens in the town . about the end of the treatment , when they were entertaining one another , as is usual at such times , oliverotto very subtilly promoted certain grave discourses about the greatness of pope alexander , and cesar his son , and of their designs ; iohn and the rest replying freely to what was said , oliverotto smil'd , and told them those were points to be argued more privately , and thereupon removing into a chamber , his unckle , and the rest of his fellow-citizens followed ; they were scarce sate down , before soldiers ( which were conceal'd about the room ) came forth , and kill'd all of them , and the unckle among the rest ; after the murder was committed oliverotto mounted on horseback , rode about , and rummaged the whole town , having besieged the chief magistrate , in his palace ; so that for fear , all people submitted , and he establish'd a government of which he made himself head. having put such to death as were discontented , and in any capacity of doing him hurt , he fortified himself with new laws , both military and civil , insomuch as in a years time he had not only fix'd himself in fermo , but was become terrible to all that were about him ; and he would have been as hard as agathocles to be supplanted , had he not suffered himself to have been circumvented by cesar borgia , when at singalia ( as aforesaid ) he took the ursini , and vitelli ; where also he himself was taken a year after his parracide was committed , and strangled with his master vitellozzo from whom he had learned all his good qualities , and evil it may seem wonderful to some people how it should come to pass that agathocles , and such as he , after so many treacheries , and acts of inhumanity , should live quietly in their own country so long , defend themselves so well against foreign enemies , and none of their subjects conspire against them at home ; seeing several others , by reason of their cruelty , have not been able , even in times of peace , as well as war , to defend their government . i conceive it fell out according as their cruelty was well or ill applyed : i say well applyed ( if that word may be added to an ill action ) and it may be called so , when commited but once , and that of necessity for ones own preservation , but never repeated afterwards , and even then converted as much as possible to the benefit of the subjects . ill applyed , are such cruelties as are but few in the beginning , but in time do rather multiply than decrease . those who are guilty of the first , do receive assistance sometimes both from god and man , and agathocles is an instance . but the others cannot possibly subsist long : from whence it is to be observed , that he who usurps the government of any state , is to execute and put in practice all the cruelties which he thinks material at once , that he may have no occasion to renue them often , but that by his discontinuance , he may mollifie the people , and by his benefits bring them over to his side : he who does otherwise , whether for fear , or ill counsel , is obliged to be always ready with his knife in his hand , for he can never repose any confidence in his subjects , whilst they , by reason of his fresh and continued inhumanities cannot be secure against him : so then injuries are to be committed all at once , that the last being the less , the distaste may be likewise the less ; but benefits should be distilled by drops , that the relish may be the greater . above all a prince is so to behave himself towards his subjects , that neither good fortune or bad should be able to alter him ; for being once assaulted with adversity , you have no time to do mischief , and the good which you do , does you no good , being looked upon as forced , and so no thanks to be due for it . chap. ix . of civil principality . i shall speak now of the other way , when a principal citizen , not by wicked contrivance , or intolerable violence is made soveraign of his country , which may be called a civil principality , and is not to be attained by either virtue , or fortune alone , but by a lucky sort of craft ; this man i say arrives at the government by the favour of the people or nobility ; for in all cities the meaner , and the better sort of citizens are of different humours , and it proceeds from hence that the common people are not willing to be commanded and oppressed by the great ones , and the great ones are not to be satisfied without it : from this diversity of appetite , one of these three effects do arise , principality , liberty , or licentiousness . principality is caused either by the people , or the great ones , as , either the one , or the other has occasion : the great ones finding themselves unable to resist the popular torrent , do many times unanimously confer their whole authoriry upon one person , and create him prince , that under his protection they may be quiet and secure . the people on the other side , when over-power'd by their adversaries , do the same thing , transmitting their power to a single person , who is made king for their better defence . he who arrives at the soveraignty by the assistance of the great ones , preserves it with more difficulty , than he who is advanced by the people , because he has about him many of his old associates , who thinking themselves his equals , are not to be directed and managed as he would have them . but he that is preferred by the people , stands alone without equals , and has no body , or very few about him , but what are ready to obey : moreover the grandees are hardly to be satisfied without injury to others , which is otherwise with the people , because their designs are more reasonable , than the designs of the great ones , which are fixt upon commanding , and oppressing altogether , whil'st the people endeavour only to defend and secure themselves . moreover where the people is adverse , the prince can never be safe , by reason of their numbers , whereas the great ones are but few , and by consequence not so dangerous . the worst that a prince can expect from an injured and incensed people , is to be deserted ; but if the great ones by provoked , he is not only to fear abandoning , but conspiracy , and banding against him ; for the greater sort being more provident and cunning , they look out in time to their own safety , and make their interest with the person , who they hope will overcome . besides the prince is obliged to live always with one and the same people , but with the grandees he is under no such obligation , for he may create , and degrade advance and remove them as he pleases . but for the better explication of this part , i say , that these great men are to be considered two ways especially ; that is , whether in the manner of their administration they do wholly follow the fortune and interest of the prince , or whether they do otherwise . those who devote themselves entirely to his business , and are not rapacious , are to be valued and preferred . those who are more remiss , and will not stick to their prince , do it commonly upon two motives , either out of laziness or fear ( and in those cases they may be employed , especially if they be wise and of good counsel , because if affairs prosper , thou gainest honour thereby ; if they miscarry , thou needest not to fear them ) or upon ambition , and design , and that is a token that their thoughts are more intent upon their own advantage than thine . of these a prince ought always to have a more than ordinary care , and order them as if they were enemies professed , for in his distress they will be sure to set him forwards , and do what they can to destroy him . he therefore who comes to be prince by the favour and suffrage of the people , is obliged to keep them his friends , which ( their desire being nothing but freedom from oppression ) may be easily done . but he that is preferred by the interest of the nobles against the minds of the commons , is above all things to endeavour to ingratiate with the people , which will be as the other if he undertakes their protection : and men receiving good offices , where they expected ill , are indear'd by the surprize , and become better affected to their benefactor , than perhaps they would have been , had he been made prince by their immediate favour . there are many ways of insinuating with the people , of which no certain rule can be given , because they vary according to the diversity of the subject , and therefore i shall pass them at this time concluding with this assertion , that it is necessary above all things , that a prince preserves the affections of his people , otherwise in any exigence , he has no refuge nor remedy . nabides prince of the spartans , sustained all greece , and a victorious army of the romans , and defended the government and country against them all ; and to do that great action , it was sufficient for him to secure himself against the machinations of a few , whereas if the people had been his enemy , that would not have done it . let no man impugn my opinion with that old saying , he that builds upon the people , builds upon the sand . that is true indeed when a citizen of private condition relies upon the people , and persuades himself that when the magistrate , or his adversary , goes about to oppress him , they will bring him off , in which case many presidents may be produced , and particularly the gracchi in rome , and georgio scali in florence . but if the prince that builds upon them , knows how to command , and be a man of courage not dejected in adversity , nor deficient in his other preparations , but keeps up the spirits of his people by his own valour and conduct , he shall never be deserted by them , nor find his foundations laid in a wrong place . these kind of governments are most tottering and uncertain , when the prince strains of a sudden , and passes ( as at one leap ) from a civil , to an absolute power , and the reason is , because they either command , and act by themselves , or by the ministry and mediation of the magistrate : in this last case their authority is weaker , and more ticklish , because it depends much upon the pleasure and concurrence of the chief officers , who ( in time of adversity especially ) can remove them easily , either by neglecting , or resisting their commands : nor is there any way for such a prince in the perplexity of his affairs to establish a tyranny because those citizens and subjects who used to exercise the magistracy , retain still such power and influence upon the people , that they will not infringe the laws , to obey his ; and in time of danger he shall always want such as he can trust , so that a prince is not to take his measures according to what he sees in times of peace when of the subjects ( having nothing to do but to be governed ) every one runs , every one promises , and every one dyes for him , when death is at a distance : but when times are tempestuous , and the ship of the state has need of the help and assistance of the subject , there are but few will expose themselves : and this experiment is the more dangerous , because it can be practised but once : so then , a prince who is provident and wise ought to carry himself so , that in all place , times , and occasions the people may have need of his administration and regiment , an ever after they shall be faithful and true . chap. x. how the strength of all principalities is to be computed . to any man that examines the nature of principalities , it is worthy his consideration , whether a prince has power and territory enough to subsist by himself , or whether he needs the assistance , and protection of other people . to clear the point a little better , i think those princes capable of ruling , who are able either by the numbers of their men , or the greatness of their wealth to raise a compleat army , and bid battel to any that shall invade them ; and those i think depend upon others , who of themselves dare not meet their enemy in the field , but are forced to keep within their bounds , and defend them as well as they can . of the first we have spoken already , and shall say more as occasion is presented . of the second no more can be said , but to advise such princes to strengthen and fortifie the capital town in their dominions , and not to trouble himself with the whole country ; and whoever shall do that , and in other things , manage himself with the subjects as i have described , and perhaps shall do hereafter , shall with great caution be invaded , for men are generally wary and tender of enterprizing any thing that is difficult ▪ and no great easiness is to be found in attacking a town well fortified and provided , where the prince is not hated by the people . the towns in germany are many of them free ; though their country and district be but small , yet they obey the emperor but when they please , and are in no awe either of him , or any other prince of the empire , because they are all so well fortified , every one looks upon the taking of any one of them as a work of great difficulty and time , their wals being so strong , their ditches so deep , their works so regular , and well provided with cannon , and their stores and magazines always furnish'd for a twelvemonth . besides which , for the aliment and sustenance of the people , and that they may be no burthen to the publick , they have work-houses where for a year together the poor may be employed in such things as are the nerves and life of that city , and sustain themselves by their labour . military discipline and exercises are likewise much request there , and many laws and good customs they have to maintain them . a prince then who has a city well fortified , and the affections of his people , is not easily to be molested , and he that does molest him , is like to repent it , for the affairs of this world are so various , it is almost impossible for any army to lie quietly a whole year before a town , without interruption . if any objects that the people having houses and possessions out of the town , will not have patience to see them plundered and burned ; and that charity to themselves will make them forget their prince ; i answer , that a wise and dexterous prince will easily evade those difficulties , by encouraging his subjects and persuading them , sometimes their troubles will not be long ; sometimes , inculcating , and possessing them with the cruelty of the enemy ; and sometimes by correcting and securing himself nimbly of such as appear too turbulent and audacious . moreover the usual practice is for the enemy to plunder and set the country on fire at their first coming , whil'st every man's spirits is high , and fixed upon defence ; so that the prince needs not concern himself , nor be fearful of that for those mischiefs are pass'd , and inconveniencies received , and when the people in three or four days time begin to be cool , and consider things soberly , they will find there is no remedy and joyn more cordially with the prince , looking upon him as under an obligation to them , for having sacrificed their houses and estates in his defence . and the nature of man is such , to take as much pleasure in having obliged another , as in being obliged himself . wherefore all things fairly considered , it is no such hard matter for a prince not only to gain , but to retain the affection of his subjects , and make them patient of a long siege , if he be wise , and provident , and takes care , they want nothing , either for their livelyhood or defence . chap. xi of ecclesiastical principalities there remains nothing of this nature to be discoursed , but of ecclesiastical principalities about which the greatest difficulty is to get into possession , because they are gained either by fortune or virtue , but kept without either , being supported by ancient statutes universally received in the christian church , which are of such power and authority , they do keep their prince in his dignity , let his conversation or conduct be what it will. these are the only persons who have lands & do not defend them , subjects , & do not govern them , and yet their lands are not taken from them though they never defend them , nor their subjects dissatisfied , though they never regard them ; so that these principalities are the happiest and most secure in the world ; but being managed by a supernatural power above the wisdom and contrivance of man ; i shall speak no more of them , for being set up , and continued by god himself , it would be great presumption in any man who should undertake to dispute them . nevertheless , if it should be questioned how it came to pass that in temporal things the church is arrived at that height , seeing that before , alexander's time , the italian ptinces , not only such as were soveraigns , but every baron and lord , how inconsiderable soever in temporal affairs , esteemed of them but little ; yet since , it has been able not only to startle and confront the king of france , but to drive him out of italy , and to ruine the venetians , the reason of which , though already well known , i think it not superfluous , to revive in some measure . before charles king of france passed himself into italy , that province was under the empire of the pope , the venetians , the king of naples , duke of milan , and the florentines . it was the interest of these potentates , to have a care , some of them that no foreign prince should come with an army into italy , and some that none among themselves should usurp upon the other . those of whom the rest were concern'd to be most jealous , were the pope , and the venetian : to restrain the venetians , all the rest were us'd to confederate , as in the defence of ferrara . to keep under the pope , the roman barons contributed much , who being divided into two factions ( the ursini , and colonnessi in perpetual contention , with their arms constantly in their hands under the very nose of the pope ) they kept the pontifical power very low , and infirm : and although now and then there happened a couragious pope ( as sextus ) yet neither his courage , wisdom , nor fortune was able to disintangle him from those incommodities ; and the shortness of their reign was the reason thereof ; for ten years time ( which was as much as any of them reign'd ) was scarce sufficient for the suppression of either of the parties , and when the colonnesi as a man may say were almost extinct , a new enemy sprang up against the ursini , which revived the colonnesi , and reestablished them again . this emulation and animosity at home , was the cause the pope was no more formidable in italy ; after this alexander vi. was advanc'd to the papacy , who more than all that had ever been before him , demonstrated what a pope with mony and power was able to do ; having taken advantage of the french invasion , by the ministry and conduct of duke valentine , he performed all that i have mentioned else where among the actions of the said duke . and though his design was not so much to advantage the church , as to aggrandize the duke , yet what he did for the one , turned afterwards to the benefit of the other , for the pope being dead , and valentine extinct , what both of them had got , devolv'd upon the church : after him iulius succeeded , and found the church in a flourishing condition ; romagna was wholly in its possession , the barons of rome exterminated , and gone , and their factions suppressed by pope alexander , and besides , a way opened for raising and hoarding of mony never practised before ; which way iulius improving rather than otherwise , he began to entertain thoughts , not only of conquering bologna , but mastering the venetians , and forcing the french out of italy . all which great enterprizes succeeding , it added much to his honor that he impropriated nothing , but gave all to the church . he maintained also the colonnesi and ursini in the same condition as he found them , and though in case of sedition there were those ready on both sides to have headed them , yet there were two considerations which kept them at peace . one was the greatness of the church which kept them in awe ; the other was their want of cardinals , which indeed was the original of their discontents , and will never cease till some of them be advanced to that dignity ; for by them the parties in rome and without , are maintained , aud the barons oblig'd to defend them ; so that the ambition of the prelates is the cause of all the dissention and tumults among the barons . his present holiness pope leo had the happiness to be elected at a time when it was most powerful , and it is hop'd , if they made the church great by their arms , he by the integrity of his conversation ▪ and a thousand other virtues will enlarge it much more and make it more venerable and august . chap. xii . how many forms there are of military discipline , and of those souldiers which are called mercenary having spoken particularly of the several sorts of principalities as i proposed in the beginning ; considered in part the reasons of their constitution and their evil ; and the ways which many have taken to acquire , and preserve them ; it remains that i proceed now in a general way upon such things as may conduce to the offence , or defence of either of them . we have declared before that it is not only expedient , but necessary for a prince to take care his foundations be good , otherwise his fabrick will be sure to fail . the principal foundations of all states , ( new , old , or mixt ) are good laws , and good arms , and because there cannot be good laws , where there are not good arms , and where the arms are good , there must be good laws , i shall pass by the laws , and discourse of the arms. i say , the arms then with which a prince defends his state , are his own , mercenary , auxiliary or mixt . the mercenary , and auxiliary are unprofitable , and dangerous , and that prince who founds the duration of his government upon his mercenary forces , shall never be firm nor secure , for they are divided , ambitious , undisciplin'd , unfaithful , insolent to their friends , abject to their enemies , without fear of god , or faith to men , so the ruine of that person who trusts to them is no longer protracted , than the attempt is deferred ; in time of peace they divorce you , in time of war they desert you , and the reason is because it is not love , nor any principle of honor that keeps them in the field , 't is only their pay , and that is not a consideration strong enough to prevail with them to die for you ; whilst you have more service to imploy them in , they are excellent souldiers ; but tell them of an engagement , and they will either disband before , or run away in the battel . and to evince this , would require no great pains ; seeing the ruine of italy proceeded from no other cause , than that for several years together it had repos'd it self upon mercenary arms ; which forces 't is possible may have formerly done service to some particular person , and behav'd themselves well enough among one another , but no sooner were they attackt by a powerful foreigner , but they discovered themselves , and shewed what they were to the world : hence it was that charles chaulk'd out his own way into italy ; and that person was in the right , who affirmed our own faults were the cause of our miseries ; but it was not those faults he believed , but those i have mention'd , which being committed most eminently by princes , they suffered most remarkably in the punishment . but to come closer to the point , and give you a clearer prospect of the imperfection and infelicity of those forces . the great officers of these mercenaries , are men of great courage , or otherwise ; if the first , you can never be safe , for they always aspire to make themselves great , either by supplanting of you who is their master , or oppressing of other people , whom you desir'd to have preserved ; and on the other side , if the commanders be not couragious you are ruined again ; if it should be urged that all generals will do the same , whether mercenaries or others , i would answer , that all war is managed either by a prince or republick : the prince is obliged to go in person , and perform the office of general himself : the republick must depute some one of her choice citizens , who is to be changed , if he carries himself ill ; if he behaves himself well , he is to be continued , but so straitned and circumscrib'd by his commission , that he may not transgress : and indeed experience tells us that princes alone , and common wealths alone with their own private forces have performed great things , whereas mercenaries do nothing but hurt . besides , a martial commonwealth that stands upon its own legs , and maintains it self by its own prowess , is not easily usurp'd , and falls not so readily under the obedience of one of their fellow citizens , as where all the forces are foreign . rome , and sparta maintained their own liberty for many years together by their own forces and arms : the swisses are more material than their neighbours , and by consequency more free . of the danger of mercenary forces , we have an ancient example in the carthaginians , who after the end of their first war with the romans , had like to have been ruin'd , and overrun by their own mercenaries , though their own citizens commanded them . after the death of epaminondas the thebans made philip of macedon their general , who defeated their enemies , and enslaved themselves . upon the death of duke philip , the milanesi entertained francesco sforza against the venetians , and francesco , having worsted the enemy at caravaggio , joyned himself with him , with design to have master'd his masters , francesco's father was formerly in the service of ioan queen of naples , and on a sudden marched away from her with his army , and left her utterly destitute , so that she was constrain'd to throw her self under the protection of the king of aragon , and though the venetians , and florentines both , have lately enlarged their dominion by employing these forces , and their generals have rather advanced than enslav'd them ; i answer that the florentines may impute it to their good fortune , because , of such of their generals as they might have rationally feared , some had no victories to encourage them , others were obstructed , and others turned their ambition another way ; he that was not victorious was giovanni acuto , whose fidelity could not be known , because he had no opportunity to break it , but every body knows , had he succeeded , the florentines had been all at his mercy : sforza had always the bracceschi in opposition , and they were reciprocally an impediment the one to the other . francesco turned his ambition upon lombardy , braccio upon the church , and the kingdom of naples . but to speak of more modern occurrences . the florentines made paul vitelli their general , a wise man , and one who from a private fortune had raised himself to a great reputation : had paul taken pisa , no body can be insensible how the florentines must have comported with him , for should he have quitted their service , and taken pay of their enemy , they had been lost without remedy , and to have continued him in that power , had been in time to have made him their master . if the progress of the venetians be considered , they will be found to have acted securely , and honorably whilst their affairs were managed by their own forces ( which was before they attempted any thing upon the terra firma ) then all was done by the gentlemen and common people of that city , and they did very great things ; but when they began to enterprize at land , they began to abate of their old reputation and discipline , and to degenerate into the customs of italy ; and when they began to conquer first upon the continent , having no great territory , and their reputation being formidable abroad , there was no occasion that they should be much afraid of their officers ; but afterwards when they began to extend their empire , under the command of carmignola , then it was they became sensible of their error ; for having found him to be a great captain by their victories ( under his conduct ) against the duke of milan , perceiving him afterwards grow cool and remiss in their service , they concluded , no more great things were to be expected from him ; and being neither willing , nor indeed able to take away his commission , for fear of losing what they had got , they were constrain'd for their own security to put him to death . their generals after him were bartolomeo da bergamo , roberto da san. severino , and the conte de pitigliano , and such as they , under whose conduct the venetians were more like to lose than to gain , as it hapned not long after at vaila , where in one battel they lost as much as they had been gaining eight hundred years with incredible labour and difficulty ; which is not strange , if it be considered that by those kind of forces the conquests are slow , and tedious , and weak ; but their losses are rapid and wonderful . and because i am come with my examples into italy , where for many years all things have been manag'd by mercenary armies , i shall lay my discourse a little higher , that their original and progress being rendred more plain , they may with more ease be regulated and corrected . you must understand that in latter times when the roman empire began to decline in italy , and the pope to take upon him authority in temporal affairs , italy became divided into several states : for many of the great cities took arms against their nobility , who having been formerly favoured by the emperours , kept the people under oppression , against which the church opposed , to gain to it self a reputation and interest in temporal affairs : other cities were subdued by their citizens who made themselves princes ; so that italy ( upon the translation of the empire ) being fallen into the hands of the pope and some other common-wealths ; and those priests and citizens unacquainted with the use and exercise of arms ; they began to take foreigners into their pay : the first man who gave reputation to these kind of forces was alberigo da como of romagna : among the rest braccio and sforza ( the two great arbiters of italy in their time ) were brought up under his discipline , after whom succeeded the rest who commanded the armies in italy to our days : and the end of their great discipline and conduct was , that italy was overrun by charles , pillaged by lewis , violated by ferrand , and defamed by the swizzers . the order which they observ'd , was first to take away the reputation from the foot , and appropriate it to themselves ; and this they did , because their dominion being but small , and to be maintained by their own industry , a few foot could not do their business , and a great body they could not maintain ; hereupon they changed their militia into horse , which being digested into troops they sustain'd and rewarded themselves with the commands , and by degrees this way of cavalry was grown so much in fashion , that in an army of men , there was scarce foot to be found . besides they endeavour'd with all possible industry to prevent trouble or fear , either to themselves or their souldiers , and their way was by killing no body in fight , only taking one another prisoners , and dismissing them afterwards without either prejudice or ransom . when they were in leaguer before a town , they shot not rudely amongst them in the night , nor did they in the town disturb them with any sallies in their camp ; no approaches or intrenchments were made at unseasonable hours , and nothing of lying in the field when winter came on ; and all these things did not happen by any negligence in their officers , but were part of their discipline , and introduc'd ( as is faid before ) to ease the poor souldier both of labour and danger , by which practices they have brought italy both into slavery , and contempt . chap. xiii . of auxiliaries , mix'd , and natural soldiers . auxiliaries ( which are another sort of unprofitable soldiers ) are when some potent prince is called in to your assistance and defence ; as was done not long since by pope iulius , who in his enterprize of ferrara having seen the sad experience of his mercenary army , betook himself to auxiliaries , and capitulated with ferrand king of spain , that he should come with his forces to his relief . these armies may do well enough for themselves , but he who invites them , is sure to be a sufferer ; for if they be beaten , he is sure to be a loser , if they succeed , he is left at their discretion ; and though ancient histories are full of examples of this kind , yet i shall keep to that of pope iulius xi , as one still fresh in our memory , whose expedition against ferrara was very rash and inconsiderate , in that he put all into the hands of a stranger ; but his good fortune presented him with a third accident , which prevented his reaping the fruit of his imprudent election ; for his subsidiary troops being broken at ravenna , and the swizzers coming in , and beating off the victors , beyond all expectation he escaped being a prisoner to his enemies , because they also were defeated , and to his auxiliary friends , because he had conquered by other peoples arms. the florentines being destitute of soldiers , hired french for the reduction of pisa , by which counsel they ran themselves into greater danger , than ever they had done in all their troubles before . the emperor of constantinople in opposition to his neighbors , sent turks into greece , which could not be got out again when the war was at an end , but gave the first beginning to the servitude and captivity which those infidels brought upon that country . he then who has no mind to overcome , may make use of these forces , for they are much more dangerous than the mercenary , and will ruine you out of hand , because they are always unanimous , and at the command of other people , whereas the mercenaries after they have gotten a victory , must have longer time , and more occasion before they can do you a mischief , in respect they are not one body , but made up out of several countries entertain'd into your pay , to which if you add a general of your own , they cannot suddenly assume so much authority as will be able to do you any prejudice , in short , it is cowardize and sloth that is to be feared in the mercenaries , and courage and activity in the auxiliaries . a wise prince therefore never made use of these forces , but committed himself to his own ; choosing rather to be overcome with them , than to conquer with the other , because , he cannot think that a victory , which is obtain'd by other peoples arms. i shall make no scruple to produce caesar borgia for an example . this duke invaded romagna with an army of auxiliaries , consisting wholly of french , by whose assistance he took imola , and furli : but finding them afterwards to totter in their faith , and himself insecure , he betook himself to mercenaries , as the less dangerous of the two , and entertained the ursini and vitelli into his pay ; finding them also irresolute , unfaithful , and dangerous , he dismiss'd them , and for the future employed none but his own . from hence we may collect the difference betwixt these two sorts of forces , if we consider the difference in the dukes reputation when the ursini and vitelli were in his service , and when he had no soldiers but his own : when he began to stand upon his own legs , his renown began to increase , and indeed , before , his esteem was not so great , till every body found him absolute master of his own army . having begun my examples in italy , i am unwilling to leave it , especially whil'st it supplies us with such as are fresh in our memory ; yet i cannot pass by hiero of syracuse , whom i have mentioned before . this person being made general of the syracusan army , quickly discovered the mercenary militia was not be relied upon , their officers being qualified like ours in italy , and finding that he could neither continue , not discharge them securely , he ordered things so , that they were all cut to pieces , and then prosecuted the war with his own forces alone , without any foreign assistance . to this purpose the old testament affords us a figure not altogether improper . when david presented himself to saul , and offered his service against goliah the champion of the philistius , saul to encourage him , accoutred him in his own arms , but david having tryed them on , excused himself , pretending they were unfit , and that with them he should not be able to manage himself ; wherefore he desired he might go forth against the enemy with his own arms only , which were his sling and his sword. the sum of all is , the arms of other people are commonly unfit ; and either too wide , or too strait , or too cumbersom . charles vii . the father of lewis xi . having by his fortune and courage redeem'd his country out of the hands of the english , began to understand the necessity of having soldiers of his own , and erected a militia at home to consist of horse as well as foot , after which , his son king lewis cashiered his own foot , and took the swissers into his pay , which error being followed by his successors , ( as is visible to this day ) is the occasion of all the dangers to which that kingdom of france is still obnoxious ; for having advanced the reputation of the swisses he vilified his own people , by disbanding the foot entirely , and accustoming his horse so much to engage with other soldiers , that fighting still in conjunction with the swissers , they began to believe they could do nothing without them ; hence it proceeds that the french are not able to do any thing against the swisses , and without them they will venture upon nothing : so that the french army is mix'd , consists of mercenaries , and natives , and is much better than either mercenaries or auxiliaries alone , but much worse than if it were entirely natural , as this example testifies abundantly ; for doubtless france would be insuperable , if charles his establishment was made use of , and improv'd : but the imprudence of man begins many things , which favouring of persent good , conceal the poyson that is latent , ( as i said before of the hectick feaver ) wherefore if he who is rais'd to any soveraignty , foresees not a mischief till it falls upon his head , he is not to be reckoned a wise prince , and truly that is a particular blessing of god , bestowed upon few people : if we reflect upon the first cause of the ruine of the roman empire , it will be found to begin at their entertaining the goths into their service , for thereby they weakened and enervated their own native courage , and ( as it were ) transfused it into them . i conclude therefore , that without having proper and peculiar forces of his own , no prince is secure , but depends wholly upon fortune , as having no natural and intrinsick strength to sustain him in adversity : and it was always the opinion , and position of wise men , that nothing is so infirm and unstable as the name of power , not founded upon forces of its own ; those forces are composed of your subjects , your citizens , or servants , all the rest are either mercenaries or auxiliaries , and as to the manner of ordering and disciplining these domesticks , it will not be hard , if the orders which i have prescribed be perused , and the ways considered which philip the father of alexander the great , and many other princes and republicks have used in the like cases , to which orders and establishments i do wholly refer you . chap. xiv . the duty of a prince in relation to his militia . a prince then is to have no other design , nor thought , nor study , but war , and the arts and disciplines of it ; for indeed that is the only profession worthy of a prince , and is of so much importance , that it not only preserves those who are born princes in their patrimonies , but advances men of private condition to that honorable degree . on the otherside it is frequently seen when princes have addicted themselves more to delicacy and softness , than to arms , they have lost all , and been driven out of their states ; for the principal things which deprives or gains a man authority , is the neglect or profession of that art : francesco sforza by his experience in war , of a private person made himself duke of milan , and his children , seeking to avoid the fatigues and incommodities thereof , of dukes became private men ; for among other evils and inconveniences which attend when you are ignorant in war , it makes you contemptible , which is a scandal a prince ought with all diligence to avoid , for reasons i shall name hereafter ; besides betwixt a potent , and an impotent , a vigilant and a negligent prince there is no proportion , it being unreasonable that a martial and generous person should be subject willingly to one that is weak and remiss ; or that those who are careless and effeminate , should be safe amongst those who are military and active ; for the one is too insolent , and the other too captious , ever to do any thing well together ; so that a prince unacquainted with the discipline of war , besides , other infelicities to which he is expos'd , cannot be beloved by , nor confident in his armies . he never therefore ought to relax his thoughts from the exercises of war , not so much as in time of peace , and indeed then he should employ his thoughts more studiously therein , than in war it self , which may be done two ways , by the application of the body , and the mind . as to his bodily application , or matter of action , besides that he is obliged to keep his armies in good discipline and exercise , he ought to inure himself to sports , and by hunting and hawking , and such like recreation , accustom his body to hardship , and hunger , and thirst , and at the same time inform himself of the coasts and situation of the country , the bigness and elevation of the mountains , the largeness and avenues of the vallies , the extent of the plains , the nature of the rivers and fens , which is to be done with great curiosity ; and this knowledge is useful two ways ; for hereby he not only learns to know his own country , and to provide better for its defence , but it prepares and adapts him , by observing their situations , to comprehend the situations of other countries , which will perhaps be necessary for him to discover : for the hills , the vales , the plains , the rivers , and the marshes ( for example ) in tuscany , have a certain similitude and resemblance with those in other provinces ; so that by the knowledge of one , we may easily imagine the rest : and that prince who is defective in this , wants the most necessary qualification of a general ; for by knowing the country , he knows how to beat up his enemy ; take up his quarters ; march his armies ; draw up his men ; and besiege a town with advantage . in the character which historians give of philopomenes prince of achaia , one of his great commendations is , that in time of peace he thought of nothing but military affairs , and when he was in company with his friends in the country , he would many times stop suddenly , and expostulate with them ; if the enemy were upon that hill , and our army where we are , which would have the advantage of the ground ? how could we come at them with most security ? if we would draw off , how might we do it best ? or if they would retreat , how might we follow ? so that as he was travelling , he would propose all the accidents to which an army was subject ; he would hear their opinion , give them his own , and reinforce it with arguments ; and this he did so frequently , that by continual practice , and a constant intention of his thoughts upon that business , he brought himself to that perfection , no accident could happen , no inconvenience could occur to an army , but he could presently redress it . but as to the exercise of the mind , a prince is to do that by diligence in history , and solemn consideration of the actions of the most excellent men ; by observing how they demean'd themselves in the wars , examining the grounds and reasons of their victories , and losses , that he may be able to avoid the one , and imitate the other ; and above all , to keep close to the example of some great captain of old ( if any such occurs in his reading ) and not only to make him his pattern , but to have all his actions perpetually in his mind , as it was said alexander did by achilles ; caesar by alexander , scipio by cyrus . and whoever reads the life of cyrus written by xenophon , will find how much scipio advantaged his renown by that imitation , and how much in modesty , affability , humanity , and liberality he framed himself to the description which xenophon had given him . a wise prince therefore is to observe all these rules , and never be idle in time of peace , but employ himself therein with all his industry , that in his adversity he may reap the fruit of it , and when fortune frowns , be ready to defie her . chap. xv. of such things as render men ( especially princes ) worthy of blame , or applause . it remains now that we see in what manner a prince ought to comport with his subjects and friends : and because many have writ of this subject before , it may perhaps seem arrogant in me , especially considering that in my discourse i shall deviate from the opinion of other men. but my intention being to write for the benefit and advantage of him who understands , i thought it more convenient to respect the essential verity , than the imagination of the thing ( and many have fram'd imaginary commonwealths and governments to themselves which never were seen , nor had any real existence ) for the present manner of living is so different from the way that ought to be taken , that he who neglects what is done , to follow what ought to be done , will sooner learn how to ruine , than how to preserve himself ; for a tender man , and one that desires to be honest in every thing , must needs run a great hazard among so many of a contrary principle . wherefore it is necessary for a prince that is willing to subsist , to harden himself , and learn to be good , or otherwise according to the exigence of his affairs . laying aside therefore all imaginable notions of a prince , and discoursing of nothing but what is actually true , i say that all men when they are spoken of , especially princes ( who are in a higher and more eminent station ) are remarkable for some quality or other that makes them either honorable or contemptible . hence it is that some are counted liberal , others miserable ( according to the propriety of the tuscan word misero , for quaro in our language is one that desires to acquire by rapine , or any otherway ; misero is he that abstains too much from making use of his own ) some munificent , others rapacious , some cruel , others merciful ; some faithless , others precise . one poor spirited and effeminate , another fierce and ambitious , one courteous , another haughty , one modest , another libidinous , one sincere , another cunning , one rugged and morose , another accessible and easie , one grave , another giddy , one a devote , and another an atheist . no man ( i am sure ) will deny but that it would be an admirable thing , and highly to be commended to have a prince endued with all the good qualities abovesaid ; but because it is impossible to have , much less to exercise them all , by reason of the frailty and crossness of our nature , it is convenient that he be so well instructed as to know how to avoid the scandal of those vices which may deprive him of his state , and be very cautious of the rest , though their consequence be not so pernicious , but where they are unavoidable , he need trouble himself the less . again , he is not to concern himself , if run under the infamy of those vices without which his dominion was not to be preserved ; for if we consider things impartially , we shall find some things in appearance are virtuous , and yet if pursued , would bring certain destruction ; and others on the contrary that are seemingly bad , which if followed by a prince , procure his peace and security . chap. xvi . of liberality , and parsimony . to begin then with the first of the above-mentioned qualities , i say , it would be advantagious to be accounted liberal ; nevertheless liberality so used as not to render you formidable , does but injure you , for if it be used virtuously , and as it ought to be , it will not be known , nor secure you from the imputation of its contrary : to keep up therefore the name of liberal amongst men , it is necessary that no kind of luxury be omitted , so that a prince of that disposition will consume his revenue in those kind of expences , and be obliged at last , if he would preserve that reputation , to become grievous , and a great exactor upon the people , and do whatever is practicable for the getting of money , which will cause him to be hated of his subjects , and despised by every body else , when he once comes to be poor , so that offending many with his liberality , and rewarding but few , he becomes sensible of the first disaster , and runs great hazard of being ruined , the first time he is in danger ; which when afterwards he discovers , and desires to remedy ; he runs into the other extream , and grows as odious for his avarice . so then if a prince cannot exercise this virtue of liberality , so as to be publickly known , without detriment to himself , he ought if he be wise , not to dread the imputation of being covetous , for in time he shall be esteemed liberal when it is discovered that by his parsimony he has increased his revenue to a condition of defending him against any invasion , and to enterprize upon other people , without oppressing of them ; so that he shall be accounted noble to all from whom he takes nothing away , which are an infinite number ; and near and parsimonious only to such few as he gives nothing to . in our days we have seen no great action done , but by those who were accounted miserable , the other have been always undone . pope lulius xi . made use of his bounty to get into the chair , but ( to enable himself to make war with the king of france ) he never practised it after , and by his frugality he maintained several wars without any tax or imposition upon the people , his long parsimony having furnished him for his extraordinary expences . the present king of spain , if he had affected to be thought liberal , could never have undertaken so many great designs , nor obtain'd so many great victories . a prince therefore ought not so much to concern himself ( so he exacts not upon his subjects , so he be able to defend himself , so he becomes not poor and despicable , nor commits rapine upon his people ) though he be accounted covetous , for that is one of those vices which fortifies his dominion , if any one objects that caesar by his liberality made his way to the empire , and many others upon the same score of reputation have made themselves great ; i answer , that you are either actually a prince , or in a fair way way to be made one . in the first case liberality is hurtful ; in the second , 't is necessary , and caesar was one of those who design'd upon the empire : but when he was arrived at that dignity , if he had lived , and not retrenched his expences , he would have ruined that empire . if any replys , many have been princes , and with their armies performed great matters , who have been reputed liberal , i rejoyn , that a prince spends either of his own , or his subjects , or other peoples . in the first case , he is to be frugal : in the second he may be as profuse as he pleases , and baulk no point of liberality . but that prince whose army is to be maintained with free quarter , and plunder , and exactions from other people , is obliged to be liberal , or his army will desert him ; and well he may be prodigal of what neither belongs to him , nor his subject , as was the case with caesar , and cyrus and alexander ; for to spend upon anothers stock , rather adds to , than substracts from his reputation , 't is spending of his own , that is so mortal , and pernicious . nor is there any thing that destroys it self like liberality ; for in the use of it , taking away the faculty of using it , thou becomest poor and contemptible , or to avoid that poverty , thou makest thy self odious and a tyrant ; and there is nothing of so much importance to a prince to prevent , as to be either contemptible or odious , both which depend much upon the prudent exercise of your liberality . upon these considerations it is more wisdom to lie under the scandal of being miserable , which is an imputation rather infamous , than odious , than to be thought liberal , and ●un your self into a necessity of playing the tyrant , which is infamous and odious both . chap. xvii . of cruelty , and clemency , and whether it is best for a prince to be beloved , or feared . to come now to the other qualities proposed , i say every prince is to desire to be esteemed rather merciful than cruel , but with great caution that his mercy be not abused ; caesar borgia was counted cruel , yet that cruelty reduced romagna , united it , setled it in peace , and rendered it faithful : so that if well considered , he will appear much more merciful than the florentines , who rather than be thought cruel , suffered pistoia to be destroyed : a prince therefore is not to regard the scandal of being cruel , if thereby he keeps his subjects in their allegiance , and united , seeing by some few examples of justice you may be more merciful , than they who by an universal exercise of pity , permit several disorders to follow , which occasion rapine and murder ; and the reason is , because that exorbitant mercy has an ill effect upon the whole universality , whereas particular executions extend only to particular persons . but among all princes , a new prince has the hardest task to avoid the scandal of being cruel , by reason of the newness of his government , and the dangers which attend it : hence virgil in the person of dido excused the inhospitality of her government . res dura , & regni novitas , metalia cogunt moliri , & late fines custode tueri . my new dominion , and my harder fate constrains me to 't , and i must guard my state. nevertheless he is not to be too credulous of reports , too hasty in his motions , nor create fears and jealousies to himself , but so to temper his administrations with prudence and humanity , that neither too much confidence may make him careless , nor too much diffidence inrolerable . and from hence arises a new question , whether it be better to be belov'd than fear'd , or fear'd than belov'd ? it is answered , both would be convenient , but because that is hard to attain , it is better and more secure ( if one must be wanting ) to be fear'd than belov'd ; for in the general , men are ingrateful , inconstant , hypocritical , fearful of danger , and covetous of gain ; whil'st they receive any benefit by you , and the danger is at distance , they are absolutely yours , their blood , their estates , their lives , and their children ( as i said before ) are all at your service , but when mischief is at hand , and you have present need of their help , they make no scruple to revolt : and that prince who leaves himself naked of other preparations , and relies wholly upon their professions , is sure to be ruined ; for an●ity contracted by price , and not by the greatness and generosity of the mind , may seem a good pennyworth ; yet when you have occasion to make use of it , you will find no such thing . moreover men do with less remorse offend against those who desire to be beloved , than against those who are ambitious of being feared , and the reason is because love is fasten'd only by a ligament of obligation , which the ill nature of mankind , breaks upon every occasion that is presented to his profit ; but fear depends upon an apprehension of punishment , which is never to be dispell'd . yet a prince is to render himself aweful in such fort , that if he gains not his subjects love , he may eschew their hatred ; for to be feared and not hated , are compatible enough , and he may be always in that condition , if he offers no violence to their estates , nor attempts any thing upon the honour of their wifes , as also when he has occasion to take away any man's life , if he takes his time when the cause is manifest , and he has good matter for his justification : but above all things , he is to have a care of intrenching upon their estates , for men do sooner forget the death of their father , than the loss of their patrimony : besides occasions of confiscation , never fail , and he that gives once way to that humour of rapine , shall never want temptation to ruine his neighbor . but on the contrary , provocations to blood , are more rare , and do sooner evaporate : but when a prince is at the head of his army , and has a multitude of soldiers to govern , then it is absolutely necessary not to value the epithet of cruel , for without that , no army can be kept in unity , nor in disposition for any great act . among the several instances of hannibal's great conduct , it is one , that having a vast army , constituted out of several nations , and conducted to make war in an enemies country , there never hapned any sedition among them , or any mutiny against their general , either in his adversity or prosperity : which can proceed from nothing so probably as his great cruelty , which , added to his infinite virtues , rendered him both aweful , and terrible to his soldiers , and without that , all his virtues would have signified nothing . some writers there are ( but of little consideration ) who admire his great exploits , and condemn the true causes of them . but to prove that his other virtues would never have carried him thorow , let us reflect upon scipio , a person honorable not only in his own time , but in all history whatever ; nevertheless his army mutined in spain , and the true cause of it was , his too much gentleness and lenity , which gave his soldiers more liberty than was sutable or consistant with military discipline . fabius maximus upbraided him by it in the senate , and call'd him corrupter of the roman militia ; the inhabitants of locrus having been plundered and destroyed by one of scipio's lieutenants , they were never redressed , nor the legat's insolence corrected , all proceeding from the mildness of scipio's nature , which was so eminent in him , that a person undertaking to excuse him in the senate , declared , that there were many who knew better how to avoid doing ill themselves , than to punish it in other people . which temper would doubtless in time have eclipsed the glory and reputation of scipio , had that authority been continued in him ; but receiving orders , and living under the direction of the senate , that ill quality , was not only not discovered in him , but turned to his renown . i conclude therefore according to what i have said about being feared , or beloved ; that forasmuch as men do love at their own discretion , but fear at their princes , a wise prince is obliged to lay his foundation upon that which is in his own power , not what which depends on other people , but ( as i said before ) with great caution that he does not make himself odious . chap. xviii . how far a prince is obliged by his promise . how honorable it is for a prince to keep his word , and act rather with integrity than collusion , i suppose every body understands : nevertheless experience has shown in out times , that those princes who have not pinn'd themselves up to that punctuality and preciseness , have done great things , and by their cunning and subtilty not only circumvented , and darted the brains of those with whom they had to deal , but have overcome , and been too hard for those who have been so superstitiously exact . for further explanation , you must understand there are two ways of contending , by law , and by force : the first is proper to men ; the second to beasts ; but because many times the first is insufficient , recourse must be had to the second . it belongs therefore to a prince to understand both , when to make use of the rational , and when of the brutal way ; and this is recommended to princes ( though abstrusely ) by ancient writers , who tell them how achilles and several other princes were committed to the education of chiron the centaur , who was to keep them under his discipline , choosing them a master , half man and half beast , for no other reason but to show how necessary it is for a prince to be acquainted with both , for that one without the other will be of little duration . seeing therefore it is of such importance to a prince to take upon him the nature and disposition of a beast , of all the whole flock , he ought to imitate the lyon and the fox : for the lyon is in danger of toils and snares , and the fox of the wolf : so that he must be a fox to find out the snares , and a lyon to fright away the wolves , but they who keep wholly to the lyon , have no true notion of themselves . a prince therefore that is wise and prudent , cannot , nor ought not to keep his p●●ole , when the keeping of it is to his prejudice , and the causes for which he promised , removed . were men all good , this doctrine was not to be taught , but because they are wicked , and not likely to be punctual with you , you are not obliged to any such strictness with them : nor was their ever any prince that wanted lawful pretence to justifie his breach of promise . i might instance in many modern examples , and shew how many confederations , and peaces , and promises have been broken by the infidelity of princes , and how he that best personated the fox , had the better success . nevertheless it is of great consequence to disguise your inclination , and to play the hypocrite well ; and men are so simple in their temper , and so submissive to their present necessities , that he that is neat and cleanly in his collusions , shall never want people to practise them upon . i cannot forbear one example which is still fresh in our memory . alexander vi. never did , nor thought of any thing but cheating , and never wanted matter to work upon , & though no man promised a thing with greater asseveration , nor confirmed it with more oaths and imprecations , and observ'd them less ; yet understanding the world well , he never miscarried . a prince therefore is not obliged to have all the forementioned good qualities in reality , but it is necessary he have them in appearance ; nay , i will be bold to affirm , that having them actually , and employing them upon all occasions , they are extreamly prejudicial , whereas having then only in appearance , they turn to better accompt ; it is honorable to seem mild , and merciful , and courteous , and religious , and sincere , and indeed to be so , provided your mind be so rectified and prepared that you can act quite contrary upon occasion . and this must be premised , that a prince , especially if come but lately to the throne , cannot observe all those things exactly which make men be esteemed virtuous , being oftentimes necessitated for the preservation of his state to do things in humane , uncharitable , and irreligious ; and therefore it is convenient his mind be at his command , and flexible to all the puffs , and variations of his fortune : not forbearing to be good , whil'st it is in his choice , but knowing how to be evil when there is a necessity . a prince then is to have particular care that nothing falls from his mouth , but what is full of the five qualities aforesaid , and that to see , and to hear him , he appears all goodness , integrity , humanity , and religion , which last he ought to pretend to more than ordinarily , because more men do judge by the eye , then by the touch , for every body sees , but few understand ; every body sees how you appear , but few know what in reality you are , and those few d●re not , oppose the opinion of the multitude who have the majesty of their prince to defend them ; and in the actions of all men , especially princes , where no man has power to judge , every one looks to the end . let a prince therefore do what he can to preserve his life , and continue his supremacy , the means which he uses shall be thought honorable , and be commended by every body ; because the people are always taken with the appearance , and event of things , and the greatest part of the world consists of the people : those few who are wise , taking place when the multitude has nothing else to rely upon . there is a prince at this time in being ( but his name i shall conceal ) who has nothing in his mouth but fidelity and peace and yet had he exercised either the one or the other , they had robb'd him before this both of his power and reputation . chap. xix . that princes ought to be cautious of becoming either odious or contemptible . and because in our discourse of the qualifications of a prince , we have hitherto spoken only of those which are of greatest importance , we shall now speak briefly of the rest under these general heads . that a prince make it his business ( as is partly hinted before ) to avoid such things as may make him odious or contemptible : and as often as he does that , he plays his part very well , and shall meet no danger or inconveniencies by the rest of his vices : nothing ( as i said before ) make a prince so insufferably odious , as usurping his subjects estates , and debauching their wives , which are two things he ought studiously to forbear ; for whil'st the generality of the world live quietly upon their estates , and unprejudiced in their honor , they live peaceably enough , and all his contention is only with the pride and ambition of some few persons who are many ways , and with great ease to be restrained . but a prince is contemptable when he is counted effeminate , light , unconstant , pusillanimous , and irresolute ; and of this he ought to be as careful , as of a rock in the sea , and strive that his in all actions there may appear magnanimity , courage , gravity , and fortitude , desiring that in the private affairs of his subjects , his sentence and determination may be irrevocable , and himself to stand so in their opinion , that none may think it possible either to delude or divert him . the prince who causes himself to be esteemed in that manner , shall be highly redoubted , and if he be feared , people will not easily conspire against him , nor readily invade him , because he is known to be an excellent person and formidable to his subjects ; for a prince ought to be terrible in two places , at home to his subjects , and abroad to his equals ; from whom he defends himself by good arms , and good allies ; for if his power be good , his friends will not be wanting , and while his affairs are fixed at home , there will be no danger from abroad , unless they be disturb'd by some former conspiracy , and upon any commotion ab extra , if he be composed at home , has liv'd as i prescribe , and not deserted himself , he will be able to bear up against any impression according to the example of nabis the spartan . when things are well abroad , his affairs at home will be safe enough , unless they be perplexed by some secret conspiracy , against which the prince sufficiently provides , if he keeps himself from being hated or despised , and the people remain satisfied of him , which is a thing very necessary , as i have largely inculcated before . and one of the best remedies prince can use against conspiracy , is to keep himself from being hated or despised by the multitude ; for no body p●●ts , but he expects by the death of the prince , to gratifie the people , and the thought of offending them will deter him from any such enterprize , because in conspiracies the difficulties are infinite . by experience we find that many conjurations have been on foot , but few have succeeded , because no man can conspire alone : nor choose a confederate but out of those who are discontented , and no sooner shall you impart your mind to a male-content , but you give him opportunity to reconcile himself , because there is nothing he proposes to himself , but he may expect from the discovery . so that the gain being certain on that side , and hazardous and uncertain on the other , he must be either an extraordinary friend to you , or an implacable enemy to the prince if he does not betray you ; in short , on the side , of the conspirators there is nothing but fear , and jealousie , and apprehension of punishment , but one the princes side there is the majesty of the government , the laws , the assistance of his friends and state , which defend him so effectually , that if the affections of the people be added to them , no man can be so rash , and precipitate as to conspire ; for if before the execution of his design , the conspirator has reason to be afraid , in this case he has much more afterwards , having offended the people in the execution , and left himself no refuge to fly to . of this many examples might be produced , but i shall content my self with one which happened in the memory of our fathers . hanibal bentiv●gli ( grandfather to this present hanibal ) was prince of bolonia , and killed by the canneschi who conspired against him ; none of his race being left behind , but iohn who was then in his cradle : the murther was no sooner committed , but the people took arms , and slew all the canneschi , which proceeded only from the affection that the house of the bentivogli had at that time among the populacy in bolonia , which was then so great , that when hanibal was dead , there being none of that family remaining , in a capacity for the government of the state , upon information that at florence there was a natural son of the said bentivogli's ( who till that time had passed only for the son of a smith ) they sent embassadors for him , and having conducted him honorably to that city , they gave him the government , which he executed very well , till the said iohn came of age. i conclude therefore a prince need not be much apprehensive of conspiracies , whil'st the people are his friends ; but when they are dissatisfied , and have taken a prejudice against him , there is no thing , nor no person which he ought not to fear . and it has been the constant care of all wise princes , and all well-governed states , not to reduce the nobility to despair , nor the people to discontent , which is one of the most material things a prince is to prevent . among the best ordered monarchies of our times , france is one , in which there are many good laws and constitutions tending to the liberty and preservation of the king : the first of them is the parliament , and the authority wherewith it is invested ; for he who was the founder of that monarchy , being sensible of the ambition and insolence of the nobles , and judging it convenient to have them bridled and restrained ; and knowing on the other side the hatred of the people against the nobility , and that it proceeded from fear ( being willing to secure them ) to exempt the king from the displeasure of the nobles , if he sided with the commons , or from the malice of the commons , if he inclined to the nobles , he erected a third judge , which ( without any reflexion upon the king , should keep the nobility under , and protect the people ; nor could there be a better order , wiser , nor of greater security to the king and the kingdom ; from whence we may deduce another observation , that princes are to leave things of injustice and envy to the ministery and execution of others , but acts of favour and grace are to be perform'd by themselves . to conclude , a prince is to value his grandees , but so as not to make the people hate him . contemplating the lifes and deaths of several of the roman emperors , it is possible many would think to find plenty of examples quite contrary to my opinion , forasmuch as some of them whose conduct was remarkable , and magnanimity obvious to every body , were turn'd out of their authority , or murthered by the conspiracy of their subjects . to give a punctual answer , i should inquire into the qualities and conversations of the said emperors , and in so doing i should find the reason of their ruine to be the same , or very consonant to what i have opposed . and in part i will represent such things as are most notable , to the consideration of him that reads the actions of our times , and i shall content my self with the examples of all the emperors which succeeded in the empire from marcus the philosopher , to maximinus , and they were , marcus , his son commodus , pertinax , iulian , severus , antoninus , his son caracalla , macrinus , heligabalus , alexander , and maximinus . it is first to be considered , that whereas in other governments there was nothing to contend with , but the ambition of the nobles , and the insolence of the people , the roman emperors had a third inconvenience , to support against , the avarice and cruelty of the soldiers , which was a thing of such difficult practice , that it was the occasion of the destruction of many of them , it being very uneasie to please the subject and the soldier together ; for the subject loves peace , and chooses therefore a prince that is gentle and mild , whereas the soldier prefers a martial prince , and one that is haughty , and rigid , a●d rapacious , which good qualities they are desirous he should exercise upon the people , that their pay might be encreased : and their covetousness and cruelty satiated upon them . hence it is , that those emperors , who neither by art , nor nature are endued with that address , and reputation as is necessary for the restraining both of the one and the other , do always miscarry ; and of them the greatest part ( especially if but lately advanced to the empire ) understanding the inconsistancy of their two humors , incline to satisfie the soldiers , without regarding how far the people are disobliged . which council is no more than is necessary ; for seeing it cannot be avoided but princes must fall under the hatred of somebody , they ought diligently to contend that it be not of the multitude ; if that be not to be obtain'd , their next great care is to be , that they incur not the odium of such as are most potent among them : and therefore those emperors who were new , and had need of extraordinary support , adhered more readily to the soldiers than to the people which turn'd to their detriment or advantage , as the prince knew how to preserve his reputation with them : from the causes aforesaid , it hapned that marcus aurelius , pertinax , and alexander being princes of more than ordinary modesty , lovers of justice , enemies of cruelty , courteous , and bountiful , came all of them ( except marcus ) to unfortunate ends . marcus indeed lived and died in great honour , because he came to the empire by way of inheritance and succession , without being beholden either to soldiers or people , and being afterwards indued with many good qualities which recommended him , and made him venerable among them , he kept them both in such order whil'st he liv'd , and held them so exactly to their bounds , that he was never either hated or despised . but pertinax was chosen emperor against the will of the soldiers , who being used to live licentiously under commodus , they could not brook that regularity to which pertinax endeavoured to bring them ; so that having contracted the odium of the soldiers , and a certain disrespect and neglect by reason of his age , he was ruined in the very beginning of his reign ; from whence it is observable , that hatred is obtained two ways , by good works , and bad , and therefore a prince ( as i said before ) being willing to retain his jurisdiction , is oftentimes compelled to be bad . for if the chief party , ( whether it be people , or army , or nobility ) which you think most useful , and of most consequence to you for the conservation of your dignity , be corrupt , you must follow their humour and indulge them , and in that case honesty and virtue are pernicious . but let us come to alexander who was a prince of such great equity and goodness , it is reckoned among his praises ▪ that in the fourteen years of his empire , there was no man put to death without a fair tryal : nevertheless being accounted effeminate , and one that suffered himself to be managed by his mother . and falling by that means into disgrace , the army conspired and killed him . examining on the other side the conduct of commodus , severus , antoninus , caracalla , and maziminus , you will find them cruel and rapacious and such as to satisfie the soldiers , omitted no kind of injury that could be exercised against the people , and all of them but severus were unfortunate in their ends : for severus was a prince of so great courage and magnanimity , that preserving the friendship of the army ( though the people were oppressed ) he made his whole reign happy , his virtues having represented him so admirable both to the soldiers and people , that these remained in a manner stupid , and astonished , and the other obedient and contented . and because the actions of severus were great in a new prince , i shall shew in brief how he personated of the fox and the lyon , whose natures and properties are ( as i said before ) necessary for the imitation of a prince . severus therefore , knowing the laziness and inactivity of iulian the emperor , persuaded the army under his command in sclavonia to go to rome , and revenge the death of pertinax who was murthered by the imperial guards ; and under that colour , without the least pretence to the empire , he marched his army towards rome , and was in italy before any thing of his motion was known : being arrived at rome , the senate were afraid of him , killed iulian , and elected severus . after which beginning , there remained two difficulties to be removed before he could be master of the whole empire ; the one was in asia , where niger general of the asiatick army , had proclaimed himself emperor : the other , in the west , where albinus the general aspired to the same : and thinking it hazardous to declare against both , he resolved to oppose himself against niger , and cajole and wheedle albinus , to whom he writ word , that being chosen emperor by the senate , he was willing to receive him to a participation of that dignity , gave him the title of caesar , and by consent of the senate admitted him his collegue ; which albinus embraced very willingly , and thought him in earnest ; but when severus had overcome niger , put him to death , and setled the affairs of the east , being returned to rome , he complained in the senate against albinus , as a person , who contrary to his obligations for the benefits received from him , had endeavoured treacherously to murther him , told them that he was obliged to march against him to punish his ingratitude , and afterwards following him into france , he executed his design , deprived him of his command , and put him to death . he then who strictly examines the actions of this prince , will find him fierce as a lyon , subtile as a fox , feared and reverenced by every body , and no way odious to his army : nor will it seem strange that he ( though newly advanced to the empire ) was able to defend it , seeing his great reputation protected him against the hatred which his people might have conceived against him by reason of his rapine . but his son antoninus was an excellent person likewise endued with transcendant parts , which rendered him admirable to the people , and grateful to the soldiers ; for he was martial in his nature , patient of labour and hardship , and a great despiser of all sensuality and softness , which recommended him highly to his armies . nevertheless his fury and cruelty was so immoderately great ( having upon several private and particular occasions , put a great part of the people of rome , and all the inhabitants of alexandria , to death ) that he fell into the hatred of the whole world , and began to be feared by his confidents that were about him , so that he was killed by one of his captains in the middle of his camp. from whence it may be observed , that these kind of assassinations which follow upon a deliberate and obstinate resolution , cannot be prevented by a prince , for he who values not his own life , can commit them when he pleases ; but they are to be feared the less , because they happen but seldom , he is only to have a care of doing any great injury to those that are about him , of which error antoninus was too guilty having put the brother of the said captain to an ignominious death , threatned the captain daily , and yet continued him in his guards , which was a rash and pernicious act , and prov'd so in the end . but to come to commodus , who had no hard task to preserve his empire , succeeding to it by way of inheritance , as son to marcus , for that to satisfie the people , and oblige the soldiers , he had no more to do , but to follow the footsteps of his father . but being of a brutish and cruel disposition , to exercise his rapacity upon the people , he indulged his army , and allowed them in all manner of licentiousness . besides , prostituting his dignity , by descending many times upon the theater to fight with the gladiators , and committing many other acts which were vile , and unworthy the majesty of an emperor , he became contemptible to the souldiers , and growing odious to one party , and despicable to the other , they conspired and murthered him . maximinus was likewise a martial prince , and addicted to the wars , and the army being weary of the effeminacy of alexander ( whom i have mentioned before ) having slain him , they made maximinus emperor , but he possessed it not long , for two things contributed to make him odious , and despised . one was the meanness of his extraction , having kept sheep formerly in thrace , which was known to all the world , and made him universally contemptable . the other was , that at his first coming to the empire , by not repairing immediately to rome , and putting himself into possession of his imperial seat , he had contracted the imputation of being cruel , having exercised more than ordinary severity by his prefects in rome , and his lieutenants in all the rest of the empire ; so that the whole world being provoked , by the vileness of his birth , and detestation of his cruelty , in apprehension of his fury , africa , the senate and all the people both in italy and rome , conspired against him , and his own army joyning themselves with them , in their leaguer before aquileia finding it difficult to be taken , weary of his cruelties , and encouraged by the multitude of his enemies , they set upon him , and slew him . i will not trouble my self with heliogabalus , macrinus , nor iulian , who being all effeminate and contemptible , were quickly extinguished . but i shall conclude this discourse , and say that the princes of our times are not obliged to satisfie the soldiers in their respective governments by such extraordinary ways ; for though they are not altogether to be neglected , yet the remedy and resolution is easie because none of these princes have entire armies , brought up , and inveterated in their several governments and provinces , as the armies under the roman empire were . if therefore at that time it was necessary to satisfie the soldiers rather than the people , it was because the soldiers were more potent . at present it is more the interest of all princes ( except the great turk and the soldan ) to comply with the people , because they are more considerable than the soldiers . i except the turk , because he has in his guards foot , and horse constantly about him , upon whom the strength and security of his empire depends , and it is necessary ( postponing all other respect to the people ) they be continued his freinds . it is the same case with the soldan , who being wholly in the power of the soldiers , it is convenient that he also wave the people , and insinuate with the army . and here it is to be noted , that this government of the soldans is different from all other monarchies , for it is not unlike the papacy in christendom , which can neither be called a new , nor an hereditary principality , because the children of the deceased prince , are neither heirs to his estate , nor lords of his empire , but he who is chosen to succeed , by those who have the faculty of election ; which custom being of old , the government cannot be called new , and by consequence is not subject to any of the difficulties wherewith a new one is infested ; because though the person of the prince be new , and perhaps the title ; yet the laws and orders of state are old , and disposed to receive him as if he were hereditary lord. but to return to our business , i say , that whoever considers the aforesaid discourse , shall find either hatred or contempt the perpetual cause of the ruine of those emperors , and be able to judge how it came about that part of them taking one way in their administrations , and part of them another , in both parties some were happy , and some unhappy at last . pertinax and alexander being but upstart princes , it was not only vain , but dangerous for them to imitate marcus , who was emperor by right of succession . again , it was no less pernicious for caracalla , commodus , and maximinus to make severus their pattern , not having force nor vertue enough to follow his footsteps . so then if a new prince cannot imitate the actions of marcus ; ( and to regulate by the example of severus , is unnecessary ) he is only to take that part from severus that is necessary to the foundation of his state , and from marcus , what is convenient to keep and defend it gloriously , when 't is once established and firm . chap. xx. whether citadels , and other things which princes many times do , be profitable , or dangerous ? some princes for the greater security of their dominion , have disarmed their subjects ; others have cantonized their countries ; others have fomented factions and animosity among them ; some have applyed themselves to flatter and insinuate with those who were suspicious in the beginning of their government : some have built castles , others have demolished them ; and though in all these cases , no certain or determined rule can be prescribed , unless we come to a particular consideration of the state where it is to be used ; yet i shall speak of them all , as the matter it self will endure . a wise prince therefore was never known to disarm his subjects ; rather finding them unfurnished , he put arms into their hands ; for by arming them , and inuring them to warlike exercise , those arms are surely your own ; they who were suspicious to you , become faithful ; they who are faithful , are confirm'd ; and all your subjects become of your party ; and because the whole multitude which submits to your government is not capable of being armed , if you be beneficial and obliging to those you do arm , you may make the bolder with the rest ; for the difference of your behaviour to the soldier , binds him more firmly to your service ; and the rest will excuse you , as judging them most worthy of reward , who are most liable to danger . but when you disarm , you disgust them , and imply a diffidence in them , either for cowardize , or treachery , and the one or the other is sufficient to give them an impression of hatred against you . and because you cannot subsist without soldiers , you will be forced to entertain mercenaries , whom i have formerly described , and if it were possible for the said mercenaries to be good , they could not be able to defend you against powerful adversaries , and subjects disobliged . wherefore ( as i have said ) a new prince , in his new government , puts his subjects always into arms , as appears by several examples in history . but when a prince conquers a new state , and annexes it ( as a member ) to his old , then it is necessary your subjects be disarmed , all but such as appeared for you in the conquest , and they are to be mollified by degrees , and brought into such a condition of laziness and effeminacy , that in time your whole strength may devolve upon your own natural militia , which were trained up in your ancient dominion , and are to be always about you . our ancestors ( and they were esteemed wise men ) were wont to say , that it was necessary to keep pisto●a by factions , and pisa by fortresses , and accordingly in several towns under their subjection , they created , and fomented factions and animosities , to keep them with more ease . this , at a time when italy was unsetled , and in a certain kind of suspence , might be well enough done , but i do not take it at this time for any precept for us , being clearly in opinion that the making of factions , never does good , but that where the enemy approaches , and the city is divided , it must necessarily , and that suddenly be lost , because the weaker party will always fall off to the enemy , and the other cannot be able to defend it . the venetians , ( as i guess ) upon the same grounds nourished the factions of the guelfs , and the ghibilins in the cities under their jurisdiction ; and though they kept them from blood ; yet they encouraged their dissentions , to the end that the citizens being employed among themselvs , should have no time to conspire against them ; which as appeared afterwards , did not answer expectation ; for being defeated at valia , one of the said factions took arms , and turned the venetians out of their state. such methods therefore as these , do argue weakness in the prince ; for no government of any strength or consistance will suffer such divisions , because they are useful only in time of peace , when perhaps they may contribute to the more easie management of their subjects , but when war comes , the fallacy of those counsels are quickly discovered , without doubt , princes grow great when they overcome the difficulties and impediments which are given them ; and therefore fortune , especially when she has a mind to exalt a new prince ( who has greater need of reputation than a prince that is old and hereditary ) raises him up enemies , and encourages enterprizes against him , that he may have opportunity to conquer them , and advance himself by such steps as his enemies had prepared . for which reason many have thought that a wise prince when opportunity offers , ought ( but with great cunning and address ) to maintain some enmity against himself , that when time serves to destroy them , his own greatness may be encreas'd . princes , and particularly those who are not of long standing , have found more fidelity and assistance from those whom they suspected at the beginning of their reign , than from them who at first were their greatest confidents . pandolfus petrucci prince of sienna govern'd his state rather by those who were suspected , than others . but this is not to be treated of largely , because it varies according to the subjects ; i shall only say this , that those men who in the beginning of his government , opposed him ( if they be of so such quality as to want the support of other people ) are easily wrought over to the prince , and more strictly engaged to be faithful ; because they knew that it must be their good carriage for the future that must cancel the prejudice that is against them ; and so the prince comes to receive more benefit by them , than by those who serving him more securely , do most commonly neglect his affairs . and seeing the matter requires , i will not omit to remind a prince who is but newly advanced ( and that by some inward favour and correspondence in the country ) that he considers well what it was that disposed those parties to befreind him ; if it be not affection to him , but pique , and animosity to the old government , it will cost much trouble and difficulty to keep them his friends , because it will be impossible to satisfie them : and upon serious disquisition , ancient and modern examples will give us the reason , and we shall find it more easie to gain such persons as were satisfied with the former government , and by consequence his enemies , than those who being disobliged , sided with him , and assisted to subvert it . it has been a custom among princes , for the greater security of their territories to build citadels and fortresses to bridle and restrain such as would enterprize against them , and to serve as a refuge in times of rebellion ; and i approve the way because anciently practised , yet no longer ago than in our days , mr. nicolo vitelli was known to dismantle two forts in the city of castello , to secure his government ; guidobaldo duke of urbin returning to his state from whence caesar borgia had driven him , demolished all the strong places in that province , and thereby thought it more unlikely again to fall into the hands of the enemy . the bentivogli being returned to bologna , used the same course : so that fortresses , are useful , or not useful , according to the difference of time , and if in one place they do good , they do as much mischief in another : and the case may be argued thus , that prince who is more afraid of his subjects than neighbours , is to suffer them to stand : the family of the sforza's , has and will suffer more mischief by the castle of milan ( which ws built by francesco sforza ) than by all its other troubles whatever ; so that the best fortification of all , is not to be hated by the people , for your fortresses will not protect you , if the people have you in detestation , because they shall no sooner take arms , but strangers will fall in , and sustain them . in our times , there is not one instance to be produced , of advantage , which that course has brought to any prince , but to the countess of furly , when upon the death of hier●nimo her husband , by means of those castles she was able to withstand the popular fury , and expect till supplies came to her from milan , and resetled her in the government ; and as times then stood , the people were not in a condition to be relieved by any stranger . but afterwards they stood her in no stead when caesar borgia invaded her , and the people being incensed , joyned with her enemy . wherefore it had been better for her both then , and at first to have possessed the affections of the people , than all the castles in the country . these things being considered , i approve both of him that builds those fortresses , and of him that neglects them , but must needs condemn him who relies so much upon them , as to despise the displeasure of the people . chap. xxi . how a prince is to demean himself to gain reputation . nothing recommends a prince so highly to the world , as great enterprizes , and noble expressions of his own valor and conduct . we have in our days ferdinand king of aragon , the present king of spain , who may ( and not improperly ) be called a new prince , being of a small and weak king , become for fame , and renown the greatest monarch in christendom ; and if his exploits be considered , you will find them all brave , but some of them extraordinary . in the beginning of his reign he invaded the kingdom of granada , and that enterprize was the foundation of his grandeur . he began it leisurely , and without suspicion of impediment , holding the barons of castile employed in that service , and so intent upon that war , that they dreamt not of any innovation , whil'st in the mean time before they were aware , he got reputation , and authority over them . he found out a way of maintaining his army at the expence of the church , and the people , and by the length of that war , to establish such order and discipline among his soldiers , that afterwards they gained him many honourable victories . beside this , to adapt him for greater enterprizes , ( always making religion his pretence ) by a kind of devout cruelty , he destroyed and exterminated the jews called marrani , than which nothing could be more strange , or deplorable . under the same cloak of religion , he invaded affrica , made his expedition into italy , assaulted france , and began many great things which always kept the minds of his subjects in admiration and suspence , expecting what the event of his machinations would be . and these his enterprizes had so sudden a spring and result one from the other , that they gave no leisure to any man to be at quiet , or to continue any thing against him . it is likewise of great advantage to a prince to give some rare example of his own administration at home ( such is reported of messer bernardo da milano ) when there is occasion for some body to perform any thing extraordinary in the civil government , whether it be good or bad , and to find out such a way either to reward or punish him , as may make him much talk'd of in the world . above all , a prince is to have a care in all his actions to behave himself so as may give him the reputation of being excellent as well as great . a prince is likewise much esteemed when he shows himself a sincere friend , or a generous enemy , that is when without any hesitation he declares himself in favour of one against another , which as it is more frank and princely , so it is more profitable than to stand neuter ; for if two of your potent neighbours be at wars , they are either of such condition that you are to be afraid of the victor or not : in either which cases it will be always more for your benefit to discover your self freely , and make a fair war : for in the first cause , if you do not declare , you shall be a prey to him who overcomes , and it will be a pleasure , and satisfaction to him that is conquered to see you his fellow-sufferer , nor will any body either defend , or receive you , and the reason is , because the conqueror will never understand them to be his friends , who would not assist him in his distress ; and he that is worsted will not receive you , because you neglected to run his fortune with your arms in your hands . antiochus , upon the invitation of the etolians , passed into greece , to repel the romans : antiochus sent embassadors to the achaians ( who were in amity with the romans ) to persude them a neutrality , and the romans sent to them to associate with them . the busines coming to be debatedin the council of the achaians , and antiochus his embassador pressing them to be neuters ; the roman embassador replyed , as to what he has remonstrated , that it is most useful and most consistent with the interest of your state , not to engage your selves in our war , their is nothing more contrary aud pernicious ; for if you do not concern your selves , you will assuredly become a prey to the conqueror without any thanks or reputation ; and it will always be , that he who has least kindness for you , will tempt you to be neuters , but they that are your friends will invite you to take up arms. and those princes who are ill advised , to avoid some present danger follow the neutral way , are most commonly ruin'd : but when a prince discovers himself couragiously , in favour of one party , if he with whom you joyn overcome , though he be very powerful , and you seem to remain at his discretion , yet he is obliged to you , and must needs have a respect for you , and men are not so wicked , with such signal and exemplary ingratitude to oppress you . besides victories are never so clear and compleat , as to leave the conqueror without all sparks of reflexion , and especially upon what is just . but if your confederate comes by the worst , you are received by him , and assisted whil'st he is able , and becomest a companion of his fortune , which may possibly restore the. in the second place , if they who contend be of such condition , that they have no occasion to fear , let which will overcome ; you are in purdence to declare your self the sooner , because by assisting the one , you contribute to the ruine of the other , ( whom , if your confederate had been wise , he oughtrather to have preserved ) so that he overcoming , remains wholly at your discretion , and by your assistance , he must of necessity overcome . and hear it is to be noted ( if he can avoid it ) a prince is never to league himself with another more powerful than himself , in an offensive war : because in that case , if he overcomes , you remain at his mercy , and princes ought to be as cautious as possible , of falling under the discretion of other people . the venetians ( when there was no necessity for it ) associated with france against the duke of milan , and that association was the cause of their ruine : but where it is not to be avoided ( as hapned to the florentines when the pope and the spaniard sent their armies against lombardy ) there a prince is to adhere for the reasons aforesaid . nor is any prince of government to imagine that in those cases any certain counsel can be taken , because the affairs of this world are so ordered , that in avoiding one mischief , we fall commonly into another . but a man's wisdom is most conspicuous where he is able to distinguish of dangers , and make choice of the least . moreover a prince to show himself a virtuoso , and honourer of all that is excellent in any art whatsoever . he is likewise to encourage and assure his subjects that they may live quietly in peace and exercise themselves in their several vocations whether marchandize , agriculture , or any other employment whatever , to the end that one may not forbear impro●ing or imbellishing his estate for fear it should be taken from him , nor another advancing his trade in apprehension of taxes ; but the prince is rather to excite them by propositions of reward , and immunities to all such as shall any way amplifie his territory , or powers . he is obliged likewise , at convenient times in the year to entertain the people by feastings and plays , and spectacles of recreation ; and because all cities divided into companies , or wards , he ought to have respect to those societies , be merry with them sometimes , and give them some instance of his humanity , and magnificence , but always retaining the majesty of his degree , which is never to be debased in any case whatever . chap. xxii . of the secretaries of princes . the election of his ministers , is of no small importance to a prince ; for the first judgment that is made of him , or his parts , is from the persons he has about him ; when they are wise and faithful , be sure the prince is discreet himself , who as he knew how to choose them able at first , so he has known how to oblige them to be faithful ; but when his ministers are otherwise , it reflects shrewdly upon the prnice ; for commonly the first error he commits , is in the election of his servants . no man knew antonio da vanafro to be secretary to pandolfo petrucci prince of sienna but he could judge pandolfo to be aprudent man for choosing such a one to his minister . in the capacities and parts of men , there are three sorts of degrees ; one man understands of himself ; another understands what is explained ; and a third understands neither of himself , nor by any explanation : the first is excellent , the second commendable , the third altogether unprofitable . if therefore pandolfus was not in the first rank , he might be concluded in the second ; for whenever a prince 〈◊〉 the judgment to know the good , and the bad of what is spoken or done , though his own invention be not excellent , he can distinguish a good servant from a bad , and exalt the one , and correct the other , and the minister despairing of deluding him , remains good in spight of his teeth . but the business is how a prince may understand his minister , and the rule for that is infallible . when you observe your officer more careful of himself , than of you , and all his actions and designs pointing at his own interest and advantage , that man will never be a good minister , nor ought you ever to repose any confidence in him ; for he who has the affairs of his prince in his hand , ought to lay aside all thoughts of himself , and regard nothing but what is for the profit of his master . and on the otherside , to keep him faithful , the prince is as much concerned to do for him , by honouring him , enriching him , giving him good offices and preferments , that the wealth and honour conferred by his master , may keep him from looking out for himself , and the plenty and goodness of his offices , make him afraid of a change , knowing that without his princes favour he can never subsist . when therefore the prince , and the minister are qualified in this manner , they may depend one upon the other : but when 't is otherwise with them , the end must be bad ; and one of them will be undone . chap. xxiii . how flatterers are to be avoided . i will not pass by a thing of great consequence , being an error against which princes do hardly defend themselves , unless they be very wise , and their judgment very good . and that is about flatterers , of which kind of cattle all histories are full ; for men are generally so fond of their own actions , and so easily mistaken in them , that it is not without difficulty they defend themselves against those sort of people , and he that goes about to defend himself , runs a great hazard of being despised : for there is no other remedy against flatterers , than to let every body understand you are not disobliged by telling the truth ; yet if you suffer every body to tell it , you injure your self , and lessen your reverence . wherefore a wise prince ought to go a third way , and select out of his state certain discreet men , to whom only he is to commit that liberty of speaking truth , and that , of such things as he demands , and nothing else ; but then he is to inquire of every thing , hear their opinions , and resolve afterwards , as he pleases , and behave himself towards them in such sort , that every one may find with how much the more freedom he speaks , with so much the more kindness he is accepted ; that besides them , he will hearken to no body ; that he considers well before he resolves ; and that his resolutions once taken , are never to be altered : he that does otherwise , shall either precipitate his affairs by means of his flatterers ; or by variety of advices , often change his designs , which will lessen his esteem , and render him contemptible . to this purpose i shall instance in one modern example . father lucas , a servant to maximilian the present emperor , giving a character of his majesty , declared him a person that never consulted any body , and yet never acted according to his own judgment and inclination ; and the reason was , because he proceeded contrary to the presriptions aforesaid , for the emperor is a close man , communicates his secrets with no body , nor takes any man's advice ; but when his determinations are to be executed , and begin to be known in the world , those who are about him begin to discourage and dissuade him , and he being good natur'd does presently desist : hence it comes to pass that his resolutions of one day , are dissolved in the next , no man knows what he desires or designs ; nor no man can depend upon his resolutions . a prince therefore is always to consult ; but at his own , not other peoples pleasure , and rather to deter people from giving their advice undemanded ; but he ought not to be sparing in his demands , nor when he has demanded , impatient of hearing the truth ; but if he understands that any suppressed it , and forbore to speak out , for fear of displeasing , then , and not till then , he is to show his displeasure . and because there are those who believe that a prince which creates an opinion of his prudence in the people , does it not by any excellence in his own nature , but by the counsels of those who are about him ; without doubt they are deceived ; for this is a general and infallible rule , that that prince who has no wisdom of his own , can never be well advised ; unless by accident he commits all to the government and administration of some honest and discreet man : in this case 't is possible things may be well ordered for a while , but they can never continue ; for his minister or vicegerent in a short time will set up for himself ; but if a prince who has no great judgment of his own , consults with more than one ; their counsels will never agree , nor he have ever the cunning to unite them ; every man will advise according to his own interest , or capriccio , and he not have the parts either to correct or discover it : and other counsellors are not to be found , for men will always prove bad , unless by necessity they are compelled to be good . so then it is clear , that good counsels ( from whomsoever they come ) proceed rather from the wisdom of the prince , than the princes wisdom from the goodness of his counsels . chap. xxiv . how it came to pass that the princes of italy have most of them lost their dominions . the qualities aforesaid being observed ; they make a new prince appear in the number of the more ancient , and render him presently more firm and secure in his government , than if he had descended to it by right of inheritance ; for the actions of a new prince are liable to stricter observation , than if he were hereditary , and when they are known to be virtuous , gain more upon people , and oblige them farther than antiquity of blood ; because men are more affected with present , than pass'd things , and when in their present condition they find themselves well , they content themselves with it , without looking out any where else , employing themselves wholly in defence of their prince , unless in other things he be defective to himself : so that thereby he will have double honor , in having laid the foundation of a new principality , and embellished and fortified it , with good laws , good force , good friends , and good example : whereas he multiplies his disgrace , who being born prince , loses his inheritance by his own ill management and imprudence . and if the soveraign princes in italy , who in our time have lost their dominions , be considered , as the king of naples , the duke of milan , and others , there will be found in their beginning one common defect as to the management of their arms , for the reasons largely discours'd of before : besides some of them will appear to have been hated by the people , or if they have had so much prudence as to preserve a friendship with them , they have been ignorant how to secure themselves against the grandees ; for without these errors no states are lost that have money and strength enough to bring an army into the field . philip of macedon ( not alexander the great 's father , but he who was overcome by titus quintus ) had no great force in comparison of the romans and the grecians which invaded him ; yet , being a martial man , and one that understood how to insinuate with the people , and oblige the nobility , he maintained war several years agaisnt both of them , and though at last he lost some towns , yet he kept his kingdom in spight of them . those therefore of our princes who for many years together were settled in their principalities , if they lost them afterwards , they cannot accuse fortune , but their own negligence and indiscretion , for not having in quiet times considered they might change ( and it is the common infirmity of mankind in a calm to make no reckoning of a tempest ) when adversity approached , they thought more of making their escape than defence , resting their whole hopes upon this , that when the people were weary of the insolence of the conqueror , they would recal them again . which resolution is tolerable indeed , when others are wanting , but to neglect all other remedies , and trust only to that , is much to be condemned , for a man would never throw himself down , that another might take him up ; besides , that may not happen , or if it does , not with your security , because that kind of defence is poor , and depends not on your self , and no defences are good , certain , and lasting , which proceed not from the princes own courage and virtue . chap. xxv . how far in human affairs fortune may avail ; and in what manner she may be resisted . i am not ignorant that it is , and has been of old the opinion of many people , that the affairs of the world are so govern'd by fortune and divine providence , that man cannot by his wisdom correct them , or apply any remedy at all ; from whence they would infer that we are not to labour and sweat , but to leave every thing to its own tendancy and event . this opinion has obtained more in our days , by the many and frequent revolutions , which have been , and are still seen beyond all humane conjecture . and when i think of it seriously sometimes , i am in some measure inclined to it my self ; nevertheless that our own free will may not utterly be exploded , i conceive it may be true that fortune may have the arbitrement of one half of our actions , but that she leaves the other half ( or little less ) to be governed by our selves . fortune , i do resemble to a rapid and impetuous river , which when swelled , and enraged , overwhelms the plains , subverts the t●ees , and the houses , forces away the earth from one place , and carries it to another , every body fears , every body shuns , but no body knows how to resist it ; yet though it be thus furious sometimes , it does not follow but when it is quiet and calm , men may by banks , and fences , and other provisions correct it in such manner , that when it swells again , it may be carried off by some canal , or the violence thereof rendered less licentious and destructive . so it is with fortune , which shows her power where there is no predisposed virtue to resist it , and turns all her force and impetuosity , where she knows there are no banks , no fences to restrain her : if you consider italy ( the seat of all these revolutions ) and what it was that caus'd them , you will find it an open field , without any bounds or ramparts of secure it ; and that , had it been defended by the courage of their ancestors , as germany , and spain , and france have been , those inundations had never hapned , or never made such devastation as they have done . and this i hold sufficient to have spoken in general against fortune . but restraining my self a little more to particulars , i say it is ordinary to see a prince happy one day , and ruined the next , without discerning any difference in his humor or government ; and this i impute to the reasons of which i have discoursed largely before ; and one of them is , because that prince which relies wholly upon fortune , being subject to her variations , must of necessity be ruined . i believe , again that prince may be happy , whose manner of proceeding concerts with the times , and he unhappy who cannot accommodate to them : for in things leading to the end of their designs ( which every man has in his eye , and they are riches and honour ) we see men have various methods of proceeding . some with circumspection , others with heat ; some with violence , others with cunning ; some with patience , and others with fury , and every one ( notwithstanding the diversity of their ways ) may possibly attain them . again we see two persons equally cautious , one of them prospers , and the other miscarri●s , and on the other side , two equally happy by different measures , one being deliberate , and the other as hasty ; and this proceeds from nothing but the condition of the times which suits , or does not suit ; with the manner of their proceedings . from hence arises what i have said , that two persons by different operations do attain the same end , whil'st two others steer the same course , and one of them succeeds , and the other is ruined . from hence likewise may be deduced the vicissitudes of good ; for if to one who manages with deliberation and patience , the times and conjuncture of affairs , come about so favourably that his conduct be in fashion , he must needs be happy ; but if the face of affairs , and the times change , and he changes not with them , he is certainly ruined . nor is there any man to be found so wise , that knows how to accommodate , or frame himself to all these varieties , both because he cannot deviate from that to which nature has inclined him ; as likewise because if a man has constantly prospered in one way , it is no easie matter to persuade him to another ; and he that is so cautious , being at a loss when time requires he should be vigorous , must of necessity be destroyed ; whereas if he could turn with the times , his fortune would never betray him . pope iulius xi . in all his enterprizes , acted with passion and vehemence , and the times and accident of affairs were so sutable to his manner of proceeding , that he prospered in whatever he undertook . consider his expedition of bolonia in the days of messer giovanni ben●ivogli , the v●netians were against it , and the kings of spain and france were in treaty , and had a mind to it themselves ; yet he with his promptitude and fury , undertook it personally himself , and that activity of his , kept both spaniard , and venetian in suspence ( the venetians for fear ; the spaniards , in hopes to recover the whole kingdom of naples , and the king of france came over to his side ; for seeing him in motion , and desirous to make him his friend , and thereby to correct the insolence of the venetian , he thought he could not deny him his assistance , without manifest injustice ; so that iulius with his rashness and huffing , did that which never any other pope could have done with all his cunning and insinuation : for had he deferred his departure from rome , till all things had been put into exact order , and his whole progress concluded ( as any other pope would have done ) he could never have succeeded ; the king of france would have pretended a thousand excuses , and others , would have suggested twice as many fears ; i will pass by the rest of his enterprizes , which were all alike , and prospered as well , and the shortness of his life secured him against change : for had the times fallen out so , that he had been forced to proceed with accurate circumspection , he would have certainly been ruined , for he could never have left those ways to which his nature inclined him . i conclude then , that whil'st the obstinacy of princes consists with the motion of fortune , 't is possible they may be happy ; but when once they disagree , the poor prince comes certainly to the ground . i am of opinion likewise , that 't is better to be hot and precipitate , then cautious and apprehensive , for fortune is a woman , and must be hector'd , to keep her under ; and 't is visible every day she suffers her self to be managed by those who are brisk and audacious , rather than by those who are cold and phlegmatick in their motions , and therefore ( like a woman ) she is always a friend to those who are young ; because being less circumspect , they attack her with more security and boldness . chap. xxvi . an exhortation to deliver italy from the barbarians . having weighed therefore all that is said before , and considered seriously with my self whether in this juncture of affairs in italy , the times were disposed for the advancement of a new prince , and whether there was competent matter that could give occasion to a virtuous and wise person to introduce such a form as would bring reputation to him , and benefit to all his subjects ; it seems to me that at this present so many things concur to the exaltation of a new prince , that i do not know any time that has been more proper than this : and if ( as i said before ) for the manifestation of the courage of moses , it was necessary that the israelites should be captives in egypt ; for discovery of the magnanimity of cyrus , that the persians should be oppressed by the medes ; and for the illustration of the excellence of theseus , that the athenians should be banished and dispersed ; so to evince and demonstrate the courage of an italian spirit , it was necessary that italy should be reduced to its present condition ; that it should be in greater bondage than the iews ; in greater servitude than the persians , and in greater dispersion than the athenians , without head , without order , harras'd , spoyl'd , overcome , over-run , and over-flown with all kind of calamity : and though formerly some sparks of virtue have appeared in some persons , that might give it hopes that god had ordained them for its redemption ; yet it was found afterwards that in the very height and career of their exploits , they were check'd , and forsaken by fortune , and poor italy left half dead , expecting who would be her samaritan to bind up her wounds , put an end to the sackings and devastations in lombardy , the taxes and expilations in the kingdom of naples , and tuscany , and cure her sores , which length of time had fester'd and imposthumated . 't is manifest how she prays to god daily to send some person who may redeem her from the cruelty , and insolence of the barbarians . 't is manifest how prone and ready she is to follow the banner that any man will take up ; nor is it at present to be discerned where she can repose her hopes with more probability , than in your illustrious family , which by its own courage and interest , and the favour of god and the church ( of which it is now chief ) may be induced to make it self head in her redemption : which will be no hard matter to be effected , if you lay before you the lives and actions of the persons above named ; who though they were rare , and wonderful , were yet but men , and not accommodated with so fair circumstances as you . their enterprize was not more just , nor easie , nor god almighty more their friend than yours . you have justice on your side ; for that war is just which is necessary , and 't is piety to fight , were no hope is left in any thing else . the people are universally disposed , and where the disposition is so great , the opposition can be but small , especially you taking your rules from those persons which i have proposed to you for a model . besides , many things that they did were super-natural , and by gods immediate conduct , the sea opened , a cloud directed , a rock afforded water , it rained manna , all these things are recompenced in your grandeur , and the rest remains to be executed by you : god will not do every thing immediately , because he will not deprive us of our free will , and the honour that devolves upon us . nor is it any wonder if none of the fore-named italians have been able to do that which may be hoped for from your illustrious family : and if in so many revolutions in italy , and so long continuation of war , their military virtue seems spent and extinguished ; the reason is , their old discipline was not good , and no body was able to direct to a better . nothing makes so much to the honour of a new prince , as new laws , and new orders invented by him , which if they be well founded , and carry any thing of grandeur along with them , do render him venerable , and wonderful ; and italy is susceptible enough of any new form . their courage is great enough in the soldier , if it be not wanting in the officer , witness the duels , and combats , in which the italians have generally the better by their force , and dexterity , and stratagem ; but come to their battels , and they have oftner the worst , and all from the inexperience of their commanders ; for those who pretend to have skill , will never obey , and every one thinks he has skill , there having been no body to this very day , raised by his virtue and fortune to that height of reputation , as to prevail with others to obey him . hence it came , that in so long time , in the many wars during the last twenty years , when ever an army consisted wholly of italians , it was certainly beaten ; and this may be testified by tarus , alexandria , capua , genoa , vaila , bologna , and mestri . if therefore your illustrious family be inclined to follow the examples of those excellent persons who redeemed their countries , it is necessary as a true fundamental of all great enterprizes , to provide your selves with forces of your own subjects , for you cannot have more faithful , nor better soldiers than they . and though all of them be good , yet altogether they will be much better , when they find themselves not only commanded , but preferred , and caressed by a prince of their own . it is necessary therefore to be furnished with these forces , before you can be able with italian virtue to vindicate your country from the oppression of strangers : and though the swiss , and spanish infantry be counted terrible , they have both of them their defects : and a third sort may be composed that may not only encounter , but be confident to beat them ; for the spanish foot cannot deal with horse , and the swiss are not invincible when they meet with foot as obstinate as themselves . it has been seen by experience , and would be so again , the spaniards cannot sustain the fury of the french cavalry , and the swisses have been overthrown by the infantry of spain . and though of this last we have seen no perfect experiment ; yet we had a competent essay at the battel of ravenna , where the spanish foot being engaged with the german battalions ( which observe the same order and discipline with the swisses ) the spaniards by the agility of their bodies , and the protection of their bucklers , broke in under their pikes , and killed them securely , while the poor germans were uncapable to defend themselves ; and had not the spaniards been charged by the horse , the german foot had been certainly cut off . 't is possible therefore ( the defect of both those foot being known ) to institute a third , which may buckle with the horse , and be in no fear of their foot ; which will be effected , not by the variation of their arms , but by changing their discipline . and these are some of those things which being newly reformed , give great grandeur and reputation to any new prince . this opportunity therefore is by no means to be slip'd , that italy , after so long expectation , may see some hopes of deliverance : nor can it be expressed with what joy , with what impatience of revenge , with what fidelity , with what compassion , with what tears , such a champion would be received into all the provinces that have suffered by those barbarous inundations . what gates would be shut against him ? what people would deny him obedience ? what malice would oppose him ? what true italian would refuse to follow him ? there is not , there is not any body but abhors , and nauseates this barbarous domination . let your illustrious family , then address it self to the work , with as much courage and confidence as just enterprizes are undertaken ; that under their ensigns our country may be recovered , and under their conduct , petrarch's prophesie may be fulfilled , who has promised that , virtu contr ' al furore prendera l' arme , and fia il combatter corto . che l' antico valore ne ' gl' italici curr ' non e ancor morto . virtue shall arm 'gainst rage , and in short sight prove th' roman valour 's not extinguish'd quite . the original of the words guelf and ghibilin , so much mentioned in history . these two factions so famous in history , were eminent in italy two ages before castruccio was born . machiavel in his treatise of the wars of that country , affirms that pistoia was the first place where those names of distinction were used , but the account wherewith the publick libraries supply me , runs thus . these two words , guelf and ghibilin , deduce their original from a schism which molested the church in the year . by the competition of two popes , innocent . and anaclet : the greatest part of christendom acknowledged innocent , who was particularly supported by the emperors of the west . anaclet the anti-pope had persuaded into his interests , roger comte de naples and sicily , a martial prince , and descended from the normans , who had conquered that country . the pretence of this double election having kept a war on foot eight years together , which was still favourable to roger , the emperor conrad the third march'd himself at the head of an army of germans , into italy , leaving his grand-son prince henry to come after . roger , to oppose him with men of his own nation , allured to the defence of his countries guelf duke of bavaria . during the course of this war which began in the year . it hapned sometimes that the emperors army was commanded by the said prince herny , who was brought up in a village in germany called ghibilin , whose situation being very pleasant , made the very name of it ●ear to him . one day the armies being drawn up , and ready to engage , the bavarians to encourage their comrades , cryed out in their language , a guelf , a guelf ; and the emperors troops ( being at the same time as well disposed to their general ) to comply with the kindness he had for that place , cryed out on the other side , a ghibilin , a ghibilin . these words seemed barbarous to the italians that were with roger , who came to guelf to know what they meant : he told them the pope's party were intended by the word guelf , and the emperors by the word ghibilin : from that time those names grew so common in both armies , that by them they answered their who goes there ? and they were given to the italians according to their several sides . 't is true , at first they were used to discriminate only anaclet's party from the emperors , but afterwards roger having vanquished and taken prisoner pope innocent ; as the price of his liberty he oblig'd him to erect the countries of naples and sicily into kingdoms , by which treaty roger being taken off from the interest of the anti-pope , and engaging entirely with the church , he affix'd the name of guelf to the pope's party , and confirm'd the name ghibilin to the faction of the emperor . the italians would fain have the credit of the etymology themselves , and by a certain gingling of words , ( and that mightily strain'd ) would have guelf deriv'd from guardatori di fe , because ( forsooth ) 't is they who defend the faith of the church : and that by corruption the word ghibilin was form'd from guida belli , that is guidatori di bataglia , a great title , and sutable to the majesty of the empire . be it which way it will , these two factions were in the height of their emulation two hundred years after , that is to say , about the year . which was very near the time that castruccio was in his prosperity . and in europe the face of affairs stood thus . the popes ( driven from rome by the violence of the emperors of the west ) had transferred the holy chair to avignon in france . in the year . it was possessed by iohn xxii . a prince of himself firm and entire , but one who by the precipitate counsels of other people had excommunicated the emperor lewis of the house of bavaria , and been too busie with his fulminations against five more princes of italy , who ( being treated by him like tyrants ) confederated against him ; their names were castruccio sovereign of lucca , scaliger , lord of verona , the marquess d' esti lord of ferrara , and visconti , and gonzague the first sovereign of milan , and the other of mantoua : which created troubles to italy . the empire of the east was at that time torn , and distracted by the ambition of the paliologi and others , whilst in the mean time the sultan orchan son of ottoman , swept away lycaonia , phrygia , and all the coast of the hellespont from the greeks . the empire of the west was then in dispute betwixt frederick of austria , and lewis of bavaria , ( whom machiavel , by mistake or inadvertency , has called frederick , lewis after long and bloody wars overcome his competitor , and made several voyages into italy to invigorate and reinforce castruccio and the ghibilins . france was governed by philip le long , who at the solicitation of pope iohn passed an army into italy to the relief of the guelfs , which army was commanded by philip de valois afterwards king , but his expedition did not answer expectation ; for either the cunning or bribes of the ghibilins had dispelled the storm which our preparations threatned upon lombardy ; or our forces were recalled upon some secret apprehension of a fourth war with the english , or by the vast projects of a fifth expedition to the holy land. spain was divided into five kingdoms , each of which had its peculiar king ; four of them were christians , and one a mahumetan . navar had the same king with france . philip the long found a way to extend the salick law into that country , and defeat his niece iane of france , daughter of lewis hutin , of both kingdoms at once . alphonso xi . as mariana calls him , ( the xii . as garibay ) had at that time the scepter of castile , but his minority transferr'd the conduct of affairs into the hands of the two infanti , don pedro , and don iohn , insomuch as by the jealousie and division betwixt the two regents , that kingdom was exposed to such disorders as are inseparable from the minority of a prince . at length the two infanti were slain in the year . in a fight which their rashness caused them to lose to the mores under the walls of granada . arragon was in obedience to don iacques the second of that name ; he was brother to fredrick , who reigned in sicily to the prejudice of robert , a prince of the house of anjou . this robert was king of naples , sided with the guelfs , and leagued himself sundry times with the florentines against castruccio . iames , king of aragon , designing to establish himself in italy , and judging that the conquests which he mediated upon the isles of corsica and sardinia , depended much upon the concord of his subjects at home ; he caused a general assembly of his estates to be held in the year . in which was concluded the union of the kingdoms of aragon and valentia , with the principality of catolonia . don denis reigned in portugal , a person eminent among his subjects for magnificent building , and in great veneration for his piety and justice . but the felicity of his reign was disturbed by domestick broils which he had with his son , the infant don alphonso , who succeeded him in the crown . don denis instituted the order of christ in the year . the more , ismael , first of that name , had the monarchy of granada ; the battel which he gained . against the two infanti of castile , reviv'd the affairs of that nation , which were in their declension before , and gave new alarms to all spain . the king and kingdom of england were both governed by favourites at that time . edward . gave his authority and confidence , one while to gaveston , and then to the two spencers ; and this weakness and imprudence of his created so many discontents , and rendred him so odious to the people , that after much trouble to quit himself of an impostor who pretended to the crown , he was forced to go thorow a cruel war against the nobility , and another no less dangerous against robert bruce king of scotland . these great stirs and commotions could not but give some jealousies to france , which seeing the provinces that the english had on that side the sea perpetually in arms , was obliged to keep upon so strong a guard , as was little different from an open war. it is not then to be admired , the affairs of europe being in this confusion , if italy was left in prey to the guelfs and the ghibilins , and gave opportunity to the laying the foundation of so many principalities , that the most part of them are still in existence . but it is certain , that neither paulus iovius , girolamo briani , il biondo , nor the rest of the historians , who have written of the wars and concussions of these two factions , have left any thing comparable to the adventures of castruccio , they have lent me indeed some circumstances for the illustration and ornament of this history , and i have been forced to paraphrase upon five or six of the sayings of castruccio to give them their true grace , and make them intelligible , i know not whether i have followed the just temperament that is to be observed in a translation . 't is vitious to assume such liberty as the history will not bear , but on the other , to tye ones self up to the same , and same quantity of words , is as disingenuous and servile . 't is true , the same comma's and stops were by no means to be neglected , were all treatises that are translated , like the fallacious answer of a divine to braccio montone sovereign of perusia , which braccio being a ghibilin as well as castruccio , departed for the siege of aquila a town in the kingdom of naples , and being impatient to know his success , upon application to an astrologer , he received this answer , ibis redibis non morieris in bello : which if punctuated thus , ibis , redibis non , morieris in bello , threatned the said braccio with the unfortunateness of his expedition ; whereas altering it thus , ibis , redibis , non morieris in bello , portended quite contrary . an ambiguity like this was sent also to manfred king of sicily , not long before he was defeated by charles of anjou . no carlo sara vitorioso del re manfredo , and ought to be interpreted with great exactness and acuracy , the mistake of a comma being as much as a mans life is worth . there is another kind of tyranny likewise , and that is when the text of the author is to regulate in a point of religion : but here we are not under any such necessities , and he who in a quarrelsom capriccio , to defame my translation , would compare every line , and put the english words all along under the italian , would make a new and pleasant kind of dictionary , and the beauties which are peculiar to each language , would be excellently presented . the life of castrvccio castracani of lvcca , written by nicolo machiavelli and dedicated to zanobi buonbelmonti and luigi alamani his particular friends . it seems ( most excellent friends ) to those who consider it , very strange , that all , or the greatest part of them , who in this world have perform'd any thing extraordinary , and raised themselves above the pitch of their contemporaries , have had their births and beginnings mean and obscure , or else infested and perplexed with all the difficulties that fortune could present . for all of them having been exposed to wild beasts when they were young , or being descended from base parentage , and ashamed of their extraction , they have declared themselves sons of iupiter , or some other deity , of which sort the number being so great , and their story so well known , to repeat them would be both superfluous and troublesome . the reason i suppose to be , that fortune willing to demonstrate to the world , that 't is not any ones prudence , but she that raises men to be great , begins to shew and exercise her power at a time in which prudence can pretend to no share in us ; that all our successes may be acknowledged to her . castruccio castracani of lucca was one of this sort , who in respect of the times in which he lived , and the place in which he was born , performed great things ; for in his beginning he was neither more happy not more eminent than the rest , as you shall understand in my description of his life , which i have thought good to transmit to posterity , having observed many things in it ( both for virtue and event ) of extraordinary example ; and to you it seemed most proper to direct it , as persons more delighted with honourable and heroick actions , than any i know besides . i say then , the family of the castracani is reckoned among the most illustrious families in the city of lucca , though at present ( according to the fatality of all worldly things ) it seems to be extinct . out of this house there was born in former times one antonio , who entring himself into orders , was made a canon of saint mitchel in lucca , and in token of honour called messer antoin : he had no kindred but one sister , who was married long before to one buonaccorso cinami : buonaccorso being dead , and she being a widow , she lived with her brother , with resolution to marry no more . behind the house in which he dwelt , master anthony had a vineyard , which bordering upon several gardens , was accessible from several parts , and without much difficulty . it hapned that one morning about sun-rise , madam dianora ( for that was the sisters name ) walking out into the vineyard to gather herbs for a salad ( as women frequently do ) , she heard a rusling under the leaves , and turning towards it , she fancyed it cryed ; advancing up towards it , she saw the hands and face of a child , which tumbling up and down in the leaves , seemed to call for relief : madam dianora , partly astonished , and partly afraid , took it up very tenderly , carried it home , wash'd it and having put it in clean clouts , she presented it to master antony , who understanding the case and seeing the infant , was no less affected with wonder and compassion than his sister before him . debating with themselves what course was to be taken , it was concluded to bring it up , anthony being a priest , and she having no children . they christened it castruccio , by the name of their father , and look'd to it as carefully as it had been their own . castruccio's graces encreased with his years , and his wit was so pregnant , they put him to nothing but he took it very well . anthony designed him for a priest , and to resign his canonship and other benefices one day , and according to that design he gave him education ; but he could not find that castruccio had inclination to that kind of life ; on the contrary , he perceived his natural disposition tending quite another way . in short , castruccio was scarce years old , but abating by little and little of his awe and respects to antonio and dianora , he began to neglect his studies , to devote himself to arms , and taking great delight in wrestling , and running , and such violent exercises , his mettle was so well suted with the strength of his body , that none of his companions were able to cope with him . he troubled himself very little with reading , unless it were such things as might instruct him for war , or acquaint him with the great actions of some eminent commander , which did not only disquiet antonio , but afflicted him . there was at that time in lucca a gentleman called francisco , of the house of the guinigi a handsom man , very rich , and remarkable for many good qualities , which recommended him to one of the first ranks in the town . he had born arms all his life long , and for the most part under the viscontis , dukes of milan . he had with them engaged for the ghibilins , and the city of lucca look'd upon him as the very life of their party . it was at the time when these two great factions ( the guelfs and the ghibilins ) shared all italy betwixt them , divided the popes and the emperors , engaged in their different interests the inhabitants of the same town , and the members of the same family . francisco accompanied usually by persons of quality of his cabal , walk'd often before the place of st. michael , not far from the palace of the podestat or governor . in that market-place he tooke notice of castruccio , who was often times playing there amongst his school-fellows and comrades . he observed the youth always prescribed such sports to the rest , as he had chosen on purpose to prepare him for the war. francisco could easily perceived how much the agility of castruccio advanced him above his companions , and he as easily perceived that he assumed an authority over them , and that they on their part paid him a reverence , and such a one as was accompanied with kindness and zeal . francisco took a great fancy to the boy , inquited what he was , and being informed by some who were by , he had a months mind to have him himself : calling him to him one day , he ask'd him if he did not prefer a gentlemans family , where he might learn to ride the great horse , and exercise his arms before the cloister of a church-man where he must spin out his days in idleness and melancholy . he no sooner mentioned horses and arms , but castruccio was ready to have leap'd out of his skin ; but recollecting himself , a sentiment of modesty kept him from answering , till the fine words of francisco having given him more confidence , he told him , that if he had the liberty of choosing he had rather a thousand times be employed as a gentleman , than in the way for which he was design'd . his resolution was so pleasing to francisco , that not long after he made a visit to antonio , and begg'd castruccio of him , in so pressing , and yet so civil a manner , that antonio finding it impossible to master the natural inclinations of the youth , delivered him to francisco . by this means castruccio changed his education , and 't is not to be beleived with what easiness he improved in those exercises which are fit for a gentleman to learn. it was to be admired with what address and vigor he mounted his horse , with what grace he managed his launce , and with what comeliness his sword ; and this his dexterity distinguished him so highly from the croud of his companions , that it would have been imprudence in any one of them to have contended with him , either at the barrieri or iusts . to all these advantages he had an engaging way with him , that obliged where-ever he came ; his actions and his words seemed premedtiate and studied , so careful , and so regular he was lest he should say or do any thing that might any ways offends . he carried himself always with respect to his superiors , with modesty to his equals , and with civility and complaisance to those who were beneath him ; so that these good qualities did not only gain him the affection of francisco's whole family , but the love and esteem of the whole city of lucca . he was eighteen years old when the faction of the guelfs drove the ghibilins out of pania . visconti prince of milan , a zealous partizan of the ghibilins , solicited succours from francisco guinigi , who casting his eyes upon castruccio , as the first mark of his affection , made him lieutenant of a company of foot , and marched with him to visconti . the first campania this new lieutenant made , put him into such reputation , that he eclipsed the glory of all the rest who served in that war : he gave so great and so many testimonies both of his courage and conduct , that his fame was spread all over lombardy . when also he came back to lucca , and observed the town had doubled the respect which they had for him before , he applyed himself to make new friendships , and to that purpose made use of all the courtesie and insinuation that is necessary in that case . not long after francesco guinigi fell sick , and finding himself near his end , having but one son of about years of age , called pagolo , he sent for castruccio , and committed the tuition of his son , and the management of his estate into his hands , and having gently remembred castruccio that he was the person who raised him , he begg'd that he would shew the same generosity towards pagolo as he had done towards him ; and if any thing was due to the bounty of the father , to return it upon his son. he fancied he discerned in the countenance of castruccio all the marks and indications of a generous mind , and died without being disturbed with the least suspicion of his ingratitude . the trust , and his administration of so great an estate made castruccio more considerable than before , but they created him likewise some enemies , and lessened the affection which some had had for him : for knowing him to be of an enterprizing spirit , many began to fancy his designs were tyrannical , and to oppress the liberty of his country . the signeur giorgio opizi ( chief of the guelfs faction in lucca ) was the most to be apprehended of all those that accused castruccio with that abominable ambition . opizi was of opinion that the death of francesco guinigi , head of the adverse party , would leave him master of the town , but he quickly found that the single reputation o● castruccio would be a new impediment to his usurpation ; so that thinking to rob him of the affections of the people , he spread false reports , and aspersed him where-ever he came . at first these calumniations troubled castruccio but little , but at length they alarm'd him to the purpose ; for he suspected that opizi would not fail to set him at odds with the lieutenant which robert king of naples had settled in lucca and that if that governor was his enemy , he should in a short time be turned out of the town . and against so great danger , his provision was this . the town of pisa was then under the government of huguccione de fagivola , originally of the town of arrezzo ; being chosen captain by the pisans , he had made himself their soveraign , and having given protection to certain ghibilins who were banished from lucca , castruccio entred into secret intelligence by the privity of huguccione , and being assured of his assistance he resolved the poor exiles should be restored . to this effect he agreed with his friends in lucca , who were of his counsel , and jealous as himself of the power of the opizi . all necessary measures were taken by the conspirators . castruccio had the care of fortifying privately a tower in the city , called the tower of honour . he furnished it with ammunition , in case he should be forced to defend it ; and having appointed the night for the execution of their design , huguccione failed not at the precise hour to be at the rendezvous betwixt lucca and the neighbouring mountains . upon a signal given to castruccio he advanced towards the gate of st. peter , and set fire to the antiport next the ●ields , whilst castruccio broke down another on the other side of the town . in the mean time his associates cryed out to your arms , to excite the people to rise , and thereby put all things into confusion . huguccione entred with his troops , and having seized upon the town , he caused all the opizi to be murdered , and all the rest of their party which fell into their hands . the governor , for the king of naples was turned out , and the government of the town altered , as huguccione directed , who , to compleat the desolations of lucca , banished no less than a hundred of the best families that belonged to it ▪ the miserable exiles fled part to florence and part to pistoia , two towns of the faction of the guelfs , and for that reason enemies to huguccione , and the prevailing party in lucca . the florentines and whole faction of the guelfs , apprehending this great success would hazard to re-establish the power of the ghibilins in tuscany , they entred into consultation which way those exiles might be restored . they set out a considerable army , and encamped at monte carlo to open themselves a passage to lucca . huguccione on his side drew the lucca troops together , and put them under the command of castruccio , and then joyning them with his own from pisa , and reinforcing them with a squadron of german horse which he got out of lombardy , he marched out to encounter the florentines . whereupon the florentines quitted their post at monte carlo and entrenching betwixt monte-catino and pescia , huguccione possessed himself of the quarter which they had left . their armies being within two miles distance one from the other , their horse met daily and skirmished , and they had come certainly to a peremptory battel , had not huguccione fallen ill just in the nick . his disposition forcing him from the camp to look out for better accommodation in monte-carlo , he left the command of the army to castruccio , his retirement , which discouraged his own men , and made them think of protracting the battel , animated the florentines , but brought no great advantage to their affairs , in short , the florentines perceiving their enemies without a general , began to despise them , and castruccio observing how much they were elated , endeavoured to augment it . he pretended great consternation , and to make his fear the more credible , he gave orders that his troops should be drawn up within the lines , but with positive inhibition for any of them to go forth , though not a moment passed but the florentines provoked them ; but all to no purpose . besides that , this pretended terror in castruccio redoubled the rashness of the enemy , and perfectly blinded them , he drew another advantage from it , which was to discover exactly the disposition of their army and the order of their march. when he had well observed them , and tempted their temerity as much as he thought fit , he resolved to fight them the next bravado they made , and omitting nothing that might encourage his soldiers , he assured them of victory if they followed his commands . he had observed that the weakest and worst arm'd of their soldiers were disposed still in their wings , and their best placed in the body . castruccio drew up in the same order , but distributed his soldiers quite contrary , for the worst and most unserviceable he placed in the body and his best men in the wings , in this posture he drew out of the trenches , and had scarce form'd his battalia , before the enemy appeared , and with his usual insolence . castruccio commanded that the body should march slowly , but the two wings were to advance as fast as they could ; so that when they came to engage , there was only the wings that could fight ; for castruccio's body having lagged by command , the florentine body had too far to march before they could charge them , so as they remained idle , being neither able to do any thing against the main body that was design'd to oppose them , nor sustain those who were engaged in the wings ; so it hapned that the florentine wings ( composed of the refuse of their soldiers ) were easily broken by castruccio's , which consisted of his best , and when the wings of the enemy ( which were drawn up before their body ; so as the whole army was ranged in the figure of a half moon ) were routed , they turn'd tail , ran among their own body which was marching behind them , and put all into confusion . the loss was very great to the florentines , they left above men dead upon the place their best officers , and the bravest of the guelfs perished there unfortunately , and to make the defeat the more lamentable , there were several reformades which died there , of extraodinary quality . among the rest , piero brother to robert king of naples ; carlo nephew to the said king ; philip lord of tarentum , who were all come , in gallantry , to make that compania with the florentines . but that which made all the more wonderful was that castruccio lost not above men , though unhappily one of hugucciones sons were of that number , his name was francesco , who sighting briskly at the head of the voluntiers , for want of good conduct , was slain at the very first charge . so eminent a victory as this , must needs put castruccio into a reputation beyond expression ; but huguccione had like to have died , with meer jealousie , he foresaw that nothing of all this would redound to him , but the vain honour of commanding in chief , and that the real advantage would all fall to his lieutenant , so that to use him at that rate , was to rob him of his soveraignty : whereupon , nettled exceedingly , in great envy of his fortune , he resolved he should die . whil'st he was in this black resolution , and attended nothing but some specious pretence to get castruccio to him , and so draw him into his net , it hapned that agnolo micheli ( a person of great alliance as any in lucca , was murther'd by one who took sanctuary in castruccio's house , and was protected : huguccione's officers pursued , and demanded the criminal ; but castruccio denyed them , and suffered him to escape . huguccione ( who was then at pisa ) unwilling to lose so fair an opportunity to revenge himself , sent for one of his sons called nerli ( whom he put before into possession of the soveraignty of lucca ) commands him to repair thither with all speed , and get castruccio to his house under pretence of supping with some of the most eminent in the town ; and private orders were given for the making him away , nerli lay'd his ambush for castruccio very handsomly , for suspecting nothing , he came to the feast , and was arrested before he went out of the palace . but nerli ( being over circumspect , and imagining it might work some alteration in the spirits of the people , if he killed him bluntly without any formality ) writ to his father to know how he should dispose of him . huguccione , mad at his unseasonable prudence , departed from pisa at the head of horse , to go himself in person to dispatch castruccio ; but , huguccione was scarce got to bagni , before the pisans revolted ; cut his deputies throat ; and slew all his family that were left behind ; and that he might be sure they were in earnest , they chose the conte de guerardesc● , and made him their governor . though he had news of this rebellion before his arrival at lucca , yet he thought it inconvenient to return ; on the contrary , he made all the hast thither that he could , to be there ( if possible ) before the report , lest if the news got before him , it might have ill effect upon the luccheses , and prevail with them to exclude him their city . but the luccheses had heard it before , had such designs of their own , and the liberty of castruccio was the thing they were to pretend . huguccione was admitted , but his presence was not sufficient to keep them in their duties : they began to assemble in parties , to whisper and speak slightly of him in private , then to murmur , then to tumultuate , and taking arms by degrees , they came boldly , and demanded castruccio should be enlarged , and this they did in so positive and audacious a manner , that huguccione apprehending , the consequences , delivered him to them . castruccio not contented with that , conceiving vaster designs than formerly , and egg'd on by an equal impulse of honour and revenge , he assembled his friends , and taking the benefit of the favourable disposition of the people , he resolved to oppose himself against huguccione , and forcing of him out of lucca with all his party , huguccione retired into lombardy to the lords of scala where not long after he died very poor . this was a happy turn for castruccio , from the incommodities of a prison , to the supremacy of a prince ; and yet this was not enough . finding himself accompanied by a great number of his friends which encouraged him , and by the whole body of the people , which flattered his ambition , he caused himself to be chosen captain general of all their forces for a twelve-month ; and resolving to perform some eminent action that might justifie their choice , he undertook the reduction of several places which had revolted from that city in favour of huguccione . having to this purpose entered into strict alliance with the city of pisa , they sent him supplies , and he marched with them to besiege serezane , but the place being very strong ; before he could carry it , he was obliged to build a fortress as near it as he could . this new post in two months time , render'd him master of the whole country , and is the same fort that at this day is called serezanello , repaired since , and much enlarged by the florentines . supported by the credit of so glorious an exploit , he reduced massa , carrara , and lavenza very easily : he seized likewise upon the whole country of lunigiana , and to secure his communication with lombardy , he took pont remoli by force , and drove out anastasio palavicini the sovereign : so that full of glory he returned to lucca , where the people thronged to meet him , and received him with all possible demonstrations of joy . this was the happiest conjuncture for castruccio in the world , for having been so discreet before to make his interest with the most considerable of the luccheses , and among the rest with poggio , portico , baccansachi , and cecco guinigi , the favour of these great men , concurring with the inclination of the people , and every thing else contributing to his happiness , he was solemnly chosen their soveraign prince . about this time frederick de baviere , king of the romans passed out of germany into italy , to be crown'd emperor there . castruccio who had already wrought himself in some measure into his favour , put himself at the head of horse , and went to wait upon him , having left as his deputy in lucca , pagolo guinigi , his pupil , whom he had treated all along , as he had been his own son , in consideration of the benefits he had received from his father . frederick received castruccio with much kindness , and having done him several honours , and granted him many signal perogatives , he made him his lieutenant in the whole province of tuscany ; besides all this , the inhabitants of pisa ( at the same time mutining against their governor gerardesca , and driving him out of the town ) to defend themselves against his resentment , addressed to frederick for protection , and he gave the soveraignty of that town to castruccio . his choice was not unpleasing to the inhabitants who knew not where to find a better support against the faction of the guelfs , and particularly against the attempts of the florentine . after this , frederick return'd into germany , having made a lieutenant general of all italy , and left him in rome . there was not at that time either in lombardy or tuscany , any of the ghibilins of the emperor's party , but looked upon castruccio as the true head of their faction . those who were banished their country upon that score , fled to him for protection , and promised unanimously that if he could restore them to their estates , they would serve him so effectually , that the soveraignty of their country should be the recompence of his kindness . the chief of them were the guidi , scolari , uberti , gerozzi , nardi , and buomoccorsi , all exiles of florence : so that , flattered by their promises , and encouraged by the strength of his own force , he entertained a design of making himself master of tuscany , and to give more reputation to his affairs , he entred into a league with matteo visconti prince of milan . he put out a proclamation afterwards , that all his subjects which were capable to bear arms , should be ready at a certain warning to put themselves into service ; and for the better order of the muster rolls , by which his militia was to be regulated , the city of lucca having five gates , he divided the whole country into five parts , and disposed every soldier under his officer with so much , exactness , that in a short time he could march with men , besides what he could draw out of pisa. whil'st he was fortifying himself with soldiers and friends ; it fell out , that the guelfs in plaisansa having driven out the ghibilins , and received considerable succours from florence , and the king of naples came thundering down upon the territories of the prince of milan . the prince desired castruccio to give the florentines diversion ; to carry the war into their country , to withdraw them from lombardy , and thereby to put them upon the defensive , castruccio desired no more , and fell with a flying army into the valley of arno , took fucechio and san-miniato , and ravaged the country so effectually , that the florentines were constrained to call back their troops out of lombardy ; but the necessity of another diversion called back castruccio to the recovery of lucca . in his absence , the family of the poggi , which had been always his friends , and contributed more to his elevation , than any of the rest ; regreting that they had not been rewarded , according to the merits of their services , conspired with several others of the inhabitants to bring the city to revolt . they began the tumult one morning , and having put themselves in arms , they killed the chief officer which castruccio had established for the administration of justice . but whil'st they were disposing themselves to push on their sedition , stephano poggio , an old man , of a peaceable temper , and one who had not medled at all in the conspiracy of his relations , made use of the authority he had with them , caused them to lay down their arms , and offered his intercession to castruccio that they might obtain their demands . upon the first notice of this commotion , castruccio drew a party out of his army , and leaving the rest under the command of pagolo guinigi , he marched with all diligence back to lucca , where finding things quieter than he expected , he knew very well how to make his advantage of so temperate a submission , and disposed his troops and his friends in all the posts that might make him master of the town . stephano poggio , who thought in this juncture he had highly obliged castruccio , came to make him a visit , and judged it unnecessary to beg any thing of him ; all that he requested was , that he would pardon his family , allow something to their ancient services , and give some little indulgence to the transports of their youth . castruccio received him with much affection , and told him that he was more pleased to find those troubles appeased , than he had been offended at the news of their commotion ; and having pressed him to bring the male-contents to him , he added , that he thank'd his stars for giving him such an opportunity of signalizing his clemency . upon stephano's importunity , and castruccio's promise , they came all to attend him ; but castruccio apprehending that this new service of stephano might some time or other be reproached to him again , he resolved to make a signal example ; and accordingly regulating himself by the severe politicks of usurpers who upon such nice and critical occasions make no bones to sacrifice the innocence of particular man , to the conservation of the multitude , he commanded that the mutineers and stephano with them should be conducted to prison , and from thence to execution . whil'st he was thus employed , the florentines recovered san miniato , and castruccio holding it imprudence to keep in the field , whil'st he was insecure in the town , resolved to give some relaxation to his arms : he endeavour'd privately to feel how the florentines stood disposed to a truce , and ( the war having exhausted their coffers ) he found them so coming , that it was concluded for two years , upon condition that either party should retain what was then in their possession . castruccio being disintangled from his foreign embarrasments , applyed himself wholly to his security at home , and under several pretences , to quit himself of all those who were likely to dispute his soveraignty of lucca , not sparing his confiscations , and proscriptions against the exiles , nor the executions of any who were under his hands . to excuse himself he gave out that he had had too much experience already of the infidelity of those people , to trust them again ; but a strong citadel which erected in the city , was the true way to continue his authority ; and to give the more terror to the citizens , he caused the houses of his adversaries to be demolished , and the citadel to be built of their materials . his peace with the florentines , and his fortifications at lucca , employ'd him not so much , as to lessen his thoughts how he might make himself greater ; being unwilling again to come to an open war , he entertained private correspondencies , both on one side and the other . he had an ardent desire to make himself master of the town of pistoia , persuading himself it would give him footing in florence ; and in this prospect he held a secret commerce of amity with the different parties , which were predominant in pistoia . this double intelligence was managed with that slyness and delicacy , that each of them believed they were particularly in his confidence . it was a long time that these two opposite cabals had divided , or rather distracted that city . the one called the faction of the bianchi , had bastiano da possente for its head ; and the other called the neri , was commanded by iacopo de gia. each of them boyling with desire to supplant its competitor , repos'd much upon the promises of castruccio : and these two heads of the factions who had long been suspected to one another , took arms at length both at a time . iacopo posted himself towards the gate that goes to florence , and bastiano towards that which leads to lucca . at first it was in debate severally by each of them , whether they should call in the florentines ; but finding castruccio more active , and his forces better soldiers , each of them sent privately to him to solicit his assistance : castruccio carried it very demurely , and promised succour to both . he told iacopo , that in person he would relieve him ; and to bastiano he sent word he would do it by pagolo guinigi his lievtenant general , and the person of the world he loved best , for he regarded him as his son. having acquainted them both that they should expect their supplies about midnight , he agreed with pagolo , and causing him to march with part of his troops to joyn with bastiano at one gate , he with the rest advanced the common road towards iacopo . at both gates they were admitted as friends ; but no sooner were they entered , but upon a signal given , bastiano was killed on one side with all his chief friends , and iacopo and his friends scaped no better on the other ; the rest of their parties betaking to their heels , the whole town was left at castruccio's devotion . he came in person to reassure the magistrates , and brought them out of the palace whither they had fled to secure themselves ; having called the people together , the promised to cancel all the old debts , did many acts of grace , lessened their imposts , and prevailed upon them to be obedient , by the force of his caresses , and new priviledges which he gave them . this profuseness of kindness , had coax'd likewise the inhabitants of the country , they came in great throngs to salute and recognize their new prince , who sent them all home again in peace , all mightily taken with his virtues , and possessed with hopes of his extraordinary benefits . there was about this time some mutinies in rome , by reason of the dearness of provisions . the scarcity that was suffered , proceeded from the absence of the popes , who kept then their pontifical residence at avignon , and it added much to the revolt , that the romans could not endure to be governed by a german . this national animosity was the occasion of frequent murthers , and perpetual disorder . errico the emperor's lieutenant general found himself too weak to apply any remedy , and apprehended ( not without cause ) that the romans had private intelligence with the king of naples , that if their forces should joyn , he should be forced out of rome , and the pope be restored . he concluded therefore his safest recourse would be to castruccio ; so that he sent to him for supplies , and begg'd of him that he would come along with them in person . castruccio made no scruple of the voyage , being equally transported to be able to do a meritorious piece of service to the emperor , and put himself in a condition to be regarded at rome , and look'd upon as the moderator of their affairs whenever the emperor should be absent . leaving therefore the care of lucca to the charge of pagolo guinigi , and contenting himself only with a convoy of two hundred horse , he came to rome , and was received by errico with all possible honour . his presence having received the authority of the emperor , he took a gentle way to pacifie the people . the first thing he did , was to provide plenty of all things , causing store of corn to be brought thither from pisa , to take off the pretence of their revolt : after which mingling very discreetly his favours and his chastisements , he reduced all the chief citizens to their obedience to errico ; in acknowledgment of which castruccio was made senator of rome , and several honours conferred upon him with more than ordinary ceremony . the day of his promotion , he came forth in a habit sutable to his dignity , but enriched with a delicate embroidery , with two devices wrought in artificially , one before and the other behind ; the first was before , and in these words , ( as devout , as common ) he is as it pleases god ; and behind in these , and shall be what god will have him . whilst these things were in transaction , the florentines incensed that to the prejudice of their truce , castruccio had surprised the town of pistoia , resolved to recover it by force ▪ and thought it not likely to be difficult , if they took the opportunity of his absence . among the fugitives from pistoia who had saved themselves in florence , there were two principally considerable , cecchi , and baldini . they were men in action , and had always retain'd a private correspondence with their friends in pistoia ; and they managed all things so dexterously for a revolt , that they caused a good party of florentines to enter one night into the town , who restored them their liberty , with the destruction of all castruccio's party this news being brought to rome , touched castruccio to the quick , who taking leave of errico , with large journeys came directly to lucca . the florentines had notice of his return , and resolved stoutly to begin the war upon him , that he might not have leisure to prepare ; wherefore having obliged all that ( like themselves ) were favourers of the guelfish faction , to put themselves forward in some extraordinary manner , they raised a strong army , and marched with all diligence to possess themselves first of the valley of nievole to facilitate their communication with pistoia ; castruccio on his side with what forces he could get together , marched directly for monte-carlo , and having intelligence where the enemy was encamped , and how numerous their army , he judged the danger would be as great should he go and confront them in the plain of pistoia , as to attend them in the valley of pescia . he concluded therefore to draw them ( if he could ) into the streights of seravalle , for narrow passes , and rough and difficult ways were convenient for a small army as his was , which consisted of not above men , and would be a disadvantage to the florentines , who were compleat . wherefore , though he was well enough satisfied of the courage of his army , and understood the worth of every common soldier , yet he thought good to withdraw out of that champagn country , lest he should suffer himself to be overwhelmed with the multitudes of his enemies . seravalle , is a castle betwixt pescia , and pistoia , situate upon a hill which on that side puts a stop to the valley of nievole . this castle stands not upon the road , but is about two flight shot higher , and the passage down into the valley , is rather strait than sleep , for the declension is very gradual to the place where the waters divide , and pass to discharge themselves into the lake of tucechio and that passage is so streight , that twenty men in front , take up the whole breadth . there it was that castruccio designed to engage the enemy , as well to give the advantage of the streight to the smallness of his own army ; as to keep them from being sensible of the vast numbers of the florentines ; and prevent the terror which they might inspire the castle of seravalle belong'd to the signor manfredi a german , who had made himself lord of it , long before castruccio had seized upon pistoia , and kept it by common consent both of the inhabitants of pistoia and lucca . either because he kept his neutrality very strictly with both , or because the castle was so strong of it self it needed to fear neither . castruccio knowing the importance of that place from the beginning found a way to gain intelligence with a person who lived in the castle . the night before the day of the battel , by the ministry of this man , castruccio caused four hundred of his soldiers to enter , who cut the throat of manfredi , and seized on the castle . having secured so considerable a post without noise , he endeavoured to persuade the enemy that he would not stir from monte-carlo , thereby to draw them into his clutches , and make them hast with all speed to gain the avenues to the val de nievole , and this plot of his jump'd exactly with the florentine design . for they having no mind that pistoia should be the theatre of the war , and being willing to remove it into the vale , they encamped above seravalle , with intention to have passed the streights the next day , not imagining in the least that the castle was surprized . castruccio having notice of their motion ; about midnight drew his army out of their quarters , and stole privately before break of day to the foot of seravalle , the accident was odd , for as he marched up the hill on one side , the enemy marched up on the other : caused his foot to advance by the way of the common road , but he drew out a party of four hundred horse , and commanded them towards the left , on that side towards the castle . there were four hundred of the enemies horse , that were a forlorn to their army , and the whole infantry followed them , but their scouts were no sooner upon the top of the hill , when on a sudden they fell foul upon the troops of castruccio . they were strangely surprized for knowing nothing of the taking of the castle , they could not imagine the enemy would come to meet them : insomuch that before they had leisure to put themselves into a posture , they were constrained to engage tumultuosly with those troops which were drawn up in good order , but they in confusion ; not but some of the florentine cavaliers behaved themselves gallantly , but the noise of so unexpected an encounter , put them presently to a stand , and being defused in the army , it put all into great disorder and fear . the horse and the foot fell foul upon one another , and both upon the baggage : want of ground rendered the experience of the officers of no use , and the streightness of the pass , confounded all their military cunning . the first troops that castruccio charged upon the top of the hill , were immediately routed and the small resistance they made was not so much the defect of their courage , as the effect of the place , with the incommodity of which , and the strangeness of the surprize , they were constrained to give ground . there was no way left for them to run ; on their flanks the mountains were inaccessable , their enemies were in the front , and their own army in the reer . in the mean time , as this first charge of castruccio was not sufficient to stagger the enemies battel , he drew out a party of foot , and sent them to joyn with the horse in the castle of seravalle : this body in reserve having possession of the hills , and falling upon the flank of the florentines , forced them to give ground , and yield to the wild incommodity of the place , and the violence and fierceness of the enemy . the reer-guard ran , and having got into the plain that looks towards pistoia , every man shifted as well as he could . this defeat was bloody and great ; among the multitude of prisoners , there were many of the principal officers ; among the rest three noble florentines , bandino di rossi , francesco brunilleschi and giovanni della tosa , without mentioning several considerable tuscans , and many of the king of naples his subjects , who , by their princes order , were in the service of the florentine . upon the first tidings of their defeat , the pistoians turned the guelfs faction out of town , and came with their keys and presented them to castruccio , who pursuing his victory , carried prato and all the town in that plain , as well beyond as on this side the arno : after which he encamped with his army in the plain of peretola , two miles from florence , where he continued braving the city , and passed several days in the enjoyment of his good fortune , parting the spoil , and coining of mony , thereby exercising with great ostentation a kind of soveraign right over their territory ; and releasing something of the rigour of his discipline , he gave his soldiers liberty to insult as they pleased over the conquered ; and to make his triumph the more remarkable , nothing could serve the turn , but naked women must run courses on horse-back under the very walls of the city . but this gallantry and ostentation entertained him but lightly , or rather served but as a colour to hide his greater designs ; for in the mean time he found a way to corrupt lupacci , frescobaldi , and some certain other gentlemen in the town , who were to have delivered him a gate , and brought him into florence in the night , had not their conspiracy been discovered , and defeated afterward by the punishment of the accomplices . this great town being so streightned , and so long block'd up , that the inhabitants seeing no other way of preserving their liberty , than by engagi●g it to the king of naples , sent embassadors to that prince , and offered to throw themselves into his arms . it was not only for his honour to accept of their proffer , but for the general interest of the whole faction of the guelfs , which without that could subsist no longer in tuscany . the terms being agreed , the treaty concluded , and the florentines to pay him annually two hundred thousand florens , he sent them four thousand horse under the command of prince carlo his son. during this negotiation an unexpected accident hapned , which put castruccio into a cooler temper , and made him give the florentines breath in spight of his teeth : there was a new conspiracy against him at pisa , not to be suppressed by his presence : benedetto lanfranchi , one of the chief citizens in the town , was the author of it : benedetto troubled to see his country subject to the tyranny of a lucchese , undertook to surprize the citadel , force out the garison , and cut the throats of all that were friends to castruccio . but as in those kind of conjurations , if a small number be able to keep things secret , it is not sufficient to put them in execution ; and therefore whilst lanfranchi was endeavouring to hook in more associates , he met with those who were false , and discovered all to castruccio . two noble florentines , cecchi and guidi , who were fled to pisa , were suspected to be the traitors ; and the suspicion of that perfidy left an ill stain upon their reputation ; which way soever it was , castruccio put lanfranchi to death , banished his whole family , and several of the chief pisans were left shorter by the head . this plot discovering to castruccio that the fidelity of the towns of pistoia and pisa would be always easily shaken ; he put all things in practice that cunning or open force could suggest to keep them in their duties : but whilst his thoughts were upon the tenters about so important a care , the florentines had some respite to recover their senses , and expect the neapolitan succours , which being at length arrived under the conduct of prince carlo , a general counsel was held of the whole faction of the guelfs . upon the resolution taken there , an army was raised , the strongest that ever had been set out by that party , for it amounted to foot ; and horse . when their forces were ready , it was debated in the counsel of war , whether they should begin with the siege of pistoia or pisa. the latter carried it , for it was fancied the conspiracy of the pisans was so recent , that in probability it had left some seeds for a second revolt ; besides , the conquest of pisa would bring pistoia along with it . this great army opened their campagn in the beginning of may . lastra , signia , monte lugo and empoli were taken immediately , and it advanced afterwards to besige san-miniato . but castruccio without discomposure , either by the greatness of their force , or the swiftness of their progress , believed rather that the favourable instant was arrived in which fortune was to put into his hands the supreme authority of tuscany ; and therefore judging this effort of the enemy at pisa would succeed no better than their designs at seravalle , he came and entrenched at fucechio with foot , and horse , having put foot into pisa under the command of pagolo guinigi . fucechio is a castle seated so advantagiously , that there is not a better post in all the plain of pisa ; for it stands upon a little eminence equally distant from the two rivers arno and gusciana . the place of their encampment could have been no where better chosen , for unless the enemy divided , and came upon them in two bodies , ( which must needs weaken them much , ) they could not cut off the provisions which came to castruccio both from lucca and pisa. to come and face them in their trenches , would be rashly to engage themselves betwixt his army and pagolo's . to turn towards pisa , they must pass the river arno , and leave the enemy upon their backs , which was an attempt as dangerous as the other . castruccio's design was to make them pitch upon the last , and to invite them the better to pass over the river ; instead of bringing down his line to the bank , ( as he might very well have done , ) he turned it off short towards the walls of fucechio , not so much to shelter himself under the said walls , but cunningly to leave the enemy such a space free , as might tempt them to pass the river . and in the whole art of war , there is nothing so subtil as the election of posts and encampments , and that was castruccio's master-piece . the enemy having taken san. miniato , consulted for some time whether they should fall upon pisa , or castruccio in his camp : at length , all things well considered , it was concluded to march straight toward him . the river arno was at that time so low , it was fordable , but with trouble , for the horse pass'd up to the saddle , and the foot with proportion . at last on the th of iune in the morning , the florentines put themselves into battalia , and began to pass the river with a party of their horse , and a body of foot. castruccio having deliberated all things , and provided for more than one event , commanded a thousand foot along the river , above the passage where the enemy appeared , and sent a thousand more to post themselves below it ; and then advancing himself at the head of five thousand foot and three thousand horse , he came on couragiously against the enemy , as half of them were passed . the florentine foot , tired with the incommodity of their passage , and the weight of their arms , advanced but faintly against him ; and for their horse , they that passed first had made the bottom so loose , and so slipperry , that there was no passage for those who were to follow : on the contrary , their horses either stuck fast in the mud , or their legs came up , and they threw their riders into the water , where many of them were drowned . so that the florentines perceiving their attempt there was not like to succeed , recovered the bank , and marching a little higher , they searched for a better place : but where-ever they made their point , and endeavoured to go over , castruccio opposed them with the infantry he had drawn out , which being arm'd lightly with targets and darts , were every where immediately , charged the enemy both in the front and the flank , and setting up at the same time most hideous shouts , the florentine horse being frighted with noise , and wounded with darts , either run back , or threw their riders under their feet . as to the florentines who had passed first , they maintained their ground with a great deal of gallantry , and till then the loss was equal on both sides ; for if castruccio doubled his endeavours to force back the enemy into the river , the enemy was no less zealous to gain as much ground as might serve for drawing up their army when it should get over . both generals were very busie in the encouragement of their souldiers , both with exhortation and example . castruccio , to vilifie the enemy , remonstrated to his army , that they were the same people they had beat before at seravalle ; the florentines represented to their troops how infamous it would be for so numerous an army as theirs to be worsted by a handful of men . but castruccio , observing the battel grew tedious , and his own men began to be as weary as the enemy , and that there were as many wounded and dead on the one side as the other , he caused another body of five thousand foot to advance ; as soon as they were got up to reer of their companions , those who had been fighting all the while , and were then in the front , were commanded to open to the right and left , and wheel off into the reer , whilst the other advanced into the ground they had forsaken ; but whilst this was in agitation , the florentines gained something upon them , but they enjoyed it not long , for being to deal with fresh men , they were quickly disordered , and followed with that vigour , they threw themselves into the river . as to the horse both of the one side and the other , no advantage was to be observed . castruccio being sensible that in number his was much inferior to the enemy , had commanded his troops to entertain their horse with slight skirmishing , only to gain time ; for believing his foot able to beat the enemies , he intended afterwards to joyn them with his horse , and fall both together upon the cavalry of the florentines . the florentines tried another passage above the first , thinking thereby to have flanck'd castruccio afterwards ; but the bank on the other side being bad , and defended by the enemies foot , they were repulsed again , and in as great disorder as before . then castruccio came up to them , and charged them so smartly in all parts , that they were totally defeated ; so that of so vast an army , scarce a third part were saved , and several of their chief officers taken . prince carlo saved himself at empoli with michael falconi , and thadeo albizi , commissaries general of the florentine army ; one may easily imagine the plunder was great , and the slaughter no less . in short , according to the exactest computation , there were slain on the florentine side men ; on the side of castruccio but . here it was that fortune began to be weary of the great actions of castruccio , and ( inconstant as she was ) instead of giving him long life that might have crown'd his felicity as if she had been jealous of his glory , she interposed with the only obstacle that was able to interrupt the prosperity of so incomparable a man. this illustrious hero tired with the fatigues of a battel , as painful as glorious ; coming out of the fight with his imagination full of great things that might follow , and running over in his mind the probability of his good fortune , believing no hopes were left for the enemies loss , nor no bounds for his victory , he marched directly for the gate of fucchio . it having been always his principle to be first on horseback , and last that came out of the field , he rested there some time , not out of ostentation , but to thank and caress the souldiers as they returned from the pursuit , and withal to be ready , in case the enemy should rally . whilst he was standing there , covered with sweat , his heart panting , and out of breath , an unlucky cold wind came from the other side of the arno , and with a pestiferous quality so affected his blood , that he fell immediately into the cold sit of an ague : at first he neglected it , though he found a general alteration , as believing himself sufficiently hardned against the injuries of the air ; but this negligence was very pernicious . the next night his fit increased , and his fever was so violent , his physitians gave him over . the universal sadness of the souldiers made his triumphant troops look as melancholy as if they had been beaten . all his officers stood about him with tears in their eyes , but having taken then particularly by the hand , and desired them to withdraw , he caused pagolo guinigi to be called , took him in his arms , and with a feeble but affectionate voice , he spake to him as follows . had i imagined ( dear son ) that fortune would have stop'd my course in the midst of the way that conducted me to glory , and so soon interrupted the felicity of my arms , i would have better enjoyed the fruit of my pains . 't is possible i should not have left your territory so large , but i should have endeavoured to have left it more quiet , by creating fewer enemies to my self , and less envy to you . i should have contented my self ( dear son ) with the sovereignty of lucca and pisa , and instead of intending the conquest of pistoia , and contracting the hatred of the florentines by so many affronts , i should have endeavoured by all means possible to have gained their affection : by so doing , if i had not lengthened my days , i should have made them at least more happy , and left you more quiet and secure . but fortune ( who will have the ordering of all humane affairs ) gave me not so much judgement as was necessary to know her , nor so much time as was requisite to master her , you have heard ( for every body has told you , and i never denied it ) how i came into your father's house , young , inconsiderable , without hopes of advancement ; in a word , in so mean a condition , that without his kindness i could never have satisfied the ambition of my nature . your father brought me up with the same care and tenderness as if i had been his own , and i do acknowledg , if ever i gave any testimonies of valour and magnanimity , they were but the effects of those great examples which he set me , and the fair education i had from him , conducted me to that height which , not only you , but all the world has admir'd . when he came to die , he committed to my care and faith both your person and interest ; have i betraid his confidence in any thing ? can you complain that my generosity has not been answerable to his ? my heart does not reproach me by any ingratitude . i have not only preserved to you the fortune of your father ; but to leave you the fruit of my labours and success , i have declined all overtures of marriage , lest hapning to have children of my own , my natural affection for them should have destroyed my friendship for you ; and lessened the acknowledgment which i owed to his bounty . it touches , it touches , dear charge , when we speak of these things . you cannot comprehend the satisfaction i receive , to leave you master of so puissant a state ; nor can you imagine how it troubles me to leave it so unselted and perplexed . the city of lucca is under your subjection , but be sure 't is not pleased with its condition : pisa likewise is yours , but you know the natural inconstancy of that people . though it has been often subdued , and passed from one servitude to another , yet it will always disdain to pay obedience to any native of lucca , and have a care how you regulate your politicks in relation to this jealousie , which is inseparable from persons of different countries . the town of pistoia is a place that ought always to leave upon your spirit some suspition and umbrage of their fidelity . besides , that it is divided within it self , the ill treatment which it has received from us will most sensibly excite it against our family . but the worst of all is , the florentines are your neighbours , and you know mortally offended , as having been worsted by me perpetually : but that is not sufficient to suppress them . they will be now overjoy'd and insult more upon the news of my death , than if they had conquered all tuscany . as to the succours , you are to expect i will not dissemble with you : you can hope for none but from the emperor , or princes of milan , and you will be deceived if you expect any from them ; they are either too slow , or too busie , or too remote . depend not therefore upon any thing but your own conduct , upon the memory of my atchievements , and the consternation which my victory has brought upon our enemy . it will be no little advantage to you if you can allure the florentines to an accommodation , and their fear , without doubt , sufficiently inclines them . let your comportment with them for the future be different from mine ; and as i have always provoked them , and believed nothing could so much contribute to my happiness , as to deal with them as enemies , let it be your care to desire their amity , and found not your repose upon any thing so much as an alliance with them . nothing in this life imports us so deep as the knowledg of our own tempers , and how to employ them ; but this science belongs most properly to those who would govern ; and it is necessary for such to spin out their lives in the luxuries of peace , when they find themselves unfit for warlike executions : my advice therefore ( dear charge ) is , that you would live in repose , and if you will make the advantage of the troubles of my life to sweeten your own , you will remember to follow it . farewel , i am going , and with this double satisfaction , that as i have left you the possession of a large empire , so i have left you such percepts as will secure it to you . castruccio ended this passionate discourse by griping pagolo by the hand , who heard him all the while with tears in his eyes : and as the last instance of his gratitude , this great person called for all the brave and faithful officers of his army , whether of lucca , pisa , or pistoia , and having recommended to them the interests of pagolo , he obliged them to an oath of allegiance , and as soon as that oath was solemnly taken , the great conqueror surrendred his soul. never was victorious army so sad , never any prince so lamented , nor any memory so venerable . his exequies were honourably celebrated , and his body buried in the church of st. francis in lucca . pagolo succeeded , but not with the virtue and fortune of his predecessor ; for not long after he lost pistoia , and then pisa , and much ado he had to keep the sovereignty of lucca , yet that continued in his family to the fourth generation . these great actions do sufficiently prove that castruccio was not only a man rare in his own age , but would have been the same in any former . his stature was higher , and his proportions better than ordinary : his aspect was charming , and he had so much grace and goodness in his accost , that never man went unsatisfied from his conversation : his hair was inclining to red , and he wore it short above his ears : where-ever he went , snow , hail , or rain , let the weather be what it would , his head was always uncovered . he had all the qualities that make a man great : grateful to his friends , terrible to his enemies , just with his subjects , crafty with strangers , and where fraud would do the business , he never troubled himself to conquer by force . no man was more forward to encounter with danger , nor no man more careful to get off . he used to say that men ought to try all things , and be terrified at nothing ; for it was clear god almighty was a lover of courage , because he made valiant men the ministers of his judgments , and corrected the poor spirited by them . he had a strange presence of wit , and made his reparties with admirable quickness ; he would rally very handsomly , sometimes he would be pleasant and innocent , and sometimes as bitter , and poinant . when occasion offered fairly , as he never spared any body , so he was never offended when he was bitten himself . we have some of his answers which he gave with much wit , and others of other peoples which he heard with as much patience . he caused a bird to be bought one day , and gave a ducat for it ; one of his acquaintance blaming him for giving so much : you ( says castruccio ) would have given a penny for it your self ? the other answering yes ; then ( says castruccio ) you would have paid dearer than i , for a ducat is not so much with me . having a flatterer about him who plagued him with perpetual requests , in great scorn castruccio spit upon his clothes : the flatterer reply'd wittily , a fisherman to get a pitiful little fish , is dabbled up to the neck , and shall i be afraid of a little spittle , that am catching a whale . castruccio was pleased with his answer , and rewarded him for it . a certain hypocrite who loved his gut as well as he , reproached castruccio one day , b● the luxury and extravagance of his table . if that were a sin ( replyed castruccio ) the●● would not be so much feasting upon holy-days . passing one day thorow a street , where there lodged certain women of but indifferen● reputation , and seeing a young man come from them who blushed , had was in mighty confusion that castruccio had seen him ; friend , says castruccio , you should not be ashamed when you come out , but when you go in . he was always of an opinion that a conqueror ought not to give too much liberty to his new subjects , which upon a time he explained very subtilly to some who understood him ; having a knot given him that was very fast tyed , he was desired to undo it , and having tryed a good while to no purpose , my friend ( said he a loud ) if a thing that is tyed can give me so much trouble , i shall be much worse when once it is loosed . he was often troubled with the assiduities of a person who pretended to be a philosopher , and was always molesting his entertainments with his admonitions and morals ; castruccio weary of his insolence at his table , told him , you philosophers are like dogs , you never go any where but where you may have something to bite . the philosopher replyed , no sir , we are more like physicians , and go only to those who have extraordinary need of us . passing one day from pisa to legorn by water , a great tempest arose on a sudden , and put castruccio into some apprehension , which one of the company observed , and told him by way of reproach , that he wondered such a man as castruccio should be frighted , when he found no such passion in himself . castruccio replyed , you have no reason sir to be afraid ; for every man values his life according to its worth . one asked him one time what he should do to make himself esteem'd ; he replyed , when you 'r invited to a feast , have a care you do not set a wooden statute upon a joyn'd stool . a fellow boasting to him one day how many books he had read , castruccio told him , it would have been more credit to have remembred half of them . a great drinker , who was a●ways debauching , used to value himself very much upon this score , that though his belly was always full of wine , he never was drunk . castruccio told him , a quart pot was the same . a friend of his seeing him engaged in a amour with a very pretty young lass , blamed him very seriously that he suffered himself to be so taken by a woman , you are deceived sir , said he , she is taken by me . one found fault with him exceedingly for being so delicate and so expensive in his dyet ; you would not ( said castruccio ) spend half so much in yours ? and being answered no , then ( replyed castruccio ) you are a greater miser , than i am an epicure . he was invited one evening to supper bp faddeo bernardi , a lucchese , a very rich and sumptuous citizen ; being arrived at the house , and conducted by faddeo into a room , exceedingly well hung , the pavement of mosaique work , wrought curiously into flowers , and leaves , and branches , which yielded a most excellent verdure . castruccio admir'd it exceedingly , and pretending to have occasion to spit , he turned about , this way and that way , and at last spit in faddeo's face ; faddeo was much troubled , but castruccio excused it , and told him , he thought he could have spit no where to have offended him less . one asking very seriously how caesar died ? he answered as seriously , would i might die like him . one of his courtiers having an ambition to regal him , made a ball one night , and invited him to it ; castruccio came , entertained himself among the ladies , and being in a good humour , fell a dancing and solacing among them , and doing some impertinencies which did not stand with the gravity of his rank : being admonished by one of his friends that it would detract from his esteem ; he told him , i thank you sir for your caution , but he that is counted wise all day , will never be thought a fool at night . one coming to him to beg a boon that castruccio was unwilling to grant , castruccio declined him , and would not seem for to hear ; whereupon the petitioner threw himself upon the ground , and put his head to castruccio's feet ; castruccio reproving him , the other replyed , you your self are the cause , you heard so little when i stood up , i had a mind to see whether your ears were upon your toes . which answer got him more than he desired . he was wont to say , the way to hell was very easie , for men went thither upon their backs , and could find it with their eyes shut . another desiring a favour of him , with a thousand impertinent and superfluous words : hark you friend , says castruccio , when you would have any thing with me for the future , send another man to beg it . another great talker having tired him with a tedious discourse , excused himself at last ▪ and told him he was a fraid he had wearied him , no indeed sir , reply'd castruccio , for i did not mind one word that you said . he used to droll upon a person , who having been a handsom boy , prov'd as handsom a man , his spight ( said he ) has been always against married people : when he was a boy he debauched men from their wives , and now he debauches women from their husbands . he saw an envious man laugh , and asked him , do you laugh , said he , that things go well with your self , or ill with other people . when he was under the tutelage of francesco guinigi , one of his comerades asking him merrily , what he should give him for a box at his ear , castruccio answered immediatly , a helmet if you please . he was forced to put a citizen of lucca to death , who formerly had been a great instrument of his advancement ; and being reproached by some body , for dealing so severely with an old friend ; no , says he , you are mistaken , it was with a new foe . castruccio compared the prudence of those persons , who though they pretended to marry , would never be brought to 't , to the discretion of those people , who though they talk'd much of going to sea , kept constantly at land. he used to say , he wondered much at one custom among men : when they buy any thing curious , either of christal or glass , they sound it , and employ all their senses to be sure it be good ; but in choosing of a wife , they use nothing but their sight , as if she was taken only to be look'd upon . he was of opinion that after his death there would be a general alteration ; and being asked when he came to die , how he would be buried , he replyed , with my face downward , for i am sure in a short time this country will be turned topsie turvey , and then i shall be in the same posture with other men . whil'st he was in controversie with huguccione , but had him in great veneration for his bravery and conduct ; being asked in discourse whether for the salvation of his soul , he never had any thoughts of turning monk , he answered no , for to him it seemed very strange if frier lazarone should go to paradise , and huguccione de faggivola to hell. being asked what time was most proper for a man to eat , to keep himself in health , he answered , the rich when they are hungry , and the poor when they can . seeing a friend of his make use of his servant to put up his breeches , he told him , i hope e're long , you 'l have one to feed you . seeing over the door of a certain person this inscription in latin , god keep this house from ill people ; he cryed , then the master must never come in to 't . passing by a little house with a great gate , he said , if they have not a care , this house will run away thorow the gate . being in discourse with the ambassador of the king of naples about the settlement of their frontiers ; upon some controversie betwixt them , the ambassador ask'd him in a huff , why then sir you are not afraid of our king ? castruccio replyed gently , is your king a good a man , or a bad ? being answered a good ; why then , said castruccio , would you have me afraid of a good man ? we might add many other answers of his , all full of weight , as well as wit ; but these shall suffice . he dyed in the th year of his age , and from the time he came first to appear in the world , in his good and his bad fortune he expressed always an equality and steddiness of spirit ; and as he left several monuments of his prosperity and good fortune behind him ; so he was not ashamed to leave some memorials of his adversity : when he was delivered from huguccione's imprisonment , he caused the irons with which he was manacled , to be hung in the publickest place in his palace , where they are to be seen to this day , being willing that posterity might know , that how fortunate soever he was in the main , he was not totally exempt from distress . that which is still remarkable is , that having equalled the great actions of scipio and philip the father of alexander , he died as they did in the th . year of his age , and doubtless he would have surpassed them both , had be found as favourable dispositions at lucca , as one of them did in macedon , and the other in rome . a narrative of the murther of vitellozzo vitelli , oliveretto da fermo , signor pagolo , and the duke de gravina , ( all of the family of the ursini ) the one committed by duke valentine , and the other composed by nicolo machiavelli . duke valentine was returned from lombardy , whither he had gone to excuse himself in relation to certain calumnies objected against him by the florentines about the revolt of arezzo , and other towns in the vale de chiana , and being come to imola , upon consultation with his friends , he concluded upon his expedition against giovanni bentivogli sovereign of bolonia , because duke valentine had a mind to reduce that city , and make it chief of his dutchy of romagna ; of which the vitelli , orsini , and their followers having notice , it appeared to them all , that the said duke valentine grew too potent , and that upon the taking bolog●● , it was to be feared , he would endeavour to exterminate them , and make himself the only great man in italy . hereupon a dyet was held at magione in perugia , where the●e met the cardinal pagolo , the duke de gravina orsini , vitellozzo vitelli , oliveretto da fermo , gianpagolo baglioni , sovereign of perugia , and antonio da venafro sent from pandolfo petrucci , as head of sienna . upon serious deliberation about the greatness and disposition of the duke , it was concluded very necessary to restrain him in time ; otherwise there was great danger of a general destruction . resolving therefore to desire aid of the florentines , and to continue their amity with the bentivogli , they sent embassadors to both ; promising their assistance to the one , and begging the assistance of the other against the common enemy . this dyet was quickly nois'd all over italy , and such of duke valentine's subjects as were discontented ( among whom were the urbinati ) began to hold up their heads , and hope for a revolution . while the people were in this suspence , certain of the inhabitants of urbino , laid a plot to suprize the castle of san. leo , which at that time was kept for the duke , and the manner was thus ; the governor of the castle was busie in repairing it , and mending the fortifications , to which purpose having commanded great quantities of timber to be brought in , the conspirators contrived that certain of the biggest pieces should be laid ( as by accident ) upon the bridge , which they knew could not be cran'd up without a great deal of difficulty ; whil'st the guards were employed in hoysting the timber , they took their opportunity , seized upon the bridge , and then upon the castle , which was no sooner known to be taken , but the whole country revolted and called in their old duke ; yet , not so much upon the surprize of that castle , as their expectations from the dyet at magione , by means of which they did not question to be protected . the dyet understanding the revolt of urbino , concluded no time was to be lost , and having drawn their forces together , they advanced , if any town was remaining to the duke , to reduce it immediately . they sent a new embassy to the florentines to solicite their concurrence against the common enemy ; to remonstrate their success , and to convince them that such an opportunity being lost , was not to be expected again . but the florentines had an old pique to the vitelli and ursini upon several accompts , so that they did not only not joyn with them , but they sent their secretary nicolo machiavelli to the duke to offer him reception of assistance which he pleased to elect. the duke was at imola at that time in great consternation ; for unexpectedly on a sudden , when he dream'd nothing of it , his soldiers revolted , and left him with a war at his doors , and no force to repel it : but taking heart upon the florentine complement , he resolved with the few forces he had left , to protract , and spin out the war , and by propositions and practices of agreement , gain time till he could provide himself better , which he did two ways , by sending to the king of france , and by giving advance mony to all men at arms and cavalry that would come in . notwithstanding all this , the ursini proceeded , and marched on towards fossombrone , where being faced by a party of the dukes , they charged them , and beat them : the news of that defeat , put the duke upon new counsels , to try if he could stop that humour by any practice of accord ; and being excellent at dissembling , he omitted nothing that might persuade them that they were the aggressors and had taken up arms first against him : that what was in his hands , he would willingly surrender ; that the name of prince was enough for him , and if they pleased , the principality should be theirs ; and he deluded them so far , that they sent signor pagolo to him to treat about a peace , and in the mean time granted a cessation of arms : however the duke put no stop to his recruits , but reinforced himself daily with all possible diligence ; and that his supplies might not be discovered , he dispers'd them as they came , all over romagna : whil'st these things were in transaction , a supply of lances arrived to him from france ; and though by their help he found himself strong enough to confront his enemy in the field , yet he judged it more secure and profitable to go on with the cheat , and not break off the capitulation that then was on foot : and he acted it so well , that a peace was concluded ; their old pensions confirmed , duckats paid down , a solemn engagement given not to disturb the bentivogli ; he made an alliance with giovanni , and declared that he could not , and had no power to constrain any of them to come personally to him , unless they pleased to do it themselves . they promised on their part to restore the dutchy of urbino , and whatever else they had taken from him ; to serve him in all his enterprizes : not to make war without his leave ; nor hire themselves to any body else . these articles being sign'd , guid ' ubaldo duke of urbin fled again to venice , having dismantled all the castles and strong holds in his dutchy before he departed ; for having a confidence in the people , he would not that those places which he could not defend himself , should be possessed by the enemy , and made use of to keep his friends in subjection . but duke valentine having finished the agreement , and disposed his army into quarters all over romagna , about the end of november , removed from imola to cesena , where he continued several days in consultation with certain commissioners sent from the vitelli , and ursini ( who were then with their troops in the dutchy of urbino ) about what new enterprize they were next to undertake ; and because nothing was concluded , oliverotto da ferno was sent to propose to him , if he thought good , an expedition into tuscany ; if not , that they might joyn , and set down before sinigaglia . the duke replyed , that the florentines were his friends , and he could not with honour carry the war into tuscany , but their proposal for sinigaglia , he embraced very willingly . having beleaguer'd the town , it was not long before they had news it was taken , but the castle held out ; for the governor refused to surrender to any body but the duke , whereupon they intreated him to come . the duke thought this a fair opportunity , and the better because he went not of himself , but upon their invitation ; and to make them the more secure ; he dismissed his french , and sent them back into lombardy ( only he retained a hundred lances under the command of his kinsman monsieur de candale . ) departing about the end of december from cesena , he went to fano , where with all the cunning and artifice he could use , he persuaded the vitelli and ursini to stay with the army till he came ; remonstrating to them that such jealousies and suspicions as those , must needs weaken their alliance , and render it undurable ; and that for his part he was a man who desired to make use as well of the counsels , as the arms of his friends . and though vitellozzo opposed it very much , ( for by the death of his brother he had been taught how unwise it was to offend a prince first , and then put himself into his hands ) nevertheless persuaded by paulo ursino ( who underhand was corrupted by presents and promises from the duke ) he consented to stay . hereupon the duke upon his departure the th of decemb. . imparted his design to eight of his principal intimates ( amongst whom don michael , and monsignor d' euna were two ) and appointed , that when vitellozzo , pagolo ursini , the duke de gravina , and oliverotto should come to meet him , two of his favourites should be sure to order it so , as to get one of the ursini betwixt them , ( assigning every couple his man ) and entertain them till they came to sinigaglia ; with express injunction not to part with them upon any terms till they were brought to the dukes lodgings , and taken into custody . after this he ordered his whole army , horse and foot ( which consisted of of the first , and of the latter ) to be ready drawn up , upon the banks of the metauro , about five miles distant from fano , and to expect his arrival . being come up to them upon the metauro , he commanded out two hundred horse as a forlorn , and then causing the foot to march , he brought up the reer himself with the remainder . fano , and sinigaglia , are two cities in la marca , seated upon the bank of the adriatick sea , distant one from the other about miles ; so that travelling up towards sinigaglia , the bottom of the mountains on the right hand are so near the sea , they are almost wash'd by the water , & at the greatest distance they are not above two miles . the city of sinigaglia from these mountains is not above a flight shot , and the tide comes up within less than a mile . by the side of this town there is a little river , which runs close by the wall next fano , and is in sight of the road : so that he who comes to sinigaglia , passes a long way under the mountains , and being come to the river which runs by sinigaglia , turns on the left hand upon the bank , which within a bow shot , brings him to a bridge over the said river , almost right against the gate : before the gate there is a little bourg with a market-place , one side of which , is shouldred up by the bank of the river . the vitelli , and ursini , having concluded to attend the duke themselves , and to pay their personal respects , to make room for his men had drawn off their own , and disposed them into certain castles at the distance of six miles , only they had left in sinigaglia , oliveretto with a party of about foot , and horse which were quartered in the said bourg . things being in this order , duke valentine approached , but when his horse in the van came up to the bridge , they did not pass , but opening to the right and left , and wheeling away , they made room for the foot , who marched immediately into the town . vitellozzo , pagolo , and the duke de gravina , advanced upon their mules to wait upon duke valentine ; vitellozzo was unarm'd in a cap lin'd with green , very sad and melancholy , as if he had had some foresight of his destiny , which considering his former courage and exploits , was admired by every body : and it is said , that when he came from his house , in order to meeting duke valentine at sinigaglia , he took his last leave very solemnly of every body . he recommended his family and its fortunes , to the chief of his officers , and admonished his grand-children , not so much to commemorate the fortune , as the magnanimity of their ancestors . these three princes being arrived in the presence of duke valentine , saluted him with great civility , and were as civilly received ; and each of them , ( as soon as they were well observed by the persons appointed to secure them ) were singled , and disposed betwixt two of them . but the duke perceiving that oliveretto was wanting ( who was left behind with his regiment , and had drawn it up in the market-place for the greater formality , ) he wink'd upon don michael ( to whom the care of oliveretto was assign'd ) that he should be sure to provide he might not escape . upon this intimation , don michael clap'd spurs to his horse , and rid before , and being come up to oliveretto , he told him it was inconvenient to keep his men to their arms , for unless they were sent presently to their quarters , they would be taken up for the dukes ; wherefore he persuaded him to dismiss them , and go with him to the duke . oliveretto following his counsel , went along with him to the duke , who no sooner saw him , but he call'd him to him , and oliveretto having paid his ceremony fell in with the rest . being come into the town , and come up to the duke's quarters , they all dismounted , and attended him up , where being carried by him into a private chamber , they were instantly arrested and made prisoners . the duke immediately mounted , and commanded their soldiers should be all of them disarmed ; oliveretto's regiment being so near at hand , were plundered into the bargain . the brigades which belong'd to vitelli , and ursini being at greater distance , and having notice of what had hapned to their generals , had time to unite , and remembring the discipline and courage of their masters , they kept close together , and marched away in spight both of the country people , and their enemies . but duke valentine's soldiers , not content with the pillage of oliveretto's soldiers , fell foul upon the town , and had not the duke by the death of several of them , repressed their insolence , sinigaglia had been ruined . the night coming on , and the tumults appeased , the duke began to think of his prisoners , resolved vitellozzo , and oliveretto should die , and having caused them to be guarded into a convenient place , he commanded they should be strangled ; but they said nothing at their deaths , that was answerable to their lives ; for vitellozzo begged only that the pope might be supplicated in his behalf , for a plenary indulgence . oliveretto impeached vitellozzo , and lay'd all upon his back . pagolo and the duke de gravina were continued alive , till the duke had information that his holiness at rome had seized upon the cardinal orsino , the arch-bishop of florence , and messer iacopo da santa croce ; upon which news , on the th of ianuary , they also were both strangled in the castle of piene after the same manner . the state of france , in an abridgment written by nicolo machiavelli , secretary of florence . the kings and kingdom of france are at this time more rich and more powerful than ever , and for these following reasons : first , the crown passing by succession of blood is become rich , because in case where the king has no sons to succeed him in his paternal estate , it falls all to the crown ; and this having many times hapned , has been a great corroboration , as particularly in the dutchy of anjou ; and at present the same is like to fall out to this king , who having no sons , the dutchy of orleans , and state of milan ( his hereditary countries ) are like to devolve upon the crown : so that at this day most of the good towns in france are in the crown , and few remaining to particular persons . a second great reason of the strength of that king is , that whereas heretofore france was not entire , but subject to several great barons , who were able not only to expostulate , but to contend with the king ( as the dukes of guienn and burbon did formerly ) the said barons are now most obsequious and dutiful . a third reason is , because formerly all the neighbouring princes were ready upon every occasion to invade the kingdom of france ; the dukes of burgundy , britannie , guienne or flanders , being always tempting them thereunto , and giving them access , passage , and reception , as it hapned when the english had wars with france , by their confederacy with the duke of britagne , they got admission into that country , and gave the king of france his hands full : and in like manner the duke of burgundy was as troublesom , by means of the duke of bourbon . but now britagne , guienne , the bourbonois , and greatest part of burgundy being united to that crown , and very loyal and faithful ; those neighbouring princes do not only want their old confederates to invite and assist them , but they have them for their enemies ; so that the king of france is more strong , and his adversaries more weak . another reason may be , that at this day the richest and most potent of the barons are of the blood royal ; so that upon defect of those who are before them , the crown may come to them , upon which score they are firm to it , hoping that some time or other it may fall either to them or their posterity , whereas to mutiny or oppose , it might prejudice their succession , as it hapned to this king lewis when he was taken in the battel of britagne , where in favour of the said duke of britagne , he was personally in service against the french. upon the death of king charles , the crown being legally in lewis , it was disputed whether that fault and defection of his should not be a bar to his succession , and had it not been that he was very rich , by means of his frugality , and able to bear the port of that dignity at his own expence , and the next heir monsigneur d' angolisme an infant , he had lost it ; but for these reasons , and some favour which he had besides , lewis was created king. the last reason is , because the states of the barons in france are not divided among the heirs , ( as in germany , and several parts of italy ) but descend still to the eldest son who are the right heirs ; and the younger sons are left , by some little assistance from their elder brothers to shift for themselves ; whereupon they betake themselves generally to the wars , endeavouring to advance themselves that way , and raise themselves fortunes : and hence it is the frenchmen at arms are better at this day , and stand fair for preferment . the french infantry cannot be good , for it being long since they had any war , they must needs want experience . besides in the country , the towns are full of tradesmen and mechanicks , all of them so curb'd and cow'd by the nobless , that they are grown pusillanimous and base ; and therefore the king of france having found them unfit , makes no use of them in his wars , unless it be of his gascoigns who are something better than the rest , and the reason is , because bordering upon the spaniards , they are constantly upon duty , or communicate something of their nature : but for some years since they have shown themselves better theives than soldiers ; nevertheless in defending and assaulting of towns they do well enough , but in the field they are but indifferent , quite contrary to the germans and swizzers , who are not to be dealt with in the field , but in storming or defending a town , they are good for nothing ; and i suppose it proceeds from hence that they cannot in both cases keep the same order which they observe in the field . wherefore the king of france makes use of switzers , and lanzknights , because his men at arms dare not rely upon his gascoignes in time of service . and if his foot were as good as his men at arms , no doubt but the king of france would be able to defend himself against all the princes in europe . the french are naturally more fierce and hot , than dexterous or strong , and if resisted handsomly in their first charge , they slacken and cool , and grow as timerous as women . they are likewise impatient of distress or incommodity , and grow so careless by degrees , that 't is no hard matter , finding them in disorder , to master and overcome them . and of this , experience has been many times had in the kingdom of naples , and last of all at farigliano , where they were twice as many as the spaniards , and it was expected every hour when they should have swallowed them up : nevertheless , because winter came on , and the weather grew bad , they began to straggle into the neighbouring towns , where they might be at more ease , and thereby leaving their camp weak , and out of order , the spaniards fell upon them , and beat them beyond all expectation . and it would have been the same with the venetians , who had never lost the battel of vaila , had they forborn following the french example but for ten days : but the fury of bartolmeo d' alviano was too hot for them . the same hapned again to the spaniards at ravenna , who might have certainly ruined the french in respect of their ill government , and want of provisions which were intercepted on that side towards ferrara by the venatians , and towards bologna , by the spaniards themselves ; but by the rashness of some , and the indiscretion of others , the french got the victory , and though as it was , it was bloody enough ; yet it had been much more , had the strength of either army consisted in the same kind of men ; but the french force lying in his men at arms , and the spaniards force in their foot , the slaughter was the less . he therefore who would conquer the french , must be sure to preserve himself against their first impetus and attack , and in so doing he shall be sure to prevail ; for caesar's character of them is true , at first they are more than men , at last less than women . france in respect of its greatness , and the convenience of its rivers , is opulent and rich ; for their commodities and labour are worth little or nothing , by reason of the scarcity of money among the people , which is so great , it is with difficulty that they are able to raise so much as will pay the impositions of their lords , though they are generally but small ; the reason is , because every body gathers to sell as he has occasion , and no body can stay to finish his harvest as it should be . so that if there should be any body ( which is seldom seen ) so rich as to be a bushel of corn beforehand , every body having of their own , there would be no body to buy it : and the gentlemen , of what they receive of their tenants , except it be for cloths , spend little or nothing ; for cattle , and poultry , and fish , and venison , they have enough of their own : so that all the mony comes into the hands of the lords , and doubtless at this time they are exceedingly rich , for the people are so poor , he that has but a floren , believes himself a prince . the prelates of france carry away ⅖ of the revenue of that kingdom , because there are several bishops who have temporal as well as spiritual revenues , who having provisions enough of their own to keep their houses , spend not one farthing of their income , but hoard it up according to the natural covetousness of the prelates , and religious ; and that which accrews to the chapters and colledges , is laid out in plate , and jewels , and ornaments , for the decoration of their chappels ; so that betwixt what is laid out upon their churches , and what is laid up by the prelates , their money and their movables is of an immense value . in all counsels for the government and administration of the affairs of that kingdom , the prelates are always the greatest number , the other lords not regarding it so much , as knowing the execution must come thorow their hands : so that both sides are contented , one to ordain , the other to execute , though there are many times some of the ancienter and more experienced souldiers taken in to direct the prelates in such things as are out of their sphear . the benefices in france ( by virtue of a custom and law derived anciently from the popes ) are conferred by the colledges ; insomuch as the canons , when their arch-bishop , or bishop dies , calling an assembly , to dispose of their benefices to them that are thought most worthy , whence it comes that they are frequently divided among themselves , because as many are prefer'd by favour and bribery , as by piety and worth : and it is the same with the monks in the election of their abbots . the other inferior benefices are in the gift of the bishops . if the king at any time would intrench upon this law , and choose a bishop at his own pleasure , he must do it by force ; for they will deny him possession ; and though perhaps it be forc'd , that king is no sooner dead , but his bishop shall be sure to be dispossessed , and another put in his place . the french are naturally covetous , and desirous of other peoples goods , which they will lavish and squander as prodigally as their own : a french-man shall cheat , or rob you , and in a breath meet , and eat , and spend it as merrily with you as you could have done your self ; which is contrary to the humour of the spaniard ; for if he gets any thing of you , you must look for nothing again . the french are in great fear of the english , for the great inroads and devastations which they have made anciently in that kingdom ; insomuch , that among the common people the name of english is terrible to this day ; those poor wretches not being able to distinguish that the french are otherwise constituted now than they were then ; for that now they are armed , good souldiers , and united , having possession of those states upon which the english did formerly rely , as the dutchy of burgundy , and the dutchy of britagne ; and on the other side the english are not so well disciplin'd ; for 't is so long since they had any war , there is not a man of them living who ever look'd an enemy in the face ; and besides , there is no body left to joyn with them , if they should land , but only the arch-duke . they are afraid likewise of the spaniards , by reason of their sagacity and vigilance . but when-ever that king invades france , he does it with great disadvantage ; for from the place from whence he must march , to that part of the piraneans by which he must pass into france , the distance is so great , and the country so barren , that every time the spaniards attempt any such thing , either by the way of perpignan , or gehenna , they must needs be much incommoded , not only for want of supplies , but for want of victuals to sustain them in so tedious a march ; because the country behind them is scarce habitable for its fertility , and that which is inhabited has scarce wherewithal for the inhabitants ; so that in these respects , towards the piraeneans , the french are in little apprehension of the spaniard . of the flemmings the french likewise are in no fear ; for , by reason of the coldness of their country , they do not gather enough for their own subsistance , especially of corn and wine , with which they are forced to supply themselves out of burgundy , piccardy , and other places in france . moreover , the people of flanders live generally of their own manufacture , which they vend at the fairs in france , that is , at paris and lyons , for towards the sea-side they have no utterance for any thing , and towards germany 't is the same ; for there are more of their commodities made than in flauders : so that when ever their commerce with the french is cut off , they will have no where to put off their commodities , nor no where to supply themselves with victuals : so that without irresistible necessity the flemmings will never have any controversie with the french. but of the swizzers the french are in no little fear , by reason of their vicinity , and the sudden incursions to which they are subject from them , against which it is impossible to make any competent provision in time , because they make their depredations and incursions with more ease and dexterity than other nations , in respect that they have neither artillery nor horse ; but though the french have towns and countries very near them , yet being well fortified and mann'd the swizzers never make any great progress . besides , the disposition of the swiss is apter to battel and fighting in the field , than to the storming or defending of towns : and it is very unwillingly ( if ever ) the french come to cope with them upon the frontiers ; for having no foot that is able to bear up with the swizzers , their men at arms without foot can do nothing : moreover , the country is so qualified , that there is not room enough for the men at arms and cavalry to draw up , and manage to advantage , and the swizzers are not easily tempted from their borders into the plain , nor to leave such strong and well provided towns ( as i mentioned before ) upon their backs , left by them their supplies should be intercepted , and perhaps their retreat be obstructed . on the side towards italy they are in no fear , in respect of the apenine mountains , and the strong places which they have at the foot of them : so that who-ever invades the dominion of france in those parts , must be sure to overcome , or by reason of the barrenness of the country about , he will hazard to be famished , or compelled to leave those towns behind him which would be madness , or to attaque them at disadvantage , which would be worse : so that on the side of italy they are in no danger , for the resons abovesaid ; and moreover , there is not a prince in italy able to undertake him , nor are the italians now in such unity as in the days of the romans . towards the south , the kingdom of france is in no apprehension , because it is washed by the sea on that side , and accommodated with ports always full of ships , ( partly of the kings , and partly of other petty princes ) sufficient to defend their coasts from any sudden impression ; and against any thing premeditated , they will have time enough to prepare ; for it requires time to make a solemn invasion , and the preparation will be discovered by some body , besides , for further security , there are always parties of men at arms scowring upon the coasts . their expence in keeping of their towns is not so great ; for the french subjects are very dutiful , and the fortresses are not kept at the charge of the kingdom , and on the borders ( where garisons , and by consequence , expence would be more necessary ) those flying bodies of men at arms save them that charge : for against any extraordinary insult , there will be time enough to provide , for that requires time to be fitted , and more to be executed . the people of france are very humble and obedient , and have their king in mighty veneration . they live at very little expence , by reason of their great plenty , and every body hath something of his own : their clothing is course , of very cheap stuff , and they use no kind of silks , neither the men nor the women ; for if they should , they should be obnoxious to the gentry , who would certainly be even with them . the bishopricks in france , according to modern computation , are , and the arch-bishopricks . the parishes are reckoned a million and , and the abbies . of the priories there is no account . of the ordinary and extraordinary entries of the crown , i could get no exact account , i inquired of several , and all told me they were as the king pleased to require . yet some persons told me that that part of his ordinary revenue which arises out of his gabels upon wine , and bread , and flesh , and the like , amounts to a million and seven hundred thousand crowns : and his extraordinary , by taxes , amounts as he pleases : but in case they fall short , he has another string to his bow , and that is by way of loans , which are seldom repaid . the letters to that purpose do commonly run thus : sir , the king recommends himself to you ; and having at this time pressing occasion for mony , he desires you would furnish him with the sum contained in this letter ; which sums are paid in to the next receiver , and there are of them in every town who receives all the profits and revenue accrewing to the king by gabels , taxes , loans , or otherwise . those towns which are subject to the crown , have no rules or orders but what his majesty is pleased to set them for raising of mony either by taxes or otherwise . the authority of the barons over their subjects , and half their revenues consists in bread , and wine , and flesh , as abovesaid , and so much a year for hearth-mony , but it must not exceed six pence or eight pence a hearth , to be paid every three months . taxes and loans they cannot require without the consent of the king , which he grants very rarely . the crown receives no other advantage from them than in the revenue for salt , and never taxes them but upon extraordinary occasion . the king's order in his extraordinary expences both in war and peace , is to command the treasurers to pay the souldiers , which they do by tickets of assignment . the pensioners and gentlemen repair to the generals with their tickets from month to month , where they are entred , and having received a new policy from three months to three months , the pensioners and gentlemen go then to the receivers of the respective provinces where they live , and are paid immediately . the gentlemen belonging to the king are , their pay crowns a month ; and paid as abovesaid , each hundred has a captain . the pensioners are no set number , and their pensions are as uncertain , being more or less as it pleases the king : they are in a way of preferment , and therefore there is no exact rules for them . the office of the receivers general of france , is , to receive so much for fire , and so much for taxes by consent of the king ; and to take care that both ordinary and extraordinary expences be paid at the time , and discharges given as aforesaid . the treasurers have the keeping of the mony , and pay it according to their orders from the generals . the office of the grand chancellor is judicial land definitive , he can pardon and condemn as he pleases , and that even in capital causes , without the consent of the king. in causes where the clients are contumaciously litigious , he can prefix them a day for the determination of their suit : he can confer benefices , but that must be with the king's consent , for those grants are pass'd by the king's letters under the broad-seal , wherefore that seal is kept by the said chancellor . his salary is franks per an . and more for his table , which table is intended for the repast and entertainment of such gentlemen , lawyers and counsellors as follow in his train , when they think fit either to dine or sup with him . the sum which the king of england received annually from the king of france was fifty thousand franks , in consideration of certain disbursements by the present king of england's father in the dutchy of britagne , but the time of that payment is expired . at present there is in france but one grand seneschal , when there are more , ( i do not mean grand seneschals , for there is never but one ) their authority is over the militia both in ordinary and extraordinary , whom for the dignity of their office they are obliged to obey . the governors of the provinces are as many as the king pleases , and have their commission for life or years , and their salaries great or little , as he thinks good to appoint : the other governors , to the very inferior officers in every little town , have all their commissions from the kings , for you must know there is no office in that kingdom , but is either given or sold by that king. of the quantity of distributions for the gentlemen and the pensioners , there is no certain account , but as to them , the king's warrant is sufficient , for they are not liable to the chamber of accounts . the office of the chamber of accounts is to view and audit the accounts of all such as have any thing to do in the king's moneys , as the generals , the treasurers , and the receivers . the university of paris is paid out of the rents of the foundations of the colledges , but very narrowly . the parliaments are five , of paris , of roan , of tholose , burdeaux and douphine , from either of which there is no appeal . the universities first were but four , at paris , orleans , bourgi and poictiers , to which these at tours and angiers have been added since , but they are very inconsiderable . the standing army is a great ( both for number of men and artillery ) as the king pleases , and are quartered and disposed according to orders from him . yet every great town upon the frontiers have artillery and ammunition of their own , and within these two years several more have been cast in several places of the said kingdom , at the charge of the town where they were made , and to re-imburse themselves , the are allowed a toll of a penny an head for all cattel , and as much for every bushel of corn , whilst the kingdoms is under no danger of invasion . the standing force is divided into four bodies , which are disposed into four several posts for the security of the country , that is to say , into guienna , piccardy , burgundy , and provence , but not precise number is observed in any , for they are lessened , or encreased , and removed from one place to another , as they have occasion to suspect . i have with some diligence inquired what moneys were assigned every year for the charges of the king's houshold , and his privy purse , and i find it is what he pleases himself . his archers are four hundred , design'd for the guard of his person , among which there are two scotch . their salary is three hundred franks a man every year , and a coat of the king's livery . but there are constantly at the king's elbow , and their salary is franks per an . his german foot-guards consisted formerly of three hundred men , with each of them a pension of ten franks a month , and two suits of apparel a year , that is , coats and shooes , one for summer , and the other for winter ; but of these foot there were particularly near the king , their salary being franks per mens . and their coats of silk , which was begun in the time of king charles . the harbingers are those who are sent before to take up lodgings for the court , they are in number , and each of them has a salary of three hundred franks every year , and a coat of the king's livery . their marshals or chief officers are four , and have each of them franks per an . in taking up their lodgings , their method is this ; they divide themselves into four parties , one marshal ( or his lieutenant , in case he cannot wait himself ) stays where the court departed , to see all things rectified betwixt the followers of the court , and the masters of the houses : another of them goes along with the court ; a third where the king lies that night ; and the fourth where he lies the next , by which means they keep so exact an order , that they are no sooner arrived , but every man knows his lodging , and is furnished with every thing got ready to his hand . the provost del hostel is a person who follows always the person of the king , and his office is judiciary : where-ever the court goes , his bench is the first , and in all towns where he comes the people may appeal to him as to their lieutenant . his ordinary salary is franks . he has under him two judges in civil causes , paid by the king , each of them franks per an . he has likewise under him a lieutenant criminal , and archers paid as abovesaid . those who are taken by this provost upon any criminal account , cannot appeal to the parliament . he dispatches all both in civil and criminal affairs , and if the plaintiff and defendant appear once before him , it is enough , their business is determined . the masters of the king's houshold are eight , but there is no certain rule for their salary , for some have franks per an . some more , some less , at it pleases the king , over whom there is a grand master with a salary of franks per an . and his authority is only over the rest . the jurisdiction of the admiral of france is over all the fleet , and ships , and ports belonging to that kingdom : he can seize , and make what ships he pleases , and dispose of them as he thinks good when he has done . his salary is franks . the knights of the king's order have no certain number , depending wholly upon the king's pleasure . when they are created they swear to defend the crown , and never upon on any terms to be engaged against it : they can never be degraded or deprived of their dignity but by death . the highest of their pensions is franks per an . some have less , for all are not equal . the chamberlains office is to wait upon the king , to see to his chamber , and to advise him : and indeed his chamberlains are persons of the principal reputation in his kingdom : their pensions are six , eight , and ten thousand franks per an . and sometimes nothing , for the king does often confer those places upon some great and rich stranger , whom he has a mind to oblige : but though they have no pensions , they are exempted from all gabels , and have their diet in court at the next table to the king 's . the master of the horse is to be always about the king ; his authority is over the quieries , and the same that the grand seneschal , the grand master , and the grand chamberlains is over those who are under them . he has the care of the king's horses , and harness , helps him up and down , and carries the sword before him . the lords of the king's council have pensions of betwixt six and eight thousand franks per an . at the pleasure of his majesty ; their names at present are , monseigneur di parigi , mons. di buonaglia , the baylif of amiens , mons. du russi , and the grand chancellor ; but rubertet , and mons. di parigi govern all . there is no table kept for them since the death of the cardinal of roan , for when the grand chancellor is absent , parigi does that office for him , and takes them with him . the title which the king of france pretends to the state of milan , is thus ; his grand-father married a daughter of the duke of milan , who died without heir males . duke giovanni galeazzo had two daughters women grown , and i know not how many sons . of the ladies , one was called madona valentina , and was married to lewis duke of orleans , grand-father to this present king , descended lincally from king pipen . duke iohn galeazzo being dead , his son philip succeeded him , who died without legitimate issue , leaving only one natural daughter behind him . afterwards that state was usurped illegally by the sforzeschi , as is reported , because they pretend it fell to the heirs of the said madona valentina , and that from the very day in which the duke of orleans married with the house of milan , he added to the three lillies in his coat of arms , the snake , which is to be seen at this day . in every parish in france there is a person called a frank archer , who is paid by the parish , and is obliged to be always ready with a good horse and arms to wait upon the king when ever they are required , whether abroad in time of war , or at home upon any other occasion : they are bound likewise to ride up and down for the security of such places as are liable to in-roads , or any ways suspected ; and , according to the number of the parishes , they are men . their lodgings are appointed by the harbingers according to every mans office , and usually the richest men quarter the greatest courtiers ; and that neither the lodger nor landlord may have reason to complain , the court has appointed a rate or rule to be observed generally for all people , and that is a sous or penny a day for their chamber ; in which there is to be bed , and chairs , and stools , and all things that are necessary . there is an allowance likewise of two pence a day to every man for linen , ( as towels and napkins ) and for vinegar and verjuice ; their linen is to be changed at least twice every week , but there being great plenty in that country , they change oftner , as lodgers desire it ; besides which , they are obliged to keep their beds made , and their chambers swept and clean . there is allowance likewise of two pence a day for the standing of every man's horse ; they are not bound to provide any thing for them , only to keep their stalls clean , and carry out the dung . some there are who pay less , as their landlords are good natured , or they can make any shift : but this is the ordinary rule of the court. the english title to the crown of france , upon my best inquiry , i find to be thus : charles the sixth of france married his lawful daughter katharine to henry the fifth , son and heir to henry the fourth , king of england : in the articles of marriage , ( no notice being taken of charles the seventh , who was afterwards king of france ) besides the dower that was given with katharine , charles the sixth , father to the said katharine instituted henry the fifth of england ( his son in law , and to be married to the said katharine ) heir to that kingdom of france : and in case the said henry should die before the said charles , and the said henry leave sons that were legitimate behind him , that then the sons of the said king henry should succeed to the said kingdom of france , upon the death of the said , charles the sixth ; which was contrary to law , because charles the seventh was prejudiced thereby , and was afterwards of no validity or effect : against which the english pretend that charles the seventh was illegitimate . the arch-bishopricks in england are two . the bishopwricks two and twenty , and the parishes . the state of germany in an abridgment written by nicolo machiavelli , secretary of florence . of the power of germany no body can doubt , because it a bounds so exceedingly in men , and money , and arms. as to its wealth , there is not a free town in the whole country , but has a publick stock aforehand of its own ; and some say argentina ( strasburg ) alone has a million of florens constantly in bank . the reason of their opulence is because they have nothing to exhaust them , but their fortifications , and furnishing their magazines ( for reparations , and recruits cost them but little . ) in the latter they have a very good way , for they have always in their publick stores , meat and drink , and firing for a twelve-month : besides , to entertain the industry of their people , they have wherewithal to set the poor on work , in case of any siege , a compleat year together , so as they may subsist upon their own labour , without being burthensom to the town . their souldiers are but little expence to them for they are always well arm'd , and well exercised ; and on their festival days , instead of the common recreations , one takes his musket , another his pike , one one sort of arms , another another , and practising among themselves , they grow very ready and dexterous ; and after they are arrived at some degree of perfection , they have certain honours and salaries conferred upon them , which is the greatest part of their charge . so that in every free town the publick treasury is rich . the reason likewise why the private persons are rich , is this because they live with great parsimony , and indeed little better than if they were poor ; for they are at no expence in their clothes , their buildings , nor the furnishing of their houses . if they have bread , and flesh , and any thing to keep them from the cold , they are well enough ; and he that wants them , is contented , and makes some shift or other without them . two florens will serve them in clothes ten years ; and according to his degree every man lives at this rate ; they do not trouble themselves for every thing they want , but only for those things that are absolutely necessary , and by that means their necessities are much fewer than ours : the result of which custom is this , their mony goes not out of their county , they contenting themselves with their own native productions , whil'st in the mean time every man is permitted to bring in what treasure he pleases into germany , to purchase their commodities and manufactures which in a manner supplies all italy ; and their gain is so much the more , by how much a small part of the profit of their labours , recruits them with materials for new . thus do they live at liberty , and enjoy their own humors ; for which reason they will not be got to the wars , but upon extraordinary pay and that will not do it neither , unless they be commanded by their own magistrates ; wherefore an emperor has need of more mony , than another prince , because if men be in a good condition already , they are not easily allured to the wars . as things stand now , the free states must unite with the princes , before any great exploit can be undertaken by the emperor ; or else they must enterprize it themselves , which they would be able to do . but neither the one nor the other desires the greatness of the emperor ; for if ever he should get those free states into his hands , he should be strong enough to overpower the princes , and reduce them to such a degree of subjection , that he would manage them as he pleased himself , as the kings of france have done formerly in that country , and particularly king lewis , who by force of arms , and the cutting off some few persons brought them to their present obedience . the same thing would happen to the states , if the princes should be cajoled , they would lose their freedoms , be wholly at the disposition of the emperor , and be forced to be satisfied with what he would vouchsafe to afford them . the distance and division betwixt the free states and the princes , is supposed to proceed from the different humors in that country , which in general are two ; the swissers are become enemies to all germany , and the princes to the emperor . it may seem strange perhaps , that the swissers , and free states should be at variance and enmity , seeing the preservation of their liberty , and securing themselves against the princes , is the common interest of both : but their discord is from this , that the swissers are not only enemies to the princes , but to all gentlemen whatever , and in their country , they have neither the one , nor the other ; but live without distinction of persons ( unless in their magistrates ) in the most levelling liberty in the world . this practice of the swissers makes all the gentlemen which are remaining in any of the free towns afraid of them ; so that they employ their whole industry in keeping their states at a distance with them , and preventing any intelligence betwixt them . moreover all of those states who have been soldiers , and had their education in the wars , are mortally their enemies moved thereunto by emulation and envy , because they themselves are not so famous abroad , and their animosity is so great , that they never meet in the sield ( let their numbers be small , or great ) but they fall together by the ears . as to the enmity betwixt the princes , and the free towns , and the swissers , i need say no more , it being so generally known ; as likewise of the jealousies betwixt the emperor and the princes . you must understand , that the emperors principal apprehension is of the princes , and not being able to correct them alone , he has made use of the assistance of these free states , and not long since , entertained the swissers into his allyance , by whose means he thought himself in a very good condition . so that these common dissentions being considered , and the particular piques and suspicions betwixt one prince , and one state and another ; it is no easie matter to unite the empire ; and yet it is necessary it should be united , before any great thing can be performed by the emperor . and though he who believes germany in a condition to do great things , because there is visibly no prince who has the power , or indeed the courage to oppose the designs of the emperor , as formerly has been done , yet he must know that it is a great impediment to an emperor not to be assisted by those princes , for though perhaps a prince dares not contend with him , he dares deny him his assistance ; and if he dares not deny him that , he dares break his promise upon occasion , and if he dares not do that , will at least mak so bold to deferr and delay the performance so long , that when his supplies do come , they shall do the emperor no good ; all which things do infinitely disturb , and embarras his designs . and this was found to be true , when the emperor would the first time have passed into italy , in spight both of the french and the venetian ; in a dyet held at that time in constance , he was promised by the several free states in germany a supply of ... thousand foot , and horse , yet he could never get of them together above , and that because by that time the forces of one state came up ; another was ready to depart , their time being expired and some sent mony in lieu ; upon which score that enterprize was lost . the strength of germany consists in the free towns rather , than in the princes ; for the princes are of two sorts , temporal and spiritual . the temporal princes are brought very low , partly by themselves ( every principality , being cantonized and distributed to several princes by constitution of their inheritances which are observed very strictly in those countries ) and partly having been much weakned by the emperor and his assistance from the said states ; so that now the amity of the temporal princes , is of little importance . there are likewise spiritual princes , whose territories , if not cantonized and divided by those hereditary customs , are yet so weakned and enervated by the ambition of their own free towns , and the favour that the emperor showes them , that the electoral archbishops , and the rest have little or no power in the great and chief towns of their own dominions ; from whence it comes to pass , that being divided at home , they cannot favour the enterprizes of the emperor , though they would themselves . but to come to the free , and the imperial towns , which are the strength of that country , as being rich , and well-govern'd . those towns for several reasons , are grown cooler in the assertion of their liberties , and much more in the acquisition of new , and that which they do not desire for themselves , they do not care another should have . besides they are so many ; and every one to be commanded by a general of their own , that their supplies , when they are disposed to send them , come but very slow , and when they do come , are not so useful as they should be , and of this we had an example not many years since . the swissers invaded the state of maximilian , and suevia : the emperor contracted with the free towns to repell them , and they obliged themselves to assist him with an army of men , but he never got half of them , and the reason was as abovesaid , when the forces of one town came up , another marched off , insomuch that the emperor dispairing of success , came to an agreement with the swissers , and left basil in their possession . and if in this case , where their own interest was concerned , they have acted at this rate , it may be guessed how they will behave themselves in the concerns of other men ; so that all these things laid together , though their power be great , yet it can turn but to little accompt to the emperor . and the venetians by their conversation and commerce with the merchants of germany , in all their transactions hitherto with the emperor , have understood him better than any body else , and dealt more honourably by him ; for had they been in any apprehension of his power , they would have insisted upon some caution , either by way of mony or towns ; and if they had seen any possibility of uniting the whole power of the empire , they would never have opposed it : but knowing that to be impossible , it made them the more con●ident , and gave them hopes of success . if therefore in a single city , the affairs of the multitude are negligently managed , in a province they will be much worse . moreover those little states are sensible , that an acquisition in italy , or elsewhere , would fall to the princes , and not to them , because they might enjoy them personally , which could not be done by a common-wealth , and where the reward is like to be unequal , people will not willingly be at an equal expence . their power therefore is great , but of little importance , and he who peruses what has been said before , and considers what was been done for several years past , will sind how little it is to be rely'd upon . the german men at arms are well mounted , and many of them well enough arm'd , but their horses are heavy and unactive , and it is to be observed that in their encounters with the italians or french , they can do nothing at all , not for any fault in the men , but the accoutrement of their horses , for their saddles being little , and weak , and without bows , every little jostle tumbuls them upon the ground : and another of their great disadvantages is , that the lower part of their bodies are never arm'd whereby not being able to defend against the first impression ( in which the excellence of those soldiers consist ) they lie exposed ( upon the close ) to the short swords of the enemy , and may be wounded both themselves and horses in those disarmed places , and it is in the power of every foot man to pull them off on their horses , and rip their guts out when they have done , and then as to the manage of their horses they are too heavy to do any thing at all . their foot are very good , and very personable men , contrary to the swiss , who are but small , rough hewn , and not handsome at all : but they arm themselves ( unless it be some few ) only with a pike and a sword , that they might be the more dexterous , and nimble , and light ; and their saying used to be , that they arm themselves no better , because they feared nothing but the artillery against which no breast-plate , or croslet , or gorget would secure them : other weapons they despise ; for it is said their order is so good , and they stand so firm to one another 't is impossible to break into them nor come near them if their pikes be long enough . they are excellent in a field sight , but for the storming of a town they are good for nothing ; and but little to defend one : and generally where the men cannot keep their old orders and manage themselves with room enough , they are worth but little : of this experience has been seen where they have been engaged with the italians , or assaulted any town , as at padua where they came off very ill , though on the other side , in the field they had done well enough . for in the battel of ravenna , betwixt the french and the spaniards , if it had not been for their lanceknights , the french had been beaten ; for whil'st the men at arms were confronted , and engaged with one another , the spanish had the better of the french , and had disordered their gascoigns , so that had not the germans came in and relieved them , they had been utterly broken : and the same was seen lately when the spanish king made war upon the french in guienna , the spaniards were more fearful of a body of german foot , which the king of france had in his service than all the rest of his army , therefore they declined coming to a battel with all the art they could use . the discourses of nicholas machiavel , upon the first decade of titus livius ▪ faithfully englished . london , printed for iohn starkey , charles harper , and iohn amery , in fleetstreet . . nicolo machiavelli to zanobi buond elmonti and cosimo rucellai . i send you a present which ( though not answerable to my obligations ) is doubtless the greatest that nicolo machiavelli was able to send , having expressed in it whatever i know or have learned by a long practice , and continued reading of the affairs of this world than which neither you nor any body else being to expect more , i am not to be blamed if my present be no better . you may complain indeed of the poverty of my parts , my narrations being so poor ; and of the weakness of my judgment , having perhaps mistaken in many places of my discourses : if so , i know not which of us is less obliged to the other , i to you , for having forced me to write against my own inclination , or you to me , for having perform'd it no more to your satisfaction . accept it then in the same manner as things are accepted from friends , among whom the intention of the giver is always more considered than the quality of the gift , and believe that as oft as i think of it , i am satisfied in this , that however i have been mistaken in many other circumstances , i have done wisely in this , having chosen you above all others for the dedication of my discourses , both because in not doing it , i should have shewn my self in some measure ingrateful for the benefits received , and in doing it , i have transgressed the common custom of authors , who for the most part direct their works to some prince , and ( blinded with ambition and avarice ) applaud and magnifie him for all the virtuous qualities , when perchance they ought rather to have reproached him with all the vices imaginable . to avoid that error , i have made choice , not of those who are actually princes , but of such as by their infinite good parts do merit to be so ; not of those who are actually able to advance me to honours , employments , and wealth , but to those , who though unable , would do it if they could : for , to judge right , men are rather to esteem those in whose nature , than those in whose power it is to be liberal , and those who understand how to govern a kingdom , than those who do govern it without that understanding . accordingly authors do commend hiero the syracusan , though but a private person , above perseus of macedon , though a great king : because to hiero there was nothing wanting to be an excellent prince , but a principality ; and perseus had nothing but a kingdom to recommend him to be king. accept then ) whether it be good or bad ) what you commanded your selves , and if you be so far in an error as to approve my opinions , i shall not fail to pursue the rest of my history , as i promised in the beginning . farewel . the discourses of nicholas machiavel , citizen and secretary of florence , upon the first decade of titvs livivs to zanobivs bonde montvs and cosimvs rvcellaivs . liber . i. considering with my self what honour is given to antiquity , and how many times ( passing by variety of instances ) the fragment of an old statue has been purchased at an high rate by many people , out of curiosity to keep it by them , as an ornament to their house , or as a pattern for the imitation of such as delight in that art ; and with what industry and pains they endeavour afterwards to have it represented in all their buildings . on the other side , observing the most honourable and heroick actions ( describ'd in history , perform'd by kingdoms and ancient common-wealths ; by kings , great captains , citizens , legislators , and others , which have not only tired , but spent themselves in the service of their country ) are rather admir'd than imitated , and indeed so far shun'd and declin'd , in all places , there is scarce any impression or shadow to be seen in this age of the virtue of our ancestors ; i could not at the same time but admire , and lament it ; and the more , by how much i observed in all civil and personal controversies , in all diseases incident to mankind , recourse is continually had to such judgments and remedies as have been derived to us by our predecessors ; for to speak truth , the civil law is nothing but the sentence and determination of their fore-fathers , which reduc'd into order , do shew and instruct our present lawyers which way to decide ; nor is the art of the physitian any thing more than ancient experience handed down to our times , upon which the practiser of our age founds all his method and doctrine . nevertheless , in the ordering of commonwealths , in the conservation of their several members , in the government of kingdoms , in the regiment of armies , in the management of war , in the administration of justice , in the enlargement and propagation of empire , there is not to be found either prince , republick , great captain or citizen , which repairs to antiquity for example ; which persuaded me it proceeded not so much from niceness and effeminacy our present education has introduced upon the world , nor from the mischief which turbulent and seditious idleness has brought forth in many provinces and cities in christendom , as from our ignorance or inadvertency in history not taking the sense of what we read , or not minding the relish and poinancy with which it is many times impregnated ; from whence it comes to pass , that many who read are much pleased and delighted with the variety of accidents contained in history , but never think them intended for their imitation , that being a thing , in their judgments , not only difficult , but impossible ; as if the heaven , the sun , the elements and mankind were altered and dispossessed of the motion , order and power with which they were primitively invested . being desirous to reduce such as shall fall into this error , i have judged it necessary to write upon all those books of titus livius , ( which , by the malignity of time , have not been intercepted ) what i ( according to ancient and modern opinion ) shall think useful for their further explanation ; to the end , that they which shall peruse these my discourses , may extract such advantage and document as is necessary for their proficiency and improvement by history ; and though my enterprize appears to be difficult , yet by the assistance of those who put me upon it , i do not despair but to discharge my self so , as to leave the way much more easie and short to any man that shall desire to come after me . chap. i. what have been generally the principles of all cities , and particularly of rome those who shall read the original of the city of rome , by what legislators advanced and by what government ordered , will not wonder it shall remain firm and entire for so many ages , afterwards so vast an empire spring out of it as that common-wealth arrived to . being to discourse first of its original , it is convenient to premise , that all cities are built either by natives born in the country where they were erected , or by strangers . the first happens when , to the inhabitants dispersed in many and little parties , it appears their habitation is insecure , not being able apart ( by reason of their distance , or smalness of their numbers ) to resist an invasion , ( if any enemy should fall upon them ) or to unite suddenly for their defence , without leaving their houses and families exposed , which by consequence would be certain prey to the enemy . whereupon , to evade those dangers , moved either by their own impulse , or the suggestions of some person among them of more than ordinary authority , they oblige themselves to live together in some place to be chosen by them for convenience of provision , and easiness of defence . of this sort , among many others , athens and venice were two : the first that built under the authority of theseus , upon occasion of the like distance and dispersion of the natives . the other ( there being many people driven together into certain little islands in that point of the adriatick sea , to avoid the war which every day , by the access and irruption of new armies of barbarians after the declension of the roman empire grew intolerable in italy ) began by degrees among themselves , without the assistance or encouragement of any prince , to treat and submit to such laws as appeared most likely to preserve them : and it succeeded to their desire by the long respite and tranquillity their situation afforded them ; that sea having no passage at that end , and the barbarians no ships to disturb them ; so that the least beginning imaginable was sufficient to exalt them to their present authority and grandeur . the second case , when a city is raised by strangers , it is done by people that are free , or depending ( as colonies ) or else by some prince or republick to ease and disburthen themselves of their exuberance , or to defend some territory , which being newly acquir'd , they desire with more safety and less expence to maintain ( of which sort several were by the people of rome all over their empire ) otherwise they are sometimes erected by some prince , not for his residence so much as for his glory and renown ( as alexandria by alexander the great ) . but these cities not being free in their original , do seldom arise to any extraordinary height more than to be reckoned the heads or chief of some kingdom . of this sort was florence , for ( whether built by the souldiers of silla , or perchance by the inhabitants of the mountain di fiesole , who presuming upon , and being encouraged by the long peace under the reign of augustus , descended from their mountain to inhabit the plain upon the river arms ) it was built under the roman empire , and could not upon those principles exalt it self higher than the courtesie of the prince would permit . the founders of cities are free , when by themselves , or the command of their soveraign they are constrained upon occasion of sickness , famine , or war , to abandon their own , inquest of new countries : and these do either possess themselves of such towns as they find ready ▪ built in their conquests , ( as moses did ) , or they build them de novo , as aeneas . in this case the power of the builder , and the fortune of the building is conspicuous and honourable , according as the cause from whence it derives its original is more or less eminent . his virtue and prudence is discernible two ways , by the election of the seat , and institution of the laws ; and because men build as often by necessity as choice , and the judgment and wisdom of the builder is greater where there is less room and latitude for his election ; it is worthy our consideration whether it is more advantagious building in barren and unfruitful places , to the end that the people being constrained to be industrious , and less obnoxious to idleness , might live in more unity , the poverty of the soil giving them less opportunity of dissention . thus it fell out in raugia and several other cities built in such places ; and that kind of election would doubtless be most prudent and profitable , if men could be content to live quietly of what they had , without an ambitious desire of command . but there being no security against that , but power , it is necessary to avoid that sterility , and build in the fruitfullest places can be found , where their numbers encreasing by the plentifulness of the soil , they may be able not only to defend themselves against an assault , but repel any opposition shall be made to their grandeur ; and as to that idleness to which the richness of the situation disposes , it may be provided against by laws and convenient exercise enjoyn'd , according to the example of several wise men , who having inhabited countries , pleasant , fruitful , and apt to produce such lazy people improper for service , to prevent the inconvenience which might follow thereupon , enjoyned such a necessity of exercise to such as were intended for the wars , that by degrees they became better souldiers than those countries which were mountainous and barren could any where produce . among whom may be reckoned the kingdom of egypt , which , notwithstanding that it was extreamly pleasant and plentiful , by the virtue and efficacy of its laws produced excellent men , and perhaps such as , had not their names been extinguished with time , might have deserved as much honour as alexander the great , and many other great captains , whose memories are so fresh , and so venerable among us . an who-ever would consider the government of the soldan , the discipline of the mamalukes , and the rest of their militia before they were extirpated by selimus the turk , might find their great prudence and caution in exercising their souldiers , and preventing that softness and effeminacy to which the felicity of their soil did so naturally incline them . for these reasons i conceive best to build in a fruitful place , if the ill consequences of that fertility be averted by convenient laws . alexander the great being desirous to build a city to perpetuate his name dinocrates an architect came to him , and undertook to build him one upon the mountain athos , and to recommend and inforce his proposal , ( besides the goodness of the soil ) he persuaded him it should be made in the shape and figure of a man ( a thing which would be new , wonderful , and sutable to his greatness ) . but when alexander enquired whence it was to be supplyed , the architect replyed ; he had not considered of that ; at which answer alexander laugh'd very heartily , and leaving him and his mountain to themselves , he built alexandria , where people might be tempted to plant by the richness of the soil , the nearness of the sea , and convenience of the river nile . again , if we examine the original of rome , and admit aeneas for the first founder , it will fall in the number of those cities built by foreigners : if romulus , among such as were erected by the natives ; either way it was originally free , without any dependance . it will appear likewise ( as shall be shewn more particularly hereafter ) by what laws romulus , numa and others fortified and secur'd it ; insomuch that neither the fertility of the soil , the commodity of the sea , the frequency of their victories , nor the largeness of its empire were able to debauch or corrupt it ; but it remained for several ages for piety and virtue more exemplary than any other commonwealth either since or before it . and because the great things acted under that government , and transmitted to us by titus livius , were performed by publick or private counsel within or without the city , i shall begin with what occur'd in the town , and was managed by publick debate , ( as judging that most worthy our annotation ) super-adding what-ever depended thereupon ; and with these discourses i intend this first book ( or rather part ) shall conclude . chap. ii. the several kinds of commonwealths and under which kind the roman is comprehended . waving the discourse of those cities which in their beginning have been dependant , i shall speak of such as were originally free , and governed themselves according to their own fancies , commonwealths or principalities , as their own inclinations lead them . of these ( according to the diversity of their principles ) their laws and orders were divers . some of them at their first foundation received their laws at one time from a single person , as the spartans from lycurgus . others received them by chance , at several times , upon variety of accidents , as rome ; and that commonwealth is doubtlesly happy , whose good fortune it is to have a person so wise as to constitute and dispose its laws in such manner at first , that it may subsist safely and securely by them , without necessity of new modelling or correction . of this sort was sparta , which for more than years was observed to remain entire and incorrupt , without any dangerous commotion . on the other side , that city must needs be in some measure unhappy , which , not having submitted to , or complyed with the prudence of a single founder , is necessitated of it selt to remodel and reform● , of these kinds , that is most unhappy whose principles were at first remote and devious from the right way which might have conducted to perfection ; and indeed those common-wealths which are in this degree , are almost impossible to be established by any accident whatsoever . but others ( whose commencements are good , and capable of improvement , though perhaps not exquisitely perfect ) may become perfect afterwards by the concurrence of accidents , yet not without danger forasmuch as most men are averse , and will not easily admit of any new law which introduces new orders and customs into a city , without great appearance of necessity , and that necessity arising necessarily from some danger impending , it many times falls out the commonwealth perishes before remedy can be applyed . of this the commonwealth of florence is instance sufficient , which in the commotion of aretz was the iith . time reformed , and the . th time confounded by the sedition of prato . but being now to discourse of the state of the roman commonwealth , and what were the accidents and orders which advanced it to that perfection , it is convenient to premise ( what has been asserted by several authors ) that there are but three sorts of governments monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy , to either of which who-ever intends to erect a government , may apply as he pleases . other ( of no less reputation ) are of opinion the forms of government are six , of which three are bad , and three good of themselves , but so easily corrupted , even they become fatal and pernicious . those which are good are the three before mentioned , those which are evil are three others depending upon the three former ; and carrying so near a resemblance , they many times interfere , and fall one into the other , as monarchy into tyranny , aristocracy into oligarchy , and democracy into anarchy and confusion : insomuch , that who-ever forms his government of one of the three former , forms it for no long time , because no care nor remedy can prevent , but it will degenerate into its contrary , by reason of the similitude betwixt virtue and vice : and these changes and variations of government happened by accident amongst men ; for at the beginning of the world the inhabitants being few , they lived dispersed after the manner of beasts : afterwards , as they multiplyed , they began to unite and , for their better defence , to look out for such as were more strong , robust , and valiant , that they might choose one out of them to make him their head , and pay him obedience ; from hence the first distinction betwixt honest and dishonest did arise : for observing that if any injur'd his benefactor , it immediately created an hatred and compassion among the rest , all people abhorring him that was ungrateful , and commiserating him that was injur'd ; lest the same injustice might happen to themselves , they began to make laws , and ordain punishments for offenders ; and this was the first appearance of justice in the world ; after which , being to make election of their prince , they did not so much respect the ability of his body as the qualifications of his mind , choosing him that was most prudent and just ; but by degrees their government coming to be hereditary , and not by election , according to their former way , those which inherited degenerated from their ancestors , and neglecting all virtuous actions , began to believe that princes were exalted for no other end but to discriminate themselvcs from their subjects by their pomp , luxury , and all other effeminate qualities , by which means they fell into the hatred of the people , and by consequence became afraid of them , and that fear encreasing , they began to meditate revenge , oppressing some , and disobliging others , till insensibly the government altered , and fell into tyranny . and these were the first grounds of ruine , the first occasion of conjuration and conspiracy against princes , not so much in the pusillanimous and poor , as in those whose generosity , spirit and riches would not suffer them to submit to so dishonourable administrations . the multitude following the authority of the nobles , took up arms against their prince , and having conquered and extirpated that government , they subjected themselves to the nobility which had freed them ; and detesting the name of a single person , they took the government upon themselves , and at first ( reflecting upon the late tyranny ) governed according to new laws devised by themselves , postponing particular profit to publick advantage , so that both the one and the other were preserved and managed with great diligence and exactness . but their authority afterwards descending upon their sons , ( who being ignorant of the variations of fortune , as not having experimented her inconstancy ) and not contenting themselves with a civil equality , but falling into rapine , oppression , ambition , and adulteries , they changed the government again , and brought it from an optimacy to be governed by few , without any respect or consideration of justice or civility ; so that in a short time it hapned to them as to the tyrant ; for the multitude being weary of their government , were ready to assist any body that would attempt to remove it , by which means in a short time it was extinguished . and forasmuch as the tyranny of their prince , and the insolence of their nobles were fresh in their memory , they resolved to restore neither the one nor the other , but conclude upon a popular state , which was regulated so as neither prince nor noble should have any authority : and there being no states but are reverenced at first , this populacy continued for some time , but not long , ( especially after its founders ) for it fell immediately into an irresistible licentiousness , contemning all authority both publick and private ; and every man living after his own mind , a thousand injuries were daily committed , so that forc'd by necessity , by the suggestions of some good ma● or for avoiding the like enormities , they returned to their primitive kingship , and from thence by degrees relapsed again in the manner , and upon the occasions aforesaid . and this is the sphear and circle in which all republicks have , and do move ; but it seldom or never happens that they return to the same circumstances of government again , because it is scarce possible for any of them to be so long liv'd , as to pass many times thorow the same mutations and remain upon its legs . it sometimes comes to pass likewise , that in the conflicts and troubles of a state , being destitute both of counsel and force , it becomes a prey to some neighbouring commonwealth that is better governed than it : but admitting that could not be , governments would fall from one to another , and make an infinite circulation . for these reasons all the foresaid forms of government are in my judgment infirm and unstable ; the three good ones from the shortness of man's life and the three bad ones from their proper imperfections . whereupon , the wisest legislators finding this defect , and avoiding every one of those kinds , they fram'd a government which should consist of them all , believing it to be more permanent and stable , because , prince , nobles and people living in the same city , and communicating in the same government , they would be all of them in sight of one another , and more capable of correction . the person which in this kind has merited most praise was lycurgus , who ordered his laws in sparta in such manner that giving king nobility and people each of them their portion , he erected a government that continued for more than eight hundred years , to his great honour , and that cities repose . to solon it hapned clear otherwise , ( who was the athenian legislator ) whose aiming only at a popular government , was the cause it was so short lived , that before he died he saw the tyranny of pisistrates spring out of it ; and though forty years after the tyrant's heirs were expelled , and athens restored to its liberty , yet resuming the old model which solon had recommended , it could not continue above an hundred years , notwithstanding many new laws were super-added to restrain the insolence of the nobility , and the looseness of the commons . but there being no mixture and temperament of principality and optimacy with the other , in respect of sparta , athens was but of little duration . but to return to rome , though it had not a lycurgus to obstetricate at its birth , and supply it with such laws as might preserve its freedom so long . nevertheless , the accidents which hapned upon the dissention betwixt the people and the senate produced that in some measure which was defective at its foundation ; for though in its beginning its laws and orders were imperfect , yet it did not altogether deflect from the right way which was to conduct it to perfection , romulus , numa , and all the rest of its kings making many good laws conformable to its freedom . but their ultimate design being to perpetuate their monarchy , though that city remained free , there were many things omitted by those princes which were necessary for its conservation . and though it fell out their kings lost their dominion upon the abovesaid occasions , yet those who expulsed them , creating two consuls in their stead , they rather drove the name than the authority of kingship out of the city . after which , the government residing in the consuls and senate , it consisted only of two of the three sorts , monarchy and aristocracy : it remained now to give place only to a popular government , and the roman nobility being grown insolent upon occasions which shall be mentioned hereafter , the people tumultuated , took up arms against them , and prevailed so far , that ( lest otherwise they might lose all ) it was consented the people should have their share , and yet the senate and consuls on the other hand retain so much of their former authority as to keep up their degrees as before : and this was the beginning of the tribunes of the people , after the creation of which , that state became better established , every one of the three sorts having a share in the government , and fortune was very favourable , that though it suffered many mutations and passed from a monarchy to an aristocracy , and from that to the people by the same gradations , and the same occasions i have mentioned ; nevertheless the power was not taken from their kings to transfer it upon the nobles , nor from the nobility to give it wholly to the people ; but remaining mixt and compounded of all three , that republick grew in time to be perfect , to which perfection the difference and jealousies betwixt the senate and people contributed exceedingly , as shall be largely demonstrated in the two following chapters . chap. iii. vpon what accidents and tumults in rome the tribune of the people was created , by which the commonwealth became more perfect . according to the judgment of all authors who have written of civil government , and the examples of all history , it is necessary to who-ever would establish a government and perscribe laws to it , to presuppose all men naturally bad and that they will shew and exert that natural malignity as often as they have occasion to do it securely , for though it may possibly lie concealed for some time , it is for some secret reason which want of president and experience renders invisible ; but time discovers it afterwards , and is therefore justly called the father of truth . after the expulsion of the tarquins there appeared in rome a very great union betwixt the senate and people ; the senate seemed to have deposited their old arrogance , and taken up a gentleness and humility that rendred them grateful even to the meanest mechanick : in this manner they curb'd and constrained their evil designs as having no hopes of success while the tarquins were living , who were formidable to the nobility of themselves and would be much more , if the people by any ill usage should be animated to joyn with them , and this was the true ground of their hypocrisie . but no sooner were the tarquins dead , and the nobility discharged of their fear , but they began to expectorate , and spit out the venome had lain so long in their stomachs against the people using them with all imaginable injury and contempt , which carriage of theirs gives good testimony to my assertion , that man is naturally wicked , never does well but upon necessity ; and when at any time it is at his choice , and he may follow his own genius with freedom , all things run immediately into disorder and confusion ; and that saying is not without reason , that reputation and poverty make men industrious , but it is laws which make them good : otherwise , if people did well of themselves , laws would be useless ; but where that is not to be expected , laws become necessary . no sooner were the tarquins removed , and the authority and terror where-with they kept the senate in awe , but it was thought fit to find out some new invention that might restrain the nobility , and keep them in the same circles of humanity and justice as the tarquins had done whilst they were alive : at length , after many squables and contentions betwixt the people and them , all was accommodated by the creation of a tribune for the security of the people , which tribune was to be invested with such authority and priviledge as might enable him to become afterwards an arbitor betwixt them , and a stop for the future to the insolence of the nobility . chap iv. the dissentions betwixt the senate and the people of rome , were the occasion that commonwealth beame so powerful and free . i cannot in silence passover the tumults and commotions which hapned in rome betwixt the death of the tarquins , and the creation of those tribunes . nor can i forbear saying something against the opinion of many who will needs have rome to have been a tumultuous republick , so full of mutiny and confusion , that had not its good fortune and valour supplyed for its defects , it would have been inferior to any other commonwealth whatsoever . i cannot deny but fortune and valour were the occasions of the roman empire ; but , in my judgment , they do not consider , that where the souldier is good , the discipline is good ; and where the discipline is good , there is commonly good fortune : but to return to the other particulars in that city , i say , those who object against the tumults betwixt the nobles and the people , do in my opinion condemn those very things which were the first occasion of its freedom , regarding the noise and clamours which do usually follow such commotions , more than the good effects they do commonly produce , not considering that in all commonwealths there are two opposite humours , one of the people , the other of the nobles ; and that all laws which are made in favour of liberty , proceed from the differences betwixt them , as may easily be seen in the revolutions of rome : for from the time of the tarquins to the gracchi , ( which was more than three hundred years ) in all the tumults in rome seldom any body was banished , and seldomer put to death : so that it is not reasonable to esteem those popular tumults so dangerous and horrible , nor to pronounce that a seditious and bloody commonwealth , which in so long time , among all their heats and animosities sent not above eight or ten persons into banishment , executed but few , and condemned not many to any pecuniary mulct . nor can it be called reasonably disorderly and irregular , which produced so many examples of all sorts of virtue ; for good examples proceed from good education , and good education from good laws , and good laws from those tumults , which many people do so inconsiderately condemn , and who-ever examines their success , will not find they have produced any laws or violence to the prejudice of the common interest , but rather on the contrary . and if any should object their ways were wild and unusual , to heat the people roaring against the senate , and the senate railing against the people . to see them running tumultuously about the streets , shutting up their shops , and leaving the town , i answer , that all cities ought to be allowed some ways of vent and evacuation for their passions , and especially those who expect assistance from their people in time of exigence and danger ; in which number the city of rome was one , and had this custom , that when the commons had a mind to a new law , they either committed some of the aforesaid outrages , or else refused to list themselves for the wars , so that to appease , it was in some measure necessary to comply with them , and the desires of a free people are seldom or never destructive or prejudicial to liberty , because they commonly spring from actual oppression , or an apprehension of it ; and if perhaps that apprehension should be vain , and ill grounded , there is the remedy of conventions , in which some honest man or good orator may remonstrate their mistake : and the people , though ( as tully says ) they may be ignorant , yet they are capable enough of the truth , and do easily submit to it , when delivered to them by any person they think credible , and to be belived . so that it is an obligation upon us to judge more moderately of the roman government , and to consider that so many good effects as proceeded from that republick , could not have been produced but from sutable causes : and if their tumults were the occasion of the creation of the tribunes , they were more laudable than otherwise ; for besides that they secured a share of the government to the people , they were constituted as guardians and conservators of the roman liberty , as shall be shewn in the chapter ensuing . chap v. where the guardianship of liberty may be most securely deposited , whether among the people or nobility : and which has greater occasion to tumultuate , he that would acquire more , or he that would defend and keep what he has . they who have given us the wisest and most judicious scheme of a commonwealth , have laid down the conservation of liberty as a necessary fundamental , and according as that is more or less secured , the government is like to be more or less durable . but forasmuch as all commonwealths consist of nobility and populacy , the question arises , in whose hands that liberty is deposited most safely . in old times among the lacedemonians , and in our times among the venetians , it was intrusted with the nobility ; but among the romans with the common people ; for which reason it is to be examined which of them made the better elections . if we look back to their originals , there are arguments on both sides ; but if we regard only their fate and conclusion , the nobility must carry it , in respect that the liberty of the spartans and venetians have been much longer lived . but on the other side , ( to justifie the romans ) freedom is ( i conceive ) most properly committed to their custody who have least appetite to usurp . and doubtless , if the ends and designs both of the nobility and commons be considered , it will be found the nobility are ambitious of dominion , while the commons have no other thoughts but to defend themselves against it ; and , by consequence , having less hopes to usurp , they have more inclination to live free : so that the conservation of their liberty being committed to the people , it is but reasonable to believe they will be more careful to preserve it ; and by how much they are less likely to usurp upon it themselves , with the more vigilance will they secure it against the incroachments of others . on the other side , he that defends the spartan and venetian constitution , alledges , that by putting that power into the hands of the nobility , two excellent things are performed . one is , that thereby they satisfie their ambition who have the greatest interest in the common-wealth . the other , that they take from the people all opportunity of exerting their natural turbulency and unquietness , which has not only been the occasion of infinite dissentions , but is apt likewise to enforce the nobility upon such desperate courses as may in time produce unremediable effects . of this , rome it self is proposed as an example , where the tribunes being invested with that authority , it was not sufficient to have one plebeian consul , but the people must have both , and not content with that neither , they would have the censor , praetor , and the other great magistrates of the city chosen out of the people . nor was this enough , but carried on with the same exorbitant fury , they began by degrees to adore such men as they saw likely to confront and beard the nobility , which humour was the rise of marius his greatness , and his greatness the destruction of rome . all this considered , it is no easie matter , upon impartial deliberation on both sides , to pronounce which of the two is most safely to be trusted with the liberty , because it is no less difficult to determine which is most pernicious to a commonwealth , he that ( not satisfied with what he has ) is ambitious of more , or he that is content , and would secure what he has got . he that shall examine it critically , will conclude thus ; either you argue for a republick , whose aim is to extend and propagate its empire , as rome ; or one whose designs reach no further than to preserve what they have got . in the first case 't is necessary in all things to follow the example of rome ; in the second , venice and sparta are rather to be imitated for the reasons aforesaid , which shall be reinforc'd in the following chapter . but to return from whence we have stragled , and discourse of what men are most nocent in a commonwealth , they that are impatient to get , or they that are only fearful to lose ; i say , that when marcus menenius was made dictator , and marcus fulvius master of the horse , ( both of them plebeians ) to inquire into certain conspiracies that were entred into at capua , against the city of rome , authority was given them at the same time to examine and take cognisance of such persons as , by bribery , or any other unlawful means , design'd upon the consulship , or any other of the great offices in rome : by which the nobility being highly provoked , ( as suspecting it to be done in opposition to them ) caused it to be spread abroad , that the nobility did not by any ambitious or irregular ways affect or design upon those great places ; but the commons , who not daring to trust their preferment to their extraction or virtue , took all extraordinary courses to advance themselves to them . in particular they accused the dictator , and that with so much vehemence and success , he was glad to call a council , and ( having complained very much of the calumniations of the nobility ) to lay down his dictatorship , and submit himself to the judgment of the people , by whom the cause being heard , he was fairly acquitted . there it was disputed very hard which was most ambitious ; he that would get , or he that would preserve ; for a violent appetite either in the one , or the other may be the occasion of great disturbances , which in my judgment are oftner caused by them that are in possession , because the apprehension of losing what they have got , produces the same eagerness and passion , as desire of acquisition does in the other , forasmuch as they seldom think themselves safe in what they have , but by new accumulation ; besides , the more wealth or territory they have , the more power or capacity they have to usurp as they see occasion : to which may be added that their incorrigible and ambitious deportments , do provoke and kindle a desire in such as have not those dignities , to compass them if they can , and that for two reasons , to revenge themselves upon them , by stripping them of all , and to enrich themselves into the bargain by the wealth and honour which they see others manage so ill . chap. vi. whether in rome such a form of government could be established , as should take away the animosities betwixt the senate and the people . what the continued jealousies betwixt the senate and the people did produce , we have already discoursed ; but because the effects of them remained till the time of the gracchi , and were the occasion of the destruction of their liberty , it may be demanded whether rome might not have attained that height of authority and grandeur under another form of government that might have prevented those animosities . to resolve this question , it is necessary to look back upon those republicks whose fortune it has been to retain their liberty a long time without those inconveniencies , to examine what was their form , and whether it was practicable in rome . as examples , we may produce sparta and venice , the first ancient , the latter more modern , both mentioned before sparta was governed by a king , and a small senate ; venice did not divide the government into distinct names ; but all who were admitted to the administration were called gentlemen under one common appellation ; and that , more by accident , than any prudence in the legislator ; for when to those rocks upon which that city is now seated , many people did repair for the reasons abovesaid , in process of time their number encreasing so fast , that they could not live peaceably without laws , they resolved to put themselves under some form , and meeting often together to deliberate upon that , when they found they were numerous enough to subsist by themselves , they made a law to praeclude all new comers from the government : and hinding afterwards their numbers encrease , and that there were multitudes of inhabitants incapable of publick administration ; in honours to the governors they called them gentlemen of venice , and the others but citizens ; and this distinction might not only be instituted , but continued without tumult , because when first introduced , all the inhabitants participating of the government , no body could complain , and they who came after , finding it firm and established , had no reason , nor opportunity to disturb it ; they had no reason , because no injury was done them ; they had no opportunity , because the government restrained them , and they were not employed in any thing that might furnish them with authority ; besides those who came after were not in number disproportionable to the governors , the latter being equally , if not more numerous than they ; for which reasons the venetians were able not only to erect , but maintain their government a long time without any revolution . sparta being ( as i said before ) governed by a king and a small senate , might likewise preserve its model a long time , by reason the inhabitants were but few , strangers excluded and the laws of lycurgus established with great veneration , so that living by those laws , all occasion of tumult was taken away , and they might continue united a long time ; for though the offices and commands were conferred upon a few , yet the revenue of the country being equally distributed , the people were not seditious , though they were kept at a distance ; nor did the nobility provoke them by any insolence or oppression ; and this proceeded from the condition of their kings , who being environed by the nobility , had no safer way to secure their dignity , than by protecting the people from injustice and violence , by which means the fear , and the desire of command being taken from the people , the emulations betwixt them and the nobility and the occasion of tumultuating ceased , so that it was not hard for them to enjoy their tranquillity several ages ; of the length of their tranquillity , there were two principal causes ; first , the number of the spartans being small , there was no necessity that their governors should be many ; and next no strangers being admitted , they were not liable to be corrupted , nor to encrease to such a number , as might grow insupportable to those few who were under their government . these things being considered , it is plain that the roman legislators could not have instituted a commonwealth that should be free from sedition and mutiny , any other way , than by imitating the venetians and spartans , that is by not employing the people in their wars , like the venetians , nor entertaining foreiners into their city , as the spartans . but the roman legislators transgressing in both , the people grew strong , and by consequence tumultuous ; and if any way the government were to be rendered more quiet , this in convenience would follow , it would be rendered also more weak , and all means be taken away that might conduct it to that height of grandeur and authority , at which afterwards it arrived ; so that those applications which prevented the tumults in rome , prevented also its enlargement , and the extent of its empire , as it happens in most humane affairs , the removal of one inconvenience is the contracting of another . for if you arm , and adapt a numerous people for the war , by their means to enlarge your territory ; you put them into a conditon of being unmanageable afterwards , and not to be kept down to your discipline and government ; whereas if you keep them disarmed , and their number but few , though you may make your self arbitrary , you can never continue it , for your subjects will grow so poor spirited and vile , you will become a pre to the first man that invades you . in all deliberations therefore , the inconveniences are to be considered , and that resolution prefer'd , in which their are fewest ; for none can be taken that are absolutely free the romans then in imitation of the spartans , might have set up a king for his life , and appointed a little senate ; but by so doing , they could never have laid the foundation of so vast an empire , for an elective king , and a small senate would have contributed but little to their unity and peace . he then who would set up a new commonwealth , should consider whether he would have it ( like rome ) extend its dominion and soveraignty ; or keep it self within its own bounds without any dilatation . in the first case it is necessary to imitate the romans , and give way to the tumults and publick dissentions as well as he can ; for without his citizens be numerous , and well disciplin'd and arm'd , he can never extend his dominion ; and if he could , it would be impossible to keep it . in the second , he is to frame to the model of the spartans , and venetians ; but because augmentation of empire , is commonly the destruction of such commonwealths , he is by all possible means to prohibit new acquisitions , because depending upon weak commonwealths , they are always destructive and pernicious , as experience has shown in the examples of sparta and venice . the first having subdued most part of greece , discovered , upon a slight accident , the weakness of its foundation , for the thebans revolting at the instigation of pelopidas , gave opportunity to other cities , and quite ruined the government . in like manner venice having conquer'd the greatest part of italy , more by their mony and artifice , than arms , presuming too much upon their force , and coming to a battel , they were worsted , and in one day lost all which they had got . i should think therefore a commonwealth that would stand a long time , should model it self within according to the example of sparta and like venice , seat it self in so strong and inexpugnable a place , that it might not apprehend any sudden insult ; nor make it self so great on the other side as to become formidable to its neighbors ; for the common motives that excite people to make war upon a commonwealth , are two ; either to conquer it themselves , or to secure themselves against it , and by the aforesaid expedient , those two ways are totally frustrated ; for if it be hard of access , and well-disposed to defend it self , it will seldom or never happen that any body will attempt it . if it keeps within its own bounds , and by experience be found free from ambition , no body will fear it , nor will any body offend it ; and questionless it would be the more safe , if by the laws and constitutions it was forbidden to extend , for i am clearly of opinion , that keeping things in this balance and equilibrium , the government would be more civil , and the peace of the city more certain . but the affairs of man being mutable , and nothing in them that is durable and firm ; there is a necessity that they either encrease or diminish , and that necessity does many times constrain us , to what in reason we should rather decline . whence it happens , that if a government be erected apt to defend it self in peace and security without extending its bounds , and necessity enforces it to enlarge , that enlargement takes away its foundation , and ruines it the sooner . so on the other side , when the stars are so benign to a commonwealth , as to place it in peace , without any occasion of war , that peace begets idlness , and idlness effeminacy or faction , which two things ( and indeed either of them alone ) will be sufficient to subvert it . wherefore , it being impossible , as i conceive , to keep things in this balance and mediocrity ; in the constitution of all republicks , particular care is to be had to what is most honorable ; and things are to be so ordered , that if necessity should compel them to inlarge , they might do it in such manner as to be sure to keep it . but to return , a commonwealth , in my judgment , is better fram'd to the example of rome , than either to the venetian or spartan , it being so hard to hit the exact way between the one and the other ; and for the emulations betwixt the nobility and the people they are to be born as inconveniences , but such as are necessary for a people that would rise to the grandeur of the romans ; against which nevertheless ( as i have shewn before ) the authority of the tribunes will be some remedy , if invested with the power of impeaching , which was given to the tribunes in other states , as i shall shew in my next chapter . chap. vii . how necessary it is for the conservation of a state , that any citizen be securely accused . there is nothing of more importance to the safety of a state , than that permission be given to such as are set up for the conservation of its liberty , to accuse such persons to the people , the senate , or other magistrates , as shall any way offend against the constitutions thereof ; and this practice has two effects very profitable for the commonwealth : the first is , the citizens , for fear of being accused , do not attempt any thing to the prejudice of the state ; and if they do , they are easily and readily suppress'd : the other is , that thereby a way is opened for the evacuation of such humours as are too frequent among the citizens of every great city ; which humours , without some legal vent , do usually recur to extraordinary ways that are absolutely pernicious : wherefore there is nothing renders a commonwealth more stable and firm , than the provision of some legal course for the evaporation of those humors which indanger it . this may be demonstrated by several examples , but especially by that which is mentioned by titus livius in his discourse of coriolanus . he tells us , that the nobility of rome being exasperated against the people , for that they thought their authority too much encreased upon the creation of their tribunes ; and it hapning at that time , that in respect of the great scarcity of provisions , the state had sent into sicily for supplies ; coriolanus being a great adversary to the popular faction , advised that this was a fair time to chastise the licentiousness of the people , and to take from them that power which they had assumed to the prejudice of the nobility , to which purpose he persuaded the senate against distributing the corn . this counsel coming to the ears of the people , they were so highly incensed , that they set upon him tumultuously as he came out of the senate , and had certainly killed him , had not the tribunes interposed , and cited him to appear before them in order to his defence . by which accident it is plain how much it is for the interest of a commonwealth , that a legal way be provided to discharge the choller of the people , which otherwise will be apt to fly to extraordinary courses , and without doubt produce more mischievous effects : for if a single citizen be cut off , ( though possible unjustly ) it begets little or no disorder in the commonwealth , because execution is done without private force , or foreign assistance , ( which are mortal things to a free state ) and what is done by course of law , and publick authority , is neither destructive nor dangerous . and as to ancient examples , i think this of coriolanus sufficient ; from whence every man may gather what mischief would have resulted to the commonwealth of rome , had he been cut in pieces by the fury of the people ; it would have created private disgusts ; those disgusts jealousies , those jealousies provision of defence ; that combinations ; combinations parties ; and parties destruction : but by the interposition of publick authority , all these evils were prevented . we have seen in our time what inconveniencies followed in florence , because the multitude had not a legal way of spending their indignations against one of their citizens . francesco valori was prince of that city , suspected by many people , as if he designed to make himself absolute , and by his haughtiness and pride to exceed those limits which the laws had prescribed : there being in that commonwealth no way to prevent it , but by setting up a faction in opposition to his , he began to look out himself , and to make a party that might defend him . the people on the other side having no legal way to suppress them , betook themselves to their arms. and whereas , if any ordinary way had been open to have opposed him , his designs had been obviated by his single destruction ; being forced upon an extraordinary , it was effected not only by his , bu● by the ruine of many other eminent citizens . to confirm what we have said , another instance might be produced in the city in the case of peter soderini , which happened for want of a law whereby they might impeachany citizen that aspir'd to the government . there were eight judges only in that commonwealth , which are not enough to administer justice against a powerful man : in states that are well constituted , 't is necessary there be more ; for where they are so few , their dispatch is but small , and they are corrupted with more ease than where they are many . if therefore there had been any such way allowed , upon his ill government , the citizens would have formally impeached him , without calling in an army of spaniards ; and if his government had been well , they durst not have accused him , lest he should have accused them again ; and by that means that emulation would have been prevented which was the cause of so much mischief : from whence it may be concluded , when ever foreign assistance is called in by any party in a city , that it proceeds from the ill constitution of that government , and that there is no legal way of purging those humours which are so natural to men ; against all which , no remedy is more properly applicable , than by authorizing several persons of quality and interest to receive informations : which practice was so well followed in rome , that in all dissentions betwixt the senate and the people , it was never known that either senate , or people , or any private citizen what-ever had recourse to foreign assistance ; for having justice at home , what need of fetching it from abroad ? to these examples aforesaid , we may add another out of titus livius , who tells us , that in clusia the chief city of the tuscans , lucamon having vitiated a sister of one aruns , and aruns being unable to vindicate her , by reason of the power of the delinquent , he addressed to the french , who at that time had the government of lombardy , and possessing them with the profitableness of the expedition , he prevailed with them to bring an army to revege him of that outrage and injury which his sister had received : and doubtless he would never have betaken himself to the relief of a foreigner , could he have hoped for reparation at home . but as liberty of just accusation is great security to a state , so toleration of calumny is as dangerous on the other side , which we shall evince in the following chapter . chap viii . vnjust calumnies are no less pernicious to a commonwealth , than legal accusations are profitable and good . though the valour of furius camillus ( after he had raised their siege , and driven the french from their leaguer before rome ) was so universally venerable , that none of the romans thought it diminution either to their reputation or dignity to give him precedence ; yet manlius capitolinus could not brook that so much honour should be given him , seeing , in his judgment , he had done as much towards the preservation of the city , and deserved as well , in saving the capital , as camillus had done in the other ; and in military experience he thought himself no way inferior : so that full of envy , and unable to bear the greatness of his competitor , finding he could make no impression upon the senators , he turned himself to the people , and spread abroad several false reports against him . among other things , he puts it into their heads , that the treasure which was arised for payment of the french had not been given , but was continued in the hands of private citizens ; which mony , if reassumed , might be applyed to publick use , and either lessen the duties , or discharge the debts of the people . these pretences had great influence upon the people , insomuch as they began to talk , to murmur , to meet , to post themselves tumultuously in many places in the city , which being observed , and thought very dangerous by the senate , they created a dictator to take cognisance of the business , and restrain the fury of manlius . the dictator cited manlius , and appointed him a day ; manlius appeared , and being environed by the people as the dictator was by the senate , silence being made , the dictator asked manlius in whose hands that great treasure he spake of was detained , for he did assure him the senators were as desirous to discover it as the people : to which manlius made no positive answer , but by way of evasion , replyed it was unnecessary ( he thought ) to tell them what they knew already as well as he ; upon which insolence , the dictator commanded him to prison ; from whence it may be observed how detestable such calumniations ought to be , not only in every free city , but in every civil society , and with what care and severity they are to be suppressed ; and that is done most commodiously , by allowing freedom of accusation ; for as calumny is pernicious , information is beneficial to a state. accusation and calumny differ in this point , that any man may calumniate another where and when he pleases , without bringing testimony , or any other circumstance to prove it : but in case of accusation 't is quite another thing , a man must bring his proofs , his witnesses , and other circumstances to make good his charge . people are legally accused no where but before the senates , the magistrates , or the people : but they are calumniated every where , within doors and without , in the streets and the market-place , and there most where there is least accusation , and the cities least disposed to receive them . wherefore he who would lay the foundation state , ought principally to provide that all persons might have liberty to inform against any one , without suspicion or fear ; which being solemnly provided , and faithfully observed , his next business is to secure them against scandals , and the calumniator can have no reason to complain if he be punished , when there are publick places appointed to receive the accusations of such as are abused ; and if in these things particular care be not taken , great mischiefs will follow ; for these kind of aspersions do not correct , but provoke their fellow citizens , and those who are accused are not so much apt to fear the disgrace , as to hate the authors of the reports . in these cases the romans had very good laws , and they stood them in good stead ; but we in florence having neglected them , have suffered much by it , and he who peruses the history of our city , will see how subject to calumniations in all times those citizens have been , who have employed in its most important affairs . one is charged with embezling the publick treasure ; another for being corrupted , and betraying some publick enterprize ; a third for ambition , and commiting one insolence or another , from whence feuds and animosities do arise on hands ; and from thence divisions ; from divisions parties ; and from parties destruction . whereas , if in florence authority had been allowed for the accusation of citizens , many mischiefs had been prevented , which followed for want of it ; for those citizens who were accused ( whether condemned or absolved ) would have not been able to have molested the state ; and the impeachments would have been fewer than the calumniations , because more people would have been calumniated than accused , in respect that the first was so much the more easie ( as is said hefore ) than the other . and these calumnies have advanced some citizens to great dignity ; for having great adversaries that opposed their designs , they joyned themselves with the people , and making them their friends , confirm'd the ill opinion which they had of their adversaries before . several examples might be produced to this purpose , but i shall only instance in one . the florentine army was encamped before lucca under the command of giovanni guiccardini their commissary . by his ill fortune or conduct the town was not taken ; which of the two soever it was , giovanni was aspersed , as having been brib'd by the luccheses , which calumny being propagated by his enemies , netled giovanni , and almost brought him to despair ; and though , in order to his justification , he offered to put himself into the hands of the captain , yet all was to no purpose ; for in that commonwealth there was no body qualified to clear him : from hence arose great contentions betwixt guiccardin's friends , ( who were the greatest part of the grandees in that city ) and those who studied novelty , which contentions , and others of the like nature , encreasing daily upon their hands , brought that poor commonwealth into a most deplorable condition . manlius therefore spreading these false reports of the senators about rome , was a calumniator , not an accuser ; and the romans in his case gave manifest instruction how such people are to be punished , that is , that they be obliged publickly to accuse , and when their charge is made good , that they be rewarded or encouraged ; but when it cannot be proved , that they be punished like manlius . chap. ix . how much a single person is necessary for the establishment of a new common-wealth , or the reformation of an old . it may seem to some , that i have run too far into the roman history , having made no mention of the founders of that commonwealth , nor of the orders which they observed either in matters of religion , or war. to ease them therefore of their suspence , who are desirous to hear something to that purpose , i say , that many perhaps may think it of ill example for the founder of a state , as romulus was , to kill his own brother , and afterwards consent to the death of titus tatius sabinus , who was chosen his companion in the government , supposing that according to that president , any of his citizens that were ambitious of command , might make away their adversaries or competitors , and remove any obstucle that opposed them ; and it were reasonable enough , were it not to be considered to what end , and upon what motives that murder was committed . this is to be taken for a maxim , and general rule , that it is impossible for any government either to be well founded at first , or will reformed afterwards , unless by a single person , by whose direction all orders , all laws are to be made and promulged . he therefore who is the founder of a common-wealth , if he be an honest man , and aims not at his own interest , and the raising of his family , more than the advancement of his country , must endeavour to get the power into his single hands , nor will any wise man ever accuse him for any action extraordinary that he shall do in order thereunto ; or if the fact be to be blamed , the effect will excuse it , especially if be good , as it was in romulus his case , for it is destructive and pernicious violence that is to be reprehended , not that which tends to settlement and reformation . he is also to be so prudent and vertuous , as not to leave the authority which he assumed in inheritance to another , because men being more prone to evil than good , his success or may employ that power to the prejudice of the state , which he in his wisdom made use of to its benefit and advantage . moreover , though one be fittest to make laws , yet when once made , they cannot hold long , if left upon the shoulders of a single person , but when the care and execution of them is transfer'd upon many , and many are concerned to maintain them , it is much better ; for though many be not so proper in laying the foundations of a government , because their diversity of opinions keeps them from discerning what is absolutely for its good ; yet when things are once setled , and they have found it , that very diversity will be a means to preserve it . and that romulus was excusable for what he did to his brother and companion , and that what he did was more for the common good than his own private ambition or revenge , appears by this ; that he had no sooner made them away but , he constituted a senate , by whose advice he acted in every thing , reserving to himself only the power of calling them together , and commanding the armies when they should resolve of a war : and of this we cannot have better evidence than that which followed after the expulsion of the tarquins , there being nothing innovated or altered by the romans , only in stead of one perpetual king , they created two annual consuls ; which shews that romulus in his first institutions aimed rather at the election of a civil and a free , than an absolute and tyrannical state. many more examples might be produced to fortifie what is said , as those of moses , lycurgus , solon , and other founders of kingdoms and commonwealths , who , by assuming a monarchical authority , were able to frame and impose such laws as were for the benefit of the publick ; but being so well known , it would be superfluous . i shall add only one , not so famous perhaps , yet worthy to be considered by those who are desirous to be good legislators ; and it is this , agls king of sparta observing his citizens had lost much of their ancient virtue , and by consequence were decayed both in their power and empire , imputing it in part to their deviation from the laws of lycurgus , desired very earnestly to reduce them again , but before he could bring it to perfection he was slain by the spartan ephori , as one who designed to make himself absolute ; but cleomenes succeeding him in the government , having the same inclination , and perceiving by some records and writings which agis had left behind , what was his intention , he found that he could not do his country that service any way , but by making himself absolute : for by the ambition of some persons , he found that he could not do the good which he designed to the generality , by reason of the malevolence of a few , wherefore he caused the ephori , and who-ever else he thought likely to obstruct him , to be killed , and revived the laws of lycurgus , which noble act might have recovered that state , and have made cleomenes as venerable as lycurgus himself , had it not been for the power of macedon , and the weakness of other commonwealths ; for not long after that reformation , being invaded by the macedonians , it proved unable to defend it self , and having no body to sustain it , was overcome ; and that just and honourable design was unhappily laid aside . considering therefore what has been said , i conclude , that a single person is best for the institution or regulating of any sort of government , and that for the death of remus and tatius , romulus was not to be blamed . chap. x. as they are to be praised who lay the foundations of any republick or kingdom , so they are to be condemn'd who set up a tyranny . among all excellent and illustrious men , they are most praise worthy who have been the chief establishers of religion and divine worship : in the second place are they who have laid the foundations of any kingdom or commonwealth ; in the third , those who having the command of great armies have enlarged their own , or the dominion of their country ; in the next , learned men of all sciences according to their several studies and degrees ; and last of all ( as being infinitely the greatest number ) come the artificers and mechanicks ; all to be commended as they are ingenious or skilful in their professions . on the other side , they are infamous and detestable , who are contemners of religion , subverters of governments , enemies of virtue , of learning , of art , and in short of every thing that is useful and honourable to mankind ; and of this sort , are the prophane , the seditious , the ignorant , the idle , the debauched , and the vile . and although nature has so ordered it , that their is neither wise man nor fool , nor good man , nor bad , who if it were proposed to him which he would choose of these two sorts of people , would not prefer that which was to be preferred , and condemn the other ; yet the generality of mankind deluded by a false impression of good , and a vain notion of glory , leaving those ways which are excellent and commendable , either wilfully or ignorantly wander into those paths which will lead them to dishonour ; and whereas to their immortal honour they might establish a commonwealth or kingdom as they please , they run head-long into a tyranny , not considering what fame , what glory , what affection , what security , what quiet and satisfaction of mind they part with , nor what reproach , scandal , hatred , danger and disquiet they incur . it is impossible but all people , ( whether of private condition in the commonwealth , or such as by their fortune or virtue have arrived to be princes ) if they have any knowledge in history , and the passages of old , would rather choose ( if private persons ) to be scipio's than caesar's ; and ( if princes ) to be agesilaus , timolion and dion , than nabis , phalaris , or dionysius ; because they must find the one highly celebrated and admired , and the other as much abhor'd and condemn'd ; they must find timoleon , and the rest to have as much interest and authority in their countries , as dionysius or phalaris had in theirs , and much more security . nor let any man deceive himself with caesar's reputation , finding him so exceedingly eminent in history , for those who have cryed him up , were either corrupted by his fortune , or terrified by his power , for whil'st the empire continued , it was never permitted that any man should speak any thing against him , and doubtless had writers had their liberty , they could have said as much of him as of cataline , and caesar is so much the worst of the two , by how much it is worse to effect and perpetrate an ill thing , than to designe it ; and this they might judge by what is said of his adversary brutus , for not daring to speak downright of caesar , by reason of his power , by kind of reverse , they magnified his enemy : after rome also was grown to be an empire , and the government in the hands of a single person , it may be observed how much more happy and secure those emperors were who lived like good princes , according to the dictate of the laws , than those who lived otherwise ; for titus , nerva , trajanus , adrianus , antoninus , and marcus , had no need of praetorian bands , nor multitude of legions to defend them , their own excellent deportment , the benevolence of the people , and the affection of the senate , saved them that charge : it will appear likewise how to caligula , nero , vitellius , and several other tyrannical emperors ; their eastern and western armies were not sufficient to secure them against the enemies , which their irregularity and ill manners had contracted ; the history of which persons , if well considered , would enable any prince to distinguish betwixt the ways of honour and infamy , of security and fear : for of xxvi emperors betwixt caesar and maximinus , xvi were murdered , and but x died in their beds ; and though some of those who were slain might possibly be good , ( as pertinax , and galba ) yet they were murdered by reason of the corruption and ill discipline which their predecessors had left in the army ; and if among those who died naturally , there were any tyrannical , ( as severus ) it is to be imputed to his great courage and fortune , which are two things very seldom concomitant in one man , it is legible likewise in the same history upon what basis and foundation a monarchy must be built , to make it solid , and permanent ; for all those emperors who succeeded by hereditary right were ill men , except titus only , and those who came in by election were good , as nerva and the four which succeeded him ; but when the empire became wholly hereditary , it ran furiously to destruction . let the times therefore from nerva to marcus be displayed before your prince , and let him compare them which went before with those which came after , and then make his choice when they would have been born , or when he would have been soveraign ; he will find when good men were at the helm , the prince safe in the security of his subjects ; peace and justice flourishing in the world ; the senate in authority ; the magistrates in esteem ; rich men enjoying their estates ; nobility and virtue exalted ; and all things quiet and well ; no rancour ; no licentiousness ; no corruption ; no ambition to be found ; the times were golden ; every man enjoyed his opinion , and defended it as he pleased ; in a word , he will find the world triumphing in felicity , the prince happy in the reverence and affection of the people ; and the people safe in the generosity of their prince . if then the reigns of the other emperors be contemplated , they will appear full of commotion , discord , and sedition , assassinations in peace ; cruelty in war ; many princes murther'd ; many foreign , many domestick embroilments ; all italy afflicted ; and all its cities destroyed ; rome burnt ; the capitol by its own inhabitants demolished ; the ancient temples desolate ; religious ceremonies prophaned ; and the whole citie full of adulteries ; the sea covered with exiles , and the rocks with blood ; infinite cruelties and barbaris●●s committed daily in the city ; and nobility , riches , honour , and especially virtue , grown to be capital offences . informers and calumniators will be found to be rewarded ; servants instigated against their masters ; children against their parents ; and those few who were so unhappy as to have no enemies ; to be destroyed by their friends ; then it will appear what mighty obligations rome , and italy , and the whole world had to caesar ; and doubtless if the prince be endued with the lest spark of humanity or good nature , he will detest the imitation of the bad , and be inflamed with an ardent propensity to the good . all which things considered , that prince certainly which aims at glory , and reputation in the world should desire a government , where the manners of his subjects are corrupted and depraved , not to subvert and destroy it like caesar , but to rectifie and restore it like romulus , than which the heavens , cannot confer , nor man propose to himself greater honour . and if a prince who would regulate and reform a city , cannot do it , without depositing his authority ; in that case he is excusable in some measure , if he dispenses ; but where he can retain the one , and accomplish the other , he is altogether unpardonable ; they therefore to whom the heavens are so propitious as to present such an opportunity , are to consider that they have two ways before them , one leading to security whil'st they live , and an honourable memory when they are dead , the other to continual troubles here , and perpetual infamy hereafter . chap. xi . of the religion and ceremonies of the romans . though rome should have been founded by romulus , and owe him ( as his daughter ) for her birth , and education ; yet the heavens foreseeing that the constitutions of romulus would not be sufficient for so great an empire , put it into the heart of the roman senate , to create numa pompilius for his successor , to the end that what was left defective by the first , might be compleated by the latter . numa finding the people martial and fierce , and being desirous by the arts of peace to reduce them to civil obedience , he betook himself to religion , as a thing absolutely necessary to the maintenance of civil policy ; and he ordered things , so that for many ages together never was the fear of god so eminently conspicuous as in that commonwealth , which was a great promotion to whatever was designed either by the senate or princes . and he who shall peruse the infinite actions of that city collectively , or of several romans in particular will find those citizens more tender of falsifying an oath , than of violating the laws , judging an offence against god more hainous , than an offence against men , and god more able to punish it : of this we have manifest evidence in the examples of scipio , and manlius torquatus , for after the defeat which hanibal had given the romans at cannas , the people tumultuating , and many of them assembling in great fear to consider of their condition ; they resolved among themselves to leave italy , and transplant into sicily . scipio having notice , repaired to them immediately , and coming in suddenly among them with his sword drawn , he forced them to recant , and take a peremptory oath not to abandon their country . lucius manlius father to titus manlius ( who was afterwards called torquatus ) was impeached by marcus pomponius a tribune of the people . before the day arrived for the hearing of the father , the son coming to the tribune and threatning to kill him , unless he would swear to withdraw his accusation , he forced him to his oath , and he performed as he had sworn ; and so those citizens who could not be retained by either the love of their country , or laws ; were kept at home by an oath which they took upon force : and the tribune laid by his hatred to the father , passed by the insolence of the son , and neglected the reflection it would have upon his own honour , to be punctual in his oath ; which proceeded from nothing but those principles of religion which nama had distused . and surely it will be found by whoever considers the roman history , how useful a thing religion was to the governing of armies , to the uniting of the people , to the keeping men good , and to the deterring them from being bad ; so that should it fall into dispute whether rome was most obliged to romulus or numa , i am of opinion , numa would have the preheminence , because where religion is fixed military discipline is easily introduced ; but where religion is wanting , discipline may be brought in with difficulty , but never in perfection . it is to be seen likewise that for the constituting a senate , and establishing of laws both military and civil , romulus had no need to pretend divine authority ; but with numa it was otherwise , he was of necessity to pretend to it , and thereupon gave out that he had private conference with a nymph , who dictated to him what he was to prescribe to the people , and all was , because he had a mind to introduce new laws and customs into that city , which he thought his own private authority would never effect . and certainly never any man brought in new laws , or set up any doctrine extraordinary , but with pretence of religion ; because otherwise they would never have been admitted ; for a man may be wise and know many things are good , and yet want reasons and arguments to convince other people ; wherefore to remove that difficulty , prudent men do make that always their pretence , and solon , lycurgus , and several others who had the same design , practised the same . the people ( then ) admiring the goodness and wisdom of numa , submitted in all things ; true it is the devotion of the age , and ignorance of the people contributed much , for thereby he was able to impress them with what new form he thought good ; and questionless , he that would establish a commonwealth at this day , would find it more easie among the rude people of the mountains who have not been acquainted with civility , than among such as have been educated in cities , where their civility was corrupted ; like rude unpolished marble which is more readily carv'd into a statue , than what has been mangled already by some bungling workman . so that all things considered , i conclude , that the religion introduced by numa , was one of the first causes of that cities felicity , because religion produced good laws , good laws good fortune , and good fortune a good end in whatever they undertook . and as strictness in divine worship , and conscience of oaths , are great helps to the advancement of a state so contempt of the one , and neglect of the other are great means of its destruction . take away religion , and take away the foundation of government ; for though perhaps the goodness and fear of their prince may sustain it for some time , and supply the want of religion in his subjects ; yet because he is mortal , and possibly but very short lived , that kingdom can hardly out-live the virtue of its governor : wherefore those states which depend only upon the piety of their princes , are of little duration , for commonly one dyes with the other , and the virtue of the father seldom revives in the son , as dante has said very wisely , rade volte discende per li rami l' tunn ana probitate , et questo vuole quel che la da , perche da lai si chiami . virtue 's but seldom to the branches spread , he who bestows't , has in his wisdom said , let him that wants , come to the fountain-head . things being thus , it is not sufficient for a commonweal thor kingdom to have a prince who governs it wisely whil'st he lives , but he must lay his foundation so , as it may out-live him , and flourish when he is in his grave ; and though rude , and uncultivated people are more susceptible of new laws , or new doctrines ; yet men that are civil , and presume more upon their education are not altogether impenatrable . the people of florence thought themselves no fools , and they had a good opinion of their breeding ; nevertheless they suffered themselves to be deluded by frier girolamo savonarola into persuasion that he had conference with god. a person of his gravity is not to be mentioned but with reverence , and therefore whether true , or not true , i will not determine , only this i shall say , many believed him , who never saw any thing extraordinary to induce them ; his life , his doctrine , the subject of his discoursing being in their thoughts enough to convince them . let no man therefore despair of what another man has attained , for men ( as i said in my preface ) are born , live , and dye , in the same method as formerly . chap. xii . how necessary for the preservation of a state it is , that religion be in esteem , and how much italy has suffered for want of it , by means of the church of rome . those princes and commonwealths who would keep their governments entire and incorrupt , are above all things to have a care of religion and its ceremonies , and preserve them in due veneration , for in the whole world there is not a greater sign of imminent ruine , than when god and his worship are despised . this is easily understood by observing upon what foundation the religion is placed where every man is born . the religion of the gentiles ran much upon the answers of oracles , upon divinations , and soothsaying , upon which all the rest of their sacrifices , rights , and ceremonies did depend ; for they did not doubt but the same thing that could presage your fortune ( be it good , or be it bad ) could as easily confer it ; and therefore they built their temples , they made their sacrifices , they offered up their prayers , and used all other ceremonies that might signifie their veneration ; for the oracles of delos , ●he temple of iupiter ammon , and such other things had a strange influence upon people , and kept them in most wonderfull devotion ; but afterwards when they began to speak according to the interest or directions of great persons , and their partiality began to be discovered ; the people grew incredulous , and prone to all kind of disturbance : a prince therefore or commonwealth ought most accurately to regard , that his religion be well founded , and then his government will last , for there is no surer way than to keep that good and united . whatever therefore occurs that may any way be extended to the advantage and reputation of the religion which they design to establish ( how uncertain or frivolous soever it may seem to themselves ) yet by all means they are to be propagated and encouraged , and the wiser the prince , the more sure it is to be done ; this course having been observed by wise men , has produced the opinion of miracles , which are celebrated even in those religions which are false ; for let their original be as idle as they please , a wise prince will be sure to set them forward , and the princes authority recommends them to every body else . of these miracles , there were many in rome , as at the sacking of urii , some of the roman soldiers entring into the temple of iuno , accosting her image , and asking it vis venire roman , will you come to rome ; to some of them she seemed to beckon by way of consent , and , others fancied she said yes ; for those men being more than ordinary religious ( as titus livius infers from the devotion , and reverence , and quietness wherewith they entred ) they fancied they heard that answer , which 't is possible they expected before ; and camillus and the other magistrates of the city promoted their belief : and if this diligent care in divine worship were regarded by christian princes according to the precepts and instructions of him that gave it at first , the states and commonwealths of christendom would be much more happy and firm : nor can any thing portend the ruine of our church with more certainty , than that those who are nearest the church of rome , ( which is the head of our religion ) should have less religion than other people : and he who should consider the present practice , with the primitive foundation , would find that either utter destruction , or some great judgment was hanging over our heads . and for as much as some are of opinion , that the felicity and welfare of italy depends upon the church of rome , i shall set down some few reasons to the contrary , which i have fram'd to my self , two of which are in my judgment unanswerable : one is that by the corrupt example of that court , that province has lost all its religion , and all its devotion , which has been followed by many inconveniences , and disorders ; for as the religiousness of the people presuppose all well , so where they are wicked , it betokens the contrary ; so then , we italians have this obligation to the church and its ministers , that by their means we are become heathenish and irreligious ; besides another ( little less pernicious ) and that is , that we are grown divided and factious , which must of necessity be our ruine , because never was any province happy or united , unless under the obedience of one commonwealth , or one prince , as france and spain at this time : and the reason is , because italy is not upon the same terms , as having no one republick or commonwealth to govern it , but the church , and though the pope has assumed a temporal as well as spiritual jurisdiction , yet he was never so couragious or powerful as to possess himself of all , and make himself prince ; nor was he ever so weak , but upon any apprehension of losing his temporal dominion , he could call in some foreign potentate to defend him against any man who was grown too formidable ; and this has been seen anciently in many examples , as when by assistance of charles the great , he repelled the lombards who in a manner hacd made themselves masters of all italy ; and when again in our days he retrenched the power of the venetians by the help of the french , after which he drove out the french by the succour of the swizzers . the church therefore being neither so strong as to conquer all italy , nor so weak as to suffer it to be over-run by any body else , has been the occasion that it never fell into the hands of one person , but has been cantonized into several principalities , by which means it has been so weak and disunited , that it has been not only exposed as a prey to the power of the barbarians , but to every one that thought good to invade it which is an unhappiness we italians owe only to the church : if any man suspects what is said , and would be experience inform himself of the truth , it would be necessary he should be so potent as to transplant the court of rome and all its authority in italy into the territories of the swizzers , who are the only people at this day which live either as to their ecclesiastical or military , discipline , according to the model of the ancients , and then he would quickly find that the wickedness and depravity of that court , would produce more confusion and disorder in that country than ever befell it by any accident before . chap. xxiii . how the romans pretended religion many times to regulate their city , to prosecute their wars , and to pacifie their tumults . and i hold it not extravagant to produce two or three examples in which the romans made use of their religion both in the regulation of their city , and the prosecution of their wars ; and although in titus livius they be very frequent , yet i shall content my self with these . after the people of rome , had created their tribunes with consular power and all of them ( except one ) from among the plebeans ; there hapning that year , a furious plague , a desperate famine , and other prodigies besides , the nobility in the next creation of tribunes took advantage of that occasion , and pretended that the gods were incensed against the people , for that they had debased the majesty of the empire , and that there was no remedy to appease them but to reduce the election of the tribunes to its primitive institution ; upon which the people were so frighted , they chose all their tribunes that year , out of the patricii . it was the same case in the taking of veii the romans had been before it ten years , and no great lekelihood of carrying it ; but the tenth , the lake of albin being miraculously swell'd ; so as to drown a good part of the country , the great officers of the army observing their soldiers weary of the siege , and impatient to be at home ; feigning to have consulted the oracles , they pretended that they had received this answer , that veii should be taken that year that albin overflowed ; which answer reflecting upon their devotion , the soldiers reassumed their courage , continued the siege , and ( camillus being chosen dictator ) carried the town ; and thus you may see how the romans made use of their religion to encourage their army against the fatigues and dangers of a tedious leaguer , and to fright the people from entrenching upon the priviledges of the nobility in the election of their tribunes ; without which pretence it would have been a hard matter to have persuaded either the one or the other . there was another example to the same purpose , terentillus , a tribune of the people , would needs make a law ( which was called lex terentilla , and shall be mentioned hereafter ) contrary to the interest , and inclination of the senate . the senate resolved to oppose it , and the best means they could think of , was pretence of religion ; of which they made use two ways ; they ordered the books of the sybils to be look'd over , and this answer to be returned , that that very year the city would be in great danger of losing its liberty , unless civil sedition was prevented ; which artifice , ( notwithstanding it was discovered by the tribunes ) put the people into such a fright , they grew cool in the business , and refused to stand by them . after this , they made use of the same pretence another time ; appius herdonius having got together of slaves and exiles to the number of four thousand men , seized upon the capitol in the night , and brought such a terror upon the city , it might very well be feared if the aequi and the volsci ( perpetual enemies to the romans ) had taken their opportunity and marched to rome , they would have gone near to have master'd it : however the tribunes persisted , and nothing could serve their turns , but the lex terentilla must be promulged ; for they affirmed the stories of being invaded , were but suggestions and fallacies , and not one word of them true : hereupon one publius rubetius ( a grave citizen , and of good authority among them ) came forth of the senate , and partly by fair words and partly by foul , remonstrating the danger of the city , and the unseasonableness of their demands , he play'd his part so well , that the constrained the people to take an oath of fidelity ●o the consul ; and in testimony of their integrity , the people ran to their arms , and recovered the capital from herdonius ; but publius valerius their consul being slain in the conflict , titus quintius was chosen immediately in his place ; who to keep the populace employed , and leave them no time to think of their law terentilla , commanded them out of town forthwith against the volsci , alledging that the oath which they had taken to be true to the consul , obliged them to follow him ; and though the tribunes opposed it , and objected that that oath extended no further than to the consul that was dead ; nevertheless livy tell us , that such was the peoples tenderness and veneration for religion , that they chose rather to follow the consul , than to strain and presume upon their consciences , giving this reason for it . nondum haec , quae nunc tenet seculum , negligentia deûm venerat , nec , interpretando sibi quisque jusjurandum , & leges aptas faciebat . the neglect of the gods , which has overspread this age , was not then come to that height , nor did everyman interpret his oaths , and accommodate his laws , to his own interest and advantage . upon which the tribunes perceiving their danger and that if they persist , they should run a hazard of being utterly extinguished ; they came to an agreement with the consul , received his orders , obliged themselves not to insist upon the lex terentilla for a twelve-month , in case the consuls for the same time would forbear drawing out the people . and thus you see how by pretence of religion , the senate overcame a difficulty , which without it , it could never have done . chap. xiv . the romans were wont to interpret their auspices with accommodation to their own pleasures and designs ; and when at any time they were forced to transgress they managed it wisely , and pretended to be very precise ; and if any body rashly despised them , he was sure to be punished . among the gentiles , auguries were a great part of their religion ( as i have said elsewhere ) and they contributed not a little to the well being of the roman common-wealth ; for which reason the romans had them in particular care , above any other ordinance , and made use of them in the creation of consuls , in the undertaking of enterprizes , in drawing out their armies , in their battels and engagements , and in every other business of importance , whether military or civil ; nor would they ever begin an expedition , till they had possessed the soldiers that the gods had promised them success ; among the several orders of auspices , they had one called the pullarii , who were to give their presages before ever they fought with their enemy : if the pullen , over which they had inspection , eat , it was a good omen , and they might with confidence engage ; if they did not eat , it was an ill sign , and they were obliged to forbear : nevertheless , when reason told them their enterprizes were practicable , they went roundly about them , though perhaps their auspices were averse , but acted with great nicety and cunning , that it might not seem done in defiance of religion : this was practised by papirius the consul before his battel with the samnites after which they never recovered . for being drawn up with his army against the samnites , with all visible advantage , and being willing to fall on , he commanded the pullarii to try their experiment ; the chickens refusing to peck , was a great trouble to the chief of the pullarii , who observed the great alacrity of the soldiers , and the great confidence of the general ; that an occasion therefore of so signal a victory might not be taken from the army , he return'd answer to the consul that the omen was good ; papirius put his men immediately into battalia , and advanced against the enemy ; but some of the pullarii having told it up and down among the soldiers , that the pullets did not eat , it came to the ears of spurius papirius , nephew to the consul , who in great hast advertising his unckle , received this answer , spurius be you diligent , and observe your orders ; to my self and my army the auspicia are good ; if the pullarius has told me false , the misfortune will be to him ; and that the event night correspond to his prognostick , he commanded the pullarii to be placed in the front of the battel ; his commands being executed , it hapned by accident as they were advancing to the fight , the chief of the pullaru was killed by a dart from one of the roman soldiers , which being told to the consul , now ( said he ) all will be well , the gods are appeased , and the blood of the author has atton'd for his lye ; and so by a discreet accommodation of his designs to the auspices , he went on to the combat , his army taking no notice that he had violated their religion . had appius pulcher been so ingenious in sicily in the first punick war , it had fared better with him when he came home , but being to fight the carthaginian army , he consulted the pullarii , who informing him that the pullen would not eat , we will see then ( said he ) if they will drink , and caused them to be thrown into the sea : and coming afterwards to an engagement , his army was defeated , himself condemn'd at his return , and papirius advanced , not so much because one had prevailed , and the the other was beaten , as because one had prudently evaded the omen , and the other rashly defyed it : and these auguries were invented for no other end , but that the soldiers might go to the fight with more confidence and alacrity ; for their alacrity was observed to contribute much to their success ; and this practice was so fortunate to the romans , that foreign governments began to make use of it ; as i shall show by one example in the following chapter . chap. xv. how the samnites in the extremity of their affairs , as their last refuge , had recourse to religion . the samnites had long war with the romans , fought several battels with them , and in the last fight in tuscany , were so utterly broken , that their army was destroyed , their chief officers slain , and the tuscans , gauls , and umbri , ( their allies ) uncapable of giving them any further assistance ; so that livy tells us , nec suis , nec externis viribus jam stare poterant , tamen bello non abstinebant , adeo ne infeliciter quidem defensae libertatis taoedebat & vinci , quam non tent are victoriam malebant . that though they were reduced to such a condition , that they could neither support themselves by their own strength , nor the supplies of their friends , yet they continued the war ; so that the unhappiness of their defence could not discourage them , but they chose rather to be conquered , than not to try for the victory . hereupon knowing that no victory is to be expected , where the soldier is diffident ; and that nothing enhanses them like a religious opinion ; as their last effort , they concluded ( by the ministery of ovius paccius their priest ) to revive an old ceremony , which they did in this manner ; altars being erected , and solemn sacrifice made , betwixt the flaming altar , and the bones of the victims , the officers having first sworn never upon any distress whatsoever to abandon the fight ; the soldiers were called over one by one , and in the same place ( before several centurions with their naked swords in their hands appointed to that purpose ) required to swear , first , that they would not deride any thing that they should either hear or see ; after which , with execrable words , and verses full of horror , they caused them to take their oaths to be ready at the command of their generals , never to fly , and to kill any of their fellows that offer'd to turn his back : and if ever they broke them , they imprecated a judgment upon themselves , and their race . some of them being scrupulous , and unwilling to swear , were killed upon the place , which struck such terror into the rest , that none of them refused . and that this ceremony might be performed with more magnificence , there being men in the field , half of them were clothed in white , with plumes of feathers upon their helmets , in which posture they encamped not far from aquilonia ; papirius was sent against them , and in his speech to his soldiers , he had this expression , non enim crist as vulnera facere , & picta , at ▪ aurata scuta , transire romanum pilum . for their feathers made no wounds , nor could the paint or glittering of their shields protect them against the darts of the romans . and to take off the opinion from his soldiers , that the solemnity and nature of their oath , might make the enemy desperate ; he told them , that that would be rather a terror , than an encouragement to them when they came to consider that by their own folly they had brought themselves in danger of the gods , the romans , and their comerades . in short the samnites wear beaten , the roman virtue , and the memory of their own frequent misfortunes prevailing against all the forc'd courage which either their oath or their religion could give them . nevertheless their sence of it was visible , seeing they made use of it as their last remedy , when they had no other hopes to recover their spirits . this might possibly have been better brought in among my forein discourses , but depending upon one of the ancientest and most important ceremonies of the roman common-wealth , lest i should divide my matter , and give too much occasion to look back , i thought it not improper to insert it in this place . chap. xvi . a people accustomed to the dominion of a prince , though by accident they may acquire their liberty , yet it is with great difficulty , if they maintain it . if the records of ancient history will serve our turn , it is manifest by many examples , that a people born and bred up in subjection to a prince , cannot without great difficulty preserve its liberty , if by any accident it attains it , as the romans did upon the expulsion of the tarquins & not without reason ; for the people is like a wild beast , ( which , though naturally fierce , disposed to live in the woods , and to find out dens and converts to conceal it self ) yet having been always brought up as it were in prison & servitude , if by accident it breaks its bonds and escapes out into the field , it is in a maze , knows not whither to run , where to sustain , or where to conceal it self , as having been accustomed to bondage and confinement ; by which means , if worth the looking after , it is easily recovered . it is the same with a people which has lived always in subjection , who , understanding nothing of publick offence or defence , and knowing as little of princes as princes do of them , are with the greatest ease imaginable reduced to a yoke which is commonly more grievous than what they escaped from before ; and this happens to them where they are not totally debauched ( for where the mass is corrupted , they cannot subsist a moment ) : i speak now of those where the malignity is not so diffused , but that there are still left more good men than bad ; in which case another difficulty does likewise occur , and that is , when-ever the yoke of tyrranny is shaken off , and liberty set up , it follows continually that many enemies are created , whose interest it is to subvert it , and no friends made that shall have any advantage by supporting it . by enemies i mean all those privado's and favourites of princes who have enjoyed the perferments and wealth of their master , and cannot but be disgusted to find themselves dispossessed ; wherefore they are constantly ready to take any occasion of restoring their old prince , that they themselves might be restored to their authority and employment . and for friends whose interest it is that ( upon the shaking off their tyrant ) their liberty should be preserved , they are not to be expected , because in free states , honours and offices are confer'd upon such as by their virtue , some great atcheivment for the benefit of the common-wealth , or some other honourable action have seemed to deserve them ; and when a man receives no more than what he thinks he has deserved , he ascribes it to his own merits rather than to the liberality of the state , and holds himself not obliged . besides , the common utility resulting from a free state , though it be in their power , it is not at all in their knowledg ; for who is it that considers , or takes care that every man enjoys quietly what god has given him ; that their wives be not dishonoured , their children abused , nor their fellows oppressed ? for who is it that will think himself bound to any man for doing him no wrong ? and things being so , a free state newly acquired , never creates such friends as will be half so solicitous for its conservation , as those enemies who have been dispossessed of their fortunes and preferment ▪ will be to undermine it , and restore their old master again : and if it be enquired what course is to be taken against the inconveniences and disorders which follow thereupon ; there is not a more efficacious , safer , and more necessary remedy , than to kill the sons of brutus , who ( as history tells us ) entred into a conspiracy against the state , with other young gentlemen of rome , for no other reason but because they could not be so loose and licentious under the consuls as under the kings ; as if their freedoms were incompatible , and the liberty of the people was servitude to them : wherefore he who proposes to govern a people , whether by the way of monarchy or republick and does not secure himself of those who are adverse to the change , must never think to effect , or at least to enjoy it long : and on the other side , it is convenient he should know the infelicity of those princes who cannot secure their dominion without murder and blood ; by which means the multitude is incensed , and become mortally their enemies : he who has but few enemies may secure it the better ; but where the multitude is provoked , no security is to be had ; and the more cruelty is used , the weaker the government ; so that when all 's done the surest remedy is to indulge the people , and make them your friends . and now ( though i may seem something confused and immethodical in speaking sometimes of a prince , and then of a republick ) i shall take the liberty to do it here briefly , that i may have no occasion hereafter . a prince therefore who , by usurping upon the liberties of the people , has made them his enemies , ( if he desires to reconcile himself ) is above all things to consider what the people affect , and he shall find it to consist principally in two things ; one is , revenge upon those who have been instrumental in their slavery ; and the other is restitution of their liberty . in the first the prince may gratifie them fully , in the second but in part . of the first we have an exact instance . clearchus governour of heraclia being banished for his tyranny , a controversie betwixt the nobility and the commons hapning afterwards in that town , it fell out , that the nobility finding themselves the weaker , addressed to clearchus , and having entred into confederacy with him , they gave him admission and overcoming the people , he took away their liberties . but clearchus perceiving himself in the clutches of the nobility , and not only subject to their insolence , ( which was neither to be satiated nor corrected ) but to the rage and fury of the multitude , which could by no means digest his encroachments upon their liberty , he resolved at one blow to rid himself of his grandees , and reconcile himself to the people , and taking his opportunity , he cut off all his nobility with great satisfaction to the rest . the other thing which they desire with so much favour is restitution of their liberty in which the prince cannot totally comply without degrading himself : he is therefore to examine upon what grounds the people are so fond of it , and he will find that some few indeed are zealous for their liberty , in hopes of office and preferment ; but the greatest part desire it only to be secure against oppression , and to live comfortably , and at ease . for in all governments , whether republick or monarchical , forty or fifty men go away with all the commands and offices of importance , which number being small , it is no hard matter for a prince to secure himself against them , by cutting them off , or by such addition to their former advantages as may in some measure oblige them . the rest , whose aim is only to live quietly , are easily satisfied by constituting such laws and ordinances as may make the power of the prince consistant with the security of the people . if a prince does this , and be observed upon no accident what-ever to violate their laws , the people will quickly be contented , and believe themselves safe . and of this the kingdom of france is an example ; being quiet , and at peace , because the kings are bound by innumerable laws , which comprehend the security of the subject ; for by the first institution of that monarchy , the kings have the disposition of their revenue , and the management of their armies , but in every thing else they are circumscribed by the laws . that prince therefore , or commonwealth , which at its first erection secures not it self , is obliged to do it at the first opportunity , as the romans did when they murdered the sons of brutus , and he that slips it will repent when 't is too late : for the people of rome ( not yet entirely corrupted ) having recovered their liberty , it was sufficient to maintain it , that they made away the bruti , and extinguished the tarquins , which otherwise was not to have been done , had the whole mass and body of the people been debauched , as i shall shew in the following chapter . chap. xvii . a people wholly corrupted in their manners , may possibly recover their liberty , but they will find insuperable difficulty to maintain it . had not kings been expelled as they were in rome , that city , in my opinion , must of necessity have declined , and its ancient virtue & the authority been lost ; for if the corruption of those kings be considered , had it been propagated but to the third succession ▪ it would easily have diffused it self among the people ; and that being infected , nothing could have preserved the city , much less have restored it to its former vigour and reputation ; but the trunk being entire , and the distemper only in the head ; by taking off that , the members were capable of being preserved . and their liberty recovered . and this may be laid down as a positive truth , that a city accustomed to the dominion of a prince ( if the manners of the people be corrupted ) can never make it self free , though the prince and his whole race be extinguished ; for some new lord or other will always spring up , unless by accident the courage and fortune of some good citizen concurs to its preservation ; and even then its liberty will be continued no longer than the life of that person ; as it hapned in syracuse , which remained free during the lives of dion and timoleon , ( though in different times ) but when they were dead , it relapsed , and fell under the same tyranny as before : but the most evident example of all was in rome which city having turned out the tarquins , found out a way of setting up , and maintaining their liberty a long time ; yet when coesar was slain , and caligula , nero : and the whole race of the caesars extirpated ; the romans were so far from maintaining it , that they could not so much as introduce the least form or appearance of liberty ; and the reason of that diversity in the same city was no other , but because in the time of the tarquins the people were not generally so vitious as afterwards in the reign of caligula and nero : for at the expulsion of the tarquins , to possess the people then against tyranny , it was sufficient to tender them an oath , by which they engaged never to admit single person again in rome : whereas afterwards , upon the death of caesar and the rest , neither the authority nor rigour of brutus , with all his legions in the east was able to dispose the people to the assertion of that liberty which so happily had been set up by the first of brutus his name . so strangely had the faction of marius diffused their poison among the commons , of which caesar being head , he had opportunity of blinding the people , and coaxing them into servitude so slily , they could not perceive the yoke into which they were thrusting their necks . though this example of the romans be pregnant enough , yet it is not brought in for any want in our own times . for in naples and milan the manners of the people being totally debauched , nothing could do , no opportunity could restore them to a condition of liberty . 't is true , upon the death of philip visc●nti , the milaneses attempted , but they could never effect it . for which reason it was very happy for the romans that their kings discovered their depravity so soon ; for by that means they were driven out before their wickedness could dilate , and spread it self among the people ; which if it had done , the troubles and tumults which succeeded thereupon had never had so good end , as to make rather for the advantage than prejudice of the city : from whence it may be infer'd , that where the multitude is not corrupt , tumults and disorders do no very great mischief ; where it is corrupt , laws may be well constituted and provided , and ye do no good ; unless executed by some person so severely , that the people are compelled to observe them , and by strict observation to become good ; which is a thing i can neither say has hapned hitherto , or promise it ever will. for it is clear , ( as i said before ) that a city declining , upon the corruption of the mass , can never recover , unless it be by the virtue and magnanimity of some active citizen , who takes the administration of justice into his own hands , and sees every thing faithfully performed , and even then , that good man is no sooner in his grave , but the people are in their old servitude again . thus it fell out with the thebans ; epaminondas , by his virtue and conduct , enabled them to keep up a form of a common wealth whilst he was alive , but , alas , at his death it was quickly dissolved ; the reason is , because no man is sufficiently long lived , to reclaim a city that has been long accustomed to licentiousness , and to reduce it to be good . so that though it happens to have such a good man among them , and he lives a long time ; nay though there be two successions of good men , if the third ( as i said before ) be defective , all goes to wrack , it must necessarily be ruined , unless by many dangers , and great effusion of blood it happens to be preserved ; because that corruption which renders it so unapt and indisposed to a free life , proceeds from the great inequality in that city and to reduce things to an equality , extraordinary ways must be used which few people know , and fewer will take , as shall be shewn more particularly in another place . chap. xviii . a corrupt city having made it self free , how its liberty may be maintained ; and not having made it self , how its liberty may be procured . i think i shall not be extravagant , if to what has been said already , i add another quaery whether , in a corrupt city , a free state may be maintained ( if by any accident it be set up ) ; or , if there be no such thing already , how it is to be obtained ? i answer , both of them are hard ; and though a certain rule cannot be prescribed , ( unless we knew the degrees of its corruption ) ; nevertheless , it being good that every thing be fairly discust , this question shall not be suffered to pass . i shall presuppose , that the city of which i speak is corrupt in extremity , and in that case the difficulty encreases with proportion ; for no laws nor customs can restrain an universal depravity ; because , as good customs cannot subsist without good laws , so good laws cannot be executed without good customs : besides , the laws which are made in the minority and innocence of a commonwealth , are not sutable or efficacious when it is grown wicked and robust ; for the laws of a city do vary upon several accidents and emergencies , but the statutes and fundamental orders are seldom or never changed , for which reason new laws are not so necessary afterwards , as good statutes at first : but to illustrate it farther . by ancient statute and custom time out of mind , the commonwealth of rome was divided betwixt the senate and the people , and all authority was derived either from the people , or senate , or tribunes , or consuls ; as also their creation of magistrates , and enacting of laws : these customs were little ( if at all ) changed in all the revolutions of that state ; but the laws for punishing malefactors , and regulating enormities , were enacted or repealed as the exorbitance of the people did fluctuate and require , as the sumptuary laws , the law against adultery , ambition , and several others , instituted from time to time , as the citizens grew corrupter . but the old customs of state being retained , ( though tainted , and sharing in the corruption of the people ) the reviving of old laws , or introducing of new , was not sufficient to keep the citizens good , but it would have contributed much , had the old customs been reform'd when those new laws were introduced , and a new form of government set up : for that those ancient customs are of no use or advantage where a city is overflown with such a deluge of corruption , is apparent by their methods in the creation of magistrates , and the exhibition of laws . the consulship , nor any other office or dignity was never confer'd by the people of rome upon any body but by formal application , which custom was originally very good , because none sought for them who was conscious of being unfit ; forasmuch as to be repulsed was a dishonourable thing , and to make himself sit , every man chose to be virtuous . but afterwards the manners of the people growing so fatally corrupt , this custom lost its primitive convenience , and became not only useless but pernitious ; for they who had most power , not they who had most virtue and capacity , pretended to the magistracy ; the poor and the virtuous not daring to appear for fear of an ignominious repulse : but this inconvenience ( like the city it self ) was not the product of a day , it stole into the commonwealth , lay concealed , encreased , and exerted it self by degrees , as all other inconveniencies do . 〈◊〉 having conquered africa and asia , and reduced the greatest part of greece , the romans began to hug themselves in their liberty , as not knowing any enemy they ought in reason to fear : this security and unhappy scarcity of enemies was the occasion that in their creation of consuls the people of rome began to regard riches and favour more than ability and virtue ; preferring such persons as could entertain and treat people handsomely , before such as were grave , and could only conquer their enemies ; afterwards , from those who were most plausible , they came down , and created such as were most powerful ; so that persons of virtue and capacity were totally excluded . in the making of laws , a tribune and any one citizen had power to propose any thing to the people which they thought of importance to the publick ; before whom it was canvas'd and discuss'd , every man having free liberty to object , or promote it ( as his judgment directed ) before it could pass . and this custom was good likewise whilst the citizens were so too ; for it was always , and is still convenient , that if any man be wiser than the rest , and can contrive any thing for the security or benefit of the publick , that he have liberty to propose it ; and it is as useful on the other side , every man have the same freedom to ventilate and examine it ; that all being well argued , and every mans opinion heard , the best may be chosen . but as the citizens grew corrupt , this custom grew incommodious : none but great men proposed any thing to the people , and what they did was not for the common , but their own private interest , and which was worse , no man had the liberty to dispute it ; so that the people were either circumvented , or forced to consent to their own ruine and destruction . so then , to have maintained rome free in such an age of corruption , it was necessary , as they altered their laws according to the prevalence of each vice , so they should have altered their fundamentals , in the making of laws , and creation of magistrates ; for the same customs are not equally convenient where the people are not equally good , no more than the forms can be alike where the matter is contrary . but 't is worth our inquity whether these customs be to be reform'd at a blow , as soon as their inconvenience is descried , or by degrees , before every body observes them . i say both of them are almost impossible : for to alter them by degrees , requires some wise and sagacious citizen , that can foresee the dangers at a distance , and trace them to their first causes ; but of such persons perhaps a city may never see one , or if it does , how hard is it for him to persuade other people : for people accustomed to a way are not easily got out of it , especially when the mischief is rather in probability than prospect . and when these old customs are to be reformed , ( as appearing unprofitable and dangerous for the commonwealth ) though they be easily discovered , they are hard to be removed , especially at once ; because the common mass being infected , common ways are too weak ; and recourse must be had to extraordinary , as violence and arms ; for before the fabrick of the government can be changed and modelled to your desire , 't is necessary above all things to make your self master of the city , and to be able to dispose of it at your pleasure : and because to reform a state , and reduce it to a civil regiment , presupposes a good man ; and to usurp , and make ones self prince by violence , presupposes an ill ; therefore it seldom falls out that a good man makes himself prince by unjust means , be his ends never so good ; nor will an ill man , who has made himself prince , ever do good ▪ it never falls into his thoughts to imploy that authority well which he has unjustly acquir'd . from the causes aforesaid therefore arises the difficulty ( or rather impossibility ) in a corrupt city , to maintain a free state , much less to erect one ; and if there should be any way found out to effect it , it would ( in my judgment ) be necessary to frame it rather according to a regal than a popular state ; that those persons whose insolence is incorrigible by the laws , may be bridled and restrained by some supreme magistrate in the nature of a king ; and to attempt any other way , must be either vain and temerarious , or exorbitantly cruel . for though cleomenes ( being a single person ) killed the ephori , ( as is said before ) and romulus , his brother , and titus tatius , and afterwards imployed their authority to the advantage of the publick ; yet it is to be considered , that the subjects neither of the one or the other were so vitious or depraved as those of whom we have treated in this chapter , and therefore they were able to do what they pleased , and excuse it when it was done . chap. xix . though a weak prince succeeds an excellent , the government may stand ; but if one weak prince succeeds another , 't is impossible . if the virtue and conduct of romulus , numa , and tullius ( the three first kings of rome ) be considered , it will be found to have been much for the advantage of that city to have its first king martial , and fierce ; the second king , quiet and religious ; and the third ( like the first ) active , and war-like again . for , as after the first institution , it was necessary there should be some-body to dispose the people to ways of religion , and civil conversation ; so it was necessary again after that , that the next king should reassume the vigour and magnanimity of their predecessor ; otherwise the minds of the citizens would have grown effeminate , and the city have become a prey to any of its neighbours . wherefore it is to be considered , that a prince not altogether so valiant and enterprizing , may maintain the government upon the score of his predecessor , and injoy the fruits of his courage and labour ; but if it happens he be long lived , and that he is not succeeded by a martial prince to revive the activity of the founder , the government must necessarily be ruined . on the other side , if two princes immediately succeeding , are martial and heroick , they are observed to do great things , and to advance the government exceedingly : david , without doubt , was a person no less excellent in military experience than in learning and wisdom ; and so great was his courage , that he left his kingdom to his son solomon in quiet and peace , who by arts of peace rather than war injoyed it happily his time upon account of his father ; but he could not leave it to rehoboam as he had received it of his father : for rehoboam being neither like his grand-father in courage , nor his father in wisdom , succeeded scarcely to the sixt part of his empire . bajazet the turkish scholar , though more studious of peace than of war , injoyed the labours of mahomet his father , who having ( like david ) subdued all his neighbours , left him a kingdom entire , that might be peaceably maintained ; but had ( bazjazet's son ) selimus now reigning , taken after his father , and not his grand-father , that empire had been ruined ; but he out-goes the glory of his grandfather . from hence may be observed , that after an excellent & magnificent prince , a pusillanimous may succeed , and the government stand ; but if one poor-spirited prince succeeds another immediately , 't is impossible it should subsist , unless ( like france ) it be supported by its old customs and laws : i call those princes weak and pusillanimous , who are not conversant , nor addicted to the exercise of arms , and do conclude , that the tranquillity of numas's reign ( which continued for many years ) was to be attributed to the courage and activity of romulus , which was revived again in tullus the third king , after whom followed ancus , a prince of so excellent a temper , that he knew how to comport as well in the calms of peace as the tempests of war. his first practice was gentle , and by methods of peace , but finding he was look'd upon as effeminate , and grew contemptible to his neighbours , he perceived the way to preserve his dignity , was , to betake himself to martial courses , and manage his affairs rather like romulus than numa . from hence an useful example for all princes may be taken , and it may be observed , that whoever is in the possession of a state , and follows the example of numa , may either keep it , or lose it , according to the different circumstances of fortune , or time . but he who imitates romulus , and is arm'd with wisdom and prowess , shall be sure to keep it , unless some extraordinary and irresistible power intervenes to supplant him . and 't is in probability to be thought , that had not the third king of rome prov'd a martial prince , and one who knew by his arms to recover his declining reputation , he could never ( or with great difficulty ) have regained it , or performed those exploits which he did afterwards : so that whilst rome was a monarchy , and under the government of kings , it was under a double danger of destruction , either by the mildness ; or the tyranny of its prince . chap. xx. two good princes , immediately succeeding , may do great things ; and well-grounded common-wealths having always a virtuous succession , their conquests and acquisitions must of necessity be according . when monarchy was banished by the romans , their dangers were banished with them , and they lay under no fear of either weak prince or tyrant ; for the command of the empire was put into the hands of the consuls , who came to that authority , not by inheritance , or any indirect or violent ambition , but by the suffrage of the people , and were always excellent persons . the city of rome enjoying from time to time the benefit of their fortune and virtue , might without much difficulty arrive at the highest top of greatness and dignity , ( as it did ) in the same number of years as it was under the government of kings . for we see in the examples of philip of macedon , and his son alexander the great , that a succession of two martial princes ( without a peaceable interposed ) is sufficient to conquer the world. and if it were possible in a monarchy , 't is easie in a commonwealth , in whose power it is to elect , not only two , but an infinite and continued succession of virtuous persons ; so that in a well-ordered commonwealth , the succession is constantly good . chap. xxi . how much that prince or commonwealth is to be condemned , which neglects to train up souldiers of its own . the princes and commonwealths of our times , if to defend themselves , or offend their enemy , ( as occasion serves ) they be unable to bring souldiers of their own into the field , they may thank themselves , and acknowledge ( with tullus ) that 't is not so much want of capacity in their subjects , as want of wisdom in them for neglecting to train them for when tullus came to the crown , rome had been forty years together in peace , ( during all numa's reign ) and there was not a man to be found who had ever seen the face of an enemy , nevertheless his own designs being martial , he resolved to make no use of the samnites or tuscans , or any other mercenary , but as a wise prince , to discipline his own ; and his art and experience was such , that in a short time he made them excellent souldiers ; and there is nothing more certain , than that where men are unapt for war , the fault is not in the situation or nature of the place , but in the carelesness or defect of the magistrate ; of which we have a fresh and memorable example . there is scarce any body ignorant , that of late years the english invaded france , and entertained no souldiers but their own ; and yet , though england had had no wars of thirty years before , and had neither officer nor souldier who had ever seen a battel , they ventured to attack a kingdom where the officers were excellent , the souldiers very good , having been trained up for several years together in the italian wars . this proceeded from the prudence of the prince , and the excellence of that government , in which ( though in times of peace ) the exercise of arms is not intermitted ; pelopidas and epaminondas having relieved thebes , and rescued it from the tyranny of the spartans , finding themselves in the middle of a servile and effeminate people , they so ordered it by their virtue and discipline , that they brought them to the use of arms , took the field with them against the spartans , and overthrew them . from whence that historian infers , that there are souldiers not only in lacedemon , but where-ever there are men , if there be any body to exercise and train them ; which tullus performed most exquisitely among the romans , and is most excellently expressed by virgil , in these words . — desidesque movebit tullus in arma viros . no soft unactive people tullus knows , but trains up all promiscuously to blows . chap. xxii . what is to be observed from the combat betwixt the three roman horatii , and the three alban curiatii . by articles betwixt tullus king of rome , and metius king of alba , it was agreed , that whichsoever of the two sides should overcome , that king should have the dominion of the other . the curiatii were all killed ; but one of the horatii being left , metius and his albans fell into subjection to the romans . horatius returning in great triumph into the city , and meeting a sister of his ( who was married to one of the curiatii ) lamenting the loss of her husband , in a great passion he killed her ; for which inhumanity being brought to his trial , he was , after many arguments , discharged , but more upon his fathers intercession than his own merits . in which accident there were three things considerable ; that we are never to venture our whole fortune upon the success of a party ; another is , that offences and deserts are not equally rewarded a well-ordered city ; the third , that no compact is well made , where the performance is or ought to be suspected . for to become servile , and in subjection to another city , is a thing of such moment and importance , that it is not to be believed that any prince or state whatsoever should be content that their liberty should be exposed to the success or courage of three of their citizens ; and this was evident in metius ; for though upon the victory of the romans he seemed to acquiesce , and promised obedience , as by articles was agreed , yet in the first expedition the romans undertook against the veientes , 't is manifest he would have deceived tullus , as one who repented of the covenants which he had made : but because of the third we have spoken largely already , in the next two chapters we shall speak only of the other two . chap. xxiii . that our whole fortune is not to be ventured upon part of our force , and that for that reason the keeping of passes is many times dangerous . it was never thought discretion to put your whole fortune in danger , unless your whole force was ready to defend it . this error is committed several ways ; one is when , like tullus and metius , they commit the fortune and virtue of so many men as either of them had in their army , to the fortune and virtue of three particular persons , which was but a pitiful part of either of their strength , not considering how , by that agreement , all the pains which their predecessors had taken to establish their liberty , and enable their fellow citizens to defend it , was rendred vain and ineffectual , by putting it into the power of three persons to destroy it ; than which ( in my judgment ) those two kings could not have done worse . another great error is , when , upon the approach of an enemy , we trust all to the keeping of an avenue , or the defence of a pass , unless it may be done with our whole force : in that case indeed the resolution is good ; but if the passage be narrow , and not room enough for your whole power , it is uncertain and dangerous ; and that which persuades me to be of that opinion , is the example of such as having been invaded by a potent enemy , though their country was environed with mountains and rocks , yet they would not attend , and engage the enemy upon the passes or mountains , but marched out of their holds to encounter him ; or else ( which is as bad ) they forsook their advantages , and expected him in some plain or convenient place within : and the reason is ( as aforesaid ) because many men cannot be brought to defend such places as are rocky , for want of subsistance ; and the passage being streight , it can receive but few people , and by consequence is not able to sustain the insult of a very great army , and the enemy may bring as may as he pleases to attack it , because his business is not to fix there , but to pass thorow and be gone : whereas he who is to defend it , cannot be in any considerable body , being ( by reason of the uncertainty of the enemies approach ) to lie there continually , though ( as i said before ) the places are both barren and streight . having lost therefore that pass which you imagined to keep , and upon which your army and people did wholly rely , the remainder of your army , and subjects are possessed with such a fear , that you can have no farther trial of their courage , but all goes to wrack , and your whole fortune lost , but with part of your army . with what difficulty hannibal passed the alps betwixt france and lombardy , and betwixt lombardy and tuscany , there is no body ignorant ; nevertheless the romans chose rather to attend him upon the tesin , and afterwards in the plain of arezzo , where the danger was equal both to the enemy and them ; than to carry their army up into the clouds upon the rocks and the snow , to be consumed by the incommodity of the place , before the enemy came at them . and whosoever shall read history deliberately , shall find few great captains that would coop themselves up in such passes and streights , not only for the reasons abovesaid , but because all of them cannot be stop'd the mountains in that respect being like the fields , having not only their roads and high-ways , but by-paths and passages , which though not observed by strangers , are well enough known to the inhabitants , who will be always ready to conduct the enemy , to remove them farther off who lie constantly upon them . of this a late example may be brought , in the year , when francis king of france design'd to pass into italy for the recovery of lombardy , the great objection by those who were against the expedition , was , that the swizzers would obstruct his passage over the mountains , which argument was found idle afterwards , for the kings of france waving two or three places which they had guarded , passed by a private and unknown way , and was upon their backs in italy , before they perceiv'd him ; so that being mightily surprized , the enemy quitted his posts , and retired into italy , and all the lombards submitted to the french ; they being deceived in their opinion , who thought the french were with more ease and convenience to be obstructed in the mountains . chap. xxiv . in well ordered governments , offence and desert are never set one against the other , but he who does well , is rewarded , and he who does otherwise , is punished . the merits of horatius were very great , having by his own single valor and conduct , overcome the curiatii ; after which he committed a most abominable act , in killing his own sister : which murther was so hainous in the eyes of the romans , that he was brought to a trial for his life , though his deserts were so fresh and considerable ; which at first sight seem ingrateful in the people ; but he who examins it strictly , and weighs how necessary and sacred a thing justice ought to be in every common-wealth , will find them more blameable for discharging , than they would have been for condemning him ; and the reason is , because in a well constituted state no man's good actions should indemnisie him for doing ill ; for punishment being as due to ill actions , as rewards are to good , having rewarded in a man for doing well , he is satisfied for what he did , and the obligation discharged ; so as if afterwards he commits a crime , he is to be punished severely according to the nature of his offence ; by the observation of which orders , a city may continue free a long time , which otherwise will quickly go to ruine . for if a citizen having perform'd any great exploit for his country , should expect not only honor and reward for what he has done , but priviledge , and impunity for any mischief he should do afterwards , his insolence would in a short time grow insupportable , and inconsistent with civil government . so then it is very necessary for discouragement from ill actions , to recompense good , which was the practice in rome , and though where a common-wealth is poor , her t●wards cannot be great ; yet even out of that small stock , she is to be punctually grateful , for a thing ( how little soever ) given in acknowledgment of ones good service ( let it be never so great ) is look'd upon as honorable , and received as a magnificent reward . the stories of horatius cocles , and mutius scaevola are generally famous . coles with incomp●rable courage maintained fight against a great body of the enemy upon the bridge over tiber , till it was cut behind him , and their passage obstructed : the other designing against the life of porsenna king of tuscany , and killing his secretary by mistake , being apprehended and brought before the king , to show the courage and constancy of the romans , he thrust his own hand into the fire , and burnt it off before his face ; and how were they gratified ? marry each of them had two staiora's , which is as much ground as can be sown with two bushels of corn. the history of manlius capitolinus is no less remarkable : having relieved the capitol ( which the french had surprized in the night ) and beaten them out again , his comerades in requital gave him a certain measure of flower , which ( as times went then ) was a mighty reward , and esteemed so adequate to the service , that manlius afterwards either out of ambition or ill nature , causing a tumult in rome , and endeavouring to debauch the people , ( his former exploits being as they thought amply rewarded ) without farther regard to him , they threw him headlong down that capitol , which he had so gloriously preserved . chap. xxv . though it is many times convenient to reform the old fundamental customs of a free city , yet it is convenient still to retain some shadow and appearance of their ancient ways . he who desires to set up a new form of government in a common-wealth , that shall be lasting , and acceptable to the people , is with great caution to preserve at least some shadow and resemblance of the old , that the people may ( if possible ) be insensible of the innovation ; for the generality of mankind do not penetrate so far into things , but that outward appearance , is as acceptable to them as verity it self . for this cause the romans at the beginning of their liberty , when their kings were expelled , thought it expedient to create two consuls instead of one king , assigning them only xii lictors , that their number might not exceed what attended upon the king. besides this , there was an anniversary sacrifice in rome , in which the ministry of the king was of necessity required : to salve that defect , the romans created a chief of the said sacrifice with the title of royal priest ( but with subordination to the high priest ) by which artifice the people were satisfied with their sacrifice , and took no occasion to complain for the expulsion of their king. he therefore who desires to reform the policy of a state , and to introduce a new , is to disguise it to the people by the retention ( at least in appearance ) of some part of the ancient customs , that may keep them from discerning it ; and if at any time by accident there be a necessity of changing the power , the number and duration of the magistrates , it will be convenient to continue the name . this ( as i said before ) is to be observed by any one who would establish an absolute power either in a republick ; or monarchical way , but he who would erect such an absolute power , as by authors is called tyrannies must unravel the whole bottom , and innovate all . chap. xxvi . a new prince in a new conquest , is to make every thing new . whoever makes himself lord of a city or state ( and especially if he finds himself weak , and suspects his ability to keep it ) if he intends not to continue the government in the old way , either by kingship or common-wealth , the best course he can take is to subvert all , to turn every thing topsie turvy ; and make all things as new as himself . to alter the magistracy , create new titles , elect new persons , confer new authorities , advance the poor , and impoverish the rich , that what is said of david , may be said of him , esurientes implevit bonis , & divites dimisit inanes . he filled the hungry with good things , and the rich he sent empty away . besides it is his interest to build new cities , to erect new corporations ; to demolish and uncharter the old ; to shift the inhabitants from one place to another ; in a word , so to toss and transpose every thing , that there be no honor , nor wealth , nor preferment in the whole province , but what is ownable to him . and for this he need go no farther than philip of macedon ( father to alexander the great ) for his pattern , who by this practice , of a small prince , made himself monarch of all greece , of whom it is said , that he removed his people , as a shepheard did his fold . those ways are cruel , and contrary not only to all civil , but to all christian , and indeed human conversation ; for which reason they are to be rejected by every body , for certainly 't is better to remain a private person , than to make ones self king , by the calamity and destruction of his people . nevertheless , he who neglects to take the first good way , if he will preserve himself , must make use of this bad ; for though many princes take a middle way betwixt both , yet they find it extream difficult and dangerous ; for being neither good nor bad , they are neither fear'd nor belov'd , and so unlikely to prosper . chap. xxvii . men are as seldom perfectly bad , as they are perfectly good . in the year . pope iulius ii. marched his army into bologna to drive the family of the bentivogli out of that state , where they had commanded with supremacy a hundred years . in the same expedition he resolved to remove iohn pogolo baglione out of perugia ( where he had usurped ) and in a word , all such tyrants as had got any church lands into their possession . coming to the town with the desire and resolution aforesaid , he attended not till he could march in with his army ; but enter'd as it were naked and disarmed ( though iohn pagolo was in person in the city , and many of his party which were got together to defend him ) so that transported with the usual vehemence wherewith he managed all his affairs , he put himself ( with his bare guards ) into the hands of his enemy ; yet he succeeded so well , that he carried pagolo off with him , and put in another governor in behalf of the church . wise men who were then about his holiness , admiring the temerity of the one , as much as the pusillanimity of the other , could not imagine how it should come to pass , that pagolo having his enemy as it were naked in his hands , and by consequence an opportunity ( with perpetual glory to himself ) to have secured him , and pillaged his equipage ( for all the cardinals were then with him , with the most precious of their jewels ) should so strangely neglect it ; especially when they considered that it was neither conscience nor good nature which restrained him ; for neither of those were to be supposed in a man who had been nought with his own sister , and murther'd several of his relations , to make his way to the government ; wherefore it was concluded to happen , because it is so provided by providence , that no man can be exquisitely wicked , no more than good in perfection ; for where there is any thing great and magnificent in a mischief , they know not how to commit it : so iohn pagolo who made no bones of either parricide or incest , could not ( or to speak more properly ) durst not make use of his opportunity to perpetrate a thing , which would have filled the world with admiration of his courage , and made his memory venerable to posterity ; for he would have been the first who had given his cardinals to understand how little it is to their reputation to lord it , and luxuriate as they do ; and the greatness of the fact would have lessened the scandal , and prevented any danger that might ensue . chap. xxviii . for what reasons the romans were less ingrateful to their citizens , than the athenians . whoever reads and observes the passages in commonwealths , will find a touch of ingratitude towards their citizens in them all , but less in rome than in athens ; and perhaps in any other republick whatever . the reason ( i suppose ) was , because rome had not that occasion of jealousie as athens had : for in rome , from the expulsion of the kings , to the time of silla and marius , the liberty of the city was never disturbed by any man within it ; so that there being no reason to apprehend , there was no reason to persecute . in athens it was otherwise ; for their liberty being invaded and taken away by pisistratus when it was most flourishing , and compleat ; and that by a pretence of advancing it ; they no sooner recover'd it ; but remembring the injuries which they had received , and their passed servitude , they flew out into such an exorbitancy of revenge , that they punished not only the faults of their fellow citizens , but the least umbrage , and appearances of them , from whence followed the banishment , and execution of so many excellent persons ; hence came the ostracism laws , and all the rest of the outrages committed afterwards upon the chief of their city , for as ye writers of politicks observe very well , the people are more cruel and vindicative who have lost and recovered their liberty , than they who have preserved it , as it was left them by their fathers . he therefore who considers what is said , will neither condemn athens , nor magnifie rome ; but impute all to necessity upon the diversity of accidents which hapned in each city . and certainly , if it be seriously considered , it will appear , that if the liberty of the romans had been oppressed , as the liberty of the athenians was , rome would have been no better natur'd , or shown more compassion to its fellow citizens , than athens did : and this may be infallibly deduced by what hapned ( after the expulsion of the kings ) against collatinus and p. val●rius ; for collatinus ( though he had been very active in asserting their liberty ) was banished for bearing only the name of tarquin ; and the other had like to have ran the same destiny , for building a house only , upon the top of mount celius , which they suspected was to command the city . so that it may probably be presumed ( by its suspicion and severity in the two cases aforesaid ) that rome would have exercised the same ingratitude , had it been injured in its minority , as athens had been . and that i may have no occasion to discourse of ingratitude hereafter ; i shall speak of it more largely in the following chapter . chap. xxix . whether the prince , or the people , is most subject to be ingrateful . and because we have undertaken to enlarge upon this subject , i think it not amiss to examine which are most frequently guilty of ingratitude , the prince , or the people : for better explication , i say , that men are ingrateful , either out of suspicion , or avarice . for if a prince , or republick send out any of their great captains upon some important expedition , which the said captain atchieves , and gains honor to himself , and reputation to his master , in this case the prince , or state , is obliged to reward him ; but if instead of rewarding , they casheer , or disgrace him , or out of a covetous principle , deny him his pay , the ingratitude is inexcusable : and leaves a scandal behind it that can never be worn out , and yet many princes are too guilty of it ; cornelius tacitus gives us the reason in this sentence , proclivius est injuriae , quam beneficio vicem exolvere , quia gratia oneri , ultio in quaestu habetur . 't is more natural to return an injury , than a courtesie , because courtesies are burthensom , but revenge is sweet . but if this ingratitude either in prince or people , proceeds not so much from avarice , as suspicion , in that case it is somewhat excusable , and of that kind we read of good store , as when a general has conquered a province or empire for his master , when he has exterminated his enemies , enriched his army , and gain'd himself a great name , 't is impossible but he must be so acceptable to his own soldiers , and so dreadful to his enemies , as must beget a jealousie in the prince ; for the nature of man being jealous and ambitious , and not to be confined within the bounds of his fortune , it cannot be but if the prince has taken a fancy that the glory of his general , is a diminution to his , the general must by some vain-glorious , or discontented action , establish and confirm it ; and then what has the prince to do ? but to secure himself either by causing him to be murthered , by taking away his command , lessening his reputation with the soldiers and people , and by all ways of industry possessing them , that the victory was not obtained by any conduct of his , but by the kindness of fortune , vileness of the enemy , or prudence and good management of the rest of the officers . after vespasian ( being in iudea ) was declared emperor by his army , antonius primus being at the same time in illyria with another army , declared for the emperor , and marched into italy against vitellius who was then paramount in rome ; and having beaten him in two pitch'd battels , he enter'd the city in the name of vespasian : so that mutianus being sent against vitellius by vespasian , he found the enemy broken , the town taken , and all things done by antonius to his hand . and how was he requited ? why mutianus took away his commission , removed him from the army , and by degrees so lessened his authority in rome , that antonius going into asia to make his complaints to vespasian , was received so coldly , that in a short time he was stript of all kind of authority , and died very miserable : and of this nature examples are very frequent in history ; every body knows how in our times gonsalvo ferrante , being the king of arragon's general in the kingdom of naples against the french , behaved himself so well , that by his singular conduct he conquered it , and put it wholly under the obedience of his master , who coming afterwards to naples himself , took from him the command of his army , dispossessed him of many strong places which he held in that country , and carried him with him into spain , where not long after , he died in obscurity . but there is no remedy ; these kind of jealousies are so natural to princes , that it is almost impossible for them to be grateful to any man , who has performed any great thing for them . and if it be so with kings , no wonder if it be so with the people , for in a free state , they have always two principal ends , one is to enlarge their dominions , the other to keep what they have got , and their eagerness to both these , makes them so often guilty of ingratitude . as to the first point , we shall speak elsewhere ; the errors in preserving their liberty ; to disgust such persons as ought to be rewarded , and to suspect such as ought to be trusted ; and though such practices are the occasion of great mischiefs in a corrupt commonwealth , and tyranny does many times ensue ( as in rome by caesar , who took that by force , which the ingratitude of the people denied to his merits , ) yet in a town that is entire , and incorrupt , they do very well , and add much to the duration of their liberty , to enforce great and ambitious men for fear of punishment to comport themselves better . in my judgment of all the commonwealths that ever had empire , rome was the least ingratful for the reasons abovesaid , there being never an example of its ingratitude but in the case of scipio : for coriolanus and camillus were banished for their injuries to the people , and though one of them remaining obstinate , was never recalled ; yet the other was not only recalled , but so restored to the affections of the people , that all his life after , they adored him as a prince . but their jealousie of scipio was of such a sort , as had never been known before , proceeding from the ornaments of his body , and the endowments of his mind ; his youth , his wisdom , his excellent qualifications had render'd him too admirable ; the powerfulness of his enemy , the danger and tediousness of the war ( which he had concluded in a very short time ) his deliberation in resolving , and his quickness in execution , had gained him a greater reputation , than was ever got by any general before him , insomuch as the senators , pretors , and all the chief magistrates in the city began to fear and respect him . this was no pleasing sight to the graver sort , because it had not been formerly the custom in rome ; whereupon cato ( a man of great esteem for his piety and justice ) took up the cudgels against him , and complained publickly that the city could not be called free , whil'st the magistrates were in awe of any particular citizen ; if then in a thing so nearly importing their liberty , the people followed the opinion of cato , in my judgment they were in some measure to be excused . in short , my opinion is , as i said before , that it is avarice and suspicion which makes men ingrateful : to the first of which the people are not naturally addicted ; and to the last , with much less propensity than princes , as having less occasion , which shall be proved hereafter . chap. xxx . what rules are to be observed by a prince or commonwealth to avoid this vice of ingratitude , and how a general or great citizen is to demean himself to elude it . to avoid the necessity of living always in suspicion , and being ingrateful to his ministers , a prince ought to go personally with his armies , as was done at first by the emperors of rome , as the great turk does now , and as all they do and have done that are valiant and couragious ; for in so doing , the honor and profit of their victories accrews to themselves ; but where they are not present at their conquests themselves , the honor redounds upon their officers , and they have not any compleat enjoyment of their successes , till they have eclipsed , if not extinguished that glory in other people , which they durst not venture for themselves ; so that their ingratitude , and injustice to their officers , does them more mischief , than their conquests do them good . but when out of negligence , or imprudence , they lie at home idle themselves , and send their generals in their stead , know no better precept to give them , than what they know already themselves . as to the general , if he finds that jealousie inevitable , he has his choice of two things . as soon as the war is ended , he is voluntarily to lay down his commission ; and to present it to his master , before he has occasion to demand it , using great care that none of his actions discover him to be either insolent or ambitious , that his prince having no cause to suspect him , may have the greater obligation to reward him . if this way does not please , the other is quite contrary ; and that is , to declare himself boldly , and try always to set up for himself , cajoling and sweetning his soldiers and subjects , making new alliances with his neighbours , seizing upon the strong towns , corrupting the officers , and where they will not be corrupted , securing them some other way , and by doing thus , he shall be even with his lord , for his ingratitude designed : and besides these two ways , there is none that i know . but ( as i said before ) because men can neither be good nor bad in extremity , it happens that great men are unwilling to quit their commands , and retire after the gaining of a victory ; behave themselves modestly they cannot : and to use rigour in an honourable way is impossible . so that whil'st they are in suspence , and uncertain which course to steer , they are many times destroyed . as to a commonwealth that would preserve and exempt it self from this detestable vice of ingratitude , the same remedy cannot be prescribed , as was prescribed to a prince ; for not being able to manage its wars in person as a prince may do , the command of their forces must of necessity be committed to some of their subjects . the best way they can take , is to follow the example of rome , and that will render them less ingrateful than their neighbors . in the wars of the romans , by ancient custom all people were employed , as well nobles as others , and from thence it came that they were always well furnished with generals and officers of all sorts , which kept them from being jealous of any one , having so many of equal merit to oppose him : besides which , there were express laws against ambition , and all people so narrowly observed , that no man durst discover the least design or inclination that way ; and in the creation , of dictators , he was commonly prefer'd , who debas'd himself most , or discovered least desire to obtain it ; by which means preventing the occasion of suspicion , they prevented the ingratitude . that state therefore which would avoid the guilt of ingratitude , is to imitate rome , and that person who would avoid the effects , must observe how the romans defended themselves . chap. xxxi . that the romans used no extraordinary punishments towards their great captains , when they committed an error of ignorance , or malice , provided the government was not damnified by it . the romans ( as i said before ) were not only less unthankful , than their neighbors but they were more human and gentle in the punishment of their generals , than any other state ; if their miscarriage was malicious , they punished it not severely ; but if it was by ignorance or mistake , instead of revenging , they did many times reward it ; and this they did upon very grave consideration , for the romans understood the charge of an army to be so great a care , and of such transcendant importance , that whoever undertook it , ought to have his mind free and indisturbed by any other respects or troubles whatsoever , for his thoughts being with his troubles , he would never mind his army , nor take any advantage . for example , an army is sent into greece against philip of macedon , or into italy against hanibal , or those people upon the frontiers , which had been conquered before , and the captain who has the general command , is loaden with all the cares which do commonly attend great and extraordinary enterprizes . now if to those necessary cares for his army , there should be superadded a fear , and apprehension of being punished at his return ( if things went otherwise than well ) and perpetual reflexion upon those who have been abused and put to death upon the same score , it must needs disturb the tranquillity of his mind , and make him unfit for any great action . the wise romans thought the infamy and dishonour of losing a battel , punishment enough , without heaping one affliction upon another . and as to those whose errors proceed rather from malice than ignorance , we have another example . sargius , and virginius had each of them an army , and were encamped before veii : sargius was posted against the tuscans , and virginius on the other side against any body else . it hapned the falisci having joyned with several of their neighbors , came to fall upon sergius . sergius had notice , and found himself too weak ; yet rather than send to his companion for supplies , he chose to be routed ; and virginius on the other side , though he knew his distress , would by no means relieve him , unless he desired it ; so that that roman army was cut off by the ambition and emulation of their generals ; a thing of very ill example , had it been suffered to pass without punishment . nevertheless , whereas other states would have punished them with death , rome inflicted only a pecuniary mulct , but their crime deserved sharper correction , but the romans were unwilling to do any thing against custom , which ( as is said before ) is very sacred with them . as to the errors of ignorance , we have another example in varro , by whose folly and rashness the romans having lost the battel of cannas against hanibal , and brought their whole government in danger , had hanibal known how to use , as well as gain a victory ; yet his offence having in it more of ignorance than malice , when he came back , the senate went out to meet him in their formalities , and not being able to congratulate his success , they gave him thanks for his return , and that de salute reipublicae non desperasset , that he did not despair of their affairs , when papirius cursor the dictator would needs put fabius to death , because contrary to orders he had fought with the samnites among other reasons which the father of fabius urged against that sentence , this was one , that the people of rome had till that time never been so severe upon any of their commanders for the loss of a battel , as papirius would now be upon the victor for gaining one . chap. xxxii . a commonwealth or prince is not to defer his beneficence till the necessity of the object requires it . the liberality of the romans to the people succeeded very well when prosenna invaded rome in behalf of the tarquins ; for the senate apprehending the people might be brought to restore the kings rather than endure the war , to oblige them , releast their gabels upon salt , and all their other duties , declaring the people were sufficent benefactors to the publick ; in providing , and bringing up their children : all which was done to cajole them into such an humour as might make them endure the siege , and swallow the calamities of the war : but let no man rely upon this example , and defer his indulgence to the people , till the enemy be upon his back ; for it shall never succeed so well to him as it did to the romans , because the multitude will think themselves more obliged to the enemy than to him , and believe , that when the necessity is over , they shall be as bad as before . the reason why this way succeeded so happily to the romans , was , because their state was but new , and scarce setled , and the people were sensible that several laws were made before for their advantage and reputation ; as particularly the law of appeal to the people : so as they were able to satisfy themselves that the benefits which were confer'd upon them by the senate , proceeded rather from a disposition in the senate to do them good , than from any apprehension of the enemy : besides , the injuries and outrages of their kings lay fresh and heavy upon their memories . but these cases hapning very seldom , 't is but very seldom that such remedies succeed ; wherefore it is better for any commonwealth or prince to consider the worst before-hand , and what people he is most like to have need of in time of adversity ; and to live so with them in time of prosperity , as that they may be encouraged to relieve him upon any distress . and he who acts otherwise , whether prince or commonwealth , ( but especially a prince ) and presumes , when the danger is hanging over his head , that it is time enough to favour the people , will find himself mistaken , and the people readier to contribute to his ruine than defence . chap. xxxiii . if an inconvenience increases either within a state , or against it ; it is better to temporize and comply , than to endeavour to remove it by violence . the roman commonwealth increasing in empire , reputation and force , their neighbours not having considered it , nor what damage that greatness might pull down upon them , began now ( when too late ) to discover their error ; and being willing to do that now which had been more easie before , forty little states of them confederated against rome . the romans , among their usual provisions in case of imminent danger , created a dictator , who , without any mans advice , might resolve as he pleased , and execute his resolutions without being called to an account . this magistrate was not only the occasion of overcoming their enemies at that time , but was very useful upon all accidents afterwards when their dominion increased . which may teach us , that when either at home within , or abroad against a commonwealth , an inconvenience arises , ( whether from an inward or an outward cause it is not material ) 't is better counsel to comply and temporize , than to endeavour furiously to suppress it ; for to resist , is to augment it , and to pull down upon our heads what we were but afraid of before . and these kind of accidents fall out in a commonwealth oftner from intrinsick than extrinsick causes , where the power and authority of some citizen is permitted to increase too fast , and more than is convenient for the honour or benefit of the state ; or when such laws are abrogated or neglected as were most for the interest of their state ; which error , if suffered to run on , will be more dangerous to oppose than to comply with ; for it is so much the harder to find out these inconveniencies in the beginning , by how much 't is natural for all people to favour every thing that is new , especially if introduced by a young man , with the least shew or pretence of advantage : for if a young gentleman appears in a commonwealth endued with more than ordinary qualities , the eyes of the whole city are immediately upon him , they run unanimously to respect him , and pay him all the honour that can be imagined ; so that if he has the least spark of ambition or vain-glory , he is presently puffed up , and inflamed with the contemplation of his own worth , and the affection of the people : and when he is arrived at such an height , as to be as visible as their error , then 't is too late ; there are but few remedies in the case ; and when most of them are applyed , they do but magnifie his power . many examples might be brought to this purpose , but i shall only instance in one . cosimo di medicis ( from whom the famous family of the medici in our city had their first grandeur ) was in such reputation for his wisdom ; and his fellow citizens were so ignorant , that he began to be formidable to the state , and the magistrates began to think it difficult to take him down , but destructive to let him stand . there was at that time in florence a person of great experience in matters of state , called nicolo da uzano , who being well advised of the first fault which he had committed in not considering in time the inconveniencies which might follow upon cosimo's reputation , resolved to obviate the second ; that is , that no force should be used to oppress him , as knowing that course would be the ruine of the state ; and so it proved not long after his death . for the citizens which remained , not following his counsel , began to combine , and fortifie against cosimo , and indeed forc'd him out of rome . whereupon , his party being increased , in a short time called him home again , and made him their prince , to which dignity he could never have arrived , but by the opposition of his enemies . the same hapned to iulius caesar , whose great virtue and excellent qualifications recommended him so highly to the favour of pompey and the people , that by degrees he became terrible , and their favour was turned into fear ; of which cicero complains , when he says that pompey began to fear him too late ; for when his fear prompted him to look out for a remedy , that remedy hastned the ruine of the state. i say then ( when this case happens ) it is incomparably better to temporize , than to endeavour to repel the mischief which threatens by violence and force . for many times , by that means , it passes as it came , and goes out of it self , or else the damage it brings is the longer a coming . in these cases princes ought to be very vigilant , lest going about to retrench and lessen the great power of a neighbour , they give him opportunity to increase it , and bring themselves into greater danger : you are therefore to compare your own strength , and your enemies ; and if you find your self the stronger , to attaque him couragiously ; but if weaker , you had better be quiet , lest it happens to you as it did to those little states who confederated against rome , to whom ( as appeared by the event ) it had been much better to have sate still , and endeavoured their friendship , than to have irritated the great power of the romans , and forc'd them to a war ; for the romans had never got to that height , if that confederacy had not given them occasion of trying all experiments for their defence , and put them among the rest , upon the creation of dictators , by which new invention they not only mastered all dangers that threatned them , but prevented a thousand mischiefs into which ( without that remedy ) the commonwealth would most certainly have fallen . chap. xxxiv . the dictatorship was useful , not hurtful to the commonwealth of rome ; and how that power which is usurp'd , and illegally assumed , is pernitious to a state , not that which is conferred legally by the suffrage of the people . there are those to be found who have said that the dictatorship was the ruine and destruction of that commonwealth , alledging that the first tyrant that was ever in that city , set himself up , under the title of dictator , and affirming that caesar could not under any other name have justified his tyranny . those who maintain that opinion did not examine it thorowly , and are not for that reason to be believed . for it was not the name or dignity of the dictator which brought rome into slavery , but the authority assumed by the citizens upon the perpetuation of that office ; and if there had been no such thing as dictator , caesar had taken some other title upon him to compass his designs ; for when ones power is absolute , he can assume what name he pleases ; but 't is not a great title that gives any man power . whilst the dictatorship was disposed by publick suffrage , it was very beneficial ; those who attained it by ways extraordinary , abused it exceedingly ; the rest were never known to have done any injury to the commonwealth thorow all the dictatorships : the reason is probable , because a man must be endued with many good qualities before he can usurp such an authority . he must be abundantly rich ; he must know how to insinuate with every body ; he must have a great party , and make every man his friend , which is not practicable where the laws are in force ; and if he had all those qualifications , they would render him so formidable , that the free voices would ever concur in his election : besides , the dictator was not perpetual , but created only upon particular exigence , and with limited power , extending no farther than the present danger , during which he had power to dispose of all things at his pleasure , and punish as he thought good without any appeal ; but he could do nothing in diminution to the government , he could not intrench upon the authority of the senate or people , abrogate their old laws , or institute new : so that the shortness of his dictatorship , the limitation of his authority , and the incorruption of the people , made it impossible for him to transgress , and do any mischief to the city ; and on the contrary , that office has been always beneficial , and , in my judgment , the principal in rome , and has contributed more than all the rest to make it mistress of the world ; for without that , that city had never been able to have obviated so many dangers , nor gone thorow so many difficulties , against which their accustomed and ordinary means would have been of little validity , as being too tedious , and slow ; ( no one counsel or magistrate being able to do all things alone but being in a mutual necessity the one of the other ) for in cases which require immediate remedy , time passes away , and is often lost whilst they are in their counsels , and when they come to a resolution , 't is too late , and their remedies dangerous . wherefore i think it convenient that a commonwealth have a certain way to be used only in case urgent necessity , as the seignory of venice , ( which at this day is the best regulated commonwealth in the world ) that state in time of imminent danger has a reserved power to confer authority upon some few of their citizens , by virtue of which they may order all as they please , without the consultation of the rest , for when a common-wealth is destitute of some such custom , it must of necessity be ruined by sticking to their old , or break them to preserve it self ; and it were to be wish'd that nothing might happen in a commonwealth that might give occasion for these extraordinary ways ; for though those extraordinary ways may sometimes be good , yet the example is ill , and introduces a custom of breaking old orders for good , which afterwards , under that pretence , will be broken for ill : wherefore that commonwealth can never be perfect , that by its laws has not provided against every thing , prepared remedies for every accident , and appointed in what manner they shall be managed ; which is to be done no better way than by a dictator , or some such magistrate to be created upon extraordinary occasion ; for without them they must certainly be ruined : and one thing very remarkable in this order , is , the wisdom of the romans in the formality of its election : for the dictators being introduced with some diminution to the consuls , ( who being from heads of the city brought down to obedience like other people , might possibly resent it , and in time be the occasion of dissention in the city ) they committed their election into the hands of the consuls , to the end that upon any extraordinary emergence , when rome should have occasion of so extraordinary a magistrate , the consuls should comply the more willingly , because they had the making them themselves ; for the wounds which a man gives himself spontaneously , and of his own election , are not so grievous as what he is forced for to bear . but towards the latter end of their empire , the romans , instead of a dictator , invested their consul with an equivalent authority in these words , videat consul , ne respublica quid detrimenti capiat ; let it be the consuls care that the commonwealth receives no prejudice . so that to return to our matter , i conclude , that the neighbouring states conspiring against the romans , and endeavouring to oppress them , made them contrive better , not only for their defence , but to put themselves into a posture , with more vigour , and counsel , and authority to repel their invasion , and turn their force upon them . chap. xxxv . how it came to pass that the creation of the decem-virat was prejudicial to the liberty of that state , though it was done freely , and by publick suffrage . in the last chapter we have shewn that a power legally conferred , and by the suffrage of the people , is not dangerous to the state ; but that which is usurped , and gotten by force , to which the election of the decem-viri may seem to be contrary , who were chosen by the people of rome to make their laws , and reform extravagancies in the commonwealth , which decem-viri by degrees encroached upon their liberties , and made themselves tyrants . wherefore we are to consider what is said , with limitation and restraint ; and respect both the manner in which such power is confer'd , as likewise the time it is to continue , whether for longer or shorter : for an absolute power ( though granted but for a year ) is very dangerous , and produces such effects as are sutable to the mind of the person to whom it is granted . and the power of the decem-viri ( if examined ) will be found much greater than the power of the dictators . for notwithstanding the creation of the dictator , the majesty of the consuls and senate remained , together with the authority of the tribunes , which were as bounds to restrain and circumscribe the jurisdiction of the dictator ; and although the dictator had power to remove any one out of the consulship , or take from him his tribunitial authority ; yet he could not vacat or abolish the whole orders of senators , consuls , and tribunes , make new laws , nor introduce a new form of government . so that their eyes being always upon him , he was forced ( as it were ) to intend only such things as were for the benefit of the commonwealth . but in the creation of the decem-viri it was otherwise ; for the whole power of the people was transfer'd to them , the consuls and senate being cashiered , and the power of the tribunes of the people almost quite laid aside ; so that standing alone in the government , without consuls , or tribunes , or appeal to the people , or any other magistrate to correct or controul them ; it was no strange thing that the very next year after their creation , they should become intolerable and insolent , especially being instigated by the ambition of appius , and for this reason it is to be observed , that when it is said , a power conferred legally , and by the suffrage of the people , is never prejudicial to the state ; it is to be supposed to be confer'd with due circumstances , and for a certain time ; but when the people is cheated , and gives it imprudently and rashly , as in this case of the decem-viri , things never go better , which is easily proved by considering what it was that kept the dictators so good , and made the decem-viri so wicked : and weighing withal the manner which other republicks that were reputed well ordered , observed , in conferring their authority for a long time , as the spartans to their kings , and the venetians to their dukes : both of them prescribing them rules and limits that they were not to exceed , and appointing such guards upon them as should be able ( though they were never so ill disposed of themselves ) to keep them from employing their power to the detriment of the state. nor is it sufficient if this power be confer'd upon good men ; for men are frail , and easily corrupted , and then in a short time he that is absolute may easily corrupt the people , contract friendships , make parties , heap up riches , and commit a thousand extravagancies ; nor can the poverty of their persons , or the want of relations prevent it , for wealth , and honour , and every thing follows them which are absolute , as we shall show particularly when we speak of the creation of the decem-viri . chap. xxxvi . citizens who have executed the greatest offices , ought not afterwards . to disdain or scruple the less . marcus fabius and cais manlius being consuls , the romans obtained a glorious victory over the veientes , and the etrusci , in which was slain quintus fabius brother to the consul , who was chosen the year before . from whence occasion is offered of admiring the excellence of the roman constitution ; and observing how well it was accommodated for the enlargement of their empire , from whose model the more the common-wealths of our days do recede , the more do they wander and deviate from the best . for though the romans affected glory and command as much as other people , they did not disdain notwithstanding to obey in their armies , the same persons whom they had formerly commanded ; and serve as private soldiers , where they had formerly been generals . this is a practice contrary to the opinion and genius of our age so much , that in venice it is provided by a publick law , that a citizen who has had a greater command , may refuse to accept of a less ( and the city allows it ) which law though it may be convenient for private persons , must needs be prejudicial to the publick ; because the publick may with more confidence commit an inferior command to a great officer , than prefer an inferior officer to a great command : for to a young soldier , those places of importance are not safely entrusted , unless persons of experience and wisdom be placed about him , by whose counsel he may be directed : and if the romans had done then , what the venetians and other commonwealths do now , and not suffered any man who had ever been consul , to serve in any other quality , many things had befallen them that would have endangered their liberty ; and again , if any young officers had been admitted to the supreme commands , and no body placed about them to manage and direct them , they would have grown dissolute and careless , and many things have hapned that might have ruined the state. chap. xxxvii . what troubles and offence was created in rome by the agrarian law ; and how dangerous it is to make a new law opposite to an old custom , with too much retrospection . it is observed by most ancient writers , that as men are afflicted in adversity , so they are satiated in prosperity ; and that joy and grief have the same effects : for when men are not necessitated to fight , they fight for ambition , which is so powerful in our minds , that let us arrive at what height of good fortune we can , we are never contented , but are still labouring for more ; and this happens to us , because we are naturally capable of desiring many things , which we are unable to compass ; and therefore our desire being greater than our power to acquire , our minds are never at rest with what we enjoy . and this is the occasion of all our varieties of fortune , for when we are always driving at more , and fearful of losing what is already in our possession , we are apt to fall into suspicions , from thence into quarrels , and from thence into wars , which do usually bring after them the ruine of our country . this we have discoursed , to give you a better contemplation of the people of rome , which by a kind of necessity was forced by their tribunitial power to fortifie themselves against the oppressions of the patricii ; but when they had obtained what indeed necessity impelled them to desire , being instigated by their ambition , they went on further , and contended with the patricii both for honor , and estate ; which was the occasion of the seditions about the agrarian law , and by degrees the destruction of the common-wealth . and because it is necessary in every well order'd state , that respect be had rather to the enrichment of the publick , than particular citizens , the people of rome could not ( in what belong'd to this law ) but erre against the fundamentals of their government , if they were so constituted , that process of time could give no occasion of difference , unless we will rather affirm that at first all things were so well , that it was beyond the power of time to disorder them : be it which way it will , it is certain this law was never mentioned in rome , but with great controversie , and tumult . this law consisted principally in two heads . one was , that no citizen of rome should be permitted to possess more than a certain proportion of land. the other , that what land should be taken from the enemy , should be divided equally among the people ; both of which articles were against the interest of the nobility ; for most of them having more land than was allowed by this law , their fortunes by it were to be confiscated , and half of them taken away ; and then by the distribution of what they should take from the enemy , they should lose all opportunity of enriching themselves for the future ; which being certainly true , and this law so perfectly pernicious to the interest of the nobility , it was never mentioned by the tribunes , but the patricii opposed it , and with all the eagerness imaginable ; yet not always by force , but sometimes by evasion , either commanding out their armies upon some pretended design , or by setting up another tribune in opposition to him who proposed the law , that thereby they might dissolve it , or else by sending new colonies . and so it hapned when the colony was sent to antium at the time when the difference was so high betwixt the patricii and the agrarians , that no other expedient could be found to keep them from blood . livy tells us , that there were very few that would list themselves upon that accompt , to fill up the number of that colony , so much more did the people prefer an alotment about rome , than in any other place . but afterwards the quarrel grew higher , and to appease their seditions , the romans were glad to send their armies sometimes to the extreamest parts of italy , and sometimes beyond them . but afterwards it falling out that the lands which they took from the enemy were remote , at great distance from rome , and not to be cultivated with any convenience , the people grew weary , and insisted not so fiercely on their agrarian law : they began also to be more moderate in those kind of confiscations , but when any country was seized , they sent colonies to plant them : with these arts they skin'd over their animosities till the time of the gracchi , who reviving them again , gave occasion to the ruine of their government : for the nobility having encreased their strength , the quarrel advanced so far , that they came to blows , and the magistrate being unable to restrain them , th● fury of the faction encreasing , each party began to look out for a head . the people chose marius , and made him four times consul , ( with some little interval ) which authority he managed so well to his own advantage , that by the power and interest which he had got in that time , he made himself thrice consul afterwards . the nobility having no other remedy against so growing a plague , applyed themselves to sylla , and having made him their chief , they fell to down right wars , which were carried on with much blood and variety of fortune , till at last the nobility prevailed . the same faction revived again in the days of caesar and pompey , and was attended by the destruction of the state : for caesar espousing the marian party , and pompey the syllan ; caesar overcame , and was the first that set up a tyranny in rome ; after whose time that city could never recover its liberty . this was the beginning , and this was the end of the agrarian law , which may seem to contradict what we have said elsewhere . that the discords and enmity betwixt the people and senate of rome conduced to the enlargement of their empire , and the conservation of their liberty , by giving opportunity for the making of such laws , as were great corroboration to their liberties and freedom ; but i answer , that the effects of the agrarian law , does not hinder , but that what we have said may be true ; for so great was the ambition of the nobility , that had it not been curb'd and check'd several ways , it would have usurped upon the city , and got the whole power into its hands . and if we observe that the agrarian dispute was three hundred years together in rome , before it could subvert it , we may easily imagine , the ambition of the patricii would have done it much sooner , had it not been ballanced and depressed by the people with their agrarian laws , and some other inventions . from whence likewise we may observe that wealth is more estimable among men , than honor ; for when the patricii were in controversie with the people about titles and honor , they never went so high as to give them any extraordinary disgust : but when their estates and fortunes were at stake , they defended them with such zeal , that they chose rather to put the whole commonwealth into a flame , than to part with them quickly . the great authors of that conflagration were the gracchi , whose good will and intentions towards the people , was much more to be commended than their wisdom . for to remove an inveterated inconvenience , and to that purpose to make a law with too much retrospection , is ill counsel ( as i said before ) and hastens that ruine which it was designed to prevent ; but with patience and compliance , the mischief is either delayed , or spends it self in time , before it does any great hurt . chap. xxxviii . weak commonwealths are generally irresolute , and ill advised , taking their measures more from necessity , than election . the volsci , and the equi understanding that rome was sadly visited with a contagion , concluded it a fair opportunity to conquer it , and having betwixt them raised a powerful army , they invaded the latini , and hernici ; over-ran most of their country , and forced them to send to rome for assistance . the romans returned answer , that they should put themselves in arms , and make as good defence as they could ; for the sickness was so raging , they could give them no relief . which shows the generosity and wisdom of that senate , that in all conditions , and under the greatest of their calamities never receded from its majesty and grandeur ; but at all times would have the disposal of the affairs of its subjects , and when necessity required , made no scruple to command things contrary to their old ways of proceeding . this i say , because formerly the senate had forbidden them to arm , upon any occasion whatever ; and perhaps another council would have thought it derogatory to their grandeur , to permit them to defend themselves : but this senate was endued with admirable prudence , understood how things were to be taken , and rejected ; and of two evils , how to make choice of the least . it troubled them much that they were not in condition to protect them ; and it troubled them no less , that they would be forced to defend themselves , upon their own score without succours from rome ; yet finding there was a necessity of it , the enemy being at their gates , and threatning them with death , they retained their authority , and with great gravity sent them word to defend themselves and raise what forces they could . this may seem but a common resolution , and what any other commonwealths would have taken as well as that ; but weak and ill ordered commonwealths cannot come off with so much honour . duke valentine having taken faenza , and overrun most part of bologna , demanded passage of the florentines to march his army to rome . the florentine council met , and consulted , and there was not one man who thought it convenient to grant it . this was not according to the discretion of the romans ; for the duke being very strong , and the florentines but weak , it had been more for their honour to have granted him passage , when they could not obstruct it ; that what they could not resist , might have been imputed to their courtesie . but there is no remedy , 't is the property of weak states to do every thing amiss , and never to do well but in spight of their teeths , for there is no such thing as prudence amongst them . and this florence has verified in two other cases . in the year . when lewis xii . had repossessed himself of milan , he had an inclination to restore pisa to the florentines upon the payment of florens : to this purpose he sent thither his army under the command of mounsieur de beaumont in whom ( though a french man ) the florentines had great confidence . beaumont came up with his army betwixt cassina and pisa , and lodged it conveniently for the battering the town : having been two or three days before , it and all things ready for the assault , commissioners came out , and offered to surrender to the french , upon condition that he would engage upon the honor of his master that it should not in four months time be delivered to the florentine ; to which the florentines not consenting , the commissioners returned . the cause why the florentines refused it , was their jealousie of the king , though they had put themselves under his protection . they did not consider that the king could better have put the town into their hands when he was master of it himself ( and if he had refused it , it would have discover'd him ) than promise to do it when he was not in possession , and yet they be forced to purchase that promise at a very great rate . two years after , arezzo revolted , and the king sent seigneur iubalt with supplies to the florentines , who had besieged the town . iubalt was no sooner arrived , but the inhabitants of arezzo made him the same proffer , and the florentines could not be brought to consent : iubalt resented it , and knowing it to be a great fault , he practised privately with the aretines , without communicating with the florentine commissaries : an agreement was clap'd up betwixt them , by virtue of which iubalt entred the town , and reproached the florentines by their indiscretion , as people wholly inexperienced in the affairs of the world . he told them , if they desired to have it , they should signifie it to the king , who would be better able to gratifie them in the town , than without . the florentines were highly offended , and spake very hardly of iubalt , till they considered that of beaumont had done the same at pisa , they had both as well as one i say therefore , that weak and irresolute states , do seldom take good counsels , unless they be forced ; for their weakness suffers them not to deliberate , where any thing is doubtful ; and if that doubt be not removed by a violent necessity , they never come to a resolution , but are always in suspence . chap. xxxix . divers people have many times the same accidents . whoever compares past things with the present , will find that in all ages men have had the same humours and appetites as now . so that 't is an easie matter by consulting what is pass'd , not only ( in all common-wealths ) to see what will follow , but to provide such remedies as their predecessors did apply ; or if there be no presidents , to invent new remedies according to the similitude of the accidents . but because these considerations are neglected , history not read , or not understood at least by him who governs , it comes to pass that all ages have their miscarriages and troubles . the city of florence after the government had stood years , having lost a good part of its territory , as pisa , and other towns , was forced to make war upon those who possessed them ; and the inhabitants being strong , and unwilling to restore them , much was spent in the war ; to very little purpose . their great expence , occasioned great taxes , and their impositions upon the people , made them mutinous , and unquiet . these affairs were administred by a magistracy of ten citizens , who were called the dieci della guerra : the people began to repine and to complain that the said counsel was the cause of the war , and that they embezled their money . that the best way would be to remove them from that office or when their time was expired to choose no more , but let the government fall back into its old channel again . these grave persons who had the superintendancy of the war , were no sooner discharged , but things grew worse and worse , and instead of recovering pisa , and the rest of the towns in dispute , they lost arezzo , and several other places . the people finding their mistake , and that their malady was rather from the feaver , than the physitian , they restored the ten commissaries , which before they had cashier'd . the people of rome had the same fancy against the consuls , and would not believe but they were the causes of all their distractions , and that to settle all things , and preserve themselves in peace , the best way would be to remove them entirely , and provide that there should never be any more , or else to restrain and limit their authority in such manner , that they should have no power over them , either within the city or without . they believed that all proceeded from the ambition of the nobility , who not being able to chastise the people in the city , because they were protected by their tribunes , contrived to carry them out of town under the command of their consuls , to correct them where they should not be capable of any redress . the first man who had the confidence to propose it , was terentillus a tribune , who moved that it might be committed to five persons to consider the power of the consuls , and to appoint limitations . the nobility opposed it , and ( it is probable ) employed all their interest against it , for it was no less than to debase the majesty of the government , and leave themselves no dignity in the commonwealth . nevertheless the obstinacy of the tribunes was such , that the name of consul was laid aside , and after several experiments , the people chose rather to create their tribunes with consular power , than to create new consuls again , showing thereby that their quarrel was not so much against the authority , as name : but they found their error at length , and restored their consuls , as the florentines did their council of ten . chap. xl. the creation of the decem-virat in rome ; what things are most remarkable in it ; and how far such a constitution may be useful or pernicious to a common-wealth . before we discourse of the troubles and commotions which hapned in rome by means of the decem-virat , it will not be amiss to give a short history of its creation , in which there are many things well worthy our remark , as well for the preservation as destruction of a state ; and this discourse will remonstrate the errors both of the senate and people in prejudice to the liberty , and of appius ( chief of the decem-viri ) against that tyranny which he design'd to erect . the romans therefore after a long debate betwixt the nobility and people about the constitution of such laws as might settle and establish the liberty of their state , by common consent , sent to athens spurius posthumus , with two other persons , for exemplifications of such laws as solon had made there , that thereby they might model their own . as soon as they were returned they chose certain learned and grave men to peruse the said laws , and select such as they thought convenient for the romans . the persons created for this office were ten of the principal citizens ( with commission for a year ) among whom , appius claudius was one , a witty , but a turbulent man. and that they might act freely , without any awe or impediment in their affairs , they laid aside all the other magistrates , ( in particular the tribunes and consuls ) and forbad all appeal to the people ; so that this magistracy were compleat soveraigns in rome . not long after appius assumed the whole authority of the ten , his companions paying a reverence , as their superior , by reason of his interest with the people ; for he had made himself so popular on a sudden , it was almost a miracle to consider how soon his nature was changed , and he of their only cruel and fierce adversary become their greatest courtier and favourite . the first year all went very well , and he who presided marched only with twelve lictors before him ; when any citizen was to be tried for murder , they framed the process , but appointing a day , left it to be judged by the people , though their jurisdiction was soveraign , and without any appeal . they writ their laws in ten tables , but before they were ratified they exposed them to the people that every man might see them at his pleasure , and approve or object as he saw occasion . when appius perceived the end of his commission approaching , he caused it to be rumoured among the people , that to compleat all , and give perfection to their designs , it would be convenient to add two tables more to their ten , in order to which the common people consented that the decem-virat should be continued for a year ; and they did it with the more readiness , that neither the consuls nor tribunes might be restored , but causes be left to their own judgment , as is said before . a day being appointed for a new creation , 't is not to be imagined how all the nobility stickled , and endeavoured to gain that honour which they had so stifly impugned by their applications to the people , whom they had so highly provoked . but among them all , none was so solicitous for the continuation of the decem-virat , as appius claudius who pressed it of the people with so much instance and humanity , that he began to be suspected by his associates , credebant enim haud gratuitam in tanta superbia comitatem fore ; they could not imagine a person of his pride would stoop to such flatterry without some great design : that they might defeat neatly , and with cunning , what they could not do by force ; though he was the youngest of them all , they committed the nomination of the next ten to him , supposing he would have observed ancient rules , and not named himself , which was a practice of no use nor reputation in rome , ille verb impedimentum , pro occasione arripuit he spoil'd their plot made advantage of their impediment , and named himself among the foremost , to the amazement and displeasure of all the nobility . this creation was no sooner over , but both nobility and people began to be sensible of their error ; for , as was said of him , finem fecit ferendae alienae personae , appius began to shew himself , and lay aside the disguise he had put on : he began to act according to his own natural pride , and in a little time had made his collegues as bad as himself . to terrifie the senate and people both , the first day of their magistracy they multiplied their lictors to , whereas formerly they had but , which were carried before every one of them by turns , but now every one of them had as many . this terror for some time was equally diffused , but afterwards they began to favour the nobility , and insult upon the people only ; and if any of the people that had been injured by any of the decem-viri , and had no right done him by the first , to whom he addressed , if he appeal'd to another , he was sure to be worse ; insomuch as the people finding their error , began in their affliction to look upon the nobility ; et inde libertatis captari auram , unde servitutem timendo , in eum statum rempublicam adduxerant ; and from thence hope for their liberty , from where their apprehension of servitude had brought their commonwealth into the condition in which it was . and this affliction in the people was no little satisfaction to the nobility , ut ipsi taedio praesentium , consules desiderarent ; that the tediousness of their sufferings might make them restore their consuls . by this time their years was expired , and the two tables to be added to the ten , both ready , and wanted nothing but publication ; the decem-viri had no mind to lay down , but began to think of continuing their authority by force , to which end they raised themselves guards out of the young nobility , and paid them out of the estates of those who were condemned . quibus donis juventus corrumpebatur , & malebat licentiam suam , quam omnium libertatem ; by which preferment the youth were debauched , and chose rather to be licentious themselves than that their country should be free . whilst things were in this posture , the sabini and the volsci made war upon the romans and invaded them with a great army . the romans were in great consternation and the decem-viri began to find the weakness of their government , for without a senate they were at a loss to manage their war ; and with it their authority would be supplanted . but being necessitated at last , they came to a resolution , and resembled the senate . many speeches were made against the decem-viri , in particular by valerius and horatius ; and doubtless their authority had been utterly exploded , but that the senate ; in spight to the people , chose rather to continue them , lest , if they were deposed , the people should set up their tribunes , and the consuls be quite laid aside ; whereas , if afterwards the decem-viri could be brought fairly to lay down , by degrees the consuls might be restored , and the tribunes be cashiered . hereupon the senate silently , without further prosecution of them , prepared for the war , and sent forth two armies under the command of several of the ten , but appius claudius was left behind for the government of the city . whilst his collegues were abroad , it was his fortune to fall in love with a plebeian's daughter called virginia , and not being able to persuade , he would take her away by force ; virginius the father of the virgin was willing to defend the chastity of his daughter , and knowing no other way to secure it , he got appius to be imprisoned : whereupon great tumults succeeding in rome , and in the army , the souldiers returned , and joyning with the people they encamped upon the holy mountain , where they resolved to continue till the ten had resigned , tribunes and consuls were restored , and the commonwealth had recovered its old liberty and freedom . this is the story of the decem-virat , as shortly related as could be , in which it may be observed , that the people of rome fell into subjection and servitude upon the same causes as other commonwealths very frequently do ; that is , by the too great desire of the people to be free , and the too great ambition in the nobility of command : when these two factions cannot agree , they are forced to refer all to some third person in whom they confide ; and then begins the tyranny . the decem-virat was erected in rome by consent both of the nobility and people , and invested with so much power , out of a hatred which the nobility bare to the tribunitial , and the people to the consular authority : as soon as the decem-viri were chosen , appius pretended highly for the people , and promised to be their champion , whereupon they favoured him exceedingly . and ( be it in what city it will ) whenever the people are brought to extol and applaud a person , for no other reason , but because it is in his power to punish their enemies ; if that person be cunning and industrious , their liberty is lost , and he can usurp when he pleases ; for by the assistance of the people he may master the nobility ; and when they are down , it will be no hard matter to subdue the people , who will have no body to fly to , nor no body to support them : but before the nobility be suppressed , he is by no means to meddle with the people . and this has been the method of all those who have laid the foundation of tyranny in any commonwealth ; which if appius had followed , he had not lost his ill-got authority so soon : but he went quite contrary , and with as much imprudence as was possible , ran himself into the displeasure of the same persons which advanced him ; and ingratiated with those who were against his preferment , and were no way able to sustain him , whereby he lost his old friends who were powerful , and endeavoured to get new that could do him no good . for though the nobility have naturally no aversion to tyranny ; yet that part of the nobility which shares not in the profits is always an enemy to the tyrant , and their ambition and avarice is so great , all the riches and honours in the tyrants disposal are too little to take them off . hence it is that the aggressor in any enterprize is of necessity to be stronger than his adversary ; and he who in the establishment of a tyranny makes the people rather than the nobility his friends , will be stronger and more secure than he who goes the other way , cajoles with the nobility , and disobliges the people : for the people being always stronger in the city , by their friendship , a tyrant may subsist without any foreign supplies . this was visible in the case of nabis the tyrant of sparta , who having the affections of the people , and secured himself of some of the nobility , defended himself against all greece , and the whole power of the romans , which without the hearts of the people he could never have done . but he who makes his interest with the nobility , cannot maintain himself without foreign assistance ; for he will want guards for th● security of his person , souldiers to do the office of the militia in the country , and confederates and allies to succour him in his distress ; whereas if he could be supplyed in these three defects , it might be possible for him to subsist without the friendship of the people . but appius failing in these , miscarried in the very beginning of his tyranny . in the creation of the decem-virat the senate and the people were guilty of very great error ; for though in our discourse of dictators we have said before , that those magistrates only are pernitious to the publick liberty , who set up themselves by force , not they who are legally chosen and by the suffrage of the people ; yet the people are to take special care in the election of their magistrates , that they may not easily usurp . but the romans instead of placing guards about their decem-viri that might have kept them in order , they not only took their guards away , but displaced all the rest of their magistrates , and made them absolute for that year , and all out of a design to countermine one another ; the nobility to suppress the tribunes , and the people the consuls . so that it hapned to them , as ferdinand king of arragon was wont to say it hapned to men that hated one another ; that is , that they acted like birds of prey , all of them pursuing the quarry with equal rapacity ; but the little birds not regarding the greater over their heads , are easily interrupted , and made prey themselves . but we have said enough to demonstrate the ill counsel of the romans in thinking to preserve their liberty by the creation of the decem-virat , and the errors of appius in driving at the soveraignty , and miscarrying so soon . chap. xli . for a mean man to grow immediately insolent , or a meek man immediately cruel , without just steps of gradation , is both imprudent and unprofitable . among the rest of appius his faults in the management of his tyranny , it was of no little ill consequence that he changed his humour so suddenly : his cunning in cajoling the people , and pretending to be of their party , was good : his invention to renew the creation of the ten was no worse ; his boldness in presenting himself contrary to the expectation of the nobility was well enough , and his creating collegues for his turn was not amiss . but having gone thus far , ( as is said before ) to change his nature in a moment ; of a friend , to become an enemy to the people ; of an humble and affable man , to shew himself proud ; of a mild man , to become difficult and perverse ; and all this with so little circumstance , that the whole world might see it was either the falsness or levity of his temper , was high indiscretion : for he that has ever pretended to be good , and is willing for his advantage to become otherwise , must not do it at a leap , but by degrees , and upon occasion , that before the diversity of his deportment deprives him of his old friends , he may have gained himself new , without diminution to his authority ; otherwise being discovered and deserted , he is certainly ruined . chap. xlii . how easily mens manners are corrupted . it is remarkable likewise in the passages of the decem-viri , that men are easily corrupted , and become wicked , be their education never so good . the youth which appius debauched , and took for his guards , is sufficient to prove it ; who , though of honourable extraction , and brought up with all possible advantage , suffered themselves to be corrupted by their preferments , became favourers of tyranny , and perfer'd their own licentiousness before the liberty of their country . quintus fabius did the same , who , though an excellent person at first , and one of the decem-viri of the second creation , blinded with ambition and enveigled by the cunning of appius , changed his good humour into bad , and grew as intolerable as he ; which things , if seriously considered , should make all legislators ( either in commonwealths or kingdom ) the more careful and diligent to restrain the ambition of mankind , and take from them all hopes of impunity when they offend in that kind . chap. xliii . those souldiers which fight for their own honour are the best , and most to be trusted from the same history it may be observed how much it imports the prosperity or adversity of affairs to have the minds of the souldiers quiet , and ready to engage upon a principle of honour , rather than to have them turbulent , and disposed to fight upon every mans ambition : for whereas the roman armies were always victorious under the conduct of the consuls ; under the decem-viri they were always unfortunate : from hence likewise it may be collected how unsafe it is to commit the defence of our affairs to a mercenary army who have nothing to encourage or oblige them but their pitiful pay , which is not considerable enough to make them so faithful as to lay down their lives in your quarrel , for in an army where the souldier is not bound to the person for whom he fights by some particular obligation , or the expectation , of more than ordinary advantage by the victory if the enemy be strong , they will make but little resistance ; and this kindness and affection of the souldiers to the general cannot be but where they are subjects fighting under a good prince or a lawful magistrate in defence of their posterity and religion : so that it is necessary for every king or commonwealth who desires to defend himself well , to train up his own subjects in military discipline , that he may safely depend upon them in time of distress ; and it has been the practice of all those who have done any great things . the roman armies under the decem-viri had doubtless the same courage as under the consuls : but not being so well affected towards the one as the other , they would not put it forth , nor give such testimonies as formerly : but when the tyranny of the decem-virat extinguished , and their liberty was recovered , having then the same tenderness and affection to their country , they fought as well as before , and their enterprizes had the same happy success . chap. xliv . a multitude without an head is altogether unserviceable ; nor is any man to threaten that has any thing to desire . upon the accident of virginius , the people having taken arms , and retir'd to the holy-mount , the senate sent to them to know upon what account they had abandoned their officers , and betaken themselves to that mount : and the authority of the senate was so venerable among the people , that having no head among them , there was no body durst return an answer : titus livius tells us , non defuit quid responderetur , deerat qui responsum daret ; they wanted not what to say , but who to deliver it . for having no certain commander , every private person was unwilling to expose himself to their displeasure . from whence we may understand how useless a thing the multitude is without a head , which being observed by virginius , he caused twenty military tribunes to be made , with power to treat and expostulate with the senate instead of a head. the people insisting to have valerius and horatius sent to them , to whom they would communicate their grievances , valerius and horatius refused to go till the decemviri had laid down their authority ; which being at length obtained with much concertation ; valerius and horatius repaired to the people , and understood that they would have new tribunes to be chosen ; they would have appeals from every magistrate to the people ; and they would have the decem-viri to be delivered up into their hands , that they might burn them alive : the embassadors liked the first of their demands , but refused to consent to the last as impious , telling them , crudelitatem damnatis , in crudelitatem ruitis : you condemn cruelty , and practise it your selves : and before you will be free , you will tyrannize over your adversaries ; advising them to lay that article by , and mention the decemviri no farther , but to address themselves to the reassumption of their power and authority , after which they would not want ways of receiving satisfaction ; for then every man's life and fortune would be at their disposing . hence we may learn how weak and imprudent it is to desire a thing , and before we receive it , declare to what ill use we intend it , especially if we mean to do mischief , 't is just as you should say , pray give me your sword , that i may run you thorow , 't is sufficient to borrow the sword , and when you have it , you may do as you please . chap. xlv . 't is a thing of ill example to break a new law , especially for the maker : and 't is no less dangerous to the governor of a state , to multiply injuries , and repeat them every day . the commotions about the tyranny of the decem-viri being composed , and rome restored to its old form of government again ; virginius cited appius before the the people to answer what he had attempted upon his daughter . appius appeared with his nobility about him ; virginius commanded him to prison : appius cryed out , he appealed to the people : virginius replyed , that he who had taken away those appeals from the people , ought not to have any benefit by them , nor be permitted to implore their protection , whose laws and liberties could receive no protection from him . appius insisted , that they ought not to violate a thing which they had urged with that eagerness , and ordained with that zeal . and though indeed the life of appius was wicked enough , and there was no punishment that he did not deserve ; yet it was inhospitable and contrary to all civil society , to violate their own laws , which were but newly made , and passed with so much importunity : for in my judgment there is nothing so indecorous , nor of so ill example in a commonwealth , as the infraction of a new law , by the legislator himself . when in the year . the state of florence was restored by the assistance of a frier called hieronimo savonarolo ( whose writings give sufficient testimony of his learning and integrity ) having among other things for the security of the citizens , obtained a law for appeals to the people in matters of state , both from the senate and the council of eight ( which law he had a long time solicited , and got with much difficulty at last ) it hapned that not long after , there were five persons condemned to death by the senate , which persons endeavouring very earnestly to appeal to the people , they were denyed that liberty , and could not have the benefit of that law ; which was greater diminution to the reputation of the frier , than any thing that had ever hapned before : for if that law was of such importance as he had pretended , it ought to have been observed ; if nor , why was it solicited so earnestly ? and it was the more remarkable in the frier , because in his many sermons and discourses afterwards to the people , he neither blamed the breaking of that law , nor went about to excuse it , for being to his purpose , he would not condemn it , and excuse it he could not , having nothing to say ; which action having discovered the ambition and partiality of his mind , took much off from his repute , and loaded him with scandal . it is of great inconvenience likewise in a state , to revive , and ferment the humours in the minds of the citizens , by a daily renovation of their injuries upon one person or other , as it hapned in rome after the decem-virat , was dissolved , and the tribunitial authority re-established by the people : for all the decem-viri , and several other considerable citizens were accused , and condemned , in so much as there was a general consternation among the nobility , who thought there would be no end of their condemnation , till they were utterly extinct : which proceeding and apprehension , would doubtless have produced great troubles in the state , had not they been prevented by marcus duellius the tribune , who published an edict , that for a twelve-month it should not be lawful either to cite or accuse any man that was citizen of rome ; by which act of moderation , he secured the nobility . from whence we may discern how unsafe it is for any prince or commonwealth to keep the minds of their subjects in perpetual fear and suspence ; and without doubt nothing can be more pernicious ; for men being insecure , and jealous of being questioned for some capital offence , will look out for protection , and not only so , but are provoked to more boldness , and become less scrupulous of doing great mischiefs . if therefore such commotions happen , it is better if possible to compose them without blood , but if example must be made , it is to be done at once , that afterwards the people may be reassured , and recover their old security , and tranquility of mind . chap. xlvi . how men leap from one passion to another , and how they who at first aim at nothing but self-preservation , when secured of that , grow oppressors of other people . after the people of rome had recovered their liberty , and had by so much improved their former condition , by how much they had made many new laws to fortifie their power , one would have expected they should have been quiet , and after so much trouble and embroilment , enjoyed some time of repose ; but it fell out quite contrary , they were more perplexed than before , every day producing some new sedition or disturbance : of which , livy giving the reasons so clearly , i do not think it amiss to insert them in this place . these two orders ( says he ) were in perpetual opposition ; when the people were humble , the nobility was proud , when the populace was quiet , and content with their bounds , the young nobility took their time to be insolent ; and when the tribunes interposed in their behalf , they made little progress at first , and at length were as much injur'd themselves . the graver sort of the nobility on the other side , though they thought their own youth to be too furious and insolent , yet they had rather if one side must transgress , that it should be their own , than the peoples : so that their immoderate desire of preserving their priviledge , was the cause that when either party was prevalent , it employed its whole power in oppressing the other . it is common among men , when they would secure themselves , to injure other people ; they begin first to do mischief , to revile , or to beat , or what other outrage they are able , as if the injury they would avoid themselves , was to be thrown upon their neighbour , and there was no medium betwixt doing , and suffering of wrong . from hence we may see after what manner ( among other things ) commonwealths are dissolved , and how suddenly men pass from one ambition to another , according to that true saying which salust put into the mouth of caesar. omnia mala exempla , bonis initiis orta sunt . all disorders and abuses , are good in their beginnings . the first thing an ambitious citizen endeavours , is so to fortifie , that he may defend himself not only against his private adversary , but against the publick magistrate , if at any time he would offend him ; to which end he makes what friends he can , by furnishing them with mony or supporting them against their oppressors ; and this seeming very honest in appearance , people are easily deluded , and no body goes about to prevent it ; so that no obstacle being given , he grows insensibly so great , that not only the private citizens , but the magistrate begins to apprehend him ; and then there is no resisting him without manifest danger , for the reasons ( which i have mention'd before ) of the dangerous contending with inconvenience that has got that growth and maturity in a city . what is then to be done ? let him alone in his prosperity , and he enslaves you for ever , unless death or some other kind accident delivers you : if you think to remove him on a sudden , you do but add to his power and hasten your own ruine ; for finding himself in such a posture that his friends , his enemies , the magistrates , and all people are afraid of him , he will then begin to domineer , and dispose of all things according to his own judgment and pleasure ; if there be any way to prevent it , it is by watching in time , by having a diligent eye over your citizens , that under colour of doing good , they may not be able to do mischief ; and that they may have as much reputation as may serve , not ruine their liberty : but of this more hereafter . chap. xlvii . though the people , in things that are discours'd in general , are many times mistaken , yet when they are reduced to particulars , they are more sensible and judicious . the name of consul ( as we said before ) being grown odious to the people of rome they resolved to have them created for the future out of the populace ; or else to limit and circumscribe their authority with such rulers as they should think fit . the nobility , to prevent both inconveniences , took a way betwixt both , and was contented that they should create four tribunes with consular authority , to be chosen indifferently out of the people , and senate . the people were well enough satisfied , as thinking by that means the consulship would extinguish , and that they should have a share of the supream dignity themselves . but observe what followed when they came to the creation of their tribunes , and it was not only in their power , but expected , that they should have been all made out of the people , they chose them all out of the nobility , which gave occasion to livy to say , quorum comitiorum eventus docuit , alios animos in contentione libertatis & honoris , alios secundum deposita certamina in incorrupto judicio esse . the success of that election did show , that when their honour and liberty were in controversie , the people were of one mind ; when they were secure and free , they were of another . considering with my self what might be the reason , i suppose it is because men are more apt to be mistaken in generals , than in particulars . the people thought themselves more worthy of the cousulship than the nobility , because they had the greatest interest in the city ; they underwent the greatest difficulty in the wars , and it was their arms which defended its liberty , and propagated the empire of rome : according to which argument , their desires seeming but reasonable , they resolved they would have them in spight of all opposition : but when they came to particulars , and to examine their own private capacities for government , they found themselves so weak and defective , that though altogether they thought themselves able enough , yet they could not find one man they judged proper for the employment ; ashamed therefore of their incapacity , they gave their voices for such as they found were more really worthy ; which titus livius admiring , has these words , hanc modestiam , aequitatemque & altitudinem animi ubi nunc in uno inveneris , quae tunc populi universi fuit ? where will you find now-a-days , that modesty , that equity , that magnanimity in one man , that was then obvious in the whole body of the people ? to the same purpose there hapned another notable example in capua , after hanibal had defeated the romans at the battel of cannas . after that defeat , the inhabitants of capua began to mutiny against the government ( as indeed all italy did at that time ) the grounds of their discontent , was an old pique betwixt the people and senate , which the first thought then to improve to the destruction of the other . pacuvius calanus being a very wise man , and at the helm at that time , considering with himself of what dangerous consequence a tumult might prove in so populous a city , resolved to find out some way to accommodate their difference . to this end , he assembled the senate , and in few words remonstrated to them the implacable hatred which the people had to them ; that they were in great danger of being murthered by them , and the city delivered up to hanibal , by reason that the condition of rome was become so deplorable ; and at length he concluded , that if they would commit the whole matter to him , he would find out an expedient to unite them , and his expedient was to lock up the senate in the palace , and by putting them into the peoples power , to preserve them . the senate submitted , were lock'd up in the castle , and having assembled the people , he told them , that the hour was now come for redeeming their liberty , and chastising the insolence of their nobility , who had so often abused them . he told them he had them all lock'd up in his custody , to be disposed of as they pleased ; but because he could not think it was their desire to leave the city without a government , before they proceeded to the execution of the ancient senators , it would be necessary , as he conceived , to think of creating a new one ; to that purpose he had brought the names of the old senators in a purse , would draw them out one by one , and as they resolved upon another to succeed in each place , he would see the old one delivered out to execution . the people were content , and pacuvius drew one , and nam'd him aloud , upon which a great noise was raised , some said he was cruel , others he was proud , and others that he was arrogant : then says pacuvius , he is unfit to be continued , pray will you make choice of another in his stead . silence was commanded , and one of the people was named ; he was named no sooner , but some began to hum , others to laugh , and all to revile , and so proceeding from one to another , they were all concluded unfit for so honourable a degree . paccucius taking the occasion , told them , since you are sensible it is unfit that the city should be without a senate ; and since you cannot agree about the election of a new ; it would be expedient in my judgment , that you propose some way of reconciliation ; for doubtless the fear in which the senators have been , must of necessity have so humbled them , that that gentleness and humanity which you have sought for elsewhere , may now be found in them . the people began then to discover in particular , the fault which they had committed in judging in general , and declared they were ready for any reasonable reconciliation . and in this manner it is that most people deceive themselves in judging generally of things and their accidents , which upon particular examination they do easily discover . after the year . the chief of the florentines being driven out of the city , it was left wholly without order or government , over-whelm'd with licentiousness and ambition , and the interest of the publick running headlong to ruine . many of the popular party foreseeing the inevitable destruction of the city , and not knowing to what else to impute it , they charged it upon the ambition of some persons among the nobility , which ( as they pretended ) formented their disorders , to take away their liberty , and model the state according to their own fancies , and designs . and these mutineers were in all places ; in the streets , in the houses , in the palaces , declaring publickly , and threatning that if ever they came to the government , they would look farther into the business , and punish all those which they should find conscious of it . it hapned afterwards that some of these citizens were advanced as they desired ; but when they were at that height , and saw things nearer than before , they became sensible of their error , and found that it was not the ambition of the nobility , but the malignity of the times , which was the occasion of all their trouble and commotion ; so as they became new men , and exercised a new way of administration ; insomuch that those who had heard them complain and threaten when they were in private capacity , seeing them now at the helm , and performing nothing that they had promised , did not look upon it as conviction of their judgment , so much as corruption of their minds . which thing being frequent among them , gave occasion to the proverb , costoro hanno un animo in piazza , et uno in palazzo . they are of one mind in the town , and another in the throne . thus , by serious consideration of what has been said we may see how to open the eyes of the people , and reduce them to a sence of their errors , if we take them from their general and abstracted notions , and fix them upon particulars , as in the case of paccucius in capua , and the senate in rome . again , i am of opinion that no wise man is to decline the judgment of the people in the distribution of offices and honours , and such particular affairs ; for in those things they are almost infallible , and when they do mistake , it is rather to be attributed to the obstinacy of some few , to whom that business is referred , than to the ignorance of the whole body ; which being certainly so , i think it not superfluous to shew in my next chapter the order which the senate observed to over-reach the people in those kinds of distributions . chap. xlviii . to prevent the advancement of mean people to the magistracy , it is particularly to be contrived that the competition be , betwixt the best and most noble , and the wickedest and most abject . when the senate began to apprehend , that the tribunes wnuld be chosen out of the people , and invested with consular power ; they had two ways , one of which they constantly made use of . they put the best and most honorable persons to stand , or else by their mony they foisted in some sordid and ignoble plebeian , among those of the better sort which pretended to the magistracy , and demanded it for him : the last way made the people ashamed to confer it : the first made them ashamed to remove it ; which reinforces what i have said so often before , that though in generals the people may be mistaken , in particulars they are provident enough . chap. xlix . if those cities which have been free from their foundation ( as rome ) have found it difficult to contrive such laws as might maintain them so . those which have been always servile , will find it almost impossible . the government of rome , and its affairs abroad and at home , do sufficiently show how hard it is to establish such laws in a commonwealth as my preserve it always in a good and quiet estate . it had first romulus , then numa , tullus hostilius , servius , and others , who employed their industry and capacity to regulate it well , and prescribe good laws ; after which , ten citizens were created on purpose , and yet new difficulties arose every day , which required new remedies : one of their great expedients ( which indeed contributed much to the incorruption of that city ) was the creation of the censors , to correct the exorbitances , splendor , and ill husbandry of the citizens ; and although in the beginning it was with some inconsideration decreed that those officers should be created for five years , yet by the prudence of mamercus the dictator , that error was afterwards rectifyed , and the time of their continuance reduced to months , which disgusted the then censors so highly , that they found means to turn mamercus out of the senate , to the great regret , both of the senators and people . and because the history does not show how mamercus defended himself , it must needs be the neglect of the historian , or the defect of the laws ; for it is not to be thought that in a perfect commonwealth , a citizen should be so ill treated for promu●ging a law so much for the security of their liberty , and his innocence left without sanctuary or protection . but to return to my design , i say , it is not to be admired if cities conceived , and born , and brought up all along in servitude , find so much difficulty to regulate , and preserve themselves in tranquility and peace ( as was to be seen in florence ) when rome and other states ( which have been free from the beginning ) have scarce been able to do it . florence was in subjection to the roman empire , and governed by other people , so long that it had searce any hopes of ever being free . afterwards having time to breath , it began to look up , and make laws for it self , but mingling them with their old laws , which were bad , they did them no good . for two hundred years together their government was in this manner , so that it was scarce worthy the name of a commonwealth . and the same inconveniencies have been incident to all cities whose beginnings have been servile like that . and though the florentines did many times by publick and free suffrage transfer an authority upon a few of their principal citizens , to examine and reform all things ; yet those few regarded not so much the common enterest and liberty , as their own private design and advantage in the whole manner of their proceedings ; which was so far from producing any order or settlement as was intended , that it augmented the disorder , and made things worse than before . to pass by other things which are likewise to be observed , i say that in every commonwealth it is particularly to be considered in whose hands the cognizance of capital offences is placed , and who has the execution of the sanguinary laws : this was well ordered in rome , an appeal lying to the people from all the courts and magistrates of the city ; and if at any time by that appeal , the delay of execution became dangerous to the state , they had recourse to the dictator , who commanded execution immediately ; but they never made use of their refuge , but in extream necessity . but florence , and other cities born in servitude and subjection , had not the benefit of such an officer , but were governed by strangers upon whom the prince had transferred his authority ; which custom they kept up , after they had made themselves free , and continued the same authority in a foreigner , whom they called their captain , which was a dangerous thing , considering how easily he might be corrupted by the better sort of the citizens : afterwards the custom changed with the revolutions of state ; and eight citizens were created to do the office of the captain , which alteration proved much for the worse , for ( as i said before ) a few men prefer'd to the government , are always liable to be caressed and cajoled by the nobility , to the prejudice of the people . against which inconvenience , venice provided very well , where there is a council of ten , which can punish any citizen whatever without any appeal ; yet for fear they should not be sufficient ( though they have authority enough ) for the punishment of persons of more than ordinary quality , they have constituted the quarantie to assist them , and the council of pregui besides , which is the highest council of that city ; so that if any man will accuse , there are judges enough ready to hear him . if therefore in rome which was originally free , and model'd and govern'd by the counsels of so many wise men , new faults were daily discovered , and fresh occasions for new laws , to be made for the preservation of their liberty ; it is not to be admir'd , if in other cities it was worse , where their original was not so free , nor so many wise men to model , and instruct them . chap. l. no magistrate or council ought to have power to check or controul the publick acts of the city . titus quintius cincimatus , and cneus iulius mentus being consuls together in rome , but at perpetual odds , the affairs of that state was at a stand , their laws were not executed , their wars were not prosecuted , nor any thing managed as it should be . the senate observing it , persuaded them to make a dictator , by whom the state might be reformed , and their differences composed , which had hitherto hindered the reformation : but the consuls , how contrary so ever in other things , consented not to do it , the senate having no other remedy , addressed to the tribunes , who by the authority of the senate required , and compelled the consuls to the creation of a dictator : in which place it is remarkable how beneficial the assistance of the tribunitial power was , not only to defend the people against the insolence of the nobility , but to controul and restrain the emulation and difference among themselves . and here it is carefully to be provided in the settlement of a commonwealth , that it be not in the power of a few persons to whom the government is entrusted , to quash or obstruct any customs or acts that are necessary to its subsistance : for example , if you authorize a council , or any other persons to distribute honours , dispose of offices , or execute any other of your commands , you must either lay a strict injunction or necessity upon them to do as you appoint , or provide , so that if it be neglected by them , it may be done by some body else ; otherwise things are ill managed , and the order is defective , as is manifest by that example in rome , it the perversness of the consuls had not been opposed by the authority of the tribunes . in the republick of venice , the grand council ( or senate ) has the distribution of honours , and the election of magistrates , both abroad and at home ; and it hapning one time , that the senate either upon some disgust , or false suggestion omitted to creat successors to the magistrates at home , or to their officers abroad , there followed great disorders immediately ; the territory and city wanting their lawful judges , could have no justice in any thing , till the senate was appeased . and this inconvenience would in time have brought the city into an ill condition , had it not been prevented by the wisdom of some citizens , who taking the opportunity obtained a law , that there should be no vacancy of offices , either within the city or without , but the old offices should be continued till their successors were chosen , by which law they deprived that great council of a power to interrupt the course of justice , which could not have been suffered without hazard to the state chap. li. a prince or commonwealth that is constrained to do a thing , is to seem to do it frankly , and without any compulsion . a wise man orders his affairs so , that whatever he does , seems rather voluntary and gracious , than done by force and compulsion , be his necessity of doing it never so great , which point of wisdom being well observed by the romans , got them great reputation among the people , especially when they decreed stipends to the soldiers out of the publick treasury , who before were obliged to serve at their own proper charges ; for seeing their wars were like to be tedious , and their armies to be carried into far countries , before they could be finished , they found neither the first could be continued , nor the latter perform'd but at the publick expence , wherefore the senate was forced and necessitated to pay the soldiers out of the publick stock ; yet they did it so slyly , and with that artifice , that though compelled by necessity , it was received as a grace , and gain'd them exceedingly the affections of the people , who had never so much as mention'd it by their tribunes , or thought of it themselves : so that never any thing was received with more demonstration of joy . but the tribunes were not so well satisfied , but endeavoured to possess the people that it was not an act of that grace as they imagined ; and that if they looked closely into it , it would appear rather a grievance , than a benevolence ; for how was this mony to be rais'd , but by taxes and impositions upon the people ? so that if the senators were bountiful , it was out of other mens purses . but all would not do , let the tribunes say as they pleased , the people believed themselves highly obliged ; and then the manner of raising the mony made it much the more grateful , for it was done with more than ordinary equity , the greatest part of it being levyed upon the greatest men , and the poor favoured as much as was possible . chap. lii . the best and most secure way to repress the insolence of an ambitious and powerful state , is to preclude and stop up those ways by which he would come to his greatness . by what has been said before , it appears what affection the senate conciliated among the people , not only by the frankness of their bounty , but by their kindness in collecting it ; which order , if continued to the people , would have prevented all the tumults which hapned afterward in that city , and deprived the tribunes of their great credit and authority . and indeed there is not a better or more secure way to suppress the insolence , or cross-bite the designs of an ambitious citizen , than to take the same ways to prevent , which he takes to advance them ; which course , if it had been followed by the adversaries of cosimo de medici would have been much more for their advantage than to have forced him out of the town . for had they applyed themselves to caressing and insinuating with the people , ( which was the way he took to fortifie himself ) they had disarm'd him without any tumult or violence , and taken from him the only arms upon which he depended for his defence . about the same time piero soderini by his extraordinary beneficence got him self a great interest and reputation among the people , and was publickly esteemed the great champion and protector of their liberties : and doubtless his adversaries , who began to grow jealous of his greatness , had done much more wisely , and honourably , and safely , to have gone the same way to work , and countermined him by their indulgence to the people , than to oppose themselves downright , and ruine him and their whole country together ; for could they by any art or insinuation have gained the affections of the city , they had taken from him the only thing upon which he relyed , without noise or confusion , and they might have opposed in all his counsels , without fear of the people : if he be urged here , that if the citizens which were enemies to piero committed an error , in not taking the same course to retain as he had done to debauch the people , peter committed the same fault by not making use of the same instruments which his adversaries employed against him ; it is answered , that soderini indeed might have tryed , but he could have done it neither with honour or case ; for the way that his adversaries took was to set up the medici , by whose assistance they bearded him exceedingly , and ruined him at last ; and it had been dishonourable for soderini to have deserted the liberties of the people , which he had undertaken to defend , and gone over to the party of the medici ; nor could he have done it so secretly or suddenly , but the people would have smelt it , and have turned the violence of their affection into as furious and hatred , which would have made his destruction much more easy to his enemies , for who-ever was but suspected to be a favourer of the medici , was thought , ipso facto , an adversary to the people . it is necessary therefore in all deliberations to weigh all things , to consider what danger and what advantage every thing will yield , and make choice of what is least dangerous : otherwise it will happen to you as it did to marcus tullius , who raised and augmented the greatness of mark anthony by the same way which he intended for his destruction ; for when mark anthony was declared an enemy by the senate , having a great army attending him , and most of them of caesar's old soldiers , cicero to draw them off from him , persuaded the senate to put octavius at the head of their army , and sent him ( with the consuls ) against antonius , pretending that the very name of octavius ( being nephew to caesar ) would bring over all his unckles party to him , whereby antonius would be so weakned it would be no hard matter to reduce him . but it hapned quite contrary ; for antonius having gained octavius to his side , they joyned their forces against tully and his senate , and ruined their whole party . which might have been easily foreseen ; nor ought cicero so imprudently to have reviv'd the name of caesar , by whom the whole world was brought into servitude , and especially rome ; nor have persuaded himself that a tyrant or any of his race would ever restore that liberty which his predecessor had suppressed . chap. liii . the people ( deceived with a false appearance of good ) do many times desire that which turns to their destruction : and how great hopes and large promises do easily debauch them . after the taking of veii by the romans , a report being spread of the convenience and pleasantness of the town , and richness of the country about it , the people of rome began to fancy that it would be much for their advantage to transplant one half of their city , aud send them thither to inhabit , for there were many fair houses to receive them ; and it could be no weakning or diminution to rome , seeing the distance betwixt the two cities was so small ; veii would be taken rather for a member of rome , than a distinct and particular city . the senate and graver sort of citizens had so little inclination to this design , that they resolved to die before ever they would consent to it . the people were so mad upon it on the other side , that when it came to a debat , and it was to be resolved what was to be done , the dispute was so hot , they had proceeded to blows , and the whole town been engaged in blood , had not the senate interposed certain ancient and eminent men , who by their interest and veneration among the people defended the blow , and appeased them for that time . in which passage there are two things considerable : the first , that the people being deceived with a false imagination of good , do many times solicit their own ruine , and run the commonwealth upon infinite dangers and difficulties , unless some person in whom they have great confidence strikes in to instruct them which is the good , and which is the evil ; and when by accident it falls out that the people ( having been formerly deceived either by persons or things ) cannot repose that confidence in any one , then of necessity all goes to wrack , and nothing can prevent it : to this purpose dante in his discourse about monarchy , tells us , il popolo molte volte grida vivala sua morte , & muoia la sua vita . the enraged multitude do often crie give us our death , our life we do defie this incredulity is many times the occasion that good counsels are neglected , as it hapned to the venetians when invaded by several enemies at one time , they could not take off any one of them , by restoring what they had taken wrongfully from other people ; which was the occasion of the war , and almost of their ruine . from whence we may consider the easiness and difficulty of persuading the people , and make this distinction , if the affair proposed be in appearance either magnanimous , or profitable , though at the bottom it be never so distructive , the people are always easie to be persuaded : on the other side , if any thing be offered ( how honourable , how useful soever ) with the least shew or glance of cowardize or inconvenience , they are never , or with great difficulty to be wrought to it . to confirm this , we have many examples both modern and ancient in rome and other places . from hence sprang their jealousies against fabius maximus , who could never beat it into the heads of that city , that it was better for their common wealth to protract , and spin out the war , than to push things on , and bring all to the hazard of a battel ; for the people looking upon it as cowardly and base counsel , and not discerning the utility at the bottom , would by no means admit it ; and fabius wanted rhetorick to enforce it upon them : and so strangely are they blinded sometimes with their bravery and courage , that though the romans had committed the same error once before , and given authority to fabius his master of the horse to fight when he saw occasion whether fabius would or not ; ( which authority had like to have ruined the whole army , had not fabius with his prudence prevented it ) yet that experiment doing no good , they were guilty again ▪ and invested varro with the same power , upon no other account , but because he had swagger'd up and down the town , that when-ever they qualified him with such a commission , he would fight hanibal , cut him to pieces ; they believe what he said , give him authority ; and what followed ? why they were beaten at cannas ; the roman army cut off ; and the roman empire almost extinguished . and not unlike this was the example of marcus centenius penula , ( a mean person , and considerable for nothing but some small command in the army ) who presented himself one day to the senate , and offered if they would give him power to raise an army of voluntiers where he pleased all over italy , he would undertake in a short time to beat hanibal out of it . the senate was sensible the proposition was rash , yet ( considering withal that if they should deny him , and report should come of it afterwards to the people , it might dissatisfie them ; beget some tumult in the city ; and be the occasion of envy and animosity to themselves ) they granted his request , choosing rather to expose all those who were so ill advised as to follow him , than run the hazard of new dissentions at home . having got his commission , and afterwards his men , with a confused and disorderly army he marches against hanibal , and fought him , but he failed of his promise , for he was killed himself , and most of his forces . in greece in the city of athens , nicias , a grave and wise citizen , could never persuade the people against an expedition into sicily ; but persuing it against all sober advise , they miscarried , and their own country was ruined . scipio , when he was made consul , desired that he might have africk for his province , and he would undertake to demolish carthage but the senate being averse upon the judgment of fabius maximus , scipio threatned to propose it to the people , as knowing very well how gratf●ul it would be to them , we might produce examples of the same nature out of our own city of florence , as when hercules bentivogli general of the florentine army , with antonio giacomini , having defeated the forces of bertolomeo at san vincenti , they went to besiege pisa , which enterprize was debated and concluded by the people , upon the great promises which hercules had made , though indeed the wiser sort of citizens were against it ; but the multitude were possessed with great matters that would be done , and nothing could dissuade them . i say then , there is not an easier way to ruine a state where the authority is in the people , than to put them upon some gallant , but desperate enterprize ; for where there is any thing of magnanimity in their nature , it is sure to be embraced , and it is not in the wit of men to dissuade them : but as this is many times the ruine of the state , so it is more often and more certainly the destruction of those citizens which promoted and commanded it , for the people full of expectations of victory , when they find they have miscarried , never impute it to an ill accident or fortune , but throw all upon the ignorance or treachery of their commanders , which seldom escape without being banished , imprisoned , or killed ; as has hapned to several of the carthaginian and athenian captains . nor does it avail that they have been victorious before ; for their present misfortune drowns all , as it fell out to antonio giacomini our general , who not taking pisa as he promised , and the people expected , fell into so great disgrace with them , that notwithstanding the many great things which he had done , he was permitted to live , more by the favour and humanity of the governors , than by gratitude or good nature of the people . chap. liv. how great the authority of a grave man is , to asswage the tumultuousness of the people . the second thing remarkable , that was mentioned in my last chapter , is , that their is nothing more certain to appease a popular tumult , and reduce the people to reason , than the interposition of some wise person of authority among them ; as virgil has told us with very good reason . tum pietate gravem , ac meritis si forte virum quem conspexere , silent , arrectisque auribus adstant . if in their tumults , a grave man appears , all 's whist , and nothing stirring but their ears . he therefore who commands in a mutinous army , or in a seditious city , and desires to appease either the one or the other , is in my judgment to present himself with the most grace and advantage that he can ; adorned with all the ornaments of his dignity , and what-ever else may make him venerable to the people . not many years since florence was divided into factions , the frateschi and the arabiati ; and their animosity was so great , they came to blows , and the frateschi were overthrown , and pagolantonio soderini slain among the rest , who was as eminent a citizen as most of his time ; upon the strength of this victory the people ran in a tumult to his house , with intention to plunder it ; but his brother francesco ( then bishop of volterra , and cardinal now ) being accidently there , as soon as he understood how things were , and perceived the rabble to encrease , he called for the richest of his robes , and having put them on , and his episcopal rochet over them , he marched out into the croud , and by the majesty of his person , and the efficacy of his language , prevailed with them to forbear , and to return peaceably to their houses ; which action was so grateful to the city , that it was celebrated publickly many daies after . i conclude therefore that there is not a surer , nor more necessary way to compose the distractions of the people , than the appearance of some grave person in such a posture as may make him venerable to them . to return therefore to what we said before , it may be seen from hence , with what obstinacy the romans accepted of that proposition for transplanting to veii , because they thought it profitable , and did not perceive the inconvenience that was in it ; for as there hapned many tumults thereupon , so much more mischief had followed , had not the senate and some other grave persons interposed , and by good fortune restrain'd them . chap. lv. how easily things are managed in a city where the commons are incorrupt ; how hard it is to erect a principality where there is an equality ; and where it is not , a commonwealth is impossible . though we have declared before what we thought was to be expected from a city whose inhabitants were totally corrupt ; yet that will not hinder us from considering the subtilty of the senate in relation to a vow which camillus had made to consecrate the tenth part of the spoils of the veientes to apollo ; which spoils being fallen into the clutches of the common people , the senate had no way but to publish an edict , requiring all of them at a certain time and place to bring in the tenth part of their gains . 't is true , that proclamation had no great effect , because another expedient was found out to satisfie the vow ; yet it is remarkable , the confidence the senate had in the good nature and complyance of the people ; and the great opinion that they would punctually bring in what-ever they were commanded . on the other side it is observable , that the people went not about to shuffle or defraud the edict by bringing in less than their due ; but declared frankly against it , as a thing illegally required . which example , with many other which i have mentioned before , are brought to shew the probity and religion wherewith that people was endued , and what good might be expected from them : and certainly where there is not that submission and conformity , no confidence is to be had ; as in those provinces which are corrupted at this day , in italy above all the rest , and i may say in france and in spain , which are likewise in some measure under the same corruption ; for tho they are not perhaps subject to so many , and so dangerous disorders as we are in italy ; yet it proceeds not from the meliority of the people , but from the excellence of their constitution , being governed by a monarchy , which keeps them united , not only by the virtue and example of their prince , but by the laws and customs of each kingdom , which are preserved to this day . germany is the place of the whole world where the footsteps of the old romans virtue and fidelity is conspicuous ; and that fidelity is the cause why so many cities live happily in liberty ; for they are so careful and studious of their laws , that that very one thing keeps them from servitude , and being over-run by their enemies ; and if any instance be desired of this more than ordinary probity in the germans , i shall produce one , not unlike that before , betwixt the senate and the people of rome . it is the custom in those states when they have occasion for mony upon the publick account , for the councils and magistrates in authority to lay a tax of one or two per cent . upon all the inhabitants under their jurisdiction , according to their respective estates ; at the day and place appointed for payment , every man appears with his mony , and having taken his oath first that the sum he pays is according to the full of his estate , he throws it into a chest provided for that purpose , and no notice taken what it is he throws in ; from whence we may conclude that there is still some sparks left in that people of their old ingenuity and religion : nor is it to be doubted but every man pays his due , for otherwise the sum would not amount to the imposition , nor to what they formerly paid ; whereby the fraud would be discovered , and they become liable to a new tax : which integrity and justice is the more admirable in our days , because it is to be found no where but in germany , and the reason ( as i conceive ) is twofold ; one , because they have had little or no commerce with their neighbours , neither trading into foreign parts , nor admitting foreigners into theirs ; contenting themselves with their own diet , and clothes , and commodities , and thereby preventing all occasion of evil conversation , which is the corruption of good manners , especially among the french , the spaniards and italians , which are wicked enough to debauch the whole world. the other reason is , because those commonwealths who have preserved their liberties , and kept themselves incorrupt , do not suffer any of their citizens to live high , and at the rate of a gentleman ; but they live all in an equality and parity , as those few noblemen or gentlemen who are there are very odious to the people ; and when-ever any of them fall by accident into their hands , they die without mercy , as those who are the fountain of all their luxury , and the occasion of their scandal . i call those gentlemen who live idly and plentifully upon their estates without any care or employment , and they are very pernicious where-ever they are ; but above all , they are most dangerous , who , besides their great revenues , have their castellanies , their jurisdictions , and their vassels , which pay them fealty and homage : of these two sorts the kingdom of naples , the territories of rome , romagna and lombardy are full ; for which reason there is no such thing as a free state in all those countries , because the gentry are mortal enemies to those constitutions , and it would be impossible to erect a republick where they had the dominion ; if any alteration be to be wrought , it is by reducing them into a monarchy ; for the matter being so corrupt , that the laws are become ineffectual to restrain them , there is a necessity that force be applyed , and that by a regal power the licentiousness and ambition of the grandees be reduced into order : this may be illustrated by the example of tuscany , which is a small territory , and yet has three considerable commonwealths in it , as florence ; siena and lucca ; and the rest of the cities of that province , though they depend upon them , yet their minds and their laws shew a strange propensity to freedom ; all which proceeds from the scarcity of gentry in those parts , especially with such power and jurisdiction as aforesaid . on the contrary , there is so great an equality among them , that if a prudent and publick man should happen among them , who had any knowledg of that kind of government , he might easily form them into a solid commonwealth : but hitherto it has been their misfortune to have no such man : i conclude therefore , that he who would establish a commonwealth , where the country consists most of gentlemen , will find it impossible , unless he ruines them first ; and on the other side , he who would set up a monarchy or principality where the equality is great , must select the most considerable and unquiet amongst them ; give them castles , and lands , and preferments , and any thing that may oblige them to his side : by which means they shall not only maintain the power of their prince , but their own insolence and ambition , and the people be forced to submit to a yoke , to which nothing else could compel them : for whilst there is a due proportion betwixt the prince and the subject , all things go well , and every man enjoys his estate : but to settle a republick in a country disposed to monarchy , or to erect a monarchy where the condition of the people have a tendency to a commonwealth , requires a person of more than ordinary authority and brain : many have tried it , but very few have succeeded ; the greatness and difficulty of the enterprize confounding them so at first , that they know not where they are , and give over as soon as they have begun . but it may be objected , that the constitution of the venetian government confutes my position , that no commonwealth can be established where the gentry are considerable ; for under that state no man is admitted to any office but those who are gentlemen . i answer , that the venetian gentry are nothing but name ; for their lands and possessions are very few , the principal part of their estates lying in their merchandize and goods : besides , none of them have any seigneuries or jurisdiction over the people , so that a gentleman among them , is but a title of honour and preheminence , founded upon none of those things which in other places make them so considerable . for as in other commonwealths the citizens are distinguished into several orders , so venice is entirely divided into two , the populace and the gentry , the gentry having , or being capable of all honours and employments , from which the populace are utterly excluded ; which for the reasons abovesaid , it has produced no disturbance in that state. these things being considered , let him who desires to erect a government , settle a commonwealth where there is a parity among the inhabitants ; and a monarchy where there are many great men , and the gentry numerous . otherwise his government will be incongruous , and of little duration . chap. lvi . great accidents , before they happen to any city or province , are commonly prognosticated by some sign , or predicted by some men . how it comes to pass , i know not ; but by ancient and modern example it is evident , that no great accident befalls a city or province , but it is presaged by divination , or prodigy , or astrology , or some way or other ; and that i may not go far for my proof , every one knows what was foretold by frier girolamo savonarola before the expedition of charles viii into italy ; besides which it was reported all over tuscany , that there were arm'd men seen fighting in the air over the town of arezzo , and that the clashing of their arms in the conflict was heard by the people . it is generally known in florence , that before the death of the old laurence de medici the duomo or chief church in that city was struck with lightning , and the people destroyed : and before piero sodermi ( who was made gonfaloniere for his life by the people ) was banished and degraded , the palace was burn'd by lightning likewise : many other instances might be produced , which i omit for brevity sake : i shall only add one which is mentioned by livy before the coming of the french to rome . marcus ceditius a plebeian acquainted the senate , that passing one night about twelve a clock thorow the via-nova , he heard a voice ( bigger than a mans ) which advised him to let the senate know , the french were upon their march to rome . how these things could be , it is to be discoursed by persons well versed in the causes of natural and supernatural events ; for my part i will not pretend to understand them , unless ( according to the opinion of some philosophers ) we may believe , that the air being full of intelligences and spirits , who foreseeing future events , and commiserating the condition of mankind , gives them warning by these kind of intimations , that they may the more timely provide and defend themselves against their calamities . but what-ever is the cause , experience assures us , that after such denuntiations , some extraordinary thing or other does constantly happen . chap. lvii . the multitude united , is formidable and strong , but separated , is weak and inconsiderable . the romans being overthrown , and their country much wasted , upon the coming of the french ; many of them ( contrary to an express order and edict of the senate ) transplanted to veii , and left rome . whereupon , by a new proclamation , the senate commanded , that by a precise day , and upon a certain penalty , they should return to their old habitations : when the news of this proclamation was first brought to veii , it was despised and laugh'd at by every body ; but when the day appointed for their return arrived , there was not a man but pack'd up his goods , and came back as was required , and as livy says in the case , ex ferocibus universis , singuli metu suo obedientes ; not one of them who were so contumacious together , but apart began to fear , and that fear made him obedient . and certainly nothing can give us a more lively description of the nature of a multitude than this case . they are bold , and will speak liberally against the decrees of their prince ; and afterwards when they see their punishment before their faces , every one grows fearful of his neighbour , slips his neck out of the coller , and returns to his obedience . so that it is not much to be considered what the people say , either of their princes good management or bad , so they be strong enough to keep them in their good humour when they are well disposed , and provide ( which they are ill ) that they do them no hurt . but this ill disposition of the people , i mean all ill dispositions but what arise either from the loss of their liberty , or the loss of some excellent prince still living , upon whom they had setled their affections . for the evil dispositions proceeding from these causes are transcendently dreadful , and strong remedies are to be applyed to restrain them . in other cases their anger is nothing , especially having no body to head them ; for as there is nothing so terrible as their fury in one case , so there is nothing so vain and inconsiderable in the other , because , though they have betaken themselves to their arms , they are easily reduced , if you can but avoid the first heat of their fury ; for by degrees they will cool , and every man considering it is his duty to return , will begin to suspect himself , and think of his security , either by making his peace , or escape . whenever therefore the multitude is in a mutiny , their best way is immediately to choose themselves a head , who may correct , keep them united , and contrive for their defence , as the romans did when leaving rome upon the death of virginia ; for their protection and security , they created twenty tribunes from among themselves : and if this course be neglected , it happens to them as livy presaged in the foregoing sentence , that as nothing is more couragious than the multitude united , so nothing is more abject when they are separate and divided . chap. lviii . that the multitude is wiser , and more constant than a prince . that nothing is more vain and inconstant than the multitude , titus livius and all other historians do agree . you shall many times find them condemning a man to death , and lamenting him when he is dead , and wishing for him again . this hapned in the case of manlius capitolinus , who being suspected to design against their liberty , was by the people thrown headlong down the rock , and in a short time exceedingly regretted . the words of our author are these . populum brevi , posteaquam ab eo periculum nullum erat , desiderium ejus tenuit . when their fear of him was over , their affection revived . and in another place where he shows the accidents which hapned in syracuse after the death of girolamo nephew to hierone , he says , haec natura multitudinis est , aut humiliter servit , aut superbe dominatur . the nature of the multitude is , to be servilly obedient , or insolently tyrannical . things being thus , i know not whether i shall not seem too bold ; to undertake the defence of a thing , which all the world opposes ; and run my self upon a necessity of either quitting it with disgrace , or pursuing it with scandal ; yet methinks , being to maintain it with arguments not force , it should not be so criminal . i say then in behalf of the multitude ; that what they are charged withal by most authors , may be charged upon all private persons in the world , and especially upon princes ; for whoever lives irregularly , and is not restrained by the law , is subject to the same exorbitancies , and will commit as bad faults as the most dissolute multitude in the world : and this may be easily known , if it be considered how many princes there have been , and how few of them good , i mean of such princes as have despised , and broke thorow those laws which were intended to restrain them . the kings in egypt were not anciently of this sort , for they were govern'd by laws in those provinces from the very beginning ; and the kings of sparta were the same : nor need we look back so far for examples ; we have the kings of france in our own days , whose kingdom in my judgment , is at this time the most regular , and best govern'd in the world . those princes therefore who are born under such laws and constitutions , and obliged to live by them , are not to be reckoned or compared with the dissolute and mutinous multitude ; but they are to be considered with a multitude under the same laws and restrictions ; as the people of rome were whilst their commonwealth was incorrupt , and they were found neither to be insolent in authority , nor slavish in their subjection ; but by their laws , and their magistrates , they kept up their dignity with honour : and if at any time necessity required that they should appear against the power of any particular person ; they did it effectually , as in the cases of manlius , the decem-viri , and others who designed to enslave them . on the other side , when it was for the interest of the publick , they were as obsequious and dutiful to the dictators and consuls , as they had been obstinate before . nor was their regret for manlius when he was dead , at all to be admired ; it was the memory of his virtues that caused it , which are commendable even among enemies . the same thing might have hapned to the best of princes ; for all writers agree , that virtue is laudable wheresoever it is to be found . and i am of opinion , that could manlius have been raised again , and presented to them in the height of their sadness , they would have served him as before , discharged him of his imprisonment , but condemned him to death . nor are princes ( and those held very wise ) exempt from this kind of inconstancy . they have put many to death , and lamented them afterwards ; as alexander for clito , and other of his friends , and herod for mariamnes . but what titus livius says of this subject , is not intended of a multitude regulated by laws , as the romans were ; but a loose and disorderly multitude , like the people of syracuse , who behaved themselves like mad-men , and committed the same faults that herod and alexander had committed before them . the multitude therefore is no more to be accused of fury and inconstancy , than a prince ; for they are both subject to extravagance , when they have no laws , nor no rules to restrain them . and of this ( besides what i have said ) there are many examples , not only among the roman emperors , but among other princes and tyrants , which have been guilty of more giddiness and inconstancy , than any multitude whatever . i conclude therefore against the common opinion , that the people are no more light , ingrateful , nor changeable than princes ; but that both of them are equally faulty , and he that should go about to excuse the princes , would be in a very great error ; for a people which governs by law , and is well ordered , shall be as stable , as wise , and as grateful as a prince , and perhaps more , though he be never so wise : and on the other side , a dissolute and irregular prince shall be more mutable , imprudent , and ingrateful , than any multitude whatever , and that not so much from any diversity in his nature ( for they are much at one , and if there be any excellence , 't is on the side of the people ) as from their greater or lesser respect to the laws under which they are to live : and he who shall consider the people of rome , will find that for years together , they hated the very name of a king , were ambitious of honour , and studious exceedingly for the good of their country , as may be justified by many examples . if it be objected that the romans were ingrateful to scipio , i refer them to what i proved so largely before , that the people are less ingrateful than princes . and as to prudence , and constancy , i affirm , they have much the advantage , and are more wise , more steddy , and more judicious than princes ; for which reason the voice of the people , is resembled to the voice of god , because by some occult and singular quality it does often presage things that are wonderful , and relating to their own welfare or calamity . in giving their judgment about dubious things , you shall seldom find them mistake , if at any time two eminent orators equally excellent in their profession , do controvert and discourse a thing pro and con before them , they will assuredly take the most rational side ; which shows they are no less capable of truth , than other people . and if in matters of honour , or enterprize which carry an appearance of publick utility , they be sometimes mistaken , ( as is said before ) the princes are more , by reason of their passions , and perturbations of mind , to which they are much more obnoxious than the people . in the election of magistrats they are more dexterous , and judicious than princes , nor , shall the people be ever persuaded to advance a corrupt , and infamous man , which among princes is easie and common . if it takes a disgust or abhorrency to any thing , 't is not readily removed , but sticks by them for several ages , which among princes is not so ; both which points may be evicted by the people of rome , who in so many hundred years , and so many elections of consuls , and tribunes , never made four elections that they repented of afterwards , and for the name of a king they abhorred it so perfectly , that no virtue , no former service to his country could excuse any man whom they suspected to aspire to it . it is evident likewise that those cities which are governed by the people , have enlarged their territories in a short time , and extended their empire farther , than those who have been subject to princes ; as rome after the expulsion of kings , and athens after they had rescued themselves from the tyranny of pisistrates ; which can proceed from nothing , but that the government by a free state is intrinsically better , than the government by a prince : nor can livy's expression about the levity of the syracusans oppose my opinion ; for let all the good and ill qualities of the prince and people be compared , and it will be found , that the people are less extravagant , and more honourable of the two . and if in the instituting of good laws , the ordaining of new statutes , and the making new orders for civil conversation and society , princes have the better , yet the people preserving , and executing them better than they , are doubtless as worthy of praise , as the founders themselves . to be short , principalities and republicks have both of them subsisted several years , and both of them had occasion to be regulated and reformed ; for a prince that is licentious , and does what he has a mind to ; has a mind to that which does him hurt , and is a weak man for his pains ; and the people which takes the same liberty , is as mad on the other side . and if the comparison be made betwixt mix'd principalities , that are circumscribed , and bounded by laws , and popular governments under the same tyes and restrictions ; the people will be found more virtuous than the princes ; but if it be betwixt loose and dissolute governments both of the one kind , and the other , the errors on the side of the princes will appear more great , more numerous , and more incapable of redress ; for in popular tumults , a sober man may interpose , and by fair words reduce them to reason ; but to an enraged prince , who dares intercede ; or what remedy is there to repair to , but violence , and the sword ? from whence we may judge and distinguish betwixt the inconvenience of the one and the other : the people are appeased with gentleness , and good words ; and the prince not to be prevailed upon , but by violence and force ; and if it be so , who is it that will deny , that the disease is more dangerous , where the cure is most difficult ? moreover when the people tumultuate , there is not so much fear of any present mischief that they are likely to commit , as of the consequences of it , and that it may end in a tyranny . but with ill princes it is quite contrary , the present misery is the most dreadful , because they hope when he dyes , their liberty may be recovered . you see then the difference betwixt them ; one is more dangerous at present , and the other for the future ; the cruelty of the people extends only to such as ( in their opinion ) conspire against the common good . the severity of the prince , is more against them who design against his particular interest . but this opinion of the people goes daily down the wind ; for every man has liberty to speak what he pleases against them ( though even the government be popular : ) but against a prince no man can talk without a thousand apprehensions , and dangers . nor will it seem to me incongruous ( the matter having drawn me thus far ) in my next chapter to discourse what confederacies are most safe , those which are made with princes , or those which are made with commonwealths . chap. lix . what leagues or confederacies are most to be trusted ; those which are made with princes , or those which are made with free states . because princes with princes , and free states among themselves , and many times with princes do enter into leagues of friendship and confederacy , i thought it not amiss to enquire in this place , whose faith is the most firm , and in whose amity the greatest confidence is to be reposed . having considered it diligently with my self , it seems to me that in many cases they are alike , and in some they differ . and first , when necessity of state requires , and there is any visible danger of losing the government , neither the one nor the other are so precise , but they will make bold with their engagements , and behave themselves ingratefully : demetrius poliorcetes had obliged the athenians by many good offices ; but his army being aftewards defeated , and himself flying to them for refuge , as to his confederates , and friends , he was repulsed , and not admitted into the city , which troubled him more than the loss of his army . pompey being beaten in thessalia by caesar fled likewise into egypt to ptolomy , whom he had formerly restored to his kingdom , and was murthered by him for his confidence . in both these examples the ingratitude seems to be the same ; yet the inhumanity was greater on the princes side , than on the common-wealths ; but be it as it will , when the state is in danger , they are neither of them scrupulous . and if there be any prince or commonwealth so punctual as to preserve their league , though with destruction to themselves ; it may proceed from the same causes . it may very well happen that a prince may confederate with some other great potentate , ( who though unable to defend him at that time ; may give him hopes notwithstanding of restoring him some other ) and persevere in his confederacy , as thinking that by having made himself of that princes party , he has rendered his accommodation with the adversary imposible . this was the case of all the neopolitan princes who sided with the french in their expedition unto those parts : and as to the free states , they suffered of old something in this nature , as saguntum in spain , which city chose rather to expose its self to direption , and all the calamities of war , than forsake its confederacy with the romans , and in the year . florence did almost the same to continue its amity with the french. so that computing every thing , and considering what both parties have done upon such imminent and irresistable danger , i believe there is more constancy and firm friendship to be found among commonwealths than among princes ; for though perhaps they may have the same sentiments and inclinations as princes ; yet their motions , and resolutions being slower , they are longer before they violate their faith . but when their leagues and confederacies are to be broken , upon the bare prospect of advantage ; in that case your commonwealths are much more religious and severe ; and examples may be brought where a small gain has tempted a prince , when a great one could not move a common-wealth . themistocles in an oration to the athenians , told them , that he had something to advise that would be infinitely to their advantage , but durst not communicate it in publick , because to publish it , would hinder the execution ; whereupon the people deputed aristides to receive it ; and act in it afterwards as he should think convenient . themistocles acquainted him , that the whole grecian fleet ( though under their passport and parole ) were in a place where they might be all taken or destroyed , which would make the athenians absolute masters in those seas ; and aristides reported to the people , that the council of themistocles was profitable , but would be a great dishonour to their state ; upon which it was unanimously rejected . but had the same occasion been offered to philip of macedon , or some other princes , they would not have been so tender ; for it was a practice among them ( and especially with philip ) who got more by breaking his faith , than by all his other designs . as to the breaches upon the non-observance of articles , they are ordinary things , and i have nothing to say of them : i speak only of extraordinary occasions , and am of opinion from what i have said , that the people do transgress less in that nature , than princes , and may therefore with more confidence be trusted . chap. lx. how the consulship , and other dignities in rome were conferred without respect of age . it is manifest in the history of the roman commonwealth , that after the people were made capable of the consulship , the citizens were promiscuously prefer'd without respect either of age or extraction ; but any man was advanced for his virtue , whether he was a young man , or an old : and this was evident in valerius corvinus , who was created consul in the year of his age ; upon which consideration in one of his speeches to the army , he told them that the consulship was , praemium virtutis , non sanguinis . the reward , not of nobility , but virtue . whether this was prudently done , or not , may admit of dispute : but as to the receiving all sorts of persons to that dignity without consideration of their blood ; there was a necessity of that , and the same necessity that was in rome , may happen in any other city that desires to do the same great things which were done in rome , of which we have spoken elsewhere . for men are not to be persuaded to suffer , but in hopes of reward ; and that hope cannot be taken away , without manifest danger . it was but equitable therefore that the people should be capable of the consulship , that being nourished a while with only the hopes , they might at length be so happy as to have it in effect . a city that employs not its people in any great affair , may order them as it pleases ; but if it designs to extend its empire , and do as the romans did , there must be no distinction . and that no regard ought to be had of any man's age , appears by this , that in the election of a young man to a degree , in which the wisdom of an old man is requisite , the multitude being to elect , it is necessary that the young man be recommended by some extraordinary exploit ; and when a young man is so happy , as to have made himself conspicuous in the city by some honourable atchievement , it were not only hard , but inconvenient if the said city might not receive the benefit of his virtue immediately , but be forced to attend till his mind as well as body was super-annuated , and all that vigour and promptitude lost , which at that time might have been so serviceable to his country : at which age valerius corvinus , scipio , pompey , and many others did great things , and were permitted to triumph for their pains . the discourses of nicholas machiavel , citizen and secretary of florence , upon the first decade of livy to zanobi bvondelmonti , and cosimo rvcellai . liber ii. the preface . it is the common practice of mankind , to commend the ancient , and condemn the present times ; but in my judgment not always with reason ; for so studiously are they devoted to things of antiquity , that they do not only admire what is transmitted by old authors , but applaud and cry up when they are old , the passages and occurrences in their youth . but my opinion is , this their way of computation is many times false , and that upon several accompts . first , because of such very ancient things we can have no absolute knowledge ; for most commonly in the narrative of affairs , what is infamous , or ill done , is pretermitted in silence , whilst what is well done , and honourable , is related with all the arts , and amplifications of rhetorick ; for so much are historians accustomed to attribute to the fortune of the conqueror , that to encrease his praise , they do not only exspatiate upon his conduct , and exploits , but they do likewise so magnifie and illustrate the very actions of the enemy , that they who come after beholding things at a great distance , have reason to admire those times , and those men , and by consequence to love them . besides it being envy or fear which disposes people to hatred ; neither of those passions extending to what cannot possibly hurt them , two great causes are wanting of finding fault with antiquity ; for as things so long passed cannot any way prejudice , so they cannot provoke to envy or discontent : but present things which are obvious to our own sence , are universally known , and no circumstance that passes ( whether good or bad ) that can be totally conceal'd ; from whence it proceeds , that observing with the excellence and virtue of our present affairs , whatever is concomitant of imprudence or vice , we are in a manner compelled to postpone them to things of antiquity , where the good only is displayed , and the bad passed by , though perhaps the present things are more worthily glorious . i do not intend any thing hereby of the arts and sciences of our predecessors , so highly improved and illustrated , that 't is not in the power of time either to add any thing , or substract . i only speak of the manners and civil conversations of men ; in which indeed we have not so many virtuous examples , as were to be found among our ancestors : so that it is not altogether unjustly if antiquity be prefer'd ; yet are not our present transactions to be always condemn'd as worse than the former , as if antiquity had no errors at all . humane affairs are in perpetual fluctuation , and have their times of decrease , as well as advancement . a city or province founded by some excellent person upon good principles and laws , not only stands , but flourishes and increases a long time in honour , authority , and wealth ; and those persons whose happiness it is to be born under those governments whilst they are glorious , and powerful , are apt to prefer their old customs , to the disparagement of the new ; yet they are in an error , and for the reasons abovesaid . but those who are born when the state is in its declension , do not so much transgress when they commend what is pass'd , and decry what is present ; which things ( having seriously considered with my self ) i conceive to be caused , because the world has been always the same , and made up promiscuously of good things and bad ; yet these good and bad things have varied sometimes , and as it were transmigrated from one city , and one province to another ; so that in those places where virtue has been a long time predominant , vice has stoln in by degrees , and supplanted it ; which is evident by the revolutions of kingdoms and empires , where virtue and justice has had its time , and been transfused afterwards into other countries . however the world was the same , though its virtue and magnanimity was unstable , removing and shifting from the assyrians first , to the medes , from the medes to the persians , and from them to the romans ; and if after the roman empire , there has been no government so great as to comprehend and ingross the virtue of the whole world ; yet the same virtue that was of old among the romans is not extinct , but dispersed and branched out into several kingdoms and provinces , as the kingdom of france , the kingdom of the turks , the kingdom of the soldan , the empire of the germans , and the sect of the saracins , which conquered so many provinces , and committed such devastations , as were the ruine of the empire of the east . in these kingdoms rent and divided from the empire of the romans , the old roman virtue is diffused , and retains still something of its pristine lustre , so that it may without injustice be admired in some places : which being so , he who is born in those provinces where the roman virtue and discipline is still in being ( but declining ) if he applauds his old country-men , and blames his contemporaries , his error is not great : but he that is born in italy , and is not in his heart a tramontan , or in greece , and is not a turk , must needs bewail his own times , and cry up his predecessors , in which he will find many things well worthy his admiration ; whereas in these there is nothing but wickedness and obloquy , no religion , no laws , no discipline , but all things impure and brutish , and they are the more detestable and deplorable , by how much the same persons who would be imitated , and are set aloft to command all , and correct those that are vitious , are most dissolute , and most vitious themselves . but to return to our discourse , i say , that though humane judgment is frail , and may be mistaken in its character of such things as by reason of their antiquity , cannot fall so perfectly under ones cognizance ; yet that will not excuse old men for preferring the transactions in their youth , because both the one and the other were equally liable to their knowledge ; nor would they be of that opinion , if men had the same sentiment and appetite as long as they lived ; but our affection altering , and our rational soul being otherwise disposed than formerly , we judge otherwise of things , though the times be the same ; for how is it possible the same things should please in our youth and old age , when their studies , and delights are so different and remote ? for ( to say no more ) as the quickness and vigour of the body decreases in old men , so their judgment and prudence increase proportionably ; and thence it follows that the same things which seemed tolerable in their youth grow insupportable when they are old ; so that the fault is more in their judgment , than the age , for supposing those things to be good , which , being wiser , by experience , they find to be otherwise . to which it may be added , that the desires of mankind are immense , and unsatiable ; that naturally we are covetous of every thing , whereas fortune allows us but little ; that from thence it happens that no ●an is contented , every man despises what he is already possessed of , commends what is passed , condemns what is present , and longs for what is to come , though induced by no reasonable occasion . things being thus , i cannot resolve my self whether ever i may not be of that number , who in these my discourses have so highly magnified the old times and exploits of the romans , to the diminution of our own : and truly , were not the vertue of that age as clear as the sun , and the wickedness of ours as manifest as that , i should have been more moderate , and feared to have run into the same error which i have condemned in other people . but things being so evident , i may with boldness deliver my opinion of both times , to the end that the minds of such young persons , as shall peruse my conceptions , may be admonished to avoid those vices which are so prevalent now , and prepared to imitate the virtue of our ancestors , when-ever occasion shall be offered . for it is the office of a good man to recommend that to other people which he thinks for the interest and honour of his country , though perhaps the adversity of his fortune , and the malignity of the times will not suffer him to practise it himself ; that by his instructions so many , at least some one may be so fortunate as to be able to follow him . wherefore having in may first book done with what i proposed about the original institution of government , and what was in my judgment necessary to preserve them : i shall now in this second , discourse of what the romans did abroad for the inlargement and augmentation of their empire . chap. i. whether the vertue or fortune of the romans was the occasion of the greatness of their empire . many have thought , and plutarch ( a grave author ) among the rest , that the people of rome where more beholding to their fortune than virtue , in the acquisition of their empire ; and among other reasons , he infers it from their own silent confession , in having erected more temples to fortune than to any of their gods. livy seems to be likewise of the same opinion ; for he seldom introduces a roman speaking any thing of virtue , but immediately it is followed with fortune , with which nevertheless i can by no means comply , nor believe it will hold water ; for though no commonwealth be to be found that has made such progress as the roman , why should it be rather imputed to their good fortune than the solid constitution of their laws ? the courage of their armies , and the excellent conduct of their emperors , extended their empire ; and then their own just measures , and the wise institutions of their first legislator preserved what they got , as we shall hereafter more largely discover . it is objected , that the romans were never at one time involved in two considerable wars , ( which is imputed rather to their fortune than wisdom ) for they had no quarrel with the latins till they had subdued the samnites , and were forced to make war in their defence ; they had no controversie with the tuscans till they had beaten the latins , and with their frequent victories almost extinguished the sabines , whereas if two of these states had confederated , and joyned their powerful armies against them , no doubt but the affairs of the romans would have been in very great danger . but be it as it will , this is most certain , they never had two great wars upon their hands at a time ; but they began one when they ended the other , or the end of the first was the beginning of the second ; and this may be observed in the series of their wars , for ( to pass by their quarrels before rome was taken by the french ) whilst the aequi and volsci were powerful and strong , they had no enemies but they ; when they were conquered , their war broke out with the samnites ; and though before that was perfectly concluded , the latins rebelled ; yet before it could be brought to a war , the samnites had made their peace , and joyned their army with the romans , to reduce the latini . that war being finished , the war with the samnites revived , and was the occasion of much mischief to the samnites ; after which , the romans began with the tuscans , and that being composed , the samnites broke out again upon the passage of pyrrhus into italy , who being repulsed into greece , they had opportunity for their wars with the carthaginians , and their first war with that state was no sooner determined , but the french , and the inhabitants on this and the other side of the alps conspired so effectually against them , that betwixt popolonia and pisa ( where the tower of st. vincent is at this day to be seen ) the confederates were routed with a very great slaughter . this war being concluded , for twenty years together they had no considerable war , for they had no body to fight with but the ligures , and the resicts of those french who were remaining in lombardy . in this posture they continued till the second punick war , which lasted years , and perplexed them exceedingly . that war being ended with a great deal of honour , their next enterprize was against the macedonians ; after which their war happened with antiochus in asia , and when he was overcome , there was not a prince or state in the whole world , which by it self , or conjunction with the rest , was able to contend with the romans . but before this last victory , who-ever considers the method of their wars , and their manner of proceeding , shall find great virtue and wisdom intermixed with their good fortune , so that the reason of their good fortune is easily discovered ; for this is most certain , when a prince or commonwealth arrives at that height of reputation that no neighbour-prince or people dares venture to invade him , ( unless compelled by indispensible necessity ) he may do what he pleases , 't is in his election with whom he will make war , and with whom he will be at peace ; for his neighbours being afraid of his power , are glad to be his friends ; and those potentates who are farthest off , and have no commerce with them , look on as unconcern'd , as if the consequence could have no reflexion on them ; and in this error they do many times continue till the calamities be brought home to their own dores ; and then , when 't is too late , they have nothing but their own private force to oppose , which is too weak when the enemy is grown so strong . i will not enlarge upon the samnites , nor recount how they stood still , and look'd on , while the romans conquered the aequi and the volsci ; but to avoid prolixity , i shall pass to the carthaginians , who were of great power and authority when the romans were at war both with the somnites and tuscans ; they had the command of all africk , and were supreme in sicily , sardinia , and great part of spain . blinded with their power , and ( as they thought ) secure in their distance , it never , came into their heads to invade them at that time , or to give any assistance to the samnites or tuscans ; but ( according to the practice of the world with things that are new , and encreasing ) they rather sided with them , and desired their friendship , not so much as perceiving their error , till the romans had conquered all the intermediate states , and began to contend with them for the empire of sicily and spain . and what hapned to the carthaginians , hapned likewise to the french , to philip of macedon , and to antiochus ; each of them believing ( whilst the romans were employed in their wars with other people ) that they would either be overcome , or that they themselves should have time enough to make peace or war with them , as they saw it most for their advantage : so that considering what is good , i am of opinion that the same fortune and prosperity may be expected by any prince or state which exercises the same virtue and industry as the romans have done before them . and here we might very properly discourse of the roman method in the invasion of other provinces , but we have done that at large in our treatise called the prince ; yet this i shall say in short , that the romans made always sure of some friend or other in the provinces against which they design'd , that might be a means to admit them , and gave them enterance , and help afterwards to keep what they had been instrumental in getting . so by intelligence with the capuans they invaded samnium ; by the help of the camertines they got into tuscany ; by the mamertines into sicily ; by the saguntines into spain ; massinissa gave them enterance into africk , the etoli into greece , eumenes and other princes into asia , and the massilienses and hedai into france ; and as by their correspondence they conquered most of those countries , so by their interest they preserved them ; which way , if diligently observed by other people , it will be found that their prosperity depended less upon fortune than those states who observed not that course : but to illustrate what we have said , and make it so plain and perspicuous that every one may see how much more their virtue than their fortune contributed to their empire ; in our next chapter we will consider what those people were whom the romans subdued , and with what obstinacy they defended their liberty . chap. ii. with what nations the romans contended , and with what obstinancy those nations resisted . nothing made it so difficult for the romans to conquer their neighbours , and some other remoter provinces , as the love which the people of those times did bear to their liberty : for in defence of that , they were so indefatigably studious , that nothing but singular and extraordinary virtue could have subdued them : and this is demonstrable by the many and great dangers to which they exposed themselves , sometimes to preserve , and sometimes to recover it ; as also by the severity of their revenge upon those who had usurp'd it . 't is evident likewise in history what detriment the people and cities have suffered whilst they were in servitude and subjection ; and whereas now a-days there is but one province which can boast of free cities , in ancient times there was not one province but had plenty . in italy from the alps ( which divide tuscany and lombardy ) to the extremest part of that country , there were many free states ; as the tuscans , the romans , the samnites , and others ; nor is there mention of any king ( but what reigned in rome ) besides porsena king of tuscany , the extinction of whose line , though not set down in history , yet it is manifest that tuscany was free at the time when the romans encamped before veii ; so well satisfied with their liberty , and so abhorring from the very name of a king , that the veientes having for their better defence created one in their own town , and sent to the tuscans to implore their assistance against the romans , after a grave and solemn debate , it was resolved , no assistance should be sent whilst they were under the dominion of a king ; as thinking it unfit to engage in the defence of a country that had betraid it self , and prostituted to the dominion of a single person . nor is this universal affection to liberty so wonderful in the people . experience tells us , that no cities have augmented their revenues , or enlarged their territories , but whilst they were free and at liberty : and certainly 't is a prodigious thing to consider to what height and grandeur in an hundred years time the city of athens arrived , after it had freed it self from the tyranny of pisistrates ; but much more to consider the greatness of rome upon the expulsion of her kings ; and the reason of all is , because in common-wealths private wealth and emolument is not so much aim'd at as the improvement of the publick ; nor is there any where so much care of the publick as in free states , where what-ever is equitable , and for the common advantage , is decreed and executed , without respect to particular persons , who may perhaps be sufferers thereby ; whereas in cities that are governed by a prince it falls out quite contrary ; for there , what makes commonly for the advantage of the prince , is prejudice to the publick : so that when a free-state degenerates into a tyranny , the least mischief that it can expect , is , to make no further advancement in its empire ; and no farther encrease either in riches or power ; but for the most part it goes backward , and declines : and if it should so happen that the tyrant should be a virtuous man , and one who by his courage and military discipline should enlarge his dominions ; yet what-ever he took would be converted to his own private use , without any benefit to the publick . for he dares not advance any of those citizens ( how worthy and honest soever ) left he should have occasion to suspect them afterwards . nor can he make those cities which he subdues , dependant or tributary to that where he is absolute ; for 't is not the interest of a tyrant to make his subjects powerful or united ; but to keep them low , and divided , that every town , every province may depend wholly upon himself ; so that the conquests of an usurper may turn to his own profit , but never to the publick ; to which purpose many things are very handsomely written by xenophon in his treatise of tyranny ; and things being thus , no body is to admire if our ancestors had so great a zeal for their liberty ; and the very name of a tyrant was so odious to them , that when long since news was brought to the army of the assassination of hieronymo the nephew of hiero of syracuse , and the whole camp was in an uproar against the conspirators ; yet when it was told them that they had proclaimed liberty , and a free government , they laid by their indignation against the tyrannicids , and being pacified with the very name of liberty , fell into consultation how it was to be preserved . nor is it to be wondred at then , if their revenge be so violent and extraordinary upon those who would violate it ; of which , though there be many examples , i shall instance only in one , but that most remarkable and horrid ; and hapning in corcirca a city in greece : for all greece being divided , and consisting of two factions , one of them under the protection of the athenians , and the other of the spartans ; and in corcirca the nobility prevailing , and having usurped upon the liberty of the people , it hapned that the people being reinforced by the assistance of the athenians , overpowred the nobility , and conquered them again . having restored their liberty , and shaked off their servitude , they clap'd up all the nobility in a large prison , and bringing them forth by ten at a time , as if they were to be banished , they put them to death with most exquisite torments ; which severity coming by degrees to the ears of the remainder , they resolved to do what was possible to defend themselves against it , upon which they stood upon their guard , and would suffer none of the officers to come in ; whereupon , in a great fury , the people ran thither , pull'd off the covering of the house where they were , and throwing down the walls , buried them all in the ruines : and of this sort of cruelty there were many other examples in that province ; for the people are usually more impetuous in revenging the loss of their liberty , than in defending it . but it may ( not unfitly ) be admir'd in this place what should be the cause that the ancients should be more zealous for publick liberty than we in our days : if my opinion may pass , i think it is for the same reason , that in those times men were more robust , and stronger than now ; which proceedeth much from the diversity betwixt their education , their religion and ours : for whereas our religion gives us a just prospect and contemplation of things , and teaches us to despise the magnificence and pomp of the world ; the ethnicks valued them so highly , and believing them their chiefest happiness , it made them more fierce and busie to defend them , and this may be collected from several of their customs ; for if the sacrifices in their days be compared with the sacrifices in ours , theirs will be found magnificent and horrid ; ours delicate and neat , but neither so magnificent nor cruel . they wanted not pomp nor formality in those ceremonies , and yet to make them the more venerable and solemn , they added blood and slaughter to them , offering up infinite numbers of beasts , which being slain before the people , made them more hard-hearted and cruel . moreover the religion of the gentiles did not place their beatitude any where but upon such as were full of worldly glory , and had done some great action for the benefit of their country . in our religion the meek and humble , and such as devote themselves to the contemplation of divine things , are esteemed more happy than the greatest tyrant , and the greatest conquerer upon earth ; and the summum bonum , which the others placed in the greatness of the mind , the strength of the body , and what-ever else contributed to make men active , we have determined to consist in humility , abjection , and contempt of the world ; and if our religion requires any fortitude , it is rather to enable us to suffer than to act . so that it seems to me , this way of living , so contrary to the ancients ; has rendred the christians more weak and effeminate ; and left them as a prey to those who are more wicked , and may order them as they please , the most part of them thinking more of paradise than preferment , and of enduring than revenging of injuries ; as if heaven was to be won rather by idleness than arms : but that explication of our religion is erroneous , and they who made it were poor and pusillanimous , and more given to their case than any thing that was great : for if the christian religion allows us to defend and exalt our country , it allows us certainly to love it , and honour it , and prepare our selves so as we may be able to defend it . but that lazy and unactive way of education , and interpreting things falsly has been the cause that there are not so many commonwealths as formerly in the world , nor so many lovers and champions for their liberty : and yet i believe the greatness of the roman empire contributed something , by reducing all the free states and republicks under their dominion . nevertheless when that great empire was broken and dissolved , very few of those poor states could recover their liberty : but when it began first to encrease and extend it self , no country was without them , and where-ever the romans carried their arms , they found little commonwealths banding and confederating against them , and defending their liberties with all imaginable constancy ; which shews that the romans were a people of more than ordinary courage , or they could never have subdued them . the samnites alone will be example sufficient , who ( as livy reports ) were so powerful , and so hearty defenders of their liberty , that for years together they maintained war with the romans ; and though they had received many losses , and such devastations had been committed in their country , yet they could never be wholly reduc'd before the consulship of papyrius cursor , the son of the first papyrius . but 't is a spectacle worthy of any mans pity , to see a country so full ( formerly ) of brave cities , and brave men , and all of them free ; now desolate and uninhabited , and scarce any body left ; to which condition it could have never been reduced but by the discipline , and diligence , and courage of the romans : but all this proceeded from diversity of constitution , for all cities and free states whatsoever , encrease not only in riches and authority , but in the numbers of their men : for who is it that had not rather procreate and have children where he may marry and enrich himself freely , than where there is danger that what he gets painfully , and lays up carefully for his children , may be ravished from them by a tyrant . in a free state you may be sure your children shall be no slaves , and that if they behave themselves virtuously , they shall be sure of preferment , and perhaps come to be princes ; riches encrease there faster , and that not only by tillage and agriculture , but by traffick and arts ; and people do naturally throng to those places where they may get what they lawfully can , and keep securely what they have got . the quite contrary happens in countries that are servile , and their condition is worse , as their servitude is greater : but there is no servitude so severe as to depend upon a commonwealth , and that for two reasons ; first because it is more durable , and less hopes of recovering their liberty ; and secondly , because it is the practise of all commonwealths to impoverish and weaken what-ever they conquer , to fortifie themselves ; which with princes is not the way , unless they be very barbarous indeed , and like the eastern princes , who not only ruine whole countries , but destroy all human conversation : but where princes are well instituted , they know better things , and do many times indulge their new conquests as much as their own territories , leaving them the exercise of their arts , and the enjoyment of their laws ; so that though they cannot encrease their wealth as where they are free ; yet they are not so subject to be ruined as where they are slaves : i speak now of servitude to a foreign prince , for the usurpation of a citizen i have spoken before . all which being considered , no wonder if the samnites whilst they enjoyed their liberty were so couragious and strong , and when it was once lost grew so abject and contemptible . titus livius tells us in his history of the punick war , that the samnites were so overlaid and cowed by one single legion of the romans at nola , that they sent embassadors to hanibal to beg his assistance , and that the said ambassadors in their oration to hanibal , the better to move his compassion , had this expression , we are the people who for an hundred years together waged war with the romans with our own private forces , and bore up many times against two armies and two consuls at once ; but now our misery is so great , and our spirits so low , we are unable to defend our selves against one pitiful legion . chap. iii. it contributed much to the grandeur of the city of rome , that they ruined the neighbouring cities , and admitted strangers to their own dignities and priviledges . crescit interea roma , albae ruinis ; the ruine of alba was the rise of the romans . 't was the saying of livy , and 't is true ; for who-ever would make any city great , and apt for dominion , must endeavour with all industry to throng it with inhabitants , otherwise it will be impossible to bring it to any great perfection . and this is done two ways , by love and by force : the first by giving passage and security to all persons that will come and inhabit there , that every man shall be free ; the second by destroying the neighbour cities , and forcing the people to come and dwell in yours . the romans observed both ways , and grew so numerous upon it , that in the time of their sixth king they had men in the town able to bear arms , proceeding in some respects like the country-man , who to make his plant larger , and more fruitful , cuts off its first shoots , that the juyce and virtue which otherwise would dilate into the branches , being kept close to the trunk , might break out with more vigor afterwards , and make it more beautiful and fertile . and that this way is necessary for the propagation of the strength and authority of a city , appears by the example of athens and sparta , which cities , though they were both free , numerous in men , and happy in their laws ; yet they could never arrive at the grandeur of the romans , though rome seemed more tumultuous , and not so well governed as they , and all for the reason abovesaid : for rome having by both those ways encreased the number of their citizens , was able to set out an army at one time of men , whereas sparta and athens could never exceed . which is not to be attributed to the excellence of the situation of rome ; but to the diversity of their conduct ; for lycurgus the founder of the spartan commonwealth , conceiving nothing could be more pernitious to it , nor more easily abrogate his laws , than intermixing with new inhabitants , he provided with all possible industry that his citizens should have no commerce or conversation with strangers . to that end he not only prohibited the admission of foreigners , and their marrying with them , but that there might be no encouragement or occasion of entercourse betwixt them , he put out a certain mony of leather , so pitifully inconsiderable , that he presumed no merchants would trouble themselves to import any foreign commodities for it ; by which means that city was never in a capacity of being very populous : and because all human affairs do hold some proportion and analogy with nature ; and it is impossible that a slender trunk , should bear vast and ponderous branches , it is not to be expected that a small commonwealth consisting of a small number of citizens , should subdue , or at least keep and maintain greater and more populous states than themselves ; and if it should happen that they should conquer them at any time , upon every slight accident they would be subject to lose them , like the tree it would be too weak for its boughs , and every puff of wind apt to blow it down . and thus it fell out with sparta , though it had conquered all greece , made it self absolute thorow that whole province ; yet thebes no sooner rebelled , but all the rest of the cities revolted , and having lost its great empire in a moment , it remained like a tree destitute of its branches . but with rome it was otherwise , its root and trunk was strong enough to support its branches how heavy and spacious soever ; and this was the great cause of the greatness of the roman empire , which livy expressed in two words , when he said , crescit interea roma , alvae ruinis . chap. iv. there are three ways which commonwealths have taken to enlarge their territories . he who has read and observed the history of our ancestors must find , that common-wealths had generally three ways of enlarging their empire . one is that which was observed of the tuscans of old , who entred into a league of confederacy with several other commonwealths , with condition of equality , that no particular should have any degree or authority above the rest , and that comprehension should be left for all their new conquests to come in , not much unlike the practice of the swizzers in our times , and the achaians , and aetolians of old . and because the romans had in those times much controversie with the tuscans and their confederates , i shall enlarge my self something in the explanation of their affairs , of which , though there be but little monument in history , yet we are assured , that before the greatness of the romans , the tuscans were very powerful both by sea , and by land ; of which power it is no small argument , their sending a colony into the mare superum to a place called adria , which grew so considerable and famous , that it denominated that whole sea , and it has been called the mare adriaticum ever since . it is known likewise that their empire extended from the tyber to the foot of the alps , which comprehends the greatest part of italy at this day ; though years before the romans came to any considerable strength , the tuscans received a great defeat by the gauls ; who under the command of bollovesus , either in quest of new quarters , or tempted by the pleasantness of the country , having passed the alps , possessed themselves of that province called lombardy , and gave it the name of gallia cisalpina ; after which they turn'd out the natives , settled themselves there , and built several cities , which they enjoyed , till in process of time , they also were supplanted by the romans . and this was the method of the tuscans proceeding , and the manner of their confederating with their neighbours , which was no less than xii cities ; of which clusium , veii , fesulae , aretium , and volterra were the chief ; but yet with all their assistance they could not exceed the limits of italy , nor indeed conquer all that , for reasons which we shall mention hereafter . another way of extending your empire , is by associating with several cities , but so as that the dignity of the command , the seat of the empire , and the honour of the enterprize may remain with you ; which was the way observed by the romans . the third is the way of the spartans and athenians , who entertained no confederates , but what ever territories they conquered , they annexed them to their own : which way is undoubtedly the worst of the three , as appeared by the two said republicks , who were ruined upon no other account , but because they had grasped more dominion than they were able to hold . for it is a thing in it self very arduous and difficult , to keep a city in subjection by a continued force , especially if ever it was free ; wherefore unless your citizens be very numerous , and your associates very considerable , by whose assistance you may be able to keep what you conquer , it will never be in your power to enlarge your dominion very much , and the spartans and athenians miscarrying in their way , miscarried likewise in their end , and all their great conquest came to nothing : the romans took the second way , and succeeded to that vast and extraordinary power , by associating equally in many things , with many states , but reserving always to themselves the seat of the empire , and the chief command in their wars , by which means it came to pass , that their confederates ( ere they were aware ) subjected themselves to the romans , at the expence of their own labour , and blood . for after they had carried their arms out of italy ; reduced several kingdoms into provinces , and the inhabitants being accustomed to live in subjection , without much difficulty submitted , the romans bearing the name of the war , and the nations that were conquered knowing nothing of their allies , submitted to their dominion , and would own no body else : whereby it happen'd that their associates in italy being over-powred by the multitude of provinces which had submitted to the romans , and by the strength and populousness of rome , began to find their error by degrees , but too late , and when they had no way left to defend themselves ; for if any of them conspired , they were quickly suppressed , and made subjects of associates . this way of administration , and enlarging their empire was peculiar to the romans ; no other people observed it , and certainly no bet●er is to be found . the next way of confederating ( which was practised by the tuscans , achaians , and aetolians in old time , and by the swizzers of late ) is the best way next to that of the romans ; for though it cannot arrive at any great empire , the confederacy consisting of so many free cities , which being all to be consulted , makes their resolutions very tedious , besides , the citizens are not so vigorous in a war , where the prize is to be divided into so many parts ; yet for these reasons it has two advantages of the third . first , whatever it gains , it keeps a long time , and loses very hardly ; and secondly , it engages not so rashly in war , but enjoys with more ease and felicity the blessings of peace : for they are longer in their consultations and debates , where there is to be a general dyet and convention , than where things are to be dispatched within the walls of one city , besides experience tells us that this way has certain bounds , which have not been exceeded by any example we can find . for after xii or xiv cities have confederated , they admit no more into the league , as holding themselves enough , and sufficient for their defence , nor are they much solicitous of extending their empire , because they are under no necessity of making themselves stronger ; and their conquest would be of little advantage to every particular state , for they would be forced upon one of these two rocks , either to incorporate them into their league , and then the multitude would breed confusion , or make them their subjects which they will hardly continue : when therefore they are got to such a number in their association , as that they seem safe against foreign invasion , and strong enough to defend themselves ; they take one of these two ways , either they receive their neighbour states or cities into their protection ( by which means they draw vast sums of mony sometimes , that are easily distributed ) or else they ●ight for other people , and receive pay from this or that prince , as the swizzers do now , and other nations have done of old . to this purpose titus livius gives us an account that at a conference betwixt philip of macedon and titus quintus flaminius , an aetolian praetor being present , there happening some words betwixt the said praetor and king philip , king philip reproached him by the avarice , and inconstancy of his country , as a people that were not ashamed to take pay on one side , and send supplies to the other , by which means it was frequently seen that in both armies the aetolian colours were displayed ; from whence we may conclude that this way of proceeding by league and confederacies , has been always the same , and has had the same effects . the third way of subjecting your conquests and annexing them to your own dominions , is very incommodious , and instable ; and if it were so to a commonwealth well constituted and armed , it must needs be much worse to a government that is weak , as most of the italian states are at this day ; but the roman way is the best , and most to be admired ; for there is no example of any body that made use of it before them , nor has any body imitated them since ; and as to the practice of the tuscans , and aetolians in their confederations , there is no body follows it now a days , but the swizzers , and the suevians : which being so , and so many brave things performed by the people of rome as well for the conservation , as the augmentation of their empire , it is not strange our affairs succeeded no better , and that we have been a prey to whoever would invade us ; for ( to say nothing of the rest ) it has doubtless becom'd the tuscans if they could not have imitated the roman discipline , nor followed their measures in extending their empire , at least to have follow'd the example of their own ancestors , who though they brought not their empire to that grandeur and immensity as the romans ; yet they enlarged it as far as they thought good , and as far as consisted with the nature of their government ; and by doing so , they kept it a long time , with immortal honour to their memory , till they were first shaken by the gauls , and afterwards so totally ruined by the romans , that there is scarce the lest token left , that there was ever any such thing ; which having brought it into my mind to consider what may be the causes of this oblivion of things , i shall discourse of them in the following chapter . chap. v. the variation of religions and languages , with the accidents of deluges and plagues have been the cause that many great things have been forgotten . in my judgment it may be objected to those philosophers who hold the world to be eternal , that if so long a course of antiquity was true , it would be but reasonable that the memory of some of their affairs should have lasted above five thousand years : yet there may be some reasons given for that oblivion of things , and they seem twofold , partly from the nature of man , and partly from the influence of the heavens ; the memory of great things are abolished from the nature of man , by the variation of their religion , or language ; for when a new religion is introduced , the first care of him that would propagate it , is to explode , and extinguish whatever was memorable in the old , to give the greater credit to his new innovation ; and if it fall out that the introducers of this new sect , be of a different language , all goes to wreck , and whatever was before , is easily forgotten . and that this is so , appears by the institution of the christian religion , whose first establishers did principally intend the cancelling and extirpation of all old ethnick customs , ceremonies , and theology ; and if there remained any memory of their affairs , it was because there was no new language introduced with it , the christians being constrain'd to explain themselves in latine ; whereas could they have done it in a new tongue ( considering their other persecutions ) we may conclude there would have been no memory left of their religion or worship : for so diligent and zealous was saint gregory , and other moderators of the christian religion , in abolishing the superstitions of the gentiles , that they caused the works of all the poets and historians to be burn'd , which made any mention of them ; they threw down their images and idols , and destroy'd all that might afford the least memory of paganism ; to which diligence of theirs , if a new language had been added , in a short time all would have been utterly forgotton ; what therefore was done by the christians for the extirpation of gentilism , it is not improbable but the gentiles might have done of old for the extirpation of the religion before . and because in five or six thousand years , religion may be twice or thrice changed , no wonder if what was before be so entirely lost , that if there remains any thing of it , it is looked upon as fabulous and incredible , as it hapned to the histories of diodorus siculus , which gives an account of or years , and are not unworthily accounted false . as to the coelestial causes from the influence of the heavens , they are such as destroy mankind in general , or reduce it to a very small number , as great mortalities , famines , and inundations of water , but especially the last , because the mischief is more universal , and if any be saved , it is only the mountaneers , which being commonly barbarous , have no knowledge of antiquity , and by consequence can convey nothing of it to their posterity ; and if it so happens that among them which are preserved , some one man may be more learned than ordinary , and have some knowledge of affairs , to give himself a name and reputation afterwards , he conceals , preverts , and transmits them as he pleases ; so that there remains to posterity no more than he thought fit to communicate . nor do i believe it is doubted but these accidents happen , and famine , and pestilence do sometimes rage in the world , seeing all histories mention them , and this oblivion of things is a certain effect of them : nor is it unreasonable to think that the great universe has its way of evacuation , as well as the microcosm ; for as in that , when the humours are redundant , and the body unable to digest them , nature exerts , and finds out some way to throw them off , without which the person must certainly miscarry ; so it is in the other , when all countries are repleat , and no room left for those that are to come ; when the cunning and malignity of mankind is at the height , there is a necessity the world should be purged by some of those three ways , that men being reduced in their numbers , and humbled under the consideration of their mortality , may ( if possible ) become better : which being so , no wonder if the tuscans formerly so famous for their administration both in war and in peace , so eminent for their courage , and so venerable for their religion , should be oppressed by the romans , and so totally abolished , that ( as is said before ) there remains nothing of them but the name . chap. vi. how the romans proceeded in making of war. we have already discoursed of the way of the romans in extending their empire ; we shall now speak of their customs in the management of their wars , by which it will appear with what wisdom they deviated from the common ways of the world , and by what easie methods they arrived at that supremacy and grandeur . he who makes war at his own choice ( and is under no constraint ) or else by ambition , has doubtless this end ; to get what he is able , and to keep it whilst he can , and rather to enrich than impoverish his own country : for such a one it is necessary to have regard to his charge , and to see that neither the conquering nor maintaining are more expensive to him , than will consist with his revenue . this the romans observed very strictly , by coming strong and suddenly into the field ; for by that one practice , all their wars with the latini , samnites , and tuscans , were dispatched in a short time . and whoever considers their wars from the beginning of rome , to the siege of the veientes , will find that they were determined in a very short time , some in six , some in ten , and some in twenty days . for their custom was , upon the first appearance of a war , immediately to draw out their army , and seeking out the enemy , they did what they could to bring him to a battel ; having beaten him ( by reason of the surprize . ) the enemy ( that his country might not wholly be harrassed ) for the most part proposed an agreement , in which the romans were sure to insist upon some part of their territory ; which either they converted to their particular profit , or consigned to some colony which was to be placed there for the security of their frontiers ; by which means the wars being ended in a short time , their conquests were kept without any considerable expence , for the colony had that country for their pay , and the romans had their colonies for their security . nor could there be any way more advantagious and safe ; for whilst there was no enemy in the field , those guards were sufficient ; and when any army was set out to disturb them , the romans were always ready with another in their defence , and having fought them , they commonly prevailed , forced them to harder conditions , and returned when they had done : by which means they gained daily upon the enemy , and grew more powerful at home : and in this manner they proceeded till their leaguer before veii , where they altred their method , and allowed pay to their souldiers for the better continuation of the war , whereas before that , their wars being short ; there was no necessity of paying their armies . nevertheless , though they paid their souldiers from that time , and maintained war at greater distance , ( whereby they were obliged to continue longer in the field ) yet they left not their old custom of dispatching it as soon as they could , with respect to the circumstances of place and time ; for which reason they continued their colonies : and besides their old custom of shortning their wars as much as they were able , the ambition of their consuls contributed exceedingly ; for their consulships being but for a year , and six months of that to be spent in their employments at home , they were as diligent and vigorous as possible , because they were not capable of triumphing till the war was concluded : and then for continuing their colonies ; the great advantage and convenience that resulted from them , was sufficient to prevail . this practice therefore was observed perpetually among the romans in the management of their wars ; only they varied something about the distribution of the prey , in which formerly they were more liberal than in after-times ; either because they thought it not so necessary when the souldiers were paid ; or else because their spoils being greater than before , they thought convenient that the publick should have its share ; that upon any new enterprize they might not be constrained to lay new taxes upon the people ; and by this way their coffers were filled in a short time . so that by these two ways , by the distribution of their prey , and the setling of colonies , rome grew rich by its wars , whereas other princes and states ( without great discretion ) grow poor : and so great was every mans ambition of enriching the aerarium , that by degrees it came to that pass , no consul was permitted to triumph , unless he returned with a vast quantity of silver or gold , or some other inestimable commodity , and put it into the treasury . so that the designs of the romans tended wholly to this , to finish the war quickly , by forcing the enemy to a battel ; or else to harrass and tire them with frequent excursions , that thereby compelling them to dishonourable conditions , they might make their advantage , and become more powerful and rich . chap. vii . what proportion of land the romans allowed to every man in their colonies . i think it no easie matter to set down the exact proportion of land , which the romans assigned to every single person in their colonies ; for i believe they gave more or less according to the barrenness or fertility of the soil ; and that in all places they were sparing enough . and the first reason that induces me , is , that thereby they might send more men and by consequence their frontiers be better guarded : another is , because living at home indigent themselves , it is not to be supposed they would suffer those whom they sent abroad to grow too opulent and rich : and in this i'am much confirm'd by livy , where he tells us that upon the taking of veii , the romans sent a colony thither , and in the distribution of the land allotted every man no more than three acres , and a little more according to our measure . they might consider likewise that their wants would not be supplyed by the quantity so much as the improvement and cultivation of their land. yet i do not doubt but they had publick pastures and woods to sustain their cattel , and supply themselves with firing , without which a colony could hardly subsist . chap. viii . what it is that disposes some people to leave their native countries , to dispossess other people . seeing i have spoken already of the military discipline of the romans ; and how the tuscans were invaded by the french ; it follows properly enough that we say something of their several kinds of war , which are two : one sort of commenced upon the ambition of some prince or commonwealth , in hopes to extend , and enlarge his empire ; as those wars which were made by alexander the great , by the romans , and by one prince against another : which wars , though dangerous , are not yet so pernicious as to supplant the inhabitants , and drive them out of their country ; for the conqueror contents himself with his victory , and the submission of the people allows them their own laws , and many times their estates . the other kind of war is much more dangerous and destructive , and that is when an entire nation with their wives and their children , compelled either by hunger , or war , leaves its own country , to fix themselves somewhere else , not to extend their dominion , or exercise any authority , ( as in the other ) but to kill or expel all the natives , and possess themselves of their estates . this war indeed is most bloody and dreadful , as salust shews very well in the end of his bellum iugurthinum , where , after iugurtha was beaten , speaking of the invasion of the gauls he tells us , cum caeteris gentibus a populo romano de imperio tantum fuisse dimicatum , cum gallis , de singulorum hominum salute ; with other nations the romans fought only for empire and dominion , with the gauls they fought for their country and lives . for when a prince or commonwealth invades a country according to the first way , it is sufficient , if those who are at the helm be removed or destroyed ; in this every mans life is in danger ; for when a whole nation transplants , and invades a new province , not only the colonies , but the natives must be extinguished , that they may fix themselves upon their lands , and possess themselves of their goods : and by these kind of people the romans were three times invaded . first by the gauls , who took rome , and ( as i said before ) drove the tuscans out of lombardy ; of which invasion titus livius gives two reasons : one was the pleasantness of the country , and the delicacy of the wine , wherewith ( being then but ill provided in france ) they were infinitely taken : the other was , the country was grown so exceedingly populous , that it was not able to sustain its own natives ; whereupon the princes of those parts judging it necessary to find them new quarters they appointed which were to transplant , and putting bellovesus and sicovesus ( two french princes ) at the head of them they sent one part of them into italy , and the other into spain : it was bellovesus lot to invade italy , and he did it so effectually , that he possessed himself of all lombardy , and made the first war upon the romans that was ever made upon them by the french. the second time they were invaded in this manner was likewise by the french , and it was after the first punic war , in which invasion the gauls lost above men betwixt pisa and piombino : the third and last was by the germans and cimbrians , who having defeated several armies of the romans , were at last themselves defeated by marius . from whence we may observe the great courage and constancy of the romans of old , that could not only bear up against three such dangerous invasions , but overcome them at last ; whereas afterwards their courage began to fail , and they were not able to resist the inundation of those barbarians ; for when the goths and the vandals invaded , they possessed themselves of the whole western empire , without any considerable opposition . the reasons which move these nations to transmigrate ( as i said before ) is necessity , and that necessity proceeds either from famine , or from wars and disturbances at home ; and when they undertake these expeditions with vast and innumerable numbers , they invade with irresistible violence , put all the natives to the sword ; possess themselves of their estates ; establish a new kingdom , and change the very name of the province , as moses did of old , and the barbarians since , who possessed themselves of the roman empire . from hence are all the new names in italy and elsewhere imposed by their several conquerors : lombardy was called anciently gallia cisalpina , francia ( from the franks ) was called anciently gallia trans alpina , sclavonia was called illyria , hungaria , pannonia , anglia , britannta ; moses gave the name of iudea to that part of syria which he conquered , and many other countries have changed their names upon the same occasion , which would be too long to recount . and because i have said before , that sometimes these kind of people are forc'd out of their country by intestine troubles and disturbances , i shall present you with one example of the maurusians an ancient people of syria , who foreseeing the invasion of the hebrews , and knowing themselves unable to oppose them , thought it more wisdom to forsake their country betimes , and preserve themselves , than to expect their coming , and lose both ; whereupon they pack'd up their goods , and with their wives and children removed into africk , where they drove out the inhabitants , and setled in their country : so that they who were too weak to defend their own province , were strong enough to force out another people . to this purpose prooopius who writes the wars of bellisarius against the vandals ( who had setled themselves in africk ) tells us , that upon certain pillars in the houses where these maurusians had lived , he himself read these words , nos maurusii qui fugimus a facie iesu latronis filii navae ; we maurisians fled hither from iesus the usurper , who was the son of navi . by which we may perceive the occasion of their departure out of syria . and certainly these nations forc'd out of their own country by irresistible necessity , are more than ordinarily dreadful , and not to be opposed but by a potent and well disciplin'd people : but when they move in small numbers , their danger is not so great , because they dare not use that violence , but are put to their wits , and to possess themselves of some quarters by cunning and insinuation , which they are to keep afterwards by ways of amity and friendship , as aeneas did , and dido , the massilians and others , who by the assistance and friendship of their neighbours , made good what they had possessed . but the people that came out of their own countries the most numerous and strong , were the scythians ; for their country being barren and cold , and the natives too numerous to be sustained in it , they were forced abroad , as having nothing to preserve them at home . and if now for five hundred years and upwards we have not heard of any such transmigration , i conceive the reasons may be several : the first may be the great evacuation in those countries , from whence the roman empire was invaded . a second may be , because germany and hungaria ( from whence those inundations came ) is better cultivated and improved , so as they can live plentifully at home , without rambling abroad : another reason may be , that the germans , poles , cimbrians , and other nations which border upon the scythians , being martial people , and continually at wars with them , are as it were a bulwark to these parts , and keep the scythians from all new invasions . the tartars likewise have been many times upon their march with very great armies , but they have been always encountred and repulsed by the poles and hungarians , which has given them occasion frequently to boast , that were it not for their arms and resistance , not only italy , but the very roman church had been many times sensible of the barbarity of the tartars . chap. ix . what those occasions are which do most commonly create war among princes . the occasion of the war betwixt the samnites and the romans , who had been a long time in league together , was the common cause betwixt all princes and governments , and was either fortuitous , or designed . the war betwixt the samnites and the romans was fortuitous ; for when the samnites made war upon the sidicins , and afterwards upon the campani , they intended not any controversy with the romans ; but the campani being beaten , and betaking themselves to the romans for relief , ( contrary to the expectation both of the romans and samnites ) the romans being in league with the samnites , could not , without violence to the said league , give them protection ; upon which ( having no other way to secure themselves ) the campani submitted to the romans , and made themselves their subjects ; and the romans , how unjust soever they thought it before to assist the campani ( whilst they were but associates ) against the samnites , their old friends , yet now they were become their subjects , and had incorporated with their state , the case was altred , and they thought it very reasonable , supposing , that if they should refuse to defend them , they should discourage all others that had an inclination to do the like , which would have been contrary to the great design of the romans to propagate their glory and empire . the same accidental cause gave occasion to their first war with the carthaginians , upon the romans protecting the massinenses in sicily . but their second war with the carthaginians , was designed ; for hanibal the carthaginian general fell upon the saguntins in spain , ( who were in alliance with the romans ) not so much out of malice to the saguntins , but that the romans being provoked to their defence , should give the carthaginians occasion to transport the war into italy . this way of provoking and hedging in a war has been always practised among potentates , especially where they had any faith or respect for other people ; for , that the peace which has been a long time betwixt them upon articles of alliance may seem firm and inviolate , they will not meddle with him against whom they do principally design , but turn their arms upon some of his friends and confederates that he is most particularly obliged to receive into his protection , knowing , that if he appears in their defence , they must have occasion to fight him ; if he does not , but disowns his allies , they publish his weakness and infidelity to the world , and by either of those ways they do their business . this example of the campani is of singular importance , as well to those who would make war upon any body , as those that are in distress ; for when you are unable to defend your self , and unwilling to fall into their hands that invade you , the best and most safe way is to put your self in subjection to some neighbouring prince , as the campani did then , and the florentines afterward when they found themselves too weak to support against the power of castruccio of lucca ; for finding that robert king of naples would not protect them as friends , they threw themselves into his arms to be defended as his subjects . chap. x. that , according to the common opinion , mony is not the sinews of war. because it is easie to begin war as a man pleases , but harder to end it ; every prince before he undertakes an enterprize is obliged to consider his own strength well , and to regulate by it . but then he must be so wise too as not to make a wrong judgment , and that he will certainly do as oft as he computes it by his bags , by the situation of his towns , or the affection of his friends , rather than by his own proper power and arms. mony , and towns , and friends are all good , when in conjunction with a strong army of your own , but without it they do nothing : without men , to what purpose is either mony or towns ? and the affection of your subjects will hold no longer than you are able to defend them . there is no mountain , no lake , no streight inaccessible , where there is no force to defend it . vast sums of mony are not only incapable of protecting you , but they expose you to more danger ; nor can any thing be more false than that old and common saying , that mony is the sinews of the war : quintus curtius was the first author of it in the war betwixt antipater of macedon , and the king of sparta , where he tells us , that for want of monies the spartans were forced to fight , and were beaten ; whereas , could they have protracted but some few days , they had had the news of alexander's death , and got the victory without fighting a blow ; but wanting mony , and apprehending their army would moulder , they were constrained to come to a battel , and were defeated ; which was the occasion of that apophthegm , that mony is the sinews of war : which saying is now a-days in every princes mouth , but improperly , in my judgment : for relying wholly upon that maxim , they think their treasure is sufficient to defend them , not considering that , if that would have done it , darius would have conquered alexander ; the grecians the romans ; duke charles the swizzers : and of late the pope and florentines united , would not have found it so hard to have mastered francesco maria ( nephew to iulius d . ) at the battel of urbin . but these whom i have mentioned , presuming more upon the multitude of their bags than the goodness of their men , were all beaten and overcome . craesus the king of lydia carrying solon into his treasury , and shewing him an immense quantity of riches , ask'd him what he thought of his power ; to which solon replyed , i think it never the greater for this ; for war is carried on , and battels are fought more with iron than gold ; and it might happen for ought he knew , that some body might come with his iron and take it all from him . again , when after the death of alexander the great , a great army of gauls transplanted into greece , ( from whence they passed afterwards into asia ) before they began their march , the gauls sent embassadors to the king of macedon to treat an accord ; which being almost concluded , to make the embassadors more plyable , the said king shews them his treasure , which consisted of a vast quantity of silver and gold , which the embassadors had no sooner seen , but longing impatiently to be at it , they broke of the treaty , and brought their army into his country ; so that that very thing in which he had reposed his great confidence and security proved his ruine and destruction . the venetians not long since had their coffers well stor'd , yet they lost all , and their wealth was not able to defend them . so that i do affirm 't is not mony , ( as the common opinion will have it ) but good souldiers that is the sinews of war : for mony cannot find good souldiers , but good souldiers will be sure to find mony ; had not the romans done more in their wars with their iron than their gold , the treasure of the whole world would not have been sufficient for them , considering their great enterprizes abroad , and their no less difficulties at home ; but fighting with iron , they had no want of gold , for those who were afraid of their armies supplyed them . and if the king of sparta was forced to run the hazard of a battel , and was beaten for want of monies , it was no more than what has hapned to others , and might have hapned to him upon other occasions : for it falls out of many times that for want of provisions an army is forc'd either to fight or to starve ; in which case there is no general so weak but he will choose that which is most honourable , where fortune has some power to befriend him . again , a general having news of supplies that are coming to the enemy , considers with himself whether he had not better engage them as they are , than attend till their recruits come up , and then fight them with more disadvantage : sometimes likewise it falls out , ( as it did to asdrubal in the country of the piseni , when he was surprized by claudius nero , and the other roman consul ) that a general is either forc'd to fight or to fly , in which case it is incomparably more safe to hazard all in a battel , than to lose all in a flight . which being so , we see there are many causes that constrain a general to fight upon disadvantage ; among which , if want of mony be one , there is no more reason we should therefore call that the sinews of war , than any of the rest which do the same thing : so that mony is not so much the snews of war , as good souldiers : 't is true , mony is requisite for the carrying on of a war , but not principally , and in the first place ; for good souldiers have many times been contented without it , though it is but seldom they want it , for 't is as impossible for good souldiers to want mony , as it is for mony alone to make good souldiers . and this is clear by the testimony of historians in a thousand places . pericles persuaded the athenians to a war with all peloponnesus , and assured them of success , upon consideration of their industry and riches ; the athenians undertook the war , and for some time prospered with their industry , but at last it appeared that the conduct and discipline of the spartans was too hard for the athenians industry and treasure . livy desides this controversie the best of any man , where , in his comparison of commanders , enquiring what would have been the event if alexander the great had turn'd his arms against the romans , he declares that in war there are three things fundamentally necessary , good souldiers , good officers , and good fortune ; and then arguing whether alexander or the romans were more considerable in those three points , he concludes , without the least mention of mony . it is not improbable but the campani , ( of whom we have spoken in the former chapter ) when they undertook the assistance of the sidicins against the samnites measured their power more by their mony than their men ; from whence it hapned that ' being defeated in two battels , they were forced to submit , and become tributary to the romans . chap. xi . 't is not discretion to enter into strict amity with a prince , whose reputation is greater than his strength . the sidicins were in a great error to desire the assistance of the campani against the samnites , as being ( by reason of their luxury ) unable to assist them , but the error of the capuans was greater , in not knowing their own weakness and incapacity to defend them : both their errors livy has very well described in these words , campani magis nomen in auxilium sidicinorum , quam vires ad praesidium attulerunt ; the capuans made a great noise , but they brought no force to the relief of the sidicins . and here it is not unseasonable to consider , that the leagues which are made with princes whose distance is too great , or power too little to relieve one , are more honourable than safe , and give more reputation than security to the person that desires them . this was experienced by the florentines in the year , when the pope and king of naples invaded them ; for they were at that time confederate with the king of france , yet they had more reputation than assistance thereby . the same would happen likewise to such of the italian princes as should confederate with maximilian the emperor , and in confidence of his alliance , undertake any great enterprize , because that alliance would be one of those that bring more reputation than relief . so then , as it was a great error in the capuans , when they were unable to defend themselves , to undertake the protection of the sidicins , so it is and will be the same in whoever follows their example . it was the same case with the tarentini , who would needs interpose betwixt the samnites and the romans , to mediate a peace : for when both romans and samnites were in the field , and their armies preparing for an engagement , the tarentini sent embassadors to the consul , to let him know from the senate of the tarentini , that they would have peace betwixt them and the samnites , and that they were resolved to take arms against them which refused it . but the consul smiling at their imprudence , in the presence of the said embassadors , caused a charge to be sounded , and immediately marching his army against the enemy , he let them see by his proceedings what answer they deserved . thus you have seen to what errors princes are subject , who undertake the protection of other states ; i shall now in the next chapter remonstrate what ways are most convenient for their own proper defence . chap. xii . vpon an apprehension of being invaded , whether it be better to make war , or expect it . among wise men , and very good souldiers , i have heard it often disputed , whether when two princes are of equal strength , and one of them designing war ( visibly ) against the other ) it be better for that prince which is like to be invaded , to sit still , and expect him at home ; or to begin with him , and make the first inroad himself ? there are arguments on both sides , and they who think it best to be the aggressor , and fall upon the enemy first , may alledge the counsel which craesus gave to cyrus , when being with his army upon the frontiers of the massageti , thamyris queen of that country sent to him to take his choice whether she should fight him within her country , or upon the frontiers : if he desired to advance , she would stand still and expect him ; if he had rather fight where he was , she would be with him immediately : when it came to be debated in counsel , craesus , contrary to the opinion of the rest , was for marching to her ; and the reason he gave , was , because if she should be beaten at any distance , cyrus would get but little of her country , for she would have time to recruit , whereas , if she were beaten at home , he would be able to sit so close upon her skirts , that she being never capable of rallying , or bringing another army into the field , must of necessity lose her whole kingdom : hanibal gave the same counsel to antiochus , assuring him that if the romans were any way to be conquered , it was by carrying the war into italy , for by so doing he might have the benefit of their arms , their wealth , and their allies ; but whilst the war was abroad , and italy undisturbed , he would leave the man inexhaustible magazine that would supply them with what and wheresoever they had occasion ; and at last hanibal concluded that rome was to be taken more easily than the empire , and italy it self , than any of its provinces . agathocles being unable to resist the carthaginians at home , invaded their borders , and forc'd them to a peace ; and scipio in the same manner to remove the war out of italy , transported it into africk . those who are on the other side do argue as stifly , that there can be nothing more dangerous than to hazard an army in an enemies country , at a great distance from their own ; and they produce the athenians for an instance , who , whilst they kept themselves upon the defensive part , and expected their enemies at home were always victorious ; but when they began to make war at a distance , and send armies into sicily they lost their liberty , and everything else . they produce also the fable of antius king of lybia , who being invaded by hercules the egyptian , was invincible whilst he kept himself within his own borders but being inveigled out by the subtility of his enemy , he lost both his kingdom and life ; upon which occasion that story was raised of antius ; that being born of the earth , ( as they pretended ) so oft as he touch'd it , so oft he received new vigour from his mother , which hercules perceiving , got him up in his arms , crush'd him to death . they produce likewise more modern examples . every body knows that ferrand king of naples was esteemed a wise prince in his time , and hearing two years before his death that king charles viii of france was preparing to invade him , he let him alone ; but falling sick afterwards , as he lay upon his death-bed , he called his son alphonso to him , and among other things , charged him that he should expect the king of france upon his frontiers , and fight him there , but that by no means he should be tempted beyond them ; and it had been better for alphonso to have follow'd his counsel , for neglecting it afterwards , and sending an army into romagna he lost both army and kingdom without striking a blow : but besides these arguments on both sides , it is urged in behalf of the aggressor , that he invades with more confidence and courage than his adversary receives him ( which is a great advantage and enhancement to his army ) that he brings many inconveniences upon the person whom he invades , to which he would not be liable , if he expected him at home . for when the enemies country is wasted , and their houses plunder'd , his subjects are not much to be trusted , nor can any more taxes be laid upon them , without great difficulty , by which means ( as hanibal said ) their magazines will be spent and their fountain dryed up that was to supply them with all provisions for war. besides , if your army be in the enemies country , it will be under a greater necessity of fighting , and by consequence will fight more desperately than at home . but to this it is answered on the other side , that it is more for your advantage to attend your enemy in your own country , than to seek him abroad ; for thereby you may furnish your self with victuals and amunition , and all other necessaries without any inconvenience , and distress him by driving the country . you may likewise with much more ease incommode and frustrate his designs , by your better knowledge of the country , and what places are more proper to attack him in ; as also you may attack him with your whole force at once , or give him battel as you please , which out of your own confines is not to be done : moreover if fortune should be adverse , and it be your chance to be beaten ; more of your men will escape where their refuge is so near , and you will sooner rally them again : in short , if you fight at home , you venture your whole force , and not your whole fortune : but if you fight abroad , you venture your whole fortune with but part of your force : others there have been , who with design to weaken the enemy , and fighting him afterwards with more ease and advantage , have suffered him quietly to march several days journey into their country , and possess himself of several towns ; but whether they did well or not , i will not determine , only i think this distinction is to be considered , whether my country be strong in fortresses , and men ; as the romans were of old , and as the swizzers at this day ; or whether it be weak and unfortified , as the territory of the carthaginians formerly , and france and italy now . in this case the enemy is by all means to be kept at a distance , because your chief strength lying in your mony , and not in your men , whenever you are interrupted in raising or receiving of that , your business is done ; and nothing interrupts you so fatally , as an enemy in your country . and of this the carthaginians may be an example , who whilst they were free at home , were able by their revenue and taxes to wage war with the romans themselves ; whereas afterwards when they were assaulted , they were not able to contend with agathocles . the florentines , when castruccio of lucca brought his arms into their country , could not support against him , but were forced to put themselves under the dominion of the king of naples , to procure his protection ; but castruccio was no sooner dead , but they were agog again , and had the confidence to invade the duke of milan , and to attempt the beating him out of that province ; so couragious were they in their foreign war , and so abject at home . but when countries are in a posture of defence , and people martial and well disciplin'd ( as the romans of old , and the swizzers at this day ) 't is better to keep off ; for the nearer they are to their own country , they are the harder to overcome , because they can raise more force to defend themselves , than to invade another people . nor does the opinion of hanibal affect me at all ; for though he persuaded antiochus to pass into italy he did it as a thing that would have been more for his own , and the carthaginian than for antiochus his advantage ; for had the romans received those three great defeats which they received of hanibal in italy , in the same space of time , in france or any where else , they had been ruined irrecoverably , for they could neither have rallyed , nor recruited so soon . i do not remember any foreign expedition by the romans for the conquest of any province , in which their army exceeded the number of . but upon the invasion of the gauls , after the first punick war , they brought men into the field for their defence : nor could they beat them afterwards in lombardy , as they did at first in tuscany , because it was more remote , and they could not fight them with so much convenience , nor with so many men . the cimbri repulsed the romans in germany , but following them into italy , they were defeated , and driven out again themselves ; and the reason was , because the romans could bring more forces against them : the swizzers may without much difficulty be over-powered abroad , because they seldom march above or strong ; but to attack and beat them at home , is much more difficult , where they can bring into the field and more . i conclude therefore that that prince whose people are in a posture , and provided for war , does wisely if he expects a potent and dangerous enemy at home , rather than to invade him in his own country : but that prince whose country is ill provided , and whose subjects are ill disciplined , does better if he keeps the war as far off as he can : and by so doing , each of them ( in his several degree ) will defend himself best . chap. xiii . that from mean to great fortune people rise rather by fraud than by force . i have found it always true , that men do seldom or never advance themselves from a small beginning , to any great height , but by fraud , or by force ( unless they come by it by donation , or right of inheritance ) . i do not think any instance is to be found where force alone brought any man to that grandeur , but fraud and artifice have done it many times , as is clear in the lives of philip of macedon , agathocles the sicilian , and several others , who from mean and inconsiderable extraction , came at length to be kings . xenophon in his history of cyrus insinuates the necessity of fraud when he represents ( in his first expedition against the king of armenia ) how all cyrus his actions and negotiations were full of fallacy and deceit , and that it was that way he conquered his kingdom , and not by bravery and force , by which he implyes that no prince can do any great matters without that art of dissembling besides he represents him jugling , and playing of tricks with his own unckle by the mother-side , the king of the medes , and shows that without that excellence , he had never been king ; and indeed i am of opinion that from a mean and base fortune never any man came to be very great by down-right generosity and force ; but by fraud alone there have been many , as particularly iohn galeazzo , who by that alone wrested the government of lombardy out of the hands of messer bernardo , his unckle . and the same courses which princes are forced to in the beginning of their authority , the same courses are taken by commonwealths at first , till they be settled in their government , and have force sufficient to defend themselves . rome ( which either by change or election took all ways to make it self great ) was not without this ; and what greater cunning or artifice could it use in the beginning of its greatness , than what it did take , and is mentioned before . for by their fair carriage and insinuation , they got several cities into consideration , and under that name , they subjected them insensibly , and made them their slaves . the latins , and other neigbouring , people were of this sort , by whose arms and alliance , the romans having conquered their enemies , they were rendered so powerful that they began to handle them now , not as associates , but subjects ; nor could the latini be convinced of their servitude , till they saw the samnites twice over-thrown , and forced to accept of their conditions . which victories , though they gain'd the romans great reputation abroad , among remote princes , who understood more of the name , than the power of the romans , yet they created envy and jealousie among those who were nearer and more sensible of their greatness ; and this jealousie and apprehension was so great , that not only the latins , but the colonies in latium and campagnia ( which had been sent thither not long before ) confederated against the romans , and resolved to make war upon them . and this war was commenced in the same manner ( as i have said before ) most other wars are commenced . not by down-right denunciation of war against the romans , but by defending the sidicins against the samnites , who made war by allowance from the romans . nor was there any other reason of their conspiracy , but because the conferates began to smell out their cunning , and to be sensible that under that false title of allies , they were in great danger of being made slaves , which annius selinus ( a latin praetor ) in an oration to the counsel expressed very properly in these words , nam si etiam nunc sub umbra faederis aequi , servitutem pati possumus , quid obest quin proditis sidicinis , non romanorum solum , sed samnitium dictis pareamus ? for if even now under the shadow of an equal confederacy , we can endure servitude : what hinders but that we betray the sidicins , and put our necks under the feet not only of the romans , but the samnites . which things being so , it is manifest the romans wanted not at the beginning of their rise , that dexterity of cheating that is so necessary to all people that are ambitious of raising themselves to a great height , from an inconsiderable beginning ; which artifice is always the less scandalous , by how much he that does practise it , understands better how to disguise it by some honorable pretence , as the romans did very well . chap. xiv . many people are mistaken , who expect with meekness and humility to work upon the proud . it falls out many times that humility and modesty towards such as have any picque or prejudice to you , is so far from doing good , that it does a great deal of mischief and of this the debate and consultation of the romans about the preservation of their peace with the latins , is an example , from whom they were in expectation of a war. for the samnites complaining to the romans that the latins had invaded them , the romans ( unwilling to exasperate them more , who were already too prone to be quarrelling ) return'd this answer , that by their league with them , the latins were not tyed up from making war as they pleas'd . the latins were so far from being satisfied by the mildness of their answer , that it made them more insolent ; insomuch that not long after they profess'd themselves their enemies , as appears by that speech of the aforesaid annius in the council aforesaid , where he tells the latins , tentâstis patientiam negando militem : quis dubitat exarsisse eos ? pertulerunt tamen hunc dolorem . exercitus nos parare adversus samnites foederatos suos audiêrunt , nec moverunt se ab urbe . unde haec illis tanta modestia , nisi a conscientia virium , & nostrarum , & suarum . you tried their patience before , in refusing them supplies ; who doubts but they were netled ? yet they swallow'd it : they had notice of our preparations against the samnites their confederates , and stirred not in their defence . whence comes this mighty modesty , and good nature ? from nothing but a sence of the disparity betwixt our strength , and their own . from hence it is clear , the patience and civility of the romans , augmented the arrogance of the latins : and that it is the interest of all princes to be very cautious of condescending from their dignity , or stooping willingly to any thing that may give the enemy an opinion of his weakness or pusillanimity ; for it is better to lose any thing bravely and by open war , than to part with it poorly in hopes to prevent it ; and it many times happens that those who part so easily with their lands or monies to prevent a war , do rather excite , than satisfie the enemy , whose nature commonly is such , that upon the discovery of their impotence or fear , his desires encrease , and new things are successively demanded ; nor will your friends be so ready to assist , if they find you timorous and irresolute . but if as soon as you have notice of the designs or insolence of the enemy , you immediately prepare to correct him ; he will not invade you so boldly , though he be stronger than you , and then your friends will come in more freely to your assistance , who , had you abandoned your self , would certainly have forsaken you . this is intended only where you have but one enemy ; where you have more , the best way is to give and promise what you think fit , that if possible , you may draw off some or other of them from their confederacy , and so break their league by dividing them . chap. xv. weak states are irresolute and uncertain in their councils , and slow councils are most commonly pernicious . from these occasions and beginnings of the war betwixt the latins and the romans , we may observe , that in all consultations , it is best to come immediately to the point in question , and bring things to a result , without too tedious an hesitation and suspence . and this we may learn from the council which the said latins took at that time when their war with the romans was in debate . for the romans , suspecting the defection of the latins , for their better information , and that they might reduce them ( if possible ) without blows , sent to them to send over eight of their principal citizens to rome , to consult with them about keeping of the peace . the latins being conscious to themselves of many things which they had acted against the pleasure of the romans , call'd a council to consider of the persons that were to go , and what their comissioners should say when they came there . the council being divided , one man proposing one thing , and another man another , annius the praetor had this expression , ad summam rerum nostrarum pertinere arbitror , ut cogitetis magis , quid agendum nobis , quam quid loquendum sit , facile erit explicatis consiliis , accommodare rebus verba . i conceive it more pertinent to our business , that you consider rather what is to be done , than what is to be said ; for when you are come to a resolution , it will be no hard matter to accomodate your words . which saying was doubtlesly true , and ought to be regarded by all princes and commonwealths . for whilst we are ambiguous , and uncertain what is to be done , we cannot tell how to adapt and accommodate our language ; but when we are come to a resolution , and have decreed what is to be done , it is not so difficult . i have inserted this passage the more willingly , because i my self have known this irresolution do much mischief , to the detriment and dishonour of our state ; and it is a fault peculiar to all weak and improvident princes and governments to be slow and tedious , as well as uncertain in their councils , which is as dangerous as the other , especially when the debate is about the relief or protection of a friend ; for your slowness does no good to him , and exposes your self . these uncertain or tedious resolutions proceed either from want of courage and force , or from the crossness and malevolence of the counsellors , who carried away by some private passion of their own , will rather ruine the state , than not accomplish their revenge , so that instead of expediting and pushing things to a conclusion , they impede and obstruct whatever is before them . for your good citizens ( though the vogue of the people runs the more dangerous way ) will never hinder the coming to a result , especially in things that will not dispense with much time . girolamo a tyrant in syracuse being dead , and the war betwixt the romans and carthaginians very hot , a council was called by the syracusans , and it was debated which side they should take . the question was canvas'd with such order by both parties , that it remained in ambiguo , and nothing was resolved , till at length appolonides ( one of the principal in that city ) in a grave and prudent oration remonstrated , that neither they were to be blamed who had spoken for the romans , nor they who adhered to the carthaginians , but the length and uncertainty of their debate ; for that irresolution would be the occasion of certain ruine ; but if they came to a conclusion , with which side soever they joyn'd , they might hope for some good . titus livius could not better have displayed the danger of this kind of suspence , than in this case of the latins ; whose assistance against the romans being desired by the lavinians , they were so long in their debate , that when at last they came to a resolution , their supplies were scarce gone out of their gates , before they had news that their confederates were beaten . whereupon milonius the praetor said very wittily , this little ground which we have marched , will cost us very dear to the romans ; and this hapned to them for the tediousness of their councils ; for they should either have assisted , or denyed them out of hand ; had they denyed them , the romans had not been disgusted ; had they complyed , they might have supported their associates , and have kept them from being ruined ; but doing neither , they destroyed their friends , and hazarded themselves . had this precept of bringing things to a speedy resolution , been followed by the florentines , they had prevented many mischiefs and damages which they met withal upon the coming of lewis xii into italy against the duke of milan ; for the said king lewis having resolved upon the said expedition , he proposed to their embassadors in his court , that the florentines should not interpose or concern themselves in the quarrel , upon which terms , he would receive them into his protection , and defend them from any harm ; the embassadors agreed , and a months time was allowed for ratification from the city . but the ratification was deferred ( by the imprudence of some persons who favoured the duke of milan's interest ) till the french had almost conquered all , and being offered then , it was refused by the king of france ( who knew well enough that the florcntines were then forced to what they did ; and desired his amity more out of fear , than affection ) which piece of delay cost the florentines a good round sum of mony , and might well have been their ruine ; as just such an accident was afterward . and this indiscretion of theirs was the greater , because they were no way serviceable to the duke of milan ; who , if he had prevailed , would doubtless have shown himself a greater enemy to them , than the king of france . of this slowness , and uncertainly of councils , i have spoken before , but new occasion presenting it self , i have discoursed of it again , as a thing worthy the observation of all commonwealths , especially like ours . chap. xvi . how much the soldiers of our times do differ from the discipline of the ancients . the battel which the romans fought with the latins , in the consulships of manlius torquatus , and decius , was the greatest and most important that ever they had in any war , with any other nation . for as the latins lost all by losing the victory , and the romans got the dominion of them : so the romans had they lost the battel , must have lost their liberty with it , and turn'd subjects to the latins . livy tells us the same thing , for ( says he ) the latin army was in nothing inferiour to the romans ; their courage the same , their constancy the same , and their numbers the same ; if the romans had any advantage , it was in their generals , which indeed were better than the latins , and it is expressed by several , both latins and romans who have left an account of that battel to posterity ; that where-ever manlius had been , that side would certainly have conquered . in this battel there were two things very exemplary and remarkable : one of the consuls , to keep his souldiers firm in their obedience , and preserve their military discipline , caused his own son to be slain for transgressing his orders , though he gain'd the victory by the means . the other devoted himself freely to death , for the good of his country ; for the dispute was like to be very hard , fighting against the latins , who ( as livy tells us ) had the same language , the same customs , the same arms , the same discipline with the romans ; the soldiers , the captains , the tribunes both in one army and the other , had been comerades and served formerly together , not only in the same army , or garison , but in the same company and band. it was necessary therefore , being equal in their numbers , and equal in their courage , that something extraordinary should be done , that might render the soldiers fiercer , and more obstinate to overcome , upon which fierceness and obstinacy the whole hopes of the victory did depend ; for whilst there is any such in the breasts of the soldiers , they never think of running , but press still on for victory and prize ; and because there was more of this constancy and fortitude in the breasts of the romans , than in the breasts of the latins , partly the destiny , and partly the bravery of the consuls effected that for the good success of their army , and the preservation of their discipline , torquatus killed his son , and decius himself . titus livius in his description of the equality of their force , gives us an exact account of the orders which they observed in their armies and fights , and he has done it so largely , i need not repeat it all , but shall only select what i think most particularly remarkable , and what , if observed by the generals of our days , might have prevented very great disorders . i say then that according to livy's description , their armies were divided into three principal schieri or squadrons . the first consisted of their hastati , which were most of them young men in the flower of their age digested into manipuli or small parties , and disposed at a certain distance with pikes or darts in their hands , from whence they were called hastati . the second squadron was as numerous as the first , and divided into as many manipuli , but their distance was something greater , and it consisted of choice men , from whence they were called principes . the third and last squadron was the biggest of the three , and had almost as many in it as both the other : and this was made up of the ancientest and most experienced soldiers , whom they called triarii . they too had their certain distances , but something greater than in either of the other . in their battels , the hastati were in the van ; the principes behind them , and the triarii in the rear . to every one of these squadrons there was a body of horse , which being drawn up in two divisions , and disposed one of the right , and the other on the left hand of the army , represented two wings , and were therefore called ala. these three squadrons preceded and followed one another exactly , but the hastati in the first squadron were drawn up closer , that , being to receive the first impetus of the enemy , they might endure it the better . the principes that followed them was not in such close order , but were disposed at more distance , to the end that if the hastati should be forced to retire , they might be received into that squadron without disorder or confusion . but the triarii were drawn up with greater spaces and intervals than both the other , and for the same reason , that if they were repulsed , that might fall back among them , and make an entire body together : being drawn up in this order , the hastati began the sight ; if they were over-powred by the enemy and forced to give ground , they fell back to the principes , and uniting with them , renewed the fight in one body ; if they were both of them too weak , and unable to bear up against the enemy , they retreated gradually into the spaces betwixt the triarii , and then all the three squadrons being joyned , the whole army charged in a body , and if they were beaten , farewel , there was no more reserves , but the battel was lost ; and because whenever the triarii was engaged , the whole army was in ●●nger , this proverb grew very frequent , res reducta est ad triarios . things are now at the extremity . the generals of our times , having laid aside all the old discipline of the romans , have neglected this among the rest , to their no little prejudice . for he that draws up his army in a posture with two such reserves , must be beaten three times before he can be utterly defeated ; whereas once beating will do the enemies business . but he that trusts only to the first shock ( as the christian armies do generally now ) may easily be broken , the least disorder , or relaxation of courage , puting all to the rout . and that which is the reason why our armies are so quickly defeated , is , because they have lost the old way of falling back one body into another , and rallying three times . for whoever draws up his army according to modern custom , does it with one of these two inconveniences , he either draws up his several squadrons shoulder to shoulder , and by enlarging his ranks , makes his files very thin ( which weakens his army very much by leaving the distance so small betwixt the front , and the rear ) or else he draws them up deeper , according to the manner of the romans ; but then their files are so close , that if the front be beaten ( there being no spaces in the battel to receive them ) they entangle and confound one another ; so as the front being repulsed , falls foul upon the middle squadron , and both of them upon the third , whereby they are embarrassed , and hindred from advancing or receiving the enemy in any order , and the whole battel is lost . the spanish and french armies at the battel of ravenna ( where monsieur de foix the french general was slain ) fought very well , being drawn up according to the mode of our times , with their fronts so extended , that their battalions were much more in wideness than depth and his was done in respect of the ground , which in that place was very spacious and large ; for being sensible that retreats are more difficult where the files are too deep , they drew them up large in the front to prevent it as much as possible : but when they are straightned for room they are forced to be contented , and draw up as well as they can , for there is no remedy . they are subject likewise to the same disorders in their marches and incursions into the enemies country , whether to forrage , or upon some other design . in the war betwixt the florentines and pisans ( upon their rebellion after the king of france's passage into italy ) coming to a battel at santo regolo , the florentines were defeated by their own horse , which being drawn up in the front of the army , and charged smartly by the enemy , were put into disorder , and forced to fall foul upon their foot , which broke the whole army . and i have been many times assured by monsieur griacus de burgo ( an old officer of foot in the florentine army ) that their foot had not fled that day , but for the disorder of their own horse ; the swizzers ( the best soldiers of our times ) when they are drawn up with the french , will be sure to be drawn up in the flanks , that if their horse should be beaten , they may not be driven in among them . and though these things seem easie to be understood , and more easie to practise , yet there has not been one of our late generals that has found the way of imitating this old method , or correcting the new ; for though they also have their armies divided into three squadrons , which they call the van-guard , the body , and the rear ; yet they use them only in their marches , and incampments ; but when they come to a battel , it is seldom seen but they are drawn up as abovesaid , and altogether run the risk of one shock , and no more . and because some people to excuse their ignorance , pretend the execution of the cannon , will not suffer them to make use of the old order , i shall examine in the next chapter whether that can be a just impediment , or not . chap. xvii . how the armies of our times are to judge of artillery , and whether the general opinion of it , be true . when i consider with my self how many field battels were fought by the romans in several times , it falls into my thoughts to examine what many people have believed , that had there been great guns in those days , as there are now , the romans could never have over-run provinces , nor made them tributary so easily , nor have done so many great things as they did ; for by reason of these fire-arms , granadoes , and such kind of engines , people are sooner terrified , and cannot show their valour so freely as heretofore ; to which it is added , that armies come with more difficulty to a battel , and that their orders and ranks are not so easily kept , so that in time the whole business of war will be dispatched by the cannon . not thinking it improper to enquire into these opinions ; to examine whether artillery have added or substracted from the strength of our armies , and taken away , or given more occasion to our captains of doing brave things ; i shall begin with their first opinion , that the romans would not have made those vast conquests , had there been artillery in those days : in answer , i say , that war is twofold , defensive , or offensive ; and it is first to be considered , which of these two wars it does most mischief or good ; and though it may be said it does great mischief in both , yet i am of opinion , it is much more prejudicial to him that is upon the defensive , than him that is upon the offensive part . the reason is , because he who defends himself , is either blocked up in some town , or straightned in his camp : if in a town , it is either small ( like your citadels ) or large : in the first case the besieged is lost ; for the force of those guns is such , that no wall is so thick , but in a few days they will beat it down : so that if he has no retreat , nor time to stop up the breaches , or throw up new works within , the enemy enters pell mell at the breach , and the cannon of the town does the garison very little good ; for this is a maxim , where people can fall on in a crowd , and run headlong in their fury to a storm , great guns do never repel them . wherefore the fierce assaults of the tramontani are not so easily sustained , as the attacks of the italians who fall not on with that fury and impatience as the other , but march up cooly and quietly to the battel , and do rather skirmish , than storm . those who enter a breach in this gravity and state , are sure to go to pot , for the artillery does certain execution upon them : but those who fall on briskly , and crowd one another into the breach ( if there be no new works or retrenchments thrown up within ) enter as they please without any great prejudice by the cannon ; for though some of them may be killed , yet they cannot be so many as to hinder the taking of the town . that this is true , we find by many instances in italy , and among the rest in the siege of brescia , the town revolted to the venetians , only the castle stood firm for the french. that the town might receive no prejudice from the castle , the venetians fortified the great street that comes down from the castle with great guns in the front , flanks , and every where , so that they thought themselves secure not only from sallies within , but from relief without . but monsieur de foix made no reckoning of them ; for marching thither with a body of horse , he alighted , and charging boldly thorow the said street , relieved the castle , without any considerable loss . so that he who is shut up in a small place , his walls battered down , and has nothing left but his artillery to defend him , is in very great danger , and can hardly escape : if the place you defend be a large town , where you have room enough to retire , and throw up new works ; yet your disadvantage is great , and the enemies great guns shall do more mischief upon you , than yours upon him . for first you must be forced to advance your cannon , and raise them to some higher place ; for whilst they are level with the ground , every blind , or small work that the enemy throws up , is sufficient to secure him ; and being forced to plant them higher , either upon the top of some wall , or church , or mount ( erected on purpose ) you fall under two inconveniences ; one is , that you cannot bring such large guns upon those places , as he can bring without , because in those little places , great guns are not to be managed ; the other is , that if you could get them up , they cannot be so easily secur'd , because they cannot have the convenience of works or baskets to defend them , as the enemy has whose guns are planted as he pleases . so that it is almost impossible for him that is besieged , to keep his cannon long upon a high place , without being dismounted , if the enemy without has any store of artillery ; and to keep them upon the ground , is to have little or no use of them , as i said before : so that when all is done , the best way to defend a town is as they did of old , by their small shot , and the courage of the soldier : and yet though small shot be of some use to the besieged , it cannot countervail the dammage which they receive from the enemies great shot , for by them their walls are battered , and beaten down into the ditches , so that when the enemy comes to storm ( which he may do with more ease when the ditches are filled up with the ruines of the walls ) the besieged are under great disadvantage . wherefore , as i said before , those guns are more beneficial to the besieger , than the besieged . and if you do not defend your self either in a great town or a little , but shall choose rather some strong and convenient place , where you may encamp and entrench , so as not to be forced to an engagement , but with advantage to your self ; i say that in this case you have no better way now , than the ancients had of old , and that many times your great guns are more inconvenient , than otherwise ; for if the enemy falls upon your back , with any advantage of ground , as may easily happen ; that is , if he gains by accident any eminence that commands your camp , or surprizes you before your intrenchments are finished , he quickly dislodges you , and compells you to fight . this was the case with the spaniards before the battel of ravenna , who entrenched upon the river roncus , but made their 〈◊〉 too low , whereupon the french having the advantage of the ground , with their great guns played so furiously over them into their camp , that the spaniards 〈…〉 , and forced afterwards to give them battel . and if you shall choose such a place to ●●trench in , as commands the whole country , and fortifie it so well , that the 〈…〉 you , yet the enemy will have the same ways of provoking and 〈◊〉 you , as were practised of old , that is , by making inroads , and plundring your country ; by 〈◊〉 your roads , and intercepting your convoys , and a thousand other 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 dities which he will put upon you , against which your artillery will 〈…〉 . so that considering what has been said , and that the roman wars 〈◊〉 most 〈◊〉 offensive ; they would have had advantage by them , and in probability 〈…〉 their conquests , had there been any artillery in their times . as to the 〈…〉 , that by reason of those great guns , men could not show their valour so much as an ancient times ; i answer , it is true , and the danger is greater when they come to place their ●adders , and make an assault dully and heavily , and rather one by one , than in a body ; their officers being in the same hazard , and liable to be killed at greater distance , nor can the strongest guards , nor choicest men about them , secure them ; yet for all these great dangers , no memorable instance can be produced of any great dammage that ever was received . for towns are not taken usually by storm , or assault ; but by way of leaguer as formerly ; and in those that are taken by storm , the danger is not much greater than it was then ; for even in those times , whoever undertook the defence of a town , had his machines and instruments of war , which though not discharged with such force , did the same execution . and as to the reaching of commanders at a distance , and killing them in the midst of their reserves , there have been fewer of them slain ( since great guns came up ) in years wars in italy , than there was in any ten years in the time of the romans ; for unless it were count lodovic della mirandola ( who was killed in ferrara , when the venetians invaded that state ) and the duke of nemours who was killed at cirignuola , there has not been one great officer slain ; for monsieur de foix at ravenna dyed by the sword. so that if men show themselves not so couragious as formerly ; it is from the weakness and ill order of their armies , rather than the artillery : and whereas it is said that these great guns are an impediment to their fighting , and that the decision of battels will by degrees be left to the artillery ; i reply , that that opinion is clearly a mistake , and has been judged so by all those who are for the old way of discipline . for he that would have his soldiers good , must exercise them well , and with frequent alarms ( true or false , 't is no matter ) accustom them to the enemy , bring them to handy-stroaks , and as it were to take one another by the beards ; by which means they will come to a greater dexterity in handling their weapons , and grappling with the enemy ; and for the same reason , the foot are rather to be relyed upon than the horse ; for if your foot be nimble and good , you may fall with more security upon an enemy perplexed and embarrassed with a train of artillery , than you could of old when they had their elephants , their chariots with cythes , and such other devices . and if the romans could find out remedies daily against such daily inventions , no question but they would have found out some or other against great guns ; and so much the more easily , because the danger of the guns is sooner over , than the danger of the other : for the execution which is done by the cannon , is done before the engagement begins ; the execution by the chariots and elephants , during the whole fight ; besides the cannon is easily avoided by the infantry , either by posting themselves behind some bank , or clapping down upon their bellies ; and yet of this so easie and obvious an evasion , experience tells us there is seldom any necessity ; for it is a hard matter to point your great guns so exactly , but that either they will be mounted too high and shoot over you , or too low , and never come at you : and when the battel is joyn'd , 't is as clear as the day , that neither great nor small shot is of any advantage ; for if the artillery be placed before the army , 't is odds but it is taken ; if behind , the execution it does , is upon themselves ; and on either side it can gaul you but little , before you get to it , and either cloy , or secure it , and if an example be required , we have one ready in the swizzers , who at navarre in the year . without horse or artillery , or any such thing , fell upon the french camp , and overcame them , though they were as strong as trenches and artillery could make them ; and another reason is ( besides what has been urged before ) because artillery ought to be guarded ( if you would have it do service ) with walls or ramparts , or some such thing as may secure it from being taken , otherwise it will be of no use , as when in field fights , it has nothing to defend it , but the bodies of men . in the flanks they are of no use , more than the old roman engines in those days who were placed out of their squadrons , that they might be managed with more dexterity , and ( when-ever overlaid by the horse or any thing else ) they were received into their legions : and if there be any way of making advantage of artillery in a field fight , it is this ; he that uses it otherwise , understands not very well , and puts his confidence in that which may easily deceive him : the turk indeed by the help of his great guns-obtained two or three victories against the sophy , and the soldan ; but if produced more from the novelty of the noise , and the terror it brought upon their horse , than any great execution they did . i conclude therefore that artillery may be good , in an army that is stout ; but where they are used in an army that is raw and inexperienced , they are of little advantage , if the enemy be either couragious or strong . chap. xviii . how by the authority of the romans , and the universal discipline of the ancients , the foot are more serviceable than the horse . by many arguments and examples , it may be proved that the romans in their military exploits had greater estimation for their infantry , than their horse ; and how all their principal designs were executed by their foot : this appeared in their wars with the latins , when the roman army being over-powered , and giving ground in that great battel near the lake of regillum , the roman general caused his cavalry to dismount , and fight on foot , and by so doing , they recovered their ground , and got the victory ; by which it is manifest the romans thought them more serviceable on foot than on horse-back , and in that posture placed more confidence in them . the same thing they practised in many other fights , and always with good success : nor can the raillery of hanibal be objected against this , who when news was brought him at the battel of cannas , that the consuls had caused all their horse to dismount , resolving to fight it out on foot , cryed out in derision , quam mallem vinctos mihi traderent equites . they might as will have bound them , and delivered them to me , which expression though coming out of the mouth of an excellent person , yet his single authority is not to be put in the ballance against the judgment of the whole roman commonwealth , and the experience of so many brave captains as had been educated under it ; and if it were , there are reasons to defend it : the foot can get into several places , where the horse cannot get : the foot keep their ranks better than the horse , and in any disorder , are sooner rallyed , and in a posture again , whereas the horse are more unmanageable , and when once out of order , with great difficulty to be rallyed . besides ( as it is among men ) so it is among horses , some are high spirited and couragious , others are untoward and dull ; and it frequently happens , that a mettled horse , has a cowardly rider , or a mettled rider a dull horse ; be it which it will , the disparity is inconvenient . a body of foot well order'd and drawn up , will easily be too hard , for the same number of horse ; but the same number of horse , will have hard service to break a body of foot , if there be any thing of proportion betwixt them ; and this opinion is confirmed not only by ancient and modern examples , but by the relations and constitutions of legislators , and whoever else have left any rules and directions for the government of an army ; for though they tell us , indeed , that at first , horse were in greatest reputation , because the way of ordering of foot was not known ; but as soon as the way of managing them was found out , and their usefulness was discovered , they were preferred to the horse . not but that horse are very necessary in an army to scout abroad , make incursions into the enemies country , pursue the enemy when he runs , and confront their horse when they come to a battel , yet the hopes and strength of an army lies more especially in the foot , and if any one error in the conduct of our italian princes has contributed to the enslaving of their country , it is their neglecting to improve themselves in the management of foot , and addressing themselves wholly to the horse . and this fault proceeded from the malignity of the officers , or the ignorance of those who govern'd the state : for this last years , the commands of the italian militia being in the hands of reformades and soldiers of fortune , who had no setled estates , they made it their design to preserve their commands by all possible means , though with never so much prejudice to their masters : and because a great body of foot , was not like to be long paid ( nor would there always be occasion to use them ) and a little one would not turn to account ; they applyed themselves wholly to the discipline of horse ; for or horse was a fair command , and maintained the officers in a good reputation ; nor was the charge so great , but their governors could pay them . for the better insurance therefore of their places , they began to undervalue and decry the foot service , in such manner , that by degrees , they were almost wholly laid aside ; so that in the greatest of their armies , there were very few foot ; the unhappiness of which practice , with other irregularities in our days , has made the italian militia so weak , it has not been able to defend it self against the insults , and depredations of foreigners . so then the foot is with more confidence to be rely'd upon , than the horse ; and that this was the judgment of the romans , appears by another example . the romans were encamped before sora , and a party of horse sallying out of the town to beat them from some post , was met by a roman captain at the head of his troop , who charging his adversary , it was their fortune both of them to be slain . however , their troops continued the fight , though their officers were dead , and the romans to facilitate their victory , dismounted in the middle of the fight , and forced the enemy to do the same , if they had a mind to defend themselves ; so that the nature of the fight was changed ; the foot service was preferred , and the samnites were routed . nothing can be more plain , that the foot were preferred , than this case ; for though upon other occasions the consuls many times dismounted their troops , yet it was to reinforce and bring off the foot , that were overlaid by the enemy ; but here they dismounted not to relieve their own foot , or to engage with the enemies , but fighting horse against horse , and finding their victory doubtful , they thought , though they could not master them on horse-back , they might do it on foot , and accordingly they alighted : i conclude therefore , that a body of well ordered foot is very hardly to be broken , but by another body of the same . crassus and marcus antonius , with a small body of horse , but a good army of foot , over-run and harrassed the whole country of the parthians for several days together , though the parthians had a vast army of horse to defend it . crassus 't is true miscarried in the expedition , but it was more by the falshood , than gallantry of the enemy ; for relying too much upon their promises , he was reduced to such distress for provisions , that he and his whole squadron were lost ; nevertheless in the midst of these exigences , being in an open and champian country , where there were no mountains , no woods , no rivers to shelter or ease them , far from all relief , and nothing left to sustain them , the foot brought themselves off under the command of m. anthonie , and behaved themselves so well in the opinion of the parthians themselves , that their vast army of horse durst not venture upon them : but to what purpose do we trouble our reader with examples so remote , we have testimony nearer home that will do it effectually . we have known in our time swizzers at novara attack horse , and as many foot ( being most gascoignes ) they never regarded : after this swizzers set upon the king of france in milan , who had with him horse , foot , and a hundred pieces of artillery , and though they did not vanquish him , as at the battel of novara , yet they fought him bravely for two days together , and though worsted at last , yet the greatest part of them got off . marcus regulus attilius , placed such confidence in his foot , that he not only opposed them to the enemies horse , but to their elephants ; and though his success did not answer his expectation , yet it hindered not , but that as great matters might have been expected from his foot. so then whoever would defeat a body of foot well ordered , must do it with another body better ordered than they , or it is never to be done . in the time of philip visconti duke of milan , swizzers having made a descent into lombardy , carmignuola the said dukes general marched against them with about horse and some foot ; for not being acquainted with their way of fighting , he thought they would have been sufficient , but having fallen upon them with his horse , and been repulsed with loss , being a wise man , and one that knew how to frame himself to every accident , he recruited very well , marched against them again , and coming to an engagement , caused all his cuirassiers to dismount , and at the head of his foot , fall on upon the swizzers , who were not able to resist them . for the cuirassiers being compleatly arm'd , forced their way into the body of the swizzers without any loss , so as their whole army was defeated , and cut off , and none left alive , but what were preserved by the humanity of carmignuola . i do not doubt but many people are well enough satisfied in their judgments , that foot are more serviceable than horse , yet such is the infelicity of our times , that neither ancient nor modern examples , nor the confession of those who have tryed them are sufficient to prevail with our princes to correct this error , or to believe that to give reputation to the arms of a province , it is necessary to revive this order , countenance their foot , and see them well pay'd ; and then doubtless they will repay him by their noble exploits . but they deviate from this way , as they do from the rest , and therefore no wonder if their conquests be more to the detriment , than augmentation of their state. chap. xix . the conquests of commonwealths that are ill governed , and contrary to the model of the romans , do conduce more to the ruine , than advancement of their affairs . these false opinions of the use and excellence of horse and foot , are so rooted in the minds of men , and so confirmed with ill examples , that no body thinks of reforming our late errors , or restoring the old discipline of the romans . thirty years since who could have persuaded an italian that foot could have assaulted horse , and as many foot , and have beaten them ? yet this was done by the swizzers at novara . for though all histories ring of it , yet none of our people will believe that it is possible to do now , what was anciently done . they object the excellence of our horse , and say they are so well arm'd , that they are able to repulse not only a body of foot , but even a mountain or rock ; and by these kind of fallacious arguments , they deceive themselves , not considering that lucullus with a few foot defeated of tigranes horse , and yet they had a sort of cuirassiers among them like ours . this exploit of lucullus we have seen acted over again by the germans in italy , as if on purpose to convince us of our error . which if princes and common-wealths could be persuaded to believe , they would commit fewer faults , be more strong against the insults of the enemy , and not place all their hopes in their heels , as they do at this day ; and those who had the government of any civil state , would know better how to conduct and manage themselves , either as to the enlargement , or conservation of their dominion , and find , that leagues and confederacies , rather than absolute conquests ; sending colonies into what they had conquered ; making publick feuds of the spoils of the enemy ; to infest and perplex the enemy rather with excursions , and battels , than sieges ; to keep the publick rich , and the private poor , and with all possible caution to keep up the discipline of the army , are the ways to make a common-wealth formidable and great . these are the true ways of enlarging , an empire ; all the rest are uncertain , or pernicious ; and if thereby any to whom these ways are not pleasing , they are by any means to lay aside all thoughts of extending their dominion ; to think only of regulating their laws at home and providing for their defence , like the little states in germany , which by so doing have lived in peace and tranquillity for many years together . but how industrious and careful soever we are , in abstaining from injury , or using violence to our neighbour , some body or other will be injuring us , and it will be impossible to live always in quiet ; from which provocation will arise , not only a desire in us , but a necessity of vindicating our selves , and retaliating upon them ; and when this desire is once kindled , if our neighbors do not supply us , with occasion , we can find it at home , as will inevitably fall out where citizens are opulent and strong . and if the cities of germany have continued free , and at peace a long time , it proceeds from a peculiar disposition in that country , which is scarce to be found any where else . that part of germany of which i now speak ( like france and spain ) was subject to the empire of the romans : but when afterwards that empire began to decline , and the title of the empire was removed into that province , those that were the wealthiest and most powerful of the cities ( taking advantage of the pusillanimity or distresses of their emperors ) made themselves free , paying only a small annual rent for the redemption of their liberties ; which being permitted , by degrees all those cities which held immediately of the emperour , and had no dependance upon any body else , redeemed themselves in that manner . whilst these cities were imployed in this traffick with the emperour , it fell out that several corporations that belonged to the duke of austria , rebelled , and having established their liberty , they encreased so fast in reputation and wealth , that instead of returning to their subjection to the duke , they became terrible to all people about them . from hence it is , that in our days this province is said to consist of the swizzers , the free towns , the princes , and the emperor . and if in the diversity of their constitutions , no wars do arise , or at least continue any time , it is from their universal respect and defence to the emperour , who , though his force be not great , has such reputation among them , that upon any controversie betwixt them , he can easily compose it , and this it is that has kept them quiet so long , that in man's memory they have had little or no troubles , but what hapned betwixt the swizzers and the house of austria ; and though for many years past , the title of emperour , has been in the said house ; yet has it not been able to reduce the pertinacy of the swizzers , though it has attempted it very solemnly . nor did the rest of the princes and free towns in germany contribute their assistance against the swizzers , partly because they were favourers of liberty , and partly because being poor themselves , they had no mind the house of austria should be rich . germany being constituted in this ballance , and aequilibrium , it rather reverences than fears the authority of the emperour , and is quiet and at peace , because the particular princes , and states being contented with their own moderate dominions , and in awe one of another , do forbear those injuries and encroachments which are common in other places ; whereas if its constitution was otherwise , the people would certainly think of enlarging as well as their neighbors , and by consequence interrupt that happy tranquillity which at present they enjoy . in other countries where there is not that exact proportion and equality of power betwixt the princes and free towns , 't is not so easie to preserve them in peace ; so that those commonwealths which have an ambition of extending their empire , must do it by confederation , or by the ways of the romans , and whoever takes any other course , rather ruines , than advantages himself ; for new conquests are prejudicial a thousand ways , and , especially when your force does not encrease with your territory , and you are not able to keep what you conquer ; and this happens when the expence of an enterprise is greater than the profit , though it succeeds . this was the case with our florentines , and the venetians , who after they had conquered lombardy and tuscany , were much weaker than before , when one of them was contented with the dominion of the gulf , and the other with a territory of six miles about . we all think of getting what we can , but take no care which way we shall keep it ; which is the more inexcusable , because we have the roman example before our eyes , which we may follow if we please , whereas they had no such advantage , but wrought all out by their own industry , and wisdom . but there is another way by which new conquests do a great deal of mischief , and especially to a well ordered commonwealth ; and that is when the city or province that is conquered , is voluptuous , or effeminate ; as it hapned first to the romans , and then to hannibal in the conquest of capua , where the contagion of their ill manners spread it self so suddenly among the soldiers , that had capua been farther off , the remedies not so near , or the romans in the least measure corrupted themselves , that conquest would have been the ruine of their state : for it was true what livy told us in these words , iam tunc minime salubris militari disciplinae capua , instrumentum omnium voluptatum , delinitos militum animos avertit a memoria patriae . capua at that time was no place for military discipline ; for being the instrument and contriver of all sorts of sensuality , it debauched the minds of the soldier from the memory of his country . and certainly such cities and provinces do revenge themselves of their conqueror without effusion of blood ; for diffusing their ill manners among his people , they become so weak and enervated thereby , that they are at the mercy of whoever assails them : which iuvenal has excellently well expressed , when he tells us that by their conversation among strangers , the roman manners were so changed , that instead of their old temperance and parsimony , they were given up wholly to luxury and excess . — stevior armis luxuria incubuit , victumque ulciscitur orbem . what by the conquer'd world could never be reveng'd by force , is done by luxurie . things being thus , and even the people of rome , notwithstanding the excellence of their constitution and discipline , being subject to suffer , and be corrupted by their new acquisitions ; what will become of those who have no such virtue nor education to defend them ? but besides all the errors above-mentioned , are guilty of another as dangerous as the rest , and that is , by making use in their wars , not of their own subjects or soldiers , but of auxiliaries , and hirelings . chap. xx. no prince , or commonwealth without manifest danger , can employ foreign forces , either auxiliary , or mercenary . had i not discoursed at large in another place about the inconvenience of auxiliary or mer●●●●●● forces , in respect of ones own , i would have taken this opportunity to have spoken more of it here , than i shall do now : but having done it already , i shall only touch upon it at present , which i cannot forbear , upon a new occasion which i have met withal in livr . i call those forces auxiliaries , which a prince or confederate sends to your assistance under his own officers , and pay . of this sort were the two leg●ons which after the defeat of the samnites , upon the importunity of the capu●● 〈◊〉 left with them for the security of their city . but those legions which were intended for the defence of that city , languishing in ease , and wallowing in luxury , began to forget the disciplne of their country , and their reverence to the senate , and contrive how they might make themselves masters of the town , conceiving the inhabitants unworthy to enjoy those possessions which they were unable to defend . but this conspiracy was di●covered in time , and not only prevented , but punished by the romans , as we shall shew more largly hereafter : at present i shall only say this , that of all soldiers , none are employed with so much hazard , as your auxiliaries . for first , neither soldiers nor officers receiving pay from you , but from the prince or state by whom they are sent , they have but little regard either to your interest or authority ; but when the war is done , give themselves wholly to pillaging and mischief , and that not only with the enemy , but their friends ; moved sometimes by their own , and sometimes by the avarice of their prince . the romans when they left those legions at capua , had no thoughts of breaking their league , or offering them any injury ; but the souldiers being depraved by the licentiousness of the place , and encouraged by the pusillanimity of the inhabitants , took occasion to conspire , and doubtlesly had they not been prevented , had seized upon the town . this we could enforce with several other examples , but the case is so plain , i shall content my self with this , and that of the regini , whose inhabitants were not only rob'd and dispossessed , but murther'd by a legion which the romans sent to them for their security . so then in prudence a prince or common-wealth is to take any course , rather than to bring himself into a necessity of employing auxiliaries , especially when he is to rely wholly upon them ; for no treaty or accommodation can be made with the enemy , but shall be more for his advantage , than to entertain such forces . and if old passages be consulted , and considered together with the new , it will be found that for one time in which they ever did good , there are hundreds in which they have done harm : nor can an ambitious state or prince have a more commodious occasion to possess himself of a city or province , than when he is invited in this manner for its assistance and defence . wherefore , he whose indiscretion is so great as to make use of such armies , not only for his defence , but his conquests of other people , takes a course that must necessarily undo him ; for he aims at the acquisition of what he cannot keep any longer than his auxiliaries will give him leave , for they can take it from him when they please : but such is the unhappiness of human ambition , that fixing their eyes only upon present satisfaction , they never think of inconveniences that will follow , whereas if they would reflect upon ancient examples , they would find that the less injurious they were to their neighbours , and the more generosity they shew towards them , the more ready would they be to throw themselves into their arms , as shall be shewn in the next chapter , by the example of the capuans . chap. xxi . the first praetor which the romans ever sent out of their own city , was to capua , and that was years after they began first to make war. the people of rome ( as we have said many times before ) in the management of their wars , and the enlargement of their empire differed much from the methods of our times : for the cities which they conquered ( if they did not think fit to demolish them ) were left free , with the exercise of their own laws , as before , and that without any other mark of subjection , than the subscribing certain articles of agreement , and whilst they kept them , they kept their old priviledges and dignity . and this custom they observed till they carried their arms into foreign countries , and began to unravel the governments where they conquered , and reduce whole kingdoms and states into provinces : this will be clear'd , if we consider that the first praetor which was ever sent abroad by the romans , was to capua ; not out of any ambitious design , but at the request of the said capuans to rectifie and compose some differences , which they could not do among themselves . the antiates following the example of the capuans , and moved by the same necessity , desired a praetor likewise , because at that time , as livy tells us , non solum arma , sed jura romana pollebant . not only the arms , but the laws of the romans were victorious . and this way of lenity in their government , contributed exceedingly to the enlargement of their empire ; for those cities or states which have been accustomed to their own liberty and laws , do more easily submit to a dominion that seems remote and at a distance ( though indeed it may have something of servitude in it ) than to that which is always before their eyes , and keeps them in perpetual apprehension of slavery ; and there is this advantage besides , that if in the administration of justice , or the management of publick affairs , any thing be acted to the displeasure of the people , it has less infamous reflection upon the prince who leaves them to their own customs and laws , than upon him who sets up magistrates of his own , and dispatches all things by them ; and this way takes off a great deal of hatred and calumny from the prince , which would otherwise fall heavily upon him . of the certainty of this opinion , we have a fresh instance in italy ; every body knows that genoua was oftentimes in the possession of the french , and that that king ( excepting of late years ) used always to send thither a governor of his own ; at present , ( the necessity of his affairs requiring it ) he has given them the election of their own governor , and it is constantly a genouese . no body questions but this way is most pleasing to the city , and by consequence their affections must be much enlarged to the king. for it is the nature of mankind ( and inseparable from it ) to trust those with more frankness , who are least like to oppress them ; and to fear those least , who are most merciful and humane . this gentleness and familiarity in the romans prevailed so far upon the capuans , that they made it their solemn request , that they would send them a praetor , which if the roman austerity had but pretended to have done , they would not only have refused , but used all means to have freed themselves from them . but what need we go to rome and capua for examples , when we have them at home ? every one knows how long it is since pistoia threw it self voluntarily into the arms of the florentines : every one knows the jealousies and emulations that were betwixt them and the florentines , pisans , lucchesi , and sanesi : and this diversity of humours proceeded not from any neglect in the pistoians of their affairs , or from any disesteem they had of their liberty , more than the others ; but from an ancient experience they had had of the affection and tenderness of the florentines , and that was the true cause why they threw themselves under their protection ; whereas carrying themselves more severely to the rest , they were so far from coming in , and submitting to their jurisdiction , that they did what they could , and tryed all ways possible to disclaim it . and doubtless had the florentines , by their leagues , or supplies comported themselves with more kindness to their neighbors , and not incensed them by their austerities , they had been masters of all tuscany at this hour ; not but that arms and severity are to be used upon occasion , but mild ways are to be tryed first , and extremities only in extremity . chap. xxii . how uncertain the judgments of most people are , in things of greatest importance . how false and erroneous the opinions of men are , all persons can testifie who have any conversation in their counsels ; which unless managed by persons of more than ordinary sagacity , are for the most part contrary to the truth . and because men of these excellent qualifications , in corrupted states ( especially in times of peace ) by reason of the envy or ambition of other people , are subject to be hated ; such counsels are frequently followed , as the deluded commons think best , or such as are recommended by those who are more solicitous of the favour , than the benefit of the people : but their errors being discovered in the time of their adversity , necessity directs them to those persons whom in the time of prosperity they dispised , as shall be shown at large in convenient place . moreover humane consultations are subject to certain accidents by which men are frequently deluded , unless their experience be more than ordinary , which accidents are apt by their likelyhood and probability to persuade people to whatever they desire . this i mention , in consideration of the advice of numisius the proetor ( after the latins were defeated by the romans ) and of what was not long since generally believed when francis i. of france invaded milan , which was defended by the swizzers . for lewis xii . being dead , and francis d' angolesme succeeding in that kingdom , he had a great design of recovering milan , which not many years before had been taken from them by the swizzers , at the encouragement of iulius ii. to facilitate his enterprize , he made it his business to gain a party in italy , and having made sure of the venetians , he addressed himself to the florentines , and pope leo x. conceiving it would be a great corroboration to his affairs if he could make them , seeing the forces of the king of spain were in lombardy , and the emperours at verona . pope leo could not be brought to consent , being persuaded ( as is said ) by his counsel , that if he kept himself neuter , he should be certain of victory ; for it was not for the interest of the church , that either the king of france , or the swizzers should be too potent in italy ; but he who would restore it to its ancient liberty , must deliver it from the servitude both of the one and the other : and because both of them together were not to be dealt withal , nor indeed either of them apart , as things stood then ; occasion was to be expected , and they were to attend till the king of france and swizzers had fought , and one of them beaten the other , and then before the conquerour had recruited , or recovered what he had lost in the battel , the pope and his friends should fall upon him , and so both of them be expulsed . it was impossible he should ever have a fairer opportunity ; for the enemy were both of them in the field , and the popes army strong upon the borders of lombardy ( under pretence of securing the territories of the church ) where it might attend the event of the battel , which the vigor , and strength of both armies portended would be bloody , and when they had destroyed one another , and were both of them weaken'd , then might his army fall securely upon them , possess it self of lombardy , and govern all italy as he pleased himself . these were the counsels which were given his holiness , and at first they seemed solid enough , but how vain they prov'd afterwards , the event did clearly demonstrate ; for the swizzers after a long and bloody fight being defeated the popes and the king of spains forces were so far from taking that opportunity of falling upon the french ( as they had promised themselves ) that they prepared to run away , nor would that have secured them , had not they been befriended by the humanity ( not to say laziness ) of the king of france , who contenting himself with one victory , never regarded a second , but strook up a peace with the pope : and truly at a distance these counsels seem'd not unreasonable , though in reality they were irrational and idle ; for the conqueror seldom loses many men , what he loses is in the fight , and the greatest part of the execution is in the pursuit ; but grant a battel is a long time before it be decided ( which notwithstanding happens but seldom ) and that many are slain and disabled of the conquering side , yet the reputation of victory gives the conqueror such esteem , and strikes such awe and terror into all people , as transcends the consideration of any loss he can sustain : so that he is in an egregious error , who thinks a victorious army may be the more easily overcome by reason of the prejudice it received in the fight ; for 't is madness to attempt such an army with a less number , than you would have engaged it before ; because their late fortune will add to their courage . this appeared by the experience of the latins ; by the counsel of numisius the praetor ; and by the losses of the people who followed it . for the romans having beaten the latins with much ado , and such slaughter of their own men , that they seemed to have got nothing of a victory but the name ; numisius proclaimed it up and down , that then was the time to recover their liberty , and that if with new forces they fell suddenly upon the romans , before they were recruited , or had any expectation of being invaded , they would certainly be overthrown : upon which the latins believing him , raised a new army , and fell upon the romans , but they were presently defeated , and suffered the inconvenience , to which all people are subject that follow such counsels . chap. xxiii . how the romans upon any accident which necessitated them to give judgment upon their subjects , avoided always the mid way . jam latio is status erat rerum , ut neque bellum neque pacem pati possent . the latins were now in such a condition , that they were neither fit for war nor peace . and what livy said of latium , is true every where else ; that prince or commonwealth is at the highest pitch of unhappiness , which is in such a condition , as that he can neither receive peace , nor maintain war : and this happens , when people are conquered , and necessitated to submit upon such hard terms as in their hearts they disdain , or else ( to go on with the war ) are constrained to implore their assistance , who will make them a prey . the ways by which we are brought into so sad a condition , are commonly ill counsels , for want of just consideration of our affairs , both as to mony and men. for that commonwealth or prince who takes right measures in those , shall very hardly fall into the d●●●resses of the latins , who accepted the condition of the romans when they should have refused them ; and declared war against the romans when they should have desired a peace ; so that as they ordered the matter , the enmity and amity of the romans did equally afflict them . the first that overcame them was manlius torquatus , and after him camillus , who seized upon all their cities , and putting garisons in them , return'd to rome , and in his account to the senate acquainted them , that the whole country of the latins was then in their hands . and because the sentence and judgment of the senate at that time upon the latins is more than ordinarily remarkable ; that it may be readier for the imitation of princes when occasion is offered , i shall set down the ●●rds which livy makes camillus speak , which confirm what we have said about the ways which the romans observed in the enlargement of their empire ; and shows , that in their determinations in matters of state , they left the middle ways , and followed only the extreams . for government is nothing but keeping subjects in such a posture as that they may have no will , or power to offend you . and this is done either by taking away all means from them of doing you any hurt ; or by obliging and indulging them so , as they may not in reason hope to better their fortune ; all which will appear , first by camillus his speech to the senate , and then by their resolution upon it . his words were these , dii immortales ita vos potentes hujus consilii fecerunt , ut sit latium , an non sit , in vestra manu posuerint . itaque pacem vobis , quod ad latinos attinet , parare in perpetuum , vel soeviendo , velignoscendo potestis . vult is crudeliter consulere in debitos victosque ? licet delere omne latium . vultis exemplo majorum augere rem romanam , victos in civitatem accipiendo ? materia crescendi per summam gloriam suppet it . certe id firmissimum imperium est , quo obedientes gaudent . illorum igitur animos dum expectatione stupent , seu poen● , seu beneficio praeoccupari opportet . the gods have put it into the power of this reverend council , to determine whether the latins shall be a people , or not . as to them , your peace will be perpetual , which way soever you take ; are you disposed to severity , and will destroy those poor people that are conquered , and your prisoners ? they are at your mercy , and you may extinguish their very name . are you disposed according to the example of your ancestors to propagate your interest by receiving them into your city ? you have an opportunity of doing it with the highest advantage and glory . certainly no empire is so firm , as where subjects exsult in their obedience . it will be expedient therefore , whilst they are in amazement and suspence , to settle their minds one way , either by punishment or pardon . according to the consuls proposal , the senate came to an issue , and gave sentence town by town , according to the nature of their deserts ; but all in extreams , without any mediocrity ; for some they not only pardoned , but loaded them with benefits , made them f●●e of their own city , and gave them many other priviledges , and exemptions , and the●●●y secured them not only from rebelling , but from ever conspiring again . the rest whom they thought fit to make examples , were brought prisoners to rome , punish'd with all kind of severity , their houses destroyed , their lands confiscated , their persons dispersed , so as it was not possible for them any way to do any mischief for the future . this was the way the romans took in the settlement of latium , which ought to be observed and imitated by all wise princes and states ; and if the florentines had followed it in the year . when arezzo and the whole valley of chiana rebelled , they had continued their authority , augmented their state , and supplyed themselves with those fields which they wanted for their subsistance . but they took the middle way ( betwixt the extreams of rigour and remission ) which is always most dangerous ; they kept the city , removed the magistrates , degraded the great men , banished some , and executed others . if any in their councils advised to have the city demolished , it was answered , it could not be done without dishonor and rexection upon their own ; as if florence was so weak and inconsiderable , it was not able to keep a garrison in arezzo . this argument was of that sort which carry some appearance , but are not really true . 't is much as if we should argue a parricide or felon , or other egregious malefactor , is not to be put to death , lest it should be thought the prince or republick was too impotent to restrain them any other way . but those who are of that opinion are to consider , that when a private person , or whole city offends so highly against his prince , or his government ; to make them examples to other people , and bridle them so as they may be sure to be no more guilty for the future , the surest way is utterly to destroy them ; and it is more honourable for a prince to extirpate them quite at once , than to endeavour to preserve them with a thousand difficulties and dangers : for whoever he be that knows not how to punish his delinquents according to the merits of their offences , and so as to secure himself for the future , is either a weak , or a poor spirited prince . to confirm what is said , we may produce another example of the romans , in their sentence upon the privernates ; from whence ( as livy says ) two things are to be concluded ; one is , that rebels are to be pardoned frankly , and obliged ; or utterly extinguished . the other that generosity of mind , and steddiness and constancy in our answers when given to wise men , make strangely for our advantage . the roman senate was assembled to give sentence upon the privernates who had been in rebellion , and being reduced by force of arms , had sent several of their chief citizens to implore the mercy of the romans : being brought into the senate ( where every body was persuading according to his inclination , some for mercy , and some for severity ) one of the senators ( before they could come to a resolution ) ask'd one of the petitioners , quam poenam meritos privernates censeret . what punishment he thought his fellow citizens deserved : to which he replyed , eam quam merentur qui se libertate dignos censent , the same that they deserve , who desire to be free . the senator continuing , quid si poenam remittimus vobis , qualem nos pacem vobiscum speremus ? if we should pardon you this time , what peace could we hope for from you ? to which he answered , si bonam dederitis , & fide lem & perpetuam ; si malam , haud diuturnam . if it be upon good terms , it will be firm and perpetual ; if upon ill , it will hardly last long . upon which the better part of the senate ( though some opposed it ) declared , se audivisse vocem liberi & viri ; nec credi posse illum populum aut hominem denique in ea conditione cujus eum paeniteat , diutius quam necesse sit mansurum . ibi pacem esse fidam , ubi voluntarii pacati sint , neque eo loco ubi servitutem esse velint , fidem sperandam . that he had spoke like a man , and like a free-man . that it was not to be imagined any people or private person would submit to a condition that oppress'd him , longer than by necessity he was constrained . that if any peace be lasting and inviolable , it is where the parties do voluntarily subscribe , not where servitude and slavery is imposed . and thereupon it was decreed , that the privernates should be civitate donati , and enjoy all the priviledges of the romans , concluding , eos qui nihil praeterquam de libertate cogitant dignos esse qui romani fiant . that they deserved to be romans , whose liberty was the greatest part of their care . and this frank and generous way of answering , took mightily with those grave men , as knowing that whatever they had said otherwise , would not have been from the heart , but with compliance and submission to their fortune and distress . and this is most certain , whoever speaks otherwise ( especially if either he has been or but thought himself free ) does but equivocate , and he that believes him , takes wrong counsels , such as are neither good for himself , nor satisfactory to them , which many times produces rebellion , and the ruine of the state , and things being so , we conclude , according to our proposition in the beginning of our discourse ; that upon any great sentence to be given against a people or city that has been formerly free , the surest way is , to wave all moderation , and either to caress or extinguish them . he that proceeds otherwise , will find himself in an error , as the samnites were , when having enclosed the romans ad turcas caudinas , they neither discharged them freely , nor put them to the sword , as one of their grave citizens advised ; but abused them , and pillaged them , and dismissed them sub jugum when they had done . but not long after , they were made sensible of their error , and that the old citizen was in the right ; as we shall show more at large hereafter . chap. xxiv . that in the generality , castles and citadels , do more mischief than good . to the states-men of our times , it may perhaps seem indiscretion or inadvertancy in the romans , that being desirous to keep latium , and privernum in subjection , they built neither castles nor citadels to secure them : and indeed they differed exceedingly from our florentine politicians , who are of opinion that not only pisa , but all other cities whatever are to be kept under that way , and surely had the romans been like us , they would have been of the same opinion ; but differing in their courage , their judgment , and their power , they differed likewise in their resolutions . nor during all the time of their liberty , were the româns known to build any castle or citadel to keep any city in awe , or any province in peace ; only some indeed which were fortified before , they garrisoned , and continued ; which being so , and quite contrary to the sentiment of our times , i think it not amiss , if in this place i inquire whether such things be profitable or unprofitable to the persons who build them . it is therefore to be considered , that such fortresses are erected , either to repel an enemy , or restrain a subject , and keep him in obedience . in the first case i do pronounce them unnecessary ; in the second dangerous . they are dangerous , and do rather obstruct than promote obedience in the subject ; because the great danger of rebellion proceeds from hatred which the people have conceived against their prince , that hatred proceeds from his injustice to the people , and he is said to be unjust when he governs them arbitrarily , and by force , which is never so manifest , as when he builds such castles and citadels among them , that no man might be able in any manner to oppose him . which being so , those kind of fortifications are not only useless and improper to keep the subject in subjection ; but dangerous , seeing by presumption upon them , princes are encouraged to treat their subjects worse than otherwise they would do , by which they contract the odium of the people ; and what is the consequence ? rebellion and blood , and confusion : neither when troubles arise , and wars break out , is there that defence or security in them , as is now adays imagined ; for there are only two ways of keeping a conquered people in obedience , you must either have a standing army ( as the romans had ) always ready to subdue them ; or you must divide , disperse , or destroy them in such manner , that they may never get together again to disturb you : for though you impoverish and plunder them never so much , spoliatis arma supersunt , they will find arms to revenge themselves ; and if you disarm them never so carefully , furor arma , ministrat . their fury will supply them . if you cut off their commanders , like hydra's , others will succeed , and do as much mischief : if you build these castles , in time of peace they may be serviceable , and make you more bold , and secure against your subjects ; but when war comes , and both your subjects and enemies infest you , it is impossible they should defend you against both . and if ever they were useless , it is now since the use of artillery is known , against the fury of which no little fort ( from whence other guns cannot play with security again , and where they want ground for repairing their breaches , or making new retrenchments upon occasion ) can possibly stand : and being so , consider seriously with your self whether these kind of fortresses are like to keep your old subjects , or your new conquests in obedience ? if your territory be hereditary , and you have received it from your ancestors , to build castles to keep your own natural subjects in obedience , will be to little purpose , for the reasons abovesaid , seeing they will be but a means to make you and your posterity the more tyrannical , and by consequence expose you to the hatred of the people , against which they will be afterwards unable to defend you . so that for these reasons , that neither he himself nor his heirs may have occasion to entrench too much upon the people ; and the people have no occasion to abhor him , a wise prince will never build citadels ; and though francesco sforza duke of milan was reputed a wise man , and built a citadel at milan to secure his usurpations , yet his wisdom did not appear in that , for it proved afterwards the ruine of his posterity . for presuming upon that , they took the more confidence to oppress the people , which incensed them so highly , that they revolted upon the first approach of an enemy , and turned their prince out of that province . so that that citadel did him no good in time of war against the incursions of the enemy ; and in time of peace , making him more insolent , it did but expose him to the hatred of the people ; whereas if no citadel had been built , and yet they had been so indiscreet as to have behaved themselves insolently to their subjects , some or other of them who had been injured would have remonstrated to their prince , the danger of his courses , before he had contracted the general odium ; by which there would have been a possibility that he might have reform'd , and reconciled himself to his subjects ; and had he done so , he would have better defended himself against the french with the affections of his people , and no citadel ; than with a citadel , and no affections of the people . besides there are many ways of losing these citadels ; by force , by fraud , by corrupting the governour , by starving , and by storm . and if you have lost a city , which you are in hopes of recovering by the favour of the citadel , which still holds out for you ; it will require an army as much as if there were no citadel at all ; and so much the stronger , by how much 't is probable the people may be more incensed from the mischief which they have received out of the castle , than they would have been , had there been no castle at all . experience it self has since taught us that that citadel of milan was of no advantage , either to the dukes of milan , nor french in time of their adversity ; but in time of peace did them much prejudice , by hindring them from taking such ways as might have obliged the people , and rendered them well affected to their government . guido ubaldo son to fred●ric duke of urbin , was a great captain as any in his time , being driven out of his country by coesar borgia ( son to alexander vi. ) and recovering it afterwards by an accident , he caused all the fortresses in the whole province to be dismantled , and destroyed ; as things which he had found by experience were more to his prejudice than security . for being beloved by the people , he would not do them the injury to put garisons in them ; and if he had , upon any invasion from the enemy , he could not have kept them without a field army to relieve them . iulius the pope , having driven the bentivogli out of bononia , built a citadel there , and put in such a governour as partly by his own ill nature , and partly by the instructions o● his master , killed many of the citizens , and committed several cruelties , which provoked the bononians so exceedingly , that they rebelled , and recovered the citadel , which had the governour been more moderate , might have been longer in his power . nicolo de castello father of the vitelli , ( returning into his country , from whence he had been banished by the popes ) immediately demolished two fortresses which had been raised by sixtus iv. as judging the hearts of the people more like than those castles , to secure him . but of all , there is no example , evinces the unusefulness of these kind of garisons , and the convenience of taking them away , more than that which hapned lately at genoa ; for the said city revolting from lewis xii . of france , in the year . lewis came with a strong army into italy , and having reduced it , built a castle of greater strength and capacity than any of that time ; for it was built upon a promontory that commanded the sea called godefa , the harbour , and the town , so that by all people it was held inexpugnable . but the french being driven out of italy in the year . genoa rebelled ( notwithstanding the castle ) and ottanio fegosa taking the government upon him , in sixteen months brought the castle to such extremity , that it was forced to surrender ; whereupon , though he was advised to keep it as a refuge in case of any disaster ; yet being a wise man , and knowing well that a prince is in nothing so safe , as in the affections of his subjects , he caused it to be demolished , and he found the benefit of that counsel , for by it he has held that government to this day ; and that so strongly , that whereas before , the appearance of a thousand foot was sufficient at any time to have carried it ; his adversaries assaulted it with ten thousand , and could do him no wrong . so that we see the demolishing de fegosa no hurt , and the making it did the king of france no good ; for when he was able to bring an army into italy , he was able to recover genoa without the help of the castle ; but when he could bring no army , he could not keep it , though the castle was for him : from whence it follows , that as the building of it , was a great expence , and the loss of it a great dishonour to the king of france ; so the taking of it was great glory to ottaviano , and the ruining it , a great advantage . and it is the same thing with those who build them in their new conquests , to keep their new subjects in obedience , which if the example of genoa and the french should be insufficient to prove , the cities of florence and pisa , will do it effectually . the florentines built a citadel at pisa , and several other fortresses to keep it in aw ; not considering that a city which had been free , and in continual emulation of the florentine greatness , was not any other way to be kept to its duty , unless ( according to the practice of the romans ) they made a fair and honourable league with it , or utterly subverted it . but how much those fortresses answered their designs , appeared when charles viii . made his expedition into italy , to whom they were generally surrendered , either thorow the fear or falshood of their governors . so that had not they been built , the florentines had never relyed so much upon them for the keeping of pisa , but had thought of some safer way to have secured it against the king of france . i conclude then , that to keep ones own native country in subjection , fortresses are dangerous , and to keep new conquests , they are ineffectual : to prove that the authority and practice of the romans ought to be sufficient , who whenever they had a mind to restrain the power , and bridle the fury of the people , did it not by erecting new fortresses , but by demolishing the old . if it be objected that tarentum of old , and brescia of late years were recovered by the fidelity of the castles , when the towns had revolted . i answer , that as to the recovery of tarentum , the castle contributed nothing , for the consul quintus fabius was sent thither with an army strong enough to have retaken it , had there been no castle at all : and , what advantage was it to the romans that the castle held for them , if the recovery of the town required a consular army , and the presence of so great a soldier as fabius maximus ; and that they might have retaken it without the help of the castle , is clear in the example of capua , which they recovered , when there was no castle to befriend them . in the case of brescia , the circumstances were very extraordinary ; for it seldom happens that when a city revolts , and the castle holds out for you , that the castle has a field army hard by , and ready to relieve you . monsieur de foix general for the king of france , being with his army at bologna , and understanding the desection of the brescians , marched immediately to recover it , and in three days time ( by the help of the castle ) was master of it again . so that it was not wholly by the benefit of the castle that brescia was recovered , but by the presence and dextery of monsieur de foix and his army . and this example may be sufficient to ballance all others to the contrary ; for we see daily in our times , multitudes of castles taken and retaken , and following the fate of their cities , and that with no more difficulty or variety of fortune , than when there are none at all ; as has been visible in lombardy , romagna , the kingdom of naples , and all other quarters of italy . and as to those citadels which are built in your new conquests , to defend you from your enemies abroad ; they also are absolutely unnecessary , where you have an army in the field ; and where you have none , they are of no use . a good army without any such forts , is sufficient to defend you . and this has been found by experience by all those who have been thought excellent in the arts of war , or of peace ; and particularly by the romans and spartans : the romans never erected any new castles , and the spartans never suffered any old ; but what cities soever they conquered , down went their walls ; nay , even in their own cities they would not permit any fortification , as believing nothing so proper to defend them as the virtue and courage of their citizens . a spartan being demanded by an athenian , whether the walls of athens were not very beautiful ? yes , says the spartan , if it was but inhabited by women . a prince therefore who has a good army in the field , may have some benefit by his castles , if they be upon the frontiers of his country , or in some places upon the coast , where they may ●etard and entertain an enemy for some time till the army can come up : but if the prince has no army on foot , let his castles be where they will , upon the frontiers or elsewhere , they are either unserviceable or dangerous : dangerous , because they are easily lost , and made use of by the enemy against you ; or if they be too strong to be taken , yet the enemy marches on , and leaves them unserviceable behind him . for an army that has no enemy in the field to confront it , takes no notice of cities or castles , but passing by as it pleases , rambles up and down , and ravages the whole country ; as may be observed both in ancient history and new . francesco maria not many years since invaded the dutchy of urbin , nor concern'd himself at all , though he left ten of his enemies cities behind him . wherefore that prince who has a good army , need not stand upon castles ; and he that has no castles , need not trouble himself to build any ; all that he is to do , is , to fortifie the town of his own residence as well as he can , and accustom the citizens to arms , that he may be able to sustain an enemy , at least for a while , till he can make his conditions , or procure relief ; all other designs are expensive in times of peace ; and unprofitable in time of war ; so that he who considers what has been said , must acknowledge that as the romans were wise in every thing else , so more particularly in their affairs with the latins , and privernates , in not thinking of castles and fortresses , but of more noble and generous ways of securing their allegiance . chap. xxv . to attempt a city full of intestine divisions , and to expect to carry it thereby , is uncertain and dangerous . the divisions in the commonwealth of rome were so great betwixt the people and the nobility , that the veientes and hetrusci , taking the opportunity , conspired its destruction , and having raised an army , and harrassed their whole country , the senate sent out g. manlius , and m. fabius against them ; whose army encamping near the enemy , were so provoked by the insolence of their language , that the romans laid aside their private animosities , and coming to a battel overthrew them ; by which we may observe how easily we erre in our counsels , and how we lose things many times the same way by which we intended to gain them . the veientes thought by assaulting the romans whilst they were embroil'd in their intestine divisions , they should certainly overcome them ; and their invading them at that time , united the enemy , and ruined themselves ; and not without reason , for the occasion of discord and faction in a commonwealth is idleness , and peace ; and there is nothing unites like apprehension , and war. so that had the veientes been wise as they should have been , they should have forborn making war upon them at that time , and have tryed other artificial ways to have destroyed them . the surest way is to insinuate , and make your self a mediator betwixt them , and to take upon your self the arbitration , rather than they should come to blows . when it is come to that , you are privately and gently to supply the weaker side ; to foment and continue the war , till they consume one another ; but be sure your supplies be not too great , lest both parties begin to suspect you , and believe your design is to ruine them both , and make your self prince . if this way be well managed , it will certainly bring you to the end which you desired ; for when both sides are weary , they will commit themselves to your arbitration . by these arts , the city of pistoia returned to its dependance upon florence ; for labouring under intestine divisions , the florentines favouring first one side , and then the other ( but so slily that no occasion of jealousie was given to either ) brought them both in a short time to be weary of their distractions , and throw themselves unanimously into their arms . the government of the city of siena had never been changed by their own domestick dissentions , had not the florentines supplied both parties under-hand , and fomented them that way , whereas had they appeared openly and above board , it would have been a means to have united them . i shall add one example more , philip visconti duke of milan made war many times upon the florentines , hoping by the dissentions of the city to have conquered them the more easily , but he never succeeded . so that complaining one time of his misfortunes , he had this expression , the follies of the florentines have cost me two millions of mony , to no purpose . in short , as the veientes and tuscans found themselves in an error ( when they thought by help of the differences in rome , to have mastered the romans ) and were ruined themselves for their pains . so it will fare with whoever takes that way to oppress or subvert any other government . chap. xxvi . he who contemns or reproaches another person , incurs his hatred , without any advantage to himself . i look upon it as one of the greatest points of discretion in a man , to forbear injury and threatning , especially in words : neither of them weakens the enemy , but threatning makes him more cautious , and injury the more inveterate , and industrious to revenge it . this is manifest by the example of the veienti ( of which i discoursed in the foregoing chapter ) for not contenting themselves with the mischiefs that they brought upon them by the war , they added contumely and opprobrious language , which so provoked and enflamed the roman army , that whereas before they were irresolute , and seemed to decline it , they now fell upon them unanimously , and over-threw them . so that it ought to be the principal care in an officer that neither himself nor his soldiers do incense and exasperate his enemy by ill language ; for that makes him but the more so , does not at all hinder him from revenging himself , but does the author more mischief than the enemy . and of this we have a notable example in asia . gabades the persian general having besieged amida a long time , without any considerable progress ; weary of the tediousness of the leaguer , and hopeless of success , he resolved to draw off and be gone ; but as he was raising his camp , the garison perceiving it , got all upon the walls , and with the basest and most provoking circumstances imaginable upbraided them with cowardize ; which nettled gabedes in such manner , that he changed his counsels , sate down again , and ply'd it with that industry and indignation , that he took it in few days , and gave it up to the fury of the soldier . the same thing hapned to the veienti ( as i said before ) who not co●tenting themselves to make war upon the romans , went up under their very noses to reproach them ; and what followed ? they irritated them so , that they settled the courage , and united the animosities of the roman army , and put them into so high a sit of impatience , that they forced the consul to a battel , in which the veientes received the reward of their contumacy . he therefore who is general of an army , or governour of a commonwealth , and commands or governs discreetly , ●hkes particular care that such ill language be not used either in the city or army , to one another , nor to the enemy : for to an enemy , they make him but worse , unless such remedies be applyed , as are practised by wise men . the romans having left two of their legions at capoua , they conspired against the capouans ( as shall be described more largely hereafter ) which occasioned a great sedition , but it was afterwards appeased by valerius corvinus , and among other things necessary in that juncture , an act of oblivion was passed , with great penalty to any man that should upbraid any of the soldiers by their sedition . tiberius grachus having the command of a certain number of servants ( in the time of hanibal's wars ) which the scarcity of men , had forced the romans to arm , made it no less than death for any man to reproach them by their servitude . so mindful were the roman officers always of preventing such exprobration , as knowing that nothing provokes and incenses a man so highly as to have his imperfections rip'd up , whether in earnest , or in jest , 't is the same thing . nam facetiae asperae , quando nimium ex vero traxere , acrem sui memoriam relinquunt ; for biting , raillery , especially with a tincture of truth , leaves an ill impression upon the memory . chap. xxvii . wise princes , and well governed states ought to be contented with victory ; for many times whilst they think to push things forward , they lose all . that we use our enemy with rude and dishonorable language , proceeds either from insolence upon some victory past or extraordinary confidence of obtaining it , which being false , perplexes our understanding , and makes us err not only in our words , but our actions . for from the time that error seizes upon our judgments , it makes us many times lose the occasion of a certain good , in hopes of a better that is but uncertain , which is a point not unworthy our consideration , seeing thereby our reason is disturbed , and our state many times brought in danger of ruine ; and this i shall demonstrate by examples both ancient and modern , because arguments cannot do it so distinctly . hanibal after he had defeated the romans at cannas , sent messengers to carthage with the news of his victory , and to desire supplies . the senate was a long time in counsel what was to be done , annon , a grave and solid citizen being present , advised them to make wise use of their victory , and think of making peace with the romans , which they might do upon better conditions , now they were conquerors , than they were in reason to expect upon any disaster . that the carthaginians had satisfied the whole world that they were able to balance the romans ; for they had fought with them , and beaten them ; and having gone so far with honour and success , they ought not ( at least in his judgment ) expose what they had got , and by hoping for more , run a hazard of losing all : but this counsel was not followed , though afterwards , when too late , it was found to be the better . alexander the great had conquered all the east , when the commonwealth of tyre ( a great town situate like venice in the water ) amazed at the grandeur of alexander , sent embassadors to him to offer him their obedience and subjection upon what terms he pleased , only they were unwilling either himself , or any of his army should come into their town . alexander disdaining to be excluded by a private city , to whom the whole world had opened their gates ; rejected their offers , sent their embassadors back , and went immediately to besiege it . the town stood in the sea , and was well provided both with victual and ammunition ; insomuch as at four months end alexander began to consider that that single town had deprived his glory of more time , than many other of his conquests of much greater importance : whereupon he resolved to come to an agreement with them , and to grant them the conditions which they demanded at first ; but the tyrians transported with pride , not only refused his proffers , but put his messengers to death ; upon which in a rage alexander caused it to be assaulted immediately , and it was done with that fury , that the town was taken and sack'd , and part of the people put to the sword , and the rest made slaves . in the year . a spanish army came into the dominions of the florentines to restore the medici in florence , and tax the city ; and they were called in , and conducted by the citizens themselves , who had promised , that as soon as they appeared in those parts , they would take arms , and declare for them ; being entered in the plain , and finding no body to joyn with them , or supply them , scarcity of provisions prevailed with the spaniard to think of a treaty , and propose it to the enemy , but the florentines were too high , and re●used it , which was the loss of prato , and the ruine of their state. so then a prince that is attack'd by another prince more potent than himself , cannot be guilty of a greater error , than to refuse an agreement , especially when it is offered ; for it can never be so bad , but it shall have in it something of advantage for him who accepts it , and perhaps contribute to his victory . it ought therefore to have satisfied the people of tyre , that alexander accepted of the conditions which he had formerly denyed them ; and it had been victory enough for them , that with arms in their hands they had forced so great a conqueror to condescend . it was the same case with the florentines ; they ought to have been contented , and thought it honour enough that the spanish army complyed , and was reduced to a condition of granting part of their desires , though they would not gratifie them in all ; for it was plain , the design of that army was to change the government ; to break their league with the french ; and to raise what money upon them they could . though of these three points , they had obtained the two last , and the first alone had remained entire to the florentines ( that is to say , the government of the city ) every citizen ( besides the security of his life ) would have had some honour and satisfaction , without concerning themselves so much for the loss of the other two . and though by the posture of their affairs their success seem'd to be certain ; yet they ought not to have exposed things to the discretion of fortune , seeing their all was at stake , which no wise man will hazard but upon inevitable necessity . hanibal having left italy , where he had been sixteen years together with a great deal of honour , being called home to the relief of his own country , found asdrubal and siphax defeated ; the kingdom of numidia lost ; the carthaginians retired , and coop'd up within the circumference of their own walls , so as they had no hopes but in hanibal and his army . hanibal being sensible that this was the last cast , and that if he miscarried , his country was quite lost , resolved to put nothing to a hazard , till he had tryed all other ways ; and was not ashamed to make the first overture of a peace , as knowing that if there was any hopes left for his country , it was in that , rather than war ; but being refused , he resolved to fight ( though with very little hopes ) supposing he might possibly win the day , or if he did lose it , it should not be without leaving some testimony of his courage and generosity . if then hanibal , a person of that great experience and conduct , at the head of a great army , chose rather to have had things determined by treaty and accommodation , than battel ; upon the loss of which , the wealth and liberty of his country depended : what is he to do , who has not his courage nor experience ? but men are subject to strange and imaginary hopes , upon which reposing with too much confidence , they take their measures amiss , and are many times ruined . chap. xxviii . how much it is for the interest of all governments that all injury be punished , whether against the publick , or particular persons . it is easily known to what men are often transported by choler and indignation , by what hapned to the romans , when they sent the three fabii embassadors towards the gauls , who were entered into tuscany , and had laid siege to clusium . for the clusians being besieged , sent to the romans to relieve them , and the romans sent to the french to require them in the name of the people of rome , to withdraw their forces out of tuscany ; the roman embassadors arrived at the army , but being better soldiers than orators , when the armies came to engage , they put themselves at the head of the clusians , to fight against the french , which being observed by the french , turn'd all their former hatred to the tuscans , upon the romans , which was much encreased after they had sent embassadors to complain of it at rome , and to require that those who had committed that fault , might be delivered up into their hands , to make satisfaction for their offence . but instead of granting their demands , or punishing their delinquency themselves , they were created tribunes with consular authority . which coming afterwards to the ears of the french , finding those persons advanced , who ought rather to have been punished , they interpreted it as done in affront to them , and being enflamed with anger and disdain , they marched directly to rome , assaulted and took it , all but the capitol , which hapned to them for nothing , but that the romans ( when their embassadors had contra jus gentium , fought against the french ) had been so far from doing them justice , that the said embassadors were advanced and preferred . for which reason , a prince and commonwealth is to take care that no such injury be done , not only to a nation , or commonalty , but to any particular person ; for if a man be highly offended either by a state , or private person , and has not the satisfaction he desires , if it be in a republick , he ceases not to pursue his revenge , though with the ruine of the state. if it be under a monarchy , and he finds himself touched in point of honour , if he has the least spark of generosity in him , he will never be quiet till he be revenged , though with never so much prejudice to himself , of which case we cannot have an apter and truer example , than in philip of macedon , the father of alexander the great . philip had in his court a young gentleman of very exquisite beauty called pausanias , with whom attalus ( a great favourite of the said philips ) was enamoured ; having tempted and solicited him many times to satisfie his passion , and found him always averse , he resolved to do that by force or surprise , which he could not do otherwise : to this purpose he made a solemn feast , and invited pausanias , and several other great persons : when they had filled themselves will with their good cheer , he caused pausanias to be taken from the table , and carried to a private place , and not only satisfied his own lust , but caused him to be vitiated by several others . pausanias complained heavily to king philip , who having kept him for some time in hopes of doing him justice , instead of performing , he advanced attalus to the government of a province in greece : which pausanias resenting ; in great anger that his adversary against whom he had so long , and so earnestly solicited , should now be preferred , he began to turn his indignation upon the king , who had refused to right him , rather than upon the person who had done him the wrong : insomuch that the very morning his daughter was married to alexander of epirus , as philip was going to the temple to celebrate the nuptiality with his son alexander on one hand of him , and his new son-in-law on the other , pausanias assaulted and slew him . this example is much like that of the romans , and is to be observed by any man that governs ; who is never to despise any body so as not to believe but he who is injured will revenge himself some time or other , though with never so much danger and detriment to himself . chap. xxix . fortune casts a mist before peoples eyes , when she would not have them oppose her designs . if the course of humane affairs be considered , it will appear , that many accidents , arise , against which the heavens do not suffer us to provide : and when this hapned at rome , where there was so much virtue , and piety , and order , well may it happen more frequently in those cities and provinces where there are no such things to be found . and because the place is remarkable , to show the influence which the heavens have upon human affairs , titus livius has discoursed of it largely and efficaciously , telling us , that the stars to make us sensible of their power , first disposed the said fabii ( who were sent embassadors to the french ) to fight as abovesaid , to the end that upon that occasion , they might make war upon rome . in the next place , they besotted the romans so , as they did nothing worthy of the name of romans in order to their defence , having banished camillus ( the only person capable of standing them in stead ) to ardea . again , when the french were upon their march towards rome , those who to repel the inroads of the volsci , and other bordering enemies , had made dictators many times , and with very good success , made none upon the approach of the french. they were so slow likewise , and so remiss in the raising of men , and so tedious in furnishing them with arms , that they could scarce draw out any considerable force against them , till the enemy was as far as the river allia which is within ten miles of rome , and when their army was come thither , it was not encamped by the tribunes with the usual diligence and discretion , they having neither chosen a good place , nor drawn their line , nor fortified themselves with trenches , nor stoccadoes as formerly , nor done any thing for their security , either humane , or divine : when they came to fight , they drew up their men so awkwardly and untowardly , that neither soldier nor officer did any thing worthy of the discipline of the romans , so that the battel was lost without any effusion of blood , the romans running at the very first charge , the greatest part of them to veii , the rest to rome , and in such consternation , that they fled directly to the capitol before they went home to their houses . so that the senate without so much as thinking to defend their city , any more than the rest , never caused the gates to be shut , but part of them fled away , and part into the capitol . there , it is true they began to observe better orders than before , and managed things with less confusion ; they discharged all those that were unserviceable , and furnished themselves with what provision they could get , that they might be able to hold out . the greatest part of those useless people which were turn'd out of the capitol , as old men , women , and children , fled into the neighbouring cities ; the rest continued in rome , and were a prey to the french. so that if a man should have read their exploits in former times , and compared them with their actions then , he would not have believed them to be the same people ; and titus livius gives the reason after he had described all the disorders aforesaid in these words , adeo obcaecat animos fortuna , cum vim suam ingruentem refringi non vult . so strangely does fortune blind other people , when she would not be obstructed in her designs ; and there can be nothing more true . wherefore men are not so much to be blamed or commended for their adversity or prosperity ; for it is frequently seen , some are hurried to ruine , and others advanced to great honour by the swing and impulse of their fate , wisdom availing little against the misfortunes of the one , and folly as little against the felicity of the other . when fortune designs any great matter , she makes choice of some man of such courage and parts , as is able to discern when she presents him with an occasion : and so on the otherside , when she intends any great destruction , she has her instruments ready to push on the wheel , and assist to her designs ; and if there be any man capable of obstructing them in the least , she either rids him out of the way , or deprives him of all authority , and leaves him without any faculty to do good . and this is abundantly cleared by this place , where fortune , to amplifie rome , and bring it to that grandeur to which it arrived afterwards ; thought fit to debase it , ( as we shall show at large in the beginning of our third book ) but would not utterly destroy it : for which reason , though she permitted camillus to be banished , she would not suffer him to be killed ; though she let rome be taken , she preserved the capitol : though she intimidated the romans , and would suffer them to do nothing wisely for the safety of the city , yet she left them so much wisdom as secured the capitol : that rome might be taken , she caused the greatest part of the army that was defeated upon the allia , to retire to veii , thereby cutting off all ways for the defence of rome : but in the midst of her career , when she seem'd in such haste , and so impatient of its destruction , she prepared every thing that was necessary for its preservation ; having conveyed a good army to veii , and camillus to ardea , that once again they might make head under a general whose reputation was never fully'd with the ignominy of such a loss , but stood clear and entire for the recovery of his country : and here we might bring store of modern examples to prove what is said , were not this sufficient without them . yet this i shall assert again ( and by the occurrences in all history there is nothing more true ) that men may second their fortune , not resist it ; and follow the order of her designs , but by no means defeat them : nevertheless men are not wholly to abandon themselves , because they know not her end ; for her ways being unknown and irregular , may possibly be at last for our good ; so that we are always to hope the best , and that hope is to preserve us in whatever troubles or distresses we shall fall . chap. xxx . princes and republicks that are truly magnificent , do not make their leagues and alliances with money , but by their virtue , reputation , and force . the romans were besieged in the capitol , and though they were in expectation of relief from v●ii and camillus , yet famine constraining them , they proposed a parley with the french , and were to pay a certain sum of money for their liberty ; the articles were sign'd , all things concluded , and commissioners sent in to receive the money , when on a sudden camillus appears with his army , as if fortune had done it ( says livy ) . ut romani auro redempti non viverent . that it might not be said the romans had ever been ransom'd : which point is not only observable in this place , but in the whole progress of the affairs of that commonwealth , where it may be seen that they never got town , nor never made peace with their money ; whatever they did , was bravely , and with their arms , which i think is more than can be said of any other state in the world . one of the great marks of the puissance of this commonwealth , was the manner of her living with her neighbors . when things are so managed in a government , that the neighbors purchase its amity , and make themselves its pensioners ; 't is a certain sign of the potency of that government : but when the neighbors on the contrary receive money from it , 't is as infallible a sign of its weakness . if one reads the roman history , he shall find the massilians , the edui , the rhodians , hiero of syracuse , and massi●issa , as they were neighbors , so they were tributaries to the romans , contributing to their expences , and taxes as there was occasion , without expectation of any other recompence , but protection . where a prince or commonwealth is weak , it is otherwise , as it appeared by our own city of florence , which in former times when it was in its greatest reputation , paid annual stipends to most of the little governments in romania , besides what was received by the perugians , castellans , and all their other neighbors ; whereas had it been strong , and well armed , it would have been quite otherwise , and all the rest would have given florence money for her protection . nor were the florentines singular in this case , the venetians did the same , and so did the king of france , who notwithstanding the greatness of his kingdom , was tributary to the swizzers , and the king of england , which proceeded from his having disarmed the people , and preferring a present opportunity of squeezing them , and avoiding an imaginary danger , before the doing those things that might have secured his state , and made it happy for ever ; which practice though for some time it may produce quiet and repose , yet the end is troubles , and losses , and ruine without remedy . it would be too tedious to recount how often the florentines , the venetians , and the kingdom of france have bought off their wars , and submitted to such dishonorable terms , as the romans could never be brought to but once . it would be too tedious to recount how many towns the florentines , and the venetians have brought with their mony , which have been the occasion of great disorders afterwards , and prov'd that what is gotten by gold , is not to be kept with iron . this point of generosity , and this manner of living the romans observed very punctually whilst they were free ; but after they fell under the government of emperors , and those emperors grew bad , they began to degenerate too , and prefer the shadow before the sun. they began to be pensionaries first to the parthians , then to the germans , and by degrees to all their neighbors , which was the first step to the ruine of that great empire ; and ●ll these inconveniences proceeded from the disarming of the people , and neglecting to train them up to military discipline , from whence a greater mischief does arise ; and that is , that the nearer the enemy approaches , the weaker , and more unable he finds you ; and therefore not being strong enough of your self to repel the enemy from your borders , you are forced to pay tribute to your neighbors to undertake it for you ; which being to be raised and extorted from your subjects , renders them more feeble and impotent . by which means it happens sometimes that those states which are in this condition , may perhaps make some little resistance upon the frontiers , but if the enemy passes that , all is gone without remedy . but all this is disorderly , and unnatural ; for as nature in all animals has fortified the vital and principal , and not extream parts of the body , because the body can subsist without the one , but not without the other . so 't is in all governments , the heart and center is to be fortified , rather than the frontiers : but this was very ill observed by the florentines , for whenever an enemy had past our borders , and took his way towards the city , there was no body in a condition to oppose him . it was the same with the venetians not many years since , and had not their city been as it were swadled with the sea , it had been certainly destroyed . this indeed has not been seen so frequently in france , because it is so great a kingdom , and too strong for most of its neighbours ; nevertheless when in the year they were invaded by the english , the whole kingdom trembled , and the king of france himself , and many others were of opinion , that if he lost one battel , the whole kingdom was gone . with the romans it was quite contrary ; the nearer the enemy approached the city , the stronger he found it : this was evident in hanibal's invasion , though he had forc'd his way into italy , fought three great battels with the romans , and beat them in every one , though they had lost so many brave souldiers and officers , yet they were not only able to continue the war , but to conquer them atlast , and all by fortifying the heart and center of their country , and leaving the extremities to shift for themselves : for the vitals and fundamentals of their state was the people of rome , the country of the latins , the neighbouring cities that were in league , and their colonies from whence they drew so many souldiers as were able to fight , and entertain the whole world. and this hanno the carthaginian understood very well : for when after the battel at cannas hanibal sent mago to carthage to give them an account of the particulars of the victory , mago having exceedingly magnified the exploits of his brother , and debased the condition of the romans , hanno interrupted him , and enquir'd whether any of the roman cities , or any of their confederates had revolted ? whether any of their senators were come in to hanibal ? or whether they had sent any embassadors to him to treat ? and when mago denied that any thing of all this had passed , hanno replyed , hostium ergo multum superest , & bellum tam integrum habemus , atque habuimus qua die annibal italian est ingressus ; there is work enough behind , and the war is as entire as when hanibal passed first into italy . it is apparent therefore , both by what is said in this chapter , and what has been said often before , that there is great difference betwixt the present and ancient methods of the romans ; and if we seriously consider it , we shall not wonder that so many towns are taken and lost , and so many governments subverted , as we have seen in our days : for where discipline is neglected , and military virtue laid aside , all things are committed wholly to fortune , which being various and unconstant , produces various mutations ; and this vicissitude and unconstancy of affairs will continue till some excellent person arises to restore the ancient discipline , and restrain fortune from giving such evidences of her power every hour of the day . chap. xxxi . how dangerous it is to believe exiles too far . i think it not amiss in this place to shew how much it imports all persons not to give too much credit to those who are banished , for many times they are but the practices and stratagems of princes and states . we have a memorable example of their inconstancy in livy , though something improper . when alexander the great passed into asia with his army , alexander of epirus his kinsman and unckle passed with another into italy , invited by the exiles of lucca , who put him in hopes that by their means he should be master of that whole province : but when he was come into italy , instead of assisting him , they conspir'd against him , and slew him , upon promise of indempnity , and restitution of their estates . from whence we may learn what faith is to be given to such as are banished out of their own country : for as to their engagements , they are nothing ; it is not to be doubted but when ever they can return by any other means , they will leave you , and betake themselves to any body else , notwithstanding any promise or engagement to you ; and that which makes their promises and confidence the less to be trusted , is , because their extreme passion and desire to come home , make them believe many things that are impossible , and pretend many things that they do not believe : so that betwixt what they believe , and what they pretend , they feed you with fair hopes , but if you depend upon them , you are undone , your expence is all lost , and your whole enterprize miscarries ; i shall only give you an instance in the aforesaid alexander , and themistocles the athenian ; themistocles being in rebellion against the athenians , fled into asia to darius , whom he solicited with large promises to an expedition into greece . darius was persuaded , and passed into greece , but themistocles being unable to make his promises good , either for shame of what he had done , or fear of punishment for what he had not , he poisoned himself ; and if themistocles a man of that excellence and virtue could delude the king , and promise more than he could perform , how little are they to be trusted , who having no such thing to restrain them , give themselves up wholly to their passion and desires ? princes therefore and states ought to be very tender of undertaking any enterprize upon the encouragement of an exile , for they seldom succeed . and because it seldom happens that towns are taken by intelligence within , i shall discourse of it in my next chapter , and add what variety of ways the romans used to come by their conquests . chap. xxxii . how many several ways the romans used to conquer their towns. the romans being a martial people , and given wholly to war , they considered every thing very diligently that might any ways conduce to the facilitating their designs ; whether it was matter of charge , or any thing else : for this reason they seldom attempted any town by the way of siege , because they thought the expence and incommodity of that way would be more than could be recompenced by the taking it ; so as they never tried that whilst there was any other hopes ; and in all their great wars , there are but very few examples of any long leaguers by them . the ways which they took were commonly either by storm , or surrender : when they took a town by storm , it was either by open force , or stratagem . open force was , when they made their attaque without battering the walls , which they called aggredi urbem cum corona ; to begirt a town , because they drew their whole army round the town , and fell on in all quarters , and in this manner it happened sometimes that they carried very considerable places at one storm , as when scipio took new carthage in spain . if this way was ineffectual , they battered down the walls with their rams , and other , engines of war. sometimes they min'd , and entred the towns under ground , as they did at veii ; sometimes that they might fight with the enemy upon equal terms , they built wooden towers , or raised mounts to the height of the walls from whence they might plague and molest them within their works . the besieged were in most danger in the first case upon a general assault , for their walls were to be made good in all places at once , and it fell out many times , that there were not men enough to supply and relieve all parts ; or if they had men enough to do that , they were not all of an equal courage , and when any gave ground , the whole town was like to be lost , and by this means that way was often succesful . when this way miscarried , they seldom sate down before a town , or went formally to beleaguer it , because it could not be done but with greater hazard to their army , for their quarters being to be extended , and their guards round about the town , they must of necessity be thinner and weaker in some places , and unable to make any considerable opposition , if the enemy should make any considerable eruption , so that the sudden and brisk way was prefer'd : when their walls were battered with their engines , those who were in the town defended themselves much as we do now against great guns , by repairing their breaches as well as they could . their way of defeating their mines was by countermining , and opposing themselves personally against the enemy , or disturbing them with their inventions , as particularly , putting of feathers , and oyls , and other stinking stuff into barrels of wood , they set them on fire , and then tumbled them among the enemy , that what with the fire , the smoak , and the stench , they might not be able to endure them ▪ their towers of wood , they destroyed commonly by throwing fire into them ; and then for the mounts which were raised against the walls , their way was to dig under the walls , and steal away their earth , or by loosening the foundations of the mount , till it all fell to the ground . but these ways of taking a town are not long to be tried ; if they carried it not quickly , they raised their siege , and sought out some other way of prosecuting the war , as scipio did when he went over into africk , for having assaulted utica , without any success , he altred his counsels , raised his siege , and addressed himself wholly to the bringing the carthaginian army to an engagement ; yet sometimes they continued their siege , as they did at veii , carthage , and ierusalem : as to their way of taking of towns by fraud and intelligence , ( as they took paloepolis ) the romans and others attempted many places after that manner , but they seldom succeeded ; for those secret correspondencies are easily discovered , and the least discovery spoils the whole design , because the conspiracy is commonly discovered before it comes to execution , it either being unpracticable in it self , or betrayed by the infidelity of some of the conspirators , there being a necessity of meeting and discoursing with such persons , as it is not lawful to discourse with , but upon some specious occasion , but suppose it be not discovered in the management , there are so many difficulties in putting it into action , that it is almost impossible to overcome them ; for if you come too soon , or too late , all is spoiled : if any noise be made , ( as by the geese in the capitol ) the least disorder , the least error or mistake destroys the whole enterprize . besides , these things being executed in the night , the darkness strikes a terror into the instruments , and the more , because they are commonly unacquainted with the place or people which they are to attaque , and therefore every little noise or accident is sufficient to confound them , and every trifling imagination will make them turn their backs ; but no body was so daring and succesful in these fraudulent and nocturnal designs as aratus sicionius , though in the day-time he was but like other men , which was rather from some secret virtue in him , than any excellence in the way . and as to the taking of towns by surrender , they either surrender freely , or by force . when they do it freely , it is done out of some extrinsick necessity , ( as when capua surrendred to the romans , for fear of falling into the hands of the samnites ) or else out of desire to be well governed , as being taken with the administration of that prince to whom they surrender ; and thus it was with the rhodians , the massillians , and other cities which gave themselves up to the romans upon no other inducement , but that they might live more happily under the roman laws , and be under a better constitution . but there are many cities which surrender by force , which force proceeds either from the fatigues and calamities of a tedious siege , or from continual excursions and depredations to which they are subject ; and against which they have no other way to secure themselves . and then all the ways we have mentioned , the romans made more use of this , carrying on their wars with their neighbours years together , in this manner for the most part ; for though they tried all the other , they found this the more profitable and safe . in sieges there is delay and loss of time , in storms , hazard and danger ; and uncertainty in conspiracies : but in bringing things to a battel , it has been seen that by beating the enemies army , they have got a whole kingdom in a day , whereas an obstinate town has cost them several years . chap. xxxiii . how the romans upon any expedition , gave their generals general commissions . i am of opinion , that to read the history of livy , with any profit and advantage we must consider not only the actions , but the whole means and process both of the people and senate of rome . among other things , it is very remarkable with what authority they invested their consuls , dictators and generals of their armies , and it was so great , that the senate reserved to it self only the power of making peace , or new wars as they saw occasion ; all the rest was left to the discretion of the consul , who might fight , or not fight , assault this town or that town as he pleased , without any contradiction . this may be proved by many examples , by more especially by what hapned in an expedition against the tuscans ; for fabius the consul having defeated the enemy at sutri , resolving to pass the forrest of gimina with his army , and invade tuscany , he was so far from receiving orders from the senate , or consulting them in the business , that he gave them not the least notice , though the war was to be removed into another country , and like to be very dangerous ; which appeared by the resolution of the senate in that very case ; for having heard of his victory at sutri , and apprehending that he might fall upon such counsels , and pass his army into tuscany , thorow that dangerous forrest , they sent two embassadors to him to advise him from that expedition ; but they came too late , for he was gone before , and having over-run the whole country , and routed the enemy , instead of hindering his design , the embassadors went back with the news of his victory . this custom of the romans , if it be seriously considered , will be found to be very solid and wise . for should the senate have been consulted by their generals upon every particular occasion , and have expected all their orders from them , it would have made their generals less circumspect , and vigorous , because the honour of the victory would not accrew totally to them , but they must participate with the senate . besides , the senate understood very well that fortune is various , and that many accidents and advantages happen which cannot be known or improved by any but those who are present ; so that if they should desire to be consulted in things of which they can have no knowledge , they must of necessity err , though they were persons of never so much experience and wisdom . wherefore they gave their general absolute power of disposing all things at his own will , and the whole honour of the expedition was to be his , that it might be a spur to prick on his diligence , and a bridle to regulate his rashness . and this i have thought fit to insert , that i might shew how much the famous commonwealths in our times do differ from the romans , particularly the venetians and florentines , who are so strict with their general , that if a great gun be but to be planted against a town , the senate must be advised , and give order how , and from whence it is to play . but this custom deserves commendation as much as the rest , which all together , have brought their affairs into that sad condition in which they are at present . the discourses of nicholas machiavel , citizen , and secretary of florence , upon the first decade of titvs livivs . liber iii. chap. i. that a sect or commonwealth be long-liv'd , it is necessary to correct it often ; and reduce it towards its first principles . 't is a certain truth , that the things of this world are determined , and a set time appointed for their duration ; but those run thorow the whole course which is assigned them by their stars , who keep their body in such order , that it may not alter at all , or if it does , it is for the better . i speak now of mixt bodies , as commonwealths , and sects , and i say , that those alterations are salutiferous , which reduce them towards their first principles ; and therefore the best ordered , and longest liv'd are they , who ( by their own orders ) may be often renewed , or else by some accident ( without the help of the said orders ) may tend to renovation : 't is as clear as the day , that no bodies of men are of long duration , unless they be renewed ; and the way to renew them ( as is said before ) is to reduce them to their principles . for the fundamentals of all sects , commonwealths and kingdoms have always something of good in them , by means of which they recover their first reputation and grandeur . and because in process of time that goodness corrupts , that body must of necessity die , unless something intervenes that reduces it to its first principles . the physitian speaking of the body of man , tell us , quod quotidie aggregatur aliquid , quod quandoque indiget curatione ; that there is not a day passes , but it contracts something which afterwards will require to be cured . 't is the same with the body politick ; and as to them , i say that they are to be cured , by being renewed ; and they are renewed , partly by external accident , and partly by internal prudence . the first happens as it were by destiny or fate , as that rome should be taken by the french , that thereby it might reassume its old customs and virtues , and revive its ancient worship , religion and justice , which were superannuated and decayed , as appears very plain by the description of their preparation against the french , in which it is declared by titus livius , that upon the marching out of their army , and investing their tribunes with consular power , they observed no religious ceremony : at the same time they not only refused to correct the three fabii , who contra jus gentium had fought against the french , but created them tribunes . and it is easily to be presum'd that they made less account of the good laws and constitutions ordained by romulus and other wise princes , than was reasonable and ( perhaps ) necessary to preserve the liberty of their state. this foreign invasion hapned to them therefore , that all the obsolete laws of that city might be revived , and that the people might be taught that it was necessary not only to maintain religion and justice , but to respect their good citizens , and esteem their vertue above the advantages which they seemed to want , for want of their assistance . and it fell out exactly , for rome was no sooner taken , but they began to renew the orders of their old religion : they punished the fabii who had fought against the law of nations , and conceived so great a value for camillus , that the senate and people both laid aside their old animosity , and plac'd the whole burden of the commonwealth upon his single shoulders . 't is necessary therefore ( as was said before ) that men which live together under a government , be often reminded by these exterior or interior accidents . the interior way is when there is a law which takes an account of all people in that corporation ; or else when there is some excellent person among them who by his virtuous example does the same thing , so that this happiness results to a commonwealth either by the virtue of some great person , or the authority of some law. and as to this last , the orders which reduc'd the commonwealth towards its first principles , were the tribunes of the people , the censors and all the other laws against the ambition and insolence of man ; which laws have need to be revived and quickned by the virtue of some citizen ; who with great courage and generosity shall put them in execution in despight of all the power of the delinquents . the most remarkable executions before the taking of rome by the french , were the death of brutus his sons , the punishment of the decem-viri , the execution of sp. melius : after the city was sack'd by the french , the most considerable were the death of manlius captolinus , the death of the son of manlius torquatus , the prosecution of papirius cursor against . fabius the master of his horse , and the accusation against scipio ; which things being extraordinary , were the more remarkable , and when ever any of them hapned , they reminded the people of their beginning , and that they were to live according to law. but when these examples began to be more rare , men took occasion to grow worse , and their exorbitancies were with more danger and tumult ; for if in ten years space no examples be made , nor no execution done , people begin to forget and despise the laws , and unless something happens that may remember them of the punishments , and infuse something of fear into them , the delinquents will grow so numerous that it will be dangerous to punish them . to this purpose they who governed the state of florence from the year to the year were wont to say , that it was necessary every five years to review the state ; for otherwise it would be very hard to maintain it : they call'd reviewing the state , reducing the people to the same terror and awe , as they had upon them of old , when every man was punished according to his crime , let his quality be what it would . but when the memory of these punishments are lost , and suffered to go to decay , men take the confidence to attempt any thing , and speak ill of whom they please , against which no remedy is so proper as reducing them towards their first principles , which is to be done by the example of some excellent person , inciting you to such executions , without dependance upon any law ; and they are many times of so great reputation , that good men desire to imitate them , and bad men are ashamed to live contrary to them . those who in rome liv'd after this manner were horatius cocles , scaevola , fabritius , the two decii , regulus attilius and some others , whose rare and virtuous example had the same effect in rome , that good laws , and good customs would have had ; and if every ten years some of those examples or executions aforesaid had hapned in that city , the minds and manners of the people could never have been so corrupted , but as those virtuous examples , and heroick punishments grew seldom , and scarce , so corruption began to multiply , for after regulus his time , there was not any such example to be seen ; and though the two cato's succeeded , yet there was such great distance betwixt them , that their examples could do but little good , especially the last of the cato's , who finding the greatest part of the city debauched , could not work any considerable reformation upon them . and so much for civil governments ; as to the conservation of sects , the same renovation is necessary , as may appear by the example of the roman religion , which would doubtless have been lost before this , had it not been reduced towards its first principle by st. francis and st. dominick , who by their poverty , and christian-like examples revived it in the minds of men , where it was almost effaced ; and prevailed that the loosness and depravity of the prelates and cardinals did not ruine it ; for men seeing them live in that indigence and poverty ; by confessing their sins to them , and hearing them preach , they began to learn meekness and charity , and obedience ; not to upbraid people by their vices , but to leave them to god , whereas their lives must necessarily be bad , who neither see nor feel what punishment is . so then it is this renovation and reduction to its first principles , that has , and does still maintain our religion . and as to kingdoms , they as well as commonwealths have occasion to reform , and reduce as the other ; which course has been of no small advantage to the kingdom of france ; for that kingdom living under laws and customs more than any other , the said laws and customs are preserved and executed by parliaments , and especially by that of paris , which revives them every time it makes out process against any great person , or opposes the king in its arrests : and hitherto it has preserv'd it self by its severity against delinquents , without regard to the greatness of their quality , whereas should they pass unpunished , they would multiply so fast , that they would become incorrigible in a short time , and not to be reform'd but with the disorder , if not the dissolution of the whole government . we may conclude therefore , that there is no safer way of preserving a commonwealth , kingdom or sect , than by reforming and reducing them to their primitive reputation , which is to be done rather by good laws , and examples at home , than foreign force ; for though that way be effectual sometimes , ( as it was in rome ) yet it is so uncertain and dangerous , it is not to be desired . and to demonstrate how much particular examples have conduced to the grandeur of rome , and what great effect they have wrought , i shall make them the subject of my discourse in this third book ; and although among them some great examples might be produced , which have been exhibited by kings , yet history having spoken of them so largely , i shall pass them by without speaking any thing of them but what belongs to their own private advantage . and begin with brutus the father of the liberty of the romans . chap. ii. 't is the part of a wise man sometimes to pretend himself a fool . no man was ever so commendable for his wisdom and prudence , as iunius brutus for counterfeiting the fool . for though livy gives us but one reason why he did so , and that is , that under that contempt he might live quietly , and enjoy his patrimony in peace ; yet it is probable by his ways of proceeding , that he did it , that thereby he might be less under the observation of the kings , and have fairer advantage of expelling them , and delivering his country , when occasion should be offered . and that this was in his thoughts , may be presumed from his interpretation of the oracle of apollo , to which when the tarquins repair'd to understand which of them should succeed in the government , it being answered that the government should come to him who first kissed his mother , the tarquins thought it not to be accomplished till they came to rome ; but brutus pretending to slip , fell down upon the ground , and kissed it , as the common mother of us all . and afterwards upon the death of lucretia in the presence of her father , and husband , and kindred , he was the first that drew the dagger out of the wound , and conjured all the slanders by , that for the future they should never suffer a king in rome . this example may be followed by those who are disguisted with their prince , but so as first to consider their own power exactly , and if they find it sufficient , they may profess themselves publickly , and declare open war ; and it is the most safe , and most honourable way : but if their force be but small , and they find themselves that way too weak , they are with all industry to endeavour to insinuate with the tyrant , serving him in his pleasures , applauding him in all his actions and words , and imitating him in every thing he does . by this means you shall be secure from danger , enjoy all the pleasures and delights of the court , and be ready for any occasion of effecting your designs . others are of opinion that you keep such a distance with the prince , as that you be neither so near him as to be covered with his ruines , nor so remote , but that you may take the advantage of his destruction to advance yourself ; and this middle way was certainly the best , if it were easie to be kept , but because i think it impossible , it is necessary to take to one of the other two , and either to remove your self quite , or get in as near him as you can ; he who does otherwise , is in a great deal of danger , especially if he be a man of any eminence and estate : for it is not enough to say , i expect nothing , i desire neither honour nor preferment , i had rather live at ease , without any controversie or trouble , for those sayings are oftner heard than believed : nor can great men , if they did really desire it , continue in that condition , because no body believes them , and no body will suffer them . a man is therefore rather to play the fool like brutus , and he does it abundantly that flatters and applauds every thing his prince sees , or speaks , or does , how contrary soever it be to his own judgment and mind . and as brutus was wise in pretending that folly ; till occasion was offered for the deliverance of his country , so he was a severe assertor of its liberty , when obtained , of which severity we shall speak in the next chapter . chap. iii. the liberty newly acquired , could not have been preserved , but by the execution of brutus his sons . the severity of brutus in maintaining that liberty which he had procur'd in rome , was no less necessary than profitable . 't is an example well worthy to be transmitted to posterity , to see a father sitting in judgment upon his sons , and not only sentence them to death , but be present , and a spectator of their execution . but so it is decreed , and it will be found so by all that are conversant in antiquity , that upon any alteration of government , ( whether from better to worse , or worse to better , it is the same thing ) it is necessary severe example should be made of somebody that opposed it , if you desire the new form would be preserved . in short , this i affirm , that whoever sets up a tyranny , cannot hope to maintain it , but by cutting off brutus ; and whoever sets up a free state , is as unlike to continue it , but by taking off brutus his sons ; and of this we have discoursed so largely before , there is no need of enlarging here , i shall add only one example which hapned in our country and times . piero soderini having restored the liberty of florence believed that by his patience and moderation he could have mollified their minds , who like the sons of brutus were impatient of reviving the old tyranny again . but he was highly mistaken , and so much the more to blame , by how much he was a wise man , and knew well enough that there was a necessity of removing such persons as by their ambition opposed themselves against him ; yet though there was a necessity to do it , and he had so fair an occasion , he let it pass , and never made use of it : for besides that , he believed his patience and good nature would have wrought upon some , and his munificence and bounty upon others ( as he often declared among his friends ) he had an opinion , that to make a stout and vigorous opposition against his enemies , it would be necessary for him to take upon him an extraordinary authority , which would not only be a breach of the laws , but of the civil equality of the city : and if he should assume such a power , and perhaps exercise it well himself , yet the people would be so terrified thereby , that after his death they would never agree to the making their gonfaloniere for life , which office he thought fit to have augmented and maintained : this consideration , though wise and good in it self , was not prudent at that time , because we are never to entertain a present mischief in hopes of a future good , especially when , for ought we know , that good may be opprest by that mischief : he ought rather to have had a care that the end of his intentions might have appeared for the good and benefit of his country , and not out of any particular ambition ; and to have provided that whoever succeeded him afterwards in his dignity , should not be able to employ that authority to the ruine of the state , which he was forc'd to take upon him to preserve it . but the good man was mistaken in his first opinion , as not understanding that the malice of mankind is not to be extinguished with time , nor appeased with presents ; for could he have imitated the severity of brutus , he had preserved his own dignity , and the liberty of the state. but as it is a difficult thing to preserve the liberty of a state , so it is no less difficult to preserve the authority of a king , as shall be shewn in the next chapter . chap. iv. a prince is never safe in his new conquests , whilst they are in being whom he dispossessed . the death of tarquinius priscus by the sons of ancus , and the death of servins tullius by tarquinius superbus shews how dangerous it is to disposses any man of a kingdom , and suffer him to live , though you endeavour by all means possible to cares him . tarquinius priscus thought his title unquestionable , being made king by the people , and confirmed by the senate ; nor could it enter into his thoughts that the malice and indignation of the sons of ancus should be so great , as to keep them from submitting to that wherewith the whole city of rome was contented . servius tullius was mistaken in the same manner , in thinking with new favours and obligations to have pacified the sons of tarquin . so that from the first example , a prince may take warning , and not delude himself with an opinion he is safe , whilst any of them are living whom he dispossessed ; and from the second he may inform himself , that old injuries are never cancelled by new favours , especially if the favours be not equivalent to the injury . and without doubt servius tullius was ill advised to believe that the sons of tarquin would be content to be his sons-in-law , when it was their due to be his king. and this ambition , and impatience to govern , is so great and insatiable in mankind , that it not only affects those persons who have some right and expectation to govern , but those likewise who in reason can have no such expectancy , as in the example of tullia the daughter of servius , but married to one of the tarquins : which tullia was so enflamed with a desire of governing , that not contented with being a king's daughter , transported with rage , contrary to all silial duty and affection , she incited her husband against her father , and forc'd him into a conspiracy , not only against his kingdom , but life . whereas if tarquinius priscus and servius tullius had known how to have secured themselves against those they had supplanted , they had neither lost their kingdoms nor lives . but tarquinius superbus was expell'd for not observing the laws and practices of the ancient kings his predecessors , as shall appear in the next chapter . chap. v. how a king may lose his kingdom , though he comes to it by inheritance . tarquinius superbus seemed to have secure possession of the kingdom upon the death of servius tullius , who dying without heirs , left him nothing of that trouble and vexation which his predecessors encountred . for although the way by which he came to the government was irregular and abominable ; nevertheless had he followed the steps of his predecessors , and observed their old rules , he would not have run himself so fatally in to the displeasure of the senate and people , nor have provoked them to have been so diligent in his expulsion . nor is it to be believed that his son sextus his deflowring of lucretia was the chief cause that he lost his kingdom , but his infraction of the laws , his tyranny , his usurpation upon the senate , and his ingrossing all authority to himself : for he had brought things to that pass , that those affairs which were formerly debated publickly by the senate , and according to their sentiment and order were put in execution , were now transacted and determined privately in his own palace , with great dissatisfaction and offence ; so that in a short time rome was deprived of the liberty which it injoyed under other kings : nor was it enough for him to disoblige the senate , but he run himself into the odium of the people , harassing them out by mechanick and servile imployments to which they had never been used in the days of his predecessors ; by which cruel and insolent actions he had so incensed and inflamed the minds of the romans against him , that they were ready for rebellion the first opportunity that offered it self ; and if that accident had not hapned to lucretia , as soon as any other had fallen out , it would have had the same effect . and if tarquin had governed , and lived according to the example of his ancestors , and his son sextus had committed that error , brutus and collatinus would have addressed themselves to tarquin ( and not to the people of rome ) for justice against his son. let princes therefore observe that they begin to ruine their own dignity and power , when they first go about to transgress and violate the old laws and customs of their ancestors : and if after they are removed , and dispossessed of their authority , they should grow so wise as to understand the felicity of governing a kingdom with good counsel , their loss would be more insupportable , and they would condemn themselves to a greater punishment than any body else would condemn them ; for 't is easier to be beloved by good people , than bad , and to obey laws , than to command them ; and to understand the way by which this is to be done , they have no more to do , but to observe the lives of good princes , as timoleon the corinthian , aratus sicionius and others , in which they will find so much ease and security to him that governs , and them that are governed , that they will be tempted to imitate them , if for nothing but the easiness of it . for when men are governed well , they desire no other liberty ; as it hapned to the people who were governed by the two persons above named , whom they compelled to continue their princes whilst they lived , though they endeavoured several times to have laid down , and betaken themselves to a private condition . and because in this and the two precedent chapters , we have discoursed of the hatred contracted against princes , and the conspiracy of the sons of brutus against the state , and others against tarquinius priscus , and servius tullius , i think it not amiss to speak of conspiracies more largely in my next chapter , as being a subject well worth the observation both of princes and private persons . chap. vi. of conspiracies . i did not think it inconvenient in this place to discourse something of conspiracies , seeing they are things of such consequence and danger , both to princes & private persons ; for by them more princes have lost their states and their lives than by open war ; a●d the reason is , because few persons are qualified to make war , but every body can conspire . on the other side , for a private person , no enterprize is more dangerous and rash ; for let him manage it as wisely as he can , it is full of difficulty , and uncertainty of success ; and from hence it is that among so many conspiracies there are so few which arrive at the end that was designed . to the end therefore that princes may learn how to defend themselves ; and private persons might be more cautious of engaging themselves in them , but may rather be contented to live quietly under the government where they are placed , i shall enlarge upon the subject , and leave nothing behind that is considerable for the document either of the one or the other . it is a certain truth , and well said of cornelius tacitus , that men are to pay an honour and respect to things past , and obedience to things present : that they ought to desire good princes , but when they are once in authority , they are to be endur'd , and those who go about to conspire against them , do most commonly ruine themselves or their country . to come therefore to the point , we are first to consider against whom these conspiracies are made , and we shall find them either against their country , or prince : and of these two sorts of conspiracies we shall discourse at present , because of those which are entred into , to deliver up a besieged town to the enemy , or upon such occasion , we have spoken amply before . and first of the conjurations against a prince , and the occasions of them , which are many , but one of more importance than all the rest , and that is the hatred of the people : for that prince who has contracted the universal odium of the people , may with reason believe that some of those whom he has offended will study to revenge themselves ; and they will be the more industrious in it , by how much they observe the general discontent and animosity against him . a prince therefore is by all means possible to prevent the hatred of the people , ( but having spoken of it before , i shall not enlarge upon it again . ) for by keeping himself from the general hatred , particular offences will not be able to amount to a war ; first , because all men have not the same resentment , and will not put themselves in danger to revenge an injury ; and then because if the discontented were all of a mind , and had power to do it , yet they are discouraged by the affection which they observe in the multitude towards their prince . the injury done by the prince , is either upon the estate , blood , or honour of the subject : where the injury extends to blood , threatning is very dangerous , and much more than down-right execution ; for when a man is kill'd , he is past thinking of revenge , and those who are alive will quickly forget him ; but when a man is threatned , and finds himself under a necessity of suffering , or doing something extraordinary , he becomes immediately dangerous , and ought to be regarded by the prince , as i shall shew hereafter . next to this necessity for the preservation of ones life ; honour and estate are the two tenderest points in which men are soonest offended , and of which the prince is likewise to have a particular care , for no man can be pillaged so perfectly , but he will have a knife left to revenge himself ; nor no man can be dishonoured to such a degree of debasement , but he will have courage enough left to attempt something in revenge ; and in point of honour , no injury goes so near a man as what reflects upon the woman ; and next to that , is to be despised . this was it that arm'd pausanias against philip of macedon , and many other subjects against many other princes . in our times iulius belanti had never conspired against pandolfus tyrant of siena , had he not first given him his daughter to wife , and then taken her from him again , as we shall shew more at large hereafter . the great motive of the conjuration of the pazzi against the medici was the patrimony of giovanni bonromei , which was given from them by the award of the medici . but there is another motive ( and that no small one ) which makes people conspire against their prince , and that is a desire of rescuing their country from tyranny and usurpation . this was it which set brutus and cassius at work against caesar. this was it which excited others against phalaris , dyonisius , &c. and against this there is no remedy , but depositing their usurpations , and because there are few will do that , there are but few which escape the ill consequence . ad generum cereris , sine caede , & sanguine pauci descendunt reges , & sicca morte tyranni . slaughter and blood pursues , he seldom lies dry in his coffin that a tyrant dies . but in conspiracies , as i said before , the dangers are so great and various , that there is not only a hazard in the designing , management , and execution , but even after the execution is done . the conspirators are either one or more ; one cannot properly be called a conspiracy , but a firm resolution in a single person to make away his prince ; this way of conspiracy is more secure than the other , because till it comes to execution , it can never be known , no body being privy to his secret , and therefore no danger of coming to the ears of the prince . these kind of resolutions may fall into the heart of any man , great or small , noble or ignoble , favourites or strangers : no man but some time or other may have access to his prince , and he that has opportunity to speak with him , has opportunity to do worse . pausanias murdered philip of macedon as he was going to the temple attended with a thousand of his guards , and walking betwixt his own son and his son in law ; but pausanias was a gentleman , and very conversant at court , but there was a poor contemptible spaniard who stabb'd ferdinand king of spain in the neck , and though the wound was not mortal , yet it was enough to shew us that there is no man so inconsiderable , but if he has courage to undertake , he may have opportunity to it : dervis a turkish priest drew his sword upon bajazet father to this present emperor , and though he did not kill him , yet it was not for want either of courage or opportunity . nor is it to be doubted but there are many ill enough disposed , who wish from their hearts to be revenged on their tyrants , but there are few that dare venture , and scarce one of those few but dies in the attempt , and no man will expose himself where there is no hopes to escape . but enough of this pertinacious malevolence in a single person , we will speak now of conspiracies betwixt a number : i say that in history all conspiracies are found to be acted by great persons , and such as have familiarity with their prince : for others , unless they be mad men or fools , will never attempt it , because people that are weak , & remote from the court , are destitute of all those hopes and conveniences that are requisite for the execution of such a design . first , men of slender fortune or interest cannot impart themselves freely , no body will be true them , because no man can concur with them upon any of those hopes which do usually encourage men to the undertaking of any great danger ; so that they can hardly communicate to two or three persons , but one of them is an informer , and the other are ruined . but if they should be so happy as not to be betrayed , the execution is attended with so many difficulties by reason of the difficulty of their access , that it is impossible but they must miscarry : and if great persons , and such as are very conversant with their prince are subject to such hazards , those doubtless must be much more who are under none of those qualifications . wherefore , when men of mean fortune , or little access at court consider their own weakness and inability , they are discouraged from any such designs ; and if at any time they be offended , and would do their prince a mischief , they content themselves with libelling and railing , and expect when persons of greater access and capacity should revenge them upon his person , and if any of these persons are so far transported , as to attempt any thing of this nature , their good will is more to be commended than their discretion . we see then , where any great conspiracy has been made , it has been by great persons , and such as have been familiar with their prince , and that as often upon the score of benefits , as injuries received ; so it was in the conspiracy of perennius against commodus , plautianus against severus , sejanus against tiberius , all of them preferred by their several emperors , and advanced to such honours , authority and estates , that their power seem'd to want nothing of perfection , but the imperial ensigns , and that they might have them as well as the rest , they conspired every one of them against their prince , and their conspiracies had such ends as their ingratitude deserved . however , in the memory of our fathers the conspiracy of giacopo d' apiano against messer piero gambacorti prince of pisa had a better end ; for the said giacopo having been brought up , and caressed , and advanced by the said piero deposed his benefactor , and took away his government for his pains . another of the same nature was that of coppola in our days against ferdinand of arragon , though it had not the same success ; for coppol● being arrived at that height of authority , that there was nothing but the bare name wanting to make him king , he attempted for that , and lost his life in the business . and certainly if any conspiracy might have succeeded , it was his , being a person as powerful as the king himself , and seconded with all the conveniences he could desire : but the same greediness of dominion that blinded him in the undertaking , blinded him in the prosecution of his design ; for had it been managed with the least prudence , it would have been impossible to have miscarried . a prince therefore who would preserve himself against conspiracy , is to have an eye rather upon those he has obliged , than those he has offended ; for they that are offended have not those frequent opportunities that the other have ; and for the disposition , it is much alike , the desire of dominion being as great if not greater than the desire of revenge ; so then authority is to be given to his friends with that caution , that there be always some space or interval left betwixt the preferment of the favourite , and the sovereignty of the prince , lest if his ambition should not be satisfied , he should aspire immediately at the crown . but to return to our design , i say , that conspiratours being to be great men , and such as have easie access to the prince , we are now to enquire into the successes of their plots , and see what have been the causes of their prosperity or miscarriage . and because ( as i said before ) the danger is considerable in the management , execution , and afterwards ; for that reason there are very few of them that arrive at their proposed end . in their contrivances and consultations there is such extraordinary danger , that unless they be carried on with singular caution and prudence , they will be easily discovered ; and they are discovered two ways , either by down-right impeachment , or by conjecture and presumption . impeachment proceeds either from infidelity or folly in those persons with whom you have communicated ; infidelity is easily found , for you cannot communicate in that nature but with such of your confidents as you suppose will venture their lives for you ; or else with such persons as are dissatisfied with the government : of such kind of confidents , one or two may possibly be found , but when you begin to multiply them , and commit your secret to more , you must necessarily be betrayed ; for their affection to you must be very great , if the apprehension of the danger , and the fear of the punishment do not deter them : besides , men are many times mistaken in the affection of their friends ; for they can never be assured of them till they have made experiment , and to make experiment in such ways as this , is exceedingly dangerous , and if perchance you have had trial of them in some other matters of importance in which they have behaved themselves faithfully and well , yet you can take no true measures from that , because this surpasses all other dangers whatsoever . if you presume upon his discontent , animosity to his prince , you may be casily deceived , for as soon as you have discovered your design , you have given him a power to reconcile himself , and his rancour must be very great , or your influence extraordinary to keep him faithful : hence it is that many conspiracies are discovered , and as it were nipp'd in the bud ; and when any of them are kept private where many persons are privy , 't is look'd upon as a miracle , as that of piso against nero , and in our times that of the pazzi against lorenzo , and giuliano de medici , in which though fifty were concerned , it was never discovered till it came to execution ; for discoveries by indiscretion , they happen when one of the conspirators talks carelesly , so as some servant or third person picks it out , as it hapned to the sons of brutus , who in their negotiations with tarquin's embassadors , were over-heard , and accused by one of the servants : another way is when out of levity you communicate with some child or woman that you love , or such other incontinent person , as dinus did , who being ( with philotas ) entred into a conspiracy against alexander the great , imparted it to a boy that he loved , called ficomachus who told it to his brother cibalinus , and cibalinus discovered it to the king. as to discoveries by circumstances and conjecture , we have an example in the pisonian conspiracy against nero , in which scevinus one of the conspirators having the day before nero was to have been murther'd , made his will , ordered milichius his freeman to furbish up his old rusty sword , enfranchised all his slaves , distributed mony among them , and caused plagets and l●gatures to be made to bind up wounds , he gave occasion of conjecture to milichius , who accused him thereupon to nero , and order being given for his apprehension , scevinus was taken into custody , and with him natalis another of the conspirators , who had been observed to have talked privately with him a long time the day before , and not agreeing about their discourse , they contradicted one another , and were forced to confess all . from these occasions of discovery it is impossible to be secur'd , but either by malice , imprudence , or inadvertency , all will out when ever the conspirators exceed the number of three or four . for if more than one of them be taken , 't is impossible but they must interfere , because two people cannot hang together so exactly in a story . if there be but one apprehended , and he be a stout man , perhaps he may have that constancy and resolution as to conceal his confederates ; but then his confederates must have as much courage as he , and not discover themselves by their slight ; for whose heart soever fails , whether his that is apprehended , or his that is escaped , 't is the same thing , for the plot is discovered . that example which is mentioned by titus livius is very rare and unusual , where in a conspiracy against girolamo king of syracuse , he speaks of one of the conspirators called theodorus , who being seized , concealed his accomplices with incomparable constancy , and accused all the kings friends ; and his companions were so confident in his courage , that none of them fled , or made the least discovery by their fear . these are the dangers which are to be pass'd in the conduct or management of an enterprize , before it comes to execution ; and as there are dangers , so there are ways of evading them . the first , the surest , and indeed the only way is not to give your confederates time to discover you , but to communicate the business to them when it is just ready for execution , and not before . those who take that course , are free from the danger of threatnings and negotiations , and commonly from all the rest ; and have been observed frequently to come to good end , and there is no man that is wise , but would carry it so if he could . i shall give you only two examples . nelimatus being unable to endure the tyranny of aristotimus king of epirus , got several of his friends and relations together into his house , and exhorting them to the deliverance of their country , some of them desired them to consider , and prepare themselves ; whereupon nelimatus caused his servants to make fast the doors , and protested to all the whole company , that they should swear to go immediately about it , or he would deliver them up prisoners to aristotimus , upon which they all took the oath , and falling incontinently to the work , they effected their design , as nelimatus had contriv'd it . one of the magi having by fraud possessed himself of the kingdom of persia , and orthanus a great person of that kingdom , having discovered the cheat , he had a conference with six others of his own quality , to contrive how they might rescue their country from the tyranny of that usurper , and ( as in the case before ) when some of them desired time , darius ( one of the six ) stood up and declared boldly , that if they would not execute it presently , he would accuse them every one , and doing it forthwith , they prospered accordingly . not unlike these two , was the way which the aetolians used in the assassination of nabis the tyrant of sparta : they sent one of their citizens called alexamenes to him with horse , foot under a pretence of a supply , commanding the soldiers to be obedient to the orders of their chief officers , but acquainted nobody with the design but alexamenes himself . alexamenes marched to sparta with his forces , but communicating nothing of his instructions , till they were fit to be executed , he did his business , and the tyrant was slain ; by which reservedness they avoided the first dangers of being discovered , which are obvious in the management , and whoever takes the same course , shall avoid them as well as they . piso ( whom i have mention'd before ) was a man of honour and reputation , a great intimate of nero's , and one in whom he placed a great deal of confidence . nero visited him often , and was many times treated very magnificently in his garden : piso by virtue of this intimacy was able to make choice of such complices as were stout and couragious , and disposed to such an exploit ( which for great men to do , is no difficult matter ) and when occasion was offered , to break the business to them so suddenly , that having no time either to deliberate or deny him , he must necessarily succeed ; and he who examines all the other examples that are mentioned , will find very few , but have been managed the same way . but men of little experience in the affairs of the world , do many times commit great errors , and more , when their designs are extraordinary , as in this . a plot then is never to be imparted , but upon necessity , and when it is ripe for execution ; and when you do communicate , do it but to one , and that a person of whom you have had long experience , or one that is prompted by the same interest and provocation as your self ; and to find one person so , is much easier than to find many , and by consequence that way is nothing so dangerous . besides , if you should be mistaken in your confidence , you have more remedy and defence , than where the conspirators are several ; for i have heard wise men say , that to a single person a man may say any thing ; ( for if nothing be to be produced under your hand ) your no , will be as good as his yea : but writing is to be shun'd as a rock , for nothing is of so much conviction , as a note under a man 's own hand . plautianus desiring to murther severus the emperor , and his son antoninus ; committed the execution to saturninus a tribune , who had more mind to betray , than obey him ; but suspecting that when he came to accuse him , plautianus should have more credit than he , he desired a warrant under his hand to confirm his commission , which plautianus granted , being blinded with ambition , whereby it happen'd that he was accused , convicted , and condemned , whereas without that note , and some other circumstances , plautianus would have been acquitted , and his accuser been punished , so obstinately did plautianus deny all . in the pisonian conspiracy , there was a woman called epicaris , who had been formerly one of nero's misses . this epicaris thinking it of importance to bring in a captain of certain galleys which nero kept for his guard , she communicated the plot , but conceal'd the conspirators , and the captain betraying her , and accusing her to nero , epicaris maintained the contrary with such constancy , that the emperor was amaz'd , and discharged her . so then , he that communicates a thing of this nature to one , runs but these two dangers , either of being spontaneously accused , and proof brought to make it good ; or else being accused by accident and of force , as when his confederate is apprehended upon suspition , and impeaches him upon the rack , in both which cases there is something to be said ; for in the first he may pretend malice , in the second fear , and that the extremity of his torture constrained him to say false : so that it is great wisdom to communicate with no body , till your designs be ripe but to proceed according to the examples aforesaid ; but if you must communicate , to do it but to one alone , and by himself ; in which though there be some danger , yet there is much less than where you communicate with many . another way , and not unlike this , is when the fury or violence of a tyrant necessitates you to do that to him , which otherwise he would be sure to do to you ; and sometimes it is so sudden and fierce , it leaves you scarce time to think of securing your self . this is an exigence and necessity that has most commonly a good end , and to prove it , i will produce two examples , and no more . commodus the emperour had two captains of his guards ( one of them called lettus , , and the other elettus ) particularly in his favour , and martia was the most intimate of his concubines . they having taken the liberty to admonish him of his ill courses , and the reflection his ill conversation had both upon his person and government , he resolved to rid himself of his monitors , and to that end writ down the names of martia , lettus , elettus , and others ( who he designed should be put to death the next night ) and put the note under his pillow . being gone out into a bath , a child that he lov'd exceedingly , being rummaging about the room , happened upon this paper , and going out with it in his hand , martia met him by accident , took it from him , read it , sent it immediately to lettus and elettus , who being sensible of their danger , resolved to prevent him , and without more ado , killed commodus in the evening . antoninus caracalla the emperor , was with his army in mesopotamia , and having made macrinus his general ( a better statesman than soldier ) it hapned ( as it does to all princes that are wicked ) that he began to apprehend ( what he knew he deserved ) that some body conspired against him . to be more certain , he writ privately to a friend ( called maternianus ) in rome , to consult the astrologers , and give him notice whether any body was contriving against the empire . maternianus writ him word he had consulted them , that there were those who did aspire at the empire , and that macrinus was the man. this letter coming by accident to the hands of macrinus , before the emperor saw it , he found the necessity that was upon him either to kill or be kill'd ; and thereupon committed the execution to a confident of his call'd martialis ( whose brother antoninus had slain not many days before ) who kill'd him accordingly . we see then that this necessity which allows us no time , has the same effect in a manner with the course which was taken by nelimatus of epirus , as i have mentioned before . we see likewise , that ( as i said in the beginning of these discourses ) that commination and threatning does a prince more mischief , and are the occasion of more plots , than violence it self . a prince therefore is to have a care of that ; to caress those that are about him , and keep them in their allegiance by his courtesie and kindness ; if that will not do , he is to secure himself otherwise as well as he can , but never to bring them into a condition of thinking themselves under a necessity of killing or being kill'd . as to the dangers which attend the execution of a plot , they proceed either from a sudden alteration of orders ; a sudden defection of courage in him that is to execute ; some imprudence in the attempt ; or some imperfection in the act , as when all are not killed that were intended . and first we must understand that there is nothing gives so much embarrasment , and distraction to the action of men as new and contradictory orders to be executed in an instant . and quite contrary to what was determined before . and if in any thing this variation be dangerous , it is in martial affairs , and in such things as we have now spoken of ; for in those cases there is nothing so necessary as that every man may know certainly his part , that beforehand he may contrive with himself , and conclude upon all the circumstances of the fact ; whereas if they have fram'd their designs , and fix'd upon their way , and immediately new orders are brought repugnant to the former , it disturbs all , and the whole plot must be ruined ; so that it is better to execute it according to the first order , though there be something of inconvenience , than to vary your orders , with a thousand times more : but this is meant only where the variation is sudden , for where you have time enough , it is not so dangerous . the conspiracy of the pazzi against lorenzo and giuliano de medici is very well known . their first orders were , that an entertainment should be made for the cardinal of st. george , to which the medici should be invited , and killed . every mans office was assigned ; some were to kill them ; some were to secure the palace ; and others to ride up and down the city , and proclaim liberty to the people : it happened when the pazzi , medici , and cardinal were altogether in the cathedral in florence at divine service , news was brought that iulian would not be at dinner : hereupon the conspirators consulting again , it was resolved to alter the plot , and do that in the church which was designed in the chamber : this sudden alteration , discomposed the whole order ; for giovan batista da montesecco would not consent to add sacriledge to his murther , and commit it in the church ; upon which they were forced to appoint another in his place , and shift all their agents from one office to another , and their time being too short to fix their resolutions , they committed so many errors in the execution , that all of them miscarried . and among the conspirators , when things come to be executed , their heart many times fails them , either out of sudden reverence , or sudden fear ; for the presence and majesty of some princes is so aweful , it either mitigates or frightens the fury of the executioner ; marius being taken and kept prisoner by the minturnenses , they sent a servant to kill him ; but the poor slave was so terrified at the sight of his person , and the memory of his name , that his courage fail'd , and he was not able to go thorow , ; and if the consideration of his quality , and the majesty of his countenance could do so much , in a person that was a prisoner , and in distress ; how much more are they effectual in a free prince , magnificently adorn'd , and as nobly attended . certainly such a sight is able to strike terror into the boldest person , and work compassion in the most cruel miscreant . some there were who conspired against sitalcis king of thrace : the day was appointed for the execution ; they met at the place , where the prince was ; but when the stroke was to be given , no body durst venture , they departed as they came , every body blamed one another , but no body knew what was the impediment , and having attempted it often with the same intimidation , they were discovered at last , and received punishment for an offence which they might , but would not put in execution . alfonso duke of ferrara had two brothers , who conspired against him , and employed giannes a priest and chantor in the said dukes chappel , to bring the duke to them , which he did many times , and it was in their power to to have killed him ; but yet not any of them durst strike him , so that at length they also were discovered , and received their reward . this remorse can proceed from nothing but the terror of his presence , or the influence of his behaviour and humanity , which compels them to mercy . but the defects and disappointments in these kind of executions , proceed either from imprudence , or terror , with either of which , the minds of the conspirators being disturbed , they become so confused and distracted , they can neither say , nor do any thing as they should . and that men are subject to those confusions and surprizes , cannot be better demonstrated than by livy's description of alexamenus the aetolian , of whom we have spoken before : for when the time was come for the execution of his design against nabis the spartan , having imparted it to his friends , livy tells us , collegit , & ipse animum , confusum tantae cogitatione rei . he recollected his mind , which was in some measure confounded with the contemplation of the enterprize for there is no man , how resolute and bloody soever he be , but must be surprized and discomposed in such cases as those , wherefore for such exploits , experienced men , and such as have been used to those kind of affairs , are to be chosen , and no other , though never so stout : for he that has had no tryal of himself in that nature , ought not to presume barely upon his courage ; nor can he promise himself any certain success , by reason that the terror and perturbation of his mind is many times so strong , that it makes his weapon fall out of his hand , or words fall from his mouth , which discover the whole plot. lucilla the sister of commodus , ordered quintianus to kill her brother : quintianus waited for commodus as he came into the amphitheater , and meeting him when he came , he ran at him with his naked sword , crying aloud , questo ti mando il senato , the senate sends you this ; but those words gave an alarm , and he was seized before he could lift up his arm to give the blow . messer antonio da volterra , deputed ( as is said before ) to kill lorenzo de medici , when he advanced to assault him , cryed out , ah traytor ! but that exclamation was the preservation of lorenzo , and the ruine of the conspirators . but these enterprizes are difficult , when directed only against one person , for the reasons abovesaid , yet when they are bent against two , they are much more , because in several places it is impossible any design should be well executed at once ; so that to conspire against a prince in that way , is a doubtful , dangerous and imprudent thing . were it not for the reverence i bear to the author , i should scarce believe what herodian says of plautianus , that he committed to one single centurion called saturninus , the killing of severus and antoninus who lived in several places ; for 't is so irrational a thing , that nothing but his authority could have persuaded me to it . certain young gentlemen of athens conspired against diocles and hippias , two tyrants in that city . they killed diocles , but hippias escaped , and revenged his death . chiones and leonides of heraclea , two of plato's disciples , conspired against clearchus and satirus , two tyrants of that place ; clearchus was murthered , but satirus survived and revenged it . the pazzi ( whom we have so often mentioned ) killed only iulian de medici , his brother escaping ; so that from these conspiracies against several persons , all wise people will abstain , as things that are fatal to themselves , their country , and every body else ; for those who escape are thereby render'd the more cruel and tyrannical , as appears by the aforesaid examples in florence , athens , and heraclea . and therefore the conspiracy of pelopidas against the tyrants of thebes was admirable , in respect of the success , seeing not only one , but ten of them were to be murthered ; and that he was neither a favourite , nor had easie access to them ; but was a rebel , and in banishment ; yet he overcame all these difficulties , got into thebes , killed the tyrants , and delivered his country ; but with the assistance of caron one of the tyrants great counsellors who gave him admission , and contributed much to his success . but let no man presume upon this example , for it is looked upon not only as a rare thing , but as a miracle . the execution of such a design may be interruped likewise by a false imagination , or some unexpected accident happening in the very act . the very morning that brutus and his confederates were to murther caesar , it hapned that he had a long discourse with cn. popilius lenas one of the conspirators , which the rest of the accomplices observing , concluded that popilius had discovered all to caesar , and was giving him an account ; whereupon it was proposed to kill caesar presently , and not to defer it till he was in the senate ; and doubtless they had done it , but that their discourse broke off ; and caesar went away without any commotion . these imaginations are sometimes very considerable , and to be regarded with a great deal of prudence , and the rather , because they are easily taken up ; for he who is conscious to himself , is always apt to suspect that they are talking of him ; and it may so fall out , that a word spoken to another intent , may gaul and disturb you as much as if it were spoken on purpose , and either force you to fly , or so hasten and precipitate the execution , that you run your self upon many inconveniences , especially where many are privy to the plot. as to the accidents , because they are unexpected and occasional , no directions can be given against them , but examples by which men are to regulate and be cautious . iulius belanti of siena ( whom we have mentioned before ) being incensed against pandolfus , who had given him his daughter in marriage , and taken her from him again , conspired his death , and laid his design thus , pandolfus went almost every day to visit one of his relations that was sick ; and in his passage went commonly by iulius his house : upon this consideration , iulius got all his accomplices together into his house , with intention to assault him as he went by ; to which purpose he armed them all , and disposed them into the porch , that they might be ready upon a signal to be given from a window above : it hapned that pandolfus being just by , the person at the window gave the signal , when by accident in the very nick of time pandolfus met a friend , and stopt to salute him : some of his attendants passing on , heard a noise of arms , took the alarm , and discovered the ambuscade ; so that pandolfus was miraculously preserved , iulio and his companions forced to fly from siena , and all by the accident of this rencounter , which not only hindred the execution at that time , but defeated the whole enterprize . but against these accidents no remedy can be prescribed , because they happen so rarely ; however it is necessary to think of us many , and provide against them as well as we can . it remains now that we say something of those dangers which we incur after execution is done ; of which sort there is but one , and that is , when somebody is left alive that may revenge it : as his children , brothers , kinsmen , and such others to whom the sovereignty may descend by right of inheritance , and these may be left to revenge the death of their predecessor , either by your negligence , or by some of the accidents aforesaid , as it hapned to giovan-andrea da lampognano , who conspiring with other persons , killed the duke of milan , but they left two of his brothers and one of his sons behind , who revenged it in due time . but in these cases the conspirators are to be excused , because there is no remedy to be provided ; but where by their own imprudence or negligence they suffer any such to escape , there it is otherwise , and they are highly to be condemned . at forum livii some there were who conspired against count girolamo , ●lew him , seized upon his wife and children , ( which were very young ) and clap'd them in prison : a great mind they had to the castle , but the governour was refractory , and would not admit them ; the counsels ( called madonna caterin● ) made them a proposition , that if they would suffer her to go into him , she would prevail with the governor to surrender , and that in the mean time her children should be left as hostages in their hands . the conspirators believed her , and let her go in , but she was no sooner in the castle , but she began to upbraid them by the death of her husband , and threaten them with all possible revenge ; and to convince them that her care and compassion for her children should not restrain her , she shew'd them her genitals thorow the windows , to let them know , that if they killed those , she had wherewithal to have more : so that perceiving their error too late , and being destitute of all counsel , their indiscretion was punished with their perpetual banishment . but of all dangers after the fact is committed , none is so fatal as the affection of the people to their prince whom you have slain . for their revenge is not possible to be prevented . of this , the murder of caesar may be an example : for the people of rome being his friends , his death was thorowly revenged upon the conspirators , who afterwards ( though in several times and places ) were all of them slain . conjurations against ones country are not so dangerous as conjurations against ones prince ; for in the contrivance and management the dangers are not so many ; in the execution they are but the same ; and after the fact is committed , they are nothing at all . in the management and preparation the dangers are not so many , because a citizen may make his party , and put his affairs in a posture without discover● 〈…〉 ●is orders be not interrupted , bring his designs to a very good end ; or if they be in●errupted by some law , it is in his power to adjourn the execution , or find out some other way that may be more commodious ; but all these ( it is to be understood ) are to be done only in commonwealths , where the manners of the people are beginning to be corrupted ; because where the city is incorrupt , such designs will never come into any of their thoughts ; but in a corrupt republick where the dangers are not so great , there are many ways for private citizens to make themselves princes ; because a commonwealth is not so quick and dexterous as a prince , their suspicion is less , and by consequence their caution : besides , they are commonly in more awe of their grandees , and therefore the grandees are more bold and couragious against them . every body has read catilins's conspiracy written by salust , and can tell how catiline ( after it was detected ) not only continued in rome , but came audaciously into the senate , and had the confidence to talk insolently both to the senate and consul ; so great reverence had that city , for its citizens . and when things were gone so far , that he had left the city , and was got to the head of an army , lentulus , and the rest of the conspirators had never been seized , had not there been letters produced against them under their own hands . hanno a great citizen in carthage had a mind to usurp ; and in order thereto ; he had contrived at the wedding of one of his daughters to poison the whole senate , and then make himself prince : when his plot was discovered , the senate troubled themselves with no farther provision against it , than by making a law against exorbitant feasting upon such kind of occasions , so great was their respect to a citizen of his quality ! but in a conspiracy against ones country , the greatest danger lies in the execution ; for it seldom happens that a particular citizen is strong enough to subdue a whole country ; and every man is not general of an army , as caesar , agathocles , cleomenes and others were , who had their armies ready to back their designs . to such the way is easie and secure ; but they who want those advantages must manage their business with more cunning , or employ foreign assistance : this cunning and artifice was used by pisistrates the athenian ; for having overcome the megarenses , and thereby got himself great reputation among the people , he came forth of his house one morning , and shew'd himself wounded to them , complaining that the nobility had abused him , and desiring that he might be permitted to have a guard for the security of his person ; which being granted inconsiderately , gave him opportunity by degrees to make himself absolute . pandolfus petrucci ( with other exiles ) returned to siena ; and by way of contempt was made keeper of the palace , which was a mechanick employment that others had refused . yet those few arm'd men who were under his command by virtue of that place , by degres gave him such reputation , that at length he made himself prince . others have taken other ways , and by time , and their industry , arrived at the same dignity without any danger : but those who have endeavoured to make themselves masters of their country by their own force , or foreign supplies ; have had various events , as fortune was pleased to befriend them ! cataline was ruined : hanno ( of whom we have spoken before ) failing in his poison , arm'd many thousands of his partisans , which were all slain with him . certain of the principal citizens of thebes , by the help of a spartan army , made themselves masters of that city , and tyranniz'd over it : so that if all conspiracies against their country be examined , there will none , or but very few be found to have miscarried in the management ; but the whole stress of their good or bad fortune has layn upon the execution , which being once pass'd , they are subject to no more dangers than what depend upon the nature of the government ; for when a man usurps , and makes himself a tyrant , he exposes himself to those natural and inseparable dangers which are the consequences of tyranny , against which he has no other remedies than what have been described before . this is what i have thought convenient to write upon the subject of conspiracies ; and if i have discoursed only of those which are executed by the sword , and not by poison , it is because they have the same orders and methods . true it is , the way of poison is the most dangerous , as being the more uncertain , because every one has not convenience , but is forc'd to confer with other people , and the necessity of that conference is much to be feared : besides , many things happen which makes your potion ineffectual , as it fell out to those who killed commodus ; who having disgorg'd his poison , forc'd the conspirators to strangle him . princes then have no enemy to which they are more dangerously exposed , than to these conspiracies , because they are never undertaken against any of them , but they take away his life , or reputation . if they succeed , he dies ; if they miscarry , and the instruments be put to death , it is look'd upon as a pretence and invention of the prince to satiate his avarice or cruelty upon the blood or fortunes of his enemies . my advice therefore is ( both to prince and commonwealth , that upon the discovery of a conspiracy , ( before they think of revenge ) seriously to consider the quality of it , and to compare the condition of the conspirators with their own : if they find them potent and strong , till they have furnished themselves with a proportionable force , no notice is to be taken ; if notice be taken , they are unable to defend themselves , and certainly ruined ; for the conspirators finding themselves discovered , will grow desperate , and be under a necessity of venturing , let the success be what it will. the romans may be an example of this way of dissembling ; for having ( as we said before ) left two of their legions at capua for the security of that city against the samnites ; the commanders of the said legions conspir'd to make themselves masters of the town . the romans having notice of their designs , committed the prevention of it to rutilius their new consul , who to lull and delude the conspirators , gave out that the senate had confirmed that station to those legions for another winter , which the legions believed , and thinking then they should have time enough , they neglected to hasten their design , till at length observing the consul to draw them away insensibly , and dispose them into other parts , they began to suspect , and that suspicion made them discover themselves , and put their plot in execution . nor can an example be brought more properly for either sides ; for by it we may see how cool and remiss people are when they think they have time enough ; and how sudden and vigorous when necessity presses them . and the prince or commonwealth which would defer the discovery of a plot , cannot do it with more advantage to himself , than by giving the conspirators some handsom occasion to believe that they may execute it with more ease and security another time ; for thereby the prince or commonwealth will have more leisure to provide for their defence : they who have proceeded otherwise , have but hastened their own ruine , as we have seen in the case of the duke of athens , and gulielmo de pazzi . the duke having made himself sovereign in florence , and understanding there were conspiracies against him ; without enquiring farther into the business , caused one of them to be apprehended , which giving an alarm to the rest , they immediately took arms , and turn'd the duke out of his supremacy . gulielmo being commissary for that city in the val di chiana in the year , having news of a great plot in arezzo in favour of the vitelli , and that their design was to renounce the dominion of the florentines , he marched thither directly , without considering the power of the conspirators , or his own , or so much as furnishing himself with what forces he might have done ; and by the advice of the bishop his son , causing one of the conspirators to be seized , the rest fell presently to their arms , disclaim'd the florentines , and took their commissary prisoner . but when conspiracies are weak , and in their infancy , if they be discovered , they are to suppress them out of hand , without any suspence , and not to follow the example either of the duke of athens , or dion of syracuse , of whom the first caused a citizen who had discovered a plot to him , to be put to death , that the rest observing how unwilling he was to believe any thing of them , might be the more secure , and hold themselves obliged . dion on the other side suspecting the affections of some people , caused one of his confidents called calippus to pretend a conspiracy , and see if he could draw them in ; but both these practices succeeded very ill , for by the first , all people were discouraged from making any discovery , and all conspirators confirmed ; and by the other , a way was recommended for the murdering of himself ; for calippus finding he had an opportunity to practice without danger , he did it so effectually , that it cost dion both his government and life . chap. vii . how it comes to pass that in the changes of state , from liberty to servitude , and from servitude to liberty , some are very innocent , and others very bloody . some people perhaps may wonder how it should come to pass that governments should be changed from one form to another , sometimes easily , and without blood , and sometimes with great difficulty and slaughter , be the variation as it will , either from liberty to tyranny , or from tyranny to liberty . and this diversity of mutations is so strange , that as history tells us , they happen sometimes with infinite effusion of blood , and at other times without the least injury to any body : as in rome , when the government was taken from the kings , and put into the hands of the consul● , no body was expulsed , or so much as molested but the tarquins ; but in other alterations it has been otherwise , and the cause of this diversity may ( in my judgment ) be deduced from the manner in which that state was acquired ; if it was obtained by force , it could not be without injury to many people , and then when ever it is destroyed , it will necessarily follow that all those who were injured before , will endeavour to repair and revenge themselves ; which is not to be done without great tumult and slaughter . but when a commonwealth is fix'd gradually , and by universal consent of the people , when it comes to be changed , there is no need of disturbing any body ●lse ; for the bare removal of those who are then in authority , will effectually do the business . of this sort was the revolution at rome upon the translation of the government from the kings to the consuls ; and the accident at florence in the year , when the medici were expelled without the least prejudice to any body else ; for they having been advanced by the general vote of the people , there was no need of doing more than turning them out of the city . such mutations are not therefore so dangerous ; but those others where many have been injured , and as many are to be revenged , have been so dreadfully destructive , that the very history of their consequences is enough to terrifie the reader ; but all books being full of them , i shall speak no more of them in this place . chap. viii . he who would change the form of a government , is to consider seriously upon what grounds he does it , and the disposition of the subject . it has been said before , that an evil disposed citizen can do no great hurt but in an ill disposed city , which conclusion ( besides my former arguments ) is much fortfied by the examples of sp●rius cassius , and manlius capitolinus ; spurius was an ambitious man , and being desirous to procure to himself extraordinary authority in rome , by favouring the people in the sale of such lands as the romans had conquered from the hernici , the senate discovered it , and grew so jealous of him , that when in a speech of his to the people he proffered to give them the mony which had been received for corn that the senate had sent for out of sicily , the people absolutely refused it ; supposing that spurius intended that their liberty should make it good : but had the people of rome at that time been corrupt , or ill disposed , they had taken his mony , and opened him a way to the making himself absolute ; but the example of manlius capitolinus is greater than this , for by that we may see how the courage and integrity which he expressed to his country in their wars against the gauls , was afterwards clowded and extinguished by an infatiable desire of authority arising from an emulation of camillus , whom the romans had advanced to a greater degree of honour ; and so strangely was he blinded with this passion , that not considering the state and incorruption of the city , or how indisposed the people were to any such enterprize , he began to make parties , and raise tumults in rome both against the senate and laws . in which passage it was evident how well that government was constituted , and how well that people was disposed ; for in this case ( though the nobility and he were great friends , and fierce defenders of one anothers interest ) none of them , nor his very relations appeared in his behalf ; and whereas at other trials the friends of the criminal used to accompany him to the bar in mourning , and with all other circumstances of sadness that they 〈◊〉 of , to work ( if it were possible ) the judges to compassion ; manlius went alone , without so much as one friend to attend him : the tribunes of the people who were in other things always opposite to the nobility , and created on purpose to balance their power ; when they found the design tending to the ruine of them all , they joyn'd heartily with them to remove so commo● a destruction : and the people of rome , who were zealous in any thing that made for their advantage , and lovers of any thing that crossed the nobility , ( though they also had their kindness for manlius ; ) nevertheless when the tribunes cited him , and referred him to the judgment of the people , they condemned him to death , without any consideration of his former services . wherefore i am of opinion , that in the whole tract of this history there is not an example that with more efficacy demonstrates the justice of that commonwealth in all its orders and degrees of men than this ; seeing there was not one citizen appeared in the defence of manlius , who was a person of known virtue and endowments , and had done many honourable things both in publick and private , and the reason was , because the love to their country had a greater influence upon them than any other respect ; and the consideration of the present danger of their affairs , being stronger than the memory of his past merits , they chose to free themselves by decreeing his death . titus livius , tells us , hunc exitum habuit vir nisi in libera civitatenatusesset , memorabilis ; this was the end of a man who had been very memorable , had he been born any where but in a free state. and in his case there are two things very remarkable ; one , that in a corrupt state glory and authority is acquir'd a quite contrary way , than where they live exactly according to the true rules of policy and justice ; the other , ( not much unlike the former ) that men in their affairs , especially of greatest importance , are to consider the times , and accommodate thereunto ; and those who by the unhappiness of their election , or their natural inclination do otherwise , live always unfortunately , and are more unsuccessful in all their enterprizes than they who comply with the times . and doubtless , by the fore-mentioned expression of the historian , had manlius been born in the days of marius and sylla , when the mass was corrupt and depraved , and susceptible of any form his ambition would have imprinted , he had had the same success that they had when they aspired to be absolute . so again , had marius and sylla come into the world in the time of manlius , they had miscarried as he did , and been lost in their first attempt . for one man by his ill customs and conversation may indeed give a touch and tincture of corruption to the people , but 't is impossible his life should be long enough to debauch them so totally that he may expect any advantage of it in his time ; or if he should be so happy , and live long enough to infect a whole city ; yet so impatient are the desires of man , that they cannot restrain their passions , or attend an opportunity of pursuing them wisely , but they circumvent and delude themselves in those very things of which they are most eagerly ambitious ; so that sometimes for want of patience , and sometimes for want of judgment they venture rashly upon things before the matter be prepared , and are ruined in their designs . he therefore who would alter a government and set up himself , must attend till time has corrupted the mass , and by degrees brought all into disorder , which of necessity must follow , when it is not ( as we said before ) purged and refined by the examples of good men or good laws , that may reduce it towards its first principles . manlius then had been a great and memorable person , had he been born in a corrupt city ; for whoever designs any innovation in a state , whether it be for the restitution of liberty , or the erection of tyranny , is particularly to regard the manners of the people , and to consider how far they are disposed to submit to his ambition ; and by so doing he may be able to judge of the success of his enterprize . for to endeavour to make a people free , that are servile in their nature , is as hard a matter , as to keep them in servitude , who are disposed to be free . and because we have said before , that in all their operations men are to consider and proceed according to the quality of the times , we shall speak of it at large in the following chapter . chap. ix . how he that would succeed , must accommodate to the times . i have many times considered with my self that the occasion of every mans good or bad fortune consists in his correspondence and accommodation with the times . we see some people acting furiously , and with an impetus ; others with more slowness and caution ; and because both in the one and the other they are immoderate , and do not observe their just terms , therefore both of them do err ; but their error and misfortune is least , whose customs suit and correspond with the times ; and who comports himself in his designs according to the impulse of his own nature . every one can tell how fabius maximus conducted his army , and with what carefulness and caution he proceeded , contrary to the ancient heat and boldness of the romans , and it hapned that grave way was more conformable to those times ; for hanibal coming young and brisk into italy , and being elated with his good fortune , as having twice defeated the armies of the romans , that commonwealth having lost most of her best soldiers , and remaining in great fear and confusion , nothing could have happen'd more seasonably to them , than to have such a general who by his caution and cunctation could keep the enemy at a bay. nor could any times have been more fortunate to his way of proceeding ; for that that slow and deliberate way was natural in fabius , and not affected , appeared afterwards when scipio being desirous to pass his army into africk to give the finishing blow to the war , fabius opposed it most earnestly , as one who could not force or dissemble , his nature , which was rather to support wisely against the difficulties that were upon him , than to search out for new . so that had fabius directed , hanibal had continued in italy , and the reason was because he did not consider the times were altered , and the method of the war was to be changed with them : and if fabius at that time had been king of rome , he might well have been worsted in the war , as not knowing how to frame his counsels according to the variation of the times . but there being in that commonwealth so many brave men , and excellent commanders of all sorts of tempers and humours , fortune would have it , that as fabius was ready in hard and difficult times , to sustain the enemy , and continue the war ; so afterwards when affairs were in a better posture , scipio was presented to finish and conclude it . and hence it is , that an aristocracy or free state is longer lived , and generally more fortunate , than a principality , because in the first they are more flexible , and can frame themselves better to the diversity of the times : for a prince being accustomed to one way , is hardly to be got out of it , though perhaps the variation of the times require it very much . piero soderini ( whom i have mentioned before ) proceeded with great gentleness and humanity in all his actions ; and he and his country prospered whilst the times were according ; but when the times changed , and there was a necessity of laying aside that meekness and humility , pi●● was at a loss , and he and his country were both ruined . pope iulius xi . during the whole time of his papacy carried himself with great vigour and vehemence ; and because the times were agreeable , he prospered in every thing ; but had the times altered , and required other counsels , he had certainly been ruined , because he could never have complyed . and the reason why we cannot change so easily with the times , is twofold ; first , because we cannot readily oppose our selves against what we naturally desire ; and next , because when we have often tryed one way , and have always been prosperous , we can never persuade our selves that we can do so well any other ; and this is the true cause why a princes fortune varies so strangely , because she varies the times , but he does not alter the way of his administrations . and it is the same in a commonwealth , if the variation of the times be not observed , and their laws and customs altered accordingly , many mischiefs must follow , and the government be ruined , as we have largely demonstrated before ; but those alterations of their laws are more slow in a common-wealth , because they are not so easily changed , and there is a necessity of such times as may shake the whole state , to which one man will not be sufficient , let him change his proceedings , and take new measures as he pleases . but because we have mentioned fabius maximus , and how he kept hanibal at a bay , i think it not amiss to enquire in the next chapter whether a general who is resolved upon any terms to engage , can be obstructed by the enemy . chap. x. a general cannot avoid fighting , when the enemy is resolved to engage him upon any terms . cneus sulpitius dictator ( says livy ) adversus gallos bellum trahebat , nolens se fortunae committere adversus hostem , quem tempus deteriorem indies , & locus alienus , faceret . cneus sulpitius the dictator declined fighting with the french , because he would not expose himself unnecessarily against an enemy , who by the incommodity of the season , and inconvenience of his station was every day in danger to be undone . when such a fault happens as deceives all , or the greatest part of mankind , i think it not improper to reprehend it over and over again ; and therefore though i have formerly in several places shown how much our actions in great things , are different from those in ancient times ; yet i think it not superfluous to say something of it here . if in any thing we deviate from the practice of the ancients , it is in our military discipline , in which we are so absolutely new , that there is scarce any thing used that was preferred by our ancestors ; and the reason is , because commonwealths and princes , being unwilling to expose themselves to danger , have shifted off that study and charge upon other people : and when in our times any prince goes in person into the field , no extraordinary matter is to be expected , for he takes the command upon him to show his grandeur and magnificence , more than for any thing else . yet they commit fewer faults ( by reviewing their armies sometimes , and keeping that command in their own hands ) than republicks are wont to do , especially in italy , where trusting all to other people , they understand nothing of war themselves ; and on the other side , in their counsels and determinations ( which to show their superiority they reserve to themselves ) they commit a thousand times more errors than in the field , some of which i have mentioned elsewhere , but i shall speak here of one of them , and that of more than ordinary importance , when these unactive princes , or effeminate commonwealths send out an army , the wisest thing which they think they can give in command to their general , is to enjoyn him from fighting , and above all things to have a care of a battel , supposing that therein they imitate the wisdom of fabius maximus , who preserved the state , by deferring the combat ; but they are mistaken , and do not consider that most commonly that injunction is either idle , or dangerous ; for this is most certain , a general who desires to keep the field , cannot avoid fight when the enemy presses , and makes it his business to engage him . so that to command a general in that nature , in as much as to bid him fight when the enemy pleases , and not when he sees occasion himself . for to keep the field , and avoid fighting , is to be done no way so securely as by keeping miles off , and sending out store of spies and scouts that may give you notice of the enemies approach , and opportunity to retreat . there is another way likewise to secure your self , a●d that is to shut your self up in some strong town , but both the one and the other are dangerous . in the first case , the country is exposed to the depredations of the enemy , and a generous prince will sooner run the hazard of a battel , than spin out a war with so much detriment to his subjects . in the second , your ruine is evident ; for cooping up your army in a city , the enemy will block you up , or besiege you , and then the multitude of your men will quickly bring a scarcity of provisions , and supplies being cut off , you will be forced to surrender ; so that to avoid fighting either of these two ways , is very pernicious . fabius his way of standing upon his guard , and keeping his army in places of advantage is laudable and good , when your army is so strong , that the enemy dares not attack you : nor can it be said that fabius declined fighting , but that he deferred till he could do it with advantage ; for had hanibal advanced against him , fabius would have kept his ground and engaged him , but hanibal was too cunning for that ; so that hanibal as well as fabius avoided fighting ; but if either of them would have fought upon disadvantage the other had only three remedies ; that is , the two foresaid , and flying . that this which i say is true , is manifest by a thousand examples , but more particularly by the war which the romans made upon philip of macedon ; philip being invaded by the romans , resolved not to come to a battel ; and to avoid it , he ( as fabius did in italy ) encamped his army upon the top of a mountain , and entrenched himself so strongly , that he believed the romans durst not have ventured to come at him : but they not only adventured , but removed him from the mountain , forced him to fly with the greatest part of his army , and had it not been for the unpassableness of the country which hindered the pursuit , the macedonians had all been cut off . philip , then , being unwilling to fight , and having ( as i said before ) encamped upon the mountains not far from the romans , durst not trust himself to his advantages ; and having found by experience that he was not secure there , he would not pin himself up in a town , but made choice of the other way , and kept himself at a distance ; so as when the romans came into one province , he would remove into another , and what place soever the romans left , he would be sure to come to : at length finding this protraction of the war , made his affairs but worse , and that his subjects were harrassed by both armies , he resolved to try his fortune , and bring all to the decision of a battel : but it is convenient to avoid fighting when your army is in the same condition as those of fabius , and sulpitius ; that is , when it is so considerable that the enemy fears to attack you in your entrenchments ; and though he has got some footing in your country , yet not so much as is able to supply him with provisions ; in this case 't is best to decline fighting , and follow the example of sulpitius , nolens se fortunae committere , &c. but in all other cases it is not to be done , but with dishonour and danger ; for to fly ( as philip did ) is as bad as to be routed , and more dishonorable , because he gave no proof of his courage , and though he escaped by the difficulty of the country ; yet whoever follows his example without that convenience , may chance to be ruin'd . no man will deny but hanibal was a great soldier , and of more than ordinary experience ; when he went into africa against scipio , if he had seen it for his advantage to have protracted the war , he would have done it , and perchance ( being a great captain , and having as good an army ) he would have done it the same way as fabius did in italy ; but seeing he did not do it , it is probable he was diverted by some extraordinary occasion . for that prince who has got an army together , ( if he perceives that for want of pay , or supplies , he is not likely to keep them long ) is stark mad if he tries not his fortune before his army disbands , for by delaying , he is certainly lost ; by fighting he may possibly overcome : and above all things , whether we are victorious or beaten , we are to behave ourselves honourably , and 't is more honourable to be overcome by force , than by some error to run your self into incommodities that ruine you afterwards . 't is not unlikely but hanibal might be impelled by some such necessity ; and on the other side scipio ( if hanibal should have deferred fighting ) might have chose whether he would have attacked him in his trenches , because he had already conquered syphax , and got such footing in africk , that he was as safe , and with as much commodity as in italy ; but it was otherwise with hanibal when he had to do with fabius ; and with the french when they had to do with sulpitius . and he who invades an enemies country , avoids fighting with more difficulty , as being obliged ( when ever the enemy appears to obstruct him ) to give him battel ; and if he sets down before any town , he is obliged so much the more , as in our times it happen'd to charles duke of burgundy , who was beaten up in his leaguer before morat by the swizzers , and defeated . and the same thing fell out to the french at the seige of novarra , where they were attacht and beaten by the swizzers . chap. xi . one person that has many enemies upon his hands , though he be inferiour to them , yet if he can sustain their first impression , carries commonly the victory . the power of the tribunes of the people was great and necessary in the city of rome to correct the ambition of the nobility , who otherwise would have debauch'd the said city much sooner than they did : but as it happens in other things , so it happened in this ; in the best and most beneficial thing to the commonwealth , there was an occult , and remote evil that lay snug , which required new laws , and new methods to suppress . for the insolence of the tribunitial authority grew so great , that it became terrible both to the senate and people , and had doubtlesly produced some great mischief to the commonwealth , had not appius claudius by his great wisdom , found out a way to temper and ballance their fury , by the intercession of their colleagues , and the way was by choosing out some person among the tribunes , whom either out of fear , or corruption , or love to his country they could dispose to withstand the designs of his brethren , and oppose himself against them , whenever their resolutions were tending to the diminution of the nobility , or prejudice of the state. which way of restraining the petulancy of the tribunes was for a long time of great advantage to the romans , and may give us occasion to consider , whether a combination of several great persons , against one less powerful than they ( whilst united ) is like to be successful against him that is alone ; or whether the single person has the advantage against the confederacy . i answer , that those whose forces are united , are many times stronger , but their performances are seldom so great , as the single persons , though he be nothing so strong , for committing an infinite number of other things ( in which the single person has the advantage ) he will be able with a little industry to break , and divide and enfeeble them : to this purpose there is no need of going to antiquity for examples ( where there is plenty enough ) the passages of our own times will furnish us sufficiently . in the year , all italy confederated against the venetian , who , when they were so over-powr'd and distress'd that they were unable to keep the field , found a way to work off count lodavic ( governor of milan ) from their league , by which means they not only obtained a peace , and restitution of what they had lost ; but they got a good part of the dutchy of ferrara ; so that they whose forces were too weak to appear before the enemy ; when they came to treat , were the greatest gainers by the war. not many years since , the whole christian world seemed to conspire against france ; yet before the end of the war , the spaniard fell off from the league , made his peace with the french , and forced the rest of the confederates , one after one , to do the same . and from hence we may easily collect that as often as many princes or states are confederated together against any single prince or commonwealth , if the single prince and commonwealth be strong enough to withstand their first impression , and spin out the war , he will certainly prevail ; but if his force be not sufficient to do that , he is in extraordinary danger , as it happen'd to the venetians ; for had they been able to have sustained their first shock , and protracted the war , till they had debauched some of the confederates , the french had never done them so much mischief , and they had preserv'd themselves from ruine : but their army being too weak to confront them , and their time too little to divide them , they were undone ; and this is evident by what happen'd afterward ; for as soon as the pope had recovered what he had lost , he reconciled himself , and became their friend ; the spaniard did the same , and both of them would have been glad to have continued lombardy to the venetians , rather than the french should have got it , and made himself so considerable in italy . the venetians at that time might have prevented a great part of their calamities , had they given some small part of their territory to the enemy , and thereby have secured the rest ; but then they must have given it in time , and so as it might not have appeared to have been done by necessity , as they might well have done before the war was commenced ; when that was begun , it would have been dishonourable , and perhaps ineffectual . but before those troubles , there were few of the venetian citizens that could foresee a danger ; fewer that could remedy it ; and none at all that could advise . to conclude therefore this chapter , i do pronounce , that as the roman remedy against the ambition of their tribunes , was the multitude of them , out of which they always found some or other , that they could make for the interest of the publick ; so it is a ready remedy for any prince that is engaged against a confederate enemy , when he can break their league , and work any of the confederates to a separation . chap. xii . a wise general is to put a necessity of fighting upon his own army , but to prevent it to his enemies . we have formerly discoursed of what use and importance necessity is in humane exploits , and shown how many men , compelled by necessity , have done glorious things , and made their memories immortal . moral philosophers have told us , that the tongue , and the hands are noble instruments of themselves ; yet they had never brought things to that exactness and perfection , had not necessity impelled them . the generals therefore of old , understanding well the virtue of this necessity ; and how much more desperate and obstinate their soldiers were rendered thereby , made it their care to bring their soldiers into a necessity of fighting , and to keep it from their enemies ; to which end , they many times opened a passage for the enemies army , which they might easily have obstructed ; and precluded it to their own , when they might as easily have passed . whoever therefore , desires to make his garrison stout and couragious , and obstinate for the defence of a town , or to render his army pertinacious in the field , is above all things to reduce them into such a necessity , or at least to make them believe it : so that a wise general , who designs the besieging of a town , judges of the easiness or difficulty of the expugnation , from the necessity which lies upon the citizens to defend themselves : if the necessity of their defence be great , his enterprize is the more difficult , because the courage and obstinacy of the besieged is like to be the greater ; but where there is no such necessity , there is no such danger . hence it is that revolted towns are much harder to be recovered , than they were to be taken at first ; for at first having committed no fault , they were in fear of no punishment , and therefore surrendered more easily : but in the other case having the guilt of their defect up their spirits , they are fearful of revenge , and so become more obstinate in their defence . these are not unusual , and yet there are other causes which render the minds of people obstinate in their defence , and one of them is the natural hatred and animosity which is frequently betwixt neighbouring princes and states , which proceeds from an infatiable desire of dominion in princes , and as zealous an inclination to liberty in commonwealths , especially if they be constituted as in tuscany , where that emulation and jealousie has made them refractory both on the one side , and the other . hence it is , though that the florentines have been at greater charges than the venetians , yet their acquests are not so much , because the towns in tuscany were most of them free , & by consequence more difficult to be brought to subjection ; whereas the towns which the venetians conquered , having been most of them under princes , and accustomed to servitude , it was indifferent to them under whose dominion they were ; and they are so far from resisting a change , that they do many times desire it . so that though the cities upon the frontiers of the venetian , were generally stronger , than those upon the frontiers of the florentine , yet they were reduced with more ease ; because being not so free , they were less obstinate in their defence : when therefore , a wise general resolves upon a siege , he is with all diligence to take away that necessity from the citizens which may make them inflexible , either by promising indemnity , if they have deserved to be punished ; or if it be only their liberty of which they are fearful , by assuring them that his designs are not against that , but only against the ambition and exorbitancy of some particular persons ; which kind of promises had strange effects in the facilitating of enterprizes , and the taking of towns ; for though wise men will easily discover the fraud , yet the multitude are commonly so impatient of war , and so mad to be at quiet , that they shut their eyes against any thing of mischief that comes to them under propositions of peace ; by which means many cities have lost their liberty , as it happened to florence not long since ; and to m. crassus and his army heretofore , who though he was sensible that the promises of the parthians were fraudulent , and made only to keep his soldiers from that necessity of defending themselves , yet he could not convince them , nor prevail with them to stand bravely upon their guard , but being blinded with their overtures of peace , both army and general were cut off , as may be seen by the history . the samnites , put on by the ambition of some of their citizens , brake their peace with the romans , and invaded their country ; but being afterwards sensible of what they had done , they sent embassadors to rome offering restitution of what they had taken , and to deliver up the authors of that counsel into their hands , ●o be punished as they pleas'd ; but being rejected , and their embassadors sent home without any hopes of agreement , pontius their general used it as an argument to encourage his men to fight more obstinately , that the romans having refused their fair overtures of peace , were resolved upon war ; and therefore there was no other course , but of necessity they must fight . and ( says he ) iustum est bellum , quibus est necessarium & pia arma , quibus nulla nisi in armis spes est . that wur is just that is necessary , and arms are piously taken up by him , who has no other hopes to secure himself . upon which necessity he founded the hopes of his victory . c. manlius was at the head of an army against the vejentes , and part of the army of the vejentes being got into his camp manlius to cut of their retreat , doubled his guards at the gates , and fortified all the passes by which they were to return ; but the vejentes perceiving they were desperate , fought with so much courage and fury , that they killed the consul , and had cut off his whole army , had not one of the tribunes very wisely opened them a way to be gone : in which action we may observe that whilst the vejentes were under a necessity of fighting , there was no resisting of their courage ; but when a way was opened for their retreat , they chose rather to fly . the volsci and the equi were entered upon the confines of the romans , who sent their consuls against them with an army : and coming to a battel , it happened that in the heat of it , the volsci were inclosed by the romans , and as it were shut up in their own camp. vettius mescins their general , finding their exigence , and that there was a necessity of being killed ; or making their way by the sword , ite mecum ( says he to his soldiers ) non murus , nonvallum , armati armatis obstant , virtute pares , ( quae ultimum & maximum telum est ) necessitate superiores estis . follow me then couragiously , you have no wall , no rampart , nothing but armed men to withstand you : you are equal to them in valour , and being under necessity , have the same advantage of the weapon . for livy calls it in this place the highest and heaviest of weapons . camillus one of the wisest of all the roman generals ( having stormed and entred veii with some part of his army ) to facilitate his victory , and take away from the enemy that last necessity of fighting ; gave orders ( and so loud that the vejentes might be sure to hear ) that no soldier should dare to touch any man who had thrown down his army , by which proclamation every man was encouraged to throw down his arms , and the city was taken with so little loss , that since that time , that stratagem has been used by several commanders . chap. xiii . whether we are more safe in a good general with a bad army , or a good army with a bad general . martius coriolanus being banished from rome , retired to the volsci , where having got an army together , he returned to rome to revenge himself for the injury his fellow citizens had done him , and he had done it effectually , had not the prayers and piety of his mother prevailed more upon him , than all the power of the romans . from which passage titus livius observes , that the roman commonwealth encreased more by the virtue of their commanders , than by the excellence of their soldiers ; because though the volsci had been always beaten before ; yet when they got a roman general , they were too hard for the romans : but though livy was of that opinion in that place , yet in many parts of his history there are instances , where the private soldiers have done great things , and sometimes fought better and in better order , after their consuls were killed , than they had done whilst they were living . thus it happened in the army which the romans had in spain under the command of the two scipio's , which , when both their commanders were slain , behaved it self so well , that it not only defended it self , but defeated the enemy , and preserved that province to the romans , so that in the whole , there are examples on both sides , where the soldiers have done bravely , and got the victory by their valour , and where the conduct of the general has done as much as a whole army ; from whence it may be concluded that they are mutually useful , and that the soldier is as much advantaged by the excellence of his general , as the general by the courage of his army . however , this i think will not be unworthy our consideration , whether is most formidable , a good army under a bad commander , or a good commander with a bad army : in the opinion of caesar neither of them was considerable ; for when he went into spain against afranius and petreius , who had a good army under their command , he went with much confidence ; because , as he said himself , ibat ad exercitum sine duce , he went against an army without a head ; reflecting thereby upon the insufficiency of their generals . again when he went into thessaly against pompey , his expression was vado an ducem fine exercitu . i go now against a general without an army . it remains now that we consider whether it be most easie for a good captain to make a good army , or a good army to make a good captain . but to this , in my opinion , it is easily answered ; for many good men in an army can sooner select one out of their number , and instruct him so , as that he may be fit to command the rest , than the best general in the world can make an army expert and ready . lucullus when he was sent against mithridates , was utterly unexperienced in matters of war , yet being in a good army , where his inferior officers were good , he quickly became a good general . the romans for want of men , were forced to arm their servants , and having referred them to be disciplin'd by sempronius gracc●us , in a short time he made them excellent soldiers . pelopidas and epominandas after they had rescued their country from the tyranny of the spartans , in a short time made their country-men so good soldiers , that they were not only able to contend , but to conquer the spartans . so that the case is equal , and which soever is good , may make the other so too . nevertheless a good army , without a good commander , grows insolent and dangerous , as it hapned in the macedonian army after alexander was dead , and as it is in civil wars among all old soldiers ; so that i think if there be more confidence to be reposed in the one than in the other , it is to be rather in the general , than the army , especially if he has time to instruct and discipline his men ; for an army without a head , is insolent and mutinous . those captains therefore are worthy of double honour , who have not only the enemy to overcome ; but are to instruct , and prepare their forces , before they bring them to engage . and in doing so , they do highly recommend the conduct of their general , which is so rare a thing , that if the trouble were laid upon many , they would be much less esteemed and respected than they are now . chap. xiv . what strange effects new inventions have sometimes in a battle , and how new noises have the same . what strange consequences have succeeded from sudden and unexpected accidents that have been seen or heard in the heat of the battel , appears by several examples in history , but especially in the conflict betwixt the romans and the volsci , where quintius observing one of the wings of his army to stagger and give ground , cry'd out to them to stand firm , for that in the other wing the victory was theirs ; with which words he not only reincouraged his own men , but put such a terror upon the enemy , that they fled in good earnest . and if in a well ordered army those unexpected vociferations have such wonderful effect , in a tumultuous and ill governed army they have much more , where everything is more subject to the agitation of such winds ▪ and of this we have a memorable example of our times . the city of perugia not many years since was divided into two parts , the oddi , and the baglioni . the baglioni prevailing , the oddi were banished . but the oddi having got an army together , and brought them privatly to a place not far from perugia , by the favour of their friends they were let one night into the town , and possessed themselves as far as the piazza . and because the streets were chained up from one side to other to hinder the passage of the horse , the oddesche had a man who went before them with a great engine of iron wherewith he brake the chains , and he had done his work so effectually , that he had broke all the chains , but what opened into the piazza the alarm being taken , and every body crying out arm , arm , he who broke down the chains being pressed so close by the throng that was behind him , that he had not room for his blow , cryed out to those that were next back , back , intending only to have made more room for his arm : but they who were next him calling back to those who were behind them , by degress the word went through the whole army , and they who were in the rear not knowing the reason , began to run , and being followed by those who were next , the whole army retreated by little and little , till at last they brake out into an absolute flight , by which inconsiderable accident , the oddi were defeated of their design . so that it is to be considered , that in a battel , order is not only to be taken that the army be well drawn up , and put in a good posture to fight ; but that no such trifling accident be able to discompose it : for if for any thing the popular multitude be unfit for the wars , it is because every noise , rumour , or alarm , distracts them , and puts them to the rout . wherefore it ought to be a principal care in a good general to appoint such persons as are to receive all orders and words of command , and derive them to the rest , that by so doing the soldiers being accustomed to their officers , may not receive any such orders , but from such persons as are commissioned thereunto , the want of which custom has many times produc'd very great confusion . as to apparitions , and such things as are many times seen , it is the part of a good general , to contrive and exhibit ( in the very height of the battel ) such sights as may incourage his own men , and discourage the enemy ; for among many accidents which conduce to your victory , this may be especially effectual . to this purpose is that invention of which sulpitius made use against the french ; being drawn up , and ready to engage the enemy , he caused all the servants and refuse of his army to be armed and mounted upon the mules and horses belonging to the baggage ; and having furnished them so formally with colours and trumpets that they appeared a compleat body of horse , he disposed them behind a hill , where they were to continue , till in the heat of the fight , they were to come forth and shew themselves to the enemy ; which stratagem being as well executed as devised , struck such a terror into the french , that it lost them the day . so that a good general has a double care upon him , to contrive by these new surprizes to intimidate the enemy ; and to provide that if any such practices be used upon him , he may discover , and defeat them . thus an indian king served semiramis , who observing the said king to be very strong in the number of elephants , to fright and persuade him that she was as strong as he , she caused several of her camels to be dress'd up , and covered with the skins of bufaloes and bulls , that they might look big , and carry the representation of elephants ; and having done so , she marched them in the van of her army , but her design did not take ; for the king having intelligence of it , perverted it into her prejudice . the fidenates being besieged by mamorcus the dictator , to terrifie the roman army contrived to have several of the townsmen in the heat of the engagement to come suddenly out of the town with fire-works at the end of their launces , hoping that the newness of the sight might be a means to disturb them . and hear it is to be noted , that when such stratagems have more of reality than pretence , they may very well be made use of , because having something of solidity in them , their weakness is not so soon discovered , but where they have more of appearance and fiction than truth , it is best either not to use them at all , or if you do , to keep them at such a distance , as that their fallacy may not be discerned ; as sulpitius did with his muletiers ; for when they are intrinsically weak , their vanity appears upon their approach , and they do more mischief than good , as the elephants of semiramis , and the false fires of the fidenates , which fires though at first , they gave some disturbance to the roman souldiers ; yet the dictator coming in , and questioning them aloud whether they were not ashamed to be smoaked like bees out of their huts ; encouraging them to turn again , he cryed out , suis flammis delete fedenas quos vestris beneficiis placare non potuistis , go to , destroy the fidenae with their own fires , seeing all your kindnesses have not been able to oblige them ; and by so doing , he defeated the fidenates , and made their project unprofitable . chap. xv. one general is best for an army , and that to govern it by commissioners , is not so good . the fidenates having rebelled , and cut off that colony of the romans that was amongst them , the romans created four tribunes , and invested with consulary power , whereof one being left behind for the security of the city of rome , the other three were sent against the fidenates and veientes ; but disagreeing among themselves , they came off with dishonour , though their loss was not much : that they gain'd no more honour , they may thank themselves ; that they received no more loss , they may thank their good soldiers . however the romans finding the inconvenience , returned to their old way of dictators , that what three persons had disordered , might be remedied by one . from whence we may discern the inconvenience of many commanders either in an army or town , which livy has expressed very clearly in these following words , tres tribuni potestate consulari , documento fuere , quam plurium imperium bello inutile esset , tenendo ad sua quisque consilia , cum alii aliud videretur , apperuerunt ad occasionem locum hosti ; these three tribunes with consular power , gave us to understand the uselesness of multiplicity of commanders , for each of them adhering to his own counsels , whilst one was for one thing , and another as positive for another , nothing was done , and they gave the enemy an advantage . and though this be example enough to prove the inconvenience of many commanders , yet for better illustration i shall add some others both ancient and modern . in the year king lewis xii of france having retaken milan , sent his army to pisa to recover it for the florentines ; who to command it had sent thither two commissaries , one of them called giovan-battista ridolsi , and the other luca d' antonio de gli albizzi . giovan-battista was a person of reputation and gravity , and being ancienter than luca , luca left the whole administration to him ; but though he shewed no ambition in opposing him ; he did it abundantly by his silence , and fullenness ; neglecting , and undervaluing every thing that was done ; so that he was so far from assisting his colleague either with his counsel or person , that he appeared as if he had been utterly ignorant in matters of war : but it proved otherwise afterwards , when upon some accident giovan-battista was recalled , and luca remained behind with absolute command ; for then he gave ample testimony both of his courage and conduct , which before , whilst he had a colleague , no body could have believed . to this purpose i shall add another saying of livy , who giving an account how quintius and agrippa ( his colleague ) being sent against the aequi , agrippa would needs have the whole management of the war to be committed to quintius , for ( says he ) saluberrimum in administratione magnarum rerum est , summam imperii apud unum esse ; in the administration of great affairs it is best that the soveraign power be invested in one person . which is contrary to the present practice of our princes and states , who do often depute more than one commander both to their armies and towns ; which ( however they think it for the best ) must needs breed inconceivable confusion . and if the cause of the ruine of so many italian and french armies in our times , be enquired into , it will be found to be the multitude , and emulation of their commanders , and it be may safely concluded , that it is better to send a man of ordinary prudence , and experience , upon any expedition , than two of the wisest and best soldiers they have , with equal commission . chap. xvi . that in times of difficulty , virtue is in esteem ; in times of ease and luxury , men of riches and alliance are in greatest request . it always was , and always will be the fortune of persons of more than ordinary endowments , to be laid aside and neglected in times of peace , especially in a commonwealth ; for that envy which is contracted by their virtue , sets up many citizens against them , who will not only be their equals , but superiors . to this purpose thucidides ( a greek author ) has a place in his history , where he shews how the republick of athens , having had the better in the peloponesian war , depressed the pride of the spartans , and subdued the greatest part of greece , was so inhansed and elated with their success , that it was proposed to fall upon sicily . it was seriously debated in athens whether the said enterprize should be undertaken or not ; alcibiades and other citizens of his party promoted it highly , not so much in respect of the publick good as their own private advantage , expecting that the management of that war would be placed in their hands . but nicias ( a person of the greatest reputation in athens ) dissuaded it ; and his great argument to make the people believe he spake his judgment , and more for the benefit of the commonwealth than any interest of his own , was , that he advised rather contrary to his own advantage , because in time of peace there were many of his fellow citizens before him , but in time of war he knew he should be the first : by which we may see it has been an ancient infirmity in commonwealths not to value persons of worth in time of peace , which disobliges them doubly ; to see themselves deprived of their dignities , and to see others preferred to them of less sufficiency than they , which error has been the occasion of much confusion ; for those persons who find themselves neglected , and know the reason of all is , the tranquillity of the times , make it their business to embroil them , and put their country upon war , though never so much to its prejudice . and thinking sometimes with my self what remedies were most proper , i could light but on two , one was to keep the citizens from growing too rich , that wealth without virtue might not be sufficient to advance any man , or able to corrupt other people , or themselves : the other , so to prepare and adapt themselves for war , that they may never be surprized , but have always employment forthe bravest of their citizens , as rome had in the time of her prosperity . for that city having armies always abroad , there was constant exercise for the virtue of their citizens : nor could a man of worth be degraded , nor an improper man be prefer'd in his place , because when ever such a thing was done , ( whether by way of error or experiment , it was the same ) the disorders and dangers which followed , were so sudden and great , that they quickly found their mistake , and return'd to their old method again . but other cities and states not so well constituted as that , which make war only in cases of necessity , cannot defend themselves from those inconveniences but are always in trouble and disorder , when ever that excellent citizen which is neglected is vindicative , and hath any reputation or part in the city . and though for some time rome kept her self free from these inconveniences , yet after she had conquered carthage and antiochus , ( as has been said before ) and seemed to be past all fear of war for the future , she chose several commanders for her army , not so much for their conduct or virtue , as for those qualities which were likely to recommend them to the people . paulus aemilius stood many times for the consulship , and was repulsed ; nor could he ever be made consul till the macedonian war , which was committed unanimously to his conduct , because they saw it was like to be dangerous and difficult . after the year our city of florence being engaged in several wars ▪ in which none of our citizens had perform'd any great matter , at last the city hapned upon a person who shewed them after what manner an army was to be commanded , his name was antonio giacomini ; whilst the war was dangerous , and there was any trouble or difficulty to manage it , antonio was free from the ambition of his fellow citizens , and had no competitor in his election to be commissary , and general of their armies : but when those were past , and new wars that were more easie and honourable were to be undertaken , he had so many competitors , that when three commissaries were to be chosen for the reduction of pisa , antonio could not obtain to be one : and though it be not manifest what inconveniences accrewed to the commonwealth by the waving of antonio , yet it may be easily conjectured , for the pisans being distressed for want of provisions , and having nothing left wherewithal to defend themselves , ( had antonio been there ) would have been forc'd to have surrendred at discretion ; but being besieged by such officers as knew not how to streighten or press them , they held out so long , that the florentines were glad to buy them out at last , whereas they might as well have had them by force . no question but antonio resented it highly , and he had need be a good man , and of more than ordinary patience not to think of revenging himself , though with the subversion of the whole city , ( if he could ) and the ruine of every private citizen , which is to be carefully prevented by every state , as shall be shewn in the following chapter . chap. xvii . a man is not to be disobliged , and employed afterwards in any matter of importance . a commonwealth is diligently to provide that no citizen be entrusted in any weighty affair , who has received any remarkable injury ; claudius nero ( who divided the army which was designed to confront hanibal , and marched away with a strong party into la mara to joyn with the other consul , and engage asdrubal before he got up with his supplies to hanibal ) having formerly commanded the roman army in spain against the said asdrubal , had come off with dishonour ; for though he had enclosed asdrubal and his whole army , and so possest himself of all passes , that he must either fight with disadvantage , or perish with hunger , yet he was over-reach'd with the subtilty of the carthaginian , who drill'd him on with pretended overtures of peace , till at length in the night he stole his army thorow the woods , and got of where he was safe . this passage being known in rome , was no small diminution to nero's reputation both with the senate and the people : but being afterwards made consul , and sent with an army against hanibal , he ventured upon that desperate counsel of dividing the army , which was a thing so doubtful and uncertain in the opinion of the romans , that the city was in strange anxiety and suspence till they had the news of his victory . it is reported that when claudius nero was questioned afterwards by his friends what it was that mov'd him to so hazardous an enterprize , in which , without necessary provocation , he had ventured the whole liberty of their country , he answered , he had done it , because he knew if he succeded , he should recover that honour which he had lost in spain ; if he miscarried , and his design should have a contrary end , he should have had the satisfaction to have been revenged of the city and citizens , by whom he had been so ingratefully , and so indiscreetly calumniated . and if the indignation arising from these kind of provocations could work so strongly upon a roman citizen , in those times when rome was in its innocence ; we may easily imagine what prodigious effects it may have upon persons in a city not so well constituted as that ; and because against these kind of disorders ( to which all commonwealths are subject ) no certain remedy can be prescrib'd , it follows that no commonwealth can be possibly perpetual , forasmuch as a thousand unexpected accidents fall in , to hasten its destruction . chap. xviii . nothing is more honourable in a general , than to foresee the designs of his enemy . it was the saying of epaminondas the theban , that no one quality was more useful and necessary in a general , than to be able to know the resolutions and designs of his enemy , and discover that by conjecture , which he could not do by any certain intelligence . nor is it difficult only to understand his designs , but his actions ; and of those actions not only such as are perform'd privately , or at a distance , but such as are done ( as it were ) before his face . for it many times falls out , that when a battel continues till night , he who has the better , believes he has the worst ; and who has lost all , supposes he has the victory . which mistakes has put the generals many times upon pernicious counsels , as it hapned betwixt brutus and cassius ; for brutus having defeated the enemy with his wing . cassius supposing he had been lost , and his whole body dispers'd , killed himself in despair . in our times , at the battel of s. cilicia in lombardy , francis king of france coming to an engagement with the swizzers , the fight continued till night : a body of the swizzers remaining entire , and hearing nothing of the defeat and execution of their comrades , concluded the victory was theirs , which error was the occasion that they marched not off as they might have done , but kept their ground till the next morning , at which time they were charged again , and overthrown . the same error had almost ruined the armies of the pope and king of spain , who upon a false alarm of the victory of the swizzers , passed the po , and advanced so far , that ere they were aware they had like to have fallen into the mouths of the victorious french. the like fell out of old in the camps of the romans and aequi ; sempronius the consul being commanded out with an army against the enemy , and forcing him to a battel , it continued till night without any visible advantage on either side . night coming on , and both armies sufficiently spent , neither of them retir'd to their camps , but betook themselves to the neighbouring hills , where they believed they should be more safe . the roman army divided into two parts , one went with the consul , and the other with tempanius the centurion , by whose courage the roman army was preserved that day . the next morning the consul hearing no more of the enemy , retreated towards rome ; the aequi with their army did the same , for both of them though they had been beaten , and marched away without regarding the loss or plunder of their camps ▪ it hapned that tempanius being behind with his squadron , and marching off as the rest , he took certain of the wounded aequi prisoners , who inform'd him that their generals were gone out of the field , and had quitted their camps . upon enquiry finding it to be true , he entred into the roman , and secured it , but the enemies camp was given in prey to the souldier , after which he returned with victory to rome , which victory consisted only in having the first intelligence of the enemies disorder : from whence it is observable that two armies engaged , may be each of them in the same distress and despair , and that that army goes away with the victory which has first notice of the necessities of the other , and of this i shall give a pregnant example of late days , and at home . in the year the florentines had a great army in the country of pisa , and had besieged that city very close . the venetian having undertaken its protection , and seeing no other way to relieve it ; to divert the enemy , and remove the war , they resolved to invade the territory of the florentine ; to which purpose they raised a strong army , marched into their country by the val di lamona , possessed themselves of the town of marradi , and besieged the castle of castiglione which stands above upon an hill . the florentines upon the alarm resolved to relieve maradi , and yet not weaken their army before pisa , whereupon they raised a new army both horse and foot , and sent them thither under the command of iacopo quarto appiano ( lord of piombino ) and the count rinuccio da marciano . the florentine army being conducted to the hills , the venetian raised his siege before castiglione , and retreated into the town : the armies being in this posture , and facing one another for several days , both of them suffered exceedingly for want of all manner of provisions ; at length neither of them being very earnest to come to a battel , and each of them being ignorant of the others distress , they resolved the next morning to break up their camp , and each of them to retire , the venetian towards berzighella and faenza , and the florentine towards casaglia and mugello . the morning being come , and the baggage sent away before , a poor woman hapned to come into the florentine camp , from marradi to see some of her relations who were in the service of the florentine : by this woman the florentine generals had notice that the venetians were gone ; whereupon reassuming their courage , they altered their counsels , pursued the enemy , and writ letters to florence , that they had not only beaten the venetians , but made an end of the war. which victory proceeded from nothing but because they had the first news of the retreat of the enemy , which if it had come to the other side , as it did to them , the consequence would have been the same , and the florentines have been beaten . chap. xix . whether for the government of the multitude , obsequiousness and i●dulgence be more necessary than punishment . the roman commonwealth was perplexed with the dissentions betwixt the nobility , and the people ; nevertheless , their foreign wars requiring it , they sent forth with their armies , quintius and appius claudius : appius being rough , and cruel in his commands , was so ill obeyed by his soldiers , that he was defeated , and fled out of his province . quintius being more gentle and benign , was better obeyed , and carried the victory where he was ; from whence it appears more conducing to the well governing of a multitude , to be rather obliging , than proud , and pitiful , than cruel . however cornelius tacitus tells us , ( and many others are of his mind ) in multitudine regend● plus paena quam obsequium valet , that to the managing of a multitude , severity is more requisite than mildness . and i think both may be true to his distinction , of companions and subjects ; if those under your command be companions and fellow citizens with you , you cannot securely use them with that severity , of which tacitus speaks ; for the people of rome having equal authority with the nobility , was not to be used ruggedly by any man that was put over them for but a while . and it has been many times seen that the roman generals , who behaved themselves amicably towards their souldiers , and governed them with mildness , have done greater things than those who used them with austerity , and kept them in perpetual fear , unless they were endued with more than ordinary virtue , like manlius torquatus . but he whose command is over his subjects , ( of whom cornelius speaks ) is to have a care they grow not insolent , and contemn him for his easiness , and there , is rather to use severity than gentleness with them ; yet that is to be done ( too ) with such moderation , that they may be kept from abhorring him ; for the hatred of the subject is never good for a prince , and the best way to prevent it , is by not interrupting the subject in the quiet enjoyment of his estate ; for blood ( unless there be some design of rapacity under it ) no prince does desire it , but upon some extraordinary necessity , and that necessity happens but seldom . but when cruelty and rapine meet together in the nature of one person , there never wants desire , nor pretences for cruelty , as i have demonstrated largely in another treatise upon this occasion . quintius therefore deserved more praise than appius deserved : and the saying of tacitus is true enough with the aforesaid restriction , but not in the case of appius : and because i have spoken of kindness and severity , i will give you one example , how mildness prevailed more upon the falisci than violence could do . chap. xx. one instance of humanity wrought more upon the falisci , than all the force of the romans . camillus having besieged the falisci , and attempted many things against them but in vain , a school-master who had the tuition of several of the principal young gentlemen of that city , thinking to gratifie camillus , and ingratiate with the people of rome , carrying them out of the walls , under pretence of exercise and recreation , he conveyed them all into the camp of camillus , and presenting them to him , told him , that by their means he might become master of the town : camillus was so far from accepting his present , that he caused the paedagogue to be strip'd , and his hands tied behind him , and then putting a rod into every one of the young gentlemens hands , he caused them scourge him back again into the town : which piece of humanity and justice when the citizens understood , they resolved to defend themselves no longer , and so immediately surrendred : a great example doubtless , and by which we may learn , that many times kindness and generosity moves an enemy more than all the force and artifice of war ; for 't is frequently seen that those provinces and cities which no violence or stratagem have subdued , have been melted and wrought upon by one single act of pity , chastity , or liberality : and of this history is full of many other examples besides . pyrrhus could not be got out of italy by all the power of the romans ; and yet fabritius sent him packing by one act of generosity , and that was giving him notice that some of his intimates would poison him , and had made overtures to the romans to that purpose . again , scipio africanus got not so much honour by the taking of carthage , as he did by one act of chastity , when he sent home a young beautiful lady ( that was taken prisoner , and presented to him ) untouch'd to her husband ; for at the news of that one act , all spain was astonished , and began to admire the virtue and innocence of the romans , which virtue is a thing so universally celebrated , that there are no great persons endued with it , but are highly esteemed by all people , as appears by all ethicks , politicks , and history , among which , the history of xenophon is abundantly copious , in demonstrating what honours and what victories accrewed to cyrus upon the bare account of his affability and mildness ; and how he was never guilty of the least pride , or cruelty , or luxury , or any other vice that defiles the conversation of man. nevertheless , seeing hanibal did the same things , and by a contrary way , it will not be amiss in the next chapter to enquire the reason . chap. xxi . how it came to pass that hanibal by methods quite contrary to what were practised by scipio , did the same things in italy that the other did in spain . i doubt not but it may seem strange to some people , that other captains who have taken a quite contrary way to what is prescribed in my last chapter , should notwithstanding have had the same success ; for from thence it seems to follow , that victory does not depend either upon humanity or justice , when we see the same praise and reputation acquir'd by quite contrary habits : and to prove this , we need not go far for examples , the same scipio whom we mentioned before , being with an army in spain , carried himself with so much piety , and justice , and liberality to all people , that he got the love of the whole province : on the other side we see hanibal in italy acting quite contrary , and with violence , cruelty , rapine , and all manner of infidelity persecuting the people , and yet with the same laudable effects as scipio had in spain . and considering with my self what might be the reason , they seemed to me to be several . the first is , because men are studious of novelty , and that not only those who are under slavery or subjection , but those who are free , and in peace ; for ( as is said before ) men are as well satiated with happiness , as afflicted with misery . this desire ( therefore ) of change opens a door to any man that invades a province with any considerable force : if he be a foreigner , they all follow after him , if a native , they attend him , assist him , and encourage him : so that let him take which way he pleases , he must needs make great progress in those places . again , people are generally excited two ways , either by love , or by fear ; so that he that is feared , is often times as readily obeyed as he that is beloved , and sometimes more . it is not material therefore to a commander which of these two ways he takes ; for if he be a virtuous person , and of any extraordinary faculties , he will be admired by the people , as hanibal and scipio were , whose great worth effaced , or covered all the faults that they committed . but in either of these two ways , great inconveniences may arise , and such as may ruine a prince . for he who desires to be beloved , upon the least excess or immoderation in his courtship , is subject to be despised ; and he on the other side who affects to be feared , upon the least extravagance makes himself odious : and to keep the middle way exactly , is not possible to our nature ; wherefore it is necessary to those who exceed in either kind , to attone for it with some extraordinary virtue , as hanibal and scipio did , who though persons of great prudence and conduct , yet it appeared that both of them suffered by their manner of living , as well as they were advanced . their advancement is mentioned before ; their sufferings ( as to scipio ) was the rebellion of his army , and part of his friends in spain , which proceded from nothing but want of being feared , for men are naturally so unquiet , that every little door that is opened to their ambition sets them agog , and abolishes all that love which they ow'd to their prince for his humanity towards them , as in this example of the friends and army of scipio ; wherefore scipio was constrained to make use of that severity in some measure , which he had always declined . as to hanibal , there is not any particular example where his cruelty or infidelity did him hurt ; only it may be supposed that they were the occasion why naples and several other towns stood so firm to the romans . it is plain likewise that his bloodiness and impiety made him more odious to the people of rome , than all the enemies that ever that city had : for whereas when pyrrhus was with a great army in italy , they gave him notice of a design on foot to have poisoned him , they were so inveterate against hanibal , that they never forgave him , but when they had defeated and disarm'd him , they pursued him to the death . and these sad inconveniences hapned to hanibal from no other causes , but because he was impious , unfaithful , and cruel : but then on the other side he had the advantage of being admired of all writers for keeping his army without any mutiny or dissention either against him , or among themselves , though it consisted of so many different nations , which could be derived from nothing but the awe and terror of his person ; which terror was so great , ( considered with the reputation and authority that he received from his valour ) that thereby he kept his souldiers united and quiet . i conclude therefore , it imports not much which way a general takes , so there be any great excellence in him to recommend it ; for ( as is said before ) both in the one and the other there is danger and defect , if there be not some extraordinary virtue to balance it . and if hanibal and scipio , one by laudable , and the other by ignominous and detestable ways arrived at the same end , and had the same effects , i think it convenient in my next chapter to discourse of two roman citizens , who by divers ways ( but both honourable ) arrived at the same pitch of glory and renown . chap. ii. how the austerity of manlius torquatus , and the humanity of valerius corvinus gain'd each of them the same honour and reputation . there were two famous captains contemporary in rome , manlius torquatus , and valerius corvinus , both of them equal in courage , equal in their triumphs , and each of them ( as to the enemy ) acquir'd all with equal virtue and terror ; but as to their own armies , and manner of discipline , it was quite different . manlius commanded with all kind of severity , excused his souldiers from no labour , nor no punishment . valerius on the other side used them with as much gentleness and familiarity : manlius to keep his souldiers strictly to their discipline , executed his own son ; which valerius was so far from imitating , that he never offended any man : yet in this great diversity of conduct , the effects were the same , both as to the enemy , the commonwealth , and themselves ; for none of their souldiers ever declin'd fighting ; none of them rebelled , or so much as disputed their commands , though the discipline of manlius was so severe , that afterwards all excessive and extravagant commands were called manliana imperia : in which place it is not amiss to enquire how it came to pass that manlius was constrained to so rigorous a method ; what it was that made valerius comport himself so mildly : how it was that this different way of proceeding should have the same effect ; and last of all , which of the two is most worthy thy to be imitated . if manlius be considered as he is represented by the historian , he will be found to be very valiant , carrying himself with great piety to his father , and country , and with great reverence to his superiors , which appeared by his defence of his father with the hazard of his own life against a tribune who accused him ; and by his fighting with the gaul , in the behalf of his country , which notwithstanding he would not undertake without orders from the consul ; for when he saw a vast man , of a prodigious proportion , marching forth upon the bridge , and challenging any of the romans , he went modestly to the consul for leave , and told him , injussa tuo adversus hostem , nunquam pugnabo , non si certain victoriam videam ; without your permission i will never engage with the enemy , though i was sure to overcome : and the consul giving him leave , he conquered his enemy . when therefore a man of his constitution arrives at such a command , he desires all men may be as punctual as himself ▪ and being naturally brave , he commands brave things , and when they are once commanded , requires that they be executed exactly ; and this is a certain rule , when great things are commanded , strict obedience must be expected , otherwise your enterprize must fail . that therefore those under your command may be the more obedient to your commands , it is necessary that you command aright ; and he commands right , who compares his own quality and condition with the quality and condition of those they command ; if he finds them proportionable , then he may command , if otherwise , he is to forbear ; and therefore that saying was not amiss , that to keep a common-wealth in subjection by violence , it was convenient that there should be a proportion betwixt the persons forced , and forcing ; and whilst that proportion lasted , the violence might last too , but when that proportion was dissolved , and he that was forced grew stronger than he that offered it , it was to be doubted much his authority would not hold long . but to return ; great things therefore , and magnificent , are not to be commanded but by a man that is great and magnificent himself ; and he who is so constituted , having once commanded them , cannot expect , that mildness or gentleness will prevail with his subjects to execute them : but he that is not of this greatness and magnificence of mind , is by no means to command extraordinary things ; and if his commands be but ordinary , his humanity may do well enough , for ordinary punishments are not imputed to the prince , but to the laws and customs of the place : so that we may conclude manlius was constrained to that severity by his natural temper and complexion ; and such persons are many times of great importance to a commonwealth , because by the exactness of their own lives , and the strictness of their discipline , they revive the old laws , and reduce every thing towards its first principles : and if a state could be so happy to have such persons succeeding one another in any reasonable time , as by their examples would not only renew the laws , restrain vice , and remove every thing that tended to its ruine or corruption , that state would be immortal . so then manlius was a severe man , and kept up the roman discipline exactly , prompted first by his own nature , and then by a strong desire to have that obeyed , which his own inclination had constrained him to command . valerius corvinus on the other side might exercise his gentleness without inconvenience , because he commanded nothing extraordinary , or contrary to the customs of the romans at that time ; which custom , being good , was sufficient to honour him , and not very troublesom to observe , whereby it hapned that valerius was not necessitated to punish offenders , because there were but very few of that sort , and when there were any , their punishment ( as is said before ) was imputed to the laws , and not to the cruelty of the prince ; by which it fell out that valerius had an opportunity by his gentleness to gain both affection and authority in the army , which was the cause that the souldiers being equally obedient to one as well as the other , though their humours and discipline were different , yet they might do the same things , and their actions have the same effects . if any are desirous to imitate either of them , they will do well to have a care of running into the same errors as scipio and hanibal did before , which is not to be prevented any other way , but by singular virtue and industry . these things being so , it remains now that we enquire which of those two ways are most laudable to follow , and it is the harder to resolve , because i find authors are strangely divided , some for one way , and others for the other . nevertheless , they who pretened to write how a prince is to govern , are more inclinable , to valerius than manli●s , and xenophon in his character of cyrus jumps exactly with livy's description of valerius , especially in his expedition against the samnites when he was consul : for the morning before the fight he made a speech to his souldiers with that mildness and humanity , that the historian tells us , non aliâs militi familiarior dux fuit , inter infimos militum omnia haud gravate munia obeundo . in ludo praeterea militari , cum velocitatis , viriumque inter se aequales cort amina ineunt , comiter facilis vincere , ac vinci , vultu eodem ; nec quenquam aspernari parem qui se offerret ; factis benig nus prore ; dictis , haud minus libertatis alienae quam suae dignitatis memor , & ( quo nihil popularius est ) quibus artibus petierat magistratum , iisdem gerebat . no general was ever more familiar with his soldiers ; no soldier too mean for him to converse with , no office too base for him to undertake . in their military recreations when they ran , or wrestled for a prize , he would not only run or wrestle , but win or lose , be overcome , or conquer , with the same evenness , and unconcernment ; nor did he ever disdain or refuse any man that challenged him . in his actions , he was bountiful , as occasion was offered ; in his words , he was as mindful of other peoples liberty , as of his own dignity , and ( which is the most grateful thing to the people in the world ) the same arts which he used in the obtaining , the same he exercised in the management of his magistracy . livy speaks likewise very honorably of manlius ▪ acknowledging that his severity upon his son , made the whole army so obedient , and diligent , that it was the occasion of their victory against the latins ; and he goes so far in his praise , that after he has given an exact account of the battel and victory ; and described all the dangers and difficulties to which the romans were exposed , he concludes that it was only the conduct and courage of manlius that got the victory that day ; and afterwards comparing the strength of both armies , he does not scruple to say , that on which side soever manlius had been , that side would certainly have had the day . which being so , makes my question very hard to determine , nevertheless , that it may not be altogether unresolved , i conceive that in a citizen brought up under the strictness of a commonwealth , the way of manlius would be best , and least subject to danger , because it seems most for the interest of the publick , and not at all proceeding from private ambition ; besides to carry ones self severely to every body , and pursue nothing but the benefit of the publick , is not a way to make parties , or friends , without which there can be no troubles in a state. so that he who proceeds in that manner , must needs be very useful , and not at all suspicious to the state. but the way of valerius is quite contrary ; for though the commonwealth reaps the same fruits as in the other ; yet jealousies will arise , and people will be fearful that in the end his great favour among the souldiers will be employed to set up himself , with very ill consequences upon their liberty . and if in publicola's time these ill effects did not happen , it was because as then the minds of the romans were not corrupt , nor had he been long enough in authority . but if we consider a prince , as xenophon did , in that case we must leave manlius , and follow valerius clearly ; because a prince is by all means to endeavour the obedience of his subjects and soldiers by ways of amity and kindness . they will be obedient , if they find him virtuous , and a strict observer of his laws ; they will love him , if they see him courteous , and affable , and merciful , and endued with all the good qualities which were in valerius , and which xenophon attributes to cyrus . for to be particularly beloved , and have an army true to his interest , is instar omnium , and answers to all other policies of state. but it is otherwise when an army is commanded by one who is a citizen of the same city with the rest of his army ; for he is subject to the same laws and magistrates as well as they . in the annals of venice we read , that in former times the venetian galleys returning from some expedition , and lying near the town , there happened a quarrel betwixt the citizens and the seamen , which proceeded so far , that it came to a tumult , both sides betook themselves to their arms , and neither the power of their officers , the reverence of the citizens , nor the authority of the magistrate was able to quiet them : but as soon as a certain gentleman appeared , who had commanded them the year before , remembring with what courtesie he had behaved himself , their kindness to him prevail'd above all other courses , and they gave over the combat , and retir'd ; but that affection , and ready obedience to his commands , cost the poor gentleman very dear ; for thereby he became so obnoxious to the senate , that not long after , they secured themselves against him , either by imprisonment or death . i conclude then , that a prince may better follow the example of valerius ; but to a citizen , it is dangerous both to himself , and the state ; to the state , because that way leads directly to tyranny ; to himself , because ( let his intentions be never so innocent ) he will certainly be suspected , and bring himself in danger . so on the other side , the severity of manlius is as pernicious in a prince , but in a citizen it is convenient , and particularly for the state ; for it never does hurt , if the hatred which follows your severity be not encreased by a jealousie of your great virtue and reputation , as it happen'd to camillus . chap. xxiii . vpon what occasion camillus was banished from rome . we have concluded in the chapter before , that to imitate valerius may prejudice your country , and your self ; and that to imitate manlius may be convenient for your self , and prejudicial to your country ; which opinion is much confirmed by the case of camillus , whose proceedings were more like manlius , than valerius ; for which reason , livy speaking of him tells us , ejus virtutem milites oderant● , & mirabantur . his virtue was both odious , and admirable to his soldiers . that which made him admired was his diligence , prudence , magnanimity , and conduct : that which made him hated was , that he was more severe in punishing , than liberal in rewarding . and of this hatred livy gives these following reasons : first , because he caused the money which was made of the goods of the vejentes to be applyed to publick use , and not distributed with the rest of the prey : next , because in his triumphal chariot he caused himself to be drawn by four white horses , which was accounted so great a piece of arrogance , that it was thought he did it to equalize the sun. a third was , that he had devoted a tenth part of the spoils of the vejentes to apollo , which ( to keep his vow ) was to be taken back again from the soldiers who had got it in their clutches : from whence it may be observed , that nothing makes a prince more odious to the people , than to deprive them of their possessions , which is a thing of so great importance , that it is never forgotten ; because upon every little want , it comes fresh into their memories , and men being daily subject to those wants , will daily remember it ; and next to this is , being insolent and proud , which is likewise extreamly odious to the people , especially if they be free . and although perhaps no detriment accrews to them from his pride , yet they are observed always to detest him that uses it . so that a great person is to avoid it as a rock , because it begets hatred , and that without any advantage , which makes it a very rash , and imprudent thing . chap. xxiv . the prolongation of commissions brought rome first into servitude . if the dissolution of the roman commonwealth be accurately considered , it will be found to proceed partly from the differences about the agrarian law , and partly from the prorogation of their magistrates , which errors , had they been known in time , and due remedies applyed , would not have been so pernicious , but rome might have enjoyed her freedom longer , and perhaps with more quiet . for though from the prolongation of offices ▪ there were no tumults no● seditions to be seen in that city ; yet it was clear that those magistrates which were continued took much upon them , and by degrees their power and authority became a great prejudice to the liberty of the state. had all the citizens who were continued , been wise , and honest like l. quintius , they would not have incurred this inconvenience . the goodness of quintius appeared in one thing very remarkably ; a meeting being appointed for accommodation of the differences betwixt the nobility , and the people ; the people continued their authority to their tribunes another year , as believing them very proper to resist the ambition of the nobles : the senate to retaliate upon the people , and show themselves as considerable as they , continued the consulship to quintius ; but quintius refused it absolutely , alledging that ill examples were to be stifled , and not encreased by others that were worse , and therefore pressed them to the election of new consuls , and prevailed with much importunity and contention . had the rest of the roman citizens imitated this person , they had never admitted that custom of proroguing of magistrates , and then the prolongation of their commands in the army had never been introduced , which very thing was at length the ruine of that commonwealth . the first person whose commission was continued in rome , was p. philo , who having besieged pale-polis , and by the time his consulship was to expire , reduced it to such extremity , that the victory seemed already in his hands . the senate would not send another to succeed him , but continued his authority with the title of proconsul , which thing ( though done then upon grave consideration , and for the benefit of the publick ) proved afterwards of such ill consequence , that it brought that city in servitude and slavery : for by how much their wars were more remote , by so much they thought these prorogations convenient ; from whence it hapned , that fewer of the romans were prepared for military commands , and the glory of their victories redounded but to few : and besides , he whose commission was renew'd , and had been a long time accustomed to the army , might insinuate so , and gain such an interest in it , as might make it disclaim the senate , and acknowledg no head but their general . this it was that enabled marius and sylla to debauch the army ; this was it that enabled caesar to conquer his native country ; which miseries had never hapned , had not that custom of continuing magistrates , and commanders been introduced . if it be objected , that their great affairs could not have been managed as so great a distance , without that prorogation of commands ; i answer ; that 't is possible their empire might have been longer before it came to that height ; but then it would have been more lasting , for the adversary would never have been able to have erected a monarchy , and destroyed their liberty so soon . chap. xxv . of the poverty of cincinnatus and several other citizens of rome . we have said elsewhere , that nothing is of more importance to the conservation of the liberty of a state , than to keep the citizens low , and from being too wealthy . whether there was any law to that purpose , or what that law was , i must acknowledge my ignorance , ( especially when i consider with what zealand passion the agrarian was opposed ) yet 't is clear by experience , that for years after the building of rome , that city was in very great poverty : and it is probable the great cause of it was , that poverty was no impediment to preferment : virtue was the only thing required in the election of magistrates , and the distribution of offices ; and wherever it was found , let the person or family be never so poor , it was sure to be advanced ; which manner of living , made riches contemptible : and this is manifest by the following example . minutius the consul being circumvented , and he and his whole army , as it were block'd up by the aequi , the romans were so possess'd with the danger of their army , that they betook themselves to the creation of a dictator , which is their last remedy in their greatest afflictions : they concluded upon l. quintius cincinnatus , who was then ( when they sent for him ) in a little country farm at plough , which livy magnifies exceedingly , and says ; operae pretium est audire , qui omnia prae divitiis humana spernunt , neque honori magno locum , ●●que virtuti putant esse , nisi effuse affluant opes : it is pleasant to hear some people talk of r●ches , as if nothing in this world were comparable to them ; as if all honour and virtue depended only upon the estate . cincinnatus ( as i said before ) was at plough in his farm , ( which consisted only of four acres of ground ) when the embassadors came to him from the senate to salute him dictator , and to remonstrate their distress . having received their message , he made no delay , but call'd immediately for his robe , came directly for rome , rais'd his army , and marched away for the relief of minutius : having defeated at the enemy , and pillaged their camp , he would not suffer the army of minutius to participate in the prize , telling him , i do not think it reasonable that you should have share in the prey , who was so near being a prey your self after which he degraded minutius of his consulship , and made him only a legate with this expression ; you shall continue here in this station ; till you learn to behave your self more like a consul . the same dictator , in the same expedition , made l. tarquinius his master of his horse , though he had none to be master of his own , for his poverty was such , he was forced to serve on foot . 't is remarkable how in those days poverty and honour were not so inconsistant as now , and that to an excellent and worthy person as cincinnatus was , four acres of land was a sufficient estate . in the days of a●tilius regulus poverty was in the same reputation ; for being at the head of an army in africa , and having conquered the carthaginians , he made it his request to the senate that he might be permitted to come home , and husband his own farm , which his servants had neglected . and this frugallty of the romans is exceedingly wonderful ; for looking for nothing but praise and honour from their victories , they brought all their prize into the publick treasury : and doubtless had regulus proposed any thing of advantage to himself by that war , he would never have been concerned to have had his four acres neglected by his servants . nor was the modesty and magnanimity of the romans less remarkable , who being put into command , and placed at the head of an army , thought themselves above any prince ; no king , no commonwealth was able to dismay them : but when their commissions expired , and they were returned privately to their houses ; no body so frugal , no body so humble , no body so laborious , so obedient to the magistrates , or respectful to their superiors as they ; insomuch that one would have thought it impossible the same minds should have been capable of such strange alterations . and this poverty continued till the time of paulus emilius ( which was the last age of that commonwealths happiness ) for though he by his triumph enriched the whole city , yet not regarding his own fortunes , he continued poor himself , and poverty was in that esteem , that paulus to gratifie and encourage one of his sons-in-law who had behaved himself bravely in those wars , gave him a silver cup , which was the first piece of plate that was ever seen in his family . and here i have a fair occasion to enlarge upon poverty , and show how much more useful it is to mankind than riches , and how many excellent arts it has produced and improved , which riches and luxury have destroyed : but this having been treated of so amply by other people before , i shall mention it no farther at this time . chap. xxvi . women are many times the destruction of states . in the city of ardea there was a great controversie betwixt the patricii and the people , about the marriage of a young lady ; who being a great fortune , had a great many servants , but more especially two , one of them a patrician , the other a plebean . her father being dead , her guardian would needs bestow her upon the plebean ; her mother was for the nobleman ; not agreeing among themselves , it came to a tumult , and by degrees to blows ; insomuch as the whole nobility appeared in arms for the one , and all the people for the other . the result was , the people being beaten out of the town , and sending to the volsci for aid , the nobles sent to rome . the volsci were readiest , and coming first to the assistance of the plebeans , they clap'd down before the town . they had not entrench'd themselves long , but the roman army came upon their backs ▪ and shut them up betwixt the town and them ; insomuch that they were quickly distressed , and forced to surrender at discretion . the romans entred the town , killed all that were accessary to the sedition , and setled their affairs . in which passage there are many observable things . first , we see women have been the occasion of much desolation , prejudice , and dissention : the rape of lucrece lost the tarquins their government ; the attempt upon virginia , was the ruine of the decem-viri . and aristotle in his politicks imputes the abomination of tyranny to the injuries they do to people upon the account of women , by their debauchments , their violences , or adulteries , as we have show'd at large in our chapter about conspiracies . so that in the government of any kingdom or commonwealth , those things are not to be reckon'd as trifles , but as the occasions of much mischief , and are by all means to be prevented , before the rancour has taken too deep root , and is not to be cured , but by the destruction of the state : as it hapned to the ardeates , who let it go so long among their fellow citizens , that at last they came to an absolute division not to be composed nor setled , but by foreign assistance , which is always the forerunner of servitude and slavery . chap. xxvii . how the civil discords in a city , are to be composed , and of the falsity of that opinion , that the best way to keep a city in subjection , is to keep it divided . in the reconciliation of a city that is labouring under civil dissentions , we are to follow the example of the roman consuls , and observe their method in composing the distractions among the ardeates , which was by cutting off the chief actors , and confiscating their estates . and to compose the distractions of a city , there are three ways ; either by cutting off the chief actors ( as the romans did ) by banishing them the city , or by forcing them to an accommadation upon such penalties as they shall be afraid to incur : of these three ways the last is most dangerous , uncertain , and unprofitable , because it is impossible where much blood has been shed , or much injury done , that that peace should last long , which was made by compulsion ; for seeing , and hearing , and conversing with one another daily , their animosities must of necessity revive , and provoke them to new outrage , by presenting them with new occasions of indignation and revenge : and of this we cannot have an apter example than in the city of pistoia , which years since ( as it is now ) was divided into the panciatichi , and cancellieri ( only then they were at open defyance , which now they are not . ) after many contests and disputes among themselves , they proceeded to blood , to the plundering and demolishing one anothers houses , and committing all other hostilities imaginable : the florentines whose business it was to unite them , used this third way , which rather encreased , than mitigated their tumults ; so that weary of that way , and grown wiser by experience , they made use of the second ; banished some of the ring-leaders , and imprisoned the rest , whereby they not only quieted their differences then , but have kept them so ever since . but doubtless the safest way had been to cut them off at first , and if those executions were forborn then by us , or have been since by any other commonwealth , it is for no other cause , but that they require a certain generosity and greatness of spirit , that in weak commonwealths is hardly to be found . and these are the errors , which as i said in the beginning , are committed by the princes of our times , when they are to determine in such great controversies ; for they should inform themselves how others have comported in the same cases before them ; but they are so weak by reason of the slightness of our present education , and their unexperience in history , that they look upon the examples of the ancients as inhumane , or impossible : so that our modern opinions are as remote from the truth , as that saying of our wise men was upon a time , che bisognavatener pistoiacon le parti , & pisacon le fortezze : that pistoia was to be kept under by factions , and pisa by a citadel ; but they were mistaken in both . what my judgment is about citadels , and such kind of fortresses , i have delivered elsewhere ; so as in this place , i shall only demonstrate how unpracticable it is to keep towns in subjection by fomenting their differences and factions , and first it is impossible to keep both parties true to you ( be you prince , or commonwealth , or whatever ) for men are naturally so inconstant , it cannot be that those parties which favour you to day , should be affected to you always ; for they will still look out for some new patron , and protector : so that by degrees one of the parties taking some disgust against you , the next war that happens , you run a great hazard of losing your town . if it be under the government of a state , the city is in more danger , than in the other case , because each party looks out for friends among the great ones , and will spare no pains nor mony to corrupt them . from whence two great inconveniences do arise : one is , you can never make them love you , because by reason of the frequent alteration of governors , and putting in sometimes a person of one humour , and sometimes another of another ; they can never be well govern'd and then the other is , by this fomenting of factions , your state must be necessarily divided . blondus speaking of the passages betwixt the florentines and pistoians , confirms what we have said in these words , mentreche i florentini dis●gnavano de riunir pistoia , divisono se medesimi . whilst the florentines thought to have united the pistoians , they divided themselves . in the year . arezzo revolted from the florentines , and the valleys di tenere , and chiana were entirely over-run by the vitelli , and duke valentine . whereupon monsieur de lant was sent from the king of france to see all that they had lost , restored to the florentines . wherever monsieur de lant came observing the persons that came to visit him , did still profess themselves of the party of morzocco , he was much dissatisfied with their factions , and more that they should declare themselves so freely ; for ( said he ) if in france any man should pronounce himself of the king's party , he would be sure to be punished , because it would imply that there was a party against the king , and it was his masters desire , that his kingdom and cities should be all of a mind : if therefore a prince believes there is no way for him to keep his towns in obedience , but by keeping up factions , it is a certain argument of his weakness ; for being unable by force and courage to keep them under , he betakes himself to these pernicious arts ; which in peaceable times may palliate a little , but when troubles , and adversity come will assuredly deceive him . chap. xxviii . a strict eye is to be kept upon the citizens , for many times under pretence of officiousness , and piety , there is hid a principle of tyranny . the city of rome being distressed for want of provisions , and the publick stores being unable to supply it , it came into the thoughts of spurius melius ( a rich citizen of those times ) to furnish the common people gratis out of his own private stock , whereby he wrought himself so far into the favour of the people , that the senate suspecting the ill consequences of his bounty , began to conspire his destruction before his interest became too great , to which purpose they created a dictator , who put him to death : from whence it may be observed , that many times those actions which seem charitable and pious at first sight , and are not reasonable to be condemned , are notwithstanding cruel and dangerous for a state , if not corrected in time . to make this more clear , i say a commonwealth cannot be well governed , nor indeed subsist without the assistance and ministry of powerful and great men : and yet on the other side that power and reputation of particular citizens is the occasion of tyranny . to regulate this inconvenience , it is necessary , that seeing there must be great men , things should be so ordered that they may have praise and reputation by such things as are rather useful than prejudicial to the state. wherefore it is carefully to be observed what ways they take to acquire their reputation ; and they are usually two , either publick or private . the publick way is when they arrive at their reputation by some good counsel , or some great exploit which they have atchieved for the benefit of the publick : and this way of reputation is not only not to be precluded to the citizens , but to be opened by such promises of reward for their good counsels or actions as may both dignify and inrich them ; and when a reputation is gained by these plain and sincere ways , it is never to be feared . but when their courses are private , ( which is the other of the two ways ) they are dangerous , nay totally pernitious . those private ways are by obliging particular persons , by lending them mony , by marrying their relations , by defending them against the magistrates and doing several other particular favours which may encourage their clients to violate the laws , and vitiate the commonwealth ; for which cause it ought to be so well fortified with good laws , that the endeavors of such ambitious men may be either discouraged or defeated ; and on the other side rewards proposed to such as arrive at their greatness by any extraordinary exploit . in rome the highest reward of those persons who behaved themselves gloriously for the good of their country , was a triumph besides which they had other inferior honours , for more inferior services , & to restrain or punish the ambition of those who went about by private and clandestine ways to disturb the peace of their country , their greatest remedy was to accuse them to the people , and when those accusations were insufficient , ( the people being blinded by some specious pretence of benefit and advantage ) they created a dictator , who with a kind of regal authority was to reduce the delinquent from his aberrations , or punish him as he did spurius melius ; and the leaving of one such fault unpunished , is enough to ruine a commonwealth , for a single example afterwards will hardly be effectual . chap. xxix . that the transgressions of the people do spring commonly from the prince . princes cannot reasonably complain of the transgressions of their subjects , because it is necessarily their negligence , or ill example that debauches them : and if the people of our times are infamous for thefts , and robberies , and plundering , and such kind of enormities , it proceeds from the exorbitance and rapacity of their governors . romania ( before pope alexander vi exterminated those lords who had the command in those parts ) was a place of all kind of dissoluteness and iniquity , every day , and every trivial occasion producing notorious murders and rapines ; which was not so much from any depravity in the nature of the people , ( as some persons would have it ) as from the corruption of their princes ; for being poor of themselves , and yet ambitious to live in splendor and magnificence , they were forced upon ill courses , and indeed refused none that could supply them . to pass by several others , one of their detestable ways was to make laws against such and such things , which after they were published , they themselves would be the first that should break , to encourage others to do the same ; nor was any man ever punished for his inobservance , till they saw enough involved in the same premunire ; then ( forsooth ) the laws were executed most strictly , not out of any true zeal to justice , but out of a desire to be fingring the fines ; from whence it followed , that by grievous mulcts and expilations the people being impoverished , were constrained to use the same violences upon those who were less potent than they ; by which means men were not so much corrected , as instructed to do ill ; and all these mischiefs proceeded from the iniquity of their princes . livy has a story to this purpose , where he tells us , that the roman embassadors ( passing with a great present to apollo , which was taken out of the spoils of the venetians ) were taken by the corsairs of lipari in sicily , and carried with it into that island . timasitheus prince of that town understanding what the present was ; whither it was going , and from whom it was sent , ( though born at lipari ) behaved himself in that like a roman , and remonstrated to the people the impiety of the fact , which he prest upon them so home , that by common consent the present was restored , and the embassadors dismissed ; the words of the historian are these , timasitheus multitudinem religione implevit , quae semper regenti est similis : which agrees with that saying of lorenzo de i medici . et quel che fa li signor fanno poi molti , che nel signor son tuttigl ' occhi volti . a prince does nought ( or regular , or rude , ) but 's followed straight by th'gaping multitude . chap. xxx . a citizen who would do any great matter by his own authority , must first extinguish all envy . in what manner things are to be ordered upon the approach of an enemy , and how a city is to be defended . the senate of rome having intelligence that the tuscans had made new levies of men to make a new inroad into their country ; and that the latini and hernici ( formerly in amity with the romans ) had confederated with the volsci , ( implacable enemies to the very name of a roman ) they concluded that war would be dangerous . camillus being tribune at that time , and invested with consular authority , they thought he would be able to defend them , ( without creating a dictator ) if the rest of his colleagues would intrust him with the chief command ; to which they readily condescended , nec quicquam ( says livy ) de majestate suâ detractum credebant , quod majestati ejus concessissent ; nor did they think any thing substracted from their authority that was added to his . upon which camillus ( taking their paroles for their obedience ) caused three armies to be raised . the first he designed against the tuscans , and commanded it himself . the second was to continue about rome to attend the motions of the latiny and hernici , and was commanded by quintus servilius . the third was left in the city , as guards for the security of the gates , and the court , and to be ready upon any accident that should arise , and the command of this army was committed to lucius quintius . the care of his magazines was refer'd to horatius one of his colleagues , who was to see them furnished with such arms and provisions , and other things as were necessary in times of war. he caused another tribune of his colleagues ( called cornelius ) to preside in the senate , and publick counsel , that he might be present in all their debates , , and ready to advise in all their daily transactions . so excellent were the tribunes in those times , that when the safety of their country was at stake , they were equally disposed either to command or obey . and here may be observed the great ability which a wise and good man has to do good , by the suppression of envy , which is many times a great impediment to the good which some persons would do , could they but get up into such authority as is requisite in affairs of importance . this envy is extinguished two ways ; either by some great and difficult accident , in which every man forseeing his own ruine , lays his ambition aside , and submits himself voluntarily to the obedience of some person from whose virtue he may hope to be delivered : such a person was this camillus , who having been three times dictator , and acted in all his administrations more for the good of the publick , than any benefit of his own , and given many excellent testimonies of his integrity and conduct besides , his colleagues were not scrupulous to transfer their authority , nor the people at all apprehensive of his greatness , nor any ( how great soever ) ashamed to be inferior to him . wherefore it was not without reason that livy used that expression , nec quicquain , &c. the other way of extinguishing envy , is , when either by violence , or the course of nature your competitors die ; that is , such persons as envying your reputation and grandeur , and disdaining that you should be above them , cannot contain themselves , and be quiet , but rather than not satisfy the perversity of their minds , will be contented their country should be ruined , especially if they have been brought up in a corrupt state , and not been meliorated by their education . against this sort of envy there is no remedy but in the death of the subject . and when an excellent person is so happy as to have these impediments removed by the course of nature , without any machination or concurrence of his , he becomes great and honourable without obstacle , and may exercise his virtues without any offence . but when he has not this good fortune , and nature is so unkind as to suffer them to live , it is necessary he remove them some extraordinary way , and make it his whole business to find one ; yet with that caution and deliberation , that he be sure his way be practicable before he ventures upon it . he who reads the bible soberly , and consideratly , will find moses ( for the promotion and establishment of his laws ) was forced to put several to death , for no other reason but because out of envy they opposed his designs : and this necessity of removing competitors was not unknown to girolamo savonarola the frier , and pietro soderini gonsaloniere of florence . the frier could not master it for want of authority ; and those of his followers who could have done it , had no true knowledge of his mind ; yet that was not his fault , for his sermons were full of declamations against the wisdom of this world , and invectives against the wise men , by whom he intended such envious persons as opposed his doctrines and institutions . soderini was in hopes by the goodness of his conversation , and his beneficence to all people , that he should have been so fortunate as to have out-lived and worn out the envy of his adversaries , seeing he was but young , and found new clients coming in daily to his party , whom his excellent deportment had drawn over . so that he abstain'd from all kind of severity and violence , not considering that time is not to be lost ; that goodness is ineffectual ; that fortune is changeable ; and that envious persons are not to be obliged by all the presents and good offices in the world , so that both these persons were ruined at last , one of them because he had not authority enough to master the envy of his adversaries ; the other because he did not do it ( though he had authority ) in time . the other thing remarkable in that story , was , the order taken by camillus for the safety of rome , both abroad and at home . and certainly it is not without reason that good historians ( as ours is ) set down certain distinct and particular cases , that posterity may learn upon such accidents in what manner to defend themselves : it is to be observed likewise , that the most dangerous and unprofitable defence is that which is made by tumult and disorder ; and this is apparent by that third army which camillus left as a guard to the city , which many would have thought unnecessary , because the citizens were generally arm'd , and martial ; so that their needed no more than to have arm'd the rest upon occasion , without troubling them with an army . but camillus ( and any other wise man would have done the same ) was of another opinion ; for a multitude is not to be trusted with arms but in an orderly and regular way . for which reason , and according to which example , he who has the government of a town , is above all things to avoid arming the people in a confused and tumultuous way ; but is rather to cull and select such as he dare trust with arms , and such as he is satisfied will obey him , let him send or command them wheresoever he pleases . the rest are to be required to keep at home , and every man look to the defence of his own house . he who is besieged , and observes this course , may defend himself well enough ; he that does otherwise , does not follow the example of camillus and will hardly defend himself . chap. xxxi . powerful states , and excellent persons , retain the same mind and dignity in all kind of conditions . among the rest of the great actions and words which our author commemorates , and mentions as certain arguments of the great virtue and excellence of camillus , in a speech of his to his souldiers , he brings him in with this expression ; nec mihi dictatura animos fecit , nec exilium ademit ; i was neither elated with my dictatorship , nor dejected with my banishment . from whence we may observe that great men are never discomposed ; let fortune vary as she pleases , let her advance them sometimes , and depress them at others , they are in the same settlement and tranquillity , so quiet and firm in their minds , that every man may see it 's not in the power of fortune to disorder them ; whereas pusillanimous and mean spirited persons , inebriated with their good fortune , and attributing all to their own virtue and good conduct , make themselves odious and insupportable to all that are about them , and that arrogance exposes them to many revolutions , which coming upon them on a sudden , do so terrifie and dismay them , that they run into the other extreme , and become as abject and vile . hence it is that in time of adversity such princes think more of their escape than defence , having made themselves uncapable of that by their ill management before . and as this diversity of temper is many times to be found in particular persons , and princes ; so it is incident to commonwealths , as may be seen by the example of the romans and venetians . the first were never dejected by any ill fortune , nor transported by any good ; as appears by their defeat at the battle of cannas , and their victory against antiochus : their defeat at cannas was the third which they had received , and for that reason was very considerable ; yet they were not so terrified , or cowed , as to commit any thing contrary to the old dignity of the romans ; for they resolved to continue the war ; they raised more forces ; they refused to redeem their prisoners upon any new terms ; and could not be brought to make any overtures of peace , either to hanibal , or the senate at carthage ; but for want of others , they arm'd their old men , and their servants . and resolved wholly upon war ; for which obstinacy and refractoriness , when hanno was told , he made a speech to the senate , and remonstrated how little they were to presume upon their victory at cannas : we see then the romans were not to be terrified or discouraged by any adversity of fortune ; we shall shew now how far they were on the other side from insulting in their good . antiochus , before he came to a battel , sent embassadors to scipio to desire a treaty : scipio sent him these conditions , that he should return with his army into syria , and leave the rest to the romans . autiochus thought that unreasonable , fought him , was beaten , and afterwards sent embassadors again to scipio , with instructions to accept of whatever terms the conqueror should give : scipio never thought of altering his first propositions , though made before the battel was won , but told them , quod romani si vincuntur , non minuuntur animis , nec si vincunt insolescere solent ; that 〈◊〉 mans were never dejected by ill for●une , nor elated by good . the venetians acted quite the other way , who having got a little good fortune , ( ascribing it to a wrong cause , as if it had proceeded from their own power and virtue ) had the insolence to call the king of france son of st. mark , and taking a fancy that they should bring their commonwealth to as great a condition of grandeur and power as the romans , they despis'd the church , and all the princes of italy besides . afterwards , when their fortune began to change , and they received a small defeat at vaila by the french ; they lost their whole empire in a day ; part revolted , and part they gave up themselves to the pope , and king of spain ; and so much had they abandoned themselves to fear and consternation , that they sent embassadors to the emperor to make themselves his tributaries , and writ poor and mean letters to the pope to move him to compassion , and to this extremity of dejection they were brought in four days time , by the loss but of one half of their army ; for the other of their proveditory retreated , and came off safe to verona with more than horse and foot ; so that had there been any courage either in the citizens or senate , they might quickly have recruited , and shewn their force again ; and if they could not have conquered , they might at least have lost all with more reputation , or possibly have brought the enemy to some honourable accord : but the poorness of their spirit , and the illness of their military discipline took from them at one time both their courage and state : and so it will be with whosoever follows the example of the venetians : for this insolence in good fortune , and dejection in bad , proceeds from their manner of education ; which if vain and idle , will make you so too ; whereas if it be otherwise , it will give you a better notion of the world , and teach you in both fortunes to behave your self with more moderation : and as this is true in single persons , so it is in commonwealths , which are good or bad according to their manner of living . we have often said it before , and think it not amiss to repeat it again , that the foundation of all governments consists in their military discipline ; and that where that is defective , neither their laws , nor any thing else can be good ; for thorow the whole tract of this history , it appears that there is a necessity your militia should be good , and that cannot be good , but by continual exercise , which you cannot be sure of unless it consists of your own subjects . and because you are not always in war , and it is impossible you shall be , therefore it is necessary that they be exercised in times of peace , which is not to be done by any but your own subjects , in respect of the charge . camillus ( as is said before ) marched out with his army against the tuscans , but his soldiers having had a sight of the enemy , found their army so great , that they were discouraged and dismay'd , and thought themselves so much inferior , that they were not able to fight the● . camillus understanding this terror in his camp , went up and down among the soldiers , and having reprehended their fear , and said many things to encourage them , and drive that fancy out of their heads , at last without further directions , come ( said he ) courage ! quod quisque didicit aut consuevit , faciat . do what you have been taught and accustomed , i desire no more . from whence it may be collected that he would not have used those words , had not his army been exercised before , and that in times of peace as well as war : for no good is to be expected , nor no general to trust himself to an unexperienced or undisciplined army , which will certainly be his ruine , though he were as good a commander as hanibal himself . and the reason is , because when an army is engaged the general cannot be present in all places , to supply all defects , and remedy all errors ; so that he must necessarily miscarry , unless he has such persons disposed up and down in the army , as are capable of understanding his mind , and executing his orders . which being so , the roman discipline is to be followed , and the citizens of every city are to be inured to their arms in times of peace as well as war , that when they are brought to fight , they may not be at a loss , or meet with any thing new , or unaccustomed to them ; by which means it will come to pass , that they will not be surprized or terrified in any condition , but retain still the same courage and sence of their dignity ; but where the citizens are undisciplin'd , and rely more upon their fortune , than experience , their hearts will change with their fortune , and they will give the same testimony of themselves , as the venetians have done . chap. xxxii . the ways which some people have taken to prevent a peace . the circei and the velitrae two of the roman colonies , revolted , in hopes the latine would have been able to defend them . the latines being defeated , and they frustrated of their hopes , it was the advice of several citizens , that they should send embassadors to rome to reconcile themselves to the senate ; but those who had been ring-leaders in the defection , apprehending the punishment would fall heavy upon their heads , perverted that design ; and to run things beyond all possibility of terms , they incited the people to arm , and invade the frontiers of the romans . and doubtless when prince or commonwealth are desirous to prevent an agreement , there is no safer , nor surer way , than by running the people into some unpardonable offence , that the fear of being punish'd may keep them averse from all overtures of peace . after the first war betwixt the carthaginians and romans , those soldiers which had been employed by the carthaginians in sicily and sardigna , as soon as the peace was concluded , went over into africa , where being denyed or delayed in the demands of their pay , they took arms , and putting themselves under the command of two of their officers , matho , and spendio , they plundered several of the carthaginian towns , and possessed themselves of others . the carthaginians ( to try all ways , before they came to extremity ) sent asdrubal ( on of their principal citizens ) embassador to them ; who having been formerly their general , it was probable , might have some authority among them . asdrubal being arrived , and matho , and spendio desirous to put the soldiers beyond all possibility of pardon , persuaded them that the best and most secure way would be , for them to kill all the carthaginians that were prisoners with them , and asdrubal among the rest . whereupon they killed them all , with a thousand circumstances of cruelty and torture ; to which piece of wickedness they added another by publishing an edict importing , that all the carthaginians which should be taken for the future , should be treated the same way . and thus they prevented all propositions of peace , and rendered their soldiers obstinate and implacable to the carthaginians . chap. xxxiii . to the obtaining a victory , it is necessary your army has a confidence not only in one another , but in their general . to win a battel , and overcome an enemy , it is necessary to give your army such a confidence , as may make them believe that nothing is able to withstan● them ; and the way of infusing this confidence is , by arming , and exercising them well , and giving them a knowledge and acquaintance one with the other ; which confidence and acquaintance is not to be expected , but where your soldiers are your own subjects , and have been brought up together . the general is to be so qualified , that the soldiers may have confidence in his wisdom , and conduct ; and they will always have such a confidence if they see him careful , and regular , and couragious , and one who preserves the majesty of his command with discretion and reputation ; which he will do , if he punishes strictly , and put his soldiers upon no over-hard and impertinent duty ; keeps his promises ; represent victory easie , either by concealing or extenuating the dangers , or by encouraging them bravely against them ; and these things rightly observed , are of great consequence both to the authority of the general , and the obtaining the victory . the way which the romans took to give this assurance to their armies , was , by pretence of religion ; for which cause before the creation of their consuls ; the raising , or marching , or engaging of their armies , their augures and auspices were consulted : and without some of these , no wise general would undertake any great enterprize , believing they should certainly miscarry , unless the soldiers were thorowly convinced that the gods were on their side . and when any of their consuls or other commanders fought in defiance of these auspices , he was punished , as claudius pulcher for despising the omen of the chickens . and although this is obvious in every part of the roman history ; yet it is better prov'd by the complaint of appius claudius to the people , against the insolence of their tribunes , where he tells them that by their means , the auspices , and other religious customs were neglected or corrupted , his words are these , eludant nunc licet religionem ; quid enim interest si pulli non pascentur , si ex cavea tardirts exierint , succinuerit avis ? parvasunt haec , sed parvaista non contemnendo , majores nostri maximam hanc rempublicam fecerunt . let them laugh at religion as they please , and cry , what are we concerned if the pullets won't eat , if they come lazily out of their penns ; or if a bird be disposed to sing ? 't is true they are but trifles , yet by not dispising those trifles , our ancestors brought this commonwealth to the grandeur it is at . and it was true ; for those little things were sufficient to keep the soldiers confident and united , which are two things go very far in a victory , though without virture and valour , they are not always successful . the prenestini being in the field with their army against the romans , they went and lodged themselves upon the river allia ( in a place where the romans had been beaten by the french ) that the consideration of the place might be an encouragement to their own men , and a terror to the romans . and though this design was not improbable for the reason abovesaid , yet it apeared by the success , that true courage is not disturbed by every little accident , as was well expressed by the dictator to his master of the house , vides tu , fortuna illos fretos , ad alliam consedisse , at tu fretus armis , animisque invade mediam acien . you see , by their posting themselves upon the allia , they rely wholly upon fortune ; do you trust to your arms , end your courage and attack their main battel . and he was in the right ; for true courage , good discipline , and a confidence arising from so many victories , cannot be discomposed by such frivolous stratagems ; light things will not dismay them , nor every disorder distract them . for even in the absence of their officers , soldiers that are expert , and accustomed to arms , are not easily beaten . as appeared by the two manlii ( both consuls , and making war upon the volsci ) who having indiscreetly sent part of their army to forrage , it fell out , that both the commanded party , and those which were left behind , were encompassed by the enemy , and as it were besieged both at a time , out of which danger the soldiers were delivered , more by their own courage , than any conduct in the consuls ; whereupon livy tells us militum , etiam sine rectore stabilis virtus tutata est . the stedfast courage of the soldiers defended them , without any help from their general . fabius had likewise an excellent way to confirm his soldiers and possess them with a confidence , which i cannot omit : having invaded tuscany with a new army ; supposing the novelty of the country , and their inexperience of that enemy might have some influence among them , to give them a confidence , he called them together before the battel , and having in a grave oration given several reasons why they might hope for the victory , he told them , that he had another reason behind , more certain than all of them , but in that he must be private ; for to discover it , would be to defeat it : a wise way , and deserves well to be imitated . chap. xxxiv . what vogue , fame or opinion disposes the people first to favour some particular citizen ; and whether they , or a prince distributes their offices with most prudence and judgment . we have shown before , how titus manlius ( called afterwards torquatus ) preserved his father l. manlius from an accusation which pomponius the tribune had exhibited against him to the people . and although the way which he took to preserve him was violent and irregular ; yet his filial affection to his father was so grateful to the people , that they not only not reprehended him for what he had done , but advanced him to honour ; for being not long after to choose tribunes for their legions , t. manlius was the second that was made . and here i think it not amiss to consider the way which the the people of rome took in the distribution of their honours , and election of magistrates ; and to inquire into the truth of what i asserted before , that the distributions of the people are better , and more exact than the distributions of a prince ; for the people follow the common and publick character of every man , unless by some particular notion of his actions , they presume , or believe otherwise . there are three ways by which a man may gain esteem and reputation with the people . the first is by extraction , when the parents having been great men , and serviceable to the commonwealth , the people take a fancy that their children must of necessity be the same , until by some ill act they convince them of the contrary . the second way is to associate with grave persons , of good esteem , and such as are reputed discreet and sober by every body ; and because nothing indicates and discovers a man so much as the company which he keeps ; he who keeps good company , may be concluded to be good ; for of necessity persons so conversant together , must have something of similitude . but their is another way of gaining the favour of the people , which exceeds them both ; and that is by performing some extraordinary action , whether publick or private , it matters not , so you come honourably off . and the judgments which are made in this case , are much better than the other : for the arguments taken from the virtue of the parents , are doubtful and fallacious ; nor can any man conclude any thing , till experience resolves him . the presumptions in the second from their conversations and company , are much better than the first , but not comparable to the third ; for reputation from ancestors or company depends barely upon opinion , and hopes , till some great action be performed that testifies your virtue , and determines the doubt ; and then if this action be performed when you are young , it makes the impression much deeper , and so fixes your reputation , that you must commit many ill actions before you can expunge it : those therefore who would advance themselves in a commonwealth , are to take this course , and endeavour to do some remarkable thing at first ; which was done at rome very frequently by several young persons , either by the promulgation of some law for the benefit of the publick ; or by the accusation of some great person for transgressing the law ; or doing some other great or new thing that may make you be talk'd of . nor are these things necessary only to recommend you at first ; but they are necessary likewise to maintain and augment your reputation ; so that they are to be renewed and repeated often as long as you live ; as manlius did ; for after he had defended his father so honourably , and by that noble action laid the foundation of his esteem , many years were not past before he fought singly with a french man , and having slain him very bravely , he took a gold chain from his neck , which gave him the name of torquatus ; and having given these testimonies of his courage in his youth , when he came to riper years he made himself as famous for discipline and justice by the example upon his son , whom he caused to be put to death for fighting contrary to orders , though he defeated the enemy ; which three great instances of his courage and virtue , made his name so honourable both then and ever since , that no victory , no triumph could have done more . and good reason , for in victories , many equalled , and some exceeded him ; but in these three very few came near , but no body exceeded him . scipio the elder was not so glorious by all his triumphs , as for having in his youth so manfully defended his father at the battel upon the tesin ; and after the battel of cannas forced certain young romans with his sword drawn to take an oath not to desert their country as they had resolved to do before ; which two actions were the foundations of his following reputation , and served as steps to his triumphs both over spain and africa which favour and good opinion of him was highly encreased , by his returning a daughter and a wife ( both of them great beauties , and both of them his prisoners ) immaculate and untouched , one to her father , and the other to her husband , in his wars in spain . and this way of proceeding is not only necessary for such as would gain honour and promotion in a commonwealth ; but for princes likewise and kings who are desirous to retain their reputation with their subjects . for nothing recommends a prince more efficaciously to the people , than in his youth to give them some taste or specimen of his virtue , by some remarkable act , or proposal for the benefit of the publick ; especially if it has any tendancy to justice , magnanimity , , liberality , or the like ; for things of that nature that are extraordinary , whether acted , or spoken , are transmitted to posterity with so much reverence , that they even come to be proverbs among the people : but to return , i say then , when the people designs to confer honour upon a citizen , upon one of these three accounts , they go upon very good grounds , but especially upon the last , when several and reiterated examples make him more known ; for then 't is not possible they should be deceived , and in young persons they are certain presages of their deportment for the future . i speak only of those degrees which are given at first , before any firm experience has made them better known , or that they pass from one action to a contrary , in which , both as to mistakes , and corruption , the people do not erre so often as princes . and because it may happen that the people may be deceived by report or opinion , or perhaps the actions of a man , as believing them more considerable and estimable than they are ( which cannot easily happen to a prince , by reason of his council which are by , and always ready to inform him ) that the people may not want such monitors ; those who have laid right foundations for a commonwealth , have provided that when the great and supream offices of a city are to be supplyed , where it would be dangerous to entertain any incapable persons , if they find the people disposed to the creation of any man who is known to be improper , it may be lawful for any citizen ; nay , an honour to any one that shall publickly discover his defects , that thereby the people understanding him better , may be better able to choose . that this was the practice in rome appears by the oration of fabius maximus , which he made publickly to the people in the second punick war , when at the creation of the consuls , the people were inclined to create t. ottacilius , whom fabius conceiving an unfit man for those times , remonstrated his thoughts so effectually to them , that he put him by that degree , and prevailed with the people to give it another person that deserv'd it much better . which being so , the people in the election of their magistrates do judge according to the best and truest tokens that they can observe ; and could they be as well counselled in these affairs as princes , they would commit fewer errors than they do . so that that citizen who would work himself into the favour of the people , must do some great matter , or express some great instance of his virtue or parts , that he may seem to imitate manlius , and get as much honour as he . chap. xxxv . what dangers they incur , who make themselves authors of any enterprise , and the more extraordinary the design , the greater the danger . it would be too long , and difficult a task to discourse at large of the danger there is in being the head in any new enterprise ; what hazards there are in the conduct , and how impossible to maintain it . reserving that therefore for a more convenient place ; i shall speak here only of the dangers to which such citizens , or other persons are subject who advise a prince to make himself head of any important design , and do it with that eagerness and impetuosity , that the whole enterprise may be imputed to him . the first thing i would recommend to their observation is , that counsels are commonly judged by their success ; if their success be unfortunate , the whole scandal of the miscarriage falls upon the author . if it prospers , and the event be good , he is commended , but at a distance , and his reward is not commensurate with the danger . the present emperor of the turks sultan selimus ( as it is reported by some that came late out of that country ) having made great preparations for an expedition into syria and egypt changed his design upon the persuasion of one of his bassa's , and with a vast army march'd against the sophie of persia. arriving in an open and ●rge country , but for the most part desarts and dry and no rivers to supply them , many diseases were contracted in his army , insomuch as with hunger and sickness , it dwindled away ( as many of the romans had done in that country before ) till at last ( though he had the better of the war ) he had lost most of his men ; upon which the emperor being highly enraged , caused the bassa who had counselled him thither to be slain . we read likewise of several citizens advising and enterprize , upon the miscarriage of which they were all of them banished . at rome certain citizens proposed and promoted very earnestly the making one of the consuls out of the people , and having prevailed , the first of them which went out with their army being beaten and over-thrown , the authors would doubtless have found the inconvenience of their counsel , had not the people ( in whose favour it was given ) appeared in their protection . so that this is most certain , all counsellors of this kind ( whether to princes or commonwealths ) are betwixt those two rocks ; if they do not advise what in their judgments they think profitable for their masters , and that frankly and without respect , they fail in their duties , and are defective that way ; again if they do counsel freely , they bring their lives and fortunes in danger , because such is the natural blindness of mankind , they cannot judge of the goodness or badness of any thing , but by the success ; and considering with my self , what way was most likely to avoid this infamy or danger , i can find no better than to take all things moderately , to assume and impropriate no enterprize ; to deliver your opinion frankly , but without passion , and to defend it so modestly , that if it be followed by your prince or commonwealth , it may appear to be their voluntary act , and not done upon your importunity ; in that case it will not be reasonable to complain of your counsel , when executed by the concurrence of the rest ; for if there be any danger , it is where things are done in contradiction of the rest of the counsel , who upon any miscarriage will be sure to combine against you , and procure your destruction : and though perhaps in this case there may want something of that glory which accrews to a single person , who carries a design against the opposition of the rest , especially if it succeeds ; yet there are two advantages on your side ; for first you will not run so great a hazard in the miscarriage , and then if you advise a thing modestly , which by the obstinacy and contradiction of the rest is carried against you , the miscarriage of their counsel , will make much more to your reputation . and although a good citizen is not to desire to raise his credit upon the misfortunes of his country , nor indeed to rejoyce in what happens of it self ; yet when a thing is done , it is more satisfaction to have your counsel applauded , than to be in danger of being punished . wherefore i am of opinion , in these doubtful and difficult cases , there can be no better way for the counsel either of a prince or state , than to deliver themselves modestly and freely ; for to be sullen and say nothing , would not only betray your country , but expose your self , because in time you would become suspected ; and perhaps it might befal them as it did to one of the counsel of perseus king of macedon , who being defeated by emilius paulius , and escaping with some few of his friends , one of them ( in discourse of his master's misfortune ) began to find fault ; and blame several passages in his conduct , which as he pretended might have been managed much better . at which the king being inraged , turn'd to him , told him , and do you ( like a traytor as you are ) tell me of it now , when 't is past remedy ? and killed him with his own hands ; so that he pay'd dear for being silent , when it was his duty to have spoke , and for speaking when it was discretion to have been silent ; nor did his forbearing to give his advice secure him from danger ; so that i am confirmed in my opinion that the best way is to observe the directions above said . chap. xxxiv . the reason why at the first charge , the french have been , and still are accounted more than men , but afterwards less than women . the arrogance of that french man who challenged the stoutest of the romans to fight with him upon the bridge of the arrien , and was afterwards killed by t. manlius torquatus , puts me in mind of what livy says in many places , of the french , that in their first attack they are more fierce and daring than men , but afterwards more fearful and pusillanimous than women . and many people enquiring into the cause , do attribute it to the peculiarity of their temperature and nature : i am of opinion that there is much of that in it ; yet i cannot think but that nature which makes them so furious at first , may be so invigorated and improved by art , as to continue their courage to the last . to prove my opinion , i do affirm there are three sorts of armies . in the first there is courage and fury , joyn'd with order and discipline ; and indeed their courage and fury proceeds from their discipline . and of this sort were the armies of the romans , for all histories do agree that there was always good order by reason of their long discipline and experience . nothing was done in their armies , but with great regularity , and express order from their general . they neither eat , nor slept , nor bought , nor sold , nor did any other action either military or civil , but by permission of the consul ; and therefore these roman armies , who by their discipline and courage subdued the whole world , are the best example we can follow ; they who do otherwise , do ill , and though perhaps they may do something extraordinary sometimes , yet 't is more by accident than judgment : but where well ordered courage meets with good discipline , and is accommodated to the circumstances of manner , and time , nothing dismays them , nothing withstands them ; for the goodness of their order giving new life and courage to their men , makes them confident of victory , and that confidence never suffers them to give ground , till their whole order be broken . there is another sort of armies which are acted more by fury than discipline ( as in the armies of the french ) and there it is quite otherwise , because not succeeding in their first charge , and not being sustained by a well ordered courage , that fury upon which they wholly rely'd growing cold and remiss , they are quickly overthrown . whereas the romans fearing nothing of danger , by reason of their good order and discipline , without the least diffidence or question of the victory , fought on still obstinately , being animated with the same courage , and agitated by the same ardor at last as at first , and the more they were press'd , the better they resisted . the third sort of armies is where their is neither natural courage , nor discipline and order , as in our italian armies now adays , which are so useless and unserviceable , that ●●●ess they light upon an enemy who runs by some accident , they are never like to have a victory ; and this is so obvious every day , it needs no example to prove it . but because by the testimony of livy every one may know what is the right discipline , and what is the wrong , i will give you the words of papirius gursor in his reprimande to fabius the master of his horse . his words are these , nemo hominum ; nemo deorum verecundiam hebeat . non edicta imperatorum , non auspicia observentur : sine commeatu , vagimilites in pacato , in hostico errent ; immemores sacramenti , se ubi valent exauctorentur ; infrequentia deserantur signa ; neque conveniatur ad edictum : nec discernatur interdiu , noctu ; aequo , iniquo loco , jussu , injussu imperatoris pugnetur ; non signa , non ordines serventur ? latrocinii modo , caeca & fortuita , pro solenni & sacrata militia , sit . let them bare no respect or reverence either to god or man : let neither the orders of the general , nor the directions of the auspices be observed ; let the loose and vagabond soldier infest his own country as much as the enemies : let them forget their oaths , and disband as they please : let them run from their colours as they think good , and not come back when they are required : let them fight hand over head , without consideration of time , or place , or order of their officers : let their ranks be confused , and their colours deserted : in a word , let their whole conduct be blind and fortuito like thieves , rather than the solemn and sacred militia of the romans . by this we may easily see whether the militia of our times be blind and fortuitous or whether it be solemn , and sacred , how far is it short of the old discipline of the romans , which consisting in exact order , produced courage and constancy in the souldiers ; and how far behind the french , among whom though their is not that just order and constancy , yet there is courage enough . chap. xxxvii . whether fighting in small parties , or pickeering before a battel be necessary ; and how the temper of a new enemy is to be found without them . in humane affairs ( as we have said before ) there is not only a perpetual and unavoidable difficulty in carrying them to their perfection , but there is always some concomitant mischief so inseparable from it , that it is impossible to arrive at the one without the other . this is visible in all the actions of mankind , so that that perfection is acquir'd with much difficulty , unless you be so favoured by fortune , that by her force she overcomes that common and natural inconvenience : and of this , and duel betwixt manlius torquatus and the french-man put me in mind , where , as livy tell us , tantiea dimicatio ad universi belli eventum momenti fuit , ut gallorum exercitus , relictis trepidè castris , in tiburtem agrum , mox in campaniam transierit ; the success of that duel was of so much importance to the success of the war , that thereupon the french army drew off in a great fear into the tiburtine country , and afterwards march'd away into campania . from whence i infer , on the one side , that a good general is to avoid any thing that ( carrying but small advantage with it ) may have an ill influence upon his army ; to fight therefore in parties , and venture your whole fortune upon less than your whole army , is rash and imprudent , ( as i have said before , where i dissuaded the keeping of passes . ) on the other side , i observe , when an experienced general comes against a new enemy that has the reputation of being stout , before he brings him to a battel , he is obliged to try him by slight skirmishes and pickeerings , that by so doing he may bring his souldiers acquainted with their discipline , and way of sighting , and remove that terror , which the fame and reputation of their courage had given them . and this in a general is of very great importance , and so absolutely necessary , that he who engages an unknown enemy with his whole army , before he has made an essay of his courage , runs himself and his army into manifest danger . valerius corvinus was sent by the romans with an army against the samnites , a new enemy with whom they had never had any conflict before ; and livy tells us he sent small parties abroad , and caused them to entertain light skirmishes with the enemy , ne eos novum bellum , ne novus hostis terreret ; lest his souldiers should be terrified with a new war , and a new enemy . but then the danger is , that your men being overcome , their terror should be encreased ; and that which you intended to animate , should discourage and dismay them : and this is one of those good things which have so near a conjunction with evil , that 't is no hard matter to take one for the other . my advice therefore is , that a wise general abstains from any thing that may strike a terror into his army ; for then the souldiers begin to apprehend , when they see their comrades kill'd before their face . for which reason those pickeerings and slight skirmishes are to be avoided by all means , unless upon great advantage , or some more than ordinary hopes of success . again , it is not his interest certainly to defend any pass , where he cannot upon occasion bring his whole army to engage : neither are any towns to be made good , but such as are of importance to the subsistance of his army , and without which both that and himself must be ruined ; and no such towns are to be fortified , but where not only a good garison may be disposed and supplyed , but where in case of a siege your whole army may be brought to relieve it : other towns are rather to be quitted than kept ; for to abandon a town whilst your army is in the field , is no disrepute to you , nor discouragement to your souldiers : but when you lose a place that you undertook , and every body expected you would defend , that abates much of your credit , and is a great prejudice to you ; so that it will be with you as it was then with the french , a trifling loss will endanger the whole war. philip of macedon ( the father of perseus ) a martial prince , and of great reputation in his time , being invaded by the romans , quitted and destroyed a great part of his country , which he supposed he should be unable to defend , as judging it better , and more consistent with his honour to suffer it to be possessed by the enemy as waste and neglected , than to undertake , and not be able to defend it . the affairs of the romans being in a very ill condition after the battel at cannas , they refused their assistance to several of their friends and allies , giving them leave to defend themselves if they could : which resolutions are much better than to attempt to defend that which is not in our power ; for in the first case we lose only our friends ; but in the last , both our friends and our selves . to return therefore to our skirmishes , i say , that when ever for the discovery of the enemy , or acquainting his souldiers with the way of their sighting , a general is constrained to make use of them , he is to do it with that art and advantage , that he may run no hazard of being worsted : or else to follow the example of marius , ( which is the better way of the two ) who marching against the cimbri , a fierce and numerous people which had invaded italy for prey , and beaten one roman army already ; observing his army to be afraid , he thought it would be necessary before he came to a general engagement , to contrive some way or other to dispossess them of their fear ; whereupon , as a wise officer , he disposed his army ( more than once or twice ) in some secure place upon the road by which the cimbrian army was to pass , from whence his men might have a view of their march , and accustom themselves to the sight of them ; to the end that seeing them to be nothing but a confused and disorderly multitude , incommoded with baggage , and either very ill accoutred , or utterly unarm'd , they might recover their spirits , and grow impatient to be at them : and this prudent invention of marius ought to be diligently imitated by other people , lest they fall into the dangers aforesaid , and come off like the french , qui obrem parvi ponderis in tiburtem agrum , & in campaniam transierunt ; who upon a trifling accident , desponded , and retired : and because i have mentioned valerius corvinus in this chapter , i shall make use of his words in the next , to shew how a general should be qualified . chap. xxxviii . how a generalis to be qualified , that his army may rely upon him . as we have said before , valerius corvinus was gone with his army against the samnites , a new enemy , with whom the romans had had no contest before . to encourage his souldiers , and acquaint them with the discipline of the samnites , he inured his men to them , by several small skirmishes , but lest that should not do , he made a speech to them before the battel , remonstrating with all possible efficacy of words , how little they were to value the enemy ; and how much they might expect from their own valour , and his conduct : livy brings him in with these words in his mouth , which gives us an exact character of a general in whom his army may confide . tum etiam intueri cujus ductu auspicioque ineunda pugna sit ; utrum qui audiendus , duntaxat magnificus adhortator sit , verbis tantum ferox , operum militarium expers ; aut qui & ipse tela tractare , procedere ante signa , versari media in mole pugnae sciat . facta m●a , non dicta vos milites sequi volo , nec disciplinam modo , sed exemplum etiam ame petere , qui hac dextra mihi tres consulatus , summamque laudem peperi ; then you may see under whose conduct you fight ; whether he that speaks to you be only a magnificent boaster , valiant in words , but ignorant in whatever belongs to a souldier ; or whether he be one that knows how to manage his arms , lead up his men , charge in the head of them , and behave himself manfully in the very heat of the battel ; i would not ( fellow souldiers ) that you should follow my words more than my deeds ; or take only my precepts , and not my example , who with this hand have gained three consulships , and immortal reputation . which words , if well considered , are sufficient to instruct any man what course he is to take to make himself reputed a great general ; he who acts otherwise will find in time that that command ( however he came by it , whether by ambition or fortune ) will rather abstract than add to his honour , for it is not titles that make men honourable , but men their titles : and it is to be observed likewise , that if great captains have been forced to such unusual language to confirm the hearts of an old veteran army , when it is to fight with a new enemy ; how much more care and art is to be used in a new inexperienced army , that never saw an enemy before . for if a strange enemy be terrible to an old army , well may he be so to an army that is new raised , and was never engaged : nevertheless all these difficulties have been overcome by the prudence of several captains , as by gracchus the roman , and epaminondas the theban , who with new raised men defeated old veteran troops , that had been long experienced in matters of war ; and their way was to prepare them for some months by continual exercise , and counterfeit battels ; by using them to their ranks , and holding them to strict discipline and obedience ; after which , they advanced against the enemy , engaged with great confidence , and performed very well . let no man therefore ( that is any thing of a souldier ) despair of making his army good , if he has but men enough ; for that prince who abounds with men , and wants souldiers , is rather to complain of his own laziness and imprudence , than of their incapacity and dulness . chap. xxxix . a general ought to know the country , and how to take his advantage in the ground . among the many things that are necessary in a general of an army , the knowledg of coasts and countries is one , and that not only in a generall , but in an exquisite and more particular way , without which he shall not be able to do any great thing : and because all knowledge requires use and exercise to bring it to perfection , so is it in this knowledg of places ; and if it be enquired what use , and what exercise is required in this case , i answer , hunting , and hawking , and such like recreations ; and therefore it is that the heroes which anciently govern'd the world , were said to be brought up in woods and forests , and accustomed to those kind of exercises ; for hunting ( besides the acquaintance which it gives you of the country ) instructs you in many things that are necessary in war ; xenophon in the life of cyrus tells us , that when cyrus went to invade the king of armenia , assigning several offices and places to the several parts of his army , he told them that , questa , non era altro ch'una di quelle caccie le quali molte volte havenano fatte seco ; that this expedition was no more than one of those chaces which they had taken frequently with him . those whom he placed as scouts upon the mountains , he resembled to them who set their nets upon the hills ; and those who were to make excursions upon the plain , were like them who were employed to rouse the deer , and force them into the toyls . and this is said by xenophon , to shew the resemblance and similitude betwixt hunting and war : for which cause those kind of exercises are not only honourable , but necessary for great persons ; and the rather , because nothing gives a man so true a knowledg of the country , or imprints it more deeply and particularly in the memory : and when a man has acquainted himself thorowly with one country , he may arrive more easily at the knowledg of other , because all countries and coasts have some kind of proportion and conformity betwixt them ; so that the knowledg of the one contributes much to the understanding of the other . but if before you have acquainted your self with your own , you seek out new regions , you will hardly without great labour , and long time , come to the knowledg of either . whereas he that is well vers'd and practised in one , shall at the first cast of his eye give you an account how that plain lies ; how that mountain rises ; and how far that valley extends ; and all by his former knowledg in that kind . to confirm all this , titus livius gives us an example in publius decius , who being a military tribune in the army which the consul cornelius commanded against the samnites , and finding the said consul and army fallen by accident into a vale where they might have been encompassed by the enemy , and cut off , vides tu aule corneli ( said decius to the consul ) cacum●n illud supra hostem ? arx illa est spei salutisque nostrae ; si eam ( quoniam caeci reliquere samnites ) impigre capimus ; do you see , sir , that hill which hangs over the enemies camp ; there lies our hope ; the blind samnites haue neglected it , and our safety depends upon the seizing of it quickly . for , said livy before , publius decius tribunus militum , unum editum in saltu collem , imminentem hostium castris , aditu arduum impedito agmini , expeditis hand difficilem ; publius decius the military tribune observed a hill over the enemies camp not easily to be ascended by those who were compleatly arm'd , but to those who were lightly arm'd , accessible enough . whereupon being commanded to possess it by the consul with men , he obeyed his orders , secur'd the roman army , and designing to march away in the night , and save both himself and his party ; livy brings him in speaking these words to some of his comrades , ite mecum , ut dum lucis aliquid superest , quibus locis hostes praesidia ponant , qua pateat hinc exitus exploremus . haec omnia sagulo militari amictus , ne ducem circuire hostes notarent , perlustravit ; come along with me , that whilst we have yet light , we may explore where the enemy keeps his guards , and which way we may make our retreat : and this he did in the habit of a private souldier , that the enemy might not suspect him for an officer . he then who considers what has been said , will find how useful and necessary it is for a general to be acquainted with the nature of the country ; for had not decius understood those things very well , he could not so suddenly have discerned the advantage of that hill , and of what importance it would be to the preservation of the roman army ; neither could he have judged at that distance whether it was accessible or not , and when he had possessed himself of it , and was to draw off afterwards , and follow the consul , ( being so environed by the samnites ) he could never have found out the best way for his retreat , nor have guessed so well where the enemy kept his guards . so that it must necessarily be that decius had a perfect knowledg of the country , which knowledg made him secure that hill , and the securing of that hill was the security of the army . after which , by the same knowledg ( though he was as it were besieged by the enemy ) he found a way to make his own retreat , and bring off his whole party . chap. xl. how fraud in the management of war is honourable and glorious . though fraud in all other actions is abominable , yet in matters of war it is laudable and glorious ; and he who overcomes his enemies by stratagem , is as much to be praised as he who overcomes him by force . this is to be seen by the judgment of those who write the lives of great persons , especially of great commanders ; for they command and applaud hanibal and the rest in all their inventions of that nature . there are many examples in them to this purpose , which i shall not repeat here ; only this i must advertize , that i do not intend that fraud which consists in betraying a trust , or breaking an agreement , to be honourable ; for though by them you may acquire power , and 't is possible a kingdom , ( yet , as i said before ) it cannot be with honour ; but by fraud , i mean that artifice which is shewn in stratagems and circumventions , against an enemy that is not only in hostility , but a state of defiance , ( for where he reposes any confidence in you , it alters the case ) and such as i mean , was the artifice of hanibal when he pretended to fly , only to possess himself of some passes , and so block up the consul and his army ; as also when to clear himself of fabius maximus , he found out the invention of binding fire-brands and other combustible matter about the horns of the cattel , and turning them out upon the enemy . and much of this nature was that of pontius general for the samnites ; which he used to circumvent the roman army ad tureas caudinas . pontius having disposed his army privately upon the mountains ; sent several of his souldiers habited like shepherds with several herds of cattel thorow the plain : being all taken and examined by the romans where the army of the samnites was , they unanimously concurred in the story which pontius had put into their mouths , that it was gone to besiege nocera ; which being credited by the consul , he brake up from his post , and marching thorow the plain for the relief of nocera , he ran himself into the trap , and was no sooner entred , but he was block'd up by the enemy . this exploit was fraudulently performed , yet it would have been very honourable to pontius , had he followed his father's advice , who would have had him either dismissed the romans frankly , that they might have been obliged by their usage , or else have put them all to the sword , that they might have taken no revenge ; but he took the middle way , quae neque amicos parat , neque inimicos tollit ; which neither multiply'd his friends , nor lessened the number of his foes . which way has always been pernitious in matters of state , as has been shewn elsewhere . chap. xli . that ones country is to be defended by all means , and whether honourable or dishonourable it imports not , 't is well defended . the roman army and their consul ( as is said before ) were block'd up by the samnites , who having proposed terms to them which were very dishonourable , as that they should be dismissed sub jugum , and disarm'd ( in token of bondage , ) and then sent back again to rome . the consuls were amazed at the motion , and the whole army was in despair ; when lentulus the roman legate stood up , and told them that in his judgment no conditions were to be scrupled at that time when their country was at stake : for the safety of rome consisting in the safety of that army , the army was to be preserved , and that country which is defended , is well defended , let the way be as it will , honourable or not honourable , it matters not : for if that army was preserved , in time rome might work off that disgrace ; but if it were lost , ( though it perished never so bravely ) country , and liberty and all would be lost with it : and so his counsel was followed . and this ought to be considered and observed by every man whose office it is to advise for the good of his country ; for where the safety of that is in question , no other consideration ought to be coincident , as whether the way be just or unjust ; merciful or cruel , honourable or dishonourable ; but postponing all other respects , you are to do that which shall procure the safety of your country , and preservation of its liberty . and this is effectually imitated by the french both in their words , and deeds , whenever the majesty of their prince , or the interest of their country is at stake . for there is nothing they bear with less patience , than to hear a man say such a thing is dishonourable for their king ; for they believe their king uncapable of dishonour , be his counsels or his fortune what they will , because whether he wins or loses , or whatever is done , all makes for the king. chap. xlii . that forc'd promises are not binding . the consuls being returning to rome , with their army disarmed , and a scandal upon them for the dishonourable conditions to which they had submitted ; the first who spake against the keeping them , was s. postumius the consul , who persuaded the senate that only himself , and those who accepted them , were obliged thereby ; and that they did not extend to the people of rome ; wherefore if the people of rome would be never so exact , the most that could be expected from them , would be but to deliver up him , and all those who had engaged themselves into the hands of the samnites ; and this he maintained with so much obstinacy and zeal , that the senate was ●onvinced , and sent him and the rest back prisoners to the samnites , with a protestation against the peace , as not extending to them ; and fortune was so favourable to postumius in the business , that the samnites not retaining him , he return'd to rome , and was in greater reputation there after his loss , than pontius was among the samnites after his victory . and here there are two things more particularly remarkable : one is , that there is no action , but is capable of producing honour and renown ; in victory there is nothing more frequent : in loss , it is possible , by making it appear that it came not by your fault ; or else by doing some action presently after , that may recompense and repair it . the other is , that it is not scandalous to break such promises as are extorted by force . for in promises relating to the publick , if they be obtained by force , when the force ceases , the promise ceaseth with it , and may be neglected without any disgrace . of this , all history is full of examples , and there is not a day but presents us with new : for as we see princes make no conscience of performing any thing that they are obliged to by force , especially if the force be removed ; so they are as little tender of their promises in other things , when the cause which press'd them to promise is taken away : which whether commendable or not in a prince , or binding or not binding , i shall not determine in this place , having spoken of it so largely in my treatise called the prince . chap. xliii . those who are born in the same country , retain almost the same nature thorow all the variety of times . wisemen were wont to say ( and perhaps not unworthily ) that he who would know what will be , must consider what has been already , because there is nothing in the world now , nor will be hereafter , but what has ▪ and will have conformity with the productions of former times ; and the reason is , because proceeding from men who have , and have had always the same passions , they must necessarily have the same effects . 't is true indeed their actions are sometimes better and more virtuous in this province , than in that , and in that more than in another , according to the difference of their education , for from the manner of their breeding , people take the first rudiments of their conversation ; and it makes it more easie to conjecture future events , by what is passed , when we see some nations retaining their humours and peculiarities a long time . so one nation has been always covetous , another fraudulent ; and so on the other side , one has been constantly famous for one virtue , and another for another . he who peruses the passages of old in our very city of florence , and compares them with our modern , will find that it has been all along exposed to the avarice , pride , cruelty , and falshood of the germans and french : every one knows how unfaithfully we have been dealt withal : how often charles viii . of france received our money , and promised to restore the citadels at pisa ; but never perform'd , which was a great instance of his infidelity , and avarice . but to wave such recent examples , every one knows what hapned in the war betwixt the florentines , and the visconti dukes of milan . the florentines being destitute of other expedients , resolved to bring the emperor into italy , to fall upon lombardy with all his power and reputation . the emperor engaged to bring a great army into italy ; to make war upon the visconti , and to defend florence against them , upon condition the florentines pay'd him ducats by way of advance , and as much more when they came into italy . the florentines agreed , paid their first money down , and the rest when they enter'd italy ; yet when he had marched as far as verona , he turned back without doing any thing , complaining of the florentines for want of performance : so that had not florence been under some extraordinary necessity , or passion , or had they ever read and considered the ancient customs of those nations , they would never have been so often over-reached , seeing they have been always alike , and used the same practices in all places , with all people . thus they served the tuscans of old , who having been many times over-power'd and routed , and dispersed by the romans , and finding their own force unable to defend them ; they articled with the french on this side of the alps to give them a sum of money , for which the french were to joyn their forces with the tuscaps , and march with them against the romans : but when the french had got their money , they refused to perform the conditions on their part , alledging that they received it not to make war upon the romans , but to forbear infesting them themselves : by which infidelity and avarice in the french , the poor tuscans were at once defeated both of their money and assistance . from whence we may conclude that the tuscans were formerly of the same nature as now , and especially the florentines , and the french and other foreign nations had always the same inclination to deceive them . chap. xliv . confidence and boldness does many times obtain that which would never be compassed by ordinary means . the samnites were invaded by the romans , and their army so weak , it durst not meet them in the field : whereupon it was resolved , that all their garisons should be reinforced , and with the rest of their troops they should pass into tuscany ( which was then at peace with the romans ) and try if they could tempt them to take up arms , and break their peace ; and in the harangue which was made by the samnites to the tuscans to remonstrate upon what occasion they had taken up arms themselves , they had this expression , rebellasse quod pax servientibus gravior , quam liberis bellum . they had rebelled , because peace was more insupportable in servitude , than war to men that are free . and so partly by persuasions , and partly by the presence of their army , they prevailed with them to take arms against the romans , which they had refused to their embassadors before . from whence it is to be observed , that when a prince desires to obtain any thing of another ( if occasion permits ) he ought not to give him time to consider , but is to act so as he may see a necessity upon him of resolving immediately ; and this is done when the person to whom the demand is made sees that in either denying it absolutely , or delaying his answer , he runs a manifest danger . this way was used very handsomely in our days by pope iulius with the french ; and monsieur de foix ( the king of france's general ) against the marquess of mantoua . pope iulius resolving to drive the family of the bentivogli out of bolonia ; and judging that to do it , he should have need of the assistance of the french , and that it would be convenient the venetians should stand neuter ; to this purpose he sent embassadors to them both , but could get nothing but uncertain and ambiguous answers ; wherefore to surprize them , and bring them that way to his lure whether they would or no , he got what forces he could together , and marching directly to bolonia , sent to the venetians to let them know he expected they should stand neuter ; and to the french to send him supplies : both of them finding themselves under a necessity of answering immediately , and that there was no time allowed to consider , fearing the displeasure and indignation of his holiness , they both of them complyed ; the venetian did not meddle ; and the french sent him assistance . monsieur de foix being another time with his army in bolonia , and understanding the defection of brescia , he resolved to go immediately and endeavour to reduce it . there were but two ways that he could possibly pass ; one was thorow the dominions of his master , but that was tedious and about ; the other was a shorter cut , thorow the territories of the marquess of mantoua ; but then he was not only to force his way thorow that country , but , he was to pass certain sluces betwixt fens and lakes ( with which that country abounds ) and that was not to be done without great difficulty , in respect of several forts which were upon them , and all well guarded by the marquess : however de foiz resolved upon the shortest , in spite of the difficulty ; and that the marquess might have no time to deliberate , he marched with his army , and at the same moment sent a messenger to the marquess for the keys of such castles as stood in his passage ; and the marquess surprized with the suddenness and confidence of the demand , sent them immediately , which he would never have done had they been more modestly desired ; the marquess being in league with the venetian and pope , in whose hands he had likewise a son at that time ; all which , had he had time to have considered , would have been very laudable reasons to have denyed it : but being press'd of a sudden , he sent them ( as is said before : ) just so it was betwixt the tuscans , and the samnites ; the presence of the samnian army having forced them to take arms , which they had refused before , and had scarcely done then , had they had liberty to have advis'd . chap. xlv . whether in a battel it is best to give or receive the charge . devius , and fabius two roman consuls , were in the field with two armies against the samnites , and tuscans ; and being come to a battel , it is observable that they took two several ways in the manner of their fighting , and it is worth our enquiry which of them was the best . decius charged the enemy with all imaginable fury , and engaged his whole army at once : fabius received the charge , and ( judging that way the most safe ) reserved his effort till the last , when ( as we say ) the enemy had spent their fire , and the heat of their fury was over . by the success of the battel , it appeared that the design of fabius was better than that of decius , who tired with the vehemence of his first charge , and seeing his men engaged farther among the enemy , than otherwise they would have been , to gain that honour by his death , which he could not hope for by the victory , in imitation of his father , he sacrificed himself for the roman legions . which when fabius understood , that he might not gain less honour by living , than his colleague should do by his death , he advanced with his reserves , and charg'd the enemy so briskly , that he overthrew them , and gained a happy and most memorable victory . by which it appears that the way of fabius was more imitable and secure . chap. xlvi . how it comes to pass that in a city the same family retains the same manners and customs a long time . it appears that not only one city has its manners and institutions different ; and produces men more austere , or effeminate than the rest ; but in the same city families are frequently found to have the same difference . of this there are multitude of examples , and particularly in rome . the manlii were always rigid and severe : the publicoli benign , and lovers of the people : the appii ambitious and enemies to the people , and so in several other families they had their peculiar qualities that discriminated them from the rest ; which cannot proceed barely from their extraction and blood ( for that must of necessity have been altred by the variety of their marriages ) but rather from the diversity of their education , in the several families ; for it is a great matter when a man is accustomed to hear well or ill of any thing from his infancy ; and makes such an impression in him , that from thence he many times regulates his conversation as long as he lives ; and if this were not so , it would have been impossible that all the appii should have been agitated by the same passion and ambition , as livy observed in most of them ; and particularly in one of the last , who being made censor , and to deposite his office at the expiration of months according to law , refused it absolutely ( though his colleague resigned ) insisting upon an old law made by the censors to continue their magistracy for five years and though there were many meetings , and great contention and tumult about this ; yet in spite both of senate and people he could not be brought to deposite . and he who reads the oration which he made against p. sempronius the tribune of the people , will discern the insolence of that family , and the bounty and humanity of several other citizens expressed by their obedience to the laws , and their affection to their country . chap. xlvii . a good citizen is to forget all private injury , when in competition with his love to his country . manlius the consul being employed in the wars against the samnites , received a wound that disabled him for executing his charge ; upon which the senate thought sit to send papirius cursor the dictator to supply his place , and the dictator being by the laws to be nominated by fabius , who was then with his army in tuscany , they were fearful ( in respect of an old quarrel betwixt them ) that fabius would not name him . whereupon the senate dispatched two embassadors toward him , to intreat that ( laying aside all private animosity ) he would name cursor for dictator , which fabius did out of love to his country ; though by his sullenness and silence , and several other signs he signified his reluctancy , and that that election went against the hair : from hence therefore all good citizens are to take example , and learn to prefer the publick good , before any private quarrel of their own . chap. xlviii . when an enemy commits any grand fault , 't is to be suspected for a fraud . fulnius being left lieutenant of the roman army in tuscany , upon the consuls going to rome to be present at some ceremony , the tuscans to draw him into a trap , lay'd an ambuscade for him not far from his camp ; and having disguised some of their soldiers in the habit of shepheards , they caused them to drive certain cattel within sight of the romans ; and the shepheards were so exact in their obedience , that they came up to their very stoccadoes : the lieutenant wondered at their confidence ; and the unreasonableness of the thing gave him occasion to suspect ; whereupon he found out a way to discover the fraud , and frustrate the whole plot : from whence we may observe that a general is not to presume upon any gross error that his enemy commits ; because it is not rational to believe he would be so sottish , and inconsiderate , were there not some stratagem at the bottom ; yet many times men are so blinded with desire of victory , that they see nothing but what makes for themselves . the french having overthrown the romans not far from the allia , and pursuing them to rome , found the gates open , and without any guards to defend them : they apprehended it a design , and stood drawn up all that day and the next night , without daring to enter , not imagining the romans could have been so abject and imprudent as to have abandoned their country . in the year . when the florentines besieged pisa , alfonso del mutolo a considerable citizen of that town , being prisoner in the camp , promised that if they would give him his liberty , he would deliver one of the gates into their hands ; the florentines believed and discharged him ; but coming afterwards to negotiate more particularly with certain commissioners deputed to that purpose , he was so far from coming privately , that he was always accompanied with several of the pisans , only when they came to treat , he desired them to withdraw . forasmuch therefore as he came publickly , and attended by several pisans , the florentines had good reason to suspect the performance of his promise : but the florentines were so blinded with a desire to have the city , that following the direction of alfonso , they came up to the gate towards lucca , expecting to be let in ; but all things being prepared for them , they received a great loss , and left many of their best officers and soldiers behind them . chap. xlix . a commonwealth which desires to preserve it self free , has need of new provisions every day ; and upon what score fabius was called maximus . it falls out of necessity ( as has been said before ) that in a great city there is not a day but some accidents occur that have need to be remedied ; and as they are of more or less importance , so their physician ought to be more or less expert . and if strange and unexpected accidents ever hapned in any city , it was in rome : one of which sort , was the the general conspiracy of the roman women against their husbands : some had poysoned their husbands already , and all the rest had their materials ready to do as much by theirs . of the same sort was the conspiracy of the bacchanals , discovered during the time of the macedonian war , in which many thousands of men and women were engaged ; which would have been very dangerous for that city , had it not been discovered ; for the romans had not a custom of punishing whole multitudes when they offended . and here we cannot but admire the fortitude , the severity , the magnanimity of the romans in punishing offenders ; which ( if there were nothing else to evince it ) would be a great testimony of their virtue and power . for so great was their justice , they made no scruple to execute a whole legion , or city at a time : sometimes they banished or men together with such conditions as would have been insupportable to a single man : so it hapned to those who escaped from the battel at cannas , they banished them all into sicily , forbidding them to quarter in any town , or to commit any disorder . but the most terrible of all their executions was the decimation of their armies , in which every tenth man was put to death by lot quite thorow their army ; nor for the punishment of a multitude can any way be found more formidable ; for where a multitude transgresses , and no certain author is known , to punish the whole with death would be too severe ; and to punish one part , and excuse another would be injust to those who were punish'd , and encourage the other to commit the same offence again : but where all are alike guilty , to execute every tenth man by lots , gives him who is to be punished , occasion to complain only of his fortune ; and makes him who escapes afraid against the next time . the good women then who would have poyson'd their husbands ; and the priests of bacchus were punished as they deserv'd ; and though these maladies in a commonwealth have many times very ill symptoms , yet they are not mortal , because there is still time enough for the cure . but where the state is concern'd , it is otherwise , and time may be wanting ; and therefore if they be not seasonably and prudently redressed , the whole government may miscarry . and this may be clear'd to us , by what hapned in rome . the romans having been very free in bestowing the freedom and priviledges of their city upon strangers , the strangers grew so numerous by degrees , and to have so great a vote in the councils , that the whole government began to totter , and decline from its old , to its new inhabitants ; which being observed by qui●●us fabius the censor , he applyed a remedy in time , by reducing all the new citizens into four tribes ; that being contracted into so narrow a space , they might not have so malignant an influence upon the city ; and this so timely and so useful expedient , was taken so thankfully from him by the people , that they gave him the addition of maximus , and he was called fabius maximus ever after . the art of war , in seven books . by nicholas machiavel . newly translated into english ; and for the benefit of the reader divided into chapters . london , printed for iohn starkey , charles harper , and iohn amery , in fleetstreet . . the translator to the reader . kind reader , it may seem strange to you at first , that i have divided the books of machiavel , and disposed them into chapters ▪ contrary to the order of his dialogues ; but i am assured when you consider my intention , you will rather applaud than condemn me . i was always sensible that no man could blame me , if i kept exactly to my author ; nevertheless i thought this way more beneficial , the length of a discourse being commonly tiresome to any man who affects brevity ; besides that in all sorts of books , these kind of breaches and sections are very helpful to the memory . for this reason the works of aristotle , vitruvius and pliny , which were originally in another method , have been reduc'd since into this manner of division . i have presum'd to do the same in this my translation , having had more regard to the ease and advantage of the reader , than to the exact order of the author ▪ whom i have not followed verbatim , by reason of the diversity of the languages , yet his sense i have observed as strictly as would consist with the propriety of our own language , assuring my self that your bounty will dispence with some faults , seeing nothing can be done so accurately , but will be subject to many . the preface of nicolo machiavelli , to lorenzo the son of philippo strozzi , gentleman of florence . many have been , and are still of opinion , that in the whole world no two things are more incongruous and dissimilar than a civil , and a military life ; insomuch that many times when a man designs himself for a soldier , he not only takes upon him a new habit , but he changes his customs , his company , his manner of discourse , and leaves off all ways of civil conversation ; for he who would be light and nimble , and ready for the execution of all sort of violence , looks upon a civil habit as improper and cumbersome ; civil customs are unsuitable to him who thinks them soft and effeminate , and inconsistant with the life he proposes ; and indeed it would be undecent if a man whose business it is to look big , and hector , and fright the whole world with his oaths and his blasphemies , should carry himself demurely , and behave himself with the usual gentleness and complacency of other men ; and this is it which in our days makes this opinion true : but if we consider the condition and method of old times , we shall find no two things more united , more conformable ; nor more necessarily amicable than they . for all the arts which are contrived in a city for the common good ; all the courses invented to keep men in fear of god and the laws would be useless and vain , were not force provided for their defence ; which force ( if well ordered ) will be able to make them good , though perhaps the laws are not so exact in themselves ; for this is most certain , good orders without military coertion will quickly moulder to nothing , and run to decay like a noble and princely palace that is uncovered at the top , and has nothing but the splendor and richness of its furniture to defend it from the weather . and if anciently kingdoms and states imploy'd great industry to keep people in peace , and in the faith and fear of god ; certainly in the regulation of their military discipline they employed much more ; for where can ones country repose greater confidence , than in him who has promised to die for it ? where can there be greater inclination to peace , than in him who is not capable of molestation or injury , but by war ? where can there be more fear of god , than in him who being obnoxious to hourly dangers , has more need of his divine assistance . this necessity being well considered by those who gave laws to kingdoms , and those who had the command of their armies , was the cause that the life of a souldier was in great reputation with all people , and much imitated and follow'd . but military discipline being now totally deprav'd , and degenerated from the practice of the ancients ; that depravity hath been the occasion of several ill opinions , which have brought that discipline into contempt , and made all people hate and avoid the conversation of a souldier . but considering with my self both from what i have seen and read , that it is not impossible to revive the discipline of our ancestors ; and reduce it to its primitive excellence , i resolved ( to keep my self from idleness ) to write what i thought might be to the satisfaction of such persons as were studious of the art of war , and lovers of antiquity ; 't is true , 't is more than ordinary boldness to treat of this subject , where others have been so scrupulous and wary ; yet i cannot think it an error to write of what others have professed and exercised with much more audacity and presumption ; for my faults in writing , may be corrected without prejudice to any body ; but those faults which they commit in the execution , cannot be repair'd , but by the destruction and ruine of several people ; consider then ( sir ) the quality of my labours , and according to your judgment let them be approved or rejected , as you think they deserve : i send them to you as a testimony of my gratitude , though my abilities are not in the least commensurat with the greatness of your favours : besides it being the custom to address things of this nature to persons that are illustrious for their birth , wealth , parts , or generosity : i knew you had not many equals in your nobility and fortune , fewer in your parts ; but in generosity and liberality , none at all . the art of war , in seven books . liber i. chap. i. how the seigneur fabritio colonna being refreshing himself one evening with some other gentlemen in a beautiful garden , took occasion to enter upon this discourse of war. seeing i am of opinion , that after a man is dead , it is lawful for any body to commend him without danger of reproof , ( because there can be no occasion nor suspicion of flattery ) i shall make no difficulty to speak something in praise of our renowned and true friend cosimo rucellia , whose name i cannot remember without tears in my eyes , having known in him all the good qualities , which one good friend or good citizen would desire in another ; for i know not any thing so dear to him , that he would not have sacrificed for his friend ; nor any thing so dreadful , that he would not have undertaken for his country : and i confess freely among all with whom i have had any acquaintance and conversion , i do not know any man whose heart was more disposed to great and magnificent things . at his death nothing troubled him so much ( as he complained often to his friends ) as that he should die young , and in his own house without honour , or the satisfaction of having been serviceable to any man as he desired , for he was sensible that no more could be said of him than that he died a good friend . however it follows not but we who were acquainted with him , may bear testimony of his virtues and good qualities , seeing their is nothing left of his works or actions to recommend him to the world : and yet fortune was not so much his enemy but she suffered him to leave a short monument of the dexterity of his wit , which appears in certain sonnets , and amorous verses of his composition ; in which way ( though he was not amorous ) he entertained himself at idle times in his youth , till his stars had conducted him to higher thoughts , by which verses it may easily be discerned with what comeliness and felicity he could have expressed his conceptions , and how honourable he would have made himself by his poetry , had he made it his business . but fortune having deprived us of such a friend , it seems to me that no better remedy can be applyed , than for us ( as far as is possible ) to make as much of his memory as we can , and recollect such of his sayings , or arguments , as were either witty or solid . and because there is nothing of him more fresh than the discourse which he had lately with fabritio colonna in his garden , ( where the said fabritio gave a large account of all the mysteries of war one the one side , and cosimo proposed , and objected , and argued with as much gravity one the other ) being then present by accident with other of our friends , i have thought fit to put in writing , that by reading it , such of cosimo's friends as were there may , renew the memory of his virtues ; such as were not there , may be troubled for their absence , and learn several things profitable not only for military , but civil conversation . i say then fabritio colonna returning from lombardy , where for a long time he had done very honorable service for the king of spain , passing by florence to repose himself some time in that city , visit the duke , and enjoy the company of certain gentlemen with whom he had had a former acquaintance , cosimo held himself obliged to invite him to his gardens ▪ not so much to shew his own liberality and magnificence , as to have larger opportunity of discoursing with him , and informing himself of such things as might be expected from a person of his experience , and spending a whole day in discoursing of what might be to the satisfaction of his mind . fabritio accepted his invitation , came to his house , and was entertained very nobly by cosimo , with several other of his more particular friends as zanobi buondelmonti , battista dalla palla , luigi alamanni and others , all of them young gentlemen , his intimate friends , and ardently studious of the same things , of whose qualifications i shall say nothing in this place , because being still living , their own actions do recommend them every hour of the day . fabritio was regall'd with as much pomp and magnificence as were consistent with the time and the place : but dinner being ended , the tables taken way , and all the formalities of the feast over , which among persons of great minds , whose thoughts are employed upon more honourable things , are not so tedious as with other people ) the day being long , and heat excessive , cosimo thought it convenient for the better satisfaction of his designs , under pretence of avoiding the heat , to carry fabritio into a close and shady arbour in the garden , where they might discourse with more leisure and privacy ; and having brought him and the rest of the company to the place , some of them disposed themselves upon the grass , ( which was very pleasant and green ) and others upon seats under the shadow of those lofty trees ; fabritio began to applaud the delightsomness of the place , and then looking particularly upon the trees , and not knowing of some of them , he stood still , as it were in suspence , which being observed by cosimo , he told him , 't is possible , sir , you may not be acquainted with those trees , but 't is no wonder , for some of them were in more request with our fore-fathers than they are with us , and having told him their names , and what delight seignor bernardo his grand-father took in planting , fabritio replyed , i thought they were as you say ; but the pleasantness of this place , and the innocence of that employment puts me in mind of some princes in the kingdom of naples who delighted themselves exceedingly in those kind of diversions , and would plant , and make delicate arbours to keep themselves from the heat ; and thereupon breaking off short in his discourse , he stood still for a while , as in some serious suspence , but presently he told them if i thought i should not misbehave my self , ( which among my friends i suppose is not easy ) i would give you my opinion of it , not to traduce or calumniate them , but for discourse sake , and to pass away the time ; for doubtless those princes ( under correction ) had done much better to have imitated their ancestors in great and heroick , rather than in soft and effeminate things ; to have followed their examples in the heat of the sun , rather than to have retir'd and withdrawn themselves into the coolness of a shade ; and rather to have personated their fore-fathers in what was solid and perfect , than in what was delicate , and corrupt ; for since these kind of entertainments have been pleasing to our country-men , our country has gone to ruine , and all things declined . cosimo . you have opened a way to a discourse which i desire exceedingly , and therefore i beg of you that you would speak of it frankly , without respect to any body , seeing i intend to interrogate you with the same freedom , and if in my demands or replies i excuse , or accuse any man , it will not be barely to excuse or accuse him , but to understand the truth . fabritio . i shall be well pleased to inform you of anything i know , and shall leave it to your discretion to judge whether what i say be true or false , expecting to learn as much from your demands , as you will do from my answers ; for a wise question makes a man consider many things which perhaps he regarded not before ; and understand others , which without interrogation he had never understood . cosimo . i will return to what you said first , that my grand-father , and your fore-fathers would have done more prudently to have imitated their ancestors in difficult and generous things , rather than in what was delicate and soft ; and in this i will excuse my part , and leave the other to be defended by you . i am of opinion that there was not a man in his time who detested all kind of effeminacy more than he , and who was a greater lover of that kind of activity and vigour which you so much commend , nevertheless he found that he could not make use of it either in his own person , or in the persons of his children , being born in so corrupt an age , that a man who should have deviated from the common practice of those times , would have made himself contemptible to every body . for if a man in the heat of summer should have lien basking upon the sands ; or in the midst of winter should have taken up his quarters in the snow , ( as diogenes did ) he would have been thought a fool , or a mad-man : should a man have followed the spartan way , brought up his children in some cottage , taught them to sleep in the fields ; to run about bare-foot and bare-headed ; wash in cold water to inure them to hardship , and by making them less fond of life , to make them less sensible of death , he would have been despised for his pains ; and have been thought rather a bruit than a man. again should a man have been observed to starve his own carkass , and to live only upon beans and pease , and such kind of pulse , and have made as small account of mony as fabritius did of what was offered him by the samnites , 't is possible he might have been commended by some few , but he should have been followed by no body : being discouraged therefore by the practice of the present age , he followed not the example of his ancestors exactly , but followed them as much as he could , with as little notice and admiration to the world. fabritio . you have excused your grand-father very handsomly on that particular , and what you have said is doubtlesly true ; but i did not speak so much of that hard and rustick way of living , as of other ways that are more soft and effeminate ; have greater conformity and correspondence with our present times , and are ( in my judgment ) easily to be introduced by any man who has the government of affairs : and in my discourse of this matter i shall not need to straggle into other countries for examples , for the romans ( my own country-men ) will furnish me abundantly ; whose practices , and order of government , if well considered , will not be found so impossible to be introduced in any other city where there is but the least spark of virtue and goodness . cosimo . what are those things that you would introduce according to the example of our ancestors ? fabritio . to honour and reward virtue ; not to dispise poverty ; to value order and discipline of war ; to constrain citizens to love one another ; to live without factions ; to postpone all private interest to the publick ; and several other things that may easily accommodate with our times ; and these things are not difficult to be introduced , provided it be done deliberately and by right means , because in them the truth is so manifest and apparent , that the commonest capacity may apprehend it . he therefore who orders his affairs in this manner , plants himself trees which will afford him a happier and more pleasant shelter and protection than these , cosimo . i will not reply to what you have said , but referring it to the discretion of the company , ( who can easily judge of it ) i shall address my discourse to you , who seems to find fault with all those who in their great and weighty affairs do not follow the examples of our ancestors , supposing thereby i may be more easily satisfied in my intention . i would know therefore how it comes to pass that , on one side you condemn all those who do not imitate the practice of our ancestors ; and yet on the other , in your wars ( which is your profession , and excellence ) it does not appear that you have made use of any thing of the ancient method and discipline , or done any thing that resembled it . fabritio . you are now come to the point where i expected you , and indeed my discourse deserved , and i my self desired no other demand . and though i might save my self the labour , with a very plausible excuse , yet i will satisfie both your desire and my own , and that the more largely , because both time and place concurs to our convenience . men who are desirous to do any great action , are first to prepare themselves with all diligence and industry , that when occasion is offered , they may be ready to execute and compleat it . and because where those preparations are made cautiously , they are not to be discovered ; no man is to be accused of negligence , unless occasion discovers him first , to which if he be remiss , and makes not use of his time to execute his design , it gives us to understand , that either he has not prepar'd as he ought to have been , or that he had not thought of it at all : and therefore no occasion having presented it self to me to discover the preparations which i had made to reduce our militia into the form of the ancients ; if i have not yet reduced it , i conceive i cannot justly be condemned , either by you , or any body else : and this i think is a sufficient answer to your accusation . cosimo . it would be sufficient indeed , could i be assured that you never had any occasion . fabritio . but because i find you may doubt whether ever such occasion were offered or not , i am content to discourse more largely ( upon condition you will have the patience to hear me ) what preparations are necessary to be made ; what occasion is necessary to be had ; what difficulties obstruct our preparatives , and hinder our occasion ; and how this is easie and hard to fall out at the same time , which seems a contradiction . cosimo . you cannot do me and the whole company a greater favour ; and if it will be no trouble to you to enlarge , it will be none to us to attend : but because the discourse is like to be long , i desire i may have the assistance of my friends , yet with your licence and permission ; wherefore they and i do make it our request , that you would not take it a miss if we interrupt you sometimes with some importunate demand . fabritio . i am very well contented , that you ( cosimo ) and these young gentlemen your friends , ask any thing of me , because i believe the heat of your youth makes you inclinable to arms , and by consequence more apt to give credit to what i shall say : and these other gentlemen shall have the same liberty , because their grey heads , and their cold blood , makes them commonly enemies to warfare , and incorrigible , as people possessed with an opinion that it is the times , not the ill customs which constrains men to live at that rate . question me then freely , as you please ; 't is the thing i desire , because i shall thereby have some respit , and repose ; and withal , the satisfaction of clearing your doubts , and leaving nothing unanswered in your minds . chap. ii. a person of honour and condition is not to make war his profession . fabritio . i will begin my discourse with what you said , that in matter of war ( which is my profession ) i never made use of any thing of the ancients , to which i answer , that war being a profession by which men cannot live honourable at all times , it is not to be taken up as a trade , unless it be by a commonwealth , or a kingdom , and if they be well constituted , they will neither of them suffer any of their citizens or subjects , or any other good man to make it his business ; for he will never be thought a good man who takes upon him an employment , by which if he would reap any profit at any time , he is obliged to be false , and rapacious , and cruel , and to entertain several other qualities that are not consistent in a good man ; nor can any man ( great or small ) who makes war his profession , be otherwise than vitious ; because that that trade being not to be followed in time of peace , they are necessitated either to prevent or obstruct peace ; or in time of war to provide so for themselves , that they may subsist in time of peace ; and neither of those two ways are practicable to an honest man ; for from the desire of providing for themselves against the evil day , when the wars should be ended , proceed the robberies , and thefts , and murders which are committed daily by such kind of people , and that upon their friends as well as enemies . and from the desire of obstructing the peace , proceed all the frauds and jugling which the officers use with those who pay them , and all to continue the war ; but if by accident peace be concluded contrary to their endeavours and design , it is to be feared that the officers finding themselves destitute of pay , and their old liberty and licentiousness , will get together such soldiers of fortune as have nothing to subsist upon , and falling into some province , plunder and rifle it without any compassion . do you not remember that here in italy we had several of these disbanded souldiers , which got together when the wars were done , called themselves the companies , and went up and down ransacking towns , and pillaging the country , and all without remedy ? have you not read how after the first carthaginian war , disbanded souldiers united under the command of matho and spendius , ( two of their officers ) and in a tumultuous manner made a more dangerous war upon the carthaginians than that which they had had with the romans ; in the days of our predecessors francis sforza not only betraid the milanois who had made him their general , but usurped upon their liberty , and made himself their prince , and for what , but that he might live in the same splendor when the peace was concluded . and all the rest of the great officers in italy were like him , ( especially if war was their profession ) and though de facto they did not all make themselves dukes of milan by their treachery , they were the more to be blamed , because without the temptation of so great advantage their lives and exorbitances were as bad . the father of francis sforza being in the service of queen iane , constrained her to cast her self into the protection of the king of arragon , having deserted her on a sudden , and left her disarm'd in the midst of her enemies , and all to satiate his ambition , to satisfy his revenge , or to have got her kingdom for himself . braccio with the same industry endeavoured to possess himself of the kingdom of naples , and had he not been defeated and slain at aquila , he had certainly effected it ; and these confusions proceeded from nothing else but from the employing of such men as were mercenary , and had nothing to subsist upon but their pay ? have you not a proverb which confirms what i say , and tells us , that war makes thieves , and peace brings them to the gallows ; the reason is , for that those persons who have no other way of livelihood , nor so much temper and ingenuity as to take to any other course that may honestly sustain them , are forced by necessity to rob upon the high-ways , and then justice is forced to dispatch them , cosimo . you have represented this trade and profession of a souldier so vile and contemptible , that to me it seems now to be worse than none at all , whereas before i thought it one of the most noble and excellent things in the world : so that unless you satisfie me better , i shall never be contented ; for if it be so as you say , i cannot imagin how it should come to pass that caesar , and pompey , and scipio , and marcellus , and so many other great captains of the romans should become so famous as to be worshipped like gods. fabritio . i have not yet thorowly examined those two things which i proposed in the beginning ; one is , that a good man cannot take up that calling as his profession : the other is , that no well constituted government ( whether commonwealth or kingdom ) will suffer its subjects or citizens to make war their whole business . to the first i have spoke what i thought fit ; it remains now that i speak to the second , in which i shall have occasion to reply to your last demand . chap. iii. how a commonwealth ought not ( in prudence ) to permit any of its citizens to make war their profession . fabritio . touching the romans which you mentioned , it is true pompey and caesar , and most of the great captains who were at rome after the last carthaginian war , arrived at great reputation , but it was rather as brave and generous , than good and virtuous men ; whereas those who were before them , were famous as much for their virtue as conduct , and the reason was , because these made not war their profession , and the others did . whilst the roman commonwealth was incorrupt and immaculate , there never was any citizen who presumed by means of this profession to make his own fortune or party in time of peace ; by breaking the laws , exacting upon the provinces , usurping and tyrannizing over his country , and using all means to make himself rich . no man of inferior condition ever thought of violating his oaths ; maintaining of parties ; disrespecting the senate ; or promoting of tumults or any tyrannical sedition with design of making himself a fortune by the profession of arms. but those who had the command of their armies , contented with their triumphs , returned joyfully to their private affairs ; and the officers who were under them laid down their arms with more alacrity than they had taken them up ; every man returning to his former course of life , without any hopes of advancing himself by plunder and rapine . and of this we have strong and evident cause of conjecture from the example of regulus attilius , who being general of the roman armies in africa , and having in a manner conquered the carthaginians , desired leave of the senate to return , that he might look to a farm of his in the country which his servants had neglected . from whence it is as clear as the day , that had he made war his profession , or designed to have raised his own fortune out of the ruins of other people having so many provinces at his mercy , he would never have been so careful of the improvement of a cottage , when every day would have brought him in more than his whole patrimony was worth . but because good men , and such as are not desirous to make a trade of war , are unwilling to reap any other fruit therefrom but labour , and danger , and glory ; when they are arrived at a sufficient proportion of the later , 't is their ambition to return quietly to their houses , and live upon their old professions in peace . as to the common and private soldiers , it 's clear they were of the same humour , and declin'd any such profession ; for though when they were at home , they desired many of them to be in the wars , yet when they were in the wars , they were as willing to be dismissed . this is manifest by several arguments , but especially by the priviledg which the romans granted to their citizens , that none of them should be constrained to the wars against his own inclination . so that rome whilst it was well governed ( which was till the time of the gracchi ) had never any souldier who made it his profession to be so , by which means few of them were dissolute , and those who were , were punished severely . a city then well constituted and governed is to take care that this art of war be used in time of peace only as an exercise , and in time of war only for necessity , and the acquisition of glory ; leaving the constant practice and profession of it to the state , as the romans did anciently to the commonwealth of rome . that citizen who has any other design in the profession of arms , let him be what he will , is no honest man ; and that city which is governed any other way , is as much in the wrong . cosimo . i am very well satisfied with what you have said hitherto , and do acquiesce in your conclusion as far as it relates to a commonwealth , but as to kings i am apt to dissent because i am apt to think it convenient a king should have those about him who made arms their profession . chap. iv. that a king ought not to permit his subjects to make arms their profession , for the mischiefs which do frequently ensue . fabritio . a kingdom well govern'd ought the more carefully avoid people of that condition , because it is they who debauch their king by being the only ministers of his tyranny . and do not object to me any of our present kingdoms ; for i shall deny absolutely that they are as well governed as formerly , when kings had no soveraignty , nor absolute power , but in the armies , because there ( and no where else ) there is a necessity of speedy resolutions ; and that such a power should be reposed in a single person ; in other cases they ought to do nothing without their counsel , and it is to be the particular care of all that are of counsel to a prince , to keep off such persons from about him as promote war in time of peace , because they cannot frame themselves to any other way of subsistance . but i will discourse something more largely of this matter , not standing so much upon a kingdom that is perfectly good according to the model of the ancients , but supposing such a one as is like the kingdoms of our days ; in which likewise a king ought to be fearful of such as live wholly by war , because the nerves and strength of all armies lyes certainly in the infantry . wherefore if a king orders his matters so ill , that his foot be not content to return to their several callings in time of peace , and live as formerly by their labour , he must necessarily be ruined ; for of all the soldiers in the world none are so dangerous as those who make war their profession ; and the reason is , because you must be always at war , or keep them always in pay ; otherwise you will run a great hazard of being turn'd out of your kingdom ; and because it is impossible either to maintain war perpetually , or keep them in continual pay , you will be in great danger of being driven out of your kingdom . my country-men the romans ( as i said before ) whilst they were wise , and honest , never suffered their citizens to make that exercise their calling , though in respect of their perpetual wars , they were able to have pay'd them perpetually : but to avoid the inconveniencies which might follow thereupon , seeing the condition of their times did not alter , they altered their men , ordering their affairs in such manner , that every fifteen years their legions were renewed , and filled up again with young men in the flower of their age ; that is to say , betwixt eighteen and thirty five years of age ; during which time their legs their hands , and their eyes do correspond one with the other , and are in the same disposition ; for they did not keep them till their strength and vigour decayed , and their frowardness , and insolence increased , as they did afterwards when the times were more corrupt . for octavian first , and afterwards tiberius ( preferring their private power before the profit of the publick ) began to disarm the people ( that thereby they might have them more easily at command ) and to keep standing armies upon the frontiers of their empire . but because they thought them insufficient to curb the people , and awe the senate of rome ; they established another army ( which they called the pretorian ) which was quartered always about the city , and intended as a guard . but when afterwards the emperors permitted them who were listed in those bands , to lay aside all other professions , and devote themselves to war , they grew insolent immediately , and became not only terrible to the senate , but pernicious to the emperor , insomuch that many of them were put to death by the fury and insolence of those soldiers , who created , and disposed their emperors as they pleased ; and sometimes it fell out that at the same time several emperors were created by the several armies , which occasioned the division first , and by degrees the destruction of the empire . those kings therefore who are desirous to live in safety and peace , ought to have their armies composed of such persons , as when there is a necessity of war , will take up arms freely for the defence of their country ; and when peace is concluded , will as readily acquiesce , and return to their old habitations and callings ; which may easily be done ; if they make their levies of such men as have professions before : a king is likewise ( upon the publication of peace ) to command his generals and great officers to their respective charges and governments elsewhere ; the reformades and gentlemen to their own houses and estates ; and the common soldiers to their original trades and occupations . and by the election of such men , they will fight stoutly to procure peace , but never disturb peace to create a war. cosimo . i must confess your discourse to me seems very considerable ; yet being so contrary to what i fancied before , my mind is not so well satisfied but there remains some doubt behind which is still to be cleer'd : for i observe several lords and gentlemen who in time of peace maintain themselves wholly by the profession of arms ; as several great commanders of your acquaintance and quality , who are in pay under several princes and states ; besides most of the men at arms are continued in pay for the guard and security of such cities and castles as are requisite to be kept ; so that in my judgment there is employment enough for them all in time of peace . fabritio . i do not believe that you can think that in time of peace there is entertainment for them all ; for if no other reason was to be alledged , the smallness of the numbers requir'd to the furnishing the garrisons , would be sufficient to refute it . what proportion is there betwixt the bodies of foot which are to be raised for carrying on a war , and those which are required for supplying the garrisons in time of peace : for those cities and castles which in time of peace are kept with a few men , are reinforced with great numbers in time of war ; besides which , great levies are made for the field armies , which upon the conclusion of peace are constantly disbanded . and as to such as are retained in the nature of guards to the state , pope iulius and you , have demonstrated how much those are to be apprehended who will not entertain any other vocation but war ; having turned them out of your guards for their insolence , and entertained swizzers in their places , as people born and brought up under laws , and chosen by the communalty by a more regular election ; so that tell me no more there is employment for them all in times of peace . as to the men at arms , and their being continued in pay in times of peace , the answer i confess is more difficult ; yet upon closer examination it will not be found impossible , because this custom of keeping men at arms in pay is corrupt , and inconvenient ; the reason is , for that they are people who having no other vocations , are occasions of daily disorders in the state , especially where their numbers are great ; but where they are not so numerous as to make an army of themselves , the danger of them is so much the less . yet many times they have done mischief enough , as i have said before in the cases of francis sforza , his father and braccio da perug●a . so that i cannot approve this custom of keeping men at arms in constant pay , having seen so much experience of their corruptions , and the inconvenience which has followed thereupon . cosimo . would you have no such forces in pay at all ? or if you would have them ; how would you have them entertained ? fabritio . not as the men at arms in france , for they are as dangerous and insolent as ours , but rather according to the method of the ancients , who raised their cavalry out of their own subjects , whom they sent home again to their houses when peace was concluded to follow their old callings , as shall be shown more largely before we end our discourse ; so that if these kind of soldiers do now ( even in times of peace ) receive pay , and live under that profession , it proceeds from corruption in their customs . and as to the pensions which i , and my fellow officers receive , i say that that also is a corrupt custom ; for a wise , and well ordered government ought not to entertain any such pensioners , but is rather to employ their own citizens for generals in time of war , and when that is done , dismiss them to their own private affairs . and with a wise king it is the same ; he is either to give no such pensions at all , or if he does , it ought to be in recompence of some signal exploit , or to oblige some excellent person in time of peace as well as war. and because you have instanced in me , i am content to stand for an example ; and therefore i say i never made war my profession . my business is to govern my subjects , to defend them , to prefer peace , but yet to know how to manage my self in war ; and if i have received honour or reward from the king , it is not for my understanding of experience in war , so much as for my integrity and counsel in times of peace . a wise prince ought not therefore to have any about him , but such as are so constituted ; for if they be too zealous either for peace or for war , they will draw him into inconvenience . this ( according to my proposition at first ) i could not but say as to the first point ; if it be insufficient , you must apply your self elsewhere for farther satisfaction . but by what is said , you may perceive the difficulty of reviving the customs of the ancients in our present wars : what preparations are requisite to be made by any man that is wise , and what opportunities are to be expected to bring them to perfection ; but you will understand them ●etter if your patience will give me leave to discourse them from point to point , and compare all the customs of the ancients , with the particular practices of our times . cosimo . if we desired at first to hear you discourse of these things , certainly what you have discoursed already , has much encreased our desire ; wherefore as we give you thanks for what you have done , so we do earnestly beg of you that you would proceed to the remainder chap. v. in what countries the best soldiers are to be raised . fabritio . seeing you are hitherto so well pleased , i will deduce my discourse of this matter from the fountain , that thereby you may comprehend it the better , and i be enabled to demonstrate it more copiously . when war is resolved , every man's chief business is to put himself into a condition of giving the enemy battel , and fighting him fairly in the field . to enable himself for this , it is necessary to raise an army ; to raise an army , there is a necessity of men , of arming them , disciplining them , exercising them , ( and that in great as well as small bodies ) of teaching them to encamp , and acquainting them with the enemy by degrees , either by frequent facing or confronting him , or by encamping somewhere near his march , where they may have the prospect of his army as he passes by . in this the whole address and industry of a campania , or field war consists , which doubtless is more necessary and honorable than any other ; and he who understands well how to draw up an army , and present his enemy battel , may be excused for all his other errors in the management of the war ; but if he be ignorant or defective in that , though in other things he be sufficient enough ; yet he shall never bring his war to any honourable conclusion . for win a battel , and you cancel all your former miscarriages ; lose one , and all that ever you did well before evaporates , and comes to nothing . it being so necessary then to find men , the first thing to be done , is to know how to make our choice ( which the ancients called delectus , and we levies ) of which i shall give you some light . they who have given us rules of the management of war , have recommended to us to make our levies in temperate regions , that our soldiers may be both valiant , and cunning for hot countries are observed to produce wise and subtle people , but not couragious ; cold countries on the other side do afford stout men , and hardy , but then they are seldom discreet . this rule was proper enough for a prince that was monarch of the whole world , and might make his levies where he pleas'd : but to give a rule that all may follow , i must needs say that all commonwealths , or kingdoms , are to make their levies in their own countries , whether hot or cold , or temperate , it 's the same thing ; because by ancient experience we find that in any country , exercise and discipline makes good soldiers ; for where nature is defective , industry will supply ; and in this case it 's the better of the two . and indeed to raise men in other countries cannot be call'd properly a delectus , for delectum habere is to pick and cull the best men in a province , and to have power to choose those who are unwilling as well as those who are willing to the war ; which kind of delectus cannot be made exactly but in your own dominion ; for in countries belonging to another prince , you must be contented with such as are willing , it being not to be expected that you should have liberty to choose as you please . cosimo . yet among those who are willing , you may pick and choose , take and leave what you think good , and therefore it is not so improper to call that a delectus . fabritio . you are in the right as to one way ; but if you consider the secret defects of such an election , you will find that in strictness it is not an election ; and that for these following reasons . first , those who are not your subjects , but are willing to the wars , are none of the best , but generally the lewdest and most dissolute persons in the province ; for if any be scandalous , idle , incorrigible , irreligious , disobedient to their parents , blasphemers , cheats , and altogether ill bred , they are those who are most likely to list themselves for the war , and there is nothing so contrary to good and true discipline , as such kind of humors : when of such kind of cattle you have more offer themselves , than the number you design to entertain , you may take your choice indeed , but the whole mass being bad , your choice can never be good . but many times it falls out , that there being not so many of them as you have occasion to employ , you are glad to take all , and in that case you cannot not be said habere delectum so properly , as milites conscribere : and of such kind of disorderly people , the armies of italy and most other places do consist at this day ; only in germany it is otherwise , because there , no man is press'd or listed barely upon the emperor's command , but as he stands willing and disposed to the wars himself ; you may judge then what part of the ancient discipline of the romans can be introduced into an army made up of such a medly of wickedness . cosimo . what way is to be taken ? fabritio . that which i recommended before , which is to choose out of your own subjects , and to exercise your authority in your choice . cosimo . if your election be made in that manner , can any ancient form be introduced ? fabritio . you know it may , if it be in a kingdom , and he who command be their prince , or lawful soveraign ; and if in a commonwealth it is the same , so he be a great citizen , and made general for that time , otherwise it is no easie matter to do any thing that shall succeed . cosimo . why sir ? fabritio . i shall tell you that hereafter , at present this may suffice , that no good is to be done any other way cosimo . well then , these levies being to be made in your own territory , is it best to make them in the cities or country ? chap. vi. whether it be best to choose you men out of the cities , or country . fabritio . those authors who have writ any thing of this nature , do agree unanimously that the best choice is in the country where they are inur'd to difficulty and labour ; acquainted more with the sun than the shade , accustomed to the spade and the plough , and to carry burdens , without any shifting , or mutiny . but because our armies do consist of horse as well as foot , my advice is , that the horse be raised in the cities , and the foot in the country . cosimo . of what age would you choose them ? fabritio . were i to raise a new army , i would choose them betwixt seventeen , and forty ; were i only to recruit an old one , i would have them always of seventeen . cosimo . i do not well understand your distinction . fabritio . i will tell you , were i to raise an army , or settle a militia where there was none before , it would be necessary to make choice of the most apt and experienced that i could find ( provided their age was sutable to the war ) to instruct them as i shall direct . but if i were to raise men to recruit and reinforce an army that was grown weak , i would take none above seventeen , because those who are there already will be able to teach them . cosimo . you would order your militia then , as ours is ordered with us . fabritio . you say well but i would arm , and officer , and exercise , and order them in a way i know not whether you be acquainted with in your country . cosimo . then you are for train'd souldiers . fabritio . why would you have me blame them ? cosimo . because several wise men have always condemn'd them . fabritio . i think you are in a mistake to say a wise man can be against training of souldiers : a man may be thought wise , ( 't is possible ) and be no such thing . cosimo . the ill success which those trained-bands have always had , is a great argument of the truth of that opinion . fabritio . have a care the fault was not more in you , than in them ; of which perhaps you may be convinced before i have done my discourse . cosimo . you will do us a very great favour . but i will tell you first , in what it is this militia is condemn'd , that you may afterwards justifie it the better . chap. vii . of the inconvenience , and convenience of trained-bands or a settled militia . cosimo . it is objected that either they are experienced and useless , and then to rely upon them is to ruine the state. or else they are ready and skilful , and strong , and then , he who has the command of them may do what he pleases . they instance in the romans , who lost their liberty by these kind of men . they instance likewise in the venetian , and the king of france ; the first of which makes use only of foreign arms , lest some time or other , they should fall under the subjection of some of their citizens : and the latter has disarmed his subjects , with the more ease to keep them under command . but those who are against these trained-bands , are more fearful when they are raw , and inexperienced than otherwise , and to this purpose they give two considerable reasons . one is , because they are unskilful , the other is , because they are unwilling , and they say , that people any thing in years , never learn any thing well ; and a man never does good when he is forced to the wars . fabritio . the reasons which you have alledged , are produced only by persons who understand things at a distance , as i shall demonstrate plainly . and first as to their unserviceableness , i say , there are no souldiers more useful than ones own subjects , and no subjects can be ordered a better way . and this being clear , and indisputable , i will not spend time in proving it farther , because i have the concurrence of all ancient history to confirm it . as to the inexperience and force wherewith they are charged , i say ( and it is true ) that , inexperience makes a man cowardly , and force makes a man mutinous ; but courage and experience both are infused into them by arming , and exercising , and accommodating them well , as shall be shown in my following discourse . but as to the point of force , you must know that such persons as are raised by the command of a prince , are neither to be altogether press'd , nor altogether voluntiers ; because to have them altogether voluntiers , would be to incur the inconveniences which i have mentioned before ; it would not be a fair election , and there would be very few go a long with you , and wholly to force them , would be as dangerous on the other side : therefore a middle way is to be taken , neither too forcible on the one side , nor too frank on the other , but such a one as may tempt them to the war out of their respect to their prince , whose displeasure they fear above all other punishments ; such a course as this , tempered so cunningly betwixt fair means and foul , cannot be dangerous , nor produce that discontent and mutiny which occasions so much mischief . i do not say that an army so chosen and exercised , is absolutely invincible , for the roman armies were many times overcome ; and hannibal's army was defeated ; wherefore an army cannot be so ordered and disciplin'd , that one may promise himself it shall never be broken . the wise men therefore of whom you speak , are not to calculate the uselesness of an army , from the loss of one battle , but are rather to believe that having miscarried once , they will be more cautious afterwards , and do something ( as occasion offers ) to expiate their disgrace : and if the business should be thorowly examined , it would not be found to be the defect of the form so much , as want of perfection in their order ▪ and this ( as i said before ) is to be provided against , not by blaming , or exploding the way of train'd men , but by improving and correcting it where it shall be found amiss ; and how that is done , i will show you particularly . as to your doubt that such an order of souldiers , meeting with an officer equally disposed , may usurp upon you , and turn you out of your government ; i answer , that arms put orderly and legally into the hands of citizens or subjects never did , nor will do any harm . and cities are kept longer innocent and incorrupt with those , than any other forces , nay than they are commonly without them . rome had its citizens in arms four hundred years together , and yet kept its liberty intire ; sparta preserved its liberty years in the same posture ; several cities have been disarmed , and kept their liberties : but how long ? not forty years any of them , and the reason is , because great cities have occasion for soldiers , and when they have none of their own , they are forced to entertain strangers which commonly do much more mischief than their own , for they are more easily debauched , and a popular citizen may more easily corrupt and employ them as instruments of usurpation and tyranny , when they have nothing but naked , and unarmed people to destroy . besides , a city ought in reason to be more fearful of two enemies than one . for in entertaining of strangers , a city is to have an eye over her mercenaries and her natives ; and to prove that this jealousie is natural and reasonable , remember what i said before of francis sforza ; whereas a city which employs only her own inhabitants , fears nobody else . but to use one reason for all , let me tell you , no man ever established a commonwealth , or kingdom , who did not believe that the inhabitants ( if arm'd ) would be willing to defend it . and had the venetians been as wise in this , as other counsels , they would have set up a new monarchy in the world ; and they are the more inexcusable that have not , because their first legislators put arms into their hands , and gave them ability to defend themselves . but their territory being little at land , they employed their arms only at sea , where they performed many great things , to the enlargement of their country . but in process of time , being forced to take arms by land for the relief of vicenza , they entertained the marquess of mantoua into their service , and made him their general , whereas they should rather have committed that charge to one of their own citizens , and sent him to have engaged the enemy at land . this unhappy resolution was that which clip'd the wings of their success , and kept them from extending their empire ; if they did it out of an opinion that their experience was not so great in land as in sea affairs , their diffidence was imprudent ; for a sea captain accustomed to the conflicts of the winds and the water , and the elements , and the enemy , shall sooner make a good land-officer , where he has nothing to fight with but men ; than a land-officer shall make a good captain at sea. my country-men the romans who were so knowing at land , being at wars with the carthaginian that was so potent at sea ; never troubled themselves to entertain either grecian or spaniard into their service , though they were both so good souldiers at sea , but they committed that charge to their land-officers , who fought the carthaginians , and beat them . if the venetians did it to prevent the usurpation of any of their fellow citizens , i think it was an unnecessary fear ; for ( besides the reasons aforesaid ) if a citizen with his sea-forces never made himself master of any sea town , he could have done it much less with any land-force . so that hence it may be seen that is is not putting the citizens in arms , that is the cause of tyranny ; but ill order , and ill management in the government ; for whilst good order is preserved , there is no danger of their being arm'd , wherefore their resolution in that point being imprudent , has rob'd them of much reputation and happiness . and as to the king of france's error in not keeping his subjects in discipline , and prepared for the wars , which is by you urged for an example , there is no body ( laying aside his private passion ) but must conclude that single neglect to be a great weakness to his kingdom . but my digression has been too great , and perhaps beyond my design , yet i have done it the more willingly to demonstrate to you that foreign force is not to be relied upon so much as ones own subjects ; nor can ones own subjects be prepared and adapted for the wars any way so well , as by training and exercise . nor can there be any better way of forming an army , or establishing a militia in any place than that which i have prescribed . if you have read the orders of the first roman kings , especially of servius tulli●s , you will find his orders like ours , and driving at nothing more than putting the citizens into such a posture , that upon any emergence they might be brought suddenly together , and form'd into an army for the defence of the city . chap. viii . of what sort of people an army is to be composed . fabritio . but to return to our levies , i say again , that being to recruit and old army , i would choose my men of about seventeen ; but to raise a new one that might be made fit for service in a short time , i would take in any betwixt seventeen and forty . cosimo would you in your election make any difference of their trades ? fabritio . many authors which have written on that subject , have made a difference of their trades , and will not allow of faulconers , fowlers , fishers , ruffians , or any persons who make sports their profession , or are in any manner subservient to pleasure : those who they recommend to be chosen , are labourers , husband-men , smiths , farriers , carpenters , butchers , huntsmen , and the like . but for my own part , i should not so much consider the quality of the profession , as the goodness of the man , and which way he may be employed with most advantage . for this reason i think your plough-men , and day-labourers in the country are more useful generally than any other ; for they take more pains , and do more service in an army than all the rest . after them are your smiths , farriers , carpenters , joyners , and such people to be chosen ; of which sort it is convenient to have good store , because their arts are usefull in an army upon several occasions : and 't is a good thing to have souldiers who have two strings to theri bow , and yield you double advantage . cosimo , how are those who are fit , or unfit for the wars , to be distinguished and known ? fabritio i shall speak of the manner of choosing a militia to form it afterwards into an army , because we shall have occasion again of speaking of the election to be made upon the recruiting of an old army . i say therefore that the fitness of a person to be chosen for the wars , is to be known by experience , ( in some great atchievment ) or by conjecture . this proof and tryal of their courage is not to be found among new raised men , it is necessary therefore where this experience is not to be had , to have recourse to conjecture , which is to be deduced from their age , arts , and stature . of the two first we have spoken before ; it remains that we speak now of the third , and tell you , that some persons ( as pyrrhus ) have been altogether for large and tall men . others ( as caesar ) would have them strong , well knit , and vigorous , which is to be judged by the composition of their members , and the quickness of their aspect . wherefore those who treat of that subject , have recommended a lively and quick eye , a nervous neck , a large breast , a musculous arm , a long finger , a small belly , round and firm thighs , and thin feet , this kind of contexture does always import activity and strength , which in a souldier are two things principally to be desired . but above all respect is to be had to their manners and that they be indued with honesty , and modesty , otherwise you choose an instrument of scandal , and a beginning of corruption ; for no body can expect , that with brutishness and dishonesty , any laudable virtue should consist . upon this occasion it seems to me not impertinent ( for your better understanding the importance of this way of election ) to let you know the manner in which the roman consuls in the begining of their magistracy made their elections for the roman legions . in which levies ( by reason of their continual wars ) being mix'd of new and veteran souldiers , they could proceed in the veterans by experience , and by conjecture in the new . you must know then , these levies were made either for present service , or to exercise them first , and employ them afterwards as occasion was offered . and although i have spoken already of what is to be observed in the election of such as are to be disciplin'd and employed afterwards , yet my intention being to shew how an army may be ordered in a country where there is no military discipline , and where men are not to be raised for immediate service , i shall speak of it further . but in those countries where it is the custom to raise forces by the princes command , there they may have them always ready for present service , as it was anciently in rome , and is among the swizzars at this day . for if in these kind of levies there be new souldiers , there are many which are old and experienced , which mingled with the new , will make a good army . notwithstanding this , the emperors ( after they began to keep standing forces and garisons upon the frontiers ) appointed masters for the training and instructing their new men whom they called tyrones , as may be seen in the life of maximus the emperor . which custom was not practised in the armies whilst rome enjoyed her liberty , but only in the city in which those military exercises being much used by the youth , it came to pass , that being drawn out for the wars , they were so well versed and experienced in that counterfeit discipline , that when afterwards they came to it in earnest , they behaved themselves very well . but when by degrees the emperors disused or abolished that custom of training , they were constrained to these ways which i have shewn you before . chap. ix how the romans raised their legions . to proceed therefore to the manner of the election of the roman legions , i say , that after the roman consuls ( in whose hands the administration of the war was wholly deposited ) had taken upon them the magistracy , being to raise an army according to custom , which gave to each consul two legions of the best men , ( who were esteemed the strength and flower of their army ) they created four and twenty military tribunes , ( six for each legion ) and invested them with the same authority as we do our captains . after this they assembled all the romans who were able to bear arms , and place the tribunes of each legion a part ; after which they drew lots in which tribe they should begin their election , and where the lot fell , out of that tribe they chose four of the best , and out of them four , and one was chosen by the tribunes of the first legion ; and out of the other three , one was chosen by the second legion ; and out of the remaining two , another was chosen by the third legion ; and the fourth person belonged to the fourth legion : these four being disposed in this manner , they proceeded to the election of four more , the first of which was chosen by the tribunes of the second legion ; the second by the tribunes of the third ; the third by the fourth , and the fourth by the first legion . after which they had a third election ; the first chose the third ; the second the fourth ; the third the first ; and the fourth the second : and in this manner they varied their elections , till at length all the legions became perfect and equal , and were then united . as we said before , the romans had the convenience of making this election for present service , because a good part of such as were chosen , were old souldiers , well experienced in their trade , and all of them well disciplin'd and train'd ; so that their elections were made by experience , and conjecture both ; but where an army is to be new raised , and chosen , not so much for present as future service ; the election in that case is to be made by conjecture only , and that from the age and person of the man. cosimo . i believe what you have said to be true ; but before you pass to another discourse , i would be satisfied in a thing of which you put me in mind , by saying that levies to be made of such persons as have not been trained up in the wars , are to be made by conjecture ; and of this i am the more curious , because i have observed in many places our militia's to be condemned , and especially as to our numbers ; for many are of opinion a less number were better , in respect that the fewer there were , the better they would be taught , and by consequence the elections would be better , the confusion less , and they would be more capable of reward , ( which is that which keeps them content ) and to be sure be under better command . i would know therefore your opinion , whether you are for a great number or a small , and what measures you would take in your elections both of the one and the other . chap. x. whether it is best for a militia to consist of a great number or a small . fabr. seeing it is your desire to be satisfied , which is best , a great number or a small ; without doubt a great number is best , and not only more necessary , but ( to keep frankly ) a compleat & perfect militia is not to be had in any place where there is not great plenty of men ; and as to your observation in other places , it is easily refused . for first , the smalness of your number does not better your souldiers , ( where plenty is to be had , as in tuscany ) nor mend your election ; because men being to judge by experience , in that country few people would be found whose experience would recommend them ; forasmuch as few of them have been actually in the wars ; and of those few , fewer have given such testimony of themselves as to deserve to be chosen before the rest ; so that he who makes his election in such places , is to lay aside his experience , and to choose by way of conjecture . other people therefore being in this perplexity , i would know , if twenty young persons of good aspects were brought before me , by what rules or method i was to choose or reject . i do not doubt but every man would confess the best way , to take , and arm , and exercise them all , ( it being impossible to judge till then which will be the best ) and to reserve your election , till having all had the same exercise , and instruction , it be easie to discern which is most vigorous , and likely to do service : so that upon the whole , to desire but few in this case , that your election may be better , is without question an error . as to the objection of being less inconvenience to the country , and to the people , i answer that a militia ( be it as little or imperfect as it may ) is no prejudice to either . because it takes away no man from his employments ; obliges no man from his business ; for to appear only on idle days to exercise , is rather a recreation to the people , and advantage to the country , than otherwise . whereas if they had no such divertisement , and young men would be apt on those days to run out into some debauchery , or extravagance , which would be much worse than those innocent recreations , which being a handsome spectacle , gives great entertainments to young people . whereas it is alledged that a less number is easier paid , and by consequence kept in better order and obedience ; i answer , that no levies can be made of so few , as that they will be paid always to their satisfaction . for example , a militia is to be established of five thousand foot : to pay them to their content would require at least ducats a month . first , foot is not a competent army , and ducats a month would be insupportable to a state , and yet insufficient to satisfie them , or to oblige them to any extraordinary enterprize . so that in so doing , your expence would be great , your force but small , and unable to defend you , much less to make any vigorous attack . if you encrease their pay , or their number , it would be the more impossible to pay them : if you gave them less , or listed less , they would be so much the more dissatisfied , and unserviceable . they therefore who talk of raising soldiers , and paying them whilst they are not in service , talk ridiculously , and of things either impossible or useless . 't is true , when they are to be raised for immediate service , they are always to be paid ; yet if in times of peace they be the occasion of any disorder or inconvenience , ( which i cannot believe ) the advantages of a well disciplin'd and ready militia does abundantly recompence it ; for where there is no such force , there is nothing secure . i conclude then , that he who would have a small number , to pay them the better , or for any other of your reasons , is mightily ignorant . for though it agrees with my opinion , that let your number be what it will , it will lessen upon your hands , ( by the many accidents that are not possible to be avoided ) yet a small number would quickly dwindle to nothing : besides , a great number is of more real service and reputation . to this it may be added , that if in order to the exercising , you select a few persons in countries where plenty is to be had ; they are so remote , and at such distance from on another , that you cannot bring them to a rendezvouz without great inconvenience ; and without exercising , militia's are useless , as shall be shown in due place . cosimo . you have satisfied me as to my former demand , but i desire you would resolve me another doubt ? and that is whether such great numbers do not produce more confusion and disorder in the country . fabritio . that opinion is as idle as the other , and for the reasons i shall give . chap. xi . how the inconveniencies . which follow great armies may be prevented . fabritio . those who are designed for the wars , may occasion disorder two ways , either among themselves , or with other people ; but the remedy is easie , though their discipline should not prevent it ( for as to quarrels and mutinies among themselves , discipline will obviate them ) if the country where your levies are to be made , be so weak , that they have no arms among them , or so unanimously united among themselves , that they have no head , this order and militia will make them more fierce and couragious against strangers , without any impediment to their unity , for men who are well disciplin'd , are as tender of breaking the laws when they are armed , as much as when they are disarmed , nor can they be any ways altred , unless the officers which you set over them debauch them , and which way that is to be done , i shall shew you presently . but if the country where your levies are to be made , are in arms , and disunited , this way will be sufficient to unite them ; for though they had arms and officers of their own before , yet they were such arms as were useless in war , and such officers as rather bred and provoked mutinies , than prevented or suppress'd them . and the reason is because in those countries as soon as a man is offended , he repairs immediately to the head of his party , who to maintain his own reputation , encourages him to revenge ; whereas a publick general proceeds quite contrary . so then by this way seditions are prevented , unity established , provinces united ( but weak ) continue their union , and are freed of their weakness : provinces disunited and mutinous , are reconciled and composed , and their ferocity which was employed formerly in disorders , is employed now to the advantage of the publick . as to the provision that is to be made that they injure not other people , it is to be considered that that is not to be done , but by the fault of their officers ; and to prevent the officers from oocasioning such disorders , it is necessary that care be taken that they do not usurp too great an authority over their soldiers , which authority is to be gained two ways either by nature , or accident ; the way by nature , is to be prevented by providing that he who is born in a place , be never put to command the forces raised in the same place , but be put at the head of such troops as are raised in other countries , with whom he has no natural converse . as to the accidental way , things are to be so ordered , that the commanders in chief be changed every year ; for the continuation of a command over the same men , contracts such a friendship and intimacy betwixt them , as is many times perverted to the prejudice of the prince . which changes , how useful they have been to those who have used them , and how much the omission of them have been prejudicial to other people , may be observed by the example of the kingdom of assyria ; and the empire of the romans ; for that kingdom continued a thousand years without tumult or civil war , which proceeded from the annual changing of the officers of the army . and in the roman empire , after iulius caesar was killed , all the civil wars ; and conspiracies which hapned betwixt the officers and the emperors , proceeded from nothing but holding the officers continually in command . and if any of the first emperors , or those who rul'd afterwards with any reputation ( as adrianus , marcus , severus and the like ) had had the providence to have introduced that custom into their armies , without doubt their empire would have been more quiet and durable ; for their generals would not have had so much opportunity to rebel , the emperors would not have had so much occasion to for , and the senate ( in default of succession ) having more authority in the election of a new emperor , would undoubtedly have chosen better . but ill customs ( either thorow the ignorance , or inadvertancy of mankind ) are not to be eradicated by examples either good or bad . cosimo . i fear my demands have drawn you from your intended discourse , for from speaking of levies and militia's , and such things , we are got clear upon another subject ; so that had i not excused my self before , i should think i deserved reprehension . fabritio . let not that trouble you , all that we have said is pertinent enough , for being to treat of the way of militia's ( which is condemned by many people ) and i to defend it , was convenient that we should begin with the way of election ; and first as to the cavalry . chap. xii . of the cavalry : fab. the cavalry anciently was raised out of the richest and most considerable of the city , but with respect to the age , and quality of the person . of these there were only three hundred to a legion ; so that in each consular army , the romans had never above six hundred horse . cosimo . would you have a standing militia of horse to exercise them at home , and employ them afterwards in the war ? fab. to do well ▪ you cannot do otherwise , if you would have soldiers of your own and not rely wholly upon such as make war their profession . cosimo . how would you choose them ? fab. i would imitate the romans , choose them out of the wealthiest , give officers as they do at this day , and see them well armed , and well exercised . cosimo . would it be well to allow them any pay ? fab. yes truly it would , yet it should be no more than would keep their horse ; for otherwise lying continually upon them , they would become grievous to the subject , and give them occasion to complain of you . cosimo . what numbers would you have , and how would you arm them ? fab. you are too quick , and pass from one thing to another ; i 'll answer you to that in another place , when i have told you how the foot are to be armed , and prepared for a field battel . the second book . chap. i. what arms were most used by the ancients in their wars . fabr. when you have raised your men , the next thing is to furnish them with arms , and before you do that , i think it not amiss to examine what arms were most used by the ancients , and choose the best . the romans divided their infantry into those who were compleatly , and those who were slightly armed . those who were lightly armed , were called velites , under which name all were comprehended who carried bows , and slings , and darts ; the greatest part of them had casques upon their heads for their defence , and a kind of buckler upon their arm . they fought in no order , and at distance from those who were arm'd compleatly ; their arms consisted of a head-piece or morrion which came down to the shoulders , a brigandine down to their knees , their legs and arms were covered with greeves , and gauntlets , a buckler covered with iron , about two yards long , and one broad , an iron ring about it without to keep off the blows , and another within to keep it from the dirt when it was lay'd upon the ground . their offensive weapons were a sword at their left thigh , about a yard and half long , with a dagger on their right side . they carried a dart in their hand which they called pilum , which upon a a charge they darted at the enemy . these were the arms with which the romans conquered the whole world . and though some of their ancient writers do give them a spear in form of a spit ; i do not see how such a weapon could be handled by one that carried such a buckler , for it was too heavy to be managed with one hand ; besides ( unless it were in the front where they had room to make use of them ) it was impossible to use them in their ranks ; for the nature of battels is such ( as i shall show hereafter ) that they do always contract and keep close , as being in much less danger , than when they are drawn up looser and at a distance : so that in that close order , all arms that are above two yards long , are not to be used , for having a spear that is to be managed with both hands , if your buckler were no hinderance , it could not hurt your enemy when he was near . if you take it in one hand , and manage your buckler with the other , you must take it in the middle , and then there will be so much of it behind , that they who come after you will hinder you from handling it : so that it is true , either the romans had no such hastae , or if they had , they made but little use of them . for if you read the history of titus livius , in the description of all his battels , you will scarce ever find he mentions those hastae , but tells you all along that having dar●ed their pila , they fell to the sword. my opinion therefore is , that this hasta be lay'd aside , and that in imitation of the romans we make use of their sword and buckler , and other arms , without troubling our selves with that . the grecians for their defence did not arm so heavily as the romans but for offence , they relyed more upon the spear , than the sword , especially the macedonian phalanx , who carried of those javelins which they called sarissae , with which they brake the enemies battels , and kept their own firm and entire . and though some writers say that they also had their bucklers , ( yet i know not ( for the reasons abovesaid ) how they could consist . besides , in the battel betwixt paulus emilius and perseus king of macedon , i do not remember that any mention was made of any-bucklers , but only of their sarissae , and yet the romans had much ado to overcome them . so that my opinion is , the macedonian phalanx was just such a body as the swizzers battalion ; whose whole force lyes in their 〈◊〉 . the romans were likewise accustomed to adorn their soldiers with plumes of feathers in their caps , which renders an army beautiful to their friends , and terrible to their enemies . in the first beginning of the roman wars , their horse used a round shield , a helmet upon their heads , and all the rest of their body naked ; their offensive arms were a sword and javelin with a long thin spike at the end of it ; and so being incumbered with shield and javelin , they could use neither of them well , and being unarmed , they were more exposed to the enemy . afterwards they came to arm themselves like their foot , only their shield was a little shorter , and squarer , their launce or javelin thicker , with pikes at each end , that if by accident one of them should miscarry , the other might be serviceable . with these arms both for horse and foot , my country-men the romans went thorow the whole world , and by the greatness of their successes , 't is likely they were as well accounted as any army ever was . and titus livius in many places of his history makes it credible where comparing the armies of the enemies , says , but the romans for courage , fashion of their arms , and discipline were before them all . and for that reason i have chosen to speak particularly rather of the conqueror's arms , than the arms of the conquered . it follows now that i say something of the way of arming at present . chap. ii. of the arms which are used at present , and of the invention of the pike . fabritio . the soldiers of our times do wear for defensive arms , back and breast , and for offensive a launce nine yards long , which they call a pike , with a sword by their side rather round than sharp . these are generally the arms which they wear at this day , few wear greaves and gantlets , and none at all head-pieces . those few who have no pikes , do carry halbards , the staff three yards long , and the head like an axe . they have among them musquetiers , who with their fire arms do the same service which was done formerly by the bows and slings . this manner of arming with pikes , was found out by the germans , and particularly by the swizzers , who being poor , and desirous to preserve their liberty , were and are still necessitated to contend against the ambition of the princes of germany who are rich , and able to entertain horse , which the swizzers are not able to do . so that their force consisting principally in foot , being to defend themselves against the enemies horse , they were obliged to revive the old way of drawing up , and find out arms that might defend them against them . this necessity put them upon continuing , or reviving the old orders , without which ( as every wise-man knows ) the foot would be useless ; for which cause they make use of pikes not only to resist and keep off , but to attack and sometimes to disorder the horse . and by vertue of these arms , , and these orders , the germans have assumed the confidence with or of their foot to attack a vast body of horse , of which 't is not above years since we had a most signal experiment ; and so many great examples there are of their courage ( founded upon their arms , and their order ) that after charles viii's expedition into italy , all nations made use of them , insomuch as thereby the spaniards grew into great reputation . cosimo . which manner of arming do you prefer , the german , or the ancient roman . fabritio . the roman without doubt , and i will tell you the usefulness and inconvenience of them both . chap. iii. whether the ancient , or modern is the best way of arming . the german foot are able not only to sustain , but to beat the cavalry , they are better for expedition , and can draw themselves up better , because not over pestered with arms. on the other side foot are more exposed to wounds both at hand and at a distance . they are not so useful likewise in storming of towns , and are in great danger where there is vigorous resistance . but the romans were so well armed , they could encounter and baffle the horse as well as the germans , and were secure against their blows by vertue of their arms , could manage themselves better in an engagement with their swords , than the germans with their pikes , and assault a town better under the shelter of their targets . so that the only inconvenience was the weight of their arms , and the trouble of carrying them along , which they easily surmounted by accustoming themselves to all kind of difficulties and hardships , and you know custom is a second nature . you must know likewise that foot are many times to engage both against horse and foot together , and consider also that these kind of soldiers would be altogether unserviceable , and could never stand against horse ; or if they could bear up against them , yet they would still be afraid of the foot , lest they should be better armed , and better ordered than they . now if you consider the romans and germans together you will questionless discover that the germans had much the advantage in charging and breaking a body of horse ( as we said before ) but to engage a body of foot armed , and ordered like the romans , they have much the disadvantage . so that by this you see what advantage and disadvantage , the one has of the other , the romans were able to fight foot and horse both , and the germans are able to deal only with horse . cosimo . i would desire you to give us an example , that we may understand it the better . fabritio . i say you will find in many places of our history , the roman foot have overcome great bodies of horse , and you shall never find that they were overcome by foot , by reason of any defect in their arms , or any advantage which the enemy had in theirs . for had their way of arming been found inconvenient , one of these two things would have followed , they would not have advanced with their conquests so far ( their enemy being better arm'd , ) or else they would have arm'd as the enemy did , and left their own way ; and because neither the one nor the other was done , it follows probably that their way of arming was the best . with the germans it was otherwise as appears by the ill success which they have had whenever they have been engaged with foot that were well ordered , and as valiant as they ; which proceeded from the advantage the enemy had of them in their arms. philippo visconte duke of milan being assaulted by swizzers , sent against them the count carmignuola , who was his general at that time . carmignuola , with horse , and a few foot went to encounter them , and coming to an engagement , was beaten for his pains . carmignuola being a wise man , quickly discovered the advantage which the enemy had in their foot over his horse , having rallyed and recruited his army , he advanced against the swissers again , and when he came near them , he caused his horse to dismount , and engaging them smartly in that posture , he put them all to the rout , and most of them to the sword , only were left , who finding themselves past remedy , threw down their arms. cosimo . how comes that great disadvantage ? fabritio . i told you before , but since you did not regard it , i will repeat it again . the german infantry have little or no defensive arms , and for offensive they have the pike and the sword , and with these weapons , and in that order they attack the enemy . but if the enemy be well provided for his defence ( as the cavalry were which carmignuola caused to dismount ) and receives them in any good order , they may deal well enough with the swizzers if they can but come to the sword ; for when they once get within them , the length of their pikes make them useless , and falling then to their sword , they have the disadvantage of wanting defensive arms , with which the enemy is provided . so that considering the advantage and disadvantage on both sides , it will appear that they who have no defensive arms are without remedy if the enemy charges but home , and passes their pikes ; for battels do always advance ( as i shall show , when i have told you their manner of drawing up ) and pressing on prepetually , they must of necessity come so near as to reach one another with their swords , and though some few perhaps may be killed or tumbled down with their pikes , yet those that are behind pressing still on , are sufficient to carry the victory , and this was the reason why carmignuola overcame with so great slaughter of the swisses , and so little of his own army . cosimo . considering that carmignuola's forces were men at arms , and ( though on foot ) yet armed compleatly , in my judgment it would be convenient upon any great enterprize , to arm your foot in that manner . fabritio . had you remembred what i told you before about the way of the romans arming themselves , you would not have been of that opinion : for a foot soldier with a head-piece , breast-plate , shield , his arms and his legs covered with iron , is better able to defend himself against the pikes , and break into them , than one of the men at arms dismounted . i will give you a modern example certain companies of spanish foot were transported out of sicily , and landed in the kingdom of naples , being to supply gonsalvo , who was besieged in barletta by the french. monsieur d' aubigny had notice of their march , and went to meet them with his men at arms , and some german foot , who pressed upon them with their pikes , and opened the spanish body , but by the help of their bucklers , and the agility of their bodies , having got under their pikes , and so near as that they could come at them with their swords , the spaniards had the day with the slaughter of most of the swisses . everyone knows how many of the swisses foot were cut off at the battel of ravenna , and all upon the same account , the spanish foot having got to them with their swords , and had cut them certainly in pieces , had they not been rescued by the french horse : and yet the spaniards drawing themselves into a close order , secured themselves . i conclude therefore , a good infantry ought to be able not only to sustain the horse , but to encounter the foot , which ( as i have said many times before ) is to be done by being well arm'd and well ordered . cosimo . tell me therefore , i beseech you , how you would have them arm'd ? chap. iv. how foot should be arm'd , and of the force and convenience of men at arms. fabritio . i would take both of the roman and german arms , and half my men should be arm'd with the one , and half with the other ; for if in foot ( as i shall explain to you hereafter ) i should have with bucklers like the romans , pikes , and muskets , like the swiss ; i think i should do well enough ; for i would place my pikes either in my front , or where-ever i suspected the enemies horse might make any impression ; my bucklers and swords should second my pikes , and be very conducing to the victory , as i shall demonstrate . so that i think an infantry thus ordered would be too hard for any other . cosimo . what you have said about the foot , is sufficient . i pray let us now hear what you judge of the horse , and which way of equipping them is the best , the ancient , or modern . fabr. i think the present way is the best , in respect of the great saddles and stirrups , ( which were not in use among the ancients ) and make men sit stronger and firmer upon their horse . i think our way of arming now is more secure , and a body of our horse will make a greater impression than a body of the old . yet i am of opinion that cavalry are not to be more esteemed now than of old , because ( as i have said ) they have in our days been oft worsted by the foot , and so they always will be , if the foot be arm'd and ordered as abovesaid . tigranes king of armenia came into the field against the roman army , under the command of lucullus , with horse , many of them arm'd like our men at arms , ( which they called catafracti ) the romans consisting only of horse , and foot . whereupon , in contempt of their number , when tigranes saw them , he said , that they were liker the train of an embassador than an army . nevertheless when they came to fight , he was beaten , and he who writes the story , blames the catafracti , and declares them unserviceable ; for ( says he ) having beavers over their faces , they cannot so well see how to offend the enemy , and being laden with arms , if by accident their horse be killed , or throws them upon the ground , they cannot get up again , nor help themselves in any manner . i say then , that nation or kingdom which prefers their horse to their foot , shall always be weak , and in danger of ruine , as italy has experimented in our time , having been exposed to ruine and depredation by strangers , for want of foot , which has been very much neglected , and all the souldiers set on horse-back . not but it is good to have horse too , yet not to make them the strength of their army , but sufficient to second the foot ; for they are of great use for scouting , making inroads into the enemies country , raising contributions , infesting the enemy , and cutting off convoys and supplies of provisions ; nevertheless when they come to a field-fight , which is the main importance of a war , and the very end for which armies are raised they are not so serviceable as foot , though indeed in a rout they are better to pursue . cosimo . i cannot concur with you in this for two reasons , one is , the parthians used nothing but horse , and yet they had their share of the world as well as the romans ; and the other is , because i cannot see which way the cavalry can be sustained by the foot , and from whence proceeds the strength of the one , and the weakness of the other . fabr. i think i have told you , or else i will tell you now , that my discourse of military affairs shall extend no farther than europe . being intended no farther , i do not think my self obliged to give a reason for their customs in asia , yet this i may say , that the parthian discipline was quite contrary to the roman ; for the parthians fought always on horse-back in confusion and disorder , which is a way of fighting very uncertain . the romans fought generally on foot , in close and firm order , and they overcame one another variously , as the place where they fought was open , or streight : in streight places the romans had the better ; in champian , the parthians , who were able to do great things in respect of the country which they were to defend , it being very large , a thousand miles from the sea , not a river sometimes within two or three days march , and towns and inhabitants very thin . so that an army like the roman , pestered and incumbred with their arms , and their order , could not pass thorow the country without great loss , by reason the strength of the enemy consisted in horse which were nimble , here to day , and to morrow fifty miles off . and this may be a reason why the parthians prevailed with their horse , ruined the army of crassus , and put marc anthony into so much danger . but as i said before , my intention is not to speak any thing of the armies out of europe , and therefore i shall insist only upon the romans , the grecians , and the germans . chap. v. the difference betwixt men at arms and foot , and upon which we are most to rely . fabr. we come now to your other demand , in which you desire to understand what order , or what natural virtue it is that makes the foot better than the horse . i say in the first place , horse cannot march in all countries as foot can ; they are not so ready to obey orders when there is any sudden occasion to change them : for when they are upon their march , if there be occasion to wheel , or face about , to advance , or stop , or retreat , they cannot do it with that dexterity as the foot . upon any rout or disorder , horse cannot rally so well , ( though perhaps they are not pursued ) which is not so with the foot . again , it is frequently seen , a brave and a daring man may be upon a bad horse , and a coward upon a good , and that inequality is the occasion of many disorders . nor let any one think strange that a body of foot can sustain the fury of the horse , because an horse is a sensible creature , and being apprehensive of danger , is not easily brought into it . and if it be considered what forces them on , and what forces them off , it will be found that that which keeps them off , is greater than that which pricks them on ; for that which puts them forward is but a spur , whilst that which keeps them off , is a pike or a sword . so that it has been many times seen both by ancient and modern experience , that a body of foot are secure , and insuperable by horse . if you object , that coming on galloping to the charge , makes the horse rush furiously upon the enemy , and to be less careful of the pike than the spur . i answer , that though a horse be in his career , when he sees the pikes , he will stop of himself ; and when he feels them prick , he will stop short ; and when you press him on , will turn either on the one side or the other : and if you have a mind to make the experiment , try if you can to run a horse against a wall , and you shall find very few that will do it . caesar , when he was in france , being to fight a battel with the swizzers , caused all his horse to dismount , and send their horses away , as being fitter to fly than to fight upon . but though horse are naturally subject to these impediments , he who commands the foot is to march such ways as are likely to be most difficult for horse , and he shall scarce come into a country but such ways are to be found . if you march over mountainous and hilly places , the very situation will secure you against the fury of the horse ; if your march be in a plain , you will seldom march any where but you will have plow'd-fields , or hedges , or woods to secure you : for every ditch , every bank , how inconsiderable so ever , takes off from the fury of the horse , and every plow'd-field or vineyards retards them . and if you come to a battel , it will be the same as in a march ; for every small accident that happens to a horse , dismays him , and takes off his courage . however , i will not omit to tell you one thing that the romans trusted so much to their orders , and arms , that had it been in their power to have chosen a place that had been sleep , and covenient to secure them against horse , ( though they had not been able to draw themselves up ) or an open place ( more obnoxious to the horse ) where they might put themselves handsomly in battalia , they chose always the last , and rejected the first . but it being time to come now to their manner of exercise , having arm'd our foot according to the ancient and modern way , let us see what exercise the romans gave them before they brought them to a battel . chap. vi. how the souldiers were exercised . though they be never so well chosen , and never so well arm'd , souldiers are carefully to be exercised , for without exercise they are good for nothing . and this exercise ought to be three-fold , one is to inure them to labour and hardship , and make them dexterous and nimble ; another to teach them how to handle their arms ; and the third to teach them to keep their ranks and orders in their marches , battels , and encampments : which are three great things in an army . for if an army marches , is drawn up well , and encamps regularly and skilfully , the general shall gain reputation , let the success be as it will. wherefore all ancient commonwealths provided particularly for these exercises by their customs and laws , so that nothing of that nature was omitted . they exercised their youth to learn them to be nimble in running , active to leap , strong to throw the bar , and to wrestle , which are all necessary qualities in a souldier , for running and numbleness fits them for possessing a place before the enemy ; to fall upon them on a sudden in their quarters , and pursue with more execution in a rout : activity makes them with more ease avoid their blows , leap a ditch , or climb a bank ; and strength makes them carry their arms better , strike better , and endure the shock better : and above all to inure them to labour , they accustomed their souldiers to carry great weights , which custom is very necessary ; for in great expeditions it happens many times that the souldiers are forced to carry ( besides their arms ) several days provisions , which without being accustomed to labour , would be more tedious to them , and by this , great dangers are many times avoided , and great victories many times obtained . as to their way of accustoming them to their arms , they did it in this manner . they made their young men wear head-pieces twice as heavy as those which they were to wear in the field , and instead of swords , they gave cudgels with lead run into them , much heavier than their swords . they caused each of them to fix a pale into the ground three yards high , and fasten it so strong that no blows might be able to batter or shake it : against which pale or stake the youth were accustomed to exercise themselves with their cudgel or buckler , as it had been an enemy ; striking it sometimes as it were on the head , sometimes on the face , then on the sides , legs , before and behind ; sometimes retreating , and then advancing again : and by this way of exercise they made themselves dexterous and skilful how to defend themselves , and offend an enemy . and for the heaviness of their counterfeit arms , they did it to make the true ones appear more light . the romans taught their souldiers rather to thrust than to cut with their swords , because thrusts are more mortal , more hard to be defended ; and he that make● it is not so easily discovered , and is readier to double his thrust than his blow . do not admire that the ancients concerned themselves in such little things , for when people come to handy strokes , every small advantage is of great importance ; and this is not my own opinion only , but is taught by many authors . the ancients thought nothing more beneficial in a commonwealth , than to have store of men well exercised in arms ; for 't is not the splendor of their gemms , not their gold , that makes the enemy run , but the fear of their arms . the faults which one commits in other things may be repaired , but those which are committed in war are never to be redressed ; besides , experience in this kind makes men more audacious and bold , for no man fears to do that which he thinks he understands : the ancients therefore would have their citizens exercise themselves in all military actions , and made them cast darts ( much heavier than the true ones ) against their pales : which besides that it taught them dexterity , it was a great strengthener of their arm . they brought up their youth likewise to the bow and the sling , in all which exercises there were professed masters ; so that when afterwards they were drawn out to the wars , they were perfect souldiers both in courage and discipline , nor were they defective in any thing but keeping their ranks in their marches , and receiving orders in their fights ; which was quickly learn'd by mixing them with such as had serv'd a long time . cosimo . what exercises would you recommend at present ? fabritio . several of those which i have mentioned , as running , leaping , throwing the bar , accustoming them to heavy arms , teaching them to shoot in the cross , and long bow , and musket , which is a new engine , ( as you know ) but very good . and to these exercises i would accustom all the youth in my country , but with more industry and solicitude those exercises which are useful in war , and all their musters should be in idle days . i would have them learn to swim likewise , which is a very useful thing , for they are not sure of bridges where-ever they come , and boats are not always to be had . so that your army not knowing how to swim , is deprived of several conveniencies , and lose many fair opportunities of action . the reason why the romans , exercised their youth in the campus martius , was , because of its nearness to the tyber , where after they had tired themselves at land , they might refresh , and learn to swim in the water . i would have also the cavalry exercised as of old , which is most necessary , for besides teaching them to ride , it teaches them to sit fast when they come to a charge . to this end they had horses of wood upon which they exercised , vaulting upon them sometimes with their arms , and sometimes without , very neatly and exactly , without any assistance ; so that upon a signal from their captain they were immediately on horse-back , and upon another signal as soon upon the ground . and as those exercises both for horse and foot were easie in those times , they would be the same now to any prince or commonwealth that would employ their youth that way , as is to be seen in several cities in the west , where they are continued . they divide their inhabitants into several parties , and every party is denominated by the arms which they wear ; and because they use pikes , halbards , bows , and harquebusses , they are called pike-men , halbardiers , bow-men , and harquebussiers ; every inhabitant is to declare in what company he will be listed ; and because some for their age and other impediments are not apt for the wars , there is a choice made out of every order , of such persons as are called , the giurati being sworn to see the rest exercised in their several arms , according to their respective denominations , and every one of them has a certain place appointed where their exercises are to be made ; and all that belong to that order ( besides the giurati ) repair thither with such monies as are necessary for their expence . what therefore is done actually by them , we may do as well , but our imprudence will not suffer us to imitate any thing that is good . by these exercises the ancients infantry were very good , and at this day the western foot are better than ours , because the ancients exercised them at home , ( as in the commonwealths ) or in the field ( as by the emperors ) for the reasons aforesaid . but we will not exercise them at home , and in the field we cannot , they not being our subjects , are not to be compelled but to what exercises they please : and this want of authority to exercise them has caused our armies to be first negligent and remiss , and afterwards our discipline ; and has been the cause that so many kingdoms and commonwealths ( especially in italy ) are so weak and inconsiderable . but to return to our order , and the business of exercising , i say , that it is not sufficient to make an absolute souldier , to in●ure a man to labour , to make him strong , swift , and dexterous , but he must learn likewise to keep his ranks well , to obey orders , and the directions of the trumpet and drum ; to know how to do right , standing still , retiring , advancing , fighting , and marching ; for without this discipline be observed with all accurate diligence , your army will never be good . and without doubt men who are furious and disorderly , are much more unserviceable than cowards ; for order drives away fear , and dissorder lessens a mans courage . chap. vii . of what number of men , and of what arms a battalion is to consist ; and of exercising in companies to make them ready either to give a charge , or receive it . and that you may the better understand what is said before , you must know that there is no nation which , to put in order its men of war , has not constituted a principal member , which member , or body , though they have altered it as to their name , yet it is not much altered as to the number of their men ; for in all places they consist of betwixt six and eight thousand . this body among the romans was called a legion , among the grecians a phalanx , among the french caterve ; the same thing by the swizzers ( who are the only people which retain any thing of the discipline of the ancients ) is called that in their language , which in ours is called battalion . true it is , that afterwards every one divided it into companies , and ordered them as they pleased . my advice is , that we found our discourse upon the name which is most known , and range it as well as we may , according to the order both of the ancients and moderns . and because the romans divided their legions which consisted of betwixt and men , into ten cohorts , i think fit that we divide our battalions into ten companies , and the whole consisting of men , allot to every company , of which may be compleatly armed , and the remaining fifty slightly . the compleatly arm'd may by with swords and bucklers called scudat● , and an hundred with pikes called pike-men . those which are lightly arm'd may be fifty foot , carrying harquebusses , cross-bows , partizans and halbards , which according to the old name may be called velites ; so that all the ten companies make bucklers , ordinary pikes , and ordinary velites , which in all will amount to foot . but because we say that our battalion is to contain men , more are to be added , of which are pikes , which we will call pikes in extraordinary , and the other are to be slightly arm'd , and called velites in extraordinary . so that my foot ( as is said before ) will be composed half of bucklers , and the other half of pikes , and other arms. i would have every battalion have a commander in chief , four centurions , and forty capidieci or corporals , and over and above , a commander in chief of the velites in ordinary , with five file-leaders . i would assign to the velites in extraordinary two officers in chief , five centurions , and fifty corporals , then make a general of the whole battalion . i would have every constable to have his colours and drums , by which means the battalion would consist of ten companies , bucklers , pikes in ordinary , extraordinary , velites in ordinary , and in extraordinary ; so as they would amount in all to foot , among which there would be corporals , constables , drums , colours , centurions , commanders of the velites in ordinary , and one general of the whole battalion , with his standard and drum , i have repeated this order the oftner , that afterward when i shew you the way of ordering a battel or army , you may not find your self confounded . i say therefore , that a king or commonwealth is to order his subjects , which he designs for the wars , with these arms , and into these divisions , and raise as many battalions as his country will afford . and when he has disposed them so , being to exercise them in order , he is to exercise them in their several divisions . and although the number of each of them cannot bear the form of a just army , yet thereby every man may learn what belongs to his own duty , because in armies there are two orders observed , one what men are to do in every battel , or division distinctly ; and the other what they are to do when united with the rest ; and those men who know the first well , will easily learn the other ; but without knowledg of the first , they will never arrive at the discipline of the second . every one ( then ) of these companies may learn by it self to keep the order of their ranks in all motions and places , to open and close , and understand the direction of their drums , by which all things are commanded in a battel ; for by beating of that ( as by the whistle in the gallies ) every man knows what he is to do , whether to stand firm to his ground , to advance , or fall back , and which way they are to turn their faces and arms . so that understanding the order of their files in that exactness that no motion , nor no place can disorder them ; understanding the commands of their officer , derived to them by his drum , and how to advance , & fall back into their places , these companies ( as i have said before ) as soon as joyned , may easily be taught what an united body of all the battalions is obliged to do when they are drawn together into an army . and because this universal practice is of no slight importance , in time of peace it would be convenient once or twice in a year to bring them to a general rendezvous , and give them the form of an army , exercising them for some days as if they were to fight a battel with an enemy , drawing them up , and disposing them into front , flank , and reserve . and because a general orders his army for a battel , either upon the sight or apprehension of an enemy , he is to exercise his army accordingly , and teach them how to behave themselves upon a march , and how in a battel , and how upon a charge , either upon one side or other . when they are exercised as if an enemy was before them , they are to be taught how they are to begin the fight how they are to retreat upon a repulse , who are to succeed in their places ; what colours , what drums , what words of commands they are to obey , and so to train them up , and accustom them to these false alarms , and counterfeit battels , that at length they become impatient to be at it in earnest , for an army is not made valiant and couragious for having brave and valiant men in it , but for the good order which is observed ; for if i be in the forlorn , and know , being beaten , whither i am to retire , and who are to succeed in my place , i shall fight boldly , because my relief is at hand . if i be of the second body that is to engage , the distress , or repulse of the first will not fright me , because i considered it might happen before , and perhaps desired it , that i might have the honour of the victory , and not they . where an army is new , this way of exercising is absolutely necessary , and where it is old , it is convenient ; for we see the roman captains before they brought them to fight , continually exercised their men after this manner , though they had been brought up to their arms. iosephus tells us in his history , that this continual exercising in the roman army was the cause that all the multitude of idle people which followed the camp either for traffick or gain , were made useful and serviceable , because they understood their orders and ranks , and how to preserve them in time of battel . but if you have raised an army of young men never in the wars before , whether you intend them for present service , or to establish them as militia , and engage them afterwards , without this way of exercising by single companies , and sometimes a conjunction of them all , you do nothing . for order being perfectly necessary , it is convenient with double industry and labour to teach such as are not skilful already , and practise such as are ; as we have seen several excellent commanders , to practise and instruct their soldiers , take extraordinary pains without any respect to their dignities . cosimo . it seems to me that this discourse has a little transported you , for before you have told us the way of exercising by companies , you have treated of entire armies , and the managing of a battel . fabritio . you say right , and the true reason is the affection i bear to those orders , and the trouble i am under that they are no more used ; yet do not think but i will recollect my self and return . as i told you before , in the exercising of a company , the first thing of importance is to know how to keep your ranks ; to do this , it is necessary to exercise them in that order which they call chiocciole , or the snail order . and because i have said that one of these battalias or companies is to consist of four hundred foot compleatly armed , i will keep to that number . these four hundred men ( then ) are to be reduced into files , five in a file , after which they are to be carried forward upon a quick march , or a slow , wheeling , and doubling , charging or retreating , which indeed is more demonstrable to the eye , than the understanding . but this snail way of exercising a company is not so necessary , because every one that knows any thing of an army , knows how 't is to be done ; and indeed it is not considerable in any respect , but to teach soldiers how to move their files ; but let us now draw up one of these companies and dispose them into their ranks . chap. viii . of three principal ways of drawing up a company , and putting them into a posture to fight . i say that there are three principal forms of drawing up men ; the first and most useful is to draw them up close , in the figure of two squares . the second is to draw them up in a square with two wings . the third is to draw them up with a vacuity in the middle , which they call piazza . to draw them up in the first figure , there are two ways . one is to double their files , that is , the second file entring into the first , the fourth into the third , the sixt into the fift , and so successively ; so that whereas they were files of five in a file , they may become forty files of ih a file . after this you are to double them again in the same manner , thrusting one file into another , and then they will be files , and twenty men in a file . this makes two squares , or very near ; for though there be as many men on one side as the other , yet towards the head they joyn together , so as one flank may touch the other ; but on the other side , their distance is at least two yards one from the other ; so that the square is longer from the rear to the front , than from one flank to another . and because we are to speak often of the fore part , the hinder part , and the sides , of this battalia or company , and of the whole army when joyned ; you must know that when i say the head or the front , i mean the fore part of the battel ; when i say the shoulders , i mean the hinder part ; and when i say the flanks , i mean the sides . the fifty velites in ordinary , do not mingle with the rest of the files , but when the battalia is formed , they are disposed by its flanks . the other way of drawing up a company is this , ( and because it is better than the first , i resolve to describe it so plain , that you shall understand it as well as it were before your eyes ) i suppose you remember of what number of men , of what officers it is composed , and what arms it is to carry . the form therefore of this battalia is of twenty files , twenty men in a file , five files of pikes in the front , and fifteen files of bucklers in the rear . two centurions in the front , and two in the rear , which the ancients called tergiductores . the constable or captain with his colours and drum is to stand in the space betwixt the five files of pikes , and the fifteen files of bucklers , corporals , upon the flank of every file one ; so that each of them may have his men by his side ; those who are on the right hand , will have them on their left , those on the left on their right ; the fifty velites are to be drawn up on the flanks and rear . now that your soldiers may put themselves into this posture in their ordinary march , it is to be done in this manner . you are first to reduce your battalia into files , five men in a file , leaving your velites either in the front or the rear , but they must be sure to be placed without this order . every centurion is to be at the head of twenty files , five of pikes are to be immediately behind him , and the rest bucklers . the constable or captain is to stand with his drum , and colours in the space betwixt the pikes and the rest of the bucklers belonging to the second centurion , and may take up the place of three of the bucklers . of the capidieci or corporals , twenty are to stand in the flank of the files of the first centurion , upon the left hand , and twenty upon the flank of the last centurion upon the right hand . and it is to be observed that every corporal who leads the pikes , is to have a pike in his hand : and they who lead the scudi are to have bucklers in theirs . having put your files into this order , and being desirous upon their march to reduce them into a battalia to make head against an enemy , you must cause the first centurion with his first twenty files to make a halt , and the second centurion to continue his march to the right all along by the sides of those twenty files which stand firm , till he comes cheek by jole with the first centurion , where he also makes his stand , and then the third marching on likewise on the right hand by the flank of the said files , advances till he be even with the other two centurions , and then he making his stop , and so the rest ; which being done , two of the centurions only are to depart from the front into the rear of the battalia , which by this means is in the same order as i said before . the velites are to be drawn up by the side , as they are disposed in the first way , which is called redoubling by a right line , for the second way redoubles them in the flanks . the first way is more easie , this is more orderly and useful , and may be better corrected and reformed to your mind , for in the first you are obliged to conform to your number , for five doubled , make ten , ten twenty , twenty forty ; so that if you would double your files in a right line , you cannot make a front of fifteen , five and twenty , thirty , nor thirty five , but you must go where the number will carry you . and therefore it happens every day upon particular rencounters , that it is necessary to make head with or foot , and in so doing to double in a right line would undo you . for these reasons this way pleases me best , and the difficulties therein , are easily removed by exercise and practice . i say then that nothing is of greater importance than to have souldiers which can put themselves instantly into their ranks , and to learn that it is necessary to exercise them in these companies at home , to teach them the quick and the slow march , to advance or retreat , and to pass thorow streights , and difficult places without disturbing their order : for soldiers that can do that well , are good soldiers , and may be called old soldiers , though they never looked an enemy in the face ; whereas on the contrary , if a man has been in a thousand battels , and understands not that , he is but a novice , and a fresh-water soldier . this is only as to closing their ranks upon a march when they are in small files ; but having closed their files , and being afterwards broken by some accident ( either from the place , or the enemy ) to rally , and recollect themselves then , there lies the difficulty and importance which requires great exercise and practice , and by the ancients was endeavoured with much industry . in this case it is necessary therefore to do two things . chap. ix . the manner of rallying soldiers after a rout , and to make them face about a whole company at a time . fabr. when a squadron is broken , to rally and bring them again suddenly into order , two things are convenient ; first , that several colours or countermarks be assigned to every battalia : and secondly to observe this rule , that the same foot stand still in the same files . for example , if a soldier 's place was formerly in the second file , let him continue in that file , and not only in that file , but in the same place ; and in order to that , as i said before , several countermarks are necessary . and first it is convenient that the ensigns and colours of each company be so handsomly distinguished , that being joyned with other squadrons , they may know one another . next , that the captains and centurions have plumes of feathers of scarfs , or something that may make them conspicuous and remarkable ; and last of all ( as being of more importance ) the capidieci or corporals are to be so accoutred that they may be known ; and of this the ancients were so extraordinarily curious , that their numbers were written upon their helmets in great characters , calling them the first , second , third and fourth , &c. and not content with this , every soldier had the number of his file , and the number of his place in that file engraven upon his buckler . your companies being in this manner made distinguishable by their colours , and accustomed to their ranks and files by practice and experience , it is no hard matter though they be disordered , to rally , and reduce them suddenly again ; for as soon as the colours are stuck down in the ground they are immediately visible , and the captains and officers knowing which are their own , repair themselves , and dispose their soldiers immediately to their places , and when those on the left have placed themselves on the left hand , and those which belong to the right hand on the right ; the soldiers directed by their rules , and the difference of their colours fall immediately into their ranks , as easily as we put together the staffes of a barrel when we have marked them before . these things if learned with diligence and exercise at first , are quickly attained , and hardly forgot ; for your raw men are directed by the old , and in time a province by these exercises might be made very fit for the war. it is necessary therefore to teach them how to turn all together , when to face about in the rear , or the flanks , and make rear and flank of the first ranks when occasion is offered . and this is no hard matter to do , seeing it is sufficient , that every man faces to that side he is commanded , and where they turn their faces , that is the front. true it is , when they face to the flank , their ranks do not hold their proportion , because the distance betwixt the front and the rear is thereby much lessened , and the distance betwixt the extremity of the flanks is much encreased , which is quite contrary to the genuine order of a battalia , for which cause great practice and discretion is required to rectifie it , and yet this may be remedied by themselves . but that which is of greater consequence , and which requires more practice , is when an officer would turn his whole company together , as if it were a single man , or a solid and massy body of it self . and this requires longer experience than the other . for if you would have it turn to the left , the left corner must stand still , and they who are next them , march so leisurely , that they in the right may not be put to run ; if they be , it will breed confusion . but because it always happens that when an army marches from place to place , that the companies which are not in the front , are forced to fight in the flanks , or rear , so that one and the same company is many times compelled to face about to the flanks and rear at one and the same time , that these companies therefore may in this exigence hold their old proportion , according to what is said before , it is necessary that they have pikes in that flank which is most likely to be attacked , and capidieci captains , and other officers in their proper places . chap. x. to range a company in such order that it may be ready to face the enemy , on which side soever he comes . fabr. when you have marshalled your fourscore files , five in a file ; you are to put all your pikes into the first twenty files , and place five of your corporals in the head of them , and five in the rear . the other files which follow , are bucklers all , and consist of men . so then the first and last file of every company , are to be corporals ; the captain with his ensign and drum , is to stand in the midst of the first hundred of bucklers , and every centurion at the head of his division . when they are in this order if you desire to have your pikes on the left hand , you are to double them company by company from the right flank ; if you would have them on the right , you are to double from the left ; and this is the way by which a company turns with the pikes upon one flank , with their officers at the head and the rear of them , and their captain in the midst , and it is the form which is observed in a march . but upon the approach of an enemy , when they would make a front of a flank , they have no more to do but to command that all of them face about to that flank where the pikes are , and in so doing the whole battalia turns with its files and officers at the same time in the manner aforesaid ; for ( unless it be the centurions ) they are all in their old places , and the centurions can quickly be there . but when a battalia marches in the front , and is in danger to be engaged in the rear ; the files are to be so ordered , that the pikes may be readily behind ; and to do this there needs no more , but whereas usually in every battalia , every century has five files of pikes in the front , those five files may be placed in the rear , and in all other places the same order to be observed as before . cosimo . if my memory fails not , you said that this way of exercise is in order to the uniting these battalia's into an army , and that this practice is sufficient to direct them in that . but if it should happen this squadron of foot should be to fight singly and by its self , how would you order it then ? fabritio . he who commands them is to judge where his pikes are to be disposed , and place them as he thinks fit , which is not at all consistant with what i have prescribed before ; for though that be a way to be observed in battel upon an union or conjunction of several squadrons , yet it may serve as a rule in what ever condition you fall into . but in showing you the two other ways which i recommended for the ordering of a battalia , i will satisfie you farther . chap. xi . to draw up a company with two horns , or another with a piazza , or vacuity in the middle . to come to the way of drawing up a battalia or squadron with two horns or points , i say you must order your files , five in a file , after this manner . in the midst you must place a centurion with files , two of pikes to the left , and three of bucklers to the right : when those five are disposed , bring up the other twenty , with twenty files and file-leaders , all of them to be placed betwixt the pikes and the bucklers , only those who carry pikes are to stand with the pikes . after these twenty five files are so placed , draw up another centurion with fifteen files of bucklers ; after which the constable or captain is to draw into the middle with his drum and his colours , with other fifteen files of bucklers . this being performed , the next to march up is the third centurion , who is to be at the head of files , of in a file , three bucklers to the left , and two pikes to the right ; and after the first files , let there be twenty file-leaders placed betwixt the pikes and the bucklers , and after these the fourth centurion : having drawn your men into this order ; to make a battalia consisting of two horns , the first centurion is to make a stand with his files at his heels ; then is the second centurion to advance with his files of bucklers , and place himself on the right hand of the st . centurion , and marching along by the side of the files , he is to advance till he comes to the file , and there he is to stop . the next that marches is the captain with his division of files of bucklers behind him , and advancing on the right hand by the flank of the other files , he is to march up to their front . after him the third centurion is to move with his files , and the fourth centurion after him , and passing along by the right flank of the last files of bucklers , they are not to stop at the front of the said files , but to advance till the last of the twenty five files be parallel with the files which are behind them . as soon as this is done , the centurion at the head of the st . files of bucklers , is to remove into the left angle in the rear , and by this means you shall form a battalia of five and twenty firm files of twenty men in a file with two horns , on each side of the front one , each of them consisting of ten files of in a file , with a space betwixt the two horns , sufficient to receive ten men a breast . betwixt the two horns the captain is to be placed , and a centurion at each point or angle ; there are likewise to be two files of pikes , and twenty corporals on each flank . these horns or wings are useful to receive and secure carriages or artillery , when they have any with them ; the velites are to be drawn up along the flanks under the shelter of the pikes . but to reduce this horn'd squadron into another figure with a space in the middle , no more is to be done , than out of the files of twenty in a file , to take eight , and place them upon the point of the two horns , which will make a good rear , and turn it into a battalia della piazza , or a battalia with a space in the the midst ; in this space or area , the carriages are disposed , and the captain and his colours , but not the artillery , for they are placed either in the front , or along the flanks . these are the forms to be observed in a battalia or squadron when it marches alone thorow dangerous places . but the single battalia without horns or vacuity is better , though to secure such as are disarmed , the horned figure is convenient . the swisses have several forms of drawing up their battalia's , one is the fashion of a cross , placing their harquebussiers betwixt the arms of the said cross to secure them from the enemy . but because those figures are proper only when squadrons fight singly and by themselves , and my intention being to show they may fight united and in conjunction , i shall not trouble my self with them . cosimo . i fancy i do sufficiently comprehend the way that is to be observed to exercise men in these battalia's ; but ( if i mistake not ) you told us that to the ten battalia's , ( which united , make a battalion ) you would add a thousand extraordinary pikes , and four hundred of the extraordinary velites . and these would you not advise should be exercised ? fabritio . i would , and with very great diligence , exercising the pikes with the same care as the rest , because i would make more use of them than the rest upon all private occasions , as in conducting convoys of provisions , depredations , and such like . but my velites i would exercise at home without bringing them together ; for it being their office to fight loose and confused , it is not necessary that they should be always exercised as the rest ; for it is enough if they understand their own business well . they ought then ( as i said before ) and i am not troubled to repeat it again ) so to exercise their men in these battalia's , that they may know to keep their ranks , understand their places , wheel readily , and shift handsomly either upon sight of an enemy , or inconvenience of the place . for when they can do this well , they will easily learn which are their places , and what are their duties in a battel . and if a prince or commonwealth grudges not to take pains , and employ themselves in seeing their subjects thus exercised , they would have always good soldiers , be always too hard for their neighbours , and would be in a condition rather to give , than receive laws from other people . but ( as i have said before ) the disorder in which we live , is the cause that we do not only neglect , but despise those things , and that is the true reason our souldiers are no better ; and though there may be officers and soldiers too that perhaps are both valiant and skilful ; yet they have no occasion or encouragement to show themselves . chap. xii . of the baggage and train belonging to a company ; how necessary it is that they have several officers , and of the usefulness of drums . cosimo . i would ask you now , what carriages you would allot to each of these battalia's ? fabritio . in the first place i would not allow that either centurion or corporal should march on horseback , and if the captain must ride , i would allow him only a mule. i would allow him two carriages , one to every centurion , and two betwixt every three corporals , because we quarter them together in our camp , as shall be shown in its due place ; so that to every battalia there should be carriages , which i would have carry the tents , and utensils for their cookery ; their hatchets , and other iron instruments to set up their huts , tents , and pavilions ; and if there be afterwards any place left , let them carry what they please . cosimo . i am of opinion that the officers which you have appointed in every of these battalia's are necessary , yet i should be afraid so many commanders should confound them . fabritio . what you say would be true , were they not subordinate to one ; but depending still upon one person , they proceed very regularly , nay without them , they could not possibly be governed . for a wall that is tottering in all places , requires that its buttresses and supporters be rather many than strong , because the strength and goodness of one , will not hinder the ruine which will follow . and therefore in all armies , and among every ten men , it is convenient to have one of more life , more courage , and more authority than the rest , who with his alacrity , and language , and example , may encourage the rest , and dispose them to fight . and to prove the necessity of these things in an army , ( viz. ensigns , officers and drums ) it appears by our armies , where there are of them all , but none of them do their office , according to the intent of their establishment . first your capidieci or file-leaders , if they answer the end for which they were established , are to have their men a-part , lodge with them , charge with them , and be always in the same file with them ; for being kept to their due places , the file-leaders are a rule and temper to the rest , keeping them firm and straight in their files , so as it is impossible almost that they be disordered , and if they be , they are quickly reduced . but in our days we make no otherwise of them but to give them greater pay , and enable them to make particular factions . 't is the same with our ensigns ; for they are used more for pomp and parade , than any military service ; whereas formerly the captains employed them as guides , and directions in case of disorder ; for every man , as soon as the ensign was fix'd , knew his place immediately , and immediately return'd to it . they knew likewise thereby how they were to move , or to halt : it is necessary therefore in an army that there be several of these small bodies ; that every body has its colours , and ensign , and guide ; for where there are many bodies , there ought to be many arms , and many officers . the souldiers ( then ) are to follow the motion of their colours , and their colours the direction of their drum , which ( being well ordered ) commands the army , and advertizes how they are to march with a motion suitable to the time which it beats , which is a great preservation to their order . for this cause the ancients had their flutes and pipes which made an excellent harmony : and as he that dances , keeps himself exactly to the time of the musick ; and whilst he does so , is not capable of erring : so an army that in its motions observes the beating and direction of its drums , cannot be easily disordered . for this reason they varied their sounds when they would excite , or asswage , or continue the courage of their men . and as their ways of beating were various , so they gave them several names . the dorick way provoked to constancy and f●rmness ; the phrygian inflam'd the souldiers into a martial fury and violence . it is repo●●ed that alexander being one day at dinner , and hearing a drum beating suddenly , the phrygian way , was transported with so great a vehemence and commotion , that he clap'd his hand upon his sword , and drew it , as if he had been going to fight . so that in my judgment it would be very convenient to revive the ancient dialects of the drum , and practices of our ancestors , and if that should prove too difficult , yet those persons should not be despised and laid aside , who would teach and instruct the souldier how to obey them ; yet those ways may be changed and varied as every man pleases , provided he ensures his souldiers ears to understand the variety : but now a-days the greatest use of the drum , is to make a great noise . cosimo . i would fain know of you ( if you have ever considered it with your self ) how it comes to pass that such military exercises are in our times grown so low and contemptible . fabr. i shall tell you freely what i think may be the cause . chap. xiii . a discourse of the author about military virtue ; and how it is become so despicable in our days . fabr. you know europe ( according to the testimony of several authors ) has afforded many excellent captains ; africk has had some ▪ and asia fewer : and the reason ( as i conceive ) is , because those two quarters of the world have had but one or two monarchies among them , and very few commonwealths ; but europe has had several kingdoms , and more commonwealths ; and men are industrious , and by consequence excellent , as they are employed and preferred by their prince , or their state. where therefore there are many princes , there are many brave men ; where there are but few of the first , there are fewer of the other . we find in asia there was ninus , cyrus , artaxerxes , mithridates , and some few others of that rank . in africa ( besides the aegyptian antiquity ) there were massinissa , iugurtha , and those great captains which were trained up in the carthaginian wars , which notwithstanding in respect of the numbers which have been produced in europe , were very few ; for in europe their brave generals are innumerable in history , or at least they would have been , had the historians ( with those they have already recorded ) made mention of such as are now forgotten by the malignity of time . for there people are more virtuous , where there have been frequent revolutions of state , and where the governments have favoured virtue either out of necessity , or compassion . as for asia , it has not produced many extraordinary men , because that province was wholly under a monarchy , which ( by reason of its greatness , the greatest part of it being always at peace ) could not produce such excellent men , as where there was action and war. in africa it was the same , yet there they were more numerous , by reason of the carthaginian republick : for commonwealths do furnish the world with more brave men than kingdoms ; because in states , virtue is many times honoured and advanced ; in monarchies and kingdoms it is suspected ; from whence it proceeds that in the one it is encouraged , in the other exploded . he then who shall consider europe , shall find it full of commonwealths , and principalities , which in respect of the jealousies and animosities betwixt them , were constrained to keep up the old military discipline , and advance those who in it were any ways eminent ; for in greece , besides the macedonians , there were manay republicks , and in each of them , several excellent men . the romans , the samnites , the tuscans , cisalpine gauls , france and germany were full of republicks and principalities , and spain was the same . and though in respect of the romans , the numbers which are mentioned of them in history , are but small ; that proceeds from the emulation and partiality of the historians , who following fortune , content themselves with commending the conqueror ; but ' its unreasonable to imagine that among the samnites and tuscans ( who waged war with the romans years together before they were totally subdued ) there were not many brave men ; and so in france and in spain ; but the virtue which authors do not celebrate in particular men , they impute generally to the whole people , whom they exalt to the skies for their constancy , and adherence to their liberty . it being true then , that where there are most principalities and governments there are more excellent men ; it follows , that when those governments and principalities extinguish , their brave men and virtue extinguish with them , there being loss occasion to exert it . after the roman empire had dilated in self so strangely , and subverted all the common-wealths and principalities in europe , and africa , and the greatest part of those in asia ; virtue declined in all places but in rome . whereupon virtuous men began to grow thinner in europe and asia , and by degrees came afterwards to a total declination ; for the virtue of the whole world being as it were inclosed in the walls of rome , when it grew depraved and corrupted there , the whole world became corrupt , and the scythians were encouraged to make their inroads and depredations upon the empire which had been able to consume and extinguish the virtue of all other places , but was not able to preserve it at home . and though afterwards by the inundation of those barbarians it was divided into several cantons ; yet for two reasons their virtue was never restored : one was because when laws and orders are once neglected and disused , it is with no little pain that they are reassumed : the other , our way of living in these times ( in respect of the christian religion ) imposes not that necessity of defending our selves , as anciently it did : for then those who were overcome in war , either killed themselves , or remained in perpetual slavery , in which they lived afterwards in continual misery . the towns that were taken were either totally demolished , or the inhabitants banished , their goods plundered , their estates sequestred , and themselves dispersed all over the world ; so that he who was overcome , suffered such miseries as are not to be expressed . people being terrified by these insupportable cruelties , kept up the reputation of military discipline , and advanced all those who were excellent therein . but at present we are under no such apprehensions : no man kills himself for being conquered : no man is kept long a prisoner , because it is more easie to set him at liberty . if a city rebels twenty times , it is not immediately razed and demolished ; the citizens are continued in their estates , and the greatest punishment they fear , is a mulct or a tax : so that men will not now submit to military orders , nor apply themselves to those labours to avoid a peril which they do not apprehend . besides , the provinces of europe are under few heads in comparison of what they were anciently : for all france is under one king ; all spain under another : italy is divided into four parties , so that the weaker cities that are unable to maintain war of themselves , defend themselves by alliances with the conqueror ; and those who are strong ( for the reasons abovesaid ) are in no fear of ruine . cos. and yet within these five and twenty years several cities have been sack'd , and several kingdoms subverted which example should teach others to reassume , and live according to the custom of our ancestors . fabr. 't is true as you say , yet if you observe what those towns were which have suffered in that nature , you will find that they were no capital cities , but subordinate , and depending : so we see though tortona was demolished , milan was not , though capua was destroyed , naples was not : brescia was sack'd , but venice was not : ravenna was pillaged , but rome was not . these examples do not make him who governs recede from his designs , but makes him rather more refractory and obstinate , and pursue them with more vehemence , to recompence himself with taxes and new impositions . this it is that makes men unwilling to expose themselves to the trouble of military exercises , ●●oking upon it partly as unnecessary , and partly as a thing which they do ●ot understand . those who are subjects , and ought to be affrighted with such example of servitu●e , ●●ve not power to help themselves ; and those who are princes , having lost their dominion , are unable , as having neither time nor convenience : whilst those who are able , either cannot , or will not ; choosing rather to run along with fortune , without any disquiet , than to trouble themselves to be virtuous ; for believing that all things are governed by fortune , they had rather follow her swing , than contend with her for mastery . and that you may believe what i have said to be really true , consider the country of germany , where , by reason of their several principalities and states , their discipline is good ; and depends upon the example of those people , who being jealous of their states and seigneuries , maintain themselves in honour and grandeur , as fearing to fall into a servitude , out of which they could not so easily emerge . this i suppose is sufficient to shew the reason of the vileness and depravity of our present discipline ; i know not whether you may be of the same opinion , or whether my discourse may not have raised some scruple in your mind . cosimo . not at all , i am rather perfectly satisfied , only i desire ( returning to our first subject ) to know of you how you would order your horse with these battalia's , in what numbers you would have them , how you would have them arm'd , and how officer'd . chap. iv. what number of horse are to be put into a battalion , and what proportion is to be observed for their baggage . fabr. you may think perhaps i forgot it , but do not wonder , for i shall speak of it but little for two reasons . one is , because the nerves and strength of an army 〈◊〉 the infantry ; the other is , because the horse are not so much debauched and degenerated as the foot ; for the cavalry is equal , if not better at this day than in ancient times . yet i have said something before of the way how they are to be exercised , and as to the manner of arming them , i would arm them according to our present fashion , both light horse , and men at arms . but the light horse ( if i might prescribe ) should carry cross-bows , with some few harquebusses among them , which ( though in other affairs of war they are but of little use ) are here very necessary , to frighten the country people , and force them from their passes , which perhaps they have undertaken to defend : for one harquebuss will scarre them more than an hundred other arms . but to come to their number , having undertaken to imitate the roman militia , i would take but good horse for every battalion , of which should be men at arms , and light horse ; and i would appoint a captain to each of these squadrons , corporals to each , and a trumpet and ensign . i would allow every ten men at arms five carriages , and every ten light horse , two ; which carriages ( as with the foot ) should carry the tents , utensils , hatchets , and other instruments and harness . think not that what i say would be any disorder , seeing their men at arms had each of them four horses in their equipage , which is a thing much corrupted ; for now in germany you shall see men at arms with but one horse , and themselves , and twenty of them are allowed but one wagon to carry their necessaries . the roman horse were likewise alone , but the triarii were lodg'd always by them , who were obliged to assist them in the looking to their horses , which may be easily imitated by us , as shall be shewn in the distribution of our lodgments : what there the romans did of old , and what the germans do at this day , we may do likewise , and we do very ill if we do not . these horse being listed and called over , may be mustered sometimes with the battalion , at a general muster of all the companies , and be appointed to make charges , and counterfeit skirmishes with them , rather to bring them acquainted , than for any thing else . what we have said already is sufficient for this part : let us now come to marshal our army , and draw it up in a posture to fight , and with hopes of success , which is the great end of all kind of military discipline , in which men employ so much study and diligence . the third book . chap. i. the order observed by the roman legions when a battel was presented . cosimo . seeing we change our subject , i shall yield my place of expostulating to another man ; for presumption being a thing which i condemn in other people , i would not be too much guilty of it my self , therefore i dismiss my self of that office , and will transfer it to which of our friends will vouchsafe to accept it . zanobi . it would have been very grateful to us all , had you pleased to have continued ; but seeing 't is not your pleasure , tell us at least which of us it is you will depute to succeed you . cosimo . i shall leave that to the election of signor fabritio . fabr. i am content to undertake it , and do desire that we may follow the venetian custom , by which the youngest of the company has the liberty to speak first , and in this case not without reason ; for this being the proper exercise of young men , i persuade my self young gentlemen are the fittest to discourse of it , as being most ready to follow it . cosimo . 't is then your province luigi , and as i do much please my self in my successor , so you may be as well satisfied with his interrogation . but that we lose no time , let us return to our business . fabritio . i am certain , that to demonstrate how well an army is to be marshall'd and prepared for a battel ; it would be necessary to declare how the greeks and romans ordered the troops in their armies : but because these things are sufficiently obvious in history , i shall pass by several particulars , and address my self only to such as i think most useful for our imitation , and fittest to give perfection to the discipline of our times , which will be the occasion that at once i give you a prospect how an army is to be ranged in order to a battel ; how they are to confront and charge one another in a real engagement ; and how they may be exercised in a counterfeit . the greatest disorders committed in the drawing up an army for a battel , is to give it only a front , because they leave them and their fortune to the success of one charge : and this error proceeds from nothing but from having lost the old way of closing their ranks , and thrusting one into another . without that way there is no relieving of the front , no defending them , nor no supplying their places in the heat of their engagement , which among the romans was most accurately observed . to the end therefore that you may comprehend this way , i say , that the romans divided each legion into three bodies . the first were hastati , the second principes , the third triarii . the hastati were in the front of the army , in thick and firm ranks . the principes behind them , but their ranks not altogether so close : and after them the triarii in so loose an order , that they could receive both principes and hastati into their body upon any distress . besides these they had their slingers , their bow-men , and their velites ; not drawn up in this order , but placed at the head of the army , betwixt the cavalry and the foot. these light arm'd souldiers began the fight , and if they prevailed , ( which was very seldom ) they followed the victory ; if they were repulsed , they fell back by the ●●nks of the army , or thorow certain spaces appointed on purpose , and retired among those who had no arms . when they were retir'd , the hastati advanced against the enemy , and finding themselves overpowred , they retir'd softly to the principes , and fell into their ranks , and together with them renewed the fight ; but if they also were too weak to sustain the fury of the battel , they retreated all into the spaces of the triarii , and all together being consolidated into a firm mass , they made another effort more impetuous than before ; if this miscarried , all was lost , for there was no farther reserves . the horse were plac'd at the corners of the army , like two wings to a body , and fought sometimes on horseback , and sometimes on foot , as occasion was offered . this way of reinforcing three times , is almost impossible to be master'd , because fortune must fail you three times before you can be beaten , and the enemy must be so valiant as to conquer you as often . chap. ii. the form observed in their battels by the macedonian phalanx . the grecians ordered not their phalanx , as the romans did their legions , and though they had many officers among them , and several ranks , yet they made but one body , or rather one front . the way which they observed to relieve one another , was not to retire one rank into another , like the romans , but to put one man into the place of another , which was done in this manner . their phalanx being reduced into files ( and let us suppose each file to consist of fifty men ) being afterwards with the front towards the enemy of all the files , only the six first could charge , because their launces ( which they called sarissae ) were so long , that the sixt rank charged with the point of his launce thorow the first ranst : in the fight therefore , if any of the first rank was either killed or disabled , he who was behind in the second rank supplyed his place ; and the vacuity in the second rank , was filled up out of the third , and so successively , and on a sudden the ranks behind , supplyed what was defective before ; so as their ranks remained always entire , and no place left void but the last rank , which was not reinforced , because there was no body behind to supply them : so that the loss in the first rank , exhausted the latter , and yet it self was continued entire . so that these phalanxes were sooner consumed and annihilated than broken , because the closeness and grosseness of the body made them impenetrable . the romans at first used these phalanxes , and instructed their legions in that way : afterwards they grew weary of that order , and parted their legions into several divisions , viz. into cohortes and manipuli , judging ( as i said before ) that body to be most vigorous and fullest of life , that consisted of most members , so constituted as that they could subsist and govern themselves . chap. iii. how the swisses ordered their battalions . fab. the swisses at present do use the same method with their battalions , as the macedonians did anciently with their phalanxes , both enranging them entire and in gross , and in relieving one another . when they came to a battel , they disposed their squadrons one in the flank of another , and not behind . they have not the way of receiving the first into the second upon a repulse , but to relieve one another , they observe this order ; they put their battalions one in the flank of another , but somewhat behind it , towards the right hand ; so that if the first be in any distress , the second advances to relieve it . the third battalion they place behind the other two , but at the distance of the shot of a harquebuss , that if the two battalions should be worsted , the third might advance in their rescue , and that which advances , and the other which retire may have space to pass by one another without any clashing or collision ; for gross bodies cannot be received so commodiously as little ; and therefore small bodies , disposed at a distance ( as they were in the roman legions ) might better receive , and relieve one another upon occasion . and that this order of the swisses is not so good as the ancient order of the romans , is demonstrated by many examples of their legions when they were engaged with the macedonian phalanxes ; for these were still worsted by the other : the fashion of their arms , and their way of reserves being more effectual , than the closeness and solidity of a phalanx . chap. iv. how the author would make use of both greek and roman arms for his battalion , and what was the ordinary army of the romans . being therefore according to these models to range and marshal an army , i think it best to retain something of the arms , and orders both of the phalanx and legion . for this reason i have said in a battalion i would have pikes ( which were the arms of the macedonian phalanx ) and scudi or shields and swords , which are the arms of the romans . i have divided a battalion into ten battalia's or companies , as the romans divided their legions into ten cohorts . i have ordered the velites or light-arm'd to begin the fight , as they did formerly . and because as the arms are mix'd , they participate of the one nation and the other ; that they may participate likewise in their orders , i have appointed that every company may have five files of pikes in the front , and the rest of bucklers , that the front may be enabled to keep out the horse , and break more easily into the foot , having pikes in the first charge as well as the enemy , by which they may be fortified to sustain it bravely , till the bucklers come up , and perfect the victory . and if you consider the strength and vertue of this order , you will find how all these arms perform their office exactly . for pikes are very useful against horse , and against foot too , before the battels be joyned , but after they are joyned , they are utterly useless . for this reason , behind every third rank of pikes , the swissers put a rank of halbards , which was to make room for their pikes , though indeed it was not enough . placing therefore our pikes before , and our bucklers behind them , they are enabled to sustain the horse , and when they come to charge , they do open and press hard upon the foot ; but when the fight is begun , and the battels are joyned , the bucklers succeed with their swords , as being manageable more easily in the crowd . luigi . we desire now to understand , how with these arms and orders you would manage your army to give the enemy battel . fabritio . i shall show you nothing at present but this : you must know that in an ordinary army of the romans ( which they called a consular army ) there were no more but two legions of citizens , consisting in all of horse , and about foot. they had besides these as many more horse and foot sent them in by their friends and confederates : these auxiliaries were divided into two parts , the right wing , and the left ; for they would never suffer them to exceed the number of the foot of their legions , though their horse indeed they permitted to be more . with this army consisting of foot , and about horse , a roman consul did all his business , and attempted any thing . yet when they were to oppose a greater power , they joyned two consuls together , and their two armies . you must know likewise that in the three great actions of an army ( their march , their encampment , and engagement ) they placed the legions in the middle , because the force in which they reposed their greatest confidence they thought fit should be more united and compact , as i shall show you more at large when i come to treat of those things . these auxiliary foot by vertue of their conversation with the legionary foot , grew to be as serviceable as they , because they were train'd and disciplin'd with them , and upon occasion of battel , drawn up in the same figure and order . he therefore who knows how the romans marshalled one single legion in the day of battel , knows how they disposed of them all : when i have told you therefore how they divided a legion into three squadrons , and how one squadron received another ; i shall have told you how a whole and entire army is to be ordered , when it is to be drawn up for battel . chap. v. the way of drawing up a battalion , according to the intention of the author . being to prepare for a battel according to the method of the romans , as they had two legions , so i would take two battalions , and by the ordering of them , you may guess how to order a compleat army : for to add more men , is only to multiply their ranks . i think it unnecessary to repeat what foot there are in a legion , what companies , what officers , what arms , what velites in ordinary , what in extraordinary , what pikes , and what other things . for it is not long since i told you distinctly , and press'd it upon your memories as a thing very necessary for the understanding all other orders ; wherefore i shall pass on without farther reflection . it seems to me best that one of the ten battalions , or companies of a battalion be placed in the left flank , and the other ten of the other battalion on the right . those on the left are to be ordered in this manner : put five battalia's ( one on the side of the other ) in the front , so as there may remain a space of four yards betwixt each , draw them up so as they may possess in breadth yards of ground , and in depth forty : behind these five battalia's , i would place three others , distant in a right line from the first about forty yards ; of these three , i would have two follow directly the companies which are upon the two extremities or corners of the five first , and the third should be disposed in the midst ; by which means these three companies should take up as much ground both in breadth and depth as the other five , which have only five yards distance betwixt the one and the other , whereas the three last should have thirty three . this being done , i would cause the two companies remaining to advance , and place themselves behind the three former in a right line , and at the distance of forty yards ; but it should be in such a sort , that each of these two companies should be ranged directly behind the extremity of the three precedent companies , and the space left betwixt them should be yards : by these means all the companies thus disposed should extend themselves in front yards , and in depth . after this i would extend the pikes extraordinary along the flanks of all the companies on the left hand , at about twenty yards distance ; and i would make of them ranks of seven in a rank , so that they should secure all the left flank ( in depth ) of the ten battalia's , drawn up as i said before ; and i would reserve forty files of them to guard the baggage , and the unarmed people in the rear , distributing their corporals and other officers in their respective places . the three constables or captains i would place one at the head of them , another in the midst , and a third in the rear , who should execute the office of a tergiductor , who was always placed in the rear of the army . but to return to the front of the army ; i say , that after the pikes extraordinary , i would place the velites extraordinary ( which are ) and allow them a space of forty yards . by the side of these on the left hand i would place my men at arms , with a space of yards ; after them i would advance my light horse , at the same distance as i allowed to my men at arms. as to the velites in ordinary , i would leave them about their battalia's , which should take up the space which i left betwixt each company , unless i found it more expedient to put them under the pikes extraordinary , which i would do or not do , as i found it more or less for my advantage . the captain general of the battalion should be placed in the space betwixt the first and second orders of battalia's , or else at the head of them , or else in the space betwixt the last of the first five battalia's , and the pikes extraordinary , as i found it most convenient : he should have about him or select men , all brave and experienc'd , and such as understood how to execute their commission with prudence , and how to receive and repel a charge ; and i would have the captain general in the midst of the drums and the colours . this is the order in which i would dispose my battalion on the left wing , which should contain half the army , and take up in breadth yards , and in depth as much as i have said before ( without reckoning the space that was possessed by the pikes extraordinary , which should be as a shield to the people without arms , and take up a space of about a hundred yards ; ) the other battalion i would dispose on the right side , leaving betwixt the two battalions a distance of about yards , having order'd it as the other : at the head of that space i would place some pieces of artillery , behind which should stand the captain general of the whole army , with the drums , the standard or chief ensign , and two hundred choice men about him ( most of them on foot ) and amongst them ten or more fit to execute any command . the general himself should be so mounted , and so arm'd , that he might be on horseback , and on foot as necessity required . as to the artillery , ten pieces of cannon would be enough for the taking of a town . in the field i would use them more for defence of my camp , than for any service in battel . my smaller pieces should be of or pound carriage , and i would place them in the front of the whole army , unless the country was such that i could dispose them securely in the flank , where the enemy could not come at them . this form and manner of ranging an army , and putting it in order , may do the same things in a battel as was done either in the macedonian phalanx , or the legion of the romans ; for the pikes are in the front ; and all the foot placed in their ranks ; so that upon any charge or engagement with the enemy , they are able not only to bear and sustain them , but ( according to the custom of the phalanx ) to recruit and reinforce their first rank , out of those which are behind . on the other side if they be over-power'd , and attack'd with such violence that they are forced to give ground , they may fall back into the intervals of the second battalia behind them , and uniting with them , make up their body , and charge them briskly again : and if the second battalia is not strong enough to relieve them , they may retire to the third , and fight all together in conjunction ; so that by this order ( as to the business of a battel ) we may supply and preserve our selves according to the grecian and the roman way both . as to the strength of an army , it cannot be ordered more strong , because the two wings are exactly well fortified with officers and arms ; nor is there any thing weak but the rear , where the people which follow the camp without arms are disposed , and they are guarded with the pikes extraordinary ; so that the enemy cannot assault them any where , but he will find them in very good order ; neither is the rear in any great danger , because an enemy can be hardly so strong as to assault you equally on all sides ; if you found he was so strong ▪ you would never take the field against him . but if he was three times as many , and as well ordered as you , if he divides , and weakens himself to attack you in several places , beat him in one , and his whole enterprize is lost . as to the enemies cavalry , though they out-number you , you are safe enough ; for the pikes which encompass you , will defend you from any impression from them , though your own horse be repulsed . the chief officers are moreover plac'd in the flank , so as they may commodiously command , and as readily obey ; and the spaces which are left betwixt one battalia and the other , and betwixt one rank and another , serve not only to receive those who are distressed , but gives room for such persons as are sent forward and backward with orders from the captain : add as i told you at first , as the romans had in their army about men , i would have our army consist of the same number ; and as the auxiliaries took their method of fighting , and their manner of drawing up , from the legions ; so those soldiers which you would joyn to your two battalions , should take their form and discipline from them . these things would be very easie to imitate , should you have but one example , for by joyning either two other battalions to your army , or adding as many auxiliaries , you are in no confusion , you have no more to do but to double your ranks , and whereas before you put ten battalia's in the left wing , put twenty now ; or else you may contract , or extend them as your place and enemy will give leave . luigi . in earnest , sir , i am so well possess'd of your army , that i fancy i see it drawn up before my eyes , which gives me an ardent desire to see it engaged : i would not for any thing in the world that you should prove a fabius maximus , and endeavour no more than to avoid fighting , and keep the enemy in suspence ; for i should blame you more , than the romans did him . chap. vi. the description of a battel . fabr. do not question it , hark , do not you hear the artillery ? ours have fired already , but done little execution upon the enemy ; the velites extraordinary , together with the light horse advance to the charge in troops , with the greatest shout and fury imaginable ; the enemies artillery has fired once , and the shot passed over the head of our foot , without any prejudice at all . that it might not have time for a second volley , our velites , and our cavalry have marched up in great haste to possess it , and the enemy advancing in its defence , they are come so close , that neither the artillery of one side or the other can do any mischief . see with what courage and bravery our souldiers charge ; with what discipline and dexterity they demean themselves , thanks to the exercise to which they have been used , and the confidence that they have in our army : see our battalions marching up , with their drums beating , colours flying , and men at arms in their wings in great order to the charge : observe our artillery , which ( to give place , and make room for our men ) is drawn off by that ground which was left by the velites : see how the general encourages his men , and assures them of victory : see how our velites and light horse are extended and returned to the flanks of our army , to see if there they can find any advantage to make an impression upon the enemy ; now , now they are met , see with what firmness our battalions have received the charge without the least noise or confusion : observe the general how he commands his men at arms to make good their ground ; not to advance upon the enemy , nor desert the foot upon any occasion whatever . see our light horse marching to charge a body of the enemies harquebussiers that was firing upon our flank ; and how the enemies horse come in to their rescue , so that being enclosed betwixt the cavalry of one side and the other , they cannot fire , but are forced to retreat behind their battalia's : see with what fury our pikes addres● themselves to the fight , and our foot advanced already so near , that the pikes are become unserviceable ; so that according to our discipline the pikes retire by little and little among the shields : see in the mean time how a body of the enemies men at arms , has disordered our men at arms in the left wing ; and how according to our discipline , retiring under the protection of our pikes extraordinary , by their assistance they have repulsed the pursuers , and killed most of them upon the place . see the pikes in ordinary of the first battalia's , how they have sheltred themselves under the scudati , and left them to make good the fight : see with what courage with what security , with what leisure they put the enemy to the sword. behold how they close their ranks in the fight , and are come up so near they have scarce room left to manage their swords . see with what fury the enemy slyes , because being armed only with pike and with sword , both of them are become unserviceable ; one because of its length , the other because the enemy is too well armed . see how they throw down their arms , how they are wounded , killed or dispersed . see how they run in the right wing ; see how they fly in the left . so now we are safe , and the victory our own . chap. vii . the authors reasons for the occurrences in the battel . fabr. what do you think now , have we not got the victory very fortunately ; but we would have had it with more advantage , had i been permitted to have put all things in execution . you see there is no necessity of making use either of the second or third order ; because our van was sufficient to overcome the enemy ; so that i am enclined to speak no farther upon this subject , unless it be to resolve any doubt that may arise in your mind . luigi . you have gain'd this victory with so much courage and gallantry , that i fear my transport will not give me leave to explain my self , whether i have any scruple or not . nevertheless presuming upon your quickness , i shall take the boldness to tell you what i think . first , therefore let me desire you to inform me , why you made use of your artillery but once ? why you caused them to be drawn off into your army , and made no mention of them afterward ? it seems to me that you placed the enemies too high , and ordered them as you fancied ; which might possibly be true ; but if their cannon should be so placed ( as i do not question but many times they are ) as that they should play among your troops , i would fain understand what remedy you would prescribe ; and since i have begun to speak of the artillery , i shall propose all my scruples in this place , that i may have no occasion to mention them hereafter . i have heard many persons find fault with the arms and orders of the ancients , as things of little or no use in our days , in respect of the fury of our cannon ; because they break all ranks , and pierce all arms at such a rate , that it seems to them no less than madness to oppose any ranks or orders of men against them , and to tire your souldiers with the carriage of arms that will not be able to defend them . fabr. your demand consisting of many heads , requires a large answer . 't is true , i caused my artillery to play but once , and i was in doubt whether they should do that ; and the reason is , because it concerns a man more to keep himself from being hurt , than to mischief his enemy . you must understand , that to provide against the fury of great guns , it is necessary to keep where they cannot reach you , or to place your self behind some wall or bank that may shelter you , for there is nothing else that can secure you ; and then you must be sure that either the one o● the other are able to protect you . those generals who put themselves into a posture to give battel , cannot place their armies behind a wall or a bank , or at a distance where the enemies cannon cannot reach them ; and therefore seeing they have no way to defend themselves absolutely , the best course is to secure themselves as well as they can , and that is by possessing their cannon with as much speed as is possible . the way to possess themselves of it , is to march up to it suddenly , and in as wide an order as is convehient ; suddenly , that they may fire but once ; and wide , that the execution may be the less . this is not to be done by a band of souldiers in order ; for if they march any thing wide , they disorder themselves ; and if they run on in a huddle , it will be no hard matter for the enemy to break them . and therefore i ordered my battel so , that it might do both the one and the other ; for having placed of the velites in the wings , i commanded that as soon as our artillery had fired , they should advance with the light horse , to seize upon their cannon ; for which reason our artillery was shot off but once , and that the enemy might not have time to charge the second time , and fire upon us again ; for we could not take so much time our selves , but they would have had as much to do the same ; wherefore the reason why i fired not my cannon the second time , was , that if the enemy fired once , they might not have leisure to fire any more . to render therefore the enemies artillery unserviceable , the best remedy is to attack it with all possible speed ; for if the enemy deserts it , 't is your own ; if he undertakes to defend it , he must advance before it , and then being betwixt it and us . they cannot fire but upon their own men . i should think these reasons sufficient without farther examples ; yet having plenty of them from the ancients , i will afford you some of them . ventidius being to fight the parthians , ( whose strength consisted principally in their bows and arrows ) was so subtil as to let them come up close to his camp before he would draw out his army , which he did , that he might charge them on a sudden , before they had leisure to shoot their arrows . caesar tells us , that when he was in france , being to engage with the enemy , he was charged so briskly , and so suddenly by them , that his men had not time to deliver their darts according to the custom of the romans . you see therefore that to frustrate a thing in the field which is to be discharged at a distance , and to prevent its doing you any hurt , there is no better way than to march up to it with all speed , and possess it if you can . another reason moved me likewise to fire my artillery no more , which may seem trivial to you ; yet to me it is not so contemptible . there is nothing obstructs an army , and puts it into greater confusion than to take away , or hinder their sight ; for several great armies have been broken and defeated by having their sight obstructed either with the dust or the sun : now there is nothing that causes greater obscurity , or is a greater impediment to the sight , than the smoke of artillery ; and therefore i think it more wisdom to let the enemy be blind by himself , than for you to be blind too , and endeavour to find him . these things considered , i would either not fire my artillery at all , or else ( because that perhaps would not be approved , in respect of the reputation which those great guns have obtained in the world ) i would place them in the wings of my army , that when they fire , the smoke might not fly in the faces of my front , which is the flower and hopes of my army . and to prove that to trouble the sight of an enemy , is a thing of more than ordinary advantage ; i need bring no more than the example of epaminondas , who to blind the eyes of his enemy , before he advanced to charge them , caused his light horse to gallop up and down before their front to raise the dust , and hinder their sight ; which was done so effectually , that he got the victory thereby . as to your opinion that i placed the enemies cannon , and directed their bullets as i pleased , causing them to pass over the heads of my foot , i answer , that great guns do without comparison oftner miss the infantry , than hit them , because the foot are so low , and the artillery so hard to be pointed , that if they be placed never so little too high , they shoot over ; and never so little too low , they graze , and never come near them . the inequality of the ground does likewise preserve the foot very much ; for every little hill or bank betwixt the artillery and them , shelters them exceedingly . as to the horse , especially the men at arms , because their order is closer than the order of the light horse , and they are to keep firmer in a body , they are more obnoxious to the cannon , and are therefore to be kept in the rear of the army , till the enemy has fir'd 〈…〉 this is most certain , your small field-pieces , and your small shot does more execution than your great pieces , against which the best remedy is to come to 〈◊〉 - blows as soon as you can ; and though in the first some men fell , ( as be sure there always will ) ; yet a good general and a good army are not to consider a particular loss , so much as a general ; but rather are to imitate the swissers , who never refused a battel for fear of great guns , but punished them with capital punishment who for fear of them forsook their ranks , or gave any other sign or expression of fear . i caused my artillery to be drawn off as soon as i had fired them , that they might leave the field clear for my battalions to advance ; and i made no mention of them afterwards , as being quite useless when the armies were joyned . you have said likewise , that in respect of the violence and impetuosity of those guns , many do judge the arms and the orders of the ancients to be altogether useless ; and it seems by that , that the people of late have found out arms and orders which are sufficient to secure them : if you know any such thing , you will oblige me to impart it ; for as yet i know none , nor can i believe that there is any to be found : so that i would know of them why the infantry of our times do carry corslets of iron upon their breasts , and the horse are arm'd cap a pied ; for seeing they condemn the ancient way of arming as useless in respect of the artillery , they may as well condemn what is practised now-a-days . i would understand likewise why the swizzers , according to the custom of the ancients , make their battalions to consist of six or eight thousand foot ; and why other nations have imitated them , seeing that order is exposed to the same danger ( upon account of the artillery ) as others are . i think it cannot easily be answered , yet if you should propose it to souldiers of any judgment and experience , they would tell you first , that they go so arm'd , because though their arms will not defend them against great guns , yet they will secure them against small shot , and pikes , and swords , and stones , and all such things . they would tell you likewise , that they keep that close order like the swisses , that they may more easily engage the enemies foot , that they may better sustain their horse , and put fairer to break them . so that we see souldiers are afraid of many things besides artillery , against which they are to provide by their arms , and their orders : from whence it follows , that the better an army is 〈◊〉 , and the closer and stronger it is drawn up , the safer it is . so that who●●● 〈…〉 opinion , is indiscreet , or inconsiderate : for if we see that a small part of the 〈◊〉 the ancients which is used at this day , ( as the pike ) and a small part of their or●●● ( 〈◊〉 are the battalions of the swissers ) have been so serviceable , and contributed 〈…〉 to our armies , why may we not believe that the other arms and orders which 〈…〉 , might have been as beneficial and useful ? again , had we no regard to the 〈◊〉 in placing our selves in that straight close order like the swissers , what other or●●●●●uld make us more fearful ? no order certainly can make us more fearful of the artillery , than that which keeps men firm and close together . besides , if i be not frighted by the artillery of the enemy when i encamp before a town , where they can fire upon me with more security , because i cannot come at them by reason of the wall , nor hinder them , bu●●by my own cannon , which will be a business of time ; if i be not afraid , ( i say ) whore they can multiply their shot upon me as they please , why should i fear them in the field where i can run upon them , and possess them immediately ? so that i conclude artillery , in my opinion , is no sufficient impediment why we should not use the methods of our ancestors , and practise their virtue and courage . and had i not discoursed formerly with you about this subject , i should have enlarged more ; but i shall refer my self to what i said then . luigi . we have heard ( or at least it is our own faults if we have not ) what you have discoursed about the artillery ; and that the best course that can be taken against it , is to make our selves masters of it with as much expedition as we can , if our army be in the field , and drawing up ready to engage . upon which i have one scruple , because to me it seems possible that the enemy may place his artillery in the flanks of his army , so as that it might offend you more , and yet be more capable of being defended . you have made ( if you remember ) in the ranging of your army for a battel , a space of four yards from company to company , and another space of twenty yards from the battalia's to the pikes extraordinary : if the enemy should draw up his army in your own way , and place his cannon in those intervals , i believe from those places they might gaul you exceedingly , and with great difficulty , because you could not enter into the enemies body to possess them . fabr. your scruple is rational , and i will endeavour to discuss it , or apply a remedy . i have told you that those battalia's are in continual motion , either for a battel , or a march , and do naturally so straighten and close themselves , that if you make your intervals narrower where you place your artillery , they will be closed up in a short time , so as they will not be able to do any execution . if you make your distances large , to avoid one danger , you incur a greater , by giving the enemy opportunity not only to possess himself of your cannon , but to rout your whole army . but you must understand it is impossible to keep your artillery among your squadrons , especially those which are upon carriages , because being drawn one way , and their mouths lying the other , it is necessary to turn them before you can fire upon the enemy , and to turn them takes up so much space , that fifty of those carriages are enough to disorder a whole army . so that it is necessary the artillery be placed without their squadrons ; and being so , they may be attacked , as is said before . but let us suppose it might be placed within the squadrons , and that a way might be found out of retaining it in the middle , and that it should not hinder the closing of their bodies , nor leave a way open to the enemy . i say that even in that case the remedy is easie , and that is by making spaces and intervals in your army for the bullets to pass ; by which means the fury of their artillery will become vain : and it will be no hard matter to do this , because the enemy being desirous that it may be secure , will place it behind in the farthest part of the intervals , so that to prevent their shot from doing mischief among their own men , it is necessary that it pass always in a right line , so that by giving place on your side , it is easily avoided . for this is a general rule , we must give place to any thing that we are not able to resist , as the ancients did to the elephants , and forked chariots . i believe , and am assured that you think i have ranged the armies , and won the day ; yet let me tell you , ( if what i have told you already be insufficient ) it would be impossible for an army so armed and ordered , not to beat in the very first encounter any other army that should be arm'd and ordered according to the method of our times ; which many times affords but one front , without any bucklers , and so ill arm'd , that they are not able to defend themselves against any enemy that is near them . and for their way of drawing up , they do it in such manner , that if they place their battalia's in the flank one of another , they make their army too thin ; if they place them behind one another , not having the way of receiving them into one another , they are all in confusion , and their ranks easily broken . and though they give three names to their armies , and divide them into three bodies , the van-guard , battaile , and rear-guard , yet they serve only upon a march , and for distinction of quarters ; but in a fight they are all at the mercy of fortune , and one small charge defeats the whole army . luigi . i have observed by the description of the battel , that your horse were repulsed by the enemies horse , and retired to your pikes extraordinary , by whose assistance they not only sustained the enemy , but beat him back again . i believe as you say , the pikes may keep off the horse in a close and gross body like that of the swizzers ; but in your army you have but five ranks of pikes in the front , and seven in the flank , so that i cannot see how your foot should be able to sustain them . fabr. though i told you formerly that in the macedonian phalanx six ranks of pikes could charge at one time , yet you must understand , that if a battalion of swizzers should consist of a thousand ranks , there could charge at once not above four or five at the most ; because their pikes being nine yards long , a yard and an half is taken up betwixt their hands ; so that in the first ranks they have free seven yards and an half . in the second rank ( besides what is taken up betwixt their hands ) a yard and half is consumed betwixt one rank and the other , so as there remains but six yards that can be used . in the third rank for the same reasons there remains but four yards and an half ; in the fourth , three yards ; and in the fift but one and an half . the other ranks therefore are not able to reach the enemy , yet they serve to recruit the first ranks , as we have said before , and are as a rampart and bulwark to the other five . if then five of their ranks are sufficient to sustain the enemies horse , why may not five of ours do as much , having other ranks behind to reinforce them , and give them the same support , though their pikes be not so long ? and if the ranks of extraordinary pikes which are placed in the flanks should be thought too thin ; they may be put into a square , and disposed in the flank by the two battalia's which i place in the last squadron of the army , from whence they may with ease relieve both the front or the rear , and give assistance to the horse as occasion requires , luigi . would you always use this order when-ever you were to give the enemy battel . fabr. no by no means ; for the form of your army is to be changed , according to the situation of the place , and the strength or number of the enemy , as i shall shew by example before i finish my discourse . but this form or model is recommended to you not as the best , ( though in effect it is so ) but as a rule from whence you may take your other orders , and by which you may understand the other ways of drawing up an army ; for every science has its generalities upon which it is most commonly founded . only one thing i would press upon you to remember , and that is , that you never draw your army up so ; as that your front cannot be relieved by your rear ; for whoever is guilty of that error , renders the greatest part of his army unserviceable , and can never overcome , if he meets with the least opposition and courage . luigi . i have a new scruple that is risen in my mind . i have observed that in the disposing of your battalia's , you make your front of five battalia's drawn up by the sides one of another ; your middle of three , and your rear of two ; and i should think it would have been better to have done quite contrary ; because in my opinion an army is broken with more difficulty , when the enemy which charges it finds more firmness and resistance the further he enters it ; whereas it seems to me , that according to your order , the farther he enters it , the weaker he finds it . fabr. if you remembred how the triarii ( which were the third order of the roman legions ) consisted only of men , you would be better satisfied , when you understood they were placed always in the rear : for you would see that i , according to that example , have placed two battalia's in the rear , which consist of men ; so that i choose rather in my imitation of the romans to erre in taking more men than fewer . and though this example might be sufficient to content you , yet i shall give you the reason , and it is this : the front of the army is made thick and solid , because it is that which is to endure the first shock and insult of the enemy ; and being not to receive any recruits from elsewhere , it is convenient that it be well man'd , for a few would leave it too weak , and the ranks too thin . but the second squadron , being to receive its friends into it , before it is to engage with the enemy ; it is necessary that it has two great intervals , and by consequence must consist of a less number than the first : for should it consist of a greater number , or be but equal to the first , either there must be no spaces or intervals at all , which would occasion disorder ; or by leaving of spaces , they would exceed the proportion of the first squadron , which would make your army look very imperfect . as to what you say touching the impression of the enemy , that the farther he enters your army , the weaker he finds it , it is clearly a mistake ; for the enemy cannot engage the second body , before the first is fallen into it ; so that he finds the middle battalion rather stronger than weaker , being to fight both with the first and second together . and it is the same thing when the enemy advances to the last squadron ; for there he has to encounter not only two fresh battalia's , but with all the battalions united and entire : and because this last battalion is to receive more men , it is necessary the distances be greater , and by consequence that their number be less . luigi . i am very well satisfied with what you have said ; but pray answer me this ; if the five first battalia's retire into the three battalia's which are in the middle , and then those eight into the two battalia's in the rear , i cannot conceive it possible that the eight battalia's first , and afterwards the ten , can be comprehended ( when eight or ten ) in the same space as when they were but five . fabr. the first thing i answer is this , that the space is not the same ; for the five battalia's in the front were drawn up with four spaces in the middle , which were closed up when they fell in with the three battalia's in the midst , or the two in the rear . besides there remains the space betwixt the battalions , and that also which is betwixt the battalia's and the pikes extraordinary ; which space altogether , do give them room enough . to this it may be added , that the battalia's take up another place when they are drawn up in order before their retreat , than they do after they are pressed ; for in their retreat , they either contract or extend their orders . they open their orders , when they fly : they contract them when they retreat ; so that in this case it would be best to contract . besides the five ranks of pikes in the van , having received the first charge , are to fall back thorow the battalia's into the rear of the army , and give way to the scudati or shields to advance ; and those pikes falling into the rear of the army , may be ready for any service in which their captain shall think fit to employ them ; whereas , did they not retire after the battel was joyned , they would be altogether useless . and by this means the spaces which were left to that purpose , are made big enough to receive all forces that are remaining . and yet if those spaces were not sufficient , the flanks on both sides are men and not walls , which opening and enlarging their ranks , can make such distances as will be able to receive them . luigi . the ranks of pikes extraordinary which you place in the flank of your army , when the battalia's in the front fall back into the battalia's in the middle , would you have them stand firm , and continue , as two wings to the army , or would you have them retire with the battalia's ? if you were willing they should , i do not see how it was possible , having no battalia's ( with intervals ) behind them to give them reception . fabr. if when the enemy forces the battalia's to retire , he does not press them too hard , they may stand firm in their order , and flank the enemy when the battalia's in the front are retired . but if they be charged ( as may be reasonably expected ) and the enemy be so strong as to force the other , they may retire with them , and that without difficulty , though there be no battalia's behind with spaces to receive them ; for the body in the midst may double to the right , and thrust one file into another , as we shall show more at large when we speak of the manner of doubling of files . 't is true , to double in a retreat you must take another way than what i have described , for i told you the second rank was to enter into the first , the fourth into the third , and so on : but here in this case we must not begin in the front , but in the rear , to the end that by doubling our ranks we may retreat , and not advance . chap. viii . the exercises of an army in general . fabritio . to answer now to whatever may be objected against my battel , as i have drawn it up before you , i must tell you again that i have ordered and engaged it in that manner for two reasons ; one to show you how it is to be drawn up ; the other to show you how it is to be exercised . as to the drawing up of an army , i doubt not but you understand it very well ; and as to the exercising , i must tell you , it ought to be done as often as is possible , that the captains may learn to keep their companies in these orders ; for it belongs to every particular souldier to keep the orders exact in every battalia ; and to every captain to keep his company exact with the order of the whole army , and know how to obey the command of the general . it is convenient likewise that they understand how to joyn one battalia with another , how to take their place in a moment ; and therefore it is convenient that the colours of each company may have its number of soldiers described in it ; for the greater commodity of commanding them , and that the captain and soldiers may understand one another with the more ease ; and as in the battalia's , so it is convenient likewise in the battalions , that their numbers should be known , and described in the colonel's ensign : that you should know the number of the battalion in the left or right wing ; as also of the battalia's in the front , or the middle , and so consequently of the rest . it is convenient likewise that there be degrees of offices and commands to raise men as it were by steps , to the great honours of an army . for example , the first degree should be file-leaders , or corporals ; the second should have the command of fifty ordinary velites ; the third of a hundred , with the title of centurion : the fourth should command the first battalia ; the first , the second ; the sixt , the third ; and so on to the tenth battalia , whose place should be next in honour to the captain general of the battalion , to which command no person should be advanced , but he who has passed all those degrees . and because besides these officers , there are three constables or commanders of the pikes extraordinary , and two of the velites extraordinary , i did not much care if they were placed in the same quality with the captain of the first battalia , nor would it trouble me if six men more were preferred to the same degree , that each of them might put himself forward , and do some extraordinary thing to be preferred to the second battalia . if then each of these captains understands in what place his battalia is to be ranged , it must necessarily follow , that at the first sound of the trumpet ( the standard being erected ) the whole army will fall into its place . and this is the first exercise to which an army is to be accustomed , that is to say , to close and fall in one with another , to do which , it is convenient to train them often , and use them to it every day . luigi . what mark and difference would you appoint for the standard of the whole army , besides the number described as aforesaid ? fabritio . the lieutenant general 's ensign should have the arms of his general or prince , and all the rest should have the same arms with some variation in the field or colours , as the prince shall think best , for it imports not much what their colours are , so they distinguish one company from another . but let us pass to the other exercise , in which an army is to be train'd ; that is in its motions , to be taught how to march , advance , or fall back with exact distance and time , and to be sure that in their marches a just order be observed . the third exercise is , teaching them to manage their arms , and charge , in such a manner , as that afterwards they may do both dexterously when they come to fight ; teaching them how to play their artillery , and how to draw them off when there is occasion ; teaching the velites extraordinary to advance out of their places , and after a counterfeit charge , to retreat to them again teaching the first battalia's ( as if they were over-powered ) to fall back into the intervals of the second ; and all of them afterwards into the third , and having done so , to divide again , and return to their old posts ; in short , they are so to be accustomed in this exercise , that every thing may be known and familiar to every soldier , which with continual practice is easily obtained . the fourth exercise instructs your soldiers in the usefulness of the drums , and trumpets , and colours , informing them of the commands of their captain , by the beating of the one , the sounding of the other , and the displaying and flourishing of the third : for being well used to them , they will understand what they are to do by them , as well as if they were directed by word of mouth : and because the effects of these commands depend altogether upon these kind of sounds , i shall tell you what kind of instruments the ancients made use of in their wars . the lacedemonians ( if we may believe thucidides ) in their armies made use of the flute , conceiving that harmony more apt to infuse gravity than fury into their soldiers . induced by the same reason , the carthaginians sounded their charges upon the harp ; with which instrument they began the fight . aliatte king of lydia , in his wars made use of them both : but alexander the great , and the romans used horns and trumpets , supposing the clangor and noise of those instruments would enflame the courage of their men , and make them more valiant in fight . but as in the arming of our army , we have followed the way both of the greek and the roman ; so in the choice of our instruments of intelligence , i would follow the customs both of the one nation and the other . i would have therefore the trumpets placed by the lieutenant-general as instruments not only proper to excite and enflame your army , but fitter to be heard , and by consequence apter to derive your commands than any of the other . the rest of those kind of instruments i would have placed about the captains and colonels of the battalions : i would have also a smaller sort of drums and flutes , which should be beaten and played upon not as we do now in our fights , but as our tabours and flagelets do in our feasts : the general with his trumpets should signifie when his army is to make a stand , when to advance , when to wheel , when to retire , when to make use of the artillery , when the velites extraordinary are to move , and by the variation of the sounds , to direct his army in all the marches and counter-marches that are generally used ; and i would have the trumpets followed afterwards by the drums . and because this exercise is of great consequence in an army , it imports very much that it be frequently taught . as to the horse , they should have trumpets too , but of a lesser and different sound from those about the lieutenant-general . and this is all that has occurred to my memory in the ordering , and exercising of an army . luigi . i beseech you sir , let me not trouble you too much , if i desire to be satisfied in one thing more ; and that is , for what reason you caused your light horse and velites extraordinary to advance against the enemy with great shouts and clamours , and cries ; and when afterwards the body and remainder of the army came to charge , they did it with extraordinary silence ? i confess i cannot comprehend the reason , and therefore i beg your explanation . fabr. the opinions of the ancient generals have been different in that point , whether an enemy was to be charged silently and without noise , or with all the clamour could be made : the silent ▪ way is best to keep your men firm in their orders , and to signifie the commands of the general : but the obstreperous way is best to excite the courage of your soldiers , and dismay the enemy : and because i thought in both cases there was something of advantage , i made use of them both , and caused those to advance with clamour , and these with silence ; for i cannot think that an universal and perpetual noise can be any advantage , because it hinders orders from being derived , which is a most pernicious thing : nor is it likely that the romans used those shouts after the first shock , for history tells us , that many times by the exhortation and encouragement of their officers , the souldiers which were flying , were stopped , and rallyed , and disposed immediately into new orders , which could not be , where the officers could not have been heard . the fourth book . chap. i. the considerations and subtleties to be used in the drawing up an army to fight . luigi . seeing the victory has been so honourably obtained under my conduct , i think it discretion to tempt fortune no farther , knowing how much she is variable , and inconstant . wherefore my desire is to resign my authority , and that zanobi may take it upon him according to the order proposed of transferring it to the youngest : and i know he will not refuse that honour , ( or rather trouble ) both in complacency to me , and as being naturally the more couragious of the two ; for he fears not to engage in these kind of conflicts , though there be as much likelihood of his miscarriage as conquest . zanobi . i shall refuse no office into which you shall put me , though i must needs say , i could more willingly have been an auditor ; for your scruples and demands have hitherto given me more satisfaction , than any thing i could have objected my self . but i think , seignor fabritio , it would be better if you proceed ( provided your patience will serve , and that we do not tire you with our ceremonies . ) fabritio . you rather oblige me sir , for this variety of interrogators , gives me to understand the vanity of your judgments and appetites . but is there any thing behind that you would have added to what has been spoken before ? zanobi . there are two things of which i would willingly be satisfied before we pass any farther . one is , whether you have any other way of drawing up an army : the other is , what reflections or considerations a general is to have , before he comes to a battel ; and when any accident intervenes , how it is to be avoided . fabr. i shall endeavour to satisfie you , but not by answering distinctly to your demands ; for whilst i answer to one , it happens many times that i seem to answer to the other ; i have told you how i would have my army drawn up , that according to that model , any other figure may be taken , as the number of the enemy , and the nature of your ground does require ; for in that case , one is to act according to the condition both of the one and the other . but take notice of this , that there is no way more dangerous , than to extend the front of your army too much , unless it be very numerous and strong : otherwise you are to draw it up close and thick , rather than wide and thin . for when your forces are few in respect of the enemy , you must look out for other remedies : as by drawing your army up , so as it may be fortified by some river , or fen , that may secure you behind ; or fortified in the flanks by some ditch or entrenchment , as caesar's was in france ; and this ought to be a general rule to you , that you extend or contract your front according both to your own number , and the number of your enemy . if the enemy be not so numerous , and your men as well disciplin'd as they , you are to make choice of an open place , where you may not only encompass the enemy , but distend your own ranks : for in streight and narrow places , not being able to make use of your orders , you cannot make use of your advantage . for this reason the romans did most commonly make choice of open and clear places , and avoided such as were difficult and close . but if your army be small , or your men inexperienced , you must do quite contrary ( as i said before ) and must find out some place where your few men may defend themselves , or where their inexperience may do you no hurt : in that case you are to choose some hill or eminence from whence you may come down upon the enemy with more force ; yet must you have this caution not to draw up your army upon any strand or sea-coast , nor under the command of any hill , of which the enemy may possess himself , because you will be exposed thereby to the enemies cannon without remedy , and be unable to do them mischief with any convenience . in the drawing up an army for battel , great regard is likewise to be had to the sun and the wind , that neither the one nor the other be in your face , for they are great impediments to your sight , one with its beams , and the other by raising the dust , and carrying the powder into your eyes ; besides , the wind being contrary , is a great disadvantage in rendring the blows which they give the enemy more languid and weak ; and as to the sun , your must not only take care that it be not in your face , nor does you no prejudice in the beginning of the fight , but that it does you no injury when it gets up : wherefore the best way is when you draw up your men , to have it if possible on their backs , that many hours may pass before it can come about into their faces . hanibal knew this advantage very well , and made use of it in the battel of cannas , and marius did the same against the cimbrians . if you be weaker in horse , it is your best way to draw up among the vines or the woods , and such other impediments , as in our times the spaniards did when they beat the french in the kingdom of naples near cirignuola . and it has been many times seen that the same soldiers which have been worsted and bastled before ; by only changing their order , and shifting their ground , have recovered the victory ; thus it was with the cartbaginians , who having been many times worsted by marcus regulus , were afterwards victorious by the conduct of kantippus the lacedemonian , who caused them to come down into the plain , where they might have room for their horse , and their elephants , and by so doing they were too hard for the romans . according to the practice of the ancients , i have observed , that all great generals when they have known which quarter of the enemy was the strongest , and where they have fortified most ; they have not opposed the strongest part of their army against it ; but have chose rather to confront it with the weakest of their divisions , and with their strongest attack the weakest of the enemies . when afterwards they came to engage , they commanded the strongest of their squadrons that they should not only stand firm , and receive the charge without making any advance , whilst the weaker parts had orders to suffer themselves to be overcome , and by giving ground gradually , to fall behind the rear of the army . the artifice procures two great disorders to the enemy . the first is , that the strongest part of his army is environ'd insensibly ; the other is , that imagining their victory certain by the retreat of their enemy , they fall frequently into disorder , which many times robs them of that victory of which they thought themselves so certain . cornelius scipio being in spain against the carthaginians , under the command of asdrubal ; and knowing that asdrubal understood very well that in the drawing up his army , he put the roman legions ( which were the strength and flower of his army ) in the midst , and that asdrubal in probability would do the like . when they came afterwards to fight , he changed his order , put his legions in the wings , and his light arm'd men in the body ; when the battel was joyned , he commanded his body to slacken their march on a sudden , and the wings to double their pace ; so that only the wings on both sides engaged , and the bodies on both sides being at a distance one from the other , came not up to one another , and the strongest part of scipio's army , fighting better than the weakest of asdrubal's , he overcame them . in those days that stratagem was well enough ; but in our days by reason of our artillery , it is unpracticable ; for the space which would be left betwixt the two bodies would give opportunity to the artillery to play , which as we said before , would be very dangerous : so then that way is to be laid aside ; and the way which i recommended before is to be used , which is to charge with your whole army , and let your weakest squadrons retire . when a general finds his army stronger than his enemies , if he would encompass it insensibly , and that the enemy may not prevent him , let him draw up his army to an equal front with the adversary : afterwards in the heat of the fight let him order by little and little to retire in the front , and let the wings advance as gradually , and it will always happen that the enemy shall be encompassed before he is aware . when a general would fight , and be sure not to be routed , let him draw up his army near some place of retreat or security , as either fens , mountains , or some strong inexpugnable town ; for in that case he may pursue the enemy , but the enemy cannot pursue him . hanibal made use of this cunning when his fortune began to decline , and he began to apprehend the conduct of marcellus . some generals to disturb the orders of the enemy , have commanded their light armed men to begin the battel , and when it is once joyned , to retire among the ranks . when afterwards it grows hotter , and both sides are thorowly engaged , they have had orders to draw forth out of the flanks of the army , and having flanked the enemy unexpectedly , they have disordered and broke him . if any one finds himself weaker in horse , besides the ways proposed before , he may place a battalia of pikes behind them , and draw them up in such manner , that in the heat of the battel they may open , and give way for the pikes to pass thorow them , and by so doing , he shall be sure to prevail . several have accustomed their light armed men to fight among their horse , and they have been found to give the horse very good assistance . of all those who are famous for drawing up battels , hanibal and scipio are the most renowned for the great skill that both of them expressed in their conflict in africa ; but because hanibals army was composed of carthaginians , and auxiliaries of several nations , he placed elephants in his front ; behind them he placed his auxiliaries , next them his carthaginians , and last of all his italians , in whom he could not safely conside : and the reason why he ordered them so , was because the auxiliaries having the enemy in their faces , and finding themselves closed up with carthaginians at their backs , should not think of flying , but being under a necessity to fight , he did hope they might either overcome , or so harrass the enemy , that when he came up with his fresh men , he might the more easily overthrow them . against this order scipio placed his hastati , principes , and triarii in his accustomed manner , so as upon occasion they might be received one into the other . the front of his army he made up with great spaces , but that it might appear close and united to the enemy , he filled them up with his velites , with order that as soon as the elephants come upon them , they should retire , and entring among the legions by the ordinary spaces , leave a way open for the elephants to pass , by which means the fury and execution of the elephants being evaded , they came presently to handy-blows , and the carthaginians were overcome . zanobi . in your description of the fight , you have caused me to remember how scipio in the engagement caused not his hastati to retire into the ranks of the principes , but divided them , and caused them to retire into the wings of the army to give place to the principes when they were to advance against the enemy : i would know therefore for what reason he differed from the ordinary custom . fabritio . i will tell you : hanibal had placed the strength of his army in the second division ; so that scipio to oppose them with equal courage , united the principes and the triarii together , insomuch as the intervals of the principes being filled up by the triarii , there was no spaces left for the reception of the hastati ; wherefore he caused the hastati to open to the right and left , and fall in with the wings of the army . but you must observe that this way of dividing the first squadron , is not to be used but when the other is superior ; for then you may do it conveniently , as scipio did ; but being inferior or under any repulse , it is not to be done without manifest danger , and therefore it is necessary that you have spaces behind in your other squadrons that may be ready to receive you . but to return to our discourse . the ancient asians among other contrivances to mischief their enemy , made use of certain chariots with sythes fastned to the sides of them , which served not only to open the squadrons of the enemy with their force , but to cut and kill them with their sythes . against these chariots , they had three ways to defend themselves ; either by the closeness of their ranks , or by receiving them into their ranks ( as they did the elephants ) or by some other vigorous resistance , as silla the roman did against archelaus , who had store of those chariots ; to repel them silla caused several stakes to be pitched into the ground before his first squadron , which putting a stop to the carreer of the said chariots , prevented the execution which they would otherwise have done . and it is observable the new method that silla used in ranging his army ; for placing his velites and light horse behind ; and all his compleat arm'd soldiers before , he left intervals sufficient to receive them which were behind when they had occasion to march up ; so that the fight being begun , by the assistance of the horse ( who had room to pass thorow the first squadron to the charge ) he obtained the victory . chap. ii. the arts which are to be used during the fight . fabr. to disturb the army of the enemy when the battel is joyned , it is necessary to invent some way or other to affright them , either by spreading a report of supplies that are hard by , or counterfeiting some representation of them that may dismay the enemy , and facilitate their defeat . minutius ruffus , and acillus glabrio two of the roman consuls were skilful in this art . caius sulpitius caused all the boys and refuse of his army to mount upon mules and other beasts that were unserviceable in fight , and placed them at a distance upon a hill , and drawn up in such order that they appeared like a compleat body of horse , when he was engaged with the french , and the enemies apprehension of that body got sulpitius the victory . marius made use of the same stratagem when he fought against the germans : if then these false alarms and representations are of such use and advantage in time of battel , true ones must needs be more efficacious , especially if they fall upon the enemies flank or rear whilst the battel is joyned : which indeed is not easy to be done , unless the nature of the country contributes ; for if it be open and plain , you cannot conceal any part of your forces , as is necessary to be done in those cases ; but in woody or mountainous countries you may conceal some of your troops in such manner as they may fall suddenly and unexpectedly upon the enemy , which will give you a certain victory . it is many times of great importance to spread a rumour abroad during the fight , that the enemies general is slain , or that he is beaten in another part of the army , which ( as the other ) has many times been the cause of a victory . the enemies horse are often disordered by the representation of strange figures , or the making of some unusual noise , as croesus did , who opposed camels against horse ; and pyrrhus when he confronted their cavalry with his elephants ; the strangeness of which sight affrighted them so , that nothing was strong enough to keep them from disorder . in our days the turk defeated the sophi of persia , and the soldan of syria only with the noise of this guns , which being unusual to their horse , disordered them in such manner , that the turk got the victory , without any great trouble . the spaniards to distract the army of amilcar , placed in the front of their army certain chariots filled with flax , and drawn by oxen , to which flax ( when the enemy came up to charge ) they put fire , and the oxen running from the fire , rush'd furiously into the army of arailcar , and put it to the rout . it is an unusual practice ( as we have said before ) to surprize and disturb the enemy with ambuscades where the country is convenient : but where it is open and large , many have made great holes in the ground , and covered them with straw and earth lightly , leaving certain spaces solid and firm for their own retreat ; over which having retired cunningly in the heat of the fight , the enemy pursuing , has fallen in , and been ruined . if during the fight any ill accident happens that may discourage your souldiers , 't is prudence to dissemble it , and turn it to advantage , as tullus hostilius did , and lucius sylla who observing in the heat of the battel a party of his troops go over to the enemy , to the great disheartening of the rest , caused it to be published quite thorow his army that it was done by his order , which not only dispelled the apprehension that was among them , but encouraged them in such manner that it got him the victory . sylla having commanded out a party upon some enterprize , and all of them being killed in fight of his army , that the rest might not be terrified , told them he sent them on purpose , because he had found them unfaithful . sertorius fighting a battel in spain , flew one of his own men , who brought him news that one of his great officers was killed , and the reason was , lest telling it to the rest , it might possibly have discouraged them . it is no easy matter to detain and army , ( if it be once tottering and inclining to run ) and to bring it to fight again : but you must consider it with this distinction , either it is wholly disordered , and then it is impossible to recover it ; or else it is disordered but in part , and there is some remedy . many of the roman generals have stop'd the flight of their armies , by putting themselves at the head of them , and as it were upbraiding them by their cowardize . lucius sylla seeing part of his troops routed , and pursued by the forces of mithridates , rode up to the head of them with his sword in his hand , and cryed out to them , if any body ask you where you have left your general , tell him you left him fighting in boetia . attilius the consul opposed those who fought bravely against those who ran away ; telling them that if they did not face about , they should be killed by their friends as well as their enemies . philip king of macedon understanding that his souldiers were afraid of the scythians , placed behind his army certain of the faithfullest of his horse , with commission to kill any man that fled ; so that his men choosing to die rather fighting than flying , overcame their adversaries . several of the roman generals have wrested an ensign out of the hands of their souldiers , and throwing it among the enemy , promised a reward to him who should recover it ; and this they did not so much to hinder the flight of their own men , as to give them occasion of doing some greater exploit upon the enemy . chap. iii. stratagems after the fight . fabr. i do not think it impertinent to add to this discourse such things as happen after the fight , especially seeing they are but short , and not to be omitted because they are conformable to the matter which we have in hand . but since one of these two things must happen , either that we gain the victory , or lose it ; i say , that when we gain it , we are to pursue it with the greatest diligence we can , and rather imitate caesar in this case than hanibal , who for not following his victory , and pushing it on after he had defeated the romans at cannas , lost the whole empire of the romans , which fortune had almost thrust into his hands . caesar on the other side never rested after a victory , but followed the enemy with greater fury than he attacked them at first . but when the day is lost , a wise general is to consider the best that he can make of it , especially if there be any thing of his army remaining . the advantage that may arise , is from the inadvertency of the enemy , who many times transported with his success , grows negligent and remiss , and gives opportunity to the enemy to revenge himself , as martius the roman did upon the carthaginian army , who having slain the two scipio's , and routed their forces , not valuing those which remained , were suddenly assaulted and broken ; for it is frequently seen , nothing is perpetrable so easily , as what the enemy fancies you can never attempt ; for commonly men suffer most , where they are most secure . a general therefore , when he cannot carry the victory , is to endeavour with all possible industry that his loss may be as little as may be ; and to do this , it is necessary to order things so that the enemy may not easily pursue , or be in a capacity to retard you . as to the way of hindering the pursuit of the conqueror ; several generals , as soon as they found their condition , and that it was not possible to continue the fight , have ordered their inferior commanders to separate , and fly in several parties , and meet again at a place which he assigned ; and the enemy not daring to divide his army for fear of a design , has let all , or the greatest part of the conquered escape . others have thrown the best of their goods in the way , that the enemy following might be delayed by the prize , and suffer them to get off . titus dimius used no small art to conceal the loss which he had sustained in the fight ; for having endured the burnt of the battel from morning till night with the loss of many of his men ; when night came , he caused most of them to be buried privately : the next morning the enemy finding so many of their own men dead , and so few of the romans , concluded themselves beaten , and fled . and now i suppose ( though confusedly ) i have in some measure satisfied your demands . chap. iv. two other ways of ranging an army to fight . fabr. 't is true , as to the form and model of drawing up an army to fight , it remains that i let you know that sometimes some generals have drawn them up in the figure of a wedge pointing in the front , supposing it the properest way to pierce , and make an impression upon the enemy . in opposition to this , the way was for the adversary to draw up in the figure of a pair of shears , which being opened , were to receive the point of the wedge , enclose it , and charge it on all sides . and about this , let me recommend to you this general rule , that the best remedy to be used against the design of an enemy , is to do that bravely of your self , to which you perceive he would endeavour to force you : for doing it voluntarily you do it orderly , and to your own profit and advantage ; whereas if you do it by constraint , you do it to your ruine . i will not repeat any thing that i have said before , to confirm my discourse . but this is most certain , if your adversary thinks to open , and as it were cleave your army with his wedge , if you keep your army open in the figure of the shears , and receive them in the middle , you cut them to pieces , and they can do you no hurt . hanibal placed his elephants in the front of his army , thinking thereby to have pierced the army of scipio with more ease ; but scipio ranging his men in the form of a pair of shears , and receiving him in an open posture , gain'd the victory , and hanibal was lost . asdrubal placed the best and strongest of his men in the front of his army to make the better charge upon the enemy ; scipio commanding his middle men in the front to retreat insensibly , and give place , was so cunningly obeyed , that the enemy was drawn in , and defeated : so that you see those designs are many times the occasion of his victory against whom they are designed . chap. v. of the constraint and advantage a man may have to fight . fabr. if my memory does not fail , it remains yet that i say something touching the things which a wise general is to consider before he comes to an engagement . and the first thing i shall say upon this subject is , that a general is never to come to a field-fight unless he be constrained , or has some more than ordinary advantage . his advantage may lye in the nature of the place , in the discipline of his army , or the number or excellence of his men. and his necessity consists in finding his condition such , that without fighting he must be certainly destroyed : as where money is wanting , where victuals are defective , and where the enemy is in expectation of supplies : in these cases a general is always to venture , though he fights upon disadvantage ; for 't is better fighting where fortune may favour you , than not to try her at all , and be certainly ruined ; and in this case it would be as great a fault in a general not to fight , as it would be if he had an opportunity of defeating his adversary , and was either too ignorant to know it , or too cowardly or delatory to make use of it . the advantages which occur in the conduct of war do many times proceed from the enemy , and sometimes from your prudence . many have been surprized and routed in their passage over rivers , by the dexterity of the enemy , who having forborn them till half of them were over ; have fallen suddenly upon them , and put them to the rout , as caesar served the swizzers when he cut off a fourth part of their army , by reason that they were separated by a river . sometimes it happens that your enemy is tired , and weary , having followed you with too much haste and inconsideration ; and in that case finding your own army vigorous and strong , you are not to lose your opportunity . besides , if your enemy presents you battel in the morning betimes , you are not immediately to draw out your army and fight him , but are rather to protract and spin out the time for some hours , ( still offering and pretending to come forth ) that their impatience of delay , or standing so long to their arms , may rebate the fury with which they came ; and as soon as you find them cool , and off of their first ardor , then you may come forth , and charge them as smartly as you can . scipio and metellus made use of this way in spain , the one against asdrubal ; the other against sertorius . if the enemy has lessened his power by dividing his army , ( as scipio did in spain ) or by any other occasion , then also a good general may try his fortune with credit . the greatest part of the gravest generals have chosen rather to receive than give the charge , because the fury of an enemy is easily sustained by those who stand firm and close in their station ; and being once check'd , it turns into cowardize . fabius being sent against the samnites and the gauls , received their fury with that indiscomposedness and tranquillity , that he conquered them both , but decius his colleague not following his example , miscarried , and was slain . some who have been possessed too much of the courage of their enemy , have chose to begin the fight in the evening towards night , that their army being worsted , might get off , or defend themselves by the benefit of the darkness . others understanding the superstition of the enemy , and that on certain days they devote themselves wholly to religion , and will not endeavour to fight , have chosen that time to attack them , and have carried the victory . caesar made use of this way against ariovistus in france , and vespasian did the same in syria against the iews , who upon their sabbath would not so much as defend themselves against the romans . chap. vi. directions for a general . fab. there is nothing of more importance to the general of an army , than to have about him persons that are faithful , experienced in war , and prudent in counsel , with whom he may constantly advise , and confer both about his own men , and the enemy ; as which is the most numerous , which the best arm'd , which the best mounted , which the best exercised , which the most patient of labour and distress , and whether the horse or the foot are to be relied upon most . the next thing to be considered is the place where he is , whether it be more advantageous for the enemy than for him ; which is most easily supplyed with provisions ; whether it be best to fight presently , or protract ; and what he may gain or suffer thereby : for many times the souldiers disgusted at the tediousness of the war , grow lazy and remiss , and coming at length to be weary , they either grow mutinous , or run away . but above all things , i would advise a general to inform himself of the nature and qualification of his adversary the enemies general , whether he be rash , or wary , and what counsel he has about him . the next thing he is to consider , is , whether he can confide in his auxiliaries or not : and be sure never to bring his army to a battel , if he finds them under any apprehension , or with the least distrust of the victory ; for the greatest sign of miscarriage , is despair , and when they think it impossible to prevail . in this case therefore you are to avoid fighting either by following the example of fabius maximus , ( who encamped his army in places of such advantage , that hanibal durst not attack him ) or else if you suspect the enemy will venture upon you in your entrenchments , and that you shall not be able to defend them , your best way will be to remove , divide your army , and dispose them in parties into several towns , that the tediousness of a siege , and length of time , which will be required , may discourage the enemy . zanobi . is there no other way of avoiding a battel , but to divide your troops , and to dispose them into several towns ? chap. vii . which way a battel is to be avoided , though pressed never so earnestly by the enemy . fabr. if i be not mistaken i have discoursed to some of you before , how he that is in the field cannot avoid fighting when pressed by an enemy who will fight upon any terms ; and that the best way he can take , is to keep himself at fifty miles distance , that he may have time to remove when he hears of his advance . fabius maximus did not refuse fighting with hanibal , but would fight at his own time , and advantage ; and hanibal was too wise to attack him , where he was sure he could do no good ; for had he believed he could have conquered him , fabius would have been constrained to have fought him , or fled . philip king of macedon , father of perseus , being at war with the romans , posted his army upon an high mountain , that he might not be compelled to fight ; but the romans assaulted , and defeated him . cingentorix general of the gauls to avoid fighting with caesar who had passed a river contrary to his expectation , quitted the country , and march'd away with his army . the venetians in our times , if they had had no mind to have fought the french king , they should not have staid till his army had passed the adda , but have removed farther off , as cingentorix did before them ; but they staid so long that they had time neither to draw up handsomely to fight , nor to make their retreat ; for the french were so near before the venetians dislodged , that the french fell upon them , and put them to the rout . so then by what i have said , it is manifest that a battel cannot be avoided , when the enemy presses it upon any disadvantage ; and let not any body tell me of fabius , for hanibal refused to fight in that case as much as he . chap. viii . how souldiers are to be encouraged to fight ; and how they are to be cooled and asswaged when their courage is too high . fabr. it many times happens that your souldiers are impatient to be fighting , but if you do not find it convenient in respect of the number of your army , the disadvantage of the place , or some other consideration , you would do well to turn them from that inclination . it happens again that necessity or occasion constrains you to fight when your souldiers are diffident or adverse : in one case it is necessary that you affright them , in the other that you excite them . in the first case , when remonstrances and exhortations will do not good , the best way is to suffer some of them to be cut off by the enemy , that those who have fought , and those who have not , may believe you another time . what fabius maximus did by accident , may be done on purpose , and by art . you know the army of fabius was very fierce to be fighting with hanibal , and his master of the horse was of the same mind with the army : fabius was of another opinion , and thought it better to protract ; and this diversity of opinions occasioned the dividing of the army : fabius kept his division in his trenches , the master of the horse went out , fought , was worsted , and had certainly been cut off , had not fabius relieved him ; by which example the master of the horse , and the whole army were convinced that their wisest way was to have obeyed the orders of fabius . as to the other point of animating your souldiers , and raising their courages to a pitch , it is good to incense them by possessing them of the contumacy and insolence of the enemy : by pretending intelligence among them , and that you have corrupted a considerable party ; by posting your army so near them , that they may see one another , and skirmish with them slightly every day , ( for things which are done daily , we easily despise ) by counterfeiting your self angry , and in a solemn and grave oration reprehending and upbraiding their backwardness , and telling them , that if they leave you , you will charge the enemy alone . but to make your souldiers bold and couragious , you are by no means to permit any of them to send any thing to their own houses ( or to deposit it any where else ) till the war be done , that they may know that though in running home they may save their lives , yet it must be with the loss of their prize ; the love of which renders people commonly as valiant as the love of their lives . zanobi . you say that souldiers may be encouraged , and disposed to fight , by a speech or oration : do you intend it should be delivered to the whole army , or only to the officers ? chap. ix . a general ought to be skilful and eloquent to persuade or dissuade as he sees occasion . fabr. it is an easie matter to persuade or dissuade any thing with a small number of persons , because if words will not do , you have force and authority to back them : but the difficulty is to remove an opinion out of the heads of the multitude when it is contrary to your own judgment , or the interest of the publick ; for there you can use nothing but words , which must be heard and understood by every body , if you would have every body convinced . for this reason it is requisite an excellent general should be a good orator , to inflame or asswage the courage of his souldiers as he has occasion ; for unless they can tell how to speak to a whole army , there is little good to be expected ; and yet in our times this way of haranguing them is quite laid aside . look over the life of alexander the great , and see how often he was put to it to speak in publick to his army ; and had he not done it , he would never have been able to have conducted it ( when laden with so much riches and prey ) thorow the deserts of arabia , and in india , where it endured so much misery and distress ; for there is scarce a day but something or other happens that causes confusion and ruine to an army where the general is either ignorant or careless of speaking to them . the way of making speeches to them takes away their fear , quickens their courage , augments their confidence , discovers their cheats , secures their rewards , remonstrates their dangers , and the ways to avoid them . in short , by those kind of orations a general reprehends , entreats , threatens , encourages , comm●nds , reproaches , and does every thing that may either enhance , or depress the passions of his men ; wherefore that prince , or that commonwealth that should design to establish a new militia , and give it a reputation , is to accustom his souldiers to the harangues of their chief officers , and to chuse such officers as know how to accost them . chap. x. certain considerations which encourage souldiers , and make them as virtuous as valiant . fabritio . the worship which the ancients paid to their gods ( though they were false ) religion , and the oath which was taken before they were listed in the army , was in those days sufficient to keep their souldiers to their duty ; for upon every misdemeanor they were threatned not only with such punishments as they were to expect from their officers , but such as could be inflicted ( as they thought ) by nothing but their gods ; which opinion being tempered with other religious ceremonies and superstitions , made all enterprises easie to the generals of those times , and would do so still , were we as careful and observant of our religion as they were of theirs . sertorious knew how to make his advantage that way , pretending conference with a white hart , which ( as he gave out among his souldiers ) came from heaven to assure him of victory . sylla to make his designs the more credible , pretended to discourse with an image that he had taken out of the temple of apollo , which directed him how he was to steer . others have pretended dreams and visions that have commanded them to fight : in the days of our fathers , charles the seventh of france during his wars with the english , pretended to be advised by a maid that was sent from heaven to give him instructions , which maid was called the pucelle d' orleans , and gained him many a victory . there are other ways of making an enemy contemptible ; agesilaus the spartan having taken several persians , strip'd them naked , and shew'd them to his men , to the end that seeing the delicacy and tenderness of their contexture , they might have less occasion to fear them . some have by design brought their men into extremity , that they might be necessitated to fight , as having taken from them all hopes of preservation , but in victory ; which indeed is the surest and best way to make your souldiers fight , and to infuse courage into them , and then this courage and obstinacy is highly encreased by their confidence in their general , and their love to their country . their love to their country is natural ; their confidence in their captain is more from his experience and conduct , than from any thing else . there may be many other obligations , but none so strong as that which binds you either to conquer , or dye . the fifth book . chap. i. how the romans marched in an enemies country , and in what manner they are to be imitated . fabr. i have shown you how an army is drawn up and marshalled in order to a battel ; i have told you how an enemy is overcome , and several circumstances which occur therein . so that it is time now to inform you how an army is to be ordered , which has not an enemy in view , but is in continual probability of an assault : this may happen when an army marches in an enemies country , or at least a country that is suspected . and first you must understand the roman armies had always some troops of horse which were scouting abroad in order to the discovery of the roads . after which followed the right wing , and after them the carriages which belonged to that squadron : then followed a legion , and after them their carriages . then another legion and their carriages ; and after them the left wing , and the remainder of the cavalry after them . this in short was the manner in which the romans marched most commonly ; and if it hapned in their march that their army was assaulted either in the front or the rear , they caused all their carriages to withdraw to the right wing or the left , as they found it convenient , and most agreeable with the nature of the place ; and then when they were cleared of their baggage , and disincumber'd , all of them unanimously make head against the enemy . if they were assaulted in the flank , they drew their carriages on that side where they were like to be most safe , and then addressed themselves against the enemy . this way being good and well govern'd , ought in my judgment to be imitated , by sending your light horse to scout about the country , and having four battalions of foot , they are to follow one the other successively , each of them with its carriages in the rear : and because carriages are of two sorts , one belonging to particular persons , and others for the common use of the camp , i would divide the publick carriages into four parts , and assign one to every battalion ; i would likewise divide the artillery , and the followers of the camp into four parts , that each battalion should have equal share in their impediments and carriages . bnt because it happens many times that you march thorow a country not only suspected , but so openly your enemy , that you expect every hour to be assaulted ; it will be necessary , that to secure your self , you change the form of your march , and put your self into such a posture , as that neither the paisants , nor the enemies army may be able to offend you , though they come upon you never so suddenly . in these cases your generals of old , were wont to march in a square order , which they called a square ; not that it was exactly of that figure , but because it was ordered so , as it was able to fight in four places at once , and by that means they were always ready either to march or to fight . i shall follow this model for ordering my two battalions which i have chosen to that purpose in stead of a compleat army . chap. ii how an army is to be marshalled to march in an enemies country . fabr. to march ( therefore ) securely in an enemies country , and to be able to make good every part when surprized , and assaulted by the enemy , i am to reduce my army into a square according to the model of the ancients ; i would have a square whose area , or vacuity within , should consist of yards , in this manner ; i would first place my flanks distant one from the other yards ; i would have five battalia's in each flank marching length ways in files , and at three yards distance the one battalia from the other ; so that each company taking up forty yards , all of them together ( with the spaces betwixt them ) shall take up yards . between the front and the rear of these two flanks , i would dispose the other ten companies , in each of them five ; ordering them so , that four of them should be placed in the front of the right flank , and four in the rear of the left flank , leaving a space of four yards betwixt each company , and of the two companies that are left , i would have one placed at the head of the left flank , and the other in the rear of the right . and because the space betwixt one flank and the other consists of yards , and these battalia's drawn sideways in breadth rather than length , will take up ( intervals and all ) yards , there will remain a space of yards betwixt the four companies in the front of the right flank , and the same space will be possessed by the four companies in the rear ; nor will there be any difference but that one space will be behind towards the right wing , and the other before towards the left . in the space of yards before , i would put my ordinary velites in the space behind , my velites extraordinary , which would not amount to a thousand for each space . but to contrive it so , that the great space within should consist of yards square , it would be convenient that the five companies which are placed in the front , and the five companies in the rear should take up none of that space which belongs to the flanks ; wherefore it is necessary that the five companies behind should with their front touch the rear of the flanks , and those five companies in the van , with their rear should touch the front of the flanks ; so that there should remain on each side of the army , a distance sufficient to receive another company . and because there are four spaces , i would take four ensigns of the pikes extraordinary , and place one in each of them , and the two ensigns which would remain , i would place in the midst of the space of my whole army in a square battalion ; at the head of which , the general of the army should stand with his officers about him : but because these battalia's thus ordered , do march all of them one way at once , but do not so when they fight ; when they are drawn up , those sides are to be put into a fighting posture , which are not guarded by other battalia's : and therefore it is to be considered that the five battalions in the front are defended on all sides , but just in the front ; so that they are to be drawn up in great order with the pikes before them . the five companies behind are guarded on all sides but behind , so as they are likewise to be ordered with pikes in their rear , as we shall show in its place . the five companies in the right flank are guarded on every side but only on the right flank . the five in the left flank are the same , only on the left flank they are open ; and therefore in the managing your army , you must observe to place your pikes so as they may turn about to that flank which is naked and exposed ; and your corporals are to be in the front , and in the rear , that ( being to fight ) the whole army , and every member of it may be in their proper places , and the manner of doing it , we have declared before , when we discoursed of putting the companies in order ; i would divide my artillery , and place part of it without my right flank ; and the other without my left . my light horse i would send before to scour the country ; my men at arms i would dispose part behind my right wing , and part behind my left , at about forty yards distance , from the battalia's . and this general rule you are to observe by all means in the drawing up your army , that your horse are to be placed either in the rear , or upon the flanks , for to place them before , at the head of the army , would occasion one of these two things , either they must be placed at such distance , that upon a repulse they may have space and time enough to wheel of without falling foul upon the foot ; or else draw up the foot with such intervals , that the horse may pass thorow without putting them into disorder : certainly no body ought to look upon this as a thing of small importance ; for many have been ruined and routed by their own men , for want of timely consideration . but to return to our business , the carriages , and the people unarmed are placed in the void place of the army , and so disposed , that there is passage left for any to pass from one part of the army to another . these companies ( without the horse and artillery ) do take up a space of yards : and because this square consists of two battalions , it is convenient to let you know what part of them makes one battalion , and what the other . now because battalions are denominated from the number , and each of them ( as you know ) consists of ten battalia's ( or companies ) and a colonel , i would have the first battalion place five of first companies in the front , the other five in the left flank , and the colonel in the left angle of the front . the second battalion should place its five first battalia's upon the right flank , and the other five in the rear , with the colonel in the right corner to secure the rear , and perform the office of him whom the romans called by the name of tergiductor . chap. iii. how to put an army presently into order , and draw it up , so as if upon a march it should be attack'd , it may defend it self on all sides . fabr. having put your army into this posture , you are to cause it to march , and in its march observe the same order , for without doubt it is safe enough against the tumults and incursions of the peasants , against which , it is sufficient if the colonel commands out parties of horse , or certain companies of his velites to repel them . nor is there any danger that those kind of people will ever come to handy strokes with you ; for men without order , are always fearful of men in order , and ' it s the practice of such people to alarm you with great shouts and crys , but never to come near ; like little curs that bark at a mastiff , but keep far enough off . when hanibal invaded italy with so much detriment to the romans , he passed thorow france ; was frequently infested by the bores , but he valued them not . but it is not sufficient to have your army in this order , but if you intend to march , you must have pioneers . and such kind of people to plain the ways , make your intrenchments , &c. and these pioneers are to be secured by the horse which you send up and down the country . in this order an army may march ten miles a day , and be time enough at their journeys end to sup , and take up their quarters by day-light ; for many times an army will march in one day twenty miles . but if it happens to be attacked by a formed army , it cannot be so sudden , but you will have time to put your self into a posture of defence , because an orderly army marches slowly , and you will have leisure to draw your self up in battalia , and put your army either into the same figures i have prescribed , or into such another . if you be assaulted in the van , you have no more to do but to bring your artillery thither out of the flanks , and bringing your horse out of the rear into the van , to put them into the same place and distance as i have directed . the velites which are before , may advance , divide themselves into two parties of five hundred a piece , and enter into their own place betwixt the horse and the wings of the army ; and then into their place are to succeed the two companies of pikes extraordinary which i placed before in the great vacuity of the army . the velites in the rear are to remove from their post , and dividing themselves , repair to the two flanks and fortifie them , and by the space and chasm which they leave at their departure , the carriages may march out , and all those who are unarmed , and put themselves behind in the rear : the space in the middle being now void , and every man in his place , the five battalia's which i ordered behind the army may advance by the void space betwixt the two flanks , and march towards those in the van. three of them may march up within yards ( with equal intervals betwixt the one and the other ) and the other two may remain behind at the same distance of forty yards . this is a form that may be ordered on a sudden , and has some resemblance with the first model of an army which we recommended before ; for thought it be streighter in the front , it is firmer in the flanks , and by consequence stronger . but because the five battalia's in the rear have pikes with them for the reasons abovesaid , it is necessary to cause them to advance to fortifie the front of the army , and therefore either you must cause your companies to turn company by company as they were solid bodies ; or else pass them into the front thorow the files of the bucklers , which way is a better way , and less disorderly , than to cause them to wheel in whole companies like a solid body : and the same thing is to be done with those in the rear upon any assault , as i have shown before . if the enemy presents himself in the rear ; you have no more to do but to face about with your whole army , and immediately the figure is altered , the rear becomes the front , and the front the rear ; after which you are to observe all the ways of fortifying your front , as i have directed before . if the enemy appears upon your flank , your army is to face about to that side , and do the same things to strengthen your front : so that your horse , your velites , your artillery may be in such places as are convenient for the making up that front ; and if there be any difference in this variation of fronts , it is only this , that some of those who are to remove , have farther to advance than others . nevertheless , in making a front of your right flank , your velites are to enter into the intervals betwixt the wings of the army ▪ and the horse should approach to the left flank , into whose place the two companies of pikes extraordinary ( which were placed in the middle ) should succeed : but the carriages should remove , and the unarm'd people , ( by the great space and overture that is made ) and retire behind the left flank , which is now become the rear of the whole army : and the other velites who were placed in the rear at first are not to budge in this case , because that place should not remain open , being of the rear become the flanks : all other things are to be done as in my first directions for the making of a front . what is said before of making a front of the right flank , will serve for making a front of the left flank , for the same order is to be used : if the enemy comes upon you so strong that he is able to attack you on both sides , you must fortify the places where you suspect he will charge , by doubling your ranks from the place where he does not appear to fall on ; by dividing your artillery , your velites , and your horse , & distributing them equally in both places . if he assaults you in three or four sides at once , you or he must be very imprudent ; for had you been wise , you would never have put your self into a place where an enemy could have come at you on so many sides , especially with a form'd and well ordered army . for to ruine you securely , it is necessary the enemy be strong enough to attack you on all sides and with as many men in every place almost , as in your whole army : and if you be so indiscreet to march into his country , or put your self into the power of an enemy whose men are three times as many , and as well experienced as yours , if you miscarry , you can blame no body but your self : but if misfortune happens not by your fault , but by accident of war , no body will condemn you , and it will fair with you as it did with scipio in spain , and asdrubal in italy . but if the enemy be not much stronger than you , and yet ventures to assault you in several places , the rashness will be on his side , and the success in all probability on yours ; for of necessity he must so weaken himself , that you may receive him in one place , and charge him briskly in another , and then you will easily ruine him . this way of ordering an army against an enemy that is not in sight , but is hourly expected , is very necessary : and it is very useful to accustom your souldiers to close , and change , and march in this order , and in their march to shew them how to fight according to my first front , and then falling into their march again , upon a new alarm in the rear , to turn that into a front ; and then each of the flanks , and so in their first posture again : and these exercises are very necessary , if you would have your army ready and well disciplin'd for which cause i would recommend it to all princes and great captains to restore these practices of the ancients ; for what is military discipline , but to know how to command and execute these things well ? what is a well disciplin'd army , but an army train'd up well in these kind of exercises ? and he who in our times would but frame his discipline to this , i am confident could never be worsted . but to continue our discourse ; if this square figure be difficult , it is not to be laid aside for that , for that difficulty is necessary : nevertheless exercise will make it easy ; for having learn'd how to draw your self up , and preserve your figure , you will easily understand afterwards how to maintain other figures in which there is not so much difficulty . zanobi . i am of your mind , that those orders are necessary , and cannot tell ( as to my self ) what can be added or substracted . yet i would willingly be satisfied in two things . one is when you would make a front of your rear , or one of your flanks , and would have your men face about , how you do signify your commands , whether by word of mouth , or sound of trumpet ? the other is , whether those you send before to plain the ways , and make them passable for your army , are to be souldiers drawn out of your battalia's , or other country people designed on purpose for that work . chap. iv. of commands derived by word of mouth , by drums , and trumpets , and of the nature of pioneers . fabr. your first demand is of very great importance , for many armies have been ruined when the captain 's orders have been mistaken , or not heard : for which reason the words of command in such great dangers ought to be clear and intelligible : and if you would signify your commands by the sound of your trumpets or drums , great care is to be taken , that the sounds be so different and distinguishable one from the other , that they cannot be mistaken . if your commands are by word of mouth you must use particular , and be sure to avoid general terms , and in your particular words you must be cautious to use none that may be liable to an ill interpretation . many times the crying back , back , has been the loss of an army : wherefore that word is to be avoided , and instead of it you are to say retreat . if you would change your front , and make it either in the flank or the rear , you must not say turn , but face about to the right or the left , to the front or the rear : and in like manner all the words of command are to be plain and intelligible , as march on , stand firm , advance , retreat : and what ever may be done by word of mouth clearly and distinctly , is to be signified that way : what cannot be done that way , is to be done by the trumpet and drum. as to the pioneers , which is your second demand , i would have that office performed by my own souldiers , as well because it was the practice of ancient times , as because thereby i should have fewer idle persons in my army , and by consequence fewer impediments . i would command out of every battalia what number i thought necessary ; i would furnish them with pickaxes , and spades , and cause them to leave their arms with their next ranks , who should carry them for them ; so that when the enemy appeared , they should have no more to do but to fall back to their ranks , and take them again . zanobi . but who should carry their pickaxes and spades ? fabr. there should be waggons on purpose . zanobi . i fear you would never prevail with your souldiers to work . fabr. we will talk of that in its proper place : at present i shall lay it aside , and discourse of the way how they are to be supplyed with provisions ; for having tired them thus long , 't is but reasonable to refresh them with victuals . chap. v. of the provisions that are necessary for an army . fabr , you must know , a prince is to keep his army as free , and as fit for expedition as possible , and to rid it of all encumbrances that may make his enterprizes difficult . the first difficulty to be removed , is want of provisions , and therefore he is to take particular care that they be furnished with bread and wine . the ancients did not think of providing of wine , for when they wanted wine , they made use of water with a little vinegar to give it a taste , so that among the provisions for the army , vinegar was provided , but not wine . their bread was not baked ready to their hands , as in the towns , but every souldier had his proportion of meal , which he ordered as he pleased , with a certain quantity of bacon , and seam , which gave their bread a gust , and rendred them strong . so that the provision for the souldiers was meal , vinegar , bacon , and suet or seam , and barley for the horses . they had commonly heards of cattel great and small which followed the armies , which being driven , and not carried , were no great encumbrance . by reason of this order , of old , an army marched many days journey thorow difficult and solitary places without want of provisions , because they lived upon such things as might easily be carried with them . but in our armies now a-days we find it quite contrary ; for the souldiers cannot subsist without wine and bisket , as when they are at home , of which , provision cannot be made for any considerable time , insomuch as they are many times famished ; or if provision be made , it is with much trouble , and vast expence . i would endeavour therefore that my army might not be supplyed at that rate ; nor would i have them have any bread but what they make themselves . as to wine , i would not hinder their drinking it , nor prohibit that any should come into the army ; but i would take no pains , nor use no industry to supply them : and for other provisions , i would follow exactly the model of the ancients : which way , if rightly considered , will shew what difficulties are removed , what wants and distresses are prevented to an army and general , , and what convenience is added to any enterprize that shall be undertaken . zanob . since we have routed the enemy , and marched afterwards into his country , 't is but reasonable to believe that we have made our depredations , tax'd his towns , taken several prisoners : i would know therefore how the ancients proceeded in these cases . chap. vi. how the ancients divided the spoil , and of the pay which they gave to their souldiers . fabr. i will satisfy you as to that : i do not question but you have considered ( because i have discoursed it formerly with some of you ) how our present wars do impoverish not only those princes which are overcome , but those two are conquerors ; for as one looses his country , so the other looses his mony : which was otherwise in ancient times , be , cause the conqueror enriched himself by the war. the reason of this difference is , because in our times no publick account is taken of the prizes , ( as formerly ) but all is left to the discretion of the souldier , which occasions two very great disorders ; the first is , as before ; the other , it renders the souldier more desirous of plunder , and less observant of order and military discipline . and we have heard of many instances , where their impatience to be pillaging has wrested the victory out of their hands who had almost perfectly obtained it . whilst the romans had the command of their own armies , they provided very well against both these inconveniencies , appointing all the prizes to be delivered in , and appropriated to the publick , and that afterwards the publick should distribute as it pleased . to this purpose they had their questores , ( which were like our chamberlains ) in whose hands all their prizes and taxes deposited , of which the consul or general of their army disposed as he thought good , for the payment of his souldiers , the curing of the wounded , or sick , and discharging the other necessities of the army . 't is true , the consul had power to give the plunder of a town to his souldiers , and he frequently did it , but that liberty never bred any disorder ; for when a town was taken , or an army defeated , all the prize was brought into a publick place , and distributed man by man ; according to every ones merit . this custom made the souldiers more intent upon victory than plunder : the practice of the roman legions was , to break and disorder an enemy , but not to pursue ; for they never went out of their ranks upon any occasion whatever . only the horse , the light arm'd men , and what other souldiers were not of the legions , followed the chase : whereas if the plunder of the field had belonged to any man that could catch it , it would have been neither reasonable , nor possible , to have kept the legions to their ranks , or to have exposed them to so many dangers . hence it was , that upon a victory the publick was always enriched ; for when a consul entred in triumph , he brought with him great riches into the treasury of rome , and they consisted of taxes , contributions , ransoms , and plunder . the ancients had likewise another custom that was very well contrived , and that was , out of every souldiers pay , to cause a third part to be deposited with the ensign of their respective companies , who never restored it before the war was ended . this they did for two reasons ; first , that every souldier might have a stock of his own ; for most of them being young , and profuse , the more they had , the more they would have squandred . the other reason was , that knowing their stocks were in their ensigns hands , they should have the more care of him , and defend him with the more courage ; and this custom contributed much to their valour , and is necessary to be observed by any man who would reduce his souldiers to the discipline of the romans . zanobi . i believe it impossible for an army not to meet with several ill accidents whilst it marches from one place to another ; and that it requires great industry in the general , and great courage in the souldiers to prevent or avert them : you would oblige me much if you would tell me what has occur'd to your knowledg in the case . chap. vii . to know the surprizes which are contriving against you upon your march . fabr. i shall satisfy you willingly , as being particularly necessary to any man who is desirous to give a perfect scheme of this discipline . whilst an army is matching , the generals are above all things to be vigilant that they fall not into any ambushments , which may be done two ways ; one when you fall into it bluntly of your self : the other when you are drill'd and wheedled into it by the enemy before you perceive it . to prevent the first way , it is convenient to send out strong parties to discover the country , who are to be the more diligent , by how much the country is more apt and proper for such things , as where it is woody or mountainous ; for ambuscades are commonly laid behind some hill , or under the shelter of some wood , and , as if you do not discover them in time , they are very pernicious ; so , if your care be sufficient , they are as easily prevented . the birds and the dust have many times discovered the enemy ; for when ever the enemy approaches in any great number , he will be sure to raise the dust , which will give you the alarm . several generals observing the pigeons to rise in some place where they were to pass , ( or other birds that fly together in flocks ) and to hover over their heads without falling again , have thereby discovered the ambushments of the enemy , and either prevented or defeated them . as to the second way of being drawn in by the artifices of the enemy , you must be cautious of believing any thing easily , that is not reasonable to be supposed : as it would be , if an enemy should leave something for you to pillage on purpose , you must suspect there is some design at the bottom , and be careful it does not succeed . if a great number of the enemy be beaten , and pursued by a few of your men , if a few of the enemy attacks a greater party of yours , if the enemy runs unexpectedly , and without any visible occasion , in those cases you must always suspect ; and never fancy your enemy so weak as not to understand his own business : on the contrary , if you would be less exposed to his stratagems , and run your self less into danger , the weaker and more careless you observe him to be , the more you are to apprehend him . in this case you are to comport your self in two different manners , you are to fear him in your own thoughts , and order your affaris accordingly ; but in your words and outward behaviour you are to seem to despise him ; this last way makes your souldiers more confident of victory , the other makes you more cautious , and less apt to be circumvented . and you must know , that to march thorow an enemies country is more dangerous than to fight a field battel . chap. vii . one is to know the country perfectly well thorow which he is to pass , and keep his enterprizes secret . fabr. the marching thorow an enemies country being so extraordinarily dangerous , it is necessary that a general doubles his diligence ; and the first thing he is to do , he is to have a cart made of all the country by which he is to pass , that he may know the towns , their number , and distance , the roads , and mountains , the rivers , the fens , and the nature and qualities of them all : and to better his knowledg , it is convenient that he discourses and interrogates some body who understands the places , objecting , and asking them several questions , and observing their answers . he is likewise to send some parties of his light horse before , under the command of prudent officers , not so much to face the enemy , as to speculate the country , and see whether it agrees with his map , and the description which he has received . he is also to send out spies and guides with good guards , promising them rewards if they tell true , and threatning them with punishment , if false . but above all he is to have a care that his army knows nothing of his design ; for in the whole art of war there is nothing so useful , as to conceal the enterprizes that you are about . chap. ix . of certain things which are requisite upon a march . fabr. that no sudden attack may be able to disorder your souldiers , you must command them to stand ready with their arms , for things that are foreseen and expected , are less terrible and hurtful . many persons to avoid confusion in their march have disposed their carriages , and unarm'd people near the colours , with command to follow them close , that upon a halt , or retreat , ( if there should be occasion ) they might do it more easily , which is a good way , and i like it well . a general is likewise to have a great care that his men do not straggle in their march , or march unequally , some too fast , others too slow , which would weaken his army , and expose it to great disorder . it is convenient therefore to place their officers in the flanks , that they may keep them uniform in their motion , restraining those who are too hasty , and soliciting those who are too slow , and that cannot be done better than by the trumpets and drums . the ways are likewise to be enlarged and repair'd , so as one company at least may always march in order . besides this , the custom , quality and humour of your enemy is to be considered , whether he be like to assault you in the morning , at noon , or at night . whether he be strongest in horse or in foot , and as you are inform'd of that , you order your men , and provide every thing necessary . but to come to some particular accident . chap. x. how to avoid fighting near a river , though pressed by the enemy ; and in what manner you may pass it . fabr. it falls out sometimes that you are forced to decline the enemy , as thinking your self too weak , and are therefore unwilling to engage him : the enemy follows you what he can to stop you , or cut you off in your passage over the river , to which you are marching to that purpose ; and your passage will take up so much time , that in probability the enemy will reach you . some who have been in that dangerous condition , have drawn a trench round the rear of their army ; fill'd it with faggots , and other combustibles , and set them on fire , whilst in the mean time their army passed over without any impediment from the enemy , by reason the fire that was betwixt them hindred their designs . zanobi . i cannot easily believe that such a fire as that could hinder them , because i remember i have heard how hanno the carthaginian being besieged by an enemy ; on that side where he designed to escape , caused store of wood and faggots to be laid , and then set them on fire : so that the enemy not observing him so strictly on that side , he passed his troops thorow the flames , only by ordering them to hold their targets before their faces . fabr. you say well , but consider a little what i told you , and what hanno did ; i told you that the generals i mentioned caused a trench to be digg'd , and filled with combustible matter ; so that when the enemy was to pass , he was to encounter with two great difficulties , the trench and the fire . hanno made his fires without any ditch , and because he designed to pass over them , he commanded that they should not be made too violent ; for without a trench , that would have stop'd him . do you not know the story of nabis the spartan , who being besieged in sparta by the romans , he set part of the town on fire to hinder the advance of the romans , who had already entred in some places ; and by that fire he not only hindred their advance , but repulsed them . but to return to our business . quintus lutatius the roman , having the cimbri upon his heels , and being arrived at a river ; that the enemy might give him time to pass , he pretended a resolution to fight them , pitch'd his camp , entrench'd himself , set up his standard , and sent out parties of horse to provide forrage . the cimbrians conceiving he would encamp there , came and encamped by him , and divided themselves into several parties , to supply them with provisions ; of which lutatius having notice , slip'd over the river before they could have time to disturb him . some have turned the course of a river , and by a cut carrying the water on the back-side of the army , have made the river fordable , and passed it with ease . when the waters are rapid and the stream strong , to facilitate the passage of the foot , they put the strongest of their horse betwixt the stream and the foot , to keep of the torrent ; and another party below to bear up the foot , if the water should be too strong for any of them . rivers that are unfordable , are likewise to be passed with bridges and boats ; so that it is good to carry in your army materials for all these things . it happens sometimes that when you would pass a river , the enemy is got on the other side , and opposes . to remove this difficulty , i know nothing you can do better , than to follow the example of caesar , who having brought his army to the side of a river in france , with design to have passed it , but finding vercingetrix with his army on the other side ready to obstruct him , he marched down the river several days journey on one side , whilst vercingetrix did the like on the other . but caesar having made a place in a wood convenient for the concealing of some of his men , drew out three companies out of each legion , caused them to stay behind there , and when he was gone , commanded that they should set up a bridge over the river , and fortify it ; and in the mean time he followed his march . vercingetrix observing the same number of legions , not suspecting that any part of them were left behind , followed him on the other side ; but caesar when he judged the bridge finished , faced about on a sudden , and finding every thing as he expected , he passed the river without any difficulty . zanob . have you any rules whereby you may discover a ford ? fabr. yes we have : whereever in a river you see the water tremble , and carry certain streaks betwixt the place where it stagnats , and the current , you may be sure the bottom is good , and the place fordable , because the gravel and sand which the river does commonly carry along with it , is more fixed there , as has been often seen by experience . zanobi . suppose the flood should have loosened the earth at the bottom of the ford , so as the horse should sink in ; what remedy then ? fabr. you must make grills or lettices of wood , sink them into the river , and let them pass over them . but to follow our discourse . chap. xi . how to make your passage thorow a streight though you be pressed by an enemy . fabr. if a general by accident be conducted with his army betwixt two mountains , and that he has but two passages , one before , and the other behind , and the enemy has got possession of both , he can have no better remedy than to do as has been done before ; that is , to dig a deep trench behind him , and make it as unpassable as he can , that the enemy may believe he intended to stop him there in the rear , that with his whole force he might make his way thorow the passage in the van : which being observed by the enemy , he concluded according to appearance ; sent what strength he could make to the other end of the pass ; and abandoned the trench , whereupon the other clap'd a wooden bridge over the trench immediately ( which he had prepared on purpose ) and passed back again without any obstruction . lucius minutius a roman consul was in liguria with an army , and was shut up by the enemy betwixt the mountains , so as he could not disingage himself : being sensible of his condition , he sent certain numidians which he had in his army upon small scrannel horses towards the places where the enemy had their guards , at first sight the enemy put themselves into a posture to defend the passes , but when they observed the numidians in ill order , and ill mounted in respect of themselves , they began to despise them , and to be more remiss in their guards ; which was no sooner perceived by the numidians , but they clap'd spurs to their horses , and charging suddenly upon them , they passed on in spight of all their opposition ; and being passed the mischief and devastation that they made in the country , constrained the enemy to give free passage to the whole army . a certain general being infested by a numerous enemy , drew up his army so close , that the enemy was able to encompass him round , and afterwards he fell so smartly upon that quarter where the enemy was weakest , that he not only worsted them , but disintangled himself . marcus antonius in the retreat from the parthians observed that every morning by break of day they were upon his back as soon as he moved , and continued skirmishing and molesting him quite thorow his march ; whereupon he resolved not to remove before noon . the parthians observing , concluded he would not stir that day , and returned to their posts , insomuch that marcus antonius had opportunity to march all the rest of that day without interruption . the same person to avoid the darts of the parthians , commanded his men that when the parthians came near them , the first rank should fall down upon their knees , and the second rank clap their bucklers over the heads of the first rank , the third over the second , the fourth over the third , and so on ; so as the whole army lay as it were under a shield , and was defended from their arrows . and this is all i can remember about the accidents to which an army is subject upon a march . i shall pass now to another thing , unless you have something else to demand . the sixth book . chap. i. what kind of places the greeks and the romans chose out for their camps , with a short recapitulation of what has been said before . zano . i think it very convenient that battista takes upon him the office of demanding , and that i lay it down ; by doing so we shall seem to imitate the good generals of old , who ( as i have been taught by seignor fabritio ) did usually place the valiantest of their soldiers , in the front , and in the rear of the army ; conceiving it necessary to have those in the van who would begin the fight bravely , and such in the rear as would bravely maintain it . and as cosimo began this discourse with a great deal of prudence , so battista may finish it with the same ; luigi and i having born the brunt in the middle as well as we could ; and seeing hitherto every man has taken his part willingly , i do not think battista will refuse . battista . hitherto i have suffered my self to be governed , and am resolved to do so for the future ; let me desire you therefore seignor fabritio to pursue your discourse , and hold us excused if we interrupt you with these kind of demands . fabr. as i told you before , you do me a very great kindness , for this interruption , and changing of persons , rather refreshes than troubles my fancy : but to follow our business , i say , that it is now high time that we dispose our army into its quarters , for you know every thing desires rest , and security ; for to repose without security , is not properly to repose . i do fancy you would rather have had me lodg'd my army first , and march'd and fought them afterwards , but we have done quite contrary , and indeed not without necessity ; for being to show how an army in a march was to quit that form , and put it self into a posture to fight , it was necessary first to show how they were to be drawn up for a battel . but to return , i say , that if you would have your camp safe , you must have it strong , and well ordered : the discretion of the general puts it in good order , but it is art or situation that makes it defensible and strong . the grecians were so curious in this point , that they would never encamp but where there was some river , or wood , or bank or other natural rampart to defend them : but the romans stood not so much upon the strength of the situation , as their own ways of fortification , nor would they ever encamp , but where according to their own discipline they could draw up their army . for this reason the romans observed one constant form in their encampments ; for they would rather make the situation of the place comply with their methods , than permit their customs , to comply with the situation ; but with the grecians it was otherwise , because following the condition and form of the place , it was necessary that they varied the manner of their encampment , and the form of their camp. the romans therefore where the situation was weak , supplyed it by art and industry : and because in this discourse i have proposed the romans for a president , i shall not leave them in my manner of encampment , nevertheless i shall not follow their practice in every thing , but picking and selecting such parts as i think most agreeable with our times . i have told you often how the romans in their consular armies had two legious of romans , consisting of about foot , and horse ; they had moreover about more foot , sent in by their friends and allies to their assistance : but this was a rule , their auxilaries never exceeded the number of the legions , unless it were in horse , and in them they were not so curious . i have told you likewise how in all their battels their legions were placed in the middle , and their auxiliaries in the flanks , and it was the same in their encampments , as you may read in such authors as make any mention of their history : i will not therefore be so exact in my relation , i shall content my self only to tell you in what order i would lodge my army at present , and you will understand by that what i have borrowed from the romans . you know that in imitation of their legions i have taken two battalions consisting of foot , and horse of service for the battalion : you know into what companies , into what arms , and into what names i divided them . you know how in ordering my army to march and to fight , i have said nothing of more men , only what was to be done , was to be done by doubling their ranks , not by any reinforcement of men . but being now to shew you the manner of encamping , i think it not convenient to stick to my two battalions , but to unite our whole army , composed according to the model of the romans of two battalions , and as many auxiliaries , which i do the rather , that the form of our camp may be the more compleat , by the reception of a compleat army ; which in my other demonstrations i have not thought altogether so necessary . being therefore to lodge a compleat army of foot , and two thousand horses of service , to be divided into four battalions , ( two of natives , and two of strangers ) i would take this way . chap. ii. the form of a camp. fabr. having found a place convenient for my camp , i would set up my standard in the midst of a square of fifty yards deep . the four sides of that square should respect the four quarters of the world , and look east , west , north , and south . in this square i would set up the generals pavilion : and because i think it discreet , and in part the practice of the ancients , i would divide my men which carry arms , from them who have none ; and those who are free , from those who are incumbred . all or the greatest part of my arm'd men i would lodge towards the east ; my men that were disarm'd and incumbred , i would lodge towards the west , making my front towards the east , and my rear towards the west ; and the north and south should be my flanks . to distinguish the quarters of those which bore arms , i would take this course , i would draw a line from the standard towards the east of yards long . then i would draw two other lines , ( with the first in the middle ) of the same length , but each of them at a distance of fifteen yards from the first ; at the end of these lines i would have my eastern port , and the space betwixt the two outward lines should make a street which should go from that gate to the general 's quarters , and take up a space of thirty yards in bredth , and in length , ( for the general 's quarter would take up fifty ) and this should be called the general 's street . then i would cause another street to be drawn out from north to south , and it should pass by the end of the general 's street , not far from the general 's quarter towards the east , which should contain in length yards , ( for it should take up all the bredth of the camp ) and be called the cross-street . having design'd the general 's quarters , and these two streets , i would mark out quarters for the two battalions that were my own subjects , and one of them i would dispose on the right hand of the general 's street , and the other on the left . and then passing over the cross-street , i would assign lodgments on the left hand of the general 's street , and as many on the right , leaving betwixt the sixteenth and seventeenth lodgment a space of thirty yards wide , as a traverse way to pass thorow all the lodgments of the battalions . i would lodge the captains of the men at arms at the front of those two orders of lodgments which joyn to the cross-street , and their men at arms in the fifteen lodgments that are next them ; so as every lodgment should contain ten men at arms , the whole number that i have allotted to each battalion , being an hundred and fifty . the captains lodgments should ●●orty yards wide , and ten in lenght ; and you must take notice that when i say wide , i mean from north to south ; and when long , from east to west . the lodgment for the private men at arms should be fifteen yards long , and thirty wide . in the other fifteen lodgments which follow on both sides of the street , ( which begin at the traverse way , and should have the same allowance of ground as i have given to the other ) i would dispose my light horse . and because there are likewise of them belonging to each battalion , i would put ten of them into each of the fifteen lodgments , and the sixteenth i would reserve for the captain with the same space of ground as is allowed to the captain of the men at arms ; and so the lodgments of the horse of the two battalions should come down to the middle of the general 's street , and be a direction to the quartering of the foot , as i shall shew . you have seen how i have lodged the horse of both battalions , with their officers in lodgments set up near the general 's street , and beginning at the cross-street ; and how betwixt the sixteenth and the seventeenth there was res●rved a space of thirty yards to make a cross-way . being therefore to lodge the twenty battalia's or companies in the two ordinary battalions , i would appoint lodgments for every two battalia's behind the lodgments of the horse , and they should each of them contain in length yards , and in bredth thirty , according to the dimensions of the horse-lodgment , and they should be so close that they should touch one another . in the first lodgment on each side butting upon the cross-street , i would lodge the captain of each company over against the lodgment of the captain of the men at arms : and this lodgment alone should be twenty yards wide , and ten long . in the other fifteen lodgments which succeed on both sides as far as the traverse way , i would quarter a company of foot , which being , should be disposed to a lodgment . the other lodgments should be set up on each side by the lodgments of the light horse , with the same dimensions of ground ; and on each side i would place a battalia of foot . in the last lodgment on each side i would place the captain of the company ( right over against the captain of the light horse ) with a space of ten yards in length , and twenty in bredth : and so these two first ranks of lodgments would be half horse , and half foot : but because ( as i said before ) these horses are all horses of service , which have no proper persons either to dress or to feed them , i would have the foot which are quartered behind , obliged to look to them , and for so doing they should be exempt from other duties in the camp ; and this was the method of the romans . after this i would leave a space of thirty yards on each side , which should make streets , and be called , one of them , the first street on the left hand , and the other the first street on the right . i would then on each side set up another row of lodgments , with their backs one to the other , with the same spaces as i assigned to the other ; and having separated sixteen of them , ( as with the rest ) to make a traverse way , i would dispose in each side four companies with their captains at the head of them , and other officers in the rear . after i had left on both sides a distance of thirty yards for a way , which on one side should be called the second street on the right hand , and on the other side the second street on the left hand ; i would set up another rank of lodgments with the same distances and separations , where i would lodge on each side four companies with their officers : and by doing this , all the cavalry , and the companies of both the battalions would be lodged in three rows of lodgments , and the general 's quarter in the middle . the two battalions of auxiliaries ( having made them to consist of the same number of men ) i would quarter on both sides of the two ordinary battalions , with the same number of rows , and in the same order as they , placing first one order of lodgments consisting half of horse , and half of foot , distant from the next order thirty foot , which distance should make a street , and be called on one side , the third street on the right hand ; and on the other side the third street on the left hand . and then i would make on each side two more rows of lodgments with the same distances and distinctions as in the lodgments of the other battalions , which should make two other streets , and be called according to their number , and the hand on which they are placed ; so that this whole army will be lodged in twelve double rows of lodgments , and there will be thirteen streets , reckoning the general 's street , and the cross-street : when i have design'd my circumference , and appointed my lodgments for my four battalions , i would leave a space betwixt the lodgments and the trenches of an hundred yards broad , which should go round my camp : and if you compute all the spaces , you will find that from the middle of the general 's lodgment , to the east gate , are yards . there are two other spaces , one from the general 's quarter to the south gate , and the other from the same place to the north gate , each of them yards commencing at the center . substracting afterwards from each of these spaces fifty yards for the general 's quarter , and five and forty more on each side for a piazza , and thirty yards for a street that divides each of the said spaces in the middle ; and an hundred yards round betwixt the lodgments and the trenches ; there remains on all sides for lodgments a space of four hundred yards wide , and an hundred long , measuring the lenght with the space which is taken up by the general 's quarter ; then dividing the said length in the middle , there will be on each side of the general forty lodgments , in length fifty yards , and twenty wide , which in all will be , in which the general officers of the battalions should be quartered ; the tr●●surers , the mastres de campe , and all such as have any office in the army , leaving some spaces empty for strangers , or such voluntiers as follow the wars meerly out of affection to the general : on the back-side of the general 's quarters i would make a street from south to north thirty yards broad , and it should be called front-street , and run along all the lodgments abovesaid . from this front-street , by the general 's quarter i would have another street that should go from thence to the west gate , thirty yards wide , answering both for situation and length to the general 's street , and it should be called the piazza-street . having settled these two streets , i would order a piazza or market-place , and it should be at the end of the piazza-street over against the general 's lodging , and not far from the front-street . i would have it square , and every square to contain yards : on the right and left hand of this market-place i would have two rows of lodgments , each of them double , and consisting of eight lodgments , in length twelve yards , and in bredth thirty : so that on each side of the piazza i would have sixteen lodgments , with that in the middle , so that in all they would be ; in which i would place those horse which remain undisposed of , that belong to the auxiliary squadrons : if these would not be sufficient to receive them , i would consign them some of the lodgments about the general 's quarters , especially those which look towards the trenches . it remains now that we lodge the pikes , and the velites extraordinary which i have assigned to each battalion , which as you know consisted ( besides the ten companies ) of a thousand pikes extraordinary , and five hundred velites . so that the two battalions had pikes extraordinary , and velites extraordinary , and the auxiliaries had the same , so that we have still foot to lodge , which i would dispose in that part toward the west , and along the ditch . from the end of the front-street towards the north , leaving a space of yards betwixt that and the ditch , i would have a row of five double lodgments , which should contain in length all of them yards , and in bredth : so as when the bredth is divided , there shall belong to each lodgment yards in length , and thirty in breadth ; and because there will be but ten lodgments in this rank , there shall be lodged foot , in a lodgment . after that , leaving a space of yards ; i would set up in the same manner , and with the same distances another row of five double lodgments , and after that another , till they came to be five rows of five double lodgments , in all fifty , placed in a right line from the north , all of them ten yards from the foss , and should entertain foot . turning then towards the west gate , in all that space from them to the said gate , i would have five other double orders , in the same manner , and with the same spaces , ( but with a distance of but yards from one row to another ) where i would lodge foot more . and so all the velites , and pikes extraordinary of both the proper battalions should be lodged from the north gate to the west gate , according to the turning of the trenches , and should be distributed into lodgments in ten rows , ten lodgments in a row . the pikes and the velites extraordinary of the two auxiliary battalions should be lodged in the same manner betwixt the west gate and the south , as the trenches incline in ten rows , ten lodgments in a row , as i said of the other : the captains or their lieutenants may take such quarters as they think most convenient on that side towards the trenches . the artillery i would dispose every where upon the banks of the trenches , and in all the other space which remains towards the west i would bestow all the baggage , and servants , and impediments of the army . by impediments you must understand ( and you know it very well ) the ancients intended all their train , and whatever else was necessary for an army , besides the souldiers , as carpenters , smiths , shoomakers , engineers , and cannoneers , ( though these indeed might be numbred among the soldiers ) butchers with their beefs and their muttons , cooks , pastry-men , and all that prepared meat for the army ; and in short , all other professions which followed the camp for subsistence : they reckoned likewise among them all the carriages for publick provisions , and arms . i would not make any particular distinction of lodgments , only i would order the streets so as that they might not be taken up by them . as to the other spaces betwixt the streets , which would be four in all , i would consign them in general to all the said impediments , that is , one to the butchers , another to the artificers and masters of several professions ; a third to the carriages for provisions ; a fourth for the carriages for arms. the streets that i would have left free , should be the street to the piazza ; the front-street , and another street called the middle street , which should begin in the north , and pass thorow the middle of the market-street ( or street to the piazza ) towards the south , which on the west side should do the same service as the traverse-street does on the east . and besides this , i would have another back-street along by the lodgments of the pikes and the velites extraordinary , and i would have all these streets thirty spaces wide . the artillery i would place afterwards upon the trenches on the hinder part of the camp. battista . i do acknowledge my ignorance , nor do i think it reproachful where it is not my profession to be otherwise : nevertheless i am very well pleased with your order , only i would desire you to resolve me two doubts : one is , why you make the streets and the spaces about the lodgments so large ; the other ( which troubles me most ) is , how you would employ the spaces which you design for the lodgments . fabr. you must understand i assign yards to the breadth of the streets , that a battalia of foot may march together a breast ; for ( if you remember ) i told you often that each company took up in breadth betwixt and yards . that the space betwixt the trench and the lodgments should be yards broad , is very necessary for drawing up the battalia's , managing the artillery , conveying and disposing of the booty , besides the convenience of retiring upon occasion , and making new ramparts , and new intrenchments within . moreover , the lodgments are better at that distance from the trenches , as being farther from fire-works and other things which an enemy might cast in among them : as to your second demand , i do not intend that every space that i have designed for a lodgment should be covered with one tent , or one pavilion only , but that it should be employed as is most commodious for those who are to lodge there with more or fewer tents as they please , provided they do not exceed their allowance of ground . to make a just distribution of these lodgments , you must have persons that are well vers'd and experienced in that affair , and good architects , who as soon as the general has made choice of his place , can immediately put it into form , distribute the lodgments by dividing the streets , and distinguishing the places for the several lodgments with a cord and pikes thrust into the ground , with so much dexterity , that all things shall be presently in order . and if you would prevent confusion , you must turn your camp always one way , that every man may know in what street , and in what quarter he may find his tent. this must be observable in all times and places , and in such manner that it may seem a moving city , which , where-ever it moves , carries with it the same gates , the same streets , the same houses , and the same figure ; which is a thing that cannot be practised by those who make choice of places of natural strength , for they must frame their camp according to the variety of the situation . but the romans fortified their camps with trenches , and ramparts , and mounts ; for they left a good space round about their camp , and before it they made a ditch commonly six yards wide , and three yards deep . they made these spaces greater or less , according to the time which they design'd to stay there , or according to their apprehension of the enemy : for my own part i would not enclose my camp with stoccado's , unless i intend to winter in it : i would have my trench and my parapet not less than theirs , but bigger upon occasion . upon every corner and side of the camp i would raise a kind of half-moon , from whence my artillery might play , and flank any enemy that should attempt the ditch . in this exercise , to understand how to mark out a camp , your men are to be trained frequently , and your other officers are by practice to be made ready in designing , and your soldiers as dexterous in knowing their own quarters , nor is there any great difficulty in it , as i shall shew else-where , for at present i shall pass to the guards of the camp , because without them all the other pains and punctilio's would be vain . battista . before you proceed to the guards , i would be informed when you would pitch your camp near your enemy , what method you would use ; for i cannot imagine that you should have time enough to do it without manifest danger . fabr. you must know no man incamps near an enemy , but he who is desirous to fight when ever the enemy will give him opportunity ; and when the enemy is disposed to it as well as he , the danger is no more than ordinary ; for two parts of the army are drawn out to fight , and the third orders the camp. in this case the romans committed the fortification and ordering of their camp to the triarii ; whilst the principes and hasta●i stood to their arms. and this they did , because the triarii being to fight last , had time ( if the enemy advanced ) to leave their work , stand to their arms , and fall every man into his place . you , if you would imitate the romans , must cause your camp to be made by the battalia's in your rear , which are instead of the triarii ; but now to the guards of the camp. chap. iii. of the several watches and guards about the camp. fabr. i do not remember in history to have found that the ancients for the security of the camp in the night , did ever make use of out guards or sentinels without the ditches , as we do now . the reason , as i take it , was because they thought the army thereby might be easily surprized , by the difficulty of discerning their sentinels , and scouts ; besides their sentinels might be over-powred or corrupted by the enemy , so that to rely upon them either in part or in whole , they concluded would be dangerous : wherefore all their guards were within their trenches , placed with such diligence and exactness , that it was no less than death for any man to desert his post . how these guards were disposed by them , i think it unnecessary to relate , because if you have not seen it already , you may do it when you please ; only this i shall tell you in short what i would do in the case . i would have every night one third of the army in arms , and of them a fourth part upon the guard , distributed all along the works , and in all convenient places quite thorow the camp : with a main guard in each of the four quarters of your camp , of which a party should remain constantly upon the guard , and another party should petrole from one quarter to the other . and this order i would use likewise in the day time , if my enemy was near . as for giving the word , and changing it every night , and other things which are observable in the like cases , i shall pass them by as notorious and known . one thing only i shall mention , as being of importance , and that which brings much advantage to any man that uses it , and as much disadvantage where it is neglected . chap. iv. to observe who goes and comes to the camp. fabr. he who would be secure in his camp , is to require notice with great exactness of all strangers that lodge in his camp , and to have a strict account of all goers and comers ; and this no hard matter to do , if the tents be but viewed all along as they stand in their orders ; because every lodgment had its precise and definitive number , and when you find them more or less than their proportion , let them be examined and punished . he who observes this course exactly , shall keep the enemy from practising your officers ( at least without great difficulty ) or from having knowledge of your affairs . had not the romans been very exact observers of this course , claudius nero ( when hanibal lay so near him ) could never have stole so privately from his camp in lucania , and have marched into la marca , and back again , before hanibal had missed him . chap. v. of military iustice , and the methods used by the ancients in the punishment of offenders . fabr. but it is not enough to contrive good orders , unless they be strictly observed , for severity is no where so requisite as in an army : wherefore to keep your soldiers to their duty , strict and severe laws are to be made , and they are to be executed as strictly : the romans punished it with death to be absent from the guard , when it was a mans duty to be there . it was no less capital to abandon the place assigned him in battel . to carry any thing privately out of his quarters . to boast and appropriate to himself some great exploit , which he never did . to fight without the general 's order . to throw away ones arms in fear . if at any time it happened a whole troop or company had offended in that nature , they were all put to death , but an imbursation was made of their names , and drawing them out by lotts , every tenth man was executed . and this way of decimation was used , that though all were not actually sensible , yet all might be affrighted . but because where the punishments are great , the rewards ought to be proportionable , that men may be as well encouraged as deterred , they ordain'd recompences for every remarkable exploit . as to him who in the fight , saved the life of a citizen . he who first scal'd the walls of an enemies town . he who first entred into the enemies camp. he who wounded or killed the enemies general , or dismounted him from his horse . by this means no signal act was performed , but it was recompensed by the consul , and applauded publickly by the rest : and those who received any of these prizes for any generous act , ( besides the glory and fame which they acquired among their fellow soldiers ) when they returned home into their country , they exhibited them to the view of their relations and friends , and were received with great acclamation . it is not then to be admired if that people extended its empire so far , being so far in their discipline , and in the observation of their punishments and rewards , towards such as by the generosity of their actions had merited the one , or by their offences the other ; of which things i am of opinion the greatest part should be observed now . i think it not amiss to mention one of their punishments , and it was this ; the criminal being convict before the tribune or consul , was by him strook gently over the shoulders with a rod , after which the malefactor had liberty to run , but as he had liberty to run , so the rest of the soldiers had liberty to kill him if they could ; so that immediately some threw stones at him , some darts , some stroke him with their swords , some with one thing , some with another , so that his life was but short , for seldom any escaped , and those who did escape could not return to their houses , but with so much ignominy and scandal , that they had much better have died . this sort of punishment is in some measure used still by the swissers who cause those who are condemned , to pass thorow the pikes , which is a punishment well contrived , and most commonly well executed ; for he who would order things so that a man should not side , or defend a malefactor , cannot do better , than to make him an instrument of his punishment ; because with another respect he favours , and with another appetite he desires his punishment , when he is executioner himself , than when the execution is committed to another . to the end then that a malefactor may not be favoured by the people , nor upheld in his offence , the best remedy is to refer him to their judgment . to confirm this , the example of manlius capitolinus may be brought , who being accused by the senate , was defended by the people , till they were made his judges ; but when his case fell once into their cognizance , and they were made arbitrators in the business , they condemn'd him to death . this then is the true way of punishing , to prevent seditions , and execute justice . but because neither fear of the laws , nor reverence to men was sufficient to keep soldiers to their duties , and to a just observation of their discipline , the ancients added the fear and authority of god. for this cause they made their soldiers to swear with great ceremony and solemnity to preserve their discipline , that if they transgress'd they might be in danger not only of humane laws , but divine justice , endeavouring by all industry to possess them with principles of religion , however they were false . battist . i pray satisfie me whether the romans permitted any women in their armies , and whether they suffered their soldiers to game , as we do now adays in ours . chap. vi. the ancients had neither women , nor gaming in their armies ; and of the manner how they discamp'd . fabr. the romans allowed neither the one nor the other , and indeed it required no great difficulty to prevent them ; for to speak truth , the exercises to which they kept the soldier constantly , either in parties , or together were so many that they had no time either for dalliance or play , nor for any thing else that could make them mutinous or unserviceable . battista . what you say pleases me very well : but pray tell me when your army discamps , what orders do you observe ? fabritio . the general 's trumpet sounds three times : the first sound they take down the tents , and the pavillions , and pack them up : the second sound they load their sumpters ; and the third they march in the same order as i said before , with their baggage and train behind every battalia , and the legions in the midst . then the auxiliary battalion moves , and it's baggage and train after it , and a fourth part of the common baggage and train , which should consist of all those who were lodged in either of the quarters , which i have shown before in the description of my camp. wherefore it was convenient that each of the said quarters should be assigned to a battalion , that upon the motion of the army every man might know in what place he was to march . so that every battalion was to march with its own baggage , and a fourth part of the common baggage behind it , and this was the manner which the roman army observed in its march , as you may understand by what we have said . battista . tell us i beseech you , in the placing of their camps , did the romans use any other customs besides what you have related ? chap. vii . the safety and health of a camp is to be regarded , and it is by no means to be besieged . fabr. i must tell you again that the romans in their encampments , were so constant to their old method , that to retain that they applyed themselves with incredible diligence , not regarding what pains , or what trouble it required : but two things they observed with a curiosity more than ordinary ; one was to place their camp in an air that was healthful and fresh . and the other was to place it where the enemy might not easily besiege them , or cut off their provisions . to avoid the unhealthfulness of the place they avoided all fenny and boggish places , or where the wind was cold and unwholsom , which unwholsomness they did not so much compute from the situation of the place , as from the complexion of the inhabitants , and when they found them swarthy or blowsy , they never encamped there . as to the other thing , never to be besieged or streightned by an enemy : you must consider the nature of the place both where your friends are placed ; and where your enemies ; and then to make your conjecture whether you can be besieged or no. it is necessary therefore a general be very skilful in the situation of the country , and that he have those about him who understand it as well as he . besides this , there is another way of preventing diseases , and that is by providing that no disorder be used in your army : for to keep it sound and in health , the way is that your army sleep in tents , that they be lodged as often as may be under trees that are shady , ( where they may have firring to dress their meat ) that they may not be obliged to march in the heat . so that in the summer time you must dislodge them before day , and have a care in the winter that they march not in the snow , nor upon the ice , without the convenience of fires . that they want not necessary cloths , nor be constrained to drink ill water ; you must command the physitians of the army to have a particular care of those who are sick , for a general will find himself overlaid , when he is at once to contend with an enemy and a disease . but of all remedies , nothing is so powerful as exercise , and therefore it was a custom among the ancients to exercise them continually . think then of what importance exercise is , when in the camp it keeps you sound , and in the field it makes you victorious . chap. viii . directions as to provisions . fabr. as to famine , you must not only have a care that the enemy cannot cut off your provisions ; but you must consider from what place you may be supplyed , and see that what you have already be not imbezled . it is convenient therefore that you have with you always a months provision before hand , and then you are to oblige your neighbours and friends to furnish you daily with more . you must likewise have a good magazine for ammunition , in a strong place , which is to be distributed with great care , giving every man a reasonable proportion every day , and keep such an eye over it , that want of it may occasion no disorder : for in matters of war every thing else may be repaired in time , but hunger the longer it lasts , will the more certainly destroy you . nor will any enemy that can master you with famine , ever seek to attach you with his arms ; because though the victory be not so honourable , it is more easie and secure . that army therefore in which justice is not observed : that army which squanders and consumes lavishly as it pleases , cannot so well barricado , or fortifie its camp , but that famine will find the way in ; for where justice is neglected , victuals is not constantly supplyed ; and where soldiers are lavish and profuse , though they have plenty , it is quickly consumed : for this cause among the ancients it was commanded that the soldiers should eat what was given them , and at a prefixed time , for no soldier durst eat but when the general went to dinner ; but every body knows how little this is observed in our days , and if then the soldiers might be justly term'd sober and orderly , they may now with as much justice be said to be licentious and debauched . battista . when you began first to order your camp , you told us you would not confine your self to two battalions , but take four , that you might shew us how a just and compleat army was to be lodg'd : i desire therefore that you would satisfie me in two things : one is , when i have either more or less than four battalions , how i am to dispose of them . the other is , what number of soldiers would suffice you , to expect , and engage any enemy whatever . chap. ix . how to lodge more or less than four battalions , and what number of men is sufficient to make head against an enemy , be he as numerous as he may . fabr. to your first demand i answer , that be your army composed of more or less than four or six thousand men you may increase or lessen their lodgments as you please , and in the same manner , you may proceed to less or more in infinitum : nevertheless when the romans joyn'd two consular armies together , they made two camps , and turned the place of the unarmed men one against the other . to your second demand i reply , that the ordinary roman army consisted of about men , but when by accident they were over-pressed with numbers , they never exceeded , with this number they opposed gauls which assaulted them after their first war with the carthaginians ; with this number they opposed themselves against hanibal : and you must observe that the romans and the greeks always carried on their wars with a few men , fortifying themselves with their good order , and the excellence of their discipline ; whereas the eastern and western nations did all by their multitudes , but the western people performed all by their natural fury , and the eastern by their submission and obedience to their king. in greece and in italy where their natural fury , and their natural reverence to their king was not so great , it was necessary to apply themselves to discipline , which was of such efficacy , that it has made a small army prevail against the fury and natural obstinacy of a greater . i say therefore that if you would imitate the romans and the greeks , you are not to exceed the number of men , but rather to be fewer , because more do but breed confusion , and hinder the order and discipline that you have learn'd . pyrrhus used ordinarily to say , that with men he would go thorow the world . but let us pass now to another part of our discipline . chap. x. certain artifices , and advertisements of war. fabritio . we have gained a battel with our army , and shown most of the accidents which may happen in it : we have caused it to march , and discoursed with what impediments it might be incumbered in its march , and at length we have brought it into its camp , where it is to take not only a little repose after its travel and fatigues , but consider and deliberate how it is to finish the war. for in the camp many things are transacted , especially there being an enemy in the field , and towns to be suspected , of which it is good to secure your self , and to reduce such as are in hostility . it is necessary therefore to come to some demonstrations , and pass these difficulties with the same glory and honour with which we have proceeded thus far . to descend therefore to particulars , i say , that if many people or persons have any thing in controversie betwixt them to your advantage , and their own detriment , ( as if they should beat down the walls of their city , or send several of their citizens into banishment ) you must cajole them in such manner that none of them may think it has any relation to them , to the end that neither of them relieving one another , they may all of them be oppressed without remedy ; or else you must command all of them what they are to do the same day , that each of them believing himself particularly commanded , may think rather of obeying than looking out for a remedy ; and by that means your commands be executed without sedition or disorder . if you suspect the fidelity of a people , and would assure your self of them , and surprize them unawares , you cannot do better than to communicate some design with them , desire their assistance , and pretend to some farther enterprize , without the least ombrage or suspition of them : and by doing so , ( not imagining you have any jealousie of him ) he will neglect his own defence , and give you opportunity of effecting your designs . if you suspect that there is any body in your army that gives advice of your designs to the enemy ; the best way to make your advantage of his treachery , is , to impart some things to him which you never intend to do ; and to conceal what you intend ; to pretend doubts where you are perfectly resolved ; and to conceal other things that you have absolutely determined : by this means you will put the enemy upon some enterprize ( upon presumption that he knows your designs ) in which you may easily circumvent and defeat him . if you resolve ( as claudius nero did ) to lessen your army , and send relief to your friend so privately that the enemy should not perceive it ; you must not take down your tents , nor diminish the number of your hutts ; but keep up your ensigns and preserve your ranks intire , with the same fires and guards as before . if any supplies come up suddenly to your army , and you would not have your enemy perceive you are reinforced , you must not augment the number of your tents ; for nothing is more useful than to keep such accidents secret . metellus being in spain with his army ; one took the confidence to demand of him what he intended to do the next day : he replyed , that if he thought his shirt knew , he would burn it . marcus croesus being asked by one when he would discamp , answered him , are you the only man think you that will not hear the trumpets ? if you design to understand the secrets of your enemy , and to know his order and condition ; you must do as others have done , send embassadors to him , with wise and experienced soldiers in their train , who may take their opportunity to view his army , and consider his strength and weakness so , as may give occasion to overcome him . some have pretended to banish some one of their confidents , and by that means had information of his enemies designs . they are discovered likewise sometimes by the taking of prisoners : marius whilst he was at war with the cimbrians , to feel the fidelity of the ga●ls , ( who at that time inhabited lombardy , and were in league with the romans ) sent to them two sorts of letters , one open , the other seal'd . in the letters that were open , he writ that they should not open those which were sealed till such a time as he directed , before which time he sent for them again , and finding them open , he found he was to repose no confidence there . chap. xi . how to rid ones self of an army that is pressing upon ones heels . fabr. several generals have been invaded , and not marched their army immediately against the enemy , but made an inroad into his country , and constrained him to return to defend it ; and this way has many times succeeded , because yours are flesh'd with victory , and loaden with plunder , whilst the enemy is terrified , and instead of a hopeful victory , like to go by the loss : so that they who have used this kind of diversion , have many times prospered . but this is practicable only to those whose country is stronger than the enemies country ; for if it be otherwise , that diversion is pernicious . if a general be block'd up in his camp by the enemy , he cannot do better than to propose an accord , or at least a truce with him for some days , for that makes your enemy the more negligent in every thing ; of which negligence you may take your advantage , and give him the slip . by this way silla disintangled himself twice , and cleared himself of his enemies : by the same artifice asdrubal extricated himself in spain from the forces of claudius nero who had block'd him up ; it would likewise contribute much to the freeing a man from the power of the enemy , to do something ( besides what has been said already ) that may keep him in suspence . and this is to be done two ways , by assaulting him with part of your forces , that whilst he is employed upon them , the rest may have time to preserve themselves . there is another way likewise , and that is by contriving some new thing or other that may amuse or astonish the enemy , and render him uncertain which way he is to stear : so hanibal served fabius maximus when he had shut him up on the mountains ; for causing little wisps of brush-wood to be tied to the horns of several oxen , he set them on fire ; and fabius not understanding the depth of the stratagem , supposing it worse than it was , kept upon his guard within his camp , and suffered him to pass . chap. xii . how a man may make a princes favourite suspected , and divide his forces . a general above all things is to endeavour to divide the enemies forces , either by rendering his confidents suspicious ; or by giving him occasion to separate his troops , and by consequence weaken himself . the first is done by preserving the estates or goods of those he has about him ; as in time of war , to spare their houses , or possessions ; and returning their children or relations safe , and without ransom . you know when hanibal burned all about rome , he exempted what belonged to fabius maximus . you know how coriolanus coming with a strong army to besiege rome , preserved the possessions of the nobility . metellus being at the head of an army againts iugurtha , moved it to the embassadors which the enemy sent to him , to deliver up iugurtha prisoner , and writing letters to them afterwards to the same purpose , he continued his correspondence till iugurtha got the alarm , suspected his whole counsel , and made them away after several manners . when hanibal was fled to antiochus , the roman embassadors practised so cunningly , that antiochus grew jealous , and trusted him no farther . as to the way of dividing the enemy , there is not any more certain than to cause an incursion to be made upon his country , that he may be constrained to leave the war , and go back to defend himself . this was the way which fabius used when he had an army against him of french and tuscans , umbrians and samnites . titus didius having a small army in respect of the enemy , expecting another legion from rome , which the enemy was desirous to intercept ; he gave out in his army that the next day he would give the enemy battel , and ordered it so , that certain prisoners which he had in his camp at that time , took their opportunity to escape , and gave intelligence to the enemy that the consul had given orders to fight ; upon which news , that they might not lessen their forces , they did not march against the other legion , and by that means it was preserved ; some there have been who to divide or weaken the force of their enemy , have suffered him to enter into their country , and possess himself of several towns , that by putting garrisons into them , he may lessen his army , and give them occasion to attack and defeat him . others designing against one province , have pretended to invade another , and used such industry in the business , that being entred unexpectedly into that country , they have conquered it before the enemy had time to relieve it : for the enemy being uncertain whether you will return back and invade the country which you threatned before , is constrained to keep his post , and not to leave one place to secure another , and it falls out many times that he is unable to defend either the one or the other . chap. xiii . in what manner seditions and mutinies in an army are to be appeased . fabr. besides what has been said already , it is of great use and reputation to a general , if he knows how to compose mutinies and dissentions in his army . the best way is by punishing the ringleaders , but then it is to be done so neatly , that they may have their reward before they have news that it is intended . the way to do that is , if they be at any distance , to summon both nocent and innocent together , that they thinking themselves safe , and not in danger of any punishment , may not be refractory , and stand upon their guard , but put themselves quietly into your hands to be punished . if they be present , and at hand , the general is to make himself as strong as he can with those who are innocent , and others in whom he can confide , and then punish as he thinks fit . when the quarrel is private , and among themselves , the best way is to expose them to danger , and let them fight if they think good ; for the fear of that does many times reconcile them . but above all things , there is nothing that keeps as army so unanimous as the reputation of the general , which proceeds principally from his courage ; for it is neither birth nor authority can do it without that . the chief thing incumbent upon a general is to pay well , and punish well ; for whenever the soldiers want pay , 't is but reasonable that they should want punishment ; for you cannot in justice chastise any exorbitance in a soldier , when you disappoint him of his pay ; nor can he forbear stealing , unless he be willing to starve : but if you pay , and do not punish them , they are insolent again ; and you will become despicable in holding a command that you are not able to manage , and by not maintaining your dignity and authority , of necessity tumults and disorders must follow , which will be the utter ruine of your army . chap. xiv . how the ancients relied much upon their auguries , and other accidents . fabr. the generals of old were subject to one molestation , from which in our days we are exempt : and that is how to pervert an ill augury , and interpret it to their advantage : for if an arrow fell down in an army : if the sun or the moon was eclipsed : if there hapned an earth-quake , or it was the general 's fortune to fall down , either as he got up on horse-back , or dismounted , it was look'd upon by the soldiers as an ill omen , and was the occasion of such fear in them , that coming afterwards to a battel they were easily beaten : and therefore the generals in times past when such an accident happened , immediately gave some reason for it , and referr'd it to some natural cause , or else wrested and perverted it to their own profit and advantage . caesar passing over into africa , tumbling down upon the ground as he came out of the ship , grasping the grass in his hands , he cryed out , teneo te o africa ; africa you are mine , for i have you in my hands . and several others have given reasons ( according to their own interest ) for the earth-quakes and eclipses of the moon : but in our days these artifices cannot pass , because our men are not now so superstitious , and our religion explodes such opinions as heathenish and vain : but whenever we should be so blind as to reassume those superstitions , we must revive the custom of the ancients . chap. xv. that we are not to fight with an enemy reduced to despair ; and several arts that may be used to surprize him . fabr. when famine , natural necessity , or human passion has brought your enemy to such despair , that impelled by that , he marches furiously to fight with you , you must keep within your camp , and decline fighting as much as possibly you can . the lacedemonians acted in that manner against the messeni ; caesar did the same against afranius and petreius . when fulvius was consul against the cimbrians , he caused his horse to attack the enemy for several days together ; and observing in what numbers they came forth to engage them , he placed an ambush one day behind their camp , caused them again to be assaulted ; and the cimbrians issuing forth in their old numbers to encounter them ; fulvius fell in the mean time upon their camp , entred it , and sack'd it . some generals have made great advantage ( when they lye near the enemies army ) to send out parties with the enemies colours to plunder their own country ; for the enemy supposing them supplies sent to relieve them , have issued forth to meet them , and assist them to plunder , whereby they have been put to disorder , and given opportunity to the adversary to overthrow them . alexander of epirus did the same against the sclavonians : and leptene the syracusan against the carthaginians , and both with success : many have been too hard for their enemies by giving them opportunity of eating and drinking too much , making a shew of being afraid , and leaving their camp full of wine and provisions ; with which the enemy having gorg'd himself without measure , the others have fallen upon them with advantage , and put them to the sword . tomyris provided such an entertainment for cyrus ; and tiberius gracchus regall'd the spaniards in the same manner : others have poysoned their meat and their drink , to ruine the enemy that way the more easily . i said before , that i did not find it in any history that the romans did ever in the night place any centinels without their camp , supposing they omitted it to prevent the mischiefs that might ensue ; for it has been often seen that the centinels which are placed abroad in the day time to hear and descry the enemy , have been the destruction of those who have sent them ; for being often times surprized by the enemy , they have been forced to give the signal with which they were to call their own men , and they coming immediately according to the sign , have been all killed , or taken prisoners . to over-reach and circumvent an enemy , it is good sometimes to vary your custom , that the enemy depending upon it , may be disappointed and ruined . thus it happened with a general , who being accustomed to give the signal of the approach of the enemy in the night by fire , and in the day time by smoke ; commanded that they should make smoke and fire together without intermission , and that when the enemy came , they should put them both out ; the enemy supposing he was not perceived , ( because he saw no signal given ) marched on in disorder , and gave his adversary the victory . memnon the rhodian desiring to draw his enemy out of his strong hold , sent one by the way of a fugitive into their army , with news that memnon's army was in a mutiny , and that the greatest part of them were gone from him ; and to confirm it the more , he caused disorders and tumults to be pretended in his camp ; whereupon the enemy taking encouragement , advanced out of his hold to attack memnon , but was cut off himself . besides the things above-mentioned , great care is to be had never to bring your enemy to despair . caesar was very cautious of this in his war with the germans , and opened a way for them , when he saw that not being able to fly , they must of necessity fight , and that more couragiously than otherwise ; wherefore he chose rather the trouble of pursuing them when they fled , than the danger of fighting them when they were forced to defend themselves . lucullus observing a party of his horse going over to the enemy , caused a charge to be founded immediately , and commanded other parties to follow them ; whereupon the enemy believing lucullus intended to fight , sent out a party to charge those macedonians who were running away ; and they did it so effectually , that the macedonians were glad to stand upon their guard , by which means of fugitives intended , they became good subjects in spight of their teeths . chap. xvi . how a suspected town or country is to be secured , and how the peoples hearts are to be gained . fabr. it is a great thing in a general to know how to secure a town that you suspect , either after a victory or before ; as several ancient examples do demonstrate . pompey being jealous of the catinenses , beg'd of them that they would give entertainment to some of his sick men , and under the disguise of sick , sending stout and valiant men , they surprized the town , and kept it for pompey . publius valerius was diffident of the epidauni , and caused a general indulgence to be given in one of the churches without the town , the people thronging thither for pardon , he shut the gates upon them , and received none back again but such as he could trust . alexander the great being to march into asia , and by the way secure himself of thrace ; carried along with him all the principal persons of that province , giving them commands in his army , and leaving the people to be governed by those of their own condition ; by which means he satisfied all parties ; the nobility by paying them , and the populace , by leaving no governor that would oppress them . but among all the ways wherewith the people are to be cajoled , nothing goes so far as examples of chastity and justice , as that of scipio in spain , when he returned a beautiful young lady to her parents , and husband untouched , a passage that contributed more than his arms to the subduction of that country . caesar only for paying for the wood which he caused to be cut down to make stoccadoes about his camp in france , got such a name for his justice , that it facilitated the conquest of that province . i know not now that there remains any thing to say further about these accidents ; or that there is any thing which we have not already examined . if there be any thing , it is the way of taking and defending of towns , which i am willing to show , were i sure i should not be tedious . battista . your civility is so great , that it makes us pursue our desires without the least fear of presumption ; for you have offered us that frankly , which we should have been ashamed to have requested . we do assure you therefore you cannot do us a greater favour than to finish this discourse ; but before you proceed , let me entreat you to resolve me , whether it be better to continue a vvar all vvinter long ( as they do now adays ) or carry it on only in the summer , and in the vvinter go to their quarters . chap. xvii . war is not to be continued in the winter . fabr. observe gentlemen , had it not been for the prudence of battista , a very considerable part of our discourse had been omitted : i tell you again that the ancients did every thing with more prudence and discretion than we , who if we be defective in any thing , are much more in matters of war. nothing is more imprudent and dangerous for a general than to begin a war in the winter , and he who is the aggressor is more liable to miscarry , than he that is invaded . the reason is this , all the industry employed in military discipline , consists in preparing your men and putting them into order for a battel . that is it , at which a general is principally to aim , because a battel does commonly decide the business , whether it be lost or won . he therefore who knows best how to put his army in order , and he who knows best how to prepare and equip them , has doubtless the advantage , and is in most hopes to overcome . on the other side , nothing is more inconsistent with good order than steep places , or cold rainy weather ; for steep places will not suffer you to open or extend your ranks according to discipline ; cold and wet weather will not permit you to keep your men together , nor present them in close order before the enemy , but constrains you of necessity to lodge them up and down , asunder without order , at the mercy of all the castles , and towns , and villages that receive you ; so that all the pains you have taken to discipline your army , is ( for that time ) utterly useless . do not admire , if now adays we make war in the winter , for our armies being without discipline , it is not to be imagined what inconveniences they suffer by not being quartered together ; for it troubles them not , that they cannot keep those orders , and observe that discipline which they never had . yet it ought seriously to be considered what prejudice has followed upon encampments in the winter : and it ought likewise to be remembred that the french in the year . were broken and ruined near garigliano , rather by the extremity of the weather , than the magnanimity of the spaniards . for as i told you before , the invador is under greatest incommodity , as being more exposed to the weather in an enemies country , than at home : for to keep his men together he is necessitated to endure the cold and the rain ; or to avoid it , to divide his men , which is mightily to expose them . but he who is upon the defensive part can choose his place and his way , attend him with fresh men , which he can joyn in a moment , and fall upon some party of the enemies with such fury , as they will not be able to endure the shock . it was the weather therefore which disordered the french , and 't is the weather that will always ruine any man that begins war in winter , if his adversary have any share of discretion . he therefore who would have his force , his order , his discipline , and his courage of no use or advantage to him , let him keep the field , and carry on his war in the winter : for the romans ( who desired all those things in which they employed their industry and diligence should be useful to them ) avoided the incommodities of winter , as much , as the asperities of the alps , the difficulty of places , and whatever else might hinder them from showing their dexterity and courage . and thus much as to your demand , we will discourse now of taking and defending of towns , and of their natural , and artificial strength . the seventh book . chap. i. how towns , or castles are to be fortified . fabr. you must understand that towns and castles are strong two ways , by nature or by art. they are strong by nature which are encompassed by rivers or fens , ( as mantua , and ferrara ) or seated upon some rock , or craggy mountain ( as monaco , and sanleo ) for other places seated upon mountains , if not difficult of access , are in our days rather weaker than otherwise , in respect of our artillery and mines : and therefore at present being to build a city , or erect a fort that may be strong , we choose to do it in a plain , and fortifie it artificially with ramparts and bastions , and our first care is to make the walls crooked and retort , with several vaults and places of receipt , that if the enemy attempts to approach , he may be opposed and repulsed as well in the flank as the front : if your walls be made too high , they are too obnoxious to the cannon ; if they be too low , they are easily scaled ; if you make a ditch before the vvall , to make the scalado more difficult , the enemy fills it up ( which with a great army is no hard matter ) and makes himself master immediately . my opinion therefore is this , ( but with submission to better judgments ) that to provide against both inconveniencies the best way will be to make your vvall high , and a ditch on the inside rather than without ; and this is the strongest way that you can build , because it keeps you both from their artillery and assaults , and gives the enemy no capacity of filling up the ditch . your vvall then is to be of the best height you can contrive ; three yards thick at the least to resist their batteries ; it is to have towers and bulwarks at the distance of every yards . the ditch within is to be thirty yards broad at least , and twelve in depth ; and all the earth which is taken out of the ditch is to be thrown towards the town , against a wall which is to be brought for that purpose from the bottom of the ditch , and carried up a man's height above the ground , which will make the ditch more deep and secure . towards the bottom of the ditch every two hundred yards , i would have a casemat from whence the artillery may scour , and play upon any body that shall descend . the great guns which are used for the defence of a town , are to be planted behind the wall on the inside of the ditch ; for to defend the first wall , falcons and such small pieces are easier managed , and do as good execution . if the enemy comes to scale you , the height of the first wall defends you easily : if he comes with his artillery , he must batter down the first wall , and when he has done that , it being natural in all batteries for the wall and rubbish to fall outward , there being no ditch without to swallow and receive it , the ruines of the wall will encrease the depth of the ditch , in such manner as that you cannot get forward , being obstructed by the ruines , hindred by the ditch , and interrupted by the enemies great guns within the walls that do great slaughter upon you . the only remedy in this case is to fill up the ditch , which is very hard in respect of its dimensions , and the danger in coming to it , the wall being crooked , and vaulted , and full of angles , among which there is no coming without manifest hazard , for the reasons abovesaid ; and to think to march with faggots over the ruines , and to fill it up that way is a chimerical thing ; so that i conclude a city so fortified is not to be taken . battista . if one should make a ditch without , besides that within the wall , would not your town be the stronger ? fabr. yes , without doubt ; but my meaning is , if one ditch only be to be made , it is better within than without . battista . would you have water in your ditch , or would you rather have it dry ? fabr. opinions are divided in that point ; for ditches with water are more secure against mines , and ditches without are harder to be filled up : but upon consideration of the whole , i would have them without water , because they are more secure ; for it has been seen , that the freezing of the ditch in the winter has been the taking of many a town , as it hapned at mirandola when pope iulius besieged it : and to prevent mines , i would carry my ditch so low , that whoever would think to work under it , should come to the water . castles i would build ( as to my ditches and walls ) in the same manner , that they might have as much trouble who stormed them . but let me give one caution to any man who defends a city , and it is this , that he makes no redoubts without , at any distance from the wall , and another to him that builds and fortifies a castle , and that is , that he makes no works within for retreats in case the first wall be taken . the reason that makes me give this counsel is , because no man ought to do that which may lessen his reputation at first ; for the dimunition of that makes all his other orders contemptible , and discourages those who have undertaken his defence . and this that i say will always happen when you make bastions without , and oblige your self to defend them , they will certainly be lost , for such small things being now adays to contend with the fury of artillery , 't is impossible they should hold out , and the loss of them being a lessening to your reputation , the lessening of your reputation will be the loss of the place . when genoa rebelled against lewis king of france , he caused certain bastions to be erected upon the hills which were about the walls , which bastions were no sooner lost ( and they were lost presently ) but the city was taken . as to my second advice , i do affirm that there is nothing so pernicious to a castle as to have those works of retreat ; for the hopes that men have of preserving themselves by deserting their posts , makes them abandon them often , and the loss of their posts , is afterwards the loss of the fort. we have a fresh example of this in the taking of the castle at furli , when the countess catharina defended it against caesar borgia , the son of alexander vi. who had brought the french army before it . this castle was full of those retreats ; for first there was a citadel , then a fortress , and betwixt both a good ditch with a draw bridge . the castle within was divided into three parts , and each part strongly separated from the other with ditches and water , and draw-bridges by which they communicated . as soon as the duke had made his approaches , he with his great guns battered one part of the castle , and laid open a good part of the wall ; whereupon giovanni da casale who had the command of that quarter , never stood to make good the breach , but left it to retire into another part , so that the enemy having entred the first quarter with little difficulty , it was not long before they made themselves masters of all , by securing the draw-bridges ( in the hurry ) which conveyed them one to another : this castle therefore which was thought inexpugnable was lost by two faults ; one was for having so many redoubts , the other was because none of them commanded the bridges ; the ill contrivance therefore of the fortress , and the imprudence of him that defended it , was a shame and disappointment of the magnanimous enterprize of the countess , who had the courage to expect an army which neither the king of naples , nor the duke of milan had the confidence to attend . yet though she miscarried in her designs , she reaped the honour which her magnanimity deserved , as appeared by many epigrams composed in those times in her praise . if then i were to erect a fort , i would do it with as strong walls , and with as good ditches as i have prescribed ; and within it , i would build only houses for habitation , and those low and weak , and such as should not hinder the prospect of all the walls , from those who were in the piazza ; that the commander might have the advantage to discern with his eye from the main guard , whither he was to direct his supplies , and that every man might understand when the wall and the ditch was lost , the castle was not to be kept . and when i made any redoubts and retrenchments within , i would do it in such manner that they should each of them command the bridges which should be rais'd upon pillars in the middle of the ditch . battista . you have said that small places are not to be defended in our days , and i suppose i have heard quite contrary ; that is to say , the lesser a place is , the better it is defensible . fabritio . you were then misinformed , for no place can be now adays strong , where the defenders have not room for new ramparts and retrenchments to retire to ; for such is the fury of the artillery , that he who presumes upon the protection of one wall or one rampart , will find himself deceived . and because bastions or forts ( provided they do not exceed their just measure , for in that case they will be rather castles and towns ) are not made in such manner that there is space to retreat , they must presently be lost . it is wisdom therefore to place these bastions without , and to fortifie within , especially the entries into the towns , and to secure the gates with ravelins , so as that no body may come in or go out in a direct line , and that from the ravelin to the gate there may be a ditch with a draw-bridge . the gates are to be fortified with portcullisses , to receive their men back again into the town when they have gone out to engage the enemy , and when it happens that they are repulsed , and the enemy pursues , that they may distinguish betwixt their own men and the enemy , and prevent their entring pell-mell amongst them . to this purpose portcullisses ( which the ancients called cateratte or pigion-holes ) were invented , which being let down excluded the enemy , and preserved their friends , whereas without them , neither bridges nor gates would be of any use , being possessed by the multitude . battista . i have seen these portcullisses of which you speak in germany ; and they were made of bars of wood in the fashion of iron gates , whereas ours are made of massy rafters or girders all of a piece , now i would willingly be informed from whence this difference proceeded , and which is most effectual . fabr. i tell you again , that the ways , and customs and orders of war are laid aside all the world over , in respect of what was used among the ancients , but in italy they are utterly forgot , and if there be any thing better than other , we have it from the ultramontani , or northern nations . you may have heard , and perhaps some of these gentlemen may remember how weakly we fortified before the coming of charles . into italy , in the year . the battlements of our walls were made but half a yard thick ; the port-holes for our great guns , and musquets or small shot were made narrow without , wide within , with many other defects which i shall forbear to mention , lest i should become tedious ; for those thin battlements were quickly beaten down , and our guns were as easily dismounted . but now adays we have learn'd of the french to make our battlements large and thick , and our port-holes large within , close again in the middle , and wide again without ; by which means our artillery are not so easily dismounted , nor our soldiers beaten from their works . besides these the french have several other good ways , which our soldiers have not seen , and so have not so much as considered ; and among the rest those open portcullisses like grates is one , and they are much better than ours , for if to defend and fortifie your gate , you have a close portcullis , when you let it down to keep out the enemy , you shut up your selves , and cannot afterwards do him any hurt , so that with pick-axes , hatchets , petards , or fire , he may do what he please without any interruption . but if your portcullis be made lettice-wise and transparent , when it is let down thorough the holes and intervals you may defend it with your pikes , small shot , or any other kind of arms. battista . i have observed in italy another northern invention , and that is to make the wheels of your carriages for your great guns with spokes crooked or bending towards the axel-tree , now i would gladly know the reason of that way , because to me the straight spokes seem stronger . fabr. do not imagine that things which deviate from common use , are done by accident ; or if you fancy they were made in that fashion for beauty , you are mistaken ; for where force and strength is required , they never stand upon beauty ; but the reason why they were changed , was because these kind of spokes are much more secure and strong ; and the reason they are stronger is this ; when a carriage is loaden , it is either equally poiz'd , or hang'd too much on one side . when it is equally poiz'd , the wheels bear equally , and the weight being equally distributed , does not burthen them much : but when it inclines to one side , the weight lies all upon one of the wheels : if the spokes be made straight , they are easily broken , for when ever the wheel bends , the spokes bend with it , as being unable to keep up the weight , so that when the weight is well poiz'd , or is otherwise but moderate , your straight spokes are strong enough , but when your carriage goes awry , and enclines to one side , they are too weak to support it . on the contrary , the spokes of your french carriages that are made bending , are made so with great reason , for when a carriage enclines to one side , the spokes on that side being made bending , will come to be straight , and will be able to sustain the whole weight better , than when it hangs equal , and ( being crooked ) bears but half . but to return to our towns and our castles . the french , besides what we have mentioned , have another way of securing their gates , and for the sallying and retiring of their soldiers during a siege , than i have yet seen practised in italy : and it is this , on the outward point of the draw-bridge they set up two pillars , and upon each of them they fasten a beam in such manner that one half of it hangs over the bridge , and the other half without . then that part which is without the bridge , they joyn together with cross bars like a grate , and to the end of each of the beams that hang over the bridge , they fasten a chain : when therefore they would shut up the bridge , so as no body should come in from without , they loosen the chains , and let down that part of it that is made with cross bars , which shuts up the bridge ; when they would open the bridge , they draw the chains , and that part comes up again , and it is to be raised gradually , so as to receive a man on foot , and no horse , or a horseman as they please , and it is raised or let down with unimaginable dexterity . this way is better than your portcullisses , because they can hardly be hindred by the enemy from being let down , not falling in a direct line as your percullisses do , which are easily stop'd by putting any thing under them . they then who would make a town strong , are to do it in the same manner as i have prescribed . moreover they are to prohibit cultivation or building within a mile round ; all should be a plain without any hills , houses , banks or trees to hinder the prospect of the besieged , or give any shelter to the enemy in his approaches . and you must know that where the ditch is without the walls , and there are eminencies above the level of the country , that town is but weak ; for those eminencies are blinds to the enemy in their approaches , and when they are possess'd , they are convenient for their batteries : but let us pass on and come into the town . chap. ii. what order is to be observed by him who shuts himself up in a town , with resolution to defend it . fabr. i will not lose so much time as to shew you how convenient it is ( besides what has been said before ) to have your stores of ammunition and victuals , because they are things that every body knows cannot be wanted , and without them all other provisions are vain . two things then are generally to be observed , you are to secure what you can possibly to your self , and to prevent the enemy of any commodity , especially in your own precincts . wherefore if there be any straw , or corn , or cattle that you cannot carry off into the town , you must be sure to destroy it . he who undertakes the defence of a town is likewise to observe this order , not to suffer any thing to be done tumultuously and disorderly , and to provide that upon every accident , every man may know what he is to do , and the way is by causing the women , children , old , lame and infirm to keep within their houses , and leave the town to be defended by those who are vigorous and strong , who being armed as is requisite , are to be distributed into all places , some upon the walls , some at the gates , some in the principal places of the city , to relieve their companions upon any distress ; another party there should be likewise , not obliged to any particular place , but always ready to succour where necessity is required ; and things being thus ordered , scarce any sedition can happen to disorder you . again , there is one thing i will recommend to your memories , both in the besieging and defending of a town : and that is , that there is nothing animates an enemy so much , or gives him such hopes of carrying a town , as when he knows his adversary has not been used to the sight of an enemy ; for many times fear only without any experiment of their strength , has caused a town to be surrendred : he therefore who comes before a city so qualified is to make all the shows and ostentations of terror that he can ; and on the other side , he who is assaulted , is to oppose men of resolution and courage , and such as are not to be terrified with shows , nor any thing but force and violence of arms ; for if the first brunt be sustained , the besieged are encouraged , and the besiegers will have no hopes left but in their reputation and valour . the ancients had several instruments of war with which they defended their towns , as rams , scorpions , bows , slings , clubs , &c. again , they had several engines which they used in their leaguers , as rams , towers of wood , vineae ; they had also their falx , their pluteus , testudo , and others ; instead of which , we now make use of artillery which is useful both for him that is besieged , as well as him that besieges . but to return . chap. iii. advertisements for such as are distressed for provisions within a town , and for such as besiege them , and would reduce them to that necessity . fabr. he who takes upon him the defence of a town , is to see such provision made both of victuals and ammunition , that he may be in no danger of losing it , either by starving or storm . as to starving ( as is said before ) it is necessary before the siege be laid , that you furnish your self well with victuals ; but because such provision cannot be made , but a long siege may exhaust it , you must betake to extraordinary ways , and look out for friends that may relieve you , especially if you have a river running thorow the town . thus the romans did when their friends were besieged by hanibal in the castle of catalino , for not being able to relieve them otherwise , they flung great quantities of nuts into the river which were carried down by the stream in despight of the enemy , and gave the garrison very good relief . some who have been besieged , to make their enemy believe that they had plenty of corn , and render them desperate of carrying them by starving , have thrown bread over their walls ; or else given corn to some of their cows , and suffered her afterwards to be taken by the enemy , that when they kill'd her , they might find corn in her paunch , and conclude that corn was as plentiful in the town as in the camp. on the other side , wise generals have used as much art and stratagem for the reduction of towns : fabius permitted the campani to sow their ground , that presuming upon it , they might make no other provision , and he came afterwards and utterly destroyed it . dionysius having besieged rhegium , pretended a treaty , and whilst things were in transaction , he provided himself with victuals with all possible diligence , but when he had effectually supplyed himself , he brake off the treaty , block'd them up again , and constrained them to surrender . alexander the great being desirous to reduce lucadia , he took , plundered , and destroyed all the castles about it , but gave the garrisons safe conduct to lucadia , by which policy he so throng'd them with men , that their numbers quickly distress'd them , and they were forced to surrender . chap. iv. other advertisements both for the besiegers and the besieged . fabr. in matters of assault , i say , the first thing to be provided against , is the enemies first effort ; for by that way the romans gain'd many a town , assaulting it suddenly , and in all places at once , and this they called aggredi urbem corona , or to make a general assault , as scipio did when he took new carthage in spain . but if the besieged can stand the first shock , it gives him such courage , he will hardly be taken afterwards . and if things should go so far , that a breach should be made , and the enemy enter ; yet the citizens have their remedy if they will stand to one another : for many armies have been repelled and defeated after they have entered a town . the remedy is this , that the inhabitants make good the highest places of the city ; and fire upon them from the windows and tops of their houses . but against this the assailers have made use of two inventions , one was to open the gates of the city , and give the inhabitants opportunity to escape ; the other is , to make proclamation , that whoever throws down his arms , shall have quarter , and none put to the sword but such as are taken in arms ; and this artifice has been the taking of many a town . moreover a town is taken with more ease , when it is so suddenly attacked , as when an army keeps at such a distance , as that the town believes either you will not at all , or cannot attempt it before they shall have the alarm of your motion , because it is at present so far off . wherefore if you can come upon them suddenly and secretly , not once in twenty times but you will succeed in your design . i speak very unwillingly of the occurrences of our times , because it must be done with reflection upon me and my friends ; and if i should discourse of other people , i should not know what to say . nevertheless i cannot pass by the example of caesar borgia ( called duke valentino ) who being with his army at nocera , under pretence of making an inroad into the dutchy of camerin , turned suddenly upon the state of urbin , and master'd it without any trouble in one day , which another man would not have been able to have effected in a much longer time . chap. v. a man is not to depend upon the countenance of the enemy , but is rather to suspect what even he sees with his eyes . fabr. those who are besieged , are to be very careful of the tricks and surprizes of the enemy , and therefore they are not to relye upon the countenance that he carries , but are rather to suspect there is some fraud or deceit that will fall heavily upon them , if they suffer themselves to be deluded . domitius calvinus besieging a town , made it his custom every day to march round about the walls with a good part of his army ; the garrison fancying by degrees that it was only for his recreation , began to slacken their guards , of which domitius having notice , fell suddenly upon them , and carried the town . other generals have had intelligence of relief that was expected in the town , and having habited a certain number of their soldisrs , and disposed them under counterfeit ensigns , like those which the besieged expected , they were received into the gates , and possessed themselves of the town . cimon an athenian general having a design to surprize a town , in the night set fire on a temple that was without it , and the inhabitants flocking out to extinguish the fire , they fell into an ambuscado , and lost their town . others having taken some of the servants , and such people as came forth for forrage , put them to the sword , and disguising their own soldiers in their cloths , have entred the gates , and made themselves masters of the town . chap. vi. how to disfurnish a garrison of its men , and to bring a terror upon a town . fabr. the ancients have ( besides these ) made use of several stratagems and artifices to unfurnish the enemies garrisons of their men : when scipio was in affrica , being desirous to possess himself of some of the garrisons , which the carthaginians had in their custody , he made many offers to besiege them , but pretending fear , he not only drew off on a sudden , but marched away with his army to a great distance . hanibal supposing our apprehension real , to follow him with a greater force , drew out his garrisons , which scipio understanding sent massinissa to surprize them , and he did it with success . pyrrhus making war in sclavonia ; advanced against the chief town in that province , in the defence of which town , several people having got together ; he pretended to despair of carrying it by force , and turning his arms against other towns which were not visibly so strong , he prospered so well in his design , that the said town drawing out a good part of its garrison in relief to their neighbours , left it self so weak , as it became a prey to the enemy . many have corrupted and defiled the waters , and turned rivers out of their channels , to make themselves masters of a town , and have miscarried when they have done . it is a way likewise that contributes much to the taking of a town to affright them with reports , as of some great victory that you have obtained , some great supplies that you have received , and an obstinate resolution if they do not surrender quickly to put them all to the sword. chap. vii . to corrupt a garrison , and take it by treachery . fabr. some generals of old have endeavoured to take towns by treachery , by corrupting some of the garrison , and they have done it several ways : some have sent of their own men as fugitives into the town , thereby to put them into credit and authority with the enemy , and give them opportunity to betray them . some by this means have discovered the strength of the garrison , and by that discovery have taken the town . some under feigned pretences have stopped up the gates of a town from shutting , with a cart , or beam , or such kind of thing , and given their party the convenience of entring . hanibal besieging the town of tarentum in calabria , which was defended by the romans under the conduct of levius , corrupted a person in the garrison called eoneus , and ordered him that he should go out a hunting in the night , and pretend he durst not do it in the day for fear of the enemy . eoneus observed his directions , went out and in several nights together , and the guards had not the least suspition ; at length hanibal disguizing some of his men in the habit of huntsmen , sent them in after him , who killed the guards , possessed themselves of the gates , and let hanibal into the town . a garison is likewise to be cheated by drilling them a good distance out of town , and pretending to fly when they come to charge you . many ( and hanibal among the rest ) have suffered their camps to be possessed by the enemy , that they might have opportunity to clap between with their army , and get into the town . again , they are sometimes deluded by pretending to raise the siege as formio the athenian did , who having plundered and harrassed the country of calcidon , received their embassadors afterwards with propositions of peace : he gave them very good words , and sent them back full of security and fair promises , upon which the poor people presuming too much , formio fell suddenly upon them , and overcame them . those who are shut up in a town , are to keep a strict eye upon such as they have any reason to suspect , but they are sometimes to be secured and obliged to you by preferment as well as by punishment . marcellus knew that lucius baucius the nolan was a great favourer of hanibal , yet he carried himself to him with so much kindness and generosity , that of an enemy , he made him his intimate friend . chap. viii . good guard is to be kept in all places and times . fabr. those who are in any fear of being besieged , are to keep diligent guard as well when the enemy is at a distance , as at hand : and they are to have most care of those places where they think themselves most secure ; for many towns have been lost by being assaulted on that side where they thought themselves impregnable ; and this miscarriage arises from two causes ; either because the place is really strong and believed inaccessible ; or else because of the policy of the enemy , who with great clamour and noise pretend to storm it on one side , whilst on the other he does it as vigorously , but with all the silence imaginable . and therefore it concerns the besieged to be very careful , and keep good guards upon the walls , especially in the night , and that as well with dogs as with men , for if they be fierce and watchful , they will give an alarm ( if the enemy approaches ) as soon as any thing : and not only dogs , but birds have been known to have preserved a town , as it happen'd to the romans , when the french besieged the capitol : when the spartans lay before athens , alcibiades to discover how his watches were kept , commanded that in the night when ever he held up a light , each of the guards should hold up another , and great punishment was to be inflicted upon any that neglected it . is●crates killed a centinal that he found a-sleep , with this expression , i leave him as i found him . chap. ix . ways to write privately to ones friends . fabr. those who have been besieged have contrived several ways of conveying intelligence to their friends ; not daring to trust their affairs to the tongue of a messenger , they write in cyphers many times , and conceal them several ways . the cyphers are made according to every mans fancy , and the ways of concealing them are divers : some have writ on the in-side of a scabard of a sword ; others have put their letters up in paste , baked it , and then given it for sustenance to the messenger that is to carry it : some have hid them in their privities ; some in the collar of the messenger's dog . there is another very useful and ingenious way , and that is by writing an ordinary letter about your private affairs , and afterwards betwixt every two lines to write your intrigues with a certain kind of water that will never be discovered but by dipping it into other water , or by holding it to the fire ; and by so doing the letters will be visible . and this trick has been very subtilly practised in our times , in which a certain person having a desire to signifie a secret to some of his friends , and not daring to trust it to a messenger , he sent out letters of excommunication written very formerly , but interlined as abovesaid , and caused them to be fixed to the doors of the churches , which being known to his friends by some private marks , they understood the whole business : and this is a very good way , for he who carries it may be deceived , and he that writes it is in no great danger . there are a thousand other ways invented according to every mans fancy and wit. but it is much easier to write to those who are block'd up in a town , than for those who are besieged to write to their friends abroad , because these letters cannot be conveyed but by somebody who must pretend to run away out of the town , which is a hard and a dangerous thing , if the enemy be any thing careful . but 't is otherwise with letters to be sent into a town , for a man has a thousand occasions to come into a leaguer , where he may watch his opportunity , and slip into the town . chap. x. how to repair a breach , and the way to defend it . fabr. but let us come now to the present way of beleaguering of towns : i say , that if you be assaulted in a town that is not fortified with ditches on the in-side , ( as i have mentioned before ) that your enemy may not enter at the breaches which the artillery make , ( for against other breaches there is no remedy ) it is necessary whilst the artillery is playing , to cut a new ditch behind the breach of at least thirty yards wide , and to throw all the earth that comes out of it towards the town , that it may make a good rampart , and add to the depth of the ditch ; and this work is to be carried on with such diligence , that when the wall falls , the ditch may be at least five or six yards deep ; and whilst they are at work to make this ditch , it is necessary that they be secured with two caseniats , that may flank the enemy in case he should endeavour to disturb them : and if the wall be so strong as to give you time to make your ditch and your casemats ; that part which is battered will be the strongest part about the town ; for that rampart will be of the same form and model which we proposed for the ditch within : but where the wall is so weak as to allow you no time , then you must show your courage , and present yourself bravely at the breach , your souldiers well arm'd , and with as much chearfulness as is possible . this way of throwing up new works was observed by the pisans when you besieged it , and they might do it well enough ; for their walls were strong , which gave them time , and the earth good and proper for ramparts ; whereas had they wanted either of those conveniences , they must of necessity have been lost . it is wisdom therefore to make these ditches round about the town before there be any necessity , as we said before ; for in that case you may expect the enemy without fear . chap. xi . of mines . fabr. the ancients took several towns by mining under ground , and that two ways , either by carrying their mines under ground into the town , and entring thereby , ( as the romans did when they took the city of vejentum ) or by undermining only the walls , and so tumbling them down . at present this latter way is more used than the other , and renders those towns which stand high , weaker then the rest , because more subject to be min'd , and then adding but a good quantity of powder , which takes fire in an instant , you do not only ruine the wall , but you open the very mountain , and cleave the works into pieces . the way to prevent this , is to fortifie in a flat country , and make the ditch which encompasses your town so deep , that the enemy may not dig under it without coming to the water , which is the best defence against mines . but if you be to defend a town upon an eminence , your best way will be to make several deep holes in the wall , that may give vent to the powder when the enemy sets in on fire . there is another way likewise to prevent them , and that is by countermining , if you find where the enemy mines , but 't is a hard matter to discover them , especially if you be besieged by a cautious enemy . chap. xii . good guards are always to be kept , and your souldiers not to be divided . fabr. he who is besieged is to take extraordinary care that he be not surprized in time of repose , as after a storm ; after the guards are set , ( which is either at break of day , or at the shutting in of the evening ) or especially whilst you are at dinner , in which time many towns have been taken , and many sallies have been made to the destruction of the besiegers . wherefore it is necessary to be upon the guard in all quarters , and your men generally arm'd : and here i cannot omit to tell you that nothing makes a town or camp harder to be defended , than the dividing of your forces ; for the enemy being able to attack you when he pleases with all his power at once , you must be ready on all sides , and having parted your forces , you will be forced to defend your self with a part , and to keep the same guards with the remainder when ever the enemy assails you , as you should have done when your whole garrison was together ; which is a great disadvantage , for he can attack you with his whole power , when you have but a part of yours to defend your self . chap. xiii . that when ones sees himself block'd up on every side , it is good to expose ones self now and then , and of the advantages which have ensued . fabr. if he who is besieged be beaten considerately , he is certainly lost ; but the besieger can only be repulsed : for which reason many who have been besieged ( either in camp or town , ) though they have been inferior in number , have nevertheless sallied with their whole force at a time , and been two hard for the enemy . thus marcellus did at nola ; thus caesar did in france , when his camp was encompassed with a vast number of gauls , for finding he was not able to defend it , because he must divide his men into partles , and distribute them round ; and finding also that standing within his stoccado's he could not do so much execution upon the enemy as he desired , he opened his camp on one side , and issuing out of it with his whole force , charged the enemy with such fury and courage that he put them to the rout . besides , the obstinacy and resolution of the besieged does many times astonish and terrifie the enemy . pompey being encamped against caesar , and caesar's army in great distress for provisions , pompey had presented him a piece of caesar's bread which was made of herbs , and look'd upon as a very strange thing ; pompey having viewed it , commanded that it should not be shewn in his army , lest it should discourage them to consider the obstinacy of their enemy . nothing was more honourable to the romans in their war with hanibal than their constancy , because in the greatest of their distress , and in the worst of their fortune , they never demanded peace , nor discovered any token of fear : on the contrary , when hanibal was under their walls , they sold the ground in which he was encamped , at an higher rate than it would have been sold at another time : and they were so true and firm in their enterprizes , that they would not draw off from capua to defend their own city , though they had an army before that , when hanibal appeared before rome . i am sensible that i have told you several things that you understood , and perhaps considered already ; yet i have done it ( as i said before ) by that means to give you a better comprehension of the quality of this army ; and to satisfie such ( if there be any such here ) as have not had the opportunity to understand it so well as you . i suppose now there remains nothing but that i give you some general rules which are very obvious and common . chap. xv. general rules to be observed in military discipline . fabr. that which is beneficial to you , is prejudicial to your enemy , and that which is beneficial to him , is prejudicial to you . he who in war is most vigilant to observe the designs and enterprizes of the enemy , and takes most pains in exercising and disciplining his army , shall expose himself to less danger , and have greater probability of victory . never bring your men to fight till you have some just confidence in their courage , till you have seen them well arm'd , and well ordered ; and never let them engage but when you find them cheerly , and hopeful of success . it is better to conquer an enemy by hunger than fighting , in which last victory , fortune has more share than virtue or courage . no resolution is so likely to succeed , as that which is concealed from the enemy till it comes to be executed . nothing is of more importance in the whole art of war , than to know how to take advantage when it is offered . nature produces few persons strong ; but industry and exercise makes many . order and discipline is more available in war , than valour or force . when any come over to your service from the enemy , they are of great advantage to you , provided they be faithful ; for it is more diminution to the enemies strength to have soldiers revolt , than to have so many slain , though the name of a fugitive is suspicious to new friends , and abominable to old . it is better in the drawing up your battalions for a battel , to draw them up with reserves , and place such behind the front as may supply it upon occasion ; than to enlarge your front , and make as it were but one rank of your whole army . he who understands his own forces and the enemies too , can hardly miscarry . the courage of soldiers is better than their number . the situation of the place is sometimes more effectual than the courage of your men . new and unexpected things are an astonishment to some armies . your soldiers despise things that are common , and are weary of any thing that is tedious , i would advise therefore that by pickeering and little skirmishes you acquaint your men with your enemy before you bring them to a battel . he who pursues an enemy that is disordered , in disorder himself ; shall lose the victory he had gained , and perhaps give it to the enemy . he who makes not provision of victuals , will be beaten without a blow . he who relies more upon his horse than his foot , or his foot than his horse , must accommodate himself to the place . if you would know at any time whether you have any spies in your army , you have no more to do but to command every man to his tent. if you find the enemy has any knowledge of your designs , you must change them . what you are to do , you may advise with many ; what you are resolved to do , communicate with few . when soldiers are in their quarters , they are to be kept in order by fear and by punishment ; when in the field , with hopes and reward . a good general never comes to a battel but when necessary requires , or some great advantage invites him . you must endeavour that your enemy may not know how you intend to draw up your army when you come to fight ; and let your figure be what it will , be sure your first companies be so ordered as that they may fall back into the second , and both into the third . when you are engaged , never employ any of your battalia's about any thing but that to which you deputed them at first ; if you would avoid putting things into disorder . sudden accidents are not easily prevented ; but those which are foreseen are prevented without difficulty . men , arms , money and provisions are the nerves of war ; but the first two are most necessary , because men and arms will find money and victuals ; but money and victuals can never find men. the rich man unarm'd , is but a prey to the soldier . use your soldiers to abominate luxury either in diet or cloths . this is as much as i can think fit to speak of in general , though i am sensible other things would have fallen in well enough with my discourse . as how and in what manner the ancients ordered their squadrons ; how they were habited , and how they exercised them in several other things , and i could have added several particulars , which i have not thought necessary at this time , because you may know it your self , and likewise because it was not my intention at first to shew you exactly how the ancient malitia was constituted , but how it was to be done in our times . for this reason i have thought unnecessary to speak any farther of those kind of antiquities , than what might be serviceable to this introduction . i know likewise i might have inlarged myself more about the exercising of horse ; and come afterwards to discourse of sea-fights , for to distinguish militia's , their armies at sea , and armies at land ; armies of foot , and armies of horse : but of sea discipline i shall not presume to say any thing , because i know nothing of it : i shall leave that to be treated of by genoueses or venetians , who by their experience in that kind , have done very great things formerly . nor shall i speak any farther of horse than what i have said before , because they are not so corrupt and disorderly . for if your foot ( which is the strength of an army ) are well disciplin'd , and in good order , your cavalry must be good of necessity . chap. xv. the way to have many horse in your country . fabr. i would however remember him who is desirous to settle and establish a good militia in his country , that to furnish it handsomly with horse , he should do two things ; one is , that he should distribute a certain number of good stalions up and down , that the country-men may breed , and drive a trade with foles and colts , as you do in this country with calves and young mules . the other is , that there might not want chapmen for the colts , i would oblige every man that keeps a mule , to keep an horse ; and he that would keep but one thing for his saddle , should be enjoyned to have it an horse ; besides , i would constrain every man that wore cloth-clothes , to keep an horse in his stable . this order was taken not long since by a prince of our times , and succeeded so well , that in a short time he had a most excellent cavalry . as to other things relating to horses , i refer you to what has been said this day , and what has been practised of old . chap. xvi . a general is to invent of himself , and not follow altogether the practiecs of his predecessors . fabr. but perhaps you would desire to know what parts and qualifications there ought to be in a general ; and i will satisfie you in short , for i cannot make choice of a properer man , than he who understands all those things which i have recommended this day ; and yet that would not be sufficient , unless he had abilities to invent some thing of his own ; for never any man was master of a trade , who had no invention of his own ; and if invention be honourable in any thing , it is most certainly in this : this is manifest in all authors who have constantly applauded all sorts of inventions , how slight and inconsiderable soever , as appears by the great character they bestowed on alexander the great , for his wisdom in appointing a cap to be put upon the top of a launce as a signal for the dislodging of his army , rather than to do it by sound of trumpet as formerly , because it imported him much that they should remove privately . he was commended likewise for ordering his soldiers upon a charge to fall down upon their left knee , as an expedient that would make them receive the charge with the more strength and firmness , which invention got him the victory , and occasioned him so much honour , that all statues erected afterwards in his honour , were erected in that posture . but because it is time to conclude our discourse , i will leave where i began , to avoid the reproach which is incident to such persons as when once straggled know not how to return . chap. xvii . the author returns , and with a short discourse concludes his book . fabr. if you remember ( cosimo ) you told me , that you could not imagine the reason why in one place i should commend antiquity , and blame those which would not imitate it in great things ; and yet i have not imitated it my self in my martial affairs , in which i have taken much pains , and spent a great deal of my time . to which i answer , that men who are to execute any thing , are first to learn which way it is to be done , that they may be afterwards the more able , when it comes to operation . now whether or no i understand how to establish a militia according to the method of the ancients , i leave you to judge , who have heard me discourse of it so long ; from whence you may imagine how much time has been spent in those thoughts by me ; what great desire i have had to bring them to effect , and whether i have already , or ever may have occasion to do it . but to satisfie you farther , and justifie my self , i will give you the reasons , and thereby observe my promise in some measure , by shewing you the conveniencies and inconveniencies in such imitations . i say then that no action this day among men is more easily executed according to the method of the ancients , than military discipline ; but it must be among such princes as are able to bring together or of their own subjects , against an enemy . on the other side , there is nothing more difficult to such princes as have not that convenience : and that you may comprehend it the better , you must understand that generals are commended upon two several accounts some are famous for that with an army ordered and prepared by their own natural discipline , they have performed great things ; so it was with most of the roman citizens , and others who had the command of armies ; whose only task was to keep their soldiers good , and conduct them securely . others have been not only to contend with and conquer the enemy , but they were first to instruct and exercise their army ; and these doubtless were worthy of more praise than they who with their old and well experienced soldiers performed such exploits : of this sort was pelopidas , epaminondas , tullus , hostilius , philip of macedon , cyrus king of persia , and gracchus the roman : all those were forced to model and discipline their armies before they ventured them to sight ; and all these were able to do it in respect of their own experience , and that they had other persons which were able to exercise their soldiers as they desired . nor would it ever have been possible that any of those generals , how good and excellent soever , could ever have done any great thing in another province full of corrupt men , unless it had been accustomed to some honest obedience . it is not sufficient then in italy to understand how to manage a veteran army ; but you must first know how to make and prepare it , and then how to govern and conduct it . again , those who do this , must be such princes as have great revenues , and many subjects , in which number i am not to be reckoned , as one who never commanded , nor never can , unless it be foreign forces under some other prince , into which foreigners , whether it be possible or not to insuse any of these things of which i have discoursed , i leave you to judge . how could i perswade a soldier of our days to carry more arms than he was accustomed , and besides his arms , two or three daies provision at his back , and a spade or pickaxe at his girdle ? how could i prevail with him to work or digg all day ; to stand all day to his arms in counterfeit exercises , that i might rely the more confidently upon him when he came to it in good earnest ? how could i work upon him to abstain from play , lasciviousness , blasphemy , and insolence , which is their practice every day ? how long would it be before i could reduce them into such order , such discipline , and awe , that if an apple tree was never so full , and stood in the middle of their camp , none of them should venture to touch it ? as is many times read of the roman armies . what is it that i can promise them that may make them either fear me , or love me , when the war being ended , i shall have no farther to do with them ? how can i make them sensible of shame who have been born and bread without any ? how should they pay me a respect whom they do not know ? by what god , by what saint shall i conjure them ? by the gods which they adore , or by the gods which they blaspheme ? which it is that they adore i cannot tell , but am sure they blaspheme them all . how can i expect they should keep their promise , which they do hourly despise ? how can they who pay no honour to god , express any to men ? what good discipline then are we like to imprint upon so depraved a mass ? if you object that the swizzers and spaniards are good soldiers , i confess them much better than the italians ; but if you consider what i have said , and the manner of proceeding of both those nations , you will find them come short in many things of the perfection of the ancients . the swizzers are become good soldiers by natural practice of those things which i have recommended ; and the spaniards by necessity ; for their wars lying in foreign provinces , where they are constrained either to overcome or dye ( because they can never hope to get off by flying ) are grown good , and yet their goodness is in many things defective ; for their excellence is only to stand and receive the enemy at push of pike , and the swords point ; besides , their is not any man among them fit to instruct another in what is necessary , much less if he be not of their own country . but to return to our italians , who having wanted wise princes , have not been capable of good orders ; and having wanted that necessity which was incumbent upon the spaniards , they have not taken it up of themselves , so that now they are the very scorn and contempt of the world , not for any fault in the people , but in their princes , who thereby have been chastised for their ignorance , and justly punished for losing their territories so ignominiously , without any considerable resistance . will you see that what i say is true ? consider what wars we have had in italy since the expedition of charles th . to this day : and although othe● wars rendered soldiers formidable and martial ; these wars by how much they were more great , and more furious , by so much both officers and soldiers became more dissolute and cowardly : and this must necessarily proceed from ill orders which are not much better at this day , and the misery is , there was nor is none able to reform them : do not think that there is any way to recover reputation to the arms of the italians , but by this way that i have proposed , and by means of such princes as have great territories there ; for this form may be imprinted in men that are simple , and plain , and ones own subjects , much sooner , than in such as are lew'd , and disorderly , and strangers . a good sculptor never expects to make a good statue out of a piece of marble that is mangled and has been ill handled ; but he will do well enough if it has never been touched . our princes in italy before they were sensible of their wars with the northern nations , believed it was enough for a prince to know how to write a civil answer ; how to direct a letter with all its punctilio's ; how to show himself witty and quick in his reparties ; how to juggle , and dissemble ; how to dress himself handsomly , and dispose of his jewels to the best advantage ; how to eat , and sleep in more state and magnificence than other people ; to have a thousand dalliances and pleasures about him ; to behave himself haughtily and extort from his subjects ; to live in idleness and ease ; to dispose of military commands to their parasites ; to despise those who proposed any thing of virtue ; to require that their words should be like oracles , and of as much authority , as if spoken by god himself ; to employ such as had no knowledge in affairs ; to commit great things to those who durst attempt nothing ; to believe every thing immediately without pondering and debating either their words or arguments that spoke them ; and several other imperfections which hindered them from seeing that at last they must become a prey to any that would attack them . these things in the year . were the occasion of those flights , and fears , and depredations by which three of the most potent states in italy were frequently destroyed . but the worst is , they which remain , continue in the same errors , and live in the same disorder , without any consideration that those who formerly desired to preserve their dominions , did all that i have prescribed this day ; and that their whole study was to accustom themselves both minds and bodies to labour , to trouble , and dispising of danger , and this was the cause that caesar , and alexander and all the valiant and brave princes were always at the head of their armies , compleatly arm'd and on foot , and rather than lose their states they would lose their lives ; so as they lived and dyed with a great deal of honour : and though perhaps some of them might be condemned for their ambition , and exorbitant desire to reign ; yet they could never be accused of effeminacy , or doing any thing that might render them delicate and unmanly . which passages if they were read and believed by the princes of our times , it would be impossible but they must alter their course of life , and their provinces their fortune . but because in the beginning of our discourse you complained of your militia , i tell you that if you have ordered it according to my abovesaid direction , and it has not answered your expectation , you have reason to complain ; but if it be not ordered and exercised according to my rules , the complaint lyes more properly against you , who has made it rather an abortion , than a perfect production . the venetians , and the duke of ferrara began very well , but they did not persevere , and it was imputable rather to themselves , than their soldiers . and let me affirm this to you for a truth , and among all the present princes of italy , he who takes his way first , and observes these rules and these orders , shall make himself greater than any prince in that country , and it shall happen to his subjects as to the kingdom of macedon , which falling under the dominion of king philip , was improved to that height by this order and exercise ( whilst the rest of greece were idle , and if employed at all , it was in following plays and balls , and such effeminat entertainments ) that in a few years time he was able to conquer the whole country , and leave a foundation to his son to make himself monarch of the whole world . he then who despises this doctrine , if he be a prince despises his own principality , and if a citizen , his own city . and in this i cannot but complain of nature , who should either have not suffered me to have known these things ; or have given me power to have executed them , which is a thing i can never hope for now , as growing old , and towards the end of my days . for this reason i have discoursed the more frankly with you who are young , and so qualified that you may be able ( if you be satisfied with what is said ) to give the same council to your own princes when occasion shall be offered , and i hope with success ; and of this i beg you would not dispond ; for this province seems to have a peculiar faculty of reviving things that are dead , as it has done poetry , and painting , and sculpture , though for my own part i cannot expect to see it , as having one foot already in the grave . certainly had fortune indulged me in my young days , so far as to have afforded so much territory as such an enterprise required , i believe in a short time i would have demonstrated to the world the power and efficacy of the orders of the ancients , by means of which i should have enlarged my dominions with honour , or lost them without shame . the marriage of belphegor . by nicholas machiavel . it is recorded in the ancient chronicles of florence , that a certain holy person , whose life was the admiration of that age , falling one day into a trance , had a very strange apparition : it seemed to him , that the souls of married men that came trooping in great numbers to hell , cried out all of them as they passed , that their marriage was the cause of their misery , and their wives the occasion of their coming thither : minos radamanth , and the whole infernal privy-council were amazed at the clamour ; at first they could not believe there was any thing in the business , but at last observing the same complaints continually multiplyed , they thought it fit to make pluto acquainted : pluto understanding the report , without imparting any thing to his wife , ( who had taken physick that week , and kept her chamber ) resolved the matter should be accurately examined , and such course be taken , as was likeliest to make the speediest discovery of the truth : he issued out his writs immediately , and assembled his courts ; his princes , dukes , counts and barons were all present ; never was senate so full , nor never was affair of that importance before it : the holy father that beheld all , affirms positively , that pluto delivered himself in this manner . right trusty and well-beloved , though our kingdom was assigned us from heaven , and the fatal decree has anciently determined our dominion : though that sentence be irrevocable , and above the cognisance of any humane power ; yet seeing his prudence is most safe , that is dictated by laws ; and his judgment most solid , that is fortified with others ; we are resolved to take your counsels along with us , which way we are to steer in an affair , that otherwise may prove ( in time ) of great dishonour to our government . the souls of married men , that are continually flocking into our dominions , do unanimously exclaim against their wives , as the only persons that send them tumbling hither ; to us it seems impossible : yet forasmuch as a peremptory and determinate sentence upon their bare allegations , would not suite with our satanical mercy ; so a careless pretermission on the other side could not be without reflexion on our iustice : that matters of such importance therefore may have their due disquisition , and our administration be defended from obloquy or scandal , that no inconveniency may follow for want of deliberation , and that some better expedient may be found out , than ourselves have happily thought on , we have thought good to call you together , being confident , and assured by the assistance of your counsels , the honour and reputation of our empire will be continued as unquestionable for the future , as it has been preserved hitherto , by our own proper care and solicitude . there was not one present , but acknowledged it a business of importance , and well worthy an exact consideration : it was the opinion of the whole board , that all imaginable means ●as ●p be used to find out the truth , but what means that was , could not be agreed on ; some were of opinion , a single person ▪ was to be dispatch'd into this world , and no more ; others judged it better to send several , and that the discovery would be more certain from the experience of many , than of one ; a third sort , more brisk and severe in their counsels , thought that clutter unnecessary , and that clapping good store of them together upon the rack , would be enough doubtless to extort a confession . however it was at last carried by the plurality of voices , that a single person only should be sent , and in this resolution the whole company acquiesced , nevertheless there being no body found that would voluntarily undertake the employment , it was concluded the election should be by lot ; and that the same time , having made their billets , and shuffled them , the lot fell upon belphegor . one may say , and say true , that fortune never decided any thing so justly ; for belphegor was no ordinary devil ; and pluto having made him formerly generalissimo of his armies 't is to be presumed he was no novice ; for all this he had a months mind to be quit of his embassy ; but the order being unalterable , he was forced to submit , and accept these conditions that were solemnly decreed , that an hundred thousand ducats should be paid him immediately , to defray the expences of his journey ; that he should assume the shape of a man ; that he should take a woman to his wedded wife , and live with her ( if possible ) ten years ; that at the end of the term , ( pretending to die ) he should give her the slip , repair immediately to his old quarters , and make affidavit upon his own experience of all the pleasures and calamities of matrimony . it was declared to him also , that during this metamorphosis , he was to be subiect to the pains and misfortunes of humanity , as sickness , imprisonment , and poverty : but that if by his cunning or dexterity he could disintangle himself , it should be allowed him and not imputed as any scandal or reproach , belphegor accepts the conditions , receives his ducats , and having drawn a spruce party of horse out of his guards , and furnished himself with pages and footmen good store , he set out immediately for this world , and arrived at florence in a very fair equipage : he chose that place above all other , for the conveniency of improving his monies , and putting it to interest with greater advantage . he called himself don roderick of castile ; he took a very noble house in the fauxburg of all-saints ; and that his quality might be undiscovered , he gave out that he was a spaniard , that being young he took a voyage into syria , that he had dwelt some time in aleppo , where he had got most part of his estate : but being weary there , he was come into italy , as a country more agreeable with his humour , with intention ( if any fair opportunity was offered ) to marry : don roderick seemed to be a very handsome man , about thirty years of age ; and in short time after his arrival , he made it evident enough that he was rich , and by his liberality , that he knew how to make the best use of them ; insomuch as several gentlemen of florence , that had more daughters than money ; took all possible pains to insinuate how welcome he should be into their alliance . don roderick , that had choice of mistresses , preferr'd one that was transcendently handsome before them all , the story says , she was called honesta , and was the daughter of americ donati , who had three more also to marry , and three sons between twenty or twenty five years of age : but though seigneur americ was of one of the noblest families of florence , yet he was look'd upon as down the wind , and one that was overlaid with too many childeren , and the unavoidable charges of his nobility : but don roderick took an order for that , defraying the whole expence of his wedding ; out of his own purse managing all things with that splendor and magnificence , that there was nothing omitted that was desirable upon such an occasion . it was mentioned before , as one of the conditions proposed to belphegor , that as soon as he was out of the infernal dominions , he should be subject to all the passions of mankind ; and accordingly he began immediately to take delight in the honours and gallantry of the world ; and as cunning a devil as he was , to be wheedled with the flatteries and applauses of men : but that which delighted him so much , cost him dear ; besides that he had not been long with honesta , but he fell stark mad in love with her , and finding something or other extraordinary in her , that i cannot think of , he was so far inamoured , he never thought himself happy before ; insomuch as when she was melancholy , or out of humour , he would curse his commission , and take his corporal oath his very life was tedious . on the other side it was not to be forgot , that honesta marrying roderick , and bringing him beauty and nobility instead of a portion , she thought it not fit to leave her pride and untractableness behind her ; these two good qualities were so eminently in her , that roderick who had been used to lucifers , and had more than once had experience of it , swore point-blank his wives insolence was beyond it : for when she once found the fondness and passion her husband had for her , believing she could manage him with a switch , and order him as she pleased , she carried her self like his soveraign , and handled him without pity or respect ; and if it happened he denied her any thing , she gave him immediately to understand , that she was also as ●loquent in scoulding , as others of her quality . by this you may judge what a cooler this was to don roderick : nevertheless the consideration of his father-in-law , his wives brothers , the kindred he had by that blessed marriage , but above all the passion and tenderness he had for her , made him endure all patiently . i shall not mention the expence of his clothes , which though never so rich , he was forced to change every week , according to the ordinary vanity of the ladies in florence . besides these , there were other things were of no less inconvenience ; he was forced ( to preserve the peace ) to assist his father-in-law in the marriage of his other daughters , which cost him a good round sum : moreover that all things might go well , and his correspondency continue with his consort , he was glad to send one of her brothers into the levant with woollen stuffs , another into france and spain with silks , and to furnish the third with wherewithal to set up a goldsmith's-shop in florence : all which afflictions together were sufficient to discompose any devil of a thousand , yet he had other thrown into the bargain : there is not any town in all italy more extravagant in their expences , in their carnivals and feasts of st. iohn , than florence ; and honesta upon that occasion must needs have her roderick out-do all people of his rank , in the sumptuousness of his entertainments , in the magnificence of his balls , and other divertisements that are usual at those times : he suffered all these calamities for the same reasons he endured the rest ; and though perhaps these difficulties were very hard and unpleasant , he would have thought them supportable , could he have been satisfied , his patience would have procured any quietness in his family , and that he might have peaceably attended the hour of his destruction . but don roderick found the clear contrary ; besides the expence your have heard she occasioned , her insolence was accompanied with a thousand other , inconveniencies , insomuch as he could keep neither officer nor servant in his house above three days together . this was severe trouble to him to find it was impossible for him to keep any body about him , though never so well experienced or affected to his affairs : nor indeed could any body blame them for taking their leaves , when the devils themselves that he brought along with him , did chose rather to return , and toast the bottoms of their feet against the fire of hell , than live in this world under the dominion of so super-devillish a woman . roderick's life being thus miserably uncomfortable , and his stock that he had reserved , exhausted by her extravagant expences , he was reduced to that pass , he subsisted only upon the hopes of the advantage he should make by the return of some vessels he had sent into the east and west . and whereas before he had very good credit in that town , to continue it , and keep up his port , he borrowed mony of such as are used in that place to put it out ; but those kind of people being such , as are not usually sleepy or negligent in their affairs , they took notice immediately he was not over-punctual to his day : his purse being already empty , and he reduced to the highest extremity , at one dash he receives news of two as disasterous accidents as could possibly befall him . the first was , that one of honestas brothers had lost at hazzard all that roderick had intrusted in his hands ; and the other was no more welcom , which was , that his other brother-in-law returning into italy , was himself cast away , and all his goods . the business was no sooner known in florence , but his creditors had a meeting , where giving him over for one that was irrecoverably lost , and not daring to discover themselves , because the time of payment was not yet come , they concluded he was to be watch'd very close , least he should chouse them , and shew them a light pair of heels . don roderick of castile on the other side , considering with himself his affairs were past remedy , and also the term he was obliged to by the infernal law , resolves to take horse and be gone without more ado , which he performed without much difficulty , living conveniently for that by the port del prato : yet he was no sooner march'd off , but his alarm was taken by his creditors ; they repair immediately to the magistrates , and pursue him not only with post and officers , but lest a certain number of ducats should debauch that kind of cattle , who are no better in italy than other places , and prevail with them for an abatement of their speed , they follow him themselves in a full body , with impatience of hearing some tidings of him . roderick in the mean time was no fool , but considered very well what he had to do ; as soon as he was gallop'd about half a league from the town , he leaves the high-way , and his horse with it , ( the country being inclosed , and full of ditches on both sides ) and was forced to make the rest of his journey on foot , which he did very succesfully ; for wandring up and down under the shelter of the vines and reeds that abound much in those parts , he arrived at last at peretola , at the house of iean matteo del bricca , baily to iean del bene. by very good fortune he meets matteo carrying fodder to his cattle ; he accosts him immediately , and promises him as he was a gentleman , that if he would deliver him from the catchpoles that were in pursuit of him , with design to clap him up , and starve him in prison , he had an invention in his pate would make him rich out of hand , and of this he would give such evidence before he departed , as should assure him of his truth and fidelity ; and if i do not , says he , with a damn'd imprecation , i will be content to be delivered up into their clutches that persecute me . now you must understand , that though matteo was an hinde and a peasant , yet the fellow had cunning enough , and knew on which side his bread was buttered ; he considered , if he undertook him , and miscarried , he had nothing to lose ; and that if he succeeded , he should be made for ever ; without any more ado therefore he promises him protection , and clapping him close upon a dunghill that was before the gate , he covered him over with brush-faggots and reeds , and such other fewel as lay there in readiness for the fire : and indeed he was no sooner in his retirements , but in came the creditors with full cry ; they swaggered and laid about them like lords , but all to no purpose , matteo could not be persuaded to confess so much as that he saw him ; insomuch as marching on still in the pursuit , but with as little success as they came thither , they gave roderick and their money over for lost , and returned to florence every jot as wise as they were before : the coast being clear in this manner , and the alarm over , matteo steals to the closet where he had left roderick , gives him a little fresh air , and conjures him to be as good as his word : roderick was very honest in that point , and i dare say never any devil , as to matters of gratitude , had more of a gentleman ; he gave him thanks for the great obligation he had received : he swore over and over again , he would do what ever lay in his power to discharge himself of his promise , and in the heat and height of his compliments , to convince him that he meant as he said , he gives him the whole story as you have had it , and at last told him the very way that he had pitch'd upon to make him a prince : know then , sayes he , that whenever you hear of any lady that is possess'd , 't is no other devil but i that have possess'd her ; and be sure i will never leave her , till you come your self and force me from my quarters , after which you have with enough to make your own terms for your payment . they had very few words more , he only gave him the summerset once or twice , and shewed him two or three jugling tricks , and vanish'd . a while after there was a great noise about the town , that mes. ambrosio amidei's daughter , that was married to bonaculo thebalducci's son , was possess'd ; her father and mother did not fail to use all the remedies are usual in so deplorable a case ; they brought before her st. zanobes head , and st. i. galbert's cloak , which was nuts to belphegor , and made him nothing but laugh : there was no body in her but don roderick de castile , who was as ingenious a gentleman-devil as one would wish , and that the world might take notice that this was no fantastick imagination , nor fit of the night-mare , nor any such trifle , but that she was really possessed , she spake latin better than tully ever writ , disputed in philosophy , and discovered the secrets and sins of several people that were there , who were very much surprized to find the devil concern himself with those kind of affairs . amongst the rest there was one holy father he did a great discourtesie to , in blurting out before the whole company , as if he had kept a young lass four years together in his cell , in the habit of a young monk ; and after all this , let any body judge whether the profession was not like to be true ; ambrosio in the mean time was in great affliction for his daughter ; he had tryed all the ways that physick or religion could propose , but to no purpose ; so as he was brought to the highest point of despair , when matteo came to him , and undertook the cure of his daughter , if he would give him five hundred florins , which he designed to lay out in land at peretola : in short , matteo was an honest fellow , and would have done the miracle gratis , and like a gentleman , but his pockets were hollow , and he had great occasion for money at that time ; seignior ambrosio accepts the conditions , and matteo falls to work ; he began very civilly with certain masses and other ceremonies , that he might appear the more formal in the business ; at length he stole to the ladies ear , calls roderick , and tells him he was come thither to him , and did require him to be as good as his word . content says roderick , and that you may see i shall deal with you like a person of quality , take notice , that because this expedition is not enough to inrich you , and do your business , i will befriend you more than once , for which reason as soon as i am departed from hence , away i 'le march into the daughter of charles the king of naples , and don 't fear but i 'le stick to her , till you come to exorcise me , so as there you may make up your markets at a blow , and become considerable for ever , but be sure after that i be troubled with you no more ; and as soon as he had said so , whip says he out of the lady , and was gone to the great joy and astonishment of whole town . belphegor in the mean time was as good as his word , as he promised matteo ; away he goes , and in two or three days time it was all over italy , that the daughter of charles king of naples , was in the same condition ; which was good news for matteo , who was at this bout to gain the philosophers-stone : in short , he tryed all means possible ; the monks went to work with their prayers , and their crosses , but to no purpose ; the devil would not budge till matteo came himself , who had formerly obliged him . the king had news of what had happened at florence , and sends away immediately for matteo to his court , who came accordingly , and after some few ceremonious formalities , counterfeited for concealment of the mystery , he cures his daughter . however roderick before his departure , as is reported in the chronicle , accosted him in this manner . you see , matteo , i have been as good as my word ; you see you are become rich in a trice , and may take your case for the future ; so as if i be not mistaken , i have discharged my self as to you very honestly , hereafter have a care how you come near me ; for as hitherto i have done you knights-service , henceforward i will do you as much mischief as i can . matteo being returned to fl●rence very wealthy , ( for the king of naples had given him above five thousand ducats ) he thought of nothing now but enjoying that peaceably he had got , never imagining roderick would do him any harm ; but his designs were much frustrated by a report out of france , that lewis the seventh's daughter was possess'd as the former : matteo was in great trouble , on the one side he was not ignorant of the power of that prince , on the other he remembred roderick's last words ; the king used all means possible , but without any success , he was told what feats matteo had done , and dispatched a post to him immediately , to desire his company at paris ; but matteo pretending i know not what indispositions , that rendered him incapable of serving his majesty , the king was forced to write to the magistrates , who sent away matteo immediately . being arrived at paris , he was in great affliction , because he knew not which way for his life to perform what was expected from him . at last he goes to the king , and tells him , that true it was indeed , he had formerly wrought some cures in that kind , but that it was not in reason to be expected he could dispossess all people he met with , seeing there were some devils so refractory and cross-grain'd , neither threats nor enchantments , nor devotion it self would do no good on : that he said not this out of any repugnancy or unwillingness to do as he was desired , but that in case his endeavours were ineffectual , he might have his majesties pardon . the king was stark mad at the story , and told him in plain terms , if if he did not rout the devil out of his daughter , as he had done out of others , he would hang him forthwith ; for he saw no reason why miracles were not as seasible at paris , as at florence and naples : these words toucht matteo to the quick , he thought there was no pleasure to be taken in being hang'd in that manner , and that what the king had said , was without any equivocation : however he recollected himself a little , or at least pretended so , and calling for the princess that was possess'd , he makes his approaches , and whispering her in the ear , told roderick he was his very humble servant , and put him in mind of the good office he had done him , when he delivered him out of the talons of the law ; adding withall , that if he left him in the lurch , in the extremity of danger he was then in , the whole world would cry out on his ingratitude ; roderick heard him with no more patience than needs must , he swaggers , swears , storms , and lays about like a devil in good earnest , gives him a thousand and a thousand ill words , but they could distinguish only these few at the last : how now , you rascally traitor , have you the impudence to come near me again ? have you forgot it was i that made you your fortune ? but i 'le make all the world see , and you too , with a pox to you , that i can take away as well as give ; besides which , you shall not fail 〈…〉 hang'd before you get away from paris : poor matteo seeing no other remedy for his misfortunes , he 〈…〉 a thinking of some other way , and having sent back the lady to her chamber , he made this speech to the king. sir , i have told you before , that their are certain ill-natur'd capricious spirits , one knows not which way to deal withal , and of this sort is that which possesses your daughter ; if what we shall administer might be sufficient , your majesty should be happy in your desires , and mine also ; but if things prove otherwise , and your majesty be not satisfied with my endeavours , i shall submit , and your majesty may deal with me as i deserve : in the mean time , i desire your majesty would give order a theatre be erected in the church-yard of nostre dame , big enough to receive all the nobility and clergy in the town : let this theatre , if your majesty think good , be hung with cloath of gold , and other rich stuffs , and an altar set up in the middle on sunday next ; i would desire your majesty to be there , with all the princes and nobility in paris , and after a grand mass is sung , let the princess be brought also : besides this , it is necessary there should be twenty persons at least , with trumpets , horns , drums , hoboys and symbals , ready in some by-place , when i throw up my cap into the air , to advance towards the theatre with all the noise they can make ; which musick , with some other ingredients that i have , will i hope send the devil packing from the princess : the king gave order all things should be done as matteo requested ; and sunday being come , and the theatre throng'd with a multitude of persons of quality , and the church-yard of nostre dame full of people , the princess was led in by two bishops , and followed by several lords of the court ; roderick was in a terrible amaze , to behold so magnificent a preparation , and pondering with himself , was over-heard to pronounce these words : i would fain know what this rascally peasant means to do ; i have seen many places , i have more than once seen the whole pomp of heaven , nor am i ignorant of what is most formidable in hell , yet can i not tell what to make of this ▪ but i 'le handle him like a rogue , as he is , and if i fall , pluto requite me ; matteo came up close to him , and desired him very civilly to depart ; but roderick cryed out , oh the wonderous cunning that is in you ! do you think by this whimsey to save yourself from my power , and the indignation of the king ? but think what you will , you scoundrel , i am resolved you shall hang for 't , or else let me pass for the most miserable poor-spirited devil in the world ; matteo persisted in his request , but belphegor gave him worse language than before ; but all that frighted not matteo , for without losing more time , he threw his hat up into the air , and at an instant the trumpets , horns , and all the rest of the musick struck up , and advanced towards the theatre ; roderick was startled at the noise , and made it manifest that there are some devils as fearful as men , and not able to imagine the reason , he called out to matteo , and asked what was the matter ? matteo being a cunning rogue every inch of him , as if he had been terribly frighted , informs him thus : alas ! poor roderick , says he , 't is your wife honesta is come to seek you at paris ; he said no more , but it is not to be imagined what disorder these four or five words put the devil into ; they took away his wit and judgment , so as without any consideration , whether the news was possible or not , without speaking one word , away he stole from the princess ; choosing rather to go back into hell , and give up his accounts there , than to return again into the thraldom of matrimony , that had already cost him so many sorrows and dangers . as soon as he arrived , he demanded audience , and in the presence of pluto , aeacus , minos , and radamanthus , all of them counsellors of state , he declared that the souls of men were in the right on 't , and that 't was their wives that sent them to hell , matteo that had been too crafty for the devil , returns to florence in great triumph ; the chronicle mentions not any great matter the king gave him , but it says , that having gained sufficiently by the two former , he esteemed himself very happy that he had escaped hanging at paris . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e chief magistrate . notes for div a -e the northern nations healthful and prolifick . their method of evacuation upon their excessive increase . their excessive increase , the ruine of the roman empire the western goths , the first invaders of that empire . rome sack'd by them , under the command of alaricus . boniface governour of africk for the emperour . gallia overrun by the franks , and from them call'd france . the hunni conquer and denominate hungaria . britain call'd anglia from the angli . the hunni invade italy under attila . attila besieges and takes aquilegia . he advances to rome , b●t retires at the request of the pope . the hunni driven bac● over the danube , return home . the first residence of the roman emperours at ravenna . new emperours elected by the romans , upon the non-residence of their old . the lombards invade italy . odoacres call'd king of rome , and the first of the barbarians which thought of fixing in italy . the old empire divided into cantons . theodorick invades italy , slays odoacres , calls himself king of rome , and held his residence at ravenna . theodorick dics . bellisarius general for iustinian the emperour . totila takes , sacks , and burns rome . narsetes a● new general for iustinian . longinus alters the government in italy . alboino kill'd by the conspiracy of his wife . the authority of the bishops of rome began to increase . bishops of rome imploy'd as ministers by the emperours and kings , and sometimes executed by them . the eastern empire destroy'd in the time of heracleus the emperour . the king of france exempts the pope from all humane jurisdiction . pascal created pope . the original of cardinals . eugenius the ii. pope . ospurcus made pope , changes his name . the original of pisa. the government of italy , anno . agabito pop● . gregory the . pope , expell'd and restor'd ; devests the romans of their power of creating emperours and consers it upon six princes of germany . clement d . pope nicolas ●d pope , excludes the romans ▪ & reduces the papal elections to the suffrage of cardinals only . schism , and anti-popes in the church . the difference betwixt 〈◊〉 and the pope , the ground of the guel●s , and 〈…〉 . the original of the kingdom of sicily . urban d . pope . the first croisade . pascal ●d ▪ alexander d. a new anti-pope . the pope's penance to king henry of england , upon the complaints about thomas bec●et . celestin d. pope . honorius d. pope . the orders of s. dominick , and s. francis , instituted . the titles of king of naples and ierusalem annex'd . the house of the esti made lords of ferrara . the guel●s side with the church , the gibilins with the emperor . innocent th pope . clement th pope . adrian th pope . nicholas d. of the house of 〈◊〉 . the first introduction of popes nephews . martin th . pope . pope celestine resigns to boniface th . the first jubilees ordain'd by boniface every years benedict chosen , dies , and is succeeded by clement th . who remov'd his residence ●nto france , . 〈…〉 the 〈◊〉 a great fami●y in milan , made princes of that city by the extirpation of the torri . the 〈…〉 milan . the dukedom of milan falls to the sforz●s . the original of the venetia●s . candia given to the venetians by the french. benedict th pope . clement th pope . the jubilee reduc'd to years . avignon given to the pope by the queen of naples . innocent th pope . urban th pope . gregory th pope . the pope returns to rome , after years absence in france . urban th pope : clement th anti-pope . guns first us'd betwixt the genoveses and venetians urban and clementn succeeded by boniface th & benedict th . boniface dies , innocent th succeeds him , and gregory the th . innocent . alexander th elected , and succeeded by iohn d . three popes at once . martin th . the queen of naples calls in the k. of arragon to her assistance , adopts him , and makes braccio da montone her general . the state of ittaly . notes for div a -e the convenience of colonies . the original of florence the denomination of florence . the first division of florence . the guelfs , and ghibilin faction in florence . the union & government of the city of florence . the antiani . the captain of the people , and podesta . their militia . a generous custome . manfredi . king of naples , a great patron of the ghibilines . ferinata uberti . carlo d' anio call'd into italy by the pope . a new model in florence . new commotion . a second model by the guelfs . the buoni huomini . la credenza . gregory x. florence under excommunication . innocent . the jealousie of the popes . nicolas . the ghibilines return . martinus pope . the government reformed by the citizens . the three priori to goxern two months , to be chosen ▪ out of the city indifferently . the segnori . discord betwixt the nobility and people . the priori the gonfaloniere . perswasion to the nobility to be quiet . the 〈◊〉 to the people . new reformation in florence . the differen ●ein the family of the cancellieri , the occasion and consequence . the bia●chi and ner●● charles of valo●s made governor of florence . new troubles occasioned by corso donati . the medici and giugni . florence burned , . corso donati . condemned . his death . . new divisions . laudo de agobbio . castruccio castracani . the council of the signori to ●it forty months , whereas before it was occasional . election of magistrats by imborsation ramondo da cardona general of the florentines . the duke of athens governor of florence . lod the emperour called into italy . the death of castruccio and the duke of calabria . new reformation . the florentines quiet at home . their buildings . a captain of the guards . maffeo da muradi . lucca sold to the florentines . taken from them by the pisans . the duke of athens . the speech of one of the senators to the duke of athens the dukes answer . . the dukes of athens chosen prince by the people . the duke of athens his practice in florence . 〈◊〉 morrozz● three conspiracies aganist the duke at one time . commotion in florence . the duke expell'd . his character . new reformation . the nobilty depos'd . the nobility attempt to recover their authority . the people arm against them . the nobility utterly depress'd . notes for div a -e emulation betwixt the ●iddle and the meaner sort of people . the ammoniti the citizens oration to the senate . new reformation . gregory xi . holds his residence at avignon . new commission for the management of the war. . a conspiracy of the guelfs . the conspiracy defeated . the speech of salvestro de medici . the balia . reformation again . luigi guicciardini's oration . new troubles the speech of a plebeian . the people rise again . the demands of the people . michaele di lando . michaele overcomes the multitude . the popular faction distinguished from the plebean . reformation the commons expell'd from the government . . michaele lando imprisoned . lodovic's death . carlo d' angio ' s death . magnificenc● envied . benedetto's speech benedetto dies at rhodes . . veri de medici's speech to the senate . donato acciaivoli confin'd . . a new conspiracy defeated . the duke of milan practises against the city . several families banished . . the king of naples dies . notes for div a -e uzano advices against the medici . philippo visconti lord of lombardi . peace betwixt elorence , and milan . imola taken by the duke philip. the florentines overthrown . albizi's exhortation to be quiet . rinaldo de gli albizi . nicolo urano . giovanni de medici 's reply to rinaldo . the sactions of uzano , and the medici the great courage of biagio del milano . the cowardize of zenobi del pino . picinino revolts . carmignuola general of the league . catasto . peace betwixt the league and the duke . . giovanni de medici's speech to his sons at his death . cosino heir his father . giusto . volterra revolts . giusto slain . rinaldo pers●ades the war. uzano opposes it the cruelty of astro. the seravezzesi complain . rinaldo ac●us'd . his speech to the ten. pagolo lord of lucca depos'd . the florentines defeated . . peace betwixt the florentines and lucchesi . nicolo da uzano's answer to barbadori . federig●'s speech to cosimo his prisoner . cosimo banished . . rinaldo's speech to his friends . eugenius the pope labours a peace , cosimo recall'd rinaldo's answer to the pop● . notes for div a -e . the souldiers in italy distinguished into two parties . the duke of milan promises his daughter to conte fran. sforza . the pope invaded , makes peace with fran. sforza . wars in romagna . fran sforza general of the pope's leag●e peace betwixt the league and the duke new ordinances in florence alphonso brought prisoner to duke philip. the dogs and his authority in cenoa . francisco spinola . genoa recovers its liberty . rinaldo's oration to the duke of milan . . the speech of a citizen of lucca to the people . jealousie betwixt the venetian and the coun. the venetians untractable conte di poppi . controversies betwixt the greek and roman churches . determined at florence , by the submission of the greek . the pope deluded , and his country invaded by piccinin● . the conte earnestly persuaded not to desert the venetians . . neri 's speech to the venetian senate . nicolo piccino defeated by the count. escapes to tenna and from thence very strangely to his army . verona surprized by nicolo recovered by the count. the duke encouraged in his expedition into tuscany by nicolo and the florentine exiles . the patriarch of alexandria general for the pope . the patriarch a friend to rinaldo . the pope discovers intelligence betwixt the patriarch and nicolo , and resolves to secure him . the patriarch secured and dies . commissioners to the count from the venetians . the count desirous to follow nicolo . dissuaded by the duke of venice . they 〈◊〉 to a resolution . the count poppi revolts from the flo●rentine . nicolo ill●advised by count poppi . nicolo practises to surprize crotona . brescia reli●ved . the battle of anghiari . piccinino defeated . poppi besieged . poppi's speech to the florentine comissaries . neri's answer . notes for div a -e the duke proposeth a peace . the ingratitude of the venetians . micheletto general for the league . nicolo's insolence to the duke . peace betwixt the duke and the count. naples taken by alfonso . baldaccio general of the flor●ntine foot . . florence reformed . nicolo dyes . troubles in bologna . santi bentivoglio . cosimo 's speech to santi new war in lombardy . the count courted by all parties . duke philip died . . the count made general for the milanesi . the venetians ambition of the dutchy of milan . alfonso ▪ invades the florentines . alsonso retreats of tuscany . the venetians totally defeated . peace betwixt the venetians and the count excluding the milanesi . the oration of one of the milan embassadors to the count. the counts answer . cosimo de medici a friend to francesco . neri cappon● against him . the venetious assist the milanesi . gasparre da vico mercato his advice . francesco enter'd milan , and made duke of it . the duke of milan and the florentines confederate . the king of aragon and the venetian● . embassadors from them to ●lorence . the florentines answer . preparations for war in florence . federigo the emperor enters into florence . tuscany invaded by the king of aragons for●es . stephana porcari . stephano and his confederats put to death . . the vale of begno revolts . . peace betwix● the duke and venetians . alfonso enters into the league . new troubles by giacopo piccinino encourag'd privatly by alfonso . calisto . solicits war against the turks . a prodigious tempest . the genoesi assaulted by alfonso genoa delivered to the french. alfenso dies . calisto . dies and pius . chosen in his chair . the genoesi revolts from the french. . the kingdom of naples invaded by giovanni d' angio . ferrando discomfited . giovannis defeated . notes for div a -e cosimo de medici and neri capponi the two great citizens in florence . luca pitti . girolamo machiavelli . cosimo dies . giacopo piccinino murdered . francesco sforza died . nicolo soderini persuades luca to take arms against piero. the senate and chief citizens attend piero at his house . the enemies of the medici depress'd luca pitti deserted . agnolo 's letter to piero de medici . piero 's answer . the florentines invaded by the venetiant . peace between the florentines and the venetians piero's speech to the florentines . piero de medici dies . tomaso soderini in great favour with the florentines , declines it discreetly . lorenzo and guiliano de medici made princes of the city . a conspiracy of the nard● . bernardo defeated and taken . the duke of milan in florence . tumults in volterra . volt●rra surrendred and sacked . italy in two factions . troubles in tuscany . conspiracy against the duke of milan . the duke of milan slain . notes for div a -e animosity betwixt the pazzi and the medici . conspiracy against lorenzo and guilian di medici . rinato dei pazzi dissuades from the enterprize , but in vain . the conspiracy miscarries . the pope and king of naples make war upon the florentines . lorenzo 's speech to the florentines . the pope and king invade the t●rritories of the florentines . genoa rebels against the state of milan . the gratitude of the fl●rentines . the popes army defeated . antonio tassino a favorite of the dutches. lodovico sforza governor of milan . lorenzo de medeci arrives at niples . new constitutions . the isle of rhodes assaulted by the turks . the embassadors to the pope . the pope replies . the duk● of calabria defeated . a new league . castello besieged by the army of the pope . the colonni provoked the pope , and are ruin'd in rome . the company of s. giorgio . pietra santa taken by lorenzo . aquila rebels against the king of naples . the pope undertakes its protection . peace concluded . the genoeses overthrown . the venetians defeated . count girolamo murdered . the countess revenged the death of her husband . galeotto lord of faenza murdered by his wife . lorenzo de medici . lorenzo died the royal politician represented in one hundred emblems written in spanish by don diego saavedra faxardo ... ; with a large preface, containing an account of the author, his works, and the usefulness thereof ; done into english from the original, by sir ja. astry. idea de un príncipe político-cristiano. english saavedra fajardo, diego de, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing s estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the royal politician represented in one hundred emblems written in spanish by don diego saavedra faxardo ... ; with a large preface, containing an account of the author, his works, and the usefulness thereof ; done into english from the original, by sir ja. astry. idea de un príncipe político-cristiano. english saavedra fajardo, diego de, - . astry, james, sir. v. ([ ], ; [ ], , [ ] p.) : ill., ports. printed for matt. gylliflower ..., and luke meredith ..., london : . includes bibliographical references. frontispieces, title pages and illustrations are engraved. translation of idea de un príncipe político-cristiano. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science. kings and rulers -- duties. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - ben griffin sampled and proofread - ben griffin text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion his royal highness william duke of glocester . printed for m. gillyflower and l. meredith . the royal politician represented in one hundred emblems . written in spanish by don diego saavedra faxardo , knight of the order of st. jago , plenipotentiary ambassador to the cantons of switzerland , at the imperial diet at ratisbon , at the famous treaty of munster , and of the supreme council of state for both the indies . with a large preface , containing an account of the author , his works , and the usefulness thereof . done into english from the original . by sir ja. astry . vol. i. london : printed for matt. gylliflower at the spread-eagle in westminster-hall : and luke meredith at the star in st. paul's church-yard , mdcc . to his highness the most illustrious prince , william , duke of glocester . may it please your highness ; the author of the ensuing work , originally a spaniard , was in his life-time , so highly esteemed for his learning , wisdom , and experience in state affairs , that he made no small figure in the greatest courts of europe . nor has this off-spring of his brain met with less favourable success . for having been translated into several languages , and in each often printed , it has been received with great applause , and ever been honoured with the protection of some illustrious young prince . but precedent , royal sir , is not my only apology for this presumption ; for were saavedra now living , he might see his theory reduced to practice by the best of kings , in the best of governments : and though he has indeed given you excellent maxims , supported by many eminent examples , yet are there none so worthy your imitation , as those you may continually observe , in the conduct and bravery of that most excellent prince , your heroick vncle ; the whole series of whose life as far surpasses panegyrick , as the greatness of his soul abhors flattery . and i was the rather induced to attempt this unpolished version , knowing that honest plain-dealing and unbiassed integrity , the two darling mistresses of our author , could not be unacceptable in a nation where they are so generally beloved , and in a court where they are beyond precedent , more peculiarly cherished and maintain'd . your royal highness will here find discourses , which i hope will not only be divertive to your youth , but profitable even in your ripest years ; by reviving those seeds of honour and virtue , which are daily sown by the pious care and example of your most illustrious parents . you may here learn , not only the duty of a prince , but that also of an accomplish'd states-man and loyal subject : and if ever it shall please god to make you his vicegerent , you may from hence ( next to the holy scriptures ) learn your duty to him also , by whom kings reign , and princes decree justice . in fine : you have here a compleat system of religious politicks , which may guide you through all the labyrinths of government in this world , and crown you with immortality in that to come . but , pardon me , royal sir , i presume not by this address to think , but that the nicest stroaks of our author come far short of your highness's blooming virtue , but as near as perfection can be copied , this work has a right in your royal highness , it shewing not so much what you should be , as ( if we may iudge the ensuing day by the glorious morn ) what you will be , the best of princes . but here i beg leave to retire , having already waded out of my depth , your highness's praises being a topick so profound , that in attempting them , i should only trouble the stream without hopes of ever plumbing the bottom . the main motives to this dedication , were those two inherent passions of mankind , especially writers , interest and ambition ; the first in regard to this work , which has need of no less a name , than that of your royal highness to protect it ; the last in respect to my self , having none greater than to subscribe my self , your highness ' s most faithful and most obedient humble servant , i. a. the author to the reader . in the toilsome leisure of my continual travels over germany , and several other countries , i compos'd these hundred emblems ; wherein you have an idea of a royal christian politician , penning them down at vacant intervals . these i had meditated on in my journeys upon the road , as oft as that continual intercourse i had by letters with his catholick majesty and his ministers , and other publick concerns incumbent on me , gave me time and leisure . by degrees the work swell'd , and though i was well assured , it came far short of perfection , as not being compil'd with that continual application of thought , nor with that accuracy and labour corrected , as was requisite to have render'd it agreeable in all its parts , and an abfolutely perfect piece ; and that it would be thought pride in me , to presume to prescribe precepts to princes : however , the importunity of my friends ( who have ever great influence over me ) prevail'd upon me to publish it ; in which also self-love had some part , for we are generally as fond of the products of our brain , as of those of nature . i write not this , reader , to excuse my errors , for that i can't do sufficiently , but that i may more easily obtain pardon of those , who shall consider my zeal , in having amidst such a croud of business , fatigues , and dangers , compil'd this book , that if any benefit might be reap●d from it , it might accrue to my prince and master ; and least with me should die the experience which i have acquir'd by a continued exercise in bus●ness for four and thirty years , which after five years study in the university of salamanca , i have pass'd in the principal courts of europe , always employ'd in publick affairs , having been at rome at the election of two popes ; at the assembly of the electoral princes at ratisbone when ferdinand the third , the present most august emperor , was created king of the romans ; at eight diets in switzerland ; and lastly at the imperial diet at ratisbone , being plenipotentiary for the most serene house and circle of burgundy . wherefore , if any one of these political counsels or precepts , shall be any ways beneficial to him who is happpily born to govern both the old and new world , i believe this attempt will be excus'd . nor should any one be disgusted at the use of emblems , since god himself is the author of them . the brazen-serpent , the flaming-bush , gideon's fleece , sampson's lion , the priests garments , the amours of the kind spouse , what are they else but emblems ? it has been my chiefest endeavour to have the invention new ; whether the performance be answerable i know not . there have been many ingenious men , who have wrote upon the same subject , and 't is very obvious for different persons to jump upon the same thoughts ; which has been my fortune , having afterwards met with in other authors , those emblems which i at first thought my own invention , which i therefore thought fit wholly to omit , not without prejudice to my design , for my predecessors have made use of several figures and motto's , which has oblig'd me to take up with others less proper . also some political precepts , which though my own , as to the invention at least , yet i have found since to be of other , and far more ancient authority : i have therefore inserted the authors names in the margin , that due honour may be paid to antiquity . 't was the happiness of the wits of former ages , that they could engross from their posterity the glory of invention . i have made it my design and care , to interweave this web with some threads of cornelius tacitus , without doubt the most accomplish'd master of princes , and who most judiciously penetrates their nature , and the customs and intrigues of courts , as also the miscarriages and success of governments ; with precepts and sentences taken from this great man , as with my hand , i lead the prince whom i would mould by these emblems , that he may without danger , gather flowers transplanted hither from anothers garden , and purg'd from the venom and thorns which their native soil frequently subjects them to , or the rankness of those times produc'd . in this second edition , i also illustrate the principal maxims of state , with proofs from holy the scriptures ; for those politicks which are refin'd in that furnace , may be truly call'd , silver try'd and refined seven times in the fire of truth . and who would learn of a heathen , or impious person , when the holy spirit is so ready to give instruction ? in explaining the emblems , i am not too prolix , that the reader may not lose the satisfaction of discovering their meaning of himself . if by chance , in my discourse , i sprinkle a little learning , it is not out of ostentation , but to enlighten the prince's mind , and render the instruction more agreeable . the whole work consists purely of state maxims and rules , those being the fittest materials for such a politick building ; however i don 't barely propose them , but intermix them with the whole discourse , applying them all along to particular cases , to avoid the danger of general precepts . it has been also my endeavour to render the stile polite , but without affectation ; short too and concise , but not obscure ; which in horace's judgment was a difficult matter , and of which i have not yet seen an instance in the castillian language . i have however made an essay towards it , knowing that what is written to princes should be neither idly sententious , nor superfluously copious . their time is precious , and he does not a little obstruct the publick interest , who with empty and frivolous discourse diverts them from affairs of greater importance . i don't so wholly confine my self to the institution and direction of princes , but that i also descend to governments , reflect upon their growth , preservation , and fall ; and so to frame a minister of state , and a prudent courtier . if at any time i am liberal of my commendations of any , 't is to excite emulation , not to flatter , to which i am very averse ; for it were a crime unpardonable to publish to the whole world , flatteries , and those too engraven in brass , or to make my self guilty of the very same thing , which i so much reprove and discommend in others . if i speak the truth with too much freedom , 't is to be imputed to ambition , which is so deeply rooted in mens minds , that without fire and sword 't is incurable . the doctrine is general ; but if any one shall from ● resemblance of vices , think himself levell'd at , or that what is blam'd in him is commended in others , 't is not my fault . as also when i reprove princes actions , or reflect upon tyrants , or only on the nature of sovereignty , it being no new or unusual thing , for a good prince to do ill , when either he is not clearly inform'd of the truth , or governed by ill counsellors . the same i would have understood of common-wealths , if in any thing i seem to dislike them ; for either my reflections are upon what is very usual in communities , or at least comprehend not those crown'd and well constituted republicks , whose government is generous and royal. i have us'd examples , both ancient and modern ; those for their authority , these partly as being more persuasive , partly too , because by reason of propinquity of time , the state of affairs is less altered , and consequently may with less danger be imitated , and a prudent and politick judgment may more safely be formed thereon , which is the principal advantage of history . nor is our age so barren of virtuous and great atchievements , as not to have furnish'd us and our posterity with good examples . besides , really it were black and envious in us to extol ancient , without the least regard to modern actions . i am well assur'd , reader , that books of this nature which treat of state affairs , are like † statues , which in running at the quintin , all aim at with their lances , all strike . i well know that whoever designs to be an author , must submit to the black ink , and press of detraction , ( which i design'd to signify by this emblem ; ) but withal i am not ignorant , that the blacker that ink , with which the letters are daub'd , and the closer the press wherewith they are press d , the fairer afterwards , and more conspicuous they appear . the translator to the reader . i will not endeavour with rhetorical flourishes to captivate any person into a good opinion of my author , or his work , being sensible i should therein do an injury to his memory , who has so often declared his aversion to flattery . i only desire the reader to remember always that he was by birth a spaniard , and though educated in the church of rome , was by profession a lawyer and statesman , who being generally wiser , are less bigotted to the foolish principles and practices of that religion . however , as i think it on the one hand needless to vindicate the illustrious house of nassau from his partial reflections , ( which were modish in the spanish court when he wrote ) the whole world being satisfied in the iustice of their cause , the heroick prosecution thereof , and what additional laurels they justly acquir'd thereby ; so on the other side , i would not be thought to recommend his religion either to prince or people . we too lately escaped the snare , to be again entangled with the knaveries or fooleries , to say no worse , of the church or court of rome ; and next under god must own our sole deliverance to a branch of that ancient and imperial family , our present gracious sovereign . these precautions being observed , i humbly presume this book will be of excellent use to all ingenuous persons of what degree or quality soever . for though by the title it seems calculated for the meridian of kings and princes only , yet it in some measure comprehends all persons within the circumference of their dominions . the statesman and politician may herein learn what qualifications they ought to be endowed with for negotiations , either at home , or in foreign courts ; how by avoiding the vices usually attending their high stations , and embracing the contrary virtues , they may render their actions meritorious to their prince or country . the officers and soldiers of an army may here without danger behold the methods and stratagems their predecessors have used to conquer their enemies , and learn that their greatest interest consists in good order and discipline , and absolute obedience to their superiors , that vice is as pernicious in a camp as a court , and that bravery and virtue in conjunction merit the greatest reward and affection from their prince or country . the merchants and seamen may here behold the vast advantage , their profession is to a government , and how ships are the moveable poles , on which the stability thereof depends . in fine , all persons of learning , sense , or reason , may from many excellent precepts and eminent examples contain'd therein , improve and refine their talents to the greatest advantage imaginable , remembring always my previous caution to avoid some few mistaken aphorisms of his religion and country . our celebrated author , don diego saavedra faxardo , knight of the order of st. jago , was born of a noble family of murcia in spain . he was the son of peter de saavedra and fabiana faxardo , who was also of noble extraction . he was educated in the university of salamanca , in the profession of the laws , wherein he became very eminent , especially in those parts thereof which are requisite for the accomplishment of an absolute politician and compleat statesman . from thence he was chosen secretary to cardinal gaspar borgia , vice-roy of naples , and soon after resident for his catholick majesty at rome ; where his conduct gain'd him so great applause , that he was sent on the same imploy into switzerland : after that , he was plenipotentiary-ambassador at two imperial diets at ratisbone ; and then commanded to assist don gaspar de bracamont , count de pennecranda , at the famous treaty of munster , where he gave signal demonstration of his great experience and dexterity in the management of the most difficult affairs of state. at his return he sate in the supreme council for the government of both the indies ; in which imploy he died at madrid in the year . all that i know more of him , you may find in his own preface , to which , for brevity sake i refer you . the greatness of his personal character and reputation , and of this book in particular , are too well-establish'd in the world to require any panegyricks on either ; but if the reader desire to see how this work was admired by some of the most learned of the age , let him read the epistles prefix'd to the latin version thereof . his religious temper more particularly appears in the great veneration he always shews for the holy scripture , and his apt application thereof ; and his politicks no less by being so well read in tacitus , the great master thereof . were that excellent roman now living , he could not but be pleased , to see the roughness and crabbedness of his stile so finely polish'd , without diminution to the profoundness of his sense and iudgment , in our english version ; though in the annotations thereof , he would find himself rivald , if not excell'd by a modern politician . but there is no greater argument to prove the general approbation and kind reception thereof , than the various editions in several languages , besides the original , as latin , french , italian , portugese , and high-german . to enumerate the particuler times and places of each impression would be superfluous , were they all known to us . let it suffice to inform you , that the impression of the original we chiefly made use of in this version , is the fourth edition , printed at valencia , . as being the most correct we could meet with . he wrote also a book , entituled , corona gothica , castellanice , & austriaca politicamente illustrada , printed at madrid , . though , as some say , be died before he had compleated it . and here i cannot but observs how disingenuous ( to say no worse ) the italian and french translators , or rather corruptors , of our author have been , especially the last , who not content only to omit whole pages and sections , very material to the purpose , have foisted in their own fulsome flatteries instead thereof , basely perverting his very sense and meaning , to comply with the interest and ambition of particular persons or governments . so dangerous a thing is truth it s some nations . but we have those rather to draw the copy after the full proportion of the original , being satisfied we have the happiness to live in so well constituted a government , and under so excellent a king , that truth and integrity are now become the great accomplishments of a courtier . our aut●or taking occasion so often to mention alphonsus the wise , i presume it will not be thought unnecessary , or be unacceptable to some readers , to give a short account of him . ●he was the tenth of that name , king of leon and castile , and was also sirnamed the astrologer , and succeeded his father , ferdinand the third , . he made the astronomical tables , still extant , which are called from his name , tabulae alphonsinae ; and 't is certainly affirm'd , that he spent crow●s in the composition of them . he refused the imperial crown of germany , which was offered him after the rejection of richard , duke of cornwall , contenting himself only with the title of emperor , which some say he resigned to pope gregory the tenth , whereof he repented , and would have reassumed the imperial title and arms ; but was deterred for fear of an excommunication against him . he was successful against the moors ; but at length dethron'd by his own son sancho , and died for grief in anno . in a great sickness , after many remedies used in vain , he began to read quint. curtius's history of alexander the great , which he did with so much delight , that he recovered his health ; whereupon he said , farewell avieen , hippocrates , and the whole croud of doctors , give me my curtius that hath saved my life . he had read the bible fourteen times , with several commentaries upon it ; he was a great astrologer , and after he had deeply considered the fabrick of the world , the following saying of his , reported by lipsius , denotes him to have been none of the most pious ; viz. that if god had advised with him in the creation , he could have given him good counsel● . by the great captain , often also mentioned , is meant gonzales of cordova , who served under ferdinand and isabella , in the conquest of granada , and was very famous in his time. it may perhaps , according to custom , be expected we should give some account of the present performance ; but that indeed is a very ticklish point ; for to commend , or even iustify it would favour of vanity ; and to discover its imperfections , would be very disobliging to our friends , the booksellers . i shall therefore in the words of an ingenuous and iudicious author , desire you to consider , that there are certain graces and happinesses , peculiar to every language which give life and energy to the words . and whosoever offers at a verbal translation , shall have the misfortune of that young traveller , who lost his own language abroad , and brought home no other instead thereof . for the grace of the spanish will be lost by being turned into english words ; and the grace of the english by being turned into spanish phrase . however we have endeavoured to come as near the sense of the original , as we could , without offering to be fidi interpretes , that properly belonging to those who translate matters of faith , or such facts of moment as have relation thereunto . the reader is desired to take notice that our author , a all others of his religion , makes use of the vulgar translation in his quotations out of the holy scripture , which in many places is so different from the english version , that they are not applicable to the purpose for which he quotes them . for instance the seventy eighth emblem is a syren or mermaid , and the motto , formosa superne . in the beginning thereof , he quotes isaiah . . et sirenes in delubris voluptatis , which we translate , and dragons in their pleasant places . how beautiful they are , unless we do them wrong , i leave you to judge . the fifty fifth emblem , is a hand holding a scepter full of eyes ; the motto , his praevide & provide . he there quotes jeremiah . . where the vulgar has virgam vigilantem ego video ; the english , i see the rod of an almond tree ; which literally taken , is little to his purpose , and therefore we leave it in the sense he took it . the word in the hebrew , is saked , for an almond tree , and verse the th , then said the lord unto me , thou hast well seen , for i will hasten my word to perform it . the almond tree is there mentioned as an emblem of hast ; the word saked , an almond tree , alluding to sakad , a word which signifies making haste . nor is the allusion frivolous , for pliny says , floret omnium prima amygdala , mense januario , martio veró poma maturat . lib. . c. . . now , if any person thinks himself represented herein , and likes not his picture , let him consider he sate not for it , and if he finds any strokes too bold , let him not blame the artist , but amend the original . as for that little popery that is in it , it has been so solidly confuted by many eminent divines of the church of england , and so ridicul'd by others , that i presume , it cannot have the least influence on the meanest protestant of the nation . in answer to what he reflects on some of his majesty's heroick ancestors , ( if it may not rather be called an encomium ) i refer the reader to that most excellent and unanswerable apology , wrote by the prince of orange himself , and published in all languages . and for a conclusion , accept of the following epigram , by an unknown hand , representing that illustrious prince , as prophetically , speaking to william the third , our present gracious sovereign . nassovius coeli miratus ab arce nepotem ad summum tantis passious ire decus ; macte , inquit , sanguis noster ; tibi cedimus ultro , quandoquidem cedunt terra fretumque tibi . me duce parta meis libertas pristina belgis , orbis hyperbore●s , te duce , liber erit . in english. when nassau from the skies beheld his son , with such large steps the race of honour run ; proceed , my boy , proceed with joy , said he ; i do , since earth and sea submit to thee . i only to my country freedom gave , you will the northern world from bondage save . the contents and order of the emblems of the first part. the education of a prince .   emb. page valour exerts its self even in the cradle . i. hinc labor , & virtus , and then art draws its drafts as on blank canvass . ii. ad omnia , fortifying and adorning the body with honourable exercises . iii. robur & decus , and the mind with liberal sciences . iv. non solum armis , in●till'd with pleasant industry v. cum delectatione informat , and adorn'd with polite learning . vi. politioribus ornantur literae , how a prince ought to regulate his actions . let him know things as they are in themselves not as represented by the passions . vii . auget & minuit , let his anger submit to reason . viii . prae oculis ira , let him not be mov'd by envy which is its own executioner . ix . sui vindex , and proceeds from glory and fame . x. fama nocet , let a prince be cautious in his discourse , for from thence his mind is known . xi . ex pulsu noscitur , let him shadow lyes with truth . xii . excoecat candor , and be assured that his defects will be the subject of obliquy . xiii . censurae pater , which both reproves and am●nds him . xiv . detra●it & decorat , let him value reputation beyond life , xv. d●m i●ceam peream , comparing his own actions with those of his ancestors . xvi . purpura juxta purpuram , but not rest satisfied with the trophies and glories deriv'd from them . xvii . alienis spoliis , let him own his scepter from god. xviii . a deo , ● and that he must resign it to his successor . xix . viciss●m traditu● , knowing that a crown is but a deceit●ul good. xx. fallax bonum , let him rus● and correct by laws . xxi . regit & corrigit . ● and establish his majesty with iustice and clemency . xxii . praesidia majestatis , let reward be the price of valour . xxiii . preti●m virtutis , let him always have respect to the true religion . xxiv . immobilis ad immobile numen , let him place in that , the stability and security of his empire . xxv . hic tutior , and hopes of victory . xxvi . in hoc signo , not in the false and counterfeit . xxvii . specie religionis , let him consult times present , past , and to come , xxviii . quae sint , quae fuerint , quae mox ventura sequantur , and not particular cases which rarely succeed● . xxix . non semper tripodem , but by the experience of many who establish wisdom . xxx . fulcitur experientiis , this will teach him to maintain his crown with reputation . xxxi . existimatione nixa , not to depend on popular opinion ; xxxii . ne requaesiveris extra , nor be discompos'd at change of fortune . xxxiii . semper idem , to endure and hope . xxxiv . ferend● & sperand● , to draw felicity from adversity . xxxv . interclusa respirat , to sai● with every wind. xxxvi . in contraria ducet , of two evils to ●huse the least . xxxvii . minimum eligendum , how a prince ought to behave himself towards his subjects and strangers . let him make himself belov'd and fear'd by all men , xxxviii . cum blandimento & rigore , being the altar to which they flee for succour . xxxix . omnibus , let his ability be the measure of his liberality xl. quae tribuunt tribuit , let him avoid extreams , xli ne quid nimis , mixing pleasure with profit . xlii . omne ●ulit punctum , that he may know how to reign , let him learn to diss●mble , xliii . ut sciat regnare , and not discover his designs , xliv . nec à quo , nec ad quem , nor rely too much on his majesty . xlv . non majestate securus , but think always he may be deceiv'd , xlvi . fallimur opinione , by the specious pretenders to vertue , xlvii . et juvisse nocet , no less than flatterers . xlviii . sub luce lues , how a prince ought to behave himself towards his ministers of state. let their authority be only dependent . xlix . lumine solis , that they may be always subject to his d●sple●sure as well as favour . l. jovi & fulmini . ● let his confidence be always vigilant . li. ●ide & diffide , ●● for evil ministers are most dangerous in the highest posts . lii . magis quam in terra noc●●s , herein they exercise their ava●ice ; liii . custodiunt non carpunt , and desire rather to depend o● themselves than the prince . liv. a se pendet , counsellors are the eyes of the sc●pter , lv. his praevide & provide , secretaries are the compass . lvi . qui à secretis ab omnibus , ● they are both wheels in the clock of government , but not the hand . lvii . uni reddatur , then let him give them all sorts of honour without prejudice to his own . lviii . sine detrimento lucis si●● , how a prince ought to behave himself in the government of his states and ki●gdoms . counsel and strangth are necessary to preserve-them . lix . cum arte & cum manu , for let him be assured , that if they increase not they will diminish . lx. vel ascendit vel descendit , let him know well all the strings of his government , and take care that the greater strings agree with the less . lxi . m●jora minoribus consonant , without discovering the artifice of their harmony . lxii . nulli patet , let him consider the beginning , and end of his resolutions . lxiii . consule utrique , let him be slow in consultation , and quick in execution . lxiv . statu● & exequere , let him correct errours before they multiply . lxv . ex uno error● multi , let him see that his countrey be well peopled , and breed up subjects fi● for the magistracy . lxvi . ex fascibus fasces , let him not over-burthen them with taxes . lxvii . amputat non excindit , let him encourage trade and commerce , which are the poles of common-wealths , lxviii . his polis , keeping to himself the power of war and peace , by his sword and his purse . lxix . fer●o & auro , ●● let him not divide his state between his children lxx . dum scinditur frangor , industry overcomes all things . lxxi . labor omnia vincit , rest renews strength lxxii . vires alit , how a prince ought to behave himself , in the internal and external disorders of his states seditions are appeas'd by c●lerity and division . lxxiii . compress● quiescunt , war ought to be 〈◊〉 taken , to acquire peace . lxxiv . in fulcrum pacis , h● who s●ws discord reaps wars . lxxv . bellum colligit qui discordia● seminat , which are caused by the ill intentions of ministers . lxxvi . intrat lux & exit flamma , and by the interviews of princes . lxxvii . praesentia noce● , let a prince 〈◊〉 of specious pretences . lxxviii . formosa superné , which ought to be delud●d by others of the same kind . lxxix . consilia consiliis ●rustrantur . by being in a readiness against a rupt●●●e . lxxx . in arena & ante arenam , and considering his strength . lxxxi . quid valeant vives , pl●cing his glory and bravery in arms. lxxxii . decus in armis , for upon the exercise of them depends the preservation of his states . lxxxiii . qffendunt & defendunt , let him act more by counsel than force . lxxxiv . plura consilio quam vi , avoiding middle counsels . lxxxv . consilia media fugi●da , let him personally assist in the wars of his state. lxxxvi . rebus adest , always remembring , that his arms flourish most ; when god is of his side . lxxxvii . auspice deo , that he ought to adjust his will to his divine decrees . lxxxviii . volentes trahimur , that concord overcomes all things . lxxxix . concordiae cedunt , that the best stratagem is diversion . xc . disjunctis viribus , that he ought not to confide in reconciled friends . xci . solidari non potest , that protection is generally pernicious . xcii . protegunt at destruunt , that leagues with hereticks are dangerous . xciii . impia foedera , that the mitre ought to s●ine equally all the world over . xciv . librata refulget . neutrality neither makes friends , nor gains enemies . xcv . neutri adhaerendum , how a prince ought to behave himself in victories and treaties of peace . in victory let him be always mindful of adversity . xcvi . memor adversae , making use of the spoils to augment his own strength . xcvii . fortior spoliis , and concluding peace under the shield . xcviii . sub clypeo , for the pleasures of peace are the fruit of war. xcix . merces belli , how a prince ought to behave himself in his old age. let him consider that his last actions crown his government . c. qui legitimè certaverit , and prognosticate what his successor will be . ci. futurum indicat , and that he is equal to the r●st of ●●●kind in the p●ngs of death . cii . ●udibria mortis ,   of the education of a prince . emblem i. valour is born , not acquired ; 't is an intrinsick quality of the soul which is infused with it , and immediately exerts it self : the very mothers womb was a field of battel to the two brothers , iacob and esau . of thamar's twins , one by nature more daring , when he could not be born before his brother , broke however the ligature , and thrust out his hand , as if he would snatch the eldership from him . a great soul exerts it self in the cradle : hercules crowned , by the conquest of two serpen●● , from that day exposing himself to envy , and making fortune truckle to his vertue . a generous spirit is conspicuous in the very first actions of nature . the infa●●● of spain , your highness his uncle of blessed memory , saw the battel of norlinguen almost even before he knew what war was , and even then knew how to command with prudence and act with vigour . cyrus , a very boy when elected king by those of his own age did in that childish government such heroick a●●●●●s , as sufficiently manifested his secret greatness 〈…〉 and royal genius , natures most excellent pro●●ct●ons are themselves their own discoverers . amid●● the rude and unrefined mass of oar , the diamond ●●●rkles , and gold glisters . the young lion as soon 〈…〉 , views his paws , and with a haughty me● , shakes his curled main ●carce yet dry , as preparing to fight . childish games , to which princes are carried by a natural impulse , are signs and prognosticks of maturer actions . nature is never so much as a moment idle , but from the very birth of it's off-spring is industrious in a regular formation of its mind as well as body ; for this reason , she has stampt such an extraordinary affection upon parents to excite their d●●●gence in well educating their children ; and least they should ( which is no unusual thing ) with a strange nurses milk , imbibe also her vicious practices , the same nature , provident in her distributions , has dispenced as it were a double fountain of purer blood , to supply them with nourishment for their young ones : but either idleness , or fear of losing their beauty , is frequently the occasion why mothers ( not without considerable detriment to the commonwealth ) neglect their duty , and give the suckling of their children to others ; which abuse , since it cannot so easily be remedied , at least great care should be taken in the choice of them . let them be healthy , of a good family , and well bred ; for as from the conception to the birth the child is nourished in the body of its mother , so is it from its birth till 't is weaned , by the nurse's breast , and this last interval being longer than the other , the child must of necessity imbibe more of the nature of its nurse than its mother , says the wise king alphonso , who prescribed laws to heaven and earth . the second obligation parents lie under , is the education of their children : there 's scarce any animal will forsake its young ones without direction given how to provide for themselves . nor are the advantages of education less considerable than those of nature , and children are more ready to embrace their parents instructions and bear their reproofs , than those of others : those particularly who are nobly born disdain to be govern'd by their inferiours . in a childs first procreation , it received nothing from the father but a body , for god alone is the authour of the soul , which except the father afterwards cultivates and improves by education , he will scarce deserve the name of a true and absolute father . nor is it new in holy scripture for a master to be called father . for example , iubal the first teacher of musick . and who , i pray , is fitter to teach his son how to appear with majesty , how to keep a decorum in all things , maintain his authority , and govern his subjects , than the prince himself ? he only has the full practick knowledge of government , which others knows only in part and by speculation : nor without reason did solomon boast that he received great improvement from his fathers instructions ; however since fathers sometimes have not themselves the qualifications requisite for a good education of their children , or at least have not leisure to take that trouble upon them , masters must be looked for of an unblamable life and conversation ; eminent withall for learning and experience ; such as king alphonso in his laws describes in these words . so that for all these reasons , kings ought to tak● great care of their children , and to choose them tutours of a good family and good livers , sound both in mind and body , and above all faithfull and just , firm to the interest of their king and country . to which i add , that they ought to be men of valour and a great spirit , well experienced in affairs , as well of peace as war , such was seneca , whom therefore agrippina made choice of for nero's master . 't is impossible , without doubt , for a man of an abject and mean spirit to imprint on a prince thoughts more sublime than his own . were an owl to instruct an eagle , she would not teach her to look on the sun , or soar above lofty cedars ; her school would be kept altogether in the dark , amidst the lower branches . the master's image appears in the scholar , and in him , he in a manner represents himself . for no other reason did pharaoh make ios●●● lord of his house , and ruler of all his substance , but to teach his princes to be like himself . those who have the tuition and government of princes sons , ought to be as careful of their tender years , as gardiners are of their most delicate plants , which even before they appear above ground ; they secure with fences to prevent their being injured , by treading on , or handling . on the first stroak depends the perfection of a picture , so does a good education on what the first years have imbibed , before the passions get strength and refuse to submit to reason . from a very minute seed a vast tree proceeds , which however small a twig at first , and easily flexible every way , when 't is invested with bark , and has diffused it self into branches , stands immoveable . the affections in youth are not much unlike poison , which having once made its passage into the heart , leaves the paleness consequent to it incurable . vertues that improve and increase with our age have not only the precedency of others , but excell even themselves . of the four winged animals in ezekiel's vision , the eagle , one of that very number , was carried higher than all those four , for because she as soon as hatcht began to have wings , the others not till long after , she not only appeared above them , but her self too . for want of a suitable consideration of this , i imagine it is that many persons usually commit the care of their sons as soon as they come into the world , to women , who with the idle fear of shadows , agreeable to the genius of their sex , enfeeble their minds , and stamp other effoeminate passions on them , which with time take deep root . to avoid this inconveniency , the persian kings commited theirs to the care of persons of worth and prudence . but above all , children's natures are to be taken particular notice of , it being impossible without it to draw a true scheme of education . now no age is more proper for it than their infancy , when nature as yet free from envy and dissimulation , sincerely discloses it self ; when in their forehead , eyes , hands , their smiles and other motions of their body , their passions and inclinations appear without disguise . the ambassadours of bearn having power given them by the illustrious william of moncada to choose which of his sons for their prince they thought fit ; upon observation , that ones hand was clinched , the others open , chose this latter , interpreting it to be a sign of munificence and liberality , as it afterwards prov'd . if an infant be of a generous and great mind , at hearing his own commendations he smooths his brows , looks pleasantly and smiles ; on the contrary , when discommended , he is concerned , blushes and casts his eyes on the ground ; if of an undaunted spirit , he looks stern , is not terrified with shadows or threats ; if liberal , he despises toyes and presents , or readily parts with them again to others ; if revengeful , he continues angry , is all in tears till he have satisfaction ; if he be cholerick , the least trifle puts him in a heat , he lets fall his brows , looks dogged , and threatens with his fist ; if affable , with a sweet smile and alluring eye , he wins favour and acceptance ; if melancholy , he avoids company , delights in solitude , is often complaining , seldom laughs , and generally looks sullen ; if he be airy , he unfolds the wrinkles of his forehead , and now gratefully fixing his eyes seems to dart a pleasing light , by and by with a kind of complacency withdrawing them , and agreeably pleating his brows , betrays the chearfulness of his mind . thus does the heart represent the other vertues also , and vices in the face and exterior motions of the body , till more cautious age has taught it to conceal them . in the very cradle and nurse's arms , the whole court admired in your highness , a certain natural pleasantness and grateful majesty , and indeed that grave carriage and presence of mind which appeared in you highness , when the two kingdoms of castile and leon took an oath of allegiance to you , exceeded the ordinary capacity of your years . i would not have however , these reflections of mine upon infancy be look'd upon as infallible and without exception , for nature sometimes deviates from her common road , and deceives the too curious enquirer , there are some , who tho' vitious in their infancy , when at years of discretion take up and reform , which happens perhaps , because one of a great and haughty spirit despises education , and consequently is subdued by his natural passions , while right reason is too weak to resist them , till that getting strength he acknowledges its errours and corrects them effectually : 't was a cruel and barbarous custom therefore of the brachmans , who either killed or exposed their children after they were two months old in the woods , if there appeared in them any tokens of an ill nature . as inhumane were the lacedaemonians who threw theirs into the river taygetes . both seemed to make no account of education , of right reason and free-will which usually correct and regulate natural affections . this also seems unaccountable , when nature joyns some eminent vertues with the most enormous vices in the same person ; as too different slips are often grafted upon two branches , which growing out of the same root produce different , nay contrary fruits , bitter and sweet . this was visible in alcibiades of whom 't was a question whether he was more eminent for his vertues or vices . and thus nature works ' ere she has begun to know her self , but reason afterwards and industry correct and polish her operations . lastly since i proposed to my self by these emblems to give an exact model of a prince from the cradle to the tomb , it won't be amiss to accommodate my rudiments and stile to each particular age , as plato and aristotle have done . at present , i advise that special care be taken to render his arms and legs active by exercise . if by chance any of his limbs should be crooked they may be straightned by artificial instruments . let ●rightful spectacles which may injure the imaginative faculty be kept from him : let him not be suffered to look asquint at any thing : use him gradually to the sha●pness of the air , nor should musick be wanting to quicken his spirits now and then : for whatever new thing children meet with , that 't is they admire , that makes the deepest impression on their imagination . emblem ii. with pencil and colours art admirably expresses every thing . hence , if painting be not nature , it certainly comes so near it as that often its works deceive the sight , and are not to be distinguished but by the touch . it can't , it 's true , animate bodies , but it frequently draws the beauty , motions and affections of the soul. altho' indeed it cannot intirely form the bodies themselves for want of matter , yet the pencil so exquisitely describes them on canvass , that besides life there 's nothing that you can desire more . nature i believe would envy art if she could possibly do the same , but now she is so kind , as in many things to use the assistance of art ; for whatever the industry of this can perfect , that nature does not finish her self . thus we see man is born without any manner of knowledge or propriety of speech , instruction and learning being left to draw the lineaments of arts and sciences on his mind as on a blank canvass , and education to imprint morality thereon , not without great advantage to humane society ; for hence it comes to pass that by one mans having occasion for the assistance of another , the bonds of gratitude and affection are strengthened : for nature has sown the seed of vertue and knowledge in all of us , we are equally born to those goods of the mind , which must be cultivated and quicken'd by some other hand . but 't is necessary these measures be taken in the tender years , while the mind is fitter to receive all manner of forms , so readily apprehensive of sciences as to appear rather to remember than first learn them ; which plato made use of as an argument to prove the immortality of the soul ; but if this be negle●●●● in the first age , the affections by degrees get ground , and their depraved inclinations make so deep an impression upon the will as no education can efface . the bear no sooner whelps but licking the limbs of her deformed litter while they are soft , perfects and brings them to shape , whereas if she suffered them to grow firm her pains would be ineffectual . it was wi●ely done ( in my judgment ) of the kings of persia to commit their sons in their infancy to masters , whose care it should be for the first seven years of their life to organize their bodies : in the second to strengthen them by using them to fencing and the like exercises . to these they after added four select persons to give the finishing stroaks ; the first eminent for learning , made 'em scholars ; the second a discreet , sober man , taught them to govern and bridle their appetites ; the third a lover of equity , inculcated the administration of justice ; lastly the fourth eminently valiant and experienced in war●are , instructed them in mili●ary discipline , especially endeavouring by incentives to honour , to divert their minds from fear and cow●ardice . but this good education is particularly necessa●●y in princes as they are the instruments of politick happiness and publick safety . in others the neglect of a good education is only prejudicial to single persons or at least influences very few : but in a prince 't is not only against his private , but every ones common interest , whilst some he injures immediately by his actions , others by his example . man well educated is the most divine creature in the world ; if ill , of all animals the most savage . what , i pray , can you expect from a prince who is ill educated , and has got the supreme power in his hands ? other evils of a common wealth are of no long continuance , this never terminates but with the princes life . of what importance a good and honourable education is , philip king of macedon was sensible , declaring in his letters to aristotle upon the birth of his son alexander his obligation to the gods , not so much for giving him a son , as that he was born at a time when he could make use of such a master , and 't is certainly never convenient to leave nature otherwise good , to her self and her own operations , since the best is imperfect and requires some external industry to cultivate it , as indeed do most things necessary for man's well being . the punishment derived to us by the fault of our first parents being not to enjoy any thing without labour and the sweat of the brow , how can you expect a tree to bear sweet fruit unless you transplant it , or by grassing it upon stems of a more refined and generous nature , correct its wildness . education improves the good and instructs the bad . this was the reason why trajan became so eminent a governour , b●cause he added industry to his natural parts and ha● the direction of such a master as plutarch . nor ha● king peter sirnamed the cruel , ever proved so barb●rous and tyrannical had iohn alphonso , duke of alb●querque , his tutor , known how to mollifie and break hi● haughty temper . there 's the same difference in men● dispositions as in metals , some of which are proof against fire , others dissolve in it ; yet all give way to the graving tools , are maleable and ductile . so there 's no humour so rugged but care and correction may hav● some effect on . altho' i confess education is not always sufficient of it self to make men vertuous , because many times under purple as among briars and woods , there spring up such monstrous vices , particularly in persons of a great spirit , as prove utterly incorrigible . what is more obvious than for young men to be deba●ched by luxury , liberty or flattery in princes courts , where abundance of vicious affections grow as thorns , as noxious and unprofitable weeds upon ill manured land. wherefore except these courts are well instituted the care taken in a good education will be to very little purpose ; for they seem to be like moulds and accordingly so form the prince as themselves are well or ill disposed , and those vertues or vices which have once began to be in repute in them , their ministers transmit to posterity . a prince is scarce master of his reason when his courtiers out of flattery cry up the too great liberty of his parents and ancestors , recommending to him some great and renowned actions of theirs , which have been as it were the propriety of his family . hence also it comes to pass that some particular customs and inclinations are propagated from father to son in a continued succession , not so much by the native force of their blood , ( for neither length of time nor mixtures of marriage are used to change them ) as because they are established in the courts where infancy imbibes them and as it were turns them into nature , thus among the romans the claudii were reputed proud , the scipio's warlike , the appii ambitious ; as now in spain the gusmans are looked upon to be good men , the mendozas humane , the mauriques have the character of formidable , the toletan's severe and grave . the same is visible in artificers , when any of a family have attained an excellency , they easily transmit it to their children , the spectatours of their art and to whom they leave their works and monuments of their labour . to all this may be added , that flattery mixt with errour sometimes commends in a boy for vertue what by no means deserves that name , as lewdness , ostentation , insolence , anger , revenge and other vices of the like nature ; some men erroneously perswading themselves that they are tokens of a great spirit ; which withall induces 'em too eagerly to pursue these , to the neglect of real vertues : as a maid sometimes if she be commended for her free carriage or confidence , applies her self to those rather than modesty and honesty , the principal good qualities of that sex. tho' indeed young men ought to be driven from all vices in general , yet more especially from those which tend to laziness or hatred they being more easily imprinted in their minds . care therefore must be taken that the prince over-hear no filthy or obscene expressions , much less should he be suffered to use them himself : we easily execute what we make familiar to us in discourse , at least something near it . wherefore to prevent this evil the romans used to choose out of their families some grave ancient matron to be their sons governess , whose whole care and employment was to give them a good education , in whose presence it was not allowable to speak a foul word or admit an indecent action . the design of this severe discipline was that their nature being pr●● served pure and untainted , they might readily embrace honest professions . quintilian laments th●● neglect of this manner of education in his time children being usually brought up among servan●● and so learning to imitate their vices . nor , says he , 〈◊〉 any one of the family concerned what he says or do●● before his young master , since even their parents don●● so much inure them to vertues and modesty as la● sciviousness and libertinism . which to this day is usual in most princes courts : nor is there any remedy for it , but displacing those vicious courtie●● and substituting others of approved vertue who may excite the princes mind to actions more generous and such as tend to true honour . when a cou●● has once bid adieu to vertue , 't is often changed but never for the better , nor does it desire a prince better than it self . thus nero's family were favourers o● otho , because he was like him . but if the princ● cannot do this , i think it were more adviseable for him to leave that court , as we remember iames th● st . king of arragon did , * when he saw himself tyrannized over by those who educated and confined him as it were in a prison : nor can i give those cour●● any other name , where the principal aim is to enslave the princes will , and he is not suffered to go this way or that by choice and at his own pleasure , but is forcibly guided as his courtiers please , just as water 〈◊〉 conveighed thro' private channels for the sole benefit of the ground thro' which it passes . to what purpose are good natural parts and education , if the prince is suffered to see , hear and know no more than his attendance think fit ? what wonder if henry the th . king of castile † proved so negligent and sluggish , so like his father iohn the second in all things , after he had been educated among the same flatterers that occasioned his fathers male administration ? believe me , 't is as impossible to form a good prince in an ill court , as to draw a straight line by a crooked square : there 's not a wall there which some lascivious hand has not sullied ; not a corner but echoes their dissolute course of life : all that frequent the court are so many masters and as it were ideas of the prince , for by long use and conversation each imprint something on him which may either be to his benefit or prejudice ; and the more apt his nature is to learn , the sooner and more easily he imbibes those domestick customs . i dare affirm that a prince will be good if his ministers are so ; bad if they be bad : an instance of this we have in the emperor galba , who when he light upon good friends and gentlemen , was governed by them , and his conduct unblameable ; if they were ill , himself was guilty of inadvertency . nor will it suffice to have thus reformed living and animate figures in a court , without proceeding also to inanimate : for tho' the graving tool and pencil are but mute tongues , yet experience has taught us they are far more eloquent and perswasive . what an incitement to ambition is alexander the great 's statue ? how strangely do pictures of iupiter's lewd amours inflame lust ? besides , for which our corrupt nature is blameable , art is usually more celebrated for these kind of things than vertuous instructive pieces ; at first indeed the excellency of the workmanship makes those pieces valuable , but afterwards lascivious persons adorn the walls with them to please and entertain the eyes . there should be no statue or piece of painting allowed , but such as may create in the prince a glorious emulation . the heroick atchievements of the ancients are the properest subjects for painting , statuary and sculpture ; those let a prince look on continually , those read ; for statues and pictures are ●ragments of history always before our eyes . after the vices of the court have been ( as far as possible ) thus corrected , and the princes humour and inclinations well known , let his master or tutor endeavour to lead him to some great undertaking , sowing in his mind seeds of vertue and honour so secretly , that when they are grown it will be difficult to judge whether they were the product of nature or art. let them incourage vertue with honour , brand vice with infamy and disgrace , excite emulation by example ; these things have a great effect upon all tempers , tho' more on some than others . those who are of a generous disposition , glory influences most ; the melancholy , ignominy ; the cholerick , emulation , the inconstant , fear ; the prudent , example ; which is generally of most efficacy with all , especially that of ancestors ; for often what the blood could not , emulation does perform . 't is with children as young trees on which you must graff a branch ( as i may say ) of the same father , to bring them to perfection . these grafts are the famous examples which infuse into posterity the vertues of their ancestors and bear excellent fruit . that therefore it may be conveighed as it were thro' all the senses into the mind , and take deep root there , should be the particular industry of his instructors , and consequently they are not to be proposed to the prince in ordinary exhortations only or reproofs , but also in sensible objects . sometime let history put him in mind of the great atchievements of his ancestors , the glory of which eternized in print may excite him to imitate them . sometimes musick ( that sweet and wonderfull governess of the passions ) playing their trophies and triumphs , will be proper to raise his spirits . sometimes let him hear panegyricks recited upon their life , to encourage and animate him to an emulation of their vertues , now and then reciting them himself , or with his young companions act over their exploits as upon a stage , thereby to inflame his mind : for the force and efficacy of the action is by degrees so imprinted on him that he appears the very same whose person he represents : lastly let him play the part of a king amongst them , receive petitions , give audience , ordain ; punish , reward , command or marshal an army , besiege cities and give battel . in experiments of this nature cyrus was educated from a little boy and became afterwards an eminent general . but if there be any inclinations unbecoming a prince discernible in his infancy , he should have the company of such as are eminent for the opposite vertues to correct the vices of his nature ; as we see a straight pole does the crookedness of a tender tree tyed to it . thus if the prince be covetous , let one naturally liberal be always at his elbow ; if a coward , one bold and daring ; if timorous , one resolute and active ; if idle and lazy , one diligent and industrious : for those of that age as they imitate what they see or hear , so they also easily copy their companions customs . to conclude , in education of princes too rough reprehension and chastisement is to be avoided as a kind of contempt . too much rigour makes men mean spirited ; nor is it fit , that he should be servilely subject to one man , who ought to command all . it was well said of king alphonsus , generous spirits are sooner corrected by words than blows , and ●ove and respect those most who use them so . youth is like a young horse that the barnacle ●urts , but is easily governed by the gentler bit. besides that men of generous spirits usually conceive a secret horrour of those things they learnt thro' fear ; on the contrary have an inclination and desire to try those vices which in their childhood were prohibited them . affections too much confined ( especially such as nature endows a prince withall ) break out at last into despair , as exhalations hard bound within the clouds , into lightning . he that imprudently shuts the gates upon natural inclinations , is the occasion of their attempting to get thro' the windows . some allowance is to be made to humane infirmity , which is by some innocent diversions to be raised to vertue : this method they took who had the care of nero's education . the tutor ought to chide the prince in private , not before company , least he rather grow obstinate when he sees his vices are publick . in these two verses of homer is very aptly contained how a prince ought to be instructed how to obey : advise , command him , and what 's good suggest he will obey when for himself 't is best . hom. . il. emblem iii. by the industry of some ingenious and carefull hand one while watering , another time defending it from the injuries of wind and ill weather , the rose grows , and as the bud opens un●olds its little leaves into a circular form : a flower strangely pretty , but which flatters only the eyes , and is subject to so many casualties , that in this its infinite delicacy 't is by no means secure . the very same sun which saw it bloom , sees it also whither , and that without any other benefit , than just shewing the world its beauty ; it brings so many months ▪ labour to nothing , nay oftentimes wounds the very hand that planted it ; nor could it be otherwise than that such rank tillage should produce thorns ▪ of coral ( a sea shrub ) there 's quite another account to be given ; for that growing under water , and continually tossed by the violence of waves and tempestuous . winds becomes so much the harder and more beautiful ; nay , then first is it more illustriously useful , when it has underwent the rage of so many elements . such contrary effects arise from the different manner of growing of this shrub , and that flower in respect of softness and hardness . the same happens in the education of princes , for they who are brought up so tenderly and closely that neither the sun , wind or other air can come to them , but that of perfumes , prove too delicate and little fit for government ; they on the contrary are strong and able who inure their bodies to laborious exercises . it 's also convenient to use ones self to cold from our infancy as a thing of great advantage to health , and that will enable us to undergo military duties . by these exercises life is prolonged , by voluptuousness and luxury shortned ▪ a vessel of glass formed with a blast of the mouth , is with a blast broken ; whereas one of gold wrought with a hammer resists a hammer . 't is no matter if he that lives a private and retired life , be delicate ; but one who is to support a kingdom , as atlas the heavens , upon his shoulders , had need be strong and robust . a common-wealth has not occasion for a prince only for a shew , but in the field also and in time of war , and in scripture we find an effeminate king mentioned as a kind of divine punishment . the advantage or disadvantage of this different education was visible in the two kings , iohn the second , and ferdinand the catholick , one of which had his at court , the other in the camp ; that among women , this among soldiers ; that entring his government seem'd to sail into a strange gulf , and leaving the helm , committed the guidance of it to his ministers ; this was neither ignorant of , nor unacquainted with government ; but knew how to rule even in another's dominion , and force subjects to their duty ; that was contemn'd , this honoured and esteemed by all ; that ruined his kingdom , this advanced to a monarchy . 't was upon this consideration that king ferdinand sirnamed the holy , was desirous to breed his sons , alphonso and ferdinand , soldiers . and what else was it rendred the emperour charles really great , as well as titularly so ? was it not his continual travels and indefatigable labours ? nor had tiberius any other thoughts when he design'd his sons germanicus and drusus for the army , chiefly for these four reasons ; that they might accustom themselves to war ; gain the soldiers hearts ; be free from the debauchery of the court ; and lastly that himself might live in more security when both his sons commanded his legions . he that lives in a camp , by the many experiences he has there , spends his time to advantage ; the courtier utterly loses his in riot , ceremonies and trifling diversions . at court a prince studies more how to set off his body than improve his mind . and tho' this latter is rather to be regarded , yet ornaments of the body , and a comely presence should not be wholly neglected . for those captivate the eyes , as this does the eyes and soul. god himself seem●d pleased with the shape and proportion of saul . ethiopians and indians in some parts choose them kings , whom the most majestick mien recommends : as the bees do the biggest among them , and that of the most shining colour . people judge of a prince's actions by his presence , and think him the best who is the comeliest . galba's very age , says tacitus , was ridiculed and s●orn'd by those who were used to nero's blooming youth . a handsome face joyned with a kind of majesty encreased vespasian's fame . thus beauty strikes the eyes , and thro' them wounding the soul engages mens affections and good opinions : 't is a particular privilege of nature , a pleasing tyrant over the affections and a certain sign of a well disposed mind ; and tho' the holy spirit for more security advises us not to judge by exteriours , yet do we seldom find a generous soul in a deformed body . 't was a saying of plato's , that as a circle can't be without a center , so neither can external beauty consist without interiour vertue . king alphonsus therefore well advised to have a prince marryed to a handsome woman , that says he , the children may be beautifull as a prince's ought to be , that they may be above other men . the lacedaemonians fined their king archiadinus for marrying a little woman , however wittily he excused himself by saying , of two evils he had chose the less . beauty of the body is the image of the soul and picture of goodness . it nevertheless happens sometimes that nature intent upon outward perfections forgets inward which are more desirable . so it was with peter the cruel , whose savage and rough disposition nature had concealed under an agreeable person . pride and ostentation of beauty easily discompose the modesty of vertue ; a prince therefore should not esteem feminine and affected charms , which serve only to inflame another's lust ; but those which usually accompany true vertue ; for the soul is not to be adorned with the beauties of the body , but this rather with the ornaments of the soul. a commonwealth requires a prince perfect in mind rather than one so in body ; tho' t were a great ornament if he were eminent for both . thus the palm is singularly commended , as well for the neatness of its trunck and leaves , as for the pleasant fruit it bears , and other excellent qualities of it , being a tree so usefull , that plutarch says the babylonians reckoned vertues in it ; these , i conceive , the complement of the coelestial bridegroom points at , thy stature is like to a palm tree . for by these words he would commend not only the beauty of his spouse's body , but the endowments also of her soul , signified by the palm as 't is an emblem of justice and fortitude : of justice because its leaves hang in aequilibrio ; of fortitude upon the account of the admirable strength of the boughs , which the more weight they are loaded with , the more forcibly grow up . 't is further an hieroglyphick of victory , because in the games and exercises of the ancients , the victors were crowned with branches of it . the cypress was never esteemed at this rate , however flourishing and green it always is , lifting its self even up to heaven in form of an obelisk : for that its beauty is meer outside without any good quality inherent in it ; it 's of a slow growth , bears useless fruit , bitter leaves , has a strong smell and taste , a thick and melancholy shade . to what purpose is a prince of a delicate body , if he only satisfies the eyes , and does not discharge his duty . there needs no more in him than an agreeable harmony of parts to shew a generous and well disposed mind , into which afterwards art and industry may inspire motion and vigour , for without that every action of a prince will be dull , and rather cause ridicule and contempt than procure authority with his subjects . but sometimes these extraordinary endowments of the mind don't render a prince amiable , as when the state is distempered and inclined to change its government , which ferdinand king of naples had once experience of ; nay sometimes vertue her self is unhappy , and a good prince often odious ; as on the other side his vices taking , as were those of vitellius . but for the generality humane will embraces that which is most perfect ; and it will be therefore a prince's interest as well in publick as private exercises , to study by them to supply and perfect nature , to strengthen himself in his youth , to create generous thoughts in his mind , and in all things to please the people : for the person of a prince should not only court the minds but eyes too of his subjects , who choose to be governed by him in whom they see most ornaments of nature and vertue . our most catholick king , your highness's father , by the pains he took and resolution he shewed at a chase , by his valour and dexterity in military exercises , his singular carriage and vivacity in publick actions , what vast reputation did he gain ? how beloved by their subjects , and esteemed by foreigners were the kings ferdinand the holy , henry the ii , ferdinand the catholick , and the emperour charles the vth. in whom beauty and a just proportion of body were joyn'd with industry , vertue and valour . but those exercises are better learnt by conversation and in company , where emulation enflames the mind and awakens industry . for this reason the kings of the goths educated the sons of the spanish nobility in their courts , not only to lay an obligation upon those families , but that their own sons might have their education and learn the sciences with them . the same those of macedon used to do , among whom the court was as it were a seminary of commanders . which good custom is either utterly forgot , or at least has not been hitherto in vogue in the court of spain . 't were otherwise the properest means in the world to engage the hearts of foreign princes , to institute seminaries of that nature , to which their sons might travel and be instructed in arts and sciences worthy , a prince . from which also this advantage would arise , that the king's sons would insensibly be accustomed to the manners and genius of those nations , and meet with a great many among them , who with singular affection and gratitude for so good an education would return the obligation with their service . to this e●d king alphonsu● sirnamed the wise , in the second of his excellent laws , call'd the partidas , has drawn up a catalogue of those arts and duties it is proper for kings sons to be exercised in . for all these exercises nothing renders a prince so fit as hunting , for herein youth exerts it self , becomes strong and active ; that gives occasion to use military arts , to view ground , measure the time , know when to expect , when assault and strike , what use to make of accidents and statagems . there the sight of the blood of wild beasts , and the trembling motion of their limbs as they expire , purge the affections , fortify the mind , and inspir●generous thoughts , such as despise fear and danger : for the solitude of a wood and that silence which usually is kept in hunting raise the thoughts to glorious actions . lastly all those exercises are to be used with that moderation that they render not the mind either wild or stupid ; for the mind is no less harden'd with too much labour , and made as it were callous and insensible , than the body . 't is therefore not convenient to fatigue both at the same time , for these labours have contrary effects ; that of the body is a hindrance to the mind , that of the mind to the body . emblem iv. knowledge is necessary in a governour , in a subject natural prudence is sufficient , nay sometimes meer ignorance . in the idea and contrivance of a building the brain is employed , in the fabrick it self the hand labours . command proceeds from understanding and is quick-sighted , obedience is ignorant generally and blind . he is by nature a commander who is most intelligent . whereas others are so either by succession , election or conquest , which depend more upon fortune than reason . wherefore we shall reckon the sciences among the politick instruments of government : so justinian ; imperial majesty , says he , ought to be armed as well with laws as arms , that the time of peace and war may be equally well governed . this 't is you have exhibited in the present emblem under the figure of a cannon levelled for the better aim , by a quadrant , the emblem of the laws and justice ; for this should so manage peace and war that what 's just be always in view , and reason be the mark at which all things be aimed by the medium of wisdom and prudence . 't is related of alphonsus king of naples and arragon , that being ask'd upon this subject , which he was most indebted to , his arms or studies ? he made answer : that 't was from his books he had learnt arms and the laws of arms . but some one may perhaps think these ornaments of learning are more convenient for the body of a commonwealth , which the word majesty seems to import , than the prince , who being distracted with publick business , can't apply himself to them ; that 't were sufficient to make learning flourish , if he entertained and patronized men of ingenuity ; which the same emperour iustinian did , who tho' himself utterly illiterate , with the assistance of men of the greatest learning , whose conversation he had , got the reputation of an eminent governour . for my part , tho' i make no difficulty to grant that even men of no literature may sometimes govern a commonwealth well , as we have instances in k. ferdinand the catholick , and many others ; yet this only holds in those genius's that experience has improved , or at least such as are endowed by nature with so acute a judgment that they can determine any thing without danger of errour . but tho' prudence may have some efforts from nature , yet t is to be perfected by learning ; for to know well how to chose what 's good , and reject the contrary , a general knowledge is almost necessary , and a long observation of examples both past and present , which is not perfectly to be attained without labour and study ; nothing therefore is so necessary to a prince as the light and ornament of good literature ; for for want of the knowledge of these things ( says k. alphonso ) a prince will be oblig'd to take to his assistance , one who does understand them ; and he may experience what king solomon said ▪ that he who entrusts his secret with another , makes himself his slave , whereas he who can keep it ●imself , is master of himself , which is infinitely requisite in a prince . for the office of a king requires a great understanding and that too illustrated with learning , for without doubt , says k. alphonso in the same law , no man can acquit himself of an office of such importance as this , at least without great understanding and wisdom , whence he who scorns the favours of knowledge and education , will be scorn'd by god , who is the author of them . other sciences have been divinely infused into many ; none but solomon was ever inspired with politickss . for tilling ground , agriculture prescribes certain rules ; the art of taming wild beasts has also its methods , but 't is easier to command any animal than man , 't is necessary therefore that he be endued with an extraordinary portion of wisdom who has men to govern . the different customs and dispositions of subjects can●t without considerable sagacity , application and experience be discovered : and consequently no man requires wisdom more than a prince . t is that makes kingdoms happy , princes feared and reverenced . then was solomon so , when the world became acquainted with his . knowledge renders a prince more formidable than power . a wise king , says the holy spirit , is the upholding of the people : but an unwise king destroyeth them . all which shews how barbarous the opinion of the emperour licinius was , who cryed out upon the sciences as a publick plague , philosophers and orators as poison to a commonwealth ; nor does that of the goths appear less absurd , who found fault with athalaricus's mother for instructing him in good letters , as if he was thereby rendred incapable of publick business . silvius aeneas had quite other sentiments of them , when he said they were silver in the commonalty , gold in the nobility , and in the prince jewels . alphonso of naples upon hearing once a certain king say , that learning did not become a prince ; replyed immediately , that 's spoke rather like a beast , than a man . well therefore said k. alphonso † , that a king ought to be assiduous in learning the sciences , for by them he will learn the office of a king , and know better how to practise it . of iulius caesar 't is related that he would have the statuary form him , standing upon a terrestrial globe with a sword in one hand , in the other a book with this motto , ex utroque caesar ; thereby intimating that as well his learning as his arms was instrumental in getting and preserving to him the empire . lewis the xith of france did not esteem learning at this rate ; for he would not permit his son charles the th . to apply himself to it , because he found himself thereby so obstinate and opinionative as not to admit the counsel of any , which was the reason why charles proved afterwards unfit to govern , and suffered himself to be led by the nose by every one , not without great dishonour to himself and detriment to his whole kingdom . extreams therefore in that as in all other things are to be avoided , supine ignorance breeds contempt and derision , besides it is exposed to a thousand errours ; on the other side excessive application to studies distracts the mind and diverts it from the care of government . the conversation of the muse is very pleasant and agreeable , and no o●● would without reluctancy exchange it for the fatig●● and trouble of audiences and consultations . alphon●● the wise knew the causes of earthquakes , but coul● not regulate the commotions of his kingdoms ; th● coelestial orbs his ingenuity penetrated , yet knew no● how to defend the empire offered , and crown haereditary to him . the sultan of egypt upon his fam● sent embassadours to him with very considerable presents , in the mean time almost all the cities of castil● revolted . thus it usually happens ; princes too muc● addicted to the studies of wisdom advance their reputation among foreigners , and lose it with their subjects . their learning is admired by those , to these sometimes prejudicial ; for men of mean parts are generally better governours than men of ingenuity . a mind too intent upon speculation is usually slow in action , and fearful in resolution , for of necessity many different and contrary reasons must occur to such a person , which either wholly take away or obstruct the liberty of his judgment . if an eye looks upon objects by the sun 's light reflected , it clearly and distinctly sees them as they are ; whereas if it be fixed directly against the sun's rays , 't is so dazled with too much lustre , that it can't so much as distinguish the colours and figures of them . it happens thus to wits ; those who too eagerly apply themselves to the studies of wisdom and learning are less fit for publick business . right reason never judges better than when free and disengaged from the disputations and subtilties of the schools ; nor without reason did the wise k. solomon call that the worst of travails which himself had tryed . for there are some of the liberal sciences , which to have a superficial knowledge of is commendable , but to make them ones whole business , and desire to attain a perfection in them , very prejudicial . wherefore 't is very convenient that prudence moderate a little that desire of knowledge which is usually most vehement in the best wits ; as we read agricola's mother did , who cooled the heat of her sons mind , when in his youth he seem'd to follow the study of philosophy more eagerly than was allowable for a roman and senatour . as in vices so in learning there is excess : and this is as hurtful to the mind as those to the body . it will suffice therefore for a prince to tast the arts and sciences as 't were en passant ; some practical knowledge of them will be more for his advantage , particularly those which relate to the affairs of peace and war , taking as much out of them as will suffice to illustrate his understanding and regulate his judgment , leaving the honour of being excellent in them to his inferiours ; let him pass only his leisure hours in this noble exercise as tacitus says helvidius priscus used to do this granted , those are not always to be esteem'd the best tutors for princes , who are most eminent for learning and knowledge , for they are generally too great lovers of retirement and studious idleness , strangers to conversation , men of no resolution and very unfit for the management of weighty affairs . but those rather who are learned and experienced politicians , who besides the sciences can teach a prince the art of government . the first thing to be instilled into a prince is the fear of the lord which is the beginning of wisedom he who adheres to god is very near the fountain of all sciences . to know what is human only , is ignorance , the daughter of malice , which is the ruine of princes and commonwealths . another necessary qualification in a prince is eloquence , that pleasing tyrant over the passions , that sweetly allures mens wills to a submission to its commands . that great prophet moses knew of what consequence this was , and therefore when he was sent into egypt to conduct the children of israel thence , made this excuse to god that he was slow of speech and of a slow tongue . and god took this for a reason , and accordingly to encourage him , promised to assist his lips and put into his mouth the words he should speak to pharaoh . what did not solomon promise himself from his eloquence ? i shall be admired , says he , in the sight of great men . when i hold my tongue they shall bide my leisure , and when i speak they shall give good ear unto me : if i talk much they shall lay their hands upon their mouth . and certainly if naked eloquence has power so strangely to captivate an audience , what can't it do if armed with regal power , or cloathed with purple ? a prince who can't speak his mind without the assistance of another ( a fault nero was first observed to be guilty of ) is rather a dumb statue , and deserves not the name of a prince . history is the mistriss of political truth , than which nothing can better instruct a prince how to rule his subjects . for in that , as in a clear mirrour , appears the experience of former governments , the prudence of predecessours , and the souls of many men collected into one . history is like a faithful counsellor , always ready and at hand . of law the prince need only study that part which relates to government , turning over such laws and constitutions of his kingdom as were by right reason dictated or by custom approved . let him not spend much time in the study of divinity ; for how dangerous that knowledge and power in conjunction is , england has experienced in k. iames , 't is enough for a prince to persevere himself in the faith and have about him devout and learned men able to defend it . lastly judicial astrology has been the ruine of many princes ; for that desire of knowing future events is in all men vehement , especially in princes , for they promising to themselves great authority if they can be looked upon as equal to the gods , or do any thing above the common reach of mankind , follow these superstitious and odious arts : nay sometimes arrive to that degree of madness , to ascribe all thing● to second causes , and utterly destroy divine providence by imputing all to chance and divination , whence it happens that while they attribute more to chance and fortune than human prudence or industry , they are too remiss in their designs and actions , and oftner advise with astrologers than their counsellours . emblem v. the sciences have bitter roots , though the fruit be sweet ; for this reason our nature at first has an aversion for them , and no labour appears so harsh as what must be employed on their first rudiments : what pains and anxiety do they cost youth ? upon which account ▪ and because studies require assiduous application , a thing very injurious to health , and which the business and diversions of the court don't permit ; the master should be industrious in inventing several means to qualify this troublesome institution by disguising it under some pleasant game , that the prince's mind may imbibe what he is to learn insensibly . for instance , to teach him to read he may use this contrivance ; let there be made four and twenty small dice , on each of them be engraven a letter of the alphabet , then let some children play , and he win who at one cast throws most syllables , or an entire word . these little victories and entertainments will take off much of the difficulty of this task , for 't is far more hard to play at cards , which , however children presently learn. now , to teach the prince to write in a way as short , i would have the letters engraven of a thin plate , this put upon paper , and him to go over these tracts of characters , as so many little furrows , with his hand and pen ; especially exercising himself in those letters of which the rest are framed . thus , while he attributes to his own wit and industry , what is only the effect of this artificial plate , he will by degrees be more pleased with those labours . nor is skill in languages less necessary for a prince ; for always to use an interpreter , or read only transactions , is a thing too liable to deceit , or at least the truth thereby loses much of its force and energy : not to mention that it can't but be very hard for a subject not to be understood by him , from whom he is to expect comfort in his afflictions , to have his miseries relieved , and to be gratified for his services . this moved the patriarch ioseph , when he was made commander over egypt ; before all things to apply himself to learn the languages most in use there , and which he did not understand . what love and esteem does at this day , the emperor ferdinand the third's skill in languages procured him , being able to answer every one in his own native idiom ; but a prince is not to be instructed in this by way of precepts , for they confound the memory ; but rather great persons sons of foreign countries should be taken into his family , by whose familiar conversation he may in a few months time , and that with a little pains , and as it were by way of diversion , make so great a proficiency , as to be acquainted with the language of each of them . that he may also know the use of geography and cosmography , ( without which policy is in a manner blind ) it were not amiss to furnish and hang his chamber with tapistry so artificial wrought , as to represent a kind of general description or map of the universe , that is , the four quarters of the world , and most remarkable countries , together with the more celebrated rivers , mountains , cities , and other place of note . by the same contrivance may the lakes be disposed , that he may fancy he sees in them , as in your sea-charts , the situation of the whole sea , its ports and islands . in globes and mathematical spheres , he may see the extent of both hemispheres , the motion of the heavens , the sun's course , its rising and setting , the vicissitude of days and nights , and all this by way of discourse and divertisement , leaving the mathematicians subtle way of arguing and demonstrating to the schools . it will suffice in geometry , if he know how to measure distances , take altitudes and depths with instruments . 't is withal necessary that he learn fortification , and accordingly for instructions sake may raise forts of clay , or some such material , with all sorts of trenches , breast-works , pallisadoes , bastions , half moons , and other things necessary for the defence of them ; then he may assault and play upon them with little artillery made for that purpose . but to fix those figures of fortification more firmly in his memory , 't would be for his advantage to have the like artificially contrived in gardens , cut in myrtle , or any other greens , as you see in the present emblem . nor ought a prince be ignorant how to marshal an army ; to that end let him have soldiers of all sorts , foot and horse , cast in metal ; of these he may compose an army , distribute them into regiments , troops ; companies , in imitation of some model , which he may have before him for that purpose . plays ought always to be in imitation of things to be afterwards practised with more seriousness . by this means he will insensibly , and without any trouble take to these arts ; and when the light of reason is risen in him , be more capable of a perfect knowledge of them by conversation of men of learning , and such particularly as have been conversant with , and exercised in affairs both of peace and war , who will discover to him the causes and effects of each particular . for the knowledge of those things is at this time more useful , easier acquired , and fatigues the mind least . let no one look on these exercises to be of no consequence in education of kings and princes children ; for experience , the best mistress , teaches us , that boys learn many things of their own accord , which they had not attained by the instruction of a master without much difficulty ▪ much less should any imagine that the variety of these methods rather prejudices than promotes education . if to tame and master an horse , so many instruments are necessary , as the bit , bridle , rains , barnacle , and those too of different sorts ; if so many precepts are needful as have been written upon this subject , what care and industry shall we think sufficient to form a perfect prince , who is not only to command the ignorant vulgar , but even the masters of the sciences ? to govern men is not the gift of nature , but rather of experience and speculation ; it seems to be the art of arts , the science of sciences , of which never any one will attain the perfection . i am not ignorant , sir , the person your highness has for a master , is for the happiness of our monarchy , so well furnished with these arts and sciences , that he can't but in a short time bring your highness to a considerable perfection in them : however these advertisements , i could not omit pursuing my design in this treatise to be beneficial as far as possible , not only to your highness , but all other princes now and hereafter . emblem vi. the heavenly bridegroom has made use of the body of this emblem in the book of canticles to express the ornaments of his brides virtues : and the same the lilies that crowned and perfected the pillars of solomon's temple , seem to allude to , as do those which beautified the candlestick of the tabernacle . this put me upon designing in the present emblem , to represent by the wheat , the sciences ; by the lilies , the arts and polite learning which they ought to be graced with . nor am i without precedent or authority , for procopius long ago by ears of corn understood disciples , as our bridgroom by lilies , eloquence . in effect , what is polite learning , but a kind of crown of the sciences ? cassiodorus calls it the diadem of princes ; and the hebrews used to crown some parts of it with garlands : and this i take to be signified by the poets lawrels . the hoods , and girdles , and coloured silken tufts , by which the hebrew doctors were distinguished . the sciences should possess the center of the soul ; gentile learning be instead of a circumference ; the knowledge of one , without the ornaments of the other , is a kind of ignorance ; for 't is with the several parts of learning , as with the nine muses , who joyning hands , make a circle in their dances . how tiresome a thing is philosophy if too severe , and not qualified , and made agreeable by polite literature and humanity ? these are therefore necessary for a prince to temper the harshness of government with their pleasantness ; for 't is from that they have the name of humane . a prince should not be altogether singular , but have something common to the rest of mankind ; he should discourse with them of different sorts of studies , and that with a courteous and obliging carriage ; 't is not royal grandeur which confounds us , but extravagant indiscreet gravity ; as 't is not the light , but the extream driness of the sun that dazles our eyes ; 't is therefore very proper that political science be deckt and embellished with the liberal arts , which cast as great a lustre as rubies in a crown , or diamonds in a ring . nor do such arts sit amiss upon majesty , as require the assistance of the hand as well as mind ; nor will it in the least derogate from a prince's authority , or obstruct his management of publick affairs , to allow him some intervals of leisure for his diversion : thus mark anthony took a delight in painting ; maximilion the second , in sculpture ; theobald , king of navarre , in poetry and musick ; with which last philip the fourth , the present king of spain , your royal highness's father , diverts himself as oft as disingaged from the cares and concern the government of two worlds oblige him to . in this exercise the spartans too instructed their youth ; and in general all of this nature are recommended by plato and aristotle , as very beneficial to a commonwealth . and though 't is true , the mind should not repose its whole satisfaction in them , policy however requires a prince sometimes to use them , the people being strangely pleased to see their prince's thoughts thus diverted , and not always intent on the contriving their slavery ; 't was on this account drusus's debaucheries were acceptable to the romans . there are only two things to be observed in the use and exercise of these arts ; one is , that they are to be practised not in publick but privately , as the emperor alexander severus used to do , though excelled by none in musick , whether vocal or instrumental . the reason of this is , we are apt to think it a contemptible sight to see the hand which bears a scepter , and rules a kingdom , filled with a fiddle-stick or a pencil ; which we still look upon to be a greater fault , if the prince be of an age , wherein one would think the care of the publick ought to take him off these private pastimes : it being our nature not to accuse a prince of loss of time , if he 's idle or does nothing , but rather blame him for spending it at these diversions . the other caution is , that he lay not out too much time upon them , or be desirous to excel others , least he take more pride in this vain excellency than in well-governing the commonwealth ; a thing nero was guilty of , who abandoned the reins of his empire for those of a chariot , and valued himself more upon acting the part of a comedian in the theatre than of an emperor of the world. this abuse which princes sometimes fall into by having a greater esteem for these arts , than the science of good government . virgil elegantly censures in these verses : let others better mold the running mass of metals , and inform the breathing brass , and soften into fl●sh a marble face . plead better at the bar , describe the skies , and when the stars descend , and when they rise . but rome , 't is thine alone , with awful sway , to rule mankind , and make the world obey ; disposing peace and war thine own majestick way . to tame the proud , the fetter'd slave to free , these are imperial arts , and worthy thee . dryden's virg. as for poetry , though it be a part of musick , accents and rhimes having the same effect in that , as notes in in this ; though that be the far nobler exercise of the two ; for this is of the hands , that of the brain . the one designed meerly to divert , the other to instruct with diversion ; notwithstanding it seems by no means proper for a prince ; it 's strange sweetness being a great obstacle to masculine and noble actions ; for when the mind is once captivated with the charms of its thoughts and conceptions , as the nightingal with the melody of her voice , it never leaves of , and grows so keen with poetical niceties , that its edge is soon turned and blunted against the hard and rugged troubles it must necessarily meet with in government . hence it also follows , that if a prince takes not the same delight in ruling as composing , he will in all probability least regard this greatest concern , wholly neglect or abandon it to the care of others ; as did john ii. king of arragon , who squandered away his time in the study of poetry , and sent for persons eminent for it from the remotest countries , till his subjects tired with his negligence , put a stop to this useless diversion of his by an open rebellion . nevertheless , since poetry is so much in vogue at courts , and does much refine and polish the mind , a prince will hardly escape the charge of ignorance , if he have not some smattering in 't . he may therefore be allow'd some time for that study , i mean as much as shall be thought fit to quicken his parts , and improve his judgment ; for how many excellent poems have by this means come from the pens of such as have govern'd in church and state , with general applause and approbation ? there are abundance of princes given to the practice of chymistry , which is indeed a very noble diversion , and discovers many wonderful effects and secrets of nature ; but for all this , i would advise a prince not to meddle with it , for curiosity will easily lead him from thence to alchymy ; or at least , under the pretext of simple distillation , he will have a fancy to six mercury , and make gold and silver ; things which the most precious of our time is thrown away upon to no purpose , and certain , wasted for uncertain treasures . 't is a phrenzy , that nought but death can cure , to make one experiment after another , and not consider that 't is impossible to find a better philosopher's stone , than a good and prudent oeconomy . 't is of this , and of commerce , not of chymistry , this sentence of solomon is to be understood , [ that nothing is richer than wisdom ] . 't was by this kind of traffick with the inhabitants of tarsis and ophir , the same solomon got his vast riches ; for which he had never prepared so many and great fleets , exposed to so many and great hazards at sea , if he could have saved the labour with a crucible . it is likely , that he who could speak well of all things , who was endued by god with a supernatural knowledge , should never find out this secret also , or actually have used it , had it been feasible ? besides , 't is not credible that god will ever permit it , for thereby in probability an end would be put to all commerce , which is maintain'd by nothing so much , as by a species of money common to all the world , and that made of some scarce and precious metal . emblem vii . the affections are born with us ; reason comes not till many years after , when they are already possess'd of the will , and this deluded with a false appearance of good submits to them , and owns no other empire but theirs , till reason recovering strength by time and experience , takes upon it the right of government it had by nature , and begins to make head against the tyranny of our appetites . this light usually rises later in princes , because the delicacies of the court which they 're used to , render their affections more prevailing ; besides , that their courtiers strive generally to get their favour , which they know , rather depends upon the will than reason ; hence all use the art of flattery , and make it their business to engage that , but cast a cloud on this . a prince ought therefore to be well acquainted with these arti●ices , and arm himself not against his own passions only , but all such persons as would abuse them to govern him . this is a great and general negligence in those who undertake to form princes minds . useless and unfruitful weeds which grow among corn , we spend time in ●●adicating ; yet suffer vicious passions and inclinations , that wage war with reason , to grow . to cure a prince's body , many galens are always ready , the mind often has scarce one epictetus ; though this is subject to no less infirmities than the body , and those so much worse , as that is more excellent than this . if its countenance were visible , and we could discover in it its ill and distempered affections , we should pity the condition of many , we at present take for happy men , whom that feverish heat of depraved appetites so miserably preys upon . if the hearts of tyrants could be opened , one might see bruises and wounds . alas ! what tempests of confusion and distraction is a mind in that condition rack'd with ? it s light is all obscured , his reason so disturbed , that all things appear to him far different from what they really in themselves are . hence proceeds that variety of judgments and opinions in the world ; hence few weigh things aright , but pass a different estimate according to the light by which they see them . for 't is with the affections , as with tellescopes , which at one end magnify , at the other diminish objects . the crystals are the same , the objects nothing alter'd ; this only is the difference , that the visual rays falling in● at one end , are dilated from the center to the circumference , and consequently diffuse themselves and multiply more ; whereas at the other end they are contracted from the circumference to the center , and so represent objects considerably less : such is the difference between these two ways of looking upon things . at the same time ( tho' in different kingdoms ) the two infants , iames , the son of iames the second , king of arragon ; and alphons● son of dionysio , king of portugal , had in view the succession of their fathers crown . but see in how different a manner , the first against his father's will refused to accept ; the other contrary to the laws of piety , by force of arms attempted to snatch it from the head of his . one considering the vast cares and dangers of government ▪ bid adieu to the world , and preferr'd a monastick life as the more quiet and happy ; the other look'd upon life without sovereignty to be burthensome and unprofitable , and had more respect to his ambition than the law of nature . this look'd upon the circumference of the crown which border'd with flowers , was an agreeable sight ; that consider'd rather the point and center of it , whence the lines of labour and care are drawn . all men propose something that has the appearance of good , as the end of their actions ; but because we are deceived in the knowledge of this good , hence proceeds our error . the greatest thing imaginable when in our own power appears little and inconsiderable , in others great and magnificent . our own faults we are not sensible of , those of others we easily discover . other mens defects seem like giants , ours scarce so big as dwarfs . nay , further , we know how to new-name vices , and give them the colour of virtue : ambition we call greatness of mind ; cruelty , justice ; prodigality , liberality ; rashness , valour . in short , few can with prudence distinguish honesty from its contrary , what 's profitable from the prejudicial . 't is thus , we are deceived when we look on things by that end of the prospective , which passions and inclinations stop . i know nothing but benefits that are to be looked upon through both ends ; those we receive , ought to appear great to us ; those we confer , little . this was king henry the fourth's custom ; nay , he seldom so much as remembred kindnesses he had done others ; on the contrary , those he had received , he never let slip out of his memory , being always careful the first opportunity to repay them as a debt . a prince ought not to imagine that a courtesy is , as it were , a mark of slavery on the person gratified : i should not call that generosity but tyranny rather , and a kind of traffick for mens affections , which the prince buys at the price of favours , as they do slaves for money on the coasts of guinea . he who does a good office should not think he lays an obligation ; he who receives it ought to think himself obliged . in a word , a prince should imitate god almighty , who giveth to all men liberally , and upbraideth not . in undertaking and carrying on wars ; in procuring and establishing peace ; in injuries as well offered as received , let him always use the same crystal of right reason , through which he may see every thing equally without disguise or ●allacy . that indifference and justice in giving a due estimate of things , becomes none more than a prince , who ought to perform the same office in his kingdom , as the tongue of a balance in a pair of scales , and agreeable thereto pass a true and sincere judgment of all things , that his government may be just , whose balance will never hang even , if the passions have place , or all things be not weighed in the scale of right reason . upon this account masters ought to come with singular ca●e and industry to instruct the prince's mind , discovering those errors of the will , and the vanity of its perswasions , that free and disengaged from passion , he may pass an unprejudiced judgment on every thing . for , really if we throughly examine the fall of so many empires , so many revolutions in states , such a multitude of kings and princes deposed and murthered , we shall find the first origin of these misfortunes to have been , the passions having shaken off their obedience , and their refusal to submit to reason , whose subjects they are by the law of nature . nor is any thing more pestilent to a commonwealth than those irregular appetites , or the particular ends which every one , as he pleases , purposes to himself . i don't hereby contend to have these passions wholly razed or extinguished in a prince , for without them he would be absolutely incapable of any generous action ; nature having not furnished us with love , anger , hope , fear , and other the like affections to no purpose ; for though these are not virtues , they are however their attendants and means , without which they are neither attainable nor practicable . 't is the abuse only , and inordinacy of them , i disapprove of ; those are to be corrected , that a prince's actions be not guided by passion , but his whole government by prudence and policy . those things which are common to other men , are not allowable in a prince . charles the fifth , if at any time he would indulge anger or indignation , did it in private and remote from company , not publickly when he represented the person and majesty of an emperor ; for in this capacity , a prince is rather the idea of a governor than a man , and rather his peoples than his own man. nothing is then to be determined out of affection , but all things examined by the rule and standard of reason ; not by his inclination , but art. a prince's behaviour should be rather political than natural ; his designs proceed rather from the heart of the commonwealth than his own . private persons usually make their own interest and advantage the measure of their actions : princes are to have the publick good in view . in a private man to conceal his passions , is look'd upon to be a sign of too close and reserv'd a temper ; in princes even policy sometimes require it . there appeared not the least symptom of passion in tiberius , when piso presented himself to him , after having , according to his order , dispatched germanicus , which occasioned no small jealousy in piso . he who commands many , should with many vary his affections , or if possible appear free from them ; endeavour in the same hour as occasions differ , to seem severe and courteous , just and merciful , liberal and frugal . tiberius was a great master of this art , whose mind it was not easy to discover ; he knew so well how to mingle the symptoms of his anger and satisfaction . a good prince commands himself , and serves his people ; but if he neglect to break , or conceal the natural tendency of his mind , his actions will be always uniform , whence every one will presently see the scope of his designs , contrary to one of the principal maxims of policy ; which for this very reason recommends variety of methods in acting , that the prince's designs may not be known . nor is it by any means safe for him to let others discover his nature and inclinations . for there 's no easier access to his mind than that , which 't is necessary he keep free and reserved , if he desire to have his kingdom well-governed . for as soon as his ministers have once discovered his inclination , immediately they flatter him , and encourage the same in themselves . if in any thing the prince be obstinate and opinionative , they are so too , and now nothing but perversness governs . but if it shall be at any time the prince's interest to court the peoples favour and applause , let him rather so behave himself , that what the people like or dislike , he may seem to have a natural inclination or aversion for . aristotle puts bashfulness in the number of the passions , denies it to be a moral virtue , because a fear of infamy , and therefore seems incompatible with a great man , whose actions being all squar'd by the rule of right reason , he has nothing to be ashamed of . according to st. ambrose , however 't is a virtue which regulates our actions ; by which i conceive , he means that ingenuous and liberal shame , or rather modesty , which like a bridle restrains us from the commission of any ignominious or unseemly action , and is a token of a good genius , and no small argument that there remain in that mind some seeds of virtue , though not yet deeply rooted . i am apt to believe aristotle speaks of another vitious and irregular bashfulness , which is an obstacle to virtue ; we may say of both , as of dew , which falling moderately nourishes and refreshes corn ; but when thick like small snow , burns up and kills it . no virtue can be freely exercised , when this passion has once prevailed , nor is any thing more pernicious to princes , for this reason above all , that it has the appearance of virtue , as if it were in a prince a sign of candor , ( and not rather of a mean and abject spirit ) not to be able to deny , contradict , reprehend , or correct without a blush . such as these straiten themselves too much in their grandeur , are in a manner afraid of shadows ; and what is worse , make themselves slaves to those they ought to govern . besides , how unbecoming is it to see in their faces the colour of shame , which none but flatterers , liars , and in general , all profligate persons ought to be stained with , and for them so to forget themselves as to be governed and cozen'd by others . whatever is asked , they voluntarily offer , and give without any respect to merit , vanquished meerly by petitions . they readily subscribe to others counsels and opinions , though they don't approve them , and had rather seem conquer'd than victors ; which is the foundation of the most considerable miscarriages in a commonwealth ; shamefacedness by no means becomes princes , who should always appear with a serene and steady aspect . princes therefore should make it their whole business to correct this passion , and moderate their natural bashfulness with valour and constancy , with a resolution not only of mind , but outward demeanour to resist flatteries , lyes , frauds , and malice , that they may correct and amend them , and preserve a royal integrity in their words as well as actions . which the two kings , iohn the second , and henry the fourth , having neglected to do ; what wonder if their authority and crowns were brought into such dangers ? farther , in curing this passion , no small discretion is necessary ; for whereas other vices , like thorns , are to be utterly extirpated , this is rather to be pruned , and the superfluity cut off ; that part of shame left which guards virtues , and regulates mens manners and actions ; for without this restraint , the prince's mind will be quite unruly ; and except he now and then reflects upon infamy and indecency , he will follow the force of his passions , and precipitate himself ; especially when there 's power to countenance them . if by good arts modesty is scarce to be preserved , what will be the consequence if we wholly abandon that ? 't was then tiberius gave himself to all manner of vice and tyranny , when he had cast off shame and fear , and followed only his own humour . hence plato said , that jupiter , if at any time apprehensive of the ruin of mankind , dispatch'd mercury for the earth , to distribute iustice and modesty among m●n , by which they might prevent their destruction . commiseration and pity is a passion not less dangerous in princes , than the other ; for when it has once prevailed in the mind , neither reason nor justice perform their offices . for out of an extravagant fear of disobliging any by reprehension or correction , they neglect to apply remedies to their subjects crimes , and suffer many to go unpunished . they are deaf to the peoples clamours , nor do publick calamities affect them , while at the same time they are sensibly touch'd with pity for three or four men who were the promoters of them . they feel themselves disordered at other mens crimes ; and accordingly for fear of any trouble upon their account , chuse to connive at , or pardon , rather than punish them . this is a weakness of judgment , and defect of prudence , to be remedied with time ; but that with the same moderation as we mentioned of bashfulness , that part only of commiseration is to be retrenched which so enfeebles the mind , that it can't act with vigour and constancy . reserving that compassionate affection peculiar to princes where right reason , without hazarding the publick security , perswades . both these passions , as well that of bashfulness , as commiseration , are corrigible , and to be subdued by some contrary actions , which may remove that too great tenderness and imbecillity of mind , and delivering it from those servile fears , render it capable of more masculine actions . if a prince now and then endeavours ( though in matters of the least consequence ) to keep his mind firm and resolute , and considers his power and quality , he will easily afterwards be able to do the same in affairs of greater moment . all 's done , if he can but once acquit himself generously in it , and make himself fear●d and respected . there remain two other passions considerably prejudicial to youth ; fear and obstinacy . fear , when a prince is so timorous , and in all things diffident of himself , that he dares neither act nor speak . never approves any action of his own ●ears to appear in publick , and love 's rather solitude and retirement . this proceeds generally from an effeminate and retired education ; as also for want of experience , the only remedy for this distemper ; that is , the prince should use himself to give audience to his subjects as well as foreigners ; often appear in publick that he may learn to know men , and in general all other things as in themselves they are , not as his imagination , or master has painted them . let there be always free access to his apartments for those worthy persons , that are his father's chamberlains , and all other courtiers that are eminent for valour , ingenuity , and experience . which custom was observed in spain till the time of philip the second , who cautious of his son charles's underhand-dealings , abolished that custom of free access and communication , and so declining one inconvenience , fell into another equally dangerous to princes , for so is it to be too much abstracted from conversation ; for this usually prompts them to rely too much upon some particular favourite . lastly , obstinacy arises partly from fear , partly from natural slothfulness , when a prince won't act at all , but resolutely rejects all instructions that are given him . that coldness of mind is to be cured by the fire of glory and incentives to it , as faults in horses are usually corrected by the spur. the prince therefore is to be led gradually into the way , and the progress he makes to be commended ; though at first those commendations be above his merit , and only for forms sake . emblem viii . in the unicorn nature hath shewn a piece of admirable skill and providence , in placing anger 's weapon exactly between the eyes . 't is absolutely necessary to have both eyes intent upon that passion , which so imperiously tyrannizes over our actions , and the motions of the mind . the same flame that lights it , blinds it , and 't is differenced only by its short continuance from fury and madness . a man in a passion is not the same as before , for he is thereby as it were put beside himself . valour has no need of it ; for what were more silly , than for this to require aid from anger , a thing stable from one inconstant , faithful from one false , sound from one diseased ? 't is not this fickle pettish passion obtains victories , triumphs over enemies , nor is that really courage that is without reason provoked . in a word , no vice is more unbecoming a prince , than that ; for to be angry , supposes contempt , or an injury received ; nor is any thing so disagreable to his place and office , in as much as nothing so obscures the judgment which should in a governor be serene and clear . a prince that is exasperated , and passionate upon any slight occasion , gives his heart into the hands of the person who provokes him , and is subject to his pleasure . if not a wrinkle in a king's coat can be disordered without offence , what will it be if he suffer any one to disturb his mind ? anger is a kind of moth which purple breeds and nourishes . pomp engenders pride ; pride , passion ; and impatience is as it were a propriety of power . the sense of princes is something too delicate a looking glass which the least breath sullies , a heaven that with the least vapour is clouded and breaks out into thunder . a vice that generally seizes great and generous spirits ; as the sea , however vast and powerful , is with the least blast of wind raised into horrid disorders and tempests , with this only difference , that they are of much longer continuance in princes minds than in the sea ; especially if their honour be concerned , which they imagine 't is impossible to retrieve without revenge . what a trifling piece of incivility was that , sancho , king of navarre , put upon alphonsus the third , after the battel of arcos , in returning without taking leave of him ? which however this so highly resented , that he could never forget it , or rest till he had got him out of his kingdom . the anger of princes is like gun-powder , which no sooner takes fire , but has its effect ; the holy spirit calls it the messenger of death ; and barely on this account 't were sufficiently reasonable to curb and restrain it . 't is very indecent for one in authority to submit to this passion . let princes remember that nothing is put in their hands for a scepter , with which they can hurt . and if sometimes a naked sword is carried before kings , 't is in token of justice not revenge ; and then 't is carried in another's hand to intimate that between anger and execution there ought to intercede a command . the publick safety depends on princes , which will easily be in danger , if they hearken to so rash a counsellor , as anger . who can escape its hands ? for 't is like a thunder-bolt when it comes from supreme power . and because , says king alphonso , anger is stronger in a king , and more dangerous than in others ; in that he can more readily satisfy it , he ought to be more prepar'd to curb and correct it † . if princes in a passion could look upon themselves , they would find a countenance unbecoming such majesty , whose tranquility and agreeable harmony , both of words and actions , ought to please rather than terrify , to acquire love rather than fear . a prince therefore should quench the heat and violence of anger ; if he can't do so , at least to defer the fury and execution of it for some time : for as the same king alphonso has said , a king ought to keep in his anger till it is over , this will be of great advantage to him , for so he will be able to judge truly , and act justly in all things * . the emperor theodosius experienced this in himself ; and for this reason enacted a law , that capital punishments should not be executed till thirty days after sentence passed . which tiberius had before him decreed , though for only ten days , and without giving the senate power to revoke the sentence once pronounced . which indeed had been commendable , if his design had been to make room for pardon , or give time for a second hearing of the cause . but tiberius was a man of too much cruelty and rigor to give that indulgence it was the counsel of athenodorus to augustus caesar , to determine nothing in a passion till he had repeated the twenty four letters of the greek alphabet . since then , anger is a short madness , directly opposite to mature deliberation ; there is no better antidote against it than prudent reflection ; that the prince be not too hasty in execution , before he has had council to examine a matter throughly . king ahasuerus , when his queen vashti refused to come at his command , though he had reason to think himself contemned , and highly resented the affront , yet would not be revenged till he had first called a council , and taken the advice of his noblemen . to talk of an injury received , inflames anger more ; hence that of pythagoras , stir not fire with a sword , for motion increases the flame ; nor is there any more effectual remedy for anger than silence and solitude . by its self it insensibly consumes and wears off ; whereas the most softning discourse is often like the water smiths use to make their fire burn fiercer . farther , anger has its seat in the ears , or at least keeps watch there ; these therefore a prince is to secure , that they be not too ready to hear ill reports , that may enrage him this i imagine was the reason the statue of iupiter cretensis had no ears , because they do more mischief to governors than good . however , i think them necessary for princes , provided they be cautious and ruled by prudence , and let not themselves be moved at the first hearing of every trifling story . anger is to be commended when kind●ed by reason , and moderated by discretion ; without such as that , there can be no justice . too much indulgence gives license to offend , and makes obedience bold . to endure all things with content , is ig●orance , or shews a servile temper of one who has a ●ean opinion of himself . to continue in anger when 't is to punish offences , or make examples of such as affront regal authority is no vice , but a virtue , and by no means derogates from mildness and clemency . was any one more meek than david , a man after god'● own heart ? so mild in vengeance , in anger so moderate ; that when he had saul , his greatest enemy , in his power , was satisfied with cutting off the skirt of his robe , and even that afterward repented of . nevertheless with severity did he revenge the injury king hamm did to his ambassadors . david had sent them to comfort the king for the death of his father , but he groundlesly suspecting they came rather to spy out the state of his kingdom , sent them away with the one half of their beards shaved off , and their garments obscenely cut off in the middle . david , a man otherwise very peaceable , could not brook this affront , but made war against him , and all the cities of his kingdom which he took , he utterly demolished ; and the people that were therein , ( to use the scripture● words ) he brought forth and put them under saws and 〈◊〉 harrows of iron , and under axes of iron , and 〈◊〉 them pass through the brick-kiln this may see● to be cruelty , and an excess of anger , to any one● that knows not that the wounds injuries make , 〈◊〉 fometimes to be so cured , as not so much as 〈◊〉 should be left . artaxerxes threatned fire and swo●● to some cities , if they obey'd not an edict he had pu●●lished , resolving , if they refused , to make so severe 〈◊〉 example of their contempt and disobedience , as shoul● extend to brutes as well as men . the most 〈◊〉 god taught us this piece of policy , when with the 〈◊〉 most rigour , yet without prejudice to his infinite m●●cy , he punished the syrians army for blasphemou●● calling him the god of the hills . the supreme authority and power of princes makes a part of a commonwealth , so that they can't put up affronts and injuries at all times . that anger too is praise-worthy in princes , and profitable to a state , which kindled by incentives of glory , elevates the mind to difficult and noble enterprizes , for without it nothing extraordinary , nothing great , can be undertaken , much less perfected and accomplished . that , that is it which nourishes the heart of generous spirits , and raises it above its self to despise difficulties . the academicks called it the whetstone , plutarch the companion of virtue . but particularly , in the beginning of his reign , the prince ought to lay aside anger , and forget past injuries ; as sancho , sirnamed the brave , did when the succession of the crown of castile fell to him . with government , a prince changes as 't were his nature , why should he not also his affections and passions ? 't were an abuse of government to take revenge of one who already acknowledges himself your subject . let the person offended think he has satisfaction in having got authority over him , who before injured him . fortune could not give him a nobler kind of revenge . so lewis xii . king of france , thought , and therefore when some perswaded him to revenge the injuries he had received , while duke of orleans , he made answer , that it did not become the king of france to revenge the quarrels of the duke of orleans . particular injuries done to his person , not dignity , a prince ought not to vindicate with his utmost power ; for though they seem inseparable , yet 't is convenient to make some distinction between them , least majesty become odious and too formidable . to this tended that of tiberius , when he said , that if piso had committed no other crime , but the rejoycing at germanicus's death , and his grief for it , he would revenge those injuries done him as a private person , not as a prince , and in a publick capacity . on the other side , those done to his dignity or publick station , he ought not to vindicate as a private person , so as in a transport of passion to think his honour and reputation lost , except he have immediate satisfaction , especially when it were fitter to be deferred ; for anger should not be a motion of the mind , but of the publick good and advantage . king ferdinand , the catholick , undoubtedly had this before him , when the king of granada refused to pay him tribute , as his ancestors had done ; and withal , insolently sent him word , that they were long since dead ; that in his mints they laboured not to coin silver or gold , but forge swords and launces † . ferdinand concealed his resentment of this liberty and arrogance for a time , and made a truce with him , deferring revenge till his affairs were more quiet and settled ; in which he consulted more the publick good , than his own particular affections . nor is it less prudent to dissemble anger , when one has reason to presume , that a time will come when it will be for our disadvantage to have shown it . for that reason , king ferdinand , the catholick , though highly affronted by the grandees of his kingdom ; yet , when he abdicated that of castile , and retreated into arragon , very discreetly concealed that indignation of mind , took no notice of the injuries he had received , but shewed himself friendly and affectionate to all , as if he then foresaw he should be sometime restored to his kingdom , as indeed it afterwards happened . a generous mind hides its resentments of injuries , and strives not by the impetuousness of anger , but rather by noble actions to smother them ; the best certainly , and a truly heroical kind of revenge . when king ferdinand , the holy , besieged sevil , a certain nobleman reproached garcias perez de vargas for wearing a waved shield , which was not allowed his family ; he then pretended to take no notice of the affront , till the siege of triana , where he fought with so much valour , that he brought his shield back stuck with darts , then returning to his rival , who was then in a secure post , and shewing him the shield , you have reason , says he , to think much that i wear this shield , that expose it to so many dangers ; without doubt no one deserves it beyond your self , who would take so much care to preserve it . those ordinarily bear affronts most patiently , who are the least subject to give them ; nor is it a less virtue to conquer this passion , than an enemy . to kindle a prince's anger is no less dangerous than to set fire to a mine or petard ; and though it be done in our own behalf , 't is prudence to moderate it , especially if against persons in power : for such anger 's generally fall on the author's own head. this was the reason the moors of toledo took so much pains to pacify king alphonso the sixth's wrath , against the archbishop of that place , and the queen , who had taken without his order , their mosque from them . from which i draw two precepts : one is , that ministers ought , when the duty of their place requires them , to tell the prince of any thing that may create distast or anger , to represent them in the most softening terms imaginable ; for it often happens that an incensed mind ve●ts its fury upon the person who gave the first information of the thing , however innocent he may be , however good his design was in doing it . the other is , that they endeavour not only to moderate princes anger , but cover and conceal it handsomely . those seraphims ( ministers of love ) which stood above god in isaiah's vision , with two wings covered his face , and with two covered his feet . least his angry countenance should strike such as were guilty of any fault with such terror and despair , that they would wish the mountains to fall on them , rather than see the face of an avenging god . the heat of anger is no soone● cooled , but princes are sorry and vexed to have had any witnesses of it , or spectators of its effect , for both are equally disagreeable to the dignity of a king. and god himself for this reason turned lot's wife into a pillar of salt . emblem ix . 't is to its own damage that envy opposes the trophies and glory of hercules . to what end does it attempt to bite his sharp pointed club , but to make its jaws bloody ? in short , 't is its own avenger . it seems to me like a sword which from the same blood it spills gathers rust , and by that is afterwards eat up . all other vices take their rise from some appearance of good , or from pleasure ; on the contrary this proceeds from an inward grief and dissatisfaction at the good of another . other vices their punishment follows , this it even preceeds . envy sooner exerts its fury upon its own bowels , than on the honour of its neighbour . 't is the shadow of virtue ; he that would avoid that , must fly the light of this . the owl's sight being by nature strong enough to bear the sun's rays , is probably the reason other birds hate and envy her : whereas would she be confined to her private places , and conceal her self in the darkness of night , she need not fear their persecutions . between equals there 's seldom emulation ; when one's fortune , the other 's envy encreases . men are naturally apt to look with an ill eye on upstart happiness , and desire to reduce the fortunes of none more than those whom they have once seen upon the level with themselves . envy is like the tare which never seizes corn till it be considerably grown , and its fruit begins to ripen . he must therefore fly fame , dignities , and honourable employments , that would not be exposed to envy's darts . a mean fortune is least dangerous . regulus in the midst of nero's cruelty lived secure , because , says tacitus , his gentility was of a small standing , and his estate inconsiderable ; but this fear would be unworthy a generous beast . others envying us , shews we excel them , but to be absolutely free from envy is a very ill sign . 't is assuredly better to endure it , than be looked upon by all with indifferency . envy is the sting of virtue ; as the thorn preserves the rose , so does that virtue . this would easily be neglected , were there none malicious and detracting . many has emulation advanced , many envy made happy . that emulation of carthage raised the roman glory , as that of francis , king of france , did the fame of the emperor charles the fifth . 't was envy gave the roman , nay , the universal church to sixtus quintus , thence came all his fortune . there 's nothing better in this case than scorn , and being always endeavouring to mount higher till the envious man's eyes fail him , and he lose sight of you . the shadow of the earth reaches the moon , that lowest of the coelestial orbs , so near the elements , and overcasts its splendor ; the higher planets it does not in the least injure : the force of the sun , when at height , scatters and dispels clouds . where 's great inequality , there 's no room for envy , and consequently this is the only remedy against it . the more expeditiously a man advances himself , the less will he be exposed to envy . no smoak comes from a fire soon lighted . whereas , while merits wrestle , as it were , with one another , envy grows and takes up arms against the person preferr'd . pride and superciliousness are things which in good success provoke envy , and stir up hatred . on the other side , modesty quells it ; for no one envies him as happy , who looks not upon himself as such . for this reason , saul immediately after his being anointed king , betook himself to his house ; and to shew he was not exalted with royal dignity laid aside the scepter for a time , and set his hand to the plough . there●s yet another remedy , which is not to enlarge one's fortune at home , but in a foreign country ; for 't is very obvious for one , who before knew another to be of a mean extraction , but now sees him in a high degree of dignity , to envy him this happiness ; this evil insinuates its self more by the eyes than ears . many eminent men have declined honours to avoid being envied . the consul tarquinius voluntarily chose exile to escape the sight of this fury . valerius publius set his own houses on fire , because their magnificence procured him envy . fabius abdicated the consu●ship , saying , now i hope envy will cease to trouble the fabii . they were however in my opinion in the wrong , for this is rather to put the sword in the enemies hands , and give further occasion to envy ; which when it has once undertaken to persecute any one , never leaves him , till it has driven him to the extremity of misery . the sun casts no shadows so long as 't is in the zenith ; but as it declines and comes nearer us , they proportionably increase and grow longer . in the same manner envy pursues him with the greater force , who is near ruin , or begins to fall ; and as it generally lodges only in mean spirited persons , is always afraid he should raise himself upon his legs again . even after daniel was thrown among the lions , darius thought him not yet secure enough from those who envied him the king's favour ; and so fearing more mens envy than the wild beasts cruelty , he sealed the stone which was laid upon the lions den with his own signet , and with the signet of his lords , that no mischief might be done him . sometimes to avoid envy , and its inconveniences , 't were advisable to embark those in the same fortune , whose emulation may be feared thus the remora , which sticking to the outside of the ship stops its course , loses its strength when taken in . envy does not always gnaw lofty cedars ; sometimes she tires her teeth , and bloodies her lips with the lowest thorns , which nature her self seems to have in a manner hated . insomuch as not to look on even the miseries and calamities of others without spite and indignation ; whether it be , that her malice is wholly mad and unreasonable , or because she cannot endure the sufferer's strength of mind and constancy , or the fame fortune's injuries usually beget . there are to be found in the person of the present author , many things to make his case deservedly deplorable ; none , or very few , to render him envied ; nevertheless there are some who envy him these continual cares and fatigues , though little acknowledged or requited . there seems to be something of fatality in this emulation against him ; it produc'd it self without any reason , and often asperses him with things , he had by hear-say from others , before he could have so much as imagined . notwithstanding his mind so full of candor , and mindful of his duty , is so far from being disturbed at these things , that he rather loves that envy and indignation , perceiving it to awaken his courage , and daily excite it to make a further progress . princes therefore , who are so far in degree and dignity superior to others , ought chiefly to endeavour to despise envy . he that has not spirit enough for that , how will he have enough to be a prince ? to go to subdue it by kindness or rigour were plain imprudence . all other monsters hercules tamed ; against this neither force nor obligations were to any purpose . nothing can silence the peoples clamours ; for whatever favours you confer , they take for debts ; nay , always promise themselves greater than they receive . obloquy and detraction ought not to quench in a prince the desire of glory , nor deter him from executing his enterprizes : dogs bark at the moon , but she easily despises them , and proceeds in her course . the principal art of government is to be able to endure envy . envy is not very prejudicial to monarchies , but rather generally enflames virtue , and makes it more illustrious ; especially , if the prince be just and constant , and don●t too easily give credit to calumnies . but in republicks , where each man goes for a part , and can execute the desires of his passions with the help of friends and relations ; 't is very dangerous raising difcord and clandestine conspiracies , whence afterwards arise civil wars , which are the causes of all revolutions in states . 't was that in former times ruined hannibal , and many other great men ; and in this our age has called in question the unparallel●d fidelity of angelo baduero that famous venetian , whom you may deservedly call the glory and ornament of that commonwealth : a man so desirous of , and pas●ionate for the publick good , that even while under banishment , and unjustly oppressed , and persecuted by envious men , he was in all things strangely sollicitous for the preservation and welfare of his country . the most sovereign remedy against envy in republicks , is an equality of all the members of them , so as that all pomp and ostentation be prohibited ; for nothing so excites emulation as the splendor and plenty of riches . this made the romans take so much care to regulate and reduce the superfluous expences of feasts , and to divide their lands and possessions , that their citizens might be all equal in strength and estate . envy in princes is very unbecoming their eminency and grandeur , as well for its being the vice of an inferior towards his superiors , as because it must be but a very inconsiderable glory which can't shine without obscuring others . the pyramids of egypt were reckoned among the seven wonders of the world for receiving light on all sides of them , without casting the least shade on any bodies near . 't is a sign of weakness to want that which we envy in others . but nothing is more unworthy a prince , than to envy the excellence and prudence of his ministers , for they are in a manner parts and members of him ; the head envies not the feet for being so strong as to support the body , or the arms , because they can labour ; it glories rather in being furnished with such instruments however , self-love sometimes is the reason , that as princes are superior to others in power , so also they are desirous to surpass them in the gifts of mind and body . even the fame of lucan's verses was a disturbance to nero in the midst of all his grandeur . wherefore those who have to do with princes , ought to be very cautious , not to seem to enter into a dispute with them for knowledge or ingenuity ; or if at any time they are by some accident obliged to it , submit rather , and voluntarily yield them the victory ; this being not only prudence , but respect due to princes . the cherubims ( those spirits of knowledge and wisdom ) which stood before the throne of god in ezekiel's vision , with singular modesty covered their hands with their wings . this i wish indeed , that the prince would be jealous of that veneration , which some to get the greater interest in him too ambitiously demand , and accordingly moderate a little the excess of those his favours . yet , by what charm i know not , this love and kindness inchants a prince's mind , and blinds envy . saul could not but look upon david with an ill eye , when he saw his great exploits , though done for his service , more applauded than his own . whereas abasuerus could easily suffer haman , that great favourite of his , to be worshipped and honoured by all as a king . no envy has more danger in it than that between noblemen ; care should therefore be taken that honours and great places seem not to be hereditary to particular families , but be transferr'd from one to another ; yet , so as that the wealthiest of the nobility be employed in places that require pomp and expence ; the poorer sort in those by which they may raise their fortune , and maintain the splendor of their birth . there is some emulation that is glorious , i mean such as envies the virtue and merit of another , but grieves to want them it self , and endeavours by all the efforts both of valour and wit to acquire them ; this , i say , is commendable ; nor is it to be reputed a vice , but a kind of spark of virtue proceeding from a noble and generous mind . the honour miltiades got by his victory over the persians , kindled such flames in themistocles's breast , as immediately consumed all his vices ; he like another man ran about athens , crying . the trophies of miltiades would not let him sleep . as long as vitellius had competitors , he abstained from vices ; but as soon as he was without them , both he and his army abandon'd themselves to cruelty , lust , rapine , and licentiousness . this is the emulation commonwealths should encourage , by proposing rewards , erecting trophies or statues ; for that is the soul and spirit by which they are preserved , and grow daily more flourishing . and this i take to be the reason the republick of switzerland takes so little pains to extend its limits , and why it produces so few famous men ; though otherwise nature has been by no means niggardly of valour , and strength of mind to its inhabitants ; for their principal design is to establish a general equality , which puts a stop to all emulation ; and consequently all noble and military virtues are buried like burning coals in ashes . but though this emulation among ministers may seem useful , yet 't is not wholly without danger , in that the people who suffer no man to be without a rival are variously affected ; hence , while these favour one , those applaud another , there arises a contention between both parties , and these factions breed tumults and seditions . besides that , the heat of ambition , and desire of advancing themselves above others , usually puts them upon unlawful tricks and artifices ; and that which at first was honourable emulation , degenerates at length into hatred and envy . metellus offended that pompey was nominated to be his successor in farther spain , and envying the glory of this great commander , disbanded the soldiers , weakned the army , and carelesly neglected all provisions . pompey did afterwards the same , when he understood marcus pompilius was to succeed him in the consulship , and for fear , possibly , the honour of conquering the numantines might redound to him , made a peace with them very dishonourable to the roman name . in our own times , grol was lost upon no other account but a dispute that arose among the officers , that were sent to relieve it , about preheminence . in short , nothing is so pernicious to princes , nothing more needs a remedy . nor is here connivance to be admitted , but both are to be punished , as well he that seems to be innocent , as the person in fault . this forgiving the occasion ; that because he renounced not his right , and let slip an opportunity of managing affairs to advantage . which rigour , if it seems to any one excessive , will be excused , by considering the emolument of the publick good , and of the example it will leave to posterity . there 's no great resolution without some mixture of injury . a subject ought to look upon the duty he owes his prince , before his own honour ; let him demand satisfaction for the injury received afterwards , and think he has acquitted himself of his duty to his prince , in having a little while put it up . patience in such a case , shews extraordinary courage ; for a generous mind ought to prefer the service of the king before its own passions ; and lay aside private feuds when the publick interest is concerned . aristides and themistocles were bitter enemies , yet being both sent on an embassy together , when they came to the city-gate , aristides said , let us here , themistocles , leave for a little time our private grudges , and at our return resume them again . the same did henry guzman , duke of medina , who though otherwise an enemy to rodrigo pontre , marquiss of cadiz , yet out of love of the publick good , went to his assistance at the siege of alhama . but because 't is much easier to prevent these dangers than remedy them afterwards ; the prince must take care not to put two ministers of equal authority in the same office , for 't is very difficult to make power and agreement subsist in the same place . tiberius being to send another minister into asia of equal quality with the then governor of that province , thought that might be of dangerous consequence ; and therefore chose m. aletus , a praetor , least their equality might breed emulation , and that occasion some impediment . emblem x. the faulcon's no sooner let fly , but he strives with his beak to get off the little bells that are hung at his feet , knowing them to prejudice his liberty ; for their tingling shrill sound is like a voice , which with the least motion raised , presently calls the faulconer , and so is the occasion that the poor bird is brought again to confinement , how far soever it hid it self in the thickest woods . alas ! how many men has the noise of their virtues , and brave exploits , been mischievous to ? how many has fame brought into envy and insupportable slavery ? nor is great or good fame less dangerous than bad . miltiades had never ended his days so unhappily in prison , had his valour been conceal'd and unknown , or moderating his high spirit , he had been content with a fortune equal to that of other athenian citizens . but the reputation of his victories increasing , and the eyes of envy being not able to bear fame's so bright rays , this republick began to mistrust what merited esteem and recompence ; they feared , forsooth , their own necks might at length be obliged to bear the yoke he had put on that of their enemies ; and dreaded more the future and uncertain danger of miltiades's infidelity , than that present , and far greater one which threatned them from those , who openly designed the ruin and destruction of their city . suspicion never admits reason into its council , nor does such fear stand to weigh the importance of things , or suffer gratitude to get the better of it . that commonwealth chose to let one , though the most deserving , of its citizens lie in prison and infamy , rather than all the rest should live in continual jealousies . the carthaginians took the government of spain from sappho , under pretence , indeed , of administring the commonwealth at home ; but the true reason was , that they could no longer suffer his power and authority . thus they banished his successor , hanno , who was so eminent for his navigations , only because he had more ingenuity and industry than they thought safe for a free people . he was the first man they ever saw stroke a lion , and make it tame , and began to apprehend he would at last subdue them , who had vanquished the savage beasts . thus commonwealths are used to recompence services and great actions . no one of the citizens takes himself in particular to be honoured , or obliged by any good office is done to the community ; as to offences and suspicion , every one thinks himself concerned . if any one 's to be rewarded , very few give him their votes ; on the contrary , to find a man guilty all are zealous . he that is more excellent than others , is thereby in danger ; for his zeal for the publick good accuses their negligence ; his prudence their ignorance . hence 't is so dangerous to be serviceable and obsequious to princes ; hence virtue and industry become like vices , odious . sallust , who had a capacity fit for the most important business , to avoid envy , feigned himself to be idle and drowsy . but the worst of all is , that sometimes a prince is displeased at being awakened by a vigilant minister , whom he would rather have as careless as himself . to remedy this , as there is an hypocrisy which counterfeits virtues , and dissembles vices ; there is need of another to conceal valour and excellency of mind , and to stop the mouth of fame . 't was undoubtedly nothing but the fear of envy made agricola so careful to hide his , that they who saw in him so much humility and modesty , unless they had otherwise heard of his fame , could never guess at his renown by his person . time made germanicus sensible of this inconveniency , but he chose to bear rather than amend it , when after the conquest of so many nations , he erected indeed a trophy , but for fear of fame put not his name to it . st. iohn concealed his , in the relation of the signal favour our saviour shew'd him at his last supper , which if 't was not humane policy , was at least prudent modesty . even meer dreams about ones own promotion breeds envy amongst brothers . ioseph almost hazarded his life , when with more ingenuity than discretion , he told his the dream he had of the sheafs of corn that made obeisance to his that stood upright among the rest ; for the very shadow of eminence , nay , the bare possibility of excelling makes envy solicitous . glory is dangerous , as well because of our own virtues , as other mens vices . vice is not so feared in men because it makes them slaves , as virtue that makes them masters ; for dominion is by nature her self given to it , and this republicks won't suffer to be lodged in the person of one , but would have equally divided among all virtue is a kind of voluntary tyranny over minds , has no less influence on them , than violence it self , or compulsion ; and indeed , to excite republicks to imitation , 't is the same thing absolutely whether the people be induced by reason or by force , constrained to obey one only ; for the first tyranny , the juster 't is , the more dangerous and irresistible . this very thing gave rise to the ostracism , or ten years banishment , to which aristides , among others , was condemned ; whose only crime , was his having the reputation of a good and just man. the peoples favour is a very dangerous friend to virtue ; for their applause and approbation is punished as a fault , as you may see in the person of galerian . so germanicus learned by experience , that the roman peoples love was fickle and unfortunate . neither princes nor commonwealths much desire ministers of extraordinary excellency , but such as have a competent skill to manage affairs , and this reason tacitus gives why poppaeus sabinus was continued four and twenty years in the government of the most considerable provinces . 't is therefore a piece of great prudence to know how to conceal ones fame , and consequently to beware of all ostentation of wit , valour , or excellency , and cover all sublime thoughts , as they say , with ashes ; though i confess , 't is difficult for a noble mind to confine to the narrow compass of its own breast , a flame that breaks out on all sides , and daily requires new fuel to increase it , and make it shine with the greater lustre . but this we may be perswaded to by the examples of these illustrious heroes , who heretofore from the dictatorship returned to the plough ; and of those that after a triumphant entry into the city of rome by breaches , because the gates were not large enough ; that after the conquest of whole nations , have retreated to poor despicable cottages , whither afterwards the common-wealth has come to find them out . nor had that ever brought them so soon into play again had it not seen they were not ambitious of honour ; for that like a shadow flies him that pursues it , follows him that flies it . his fame and reputation is greatest , who strives to conceal it . rubellius plautus was thought to deserve the empire because he lived retired ; but 't is not so in monarchies , where one ascends higher by having begun to ascend . a prince has men of courage and bravery in great esteem , republicks fear them rather ; that animates them by rewards and presents , these discourage them by ingratitude : nor is fear of their liberty always the reason of it , but 't is also a pretence to cloak their envy and emulation under . if any one be the object of all mens favour and applause , he is usually suspected and envied ; which rarely happens in princes , who don 't easily envy their subjects glory ; but if they do any thing commendable , they attribute it to themselves , as being the execution of their orders . this has been observable in the emperor otho . prudent ministers ought therefore to attribute to the prince the happy success of things ; taking warning by the example of silius , who incurred tiberius's displeasure by boasting that he alone kept the legions to their duty ; and using to say often , that tiberius was indebted to him only for his empire : for caesar thought at this rate his fortune would be destroyed , and that he was unable to make return to so great merit . nor was vespasian displeased with antonius primus for any thing , but too frequently mentioning his own merits . agricola was far more prudent , who never magnified his exploits for his own fame , but attributed all his success to his superiors . ioab has left an illustrious example of this to all generals ; who , when he had forced any city to surrender , sent word before to king david to bring up new forces , that the surrender might be ascribed to his conduct . the ancient germans were above others commended for this , who lay under a strict obligation , not only to defend and preserve their prince , but also to attribute the glory of their own brave actions to him . for these reasons a person is much securer of a recompence for the services he does a prince , than those done a commonwealth ; and will with more ease get the favour of the one than the other . besides , that there 's less danger in offending that than this ; for the multitude knows not what connivance , mercy , or danger are ; it is equally rash in its resolutions , whether the thing to be attempted be dangerous or unjust ; for either the fear or blame is divided among many , and each man perswades himself the danger is not like to fall on his pate , that the infamy belongs not to him . a community has no forehead to blush , as a prince has , who is with great reason solicitous for his own person chiefly , as well as for his reputation , and that of his posterity . all men flatter a prince , setting before him the things that lead to glory , in republicks few are concerned for the publick honour , almost all for security . a prince has his subjects to content , in a community that care and trouble ceases ; for what it undertakes or does , is by the common counsel of all , and so every one is thought to be concerned in it . and hence i imagine it comes to pass , that commonwealths ( i mean not such as are in a manner kingly ) are so unconstant and false in the observation of treaties ; for that only is just with them , which seems to be for the interest of their preservation , grandeur , and the liberty they so much advance , in which they are extreamly superstitious . they imagine they worship true liberty , and with a servile submission adore infinite tyrannical idols . every one thinks he commands , and all obey ; they are all provided with an antidote against the poyson of monarchy , and the sovereignty of many they greedily and securely swallow ; they fear nothing more than the tyranny of foreigners , take no notice of that at home . liberty is talkt of every where , found no where . all are possessed of it in imagination , none in reality . let the united provinces now make a comparison between the liberty they formerly had , and that they enjoy at present , and diligently examine which of the two has the advantage ; whether they ever underwent the same slavery then , suffered those loses and taxes they at this day sensibly experiment . let the subjects of some commonwealths , nay the magistrates themselves , in whose hands the government is , think whether it were possible for any tyrant to enslave them more than those very persons they have set up to assert their liberty , when there is not one that really enjoys it in his actions . they are all miserable slaves to their own jealousies ; the magistracy is its own tyrant ; and it may be truly said of both , that they live without a master , but not with liberty ; for the more they strive to disengage themselves from the bonds of slavery , the faster they are bound with them . emblem xi . the tongue is an instrument , by the help of which the mind discovers its sentiments , for it expresses it self either by that , or by the pen , which like a silent tongue sometimes supplies its place , drawing on paper the words which should have been uttered by the voice . from both the one , and the other , one may draw a probable conjecture of a man's parts and capacity . for by speech , wisdom shall be known , and learning by the word of the tongue . hence king alphonso , the wise , speaking in his laws how a prince ought to carry himself in his conversation , what moderation he should use in speaking ; among other things says , multiloquy makes their words unregarded , and if a king be not a man of good sense , his tongue soon discovers the defect ; for as an earthen pot is tried by the sound , so is a man's sense by his words † . a comparison which he seems to have borrowed from this passage of persius : — sonat vitium percussa malignè , respondet viridi non cocta fideli● limo . speech is the minds countenance ; by that is discovered whether it be sound or not . to represent this , i have made use of another nobler emblem , and more accommodated to the subject ; 't is a bell , the true emblem of a prince ; for as that is hung up in the most eminent place of the city , it times , and regulates all the citizens actions ; and if the metal be not good , or it has any other fault in 't , 't is by its sound presently discerned . so a prince is a kind of general clock to all his subjects , who in a great measure depend , as i may say , upon the motion of his words , and by them he either gets or loses a reputation , every one giving himself to gue●s at his genius , wit , and inclinations , by his discourse . not a word escapes his hearers , each one makes a deep impression on their memory , they are repeated to others , and exposed to the censure of all , who usually put various constructions upon them , as they think fit . nay , even , what comes from him in private and unawares , passes for profound and mysterious , and not for casual and accidental . it were therefore very proper for them not to be extemporary but premeditated , not spoken without a previous consideration of all the circumstances of time , place , and persons . for — nescit vox missa reverti , — as horace says , seconded by king alphonso , for this reason all men , especially a king , ought to take great care of his words before he utters them , for when they are once out of the mo●th , there is no man can recal them † . whence may arise very great inconveniences , for the words of kings are the principal instruments of government . death and life are in the power of the tongue ; as also the honour and ignominy , the prosperity and ruin of subjects . this made aristotle , when he sent callisthenes to alexander the great , advise him to talk little with him , and only upon agreeable subjects ; for that 't was a dangerous thing to treat with one who carried the power of life and death at his tongues end . there 's not a word comes from a prince's mouth without a peculiar emphasis : is it about business , they are commands ; if of crimes , they are sentences ; if of promises , obligations ; by his words he is either obeyed or disobeyed . let princes therefore take care how they use this tongue of theirs , which nature has not meerly by chance fenced and inclosed with , as it were , a wall of teeth ; nor is there less need of a bridle for the tongue , than for a horse . 't is , it is true , one of the least members of the body , but 't is like the rudder of a ship , on whose motion the loss or safety of the whole vessel depends . the tongue is placed in a wet place , and so easily slips , unless stai'd by prudence . hence that prayer of david ; set a watch , o lord , before my mouth , keep the door of my lips . for a prince to condescend to a familiar conversation with any one , lessens his character , prostitutes his authority , and brings many other inconveniences upon him , unless he do it for information ; for every man desires to have a wise prince , and one that understands his affairs very well ; which is next to an impossibility , for a prince can't know all things ; and if he answer in the least from the purpose ; he shall be presently condemned for insufficiency or negligence . besides , that princes talents and endowments very rarely answer the generally received opinion of them ; therefore to avoid the danger of this , the roman emperors chose to treat with their subjects by notes , and give them answers in writing , as well to get time for deliberation , as because the pen is less subject to mistake than the tongue ; for this can't handsomely defer an answer , that can . sejanus , however great a favourite of tiberius's , conferr'd only with him by way of memorial . there are , however , some affairs which may be better treated of by word of mouth ; particularly , when there●s something of danger in leaving ones sentiments in anothers hands , which are a kind of perpetual evidence , and more liable to be wrested to different meanings than words , which as they quickly pass , and stick not deep in the memory , are not so easily actionable . but whether a prince gives his answers this , or the other way , he should always remember , that brevity is the most prudent , and most becoming a princes majesty . hence tacitus gives that epithet imperial to brevity . you should use the tongue as your sword , that is , not lay your self too open to your adversary ; he that discloses his whole mind , exposes himself to danger . concise discourses have the greatest efficacy , and leave most room for reflection . nothing 's so like a king , as to talk little , and hear much . nor is it less requisite for him to know how to be silent , than how to speak . in this , men are our masters . in that , god himself , who always injoyns silence in his mysteries . he resembles the divinity most , who has learnt to hold his peace . even a fool when he holdeth his peace is counted wise , and he that shutteth his lips is esteemed a man of understanding . the heart of fools is in their mouth , but the mouth of the wise is in their heart . this is prudence to avoid both extreams , for each has its danger : all to talk , or none , are distant , and yet neighbouring faults . auson . 't is then only convenient to speak , when silence prejudices either the prince or truth . majesty by a nod only sufficiently explains its self . silence well-timed , is in princes great eloquence ; and a grave and modest carriage are usually more significantly expressive of one's thoughts than words themselves . but if one's obliged to use these at any time , they ought to be sincere , and with liberty in thinking becoming a king. your free conceptions dress in plain words . tass. for by too many asseverations , oaths , and unnecessary proofs , they either quite lose their credit , or at least are rendred suspicious ; they ought then to be grave without moroseness ; graceful without affectation ; of force without roughness ; lastly , common not vulgar . even with god , words well ordered , seem to have most weight and influence . but the tongue and pen require no where more prudent moderation than in promises , in which princes either out of a natural generosity , or to obtain their ends with more ease , or to avoid a danger , are usually extravagant ; which when they can't perform , they lose their credit , and procure themselves enemies , so that it had been better not to have been so lavish of them . there have been more wars occasioned by the breach of promises than by injuries . for interest is seldom in these so much concerned as in them . and princes are generally moved more by their own advantage than by injuries received . to make large promises , and not keep them , is interpreted by a superior , an affront ; by an equal , injustice ; by an inferior , tyranny . the tongue therefore should not be too forward to promise , without assurance that the promise can be performed . in threats also , the tongue easily goes beyond its limits ; for the heat of anger soon puts it in motion , and when revenge can't equal the passion , of necessity prudence ; nay , and supream power must l●se not a little of their credit . 't is therefore much more adviseable to dissemble injuries , that the effects of satisfaction may be considered before the prince threatens it . he that uses menaces before his hands , designs either to make them the only instruments of his revenge , or to give his enemy warning . there 's no more ter●ible threatning than silence . if mine 's already let o●● , no one is afraid ; those are always more formidable that lie still conceal'd under-ground ; for the effects of the imagination are usually greater than those of the senses . detraction has in it a great mixture of envy and ostentation ; it is always almost of an inferior towards his superior , and consequently much below a prince , by whose lips no man's honour ought to be brought in question . if he sees vices , he should punish them ; if other small defects , correct or connive at them . the praise of brave actions and services is a part of their reward ; excites the person commended to , as it were an emulation of himself , and is a spur to others . however , to commend all subjects indifferently , is not without danger . for the judgment they pass on them being various and uncertain , and that praise , a kind of definitive sentence , time may discover to have been rashly given ; in the mean time , the prince's honour will oblige him not to retract easily what he has once approved . as well therefore for this reason , as not to give occasion to envy , great circumspection is required in praising persons , which is also one of the holy spirit 's oracles , iudge no one blessed before his death . it was a principal maxim among the stoicks , to commend no one rashly , because scarce any thing can be a●firmed with certainty , and we are often deceived in things that appear to us most praise-worthy . emblem xii . the heart of man , nature , that skilful architect , has hid in the most retired part of the breast ; however , least probably , seeing it self thus concealed , and without witnesses , it should do any thing against the law of reason , she has withal given man that native colour or fire of blood , for modesty to inflame his countenance withal , and accuse his heart , if it deviate from honour in any thing , or think otherwise than the tongue speaks , both which ought always to have the same motion , and a mutual agreement in all things . but malice by degrees effaces that mark which is used in children to shew its self . hence the romans well-knowing the importance of truth for the establishment of society , and maintaining commerce in the commonwealth ; and desiring nothing more than to preserve the shame of deserting it among men , hung about their childrens neck a golden heart , ( which they called bulla ) an hieroglyphick , says ausonius , invented by pythagoras , to signify the ingenuity men ought to profess in conversation , and the sincerity they should observe in truth , wearing at their breast , a heart uncovered , as it were , and open , the genuine emblem of that truth . and this we commonly mean , when speaking of a man of veracity , we say he carries his heart in his hands , or that he is open-hearted . the same the egyptian priests signified by the sapphire they put upon their princes breasts , to represent emblematically the same truth ; as their ministers of justice also used to wear about them some figure of it . nor should any one imagine , that for the prince to be so sincere , and professed a lover of truth , would perhaps but give an occasion to deceit and cozenage ; for on the contrary , nothing is more effectual in preventing those cheats , and driving away lyes , which never dare look truth in the face . the same observation i take that advice of pythagoras to allude to , never to speak with one's back towards the sun ; thereby intimating that nothing ought to be uttered repugnant to truth ; for a liar can't bear the bright rays of truth , signified by the sun upon a double account , both because of the sun's unity ; as for that it disperses darkness , and drives away shades , restoring to all things their true light and proper colours , as the present emblem shews ; where as soon as that luminary is got above the horizon , the obscurity of night immediately flies , and the nocturnal birds retire to the woods dark coverts , which in that 's absence , and favoured by the silence of night , use while others sleep , to seek their prey . what confusion is the owl in , if by chance she comes into the sun's presence ? in that glittering light she staggers to and fro , and is confounded , that splendor quite blinds her , and frustrates all her tricks . can any one have so much subtilty and craft , but they will presently fail him when he comes before an ingenuous prince , and one that is a particular friend to sincerity and truth ? there 's no force able to penetrate into the designs of a candid mind , if that candor want not some retirements for prudence . is there any thing more open and evident to the eyes of the world , any thing more resplendent , more opposed to shadows and darkness than the sun ? nevertheless , if any one will look stedfast upon its rays , he will discover i know not what abuses , as 't were , and obscurities of light , which so darken the eyes , that what they saw , they can't tell . thus knavery is blinded with the light of truth , and its foundations overturned , nor can it find any more a way to delude with its artifices . 't is a victory truly worthy a prince , to conquer frauds and cheats with ingenuity , lyes with truth . to lye is a slavish vice , and consequently very unbecoming the generous mind of princes , who above all men should endeavour to render themselves like god , who is truth it self . whence kings , ( says king alphonso ) who keep its place upon earth , and to whom it particularly belongs to guard it , ought to take special care not to contradict it by falsity ; if a king should once give himself to lying , he will not be believed , even when he speaks truth , and will farther give incouragement to others to follow his example . this inconveniency tiberius experimented , who often pretending to restore liberty and the consular government to the commonwealth , and to remit the management of affairs to others , caused the people to mistrust him when he meant really and honestly . the greater monarchs are , they are the more exposed to vanity and lyes . the rays of a plentiful fortune easily contract the clouds of detraction . in great empires all things have the worst construction put upon them , and are obnoxious to reproaches . what open force can't do , calumny by secret mines attempts , in which thing he that hath the rule over others , has need of great courage , not to change his course , or suffer himself to be stopt by the clamours of cavillers . this constancy and firmness of mind has always eminently appeared in the kings of spain , to whom it has been , in a manner , natural to despise envy and calumny ; by which means alone , many clouds of that nature have been dispelled , which as majesty raises , so it also by the force of truth dissipates , as the sun's heat does vapours . what infamous libels , what manifest falsities , what forg'd stories , what calumnies have malicious men often spread against the spanish monarchy ? nor for all this , could that envy be able to cast the least blemish upon its so just administration of the kingdoms 't is possessed of in europe , because that is open to the world , and visible to all . among other things , by new contriv'd devices , and studied lyes to render its government odious , and so make the rebellious princes less desirous of a reconciliation : i know not what author , under the name of the bishop of chapa , has published a book , wherein he gives a large account of the inhumane and barbarous usage the indians received from the spaniards ; and that those lyes might have a more easy credit ; the book was first spread about in spain , as printed at sevil , afterwards translated into other languages . an ingenious invention indeed , and accute piece of malice , and of more consequence than perhaps can be believed , for upon some easy minds it had very ill effect , though most of the more prudent so●● soon discovered the cheat ; in as much as all those things are abundantly confuted by the extraordinary zeal for religion and justice , the spanish nation always with great constancy exercises and maintains all over the world , nor is it unlike its self in the indies only . i won't however deny , but at the first invasion of america , some things happened not altogether to be approved , but this was only by their fault , who thinking this known world too little for their vast minds , had the boldness by the permission , rather than command , or choice of their king to try their fortune in other parts , and discover new countries hitherto unknown , where they found a barbarous people , idolatrous to superstition , more savage than beasts , who brutally lived on man's flesh , whose inhumanity was incorrigible but by force and utmost rigour . but it was not long before their catholick majesties provoided a remedy against these disorders , for they sent to those coasts commissaries to punish those severely they found had been guilty ; and to maintain entire justice among the indians , they gave afterwards many paternal orders for their preservation , of which it was none of the least to exempt them from those severe labours they daily underwent in the mines , and in other things before the discovery of those countries . they sent besides , divines with great zeal to teach them the mysteries of the christian faith ; founded bishopricks at their own expences , and those of the crown , and maintained religious convents for the benefit of that new planted church , without suffering them from the time those vast countries fell into the spaniards hands , even in the absence of their new masters , to want any any thing which 't is a king's duty to supply his subjects withal . in which the government of this state , and the vigilance of its ministers , may in a manner seem to surpass that of the sun it 's self , of the moon and stars , and the influence they have over things below ; for but a few hours , in which the sun's presence lightens one hemisphere ; the other is in confusion , while malice cloaths and covers its self with the darkness of night , and under the mask , as it were , of that obscurity commits murders , robbe●ies , adulteries , and every thing that 's ill , the sun's providence not being able to prevent them , though , indeed , even in the night he spreads some twilight above the horizon , or in the interim leaves the performance of his office to the moon as his vicegerent , and the stars as his ministers , and communicates to them the authority of his rays . from this our world , the kings of spain govern that other in justice , peace , and religion , with the same political happiness the kingdoms of castile enjoy to their satisfaction . but least the envious and enemies of the spanish monarchy should triumph with these their artifices , and that all the calumnies of that book may be entirely overthrown , let us suppose all those evils , which malice has feigned the indians to have suffered , to be true ; and compare them to what have been really undergone in our own time in several wars , as well against genoa , as in germany , burgundy , and lorrain , and 't will appear clearer than light , that that lye comes far short of the truth of these . what cruel torments have tyrants ever invented against innocence , which in these our times we have not seen put in practice , not against inhumane and barbarous people , but civilized nations ; and those not always enemies , but even their own members , without respect to propinquity of blood , or piety towards their country ? how often have we seen auxiliary forces turn their weapons upon them that sent them ? defence been more bloody than open offence ? protection become immediate destruction ; friendship , hostility ? not a stately edifice , not a sacred place , has been spared by fire and sword : in a little time we have seen an infinite number of towns , forts , and cities , buried in their own ashes ; and countries very populous changed into most solitary deserts . nor yet , could that thirst of humane blood be quench'd or satisfied . 't was no new thing then to try pistols and swords upon mens breasts , as bodies of trees , and that not only in the heat of battel , but in cool blood , 't was then a very agreeable spectacle to see the deformed looks , and trimbling limbs of men exspiring . how often have mens bellies ript open served for mangers ? sometimes in those of women ( 't is dreadful to mention it ) their tender embryo's were mixt with straw and oats , and made provender for horses . at the expence of life , 't was try'd , how much water a man's body would hold , or how long one could live without sustenance . nuns were violated , daughters of good families dishonoured , wives ravished in the very sight of their parents and husbands . women , as all other spoil or plunder , were either sold or exchanged for cows or horses , and labourers were put to chariots , and compell'd to draw them as horses ; and to make them discover where their riches lay , hung by the feet and members , and thus let down into hot furnaces . there children were barbarously murdered before their eyes , that paternal affection might in the grief of these their dearest pledges effect what self-love could not oblige them to . in woods and forests where wild beasts find refuge , men could not ; for the blood hounds chased them thence , and brought them to the stake . the deepest lakes we●e not secure from so ingenious cove●ousness and rapine ; the effects of these wretched people were rak'd thence with hooks and nets . not so much as dead mens bones were suffered to rest , tombs and grave-stones were thrown down to search under them for treasures . there 's no magical , no devilish art which they put not in practice to discover their money . many thousand men perished by cruelty and covetousness , not by their own baseness , as the indians , whose extirpation divine justice permitted , for having been so many ages rebels to their creator . i mention not these things to accuse any nation in particular ; for i am assured most , if not all , have acted their parts in this barbarous and inhumane tragedy ; but only to vindicate that of the spaniards from calumny . the sweetest and best fram'd mind is sometimes in danger of transgressing its limits . 't is the weakness of our frail nature , to be subject to commit the most brutish action , if it want the bridle of religion and justice . emblem xiii . the moon supplies the sun's absence , in presiding over night ; upon the various motions , upon the increase and decrease of that , depend the vigor and conservation of things here below ; and although that is as much more beautiful as these be obscure , and of themselves weak , as receiving their being from its light ; yet there 's no one , either upon that account , or for its other innumerable benefits , takes much notice of it , even , at the height of its splendor . but i● it be at any time by the interposition of the earth eclipsed , and discover the defects of its body , not as before illuminated by the sun , but dark and opacous , immediately all mens eyes are upon it , all observe it ; nay , this accident curiosity long before anticipates , and measures its steps every moment . what are princes , but a kind of terrestrial planets and moons , on which that divine sun of justice diffuses its rays for the government of the earth ? for if those stars have power over things , these have over minds . this i imagine made the persian kings endeavour by a sort of false rays to imitate the form of the sun and moon , to make themselves esteemed equal to those planets . sapor , one of them in a letter to the emperor constantius , called himself brother to the sun and moon . princes , their dignity makes conspicuous among other men , as placed in the highest orbs of power and empire , and so exposed to all mens censures . they are coloss● , or vast statues , whose parts can't bear the least disproportion one to another , but others eyes will presently be upon it . they ought therefore to be very circumspect in their actions , since they are the objects of the whole world's attention ; and tho' their good ones pass sometimes without remark , their faults will never escape observation . curiosity employs a hundred eyes , and far more ears , to penetrate princes most secret thoughts . they seem like that stone in zachariah , upon which were seven eyes . for which reason , in the highest grandeur there is least liberty . the prince's hand keeps time in that musical consort , which good and prudent government makes ; if this time be not regular and even , there arises a confusion of voices , and the harmony is disordered in others , in that all follow the motion of that . hence 't is , that states generally resemble their princes , and sooner the ill than the good ; for as subjects use so carefully to observe their vices , they make an impression on their minds , and are easily afterwards imitated out of flattery . for vicious princes not only commit vices themselves , but infuse them into their people , and are more blameable for the example than the fault ; and experience tells us , that bad habits commonly do more mischief than the very best do good ; for such is the perverse inclination of our nature , that it rather studies to imitate vices than virtues . how great , how excellent , were those of alexander the great ? yet , the emperor caracalla strove to resemble him in nothing but that habit he had of leaning hi● head on his left shoulder . though , indeed , some of a prince's vices prejudice himself only ; others affect also the commonwealth , as tacitus has observed in vitellius and otho . yet they are all extreamly prejudicial to subjects by the example they give . our easy tempers are biass'd by princes ; we follow their example , whether they be good or evil , like those wheels in ezekiel's vision , which in all things exactly followed the motion of the cherubims . each action of princes seems to be a command to be obeyed by imitation . subjects imagine they do their prince an agreeable piece of service in imitating his vices , and seeing these are masters of the will ; flattery easily perswades her self this must be the way to gain it . thus tigellinus grew daily more bold and confident , thinking his ill practices would be less unacceptable , if he could engage his prince ( nero ) to be his associate in them . by this means 't is the commonwealth is disordered , and virtue confounded . princes should therefore lead such a life , so form their manners , that all may learn by them to be virtuous and honest ; which advice they have given them by king alphonso , in the sixth of his law. for if vices extinguish the lamp of virtue in a prince , who ought like a beacon to give light to all , and shew them the securest course to sail in , he cannot avoid dashing against rocks the vessel of the commonwealth ; it being impossible for that government to be well ordered , where the prince has abandoned himself to vice : for , says king alphonso , the nature of vice is such , that the more a man uses it , the more he loves it . the people easily slight and contemn laws , if they see him that is the very soul of them not observe them . thus , as the moon 's eclipses prejudice the earth , so the prince's faults are the destruction of his kingdom : for the punishment due to them , god almighty generally inflicts upon the subjects too , and that deservedly , for that in following his example , they make themselves accessary to the same crimes ; as 't is related in scripture of the people of israel under ieroboam . the bare shadow of an ill action , which obscured king roderigo's fame , kept the liberty of all spain in darkness for many years ; wherefore that barbarous custom of the mexicans is in some measure excusable ; who at the inauguration of a new king , obliged him to take an oath he would administer justice , not oppress his subjects ; that he would be in war strenuous and valiant : in a word , that he would † take care the sun continued his course , and preserved his splendor ; that the clouds should give rain , and the rivers water , and that the earth should produce its fruit plentifully . for the sun himself obeys a holy prince , as ioshua experienced for a reward of his virtue , and the earth is more than ordinary fertile out of gratitude , in a manner to the justice of kings towards their people . this is what homer would signify by these verses : the king , who takes religion for his guide ; who does for 's subjects wholesome laws provide ; for him the willing earth shews all its stock , corn , wine , and fruit ; for him the teeming flock brings double births ; the sea opens all its cells : where iustice reigns , their peace and plenty dwells . the goodness of a year is not to be judged of so much by good fruit , as the justice of the prince . and 't is very much the opinion of the vulgar , that those who govern them , are the only cause of their happiness or misery ; nay , they often impute to the prince , even casualities , as the roman people did to tiberius . let not a prince perswade himself that his vice● will be less censured , for suffering them to go unpunished in others , or having them in common with the people , as 't is related witiza did : for though subjects love libertinism , they hate the author of it ; which was the reason it cost him afterwards his life , being by all men hated for his scandalous way of living . what we usually censure in others as highly base and infamous , in our selves we scarce allow to be infirmities of nature . the greatest defect in our selves we easily connive at , but in a looking-glass can't suffer the least spot . such a one is a prince , in whose person his subjects have a view of themselves , nor is any thing more unpleasant to them , than to see him sullied with vice. nero was not at all less infamous for having many companions in his debaucheries ; however he thought thereby to avoid scandal . nor should princes imagine themselves secure from a self-consciousness of their good actions ; for whenever the people can't inform themselves of their actions , they begin nicely to examine them , and always put the worst interpretation upon them ; wherefore 't is not enough for them to do well , but necessary , also , that the means they use have no appearance of evil. and how will that man have any thing secret , who can't be without his own grandeur , and a retinue of courtiers , nor do any thing alone ; whose liberty draws with it so many fetters and golden chains , whose noise every one hears ? this was signified in the person of the high-priest , by those little bells that hung round the bottom of his garment , least he should forget that his steps were exposed to all mens ears . all the guards both within and without a prince's palace , all the courtiers that attend him in his chamber or closet , are so many spies of his words and actions ; nay , and very thoughts , attentively observing all his gestures , and the motions of his countenance , that discoverer of the heart . thus , according to the psalmist's expression , their eyes look unto his hands . but if they observe any failing in a prince , though they pretend to conceal it , yet they love to discover it , either to get the reputation of persons discreet , and well acquainted with the government , or that of zealots . here they look on one another , and no one daring to open his mouth , they speak most by their silence . the secret boils and bubbles within them , agitated by the fervent desire they have of revealing it , till at last it overflows . tongues run to ears . this man discloses it to that , having first obliged him by oath to secrecy ; that in the same manner to another ; so that while no body knows , 't is known to all . thus , as 't were in a moment calumny passes from the closet to the offices , thence to the streets and publick places . but what wonder is it , if this happens among domesticks , when princes are not assured , even , of their own faithfulness , however desirous they are to conceal their vices and tyrannies ; for their own conscience accuses them ; as it happened to tiberius , who could not forbear disclosing to the senate the miseries which he suffered from his crimes . however , princes ought not to be discouraged , if by their industry and diligence they seem not to satisfy every one ; for that is a thing impossible , nor will ever passion , envy , and the so different judgment of the mob concur to commend him , much less can this our frail nature in all things act without fault and error . is any one more careful and sollicitous in giving light to this world , any more perfect than that eye of it , that prince of light , the sun , who gives being , colour , and beauty to all things ? yet notwithstanding the splendor of his rays , curiosity discovers therein i know not what spots and obscurities . this care of the prince to regulate his own life and actions , ought to be extended to those also of his ministers , the representatives of him , in as much as both god and men hold him to be no less obliged to do the one than the other . ● t is not the moon 's defect , what it suffers in an eclipse , but that of the earth , which interposes its shadow betwixt it and the sun ; nevertheless every one imputes it to the moon ; and this shadow only is sufficient to darken its rays , and create so much prejudice to things here below . prince's vices we only attribute to his depraved will ; but to let crimes in his ministers go unpunished , is esteemed baseness of mind . the vehemence of the passions and affections is some excuse for our particular faults , but to indulge them in others , is wholly inexcusable . a vicious prince may have virtuous ministers ; but if he begin to connive with them , both he and they will be bad . hence it sometimes happens , that an ill prince's government may be good , provided he take care others follow not his example : for that rigour suffers not any action to be mimick'd out of flattery , nor lets that natural inclination of the will prevail , by which every one loves to resemble princes by imitating their actions . grant such a prince bad for himself , he will be good for the state. to give absolute liberty to ministers , is wholly to abandon the reins of government . wicked princes are as difficult to be cured as tainted lungs ; in that remedies can't be applied to them . for these consist in hearing and seeing , both which they are equally averse to ; nay , love not that others should hear or see ; at least , their domesticks and ministers , who rather applaud . princes vices , don't suffer it ; but as the ancients were used to make a great noise with brass and cymbals , while the moon was in eclipse ; so they make it their business with musick , and other divertisements , to amuze the prince's mind , chiefly to keep his ears continually employed , least the peoples clamours , or the voice of truth , which discovers cheats , should reach them : and lastly , that the prince being plunged in the same vices with themselves , there may be none to reprove and correct them . emblem xiv . there 's scarce any one instrument can by its self make a work of art entirely perfect . what the hammer can't , the file finishes . yea , faults of the loom the shears ( the body of the present emblem ) correct , and give an additional neatness and beauty to cloath . the censure of others rectifies our manners ; they would be full of knots , did not the tongue clip them off : those whom the law its self can't curb or reform , oftentimes fear of blame only restrain , that being the spur of virtue , and bridle to keep it in the right way . reproofs upon the obedient ears of a prudent prince , are ( as solomon says ) like ear-rings of gold and glittering pearls , wonderfully ornamental and great accomplishments to him . there 's no more mortal enemy to vice than censure , it has far more efficacy than exhortation and instruction ; for exhortation proposes at a distance future fame and glory ; censure immediately accuses what is base and dishonourable , and inflicts present punishment , by divulging the infamy . that incites us to do well ; this not to do ill , and the mind more easily abstains from what is ignominious , than it enterprizes a thing difficult and honourable . in effect , 't is with reason honour is reputed to consist in the opinion of others , that we may dread that opinion , and seeing our actions depend upon each man's judgment , make it our business to satisfy all . thus , although murmur be bad in its self , 't is however good for the state ; in that there 's nothing has more power and influence over magistrates and princes . what would not power dare , did not blame resist it ? what crimes would not that fall into , were there no such thing as this ? there 's no better counsellors in the world than murmurs , for they proceed from experience of evils . could princes hear them , undoubtedly things would succeed better . satyrs and libels i dare not altogether approve , for they generally either exceed the bounds of truth , or give rise to scandals , tumults , and seditions ; however possibly some allowance ought to be made therein , in consideration of the good effects they have . obtrectation is a sign of liberty in a commonwealth , for in that which tyranny oppresses , 't is by no means tolerated . 't is a happy time when you have liberty to think what you please , and speak what you think . 't would be unjust in him that governs to desire to put a door upon his subjects lips , and forbid them to complain under the yoke of their slavery . let them murmur , let them revile , while they let us reign , said pope sixtus v. to those who told him how ill rome spoke of him . indeed , not to be concerned or moved at all by detraction , were to have cast off all sentiments of honour ; than which nothing is worse in a prince , for he then makes a pleasure of infamy ; he ought therefore so to resent them , as thence to learn something , not with a design of revenge . how will one be able to put up greater things , who can't connive at such inconsiderable trifles ? 't was no less virtue in the great captain † to suffer the complaints and clamours of his army at the river garigliano , than undauntedly to withstand so eminent a danger . 't is impossible to repress this license and liberty of the people . those princes are mistaken , who think by their present power to extinguish the memory of the following age , or imagine their majesty is able to gild bad actions . not all nero's liberality , nor feigned piety could wash away his infamy , for having set the city on fire . flattery , 't is true , can take care that slanders come not to the prince's ears , but can't help but there will be slanderers . a prince , who forbids his actions to be spoke of , renders them suspected ; and as the commonalty are apt to presume the worst , they are published for bad . those things are least aggravated , which are not much valued vitellius forbad any one to mention his bad actions ; hence many , who , if they had been at liberty , would have said otherwise , meerly because of the prohibition , spoke more to his disadvantage . a prince ought to pass over commendations and invectives , so as not to be tickled with them , nor by these dejected . if praises please him , and he give ear to them , every one will try to make himself master of his mind by flattery ; if murmurers be a disturbance to him , he will decline difficult and glorious enterprises , and become sluggish in his government . to be vainly puft up at ones praises , is a sign of a slender judgment ; to be offended at every thing , is for private men. to connive at many things is the part of princes ; to pardon nothing , that of tyrants . this , those great emperors , theodosius , arcadius , and honorius , very well knew when they commanded ruffinus , their captain of the guards , not presently to punish the peoples clamours against them ; for , said they , if they proceed from inconstancy , they are to be despised ; if from madness or folly , to be pitied ; if from malice , and a design to injure us , to be pardoned . once , while the emperor charles the v. was at barcelona , an accusation was brought him in writing against some , who had traduced his actions , in order to consult with him about the sentence to be passed upon them ; but he inraged at the person who presented it , threw the paper immediately into the fire , by which he then accidentally stood and burnt it . it belongs , i know , to a prince to inform himself of all things , but nicely to examine each word , is unworthy a generous breast . in the roman republick , actions only were punished , not words . there 's a wide distance between inconsiderately speaking and maliciously acting . the crown would be too thorny , did the least thing prick it thus . that injury , which the person against whom it was designed , don't look upon as such , is very little , if at all offensive . 't is too much easiness in the prince , and a sign he has a mean opinion of himself , to be moved at every trifling report ; and 't is an ill conscience that incites men to punish detracters ; a mind pure and undefiled despises things of that nature . if the aspersion be true , the prince's amendment must wipe it off ; if false , it will of its self disappear . for contempt makes such things wear off ; resentment i● a seeming acknowledgment of them . the roman senate commanded cremutius's annals to be burnt ; which made the people more eager and desirous to read them . 't was the same with the scurrilous pamphlets of vejentus , which were eagerly search'd for , and frequently read , while not to be had without danger , but by being licensed , soon forgot . curiosity submits to no judges , fears no punishment . what is most forbid , it chiefly engages . the very prohibition inhances the value of satyrical pieces ; and when men of wit are punished , their authority increases . no● have those kings , who have used such rigour , procured themselves any thing but disgrace , but to the author's honour and esteem . now , as 't is much for a prince's advantage to know what ill others speak of him , so it is not a little prejudicial to be too ready to hear defamers : for as we easily believe what is accused in others to be true ; 't is very obvious for the prince , either to be deceived , make some unjust resolution , or err in giving judgment . this is a thing very dangerous , especially in courts , where envy , and the gaping after preferment , and the favour of princes , are whet-stones to defamation ; and courtiers are usually like those locusts in the revelations , having mens faces , but lions teeth , with which they gnaw and feed on honour as ears of corn . the holy spirit compares their tongues to a sharp sword ; as also to arrows that privily strike the innocent . david destroyed them as enemies . no court , where they are tolerated , can be at rest ; and their whispers will give the prince no less trouble than publick affairs . the remedy is , not to hear them , setting two porters at the ears , reason and judgment , that they be not opened without considerable occasion . a guard is no less necessary at the ears , than the palace-gates ; and yet princes are mighty sollicitous about these , take little or no care about them . he that gives ear too easily to detracters , makes them audacious . no one traduces others , but before one who loves to hear it . it would do well also to bring these bablers , and the person accused , face to face , telling him what they say , that for the future they may be ashamed to be the authors of discord . this , if i mistake not , is meant by the holy spirit in these words , hedge thy ears about with thorns : that he that should put his mouth to them , to tell malicious stories , might there find his punishment . the prince has reason to be jealous of one , who dares not publickly speak what he is not afraid to whisper ; and although this care may conceal abundance of truths from the prince , which , indeed , 't is for his advantage , there being many domestick things , 't were better for him to be ignorant of than to know , and the best way to banish all defamation in general ; yet , when accusations proceed not from malice , but a kind of zeal to serve the prince , 't is by all means requisite to hear , and well examine them , looking on them as informations absolutely necessary , not only for good government , but his own security also . hence the emperor constantine , in a law for that purpose , assigns a reward to those who would accuse his ministers and domesticks of any real crime . this is absolutely necessary , that the prince may know all that passes in his palace , at his council-board , and in the courts of judicature , where fear stops the mouth , and the favours of the prince conferred by his ministers make the persons gratified dumb , and not dare to discover their faults , as if , forsooth , this were to acknowledge the good office , and to shew their gratitude , which is rather to be esteemed disloyalty and treason : for that obligation they lie under to undeceive their prince , and if they observe his ministers to be faulty to inform him , is a natural obligation of fidelity , and more binding than any other . 't is an infinite prejudice for a prince to distribute his favours by the hands of his favourites ; for these buy , as it were , others a● the price of them , who are assisting to the neglect of their duty , at least approve and defend it ; and thus deluding the prince , are the reason he continues his affection to them . the ancient republicks very sensible how conducive satyrs were to restrain vice by the fear of infamy , allowed them upon publick theatres ; but these from a general censure of mens morals insensibly degenerated into particular reflections , not without considerable injury to the honour of some ; hence proceeded factions , and from them popular insurrections : for as the holy spirit says , a backbiting tongue disturbs the peace , and is the ruin of whole families and cities . so , least the correction of manners should depend on the malice of the tongue or pen , there were instituted censors , who by publick authority took cognizance of every one's behaviour , and corrected their vices . that office was in those times of great use , and continued long in vogue , because its jurisdiction was upheld by modesty ; however in ours 't is impossible to be executed : for pride and libertinism would presently make all the opposition to it imaginable , as they now resist the magistracy , however armed with the best laws in the world and publick authority , and consequently censors would be ridiculous , not without great danger to the state ; there being nothing more hurtful , nothing that makes vice more arrogant and insulting , than for such remedies to be applied to it , as delinquents turn into contempt and ridicule . but as the office of censor was introduced for the reformation of manners , so was it also to register the goods and estates of every citizen , and to take the number of them ; and although that custom prevailed a long time , both among the greeks and latins , with great advantage to the commonwealth , yet at this day 't would be very odious and subject to vast inconveniencies ; for to know so accurately the number and effects of subjects , is of no use , but to burthen them with more taxes and impositions . that numbring of the people of israel under king david , god punished as a most heinous crime : for what is so hard and inhuman , as by publishing and proclaiming every ones estate at once , to discover the advantages of poverty , and expose riches to envy , avarice , and rapine . but if in those states , the office of censor , could heretofore be executed without these inconveniencies ; 't was because its being newly instituted made it generally received and approved , or else because people were then less proud and assuming , less rebels to reason , than in these our times . emblem xv. how i wish i could read on all princes breasts , the symbol of the present emblem , and that as balls of fire flying in the air imitate the splendor of the stars , and shine immediately from their being thrown out of the hand , till they turn to ashes ; so in them also ( for the holy spirit compares them to ● bright fire ) would continually burn the desire of fame ; nor should they much care , for that flames wanting matter to feed on , or that what burns most fiercely , is withal soonest consumed . for though length of life be the common desire of man and beast , yet have these no other end than meer living , but man of living uprightly . 't is no happiness to live but to know how to live , nor does he live most , who lives longest , but who lives best ; for life is not measured by time , but the use that 's made on 't . he , whose life like a star in the midst of a cloud , or like the full moon , shines upon others with rays of bounty and munificence in its season , does undoubtedly live long : as on the contrary , he who lives only to himself , though he lives to a great age , lives but little . the benefits and improvements which flow from a prince upon the state , number the days of his life , those who live without them , oblivion deducts from the sum . titus vespasian , the emperor , calling to mind once at supper , that he had done nothing for any one that day , pronounced that remarkable and justly admired sentence , friend , i have lost a day . and 't is reported of peter , king of portugal , that he was wont to say , that he deserves not to be a king , who does not each day bestow some favour or benefit upon the state. no man's li●●'s so short , but it affords time enough to execute some glorious exploit . a brave spirit in one moment resolves , and in few more executes its resolutions . what matter 's it if he falls in the attempt , if the memory he left behind raises him to life eternal . it only can be called life which is bounded by fame , not that which consists in body and vital warmth , which no sooner begins , but begins to die too . death is naturally equal to all , but is distinguished by the glory or oblivion we leave to posterity . who dying makes renown a substitute for life , lives still . strange force of virtue , which even against nature , makes that which is of its self fading and perishable , immortally glorious . tacitus did not think agricola's life short , though he was snatch'd away in the prime of his years : for his glory prolong'd his life . let no one despise or slight posthumous fame , for in as much as the mind covets it , 't is an acknowledgement that one time or other 't is to be enjoyed ; but they are in the wrong , who think it sufficient , if they leave it behind them in statues , or in posterity ; for in one 't is fading , in t'other 't is none of theirs . that only is their own which springs from actions , which if not extraordinary merit no praise ; for fame is the daughter of admiration . to be born , only to make one in the world , is for the vulgar rout ; 't is for princes to appear perspicuously eminent among others . others study what they think their own interest , but the utmost and only aim of princes should be glory . avarice , and desire of riches , fill their breasts ; but a prince should be inflamed by an ambition of fame . a heavenly heat inspires our prince's veins . virg. a generous spirit knows no mean ; 't will be either caesar , or no body ; either a shining star , or a dark cinder ; nor will this , if honourably extinguished , shine less gloriously on obelisks , than t'other . nor , indeed , is that soul truly great , which , like the best gunpowder fired , does not immediately burst the body that includes it . the breast is too narrow to contain a brisk and active soul. garci sancho , king of navarre , going to ingage the enemy , trembled all over , yet in the fight behaved himself bravely and couragiously . his body dreaded that great multitude of enemies , into which his courage prepared to carry it . let it therefore be the whole aim of a prince to live gloriously , that he may be a light in this world . all other things will come with ease , but fame not without assiduity and application . but if in the beginning of his reign he loses his reputation , he will very difficultly recover it ; for what the people once conceive of him , they will never afterwards forget . he , who sets too great a value upon life , avoids toils and dangers , without which two , honour can never be attained . this tacitus observed in king marabodo , who quitting his kingdom , lazily and shamefully spent his days in italy , losing much of his reputation through a too fond desire of life . let a prince so stere his course , be the sea calm or tempestuous , as still to keep his eye upon that shining beacon of glory ; ever and anon calling to mind ( that he may admit , or think of nothing unworthy himself ) that history will publish his fame , his exploits and glorious atchievements to all ages , and to all nations . princes have no other superior than god , and fame ; they alone by the fear of punishment and infamy oblige them to act honourably ; for which reason they often fear historians more than their enemies , and are more aw'd by the pen than the sword. king balthasar , though he saw only the hand and pen , as yet not knowing what they would write , was so disorder'd , that he quaked all over , and the ioints of his back were loosened . but if they neither regard god nor glory , nothing glorious or honourable can be expected . for who e're slights honour , despises virtue . a generous desire of glory avoids the blemish of vice or injustice . nor is there a more savage brute than that prince , who is neither moved by remorse of conscience , or desire of glory . nor is there , nevertheless , no danger in glory ; for its brightness often dazles princes , and leads them headlong into rashness and temerity . that which seems honourable and glorious to them , is vanity or folly , sometimes pride or envy , and oftentimes ambition and mere tyranny . they propose great matters , egg'd on by the flatteries of their ministers , who set before them many things under the appearance of glory , concealing in the mean time the unjust and inconvenient means by which they are to be attained ; by which being seduced , they oftentimes find themselves deluded and ruined . that glory is safe which springs from a generous spirit , and keeps within the bounds of reason and possibility . since therefore honour and infamy are the strongest excitements to good actions , and that both are by history delivered down to posterity ; 't would be convenient by rewards proposed to excite historians to write , and to countenance typography , the true treasury of glory , where the rewards of grea● actions are deposited to future ages . emblem xvi . 't is an old saying , purple is to be judged by purple ; by which the ancients signified , that things were then best distinguished , when one was compared with the other , especially if they were such as could not easily be distinguish'd by themselves . thus merchants do , who compare colour to colour , that they may shew each other , and that a surer judgment may be given of both . in the temple of iupiter capitolinus , there was a cloak ( a present of some king from persia ) of such an excellent grain , that the robes of the roman ladies , nay , even of the emperor aurelian himself , compared with it , look'd as faint as ashes . if your royal highness , when raised to the crown , would exmine , and know the true worth of the royal purple , expose it not to the false light of flatterers and fawning knaves , for that will never shew you its true colour : nor rely too much upon self-love , for that is like an eye , that sees all things but its self . 't will be therefore necessary , that as eyes are known by their own species , like forms represented in a glass ; so your highness would compare the lustre of your diadem to that of your glorious predecessors , seriously reflecting if any virtues shine more bright in theirs than yours , by viewing your self in them as in a glass . let your highness , i say , compare your own actions to those of your ancestors , and you will easily see the difference between yours and theirs , that you may either give a true colour to their actions , or rejoyce in the worth of your own , if in any thing you happen to have out-done your predecessors . let your royal highness therefore please to consider , whether you equal your father in courage , your grandfather in piety ; philip the second , in prudence ; charles the fifth , in greatness of spirit ; philip the first , in affability ; ferdinand the catholick , in policy ; in liberality , that alphonso , who was nick-named from his broken hands ; in justice , king alphonso the eleventh ; and lastly , king ferdinand the holy , in religion : and that moreover , your highness would be stir'd up by a generous emulation , to a glorious desire of imitating these great men. quintus maximus and publius scipio , were used to say , that when e're they beheld the images of their ancestors , their souls were fired and excited on to virtue : not that they were moved by the meer wax or stone , but that comparing their own actions to those of others , they could not rest till they equall'd them in glory and renown . elogies inscribed on tombs , speak not to the dead , but to the living : they are certain summaries , which for memory's sake , the virtue of the predecessor leaves to the successor . mattathias said , that by calling to mind the actions of their ancestors , his sons should acquire present glory and eternal renown . for which cause also , the high priests , who were princes of the people , wore upon their breasts the virtues of the twelve patriarchs , their predecessors , engraven upon as many stones . in effect , it becomes a prince to vie with his ancestors in glory , not with his inferiors , for 't is no praise to excel them , and to be out-done by them , the greatest scandal . the emperor tiberius observed as law , all the sayings and exploits of augustus . moreover , let your highness compare the purple you wear at present , to that you wore formerly ; for we are oftentimes desirous to forget what we have been , for fear of upbraiding our selves with what we are . let your highness consider , whether you are grown better or worse , for we find it often happens , that at the beginning of their reigns , princes minds are gloriously bent upon the execution of their office , in which afterwards they grow more remiss . almost all begin their reigns with great and glorious spirits ; but at last by degrees , either they sink under the weight of affairs , or grow effeminate by luxury and ease , with which they easily suffer themselves to be taken , forgetting they are obliged to keep and preserve their once gotten glory . this very thing tacitus remarks in the emperor tiberius , that at last , after a long experience in affairs , he was altered and ruined by the mere force of government . a long reign creates pride , and pride the hatred of the people ; as the same author observes in king vannius . many begin their reigns with extraordinary modesty and justice , but few continue so ; because their ministers are flatterers , by whom they are taught to act boldly and unjustly . as it happened to vespasian , who in the beginning of his reign was not so much bent upon injustice , until by the indulgence of fortune and advice of evil counsellors , he learnt it . let your highness compare not only your own virtues and actions , but those of your ancestors with one another , by confronting the purple of some stain'd with vices , to that of others glossy and shining with great and noble actions : for examples never move us more than when they are confronted one with another . let your highness compare the royal robe of king † hermenigildus , with that of peter the second , king of arragon ; one glittering with stars , and died with blood , which he had gloriously spilt in the war against leuvigildus , his father , who was infected with the arrian heresy ; the other trampled under the feet of horses in a battle at girone , when he brought succours to the albigensians in france . let your highness cast your eyes back upon past ages , and you will find spain ruined by the licentious lives of the kings , witiza and roderick , but recovered again by the piety and courage of pelagius . you 'll see peter deposed , and killed for his cruelty ; and his brother , henry the second , advanced to the crown for his singular mildness . you 'll see the glorious infant , ferdinand , blessed by heaven with many kingdoms , for that he would not accept of that of his grandson , king iohn the second , although there were those who freely offered it him : on t'other side , the infant sancho accused by his own father of disobedience and ingratude , before pope martin the fourth , for that he would have usurped the throne in his life-time . this comparison your highness may follow as a sure guide in the management of your affairs ; for , though by discourse and conversation you may know the lustre and brightness of heroick exploits , as also the baseness and infamy of ill actions ; yet all these move us not so much , considered in themselves , as in those persons , whom they have made glorious in the world , or despicable . emblem xvii . a tree bedeck'd with trophies , is still a trunk as afore ; those which were an honour to others , are but a burthen to it . so truly , the glorious exploits of ancestors are but a shame and disgrace to the successor , unless he imitates the same . nor does he inherit their glory , but their actions only , by an imitation of which he will obtain the other . just as light is reflected from a diamond , because it finds substance , but quickly pierces glass which is thin and transparent ; so if the successor be stout and brave , the glory of his predecessors adds yet a greater lustre and brightness to him ; but if like thin and paultry glass , he can't withstand the lustre , it serves only to discover his vile and abject soul. the actions of ancestors , which are only examples to others , are laws to the successor , for the whole esteem and prerogative of nobility is grounded upon this supposition , that the descendants will imitate the actions of their forefathers . he , who vainly boasts of these without imitating them , only shews the difference between himself and them . no one is to be blamed for not equalizing the actions of them to whom he bears no relation . for this reason , the nobility of rome were wont to place before their doors the statues of the illustrious men of their families , that they might shew to posterity what obligation they lie under . bodislaus the fourth , king of poland , always wore his father's picture in gold about his neck ; and whenever any affair of great consequence was to be determined , he put it to his mouth , and kissing on 't , with veneration us'd to say , god grant i may never do any thing unworthy your royal name . how many such medals of your heroick ancestors might your highness find ? which would never permit you to act any thing beneath their royal blood ; nay , would rather encourage and excite you to out-do them in glorious exploits ? now , if this emulation of ancestors enflame the minds of the nobility , they certainly deserve the principal employments in the state. for as 't is likely those should be best who proceed from the best ; as also presumption and experience teach , for eagles hatch eagles , and lions beget lions . and oft-times self-worth and fear of infamy stirs up noble thoughts in the mind . yet , i grant that this rule holds not always good , either because nature can't do what she would , or because of ill education and effeminacy ; or because mens souls themselves are not equally noble and generous , but act differently according to the affection of the body , in which they are as 't were drowned . there are some too , who seem only to inherit the trophies and glory of their ancestors , without their virtues , and are in all things wholly different from them . of this we have an example in the eagles themselves , who altho' they commonly breed eagles ; yet there are some , who think that ostriches are a certain species of them , tho' wholly degenerate , having neither the generosity , strength , nor swiftness of an eagle ; this fine bird being transformed into a loathsome dull animal . 't is scarce credible how prejudicial 't is to the publick good , without any discretion or regard to merit , to elect only the nobility into publick offices , as though the experience and virtue of ancestors ran in the blood to posterity . industry will languish , virtue will grow sluggish and lazy , if only grounded upon nobility , which will look upon rewards as its just due ; nor will the hopes of obtaining , or the fear of losing them , be a means to make them act honourably : which very argument tiberius used to the senate to perswade them not to assist the family of m. hortalus , which tho' very ancient , was fallen to poverty . in time of peace , indeed , men of great and noble families may be well preferred to places of the greatest authority , in which the splendor and reputation of the family is of great advantage . in military offices the case is alter'd , for these require activity and strength both of mind and body : but if these are found in the nobility , though not in altogether so great perfection as in others , the merits of their ancestors , or the common esteem and respect of men will easily compensate for the rest , yet can they by no means supply an intire defect . for this reason tacitus deservedly ridiculed the election of vitellius , when he was sent to command the legions of lower germany ; not considering his incapacity for such an office , it seem'd enough that he was the son of vitellius , who had been for three times consul . tiberius acted not so in the beginning of his reign , he conferr'd honours respecting both the nobility of the family , the excellency of the person in the art of war ; as also his worth in time of peace , that it might appear he did not without reason prefer one before another . i grant that the esteem and authority of nobility may do much in war ; but 't is not that , but bravery and industry that routs the enemy . the germans formerly chose their kings for their nobility , but their generals for their valour . then arms flourish when valour and virtue are in esteem , and in possession of the greatest posts in the army ; in which they may either acquire nobility , or enlarge and illustrate that which they have already . the hope of this furnisht past ages with brave heroick generals ; but where this is wanting , art military is neglected and slighted ; for nothing but the honour of preferment in the army can recompence the inconveniences and perils of war. nor is it true as some suppose , that the greatest respect and obedience is paid to those of the noblest families ; for if they are not qualified with these two great qualities , conduct and valour , all the deference paid to their blood will be only meer ceremony , not real respect . the heart values and admires only such a virtue and greatness of soul , as is the maker of its own fortune . columbus gave laws to the ocean , and herman cortez , to the new world ; these , though they did not spring from illustrious families , yet did they procure a nobility for their posterity , equal to those of the greatest rank . the most noted rivers take their rise and beginning from the smallest rivolets , and a little after take their name and glory from the channel . in war , where courage and bravery are most esteem'd , 't will be expedient to promote those to the highest honours who have merited it by noble exploits , though they are perhaps but of mean extraction ; yet , in time of peace , 't will be very dangerous for a prince to commit the government to mean and worthless persons ; 't will immediately incense the noble and brave against him for slighting and mistrusting their i●tegrity . which then chiefly happens , when the subject is not endowed with good natural parts , not when he is cried up and admired by all , the obscurity of birth being sufficiently brightned by the excellent endowments of mind . we see many , who seem to be born of themselves , as tiberius used to say of curtius rufus . to such as these claudian's praise of a good choice of ministers is well adapted . mirit , not birth , he does prefer † ; nor cares he whence , but what they are . but if the nobility be corrupted by ease and luxury , 't were adviseable to reform it by rewards and exercise , rather than to institute an entire new set . silver and gold are easily purified and clean'd , but to make gold out of silver , is a vast labour beyond the art of chymistry to perform . henry the fourth , was therefore very ill advised by some to ruin all the grandees of his kingdom , and to promote those of mean fortune . though the licentiousness and disobedience of the nobility may sometimes require that it be a little humbled ; for too much greatness begets pride , and an aversion to subjection and obedience . the weakest always seek justice and equity , but the stronger trouble not themselves with it ; and the people are generally more quiet , when there are no great ones to protect them , and to foment their innovations . for this reason , the laws of castile don 't allow two great and noble families to incorporate , that so the estate might be more divided , and that it might not creat jealousy and envy among others . there are ways under the pretext of honour and favour to remedy excess of riches , in giving opportunity of employing it to the service of the prince and people . but prodigality and luxury are now grown to that height , that there is no occasion for such means ; for all the nobility are so much straitned by debts , and necessary expences , that they want means to execute such thoughts , or to attempt innovation . while they would be great beyond what they can , they become even less than what they are . 't is certain , that the noblest and most renowned families are ruined by a desire of grandure and magnificence . but as too much riches are dangerous , so also is extream poverty . for when any of these great ones have squandred away their estates , they presently set up for innovation . emblem xviii . virtue has given empire to many , vice to few . in these the scepter was a violent and dangerous usurpation , in those a just title and lasting succession . virtue by a certain occult and secret force , does as 't were compel men to love and admire it . the elements obey the heavens for the perfection and excellency of them ; so men too think none worthy the sovereign power , but those of sovereign justice and virtue . for which cause , cyrus thought no one was fit to govern , but he who was better than those he governed . subjects pay more reverence to a prince , in whom they discern more than ordinary endowments of mind ; the greater they are , the greater is their respect and esteem , for all believe that to such a prince , god is more propitious and ready to assist him in all things , and to direct his government . 't is this alone made ioshua's name celebrated all the world over . all the actions and counsels of a good prince the people receive with joy , and through a certain zealous confidence promise themselves success from them ; but if it fall out otherwise , they persuade themselves that for some supernatural and unknown reasons 't is convenient it should be so . for the same cause among some nations , the high priests were kings , that the people receiving holy ceremonies and divine worship from them , might acknowledge in them a certain more sublime nature , more allied and familiar to god himself , which as a mediatrix they might make use of in their prayers , and against which they durst not attempt any thing . the crown upon aaron's mitre attracted the eyes and desires of all . iacob worshipped ioseph's scepter , on the top of which was a stork , the emblem of piety and religion . let none imagine that the time is lost , which a prince employs in the exercise of goodness and virtue ; nay , god does then chiefly dispose and direct the events of things . ferdinand antoline was at his devotions , while count garcias fernandez fought the moors at the river duero , and an angel in his likeness supplied his place in the fight , by which he not only escaped the discredit of not being at the battel , but also gained the chiefest praise of honour of the victory . something like this is related of that renowned general , count tilly , that true christian ioshua , not less holy and religious , than warlike and brave , that while he was at prayers , the army was drawn up by another in his shape . the emperor , ferdinand the second , had more standards and trophies presented to him in the time of divine service , than many of his ancestors had gained from the enemy . the israelites stood still , and god wrought wonders for them . that crown , which like ariadne's shines with refulgent stars of virtue , shall last to eternity . the emperor septimus told his sons as he was dying , that he left them a firm and lasting empire if they were good ; if wicked , but of short continuance . king ferdinand , who from his great virtues , was sirnamed the great , did by these wonderfully increase the glory of his kingdom , and establisht it to posterity . his piety was so great , that when the body of st. isidore was carried by sevil , he and his sons , barefoot , carried these holy relicks from the river durio , quite to st. iohn's church in the city . for 't is god by whom kings reign , and upon whom all their power and felicity depends ; they could never err , if they would make him their only object . the rays of the sun never forsake the moon ; she , as if she knew she received all her light from the sun , looks on him continually , that she may be enlightned by him ; which princes must so imitate , that they may always have their eyes fixt upon that eternal light , which affords light and motion to the world , and from which empires take their encrease and decrease , as is intimated in the present emblem by the scepter , on the top of which is the moon looking towards the sun , the true emblem of god , as well because no other thing comes nearer his omnipotency ; as also , because that alone gives light and being to all . which 'cause it solely all surveys , is properly call'd sol. boet. for there is no power but from god . kings are crowned in his eternal mind before they are here on earth . he , who gave the orbs coelestial first motion , gives it also to empires and republicks . he , who has appointed a king over bees , has not left meerly to chance or humane choice , these second causes of princes , who are his vice-roys upon earth , and as like him as may be , being represented in the revelations by those seven planets , which god held in his hand ; upon them he darts his divine rays , the reflection of which gives them the utmost power and authority over their subjects . without that splendor , all power , how great soever , is in a manner dark ; the prince who slighting this light , shall follow another , an appearance may be of some good , which his own convenience , not right reason offers , will soon see the orb of his power eclips'd and darken'd . what e'er avoids the sun , must necessarily be in darkness . the moon , although it finds its self oft'times quite dark , does not therefore turn away from the sun , but looks on 't with so much the more eagerness , till at last 't is again enlightned by it . let a prince hold his scepter fixt and steady , having always a regard to virtue , as well in prosperity as adversity : for the same divine sun , which either for punishment or exercise of his virtues , permitted his decrease , as a recompence of his constancy will again promote and encrease his greatness . thus 't was with the emperor , ferdinand the ii. who was often reduced to that extremity of fortune , that his empire and life too seem'd desperate . yet he was resolved never wholly to despair , nor to turn his eyes from that eternal sun , the maker and governor of all things , whose divine providence freed him from all perils , and advanced him far above all his enemies . moses's rod , which was the emblem of a scepter , did wonders whilst he held it● in his hand upright t'wards heaven ; but as soon as he cast it upon the ground , 't was turn'd into a venomous serpent , dreadful even to moses himself . whilst the scepter , like iacob's ladder , touches heaven , god himself supports it , and angels descend to its assistance . this the egyptians knew , who on the top of their scepters were used to engrave the head of a stork , a religious bird , and pious t'wards its parents ; but on the bottom , the foot of a sea-horse , an impious and ungrateful animal , which plots to kill his father , that he may the more freely enjoy his mother . by which hieroglyphick they meant nothing , but that princes ought always to prefer piety to impiety . machiavel would have his prince to learn this hieroglyphick , but in quite another sence , for he would have piety and impiety placed at each end , that he might turn it as he pleased , and hold that upwards which tended most to his preservation and advantage . for which reason , he thinks 't is not necessary for a prince to be virtuous , 't is enough if he pretends to be so ; for to be really so , and to act according to the dictates of virtue , would , he says , be pernicious ; but that 't is most advantageous to be thought so ; for by this means he will be so disposed , as to know how to shift upon occasion , and so to act in all things as advantage or opportunity shall require : and this , he says , is principally necessary for princes new●● come to the crown , who ought to be quick and ready to spread their sails to every breath of fortune , and as necessity requires . impious and foolish counsel , that would insinuate that virtues need not be real and genuine , but only counterfeit and imaginary , for how can the shadow be as effective as the substance ? what art or pains can bring chrystal to that perfection , as it shall equal the diamond in lustre and brightness ? won't any one at first sight discover and laugh at the cheat. a true glory takes root and flourishes , tha● which is not , falls like blossoms ; nor can any thing be lasting that is counterfeit . there 's no art or cunning so great , as to make a vicious inclination appear truly good and virtuous . for if we so easily fail in real virtues so agreeable to our nature and inclination , what shall we do in false and imaginary ones ? how will the subjects , when they discover the cheat , be able to endure the stench of this sepulchr● of abominable vices , without any ornament of goodness ? how can they turn their eyes from that inward wound , when the patch under which it lurk'd being drawn off , 't is openly exposed to the sight of all ? whence a prince will be contemptible and ridiculous to his own people at home , and suspected by foreigne● abroad . he will be surely odious to both , for neither can live securely under him . nothing renders tyra●ny more grievous than when the prince dissembles virtue . for from thence oft-times greater vices spring , for this reason many were afraid of otho , when he stood candidate for the empire . when a prince is known to be wicked and vicious , 't is easy to beware of him , but not so when he dissembles . open vice may be imputed to frailty of nature ; but pretended virtue is only cheat and design ; not accidental , but premeditated injustice ; so that 't is more pernicious than open vice. as tacitus remarks in sejanus , there is no greater villainy , than under pretence of virtue to exercise vice . 't is a certain weakness to be openly wicked , but to counterfeit virtue is true villainy . men more easily dispence with other vices , but all loath hypocrisy ; for by them we only deceive our selves , but by this , others too . nay , good actions are despised if artificial , and not the product of virtue . vitellius did many things to curry favour with the people , but those things which would have been really acceptable , had they proceeded from a principle of virtue , were ( by the memory of his former course of life , and because every one saw that they were feigned and forced ) look'd upon as base and vile . and , pray , who would dissemble virtue , if it cost the same pains to do so , as to be really virtuous ? if virtues themselves , by reason of the wickedness of manners , have scarce strength and power to subsist , how then should the false and counterfeit ? who e'er puts more confidence in these tricks than in divine providence , denies that he receives his crown and preservation from god , and that he is the disposer of rewards and punishments . if a prince's vices proceed from weakness , and not from affection , 't is best to conceal them , that they may not give ill examples ; for to conceal them on that account , ought not to be accounted hypocrisy , or a design to cheat others , but rather prudence , and an esteem and respect due to virtue . there 's no curb or restraint to that power which does not veil its tyrannies with some pretence or other . the senators never feared tiberius , more than when they saw him without dissimulation . yet tacitus writes of piso , that he was cried up by the people for virtues , or something resembling them . i don't mean by this , that virtues are the same in a prince , whether feigned or real ; but that the people are sometimes deceived , and take hypocrisy for virtue . therefore how much more firm and lasting would piso's fame have been , had it been supported by real and solid virtues . the same inconveniences arise if a prince is possest of real virtues , but such as he will easily change for his conveniency ; for that cannot be virtue , which is not a firm and constant habit of the mind , nor will it inhabit such a breast with fears , not upon any prospect of advantage to turn it into vice , and joyn with villainy . and how can this ever be convenient for a prince ? and what case or circumstance can require it , especially in these our times , when rule and empire are established upon sure laws ; not depending as in the roman's time , upon the election and insolence of the soldiers . no danger can be so great , that a prince by prudent virtue may not avoid without having recourse to vice. if at any time a prince renown'd for virtues be vanquished , 't is not because he was good , but because he knew not enough how to be good . a just prince is not obliged hastily and rashly to confront and oppose vice , where there is no prospect of advantage , but certain and manifest danger from this over-diligence ; nay , 't is a piece of great prudence to permit and suffer that quietly , which by opposition can't be prevented . let him dissemble the knowledge of their vices , till he finds a convenient time to remedy them ; and in the mean time reward the good , and punish the bad , and use such other means as prudence shall suggest ; but if these are not sufficient , let him leave it to his successor , as tiberius did , when he saw he could not reform the manners of his time . for if through fear , a prince should by doing ill conform himself to the life and manners of ill men , he would not only not bring them into the way of virtue , but would at the same time mislead the good , so that both would grow worse ; virtue in a prince is never dangerous , but rash zeal and severity often is . villains don't hate a prince for being good , but , because , for his too strict severity they can't be wicked and lewd . there 's no body but desires a just prince ; the worst have need of such a one , that justice may flourish , by which they may live not only secure from others , but from one another too . this seneca meant , when , that he might perswade nero from incestuous conversation with his mother , he threatned him that the incest was divulg'd by his mother , who gloried in 't , and the so●diers would not endure so vicious a prince . nay , so necessary are virtues to a prince , that without some vices themselves can't subsist . nor did s●janus endear himself to tiberius by other means , than by mingling virtues with vices . such a mixture of virtues and vices one might see in lucinius mucianus ; in v●spasian also , there were many notable vices ' as well as virtues . this is certain , sejanus's favour with tiberius had been much more secure ; and vespasian and mucian , had been much more accomplished princes , if substracting their vices , their virtues only had remained . if it be convenient for a prince to be vicious , that he may distinguish the good from the bad , 't will be sufficient only to know how to be so , without being practically so . let him therefore be virtuous , but let him be so circumspect and prudent , that no cheat or knavery may scape him , no villany but which he may see through ; so by throughly observing each man's manners , and way of life , he may govern them the better . and in this sense may their opinions be taken , who think that princes are so much the more secure , by how much they are more wicked than their subjects . this sort of vice relating to the knowledge of wickedness , is very expedient to know how to chastise , and also to bear with humane frailties : without that knowledge , severe virtue is too rigid and dangerous for government . whence 't is , that in a prince manly virtues are most requisite , such as are appropriated to empire , not those monastick melancholy ones , which make him timorous , slow , and unsteady in his resolutions , averse to humane conversation , and more intent upon his own private perfections than the government of the publick . the greatest perfection in a prince , is to answer the obligations laid upon him by god almighty . machiavel would not have a prince counterfeit virtues at certain times only , but he endeavours also to establish a sort of policy upon vice , by shewing how by help of this , the other may be advanced to the highest pitch ; and by asserting that men are ruined , because they know not how to be wicked ; as if there might be a certain science to be form'd of it . this doctrine has made many princes tyrants , and ruined them . men are not ruin'd , because they know not how to be wicked , but because wickedness it self can't long defend its self ; for there is no villainy so cunning and cautious , as to prevent its self from being caught at last in its own snares . what skill can instruct a man to keep a sound judgment in his vices , whose sins trouble his conscience , which though 't is in us , yet by a certain divine impulse operates without us , being both judge and executioner of our actions : whose tyranny nero felt after he had commanded his mother to be kill'd , fearing that the light which gave life to others , brought his death . the most resolv'd spirit sometimes hesitates , and is confounded at the sight of villainy : so it happened to sejanus , when he plotted to extinguish the family of tiberius ; he was confounded by the greatness of the crime . god taketh the wise in their own craftiness . vice is ignorance , opposed to prudence ; 't is a violence that toils to its own ruin ; 't is a dangerous building which falls upon his head who built it . no judgment is so great as to correct lesser tyrannies by greater ; and to what a vast bulk might men raise it ? that very example of iohn pagola of peru , which machiavel makes use of to confirm his assertion , makes it evident enough how dangerous 't is to walk upon those precipices , when though he had procured the death of pope iulius the second , he could by no means accomplish his villainy . the same also befel d. valentine , whom he proposes as an idea as 't were to princes ; for he , that he might upon the death of pope alexander the sixth , secure his own affairs , drank to some of the cardinals of the contrary faction in a bowl of poison , but the cups being by mistake changed , he and alexander drank the poison , upon which the pope died suddenly , and valentine was so ill upon 't , that he could not be present at the conclave , ( which mischance all his cunning could not foresee and prevent ) whence it happen'd too , that whom he desired was not elected , and he himself lost all that he unjustly possessed in romania . divine providence does not permit tyrants to thrive in their designs : 't is virtue only that has the power to make god propitious to us , not wickedness . if any tyrant has long enjoy'd his unjust usurpations , 't is the effect of some eminent virtue or natural endowment , which hides his vices , and makes him obey'd by the people . but malice ascribes this to tyrannical artifices , and from examples of that nature , picks out some impious and erroneous maxims of state , to the ruin both of princes and empires . besides , all don't reign , who have the scepter in their hands , or the crown upon their heads ; for divine justice , though it leaves them the kingdom , takes away the command , by permitting them to be slaves to their passions , and their ministers , and to be oppressed by misfortunes and seditions . so was samuel's prediction to saul fulfilled , that as a punishment for having disobeyed god , he should be no more king : for though he lived and died king , yet was his reign but perfect slavery . emblem xix . in the games of vulcan and prometheus , several persons being placed in a row imployed themselves thus : the first came out with a lighted torch in his hand , which he gave to the second , and he to the third , and so from one to t'other ; whence came th● proverb , cursu lampada trado ; apply'd to those things which past as 't were by succession from one to another . in which sense lucretius , et quasi cursores vitai lampada trado . which he seems to have borrowed from plato , when perswading men to propagation , he says 't is necessary , that life which men received from their predecessors , they should like a flaming torch deliver down to posterity . what else is a scepter , but such a torch as this , which passes by succession from one to another ? what is it therefore that majesty assumes to its self in this so short and transitory greatness ? many things are common to a prince with other men , there 's but one thing , and that accidental too , which makes the difference . all those don't humble his mind , yet does this single accident puff him up above others . let him think that he is a man , and that he governs men ; let him consider well that he comes upon this great theatre of the world to act the part of a prince ; and that he having his discharge , another shall succeed to those robes which he shall leave ; and that of both of them only this will remain , that they once were . lastly , let him know that these robes wherewith he is cloathed , are not his own , but the states , which that only lends him , that he may be a while its head , and may consult for the preservation , increase , and prosperity thereof , as we have said before . when therefore a prince has once begun to run the race of this life , furnished with the lighted torch of his state ; let it not be his only business to prolong his race , for the goal is already fixt beyond which he can't go ; and who knows but that he may be now very near it , the flame being exposed to every blast of wind. one single gale wrenched it from the hands of king henry the first , er'e he was fourteen years old . also a fall from a horse prevented prince iohn , son of their most catholick majesties from taking hold on 't . let a prince consider also the fitness of his hand , the occasion and right , that he mayn't rashly grasp at more of these torches , than either succession or lawful election shall grant him . had frederick , count palatine , considered this , he had never lost his electoral dignity , his places , and titles so unfortunately , for being ambitious of the kingdom of bohemia . and truly charles , king of naples , had ended his race more successfully , had he been contented with the torch of his own kingdom , and not attempted to grasp at that of hungary , where he was therefore poisoned . let not a prince too readily trust his torch to another , nor suffer any one to touch it with so great authority . for empire admits of no companion . the infant sancho attempted to snatch this torch from his father , king alphonso the wise , by the same power and authority which he receiv'd from him . nor were there wanting pretences for the infant of portugal , to attempt the same against his father , dionysius . these torches of kingdoms lighted by ill methods , are commonly soon extinguish'd , for no power acquired by wickedness is lasting . king garcias forc'd his father , alphonso , to quit his kingdom , but could not enjoy the crown so gotten above three years . fruela the third , possess'd but fourteen months the kingdom which he had attain'd rather by force than election . violent counsels h'an't always their desired success . ramon hop'd certainly to inherit the throne of navarre , if he could make away with his brother sancho ; but the people abhorr'd him who had conceiv'd such a horrid villainy , and so offer'd it to sancho , king of arragon , his uncle . let not a prince unadvisedly trust his torch out of his own hands in his life-time , least , if he should afterwards repent , it should befal him , as it did king alphonso the fourth , who having once resign'd his kingdom to his brother ramiro , could never afterwards retrieve it , though he desir'd it . ambition while in possession regards not justice , having always arguments and pretences at hand to defend it self . and who will not be mov'd by the difference between commanding and obeying . though these torches do pass from father to son , yet let kings remember that they receive them from god , and that when he pleases they are to surrender them to him , that they may know to whose gift they ought to ascribe them , and how strict an account they are to give of them . this king ferdinand the great did , who with his last breath pronounc'd these words , thine , o lord , is power , empire is thine ; thou art supream king of kings ; all things are under thy providence . the kingdom which from thy hand i receiv'd , unto thee i resign . the same words did king ferdinand the holy , use at the point of death . 't is a glorious , though laborious race which heaven has design'd for your royal highness , which must be run not with one , but with several torches of shining diadems , which like the sun , but without ever leaving us in the dark , will diffuse their extended light from east to west . furious winds rising from each part of the horizon , will perhaps threaten them ; but since god has lighted them to preceed the standard of the cross , and to give light upon the holy altars of the church , it may well be hop'd that these may shine like that ; especially if your highness's faith and holy zeal , would by holding them upright , make their flame burn more clear and bright , its natural tendency being towards heaven ; and he who holds them obliquely , will make the flame its self feed upon and wast them , but he who turns 'em directly downwards , opposite to heaven , will immediately extinguish them ; for the matter which would else nourish them , will then extinguish them . let your highness therefore take care with these lights to finish your course with glory , and surrender them bright and flaming to your successor , not meerly such as you receiv'd them , but illustrated and augmented with new rays : for god weighs both kingdoms and kings when they begin to reign , that he may afterwards require a just account from them ; thus he did with king balthazar . and if otho thoguht himself oblig'd to deliver up the empire to posterity , such as he had receiv'd it from his ancestors ; your highness must acknowledge no less an obligation deriv'd to you from your glorious predecessors . so the emperor , charles the fifth , resign'd his while he was yet living , to his son philip the second : and though the wickedness of some can't attend the end of their career , for fear of adverse winds already rais'd , as was the case of alphonso , king of naples , who seeing he could not resist charles the eighth of france , surrendred the crown to his son ferdinand , duke of calabria ; yet certain 't is , that his design was to make a timely restitution of his crown to god , and prepare himself for another , not temporal but eternal one , which once obtain'd may be securely enjoy'd without fear of ever being lost . emblem xx. among the ceremonies of the athenians at their marriages , a certain little boy , with a basket of bread in his hand , and a crown of thorns upon his head , went before the bridegroom ; by which , i believe , they intimated that matrimony was not instituted for pleasure only , but also for cares and labours . by the same ( if emblems will admit human figures ) might also be meant a prince . for what thorny cares does not he feel , who endeavours to maintain his state in justice , peace , and plenty . what difficulties does he experience ? what dangers is he liable to , who commands other ? his fatigues should be the peoples rest , his dangers their security , his vigilance their sleep . but we have here represented the same thing by a crown , fine , indeed , and charming to ●ight , but within full of thorns and briars ; with this motto of seneca the tragedian . false good ! what cares dost hide , under the appearance of a gay outside ? who viewing those pearls and diamonds , and those flowers which adorn a crown , would not fancy that the inside was much more fair and beautiful ; yet is there nothing but sharp thorns , which continually prick and scratch the head and breast ? there is not a pearl in a crown , but which is sweat ; nor a ruby , but which is blood ; nor a diamond , without some asperity or roughness ; 't is a circumference without a center of rest , a perpetual motion of cares * ; for this reason kings anciently wore a crown made like a ship , to represent its inconstancy , trouble , and dangers † . this he well knew , who , when a crown was offered him , laid it down , with these words , let him take thee up , who does not know thee . instead of crowns they at first us'd fillets , not as a badge of majesty , but only to bind and preserve the head . so heavy are the cares of a crown'd head , that it had need to be fore-arm'd ; for to reign is nothing but three continual sighs and toils , in preserving , acquiring , and losing . therefore did the emperor , mark anthony , say , that empire was the greatest of troubles . princes are born to labours , let them therefore inure themselves thereto . the kings of persia had a chamberlain , who wak'd them betimes in the morning with these words , arise , o king , to look after the affairs of your kingdom . some princes now-a-days would not endure such disturbance , for they perswade themselves that ease , voluptuousness , and vices , are the rewards of princes , but that the shame and disgrace thereof belong to others . whereas some princes shamefully neglect their duty , it is because ( as we shall mention elsewhere ) they take the kingdom for their inheritance and propriety , which they may use as they please , and think that their authority and sovereign power is subject to no laws , but altogether free to act as it list ; in which flattery encourages them , insinuating that without that freedom and liberty of living , a kingdom would be the worst of slavery , more intolerable than the meanest condition of subjects . whence resigning themselves to luxury and pleasure , their strength and spirits flag , and themselves become wholly unfit for government . hence , i believe , it is , that among so many princes , there are so very few good governors , not that they want natural parts , for in those they usually exceed others , as being born of better blood ; but because that through ease and luxury they don't make use of them ; nor do their courtiers suffer it , for they make their fortunes with more ease under a negligent than careful prince . the remedy against these inconveniencies consists chiefly in two things ; the first is , that a prince , should from his youth , as soon as he has the use of reason , be accustomed to the management of affairs , even before the death of his predecessor ; thus god did with ioshua . and if in matters of concern and trust , it be not convenient , for reasons which i shall shew in the last emblem but one ; yet in other things it is , that his mind may be diverted from debauchery . this made the roman senate introduce their youth to their consultations . by the benefit of this many popes nephews , though they have been admitted very young to the administration of affairs , have in a few years made experienc'd statesmen . the other is , that those that are near the prince , should dexterously endeavour to root out of his mind certain vain opinions of his greatness , and let him know that 't is the common consent of all that gives power and authority to the scepter , for nature made no kings . that his purple is an emblem of blood , which he should be ready upon occasion to shed for the people ; that it was not given to breed and nourish the mo●h● of vices : that he is born a prince by chance ; that virtue only is the proper good of man ; that his dominion is government , not absolute power , and that his vassals are subjects not slaves . this document the emperor claudius gave to meherdatus , king of persia . let them advise the prince so to do by those whom he governs , as he would be done to were he a subject ; so gaiba instructed piso when he adopted him his son . no prince was ever elected only to be so , but that being so he might be serviceable to the rest . king antigonus considering this , advis'd his son not to abuse his power , not to be proud or use his subjects ill , knowest thou not , my son , said he , that our kingdom is but a noble slavery . upon this the woman grounded her answer to the emperor rodolphus , who telling her he was not at leasure to hear her : then , says she , you are no more emperor . subjects are not born for the king , but the king for the subjects . 't would be too hard a bargain for them to sell all their liberty to the king , if in return they could not promise themselves justice and protection from him , to which end they voluntarily submitted themselves to his command . the romans in their triumphs were crown●d with their own shields , made into the circular form of a crown , whence were introduc'd the diadems of the saints , who were victorious against the common enemy . a prince deserves not a crown , unless also he use it as a shield to ward the stroaks of adverse fortune from his subjects . to reign is rather an office than a dignity , an authority of a father over his children ; and if the subjects find not that fatherly care and affection in the prince , they owe him no respect or filial obedience . king ferdinand the holy , look'd upon his government as an office , which consisted in protecting his subjects , in administring justice , in chastising vice , and procuring the enlargement of his territories ; not sparing any pains for its advantage , and according to this he always acted . princes are ( as we shall observe elsewhere ) like mountains , as well because they are nearer the favours of heaven ; as because they should receive all injuries of the weather upon themselves , being depositaries of ice and snow , which melting , should flow thence , and water and refresh the droughty fields and valleys beneath , and by the shade of their bodies defend them from the scorching : heat of the sun . for this reason , the scriptures call princes giants , for they that are born to sustain the weight of government , had need be of a more than ordinary stature : they are giants which must undergo fatigues and groans ( as iob says ) under the waters , by which are meant people and nations . they are the corners which sustain the whole fabrick of the state . a prince , who believes he is not born to do this for his subjects , and does not prepare himself to shelter them from the injuries of the weather , dwindles from a mountain to a valley ; nay , 't is unlawful for him whom heaven has design'd to govern others , to regard his own ease and quiet . wamba being elected king of the goths , and refusing the crown , a certain captain with his drawn sword threatned to stab him unless he accepted it ; shall you alone , says he to him , oppose the will of the whole nation , and prefer your own private ease to the publick good ? for this reason , the states of guadalajara would not suffer king iohn to resign his kingdom to his son henry , he being too young , and himself having a constitution fit for government . hence 't is evident , that princes are a part of the commonwealth , and that they are in some measure subject to it , as instruments of its preservation , so that their success or misfortunes respect it ; as tiberius told his sons . those who desired david for their king , told him , we are thy bone and thy flesh ; intimating to him that he must with his own strength support them , and take upon himself all their toils and grievances . a prince ought also to be taught while he is young , to tame and govern the skittish horse of government ; for should he let him have his head , he would fall headlong with him : he should use therefore the bridle of reason , the reigns of policy , the whip of justice , and the spurs of valour , keeping always fast in the stirrups of prudence . he must not execute every thing that comes into his mind , but only what is honourable and just , least he should transgress piety , reputation , modesty , or good manners . let not a prince imagine that his power is wholly absolute , but subject by the publick good and interest of his state. not immense , but limitted , and expos'd to many casualties ; one blast of wind dissipated all philip the second's naval preparations against england . let the prince also know , that his authority is not so sovereign , but that part of it remains in the subject , which they either reserv'd to themselves from the beginning , or which common sence has since granted them for their defence against any prince notoriously unjust and tyrannical . good princes are pleas'd at the liberty of their subjects ; tyrants only would be absolute . the safety and preservation of the kingdom , depends upon the well-temper'd freedom of the people . 't is not that prince who is most powerful , that is most secure , but he who is so with reason ; nor is he less sovereign who defends the just rights and privileges of his subjects . 't is rather prudence to let them enjoy 'em freely , for they never derogate from the authority of the prince , but when he thinks his honour affronted , and endeavours wholly to take 'em away . let him be content to maintain his crown by the same means his ancestors did . it seems to be this which god would admonish princes of , ( though in another sence ) by ezekiel the prophet , when he said , bind the tire of thine head to thee ; if any one shall wear it too loose , 't will be very apt to fall off . emblem xxi . justice is the center from which the circumference of a crown is drawn . if we could live without one , there would be no need of t'other . in former times all princes iudges were , and to see iustice done , was all their care. in the first age there was no need of punishment , for there were no crimes ; nor of rewards , for virtue and glory were belov'd for their own sakes . but as the world grew older , wickedness encreased with it , and made virtue more reserv'd , which before liv'd freely and carelessly in the fields . when equality was laid aside , and ambition and force suppli'd the place of modesty and shame , then government was also introduc'd . for prudence urg'd by necessity , and common prudence oblig'd men to civil society , that they might exercise virtues , which reason prompted them to , and make use of speech which nature gave them , that by revealing to one another the sense of their minds , they might inform , assist , and defend each other . society being thus by common consent establish'd , there arose at the same time a certain supream power necessary to the preservation of its parts , which by punishing vice , and rewarding virtue , might defend them in peace and justice . and because this authority could not be diffused through the whole body , by reason of the confusion which would arise in the execution thereof ; and because 't was also necessary that some should command , and the rest obey , they quitted their pretensions to it , conferring it either upon one , few , or many , which are the three sorts of government ; monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy . the first of which was monachy ; for originally men were govern'd by one in each family ; afterwards they chose from among the people , one , who excell'd others in goodness and virtue , whose hand , as his authority encreas'd , they honour'd with a scepter , and his head with a diadem , as a badge of the power and sovereignty which they had conferr'd upon him , which should principally consist in justice , by which he should preserve and defend his subjects in peace ; so that without that there is no order of government , and all kingly authority ceases , as it happened in castile , which was reduc'd to the government of judges , the kings being excluded for the injustice of ordonno and fruela . this justice could not be well administer'd by the mere law of nature , without imminent danger to the commonwealth ; for since 't is defin'd to be a constant and perpetual desire of giving to every one their own , it would be very dangerous if it should depend upon the opinion and judgment of the prince , and not be written ; nor can mere natural reason , though free from affections and passions , give true judgment in such variety of cases as happen continually . so that 't was necessary for states to arm themselves with laws , deduc'd from long use and experience , as well penal as distributive ; these to punish faults , and those to give every one his own . penal laws are represented by a sword , the emblem of justice , as trajan intimated , reaching a sword to the captain of his guards , with these words , take this , and if i govern well , use it for me , if not , against me . equally sharp on both sides , as well for the rich as the poor ; not with one edge blunt , and t'other sharp ; to spare one , and hurt another . distributive laws are represented by a rule ▪ square , which measures indifferently the actions and rights of all . by this rule of justice things ought to be measured , not this rule by things , as the lesbian rule was , which being made of lead , easily adapted it self to all shapes of the stone . the prince ought to give life and vigour to both . king alphonso the wise said , that a king was the heart and soul of the state. and in another place he says , that rex a king is the same with regula a rule . rex a king , and lex a law , differ but in one letter ; and what else is a king but the speaking-law , and the law but a dumb king ; so much king that could it exert it self it should govern alone . prudence has as it were divided the power of princes , and yet in their persons it remains whole , yet it has subtilly transferr'd part thereof to paper , so that it has left majesty written and expos'd to the view of all , for the exercise of justice , so that justice and chastisement , by means of the law , anticipating crimes , the sentence might not be ascrib'd to the will , passion , or interest of the prince , and that he might avoid the odium of his subjects . the law is an excuse for rigour , a discountenancer of favour , an invisible arm of the prince , with which he holds the reigns of the government . there is no better way to make authority respected and obeyed ; for which reason the law should be punctually observ'd , nor should force be us'd in any thing which may be decided by law . when once a prince proceeds that way , the laws will soon lose their force and efficacy : crimes will be reckon'd innocence , and justice tyranny : nor is the power of the prince a little diminish'd , for that is ever more effectual with the law than without it . 't is the law that crowns , defends , and confirms a prince , without it there would be no difference between subjection and command . true policy is founded upon the law , not upon arbitrary sway. they are the true rule of government , the roads of policy , by them as by certain lines the ship of the state fails securely ; they are the walls of civil power , the eyes and soul of the state , the fetters of the mob , and the bridle ( the present emblem ) which guides and curbs it . even tyranny it self can't subsist without them . the determination of justice could not be safely committed to the inconstancy of the will , which is subject to so many affections and passions , and of it self perfectly blind ; but it was necessary that it should be restrain'd by certain fix'd decrees and statutes , founded upon reason and prudence , which should without distinction be obligatory to all . such are the laws which experience of past accidents has provided for future ones ; and since they can't explain themselves , but are mere bodies which receive soul , and understanding from the judges , with whose tongues they speak , and by whose pens they are explain'd , and apply'd to particular cases , it being impossible to comprehend all ; let a prince be very careful to whom he commits them ; for in them he entrusts his very being , and the chief instruments of government ; but the choice being once rightly made , let him not hinder the free exercise and ordinary course thereof , but leave it wholly to the magistrate ; but if princes will through clemency or arbitrary power , intermeddle with the exposition of the laws ; all this politick structure will fall , and those laws which should prop and support it , rather cause its ruin . tyranny is nothing else but an ignorance and contempt of the laws , assuming to it self their power and authority . this rome of old bewail'd as the chief cause of its slavery , augustus arrogating to himself the chiefest offices in the law , that he might the better play the tyrant . when caesar to himself assum'd the laws , poor rome grew soon degenerate and base , forgot her war , and slept in servile peace . claud. a prince in obstructing the laws encourages vice , as it happ'ned in the time of the emperor claudius . ● multiplicity of laws are very dangerous to a state , for they destroy one another ; being too numerous they create confusion and oblivion , or when they can't be observ'd are despis'd . a sure sign of a dissolute and corrupt state ; one contradicts another , and makes room for sinister interpretations , and different opinions , whence arise disputes and contentions . the greatest part of the people are taken up in law , there want men to manure the ground ; for offices and war. a few good support many bad , and many bad lord it over the few good . the courts of judicature are harbours for pirates , and receptacles for thieves . those very men who should be the assertors of the peoples liberty , are the heaviest fetters of their slavery . too many laws are not less pernicious to a state than vices . he who makes many laws , sets many traps , in which all must be caught . so caligula , when he had a design upon the innocent , established many laws , written in so small a character , that they could be hardly read . and claudius published twenty in one day , which so puzzled the people , that 't was more difficult to know than to observe them . therefore aristotle said , that few laws were sufficient for the weightest cases , and that the rest ought to be left to natural reason . nothing is so prejudicial to state as multiplicity of laws : hence god threatened israel , as a punishment for their sins , that he would multiply their laws . to what purpose is it to make an addition of new laws upon every slight occasion , when there is no case which has not happ'ned before , nor any inconveniency which has not been already consider'd of , and by observation and experience provided for ? those which are now introduc'd into castile , as new , may be all found in the ancient records . the observation of these would be much more agreeable to the people , and would create less odium to the prince , than the promulgation of other new ones . in those judgment acquiesces , in these 't is dubious and unsteady ; those seem to be founded with care , the authority of these is questionable ; those may safely be renew'd , these can't be introduc'd without danger . to make experiments of new medicines is dangerous to health and life ; many herbs before the way of preparing them were known , were poison . better is that state govern'd , whose laws , though imperfect , are settled , than that which is continually changing them . the ancients to intimate that laws , ought to be perpetual , wrote them upon tables of brass , and god engrav'd them with his eternal finger upon stone . for this reason augustus advis'd the senate , that they should preserve their laws intire without altering them ; for that tho' they were bad , they were more beneficial to the state than new ones . there is no kingdom but is provided with laws sufficient ; but care ought to be taken , least the variety of interpretations should render them ambiguous and obscure , and occasion disputes and controversies . this ought to be prevented , which might with ●ase be done in spain , if some king , upon this account not less a restorer than pelagius , would abbreviate all processes , and leaving the civil law , would make use only of those of the kingdom , which are not less prudent and learned than just and reasonable . this king recesewind meant , when in one of his laws he said , also king alphonsus the wise , commanded his iudges . this their majesties , ferdinand and ioan , afterwards confirm'd , as did king alarick , who laid severe penalties upon the judges for admitting the pleas of the roman laws . nor does it a little derogate from supream jurisdiction to be govern'd by foreign laws . to this i foresee two objections ; first , that if these laws were written in spanish , the latin tongue would be lost , and the lawyers would apply themselves wholly to the study and explanation of them only ; besides , that without the knowledge of the civil law , from whence they are deriv'd , they could not be well understood . the other is , that since the civil law is common to almost all europe , according to which causes ought to be decided , and that the rights and privileges of princes are often to be determin●d in foreign parliaments , and courts of judicature ; it will be very necessary to have men well vers'd in the said law. which inconveniences will be easily remedied by erecting and indowing some places for civil lawyers in the universities ; as ( though upon different motives ) king ferdinand did . but if this can't be effected , the foremention'd inconveniences may be thus remedied ; first by prohibiting such a vast number of books to be imported , which serve only to clear the pockets , not the understanding , nor is printing any thing else now-a-days , but merchandize and trade . this variety confounds the senses , embarrasses and puzzles the judgment . 't would be more adviseable , where the written laws are not full enough for the decision of any controversy , to be guided by reason , that living law , rather than to grope for justice in the obscurity of such diversity of opinions , equally favourable to each side , and subject to subornation and passion . next , by shortening the tedious methods of the law , as king philip the second design'd to do at milan , when he consulted with the senate about that affair . in which he not only respected the good of the subject , but also that in that state , which is the bullwark of the kingdom , there might be more men of the sword than the gown . the same was attempted by the emperors , titus and vespasian , charles the fifth , their catholick majesties , peter , king of portugal , james the first of arragon , and lewis the eleventh of france ; none of them being 〈◊〉 to effect it , nor can any one else hope to bring 〈◊〉 about , since for the reforming the practice of the ●●nch , the judges themselves must be of counsel , whose interest it is to prolong suits , as 't is that of soldiers to continue war. 't was pure necessity oblig'd the most serene queen isabel , of her own accord , to make use of this remedy , when being at sevil harrass'd with vexatious appeals , she commanded all suits depending , to be by the assistance of able and learned men , decided in her presence , without the noise of the bar , and that accumulation of informations and processes , and truly successfully enough as experience has shewn . the cantons of switzerland are very prudently govern'd , because there are no lawyers among them ; the witnesses are heard , and without writing down any thing , except the judgment , the causes are immediately decided . a quick condemnation is more expedient for client , than a favourable judgment after a tedious dependance . he who commences a law-suit now-a-days , does as it were plant a palm-tree , which he can●t expect to live to gather the fruit of . in a state where suits are long and tedious , the people can never live peaceably and amicably . let there therefore be few counsellors , attornies , and sollicitors . how can that government be quiet , in which there are so many who get their living by raising and promoting feuds and law-suits ? what hopes of restitution to the injur'd , when there are so many ready to fleece and strip him ? suppose them to be persons of worth and integrity , yet is justice ne'er the better administred for their number ; no more than a disease is better cur'd by many physicians . nor would it redound to the common good , if with the loss of the publick tranquility , and the estates of the people , there should be made too nice a scrutiny into every ones right : a moderate and moral care is sufficient . nor does less damage arrive from an abundance of penal laws to prohibit luxury in cloaths , and superfluous expences ; for such edicts are generally slighted , and not observed ; the same month in which they are establish'd , they are abolish'd . they are like the responses of the sibyls , written upon leaves , and scatter'd by the wind. and if once this disobedience takes place , it makes luxury more insolent and secure . the prince's reputation suffers , when the remedies which he prescribes are ineffectual , or not observ'd . the edicts of margaret of austria , dutchess of parma , not being executed , derogated much from her authority in flanders . therefore 't is a question , whether moderate luxury be not a more tolerable inconveniency , than a prohibition when not obey'd ? or whether it be not better to wink at old and settled vices , than by feeble laws to shew that they are stronger than the prince ? if laws are once broken , unpunished , there is no restraint or shame beyond . if a prince would express these laws and edicts about reformation of manners in himself , perhaps flattery , or the natural propensity in inferiors to imitate their superiors , or the subjects their prince , would be more effectual than the rigour of the law , and that without danger to sovereign authority . frugality , which the sumptuary laws could not introduce , the emperor vespasian did , only by his example . the imitation of the prince , is a slavery sweetned by flattery . 't is easier for nature to err in her own works , said theodorick , king of the goths , than for the subjects not to observe the manners of their prince . in him , as in a glass , the people adjust their actions : — the nation follows still , the fashions of the court , and 't always proves , example more than law the people moves . claud. customs are laws , not written upon paper , but in the mind and memory of all , and are more grateful when not forc'd , but a free choice and sort of liberty ; and the same common consent , which first introduc'd them , still observes them so strictly , that it won't permit them to be altered though they are bad , for common opinion , by which , after they have been received by their ancestors , the people are fully perswaded they are just and reasonable , does prevail more in this matter than the strongest arguments ; nay , than the inconveniences themselves which are found in them . 't is therefore more prudent to bear with them , than wholly to remove them . a prudent prince governs his state without altering its customs . but if they are opposite to virtue or religion , they ought to be dexterously corrected , and the people by degrees prepared to know the reason . king froila incurr'd the odium of many by disannulling the custom of the clergy's marrying , which had been before introduc'd by witiza , and confirm'd by the example of the greeks . if the state be not well constituted , and the peoples minds docil and corrigible , laws will be of small use . which i believe solon meant , when being ask'd what laws were best ; he answered , those which the people observe . medicines are of no use where the disease is incurable . lastly , laws will be insignificant , unless the prince by his life and example confirm and strengthen them . that law seems pleasant and easy to the people , which the legislator himself observes : if you command , and hope to be obey'd , observe your self those laws your self first made . the people then will due obedience shew , to you who make laws , and observe them too . claud. the laws made by servius tullius , were not only for the people , but also for the prince . by them controversies between the prince and people ought to be determined : as tacitus relates of tiberius . tho' ( said the emperors , severus and antoninus ) we are free from the laws , yet we live by them . a prince is not oblig'd by the strict letter of the law , but by the reason on which 't is grounded , for that is natural and common to all , not peculiar to subjects only for their good government ; for in such case the observation of the law belongs to them alone , tho' 't will be very necessary , if the case will allow , for him to conform himself to them , that so they may seem the more pleasant to others . this was the meaning of god's command to ezekiel , that he should eat the roll . that others seeing that he had first tasted the laws , and found them sweet as honey , all might imitate him . the kings of spain are so subject to the laws , that the treasury in cases of the royal patrimony , runs the same fortune with any other subject , and in a doubtful case is condemn'd . so it was enacted by philip the second ; and once when his grandson , philip the fourth , your highness's father , was present in council , upon a debate of a case relating to the exchequer , neither the judges wanted integrity to give it against him , nor his majesty temper to hear it without resentment . happy is that state , in which the prince's cause is the worst . emblem xxii . though the peoples consent confers the power of justice upon princes , they receive it immediately from god , as being his vicars in temporal affairs . they are the royal eagles , the ministers of iove , who administer his thunder , and supply his place in punishing vice , and administring justice ; in which they have need of three qualities of the eagle , sharpness of sight to inspect crimes , swiftness of wing for execution , and strength of talons , that they main't fail therein . the injury done by a certain nobleman to a poor peasant , though in the remotest corner of galicia , could not escape the quick sight of king alphonso the seventh , call'd emperor , who disguising himself , went immediately to punish him with such speed , that he apprehended him before he knew any thing of his coming . o lively and ardent soul of the law ! to be himself judge and executioner , to satisfy an injury done to a poor peas●nt , and to punish the unjust oppression of the grandee . the same did king ferdinand the catholick , who being at medina , went privately to salamanca , and seized roderigo maltonado , who exercis'd great-oppressions in the castle of monleon . who would ever transgress the laws , if he always fear'd such a surprise ? one such as this would frighten and reform a whole kingdom . but it is not always expedient for majesty it self to imitate such examples . when the state of the kingdom is well settled , when the courts of judicature are open , and the fear of the law is fresh and lively , 't is sufficeint for a prince to see justice administer'd by his ministers . but when all is in confusion , when obedience staggers ; when the king's authority is slighted , as 't was in those times , then some such suddain and severe punishment will be seasonable , that the people may know the power of their prince , and understand , that as in a humane body , so in a kingdom , the soul of majesty is all in all , and all in every part . yet 't will be very necessary to moderate this severity , when the distemper is inveterate , and the kingdom confirm'd in vice ; for if virtue should be too severe upon vice , and endeavour to reform all at once , 't would be esteem'd rather cruelty than justice . time must recruit that which time has weakned ; to precipitate a cure is dangerous , and may make the prince experience the rage of the incens'd multitude . connivance and dexterity is often more effectual than force . in this king ferdinand the catholick was excellent ; and by this king peter was deceiv'd , who relying wholly upon severity , got the name of cruel . though justice be one single virtue , yet has it various effects , according to the difference of time . sometimes the people wholly reject it , and become more insolent ; sometimes they acknowledge the damage of their excess , and co-operate with the prince to remedy it , and suggest the most severe means against their own liberty , by which the prince acquires the name of just without danger . let not a prince remit the punishment of such offences against the government , in which few are concern'd , but pardon those in which many are involv'd . agrippa being put to death , in the isle of planasia , by the order of tiberius , a certain slave who was very like him , stealing away his ashes , pretended that he was agrippa ; the romans believ'd it ; the report spread , and caus'd a tumult , with evident danger of a civil war. tiberius caus'd the slave to be apprehended , and put to death privately , and though many gentlemen and senators of his own family , were said to have assisted him with money and advice , yet would he suffer none to speak in his behalf . thus prudence triumph'd over cruelty , and by silence and connivence he appeas'd the disorder . let a prince pardon small offences , and punish great ones ; sometimes let him be content with repentance , which tacitus commended in agricola . he is not the best governor who punishes with most severity , but he who pardons with such discretion and circumspection , as not to give any occasion to the delinquents to transgress again . no body commends a chirurgeon for cutting off many legs and arms ; no body hates a prince for punishing , provided he does it with reluctancy and grief ; but him who delights in it , and eagerly carps at all opportunities of doing it . to punish for example , and amendment is mercy ; but to do it through passion or avarice is tyranny . let not a prince suffer any one to think himself so great , and free from the laws , as to dare to oppose the ministers of justice , and those who represent its power and authority , for so the pillar of justice can't stand secure , when such boldness once takes place , contempt will by degrees undermine it , and bring it to the ground . the chief foundation of the spanish monarchy , and that which has rais'd it to such an height , and keeps it so , is the inviolable observation of justice and rigour , by which its kings have always taken care to make it respected and esteem'd of all . no violation of it goes unpunish'd , though great be the dignity and authority of the delinquent . a certain judge at corduba , was by the command of king ferdinand the catholick , enquiring into some misdemeanor , whom when the marquiss of puego had arrested , the king so resented it , that all the signal services of that family of corduba , could not hinder him from punishing him very severely ; afterwards he put himself wholly into his majesty's hands , by the advice of the great captain , who seeing the heinousness of the crime , which would not admit of pardon , wrote to him to cast himself at the king's feet , by which he might perhaps expiate his crime , but if not he would certainly be ruined . nor ought a prince only to punish crimes committed against his own person , or during his reign ; but those also which were acted in the last , though the state were then under the power of an enemy . for presidents of disobedience and contempt of authority being conniv'd at , or rewarded , are dangerous even to successors . dignity is ever the same , being always espoused to him who possesses her . wherefore he defends his own cause , who takes care of his predecessor's honour , though 't was not wounded in his time . a prince ought not to leave behind him the memory of one , who has been so impudent as to affront authority unpunish'd ; for i● once subjects are perswaded that they may raise their fortunes , or satisfy their passions , by the death or abuse of the prince , none will be able to live secure . the punishment of impudence to the predecessor , is the security of the successor , and a warning to all from daring to attempt the like . for which reason vitellius put all those to death , who petition'd him for rewards for the murther of galba . every one is treated as he treats others . iulius caesar commanding the statues of pompey to be erected , confirm'd his own . if princes should not unite against contempt and treason , authority and loyalty would be in danger . in cases where the same circumstances concur , a prince ought not to connive at some and punish others , for nothing renders them more odious than partiality , whence the egyptians signified the equality which should be observ'd in justice , by the feathers of an ostrich , which are equal on both sides . 't is great prudence in a prince to find such sorts of punishments , as will expiate the offence , with the least damage to the delinquent . certain noblemen fomented disturbances in galicia ; and though they deserv'd death , king ferdinand the fourth call●d them to him , and gave them employs in the army , where some of them were punish'd by the enemy , others by the hardships and toils of war , and so that province was reduc'd to its former tranquility . as in time of peace , justice and mercy are very advantageous , so in war are rewards and punishments ; because there the dangers are so great , as would not be attempted without great hopes , and nothing but fear could restrain the licentiousness of the soldiers . in so much as without these two things , says king alphonso , the faults which are committed●in war are much more dangerous ; for if men have so much to do to defend themselves from the mischief of their enemies , how much more have they from that which accrues from their own faults ? for which reason the romans inflicted divers sorts of infamy and punishment upon the soldiers who fail'd in their duty , or in any dangerous attempt or military affair ; whence they were less afraid of the enemy than the punishment , and chose-rather to die bravely in action , than to lose their honour or lives afterwards with perpetual ignominy and disgrace . in those times none durst desert , because he could not shelter himself in any part of the empire . now-a-days deserters are not only not punished when they return to their own country ; but sculking from battel , they march from milan to naples , where as if they had serv'd under some other prince , they are again listed into his majesty's service , to the great detriment thereof . in which the vice-roys should follow the example of the roman senate , who after the battel of cannae , though they were in extream want of soldiers , could not be induc'd to redeem six thousand prisoners which hannibal offered them , thinking them not worth redemption , who suffer'd themselves ignominiously to be taken prisoners , when they might have died gloriously . the errors of generals committed through ignorance , ought rather to be conniv'd at than punish'd , least the fear of being punished or reprimanded should make them too timorous . besides the greatest prudence may be confounded in accidents of war , whence they deserve compassion rather than punishment . varro lost the battel of cannae , and at his return the whole senate went out to receive him , thanking him for that in such a total defeat he had not wholly despair'd of affairs . when connivence is not convenient , but the execution of justice is required , let it be done with readiness and resolution . he who does it privately and by stealth , is more like an assassine than a prince . he who checks the authority which the crown gives him , either doubts his power or merit ; from the prince's distrust of himself proceeds the peoples disrespect . whose opinion of him is answerable to what he has of himself . king alphonso the wise lost the esteem of his people , by doing justice in private . this can be convenient only in troublesome times , when greater dangers may be fear'd , if the people don't see the authors of seditions punish'd e'er they know they are taken . thus tiberius acted for fear of this inconveniency . in other cases let a prince execute that office boldly and vigorously , which he holds in the name of god and the people ; for 't was justice that at first gave him his scepter , and 't is that which must preserve it . 't is the will of god , the harmony of government , and the protection of majesty . if the laws be once suffer'd to be broken unpunish'd , there will be neither fear nor modesty , and without them no peace nor quiet . yet let princes consider that they are like masters of families ; nay , that they really are such in respect to their subjects , and therefore let them temper justice with clemency . they ought to drink the sins of the people , as god intimated to st. peter , by that vessel of unclean animals , out of which he commanded him to eat . a prince should have the stomach of an ostrich , so hot with mercy as to digest iron , and should be also an eagle with the thunder of justice , which by striking one terrifies all . for if all were to be punish'd who transgress'd , there would be none left for the prince to command , for there is scarce any man so just , as not to have one time or other deserved death . the rigour of justice is not less dangerous to the crown , life , and empires , than injustice . of this king iohn the second is an example , who for his great severity became odious to his people : and king peter the cruel , lost thereby his kingdom and life too . let justice and mercy walk hand in hand , so link'd together , as if they were parts of the same body , yet so that one may be us'd without offence to the other . for this reason god gave not the flaming sword , which guarded paradise , to a seraphim , which is all love and mercy ; but to a cherubim , a spirit of knowledge , who knew better how to temper justice with clemency . nothing is more pernicious than a prince over-merciful . in the times of nerva they us'd to say , that 't was more difficult to live under a prince who bore with all , than one who bore with nothing . for he is not less cruel who pardons all , than he who forgives none , nor is excessive mercy less prejudicial to the people than cruelty ; and sometimes indulgence and forbearance does more mischief than the crime it self . for wickedness grows bolder , when it can promise it self pardon . 't was the clemency , or rather negligence of king henry the fourth , that made his reign as bloody as that of king peter was by his cruelty . clemency and severity , the one profuse , and the other moderate , make the prince beloved . he who can neatly and prudently temper these virtues , can't chuse but govern well ; nay , his whole reign will be a tuneful harmony , like that which proceeds from a base and treble . heaven produces corn by the mildness of its dew , and preserves it by the rigour of its frosts and snows . if god were not merciful , we should fear him , but not adore him ; both these virtues make him both fear'd and lov'd . therefore alphonsus , king of arragon , us'd to say , by justice i oblige the good , the bad by clemency . the one compels their fear , the other engages their love. confidence of pardon makes subjects arrogant , and excessive clemency creates contempt and disrespect , and occasions the ruin of governments . emblem xxiii . there are no greater chymists than princes , who set a value upon worthless trifles in bestowing them upon others as a reward of virtue . the romans invented several sorts of crowns , as mural , civick , and naval , as glorious badges of great and worthy exploits ; these nature suppli'd them with as grass , palm , and bays ; of which without any cost they made those crowns . the treasury would not have been sufficient to have rewarded services , had not that politick invention of crowns been thought on ; which being given as publick testimonies of val●ur were more valued and esteem'd than gold or silver . the soldiers underwent all fatigues and dangers to obtain them . for the same reason the kings of spain founded military orders , whose badges were not only marks of nobility , but also of valour ; so that all care ought to be taken to keep up their value and esteem , by bestowing them with great attention and respect to merit ; for they are so much esteem'd as they are tokens of nobility and bravery ; but if without distinction they should be promiscuously con●●r'd on all , they would grow cheap and contempti●●● . and arminius might well jeer his brother flavius ( who follow'd the roman faction ) that when he had 〈◊〉 an eye in battel , he should call to mind the collar and crown , the cheap rewards of slavery the romans so well knew of what advantage 't was to ●●●●erve the peoples esteem for those rewards , that 〈◊〉 held a council about the qualifications which a s●●dier ought to be indow'd with , to merit a crown of oak . in the badge of the order of st. iames , ( the figure of this present emblem ) are express'd the endowments which ought to be consider'd ere it is be●●w'd ; for the ground-work is a scollop-shell , the ●●●duct of the sea , bred among waves and billows , 〈◊〉 inur'd to fatigues ; in its fair bosom shines the 〈◊〉 , the emblem of nobility and virtue , as well for 〈◊〉 purity , as that it is bred by the dew of heaven ; when these are bestow'd upon children , or such who 〈◊〉 not de●erv'd them by any signal service , they are 〈◊〉 of favour , not rewards . who will endeavour 〈◊〉 merit them by services , if he can obtain them by diligence ? they were instituted for war , not peace , 〈◊〉 so ought to be distributed among those only who 〈◊〉 signaliz'd themselves therein , or serv d at least four years in the army , and made themselves fit for preferment , which doubtless would induce more of the nobility to apply their minds to arms , and the art of war would flourish more . this , because the athenians neglected , they became a prey to the macedonians . alexander severus considering the importance of gratifying the soldiery , as being the foundation and security of the empire , divided the contributions among them ; esteeming it a great crime to squander it away in luxury , or upon his courtiers . let other rewards be common to all , who signalize themselves either in war or peace ; to this end the scepter was endow'd with riches , honours , and offices ; as also with the power and authority of justice that with these it might punish offences ; with those reward virtue and valour . without rewards and punishments , governmen● would be in confusion , for they are the spirit that maintains and preserves them ; without them they can't subsist , for the hopes of reward engage respect , and the fear of punishment , obedience , even against the natural desire of liberty . hence the ancients represented empire by a whip , as may be seen in some consular coins ; and 't was a prognostick of the grandeur of augustus , who dreaming that iupiter offer'd him a whip ; he interpreted it to be the roman empire , which had been erected and maintain'd by rewards and punishments , who would refrain from vice if there were no punishments ? who would ●●pose themselves to dangers , were there no rewards ? democritus considering that the world could not be govern'd without them , call'd them two gods of the world. they are the poles of the orb of civil authority , the two lights of a state , without which it would be overwhelm'd in foggy darkness : they are the props of princes thrones . for this reason ezekiel commanded king zedekiah to lay down his crown and 〈◊〉 regalia , as being unworthy of them , in that he could not distribute rewards with justice . the prince in acknowledging merits , acknowledges a reward due , for they are relatives ; and if he gives not that , he is unjust . the importance of rewards and punishments was not well consider'd by the legislators and lawyers , who have been altogether upon penalties and punishments , without ever mentioning rewards . that wise legislator of the partidas consider'd ●elter of this ; for that he might join one with the ●●her , he intituled it particularly of rewards . since therefore rewards and punishments are so necessary for a prince , that without this balance he can't walk steadily upon the rope of government , he ought well to consider the right use of them . for this rea●●n the lictors rods were bound up ; but the crowns ●eing made of leaves , which soon fade , were wrought 〈◊〉 the victory ; that while those were loos'd , and these were finish'd , some time might interfere between the fault and the punishment , between the desert and the reward , and that the merit and demerit might be duly consider'd . rewards inconsiderately given , scarce merit thanks . he soon repents , who bestows them rashly ; nor is virtue safe from him , who punishes without discretion . if the punishment be extravagant , the people excuse the fault , and blame the severity . if virtue and vice be equally rewarded , the one is disgusted , the other becomes insolent . if in equality of merit , one is rewarded above the other , it creates envy and ingratitude ; for envy and gratitude for the same thing , can never go together ; also the method of dispensing rewards and punishments ought to be consider'd ; for rewards ought not to be deferr'd till they grow despicable , as being despair'd of ; nor punishments till they seem not due , as being aton'd 〈◊〉 by length of time , or as not being now exemplary to others , for as much as the cause is wholly worn out of memory . king alphonso the wise , one of your highness's progenitors , very judiciously admonish'd his poster●ty , how they ought to behave themselves in rewards and punishments , saying , that we ought to beh●vse our selves with moderation , as well in the good we do , as in the ill we punish ; for that in both the one and the other we must have regard to the circumstances of the person , time and place , and that the world properly speaking is supported but by the observation of these two things , rewarding those that do well , and punishing those that do otherwise . sometimes 't will be convenient to defer the distribution of rewards , that they may not seem due from justice , and that those who expect them , flush'd with those hopes , may more vigorously perform their duty ; nor is there any merchandise cheaper , than that which is bought with the hopes of reward . 't is certain men do more out of hopes than for rewards already receiv'd . whence it appears how prejudicial is succession in publick offices and rewards , which tiberius consider'd when he oppos'd the proposal of gallus , that the candidates should be nam'd every five years , who should succeed in the lieutenancies of legions , and the praetorship ; for that others , for want of hopes , would flag in their duty and service . in which tiberius did not only respect the publick detriment , but also that he should hereby lose the prerogative of distributing rewards , in which he conceiv'd the strength of his government consisted . and so by a plausible oration he retain'd his authority . court favourites , uncertain of the continuance of their power , ●●rely remedy this inconvenience of future succession , thereby to adjust their own actions , to weaken the prince's power , and free themselves from the importunity of petitioners . a prince being as it were the heart of his state , as king alphonso said , the vital spirits of riches and rewards , should by it be imparted to the other members , even the re●●otest parts , though they cannot injoy his presence , should nevertheless participate of his favours . princes are seldom mov'd by this consideration . they usually reward those only who are about them , being overcome either by the importunity of petitions , or by the flattery of their courtiers , or through want of resolution to refuse them . and so as rivers only refresh the grounds through which they run ; so they gratify and reward those only who are near them , unmindful of the pains and perils their foreign ministers undergo to preserve their authority , and to do that which they themselves cannot . all favours are shared among courtiers and parasites ; those services are most valued , which smell of civet and pulville , not those which are smear'd with blood and dust ; those which are seen , not those which are heard of at a distance ; as well because flattery sooner strikes the eyes than ears , as because the mind is tickled with the vain glory of present submissions and acknowledgements . for these reasons courtservices are sooner rewarded than desert , ambition before zeal , and complaisance before fatigue and toil. a splendor which pays it self . he , who does absent services may perhaps be commended , not rewarded . he will be for a while fed with vain hopes and promises , but will at last die starv'd with despair . the remedy is coming sometimes to court , for no letters or memorials are so perswasive as presence . the buckets of pretention are not to be fill'd , unless they are dipp'd into the court-waters . the presence of princes is as fertile as that of the sun. all things flourish when that shines , but fade and wither in its absence . to him who stands under the tree , the fruit drops into his hand . whence all covet to live at court , and decline foreign employments , in which the prince has most need of ministers . this would be remedied , if the bait of rewards was thrown farther off , if they were bestow'd where deserv'd , not where they are begg'd ; without need of petitions or importunities . king theodorick comforted the absent , saying , that from his court he observ'd their actions , and discern'd their merits . pliny said of trajan , that it was easier for his eyes to forget the persons of the absent , than for his mind not to remember his love towards them . yet this advice for absent ministers to repair sometimes to court , ought not to be effected , by desiring to be dismist from their offices , but still retaining them , by giving several reasons to get leave of the prince to be sometimes with him ; for so they may obtain what they desire , still retaining that which if they should quit , might be confer'd upon another . many either dissatisfied with their present station , or ambitious of greater , resign it , and afterwards repent , finding their hopes and expectations frustrated , for the prince looks upon it as a slighting and contempt of his favour . let no man presume so much upon his own person and parts , as to think the prince can't live without him . for princes never want ministers , and being once slighted , they often forget their chiefest . this i speak to those who canvass for publick employs , not those who knowing the vanity of them , choose to live solitarily and retir'd . only let them consider , that great souls form●d for business , don't always find in retirement that ease and tranqu●lity of mind , which they propose , and being once ingag'd therein , without being able to change their resolutions , they live and die miserable . modesty in receiving rewards and gratuities , is of great use , together with such a prudent carriage , as may make them appear obligations to farther services , not to drain the prince's liberality , for this obliges him yet more : as god , when solomon ask'd for nothing but an understanding heart , not only gave him that , but also riches and glory . they ought not to be demanded as a debt , for virtue is to it self a fair and large reward ; and though some acknowledgement be due , yet does it depend upon the prince's favour . and all had rather it should be receiv'd as their bounty , not a just debt to desert . whence princes are more inclin'd to reward liberally small services , but great ones more sparingly , for they think they shall receive more acknowledgments from the one , than the other . whence he who has receiv'd many favours , may expect to receive more , for bounty once bestow'd causes farther benefits . for a prince had rather another should acknowledge himself his debtor , than he his , the first being the more honourable . lewis the eleventh , king of france , used to say , that he had more regard for one , who for small services had been well rewarded , than for others who for great services had receiv'd but small reward . the emperor theodorick owning this failure , confess'd , that 't was from ambition that rewards sprouted out , without the least care of him who planted them , and that it provoked him to give more to those whom he had once began to favour . this is visible in favourites , towards whom princes favour and liberality seem a kind of obstinacy . emblem xxiv . though ( as we have said before ) justice arm'd with the laws , and rewards , and punishments , are the pillars which support the structure of the state , ye● will these pillars be in the air , unless founded upon the basis of religion , which is the bond of the laws ; for the jurisdiction of justice comprehends only external acts , legitimately approv'd of ; but don●t extend to priva●e and internal ones . it has authority only over t●e body , not the mind ; so that wickedne●● would little heed punishment , when it could privately commit injuries , adulteries , and rapine ; nay , he would make a jest of the laws , were there not another invi●sib●e one , menacing within . so necessary is this 〈◊〉 in a government , that some atheistical persons estee● religion but a meer politick invention ; who without ●t would be content with his poverty and present condition ? what trust in bonds and covenants ? what integrity in the administration of goods ? what fide●ity in offices and employments ? what security of life ? few would be entic'd by rewards , if they could obtain the same thing by private injustice ; few would be charm'd with the beauty of virtue , if through hopes of a more lasting garland than one of palm , they did not confine themselves to the strict rules of continency . vices would soon confound the order of government , without the principal end of happiness , which consists in virtue , and in this foundation and bulwark of religion , which sustains and defends the civil power , if the people did not think that there was another supream tribunal to judge the thoughts and imaginations , whose rewards and punishments will be eternal . the hope and fear of this being born in the most barbarous and impious sinners , do regulate and compose their actions . caligula scoff'd at , and ridiculed the gods ; yet , when it thundered he was forc'd to own a supream hand , which had power to punish him . this hand all acknowledge , for there is no heart which is not touch'd with that divine magnet . and as the mariners needle from a certain natural sympathy , is in perpetual motion , till it stops a● the light of that fix'd north star , about which all the coelestial orbs are turned , so we can't live quietly till we acknowledge and adore that increated north , in which is true rest , and from whence proceeds the motion of all things . who ought to observe this more than a prince , who is the pilot of the state , upon whose care it depends to bring the s●ip safe into port ? nor is it enough for him to seem to look at that , while he keeps his eyes upon other dark and obscure ones , for so he would lose his course , and run the vessel upon sands and rocks , and so make a wreck . the people will be divided in opinions , and thence into factions , from whence arise plots and seditions , and from them changes in states and empires * . more princes are ruined by dissention in religion than by arms. for which reason the sixth council of toledo prudently enacted † , that no prince should come to the crown before he had first taken an oath not to tolerate any one in his realm who was not a christian. spain could never be at quiet till 〈◊〉 rejected the errors of arius , and wholly embrac'd the catholick religion , since which the people have liv'd so happily , that when king weterick afterwards endeavour'd to introduce that sect , he was kill●d in his very palace ; but notwithstanding many like examples , there are some who dare impiously teach princes to dissemble and counterfeit religion . he who dissembles it , does not believe it . and if this dissimulation be a politick artifice to unite peoples minds , and to maintain the state , true religion would better do it than false , for this is fading , that eternal . many empires founded upon false religions , proceeding from ignorance , god has preserv'd a long time , rewarding by that means their morality , and blind worship , and barbarous sacrifices , with which they fought him ; not that they were acceptable to him , but for the religious simplicity wherewith they were sometimes offer'd . but has never preserved those empires , which counterfeited religion more through malice and artifice than ignorance . st. isidore , at his death , foretold the spaniards , that if they stray'd from the true religion they should be subdu'd by their enemies ; but if they persisted in it , their grandeur should be rais'd above all nations . which was verified by the yoak of the africans , which began from the time that witiza deny'd obedience to the pope , after which liberty of worship , and licenciousness of vice disturbed the publick peace , and ruined military discipline , which brought heavy misfortunes upon the king himself , and his sons , as well as upon the kingdom ; till being subdu'd and chastis'd , spain acknowledg'd its errors , and again found heaven propitious in that little handful of christians , with which pelagius retir'd into a cave in the mountain ausena , call'd cav●longa , where the arrows and stones of the moors were miraculou●ly retorted upon themselves † . from that the monarchy began to revive , and rose ( though after a long time ) to that greatness , which it at present enjoys , as a reward of its constancy in the catholick religion . since then , religion is the soul of governments , a prince ought to use all possible care to preserve it ; the first spirit which romulus , numa , lycurgus , solon , plato , and other founders , infus'd into them , was religion , for that unites mens minds more than necessity . the emperors , tiberius and adrian prohibited all foreign religion , and were wholly intent upon the preservation of their own : as also theodosius and constantine , who established laws and punishments against those who revolted from the catholick faith. their majesties , ferdinand and isabella , never tolerated the exercise of any other religion . in which commendable was the constancy of king philip the second , and his successors , who could never be induc'd to compose the seditions of the netherlands by toleration of liberty of conscience , though they might thereby have retain●d those provinces , and sav'd those immense treasures which were expended in the war. they preferr'd the honour and glory of god to their own ease and tranquility ; imitating flavius jovianus , who being proclaim'd emperor by the army , excus'd himself , saying , that he was a christian , and that 't was not fit he should command them who were not so , and would not consent till all the soldiers had promis'd to turn christians . though he might inherit this pious constancy from his ancestors , since the eighth council of toledo mentions the same thing of king recefuinthus , of which piety your royal highness's father , philip the fourth of glorious memory , is a signal example to your royal highness . in the beginning of whose reign it being argu'd in council , whether the truce should be continued with the dutch ; and some of his counsellors urging that it was not policy to begin war , or any change of affairs , in the beginning of a reign ; he oppos'd them , saying , that he would not have his name branded with the infamy of having maintain'd one hours peace with the enemies of god and his crown ; and so immediately broke the truce . for this ardent zeal and constancy in the catholick religion , king recaredus merited the name of catholick , ( as long before the kings of france that of most christian ) . in the third council of toledo , and in that of barcelona , which title the kings sisebutus and ervigius kept , which their successors afterwards lost , till re-assum'd by king alphonso the first , to distinguish him from hereticks and schismaticks . though 't is a king's duty to maintain religion in his realms , and to promote the worship of god , as his vicars in temporal affairs , that they may govern to his glory , and their subjects safety ; yet they ought to know that 't is not in them to decide controversies in religion and divine worship , for the care of this belongs directly to the spiritual head of the church , to whom alone christ has given this authority , the execution , preservation , and defence thereof only is committed to kings , as that head shall order and direct . the priests sharply check'd king uzziah , and god severely punish'd him because he offer'd incense . 't is necessary for the preservation of the purity of religion , that it be the same in all the parts of the christian world. true worship would soon be lost , if each prince might accommodate it to his own ends and designs . in those provinces and kingdoms where this has been attempted , there searce remain any tracts thereof , so that the poor distracted people are wholly ignorant of the true religion . the spiritualty and temporalty are two distinct jurisdictions ; this is adorn'd by the authority of the other , and that is maintain'd by the others power . 't is an heroick obedience which submits to the vicar of him who disposes of crowns and scepters . as arbitrary and free from the laws as princes pretend to be , they must still pay obedience to the apostolick decrees , and are oblig'd to give force to them , and see them strictly observ'd in their dominions ; especially when 't is not only expedient for the spiritual , but also the temporal good , that those holy decrees be put in execution , nor should they suffer any one to violate them , to the dammage and prejudice of their subjects , and their religion . emblem xxv . the stork builds its nest upon the church steeple , and by the sanctity of the place makes its succession secure . the prince who founds his kingdom upon the triangular stone of the church , renders it strong and lasting . the athenians once consulting the oracle of delphi , how they might defend themselves against xerxes , who with a vast fleet of twelve hund●ed sail , was coming to fall on them , were answer'd , that if they could fence their city with a wooden wall they should get the better ; themistocles interpreted apollo's meaning to be , that all the citizens should go on ship board ; which done they obtain'd a victory over that prodigious fleet. the same success will attend a prince , who shall embark his grandeur in the ship of the church ; for if this by the testimony of another oracle not fabulous and uncertain , but infallible and divine , cannot be sunk , neither can that which is embark'd in it . for this reason your highness's glorious ancestors , were us'd to consecrate part of the spoils they took in war from their enemies , to god , as the lord of victories who fought for them , offering for his worship very considerable revenues and possessions , whence innumerable foundations and endowments of churches , cathedrals , and convents , took their rise ; having built in spain above seventy thousand churches . of which samy , the first king of arragon , alone , built a thousand , consecrated to the blessed virgin , which his munificence was amply rewarded by the many conquests he made , and victories he won , having fought thirty three battels , in all which he came off victorious . these pious works were like religious colonies , render'd by their spiritual arms not less powerful than military ones ; for artillery make not so great breaches as prayer . the prayers of the israelites for seven days beat down the walls of iericho . riches are therefore better reposited in temples than treasuries ; not only against extream necessity , but that as by them religion flourishes , the state may with it . the athenians kept theirs in that of delphi , as did many other nations . what better guardian than the sovereign arbitrator of kingdoms ? our hearts at least will be in the churches , if our treasures are there . wherefore their council 〈◊〉 no less impious than imprudent , who under the ●lightest pretence of publick necessity are for pillaging them . he is not worthy the protection of divine providence , who diffident of god's power , upon every accident has his eye upon the furniture of his house . when king ferdinand the holy , wanted money to carry on the siege of sevil , and some advis'd him to supply the deficiency of his exchequer out of the church-treasures . he made answer , i promise my self more from the prayers and sacrifices of the priests , than from their riches ; which piety and confidence , god abundantly recompenc'd the very next day by the surrender of the city . those kings , who have done otherwise , have left severe examples of their sacrilegious presumption . gunderick , king of the vandals , going to plunder st. vincent's , fell down dead as he was entring it . the great misfortunes of alphonso , king of arragon , were thought to be god's judgment● upon him , for having robb●d his sacred houses . queen uraca died at the very door of st. isidore's at leo● , the treasures of which she had embeziled . sane●● , king of arragon , was shot through the arm with 〈◊〉 arrow , for that he had defil●d his hands with th● plunder of churches . and though , in st. victorio's a● rota , he publickly confess'd his crime , and with tears and all imaginable signs of contrition , offering r●stitution and amendment , yet it pleas'd god to publish his offence in his punishment , as a war●ing to others . king iohn the first , was routed and kill'd a● the battel of aliubanota , for having made use of the treasures of the church of guadaloup● . upon the surrender of cajeta to frederick , king of naples , the fren●h loaded two ships with the plunder of the churches , both which were lost . but in all these cases , extream necessity had not place ; for then right . reason allows princes for their preservation , to make use of such riches , as out of ● pious liberality themselves have laid up in these holy places , provided it be with a resolution to restore them when the prosperity of their affairs shall put them in a capacity . as their catholick majesties , ferdinand and isabella did , having obtain●d a grant from the parliament of medina del campo , of the church-plate to defray expences of war. and the sacred canons and councils have prescrib'd certain cases and circumstances of necessity or danger , wherein ecclesiasticks are bound to assist the publick with their contribut●ons ; and certainly 't would be inexc●●able ava●●c● in them not to regard common necessities . they are the most noble and principal part of a state ; and if for them , or for religion , others are oblig'd to expose their lives , why not they their riches ? if the state maintains and keeps them , it may very justly expect a reciprocal relief from them for its conservation and defence . the people would be di●courag'd from paying tyths , and other church duties , if in common calamities there were none to ease them of extraordinary burthens ; they will blame their own piety , and their zeal and devotion , for any new offerings , donatives , and legacies to the chu●ch will slacken . 't is therefore highly reasonable that the clergy in cases of this nature , aid the publick with their revenues , not only for that the danger or benefit equally respects all ; but withal , least the goods and estates of the laity be so oppress'd , that tillage , and with it tythes , and other pious works must fail . in such cases , church-plate shews better in bars in the mint , than in chalices and cups in the vestry . this obligation upon the state ecclesiastical , is more strict in the more urgent necessities of the s●●nish kings ; for almost all the foundations and endowments of churches being the effects of their pious liberality , ●hey are in justice bound mutually to relieve their patrons in necessity , and oblige them to continue their munificence in better times . these , and many other reasons , have prevail'd with the apostolick see , to be so liberal to the kings of spain , in granting them the use of the church goods , to maintain their wars against the infidels . gregory the seventh granted sancho rami●ez king of arragon , the tythes and revenues of all the churches , either newly built or gain'd from the moors , to dispose of as he pleas●d . the same grant also pope urban made to peter the first , king of arragon , his successors and grandees of his kingdom , excepting the churches of residence . innocent the third granted the bull of the croisade for the war of spain , which was call'd the holy war ; which favour , pope calixt●s afterwards in henry the fourth's time extended both to the living and the dead . gregory the tenth , gave king alphonsus the wise , the third part of the tythes which were design'd for building : this began afterwards to be perpetuated in iohn the second's reign ; and alex●nder the sixth extended it also to the kingdom of granada . john the twenty second , granted the tythes of the church revenues , and the croisade to king alphonsus the eleventh . urban the fifth , a third part of the benefices of castile to peter the cruel . sixtus the fourth , consented to have the clergy contribute at one time an hundred thousand ducates for the war of granada ; which favour several other popes continued . iulius the second , granted emanuel , king of portugal , the third part of the revenue which belong'd to the church-building , and the tythes of all other ecc●esiastical incomes . these subsidies ought not to be spent but in necessities , and for the publick uses , to which they were design'd . this queen isabella so religiously observ'd , that seeing ninety millions rais'd by the croisade , she immediately commanded they should be employ'd to the very uses prescribed by the apostolick bulls . those favours will shine more , and produce better fruit , when so expended . but necessities and danger usually confound all things , and easily wrest the popes meaning to what was not intended . emblem xxvi . it was an impious opinion , that of those who impudently asserted the heathens to have had more courage than the christians ; upon this ground , that their superstition strengthned their minds , and render'd them more fierce and manly by the dismal sight of so many bloody victims , as they offer'd to the gods in their sacrifices ; and held them only to be men of courage and magnanimity , who got the better of other nations rather by force than reason : accusing on the contrary the institution of our religion for recommending humility and meekness ; virtue is good for nothing but to make men mean spirited . what an impious and unreasonable opinion this ! the spilling of blood may indeed make the mind more barbarous and cruel , more valiant it never can . fortitude and magnanimity enter not at the eyes , but are born within the breast ; nor are those the most generous , who are most pleas'd with the blood and slaughter of beasts , or who live on man's flesh. our religion does not contemn magnanimity , but rather promotes it , not by proposing to us temporary and corruptible rewards , as the pagan superstition does , but eternal ones never to have an end . and if a simple crown of lawrel , which begins to fade as soon as gathered , inspired so much courage then , what won't now that everlasting one of stars ? is it that the heathens have exposed themselves to greater dangers than the christians ? no , for if at any time they assaulted a city , or forc'd a camp , it was under shields and targets . whereas now christians must make their way through thick showers of bullets , and the thunder and lightning of gunpowder . 't is a mistake to imagine humility and valour incompatible ; they are rather so closely connected , 〈◊〉 without the former this is impracticable ; nor can true valour be where there is not humility , patience , and in general all other virtues . for he only is really valiant that can subdue his passions , and is free from all perturbation of mind ; a study the stoicks have bestow'd much labour on , and after them the christians with greater success . he makes but a very small progress in it , who suffers himself to be transported with anger and pride . this is truly heroical to conquer ones lusts and appetites . the mind where these conflicts are , is none of the easiest fields of battel ; he who has learnt thus much submission , to bend the knee to another , will upon occasion easily despise danger , and with undaunted resolution submit his neck to the ax. the heathen religion , 't is true , has produced many great commanders , such as were the caesars , scipios , and abundance of others , but certainly the christian has furni●ht us with no less con●iderable ones in the persons of the alphonso's and ferdi●●●ds of castile , as well as other kings of arragon , navarre , and portugal . what valour could possibly equal that of the emperor charles the fifth ? what great generals has antiquity ever celebrated , which have not been equall'd , if not been surpass'd by gonzal●z f●●dinand of cordova , fernan cortez , antony de lieve , ferdinand d'avalos , marquiss of pescara ; alphonso d'avalos , marquiss of guast ; alexander farnese , duke of p●rma ; andr●w d'oria , alphonso d'alb'ouquerque , ferdi●●nd alvarez of toledo , duke of alba ; the marquisses of sancta cruz ; the earl of fuentes , marquiss spinola , le●is fa●ardo , and almost infinite others ; as well spainards as others , never sufficiently to be commended by fame . to whom may deservedly be applied what st. paul said of those great captains , gideon , barak , sampson , ieph●●a , david , and samuel , that by faith they subdued kingdoms ; waxed va●iant in fight , ●urn'd to flight the armies of the aliens if we will compare the victories of the heathens to those of the christians , we shall find the latter to have been much the greater . in the battel of navas were kill'd two hundred thousand moors , with the loss only of twenty five on our side ; finding the camp so covered with spears and darts , that though the victors ●taid there two days , using no other fewel but the wood of them ; they could not consume them , even , though they endeavour●d it . there fell more in the battel of salado , with the loss but of twenty christians . and in that naval victory , which don john of austria obtain'd over the turks at lepanto , there were no less than an hundred and eighty gallies sunk and taken : which victories christians attribute not to their own valour , but to the true god whom they adore . an heart confiding in god , as effectually stays an enemy , as a hand arm'd with a sword , as iudas machabaeus found . 't is god who governs the hearts , 't is he that imparts courage and strength , that grant● or denies victories . he would be an impostor , and could not be clear'd from the imputation of fraud , were he rather assisting to those who adore false gods , whose idolatrous sacrifices all tend to procure their favour . but if he sometimes also permit them to be victorious , 't is not to be ascrib'd to their devotion , but to other secret causes of divine providence . in the thirst which the roman army suffer'd in the war against the marcomanni ; god could not be appeas'd with the prayers and sacrifices of the heathen legions , but when the tenth compos'd of christians , at last implor'd his aid , he sent down plentiful showers to them , but to the enemy thunder and lightning , so that they obtain'd an easy victory , whence it was afterwards call'd the thundring legion . if that faith were still , it would still work the same effects ; but whether through want of that , or for some other secret ends , god does sometimes permit those to be triumph'd over , who pay him true adoration ; but then the victory is not a reward to the conqueror , but a chastisement to the conquered . let princes therefore always hold in their hands the flag of the cross , signified by that sword which ieremiah gave to iudas machabaeus to wound his adversaries withal , and on their arms the buckler of religion , and continually before their eyes , that eternal fire which went before the persian monarchs : an emblem of that other incomprehensible fire from which the sun receives its rays . this is the true religion which the soldiers ador'd , as oft as they prostrated themselves before the emperour constantine's banner : for when the ●●ape of a cross in the heavens made by the sun 's light , with this inscription , thou shalt conquer under this sign * , seem'd to promise him the victory over maxe●ti●● , he commanded a standard to be made in the same form with that of the present emblem , with the letters x and p , cyphers of christ's name over it , and the letters alpha and omega , the emblem of god , the beginning and end of all things . this standard the emperors after him made use of , till iulian the apostate's time † ; and don john of austria had on all his colours embroider'd a cross , with this motto : with these arms i have conquer'd the turks , and with the same i hope to overcome hereticks * : king alphonsus the great put the words of constantine's cross on another sort of ensign , which he afterwards offer'd in the church of oviedo : and of those i have thought fit to make use on , as well as constanstine's standard , to form this emblem , and to imprint on princes minds , that faith and assurance , with which they ought to erect the standard of religion against their enemies . at the battel of navas , a person made way three times through the thickest of the enemy with the cross of roderigo , archbishop of toledo , though all the darts and arrows of the moors were aim'd at it , and many stuck in the lance. angels are the guards of this banner ; two angels upon white horses , were seen to fight in the front of the battel of simaneas , when king ramiro the second , vanquish'd the moors ; and in that of clavigio , in time of ramiro the first ; and also in that of merida , under king alphonsus the ninth , appear'd that divine light , the son of thunder , st. iago , patron of spain , on a white steed carrying colours distinguish'd by a red cross. no one shall be able to stand before you , ( said ioshua upon his death-bed ) if you put your hope and confidence in god : your sword shall conquer thousands , for he will fight for you . the holy scriptures are full of instances of this divine assistance . god put the very stars in array against the canaanites . against the amorites he arm'd the elements , and rain'd great stones from heaven . nor did the faithful need any assistance against the madianites , for the lord set every man's sword against his fellow . thus , whoever is god's enemy , brings vengeance upon his own head . emblem xxvii . what , neither force , nor a close siege of many years could do against troy , fraud at length effected under pretence of religion , the graecians conveying their arms into the city within the body of a wooden horse , under pretext of a vow to minerva . neither the clattering noise of the weapons , nor the advertency of the most prudent citizens , nor the consideration that it could not be brought into the city but by a breach , nor that of its being to continue within the walls a considerable time , were sufficient to open the peoples eyes , and to discover the treachery : of such influence is religion . this scipio africanus , sylla , sertorius , minos , pisistratus , lycurgus , and many others , have advantageously made use of to authorize their laws , and impose upon the people . the phoenicians coming into spain , built , where medina sidonia now stands , a temple in the form of a fortress dedicated to hercules , saying , that they were so commanded in a dream . the spaniards believ'd that to be devotion which was stratagem , that to be piety which was a trick , whereby religiously to enslave and plunder the people . by means of another temple on the promontory dianea , ( now denia ) the inhabitants of the isle of zante conceal'd the design they had of bringing spain under their subjection . king sisenand having depos'd swinth●●● , to secure to himself the crown , call'd a provincial synod of about seventy bishops , under colour of making new laws for regulating ecclesiastical discipline which time had corrupted ; whereas his chief and re●l design was to get swinthila depos'd , and himself inthron'd by a dec●ee of these fathers , the better to satisfy the people . which very artifice ervigius made use of to confirm his election , and the abdication of king wam●● malice well knows what effect religion has on mens minds , and therefore makes that the principal instrument to execute its designs , which easily impose upon the simple vulgar , who , poor souls , not being able to penetrate all their ends , believe their only tendency is to render god propitious , to make him prosper their temporal affairs here , and reward them eternally hereafter . what nauseous delusions have nations swallow'd when gilt with religion , miserably abandoning themselves to superstition ? what servile and barbarous custom has not that introduc'd , to the prejudice of liberty , life , and fortune ? let princes therefore be upon their guard , in these times particularly , when policy puts on the mask of piety , and not easily admit those stalking-horses of religion , which have ruined not only cities , but whole countries and kingdoms . for , if under that title , ambition and avarice creep in , and the people be oppress'd , they will renounce god's easy yoak , and will look upon this natural and divine law of religion to be nothing but a piece of state policy ; and that princes under that veil conceal their methods to keep subjects in allegiance , and strip them of their fortunes . let princes therefore throughly examine , whether the novelty introduc'd be really upon the account of religion , or meerly a specious pretence to the prejudice of their power and authority , to the detriment of their subjects , or the publick peace ; which they may find out by the ends it proposes , by observing to what such innovations tend , whether to interest or ambition , whether they conduce to the spiritual good or not ; or if this can't be procur'd by other means less prejudicial . in such cases an evil is with less danger prevented than afterwards remedied ; and the only means to prevent it , is not to give place to these pretexts and abuses ; however , if they be already introduc'd , they ought to be corrected with all the mildness imaginable , not rashly , nor with violence or extream rigour ; especially , if the case fall not under the prince's jurisdiction ; but with extraordinary address , having du● respect to the persons , under whose cognizance it falls , laying before them the truth of the thing , and the ill consequences and inconveniences of it . for if the secular prince attempt to do it by force , and those abuses should be establish'd into a custom among the people , they will interpret this violence to ●e impiety in the prince , and rather obey the priests than him : on the other side , if they see the ecclesiastical and civil power disagree , they will throw off all obedience , and emboldened by the declared will o● the prince , they will make an insurrection against religion it self , and be insensibly induc●d to beli●ve , th● inconveniencies of these contentions extend even to the substance of religion , which will easily bring them to change their opinions , and that too . and by this means , the prince being engag'd in civil broils and dissentions with the clergy , and the people in new opinions , all respect for things sacred will cease , and errors arise upon the eclipse of that divine luminary which before enlighten'd and united their minds ; which is the scource of the ruin of many princes , and of the revolutions of states . great prudence is requisite to govern the people in such matters , for 't is equally obvious for them to despise them , which is impious ; and to be over credulous in them , which is superstition ; this last most frequently happens , in that their ignorance is presently taken with appearances of devotion , and new opinions , before reason has had time to examine them ; wherefore 't is very necessary gradually to remove from them all occasions of ruin , those particularly which usually arise from frivolous disputations about too subtle points , such as very little , if at all promote religion , not suffering them to be defended or printed ; otherwise they will be divided into factions , and every one's maintaining his own opinions with as much heat and obstinacy , as if they were matter of faith , may occasion no less disturbances , than even a difference of religions , or a toleration of them . it was an apprehension of this made tiberius forbid the books of the sibyls to be seen , whose prophecies might cause seditions . in the acts of the apostles we read , that the books which contain'd idle curiosities were burnt . an appearance often miserably deludes the common people , who blindly follow any superstitious devotions with a submission wholly effeminate , which renders them melancholy , cowardly , and very slaves to their own imaginations ; which debase their spirits , and prompt them to idle away their time in convents and pilgrimages , where oft-times many abuses and vices are committed . this is an infirmity of the vulgar , and not a little prejudicial to the truth of religion , and the publick safety ; and unless nipp'd in the bud , creates great inconveniencies and dangers , being a kind of folly that under the appearance of good does every thing hand over head , following new notions of religion , and devilish inventions . some submission is requisite , but that without base and ssavish bigottry ; such i mean as has virtue in esteem , abhors vice ▪ and holds labour and obedience to be more agreeable to god and the prince , than convents and pilgrimages , this devotion being usually celebrated with banquets , balls , and plays ; like that of the people of israel at the consecration of the molten calf . but if the people once begin to be too opinionative in matters of religion , and to introduce any innovations in it , immediate remedy must be apply'd , and the ill seed be routed out before it take root and spread farther , so as to grow into a body too powerful for the prince , against whom they may afterwards , if he refuse to conform to their opinion , contrive some pernicious innovation in the government . and though the understanding be free , and without destroying its liberty can●t be constrain'd to believe , and so it may seem to belong peculiarly to god almighty to punish those who have unworthy sentiments of him ; yet , would it be of very ill consequence to commit the decision of the sublimest mysteries of faith to the blind and ignorant mob : 't is therefore infinitely requisite to oblige subjects to think , as the ancient germans did , that there is more sanctity and reverence in believing than knowing things divine . what monstrous errors were a kingdom obnoxious to , if each man were allow'd to be a jugde in matters of religion ? hence the romans were so careful in prohibiting the exercise of any new religion , and claudius thought the foreign superstitions a sufficient subject for complaint to the senate . but if malice have already got footing , and punishment be too weak to resist the multitude , 't is necessary that discretion perform the part of fire and sword : for obstinacy in faults sometimes increases by an untimely application of remedies too violent ; nor does reason always surrender to force . king ricaredus by dexterously adapting himself to the times , now dissembling , now flattering , brought his subjects to renounce arianism , and to return to the catholick church . great men have anciently made use of superstition ( as we have before intimated ) to authorize their laws , animate their people , and keep them in subjection and obedience ; to this end they feigned dreams and divine revelations , and pretended to have private conference with the gods ; but although these artifices extreamly influence the simple people , whose superstitious humour is easily affected with things that have an appearance supernatural : 't is not however allowable for princes to delude them with counterfeit miracles , and a false shew of religion . of what use is the shadow , where one may enjoy the light it self ? to what purpose those divine imaginary prodigies of heaven , since it gives , as we see , so many real ones to those who with a firm faith and assurance expect them from divine providence ? how can an infinitely just god give success to these arts which seem to call in question his care and concern for things here below , that counterfeit his omnipotence , and ascribe to him what he is not the author of ? what certainty in religion can the people promise themselves , if they see it wrested to serve the particular ends of princes , and that 't is nothing but a veil with which they cover their designs , and give truth the lye ? that policy is certainly very unsafe , that is cloak'd with fraud , very weak and tottering , that is supported by contrivance . emblem xxviii . prudence is the rule and measure of virtues , without that these degenerate into vices . wherefore as other virtues have theirs in the appetite , this has its residence in the intellect , from thence presiding over them all . agatho calls it a great goddess . this it is which constitutes the three forms of government , monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy , and assigns each of them their parts conformed to the subjects nature , having its eyes always intent upon their preservation as the principal end of politicks . prudence is the state 's anchor , the prince's compass . where this virtue fails , the very soul of government is wanting . ' t is this , ( says king alphonsus ) which makes ▪ see things as they are , and judge what they may be , making us act therein decently , without tumult and precipitation . 't is the peculiar virtue of princes , and that which above all others renders a man compleat , which makes nature so sparing in her dispensations of it ; having given many great wit and capacity , very few great prudence ; for defect of which , the more eminent men are in dignity , the more dangerous is their government ; for as much as they easily transgress the limits of reason , and are ruined ; besides , that one of command requires a clear judgment to discern all things as they are in themselves , to weigh and give each thing its just value . this nice examination is of very great consequence in princes , and as nature contributes much to it , so does observation and experience more . the virtue of prudence consists of several parts reducible to these three heads ; the memory of past , the knowledge of present , and the prospect of future times . all these differences of time are represented in this emblem , by a serpent , the emblem of prudence , upon an hour-glass , which represents time present , winding it self about a scepter , and viewing it self in the two glasses of past and future ; with this verse of virgil , translated from homer , including all three , for the motto : what are , what were , and what shall come to pass . which prudence looking into regulates , and composes all its actions . these three times are the mirror of government , in which by observing the past as well as present errors and miscarriages , it d●esses and beautifies it self by private and acquired experience : of the former i treat in another place . the acquir'd is either attain'd by conversation or history . conversation is very beneficial , thought something more limited , being apprehended with less difficulty , abundantly more satisfactory of all doubts and questions , and consequently more improving . history is a general representation of all the ages of the world , and by the benefit of that the memory recals the time of our ancestors . the faults of those who were , instruct them that now are . wherefore 't is necessary that the prince search for true friends , such as will relate with sincerity things both past and present : and since they are , as alphonsus , king of naples and arragon , us'd to say , like histories that neither flatter , nor conceal , or dissemble the truth ; let him admit them particularly into his council , carefully observing the neglects and failings of his predecessors ; by what tricks they have been put upon ; the court artifices ; the intestine and foreign ills of kingdoms ; and examine whether he be not in danger of the same . time is the best master of princes . past ages are a kind of hospitals , where policy anatomizes the carcasses of monarchies and commonwealths which once flourished , thereby the better to cure the ails of the present . they are the sea-charts , wherein by the wrecks , or prosperous navigations of others , shores are discover'd . seas sounded , sands and rocks found , and all the lines of government marked out ; yet , are not all books good counsellors ; for some advance knavery and deceit , which because more practised than truth , many have recourse to . the most secure are those dictated by divine wisdom . here a prince hath for all manner of accidents , a compleat system of politicks , and safe precepts to govern himself and others by . for this reason , the kings of israel were commanded to have always by them , the book of deuteronomy , and to read some part of it every day . 't is god we hear , him we learn of as often as we turn over those divine oracles . the emperor alexander severus , had always near him persons well vers'd in history , to tell him what other emperors had done in dubious matters . with this study of history , your royal highness may securely enter the dangerous sea of government , having the experience of things past for a pilot to steer you in the conduct of those present , both which your highness ought to manage , so as to keep your eyes fixt on futurity , still looking forwards to prevent dangers , at least to render them less injurious . according to these aspects of times , your highness's prudence ought to judge of things to come , not by those of the planets , which being few in number , and having their motions stated and regular , cannot possibly ( though there were some virtue in them ) foretel such variety of events , as fortune produces , or free-will prepares . nor are speculation and experience sufficient , whereupon to ground any certain knowledge of causes so remote . let your highness therefore be pleas'd to cast your eyes on the times past , from ferdi●●●d the catholick , to philip the second , and comparing them with those that have pass'd from thence till now ; consider whether spain be now as well-peopled , as rich and plentiful as then ; whether arts and arms flourish as much ; whether trade and husbandry succeed as well ; and if your highness find it to have fail'd in any of these particulars , dissect the whole body , search into its arteries and parts , the sound and entire as well as the distemper'd ; as also into the causes of those infirmities : consider with your self , whether they do not proceed from some of those so ordinary ones ; from planting colonies , want of propagation , multiplicity of religious orders , too many festivals , universities , and studies , the discovery of the indie● , peace ill manag'd , war slightly undertaken , or negligently carried on , from the cashiering of officers , the rarity of recompences , the oppression of usury , the transportation of money , the disproportion of the coin , or whatever causes of the like nature . if your highness shall discover the fountain from whence the evil proceeds , it will be no difficult matter to provide a remedy against it ; and from a competent knowledge of the past and present times , your highness will be enabled to make an estimate of that to come , for there is no new thing under the sun ; the thing that hath been , it is that which shall be ; and that which is done , is that which shall be done . the persons are chang'd not the scenes , manners and customs are always the same . after the conversation of books , it will be very much for a prince's improvement to have that 〈◊〉 learned men , who are daily conversant with them , and will entertain his ear with well digested discourse and reasonings , the result of long premeditation . this gave occasion to that usual saying of iohn the second , king of portugal , that a kingdom either found a prince prudent , or made him so . that is , the gre●● school of government , wherein ministers of the greatest learning and most eminent experience , wh●ther domestick or foreign , converse with the princ● about affairs . here one is in constant exercise , and has a particular knowledge almost of whatever is transacted in the world. this school being , more especially necessary for a prince , teaches him , if not out 〈◊〉 duty , at least for learning's sake to apply himself 〈◊〉 affairs , and study fully to understand , and go 〈◊〉 the bottom of them , and not leave them to the decision of his councellors . for by an entire neglect an● disuse of business , the mind become savage , an● conceives an aversion for it , as an intolerable weight , and so chuses to leave all to the care and industry of others . and if their opinion upon any subject be afterwards told him , he is in the dark , not being able to discern whether they have determined well or ill ; in which confusion he must necessarily be ashamed of himself , seeing how like a dumb idol he is , to whom adoration is paid , while another renders the oracles . for this reason , the prophet zachary calls that prince an idol , who like a shepherd that leaveth his flock , forgets his duty . he is statue which represents , but does not exert majesty . he has a mouth and speaks not ; eyes and ears , but neither sees nor hears . and being generally look'd upon to be an idol of adoration only , not miracles , is universally despis'd as an unprofitable burthen to the earth . nor will it be easy for him to retrieve his credit ; for affairs out of which he might draw some experience , will glide away like waters that never return ; and not knowing where the web of affairs begins , 't is impossible he should finish it with success . to avoid these and the like inconveniences , it is absolutely requisite for the prince at the beginning of his reign to apply himself to the administration of publick affairs , that by use he may gradually learn the art of government . for though they at first seem terrible and difficult , ambition and the glory which may be expected thence , will afterwards make them pleasant and delightful . let not fear of doing amiss be any obstacle to him , for there 's no prudence so in●●llible but it may sometimes err . from errors proceeds experience , and from thence the best maxims of government . and if at any time he happens to be in one , let this thought comfort him , that 't is sometimes less dangerous to miscarry himself , than succeed by another ; for this the people carp and cavil at , the former they easily bear with . a prince's obligation consists only in being desirous , and using his utmost endeavours to succeed , admitting instruction and counsel without pride and presumption , that mother of error and ignorance . power is born with princes , wisdom not : if they will but hear , they will know how to govern. solomon owning what a child he was to judge god's people , prayed for a docile and understanding heart , thinking that sufficient to make him capable of successfully discharging his duty . a zealous and well-meaning prince , god leads as 't were by the hand , least he should at any time make a false step in the government of his states . emblem xxix . some fishermen , once in the island chios , casting their nets into the sea for fish , drew out a tripos , which was a kind of vessel made for the service of th● altar , or ( as others will have it ) a round three legg'd table , an admirable work , and of an inestimable value , not so much for the matter , though it was of gold , 〈◊〉 because of the artist vulcan . this kindled avarice in them , and all the other fishers of that island , who in vain often threw theirs with the same hopes . how often have the happy successes of one prince deceiv'd himself and others , while they all endeavour to attain ●he same fortune by the same means ? 't is not so easy to follow another's steps , or to go ones own over again , so as to tread always exactly in the same tracks . ● small space of time joyn'd with so great ● variety of accidents effaces the first , and whatsoever impressions are made afresh , are quite different , and consequently lead not to the same end . alexander the great has had many followers and imitators , who although nothing inferior to him in all accomplishments , both of body and mind , yet could never arrive to ●o high a pitch of glory and success , at least have not me● with that applause to be good is in our power , but to appear so to others is not . fortune sports with us even in matters of fame , nor does the same success always correspond to the same action . what befel saguntum , did also happen to estepa , yet of this there scarce remains any memory . this little city , forsooth , deserv'd not so much glory ; for what is scarce taken notice of in small , in great ones is often highly extoll'd . the same thing is usual in virtues ; the same shall create one prince a good , another an ill character ; this is the times and subjects . if the nobility be unruly , the commonalty dissolute and licentious ; the prince that tries to reduce them to reason , will not escape the name of bad . every kingdom would have a prince of its own stamp . whence 't is , that though a prince govern by the same good methods , as have in anothers government been applauded , yet shall he not be so well receiv'd , nor equally commended , excep● the subjects of both alike good . hence t is not without danger , for a prince to b● wholly guided by examples , it being ve●y difficult , i● not absolutely impossible , that in any one case th●● should be an equal concurrence of all those very circumstances which are in another . these second caus●● of the coelestial orbs turn round continually , and form each day new aspects of constellations , by which they produce their effects , and the changes o● things : and as the stars once appearing never retu●● exactly in the same manner again , so neither have th●● the like operations upon things here below , and by the variation of some accidents , the successes too 〈◊〉 varied , in which chance has sometimes more effica● than prudence . others examples in my opinion deceive princes no less than to follow none at all . wherefore what has happened to others deserves con●ideration , to establish a prudent policy ; not that all its maxims should be squared by ●heir rule , and that exposed to the hazard and uncertainty of casualties . others events are to be an instruction not a law . those examples alone can be imitated with any assurance , that result from causes and reasons essentially good , and common to the law of nature , and that of nations , for they are at all times the same . as a●so those of such princes as have preserved themselves in credit and honour by religion , justice , and clemency , and other virtues and moral actions . yet in these cases too careful attention is required , for manners ▪ and the reputation of virtues often change , nor is it new or unusual for a prince to be ruined by the ●ame , that at another time made him flourish . all these things therefore prudence ought to consider , a●d not put too much confidence in its self , but consult the various accidents that every day happen , not looking upon things to come as certain ▪ however disc●eet judgment and diligence seem to have sea●cht and provided ●gainst them . for events are not always correspondent to their means , nor do they at a●l times depend upon the ordinary connexion of causes , where humane counsels usually take effect , but on that supe●ior cause which directs all other . this makes our thoughts and suppositions so uncertain , and the hopes ●ounded thereon so subject to disappointment . no one was in all mens opinion farther from the empire , than claudius , yet heaven had then design him for tiberius's successor . this is more common in the e●ection of popes , wherein humane industry is very often baffled . divine providence does not always use natural means , at least sometimes produces by the same different effects , drawing streight lines by a crooked rule , so what should have been advantageous , proves frequently prejudicial to the prince . the same pillar of fire in the wilderness gave light to god's people , and filled the enemies camp with darkness . the greatest humane prudence is oftentimes at a loss ; whe●e a man expected secu●●ty , he sometimes finds ruin , as it happened to viriatus , who was betrayed and killed by those very ambassadors he had sent to the consul , servilius . a misfortune we have once sustained , we don't easily believe we shall suffer again ; but on the contrary , presently persuade our selves prosperity will continue , o● at least return . this confidence has been destructive to many in that it disarms prudence . this world is a vast sea of events , tossed by various and unknown causes . let us not be too much elated , if by chance we bring our nets to shore full with the success of our wishes ; nor on the other side , dejected if they prove empty ; we ought always to cast them , and expect the consequence with the same equality of mind . 't is impossible for that man to enjoy any rest , who promising himself a prosperous issue of his design , sees a contrary event , and is destitute of a remedy for it ▪ misfortunes cannot surprize one that expects the worst , nor will disappointed hopes expose him to ridicule , as they did the persians in the war against the athenians , who had a great while before furnished themselves with marble from paros to inscribe the victory on , which their hopes had long ago anticipated ; but being afterwards overcome , the athenians made use of that very marble to erect to revenge a statue , an everlasting monument of the persian folly. to presume to know things to come , is in a manner a rebellion against god , and a foolish contention with divine wisdom , which has indeed permitted human prudence to guess at , but not foretel things of this nature , that in this uncertainty of accidents it may acknowledge it self more subject to , and dependent on its creator . this makes policy so cautious and provident in its resolutions , well knowing how short sighted the grea●est humane wisdom is in futurity , and how ●ncertain those judgments are , which are grounded upon presumption . if princes could foreseeu future contingences , their councils would not so often miscarry . and this i take to be the reason , that as soon as saul was elected king , god infused into him the spirit of prophecy . from what hath been said , may be gathered , that although antiquity be venerable , and there be really something royal in the ways she hath opened to posterity , for experience to pass more securely ; yet 't is visible many are ruined by time , so that they grow , impassable ; and consequently the prince ought not to be so diffident of himself , so religiously to tread his ancestors steps , as not upon occasion to venture to go another way of his own . innovations are not always dangerous ; it is sometimes convenient to introduce them . were there no alterations , the world would never be perfected , which advances in wisdom as it does in age. the most ancient customs were new . and what we now see without example , will be hereafter a precedent . what we now follow by experience , was begun without it . our age also may leave many glorious inventions for posterity to imitate ; nor is every thing the ancients have done the best , no more than all the moderns do now , will be approved by after-ages . many abuses have descended to us from our ancestors , and many severe savage customs of the ancients time has mitigated and changed for the better . emblem xxx . ingenious rome , that virtue and valour might not want trophies to honour and recompence conquerors , excite emulation in posterity , and give example to her other citizens , invented the columnae rostratae , pillars whereon were hung the heads of such ships , as returned victorious after long voyages , thus eternizing the memory of sea-fights ; one of which monuments was raised to the consul duillius , for the signal victory he obtained over the carthaginians ; as also to marcus aemilius for another . this trophy gave occasion to the present emblem , wherein the strength and firmness of the pillar represents wisdom , and the heads of the ships that had run through so many perils upon the ocean , experience , the mother of prudence and support of that wisdom . this has things universal and perpetual for its object , that particula● actions . the one is acquired by speculation and study ; the other ( which is an habit of the mind ) by the knowledge of good and evil , and by use and exercise ; both jointly make a perfect prince , one alone is not sufficient . whence it easily appears how dangerous the government of those is , who are addicted only to the contemplation of sciences , and a solitary life , for such want generally use and practice , and so can profit little by their actions , they being either rash , or mean and abject ; especially if they be trans●orted with excess of fear or zeal . their discourses , indeed , and writings ( wherein more of a speculative than practical genius reigns ) may be serviceable to the prince to awaken his mind , and furnish him with matter for conversation , provided they be seasonably used , and with experience . physick prescribes remedies for diseases , which however the physician never applies without first examining the qualities of the distemper , the nature and constitution of his patient . had hannibal by this consideration moderated his barbarous arrogance , he had not took phor●io for a fool , for teaching the art of war , when himself was no soldier ; for although speculation alone does by no means acquire practice , it being extreamly difficult for the hand to copy accurately all that the mind has drawn , or for whatever the imagination has proposed to be accomplished to the eyes satisfaction ; especially when war depends upon such a variety of accidents that experience her self sometimes know● not what is to be done . yet , for all this , phormio might have given hannibal ( as great and experienced a general as he was ) such precepts as would have taught him to correct his treacherous and subtle nature , to leave off his cruelty to conquered nations , and proud carriage to such as had recourse to him for protection . he undoubtedly had learnt to make a better use of the victory at cannae , to shun the debaucheries of capua , and gain the favour of antioc●us . king ferdinand the catholick , used on some occasions the ministery of the religious ; but whether to manage or only prepare affairs , i can't say ; or if it was not , perhaps to spare the expence of ambassies , or prevent the inconveniences usually arising from disputes between the nobility about precedency . however secrets are not securely intrusted to them , they depending more upon the obedience of their immediate superiors , than that of princes ; and if they accidentally die , into their hands will fall all private letters and papers . besides , for neglect of duty they are not punishable , and their example is a disturbance to religious tranquility , and the practices of policy infect their candor and simplicity . they are better physicians for spiritual than temporal distempers . every sphere has its peculiar activity . i don 't in the mean time deny that sometimes there are to be found among them , persons who have had their education in courts , without that narrowness of soul which usually accompanies a monastick and retired life , wits so cultivated by learning and observation , that affairs even of the greatest consequence may be safely committed to them , especially such as respect the publick quiet , and the good of christendom ; for modesty in conversation , well ordered virtues , the gravity of , and deference paid to a religious habit , are no small recommendations in prince's courts to gain audience , and prepare minds to receive impressions . experiences drawn from others misfortunes and dangers , are indeed happy , but not so effectually persuasive as our own ; the former we see or hear only ; these we sensibly feel too . they are too deeply engraved , as i may say , on our breasts to be soon effaced . shipwrecks descried from shoar , are something more affecting than anothers relation of them ; but he who has had the fortune to escape them , hangs up his rudder in the temple of experience for ● perpetual memorial of it . so that though a prince will improve by both , yet his own private ones he ought most to regard , particularly observing this , that if they proceed from any fault , self-love is too apt to excuse them ; and that truth late or never comes to his ears to undeceive him , being either stopped in the palace-gates by malice , or concealed by flattery , which makes virtue not dare to unmask it for fear of bringing it self into danger , because it belongs not to it , or at least it sees all would be to no purpose . and thus princes ignorant of what neglect they have been guilty , how and where they have done amiss in their councils or actions , cannot correct their errors , nor by their experience prove more cautious and prudent for the future . there ought to be no fault committed , no miscarriage happen in the state , whereof there should not be present faithful and sincere information given the prince . there 's no sensation or pain in any part of the body , but immediately is carried to the heart , as the prince of life , where the soul has its chief residence , and as that whose principal interest it is to preserve the other members intire . how happy were it , if kings well knew what evils their kingdoms laboured under , we should not see them so inveterate . whereas the only thing now aimed at in courts , is to divert the prince's ears with musick , and such like entertainments , that he may not hear his subjects complaints , nor say with saul , what ail●th the people that they weep ? and so he is ignorant of their necessities and calamities , at least knows them too late . though the adventure of i●nas , whom a great fish had vomited up alive , was very fresh ; though his publick cries made a noise over the whole city of nineveh , whose destruction he threatned within forty days : yet was the king the last that heard of it , every citizen , from the greatest to the least , having already mourned , and put on sackcloath . who is there has the courage to tell a prince the whole truth , or discover the evils that menace him ? the whole army of bethulia came to holofernes's tent with great c●ies , because the sun was already risen , yet did not the office●s of the bed-chamber dare to awake him , nor call him by his name , but made only ● noise with their feet ; till when the evidence of the danger obliged them to enter , the enemy had already cut off his head and hung it upon their walls . thus it generally happens , the prince first discovers faults , when there 's either no remedy for them , or at least it cannot be applied without great difficulty . his ministers perswade him all things succeed well , which makes him negligently lose all experience , and the instructions of necessity , the best mistress of prudence . for although prosperity proceed from prudence , this does not from prosperity . the principal office of prudence in princes , or others concerned with them , is to teach them to know expe●imentally all mens humours , which are discernible from the dress , the looks , the motions of the eyes and actions , and lastly from the speech . marks which god almighty thought so necessary to human commerce , that he has wrote them visibly upon every one's forehead . without them neither the prince would know how to govern , nor men of affairs obtain their ends. mens minds are as various as their faces ; and although reason be in its self one and the same , the ways reasoning take● in the research of it , are widely different ; and the delusions of the imagination usually are so great , that some men appear as irrational as the very brutes . wherefore all are not to be treated with in the same method , but this must be varied , suitably to the person 's nature , as they change the bit according to the horse's mouth . some tempers are generous and exalted , with these reputation and honour are most prevaising : others mean and abject , which are wholly lead by private interest and advantage . some are bold and enterprizing , these are to be gently turned from the precipice : others slothful and timorous , which should be so lead by business , that they may see the vanity of danger . some are naturally servile , these threats and fear of punishment has more influence on than intreaties : others arr●gant , and are tamed by authority , being by compliance ruined . one is full of fire , and so quick at business , that with the same expedition he dispatches it , he immediately repents ; this man 't is hard giving counsel to : another is slow and irresolute , whom time must teach at his own cost . some are ignorant and stupid , these are not to be convinced by subtle and refined arguments , but palpable demonstrations . others sceptically dispute every thing , and are guilty of an excess of subtilty , these must be abandoned to themselves , to fly as hawks till they be ●ired , then called to the lure of reason , and the bus●ness in hand . some refuse all mens counsel , are wholly guided by their own ; to these you are not to give any , but so point as it were to them , and give such hints in a large discourse upon the matter , that they may of themselves light on them , which will make them approved as their own off-spring , and ac●ordingly executed ; others know neither how to act nor resolve without counsel , with such as these all the persuasion in the world is to no purpose , so the business which should have passed through their hands may be better transacted with their counsellors . the same variety which is visible in dispositions , is found also in affairs ; some are easy at first , but afterwards increase as rivers by the affluence of rivule●s , as it were of divers inconveniencies and difficulties , these are overcome by expedition in not giving time to their increase . others on the contrary , like the winds rise in storms , but end calmly , which require pa●ience and constancy . the enterprize of some is full of uncertainty and danger , in that when one least thinks the depth of difficulties appears , here one must proceed with caution and courage , with care , and a mind provided to encounter any accident . some require secrecy , these are to be carried on by mines , that the happy success may break out before one can perceive it : others can't be obtained but at certain times , in these you ought to have all the means ready immediately to hoist sail upon the first favourable blast of wind. some take root gradually ; and demand time to come to maturity ; here the seed of diligence is to be sowed and the fruit waited for : others except they succeed presently never do at all , which must be taken by assault , by employing all methods at once . some are so delicate and brittle , that like glasses they are with a blast formed and broken , these are to be tenderly handled : the difficulty of others is inhanced by being too much desired and pursued , here the arts of lovers are useful , whose passions are inflamed by slight and disdain . in a word the management of a few affairs demands precipitation ; in more force prevails ; in many patience , and in almost all reason and interest . importunity has spoil'd abundance of affairs , but it has also furthered many , as st. ierome said of the woman of canaan . men are no less weary of refusing than granting . opportunity is the thing contributes most to the good management of affairs ; he who knows how to use this shall scarce ever miscarry . the husbandman that is well acquainted with the nature of his soil , and knows the proper seed-time , may expect a plentiful harvest . there 's a time when all things are granted , another wherein all are denied , according as the mind shall be disposed , in which you may easily see the increase and decrease of business , for being lopped like tre●s in a proper month , they sprout out the more . some address in proposing and persuading by honesty , profit , and ease ; prudence in the choice of means , and some other natural endowments infinitely conduce to the succefs of affairs , provided those gifts of nature be accompanied with a discreet kind of complaisance and natural grace that captivates the mind ; for some mens looks and behaviour are so disagreeable and ungenteel , that they even shew one how to refuse their petitions ; but although these means ●oyned with good judgment and industry have a strange effect on business ; yet too much confidence ought not to be put in them , not yet should they be despaired of . light affairs sometimes breed great difficulties ; and on the other side , the lightest causes often obstruct the most weighty . the greatest prudence is sometimes blind in a matter as clear as the sun ; divine providence that has already long ago determined in his eternal decree , what shall become of every thing , being thus pleased to sport with humane affairs . from this variety of capacities and affairs ; appears of how much concern it is to the prince , to make choice of ministers fit to manage them , each man being no more capable of all manner of business , than every instrument useful for all works . persons of a violent temper , the cowardly and dif●ident , the rough and unpleasant in conversatio● , who can never serve the times , nor adapt themselves to others natures and customs , rather spoil affairs than compose them ; are readier at making , than reconciling enemies , fitter to be informers than mediators . affairs require persons of very different qualities to administer them . that man is above all the most proper , who in his air and words discovers a soul of candor and veracity , whose private person procures him love and esteem ; in whom jealousy and cunning are from art not nature , who can keep them in the most secret place of his breast when they require concealment ; who proposes with sweetness , hears with patience , replies with force , dissembles with discretion , urges with attention ; who obliges by liberality , persuades by reason , and convinces by experience ; who in a word designs prudently , and executes effectually . it was with these ministers , king ferdinand the catholick was able to succeed in all his enterprizes . the good choice of these is of no le●s consequence , than the conservation and enlargement of any state , for as much as all depends upon their administration ; more kingdoms having been destroyed by their ignorance than by that of princes . let this therefore be your highness's chiefest care to examine diligently all the qualities of your subjects , and after having given them any place , look now and then into their actions , and not be presently taken with , and deluded by the draught of their memoirs . there being very few ministers , who in them draw themselves to the life ? in effect , who will be so candid , so much a stranger to self-love , as to confess what good he has neglected to do , what evil to prevent ? it will be much if he with sincerity relate what he has actually done ; some using to write to the prince not what they have done or said , but what they ought to do or say . they have thought of , and designed every thing ●●fore-hand : they foresaw , nay , and executed all-affairs enter their closets like mishapen logs , but immediately come out again , as from some statuaries shop , exquisite figures ; 't is there they are varnished , gi●●ed , and painted , to beautify them , and enhance their value . there judgments are form'd , and abundance of preventions devis'd ever after the success ; there they are more powerful than god himself ; make the past time present , and the present past , by changing the date of their actions , as they see convenient . they are ministers who transact affairs in imagination only ; men that court applause , and steal rewards by their false letters : whence proceed the greatest inconveniences in the world , in that the prince's privy counsellors being directed by those intelligences and advices , if they are false , the orders and resolutions founded upon them will necessarily be so too . the holy scripture teaches us how ministers , and particularly ambassadors are oblig'd punctually to execute their commissions ; for we see in that hazael had from benhadad , king of syria to consult the prophet elisha about his disease , he chang'd not one word , nor dared so much as to speak in the third person . ministers of extraordinary experience are sometimes dangerous , either for that the prince puts too much confidence in them , or because biassed by self-love , or presuming upon their own abilities , they seldom think thoroughly of affairs , and born as 't were to overcome the most violent tempests , despise the small storms of inconveniences and difficulties , whereby they evidently expose themselves to danger . those are in some cases much safer , who 〈◊〉 yet novices in navigation keep close to the shore . though both together compose the best counsels ; in that the experience of those is qualified by the timorousness and caution of these ; in debates between the flegmatick and cholerick , the bold and circumspect , the quick and slow , there results a wholsome composition of opinions , as there does in bodies from the contrariety of humours . emblem xxxi . a pillar supports it self , balanced by its own weight . if it once leans on either side , it presently falls , and that the sooner the heavier it is . thus empires stand , and are preserv'd by their own authority and repute ; when they begin to lose that , they begin to fall ; nor is any earthly power sufficient to strengthen and prop them . let no one trust too much to a streight pillar , when it inclines never so little , the weakest hand promotes its ruin ; that very leaning i know not how inviting to push it ; but when falling , the strongest is unable to uphold it . one single action sometimes overthrows the best establish'd reputation which a great many can't erect again . for scarce any stain can so thoroughly be washed out , but some sign of it will remain , nor any opinion in mens minds that can be entirely effaced . dress the infamy as carefully as possible , it will still leave some scars . wherefore , if the crown stand not fixed and firm upon this perpendicular pillar of reputation , it will soon fall to the ground . alphonso the fifth , king of arragon , by his credit not only preserved his own kingdom , but conquered that of naples . at the same time iohn the second , king of castile , for his mean spirit was so far the contempt of his subjects , that he admitted what laws they thought fit to impose . the provinces which under iulius caesar and augustus , princes of great esteem , were firm and loyal , rebell'd in the reign of galba , a man slothful , and universally despised . royal blood and large dominions are insufficient to maintain reputation , where private virtue and magnanimity are wanting ; as it is not the frame of a glass , but its intrinsick excellency makes it valuable , regal majesty has not more force than respect , which usually arises from admiration and fear , and from these obedience and subjection , without which the princes dignity cannot long maintain it self , being founded upon the opinion of others ; and the royal purple will be rather a mark of derision , than eminence and majesty , as was visible in henry the fourth . it is the spirits and native heat that keep the body upright ; the legs alone would not be a sufficient basis. and what is reputation , but a kind of fine spirit kindled in all mens opinions , which raises and supports the scepter . let the prince therefore take all possible care that his actions may be such as will nourish and foment these spirits . the parthians grounded their petition upon reputation , when they asked tiberius to send as of his own accord , one of phraates's sons to rome . this repute and authority has yet greater influence in war , where fear is of more efficacy than the sword , and opinion than strength , whether of mind or body , and therefore to be taken no less notice of than force of arms. this made suetonius paulinus very prudently advise otho to endeavour always to keep the roman senate on his side , whose authority could never be wholly darkned , though it might be sometimes eclipsed . this also made many countries submit to it , and seek its protection , in the differences that were between those great generals , caesar and pompey , each his principal aim was to conquer rather the reputation than arms of his rival ; well knowing that minds and forces follow more the noise of fame , than that of the drum. king philip the second was eminently skilful in this art of preserving reputation ; having by it from his cabinet so managed the reigns of both worlds , that he always had them at command . nay , even when the ruin of states is apparent , 't is better 〈◊〉 suffer them , than ones credit to be destroy'd , for without this 't is impossible to re-establish them . for which reason , though the republick of venice saw it self lost in that violent storm of the league of cambray , yet that most prudent and valiant senate thought it better to shew their constancy on that occasion , than to betray any cowardice by using dishonourable means . desire of dominion makes princes mean. for want of this consideration , otho with stretch'd out hands seem'd to adore the people , he embraced every one , and shewed all the servileness imaginable to gain them to his party , and so procur'd the empire by those means which declared him unworthy of it . even in indigence and necessity it is not fit to use means violent and inglorious , or seek the assistance of foreigners ; for both are dangerous , and neither seek to relieve want ; nay , reputation is the better remedy for it . one man is as rich in opinion , as another in the abundance of hid treasures . the old romans were undoubtedly perswaded so , when in several occasions of adversity , the provinces offering them money and corn , they return'd thanks , but would not accept them . two legions having been cast away at sea , to recruit the loss , gaul , spain , and italy , sent money , horses , and arms ; germanicus commended their affection , and accepted only of the horses and arms , but not the money . in two other presents made the roman senate , of golden cups of great value , in time of extraordinary necessity , the first time thanks were given the ambassadors for their care and magnificence , and the cup of least value accepted . the other , thanks were return'd , but the presents rejected . the authority and reputation of a prince proceeds from several causes ; some of which respect his person , others his state. the former sort are either of body or mind : of the body , as if it be of a suitable frame , and a disposition capable of maintaīning majesty ; though the natural defects of body are often supplied by virtues of mind . charles emanuel , duke of savoy , had no small imperfections of body ; yet his great and generous soul , his lively wit , his complaisance , and other courtly accomplishments made him admired by all . a grave and austere carriage make him pass for a prince , who without that would be but very contemptible ; yet this air ought to be temper'd with courtesy and good humour , that authority may be supported without incurring hatred , or the character of arrogant ; a thing tacitus commends in germanicus . the riches and splendor of apparel is another thing , procures admiration and authority : for the vulgar are taken with these outsides , and mankind admits the eyes no less than the understanding into its counsel . whence alphonso the wise , very well said , that cloaths contribute much to make m●n known for either noble or base ; and the ancient sages oblig'd their princes to cloths of gold , and silk , and beset with iewels , that they might be known at sight without inquiry . when king ahasuerus gave audience , he wore royal apparel , and shone in gold and precious stones . it was on this account god commanded moses to make holy garments for aaron , his brother , for glory and for beauty . and he accordingly made them of purple , embroidered with gold , and adorned with other things of great value , which his successors wore after him ; and at this day the popes do , though with greater prudence , and less expence . and indeed , if his holiness be an arm of god upon the earth ; if the voice of his censures be like that of the almighty's thunder , 't is but just ( whatever impiety cavils ) that as god covers himself with light , the garment of heaven , so she should be deck●d with earthly pomp , and carried upon mens shoulders . the same has place in princes , who are god's vicegerents in temporals . large and sumptuous palaces magnificently furnish'd , a noble and eminent family , guards of nations of approved fidelity , the splendor and grandeur of a court , and other publick ostentations do also set out a prince's power to the best advantage , and give an additional majesty . illustrious titles of states conquered or hereditary , which are attributed to him , are also manifestations of his eminency . thus , isaiah , by divers names and titles declares the majesty of the supream creator , and prince of all things . by these therefore your highness is to study to enhance the lustre of your royal person , provided however they be not ascrib'd out of levity or flattery , but from an universal applause founded upon virtue and true valour , such as were those of your highness's ancestors , ferdinand the holy , alphonso the great , sancho the brave , iames the warlike , alphonso the noble , and many others . the excellency of virtues , and in general all natural perfections requisite in a good governor , procure a prince esteem and authority . one alone that shall shine in him , whether it respect peace or war ; abundantly supplies the defect of all others , as if he apply himself to business , though not with absolute sufficiency ; for to leave all to the care of ministers infinitely diminishes the force of majesty . this was sallust's counsel to livia . any one resolution the prince shall have taken very opportunely without anothers advice : one resentment , and to have once shewn the extent of his power , though upon the slightest occasion , make him fear'd and respected ; as does constancy of mind in both fortunes , for the people look upon it as supernatural , not to be puff'd up by prosperity , or by adversity dejected ; they believe there is something more than humane in such a prince . equality in actions is another thing that greatly advances a prince's character , it being a sign of a serene and prudent judgment , if he dispence his favours , or revenge injuries out of season , he will indeed be fear'd , but not esteem'd ; as vitellius experienc'd . farther to maintain reputation , prudence not to attempt what cannot be obtain'd , very much contributes . for so his power will seem infinite , if the prince engage in no war wherein he cannot conquer , or demand nothing of his subjects but what is just and feasible , not giving the least ground for disobedience . to enterprize , and not accomplish , is in a prince inglorious ; in subjects rash . princes are valued at the same rate they set upon themselves . for altho' honour consists in the esteem of others ; yet this is generally form'd out of a preconceiv'd opinion of every one , which ( at least if prudent ) is greater or less , according as the mind gathers strength from the valour it finds in it self , or loses it , if without merit . the greatest souls are most aspiring ; the cowardly dare attempt nothing , judging themselves unworthy the least honour . nor is this always a virtuous humility and modesty in this sort of men , but a baseness of mind , which renders them deservedly contemptible to every one , while they pretend they aim at nothing higher , because they are sensible of their want of merit . blaesus almost seem'd unworthy the empire , merely for refusing the offer of it . unhappy is that state , whose head thinks himself undeserving the title of prince , or who presumes he merits more ; the first is meanness of spirit ; this latter is accounted tyranny . in these endowments of the mind , chance also has place ; for a prince happens often , even with them to be despised , when prudence is unhappy , or events answer not designs . some governments , good in themselves , are notwithstanding so unfortunate , that nothing succeeds under them ; which is not always the fault of humane providence , but the divine so ordains , when the particular ends of this inferior government , agree not with those that superior and universal one proposes . this i add withal , that all these good qualities of mind and body , are not sufficient to maintain the prince's reputation , if his family be dissolute ; it is on that depends all his authority , nor is any thing more difficult , than a regular management of a family . it usually seems easier to govern a whole country than one house ; either because a prince intent on greater things is negligent of this , or self-love is an obstacle , or for want of courage , or out of a natural slothfulness , or at least , because his attendants so blind his eyes , that his judgment can't apply remedies . it was none of the least commendations of agricola , that he had curb'd his own family , never suffering his domesticks to intermeddle with publick affairs . galba was a good emperor , but an ill master of his palace , no less vices reigning there than in that of nero . tiberius , among other things , was commended for having modest servants . no government can be well instituted , where courtiers command , and rob , or prostitute its authority by their p●ide and vices . if they are good , they make the prince the same ; if wicked , he though really otherwise , will appear so too . from them the prince's actions have their value , on them depends his good or ill character ; in as much as others virtues and vices are wont to be imputed to him . if his domesticks are prudent , they conceal his faults ; nay , as much as possible vindicate every action of his , and by extolling , render them more illustrious ; they relate them with a grace that challenges admiration . whatever comes from the prince into publick , is great in the peoples eyes . princes in their palaces are like other men , but respect makes them imagined greater , and their retirement from common conversation covers their sloth and weakness : whereas , if their servants are guilty of imprudence or infidelity , the people by them , as through chinks discover it , and quit that veneration they before had for them . the prince's reputation redounds from that of the state , if this be provided with good laws and magistrates ; if justice be observ'd , and one religion maintain'd therein ; if it pay due respect and obedience to majesty ; if care be taken of corn and plenty , if arts and arms flourish , and one may in all things see a constant order and harmony proceeding from the prince's hands ; and lastly , if the states happiness depends upon the prince himself : for if that can be injoy'd without this , they will soon despise him . the labourers in egypt regard not the skies , for the nile by its inundations watering and making their land fertile , they have no need of clouds . emblem xxxii . the oyster conceives by the dew of heaven , and in its purest womb , the pearl , that most beautiful embryo is born . no one would imagine its exquisite delicacy , to see so course and unpolish'd an outside . it is thus , the senses are usually deceiv'd in their censure of exterior actions , when they judge only by the outward appearance of things , without searching the inside . truth depends not upon opinion : let the prince despise that , if he be sensible he act agreeable to reason . he will never dare enterprize any thing difficult or extraordinary , if fear prompts him to consult the sentiments of the mob . in himself he should look for himself , not in others . the art of government suffers not it self to be disturb'd by those thin shadows of reputation . the king has the greatest , who knows perfectly how to manage affairs both of peace and war. the honour of subjects the least thing blemishes , whereas that of kings is inseparable from ●e publick good ; this continuing , that increases , ●●ling , it perishes . besides , government would be too d●ngerous , had it no better foundation than the laws of reputation , instituted by the giddy rabble . contempt of such is courage and steddiness in a prince , whose sovereign law is the peoples safety . tiberius hereto●ore gloried in having shewn himself fearless of affronts and scandal for the publick benefit . a great and lively soul is nothing affraid of the uncertain ru●ours of the multitude and common fame . he who ●●spises this imaginary , will thereby obtain real and ●●lid glory . this fabius maximus well knew , when ●e preferr'd the publick safety before the clamours and complaints of the people , accusing his delays ; 〈◊〉 did also the great captain in the captivity of duke valentin , who , though he had surrendered , and intrust●d himself to his safe conduct ; yet for some fresh 〈◊〉 he was inform'd he had laid against his catholick majesty , kept him prisoner , thinking the dangers his liberty might cause more to be respected , than the aspersions were thrown upon him for the breach of 〈◊〉 parole ; from which , at that time , it seem'd by no means proper for him publickly to clear himself . king s●●cho the brave , was a prince renown'd and warlike ; 〈◊〉 deaf to the calumnies of his subjects , he declin'd the battel of xeres † . 't is better for a prince to be ●●red by his enemies as prudent , than as rash and precipitous . my design by this discourse is not to make the prince a very slave to the commonwealth , so that for ●●y reason , or upon the least appearance of its inte●●st , he should break his word , or run counter to all treaties and agreements : for such a violation can neither be of any advantage to him , nor his state , but will be rather the ruin of both ; what is dishonest being never long secure : a remarkable instance of which we have in the kingdom of arragon , which has been so often embroiled , toss'd with so many storms of calamities and eminent miseries , because peter the fourth , as well in times of peace as war , had more regard to interest , than credit and renown . interest and honour should walk hand in hand , and the same pace ; nor c●● i be reconciled to this opinion , that nothing is glorio●s but what is safe , and that whatever is done to maintain dominion is honourable . for what is base , can never be a good means to preserve it ; nor if it were , will it be therefore the more honourable or excusable . my design is only to raise the prince's mind above the vulgar opinion , and arm him with constancy to withstand the vain murmurs of the multitude ; that he may know how to temporize , to dissemble injuries , to lay aside kingly gravity , to despise empty fame , having his eyes fix'd upon that which is true and well-grounded . in a word , to take counsel from the time and necessity , if the conservation of his state require it , and not suffer himself to be deluded with vain shadows of honour , esteeming that more than the publick good. a fault blam'd in king henry the fourth , who refus'd to take their advice , who perswaded him to apprehend iohn pachico , marquiss of villena , the author of the troubles and commotions among the grandees of the kingdom : saying he had made him a promise of a safe passage to madrid , which he ought not to violate . a frivolous excuse , to prefer an idle proof of faith and clemency to his own life , and the publick safety , especially towards one , who would abuse this his favour to plot against his royal person , which was the source of great calamities to the king , and his whole kingdom . tiberius was not at all moved , that some blamed him for making so long a stay at the 〈◊〉 of caprea , and neither went to aid the gauls , of whom a great part were already lost ; nor to appease the legions in germany . prudent constancy hears , but does not much regard the sentiments of the ignorant multitude ; knowing if things succeed well , murmur will afterwards turn to greater glory , and sensibly va●ish of it self . the army distrusted saul's election , and in derision said , how shall this man save us ? saul however took no notice of those words , but made as if he did not hear them , ( nor indeed should princes hear every thing ) and the soldiers , condemning afterwards their crime , recanted , nay , and made diligent search for the author of that abuse to put him to death . it had not been prudent in saul to expose 〈◊〉 election , by discovering his knowledge of the peo●●es dissatisfaction . what levity were it in a tra●eller to be stopp'd by the importunate noise of every grasshopper ? to be guided in ones resolutions by the ●●●ting mob were folly ; to fear them , and re●oke what has been once resolved , base and infamous . scarce any council would be secure , did it depend ●pon the multitude , who are incapable of penetrating ●ll the motives upon which the prince acts , nor is it 〈◊〉 to make them publick ; for that were to give them the authority of the scepter . all the peoples power 〈◊〉 included in the person of the prince . it is his part to act , theirs to obey , with a firm perswasion of the equity and reasonableness of his commands . if every 〈◊〉 bad liberty to ask reasons of what is injoyned , there ●●uld be an end of obedience and empire . 't is as necessary for a subject to be ignorant of these things , 〈◊〉 to know others . the sovereign iurisdiction of things god has given to princes , to subjects is left the glory of obedience . the only thing required of a prince , is to acquit himself of his duty in his resolutions and decrees ; if the success prove not answerable to his desire , he ought not to be discouraged ; for it is sufficient that he has done nothing imprudently ; the very best counsel is weak and liable to abundance of accidents . the greater a monarchy is , the more exposed it is to the unhappy casualties , which chance brings with it , or humane understanding is unable to foresee and prevent . gross bodies usually labour under great distempers . did not the prince prosecute affairs notwithstanding all obloquy and detraction , with courage and constancy , he would lead but an unhappy life . if he at any time chance to err , courage is necessary , least he be dash'd , and become for the future slow and irresolute . that prince , who upon no grounds suspects all he does will be disapproved of , contracts too much the limits of his power , and subjects himself to a thousand terrors of imagination , which generally arise from some private superstitious perswasion , or excess of melancholy . these inconveniences david seems to have acknowledged , when he prayed god to take away the reproach which he fear'd . let the prince therefore arm himself with constancy to resist any events , and the opinions of the vulgar , and shew his valour in the defence of the true and real reputation of his person and arms , seeing the lo●s or stain of this brings the whole empire into danger . king ferdinand the catholick , very well understood this , when he advised his father , iohn the second , king of arragon , to adapt himself to the times and necessity , and endeavour to secure his crown by gaining the hearts of the marquiss of villena , and alphonso carillo , archbishop of toledo † . he did indeed all honourable means to effect it ; but could never be oblig'd basely to bend his regal authority to the fury and violence of his subjects , thinking there to be more danger in this , than advantage in gaining their affe●●ions . time is the best master of these arts , and such ●one may come as will make even mean actions heroick , and impute even base and servile submission to fortitude . 't is an honourable and lawful end enobles them . tacitus accuses vitellius for , being nero's ass●ciate in his debaucheries without any necessity , which had made it very excusable , but out of meer luxury and lasciviousness . to submit to necessity , requires no less resolution than to overcome it ; and what is sometimes thought baseness , is a desire of honour , as when to prevent the loss of this , or at least to preserve it , injuries are put up for a time . he that immediately runs to revenge , suffers himself to be led more by passion than honour . anger , 't is true , has satisfaction , but the ignominy becomes more notorious and publick . how oft has bloodshed been a kind of rubrick inscribed with injuries ? how often have we seen in the offenders gashed face , the offended person 's infamy written in scars , as in so many letters ? honour has been more frequently lost by revenge than dissimulation ; this brings oblivion , that remembrance ; and we more value a person that has prudently taken an affront , than one who has rashly reveng'd one . he , who makes a true and prudent estimate of the price of his honour , weighs it against revenge , which the former with the addition of a grain of publick esteem , out-weighs by much . although it is my advice , that the prince value not popular discourse ; this , however , i would have limited to the cases mentioned , that is , when it is compensated by the publick good , or obstructs the execution of any great designs , which the people don●t comprehend , at least not well understand : for the success and honour of the thing recovers afterwards the lost reputation with interest . it will in the mean time be prudence in the prince at all times , as much as possible , to conform his actions to the inclinations of the people ; their approbation working almost the same effect with real glory ; they both consist in men's imagination , and the popular voice , though false , sometimes gains so much credit , that neither time , nor any contrary action can ever after efface it . emblem xxxiii . what an entire glass represents , the same when broken , each part of it exhibits . thus the lion views himself in both pieces of that of the present emblem , that symbol of fortitude and generous constancy , which a prince in all accidents ought to maintain : in as much as he is a publick mirror , wherein the whole world views it self , as king alphonso the wise has well observed , speaking of kings actions , and how they ought to be regulated . whether therefore success preserve , or misfortunes break him , he should ever appear with one countenance ; which indeed in prosperity is of some difficulty , considering how apt the passions are to break forth of themselves , and that reason vanishes with glory . however , a truly noble mind suffers not it self to be transported , even , by the highest happiness , as one might see in vespasian , who though he was by the unanimous consent of all saluted emperor , was yet neither proud nor arrogant , nor could the alteration of affairs work any in him . that man , who with his fortune changes his mind , confesses he did not deserve it . this modest assurance was eminent too in piso , who when adopted by galba , look'd so serene and unconcern'd , as if it had been in his power to be emperor , and not depending upon the will of another . valour also is wont to be endanger'd by adverse accidents , in that they generally find men unprepared , there being scarce one who seriously thinks of all the calamities incident to him . which makes them surprise many unawares , and is the reason the mind is then in so much confusion , which proceeds either from excessive dotage on those happinesses it falls short of , or from fear of loss of life ; the desire of prolonging which is ingrafted in every man's nature . let others harbour those passions , yet in a prince's breast they ought never to be entertain'd ; whose duty 't is to govern equally in both fortunes , and to keep always a pleasant composed countenance and undaunted speech . thus otho appear'd to his friends , even after the loss of his empire , endeavouring to stop their unreasonable tears . in that bloody fight at navas of toulo●●● , king alphonso the ninth , continued in the heat of the engagement with the same calmness of mind and looks . no accident was ever able to disclose the passion of king ferdinand the catholick . being once struck by a mad fellow of barcelona , he seem'd to be nothing disordered , only gave command he should be seized . the emperor , charles the fifth , at the siege of ingolstadt , changed neither his looks nor station , though the continual fire of the enemies guns had tore his tent in pieces , and cut off some by his side . with no less constancy the king of hungary , ( now the most august emperor ) and his highness , ferdinand the infant , ( both glorious rivals of charles's courage and atchievements ) stood undaunted at the battel of norlinguen , not the least terrified by the death of a colonel , who was kill'd by a cannon-shot very near them . nor should i omit here the example of maximilli●● duke of bavaria , and elector of the empire ; the same , who was famous for the numerous victories he obtain'd at the head of the catholick league . he was not puff'd up with them , nor suffer'd afterwards his great soul to be broken by the contrary success , though he saw his states ruined , and the king of sweden , and frederick , count palatine , in his palace of monaca , ( a fabrick worthy so great a prince ) and tho' he found the duke of frizeland as much his enemy as the other two . let envy , and the fickleness of times , divide and dash into never so many pieces , the glass of tates , yet in every of them , however small , majesty will remain entire . whoever is born to a scepter , ought not to be chang'd at any event or accident whatever , nor think any so grievous and insupportable ▪ as for it to ab●●don himself , and dissemble the person he bears . king peter , even , when he fell into the hands of his brother , and deadly enemy , conceal'd not who he was , may , when it was question'd , if it were he or not , he cried out aloud , it is i , it is i. this very constancy in preserving a grandeur and majesty in misfortunes , 〈◊〉 sometimes the best and only remedy against them ; as it was with porus , king of the indies , who being taken prisoner by alexander the great , and demanded how he would be treated : made answer , like a king. and when alexander ask'd him , whether he desired nothing more : he replied , that word comprehends all . which heroick answer so affected alexander , that he not only restored his kingdom , but gave him other countries besides . to yield to adversity , is as it were to side with it . valour in the conquered pleases the victor , either because it renders his triumph more glorious , or because such is the intrinsick energy of virtue . the mind is not subject to violence , nor has fortune any power over it . the emperor , charles the fifth , used severe threats to iohn frederick , duke of saxony , to oblige him to surrender the dutchy of wirtemburg . to which his answer was , his imperial majesty may indeed do what he pleases with my body , 〈◊〉 shall never be able to strike fear into this breast . which he really shew'd on another occasion of much greater danger ; for it happened , as he was playing at chess with ernest , duke of brunswick , he heard sen●●nce of death was pass'd upon him , which he receiv'd with no more trouble , than if the news had not concern'd him , but chearfully bid the duke play on ; which generous carriage wiped off , in some measure , the infamy of rebellion , and procured him glory . one great action even upon a forced death , leaves a luster and repute to life . as has in our own time ●appned : rodrigo calderon , marquiss de sievigl●sias , or ●●ven churches , whose truly christian valour and he●●ick constancy , were the whole world's admiration , in so much as to turn envy and hatred , things com●●on to one of his fortune , into pity and commenda●●● . none are delivered from violent casualties by timorousness , nor does confusion any way lessen danger , whereas resolution either overcomes , or at least renders it illustrious . the people gather what peril they are in from the princes countenance , as mariners do the danger of the tempest from that of their pilot. for that reason ought he to appear equally serene in prosperity and adversity , least fear dash , or pride exalt him , and others be able to judge of the state of affairs . this made tiberius take so much care to hide every unsuccessful accident . all is in disorder and confusion , when in the princes face , as that of heaven , the tempests which threaten the commons are discernible . to change colour at every breath of fortune , betrays a light judgment and mean spirit . constancy , and an even look , inspire subjects with courage , strike enemies with admiration . all men fix their eyes upon the prince , and if they see fear there , they fear . thus 't was with those who were at otho's table . besides , there can be no fidelity where fear and distrust find entertainment . which , however , i would have understood of those cases , wherein it is convenient to dissemble dangers , and conceal calamities ; for in others to join in publick expressions of sadness , don't ill become the prince , as that which manifests his love to his subjects , and engages their hearts . the emperor , charles the fifth , put himself in mourning , and express'd his sorrow for the sacking of rome . david upon the news of the death of saul and ionathan , took hold of his cloaths , and rent them . the same did ioshua for the loss received by the men of ai ; and he fell to the earth before the ark of the lord . and indeed , what can be more just , than in a common calamity thus to submit to god ; 't is a kind of rebellion willingly to receive good only at god's hands , and not evil also . he that is humble under correction , moves to pardon . here it may be disputed , whether this steddiness of mind be commendable in an inferior , when he needs the aid of the more potent ; the solution of which doubt requires a peculiar distinction . he , who is under oppression , and craves anothers assistance , should not do it with too much cringing and solicitude , least he make his fortune desperate , there being no prince , who out of pure compassion will reach his hand to a man fallen , or undertake the defence of one that has already abandon'd all hopes of himself and his affairs . pompey's cause lost not a little in the opinion of ptolomy , when he saw so much submission in his ambassadors . the king of the cherusci shewed much more courage , when upon the loss of his kingdom , thinking it his interest to procure the favour of tiberius , he wrote to him not like a fugitive or beggar , but as one who remembred his former fortune . nor is the example of mithridates les illustrious , who being overthrown by eunon , is said , with a resolution truly royal , to have thus bespoke him , mithri●ates so many years sought by the romans by sea and land , here voluntarily surrenders himself , do what you please with the off-spring of the great achemenes , the only thing my enemies cannot deprive me of . which words prevailed with eunon to intercede with the emperor claudius in his behalf . let him , who hath faithfully served his prince , speak boldly if he find himself injured ; as herman cortez did to charles the fifth ; and segestes to germanicus . in other cases prudence should examine necessity , time , and the things themselves , having attentive respect to the following maxims . that a superior takes boldness in an inferior for an affront , imagining he aspires to be his equal , or disparages him ; and on the other side , is very apt to slight one he sees too abject and submissive . it was for this reason , tiberius nominated none to be senators , but such as were of a servile nature , and though such persons were necessary for his service , yet could be not endure that baseness of mind . thus we see princes are competent judges of every ones natural vigour and alacrity , and are apt to put affronts upon those whom they know will take them . vitellius had not took the liberty to keep valerius maximus so long from the consulate , which galba had conferr'd on him , but that he thought his meek temper would not resent the injury . for this reason a resolute kind of modesty , and a modest courage will be highly requisite in a prince , who , if he must of necessity be ruined , had better be so with a mind great and noble , than base and degenerous . this marcus hortalus consider'd , when tiberius refused to assist him in the extremest necessity . when the more powerful denies another the honour due to him , ( especially in publick actions ) it is more adviseable to snatch , and as i may say , steal , than dispute them . he that doubts distrusts his merit ; the dissembler tacitly owns his want of it , and modesty is afterwards but laugh'd at . he , who handsomely assumes the preference due to him , easily preserves it afterwards . thus it happ'ned once to the german ambassadors , who seeing those of such nations as surpassed in valour and constant alliance with the romans , seated among the senators in pompey's theatre , said , no men in the world were preferable to the germans for arms and fidelity , and immediately took place with the senators , every one being taken with their generous freedom and noble emulation . as to favours and gratuities , which depend wholly upon the prince's pleasure , although they seem due to merit or virtue , the subject ought not to murmur if they be not conferr'd upon him : on the contrary , rather give thanks under some honest pretext , following the example of some officers , who were displac'd in vitellius's time . for a discreet courtier usually lets acknowledgments close all his discourse with the prince . this piece of prudence seneca shewed after his conference with nero , about the crimes laid to his charge . he that complains , declares he has been ill us'd ; and princes have very little confidence in one they think dissatisfied ; all of them affecting to be like god in that , of whom we never complain in our affliction , nay , we rather give thanks for them . in accusations also constancy is of very great consequence ; he that gives way to them , makes himself a criminal . the innocent person , who disowns his actions , does in a manner plead guilty . a good conscience arm'd with truth , triumphs over envy : if that be degenerate and resist not the stream of misfortunes , their waves will overwhelm him , as a river by the force of its current throws down the weaker trees , whereas the deeply rooted stand immoveable . all sej●nus's favourites fell with his fortune ; marcus terentius alone , who couragiously acknowledge he had courted and esteem●d his friendship , as that which procured him the emperor tiberius ● favour , was acquitted ; and all other evidences either banished or executed . in some cases this firm assurance is absolutely necessary , that innocence defend not it self by excuses , for fear of betraying timorousness ; nor good services be taken notice of , least they be thought to be upbraided . thus agrippina did when accused of having procured plautus the empire . nor should the prince's person only be a looking-glass to his subjects , but he is to shew himself such by his state also , which is as it were his picture , and so in that no less than his own person , religion , justice , clemency , and all other imperial virtues ought to be conspicuous . and in as much as councils , seats of justice , and courts of chancery , are parts of this glass , in them the same qualities should be found as are in the whole ; nay , in all particular ministers who represent it ; for it very much lessens the prince's reputation to appear favourable to every pretender to dismiss them with fair promises , and give incouragement to their hopes ; and on the other side , put off his counsellors , and other ministers , to deter them by rough usage from pursuing their petitions . an artifice that will soon discover it self to be unworthy a generous and royal breast . the minister is a piece of publick coin , stamp'd with the prince's image , which , except it be of good allay , and represent him to the life , will be refused as counterfeit . if the head , which governs , be of gold , the hands also which serve should be so too ; as were those of the spouse in the holy scripture . farther , ambassadors are also principal parts of this glass , as persons in whom the prince's authority is lodged . and certainly it would infinitely prejudice the publick faith to have his words and veracity not found in these : and as they are the lieutenants of his power and courage , so ought they on all occasions to manifest them , as if the prince were present in person . thus did anthony fonseca , after he had proposed to charles the eighth , in his catholick majestys name , that the kingdom of naples should not be invaded , till it had been judicially determin'd whose title was best , and saw it came to nothing ; with singular freedom of mind he openly declared his king had now satisfied his conscience ; that he was at liberty to take which side he thought most just , and immediately in the presence of the king and council , broke the treaties of peace before made between the two crowns . as the minister is to be furnished with his prince's maxims , so also should he be with his majesty , valour and magnanimity . emblem xxxiv . whoever looks on the thorns and prickles of the rose● tree , will hardly be perswaded a daughter so beautiful as the rose could proceed from so deform'd a mother . one had need be indued with a great measure of faith to water it , and wait till it be cloathed with verdure , and blossom into that wonderful pomp of flowers , of so delicate a smell . yet by patience and long expectation , we at length find the labour not lost , nor that care ill imployed which has produced such beauty and fragrancy . the first branches of virtue are harsh and thorny to our depraved nature , but after some time , its flower of all other , the most beautiful begins to bloom . let not the first sight of things discourage a prince , for the outside of very few in government are pleasant ; they all seem full of thorns and difficulties , but experience has found many easy which appeared much otherwise to sloth . the prince therefore should not be disheartned ; for in lightly yielding to them , he will be overcome by his own apprehension rather than any thing real . let him endure with courage and hope , with patience and perseverance , still keeping the means in his hand . he that hopes has a good and faithful companion on his side , i mean time. whence philip the second used to say , i and time against any two . precipitation is the effect of madness , and generally the occasion of great perils . theobald , earl of champagne , put his succession to the crown of navarre , very much in question , by not having patience to wait for his uncle , king sancho's death , but underhand conspiring with the nobles to possess himself of the kingdom in his life-time ; for this put sancho upon adopting iames the first of arrag●n , his heir . patience obtains many trophies . this was scipio's excellency , who though he had infinite occasions of displeasure , was yet so patient , as never to let ● passionate word fall from him , which thing gave sucess to all his designs . he that suffers with expectation , vanquishes the slights of fortune , and obliges her to take his part , that confidence among all her vicissi●●des like flattery winning upon her . columbus , not without great hazard , exposes himself to the ocean 's incertain waves , in quest of new countries . neither h●rcule's ne plus ultra , at caspe and abyla , nor the mountains of waters , that seem to oppose his enterprize deter him from it ; he by sailing tells the sun's steps , and steals from the year its days , from the days their hours ; his needle wants the pole , his charts the lines , his companions patience ; all things conspire against him , but his hope and patience rub through all difficulties , till at length a new world recompences his invincible constancy . ferendum & sperandum , was a saying of empedocles , and afterwards the emperor macrinus's motto , whence that of this emblem is borrowed . some dangers are more easy to surmount than avoid : as agathocles well knew , when being beaten , and besieged in syracuse , he did not basely surrender to the enemy , but leaving a sufficient body of men for the defence of the city , marched with the rest of his army against carthage , and he who could not be victorious in one war , by this means obtain'd a double triumph . rashness frequently overcomes a danger , and despising it often confounds an enemy . when hannibal saw the romans after the battel of cannae send succours into spain , he began to fear their power and strength . no one ought to trust prosperity too much , or despair in adversity . fortune lies between both , as ready to advance as depress . let the prince therefore keep in the one , and the other , a constancy and strength of mind , prepared to encounter any accident , and not suffer the threats of the greatest tempest to disturb him : for sometimes the waves have cast a man out of one ship that is to be wreck'd , into another that is to be saved . a great and generous soul heaven it self favours . let not the prince rashly despair for anothers dangers , or those which chance brings with it . he that observeth the wind shall not sow , and he that regardeth the clouds shall not reap . let him not imagine he obliges any one by his afflictions . tears are womanish , nor is fortune appeased with such sacrifices . a great soul endeavours to give it self satisfaction or comfort by some heroick and generous action : thus agricola , when he heard of his son's death , took not the accident as generally men do , ambitiously ; nor in tears like women ; but by war diverted his grief . to be wholly insensible , is either vain-glory , or excess of consternation . in suing for offices and honours , the design of this emblem is very useful . he that can bear and hope , knows how to get the better of his fortune . whereas one that impatient of delay , thinks it base to be beholding and submit , shall be despised and abandon'd by the whole world. to look on it as a point of honour not to obey any , is the way to command none . the means are to be measured by the end ; if in obtaining this there be more honour got , than is lost by them , certainly they ought to be used . impatience of sufferings we take for generosity of mind , when it is imprudent haughtiness . honour once attain'd , the tracks made in ascending them , presently wear out . to endure much in order to advancement , is not base degeneracy , but extraordinary strength of a mind elevated and aspiring . some tempers there are which can't abide to wait , that would have all things ended in a moment ; desiring now to exceed their equals , by and by their superiors , and in a little while , even their own hopes . these hurried by this violence of ambition despise the most secure means as slow , and choose to employ the shortest , though most hazardous . but it usually fares with them , as with buildings raised in haste , before the materials have had time to dry and settle , which immediately fall down again . the master-piece of government consists in hoping and enduring , in that these are the only means to do things in time , without which nothing can possibly come to maturity . trees that at the springs first warmth bear flowers , soon lose them for not waiting till the winters cold was quite gone . he , who would ripen affairs with the hand , cannot have the satisfaction of tasting the fruit of them . impatience is the cause of miscarriages and dangers ; it creates peri●s , which by being uneasy under , and too hasty to escape , we augment . therefore for those evils , as well internal as external , which have by our negligence been increas'd in the commonwealth , 't is better to let them take their course , and be sensibly cured by time , than precipitate a remedy , wherein there is more danger . if before we could not foresee and prevent ; at least let us learn to bear them after : they are increas'd by opposition . a danger conceal'd or not taken notice of , thereby becomes publick , and lays greater impediments in his way , who thought to stop it . fear imprudently arm'd against a superior power , does but find it exercise , and render it more powerful by the addition of its own spoils . this method cerealis took to compose the minds of those of treves , least they should take up arms against the romans , saying , a fabrick , as that was , which had been the product of eight hundred years success and industry , could not be pull'd down , but its ruin must of necessity bury the authors of it . many things would not succeed so ill , did not our fear and imagination act with too much precipitation . apprehension and jealousy of tyranny , when once discovered , make it begin to be really , though it were not before . whence in such like cases , 't is a piece of no less courage to know how to dissemble , than to be too rash in remedying . the former is the genuine effect of prudence , this generally the result of fear . emblem xxxv . the closer the breath is pressed in a trumpet , with the greater harmony and variety it goes out of it ; thus 't is with virtue , which is never more clear and harmonious than when suppressed by malice . the flame of valour is apt to die , if the wind of adversity don't revive it ; that awakens the mind , and makes it look about for means to amend it . happiness , like the rose , grows out of thorns and miseries . alphonso the fifth , king of arragon , was vanquish●d and taken in a sea-fight with the genoeze ; and that , which in all probability was like to retard his expedition against the kingdom of naples , was the very thing that furthered it with greater happiness and power ; for by making a league with philip , duke of milan , who retain'd him prisoner , he obtain'd both his liberty , and forces for the conquest of that kingdom . necessity compell'd him to get his host of his side ; for in prosperity , indeed , every one lives to himself alone , but in adversity for himself and others . those disclose the passions of the mind , otherwise forgetful of it self : whereas , by this it learns caution , and arms it self with virtues , as means to attain real and lasting happiness . whence it is not a little easier to escape bad , than be continued in good fortune . in prison first appeared alphonso's extraordinary endowments and ornaments of mind , which till then had lain hid ; and the duke of milan charm'd with them , was ambitious of his friendship , and laid these obligations upon him . he obtain'd more by losing the victory , than he could have expected had he been victor . fortune sports between extreams , and takes delight in shewing her power , in skipping from one to another . there is no virtue but will shine in adversity , as no star but sparkles with greatest lustre in the darkest night . then the weight shews the palm's strength when this is raised higher under it . the rose preserves its leaves longer fresh among nettles than flowers . did not virtue exert it self in adversity too ; it would not deserve victories or truimphs . 't is its property to conquer by suffering . whence it evidently appears , how impious the error ( confuted by us in another place ) of those is , who advise the prince not to be bigotted to virtue , but to comply with vice when necessity shall require ; a time in which he ought more particularly to approve himself constant in it , with greater hopes of success : as it usually happned to the emperor , ferdinand the second of blessed memory ; who in his greatest dangers would resolutely affirm , he 'd rather lose the empire , and all he had , and with his whole family beg from door to door , than to commit an unjust thing to maintain his grandeur . words truly worthy so pious a prince , whose exemplary piety and faith were so acceptable to god almighty , that he vouchsafed to take the imperial scepter , and perform his office here on earth , giving him several signal and miraculous victories . in the greatest dangers and distresses , when all hope fail'd , and humane prudence and valour were destitute of means , he always came off with most success and greatest triumph . the roman emperors of old lived in affluence of peace , and all manner of delights , yet were tyrannized over by their own passions , and rack'd by a thousand fears . but this pious hero found repose and tranquility of mind amidst the raging tempests , which the fury of rebels raised against his empire , and most august house the just sings amidst misfortunes , and the wicked man weeps in his impiety . thus the fiery furnace was as a choire to the three children . miseries and hardships are attended with great advantages ; they correct the prince's pride , and reduce him to reason ; with what fury does the wind sometimes storm ? how arrogantly does the sea swell and rage , its foaming billows like mountains threatning heaven and earth ! and yet a small shower composes and calms it . thus misfortunes raining from heaven allay the prince's pride and presumption . they make a just governor of a tyrant , of a prince careless and negligent of his affairs , one careful and circumspect . for , then even necessity obliges him to take care of his people , to esteem nobility , honour valour , do justice , and respect religion . power is never in greater danger than when all things flow prosperously . for cares being then laid aside , too much security is apt to stifle counsel and prudence . ease and idleness has been the ruin of more princes than labour . 't is with them as with bodies , which are kept in vigor by motion , without which they languish and decay . whence it appears farther , how erroneous we are in our judgments of good and evil , scarce ever knowing what is most for our advantage . adversity we look on as rigour and cha●fisement , when it is really warning and instruction . the present of ear-rings and a sheep , which iob's friends and relations made him , seems to intimate , that he should endure all things with a patient , even temper , and that those afflictions were precious admonitions of god whisper'd in his ear. god's afflicting us sometimes is wonderful mercy , and on the contrary his recompences are punishments ; for by these he clears , as it were , the bill of our debts , and by paying for some of our merits , remains creditor to our offences ; whereas by afflicting us , he at once pays himself , and excites us to amendment . emblem xxxvi . the expert and prudent seaman is not always carried at the pleasure of the wind , but rather by 〈◊〉 benefit of it , so disposes the sails of his ship , that 〈◊〉 arrives at the desired port , and with the same wind 〈◊〉 at which he pleases of two opposite shores , with●● endangering his voyage . but when the heaven 's calm ; by the help of sails and 〈◊〉 he out strips even the wind it self . with no less 〈◊〉 and diligence the prince ought to steer the vessel of 〈◊〉 state in the tempestuous sea of his reign , so atten●●vely observing all storms that he may with prudence and valour make use of the same in their time and place . he is a pilot , to whose conduct the life and safety of all is committed ; nor is any ship more hazardous than a crown exposed to so many winds of ambition , so many rocks of enemies , and storms of people . king sancho the brave needed all his industry to arm himself against fortune , and secure the right of his crown . almost the whole science of politicks consists in knowing how to discern times , and make use of them : a storm sometimes bringing a ship sooner into harbour than a calm . he , who can break the force of ill fortune , renders it favourable ; and one that knowing a danger yields to it , and gives it time , at length surmounts it . when the sailor finds there is no contending with the billows , he strikes sail and abandons himself to them ; and because his resistance would rather add force to the wind , uses some narrow creek to rest his ship in , and shelter it from the waves . something must be granted dangers , if one would escape them . iames the first , king of arragon , was sensible of the aversion his nobl●s and people had to him , and that it was by no means convenient to increase their fury by an untimely opposition , but rather to give it time to sink of it self ; as rivers do , whose waters in a tempest swell and overflow their banks , voluntarily suffer'd himself to be play'd upon , and as it were imprisoned , till he restored all things to their former calmness and tranquility , and reinstated himself in the throne . the same discreet moderation queen mary used , when by siding with the grandees , and satisfying their ambition , she preserved the crown of castile , during the minority of her son. ferdinand the fourth † . did the sailor think it a dishonour to yield to a storm , and were resolved with sails and oars to withstand it , his ruin would be inevitable . constancy consists not in unseasonable struggling , b●● in hoping , and so enduring danger , without letting fortune get the upper hand of one . in such cases the glory is to escape safe . what seems baseness of mind in them , is afterwards magnanimity crown'd with success . when king alphonso the wise , saw himself deprived of his kingdom , putting his whole confidence in the king of morocco's assistance , made no difficulty to beg of alphonso de guzman , governor of st. lucar de barameda , who upon some disgust had retired to that prince's court , that forgetting all former injuries , and remembring their ancient amity , and his nobility , he would stand his friend , and endeavour to be an instrument of that king 's supplying him with men and money . which letters are to this day kept in that most illustrious and ancient house . nevertheless kings ought not to yield to their subjects violence , unless in cases of extremity , for he very little consults his authority , who debases himself by too much condescention . the dishonourable terms king ferdinand the holy , constrain'd by his non-age , made the house of zara , no way appeased them . nor could isabella reclaim alphonso carillo , bishop of toledo , though she honour'd him with a visit at alcala . i confess in desperate cases , prudence is wont to try all ways that chance can render possible . it is great courage and strength of reason , on occasions of that nature to restrain the spirits , and weigh the present necessity , and greatness of the danger against such means as may contribute more to the state 's preservation . no one was ever more jealous of his grandeu● than tiberius , yet he dissembled the boldn●s● of lentulus germanicus , who having the command of the german legions , was so audacious as to write to him with threats , not to send him a successor , covenanting as 't were to let his prince enjoy the empire , provided he were continued in his province ; and he , who could not put up the emulation of his sons , took this slight patiently . not but he knew the ill consequence of letting such disobedience go unpunished , but if he opposed it , he consider'd he should incurr the publick odium ; that he was now in years , and in a state where his affairs depended more upon reputation than strength . subjects would be little beholding to the valour of the prince who governs them , if he should presently in ill fortune submit to necessity ; and on the other side as little to his prudence , if when that fortune can't be overcome , he will however withstand it . courage should be moderated by prudence and address , and what cannot be effected by strength , should be the work of art and industry . 't is no less glorious to avoid than to surmount a danger . to fly it always is sloth ; to expect , ignorance or surprize ; to despair cowardice . men of courage make head against fortune her self . the prince●s duty and end is not lightly to contest with his state upon the billows , but to conduct it to the haven of preservation and safety . that is esteemed valiant wisdom , which draws benefit out of adversity ; as also , that which by struggling compasses its ends sooner . kings , the masters of times and things , are always followed , never led by them . there 's no building , but whose ruins , with what addition industry is wont to make , may erect a more stately fabrick : nor any state so intirely abandon'd by fortune , that valour cannot preserve , and even advance , provided it consult prudence upon events , and know how to make right use of them , or at least to turn them to its advantage . ferdinand the catholick , and lewis the twelfth of france , had divided between them the kingdom of naples ; and the great captain knowing the circle of a crown to have but one center , and that empire admits of no companion , endeavoured immediately to get his master's share into his hands ; that in cafe of after disputes , which he foresaw would arise between those two kings , he might be the more at leasure , and use them afterwards to disposses the king of france of his part , as in effect it happned . accidents , it is true , have some force ; but we increase or diminish them according to our carriage under them . our ignorance gives divinity and power to fortune , in that we lightly resign our selves to her vicissitudes . did we change our customs and measures as oft as she does the times , she would not be so powerful , nor we so subject to her empire . the make of our cloaths we alter with the mode , but neglect our mind and manners . what wind does not the skilful pilot make serviceable to his voyage ? as that veres he trims his sails , and thus all conduce to the end he proposes . we refuse to shake off the ill habits of our nature , either out of self-love or imprudence , and afterwards lay the fault on casualty . we grow desperate before we seek to remedy our misfortunes , and through obstinacy or inadvertency , let despair get the ascendant over us . we cannot in adversity lay aside that pride , anger , vain-glory , detraction , and those other vices which prosperity bred in us ; nor are without great difficulty induc'd to acknowledge them that have brought us into that unhappy condition . every moment in every affair , with whomsoever of his subjects the prince shall have to do , he ought to differ from himself and change his nature . nor does this require any extraordinary knowledge , but a certain disposition only , and capacity to adapt ones self to all contingences , and prudence to foresee them . now , as we are lost in adversity for want of furling the sails of our passions , and submitting to it for a time ; so also do we bring destruction upon our selves and princes , when we indiscreetly and conceitedly go about to measure their interest , passions , and inclinations , by our own natures and advantages : it being impossible for a minister of a liberal temper to exert his generosity under a covetous , griping prince ; or one valiant and active with one slothful and cowardly . our motions should be regulated by the activity of the prince's sphere . this was a fault in corbulo , who serving claudius , a pusilanimous , mean-spirited prince , made many rash attempts , by which he could not but be disagreeable to him . in some ministers an imprudent zeal is the cause of this error ; in others , which is most frequent , self-love and vain-glory , which makes them desirous to appear prudent in the eyes of the world , and shew their ability , as if , forsooth , by their means alone the prince succeeded ; but that whatever he undertakes by himself , or others , is faulty ; and thus under colour of zeal they pub●ish the government 's defects , and discredit their prince : artifices which generally the minister himself feels the effect of afterwards by the loss of his prince's favour . he that consults his interest , and would establish his fortune , must with all possible speed fly such affectations , as odious to the prince and whole world ; he should be more serviceable in deed than in word ; he should conform to the prince's nature and condition , reducing him to reason , and his duty , under colour of service , with humility and a quiet industry , without noise and arrogance . it is the ruin of valour and virtue to be too nice observers of constancy , and to think that their whole reputation depends upon it ; for in the mean time others more various , who can transform themselves into any shape , and suit theirs to the prince's nature , carry away the gratuities and preferments . but these are not to be used with aleto's design , to deceive ; but to prevent being unadvisedly ruined at court , or to render one more serviceable to the prince , for the●e are some of such a make , that it is absolutely necessary for the minister to put on their nature ; and as i may say , to creep into them , to make them move and act ; as men , who neither will be directed by others counsel , nor can dispatch their own . and consequently not always what is most expedient is to be advised a prince , but what he is in duty oblig'd to execute . those courageous counsels which were given vitellius , though the best in the world , were useless because he wanted resolution to put them in practice ; he was usually deaf to them . ministers are as it were the prince's sails . now , if they are large , and the prince a shallow vessel , if they are always loosed without consideration of the burthen of the boat , they will certainly overset it . emblem xxxvii . that the prince may not escape the storm without full instructions in all accidents that ill fortune can throw him into ; this device represents the choice of the lesser evil , when the greater are inevitable . thus the pilot , when he has● lost all hopes of being saved by opposition , or compliance with the tempest , endeavours to make the land , and run his ship ashore ; where , if he lose his ship , yet he saves his life and merchandize . it was very commendable in the romans , that when they could not oppose fortune , they provided for their own security . the prince's valour consists not only in resisting , but withal in weighing dangers , and submitting to the less , when the greater is insuperable . for as it is the part of prudence to prevent , so it is of courage and constancy 〈◊〉 bear patiently what is not in the power of prudence to decline , a thing alphonso the sixth was a great ma●●r of ; a prince modest in prosperity , valiant in ad●●sity , never unprepar'd for any accident . 't is a vain-glory of a prince , who with more temerity 〈◊〉 valour , chooses rather to die in the greater dan●er , than escape in the lesser . he consults more his own fame than the publick safety ; or rather wants courage to despise the opinions of the multitude , who inconsiderately , and without any knowledge of the accidents , condemn prudent resolutions ; and when in danger , are against having recourse to remed●●s so dangerous and violent . that sometimes looks like courage is cowardice ; where presence of mind is wanting to hope in danger , the confusion of fear casts us into it . when prudence and fortitude go hand in hand , then consideration takes place ; and if it find not safety in the lesser , is not affraid to encounter the greater danger . 't is a base weakness to die with fear . there is no valour like what necessity inspires . 't is commonly the last remedy in desperate cases , neither to hope nor quite despair . thus a ship not daring to ●●●st the shore , abandons it self to the wide sea , and by the force of its billows escapes . one peril is ordi●●rily the remedy of another . upon this , i conceive , was grounded the counsel some gave galba in a con●●●racy against him , to oppose the first fury of it . garcias gomez defended the fort of xerez , ( which he was governor of in the time of alphonso the wise ) and although he saw all his men kill'd or wounded , would not surrender , nor accept the terms , though ●●nourable , which the moors offer'd him ; for having little confidence in them , he chose rather to die gloriously in the arms of his fidelity , than those of his ●nemies ; and what in all appearance was like to cost him his life , in a wonderful manner charm'd his enemies , who admiring his bravery and resolution , by a hook drew him out of the citadel alive , using him with great civility , and carefully dressing the wounds he had receiv'd during the siege † . such is the force of valour , that it captivates even enemies . courage has given life to more than fear . i know not what divinity attends and rescues it from dangers . when ferdinand , the holy , besieg'd sevil , garcias perez de vargas , a citizen of toledo , with another , being separated from their company , were passing along the river guadalquivir , when on a sudden they spy seven moorish horse making towards them : his comerade advises him to retire , but garcias not to incurr the ●gnomity of cowardice by a dishonourable flight , pulls down the vizer of his helmet , brandishes his sword , and advances by himself : the moors knowing his ' person , and admiring his resolution , let him pass without attacking him . thus his heroick valour sav'd him ; for had he fled with his companion , the enemy had in all probability pursued and took him prisoner . it requires a mind free and disingag'd to examine dangers ; first in the report , and afterwards in the quality of them : in the rumour , because those are generally esteem'd greatest which are farthest off . the people hear and tremble at them , and seditiously spread and increase them , rejoycing at their own misfortunes because unusual , or out of disaffection to the present government . it is therefore the prince's part to appear firm , and to disperse such idle apprehensions . as upon those reports which were spread in the time of tiberius , of the revolt of the provinces of france , spain , and germany , he never betrayed the least discomposure , nor chang'd his residence , nor way of living , as well knowing the levity of such reports . if once a prince surrender to fear , he will be ever after uncapable of resolving . for then prudent counsels and popular rumours will be receiv'd with equal credit . as they were by vitellius in the civil war with vespasian . dangers imminent appear greatest , being cloath'd by fear with horror , and by presence magnified ; and we by endeavouring to escape them , fall into others abundantly greater , which though they seem at a distance , we afterwards find too near . 't is idle to imagine we can avert them by interposing a little time . many have vanished by being resisted , on the contrary , opposition has encreas●d others , and they have prov'd real , which were only imaginary . as it happened to the syrians army before samaria . fear of danger has destroy'd more than danger it self . what vain apprehension can do ? we have within these few years seen at a publick bull-fight at madrid , when a suddain bruit being rais●d of some danger in the place where they fought , struck confusion and terror into all , though not one knew the reason . the confus'd flight of some increased the consternation , and because none would stay to know the certainty , many ran into the jaws of death by the same way they took to escape it ; and the consequence had been much worse , had not the constancy of philip the fourth , whom every ones eyes were upon , unmov'd at the commotion and rumour , rais'd the trembling spirits of his subjects , except the prince in dangers and misfortunes of this nature , can repress the peoples fears , counsels are confounded , all command , and none obey . to be too cautious in avoiding dangers , is sometimes the utter ruin of states . frederick , count palati●e , had not lost his , and his electorate , had not fear after his defeat given wings to him to abandon all : for he might easily have retired to prague , or some other place , with the remnant of his forces , and compounded with the emperor , so by making choice of the lesser evil have escap'd the greater . we are oftentimes deluded by fear so disguised , that we take it for prudence , and constancy for ra●●ness . we sometimes boggle , and are at a stand what to resolve , and in the interim the danger steals on us . all things are not to be fear'd , nor is deliberation always required , for between prudence and precipitation , valour often designs noble actions . the great captain having entered the river garillan with his army , was reduc'd to such streights , that his soldiers mutined and deserted ; and when his office● advised him to retreat , he answered , this i have resolv'd with my self , rather to gain ground , though 〈◊〉 enough for a grave , than give back a step , might i live an hundred years . an heroick sentence , worthy the courage and prudence of so great a man. h● well knew , that without rashness there was no hope● , in the case he then was ; but weighing the dang●● against the credit of his arms , the only support of 〈◊〉 faction in the kingdom , which entirely depended upon the success of that expedition , he chose rather to put all to the risque of one battel , and maintain his repute , than to lose by degrees with dishonou●● how often for want of a timely incision have we 〈◊〉 wounds fester and spread . some dangers vanish of themselves , others are increased by negligence , and wast kingdoms insensibly● and make them perish as it were by a consumption● some are unknown ; of these one can't be too ca●tious , for that they surprise before a remedy can be provided . others are known but slighted , by these negligence , and too much confidence are usually su●ferers . no danger , though never so inconsiderable should be despised , for time , and other accidents often augment them , and valour consists not so much in ●●nquishing , as in diverting dangers . to live in sight ●●ereof , is as bad as to suffer them . nor is the confidence we put in another's clemency less treacherous , when to decline one danger we fall into a greater , as when we surrender our selves at discretion to an enemy ; we consider in him only the generosity of pardon , not the force of revenge or ambition ; we measure his compassion by our grief and affliction , and are apt to persuade our selves that we can move him to relieve us . when iames the third , king of majorca , was too weak for his brother-in-law , peter the fourth of arragon , who upon i know not what pretence would dispossess him of his dominions ; he put himself into his hands , thinking this submission would obtain what his arms could not ; but that king was more influenc'd by ambition than clemency , so that he deprived him of his kingdom and title . thus dangers deceive us , and we find that to be the greater , which we chose as the lesser . there can be no assurance in counsel grounded on principles that depend on anothers pleasure . we deceive our selves in supposing others will act nothing but what is agreeable to religion , justice , relation , or friendship , or but what is consistent with their honour and interest . not considering that men are not always guided by their advantage or duty , but rather by their private passions and sentiments ; and consequently their actions are not only to be examined by the rule of reason , but also by that of malice , and the experience of the ordinary injustices and tyrannies of the world. dangers are a prince's best masters . the past teach 〈◊〉 to remedy the present , and prevent the future : those of others are , 't is true , instructing , but they are easily forgot . our own leave in the soul some marks and scars of the losses sustain'd , as that which has once wounded the imagination does fear . let not then contempt or forgetfulness ever erase them , especially when having escap●d a danger , we fancy the same will never return , or if it does , will not annoy us ; for though some one circumstance , which is very unlikely to happen a second time , may remove dangers , yet other succeeding new ones make them unavoidable . emblem xxxviii . from nature , this universal commonwealth of things , and empire of mixt bodies , derive their original , the supreme government of which she lays claim to ; and for the more firm establishment , and more secure maintaining of it , has made her self so loved by them , that the elements , even in the midst of their contrariety with an admirable consent , conspire to preserve it . all things would be soon dissolv'd , did they hate nature their princess and sovereign , who with mutual ties of love and benevolence , as with the fastest knot , unites them . it is this love which holds the earth in aequilibrio , and makes the orbs of heaven whirl round it . let this monarchy of things created , founded in their first being , be a lesson to defend their persons and subjects by affection , the most faithfull guard they can have about them . claud. not guards , nor groves of pikes defend like love. this is the only impregnable fort . for which reason the bees elect a king without a sting , for he has no need of arms , who is beloved by his subjects . nature would by no means have it in his power to hurt , whose duty 't is to govern , least he become odious , and promote his own ruin . the greatest and most absolute power a prince can have ( says k. alphonso ) is when he loves his people , and they reciprocally love him . the body defends the head , upon account of the love it bears it , in consideration , that this directs and preserves it : else would it not hold up its arm toward the threatning blow . who would expose himself to hazards , except he had a love for his prince ? who protect and defend his crown ? the whole kingdom of castile sided with the infant henry , against k. peter the cruel , because the one was beloved by all , the other as universally hated . the first principle of the ruin of kingdoms , and all the revolutions in states is hatred . the kings ordonno and fruela the second were so abominated by their subjects , that the very name of king became odious ; castile was reduc'd into a commonwealth , and the government divided between two judges , one of which administred affairs of peace , the other those of war † . portugal never took up arms against its kings , nor revolted from its obedience ; the reason is , it bears a sincere affection towards them ; and if at any time it has excluded one and admitted another , 't was , because one was belov'd , the other for male-administration hated . it was the advice of iames the first of arragon to alphonso the wise , to seek rather the love than fear of his subjects , and to ingratiate himself with the clergy and commons , that he might be the better able to grapple with the nobility ; which counsel if he had follow'd , he had never lost the crown . nero no sooner ceas'd to be lov'd , than conspiracies were form'd against him , a thing which subrius flavius upbraided him with to his face . a king's power and majesty consist not in his own person , but in the affection and good will of his subjects . if they be disaffected , who will oppose his enemies ? 't is preservation makes the people want a king , but that can never be expected from one , who makes himself hated . the arragonians prudently foresaw this , when having call'd to the crown peter altharez lord of borgia , from whom the most ancient and illustrious family of the dukes of gandia is descended , they afterwards repented , and would not have him for their king , because they saw he us'd them with austerity and rigour , even before his election . contrary to what ferdinand the first , king of arragon did , who by love and benevolence , engag'd the hearts of all in that kingdom , as also in castile during his reign there . we have seen many princes ruin'd by fear , none ever by love. if therefore a prince would be formidable , let it be to his enemies , but let him endeavour to be belov'd by his subjects ; without which , though he come victorious over them , he will at last fall by the hands of these . as it befell bardanus king of persia . love and respect may be joyned , but not love and servile fear . he who is fear'd is hated , and he who is hated is by no means secure . quem metuunt , oderunt . quem quisque odit periisse expedit . enn. he who is fear'd by many , also fears many . and what greater misfortune is there , than to command those who obey through fear , and govern bodies rather than minds ? the difference between the just prince and the tyrant is , that one uses arms to maintain his subjects in peace , the other to protect himself against them . if the strength and power of a prince hated , be small , he is much exposed to danger from his subjects ; if great , yet much more . for the greater their fear is , the more sollicitous are they to provide for their security , as apprehending his cruelty will encrease with his grandeur , as in bardanus king of persia , whose glory made him more severe and insupportable to his subjects . if not for fear of danger , at least in gratitude , a prince should avoid being terrible to those by whom he reigns . whence that was a very unworthy saying of caligula , let them hate me , so they fear me ; as if the security of empire consisted in fear : whereas no power can be lasting where fear bears the sway . and though seneca said , he knows not how to govern , who is too fearfull of hatred ; fear defends kingdoms : 't is a tyrannick maxim , or is to be understood of that vain fear which sometimes princes are in of offending others , even when their commands are just , which doubtless is dangerous , and not a little derogatory from their authority . he can never reign , who wants constancy and courage to despise the hatred of ill men , to preserve the good . nor is caligula's sentence justifi'd by that of the emperor tiberius ; let them hate me , so they approve me . for no action of a person hated is ever approv'd . hatred blames all , and puts the worst construction on every thing . when once a prince is hated , his good actions as well as bad are interpreted against him . it seems necessary for a tyrant to keep his subjects in awe , in as much as his empire being violent , must be supported by violent means , there wanting those two obligations of nature and voluntary subjection , which , as alphonso the wise says , are the greatest debts a man can owe his lord. and the tyrant sensible , that without these bands 't is impossible there should be real love between him and his subjects , endeavours by force to make fear effect what ought to proceed from natural affection ; and as his disturbed conscience fears cruelty against it self , it exercises it upon others . but the lamentable examples of all tyrants abundantly shew how short-liv'd this method is . for though we see the empires of the turks , muscovites and tartars have been continued for many ages by fear alone , yet these barbarous nations ought not to be made a precedent : their manners are so savage , that they seem to have more of the brute than the man , being commonly led more by punishment than reason , and consequently by that only can be kept in subjection , as brutes are not tamed but by force and fear . yet generous spirits suffer not themselves to be compell'd or cheated into obedience , but are induc'd thereto by sincerity and reason . for , says king alphonso , our people being loyal and couragious , their loyalty ought to be maintain'd by truth , and their courage by right and justice . there is usually 'twixt the prince and his subjects such a kind of inclination and natural sympathy , as renders him amiable without any more care ; for a prince who deserv'd hatred is sometimes lov'd , and on the contrary one hated who merited love. and though eminent vertues and accomplishments of mind and body are wont of themselves to challenge love , yet they have not always this effect , unless accompained with an agreeable kind of humour , a sweet , obliging air , which through the eyes , as windows of the mind , shews the inward goodness , and engages mens affections . besides that , accidents which could not be prevented , or some sinister apprehension may so break this love and good will between the prince and subject , that it can never after be re-united ; yet much may be done in that case by skill and address , in knowing how to govern to the satisfaction of the nobles and commons , avoiding giving them any occasion of displeasure , and behaving himself in all particulars , so as to create a good opinion of his government . but since the means whereby the affections of subjects may be procur'd , are every where scatter'd through this book , i shall only say here in general , that nothing contributes more to the obtaining it , than religion , justice and liberality . but because without some species of fear , love would be soon turn'd to contempt , and the edge of regal authority blunted , it is highly requisite , that subjects entertain such an awe as arises from respect and veneration , not tha● which is the result of danger from injustice and tyranny . so necessary it is for a prince to make himself feared by not suffering indignities , maintaining justice , and abhorring vice , that without such an awe in subjects , 't would be impossible to be long secure : for all naturally desire liberty , and the inferior part of man rebells against reason , and is incorrigible but by fear . the prince must therefore tame his subjects as the horse-courser breaks his colt , ( the figure of the present emblem ) who with the same hand strokes and curries him and threatens him with the whip . both the rod and the manna were kept in the ark of the tabernacle , to intimate , as i imagin , that rigour and clemency should be joyn'd in the prince's person . god's rod and staff comforted david ; for if that wounded , this supported him . when god gave the law of the decalogue to the israelites on mount sinai , he at once terrified them with thunder and lightning , and pleasing , allur'd them with heavenly musick ; both the one and the other is necessary to preserve a love and veneration in subjects . let this therefore be the prince's study , to make himself at once lov'd and fear'd : lov'd , as the protector of his people ; fear'd , as the soul of the law , upon which all their lives and estates depend : lov'd for his rewards , fear'd for his punishments : lov'd for his goodness , fear'd for his authority : lov'd as a promoter of peace , fear'd as arbiter of war. so that the good in loving him may find cause to fear : the bad in fearing him may find something to love in him . this fear is as necessary to the preservation of the sceptre , as that which proceeds from the pride , injustice , and tyranny of the prince , is prejudicial and dangerous to it , in leading to despair . the one procures his liberty with the prince's ruin ; god breaking the staff of the wicked , and the sceptre of such as rule with too much severity . whereas the other by conforming himself to reason , studies to avoid his anger and punishment . this fear is of the same brood with love. for there can be no love without fear of losing the object lov'd , and care to continue in its favour . but since 't is not so much in the prince's power to beget love as fear , 't is better for him to ground his security on this than that alone , which as the product of the will is various and inconstant ; nor is any artificial flattery , any forc'd complaisance sufficient to gain the hearts of all . that prince i take for a great governour , who alive is fear'd , and dead , lov'd by his subjects ; as ferdinand the catholick was , for if he be not lov'd , 't will suffice that he is esteem'd and fear'd . emblem xxxix . there is an ancient medal to be seen , upon the reverse of which is engraven a flash of lightning upon an altar , to signifie , that a prince's severity ought to yield to prayers : an emblem offensive to the eyes , the lightning of punishment being represented so lively and so near to pardon , that fear may be apt to dash all hope in the goodness of the altar . and though it be fit sometimes , that the looks of the prince before whom the criminal bends , should at once represent the terror of justice , and mildness of mercy ; yet this is not always proper , for that were contrary to the advice of the h. spirit , who would have life and clemency shine in a king's countenance . in this emblem therefore , instead of the lightning i have plac'd upon the altar the golden fleece , introduc'd by philip the good duke of burgundy , not to signifie , as many imagin , the fabulous fleece of colchos , but that of gideon , which for a token of victory was moistned with the dew of heaven , when all the country about it was dry . a symbol whereby meekness and humility is express'd , as the same is signified by that immaculate lamb the son of god , offer'd for the world's salvation . the prince is a victim devoted to fatigues and dangers for the common good of his subjects . a precious fleece , rich in dew and other blessings of heaven . here they ought at all times to find wherewithal to quench their thirst , to redress their grievances ; let him be always affable , always sincere and benign towards them , which will be more effectual than severity . upon the sight of alexander's pleasing looks , the conspirators immediately threw down their arms. the serenity of augustus tied the hands of the gaul , who went to throw him down a precipice in the alps. the modest and sweet temper of king ordonno the first strangely won the hearts of his subjects . sancho the third was called the desired , not so much for the shortness of his life , as for his affability . and the arragonians received ferdinand the infant , king martin's nephew to the crown , upo● a liking they took to his obliging demeanour . modesty and good humour all must love . obedience is sufficiently heavy and odious of it self ; let not the prince add rigour to it ; for that is a file , wherewith natural liberty generally cuts the chains of slavery . if princes in adversity think complaisance and humanity to be used for a remedy , why should it not as well in prosperity for a preservative ? the benign aspect of the prince gains a pleasing empire over mens minds ; 't is a dissimulation of sovereignty . by complacency , i do not here mean that which is so vulgar , that it begets contempt , but which has so agreeable a mixture of gravity and authority , as leaves room for love , but a love attended with respect : for where this is wanting , that is apt to turn too familiar and aspire to an equality . and if the august part of majesty be not maintain'd , there will be no difference between the prince and subject . some ornament of the person ( as has been before hinted ) and a well temper'd gravity is requisite to support the royal dignity ; for i can by no means approve of a prince's making himself so familiar with every one , that it may be said of him as it was of agricola , who was so plain in his dress , so condescending and familiar , that many sought his fame in his person , but few found it . for what is common , no one admires , and respect is the genuine effect of admiration . some grave severity must appear in the prince's face , and something extraordinary in his carriage and royal port to shew supreme power ; but this severity should be so qualified by sweetness , that jointly they may beget love and reverence in the subject , not fear . the sword has been often drawn in france against the regal majesty , for being too familiar . affability must not diminish authority , nor severity love ; a thing tacitus admir'd in agricola , and commended in the emperor titus , who appear'd affable to his soldiers without derogating from his authority as general . let the prince compose his looks , that they may at once assert authority and invite love ; let him appear grave , not austere ; animate , not drive into despair : looking always with a gracefull , agreeable smile , using words complaisant , and gravely courteous . some think themselves no princes , except they shew something irregular in their expressions , looks and port , contrary to the common way of other men : so ignorant statuaries think the art and perfection of a coloss , consists in having bloated cheeks , blubber lips , lowring brows and squint eyes . true greatness doth not consist in mighty state , † in lofty mein and words , or haughty gate . king a●asuerus was of so terrible an aspect , that queen hester coming into his presence fell into a swoon , and had not recovered , but that the king , his spirit being changed by a divine impression , held out the scepter , to shew her it was but a piece of gilded wood , and himself a man , not a vision as she imagined . if majesty too severe and disorderly could produce this effect in a queen , what will it in a private person oppressed with poverty and affliction ? the holy scriptures call a prince physician , and father , and neither this cures nor that governs with inhumanity . but if upon occasion , the prince frowns upon a subject , let his reprimands begin with an encomium on his virtues , afterwards laying before him the deformity of his crime , and thus strike him with a generous fear , in as much as the shadow of vice is most conspicuous when oppos'd to the light of vertue ; care also should be taken , that the reproof be not so harsh and publick , that the subject losing his reputation , shall withal , lose all hopes of retrieving it , and so obstinately persist in his fault . let anger therefore and mildness , punishment and rewards be so intermixed , as in the golden fleece , the steels and flints are knit together , and between them flames of fire , to signifie that the prince's heart should resemble the fire-stone or flint , which keeps the sparks of its anger shut up , least they should hurt any one rashly ; yet in such a manner , that if it happen to be struck by injury or contempt , it immediately breaks out into fire of revenge and justice , yet those not so quick in execution , but it has the dew of the fleece at hand to extinguish , at least to moderate them . god said to ezekiel , as adamant and flint have i made thy fore-head , signifying by that the constancy of justice , and by this the fire of piety . but if the prince cannot break his rough and savage nature , let him at least keep an obliging family to supply his place , giving a courteous reception to all business and petitions . a prince is often beloved or hated upon account of his servants ; they very much cloak their master's roughness , if they have the skill to moderate it , or to excuse it by their affability and discretion . some nations hide the royal majesty behind veils and curtains when he gives audience , without exposing him to the people . a custom inhumane to the prince , severe and cruel to the subjects , who usually find comfort in their prince's presence , if not in his hands . this retreat may make the prince more fear'd , but never more beloved . 't is through the eyes and ears that love strikes the heart . what we neither see nor hear , we can't love . a prince who refuses the sight and speech of his subjects , refuses to hear their necessities and to remedy them ; the tongue is an easie instrument , that ought to reconcile the minds of all : let not the prince make it harsh and dis-agreeable . king iohn the first , because he was short , and had an impediment in his speech , lost the portuguese in his pretension to that crown , upon the death of king peter . 't is not sufficient for the prince to dispatch business by memorials and petitions , for by them the sentiments are not so well express'd . they not being attended with sighs and other moving actions , they are but dry tears , and have not that force upon the prince . the doors of temples are always open , so also should be those of palaces ; for princes are god's vicegerents , and the altars ( as we have said ) which the people fly to in their afflictions and calamities . 't would be a scandalous thing for a soldier to find it more easie to charge through a squadron of pikes , than to come to the presence through the midst of swiss and dutch guards , who , like armed hedg-hogs , are neither gain'd by prayers nor civility . let people come to me , says the emperor rodolphus , for i am not emperor to be shut up in a box . this retirement makes the mind savage . attention to government , and communication soften the temper and render it easie . princes , like hawks , are tam'd by the assiduity of affairs , and by familiarity with men. the kingdom of leon rebell'd against king ramirez the third , for his difficulty of access . king ferdinand the holy was deny'd to none , and every one had admittance even to his most private apartment : the kings alphonso the twelfth , and henry the third , gave publick audience three times a week , as did also their catholick majesties , ferdinand and isabella † . nature has put doors to the eyes and tongue , but has left the ears open , that they may be ready to hear at all times . let not a prince then stop 'em , but hearken favourably to those that would speak to him . let him comfort either by reward or hope , for that is one kind of satisfaction which supports merit . let him not always use set forms and general answers ; for those which are given to all satisfie none , nor is it a small trouble to the petitioner to receive an answer that he knew before : let him not always hear , let him ask sometimes , for he who does not enquire , will never be well inform'd . let him throughly know the state of affairs , and let his audiences be instructive , not merely ceremonial ; as were those of ferdinand the holy , alphonso king 〈◊〉 arragon , king ferdinand the catholick , and the empe●●● charles the fifth , by which they were beloved and re●●ected by their subjects , and esteem'd by strangers . as ●●e audience should be easie , so it ought also to be speedy ; ●●r the delay of a benefit diminishes the obligation . tho' there are some affairs of that nature , that 't is better to let time undeceive them , than either the prince or his mini●●●rs . for all had rather be entertain'd with hope , than be dispatch'd with despair , which in prudent courts is ●ound , not given . i don't approve of the prince's exposing himself in the streets and publick places , for the people ; 't is true , admire him the first time , observe him the second , and slight him the third . that which is not seen is respected most , ●nd the eyes often despise what the opinion esteem'd . 't is not convenient the people should know whether the chain of their slavery be of iron or of gold , passing judgment upon the parts and qualifications of the prince . we respect that most which is farthest distant . some nations take the prince's affability and complaisance for a vice. others dislike his reservedness , and would have him mild and courteous , as the portuguese and the french. the extreams in one and t'other are always dangerous , and he will be best able to moderate them , who in his actions and government , remembers that he is both prince and man. emblem xl. the scriptures call princes mountains , and the rest of mankind , hills and valleys . this comp●rison comprehends the great affinity between them ; for mountains are princes of the earth , as being near●● heaven , and superiour to the other works of nature , as also for their liberality , by which from their own generou● bowels , they supply with continual streams the droughty plains and vallies beneath , cloathing them with flowers and verdure , this being the true property of princes . by this vertue more than any is a prince ally'd to god , who 〈◊〉 ever giving to all plentifully ; 't is this renders obedience more prompt , for a present from him who could command , forces obligation . subjection is agreeable when 't is beneficial . king charles of navarre , call'd the noble , gain'd the love of all by his liberality . king henry the second did thereby wipe out the murder of his brother king peter , and established his right to the crown . what cannot a liberal prince do ? what can't a golden scepter oblige to ? even tyranny is conniv'd at and born with , when the prince knows how to give , especially when it gains the applause of the people , by supplying the publick necessities , and rewarding persons of merit . this vertue , in my opinion , maintain'd tiberius in the empire , for this he always practis'd . but there is nothing more pernicious to a prince , than liberality and goodness ( for they usually go together ) if not used with moderation . liberality , says king alphonso the wise , becomes all men of power , but principally a king , when he uses it to purpose , and as he should . garcias sancho , king of navarr , lost his subjects affections , by the same liberality with which he hop'd to have gain'd them ; for to maintain it , he opprest them with taxes and impositions . prodigality is little distant from rapine or tyranny ; for when the treasury is drain'd by ambition , it must of necessity be recruited by ill and indirect means . he who gives more than he is able , says alphonso the wise , is not liberal but prodigal ; and when his own stock fails , he will be obliged to make use of others ; so that if on one side he ●●kes friends by what he gives , he on th' other side makes e●●mies by what he takes away . diego d' arias , treasurer to king henry the fourth , least he should fall into this incon●enience , represented to him the extravagance of his liberality , and that 't was convenient , that his retinue should be reduc'd to a lesser number , and that the salaries allow'd to such as did not actually serve , or were any ways incapacitated , might be taken off : to whom the king made this answer , i too , were i arias , should more respect my money th●n my liberality ; you say well as to your self , but as for me , i 'll act as becomes a king , without fear of poverty , or exposing my self to the necessity of raising new taxes . 't is the duty of a king to give , and to measure his authority by the publick good , not his own particular , which is the true fruit of riches . to some we give because they are good , to others , that they may 〈◊〉 be bad . words truly worthy a king , if he had been guided by these considerations , but his gifts were always excessive and without order , without the least regard to the merit of the party , as his brother-in-law king ferdinand observed in one of his laws , saying , that he gave rewards for shew not for merit . whence we may observe the circumspection a prince ought to observe in his liberality , for fear of giving occasion to his subjects to acknowledge his authority ▪ only to receive from him , not to obey him . an extravagant subject ruins only himself . but a prince , himself and state too . the treasury would be soon at an ebb , if the prince should be extravagantly liberal , without considering , that they are the magazines for publick necessities . the mountains don't squander away the snow which the vapours of the fields and valleys heap upon its top , but on the contrary , preserve it against summer , and then in gentle streams returns it upon the same grounds it was attracted from . they don't descend all at once , for so they would not answer their design , and would be slighted as useless , for liberality is the greatest enemy to liberality ; nor do they immediately mix with the rivers leaving the plains and vallies dry , as princes usually do , who give to the rich what ought to be distributed among the poor , and drain the thirsty sands to supply the brimfull lakes , which have no need of it . 't is a great fault to gain the favour of the rich at the expence of the poor ; and by vain extravagance to oppress the body of the state , whose ruin is always promoted by the pride and vanity of a few . the people cannot brook to see that power vainly squander'd away , which ought to be employ'd to the preservation of them , and the prince's dignity . the rewards of a prodigal are not esteem'd , because they are common , and proceed from the vice of extravagance , not the vertue of liberality , and by giving all to a few he offends many ; that which is given to some particular ones , being wanted in general by all . he who gives without care or choice , enriches indeed , but rewards not : to give to those who deserve , 't is necessary to be sparing to others . so that a prince ought to use great prudence and judgment in the distribution of rewards . for when they are well distributed , though they fall on but few , they affect many . the scriptures command all offerings to be made with salt , which is the same as prudence , equally distant from prodigality and avarice . but because a prince ought to be generous to all , let him imitate aurora , which , as it passes , always leaves something , tho' but dew and flowers . nay often satisfies only with its beauty and pleasantness . let him give to all , but with such moderation , that without putting it out of his power to give more , he may content them . some by presents , some by words , and some by affability ; for oftentimes the eyes give more than the hands . liberality is the only vertue , which should be sometimes in the opinion of others , more than in the person of the prince ; experience teaching us , that 't is sufficient that he express some demonstrations , with such address , that he may be generally esteem'd liberal ; so that he must avoid refusals , for 't is a great trouble to receive them from a prince . what he cannot give to day , he may give to morrow ; and if he cannot , 't is better to let time discover it than to tell it himself . he who refuses , either does not distinguish merit , or shews his want of power or will , and neither of these declarations become a prince , whose power and grandure the petitioner acknowledges . let a prince be generous in the reward of vertue , but let it be with offices and imployments , and other revenues already allotted to liberality , not with the crown-rents , and treasury reserv'd for greater uses . king ferdinand the catholick was very liberal , but not to the prejudice of the crown . he was ( at his first coming to the crown ) slow in the distribution of offices , the better to gain mens minds , and to reward those who had followed his party . he knew with great prudence to mingle liberality with frugality . of which he has not only left us an example but also a law , in these words : kings ought not to be so generous and bountifull , as that it may be term'd extravagance ; for this vertue of liberality ought to be used with order and measure , without detriment to the crown and royal dignity † . to lay up the better to employ , is not avarice , but premeditated liberality . to give inconsiderately , is either vanity or folly. by this parsimony king alphonso the wise rais'd the monarchy , and lost the crown by his profuse extravagance ; one of the principal complaints the kingdom made against him , was , that he had given the empress marth● thirty thousand marks of silver , to redeem her husband baldwin , whom the sultan of aegypt retain'd prisoner ; in which he was more vain than prudent . king henry the second found the damage of having weakned the power of his crown by his too great bounty , and therefore revok'd it by his last will. time and opportunity ought to guide princes in their liberality ; sometimes it ought to be moderated , when the expences of war , and the publick necessities are great , and to be apply'd to avert dangers , and to facilitate designs ; in which he saves most , who spends most : for he who gives by little and little , spends his money , without attaining his end . war is avoided , and victory and peace purchased by liberality . the prodigality of a prince may be corrected by committing the management of his treasures to thrifty frugal ministers , as may his avarice by generous ones . 't is necessary sometimes to let a prince see the summ of his liberality ; for grants are made sometimes without consideration ; and if the prince kept an account of his expences he would doubtless moderate them ; and 't is not always liberality to grant gratuities , for avarice is often vanquish'd by importunity , or sometimes weary with contending , grants them through despair . 't is natural to all princes to give to those who have most ; i know not whether through fear or esteem of power . this that great courtier ioseph well understood , when calling his father and brothers into aegypt , and offering them in pharaoh's name all the good of that kingdom , he bid them bring with them all the riches and goods that they had ; knowing , that if they came rich , the king would be more liberal to them ; so that he who expects bounty from a prince , must not represent to him his poverty and misery . there are no more ready means to have , than to have . emblem xli . the motto of this emblem has been famous to all antiquity . some attribute it to bias , to pythagoras , thales and homer ; but i think 't is more reasonably ascrib'd to the delphick oracles , for it seems rather a divine than humane sentence , fit to be engraven on all the crowns , sceptres , and rings of princes . to this is reduc'd the whole science of government , which consists in avoiding extreams , and loves the middle , where vertue keeps its sphere . 't was ask'd socrates , which was the properest vertue for a young man , and he answer'd , nothing to excess , by which he comprehended all . to this motto the body of the present emblem seems well suited ; corn lay'd by the violence of unseasonable rain , when gentle dews were sufficient . honours by being too great suit ill with subjects , and rather disgrace than adorn them . there are some favours so out of season , that they pass for injuries ; what avails it for the prince to do a benefit , if by his austere looks and rugged words , he seems , as 't were , to throw it at one , or does it so unseasonably , that it does no kindness . the benefit and favour is lost , and the hand abhorr'd that gave it . which made king alphonso the wise say , that rewards should be given so ● propos , that they may be beneficial to the receiver † . as there are errors in excess of rewards and favours , so there is also in punishments . such an exact rigour better becomes a minister of justice than a prince ; he is not at his liberty , but the prince has the keys of the law in his own hand . 't is not justice which is too severe , nor mercy which is not moderate , and so of other vertues . the same moderation a prince out to observe in the arts of peace and war , so guiding the chariot of the government , as they did in the games of old , that the wheels may not touch the goals , for so they would be broken ; the art of the ancient racers consisted , in measuring the distance so exactly , as to pass as near as possible , without touching eithe● end . what a prince ought to take most care of , is the moderation of his passions , governing them with such prudence , that he may neither desire , hope , love or fear with too much ardour and violence , rais'd by the will not by reason . the desires of private persons may be easily accomplish'd , but those of princes not , for those are proportion'd to their conditions , and these are usually greater than the force of their grandure , tending always to extreams . almost all princes either ruin themselves , or run into great inconveniences , through excess of ambition , mans desire being unlimited , and the possibility of things very narrow , it rarely happens that the first are measured by the latter , or that there is any justice between them . hence princes seek pretences to rob their neighbours , nay their greatest friends , aspiring ever at the enlargement of their state , without measuring their bodies with their strength , and their government with humane capacity , which cannot maintain all that may be acquired . the grandure of empires lies upon their own shoulders , and are always ready to fall ; oppress'd with their own weight . let princes therefore endeavour to maintain their states , which either succession or election has given them ; and if any just occasion shall offer of enlarging them , let them make use of it a god's name , but with such caution , as the event shall shew to prudence . ambition is not less dangerous in the excess of its fears than of its desires , especially in that which is acquired by violence . fear suggests no means which are not immediately made use of for its preservation . there is none of the line of the party wrong'd , or any one who has the least pretension to the state , though never so remote , but is fear'd . tyranny usually proposes nothing less than a general ruin . thus mucianus practis'd , killing the son of vitellius . the same also is taugh● in the school of machiavell , whose scholars forgetting the example of david , who sought out saul's relations , that they might partake of his mercy , follow that of some tyrants , as if all were not ruin'd by these pernicious practices ; and if any one has been preserv'd ( as we shall observe ) 't was by changing them for the better . most kingdoms are augmented by usurpation , and afterwards maintain'd by justice , and legitimated by time . extreme violence is extreme danger . cyrus invaded lydia , and dispossess'd king croesus . but had he had any of our politicians , they would have advis'd him , for his greater security , to have taken him off . yet cyrus restor'd him one city , by which he might support his royal dignity ; and 't is certain , he had provok'd the hatred and arms of all greece , if he had shew'd himself cruel . tyranny is equally hatefull to god and man ; nor are there wanting in such cases , some mild means , by which the mind may be diverted , from shedding blood , from breaking the line of succession , from diminishing , or transferring the greatness of states , and taking off those who may aspire to the crown ; which had they been observed in portugal , that people had never revolted . when the danger is so evident , that it obliges to defence and natural preservation , the prince ought to strike at the root , that it may not sprout again , keeping a watchfull eye upon it , least it should happen , as it did to the philistin princes , who having cut off sampson's hair , wherein lay all his strength , began to ridicule him , not considering that it might grow again , as it afterwards did , when he pull'd the temple upon their heads , killing more enemies dying than he had done living . inordinate ambition moreover perswades the oppression of the liberty of the people , the humbling of the nobility , the weakning of the potent and rich , and the reduction of all to the royal prerogative , thinking that the more absolute , the more firm it is ; and that the lower the people are reduc'd , the higher its glory rises ; an error by which flattery gains the hearts of princes , and leads them into great dangers . 't is modesty that preserves empires , so correcting the prince's ambition , that it may maintain it within the bounds of reason , the power of his dignity , the honour of the nobility , and the liberty of the people , for no monarchy is lasting which is not mixt , that is compos'd of aristocracy and democracy . absolute power is tyranny . whoever promotes that promotes his own ruin . a prince ought not to govern as the lord , but as the father , the protector and governour of his states . these disorders of ambition proceed from a long use and abuse of dominion , which covets all for it self ; in which 't is necessary princes should conquer themselves , and submit to reason , however difficult the attempt appear ; for many can conquer others , few themselves . this victory is of force , that of reason . 't is not valour to conquer in battle , but to subdue the passions . obedience and necessity make subjects humble and modest ; superiority and power render princes proud ; pride has destroy'd more kingdoms than the sword ; more princes have ruin'd themselves than have been undone by others . the remedy consists in the prince's knowledge of himself , by retiring within himself , and considering , that though the scepter distinguishes him from his subjects , they much exceed him in endowments of mind , more noble than his grandure . that if reason might take place , the most accomplish'd man would be king. that the hand with which he governs the world , is of ●lay , and subject to the leprosie , and all other human miseries , as god gave moses to understand , that knowing his own miseries , he might pity those of others . that a crown is a very unsafe possession , for between the utmost height , and the lowest fall , there is no interposition . that he depends upon the will of others , since if they would not obey , he would be but like other men . the greater the prince shall be , the more he ought to esteem this modesty , since god himself does not disdain it . modesty which hides greatness under it , is like rich enamel upon gold , which gives it the greater value and esteem . tiberius had no artifice more cunning , than to appear modest to gain esteem . he severely reprehended those who call'd his occupations divine , and him lord . when he went into the courts of justice , he would not suffer the president to quit his seat , but sat down upon one corner of the bench . he who is gotten to the highest step among men , cannot rise but by stooping . let all princes learn modesty of the emperor ferdinand the second , who was so familiar and affable to all , that he made himself lov'd rather than reverenc'd . in him goodness and modesty were conspicuous , and majesty found but by attention : he was not the imperial eagle with a sharp beak , and bare talons , threatning all , but the tender pelican , continually digging his own intrails to feed his people as his own young . it cost him no pains to humble his grandure , and make himself equal to others . he was not the master but father of the world , and the excess of modesty often causes contempt , to the ruin of princes , to him it created more respect , and oblig'd all nations to his service and defence . see the force of true goodness , and of a gre●t soul , which triumphs over it self , and is superiour to fortune ! he has left us in the present emperour his son , the lively portraicture of all these qualities , with which he steals the hearts both of friends and enemies . there is no vertue more agreeable to a prince than modesty , all others would be foolish in him , if that did not adjust his looks and actions , not permitting them to exceed themselves . in government 't is very convenient not to touch upon extremes , for too great condescension is not less prejudicial than a haughty grandure . monastick communities may perhaps suffer the rigour of obedience , but not popular ones . such rigid discipline may keep a few in awe , but not many . civil happiness consists in vertue , which consists in the middle , as does civil l●fe and the government of states , for the nature of empire is such , that the people may take it away , without being ruin'd by too much licence , or render'd obstinate by too much rigour . in government we ought not to consider what should be , but what may be . even god adapts himself to human frailty . between these extremes also the body of the common-wealth should be constituted , care being taken that there mayn't be too great difference in the conditions of the citizens ; for excess or inequality of riches or nobility , if it be much , creates in some pride , and in others envy , and from thence proceed enmity and seditions . for there can be no friendship or civil agreement among them who are so unequal in their conditions and fortunes , for all hate equality , and covet more , either to govern as lords , or obey as slaves . some too haughty contemn the laws , and despise obedience ; others too servile , know not how to bear it , and have neither fear of infamy nor punishment , hence there would become a community of lords and slaves , but without respect between themselves , since neither would know how to measure themselves by their own condition . those of the lowest quality pretend to be as those of higher . those who are equal or superiour in one thing , think they are in all . those who have the advantage in all , can't contain themselves , and despising every one would proudly lord it over them , without obedience to him who commands , or adapting themselves to the constitutions and customs of the state , whence proceeds its ruin and conversion into other forms , for all sigh and are uneasie under it . and though it be impossible intirely to remedy this contention in states , because of the difference of condition of the parts of which they consist , yet are they preserv'd if it be moderate , and ruin'd if excessive . as it happens in the four humours of the body , though the blood be the most noble , and the choler the most potent , yet do they mutually preserve one another , while there is no great inequality between them ; so that state will continue long , which consists of moderate parts , and not much unequal between themselves . 't was the extravagant riches of some of the citizens which caus'd the ruin of the state of florence , and is at present the cause of the troubles of genoua . because in venice they are better divided , it has continued so many ages , and if there happen any danger or inconvenience in the government , 't is through the too great poverty of some of its magistrates . if any republick has been preserv'd for all these disorders and excess of its parts , 't is through the prudence and industry of the governour , who keeps it in its devoir , by the fear of the laws , and other discreet means , such as not to wrong any one , nor violate the privileges and conveniencies of the poor , to employ the great ones in the administration , and in offices ; in fine not to oppress , but rather to encourage the hope of those who are of an high and enterprising spirit . but this will continue no longer than it has prudent governours ; and because states can't be sufficiently provided for by these temporal remedies , which depend upon chance , 't is necessary in their first institution , to provide means to correct these excesses , before they happen . emblem xlii . i am indebted , for the body of this emblem , to the civility of the present pope urban the viiith . his holiness having been pleas'd to shew me upon a precious stone , engraven in the time of the romans , two bees drawing a plough , which was found in his time ; a presage of the rise of his noble and ancient family , his arms being joyn'd to the triumphant yoak of the church . which upon reflection put me in mind of a prodigy of king wamb● , when being anointed by the archbishop of toledo , there was seen to spring from his head a bee , which flew streight towards heaven , prognosticating the sweetness of his government : from whence i infer , that the ancients would shew by this emblem , how necessary 't was to mingle , profit with pleasure , the art of making honey , with that of agricultura . for a motto to which , i thought the beginning of that verse of horace would not be amiss . omne tu●it punctum , qui miscuit utile dulci. hor. who mixes gain with sport gains er'y point . in this consists the main art of government ; this was the first piece of policy in the world ; this the ancient philosophy taught us , ●eigning that orpheus made beasts follow him , and that the very stones danc'd to amphion's harp , with which he built the walls of the city of thebes , to signifie that the mild instruction of those great persons were sufficient to reduce men , not less savage than brutes , and more insensible than stones , to the harmony of the laws , and civil society † . these arts all states have used to instruct the people , mingling instruction with sport and publick games . all greece flock'd to mount olympus , to be present at the olympian , pythian , nemaean and isthmian games ; some out of curiosity to see them , others to obtain the propos'd rewards , and upon this occasion they exercis'd their strength , sacrific'd to the gods , and treated of the most important affairs of the government of those provinces . comedies and tragedies were also invented to purge the affections . the gladiators of the romans , and the bull-fights of the spaniards , ( who also are diverted with terrible and desperate enterprizes ) were to confirm the mind that it might not be daunted at the sight neither of blood nor death . wrestling , tilting , horse-races * , and other such sports , are so many schools in which arts military are learn'd , and the mind at the same time recreated and diverted . the people must be drawn by flattery and mildness , to the conveniencies and designs of the prince ; they are like a horse which being gently stroak'd into temper takes the bitt , and afterwards submits to burthens and the lash . they can't bear too much rigour , or too much gentleness . excess of liberty is as dangerous to them as excess of slavery . princes who have wanted this consideration have felt the rage of the incensed multitude . inveterate distempers are not always to be cured by the knife and fire . they require soothing medicines , and when there is need of bitter pills , they should be well gilt , to deceive the sight and tast. 't is not necessary that the people should know the ingredients of the prince's resolutions and counsels , 't is sufficient that they swallow them upon any pretext . the dangers and hardships of war are sweeten'd by the mildness of the prince . thus germanicus to keep the ger●●● legions in obedience , and more ready for battle , us'd to visit the wounded soldiers , and taking notice of their wounds , commend their actions , gaining some by hope , others by good words , and so made them eager to fight . this goodness alone is not effectual , there is need also of some eminent vertue in the commander , that if he be beloved for that he may be respected for this . many times a prince is beloved for his extraordinary goodness , and despised for his insufficiency . respect proceeds not from love , but admiration . he obliges all , who having courage to make himself fear'd , makes himself beloved ; who knowing how to execute justice , knows also to be mercifull . goodness is often interpreted softness and ignorance , in him who has no other vertues to recommend him . these are of such force in a prince , that they soften his se●erity and rigour , being recompenc'd by them . even great vices are excus'd , or at least conniv'd at in him who is master also of great vertues . in negotiations 't is very convenient to mingle sweetness with gravity , and jests with truth , provided it be à propos , without offence to good manners , nor the gravity of the subject , in which the emperor tiberius was well skill'd . there 's none can endure a melancholy roughness , a look always set to business , a grave speech and a formal behaviour . 't is prudence sometimes to mix a little folly in counsels , when 't is well apply'd 't is wisdom . a happy thought and a word in season gains peoples minds , and most difficult affairs to the end proposed , and sometimes discovers the intention , deceives malice , diverts offence , and prevents a positive answer where 't is not convenient . we ought also in negotiations to mingle the advantage of those whom we would perswade , shewing them that 't is their interest as well ours ; for all are mov'd by self-interest , few by obligation and glory . sejanus , to incite drusus to the murther of his brother nero , set before him the hopes of the empire . the skill of a prudent minister consists in facilitating affairs with others interests , disposing the treaty so , that theirs and his own prince's may seem to be the same . to desire to negotiate affairs by self-interest only , is to bring water in broken pipes ; where one receives it from another , all receive assistance and advantage . emblem xliii . all things as well animate as inanimate are leaves of this great book of the world , the work of nature , wherein divine wisdom has written all sciences , to teach and instruct us how to act . there is no moral vertue , which is not found in animals . practick prudence is born in them ; in us 't is not acquired but by instruction and experience . we may learn from them without confusion and shame of our ignorance , for he who informs them , the same is author of all things . but to put on their nature , or desire to imitate them in acting like them irrationally , hurried by the appetite of our affections and passions . would be giving an affront to reason , the proper gift of man , by which he is distinguished from other animals , and merits the command over them . they for want of reason are without justice , each aiming at nothing but its own preservation , without respecting injuries done to others . man justifies his actions , and measures them by equity , doing nothing to others , which he would not have done unto himself . whence may be inferr'd how impious and inhuman is the design of machiavel , who forms his prince upon another supposition , of the nature of the lion and the fox , that what he can't attain by reason he may by force and fraud , in which he was instructed by lysander general of the lacedaemonians , who advis'd a prince , that where the lion's skin fail'd , he should put on that of the fox , making use of his tricks and artifices . this doctrine is of long standing . polybius reprehends it in his own and the foregoing ages . in this king saul may be a lesson to all . this maxim has encreas'd in time , there being no injustice nor indecency , but appears honourable to policy , provided it be in order to dominion , thinking that prince lives precariously , who is tied up to law and justice . whence they regard not breach of treaties , faith , or religion it self , when for the preservation or augmentation of empire . upon these false foundations duke valentine endeavour'd to raise his fortune , but before he had finish'd it , it fell with that violence upon him , that the very fragments and ruins of it were lost . how can that last which is founded upon deceit and lyes ? how can that subsist which is violent ? what force can there be in contracts , if the prince , who should be their security , is himself the first that breaks them ? who will put any confidence in him ? how can his empire stand , who trusts more to his own artifices than to divine providence . nor for all this , would i have a prince so mild , as never to use force , nor so candid and sincere , as not to know how to dissemble , nor provide against deceit , for so he would live exposed to malice , and be play'd upon by all . my design in this emblem is , that he should be indued with valour , but not with that brutish and irrational courage of beasts , but that which is attended by justice , signified by the lyon's skin , the emblem of valour , and therefore dedicated to hercules . sometimes 't is necessary for a prince to cover his face with a frown , and to oppose fraud . he should not always appear mild . there are occasions when he must put on the lion's skin , that his subjects and enemies may see his claws ; and that he may be thought so severe , that fraud may not have the boldness to attack him with flattery , which way it uses to tame the minds of princes . this , it seems the aegyptians would intimate , by putting a lion's skin upon their prince's head . there is no respect nor reverence , where there is no fear . the people perceiving their prince can't be angry , and that nothing can alter his mild temper , always despise him ; but this severity need not immediately come to execution . 't is not necessary for a prince to be really angry , but only to appear so . the lion without discomposing himself , or thinking of hurting any other animals , with his very looks infuses dread into all ; such is the majestick force of his eyes . but because 't is convenient sometimes to gild force with craft , and indignation with mildness , to dissemble a little , and accommodate himself to the times and persons : therefore in the present devise , the lion's head is not crown'd with the little tricks of the fox , which are mean and base , and below the generosity and magnanimity of a prince , but with serpents , the emblem of carefull and prudent majesty , and in the sacred writs the hieroglyfick of prudence , for their cunning in defending their heads , in stopping their ears against all inchantments , and in other things only tending to their own preservation , not the prejudice of others . for the same reason , and the like accidents , i have made use of these words as a motto to the present devise , that he may know how to reign , taken from the motto of lewis the eleventh king of france , who knows not how to dissemble , knows not how to reign . in which the whole art of government is briefly comprehended ; but there is need of great prudence and circumspection , least this power should turn to tyranny , and this policy to fraud : these mediums nearly bordering upon vices . iustus lipsius defining fraud in matters of policy , says , 't is shrewd counsel , deviating from vertue and the laws , for the good of the king and kingdom ; by which avoiding the extremes of machiavel , and finding also , that 't is impossible for a prince to govern without some fraud and cunning , he advises a little , tolerates mediocrity , but forbids extremes ; bounds very dangerous to a prince . for who can exactly describe them ? there ought not to be such rocks so near politick navigation . the malice of power , and ambition of rule , act sufficiently in many ; if fraud be vicious , 't is vicious in its least parts , and therefore unworthy of a prince . the worth and dignity of the royal purple , disdains the least ●spot . the minutest atom is visible , and blemishes the rays of these terrestrial suns . and how can it be suffer'd that his actions should deviate from vertue and the laws , who is the very soul thereof ? there is no fraud without a mixture of malice and falshood , both opposite to royal magnanimity ; though plato says , that falshood is superfluous in the gods , they having no need on 't , but not in princes who have great occasion for it , and that therefore it may be allow'd them sometimes . that which is unlawfull ought not to be allow'd , nor ought we to make use of means in their own nature wicked , to obtain just and honourable ends . dissimulation and cunning are then only lawfull , when they don't drive to knavery , and prejudice the authority and reputation of the prince ; in which case i don't esteem them as vices but prudence , or the daughters thereof , being both advantageous and necessary to a commander : which would be , if prudence respecting its own preservation , would make use of fraud according to the different circumstances of time , place , and persons , so as the heart and tongue , the mind and words may ever agree . that dissimulation ought to be avoided , which with fraudulent intentions belyes the things designed . that which would make another understand that which is not , not that which would make him not understand that which is for this end one may sometimes use indifferent and equivocating words , not with a design to cheat , but to secure ones self , and prevent being cheated , and for other lawfull ends . thus we see the master of truth himself pretended to his disciples , who were going to the city emmaus , that he was going farther . the counterfeit folly of david before king ac●is ; the pretended sacrifice of samuel ; the kids skins fitted to iacob's hands , were all lawfull dissimulations , the intent not being to cheat , but only to hide another design , nor are they the less allowable , because one foresees that another will thereby be deceiv'd , for that knowledge proceeds not from malice , but a kind of caution . and these arts and practices are then chiefly to be made use of , when we treat with designing and crafty princes ; for in such case , distrust , cunning , hypocrisie , ambiguous replies , prudent equivocation , least a prince should be ins●ared , and give occasion for others plots and machinations , defending himself with these arts , and not offending or violating his publick faith , what is this but being upon his guard ? that ingenuity is foolish , which frankly discovers its secret sentiments ; and the state would be in danger without some caution . 't is a dangerous sincerity to speak truth always , since secrecy is the chief instrument of government . whatever prince intrusts a secret to another , at the same time intrusts his sceptre too : it does not become a prince to lye , but it does to be silent , or to conceal truth ; not to trust or confide in any one rashly , but to be wary and circumspect , that he mayn't be cheated . this caution is extremely necessary for a prince , without which he would be expos'd to many and great dangers . he who knows and sees most , believes and trusts least , because either speculation , or practice and experience renders him cautious . let a prince's mind therefore be sincere and pure ; yet skill'd in the arts and practices of others . experience will shew in what cases it becomes a prince to use these arts , that is , when he shall observe that the malice and stratagems of those with whom he deals requires it . in all other actions a prince ought to discover a royal candor , sometimes even to those who would deceive him ; for if they interpret it favourably , their designs are broken and begin to flag : besides no fraud is so generous as truth , of which , if they can be sure , they make him master of the most private secrets of their souls , without arming themselves with the like practices for the future . what nets are not spread , and what stratagems contrived for the cunning and subtilty of the fox ? who ever set snares for the tame innocence of the swallow ? those princes whom the world admires for their prudence and conduct can't make use of this art ; for none will believe that their actions are guided by chance or sincerity ; the demonstrations of their truth are taken for counterfeit : in them caution is accounted malice ; prudence , dissimulation ; and circumspection , deceit . some charge his catholick majesty with these vices , because that by the natural vivacity of his judgment , and his continual experience in war and peace , he was well acquainted with the treacherous dealing , unsincerity of the times , defending himself with so great prudence , that his enemies were either taken in their own snares , or wholly broken by counsel and time. for this reason some princes feign sincerity and modesty , the better to palliate their intentions , or that malice may not so easily trace them . so domitian did . a prince who would be thought wise in all things , is for that reason not so . to know how to be ignorant seasonably is the greatest prudence : there 's nothing more advantageous , nothing more difficult than to be wise with moderation : this tacitus commends in agricola . all conspire against the most knowing , either through envy , or to defend their own ignorance ; or perhaps , because they suspect that which they cannot comprehend . saul seeing that david was too wise , he began to be cautious of him . other princes appear diverted in their actions , that they may be thought to act casually and without design . but such is the malice of policy now a days , that it not only penetrates those arts , but cavils too at the most plain sincerity , to the great prejudice of truth and publick tranquility . there being nothing that is interpreted rightly ; and truth consisting in one point , and those in the circumference , from whence malice may take aim , being infinite , they fall into great errors , who will wrest from anothers words and actions a different sense from what they appear ; and interpreting others designs in the worst sense , cause both parties to arm themselves , and so to live in continual distrust and jealousie of each other . he who is most ingenious in these suspicions is farthest from truth ; for by the acuteness of his wit he penetrates farther than what is generally comprehended ; and we are often positive of that in others which is only a deceit of our own imagination . so to a sailor the rocks seem to run , when 't is only the ship that is in motion . the shadows of policy are usually greater than the body it self , and some times this is neglected , and this made use of , so that there often arises greater damage from the prevention , than could arrive from the thing fear'd . how oft has a prince , through a groundless jealousie , declared war against him who never thought of offending him ? and both taking arms , that which was at first but a slight and ill-grounded presumption , ends in a bloody war : 't is the same with such , as with ill built ships , which the more they sally from side to side , are the sooner lost . i don't blame diffidence , when 't is the daughter of prudence , as we said elsewhere ; but a total defect of good faith , without which , neither friendship , society nor covenants can be lasting . the law of nations would be invalid , and all things would be expos'd to fraud and deceit . all things are not acted with an ill intention . the greatest tyrant sometimes proposes just and honourable ends . emblem xliv . uncertain and dubious is the motion of the serpent winding it self first one way then another , with such uncertainty , that its very body knows not where it will erect its head . you 'd think it made this way , and immediately it moves contrary , without leaving any tract of its passage , nor can the intention of its motion be discover'd . so occult should be the counsels and designs of princes . none ought to know whither they tend ; they should imitate god the great governour of all things , whose ways are past finding out : for which reason the seraphim cover'd his feet with his wings . princes ought so carefully to conceal their designs , that their ministers themselves should not penetrate them ; nay , that they should be the first that should believe otherwise and be deceiv'd , thereby the more naturally and effectually , without the danger of dissimulation , which is easily discover'd to confirm and secure their real intentions , instilling the same error into others , that so it may pass current , and be believed on all sides . thus tiberius did , when some murmur'd that he did not go to pacifie the mutinous legions in hungary and germany , he pretended he would go with all speed , by which deceiving the prudent , he deceiv'd also the people and provinces . the same also did king philip the second , who conceal'd his designs from his own ambassadors , pretending others , when 't was convenient for them to believe them , and perswade others to do so . a prince can by no means use these arts , if his ingenuity be not so cautious and circumspect , as not to discover the real motions of his mind by his manner of government , and let his rivals and enemies penetrate his heart and thoughts ; that he may slip out of their hands , when they think they have him secure . this method by which another is deceiv'd is rather a sort of self defence than malice , where it is used according to reason , as the greatest heroes have always done . what necessity is there of discovering the heart , which nature has on purpose hidden within the breast ? even in the most slight and frivolous affairs , 't is pernicious to divulge them , because it gives occasion by way of discourse to discover farther . yet though the heart be hid within the breast , its ails and distempers are discover'd by the arteries . execution loses its force , not without loss of the reputation of a prince's prudence , if he divulges his designs to the people . secret and unknown designs threaten all , and distract and puzzle an enemy . secrecy in war is more necessary than in other affairs . few enterprises unseasonably detected succeed well . how is he surpriz'd who receives the wound before he sees the weapon ; he who will not stir till he hears the clashing of arms ! this i would have understood of wars against infidels , not of those between christians , which ought to be proclaim'd , that there may be time for satisfaction , by which the effusion of blood may be avoided , this being required to render a war lawfull and just . in this the romans were to be commended , who instituted a college of twenty priests whom they call'd heralds , whose business it was to proclaim war , to make peace , and to establish alliances : these were also judges in such cases , and took care that the party injur'd should receive satisfaction , appointing a term of thirty ● three days for an amicable composition ; in which time , if the disputes were not ended , they declar'd war by throwing a spear into the enemies country , from which day commenc'd acts of hostility and incursions . of these declarations there are divers examples in the scriptures . iephtha being chosen prince of the israelites , did not take up arms against the ammonites , before , by ambassadors , he had enquir'd into the reason which mov'd them to the war . the method of our times is not so humane and generous . we experience the effects of war before we know the cause thereof . an unexpected and sudden invasion makes the injury the greater , and renders the minds of the parties implacable , this generally springs hence , that they take up arms not to satisfie injuries , or atone for damages receiv'd , but only from a blind ambition to enlarge their dominions : in which , without respect to religion , consanguinity or friendship , they trample upon the most sacred laws of nature and nations . if a prince suspects any of infidelity , let him not immediately change the serenity of his looks , or shew any sign of his suspicion , but rather by new flattery and honours endeavour to confirm their minds and oblige them to fidelity . rigour is not always the best and safest remedy . branches lopt off die , and revive not again . thus marcellus conniv'd at lucius bancus of nola , a very rich , and withal very factious person , and though he well knew he sided with hannibal , he call'd him to him , told him , how his vertue and valour were esteem'd by all , particularly by the roman generals , who were witnesses of his bravery at the battle of cannae : he honour'd him with words , supported with hopes and promises ; gave him at all times free access to his presence , and by this courteous usage so oblig'd him , that from that time the roman state had not a more faithfull friend than he . this dissimulation requires great care and prudence , for if the offender should mistrust it , he would interpret it a design to bring him to punishment , and so would sooner fire his mines , or endeavour to preserve himself by other violent means . which is chiefly to be fear'd in tumults and crimes of the multitude . thus fabius valens , though he would not punish the authors of a certain commotion , yet did he permit some of them to be tried . but since 't is very difficult to purge the mind of treason once conceiv'd , and since such crimes ought not to go unpunished , 't is then only fit to connive , when greater danger attends the declaration , or the number of offenders makes the punishment impracticable . this iulius caesar consider'd , when he commanded some letters from pompey to the roman nobility against him , which he had intercepted , to be burnt unopen'd , thinking 't was the mildest method of pardoning , not to know the crime . a piece of true generosity and singular prudence , since 't was impossible to punish all , not to oblige himself to the inconveniencies of connivance . those of mean condition may be made examples , and the great ones conniv'd at , till a more convenient opportunity . but where the delinquents may be punished without danger , 't is safer , by punishing them , to consult self-security , than to trust to dissimulation ; for this often emboldens great spirits . hannibal plotted to poison the carthaginian senate , and upon the discovery of the treason , the senators thought it sufficient to make a law to regulate the excels and expences of feasts , which gave hannibal occasion to plot afresh against them . that art and cunning most becomes a prince , and that dissimulation is most allowable and necessary , which so composes and forms the looks , words and actions towards him whom it would deceive , as that he mayn't mistrust that his designs are discover'd : for by that means there will be time to search farther into them , and either to punish or elude them , while the party is not so sollicitous in the concealment of them ; but if he once find himself betray'd , he begins to tremble , and thinks himself not secure , till he has put his designs in execution . this oblig'd agrippina to pretend not to understand the murther which her son nero design'd her . this dissimulation or feign'd simplicity is very necessary for ministers who ●erve cunning and defigning princes , who make it their care to conceal their intentions ; in this tiberius was a great master . the same artifice the roman senate us'd , when the same tiberius , after the death of augustus , let them know , to try their thoughts , that he would not accept of the empire , it being a burthen too heavy for him ; they by a studied ignorance and forc'd tears begg'd he would please to accept it , all being afraid to seem to understand his meaning . unjust princes hate those who they think understand their ill practices , and take them for enemies . they claim an absolute authority over mens minds , not subject to anothers understanding , they will have their subjects intellects at as much command as their bodies , esteeming it part of their duty and respect not to understand their designs . wherefore 't is disallowable and dangerous to pry into the privacies and secret thoughts of princes . tiberius complaining that he was in danger from some of the roman senators , asinius gallus desir'd to know who they were , that they might be brought to justice , which tiberius took very ill , that he should desire to know what he had a mind to conceal . germanicus acted more prudently , who though he well understood tiberius's meaning , and that he was recall'd from germany , only to stop the progress of his glory , readily obey'd without seeming to understand . since princes commands can't be declin'd , 't is prudence to obey them chearfully , pretending ignorance of the motives , to avoid danger . thus archelaus , though he knew he was call'd to rome by tiberius's mother through craft and treachery , yet he dissembled it , and fearing violence if he should be thought to understand it , made what hast he could thither . and this dissimulation is yet more necessary in the errors and vices of princes , for they esteem them as enemies , who are acquainted therewith . in the banquet at which germanicus was poison'd , some ran for 't , but the more prudent fat still looking upon nero , that they might not be thought to mistrust the murther , but rather to believe that it was natural . emblem xlv . the lion , the body of this devise , was among the aegyptians the emblem of vigilance , and us'd to be set in the frontispieces and porches of their temples . hence alexander the great was engraven upon his coin with a lion's skin upon his head , to intimate that he was not less carefull and vigilant than valiant ; for if at any time affairs requir'd that he should not spend much time in sleep , he was us'd to lie with his arm out of bed , holding a silver ball in his hand , that if he should fall asleep , that falling into a brass bason set underneath for that purpose , might waken him . he had never conquer'd the world , had he been sleepy and lazy , he ought not to snore away his time , who has the government of people committed to him † . thus the lion knowing himself to be king of beasts , sleeps but little , or if he does , 't is with his eyes open : he does not confide so much in his empire , nor relie so much on his majesty , as not to think it necessary to seem to be awake even while he sleeps . the senses do indeed require rest sometimes , but even then 't is necessary princes should be thought to be awake . a sleeping king differs not from another man : this passion he ought to conceal from friends as well as enemies ; he may sleep , provided others think him waking . let him not depend so much upon his authority and power , as to shut his eyes to care and circumspection . 't is a cunning dissimulation in the lion to sleep with his eyes open , not with a design to deceive , but only to hide his sleepiness . and if any one designing against him be deceiv'd , finding him awake whom he thought he had seen sleeping , 't is his own fault not the lion's . nor is this pretence below the greatness of his mind , no more than that other piece of cunning , of smoothing over the tract of his feet with his tail to deceive the huntsmen . there is no fortress secure unless guarded by vigilance . the greater the prince is , the greater care he ought to be crown'd with , not with the sincerity of innocent doves , but the prudence of subtle serpents . for as when the lion enters the field , the other beasts lay aside their natural enmity , and give over fighting , and with joint force combine against him , so among men all arm and unite against the strongest . nothing is more pernicious to the kingdom of england , than the greatness of the dutch , for they take from them the dominion of the seas ; nothing more prejudicial to france , than the grandure of those same rebels , who once breaking down the dikes oppos'd by spain , would , like an inundation soon o'erwhelm the kingdom of france , as king henry the fourth wisely observ'd : and yet what weigh'd more with both these two crowns than their danger , their hatred , i mean , and fear of the spanish monarchy , rais'd that people to that grandure and power , which upon alteration of affairs they may fear against themselves . we are more sollicitous and carefull to avert present dangers than future ones , though these are often greater . fear obstructs the senses , nor permits the mind to survey things at a distance . a groundless fear is often of more force than the greatest reason of state. the power of spain in italy is a preservative against the distempers of the genoese liberty ; the same also preserves the dukedom of tuscany , augments the spiritual empire of the church , maintains the authority of the house of austria , and secures the venetians from the tyranny of the turks ; yet i know not whether the ministers of these princes will acknowledge this , or act conformable to this their interest . such jealousies as are not guided by reason , work their own ruin . they who thought they should be safe in disarming the emperour ferdinand the second , sound afterwards that they had need of those arms which they had caus'd him to disband . many provinces , which for reasons of state sought the ruin of the roman empire lost their own liberty with its ruin . let not a prince put much confidence in exterior respect and ceremony , for 't is all feign'd , and far from what it appears to be ; complaisance is flattery ; adoration , fear ; respect , force ; and friendship , necessity . the good opinion which a prince conceives of others , they make use of to circumvent and betray him . all watch his motions , to make a prey of him ; all strive to overcome him by stratagem whom they can't by force ; few or none act sincerely with him ; for he who is fear'd , seldom hears truth ; and therefore he ought not to sleep in confidence of his own power . let him oppose stratagem with stratagem , and power with power . a generous mind closely and cautiously prevents , or couragiously resists dangers . but though in the present emblem we allow of the arts of dissimulation , nay and think them necessary with the aforesaid restrictions , yet does it more become the ministers than the princes themselves , for in them there is a certain occult divinity which is offended at that care : dissimulation is usually the daughter of fear and ambition , neither of which ought to be discover'd in a prince . the conveniences of dissimulation he ought to supply by silence and reservedness . a prince is more belov'd for being prudent and wary , provided he act with a royal sincerity . all hate artifice , and on the contrary , a natural and open freedom is agreeable to all , as tacitus remarks in petronius . emblem xlvi . an oar under water appears crooked and broken , which is caus'd by the refraction of species : so in many things our opinion deceives us . for this reason the sceptick philosophers doubted of all things , and durst affirm nothing for certain . a wary piece of modesty and prudent distruct of humane judgment , and not without ground : for to a certain knowledge of things , there are required two dispositions , that which is to know , and that which is to be known ; the first is the understanding , which uses the external and internal senses to form imaginations ; the external are variously chang'd according to the abundance or defect of humours . the internal are also subject to changes , either from the same cause , or from the different affections of the organs . whence proceed such different opinions and judgments , one judging differently of the same things from another , and both with equal uncertainty ; for things change their shape and colour with their places , by being near or at a distance , or because none are purely simple , or because of natural mixtures and species which interpose between them and the senses ; so that we can't affirm things are so and so , but that they seem such , forming an opinion not certain knowledge . plato found a yet greater incertainty in them , when he consider'd that there was nothing of so pure and perfect nature as god ; and that in this life we could have no perfect knowledge of any thing , but saw only things present , and those too , reflections and shadows of others , so that 't was impossible to reduce them to a science . not that i would have a prince a sceptick , for he who doubts all determines nothing ; nor is there any thing more pernicious to government , than hesitation in resolving and executing . i only advise that he would not be too positive in his opinions , but believe that he may easily be deceiv'd in his judgment , either through affection , or passion , or false information , or flattery and insinuation , or because he don't care to hear truth which prescribes bounds to his authority and will , or because of the uncertainty of our own apprehension ; or lastly , because few things are really what they appear , especially in policy , which is now a-days nothing but the art of cheating , or not being cheated ; wherefore they ought to be viewed in different lights , and a prince ought carefully to consider and weigh them not slightly to pass them over , least he should give credit to appearances and groundless stories . these cheats and politick tricks can't be well known , unless the nature of man be also known ; for the knowledge of him is absolutely necessary for a prince , that he may know how to govern and beware of him . for tho' government be an invention of men , 't is in no danger but from them ; for man has no greater enemy than man. the eagle hurts not the eagle , nor the serpent the serpent ; but man is continually plotting against his own kind . the dens of beasts are open and unguarded , but three of the four elements are not sufficient for the guard of cities , viz. earth cast up into walls and entrenchments , water confin'd to ditches , and fire enclos'd in artillery . that some may sleep , the rest must watch . what instruments are there not invented against life , as if it were not of it self short enough , and subject to the infirmities of nature ; and tho● the seeds of all vertues and vices are in man as their proper subject ; 't is with this difference , that those can't grow and increase without the dew of celestial and supernatural grace ; but these do spontaneously bud out and flourish , which is the effect and punishment of man's first sin ; and as we always suffer our selves to be led by our inclinations and passions , which hurry us to ill , and as there is not the same danger in vertue as in vices , we therefore will lay before a prince a short description of deprav'd human nature . man is then the most inconstant animal in the creation ; pernicious both to himself and others ; changes with his age , fortune , interest and passion ; nor does the sea vary so oft as his condition . he is deluded by empty appearances , and through self-conceit persists in his errour . revenge and cruelty he esteems praise-worthy and honourable . is well vers'd in hypocris●e , and can dissemble his passions a great while . with words , laughter and tears he conceals his thoughts . veils his designs with religion . confirms and maintains lyes with oaths . is a slave to hope and fear . favours make him ungratefull . dominion proud . constraint vile and abject . law fearfull . benefits he inscribes on wax ; injuries receiv'd on marble ; and those he offers on brass . he is subject to love ▪ not out of charity , but an appearance of good . a mere slave to anger . in adversity prostrate and cringing . in prosperity arrogant and proud . what he commends in himself ▪ and affects , he wants ; calls himself a true friend , but knows not what friendship means . slights his own and covets o●hers goods . the more he has , the more he desires . the good fortune and prosperity of others kills him with envy under shew of friendship , he is the greatest enemy . loves the rigour of justice in others , but hates it in himself . this is a description of humane nature in general , nor are all these vices in one person , but dispers'd in several . and though a prince think that some one is wholly free from them , let him not therefore be less cautious of him , for there is no certainty in the judgment which is made of the condition and nature of men . vice often puts on the mask of vertue , the better to deceive , and the best of men may be deficient sometimes , either through human frailty , or the inconstancy of the times , or necessity , or interest , or appearance of publick or private good , or over-sight , or want of knowledge ; whence it happens that the good are not less dangerous than the bad ; and in case of doubt , 't is more prudent for a prince to avoid the danger , remembring ( not to offend , but to defend ) that , as ezekiel said , briars and thorns are with him , and he dwells among scorpions , whose tails are always ready to strike such generally are courtiers , they all advance their own pretensions by deluding the prince , or by removing his best and most deserving favourites , by means of his own power . how often have waves of envy and jealousie been interpos'd between the eyes of the prince , and the minister's actions , making those appear crooked and disloyal which are drawn by the rule of justice and his service . thus vertue suffers , the prince loses a good minister , and malice triumphs in its practices ; which that he may practically know , and not suffer innocence to be wrong'd , i will here set down the most usual . there are some courtiers so subtle and cunning , that while they seem to excuse their rival's faults , they then most accuse them . so augustus reprehended the vices of tiberius . others there are , who to cover their malice , and gain credit under pretence of goodness , begin under the title of friendship , with the praises of him whom they would remove , extolling some little insignificant service , and at the same time by a feign'd zeal for the princes interest , which they pretend to prefer before all friendship and relation , gradually discover his faults , which may procure his disgrace or loss of place . but if their ambition and malice can't procure this , they at least establish their own reputation by carping at their friends faults , and gain themselves glory by his infamy . alphonso the wise king of naples was well acquainted with all these practices ; wherefore when he heard one full of the praises of his enemy ; observe , says he , the artifice of that man , and you will find that the drift of these commendations is only to do him more mischief . and so it fell out , when he had for six months endeavour'd to gain credit to his intentions , that he might afterwards the sooner be believ'd in what he should say against him . mines are always sprung at a distance from the walls where they are to do execution . those friends who praise you are worse than enemies who murmur at you . others , that they may cheat more securely , praise in publick , and in private scandalize . nor is their subtilty less malicious , who so adorn their calumnies , that they look like praises ; as aleto did in t●sso . gran fabro di calumnie adorne in modi novi , che sono accuse e payen lodi . these the psalmist meant , when he said , they were turned aside like a deceitful bow . or as hosea the prophet says , like a deceitfull bow , which 〈◊〉 at one place and hits another . some extoll their rivals to that degree , that it may plainly appear they don't speak seriously and really , as was observ'd in tiberius when he prais'd germanicus . others make use of these commendations to raise their enemy to such posts as may at last ruin them , or at least procure their removal from court , though to his greater advantage ; which i believe was among others , the reason why ruigomez caus'd ferdinand duke of alba to be sent into flanders , when those provinces revolted . with the same in t ntion macian prais'd anthony in the senate , and pro●pos'd for him the government of the neither spain ; and to facilitate it , he divided his offices and honours among his friends . 't is scarce credible , how liberal envy is , when it would remove him who eclipses its glory or obstructs its rise : 't is a wave which drives him who can't swim , upon the shore of fortune . sometimes commendations are us'd with a design of creating envy to the party prais'd ; a strange way of striking , with others vices . many endeavour to introduce their own creatures with such artifice , as no one can penetrate their designs ; and to that end , they first carp at some trivial faults committed by others in the same offices , then praise and cry up others as more fit for those places , and sometimes they entertain them as if they had no knowledge of them , as lacon did piso , that he might be adopted by galba . others , the better to conceal their passion , lay their plots at a distance , and instill their hatred gradually into the prince's mind , that being at last full , he may burst upon their enemies . these means sejanus us'd to alienate the mind of tiberius from germanicus and these the holy spirit seems to condemn under the metaphor of plowing lyes which is the same as sowing tares in the mind , that they may afterwards reap the fruit of wickedness some , not with less cunning , first deceive those ministers in whom the prince has most confidence , by insinuating into them some falshoods , which they afterwards imprint in the prince . this was the art of that lying spirit of the prophet micaiah , which propos'd to deceive king achab , by being in the mouth of all his prophets , and god permitted it as the most effectual means there are others , who make advantage of the injuries the prince has receiv'd , and perswade him to revenge , either that they may themselves be thereby reveng'd of their enemies , or else cause him to be turn'd out of favour and trust. by this artifice iohn pacheco perswaded king henry the ivth . to apprehend alphonso fonseca archbishop of sevil , and afterwards advis'd him privately to provide for his own safety . these are the usual practices of courts , and though they are oft discover'd , yet they never want patrons , nay , there are those who will suffer themselves to be cheated twice ; whence we often see bare-fac'd impostors remain at court so long ; an effect of the weakness of our deprav'd nature , which is more taken with lyes than truth . we are more apt to admire the picture of a horse than a real one , that being but a lye of th' other . what is rhetorick with all its tropes and figures , but a kind of falshood and cheat ? from all which we may see , how much danger there is of a prince's being deceiv'd in his opinion , unless he with great application and diligence examine things , suspending his belief , untill he not only sees the things themselves , but also as it were , feels them , those especially which he has only by hear-say . for the breath of flattery , and the winds of hatred and envy enter at the ears , and raise the passions and affections of the mind , before there can be any certainty of the truth of the thing . 't would therefore be very convenient for a prince to have his ears near his thoughts and reason . as are the owl's ( for that reason perhaps sacred to minerva ) upon the top of its head , the chamber of the senses , all of which we have need of in hearing , least our ears should deceive us . let a prince therefore take great care thereof , for when the ears are once free from affections , and reason sits there as judge , every thing is well examin'd ; all things relating to government depend upon the relation of others : therefore what aristotle said of bees seems improbable ; that is , that they are deaf ; for that would be a great inconveniency for that prudent and politick little animal , since those two senses , hearing and seeing , are the instruments through which we draw wisdom and experience ; both these we have need of to prevent our being deceiv'd by passion , nature or inclination . the prepossess'd moabites thought the waters upon which the sun shone , were blood . the same noise of the people , to the ears of warlike ioshua , seem'd their shoots to battle ; and to those of gentle moses a harmony of musick . for which cause , god , though omniscient , would verifie with his eyes what he had heard of sodom and gomorrha . when therefore a prince shall have seen , heard , and felt things , he can't be deceiv'd , or if he be , 't will not be his fault . from all which we may see how ill contriv'd was that image of the thebans , by which they express'd the qualifications of their princes , for it had ears , but no eyes , these being full as necessary as those : the ears to know things , and the eyes to believe them , in which the eyes are most trusty , for truth is no farther distant from a lye than the eyes from the ears . nor has a prince need of less diligence and attention in discussing the counsels and proposals of his ministers , before he puts them in execution ; such as concern raising money , regulating the government , and other matters relating to peace and war , for their usual aim is their own particular interest , and effects don 't always correspond to our expectations . ingenuity often approves counsels which experience afterwards rejects . yet is it imprudence wholly to slight them , for the success of one only makes amends for the vanity of the rest . spain had never obtain'd the empire of the new world , if their catholick majesties had not gave more credit to columbus than other princes . yet to be over credulous or confident to act whatever is propos'd , is either levity or folly. first , the condition of the proposer is to be consider'd , his experience in the matter ; what end he may have in deceiving ; what interest if he succeeds ; also the means and time by which he thinks to accomplish it : nero , for want of these considerations , was much disappointed about a treasure which one told him he had found in africk . many projects at first seem considerable , which prove at last vain and useless . many seem light and frivolous , from whence result great advantages . many which have been successfully experienc'd in small matters , in affairs of greater moment succeed not . many seem easie to reason , which are difficult in the operation . many are prejudicial at first , and advantageous afterwards , and so on the contrary ; and many have different effects from what were at first propos'd . the lazy and blind vulgar don't know truth , unless they light on it by chance , for they foolishly form opinions of things before reason foresees the inconveniences , and promise themselves a more certain knowledge from the success , the guide of the ignorant , and so if any one should go about to argue these people out of their opinions he would lose his time and pains . there are no better means , than to make them see and feel their errors ; so startling horses use to be whip'd and spur'd to make them go forwards to see the vanity of the shadow which frightned them . this means pacuvius us'd to appease the people of capua , who rose against the senate : he first shut all the senators by their own consent , into a certain hall ; then calls the people together , tells them , that if they have a mind to take off or punish the senators , now is their time , for they are lock'd up without arms ; but withal tells them , it would be necessary to take them one by one , and immediately to elect another in the room of him whom they took off , for that without those heads the state could not subsist a moment . he puts all their names in a pot , draws out one , and asks the people what they would have done with him ; they all cry out , let him die ; then he advises them to elect another ; this confounds them , and they don't know who to propose ; and so a second and third time they could not agree upon their choice . at last their confusion taught them , that 't was better to bear with an ill already experienc'd , than to attempt a remedy , and so they immediately commanded the senators to be releas'd . the people is very furious in its opinions , and 't is often , especially upon any imminent danger , a piece of great management in a prince to govern it with his own hand , keeping pace with it in its ignorance . the people are often reduc'd to their duty , by laying before them the incoveniences which have hapned in the like cases ; for they are more mov'd by example than reason . emblem xlvii . even vertues have their dangers ; they should be always in a prince's mind , but not always in exercise . publick interest ought to dictate when and where to use them . us'd without prudence , they either become vices , or are not less hurtfull than them . in a private person they respect only him ; in a prince both him and the state too . they ought to suit with the common interest of all , not with that of particular persons . civil science prescribes certain limits to the vertue of him who commands and him who obeys . justice is not in the power of the minister , but ought always to be directed by the laws . in the prince , who is the soul thereof , it has certain considerations , which respect the government in common . in the subject commiseration can never be excessive ; in a prince 't is often dangerous . to demonstrate this in the present emblem , i have made use of that method , which according to sanaz●ro and garcilazo , the shepherds us'd to catch crows . which shews princes with how much circumspection they ought to interest themselves in the misfortunes and dangers of others . they fastned a crow by the pinions of its wings to the ground , this seeing others fly by , would , by making a grievous noise , excite them to pity , and come down to its assistance . cercavanla , i alguna mas piadosa del mal ageno de la companera . quae del fnyo à visada , ô timerosa , &c. for that which was fastned to the ground , catches hold of another with its claws , thereby to free it self , and that again of another , which the same compassion brought to their assistance ; so that for the sake of one another , they are all caught . in which something may be attributed to the novelty of the accident , for sometimes that appears compassion which is only a motion of natural inquietude . i allow the eyes and heart to be mov'd with compassion , at the misfortunes and complaints of foreign princes . but not to arm upon every slight occasion for their defence . for a private person to expose himself to dangers to serve his friend , is brave and commendable , but in a prince blameable , if he hazzards the publick safety for the service of a foreigner , without good grounds and reasons of state ; nor are those of consanguinity or private friendship sufficient . for a prince is born more for his subjects than his relations and friends ; he may indeed assist them , but without incurring any damage or danger . when assistance renders the danger so common , that the ruin of one draws after it that of the other , there is no tie of obligation or piety can excuse it : but when interests are so interwoven and united , that one must follow the fate of th' other , who-ever assists in that case acts his own cause ; and 't is more prudence ( as we have said ) to oppose dangers in a foreign state than to expect them at home . also when 't is the publick interest to assist the oppressed ; the prince who is most potent , is , without doubt , obliged to it . for between princes justice can't have recourse to the common tribunals ; 't is in the authority and power of the strongest , that it finds refuge . in such case 't would be a kind of tyranny to be an idle spectator only , and give way to that policy which aims to imbroil other princes , that themselves may be more secure through their dissensions , and raise their own fortunes upon the ruin of others , for such as these the supreme judge of the intentions severely punishes . these cases require great prudence , to weigh the ingagement with the interest , least we should ▪ entangle our selves in others misfortunes , and make their danger ours , for we must not afterwards expect the same return . spain pitied the misfortunes of the empire , and assisted it with its blood and treasures , from whence proceeded the invasions which france made in italy , flanders , burgundy and spain , the whole war lying at present upon this monarchy , yet won't some in germany acknowledge this , or believe that it is for their sakes . experience therefore in our own and others misfortunes ought to make us more cautious in our commiseration and assistance . how often , by assisting the misfortunes of our friends , have we lost both our selves and him , being afterwards ungratefull for the benefit ! how often have these incurr'd the hatred of a prince by those very means by which they have endeavour'd to serv'd him . germanicus was adopted by tiberius , appointed to succeed him in the empire , and so faithfull in his service , that he took it as an affront , that the legions should offer him the empire , and when they press'd him to it would have stabb'd himself ; and the more faithfully he behav'd himself , the less gratefull he was to tiberius . his care in appeasing the legions with donatives was distastfull . his piety in gathering and burying the relicts of var●s's army , he interpreted ambition . the compassion of his wife agrippina in cloathing the soldiers , seem'd a desire of rule . in a word , all germanicus's actions were misinterpreted . germanicus knew this hatred , and that he was call'd upon pretence of honour , from his true glory in germany , and endeavour'd to oblige him more by obedience and observance ; but this made him still more odious , till gratitude , oppress'd by the weight of obligation , he sent him to the eastern provinces , where he caus'd him to be poison'd by piso , rejoycing in the death of him , who was the support of his empire some princes are idols , whose eyes are , ( as ieremiah says ) blinded with the dust of those who enter in to worship them . they acknowledge no services , and what is worse , won't be convinc'd of them , nor that their liberty is subject to desert , and therefore take great care to disengage themselves from it . him who has perform'd signal services they charge with some crime or other , that his pretension to reward being reduc'd to a defence , he may take his pardon for a sufficient recompence . they seem dis-satisfied with those very services which they inwardly approve ; to avoid being oblig'd , or they attribute them to their own orders , and sometimes that very thing which they desir'd and commanded to be done , they repent of afterwards , and are angry with him who facilitated it , as if he had done it from his own motive . the heart of a king is unsearchable . 't is a deep sea which is to day boisterous and raging , from the same cause which made it yesterday calm and serene . the goods of fortune and mind , and also riches and honours , they sometimes e●●eem meritorious , sometimes injurious and criminal . the most officious diligence often displeases them . that of uzza● to god , in putting forth his arm to support the falling ark , cost him his life . princes usually recompence negligence rather than care , and reward the least services with greatest honours . to be oblig'd they reckon servile and mean , and chuse ingratitude rather than acknowledgment . the prompt zeal and liberality of iunius blaesus towards the emperor vitellius got him his hatred instead of thanks . the renown'd roger of catalo●ia , being at constantinople to assist fadricus king of sicily , was recall'd by the emperor andronicus to defend the empire ; he did things beyond belief ; with a small number of his valiant catalonians ; he repell'd the turks , and when he expected a reward for his services , the emperour upon some slight pretence , put him to death . and very often some frivolous pretence is more regarded than the greatest services ; for gratitude is esteem'd a burthen to the mind , but revenge discharges the bile . there is this misfortune in the service of princes , that no man knows when he obliges or disobliges them . and if we would form any method of policy from the light of history , and the misfortunes which we incur through our over●officiousness , we had need distinguish between vertues , that we may know how to use them , by considering that though they are all in us as their proper subject , yet do they not all operate within us . some are practised externally , others internally . these are fortitude , patience , modesty , humility , religion , among which , some are only so far for us , that those external ones contribute no more thereto , than the security of humane society , and an esteem for their own excellence , as are humility , modesty , and humanity . so that the more perfect these vertues are , the more they work upon the minds and approbation of others , provided we can keep a decorum . other of those vertues , though they are internal , yet their operation depends upon external actions , as valour and magnanimity . in these there is no danger , if they be govern'd by prudence , which prescribes time and manner to all vertues . for excessive and imprudent reservedness usually obstructs our interest ; we losing our selves under a notion of reputation and glory , while those who suit themselves to the times , necessity and fla●tery , obtain the rewards and commendations . in the exercise of those vertues which respect the good of others , such as liberality and compassion , there is always some danger , because neither the rewards of princes , nor the acknowledgments of friends are answerable to them ; we perswade our selves that our services will be acceptable , and that to assist our misfortunes , they will reciprocally expose their own lives and fortunes . into this error we are led by our own sense of gratitude , which often makes us heedless of our own ruin , to satisfie for obligations receiv'd . but if we fall into any calamity they withdraw and desert us . there were but three of iob's friends who visited him in his afflictions , and they too by god's command : nor did they assist him but with words and severe advice , which he had need of all his patience to bear . but after god again smil'd upon iob , and began to heap on him riches in abundance , then came flocking to him , not only his brethren and relations , but those too who knew him not but by sight , and sat down at table with him , that they might partake of his prosperity . this error , under pretence of mutual assistance and obligation has been the ruin of many , who have reap'd nought but ingratitude and hatred from their benefits and kindnesses , and created enemies of those who before were their friends , so that they die friendless and miserable . the holy spirit has cautioned us of this : my son , says he , if thou be surety for thy friend , if thou hast stricken thy hand with a stranger ; thou art snar'd with the words of thy mouth , thou art taken with thine own words . he advises us to deliver our selves from the hand of a friend , as a roe from the hand of the hunter , and as a bird from the hand of the fowler . do good but look about ye , is a spanish proverb drawn from experience . those are not subject to these misfortunes who live only to themselves , nor suffer themselves to be mov'd by compassion or charity , to assist the calamities of others , being deaf to their tears and groans , avoiding all occasions of intermedling with them , whence they live free from cares and troubles , and if they gain not new friends , they however keep those they have ; not being esteem'd for the good they do , but for the ill they don't do , this being in them accounted prudence . besides we naturally esteem them most , who have least need of us , who without being beholden to us , live content with their own . whence considering the usual custom of mankind , it may perhaps seem adviseable to be an idle spectator of others calamities , and minding only our own interests , not to engage our selves in their dangers and troubles . but this policy would be against our duty as christians , charity , and generous vertues , which gives us a nearer access to god. this would dissolve all civil society , which wholly consists in the mutual assistance of one another . vertue needs no outward acknowledgments ; being to it self a fair reward . nay , 't is then most perfect and glorious , when it expects the least return ; for 't is a kind of avarice to do good in hopes of a retaliation , which if not obtain'd creates a lasting resentment . let us therefore be guided by the consideration of what we owe our selves , and also by the example of god almighty , who bestows his blessings even on the ungratefull . yet 't is prudence to have respect to the time when and where acknowledgments may be expected , for 't is too hard for a man , after great expences , great hazards and hardships undergone for another , to meet with nothing but ingratitude in return . to him who understands the nature and usual ways of mankind , this will not seem at all new ; but foreknowing it , will ward the blow , and avoid being hurt . we should also well consider , whether it be really our friend's interest for us to undertake his assistance : for sometimes we do him an injury by our diligence , because 't is either unseasonable or imprudent , by which we ruin both our selves and him too . this officiousness thraseas check'd in rusticus arulenus , though in his own behalf , knowing that kindness would be prejudicial to the intercessor , and of no advantage to the criminal . nor is it less imprudent and dangerous to be over zealous for the publick good and welfare of the prince , then especially , when without obligation of duty , or certain prospect of remedy , we intermeddle with their concerns to our own apparent ruin . i don't mean , that we should be insensible at the sight of others sufferings , or that for our own ease and quiet we should basely truckle to the times and tyranny . but that we should not foolishly ruin our selves , and that we should follow the example of lucius piso , who in difficult and deplorable times , knew how to preserve himself with such prudence , that he was never the author of any servile proposition , and upon absolute necessity , did it with great moderation . oftentimes we are forward in giving our advice in things which don 't concern us , perswaded that therein consists the remedy of the publick ills : not considering how easily we are deceiv'd with a conceit of our own opinions , without particular knowledge of the motives upon which princes act . nothing is more dangerous than to advise ; even he who is oblig'd in duty to it , ought to avoid it if not ask'd ; for advice is judg'd by the event , and that depends upon future accidents , which no prudence can foresee , and that which falls out ill is attributed to the counsellor , but not that which succeeds well . emblem xlviii . how are princes arm'd against foreign enemies ! and how unprovided against domestick ones ! who follow them even through the midst of their guards , yet do they take no notice of them . these are flatterers and parasites ; nor is there less danger from their fawns than from an enemy's sword. flattery has ruin'd more princes than force . what royal purple has not this moth eaten ? what sceptre has not this worm gnaw'd ? it insinuates it self into the tallest cedars , and preying upon the root soon brings them to the ground . 't is a damage not discern'd , but by entire ruin ; the effect is sooner seen than the cause . 't is a false silk-worm which inhabits the gilded roofs of palaces . the present emblem compares it to a lizzard , with a gay sta●ry back and poison'd breast . it appears to the prince under the shining cloak of zeal , the better to conceal its pernicious designs . let a prince know , that all brightness does not denote the excellence of the subject ; for in the scripture it is a sign of a leprosie ; and rotten wood gives a kind of light in the dark . there are some glimmerings of good , even in the blackest soul. sometimes in the very bowels of severity , the assertor of liberty , and opposer of the prince . flattery basely discovers it self ; as when valerius mesalla propos'd the administring the oath of allegiance to tiberius each year , and being ask'd by whose order he did it , he reply'd , that 't was from his own proper motive ; for that in all matters of publick concern , he would follow the dictates of his own reason , even though he should offend by it . not unlike this , was that of ateius , who when lucius ennius was accus'd of having destroy'd the silver statue of tiberius , to make house plate on , and tiberius being willing to wave the accusation , openly oppos'd it , saying , that the senators ought not to be depriv'd of the power of judging , nor should such a crime go unpunish'd ; that he might indeed forgive his own grievances , but should not be prodigal of the injuries done the state . the lizzard changes its skin every year , so also does flattery , as oft , i mean , as the prince changes his mind . the ministers of king alphonso the tenth , advis'd him to divorce queen violante , for barrenness , arguing , that the marriage was void , which they afterwards declar'd valid , and perswaded the king to retake her to his bed † there is no animal more cunning than the lizzard , whence the lawyers call all false practice crimen stellionatus . who uses more cheats than the flatterer , imposing upon the will , the noblest faculty of man ; so much above the other senses , that without it the rest would be inslav'd . the lizzard does not kill him whom it wounds , but only benumbs him , and puts him , as it were , beside himself , by raising divers passions in him . the proper quality of a flatterer , who with specious pretences charms the eyes and ears of princes , and put them so beside themselves , that they can't search the truth of things . the lizzard is so inveterate against man , that when it casts its skin , it eats it up , least it should be usefull in the cure of the falling-sickness . a flatterer desires a prince may not recover from his errors ; for disabuse is the son of truth , which is an utter enemy to flattery . flatterers envy the prosperity of princes , and hate them as those who by their power , and a certain necessity oblige them to the slavery of dissimulation and flattery , and force them to speak one thing and think another . a prince has need of great prudence to distinguish flattery : for it consists in praise , which he will find from those who are far from that vice. this is the difference that a flatterer promiscuously commends all , honourable or base , good or bad ; but the other only that which is just and good . when therefore a prince sees things attributed to him which are due to others , or which are mere accidents ; frivolous things commended and extoll'd which don 't deserve it , such as tend more to pleasure than reputation . such as avert his mind from the toil of affairs , such as respect more his own advantage than the publick interest , and that the person who so commends these things , does not rightly govern himself , that he does not shew any concern or readiness to admonish him , when he commits any thing below his person and majesty ; nay , that he excuses his errors , and regards more his own interest than his service , that he never seems offended at any thing , that he may he always near him , that he does not associate with those who are zealous patriots and lovers of their country . that he praises those whom he thinks agreeable to him , and whom , if he would , he cannot turn out of favour , that when he finds himself fixt therein , makes it his business to gain the esteem of others , by attributing all good success to himself , and by accusing the prince in that he did not follow his counsel ; that to gain credit , he brags that he reprehended his errors , when in private he excus'd commended and approv'd . such a one as this a prince may well mark for a flatterer , whom he ought to avoid as the most venomous poison , and directly opposite to that sincere love with which he ought to be serv'd . but though these marks are plain enough , yet is self conceit generally so blind , as not to discern flattery , but suffer it self to be coax'd with its own praises , which exercise an agreeable tyranny over the senses , so that there is no flattery so gross , which it does not believe its due . sometimes this happens from a remiss and negligent goodness , which not duly considering the inconveniences of flattery , bears it , and interprets it submission and zeal . this was the fault of ferdinand king of galicia , who was hated of his subjects for listening too much to flatterers . and king alphonso the ninth , for the same reason , did not a little obscure the glory of his other vertues and exploits . let princes therefore believe , that they may be so deceiv'd either through self-conceit , or their natural goodness , that though there be sufficient tokens to distinguish flattery , which that they may know and avoid , i would advise them to read history , and observe by what tricks and cheats their ancestors were cajol'd , and what losses they have incurr'd thereby , and then consider , whether or no they are not serv'd in the same manner . one time only , when king ahasuerus could not sleep , and commanded the chronicles to be read to him , he presently learn'd from thence what never any one durst tell him , the designs and tyranny of his favourite haman , and the faithfull services of mordecat : those hid hitherto by dissimulation and flattery , these stifled through malice , by which being disabus'd , he punish'd the one and rewarded the other . yet even in this they ought to beware of flattery , wherefore let them read themselves ; for perhaps if another reads , he will either pass over those cases which should instruct them , or change some sentences and words . o unhappy state of majesty , which can't be sure of the truth even of books , which are esteem'd the faithfullest friends of mankind . a prince ought also to get a sight of all libels which are publish'd against him : for though malice dictate them , yet truth writes them , and he will find therein what his courtiers conceal , and gather prudence and instruction from his infamy . tiberius seeing how he had been cheated , in not discovering the practices of sejanus in time , caus'd to be publish'd the will of fulcinius trius , which was a satyr upon him , that he might see , though to his shame , the truths which flattery had conceal'd from him . let not a prince always view his own actions in the glass of those that are about him , but rather let him consult strangers , zealous men , and such as are of strict lives and conversation , and observe if they all agree in one opinion : for the variable and inconstant glasses of flattery never represent things as they really are , but as the prince would have them . and 't is better to be corrected by the wi●e , than cheated by the flattery of fools . to this end 't is necessary sometimes to consult one , sometimes another , making them lay aside modesty and fear , by letting them know the obligation they are under to speak truth . even samuel durst not freely tell what god commanded him , to eli the high-priest , until he entreated him . let a prince sometimes view himself in the glass of the people , in which the least spot immediately appears , for the mob can't dissemble . lewis the fourth of france , would , disguis'd , mix himself with the crowd , and hear what they said of his actions and government . he that would find truth , must seek her in the streets . lewis the eleventh of france us'd to complain , that he wanted one piece of furniture in his palace , which was truth . which is too modest and plain to live in courts , being confounded in the presence of kings . for this reason saul disguised himself when he went to consult the witch of endor , that she might answer him with more freedom ; and he did this himself without trusting to another . ieroboam also observ'd the same method , when he sent his wife to ahijah to enquire about their sick child . he commanded her to disguise her self , that he might not know her , least if he should , he might either give her no answer at all , or not tell her truth . since then truth is not to be found in the palaces of princes , she must be trac'd out else-where ; 't is the honour of a king to search out a matter . king philip the second had a favourite , whom he lov'd extremely , who us'd to inform him of whatever was said of him as well within as without the court. 't is observable , that though the discourses of the people in the absence of the prince , be true , yet when they come to his ears they are so softned , and gilded with flattery , that they rather encourage , and blindly make him pursue his vices , perswading him that his actions are highly approv'd by all . no government was more tyrannical than that of tiberius ; no favourite more hated than sejanus ; yet when they were at caprea , the senate earnestly begg'd , that they would please to let them see them . nero was so miserably deceiv'd by the flattery of the people , that he believ'd they could not bear his absence from rome , though for never so small a time , and that his presence comforted them in their adversity ; though he was really so odious , that the senate and nobility were in doubt , whether he was more cruel in his absence than his presence . there are other ways to know flattery , but few princes care to make use of them , it being so agreeable to their inclinations and nature ; and so we see coiners punish'd , but not flatterers , though the last are most guilty ; these gild and counterfeit our money , those our vices , putting them off even to our selves for vertues . this is a great fault , which is still decry'd , yet still maintain'd in the courts of princes ; where truth appears not without danger , especially with haughty and passionate princes . bernardo de cabrera lost his life for his friendly advice in some affairs to peter the ivth of arragon , notwithstanding his signal services , and his having been his tutor . he who advises or informs another , seems to accuse his actions and judgment , which princes won't endure ; for they think he don 't sufficiently respect them , who talks to them freely . gutierrez fernandez of toledo with an honest and well-meaning sincerity , told king peter the cruel , what he thought of his government , and advis'd him to moderate his severity ; which meritorious advice the king took for such a crime , that he caus'd him to be beheaded for it * . a prince looks upon him as his judge , who observes his actions , nor can he endure him who finds fault with them . the danger is in admonishing a prince what he should do , not what he would do : which is the reason truth is so timorous , and flattery so audacious . but if any prince would be so generous , as to think it base and mean to be coax'd by flattery , and look upon it as a contempt for others to pretend to impose upon him , by false praises , and speak more of his grandure than his person , he would soon be rid of this sort of cattle by arming himself with severity ; for none will dare attempt a stanch and severe prince , who fathoms the truth of things , and has learnt to contemn vain honours . tiberius with the same composure of countenance , heard the freedom of piso , and the flattery of gallus . and though he dissembled so well , he knew the flattery , as he did that of ateius capito , considering their thoughts , not their words . let a prince also publickly gratifie those who shall be so ingenuous as to tell him truth . thus clisthenes the tyrant of sicily did , who erected a statue to one of his counsellors , who contradicted his triumph , by which he wonderfully gain'd the hearts of his subjects , and encouraged his other counsellors to speak their sentiments more freely . king alphonso the twelfth , being once advising about an affair of great moment , with his sword in his right hand , and his sceptre in his left , spoke to this effect : come , says he , speak all your minds freely , and frankly advise me what you think for the glory of this sword , and the advantage of this scepter * . happy that kingdom , in which counsel is neither embarrass'd by respect , nor aw'd by fear ! all men know the baseness of flattery , but they know too the inconveniencies of truth , and see more danger from this than that . who would not speak with more sincerity and zeal to princes , were they all of the same temper with iohn the second king of portugal , who when one petition'd for some vacant office , reply'd , that he had long since promis'd it to a faithfull servant , who never spoke to please , but to serve him and the state † . but this generous sincerity is very rarely to be found ; princes being usually of king achab's mind , who calling a council of prophets , would have micah excluded , because , says he , he doth not prophecy good concerning me , but evil . for this reason , ministers often run great risques , who through zeal are too forward in telling their thoughts of future dangers , that they may be seasonably prevented . for princes had rather not know them than fear them ; their ears are prepar'd for the soft harmony of musick , but can't bear the jarring sounds of impending dangers . whence they chose for their counsellors and confidents , such as will tell them nothing but what they approve of , and not what god inspires as the prophet micah did . what wonder then , if without the light of truth they lose their way and are lost ? would these tell-truths be guided by prudence , doubtless a prince would more value truth , than vain and empty flattery ; but there are few who use it seasonably ; or with that modesty and address that is requisite . for all that are free are morose , and offend princes with the asperity of their looks , especially when arm'd with truth ; for some vertues are odious , such as obstinate severity , and a spirit not to be gain'd by favours . for princes think themselves slighted , when they see those measures , which are usually taken to obtain their favour are contemn'd , thinking he who does not study to acquire them , neither acknowledges himself their subject , nor has occasion for them . the superiour uses the lancet or incision knife of truth , to cure the distempers of the inferiour , but this only a caustick , which without pain benumbs , and wears away the parts infected in the superiour . to be troublesome with unseasonable and improper truths , is rather malice than zeal , rather sauciness that admonition . god himself uses singular prudence and caution in revealing them ; for though he might have told pharaoh and nebuchadnezzar their future calamities by ioseph and daniel ; yet he chose rather to do it by dream , when the senses were ●ull'd and majesty buried in sleep , and even then not clearly , but by figures and hieroglyphicks , that there might be some time allow'd for their interpretation , to avoid sudden terrour and consternation , as also the danger of the ministers , should they unask'd declare such things . 't is sufficient , if the minister can make the prince understand them ; which if he can effect by signs , let him not use words . yet are there some so imprudent , that they glory in bold truths , and are fond to be the bearers , nay sometimes the inventers of ill news . let these learn of what befell king balshazzar , to whom the hand that pronounc'd his death upon the wall , was not wholly visible , but only the fingers appear'd , and but the ends of them neither ; so that it could not in the least be discover'd , who guided them ; nor this by day light but by night , writing that decretory sentence by candle-light , upon the wall in such characters , as required some time to be understood . while therefore the intention is good , and accompanied by prudence , 't will be easie to walk a secure and middle path , between the slavery of flattery and the arrogance of truth ; for all truths may be spoken , provided it be with discretion , by proposing only the amendment of those to whom they are directed . thus the discretion and address of agricola mollified the stern humour of domitian . he who with his services and modesty mingles valour and industry , may live safe under the worst of princes ; and gain more reputation , than those , who by being too ambitious of glory , do foolishly ruin themselves , without any advantage to the state ; by this circumspection m. lepidus turn'd to his advantage many dangerous flatteries , and preserv'd the favour of tiberius . thrasea paetus's going out of the senate , to avoid being present at the votes , which to flatter tiberius , they were making against the memory of agrippina , was pernicious to the senate , and dangerous to himself , without giving any foundation to the peoples liberty , as he proposed . truth is yet more dangerous in those , who avoiding flattery , to seem free and plain , carp at the actions and failures of princes , with sharp jests , which stick long by the great ones , especially where they are grounded upon truth : as vestinus found by nero , who put him to death for reprehending his vices with too much freedom . to speak truth only to publish the faults of the government , is a kind of freedom which looks like advice , but is reflection ; it appears zeal but is malice . and this i look upon as not less pernicious than flattery it self . for if one be an odious slavery , the other is a false kind of liberty . hence the wisest princes dread freedom as much as flattery , neither being safe , and therefore the extremes of both are to be avoided ; which was observ'd in the time of tiberius yet 't is certain , there ought to be some allowance for flattery , thereby to introduce truth ; for not to flatter in somethings , is to accuse in every thing ; and in a corrupt government , there is as much to be fear'd from too much as too little flattery . the state would be in a desperate condition , and the prince inhuman and barbarous , if neither truth nor flattery durst approach him . he would be like an adder , if he should be deaf to that flattery which would persuade him to what is glorious and honourable . with such as these god threatned the people of ierusalem by the prophet ieremiah ; i will send serpents among you , cockatrices which will not be charm'd , and they shall bite you . that mind is wild and savage , which a gentle and modest flattery can't sooth into good temper , and compliance with its wholsome advice . truth being of it self something bitter , we must sweeten the brim of the cup , that princes may drink with more pleasure : they won't hear it if it be dry , nay are often worse for it . the more tiberius's cruelty was exclaim'd against , the more severe and bloody he grew . 't is of use sometimes to commend some famous actions in them , as if they had actually done them , that they may be thereby prompted to put them in execution ; or to be extravagant in the commendation of valour or other vertues , that they may be the more eager to follow them . this enflames the mind more to honour than flattery . these means , says tacitus , the roman senate us'd to nero in the beginning of his reign . 't is of very ill consequence to commend vices under the name of vertues ; for this is encouraging princes to commit greater . nero seeing his severity taken for justice , became a perfect tyrant . we ill consult our own liberty , fortunes and lives , in endeavouring to extend the unjust power of princes beyond their due bounds , by administring them means to satisfie their ambition and lusts. scarce any prince would be bad , were not his ministers flatterers . they gain that favour by publick mischief , which they can't merit by their vertues . prodigious villany ! for a momentary favour , which they are very often disappointed of too , or rather ruin'd with , to betray their country and promote tyranny ! what wonder , if god chastises subjects for the faults of princes , if they are the cause of them , while princes act all by their ministers , who teach them several ways of burthening their subjects with taxes , of oppressing the nobility , and turning the government into tyranny , by violating privileges , laws and customs , and so are at last their own executioners . emblem xlix . many reasons make me doubt , whether the chance of birth has any part of the favour or hatred of princes ; or whether our conduct and prudence , can , without ambition and peril , find a secure path , between a froward obstinacy , and a despicable slavery . there seems to be a certain occult force , which , if it does not compell , does at least move our will , and incline it to one more than another : and if in the senses and natural appetites there is a sympathy and antipathy to things , why not in the affections and passions ? they may perhaps , have more power and force over the appetite than the will , because that is more a rebell to free-will than this , but it can't be deny'd , but that the inclination too is of great force , being generally attended by reason , especially when art and prudence know how to adapt themselves to the humour of the prince . we see in all things as well animate as inanimate , a secret correspondence and friendship , whose chains are easier broken than parted . neither the injuries nor adversities which king iohn the second suffer'd for his affection to alvarez de luna , nor the apparent danger of the latter , could dissolve that firm bond of friendship with which their souls were united . and though this inclination be not natural , yet gratitude for past services , or the extraordinary merits of the subject usually produce it . vertue is of it self amiable , and gratefull to the will. 't would be barbarous to oblige a prince to balance his affections with indifferency to all , for they proceed from the heart by the eyes and hands : what stanch severity can always resist the charms of favour ? how reserv'd was philip the second ? yet had he not one but many particular favourites . god himself had some whom he peculiarly favour'd , giving them power to stop the course of the sun and moon ; the lord obeying the voice of man . and why ( as king peter observ'd ) is particular friendship allow'd to private persons and not to princes ? many are the troubles of government , to alleviate which , 't will be necessary to have some one near you in whom you can put a more particular confidence . there are many difficulties in it , which are not to be surmounted by one . the burthen of a crown is too weighty and cumbersome for one to bear , the strongest yield to it , and , as iob says , bend under it . for this reason , though god was assistant to moses , and supply'd him with ability and instructions to administer his office , yet he commanded to make use of the elders in the government of his people , that they might help to bear the burthen . and ieth●o his father-in-law , thought the burthen greater than he was able to bear . alexander took parmeno to his assistance ; david , joab ; solomon , zadock ; darius , daniel ; by whose directions they succeeded in their affairs . no prince is so prudent and discreet , as of himself to know all things , nor so carefull and diligent , as to manage all affairs alone . which natural impotency oblig'd princes to erect courts and counsels , and to create presidents , governours , and viceroys , in whom the power and authority of princes might reside . for alone ( says king alphonso the wise ) they can't penetrate and examin all things , but have need of the assistance of others , in whom they can confide , who should use the power which they receive in performing those things which princes can't do themselves † . and if princes use the assistance of ministers abroad , why should he not in the more private affairs of his cabinet ? 't is necessary he should have some one near him , whom he may deliberate with about the advice and counsel which is given him . that he may with him compare his own scruples and propositions , and be by him instructed . whom , in fine , he may safely trust to expedite and execute affairs . would it not be worse , if embarrass'd with such weighty cares , he should communicate himself to none ? besides , 't is absolutely necessary that the prince should have some assistant , who , disengag'd from all other business , should be as a mediator between him and his people : otherwise it would be ▪ impossible for him to hear and satisfie all , nor would it suit with his majesty . for this reason , the israelites besought moses that he would speak to god for them , for they themselves were afraid of his presence . and absalom , that he might render david odious to the people , urg'd that he had no ministers about him to receive the complaints of the distressed . the zeal and prudence of a favourite may with ease rectifie the defects of government , and the inclinations of princes . agricola by his prudent address , reclaim'd domitian , and though sejanus was bad , tiberius was worse , when without him he follow'd his own inclinations . and truly by such favourites god-often saves a whole kingdom , as he did syria by naaman , and aegypt by ioseph . since then 't is necessary that the weight of government should be divided ; 't is natural in the choice of such an assistant to be guided in some measure by inclination , or some secret sympathy in the persons of each ; which choice , if it be founded upon desert , can be no ways dangerous ; nay , 't is requisite that the humour of the party whom the prince takes to assist him , should be chosen to him the question is . whether one or many should be chosen to this office ; if many equally favour'd and respected , emulation will arise , and their counsels will thwart one another to the detriment of the state. so that it seems more agreeable to natural order , that affairs should be committed to one alone , who should supervise the rest , and by whom affairs should come digested and methodized to the prince , who should only substitute him to his cares and trouble , not his power and authority , in his counsels not his rewards . the sun alone imparts light to the whole world , and when he sets , he leaves not many but only one vicegerent , the moon , with a lustre much greater than that of the other stars , who seem but as so many inferiour ministers to assist her . yet neither this nor those shine with their own , but borrow'd light , which the earth acknowledges receiv'd from the sun. nor does this favour misbecome majesty , when a prince devolves part of the burden of affairs upon his favourite , so as to preserve the sovereign power and authority to himself : for this is not favour but imployment , not so much an obligation , as a communication of trouble ; nor is this so much to be envied , if princes would be so prudent , as to give it another name ; as president of the council , or chancellour ; as the magistrates call'd praefecti at rome , incurr'd no envy , though they were second caesars . the felicity of subjects consists not in the prince's being like a loadstone , attractive of iron and not of gold , but in his knowledge in chusing such a minister as will attribute whatever is great and commendable to him ; and take all the reflections and odium of the people upon himself ; one whose mind is wholly bent upon the publick good ; who manages affairs without ambition ; hears without disdain and debates without passion ; whose resolves and determinations have no respect to self-interest . in a word , whose whole aim is the service and advantage of his country , not himself , or the preservation of his master's favour . by this rule one may know whether this familiarity proceed from pure zeal or tyranny . princes ought to take great care in the choice of such a minister , endeavouring not to be byass'd by affection or fansifull inclination , but by rare and excellent qualifications and merits , for sometimes such friendship is not the result of deliberation but accident ; it is not favour but diligence : courts usually erect and adore some idol which they deify , and treat with royal splendor and magnificence ; they worship it upon their knees , burn tapers , and offer incense to it , imploring its assistance with prayers and vows . as industry can change the course of rivers , and turn them another way ; so it often happens that those who have business at court , not regarding the prince , the true channel of aff●irs , apply themselves to the favourite , whose arts do , by this , so secure the prince's favour , that he can never disengage himself from it . no prince was more cautious , none more free than tiberius , yet was he subject to his favourite sejanus . in which case 't is difficult to say , whether such favour be human choice , or some superiour power , for the greater good or ill of the commonwealth : the holy spirit says , 't is a particular judgment of god . tacitus attributes the favour and fall of sejanus to the anger of the gods for the ruin of the empire . a misfortune scarce avoidable , when this favour falls upon a person of great quality , as it usually does in courts where the chief of the nobility are ministers . for he who is once possess'd of it , will , by the preheminence of his birth and grandure of his family endeavour what he can to preserve it , nor will he easily suffer himself to be supplanted by any one : as was seen in iohn alphonso robles , in the time of king iohn the second † . the heart of a prince is never safe in the power of a subject , whose nobility and authority make him too much respected by others . though this inconveniency is lessen'd , when this favour falls upon some great man who is truly zealous and intent upon his prince's service , and the honour and welfare of his country , for then the people's envy and odium will not be so great , and the orders which are dispatch'd through the hands of such a one will be the more readily observ'd ; yet 't is always highly necessary , if a prince could balance his favour between his own authority and the merits of his favourite , to commit only that part of the administration to him , which he cannot manage himself ; for should he commit it wholly to him , he would experience the same misfortunes with king ahasuerus , when he entrusted hamon with the government of his people . let him not give by another's hand what he can dispose of with his own ; nor borrow others eyes , when he can see with his own . as to what is done in courts of justice and counc●ls , let him afterwards consult the presidents and secretaries , from whose relations he may receive a just account of the affairs therein transacted ; and his resolutions will be more concise and ready , when he confers with those by whom the aff●irs ●ave been managed . this method the popes and emper●●●se , as did also the kings of spain ●ill philip the second , who being an excellent pen-man , introduc'd the custom of taking debates and consultations in writing , which afterwards prevailing , gave rise to private favour : for the kings being embrass'd with such a vast number of writings were oblig'd to communicate them to some one , and this must of necessity be a favourite . on such a one let a prince bestow more peculiar marks of favour and benevolence . for he who merits his favour and shares his trouble , ought to have pre-eminence above others . the shadow of st. peter worked miracles . what wonder then , if a prince's favourite , who is but his shadow , acts with more authority than others ? nevertheless , some favours should be reserv'd for others ; nor should those other be so great , as to exceed the condition of a subject , and make him equal to the prince , so as to have court made to him as co-partner in the empire , and to draw the whole body of affairs after him , which derogates much from the authority and esteem of the prince . a favourite should act as the shadow not the substance . in this the kings of castile , who , in times past , had favourites , run● great risques ; for as the power of the kings being then not so large , how little soever they granted , it endanger'd the whole kingdom ; as it befell king sancho the strong , for his favour to lopez de hara ; king alphonso the eleventh , for his to count alvaro osorio ; king iohn the second , and king henry the fourth , for theirs to alvaro de luna , and iohn pacheco . the whole point of favouritism consists in the prince's knowing how much he ought to allow his favourite , and he how much he ought to receive from his prince . whatever exceeds this rule , creates ( as we shall mention anon ) jealousie , envy and danger . emblem l. the mountain looks down with disdain upon the other works of nature , and proudly rises above them , so as to have communication with the skies . let not the vallies envy it this glory , for though it be nearer the favours of heaven , 't is also more expos'd to the strokes of its . thunder too . about its head clouds gather , and storms prepare their rage , and upon it they first exert it . 't is the same in offices and imployments more immediately under princes . the activity of their power is most offensive to those who are nearest it . their conversation is as venomous as that of a viper . whoever walks among them , walks among snares , and the arms of his offended enemies . the favour and disdain of princes are so immediate , that nothing intervenes . their love knows no moderation ; when turn'd to hatred , it leaps from one extreme to th' other , from fire to frost . the same instant sees them love and hate , with the effects of thunder , which while the noise is heard , or the flash seen , reduces the bodies to ashes . the favour of princes is like flame , extinguish'd with the same ease 't was lighted . nay some have thought it absolutely fatal to those on whom it falls . and many examples as well past as present , are sufficient evidences of it ; we have fresh instances of the sudden falls of the most exalted favourites . the duke of lerma in spain ; the marshal d' ancre in france ; the duke of buckingham in england ; john olden barnvelt in holland ; cardinal clesel in germany ; at rome cardinal nazaret ; yet may this be ascrib'd to divers causes , either because the prince having given all that he could , or the favourite obtain'd all he desir'd , he was mounted to the highest step , and so must of necessity descend . but suppose there be moderation in the favours of the one , and the ambition of the other ; yet what constancy can there be in the minds of princes , which the more vehement they are , are the more subject to variety and contradiction ? who can fix the affections of him whose senses see double , and is like the first matter , not resting in one form , but pleas'd with variety . who can preserve that favour which is liable to so many chances and turns of humour ? who can behave himself with so nice integrity , as to maintain the prince's good opinion of him with the people ? the eyes of all are upon the favourite . the prince's friends think him an usurper of their rewards , his enemies that he incenses the prince farther against them . these , if they return to their duty , must make the disgrace of the favourite one of the conditions ; those if they forsake it , lay all the blame upon him . ambition and envy are always in arms , intent upon every occasion to ruin him . the people are so imbitter'd against him , that they impute even natural misfortunes , and the prince's vices , all to him . bernardo de cabrera lost his head for the tyrannies of mpeter the fourth , king of arragon , whose favourite he was . by the same means that a person endeavours to gain the favour of the prince , he incurs the odium of the subjects ; so that it was truly said by that great man , alphonso de albuquerque , governour of the e●st-indies , that a minister in obliging his prince , offended the people : and if he endeavour to gratifie the people , he disobliges the prince . if this favour be only founded upon exteriour adoration , fomented by court-artifices , 't is violent and momentary , and the prince will endeavour to free himself from this impos'd involuntary slavery . if it proceed from a natural propensity of the mind , 't is very subject to second causes , and is effac'd by time or the ingratitude of the subject , when he forgets from whence he took his rise . if a person's mein and carriage do , as it were , ravish the prince's favour , it either soon fades , or is only superficial , as in common friendship . if it be from some qualifications of mind greater than those of the prince , when-ever he knows it , there 's an end of his ●avour , for none can endure in another pre-eminency in 〈◊〉 valour , which is usually esteem'd above power and authority . if it be from assiduity and care in business , diligence is not less dangerous than negligence ; for success does not always correspond to means , because of the diversity of accidents ; and princes will be disappointed in nothing that they wish and desire . success is attributed to chance , or to the fortune of the prince , and not to the prudence of the favourite , but misca●●iages to him alone , though the fault be anothers , for all are willing to father success , but misfortunes are laid at ●nother's door , that is to the favourite . even casualties are imputed to him , as the falling of the amphitheatre , and the burning of mount caelius were to sejanus . nor do they only accuse him in affairs of his own management , but also in those of others , or in those accidents that depend upon the prince's will and nature . thus seneca was blam'd for that nero would have drown'd his mother . men cannot imagin a wickedness so strange as was not believ'd of sejanus . there is no natural death , of a great minister or relation of the prince , but is immediately reflected upon the favourite . as was that of prince philip emanuel , son to charles duke of savoy , to the duke of lerma . if this favour proceeds from obligation , and from signal services perform'd , the prince will by degrees grow weary of the burthen , and his love will turn into hate , because he looks upon him as a creditor , and being unable to pay him , he seeks pretences to break with him , and so strike off the debt . acknowledgment is a kind of slavery . for he who obliges another , makes himself his superiour , which is inconsistent with the sovereignty of a prince , whose power is diminished , if it be not greater than the obligation : and princes being oppress'd with the weight of gratitude and obligation , become notoriously ungratefull , that they may discharge themselves from them . the emperour adrian put titian to death , who had been his tutor from a boy , and to whom he ow'd his empire : not to mention that the fatigues of many years are effac'd by one oversight ; princes being more apt to punish a slight offence , than to reward signal services . if they are honourable , they create emulation and envy in the prince himself , for whose service they are perform'd , for some are more angry with those who have serv'd them successfully and gloriously , than with those who have been more remiss and less successfull , of this humour was philip of macedon ; a vice which his son alexander inherited ; and was visible in iames the first of arragon , who when don blasco de alagon had taken morella , he thought he had gotten more glory than he in that expedition , and therefore took from him that city , and gave him in exchange that of sagasto . the victories of agricola made domitian jealous , seeing that the fame of a private man exceeded his . so that in the most glorious and successfull exploits there is the greatest danger . if favour springs from the prompt obedience of the favourite to the will of the prince , it makes the government incur the above mention'd inconveniencies of flattery , and soon ruins both the prince and favourite ; obedience is as dangerous as disobedience ; for if the command succeeds , 't is ascrib'd to the prince , if not , to the favourite . if this command be not obey'd , 't is then the reason why it succeeded not . if it be unjust , he dares not make that his excuse , lest he offend the prince ; if he obey , the ●ault is all laid upon him ; and the prince , that he mayn't seem the author of the mischief , permits him to suffer either in the opinion of the people ; or in the hands of the judge . thus tiberius serv'd piso after he had by his command poison'd germanicus , whose cause he referr'd to the senate ; and coming to rome , he behav'd himself as if he knew nothing of the matter , leaving him confounded to see him so unconcern'd and reserv'd , without either pity or anger . if this favour falls upon a man of small qualifications and merit , he will sink under the weight of affairs ; for without a brave and vigorous mind , without a quick and piercing wit , the favour of princes cannot be long maintain'd . if it proceeds from a resemblance and conformity of vertues , when the prince bids adieu to them the other is at an end . for he will hate the favourite , as one who accuses his change , and whom he can't make use of in the prosecution of his vices . if a prince loves a favourite , for that he makes use of him as an instrument to execute his vicious designs and inclinations with ; what-ever ills do thence arise , either to the king's person , or to the government , all fall upon him ; and the prince with ease clears himself by disgracing him ; or else hates him as a witness of his vices , whose presence does , as it were , upbraid him with his crimes . for the same reason nero disgrac'd anicetus the murtherer of agrippina ; so tiberius discharg'd those ministers who had assisted his cruelty , and made use of others . the odium of the death , and the favour of him who commands it , end both with the execution , and the prince thinks he sufficiently clears himself in punishing the crime , as plancina found . if this favour proceed from the communication of important secrets , he is in danger from them , for they are vipers in the breast of the favourite , which gnaw his entrails till they eat their way out , for either levity or ambition of seeming a man in favour , reveals them , or they are discover'd by another , or by discourse , which are equally pernicious to the favourite . but though this should not happen , the prince will be willing to free himself from the care of having entrusted them , by tearing open the bag in which they are hid : as many secrets so many dangers . nor is the danger less , if this favour proceeds from the favourites being conscious of the prince's cowardice and baseness ; for such favour is rather fear than inclination , nor will a prince indure , that his honour should depend upon another's silence , or that there should be one who inwardly should despise him . if this favour be but small , it can't resist the fury of envy , but is blown down by every blast , like a tree not firmly rooted . if it be great , it creates envy and fear in the prince himself , and so makes him carefull to free himself from it ; as when we have pil'd stones upon stones , we at last fear lest the heap which we have rais'd , should fall upon our own heads , and so push them over th' other way . the prince sees the statue which he erected shades his own grandure , and so pulls it down again . i may venture to say , that princes seem to delight to shew their power , as well in pulling down those images as in erecting them ; for their power being limited , can't seem immense , unless it return to the center from which it proceeded , or keep in a circle . these are the rocks against which , if the ship of favour strike , 't is lost , so much the surer , by how much the more sail it makes . but if any one scape , 't is either because it recover'd port in time , or that it ran first upon the shore of eternity . is there then any pilot so skilfull as to know how to manage the helm of favour , and to sail in so very dangerous a gulf ? what prudence , what art can save him ? what chymist can fix this mercury of princes affections ? especially , when favour founded upon eminent merit can't resist envy and the machinations of so many as conspire its ruin . neither the kings darius nor achis could defend their favour to daniel and david , against the hatred of the princes and guards ; but were forc'd for their satisfaction , to banish one , and throw the other into a den of lions , though they were well assured of their integrity and innocence . though no prudence nor attention be sufficent to prevent those accidents which depend not upon the favourite , yet may he do much in things which depend upon him , and at least will be unblameable if he fall into disgrace . which consideration oblig'd me here to mark out to him the usual causes of his ruin , arising from his own imprudence and the malice of others , that being forewarn'd he may avoid them . if we would attentively consider the maxims and actions of former favourites , and especially of sejanus , we shall find , that most of them fell , because they could not continue those good methods by which they at first obtain'd the prince's savour . all to merit it , and gain the applause of the people , enter into favour zealous , humble , courteous , and officious , giving counsel for the glory of the prince , and preservation of his grandure , the method by which sejanus ingratiated himself , but being once masters of this favour , they loose the helm which before guided them , and believe they have no more occasion for it in their voyage , but can sail securely with the gale of the prince's favour . at first they are diligent to appear wholly disengag'd from their own affairs , and only intent upon the prince's interest , preferring his service even to their own lives and fortunes ; whence the prince , persuaded that he has got in this person a faithful associate in his labours , loves him and extolls him every-where ; as tiberius did sejanus to the senate and people . they endeavour farther by some generous and heroick action to prove their fidelity to the prince and win his heart . thus sejanus ingratiated himself with tiberius , by sustaining with his own hands and head , the weight of a precipice which would else have fallen upon tiberius , causing him thereby to put more confidence in his friendship and constancy . which good opinion of a favourites fidelity , if a prince once imbibes , he easily fancies himself secure of it for the future , and willingly takes his advice though never so pernicious , putting more confidence in him than in himself ; as tiberius did after that action . and hence proceed very great mischiefs . for he is blinded by this pre-conceiv'd opinion , nay , and himself promotes his favourite's credit and reputation , by permitting extraordinary honours to be paid him , as tiberius did , hanging sej●nus's picture in the theatres a●d publick places . this whisper passes immediately from one to another , whence is rais'd a new idol , like that of aaron out of the ear-rings , for either there would be no favour , or at least , 't would be but of short continuance , without the applause of the people : this honour creates arrogance and avarice to support it , the usual vices of the great ones . the favourite forgets himself , and those good qualities which made him at first esteem'd , by degrees fade , prosperity insensibly disclosing those vices which policy had a while conceal'd . so it happen'd to antonius primus , in whom prosperity discover'd pride , avarice , and other ill qualities which were before unknown . grandure disturbs the reason , and makes the favourite aspire to things above him ; thus sejanus offer'd marriage to livia . he manages affairs not as a minister , but a companion ( which was mucian's great fault ) ; and would have the prince but a bare name , reserving all the authority to himself . nor dares any say to him what bathsheba said to david , and now be●old adonijah reigneth , and now , my lord the king , thou knowest it not . and 't is the favourite's whole aim to exceed the prince in those qual●ties which are proper to royalty , that he may be esteem'd beyond him ; which way absalom made use of to disgrace king david , affecting affability and a readiness to hear the subjects complaints ; by which he stole the hearts of the people . a favourite does not think himself such , unless his servants , relations and friends participate of his authority , and so for his security he con●errs the chief offices of state upon them , and so cuts the nerves of envy . with this design sejanus preferr'd his own creatures . and because this power derogates from the authority of the princes of the blood , who always oppose favour , not being able to bro●k that it should be more esteem'd than birth , and that the prince should suffer himself to be govern'd by a subject , on whom they must depend , ( a danger which sejanus experienc'd in the family of tiberius . the favourite breeds discontent between them and the prince . thus sejanus inform'd tiberius , that agrippina conspir'd against him , and agrippina that tiberius design'd to poison her . if the favourite succeeds in any thing of this nature it emboldens him to proceed farther . after the death of drusus , sejanus had a design to cut off the whole family of germanic●s . so that the favourite being blinded with passion and excess of power , scorns private artifices , and acts openly against the prince's relations , as sejanus did against agrippina and nero. none dare warn him of the danger of his actions , for all tremble at the majesty of his presence , as the israelites did at that of moses , when he came from conversing with god and as he sees himself as much respected as the prince , he conspires against him , and oppresses his subjects , knowing he can't gain their good will ; which makes them in despair , doubt , whether his avarice and cruelty would not be less , were he really their prince , than now when not being so , he treats them as slaves and strangers . which otho consider'd in a favourite of galba . all attempts of this kind augment the danger , for envy encreases , and malice arms against the favourite , who thinking he can't overcome it , but by some greater , applies all the means that emulation of favour , more furious than that of love , can suggest . and since the security of his favour depends upon the constancy of the prince's will , he endeavours to oblige him , by pleasures and voluptuousness , the main instruments of favour , which vitellius's courtiers made use of to preserve his . and least the prince should give credit to any , he makes him di●fident of all , the good especially , for them he fears most . by this artifice vatinius , and sejanus ingratiated themselves . the favourite considering , that nothing is more opposite to favour than the capacity of the prince , makes it his whole endeavour , to keep him from knowing , understanding , seeing or hearing any thing , or having any one about him to inform him . he procures his aversion to business and fatigue , by filling his mind with the diversions of huntting , plays , and banquets , that his senses being diverted , neither his eyes may inspect transactions , nor his ears hear the murmurs and complaints of his people . thus in the sacrifices of the idol moloch , the priests made a noise with drums and trumpets , to drown the cries and groans of the dying infants . sometimes by a farther fetch , he embarasses and confounds him with affairs and papers , on purpose to tire him quickly , so we ride colts in a boggy ground to break them , and make them sooner take the bit. to which end he perswades him to assist at audiences , by which being wholly wearied , he may commit the management of all to the favourite , thinking it sufficient to have an account of affairs from him . whence ( as ieremiah said of the babylonish idols ) the prince is nothing but what the favourite pleases . he would not have affairs go smoothly and with success , for any one can sail in a calm , but he wishes that the sea may run high , and that the state may be so toss'd by the waves , that the prince may be afraid to put his hand to the helm , and so have more need of him . and then to stop at all avenues to truth , and remain sole manager of affairs beyond the reach of envy , he draws him from court to some retreat among his own creatures . so sejanus perswaded tiberius to retire from rome . all these arts redound much to the prejudice of the state , and the princes reputation , and he who hawks after a prince's favour by these means , does him more injury than one who openly offends him . for an offence is given by one fault , but favour is not acquir'd under many , and these always derogate from the honour of the prince , and are opposite to the publick welfare . a state suffers much upon the sudden death of its prince , but this grievance is soon remedied in his successor , which can't be , when the prince is by these arts render'd unserviceable to the government , this misfortune must continue as long as he lives , to the utmost detriment of the commonwealth . and as 't is daily more and more felt , it creates discontent and murmurs among all , who find that this favour is not voluntary but violent , not choice but force , and many grounding their fortune upon his disgrace , he being an impediment to their promotion ; these , i say , being always arm'd against him , 't is impossible but that at last they should find an opportunity to displace him , or that the prince should not at last perceive the trick , and that all the envy and odium conceiv'd against the favourite falls upon him , as tiberius at last found : and then the prince beginning to open his eyes , at the same time begins to fear the power which he has given his favourite ; which made tacitus doubt whether tiberius more lov'd or fear'd sejanus ; and as before his favour rais'd him , so now his hate procures his ruin . this is the critical point of favour , in which all are in danger , for neither can the prince dissemble his dis satisfaction , nor the favourite remain constant in his disgrace , whence both being disgusted the bond of amity is broken . the prince regards the favourite as unworthy his favour , and he him as ungratefull for his services , and believing that the prince can't be without him , and that he must shortly recall him , he wi●hdraws a while from court , and gives occasion to another to intermeddle in affairs , and foment the new rais'd disgusts , whence in a short time the favour is turn'd into hatred , the impatience of the favourite hastning his ruin . the report of his disgrace spreads , and all grow insolent and insult over him , it being now not in the power of the prince himself to assist him . his relations and friends fore-seeing his fall , and the danger which threatens them , fear lest they too should be involv'd in the ruin . as a lofty tree falling crushes all that grow under the shadow of its branches ; nay these are the chief promoters of his fall , that they may get out of danger themselves , all joining , some as friends , some as enemies , to push down this falling wall . the prince asham'd of himself , strives to free himself from this subjection , and to regain his credit , by making the favourite the principal cause of all miscarriages , so that he is caught in his own snares without being able to free himself , as sejanus was , and the more he strives to disengage himself , the more he hastens his ruin : for when favour once sickens it must die , there being no medicine can recover it . from all that has been said we may evidently see , that the greatest danger in favour is in the methods which ambition takes to preserve it ; it being the same with favourites , as with people who are too curious about their health , who thinking to preserve it by abundance of physick , rather destroy it and shorten their days . and as in distempers of the body there is no better remedy than abstinence , leaving the rest to nature , so when favour begins to sicken , the best advice is not to tamper too much with medicines , but to serve his prince with sincerity and integrity , without affection or interest , leaving the operation to merit and truth , more durable than artifice ; and using only some preservatives , such as respect the favourite , the prince or his ministers , or the court , or the people , or strangers . as to the favourite , he should preserve the same state of modesty , and affability that his fortune found him in . he should clear his looks from the dazling beams of favour , as moses did when he spoke to the people , after he came from communing with god . daniel , though he was a favourite to many kings , waited with the rest in the anti-chambers . let him refuse those honours , which either belong to the prince , or exceed the sphere of a minister , and if any would offer them , let him advertise both himself and him , that he is only a servant to the prince , to whom alone those honours are due : so the angel inform'd st. iohn when he would have worshipped him . let him not make his prince's favour the means whereby to execute his lusts and passions . let him hear with patience , and answer calmly , let him not affect others favour , nor fear their displeasure ▪ nor conceal his favour , nor covet sovereign power , nor arm against envy , nor provide against emulation , for in these precautions are very dangerous let him fear god and infamy . the favourite is also in danger from his family and relations , for though the prince and people do approve of his actions , it don't thence follow , that they must also those of his domesticks and relations , whose disorders , indiscretion , pride , avarice , and ambition render him odious and ruin him . let him not deceive himself by thinking , that his own creatures are the support and strength of his favour , for he who depends on many , is in danger of many , and therefore 't is better to keep them within remembrance of their former condition , and far from the management of affairs , that others may see they hold no part in the government , nor his favour , or that they are preferr'd meerly for being his servants . but if they are persons of worth and merit , i would not that their being the favourites servants and relations should prejudice them . christ has taught us this point , giving to his relations the dignity of forerunner and apostle , but not that of teacher of nations , and that of the pontificate , which were due to the faith of st. peter , and the learning of st. paul. with the prince let him observe these maxims . let him always presuppose , that his favour or affection is very subject to change , and if any such change should happen , he enquire not into the cause thereof , nor pretend to take notice of it , that the prince may not suspect him , nor his rivals hope his fall , for he is in danger of it when he but thinks of it . let him not build his favour upon the inclination and fancy of the prince , but upon his own merit ; for if the gold of favour be not well tempered with that allay , it can never endure the hammer of emulation . let him love more the dignity than the person of a prince . let him moderate his zeal by prudence , and guide his understanding by that of the prince , for none can suffer a a rival in sense . let him think himself his subject not his companion , and being a creature , let him not pretend to equal his creator ; let him esteem it honourable , and glorious to ruin himself to augment his grandeur . let him advise with a modest , agreeable and sincere freedom , without fear of danger or ambition of being accounted zealous and stanch in his opinion . let him make no affair his own , nor think his reputation concern'd in its success , nor be disgusted that his sentiments are rejected , or that being admitted they were afterwards altered , for such attempts are very dangerous . in debates and resolutions , let him be neither so hot as to flame , nor so cold as to freeze , but keep a moderate pace according to time and opportunity . let him be more intent upon his duty than his favour , but without affectation or vain glory , for he who serves only for reputation , robs the prince of his . let his silence be a propos , and his words close and ready upon occasion , which quality king theodorick commended in one of his favourites . let him prefer his princes service to his own interest , nay let them be both one . let him pay due veneration to the royal family , esteeming their friendship his greatest security , without fomenting differences between them and the prince , for blood is easily reconcil'd to the ruin of the favourite . let him take care that the prince has always good servants , and faithful ministers about him , and let him instruct him faithfully in the art of government . let him neither shut his eyes , nor stop his ears , but rather take care that he see , touch and feel all things himself . let him discreetly inform him of his errours and failures , without fear of offence , if necessity requires . for though his favour may sicken for a time , 't will recover again when he finds his errour , as it happen'd to daniel with the kings of babylon . when the prince resolves or determines any thing through heat or passion , he should endeavour to bend not break those resolutions , waiting while time and the inconveniencies thereof convince him of his errour . let him not prevent his hearing peoples complaints , and satyrs , for when they fall upon innocence , they are as grains of salt that preserve favour , and admonitions not to err or to amend . let him ascribe successful actions to the prince , but t●ke miscarriages upon himself . let him always think his ruin sure and certain , waiting for it with constancy , and a free and disinteress'd mind , without being over sollicitous to establish his favour , for he falls soonest from a precipice who fears it most . the reflection of the danger disturbs the brain , and we grow giddy with looking from an height . whatever favourites have been thus giddy have certainly fell , when those who have not been so sollicitous have pass'd secure . among the ministers of state , let him behave himself rather as a companion than a master , rather as a defender than accuser . let him encourage the good , and endeavour to reform the bad. let him not interpose his authority in their preferments or removals ; and leave to them their own business . let him not alter the course of counsels in consultations , nor deny any access to the prince . if the prince would have him confer with him , let him declare his sentiments frankly , without any other design than to consult for the best . the court is the most dangerous rock of favour , and yet all use it to establish and confirm it ; there is not a stone in it but would strive to fall , if in falling it might crush the statue of the favourite , which is as brittle as that of nebuchadnezar , by reason of the diversity of metals that compos'd it . not one courtier is a true friend to the favourite ; if he chooses some he incurs the hatred and envy of the rest ▪ if he introduces them , he is in danger of being supplanted ; if he does not he makes them his enemies . 't is there●ore the safest way to walk with indifference to all , and not to intermeddle in the affairs of any one , but endeavour to satisfie all , and ( if possible ) rather to promote than hinder them in their pretensions and interest . if any one shall have insinuated himself into the prince's favour , 't will be the best way to keep him there ; for he who wrestles with another to throw him down usually falls with him , and opposition confirms favour . more favorites have been ruined by striving to displace others , than by advancing them . let him slight accusations , or commendations to the prince , and leave them to fortune . favour is very subject to the people , for if they disapprove the favourite , the prince can never support him against the common cry ; or if he attempts it , the people usually turn his judges and executioners , we having seen a great many fall by their hands . if the people love him to excess he is in danger from thence , for that creates jealousie and envy in others , nay in the prince himself , whence the peoples loves are generally short and unlucky . and so that the favourite may walk safe between these two extreams , he must avoid all occasions of publick applause and acclamations . let him only endeavour to procure to himself a good esteem , by piety , liberality , complaisance and affability , making it his care to see justice duely administred , that there may be plenty of all things , that the publick peace be not disturb'd in his time ; that privileges be not violated , nor novelties introduced into the government ; but above all that there be no disputes in matters of religion , nor difference among the clergy : for he will soon feel the peoples rage , if he once incur the name of impious . foreigners who want this natural love for the prince , depend more upon the favourite than him , whence they pay him most respect , that they may by his means accomplish their designs , to the great dishonour of the prince , and prejudice of his states . nay , they often prove the ruin of the favourite , unless he abundantly satisfie them in their desires and requests ; wherefore he ought to beware of their respect , and refuse the incense and worth of foreigners , letting them who would pay him those honours know , that he is only the curtain before the image , and that 't is the prince that works the miracles . ambassadors usually affect the friendship of the favourite , as the most effectual means to accomplish their affairs , and judging that the disorders which result from favour , will be of service to them , they endeavour to foment it , being often introduc'd thereto by the favourite himself , and as they take occasion to commend them in audiences , and seem at first sight free from interest and emulation , it has often very good effect , yet for all this they are dangerous friends ; for the favourite can't preserve their friendship without great detriment to the prince and state. and if in consideration of his duty , he does not abundantly satisfie them , they are utter enemies and leave no stone unturn'd to ruin him . 't is therefore safest not to be more engag'd to them than the princes service will permit . endeavouring only to gain the reputation abroad of a sincere and affable person , and one who would rather preserve the good correspondences and alliances of his prince , than break ' em . a timely application of these preservatives may perhaps prevent a favourites fall , but when he has once incurr'd the odium and envy of the people , these are look'd upon as tricks and artifices , and more endanger him . as it happened to seneca who took no method to prevent his death , but endeavouring to moderate his favour , when he found himself persecuted . if notwithstanding the observation of all these cautions , the favourite shall fall into disgrace , his fall will be glorious , he having liv'd without the little fears , and the shameful care of preserving his favour by methods below a generous spirit , a torment much worse than the disgrace it self . if there be any thing valuable in a princes favour , 't is only the glory of having merited his esteem ; the continuation of which is full of cares and dangers . and he is happiest , who soonest and with most reputation quits it . i have describ'd , royal sir , the practices of favourites , but not how a prince ought to comport himself towards them , not supposing that he ought to have any , for though he must be allow'd to have more inclination to one than another , yet not so as to devolve all his authority upon one person , from whom the people must expect orders , rewards and punishments ; for such favour is properly an alienation from the crown , and dangerous to the government , even when favour succeeds in the election of the subject , for neither will the people so readily obey , nor so awfully respect the favourite as the prince , nor is he so much concern'd for the welfare of the state , nor is he so immediately under the care of god as the prince : so that though many of your royal highness's ancestors have had favourites , who with much care and zeal ( as we see at present ) have endeavour'd to act with the greatest integrity , yet have their attempts met with answerable success . let not your royal highness be deceiv'd by the example of france , whose territories we see indeed much enlarg'd by the counsels of a favourite , but not without detriment to the kingdom , and prejudice to the royal prerogative . whoever shall duely consider the persecution of the queen mother , and duke of orleans ; the blood of monmorency spilt , that of the prior of vendosme , of paul reny , and of monsieur de macraints , the imprisonment of the duke of bulloign , the exactions and oppressions of the subjects , the usurpation of the du●chy of lorrain , the leagues made with the dutch , protestants and swedes , the design upon charles emanuel duke of savoy , the peace made at mouzon without the knowledge of the allies , the curb impos'd upon the valtoline and grisons , the succours sent to scotland , and the english parliament , the sieges of fontarabie , st. omer , thionville , fornavent and catelet , the loss of so many soldiers at lovain , tarragone , perpignan , sa●e , valence upon the po , imbree and la r●que , the retaking aire and the bass. he , i say , who shall consider these things , will find that all his measures were grounded upon violence , and that his favour was founded upon force ; that the sword so daring against the persons of kings , has been timo●ous and cowardly against this minister , that fortune has favoured his temerity , that he has succeeded by the same means he should have fail'd , whereas we have lost by the same methods we should have gain'd ; a sure sign that god prospered this favourite for the exercise of christianity , and for our chastisement , forestalling our prudence , and confounding our valour . kingdoms destin'd to ruin , fall by the same means they should be supported ; thus the entrance into the adriatick created distrust , the protection of mantua jealousie , the opposition at nivers wars , the diversion , expence , the army in alsace rivals , the war for spain rebellions . at the siege of casal we lost an opportunity of putting an end to the war ; the counsel of secretary passiers to prince thomas , hindred the relief of turin and triumph over france . the same thing happed at aire , for a foolish piece of formality , the news that was brought of the siege of arras made them omit the care of relieving it . for a vain scruple d' amvilliers was not succoured , through cowardize or treachery , chapelle surrendred . o providence divine ! whither tend such variety of accidents , so different from their causes ? 't is not by chance that the government of europe is put into the hands of favourites . god grant success may answer the publick prayers . the end of the first volume . his royal highness william duke of glocester . printed fo● m. gilliflower and l. meredith . the royal politician represented in one hundred emblems . written in spanish by don diego saavedra faxardo , knight of the order of st. iago , plenipotentiary ambassador to the cantons of switzerland , at the imperial diet at ratisbon , at the famous treaty of mvnster , and of the supreme council of state for both of indies . with a large preface , containing an account of the author , his works , and the usefulness thereof . done into english from the original . by sir ia. astry . vol. ii. london : printed for mat● . gylliflower at the spread-eagle in westminster-hall : and luke meredith at the star in st. paul's church-yard , mdcc . of the education of a prince . emblem li. there is nothing better or more advantageous to mankind than prudent diffidence ; 't is the guard and preservation of our lives and fortunes , our own security obliges us to it ; without it there would be no caution , without which no safety ; that prince governs best who trusts fewest , there is but one confidence safe , which is not to depend upon the will of another . for who can secure himself of man's heart , hid in the privatest corner of the breast , whose secrets the tongue dissembles , the eyes and all the motions of the body contradict . 't is a gulf rowling with the tempests of different affections , a sea full of hidden rocks which no chart can discover . what prudence must the needle be touched with for a prince to sail by , through such dangerous and difficult seas . how well should he know the winds ? when to furl and loose the sails of confidence ? in this consists the chiefest art of government ; 't is in this that a princes danger chiefly consists , either through want of experience in affairs , or knowledge of his subjects , none of them appearing ill to him . for in his presence all compose their actions , and adjust their looks : their set speeches sound nothing but love , zeal and fidelity , and their attendance nothing but respect and obedience ; discontent , hatred and ambition being hid in the heart ; which made one say , a prince should trust no body ; but both extreams are equally to be avoided . to trust none is the suspicion of a tyrant , to trust all the easiness of an imprudent prince . confidence is not less important to a prince than distrust : the one is worthy a sincere and royal breast , the other is very necessary in the art of government , as an instrument by which policy works its ends. the difficulty consists in knowing how rightly to use one and t' other , so that neither a too credulous confidence expose you to infidelity and dangers , or a too suspicious distrust provoke hatred , or make the prince by reason of this diffidence incapble o● treating with any one : he should not measure all thing● by confidence , nor all by distrust . if a prince will trus● none , who can serve him without evident dangers ? 't is a● great a misfortune to lose a faithful minister upon vain and groundless suspicions , as by a too easie credulity to trus● those who are not so . let a prince confide , but at the same time suspect that he may be cheated ; this suspicion ought not to retard the course of his actions , but only to be a caution to him : if he was without suspicion he would be too careless . suspicion is a cautionary security , a due weighing of matters ; he who doubts nothing can never know the truth . let him give credit as if he believ'd , and distrust as if he believ'd not . confidence and diffidence being thus governed by prudence and reason , work miracles . let the prince therefore be well advised in the affairs which he treats of , in the alliances which he ratifies , in the peaces which he concludes , and in all other treaties in general which concern the government ; and when he signs them let his hand be full of eyes , ( as in the prefent emblem ) that he may see what he does . the bawd in plautus valued not the promises of the lover when she said , our hands are full of eyes , what they see they believe ; and elsewhere she calls the day quick sighted , in which she never traded but for the ready . blind are resolves made by confidence : pythagoras's motto was , not to shake hands with every body . credulity to all is very dangerous ; let a prince therefore consider well before he ingages himself , thinking always that his friends as well as his enemies design to cheat him , one more , the other less ; one to rob him of his territories and riches , the other only to reconcile himself to his favour and good-will . this pre-supposition should not be deriv'd from fraud , and villainy giving him the liberty to forfeit his word and promise , which would utterly confound the publick faith , and be a great blot in his reputation ; this caution should be nothing but a prudent circumspection and piece of policy . that diffidence the daughter of suspicion is then blameable in a prince , when 't is frivolous and vicious , which immediately discovers its effects and proceeds to execution , not that circumspect and general distrust , which equally regards all , without particularizing upon any one , until the circumstances well examined shall dictate otherwise , and perhaps you may not sufficiently confide in any one , whom you may nevertheless have a good opinion of , for this is not a particular distrusting of him , but a general caution of prudence ; there are forts in the very middle of kingdoms , in which there are garrisons kept , as if on the enemies frontiers . this caution is convenient , and reflects not upon the subjects fidelity . a prince may confide in his relations , allies , subjects and ministers , yet this confidence should not be so remiss , as to lull him asleep , and make him careless of all accidents , by which ambition , interest , or hatred usually pervert fidelity ; breaking the strongest bars of the law of nature and nations ; when a prince had rather chuse to suffer , than live in the continual alarms of so many cautions ; and rather let things run on , than remedy the inconveniencies which may happen . he makes his ministers wicked and sometimes treacherous , for they imputing his indulgence to incapability despise and slight him , and each reigns absolutely in that part of the government which is allotted him . but when the prince is vigilant , and if he does confide in any does it not without caution ; when he is always so prepar'd , that treachery shall never find him unprovided ; when he condemns not without hearing ; and reprehends not but to preserve fidelity , when 't is in danger , he may wear his crown in safety . king ferdinand the catholick had no reason to suspect the fidelity of the great captain † ; nevertheless he kept those people near him who should diligently pry into his actions , that he knowing how narrowly he was watch'd , might act with the more caution . this was not properly an action of distrust but prudence . for all this he must take care that this suspicion be not groundless and frivolous , as was that of the same king ferdinand to the same great captain ; for though after the loss of the battel of ravenna , he wanted him for the management of affairs in italy , he would not make use of him when he saw with what eagerness all the people strove to serve and fight under him ; and so endeavoured by al● the means he could to assure himself of duke valentine , 〈◊〉 that suspecting an experimented fidelity , he exposed himself to one suspected : so over jealous spirits to avoid one danger fall into a greater ; though sometimes the refusal of the services of such great men , may be rather a princes envy or ingratitude , than jealousie or suspicion . it may be also that this wise prince , thought it not convenient to make use of a man whom he knew to be discontented ; a prince must expect little fidelity from a person of whom he has once shewn a distrust . the more ingenious and generous a spirit is , the more it resents the suspicion of its fidelity , and so more easily quits it , which made getulius make bold to write to tiberius , that he was loyal , and unless suspected , would remain so . a prince ought to learn by the experience of his own accidents as well as others , how far he ought to confide in his subjects . amongst the cautions which king henry the ii. left his son don john , there was this , that he should continue the rewards given to those , who had follow'd his party against king peter their natural lord , but that he should not put so much confidence in them , as not to have an eye upon 'em , that in offices and places of trust he should make use of those , who adher'd to their master king peter like true and faithful subjects , and oblige 'em to make amends for past offences by future services ; but that he should not put any confidence in the neuters , who had shewn themselves more addicted to self interest than the publick good. traytors are odious even to those whom they serve by their treason , and the loyal are esteem'd by those against whom they are so ; upon this ground otho trusted celsus , who had faithfully served galba . 't is not good to raise a minister all at once to great places , for it makes other envy him and hate the prince , they taking this sudden promotion as an argument of his levity . there is no minister so modest , as not to be affronted , nor so zealous as to continue in his devoir , when he sees another so unjustly preferred . for one that 's satisfied many are discontented ; and when the ministers are disgusted 't is impossible the government should go well : such elections are nothing else but abortive births ; and fidelity takes deeper root , when it sees that offices and imployments are the reward of faithful services : the prince has in the mean while time to make tryal of his minister , first in places of small trust least it should cost him too dear , afterwards in places of greater importance , let him examine before he employs him in affairs of peace or war , what is the most likely to shake his fidelity , what his birth is , what his reputation and fortune ; this circumspection is particularly necessary in places of trust , which are as 't were the keys and security of governments . augustus would not permit any senator or roman knight to enter egypt without his special order , because that province was the grainary of the empire , and that he who made himself master of that had the other at command : for the same reason tiberius sharply reprehended germanicus for going into alexandria without his leave , but for the greater security , and the better to keep the minister in obedience , 't would be convenient to allow a little more authority to the magistracy of the province , for there are no curbs stronger than that , nor more ready to oppose the faults of the governor . mean and abject spirits , such as have no ambition of glory , or thirst for preferments , are fit for no employ . the chief quality which god found in ioshuah , to introduce him into the management of affairs , was that he had a great spirit . but yet the courage should not be so great , as to repine at his being born a subject , and not be contented with his condition ; for the loyalty of such is in great danger , because they aspire always to the highest step , which if they attain not , 't is either for want of power , or wit , besides they soon flag in their zeal for the publick , and obedience to their prince . great spirits are not less dangerous at least , if they are not docile and modest for being very positive and conceited of their own opinions , they are apt to slight commands , and believe that all should be governed at their pleasure . a person is as troublesome for his good qualifications , as for his having none at all ; for there is no satisfying him , who presumes too much upon his merit : tiberius never desired great vertues in offices of trust , and hated vices too ; for from one he feared danger to himself , from t' other scandal to the government . nor are those fit for ministers who are rich and of great families , for having no need of the prince , and flowing in plenty of all things , they won't expose themselves to perils and toils , nor can , nor will they be under command . whence sosibius britannicus us'd to say , princes can't endure riches in the commons . when a prince shall have made choice of a minister with all due circumspection , let him seemingly put an entire confidence in him , but always keep an eye upon his actions and intelligences , and if they are any ways suspicious , let him be removed to another post , where he will want opportunity to make a party to execute his ill designs ; for there is more prudence and kindness in preventing a crime , than in forgiving it when committed ; if germanicus's victory , and the soldiers applause pleas'd tiberius on one hand , on t' other they made him jealous and uneasie . and understanding the commotions in the east , he was glad of a pretence ea expose him to dangers , by making him governour of those provinces . now if any minister is to be removed , it should be done under the pretence of honour , and before the reasons are known , with such prudence as mayn't give him reason to mistrust the princes disgust : for as fear of being cheated is the way to be cheated ; so suspicion of loyalty makes traytors ; for which reason tiberius having a mind to recall germanicus to rome , did it under a pretence of a triumph which he design'd him ; offering him other preferments , of which princes are very liberal , when they would free themselves from their jealousies . if a subject once loses the respect he owes his prince , after confidence will never secure him . sancbo the first king of leon pardoned count gonzalo , for having taken up arms against him , endeavouring to reconcile him by his favours , but those by which he thought to have oblig'd him , only gave him opportunity to poyson him . when princes are concerned with one another , there is no obligation of friendship or affinity , a sufficient reason for their trusting each other ; don ferdinand the great king of castile , and his brother garcias of navarre were at difference ; he as he lay sick at nacar had a design to seize his brother who came to pay him a visit ; but his design not succeeding , he had a mind to dissemble his intent by visiting his brother , who caused him to be apprehended * . revenge and state-policy is of greater force than friendship , or consanguinity . the same befel don garcias king of galicia , for having trusted his brother alonso king of castile : the most irreconcileable falling out , is that between relations and dearest friends , and perfect hatred is the result of perfect love ; from all which we may infer , how difficult a thing 't is for a prince to trust himself in the hands of his enemies , it cost the king of granada his life for going , though with a pass port to ask assistance from king peter the cruel . lewis forza duke of milan , was more cautious , refusing an interview with the king of france , unless in the midst of a river , or upon a broken bridge . a true piece of italian policy , not to trust where they have once shew'd a jealousie , for which reason the italians were much admir'd at the interview between the great captain and king ferdinand the catholick , as also at that between the same king , and the king of france his enemy . in some cases confidence is more safe and necessary to gain peoples affections than distrust . don alonso vi. having lost his kingdom of leon , liv'd retir'd at the court of the king of toledo , who was a moor , when upon the death of don sancho his sates recalled him to his throne , with the greatest privacy imaginable , fearing lest if it should come to be known by the moors , they might retain him by force ; he like a prudent and grateful prince discovered the whole affair ; this confidence so oblig'd the barbarian king , who before understood the intrigue and design'd to seize him , that he not only let him go free , but also furnished him with money for his voyage : see the power of gratitude which disarms even the most savage spirits .. * distrusts between princes can't be cur'd by satisfactions or excuses , but by their contrary ; if time won't heal them , diligence never will : these are a kind of wounds which the probe and the hand does but more exulcerate ; and a sort of apparent jealousies , which are an introduction to infidelity . emblem lii . the scorpion translated to the skyes , and plac'd among the constellations loses not its malignity , which is greater , by how much more its power and venomous influences are extended over things below . let princes therefore well consider the qualifications of those subjects , whom they raise to places of trust , for there vices always thrive ; nay , vertue it self is often in danger , for the will being arm'd with power , bids defiance to reason , and often gets the better ; if vertue have not resolution enough without being dazl'd with the splendour of riches and prosperity to resist it . if promotion makes the good bad , 't will make the bad worse . and if vice notwithstanding the punishments and infamy that attend it find so many followers , what will it do when back'd with favour and preferments . and if vice be the ready way to preferment , who will seek it through the rugged road of vertue ? that is inherent to our natures , but this must be acquir'd by industry . the first forces rewards , the other expects 'em with patience , and we find the appetite much better pleas'd by its own violence than merit ; and being impatient had rather depend upon its own industry , than attend the pleasure and will of another ; to reward the bad , by promoting them to places of authority , is , to check the vertuous and incourage the vicious . a private knave while he is private can do no great matter of mischief , 't is but an inconsiderable number of private men , on whom he can exercise his villainy ; but promoted to places of trust , his villainy reaches all , being himself minister of justice , and having the whole body of government at his disposal ; villains ought not to be put into places where they have power to exercise their villainy , nature foreseeing this inconvenience , has given venomous animals neither feet nor wings , that they may do less mischief ? he who furnished villains with either designs it should either run or fly . but princes nevertheless usually make use of the bad rather than the good , the former seeming generally more cunning ; but they are mistaken , for vice is not wisdom , and he can have no true judgment who has no vertue ; for which reason don alonso king of arragon and naples , commended the prudence of the romaus , in building the temple of honour within that of vertue , that to go into that you must necessarily pass through this , esteeming him not worthy of honour , who was not a follower of vertue ; and that he should not arrive to offices and preferment , who enter'd not at the porch of vertue : without this how can a minister be serviceable to the government ? among a crowd of vices what room is there for prudence , justice , clemency , valour , and other vertues absolutely necessary for a commander ? how will the subject observe those proper to him , if he wants the example of the minister , whose actions he observes carefully , and imitates through flattery ? the people have a respect for a just minister , and imagine that he cannot err ; on the contrary , they never approve and commend the actions of one who is not so . demosthenes spoke very well one day in the spartan senate , but because the people look'd upon him as a vicious person , they rejected his counsel . whereupon it was ordered by the ephori , that a person whom they had a better opinion of should propose the same thing , that it might be received and executed : this good opinion of the people is so necessary , that though the minister be a person of integrity , the government is not safe in his hands , if the people mis-inform'd think him otherwise . henry the vth. king of england , for this reason at his coming to the crown , removed from him all those who had been his companions in his younger days , and turn'd out all ministers , putting in their places men of worth , and such as were agreeable to the people ; one can impute the success and victories of theodorick , to nothing but his good choice of ministers , having no other for his councellors than prelates of the strictest vertues . ministers are as it were the picture of majesty , which since it can't appear every where is represented by them ; who ought therefore to be as like him as possible in life and conversation , since the prince cannot of himself exercise in all places , the authority which he has received by common consent , he ought to take great care how he shares it amongst his ministers . for he who is not born a prince , when he sees himself deck'd with majesty , will take pride in shewing it , by exercising his authority and passions . and here may the question be decided ; which nation is in the better condition , that where the prince is good , and the ministers bad , or that where the prince is bad , and the ministers good [ for that may happen according to tacitus ] for necessity obliging a prince to substitute his power to several ministers , if they are bad they will do more damage to a nation , than the prince be he never so good can advantage it ; for they will abuse his goodness , and under pretence of publick good , will turn it to their own private interest and advantage . a bad prince may be reformed by many good ministers , but not many bad ministers by a good prince . some imagine a princes hands are bound , and his liberty infring'd , when he has good ministers , and that the more vicious the subjects are , the safer he lives among 'em ; a ridiculous and senseless phancy , for vertue is the only thing that keeps nations in obedience and quiet , and nations are never more quiet and firm than when at home , private people live justly and innocently , and justice and clemency flourish abroad ; 't is easie to govern the good . without vertue the laws lose their force ; the love of liberty reigns , and the aversion to government increases , whence proceed the change of states , and fall of princes . 't is necessary then that they have vertuous ministers , who should advise them with zeal and affection , and introduce vertue into the nation by their example , and by the integrity of their lives . tiberius held the extreams of both vertue and vice equally dangerous to a minister , and chose one between both , as we said elsewhere , but this is properly the fear of a tyrant ; if a vertuous minister be good , one more vertuous is better . but 't is not sufficient for his ministers to be endued with excellent vertues , if those necessary endowments , and ornaments of experience , which the management of affairs requires are not eminently visible in him : africk still mourns and shews upon the sooty faces of its inhabitants , the rashness of phoebus [ if we may use the philosophy and morality of the ancients ] in lending his chariot to his son phaeton , an unexperienced youth , and one who did not in the least merit such promotion ; and this is the danger all elections carry with 'em which are made at a jump , and not gradually , by which experience teaches 'em to know the people , and to rise by degrees . tiberius though a tyrant never advanc'd his nephews without this caution , and particularly drusus , whom he would not make a tribune till after eight years experience . preferment to an unexperienc'd person is favour , but to one of experience a just reward . yet is not experience in all things , as neither all vertues requisite for every office ; but only those who regard each in particular , for that which is proper and requisite for one is not always for others : experience of the sea is useless in affairs at land , and it does not follow , that he who knows how to manage a house or ride a horse , can also marshal an army . in this lewis forza duke of milan was mistaken , when he committed the conduct of his army against the king of france to galeaze st. severin , who was very dexterous in managing horses , but understood little of affairs of war. mottathias made a more prudent choice when seeing himself near his end , he chose for general iudas macchabee , a robust man , and well vers'd in arms , and for his counsellor his brother simeon a man of judgment and experience . in this we have seen great errors , in changing the reins and administration of governments . these are different in kingdoms and common-wealths . some respect justice , others plenty , some war , others peace ; yet though they are so different in themselves , there is nevertheless a certain faculty or civil vertue , which unites 'em , and makes them all tend one way , to the preservation of the state : each aiming at this by means proportion'd to the office he is in . this civil vertue is different according to the several forms of government , which differ according to the means , and methods of governing , for which reason a man may be a good citizen , but not a good minister , for 't is not sufficient that he be endu'd with several moral vertues , unless he has also civil ones , and this natural disposition so proper to administration and government . 't is therefore necessary for a prince to know the nature and inclinations of his subjects , that he may better know how to employ 'em , for upon this good choice all the actions of his government depend . the genius of herman cortez , was particularly proper for the conquest of india ; that of gonzalez fernandez of cordova for the war of noples ; and if they had been exchang'd , and the first sent against the french , and the latter against the indians , doubtless they had not been so successful . nature has not given man a like qualifications for all things ; but only one excellence for one office , whether it be frugality , or prudence , and 't is certain , instruments do most service when they are made use of by one , not by many . for this reason , aristotle blam'd the carthagians , for that among them one person officiated in many places , there being no man fit for all . nor is it possible [ as the emperour iustinian remark'd ] to mind two , without forgetting one or t' other . a nation is much better govern'd , when in that as in a ship every man knows his birth ; for though perhaps a man may be found capable of all affairs , it do's not follow , that they shall be all assign'd him . that great copper vessel for sacrifices called for its largeness a sea , and supported by oxen before the altar of the temple of solomon contain'd measures , yet they never put in above . 't is by no means convenient to accumulate all offices and preferments upon one person , to the envy and dissatisfaction of all ; but whether for want of knowledge of persons , or for that they won't take the pains to look for fit men , it usually happens that princes imploy one , or at most a very few of those who are about them : in all affairs , whence promotions and rewards are scarce , and so emulation grows cold , and all things move slowly . for the same reason 't is not good for two persons to be employed about the same affair , for that makes it confus'd like a picture drawn by two hands , the methods of painters being always different , one is quick , the t' other slow , one loves lights , the t' other is more for shades . besides this , 't is impossible two should agree in the same conditions , counsels and methods , or that they should not disagree to the great detriment of the negotiation and prince too . these second causes have each their distinct office and separate operations . for my part i think it more adviseable to commit an office to one person less capable , than to two though more sufficient ; since therefore the good election is a thing so necessary , and its success so difficult , 't is not adviseable for princes to relie too much upon their own judgments . pope paul the iii. and king ferdinand the catholick first consulted the people , suffering it as if carelesly to be published before they made their choice ; the emperour alexander severus , proposed his choice to all , that each person as if he were interested in it , might freely declare his thoughts of his capacity , or incapacity . though the peoples approbation is not always to be depended on : sometimes 't is in the right , sometimes 't is in the wrong ; 't is oft deceived in mens natures and hidden vices . moreover industry , self-interest , or malice , and emulation spread this report among the mob , either in their favour or otherwise . nor is a ministers behaving himself well in small offices sufficient to recommend him to greater , for preferment makes some more vigorous and active , others careless and lazy : much safer was the diligence of king philip the ii. who carefully observed his nurseries , and took particular notice what plants were like to bear , when transpanted into the civil or ecclesiastical government , and had private informations of their behaviour in their youth , before ambition could disguise their vices , whether they grew streight and upright , or crooked ; and had certain characters of the vertues and vices of the chief of his subjects ; whence he never made an ill choice , and in his time flourished persons truly valuable ; especially in ecclesiastical preferments , for he thought it better to make choice of such as he knew would not deserve punishment , than to punish them afterward . happy is that kingdom where there is no room for ambition , petitions , prayers , nor attendance , and where even concealed vertue has no need of a petition , or recommendation to be known to the prince , who of himself knows the merits of his subjects ; this was formerly spoken in tiberius's commendation . an auricular commendation depends upon others , but an ocular one not ; that may be deceived , this rot ; that only informs the mind , this both informs and moves too ; nay , as 't were forces to punishment or rewards . some countreys have chosen their ministers by lots , which in some cases is not improper , to decline envy , and avoid contention and emulation , often the grounds of tumults and seditions . but when a fit person is to be chosen for the administration of justice , or command of the army , upon whom the government and publick safety is to depend , a matter of that concern , ought not to be decided by the uncertainty of chance , but to pass the tryal of a due election for the lot or dye weigh's not qualifications , desert , and reputation , as counsels do , where all things are examined by weight and measure , and though all counsels are usually guided by interest , a prince may make a good choice , if he takes care privately to inform himself of the parties qualifications and vertues , as also the ends which his councellors propose in promoting them . for when a prince blindly approves all proposals , these above-mentioned inconveniencies will attend ; but when his counsellors see that he examines them , and that he does not always admit the persons propos'd , but chooses others more sufficient , they will advise with greater care and deliberation . emblem liii . the thebans represented the integrity of ministers , especially those of justice , by a statue without hands : for when they are shut they are the emblem of avarice , when open its instruments . this garden represents the same thing , by these statues without arms , which are at the corners of each walk , like those in the walks at rome ; nor are there any better guards than these ; for they have eyes to watch the flowers , but want arms to gather them ; if all ministers were like these statues , the exchequer would be more secure , and nations better governed , especially commonwealths , whose revenues are looked upon as common , every magistrate believing it no crime to make his fortune out of them ; one accuses t'other to excuse himself , and all wink at one another , and this vice being like fire , which with the same matter that should quench it is nourished and burns fierce , so they the more they get , the more they desire , and avarice once glutted with the publick treasure , then attacks private persons , whence they wholly confound the principal end of society which is common perservation . where avarice reigns , peace and quiet is banished ; all things are in disorder and confusion ; nothing but jars , seditions and civil wars , the forms of government are changed , and empires run to ruine , as most have been lost upon this account . avarice drove the phoenicians out of spain * ▪ that made the oracle of apollo foretell the downfall of the common-wealth of sparta . god warn'd moses to choose persons into places of trust who hated covetousness . 't is impossible that state should be govern'd well whose ministers are covetous ; for how can he who plunders every body rightly administer justice ? how will he procure plenty , whose whole gain is starving others ? how can he love the kingdom , who thinks of nothink but robbing on 't ? how can he whose mind runs upon nothing but filling his chests , mind affairs of state ? how will he indeavour to merit rewards , who is his own pay-master ? nothing succeeds well when self-interest manages . for interest is preferr'd before duty or honour . nothing great or glorious is enterpriz'd without a desire of glory , which a mean , abject , covetous spirit has no value for . there is scarce any crime but proceeds from avarice or ambition . nothing makes rebels sooner than the fraud and corruption of the ministers . they are first moved by their particular damages , then by the common injustice , then by envy against those who commit it , and so by hatred to the prince that suffers it ; if he knows it not , they accuse him of incapacity ; if he tolerates it , they say he 's remiss and negligent ; if he permits it , he 's an accomplice ; if he wishes it to the end , that the authors being glutted like spunges , he may take occasion to squeeze 'em afterwards , he is a tyrant . o unhappy prince and state , wherein the ministers don't thrive but by their ruine . nor would i have ministers so nice , as to 〈◊〉 ●e●sents in general ; 't is incivility to receive none ; many , s●●●dness ; all , covetousness . avarice in princes is the ruin of states , for the people can't bear to see their estates in danger , in the hands of him whom they choose to preserve 'em ; so that seeing this pretended defender of his countrey , the first that arms himself against it , they streight look out for another : in short , what can a subject hope for from a covetous prince ? for this vice even children hate their parents . where there is no prospect of interest , there is no love nor obedience ; that government is tyrannick which respects self-interest , more than the publick good. king alphonso , the wise , for this reason said : that a king ought not to covet abundance of riches only to fill his treasury , and not do good with them ; for 't is impossible but he who does so , must use indirect means to gain 'em , which is beneath the dignity of a prince * ; the holy writ compares a covetous prince who unjustly usurps his subjects estates to a roaring lyon , and a hungry bear , and his actions to a spiders web which perishes with it , or to a vineyard-keeper's arbour , which lasts but a little while ; that which is ill got is soon spent how like spiders are some princes , who spin their web from their own bowels , griping and draining their subjects to make their own fortune from the rock , and weave nets which soon break and deceive their hopes . there are several remedies against this vice , the best are those which prevent it ; for if once nature is tainted with it , 't is very difficulty cured ; 't is our last shift . if princes are naturally lovers of money , they should be kept from seeing or feeling it , as much as possible , for avarice like love enters at the eyes , and 't is more easie to order a payment than to make it ones self . the ministers of the treasury too should be generous , and not prompt the prince to enrich himself by sordid and unworthy methods ; to prevent also avarice in the ministers , care should be taken that offices and places be not bought and sold , as the emperour commodus observ'd , for he who buys 'em sells 'em too ; this the emperour severus knew , as also lewis xii . of france , who used this remedy , but has been since ill observ'd by his successours . it seems to be the law of nations , that a province , the command of which is bought , should be plunder'd , and that judgment should be given to the highest bidder at the court of justice , which is not to be approached but by golden steps . castile to this day finds the misfortune of these methods in the governments of their cities , because they are all sold , against a statute made by common consent , in the time of don john ii. that they should be for life , and given to none but whom the kings should nominate . 't is necessary besides to settle a competent salary upon each office , such as the incumbent may live handsomely upon ; this was the method of don alonso ix ▪ giving sufficient salaries to his judges , and severely punishing those whom he found guilty of bribery . the same was practis'd by their catholick majesties , ferdinand and isabella , who reduced lawyers fees to a certainty * . magistrates should not be suffer'd to traffick or merchandize , for they 'll never give good counsel , which they see is against their gain . besides the people is better satisfied with the honour and preferment which are conferr'd on others , provided they have the gain and profit , but they are incens'd and apt to rebel when they see themselves rob'd of both . and to this cause the feuds between the nobility and commonalty of genoua may be attributed . offices ought not to be given to poor and needy persons , for their poverty exposes 'em too much to corruption and bribery . in an election in the roman senate for a governour of spain , the dispute lay between sulpicius galba and aurelius cotta , scipio being asked his opinion reply'd , he lik'd neither , one for having nothing , and t'other for that he had never enough . the athenians always elected rich magistrates , and aristotle gives this reason for it , that 't is impossible for a poor one to govern justly or peaceably ? 't is true , in spain we have had several able states-men , who came poor into office and went poor out . ministers who have a great family are very burthensome to their provinces ; for though they are men of integrity themselves , yet their retinue mayn't be so , the roman senate for this reason would not suffer them to carry their wives into their governments ; and the kings of persia generally prefer'd eunuchs to the greatest places of trust , because being free from the trouble of wives , and cares of providing ▪ for children , they might be more careful of , and less chargeable to the publick . those who are too much addicted to self-interest , and a desire of raising their fortunes , are very dangerous in publick offices . for though some do strive to raise themselves by merit and renown , yet they generally think it the surest way to do it by riches , without waiting rewards and gratuities from the prince , who is usually most sparing to him , who deserves most . lucullus the consul whom want made covetous , and avarice cruel , brought an unjust war upon spain only to enrich himself . residents in courts after imployments are over , is a very effectual remedy , because of the fear not only of losing this ill gotten wealth , but also of punishment , in the severity of which there should be no favour , nor should it be bought off by resounding ; as sergius galba the praetor did at rome , when he was accused of treachery to the portugueze . if all the chairs of justice were cover'd with the skins of corrupt judges , as cambyses king of persia order'd , and since him roger of sicily , certainly justice and integrity would be more strictly observed . emblem liv. liberty is natural to men ; obedience forced ; that is arbitrary , this guided by reason , these are contraries , and continually jarring against one another ; whence proceed rebellions and treasons against the prince , and as no government can consist , unless some commanded and others obeyed ; every one would be head , and depend on none but himself , which being impossible , he imagines his liberty consists in changing the form of government : and this is the greatest misfortune that can befall states , and is often the chief cause of their ruine , wherefore 't is highly necessary to use such methods , as that this lust after liberty , and this humane ambition being removed far from the immediate administration , should be kept under by reason , and the force of government ; so that this supream authority which is the princes property should be granted to none else , for he exposes loyalty to evident danger ; who grants any one a power too absolute . the royal crown put upon a subjects head , tho' but in jest , will make him proud and think himself above what he is . the mind of a subject should not experience this royal grandeur and glory of reigning , for afterwards abusing it he usurps it , and that it mayn't return to him from whom he had it , he plots and contrives his ruine ; the divine writ in one chapter gives us examples of kings put to death by the hands of their subjects , for having raised them too high . solomon for all his wisdom fell into this misfortune and ran the same risque , for having made ieroboam president of all the customs of the house of ioseph , and we read that he had the impudence to lift up his hand against his king . let princes then take it for a maxim of state , not to promote one too much above others , or if they are oblig'd to it , let it not be one but several , that they may balance one another and mutually keep each other in their devoir , by a reciprocal examination of one anothers actions and designs . the emperour ferdinand ii. did not sufficiently observe this piece of policy , when he gave the absolute command of his armies , and provinces to the duke of fridland , whence sprang so many misfortunes , and amongst the rest the loss of that great man , which was meerly the effect of too much power . let not princes be deceived by the example of pharaoh , who committed all his power into the hands of ioseph , who preserv'd his kingdom ; for ioseph was the emblem of christ , and there are very few ioseph's to be found now adays . each would depend upon himself , and not upon the body ; which this present emblem represents , by a branch encircled with a wicker basket filled with earth , such as gardiners use , where it by degrees takes root , and so being cut off insensibly , becomes a tree independant of the stock , without the least respect to its greatness . this example shews the danger in making governments of provinces perpetual , for ambition having once taken root , claims 'em as its property , he who is so accustom'd to command , will afterwards scarce be brought to obey . france shews us many examples of this written in its own blood. even god's ministers in the kingdom of heaven are liable to slip , the perpetuity of great offices is an alienation from the crown ; the scepter will be useless and of no force , and will stand in awe of that very power it has been so prodigal of : liberality will want a dowry , and vertue a reward . the minister becomes a tyrant in the government which he is sure of for life ; that prince whom he sees preserves his authority , he respects as his master , but him who does not he despises , and at last rebells against him . therefore iulius caesar limited the pretorship to one year , and the consulship to two . and the emperour charles v. advised his son philip ii. not to continue ministers in office too long , especially in places military , to give the greatest to persons of mean fortune , and embassy's to the rich , thereby to weaken ' em . the bravery of the great captain in italy , made king ferdinand the catholick suspect him , so that he recall'd him , and if he did not then wholly mistrust him , at least he would no longer hazard his loyalty , by the continuation of the vice-royship of naples . and though that great politician tiberius continued ministers in posts all their life-time , but this was upon such tyrannick considerations , as ought not to enter into the thoughts of a prudent and just prince . princes ought therefore to take advice from nature , the mistress of true politicks ; who does not allow its celestial ministers of light a perpetual authority , and government of the world , but certain fixt seasons , as we may see in the motion and reigns of the planets , that they mayn't lose the right of disposing of 'em , and to prevent , the usurping her authority and power ; besides she considers , that the earth would be ruined , if it should always be governed by the melancholy of saturn , or the heat and fury of mars , or the severity of iupiter , or the subtilty of mercury , or the levity of venus , or the inconstancy of the moon . in removals of this nature great care ought to be taken , that ministers should not take it to be a slur upon their reputation , to be removed from greater to lesser places , for since there are not many , that minister would be of no use , who when he has been employ'd in the highest , would refuse to officiate in lower places ; and though reason requires that rewards should be equal to deserts ; yet in this point the subjects reason should be guided by the princes interest , when his service , or the publick advantage is in the case ; [ not that he ought to be put into any inferior post , out of contempt or disgrace ] for so the importance of the negotiation makes amends for the meannes● of the office. if any offices may be continued long , they are embassies● for their business is only to intercede , not command ; not to give orders , but to negotiate ; at their departure all acquaintance with their native countrey dies , and all intimacy with the prince with whom they negotiate and his ministers cease . forts and garrisons , which are as it were the keys of the kingdom , should be at the immediate power and disposal of the prince ; king sancho was ill advised , when by reason of the minority of his son don alonso iii. he order'd those of the nobility , who were governours of cities to remain till his son was fifteen years old , which occasioned many grievous calamities to that kingdom . as for other offices let 'em be but for a time , for their too long continuance makes the ministers proud , and endangers their loyalty : this tiberius knew though he did not practise . vertue is tired by industry and expectation ; yet should not offices be of too short continuance , so as the minister can reap no benefit or experience in 'em , or so as to make him too ravenous like hawks in norway , because of the shortness of the day ; but in troublesome and dangerous times , publick offices and places of trust ought to be continu'd longer , least they should upon removal be conferr'd upon raw , unexperienced persons . so augustus did upon the defeat of quintilius varus . but this doctrine of ministers being continued in offices but for a time , must not be understood of those supream offices of the princes counsel , or of justice . but on the contrary , they ought to be fixt and continued , because of the advantage of their experience and knowledge of affairs depending . these kinds of offices are in governments like the poles in the heavens , about which the lesser orbs move , so that if they should be chang'd or removed , the whole universe would be endanger'd by the disorder of its natural motions . solon knew this inconveniency in the four hundred senatours , which were yearly elected by lot at athens , and therefore he established a senate of sixty worthy men who were called areopagites , and while this continu'd the republick flourished . 't is moreover very dangerous to commit the government of kingdoms during the minority , to persons who have any pretentio●s thereto , though never so unjust ; so it fell out in arragon , by the imprudence of those who committed the government to sancho duke of roussillon , until king iames i. came to age . those persons who have no manner of pretention to the crown , either by birth , or any other cause , often thirst after it ; how much more then those , who in pictures and images see their ancestours brows incircled with it ? this age as well as the pass'd gives us many deplorable examples of relations , who have treacherously usurped kingdoms which they were entrusted with . those of the royal blood are more prone to tyranny , in that they never want means to accomplish their designs . few can be perswad'd of the justice of that law , which prefers birth to vertue ; and every one thinks he better deserves a crown , than another , and if this reason should be of force in any one , he is in danger from his favourites , who hoping to participate of his grandeur , strive to procure it by violent means , and to raise jealousies amongst his relations . if king philip had any jealousie of don john of austria they flow'd from this spring . a glorious example of this policy we find in the infant ferdinand refusing the crown , which was the right of his nephew don john ii. by which generous recusance of that crown on earth he merited many more in heaven . the generous loyalty which the infants of that name have paid the kings of their race , is of an ancient date . nor do we find less in this present infant towards the present king , whose respect and obedience is more like that of a subject than of a brother . the heavenly spheres pay not a more ready obedience to the first mover , than his highness does to his majestys will. o truly noble prince , whose glorious birth , though the greatest in the world , is yet the least of his excellencies , the effect of divine providence , that in a time of such troublesome and tedious wars , which strain'd the very axle-tree and poles of the government , to raise us up an atlas to support it by his valour , conduct and prudence . emblem lv. aristotle the better to instruct alexander the great , in the qualities of counsellours compared them to eyes ; which comparison don alonso the wise makes use of in his books of laws . nor is this thought new , for the kings of persia and babylon call'd 'em their eyes , their ears and their hands , according to the offices in which they officiated : the seven spirits god's ministers sent all over the earth , were the eyes of a lamb without spot or blemish . a prince who ought to see and comprehend so many affairs , should be all eyes and all ears , and because he can't be so , he must make use of the eyes and ears of other . whence there is no prince , though never so prudent and intelligent , but ha● occasion for ministers and to make use of them as his eyes , ears and hands . this is not of small advantage to him ▪ if he knows how to make a right use on 't , for by thi● means he sees with every body's eyes , hears with their ears ▪ and takes advise from them all . the aegyptians mean● this by the eye which they placed upon their scepter ▪ for counsels are the eyes by which we inspect futurity . this ieremiah seem'd to allude to , when he said , virga● vigilantem ego video . for this reason , in this present emblem you see a scepter full of eyes , to give the prince to understand , that he ought to inspect all affairs of the government by his ministers ; nor is it to be wonder'd at , that we place the ministers in the scepter , for formerly their names were engrave on the crowns of the emperours and kings of spain , nor without reason , for they shine brighter than the diadems themselves . this emblem of eyes sufficiently shews the qualifications that a minister ought to be endued with . for as the sight extends to all things far and near , so should the active spirit of the counsellour inspect all things present , past and future , that he may make a right judgment of things , and give a true opinion of all affairs , which can't be done without much reading , great experience , and a continual commerce with foreign countries : for if the counsellours ben't perfectly versed in the princes nature , and the manners and genius of the people , they 'll ruine both themselves and the government . and to know this requires use ; for the eyes don't know things which they have never seen ; he who has had experience and knowledge of things , will readily find expedients and remedies . there is such a correspondence between the eyes and heart , that the affections of the one immediately strikes the other , when this is sad they weep , when this glad they smile ; if the counsellour has not a particular esteem for his prince , he will take but little care of his affairs , and is therefore very little to be trusted , so said king alphonso the wise : * that councellours ought to be the princes true friends , otherwise he would be in great danger , for those who hate a person will never advise him cordially . the eye won't suffer the finger to touch its inside , but upon its approach immediately sculks within the lids ; how wise and learn'd soever the minister is in his counsels , if he is easie and free of his secerts , if he suffers his finger to probe his heart , he 'll be more prejudicial to the princers affairs than one who understands nothing , counsels are worth nothing when revealed , and there is more danger in good resolves unseasonably discover'd , than in ill ones executed with secrecy ; let a minister therefore avoid discourse with those who are not entrusted with the same secret . let him shut his heart against those who would dive into it : for in discoursing of affairs the design is easily discovered , with the maxims by which the prince governs . the lips are the windows of the heart , the opening of which discovers all within . the eyes are so pure and free from avarice ; that they won't admit the least atom , and if by chance any thing , though never so little gets in , it obstructs their sight , or at least makes them see things double , and different from what they are ; the minister who receives presents will be blinded with the dust of them , so as not to be able to discern things rightly , but only as self-interest shall represent ' em . though the eyes are two , yet they see but one and the same thing , they both agree in the truth of the species which they receive , and in transmitting them to the sence by the optick nerves which are united , that they mayn't enter severally and deceive it . if the ministers don't unanimously agree in advising for the best , without being divided in their sentiments by love and hate , or any other reason ▪ the prince will be always in doubt or confusion , without knowing which counsel is best . and this inconvenience falls out when one minister thinks he sees and understands more than another , or when he has not judgment enough to distinguish which is best . or when he is byass'd by his own passions or desire of revenge . but a minister should be free from all these , so as to have no other purpose or design than the service of his prince : such a minister [ says alphonso the wise ] is called in latine patricius , being as it were a father to the prince , which title is taken from the resemblance it bears to the natural father , for every father is naturally inclined to advise his son in all things for his advantage and honour ; so he who governs the prince by his counsels , ought to love him and advise him with sincerity , preferring his honour and interest above all things , not respecting the love or hatred , interest or prejudice , that may ensue , and all this without flattery , not minding whether he be good or bad ; like a father in instructing his child † . nature has divided the jurisdiction of the eyes by a line interpos'd , not but that they both agree in operation , assisting one another with a zeal so mutual , that if one turns to one side , the t'other does so too , that they may have a more certain cognizance of things , neither regarding whether they be within their sphere or not , the same agreement is absolutely necessary amongst ministers , whose zeal should be so universal , that they should not only regard those things which their office obliges 'em to , but also those that belong to others ; there is no member , but for the preservation of the whole body , sends its blood and spirits to the assistance of that which is out of order . for a minister to be an idle spectator of anothers calamities shews malice , envy and want of respect to the prince . this proceeds often from a love of self-interest and glory ; or least he should by assisting his friend endanger his own reputation , or else that he may flourish more upon his friends misfortune . such ministers only serve themselves not the prince . whence proceed divisions in the state , army and revenue , by which many good opportunities are lost , many towns , castles and provinces ruined ; ministers should mutually communicate their designs and actions , as the cherubims did their wings in the temple of solomon . as u●eful as eyes are to the body , nature has given it but two , because more would breed confusion and obstruct the susception of things : 't is the same in counsellours , for when there are too many , consultations are retarded , secrets revealed , and truth confounded , for their votes are only counted not duly weighed , and the greater number carries it ; and thence proceed generally all misfortunes in common-wealths . the multitude is always blind and thoughtless ; and the wisest senate , if composed of too many , will have a mixture of the ignorance of the vulgar . a few planets give more light than many stars , and the multitude thereof in the via lactea darken one another by the refraction of their own light , so that 't is darker there than in any other part of the sky . two great a number makes liberty sawcy and stubborn , and difficult to be reduced to the princes will . as it often happens in parliaments and general assemblies ; let therefore the prince have just so many ministers as are sufficient to govern his state , carrying himself indifferently to them all , not being ruled wholly by one , for he can't see so well with one as with all ; thus xenophon said when using the same comparison , he called the ministers of the kings of persia their eyes and ears ; such a minister would usurp all the dignity and majesty of the prince to himself , for that the prince is oblig'd to see with his eyes princes are generally so taken with some one minister , that with him they negotiate all manner of affairs , though he be never so great a stranger to them ; hence proceed so many errours in their resolutions , for neither can men of learning give proper advise in military affairs , nor souldiers in those which relate to peace ; upon which consideration the emperour severus advised with every one in those matters which particularly belonged to them . by all these qualities of the eyes the body is govern'd , without 'em it can't move one step securely ; 't will be the same in the government which wants good ministers . without these eyes the scepter would be blind , for there is no prince so wise as to be able to decide all affairs himself : † since royalty [ says k. alphonsus ] admits of no companion , nor has occasion for any , 't is necessary for the prince to have about him persons of integrity and wisdom , who may upon all emergencies advise and assist him . but if any prince imagines his own eyes so good as to believe he can see all things without the assistance of others , he is more vain than prudent , and will stumble each step of his administration . ioshua though he communicated with 〈◊〉 ▪ received instructions from him ; and particularly for the taking the city nai , he advised with his old captains about it . king assuerus's ministers never departed from his side , and he maturely advised with them about all affairs , a custom which kings always observed . only by pride cometh contention , but with the well advised is wisdom nature has qualified no man sufficiently to manage a government though never 〈◊〉 little by himself , it being impossible for one to know so much as many . and though one quick-sighted can see further than many others , for they are not like number● ▪ which are multiplyed by themselves , and make one great summ , it must be understood of things at a distance , not of those in a near circumference , for then many eyes discover more than one , provided the number be not so great as to create confusion ; one person has but one argument , for he can't have many at the same time , and being fond with that will go no further . in counsels the prince hears all , and following the best renounces his own opinion , and perceives the inconveniencies of those , which proceed from passion or interest . for this reason don john ii. of arragon writing to his sons their catholick majesties , upon his death bed , he advised them to do nothing without the counsel of vertuous and discreet ministers . 't is necessary , that these eyes of ministers should preceed each step of the administration , and mark out the way . the emperour antoninus sirnam'd the philosopher the wisest prince of 〈◊〉 time , had for his counsellours scaev●la , mutlanus , ulpianus and marcellus , all persons of exquisite merit , and when their counsel seem'd better than his own , he with ease ●quitted it and sided with them ; 't is fitter says he , for me to follow the advice of so many worthy friends , than for them to follow mine . a wise man hearkeneth unto counsel . an ignorant prince who will be advised , will succeed better in his affairs , than an understanding one who depends too much upon his own opinions . let not a prince's pride suggest● to him , that he divides the honour of the success , in taking the advise of his ministers ; for 't is as commendable to submit himself to be advised by others , as to succeed in any thing of his own management . * be advised , o king , and govern'd in your turn . this taking advice , is a particular mark of a prince's authority ; 't is the inferiours duty to give advice , and the superiours to receive it . there is nothing more becoming royalty , nothing more necessary than consultation and execution . 't is an action [ said king alphonsus xi . in the parliament of madrid ] worthy the royal grandeur , to have always , according to his commendable custom , worthy counsellours about him , and to take advice of them in all things ; for if every private man's duty be to have good counsellours , how much more is it incumbent upon a prince ? every fool can give advice , but he must be a man of prudence who resolves well . and there is no diminution of the honour of a prince , who knows how to take advice and make a good choice : whatever shall be well enacted by the assistance of your counsels , said the emperour theodosius in one of his laws , will redound to the honour of the empire and my own glory . the victories of scipio africanus proceeded from the counsels of laelius , whence they said in rome , laelius wrote the play , and scipio acted it . yet did not this obscure the lustre of his glory , nor was the honour of scipio's exploits attributed to laelius , 't is necessary that the prince should know how to act the play himself , and that the minister should not be both poet and actor too . for though a prince's ministers are his eyes , yet he should not be so stark blind , as not to see at all without them , for this would be to govern by guess , and he would incur the contempt and disrespect of his subjects ; lucius torquatus being chosen consul the third time , desired to be excused for the weakness of his eyes , saying , 't was a shame that the government , and the estates of the citizens should be committed to one , who must be forced to see with other men eyes . king ferdinand the catholick us'd to say , that ambassadours were a prince's eyes ; but that he would be very unfortunate who should see with no other : that great politician did not wholly rely upon his ministers ; see with them indeed he did , but as we do with spectacles , by applying 'em to his own eyes . when the ministers find that the administration of affairs is wholly in their power , they wil● wrest it to their own private ends , and their ambition increasing they divide into factions , every one arrogates 〈◊〉 himself that share of power and authority , that the prince thro' his laziness and insufficiency has granted him . all things are in disorder and confusion ; if the ministers aim to be any thing more than perspectives , by which the prince discovers the horizon of affairs , and takes those resolutions and counsels which he likes best , nature has given him eyes , and if god governs his heart , he directs also his sight , and makes it more clear and quick than his ministers . king philip ii. retir'd sometimes into himself , to meditate upon the affairs of his government , and after having fervently recommended himself to god ; he resolv'd upon the first method that offer'd it self , though against the opinion of all his ministers , and this generally succeeded . counsellours can't always be at the princes elbow , for the state of affairs and the urgency of opportunity requires sometimes , that their resolutions be quick and ready . orders are not respected and obey'd , when it appears that he gives them not , but receives them himself : 't is a presumptuous rashness to conclude all without ever taking advice , and a stupid slavery to act nothing without it . he who commands should have the liberty of changing , mending , and rejecting whatever his ministers propose to him . 't is sometimes convenient to hide from 'em certain mysteries , and to deceive them , as the same philip , did who differently reported to his council the negotiations of his ambassadours , when he had a mind to draw 'em to his own resolutions , or thought it convenient to conceal certain circumstances from them . a council of state should be like a colossus , that the prince standing upon its shoulders may see farther than it . the thebans did not desire princes so foresighted , as one may guess by the manner of painting them with their e●rs open , and their eyes shut , signifying that they ought blindly to execute all the resolutions of the senate : but this was not the emblem of an absolute prince , but only of a prince of a common-wealth , whose power is so circumscrib'd that 't is sufficient for him to hear , for the power of seeing what is to be done , it reserved for the senate . this is nothing but a dark shadow of majesty , and an empty appearance of authority . his power is nothing but a reflection of that of the senate , and so he has no need of eyes , who can't go where he pleases . but though 't is convenient for a prince to preserve this liberty in counsels , yet he ought not to be so vain as for fear of being thought to want their advice , to reject whatever they pro●●●e ; for so he would incur very great inconveni●ncies : as pettus did according to tacitus . if 't were possible kings should have kings for their counsellours , that 〈…〉 counsels might not deviate from 〈◊〉 a●thority and honour of 〈◊〉 ; a prince sometimes 〈…〉 beneath himself 〈…〉 instigation of an abject 〈…〉 . but since this is impossible they 〈◊〉 chuse 〈◊〉 ●●unsellours , as though they are not princes by birth , are so in grea●ness of mind and generosity . in spain there are several councils instituted , with a great deal of prudence ; for the government of kingdoms and provinces , and for all the most important affairs of the kingdom ▪ yet ought not all care to be rejected , by confidently relying upon this happy constitution , for no government is so strongly fenced , but that its foundations in time wear away , or are unsens●bly undermin'd by malice or abuse . 't is not sufficient for each distinct part to be well govern'd , if they don't sometimes all unite , to treat as well of themselves in particular , as of the whole body in general . for this reason we have in convents or religious orders , provincial and general chapters , and in the government of the church , councils . for the same reason every ten years there is held at madrid a general council consisting of two counsellours , of each particular council , and of two deputies of each province , to consult for the preservation not only of each part , but of the whole kingdom . for if these kingdoms were not so renewed , they would grow old and at last die . this assembly will unite the parts of the monarchy , and make 'em agree among themselves , to the mutual assistance of each other . for this reason the councils of toledo were assembled , where not only matters of religion , but also those of state were treated of . all these qualities of eyes ought also to be found in confessors to princes , who are their counsellours , judges , and spiritual physicians : these offices require men of zeal and intire affection for the service of god , and their prince ; persons who have sence to judge well , prudence to advise , liberty to reprehend , and courage to undeceive , by setting before his eyes , though at the hazard of his favour , the disgusts of his subjects , and the danger of his kingdom , without smearing over the craz'd and falling wall with untempered mortar . some princes use confessors only for conscience sake , others make use of them as councellors of state : i shall not pretend to examine into the reason of these two methods ; i only say , 't is thought convenient in spain , to admit the king's confessor into his council , as well to give his assistance in matters of conscience , as also that being as it were a sharer in the management of affairs , he may correct the prince , if in any thing he is deficient in his devoir . for some know the faults that they are guilty of as men , but not those which they commit as princes , though those are greater which belong to their office than those which respect only their person . no● only the confessors ought to assist in council , but also bishops , or other ecclesiasticks , who by their authority and learning may be very serviceable , and so the two arms , the temporalty and spiritualty will more firmly unite , for the defence and preservation of the body of the government . the gothick kings used to advise about all weighty affairs , with prelates who were to that purpose assembled in the councils of toledo . what we have said about confessors should be understood also of preachers , who are the trumpets of truth , the interpreters between god and men , in whose mouth god has put his word , the prince ought to carry himself with great circumspection towards them , they being the channels by which wholesome or poysonous doctrines are delivered to the people ; the mobb wholly depends upon 'em , they being the most proper instruments either to raise or appease them , as has been seen in the revolts of catal●nia and portugal . their zeal for declaiming against vice , often gives 'em occasion to reflect upon those in authority , which the people eagerly swallow , thro' their natural aversion to the ministers ; whence proceeds contempt of authority , and the peoples disgust , which is the occasion of seditions and tumults ; especially when the princes faults are reflected on , 't is necessary therefore , that these reprimands should be general , without pointing at persons when the scandal is not publick , or holy admonitions , or other circumstances have been ineffectual . god so modestly in the apocalypse reprehended the bishops , that he seems almost to ●latter them ; christ never reflected upon any person from the pulpit , his reprehensions were general , and if at any time he descended to particulars 't was not as preacher , but as king. that should by no means be heard from the pulpit , which is dissolute and punishable in the streets , in which zeal is often mistaken , either because 't is extravagant , or blinded with the applause of the giddy mobb , which eagerly crowds to hear the prince or magistracy reflected upon . emblem lvi . the office of a secretary depends upon the understanding , not the pen ; if it all lay in neatly cutting a letter printers would be the best secretaries . his duty is to consult , propose and bring matters to perfection , he is the right hand of the princes will , his instrument of government , the finger by which he points out his resolutions ; and as king alphonsus says , the second officer of the houshold , at least of those who are of the cabinet ; for as the confessor is mediator between god and the king , so is the secretary between the king his subjects † . discreet and prudent consultations in councils will be of small effect , if he who should methodize them should fail in his part ; the ministers give their opinions , and the prince declares his sentiments by his secretary , and a word now and then aptly apply'd , changes the face of affairs , as in a picture , a small shade or a stroke of the pencil , either spoils it , or gives more life to it ; the council forms the idea of the building , the secretary draws the plan thereof , which if it be irregular , the super-structure must of necessity be so too . the better to represent this , you see in the present emblem his pen is a pair of compasses , because his business is not only to write , but also to measure the resolves , and to set out fit times and opportunities for the execution of 'em , that they may neither be too soon nor too late : this office is so united to that of the prince , that if the trouble of affairs would permit , it should by no means be committed to another , for if it is not a part of majesty , 't is at least a certain reflection of it ; this i believe cicero meant , when he advised the then pro-consul of asia thus , let your ring [ which you must construe secretary ] be not as any other piece of goods , but as your own self , not a minister of another's will , but a witness of your own ; each other minister is the kings representative but in one office , but the secretary in all . it suffices others to know what belongs to their particular places , but he must have a perfect knowledge , a general and particular intelligence of practices , and arts , as well of peace as war. if they erre 't is but in some one particular ; but this reaches all in general , yet so privately , that the mis-carriage is imputed to the council ; as the ignorance of the physician is to the malignity of the distemper ; some affairs may be negotiated with bad ministers , but not with an ignorant secretary . he is the stomach , in which affairs are digested , and if they come thence crude and ill concocted , the life of the government will be sickly and short ; cast your eyes back upon pastimes , and you will find that never any government has been well manag'd without good secretaries . what signifies the princes careful resolves , if the secretary knows not how to apply them , by judiciously considering , and prudently observing certain circumstances on which affairs always depend . if he wants discretion and judgment , his written rules and instructions are of small use , for there is scarce any affair for which you can find an exact precedent . for time and other accidents alter the very nature and form of all things . apothecaries have different medicines prescribed by several physicians , for several diseases ; but they 'd be notoriously mistaken , if they should ignorantly apply them without a due knowledge of the causes whence they proceed , as also of the constitution of the sick person , the time , and other circumstances ; which experience , reason , and speculation shall dictate . the same affair should be differently prescrib'd to a phlegmatick and cholerick minister , differently to a timorous and bold one . the secretary ought to instruct each how he should behave himself . what are secretaries offices , but certain schools for the education of able statesmen ? from what practice and experience teaches them , they learn the true art of government . there they observe what counsels have succeeded , what mis-carried . from all which appears the necessity of choosing such for secretaries , as are endu'd with good natural parts . those great ministers or secretaries of god , which we call evangelists , were represented in the apocalypse , by four wing'd animals , full of eyes both within and without , signifying by their wings , their expedition and execution , their knowledge of all things by their external eyes , and their contemplation by their internal ones . being so busie that they never rested night or day , so intent upon their duty , that their wings were always stretch'd upwards , so conformed and united to the holy spirit in all things , that they never parted from it . to make a good choice of a secretary , 't would be convenient for princes to train up such persons as by their natural qualifications and perfect knowledge of the latine tongue seem fit for it , under their ambassadours , or chief ministers , making tryal of them in several posts beyond sea ; and afterwards let them call 'em to the secretaries office at court , where they may serve , and capacitate themselves for secretaries of state , high treasurer , and the like , upon whose knowledge and experience , the success and good management of affairs very much depend . by this means the ill choice which ministers of state usually make of their secretaries would be avoided , for they employ only them , who have served 'em formerly , and who are usually most unfit for that office , being chosen commonly more from the neatness of their hand-writing than their understanding . whence it falls out , that a good minister who has a careless ignorant secretary , is more prejudicial to the princes affairs , than a bad minister whose secretary is discreet and careful ; besides the secretary being chosen by the prince himself , on whom he solely depends , will make the minister more vigilant and attentive in the performance of his office ; king alphonso well knowing of what importance it was to have a good secretary , said , that a king ought to make choice of for that charge , a person well born and well bred , of good sence , good temper , and good manners ; who can read and write latine , as well as his vulgar tongue † . king alphonso seems to thing it not sufficient that he can read it , but that he must readily speak it too ; for this is absolutely necessary for him , who is to treat with all nations . especially at present , now the spanish monarchy is extended over so many foreign kingdoms , and provinces , because o● the frequent correspondence in latine . the most essential thing in a secretary is secrecy , whence his name is derived , that he may upon hearing it be put in mind of his duty . the tongue and the pen are the most dangerous instruments of the heart , by these 't is usually expos'd , either through levity , or vanity , to be thought the repositories of very important secrets , by discovering them , either by discourse or writing , to those from whom they should conceal 'em : so that he is not fit for the charge of a secretary , who can't modestly hear others , rather than talk himself , without changing the air of his face at any thing ; for oft-times the secrets of the heart are discovered thereby . emblem lvii . the wheels of a clock perform their office with such silence , that their motions can neither be heard nor perceived , and though the whole contrivance depends upon them , yet do they not attribute to themselves the honour of it , but lend to the hand its motion , which alone distinguishes and points out the hours , and is esteem'd by all , the only rule and measure of time . this mutual correspondence and agreement should be between the prince and his counsellours ; for 't is highly convenient to have them : for [ as king alphonsus the wise said ] though emperours and kings are great persons , yet can neither of them by themselves do more than a single man ; ‖ and the government of a nation requires many , but them so modest as not to attribute their successful resolutions to their own counsel , but to the princes ; let 'em share the trouble but not the power ; let 'em be ministers not companions ; let 'em know that the prince can govern without them , but not they without him . where a prince can shew his authority and greatness without the assistance of others , let him do it . in aegypt where the heat of the sun is more powerful than in other parts , it breeds animals without any assistance ; if a prince does nothing without advice , he 's more like a client than a prince . the force of government is lost , unless the summ of affairs be reduced to one ; monarchy is distinguished from other methods of government in that one only commands , and the rest obey , and if the prince shall permit several to rule , 't will not be a monarchy but an aristocracy , there is no command where all are masters . the holy spirit takes this for a punishment of the sins of the people , and on the contrary a blessing when only one commands , when the ministers shall find a prince so careless as to let others reign , they usurp to themselves what authority they can . pride and emulation grows among them , every one tears a slip from the royal robe , so that at last it remains a mere ragg . the people confounded between so many masters , no longer acknowledge their true and lawful one , and so begin to despise and contemn the government . for they believe nothing can be well done , but what they think the prince does of himself , whence they prepare a remedy by force . histories furnish us with deplorable examples of this , in the deposition and death of garcias king of galaecia , who would not be so much as the index to point out the motion of the government ; but left all to the management of a particular favourite of his , who was afterwards kill'd with him . we find sancho king of portugal depos'd , because his queen , and a few other scoundrel servants had the whole management of affairs ; the same thing be●el king henry iv. for being so easie as to sign all dispatches which his ministers brought him ▪ without ever reading or knowing the contents of ' em . the prince exposes himself to all manner of inconveniencies , who without perusal or consideration , agrees to whatever others desire him : for upon him as upon soft wax every one makes what impression he pleases ; so it was with the emperour claudius . god plac'd the government upon the princes own shoulders , not upon his ministers ; as samuel intimated to saul , at the entertainment when he anointed him king , when he on purpose ordered the cook to set by for him a shoulder of meat . yet would i not have a prince like a camel merely to bear burthens ; but his shoulders should be full of eyes , like the animals in ezekiel's vision , that they may see and know what they bear : elisha call'd elias the chariot and horsemen of israel , because he sustain'd and manag'd the government † . he does not deserve the name of prince , who cannot of himself give orders and contradict 'em , as is visible in vitellius , who not being capable of commanding nor punishing , was no longer emperour , but only the cause of war ; wherefore a p●ince should not only perform the part of the hand in the clock of the government , but that also of the pe●dulum , which regulates the motions of the wheels : in short , upon that depends the whole art of government ? not that i would have a prince perform the office of a judge , counsellour or president , for his dignity is far above it , if he apply'd himself so to all business , he would want time for affairs of greater moment . he ought , says king alphonso , to have understanding , loyal , and trusty persons to assist him , and serve him faithfully in all things , as well to advise him as to administer justice to his people ; for he can't of himself duely weigh and examine all things , so that he has need of some in whom he can confide . he should use them as the instruments of government , and let them operate ; yet so as he may inspect what they do , with a superiour direction , more or less immediate or assistant , as the importance of affairs requires . those things which properly belong to the ministers , let the ministers perform . those which are peculiar to the princes office , let him only manage . for which reason tiberius check'd the senate for leaving the whole burthen of affairs to him , the weighty thoughts of princes , ought not to be disturb'd by ●rivolous consultations , when without any offence to their majesty , they may be decided by the ministers . wherefore sanguinius advised the roman senate , not to trouble the emperour with such matters , as without molesting him were in their power to remedy . but if a prince relying upon the prudence and integrity of a minister , shall intrust him with the management of any affair , let him leave it wholly to him . after god had made adam lord of the whole earth , he brings all the animals which he had created , that he might give 'em names , god would not so much as reserve that to himself . for the like reason a prince ought to leave ordinary cares and troubles to others : for the head intermeddles not with the business of the hands and feet , nor does the pilot intermeddle with the common sailers duty , but sitting in the stern does more with the gentle motion of his hand , in guiding the boat , than all the other with their toil and labour . but if a prince either by reason of his minority or old age , or any other natural defect , be incapable of attending the direction of affairs , let him choose an assistant . for 't is much better to govern well by another , than ill by himself . the first years of nero's reign were happy , because he took advice from good councellours ; but when he took the management of all into his own hands he ruin'd himself . king philip ii. finding that age and infirmities had render'd him unfit to govern , chose certain trusty and experienced ministers for his assistants . yet even when necessity urges , a prince ought not wholly to omit the care of affairs , be his ministers never so prudent and faithful , for the body politick resembles the natural , in which if the heat be deficient , no remedy , no art , nor industry can preserve its life . the prince is the soul of the government wherefore to keep that alive , 't is necessary that this should assist the members and organs ; if he can't absolutely do this , let him seem to see and hear all things , with such assiduity , that they may be attributed to his disposal and judgment ; the princes presence though it has no other effect , at least influences the ministers , and makes 'em more careful and assiduous . to know only that all orders come through his hands , gives them authority , though he never alter nor see 'em ; what will it do then if he shall particularly examine , and being privately instructed , shall correct and reprehend his ministers faults ? if he do this but once , they will be ever after fearful and cautious , they will imagine that he actually sees , or inspects all things . let them treat in councils not only of affairs of state , but also of what worthy persons , they should promote to offices and preferments ; but let his hand confirm their resolutions , let it be that which bestows all rewards and gratuities , not suffering as in a sun-dial his shadow , i mean his ministers and favourites ▪ to point 'em out , and publish them , and ●o cause them to be ascrib'd to them ; for by this he woul● lose his esteem , affairs their authority , rewards their acceptance ; and the prince is slighted by those whom he 〈◊〉 most oblig'd ; for which reason tiberius when he saw the senate inclin'd to reward m. hortalus , vigorously oppos● it . and sharply check'd iunius gallio , for proposing gratuities to the praetorian souldiers , giving him to understand that it was only the emperours prerogative ; so 〈◊〉 prince is not respected because he is a prince , but becaus● as such he commands , rewards , and punishes . if any piece of severity is to be committed , or any rigorous punishment to be inflicted , let it be done by the hands of hi● ministers , but let the prince conceal his own as much 〈◊〉 possible . let the peoples indignation , and the odium 〈◊〉 severity , and punishment fall upon them , not him ▪ the ancients said of iupiter , that of himself he darte● forth none but benign rays , without hurting any one , bu● only to shew his power , but that malign ones were by th● council of the gods ; let the ministers be thought sever● and cruel , the prince tender and merciful ; 't is their 〈◊〉 to accuse and condemn , his to forgive and pardon . em●nuel king of portugal thank'd a certain person , who fou●● an argument to sa●e a criminal . also iohn iii. king 〈◊〉 portugal being present at the tryal of a criminal , whe●● the judges were equally divided , and his opinion ask'd 〈◊〉 decide the matter spoke to this effect , you , says he , 〈◊〉 having condemn'd this man have done justice , and could wish you had been all of the same opinion ; 〈◊〉 i am for acquitting him , least any should say , that 〈◊〉 kings vote alone took away a subjects life . the princ● is made for the subjects preservation , and he ought to 〈◊〉 no one to death , but for the sake of that . the hand of a clock has no effect upon the wheels , but permits them to do their duty , and only denotes their motion , so the emperour charles v. was of opinion , a prince ought to behave himself towards his council , to let them alone in their debates without intermeddling with 'em ; this precept he left to his son philip the ii. a princes presence obstructs their freedom , and gives opportunity for flattery , and though in matters of greater moment , the prince's presence seems very convenient , in that he can't be so throughly inform'd by reading , as by hearing their debates , for by this he will learn much , and begin to love business , and be instructed in the qualifications , and designs of his councellours , a prince ought to be extremely cautious in declaring his opinion , least either flattery , respect , or fear should make it received . for this reason piso , when marcellus was accus'd for taking down the head of augustus's statue , and putting his own up ; being ask'd his opinion by tiberius , what 's your sentiment , sir , said he , if you speak first i know what to follow , but if last i am afraid least i should imprudently think otherwise for the same reason 't was a prudent order of the same emperour , that his son drusus should not vote first in the senate , least others should think themselves oblig'd to follow his opinion . this is a thing of ill consequence ; is it less inconvenient not to declare his mind at all , for so that counsel which seems best may with more secrecy be executed . henry king of portugal proposed matters with so much discretion in his council , that it could not be discover'd , either by his words or looks , which way he inclined ; whence came the custom of presidents and vice-roys , not giving their votes in council , which is an anci●nt practice , and was used by the etolians . but in a matter in which the prince desires rather their approbation than advice , he may open his mind and declare his opinion , for he will find they will generally ●ide with him either through a desire to please , or because we naturally incline to follow our superior . in affairs of war , especially when the prince is involv'● therein , his presence in council is of more importance , 〈◊〉 well for the above-mentioned reasons , as that he thereby animates them , and that their prudent resolves may be pu● in speedy execution , and least while they are brought to him the opportunity be slipt . he must know that some minis●ers desire to be thought vigorous and active , rathe● than discreet , and so in the princes presence o●t●n are the authors of rash counsel , not that they would be th● persons that should execute them , nay they have a particular aversion to all danger , as it was with those who advis'd vitellius to take up arms . 't is a common question among politicians , whether 〈◊〉 no a prince himself should not assist in the courts of justice ; 't is a too weighty employ , and would take up 〈◊〉 much of that time which is necessary for affairs of state and the administration of the government . though tib●rius after he had assisted in the senate , went to the court● of judicature . king ferdinand the holy was ofte● present in those courts , where he heard and defended the poor , and protected the weak from the strong . k. alphon●● the wise ordain'd , that the king himself should undertake the causes of widows and orphans , for tho' , says he , he is oblig'd in general to defend his subjects , yet ought he particularly to assist them , because they are more helpless than others * . solomon's great judgment in the decision of causes got him the general esteem of all ; the israelites desired a king , who as in other nations might be judge over them ; the presence of the king makes judges just , and his power only can defend the poor ; the chief reason why god chose david king was , because he who had freed his flocks from the jaws of the lion , best knew how to protect the impotent from the powerful : so grateful and acceptable is this care to god , that for that only he promises to blot out all the rest of his sins , and make them as white as snow . wherefore i can't deny that this is the main part of a prince's duty , yet i think he fulfils it , if he chooses persons of integrity for his ministers of justice , and takes care that they justly and uprightly perform their offices . 't will suffice sometimes in the most important cases , i mean such as may be oppress'd by power , to be present at their giving their opinions , so as to make the judges always in fear , least he should be in some corner of the court and hear all that is said and done . for which reason all the judges live in the royal palace at madrid ; and in the courts where they sit , there are windows , from whence his majesty uses to hear all that passes . the same is usual in the turks divan , where when the bassa's meet to treat about affairs , he hears them when he pleases , from a window cover'd with sarcenet . and this harmony of the clock , and the mutual agreement between the wheels , and the hand which points the hours is evidentl● visible in the government of the kingdom of spain , which is so well constituted , that those kingdoms and provinces which nature has dis-joyn'd , she unites by the prudence of her government each has its particular court at madrid , c●stile , arragon , p●rtugal , italy , the netherlands and the indies , to which there is but one president , they take cognizance of all affairs , whether of justice or rewards belonging to any of these kingdoms or provinces . and their debates are brought to the king who orders what he thinks fit , so that the councils are as 't were the wheels , and his majesty the index ; or they the optick nerves , by which visible species are transmitted to the prince , and the king the common sense which discerns and judges them . the affairs of the kingdom being so dispos'd and presented to his majesty , all 's manag'd with that ease and prudence , that for above a hundred years since it began to flourish ; there has happened no considerable mis-carriage , which is almost incredible , in such a dis-united body . the roman empire was more succinct , and yet it almost continually felt convulsions and disorders , an undeniable proof that ours is better founded than their's , and govern'd by men of greater judgment , prudence and integrity . since then the summ of all affairs should be reduc'd to the prince , he should not only be a father to the republick in love , but economy too , nor should he think it sufficient to have counsellours , and ministers to manage his affairs , but he should also keep by him a certain private memoir of them , by which he should be guided in all things ; as merchants keep their accounts in a particular book for that purpose , such a book as this the emperour august●s kept . in which he took an account of the revenue , of the number of the citizens and auxiliaries in his service , also o● the fleets , kingdoms , provinces , tributes , taxes , and gratuities , all which he wrote with his own hand ; the memory is the treasury of experience , but is very short and weak without the assistance of the pen to strengthen and perpetuate it upon paper . he 'll find a great advantage , who for memory's sake takes an account of all actions good or ill , in his book ; which diligence if your royal highness when setled upon the throne shall neglect , and think it beneath your grandeur to stoop to , and that your presence is sufficient without this troublesome assiduity , leaving that to your ministers , i dare aver● from the excellent constitution , and order of this government , both in its courts and counsels , your highness might finish your course without any considerable danger ; but you would be no more than the hand to the clock , wholly govern'd by the wh●els , nor would there appear any thing conspicuous or glorious in your whole reign ; as there will , if [ which god grant ] your highness imitating augustus , shall make your remarks upon each kingdom distinctly , with an addition of all garrison'd towns , also of all persons famous for war or peace , with their qualifications , characters , services and the like ; particularly inserting all a●fairs of great concern , what has been their issue , in what they succeeded , in what fail'd , and several other observations , which are instructive in the art of government . hence proceeds the harmony in the order of the jesuits , which all so much admire , for every three years the general has a particular account of all things that have pass'd , together with a private list of those of the order ; who because they may in time alter their nature and manners these catalogues are renewed every year ; besides , he has particular informations every year of what ever in necessary for him to know . by which they always succeed in their elections , by suiting the capacity of the person to the office , not the office to the person . and if princes had such characters of things and persons , they would not be so often deceived in their resolves and counsels ; they would be better instructed in the art of government , and need not depend wholly upon their ministers ; and these would serve the prince with more care and circumspection , when they knew that he understood and took notice of all things ; and so these gross faults which we see at present , i mean , in not timely providing necessaries for peace and war , would never be committed ; in a word , the fear of this catalogue would make vertue flourish , and vice perish ; nor would these short memoirs breed any confusion , especially if some were made by the princes own hands , and others by his chief ministers , who are persons of understanding , and whom he can trust to do it sincerely and carefully ; wherefore if as cicero says , this knowledge is necessary for a senatour , who is but a small member of the government , how much more is it for a prince on whom depends the universal welfare of his state ? and if philip king of macedon , caus'd the articles of the roman league to be read over to him twice every day , why should a prince disdain to read in one book , an epitome of the whole body of his empire , viewing in that as in a map , all the parts of which it consists ? emblem lviii . honour is one of the chiefest instruments in the art of government ; if it were not the off-spring of glory , i should think it a politick invention ; it is the prop of empires ; without it none could stand long ; a prince without it wants a guard for his vertues , the spur of renown , and bond , which makes him to be loved and respected ; a thirst for riches is tyrannick , but for honour royal ; nor is honour less requisite in the subject than the prince ; for without that the laws would not be able to keep the people in their devoir , it being certain , that they are more restrain'd by the fear of infamy than punishment . the economy of government would soon be ruined , were not obedience , loyalty , integrity and such like vertues in esteem . ambition for honour preserves the authority of the laws , to attain it we inure our selves to labour and vertue . that government is in as much danger where all would be slaves , as that in which a●l would be masters . a nation too abject and base , is a prey to every invader , and soon forgets its duty to its lawful prince ; but that which is of a more lofty spirit , and which sets a value upon honour , slights all toils and perils ; nay , even despises its own ruine , to remain firm in its obedience and loyalty ; what wars , calamities and devastations by fire and sword , has not the dutchy of burgundy felt for preserving their faith and allegiance to his catholick majesty , neither the tyranny and barbarity of their enemies , nor the infection of the elements , though all seem'd to conspire against them , could shake their constancy . they might indeed take from those loyal subjects , their estates , their countrey , and their lives , but not their sincere faith , and generous loyalty to their lawful prince . the usual remedies against intestine disorders , is to make the people strangers to honour and reputation , which piece of policy is us'd in china , which is in no danger but from its own subjects : but in other kingdoms which are exposed to invasions , glory and renown is absolutely necessary for the subjects , that they may have courage to repulse an enemy ; ●or where there is no honour , there is no valour . that prince is not truly great , who does not command great spirits , nor can he ever without such make himself formidable , or enlarge his territories . the subject's honour obliges them to procure the prince's , for upon his grandeur depends their's . the very shadow and empty appearance of honour , makes 'em assiduous in labours , and valiant in dangers . what treasures could make sufficient compensation for the estates , and blood which subjects squander away for the prince's will and fancy ; were it not for this publick coin of honour , wherewith every one pays himself in his own opinion ? 't is the best price of worthy and brave exploits , the cheapest reward that princes could have found , so that if not for their own grandeur , they ought at least for their conveniency and interest , maintain it among their subjects ; by either taking no notice of , or lightly punishing the faults which they commit to defend it , and on the contrary , by encouraging with rewards and publick acknowledgments , such actions as are generous and honourable . but they should beware of giving the least incouragement to that vain fantastical honour so much in vogue , which depends upon peoples fancies , not true vertue , thence proceed disputes among the ministers about precedence , to the prejudice of the publick , and the prince's service : hence duels , affronts , and murthers ; and from these come tumults and seditions . this makes obedience stagger , and defiles it with the prince's blood ; for if once the subject shall be perswaded in his own opinion , or by the common cry , that he is a tyrant and not fit to live , he soon contrives his death , to obtain the honour of assertor of his countrey 's liberty . it should therefore be the princes care to abolish this superstition of false honour , and to promote the worship of the true . let not a prince disdain to honour merit , either in subjects or strangers , for this does not derogate from the prince's honour , no more than the light of a torch is diminished by the lighting of another by it ; for which reason ennius compares the charity of a person , who instructs a wandring traveller in his way , to a flame . he who t' a wandring man his way has shewn , lights t'others torch and never hurts his own * from whence proceeds cicero's advice , that whatever kindness can be done another without detriment to ones self , let it be done even to a stranger . from both these sentences the present emblem is taken ; a lighted candle in a candlestick , the emblem of divinity , and supream authority , at which two others are lighted , to signifie that a prince may bestow honour upon those who deserve it without detriment to his own . his honour , is borrowed , not his own , who is afraid of wanting it , when he confers it on others . springs continually flow , and are never empty . the fund of honour in princes is inexhaustible , be they never so profuse : all respect them as the only magazines of honours , from whence every one expects his share ; so the earth with its vapours refreshes the air , which returns them in dew upon the earth again . and this mutual correspondence between the prince and his subjects , king alphonso the wise knew , when he said , that these in honouring him , honour'd themselves , because from him they expect honour and preferment ; where this mutual honour is , there affairs flourish in peace and war , and the government is established . nor does a prince shew his majesty more in any thing , than in the honours he confers . all natural bodies the more noble they are , are the more generous and free of their vertues and gifts . to give riches is humane , but the distribution of honour belongs to god or his vicegerents . in these maxims i would perfectly instruct your highness , especially in that of honouring the nobility , who are the main support of monarchy . let your highness hearken to your glorious predecessor , king alphonso the wise , who in laying down maxims for his successors , speaks to this effect : furthermore he ought to respect and honour the nobility for their riches , and for that they are an honour to his state ; and he should respect and honour the gentry , as being his guard and the bulwark of his kingdom . without rewards services flag , but rewarded they flourish , and make the kingdom glorious under an ungrateful king never any great action was a●chieved , nor any glorious example transmitted to posterity . those three brave souldiers , who broke through the enemies squadrons and fetch'd water from the cistern , scarce did any thing else remarkable , because david did not gratifie them . a prince by once rewarding the merits of a family , binds them to his service for ever . the nobility is as much urg'd to glory , by the noble exploits of their ancestors , and by honours with which they were rewarded , as by those which they themselves expect ; 't was upon this account that your royal highnesses predecessors bestowed eternal marks of honour upon the services of some great families of spain . so king iohn ii. rewarded those of the counts ribadeo , by permitting them to eat at the king's table upon tw●lfth-day , and to have the same coat which his majesty wore that day ; his catholick majesty granted the same honour to the marquess of cadiz . and order'd , that they should have the coat which he wore upon the feast of the blessed virgin : to the marquesses of moya , he gave the cup which the kings should drink out of upon st. lucia's day ; to the earls of roca , of the family of vera , and to all of that house a grant for each , to exempt thirty persons from all taxes ; the same king ferdinand , when he met the king of france at savona , invited the great captain gonsalvo to table with him , at whose house also he staid at his entry into naples ; and what wonder since he ow'd him his kingdom and all spain , its glory and success † ? of him might well be said , what tacitus says of another brave and valiant general . in his body was all the beauty of the cherus●i ; and whatever was done with success was the result of his counsel . the valour and conduct of one minister is often the foundation and rise of a kingdom that which is founded in america is owing to herman cortez , and the pizarrs . the single valour and industry of the marquess of aytona , kept the netherlands from revolting upon the death of the infanta isabella , and some of our present ministers have been the chief instruments in preserving the empire in the house of austria , and of the tranquility which italy has so long enjoyed , whose great rewards have been a spark to kindle a glorious emulation in others . by recompencing one service you purchase many more ; 't is a noble usury which enriches princes , and enlarges and secures their estates ; the ottoman empire flourishes , because it encourages and prefers valour in whomsoever it is conspicuous . the fabrick of the spanish monarchy arrived at this perfection , because king ferdinand the catholick , and after him charles v. and philip ii. knew how to hew out , and proportion the stones to its bigness . princes complain of this age of being barren , and not productive of such great spirits , not considering that the reason is that they don't look for them , or if they do find them , that they don't give them sufficient encouragement , but only promote those who are about them , which depends more upon chance than choice . nature always produces some great genius's , but princes don't always make use of them . how many excellent genius's and great spirits are born and die in obscurity , who if they had been imployed and exercis'd in business , had been the admiration of mankind : ossat had died chaplain of st. lewis in rome , without the glory of having done so many signal services to france , had not henry iv. of france observing his great abilities procur'd him a cardinals hat. if a prince suffers a great soul to herd with the common rout , he will live and die like one of them , without performing any thing remarkable or glorious . christ went up to the mountain tabur with three of his disciples only , leaving the rest with the multitude , upon which their faith immediately cool'd , so that they could not cure a posses● person . great spirits do not flourish nor blossom , unless they are water'd by the dew of favour . that prince therefore , who shall sow honours shall reap able statesmen . but he ought to sow them in season , and to have them always ready upon all occasions ; for then they are rarely t● be found . in this princes are usually careless while they li●● in peace and quiet , thinking they shall never have need o● them . nor should a prince honour and prefer only his nobility and ministers , but also all others of his subjects , whose actions shall be meritorious . as king alphonso prudently advises in his laws , where he says , that a prince ought to honour vertue wheresoever he finds it , though it be in the very meanest of his subjects . a prince ought to be very cautious in the distribution of honours , considering the time and weighing the qualifications of the persons , that they may be exactly adapted to their merit . for that distinguishes dignities , as the intrinsick worth of a diamond makes it more valuable ; if honours were all equal , they would be less valued ; 't is a kind of tyranny not to reward desert , and nothing more incenses the people than it ; a whole government is disordered by the unequal distribution of preferments , rewards above desert are a scandal to the receiver , and an affront to those who deserve better . one is gratified ; many offended . to gratifie all alike is ●o reward none . vertue thrives not by equality , nor will valour ever attempt any considerable action , without the hopes of some particular reward . a statue erected for one , affects many with a glorious desire of obtaining the same honour . in a word , honour suited to a persons merit , is a spur to him , an encouragement to others , and a means to preserve obedience in the people . but though nothing more firmly settles , or more gloriously adorns a prince's throne than distribution of honours , yet ought he diligently to take care , not to grant away those which are proper to his own dignity , and distinguish him from others : for they are not like flames which passing to another subject , still remains entire in its own ; but all such which he shall confer on others , will no more shine in him , so that majesty will be obscur'd , nor will any make their applications to him , but to them to whom he has granted such honours ; tiberius would not permit even his mother livia to receive those particular honours which the senate design'd because he thought 't would diminish his authority . even ceremonies which were introduced either by chance or flattery , and are now peculiar to the prince , he ought not to make common to others . for though they are vain and empty , they mark out the borders of majesty to respect and veneration . tiberius was disgusted , that the same publick prayers were made for nero and drusus which were made for him , tho' they were his sons and successours in the empire ; the honour of princes vanishes , when made common by promiscuous flattery ; sometimes though , as when ministers do personate the prince in his absence , the same honours and ceremonies are to be paid them , as are due to the prince if present ; as we fee in vice-roys and courts of supream authority , which like stars shine in the suns absence ; but not in his presence , for then those marks of honour are paid to the royal dignity represented in the ministers , who are as it were the pictures of majesty , and the reflection of supream authority . emblem lix . nature , the provident disposer of all things , has divided countries from one another , and hedg'd 'em in sometimes with mountains like ●ast walls , sometimes entrenched 'em about with deep rivers , and sometimes with the ocean it self , that she ●ight put a stop to the designs of humane ambition ; for ●he same reason she has constituted different climates , na●ures , languages , and customs , that in this great diversity of nations , each might live amicably , and in unity among themselves , not easily giving way to the power and tyran●y of invaders . yet are not all these bars and fences of nature , able to check this insatiable desire of rule ; for ambition is so great and so deeply rooted in man's heart , ●hat it thinks the five zones too narrow for it . alexander , ●hey say wept , that he had no more worlds to conquer . all the blessings of life , nay life it self , for all our natural inclinations to preserve it , are all slighted for a moments reign . humaya going to invade the kingdom o● cordova , some of his friends di●swaded him from it , urging the danger of the attempt : call me king to day , say● he , and to morrow kill me ; there is no passion in ma● more blind and dangerous than this . this has cost many their lives , as well as estates , which they would have there by enlarged . a certain prince of tartary usually drank ou● of a cup on which was engraven the head of a prince o● muscovy , who in invading his kingdom lost his own , wit● his life ; about the edge of which was this inscription : this prince by coveting mine , lost his own . almost the same thing befell king sancho , who woul● have rob'd his brothers of the kingdoms , which their father king ferdinand had divided between ' em . ambitio● is in danger , when it but puts its arm out of its territories like the snail which runs a risque whenever it peeps out o● its shell . and though tyridates said , that 't is for private men to maintain their own , but for kings to invad● others ; yet this is only then ; when reason and pruden●● advise it , and when power has no other tribunal than that o● arms ; for whoever unjustly robs another of his kingdom gives others opportunity and right to do the same to him first let a prince consider the danger of his own , before 〈◊〉 thinks of invading another's kingdom : for which re●son the emperour rodolphus i. us'd to say , 't was bett●● to govern well than to enlarge a kingdom ; if king ●phonso the wise had took this advice , he had never pursu● his pretentions to the empire , to the so evident peril his own kingdom ; so that the comparison of alphonso ki●● of naples was very applicable to him : that such ambit●ous princes were like gamesters , who cheated by a vain hope of winning , lose even what they had . to defend ●his state is a prince's duty , but to invade another's is ●erely arbitrary . ambition hurries men to new and dangerous attempts ; and the more it has the more it co●ets . it encreases with empire . opportunities , and the easiness of the means charm princes eyes and hearts , and hinder them from understanding , that they ought not to covet all that they can obtain ; a generous mind should be regulated by reason and prudence ; he is not safest who ●ossesses most , but he who possesses most lawfully . too great an extent of power , creates emulation and envy , and ●ncreases danger . for they arm and unite against the ●trongest , as the kings of spain did against alphonso iii. whose greatness and prosperity they suspected . for which reason 't is more desirable to have power well grounded and ●stablish'd , than to exercise it ; for there is as much danger ●n maintaining as in procuring it . were there no foreign enemies , affluence of plenty would sufficiently enervate it ; ●s the grandeur of old rome found , which augustus ●oreseeing , proposed to remedy it by prescribing bounds to ● , which the emperour adrian afterwards effected . let a prince bridle his felicity and he will reign well . t is no difficult matter for injustice and tyranny , if arm'd with power , to raise and extend kingdoms ; the difficulty ● in the preservation thereof , it being a harder matter to govern well than to conquer . for in arms usually fortune takes place , but govern●ent depends on prudence . success enters the gate ●ithout being called , by merit or industry , but 't is pru●ence only that keeps her there . alphonso the wise gave this reason , why 't was less difficult to get , than to ma●●tain when got ; because the preservation depends upo● judgment ; but the acquisition upon chance . ho● fortune with both hands , or she 'll slip from you a hedge-hog [ from whence i took this emblem ] is fou● with ease , but to hold it requires prudence ; that is , yo● must apply your hand so as gradually to smooth down 〈◊〉 thorny bristles , which when erected resemble a squadr● of pikes . claud. arm'd with her self she does securely go , her self , the quiver , arrow , and the bow. scarce were the arms of spain retir'd from the netherland● in the time of don john of austria , when those of the r●bels enter'd . 't was an easie matter for the king of fr●● against the laws of god and man to seize upon the dutch● of lorrain , but to maintain it now , he finds it expensive a● dangerous ; so he is oblig'd always to keep an arm'd ha● upon it , and the causes which occur in the acquisition do● always in the preservation . but if 't is once setled , time will help to fix it ; whence happens , that sometimes one person may easily maintain government which was not rais'd , but by the great to● and perils of many . wherefore since 't is a prince's chief duty to preserve 〈◊〉 states , i will here subjoyn the means which it may be do● by , whether they descend by succession , or are acquir'd● conquest or election . i first premise the general caus● which usually concur in attaining and maintaining the and those are god ; that is , when he assists us with religi● and justice ; opportunity , when a concurrence of causes pen the way to grandeur ; and prudence , either in maki●● these opportunities , or in using them when offer'd . the are other instruments common to the art of governme●● as valour , the prince's assiduity and prudence , the peop●● esteem , respect and love for him ; the reputation of ● crown , the force of arms , unity in religion , a due administration of justice , the authority of the laws , the distribution of rewards ; the severity of punishments ; the integrity of the magistracy ; the good election of ministers ; the preservation of privileges and customs ; the education of youth ; the modesty of the nobility ; the purity of the coin ; the encrease of trade and arts ; the peoples obedience ; concord , plenty , and publick riches . by these means all states are maintain'd , and though the government of each requires great care and attention , yet do those which descend lineally from father to son require ●east ; for sovereign power and obedience being become habitual , and as it were natural to the subjects , they forget that it was of their own institution , not an original pro●riety . no one dares deny him respect and veneration , whom he has own'd for his lord from his birth ; all are ●w'd by fear of punishment from the successour , for crimes which they shall commit in the present reign : the sub●ects easily bear and wink at his failures . the very tide of affairs , which long custom and experience has con●in'd to a channel , secures him , though he be incapacitated for government , provided he be of an easie docile nature , ●nd one that will act for the best in all things , and can ●ake choice of good ministers , or should happen on them ●y chance . but those states which descend by an indirect line , or ●y marriage ; a prince ought to manage with particular care and circumspection , especially at the beginning of is reign ; in this those princes run great risques , who thro' ●o much zeal , or too fond a desire of glory , reverse the ●ctions and institutions of their predecessours , introducing ●ovelties of their own , without that due moderation and ●rudence which is necessary even in changing 'em into bet●er ; for plato's opinion that all change is dangerous except ●om bad , must not be understood of governments , which 〈◊〉 great risques unless remedied by degrees , according to 〈◊〉 order of nature , which does not leap from one ex●eam to the other ; but interposes the temperature of the ●ring and autumn , between the extremities of the winters cold , and summers heat : a sudden and violent chang● is troublesome and doubtful ; that which is slow and gr●dual is always more easie . 't is dangerous in sailing to shift the sails upon a contrary mind , because they mu● on a sudden be changed from one side of the ship to th● other . wherefore 't is requisite for a prince at the begi●ning of his reign , to observe the methods of the last , 〈◊〉 king care to reform it by degrees with that easiness a● moderation , that the people shall find themselves on t'othe● side without knowing how they got over . tiberius du● not at the beginning of his reign abolish the publick sport● introduc'd by augustus . galba reigned but a f●● months , because immediately upon coming to the thron● he began to punish past crimes , to moderate extravaga● donatives , and to curb the licentiousness and insole● which the people had been so us'd to in nero's time that they as much loved their princes vices , as former they esteem'd their vertues . the same befel the empero● pertin●x , for designing to reform the militia , enerva●● under the luxurious reign of commodus . lewis xi ▪ ki●● of france fell into the same errour , for that he began 〈◊〉 reign with the severe punishment of some of his princip● nobility . the excellence of a new government ought 〈◊〉 be benignity ; since too much rigour and severity is 〈◊〉 vice of an old one . what dare not old kings do ? the softest chai● , of kingdoms is in a new princes reign . to settle a government is a work of time , for 't is troublesome to reform , as to new model one ; for 〈◊〉 reason david excus'd himself from punishing ioab for the murther of abner , as being weak and newly anointed king ; that is , he fear'd by too much severity , he should make his new gotten government odious . rehoboam had never ruined himself had he considered this , when by the counsel of the young men , he answer'd the people of israel , who desir'd he would treat 'em with less severity than his father had done ; my father made your yoke heavy , and i will add to your yoke ; my father also chastised you with whips , but i will chastise you with scorpions . there is nothing more serviceable to a prince at his entrance upon the government , than to signalize himself by some glorious exploits , for reputation once got is not immediately lost ; for which reason domitius corbulo , when he was sent into armenia took particular care to raise his reputation . the same agricola did in his government of britain , knowing that the reputation of his first actions would byass all the rest the comparison which the people make between the past and present administration is always of ill consequence , when they don't find in this the same felicity they did in t'other , or don 't perceive the same parts and qualifications in the present prince , as in his predecessor ; let him therfore take care as much can be , that there be no difference ; but that the same hand may seem to hold the reins . but if the prince , either cannot , or knows not how to adjust his actions to the peoples humour as his predecessour did , let him more particularly avoid occasion , which may breed comparisons . which was the reason that tiberius was never present at publick shews , fearing that his rough melancholy temper , compar'd to the complaisant gaiety of augustus , would be offensive to the people . wherefore as soon as a prince comes to the helm of affairs he should diligently enquire , what things were distasteful in the past reign , that he may avoid them ; this was nero's maxim at his accession to the throne , prescribing it as a plan of his future government , sedulously declining those things which had lately bred disgust . let a prince also adjust his actions to the customs of the countrey , and methods of his predecessor , for even the vertues of the successour which are new , and such a● the predecessour and the nation in general were unacquainted with , the people look upon as vices and loath ' em . the parthians demanded vono for their king , a person endu'd with the gentile accomplishments of rome ( where he had been as hostage ) but those vertues lost him the affections of his people , who regarded them as nothing but new vices ; they were disgusted , that he did not give his mind to horses and hunting , as his predecessors did ; and on the contrary they all loved nero , because he accommodated himself to their customs . and if this difference of manners in the princes person produces these effects , how much greater will the alteration of the customs and ways of the people create ? but if correction be necessary , it must be apply'd with such moderation , as may neither make the prince seem severe nor remiss , but when the negligence of the predecessour was very great , and the people require a remedy , then the activity and diligence of the successour is very opportune ; as was visible in the first years of your royal highnesses renown'd father 't is a generous piece of justice , for a prince to begin his reign with pardoning all offences against himself , and punishing those committed against others ; nothing gai●● people's esteem and respect more than this . as the emperours vesp●si● and titus found , as also charles vii . king of france . upon this consideration witiza remitted the banishment of those whom his father had condemned , and caused their tryals to be burnt , by this great means the better to secure the crown upon his head. though these acts are highly requisite , yet the main point is the gaining the love and obedience of the subjects ; which two kings of arragon were absolute masters of † : one was king alphonso i who going to take possession of the kingdom of castile for his wife terraca , behaved himself with great complaisance and affability to all ; he heard causes , and administer'd justi●e himself ; he protected widows and orphans , reliev'd the poor , honour'd and reward'd the nobility according to their desert , prefer'd vertue , and made the kingdom plentiful and populous , which acquir'd him the affections of all . the other was alphonso v. king of naples , who made himself extreamly beloved by the people , by his care and prudence in affairs , by a due disposal of rewards and punishments , by liberality , complaisance and easiness of access , by his love for the publick well-fare , and by so exact a conformation to the manners and customs of the kingdom , that he seem'd a natural , not a foreign prince . those kings who have their residence among their subjects , may gain their hearts more easily , than those who reside in distant provinces , for if their loyalty does not grow quite cold , 't is at most but luke-warm , and nothing but the excellence of the constitution can preserve its heat ; that is by providing able ministers , and by severely punishing their faults , especially those which they commit against justice , and the reputation and estates of others , all the comfort absent subjects have is that if the prince be good , they shall feel the effect of it as well as if present , but if otherwise , they should be least under the lash of his tyranny . but because such kingdoms love novelty and change and require the presence of the prince himself to govern them ; the confidence which he puts in them , should be arm'd and senced from all accidents , using the same means which we prescrib'd for the preservation of a conquer'd kingdom ? elective kingdoms which are obtain'd by favour are also maintain'd by the same , though this very rarely continues long . and though all new empires begin with applause , yet in this 't is but short and soon over ; amidst the very acclamations , when saul was anointed king , the people began to distrust and slight him , though he was chosen by god himself . but there are ways by which the person elected , may preserve the peoples good opinion of him , that is to say , by maintaining those vertues and qualifications , which made him at first thought worthy of the crown ; for men usually change their manners with their fortunes . tiberius had a very good character and reputation , while he was a private person and liv'd under augustus ; as also had galba ; let him be courteous and obliging to all . grateful and liberal to those who elected him ; civil to those who gave their votes against him ; let him be a zealous lover of his countrey . and a vigorous assertor of its laws and privileges ; let his council be compos'd of the natives of the countrey , imploying them alone in offices and places of trust , not admitting foreigners and relations ; let him maintain his family with modesty ; let him temper majesty with consideration , and justice with clemency ; let him so govern as if his kingdom came by descent , which he should transmit to his posterity , not as if it were elective , fleecing it of what he can during his reign ; according to the poet. a short reign never spares the people : for 't is very difficult to be moderate in grandeur which must die with us . the prince ought moreover to be peaceable , not an invader of others : for elective kingdoms fear such a master , whose mind is bent upon conquering others ; but they love him who is only careful in preserving his own , as we see in poland , for 't is evident that all kingdoms were at first elective , and that 't was only ambition of enlarging them by invading their neighbours , by which so many have lost that liberty , which they would have taken from others . nor is it possible , that among so many casualties and dangers of election , this enlargement of states should be lasting , for those very arms which make those additional conquests , will reduce them to hereditary kingdoms ; which was galba's excuse for not converting the empire into a commonwealth . elective monarchies love liberty , and so ought not to be governed without it , and since election is the scale in which they weight it , the prince should always stand on that side , for if he gives the least suspicion that he intends to make the crown hereditary , he will certainly lose it . in states acquir'd by conquest , there is more difficulty in attaining than preserving them , for they are like wild colts , in which the main trouble is backing them , for afterwards they willingly take the bitt , and submit to the burthen . fear and flattery open the way to dominion ; the first asc●nt of which is steep and difficult , but once setled you want neither partizans nor ministers ; yet since these services are generally forced and counterfeit , they easily revolt when they have opportunity , and are therefore to be entertain'd and cherish'd with great care , especially at first , since from the first actions we easily judge of the future government ; as vitellius experienced , who grew hateful and odious to all , for the death of dolabella . and though piso said , that a kingdom acquir'd by ill practices could never be maintain'd by good ones , yet king sancho did this way establish his doubtful title to the kingdom , which he got by conquest . princes are soon ruin'd by striving to preserve that by force which they got so . this pernicious piece of policy has been the ruin of all tyrants , and if any one has preserved himself ; 't is because he chang'd his tyranny into benevolence , and his cruelty into clemency : vice cannot subsist long unless vertue be its substitute ; ambition unjust in acquiring at first , must change into zeal for the publick good to maintain it self . subjects love their prince for the publick , and their private interests , and when they succeed in both , their fear soon changes into reverence , and their hatred into respect : but care must be taken that this reformation of vices , which are now publickly known , be not so sudden nor affected , as to proceed from design not nature , whose operations are slow and methodical , so otho thought ; that a sudden modesty , or affected gravity could not preserve the empire which he had attain'd by villany . the people are more apprehensive of such changes than of vices themselves ; for they suspect greater mischief at the bottom . feign'd vertue is worse than vice ; for this is executed under the shape of the other . augustus was an admirable pattern of prudence and valour , in raising and supporting his empire , which all princes ought to copy . at nineteen years of age he shew'd himself worthy of the empire , by sustaining the civil wars . from which time he began to raise his fortunes . empires are not obtain'd by deserving , but by having merited them . one victory proclaim'd him emperour , because he knew how to make use of opportunity and prudence ; of opportunity in triumphing over anthony and lepidus , of prudence in not entering by open force , every one was weary of civil wars , the empire was naked and defenceless , all the most couragious being taken off , by the wars or proscriptions . the provinces were disgusted at the government of the senate , and shew'd their inclination to change it ; dissentions and civil discords , oblig'd 'em to apply the usual remedy of turning aristocracy into monarchy . all these concurrents manag'd by prudence , facilitated his access to the empire ; which by the same conduct he maintain'd , he oblig'd the mobb , by defending them by the authority of a tribune ; and to avoid giving disgust , he neither took upon him the name of a king , nor dictator , but only that of prince . he continued the titles of the magistrates , he engag'd the souldiery by gratuities ; the people by plenty , and all in general by the sweets of peace , by affability , civility and clemency . he was courteous even to his rivals , anthony and lepidus , and reward●d those with honours and riches , who had been zealous in his service . he very rarely was severe , and then not through passion , but to procure the publick quiet . he captivat'd the minds of all , by a ready and copious eloquence , very becoming his dignity ; he us'd justice among his subjects , and modesty to his allies ; he shew'd his integrity , in punishing the debauching of his daughter and neice . he took care to preserve noble families , as is visible in his bounty to marcus hortalus . he severely punish'd the authors of libels upon any of the nobility , and slighted , those upon himself and government . he very much adorn'd and beautified the city of rome . he fix'd the bounds of the empire , keeping a book of his revenues and expences he erected a military treasury , and so dispos'd his forces , that his armies , fleets and provinces might as it were take hands : these good qualities made the romans chose the present government which was secure and safe , rather than run the risque and uncertainty of the past ; hence they first became fond with tyranny . i don't relate all these arts with a design to instruct tyranny , but that tyrants may be these ways reform , by joyning these to the fear , which force and oppression have created . for that which is gain'd by the sword must be preserved by it . for which reason in such states , 't is requisite to erect castles and forts , but so contriv'd as they mayn't seem a curb to the peoples liberty , but a protection against foreign invasions , garrisons appointed for their safety not to keep 'em in awe , for this always makes 'em desperate . the spaniards were so offended , that the emperour constans should commit the guard of the pyrenaean hills to foreigners , that they invited ( though to their great detriment ) the vandals , alans , swedes , and other nations into spain . confidence makes subjects loyal , which made the scipio's give the celtiberi●ns leave to march under the same colours , and lodge in the same tents with the romans . also augustus's life guard were spaniards of the colaguritan legion . let a prince endeavour gradually to transplant into his conquer'd provinces , the customs , genius and language of the conquering nation , as they did in spain , in those colonies which were founded in the time of augustus , this they are easily brought to , being inclin'd to imitate their conquerours , flattering them by accommodating themselves , to their manners and genius , and esteeming their privileges , and honours more than their own . for which reason the romans gave their friends and confederates the title of citizens , thereby to preserve their fidelity . the emperour vespasian to oblige the spaniards granted them all the privileges of italy . acquir'd provinces if they are used like strangers , never forget their enmity ; this was the reason , why the emperour claudius gave the dignity of roman citizens to galli● comata , saying , that the laced aemonians and athenians were ruin'd by nothing , but by using their conquer'd nations as foreigners , but that their founder romulus acted with more prudence , who in the same day saw his enemies , his fellow-citizens . by these and such like means , foreign government becomes natural , after continuance of time has fix'd and setled it , and blotted out the memory of former liberty . spain in its restauration slighted this policy . esteeming more the preservation of its nobility , than to debase it with the blood of africk , and so would not share any of its privileges , and honours with this conquer'd people , whence though united in one body , they kept their own customs , and language , together with such an indelible hatred , and treachery that they were forced , that they might free themselves from them , to drive 'em quite out , and to deprive themselves of so many subjects , so useful in agriculture ; which made all the world wonder at their policy , in preferring the splendour of their nobility , to their advantage and interest , and their religion to humane prudence . in changing one form of government into another , such skill should be us'd that the people mayn't perceive the change , and regret the loss of the former . it was at the expulsion of kings at rome , where all things , as well sacred and profane were manag'd with that prudence , that the people did not perceive the want of those kings , who had before the care and management of both , and afterwards when the commonwealth was turn'd into an empire , the magistrates retain'd the same titles , and the same order of the senate remain'd , with a shew of their ancient liberty , and 't was this established the empire . the dukes of tuscany did the same in the dukedom of florence . the emperour augustus was a great master of this policy : disposing things by degrees , executing some out of hand , and remitting others to another opportunity , fearing he should not succeed in endeavouring to do all together . but samuel was more worthy of admiration , in changing as he did the government and policy of the people of god , without giving any one occasion of complaint . the very shadows of liberty should be so dissipated , that they should insensibly disappear as dominion takes root ; this agricola judg'd the best way to manage britain . there is no force more mild and effectual in maintaining and preserving acquir'd provinces than liberality . men have worshipped and attributed divinity , even to things inanimate , which they have received any benefit from ; they are easily gain'd by interest ; nor do they much care what hand holds the scepter , whether foreign or natural , provided it be liberal ; they who suffer themselves to be oblig'd by benefits received , and afterwards prove false , can never do the prince any great damage by their designs against him , for no body will take the part of an ungrateful person . for this reason scipio upon the taking of carthage , order'd all their goods to be restor'd to the inhabitants ; and sertorius gain'd the affections of the spaniards by moderating their taxes , and constituting a senate in spain like that at rome , and king ervigius the better to secure his throne , lessen'd the imposts which were laid upon his subjects , and forgave all that was due to his treasury . the romans in their conquer'd provinces lessen'd their taxes , to make their dominion seem the more easie ; for subjects can better brook slavery it self , than avarice in their commanders , as the romans found in the rebellion of the frisians . a prince ought therefore to be very cautious of oppressing his new acquir'd provinces with taxes , but especially of introducing those which are us'd in other parts ; for such an introduction is odious : the cappadocians revolted , because archelaus would have introduced taxes among them , after the roman fashion . modesty is also necessary to the preservation of acquir'd kingdoms ; the senators were more disgusted at caesar's not rising up when they entred the senate , than at the loss of their liberty . which tiberius observing , carried himself reservedly and modestly toward them ; the people take more notice of accidents than the substance of things , and sometimes for frivolous empty punctilio's of honour princes lose their esteem , and become odious to ' em . sejanus thought 't was better to slight the empty shadows of grandeur , and to augment real prower . the romans valu'd not vain ceremonies , but were intent upon the increase and preservation of their empire : for which reason tiberius like a prudent politician , was a vigorous contemner of honour . nor would he ever permit the farther spain to erect temples to him , nor admit of the title of father of his countrey , well knowing the danger of inordinate ambition , when expos'd to the view of every one . for the same reason of state the dukes of florence , demean themselves with great civility to their subjects not permitting them to stop , to pay their respects when they pass by , as is usual at rome . after that castile had refus'd obedience to kings , they banish'd those high sounding titles , calling their governours only judges , that they might be the better received by the people . by the same prudence and moderation ; don ferdinand the catholick refus'd the name of king [ after the death of the queen ] and would be call'd only governour of castile . some states in italy which aspire to royal dignity , will i believe at last ( pray god i may be mistaken ) find the ill consequences of their having left their former modesty , for italy will not be able to support itself , when she shall see so many crown'd heads within her territories . 't is less inconvenient to extend the limits of any state , than to alter the form of its interiour greatness ; either through the jealousie of the nobility , or the contempt of the commons , for about those they are both mighty captious ; from the inequality of communities proceeded common government ; in which not to admit sovereignty is the means to preserve their freedom ; but if the seeds of royalty are once sown , they will produce the desire of monarchy , which puts an end to their liberty in a word , 't is peace alone ( as we shall shew elsewhere ) that preserves a●quir'd kingdoms ; provided that peace be cautious and arm'd . for so it gives opportunity to possession , to settle its government , and justifie its title , without the trouble of war which confounds all right , and gives opportunit● to turbulent uneasie spirits , and robs the commander o● his authority . wherefore a prince ought not only to endeavour to procure peace , to his new kingdoms , but also to the neighbouring provinces ; for the same sparks of fire easily catch , and the fury of arms soon embroils those that are near them . this was the reason that king philip iii. took up arms against emanuel ▪ duke of savoy , when he would have taken monferrat from the duke of mantua , his majesty endeavouring to decide those pretentions by justice , not force , nor would he suffer the ambition of one person to disturb the quiet of all italy . the same danger is at present to be fear'd , unless these animosities which have put so many princes in arms , be accommodated ; for the sword once drawn , either revenge thinks of satisfaction for affronts received , or justice of recovering her right , or ambition of extending its dominions , or mars himself of trying his strength . i conclude this discourse with four verses of tasso , in which he very judiciously , and concisely comprehends the true grounds , upon which any new kingdom should be established . emblem lx. an arrow sent from a bow , either mounts or falls , without suspending in the air ; like time present , which is so imperceptible , that it no sooner is , but is past : or like angles in a circle , where the acut● becomes obtuse , without ever forming a right angle . the first point of the arrows consistence is the first of its declination ; the higher it mounts , the nearer 't is to its fall . all things when they arrive at their highest pitch , mu●● necessarily decline : hippocrates observ'd this in human● bodies , that when they are past thriving , they immediately begin to decay . nothing in nature is permanent ; the heavens themselves never rest , no more do their effect● which they imprint on things below ; for which reason socrates attributed all changes of government to them . monarchies differ not from animals and vegetables , they are born , live and die like them , nor have they any time of consistence , so that their falls are natural . in not increasing they decrease . there is no interval in the fall of the highest fortune ; when it once begins to fall 't is impossible to stop it ; 't is more difficult for the majesty of princes to fall from the highest pitch to the middlemost , than from thence to the lowest degree . but all kingdoms don't rise and fall by the same degrees ; when they are got up to the highest point , they fall with more speed than they rose . alexander was twelve years in raising his kingdom , which decay'd in a very small time , being rent and divided at first into four , and afterwards into more principalities . the causes of the rise and fall of states are many ; those who attribute them to motion , or the power of the stars , or the number of plato , or climacterick years , deny providence the care of sublunary things . he who has design'd to make the world , will not disdain to govern it : nay to create , and not take care of the world , would be disapproving his own work . if god vouchsafed himself to paint the peacocks tail , and the butterflies wings , shall we think he will commit to chance the management of empires and monarchies , upon which depend the happiness or ruin of mankind , for whom all things were created ? 't would be impious to believe it , and to attribute the success of things to our own counsels , the highest arrogance . by him kings reign , and with his own hands he disposes of scepters , and though in their preservation he give their free course to those natural inclinations , which were either born with us , or imprinted in us by some other influence , without giving any check or restraint to free-will ; yet does god himself order and dispose them 〈◊〉 that no government was ever ruin'd , without the interv●ning of some humane folly and bindness . i cannot for●bear thinking that empires would be pepetual , if prince● would accommodate their will to their pow●● , their power to their reason , and their reason to accidents . since then prudence and humane counsel have their 〈◊〉 in the falls of empires , we may easily find the causes ther● of ; which are either general or particular ; general which comprehend all kingdoms , whether acquir'd by successio● election or conquest , and are many , but may be redu●● to four principal ones , from whence proceed the rest ; 〈◊〉 in the horizon of the world , from the four cardi●● winds proceed many collateral ones . these causes are r●●ligion , honour , life and estate ; for the conservation 〈◊〉 which civil society was first instituted , and the people ●●●came subject to the government of one , a few , or many and whenever they find themselves oppres'd in any one 〈◊〉 these four , they rebel and change the form of the govern●ment . we will therefore touch upon these , with as mu●● brevity as the subject will admit . though religion , as we said before , be the strong● bond of governments , yet is it that which disunites th●● most , and reduces them into many forms , when it is 〈◊〉 universal , for those who are of different opinions 〈◊〉 god , never live in unity among themselves . if they ●●●gree and quarrel about trivial customs and manners , 〈◊〉 much more will they about their affection and loya● due to the creator of all things , and furious zeal of ●●●derstanding things of such importance . liberty of c●●●science is the ruin of any state. those who disagree matters of religion , are to one another ( as the holy s●●rit says ) pricks in their eyes , and thorns in their sides the duty of subjects , and the greater ties of friendship , and relation are loos'd , and broken upon account of religion . king witeric was put to death by his own subjects , for endeavouring to introduce arianism , the same befel witiza for altering the rites and ceremonies of divine worship . galicia rebelled against king froilus for the abuse of the marriage of the clergy : as soon as dive sity of religions was introduced among the dutch , they rebell'd against their lawful king and master . so honour , as it is the defence and preservation of states , and the chief spur to loyalty , so it also disturbs them to clear it self from affronts , contempt and injuries , the people preferring honour before life and fortune . count iulian invited the moors into spain , because he suspected that king roderick had violated the honour of his daughter cava ; the nobles of castile took up arms against alphonsus iii. for that he would infringe their privileges , and oblige 'em to pay taxes ; as did the subjects of ramires iii. king of leon , for his severe and servile usage of them . for affronts received by the people always provoke to revenge upon the prince ; and contempt creates seditions . and this either , when the prince contemns the people , or the people the prince , which is when they don't find him fitly qualified , thinking it base to obey one who knows not to command , and make himself respected , and takes no care of the government . so the people of arragon served their king iohn i. the same thing befel iohn ii. of ●astile for his insufficiency , henry iv. for his vices , and alphonso v. of portugal , for suffering himself to be govern'd by others nor do subjects take it as ● less injury and contempt , for the prince to make foreigners his chief ministers , and to dispose of all dignities and preferment among them : for ( as king henry said ) that is declaring plainly , that his own native subjects are insufficient and unworthy * . this was the cause of the commotions of castile , in the time of the emperour charles v. the same thing happens upon an unequal distribution of honours , for that men of great spirits can't brook ; and take it as an affront , that men of le●● desert are preferr'd before them . the greatest disease of a government is incontinence and lust in the governours ; hence proceed seditions and revolutions of states , for that violates the honour of many , and is severely punished by god. one such action buried spain in ashes for many ages ; the same call'd down great plagues upon egypt . and david suffered great troubles , both in his own person , and in his posterity , who were continually persecuted and destroy'd by the sword. there is danger in those states , where many are excluded from offices ; for they are all so many enemies ▪ no man is so stupid as not to desire honour ▪ and take it ill to be deprived of it . those states also are subject to the same inconveniency , in which the magistracy is divided among a set number of the nobility , all the rest being excluded . the third cause of the revolutions and troubles of states is the desire of preserving life , that is , when the subjects think the prince so lazy , and cowardly as that he can't preserve and defend them ; or else when they hate him for his severity , as they did king alphonso iii. or for his cruelty , as they did king peter ; or for his injustice and tyranny , which endangers all their lives , as they did king ordonius , for the ill usage and murther of the counts of castile , whence proceeded the change of his state * . the last is , estates , that is when a prince idlely squanders away his subjects fortunes ; which occasion'd garcias king of galicia , to lose both kingdom and life too ; or when he extravagantly spends his revenues , which was ramon's pretence for killing ● his brother-in-law , sancho king of navarre ; or when he is very covetous , as was king alphonso ; or when through his ill management , the state suffers by scarcity , or when the price of things rises , or trade fails , which render'd the same alphonso so odious ; or when the coin is bad , as 't was in the time of peter ii. king o● arragon , and in many other kings reigns ; or when places of profit , or riches are unequally despos'd of . for envy and necessity take up arms against the rich and so raise commotions . this also happens from the male-administration of justice , from the quartering of souldiers , and from other burthens , which oppress the subjects estates and goods . besides these general causes , there are others particular to the three distinctions which i made of kingdoms , in the last emblem , which may be inferr'd from what i propos'd for their preservation ; for the knowledge of preserving a state , implys the knowledge of what will ruin it , and so on the contrary ; for all this i cannot but enlarge a little , though i run a risque of repeating what has been already said . hereditary states are usually ruined , for want of care and diligence in the successour , especially when they are considerable ; for then their greatness makes him secure and negligent , careless of all danger , and dubious in his councels . in execution timorous , least he should disturb the quiet he injoys ; he takes no care to prevent misfortunes , but thinks it sufficient if he can remedy them ; not considering that this latter is more chargeable and less effectual . he thinks bravery too dangerous ; and in procuring peace by certain idle and uncertain means , he brings a war upon himself , and so ruins himself by the very means he us'd for his preservation . this is the misfortune of monarchies , that in taking repose they find ruin , endeavouring to stop they fall , and ceasing to labour they grow feeble . ezekiel aptly represents all this in his vision of the four wing'd animals , which are the emblems of princes and monarchies : which when they went i heard the noise of their wings , like the noise of great waters , as the voice of the almighty , the voice speech as the noise of an host ; when they stood they let down their wings . but 't is not necessary to a prince's preservation to be always making new conquests , for this would be endless , and run into tyranny and injustice ; a state may easily maint●in it self within the circumference of its own circle , provided it preserves its activity and vigour , and those arts by which it at first acquir'd its gra●deur ; running water preserve their purity , but once standing they taint ; yet is it not necessary , that they should be always running ; it suffices that they keep a motion within themselves , like lakes mov'd only by the winds ; so monarchies in which discipline flourishes , and which are fenced against all accidents , are of long continuance , though they make no excursions ; for without war arts military may be exercised ; so cassius in time of peace caus'd all the old military discipline to be observed . a prince for want of exercise of his arms , should not grow wholly enervate by the sloth and laziness of peace ; but should then enterpize some glorious action , that may preserve his reputation . augustus during the repose of his empire , suffer'd not his fiery soul to be extinguish'd by the ashes of idleness , for when he wanted what to do as man , he employ'd himself as god , studying the motion of the spheres , correcting the months , and prescribing laws to time . to this end philip ii. erected that admirable fabrick of the escurial ; in which he aim'd to outdo nature her self in art , and to shew the whole world the greatness of his soul , and of his piety . but hereditary kingdoms are also in danger , when the successour forgetting the laws and institutions of his ance●●ors , thinks that the subjects duty , and subjection is from nature , and not remembring that his grandeur is deriv'd from them , he looks upon 'em as slaves , and is more bent upon his own interest , than the publick good , his administration being turn'd into tyranny . whence the people conceive a disrespect to the prince , and an odium and abhorrence of his person and action , by which the reciprocal union between the king and people is broken ; since one obeys , and t'other commands by the mutual benefit they receive , one in the splendour and grandeur of his government , t'other in the happiness of being well govern'd ; without this reciprocal bond , heredi●ary kingdoms would go to ruin , or at least suffer a change ; for the prince seeing himsel● despised and slighted by all , is in perpetual fear , from which fear proceeds cruelty , and from that tyranny ; which the nobles not being able to bear , conspire against him , and by the assistance of the people dethrone him : whence it comes that the people looking upon them as the restorers of their liberty , offer them the government , and thus aristocracy is introduc'd ; but even this soon falls into the inconveniences of monarchy ; for as their children succeed , the magistracy and government becomes hereditary , and they abuse them , and convert them to their own interest , whence the people finding themselves oppress'd by them , wrest their power from 'em , and will set up for governours themselves , as if their liberty was greater in a democracy , in which it being impossible to preserve equality , insolence , and injustice rule , from whence proceed seditions and tumults , and thence confusion , which obliges 'em to choose some one person to command 'em , and so the government becomes once again monarchical . this circle usually states run , in which they very often wholly lose their liberty , when some potent neighbour makes use of the opportunity of their commotions , to conquer and enslave them . elective kingdoms , or at least the peoples affections for the prince are lost ; when the actions of the elected prince correspond not to the opinion which had been once conceived of him ; for many appear capable of government , before they come to it , as galba did ; those who voted not for the election are in continual danger and fear , which makes them desire and contrive a change. those who assisted him with their votes , promise themselves such a share of his favour , that finding themselves disappointed in their hopes , they fall into disgust and complaint ; it being impossible for the prince to satisfie all . or whether it be that humane gratitude is tir'd with the coutinual sight of its benefactors , and looks upon them as so many creditors . subjects us'd to frequent elections are always fond of them , and still fanc● the new prince will be better ; those who have the privilege of voting take it to heart , that their power in which their honour consists should lie so long dormant and useless . the prince elected on t'other hand , proud of his power endeavours to extend it , and so break the oaths and covenants of his election , and despising the natives of the countrey , if he be a foreigner , admits only his own countreymen into offices , and endeavours only the preferment of his own family , by which he incurs the hatred of his subjects and his own ruin : for few nations can endure the command of strangers . ieremiah told this as sad tidings to ierusalem . kingdoms acquir'd by conquest are also soon lost , for luxury enervates the strength and vigour of the mind ; felicity disturbs counsels , and misleads princes from those ways by which they attain'd their grandeur ; they obtain'd it by valour , clemency and reputation , and they lose it by laziness , severity and contempt . which changing the government , changes also the affection and obedience of the subject ; the reason why the carthagenians were expell'd spain was , that they did not know that states should be maintain'd by the same arts they were acquir'd by ; which usually the conquerours of provinces are more observant , than their successours , for they imploy all their courage and wit , in attaining and preserving them , but succession makes these negligent and careless . whence 't is an observation , that those who acquire kingdoms usually keep 'em , and those who receive them lose them . the holy spirit says , that kingdoms pass from one nation to another , because of injustice , injuries and deceit . i conclude the present discourse with two cautions , first that the preservation of states does not always depend on their being far from the causes of their ruin , but sometimes on their being near them ▪ for fear creates care and diligence ; the other is , that 〈◊〉 in the person of the prince , or in the body of the state , the least ill should be taken most care of , for they increase insensibly , without being perceived till they are past remedy . a small worm destroys the tallest cedar ; the little remora stops the course of a ship under sail ; frivolous losses caus'd the ruin of the roman empire . a slight disorder of body is often more dangerous than a real sickness , for that is not minded , this diligently taken care of : we immediately apply medicines to a fever , but never heed a cold , from which the greatest distempers proceed . emblem lxi . an harp forms a compleat aristocracy , compos'd of monarchy and democracy ; understanding presides , several fingers govern , and many strings obey , not with a particular , but general and common harmony , so that the disproportion between the great and little ones don't spoil the tune . one may justly compare to a a harp every republick , in which long practice and experience , have appointed who shall command , and who obey ; in which they have establish'd laws , elected magistrates , distinguished offices , prescribed set rules and methods of government , and instituted in each part of the republick , such customs and laws as are most conformable and consentaneous to its nature . this makes the first institutions durable , and not easie to be chang'd . this harp of kingdoms and commonwealths being thus fitted up , and all the strings tun'd and dispos'd in order , though any one should ●ansie he could better tune any one of them , he ought to have a better opinion of the prudence and judgment of his ancestors , whom long practice , and dear bought experience had instructed : for some ways and methods of government , though they have some inconveniences are yet better born with than alter'd . a prudent prince tunes the strings in the same order they stand in , not changing them without time or other accidents have so discompos'd them , that they can't perform the office they were first design'd for , wherefore a prince should perfectly understand this harp of his empire , and the grace and majesty that attends it , and be throughly vers'd in the nature , qualities , and genius's of the nobility and commons , which are its main strings . for as king alphonso says in one of his laws : a king 's greatest care should be to know men , for since tis them he has to do with , an exact knowledge of them is absolutely necessary * . in this consists the principal art of government . to know his subjects is a king 's best art † . those who have most apply'd themselves to this study have govern'd with most success . many take this harp in their hand , but few can finger it with judgment , few understand its nature , and can touch it agreeably . let therefore a prince know , that a kingdom is nothing but an union of many cities and people ; and a joynt consent to the command of some one , and the obedience of the rest , which consent , ambition and force introduc'd . concord at first rais'd , and concord preserves it . justice and clemency keep it alive ; 't is the care of others safety ; its sp●rit consists in unity of religion ; its increase , preservation or ruin depends upon the parts of which it is compos'd . it admits of no companion ; is expos'd to all dangers . in it more than any thing ▪ fortune shews her inconstancy . 't is liable to envy and emulation ; 't is in more danger in prosperity than adversity ; for then it lives in security , which creates pride , from whence proceeds its ruin ; when young 't is weak , and when old decrepid ; 't is as much in danger in continual peace as in war. it falls of its self , when not exercis'd by foreign arms , and when it once begins to fall it cannot stop it self ; there is no interval between its highest elevation , and its ruin. emulation sometimes raises it , and sometimes oppresses it . if it be small it can't defend it self , if great it can't govern it self , it is better govern'd by art than force ; 't is fond of novelties though they are its bane , vertue is its health , and vice its sickness . labour raises it , and idleness is its ruin ; 't is fortified by forts and alliances , and establish'd by laws , the magistracy is its heart , counsel its eyes , arms its hands , and riches its feet . this harp is attended with a certain majesty , which is a harmony springing from the strings of the people , and approv'd by heaven . an emblem of power , and splendour of supream jurisdiction ; a certain force which draws authority and obedience to it ; the safeguard and preservation of the government . opinion and fame give it life ; love , security ; fear , authority ; ostentation , greatness ; ceremony , reverence ; severity , respect ; pomp , esteem ; in retirement the more venerable ; 't is in danger of contempt and hate . it neither bears equality nor division , for it consists in admiration and unity ; 't is constant in either fortune ; respect strengthens it ; arms and the laws maintain it ; it lasts not in pride , nor falls in humility ▪ it lives by prudence and beneficence , and dies by force and vice. the strings of a harp are the people , which are naturally monstrous , different from themselves , inconstant and various ; govern'd by outward appearances , without searching to the bottom of things ; they take counsel of report , so void of means and reason , that they cannot distinguish truth from falshood , always prone to mischief . the same minute of two contrary affections , by which they are always guided not by reason ; by violence not prudence , by the shadow not the reality . only to be tam'd by punishment . their flatteries are an aukward medly of truth and falsity ; they know no medium ; they love or hate to excess ; are extreamly complaisant , or extreamly insolent ; either fear or frighten ; and when they fear , are most contemptible . small dangers at hand terrifie them strangely , but great ones at a distance , they are unconcern'd at . if a servant slavish , if a master haughty ; know not what liberty is themselves , and will not suffer it in others . bold and courageous in words , but cowardly and base in action . they rise upon the least occasion , and are soon compos'd . do not lead , but follow ; bear themselves the same to all ; are sooner forc'd than perswaded . in success arrogant and impious , in adversity timorous and superstitious ; as prone to cruelty as mercy . equally blind in their favours as their persecutions ; they abuse clemency by licenciousness , and rebel against strict discipline ; if they once shall attack the rich , neither reason nor shame will reclaim them . they raise and are fond of stories , and by their own credulity enlarge them ; they follow the advice of the many , not the wise few ▪ they attribute ill success to the malice of the magistracy , and common calamities to the prince's f●ult . nothing makes them more supple and obedient than plenty of provisions , for upon that their care and thoughts are fixt . interest and dishonour soon put them in commotion . loaden they fall , lighten'd they kick back ; they love hot and rash spirits , and an ambitious and turbulent way of government ; they are never content with the present state of affairs , but are always greedy of change. a servile imitator of the vertues and vices of those in authority . they envy the rich and wealthy , and plot against them ; are mighty fond of plays and shews , nor is there any other way , than that to gain their favour . superstitious in religion , paying more respect to the priests than their principles . these are the chief qualities and affections of the mob . but a prince may be satisfied that there is no community , or councel , though never so great and grave , and of select persons , in which there is not something of the vulgar , and which does not in many things resemble the popularity ? the court makes another part of the strings of this harp ; which if a prince can't touch with great prudence and dexterity , the whole harmony of government is spoil'd ; wherefore that he many know to tune them well , 't is necessary he should know their nature . the court is presumptuous and inconstant , changing its colour , camelion like , each moment according as the wind of prosperity or adversity blows ; though it all speaks one language , yet all don 't alike understand it ; it worships and adores ●he rising prince , but slights him when declining towards his west ; it censures and carps at his actions , and yet imitates them ; it hawks after his favour , with the nets of flattery ; ever bent upon ambition and self-interest ; it lives by lyes and hates truth . easily swallow● vice , but vertue not without difficulty ; loves change and novelty ; fears every thing , and distrusts all . haughty and arrogant in authority , servile and cringing in obedience . envys even it self as well as others ; wonderful cunning and dissembling , in concealing its designs ; it veils its hatred with smile and ceremony . praises , and commends in publick , and defames privately . is its own enemy , fantastical in its appearance , and unperforming in its promises . this instrument of government being known , and the qualities and sound of each string , the prince ought to touch 'em with that dexterity , that they may all sound harmoniously without jarring ; in which he ought to keep time and measure , and not favour one string more than another , in those which are to make the consort , and wholly forget others ; for in this instrument of the government all have their proper functions , tho' they are unequal and easily jarr , which discord is very dangerous , when he shall grant too great authority to the magistracy ; or too much favour the commons , and slight the nobility ; or administer to some , and not to others ; or confound offices military with civil , or does not well know to sustain his majesty by authority ; his kingdom by love ; the court by gravity ; the nobility by honour , the people by plenty justice by equality ; the laws by fear ; arms by rewards ; power by frugality ; war by riches , and peace by reputation ; every one of these instruments are different , both in their nature , and the disposition of the strings , which are the subjects ; and so should be manag'd and play'd upon by different ways , and a different hand ; one kingdom is like a harp , which not only requires the softness of the fingers ends , but also the hardness of the nails too . another is more like an organ , which requires both hands to express the harmony of the pipes . the third is so delicate , like a guitarre , that it won't bear the fingers , but must be touch'd with a fine quill , to make it exert its harmony . a prince ought therefore to be well vers'd in the knowledge of these instruments , and their strings , to keep 'em always in tune , and to take care not to strain too hard upon the notes of severity or avarice ( as st. chrysostom observ'd in god himself ) for even the best string when too much strain'd , if it does not break , at least spoils the sweetness of the consort . emblem lxii . the ingenuous and industrious bee cautiously conceals the art by which it makes its combs . they are all busie , and none can find out their oeconomy and method of government . and if any one more curious than ordinary shall endeavour to inspect it , by means of a glass hive , they soon plaister it over with wax , that they may have no spyes , nor witnesses of their domestick transactions . o prudent commonwealth , mistress of the world ! thou hadst long since extended thy empire over all animals , had nature furnish'd thee with strength equal to thy prudence . let all others come to thee to learn the importance of silence and secrecy , in the management of affairs ; and the danger of discovering the artifice and maxims of government , negotiations and treaties , counsels and resolutions , the ails and inward infirmities of states ; if drusus the tribune had duly consider'd this prudence of bees , when a builder promised him to make the windows of his house , so that no body should look in , he had not given him this answer : rather , says he , so contrive my house if you can , that all may see what i do ; this was a piece of pride of an open ingenuous spirit , or the confidence of a private person , not of a publick minister , or a prince , in whose ▪ court there should be some retirements , where they may unseen treat and deliberate of affairs . counsel is like a mystery , to be communicated but to few . ancient rome erected altars to the god ( whom they called consus ) who presided over counsels , but they were subterraneous ones , to intimate , that counsels ought to be private ; by the benefit of which secrecy it grew to that greatness , and maintain'd it self so long ; for silence is the best and strongest bond of government . their senate was so close and trusty , that never any of their debates were publish'd ; there was not one for many ages who discover'd ' em . they had all ears to hear , but none tongues to divulge . i question whether the same may be said of present governments . that which was yesterday debat'd in council , is to day the subject of womens chat ; who with ease ( notwithstanding the prophet micah , coaks them out of their husbands , and so tell 'em again to others ; as it was in that secret , which m●ximus told his wife marti● , and she to livia . by these channels , those secrets soon come to the ears of foreign ambassadours , whose inquisitiveness nothing scapes . they are publick spies , and plummets that always search the bottom ; prudent are those governments , which allow them not continual residence . they are more prejudicial , than beneficial to the publick peace , and they oft'ner breed disturbances than promote tranquility . they are ever making glass hives , that they may treacherously inspect the deliberations of councils . let a prince therefore attentively indeavour to stop all those crevises , through which inquisitive curiosity may pry into his concerns . for if any enemy penetrates them , he easily prevents and frustrates them . as germanicus did , who understood all the designs of his enemies . this was the reason of the advice which sallust gave livia , that the secrets of the family , nor the counsels of friends , nor the ministery of the militia , should by no means be divulg'd . sampson in discovering wherein his strength lay to dali●h , gave his enemies opportunity of robbing him of it . private designs strike a fear upon all , and create a veneration for the prince ; and though at first they are not well grounded , yet may a prudent judgment afterwards find means to make them successful . the respect and esteem which we have for princes and common-wealths , would all be lost , if their private consultations were made publick . they are carv'd gyants , which seem tall and vast to the eye , and which frighten more than hurt , but if that fear shall approach nearer , 't will find them govern'd and fram'd by men of no higher statu●e than themselves . states which are close in their counsels , and actions are respected , but otherwise despis'd by all . how smooth and pleasant does a deep river glide along ; and how rough and uncouth that , which discovers the pebbles and weeds at the bottom ! none dare wade that , but this every one skips over . those things which opinion magnifies , the eye shews less . reverence proceeds from distance . for this reason , god when he conferr'd with moses upon mount sinai , about the laws and government of his people , he veil'd its top not only with fire , but also with a thick cloud , least any one should treacherously observe them ; he also commanded upon pain of death , that none should approach the very foot of the mountain . if god himself , is so cautious in his commands and consultations , what then should man be , whose wisest counsels are ignorance ? when their resolutions are publish'd in due time , they seem elaborate and compos'd with profound judgment ; they shew the majesty and prudence of the prince , and we believe there are reasons and considerations which we can't comprehend ; nay we many times imagine some , that the ministers never so much as thought of . but if we were to hear the debates , grounds , and reasons of their resolves , we should perhaps deservedly ridicule them . as upon the stage the actors appear , gay and splendid , and move the respect of all ; but behind the scenes is despicable misery and confusion . 't is yet more dangerous to entrust the mysteries of government to foreigners , these king henry ii. ever suspected * . and though perhaps many would be true , yet the safest way is , not to admit any of 'em to the management of affairs , especially those of the treasury ; chiefly when they are not subjects , or of equal capacity . least they should dive into the maxims of the government ; 't is our unhappy temper to slight and contemn our own , and admire all foreign commodities . we think there is no courage , knowledge , or prudence but is imported , not regarding the advice of the holy spirit : admit not a stranger within thy door , for he will raise a whirlwind against thee , and at last turn thee out of thy own dwelling . if a prince would have his counsels kept secret and close , let him himself set a good example of prudence and taciturnity . let him imitate q. m●tellus , who we are told us'd to say , that if his shirt knew his thoughts , he would order it to be burnt . let him diligently endeavour to conceal his mind ; for he who is master of his thoughts , has already the main instrument of government . this tiberius knew , who even in matters which he had no design to conceal , either naturally , or through use , always spoke intricately and obscurely ; but then most of all , when 't was discours'd of his succeeding augustus . secrets are not to be communicated to all ministers , though they are never so faithful ; but only to those to whom they some way belong , or those from whom they can't be conceal'd without greater damage . christ when he desir'd to have one of his miracles private , made only three of his apostles privy to it , thinking it not safe to intrust it to them all . the keeping of a secret requires great care ; for though we can be silence , yet it is not in our power to command the interiour passions , or to suppress that quick motion of the blood , which betrays the secrets of the heart , by the face and eyes . the mind being like the finest paper , which discovers on the other side what is written within ; so britannicus's death appear'd in agrippina's face , though she did what she could to stifle it . augustus and tiberius knew this , and because they doubted they could not enough dissemble their joy for germanicus his death , durst not appear in publick . the tongue is not the only blabb of the secrets of the heart ; man has many as great tell-tales as that about him ; as love , which being a fire gives light to , and discovers the darkest designs : anger which froths and boils over ; fear of punishment ; violence of sorrow ; self-interest , honour or infamy ; vain-glory of our own thoughts , which prompts us to disclose them before they are put into execution . in short , the weakness of the mind , either from wine , or any other accident . no caution can deceive these natural spies . nay , the more care is taken to blind them , the sooner they discover the secret. as it befel sevinus in a conspiracy , which he was concern'd in , who discover'd his care and concern through all his pretended joy , and though long use may in time correct nature , and make it more retentive , as octavia , who though very young could hide her grief and other affections ; and nero who beside his natural propensity ▪ had almost an acquir'd faculty of disguising his hate with false flatteries ; yet art can't be so vigilant and attentive , as not sometimes to forget it self , and give nature its free course , especially when urg'd and provok'd by designing malice ; which is done many ways , which i will here describe , that the prince may beware of them , and not suffer any one to fathom his private sentiments . malice then sometimes touches the peccant humour , that it may exert and declare it self . so sejanus egg'd on agrippina's relations to incense her haughty spirit , that she might be urg'd to discover her desire of reigning , and so give tiberius occasion to suspect her . injuries and affronts also do the same , being the keys of the heart . as close and reserv'd as tiberius was in his thoughts , he could not contain himself when agrippina affronted him . he who concealing his real sentiments pretends contrary ones , will soon discover peoples thoughts of them ; with which artifice the emperour tiberius us'd to fathom the thoughts of the senate , making a shew as if he would not accept of the empire . there is yet another piece of cunning , which insinuates 〈…〉 or discommending that , 〈…〉 bottom of , 〈…〉 be of the party to gain credit , and induce the other to disclose his sentiments . this way latiaris by commending germanicus , pitying agrippina's misfortune , and accusing sejanus , so ingratiated himself with sabinus , that he discover'd to him his aversion to sejanus . many questions ask'd at a time , are like so many bullets discharged at once , which no caution can avoid , and which disarm the most retentive breast ; as were those of tiberius , to piso's son ; the mind is also confounded by sudden and unexpected questions ; as tiberius on●● found , by those of asinius gallus , when though he had taken time to answer , yet he could not hide his concern so , but that afinius took notice of it . the authority of the prince , and the veneration due to majesty , are means to discover truth , and sometimes more than truth ; as tiberius found , as often as he examin'd the criminals himself . by discourse and talk , which some can promote with great dexterity , the mind is discover'd ; as by joyning the several pieces of a torn letter , you may read the sence of it , and by this method the conspirators against nero , knew that fenius rufus was of their party . from all which a prince may inferr , how difficult a matter 't is to keep a secret , and if it is safe within our own breasts , it is much less so , when committed to others ; wherefore it should without absolute necessity be entrusted to none ; 't is like a mine , which if it has too many vents the force of the powder is lost , and it proves ineffectual , but if there is a necessity of a prince's communicating his secrets to his ministers , and he seeing 'em divulg'd would know by whom , let him feign several important secrets , and commit one to each , and by that which he hears of first , he will find who was tardy before . let not these cautions seem frivolous for from very small causes , great commotions often proceed . the most potent empires are in danger of being sapp'd by the sea , if its curiosity could find but the least chink to enter at when this worm has once found the root of the secret , it soon brings the tallest tree to the ground . emblem lxiii . in all affairs the beginnings and ends ought mutually to correspond ; the form should be perfect , and not easily to be chang'd . the potter does not give his wheel so much liberty , nor use his hand so carelesly , as to form a different pot from what he began . let any undertaking be uniform and agreeable to its self . * when you begin with so much pomp and shew , why is the end so little and so low ? be what you will , so you be still the same . there is nothing more pernicious than this , inequality of actions and government , when the beginnings don't answer the ends. he makes himself ridiculous to all , who begins his reign with care and diligence , and afterwards grows negligent and careless . it had been better always to have kept the same pace though dull and slow , the commendation which the beginning of his reign merited accuses the end . galba lost his reputation , for that , at the beginning of his empire he promis'd to reform the militia , and afterwards admitted persons wholly desertless . many princes seem very good , and are very bad . many talk and discourse prudently , and act without discretion . others promise much , and perform little ; some are very valiant in peace , and mere cowards in war ; others undertake every thing and do nothing . this disagreement is much below the majesty of a prince , in whom a firm constancy should appear in all his words and actions . the people can never be firm in their obedience to a prince , who staggers thus himself . wherefore he should attentively consider , before he concludes any thing , whether in the executions of his counsels , the middle will be answerable to the beginning and end ; as godfrey advises . let him who does at great begin●●●g●●m , * make the thread even ; and both ends the same . the web of government , tho' never so finely wrought , cannot be good and strong unless it be even . nor is it sufficient to know , how to enter upon an affair , but 't is expedient too , to know how to end it . by the head and stern of a ship , the ancients represented perfect counsel , duly weigh'd from the beginning to the end . whence i took the figure of this present emblem , representing prudent counsel , careful of its beginning and end ; by a ship moored between two anchors , one a head , and the other a stern , to preserve it from the violence of tempests ; only one at the bow would be of small effect , if the wind blowing hard a stern , should drive her upon the rocks . there are three things requisite in resolutions , prudence to deliberate , diligence to dispose , and constancy to proceed . all the heat and toil about the beginning of affairs would be insignificant , if ( as it usually is ) we are careless about the end ; 't is at each end that prudence ought to cast anchor . but since prudence only regards things present and past , not future , upon which all affairs depend ; 't is necessary by discourse and reason , to conjecture and foresee what such and such means should produce ; to make use of deliberation and counsel ; which are as the wise alphonso says , the best foresight a man can have in dubious matters . and in those there 's three things to be consider'd , the probability , justice , and profit of the thing propos'd ; and also the capacity and experience of the minister , who gives the counsels ; whether he be moved by interest or private ends ; whether he offers himself to the danger , what are the difficulties of the enterprize , and upon whom the blame and honour of the event will fall . these cautions premis'd , and the matter stated , such means ought to be applys'd , as are conformable to the above mentioned qualities ; for nothing will be just and beneficial , which shall be attain'd by indirect or extravagant means : in this also should be consider'd , four distinctions of time , which occur in all affairs , but especially in diseases of states , as well as those of humane bodies , and these are the beginning , the growth , or progress , the consistence , and declension ; by which , and a timely application of proper means , the desir'd end is easily obtain'd ; as on the contrary , by transposing these methods , 't is retarded ; 〈◊〉 the course of a ship would be , if the rudder were chang'd to the head ; the art consists in selecting means proper to the ends design'd , using sometimes these , and sometimes tho●● those being not less useful and assistant which are omitted than those which are apply'd ; as in a consort of voices , where some cease while others sing , and yet all equally make the harmony . affairs will not move of themselves , tho their good disposition , and justice , or common interest seem to drive 'em , and if not guided by judgment , they certainly miscarry ; few princes would err , if they govern'd with assiduity and circumspection ; but either they tire , or else despise these arts , and will obstinately accomplish their designs by their own methods . this is the way of stubborn ignorance , but prudence uses other means . what force can't subdue , is easily obtained by dexterity , adapted to time and circumstance . so caecinus , when he could neither by prayers , nor by threats stop the flight of the german legions possess'd by a vain fear , he at last threw himself in the gate way , and by the horror , they conceiv'd of trampling over their generals body , stopt them . the same thing pompey did in another case ; one single word spoken to purpose has gained the victory . ferdinando gonsalez count of castile , having drawn up his army against the moors , a certain person putting spurs to his horse , rode out of his rank towards the enemy , and immediately the earth open'd and swallow'd him , the whole army was in a consternation at it , but the count turning to 'em : courage gentlemen , says he , if the earth can't bear us , much less will our enemies , and instantly joyning battle he gain'd the victory . that which happen'd at the battle of cirniola is not less remarkable ; an italian thinking the spaniards were routed , set fire to two waggons of powder , the great captain gonsalvo readily and cheerfully animated them with these words : courage my friends , these are the bone-fires for our victory ; which the event prov'd * ; so much it imports a minister to have a quick ready wit , and address to make use of opportunities , and by proper means to turn misfortunes to his advantage . if after the election of good ministers , and the application of proper means , events don't answer the prince's desire , let him not be discouraged , but rather shew his constancy ; for resolutions should not be measur'd by chance , but prudence . casualties which can't be foreseen , or prevented , accuse not the action ; and to blame a man for doing his endeavour is impudence . this usually befalls princes , who either want judgment or courage ; who being oppress'd by ill success , and as it were beside themselves , give themselves up to melancholy , and lose that time in vain reflections upon what has happen'd , which should be imploy'd in remedying it , quarrelling with themselves , that they did not take another method ; and laying all the fault upon him who was the author of this , not considering whether 't was grounded upon reason or no. whence 't is that ministers are afraid of declaring their opinions , and let slip many opportunities , without advertising the prince thereof , for fear of exposing their favour and reputation to the uncertainty of casualties . these inconveniences a prince ought most industriously to avoid , by persisting constant in adversity , and excusing their ministers , when they are not notoriously to blame , that they may more readily and couragiously assist him in overcoming them . and tho' there are palpable errours in some resolves and executions , yet he ought to bear it calmly ; for what is once done , as we say , can't be undone ▪ we ought to reflect upon past actions , for instruction not affliction ; it requires as much courage , to pass by faults , as to encounter dangers ; there is no empire free from ' em . he who is too timorous cannot resolve , and oftentimes irresolution is worse than errour it self . business requires a quick and ready genius ; if each particular should take up his whole time , many must of necessity be neglected , to the utmost detriment of the parties concern'd , and of the government in general . emblem lxiv . the ancients in war made use of certain chariots arm'd with scythes , which mov'd and executed at the same time ; the wheels and scythes being both govern'd by the same motion ; those were no sooner whirl'd about , but these did execution , with equal speed and effect , and are therefore in the present figure , the emblem of speedy execution ; as those fiery wheels in the throne of god , signified the activity of his power , and the quickness of his operation . let prudence ( as we said before ) chuse a fit time for consultation , but let its resolves , and executions have such a mutual correspondence , as they may both seem to move together , without any interpos'd delay . for consultation and execution should joyn hands , that they may assist each other in the production of the desir'd effects . the emperour charles v. us'd to say , that delay was the soul of counsel , and speed that of execution , and that both joyn'd together were the quintessence of a princes prudence . king ferdinand the catholick had not been so successful in his undertakings , had he not maturely weigh'd , and speedily executed his resolutions . were a prince indued with both these vertues , he would never want success , which is ever the daughter of opportunity , which once past is not to be recall'd . one minute brings us great advantage , or great detriment , wherefore demosthenes blam'd the athenians , for spending too much time in preparations , saying that opportunities would not wait their delays . if the counsel be advantageous , that time which is spent in delay deducts from its advantage . there is no room for delay in counsels which are not valuable , but in their effects . counsel is an embryo , and unless execution which is the soul thereof gives it life , it dies . 't is the product of the understanding , and an act of practick prudence , which if it exert not it self but remains in contemplation , 't is nothing but a vain imagination and fancy . resolution , says aristotle , should be executed with haste , but deliberated with leisure . iames i. king of england , advised his son to be prudent and cautious in his deliberations , firm and constant , in his resolutions , and prompt and resolute in his executions ; for that , for this last nature had supplyed the hands and feet with so many joynts and such ready motion . delay is base and mean ▪ but speed great and royal. . this vice of delay is very frequent in great kingdoms , and proceeds from their too great confidence of their power , as was visible in the emperour otho . as also from the unweildiness of the wheels , upon which its grandeur is carry'd , and least the prince should run the risque of losing what he already has , he lives content within the bounds of his own empire . that which is really laziness and sloth is call'd wisdom , as was that of the emperour galba . empires in their infancy acquire strength and vigour by dispatch , whilst the blood boyls , and the spirits of glory and ambition are active . the roman state throve by action and bravery , not by those dilatory counsels which cowards call cautions . but after they are at their full growth , their very majesty and authority supports 'em long , though that vigour and heat of glory , and ambition be extinguish'd , as the sea keeps its motion for a considerable time after the wind ceases . when therefore empires are in this vigour , i don't so much disapprove of these tedious deliberations . for so they gain more time to enjoy quietly what they have gotten : too speedy resolutions being often attended with danger . in this sence that of tacitus is to be understood , that power is better preserv'd by cautious than rash counsels . but when this age decays , and the esteem and authority of the empire begins to flag , other methods ought to be us'd , counsels should be speedy , and other means apply'd to recover its former vigour , before decrepid old age comes on , and renders it irrecoverable ; this difference of ages is not considerable in small states , but they should always be ready to spread their sails to every favourable wind , which sits sometimes this way , sometimes that . as in the circumference of the horizon , the winds rule alternatively upon the earth ; the goths and other nothern nations , had formerly very favourable winds , of which they made so good use , loosing all their sails , that they penetrated even to hercules's pillars , the then utmost limits of the world ; but this wind ceasing another succeeded more favourable to other empires . constancy in executing resolutions , whether they are the prince's own , or given him by others , is always of great importance . for want of this paetus could not triumph over the parthians . all eager and fiery spirits quickly resolve , and soon repent , they are hot at the beginning , but cold in the end of affairs ; they aim at all , but bring nothing to perfection ; they are like the animal call'd calipes , which mo●es with great haste , but advances not a foot in an hour . the management of all affairs requires conduct and valour , one to form and t'other to execute them ; to a resolv'd and brave spirit nothing is difficult ; but he who is scrupulous , and timorous , meets with a world of difficulty , and loses many lucky opportunities . great men are long in their deliberations , and jealous of what may happen , but once resolv'd they act with vigour and confidence , without which the courage sails , and not applying convenient means , wholly desists from the enterprize . there are few affairs which cannot he accomplished by wit , or which time , and opportunity cannot facilitate ; wherefore 't is not proper wholly to confound them , but to preserve 'em entire . chrystal once broken can't be rejoyn'd , and so affairs ; be the tempest never so great , ●tis safer to keep some sail abroad , than to fu●l all . most affairs die by being despair'd of . ' ti● also highly conducive , that he who is to execute orders , should first approve them , otherwise he will not ●hink 'em necessary , or else find difficulties in them , and so ●ot apply himself to them as he ought , not caring whether they succeed or no. that minister is most proper to exe●ute who first gave the counsel . for his honour and re●utation 〈◊〉 concern'd in its success . emblem lxv . a stone cast in a pond creates such a continual series of waves , that they at last become innumerable , and wholly disturb that transparent element , and calm looking-glass ; from which the species of things which were before distinctly represented , appear now in disorder and confusion . 't is the same with the mind , in which from one errour proceeds many , so that the judgment being confounded and blinded , and the waves of passion raised , the understanding can't perceive the truth of things represented , but striving to remedy the first errour falls into another , and thence into a third , which at length become infinite , and the further they are from the first the greater they are , like waves that are most distant from the stone that caus'd ' em . the reason of this is , that the beginning is said to be half of the whole , so that a small errour in the beginning correspond to the other parts . wherefore great care of the first errour should be taken , for from thence all others proceed . this is visible in m●smissa , who being checked by scipio for marrying sophonisba , thought to remedy that fault by a far greater , in poisoning her . king witiza by his vices obscured the glory of the beginning of his reign , and that the number of the mistresses he kept might not seem scandalous , he allow'd all his subjects the same liberty ; nay , and made a law for impowering the clergy to marry ; and at last finding his errours contradictory to religion , he deny'd the pope's authority , and thence incurr'd the odium of the whole kingdom , wherefore to prevent their rebelling he demolish'd the fortifications of most cities and castles , and so laid all spain open to the incursions of the moors * , and all these faults proceeding , as you see , at last occasion'd his death . the same series of crimes is visible in duke valentine : he endeavoured to build his own fortune upon the ruin of others , to which end he omitted no sort of tyranny , one piece of cruelty being follow'd by a greater , which at last cost him his state and life too , proving himself an unfortunate scholar , and machiavel , a pernicious master . the faults of princes are difficulty corrected ; for that they usually affect many ; or sometimes because of obstinacy or ignorance . great spirits which are often more ingenuous and tractable than others , easily acknowledge their errours , and being convinced of them , study to amend them , pulling down the ill built edifice stone by stone , to rebuild it with more firm and durable materials . the motto of the emperour philip iii. was , be not asham'd to alter that which was ill began . he who returns by the same way he went , will find his mistake , and soon recover the right road ; repentance would be afterward insignificant . to own you , have at last your errour found * , is of small use , when once the ship 's aground . policy is a certain chain , in which if one link be broken , the whole is useless , unless soon solder'd : a prince who knows the danger of his resolutions , yet still persists in them , is a greater lover of his own opinion , than his countrey ; esteeming an empty shadow of glory more than truth ; and while he would be thought constant , he is stubborn and perverse , 't is the general vice of sovereign power , to think it beneath 'em to retire when they have once advanced . — he thinks it brave † who grasps the scepter in his royal hand not to retreat — though the emperour charles v. was better advised , who having sign'd a grant , which he was afterwards informed was illegal and disallowable , order'd it to 〈◊〉 brought him , and immediately tore it : i had rather , say● he , tear my writing than my soul. to know ones ●●rours , and still to persist in them is tyrannick obstinacy ; but to defend them●upon pretence of honour , is to resolve to sin on , and to incourage ignorance and folly , 't is gilding iron with gold , which soon wears of , and the iron appea●● in its rusty hue. an errour corrected makes us more ca●tious for the future , and to commit faults sometimes is a means to prevent greater . so small is our capacity , that we are to be instructed by our very faults , and are taught by them how to act discreetly . 't is certain , that the be● laws and examples proceed from others crimes . the most prudent state committed many miscarriages , before it arriv'd to perfection . god alone could compleat the fabrick of this world without errour , and yet even he did afterwards in a manner repent him , that he had made man . we are sometimes more indebted to our miscarriages , than to our success ; for those instruct us , but these are only the seeds of pride and vanity . the patriarchs instruct not on●y the wise , but the sinful , 't is the shades give light to a picture , to them we owe the excellency of that art. errour does not always proceed from imprudence , time and other accidents are often the occasion of it . for that which was at first convenient , is afterwards prejudicial . the greatest prudence can't give counsel , which will be proper at all times ; which makes it necessary to alter resolutions , and repeal laws and statutes , especially when there is an apparent advantage ; or danger , or when the prince finds himself mis-inform'd of matters , upon which such resolutions were grounded . this was the reason king ah●suerus gave for recalling the sentence , which he had pronounced against the people of god , upon the unjust accusation of haman . in these and the like cases , 't is not levity of mind , but prudence to alter counsels and resolutions , nor can it be called inconstancy , but a firm zeal to be guided by reason in all things , as the weather-cock is by the wind ; and the needle by the north pole. the physician varies his medicines according to the accidents , having respect to nothing , but the recovery of his patient . the different diseases which states labour under , require different methods of cure. let a prince then think it a credit to review , and correct his decrees , and his errours too , without being asham'd of 'em to commit 'em might be inadvertency ; but to amend is prudence ; obstinacy is ever a certain sign of folly. yet 't will be prudence to make this alteration with such address and dexterity , that the people may not perceive it : for they ignorant and foolish as they are , call mistake want of prudence , and amendment , levity . but tho' i advise a prince to correct his errours , yet i would not be understood of all in general ; for some are so small and insignificant , that the danger of being censur'd for levity in the amendment of them is more than the damage they can do by continuing . so that where they will by degrees cease of themselves , without drawing on greater , 't will be better to let 'em remain . there are some of that nature , that 't is better to follow 'em , nay , and vigorously to persist in them , there being perhaps more danger in retracting ; and these frequently happen in war ; there are some affairs , in which that you may succeed , 't is requisite to use indirect means , tho' you incur some small inconveniencies , as the way to straiten a crooked stick is to bend it the contrary way ; in these cases small errours are not to be valu'd , nor their causes , nor means , provided they be not wholly opposite to honour and justice , and when the advantage to be reap'd from 'em is considerable : for so they are allowable , and ought rather to be call'd disposition to success than errours . others are so interwoven in great attempts , that like roses there is no approaching them without pricking ones hand . and this in those counsels which concern the general good of a nation , which are always prejudicial to some private persons . the bodies of states are compos'd of different and opposite parts , as to their qualities and humours , and a remedy which is apply'd to the whole body , is usually disagreeable to some part : a prince therefore has need of great prudence , to weigh and compare advantages with damages , and of a great courage to execute without hazarding the loss of those for fear of these . emblem lxvi . renovation perpetuates the most fading things in nature ; each individual eternizes it self in another , and by that means preserves its species . 't is for this the husbandman carefully preserves young plants to substitute in the room of those trees which die . he does not leave this to chance , because perhaps they will either not spring at all , or not such as he desires , or else not in proper places , nor will they of themselves grow strait and handsome , without his care in setting them while they are young ; for when once grown up no force can straiten them . the same care ought to be taken in the education of youth ' , especially in those countreys , where the constitution of the climate is apt to produce great and noble spirits , which are like fertile fields soon over-run with wood and brambles , unless their fertility be corrected by the art and industry of the husbandman . the greater the spirit is , the more dangerous it is to the state , unless timely moderated by education . a high aspiring spirit cannot contain it self ; it shakes off the curb of the laws , and is eager for liberty , and should therefore be restrain'd by art and instruction , and afterwards by being busied in some honourable exercise , but when a little more advanc'd in years , the cure for its levity is , to employ it in affairs of state ; i take this to be the reason , why some states admitted young persons into their senates . but the best way is , that which gardiners use , to transplant their young trees into another ground , that the superfluous roots may be prun'd , and the tree grow strait and tall . youth seldom thrives well in its own countrey . for their friends and relations by too much indulgence make them extravagant . in other countries 't is otherwise , for their necessity obliges them to regulate their actions , and to endeavour to gain people's esteem . at home we generally expect a little more liberty , and are apt to promise our selves pardon ; but abroad when we are not known , we are afraid of the rigour of the laws , besides travel polishes our behaviour , and corrects the roughness of our nature , and that foolish vanity , which attends our home-bred gentlemen . there languages , and men are learn't , and their manners and customs observed , the knowledge of which qualifies a man for affairs , as well of peace as war. 't was travel made plato , lycurgus , solon , and pythagoras , such prudent lawgivers and philosophers . at home men are born and die with the same fortune , but abroad they raise it . no planet is exalted in its own house , but in anothers , though not without detriment and inconveniency to it self . travel is the great mistress of prudence , if made for information , as well as direction . in this the northern people are very much to be commended , who with great curiosity and attention travel the world over to learn languages , arts and sciences . the spaniards who have greater conveniency for travelling than any other nation , because of the great extent of their kingdom , have the least inclination to it , lazily spending all their time at home , unless sometimes they are call'd out by war ; when nevertheless 't is absolutely necessary for princes , who have often occasion to bring their armies into several countries , to have a perfect knowledge of them . the two chief reasons which detain our spanish nobility at home , are first , because spain being almost wholly surrounded by the sea , 't is more inconvenient sailing , than travelling by land ; the other is a vain conceit , that they can't appear abroad without great pomp , and expensive equipage , in which strangers , though persons of the best quality are more modest . nor is it sufficient only to transplant youth , but nurseries should be also rais'd , of which vacant offices may be supply'd , to avoid the necessity of employing fresh persons , who must buy their experience at the hazard of the state. this is represented in the present device by a bundle of rods , the emblem of magistracy ; for these being planted produce more of the same ; and because in each of the three forms , that 's to say monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy , the methods of government are different , so should also the methods of education of youth , according to the different institutions and customs of each state ; and according to those things , in which they have most occasion for able men. the persians , aegyptians , chaldaeans , and romans were particularly careful about this ; but principally about the education of youth for the magistracy , the welfare or ruine of states , depending upon the capacity , or insufficiency of the magistrates , who are as it were their soul , and according to the affections of it the whole body is govern'd . there were several colleges erected in spain for this purpose , which were so many seminaries of able men for the administration of the government ; these though their institutions might seem vain and frivolous , yet were they of great use upon this account , that they first taught those to obey , who were afterwards to command . i have elsewhere said , that the knowledge of sciences was a necessary qualification for a prince , and will now examine whether it be proper for subjects , or whether the young commonalty should be instructed therein . nature has plac'd in the head , as having the command over the whole body , the understanding to apprehend sciences , and the memory to retain them . but to the hands and other parts she has given only a disposition to obedience . men at first enter'd into society , for the mutual assistance of each other , not for contemplation ; more for the conveniency of action , than the subtilty of nice speculation : the happiness of governments proceeds not from the vivacity of the wit , but the activity of the hands . the leisure of studies is imploy'd in vices , and eternizes all those upon paper , which the wickedness of the times shall invent ; plotting against the government , and raising seditions among the people . the spartans thought it sufficient to learn obedience , patience , and conquest . too subtil and learn'd subjects are always fond of novelty , continually reflecting upon the government , and disputing the princes orders , and raising commotions among the people ; obedience should be prompt not ingenious , sincere not cunning . ignorance is the principal foundation of the turkish empire . and the readiest way to ruin it is to sow literature among the people . the happiness and tranquility of the swisse proceeds from the same cause , for frivolous sophistry is forbid among them , yet are they govern'd with as much policy and prudence , as any nation whatever . study enervates the body , and deba●es the mind , giving it too quick an apprehension of danger . most men are charm'd by the pleasure , honour , or profit of learning , so that few would apply themselves to arms , or military exercise for the defence of the state , whose interest is in having its people valiant , rather rather than learned . the genteel politeness of learning , makes the mind wholly averse to all laborious exercises . study makes men melancholy , and lovers of a retired and single life ; which is wholly opposite to the design of government , which is to multiply , and raise men fit and capable of publick imployments , and such as are able to act offensively , or defensively with an enemy . the neatherlands shew us , that it is not learning and ingenuity , but arts , industry and trade , that makes a nation flourish . the germans and other nations consider'd these inconveniencies , and therefore founded their nobility upon arms , not regarding the honour and reputation of learning ; whence almost all the nobility apply'd themselves to war , and arts military . though literature conduces much to the knowledge of the true religion , yet 't is evident , that from thence arise different opinions , which create as many sects , whence proceed the confusion and ruin of empires , so that the true religion being now found , a sincere and credulous ignorance would be much safer , than a presumptuous and conceited knowledge , which is expos'd to so many errours . these and some other reasons which might be alledg'd , seem to advise an utter extirpation of learning , according to the rules of policy , which regard more the authority of the prince , than the advantage of the subject ; but these are maxims of a tyrant , not a good and just prince , who should have no other object than the honour and welfare of his people ; to whom learning is absolutely necessary to confute the errours of sectaries , which always flourish where ignorance reigns , and also to administer justice , and to preserve and improve arts military , as well as civil . for scholars are as useful in defending cities as souldiers ; as syracuse formerly found in the person of archimedes : and dole in its learn'd senate , by whose prudent counsel , ingenious machines , and vigorous and resolute defence , it resisted the whole power of france ; changing their libraries into magazines , their gowns into coats of mail , and their pens into swords , which dip'd in french blood , recorded their names and actions to eternity . 't is only too great a number of universities and students , which is prejudicial to the publick , as spain found , whence 't is highly necessary , that the greatest number should apply themselves to arts of navigation and war , not to law or speculative sciences : for which reason there should be greater incouragement given to those than the other , that men may be the more inclined to follow them ; for want of such incouragement in spain , there are so many apply themselves to learning , that there wants souldiers to defend the kingdom . this ought to be remedied by the care and prudence of the prince , who should so judiciously dispose the education of youth , that the number of scholars , souldiers and tradesmen might be proportioned to his state. the same proportion should be observ'd in those who would lead a religious monastick life , of whom too great a number is very prejudicial , both to the prince and state. though religion and piety ought not to be measur'd by the rule of policy , and in the church militant , spiritual arms are of more use than temporal , he who was the first founder of that state , will maintain and preserve it without detriment to the publick ; nevertheless since human prudence ought to believe , not expect miracles , i leave it to him whose duty 't is , to consider , whether if the number of ecclesiasticks , and religious orders should exceed the laity which should support 'em , it would not be of great detriment even to the church it self the council of lateran in the time of innocent iii. provided a remedy for this inconveniency , by prohibiting the introduction of new religions . the royal counsel of castile , also perswaded his majesty to request of the pope , that there might be none admitted into any convent under the age of sixteen years , and not be ordain'd under twenty ; but pretended piety and nice scruples of conscience , easily pass over these inconveniencies . but this proportion in those who are design'd for business or speculation , will be of small use , unless the prince also take care of the nurseries of the commonalty , which should produce a sufficient number of well qualified citizens to succeed in the room of those whom death daily takes off . the ancients were always very careful of propagation , that each individual might be succeeded by another . of the necessity of this , the romans in particular were so well satisfied , that they not only proposed rewards for procreation , but also looked upon a single life as infamous . germanicus the better to oblige the people to revenge his death among the rest of the services , he had done the government , he urg'd , that he had six children by his wise . tiberius also told it , as a good omen to the senate that drusus's wife , was brought to bed of twins . the strength of kingdoms consists in the number of subjects ; and he is the greatest prince whose state is most populous , not he whose territories are largest : for they of themselves can neither defend nor offend ; but by means of their inhabitants● , on whom all their glory depends . the emperour adrian us'd to say , that he had rather his empire should ab●und with men than riches ; and with a great deal of reason , for riches without subjects do only invite wars , without being able to defend themselves , as on the contrary , subjects without riches , want neither power to acquire , or maintain them , in the multitude of people is the king's honour : but in the want of people , is the destruction of the prince . the wise alphonso would have a prince take particular care to people his state , and that not only with commonalty , but also with nobility ; in which he judg'd with great prudence , for one without the other is like a body without a soul , the commonalty being insignificant without the nobility , which are their life , and by whose example they learn to covet glory , and despise danger . it ought therefore to be a prince's chief care , to preserve and maintain them . as augustus did , who not only caus'd hortalus to marry , but also allowed wherewithall to his quality , that that noble family might not be extinct . the germans are very circumspect in this point , for which reason they anciently gave no portion with their women , and even now give very small ones , that their vertue and nobility might be their only dowry , and that their lovers might respect the endowments of their minds and bodies , more than their fortunes , that marriages might be sooner concluded , without losing so much time in fortune-hunting ; for which reason lycurgus wholly prohibited the giving dowries to women ; and the emperour charles v. regulated them ; 't is said also , that aristotle reprehended the la●edaemonians , for giving such large fortunes to their daughters . king alphonso also advises , that a prince unless upon extraordinary occasions should not people his state with foreigners , and truly with a great deal of reason , for different manners and religions are the worst domestick enemies . this made the spaniards drive the iews and moors out of spain . foreigners introduce with them their vices , and errours , and are ready upon every occasion to rise against the natives . but this inconveniency would not be much to be fear'd , if only labourers and husbandmen were admitted , nay , this is sometimes of great advantage . so the grand signior selim sent a vast number of labourers from cairo to constantinople . the poles having elected henry duke of anjou king , among other articles 't was agreed , that he should bring with him several families of artificers . nebuchadnezzar upon the taking of ierusalem , carried away all the men of might even seven thousand , and crafts men , and smiths a thousand , and all that were strong , and kept for war , even them the king of babylon brought captive to babylon . but because this method may be too troublesome and chargeable , and also because such a supply may be insufficient , i will here set down the usual causes of want of people in nations . and these are either internal or external ; external are wars and plantations ; war is a sort of monster which feeds on humane blood ; and since 't is the interest of each state to maintain it abroad as the romans did , it must necessarily be done at the expence of the lives and estates of the subjects . neither can plantations be long ma●ntain'd , without great suppl●es of men , as we have found in spain ; for which reason the romans during the war with hannibal , and for some years after , took little care of planting new colonies ; they having more reason to recruit than weaken their forces . velleius paterculus esteem'd the planting colonies out of italy as very pernicious , because being so far distant from the heart of the empire , they could ●ot assist it upon occasion . the other causes are internal . the principal of which are taxes , want of husbandry and trade , and too great a number of holy days , the inconveniencies , and remedies of which i have set down elsewhere . the court is also a great cause of the want of people , for as a hot liver draws all the natural heat to it self , leaving other parts of the body spiritless and faint , so the pomp , ease , delight , profit , and hopes of reward at court , allure the minds of most , especially of the artificers and tradesmen , who think it a more pleasant and easie life to serve some person of quality ; than to toil at their own trade ; the nobility also , invited by the prince's presence , or the charms of the court , leave their estates in the countrey for a court life ; whence not being able to look after them , but spending their revenu●s upon extravagant and unnecessary expences , their estates become poo● and uninhabited , whereas they would have been rich and populous , had their lord resided there . the emperor iusti●●n prudently reflected upon these inconveniencies , and appointed an officer on purpose to prevent them . king iohn ii. also order'd , that all the nobility at his court should at certain times , visit their own estates , as also the emperor trojan did before him . birth-right also , especially in spain is very prejudicial to propagation ; for the eldest brother claims the whole estate ( which king theodorick thought very unjust ) , so that the youngest not having wherewithal to maintain a family , instead of marrying , either shut themselves into convents , or turn soldiers . for this reason plato call'd riches and poverty , the ancient plagues of commonwealths , knowing that almost all their misfortunes proceeded from an unequal distribution of riches . if the citizens had all an equal dividend , state would undoubtedly flourish more . but though the advantage redounding from hence wou●d be great , the preservation of the nobility by means of fie●● would not be less , for by that means they would be in a capacity to serve the prince and state ; so that those may be allowed to the ancient nobility , not to the modern , by making a law , that all relations to the fourth degree , should be joynt heirs , if not of the whole , yet of the greatest part of the estate ; thus the inconveniencies of legacies and gifts would be prevented , which are more the effects of vanity , than a design to serve the publick , as also of that religious prodigality , which observing neither bounds , nor proximity of blood , gives all to the church , not leaving so much as subsistence to brethren , or any other relations , whence families become extinct , the royal revenues are exhausted , the people impoverish'd , and unable to pay taxes , the power of those who are exempted is increased , and the authority of the prince diminished . this moses considering forbid by edict , any one from offering any more towards the work of the sanctuary , though god himself was the author of those offerings , and th●y were offer'd through pure devotion ▪ ; the republick of ●e●ice have made very prudent provisions against this . 't is necessary also , that a fit time should be observed in marriages : for if too late the succession is endanger'd , and the government would be too much expos'd to the incontinency of youth : and if soon the children being almost of the same age with their fathers , would soon forget their duty , and grudge 'em the time they live . emblem lxvii . the policy of our times presupposes malice and fraud in all things , and therefore arms it self with greater , without any regard to religion , justice or honour . it thinks nothing disallowable that is advantageous ; but as these practices are now common , they must need justle and confound one another , to the detriment of the publick tranquility , and without obtaining their propos'd ends. but let a prince cautiously avoid such doctrine , and learn rather of nature the mistress of true policy , without malice , fraud , or any ill practice , there being none so certain , firm and solid , as that which she observes in the government , of vegetables and animals , more especially that which she dictates to every man by his reason . particularly to shepherds and husbandmen , for the preservation of their flocks , and improvement of their ground : hence may be 't is , that those kings who have been chosen from the crook or the plow , have made the best governours . though the shepherd ( whose office is almost the same of a prince's ) enjoys the benefit of the wool and the milk of his flock , yet 't is with such moderation , that he neither draws blood from their duggs , nor shears their skin so close as to leave 'em wholly expos'd to the inconveniences of cold and heat . so a prince , says king alphonso ) ought more to value the common good of his people , than his own particular interest , for the common good and riches of his subjects , are as it were his own * . the husbandman cuts not down the body of the tree , for his domestick occasions , but only lops the branches , and not all of them neither , but leaves enough to sprout out and serve his occasions the next year ; but the farmer is not so careful , who is for making the best of his farm while his lease continues , not caring how much he impoverishes his ground for his landlord . this is the difference between a lawful prince and a tyrant , in respect of taxes and impositions . this having an unjust title , and fearing soon to be dethron'd , makes the best use of his time , stocking up all by the roots , fleaing instead of shearing his flock , instead of feeding them he gluts himself , and instead of defending them , leaves them a naked prey to every wolf . but a just and lawful prince in imposing taxes , considers the justice of the cause , the quantity , quality , and occasion , and also proportions them to his subjects estates and persons , treating his kingdom not as a body which is to die with him , but to remain to his posterity ; knowing that though princes are mortal , states are eternal , and since he expects a new crop from his kingdom every year , he preserves it carefully , as his best treasury , which he may make use of upon urgent occasions : for as king alphonso said in one of his laws , borrowing his thought from a precept of aristotle to alexander the great : the best and most lasting treasure of a king , is his people , when they are well defended ; according to a saying of the emperor iustinian , that the kingdom was always rich , and the exchequer full when the subjects were wealthy , and the land plentiful * . when therefore a prince raises taxes with this moderation , the subjects ought chearfully to pay them , nor can they without a sort of rebellion refuse them ; for sovereignty has no other portion , nor publick necessity any other assistance ; there is no peace without soldiers , no soldier without pay , no pay without taxes . for this reason when nero would have remitted the taxes , the roman senate oppos'd him , saying , that without them the empire would be ruin'd . taxes are the prince of peace : but if they are too heavy , and the people not well satisfied of their necessity , they soon rebel against their prince . 't was for no other reason that king alphonso sirnamed the great , grew so odious to the people , that after many troubles and vexations he was oblig'd to quit his crown ; for the same also garcios king of galicia lost both his kingdom and life too † . k. henry iii. consider'd this danger , when being advised by some , to raise new taxes to defray the expence of war , he answer'd , i fear the discontent of my people more than my enemies . money collected from unjust taxes , is mingled with the subjects blood , as was seen to drop from that piece which st. francis of padua broke in the presence of ferdinand king of naples , and this ever crys for vengeance against the prince . great taxes therefore ought not to be rais'd till the people be well convinced of the necessity o● them ; for when they are satisfied of that , and of the justice of the cause , they patiently bear the heaviest impositions , as we see in those which were rais'd by k. ferdinand ivth , and in the grant which the parliament , of toledo made of a million , in the times of henry iii. permitting him also to raise more of his own accord , to carry on the wars against the moors . for though 't is not for private persons to examine into the justice of taxes , though they cannot often apprehend the causes of expences , nor can they be communicated to them without evident danger , yet are there some general reasons which they may without damage be inform'd of , and though natural and divine reason do allow the power of levying impositions to the prince , without the subjects consent , when they are just and necessary ( as king alphonso us'd to say ) yet will a prudent prince so manage the matter , and dispose the minds of his subjects , that it may seem to be done with their approbation ; taxes are ( according to the scripture ) the bridle of the people ; they keep them in obedience , and uphold the prince's authority . those who are free from all taxes are ungovernable ; yet this bridle should be so easie , as not to gall them too much ; as king flavius herwegi●s prudently consider'd in the thirteenth council of toledo , saying , that that government was best which neither oppress'd the people with too great taxes , nor made them remiss and negligent by too little * . the command which princes have over the lives of their subjects , is executed without danger , it being done by law , which punishes some as examples to the rest ; but not so that command which they have over their goods and estates , for that comprehend● all in general , and people are more sensible in what concerns their estates than their bodies ; especially when they are got by sweat and blood , and are to be imployed to supply the prince's luxury . in which that remarkable action of k. david ought to be consider'd , when he refus'd to drink the water which his three soldiers brought him from amidst the enemies camp , least he should seem to drink the blood of those men . 't is no good policy to impoverish the people by taxes the better to keep them in obedience , for though poverty , whether original or accidental , debases our spirits , which always rise and fall with our condition ; yet does oppression provoke our minds , and urge us to rebellion . all the israelites that were in distress , and every one that was in debt , and every one that was discontented joyn'd david against saul . the people are always most obedient when they are richest . the plenty of egypt made the people of god , though very severely us'd , forget their liberty ; but afterwards when they came to want in the wilderness , they complain'd heavily of their slavery and bondage . when a kingdom is given upon condition , that no taxes shall be levy'd without its consent , or if this be afterwards provided by some general decree , as was in the parliament of madrid , in the time of king alphonso xith . or when it has acquired this privilege by long prescription , as in spain , and france ; in such cases the prince must wait the consent of the parliament , least he should expose himself to the same danger , as charles viith . of france did formerly , when he went to raise a certain tax without communicating it to his council . 't is also of great advantage to a prince to be so well es●eem'd of his people , that from their opinion of his zeal for their good , they may think whatever taxes he imposes upon them are just and reasonable , and blindly agree to whatever he proposes , committing themselves wholly to his prudence and management , as the egyptians did to ioseph's , when he exacted the fifth part of their estates . when the people have once this confidence in the prince , he ought diligently to take care , not to burthen them without sufficient cause , and mature deliberation . but if necessity does require it , let him at least take care that the taxes be well expended ; for the people take nothing more hainously , than to see no advantage from their oppressions , and to see their estates squander'd away to no purpose . they are also very uneasie to see taxes continued , when the occasion for which they were rais'd is over . as 't was in vespasian's time , when the taxes rais'd for the necessity of war were continued in time of peace . for afterwards subjects dread them , and grudge to pay them though never so small , thinking that they will be perpetual . queen mary gain'd the hearts of her subjects , and preserv'd their loyalty in the most difficult times , by remitting the excise which her husband king sancho ivth . had laid upon provisions . 't is difficult to perswade people to part with their money to maintain a foreign war , nor can they easily apprehend how much it conduces to their interest , to keep war from their own doors , and maintain it in foreign states , and how much safer is the defence of a shield than that of a helmet , that being farther distant from the head. the purblind mobb can seldom see so far . they weigh rather the present burthen , than the future benefit , not thinking all the riches of the kingdom will be afterwards too little to make good the damage they have suffer'd by their obstinate negligence . it requires therefore , all the prudence and dexterity of a prince to make them know their interest . in raising taxes , care ought always to be taken not to oppress the nobility : for exemption from taxes being the chief distinction between them and the commons , they can't brook to see themselves degraded , and their privileges violated , which were acquir'd by the valour and vertue of their ancestors . this was the reason why the nobility of castile took up arms against henry iii. who tax'd 'em at fi●e marvedees of gold apiece , towards the charge of the war. neither should taxes be laid upon such things as are absolutely necessary for life ; but rather upon toys , curiosities , pride and vanity : for so besides correcting luxury , they would fall in the greatest measure upon the rich , and would be encouragement to husbandmen and tradesmen , which part of the government ought most to be cherished and supported ; so the romans laid great taxes upon the spices , pearls and jewels , which were imported from arabia ; as alexander severus did upon those offices which tended more to debauchery , than use and necessity , 't is the readiest way to reformation , to inhance the price of vanity . there are no taxes paid more easily than those which are laid upon commodities imported ; for the greatest part of them is paid by foreigners ; wherefore in england the royal revenue is very prudently raised from these kind of taxes , the kingdom it self being exempt . the greatest inconveniency in raising taxes and excise is , in the collectors and receivers , who are often more burthensome than the taxes themselves ; for there is nothing that the subjects take more grievously , than the violence and importunity of these sort of men in collecting their money . 't is an observation that only sicily endur'd them with patience : god himself complains of them by the prophet isaiah , that they oppress'd his people . in egypt some prophet was always president of the customs , for they thought it not safe to trust 'em to any but god's immediate servant ; but now they are committed to pedlars and broakers , who wreck a ship in port , which had escaped the fury of the wind and sea , like robbers plundering travellers of their goods and money . what wonder therefore that trade decays , and that riches and merchandice are not imported , if they are expos'd to such as these , who plunder 'em by authority , what wonder , i say , that the people complain of taxes , if for one shilling that comes to the king , ten goes to the collectors and receivers for this reason , when in the parliament of guadal●jara , the kingdom of castile offer'd to raise ducats , it was upon condition , that they themselves should keep books of the receipts and disbursements of it , that they might know what was imployed to the publick interest , and how it was expended , without trusting it to the management of those who had the government of the kingdom during the kings minority . for the same reason , the people of france propos'd to king henry ii. that if he would discharge his collectors , they would themselves pay in their assessments , where-ever he should order ; which the king had agreed to , had not some of his ministers disswaded him . the kingdoms of castile have often offer'd the same thing , nay , and also to pay off the crown debts ; but 't was judg'd that it would be a diminution to the royal authority , to be instructed and tutor'd by the kingdom , and besides , that such a power could not be without danger . but i believe the true reason was , that the court was unwilling to lose so many beneficial offices , and such ready means of getting money . a prince's credit consists not in the administration , but in the possession of riches . the roman state was not less careful of their authority than any other , yet by reason of the trouble and charge of collecting , it order'd each province to collect and pay in their own taxes ; taking care to keep the officers in their duty , that they might not oppress the people through avarice and extortion ; in this tiberius took particular care . modesty in the collecting of one tax , obliges the people more readily to grant others . emblem lxviii . the ingenious greeks included in certain pretty fables , as the aegyptians in hieroglyphicks , not only all natural philosophy , but also moral and politick ; either to hide them from the vulgar , or else that they might be the better imprinted in their minds , by these pleasant and delightful fictions . so , to represent the power of navigation , and the riches thereby acquir'd , they feign'd , that the ship argo ( which was the first that durst venture upon the main ocean ) obtained the famous fleece , which instead of wool , yielded gold ; for which glorious exploit it was consecrated to pallas , the goddess of war , and placed amongst the constellations , as a reward of such dangerous voyages : shewing the world , that by the help of oars and sails , they might make way through mountains of waves ; and by the assistance of the wind , carry arms and merchandise all the world over . this morality , and the preferment of that ship to the skies , occasion'd me to draw two in this present emblem ; as the poles of the globe terrestrial , to shew that navigation is the support of the world , by commerce and arms : these poles are movable , but in their motion consists the stability of empires : there 's scarce any monarchy which has not receiv'd its rise and preservation from thence . if the grandeur of spain were not supported by both those poles , the mediterranean and ocean , it would soon fall : for 't is evident , that provinces so distant from one another , would be in imminent danger , were it not , as 't were , united by oars and sails , and timely supplied with recruits for its support and defence : so that ships and gallies seem to be nothing but a kind of sea-bridge . for this reason , the emperor charles v. and ferdinand duke d' alva , advis'd king philip ii. to maintain a great fleet at sea. king sisebutus well knew the advantage of it , being the first that kept a fleet upon the spanish seas . themistocles gave the same adice to his state ; and the romans made use of it afterwards to conquer the world. this element begirts and conquers the earth : in it strength and speed are united ; and whoever can make use of them with valour , has the world at command . arms at land attack and terrifie only one nation , but at sea they alarm the whole world. there is no circumspection , or power sufficient by land , to defend the sea coasts . 't is the sea which has civiliz'd all nations , which had been rude and barbarous , without the use of navigation and commerce , which has taught 'em to know one another's languages and customs : this antiquity meant , when they feign'd that the rudder of the ship argo spoke ; intimating , that by the help of that , foreign languages were learn'd . 't is navigation that supplies each nation with the goods and riches of others , all nations mutually furnishing each other with what they want ; which advantage promotes that mutual love and correspondence between men , which is necessary for their reciprocal assistance . this marine power is more necessary for some kingdoms than others , according to their several situation and disposition . the asiatick monarchies have more occasion for a land than sea force . venice and genoa , of which one lies upon the sea , the other near it , being utterly unapt for husbandry and agriculture , apply themselves wholly to navigation : and as long as they maintain'd their power at sea , they were the terrour and glory of the world. so spain , which is in a manner surrounded with the ocean , must establish its power at sea , if it would aspire to universal monarchy . the situation of its ports is very commodious , not only for the support of such force , but also for hindring the navigation of other nations , who , by our trade , get riches and strength to make war upon us afterwards . for which reason , 't will be convenient to provide sufficient security for commerce and traffick , they being the principal causes ; 't is they turn all the ports into magazines and stores , furnishing the kingdom with all things necessary , making it flourish , and grow populous . these and other conveniences the prophet ezekiel intimated , in the allegory of the ships which belong'd to sidon ( a city situate at the entry of the sea , ) which was full of merchants and mariners . they of persia , and of lud , and of phut , were in its armies , men of war : they hang'd the shield and helmet in it , they set forth its comeliness . tarshish was its merchant , by reason of the multitude of all kind of riches ; with silver , iron , tin , and lead , they traded in its fairs . in a word , there was nothing in any nation , which was not sold in its fairs ; so that it might be truly called glorious in the midst of the seas . we find also its prince exalted , and lifted up by its traffick . the republicks of si●● nineveh , babylon , rome , and carthage , flourish'd bo●● in war and peace , as long as they maintain'd the●● trade and commerce . when venice and genoa fail'd ● traffick and navigation , their grandeur and glory soon faded . holland , situate upon a barren sand , 〈◊〉 capable of being manur'd by either spade or plow supports very numerous armies by their trade an● commerce ; and maintains such populous cities , as the most fertile plains would not be able to supply . fr● ●● has neither mines of silver nor gold , yet does it enri●● it self by its trade in several kind of toys and guga● in iron , lead and tin : whereas we , through laziness , neglect these riches , which the conveniency 〈◊〉 the sea offers us . we , with great toil and danger bring home the treasures of both the indies , as diamond● pearls , spice , &c. without proceeding any further ; where●as other nations reap the benefit of this our labour , b● transporting them into all the countries of europe , asia and africa . we support the genouese with gold 〈◊〉 silver to trade with , and afterwards pay 'em extravaga● prices for their commodities , so paying interest for o● own money . we furnish other nations with silk● wool , steel , iron , and many other commodities which , after they are wrought , are brought to us again and we buy them at a prodigious rate , by reason of th● carriage and workmanship : so that we pay very de● for the ingenuity and industry of other nations . th●● bring us trifling , insignificant ware , and carry hen●● our substantial gold and silver . whence it is , ( ● king henry ii. said ) that foreigners , nay , sometimes 〈◊〉 very enemies , grow rich and powerful , while our own 〈◊〉 are impoverish'd and beggar'd . this the emperor tiber●● formerly complain'd of , when he saw the extravagan● of the roman ladies in pearls and jewels . yo● r. h. would gain immortal honour , in encouragi● and promoting trade and navigation , both in the citizens and nobility ; for the products of the earth are not more natural than those of traffick and commerce . the kings of tyre did not disdain to trade ; and the fleets which solomon sent to tarshish , carry'd not only necessaries , but also merchandize and effects to trade with , that he might exceed all the kings of the earth for wisdom and riches . we read , that pompey put out his money to use. the nobility also of rome and carthage thought it not beneath 'em to traffick . rome instituted a college of merchants ; whence , i believe , the dutch took the institution of their companies . how much more commodiously might spain establish them , by securing them with men of war ; which would make it not only rich , but formidable . these conveniencies the kings of portugal considering , setled their commerce in the east , by force of arms ; maintaining their arms by their trade ; and by the help of both , founded a new and large empire ; establishing religion , before unknown to those remote countries : as it was also to the western part of the world , till introduc'd by the valour and prowess of the castilians , who instructed that heathen country in what before they never so much as heard of ; so that receiving from them the true religion of the gospel , and the mysterious bread of the encharist , brought them so far , that they cried out for joy , with the prophet isaiah , who hath begotten me these ; seeing i have lost my children , and am desolate , a captive , and removing to and fro ? and who hath brought 〈◊〉 these ? behold , i was left alone , these , where had they ●een ? 't would be also conducive , that if , as the romans formerly establish'd garrisons at constantinople , rhodes , ●pon the rhine , and at cadiz , as in the four principal angles of the empire ; so now the spaniards should erect military orders in several places in the mediterranean and ocean , who might cruise about the seas , and clear them of pyrates , and secure our trade with other nations . these badges of honour and nobility , are sufficient rewards for vertue and valour ; and the presidency of these orders are rich enough to give a beginning to so glorious and royal an undertaking . but if their revenues should not suffice , nor the crown be willing to be depriv'd of so many noble posts , the administration of which is invested in it by the apostolick see , some ecclesiastical rents might be apply'd to that use . this was the advice of king ferdinand the catholick , who would have constituted the knights of st. iames at oran ; and the orders of alcantara , and calatrava , at bugia and tripoli ; having obtained leave of the pope , to convert the revenues of the conven●● del villar de venas , st. martin , in the diocese of saint iames , and that of oviedo , to that use . but by reason of the war , which soon after broke out in italy , this design was not accomplish'd , or perhaps because god reserv'd the glory of this institution for some other king. nor is the state-objection , against intrusting such potent offices to the nobility , of force . military orders were , 't is true , the occasion of so many rebellions in castile : yet now , when the power of our king is enlarg'd by the addition of so many crowns , tha● inconveniency is not to be fear'd ; especially if these orders were setled out of spain , and the presidency of them ingrafted , as it were , in the crown . emblem lxix . divine providence would not suffer this monarchy of the world to be one moment without gold and iron ; one to preserve , and the other to defend it : for if it did not create them at the same time with the world ; yet did the sun , the second governor of all things , immediately after its creation , operate in purifying and refining the mineral matter , and locking it up in mountains , as in publick treasuries ; where also mars , after the matter was harden'd and re●in'd into iron and steel , erected his armory . arms are the hands of governments ; and riches their blood and spirit : and if these don't supply the hands with strength , and they again preserve and defend them , the whole body will soon fall , and be expos'd to ruine and violence . pliny tells of a sort of ants , in india , which instead of grains of corn , heap up grains of gold. nature has not granted those laborious animals the use of this metal ; yet it would have them , like masters , inform every government of the importance of laying up treasure . and though it be the opinion of some statesmen , that hoarding up riches , serves for nothing but to invite enemies , as hezekiah found , when he had shewn his treasure to the embassadors of assyria ; and as the egyptians knew , who , for this reason , employ'd all their royal revenues in building ; yet are their reasons invalid , and these two examples of no force : for 't was not hezekiah's shewing his riches , that brought the war upon him ; but his vanity and pride , in putting his trust in them , more than in god : 't was this that made isaiah prophesie , that he should lose all that he had . nor did the egyptians employ their treasure in building , through fear of losing it , but through vain-glory , and a design to amuse the peoples minds , as we shall observe in its proper place . if a prince amasses treasure , through avarice , not making use of it , when occasion requires , to defend his country , and offend his enemy , and , to save charges , leaves his state unprovided of arms and men , he will soon invite his enemies to forge keys to open his chests , and plunder him of his riches . but if he applies those treasures to the use and service of his state , he will at once strike an awe and respect into his enemies . for riches are the nerves of war : 't is they procure friends and allies . in a word , a full exchequer does more execution than artillery , fleets , or armies . when thus apply'd , hoarding riches , and moderation of expences , are not avarice , but prudence ; as was that of king ferdinand the catholick , who , while living , was call'd miserable and covetous ; but after his death , was clear'd of that aspersion , he leaving behind him but a very inconsiderable summ ; whatever he hoarded , he used to expend upon the fabrick of the kingdom , placing his glory not in spending , but in having what to spend . it must be observ'd , that treasures are sometimes collected with a true and heroick design , to execute some great and glorious action : yet does this , by degrees , dwindle into avarice , and the ruine of states happens before the treasury is open'd for their relief . man's mind is easily taken with the love of riches , and is wholly possess'd with a desire of obtaining them . nor is it sufficient , that these treasures be divided among the whole body of the state , as chlorus in eutropius desired : for riches secure the prince , but endanger the people . cerealis told the people of treves , that their riches were the chief cause of their wars . when the publick is poor , and private persons rich , misfortunes arrive , before they can be prevented . counsels are prejudiced ; for the people avoid those resolutions , which seek to redress the publick grievances , at the expence of particular persons , so that they can very difficultly be induced to make war. aristole , for this reason , blam'd the constitution of the common-wealth of sparta , it having no publick treasury . and if the people are more intent upon their own private , than the publick interest , with how much regret will they be induced to remedy the grievances of the publick , at their own particular expence ? the republick of genoa feels this inconveniency . and plato ascribes the ruine of that of rome to no other cause , in an oration which sallust says he made in the senate , against the accomplices of cataline's conspiracy ; having ( as st. augustine explains it * ) stray'd from their first institution , in which private persons were poor , but the publick rich. of which horace complains † : non it a romuli praescriptum , & intonsi catonis auspiciis , &c. great princes , relying too much upon their own power , lay aside all care of laying up treasure , or of preserving what they already have ; not considering , that if the necessity of their affairs should require money , they must be oblig'd to oppress their subjects with taxes , to the great hazard of their fidelity ; and the greater the kingdom is , there will be need of greater expence and charge . princes are briareus's , who , what they receive with fifty hands , spend with a hundred ; nor is any kingdom rich enough to supply the extravagance of one . clouds , in one hour , spend all the vapours which they have been many days in collecting . those riches which nature had for many ages hoarded up in the close treasury of the earth , were not sufficient for the extravagant prodigality of some of the roman emperors . and this extravagance is usual to successors who find the treasury filled to their hands : for they spend that carelesly and lavishly , which they never knew the trouble of acquiring ; they soon pull down the banks of the treasury , and drown their state in pleasure and luxury . in less than three years time , caligula squander'd away sixty six millions of gold , though then one crown was as much as two now . power is self-will'd and foolish , and should therefore be corrected by prudence ; for without that , empires would soon fall to ruine : that of rome seem'd to decline , from the time that the emperors began to squander away its treasures . the world is wholly ruled by arms and riches . which is represented in the present emblem , by a sword and golden bough , which a hand holds over a globe ; to intimate , that by both these the world is govern'd : alluding to virgil's story of aeneas , who , by the help of both these , conquer'd even hell it self , and subdued its monsters and furies . the sword wounds most , whose edge is gold ; and valour without conduct , and magazines without treasuries , are insignificant . a prince ought therefore to consider , before he declares war , whether he is sufficiently furnish'd with these means to prosecute it : for which reason , 't will be convenient , that the president of the treasury should be one of the council , that he may give an account of the state of the revenue , and what grounds they have to proceed upon . power ought to be cautious and circumspect , and diligently consider of what it undertakes . prudence does the same in the mind , as the eyes do in the head ; without that , kingdoms and states would be blind : and polyphemus , who having once lost his eye by the cunning of vlysses , in vain threw stones about , and storm'd for revenge : so will they vainly squander and throw away their treasure and riches . what prodigious summs have we seen spent in our times , upon some vain fear , in countermining enemies designs , in raising armies , and making war , which might have been avoided by a friendly composition , or by dissimulation ? how much in subsidies and taxes ill apply'd , and in other necessary expences , by which princes , thinking to make themselves powerful , have found the contrary : the ostentations and menaces of gold extravagantly and unseasonably squander'd away , render themselves ineffectual , and the second are less than the first , for one weakens the other . strength lost , is soon recruited ; but riches once spent , are hard to be recover'd . they ought not to be us'd but upon absolute necessity . aeneas did not first shew the golden bough , but offer'd to force his passage with his sword. the chief unsheath'd his shinning steel , prepar'd , though seiz'd with sudden fear , to force the guard. but when he found that neither force nor fair means could oblige charon to waft him over , the golden bough was produc'd , which had been hitherto conceal'd : at the sight of which , the angry god was pacified . * if neither piety , nor heaven's command , can gain his passage to the stygian strand , this fatal present shall prevail , at least , ( then shew'd the golden bough , conceal'd within her vest. ) no more was needful ; for the gloomy god stood mute with awe , to see the golden rod , &c. let princes therefore take care to keep those eyes of prudence upon their scepters , clear , and quick-sighted , not disdaining oeconomy , which is the safety and preservation thereof ; princes being , as 't were , the fathers of their people . the great augustus condescended , as we have said before , for the good of the publick , to take the accompts of the empire with his own hand . spain had had long since the universal empire of the world , if it had been less extravagant in war , and more regular and methodical in peace ; but through a certain negligence , the usual effect of grandeur , it has suffer'd those riches which should have render'd it invincible , to be made use of by other nations . we purchase them of the simple indians , for toys and baubles ; and afterwards , we our selves , as silly as they , permit other nations to export them , leaving us brass , lead , or some such worthless commodities , in their stead . 't was the kingdom of castile , which , by its valour and prowess , erected our monarchy ; yet others triumph , and that suffers , not knowing how to make good use of the vast treasures which are brought to them . so divine providence , in a manner , levels and equals states ; giving to the great ones strength , without industry ; and to the little , industry to acquire strength . but lest i should seem only to discover wounds , and not heal them , i will prescribe some remedies ; not drawn from the quintessence and nicety of speculation , which are approv'd at first , when new , but afterwards rejected by experience ; but such as natural reason shall suggest , and such as ignorance slights as vulgar . the chief wealth and riches of nations , are the fruits of the earth ; no mines in the world being richer than agriculture . this the aegyptians knew , who made the lower end of their scepters like a plow-share ; to intimate , that its power and grandeur was founded upon that : the fertile sides of vesuvi●s , are richer than potosus with all its gold. 't is not by chance , that nature has so liberally imparted the fruits of the earth to all , and hid gold and silver in the very bowels of the earth : it made those common , and expos'd them upon the superficies of the earth , on purpose for man's nourishment ; and hid these in the bowels thereof , that they might not easily be dug out , and refined , knowing they would prove the bane and ruine of mankind . spain was , in former times , so rich , almost only from the fruits of the earth , that lewis king of france , coming to toledo , in the time of king alphonso the emperor , was surpriz'd at the splendour and magnificence of that court , affirming , that he had not seen the like in all that part of asia or europe , which he had travell'd through , in his voyage to the holy land. such was then ●he grandeur of one king of castile , though distracted with civil wars , and the greatest part of his kingdom possess'd by the moors . there are some authors affirm , that there was in this kingdom , in the time of the holy war against the heathens , a rendezvouz of a hundred thousand foot , ten thousand horse , and sixty thousand waggons ; and that king alphonso iii. daily paid both the soldiers , captains , and generals , according to their office and quality . these vast expences and provisions , which at present seem incredible , the single kingdom of castile could afford ; nay , and at the same time maintain'd a greater number of enemies , without the assistance of foreign riches ; until a certain biscayner , roving upon the sea , by fortune , got a sight of this new world , either unknown to , or forgotten by the ancients , and preserv'd for the honour of columbus , who , after the death of this spaniard , diligently considering the observations that he , the first discoverer had made , undertook to demonstrate the discovery of the provinces which nature seem'd designedly to separate from us by mountainous waves . he communicated this his project to several princes , hoping , by their assistance , to facilitate his great and difficult enterprize : but all slighted it , as vain and notionary . which if they had done through prudence and caution , and not distrust and misbelief , they had merited the same praise which carthage gain'd of old ; which , when some sailors were boasting in the senate , of the discovery of a wonderful rich and delicious island , ( supposed to be hispaniola ) caus'd 'em immediately to be put to death , thinking the discovery of such an island would be of more detriment than advantage to the commonwealth . columbus , at last , applies himself to their catholick majesties , ferdinand and isabella ; whose generous spirits , capable of many worlds , could not be content with one alone . so that having received necessary assistance , he put to sea ; and after a tedious and hazardous voyage , in which he encounter'd as great danger from the diffidence of his companions , as from the sea it self , he at last return'd to spain , laden with gold and silver . the people flock'd to the shore of guadalquivir , to admire these precious products of the earth , brought to light by the indians , and thither by the valour and industry of their countrymen . but this great plenty of them soon perverted all things ; the husbandman soon leaves plough , gets into his embroider'd silks , and begins to be more curious of his tawny , sun-burnt hands ; the merchant steps from his counter into his sedan , and lolls it lazily about the streets ; workmen disdain their tools , and all , forsooth , must now turn gentlemen . no money is current now but silver and gold ; and our coin being wholly unmix'd and pure , is coveted and desired by all nations . gold and silver now growing common , all things raise their price . in fine , it befel our kings , as it did the emperor nero , whom a certain african put a trick upon , telling him , in his grounds he had found a vast treasure , which he believ'd queen dido had buried there , either lest too much riches should enervate the minds of her subjects , or lest they should invite others to invade her kingdom . which the emperor giving credit to , and thinking himself already sure of the treasure , squander'd away the old stock , upon the hope of these new-found riches : the expectation of riches being the cause of the publick want . cheated by the same hopes , we were persuaded that we had no more need of fix'd and standing treasuries , but think our ships sufficient , not considering that all our power depends upon the uncertainty of the winds and seas ; as tiberius said the lives of the romans did , because their provisions were all brought them from foreign provinces . which hazard aleto consider'd , when dissuading godfredo from going to the holy wars , he said , * shall then your life upon the winds depend ? and as mens hopes are generally above their estates , state and pomp encreases ; the salaries , wages , and other charges of the crown are enlarged , out of confidence and expectations of these foreign riches ; which being afterwards ill and negligently managed , were not sufficient to defray such expences : and this made way for debts , and those for usury and interest . necessity daily encreas'd , and occasion'd new expences : but nothing was so prejudicial to the publick , as the alteration of the coin ; which , though not consider'd , should be preserv'd in as much purity as religion it self ; the kings , alphonso the wise , alphonso xi . and henry ii. who did offer to alter it , endanger'd both themselves and kingdoms ; and their misfortunes ought to have been a warning to us . but when ills are fatal , neither experience , nor example , can move us . king philip ii. deaf to all these cautions , doubled the value of copper coin , which was before convenient for common use , and answerable to bigger money . foreigners coming to understand the value that the royal stamp gave to this paultry metal , began to traffick with nothing else , bringing us in vast quantities of copper ready coin'd , in exchange for our gold , silver , and other merchandise : which did us more damage , than if all the monsters and venomous serpents of africa had been brought among us : and the spaniards , who us'd to ridicule the rhodians for their copper money , became themselves the jest and laughing-stock of the whole world. trade was ruin'd by this troublesome , scoundrel metal , all things grew dearer , and , by degrees , scarcer , as in the time of alphonso the wise. buying and selling ceas'd , and at the same time the revenues of the crown were diminish'd , so that new impositions and taxes were unavoidable ; whence , for want of commerce , the wealth of castile was spent , and the same inconveniencies renew'd , proceeding one from another in a pernicious circle ; which will at last prove our ruine , unless a remedy be timely apply'd , by reducing that king of money to its former and intrinsick value . who would not think that this world must be subdu'd by the riches and wealth of the other ? and yet we see there were greater exploits perform'd formerly by pure valour , than since , by all these riches ; as tacitus observ'd , in the time of vitellius . foreign nations did soon after find the same damage , from the discovery of the indies , from their too great dependance upon their riches ; all things grew dearer with them ; as with us , their expences surmounted their revenues : in a word , they suffer'd all the same inconveniencies with us ; which were so much greater to them , as being farther distance from those provinces ; and the remedy of gold and silver which is brought us from the indies , and which they must receive from us , being more uncertain . these are the inconveniencies which the discovery of the indies caused : in knowing the causes of which , we know also their remedies . the first , is , not to neglect agriculture , upon hopes of those riches : those which we receive from the earth , being more natural , sure , and common to all : wherefore husbandmen should be encourag'd and exempted from the oppressions of war , and all other incumbrances . the second , is , that since all things are restored by the contrary means to which they were ruin'd , and the expences are greater than the hopes and expectation of those metals ; the prince should , like a prudent governor , provide , as the senators of rome advis'd nero , that the publick revenues should rather exceed , than fall short of the expences ; that he should moderate those that were superfluous and unnecessary : imitating the emperors antoninus pius , and alexander severus , the last of which us'd to say , that 't was the part of a tyrant , to support them with the intrails of his state. such a reform would only disgust some few , not the whole nation . and if abuse or imprudence has rais'd the salaries of offices , and charges in peace and war ; and if they are only introduc'd by vanity , under the title of grandeur ; why should they not be corrected and reform'd by prudence ? and as the greater the kingdoms are , those abuses will be greater ; so also will be the effects of this remedy . frugality is the best revenue . gold once spent , returns not . by damming up the streams , the fountain-head rises . and the way to keep silver , is to fix the mercury of it ; that being the true and approv'd philosopher's stone . wherefore , i am satisfy'd , that if a prince be inform'd by his ministers , of all superfluous expences by sea and land , and would resolve to moderate them ; he would soon find himself enabled to pay his debts , lessen his taxes , and fill his treasury . as king henry iii. who finding the crown much in debt , consulted with his parliament , how to remedy it : and they could not find a better expedient , than what we have here propos'd ; that is , to reduce salaries and pensions , and regulate superfluous expences . the treasurers also , and other officers in the treasury and exchequer , should be reduc'd to a less number , as also the collectors of taxes , who all , like the thirsty sands of africk , soak and drink up all the streams of the revenue , which pass by them . the great emperor of the turks , though he has immense revenues , has but two treasurers , one in asia , and 'tother in europe . henry iv. of france ( not less a statesman than a soldier ) was satisfy'd of the inconveniency of this , and therefore reduc'd the ministers of his revenue to a less , yet sufficient number . the third remedy , is , that since princes are , by importunity , often forced to grant those things which are not in their power ; all such grants , privileges , immunities and rewards , as are prejudicial to the crown , should be revok'd ; especially when the same causes concurr , as mov'd their catholick majesties to repeal those of king henry iv. for , said they , in another law , a princes liberality should not be so great as to ruine him ▪ and the immunities granted to subjects , should be such as may not prejudice the crown . but if a prince , through negligence or necessity , has not consider'd this ; it must be remedy'd afterwards . as was after the abdication of ramirez king of arragon ; at which time , all grants that had weakned the crown , were made void . king henry the liberal , and queen isabella , did the same thing : and king iohn ii. repeal'd the privileges and immunities which himself and his predecessors had granted . 't is with princes , as 't was with the idols of babylon ; from whose crowns , according to ieremiah , the people took the gold and silver , and apply'd it to their own use . king henry iii. perceiving the same abuse , imprison'd several of his nobility , and made 'em refund what they had purloin'd from the crown ; by which , and a just administration of his revenues , he amass'd a prodigious treasure in the castle of madrid . the last remedy , ( which should have been the first ) is , that a prince should first regulate the expences of his own family , if he would reform those of his people : for their reformation , as king theodatus said , must be begun by the prince , that it may be effectual . st. lewis , king of france , advised his son philip to take care that his expences were moderate and reasonable 't is a misfortune , that princes think it becomes their grandeur to be careless , and keep no accompts ; and take extravagance to be liberality , not considering how contemptible they are when poor ; and that true greatness does not consist in shews , and gaudy ostentation , but in castles , strong garrisons , and armies . the emperor charles v. in the parliament of valladolid , moderated the expences of his houshold . the true greatness of princes , consists in being liberal to others , and moderate and sparing to themselves . for which reason , sisenand , king of spain and france , ( so stiled by the fourth council of toledo ) us'd to say , that kings should be mais escasos que gastadores ; that is , rather rich than lavish . i well know the difficulty of these remedies ; but , as petrarch said , in the like case , i do my duty : and though all that is requisite , cannot be executed ; it ought to be represented , to accomplish the design of this book . i dare hardly say any thing about the remedies of money , it being the apple of the eye of the state , which you cannot touch , without hurting ; so that 't is better to let it alone , than to alter the ancient method : the acutest judgment cannot foresee all the inconveniencies which attend every alteration thereof , until they are discover'd by experience : for it being , as it were , the rule and measure of contracts , every one feels the least variation of it ; commerce is disturb'd , and the whole state disorder'd . wherefore , after king peter ii. had abdicated the throne , it was prudently enacted by the kingdom of arragon , that all their kings thenceforward , should take an oath , not to alter any thing about the coin. this is the duty of a prince , as pope innocent iii. wrote to the same king peter , when his subjects began to rebell against him . of which this seems to be the reason ; that the prince is subject to the law of nations , and as publick trustee , ought to take care that there be no alteration in the nature of the coin , which consists in matter , form , and quantity ; nor can any kingdom be constituted , where that is not pure . but not to be wholly silent in a matter so important to government , i 'll mention two things . first , that money is then just and convenient , when the coin or stamp adds nothing to the intrinsick value of it , and when the gold and silver have the common alloy of other nations ; for this will prevent its being exported . the other , is , that it should be of the same weight and value with that of other nations , permitting also the currency of foreign coin : nor will it at all derogate from the prince's authority , since the coin serves only to shew the weight and value of it . and this seems most commodious , i● those kingdoms which hold correspondence and trade with many nations . emblem lxx . empire admits of no companion , nor can majesty be divided : for it is impossible that each should command and obey at the same time ; especially since power and accidents cannot be so nicely shar'd between them both , nor ambition so equally balanced , but that one will desire to be above the other , or that envy and emulation will disturb their agreement . * rivals in empire still mistrustful are ; nor can authority a part'ner bear . it seems next to an impossibility , that the orders and commands of two governors should not thwart one another . moses and aaron were brothers ; and yet when god made them part'ners , he thought it necessary to be in the mouth of one , and in the mouth of the other , and to teach them what to do , lest any dissention should arise between them . a republick has but one body , and should therefore be guided but by one soul . a king will hardly entertain even a depos'd prince within his kingdom . this was the king of portugal's excuse , for not admitting king peter , when depos'd by his brother henry . nothing but matrimony , which unites bodies and souls , and the singular prudence of king ferdinand and queen isabella , could have prevented the inconveniencies of their joint-reign in the kingdom of castile . for power and concord are very rarely found together . and though there was some consent and union in the joint-empire of dioclesian and maximinian , yet was not that without its troubles and inconveniencies ; for which reason , the roman consuls used to command by turns . but if there be occasion for more princes than one , 't is better to have three ; for the authority of one , will check the ambition of the other two. there can be no faction , where there is no equality ; which was the reason why the triumvirates of caesar , crassus , and pompey , and of anthony , lepidus and augustus , continued for sometime . the kingdom was well govern'd , during the minority of king henry iii. by his three guardians * . upon which consideration , king alphonso the wise propos'd , that during the nonage of kings , the administration of affairs should be committed to one , three , five , or seven . which not being observ'd in the minority of alphonso xi . the kingdom of castile felt great commotions , from the government of the two infants , iohn and peter , which at last oblig'd the royal council to take upon 'em the administration . though empires are always violent , and of short continuance , which are divided , and depend not upon one ; as it happen'd to alexander's , which , vast as it was , ended with his life ; for that after him , 't was divided among many . that which the moors had founded in spain , had lasted longer , had it not been divided into many kingdoms . this is represented in this present emblem , by a crown'd tree , which signifies a kingdom : to intimate , that if two hands , tho' of the same body , should pull this tree two different ways , they would rend , burst , and ruine the crown . for humane ambition sometimes forgets the bonds of nature . when states are divided among brothers , the crown can never remain entire , and in union ; for every one is for himself , and grasps at the whole sceptre as his father held it . so it befell king sancho the elder . divine providence united all the kingdoms of spain to his empire , that by their joint-force they might expell the moors , and free themselves from their tyrannick slavery : but he , through fatherly affection , rather than prudent policy , divided his kingdoms among his children , thinking that so they would be stronger , and more ready to unite against the common enemy * . but instead of that , each of the brothers set up for king himself . so that the crown being thus rent in pieces , lost its strength and splendour . and as domestick feuds and grudges are more inveterate than other , they soon grew to civil wars , each endeavouring to depose his brother , to the utmost detriment of the publick . this example might , one would have thought , have been a warning to all princes , for the future ; yet we find king ferdinand the great , the emperor alphonso , and iames i. king of arragon , guilty of the same fault , dividing the command of their kingdoms among their children † . i know not whether this be the effect of self-conceit , or humane nature , ever greedy of novelty , and fond of old rejected opinions , thinking that best , which was done by their ancestors ; if 't is not that we seek for examples to excuse our own resolutions . iames ii. king of arragon , was more prudent upon this score , when he firmly enacted , that the kingdoms of arragon and valence , and the province of catalonia , should never be separated * . nor can these errors be excused , either by the law of the twelve tables , or the common law , which shares the father's estate equally among the children ; or by natural reason , which seems to urge , that as the children receiv'd their being in common from their father , they should also be sharers of his estate . for a king is a publick person , and ought to act as king , and not as a father ; and ought rather to attend the good of his subjects , than his children . besides , a kingdom is a kind of publick chattel , and so belongs to no one in particular ; it not being in the king's power to dispose of that , as of his own private goods : for the subjects , in submitting themselves to one , have requir'd a right to be preserv'd , defended and maintain'd by him ; which is inconsistent with the division of the empire : and since this right is common and universal , it ought surely to be preferr'd to private love , and paternal affection , or to desire of making peace among his children , by the ruine of the publick . besides , instead of making them agree , it arms 'em with power to quarrel with one another about the dividends , which cannot be made so equal as to satisfie all . brothers would live much more quietly , if their maintenance should depend upon him who commands in chief ; for so each would receive a revenue sufficient to support the grandeur of his birth . thus iehosaphat did . there being no occasion for that barbarous custom of the turks , or that impious policy of some , who think no government firm and secure , unless its foundation be mix'd with the blood of all such who have but the least pretensions to it ; as if that , like cement or mortar , fasten'd the stones of the building . for the said reason , almost all nations preferr succession to election ; well knowing that an interregnum is liable to dissentions and civil wars , and that 't is safer to accept a prince , than to seek one . wherefore , since succession is best , 't is most agreeable to follow the course of nature , preferring him whom she first sent into the world ; so that neither minority , nor any other natural defect , is a sufficient objection to this right , especially when there are greater inconveniencies attend the admittance of another , of which the scriptures afford us very many examples . there is the same reason and right for the succession of women to the crown , in default of heirs male ; for otherwise the crown would be subject to divisions , by collateral pretensions . and though the salique law , under the pretence of the frailty and imbecility of that sex , ( if it mayn't rather be call'd the envy and ambition of men ) does , contrary to the many glorious examples of the valour and conduct of the female sex , urge many inconveniencies , which may seem to exclude them from the administration ; yet is there none so weighty as to balance the advantage of preventing an interregnum . nay , there are strong reasons why they ought to be admitted , it preventing pretensions and civil wars about the succession : and besides , matching the heiress to some great prince , there acceeds a considerable addition to the crown ; as it happen'd to the kingdom of castile and the house of austria . if the above-mention'd inconveniencies are ever of weight , 't is in small principalities ; where the heiress marrying with other princes , the family may become extinct , and one state be confounded with the other . emblem lxxi . what does not labour overcome ? it subdues iron , softens brass , draws out gold into the finest wire , and cuts the hardest diamonds . a soft rope does , by continual motion , wear the marble edge of the well . by this consideration , st. isidore , when he apply'd himself to study , overcame the dulness of his genius . what fort was ever so strong , as that assiduity could not conquer it ? the continued force of that engine , which the ancients call'd a ram , would make a breach in the thickest and strongest walls . and we see now a-days , that castles , though defended by artillery walls , ramparts and ditches , are at last forced to yield to the spade and mattock . no difficulty retards or checks a constant spirit . the temple of glory is not situated in a delightful valley , nor in a delicious plain , but upon a rugged mountain's top , not to be arriv'd at , but by rough , uncouth paths , over-run with thorns and brambles . the temples of minerva , mars , and hercules , ( deities glorious for their vertue ) were not built of corinthian or carv'd work , finely imbellish'd with curious engravings , as were those of flora and venus ; but after the dorick fashion , rough and unpolish'd : nor did the cornices and chapiters of the pillars shew any thing , but that they were built by labour and industry , not by luxury and ease . 't was not the ship argos's lying at anchor in port , that preferr'd it to the skies ; but it s daring the wind and sea , and resolutely exposing it self to all dangers and difficulties . never did any prince enlarge his territories by effeminacy , luxury and ease . labour , traffick and industry are necessary to all , but to none more than to a prince ; for others are born only for themselves , but a prince for all. a kingdom is not an office of repose and rest. certain courtiers once were discoursing before alphonso , king of arragon and naples , against the necessity of a prince taking pains ; do you think then , says he , that nature gave princes hands to do nothing . that wise prince had , doubtless , considered the admirable composure of them , their joins , their readiness to open , and their strength to hold , and also their mutual aptness to do whatever the mind proposes , being , as it were , the instruments of all arts : whence he concluded , that this exquisite structure was not accidental , or merely for no use , but for pains and toil , labour and industry . the prince whose hands are careless and unclinched , will soon drop his sceptre , and give his courtiers opportunity of catching at it . as it befell king iohn ii. who so wholly gave himself up to the diversions of poetry and musick , that he could not endure the weight of affairs , and either carelesly transacted them himself , or left 'em totally to the management of his ministers ; rather chusing this sottish ease , than the glorious labour of government ; not at all regarding the examples of his heroick predecessors . so we often find , that the vertue and ardent courage of ancestors is wholly extinguish'd in their posterity , by the luxury and voluptuousness of empire , and so the race of great princes becomes degenerate ; as we see in horses , when they are remov'd from a dry and lean pasture , into one too fat and fertile . this consideration mov'd frederick king of naples , upon his death-bed , to write to his son the duke of calabria , to inure his body to military exercise , and not suffer himself to be debauch'd by pleasures , nor vanquish'd by difficulties and dangers * . labour and employment is , as it were , the anchor of the mind : without which , it would be toss'd about with the waves of passion , and dash'd to pieces upon the rocks of vice. god enjoyn'd labour to man , as a punishment ; yet so , as it might be at the same time the means of his quiet and prosperity . those foundations and noble superstructures of the monarchies of the medes , assyrians , greeks and romans , were not founded by sloth and laziness , but by toil and labour . it was that which so long supported their grandeur ; 't is this which still preserves oeconomies in kingdoms : for since it partly depends upon the mutual assistance of peoples labours , when they flag , all those conveniencies at the same time cease ; which oblig'd men to society and order of government . divine wisdom proposes the example of the ant , to instruct men in their duty ; for that , with great care and prudence , lays up a store in the summer , to supply its necessity in winter . let princes learn from this little , prudent animal , timely to provide their cities , forts and garrisons with necessaries ; and to make preparations in the winter , to meet the enemy in the spring . nor is the commonwealth of bees less assiduous than these ; you shall never find them idle , but continually employ'd both within and without their little cells ; the diligence of each , causes the prosperity of all . and if the labour of these little animals can enrich the whole world with honey and wax ; what would a kingdom do , in which all the people should be equally industrious ? for this reason , in china , tho' it be so populous , that it reckons seventy millions of inhabitants ; they all live in the greatest affluence and plenty , there being none among them but exercises some trade . the scarcity of things in spain , proceeds from the want of this , not from the infertility of the soil ; for in the countries of muroia and carthagena , wheat returns a hundred corns for one , and might thereby sustain a war for many ages : but this misfortune arrives from the neglect of husbandry , trades , business , and commerce ; the people , even the meanest of them , being so excessive proud , that they can't be content with what lot nature has given them , but aspire to something greater , loathing those employments which are not agreeable to their affected grandeur . the reason of which , seems to be , that the bounds between the nobility and the commonalty are not so well distinguish'd with us , as in germany . but as noble and well-employ'd labour is advantageous , that which is nice and superfluous is prejudicial . for mens minds are not less effeminated by soft and easie employments , than by idleness . wherefore the prince ought to take particular care to employ his subjects in such arts as tend to the defence and preservation of the state , not to luxury and debauchery . how many hands are vainly wearied in adorning one finger , and how few in the necessities of the body ? how many are employed in making conveniencies for pleasure and recreation , and how few in making necessary works for the defence of cities ? how many in gardening , and forming curious figures in box or myrtle ; and how few in agriculture ? whence we see kingdoms abound so much in superfluous trifles , and want those things which are most necessary . since therefore labour is so conducive to the preservation of a state , the prince ought to take care that it be continual , and not be hindred by too great a number of holy-days , such as the people , through a kind of pious levity , dedicate to divine worship : for experience shews us , that such are more employ'd in profane games and sports , than religious exercise . but if labourers would spend those days , as we read st. isidore of madrid did , 't were to be hop'd that the time would not be lost , and that angels would descend and hold the plough : but experience has taught us the contrary . one holy-day in which all arts and trade ceases , is more considerable than any tax ; and , as st. chrysostom says , saints take no delight in being worshipp'd , at the expence of the poor . so that holy-days and working-days should be so divided , as that those might not hinder the other . and it was argued in the council of mentz , in the time of pope leo iii. whether 't was not better either to reduce them to a less number , or else to transferr some of them to the next sundays . though generally the end of all actions is rest , yet 't is otherwise in those which belong to government : for 't is not sufficient for princes and states to labour , but their labour must also be continual . one hour's negligence in a garrison , frustrates the care and vigilance of many months . the roman empire , which had been supported by the labour and valour of six ages , was ruin'd by the negligence of a few months . spain would scarce repair the loss in eight year , which it sustain'd in eight months . there should be no interposition of idleness between the acquisition and preservation of empires . the husbandman has no sooner got his harvest into the barn , but he immediately goes to plough again ; his labours never end , but continually renew . if he should rely upon his grainery , and leave his lands untill'd ; he would soon find one empty , and the other over-run with weeds and bryers . but there is this difference between the husbandman and the prince ; that he has his set-times of sowing and reaping , but the prince has not : for in government , all months are septembers to sow , and augusts to reap in . let not a prince believe that the pains and labours of his ancestors excuse him , for this motion must be continual : and as declining things surely fall , unless supported by some new force ; so do empires , unless sustain'd by the strength of the successor . this is the cause ( as we have observ'd ) of the ruines of all kingdoms . when any monarchy shall be once instituted and founded , it should ne'er be idle , but should imitate heaven , whose orbs continue their motion from their first creation ; and if they should once stop , the generation and production of all things would cease . the exercise of states should be always continual and vigorous , and not be corrupted by idleness or intermission ; as we see the sea , if not agitated by the winds , is kept in motion by its tides . citizens who carelesly give themselves up to pleasure and luxury , without ever moving their hands to work or labour , are their own greatest enemies . such idleness plots against the laws and government , and is nourish'd by vice , from whence proceeds all the internal and external misfortunes of states . that repose only is commendable and beneficial which is the gift of peace , and which is employ'd in trade , and employments and exercises military and civil , by which all enjoy a serene , peaceable and secure tranquility . emblem lxxii . the steel would lost its spring , and the string its force , if a bow were always bent . labour is necessary and beneficial , but cannot continue without some intermission . the yoke does not always hang upon the oxe's neck . the force and vigour of things consists in vicissitude . from motion comes rest , and from thence motion again . nothing , ( says the wise alphonso ) can continue long , which takes no respite . even land must be fallowed , that it may afterwards brings better crops . vertue is refresh'd and strengthned by rest , like the stream of a fountain ( the figure of the present emblem ) when stopp'd by the hand . a seasonable rest , refreshment gives ; and weary valour , after ease , revives . for this reason , day and night have divided the hours into labour and rest. while half the world wakes , th' other sleeps . and the ancients feign'd , that even iove himself sometimes eas'd himself , by laying the burthen of the world upon the shoulders of atlas . the most robust constitutions are not able continually to bear the fatigues of government . continual toil weakens the body , and besots the mind ; so does also too much ease . it should be therefore only as a watering to plants , which refreshes , not drowns them : or like sleep , which , if moderate , corroborates ; if excessive , rather enervates the body . there are no diversions better than those which at the same time recreate and instruct the mind , as does the conversation of ingenious and learned persons . such the emperor adrian always entertain'd at his table ; which , for that reason , philostratus call'd , a rendezvouz of the learned . the same , pliny commends in trajan ; and lampridius in alexander severus . alphonso , king of naples , always retir'd with them , after dinner , into another apartment , that he might ( as he us'd to say ) feed his mind , as he had done his body . tiberius never travell'd from rome without nerva and atticus , men of excellent learning , to direct him . francis , the first king of france , learn'd so much from his constant and continual conversation with such learned men , that though he had never apply'd himself to literature , he would discourse very pertinently upon any subject . but this commendable custom is out of date ; and instead of it , princes keep buffoons , jesters , and ridiculous fellows , for their entertainment at table . the errors and shame of nature are become now their diversions . they love to hear themselves prais'd , though undeservedly : and though reason and modesty would reject those praises , as coming from some fool ; yet self-conceit easily receives them ; and the ears being by degrees us'd to them , soon give way to flatterers and pick-thanks . their jests impose upon the will , being generally obscene , sometimes vicious . and if such buffoonry can divert the mind , how much more will the neat and witty discourses of the learned , who not being too grave and rigid ( as they are sometimes ) can be facetious and witty upon occasion ? if there be any diversion in looking upon some mishapen , ridiculous monster ; what satisfaction will it be , to hear of the prodigious works of nature , and to discourse of her wonders and secrets ? athenaeus mentions of anacharsus , that some of these buffoons being once brought to table , to promote mirth , he remain'd grave and serious , but laught heartily at the sight of an ape , saying , that th●● animal was naturally ridiculous , but man only by art , and base affectation this composure was great , and becoming the dignity of a prince . these fools are a kind of publick spies in courts , corruptors of manners , and very often plotters against the prince and state : for which reason , the emperors augustus , and alexander severus , would never entertain them . if they are good for any thing , 't is for the truth they tell the great ones by way of jest. some princes , through the glory and ambition of affairs , think themselves sufficiently eas'd , in resting from matters of importance , and employing themselves in those of less moment ; as the hair of a mad dog cures his bite . but because then all minds are not diverted by this means , and that there is no affair , though never so little , but requires attention enough to tire the mind ; 't is necessary to be sometimes wholly unemploy'd , and to quit , for a time , the trouble and toil of government . business ought to be so mix'd with diversion and pastime , as that the mind may neither be oppress'd by the first , nor enervated by the latter : it being like a mill , which having nothing to grind , wears out it self . pope innocent viii . sometimes laid by the helm of the church , and diverted himself in his garden , in planting trees . in these truces of repose , age , time , and the quality of the diversion , ought also to be consider'd : so that gaiety mayn't be offensive to reserv'dness , ingenuity to gravity , nor recreation to majesty . for some pastimes not only debase the mind , but also diminish the prince's authority . so artaxerxes was infamous for spinning ; viantes , a king of lydia , for fishing for frogs ; augustus , for playing at even or odd with the boys ; domitian , for killing flyes with a bodkin ; solyman , for making pins ; and selim , for embroidering with the women . while the prince is young , there are no diversions more proper than such as confirm the mind and body ; such as fencing , horse-races , tennis , and hunting ; and also those noble arts of musick and painting , which we elsewhere commended in a prince's education ; which are very requisite to refresh the spirits , when exhausted by assiduity of affairs , provided they be us'd with moderation : so as not to waste that time therein , which should be employ'd in matters of state. king ferdinand the catholick diverted himself so profitably , that even amidst his recreations he forgot not his affairs ; but while a hawking , he gave ear to the journals and dispatches which his secretary read to him , and at the same time observ'd the game . emanuel , king of portugal , never deny'd audience amidst his diversions . a prince should divert himself upon affairs , as the dolphin does upon the waves , though never so deep , not seeking the quiet retreat of some river . his repose should not be idleness , but refreshment . 't will be convenient sometimes to entertain the people with publick diversions , that they may breath a little , and return more vigorously to their work , upon which their thoughts are employ'd : for if they are always sad and melancholy , they turn them against the prince and magistracy ; whereas if they are allow'd some refreshment and recreation , they submit their necks to any burthen ; and losing their heat and restiness , live in obedience . for this reason , croesus told cyrus , that he must learn his lydians to sing , dance , and revel , if he would keep them in obedience . these diversions keep the people as firm in their obedience , as did that method of pharaoh , in employing the people of israel in making bricks . for the same reason , agricola granted the britains many of these diversions ; and they looked upon that as a favour , which was part of their slavery . this the embassadors of the tencteri knew , when being sent to cologn , they propos'd the ●estitution of their ancient native customs , and the abolition of those pleasures which the romans had introduced , by which they subdu'd more than by force of arms . states being more observant of this policy , than princes , permit every one to live according to his pleasure , conniving at vices , that the people may less apprehend the tyranny of the magistracy , and be more in love with that way of government , taking this licence for liberty ; they being ever more prone to a dissolute , than a regular way of living . but this policy is none of the safest : for when people have once laid aside respect for vertue and the laws , they begin to despise the authority of the magistracy ; nay , almost all mischiefs in states proceed from libertinism ; it being sufficient to keep the people in peace and tranquility , and to allow them some honest and agreeable recreations . to live conformable to government , is not slavery , but liberty . but since in all things the publick good ought to be the only aim , 't is conducive to convert all these diversions into such pastimes as exercise the strength , prohibiting all such as depend upon luck , as pernicious both to the government and subject : to these , because they give themselves so much to them , that they neglect their business ; to that , because by such games the people squander away their livelyhood , and so , through want , are necessitated to plunder and rebel . emblem lxxiii . the diseases of states are hidden : nor can any one judge of them by their present disposition ; for when they seem in full health and vigour , they are taken ill of a sudden , the distemper breaking out when least thought of ; like the vapours of the earth , which are not visible till gathered into clouds . wherefore a prince ought carefully to remedy the first symptoms ; nor are they to be slighted , as seeming frivolous and distant : as neither the first rumors of ills , though to appearance never so unreasonable . who can penetrate the unsetled designs of the frantick mobb ? upon the least occasion , the least shadow of slavery , or male-administration , it rises , and takes arms against the prince . seditions arise from small causes , and afterwards proceed to greater . if they are neglected at first , they will be at last incurable ; they spring like rivers from small fountains , and afterwards flow into large streams . their beginnings always create too much fear , or too much confidence . these considerations kept tiberius in suspence , when he had notice that a certain slave pretended to be agrippa , and began to raise commotions in the empire : for he was in doubt whether he should punish him out of hand , or let time discover the cheat ; sometimes considering that nothing should be slighted , then again , that he ought not to be frighted at every thing , being dubious between shame and fear , but at last he resolved upon a remedy . certain it is , that sometimes the torrent of the mutinous mobb is so rapid , that unless care be taken , it leaves its own channel dry , or falls into civil wars , the consequences of which are always terrible , but are , if taken in time , moderated by accidents and chance , and wholly quash'd by care and prudence . experience shews many ways to appease the commotions and seditions of kingdoms ; sometimes chance offers them , and sometimes the inclination of the seditious . as it happened to drusus , who seeing the legions repent of their having mutiny'd , because of an eclipse of the moon , which happened at that time , and which they took for an ill omen , made use of that inclination to appease 'em . the same also herman cortez did , upon another occasion . nor are these means to be slighted as frivolous ; for the mobb is often quieted with the same ease it is rais'd : neither of which motions are guided by reason . a blind hurry puts them in motion , and an empty shadow stops ' em . all the art lies in knowing how to humour their rage ; while that works , they are uncontrollable ; they always either fear , or are fear'd . if any one should endeavour , by a set , premeditated speech , to appease and quiet them , he would lose his time and pains . a sharp sentence , or severe check , has more force than all the rhetorick in the world. iulius caesar with one word quash'd a mutiny among the soldiers ; * — begone , ye roman drones , and leave our ensigns to be born by men. but the most effectual means to pacifie a sedition , is division ; by drawing the heads thereof into divers factions and parties . this way we use with bees , whene'er that wing'd people begin to mutiny , ( for even that republick has its intestine broils ) and leaving their waxen houses , begin to gather in the air , by throwing a little dust among them , they are soon separated : † throw but a little sand , they settle straight . whence the figure and motto of this present emblem is taken . but though this division be always good , 't is more prudence thereby to prevent ills e're they happen , than to remedy them afterwards . king ferdinand iv. understanding the commotions of some of the nobility of galicia , sent for them ; and giving them commissions , sent them to the wars . the romans us'd to send all turbulent and seditious men to their colonies or armies . publius aemilius transported the chief authors of seditions to italy ; as also charles v. did the nobles of saxony . rutilius and germanicus , instead of punishing some mutineers , made 'em freemen . drusus appeas'd the mutinous legions , by separating them from one another . loyalty , and military vertue , are maintain'd by division , because it hinders forces and vices from joyning . for this reason , the armies were separated , in the time of galba 't is for this reason , that many think it requisite to prohibit all cabals and meetings of the people : for the same cause , grand cairo was divided into several districts or parishes , by very high walls , that the people might not so easily associate . nor is it any thing else that has so long preserv'd venice in quiet , than that all its streets are divided by the sea. separation makes people dubious and unresolv'd , not knowing which part is safest ; but without that , they would all unanimously side with the strongest . this made pisander sow discord among the athenians , that he might divide and separate them . in military seditions , 't will be sometimes conducive to set them together by the ears : for one mutiny is generally remedied by another . the roman senate was advis'd , upon a certain popular insurrection , to appease the mobb by the mobb , weakning their force by division . and doubtless this is the meaning of that law of solon , which condemn'd a citizen , who , in a sedition , did not adhere to some one party . but this is rather to enflame , than quench and divide it ; since , at this rate , there would remain none who might be mediators to compose it . there is also another effectual remedy , which is the presence of the prince , bravely and resolutely confronting the fury of the people : for as the sea , which foams and dashes against rocks and hills , runs smooth upon the even sand ; so is the mobb hush'd and quieted by the serene presence of its prince . augustus , with his looks , frighted the actian legions into obedience . in the disorders of the german legions , when the soldiers look'd upon the multitude , they shouted ; but when again they cast their eyes upon caesar , they seemed to tremble . sedition is soon quash'd by authority and presence . as the blood hasts to the assistance of the part wounded , so ought the prince to assist with his presence at the disorders of his state. majesty easily reduces subjects to their obedience ; for in that nature has plac'd a certain occult force , which often produces wonderful effects . certain conspirators had enter'd the very palace of peter iv. king of arragon , with a design upon his life ; and he readily going to meet them , quite dash'd their resolutions . the rebellion in the belgick provinces had never gone so far , had philip ii. been himself upon the spot . but this remedy ought well to be weigh'd and consider'd of , whether or no absolute necessity requires it : for 't is the last ; and if that fails , there is no other . for this reason , tiberius sent drusus and germanicus to compose the mutinous legions in hungary . the prince's presence is also dangerous , if he be hated , or a tyrant ; for then the subjects are willing and eager to shake off the yoke of obedience . but if any kingdom be divided into factions , by the private grudges of families one to another , 't is prudence to prohibit their names from being mention'd . thus did king francis of navarr , forbidding any one , upon severe penalties , to be call'd agramont or biamont , which were two families in that kingdom at continual enmity . but if the peoples dissatisfaction and sedition proceed from the male-administration of some minister , there is no dust more effectual to appease them , than the punishment of that person . if they impute to the minister that which is really the prince's fault , and so rise against him , their errour must have its free course ; since neither force nor reason can stop it , without greater detriment to the publick . innocence , 't is true , will thereby suffer , but not through the prince's fault . in all such great accidents there is no remedy without injustice , which is compensated by the publick good . sedition is a poison which strikes at the heart ; and 't is therefore necessary sometimes to lop off a limb , to save the body ; and to give way to the torrent of fury , though disagreeable to reason and justice . thus did queen isabella , in a rising of the people of sevill : for when they insisted upon her turning andrew cabrera , governor of the palace , out of his office , and were running on to further demands , she cut 'em off short ; gentlemen , says she , what you demand , i had before resolv'd on ; go , remove not only the governor , but also all my other domesticks . by which answer , she seem'd to command that which she was forc'd to , and the mutineers took it as her favour and kindness ; and having satisfy'd their rage , by tumbling down those headlong , whom they found upon the towers , they were quiet ; and afterwards she , upon examining the accusations which they laid to the governor's charge , finding them unjust and groundless , restor'd him to his office. when the mutineers think that the punishment of the heads of the sedition will be sufficient , they spare none , hoping by that means to expiate their crime ; as the german legions did ; though patience and connivance did encrease their insolence ; and the more you grant them , the more they crave , as did the soldiers which flaccus sent to rome : yet this chiefly happens , when the person so granting is but of small authority among them , as was flaccus , whom the whole army despised . but in the fore-mention'd case of germanicus , the demands of the mutineers ought to be comply'd with , though violent and unreasonable , that their fury might have been qualified , or that he might have had some honourable pretence , to wave their punishment . he knew the injustice and inconvenience of a general punishment , and that it would of necessity involve the innocent : but though it could not wholly be avoided , it seemed not to be done by his command , but was rather to be imputed to chance , and the fury of the seditious . the fault of the minister ought to be excused , as a piece of policy , when by popular constraint he becomes head of the sedition ; that he may afterwards , when their fury begins to abate , with more ease reduce them to obedience . so spurinna gave way to the soldiers rage , and pretended to countenance them , that he might preserve his authority among them , when they began to repent . sometimes the people , upon pretence of preservation of their liberties and privileges , encroach upon the royal prerogative : a piece of arrogance that ought by no means to be connived at , lest they should thence become more saucy . in this case , the punishment of the delinquents should be speedy , and the heads of the promoters stuck up , as a terrour to the rest , when they least think on 't . for there is nothing quells their insolence more , than the punishment of their leaders ; it being an approved truth , that the body of the mobb dare attempt nothing without them . ramirus , king of arragon , being embroil'd in the insurrections of his people , ask'd advice of the abbot of tomer : who gave him no answer , but with his switch , imitating periander , lopt off the heads of the tallest flowers in his garden , ( where he was then walking ) and by that shew'd him what he was to do . upon which he beheading the chief authors of the rebellion , and restor'd peace to his kingdom . the same was the advice of don lopez barrientos , to king henry iv. yet will it be convenient to use this method with such moderation , as that the execution may fall but on few : but those who cannot be punish'd , must be conniv'd it , or so dealt with , as that their affections may be gain'd ; as we read otho did , when his army mutiny'd . severity with moderation , appeases all commotions : for when the bad begin to fear , the good will obey ; as vocula found , who , in a general mutiny of the legions , punish'd but one man . the method also of the punishment ought to be so mild , as not to give the people occasion to resent it as a national grievance , for that would make them more resolute . slavery , wounds , and all the miseries of war , were not so grievous to the germans , as that trophy which germanicus erected out of the spoils of the rebellious provinces . ferdinand duke d'alba did not forget this precept , when he erected a statue of the rebels heads : nor had he omitted it , though he had read or heard , that vitellius would not put to death iulius civilis , a man of great authority among the dutch , lest he should thereby alienate the minds of that warlike people ; for he thought a severe animadversion more proper : which nevertheless created no disturbance ; though there were not wanting those who urg'd it as an aggravation , to make that people revolt . there is another sort of disobedience , which proceeds from a too zealous and inconsiderate fidelity ; in which case the subjects are to be brought to their duty , by benign and mild means . such as iohn ii. king of arragon , us'd , in an insurrection at barcelona , upon the death of his son , prince charles : for he wrote to that city , that unless compell'd by necessity , he would never use violent methods ; but that if they would return to their obedience , he would use them as his own children . this mildness , and his promise of a general pardon , reduced them all to their devoir . a prince ought always to discover an inclination to clemency ; for without hopes of that , criminals grow desperate . for which reason , valentinus , after he had mov'd the people of treves to a rebellion , order'd the roman embassadors to be kill'd , that he might , by the peoples despair , strengthen his crime . sedition turns to obstinacy , where there is no hopes of pardon ; and the seditious had rather die rebels , than malefactors . upon this account , those who follow'd the faction of vitellius , were pardon'd . this generosity is particularly necessary in insurrections of the mobb . this king ferdinand the holy us'd in the commotions of castile ; and iohn i. in the convention of the states of guadalajara , pardoning all those who sided with the portuguese . but if a prince has lost his reputation , and is in contempt with his subjects ; then , i confess , clemency will be of small use : nay , those very remedies which should cure these wounds , do more exulcerate , and render them incurable . for his authority once lost , he can neither maintain the severity of punishment , nor terrifie the offenders by example : so that he must give way to his misfortunes , and as prudently as he can , circumvent them by policy and stratagem . thus vocula did , when he saw he was unable to punish the mutinous legions . for the same reasons , king iohn ii. releas'd those noblemen whom he had in prison . nor are those favours and benefits more effectual in appeasing seditions , which proceed from a prince who has lost his reputation : for the receiver either imputes them to cowardice , or persists in rebellion to preserve them ; and sometimes sets up another king , by whose protection he may enjoy them : as did those who conspired against king henry iv. for they would never be obliged by his favours , though never so great and numerous . when a prince resolves to quench the fire of sedition , 't will be conducive , that those resolutions should be thought to proceed from his own vertue , not from the persuasions of others ; for the people are generally more incens'd , when they find the prince does nothing but by the instigation of his ministers . but when a general pardon is once granted , the prince ought punctually to observe it , wholly forgetting all former offences and injuries ; for otherwise he would give occasion for fresh commotions : as ferdinand king of naples did , when he offer'd to punish some noblemen whom he had already pardon'd , and who had put themselves under the protection of king ferdinand the catholick . but if they are afterwards found delinquent , they should be punish'd with the utmost rigour of the law , to curb them , and prevent others from abusing the prince's authority . in these , and all other remedies , there is nothing more useful than expedition : for the people grow arrogant and saucy , when their insolence meets wi●h no check nor opposition . time confirms them in their revolt , and makes those who were dubious declare for them , and so endangers the most loyal . therefore artabanus endeavoured , with utmost speed and diligence , to compose the commotions of his kingdom . as seditions are suddenly raised , they ought suddenly to be remedied . there is more need of action than of consultation , before the venom takes root and spreads . when the people are once us'd to murther , rapine , and all other ills that sedition brings with it , 't is very difficult to recall and pacifie them . this king henry well knew , when , upon the death of his brother , king peter , he immediately seized upon the chief cities and garrisons of the kingdom ; and by this diligence , soon establish'd its tranquility . seditions therefore , and civil wars , being distempers which consume the life of the state , and enervate the prince , by the losses which he receives , and the gratuities which he is oblig'd to give , 't is the best way to compose them upon any terms . this mov'd king ferdinand the catholick to agree with alphonso king of portugal , in his pretensions to the crown of castile . for in such disorders , the weakest , and most oppress'd , are strongest . princes are at the discretion of those who have their arms in their hands , and the soldiers have more authority than their commanders . emblem lxxiv . animals naturally endeavour nothing but the preservation of their individuals ; and if at any time they injure one another , 't is generally from that reason , and a certain natural fierceness , which is not subject to the command of reason . on the contrary , man , animated with that celestial flame , which gives him the command of all things , easily persuades himself , that he is not born only to live , but also to enjoy all those things , even beyond the bounds which reason has prescribed him ; and his imagination being cheated by the false appearance of good , seeks this enjoyment in several objects , and therein places his felicity and satisfaction . some think it consists in riches , others in dainties and luxury , others in dominion , and every one in what the errors of his appetite or fancy suggest ; for the enjoyment of which , they apply those means which their rambling and unquiet minds prompt 'em to , though never so unjust . whence proceed murthers , rapine , and tyranny , which make man the most unjust of all animals : and since one cannot be secure from another , several kind of arms were invented , to repell villany , and preserve innocence and liberty , and so war was introduced into the world . this was the original of this monster , unless it came from hell , after the fall of the rebellious angels . war is so hateful to god , that he would not permit david , as just as he was , to build the temple , because he had shed much blood . all good princes dread it , as knowing the various events and success thereof . war disturbs the order and harmony of states ; changes religion , violates justice , silences the laws , destroys friendship and relation , makes arts forgot , agriculture cease , ruines trade , depopulates cities , and alters governments . king alphonso calls wars , the alienation from peace , the disturber of quiet , and the destruction of order . a civil war is like a burning fever , which soon scorches up the state : a foreign war cuts its veins , and dreins it of its riches , strength and vigour . war is a vice contrary to reason , nature , and the end of man ; for god created him after his own image , and gave him the command of all things here below , not to destroy them by war , but to preserve 'em by peace : he did not create him for war , but peace ; not for rage , but quiet ; not to ruine , but to preserve : for which reason he sent him into the world naked , without arms to offend others , or a thick hide to defend himself ; so indigent of the assistance and government of others , that even in his most flourishing estate he can't subsist without foreign aid . this necessity oblig'd him to society , and civil correspondence ; from which , by the joint-labour of all , he might be supply'd with necessary conveniencies for life , and that this politick felicity might unite all in the firmest bonds of mutual friendship ; and that one country , haughty with its own riches , might not disdain communication with the rest , he has shar'd his blessings among all ; wheat he has given to sicily , wine to crete , purple to tyre , silk to calabria , aromaticks to arabia , gold and silver to spain and the west-indies ; diamonds , pearls and spices , to the east-indies . the desire and want of the riches and rarities creating commerce , by which the whole world became as one common house , and that they might understand one another in this correspondence , and mutually express their affections of love and benevolence , he endued them with a voice articulate , smooth and pleasant , to explain their conceptions ; laughter , to shew their satisfaction ; tears , to shew their sorrow ; hands , to exert their faith and liberality ; knees , their submission and obedience : which are all tokens of a civil , benign , and pacifick animal . but those animals which nature designed for war , she created with arms offensive and defensive , for that purpose ; to the lion she has given claws , to the eagle talons , to the elephant a trunk , to the bull horns , to the bear fangs , to the porcupine sharp quills ; she has made adders and vipers formidable by their poison , for their defence consists in our danger , and their security in our fear . for which reason , she has cloathed almost all beasts with a thick skin , for their defence ; the crocadile with a breast-plate , serpents with a coat of mail , scorpions with scales : she has given all an aspect terrible , and a voice horrible and dreadful . let therefore savage war be for them , not for man , in whom reason is predominate over rage . nature has hid iron , steel , gold and silver , in the bowels of the earth , lest men should make ill use of them ; but revenge or injustice has found them even there , some for the instruments , and some for the price of murther . great abuse of mankind , to employ gold and silver to the destruction of life , which was given for its preservation ! but because many men ( as we have said ) more savage than the very beasts themselves , are more sway'd by lust and ambition , than reason , and so unjustly covet to oppress and govern others , war became necessary for natural defence ; for there being two methods of deciding matters , one by justice , the other by force , which is common to all animals , when the one can't be us'd , the other must , provided the cause and intention be just , and the authority of the prince be lawful ; in which also nothing should be resolv'd on , without due deliberation . so the athenians us'd to consult their orators and philosophers , about the legality of their wars ; for 't is in our power to begin , but not to end them ; he who undertakes them in haste , will repent at leisure . war ( says king alphonso ) ought to be well weigh'd e're 't is begun , that it may be agreeable to reason and iustice ; for from hence proceed three great advantages : the first , is , that god favours those who do so : the second , is , that they themselves are more encourag'd , upon confidence of their iustice : the third , is , that those who know it , if they are friends , join more chearfully ; if enemies , they have the less hopes of success * . war ought not to be undertaken for slight and frivolous matters , such as were those which mov'd xerxes to bring war upon the greeks , and the lumbards to make an irruption into italy . that prince is a tyrant , who wages war for another state ; but he just and commendable , who does it for the defence of his own , or the recovery of unjust usurpations ; in such case especially where justice cannot be obtained otherwise , or where it is more securely decided by the sword , than the book so subject to deceit and cavil . the success of war is a just judge , giving the right of victory to him to whom it belongs . king philip ii. was so desirous to clear his right to the crown of portugal , upon the death of king sebastian , that after having had the opinions of many divines and lawyers , and his army being then upon the frontiers , he stopp'd , to conferr with them further about it . a prince who desires gradually to raise his fortune , may do it by war , provided he has just occasion . but he who is already in quiet possession of a competent greatness , ought diligently to consider how he engages himself in war ; and to endeavour , as much as possible , to avoid it by honourable means , without loss of authority and reputation ; for if he loses them , the refusal will rather kindle it . the emperor rodolphus i. us'd to say , that 't was more commendable to govern a state well , than to enlarge it . 't is not less glorious for a prince to preserve peace with his sword , than to conquer in war. happy is that kingdom , in which the reputation of arms maintains plenty , and where lances support the vines and olive-trees ; where ceres is protected by bellona's head-piece . the greater the courage is , the more averse 't is to war , as knowing to what it must be obliged . many times , cowards advise and promote it , and the brave act it . if war is commenc'd for the sake of peace , what need of that , when we may enjoy this ? the choice of it ought not to proceed from the will , but from force or necessity . the ancients feign'd , that pallas was born out of the head of iupiter ; to intimate , that war ought to proceed from prudence , not from the perverseness of the mind . sebastian , king of portugal , who carried it into africk , more by the impulse of his courage than counsel , with his blood imprinted on those sands the truth of this precept . the bees don't chuse an armed king , that he mayn't be given to war , and neglect the government of his own state , for foreign conquests . if francis king of france , and gustavus king of sweden , had duly consider'd this , the first had not been taken at pavia , nor the last kill'd at lutzen . ambition of rule , is that which begins the ruine of many states . this hanibal knew at last , when he told scipio , that ' t would have been better , had the gods given men more modest thoughts , that the romans might be content with italy , and the carthaginians with africk . great princes ought to carry on war with their utmost power and vigour , that they may the sooner end it , as the romans did ; for the protraction of it is both chargeable and dangerous . the enemy is also thereby disciplin'd , and forewarn'd , and encouraged . power , without vigour , loses its esteem . for these reasons , two wars ought not to be commenc'd at the same time ; for the forces being divided , they can't be ended so soon , nor is any power sufficient to maintain 'em long , nor subjects capable to command them . the romans ever endeavoured , as do the turks at this day , not to be engaged in two wars at a time . upon this were grounded the threats of corbulo to the parthians ; telling them , that all the empire enjoy'd a firm peace , and that they had only that war . emblem lxxv . medea ( to facilitate the conquest of the golden fleece ) sowed serpents teeth in col●hos , whence immediately sprang troops of armed men , who falling together by the ears , destroyed one another . so some princes and states , the pernicious medea's of the world , sow discord among princes , and reap wars , and confusion , the fruit thereof , in their own states . they think to enjoy themselves that repose which they molest in others , and the event proves contrary . cosmographers say , about the aequilibrium of the world , that it is so equidistant from the center , that the least weight moves the earth . 't is the same in war ; there is none so distant , but it changes the center of rest of other kingdoms . war is a raging fire , which kindled in one place , runs on to others , and very often to its own home , according as the wind drives it . the prudent farmer dreads the storm he sees gathering upon the mountain's top , though at never so great a distance : much greater need has he to fear , who raises it , by supplying it with vapours . those who foment the dutch power and grandeur , may in time repent it , when subject to the yoke of their slavery ; as it befell those who favour'd the rise of the roman grandeur . the venetians , jealous of the portuguese , for that by their voyages they depriv'd 'em of the traffick of the persian sea , and the east-indies , sent an embassador against them to cairo , and engineers and carpenters to arm the king of cal●cut against them , persuading the dutch to oppose their passage by the cape of good hope . but they having comply'd with their desires , and establish'd their own factories and commerce , quite disappointed the republick , who had better have left the portuguese trade free , since so they might have made use of their ships to import the eastern commodities ; which when they had brought to their ports , the inhabitants might with more industry and profit disperse over europe . thus we see the means which humane prudence makes use of for its own safety , turn to the ruine of the author . the dukes of savoy and parma thought to maintain the war in the state of milan ; and the one utterly ruin'd his own , and the other made his the seat of war. ill advice impos'd upon the goodness of the french king , made him fearful of himself , diffident of his mother and brother , and of the whole kingdom , being persuaded , that without war he could not subsist , and that his preservation depended upon the ruine of the house of austria ; and for that end , he rais'd ( with the blood of the nobility of that kingdom , engag'd in civil broils ) clouds which created a general tempest against all christendom ; the rhine , moselle , danube , and elbe , being summoned to his assistance . he foments the clouds in england , holland and denmark . he breaks the ice of sweden , that he might pass the baltick sea by those northern streights , to the ruine of empire . he thaws the snows of the switzers and grisons , and scatters them through germany and italy . he turns the river po upon the state of milan , summoning the tyber and adriatick to his assistance . he raises the fogs of africk , persia , turkey , tartary and moscovia , that they might in clouds of arrows and lightning invade europe . he forces through the secret crannies of the earth , earthquakes which shook brazil and the east-indies . he sends through all parts furious hurricanes , which made one continual tempest ; and he disturbed the heavens with such diligence and art , that it darted fire , hail'd shot , and rain'd blood upon the earth . he reaches from pole to pole with the shot of his artillery , and with his dragoons , more swift ( by the negligence or malice of some ) than the imperial eagles . their neighings are heard in all parts , and mars triumphs in blood and dust . the author of so many wars , verifying what isaiah said of lucifer , that he disturbs the earth , ruines kingdoms , dispeoples the world , and destroys its cities . for when god makes use of one as a scourge to the rest , he gives him his power , by which he succeeds in whatever he undertakes , while his divine anger continues . he told moses , that he had made him god over pharaoh ; and so , as god , he wrought miracles , to punish him and his kingdom . but i am not so bold to say , that in pharaoh's person , and his kingdom , is represented that of france , and the punishment that divine sun of justice threatens it , and that we must hope for other miraculous actions for the preservation and grandeur of the house of austria , that his displeasure being appeased , will by little and little dispell the clouds which obscure its pinnacles , discovering thereupon the triumphant imperial eagle , which having sharpned its talons and its beak , and refresh'd its feathers in the waters of its trouble , shall join that divine lightning , which shall be light to it , and fire to france , causing to fall upon them the whole tempest which they had raised against other kingdoms . the spirit of so many tempests shall waste it self , their counsels being rash and violent . french shall war with french , friend with friend , brother with brother , city with city , and the kingdom with the kingdom , by which it shall become the bloody scene of that war which it has so industriously procured other nations . such counsels are like spiders webs , drawn from their own bowels ; their due punishment is , to fall into the same nets which they have spread for others . perillus invented a brazen bull for the exercise of his tyranny , and was himself the first that made it bellow . no possession is secure , which is founded upon the destruction of others . a certain french embassador advised the league of cambray against the republick of venice , insinuating , that she should sow dissentions among the princes , and build her own fortune upon their ruine : and several of them uniting , disarmed her , and took from her all the lands she possess'd upon the continent . it may be , that those times required such artifices ; or that the prudent noblemen , of which that illustrious senate always consists , knew those inconveniencies , but could not prevent 'em , either through the furious torrent of the multitude , or through fear of rendring themselves suspected by opposition . this is the misfortune of republicks , that malice , tyranny , fomenting hatred , and self-interest , without respect to justice , pass for zeal and love to their country , hindring persons of integrity from appearing . that the prudent endeavour to procure the peace of the state , while giddy fellows , who have no prospect of the time to come , molest it by their vain and dangerous enterprizes , and that in their resolves , their votes are counted not weighed ; and that communities are always fuller of raw , ignorant persons , than of those of prudence and experience ; thence happen grievous inconveniencies . and we see at present that republick governs with great applause by the best maxims , and that she always promotes the universal peace and good correspondence with her neighbouring princes , not being to be prevail'd upon by the continual importunities of france to join in the present war ; by which she has not only oblig'd the house of austria , but has been also freed from this general influence of mars , by which she has gained more than she could have done by the sword. the neighbourhood of greater power is not always dangerous ; it is sometimes like the sea , which ebbing , leaves whole provinces to the continent . there are not few princes and republicks which owe their preservation to this monarchy . 't would be a dangerous attempt for the lesser powers always to join in making war upon the greater , ( as we observ'd elsewhere . ) states gain more by their good correspondence with princes , than by force . they are cunning ladies , who easily captivate their heart and will , and guide their actions to their particular ends. let 'em not therefore be disturbed , if princes are sometimes angry with them ; for such anger is like the petty quarrels of lovers , which are the renewing of love : let them blame rather jealousies , and credulous suspicions , which make them doubt the fidelity of their best friends ; which is the vice of the multitude , who measure things not by reason , but by their vain suspicions . these arts of sowing discord , and procuring the rise of one by the fall of others , are most in use in courts and palaces : they proceed from ambition ; for rewards being already divided , and there being no means to introduce new forms , but by the corruption of others , they procure it by scandal and violence . sometime 't is the envy of one minister to another , for some excellent qualifications , endeavouring to prevent his continuance in a post where they may be conspicuous , or else to ruine the reputation he has already acquir'd , by false accusations : and when he can't obscure the truth , he sneers , joaks at , and ridicules it , under pretence of a kind of friendship ; that losing his credit in things of small concern , he may afterwards gain it in things of greater moment . such malicious , sly tricks , are ever perni●ious to their author , as tacitus remark'd in hispon , and in those who followed him . notwithstanding , lucinus proculus succeded well , by accusing others . this sometimes happens , when goodness and modesty are so reserv'd as to live privately , despising the honours and favour of princes , as it befalls those , who , through distrust of their own abilities , are thought unfit for the management of publick affairs ; such as these , assiduous malice , such as is intent upon gaining mens opinions , easily robs of the due rewards of their vertue , as tigillinus us'd to do but such artifices fall with the same speed they rise ; of which tigillinus is an example , who died infamously by his own hands . emblem lxxvi . the sun darts the rays of his light upon a concave-glass , and thence proceeds , in rays of fire , the figure of this present emblem ; intimating , that in the good or bad intention of the ministers consist peace or war. the reverberation of the orders they receive , is fatal . if the breast be of clear and plain crystal , the orders flow thence as pure , if not purer , than they entred ; but if it be steel , they will imbroil the whole world in wars . to this end , princes , desirous of peace , should beware of making use of warlike ministers ; for as they found all their fortune upon arms , they continually seek occasions to exercise them . france had never bewail'd the effects of so much discord , nor europe of so many wars , had not the preservation of that king's favour consisted therein . we find , in holy writ , that the priests carried the trumpets wherewith they declared war ; that the modesty and gravity of their sacred office would not use them without great occasion . the breasts of princes are seas , which swell with mountains of waves , when their ministers are blustering boreas's , but are calm and serene when they are gentle zephyrs ; for a generous and peaceful mind tempers the hot and dangerous orders , and turns them to good ; like the sun , whose rays , though they pass by angles , endeavour to free themselves from this imperfect form , and return spherical in their reverberation . and sometimes it suffices not that their intention is good , if they pass for warriors ; for either none believe that men of their courage would neglect an occasion , and fear arms against their bravery , or at least malice takes it as a pretence . the count of fuentes , foreseeing what would happen to the valtoline , from the revolt of the grisons , upon account of the league with the republick of venice , built a fort at the mouth of the river ada , for the security of the state of milan . the duke of feria , in the same country , summon'd the catholicks to defend themselves from the protestants . the duke d' ossuna endeavour'd , by a fleet which he had in the adriatick , to divert the arms of venice upon friuli . and to these three ministers are ascrib'd the wars which were afterwards occasion'd through the troubles of the duke of savoy . in those who assist at treaties of peace , the danger is yet greater , each acting according to his inclination and passion , and not according to the good intention of the prince . don lopez de haro being disgusted by king sancho the strong , reveng'd himself in the treaties of peace between that king , and peter iii. king of arragon , differently reporting the answers of both ; which incens'd them more than before . the greatest misfortune of princes , is , that they can't personally assist at all affairs , but are oblig'd to be guided by others reports , which are like streams which are always tinctur'd with the quality of the minerals through which they pass , proceeding always infected with the malice , passion or affection of the ministers , and answer their conveniencies and designs ; by these they strive to flatter the prince , preparing them so , that they may be grateful to his taste and inclination . ministers , and principally embassadors , eager to shew their abilities , and that they penetrate all things , report to the prince for certainty , not that which is , but that which they fansie may be ; they are too prone to suspicions , which they form from the least shadow , and then give credit to them , whence proceed great equivocations and errors , and is the chief cause of quarrels and wars among princes ; for no minister but has power to promote broils and discord . let princes therefore be cautious of giving credit to the first relations of their ministers , but compare them first with those they receive from others : and to form a more certain judgment of what is written to them , let them be perfectly acquainted with their humour and genius , and with their method of conceiving things , whether they act by private interest and passion ; for it happens sometimes , that the minister is taken with a love for the country or prince with whom he treats . and thinks all things right and just ; and sometimes suffers himself to be oblig'd by their favours and civilities , and being naturally grateful , is of their side , and acts their cause . sometimes is deluded by plain appearances , and by contrary reports , cunningly spread , and so easily deceives his prince ; for there is none more apt to deceive others , than one who has been impos'd upon before . many ministers are mov'd by slight reasons , or by some passion or private aversion which disturbs their judgments , and turn every thing to ill . there are some also naturally enclin'd to misconstrue all actions and designs ; whereas others are so frank and generous , that they think nothing ill design'd . both the one and the other are dangerous , and these last not less so than the others . sometimes the minister , thinking it part of his duty to discover to the prince his enemies , and that by that means he shall gain the character of a zealous and understanding person , becomes so nicely suspicious , that no one is safe from his tongue and pen ; and to make his surmises and apprehensions sure , gives occasion , by his distrust , to friends to become enemies , to the great detriment of the prince , to whom it were much better to have a good confidence in all , or for the minister to apply remedies to cure , not to infect the minds and wills of the subject . ministers also , weary of embassies , that they may retire to enjoy the conveniencies and ease of a domestick life , stick not to promote a rupture between the princes they assist , or at least to suggest counsels not less pernicious . princes are much deceived , who think their ministers act always as ministers , and not as men. if it were so , they would be much better served , and find less inconveniencies . but they are men , and their office does not strip 'em of their inclination to ease , and to the pleasures of love , anger , revenge , and other affections and passions , which zeal nor duty are not always capable to correct . but let princes be apprized , that those who can't seduce good and loyal ministers , ( for that they fathom their artifices and counsels , and know what is their prince's interest , what not ) they traduce them as distrustful , passionate , perverse and obstinate , and therefore endeavour to remove them from the management of affairs , and to introduce others less knowing , or to treat immediately with the prince himself , tendring him specious propositions , which oblige him to resolves more prejudicial . he must not give the least grounds to any one , to think that he can't change the course of affairs , or displace ministers ; for if such thoughts take place , the prince will be ill served : for such confidence causes disdain and disobedience in the accuser , and the fear of it discourages the minister . the errors of these are less dangerous than those to admit the accusations against them , especially if they are foreigners : and were they true , yet 't is more prudence to deferr the remedy , till he from whom they came can't ascribe it to himself . emblem lxxvii . the farther those two luminaries of day and night are distant from each other , the greater their influence and light is below : but when they are in conjunction , their being brethren ; does not prevent the one from obscuring the other's rays ; and such eclipse creates shadows and inconveniencies to the earth . princes , by the benefit of their ministers and letters , maintain and uphold mutual correspondence with each other : but if they should conferr personally with one another , their interview would create shadows of suspicion and jealousie , which would put all their states in confusion , for that they never find in one another what they promis'd to themselves , and that neither measures himself by his own rule , but pretends always to much more than his due . an interview of two princes , is almost like a duel , in which they fight with ceremonies , each endeavouring to conquer t'other . the families of each assist at the engagement , like two hostile troops , each being zealous for his prince's triumph over the other , in personal accomplishments or grandeur ; and as in such a number all can't be men of prudence , some light expression , or slight affront , causes dissatisfaction in the rest . so it happen'd in the interview between king henry , and lewis xi . of france ; in which the spaniards exceeding them in pomp and greatness , and scouting the meanness and slovenliness of the french , those two nations departed enemies , who had till then maintain'd a good correspondence together * . the hatred between germanicus and piso was private , till they saw one another . the interview between ferdinand iv. of castile , and dionysius , his father-in-law , king of portugal , caused great disorders ; as did that of king philip i. and king ferdinand . and though the meeting of iames i. and king alphonso , produced very good effects , yet is it the safest way for princes to manage their affairs by embassadors . sometimes favourites sow discord between the prince and those of the blood-royal , ( as we have before observ'd ) of which there are many examples in our histories . don lopez de haro procured a separation between king sancho the strong , and the queen his consort . the domesticks of queen catharine , mother to king iohn ii. incens'd her against the infant , don ferdinand . don alvarez de lara endeavoured ( thereby to keep the government in his own hands ) to persuade king henry i. that his sister , queen berenguela , design'd to poison him . those who were interested in the quarrels between the infant sancho , and king alphonso the wise , his father , took what care they cou'd , to prevent their meeting and agreement . the grandees of castile hindred the reconcilement of king iohn ii. to his son henry . don alvarez de luna , that of king iohn of navarre , to his son prince carlos of viana . the favourites of king philip i. dissuaded him from an interview with king ferdinand . such artifices we have seen us'd in france , in these times , to the detriment of that kingdom , and of all christendom . the only remedy is , to despise the difficulties and inconveniencies which these favourites represent , and to come to an interview , when the secret operation of the blood has appeas'd their minds , and discover'd the malice of those who procur'd the misunderstanding . upon these reasons , king ferdinand gave a meeting at segovia , to king henry iv. his brother-in-law , not fearing the danger of exposing himself to the resentment of an offended king , who , either through natural affection , or to disguise his infamy , procur'd his daughter ioanna 's succession to the crown * . for though he was sufficiently pre-advis'd by his ministers of the danger of the thing ; yet in the scales of prudence , this consideration out-weigh'd , that no force nor treaty was so effectual as presence . emblem lxxviii . what we see of the mermaid , is beautiful ; what we hear , melodious ; that which the intention conceals , pernicious ; and that which is hidden under water , monstrous . who could imagine so great an inequality in so fair an appearance ? such beauty as to charm the mind , and such harmony as to intice ships upon rocks ? antiquity admir'd this monster as an extraordinary prodigy : yet is nothing more frequent ; courts and palaces are full of them . how often is a fair , smooth tongue , the snare to entrap a friend ? how often does a friendly , smiling look , conceal a heart full of rancour and malice ? how often are tears forc'd from a spring of joy ! those who shew'd most sorrow for the death of germanicus , were those who rejoyc'd most . when the head of pompey was brought to caesar , he , by his tears , dissembled the satisfaction of the sight : caesar , at first , his gift would not refuse , nor turn his eyes away , but fix'dly views till he perceiv'd 't was true , and plainly saw 't was safe to be a pious father-in-law ; then shed forc'd tears , and from a joyful breast drew sighs and groans , as thinking tears would best conceal his inward ioy — * we see much of the syren in the pretexts of some princes : how full of religion and concern for the publick good ? how obliging , kind , and promising ? and what cheats do they impose upon each other , under these feints and appearances ? they have the face of angels , but end in serpents ; and embrace , only to sting and poison : the wounds of a well-meaning sincerity are more wholsom than the kisses of such lips . the words of those are smooth and balmy , but of these sharp-pointed arrows . how often has treason took rise from honours ? tiberius , designing the death of germanicus , as jealous of the glory of his victories , and to extinguish thereby the race of augustus , call'd him to triumph , and made him his companion in the empire . by such arts he strives to disguise his mind : he burns with envy of germanicus ; and makes his glory blaze more , only the sooner to extinguish it : what appears is honour and affection , what is conceal'd is hatred and malice the more frank and sincere a man appears , the more fraud and design he harbours . we are not so apt to be deceiv'd by muddy as by clear fountains , which hide their poison , and invite by their clearness . for this reason , prudence should be upon her guard , to penetrate these arts of princes , suspecting them most when they seem most fair and obliging , and acting against their custom and nature ; as agrippina did , changing her morose temper into good humour and dalliance , to take nero off from the love of his slave : which alteration was suspected by nero and his friends , who advis'd him to beware of her subtilties . we should be more cautious against what princes conceal , than against what they shew ; more against what they are silent of , than what they declare . the elector of treves delivers up that city to the french king , to put therein a garrison , though he knew 't was imperial , and under the hereditary protection of the king of france , as duke of luxemburgh , and lord of the lower burgundy , and that thereby he not only ran counter to that protection , but also to the constitutions of the empire ; for which reason , the troops of spain surprize this city from the french , and accidentally detain the person of the elector , and treat him with all respect due to his dignity : and the king of france having eighteen days before concluded a league with the hollanders against the netherlands , makes use of this pretext , though happening afterwards , and enters with his forces in their behalf , under pretence of setting at liberty his friend and allie . he who seeks occasions , easily finds or makes ' em . malice is like light , which enters at the least chink ; and such is our inclination to liberty , and so blind our ambition , that there is no pretence which respects either of them , but we immediately embrace it , suffering our selves to be deceived by it , though never so unlikely or unreasonable . italy does not yet apprehend the designs of france , to lord it over her , under pretence of protection , though she has seen the publick faith so often violated , as in the treaties of ratisbon , carasco , and mon●on ; the usurpation of montferrat , the valtoline , and pignerol , and a garrison put into monaco . by such pretexts princes mask their ambition , their avarice and designs , to the expence of the lives and fortunes of their subjects . hence proceed all the commotions and wars that the world labours under . as interests alter , so also do these pretexts ; for they give umbrage to them , and follow them . the republick of venice enter into league with the grisons ; the french oppose it , lest it should diminish their alliance with them . whereupon the people are divided into factions , to the prejudice of the catholicks , whom the protestants endeavour to extirpate . the switzers hereupon summon a diet , and can find no better remedy , than to invite the spaniards into the valley ; an expedient before thought on by pope clement viii . in the instructions given to the bishop of veglia , when sent to the catholick cantons in quality of nuncio . which method was also approv'd of by gouffier , who managed the affairs of france , and who persuaded count alphonso casati , embassador from spain to the switzers , to write to the duke of feria , to enter the valtoline with his majesty's forces ; that thereby shutting up the passage of valcamonica from the venetians , they might desist from their pretensions , and that the valley might be clear'd of the protestants . the duke , moved by these instances , and by the common danger of this sect , which threatned the state of milan , and all italy , and also by the complaints and tears of the catholicks , enter'd the valtoline ; and immediately the french , upon new considerations , change their minds , and oppose this intent , entring into league in avignon with venice and savoy , under pretence of the liberty of italy , though that consists more in the stopping that passage from the protestants on t'other side the mountains , than in any acquisitions the spaniards could make in this country ; and the valtoline being only the pretence of the league , the arms of the allies serv'd only as a diversion , and all the force and design were turn'd to the oppression of the republick of genoa . so that pretences vary according to the alteration of interests . times by their effects discover the falsity of these pretences ; for either they don't perform what they promise , or don 't act where they propos'd . the republick of venice had a mind to seize gradisca , and took for a pretext the incursions of the vscoques in croatia : they made a feint to defend the liberty of the sea , and made war upon the land. many times they make war , upon pretence of zeal for the glory of god , and rather hinder it ; sometimes for religion , and confound it ; sometimes for publick peace , and disturb it ; sometimes for the peoples liberty , and oppress 'em ; sometimes for protection , and enslave them ; sometimes to preserve their own state , and they invade others . o men , o people , o states , o kingdoms ! whose tranquility and happiness depends upon the ambition and capriche of a few . when the ends of actions are just , but are in danger of not being so interpreted , or of miscarrying if they are understood , we may so dispose them , that our actions may appear different to the eyes of the world , and be thought to be guided by other honest causes . he who acts so , cheats none , but acts justifiably , but only amuses malice by false appearances , by which it deceives it self , and prevents its opposition to the just designs of the prince ; for no reason obliges him to point at the mark at which he levels ; for it would be impossible for him to strike one , if at the same time he did not seem to aim at another . there is not less danger to states , in the feign'd zeal with which some would seem to respect the publick , and regard only their own particular interest . they pretend to reform the government , to weaken its authority : they propose means , and suggest counsels after the effect , to discover errors already past remedy : they affect liberty , to gain the applause of the people against the magistracy , and confound the state , by reducing it afterwards to slavery . these artifices are us'd by all tyrants of republicks . what feints did tiberius make of restoring liberty to that of rome , when his whole design was to oppress it . the same methods the prince of o — us'd to make the netherlands revolt , which his family have made use of since to lord it over the vnited provinces . time will shew them , to their cost , the difference between a natural prince and a tyrant ; then they will repent of having preferr'd rebellion with their ruine , to obedience with security , as cerialis advis'd those of treves . the people blindly fly to the call of liberty , and don't know it till they have lost it , and find themselves intangled in the nets of slavery . they suffer themselves to be moved by the fears of these false crocodiles , and rashly intrust them with their lives and fortunes . how peaceable would the world be , if subjects knew , that whether the government be of all , of many , or of one , it would have its inconveniencies , with some kind of tyranny : for though speculation may invent a perfect form of government , as it must be of men , not of angels , it may be commended , but not practised . so that liberty consists not in this or that form of government , but in the preservation of that which a long use and experience has constituted and approved , in which justice is defended , and publick peace preserv'd , supposing that some sort of government must be obey'd ; for liberty never suffers more than in such changes . we think to find a better , and we fall into a worse ; as it happen'd to those who survived tiberius and caius ; and when we better our selves , it does not countervail the damage we sustain in the change of one form to another . so that 't is better to bear with the present , though unjust ; and hope , that if the prince be bad , god will be pleas'd to send another good one . 't is he bestows kingdoms ; and 't would be accusing his divine decrees , not to obey those whom he has constituted . nebuchadnezzar was a wicked prince , yet god threatned a severe punishment to those who did not obey him . as we are contented with the seasons , and bear patiently the inconveniencies of nature ; so also we should the defects of our princes . while there are men , there will be vices . where is there to be found a prince without them ? these evils are not continual . if one prince be bad , another good one succeeds , and so one makes amends for the other . emblem lxxix . no bird so much resembles man in the articulation of the voice , as the parrot * . it s vivacity is so great , that some philosophers have doubted whether it did not participate of reason . cardan says , that it surpasses all birds in ingenuity , and quickness of apprehension ; and that it not only learns to speak , but also to meditate with a desire of glory . this bird is very candid and ingenuous , the quality of great spirits : yet is not its candour exposed to deceit , but she knows how to prevent it ; and as sly and crafty as the serpent is , it evades his artifices , and to secure its nest from him , it hangs it at the end of the highest and slenderest twig of a tree , in the manner here represented , that when he would pass by them to devour its young ones , he falls by his own weight . so artifice must be frustrated by artifice , and counsel by counsel . in which case , king ferdinand the catholick was an exellent master for princes , as he sufficiently shewed in all his designs , particularly in his marriage with germana de foix , niece to lewis xii . of france , to break the peace clapt up at hagenaw , between the emperor , and his son-in-law , king philip i. without his knowledge , and to his prejudice . nor did he use with less address the opportunity offer'd by the same king of france 's desiring a league with him , to get liberty to invade the kingdom of naples , contriving the matter so that he might recover the governments of rousillon and sardinia : and when he saw the french king had already made an inroad into italy with that intent , and withal how dangerous a neighbour he would prove to the kingdom of sicily , which his eye was upon , he put a stop to his progress , broke the treaty , and denounc'd war against him , entring into an alliance with the republick of venice , and other princes . and these weapons are more necessary in war than peace ; for their wit does more than strength . and certainly that commander deserves no small praise , who despising the vain-glory of conquering his enemy with the sword , steals the victory , and triumphs by policy and stratagem , whereby the law of nations is not the least violated . for if the war be just , the methods thereof are so also : 'twixt force and fraud , what difference in war ? and indeed , what reason can be given , why you may not deceive him , whom it is lawful even to kill ? it is a piece of magnanimity to preferr the publick safety before a triumph , and make sure of victory without exposing it to the manifest fortune of war , when there 's none , in humane judgment , can appear so certain , but it is subject to a thousand chances . in countermining the cunning designs and intrigues of an enemy , we must not always regard what a prudent man would do in the like case , ( though to have also some fore-thought of that were adviseable ) but a judgment must be formed from the condition and capacity of the person to be dealt with ; for all men take not always the most proper and prudent methods . ferdinand duke of alba 's entring portugal with an army , upon king sebastian 's death , was amazing ; by several blamed as a very dangerous enterprise , in a person so eminently versed in the art of war. to whom he reply'd , that he was not ignorant of the danger ; but he trusted in having to do with a nation , which by a continued enjoyment of peace , had probably forgot the affairs of war. even when we have to do with men eminent for prudence , the judgment and conjecture we pass upon their actions , even by the rule of reason and prudence , is not infallibly certain ; for sometimes they suffer themselves to be carry'd away by passion , and the wisest men are now and then guilty of the greatest errors , self-conceit rendring them negligent , or too much confidence in their discretion , making them presume , that though they have a little lost their way , they can easily find it again . sometimes in things they presuppose , time and other events deceive them . wherefore it is the safest way , ever to suspend one's judgment in things that depend upon another's pleasure , and not to go about to regulate them by our own private discretion ; for every one has his particular reasons unknown to others , and consonant to his nature , which are the spring of his actions . what to one seems impossible , another thinks easie : and there be some genius's that fear not the most hazardous enterprises ; some that are guided by reason , others that are utterly averse to it . the most secret artifices of enemies , or those who under colour of friendship , aim wholly at their own interest , are such particularly whereby they make their proposals with so much subtilty , that they seem to redound to the prince's advantage , when they really tend to his ruine ; a thing his integrity is easily deluded in , if he want experience , or smell not their drift . it requires therefore no small prudence and attention to turn such counsels to the destruction of the authors thereof . into what precipes will that government fall , which is directed by foreign councils , contrary to the advice of the holy ghost . but although an enemy's designs are usually discoverable by bare reasoning , yet is it convenient to trace them also by spies , the principal instruments of government , without which a crown can never be secure , or admit of encrease , nor a war be carry'd on with success . vitellius was condemned for being improvident in council , in warfare ignorant , how to draw up an army , what belong'd to scouts , when to prosecute , when protract a war. and indeed , of what ill consequence this negligence is , germany can abundantly testifie , which has lost several advantageous opportunities , and its soldiers been oftentimes surprized and cut off in their quarters , for want of intelligence of the enemies designs and marches . ioshua made use of spies , though god himself took care of his arms . moses never march'd , but an angel carry'd a pillar of fire before him , to shew where to encamp ; yet by god's command , he sent out men to search the promis'd land . embassadors are nothing but publick spies ; and without prejudice to the law of god , or that of nations , may endeavour , by bribes and presents , to corrupt the fidelity of ministers , who even by oaths are oblig'd to it , and to sift out what ill contrivances are in agitation against their prince ; for these are no way obliged to keep the secret , and the other have on their side the natural reason of self-preservation . emblem lxxx . the stone-cutter at home first prepares and polishes the marbles he designs for the ornanament of a building ; because afterwards it would be more troublesome , and the work imperfect . for this reason , i conceive , those of solomon's temple were fashion'd , that it might be erected without noise , and the sound of tools . thus wise princes ought to polish their designs , and bring their resolutions to maturity , before they put them in execution ; for not to consider of them but in the field , is more like a gladiator than a prince . the bull ( the figure of this emblem ) before he engages his rival , practises by making trial of himself , and by often running his horns against a tree , by degrees learns the art of defending himself , and goring his opposer . he who is to consult in heat of action , fears all things , and knows not what measures to take . but because occasions happen not always as we wish , and sometimes it is not in our power to retard or hasten them , it will be the part of prudence to consider whether it is better to execute our resolutions with leisure or expedition , for that some affairs require speed in their resolutions , others time , and mature consultation ; and to offend on either hand , will be to the prejudice of the government . consideration , when of worse consequence than rashness , is by all means to be avoided . in sudden emergencies , counsels are better snatch'd than taken . whatever time is spent in deliberation , will either overcome the danger , or lose the opportunity . fortune's nimble , but the generality of men move but slowly , and that 's the reason so few overtake her . the greatest part of our deliberations are upon things already past , and the counsel comes after the event . our affairs run with so much swiftness , that counsel must be speedy to pursue them ; nay , even that will be too slow , it ought to be in a readiness to expect them . when time favours , it is assisted by delay ; otherwise expedition surmounts it , and then counsellors of lively , active spirits , are chiefly necessary . other affairs , which allow time , should be transacted with maturity ; for nothing is more opposite to prudence , than haste and passion . impetuousness ever miscarries , and examination and attention are confounded by it . hence it is that hot , rash counsels almost always please at first sight ; are difficult in the execution ; in the event grievous ; and the persons who suggest them , though they may appear at first daring , yet when they come to execute , are at a stand , being embroiled by their own counsels : for haste is blind , and without forecast . wicked counsels require precipitation , but good usually get strength by delay . and although the common people love to see effects before they do causes , and so always condemn slow counsels ; yet the prince ought to be proof against these murmurings , which , upon success , will afterwards redound to his glory . nevertheless , delay must not be so great , as to let slip the opportunity of execution ; a fault the emperor valens was guilty of , who idly spent the time of action in consultation . this is a general error in imprudent counsellors , who , perplex'd with the weight of affairs , can neither judge of the danger , nor come to any conclusion ; whence they start at the least shadow , nay , and think by these very doubts to pass for discreet . they suspend their counsels , till time it self furnish them ; and then begin to resolve , when the opportunity is gone . counsels therefore should be ripened , not hurried ; for maturity errs neither in excess nor defect of time : as it is admirably express'd by augustus , in his device of a dolphin twin'd round an anchor , with this inscription , festina lente ; with which that of alexander the great is not incompatible , nihil cunctando : the one being understood of affairs of peace , the other concerning those of war , where expedition gives success to the greatest designs . cerealis succeeded well in all things , by resolving and executing with expedition . but notwithstanding speed does generally produce great effects in war ; yet care should be taken , that it be not blind and inconsiderate , beginning briskly , but in the end languisheth . when the thing it self admits of delay , and there is room for deliberation , this is of more service than rashness : though both in the one and the other prudence should measure time , either lest through want of it the counsels be like whelps , born blind , or as hedghogs with prickles and difficulties , by being too slow . when therefore orders come first out of the prince's hand , let them be absolute , to prevent confusion or doubt in their execution . for the most prudent ministers can never perform as they ought , such as come to them rough and deformed : it is for him that commands to prescribe the form , for the subject to execute it . and if each do not keep to their distinct duties , the work will remain defective . the prince should do the part of a master-workman , the minister that of an inferior labourer . that prince who leaves all to the disposal of his ministers , either is ignorant or weary of his office. 't is an ill-constituted government , where ●ower is lodg'd in many ; nay , it is indeed no government , which is not under one head. if ministers rule , all authority and the order of government will perish . then only they may and ought to suspend the execution of orders , when the same appear evidently unjust , inasmuch as they are born for god , before their prince . as also when the prince's commands are prejudicial to his patrimony or reputation , or inconsistent with good government , and depend upon the knowledge of some particular matters of fact , or lastly , when distance or other accidents shall seem to have made such an alteration in the state of affairs , that it may be probably gather'd , that had the prince known these before , he would not have given those orders ; in this case , provided however there be no other considerable danger in delaying , they may be deferred and excepted against , modestly however , and with all the respect due to his authority and judgment , with this hope at least , that upon better information , he may command what is more proper to be done . thus the great captain did , when , contrary to the orders of ferdinand the catholick , he stay'd at naples with his army , considering with what impatience the italian princes expected the result of the interview between the two kings , ferdinand , and his son-in-law , philip i. and what a desperate condition the affairs of naples would be in , if he abandon'd them at that juncture . for all this , if the minister know his prince to be so great a lover of his own counsels , as rather to do amiss , than admit of instruction , he may hold his tongue , and dissemble ; for it were downright folly for him to expose himself to danger , without hopes of a remedy . corbulo was already engaged in some considerable enterprize ; but the emperor having commanded him to desist , he retir'd : for tho' he knew those orders were unadvisedly given , yet he would not ruine himself by disobeying them . no orders require so punctual observance in the minister , as those which relate to matters of state. in this case ( unless the above-mention'd circumstances occurr , or there be otherwise any considerable evident danger in the execution ) he is implicitly to obey , without giving any heed to his private opinion and arg●ments . for the designs of princes are often too deeply rooted , to be penetrated by the minister , or rather they would not have him dive into them ; and therefore he should side with the prince's commands , and presume upon his prudence that so it ought to be . hence dolabella , when commanded by tiberius to bring the ninth legion out of germany , readily obeyed , although he wanted not reasons to the contrary . if every one had liberty to canvas and examine what is enjoined , all things would be confounded , and infinite opportunities lost . a kingdom ( as has been said elsewhere ) is like a musical instrument , whose strings the prince tunes , who runs them all over with his fingers ; whereas the minister touches only one , and not hearing the rest sound , cannot know whether it be too high or too low , and would very easily be mistaken , if he went to set it according to his own fancy . the count de fuentes , by the liberty of his years , zeal , services and experiences , crowned with so many signal trophies and victories gave him , sometimes ( while he governed the state of milan ) suspended his obedience to king philip the third's orders , because he ●udged them improper , and to proceed rather from the self-interest or ignorance of his ministers , than his own mind : which example many afterwards have followed , to the great prejudice of the publick repose , and regal authority . it would be of very ill consequence , for ministers to be always allow'd to question , whether what is commanded , be the prince's will or not ; an abuse which usually has its first rise from their knowing it not to be his own hand that proportions and polishes the stones designed for the edifice of government . but suppose it be another's , yet due honour and submission ought to be paid to the commands , no less than if they came from his own will and judgment , or else there would be nothing but confusion and disorder . zealous and prudent obedience reverences the bare hand and seal of its sovereign . but if princes are too remote , and there is danger of their orders coming too late , even after the event , or that variety of accidents ( particularly in affairs of war ) may not allow time for deliberation , and there be certain intelligence that the opportunity will be in the mean time lost , it will be prudence to give full power of acting as occasion shall require , lest that happen which befell vespasian , in the civil war with vitellius , when distance of place made the counsels come after the events . to avoid which inconveniency , tiberius , upon sending drusus to command the german legions , joined with him some prudent and experienc'd counsellors , whom he might consult as occasion required , but a full power to act as he saw opportunity . when helvidius priscus was sent into armenia , he had a commission to act as he saw occasion . in●fine , this was the usual practice of the roman senate , to leave all to the discretion and conduct of their commanders , and to recommend nothing in particular to them , but only all possible care that the commonwealth suffer'd no damage . an example the republicks of venice and florence are far from imitating ; who , unwilling to let their liberty lie at the mercy of one man , restrain the power of their generals ; being forewarned by the example of augustus , who turned the arms upon the commonwealth , which he had taken up in its defence against mark anthony . this freedom of power the ministers who are near the king's person are wont to limit , to encrease their own , and render it necessary for all to pass through their hands . whence it is that so much time is spent in deliberating , and that resolutions are taken too late to be executed , or at least to have the success that might be expected from them ; and consequently the charges and pains in preventing is utterly thrown away . it happens also sometimes , that while there passes so great a space of time between the accidents themselves , and their being known and examined , fresh advice is brought of the state of affairs , with new circumstances , which make it necessary to alter the former orders ; and after this manner days and years slide away , without any effect either of resolution or action . emblem lxxxi . the forces of all powers are limited , those of ambition alone ( the common vice of humane nature ) infinite . this , the more it has , the more it desires to have , or rather is a kind of fiery appetite by the heart exhaled , which draws strength and encrease from the very matter it is apply'd to . this failing is greater in princes than in other men ; for to the desire of getting is joined that glory of commanding , both which neither submit to reason nor danger , and hate to measure themselves by their abilities . wherefore the prince ought to weigh well what his sword is able to strike , what his shield to defend , always remembring this , that his crown is a finite and limited circle . king ferdinand the catholick , in all his undertakings , never failed to consider every circumstance of them , their cause , disposition , time , means , and end. he who attempts nothing but what he can effect , will pass for invincible ; whereas one that aspires to a thing impossible , or too difficult , discovers the bounds of his power , and the frustrated designs are , as 't were , publick records of his weakness . there is no monarchy so potent , but it is upheld more by opinion than reality , by reputation than strength . desire of glory and sovereignty hurry us on , so that all things seem easie , but in the end we meet with difficulties unobserved before . almost all wars might be avoided , were their means and end throughly examined at first : it is therefore incumbent on the prince , before he engage in them , perfectly to know his forces , as well offensive as defensive , the state of his malitia , and what officers he has to command them , the substance of his coffers , what contributions he may expect from his subjects , and whether they be like to continue loyal in adversity , also by study , reading and conversation , to instruct himself in the disposition and situation of countries , in the customs of nations , the natures of his enemies , their wealth , auxiliaries and allies . let him measure every one's sword , and examine wherein his strength consists . henry , king of castile , notwithstanding his sickness , never neglected this , but sent several embassadors as far as asia , to inform him of the manners and customs of those parts . the same did moses , before the israelites entred the promised land . and lest the prince we frame by these emblems should want this matter also , i shall here , in general , touch upon some points of it , with what brevity the present design requires . nature , willing to shew her beauty and power , by the variety of her productions , has stampt a difference not only upon the faces , but also on the minds of men ; there being a vast disagreement between the tempers and morals of nations . to this end , she has variously disposed the causes themselves ; which either jointly all operate in some places , or separately ; in these some , in those others . geographers have divided the globe of the earth into divers climates , each of which is subject to a particular planet , as to the principal cause and fountain of that diversity : and because the first climate , which is drawn through meroe , an island of the river nile , is subject to saturn , they say its inhabitants are black , barbarous , rough , suspicious , treacherous , and cannibals . that those of the second , which is attributed to iupiter , and passes through siene , a city of egypt , are religious , grave , honest and prudent . those of the third , which is subject to mars , and reaches through alexandria , are restless and warlike . those of the fourth , which is under the sun , and is stretch'd through the isle of rhodes and the midst of greece , are men of learning , orators , poets , and ingenious artists . those of the fifth , which passes through rome , dividing italy from savoy , and is ascribed to venus , are effeminate , lovers of musick and luxury . those of the sixth , govern'd by mercury , and passing through france , are fickle , inconstant , and addicted to sciences . lastly , those of the seventh , where the moon presides , and which is extended through germany , the low-countries , and england , are flegmatick , lovers of good-fellowship , fishing , and trading . nevertheless , this one cause seems not to be always uniform , nor sufficient : for under the same parallel or climate , with the same elevation of the pole , and an equal rising and setting of the stars , we see opposite effects , particularly in the climates of the lower hemisphere . in aethiopia , for instance , the sun's beams scorch and blacken mens bodies ; but in brasil , which has the same latitude , their skins are white , and the air temperate and agreeable . the ancients held the torrid zone , for its excessive heat , to be uninhabitable , yet in armenia it is very temperate , and well peopled . and though those eternal luminaries of heaven have some energy , yet the disposition of the earth contributes more ; for we find the effects of their rays to be greater or varied , according to the various situation of hills and valleys , and temper'd even by rivers and lakes . this is undeniable , that nature is wonderful in her works , and that she sometimes seems to swerve from the ordinary laws of causes , and from reason , as it were on purpose to baffle humane curiosity . who can account for what we see happen in the country of malabar , where calecut is ? vast high mountains , which touch the very clouds , and end in a promontory call'd anciently corus , now cape comorin , divide this country into two parts , and altho' both have the same elevation of the pole , yet when on this side the mountains winter begins , and neptune's billows rage and swell , on the other side the fields and towns are burnt up with the scorching heats of summer , and the waters continually calm . this diversity then which is in climates , in the situation of places , the temperature of the air , and food , variously distinguishes mens complexions , and these again their very natures . for the manners of the mind follow the temperament and disposition of the body . the northerns , by reason of the sun's remoteness , and the coldness of their countries , are sanguine , robust , and valiant ; whence they have almost ever had dominion over the southern nations ; the assyrians over the chaldaeans , the medes over the assyrians , the parthians over the greeks , the turks over the arabians , the goths over the germans , the romans over the africans , over the french the english , and over these the scotch . they love liberty , as those also do who inhabit mountains , as the switzers , grisons , and biscayners , their temperament being not much unlike the constitution of the northerns . in nations very near the sun , excess of heat quite dries up the blood ; which makes the inhabitants melancholy , and profound in the penetration of nature's secrets ; whence all other northerly nations have received the mysteries of sciences from the egyptians and arabians . those countries which lie between the two torrid zones enjoy a favourable air , and there religion , justice and prudence flourish . but because every nation differs from others in many particulars , although they are all situate under one climate , i shall here set down what i have by long experience and study observed of each , lest this necessary piece of knowledge should be wanting to your highness , who exercise dominion over almost all . the spaniards love religion and justice , are patient of toil , in counsel profound , in execution slow ; of such great souls , that neither good fortune elevates , nor ill dejects them . what is in them a natural glory , and greatness of mind , is imputed to them for pride , and a contempt of other nations , when notwithstanding it is that which is most agreeable to all , and makes them most esteemed ; that , i say , which above all follows the guidance of reason , and by the dictates of that checks its passions and appetites . the africans are subtile , deceitful , superstitious and barbarous , and observe no military discipline . the italians cautious and prudent : there 's no species or image of vertue which they represent not in their words and behaviour , to promote their ends and interest . a glorious nation , whose temporal empire did heretofore , as its spiritual one does at this day , rule almost the whole world. they are no less able and fit to command , than obey ; of prodigious courage and ingenuity in arts , as well of peace as war. their excess of judgment makes them enclinable to suspicion , to the prejudice of themselves , and other nations . they are in continual fear and jealousie of greater powers , and make it their endeavour to balance them . there 's not a sword drawn , nor pike trail'd in any part of the earth , but what has been first made and sharpened in the forge of italy . in germany , variety of religions , civil wars , and the soldiers of other nations serving there , have corrupted their ancient candour and ingenuity of mind . and as things of a delicate make receive most damage by being corrupted ; so where foreign malice has infected these people , it has render'd them more mistrustful and depraved in their morals . some of them have wholly thrown off allegiance to their prince . the horror of so many cruelties has render'd their minds so savage , that they are neither touch'd with love nor compassion towards their neighbours or one another . one cannot , without tears , compare what this illustrious heroick nation has been , with what it is now , ruin'd no less by the vices , than arms of others . although this must be confess'd , that in a great many nature has had more force than example , several still refaining the candour and generous sincerity of their ancestors ; those ancient manners are yet in our time sufficiently demonstrated by the integrity and nobleness of these . nevertheless , tho' the case be thus in germany , yet we cannot deny but good manners have more in●●●nce there , than in other places good laws . all arts are in request there ; nobility is most diligently preserved , in which thing it may boast above all other nations . their obedience and patience in war is great , their hearts strenuous and valiant . the power of the empire perished , by being too prodigal of it grandeur and majesty among the princes , and suffering the usurpation of so many provinces , and the too great liberty of the free towns , the chief rise of its troubles , by the disunion of the parts of so puissant a body . the french are civil , affable , and warlike : their first onsets , with the same speed they are heated , cool again . they neither know how to keep within the bounds of their own , nor preserve themselves in another land ; are impatient and fickle ; in look lovely , in manners intolerable ; their vivacity , and freedom of action , being very disagreeable to the gravity of other nations . all arts and sciences flourish among them . the english are grave and resolute , have a good opinion of themselves ; and , when occasion requires , undauntedly expose their lives to the greatest dangers , though sometimes carry'd on by too bold and impetuous passion , rather than premeditated choice . they are excellent and powerful by sea , and good soldiers also at land , when by long use inured to arms. the irish are hardy ; despise arts , and proudly boast of their extraction . the scots are constant and faithful to their kings , having continued the crown in one line for twenty ages down to these times . they know no other tribunal of their anger and revenge , but the sword. the netherlands are industrious , men of candour and sincerity , fit for arts both of peace and war , in which that soil has always produced eminent men. they love religion and liberty ; know not how to cheat others , nor will they suffer themselves to be cheated . their kind natures are like melted metals , which afterwards consolidated , always retain the impression of their jealousies . hence the wit and address of count maurice were able to give them an aversion to the spaniards , ●●d under a pretence of liberty , bring on them that yoke of slavery under which the vnited provinces live even at this day . the rest of the northern nations are wild and ungovernable ; know how to conquer , and maintain their conquests . the polanders are martial , but better at preserving than acquiring . the hungarians haughty , and resolute assertors of their privileges . they retain also many of the manners of those nations which have took up arms for or against them . the sclavonians fierce . the greeks vain , superstitious , and without faith ; forgetful now of what they have been heretofore . the asiaticks are slaves to their sovereigns , to their vices also , and superstitions . that vast empire was at first raised and is still supported more by our cowardice than the courage of that people , more for our punishment than their desert . the moscovites and tartars are naturally servile ; rush with heat into the battel , and as presently fly . but these general observations comprehend not without exception every individual : for there are found some grateful and loyal persons in the most ungrateful and perfidious nation , inasmuch as alteration of governments , passing from one nation to another , conversation , inter-marriages , war , peace , and those very motions of the spheres which from the poles and from the zodiack of the primum mobile derive on things here below celestial influences , change customs and manners , nay , even nature it self . for if we consult histories , we shall find the germans were noted for their bravery ; the italians , on the contrary , branded with cowardice : a difference not visible now . nations have been uppermost by turns ; and while monarchy lasted in them , vertues , arts and arms flourished , which have been afterwards , with the empires ruine , buried in its ashes , and with it revived again in another place . nevertheless , all nations have some peculiar inclinations and passions , which insensibly stick to foreigners , if they make any considerable stay amongst them . the customs then of nations being known , the prince will be able far better to manage affairs whether of peace or war , and know how to rule foreign countries , every one of which enclines to a particular manner of government , as conformable to its nature . they have not all an uniform reason of state , no more than one medicine is a cure for all their diseases . and herein unexperienc'd counsellors are generally out , who think others can be govern'd by the maxims and principles of their own states . the bit which is easie to the spaniard , is not so to the italian and netherlander : and as the ways of dressing , managing and breaking the horses of spain , naples and hungary are different , though they are all of one species ; so nations also should be differently govern'd according to their natures , customs and habits . from this variety of peoples conditions , we may gather , how careful the prince ought to be in sending embassadors , to see that they be not only endued with all the qualifications necessary for the representation of his person , and exercise of his power ; but withal , that their natures , wit and manners , agree with those of the nation they are to treat with : for if this conformity be wanting , they will be fitter to kindle war , than to make peace ; to excite hatred , than procure love. hence god himself was , as it were , in suspence , and dubious in the choice of a minister to send to his people , and therefore deliberates thus with himself ; whom shall i send , and who will go for us ? every court requires a minister suitable to its nature . in that of rome , men of thought are approved , who are perfectly versed in the art of dissimulation , so as not to betray any passion , either in their speech or looks : such as appear sincere , and are subtile and prudent ; who know how to oblige all men , and be obliged to none ; are civil in negotiations , easie in treaties , reserved in counsels , constant in resolutions , friends to all , intimate with none . the emperor's court requires a man who maintains his authority without pride , who speaks with sincerity , proposes with modesty , answers with truth , and expects with patience ; who anticipates not accidents , but makes use of them when they happen ; who , in a word , is cautious in promising , exact in performing . the french court likes men of facetious , pleasant humours , that can mix seriousness with gaiety ; that neither despise , nor very much regard promises ; who change with the times , though more according to the present than future . in england , the grave and reserved are commended , such as are slow both in negotiations and dispatches . at venice are valued men of eloquence , of a ready lavention , ingenuous in reasoning and proposing , and quick-sighted into others designs . at genoa , persons of frugality , loving rather to compose than breed dissention ; who keep up their authority without state , are patient , and time-servers . the suissers require such as can , upon occasion , lay aside publick grandeur , and be familiar in conversation ; as have learn'd to ingratiate themselves by presents and hopes , to have patience , and watch their opportunities ; for they have to do with a subtile and jealous people , differing from each other in religion , factions , and methods of government , but are unanimous in their resolutions and decrees , and in their counsels avoid extremes , which each canton afterwards executes according to its own method . now , as these qualities are proper for every court before-mention'd ; so are complaisance , civility , and splendour , of universal use in all , if accompany'd with a good mien and carriage , with some learning and knowledge of languages , particularly the latine ; for these affect every body , procure the applause and esteem of foreigners , and credit to one's own country . as nations differ in manners , so do they also in strength . that of the church , consists in the respect and obedience of christian believers ; that of the empire , in reputation of grandeur ; of spain , in its infantry ; france , in the nobility ; of england , in the sea ; of the turks , in their number ; that of poland , in its cavalry ; that of the venetians , in their prudence ; of the savoyards , in their judgment . almost all nations differ from each other in arms both offensive and defensive , which are adapted to the genius and disposition of each country ; wherein it is principally to be considered which are the most common and general , and whether those of our own country are inferior to others , that the most advantageous may be made use of ; for excellency in one kind of weapons , or the novelty of the late-invented ones , often give or take away empires . the parthians enlarged theirs by the use of darts : the french and northerns opened a way to theirs by that of the armed lance , forc'd on by the swiftness of their cavalry : the art of fencing , which the romans practis'd in their publick sword-plays , ( wherein judgment has great effect ) made them masters of the universe : and the spaniards have conquer'd a new world , and establish'd a monarchy in europe , by the invention of several sorts of fire-arms ; for these , above all , require courage and resolution , which are the particular vertues of that nation . to this element of fire the very earth has opposed it self , ( so that now all the four elements conspire the destruction of mankind ; ) and by introducing the pick-ax and shovel , the industry of the dutch has made such advances , as to be able to resist the valour of spain . the greatest politicians often mistake the balance of governments ; particularly some of the italians , who vainly strive to keep them always in aequilibrio ; for that government is not the most dangerous or potent , whose dominions are of the largest extent , or subjects most numerous , but which knows best how to use its strength . if you put the forces in a pair of scales , and one fall down , the other hang in the air ; yet , upon adding to this but one drachm of prudence and valour , or else if the quantity of ambition and tyranny exceed in that , the former shall poise , if not out-weigh the latter . they who have raised their fortune in this world , and ruled it , have all had but slender beginnings . the grandeur of the house of austria inflamed the envy of many , and all conspired to bring it down , while not one so much as thought of sweden , which had undoubtedly enslaved germany , and perhaps italy too , had not the king's death prevented it . powers that begin to grow , are more to be feared than those that are already grown ; for in these their declension is natural , as in those their encrease . the one strive to preserve themselves by the publick quiet , the other to advance themselves by disturbing foreign dominions . suppose one power be in it self stronger than another , this has not therefore less valour than that , to defend and protect it self . one planet has more force and vigour in its own house , than another in its elevation . nor are these fears of a neighbouring power always well grounded ; on the other side , they often turn to its advantage . italy was under apprehensions of slavery from the west , when it saw the kingdom of sicily united to the crown of castile ; which were not a little augmented when naples was added , and both at once paid obedience to castile : but when the emperor charles v. annexed the state of milan to the crown of spain , it seemed absolutely to despair ; yet for all this , the princes lost not their liberty ; on the contrary , have been effectually preserv'd against the turkish and transalpine arms , and enjoy'd a whole age of peace . the fort de fuentes , built by the spaniards , was a great eye-sore to many , who look'd on it as a bridle to italy , yet experience has shew'd its only design was their defence . but all these examples are not sufficient to cure the pannick fears of that hypochondria of state-interest , as they call it , especially complicated with the ill humours of envy and emulation , so as to make it shake off those melancholy whimsies . his catholick majesty lays siege to casal , to dispossess the french of it , and put it into the hands of the right owner , to promote the peace of italy : and what do the envious , but immediately enter into a new league to oppose him ? as if one city , more or less , were of any moment to so vast a dominion . from this false apprehension of future evils and dangers , which perhaps would never have really come to pass , proceed other present ones , much greater , by the anticipation of their remedies . let such persons then as are thus solicitous to poise the balance of governments , lay aside their emulations ; for it cannot be effected without prejudice to the publick repose . who can so keep the globe of the world in this equinox of power , that some shall not come nearer the solstices of grandeur than others ; nations would be in perpetual war ; nothing giving more disturbance to them , than to be once possess'd with such empty chimera's which never have an end , especially since the union of inferiour powers against a greater cannot be of long continuance : and should they pull this down , who will they find to share the grandeur among them , so that each shall be satisfy'd , and not every one desire the whole ? who shall keep them so even , that one shall not encrease faster than another ? since man's body is preserved by the inequality of its members , why should not states , as well by the greatness of one and mediocrity of another commonwealth ? it is the securer policy to follow the most powerful , and conform to their fortune , than to oppose them . opposition awaken● power , and gives a pretence to tyranny . the orb● of heaven suffer themselves to be whirled by the violence of the prim●m mobile , which they cannot resist ; and in following the motion of that , perform their own course . ferdinand de medicis , duke of tuscany , learn'd at rome the art of molesting superior powers , and practised it against spain by certain new devices , in france , england , and holland ; but he afterwards found the danger of it , and left it as a lesson to his successors never to use them ; which they observe to this day , to the great benefit of the publick tranquility . emblem lxxxii . some adorned their helmets with swans and peacocks , by the generosity of these creatures to animate their minds , and inflame them with a desire of glory ; others with a bear 's or lion's head , letting the skin hang down their shoulders , to strike terror into their enemies . so that of this device ( the design of which is to shew what a price the prince ought to set upon arms ) i have chosen for the crest a porcupine , whose quills , no less agreeable for their roughness , than the ostrich's feathers are for their smoothness , at once defend and assault . there 's no garb more graceful than armour adorned with arms. the splendour of purple , however sparkling with gold , pearls and diamonds , is insignificant ; and the magnificence of palaces and attendance , and the pomp of courts useless , except flaming swords , and the glittering of arms , contribute to render princes illustrious . solomon , the wisest of kings , gloried not so much in his costly wardrobes , as in his rich arsenals , which were stored with shields and targets of an inestimable value . the spaniards of old prized a war-horse more than their blood : now that esteem is sunk , by the convenience of coaches and chariots , the use of which was prohibited among the romans to all but senators , and ladies of quality . to remedy which abuses , and once more introduce the custom of riding , the emperor charles v. spoke thus in the assembly of the states of madrid , in the year : the natives of these kingdoms ( said he ) have ever been esteemed and honoured both at home and abroad , for their skill in chivalry ; and it is by this alone they have obtained so many glorious victories over their enemies , as well christians as infidels , conquered so many kingdoms and dominions as at this day depend on our crown . the scripture says , in the praise of men of courage , that their shields are of fire ; intimating how careful they are to keep them bright and well polish'd : and in another place observes , that their rays reflected on neighbouring mountains were like lamps of fire . david said , a sword added grace even to the majesty of god . hannibal's habit was mean and modest , but in equipage he surpass'd all others . the emperor charles v. took more delight in military pomp , than in robes embroider'd with gold. ottocarus , king of bohemia , being overcome by the emperor rodolphus , came with great splendour to swear homage to him , and , as he was exhorted by his attendance , to deck himself as became his majesty : he replied ; arm , and march in rank and file , and shew these men , that you place your bravery and gallantry , not in fine cloaths , but in your arms , for they best become both me and you . that majesty begets princes most authority , which proceeds from power . the people chuse them for their defence ; which was intimated by the navarrois , when , in their coronations , they seated the kings on a shield : this was their throne , and heaven their canopy . the prince should be a buckler to his subjects , armed against all assaults , and exposed to dangers and injuries . he will never appear more beautiful either to them or foreigners , than when in armour . the first ornaments and marks of honour the ancient germans gave their youth , was a sword and buckler : till then they were part of their family , but afterwards became members of their government . the prince never looks like himself , but when in arms. there 's no equipage more splendid than a troop of curiassiers ; no train more pleasing to the eye than that of squadrons , whose sight is then most agreeable , when they are martially equipt with all things necessary for an attack , and want nothing either for their defence or subsistence . an army requires no other ornament but what is necessary for them . splendid furniture is but luggage and cumber . that makes the best appearance in war , which conduces most to the principal end of victory . hence scipio the african , upon going into spain , commanded each of his men to carry on his shoulders thirty days provision , and seven stakes for intrenchments . such was then the equipage of that warlike nation , so inured to hardships , that they took the city to be built for the roman senate and people , the temples for the gods , but thought their glory was in the fields , under tents and pavilions . by such discipline they were able to rule the world. delights , costly cloaths , and riches , are for courtiers ; in soldiers they do but excite the enemy's avarice . hence hannibal had just cause to smile , when antiochus , shewing him his army , rather beautiful in apparel , than strong in arms , demanded whether this would be enough for the romans : yes , ( answer'd he , with an african subtilty ) certainly enough , be they never so covetous . let not the empty show and glittering of gold and silver terrifie you , which neither defend nor wound , said galgacus to the britains , to take away the fear of the romans . and solyman , going to relieve ierusalem , to encourage his men , tells them : their glorious equipage you view from hence , shall be our plunder , ' stead of their defence . * and tho' iulius caesar was for having his soldiers rich , because he thought fear of losing their estates would make such men more resolute ; yet large spoils expose victory to sale , and arms adorned with nothing but their own strength buy it : for the soldier is generally more solicitous to preserve what he has , than even to get the victory . he that goes to fight , with a spirit of covetousness , is desirous to conquer his enemy , only that he may afterwards rifle him . interest and glory are powerful incentives to man's breast . how would hannibal have laugh'd to have seen the soldiers of these times so fine and spruce , and with such sumptuous equipages , that there are scarce horses and carriages enough for them . how could he have pass'd the pyrenaean hills , or open'd a way over the snowy alps , with such a number of chariots ? they now ( particularly in germany ) look not like armies , but large colonies of nations , removing from one place to another , with their whole families , and all their houshold goods , as if they were instruments of war . the like remissness in discipline tacitus observ'd to be in otho's army . there is no prince rich enough , no province plentiful enough to supply them with provision . they are equally injurious to friends and enemies . the same slackness was introduc'd by duke fridland , to raise a great number of soldiers , suffering them to forage whole countries , with a design , as some thought , to oppress and weaken them , so that they should never after be able to make head against his forces , or else by this licentiousness to enervate the army it self , following herein the practice of caecinna . this abuse threatens great inconveniencies , unless a timely remedy be applied , and that one which shall not appear desperate . for tho' it costs no less pains to correct undisciplin'd soldiers , than resist enemies , as corbulo ●ound in syria ; yet this must be understood , when the enemy gives not time , or at least when it is improper to make so sudden a leap from one extreme to the other . but if time allow , nothing hinders but an army may be reduced to order and discipline , by exercise , severity , and example ; without which three , it is impossible it should be reformed , at least long continue so , as vitellius experimentally found true . corbulo was sensible of the same , when he was sent into germany , and therefore reduced those slothful , disorderly legions to their ancient discipline . the same he did afterwards with his army in syria , where he found soldiers so ignorant in the affairs of war , that there were many , even veterans , who had never kept guard , or stood centinel , who were utter strangers to trenches and fortifications , unarmed , but rich and magnificent , as having served all their time in good garrisons ; and cashiering such as were unserviceable , kept the rest encamped all the winter , to inure them to cold , himself in a thin habit , and his head uncovered , always attending them , whether on a march or in their works , commending the valiant , comforting the weak , and giving example to all ; and when he perceiv'd the inclemency of the weather made many leave their colours , he remedy'd that by severity , not pardoning ( as was usual in other armies ) the first and second transgression of that nature , but whoever deserted was immediately put to death . and that was found to be of more use than clemency ; for fewer deserted his camp , than did those where it was pardoned . the soldier could never be brought to undergo those great fatigues , and expose himself to the present hazards of war , without some other severity , or some reward to equal those two . princes , by honours and recompences , make good generals ; and these good soldiers , by example , rigour , and liberality . godfrey well knew courage to be encreased by glory , and hopes of advantage , when , upon the point of giving battel , he clears the doubts , and elevates the hopes of those whose bravery deserves reward . — some he with wealth , with honour some excites , and diff'ring genius's as each delights . * i dare affirm , no soldiers can be good , unless their commanders be something enclin'd to prodigality and severity . and 't is probably on this account the germans call a regiment , and all that belongs to it , the colonel's staff , ( den regiment oder colonelstah , ) for with that soldiers are to be ruled . moses kept his in such strict discipline , that suing once for passage through the king of edom's country , he withal engaged , that none of them should drink of the water of his wells , or pass through any one's fields or vineyards . antiquity has left us an illustrious example of the re-establishment of decayed military discipline in the person of metellus , when he was in africa , where he found the roman army so corrupted , that the soldiers would not stir out of their quarters , deserted their colours , and dispersing themselves over the province , ravag'd and plunder'd where-ever they came , being guilty of all the extravagancies that avarice and luxury are capable of inspiring . yet all these he insensibly remedied , by exercising them in military arts. he first order'd , that no bread , or any other meat dress'd , should be sold in the camp ; forbad the sutlers to follow the army ; suffer'd not any common soldier , upon a march , to have a servant or mule. and thus correcting the other abuses , he restor'd them to their former courage and strength . the effect of which care was so great , as of it self to terrifie iugurtha , and oblig'd him , by embassadors , to beg his life , and the lives of his children of him , and to promise the delivery of all besides to the romans . arms are vital spirits , which cherish and give motion to the body of a government ; the surety of publick tranquility , wherein the preservation and encrease of the same consists , provided they be well ordered , and admit of discipline . this the emperor alexander severus well knew , when he said , ancient discipline was the support of the commonwealth , the fall of which would be the ruine of the roman name and empire . since then it is of so great importance to have good soldiers , it is the duty of princes to conferr favours and honours upon them . saul loved a brave soldier so well , that he would not suffer him out of his sight . reward and honour find , and exercise makes them : for nature produces few valiant men ; but industry , with good instruction , brings up many . this ought to be the care of the captains , colonels , and generals , as it was of sopher the chief of the host , who exercised his fresh-water soldiers . and thus the holy scriptures call commanders , masters of soldiers , it being their business to teach and instruct them ; such were potiphar and nebuzaradan . but because this , through the excessive indulgence and carelesness of officers , and upon account of other impediments in war , is not easily reduc'd to practice , the evil of it ought rather to be timely prevented ; a thing which princes and commonwealths are strangely negligent in . upon the study of literature are founded colleges ; for religion , convents and monasteries . the church militant has its nurseries for the edification of spiritual soldiers to defend it ; for temporal ones there is none . the turk alone regards this , who , to that end , gathers children of all nations into certain seraglio's , and sees them brought up in the exercise of arms ; whence afterwards is formed the body of his janizaries , who knowing no other father or lord but the grand signior , are the chiefest strength and defence of his empire . christian princes ought to do the same in all great cities , by taking orphans , foundlings , and all other of that nature , into seminaries for that purpose , there to be instructed in military exercises , taught to forge arms , twist ropes , make gun-powder , and all other ammunition , to prepare them for war-service . there might also be some educated in sea-port towns , where they might have an early insight into navigation , and see the manner of building ships , of making sails and cables , which would be a means to cleanse the commonwealth from those dregs of vagabonds , and furnish it with persons that would be useful in military arts , which might be kept out of what they daily earn ; or , if that would not suffice , a law might be made to assign such seminaries the third of all pious gifts or legacies : for assuredly they deserve no less who defend the altars , than those that offer incense at them . it would be also a very good way , for the subsistence of an army , to endow the treasury of war with certain stated revenues , to be employed to no other uses : as augustus did , who setled the tenth of all hereditaments and legacies , and the hundredth part of all commodities sold upon it . which tax tiberius would not afterwards take off , even though the senate requested it , because it was the support of the military treasury . thus peter count de lemos endowed that of n●ples ; but envy afterwards overthrew all that his zeal and prudence had establish'd . neither should this care be taken for soldiers only , but also in erecting fortresses , and garrisoning them ; forasmuch as that charge may prevent many greater . the weakness of a place invites an enemy , whereas scarce any one attacks a state he thinks able to defend it self . if all that is lavishly squander'd away in gaming , shows , and building , were expended upon this , princes would live abundantly more secure , and the whole world enjoy more peace and tranquility . the emperors , dioclesian and maximilian , took it as a signal piece of service of a certain governor of a province , who laid out a summ of money design'd for the structure of an amphitheater , upon the repair of a citadel . emblem lxxxiii . the very ground whereon fortresses are built is their greatest enemy . it is upon the surface of that with the shovel and pick-axe ( weapons of this age ) trenches and approaches are made to begin a storm . 't is within the bowels of the same , that mines are secretly sprung under the foundations of the walls and bulwarks , which taking fire , blow them all up . that castle only is impregnable , which , situated in the midst of waters , is on all sides surrounded with the fury of foaming billows ; which , although they beat against it , yet do at the same time also defend it , by not admitting of a naval siege ; and all the danger would be in a calm , if it should continue long . thus governments , while engaged in war , are generally safe : then are they industriously vigilant , providently forewarn'd ; glory animates ; exercise redoubles their courage ; emulation prompts to great enterprizes ; and common danger unites mens affections , and purges off the state 's ill humours . fear of an enemy , keeps a people regular , and under laws . the romans were never more valiant , nor their subjects more quiet and obedient to the magistrates , than when pyrrhus first , and after him hannibal , came up to the very gates of their city . a great monarchy is in more danger upon the account of its power , than others are from their weakness ; for that , through too much confidence in its strength , neglects to provide against future casualties : whereas , on the contrary , fear puts this always upon its guard. if military discipline cease , and be not kept in continual exercise , sloth effeminates minds , weakens and throws down walls , rusts swords , and gnaws the straps of shields ; debaucheries , by degrees , encrease with it , and ambition reigns ; whence arise dissentions , and from them civil wars : so that there is not one intestine malady or infirmity ingender'd by laziness , but the whole state suffers by it . nothing grows or is preserved without motion . q. metellus , upon the news of the loss of carthage , said openly in the senate , that he now apprehended that of rome would follow , when he saw that rival republick destroyed . pub. nasica , hearing one say , this success put affairs in a better posture ; answer'd , nay , rather , they are now in greater danger . this wise man well knew those hostile forces were like surges , which indeed shook the city , but withal added strength and courage to it ; and therefore exhorts them to beware of their ruine , as knowing weak minds to have no greater enemy than security , and 〈◊〉 fear was a necessary tutor to this pupil people . ●●inthila , king of the goths , was great in spain , and ●●quired renown by his atchievements , while he was engag'd in war : when that ceas'd , he abandon'd him●elf to luxury , and was ruin'd . king alphonsus vi. re●lecting upon the losses he had receiv'd from the moors , ●●k'd the reason of it ; and was answer'd , it was the sloth and looseness of his men : upon which he immediately forbad bathing , and all other wantonnesses that impair strength . the oscitancy and drowsiness of the two kings , roderick and vitiza , made almost all spain fall a prey to the africans , till the times of pelagius and his successors , when warfare beginning to flourish again , valour , and the glory of arms , encreased by constant emulation , and not only deliver'd spain from that heavy yoke , but render'd it head of a puissant monarchy . the emulation between the military orders of castile produced abundance of great men , who ●trove more to surpass each other in military glory , than to conquer an enemy . the house of austria had never ascended to this pitch of grandeur , had it always been given up to idleness . the same means envy takes to pull it down by , strengthen and render it more glorious : for they who live in peace , like iron not used , lose their brightness , and become rusty . lesser powers may indeed be preserv'd without arms , but not great ones : for it is not so difficult to keep fortune equal in them , as in these ; out of which , if arms be ●ot sent abroad , war is kindled at home : as it befell the roman monarchy ; with whose grandeur , ambition , that old inbred vice , encreased and broke out . for when affairs were in a low condition , it was easie to keep an equality : but after the conquest of the world , when their rival cities and kings were destroyed , and they at leisure to share their riches , then it was that the senators and common people first began to fall out . the emulation of valour which is exercised against enemies , when there is any , is usually inflamed between country-men , when there is none . this the germans had experience of , when , upon the romans leaving them , and their being exempt from foreign fear , out of emulation , turn'd their arms upon one another . the peace of the roman empire was very bloody , it being the source of all their civil wars . long peace was agreeable to the cherusci , but of no advantage . the wars of the low-countries put an end to the intestine commotions in spain . that theater of war , or rather that school of mars , where so many military arts have been taught and exercised , has been very much to the advantage of this monarchy : though , 't is true , this military exercise and discipline has been common to its enemies and rivals , almost all the princes of europe having learn'd the use of arms there , although it is a prodigious charge to make war in countries so disturb'd and remote , with so much bloodshed and extortion , so much advantage on the enemies side , and so little on ours , that it may reasonably be question'd whether it were better to conquer or be conquered ; or if it would not be more expedient to apply some remedy , whereby to quench , or at least damp , for a time , that ardent thirst after blood and riches ; to the end , that what is thrown away there , might be laid out upon a a fleet , for the establishment of the empire of the ocean and mediterranean , and the carrying on a war in africa , the successful progress of which , by reason of the nearness of spain and italy , would the more unite this monarchy . however , love of those so ancient and loyal subjects , join'd with a desire to see them redeemed from that vile slavery , they are , under the notion of liberty , miserably oppress'd with , and to reduce them to the true worship of god , have more influence on us , than state-interest . now as the encouragement of valour and military glory in a monarchy , is the security thereof ; so is it not without danger , when the supreme power is lodg'd in many , as in commonwealths ; their greatest hazard being in their own arms , while they intrust the power of the army to one ; that very hand which they first arm'd usually laying the yoke on them ; those forces themselves gave , oppressing their liberty . thus it was with the roman republick , and from thence tyranny pass'd to almost all other nations . however requisite therefore it be to keep armies always ready , and in exercise ; yet the arts of peace are still more secure , especially if the people be corrupted , and separated in distant places : for the fierceness of war does but render them more insolent ; and it is better to keep them in view of danger , than secure from it , if you expect they should unite for their conservation . the liberty of the republick of genoua was not less safe , when its mountains were not regularly fortified , than now that through singular industry and labour they are made as impregnable walls to the state. for too much security breeds ill humours , divides the people into factions , begets presumptuous spirits , and despises external means . in a word , in commonwealths harrass'd with intestine broils , wars are more dangerous than useful ; and consequently then only will be of advantage to genoua , when that prudent senate shall act as if they had never built them . emblem lxxxiv . it has been the opinion of some , that nature was rather a step-mother to man , than his own ; and that she had shewed her self more liberal to other creatures , in giving them a clearer instinct and notice of the means necessary for their defence and conservation . but these persons did not sufficiently consider their own excellency , their power and dominion over sublunary things ; nature having bestowed on them a swift understanding , in a moment penetrating both the earth and heavens : a memory , wherein , without the least confusion or disorder , are reposited the idea's of things so various : a reason , which distinguisheth , collects , and concludes : a judgment , that comprehends , weighs , and determines ; gifts whereby man is intitled to the sovereignty of all created beings , and a liberty to dispose of them according to his pleasure , having hands framed with such skill and wisdom , that they are tools fit for all arts ; so that although he comes into the world naked and without arms , yet he forges them according to his fancy , either to defend himself , or assault others . the earth , to that end , furnishes him with iron and steel ; the water ( as you see in this device ) turns the mill that strikes them : thus all the elements obey his will. with any slight plank ( boat ) he tames the sea's pride , and gathers the winds into a small piece of canvas , to make them serve him for wings to fly from one place to another ; confines all the fire's violence within brazen pipes , call'd guns , and thence shoots thunderbolts no less terrible than those of iupiter himself . by wit and art he facilitates many things impossible to nature : by these he improves nature ; he tempers breast-plates , and sharpens iron into lances . it behoves the prince to use industry more than force , wisdom than arms , the pen rather than the sword . for to attempt every thing with one's utmost power , is the folly of the gyants , who heaped mountains upon mountains . it is not the greatest strength that always triumphs ; the little remora stops the course of a ship. that one city , numantia , fatigu'd the whole roman empire , for fourteen years : nor did the conquest of those vast countries of asia cost it so much pains as the taking of saguntum * . strength decays by degrees , and is consumed , but wisdom and ingenuity endures for ever ; and except war be managed by this , victory is never obtained by that . a war carry'd on by policy is secure ; that which relies wholly upon strength , hazardous and uncertain . one wise head is worth twenty hands . † tiberius , writing to germanicus , boasts , that in the nine times he was sent by augustus into germany , he had done more by stratagem than by force . nor did he use to take any other measures , when emperor , especially to maintain the remote provinces ; and would frequently say , that foreign affairs should be managed by wisdom and policy , and armies kept as far off as possible . all things are not surmounted by strength and expedition , but many by policy and deliberation . the low-countries were ruin'd amidst their continual victories ; because they confided in strength , more than prudence . let force submit to policy ; for that will conquer where the other cannot . when the moorish armies annoyed spain , in the time of king roderick , the governor of murcia was defeated in a battel , where all the nobility of this city lost their lives ; and the women having intelligence of it , placed themselves along the walls , in mens habit , and all in armour . upon which the conquerors , thinking by this they were still very numerous , consented to honourable terms . edward iv. king of england , used to say , that charles the wise , of france , without any armies , by writing letters only , did him more mischief than his father or grand-father had done with all theirs . the sword can exert its force but in a few places ; good management is of universal influence . nor does princes being remote one from another signifie any thing : for as trees have communication with , and are united to each other by the means of roots , their activity being a very large extent ; so they , by their embassadors , and secret practices , may do the same . policy makes the strength of foreigners its own by alliance , having the common interest in view . a prince may do more from a private closet , than in an open plain . king philip ii. never went out of madrid , yet kept the world in awe and obedience : he made himself more formidable by prudence than by power . the power that makes use of address , is in a manner infinite . archimedes often said , if he had a place to stand on , he could , with his machines , move this terraqueous globe . any potent monarchy might easily attain to an universal empire , if to its strength were joined skill and industry : but lest this should be , that primum mobile of empires permits the great ones to want prudence , and wholly trust to their power . more affairs are transacted by counsel and conduct , than by blows . power with rashness is as dangerous as rashness without power . abundance of wars between christian princes might be avoided by industry ; but either judgment is insensible of their inconveniencies , and cannot find a way to decline them honourably , or it does not regard them , ambition blinding prudence ; or else vanity and haughtiness look on it as a piece of bravery , voluntarily to face them ; and thus are tickled with a counterfeit-glory of war , which , as it is a publick action , whereon the common preservation of all depends , ought not to be measured by thin shadows of honour , but by the publick advantage and utility ; yet so , that the prince must in the mean time leave no stone unturn'd to shun war , cutting off all occasions , before they happen , or if they be already , getting the hearts of such as by their counsel can promote peace . let him find out all endearing ways imaginable to preserve friendship : let him embrace his enemy both within and without his realms ; and by crossing his designs , and entring into leagues and alliances defensive , terrifie him . and to these humane means let him join the divine assistances of prayer and sacrifice , and apply himself to the pope , as the common father of christendom , ingenuously telling him his intentions and desire of the publick quiet , of the injury received , or the reasons that induce him to take up arms , if satisfaction be not made him . whence the matter being also carry'd to the college of cardinals , and the authority of the apostolick see interposed , either the war will be avoided , or the prince justifie the cause of it at rome , where is the tribunal at which all princes actions ought to be judged , and their controversies decided . nor is this a mean-spiritedness , but rather a christian generosity , and political provision for the maintaining amity among nations , and the avoiding of emulations , and the confederacy they occasion . emblem lxxxv . when the bear has got a bee-hive , he finds no better way than to plunge it under water ; for any other would rather hinder his design of getting the honey , and escaping the stings of the bees . by this example , the present emblem shews the inconveniencies of keeping a mediocrity in counsels ; experienc'd in that which herennius pontius gave the samnites , when they had got the romans in a narrow pass , who seeing his first advice rejected , which was to let them all go , was for putting them all to the sword : and being ask'd why he thus went from one extreme to the other , when the middle-way might be taken , of giving them their liberty , after the imposition of certain laws , as being conquer'd ? he answer'd , that it was necessary either to shew themselves generous to the romans , by so signal a kindness to establish a firm and inviolable peace with them , or else to give such a blow to their forces , that they should never again be able to make head against them ; any way between these two , said he , will neither make friends , nor take away enemies . hence that of aristodemus to the aetolians : we must have the romans either our allies or enemies ; there 's no middle-way . in those cases where any one would oblige a friend or enemy , moderate expressions of kindness do nothing : for gratitude always looks upon the omissions are made , and seldom fails to find a reason not to think it self obliged . thus francis i. king of france , laid not aside his enmity to the emperor charles v. notwithstanding he set him at liberty , because his captivity was not so generous as that of alphonsus king of portugal , who being taken in a battel by ferdinand king of leon , was treated by him with all the humanity imaginable , his wounds dress'd carefully , and himself set at liberty after his recovery ; favours which wrought upon him to lay his whole kingdom at the conqueror's feet : but ferdinand refused the offer , satisfied with the restitution of such places as had been lately taken in galicia . the same consideration had philip , duke of milan , when having taken prisoners the kings of arragon and navarr , ( the first of which was alphonsus v. ) he call'd a council , to deliberate what should be done with them ; and while some were for having them pay a ransom , others for binding them to certain conditions , and lasty , others for freely dismissing them without either , he took this last advice , thereby to lay the greater obligation upon them , and so engage their friendship . when kingdoms are embroil'd in civil wars , there 's nothing more dangerous than standing neuter , as henry the infant endeavoured to do , during the troubles of castile , occasion'd by the nonage of king ferdinand iv. by which means he lost his friends , without obliging his enemies . nor is it less dangerous in the punishments of the multitude , to inflict them promiscuously on all ; wherefore it seems most adviseable , either wholly to connive at their faults , or to make a severe example of some one . hence germanicus was counsell'd , in the rebellion of the german legions , either to grant all or none of what the soldiers demanded ; and deservedly blam'd for indulging them part , taking a middle-way . thus drusus , in another occasion of the like nature , was advised either to dissemble , or punish with rigour . the prudentest counsel certainly in the world : for the common people can never keep a medium between two extremes , but always exceed in the one or the other . if the matter require expedition , it is certain ruine not to venture enough , or not to use sufficient precaution ; as it happened to valens , who wavering between the counsels that were given him , could not come to any determinate resolution . in affairs of war , fear would sometimes appear prudent ; and to that end , suggests moderate resolutions ; which serve but to encourage the enemy , and give him time to look about him . as king iohn i. found , who pretending the crown of portugal was devolved on him by the death of ferdinand , his father-in-law , resolved to enter that kingdom alone , and to have his army follow : whence the portuguese gained time to take up arms in the interim ; which had never been done , had he immediately fell upon them ; but he , to avoid war , left his right to the decision of justice . threats signifie little , if the hand lifted up , have no weapon in it , and do not sometimes punish disobedience in earnest . the hastiness of the french , makes them regard neither the past nor present time , and through the heat of their minds they are too adventurous , and too precipitous in their resolutions : however , this very thing oftentimes gives success to them ; for by this means they avoid luke-warmness , and dispatch every thing in a trice . the spaniards , on the other side , are dilatory , that they may , by long and much consideration , proceed with more caution ; and out of an affectation of prudence , use to hesitate ; nay , while they take time to consult , lose the opportunity of execution . the italians know better how to make their advantage both of the one and the other , using the opportunities as they present themselves : not like the germans , who are slow in resolving , lazy in executing , and consult only the present time , without any regard to the past or future . their minds change with events , which is the reason they have so little advanced their fortune ; it being otherwise a nation , which , considering its innate courage , might extend its dominions far and near . to the same cause may be ascribed the long continuance of the civil wars the empire is harrass'd with at this day ; which undoubtedly , by resolute counsel and expedition , might have been laid asleep long ago ; whereas by slow counsels , which yet pass'd for prudent , we have seen vast armies , upon the rhine , which might have made way even into france , and forced it to an universal peace : a thing has done them more prejudice , than if they had lost several battels : for there can be no greater overthrow , than for an army insensibly to waste and perish within it self . it is this has made havock of their own country , and the places adjacent , through which war ought to be carried , when now its seat is in the very heart of germany . in all other affairs of civil government , middle-counsels may have place ; because of the danger of extremes , and because it is of great importance ever to take away from which you may afterwards ( in case of necessity ) come to any one of the two with the less inconvenience . between these two extremes , the ancients placed prudence , represented by the flight of daedalus , who came neither too near the sun , nor too near the sea , lest the excessive heat of the one should melt , or the moisture of the other wet his wings . i● countries whose inhabitants are not of a servile nature , but of a polite genius , and generous spirit , the reins of the people ought to be govern'd with so much caution and address , that neither too much indulgence shall breed arrogance , nor too much rigour aversion . it is equally dangerous to curb them with bits and barnacles , and turn them loose without a bridle ; for they can neither endure all liberty , nor all slavery , ( as galba told piso of the romans . ) always to execute power , is to wear out the chain of servitude : 't is a kind of tyranny , to go about to reduce subjects to the model of an absolute perfect state , in that the condition of humane nature admits not of it . it is not necessary for a government to be such as it ought to be , but as it is capable of being ; for all things that are expedient , are not possible to humane infirmity . it is an absurdity , to wish there may be no defect at all in a common-wealth . there will be vices , as long as there be men. excess of zeal is the spring of many mistakes in governors , in not knowing how to conform to prudence . the same is ambition , when princes affect to pass for severe , and imagining their reputation consists in ruling their subjects so , that they shall never in the least degree swerve from reason and the laws . 't is a dangerous strictness , which consults not the ordinary passions of the vulgar . open address prevails more than power ; example and complacency , than inhuman severity . let the prince therefore rather make believe he finds his subjects good , than value himself upon making them so : which tacitus commends agricola for , in his government of britain . let him not suffer himself to be deceived in the past times , so as to wish he could see those good manners he fancies were in those days : for malice was ever the same in all times ; but 't is a fault of our corrupt nature , always to like the past better than the present . besides , granting that severity and obedience were greater formerly , yet this age will not bear it , if those ancient manners are alter'd in it : this mistake cost galba both his life and empire . emblem lxxxvi . man's mind has not been satisfy'd with the speculation of terrestrial things ; but impatient that the knowledge of the heavens should be deferred so long as till after death , has broke the prison of the body , and soar'd above the very elements , to find out , by reasoning , what it could not by touching , sight , and hearing : and to this end , hath form'd in imagination an idea of that most beautiful fabrick , contriving a sphere with such various circles , equations and epicycles , as aptly represent the several motions of the planets and constellations ; and though he be not positively assured whether the thing be really so , he hath , however , acquired this glory , that he can now conceive how this world is , or at least how it might have been created . neither does the mind stay here ; but restless and venturesom in its researches , has imagin'd another quite different hypothesis , and would persuade others , that the sun is the center of those orbs which move round it , and have their light from it . an hypothesis impious , and directly contrary to natural reason , which gives rest to heavy bodies ; repugnant to holy writ , which says , the earth stands for ever : lastly , inconsistent with the dignity of man , as if he must be moved to enjoy the sun's rays , and not the sun to bring them him , when yet this ( as all other creatures ) was made , only for his service . it is certain then , that this prince of light , who has in charge the empire of all things here below , illuminates , and by his presence informs them , by going , without intermission , from one tropick to the other , with a contrivance so wonderful , that all parts of the earth receive from him , if not an equal heat , at least , an equal light , whereby the divine wisdom has prevented the evil that would unavoidably ensue , if the sun should never leave the aequator ; for then its rays would utterly burn up some countries , while others would freeze , and be involved in perpetual darkness . this natural example teaches princes how much it advances the publick utility , for them , like that swiftest of the planets , continually to move about their states , to warm the affection of their subjects , and give life to their affairs . this is what the royal prophet would intimate , when he says , god has placed his tabernacle upon the sun , which never stands still , but is present on all occasions . king ferdinand the catholick , and the emperor charles v. kept not their courts in one certain place ; by which means they atchieved many notable things which they could not possibly have done by ministers , who , although dexterous and careful enough , yet never perform what the prince would , were he present in person ; because they want either orders or power . our saviour christ no sooner came to the sheep-pool , but he healed the paralytick , which the angel could not do in eight and thirty years , whose commission being only to trouble the water , he , as a minister , could not go beyond it . 't is impossible for states to be well govern'd by the bare relations of others , and therefore solomon advises kings to give ●ar to their subjects themselves ; for this is a part of their office , and to them , not to their ministers , is given of the lord that power and vertue which accompanies the scepter only , wherein it infuses the spirit of wisdom and counsel , of courage and piety ; nay , i may say , a kind of divinity , enabling the prince to foresee things to come , so as that he cannot be put upon either in what he sees or hears . nevertheless , in time of peace , some fix'd place of residence seems by no means inconvenient ; and it will be sufficient , by going a progress round each country , to have once visited his states . nor indeed are any treasuries capable of defraying the expences frequent removals of a court will require ; nor can they be made without considerable detriment to the subject , without disturbing the order of councils and tribunals , and retarding the proceedings of government and justice . king philip ii. throughout his whole reign , scarce ever went a step out of madrid . but in occasions of war , it appears more adviseable for the prince to be himself present , and to head his subjects : for 't is for that reason the scared writings call him shepherd and captain . thus god , commanding samuel to anoint saul , does not say to be king , but to be captain over israel : intimating that this was his principal office ; and in effect , that this was the practice of all kings in former ages . upon this it was that the people grounded their petition for a king , that they might have one to go out before them , and fight their battels . nothing encourages soldiers more in war , than their prince's presence the lacedaemonians thought theirs , even while in their cradles , had the same power , and therefore carry'd them , in their infancy , into the field . antigonus , the son of demetrius , took his presence , in a sea-fight , to be equivalent to a great many ships of the enemy . alexander the great animated his men , by representing to them , that he first exposed himself to dangers . when the prince , in such a case , is upon the place , great exploits are often performed , which no one , in his absence , would dare to undertake : nor is there need to wait for orders from court , whence they generally come too late , after the opportunity is gone , and always full of vain apprehensions , and impracticable circumstances ; a thing we have often experienc'd in germany , not without great prejudice of the publick . there 's nothing kindles spirits so generously , nothing that inspires such lofty thoughts in the minds of soldiers , as to have the prince , in whose hand is reward , an eye-witness of their bravery . this argument hannibal made use of , to inflame the courage of his men ; there 's none of you , said he , whom i am not a witness and spectator of , and cannot too , in convenient time and place , requite , where i observe merit . to the same effect , godfrey thus spoke to his men : whose country is not known ? whose noble blood , whose courage or whose conduct is not understood ? * upon this account , it will not be convenient for the prince to intrust his forces with a general ; which is so certain a danger , that it was looked upon as unsafe for tiberius to put his into the hands even of his son germanicus . and this takes place more particularly in civil insurrections , where ( as has been said ) the princes appearing , easily dashes the rebels . notwithstanding , every motion of war , or the loss of any small town , should not make the prince come abroad , and desert the court ; whence government flows to all the other parts , as tiberius well observed in the troubles of germany : he , at another time , hearing himself reviled , for not going to quiet the hungarian and german legions , stood unshaken at those murmurings , and was fix'd not to abandon the head of the monarchy , and expose that and himself to the chance of war. by these reasons were they led , who persuaded david not to go out to fight against the israelites who adhered to absolom , saying , that their being put to flight , or cut off , would not be of so bad consequence , as if he should fly or be killed in his own person , which was worth ten thousand of them , and therefore that it seemed best that he should stay behind to guard the city : which accordingly he did . so if the war be made to revenge an injury or affront , vindictam mandâsse sat est . * the same may be said when arms are taken up for defence only , and there be no evident danger ; for then the prince will get more credit by despising it , and leaving it to a general . so if the war be waged to make any new conquests , it will be thought too eager ambition in him to hazard his person , and be greater prudence to try his fortune by another ; as king ferdinand the catholick did , committing the conquest of naples to the great captain , and that of the indies to herman cortez . if a general fall , it is easie to find another to succeed him ; but if the prince be lost , all is lost , as it befell king s●bastian . the absence of princes from their courts is very dangerous , as spain found to its cost , in that of the emperor charles v. nor should a prince venture his own state , to conquer others the same sun ( whose figure we use in this device ) never visits the poles , because one of them would be endanger'd in the mean time : — medium non des●rit unquam coeli phoebus iter , radiis tamen omnia lustrat . † nature has given the kings of the bees wings , but those very small , lest they should stray too far from their kingdoms . let the prince go to those wars only whose seat is within his own dominions , or that threaten him with evident danger . hence mucianus advised the emperor domitian to stay at lyons in france , and not stir till the state of those provinces , or the empire it self , were in greater danger . nor was it good counsel which titianus and proculus gave otho , not to be at the battel of bedriacum , upon the issue of which the whole empire depended . the arch-duke leopold shews much more courage and prudence , who though he sees himself assaulted at salefeld , by the joint-forces of his enemies , much superiour to his , yet undervalues his personal dangers , and always maintains a general constancy , well knowing the safety of the empire and house of austria to consist in this event ; and so is the foremost in the perils and fatigues of war. — monstrat tolerare labores , non jubet — * but even in these cases too , it is necessary to examine the condition of the war , whether the prince , by absenting himself , will not leave his state in greater danger , either from within or abroad ; if he shall not hazard his succession ; whether he have courage enough , and be capable of arms , and have an inclination to them : for if he want but any one of these qualities , he will do more by putting his power and forces into another hand ; as we see in the loadstone , which by touching the iron , and communicating its virtue to it , lifts up a greater weight than it could do by it self . but if the necessity be great , it will suffice , if the prince be hard by , to influence his army , staying in some place , whence he may readily consult , resolve , and give orders : this was the emperor leopold's way , who removed sometimes to aquileia , sometimes to ravenna or milan , to be near the wars of hungary and germany emblem lxxxvii . prudence is not always fortunate , nor temerity always unhappy : — quisquis sapit celeriter , non tuto sapit . it is however good for fiery tempers to follow the first impetus of nature , because by delay they cool insensibly , and can never determine themselves ; nor has it usually an ill end ( in war particularly ) to let themselves be l●d by that secret force of second causes , which if it does not compell , at least moves them so , that with it they seldom miscarry . some divine genius favours daring actions . scipio passes the sea into africa , and freely trusts himself to the punick faith of syphax , with apparent risque of his life , and the publick safety of rome : julius caesar in a small bark abandons himself to the fury of the adriatick ; and both succeed in their ras●ness . it is impossible for all things to be provided against by prudence ; nor would any thing great be attempted , if that should stand to consult all casualties and hazards . cardinal gaspar borgia enter'd naples in disguise , upon hearing of the sedition between the commons and nobility : the danger was great ; and when some of the nobility proposed several ways for him to secure himself , he answer'd , with a p●esence of mind truly generous , it is not now a time for deliberation , something must be allow'd to chance . if after the success of great enterprizes , we should look back upon all the dangers that attended them , we should scarce venture on them again . iames , king of arragon , was so adventurous , as to sit down before valencia with only a thousand foot , and three hundred and sixty horse : and though this undertaking was look'd on by all men as rash , nay , impossible , yet the town surrender'd . bold counsels are commonly judged by the event ; if they succeed , they are commended for prudent , and those persons blamed who gave safer advice . no judgment can either in precipitation , or when it acts calmly , sufficiently provide for it self , in that affairs depend upon contingencies , which are uncertain even to the most wary foresight . sometimes rashness comes before occasion , and moderation follows it ; sometimes this slides swiftly between them , nor has it any hair behind to be held by . all things depend on that eternal providence , which efficaciously moves us to act , when the disposition of it , and the accomplishing of its divine decrees so require ; and then fool-hardy counsels are prudence , and errors the highest reason . when providence would pull down the pride of a monarchy , lest , like the tower of babel , it should attempt to reach heaven , it confounds the designs and languages of its ministers , that they may disagree ; so that if one asks for lime , another either does not understand what he means , or else offers him sand. in the untimely death of those who are invested with supreme government , its end is not to cut their thread of life , but to throw down that grandeur . the holy spirit , mentioning david's victory over goliah , says not that his body , but that his boasting was beat down with the stone . so if , on the other side , it has decreed to exalt a monarchy , it creates in that age brave commanders , and wise councellors , or causes them to be made choice of , and gives them occasion of exerting their valour , and giving proof of their wisdom , by which two more is done than by the arm and sword . bees then swarm into helmets , and weapons grow , as that hunting spear of romulus did , upon mount palatine , and erected at a wild boar. the very missing of the blow of this founder of the roman monarchy was fortunate , being a kind of prognostick of it . which shews , that it is not always courage or prudence that raises and supports monarchies , ( though they are generally the instruments ) but that superior impulse which moves all causes together , for their encrease or preservation ; and then even chance , directed by that eternal mind , effects what prudence could not so much as have imagined before . when germany revolted , and the roman affairs were extremely desperate , the fortune of this nation , as it had often upon other occasions , came to its assistance out of the east . if the valour and conduct of any hero be ordained to these ends , no other person , though never so brave , and truly great , can deprive him of the glory of obtaining them . could there be a finer soldier than d'aubigny ? yet he was unsuccessful , having to deal with the great captain , who was destined to establish the spanish monarchy in italy : god so disposing ( as he did in favour of the roman empire ) its beginnings and causes , by the means chiefly of ferdinand the catholick , who , by his prudence and skill in government , laid the foundations of that monarchy , and by his valour erected and enlarg'd it ; being so careful and vigilant to encrease it , that he neglected no occasion which offer'd it self ; nay , of himself , found all that humane judgment is capable of : lastly , so strenuous in the prosecution of them , that he was always the first in danger and fatigue ; and as imitation is abundantly more easie to mankind than obedience , he made it his business to command more by his actions than orders . but because so great a fabrick required workmen , that age ( fertile in great persons ) produced columbus , herman cortez , the two brothers francis and ferdinand pizarro , antony de liba , fabritius , and prosper colonna , raimond de cardona , the marquesses of pescara and basto , and many other hero 's so illustrious , that a whole age now scarce brings forth one such . to that end , god then prolonged their lives ; whereas now , not mars's fury , but some lingring fever , carries them off before their time . within how few years has untimely death depriv'd us of peter of toledo , lewis tajardo , frederick of toledo , the marquess spinola , gonsalez of cordova , the duke de feria , the marquess d'aytona , the duke of lerma , john fajardo , the marquess de zelada , the count de la fere , and the marquess de fuentes , all persons no less considerable for the glorious actions they did , than those which all the world still expected from them ? how profound and inscrutable is the providence of this eternal deity ! who would not from hence inferr the decay of the spanish monarchy ? as in the emperor claudius's time , the death of so many magistrates , as a quaestor , aedile , tribune , praetor , and a consul , in a few month's time , was look'd on as a prodigy portending some evil , unless he consider'd , that these instruments are taken away , to let all men see , it is by divine grace , rather than humane strength , is upheld that power , the pillar and support of christian commonwealths . it is this first mover of the universe that disposes these interchangeable alterations of things , these revolutions of empires . one age raises up great men in a country , improves arts , and makes arms flourish ; and the succeeding immediately overturns and confounds all , without leaving so much as the traces of the vertue and valour which were an ornament to those of the past . what great , what secret force on things , nay , even on minds , is conceal'd in those second causes of the heavenly spheres ? it is not by meer accident that those superior lights are so different one from another , some having a fix'd place , others wandring ; and since this disorder and irregularity gives no additional beauty , it is a sign at least they contribute to operations and effects . o vast volume ! in the leaves of which , god , the contriver and maker of all things ( yet without laying any obligation upon his own power , or man's will ) has wrote their changes and vicissitudes in characters of light , for the glory of his eternal wisdom , which past ages have , the present do , and those to come will for ever read ! greece was heretofore flourishing both in arms and arts ; it left rome enough to learn , but little to invent ; but now it lies buried in the depth of ignorance and degeneracy . the wits in augustus's time exceeded even expectation , but under nero they began to flag , so that all the pains and industry in the world was not sufficient to save the arts and sciences from destruction . unhappy are those great genius's who come into the world when monarchies are declining , in that they either are not employed , or if they be , cannot withstand the weight of their ruine , or perhaps miserably fall with them , without honour or renown ; nay , sometimes their fate seems deserved , and they are blamed for what was the effect of chance . god lays no constraint upon free-will ; but yet either the course of causes draws it on , or , for want of that divine light , it stumbles of it self , and its designs are overthrown or executed too late . princes and councellors are the eyes of kingdoms ; and when god almighty determines the overthrow of these , he blinds them , that they may neither see dangers , nor know their remedies . that which they think to succeed most by , leads them most into miscarriages : they see accidents , but do not prevent , but rather , as much as in them lies , forward them . a dangerous instance of this truth we have in the swiss-cantons , ever so prudent and stout in defending their country and liberty , but now so negligent and supine , that themselves are the cause of the ruine that threatens them . the first author of monarchies had situated their republick between the outworks of the alpes and the rhine , and environ'd it with the countries of alsace , lorrain , and burgundy , against the power of france , and other princes ; and when they were farthest from the fire of war , in the fruition of a happy and desired peace , they of themselves called and encouraged one upon their own borders , standing by and seeing the ruine of those provinces , redounding afterwards to their own prejudice , they not considering the danger of a neighbouring power , superiour in strength , and whose fortune must of necessity be raised out of their ashes . may i be deceived , but i fear this body of the switzers is already at its full growth , and that it will begin to decay , when those spirits and forces are spent which supported its reputation and grandeur . empires , 't is certain , have their periods : that which has endured longest , is nearest its ruine . emblem lxxxviii . what strange force has the loadstone , to produce such wonderful effects ? what so amorous correspondence with the polar star , that although because of its weight it cannot always gaze on its beauty , yet the needles it touches should ? what resemblance can there be betwixt these two ? what so great virtue , that is not lost at so wide and remote distances ? and why does it encline to that star or point of heaven , rather than to any other ? were not the experience common , ignorance would be apt to impute it to magick , as it does all other extraordinary effects of nature , when it cannot penetrate the obscurity of its operations . nor is the loadstone less admirable in that other virtue of attracting and lifting up iron , against its innate gravity ; nay , even this , carried by a kind of natural tendency to obey that superior power , closes with it , and does voluntarily , what , one would think , could not but be violent . how much were it to be wish'd that the prince would , by this example , learn to know that concourse of causes , which ( as hath been said ) sets up or pulls down empires , and how to carry himself therein , so as not to encrease their force by a too obstinate opposition , nor by a too easie yielding to facilitate their effects , it being with this series and connexion of causes moved by the first cause , as with a river , which while it streams in its ordinary current , is easily parted into several branches , or , by banks cast up , turned this or that way , and suffers bridges to be made over it ; but when swelled by continual rains , or melting snows , admits of no resistance ; and for any one to contend with it , does but augment its force , and put it in a condition to carry all before it . hence the holy spirit admonishes us not to strive against the stream . patience surmounts that violence , which in a moment loses both its power and being . upon which account it was look'd on as an ill omen to the war of vitellius , in the east , that euphrates overflowed , and bubbled into a kind of frothy crowns , by those who consider'd how transitory these were . when therefore many causes conspiring together , attend the victories of a● enemy , and open an happy way to his military expeditions , it will be great prudence to allow them time to disperse sensibly of themselves , not that they lay any necessity upon the freedom of the will , but because this freedom has power only over the motions of the mind and body , not over those external things : it may indeed give way to accidents , but cannot avoid being overwhelmed by them . constancy in expecting , is infinitely more valuable than valour in fighting . this fabius maximus well knew ; and therefore let that torrent of hannibal run by , till having by long delays weakened , he at length surmounted it , and saved the roman state. successes get strength from one another ; and by the reputation opinion gives them , suddenly encrease to that degree , that no power is able to grapple with them . the spanish monarchy render'd charles v. fortunate and glorious ; and he , by his prudence , courage and vigilance , made the empire happy . which eminent qualities were followed by the general acclamations and applause of all nations . all men joined with his fortune ; and the french king , francis i. emulous of so great splendour , striving to eclipse it , lost his own liberty . what terrors does lightning strike us with , when it breaks out of the clouds ! then first exerting its force when it meets with resistance ; without that , vanishing into air. such was that thunderbolt raised out of the exhalations of the north ; within a few days it triumphed over the empire , and struck almost the whole world with terrour : and yet one leaden bullet piercing it , made it presently disappear . there is nothing so frail and uncertain as the fame of a power that stands not upon its own bottom . all those efforts of several causes concurring , are very brittle , in that they hinder each other ; and are subject not only to various accidents , but to time also , which by degrees brings their effects to nothing . many wars , hot and impetuous at the first , vanish by delay . he who can but a little while bear up against the forces of confederate enemies , certainly gets the better of them at last : for as they are many , they have different causes , different interests and designs ; and if they happen to disagree in any one thing , part and leave one another . there was never a greater league than that of cambray against the republick of venice , yet the resolution and prudence of this valiant senate soon broke it . all things in the world arrive to a certain period ; after which , they decline again . were that critical minute known , it would be easie to overcome them . 't is for want of this knowledge , which sometimes consists in the least delay imaginable , that we sink under accidents . our impatience or ignorance aggravates them , in that often , not sensible of their force , we voluntarily submit to them , or else perhaps promote them by the violence of those very means we take to shun them . god had undertaken the grandeur of cosmo de medicis ; and they who strove to put a stop to it , by banishing him from the republick of venice , were the instruments of making him master of it . nicholas vzanus observ'd , with much greater prudence , the torrent of that fortune ; and lest it should encrease by opposition , thought it most advisable ( as long as he lived ) to give him no occasion of displeasure ; but with his death the consideration of such discreet counsel fell . nor is it possible for the greater force of such like cases to be concealed ; forasmuch as all things conspire to their success , though they appear , at first sight , directly contrary to that end . and therefore it is then best to endure what you cannot mend ; and quietly to conform to god , by whose appointment all things come to pass . the iron should not obey the loadstone more readily , than we the divine pleasure . he comes to less harm who lets himself be carried down by the stream , than he that struggles against it . it is a foolish presumption , to think to overthrow the decrees of the almighty . the predictions of the statue with feet of clay , in nebuchadnezzar's dream , was never the less certain , for his making another of gold , and commanding it to be worshipped . however , this resignation of our will to the divine must not be so brutish , as that we should believe all things were so ordain'd from eternity , that nothing can be improv'd by our diligence and conduct ; for this would be the very weakness of mind which had given occasion to that divine decree : we are to act as if all depended on our will , for god makes use of our selves to bring us to happiness or misery . we make a part of the creation , and that no small one ; and though things were set in order without us , yet they were not made without us . 't is true , we cannot break that web of events wrought on the loom of eternity , but we might very well concurr to the weaving of it . the same that ranged the causes foresaw their effects , and permitted their course , yet so that it should be still at his command . he has saved from danger whom he thought fit ; and left others in it , by abandoning them to their liberty : if the first was an effect of his mercy , or our merit , this is of his justice . our will involved in the ruine of accidents , falls with them ; and as this most wise contriver of the universe is the supreme and absolute arbitrator , he might break his vessels as he pleased , and make one to honour , another to dishonour . in the eternal disposal of empires , their progresses , revolutions , or ruines ; that sovereign governor of the orbs had always present in his mind our valour and vertue , our negligence , impudence , and tyranny : and upon this prescience it was , that he disposed the eternal order of things , in conformity to the motion and execution of our choice , without the least violence done to the same . for as he lays no constraint upon our free will , who discovers its operations by reasoning ; so neither does the supreme being , who by his immense wisdom foresaw them long ago . he forced not our will in the alterations of empires ; but rather altered empires , because our wills freely and deliberately deviated from justice . the cruelty exercised by king peter was the cause of his brother henry's succeeding him ; not , on the contrary , this the occasion of that . for the mind has more power than any fortune , turns its affairs which way it pleases , and is the sole cause of a happy or miserable life . to expect fortune from chance , is heartlesness ; to think it prescribed and already determined , desperation . at this rate , vertue would be useless , and vice excusable by compulsion . let your highness but look upon your glorious ancestors , who have raised the greatness of this monarchy , and i am assured you will see , it was not chance that crowned them , but vertue , courage , and fatigues , and that it has been supported by the same means , by their descendants , to whom an equal glory is due ; he no less contributing to the fabrick of his fortune who maintains it , than he that at first raised it . 't is a thing equally difficult to get , and easie to lose . one hour's imprudence ruines what cost many years to acquire . by labour and vigilance alone is procured god's assistance , and the grandeur of princes is deriv'd from eternity . emblem lxxxix . the smallest things encrease by concord ; by discord the greatest fall to the ground . those which being divided , were weak and impotent ; when united , resist any force whatever . what arm can pull off a horse's main when the hairs are not parted , or break a bundle of arrows ? and yet either of these , of it self , is unable to withstand the least violence . by these emblems , sertorius , and scilurus the scythian , express'd the force of concord , which of many distinct parts makes one united and consequently strong body . care of the publick repose has raised the walls of cities so much above the reach of men , that they might not scale them ; but however , many soldiers at once closing their shields , and mutually joining and agreeing to lift one another up , have got above their battlements , and stormed them . all the works of nature are preserved by amity and concord ; and when this fails , they decay and die : the cause of death being no other than a discord of the part , whereon life depends . the very same happens in commonwealths ; as common consent made them a society , so a dissention between the greatest or most powerful part dissolves again and dissociates , or else new models them . that city , which by concord was but one , without it becomes two , nay , sometimes three or four , for want of that body of love whereby its inhabitants made one body . this division engenders hatred , whence revenge arises , and from that a disrespect of laws ; without the authority of which , justice loses its force ; and where that fails , arms are taken up ; and a civil war breaking out , the order of the state , which wholly consists in unity , is confounded . the bees no sooner fall out , but their commonwealth is destroyed . the ancients , to represent discord , painted a woman tearing her cloaths . et scissâ gaudens vadit discordia pallâ . * now if it has the same effect between citizens , how will they be able to unite for their common defence and interest ? how will they have god on their side , who is peace it self , and so great a lover of it , that ( as iob says ) with it he maintains his heavenly monarchy . plato used to say , nothing was so pernicious to commonwealths as division . concord is the ornament of a city , its walls and guard ; even malice it self cannot stand long without it . domestick dissentions are so many victories for the enemy ; as those of the britains , galgacus said , were to the romans . but notwithstanding these and other reasons , some politicians assert , that it is necessary , for the preservation of a state , to sow discords among the people ; and to this end , alledges , for an example , the bees , in whose hives is always heard a kind of murmurring and dissention . but , alas , this is so far from strengthning , that it rather overthrows their opinion ; for that humming is not a dissonance , as i may say , of wills , but a harmony of voices , whereby these creatures , as it were , encourage and stir up each other to the labours of making honey , as mariners do when they hoise sail. nor is the argument drawn from the contrariety of the four humours in living bodies , of any force ; for 't is rather from this conflict of theirs that proceed diseases , and shortness of life , that which is prdominant at last getting the victory . hence vegetables , because without that contrariety , endure longer . what differs from , and is at variance with it self , must of necessity suffer ; and what suffers , can never be lasting . who , when a republick is divided , can keep the flame of dissentions within certain bounds ? who will afterwards quench it , when all are involved in them ? the more powerful faction will now oppress the weaker ; and that to defend , this to revenge it self , make use of foreign forces , and so enslave the commonwealth , or else introduce a new form of government , which will almost always be tyrannical , as several instances witness . it is not the prince's duty to distract the minds of his subjects , but rather to keep them loving and amicable ; and besides , 't is impossible they should conspire to love and obey him , who are divided amongst themselves , or consider not whence their evil comes . as often therefore as the prince himself is the cause of discord , divine providence ( as it abominably detests it ) permits those very means he thought to preserve himself by , to be the instruments of his ruine : for when the parties come to know it , they despise and abhorr him , as the first author and promoter of their differences . king italus gained the affection and applause of the germans , by never fomenting dissentions , and carrying himself alike to all . for these then , and such like reasons , the prince should beware of letting discords take root ; and rather strive to encourage the union of his state , which will easily be maintained , if he look carefully to the observance of the laws , the unity of religion , plenty of corn and provision , to the equal distribution of favours and gratuities , to the maintaining of privileges ; if he take care that the common people be employed in mechanick arts , the nobility in publick government , arms , and literature , to prohibit cabals , and clandestine meetings , to keep the great ones frugal and modest , and the inferiours peaceable , to restrain privileged persons , and those who pretend to be exempt from duties ; in a word , if he see that riches be reduced to a mediocrity , and poverty remedied . for from the reformation and regulating these , results good government ; and where that is , there peace and concord ever flourish . there is but one case wherein it seems convenient and warrantable to kindle discords in kingdoms , and that is , when they are already troubled with seditions , and intestine broils ; for then to distract them into factions , will be a means to weaken the power of the bad , the only end in that being to render peace to the good. and it is a piece of self-preservation , not to let disturbers be at quiet ; inasmuch as the concord of ill men is to the prejudice of the good ; as 't is to be wish'd that these may live peaceably , so it is that those may be in discord : for good men always come by the worst , when bad men are united . the discord we condemn as pernicious to common-wealths , is that which arises from hatred and enmity ; not that contention which has place between several conditions and members of the same commonwealth , as between the lords and commons , the soldiers and tradesmen : for that contrariety , or rather emulation , by the very diversity of natures and ends , keeps up a distinction in the degrees and spheres of the state , and supports it ; nor are there seditions , but when the states combine together , and make every private person 's the common interest : just as from the commixtion of the elements , and the meeting of rivers and streams , proceed storms and inundations . it concerns the prince therefore to employ all his care upon this division ; so moderating it , that it shall neither come on the one hand to absolute rupture , nor on the other to unlawful combinations . the same thing should be done between ministers , that some kind of emulation and diffidence one of another , may make them more attentive of their duty ; for if once , through a neglect of this , they dissemble , and conceal one another's faults , or with one consent join the pursuit of their own interests , there will be an end of the prince and the state , without the possibility of a remedy , in that none can be apply'd but by their hands . but if this honest and generous emulation should degenerate into aversion and enmity , it will create the same inconveniencies ; for they will then be more intent on contradicting and thwarting one another , more solicitous to overthrow each others counsels and actions , than to promote the publick good , and their prince's service . every one has his friends and creatures , and the common sort of people are apt to be ●ead into factions , whence generally arise tumults and dissentions . for this reason , drusus and germanicus ●oined themselves , lest the flame of the differences ●indled in tiberius's palace , should be encreased by the ●last of their favour . whence it is apparent how ●●roneous the judgment of lycurgus was , who sowed dissentions among the kings of lacedaemon , and ordained , that when embassadors were to be sent afar off , such persons should be made choice of , as had some grudge to each other . we have not a few examples in this age of publick losses , occasion'd by the clashing of ministers joined in one commission , upon a supposition that this very emulation would incite them to execute it carefully . the prince's service is one , and cannot be perform'd but by persons unanimous : whence tacitus commends agricola , for one who was far from envying his colleagues . and certainly it is less dangerous for an affair to be managed by one bad , than by two good ministers , if they don't agree , which rarely happens . the nobility is the prince's greatest security , or greatest hazard , being a powerful body , that draws most of the people after it . spain and france furnish us with many bloody instances of this truth ; that in former ages , this in all . the best remedies are , by the means of emulation , to keep them divided from the commons and themselves , yet with the moderation above-mention'd . to multiply and level the titles and dignities of the nobles ; to spend their estates upon publick ostentations , and their great souls in the toils and dangers of war ; to divert their thoughts by employments of peace , and humble their exalted spirits by the servile offices of the court. emblem xc . kings , in holy scripture , are compared to rivers ; for so the prophet habakkuk is to be understood , when he says , god would cleave the rivers of the earth ; meaning , that god would divide the forces of those who took up arms against his people : as david actually found he did , in his defeat of the philistines ; and therefore openly confessed , that the lord had divided his enemies before him , as waters are divided . division is the most effectual means to pull down any power ; the very greatest , if divided , being uncapable of making any further resistance . how impetuously does a river stream down the midst of its channel , breaking through its very banks to open it self new passages ; yet if parted into several rivulets , it loses its strength , and becomes passable to all . thus it happened to the river gyndes , where a beloved horse of cyrus's having been drowned , it so enraged him , that he immediately commanded it to be cut into an hundred and sixty canals ; by which means it lost both its name and greatness ; and that which before would scarce bear bridges , might afterwards be easily forded . this the counsel had regard to , which some gave the roman senate , to weaken the river tiber , by turning the course of the lakes and brooks that discharged themselves into it , to rid the city of continual fear and danger of its inundations . but the senate refused to do it , as unwilling to deprive the tiber of its glory . all these things have given occasion to the present ●mblem , which ( by a river parted into several branches ) shews of what consequence it is to distract the forces of puissant princes : for the greater the power is , the more forces and expence its defence requires ; nor is it hardly possible to find officers and soldiers enough for it , or to prevent all mischances . courage and prudence are confounded , when dangers threaten thus on all sides . besides , this is the most secure and the cheapest method that can be taken ; inasmuch as a trumpet on a sudden sounding an alarm in several parts of a kingdom , has abundantly greater effects , than a war solemnly denounced . it is always the best and securest way , to divide enemies forces , and sow seeds of dissention within their states : nothing so much exposing to plots and invasions , as discord and sedition . by these artifices the phoenicians established their dominion in spain , dividing it into various factions . the same did the carthaginians against them . therefore the counsel of the marquess of cadiz was not at all imprudent , when having taken boabdili , king of grenada , he moved ferdinand the catholick to set him at liberty , that his presence might foment the factions a foot between him and his father , about the crown , which had distracted the kingdom into a great many parties . when the roman empire , says tacitus , began to decline , and hasten to decay , nothing greater could be desired of fortune , than the discord of its enemies . no money is laid out to more advantage , none with less bloodshed or danger , than that which is employed in encouraging the dissentions of an enemy's kingdom , or in getting another prince to make war upon it ; for the charges and damage become hereby much more inconsiderable . but this matter demandeth extraordinary advertency ; for sometimes , upon a mis-grounded apprehension , money is expended to no purpose , and the discovery of the ill intention begets open hostility : a thing we have many instances of , in those who without any provocation , or the least prospect of advantage , have countenanced the adversaries of the house of austria , to keep its hands full , by continual wars , in the mean time unprofitably exhausting their treasuries , without considering , that if they should once be attack'd by those of this house , it would be much better to have still by them , for their own defence , what they had laid out upon the diversion of their forces . and this whole doctrine has place , without any scruple in policy , in an open war , where the reason of self-preservation is more cogent , than other considerations less solid ; and the same cause that makes the war lawful , justifies also this discord . but when the case is nothing but an invidious emulation of grandeur , these artifices are not warrantable ; for he who stirs up the subjects of another prince to rebellion , at the same time teaches his own to be traitors . the emulation should be between the persons , not the offices : dignity is of the same kind in all its parts ; that which wounds one , wounds all . passions and hatreds are transient , but bad examples remain for ever . it is the interest and concern of every prince , not to suffer the dignity of another to be injured by contempt or disobedience , or his person by treason . 't is an action unworthy of a prince to conquer by poison , not by the sword. it was ever accounted base , among the romans ; and is to this day with the spaniards , who have been so far from making use of such secret practices against their enemies , that they have often been assisting to them . a remarkable example of which , our catholick king left your highness , when he sent an army to aid the french king against the english , who had possess'd themselves of the isle of rhea , not regarding the duke of roan's advice , which was , to divide the kingdom into several governments . and another time , when his majesty offered , by monsieur de maximi , the pope's nuncio , to assist the same king in person to subdue the hugonots of montauban , and drive them out of his country . which signal and heroick kindness had no other return but ingratitude ; leaving a lesson to reason , not to let it self be too easily touch'd with compassion towards a foreign state. from what hath been said , it is obvious to deduce how much the agreement of subjects minds , and the union of states , contribute to their common defence : if , i say , every particular person did look on the danger of his neighbour as his own , be it at never so remote a distance , and accordingly endeavour all ways , both with men and money , to relieve him , that the whole body may be preserved . but not a few are deceived in this point ; they who are far off , flattering themselves with the thoughts that the danger will never reach them , or that they are no way obliged to anticipate such expences , and that it is greater prudence to keep their forces entire till the enemy come nigher . but alas ! then all the difficulties being surmounted , and those states taken , which served them for out-works the rest will never be able to hold out . this was the fate of the britains : of whom , thus tacitus ; heretofore they were under kings , now are by petty princes distracted into factions ; nor does any thing further our designs against the strongest nations , than their not consulting the common good. seldom above two or three cities associate to repell the common danger : thus while every one fights single , all are overcome . the kingdoms of spain , and provinces of italy , burgundy and flanders are sensible of this danger , with a greater prudence , a more eminent and exemplary piety , zeal and affection towards their lawful lord ; in that with a generous emulation they voluntarily offer his majesty their lives and fortunes , to protect them from their enemies , who with joint-forces conspire the overthrow of the catholick religion , and that monarchy . let your highness ingrave these services on your tender breast ; and let the gratitude and esteem due to subjects so loyal , encrease with your glorious years : then you will judge which is most excellent , to rule the world , or such a government . * emblem xci . friendship seems to restrain a government more , and to have been more considered by law-givers , than iustice. for if all men were friends , there would be no need of justice ; but though all were just , yet would they want the protection of friendship . friendship is the greatest good mankind enjoys ; a sure sword always by one's side , both in peace and war ; a faithful companion in both fortunes . with this , prosperity is crown'd , and adversity becomes more easie . for it neither is diminished by one , or encreased by the other : in one it is guided by modesty , in the other by constancy ; in the one and the other always at hand , as if by both it were like to gain . consanguinity may be without kindness and affection , friendship cannot . this comes from our own choice , that from chance . that may be without the bond of communication and mutual assistance , this cannot ; forasmuch as there are three things , which , as constituent parts of its being unite it ; nature by the means of resemblance ; the will , by that of good humour ; and reason , by that of honour . hereunto , certainly , king alphonsus the wise alludes , when he accuseth a certain person of cruelty and injustice , for carrying away prisoner one of two persons who were endeared to each other by consanguinity and friendship . the more tried therefore and sincere the friendship has been , so much the less valuable will it be , when once violated . a crystal crackt , is good for nothing . the diamond loses all its worth , when divided into pieces . a sword once broken , can never be solder'd again . whoever trusts to reconciled friendship , will find himself deceived ; for upon the first blow of adversity , or prospect of advantage , it will presently relapse again . neither david's mercy , in sparing saul's life , nor the acknowledgments and fair protestations of saul , confirmed by oath , were sufficient to make the first think himself e'er the safer for this reconcilement , or the last to cease plotting against him . esau , with embraces , and tears in his eyes , tried to regain the favour of his brother iacob ; and though there passed great signs and expressions of friendship on both sides , yet could they never take away iacob's distrust , who , notwithstanding , endeavoured all he could to be severed from him , and secure himself * . renewed friendship is like a vessel of metal , which to day shines , and to morrow is covered with rust . nor are all the good offices in the world capable of making it firm , because the remembrance of injuries is never quite erased out of the mind . ervigius , after the usurpation of wamba's crown , marry'd his daughter cixilon to egica , a very near relation of that king 's , and afterwards nominated him for his successor ; but even this could not keep egica from giving some marks of his hatred to his father-in-law , as soon as ever he came to the crown * . the scars of wounds made by injuries on the mind , always remain in the person wrong'd , and upon the first motion bleed afresh . injuries are like marshes , which , though dried up , are easily filled with water again . there is a certain shadow always betwixt the offender and the offended , which no light of excuse or satisfaction can dispell . nor is friendship secure on the former's side , in that he never is persuaded the other has really and from his heart forgiven the injury , and always looks on him as an enemy . besides that , it is natural to hate one you have injured . this is what happens in the friendship of private persons , but 't is not so in those of princes , ( if indeed there be any true friendship to be met with between them ) for self-interest makes them friends or enemies ; and though the friendship be broke a thousand times , yet it is presently renewed again by hopes of advantage ; and as long as this may be executed , continues firm and constant . wherefore in such friendships as these , no regard is to be had to the ties of blood , or obligations of favours received , for these are things disowned by ambition . their duration is to be esteem'd by utility , in that all friendships now-a-days are like those of philip , king of macedon , who made interest , not faith , the measure of them . in these , friendships , which are more reason of state , than any mutual harmony of wills , aristotle and cicero would never have so sharply reprimanded bias , for saying , we ought to love no otherwise , than if we were to hate again : for a prince would be deceived in his confidence , should he ground it upon such friendship . it is best then for princes to be friends so to day , as to think they may possibly fall out to morrow . but although this precaution is not to be found fault with , yet interest and self-ends are not to be preferred to friendship , ever the more , for that 't is common for others to do so . let friendship fail in others , but not the prince we propose to form by these emblems , whom we exhort to constancy in his actions and obligations . all that has been said hitherto , has respect to such friendships as are betwixt neighbouring princes , between whom there is some emulation of grandeur ; for among others , sincere amity , and a reciprocal correspondence , may have place . power should not be so over-careful , as to trust no one . like a tyrant , he will be ever in fear , who puts no confidence in his friends . without these , the crown is slavery , not majesty . 't is an unjust empire , that deprives princes of friendships . not armies nor treasures are the defence of a kingdom , but friends . 't is not the golden scepter that protects a king , but abundance of friends ; those are the truest , those the securest scepter . nor is there any greater instrument of good government , than good friends . friendship between great princes , should be maintained rather by a good correspondence , than by presents ; for interest is always ungrateful and insatiable : for the sake of that , friendships are pretended , never really contracted ; as vitellius found , who thinking to preserve his friends , by the richness of his presents , not by his merit , deserved rather than had them . friends are to be kept by iron , not gold ; for fear of arms creates more of them , than desire of money . pecuniary subsidies enervate the giver ; and the greater they are , the lesser time can they be continued ; and as fast as the prince's coffers empty , his reputation diminishes . princes are esteem'd and lov'd for the treasures they still have , not those they have already squandered away ; more , i say , for what they can give , than for what they have given : for hope prevails much more with men than gratitude . he who buys peace , is unable to uphold it with arms. this is a fault which almost all monarchies fall into , when arrived to some height of grandeur , they strive to maintain it by money , not arms ; and thus consuming their treasures , and oppressing their subjects , to raise contributions for neighbouring princes , to keep the circumference quiet , they weaken the center . and though that greatness be supported for a time , yet 't is at the price of a greater downfall ; for that weakness being known , and the frontiers once lost , the enemy , without opposition , makes way to their heart . thus it befell the roman empire , when , after having been at so many useless expences , and wasted their strength , the emperors went about to gain the parthians and germans by presents , which was the first beginning of their ruine . hence alcibiades advised tisaphernes not to be so liberal of his succors to the lacedaemonians , but to remember , that it was not his own , but another's victory he promoted ; and that he was to support the war , so as not to be obliged to abandon it through want . this counsel we may make our advantage of , by taking care , what is expended on favour of foreign princes , to the great prejudice and weakening of castile ; which yet , as being the heart of the whole monarchy , should be furnish'd with the greatest quantity of blood , to distribute vital spirits to all the other parts of the body ; as nature her self , the best mistress of politicks , instructs , who fortifies with the strongest fences the interiour parts , whereon life depends . if what timorousness and solicitude spends abroad to keep the monarchy in security , prudence would lay out at home in maintaining forces both by sea and land , in fortifying and garrisoning strong holds , forts and cities , the remote provinces would be abundantly more safe ; and if any one should be lost , it might easily be recovered by the forces within . rome was able to defend it self , and even to retake all that hannibal had gotten from them , nay , even to overthrow carthage it self , by keeping all its wealth and strength within the bowels of the commonwealth . not that i say this , with a desire to persuade princes always to refuse their money to their friends and neighbours , but only that they might be very careful how they lay it out , and rather assist them with men than money ; for this stays with them that receiv'd it , whereas those return to him who sent them . and this is to be understood , when there is no danger of engaging themselves in the war , by drawing it into their own states , or of getting their friend greater enemies ; as also when it is more expensive , and liable to more inconveniences to aid with money , than arms : for one of the two ways state-interest absolutely requires us to defend a neighbouring prince , as often as our fortune is inseparably joined with his ; it being prudenter to carry on a war in another's state , than to feed it in the very heart of our own . thus , of old , it was the peculiar way of the romans to make war far from home , and by the fortresses of the empire to defend the fortunes of their allies , not their own houses . and this we ought to have learn'd from that government , that we might not be forced to lament at this day so many calamities . 't is this policy , rather than ambition , that has moved the swiss-cantons to undertake the protection of some people ; for though they were sensible this could not be done without great charges , and the running the risque of their own defence , yet they thought it more their interest to keep the war out of their own territories : the confines of a neighbouring state are the walls of our own , and as such , to be guarded with all the care imaginable . emblem xcii . even the feathers of birds are in danger , when too near those of the eagle ; in that these , by that natural antipathy surviving in them , which is between the eagle and the other birds , corrode and destroy them . thus protection changes into tyranny . a superiour power observes no laws , ambition no respect . what was committed to its trust , it afterwards detains as its own , under colour of self-preservation . petty princes think to secure their states by foreign aids and utterly ruine them : they fall a prey both to friend and enemy ; the former being no less dangerous from confidence , than the latter from hatred . with a friend we live secure , without the least fear or precaution ; so that he may easily strike us , without any danger on his side . upon this reason , i conceive , was founded that law , which commanded , the oxe that had gored any one , to be stoned , but says nothing of the bull ; because we trust the oxe more , as being a domestick animal we every day make use of . ambition creeps in , under the pretext of friendship and protection ; and that , by their means , is easily obtained , which never could have been by force . with what specious names did the romans mask their tyranny , when they received the people of other nations for citizens , friends , and allies ? they admitted the albani into their common-wealth , peopling it with those who before were enemies : the sabines they made free of their city ; and abundance of countries called them to their aid , against their enemies , as the protectors of their liberties and privileges , and the universal arbitrators of justice . thus they , who of themselves could not have 〈◊〉 one foot of ground , by the ignorance of others , extended their dominions far and near . at first they exacted but moderate tributes of those nations ; thus disguising their treachery , under the appearance of morality . but when that imperial eagle had spread its wings wider , over the three parts of the world , europe , asia , and africa , she whet her beak upon ambition , and discovered the claws of her tyranny . the people then found their confidence was miserably deluded , and the feathers of their power destroyed , under those of the oppression of taxes , and the loss of their liberty and privileges ; and now the tyranny was grown powerful , could neither recover themselves again , nor re-establish their forces : and to the end the venom might turn into nature , the romans invented colonies , and introduced the latin tongue , thus to efface the distinction of nations , and leave the romans alone to enjoy the empire of all . this was that eagle in ezekiel's vision , with great wings , and many feathers ; or , as the septuagint has it , many talons , because such were its feathers . how often do men think they stand under the one , when they are really under the other ? how often do they think themselves covered with the lily , when stuck so fast amidst thorns and briars , that they can't escape without tearing their cloaths . the city of pisa put their rights and pretensions against the republick of florence , under the protection of ferdinand the catholick , and the king of france ; and both agreed to deliver it to the florentines , under the pretence of the repose of italy . lewis sforza employed the assistance of the french against his nephew , iohn galeas ; and they having divested him of the dutchy of milan , carried him prisoner into france . but what need is there to look so far for examples ? let the duke of mantua 〈◊〉 how dear another's protection has cost him ? let 〈◊〉 elector of treves , and the grisons , say whether they have ●●eserved their liberty , by admitting foreign armies into their states , for their defence and protection : let germany tell us how it finds it self , under the patronage of sweden ; now the noble circles of its provinces , heretofore the splendour and support of the imperial diadem , are divided and broken ; now those sparkling diamonds , the cities of the empire , its ancient ornament , are sullied and unset , the orders of its states overthrown and confounded , the harmony of its politick government destroyed , its ancient nobility stript and impoverished ; that , of all its provinces which knew best how to assert its liberty , now without the least appearance of it , is trampled under foot and laid waste by the fire and sword of foreign nations , and exposed to the will of a thousand tyrants , all living pictures of the king of sweden ; in a word , a slave both to friends and enemies , and so stupified by its misfortunes , that 't is render'd incapable of discerning its interest or disadvantage . this is the fate of all people at variance with themselves , of all princes who make use of foreign forces ; especially if he who sends , does not also pay them . thus it happened to the cities of greece , when philip , king of macedon , contriving to ensnare the liberty of all , fomented their contentions ; and by fiding with the weaker , made both the victors and vanquished submit to one yoke . glory , at first , prompts to the defence ; but in the end , ambition seizes all . whoever employs his forces for another , expects some amends for it . the country always loves the power that protects it ; the subjects imagining they shall live more secure and happy under his government , freed from the fear and danger of wars , and the severe taxes inferiour princes are wont to impose , and from those grievances they generally suffer at their hands . the nobles too , think it more honourable to serve a greater master , who has larger rewards to give , and greater preferments to confer upon them . all these considerations make way for tyranny and usurpation . auxiliary troops always obey him who sends them , or in whose pay they are , and treat those countries they serve in , as foreign ; so that when the war is ended with the enemy , they must begin with the friend . therefore i think it better , and less hazardous and expensive , for the weaker prince to come to a composition , upon any terms , with the more powerful , than even to conquer him with foreign arms : what cannot be obtained but by them , can much less be preserved without them , after they shall be withdrawn . this danger of auxiliary forces is yet more to be feared , when the prince who sends them is of a different religion , or has , or at least pretends to some right to that state ; or else , if it be of any considerable advantage for him to be possessed of it , for the opening a passage to his own , or obstructing that of an enemy . these apprehensions should be measured by necessity , the condition and manners of the prince being well examined ; for if he be open and generous , publick faith and reputation will have more influence on him , than interest , and reasons of state ; as has been experienced in all the princes of the house of austria , ( represented by that powerful protecting cherub to which ezekiel compares the king of tyre , before he failed in his duty ) of whose friendship no one can justly complain . piedmont , savoy , cologne , constance , and brisac , all places defended by the spanish arms , and afterwards restored without so much as a garrison left in them , are everlasting witnesses of this truth . nor can genoua deny it ; for when oppressed by france and savoy , it put its liberty into the hands of the spaniards , these people most faithfully preserved it , as esteeming more their friendship , and the glory of publick faith , than dominion . but if necessity , at any time , oblige the prince to have recourse to a foreigner , he may avoid the dangers mentioned , by these two or three cautions : if he take care that the foreign forces be not greater than his own ; that his own officers command them ; that they be not put in garrisons ; that they be mixed or divided , and immediately drawn out against the enemy . emblem xciii . often has the tyrrhene sea felt the danger of the neighbourhood of mount vesuvius : but we learn not always to profit by our misfortunes , being , out of a vain confidence , apt to persuade our selves , they will never happen a second time . the world had long since been at the height of wisdom , had it known how to improve by its experiences : but time , we see , effaces them , as it did in the ruines the late conflagrations had left upon the skirts of that mountain , covering it with a prodigious quantity of ashes , which , but a few years afterwards , the plough cultivated , and reduced again to soil . the remembrance of the losses sustained , was lost , or rather , no one would retain it , when yet they ought to have ever kept humane caution upon its guard. the treacherous mountain conceal'd under its green garment the heat and drought of its entrails ; and the sea , suspecting no harm , made an alliance with it , and embraced it with its waters , not regarding the contrariety of those two natures . but the treacherous mountain kept its intention so close , that not the least smoke gave any sign of what was plotting within . their communication encreased by secret ways : nor co●ld the sea imagine this pretended friend was raising fortifications against it , and preparing mines with divers sulphurous metals ; which being afterwards filled , and that in our age , was set fire to . there open'd , on the top of it , a wide and deep mouth , breathing out flames , which at first seem'd to be no more than p●●mes , as i may say , of sparks , or bonfires , but in a few hours proved tragical prodigies . this heavy body several times shook ; and amidst its dreadful thunder , vomited up the liquid flames of those indigested matters of melted metals which boiled in its stomach : like torrents of fire they streamed down it , into the plains adjacent , burning the trees , and carrying the houses along with them , till at length they run into the sea ; which , astonish'd at so sudden an hostility , retired with its waters to the very center , whether out of fear , or policy , to raise a greater body of waves to defend it self withal ; for now the old league was violated , it was obliged to prepare for its defence . the two elements engaged not without the trembling of nature her ●elf , afraid of seeing this beautiful fabrick of the universe on fire : the very waves , conquered by a superiour enemy , burned ; and the fish , swimming in the flames , were drowned : for the fire , ( as solomon speaks ) had power in the water , forgetting his own vertue ; and the water forgot his own quenching nature . such will be the effects of all the like alliances of contrary natures . let not the catholick prince , who enters into a confederacy with infidels , expect less evils . for there being no more inveterate animosities than those which arise from the difference of religions , the present necessity may indeed dissemble them , but it is impossible that time should not discover them : and how is it to be imagined that amity can ever be maintained between them , when the one cannot trust the other ? when the ruine of this , is the interest of that ? they who differ in opinions , differ also in minds ; and as creatures of that eternal artificer , we cannot suffer any other adoration to be paid him , than what we judge to be true and orthodox . and altho' the friendship of infidels were never so good , yet divine justice permits us not to obtain our ends by the means of his enemies , nay , usually chastises us by the very infidel's hand that sign'd the treaty . the emperor which constantine the great translated into the east , was ruin'd by the alliance of the palaeologi with the turk ; god permitting it to remain to posterity , for an example of his correction , but not any living memorial of that family . but if , by reason of the distance of places , or disposition of things , the chastisement cannot be inflicted by those very infidels , god uses his own hand . what calamities has not france suffered , since francis i. more through emulation of charles the fifth's glory , than forced by any necessity , made a league with the turk , and called him into europe ? this fault he acknowledged in the last moments of his life , expressed his utmost detestation of it in words ; which piously we ought to impute to a christian compunction , though otherwise they seemed to proceed from extreme despair . god pursued his chastisement in some of his successors , by taking them off with violent and unhappy deaths . now if this just judge be thus severe on princes who do but ask the aid of infidels and hereticks , what will he do to those who assist them against the catholicks , and are the reason of their making such great progresses ? the example of peter ii. of arragon , will tell us : this king stuck with all his forces to the faction of the albigenses in france ; and though he fought at the head of one hundred thousand men , against the catholicks , who were but eight hundred horse , and a thousand foot , lost at once both his life and the battel . iudas machabaeus no sooner joined with the romans , tho' only to defend himself against the grecian power , but the two angels , that stood by his side , left him , and he was slain . the same punishment , and for the same cause , suffered ionathan and simon , his brothers and successors . nor is the excuse of self-defence always sufficient ; for all the conditions and circumstances that make such confederacies allowable , very rarely concurr , and are of greater weight than that universal scandal and danger of defiling the true religion with errors ; the communication of hereticks being a poison apt to infect , a gangrene that soon spreads , where minds are enclined to novelty and licentiousness . policy distrusting the divine assistance , and wholly relying upon humane artifices , may indeed deceive it self , but not god , at whose tribunal meer appearances of reason are not received . baasha , king of israel , built a fortress in ramah , the last city of the tribe of benjamin , in the kingdom of asa , and so stopt its avenues , that no one could go in or out of it with safety . this occasion'd a war between those two kings ; and asa fearing the alliance of ben-hadad , king of syria , with his enemy , contrived first to break that , and then enter'd himself into a confederacy with ben-hadad : which when baasha heard , he left off building the fortifications of ramah . nevertheless , though asa made this league out of necessity , and only for his own defence , whereof the good effect soon appeared ; yet god was displeased that he put more confidence in the king of syria than in him , and sent hanani the prophet to represent his fault to him , and threaten him with wars , as a punishment ; which accordingly happened . whence it will be easie to gather , how much france has incurred the divine displeasure , by the alliances it has now engaged it self in with those of another religion , to oppress the house of austria : where is no room for the pretence of self-preservation in extreme necessity , since without any provocation or reason , he has sided with all its adversaries , and made war upon it , fomenting it out of their states , and enlarging these by the usurpation of foreign provinces , and assisting the hereticks and their allies with counsel and arms to conquer the catholicks ; no one , in the mean time , coming thence to the treaty of peace at cologne , although the pope , the emperor , and king of spain , had all sent their plenipotentiaries thither . nor is it unlawful only to make leagues with hereticks , but even to make use of their forces . the holy scriptures give us an illustrious instance of this , in the person of king amasiah , who having hired an army of the sons of israel , was commanded of god to dismiss it , and reproved , for not rather relying on him . and because he presently obeyed , without any regard to the danger , or to the hundred talents he had given them , god gave him a signal victory over his enemies . confederacy with those of a different religion is lawful , when its end is the intermission of war , and liberty of commerce ; such as that was which isaac made with abimelech , and as now is between spain and england . when any treaty is made with hereticks , provided it interfere not with religion or good manners , and be confirmed by oath , the publick faith is by all means to be kept with them ; for in the oath , god is called to be a witness to the agreement , and , as it were , a surety for the performance of it , both parties consenting to make him judge of it , to punish the perjurer . and certainly it were a hainous sin , to call him to witness to a lye. nations have no other security of the treaties they make , than the religion of oaths ; which if they should make use of to deceive , there would be an end of commerce in the world , nor would it be possible for firm truces or peace to be ever concluded . but though there pass no oath , yet the treaties should nevertheless be observed : for from the truth , fidelity and justice whereby they are maintained , there arises in them a mutual obligation , and a duty common to all nations ; and as it is not allowable to kill or hate a man of a different communion , so neither is it to cheat , or break a promise to him . hence ioshua kept his oath with the gibeonites : a thing which was so pleasing to god almighty , that he vouchsafed in his savour to interrupt the natural order of the orbs of heaven , obeying the voice of ioshua , and stopping the sun in the midst of its course , to give him time to prosecute the slaughter of his enemies , and acquit himself of his obligation : as , on the contrary , he punished david with a three years famine , for saul's breaking this very treaty three hundred years after . emblem xciv . the sun , when in libra , distributes his rays with so much justice , that he makes the days and nights equal ; not , however , without having a more particular regard to the zones that are nearest and most subject to his empire , to which he imparts a greater force of light , always preferring those climates and pa●allels that are least remote ; and if any country suffers the intemperatures of heat under the torrid zone , the fault is in its ill situation , not in the sun's rays , since they are at the same time benign to other parts of the same zone . now what the sun does in the equinoctial-line , a part of heaven so considerable , that if the immense being of god could be confined to any limited place , it could be no other than that ; the same effect , i say , is produced here below , by that pontifical triple-crown , which from rome , as a fixed equinox , with its divine rays illuminates all the parts of the world : this is the sun of these inferior orbs , in which was substituted the power of the light of that eternal sun of righteousness , that all things sacred might receive from it their true form , so as never to be called in question by the shadows of impious opinions . there is no country so near the poles , but the brightness of its rays , in spite of the frosts and mists of ignorance , has reached it . this tiara , or triple-crown , is the touch-stone on which other crowns are tried , and the caracts of their gold and silver proved , in that , as in a crucible , they are separated from other base metals ; and it is by the tau they are stampt with , that they are assured of their real value . hence ramius , king of arragon , and many others , voluntarily offered to become feudataries to the church , looking on it as an honour and happiness for their crowns to pay it tribute . those that refuse the touch of this apostolical stone , are of lead and tin , and so soon wear out , and consume , rarely passing to the fifth generation , ( as we see by frequent experience . ) it was with the respect and obedience of princes , that their temporal grandeur and dignity , foretold by the prophet isaiah , was encreased ; who afterwards armed the spiritual sword , so as to render it capable of being the balance of the kingdoms of christendom . and by the same means the popes still endeavour to support their power , procuring the favour of potentates by their paternal affection . their empire over minds is a voluntary one , imposed by reason , not force : and if at any time this latter has been too immoderate , it has had quite contrary effects ; for passion is blind , and easily runs headlong . the papacy even unarmed , is stronger than the best appointed armies . the presence of pope leo in his pontifical robes , struck such a terrour into attila , that it made him retreat , and lay aside his thoughts of sacking of rome ; which had he attempted by arms , he had never quelled the haughty spirit of that barbarian . the bare whistle of the shepherd , or a kind menace of the crook or sling , do more than the hardest stones . it is a rebellious sheep , that must be led by rigour : for if the piety of the faithful has given force to the papal dignity , that was rather for the security of its grandeur , than done with a design to let them use it , except when the maintenance of religion , and the universal benefit of the church so required . when , contrary to this one consideration , the mitre is turned into a helmet , no more reverence or obedience is due to it , than if it were merely temporal * : and if it will depend on reasons of state , it will be looked upon only as a politick prince's crown , not as the diadem of a pope , whose empire is supported by a spiritual authority . his pastoral office is of peace only , not war ; his crosier crooked , to guide , not pointed , to wound . the sovereign priest is the sovereign man , and therefore should not , as other men , be guilty of envy , hatred or partiality , which are always incentives of war . this even the very pagans required in their chief-priest . the splendour of his vertues strike the mind more than the sword does the body , which is much less prevalent in composing the differences of princes than love and respect ; for when princes once see that his good offices proceed from a true paternal love , free from passions , affections , and politick artifices , they willingly lay their rights , and arms , at his feet . this several popes have had experience of , who avoiding neutrality , have shewn themselves the common fathers of the whole world. he who adheres to one alone , denies himself to all besides ; and he that is neither on this side nor that side , takes the part of none . whereas the high-priests should be for all , as their garments , in the old law , gave us to understand , whose exquisite make represented the globe of the earth . 't is a piece of cruelty to stand with arms a-cross at the sight of other mens calamities . should a father stand still while his children quarrel , he would be deservedly blamed for whatever mischief they should do one to another ; he ought , sometimes by rigour , sometimes by good words , to part them , putting himself betwixt them , or , if need be , espousing one's cause , the better to reduce the other to agreement . thus if princes refuse to hearken to the fatherly admonition of his holiness , if they pay not the respect due to his authority , and there be no hopes of ever recovering them , it seems best to declare in favour of the most just side , always having regard to the publick quiet , and the advancement of religion and the church , to assist that , till the other be brought to its duty : for he that approves the cause of the one and the other , will be thought to co-operate with both . * in italy , more than in any other part of the world , this care of the popes is necessary : for if once they so openly betray their inclination to the french , that they may promise themselves their aid and favour , they will soon bring their arms thither . this conside●●tion prevailed on some popes to shew themselves more addicted to spain , the better to keep france within bounds ; and if at any time , any one , induced by an appearance of good , or through partiality or self-interest , and a forgetfulness of this caution , has used secular arms , and called in the aid of foreigners , he 〈◊〉 given occasion to great commotions in italy ; as historians observe , in the lives of vrban iv. who sent for charles , count of anjou and provence , to 〈◊〉 relief , against mainfroy , king of both sicilies : of nicholas iii. who being jealous of the power of king charles , had recourse to peter , king of arragon : of nicholas iv. who enter'd into a league with alphonsus ●f arragon , against king iames : of boniface viii . who ●ppealed to iames , king of arragon , and called in the assistance of charles of valois , count of anjou , against ●rederick , king of sicily : of eugenius iv. who sided with the faction of anjou , against alphonsus , king of n●ples : of clement v. who sought the aid of philip of 〈◊〉 , against the viscounts of milan : of leo x. and c●●ment vii . who made a league with francis , king of france , against charles v. to throw the spaniards out of italy . this inconveniency proceeds from the weight of the apostolick see , it being so great , that the scale wherein 't is put must necessarily fall very much . it is probable that some appearance of good moved those ●●pes to do thus ; but certainly , in some of them , the 〈◊〉 was far from answering their intention . but as it is the duty of the popes to endeavour to ●●intain princes in peace and tranquility ; so ought these , out of interest ( were there no divine obligation for it , as there really is ) to have continually their eyes , like the heliotrope , upon that sun of the pope's triple-crown , which always shines , and never sets , and to be ●●edient to , and protect it . hence alphonsus v. king of arragon , upon his death-bed , charged his son ferdinand , king of naples , to esteem nothing beyond the authority of the apostolick see , and the favour of the popes ; and to take care not to disgust them , whatever reason he had on his side . impious or imprudent princes think it a piece of bravery to carry themselves haughtily towards the popes : but such an humility is so far from being a weakness , that 't is a religious act ; 't is no dishonour , but a glory . the most submissive deferences paid them by the greatest princes , are but a pious magnanimity , that teaches subjects what respect is to be paid to all that is sacred ; they beget not any infamy , but rather an universal applause . no one condemned the emperor constanti●● , for taking a low seat in a council of bishops ; nor king egica , for prostrating himself upon the ground , in another held at toledo . no one ever succeeds in opposing the popes ; those are quarrels that nev●● have a good end ? and who can separate the inter●●● of the temporal prince from that of the head of the church ? injury and authority are so joined , that the greater that is , the more it derogates from this . the pontifical dignity , when armed with both the temporal and spiritual sword , withstands the greatest power . it meets with an unshaken obedience in foreign kingdoms ; and if it once goes to make war upon them , the people's piety grows cold , and from fighting with arms , they come to that of books ; allegiance tott●● ▪ and religion being confounded , changes of governm●●● ensue , and the overthrow of kingdoms , whose only bottom is the reverence and respect of the priesthood . which made some nations unite it to the re●● dignity . princes ought therefore to carry themsel●● with so much prudence , as to decline , as much as 〈◊〉 sible , giving any occasion of distaste to the pope●● which they will do , if they pay a due respect to 〈◊〉 apostolick see , maintaining its privileges , rights , 〈◊〉 ●munities inviolable , and asserting their own with ●urage and resolution , when they interfere not with ●●●m , without admitting any innovations prejudicial to ●●eir own states , and which tend not to the spiritual ●ood of their subjects . when charles v. went into ●ely to be crown'd , the pope's legates would oblige ●●●m to take an oath to preserve the rights of the church . ●o which he answer'd , that as he would not alter them , 〈◊〉 neither would he , on the other side , do any thing against 〈◊〉 constitutions of the empire : which he said , upon the ●●count of the fiefs which the church pre●ded on parma and placentia . * king ●dinand the catholick was so exact in this , ●at one may , in a manner , say he fell ●to excess ; judging it not fit to transgress ●●e limits of rights and privileges the ●st in the world ; because when the foot is once ●●ed , it presently defends the place it stands on , as a ●●●ssession ; and insensibly goes farther , when , by briskly ●●posing its first steps , much greater losses might be ●●oided . iohn , king of arragon , refused to ratifie the ●●ant of the archbishoprick of saragossa , made by pope ●●tus iv. to cardinal ausias dezpuch , because he did not ●ominate him , as was then the custom ; but causing the ●●rdinal's goods and revenues to be seized , and mis●ing his relations , forced him to quit the pontificate , ●●ich he afterwards conferred upon his nephew al●●●sus . such another dispute , a little after , arose ●●on the subject of the church of tarrassona ; which a ●rtain temporal judge having been made bishop of , 〈◊〉 ordered him to leave it instantly , threatning , if he ●●d not , to drive him , and all that belong'd to him , out 〈◊〉 his kingdom . the same did his son ferdinand , in 〈◊〉 the bishoprick of cuenca , to which pope sixtus had ●●●ated raphaël galeot , a relation of his own : for ●●e king , incens'd that it should be given to a foreigner , and without his nomination , enjoined all the spaniards to leave rome , protesting he would call a council upon that and some other matters ; and when the pope afterwards sent his nuncio into spain , he bid him return , complaining that his holiness did not use him as such an obedient son of the church deserved , and wondred that the embassador should undertake such a commission : but he humbly making answer , that he would renounce the pri●●es of an embassador , and submit wholly to his majesty's pleasure ; by this , and the good offices of the cardinal of spain , he was admitted , and all the differences adjusted . but unless , for self-preservation , or otherwise , the case be extremely dangerous , recourse should not be had to these methods ; and it is befitting the paternal affection of the popes , not to give occasion to them , behaving themselves so courteous always , so as thereby to maintain a good correspondence with princes : for although they have in their hand , as was said , the two swords of spiritual and temporal authority , yet this ought to execute nothing but by the arms of emperors and kings , as protectors and defenders of the church : which makes it ( as alphonsus the wise says * ) of so much concernment for those two powers always to agree , so that each may help the other , when occasion requires . i doubt not but all those whom god hath placed in this high station , have this care deeply rooted in their hearts ; but yet it is often-times perplexed by the courtiers of rome , whose only business is to sow discords ; as also by the ambition of some ministers , who think to wind themselves into the favour of the popes , and to procure the best preferments by their independency on princes , and by the aversion they bear them , always inventing pretences to reject their petitions , and taking all occasions of affronting their embassadors ; and who , to appear stout , suggest violent counsels , under colour of religion and zeal : all which ruine the good understanding of the popes and temporal princes , to the great prejudice of the christian commonwealth , and chills the veins of piety , for want of love , the artery that cherishes them , and maintains their warmth . emblem xcv . the isthmus maintains it self between the force and power of two contrary seas , as their common arbiter , not enclining more to this than that : hence , what one takes from it , the other restores again ; and by the conflict of both , it is preserved entire ; for if the waves of either should once swell and overflow the whole tract of ground , they would spoil its jurisdiction , and it would be no longer an isthmus . this neutrality betwixt two great powers supported , for a long time , peter ruiz d'azagra in his government of albarraein , situate on the frontiers of castile and arragon ; for each of these kings took care not to let it be oppress'd by the other , and those emulations kept the freedom of that little state untouch'd . by this the dukes of savoy may see how much it is their interest to stand neuter between the two crowns of france and spain , and to keep in their hands the free disposal of the passes into ●●aly by the alps , as a thing whereon their grandeu● , their conservation , and the necessity of their friendship , entirely depends ; it highly concerning each of these crowns not to let them be subdued by the other . hence the spaniards have so often marched to the aid of charles emanuel , and recovered such places as the french had taken from him . i know only one case wherein it is better that these princes brea● this neutrality , and side with one of the two crowns and that is , when the other attempts the conquest of their dominions , particularly that of france : for if once the french should drive the spaniards out of italy , they would become so powerful ( considering they have already e●tended their dominions from the very utmost limits of the ocean , as far as the mediterranean , through cal●●ria ) that over running the states of savoy and piedmont , they must of necessity either unite them to the crown of france , or but then them with an intolerable slavery , which the whole body of italy would soon feel the effects of , without hopes of redeeming their liberty again ; and for spain ever to retrieve their losses , or balance their forces , would be extremely difficult , considering the vast distance between them too . this danger the republick of venice , with a great deal of prudence , weighed , when seeing charles the eighth's power encrease in italy , they struck up that which was called the holy league . from that time , one may say , divine providence began to contrive the security and preservation of the apostolick chair , and of religion , and to prevent its falling under the tyranny of the turk , or being infected with the heresies , then taking root in germany ; advanced the greatness of the house of austria , and establish'd the spanish monarchy in the states of naples , sicily , and milan , that italy might have a catholick prince to defend it on all sides : and to restrain the power of spain , and make it content with the rights of succession , fiefs , and arms , it raised it a rival in the person of the king of france , to lay its kings under a necessity for their preservation of gaining the love and good-will of their subjects , and the esteem of other princes , by maintaining justice among them , with these peace , without giving the least occasion to war , which always hazards the rights and designs of the most powerful . this advantage which italy reaps from the power of spain , is , by some , unjustly traduced as a yoke of slavery ; when , on the contrary , it is the only instrument of its repose , of its liberty and religion : the mistake proceeds from their not well knowing the importance of this counterpoise . a person , ignorant in navigation , seeing the bottom of a ship filled with sand and stones , thinks it carries the cause of its wreck in this weight : whereas they who are acquainted with sea-affairs , know , that without this ballast , the lightness of the ship could never subsist long against the agitation of the waves . nicephorus , speaking of this aequilibrium between two crowns , looks on it as a common advantage to the subjects of both kingdoms , when he says , that he could not enough admire the inscrutable wisdom of god , who makes two directly opposite means tend to the same end ; as when he would keep two powers at variance , without however subjecting the one to the other , he either gives to both commanders , whose capacity and courage discover the artifices , and oppose the attempts of the adverse party , which makes for the liberty of the subjects of both sides ; or else sets over them men so senseless and cowardly , that they undertake nothing considerable one against another , but leave the limits of the kingdom as they found them . for the same ends , divine providence has parted the forces of the french and spanish kings , by interposing the high walls of the alps , lest propinquity of territories , or easiness of passage , should be a temptation to war , and favour the french most , if that nation should have these doors so often open . it has still , for greater security , given the keys of them to the duke of savoy , an italian prince , who having his states between those two kingdoms , can lock or leave them open , according as the publick good requires . this divine disposition pope clement viii . was sensible of , and with singular prudence procured the state of saluzzes to fall into the duke of savoy ' s hands . * this was a very ancient state-maxim ; on which alphonsus , king of naples , grounded his advice to the duke of milan , not to deliver up asti to lewis the dauphin : for ( said he ) it is not for the good of italy , that the french strive to get footing there , but to bring it under their subjection , as was attempted in the genoese expedition . that italian prince penetrated not the force of this counsel , who advised the prefent french king , by making himself master of pignerol , to get firm footing on the alps ; deceived probably ( unless it were malice ) by the appearing conveniency of having the french ready against any attacks of the spaniards ; not considering , that by the fear of a future war , which might perhaps never have really happen'd , a present and most certain one is kindled , upon the admission of the french into italy ; it being impossible for peace to be preserved in any one province betwixt two nations so opposite and disagreeing : nor were italy like to reap any other benefit from it than this , that it would nourish a serpent in its bosom , whose poisonous sting would certainly afterwards envenom it . besides that the french , even when within their own limits , on the other side of the alps , are always near enough to march into italy , when called , nor is it necessary that they be so near as to have the passage at their command . besides , were the french so modest , so void of ambition , as to confine themselves there , and not move but when called upon ; yet who doubts but upon such an occasion they would widely transgress the bounds of protection ; as lewis sforza , castruchio castrocani , and several others , have actually experienc'd , who sought their aid with no other advantage , than that the same befell them ( as it does some at this day ) which tacitus relates to have happened to the frecentini , who , while they agreed among themselves , valued not the parthians ; but upon their falling into dissentions , while each called in aid against his rival , the person invited by one party conquered both . now if that power might be brought into pignerol , so as to be wholly at the disposal of italy , either to call it in , or send it out of its territories , as occasion should require , there had then been some reason in the policy , some colour of zeal for the publick good , in this counsel : but now , in a time the most improper in the world , to place it within the very gates of italy , to enter them upon every motion of ambition or levity , and that fear of it might keep the spaniards continually upon their guard , and occasion be given to other princes to take up arms , and a storm of wars be raised never to be calmed , was so far from being good counsel , that it was the rankest treason , being , in plain terms , no other than exposing it to the power of france , and wresting that out of the italian prince's hand , which he had over the alps , for the common good of all. in the other potentates of italy , which are not situate between those two crowns , this reason of neutrality has not the same force ; for when once war is brought into italy , they cannot but fall a prey to the conqueror , without having obliged either party ; as the consul quinetius said to the aetolians , to persuade them to declare for the romans , in the war against antiochus ; and as the florentines found , when refusing to join with the king of arragon , they stood neuter ; thereby losing the favour of the french king , without appeasing the anger of the pope . neutrality neither makes friends , nor removes enemies . hence alphonsus , king of naples , said of the sienois , who thinking to save themselves by neutrality , were ruin'd , that the same happened to them , which usually does to one who lodges in the middle of an house , whom they below fill with smoke , those above pour water down upon him . what did not the thebans suffer , by being neutral , when xerxes invaded greece ? while lewis xi . of france continued so , he never had peace with any prince . * let not the prince be deceived , in imagining this neutrality to be the best means to balance the forces of spain and france ; for certainly there ought to be some declaration in behalf of the former , not that it may enlarge its territories , or make an inrode into france , but that it may maintain what it is already possessed of , and the french be kept within their kingdom , and not by any neutrality or affection be invited out . and this is so certain , that the very declaration of favour , without any other publick de●●nstrations , poises these scales , and is a sufficient ar●ment of war. italy can never bear two factions that ●ive to raise their fortunes by the contention of both ●owns within its bowels . this charles v. was sensible 〈◊〉 when , to restore peace to italy , he destroyed them , ●●d new-modelled the republick of florence , which at ●●at time encouraged them ; for one of the two balances 〈◊〉 france or spain , never so little over-loaded , turned . 〈◊〉 scale of peace , which consists in keeping them even . ●●on the knowledge of this truth , all prudent princes ●●d commonwealths have shewed themselves more ad●●ed to spain , to add some weight to it ; and that by ●●ing a more perfect aequilibrium , they , with their ●●tes , might enjoy a happy tranquility ; and if at any ●ne any one has disordered it , by espousing the contrary ●●ty , he has been the occasion of great troubles , and ●●moted the ruine of italy . glory , that constant attendant of ambition , prompts ●ne italians to think it would be more advantageous 〈◊〉 them to unite against both crowns , and have no ●●er masters but themselves , either by dividing them●●ves into republicks , or setting up one head. thoughts ●re for talk , than effect , considering the present ●●ndition of italy ; for either this sovereign must be 〈◊〉 pope , or some other . if the pope , there want not ●●y many plausible reasons to shew the impossibility 〈◊〉 maintaining a spiritual monarchy changed into a ●mporal one under an elective prince ( especially if 〈◊〉 be of a declining age , as generally all the popes are ) ●sed only in arts of peace , and ecclesiastical tran●lity , wholly employed in spiritual affairs , and sur●nded with nephews and relations , who , should ●●●y not require to secure to themselves the succession 〈◊〉 their states , will be sure to share them by investitures . ●●●des , it being the interest of christendom , that the ●●●es be the common fathers of all its members , and 〈◊〉 have any differences with other princes , they will ●●●eby be engaged in perpetual quarrels with those two ●●wns ; which , on account of the claims each lay to the dutchy of milan , and the kingdoms of naples and sicily , will soon fall upon the apostolick see , whethe● joined by some compact to divide the conquests of these states , or separately , one breaking into italy through , the milanese , the other through naples , with the danger too of one of them calling in the aid of the germans , or the turk , who would afterwards fix in italy . but suppose any person were created king of all italy , yet still the same inconveniencies would remain ; nay , another much greater would arise from hence ; that in form a monarchy , this king must necessarily make other princes subject to him , and strip the pope of his empire : for should he leave them in the same condition they are at present , ( though it were under some acknowledgment of homage , or in alliance ) he could never support himself ; besides that thus italy would lose that spiritual empire , which renders it no less ill●strious than heretofore the roman did , and being d●prived of its liberty , would be brought to a kind 〈◊〉 tyrannical confusion . there is yet less probability of italy 's continuing 〈◊〉 peace , under several native princes , for they can neve● agree so uniformly as to unite against the two crow● but will rather ruine one another by intestine wars , ● it happened in former ages ; the italian nation being 〈◊〉 so lofty a genius , that it scorns a medium ; either it m●●● absolutely govern or obey . from all which , it appears , how necessary so●● foreign power is to italy , which , opposed to all othe● neither suffers wars between its princes , nor allo● them to make use of foreign arms ; which is the reas● that since it was united with the crown of spain , it 〈◊〉 always enjoy'd a perfect and continual peace . the advantage therefore that attends that necessity 〈◊〉 joining it self to one of the two crowns , may pre●●● upon the italian nation to conform to the present 〈◊〉 especially since if there should happen any alteration 〈◊〉 milan , naples and sicily , it could not but give a 〈◊〉 ●●●●rbance to other governments : for no new forms 〈◊〉 ●ntroduced without the corruption of others ; and 〈◊〉 one of the two nations must be incorporated 〈◊〉 italy , the spanish has most reason for it , they lying 〈◊〉 under the same climate , which renders them more 〈◊〉 in firmness of religion , observance of justice , ●vity of actions , fidelity to their princes , constancy in 〈◊〉 promises and publick faith , in moderation of mind , 〈◊〉 briefly , in all other customs and manners ; and ●es , because the king of spain governs not in italy 〈◊〉 stranger , but as an italian prince , who aims at no●●●g more there , than to maintain what he justly pos●●● since he can , with much more advantage to his 〈◊〉 , extend his monarchy over the vast countries 〈◊〉 africa . this maxim ferdinand the catholick left to successors , in generously refusing the offer of the 〈◊〉 of emperor of italy , saying , that he desired nothing 〈◊〉 what of right belonged to him , and that it was not his 〈◊〉 to dismember the imperial dignity . this truth is ●●●ently attested by the restitutions the king of spain 〈◊〉 made of several places , without making use of any 〈◊〉 of arms , or demanding satisfaction for charges 〈◊〉 damage , or taking up arms but upon necessity , 〈◊〉 for his own defence , or that of another , as the 〈◊〉 of mantua have experienc'd ; and if he has at 〈◊〉 time made war upon the duke of nevers , it was 〈◊〉 as malice would insinuate , to make himself master ●asal , but to put it in the power of the emperor to justice to those who laid pretensions to these states . 〈◊〉 the duke of nevers having implored , by the marquess mirebaean , his majesty's protection and consent to 〈◊〉 marriage of his son , the duke of retel , with the ●●●eess mary , obtained both : but after the conclusion of 〈◊〉 matter , advice was brought to madrid , that by the ●er-hand practices of count d'estrige , the wedding 〈◊〉 already celebrated , vincent , duke of mantua , being ●he point of death , without the king's knowledge , ●●●ctly against the agreement between him and the 〈◊〉 ; which was the reason that this novelty , which appeared to some a kind of slight and distrust , deferred first the execution of the protection , and gave afterwards place to fresh deliberations ; wherein it was resolved , that without any notice taken of all this , the favour promised , should remain in full force , and one be sent to give the married couple joy. but as divine providence had determined the destruction of the city and house of mantua , for the vices of its princes , and their violation of so many marriages , it directed all events to that end ; and accordingly , for this reason , while these things passed in spain , cardinal richlieu , a sworn enemy to the duke of nevers , brought it about , that the duke of savoy , assisted by his master , denounced war against him , to get what he laid claim to in montferrat . but the duke smelling this to be nothing but a pretence , under which to bring th● french arms into italy , and by the ruine of both dukes , to encrease the grandeur of france , discover'd the whole intrigue to gonsalvo of cordoua , governor of milan , promising to desert the french , if he would ass●●● him . gonsalvo desired time to consider , and se●●● advice of it into spain ; and seeing the duke make some difficulty to grant it , and that if he did not succo● him , the doors of the alps would be open to the french , he , of his own head , agreed with the duke , hoping to make himself master of casal , by the mea●●● of espadin , whereby ( as himself wrote to his majesty ) the emperor might with much more ease determine the controversies on foot in montferrat and mantua : a reso●lution which obliged his majesty to suspend a second time● the execution of the protection promised , though contrary to his design of procuring the peace of italy ▪ nevertheless , to maintain that , and cut off all occasi●● of jealousie , he gave order to gonsalvo of cordoua , that if , as was supposed , he was already possessed of casa● ▪ he should keep it in the name of the emperor , the true master of it , at the same time dispatching letters to him to that effect , to convey , in that case , to his imperial majesty . but the treaty with espadin not su●●ding , gonsalvo , without any order from his ma●●●y , invested casal ; which was the occasion of the 〈◊〉 of france ' s journey to susa , and of spain's being ●xpectedly engaged in the war , after having pub●ly protested that those forces were only auxi●ies to the emperor , to the end the rights of the ●●enders upon mon●ferrat and mantua might be ●●ded by way of justice ; nor would gonsalvo accept ●he term offered him by the duke of nevers , of ●●●ng casal , lest any should think his majesty engaged ●ese commotions more out of private interest , than 〈◊〉 the fake of the publick quiet . this is the very ●th of the matter , which so many have unjustly ●aim'd against , so few really known . ●et the prince therefore and republick of italy lay ●e the empty shadows of jealousies assuring them●es that spain aims at nothing more than to keep up 〈◊〉 grandeur amongst them , not to encrease it ; and let 〈◊〉 give place to this true piece of policy , if they desire peace of italy : for these imaginary emulations tend ●o other end , but to promote its disquiet ; there ●g no war but what proceeds either from the ambi●●● of a powerful monarch , or the apprehensions of ●●feriour prince . emblem xcvi . victory in just wars , aims at no other end 〈◊〉 peace : hence that is the most glorious , wh●●● is obtained with least damage , and more 〈◊〉 stratagem than force , which was least covered 〈◊〉 dust and blood ; which horace calls , — dulcis sine pulvere palma : * lawrels with ease obtain'd , smell always sweet . the romans , for bloody victories , sacrificed a 〈◊〉 and an oxe , for those got by stratagem . if by wit●●● ●nderstanding we are like god , but have force in com●on with brutes , undoubtedly there is more glory in ●●quering with the former than the latter . tiberius ●s better pleas'd in having quieted the empire by pru●nce , than if he had done it by the sword : and agricola looked on it as glorious to vanquish the britains ●●●thout the loss of roman blood . if victory pro●oses the preservation and encrease of the common-●ealth , it will succeed much better by policy or nego●tion , than by arms. the life of one citizen is of ●ore account than the death of many enemies . whence ●●pio the african used to say , that be had rather save 〈◊〉 citizen , than conquer a thousand enemies : a sentence ●hich afterwards the emperor marcus antoninus pius ●ok for his device . for to conquer an enemy is the 〈◊〉 work of a general ; to save a citizen , that of a ●●triot . vitellius considered not this , when having de●●ded otho , he said , in passing among the dead bodies , ●●he smell of dead enemies is sweet , but that of citizens yet ●●eter . a barbarous saying , unworthy even of a vulture . ● quite different compassion was seen in himilcon , who ●ving obtained considerable victories in sicily , because 〈◊〉 had lost most of his men by sicknesses which seized 〈◊〉 army in their camp , entered carthage , not in ●riumph , but in mourning , and the habit of a slave , ●●d going strait to his quarters , killed himself , without ●aking a word to any . cruel victory seems to be ●●re the heat of revenge , than effect of courage ; it has ●●re of fierceness than reason in it . when lewis xii . ●ing of france , received news , that his army had ●otten the better in the battel of ravenna , though with 〈◊〉 loss of all his officers , and the best part of his ●●diers ; would to god ( said he , sighing ) i had lost the ●ay , and my brave captains were now alive ! may such ●ctories as these be for my enemies , wherein the conquered 〈◊〉 conqueror , and the victor vanquished . for this reason , the most prudent commanders decline engagements and attacks as much as possible ; and value themselves more upon obliging the enemy to yield , than upon subduing him by force . the great captain received gajeta by surrender : and some thinking he had better , since he was now master of the field , have stormed it , and taken the officers , with the garrison , prisoners , to prevent any mischief they might do , if let go ; he answered , it would have cost more in powder and ball than the danger would have been worth . it is a generous valour that brings the enemy to a surrender without bloodshed , and a happy war that is ended by mercy and pardon . valour is for the enemy , but mercy for the captive . this generosity of mind is very rare now-a-days , when war is undertaken more to satisfie passion , than to exert valour , more for devastation than conquest . it is called peace , to reduce cities into ashes , and countries into desarts , to lay waste and burn up fields , as we see in germany and burgundy . what a barbarous cruelty , how inconsistent with humane reason is it thus to wage war with nature her self , and take from her those means wherewith she nourishes and supports us ? the holy scriptures forbid even the trees that grow near besieged cities to be cut down , because they are wood , not men , and so cannot encrease the enemy's number . to that degree does god abhorr blood spilt in war , that though he had made his people take up arms against the midianites yet he afterwards enjoined , that whosoever had killed any person , or touched any slain , should purifie himself ●●ven days out of the camp . aeneas thought it ● crime to touch things sacred before he had washed ●is hands in some living stream : attrectare nefas , donec me flumine vivo abluero . * god , as he is equally the author of peace and life , hates those who disturb that , or cut the thread of this : ●ven to weapons , as the instruments of death , he has ●eclared his aversion ; for hence , i conceive , he com●anded his altars to be built of rough , unpolish'd ●tone , which no iron had touched ; such as that was ●hich the people of israel raised , after they had passed ●●e river iordan ; and that of ioshua , after his ●ctory over the men of ai . the reason of this , 〈◊〉 that iron is the matter of war , whereof swords are ●ade : nor would he suffer the use of it in the purity and ●aceableness of his sacrifices , as that other precept ●●●ms to intimate . but ambition of glory seldom gives place to these ●nsiderations , imagining there can be no reputation ●t , where valour is not exercised , and blood spilt ; ●●d thence it is that some care not to make use of ●●xiliaries , or admit of companions in victory . ●ing alphonsus iii. lost the battel of arc , only because 〈◊〉 would not stay for the coming up of the forces of ●on and navarr ; and tilly , that of leipsick , by not ●aiting for the imperial forces . in which thing ambi●on is much in the wrong ; the glory of victories consisting not so much in any degree of courage , as in having known how to make good use of safe counsels ; forasmuch as the one depends on chance , the other on prudence . he obtains the victory soon enough , who has with judgment so provided that he should not be overcome . ambition burns ; and reason , once disturbed , follows its natural force and tendency , and destroys it self . states are never more beholding to their prince , than when undervaluing trophies and triumphs , he strives to maintain peace by negotiation , and purchases victory with money ; for it is much cheaper buying for that than blood , and generally safer fighting with golden than iron weapons . the variety of past accidents is apt to make victory forget it self ; glory , to make it vanish ; joy , to disorder ; spoils , to puff it up ; acclamations , to make it over●confident ; and bloodshed prompts it to despise the enemy , and sleep secure , when it should be most vigilant , and shew greater fortune in subduing it self , than it met with in conquering the enemy : for this latter may possibly be more an effect of fortune than courage ; but in the triumph over our affections and passions , chance has no part . the general therefore would do well , immediately after a victory , to retire into himself , and with prudence and constancy compose the civil war of his passions ; forasmuch as without this triumph , that other will but be more dangerous . let him watch his spoils and trophies the more carefully , the more of them he has gotten ; for in danger , fear doubles guards and sentinels , when he who thinks himself out of it , abandons himself to sleep . ioshua drew not back his hand , till he had utterly destroyed all the inhabitants of a● . between the battel and victory there is no security : despair is daring ; and the most contemptible animal , when provoked , turns again . this experience cost archduke albert dear , at newport : and abner told ioab the danger of making his sword too bloody . besides , adversity is ingenuous ; and the enemy it oppresses often lays hold on the occasion , and recovers in a moment whatever it had lost , baffling fortune by her own incon●ancy : a goddess , who the more she shines , the more brittle she is , and the sooner broken . a general must not therefore be elated by his victories , nor think it impossible for him to become in his turn a trophy to the person he ●as conquered . he should have ever before his eyes the like casualty , phansying he always sees plunged ●der the waters of calamities the same palm which ●e has once lifted up in triumph : thus that of this ●●blem looks it self in the water , whose liquid mirrour ●●presents to it the condition , the force of winds , or ●●jury of time , may reduce it to . this prudent cau●●usness made the spouse compare the eyes of her ●eloved to rivers of waters , because in them the 〈◊〉 dresses and prepares it self for adversities . ●●sperity is glory's greatest enemy : confidence ren●ing vertue negligent , and pride undervaluing danger . ●cessity obliges the conquered to good discipline ; ●ger and revenge animate him , and inspire cou●ge : whereas the conqueror , through arro●●●ce , and breach of discipline , grows dull and ●●●vy . the gain of a battel is often-times the ●ginning of happiness to the conquered , of misfortune 〈◊〉 the victor ; the one being blinded by his fortune , 〈◊〉 other casting about to retrieve his . what arms ●●rishing could not conquer , those thrown down often 〈◊〉 ; and spoils scattered here and there , inflaming the avarice of the victorious , make of them an ea●ie victory . thus it befell the sarmatae , who being loaded with plunder , were cut in pieces , as if they had been bound , and immovable . the battel of tarro , against charles viii . of france , was lost , at least dubious , ●●debanmur , tac. hist. l . only by the italian soldiers falling too soon upon the baggage . hence iudas maccabaeus required his men not to touch the booty , until the fight was over . victories are to be esteemed more for the progresses may be expected from them , than for themselves , and therefore should be cultivated , that they may bear the more . to give the enemy time , is to arm him ; and to sit down satisfied with the fruit already gathered , to leave arms barren . it is as easie for a fortune raised to fall , as it is to lift up again one fallen . tiberius , considering this uncertainty of things , endeavoured , with many arguments , to persuade the senate not to be so quick in executing the honours decreed to germanicus , for his victories in germany . although victories should be pursued , yet it ought not to be with a heat so secure and careless as to slight dangers . let expedition consult with prudence , with regard to time , place , and occasion . let the prince use his victories with moderation , not with a bloody and inhumane tyranny , always having before him that counsel of theodorick , king of the ostrogoths , in a letter to his father-in-law , clovis , about the germa● victories ; in such cases , let him be heard who has most experience : no wars have been more successful to me , than those i have ended with moderation ; for he comes oftenest off conqueror , who best uses his victory ; and fortune ever favours them most , who are least puft up * . the french follow not this prudent advice , but rather have imposed a heavier yoke on germany than it ever yet bore , and hastened the ruine of that empire . the piety and modesty of marcellus made a greater shew , when he wept to see the ruine of the beautiful buildings of syracuse , than his valour and glory in having stormed it , and made a triumphant entry at the breach . count tilly struck the hearts of several , more by the tears he shed for the burning of magdeburg , than by his sword. and though ioshua commanded the officers of his army to put their feet upon the necks of the kings taken in the battel of gibaon ; yet this was not done out of pride or vain-glory , but to animate his soldiers , and to remove the fear they had conceived of the giants of canaan . to treat those one has subdued with humanity , to maintain their privileges and nobility , and to ease them of taxes , is twice to conquer them , once by arms , and afterwards by kindness , and in the mean while to prepare a chain for other nations ; no fewer yielding to generosity , than to force . expugnat nostram clementia gentem , mars gravior sub pace latet . * by these artifices the romans made themselves masters of the whole world ; and if ever they forgot them , their victories were the more difficult . despair it self arms against a bloody conqueror . vna salus victis nullam sperare salutem . † the wretch's only comfort is despair . there are some men , who , with more impiety than reason , advise , for greater security , to extirpate the hostile nation , as the romans did in demolishing carthage , numantia , and corinth , or else to oblige it to seek a new habitation ; which is a barbarous and inhumane counsel : others are for extinguishing the nobility , building forts , and disarming the inhabitants . but this tyranny is practicable only in servile nations , not among people of ● more generous nature . cato the consul , to secure himself from some people of spain , near the ●iver ●berus , took away their arms , but was soon obliged to return them ; they being so exasperated to see themselves without them , that they killed one another ; they despised a life destitute of instruments to defend their honour , and acquire glory . emblem xcvii . hercvles having master'd the lion , knew how to enjoy his victory , in covering his shoulders with its skin , in order the more easily to tame other monsters . thus the spoils of a triumph arm the conqueror , and encrease his power . thus ought princes to use their victories , augmenting their forces by the prisoners , and advancing the grandeur of their states by the places they take . all kingdoms , in their original , were small ; and if they encreased , it was by getting , and preserving . the same reasons that make the war lawful , justifie also the detaining of what it brings . to spoil , only that you may restore again , is a foolish and extravagant levity . that man holds not himself at all obliged , who to day receives what was yesterday wrested from him with bloodshed . princes , by restitution , barter for peace , and buy its contrary : 〈…〉 render them formidable ; what they 〈…〉 contemptible , this being generally 〈…〉 ; and if after , upon 〈…〉 , they go about to recover it , 〈…〉 difficulties . his majesty 〈…〉 put the valtaline in 〈…〉 ; and the french 〈…〉 the state of milan in 〈…〉 and arms. by holding 〈…〉 is check'd , 〈…〉 by so many pawns 〈…〉 necessity . time and 〈…〉 the 〈◊〉 in what cases it is 〈…〉 , to prevent greater 〈…〉 , however , must be 〈…〉 , whose blind appetite 〈…〉 by those very means it 〈…〉 . princes 〈…〉 , let several considerable forts 〈…〉 , in war , they are sorry for , but too late . present necessity accuses past liberality . no power should be so confident of it self , as to think it stands not in need of every one of them for its defence . the eagle parts not with her tallons ; which if she did , she would become the je●● of other birds : they respect her not as their queen , for her beauty , since in that the peacock much exceeds , but for the strength of her pounces . the grandeur of his majesty would now be in far more veneration and security , had he still kept the state of siena , the garrison of placentia , and , in general , all those places which he has left in other hands . even restitution of a state is not to be made , when it cannot be without prejudice to another . there is no less inconveniencies in making war upon another , than in using arms negligently : to take them 〈◊〉 only to offer blows , is a dangerous way of fighting . ● sword drawn without being dyed in blood , returns ●●amed into the scabbard ; if it wounds not our enemy , ● does our honour . fire is the instrument of war ; ●●oever holds it up in his hand , will be burnt by it . ●he army , if not kept in the enemy's country , wasts ●s own , nay , is wasted it self . courage grows cold , ●ithout occasions to exercise , and spoils to inflame it . ●ence vocula quartered his men in the enemies land ; 〈◊〉 david went out of his own realms to meet the philistines . the same did iehoash , king of israel , ●hen he heard that amaziah , king of iudah , was ●●ming against him . subjects can never long bear 〈◊〉 war at home ; for by maintaining , in this manner , ●oth friends and enemies , charges encrease , means ●il , and dangers continue . but if any one thinks ●●reby to sooth up , and the more easily appease him he ●●gaged with , it is imprudent counsel , there being no ●●ttering a declared enemy . moderation in war , is ●ot imputed to clemency , but to weakness , and the ●ost powerful lose their reputation , and are endanger'd 〈◊〉 it . the king of spain 's mildness to charles of savoy , ●●st him dear . this duke made war against ferdinand duke of mantua , to assert his ancient pretensions upon montferrat ; and king philip iii. not thinking it fit that 〈◊〉 sword should decide this suit , then depending before the emperor , and that the quarrel of these two ●rinces should disturb the peace of all italy , made war ●pon the former , and sate down before asti , not with ●●y design to enter that place forcibly , ( which might ●●ve been easily done ) but by this menace to oblige him 〈◊〉 peace , as accordingly he did . this moderate way ●f proceeding encreased the duke's obstinacy , and , contrary to the treaty , he again took up arms , kindling another war more dangerous than the first . upon which , his majesty besieged ver●eil ; which he took , but presently restored again : so that the duke , who saw his designs succeed so happily , struck up a leag●● with the french and venetians at avigno● , and a third time disturbed italy . all which wars might very easily have been avoided , had the duke of savoy been made to feel the weight of the spanish arms , and suffered the loss of part of his state. whoever has once opposed a greater power , will never become a friend , till he sees himself oppressed and robb'd of all , ( as vocula said to the mutinous legions , when he encouraged them against some provinces of france that revolted . ) princes are not feared for having the weapons in their hands , but for knowing how to use them . no one assaults him who dares turn again . almost all wars are grounded either upon the oscitancy or cowardice of the person against whom they are waged . what risque is there in making war against a prince wholly devoted to peace , since whatever the success be , that will certainly be obtained ? for this reason , it seems convenient , that the maxims of the spaniards be changed in italy , which endeavour to inculcate , that the king wishes nothing so much as peace , and would purchase it at any rate . it is fit , indeed , princes should know that his majesty is always sincere , and willing to keep a good understanding with them , ready to employ all his forces for their conservation and defence , and that he will spare no care which may contribute to the quiet of those provinces : but withal , they should know , that if any one unjustly opposes his grandeur , and conspires to overthrow it , putting him to the damages and expences of war , he will get satisfaction , by detaining what he shall take from them . what court of justice will not allow costs to the party that sues another without reason ? ●●o will not try his sword upon the body of a potent 〈◊〉 , if he can do it with safety ? when a victory is obtained , the spoils should be 〈◊〉 among the soldiers , and particular honour shewed 〈◊〉 as have eminently signalized themselves in the fight ; ●●at valour seeing it self rewarded , may be encouraged 〈◊〉 greater enterprizes , and be an example to others . 〈◊〉 this end , the romans invented so many crowns , ●ollars , ovations , and triumphs . saul erected to him●●lf a triumphant-arch , upon the defeat of the ama●●●ites . nor are these honours to be done the ●●rvivors only , but those also who have valiantly lost ●●eir lives in the battel , since they bought the victory 〈◊〉 so dear a price . signal services done the state , can●ot be recome●●●ed but by some eternal remembrance . ●hus those of 〈◊〉 were requited with a sepulchre ●hich lasted 〈◊〉 many ages . the soul , sensible of 〈◊〉 own 〈◊〉 , undervalues dangers , to make the ●emory of its actions immortal too : hence the spaniards 〈◊〉 old raised as many obelisks about every soldier 's ●omb , as he had killed enemies . god being the ●●vereign disposer of victories , to him we ought to pay 〈◊〉 acknowledgments first , to engage him to grant us ●thers , not only by way of thanksgiving and sacrifice , ●ut by spoils 〈◊〉 and offerings ; as the israelites did , ●pon raising the siege of bethulia , and routing the assyrians ; and ioshua , after his victory over the men of ai . in which particular the spanish kings have always been very liberal ; which piety of theirs god has rewarded with the present monarchy . emblem xcviii . war , in many things , resembles fire , not only in its nature , which is to destroy , but also for that the same matter wherewith it i● fed , when there is too much of it , extinguishes it . arms support war ; but if they are very powerful , quench it , 〈◊〉 change it into peace . therefore whoever would ob●●in this , must use them ; it being impossible that any ●eace should be concluded with honour and advantage , ●nless it be treated of under the shield● , and with this ●he arm must be guarded , which reaches out the hand to receive the olive of peace . clovis wish'd for two right-hands ; one arm'd , to oppose alaricus ; the other ●aked , to present in token of peace to theodorick , the mediator between them . the arms of a prince should be equally prepared for peace and war. clovis never thought he could obtain that by shewing his unarmed right-hand , without having at the same time another ●pon its guard. this is that the greeks meant , by the hieroglyphick of a man holding in one hand a pike , in the ▪ other a caduceus . negotiation , expressed by the latter , can never succeed , except the menace of the former attend it . when the athenians were annoyed by eumolphus , their general marched first , with a caduceus in his hand , and was follow'd by the flower of his men in armour , hereby shewing himself ready as well for peace as war. when the rhodians sent an embassy to constantinople , there went one by the embassador's side carrying three boughs , signifying the same disposition of mind : to which virgil seems also to have alluded , in this verse of his , pacem orare manu , praefigere puppibus arma . * to sue for peace , yet prosecute the war. even after the conclusion of peace , care ought still to be taken of war ; since between the conqueror and conquered no firm faith is ever established . one day saw that of the french several times engaged and violated at casal , and the marquess de saint croix 's goodness abused , he who preferred the quiet of italy before the glory of victory , which an advantageous post , and 〈◊〉 forces , offered him as 〈…〉 in treaties of peace , a free temper is no less requisite than i● the management of a war. he that cons●lts too much his honour in them , and would conquer his enemy as well with the pen as sword , bu●ies sparks under the ashes , to kindle the fire of a greater war. those peaces which pompey , and after him , the consul mancinus , made with the nu●●●tines , had no effect , because they were not a little derogatory to the honour of the roman commonwealth . the capitulation of asti , between charles emanuel , duke of savoy , and the marquess de hino●osa , was soon broken , upon account of one of the articles about di●arming the soldiers , not much for his majesty's reputation , which those disturbances and innovations of the duke seemed to tend to . no peace can be secure , when there is so much inequality . one of the privernates being asked by the roman senate , how his countrymen would observe the peace , if it were allowed them ; answered , faithfully , and for ever , if you grant us a good and equal one ; but if you impose hard conditions , you must not expect we should keep them long . never does any one observe a peace which he knows is to his disadvantage . except it be honourable , and for the conveniency of both parties , it will be but a lame contract : he that studies most his own interest in it , makes it most slender , and subjects it to an easie rupture . upon any ill success , one is not immediately to have recourse to peace , as long as the least room is left for putting affairs in a better posture ; otherwise it can never go well with the oppressed : hence , after the loss of the battel of toro , alphonsus , king of portugal , thought it not a good time to talk of agreeing with ●●rdinand the catholick . that is a weak peace which ●●rce and menace extort ; for honour and liberty never 〈◊〉 to plot against it . there are usually no less cheats and contrivances in ●reaties of peace than in war : witness those pretended 〈◊〉 of rhadamistus , to take away mithridates 's life * . ●hey are generally set on foot only to discover the ●ctions and designs of the enemy , to give time for ●●rtifications , succours , and the practices of alliance ; 〈◊〉 waste the enemy's forces , break confederacies , and ●ll asleep with the hopes of peace , diligence and precaution . sometimes they are clapt up , in order to raise ●ew forces , frustrate counsels ; and , in a word , to serve 〈◊〉 a truce , or cessation of arms , until a better oppor●●nity for taking them up again shall offer it self , or that the seat of the war may be changed . thus the french sign'd the peace of mouzon , with no other intent than to remove the war into germany , and fall upon the valtoline that way . so the only end of the peace of ratisbone was to disarm the emperor ; for at the same time the french agreed to it , they were brewing a league with the crown of sweden against him , and there was not above two months between the one and the other . now in the like cases , war is much better than a suspected peace ; this being indeed a peace without peace . peaces should be perpetual , as all those of god have been . hence the holy scriptures call such treaties , covenants of salt ; by this expression intimating their permanency . a prince who is a real lover of peace , and sincerely endeavours the settlement of it , is not afraid to bind even his posterity to its observance . a short peace is good for nothing but to gather fuel to light war withal . the same inconveniencies attend trucer made for a few years ; they do but suspend anger for a time , and give place for the sharpening of swords , and pointing of lances ; by their means usurpations pass into prescription , and peace is afterwards rendred more difficult , inasmuch as no one resigns willingly what he has possessed a long time . the ten years truce between the emperor charles v. and francis i. gave not peace to europe , as * pope paul iii. very well observed . but when the peace is secure , firm , and honourable , no prudenter course can be taken than to embrace it , however victorious your arms are , or whatever considerable progresses may be expected from them ; since the casualties of war are various and fortunate , often beget unhappy successes . how frequent is it to see him begging for peace , who was but just before asked it . a certain peace is better than a victory in expectation ; the one depends on our own pleasure , the other is in god's hand . and though sabinus said , that peace was to the glory only of the conqueror , but profitable to the conquered : yet this advantage reaches the victor too ; for by being so , he may have it the more advantageous , and secure the progresses already made . there is no better time for peace , than when one is uppermost in war. this , among other reasons , moved hanno , when news was brought to carthage of the victory of cannae , to advise the senate to close with the romans : and it was for nothing but the neglect of this , that they were forced in the end to submit to such laws and conditions as scipio thought fit to impose . in the heat of arms , when success is yet dubious , to shew a desire of peace , betrays weakness , and gives heart to the enemy . he that is too passionate for it at such a time , never obtains it : valour and resolutions are much better persuasives to it . let the prince then love peace , yet not to that degree , as to commit in●ustice , or suffer indignities , for the sake of it : let ●im not look on that he has made with a neighbour superiour in strength , to be safe ; for it can never be , where the one is powerful , the other weak . ambition knows not how to contain it self , where ●here is a prospect of usurping any thing ; and specious names , and pretexts of moderation and justice , are never wanting to him that seeks to enlarge his do●inions , and aspires to be a monarch : for one who is so already , aims at nothing more than the enjoyment of his own grandeur , without going to intrench ●pon that of another , or designing any thing against it . emblem xcix . he knows not how to value the quietness of the harbour , who has not felt the storm ; nor is he sensible of the sweetness of peace , that has never tasted the bitterness of war : then first this wild beast , the sworn enemy of life , appears in its true colours , when it is tamed . to that agrees samson 's riddle of the dead lion , in whose mouth bees swarmed , and wrought their honey-combs . for when war is ended , peace opens the doors of commerce , brings the hand to the plough , re-establishes the exercise of arts , the effect of which is plenty , as of that riches which freed from the fears that drove them away , then begin to circulate . peace then , as isaiah the prophet speaks , is the greatest good that god has bestowed on mankind , as war the greatest evil. hence the egyptians , to describe peace , represented pluto , the god of riches , as a boy crowned with ears of corn , laurel and roses , to signifie all the happiness it brings along with it . god has given it the name of beauty , in isaiah , saying , his people should take their rest in it , as upon a bed of flowers . even the most insensible beings rejoyce at peace . how chearful , how fertile do the fields look , which that cultivates ? how beautiful the cities adorned and enriched by its calmness ? on the other side , what desarts , what ruinous countries are not those where the fury of war has ranged ? scarce can one know now the fair cities and castles of germany , by those disfigured carkasses . burgundy sees its verdant perriwig ( as i may call it ) dy'd in blood ; and its cloaths , once so gay and fine , now ragged and scorch'd up , with amazement at so wonderful a change. nature has no greater enemy than war. he who was the author of the whole creation , was at the same time author of peace . justice gives it self up to its embraces . laws tremble , hide themselves , and are dumb at the frightful sight of weapons . hence marius excuses himself , for having done something against the laws of the country , by saying , he could not hear them for the noise of arms. in war , it is equally unfortunate to good men to kill and to be kill'd . in war , fathers , by a subversion of the order of mortality , bury their children ; whereas in peace , these bury them . here every one's merit is considered , and causes examined : in war , innocence and malice run the same fortune . in peace , nobility is distinguisht from populacy : in war , they are confounded , the weaker obeying the stronger . in that , religion is 〈◊〉 ; in this , lost ; that maintains , this usurps dominions ; the one breaks the haughty spirits of subjects , and renders them submissive and loyal , the other makes them haughty and rebellious . this made tiberius fear nothing so much as disturbing the repose augustus had left in the empire . with peace , delights and pleasures encrease ; and the greater these are , the weaker are subjects , and more secure . in peace , all depends on the prince himself ; in war , on him that has the command of the armies . hence tiberius dissembled all occasions of war , that he might not commit it to the management of another . pomponius laetus well knew all these inconveniencies , when he said , that while the prince could live in peace , he should by no means kindle war. the emperor marcianus used this motto , pax bello potior ; and certainly not without reason , forasmuch as war can never be convenient , unless carried on to maintain peace . this is the only good that infernal monster brings with it . that of the emperor aurelius caracalla , omnis in ferro salus , was a tyrannical saying , and fit for that prince only who cannot maintain himself but by force . that empire is of a short continuance , whose support is war . as long as the sword is by the side , danger is so too : and though victory be in one's power , yet peace is rather to be embraced : for there is none so happy , but the damage that attends it is greater . peace is the greatest treasure man e'er knew , a thousand triumphs to it seem but few . * no victory can make amends for the expences of it . so mischievous is war , that even when triumphant , it throws down walls , as it was the custom among the romans . now then we have conducted our prince amidst dust and blood , and thus seated him in the quiet , happy state of peace ; our next advice is , that he do his utmost to preserve it , and enjoy the happiness thereof , without imbittering it with the perils and calamities of war. david never took up arms , but when indispensibly obliged . the emperor theodosius did not seek , but rather found war. it is a glorious and princely care , that of procuring peace . now caesar 's grandeur , caesar 's glories reign , his conqu'ring arm sheathing his sword again . * nothing in the world is more an enemy to possession than war. it is a wicked , as well as foolish doctrine , which teaches , that seeds of hatred should be nourished , that matter for war may be furnished , whenever it shall be thought fit . he always lives in war , who has it always in his thoughts . the advice of the holy spirit is much more wholsom , seek peace , and pursue it . when a peace is once concluded , the laws of god and man oblige to a faithful observance of it , even although transacted with one's predecessors , without any distinction between the government of one and many ; both the kingdom and commonwealth , for the benefit , and upon the faith of which the contract was made , being always the same , and never dying . time , and common consent , have passed what was once agreed upon into a law. nor is force or necessity a sufficient excuse for making war : for if the publick faith might be violated for these things , there would be no capitulation , no treaty of peace , but might be broken , under the same colour . francis i. was blamed for declaring war against charles v. contrary to the agreement made during his imprisonment , under pretence of constraint . by such artifices , and equivocal negotiations , it comes to pass , that none at all are firm ; so that to establish them , it is necessary to demand hostages , or detain some considerable place ; things which embarrass a peace , and fatigue the world with perpetual wars . the prince then being free from the toils and dangers of war , should apply himself wholly to the arts of peace , ( according to tasso , ) learning and arts promote throughout your realm , divert your subjects minds with plays and balls : with equal iustice punish and reward ; and out of danger , stand upon your guard. yet not without reflecting how soon war may possibly disturb his rest. let not his eye quit the arms his hand has laid down ; nor those old medals influence him , upon the reverse of which peace was described burning shields with a torch : this was far from being a prudent emblem ; for there is nothing so necessary after war , as the preserving of arms , to keep violence from making any attempt against peace . none but god alone could , when he gave it to his people , break the bow , ( as the psalmist expresseth it ) cut the spear in sunder , and 〈◊〉 the chariots in the fire ; forasmuch as he being the arbiter of war , needs not arms to maintain peace withal : but among men there can be no peace , where ambition is not restrained by fear or force . this gave occasion to the invention of arms , which defence found out before offence . the plough marked out the walls before the streets were disposed , and almost at the same time tents were pitched , and houses built . the publick repose would never be secure , did not care armed guard its sleep . a state unprovided with arms , awakens the enemy , and invites war. never had the alps heard the echo's of so many trumpets , had the cities of the milanese been better fortify'd : this state is , as it were , an outwork to all the kingdoms of the spanish monarchy , and each ought , for its own security , to contribute to its strength ; which , joined with the power of the sea , would render the monarchy firm and unshaken . mens hearts , were they of adamant , could not supply the defect of walls . king witiza , by demolishing these , made the moors so bold as to invade spain , when those banks were gone , which , till then , had stopt their inundations . augustus was not guilty of this negligence , in that long peace he enjoyed ; but appointed a publick treasury , as a provision against a war. except forces be exercised in time of peace , and the mind disciplin'd in the arts of war , it will not easily be done , when danger of invasion shall have put all men in a consternation , and they be more intent on flying and saving what they have , than on their defence . there is no greater stratagem , than to leave a kingdom to its own idleness . when military exercise fails , valour does the same . nature produces in all parts great souls , which either occasion discovers , or want of business burieth . past ages have not furnish'd braver men in greece and rome , than are at this day born ; but they then appeared so heroical , because desire of rule made them use themselves to arms. let not a prince be discouraged at the sluggishness of his subjects ; discipline will fit them either to preserve peace , or to maintain war. let him keep them always employed in the exercise of arms ; for he that desires peace , must prevent war. emblem c. it is a short breathing between the cradle and the tomb ; short , i say , yet 〈◊〉 of occasioning considerable evils , if ill employed . often does a commonwealth lament whole ages the errour of one moment . on this point turns the fall or rise of empires . one bad counsel , in a minute throws down what has cost valour and prudence many years to build . and therefore it is not enough , in this amphitheater of life , to have run well , if the course be not equal to the end. he only receives the crown , who has lawfully touch'd the last goal of death . the foundation of houses consists in the first stones ; that of renown , in the last ; except they be glorious , it soon falls , and is buried in oblivion . the cradle does not flourish until the tomb has first , and then even the briars of past vices turn to flowers ; for fame is the last spirit of our actions , which thence receive their beauty and lustre , a thing never seen in an infamous old age , that rather effacing the glory of youth , ( as it happened to vitellius . ) the most perfect stroaks of the pencil or chizel are not esteemed , if the whole work remain imperfect : and if ever fragments were regarded , it was for being the reliques of a once perfect statue . envy or flattery , while life lasts , give different forms to actions ; but fame , unbyass'd by those passions , pronounces , after death , true and just sentences , which the tribunal of posterity confirms . some princes are sensible enough of how great consequence it is to crown their life with vertues ; but they are mistaken , in thinking to supply that , by leaving them described in epitaphs , and represented in statues ; not considering that they blush to accompany him in death , whom they had not accompanied while alive , and that the marbles are , as it were , in indignation to see the counterfeit-glory of a tyrant inscribed on them , but seem to soften to facilitate the engraving of that of a just prince , hardening again afterwards to preserve it to eternity ; which even the stones themselves sometimes write on their hardness . letters of a miraculous epitaph were the tears of blood , shed by those before st. isidore's altar at leon , for the death of king alphonsus vi. * nor came they out of the joints , but from the heart of the marbles , which seemed mollified for the loss of so great a king. the statue of a vitious prince is a kind of transcript of his vices , nor is there either marble or brass so durable as not to submit to time : for as the natural fabrick is dissolved , so also is the artificial ; and that only is lasting which vertues frame , those intrinsick and inseparable ornaments of an immortal soul . what is engrav'd on the minds of men , being successively deriv'd from one to another , endures as long as the world. no statues are 〈◊〉 perpetual than those carved by vertue and good offices 〈◊〉 the esteem and acknowledgment of men , ( as mecanus told augustus● ) for this reason , tiberius refused the temples which the nearer spain would have built in honour of him , saying , that the temples and statues which he most esteemed , was to perpetuate his memory in the minds of the commonwealth . the ashes of hero's are preserved in the everlasting obelisks of universal applause and triumph , even after having been spoiled by fire , as it happened to those of trajan . the dead body of that valiant prelate , giles d' albornoz was carry'd ' from rome to toled● upon the shoulders of nations as well friends as enemies , and a guard was forced to be set to defend that of augustus . but granting the firmness of the marble , and solidity of the brass , should equal future ages , yet it is not known afterwards who they were raised for * ; as it is at this day with the pyramids of aegypt , where we see that names of those worn out who laid their ashes there to immortalize themselves . from what has been said , may be easily gathered how much it concerns the prince , in the declension of his life , to endeavour that his former glories may receive new life and vigour from those of his last days , and that both , after his death , may remain for ever in the memory of mankind . to which end , we shall offer some rules to direct him how he ought to govern himself , with relation to his person , his successor , and his dominions . as to his person , he is to know , that as he advanceth in years , his empire grows more savage , and less subject to reason ; for the variety of accidents he has met with , instruct him in malice ; and by indulging jealousies and distrusts , he becomes cruel and tyrannical . a long reign is apt to beget pride and presumption ; and the experience of want , avarice : whence proceed many things inconsistent with the decorum of majesty , and from them contempt of the royal person . princes will still retain their ancient customs and gravity , forgetting what they did when young , and thus they render themselves odious . in the beginnings of government , passion for glory , and fear of ruine , make them take care to act with prudence and caution : but afterwards ambition is tired , and the prince has neither any satisfaction in good , nor any concern for ill success ; but imagining vice to be the recompence of his glory , and reward of his toils , shamefully gives himself up to it : whence it is that so few princes grow better by ruling , of which the holy scriptures give us instances in saul and solomon . they are , in their government , like the image in nebuchadnezzar's dream , its beginning 's of gold , its end of clay . vespasian was the only prnce remarkable for having passed from bad to good . besides , let the prince strive never so much to continue like himself , it is impossible for him to please all , if his reign be long ; for the people hate to be ruled so long by the same hand . they love novelty , and rejoyce at revolutions , though dangerous , as it fell out in the reign of tiberius . if the prince be vertuous , he is hated by the bad ; if vitious , both by the good and bad , and then the only talk is of the successor , whom every one makes his court to ; a thing which cannot but incense the prince , and which usually enclines him to hate his subjects , and use them ill . as his strength decays , his care and vigilance , his prudence also , understanding and memory proportionably fail : for the sense● grow old no less than the body ; and as he desires to reserve this small remainder of his days to himself , free from the hurry and fatigue of government , he surrenders all to his ministers , or some favourite , on whom the weight of affairs lies , and the odium of the people is transferred . in which case , they who are not in the prince's favour , and have no share in the administration and preferments , wish for , and do their utmost to procure a new master . these are the most dangerous rocks of a declining age , among which the prince cannot use too much precaution against a shipwreck . yet though the course be hazardous , he ought not therefore to despair of passing securely , since many princes have maintained their esteem and respect to their last gasp. an excellency which the whole world admir'd in philip ii. the motion of a prudent government continues uniform to the very shore of death ; a former character and reputation support it against the hatreds and inconveniencies of age , as tiherius experienc'd in himself . besides we pass over a great many slips in old age , which would be unpardonable in youth , ( as drusus observed . ) the more boisterous the storms are , with the more resolution the prince had need be armed to bear up against them , and the closer he ought to keep to the helm of government ; lest by entrusting it in the hands of others , both himself and the commonwealth should fall a prey to the sea. while the prince's vigour lasts , he should live and die in action . government is like the spheres , which never stand still ; it admits no poles but those of the prince . in the arms of the state , not those of sloth , the prince must find refreshment in the toils of his old age : and if through the infirmities of his age he wants strength to bear them , and has need of other shoulders , yet let him not wholly refuse the assistance of his own , were it only for shew , since that is the same thing in the eyes of the ignorant mobb as reality , and ( as we observed elsewhere ) is a restraint to ministers , and support to reputation . in this case it is safer to form a privy-council of three , as philip ii. did , than to leave all to the management of one single person ; because the people look not on them as favourites , but as councellors . let the prince beware of covetousness , a vice universally detested , and peculiar to old age , which it never forsakes , though it has bid adieu to all others . undoubtedly galba might have ingratiated himself with the people , had he been in the least generous . let him conform to the mode , and present customs , and forget those more harsh and rigid ones of former times , a fault old men are too apt to fall into , whether it proceed from the prejudice of their education , from vain-glory , or the difficulty they find in taking up those new customs ; whence they incurr the hate of all men. they give way to that melancholy humour , which ariseth from the coldness of their age , and exclaim against all pastimes and divertisements , not remembring how much time they have formerly spent in them themselves . let him not discover any jealousy of his successor , as ferdinand the catholick did , when philip i. was to succeed him in the kingdom of castile . that is the time when most adore the rising sun ; and if any one appears reserved in this particular , it is a trick to make himself pass for a loyal , constant man , in the opinion of the successor , and to gain his esteem ; as was observed of several , at the death of augustus . let him strive to endear himself to all by courtesy , equality of justice , by clemency and plenty ; being assured , that if he have governed well , and got the love and good opinion of his subjects , he will maintain them without much difficulty , begetting in their minds a fear of losing , and a desire of keeping him . all these methods will be yet of more force , if the successor be such as he may be in a manner born again , and immortalized by ; for although adoption be only a fiction of the law , yet the person adopting seems to renew his youth in him , ( as galba said to piso. ) succession ought not to be the least care of princes , it being not so frivolous a thing as solomon imagined . sons are the anchors and props of a state , the joy and comfort of a government and court , augustus well knew this , when having none , he adapted his nearest relations , to be , as it were , pillars to support the empire . neither fleets nor armies are greater securities to a prince , than a numerous off-spring . there are no greater friends than they ; no more zealous opposers of tyranny , domestick and foreign . all bear a part in the happiness of princes , their children only are sharers in their misfortunes . friends change and fall off with adversity , but never our own blood , which though transfused into another , still corresponds with us by a secret and natural inclination . the safety of the prince includes that of his relations , and his faults reflect upon them ; and therefore they endeavour to mend them , being most concerned to observe , and most free and bold to reprove them . thus drusus made it his business to discover what was disliked at rome in his father , that he might correct it . and these reasons may serve to excuse that authority which some popes have allowed their nephews in the management of affairs . the subject has , in the heir , one to reward his services ; and , on the other side , he is afraid to offend the father , who leaves a son to inherit his power and quarrels . on this marcellus grounded his advice to priscus , not to pretend to prescribe to vespasian , a man grown old in triumphs , and the father of many young children . the hopes of the rising sun makes the cold and gloomy evenings of the setting much more tolerable . ambition is confounded , and tyranny trembles . liberty dare not break the chain of servitude , when she sees the links continued in a long train of successors . the publick repose is not disturbed by factions and differences about the succession , every one already knowing that a new phoenix must arise out of the ashes of the old one , and that even now this successor has taken root , and got strength , by making himself beloved and feared ; as an old tree shoots out of its stump a young sprig , which , in time , comes to grow in its place nevertheless , if it lie in the prince's breast to appoint the successor , he is not to make such use of this advantage , as to preferr the interest of his kindred to that of the publick . moses , distrusting the abilities of his own sons , left to god the choice of a new captain of his people : and galba gloried , in having had more regard to the publick good , than to his family , and having chosen a person out of the commonwealth to succeed him . this is the last and greatest benefit the prince is capable of doing his states , ( as the same galba told piso , when he adopted him . ) 't is a noble instance of the prince's generosity , to strive to make his successor better than himself . he has but a mean opinion of his merit , who seeks a name only by the vices of him that comes after , and by the comparison of one reign with another . herein augustus himself was faulty , in chusing tiberius upon the same motive , without considering , that the glorious or infamous actions of a successor are charged upon the predecessor who was concerned in his election . this care to provide a good heir is a natural duty in parents , and they ought to attend it with utmost application , since in their sons they in a manner live for ever : and indeed it were against natural reason to envy the excellency of their own image , or leave it unpolish'd . and though the institution of a great person be generally the occasion of domestick dangers , inasmuch as mens ambition is proportion'd to the capacity of their souls ; and though oftentimes , by the subversion of the ties of reason and nature , children grow weary of expecting the crown so long , and seeing the time of their pleasure and glory waste , as it was with rhadamistus , in the long reign of his father pharasman , king of iberia ; although too it was the counsel of the holy spirit to fathers , not to give their sons liberty in their youth , nor wink at their follies : yet for all this , i say , a father ought to spare no pains that may contribute to the good education of his son , which is the second obligation of nature , nor let fall his hopes and confidence for a few particular cases . no prince was ever more jealous of his children than tiberius , yet he absented himself from rome to leave drusus in his place . but if the prince would prevent these suspicions by politick methods , let him allow his son a part in the administration of affairs both civil and military , but never in the dispensation of his favours ; for by the former the applause of the people is not so much got , who are apt to be taken with the liberal and obliging temper of the son , a thing not very pleasing to the fathers who sit on the throne . in a word , he may be admitted into the secrets of state , not into the hearts of the subjects . augustus , who well understood this , when he desired to have tiberius made tribune , commended him with so much artifice , that he discovered his faults in excusing them . and it was believed that tiberius , to render drusus odious , and make him pass for one of a cruel temper , gave him leave to frequent the sword-plays ; as he was glad when any contest arose between his sons and the senate . but these artifices are more hurtful and treacherous than becomes the sincerity of a father ; it is more prudent to join with the young prince some confident , in whose power the direction and management of affairs may be : as vespasian did , when her gave the praetorship to his son domitian , and assigned mutian for his assistant . but if the son shall seem to harbour great and enterprising thoughts , such as may give just apprehension of some ambitious design against the respect due to a father , out of impatience of his long life , the best way will be to employ him in some undertaking that may wholly engage those thoughts , and cool the warmth and vigour of his mind . it was this made pharasman , king of iberia , put his son rhadamistus upon the conquest of armenia . but as this caution of honouring the son , and employing him in places of difficulty , is absolutely necessary , so also must care be taken to put the command of the armies in the hand of another ; for whoever is master of them , rules the whole state. to this end , otho gave his brother titianus the name and reputation of the supreme command , yet left all the authority and real power lodged in proculus : and tiberius , when the senate had decreed germanicus all the provinces beyond the seas , made piso lieutenant of syria , to be a check to his hopes and designs . indeed , the constitution of states and governments in europe is such , that there is little fear of those dangers ; yet if the genius of the son should be so violent and terrible , that the remedies mentioned cannot sufficiently provide for the father's security , let him consider whether it be proper to apply that which philip ii. used with his only son , don carlos , the execution of which made politicks admire its own power , struck nature with amazement , and the whole world with horrour . but if he distrust the fidelity of his subjects , because of their aversion to his son , there is usually no better remedy than to have him educated in some other court , and under the protection of some greater prince , ( provided there be no danger of any emulation between them ) with whom he may afterwards establish an alliance . this motive prevailed with phraates , king of parthia , to bring up vonones in the court of augustus : though this oftentimes produces a contrary effect , the people being apt to hate him afterwards as a foreigner , who returns to them with strange manners , which was the case of the same vonones . in the disposal of his dominions to his children , the prince cannot be too cautious ; inasmuch as it is sometimes the advancement , sometimes the ruiné of a kingdom , especially in the younger sons , who generally envy the elder his prerogative , and in the daughters matched with his own subjects ; whence arise jealousies and uneasinesses , which end in civil wars . augustus re●●●●ting upon this , refused his daughter to a roman knight , who might occasion disturbance , and proposed proc●dejus , and others , who lived a calm and retired life , and intermedled not with affairs of state the choice of a tutor for the son who is to succeed in his non-age is another thing , which demands all the skill and prudence the father is master of , there being nothing more exposed to casualties than that ; as we see present , and read of past examples of many princes , who , during their minority , have lost their lives and kingdoms , at least been reduced to great distress . for if the guardianship be left to the mother , though that may be looked upon as most secure , yet the prudence and experience requisite for such a task are rarely to be met with in a woman , and most of that sex want courage to awe subjects , and gain respect . but should it fall to the uncle , ambition of rule is wont to break the strongest and most close ties of blood. if it light upon the ministers , every one of them is wholly devoted to his private interest , which occasions divisions among them . besides , subjects despise the government of their equals , which is the rise of troubles , and civil commotions ; and therefore out of all these dangers and inconveniencies the prince must chuse the least , considering the nature of the state , and of the persons most capable of the education of his son , and picking out a class of subjects , whereby the security of the pupil may be so provided for , that they cannot possibly unite and conspire to ruine him . in this case it is highly requisite that they be immediately brought into business , who are to have , after the father's death , the tuition and guidance of the heir , and administration of the government . nor is it the prince's only duty to get the successor secured and instructed , but he is also to prevent the accidents of his new government , and their ill consequence ; for when the sails are changed the ship is endanger'd ; and by the introduction of new forms , nature suffers ; because things end faintly , but begin with vigour : 't is from this vicissitude of things that those dangers proceed which threaten upon the meeting of the waves of both reigns , as it happens when one rapid river runs violently into another of an equal current . the authority of the successor is easily lost , and conspiracies and innovations contriv'd against him ; and therefore the prince should endeavour to make the latter part of his reign so calm , that the new one may be entred on without the least hazard : and as seamen , when they enter the port , quit their oars , and furl their sails ; so ought he to close his government , by laying aside all thoughts of enterprizes and wars , by confirming ancient alliances , and making new ones , particularly with his neighbours , that peace may be setled in his realms . 't is no less worthy praise , when age draws on , to settle peace and quietness at home ; that no intestine broil● subvert the state , or pow'rful neighbours war without create . * let him dissemble injuries , us tiberius did with getulicus and philip ii. with ferdinand de medicis ; for at such a time the most prudent princes order a rainbow to be put over their tombs , for a token of peace to their successors , not a lance fixed in the earth , to prompt them to revenge their quarrels , as the athenians used to do . let him govern his foreign provinces with counsel and address , not arms ; and see that the governors he sets over them be eloquent , lovers of peace , and unexperienc'd in war , lest they kindle it , as it was done in the time of galba . let him compose the minds of his subjects , and reconcile their differences ; protect them from inj●ries , moderate their taxes , and re●ove all nor●lties odiovs to the people . let him make choice of prudent ministers , friends to peace and the publick quiet ; for by this means his subjects minds being formed to ease , and gentle usage , will promise themselves the same from the successor , and so not attempt any innovation . emblem ci. many great men have laboured , by speculation and exper●ence , to form the idea of a perfect prince . it hath 〈…〉 this royal porcelain , this 〈◊〉 vessel of ear●● , no less brittle than others , and more subject to casualties than any ; particularly when the potter is of the school of matchiavel , whence all come out distorted , and of short continuance , as that was which he laid down as a model of the rest . the design of these emblems has been to set off that purple , whose scarlet dye soon turns to ashes ; they began at the cradle , and end at the tomb. they are the parenthesis of man's life , which the least clause of time includes ; nor is it easie to determine which hour is the most happy , that wherein the eyes are open to the day of life , or that in which they are closed to the night of death , since the one is the beginning , the other the end of our labours ; and however great the difference may be betwixt being and not being , yet the material part of man only feels that , not the form , which is immortal , and improved by death . the dread we have of the grave is natural ; but had reason more influence on us than desire of living , we should rejoyce at the fight of it , as those do , who looking for treasures , find urns , being sure to meet with riches there ; for it is in the grave that the soul finds the real treasure of eternal rest. this simon maccahaeus signified by that hieroglyphick of ships carved upon the pillars he set about the maus●laeum of his father and brothers ; intimating , that the ship of our life floating upon the billows of the world , is never quiet till landed at the shore of death . in effect , what is life but a perpetual fear of death ? without any thing to assure us of its continuance . many signs portend the approach of death , not one exactly marks out the bounds of life , the most flourishing age and strongest constitution are not sufficient sureties for one hour of health . the heart , which performs the part of a balance in this clock of the body , points indeed to the present● hours , but never to the future . nor ought this ●ncertainty to be termed disdain , but rather a favour of nature ; for were the precise time determined for death as it is for birth , for the dissolution as for the formation of the body , man would become insolent to reason ; and therefore she has not only given him one sure minute to breath in , but , on the contrary , hath in all things imaginable laid before him evidences of the shortness of life : the earth represents it to him in the youth of its flowers , and gray-hairs of its harvests ; the water , in the rapidness of its current ; the air , in the fires it kindles , and extinguishes again in a moment ; and the heavens , in the prince of light which the same day sees rise in the golden cradle of the east , and set in the dark tomb of the west . but if death be the last of all evils , that it comes not too late is to be esteem'd a happiness . the shorter the interval is between the cradle and the tomb , the shorter is the course of our labours ; and therefore iob wished he had been immediately carried from the womb of his mother to that of the earth . we are bound as soon as born , and all our life-time after involved in care● ; nor have kings , in this , any privilege above the rest of mankind * . did humane felicity consist in long life , man would undoubtedly out-live the stag ; for it were absurd that any creature should be happier than him , for whose service they were all created . that natural desire we have of seeing hours pass swiftly away , is an argument that it is not time which makes our happiness ; for then would the mind find its rest in that : whatever it desires out of time , it always wants . in princes , more than in others , as they are exposed to greater accidents , experience shews that in a long life fortune is endanger'd , she being tired as much with being propitions , as with being adverse . lewis xi . had been a happy prince , had he ended his days before the calamities of his last years . sovereignty is a kind of tempestuous sea , not to be kept calm by a long course of life ; he who lives longest , suffers most storms and dangers . but if we consider the end and perfection of nature , a long life is happy , when , according to the testimony of iob , it comes into the grave in its maturity , as corn into the barn , before decrepidness makes it wither ; for with the shadow of death the vital spirits congeal , and the body remains useless . the trembling hand can no longer steer the helm of the state , the eye perceive the clouds of heaven , the course of the winds , and the rocks of the sea , nor the ear hear the barkings of scylla and carybdis . amidst so many miseries of nature , constancy fails the prince ; and being reduced , by the moisture of the senses , to a second infancy , he believes every thing , and suffers himself to be govern'd by malice , which is then most awake in those about him , who at such a time offend with equal profit and impunity . women get possession of his will , as livia did of augustus's , when she made him banish his nephew agrippa , bringing him to such a pass , that he who before knew how to maintain the whole world in peace , became incapable of ruling his own family . by this means majesty is made the derision of all men , of which galba was an instance other nations despise him , and are not afraid to rise up against him , as arbanus did against tiberius . the authority of a decrepid prince is lost , and his orders 〈…〉 , not taken for his own , as it was 〈◊〉 of those of 〈◊〉 . he is hated by the 〈◊〉 , who look upon him as an unprofitable instrument , the source of all the evils the government suffers : and as love is in a manner bred by interest , and brought up by hope , all make slight of him ; inasmuch as he is not ●ble to give much , who hath but a little while to live . his empire is accounted precarious , and short lived , as that of galba was ; and the ministers , like the goss-hawks of norway , that they may get the day , lay their pounces upon the publick trea●ures , selling places and favours , as the servants of the same emperor did . when therefore the age is come to this pass , the prince has more need of instructions to make him sensible of his inability , and resign the weight of the government to his successor , than of precepts to continue it to himself . let not ambition delude him , by the representation of his post character and applause ; for men consider not the prince as he was , but as he now is : nor is it enough to have once made himself feared , if he cannot do it now ; nor to have governed well heretofore , if he neither is able nor knows how to govern well still . dominion is like the sea , which immediately casts on shore all unprofitable carkasses . the prince is esteemed for the form of the soul with which he ordains , commands , rewards and punishes ; so that when age comes to discompose that form , the esteem vanishes ; a●d therefore it will be prudent to acknowledge the injuries and contempts of age in time , and so slip from them before they arrive . if the prince and business must part , it is better that he bid the first adieu . 't is a glorious action to submit to own one's frailty , and voluntarily divest one's self of grandeur , before death takes it away by force ; lest it should be said , that he died unknown by himself , who lived known by all men. he should consider , that his royal scepter is like the herb of the same name , which in a little time turns to worms : and that if the whole globe of the earth be no more than a point , in comparison of the heavens ; what will one monarchy , one kingdom be ? and though this were never so large , yet he can have no more of it than a place to bury him in , or , as saladin said , a shrowd , without carrying away with him any other glory . the prince is not to live always for the commonwealth ; he should reserve some time to himself , and endeavour , that at the setting of his life the horizon of death may be cleared from the vapours of ambition , and the clouds of passion and interest , as is expressed by the sun in this emblem , taken from the sepulchre of ioshua , upon which a representation of that planet was raised , with this difference only , that there it was put in memory of its standing still , at the voice of this great captain ; here , to signifie , that as a clear and fair evening is an infallible sign of the serenity of the next morning , so a reign ended in sanctity and happiness , portends , that he who is a to succeed will be also happy , for a reward to the vertue , and by the irresistible efficacy of this last example . the art of living and dying well , that glorious retirement of the emperor charles va. may teach , who so far laid aside all publick cares , that he never so much as enquired after the state of his monarchy , but brought his great soul , otherwise made for brave atchievements , to the dressing of a garden , or to divert the hours ( after his spiritual exercise performed ) at some ingenious art or other . but if there are any disputes or revolutions to be apprehended upon account of the succession , it will be prudence in the persons present at the king's death to keep it secret , and make that and the possession of the successor publick at one time . for in such cases the people are like a colt not broke , which suffers not the saddle , unless it 〈…〉 sees it . th●● livi● concealed the 〈◊〉 untill 〈◊〉 was setled in his 〈◊〉 ; as agrippin● did that of claudius , with so much di●●imulation , that even after his decease a senate was convened in his name , and prayers offered for his health , till time was gained to contrive nero's succession . the death of the prince being made known , neither piety nor prudence dissuade from tears , and demonstrations of sorrow . the holy ghost , far from forbidding , recommends th●em . all the people of israel lamented the death of abner , and david followed his corps to the grave . for though there want not christian considerations to comfort us ; and though there hath been heretofore a nation , which , less enlightned with the rays of immortality , received those with tears who came into the world , and took leave of them that went out of it with rejoycings ; yet these reasons stand good only on their side who are gone to a better life , but are not for those who are left alone , and deprived of their services and conversation . even our saviour christ going to raise lazarus , wept over his sepulchre . these last expressions of grief must not be denied the tenderness and resentments of nature : they are the scales wherein the merit of the deceas'd prince is weighed , and whereby may be known what value his subjects had for him ; in a word , the touch-stone on which their love and obedience is tried , which strengthens the links of subjection , and gives heart to the successor . yet for all this , the people must not be obliged to an expensive mourning , for fear their prince's death should turn to a burthensom tax . not , however , that funeral pomp , and magnificent tombs , adorned with statues , and costly imbossed works , are to be look'd on as a meer vanity of princes ; they are rather a generous piece of piety , which marks out the last bounds of humane greatness , and shews , in the magnificence wherewith their ashes are honoured , what respect is owing to majesty ; sepulchres being no other than a kind of mute history of the royal race . the obsequies of david and solomon were celebrated with extraordinary pomp and splendour . in the funerals of private persons great care is required , because superstitions prejudicial to religion are easily introduced , the imagination being deluded in what is hoped or feared from the deceased ; and for that funeral charges are things which happen every day , and concern many , it is absolutely necessary they should be moderated , sorrow and vain-glory being apt to raise them too high . plato set a certain rate upon the building of sepulchres , as did solon also , and after them the romans . king philip ii. made a law to regulate the abuses and excesses of funerals and monuments ; saying , that what was laid out superfluously upon them , were better given to pious uses , and to pray for the souls of the deceased . thus far your highness has seen the birth , death , and burial of the prince whom these emblems form ; being , as it were , present at the building of this politick edifice , from the very foundation , to the last stone . and now , that your highness may with more ease take a review of the whole fabrick , i have thought convenient to subjoin here a kind of platform thereof , or looking-glass , wherein it may be represented , as a greater city is in a lesser . this shall be king ferdinand the catholick , one of your royal highnesses's ancestors ; in whose glorious reign , all the arts both of peace and war flourished , and accidents both of prosperous and adverse fortune occurred . the infancy of this great king was ripe and vigorous , his youth employed in military exercises ; and what art and industry could not perfect in him , experience supplied . his very leisure was employment ; and his diversions , attention of mind . he was absolute master of his passions , following more the dictates of policy , than his own natural inclinations . he own'd his grandeur to be from god only ; and gloried in his own actions , not those of his ancestors . he look'd on sovereignty rather as a charge than a succession . he qu●e●ed his realms by dil●gence , and personal presence , rais'd his monarchy by valour and prudence , ●stabllsh'd it by religion and justice , supported it by love and respect , embellish'd it with arts and sciences , enrich'd it by trade and husbandry , and eterniz'd it by maxims and institutions truly politick . he was a king as well of his court as kingdoms , and master as well as home as abroad . he temper'd his liberality with frugality , affab●lity with authority , modesty with gravity , and clemency with justice . by punishing some few , he terrified many ; and by rewarding others , he encourag'd the hopes of all . personal affronts he easily pardon'd , but those which struck at the royal dignity he never forgave . the injuries done to his subjects he reveng'd as his own , behaving himself always as a father to them . he valu'd his glory more than his dominion ; but was neither puft up by prosperity , nor dejected by adversity : in the one he fortify'd himself against the other ; and when fortune frown'd , he us'd all his industry to retrieve her favour . he made use of time , not time of him ; and though he submitted to necessity , he made it subservient to his own advantage . his conduct render'd him both belov'd and fear'd of all . he gave audience with readiness ; hearing , that he might know ; and asking questions , for his more certain information . he trusted not his enemies , and was reserv'd even with his friends . his friendship was conv●niency ; his kindred , reason of state ; his confidence vigilant ; his diffidence considerate ; his providence , assurance ; his jealousy , circumspection ; his malice , a defence ; and his dissimulation , a refuge . he deceived none , yet others were deceived by the ambiguity of his words and treaties , which he knew how to manage with so much artifice ( when it was necessary to baffle malice with prudence ) as to be able to extricate himself without violating the publick faith. neither falshood dared attack his majesty , nor flattery his knowledge . he made his ministers serviceable to him , without making them favourites ; and suffer'd himself to be counsel'd , not govern'd by them . what he could do himself , he committed not to others . he took time for consultation , but was very expeditious in execution . in his resolutions the effects were seen sooner than the causes . he conceal'd his designs from his embassadors , when he desir'd , that being deceiv'd themselves , they should more effectually persuade others the contrary . he knew how to rule with his queen , and obey his son-in-law . he imposed taxes through necessity , not out of avarice and luxury ; and what he then took from the church , he afterwards restor'd , respecting the ecclesiastical jurisdiction , and maintaining the regal . he kept no fixed court , but , like the sun , mov'd continually about the orbs of his realms . he manag'd peace with moderation and integrity , and prosecuted war with force and stratagem , neither desiring the one , nor refusing the other . whatsoever his foot was fixed on , his arm and conduct join'd in the defecne thereof , encreasing his strength by the spoils of his enemies . he did as much by his negotiations , as by his arms , never committing to the sword , what he could conquer by address . he plac'd the ostentation of his grandeur and pomp in the bravery of his battalions . he was always present , in time of war , within his kingdoms . the same orders which he gave , he observ'd himself ; and made leagues so as to remain arbiter , not subject . he was neither exalted when conqueror ; nor when beaten , dispirited . he sign'd treaties of peace under the shield . in a word , he liv'd to all the world , and dy'd to himself ; yet always remaining , in the memory of . men , as an absolute pattern for princes , and immortalizing himself in the desire of his subjects . this naked skull of death , the dismal sc●●e , which now the simple spider measures o're with its slight web ; which baffled heretofore the nicest subteilties of humane brain , once wore a 〈◊〉 , and triumphant stood , as monarch of the 〈◊〉 of peace and war : his smiles gave life ; his anger dire despair ; and all the world depended on its nod. what oncee gave proudly laws to war and peace , spiders and ear-wigs do now possess . why then this pride , o princes , since the grave makes no distinction 'twixt the base and brave , betwixt the mighty prince and wretched slave ? on the author and his book , in allusion to the emblem . whither so fast , vain man ? 'fore out of breath , stop , and behold this lively scene of death . the head thou seest was great saavedra's once , a greater name no rhetorick can pronounce . here piety with policy were join'd . here honour , sence and learning were combin'd false machiavilian notions to convince , and form at oncea wise and vertuous prince . where now , alas ! worms having eat it bare , the death-watch spiders spread their curious hair , and with their bowels nobly re-interr , scepters and crowns here tumbled down you see ; a trifling lose to one so great as he : but since this work remains , the world may cry , death , where 's thy sting ? grave , where 's thy victory ? finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e praecipere qualis debeat esse princeps , pulchrum quidem , & generosum , & prope superbum . plin. jun ▪ lib. . epist. . numb . . exodus . judges . judges . exodus . song of solomon . psalm . . the words of the lord are pure words ; as silver tried in a furnace of earth , purified seven times . brevis esse laboro obscurus fi● , hor. tac. . ann . qui ob similitudinem al●ena malefacta sibi objectari putant . tac. . ●ist . ibid. † estafermos . notes for div a -e the first edition that i know of , was at munster , anno . which being near six . year before the conclusion of the peace there , may serve as some apology for the author's reflections on the princes of orange , and other heroes of the adverse party . nic. antonio's bibliotheca scrip. hispan . miraeu●'s bibliotheca ecclesiast . moreri ' s great dictionary mariana hist. hisp. turquet . roderick geneb . spond . bzovi●s . sir iohn denham● bochartus's geograph ▪ sacra . phaleg , lib. c. . canaan , lib. . c. . notes for div a -e and the children ●●ruggled together within her , gen. . . and it came to pass when she travailed , that the one put o●●● his ha●d first , genes . . . hast thou children , instruct them . eccles. . . educat● siquidem recte à parentibus , per sancto● & justos mores boni merito ●vadent . arist●t . oecon. lib. . wisdom exal●eth her children . eccles. . . he was the father of all such as handle the harp and organ , gen. . . my ●on give me thine heart , and let thine eyes observe my ways . pr●v . . . for i was my father's son , tender and only belov'd of my mother ; he taught me also , and said , let thine heart retain my words . prov. . . quarendi sunt liberis magistri , quorum & inculpata sit ●ita & mo●e● . plut. de educ . vtque do●itii jueritia tali magistro adolesceret ; & co●siliis ejusdem ad spem domination●s uteretur . tac. . ann. and he made him lord of his house , and ruler of his substance : to bi●d his princes at his pleasure : and teach his sena●ours wisdom , psal. . , . bow down his neck while he is young , and beat him on the sides while he is a child , least he wax stubborn , and be disobedient to thee , and so bring sorrow to thine heart . eccles. . . i● is good for a man that he bear the yoke in his youth , he sitteth alone , and keepeth silence , because he hath born it upon him , lam. . , . they four had also the face of an eagle . ezek. . . train up thy child in the way he should go : and when he is old he will not depart from it . prov. . . nutritur puer non à muliere n●trice parum honorifica , verum ab eunuchis , qui reliquorum circa reem optimi videantur , plur. primo a●cib . i●venes non s●nt maligni moris , sed facilis moris , propterea quod nondum vi●●●nt 〈…〉 . caeterum ne propter teneritatem membra torqueantur , nationes quibusd●● artificiosis instr●mentis utebantur . arist. lib. . pol. cap. . omnibus natura fundamenta dedit , semenque virtutum , omnes ad ista omnia nati sum●s ; cum irritator accessit , ●unc i●●a ●●ni●● bona , velu● sopita excitantur . sen. epist. . ex hoc posse cog●●s●● animas immortales esse , atque divinas , quod in pueris mobilia sunt ingenia , & ad p●●●●piendum facilia . plat. de a● . homo rectam nactus institutionem divinissimum mansuetissimumque animal effici solet ; si vero , vel non sufficienter , vel non benè educetur , eorum quae terraprogen●it , ferocissimum . plat. lib. . de leg . educatio , & institutio commoda , natur as bonas inducit , & rursum bonae naturae si talem institutionem consequantu● , meliores adhuc & praestantiores eva●ere s●imus . plat. dial. de leg. cuncta igitu● mala , sed ea maximè quae turpitudinem ●abent vel ●dium parent , sunt procul à pu●ris removend . arist. pol. . c. . nam f●cile turpia loquendo , efficitur ut homines his proxima facient : arist. pol. . c. . coram quâ neque dicere fas e at , quod turpe dictu , neque facere quod inhonest●● fact● vi●eretur . quint. dial . de ora● . quo disciplina , ac severitas ●o pertimebat , ut sincera & integra , & nullis pravitatibus detorta uni●scujusque natura toto statim pectore arri●ere● artes honestas . quin●il . ibid. nec quisquam in tota domo pensi habet qui●● coram infante domino , aut dicat aut faciat ; quando etiam ipsi parente● nec probit●i neque modestiae ●arvulos assue●ac●unt , sed lasciviae , & liberta●i . quint. ibid. neque enim auribus jucunda convenit dicere , sed ex quo aliquis gloriosus fiat . eurip. in hippol. p●ona in eu● au●● neronis ut similem . tac. . hist. * mar. h●st . hisp. † mac. hist his. amicorum , libertorumque ubi in b●nos incidisset , sine reprehensione patiens . si mali f●rent , usque ad culpam igna●us . tac. . hist. cum autem ne quis talia loquatur prohibetur , satis intelligitur vetari , ●e turpes , vel picturas vel fabulas spectet . arist. pol. cap. . quo facilius lubricam principis aetatem , si ver●tutem asper nare●ur , voluptatibus concessus , retineret . tac. . ann . est etiam utile s●atim ab ineunte aetate frigoribus assuescere , hoc 〈◊〉 tum ad v●letudinem , tum ad munera milita●ia commod●ssimum est . arist. pol. . cap . i will give children to be their princes , and b●b●s to rule over them , isa● . . . vt suesceret , militi●e , s●udiaque exercitui pararet , si●ul juventutem urban● luxu lascivientem medus in castris haber● tiberi●s , s●que 〈◊〉 rebatur , utroque filio legiones obtinente . tac. . ann . and when he stood among the people , he was higher than any of the people from the shoulders upwards , sam. . . ipsa ●tas galbae & irrisui & fastidio erat assuetis juventae neronis , & imperatores forma & decore corporis , ( ut est mos vulgi ) comparantibus . tac. . hist. augebat famam ipsius decor oris cum quadam majestate . tac. . hist. commend not a man for his beauty , neither abhor a man for his outward appearance . eccles. . . species enim corporis simulacrum est men●is , figuraque probitatis . ambr. . de vir . cant. . . studia exe citus raro c●iquam b●●is ar●ibus quaes●ta , perinde ad fuere quam ●uic per ignaviam . tac. hist. pers●●● principis non solum animis , sed etiam oculis servire debet ●●vium . cic. phil. . h●c cobors , velut seminari●m ducum , praesect● u●que apud macedonas fu● . curt. nam & sylvae solitudo , ipsumque illud silentium quod venationi da●ur , magna cogitationis incitamenta sunt . plin. lib. . epist. ad cor. tac. nam simul mentem & corpus laboribus fatigare non convenit , quon●am bi labores contrariarum rerum efficientes sunt . labo● enim corp●●is menti est impedimento , mentis ●utem corpori . arist. pol. . c. . praeest autem naturae , qui valet intelligentia praevidere . arist. pol. . c●p. . imperatoriam majestatem no● solum armis decoratam , s●d etiam legibus oportet esse armatam , ut u●rumque tempus & belli & pacis recte possit gubernari . ju●● . in prooem . inst. ex libris se arma , & armorum iura didi●isse . panorm . lib. . e●si prudentia quosdam impetus à natura suma● tamen perficienda doctrinâ est . quint. lib. . c. . omni animali facilius imperabi● quam homini , ideo sapientissimum esse oportet , qui hominibus regere ve●it . xenoph. null●s est , cu● sapientia magis conveniat , quam principi , cujus doctrina omnibus debet prodesse subditis . veget. wisd. . . eccl. . eam vocem b●vis esse , non ●ominis . panorm . lib. . † lib. c. . p. . hebetiores quam acutiores ut plurimum melius rempub. administrant . thucyd. lib. . i gave my heart to search out by wisdom , concerning all things that are done under heaven : this sore travail hath god given to the sons of men , to be exercised with ▪ ●●●les . . . sunt enim quaedam ex liberalibus scientiis quos usque ad aliquid discere honestius sit , penitus vero illis tradere atque usque ad extremum persequi velle , valde noxium arist. lib. . pol. sed in prima juventa studium philosophiae acrius quam concessum rom. ●c senat●ri hausisse , ni prudentia matris incensum ac flagrantem animum coercuisset . tac. in v●t . agr. retinuitque quod d●fficillimum est ex sapientia modum . ibid. ingenium illustre altioribus studiis juvenis admodum dedit , non ut plerique , ut nomine magnifico orium velaret , sed quo firmior adversu● fo●tuita rempub ▪ ●apesseret . ta● . lib . hist. psal. . . o my lord , i am not eloquent , neither heretofore , nor since thou hast spoken to thy servant : i am but slow of speech , and of a slow tongue . exod . . i will be in thy mou●h , an● teach thee what thou shalt say . exod. . . wisd. . . primus ex iis , qui rerum po●iti essent , neronem alienae facundi● eguisse . tac. . ann. verissmam disciplinam , ●●ercitationemque ad politicas actiones , historiam esse . polyb. lib. . hominum multorum m●ns in unum collecta . greg. naz. ad nicom ▪ psa●m ● . . i●aque ludi magna ex parte imitationes esse debent earum rerum , qu● se●io postea obeunde . arist. pol. . c. . a wise man will hear , and will inc●ease learning ; and a man of understanding shall attain unto wise counsel . prov. . . eccl. . . mihi videtur ars artium & scientia scientiarum , nominem ▪ regere , animal tam varium & multiplex . greg. naz. in apolog. thy belly is like an heap of whea● , set about with lilies , ●ant . . . and upon the tops of the pillars was lily-work , so was the work of the pillars finished . kings . . exod. . . spicae nomine , at ego quidem sentio , discipulorum caetum intellexit . procop. in c. . isa. his lips like lilies dropping sweet smelling myrrh . cant. . . diadema eximium impretiabilis not●●ia literarum , per quam dum veterum providentia discitur , regalis dignitas augetur . cassi. . var. . nec cuiqua● judici grave , au●es studiis honestis & voluptatibus concessis impartire . tac. . ann. nec luxus in juvene adeo displicehat : hoc potius intenderet , diem ●difica●i●nibus , noctem conviviis ●●a●ere● ; quam solus & nullis voluptati●us avocatus , 〈…〉 & malas curas exercer●t tac. . ann. haec tria ad discipl nam spectari ●portet , at medium tenea●ur , ut fieri 〈◊〉 ut deceat . vile autem exerciti●m putandum est , & ars , & discipl●na , quae● 〈◊〉 co●pus , aut animam , aut ment●m liberi hominis ad ●sum , & ●pem vi●tutis inutilem reddant . arist. pol. . cap. . be not curious in unnecessary matters ; for more things are shewed unto thee , than men understand . eccl . . what is richer than wisdom that worketh all things ? and if prudence work ; who of all that are is a more cunning workman than shee ? wisd. . . and he spake of trees , from the cedar-tree that is in lebanon , even unto the hysop , that springeth out of the wa●l . kings . . si recludantur tyrannorum mentes , posse aspici laniatus , & ictus , quando , ut corpora verberibus , ita saevitia , libidine , malis consultis animus dilaceretur . tac. . ann. omnia namque ejus , quod speciem boni praefert gratiâ omnes agunt . arist. pol. . cap. . pauci prudentia , honesta à deterior●bus , uttlia ab noxiis discernunt . tac. lib. . ann. james . . regum est ita vivere , ut non modo homini sed ne cupiditati quidem serviant . m. tull. in orat. syll. null● magis exterritus est , quam quod tiberium sine miserat●ne , sine ira obstinatum , ●lau●umque vidit , ne quo affectu perumperetur . tac. . ann. 〈◊〉 est sapere , qui , ubicumque opus sit , ani●●um possis flectere . terent. tempo●i ap●ari decet . sen. in m●d. ha●d f●cile q●i despexerit illa , in c●gni●●sne mentem principis ; 〈…〉 misouit ●ra & ●lementiae signa . tac. ann. pulchra virtus est verecundia , & suavis gratia , quae non solum in factis , sed etiam in ipsis spectatur sermonibus , ne modum praetergrediaris lo●uendi , ne quid indecorum sermo resonet tuus . st. ambros. quorundam parum idonea est verecundia rebus civilibus , quae firmam frontem desiderant . seneca . vix artibus honestis retinetur pudor . tac. . ann. postremo in scelera s●●ul ac dedeco●a prorupit , postquam remoto pudore & ●etu , suo tantum ●ngento utebat●r . tac. . ann. principatu● enim proprium est mise●eri . st. chrys. non desiderat fortitudo advocatam iram . cicero . quid enim ●●●ltuis est , quam hanc ab i● acundia petere praesidium , rem stabilem ab in●ertâ , fidelem ab infidâ sanam ab aegra ? senec. the w●ath of kings is as messengers of death . prov. . . † l. . tit . p . * l. tit . p. . idque vitae spatium damnatis prorogaretur , sed non senatui libertas ad poenitendum erat . tac. . ann. n●que tiberius interjectu temporis mitigabatur . tac. . ann. esth. . . let every man be swift to hear , slow to ●●ak , flow to wrath . iames . . nunc iras●i ●onven● , justitiae 〈◊〉 . s●ob . serm. . lord remember david and all his afflictions , lat. vers. 〈◊〉 suetudinis ejus . psal. . . i have found david , the so● iesse , a man after mine own heart . acts . . and it 〈◊〉 to pass afterwards that david's heart smote him , because he had 〈◊〉 off saul's skirt ▪ sam. . . sam. . . esth. ● . because the syrians have said , the lord is the god of the hills , but he is not god of the vallies ; therefore will i deliver this great multitude into thine hand , and ye shall know that i am the lord , kings . . nam si legatus officii terminos , obsequium erga imperatorem exuit , ejusdemque morte , &c. luctu meo laetatus est , odero : seponamque ● domo meâ & privatas inimicitias , non principis , ulciscar . tac. . ann. † marian. hist. hisp. lib. . cap. . a fool 's wrath is presently known ; but a prudent man covereth shame . lat. vers. injuriam dissimulat . prov. . . cuncta tamen ad imperato●em in mallius relata . tac. . ann. isaiah . . revel . . . gen. . . envy is the rottenness of the bones , prov. . . insita mortalibus natura , recentem aliorum soelicitatem aegris 〈◊〉 intr●spicere , modumque f●tunae à nullis magis exigere , quam quos in 〈◊〉 videre . tac. . ann. but when the blade was sprung up , 〈◊〉 brought forth fruit , then appeared the tares also , matth. . ● . ex mediocritate fortunae pauciora pericula sunt . tac. . 〈◊〉 quia nova generis claritudine , neque invi●●osis opibus erat . tac. 〈…〉 sam. . . vt effugiamus n●men invid●●e , quod verbum ductum est , à nimis intuend● fortunam alte●i●s . c●e . in 〈◊〉 . non ●ni● poterimus utta esse invidiâ spoliati opibus , & i●la senatoria patesta●e . cic. ad att. that the purpose might not be chang'd concerning daniel . lat. vers. ne quid fieret contra danielem , dan. . . peculi●riter miratum , quo mode adhaerens ●enuisset , nec idem polleret in navigi●● recep●us . plin , lib. . c. . pyramides in egypto , quarum in suo statu se umbra consume●t , ultra constructionis spatia nulla pa●te respicitur . cassiodor . l. . var. epist. . lucanum propriae causae accendebant , quod fama● carminum ejus premebat nero. tac. lib. . ann. and there appear'd in the cherubims , the form of a man's hand u●der their wings , ez●k . . . and saul eyed david from that day , and forward . sam. . . and all the king's servants that were in the 〈◊〉 , b●w'd and reverenced haman , for the king had so commanded concerning him . esth. . . tum ipse , exercitusque , saevitia , libidine , rapti in extremos mo●es proruperunt . tac. . hist. scientia militiae & rumore populi , qui neminem sine 〈◊〉 sinit . tac. . ann. privata odia publicis u●ilitatibus remittere , tac. . ann. arduum eodem loco potentiam , & concordiam esse . tac. . ann. delectus est m. aletus è pretoriis , ne consulari obtinente asiam , emulatio inter pares , & ex eo impedimentum ●riretur . tac. . ann. nec minus periculum ex●magna fama quam ex mala . tac. in vir. agr. cui vigor animi ingentibus negotiis par suberat , eo magis , ut invidiam amoliretur , somnum & inertiam ostentabat . tac. . ann. viso aspectoque agricola quaererent famam , pauci interpretarentur . tac. in vit. agr. debella●is inter rhenum , albimque nationibus exercitum t●●erit caesaris ea monumenta marti , & iovi , & augusto sacravisse , de se nihil addidit , metu invidiae , an ratus conscientiam facti esse satis . tac. . ann. now there was leaning on jesus's bosom , one of his di●ciples whom jesus loved . iohn . . agricola simul suis virtutibus , simul vitiis aliorum in ipsam gloriam praeceps agebatur . tac. in vit. agr. nihil ausus , sed nomen insigne , & decora ipsi juventa , rumore vulgi celebrabantur . tac. . hist. breves & infaustos populi romani amores . tac. . ann. n●llam ob eximiam artem , sed quod par negotiis , neque supra erat . tac. . ann. omnium ore rubellius plautus celebratur , cui nobilitas per matrem ex iuliâ familiâ , ipse placita majorum c●lebat , habitu severo , ca●●â & secretâ domo , quantoque metu occultior , tanto plus famae adeptus . tac. . ann. gloriam in se trahente , tanquam , & ipse foelix bell● , & suis ducibus , & suis exe●citibus remp. aux●sset . tac. . hi●t . destrui per haec fortunam suam , caesar , imparemque tanto meri●● rebatur . tac. . ann. ni●ius commemorandis quae meruisset . tac. . hist. nec agricola unquam suam famam gestis exultavit , ad auctorem & ducem , ut minister , fortunam referebat . ita virtute in obsequendo , verecundia in praedicando extra invidiam , nec extra gloriam erat . tac. in vit. agr. now therefore gather the people together , and encamp against the city , and take it , least i take the city , and it be called after my name . lat. vers. et nomini meo ascribatur victoria . sam. . . principem suum defendere , tueri , sua quoqu● fortia facta gloriae ejus assignare , praecipuum sacramentum erat . tac. lib. de germ. tarda sunt quae in commune expostulantur , privata● gratiam statim mereare , statim recipias . tac. . ann. ita trepidi , & utrinque anxii coeunt ; nemo privat●● , expedit● consilio , inter multos , societate culpae tutior . tac. . hist. 〈◊〉 de●●s publicum curae , plures tuta disserunt . tac. . ann. magis sine domino , quam in libertate . tac. . ann. sed dum veritati consulitur , libertas corrumpebatur . tac. . ann. eccles. cap . . † l . ●it . . p. . orati● vultus ani●● est , si cir●umto●sa est & fucata , & manuf●cta , o●tendi● illum non esse 〈◊〉 , & habere aliquid ●racti . sen epis● . . vas fictil● ictu & sono , h●mo sernione p●o●atu● . meliss . serm . tom. ● . b●bl . a fool travaileth with a word , as a woman in labour of ● child . eccles. . . † l. . tit . . part . . where the word of a king is , there is power . eccl. . . death and life are i● the power of the t●ngue . prov. . . eccl. . . psalm . . neque ●●sse principem sua scientia cuncta complecti . tac . ann. componit ad caesareni codicill●s : mo●is quippe tum erat quamquam praesentem sc●ipto adi●e . tac. . ann. multum brevi sermone inest ●rude●tiae sopn●cl . imperatoria brevit●●e . tac ▪ . hist. pro● . cap. . eccles . ▪ job . . better is it that thou shouldest no● vow , t●an that thou shouldest vow and no● pay . e●cles . . . ●e not hasty in thy tongue , and in thy deeds sl●ck and remis● , eccl. . . vid. lat. vers. ante mortem ne laudes hominem quenquam . eccles. . . magni praesentia veri . virgil. excellent speech becometh not a fool ; much less do lying ●ip● a p●ince . prov. . . ad vana & toties irrisa revolutus de reddenda rep●● utque consules , se● quis alius , regimen susci●eret , ●●ro quoque & honesto fidem dempsit . t●c . a●n . c●ncta m●g●is impe●iis objecta●i solitus . t●c . . ann. rex regum sapor , particeps side●●m , & frater s●iis , & lunae , constantio fra●ri meo sal●t●m . amm●in . marcel . lib . zach. . . qui magno imperio ●●●diti in excelso ae●a●em agunt , eorumque fact● 〈◊〉 mortales novêre , ita maximâ fortunâ ●●inima licentia est . salust . vitellius ventre , & gula sibi ipsi hostis : otho luxu , saevitia , audatia reipub. exitiosior ducebatur . tac. . hist. flexibiles in quamcunq●● partem ducimur à principibus , atque , ut ita d●cam , sequentes sumus . plin in paneg. ezek. . ● . ea conditio principum , ut quicquid facian● , praecipere videantur . quinci● . validio●que indies tigellin●● , & malas artes quibus pollebat , gratiores ratus , si principem societate s●eleris obstringeret . tac. . ann. and the lord sh●ll give israel up , bec●use of the sins of ierob●am , who did sin , and made is●ael to sin . kings . ● . † lop. gamar . annum 〈◊〉 non tam de bonis fructibus , quam de juste reg●●●tibus existimandum . boetius . qui mos vulgo for●uita ad culp●● trabentes . tac. . ann. ratusque dedecus emoliri , si plures 〈◊〉 dasset ▪ tac. . ann. and he compassed him with pomegranates , and with golden bells round about , that there might be a sound , and a noise made , that might be heard in the temple . eccl. . . psal. . . his word was in mine heart as a burning fire sh●t up in my bones , and i was weary with forbearing , and i could not slay , ier. . . quippe tiberium non fortuna , non solitudines protegebant , qui●●ormenta pectoris , su●sque ipse poe●as fateretur . tac. . ann. igitur aeris sono , tubarum , corn●umque conc●n●u strepere , prout ●plendidior , obscuriorve laetari aut moerere . tac. . ann. prov. . . rara temporum foelicitate , ubi sentire quae velis , & quae sentias dicere licet . tac. . hist. magnarum rerum curas non dissimulaturos , qui animum etiam levissimis adverterent . tac. . ann. † gonsalvo of cordoua . quo magis socordiam eorum irride●e libet , qui praesenti potentiâ , credunt extingui posse etiam sequentis aevi memoriam . tac. . ann. non ope humana , non largit●onibus , aut deûm placamentis decedebat infamia , qui● jussum incendium crederetur . tac. . ann. prohibiti per civitatem sermones , eoque plures , ac si liceret , vera narraturi , quia vetabantur , atrociora vulgaverunt 〈…〉 quoniam si id ex levitate processerit contemnendum est ; si ex insania , miseratione dighissimum , si ab inj●ria , remittendum . l. unica c. si quis imperat . maledi● . omnia scire non omnia exequi . tac. in vit. agr. facta arguebantur , dicta impunè erant . tac. . ann. vana à scelestis , dicta à maleficiis differunt . tac. . ann. namque spreta exolescunt , si trascare agnita videntur . tac. . ann. conquisites lectitatosque donec cum periculo parabantur , 〈◊〉 licentia habendi oblivionem attulit . tac. . ann. punitis ingeniis gliscit authoritas . tac. . ann. neque aliud externi reges , 〈◊〉 qui eadem saevitia usi sunt , nisi dedecus sibi , atque illis gloriam peperere . tac. . ann. rev. . . psal. . . psal. . . psal. . . eccl. . . lat. vers. et hanc velim generalem tibi ●●●stituas regulam , ut omnem qui palam veretur dicere , suspectum habeas . s. bern. . . de cons. ad eug. c. . si quis est cujuscunque loci ardinis , dignitatis , qui se in quemcunque iudicum , comitium , amicorum , & palatinorum meorum aliquid veraci●er & manifeste probare posse confidit , quod non integre , atque juste gessisse videatur , intrepidus , atque securus 〈◊〉 , interpellet me , ipse audiam omnia , ipse cognoscam , & si fuerit comprobatum , ipse me vindicabo . l. . c. de accus . curse the whisperer , and double tongued ; for such have destroyed many that were at peace , eccles. . . sam. . . quid enim tam du●um , tamque inhumanum est quam publicatione pompâque rerum fami●iar●um , & 〈◊〉 detegi utisitatem , & invidiae exponere aivitia● . l. . c. 〈◊〉 . ● qui● . quam . pars . eccles. . . fax mentis honestae gloria . he was as the morning star in the midst of a cloud , and as the moon at the full. eccles. . . eccles. . . the number of years is hidden to oppressors . iob . . quanquam medio in spati● integrae aetatis ereptus , quantum ad g●riam longissimum ●evum peregit . ●ac . in vir. agri● . caeteris mortalibus , in eo stare consilia , quid sibi conducere pute●● , principum diversam esse sortem , quibus praecipua rerum ad famam di●●genda . tac. . ann. argentum quidem , & pecunia est commo●● omnium possessio , at honestum , & ex eo laus , & gloria deorum est 〈◊〉 eorum , qui à aiis proximi censentur . polybius . let your light so shine before men , that they may see your good works , matth. . . caete●a principibus statim a●●esse : unum insatiabiliter parandum , prosperam sui memo●●am . tac. . ann. consenuitque , multum immatatâ 〈…〉 . tac. . ann. dan. . . tanquam in speculo ornare , & comparare vitam tuam ad alienas virtutes , plu●arch . call to remembrance what acts our fathers did in their time , so shall ye receive great honour , and an everlasting name , macc. . . and in the four rows of stones , was the glory of the fathers graven , wisd. . . qui omnia facta dictaqu● ejus vice legis observem . tac. . ann. an cum tiberius p●st tantam ●erum experient●am vi dominationis convulsus , & 〈◊〉 sit . tac. . ann. prima imperii aetate clarus acceptusque popularibus ; mox diuturni●atem , in superbiam mutans , & odio accolarum s●●al 〈…〉 circumventis . tac. . ann. ipso vespasiano , inter initia imperii ad obtinendas iniquitates han● perinde obstinato ; donec , indulgentia fortunae , & pra●is magistris , didicit , ansusque est . tac. . hist. † marian. hist. hisp. par est meliores esse eos qui ex melioribus , arist. nam ut ex homine hominem , ex belluis helluam , sic ex bonis bonum generari putant ; at hoc qu●dem natura saepè efficere vult , non tamen potest . arist. . pol. c. . langues●et alioqui ind●stria , intendetur socordia , si nullus ex se metus , aut spes , & securi omnes aliena subsidia expectabant , sibi ignavi , nobis graves . tac. . ann. censoris vitellii ac ter consulis filius , id satis ●idebatur . tac. . hist. mandabatque honores , nobilitatem majorum , claritudinem ●●●litiae , illustres domi artes , spectando , ut satis constaret , non alios poti●●es fuisse . tac. . ann. reges ex nobilitate , duces ex virtute 〈◊〉 . tac. de mor. germ. si remp. gnaris , & non magni pre●ii hominibus committas , stat●●n & nobilium ac strenuorum iram in te provocabis ob contemptam e●um fidem , & maximis in rebus damna patiens . dion . cassio . videntur 〈◊〉 ex se nati . tac. . ann. † claud. et revocante nobilitate , cui in pace durius servitium est . tac. . ann. nam imbecilliores semper equum , & justum quaerunt , potenti●ribus autem id nihil curae . arist. pol. . c. . nihil ausuram plebem principibus amotis . tac. . ann. commodum est etiam , ut haereditates non donatione , sed jure agnationis tradantur , utque ad eundem una , non plures haereditates perveniant . arist. pol. . c. . dites elim familiae nobilium , aut claritudine insignes , studio magnificentiae prolabehantur . tac. . ann. sed cum ex primariis aliqui bona dissiparunt , hi res novas moliuntur . arist. pol. . c. . non censebat conveni●e cuiquam imperti●m qui non melior esset iis quibus imperaret . xenoph , lib. . so the lord was with ioshua , and his fame was noised throughout all the country , iosh. . . rex enim dux erat in be●h , & iudex , & in iis quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent , summam potesta●● habebat . arist. pol. . . minusque insidiantur iis , qui d●●● auxiliares habent . arist. polit. he set a crown of gold upon the mitre , wherein was engraved holiness , an ornament of honour , a safety-work , the desires of the eyes goodly and beautiful . eccl. . . and he worshipped leaning upon the top of his staff. vid. la● vers. et adoravit fastigium virgae ejus : heb. . . fear ye not , stand still , and see the salvation of the lord , which he will shew you to day , exod. . . and the lord god of israel fought for israel , josh. . . and that turn not aside from the commandment , to the right , or to the left ; to the end that he may prolong his days in his kingdom , he and his children in the midst of israel , deut. . . rom. . . principes quidem instar deorum esse . tac. . ann. and he had in his right hand seven stars , revel . . . and he cast it on the ground , and it became a serpent , and moses ●led from before it , exod. . . and he dreamed , and behold , a ladder set upon the earth , and the top of it reached to heaven ; and behold , the angel● of god ascending and descending on it . gen. . . vera gloria radices agit , atque etiam propagatur ; ficta 〈◊〉 celeriter tanquam flosculi decidunt , neque fimulatum quidquam potest 〈◊〉 diuturnum . cic. lib. . de off. cap. . and all our righte●●●nesses are as filthy rags , isaiah . . otho interim , contra 〈◊〉 omnium , non deliciis , neque desidia torpescere , dilatae voluptates , diss●●● lata luxuria , & cuncta ad decorem imperii composita , eoque plus 〈◊〉 a●●erebantur fals● virtutes , & vitia reditura . tac. . hist. haud minus noxiae , quoties , parando regno finguntur . tac. . ann. extrema est perversitas , cum prorsus jus●●tia vaces , ad id niti , ut 〈◊〉 bonus esse videaris . plat. quae grata sane & popularia , si à ●●tutibus proficiscerentur ; memoria vitae prioris , indecora , & vilia accipiebantur . tac. . hist. penetrabat pavor , & admiratio , callidum olim , & regendis sceleribus obscurum , huc confidentiae venisse , ut tanquam dimotis parietibus ostenderet nepotem sub verbere centurionis , inter servorum ictus , extrema vitae alimenta frustra orantem . tac. . ann. claro apud vulg●●●umore erat per virtutem , aut species virtutibus ●imiles . tac. . ann. permittimus , quod nolentes indulgemus , quia pravam hominum voluntatem ad plexum cohibere non possumus . s. chrysost. non id tempus censurae , nec si quid in moribus laboret defuturum corrigendi authorem . tac. . ann. pervulgatum esse incestum , gloriante matre , nec toleraturos milites profani principis imperium . tac. . ann. corpus illi laborum tolerans , animus audax , sui obtegens , in alios criminator , justa adulatio , & superbia , palam compositus pudor , intus summa adipiscendi libido , ejusque causa , modo largitio , & luxus , saepius industria , & vigilantia . tac. . ann. ambigua de vespasiano fama . tac. . hist. egregium principatus temperamentum , si demptis virtutibus utriusque vitiis solae virtutes miscerentur . tac. . hist. eo munitiores reges censentur , quo illis , quibus imperitant , nequi●res . salust . sed à caesare profecto demum sceleris magnitudo intellecta est ; reliquo noctis , modo persaepius pavore exurgens , & mentis in●ps operiebatur , tanquam exitium allaturam . tac. . ann. sed magnitud● facinoris metum , prolationes , diversa interdum consilia adferebat . tac. . ann. job . . he disappointeth the devices of the crafty , so that their hands cannot perform their enterprise , iob . . because thou hast rejected the lord , he has also rejected thee from being king , sam. . . vt vitam , quam ipsi à majoribus , accepissent , vicissim , quasi t●dam ardentem posteris tradant . plato . i will also give thee for a light to the gentiles , that thou maist be my salvation to the end of the earth , isaiah . . thou art weigh'd in the balance , and found wanting , dan. . . vrbi nostrae institutum , & à regibus usque ad principes continuum , & immortalem , sicut à majoribus accepimus , sic posteris tradamus . tac. . hist. quam arduum , quam subjectum fortunae regendi cuncta onus ? tac. . ann. * s●rabo . † valer. max. let them set a fair mi●re upon his head , zach. . . consula●es fasces , praet●●tum , curulemque sellam , nihil aliud , quam pompam funeris putent ; claris insignibus velut in●●sis velatos ad mo●t 〈◊〉 destinari . liv. . hist. vt non dominationem , & servos , sed rectorem & cives cogitaret . tac. . ann. cogitare quid ●ut 〈◊〉 sub alio principe , aut volueris . tac. . hist. an ignoras , 〈◊〉 mi , nostrum regnum ess●● n●bilem servitutem ? with f●vour wilt thou compass him as with a shield , psalm . 〈◊〉 . vt enim gubernatio patrisfamilias est regia quaedam potestas domi ; ita regia potestas , est civitatis & gentis unius aut plurium quasi domestica quaedam gubernatio . arist. polit. . cap. . for thou hast been a strength to the poor , a strength to the needy in his distress ; a refuge from the storm , a shadow from the hear , isa. . . there were giants in the earth in those days ; the same became mighty men , gen. . . vid. iob . . and the waters which thou sawest , where the whore sitteth , are peoples , and multitudes , and nations , and tongues , revel . . . vid. sam. . . it a nati estis ut bona malaque ves●ra ad remp. pertineant . tac. . ann. sam. . . facta quae laedunt pietatem , existimation●m , verecundiam nostram , & ut generaliter dixe●im , contra bonos more 's fi●●t ●ec facere e●s credendum est . l. . f. de condit . i●stir . quomodo pessimis imperatoribus sine fine dominationem , ita quamvis egregiis libertatis modum placere . tac. . ann. bind the ti●e of thine head upon thee . ezek. . . sermo vero datus est homini , ad utile & inutile , ac proinde justum ac injustum declarandum . arist. pol. . cap. . nam respub . nulla ●st , ubi leges non te●ent imperium , arist. pol. . cap. . for justice is immortal , wisd. . . leg●m scimus iusti injustique regulam esse . seneca . nec utendum imperio , ubi legibus agi possit . tac. . ann. minui jura quoties gliscat potestas . tac. . ann. the work of righteousness shall be peace , and the effect of righteousness , quietness and assurance for ever , isaiah . . inauditi atque defensi tanquam innocentes peritant . tac. . hist. factae sunt autem leges , ut eorum metu humana coerceatur audacia , tutaque sit inter improbos innocentia , & in ipsis improbis reformidato supplicio refraenetur audacia & nocendi facultas . isid. lib. . etymol . l. legibus , c. de leg . insurgere paulatim , munia senatus , magistratuum , legum in se trabere . tac. . ann. nam cuncta legum , & magistratuum mu●ia in se trahens princeps , materiam praedandi patefecit . tac. . ann. deditque jura , queis pace , & principe uteremur , acriora ex 〈◊〉 vincula inditi custodes . tac. . ann. vtque antehac ftagitiis ita nunc legibus laborabatur . tac. . ann. because ephraim hath made many altars to sin , altars shall be unto him to sin. scriba●●i multiplices leges meas , says the latin version , hos. . , . vsus ●ris ad perpetuitatem monumento●um jampridem translatus est tabulis aereis , in quibus constitutiones publicae inciduntur . and he gave unto moses , when he had made an end of communing with him upon mount sinai , two tables of testimony , tables of stone written with the finger of god. positas semel leges constanter servate , nec ullam earum immutate ; nam quae in suo statu eademque ma●●nt , etsi deteriora sint , tamen utili●ra sunt reipublicae , his quae per innovationem , vel meliora indacuntur . dion . l. . non fuerint concordes unquam , aut inter amantes cives , ubi mut●● 〈◊〉 lites judiciales sunt , sed ubi eae brevissimae & paucissimae . plato . tot à majoribus repertae , tot quas divus augustus tulit , illae oblivione , hae ( quod flagitiosius est ) contemptu abolitae , securtorem luxum fecere . tac. . ann. num coercio plus damni in remp. ferret ; quam indecorum attrectare , quod non obtineretur , vel retentum ignominiam & infamiam virorum illustrium posceret . tac. . ann. sed praecipuu● adstricti moris autor vespafianus fuit , antiquo ipse cultu , victuque obsequium inde in principem , & aemulandi amor validior , quam poenae ex legibus , & metus . tac. . ann. mos hominum tutissime agere , qui praesentibus moribus , legibusque etiam si deteriores sint , minimum variantes rempub. administrant . thucid. quid leges sine moribus vanae prosiciunt ? s. aug. digna vax●st majestate regnantis , legibus allig●tum se pr●fiteri . l. . c. de leg. quibus etiam reges obtemperarent . tac. . ann. siquando cum privatis disceptarent , forum & jus . tac. . ann. eat this roll , and go speak un●o the house of israel ; so i opened my mouth , and he caus'd me to eat the roll , ezek. . , and . quae gloria tua est praecipua , saepe vincitur fiscus cujus mala causa nunquam est , nisi sub bono principe . plin. in pan. for he is the minister of god to thee for good ; but if thou do that which is evil , ●e afraid ; for he beareth not the sword in vain , rom. . . m●r. hist. of spain ▪ et quanquam multi ex ejus dom● equites ac senatores sustentasse opibus , juvisse consillis , dicerentur . tac. . ann. parvis peccatis 〈◊〉 , magnis severitatem commendare ; nec poena semper , sed saepiùs p●nitentia contentus esse . tac. in vit. ag●ic . hanc p. c. curam sustinet princeps , hâc omissâ sunditus remp. trahet . tac. . ann. mar , hist of spain . non honore galbae , sed tradito principi●●● more , munimentum ad praesens , in posterum ultionem . tac. hist. lib. . cavendum est ne iisdem de caussis alii plectantur , alii ne appellantur quidem 〈◊〉 de off. nec tiberius poenam ejus palam ausus , in secreta palatii parte interfici jussit , corpusque clam auferri . tac. . ann. si prohibita impunè transcenderis neque metus ultrà neque pudor est . tac. . ann. wherein were all manner of fourfooted beasts of the earth , and wild beasts , and creeping things , and fowls of the air ; and there came a voice unto him , rise , peter , kill and eat , act● . , . vix enim quisquam adeò mali expers , ut non aliquam mortem meyeatur . tac. . ann. and he plac'd at the east end of the garden of eden cherubims , and a flaming sword , gen. . . faliciores sunt impr●●i , supplicia luentes , quam si eos nulla justitiae 〈◊〉 coerceat . boet. lib. . phil. mirumque amorem assecutus etat effuse clementiae , modicus severitate . tac. . ann. i will sing of mercy and judgment , unto thee , o lord , will i sing . imperator aliquando torquibus , murali , & civicâ donat ; quid habet per se pretiosum , quid pr●texta , quid fasces , quid tribunal , quid currus ? nil horum honor est , sed honoris insigne . sen. lib. . de ben. irridente arm●nio vilia servitii praemia . tac. . ann. hono●● augmentum non ambitione , sed labore ad unumquemque convenit perve●● ▪ l. contra publicam c. de re milit . tunc vectigal publicum , quo anteà milites & remiges aleba●●●● , cum urbano populo dividi coeptum , quibus rebus effectum est , ut inter 〈◊〉 graecorum , sordidum & obscurum antea macedonum nomen emergeret . trog . ● . . aurum & argentum raro cuiquam nisi militi divisit , 〈◊〉 esse dicens , us dispensator publicus in delectationes suas & suorum 〈◊〉 , id quod provinciales dedissent . la●p . in vit. alex. for the throne is establish'd by righteousness , prov. . . remove the diadem , and take off the crown , &c. ezek. . ● . subverti leges , quae sua spatia exercendae candidatorum 〈◊〉 , quaerendisque hand potiundis honoribus statuerint . tac. . ann. hand dubium erat , eam sententiam altius penetrare , & arcana i●perii te●tari . tac. . ann. atque ita favorabili in speciem eratione , vim imperii retinuit , ibid. abunde cognoscetur quisquis fama teste laudatur ; quapropter longissime constitutum mentis nostrae oculus serenus inspexit & vidit meri●um . cassid . lib. . cap. . facilius quippe est , ut oculis ejus ●ult●● absentis , quam animo charitas excidat . plin. in paneg. and i have also given thee that which thou hast not ask'd , both riches and honour ; so that there shall not be any among the ●ings like unto thee , in thy days , kings . . amamu● 〈◊〉 beneficia germinare , nec semel praesta● largitulis collatae fastidium , ma●●sque nos provocant ad frequens praemium , qui initia nostrae gratiae suscipere ●●ruerunt ; novis enim judicium impenditur , favor autem semel placitis ●xhibetur . cas. lib. . epist. . * mar. hist. of spain . † concil . tolet. cap. . † mar. hist. of spain . omnium primam rem ad multitudinem imperitam efficacissimam deorum metum injiciendum ratus . liv. ob hoc sui regni apicem à deo solidari praeoptaret , si catholicae fid●i per euntium turmas acquireret , indignum reputans catholicae fidei principe● sacrileges imperare . conci● . tol. . cap. . and they withstood vzziah the king , and said unto him , it appertaineth not unto thee , vzziah , to burn incense unto the lord , but to the priests , chro● . . . and the people shouted with a great shout , that the wall fell down flat , so that the people went up into the city , every man strait before him , and they took the ci●y , ios. . . for where your treasure is , there will your heart he also , mat. . . now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown , but we an inco●r●ptible , cor. . . heb. . , . so that fighting with their hands , and praying to god with their hearts , they slew no less than thirty and five thousand men , mach. . . least thou say in thine heart , my power , and the might of my hand hath gotten me this victory . but thou shalt remember the lord thy god ; for it is he that hath given thee power to get wealth , deut. . , . take this holy sword , a gift from god , with which thou shalt wound the adversaries , ● mach. . . * in hoc signo vinces . euseb. i. . hist. st. ambr. ep. . † ge●●br . l , . chron. anno . * mar. hist of spain . josh. . . ibid. they fought from heaven , the stars in their courses fought against sisera . the lord ca●t down great stones from heaven upon them to azekah , and they died , iosh , . . judg. . . for the priest's lips should keep knowledge , a●d they should seek the law at his mouth , malach. . . nullae res multitudinem efficacius regit , quam superstitio . curtius . censuit asinius gallus , ut libri sibyllini adirentur , renuit tiberi●s , perinde divina humanaque obtegens . tac. . ann. many of them also which us'd curious arts , brought their books together , and burnt them before all men , acts . . and they arose up early on the morrow , and offered burnt offerings , and burnt peace-offerings ; and the people sat down to eat , and to drink , and rose up to play , exod. . . eos vero qui in divinis aliquid innovant , odio habe , & coerce , non deorum solum causâ ( quos tamen qui contemnit , nec aliud sane magni feceri● ) sed quia nova quaedam numina hi tales introducentes , multos impellunt ad mut●●ionem rerum , unde conjurationes , seditiones , conciliabula existunt , res profecto minimè conducibiles principatui . dion . deorum inj●rias dii● curae , tac. . ann. sanctius , ac reverentius visum , de actis deorum credere , quam scire . tac. de mor. germ. neque nisi romani dei , nec quo ali● more , quam parvo colerentur , t. liv. quia externae superstitiones valescant , tac. . ann. nam recte disponere , recteque judicare , qui potest , is est princeps & imperator . menand . who seek wisdom upon earth , the merchants of merrhan and theman , the authors of fables , and searchers out of understanding ; none of these have known the way of wisdom , or remember her paths , baruch . v. . all scripture is given by inspiration of god , and is profitable for doctrine , for reproof , for correction , for instruction in righteousness , tim. . . and he shall read therein all the days of his life , deut. . ● . praeficiebat rebus literatos , & maximè qui historiam norant , requirans 〈◊〉 in talibus causis , quales in disceptatione versabantur , veteres impera●●● fecissent . lamp. she knoweth things of old , and conje●●●eth aright what is to come , wisd. . . eccles. . . wo to the idle shepherd that leaveth his flock , zach. . . they have mouths , but they speak not ; eyes have they , but they see not ; ears have they , but they hear not ; noses have they , but they smell not , psalm . . we know that an idol is nothing i● the world , cor. . . give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judg● thy people , that i may discern between good and bad , i kings . . plures aliorum eventis docentur . tac. . ann. quippe fa●● ▪ spe , veneratione potius omnes destinabantur imper●● , quam quem fatu●●m principem for●una in occulto tene●●t . tac. . ann. sam. . . sam. . . jon. . . judith . ▪ ibid. eccl. . . eccl. . . quod precibus non potuit t●dio impetravit . d. hieron . kings . . nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile ac fl●xum est , quam famae potentiae , non sua vi ni●a . tac. . ann. melius divo iulio , divoque augusto notos eorum animos galbam , & infracta tributa , hostiles spiritus induisse . tac. . hist. nomine tantum , & auctore opus , ut sponte caesaris , ut genus arsacis , ripam apud euphratis cerneretur . tac. . ann. nunquam obscura , nomina , etsi aliquando obumbrentur . tac. . hist. erat grande momentum , in nomine vrbis , & praetextu senatus . tac. . hist. nec d●erat otho protendens manus adorare vulgum , jacere oscula , & omnia serviliter pro dominatione . tac. . hist. caeterum ad supplenda exercitus damna , certavere gallia , hispania , italia , quod cuique promp●um , arma , equos , au●um ●fferentes , quorum laud●to studio germanicus , armis modo & equis ad bellum sumptis , propria pecunia militem juvit . tac. . ann. legatis gratiae actae pro magnificentia cu●aque , patera quae minimi ponderis fuit accepta . liv. l. . gratiae actae , ●●rum non acceptum . liv. . visuque & auditu juxta venerabilis , cum magnitudinem , & gravi●atem summae fortunae re●ineret invidiam & a●●ogantiam e●●ugeret . tac. . ann. hest. . . exod. . . ibid. job . . psalm . . job . . psalm . . eccl. . . prov. . . job . . isaiah . . neve tiberius vim principatus resolveret , cuncta ad senatum vocando . tac. . ann. vite●●um subitis offensis , aut intempestivis blanditiis mutabilem contemnebant metue●antque . tac. . hist. optimus quisque mortalium altissima cupere . tac. . ann. ade● non principatus appetens , ut parum effageret ne dignus crederetur . tac. . hist. primum domum suam coercuit , quod plerisque haud minus arduum 〈◊〉 , quam provinciam regere ; nihil per liber●os , servosque publicae rei . tac. in vir. agr. iam afferebant cuncta venalia praepotentes liber●i servorum manus sub●tis avidae tanquam apud senem festinantes . tac. . hist. modesta servitia . tac. . ann. aratores in aegypto coelum no● suspiciunt . pli● . offensionem pro utilitate publica non pavidum . tac. . ann. † mar. hist. hisp. nihil gloriosum nisi tutum , & omnia retinendae dominationis 〈◊〉 . sallust . tanto impensius in sccuritatem compositus , neque loco , neque 〈…〉 , sed ut s●litum per illos d●es egit . tac. . ann. sam. . . sam. . . non ex rumore statuendum . tac. . ann si ubi jubeantur , quaerere singulis 〈◊〉 ; pereunte obsequio , e●●am 〈◊〉 interci●it , tac. . hist. psalm . . † mar. hist. hisp. sectari cantantem solitus , non necessitate , qua honestissimus quisq●e , sed i● luxu & sagina mancipatus emptusque . tac. . hist. in ipso nihil tumidum , arrog●●s , aut in rebus novis novum fuit . tac. . hist. frons privata manet , non se meruisse fatetur , qui crevisse putat . cla●d . nullum turbati , aut exultantis animi m●tum prodidisse , ●ermo erga ●●rem , imperatoremque reverens : de se moderatus , ●hil in vultu . ha●●qe mutatum , quasi imperare posset magis quam veilet . tac. . hist. vlacidus ore , intrepidus verbis , intempestivas suo●rum lathry●●●●ercens . tac. . hist. haec audita , quanquam abstrusum , & tristissima quoque maxi●● occultantem tiberium pertule●unt . tac. . ann. simul oth●● vultum intn●eri , atque eve●t inclinatis ad suspicionem mentibus , cum ti●● ret otho timebatur . tac. . hist. fides metu infracta . tac. . 〈◊〉 sam. . . jos. . . job . . non ut profugus aut supplex , sed ex memoria prioris fortunae . tac. . ann. mithridates terra marique per tot annos romanis quaesitis , sponte adsum ; utere , ut voles , prole magni achemeis , quod mihi solum hostes non abstulerunt . tac. . ann. m●ta●●●e rerum , & prece haud degenerare permotus . tac. . ann. simul segestes ipse ingens visu , & memor ia bonae societatis impavidus ; verba ejus in hunc modum fuere . etiam illum , qui libertatem publicam nollet , tam projectae servi●ntium patientiae cedebat . tac. . ann. nulla offensa , sed mit●● & injuriam segniter laturum . tac. . hist. avitae nobilitatis eti●● inter angustias fortunae retinens . tac. . ann. nul ' os mortalium armis , & fide ante germanos esse . tac . ann. quod comiter à visentibus exceptum , quasi impetus antiqui , & bona ●mulatione . tac. . ann. actaeque insuper vitell● gratiae , consuetudine servitii . tac. . hist. seneca ( qui finis omnium cum dominante sermonum ) gratias agit . tac. . ann. constantia orationis , & quia repertus erat qui efferret quae omnes animo agitabant , &c. tac. . ann. vbi nihil pro innocentia , quasi diffideret , nec beneficiis , quasi exprobraret , disseruit . tac. . ann. praefectus nisi formam suam referat , mali fati instar subditis efficitur . them. orat. . cant. . , . vt nullum ferox verbum excideret . tit. liv . eccl. . . quem casum , neque , ut plerique fortium virorum , ambitiosè , neque per lamenta rursus , ac terrorem multebrem tuli● , & in lustu , bellum inter remedia erat . tac. in vit. agr. prov. . . octogentorum annorum fortuna , disciplinaque , compages haec coal●● ; quae convelli sine excidio convellentium non potest . tac. . hist. multorum improbitate depressa veritas emergit , & innocentiae desens● interclusa respirat . cicero . secundae res acrioribus flimulis animum exploravit ; quia miseri● toler antur , felicitate corrumpimur . tac. . hist. dan. . . job . . † mar. hist. hisp. reputante tiberio , publicum sibi ●dium , extremam aetatem , magisque fama , quam vi stare res sua● . tac. . ann. cur hostem concitet ? adversa in remp. casura ; sin prosperè egisset , formidolos●m paci virum insignem , & ignavo principi praegravem . tac. . ann. tac. . ann. neque alients consilis regi , neque sua expedire . tac. . hist. surdae ad fortia consilia vitellio aures . tac. . hist. proinde intuta quae indecora ; vel si cadere necesse sit , occurrendu● 〈◊〉 , tac. . hist. † mar. hist. hisp. tanto impensius in securitatem compositus , neque loco , neque vultu mutato , sed ut solitum per illos dies egit ; alti●●dine animi , an competerat , modica esse & v●lgatis leviora ? tac. . hist. quia in metu consilia prudentium , & vulgi rumor juxta audiun●● ibid. kings . . nemo mortalium juxta viperam secures somnos sapit , quae etsi non percutiat certe solicitat ; tutius est perire non posse , quam juxta pericul●m 〈◊〉 periisse . sanct. hier. corporis custodiam tutissimam esse putatam in virtute amicorum , tum in benevolentia civium esse collocatam . isocr . ad nic. salvum principem in aperto clementia praestabit , vivum erit inexpugnabile monument ●n amor civium . sen. de clem. lib. ca. . † mar. hist. hisp. nec quisquam tibi fidelior militum ●uit , dum amari meruisti , odisse ●aepi postquam parricida matris & uxo●is , auriga , histrio , & incendiar●us extitisti . tac. . ann . clarit●●ine paucos inter senatum regum , siperinde amorem inter populares , quam metum apud hostes quaesivisset . tac. . ann . i●geus gloria , atque eo f●rocior , & subjectis intolerantior , tac. . ann . wisd. . . timore princeps ●ciem authoritatis suae non patitur hebescere . cic. . ca● . ps. . . exod. . ita agere in subjectis , ut magi● vereantur severitatem , quam ut saevitiam ejus detestentur . colum. isa. . , . prov. . . jud. . . comitas facile faustum omne atterit , & in familiari consuetudine agrè custodias illud opinionis augustum . herod . lib. . cultu modi●us , se●mone facilis ; adeo ut plerique , quibus magnos viros per ambitionem astimare mos est , viso aspectoque agricola , quaererent famam , pauci interpretarentur . tac. in vit . agr. et videri velle non asperum , sed cum gravitate honestum , & talem , ut eum non timeant obvii , sed magis revereantur . arist. pol. lib. . c. . nec illi quod rarissimum est , aut facilitas authoritatem ▪ aut severitas amorem diminuit . tac. in vit . agr. atque ipse , ut super fortunam crederetur , decorum se , promptumque armis ostentabat , comitate & alloquiis officia provocans , ac plerumque i● opere , in agmine , in gregario militi mixtus , incorrupto ducis honore . tac. . hist. † claud. h●sther . . ibid. ibid. ibid. isai. . . eccl. . . ezek. . . etiam fera animalia si clausa teneas , virtutis obliviscuntur . tac. . hist. † mar. hist. hisp. eccl. . . continuus aspectus minus verendos magnos homines ipsa societate f●it . liv. arcebantur conspectu , quo venerationis plus inesset . tac. . hist. cui major è l●nginquo reverenti● . tac. ● . ann . ye mountains of israel , hear the word of the lord god , 〈◊〉 saith the lord god to the mountains , and to the hills , to the rivers , and to the valleys , ezek. . . ●ames . . prov. . . quam virtutem diu retinuit , cum caeteras 〈◊〉 . tac. . ann . ac velut perfringere aerarium : 〈◊〉 si 〈◊〉 exhauserimus , per scelera supplendum ●rit . tac. . ann . psal. . . levit. . . eccl. . . eccl. . . † l. . tit . . lib. . recop . prov. . . gen. . . ibid. ver . . luke . . magni animi est magna contemnere , prudentis est mediocria malle , quam nimia ; ista enim utilia sunt : illa quòd superfluunt nocent . sic s●● getem nimia sternit ubertas , sic rami onere franguntur , sic ad maturita●em non pervenit nimi● foecunditas , sen. epist. . † l. . tit . . p. . mansuram discordiam ●btendens , ●i semina belli restrinxisset . tac. ● . ann . sam. . . hec clementia non minus utilis victori quam victo fuit . tac. . hist. judg ▪ . . ibid. ibid. quae ex pluribus constat resp melior est arist. pol. c. ● . huc enim sunt omnia reducenda , ut iis qui sub imperio sunt , non tyrannum , sed patrem-familias , aut regem agere videatur , &c. arist. pol. . c. . exod. . . hebr. . . quod regnum est , cui parata non sit ruina , & proculcatio , & dominus , & car●fex ? nec ista intervallis divisa , ●ed hor●e momentum interest inter soli●m , & aliena genua . senec. modestia fama , quae neque summis mortalium spernenda est , & à diis aestimatur . tac. . ann . acer●éque increpuit eos qui divina● occupationes , ipsumque dominum dixerunt . tac. . ann . assid●bat in corn● tribunalis . tac. . ann . non ●nim solum respublica , quae optima sit , considerari debet , sed etiam quae constitui possit , praetereà quae facilior & cunctis civitatibus communior habeatur . arist. lib. pol. . c. . praeterea seditiones 〈◊〉 modo propter fortunarum , sed etiam propter honorum inaequalitatem existunt . arist. lib. . c. . sed jam haec consuetudo in civitatibus invaluit , ut homines , aequalitatem odio hab●ant , & malint , aut imperio potiri , aut si victi fuerint , imperio subesse . arist. lib. . pol. c. . nam qui virtute praestant , iniquo animo sibi indigniores aequari paterentur : quamobrem sapè conspira●e , & seditio●es commovere notantur . arist. pol. . c. . † silvest●es homines sacer interpresque deorum , cadibus & foedo victu deterruit orpheus , dictus ab hoc lenire tigres , &c. * juego de las cannas . imperaturus es hominibus , qui nec totam servitutem pati possunt , nec totam libertatem . tac. . hist. circumire saucios , facta singulorum extollere , vulnera intuens , alium spe , alium gloria , cunctos alloquio & 〈◊〉 , sibique & praelio firmabat . tac. . ann . tiberius tamen lu●ibria ser●is permiscere solitus . tac. . ann . mis●● stultitiam consiliis brevem . eccl. . . quo leonis pellis attingere non potest , principi assumendam vulpinam . plut. fuit , cui in tractandis negotiis dolus malus placeret , quem regi convenire sane nemo dixerit , etsi non desunt , qui id tam crebr●●su hodie doli mali , necessarium eum esse dicant ad publicam rerum administrationem . polyb. . hist. nihil gloriosum nisi tutum , & omni● retinendae dominationis honesta . sal. ubicunque tantam honesta dominanti licet , praecario regnatur . sen. in trag ▪ thyest. a lion which is the strongest among beasts , and turneth not away for any . prov. . . and he made as though he would have gone farther . luke . . and he changed his behaviour before them , and feign'd himself mad in their hands , and scr●bbled on the doors of the gate , and let his spittle fall down upon his bea●● , sam . . and the lord said , take a heifer with thee and say , i am come to sacrifice to the lord , sam . . and he put the skins of the kids of the goats upon his 〈◊〉 , and 〈…〉 the smooth of his neck , 〈◊〉 . . simul simplicitatis , ac modestiae imagine conditus , studiumque literarum , & amorem carminum simulans , qu● velaret animum . tac. . hist. retinuitque quod difficillimum est , ex sapientia modum . tac in vit . agr. wherefore when saul saw that he behaved himself very wisely , he was afraid of him , . sam. . . but canst not tell whence it cometh , and whither it goeth . ioh. . . and who is able to discover his ways ? eccl. . . and with twain he covered his feet , isai. . . primo prudentes , dein vulgum , diutissimè provincias fefellit . tac. . ann . et baculum intorquens emittit in auras , principium pugnae . virg. and iephtha sent messengers unto the king of the children of ammon , saying , what hast thou to do with me , that thou art come against me to fight in my land ? iudg. . . ne dissimulans suspectior foret . tac. . hist. solum insidiarum remedium esse si non intelligerentur . tac. . ann . consulto ambiguns . tac. . ann . quibus usus metus si intelligere viderentur tac. . ann . intelligebantur artes : sed pars obsequii 〈…〉 ne deprehenderentur . tac. . hist. abditos principis sensus , & 〈◊〉 quid occultius parat exquir●re illicitum , anceps , nec ideo assequare . tac. . ann . eo aegrius accepit recludi quae premeret . tac. . ann . haud ●●●●ctatus est ultra germanicus ; quanquam fingi ea seque per invidiam ●●rto jam decori abstrahi intelligeret . tac. . ann . si intelligere videretur , vim metuens , in urbem properat . tac. . ann . tr●pida●●● à circumsedentibus , diffugiunt imprudentes , at quibus altior intellectus , resistunt defixi , & neronem intuentes . tac. . ann . † non decet ignavum totâ producere somnum n●cte virum , sub consilio , sub nomine cujus t●t populi degunt , cui rerum cura , fidesque credita summarum est . dicta factaque ejus quanto solutiora , & quandam sui negligentia● praeferentia , tantò gratius in speciem simplicitatis accipiebantur . tac. . ann . ezek. . . semper cauda in ictu est , nulloque momento meditari cessat , ne quan●o desit occasioni . plin. lib. . c. . q●anqua● 〈◊〉 or●●t●one , quaedam de habitu , cultuque & institutis ejus fecer●t● quae velut excusand● exprobraret . tac. ann . unde amico infamiam parat , inde gloriam sibi re●ipere . tac. . ann . pessimum ini●icorum genus , ●●udantes . tac. in vit . agric. secr●tis cum criminationibus infa●●n●verat , ignarum , & quo cautius dec●peretur , palam laudat●●● . tac. . hist. psal. . . hos. . . multaque de virtute ejus memoravit , magis in speciem verbis ad●rnata quam ut penitus sentire crederetur . tac. . ann . igitur mucianus quia propalam opprimi antonius nequibat , multis in senatu laudil●s cumulatum s●cretis promissis onerat , citerierem hispaiam ostenta●s discessu cluvii rufi vacuam . tac. . hist. sed callidè ut ignotum 〈◊〉 tac. . ann . odia in longum jacens , quae reconderet . auct●que prom●r●t . tac. . ann devise not ( lat. noli arare ) a lye against thy brothers ▪ eccl . . ye have plowed wickedness , ye have reaped iniquity , ye have eaten the fruit of lyes , hos. . . and he said , i will go forth and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets , kin. . . and they rose up early in the morning , and the sun shone upon the waters , and the moabites saw the water on the other side as red as blood , kings . . and ioshu● heard the noise of the people , as they shouted , he said unto moses , there is a noise of war in the camp . and he said , it is not the voice of them that shout for mastery , neither is it the voice of them that cry for being overcome : but the noise of them that sing , do i hear , exod. . , . i will go down now , and see whether they have done altogether according to the cry of it , which is come unto me ; and if not , i will know , gen. . . non authoris , non ipsius negotii side satis spectata , nec missis visoribus per quos nosceret an vera ass●rerentur . tac. . ann . plebei● ingenia exemplis ●agis quam ratione capiuntur . macrob. quas● scelere contaminaretur . tac. . ann . at ille moriturum potiùs quam fidem exueret , clamitans , ferrum à latere diripuit , elatumque deferebat in pectus . id. ibid. sed quod largiendis pecuniis & mission●●estinata favorem militum quaefivisset , belli●a quoque germanici gloria aug●batur . id. ibid. quod tiberio haud probatum . id. ibid. id s●berit animum altius penetravit . id. ibid. cuncta germanici in deterius trahenti . id. ibid. quanto summe spei propi●r , tanto impensi●s pro tiber●o niti . id. ibid. novisq●e provinc●is impositum , dolo simul & cafibus objectaret . tac. . ann . na● g●rmanici mortem inter prospera ducebat . tac. . ann . their eyes be full of dust , through the feet of them that come in . baruc. . . prov. . . nobilitas , opes , omissi g●stique honores pro crimine & ob virtutes certissimum exitium . tac. . hist. and uzzah put forth his hand to the ark of god , and took hold of it , for the oxen shook it and the anger of the lord was kindled against uzzah , and god smote him there for his error , and there he died by the ark of god , sam. . . lugdune●sis galliae rector , genere illustris , largus animo , & par opibus , circumdaret principi ministeria ▪ comitaretur liberaliter , 〈◊〉 ipso ingratus quamvis , odium vitellius humilibus blanditiis velaret . tic. . hist. and no man knoweth either love or hatred , by all that is before them , e●●l . . . now when iob's three friends heard of all this evil that was come upon him , they came every one from his own place , v. lat. v●nerunt sicut locutus est dominus ad eos , job . . then came there unto him all his brethren , and all his sisters , and all that had been of his acquaintance before , and did eat bread with him in his house , iob ● . . prov. . . ibid. ne vana , & reo non profitura , intercessori exitiosa inciperet . tac. ann . nullius servilis sententiae sponte author , & quoties necessitas ingrueret , sapi●ntèr moderans . tac. . ann . wo unto them that call evil good and good evil ; that put darkness for light , and light for darkness ; that put bitter for sweet , and sweet for bitter , isai. . . when a man shall have in the skin of his flesh , a rising , a scab , or bright spot , levit. . . sponte dixisse , respondit ; neque in its quae and remp . pertinerent , consilio nisi su●●surum , vel cum periculo offensionis , ea sola species adulandi supererat . tac. . ann . palam aspernante atieo capitone quasi per libertatem . n●● enim debere eripi patribus vim statuendi , neque tantum maleficium impune habendum ; sane lentius in suo dolore esset ; reipub . dolores ne largiretur . tac. . ann . † mar. hist. hisp. o my people , they which lead thee cause thee to err , and destroy the way of thy paths , isa. . . elanditiae pessimum veri affectus venenum ; sua cuique utilitas . tac. . hist. quae ab haeredibus occultata , recitari tiberius jussit : patientiam libert at is alienae ostentans , & contemptor suae infamiae , an scelerum sejani dici nescius , mox quodam modo dicta vulgari malebat , veritatisqui cui officit adulatio , per probra saltem gnarus fieri . t●c . . ann . it is better to hear the rebuke of the wise , than for a man to hear the song of fools , eccl. . . and samuel feared to shew eli the vision , sam. . . and he said , what is the thing that the lord hath said unto thee ? i pray thee hide it not from me , ibid. and saul disguised himself , and put on other raiment , and he went , sam. . . king . . prov. . . cr●brisque precibus efflagit abant , visendi sui copiam facerent . tac. . ann . vidisse civium moestos vultus , audire secretas quarimonias , quod tantum aditurus esset iter , cujus ne modicos quidem egressus tolerarent , sueti adversum fortuit a aspectu principis ref●veri . senatus & primat●● in incerto erant . procul , an coram atrocior haberetur . tac. . ann . contumacius loqui non est tutum apud aures superbas , & offensioni proniores . tac. . ann . * mar. hist. hisp. nam suadere principi quod oporteat , multi laboris , & periculi . tac. . hist. etiam ego & tu simplicissimè inter nos hodie loquimur , caeteri libe●tius cum fortunâ ▪ quam nobiscum . tac. . hist. audiente h●c tiberio , ac silente . tac. . ann . intellexit haec tiberius , ut erant magis , quam ●t dicebantur . tac. . ann . * mar. hist. hisp. † mar. hist. hisp. kings . . after their own lusts they shall heap to themselves teachers , tim. . . and mi●ah said , as the lord liveth , even what my god saith , that will i speak , chron. . . gen. . . & dan. . moderatione tamen prudentiâque agricolae leniebatur , quia non contumaciâ neque inani jactatione libertatis famam , fatumque provocabat . tac. in vit . agric. posse etiam sub malis principibus magnos viros esse . tac in vit . agric. nam pleraque ab saevis adulationibus aliorum in melius flexit : neque tamen temperamenti egebat , cum ● quabili authoritate , & gratia apud tiber●um viguerit . tac. . an . thrasea paetus silentio vel brevi ass●nsu pri●res adulationes transmittere solitus , exiit , tum senatu , ac sibi causam periculi fecit , caeteris libertatis initium non praebuit . tac. . ann . tiberius acerbis facetiis irridere solitus , quarum apud pr●potentes in longum memoria est . tac. . ann . saepe asperis facetiis illusus , quae ubi multum ex vero traxere , acrem sui memoriam relinqunt . tac. . ann . unde angusta & lubrica oratio sub principe qui libertatem metuebat , adulationem oderat . tac. . ann . quae moribus corru● ptis , perinde anceps , si nulla , & ubi nimia est . tac. . ann . psal . . jer. . . caesar objectam sibi adversus reos inclementiam , eo pervicacius amplexus est . tac. . ann . magnis patrum laudibus , ut juvenilis animus levium quoque rerum gloria sublatus , majores continuaret . tac. . ann . postquam cuncta scelerum pro egregiis ●●cipi videt , exturbat octaviam . tac. . ann . and he said in the sight of israel , sun , stand thou still upon gibeon ; and thou moon , in the valley of ajalon , jos. . . the lord harkened to the voice of man , for the lord fought for israel , ibid and they shall bear the ●urthen of the people with thee , that thou bear it not thy self alone , n●●b . . . for this thing is too heavy for thee ; thou art not able to perform it thy self alone , exod. . . † l. . tit . . p. . solatium curarum frequenter sibi adhibent maturi p●eges , & hinc meliores aestimantur , si soli omnia non praesumunt . cassiod lib . epist. . exod. . . thy matters are good and right , but there is no man deputed of the king to hear thee , sam. . . qui in regiae familiaritatis sacrarium admittuntur multa facere possunt , & dicere , quibus paupcrum necessita , sublevetur , faveatur religio , fiat aequitas , ecclesia dilatetur . petr. blis . epist. . obtectis libidinibus , dam sejanum dilexit , timuitve : postremò in scelera simul at dedecora prorupit , postquam remoto pudore , & metu , su● tantum ingenio utebatur . tac. . ann . kings . and so the multitude , allured by the grace of the work , took him now for a god , which a little before was but honoured as a man , wisd . . tiberium variis artibus devinxit , adeo ut obscurum adversus alios , sibi uni incautuin intectumque efficere● . prov. . ● n●● tam sol●rtia ( quippe iisdem artibus victus est ) 〈…〉 pari ex●tio vigu●t ●●●iditque . tac. . ann . † m●r. 〈…〉 lib. . l. . esth. . . acts . . sed uterque mensuram implevimus & tu quantum princeps tribuere amico posses , & ego quantum amicus à principe acci●pere : caetera invidiam a●gent . tac. . ann . eccles. . . ibid. fato potenti● raro sempiternae . tac. . ann . an satius capis , ●ut illos cum omnia tribuerunt ; aut hos , cum jam nihil reliquum est quod capiant ? tac. . ann . wisd. . . haec est conditio regum , ut casus tantum adversos hominibus tribuant , sccundos fortunae suae . aemil. prob prospera om●es sibi vendicant , adversa uni 〈◊〉 tac. in vit . agric. feralemque annum fer●bant , & omnibus adversis susceptum principi consilium absentia , qui mos vulgò ad culpam fortuita trahentes . tac. . ann . ergo non jam nero cujus immanitas omnium qu●stus anteibat , sed adverso rumore , seneca erat , quod oratione tali confessionem scripsisset . tac. . ann . sed quia sejanus ●acinorum ommum repertor habebatur , ex nimia charitate in eum caesaris , & caeterorum in utrumque odio quamvis fabulosa & immania credebantur . tac . ann . nam beneficia eo usque laeta sunt dum videntur exsolvi posse ; ubi multum antevenè●e , pro gratia odium redditur . ibid. quidam quo plus deb●nt , magis oderunt . leve as alienum debit●rem facit , grave inimicum . sen. ep. . quem ita gloriae cupidum esse dicunt familiares , ut omnia clara ●acinora sua esse videri cupit , & magis indignatur ducibus & praefectis , qui prospere , & laudabilitèr aliquid gesserint , quam iis qui infelicitèr & ignave . demost. suae demptum gloriae existimans quicquid cessisset alien● . curt. id sibi maxime formidolosum , privati hominis nomen supra principis attolli . tac. in vit . agric. integram causam ad senatum remisit . tac. . ann . nullo magis exterritus est , quam quod tiberium sine miseratione , sine ira obstinatum , clausumque vidit , ne quo affectu perrumperetur . tac. . ann . wisd . . levi post admiss●m scelus gratia , dein graviore odio , quia malorum facinorum ministri quasi exprobrantes aspiciuntur . tac. . ann . qui scelerum ministros ut perverti ab aliis nolebat , ita plerumque satiatus , & oblatis in eandem operam recentibus , veteres & praegraves adfl●xit . tac. ann . ut odium & gratia desiere , ju● valuit . tac. . ann . isa. . . vid. lat . vers . dan. . s●m . . . quia sejanus , incipiente adhuc potentia , bonis consiliis no●escere volebat . tac. . ann . ut soci●m laborum non modo in sermonibus , sed apud patres & populum celebraret . tac . ann . praebuitque ipsi materiam , cur amicitiae , ●●stanti aeque 〈◊〉 magis fideret . ibid. major ex e● , & quanquam exitiosa suaderet , ut non sui anxius , c●m fide audiebatur ibid. colique per theatr● & fora effigies ejus , interque principia legionum sineret . ibid. exod. . . avaritiam & arrogantiam , praecipua validiorum vitia . tac. . hist. felicitas in tali ingenio , avaritiam , superbiam , caeter●que occulta mala patef●cit tac. . hist at sejanus nimiâ fortunà socors , & muliebri insuper cupidine incensus , promissum matrimonium , flagitante livia , componit ad caesarios codicillos . tac. ann . mucianus cum expedita manu , socium magis imperii quam ministrum agens . tac. . ann . vim principis amplecti , ●omen remittere . tac. hist. kings . . sam. . . neque s●natorio ambitu abstin●bat , clientes suos konoribus aut provinc●is ornando . tac. . ann . c●terum pl●na c●sarum domus , juvenis filius , nepotes adulti m●ram capitis ad●erebant . tac. . ann . imm●ssis qui per speciem amiciti● monerent , paratum ei venenum , vitandas s●ceri epul●s . tac. . ann . exod. . . esth . ● . minore avaritia , aut licentia grassatus esset vinius s● ipse imperasse● , nunt & subjectos nos habuit tanquam suos , & viles ut alienos . tac. . hist. unum ad potentiam iter prodigis epulis , & sumptu , ganeaque sati●re inexpl●biles vitellii libidines . tac. . hist. optimi cujusque criminatione eousque valuit , ut gratia , pecunia , vi nocendi , etiam malos praemineret . tac. . ann . sui obtegens in alios criminator . tac. . ann . baruch . . ac ne assiduos in domum caetus arcendo , infringeret potentiam , aut recept●ndo facultatem criminantibus praeberet ; huc ●lexit , ut t●berium ad vitam procul roma amoenis locis degendam , impelleret : mult● quippe provideb●t . suà in manu aditus , literarumque magna ex parte se arbitrum fore ▪ cum per milites comm●arent : mox caesarem vigente jam ●en●ctâ se●r●toque loci mollitum munia imperii facilius transmissurum : & mi●ui ibi invidiam , ademptâ salutantum turbâ , sublatisque m●nibus vera po●entia augere . tac. . ann . plura saepe peccantur dum 〈◊〉 , quam cum 〈◊〉 . tac. . ann . perque invidi●m tui , me qu●que incusant . t●c . . ann . dum sejanum dilexit timuitve . ibid. quidam male alacres , quibus infanstae amicitie gravis exitus imminebat . tac. . ann . psal. . . n●n tam s●le●tia , quippe iisdem artibus victus est . tac. . ann . exod. . . dan. . . revel . . ● . eccles , . . ●ccles . . . prov. . . luk. . . sub genii nostri luce intrepidus quidem , sed reverenter astabat , opportun● tacitus , necessariè copiosus , cass. lib. ● . ep. . prov. . prov. . . eccles. . . breves & infaustos populi romani amores . tac. . ann . instituta prioris potentiae commutat , pro●ibet coetus salutantium , v●tat comitantes , rarus per urbem , quasi valetudine infe●sa , aut sapientiae studiis do●● 〈◊〉 . t●c . . ann . notes for div a -e eccles. . . the heart is deceitful above all things , an● desperately wicked : who can know it ? ierem. . . utrumq● in viti● est , & . omnib●is credere , & . nulli . seneca . † gon●alez fernandez of cordov● . mar. hist. hisp. sibi fidem integram , & . si nullis infidiis peteretur , mansuram . tac. . ann . quippe proditores , etiam iis , quos anteponunt , invisunt . tac. . ann . mansitque celso velut fat alit●r etiam pro othone fides integr● & . infelix . tac. . hist. he that is faithful in that which is least , is faithful also in much , luk. . . acerrimè increpuit , quod contra institutum augusti , non sponte principis alexandriam introisset . tac. . ann . numb . . . neque enim imminentes virtutes sectabatur , & rursus vitia oderat ; ex optimis periculum sibi , à pessimis dedecus publicum metuebat . tac. . ann . qui in affluentia fortunae , virium , opum , & amicorum , ālioruamque talium constituti sunt , reginaeque ob●dire norunt . arist. . pol. c. . auri vim , atque opes principibus infensas . tac. . ann . nuntiata ea tiberium laetitia curaque affecere . tac. . ann . ut to specie germanicum suetis legionibus abstraheret , nov●sque provineiis impositum , dolo simul & casibus objectaret . tac. . ann . acriùs modestiam ejus aggreditur , alterum consulatum offerend● . tac. . ann . * mar. hist. hisp. difficiles fratrum dissentiones , & qui valdè am●nt , valdè edio habent . arist. . pol. c. . * mar. hist. hisp. nam qui maguam potestatem habent , etiam si ipsi nullius pretii sint , multum nocent . arist. . pol. cap. . for the children of this world are in their generation , wiser than the children of light , luke . . regiae potentiae ministri . quos delectat superbiae suae longum spectaculum ; minusque se judicant posse , nisi diu , multumque singulis , quid possint ●ftendant . seneca . posse etiam sub mal●s principibus magnos vires esse . tac. in vit . agr. neque nunc properè , s●d per octo annos capto experimento . tac. . ann . nam unum opus ab uno optim● perficitur , quod ut fiat , munus est legumlatoris providere , nec jubere , ut tibia canat quisquam , & idem gale●●s confici●t . arist. . pol. cap. macch. a . sic enim optimè instrument a profici●nt , si eorum singula , non inultis , sed uni deserviant . arist. lib. . pol. cap. . nec sit concessum cuiquam duobus assistere magistratibus , & utriusque iudicii curam peragere , nec facile cre●endum duabus necessariis rebus , unum suff●cere . l. f. de asses ● chron. c. . . kings . . ubi aliquos voluisset , vel rectores provinciis dare , vel praepositos facere , vel procurat●res , id est , rationales ordinare , nomina eorum proponebat , & lamp. in vit . alex. sev. haud semper errat famae , aliquando & eligit . tac. in vit . agr. non ex rumore statuendum multos in provinciis , contra quem spes , aut metus de illis fuerit , egisse , excitari quosdam ad meliora magnitudine r●rum , hebescore alios . tac. . ann . officiis ac administrat ●onibus , potiùs non peccaturos , quam damnare cum peccassent . tac. in vit . agr. quia sine ambitione , aut proximorum precibus , ignotos etiam , ac ultro accitos m●nificentia juver at . tac. . ann . sorte & . urna mores non disecrni : suffragia & existimationem senafus reperta , ut an eujusque vitam , famamque penitrarent . tac. . hist. eccles. . . eccles. . . * mar. hist. hisp. exod. . . pl●raque eor●m quae h●mines injuste faciunt , per ambitionem & ava●i●●am commit tuntur . aristo● . . pol. cap. . prov. . . * l. . tit . . p. . prov. . . job . . job . . provincias spoliari , & nummarium tribunal , audita utrinque licitatione , alteri addici non mirum quando quae emerit vendere gentium jus est . sen. lib. . c. . de ben . * mar. hist. hisp. sed caput est in omni rep. ut legibus , & omni alia ratione provisum sit , ne qu●● facultas quaestus faciendi magistratibus relinqu●tur . arist. pol. . c. ● . tunc utrumque ei molestum est , quod nec honorum particeps sit● & quod à quaestibus submoveatur . ibid. quasi impossibile ●it , qui egenus existat , eum benè magistratum gerere , aut quietem optare . arist. pol. . c. . haud enim frustra placitum olim , ne foeminae in s●cios aut gentes externas traherentur . tac. . ann . hest. . . naturam duas necessarias res , easdem salutares human● generi comparasse , ut alii cum imperio essent , al●i ei subjicerentur , nihilque quod citra haec , nec 〈◊〉 quidem queat spatio perdurare . dion . lib. . kin. . . kin. . . est autem omnis monarchiae cautio communis , neminem facere nimis magnum , aut certè plusquam unum facere : ipsi enim inter se , quid quisque agat observant . arist. . pol. c. . gen. . . job . . id morum tiberii suit , continuare imperia , ac plerosque ad fine● vitae in eisdem exercitibus , aut iurisdictionibus habere . tac. . ann . superbire homines etiam annua designatione : quid si honorem per quinquennium agitent ? tac. . ann . apoc. . . superior debet esse totus mens , &c totus oculus . s. antioc . hom. . nam principes ac reges nunc quoque multos sibi oculos , multas a●res , multas item manus atque pedes faciunt . arist. pol. . c. h●● enim ratione , & omnium oculis cernet , & omnium auribus audiet , & omnium denique consiliis in unum tendentibus consultabit . sines . ad arcad consilium oculus futurorum . arist. lib. . de regim . ●erem : ▪ . vid. version . vulgar . morum , animor●mque provincie nisi s●●gneri qui de ea consulant , perdant se , & r●mpub . cicero . eccles . . . * l. . tit . . p. . eccles. . † l. . tit . . p. . chron. . . populi im●erium juxta libertatem : paucorum dominatio regi● l●bidini proprior est . tac. . ann . hinc factum est , ut vulgò jactarunt per●arum regem multos h●bere e●ules , auresque multas : quod si quis putet unum oculum expetendum regi , eum egregie falli certum est , unus enim & pa●ca videat , & pa●ca 〈◊〉 ; xenoph. lib. . cyri. et majestas qui 〈◊〉 imperium habere apud ministrum sol●t ; regi , aut principi 〈…〉 relinquitur . plutarch . unde si de jure tractaretur , in consilium solos doctos adhibebat , ●●vero de re militari , milites veteres , & senes ac bene meritos & locorum peritos . lamp. in vit. alex. † l. . tit . . p. . si de sua uni●● sententia omnia geret , superbum hunc judicabo , magis quam prudente● livius . jos. . . hest. . . prov. . 〈◊〉 nemo solus sapit . plaut . prov. . . prov. . . prov. . . * homer . ● prov. . . bene enim quod cum vestro consilio fuerit ●●●dinatum , id ad beatitudinem nostri imperii , & ad nostram gloriam red●●●dare . l. humanum , c. de leg. indignum esse , rempub , & f●●tunas civium ei committi qui alienis oculis uti crederetur . tit. li● ▪ lib. . prov. . . non omnia consilia cuncti● praesentibus tractari , aut occasionum velocitas patitur . tac. . hist. ne 〈◊〉 sententi● indig●●s videretur , i● diversa ac deterior● 〈◊〉 . tac. . ann . ezek. . . cry aloud , spare not , lift up thy voice like a trumpet , is● . . for every high priest taken from among men , is ordained for men in things appertaining to god , heb. . . behold i have put my words in thy mouth , ierem. . . i know thy works , and charity , and service , and faith , and thy patience , and thy works ; and the last to be more than the first . notwithstanding i have a few things against thee . revel . . . † l. . tit . . p. . sit annullus tuus , non ut vas aliquod , sed tanquam ipse tu ; no● minister alien● voluntatis , sed t●stis tuae . cicer. epist. . ad quint. fratrem . revel . . . ibid. ezek. . . ezek. . . † l. . ti● . p. . ‖ l. . ti● . . p. . neve tiberius vim principatus resolveret , ●unc●a ad senatum vocando , eam conditionem esse ●mperan●● , ut non aliter ratio const●t , quam si uni reddatur . tac. ann . for the transgression of a land , many are the princes thereof prov. . . and i will set up one sheph●rd over them . ez●● . . ● . nihil arduum videbat●r in ani●o principis , 〈◊〉 non judiciu● , non odium erat nisi indita & j●ssa . tac. . ann . is●● . . and the cook to●k up the shoulder , &c. sam. . . ezek. . . lm lxx . † kings . ips● n●q●e jub●nd● , neque vi●an●i pot●ns , non jam imperator , sed tantum 〈…〉 . t●c . h●st . non aedilis , aut praetoris , aut consulis partes sustineo , majus aliquod , & excelsius à principe postulatur . tac. . hist. et proximi senatus die , tiberius castigatis per literas oblique patribus , quod cunct● curarum ad principem rejicerent . tac. . ann . sanguinius maximus è consularibus oravit senatum ne curas imperatoris conquisitis insuper acerbitatibus augerent , sufficere ipsum statuendis remediis . tac. . ann . gen. . . inclinatio senatus incitamentum tiberio fuit , quo promptiùs 〈◊〉 saretur . tac. . ann . violentèr increpuit , velut coram rogit●● quid illi cum militibus , quos , neque dicta imperatoris , neque pr●mia , 〈◊〉 ab imperatore accipere par ●sset . tac. . ann . et honores ipse 〈◊〉 se tribuere , p●nas autem per ali●s magistratus , & judices irrog●● arist. lib. pol. c. . quo lo●o cens●bis caesa● ? si pri●us , habeo quod sequor : si post omnes , vereor nè imprudens dissentiam . tac . ann . exemit etian● drusum consule● designatum dicendae primo loco sententiae , quod alii ci●ile reb●ntur , nè 〈…〉 fieret . tac. . ann . sed quod in cjusmodi rebus accidit , consili●m ab omnibus dat●● est , periculum pauci sensere . nec patrum cognitionibus satiatus , iudiciis adsidebat in co●nu tribunalis . tac. . ann . * l. . tit . . p. . and all israel h●ard of the judgment which the king had judged , and they feared the king : for they saw that the wisdom of god was in him to do ●udgment , kin. . now make us a king to judge us like all the nations , sam. . . a king that sitteth in the throne of judgment , sca●●ereth away all evil with his eyes , prov. . . psalm . . sam. . . isa. . . opes publicae continebantur , quantum civium , sociorumque in ●●mis , quot classes , regna , provinciae , tributa & necessitates , ac largiti●nes , quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat augustus . tac. . ann . est senatori necessarium nosse rempub. quàm latè p●tet , quid habeat militum , quid valeat aerarium , quo● socios resp. habeat , quos amicos , quos ●ipendiarios , qua quisque sit lege , conditione , foedere , &c. cicero . velle pecuniis excellere tyrannicum , h●noribus vero magis regium . arist. po● . lib. . itaque monarchas , non ut sibi vendicent monarchiam , invadunt , s●d ut famam & gloriam adipiscantur . arist. pol. . cap. . * ennius . ut quicquid sine detrimento accommodari possit id tribuatur velignoto . cicero . † mar. hist. hisp. illo in corpore decus owne cheruscorum , illius consilia gesta , quae prosper● ce●id●rint testa●atur . tac. . ann . nam quod domino in monte demorante , & ipsis cum turba resid● tibus quid●m tepor eorum fidem retardaverat . hilar. cap. . sup. matth and i brought him to thy disciples and they could not cu● him , matth. . . caeterum anxius invidia , & mulieb●e fastigium in diminutionem sui ●ccipiens , ne lictorem qui●●em ei decern● 〈◊〉 tac. . ann . tum verò aequari adolescentes senectae suae , uis hoentèr indoluit . tac. . ann . vanescit augusti honor , si promis● noribus vulg●tur . tac. . ann . test●dinem , ubi collecta in suum tegmen est , tutam ad omnes 〈◊〉 esse , ubi exerit partes aliquas , quodcunque nudavit obnoxium at que i● mum habere cic et sua retinere privatae domus , alienis ce●●● regiam laudem esse . tac. . ann . suam quisque fortunam in 〈◊〉 ●●lio habeat , cum de ●lieno deliberat . curtius . quibus nova & ancipitia praecolere avida , & plerumque fallax 〈◊〉 est . tac. . ann . vetus , & jampridem insita mortalibus 〈◊〉 cupido , cum imperii magnitudine adolevit erupitque . tac. ▪ 〈◊〉 et quae ab exiguis profecta initiis ●o ●reverit , ut j●m magni●●ine laboraret sua . liv. lib. . addideratque consilium coercendi in●● terminos imperii . tac. ann . i●pone felicitati tu● fraena , faci●● reges . curti● , fa●ilius est qu●dam vincere quam tenere . curt. fortunam 〈…〉 invenies quam retineas publ. fortunam tuam pressis manibus tene , lubrica . curtius : anceps & operosa nimis est mutatio , quae subitò & cum qu●● violentiâ suscipitur ; facilior autem quae sensim & paulatim de . li●● fit . arist. . pol. sed populum per tot annos mollitèr habi● nondum audebat ad duriora vertere . tac. . ann . 〈◊〉 veterem disciplinam , atque ita quatuordecim annis à nerone 〈◊〉 , ut haud minus vitia principis amarent , quam olim virtutes 〈◊〉 rabantur . tac. hist. . non minus negotii est remp. 〈◊〉 quam ab initi●●onstituere . arist. . pol. cap. . s●m . . . kings . . ubi famae inserviret , 〈◊〉 in novis c●ptis validissima est . tac. . ann . non ignarus instandum fa●●ae , & prout prima ●essissent , fore universa . tac. in vit . agr. cur abstinuerit spectaculo ipse , variè trahebant ; ali● taedio caetus , ●●id●m tristitia ingenii , & met● comparationis , quia augustu● comi●er ●●●fuisset . tac. . ann . tum formam futuri principatus pr●scripsit , ca maximè declin●● , querum recens flagrabat invidia . tac. . ann . sed prompti adius , obvia comitas , ignotae parthis vertutes , nova vitia . tac. . ann . quod hic prima ab infantia instituta . & cultum armeniorum 〈◊〉 latus , venatu , epulis , & quae alia barbari celebrant proceres , plebem●● juxta devinxerat . tac. . ann . novum imperium inchoanti●● utilis clementia . tac. . hist. † mar. hist. hisp. laudatorum principum usu● ex aequo , quamvis prout agentibus , s●vi proximis ingr●nt . tac. . hist. sam. . . egregium vita , famaque quoad privatus , vel in imperiis sub augusto fuit . tac. . ann . major privato visus , dum privatus fuit . tac. . hist. non parcit populis regnum breve . statius . difficilius est temperare felicitati , qua te non putes di● us●rum . tac. . ann . si immensum imperii corpus starè , ac librari sine rectore posset , dignus eram à quo respub . inciperet . tac. . hist. prima dominandi spes in arduo ; ubi sis ingressus , adsunt studia & ministri . tac. . ann . magna cum invidia novi principatus , cuju●●oc primum specimen nosce●atur . tac. . hist. nemo enim unquam imperium flagitio quaesitum , bonis artibus exercuit . tac. . hist. simul reputans non posse principatum scelere quaesitum , subita modestia & prisca gravitate retineri . tac. . hist. nono decimo caesar octavianus civilia bella sustinuit . tac. . ann . mansisse , c●s●re augusto victore , imperium . tac. . hist. lepidi atque antonii arma in augustum cessere . tac. . ann . cuncta discordiis civilibus fess● . ibid. nulla jam public● arma . ibid. nullo adversante cum ferocissimi per acies out proscriptione cecidissent . ibid. neque provincia illum rerum statum abnueb●nt , suspecto senatus populique imperio , ●ob certamina , potentiam & avaritiam magistratuum . ibid. non alitèr discordantis patriae remedium suisse quam ut ab uno regeretur . ibid. ad tuendam plebem tribunitio jure contentam . ibid. non regno tamen neque dictatura , sed principis nomine constitutam remp. ibid. eadem magistratibus vocabula , militem donis populum annona , cunctos dulcedine ●tii pellexit . ibid. multa antonio & multa lepido concessit . ibid. quanto quis servitio promptior , opibus & honoribus extollebatur . ibid. pauca admodum vi tractata , quo caeteris quies esset . ibid. augusto prompta ac profluens , quae decerat principem , eloqu●ntia fuit tac. . ann . ius apud cives , modestiam apud socios ibid. . ann . oh impudicitiam filiae & neptis , quas●urbe d●puli● , tac. . ann . in lect●s à divo augusto liberalitate decies sestertium duc●re u●orem , ●è clarissima familia extingueretur . primus augustus cognitionem , ●e famosis libellis , specie legis ejus tractavit &c. tac. . ann . sed ipse divus iulius , ipse divus augustus & tulêre ea , & reliquêre tac. . ann . urbem ipsam magnifico ornatu . tac. . ann . m●ri oceano , aut a●nibus longi●quis septum imperium . tac. . ann . regiones , provincias , classes , cuncta inter so co●●exa . ibid. novis ex rebus aucti tuta & pr●●●ntia quam vet●ra & periculosa mallent . ibid. quid aliud exitio lacedaemoniis & atheniensibus fuit , quamquam armis pollerent , nisi quod victos pro alienigenis arcebant ? et conditor noster r●mulus tantum s●pientia valuit , ut plerosque populos , eodem die hostes , deind● cives habuit . tac. . ann . eadem magistratuum vocabula . tac. . ann . sed tiborius vim principatus , sibi firmans , imaginem antiquitatis senatui praebebat . tac. . ann . non omnia statim , uti decretum erat , executus est , veritus , nè parum succederet si simul homines transferre & invertere vellet , sed qu●dam extempore disposuit , quaedam rejicit in tempus . dion . eccles . . . idque adversus britanniam pro●iturum , si romana ubique arma , & velut è conspectu libertas tolleretur . tac. in vit . agric. quaedam ex regiis tributis diminuta , qu● mitius rom. imperi●● speraretur . tac. . ann . pa●em exu●re , nostrae magis avaritiae , quam obsequii impatientes . tac. . ann . quid 〈◊〉 , in modum deferre census , pati tributa adigebatur . tac. . ann . verba fuere pauca , & s●●su permodesto . tac. . ann . et minus sibi invidiam , adempta salutantium turb● , sublatisque inanibus● , vera potentia aug●ri . tac. . ann . apud qu●s vis imperii valet , inania transmit●untur . tac. . ann . validus alioqui spernendis honoribus . tac. . ann ▪ nomen patris patriae tiberi●● à popul● saepius ingestum , repudi● vit . tac. . ann . c●ncta mortalium incerta , quantoque plus ad●●tus sere● , tant● se magis in lubrico dictitans . tac. . ann . nec enim in melius verti , nec diu sistere valent , reliquum est , ●t 〈◊〉 deterius dilabantur . hippoc. qui causam esse tradit , quod nihil perpetuò maneat ▪ sed omnia motu qu●dam orbicular : mutentur . arist. . pol. naturales esse convers●●●es rerumpub . cic. lib. . de nar . deor. regum majestatem dissi●ilius à summo fastigio ad medium detra●i , quam a mediis ad ima prae●ipitari . livius . fati maligna , perpetuaque in ommbus rebus lex est , ●t ad summum perducta , rursus ad infimum velocius quidem quam ascen●erunt , relabantur . seneca . ego ita comperi omma regna civit●tes ▪ nationesque usque eo prosp●● imperium habu●sse , dum apud eos vera consilia valuerunt ; ubicunque gr●● timor voluptas ●a corrupt●re , post paulo imm●nut● opes , deinde 〈◊〉 in perium , postremè servitus imposita est . sallust . numb . . . honor quoque quant●● valeat , & quomodo sit causa seditionis 〈◊〉 est arist. . pol. c. . et multae conspirationes , & invasio●s in monarchas propter pudendas contumelias , in corpus illatas fact● sunt . arist. . pol. l. . prop●er contemp●um etiam seditiones conspirat●●●qu● f●●n● a●●st . . pol. c. . * l. . tit . . lib. . recop . non multitudo qu●dem gravit● fert inaequalitatem patrimoniorum , praestantes autem honorum inaequalitatem . arist. lib. . po● . c. . nam homines tum quod ipsi inhonorati fiunt inovent seditiones , tum quod alios videant in honore . arist. . pol. . gen. . . sam. . . cum enim multitudo in●pum est in civitate , eademque ab honoribus exclusa , necesse est eam civitatem plenam hostium reipub arist. lib. . pol. c. . honori incumbit , tam ignarus quam bonus . arist. . pol. . * mar. hist. hisp. insuper seditiones oriuntur , non solum ob patrimoniorum , verum etiam ob honorum inaequalitatem . arist. lib. . pol. . sed illud primum omnium dubitar● non potest , quin cognitis iis quae reipub interitum important , ea quoque quae salutem afferunt , intelligantur . arist. lib. . pol. cap. . 〈…〉 diora sunt remedia quam mala . tac. in vit . agr. ezek. . . attamen quantum sine bello dabatur , revocare priscum morem , exercitare legiones cura provisus agere , p●rinde acsi hostis ingrueret . tac. . ann . aliae ●yrannides ex regibus , qui moribus institutisque majorum violatis , imperia magis concupierunt . arist. pol. . cap. . nam si 〈◊〉 volentibus imperet , protinus desinit ●sse reg●um . arist. . pol. cap. . omnium consensu c●pax imperii , ●isi imperasset . tac. . hist. jerem. . . illud clarum te●tatumque exemplis est , quod homines felicitatem assequantur be●ignitate in alios , & bona de se opinione , iidem cum adepti , qu●e voluerant , ad injurias & impotenti●n in imperiis dilabuntur , fit meritissimo , ut una cum imperantium mutatione , ●psi sub●iti se & affectus mutent polyb. qui occuparunt imperia , eo●um plerique eadem retinu●runt , qui vero tradita ab aliis accepere , hi statim fer● omnes amiserunt . arist. . pol. . eccles. . . conservantur etiam respub . non solum , qui● procu● sunt ab iis , ●uae interitum aff●runt , sed etiam , quia prope sunt , nam timor intentiore cur● r●i●ab , consul●re c●gis . arist. . pol. cap. . ibid. * l. . tit . . p. . † ma●● . kings . . neque nervum intendit , neque remittit ultra modum , nè harmi●●iae consensum laedat . chrysost. tu vero , inquit , siquid in te artis est , it a compone do●num meam , ut quicquid again , ab omnibus perspici possit . vell. pat lib. . judith . . . taciturnitas optimum atque tutissimum rerum administrandarum vinculum val. max. l. . c. . micah . . . quod maximum uxori martlae aperuisse , illam liviae . tac. . ann . nihil ex iis caesari incognitum ; consilia , locos , prompta multa noverat , astusque hostium in perniciem ipsis vertebat . tac. . ann . ni arcana domus , ne consilia amicorum , ne ministeri● militum vulgarentur . tac. . ann . jud. . ● ibid. prov. . . major è longinquis reverentia . tac. . ann . exod. . . exod . . * l. . tit . . lib. . re●op . n● ali●ni regni , quod non convenit , scrutentur arcana . l. m●rcato●es c de commer . tib●rioque etiam in rebus , quas non occuleret , seu natura , sive adsuetudine suspensa semper , obscur● semper : tunc vero nitenti ut sensus suos abderet tac. . ann . luk. . . si tam in nostra potestate esset oblivisci quam tacere . tac. in vit . agric. psal. . . at agrippinae is pavor , ea consternatio mentis ▪ quamvis vultu premeretur emi●uit . tac. . ann . anne omnium oculis vultum eorum scrutantibus salli inteliigerentur . tac. . ann . atque ipse moestus & magnae cogitationis manisestus erat , quamvis laetitiam vagis sermonibus simularet . tac. ● . ann . octavia quoque quamvis rudibus annis omnes affectus abscondere didicerat . tac. . ann . factus natura , & consuetudine exercitu● , vel●re odium fallacibus blanditiis . tac. . ann . eccles. . . agrippinae quoque proximi inliciebantur pravis sermonibus tumidos spiritus perstimulare . tac. . ann . audita haec raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuit correptamque graeco versu admonuit , ideo laedi quia non regnaret . tac. . ann . postea cognitum est ad introspiciendas etiam procerum v●luntates , inductam dubita●ionem . tac. . ann . tac. . ann . crebris interrogationibus exquirit , qualem piso diem supre●●● noctemque exegisset , atque illo pleraque sapientèr , quaedam inconsultius resp●●dente . tac. . ann . perculsus improvisa interrogatione paululum reticuit . tac. . ann . etenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat . ibid. non temperante tiberio quin premeret voce ; vultu , ●ò quod ipse ●reberrimè interrogabat : neque ▪ refellere aut eludere dabatur ; ac saepe etiam confitendum erat nè frustra quesivisset . tac. . ann . crebr● ipsius sermne fact● fides . tac. . ann . tac. . ann . * ld. roscom . hor. art poet. nec enim ad hanc forman caetera erant . tac. . ann . * tass. cant . . mihi prora & puppis , ut gr●ecorum proverbium est , fuit à me tui dimittendi ut rationes meas explicares ; prora itaque & pupp● summam consilii nostri significamus ; propterea quod à prora & puppi , tanquam à capite , & calce pendeat totan●vis . cicero . acribus ut ferme tali● initiis , incuri●so fine . tac. . ann . omnes qui magnarum rerum consilia suscipiunt , astimare debent , an quod inchoatur reip. utile , ipsis glorios●m . aut pr●mptum effectu , aut certè non ●rduum sit , simul ipse qui ●uadet considerandus est adjiciatne consilio periculum suum : et si fortuna coeptis fuerit cu● s●mmum decus acquiratur . tac. . hist. nam saepe honest●s rerum causas , ni judicium adhibeas , pernic●●● exitus c●nsequuntur . tac. . hist projectus in limine portae , miseratione demum , quia per corpus legati eundum erat , clausit viam . tac. . an . * mar. hist. hisp. eccles. . . dan. . . priusquam incipias , censulito , & ubi cons●lueris mature facto opus ●st : ita utrumque per se indigens alter al●●●ius auxilio viget . sallust . nullus cun●●ationi 〈◊〉 est in eo co●●●lie , quod non p●test laudari , nisi peractum , tac. . hist barbaris 〈…〉 ; statim exequi regium videtur ▪ tac. ann . quo plus virium ac roboris , è fiducia tarditas inerat , tac. . hist et motus temporum obtinuit , ut quod segnities erat , sapienti● voca●etur . tac. . hist agendo , audendoque res romana crevit , 〈◊〉 hic signibus consiliis , quae timidi ●●uta voc●nt . tit. liv. potenti●● cautis , quam acrioribus consiliis tutius haberi . tac. . ann . eludi parthus tractu belli poterat , si paeto aut in suis , ●ut in 〈◊〉 consiliis constantia fuisset . tac. . ann . vir ea ratione fiet 〈◊〉 : si in deliberando quidem cunctetur , & praetim●●t quicquid potest 〈◊〉 , in agendo autem ●●nfidat . herod . in principio enim peccatur ; principium autem dicitur dimidium t●tius , itaque parvum in principio erratum correspondens est ad alias partes . arist. pol. lib. . cap. . cum fieri non possit , ut si in primo , atque principio peccatum fu●rit , non ad extremum malum aliquod evadat . arist. pol. . cap. . * marian. hist. hisp. lib. . cap. . ferox scelerum , & quia prima provenerant , volutare secum , quonam modo germa●i liberos perverteret . tac. . ann . * claud. † seneca . usu probatum est p. c. leges egregias , ●●●pta honesta , apud bonos ex delictis aliorum gigni , tac. . ann . gen. . . instruunt patriarch● , non solum docentes , sed etiam errantes . a●b lib. 〈◊〉 de a●● . c. . non d●bet reprehensibile judicari , si secundam varietatem temporum , statu●a qundoque varientur humana , p●s●●t●m cam urg●ns n●●●ssitas , vel evidens utilitas id exposuit . cap. non deber de cons. & a●● . hest. . . literas ad usum saltem discebant , reliqua omnis disciplina erat , ut pulchrè parerent , ut labores perferrent , ut in pugna vincerent . plutar. patres valere decet consilio , populo supervacanea calliditas est . sallust . ne nimia religionum diversitas grav●m in ecclesia dei confusionem i●ducat firmiter prohibemus , nequis de c●ter● novam religionem inven●at , &c. conc. later . ostendite populo romano divi augusti neptem , eandemque conjuge●● meam , numerate sex liberos . tac . ann . nulli ante romanoru●● ejusdem fastigii viro g●●inam stirpem editam . tac. . ann . cum ampliari imperium ●ominum add●●●iion● potiùs , quam pecuniarum copi● malim . prov. . . ne clarissima familia extingueretur . tac. . ann . dotem no● uxor marito , sed uxori maritus affert . tac. de mor. germ. statuit virgines sine dote nubere : jussit uxores eligerentur , non pecunia . trog . lib. . quare qui inquilinos & advenas antehac in civitatem receperunt , ●i magna ex parte seditionibus jactati sunt . arist. ● . . pol. c. ▪ kings . . fuit proprium pop. rom. longe à dom● bellare , & propugnaculum imperii sociorum fortunas , ●on sua tecta defendere . cic. pro leg . man. dei●d● neque dum annibal in italia moraretur , nec proximis post excessum ejus annis vacavit romanis colonias ●●ndere , cum esset in bello conquirendus potius miles , & post bellum vires ref●ve●dae , potius quam spergendae , vell. lib . in legibus gracch● inter perniciosissima num●raverim , quod extra italiam coloni●s posuit , vell. lib. ● . invenim●● enim quia populatim provinci● suis habitatoribus spolr●●●● : magno vero haec nostra civitas populos● est , turbis diversor●●● h●minum , & maxima agricolarum suas civitates & culturas relinquentiam , auth de quaest. iniquum est enim ut de una substantia , qu●bus competit . aequa successio . alii abundantèr affuant , alii paupert ati● r●comm●d●●●gemiscunt cass. lib. . epist . commodum est etiam , 〈…〉 donati●●e sed jure cognitionis tradantur , arist l. . pol. exod. . ● . exod. . . exod. . . jerem. . * l. . ti● . . p. . alitèr utimur propriis . alitèr commodatis quint. de orat. ezek. . . john . . principes mortales , rempub. aeternam esse , tac. . ann . * lib. . tit . . p. . neque quies gentium sine armis neque arma sine stipendiis , neque stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt , tac. . hist. diss●lution●m imperii docendo , si fructus quibus resp. sustinetur 〈◊〉 , tac. . ann . † mar. hist. hisp. lib. . cap. . tibi summum rerum judicium dii dedere : nobis obs●quii gl●●ia relict● est , tac. . ann . sam. . . vide. * ut nec incauta exactio populos gravet , nec indiscreta r●missio statum gentis fociat deperire , concil . tol xiii . sam. . . ferocissimo quoque adsumpto , aut quibus ob egestatem , ac metum ex flagitiis maxima peccandi necessitudo , tac. . ann sam. . . gen. . . necissitate arm●rum excusorta , etiam in pace mau●er● , tac. . ann . plerumque accidit , ut quae provinciae pecuniae parcendo , ●mota pericula contemnunt incumbentibus demum malis , desperat● s●pe remedio graviora sentiant detrim●nta , paul. jov. isa. . vid. portus nostros navis veniens non paveseat , ut certum nautis possit esse naufragium , si manus non incurrere●t exigentium : quos frequenter plus affligunt damna , quam solent naufragia , cassiod . lib. . ep. . ne provinciae nobis oneribus turbarentur , utque vetera sin● a varitia , ●ut crudelitate magistratuum tolerarent , tac. lib. . ann . ezek. . . ibid. ibid. ver . . ibid. ver . . ibid. ver . . ezek. . . quid ? lapidum causa pecuniae nostra ● hostiles gentes transferuntur . tac. . annal. king. . . psalm . . isai. . prov. . . isai. . . king. . . ibid. ver . . sed nihil aqu● fatigabat , quam pecuniarum conquisitio ; eos esse belli civilis nervos dictitans , tac. . hist. melius publicas opes à privatis haberi , quam intra unum claustrum asservari . eutrop. penes quos aurum , & opes praecipuae bellorum causae . tacit. . hist. male e●iam circa pecunias publicas constitutum est apud ill●s , quia neque in publi●o habent quicquam , & magna bella gerere coacti , pecunias agre con●erunt . arist. l. . c. . pol. privato usui bonum publicum postponitur . tac. . annal. * st. august . lib. . de civ . dei , cap. . † lib. . ode . prov. . . * dryden ' s virgil. maxima pars hominum è terra vivit & fructibus . aristor . polit. lib. . c. . et divitiarum expectatio inter causas paupertatis publicae erat . tac. . annal. at hercule nemo refert , quod italia extern●e opis indiget ; quòd vita populi romani per incerta maris & tempestatum quotidie vivitur . tac. . annal. * tasso . s●epe enim de facultatibus suis amplius quam in his est , sperant homines . justin. instit. quibus ex causis man. § in fraudem . vires luxu corrumpebantur , contra veterem disciplinam , & instituta majorum , apud quos virtute , quam pecunia res rom. melius stetit . tac. . hist. vt ratio quaestuum , & necessitas erogationum inter se congruerent . tac. . annal. baruch . . a domesticis volumus inchoare disciplinam , ut reliquos pudea● errare , quando nostris cognoscimur excedendi licentiam non praebere . cas. lib. . ep . . da operam ut impensae t●ae moderat● sint , & rationi consentaneae . bell. in vit. s. lud. multa scribo non tam ut saeculo meo prosim , cujus jam despera●● miseria est , quàm ut meipsum conceptis exonerem , & animum script●● soler . petrarch . * lucan . exod. . . vnum esse reip. corpus atque unius animo regendum . tac. . annal. quanquam arduum sit , eodem loci potenti●●● & concordiam esse . tac. . annal. * mar. hist. hisp. l. . c. . * mat. hist. hisp. l. . c. . † mar. hist. hisp. l. . c. . * mar. hist. hisp. l. . c. . chron. . . minori discrimine sumi principem quàm quaeri . tac. . hist. * mar. hist. hisp. l. . . gen. . . prov. . . non gaudent martyres , quando exillis pecuniis honorantur , in quibus pauperes plorant . st. chrysoft sup . matth. oportere dividi sacros & negotiosos dies , quibus divi●a colerentur , & humana non impedirent . tac. . annal. nostram omnem vitam , in remissionem atque studium esse divis●● ▪ plat. de lib. educat . otium enim tum ad virtutes generandas , 〈…〉 civilia munera obeunda requiru●●tur . arist. pol. l. . c. . nascitur ex assiduitate laborum animorum hebetatio quaedam , & l●nguor . senec. de tranquil . anim. cum inter suos convivaretur , 〈◊〉 vlpianum , aut doctos homines adhibebat , ut habere fabulas literatas , 〈◊〉 se recreari dicebat & pasci . lamp. in vit. alex. sev. co●ceius nerva , cui legum peritia : eques romanus , praeter sejanum , & illustribus curtius atticus ; ●aeteri liberalibus artibus praediti fer●● graeci , quorum sermonibus levaretur . tac. . annal. accitis in convivium peritis ad risum commovendum hominibus , 〈◊〉 omnium non risisse , post autem inducta simia in risum solutum , dixisse , natura id animal ridiculum , hominem autem arte , & studio eoque pa●●● honesto . athen. l. . satis onerum principibus , satis etiam potentiae . tac. . annal. impera , ut liberos cit●aram pulsare , psallere , cauponari doceant , & 〈◊〉 comperies , o rex , viros in mulieres degenerasse , nihilque metuendum , 〈◊〉 rebelles ● te unquam desciscant . herod . lib. idque apud 〈◊〉 ritos humanitas vocabatur , cum pars servitutis esset . tac. in vit. agr. instituta cultumque patrium resumite , abruptis voluptatibus qui●● romani plus adversus subjectos , quam armis valent . tac. . hist. item vivere ut quisque velit permissio , quoniam sic magna erit tali reip. faventium multitudo , ●●am vulgo dissoluta gratior est quam temperata vita . arist. . pol. . ex parvis orta seditione de rebus magnis dissidetur . arist. l. . pol. cap. primis eventibus metum ac fiduciam gigni . tac. l. . annal. vi ne militum servum suum coërceret , an inanem credulitatem tempore ipso vanescere sinere● , modò nihil spernendum , modò omnia metuend● , ambiguus pudoris a● metus reputabat . tac. . annal. initia bellorum civilium fortunae permittenda , victoriam consiliis & ratione perfici . tac. ● hist. vtendum inclinatione e● caesar , & quae casus obtulerat , in sapientiam vertenda ratus . tac. . annal. nihil in vulgo modicum : terrere ni paveant , ubi pertimuerint impunè contemni . tac. . annal. * lucan . † virg. in georg. tyronem à ve●erano , legionem à legione dissociant . ta● . . annal. longis spatiis discreti exercitus , quod saluberrimum est ad ●ontinendam ●ilitarem fidem , ne vitiis nec viribus mis●ebantur . tac. . hist. quod in seditionibus accidit , unde plures ●rant , omnes fuere . tac. . hist. dux ad solvendam militum conspirationem alterum in alterum concitat . s. chrysost. remedium tumultus fuit alius tumultus . tac. . hist. divus augustus vultu & aspectu actiacas legione● exterruit . tac. . annal. illi quoties oculos ad multitudinem retulerant vocibus trucul●●●●●repere , rursum viso caesare trepidare . tac. . annal. res●st●●●●esque germanico & druso , posse à se mitigari , vel infringi : quod aliud s●●sidium si imperatorem sprevissent ? tac. . annal. habet aliquid ex iniquo omne magnum exemplum , quod contra 〈◊〉 utilitate publica rependitur . tac. . annal. gaudebat cae●●●●s miles , tanquam semet absolvere● . tac. . annal. nihil ●●●ci patientia , nisi ut graviora , tanquam ex facil tolerantibus imperen●●● . tac. in vit. agr. et flaccus multa concedendo , nihil aliud 〈◊〉 , qu●m ut acrius exposc●rent , quae sci●bant negaturum . tac. . annal. superior exercitus legatum hordenium flaccum spernebat . tac. . hist. nec caesar ar●ebat , quando nihil ipsius jussu , penes ●osd●● saevitia facti & invidia ●rat . tac . annal. fit temerit●●●● alienae comes spurinna , primo coactus , mox velle simulans , quo plus aucto●itat●● inesse● consiliis , si seditio mitescere● . tac. . hist. neque 〈◊〉 glis●entis discordiae remedium , quàm si unus alt●●ve maximè prompti subverterent●r . tac. . annal. nihil ausuram plebem principibus amot●● . tac. . annal. nam periander caduceatori , per quem thrasybulus consilium ejus exquirebat , nihil respondisse fertur , sed s●icis eminentibus sublatis segetem ad●quasse . arist. pol. . c. . e● oratio ad perstringendos mulcendosque militum animos , severitatis modus ( neque enim in plures quàm in duos animadverti jusserat ) gratè accepta , compositique ad praesens , qui coerceri non poterant . tac. . hist. et dum mali pavent , optimu●●●isque jussis paruere . tac. . hist. haud peri●de germanos vul●era , luctus , excidia , quàm ea species dolore & ira adfecit . tacit. . annal. iulius igitur civilis periculo exemptus praepotens inter bata●●s , ne supplicio ejus ferox gens alienaretur . tac. . hist. quo minor spes veniae , cresceret vinculum sceleris , tac. . hist. tac. . hist. sed vires ad coercendum deerant , in frequentibus infidisque legionibus , &c. tac. . hist. nihil spei , nisi per discordias habeant . tac. . annal. nihil in discordiis civilibus festinatione tuti●s , ●●i facto magìs , quam con●ulto opus est . tac. . hist. pergit properus & pra●veniens inimico●um actus , amicorum ●●●●ite●tiam . tac. . annal. paul. ad gal. . . quippe i● turbis & discordiis pessimo cuique plurima vis . tac. . hist. civilibus bellis plus militibus quam ducibus licere . tac. . hist. vn● ac ca vetus causa bellandi , profunda libido imperii , & d●●●tiarum . sal. in cons. catil . iam. . . chron. . . sam. . . video serrum ex iisdem tenebris esse prolatum , quibus a●rum & argentum , ne aut instrumentum in caedes mutuas deesset , aut pretium . senec. nam cum duo sint genera disceptandi , unum per disceptationem , alter●● per vim , cumque illud proprium sit hominis , hoc belluarum , confugiendum e●● ad posterius , si ●ti non licet superiori . cicero . * l. . tt . . p. . castrensis jurisdictio secura , & obtusior , & plura manu agens , calliditatem fori non exerceat . tac. in vit. agric. sumi bellum etiam ab ignavis , tenu●ssimi cujusque periculum geri . tac. . annal. pa●em habere debet voluntas , bell●m necessi●●s . de august . epist. . tom. . tac. . annal. for they have sown the wind , and reap'd the whirlwind . h●sea . . isai. . . ezek. . . ier. . . ier. . . . . ier. . . isai. . . isai. . . exod. . . data est moysi authoritas , & potest●● , 〈◊〉 vel●t deus pharaontem ●erreret , puniret . hil. l. . de trin. mac. . . isai. . . ibid. ezek. . . pro● . . . sapientibus quietis & reip. curae : levissimus quisque , & futuri imp●ovidus spe vana tumens . tac. . hist. perniciem aliis , ac postremum sibi invenere . tac. . annal. vt cuique erat , criminando , quod facillimum factu est , prav●s & callidus , bonos & modestos anteibat . tac. . hist. praefectur●● vigilum , & praetorii , & alia praemia virtutum velocius vitiis adeptus . tac. . hist. inter stupra concubinarum , & oscula , & deforme● mores , sectis novacula faeucibus , infamem vitam foedavit , etiam exi●u se●● & inhonesto . tac. . hist. and the sons of aaron the priest shall blow with the trumpets , and they shall be for an ordinance for ever to you , throughout your generations . numb . . . in turb●s & discordi●s pess●mo cuique plurima vis . tac. . hist. * mar. hist. hisp. discesser●ntque opertis odiis . tac. . an●al . * mar. hist. hisp. isai. . . prov. . . peractis tritsitia imitamentis . tac. . annal. periisse germanicum nulli jact antius moerent , quam qui maxime laetantur . tac. . annal. * may's version of lucan . prov. . . psal. . . nec ideo sincerae charitatis fidem adsecutus , amoliri juvenem specie ho●oris statuit , struxitque caus●s , aut fortè oblatas a●ripuit . tac. . annal. tum agrippina ver●is artibus , per blandimenta juvenem aggredi , suum potiùs cubiculum ac sinum offerre contegendis , quae prima aetas , & summa fortuna expeterent . tac. . annal. quae muta●i● nequ● ner●nem fefellit , & proximi amicorum metuebant , orabantque caver● in●idis mulior is semper ●trocis , tum & falsae . tac. . annal. vt imperium evertant libertatem praeferunt : si impetraverint ipsam aggredientur . tac. . annal. caeterum libertas , & speciosa nomina praetexuntur , nec quisquam alienum servitium & dominationem sibi concupivit , ut non eadem ista vocabula usurparet . tac. . hist. speciosa verbis , re inania au● subdola : quantaque majore libertatis imagine ●egebantur , tanto eruptura ad infensius servitium . tac. . annal. ne cont●●aciam cum pernicie , quam obsequium cum securitate m●litis . tac. . hist ▪ dilecta ex his , & constituta reipub. forma laudari facilius quam evenire , vel si evenit , haud diuturna esse potest . tac. . annal. an neronem extremum dominorum putatis ? idem crediderunt , qui tiberio , qui caio superstites fuerunt : cum interim instabilior & saevior exortus est . tac. . hist. ferenda regum ingenia , neque usui crebraes mutationes . tac. . annal. vlteriora mirari , praesenti● sequi , bonos imperatores voto expetere , qualescunque tolerare . tac. . hist. ier. . . quomodo sterilitatem , aut nimios imbres , & ●aetera naturae mala , ita luxuriam vel avaritiam dominantium tolerare . tac. . hist. vi●ia erunt , donec homines . ibid. sed neque haec continua ; & meliorum interventu pensantur . ibid. * si me non vide●s esse negabis avem . mar● . inter aves ingenio , sa●●citateque praestat , quod grandi sit c●pite , atque in india coelo sincero 〈◊〉 , undè didicit non solum loqui , sed etiam meditari , meditatur ob st●dium gloriae . ●ardan . cum justè bellum suscipitur , ut aperte pugnet quis , aut ex insidiis , nihil ad iustitiam interest . d. aug. dolus an virtus quis in hoste requirat . virg. receive a stranger into thine house , and he will disturb thee , and turn thee out of thine own . eccles. . . ignarus militiae , improvidus con●ilii , quis ordo agminis , quae cura explorandi , quantus urgendo , trahendove bello modus . tac. hist. l. . and joshua sent out two men to spy secretly . ios. . . and the angel of god which went before the camp of israel , remov'd and went behind them ; and the pillar of the cloud went from before their face , and stood behind them . exod. . . send thou men , that they may search the land of canaan , which i give unto the children of israel . numb . . . timet , atque eum deficere omnia videntur , qui in ipso negotio ●●●silium capere cogitur . jul. caes. res nostrae feruntur , imo volvuntur ; ergo consilium sub die nasci debet ; & hoc quoque tardum est 〈◊〉 , sub manu , quod aiunt nascatur . seneca . omnia non properanti clara certaque sunt , festinatio improvida est & 〈◊〉 livy . scelera impetu , bona consilia morâ valescere solent . ●ac . l. . hist. festinare quodvis negotium gignit errores , ●nde 〈◊〉 detrimenta exoriri solent ; at in cunctando bona insunt , quae si non 〈◊〉 talia videantur , in tempore bona quis esse reperiat . herod . ips● 〈◊〉 cunctatione agendi tempora consultando consumpsit . taci● . sane cerealis parum temporis ad exequenda imperia dabat , 〈◊〉 consiliis , sed eventu clarus . tac. l. . hist. omnia inconsulti imp●●● caepta , initiis valida , spatio languescunt . tac. . hist. duces pr●videndo , consultando , curctatione saepius , quam temerita●e prodesse . idem ibid. iam castra in hostili loco moliebatur corbulo , acceptis tamen à 〈◊〉 imperatore literis , quibus se recipere jubebatur , re subita , quanquam 〈◊〉 simul offenderentur , metus ex imperatore , contemptus ex barbaris , 〈◊〉 brium apud socios ; nihil aliud prolocutus , quam ●eatos quos●am duces 〈◊〉 , fignum recep●ui dedit . tac. l. . annal. iussa principis magis , quam incerta belli metuens . tac. l. . annal. see the land what it is , and the people that dwell therein , whether they be strong or weak , few or many . numb . . . homines , qui frigida h●● , europamque habitant , sunt illi quidem 〈◊〉 . arist. l. . pol. c. . graecorum autem genus , ut locorum medium tenet , sic ex utr●q●● naturâ praeditum , quippe animo simul & intelligentia valet . arist. l. . pol. c. . advenientes enim externos benignè hospitio excipiunt , adeo u● aem●latione quadam invicem pro illorum honore certent : quos advenae sequ●ntur , hos laudant aemicosque deorum putant . diod. sicul. l. . c. . plus ibi bonos mores valere , quam alibi bonas leges . tac. de mor. ●●●●●norum . had the author liv'd longer , or not wrote so soon , he would have been of another opinion . natura enim quoddam hominum genus proclive est ut imperio herili gubernetur , aliud ut regio , aliud ut civili , & horum imperium cujusque aliud est jus , & alia commodit●s . arist. l. . pol. c. . isai. . . and king solomon made two hundred targets of beaten gold , six hundred sheckl●s of beaten gold went to each target : and he made three hundred shields of beaten gold , and three hundred sheckles went to one shield . chron. . , . hispanis militares e●● sanguine ipsorum cariores erant . trog quibus quidem vehiculi● 〈…〉 & spectatae probitatis , aliàs uti non licuit . alex. ab alexan● l. . c. . and the shield of his mighty men is made red na●um . . now when the sun shined upon the shields of gold and brass , the mountains glistered therewith , and shined like lamps of fire . macchab. . . psal. . . vestibus nihil inter aequales ●●ellens , arma a●que equi inspiciebantur . scuto frameaque juvenes ●●abant . haec apud illos toga , hic primus iuventae honos , ante hoc domus 〈◊〉 videbantur , mox reipublicae . tac. de mor. germ. supellex pretiosa nihil aliud quam onus & impedimentum . curt. l. . vrbem senatui , & populo romano , templa diis reddita , propri● esse militiae decus in armis . tac. l. . hist. ne terreat va●● aspectus , & auri fulgor atque argenti , quod neque regit neque vulner●● . tac. in vit. agric. * tass. can. . quod tenaciores eorum i● pretio essent metu damni . sueton. quidam luxuriosos apparatus conviviorum , & irritamenta libidinum , 〈◊〉 instrumenta belli mercarentur . tac. l. . hist. cui perfidiam 〈◊〉 , infringere exercitûs virtutem inter artes erat . tac. l. . hist. sed corbuloni plus molis adversus ignaviam militum , quàm contra per●●iam hostium erat . tac. l. . annal. degenerabat à labore ac virtute miles , assuetudine voluptatum & conviviorum . tac. l. . hist. legiones operum & laboris ignar●● , popul●tionibus laetantes , veterem ad morem reduxit . tac. l. . annal. veterani qui non stationem non vigilias inissent , vallum , fossamque quasi nova & mira viserent , sine galeis , sine loricis , nitidi , & quaestuo●● , militi● per oppida expietâ . tac. l. . annal. ●pse cultu levi , capite intecto , in agmine , in laboribus frequens adesse ; laudem strenu●● , solatium invalidis , exemplum omnibus o●tendere . ibid. remediu● severitate quae●i●um est . nec enim ut in aliis exercitibus , primum alterumqu● venia prosequebatur , sed qui signa reliq●erat , s●atim capite poenas luebat . idque usu salubre , & misericordia melius apparuit . quippe pauciores castr● deseru●re , quam ea in quibus ignoscebatur . ibid. * tass. can. . we will not pass through the fields nor through the vineyards , neither will we drink of the water of the wells . numb . . . disciplinam majorum rempublicam tenet , quae si dilabatur , & nomen romanum , & imperium amissum iri . alex. sever. apud lamprid. paucos viros fortes natura procreat , bona institutione plures reddit industria . veget. and the principal scribe of the army , who mustered the people of the land , &c. king. . . gen. . . ierem. . . centesimam rerum venalium post bella civilia institutam , deprecante populo , edixit tiberius militare ●rarium eo subsidio niti . tacit. ● . . annal. ita enim & tutelae civitatis instructae murorum praesidio providebitur , & instaurandi agonis voluptas , confirmatis his , qua ad securitatis cautionem spectant , in secuti temporis circuitus circuitione repraesentabit . l. unica c. de expen . publ. l. . civitates magna ex parte bellum gerentes conservantur , caedem i●per●o potitae corrumpuntur . aristot. l. . polit. c. . metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat . salust . whose arrows are sharp , and all their bows bent : their horses hoofs shall be counted like ●lints . isai. . . timens infirmis animis hostem securitatem , & tanquam pupilli● 〈◊〉 idoneum tutorem necessarium videns e●se terrorem . mar. hist. hisp. nam pacem agentes , tanquam ferrum , splendorem amittunt . arist. l. . polit. c. . vetus 〈◊〉 jam pridem in●ita mortalibus potentiae cupido , cum 〈◊〉 per●i magnitudine adolevit , erupitque . nam rebus modicis , aequalitas fa●●● habeb●tur , sed ubi subacto orbe , & aemulis vrbibus regibusque excisi● s● cu●as opes concupiscere vacuum fuit , prima inter patres plebemque 〈◊〉 mina exarsere . arist. l. . pol. c. . decessu romanorum , 〈◊〉 vacui externo metu gentis assuetudine , & tum aemulatione gloriae arma in se verterant . tac. l. . hist pacem sine dubio post haec verum cruent●● . tac. l. . annal. cherusci nimiam ac marcentem diu pacem illacessui nutrierunt , idque ju●undius quam tutius fuit . tac. de mor. roman . multa quae natura impedita erant , c●nsi●io expediebat . livy , dec. . wisd. . . eccl. . * a city of spain , now call'd morvedre . † eurip. se novies à divo augusto in germaniam missum , plu●a consilio , qu●● vi perfe●isse . tacit. l. . annal. consiliis & astu , exter●as res ●●liend●s , arma procul habenda . non omnia viribus superantur , non velacitate , non celeritate , sed corilio & sententia . c●cero . mar. hist. hisp. pleraque in summa fortuna auspiciis & consiliis , magis quam ●elis & ●●nibus geri solent . tac. annal. neutralitas nec amicos pa●it , nec inimicos tollit . polyb. romanos 〈◊〉 socios habere oportuit , aut hostes , media via null● est . aristodem . periculosa severitas , flagitiosa l●rgitio : seu nihil militi , seu omnia concedereniur in ancipiti republica . tac. . annal. satis superque missione , & pecunia & mollibus consul●is peccatum . id. ibid. al●i fortioribus remediis agendum , nihil in vulgo modicum : terrere ni paveam , ubi pertimuerint , impunè contemni . tac. . annal. mox utrumque consilium aspernatur , quod inter ancipitia deterrimum est , dum media se quitur , nec ausus est satis , nec providit . id. l. . hist. neque enim hic , aut in caeteris gentibus , quae regnantur , certa dominorum domus , & caeteri servi : sed im●eraturus es hominibus , qui ne●●otam servitutem pati possunt , nec totam libertatem . tac. l. . hist. maluit videri invenisse bonos quam fecisse . tacit. in vit. agric. laudamus veteres , praesentes carpimus annos . nocuit antiqu●s rigor , & nimia severitas , cui pares non sumus . tac. l. . hist. eccles. . . this opinion was embraced and maint●i●ed by copernicus , rheticus , rothmannus , kepler , galilaeus , des cartes , and gassendus , by whom all arguments to the contrary are fully answer'd . velocissimi sideris more , omnia invisere , omnia au●ire . plin. jun. psal. . rise , take up thy bed and walk . iohn . . for an angel went down at a certain season , and troubled the water . ibid. . give ear , you that rule the people , &c. wisd. . . ibid. ver . . and the spirit of the lord shall rest upon him , the spirit of wisdom and understanding , the spirit of counsel and might , the spirit of knowledge , and of the fear of the lord. isai. . . and i will set up shepherds over them , which shall feed them , and they shall fear no more , &c. jer. . . and thou ●●alt anoint him to be a captain over my people i●rael . sam. . . rex enim dux erat in bello . arist. l. . pol. c. . nay , but we will have a king over us ; that we also may be like all the ●●tions , and that our king may judge us , and go out before us , and ●●ght our battels , sam. . , . mevero , inquit , praesentem , 〈◊〉 multis navibus comparas . plut. in ep●ph . ego qui nihil 〈◊〉 unquam praecepi , quin primus me periculis obtulerim , qui saepe cive● 〈◊〉 cl●peo texi . curt. l . nemo vestrum est , cujus non idem ego spectator & testis , notata temporibus locisque referre possim decora . liv. dec. l. . * tass. cant. . in cujus manu tot legiones , immensa sociorum auxilia , mirus apud populum favor , habere imperium quàm expectare mallet . tac. l. . annal. divus iulius seditionem exercitus verbo uno compescuit . quirites ●●cando , qui sacramentum ejus detrectabant . divus augustus vultu & aspect● actiacas legiones exterruit . tac. l. . hist. neque decorum pri●cipibus , si una ●lterave civitas , omissa urbe , unde in om●ia regimen . tac. l. . annal. s●m . . , . * claud. ne nova molire●ur , nisi ●ioribus firmatis . tac. annal. l. . † claud. ipse lugduni vim fortunamque principatus è proximo ostenta●●● , nec parvis periculis mixtus , & majoribus non defuturus . tac. hist. l. . postquam pugnari placitum , interesse pugnae imperatorem , an se●●● melius foret , dubitavere . paulino & celso non adversantibus , ne pr●●cipem objectare periculis viderentur ; iidem illi deterioris consilii perpul●●● , ut brixellum conderet , ac dubiis praeliorum exemptus , summae rerum & ●●perii seipsum reservaret . tac. hist. l. . * lucan . nullum nunc in is●a occaaione deliberandi tempus est , aliquid 〈◊〉 permittendum . mar. hist. hisp. l. . c. . fortuna in sapient●●● cessit . tac ▪ de mor. germ. when he lift up his hand with the stone in his sling , and beat down the boasting goliah eccles. . . pleraque in summa ●●●una , auspiciis & consiliis potius quam telis ac manibus geruntur . tac. annal. l. . affuit ut saepe aliàs fortuna populi romani 〈◊〉 oriente . tac. hist. l. . struebat jam fortuna , in diversa parte terrarum , initia causasque imperio . tac. hist. l. . numerabatur inter osfenta , diminutu : omnium magistratuum numerus , quaestors , aedile , tribu●o , ac praetore & consule , paucos intra menses defunctis . tac. annal. l. , etiam merito accidisse videtur , & casus in culpam transit . velleius . cuj●scunque fortunam mutare constituit , consilia corrumpit . velleius . for the lord hath poured forth upon you the spirit of deep sleep , and hath closed your eyes ; the prophets , and the rulers , and the seers hath he covered . isai . . fluminum instabili● natura , simul ostendere● omnia 〈◊〉 tac. annal. l. . eccles. . . nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile ac fluxum , quam fama potentiae non suî vi nixae . tac. annal. l. . multa bella impetu valida per t●edia & moras evanuisse . tac. opportunos magnis conatibus transitus rerum . tacit. hist. l. . optimum est pati quod emenda●re non possis , & deum , quo authore ●uncta eveniunt , sine murmure ●omitari . sen. ep. dan. . . eccles. . . rom. . . valentior enim omni fortuna animus est , in utramque partem res suas ducit . sen. epist. . non enim votis , neque supplici●● muliebribus auxilia deorum parantur ; vigilando , agendo , prosperè omni● cedunt . sallust . a three-fold cord is not quickly broken . wisdom . . * virg he maketh peace in high-places . nostris illi dissentionibus , & discordiis clari , vitia ●ostium in gloria● exercitus sui vertunt . tac. in vit. ag●ic . conversis ad civile bellum animis , externa sine cura ●abentur . tac. hist. l. . and a seventh doth my heart abhorr , he that soweth discord among brethren . prov. . . concordi● malorum contraria est bonorum , & sicut optandum est , ut boni pacem habeant ad invicem , ita optandum est , ut mali sint discordes , impeditur enim iter bono um , si unitas non dividatur malorum . s. isid. procul ab aemulatione adversus collegas . tac. in vit. agric. thou didst cleave the earth with rivers . haba● . . . the lord hath broken forth upon mine enemies before me , as the breach of waters . sam. . . siamnis nar ( id enim parabatur ) in rivos diductus supernavigasset . tac. annal. l. . quin ipsum tiberim no●●e , prorsus accolis fluv●s ●●batum , minori gloria fluere . ibid. prudentis est ducis inter bostes discordi●e causas serere . veget. discordia & seditio omnia facit opportuniora insidiantibus . livy . vrgentibus imperii romani fatis , nihil jam praes●are fortuna majus ●●tuit , quam hostium discordiam . tac. de mor. germ. non fraude neque occultis , sed palam , & armatum populum romanum bostes suos ulcisci . tac. hist. l. . olim regibus parebant , nunc per principes factionibus , & studiis trabantur ; nec aliud adversus validiss●mas gentes pro nobis ●●ilius , quam quod in commune non consulunt . rarus duabus , tribusve civitatibus , ad propulsandum commune periculu● conventus : ita dum singuli pu●nant , universi vincuntur . tac. in vi● . agric. * cam. lus. videtur amicitia magis continere , & majore quam justitia in studio fuisse legislatoribus . nam si amicitia inter omnes esset , ni●il esset , quod justitiam desiderarent ; at si justi essent , tamen amicitiae praesidium requirerent . arist. ethic. l. . l. . tit. . p. . and saul went home ; but david and his men gat them up unto the hold . sam. . . * gen. . . never trust thine enemy ; for like as iron rusteth , so is his wickedness : though he humble himself , and go crouching , yet take good heed , and beware of him , eccl. . . * mar. hist. hisp. proprium humani ingenii est , odisse quem laeser is . tac. vit. agric. non exercitus neque thesauri , praesidia regni sunt , verum amici , sallust . non aureum istud sceptrum est , quod regem custodit , sed copia amicorum , ea regibus sceptrum tutissimum , xenoph. nec ●llum majus boni imperii instrumen●um quam boni amici , tac. annal. l. . dum amicitias magnitudine munerum , non constantia morum continere putavit , meruit , magis quam habuit , tac. hist. l. . ne tanta stipendia classi lacedaemoniorum praeberet , sed nec auxiliis nimis enixe ju●andos , quippe non immemorem esse debere , alienam esse victoriam non suam instruere , & eatenus bellum sustinendum , ne inopia deseratur , trog . l. . fuit proprium populi romani longè à domo bellare , & pro●ugnaculi● , imperii sociorum fortunas , non sua tecta defendere , cic. pro leg . man. plin. l. . c. . ael . l. . c. . de animal . if an oxe gore a man or a woman , and they die , the oxe shall be s●rely stoned , exod. . . and there was also another eagle , with great wings , and many feathers , &c. ezek. . . philippus rex ma●edonum libertati ●●●ium insidiatus , dum contentiones civitatum alit , auxilium inserioribus ferendo , victos pariter , victoresque subire regiam s●rvitutem coëgit . justin. thou art the anointed cherub that governeth , ezek. . . for earthly things were turned into watry ; and the things that before swam in the water , now went upon the ground , wisd. . . mar. hist. l. . c. . and their word will eat as doth a canker , tim. . . in the six and thirtieth year of the reign of asa , baasha king of israel came up against judah , and built ramah , to the intent that he might let none go out or come in to asa king of judah , chron. . . and it came to pass , when baasha heard it , that he left off building of ramah , and let his work cease , chron. . . because thou hast relied on the king of syria , and not relied on the lord thy god , therefore is the host of the king of syria escaped out of thine hand , &c. herein thou hast done foolishly ; therefore from henceforth thou shal● have wars , chron. . , . o king , l●t not the army of israel go with thee : for the lord is not with israel , to wit , with all the children of ephraim . but if thou wilt go , do it , be strong for the battel : god shall make thee fall before the enemy : for god hath power to help , and to cast down , chron. . , . we s●e certainly that the lord is with thee : and we said , let there be now an oat● betwixt us , even betwixt us and thee , and let us make a covenant with thee , that thou shalt do us no hurt , gen . , . we have sworn unto them by the lord god of israel : now therefore we may not touch them , i●sh . . . so the sun stood still in the midst of heaven , and hasted not to go down about a w●ole day . and there was no day like that , before it , or after it , that the lord hearkened unto the voice of man : for the lord sought for i●rael , iosh. . , . then there was a famine in the days of david , three years , year af●er year ; and david enquired of the lord. and the lord answered , it is for saul , and for his bloody house , because he slew the gi●eonites , sam. . . then thou shalt see and flow together , and thine heart shall fear , and be enlarged , because the abundance of the sea shall be converted unto thee , the forces of the gentiles shall come unto thee , isai. ● . . * the italian is ●ere guilty of par●ial omissions and additions . summum pontificem etiam summum h●minem esse , non amulationi● 〈◊〉 odio aut privatis affectio●i●us 〈◊〉 , tac. annal. li● . . for in the long garment was the whole world , wisd. . ● . * a whole page is here omitted in the french. zurit . hist. arragon . l. . c. . mar. hist. hisp. zurit . ann. de arrag . euseb. in vit. const. 〈…〉 reg. goth. honor 〈…〉 tac. hist. l. . * a page and an half is here omitted in the italian . zur . hist. arrag mar. hist. hisp. l. . c. . anton. ●eb . hist. hisp. * in proem . p. . mar. hist. hisp. l. . c. . mirari 〈◊〉 subit impervestigabile● dei sapientiam , qui plane ●●●traria uno fine conclusit . nam cum du●● ad●ersarias potestates inter se co●mittere statuit , nee alteram alteri subjicere , aut ingenio & virtute 〈◊〉 utrinque parti moderatores praeficit , ut alter alterius consilia & 〈◊〉 vertas , & utrinque subditorum libertati consulatur , aut utrosque ●ebetes & imbelles deligit , ut neuter alterum tentare , & s●pta ( quod aiunt ) 〈◊〉 aude●● , veteresque regnorum limites convellere . niceph. * here is a page and an half omitted in the french. quoties concordes agunt , spe●nitur parth●● ; ubi dissensere , dum sibi quisque contra aemulos subsidium vocant , accitus in partem adversu● omnes valescit . tac. annal. l. . quippe sine dignitate praemium victoris eritis . liv. l. . neutralitas neque a●icos parit , ●eque inimicos tollit . polyh . phil. de comin . * this whole paragraph is omitted in the french. * horat. laetiore tiberio , qui● pacem sapienti● firmaverat , quim si bellu● 〈◊〉 a●ies consecisses , tac. annal. l. . ingens victoria dec●● 〈◊〉 a romanum sanguinem bellants , id. in vit. ag●ic . dare in discrimen legiones haud imperatorium ratus , tac. annal. lib. . bellorum egregios ●ines , quoties ignoscendo transigatur , ta● annal. l. . quanta pervicacia in hostem tanta beneficentia 〈◊〉 versus supplices utendum , id ▪ ibid. vbi solitudinem fa●●● pacem appellant , tac. in vit. agric. when thou shalt besi●●● a city a long time , in making war against it to take it , thou shalt 〈◊〉 destroy the trees thereof , by forcing an are against them : for 〈◊〉 mayest eat of them , and thou shalt not cut them down ( for the 〈◊〉 of the field is man's life ) to employ them in the siege , deut. . . and do ye abide without the camp seven days : whosoever ●●th killed any person , and whosoever hath touched any slain , purifie ●●●h your selves and your captives , on the third day , and on the ●●●●th day , numb . . . * virgil. and there shalt 〈◊〉 build an altar unto the lord thy god , an altar of stone : thou ●●it not lift up any iron tool upon them , deut. . . then ●●ua built an altar , &c. an altar of whole stones , over which no 〈◊〉 had lift up an iron , iosh. . . . if thou wilt make ●an altar of stone , thou shalt not build it of hewn stone : for if thou 〈◊〉 up the tool upon it , thou hast polluted it , exod. ● . . for 〈◊〉 drew not his hand back wherewith he stret●●●● out the spear , until he had utterly destroyed all the inhabitan● a● , josh. . . shall the sword devour for ever ? knowest thou not that it 〈◊〉 be bitterness in the latter end ? sam. . . his eyes 〈◊〉 as the eyes of doves by the rivers of waters , cant. . . aliquando etiam victis ira virtusque , tac. in vit. agric. acriore hodiè disciplinî victi quam victores agunt : h●s ira , odium , 〈◊〉 cupiditas ad virtutem acc●ndit , tac. hist. l. . qui cupidine praedae graves onere sarcinarum velut vi●cti but ●tand ye now fast against your enemies , and overcome them ; then may ye safely take the spoils , maccab. . . cuncta mortal um incerta , quan●●●● plus ad●ptus forat , tanto se magis in lubrico dictans , tac. annal. l. ● . * cassiod . come near , put your feet upon the necks of these kings , ●osh . . . fear not , nor be dismayed ; be strong , and ●f good courage : for thus shall the lord do to all your enemies against whom ye fight , iosh. . . * claud. † virg. mar. hist. hisp. vt praeda ad virtutem incenderentur , tac. hist. l. . and ●avid ca●e to baal-perazim , and david smote them there , sam. ● . . therefore jehoash king of israel went up , and he and amaziah king of judah lo●ked one another in the face at bethshemeth , ●●ich belongeth to judah : and judah was put to the worst before israel , king. . , . 〈…〉 cum spoli●●i exutique 〈…〉 fore , tac. hist. l. . saul came to ca●mel , and behold , ●e set him up a place , sam. ● . . and set up 〈◊〉 pillars upon it , one against another , for 〈◊〉 father , his 〈…〉 : and he set great pillars round ●●out them , and set arms upon the pillars , for a perpetual memory , 〈◊〉 carved ships beside the arms , that they might be seen of men ●●●lling in the sea . this sepulchre , which he made at modin , standeth 〈◊〉 unto this day , maccab. . , , . 〈…〉 , arist. l. . po● . c. . after , when they 〈…〉 jerusalem , they worshipped the lord ; and as soon as the 〈◊〉 were purified , they offered their burnt● offerings , and their 〈◊〉 - offerings , and their gifts , iudith ● . . and thou shalt offer burnt-offerings thereon unto the lord thy god , and thou shalt offer peace-offerings , 〈◊〉 . . * virg. cum in victores victosque , munquam solida fides convalesceret , tac. hist. l. . bellum anceps , an pax in●onesta placeret , nec dubitatum de bello , tac. annal. l. . si 〈◊〉 dederitis , & fidam , & perpetuam ; si 〈…〉 tit. liv. l. . nec credideris ullu● 〈…〉 in ea conditione , cujus cum paniteat , diutius , quam necesse sit , mansurum , tit. liv. l. . * tac. annal. l. . in pace suspecta tutius bellum , tac. hist. l. . saying , peace , peace , when there is no peace , ier. . . and i will establish my covenant between me and thee , and thy seed after thee , in their generations , for an everlasting covenant ; to be a god unto thee , and to thy seed after thee , gen. . the lord god of israel gave the kingdom over israel to david for ever , even to him and to his sons by a covenant of salt , chron. . . * in ●ul . indict . conc. trident. melior enim tutiorque est certa pax , quam sperata victoria ; illa in tua● , haec in deorum manu est , liv. dec. . l. . pac●m , & concordiam victis uti●ia , victorib● tantum pulc●ra esse , tac. hist. l. . quia inter innocentes , & validos ●also qu●escunt , tac. de mor. ●●rm . vbi manu agitur , modestia , ac probitas , nomina 〈◊〉 sunt , tac. ibid. and behold , there was a swarm of bees , and honey in the carkass of the lion , iudg. . . lord , thou wil● ordain peace ●or us : for thou hast wrought all our works in us ▪ isai. . . and my people shall dwell in a peaceable habitation , and in sure dwellings , and in quiet resting places , isai. . . et sedebit pop●l●s 〈◊〉 in pulc●ritudine pacis , vulg. righteousness and peace have kissed each other , psal. . . aequè apud bonos miserum est occidere , quam perire , tac. hist. l. . nam i● pace causas , & merita spectari : ubi bellum ingrua● , innocentes a noxios juxta ca●dere , tac. annal. l. . sed longa pax ad 〈◊〉 servitium fregerat , tac. hist. l. . ni●il aque tiberium 〈◊〉 habebat , quam ne composita turbarentur , tac. annal. l. . quantâ pecuniâ dites , & voluptatibus opulentos , tanto magis imbelles , tac. annal. l. . dissimulante tiberio damna , ne cui bellum permitteret , tac. annal. l. . violentia nemo imperia continuit diu , ●●derata durant , seneca . * sil. ital. * propert. semina odiorum jacienda , & omne scelus externum habendum cum laetitia , tac. annal. l. . psal. . . psal. . . mar. hist. hisp. 〈…〉 ta● . annal. l. . cesserunt que prim● postremis , & bo●a● juventae , senectus flagitios●●●●teravit , tac. annal. . . s●●m ●uique decus posteritas rependit , tac. annal. . . * mar. hist. hisp. vt vultus ●ominun , it a simulacr● v●ltus imbecilla a● mortal●a 〈◊〉 ; for●a mentis aeterna , quam tene ▪ e , & exprimere non per alie●●●●●teriam , & artem , sed iuu ipse moribus possi● , tac. in vit. agri● . 〈◊〉 tibi neque aureas , nequ● argemeas . ●ieri ●●q●am 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 a●tem ali●s tibi sta●●as in ipsi● hominu● animis nibil 〈…〉 effice , me●aen . ad august . hac mibi in ●nimis vestris templa , bae pulcherrim●e effigies & ma●surae , n●m que saxo 〈◊〉 , si ●●dicium poster●●um in odium vert●t , pro 〈…〉 , tac. annal. l. . auxilio militari t●●ndu● , 〈◊〉 sepultr● ejus 〈…〉 , tac. annal. l. . * the memory of them is forgotten , eccle● . . . ●●ter omnes eos n●n cons●at à quib●● factae s●●t , justi●●i●● casu ●bliteratis t●●ta vanit●ti● au●●orib●s , p●●n . . . ve●ustate imper●● c●alita ●udacia , tac. annal. l. . ips●● sa●e se●em , & prosperis , adversisque satiatum , tac. hist. l. . solusque ●●●ium ante se princip●● , in meliu● mutatus est , tac. hist. l. . multi odio praesentium cupidine mutationis , suis quoque periculis l●tab●●tur , tac. annal. l. . pars ●u●to maxima imminen●es d●●inos var●is 〈◊〉 differeb●nt , tac. annal. l. . quippe ut ●●●pus , sic e●iam mens su●●●abet senium , ari●t . l. . pol. c. . reputante tiber●o public●● sibi odi●● , extre●●● aetatem ●●gisque fama , q●a● v● stare res 〈◊〉 , tac. annal. l. . sane gravaretur aspectum civium senex imperator , fessamque ●●atem , & actos labores , praetender●t : druso quod nisi ex arrogant●a impedimentum ? tac. annal. l. . se tamen fortiora solatia è complexu reip. petivisse , tac. annal. l. . constat po●uisse con●iliari animos quantulacu●que parci senis liberalitate , tac. hist. lib. . patres , eq●es . 〈◊〉 quis illustrior , ●●nto magis falsi a● 〈◊〉 , ●●ltuque composito , ne laeti excessu p●incipis neu tristiores , pri●ordio lachrymas , gaudi●● , quaestus , adulationes misceb●nt , tac. annal. lib● . . et audita adoptione defi●am videri senex , q●iod nu●● 〈…〉 objicitur , tac. hist. l. . y●a , i hated all my labour which i had taken under the sun : because i should leave it unto the man that shall be after me , eccles. . . quo pluri●us munimentis insis●eret , tac. annal. l. . non legiones , non classer , perinde firma imperii munimenta quàm numer●● liberorum , tac. hist. l. . quorum prosperis & alii fruantur , adversa ad justissimos perti●eant , tac. hist. l. . nam a●icos tempore , fortuna , cupiainibus , aliquando aut erroribus imminui , transfer●i desinere : suum cuique sanguinem indis●retum , tac. hist. lib. . vtrumque in laudem drusi trabebatu● : ab eo in urbe inter coetus & sermones bominum obversante secreta patris mitigari , tac. annal. l . he leaveth behind him an avenger against his enemies , and one that should shew favour unto his friends , ecclus. . . suadere 〈◊〉 prisco , ne supra principem scanderet ; ne vespasianum senem triu● . ●ha●em , juvenum liberorum patrem prae●eptis ●oër●eret , tac. hist. l. . intempera●tia civitatis donec ●us eligatur ●ultos desti●andi , tac. hist. l. . ex ●rbore 〈…〉 , & trunco novam producit qu●● anteq●am antiqua decidat , jam radices & vires accepit , tol. de rep. l. . c. . ● . . let the lord , the god of the spirits of all flesh , set a man over the congregation , numb . . . sed augustus in d●mo successorem quaes●vit ; ego in republica , tac. hist. l. . nunc ●o ●ecessitatis jampridem ventum est , ut nec mea senectus conferre plus populo romano possit qu●m bonum successore● , nec tua plus j●venta quàm bonum principe● , tac. hist. l. . ne ti●erium quidem caritate aut reipublicae cura successor●m ●dscitum : sed quoniam arrogan●iam saevitiamque introspexerit , compar●tione deterrima ●ibi gloriam quaefi●isse , tac. annal. l. . optimos quippe mort●lirum , altissima cupere , tac. annal. l. . is modi●um hyberiae regnum senecta patris detineri , ferocius crebriusque jactabat , tac. annal. l. . give him no liberty in his youth , and wink not at his folly , ecclus. . . vt amoto p●tre , drusus munia consulatu● solus impleret , tac. annal. lib. . displicere regna●ntibus civilia filiorum ingeni● , tac. annal. l. . qu●nquam ●onor●●●atione , qu●dam de habitu , ●●ltuq●e & institutis ej●s jecerat , qu● vel●t excu●ando exprobraret , tac. annal. l. . ad o●te●tand●● saevitiam in●vend●sque p●pull off●nsio●●● , concess●m f●lio materiam , tac. annal. l. . l●tabatur tiberi●● quum inter filios & leges sen●tus dis●ept●ret , tac. annal. l. . caesar d●mitianus pr●●turam capit . ejus 〈◊〉 epistoli● edictisque proponebatur , vis penes mutianum erat , tac. hist. l. . ●gitur pharasmanes juvenem potentiae promptae & studio pop●darium accinctum , vergentibus jam armis suis metuens , alia● ad spem tra●ere & armeniam oftentare , tac. annal. . . ●rofecto brixellum othone , honor imperii penes titianum fratrem , ●is , ac potestas penes proculum praefectum , tac. hist. l. . qu● syriae imponeretur , ad spes germanici coercendas , tac. annal. l. . partemque prolis , firmandae amicitiae , miserat : ●aud perinde nostri me●u , quam fidei popularium diffisus , tac. annal. l. . quamvi● gentis arsaci●arum , ut extern●m aspernaban●ur , tac. annal. l. . immensumq●● attolli pro●ideret q●em conjunctione ta●● super alios 〈◊〉 , tac. annal. l. . proculejum , & quosda● in sermonibus 〈…〉 , reip negotiis permixto● , tac. annal. l. . wo to thee , o land , when thy king is a child , eceles . . . quando ausuros exposcere remedia , nisi novum , & nutantem a●hus principem , precibus vel armis adirent , tac. annal. l. . * tasso . m●lt●que gratia man●it reputante tiberi● publicum sibi odium , extre●am ●●atem , magisque fama quam vi●st●re res suas , tac. annal. l. . consilis & astu res externa● moliri , arm● procul ba●ere , tac. annal. l. . hispaniae praeerat cl●vius ruf●● vir fa●und●s , & pacis artibus , belli ine●p●●t●● , tac. hist. l. . and the day of death , than the day of birth , eccles. . . and dig for it more than for rich treasure , which rejoyce exceedingly , and are glad when they can find the grave , iob . , . and set great pillars round about them , and set arms upon the pillars , for a perpetual memory , and carved ships be●ides the arms , ma●cab . . . wherefore then hast thou brought me forth out of the womb ? o that i had given up the ghost , and no eye had seen me , i should have been as though i had not been , i should have been carried from the womb to the grave , iob . , . i was nourished in swadling cloaths and with care● , wisd. . . * for there is no king that hath any o●●er ●eginning of birth , wisd. . . l●sas 〈…〉 fact●s na●●ra fuisse necesse est , arist. pol. l. . c. . thou shalt come to thy grave in a full age , like as a shock of corn cometh in , in his season , iob . . secund . septuagint . cum ●pud infirmum & credulum , minore metu & majore prae●io peccaretur , tac. hist. l. . nam senem augustum devi●xerat , adeo , uti nepotem unicum agrippam posthumu● in insulam planasiam projic●ret , tac. annal. l. . nulla in praesens formidine dum augustus aetate validus , seque & domum , & pacem sustentavit , postquam profecta jam senectus & agro corpore fatigabatur , aderatque finis , & spei novae ; pauci bon● liber●atis inc●ssum disserere , ibid. ipsa aetas galb●e , & irrisu● & fastid●o erat , tac. hist. l. . senectutem tiberii ut inermem despicient , tac. hist. l. . 〈◊〉 , & principe i●●●to exitium d●mui ejus i●tendi 〈◊〉 , 〈…〉 l. . precarium sibi imperium & brevi transi●●●●● , tac. hist. l. . 〈◊〉 afferebant ve●alia c●nct● , prap●●●mses libe●● . 〈…〉 , tac. hist. l. . theophr . l. de plant. my breath is corrupt , my days are exti●●● , the graves are ready for me , io● . . and the sun stood still , and the moon stayed , ios● . . . sim●l exce●●i●●e augustum , & rer●m pot●ri neronem ●ama e●dem ●●lit , tac. annal. l. . dum res firmando nero●●● i●p●rio 〈◊〉 , tac. annal. l. . my son , pour forth tears over the dead , e●clus . . . mourn before abner : and king david himself followd the bier , s●m . . . jesus wept , io● . . . quomodo imaginibus suis noscuntur , quas nec victor quidem abolevit , ●ic partem memoriae apud scriptores retinent , tac. annal. l. . politick discourses written in italian by paolo paruta ... ; whereunto is added a short soliloquy in which the author briefly examines the whole course of his life ; rendred into english by the right honorable henry, earl of monmouth. discorsi politici. english paruta, paolo, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) politick discourses written in italian by paolo paruta ... ; whereunto is added a short soliloquy in which the author briefly examines the whole course of his life ; rendred into english by the right honorable henry, earl of monmouth. discorsi politici. english paruta, paolo, - . monmouth, henry carey, earl of, - . [ ], p. : port. printed for h. moseley ..., london : . translation of: discorsi politici. errata on p. 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in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . italy -- history. rome -- history. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion hen : do : cary baro de leppington comes monmouthen●is . et honble : ord : balni● eques . politick discourses ; written in italian by paolo paruta a noble venetian , cavalier and procurator of st. mark . whereunto is added , a short soliloquy , in which the author briefly examines the whole course of his life . rendred into english by the right honorable , henry earl of monmovth . london , printed for h. moseley , and are to be sold at the prince's arms in st. paul's church-yard . : the contents of the several discourses the first book . discourse i. what was the true and proper form of government observed in the commonwealth of rome ; and whether she could be better ordered in civil affairs , having armed people on foot . pag. . ii. what success the roman affairs would have had , if alexander the great had turned with his victorious army into italy . iii. whether was the better and more laudable advice ; that of the carthaginians in offering to assist the romans against king pyrrhus ; or that of the romans in refusing their offer . iv. which of the two famous roman commanders , quintus fabi●s maximus , or p. scipio africanus , brought more of 〈…〉 the commonwealth of rome in managing their war. v. whether war being to be made against the romans , hannibals counsel was good to carry it into italy . vi. whether it was well done by the romans , to carry the war against the carthaginians , into sicily and spain ; and into macedonia and greece , against king philip ; whilst hannibal waged war with them in italy . vii . whether the destruction of carthage was the rise of the ruine of the roman republick . viii . why rome could not regain her liberty after the death of julius caesar as she had formerly done , by driving the tarquin● first out , and then appius claudius and the other decemviri . ix . which is the safer way to be taken , to arrive at honor and glory in a commonwealth ; that which was held by cato , or that which was pursued by caesar. x. to what age of the city of rome the greatest praise and merit is to be given , for the prosperity and greatness whereto she arrived . xi . how the roman empire , though it fell oftentimes into the hands of base and wicked m●n , was notwithstanding able to maintain it self in the reign of many emperors , and how it came to be finally destroyed , xii . why the commonwealth of rome , though she suffered many defeats in divers battels , yet did still prove victorious at last . xiii . whether the city of rome could have maintain'd herself longer in the glory and majesty of her command , if she had preserved her librty , and form of commonwealth , then she did under the government of emperors . xiv . why the grecians did not much extend the confines of their dominion , as did the romans ; and how greece came to lose her liberty . xv. whether ostracism used by the athenians ; be a just thing , or no ; and whether it be useful for the preservation of a commonwealth . the second book . discourse i. why the commonwealth of venice hath not so for enlarged her pr●cincts , as did the roman commonwealth . ii. whether or no the commonwealth of venice be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the city of pisa , when it was app●gne● by the florentine● . ● iii. that the commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate successes of war , after the routing of the venetian army in the actio● of giaradada . iv. whether the princes of italy did well , or no , to assault the army of charl● the eight , king of france , when after having gotten the kingdom of naples , he hasted to pass over the mountains . v. whether or no the forces of leagues be fit for great enterprises . vi. why modern princes have not done actions equal to those which were done by the antients . vii . what the cause is why italy hath enjoyed so long peace and quiet in these latter times . viii . whether citadels and strong-holds , much used by our modern princes , be commodious , and of true safety to a state , or no. ix . whether the opinion of pope leo the tenth were good , or no , and his counsel safe , of driving foreign nations out of italy by the help of other transalpine forces . x. whether the counsel taken by the emperor charls the fifth , and by his commanders , of not parting from the walls of vienna , when solyman was come with very great strength from constantinople to assault it , deserve praise , or blame . a table of all the more notable things contained in the present politick discourses . a. adrian the emperor , why he resolved to go on progress over all his states , and to visit every part thereof — pag. - . where he set the bounds of his empire — ibid. agesilaus , though he were king in sparta , was obedient to the laws of the country — alcibiades , by too much desire of glory , ruined his country — . had higher thoughts then the rest of the greek commanders — alexander the great , the greatness of his enterprises — . his militia — - an indian gymnosophist shews him how in a large kingdom insurrections fall out — . how far he extended his empire , and in how little time — . and how — . his artifices , and laudable way , for opening the way more easily to his great atchievements , and greater glory — ambition precipitated rome into very grievous disorders — - - . when discovered , makes men distastefull — . it , and fear raise in princes minds a desire of innovation — . the important mischief of it , if once gotten into mens hearts — . how it is to be cured in states-men — ibid. an army keeping the field , how greatly beneficial — armies , maintained by the romans to carry on the war in divers parts , taken only out of italy — arragonian kings of naples , what they did for fear of the french forces — artillery , of what use in war●● — . that in their stead the antients had miraculous engines , called tormenta — assaulting the enemy in his own state , how advantagious — attalaricus king of the goths descends into italy — . is afterwards entertain'd for a stipendiary to the empire — ibid. attila content to lose the day , so the roman commander might be slain in the battel — athens , why she soon lost her liberty — - - athenians of great power in greece — . by what people followed and favour'd — ibid. too hard for the rest in sea-forces — ibid. hinder'd by the spartans from taking in sicily , and from assaulting persia — . why they could not enlarge their dominion — augustus caesar , in many places enlarged the empire — . remained sole lord of the whole world — . reduced it all to peace , though he was troubled with some insurrections — ● . see octavianus . b. battails , subject to divers unexpected accidents — when they are to be adventured upon — brutus , junius br. how he stirr'd up the people to liberty — . why he condemned his own sons to death — brutus , marcus br. why he could not preserve the liberty of rome , recover'd by caesars death — . that he endeavored it when 't was too late — c. carthaginians , why they came to aid the romans against pyrrhus — for a long time friends to the romans — ibid. should rather have been afraid of the romans then of pyrrhus — . were stronger at sea then they — . often subdued — cat● major , causing sigs to be brought from carthage into the senate-house , gives counsel that that city should be destroyed — . how such counsel might be useful — cato uticensis , what things they were which ingratiated him with the senate and the people — . did many times prevail against caesar — ibid. founded his greatness upon nobler courses — . what demonstrations he received from the people of their singular favour to him — . because his manners were not suitable to the form of that republick , he could not hold out his reputation among them to the utmost — charls the great , having freed italy from the slavery of the northern barbarians , made his son pipin king of italy — charls the eighth , king of france , his passage into italy for the conquest of naples — . at his return assaulted by the italian princes ; and whether they were well advis'd in it , discoursed upon at large — ibid. charls the fifth , emperor , compared with solyman — . his great wars with francis the first , king of france , and his famous expeditions — . why his enterprises against the kingdom of france proved vain — . why he shunn'd hazarding a set battel with solyman — . how the state of milain fell to him — . whether he was well advised in not parting from before the walls of vienna , when solyman was come to assault it — a city well ordered , how it should be qualified — . for preserving of unity among the citizens , whether the courses which caesar took , or those used by cato , were more available — ● . when it is grown to a great height , 't is a hard matter to order it aright — . that which aspires to a large dominion , must have two things — ● . what is most necessary for its long continuance , especially such a one as is cast into the form of a republick — ▪ of how great importance the situation is — citizens of singular quality banish'd from athens for ten years — — to make them vertuous , three things necessary — . by what means they may acquire greatness — . that quietness and concord between them is of main importance for the felicity of the state , and how it may be preserved — ibid. & — a citizen very potent , how to be corrected , that he disturb not the common quiet — cleomenes king of sparta , accounted the riches of the persians not worth the trouble they would stand his soldiery — colonies , when first used by the romans , and how beneficial to them — & of the venetians why sent into candy — ibid. constantine the great divided the empire between his three sons — . why he transferred the empire to constantinople — constantine son to the above-named , what part of the empire fell to his share — consalvo ferrante , why kept under by king ferdinand — consuls , of what authority in rome — - - customs , how profitable good ones are to cities — d. dalmatians , with much difficulty subdued by the venetians — decemvirate , held the form of a republick — . why rome was able to free herself from its tyrannie — . why driven out from thence — docius emperor of constantinople , routed by the goths , flieth , and is drown'd in a fen — discords sprung up in rome from war , not from peace — dictator , upon what occasions chosen by the romans — . of what relief to rome , and who was the first — . esteemed necessary in times of great danger , and what his dignity was — e. education good , how useful to a city or state — elephants imployed by pyrrhus in his wars against the romans — emperors of rome , favour'd , assisted , and maintained by the soldiers and the people — - - . thirty at one time assum'd that title — . why some were chosen to be their companions in their lives , and their successors after their deaths — . when those of caesars race ended ibid. which were slain by the soldiers , for desiring to reduce them to good discipline — empire of the romans , when it began — . when it began to decline — ● the causes of its declination and ruine — . when it was void of worthy men and valiant commanders — . became tributary to the goths — equality or parity of goods , why observed in sparta — . of all the citizens in government , is not good — . what equality is convenient for a common-wealth , that it may last long — event , the surest way to know what is likely to follow — . that war is far more subject to divers unexpected events , then any other actions of ours — that it is the master of fools — . not the event of things , but the advice wherewith they were done , makes them either praise-worthy or blameable — f. fabius maximus , his action and worth — , &c. deserved to be praised not only for prudence , but for courage — . feared by hannibal — ibid. overcomes hannibal when conqueror — ibid. why he took a contrary course to that of scipio's — fame and reputation , of great importance in all our actions , but especially in war — ferdinand king , brother to charls the fifth , why it would have been far better for him quietly to have suffered john king of hungary to be his neighbour , then to pull upon himself the turks forces — ferdinand king of spain , why he kept under consalvo — . not just in his league with the venetians — florence , why she could not keep herself in a firm state of government free from civil dissentions — the florentines succoring the dukes of milain and ferrara with men and monies , hindred the venetians in those enterprises — . not well thought of , and indeed hated by the italian princes , for the correspondence which they held with the french — . how their fortresses put them to much trouble and damage , when they were seised upon by the french brought in by their king charls the eighth — forts or fortresses , of how great furtherance to a state — . the doubts for which it may seem they are not available — . other more certain , and no less grievous — . why called i ceppi della toscana — ibid. arguments and reasons to demonstrate the great benefit of forts — . how to be rightly disposed and regulated — . the defence and praise of rearing forts — ibid. the doubts and arguments against them resolved — ibid. fortune , what is to be understood by that name — the fortune of the romans overborn by hannibal — . why she easily rose up again , changing for the better — . when she proved cross , they still kept the same minds — fortune very cross to the venetians — france , the romans put sore to it ere they could take it in — . whence the late troubles and discords arose — the french oftentimes assaulted rome — - . how timorous they shewed themselves when the wars in italy grew unlucky — . why they have not been able to make great atchievements in italy , nor to stay long there — francesco foscari duke of venice , said , that the republick could not much increase in power , unless she made some enterprises by land — francis the first , king of france , how he palter'd in the league with the italian princes — . for endowments of the mind , and other qualities , most eminent — ibid. though his fortune gave way to that of charls the fifth , whom yet he put to much trouble — . why his furious endeavor to assault spain prov'd bootless — . and as much in vain his enterprises in italy — g. genoeses conquer'd by the venetians — . whereupon it was that at first they entred into competition , and afterwards into a deadly fewd with the venetians — the goths , famous for the destruction of the empire , and of many provinces — their original , and why they fell down into italy — ibid. other actions of theirs under divers commanders — . they also took pay under the emperors — ibid. government , how the quality of every one may be known — - . what the right form of it is — ibid. what it was in rome — . what in sparta — ibid. what in venice — . every form is not convenient for every state — the form of the government is , as it were , the soul of the state — from a popular government men come to tyrannie — . the change thereof in rome , occasioned so much the sooner the end of her empire — and of the corruption of her militia — greece , why the romans strove to keep her from falling into philips hands — had a general council called the amphictiones , like the diets of germany — in many of her cities had men of eminence for all manner of worth — not being at unity in herself , could not compass any great atchievements abroad — . by reason of her dissentions , could not make use of her victories against the persians — . minded arts more then arms — ibid. whence her victories against the persians proceeded — . how she came to fall into the hands of the macedonians — . then , of another philip — lastly of the romans — ibid. why after the death of alexander , she could not recover her liberty — . for the same reasons , having afterwards the empire of constantinople , she could not preserve herself in that dignity — how highly her soldiers were esteemed by philip of macedon , and alexander the great — ibid. & guido ubeldo duke of urbin , why he would allow of no forts in his dominions — - h. hannibal , upon what ground he made war upon the romans in italy — what reasons should have removed him from that resolution — honorius the emperor , his cowardise and simple saying — hungary , whence so called — . the occasion of the wars for her , between the house of austria and the turks — i. italy , how much she abounded in soldiers — . the romans meetly out of their own citizens , and of their other territories in italy , were furnish'd with commanders and soldiers for all their armies — . was long obedient to the western emperors ; yet withdrew herself from under their command , and submitted to lords of her own — italy , through her own princes fault , at present , under the command of strangers — . her late quietness and peace , and from what causes — when it began — . how it may be continued — . before the times of pope leo the teath , in great misery for thirty years — italian princes , whether they were well advised in setting upon charls the eight king of france , at his departing out of italy — iugurth with a bitter saying , taxed the extreme grippleness and avarice of the romans — iulius caesar , what fierce people he conquer'd in france — . why it was difficult and troublesome for him to tame them — . he would always charge his enemy first — k. kingdoms large and ample , why apt and subject to insurrections — l. laws , what benefit they bring — . they ought to be confirmed by good customs — . their aim ought to be , to take away the abuse of things , not the things themselves — leagues ( or confederacies ) why they are made , their force and power — made by the christians against the infidels — - - - . which are the firmest — . the defects which they may , and use to have — for what causes they are made — . how and when men may with reason expect benefit by them — . why they are no better esteemed — ibid. that famous one of cambray against the venetians , why made , how soon dissolved , and how unjust it was — - leonidas , his famous victory against the persians — lewis the twelfth , king of france , his nature and qualities of minde — why he conspired against the venetians ; and how injuriously — — lodowick sforza duke of milain , how fearful he shewed himself upon the league between the french and the venetians — . he calls charls the eight king of france into italy , and then to his own great damage repents himself of it — lycurgus , why his laws proved good — . had many means to help him in the setling of his laws — . ordered his republick so , that it should not much increase its dominions — m. magistracies , the confirming of them proved very dangerous in rome — they ought to be of limited authority , and for a short time — malta , why it preserved it self against the assaults of bolyman — marius , by what ways he began his greatness — . by his ambition he much endamaged the commonwealth — - . his discreet carriage in the enterprise against the cimbri , which were come down into italy — medici , how that family got the superiority in florence , and kept it — the militia of the greeks or macedonians , what it was — . of the carthaginians , mercenary and incommodious — . of the romans , proved very profitable to the commonwealth , by being in the hands of many — ibid. well understood and practised by the romans — - - - . afterward grew corrupted and abject — - - - . of the turks , how numerous , well order'd , and in continual pay — - - - . of the christians , much inferior to that of the turks — . naval , cannot of it self much enlarge the dominion of a state — . the forces thereof are increased and maintained by those of the land — n. natural inclination ought to be followed in the choise of our actions — nicolo orsino , count of pitioliano , like fabius maximus , and not like him — nobles , why a● first of little authority in rome — . opposing the communalty , and hated by it — . authors of the destruction of tyrannies — o. octavianus , why easily entertained by the army after caesars death — p. peace , how it remains of it self , being brought into states — . how , in these last times it is established in the minds of the italian potentates — how peace , concord , and unity amongst citizens ought to be preserved by laws — plutarch , prefers lycurgus before numa — pompey , set up by the senate to take down caesar — . his triumphs — ibid. after the war with mithridates , quitted the army — . subdued for the romans above eight hundred cities — . the laudable way and art by which he brought people to obey the romans , and facilitated his enterprises — the people of rome , of what authority in the commonwealth — . how from the beginning it was of great power , and increased it more and more — loving liberty , how it came to lose it — . sought by seditions to obtain from the senate all things , though never so unjust — the people ; that to curb it , severity prevails more then meekness — . that out of its natural fickleness , it useth to favour a forein prince , and by seditions and violent attempts to plot against the present power — a prince shall do well and wisely to have a care , that no subject of his grow to be suspected for his greatness — . must not for his own relief make use of forein aids , that he may be too strong for his native forces — princes , what sort of militia it is best for them to make use of in their expeditions , and other matters of war — . sage advice to them in points of war , and the choice of commanders — . those of italy have used to imploy foreign commanders , and foreign mercenary soldiers — see more in states . r. republicks , how their divers forms may be known — . how their continuance may be known — . how at last they grow to be tyrannies — . that a state deserves not the name of a commonwealth or republick , where the decrees of the people , and not the laws , carry all the command — . for the long preservation and quietness of them , nothing more necessary then a parity — . a poor one cannot enlarge its dominion — rome , was a mixt , but imperfect commonwealth , and why — - . was too popular — . why it could not free it self from many disorders — how long it held its greatness — . when , and how she might have freed herself from her many bad qualities and defects — ibid. how she abounded in soldiers and commanders — - - - . how she made way for monarchy — . she scatter'd her corruptions amongst the nobles and the communalty — . that those citizens proved worst oppressors to her , whom for the meer conservation of her liberty she had too much exalted — her first , second , and third age — . her first seven kings , of what considerable benefit they were to her — . at what time she deserved the praise of good government — romans , why they refused the carthaginians aid against pyrrhus — . refused to have peace with pyrrhus — ibid. for what causes chiefly they had the better of the carthaginians — . they regarded not so much present dangers , as future — . out of one war they still framed another — why they were invincible , according to polybius — . the two pretences under which they made their most notorious acquisitions — . how by colonies they kept their new subjects in loyalty and obedience — romulus , a man fierce , ambitious , and desirous to enlarge his estate , train'd up the people according to his genius — s. scipio africanus , his worth and actions — - . why he took a course differing from that of fabius — . his passage into sicily , of what benefit it was — scipio nafica , when carthage was taken , disswaded the senate from destroying that city — . whether that counsel of his were founded upon good reason — ibid. the senate of rome , what number it consisted of , and when first instituted — its authority — . the generous answer she gave to the ambassadors of pyrrhus — - . little esteemed of by julius caesar — . subject to corruptions — . severity , in what sort of commonwealth it doth good — . was very great in cato — ibid. sylla , brought into rome licentious living — . increased the order of the senators , to counterpoise the communalty , — gave honors and riches to his favorites — ibid. soldan of caire , how and why he lost all his kingdom in a short time — solyman parallel'd with charls the fifth — . his endowments of mind and fortune — . his great atchievements — . why he made no great progress in hungary — . nor at corfu against the venetians — ibid. why he made that expedition into hungary — . had under his command four empires , and eighteen kingdoms — sparta , a mixt republick very excellent — . her laws not written — that authority which the kings had there , not prejudicial to it — . many worthy men flourished in it , by reason of the form of its government — for want of money , could not enlarge her empire — spartans , when and why of great power in greece — . by what people followed and favour'd — ibid. stronger then the rest in land forces — ibid. why they would not have their cities begirt with walls — states ; whence their divers changes come — . how men grow desirous of their change — . are augmented and preserved by the same things which gave them their beginning , and corrupted by the contrary — . where they have been ruin'd by intestine discords , the over-great height of some of their own hath been the cause — . that they have their beginning , increase , stay , declination , and ruine — s●ilico , a barbarian , and by nation a hun , called to the command of the roman army , betrays the empire — t. thebans much esteemed of for the discipline of their soldiers , called the sacred band — . pelopidas and epaminondas , famous commanders of theirs — ibid. themistocles , what his advice was , and his naval victory against the persians — tiberius gracchus slain by the nobles of rome , without any revenge from the people — tribuneship in rome , of how great power , and its insolence — . called sacrosanctus — triumph in rome , when first instituted , and to whom first granted — turks , their assistance refused by the venetians , and yet sued for by other christian princes — . why they cannot so suddenly nor easily do any signal enterprises by land — . are accustomed , for their own security , to destroy the inhabitants of such places as they take in , especially those of the better and richer sort — . their chiefest strength consists in their cavalry — their law promiseth everlasting reward in heaven , to every one that loseth his life in their soveraigns quarrel — v. valerius publicola , why in reforming the government of rome , he yielded many things to the people — - . that he might have order'd the city better — ibid. venice , in time brought her government to perfection — . how she hath been able to preserve her liberty thus long — . what her government is — ibid. when it began — - . her founders lovers of peace , and of an intent and end differing from that of the founders of rome — ibid. her greatest and most difficult attempts have been either in their own defence , or for religion , or in assistance of others — . what wars and efforts of fierce nations she at her first beginning underwent — . why she made use of foreign soldiers and commanders — . that for having accustomed to imploy foreign commanders , she hath not been able ( by reason of their disloyalty ) to prosecute such enterprises of hers as had been well begun — ibid. venetians , what course they took to free themselves from the danger they were in of the genoa-forces — . that the practice of merchandising is not to be blamed in them — . some of their illustrious and famous princes — ibid. what title their dukes assumed for the taking in of constantinople — how prejudicial to them the ottoman empire hath been — ibid. that , had it not been for the treachery of their commanders , the state of milan had been theirs — . their weighty and glorious enterprises by sea and land against the saracens , for the emperors of constantinople , and against the genoeses — . why they called lewis king of france into italy — why almost all christian princes entred into a league against them — - how discreetly they have continued neutrals in the discords of princes , that thereupon peace might follow in these latter times — . why they sent into candy new colonies of their own gentry — vertue , what two vertues are necessary for him that proposeth great matters to himself , and aspireth after glory — vertuous , to make men vertuous , three things are needful — w. war , brought home to the enemies own doors , how advantagious — when it ought to be carried on with protracting of time — . war , and not peace , was the cause of romes ruine — . it is subject to divers successes and chances , more then any other action of ours — - - wars , made by the romans after the subduing of carthage — . made and maintained by them in many places at once — . particulars most necessary for them — . the manner of wars now used , is the chiefest cause why the enterprises of modern princes prove not equal to those of the antients — the end of the second table . errata . pag. lin . - after not read only . - dele not . - for licence read licentiousness . - for temperance read temper . - for them read those . - before what insert do . ib. dele more . - for of read and , for and read of . - dele only ; - ult . after obedience insert i● . - after ●ighting read they . - after these insert rather . - after of insert all this . - before the insert to . - pen. after as insert if . - after 〈◊〉 insert the less . - after not insert only - after not insert only . - dele and ( the first . ) pag. lin . - before goths insert great valor of the ibid. for commanders read soldiers . - for rhodosius read rhodanus . - for soldiers read commanders . - for where read were . - dele then by . - for a read the. - for them into his , read him into th●● . - after mens insert thoughts . - before pope , insert with francis king of france . - after if insert we . - for sadly read easily . - for cor●●r read corf● . ibid. for corfee read corf● . - after thereof insert more . - before not insert it . ibid. dele it . ● — dele be . the first book . the first discourse . what was the true and proper form of government observed in the commonwealth of rome ; and whether she could be better ordered in civil affairs , having armed people on foot . there are many , who reflecting upon the greatness of the commonwealth of rome , wonder at her so many prosperities , by which she flourished a long time , and at last obtained the mastery of all other monarchies : and thinking that it is enough to admire her feats of arms , and management in peace , do not care for enquiring into the reason thereof ; so as ballancing thereby every of her several operations , they may know what they were that were truly worth praise and imitation , and what blame-worthy and to be avoided . but certainly these men seem not to know , to how many and how great and various accidents all humane works are subject , and what the true rule and measure is whereby the perfection of states is comprehended : for that is not simply the greatness of an empire , to which she at the beginning riseth by fortune , and which is increased by injustice ; but that may well be said to be the true form of government , by which people living in peace and union , may work righteously , and obtain civil felicity . he therefore who will judge aright of the actions of that commonwealth , without suffering his eyes to be dazeled wi●h the splendor of the roman greatness , let him consider them nakedly , as void of that reputation which antiquity and the power of empire purchased them , and he will find some things peradventure amongst the many for which she worthily deserved to be cryed up by all men , which are more to be observed for the amendment of present governments by their example , then for imitation , out of hopes of attaining any true praise or apparent good . but as there is nothing of greater importance in a city , then the form of government , by which , as by the soul thereof , every good act is produced ; so of all other observations which may be had of the city of rome , there is not any more worthy , or of more use , then to examine what was the truest form of her government , that we may afterwards see whether she might have been be●ter ordered in civil affairs then she was , without disordering her militia ; and whether she could keep together the people armed , and obedient to the laws . to know then what the condition of her government was , and thence to comprehend whether that supreme excellencie were in it , as hath been thought by some men ; following the rule which philosophy teacheth us , which says , that every form of republick is not convenient for every city , but that they must be varied according to the divers natures of the people , and according to other accidents ; we must examine what that state was in it self , and then what proportion it held with that city . but because it would be too difficult a business to assign any certain condition unto her , which may equally correspond to all times , she not having so punctually observed one and the same form continually , but varied it somewhat accordingly as it inclined more or less to a popular state ; we must have our eys most fixt upon that age , whe●ein the glory of that commonwealth did most flourish ; not so bearing notwithstanding to touch upon such things in other times , as may conduce to our purpose . he who would diligently consider all the parts of the republick , will find not only so much diversity , but even contrariety in them , as he will not be able easily to resolve which was her properest form of government : for if respect be had to the great authority of consuls , especially in armies , we may , not without reason , believe , that that city under the name of a commonwealth , was governed with laws befitting a kingdom ; since that form of magistracie did use such autho●ity in managing of arms , in concluding peace , and in agreeing differences between potent kings , as one onely prince could hardly have treated of those thing with more absolute power : differing from monarchy only in this , that they kept this authority but for a short time , and did acknowledg it to proceed from the will and favor of the people . but he who will consider what a share of the most important resolutions of the commonwealth the senate had , as that which governed the publick treasury , the chief foundation of a state , and to which the priviledg did belong first to treat of , and then to resolve of such things as were to be propounded to the people , will be of opinion , that such a commonwealth did lean more towards aristocracie , then any other government . yet passing on to further considerations , and finding the authority of consuls , senate and tribunes to be so often baffled and nullified , and the supreme magistracies oftentimes contaminated by the meanness of popular men who have had the exercise thereof , will vote otherwise , and think the government to have been meerly popular . wherefore ●olybius being willing , in the sixth book of his histories , to assign some certain form of government to the city of rome , would not restrain it under any one particular form , but called it a mixt republick , as was that of sparta . which opinion is sithence followed by some modern writers , who treating of the differing forms of commonwealths , and particularly of that of rome , do punctually agree with polybius . and certainly they were thus far all in the right , to wit , that the divers manners of rule by which that city was governed , could not be expressed by any one name . for what gives the true form to a city , but the communication of government ? which as it is participated by citizens , makes such alteration or mutation in a state , as the philosopher was of opinion , that though the city did totally remain the same , the variation of this only was able so to metamorphose it , as it cannot be said to be what it was before : for it is not the walls , nor the inhabitants , but the form of government which makes it be so . therefore he who will determine the form of a city , must have respect to whatsoever doth therein help to the attaining of magistracie , that he may infold all parts that belong to the managing of a commonwealth . so as since men of all conditions , according to the divers respects either of liberty , nobility , wealth or worth , were admitted into government , these divers communications will not admit the ascription of any peculiar or particular form . agreeing therefore herein with polybius , we will now endeavour to find out what is more hard to know , and is better worth knowledg , to wit ▪ what sort of mixture this was . for though a mixt commonwealth may be perfect , it follows not , that all mixtures may make her so ; nay rather where several differing parts are wound up together , so as a third kind of nature is produced by their connexion , such a composition will rather increase the imperfection of the state , and be the reason why it cannot long continue under such a disproportionate mixture . and as it falls out in our bodies , which being compounded of four elements , continue so long in life , as that proportion is maintained , which when it is destroyed , they are likewise wasted and corrupted ; ( for that part which becomes too prevalent , changeth the rest into its self , and dissolves the form which they made when all together : ) so that commonwealth which is composed of divers parts , may continue in one and the same state , as long as the authority of government is proportioned with equal temperament , as it ought to be , to each part . but as soon as any one part begins to domineer too much , it is apparent that she grows towards corruption : for the prevalent part by consuming the rest , doth by little and little reduce them all into its self , and alters the aspect of the city . therefore such a disposition is required to this form of government , as no disorder may be therein found whereby that mixture may be broken or confused . wherefore as divers faculties concur together to the forming of man , but are notwithstanding so well ordered in that union , as all of them partaking of some office or other , they have their several degrees of dignity ; so divers citizens reduced to live together in one city , though all of them may in some sort participate of government , yet the ●mployments must be diversly disposed of , so as some of them may hold the first place , and as certain primary causes , must give motion to other things which are done in the commonwealth . these considerations being applied to the city of rome , will make it appear clearly that there was no such equality nor order in her , as is to be desired in a mixt commonwealth to render it excellent , and long lived . for the immoderate authority , which was by the laws granted to divers magistrates , but much more the extraordinary power which was intrusted in many citizens , shews how ill that so necessary proportion was observed in her : and on the other side , the peoples power , and the admittance thereof without any difference to all manner of negotiations , gives manifest tokens of a confused disposition , all orders being mixt together without distinction either of office or degree , and the baser sort being oftentimes exalted above the more worthy . hence it was , that amongst such confusion , many customs might be introduced , which were not onely corrupt , but even contrary one to another ; as was that of prolonging the time of magistrates , which was repugnant to the great authority which was reserved to the people ; and that other of suffering the wealth of private men to increase to such a height in a city , where there was no prefixt boundeur of wealth appointed by the laws for being a citizen : which laws or customs do some of them tend to the power of a few , and other some of them are proper for a popular state. but if we proceed further , we shall find their disorders so far advanced , as not being able to consist together in one subject , they were the occasion of that commonwealths dissolution . the confirming of their authority , whose magistracy was by the usual time appointed by the laws exp●red ▪ was introduced at first with some appearance of advantage , but with very bad example , for that having begun important affairs in countries far off , they might finish them , and weaken the enemy before their return home . thus was the charge of the province lest to marcus fulvius , who fought in asia against antiochus , after he was out of the consulship ; the which was done likewise to gneus manlius to bridle the daring aetolians , and to appease the affairs in greece , and the like upon many occasions was done to divers others , and very long in ensuing times , with very pernicious example , but the disorder ceased not here , for , without need , the city magistrates were so far prolonged , as the same were seen to return ten times to be the peoples tribunes . which made the citizens infinitely ambitious , and afforded them occasion by being so long in power , of plotting many things , and of molesting the common-wealth divers waies by the peoples insurrections . nor was it less prejudicial to permit private men to grow to such immoderate riches , as equalling therein the most potent kings ; there was a citizen of rome who arrived to such greatness , as he said , he ought not to be esteemed rich who could not out of his own revenue maintain an army : whence it arose that the nobility , being much envied and suspected by the people , the way was opened to the gracchi to excite those hemous disorders which ended not but with the utter ruin of the commonwealth . provision was long before hand by the law against such disorders , licineus the tribune having instituted , so to curb the avarice and ambition of the nobility , that no citizen should possess above five hundred acres of land ; but these orders in civil affairs were so weak and imperfect , as one law might easily be broken , by introducing a contrary custom ▪ the nobles therefore little esteeming the licinean law , did very much increase their wealth , and fraudulently usurping the publick territories , which were wont to be kept for the benefit of the people , brought in forainers to manure them ; so as the people being become very poor , and seeing the nobility injoy all the fruits of the common labor of the militia , did very unwillingly suffer such an injury , and did very willingly listen and adhere unto any one who would feed them with hopes of bringing things to a just equality ; wherefore such as were seditious took occasion to try novelties , so as at last in the times of the gracchi , recourse must be had unto arms , and civil differences must be thereby decided : which ( as shall by and by be more clearly shewn ) might have been long before foreseen ; for such customs did much disorder the commonwealth , not onely in that they partook not of civil modesty , but by their being clean contrary to the laws of that city , which lent most towards a popular state , all authority being given by them to the people in their suffrages , and also in the most important state-resolutions . so as it seemed respect was only had to the liberty of dividing the government amongst citizens : all places of magistracie were equally common to all , and small means kept not any one far from the commonwealth ; they might marry togeth●r , foreiners were easily made free denizens ; the tribunes had power to nominate all magistrates ; the manner of living was not free , but very licentious : and the supreme authority of the tribunes doth of all other things most cleerly shew what that government was , who being greatly respected and reverenced by all men , and called by the superstitious title of sacr●sancti , they were so insolent in their office , as a tyrant could hardly have used more severity in his commands . see how boldly a tribune of the people made marius viola●●● , a nobleman , be seised on , commanding that he should be suddenly thrown head-long down the tarpeian rock , for no other reason , but that in a speech which he had made , he used some harsh words against the people . but the tribune sulpitius using more violence , came one morning into the piatza with many armed men and driving away the consuls who would have opposed such an action , made mar●●● be decreed for the undertaking against mithridates , not caring though therein he went against the laws , which not being in any thing observed , all good institutions were made in vain , whilst the laws were violated and destroyed by the tribunes too great power . he then who shall consider these things , will not say that they tended not to the making of a commonwealth totally popular ; yet many things were contrary to these , as hath been considered in perpetuating the government of the armies , and in the excessive riches of some citizens . some popular commonwealths , as that of athens , used by a quite contrary advice , to ban●sh such citizens ten years from the city , who did for some excellent quality far exceed the rest ; in some others , because they did in some sort partake of popularity , the equallity of means , or levelling was introduced , so to content , and please the people , as in sparta ; and certainly to grant but a limited power , and but for a short time , to magistrates are excellent precepts of such legislators as will constitute a free city ; for so all the citizens may have their share of government , but none freely dispose thereof , to his own proper use , and then indeavour to bring things to an equality , or at least provide so , as they may not increase so immoderately , as any one citizen may be envied or suspected by the rest , for his too great power . it is then no wonder , if rome were much divided , since these things were not observed in her ; for by such a diversity of orders she became a body with two heads , and of two several shapes , which occasioned continual domestick disorders in her . for the nobility glorying in the dignity of consulship , wherein they used great authority , and which they for the most part kept amongst themselves , and being also proud of their wealth , would usurp all the government to themselves : and on the other side , the people , bearing so great a sway in all things , and relying much upon the magistracy of the tribunes were so insolent , as they would acknowledge no obedience , nor bear any respect to the laws , or to the magistrates thereof ; but would resolve all things according to their own fancy , and as made most for their advantage ; which made that city , which was so potent in military and foraign affairs , very weak in such as were civil and domestick ; for such a division of power in men of contrary minds , keeps the forces of the city , with much prejudice divided ; whilst the one of them contesting with the other , they hinder the resolutions and executions of important affairs , as it often fell out in rome , for necessity urging to list forces to march against the enemy , the tribunes were presently ready to incense the people , so as there was none that would give a name to the militia , which insolencies were increased by the peoples being able to do it safely . for , the tribunes minding nothing else but how to make their faction powerful , accepted of the appeals of every popular man , though in unjust causes , to the end that the people might be the more respected by the nobility , and more ready and bold to raise seditions , whereby they did always increase their power , and had by these means obtained many things from the senate . the nobles likewise , no less sollicitous to increase their authority , that they might keep back the peoples insolencie , sought always to keep them low , and did with like endeavours maintain those of their own order in all judgments . so as in punishing or in absolving of faults , it was oftentimes a thing of greater consideration , whether the party concerned were a nobleman or a plebeian , then whether he were guilty or innocent : and hence great prejudice arose unto the commonwealth ; for all justice was soon corrupted , without which no good order can be kept ; and each party , valuing the publick welfare but a little out of a desire of their own greatness , the city was reduced oftentimes into eminent dangers . thus the roman plebeians , thinking almost that they had not a common country , but that it did only belong unto the nobility , forsook it , and retired into the aventine ; valuing more the increase of their own power , by necessitating the senate to yield to their desires , then their putting the city into such a disorder . the nobles likewise more sollicitous to abase the people , and to increase their own fortunes , then to preserve peace and union in the city , did nourish civil discord by usurpi●g the common goods , and by reducing the people to great poverty through usury . by this discourse it may be comprehended , how badly proportioned the orders were in that mixt government : but it may be more cleerly seen , by comparing this commonwealth with that of sparta , which proved more excellent then any other in that mixt government , and preserved it a long time free from all discord , by vertue of her most excellent laws . in sparta , the princes power ended not but with his life , to the end that he being preferred before all others for making the laws be observed , he might the better do it , being detained by no self-respect from deposing of magistrates , or from being judged by the people . but his authority was notwithstanding so limited , as he was rather a custos of the common liberty , then a true prince in the city . the people had as great a share in government , as their condition required : for it being they who were to make use of the magistrates , it seemed they might better know their abilities ; as we see it falls out in other trades , that the excellencie of the work is better known by him that is to use it , then by the maker thereof . the people had the power given them of choosing and of correcting magistrates ; but greater authority was granted to the senate , which was placed as in the midst to defend the commonwealth from the princes power , and from the peoples insolencie , to the end that thereby it might the better temper the one and the other . now let us see how in the joint union of these three governments , certain conditions were appropriated unto every of them ; but neither so many , nor yet such as made them of clean contrary qualities , but so as they might very well be united in one and the same person . the prince had perpetuity of power ; but this stood so corrected by the laws , as it might easily consist with the other states . the senate , which was made up of forty eight of the prime citizens , represented a true aristocratical commonwealth ; but because they acknowledged their dignity from the people , their power was not such as bereft others of their liberty . but the peoples authority in ordering rewards and punishments , as it was not dangerous , so it afforded place for a modest popular state , and rendred that government more perfect , by mixture of all the three best . but above all things else , there was a miraculous proportion observed in sparta , in sharing out those things , which use to cause civil dissentions amongst citizens : for the noblemen had the greatest part in honors , but the people were equal to them in wealth , all the revenues being in common ; so as the ambition of the one , and the necessities of the other were satisfied , and all of them being content , they enjoyed much peace and tranquility , so as that commonwealth may endure longer then any of the antient reipublicks . and if at the first she had been a little more large in communicating her government , by encreasing the number of her senators , so as there had been no occasion in theopompus his time , for the better regulating their too great authority , of introducing the magistracy of the ephori , whereby the city began to be a little too popular , and leaving licurgus his antient institutions , gave it self over to licentiousness , nothing could have been desired in that city to have reduced her to the highest p●tch of perfection . therefore as far as the roman government differed from this , it must be confest it fell so far short of true excellencie . the consuls of rome had great authority , and it may be more free then became any magistracy in a commonwealth , but the little durance thereof made it less beneficial to the the republick : for their power being soon to be given over , made them less diligent , and less bold in undertaking publick affairs : for consulship being laid aside , the way was opened of revenging private 〈◊〉 by the tribunes . so cicer● , who freed his country from catalius conspiracy , when he was out of place , was banished . but the senate , because it had not any ordinary magistracy , from whence no appeal might be made , by which is might curb the peoples insolency , had not that respect given to it , by which the ignorant common people is governed : so as the people , not being held back by this bridle , ran into such l●centiousness , as they dared to commit divers indignities even against the chief magistracy of counsulship ; as they did when they plucked the consul camillus hestare from the tribunal , that they might by force ob●a●● admittance to that supream magistracy . the weakness of the senate was likewise the occasion of the increase of the power of some citizens , for the peoples resolutions prevailing over the like of the senate , the way of ariving at great power by the favour of the people , in despite of the senate , was opened to such as were ambitious . thus did marius cause himself to be declared consul , contrary to the laws , and caesar to be confirmed in his province : and to suppress these mens immoderate greatness , which tended towards tyranny , it was requisite ( since the commonwealth had no usual means to do it ) to prefer other citizens of the nobilities side , whose greatness proved afterwards no less pernic●ous , then that of those whom they thought through their authority to suppress , wherefore the city became wholly divided ; so that private injuries were with horrid cruelties revenged by sylla , though he professed to vindicate the common welfare : and pompey , to maintain his greatness put rubs in the treaty of agreement with caesar : wherefore betaking themselves to arms , the commonwealth could not at last but fall . these disorders were occasioned through the weakness of the senate : but the people , possessing themselves of other mens places , usurp● the best imployments of the commonwealth , and being equall to the nobility in p●●nt of liberty , would without any respect to other things purtake equally of government . so the right disposure of the honors and orders of the city were confused , which require geometrical , and not arithmetical proportion , in such sort , as the same things be not granted to all men , but to every one that which is most convenient for him . and certainly to constitute a city of that form , as all her citizens should be equal , would be no better then to make a consort of musick consisting all of the same voyces ; for as the latter produceth no true harmony , so doth no good concord result from the former . therefore care must be had , that every order may keep its own state , and be neither too much exalted , nor too much abased , lest the too 〈◊〉 , or too sharp tone occasion diss●nance , as it was seen to fall out in rome , where this just proportion was but badly kept , people of unequal condition and worth , being oft times made equal in dignity , which caused a government full of confusion and disorder , not bounded in any one form , but disposed to receive all forms . but if we will assign any particular state to the mixt body of this city , as predominate over the rest , there can be none more properly given her then popularity . which though it may be already comprehended , yet it will be better known by passing to some other more particular considerations . the state of the commonwealth is known by observing in whom the chief command is found , but the majesty thereof appears clearly in the creating of magistrates , in making new laws , or repealing old ones , in making war , in disposing of rewards or punishment : all which things being by many examples seen to lie in the power of the people , do evidently witness that the state of this commonwealth was popular . the people were they who gave authority to magistrates , nay even to the senate it self , by authenticating and invigorating the resolves thereof ; and as the soul of that government , they did in divers manners move the other parts of the commonwealth in their operations . so as her truest and properest form can only be taken from them ; nay , it was seen that the resolutions of the republick did bind the senate , and were of equal force with the peoples commands , prolonging magistrates in their places , and by the authority thereof putting a period to begun wars . wherefore the corruption of a popular state may be further seen , by the immoderate power of the meanest citizens . let us next view the ultimate end of that commonwealth , which by a certain ordinary , and as it were natural change of condition , will shew us what her first form was . for it being changed into tyranny , which usually ariseth from a popular state , it appears that that city was formerly governed by the people , and had by corrupt manners opened the way to tyranny ; so as this transition was easily made by the likeness of state : for , that city where the people commands with licence , may be said to be subject to many tyrants ; nor admits it of any change , saving that one man becomes the master of those disorders , which a multitude were masters of . there were likewise always many popular pick-thanks in rome , who , like the flatterers of tyrants , tracing the people in their humors , went a birding after favors , whereby they won credit and preferment . which , as the philosopher says , is a manifest sign , that in such a city the people command , not the laws . which is seen by many experiences , of which marius was an evident example ; who being born of very mean parents , and appl●ing himself from the begining to the government of the commonwealth , not guided by the glory of his predecessors , or any noble action of his own which might first introduce him thereinto , but confiding in a certain greatness of spirit , began to think of acquiring great power , so as being become tribune of the people he betook himself wholly to abase the authority of the nobles , as he did in publishing the law of suffrages , threatening consul cotta to imprison him , if he forbare not to oppose him . by which boldness he won so much favor with the people , as he was able to dispose of them afterwards as he listed in any affair , how unjust soever , or in working revenge upon his enemies ( as he did in banishing innocent metellus ) or to aggrandise himself ; insomuch as he , contrary to the laws , was created consul , against the cimbrians , being absent , and in a contumacious time ; and lastly in making the province be assigned unto him , which belonged to sylla . by such means the way was opened to the immoderate power of citizens , which in the height of their prosperity brought that commonwealth to its final ruine . for these disorders being long before begun , were afterwards by the spaciousness of the city so in●●eased , as the people being become powerful by reason of the numerousness of the citizens , and growing more free and bold by their so many prosperities , not content to be equal to the nobility , would become greater then the laws . they banish'd many citizens without hearing the cause ; they granted places of magistracie before the usual time ; they confirm'd the authority of those that were already out of it , and disposed of all things , not according to civil equity , but as they liked best . which things do sufficiently manifest the imperfections of that government : for the philosopher says , that that state where the people command , and not the laws , is so corrupt , as it deserves not the name of a commonwealth , no sort of government being to be thereunto assigned . which easily happens in cities which are very great and powerful , as was that of rome . but i● we shall then consider the conditions of those men into whose hands that government was put , we shall thereby likewise find , that amongst the several forms of popular states , this may be thought the most corrupt , as that whereinto even artificers were admitted : which being usually but ill conditioned , and frequenting assemblies only that they may talk together , do constitute an imperfect state , and subject to alterations . and hence it may be deduced , that this part being most prevalent in that so corrupt and imperfect commonwealth , the others must partake of the same imperfection : for no such union can be framed out of two good governments , and one very bad one , as is requisite to give form to a good government ; neither could they continue together for never so small a time . whence it may be likewise inferred , that those other parts of the commonwealth , which may seem to resemble monarchy and aristocracy , as the consuls and senate , came short of such perfection as is proper to those states , declining to the contrary party for many things may be observed to have been done by consuls with more authority and boldness , then what became a commonwealth . to pass by many other examples , caesar being confirmed in that power which he had received as consul , usurped the liberty of the commonwealth . there were likewise many corruptions in the senate , which shew how subject that part was likewise to various disorders : for when the commonwealth was at the very height of her perfection , senators were become so mercenary , as iugurth having corrupted many of them , and purchased his own sa●ety by monies , it may well be said , that the citizens of rome would have sold their city , if they could have met with a chapman for it . another consideration may be added , to wit , that that commonwealth cannot be said to be well ordered even in the very popular state which she so much affected : for it is easie to frame any government for a short time in any whatsoever estate ; but the sufficiencie of a law-maker , and the excellencie of laws , is found by the long continuance thereof , therefore those orders by which the peoples authority was too much increased , cannot be said to be truly popular ; but such may be so esteemed , whereby the state is long preserved . wherefore many things being ordered in rome without this temperance , in favor of the people , they of themselves bereft the state of all solidity . thus licentiousness of living , frequent meetings , appeals to the tribunes . freedom in accusing , and other such things as seemed to be done in favor of the people , served for the building up of tyranny , and wrought romes final ruine . which was formerly seen in athens ; which being constituted by solon in a too popular condition , soon lost her liberty , and was possest by a citizen of hers named pisistratus , who followed the same way which the legislator himself had opened unto him , by attributing too much to the people . so what is intended for good , proves often , fatal , if not well understood . but having discoursed sufficiently of the form of the government , it will not be amiss to examine some other more general conditions , by which the perfection of every state may be the better known . in ordering a city , respect is to be had to two things ; to what belongs to war , to what belongs to peace ; to the end that she may not be governed by chance in either of them , but by certain laws , and may be equally preserved from forein plots , and from home discords ; and to endeavour , that as she cannot always enjoy peace , so she should not be continually molested with war. but he who will consider the actions of the romans , and the institutions of their city , will find them so seriously addr●st to military affairs , as he may easily judge that they proposed no other things to themselves , then how to increase empire , by making one war beget another ▪ wherefore many armies were instituted , and many rewards for military valor , to make men bold and valiant against the enemy ; but not any thing wereby to accustom them to justice , temperance , and to other civil vertues , whereby the city might be maintained in peace and unity . 't is therefore no wonder if that commonwealth won so much empire , and such glory in times of war ; and in times of peace , like rusty iron , lost all her lustre : so as troubles from enemies abroad were no sooner ceased , but much greater were excited at home by dissentions amongst the citizens , which did not terminate till things were recalled by occasion of war to the same warlike order and discipline in which the city was excellently well instituted : which might for a while preserve her ; but when through the want of occasion of war , she could not by that means correct her many disorders , nor reduce herself to any setled condition for any space of time , being still agitated by storms of civil sedition , she must at last be miserably lost , when it was time to begin to enjoy her greatness and prosperity . for this cause scipio nasica , a very wise man , would not consent to the destruction of carthage , knowing that that commonwealth which was ordered onely for war , could not last long in idleness . how can that government then be termed good , which is so ill disposed towards the attainment of a cities chief end ? and who can doubt but that the true end of a city is to have her citizens live vertuously , not the inlarging of her empire ? therefore the philosopher said well ; that true civil felicity was not to be expected from astions which relate to things abroad , but from those which are used amongst citizens . it argues not then an excellent government in that commonwealth , that she overcame the whole world , since the perfection of government lies in making a city vertuous , not in making her mistress of many countries . nay the increasing of territories , as it is commonly coupled with some injustice , so is it remote from the true end of good laws , which never part from what is honest . governments which aim at empire are usually short lived ; which denotes their imperfection : which happens not onely because they were not better accommodated in times of peace , but that for the great inlarging of confines , it is necessary to nourish ambitious thoughts in citizens , and such as are too desirous to domineer , which are easily turned to the prejudice of the commonwealth its self . for it is not to be affirmed that the same thing can be good in respect of the publick , and bad in private affairs . for the general felicity of the whole city , and the particular good of every citizen , is one and the same thing , they onely differ in some certain respects . then taking ones argument from these things , the end of this great commonwealth might easibly be conjectured , which ( as one said well ) was overthrown by the wait of its own bulk . but grant , that the lives of such states may be prolonged , it cannot certainly be done without falling upon many other troubles and dangers . let marius his example serve us to see what advantage citizens got by the immoderate desire of glory and dominion ; who being alwaies bred up in arms , and having wone credit and preferment thereby , finding that his antient reputation began to fail by ensuing peace , raised mithridates king of pontus , against the commonwealth , to the end , that being to make use of his vallor , he might recover his former repute . thus athens who once in●oyed a peaceful condition , under pericles his good government , when she turned her endeavours of peace and quiet , to arms and dominion , and would change her manner of life , she reaped the like fruits of ambition , which by such orders she had sowed in the minds of her citizens . for alcibiades out of too immense a desire of glory , was he , who of himself did incite the lacedemonians against his country , by whom she was afterwards robbed of her liberty and empire . for all this , you hear me not say , that the study of arms ought to be neglected , which are very necessary in what soever state , to defend ones self against the injuries of neighbors , and to preserve freedom and liberty : nay , aristotle reprehends plato , for that he thought cities had no need of arms at the first ; but onely when they began to have dominion . but though they may be useful for some other respects , citizens ought not to fix their studies so much upon military exercises , as not to know nor value any other praise but that of the militia , and to place their greatest and chiefest good , and the welfare of their city therein ; but they must know , that a man must travel further to find out felicity , which is derived onely from vertuous actions , reserved in peace , as the true fruits of the labours of war. let us then conclude , that this part which was very excellent in rome , lost much of that praise , which otherwise it might have deserved for the exquisiteness of its orders , because true use was not made thereof , as a means to obtain the true intent of the city . for if aristotle laught at those who praised the lacedemonian commonwealth , because she had made her citizens so valiant in war , by her excellent military discipline , because she exceeded the other cities of greece in the largeness of her confines ; what would he have said of the commonwealth of rome , where certainly military exercises were studied much more , to the end , that she might vanquish the furthest distant nations : for in sparta , too boot with such institutions as appertained to the militia , there were excellent customs for the breeding of citizens in civil vertues : and it is seen that licurgus his intention aimed not so much at empire , as did that of romulus ; the former much more respecting the peace of the city , and the agreement among citizens , minding military affairs onely so far forth as they are necessary for the preservation of liberty against forreign forces . another consideration to be had , in regard no less then these , is , that in a well-ordered city , the laws ought to be confirmed by the manners and educations of the citizens , the which is of more force to make men honest , then is the fear of punishment ; nay , from hence actions arise according to true honesty and vertue ; for they proceed from a vertuous habit , which is only acquired by exercise . therefore where good institutions of life are wanting , the severity of magistrates is not sufficient to make citizens obedient to the laws . for when the appetite hath already gotten power , and is accustomed to vice , 't is too hard a matter to overcome her by force . therefore aristotle said , that laws , though very useful , do but little good , if men be not endued with such customs and discipline as fits with the state of the city . wherefore teaching in the eighth of his politicks , how citizens are to be made good and honest , he proposed three things requireable , joyning reason and custom to nature . but custom may be thought so much more necessary then the other two , as that a mans natural inclination to vertue , makes him not vertuous , unless he confirm his natural disposition by habit , accustoming himself to do well . nor can reason force appetite , but must first find it well reduced by good education , if she will make use thereof in vertuous operations . as much more then , as this part is necessary , so much more failing will be found in that commonwealth , where such orders were not taken by a civil way , for the good education of citizens : whence it arose that their laws met not with such due observance , as did them of sparta , not written in paper , but ( as it were ) ingraven in the hearts of every one by the force of custom ; wherefore she proved truly miraculous , by reason of the excellent customs introduced by lycurgus , to breed up citizens in a vertuous and civil life . therefore plutarch comparing lycurgus with numa , preferred lycurgus , for that his having confirmed citizens by good customs in those orders which he had introduced into the city , was the reason why they were long observed ; whereas numa , contenting himself with bare written laws , though good , and tending to peace , not taking any further care for the education of citizens , could not make them be observed for so short a time , but that they terminated together with his life . and it is found by experience , that lycurgus his orders were of such force , as they preserved the liberty of sparta longer then the like of any other of the antient commonwealths . wherefore philopomenes having overcome the lacedemonians , yet would he not totally tame them , and reduce them under the achaean commonwealth , till he had cancelled all the antient institutions of their city , wherein whilst young , they were so bred up to liberty , as they could by no means be brought to undergo servitude . from this discourse it may then be concluded , that the government of the roman commonwealth was of a mixt form , but ill proportioned within its self , too much inclining towards the corruption of a popular state ; and that she came short of the spartans in three things : in the excellencie of government , in the endeavours of peace , and in good customs . the other part remains now to be discussed ; whether the city of rome might have received a better form of state ? for the good orders of a city depend not always upon the legislators wisdom , but upon many other joint accidents . the first thing to be had in respect , is the nature of the people , with which the form of government ought to have a just proportion . wherefore polititians say , that the legislator ought not only to consider which is the best form of government , but what best befits every city , and such other accidents which make so many alterations in states , as it cannot be denied but that fortune hath a share therein . lycurgus was justly esteemed an excellent legislator ; but many things concurr'd in him which helped him very much to put his thoughts in effect : he was a king , and using force at first , as it was fit to do , he might introduce such a form of government as would bridle the peoples insolencie , and increase the au●hority of the senate ; it made likewise much for his purpose , that wealth of the city lay but in a few mens hands , so as by bestowing honors upon them , he could as it were by the way of bartering the easilier dispose them to content themselves with an equality of goods , whereby he satisfied the people of sparta's desire , who were but few in number , and consequently but weak , and the more easie to be ordered in any sort of government . hence it was that the legislators of other cities , though they were wise men , could not notwithstanding form a republick throughout so well ordered as did lycurgus , because they found not a subject apt to receive such a form , and because they wanted that authority and power which was thereunto needful , or for other such like accidents , which did not correspond well with what they did . therefore solon , though he had had the same intents , could not have introduced such a government in athens ; because he was a private citizen chosen by the nobility , and consent of the people , to reform the city ; so as it behoved him to comply in many things with the one and the other , and his small authority took much of that respect and reverence from the laws ordained by him , which ought to have been given them . wherefore many blamed him and his institutions ; so as at last , to shun such ve●ation , he was forced to part from his ungrateful country . he met also with another difficulty ; he found the city divided , the people much accustomed to enjoy liberty , and at that time much incensed against the nobility by the oppressions of usury under which they suffered ; so as he was compell'd , to the end that they might rest content with their new government , to ease them in their debts , and give them a share in the government ; which he could not do without much injury to the nobility . the commonwealth of venice hath gotten an excellent government ; but was not at first governed by those laws which she now is : but diversity of occasions have opened the way to the wisdom of many of her citizens , who adding new orders to the old , have brought her to such a height of perfection . which might the easilier be done , because that city was free-born , and was from the very beginning ordered according to the true civil end , to wit , to peace and concord , and to the union of her citizens . but on the contrary , other modern republicks , the cities wherein such governments were formed , having been formerly long accustomed to obey emperors , since they got their liberty by many accidents , they knew not , as not being well acquainted therewith , how to use it , by reason of the citizens various dispositions of mind : so as wheeling often about with an uncertain form of government , they in process of time return'd under the command of one . these considerations being applied to the city of rome , will prove that the prudence of her citizens , though they were very wise and valiant men , was not sufficient to reduce her to a perfect form of commonwealth ; but they might have amended many great disorders in her , which did much shorten her life . for he who will consider the conditions of the people of rome , will find them to be such , as no form of government could better agree with them then a popular state ; for they were all warlike men , bred up even from the very first foundation of the city in the exercise of arms. and though a commonwealth may be formed amongst these , which may have a certain similitude to an aristocratical state , when the citizens being governed by certain laws , partake every man more or less of that government according to their worth ; ( for , military discipline hath a certain species of vertue , though it be none of those that do immediately serve to purchase the ultimate end of a city ) yet this government is very seldom met with ; and though it want the true and proper form , is commonly called by the usual name of a commonwealth . so as though at first the city of rome leaned much thereunto , in a short time the people had a great share therein ; who not knowing how to moderate themselves , made it grow licentious . but he who will look back even to her first beginning , will find that the peoples authority did thereby ever increase together with the city : for the peoples power and liberty was great not only after the driving out of the tarquins , but even when it was commanded by kings ; that city seeming even from that time to be naturally more disposed to the form of a commonwealth , then of a kingdom . for , after the death of romulus , the people being powerful , as having the weapons in their hand , and as being the first founders of that city , usurped the authority of choosing kings : who on the contrary side , that they might the better confirm themselves in their new kingdom , endeavoured to accommodate themselves to the nature of the people , and to purchase their love by granting them many considerable things . so as even under the kingly government it had the power of appeals , as appeared in horatius his case , who being condemned by the magistrates for his sisters death , appealed to the people , and was by them freed . in favor of them likewise the city was divided into centuries , with a certain order of a very small tax , according to which the degrees of the militia , and the authority of the publick courts ( things which did all of them appertain to a popular state ) were to be distributed . to boot with these laws , the great number of citizens , which did even then arise to one hundred and thirty thousand , made the peoples party very powerful ; as also their having been so ready and so successful in engaging themselves in so many enterprises for the commonwealth , without receiving any pay for their pains . but the nobility was a long time very weak , and in but little esteem : for the first founders of the city being shepherds , and all of the same condition , there was no distinction of degree amongst them , save what was soon after brought in 〈◊〉 romulus ; who choosing the senate out of all that former number , that they might be assistant to the king in providing for things requisite for the state , by this order he divided some of the worthiest of the people in this new city from the rest , who gave the rise to the roman nobility . but even this order was very weak ; for it was at first instituted by romulus but of a small number of men ; and though others were afterwards added thereunto , yet till such time as the city got her liberty , 〈◊〉 never exceeded the number of two hundred senators ; nay , even these were much lessened by the cruelty of tarquinius superbus , and their authority narrowly bounded by the counterpoise of regal power . so as when the city put herself into liberty , there were not noblemen enough to form a state of optimati : in this case did publius valerius find the city of rome , after the driving out of the tarquins , when he through brutus his death , rema●ning sole consul , was to constitute laws , and new mould the commonwealth . wherefore desirous to introduce a state differing from the former , under the name of liberty , it behoved him not to lessen , but to encrease the authority of the people : for else they would not have indured it ; and by fiding with the tarquins , they might easily have confounded that government , and reduced the city again under the power of kings . for which reason also , brutus , though he was first created consul , not willing to lose the favor and assistance of the people , without which he thought the new orders of the city could not be well established , perswaded his colleague tarquinius collatinus , that to give satisfaction to the people , to whom the name of tarquin was become odious , and suspitious , to lay down his consulship : by these reasons it appears , that valerius was compelled to ordain many things in favour of the people , as were the appeals from the consuls ; the order , that upon pain of death no man should enter into any place of magistracy without the peoples approbation ; the petty punishment appointed for them who should not obey the consuls commands , which was no more but to pay five oxen and two sheep . moreover he eased the poor of many grievances , and made many other very popular laws , whence he purchased the name of publicola . but which 't is understood , that in ordering of the commonwealth , respect was to be had in many things to necessity and to the condition of those times : yet if we shall consider other accidents , we shall find them much contrary to such a necessity ; for the new legislator was not prince , as was licurgus , but possest a place of magistracy for a short time , the authority whereof was hardly yet well known , and not much valued : so as he could not use force to withdraw the people from a popular state , as it would have been needful , finding the people so disposed , as hath been said . therefore the city being after a while to be reformed again , the magistracy of ten was chosen , with greater authority then was that of the consuls , which took away all appeals , to the end that being more feared and reverenced by all , it might without any respect constitute new laws with great firmness . and if appius his ambition had not ruined the business , that commonwealth might perhaps have been reduced to some better condition : but yet not to any very perfect one , it being too hard a thing to order cities well , which are already much augmented ; just as we see it falls out in every particular man , who in his tender years may be easily made to undertake any manner of life , but when by practise he is settled in , as it were , a certain proper nature of his own , he cannot easily be altered from it . and if there have been any one , who hath been able to order a city already well grown , yet we shall find that that city was not so great nor potent , as was the city of rome , at this time of the new reformation ; and therefore the difficulties were much less , it being a very hard thing , and which , as saith the philosopher , 〈◊〉 almost exceed humane power , to dispose of a great multitude in an excellent 〈◊〉 of government . then as these things were the reason why this common-wealth was not well ordered at first , so did they in time bring her to great disorders and seditions , and finally to her destruction . for it is usual , that the further he advanceth that is once out of the way , so much doth he return backwards , is so much the more pusled , and the further from the place he intended to go to . so the authority of the people being by these new institutions alwaies to increase together with the greatness of the city , she swarved the further from the end , true liberty , to which she seemed to address her self . and because this common-wealth was born with this infirmity , the worth of none of her citizens , though it were never so great , was sufficient to cure her thereof , or to prolong her life , as it happens in our humane bodies , which contracting some ill disposition of humours at their first entring into the world , are soon thereby opprest and brought to death , no natural vertue , though of force for other things , being able to afford any cure . 't is notwithstanding very true , that though such like accidents rendred the city uncapable of any excellent government , by inclining her to a popular state , yet had they not so determinately disposed of her , but that she might have freed her self of many of her bad qualities , had not the ambition of her citizens by increasing these her natural imperfections , made her fall into greater disorders . let us begin to consider what publicola's actions were from the very beginning of the commonwealth , and we shall easily discover his ambitious thoughts by which he was moved to study so over-much how to please the peoples appetite in every thing . these his intentions were apparently seen , by taking his being refused in the election of the consuls so heinously , as that he kept a good while from the republick , as if he had put his hand to the government , for his own greatness , not for the common good : but much more for that having compast that degree , and finding the people jealous of him , for having built his house in a high and strong scituation , fearing lest together with the peoples love he might loose his own authority and power , he chose so to humble himself , as forgetting the dignity which belonged to the supreme magistrate of so great a city ; he made the fasces , the ensigns of consulship , be held in a posture of homage , whilst he made his oration , to shew , ( as he himself said ) that the authority of the consuls was subject to the authority and dignity of the people . this his desire of being esteemed popular , was the reason why in this new reformation , he went not about to what was very necessary ; to amend in part those defects which could not totally be taken away ; to wit , to give a just counterpoise to the authority of the people , tempering it with that of the senate , by very much increasing the number of the senators , and by apropriating the weightiest affairs of state , to that order , which how necessary it was , was afterwards seen , but too late put in execution ; to wit , in sylla's time , by whom the first number of senators was doubled , yet but to little purpose , the peoples authority being already too mightily increased , and many seeds of corruption being by this means sown abroad in the minds of the people . but valerius added but one hundred to the uumbea of the senate , neither did make any law in savour of them , both of which he might at that time easily have done . for being at the time of the new reformation to chuse new senators of the equestral order , or of some other of the people , he would not onely have been content , but would have wone much honour , by exalting many of his friends to that dignity , as it was seen he did by those few that were chosen : and the people would have had sufficient power in the commonwealth , if without communicating the weightiest affairs of the kingdom unto them , the indemptnity of chusing and of correcting magistrates had been reserved to them : and then that appeals might have been granted them , by which means they would not onely have had a hand in the city affairs , but likewise they might have secured themselves from being injured by the nobility ( a thing much desired by the people ) and from danger of loosing their liberties . and the authority and reputation of the senate being by this means augmented , the peoples insolency might the more easily have been moderated in those accidents which afterward happened . which though it seemed ( as hath been said ) more harder to have been done in that city , for another respect , yet the revolutions of government in the first birth of this republick , did a little lessen ordinary difficulties . for passing from monarchy ( which in the tarquins time was almost become tyranny ) to a new condition ▪ the l●gislator might have made it an aristocracie ; it being as it were natural in the change of states , that the government which had wont to be in the power of a tyrant , passes into the hands of the nobility , who are usually the first who lay hold in pulling down tyranny , as in rome , where tarquin and brutus were the first founders of liberty . therefore if the people deserved to be made partaker in the new government , for having assisted herein , much more ought the nobility to have their dignities and priviledges increased , this common benefit of the city having had its chief rise from them ; nor would the people have had any reason to complain thereof . but publicola , in stead of increasing the honor of the senate , introduced by a very pernicious example , small respect to the magistracie of consuls ; which occasioned many disorders , which might easily have been corrected by a just fear , as is cleerly seen by many examples , but chiefly by this ; that the people being in insurrection , and contumacious against the power of consulship , the creating of a dictator , a magistracie of supreme authority and reverence , proved a sure remedy to asswage the tumult . and what more manifest sign could there be given , that the people might have been tamed and made obedient by fear and by respect unto the magistrates , then that which was given upon the occasion of appius his decemvirate ? for being so ill dealt with by him and by his colleagues , as they wanted not reason to apprehend tyranny ; yet the authority of this magistracie , from which there was no appeal to be made , and the severity wherewith it was administred ▪ did so bridle the people , as they patiently endured all injuries ; nor durst they go about to shake off that slavery , till the senate interposed it self , and that horatius and valerius declared themselves heads of the insurrection against the decemviri . there ought therefore either greater respect to have been given to the consulary authority ; or else , if the more severe and free power of an ordinary magistrate seemed not to be convenient for the state of that commonwealth , the respect and reverence due to the person of the magistrate ought to have been transferred to the authority of certain laws , of which the magistrate should have been chief guardian , inflicting severe punishment upon the not observers thereof : for by this means the people would have had no occasion to be off●nded with the nobles , when their insolencie should be punished by vertue of the laws ; this arising amongst many other be●efits from the laws , that he who is punished for his faults cannot complain of any one , being condemned by order of law , not by the judge his will. but what hath been noted of publicola in this first beginning , may also be known at all other times , and in many other of the chief roman citizens ; who through ambition siding with the people , were the cause of their pride and insolencie . so the consuls valerius and horatius , not being able to obtain triumph from the senate , sought to have it from the people ; and the whole senate ( not to multiply examples ) by creating a dictator to suppress the authority of the consuls titus quintus cincinnatus , and geneus iulius mento , who opposed them therein , had recourse unto the tribunes , who by threatening imprisonment forc'd them to give way to the resolution : and those noblemen did usually take another course then what is to be held with the people , with whom grave and severe proceeding doth avail more then humble and mild demeanor . but they were so blinded by ambition , as not knowing , or not caring for such errors , they strove who should most ingratiate themselvs with the the people , by presents , shews , and submiss comportment . and this instruction might be learn'd by the example of the people of rome themselves : for it was ofttimes seen , that greater respect was given to those few who had known how to use severity to the people , then to those who carried themselves submissly unto them . and certainly , amongst other things , the judgment which followed upon the cause between menimiu● and spurius servilius , was very remarkable : who being both of them accused of the same fault by the tribunes , to wit , that being consuls they had opposed the agrarian law ; menimius , who by intreaties and submiss carriage endeavoured absolution , was condemned ; but spurius servilius stoutly withstanding the tribunes fury , and speaking severely to the people , was acquitted . and furius and manilius , who had both of them been consuls , being not long after accused , the nobles being willing totally to free them from such danger , kill'd the tribune in his own house who had impeached them ; which did so affright his colleagues , and the people , as none of the tribunes would afterwards reassume the same cause : and all the insurrections which were then in the city being suddenly appeased , all of them did willingly subscribe the militia . appius claudius was always very severe against the people ; and amongst other of his actions , the punishment which he took upon the armies insolencie was very observable , for he made them be decimated , very tenth man be put to death ; which was submitted unto without any the least tumult , by reason of the antient opinion of the captains severity , and for the fear infused into the soldiers by the sentence of death against some centurions who were accused for having been authors of that insurrection . which was sufficient so far to curb them all , as though they were all of them then in arms , every of them stood peacefully spectators of the death of so many kinsmen and friends , and of their own doubtful chance ; and ( which peradventure is a greater wonder , and doth the better confirm this truth ) appius being accused for this sentence by the tribunes , after he had laid down the consulship , using the same severity in defending himself , he was not held less guilty for having been formerly consul : so as the people neither willing to absolve him , nor daring to condemn him , the cause was put off , and he suffered to depart . and in the latter times , when the peoples power was greatest , tiberius gracchus endeavouring to propound the observance of the licinian law , the nobles , changing their habits , and shewing great humility , labored to win favor from the people ; but since they saw they could do no good by this means , they resolved for their last refuge to use force , and kill'd the author of those seditions . which action of theirs did so astonish the people , as they suffered the tribunes death , whom they had so dearly loved , and who had lost his life in defence of their cause , to go unrevenged . and soon after , caius gracchus reassuming the cause which his brother had in vain endeavoured , the nobles , using the same cunning , sought first by fair means to deprive him of popular favor , making use of another tribune to this purpose , by causing other popular laws to be propounded by consent of the senate . but humility avail'd no more at this time , then it had done formerly ; so as it behoving them to betake themselves again to arms , they slew caius gracchus in the aventine , and after the death of two brothers , annull'd all the laws made by them ; nor did the people ever seem to resent it . which if it might have been done by an usual way of a magistrate , as hath been touched upon , doubtless these ruder remedies , as better suiting with the infirmities of that commonwealth , might have freed her from many mischiefs . this is likewise confirmed by many other experiences : for as long as the senate kept up the authority thereof , threatening to create a dictator , it kept the terentilla law from being made , of creating a magistracie of five men , who were to correct the consuls power . but when it chose to appease the people by giving way to their importunities , it did only invite them to endeavour more novelties ; so as humility made them not more quiet , but more insolent . wherefore having obtained appeals , they would have a magistrate of their own , endowed with supreme authority ; and having gotten the power of the tribunes , they could not stop there , but would be admitted into the consulship , into the dictatorship , and to all other sort of dignities ; and having obtained all sort of honors , they began to aspire to the estates of the nobles ; who being too late aware of their error , to keep themselves from being quite dis-robed of every thing , and not being able to remedy themselves by the laws , or by magistracy , they were forced to have recourse to arms , to moderate the peoples insolencie . whence it may be concluded that the romans not having used those means , neither at the first making of their laws , nor almost at any other time , in any of their actions , which were proper to overcome certain bad qualities , which they had contracted even from the birth of the commonwealth , was the reason why , remaining alwaies , as it were a distempered body , wherein ill humours did continually encrease , she was alwaies sickly , perplext by so many civil discords , and and came to a shorter period of life , then she ought to have done for many other of her most noble conditions . the example of this powerful and famous republick , if we will well obserserve her civil orders , and what proceeded from thence , and if they shall be measured by truer and more general rules , may instruct us excellently well , how to discern the perfections and imperfections of modern states . and say it will not serve to correct errors , already too much confirmed by corrupt customs ; it will at least be of use to know what value ought to be put upon every government , and what length of daies may in reason be allotted thereunto , holding notwithstanding that disorder , for a truer rule then all orders , which is oft times introduced by various and unthought of acciden●s upon which our civil actions do depend , not onely regulated by humane wisdom , but subject ( for ought that appears to us ) in many things to a certain casualty ; though they be indeed directed by assured , though hidden causes , reserved in the bosom of divine providence , whereunto our reason cannot reach . therefore if following the usual manner of speech , we shall in these our discourses , make often use of the names of chance and fortune , let them be understood in this true and pious manner . the second discourse . what success the roman affairs would have had if alexander the great had turned with his victorious army into italy . the republick proved more fortunate then any other state in many things , so as he had reason on his side , who said ; that fortune , who was usually an enemy to vertue , had made truce with her , that she might exalt that city to the highest pitch of greatness . but this may chiefly be acknowledged from her , being freed from the necessity into which the course of time had brought her , of making trial of her forces , against those of alexander the great , who after having conquered darius , and subjugated persia , together with other nations , did not bethink himself of turning into europe ; and chiefly into italy , rather then into the utmost parts of the east : or that from having accomplished so many famous interprizes in arabia , and in the indies , being as yet but in his youth , he lived no longer to carry his victories over the other parts of the world , not as yet concerned in his forces , though invaded by his immense desire of dominion . it will certainly be worth the consideration , whether if alexander had at first had any such thought , or that he had had time afterwards to put it in effect , to think what influence he would have had upon the affairs of rome . this doubt was put by livy , who in the ninth book of the first decade of his histories , betook himself to discourse of what might have happened , if the roman commanders had been to have made war against alexander . but without considering any thing which might make against his opinion , he bends all his reasons to prove that the roman forces would have proved victorious if they had chanced to have fought against those of alexander the great ; which he resolves for as great a certainty , as if the effect had ensued . yet many arguments to the contrary may be taken out of divers of those things , which livy relates of his romans . we can take no surer way to know what would have been the success of things not done , then to consider what hath been done ; which may guide us by conjecture to penetrate into what might have happened in other things , if occasion should have served . let us then cast an eye upon what alexanders actions were in those times , and what those of the roman commonwealth ; and we shall see what might have been expected from the worth of force , and either of them , if trial had been made thereof . alexanders enterprizes were sufficiently famous , and known to all men , since the recounting of them hath wearied so many writers . and plutarch who writ the lives of the valliantest , and most magnanimous men of so many ages ; in his preface to that of alexander , excuseth himself ( with he doth not in relating the lives of any others ) if he be not able sufficiently to write all his actions , by reason of their number and worth . but the romans enterprizes in that age , were not in themselves very great , nor very greatly cried up by others . though those which they afterwards performed , did for glory out-do , what ever was done by any other potentate ; so as reputation and fame ( which bear so great a sway in all our operations , but chiefly in what belongs to war ) was without all doubt greater in alexander , then in those roman captains who flourished in his time , when the greatness of the roman commonwealth was but in its rise , and first beginning . but let us come to some further particular . the commonwealth had not as then inlarged her confines , further then into latium , into some parts of umbria , and into picenum , amongst people who were very near the volsci , and the aequi. their armies were not yet marched out of italy ; which they did not till they made war with the carthaginians . whence it is to be gathered , that the commonwealth was as yet but weak , and not accustomed to those more weighty and important actions of war , wherein in after ages it must be confest she did great and wonderful things . but at this time many vertues in the citizens of rome , and the customs of the city , not as yet corrupted , were more to be exalted then their military valour , which though their souls might be full of , yet they wanted illustrious occasions to exercise it . and those so many famous commanders , which as livy says , may be paralelled with alexander ; fabius maximus , valerius corvinus , lucius papyrius , titus manlius , torquatus , and others of that age , what great fears of arms did they ? the war was as yet made , as it were , underneath the city gates ; nor did these as consuls , or dictators lead armies to fight against any save the aequi , sanniti , toscani , and other neighbouring nations , which were but weak commonalties , whose dominions extended no further then their own cities , and the territories thereof : none of all those countries being as then reduced under the power of any one lord. yet livies words , and the deed it self , of having had recourse so often to the dictator , and having had war so many years with the same nations , shews how much so weak potentates were feared by the romans , who cannot notwithstanding be said to have been much superior to them , either for strength , and worth of their militia ; since it behoved to fight so often with them , and hardly could they after so many dangers , and a long course of time extinguish them , or rather make them their companions and friends . who can then justly compare these things to alexanders great atchievements , to his so many victories won over the greatest and most potent kings of asia ? what though darius his men may be said to have been rude and base ? it cannot be denied but that they were three hundred thousand armed men , and of that nation wherein the monarchy had long been : and alexanders victorious forces overran more countries in little more then ten years , then did the romans in a much longer time , when they were at their greatest . the before-named roman commanders are deservedly praised for divers vertues : but what could there be desired more in alexander , to make him be an excellent commander ? who had his share in more battels then he ? who shewed more boldness in undertaking enterprises , greater constancie in prosecuting them , more hopes in effecting them ? what other commander was ever more highly esteemed , and dearly beloved by his soldiers ? those vertues which divided amongst many men , have made many captains worthy to be praised , met all of them abundantly in him . would alexander peradventure have been afraid to pass into italy , who shewed his undauntedness in entring into the desarts of arabia , without any other hope of bringing himself and his army safe back , save what his courage and his happy genius promis'd him ? but how easily might he have passed into italy ; greece , which was formerly conquered by his father king philip , being at his devotion ; and to boot with the abounding commodities which that country and his own forces might have afforded him , might not he have hoped to be received and assisted by so many people who were express enemies to the roman commonwealth ? who would not have refused to have obeyed so great a prince as was alexander , so to avoid submitting themselves to the dominion of a city like to one of theirs , and with which they had long and grievous contestations : nay , the hatred and envy which they bore to the romans greatness , would have made them all have sided with alexander against them . was not pyrrhus invited into italy for this purpose by the s●mniti and tarentini ? and did not many of the cities which were under the romans obedience , put themselves for the same reason under the power of hannibal , being thereunto moved rather out of their hatred to be commanded by the romans , then their fear of being supprest by the carthaginian forces ? it now remains , that we consider some things of alexanders militia , and of that of the romans . by which it will not be hard for him who will not willingly be deceived , to know on which side the advantage , and the disadvantage might have been : since , if the numher of combatants be to be valued , who can doubt but that the armies of which he was lord , who was lord of so many provinces as was alexander , were much to exceed those which one only city , though very populous , and very watlike , as was that of rome , could put together : and if alexander would do most of his famous actions with his macedonians only , it was out of his choice and judgment , not out of any weakness ; for he thought an army of a few valiant and expert soldiers fitter to undertake a great enterprise , then a great mult●tude , which oftentimes bring more confusion then aid . so as having , when he had overcome darius , made that so memorable order of his soldiers of thirty thousand young men , chosen out of the flower of many subjugated provinces , and made them be instructed in the macedonian militia , he little regarded his own macedonians ; whom ( as it is written ) he permitted out of favor , and in reward of their former service , and at their own requests to follow his ensigns , and to pass with him into india to new undertakings . but the so many battels which he so successfully made , may sufficiently witness the excellencie of his discipline in the militia , as also his taking of so many cities , his long voyages , the perpetual exercise in military works : by which things it may be conceived , that no more veteran army could be found in those times , which was more expert in all that belonged to the militia , more obedient to their captains , and more observant of all military order then then was that of alexanders , the ordering of soldiers used by alexander , which was called phalanx , is at this day celebrated ; in which the ranks of soldiers standing close , being as it were woven together , and covered over with great shields , they made a solid and safe body of an army , able to sustain whatsoever charge of the enemy . livy does afterwards consider , that the counsel of a wise senate , as was that of rome , would have prevailed over any one mans resolves , such as was alexander ; but he considers not on the contrary side , how that in affairs of importancie , and chiefly in matters of war , the supreme authority and command of one alone is requisite . the romans themselves were of this opinion , who in cases of great difficulty had recourse to a dictator , whose commissions were not limited , but he was only charged to take such care as that the commonwealth might undergo no loss nor prejudice . nor for all this is the authority or reverence due to a dictator , who is magistrate but for a short time , and subject to give an account for what he does , in this to be compared with the majesty of a kings command , and of so great and so esteemed a king as was alexander . how often fell it out in rome , that when supplies were to be sent to an army , discords were importunately sollicited by the tribunes , and the army hindered from being listed ? was there any such thing in alexander , in whom supreme authority and empire did consist ? nor did he yet want some more confiding friends , whose counsels he was accustomed to make use of , and those but a few , wise , and wholly intent upon the good of that prince , upon whom all their greatness did depend ; as counsels ought to be in business of great weight , to the end that they may be maturely resolved upon , and readily executed . which happens not where any command with equal authority , and oft-times with much differing thoughts and ends . but it may yet be more cleerly seen what success the romans would have had against alexander , by looking a little forward , and considering the affairs of the ensuing age. the first carthaginian war lasted for the space of four and twenty years , in which time the carthaginian power was weakened by the romans ; but not so quenched , but that it could soon get up again and trouble the very romans that were conquerors . and when hannibal passed with his army into italy four and forty years afterwards , rome being much increased in power and reputation , was not the commonwealth of rome not only robb'd of all the state which she possest , but the very city of rome reduced into great straits ? and yet hannibal was not alexander ; he had not the fortune , the forces , nor authority which alexander had : he led his army a long way by land , and the sea was blockt up by the possession which the romans had in sicily , and by their powerful fleets at sea , to keep him from receiving succor : nor were his own citizens a less impediment to him , ( who envied his glory ) then were his enemies , in keeping out his army . but there was no such thing in alexander , who by a short cut at sea might have brought his army to the italian shores , and have easily been accommodated with all things necessary . nor can that be objected to alexander , which lessened hannibals honor , to wit , that be knew how to overcome , but not how to make use of victory : but amongst many of his singular endowments , he was very ardent and sollicitous in prosecuting victories ; so as no difficulty nor danger whatsoever did ever retard him the least of time , from making good use of his prosperous fortune . which afforded plutarch occasion to introduce alexander , speaking of himself , in such manner as he challenged all the praises which was given unto him , as more due to his own merit and worth , then to the favour of fortune . for these reasons then , that which was first said , may be asserted , that is , that it may be numbered amongst romes greatest good fortunes , that alexander the great bethought himself not sooner of coming into italy , or that he lived not long enough to do it afterwards ; for had he done so , that commonwealth must either have been oppressed by so much greater a power , or if we will speak more mildly , and with more respect to the roman greatness , she must have run great hazard in her fortune . and certainly , that happy genius which guided both these empires to such a height of greatness and prosperity , kept them at such a distance , as that their forces should not meet together , which had they done some one of their armies must either have been totally routed , or at least their fame and glory must have been much obscured . the like may be said to have happened in these latter times , between two great and fortunate princes , the emperor charls the fift , and the ottaman sultan solyman , who did both of them flourish in one and the same time , and being both of them ( if it be lawful to make this comparison by reason of their diversity of faith ) endued with great emulation , grandeur of spirit , and warlike worth ; it seems that either their own election kept them from encountring one another , or else that they were alwaies kept far assunder by some certain occult cause , so as they might not hazard that glory which with so much labour and danger they had won in the wars , against other princes . but it was particularly observed by all men , and not without great wonder , and it was attributed to the same respect ; that the numerous and powerful armies of both these princes being brought into austria , and come very near one another , with an intention , as it seemed , to try by battle the force and worth of themselves and armies , so great a preparation for war proved altogether vain : solyman not advancing with his camp to challenge the germans to joyn battle , as he had first professed he would ; nor caesar not budging with his men from the walls of vienna , though before the approach of the enemy , he had proudly boasted that he would assault him to revenge the former injuries done to his brother , and to all germany . but because these considerations sute not with our present purpose , and for that we may peradventure have occasion to treat thereof hereafter ; we will hear end this our present discourse . the third discourse . whether was the betrer and more laudable advice , that of the carthaginians in offering to assist the romans , against king pyrrhus , or that of the romans , in refusing their offer . amongst many wars made by the romans , that was of very great weight and danger , which she had to sustain against pyrrhus , king of epire , when he past with a powerful army into italy in behalf of the tarentines . other wars were made for the most part by the romans against others , this was made against them by a king of greater power then was theirs , and of greater worth in himself , and of better experience in affairs of war. insomuch as he deserved after hannibal , to be e●eemed the prime commander of his , and of former ages . this war was likewise commenced when the commonwealth had not so well confirmed her power as she did afterwards ; this being before the first carthaginian war , which brought the romans first to make war out of italy . but as the romans upon this occasion gave many examples of their undoubted worth , so , opportunity of handling some state affairs , from whence useful precepts for civil government may be drawn , to him who shall discourse upon their actions . whilst pyrrhus was with an army in italy , the carthaginians sent their general mago with one hundred and twenty frigats to assist the romans ; but the romans , thanking the carthaginians for this their readiness to assist them , sent their general back , with all the carthaginian forces . this being the matter of fact , it deserves consideration , whether the carthaginians , or romans are more to be praised for their wisdom and magnanimity . to proffer and lend assistance to one who stands in need thereof , especially to one who hath formerly been very fortunate , is a thing befitting great and generous princes , and to refuse it , so it be done modestly , and without arrogancy , shews no less generosity , since men do thereby appear to conside in themselves . so likewise to maintain war in anothers territories , so to keep it far from ones self is a wise and useful counsel , and not to value present dangers so much , as altogether to neglect things of a further distance , is no small sign of discretion . but let us come to a more particular consideration of these things , that we may the better see into them , and know what judgement to give of them , either in praising or dispraising them . the romans were at this time in amity with the carthaginians , and had often formerly renewed their confederacy with them : the confines of their dominions being as yet far distant one from another , whereby the occasion of offence was taken away , did ratifie the peace and amity between those two states : so as it was a thing well-beseeming so great a principality , as was that of the canthaginians , not to forgo their friends in time of danger , though they were not bound by any particular obligation , to assist them . and as the failing in such a duty might have cast some blut upon their city , so deserve they no small praise for their reediness in performing it . but these things are peradventure of less force , and estimation amongst princes ; whence it may be worth consideration , whether the carthaginians were not perswaded out of other reasons to assist the romans in this war. great was the fame of king pyrrhus his valor , and forces at this time ; and no less the report of his ambition , and of his vast designs of assaulting sicily , and affrica , when he should have overcome the romans . wherefore the carthaginians had reason to use all their endeavours not to make trial of their forces and fortune with this prince : and nothing was more opportune for them , to keep such dangers far from them , then to keep pyrrhus in italy ; who finding himself more withstood by the roman forces , thorough the assistance of the carthaginians , would be necessitated to make the longer abode in italy , and ( as it falls out in long enterprises ) to waste many of his people there , and lessen that reputation and terror which usually accompanies great armies , in their first and unexpected assaults . to make war in another mans country is alwaies good advice ; but best for those that are farthest off , especially when it may be hoped that such a fire may be long fed in another mans country . the forces of the romans were sufficiently strong of themselves , but much stronger being joyned with those of the carthaginians , and fitter to withstand pyrrhus his forces : who on the other side , having undertaken this enterprise , with vaste thoughts , and being resolved to hazard his whole fortune , out of a desire of new glory , and greater empire , and being himself a valiant commander of a valiant army , it was not easily to be beleeved that he would quit italy , unless victorious , or else quite over come and destroyd . if pyrrhus should have overcome the romans , when they were abandoned by the carthaginians ; and being afterwards big with reputation of his victory , should have passed into sicily , to molest the affairs of the carthaginians , as his design was to do when he left his country , what danger would they have been in , or what succour could they have expected from the romans , since they had not been aided by the carthaginians in their great necessity , and must have been much weakened by the defeat given them by pyrrhus ? but if the romans had been assisted by the carthaginians , and pyrrhus , weary of trying his fortune in italy , should have turned his forces upon the carthaginians , how could the romans have refused to have assisted the carthaginians , in like manner as they had done them ? whence it follows , that those men which the carthaginians should have sent into italy , should have fought not onely for the safety of italy , but for the like of sicily and affrica , and with no less advantage to carthage , then to rome . but though it had been apparent , that the romans might of themselves have resisted pyrrhus , and have got the victory , it had made no less for the carthaginians , to make use of this occasion , thereby to oblige the romans , whose power was then very great , and their worth very much esteemed , and their intentions of inlarging their empire , being already known : so as it became the carthaginians for their own safety sake , to have an eye to the greatness of this new potentate ; and not being able to quell him , they had all the reason in the world to keep him their friend , to the end that he might turn his forces somewhere else , and not upon them . but what friendship is more firm then that which is bound with the tye of great benefits ? for the receiver , must by an occult force of nature incline to love his benefactor , and the doer , loves this the noble product of his good turn in another , and by so doing makes himself be the better beloved . great was the romans need at this time , who had not as yet met with a more formidable enemy then pyrrhus , and therefore the occasion was likewise great , which offered it self to the carthaginians to contract a near friendship and confederacy with the romans . but to this it may be objected , that by succouring the romans , the carthaginians would draw anothers war upon themselves ; nor was it so easie a thing to overcome the romans , as that pyrrhus could end that war so suddenly , or with so entire forces , as the carthaginians had cause to fear them : nay , rather the irritating of pyrrhus by injuries , might provoke him to revenge , and make him forgo the romans , and fall upon the carthaginians . but say that the affairs of rome , though assisted by the carthaginians , should have succeeded amiss ( as things of this nature are alwaies subject to variety of accidents ) what hopes had the carthaginians to defend either what they possessed in sicily , or even the african coasts , when they should have sent the greatest part of their shipping and souldiers to assist the romans ? and why should the carthaginians rather fear pyrrhus his greatness , then that of the romans ? pyrrhus his dominions lay further off , and more incommodious to molest the carthaginians , then did the romans ; he was but one man , and though valiant , yet his life was subject to various mischances ( as it proved afterwards , he being slain by a stone , thrown by a poor old woman ) but rome abounded in valiant commanders , and was come to the pass , a man may say , of preserving herself still the same : so as all other princes ought rather to have had a care to keep the romans from growing stronger , then any other potentate : for romes power was more stable , aud therefore like to cause longer , and greater dangers to others . wherefore to keep the romans long busied in the war against pyrrhus , by which their forces must have been weakened , was the means to preserve other states from that ambition of dominion which was already discovered to be in the romans . on the other side ; to assist the romans in ridding themselves of the troubles of war , especially if this should have happened by their obtaining any signal victory , what was it but to increase the reputation and courage of others , so to hasten their own dangers ? for being freed of such incumbrances , and aspiring after greater things ( a thing which is always occasioned by good success ) it was not likely the romans would stand idle , but ready to imbrace any enterpise , as it happened afterwards . for the first carthaginian war ensued soon after the war made with pyrrhus : for the romans meeting with no resistance in italy , after the honor which they had won in their victory over pyrrhus , they began to march with their forces into other countries ; they past into sicily , being invited in by the mamertini , as pyrrhus was first called ito italy by the tarentini . and the weakness of pyrrhus his forces did not so much occasion the victories won in the war , asdid his inconstancy in prosecuting enterprises once begun , which though it was a natural defect in him , yet may it be believed , that his sudden departure from italy might be occasioned by the injury done him by the carthaginians , who unprovoked had taken up arms against him , and were ready to come and find him out in other mens countries . but it may be another greater respect might have moved him to assault the carthaginian state , to wit , that he might onely have to do onely with the carthaginians , as he had at first fought onely with the romans ; beginning to suspect , as having already discovered the carthaginians good will , that if he should tarry longer in italy , and that the romans danger should encrease , that confederacy might be made between them and the carthaginians , which was first refused : so that whatsoever he should afterwards undertake against either of them , might afterwards prove more difficult . this was then the reason why pyrrhus , whilst the business in italy was not yet finished , nor the danger of the tarentines not well secured , marched to go for sicily ; which caused so much trouble and danger to the carthaginian affairs , as if he had known how to make good use of his victory , the carthaginians might peradventure have been brought then to those final extremities which were deferred for another time , more for the romans glory , then for their welfare and good fortune . thus what hath been already said , may suffice for what concerns the carthaginians . let us now see what the romans did , and consider whether they did well or no in refusing the help which was voluntarily offered them , nay brought home to them by the carthaginians . the war which was made by pyrrhus against the romans , must be thought to be both great and difficult , being made by a warlike prince , who brought many many men with him , well trained up in arms , so as by the very name and fame of his forces , he had almost brought many cities of italy to his devotion , withdrawing them from the obedience of the romans ; and though he were a stranger , yet having firm footing in italy , whither he was called by the tarentini , he was not likely to undergo those dis-accommodations , which armies use to suffer in another country ; but his forces appeared the more formidable by reason of that terror , which things of great fame , and not formerly known , use to bring with them . and the elephants were a great cause of fear , the romans not being formerly acquainted with that manner of militia . in so much danger therefore , when the whole rest was at stake , to presume too much upon ones self , and upon ones proper forces , and to dream onely of glory , when they were to have been more sollicitous of safety , hath the appearance rather of rashness , then of mature and wise counsel . and why should the romans promise so much unto themselves against pyrrhus , as to despise the carthaginians help , being as then accustomed to fight with the tarentini , a weak nation , given over to delights , of which they were reprehended by pyrrhus himself ; and being now to fight with true souldiers , expert in all sort of sufferings , and all military discipline , in the recent wars made by pyrrhus in macedonia . and when nothing else , but even fortune ( which in matter of war is so uncertain ) should have proved averse unto them in any thing , to whom could they afterwards have had recourse for succour , having despised so great helps , readily sent by so great a power , of so great esteem and authority , as was then the commonwealth of carthage ? yet on the other side , it may seem no ways to agree with the romans greatness and generosity , to confess themselves so terrified by pyrrhus his forces , as that they needed foreign help to defend themselves . the romans might have had peace from pyrrhus , who when he came into italy , sent his ambassadors to rome , informing the senate by them , that he was come to compose the difference between them and the tarentini , with whom , if the romans would have peace , he proffered them the like : to which , answer was made , that the common-wealth of rome had not chosen him for their arbitrator , neither did they fear his enmity ; therefore let him first return to his own kingdom , and then , as a friend to the commonwealth he might treat of peace , and should be willingly listened unto . but the city of rome did already begin to envy and emulate the common-wealth of carthage , which she did peradventure more esteem then open enmity with the kingdom of epire , wherewith she thought she should not so soon have to do neither in matter of peace nor war , though pyrrhus his ambition had then brought him into italy . therefore if the romans would not accept of peace from pyrrhus , they oughtless to acknowledg their safety from the carthaginians . they likewise thought they might so much rely upon their own forces , having valiant and well disciplined souldiers of their own , as that there remained no doubt of victory in that war , then what does never part from the uncertainty of chance in war. they considered that the number of armies or fleets might be increased by foreigners , and yet the power to resist an enemy not be made the greater ; whilst either the differing ends of princes , the little agreement between commanders , or the contrary custom and discipline of souldiers , do often occasion many discords in matter of war ; which are not found where one onely chieftain commands , and disposeth of all things , and where better obedience shewn by souldiers of one and the same dominion . therefore was it that the romans did sundry other times refuse foreign aid ; as particularly , in the war against antiochus , when refusing assistance sent unto them by other kings of africa , they with their own few , but valiant souldiers , routed antiochus his numerous army , made up of many several nations . such respects as these might have been liable to consideration , even when their faith and friendship , who were to have lent assistance , had been for certain to be credited ; but who could secure the romans , who having already extended their dominions far into italy , could not grow much greater without injuring nations further off : from being jealous of the carthaginians , who were antient and powerful lords in affrica , and in spain , and possessed of the greatest part of sicily ; and as there were none who could more hinder the increase of their greatness then the carthaginians , so was it necessary that they being apprehended for such by the romans , should likewise fear them for the preservation of their own quiet and security . and what charity is this , might those wise and ancient senators of rome say , which hath moved these affricans to be so careful of us , as without any obligation of confederacy , and not sought unto , they should send so prime a captain as mago , with such a number of frigats and soldiers , to assist us , and to bereave their own state of such defence , to preserve the states of other men ? the greater the appearances seemed outwardly , the more might it be suspected that these things proceeded not from sincerity of heart : if the carthaginians had done this , because they held the romans to be so unworthy , as that they were to yeeld to pyrrhus his first assault , and so their states might be exposed to the same danger , it was not good to nourish such an opinion in the carthaginians , by which they should no sooner be quit of pyrrhus , but the carthaginians , who were as willing to keep the romans low , as pyrrhus was , might come and set upon them . so whilst they should endeavor to secure the war which was on foot , and from which , if they were the same men which they had always used to be against their enemies , they had great hopes they might defend themselves , they might have raised another more dangerous and difficult ; if the roman generosity had not suffered that by anothers fraud , whereunto they should , onely have given consent and some small reward , pyrrhus should have been slain ( as they were offered by an acquaintance of his , he should be ) though thereby they were freed from all danger ; but rather to exempt the commonwealth from such a blemish , the roman commander chose to acquaint the enemy with what was plotted against him ; how could they , or ought they to tolerate that the carthaginians , who had sent aid , not out of any desire of romes welfare , but as those that envied her glory , should boast themselves of being the preservers of the roman liberty ? if it should have so faln out by any adverse accident that pyrrhus , who came to assault them , should have proved conqueror ; nothing had been to be blamed but the fortune of war , since they themselves should have carried themselves gallantly and advisedly in the maintaining of it : but if they should have accepted of the carthaginian succour , men might think , that the romans gave themselves for overcome , before a blow was given and that they were much inferior to the enemy , not in forces , but in valor : that pyrrhus had not undertaken that enterprise out of necessity , but onely out of a desire of novelty , and hopes of glory : that therefore if his first assaults should be stoutly sustained , he should have enough of it , and that being invited by another occasion , which he understood was already brewing against him , by the sicilian discords , being naturally of a fickle humour , he might readly turn to some other undertaking ; and that as he had come into italy slightly , and upon no occasion , to make war against them , so he might easily be perswaded by any adverse fortune to give over the affairs of italy , and fall upon something else ; had he been so strong in men and forces , as it seems men thought he was , he would not have sent his orator cineas to seek friendship with the senate and people of rome , and to endeavour that by words which he might easily have obtained by force , which was , to grant peace to the tarentines his confederates . something like this we may believe was said by that appius , a senator of experienced wisdom ; who was imployed in answering pyrrhus his ambassador , and in readily accepting the intimated war. and whosoever shall duly consider these so many and so sprightly reasons which they had to dismiss the carthaginian assistance , must needs be perswaded that it did agree with the roman wisdom and generosity . yet he who will ground his judgment aright , and justly weigh what the carthaginians did , must reflect upon divers respects , by which such actions are usually governed . if then the advantage of the business be only considered , it will appear to consist well with what the carthaginians did then advise upon : for , to hazard those few forces which they sent to assist the romans , tended towards the preservation of their own state from pyrrhus his incursion ; and it appeared rational enough , that the war made against him by the roman forces , joined with those of the carthaginians , might draw on to a length of time : for it was believed by the resolution which pyrrhus took when he went from his kingdom , that he should not have so soon given over his attempt ; and the carthaginians being with a considerable strength in the roman armies , might at their pleasures , and in divers manners have so prolonged the war , and spun it out into such a length , as they might have so weakened both their forces , as they needed not for a long time to fear either pyrrhus or the romans . but in the romans resolutions to refuse the carthaginian succor , the magnanimity of their minds is chiefly to be praised : for the war was not slighted by those who refused to make peace with their enemies , and to accept of assistance from their friends ; but full of dangers , which if they should be able to overcome , they thought it would be an action of great worth , but of greater difficulty . but this resolution , out of the aforesaid reasons , made not so much for their advantage for the present , as for the future . and it was known , that fabritius his generosity in preserving pyrrhus his life ( though his enemy ) from the treachery of other men , made no less for the overcoming of pyrrhus , then did the military discipline of valerius corvinus , and the roman armies which fought against him . wherefore he sent cineas to rome to grant liberty to such prisoners as he had taken , and to desire peace with the romans , being moved thereunto rather by that noble act , then by any loss he had received in the conflict . and it may be believed , that it was this which made him resolve to forego italy the sooner , and leave the roman affairs quiet . yet such a consideration may appear to be very weak , being compared to the advantage which might thereby have been gotten : for it had regard to things of uncertainty , and to dangers far off ; whereas the carthaginians help might have made for the good of present affairs . wherefore the romans might be herein convinced ; if it were not to be said , that the desire of glory was so great in them , as aiming only and chiefly thereat , they put on their resolutions with such fervor , as they did not only exceed all others , but even themselves . they thought they should make their condition the worse by accepting of forein assistance , whatsoever should befall them : for if they should overcome pyrrhus , assisted with the carthaginians , the military valor would be much lessened , which otherwise did belong to so great an undertaking , and to the so great hazard which they ran ; but if they should be overcome , their shame would be increased ; the roman forces , though assisted by so great a strength of foreiners , not being able to resist pyrrhus his army . they might likewise peradventure doubt , lest by reposing some part of their hopes upon forein aid , they might make their own senators less fervent and sollicitous in providing things fitting for the war , and their captains and soldiers less diligent in their military imployments ; as it often falls out in what is recommended to the care of many , that whilst one to ease himself a little , seeks to lay load upon another , the burthen is more weakly sustained by many , then it would have been by a few : but the truth of these things can but only be discuss'd by probable arguments , to delight our selves in the variety of affairs which present themselves in the ballancing of several reasons which may happen in these great actions : for to give a determinate sentence therein , we want the ground work of those particulars , which we cannot take notice of now in things done so long since , and by which all our works , especially such as are subject to so many alterations as are all civil and military affairs , can be only best regulated . it is most certain , that the romans , who were formerly full of high and glorious thoughts , got so much boldness and reputation after having driven pyrrhus out of italy with their own proper forces , and overcome him in so many battels , as they did the easilier undertake any war , and no nation in italy durst ever after oppose their designs , whereby they soon opened the way to a large empire . the fourth discourse . which of the two famous roman cammanders , quintus fabius maximus , or p. scipio africanus , brought more of advantage to the commonwealth of rome in managing their war. fabius maximus , and p. scipio africanus , descended from noble roman families , and endued with excellent parts , did flourish in the same age ; which happening to be at the time when the commonwealth of rome was much molested by the carthaginian forces , they had occasion to shew their valor in the behalf of their country , and to purchase much glory to themselves . they had alike zeal to the common good ; their love to their country , their strength of mind , and knowledg of military affairs was alike ; but they differed in opinion concerning the management of the war , and different was the occasion which they had in exercising it . great was the service which the city of rome received from these two ; but they differed much in their ways and ends . fabius led the armies through italy against hannibal , for the safety of the city of rome : scipio fought in africa against the same hannibal , for the glory and grandezza of rome , being already freed from so many dangers of the carthaginian forces . the former brought succor and help in a very seasonable time to the affairs of rome when they were much distressed , and raised up the tottering fortune of the commonwealth : the latter , by discomfiting many of the carthaginian commanders , and even hannibal himself , did not only put his romans in perpetual safety from the carthaginian forces and stratagems wherewith they had been so long molested , but brought whole africa under their obedience . fabius preserved italy from the slavery of forein nations , into which she had certainly fallen , had it not been for his actions and advices , hannibal having already possest himself of all the chief cities : but scipio did much enlarge the roman confines , and made the africans confess they were overcome by italian valor , and submit their necks to the yoke of the roman empire . these excellent commanders shewed great worth , and great experience in military affairs by these their actions , each of them using therein their proper qualities and endowments : fabius loved constancy , gravity , followed late taken resolutions , but such as were secure . scipio , measuring all things according to the greatness of his conception , did wilingly imbrace new enterprises , nothing that was glorious seemed hard to him . fabius feared hannibal out of wisdom , not out of any cowardly mind ; scipio despised him , confiding in himself and in the valor of his army . wherefore fabius thought he had ended the business , if hannibal being reduced to much hardship , should be forced to forgo italy : but scipio as if he had been sure of victory , refusing all offers of agreement how advantageous soever , made by the carthaginians , would hazard the day in that famous place of zama , where the height of empire was to be decided between two powerful nations . and truly it seems , that it was romes good fortune , which made these two so excellent men be at this time coetaneans , though with different thoughts applied to the safety and glory of that commonwealth : for the one , with much patience overcoming the bitterness of fortune , and the insolency of the enemy , freed her from so many dangers into which she was faln : the other , finding the commonwealth already restored , and knowing how to make better use of his good fortune then hannibal , did by his noble daring add greater splendor , and glory to her . but here it may be worthy consideration , which of these two may be thought to have done things which were better , and of more use for the commonwealth . fabius his actions tended to the safety of his country , when she was reduced into great danger , and put a period to her troubles more by good counsel , then by many forces : but the affrican proposed unto himself the increase of glory , and of empire of the city of rome . wherefore not satisfied with what he had succesfully done in spain , he resolved to pass into affrica , where refusing all conditions of peace , he would needs joyn battel with hannibal , wherein his prosperity continuing , he won a great and glorious victory . on the one side then , fabius deserts appear to be very great , he having preserved the city when it was in a desperate condition , so by saving it from the utmost of dangers , he made himself a sharer of that praise which is given to the first founders of cities : and certainly such was hannibals fortune at that time , the worth and reputation of his army such , as all force indeavoured against him , would have proved not onely vain but prejudicial ; and his being judged by the senate and people of rome to be a commander fit to cope with hannibal , and onely fit to suppress his forces , even then when scipio that valiant and famous captain , did live and flourish , shews that fabius worth was so highly esteemed , as it was not to be exceeded . and this is afterwards confirmed by the grave testimony of paulus aemilius , famous among the most celebrated romans ; who being , as consul , to go into the camp against hannibal , highly extolling things formerly done by fabius , whilst he was dictator , said that he would rather be praised in matters of war by him alone , then do things which might differ from his actions , though they pleased all the people of rome therein . fabius was indeed excellently well advised in all he did ; for he was no less valiant in withstanding the enemy in battle , and in correcting the error and rashness of minutius , master of the cavalry , who had importunely , and contrary to his opinion begun the skirmish , then he was formerly wise in foreseeing the danger , and in endeavouring to keep it off . his constancy of mind in adversity witnessed his no want of courage , but out of abundance of wisdom he shunned the hazard of giving battel . wherefore after the discomfeiture at cannae , no man was more constant , and ready then he to take a resolution . it is therefore said , that in the dejection of souls , and confusion of all things , the citizens had recourse to his counsel , as to an oracle : and the comparing the actions of others , in what concerned the administration of war against hannibal , made fabius his worth appear the more ; for before he took upon him the dictatorship , the consul flaminius was routed at the lake thrasymenus , and when he laid down the dictatorship ; terentius taking other courses then did fabius , gave occasion for that famous and grievous overthrow which the romans received at the battel of cannae ; whereby it may be known , that wise commanders ( just like understanding physitians when they meet with weak bodies , do oftentimes make use rather to prescribe quiet and good government , free from all disorder , then physick ) when they know the forces of the commonwealth to be but weak , as were those of the romans at that time , ought also to free the state from great and eminent dangers , by temporizing , and by proceeding leasurely with all advantage , then by using force of arms and hazarding a battel . which made hannibal say , that he feared fabius his fearfulness more , then the daring of the other roman captains : and finding all his designs at other times frustrated by fabius , he affirmed that the romans had also their hannibal . nor could his cunning be indeed overcome otherwise then by cunning , and by knowing how to make use of fitting occasions , and how to bereave the enemy of the like , which indeed was peculiar to fabius . it may moreover be said for fabius , and in praise of his advice , that as no humane action is more subject to divers unexpected accidents , then in battle , wherein great effects are often produced from very small accidents , so cannot a commander attribute at any time so much praise unto himself in victories , but that good fortune will challenge a great share therein : wherefore it is numbered amongst the chief qualities which are to be desired in him who would prove a good commander , that he be fortunate . besides , no victory is ever won by meer fighting , without much blood , and much loss of ones own men ; so as to overcome an enemy by such means as fabius knew how to do , and without exposing himself to the danger of a set battle , to overthrow an enemies army by reduceing it to great hardships , is a thing of more rare vertue , and which makes the commander more praise-worthy . by these cunnings were hannibals cunnings deluded , by these was his fierceness tamed , and the reputation won from him , and from his army , which he had won in battel , by having so often worsted and overthrown the romans . so as it may be said , that fabius conquered hannibal a conqueror ; but that scipio overcame him when he was already conquered . for fabius had to do with him , when he was in italy with a puissant army , and in the height of his greatest prosperity ; but scipio made not trial of his forces against those of hannibal , till he was returned to africa , with his army beaten and wasted by sufferings , and when by the usual change of humane affairs the state of things between the carthaginians and romans was sufficiently altered . wherefore hannibal , who had formerly endeavoured nothing more then to fight his enemies in a pitch'd field , when he was returned to africa , perswaded the carthaginians to peace , and proposed all conditions of agreement to scipio , so to shun joyning battel with him ▪ in which , as if he had foretold his own misfortunes , he lost the remnant of his army which he had brought from italy . wherefore should it not then be thought , that it was harder for fabius to stop the course of hannibals victories , then it was for scipio to overcome him in battel , when the carthaginians were at their greatest loss , and 〈◊〉 ? nay , it was objected to scipio , when he endeavoured to lead his army into africa , that he did it to shun encountring with hannibal in italy . it is a very common , but a very true saying , non minor est virtus quàm querere , parta tueri . fabius preserved the glory , reputation and state of the commonwealth , which his ancestors had won ; scipio increased them . so as had it not been for fabius , the name , at least the fame of rome had been almost lost : but she had onely been less glorious without scipio . on the contrary , who will consider scipio's great actions , how can he judge him to come short of any other roman commander whatsoever , either for glory or dedesert ; since he may be said to have been the first who opened the way unto the romans of conquering the whole world , as they did in a short time ? for by his means africa was conquered , and a curb put to the greatest and most powerful enemies that ever the romans had ; so as none ever after durst withstand the roman greatness by force , or did disdain to humble and submit themselves to their worth and fortune , whom the most powerful and fortunate of all other nations did already obey ? scipio brought all spain under the roman obedience , driving away the carthaginians from thence , whom he overcame in four several battels : nor did he make the way easie to greater acquisitions , less by his excellent gifts of mind , then by force of arms ; making those people affectionate , and faithful to the romans . and yet as not much valuing these his great deeds , being returned to rome full of glory , he endevaoured to return again with his army into africa , knowing that the carthaginians could not keep quiet at home , but must be troubling and endangering the the romans : nor had he less difficulty to overcome fabius his obstinate opinion in the senate , who blamed this advice , then in routing the enemies in the field . but if fabius be to be esteemed , because he in a short time freed the romans from the danger of the carthaginians ; what must we say of scipio , who did for ever secure them from these their enemies , bereaving them of their land-forces by taking the flower of their men away from them in battel ; and the like of their maritime strength , having by agreement forced them to burn all their ships ? which won him so great respect from all persons , as at his return from africa people ran from all parts , only that they might see him . to say truth , what can be said of fabius , save that he did not lose ? but in scipio's victories , what can be desired to make them greater or more glorious ? in the space of forty five days he raised a powerful army ; and followed by more voluntiers for the fame of his worth , then he carried soldiers with him by decree of senate , he marched into africa : he conquered people and cities , that were enemies to the name of roman ; he overcame asdrubal and hanno , two famous carthaginian commanders ; he discomfited hannibals army , and ending the war with the overthrow of the enemy , he returned time enough to rome to lay down his magistracie . hannibal being withdrawn from the walls of rome , and kept at gaze by fabius his cunning , stayed in italy , expecting succor from africa , to renew the war with greater force . scipio's advice and actions were only able to draw him out of italy ; so as carrying the war elswhere , at the same time he freed his own home from the troubles and danger thereof . he who should have asked fabius , what the signs were , what the fruits of his victories ; what could he have shewn ? no enemies taken , no cities won , no gold nor silver brought into the comon-exchequer . but many things prove the glory and deserts of scipio : so many prisoners taken , amongst which syphax , the great and famous king of numidia ; so many cities subjugated in africa , and in spain ; the annual tribute imposed upon the carthaginians ; the rich pillage brought ●●me from the enemy . what is there then 〈◊〉 like , not to name equal , between these two , which may make them contend for military glory ? but certainly it may be affirmed for truth , that the one and the other of them are come to the height of glory , though they took several ways to arrive at it : for each of them shewed wisdom and valor in their actions , becoming advised statesmen , and great commanders . divers accidents concurred in their several actions , which perswaded them to proceed after a differing manner : for fabius being to withstand hannibals violence , who being already advanced into the very bowels of italy , and being drawn veryneer to rome herself , had filled all things with fear , did not think it fitting in this confusion of affairs to hazard all the fortune of the commonwealth in a day of battel : for the neerness and power of the enemy did not allow time to recruit and stop the course of hannibals victories , in case that army wherein the chief hopes of romes welfare did consist , should have been beaten . but scipio having to do with the same hannibal , when he and his army were in africa , and neer the city of carthage , knew that if any thing of ill should befall him , he should only lose those men that were with him ; which loss might easily be recovered , the condition being considered wherein the common-wealth then was : and it being his fortune to overcome hannibal , he reduced the affairs of the carthaginians ( whom he had worsted in divers other battels ) to the utmost of dangers : wherefore by the victory he got great rewards for himself , great glory , and increased the empire of his commonwealth . scipio had also other reasons which perswaded him to fight ; his being in a forein country , his keeping of the enemy from recruiting after their late losses , and he being shortly to lay down his command ; so as to spin out the war in length , was to deprive him of his conceived hopes of victory , and to lessen what he had already done . scipio therefore had as much reason to engage in battel , as fabius formerly had to refuse fighting . this is confirmed by the several ways of proceeding of the same hannibal , an excellent commander ; who at first , when he was in italy , desired nothing more then to come to a pitch'd battel , out of the aforesaid reasons ; so afterwards being withdrawn with his army into africa , shunn'd encountring scipio as much as he might , the different condition of affairs advising him differently . and it is a general rule , that those things ought to be avoided which please the enemy ; for the respects being different , that which makes for the one , must needs be bad for the other . it must afterwards be considered , that if fabius had pleased , when he was made dictator , after the unfortunate fight at the prassemine lake , to lead that army into africa which was destined for the safety of the very city of rome , it must have been exposed to apparent dangers of the enemies victorious forces , with uncertain hope of success in africa ; nor would this diversion have been then peradventure a sufficient means to have freed it from danger , as it did afterwards when scipio's counsel was followed in an opportune time , when after divers bad successes both in spain and africa , hannibal was sent for back to assist the much weakned affairs of his commonwealth . he therefore who will go about to imitate the actions of these two captains , if he will reap good thereby , must first very well consider every particular of those things which he goes about , and therein accommodate himself , either by hazarding battel , and hasting on to the end of the enterprise with sudden and resolute parties , or else must harass and overcome the enemy by drawing things out to a length , and by reducing him to many inconveniencies . he also who will advise wisely touching the assaulting of another mans country , to keep his own from danger , or who will else make good his own affairs only by way of defence , must have divers respects in consideration , which lead to the knowledg what in his case is fittest to be done ; and by so doing he may hope for the good success which these two famous roman commanders had . but howsoever , though their affairs fall out less prosperously , he will win the praise of being either a wise and circumspect , or else a valiant and bold commander ; as befell scipio and fabius , because each of them knew how to manage the war so , as the condition of times , the quality of their own and of their enemies forces , the diversity of the place , and other respects and accidents , which in such cases ought to regulate our actions , did advise them to do . the fifth discourse . whether war being to be made against the romans , hannibals counsel was good to carry it into italy . hannibal , a cried up carthaginian captain , intending to wage war with the romans , resolved to lead the army which he had already raised in spain into italy by land , passing first over the pyrenean mountains , and then over the alps , that he might approach as near as he could to the city of rome , the seat of the empire . this is thought by all men to be a bold and generous advice , but it is much doubted whether it were advantagious for the carthaginians , and for hannibals own defigns . he thought , that being to quell the roman power , he must shake it in those parts where it had taken deepest root : that the romans would be furnished with soldiers , victuals , moneys , and all things else from italy , wherewith they were wont to maintain war against several nations , and to encrease their own glory and empire : that whilst they were masters of this , they could not be much prejudiced by any thing that could be attempted against them in other parts : that usually his advantage was very great who assaulted another at his own door , because he keeps the perils , and greatest losses of war far from him : he increaseth courage in his own men , and takes in from the enemy , and makes the way more easie to victory , not onely by forces but by reputation , and also by the fear which he infuseth into the enemy : but the farther off the war is catried , and the nearer the enemy is assaulted in the centre and very heart of his state , the more are such advantages got . if the romans , who were alwaies wont to molest other mens affairs , should be forced to fight within their own confines , and were to wage war , not to inlarge their dominions , but to defend themselves and what they held deerest , they would prove less then themselves , because their courage would fail them , and the splendor of the roman name would be obscured , which did so much help to the atchieving of their enterprises . therefore the romans knowing by experience the disadvantage of making war at home , and open enmity being professed between them and phillip king of macedon , fearing least the carthaginian war being ended , he would assult italy , as hannibal had done but a little before , would be the first who should pass with their army into greece , and carry the greatest trouble and danger of war into the states of others . but the longer and more difficult the way was for hannibal to conduct his carthaginians into italy , so much greater honor would he win when he should have overcome these difficulties : that without great constancy and worth in the commander and soldiers , so hard an enterprise could not have been undertaken , such craggy mountainous feats passed over , and their way be made by the sword amidst an enemies country . to this was added , that there were many in italy , who were not pleased with the romans empire , by whose colonies sent by them into other peoples countries , they were robbed not onely of their goods but of their liberty : that the fame given out that hannibal would free these from the roman slavery , and the whole world from the fear of their ambition and power , might alienate the minds of such as were neighbors to the romans , and reconcile them so much the more to him . hannibal did likewise consider , as he whose intention it was not to make in●odes into the roman territories , to make a sore and long war with them , that there were many in the carthaginian senace who were not well pleased with this enterprise , some being moved by respect of the contrary faction , others by envy to his glory , and others by zeal they bore to their countries quiet . that if he should be with his army in some neighboring country , and that the romans should be but weakly invaded , and not soundly set upon , it might in likelihood fall out he should be sent for home , and peace be concluded . he feared likewise lest his army , which was composed of divers nations , when his soldiers should find themselves near their own houses , they might the more easily disband . being therefore onely intent to come with his forces into italy , he would shun all occasions of trying his men against the romans in a pitch'd field , when publius scipio went to encounter him at the banks of rhodanus . moreover it would not satisfie the high and magnanimous end which he had prefixt unto himself , of freeing carthage , his country , from the tribute to the which she was made liable by the romans , to molest them in any part further from the state , but he must march against the very city of rome , the seat of the empire , to allay , or at least to weaken much their power . other smaller things might have given some trouble to the romans , and have retarded their greatness ; but in the same danger and uncertainty of war , whereby she had provoked so powerful an enemy against her , the reward , and the benefit were not equal in both the cases . very great and difficult undoubtedly was such an enterprise , but befitting hannibal , who , as it was said , had through the magnanimity of his spirit , proposed unto himself to imitate the deeds of hercules , and had taken up arms against the romans , not out of any hatred he bore them , but for the dignity of empire . so as what would have infused fear into another , did set his mind the more on fire . he thought likewise by force of necessity to infuse into his soldiers that strength and constancy of mind , which was as an excellent vertue in himself , whilst fighting should be enforced , all occasion of flight being taken away , to put all their hopes of safety in their swords . this most expert commander knew likewise wherein his forces did exceed , and therewithal he would make trial of their worth . wherefore passing with his army safe over the mountains , he foresaw he should find large plains in italy , wherein he might fight the romans upon great advantage , his army abounding in horse , and the infantry being the romans chiefest strength . then as this counsel was taken by hannibal with reason , so if this action be particularly considered , it may be said , that he was very successful therein : for the first time that he had to do with the roman armies in italy , thought the armies of two consuls were joyned together against him , that which was first sent against him into france , and that which was destined to encounter him when he should have descended the mountains , he came off with such victory as he put rome into great terror , both for that the city was not wont before to hear such bad news from their captains , as also for having so powerful , and so victorious an enemy so nigh at hand . but what can be added to the victories gotten at the lake of thrasymenus and at cannae , ( places made famous for the calamities which the rom●ns suffered there ) to make his glory greater ? and the good thereof was answerable to the greatness ; for those of the empire rebelling every where , and flying from the romans distressed fortune , to hannibals favor and obedience , he soon made himself master of almost all italy , and put the very city of rome to great danger and confusions . so as it was either his noble daring which begot such prosperous effects , or else it was thereby accompanied . yet there wanted not other reasons , and respects , which may make hannibals advice of leading his army into italy appear less useful , and less praise worthy ; and it may be said , that if he had passed into italy with almost all the whole carthaginian forces , bringing along with him veteran soldiers , and the greatest strength of the carthaginian empire , he ought to have considered , that undertaking to make war against the romans , a warlike , powerful , and fortunate nation , the carthaginian state was not likely to keep unmolested by their forces ; reason not permitting it to be believed , that they who formerly , not provoked by any injuries , but rather excited by a desire of government , had happily waged war with the commonwealth of carthage , would now stand only spectators of their own misery , and repulsers of offence , but that they would rather endeavour to carry that fire which was kindled in their own houses , either into africa or spain , to keep the carthaginian forces from succouring that part where their own danger was increased . and so did the effect ensue ; for the romans having first assaulted spain , and after africa , and finding them both but badly provided of garrisons fitting to withstand so potent an enemy , they reduced the first under the obedience of their commonwealth , driving all the carthaginians from thence , and did put the other into so great confusion , as little more then the bare name of a republick remained to the very city of carthage . but how could hannibal hope to tarry long in italy , and to be able to receive such succors and supplies as he must of necessity stand in need of ? the way was shut up by land by the craggy mountains , and by the enemy ; and the sea was less open to them , the romans not being only masters of the sea , but of navigation ; for their fleet was greater then that of the carthaginians : whence it was , that the succor came neither time enough to hannibal for him to prosecute his victories ; neither when it was sent , could it come safe to him , his brother asdrubal , who conducted it , being cut in pieces , together with all his men by the consul claudius . out of these respects it may be thought , that it had been better and safer for hannibal to have commenced the war against the romans in sicily or sardinia . the pretence of taking up arms against the romans , for the recovery of such things as were granted out of great necessity to them by his commonwealth , was more just . wherefore he might have bethought himself of not provoking the disfavor both of god and man against him ; as it appeared on the contrary , that his breach of articles , and his too bold design of driving the romans out of italy , their own proper seat and dominion , made all things prove cross unto him . the business would likewise have proved more opportune and easie , by reason of the ill satisfaction which the people of those islands received from the romans power , which occasioned in them a great mind to rebel , as was afterwards found . the carthaginian commonwealth was strong enough by sea ; and though fortune had not been propitious to them in their naval conflict with the romans , yet was their experience in maritime affairs greater ; and the city was then so well provided of shipping , as we read that they were above five hundred ships which they were forced to burn by command from scipio , after hannibals rout in africa . if hannibal would then have put his army into these bottoms , and have turned with powerful forces upon sicily and sardinia , and being also assisted with the peoples inclination , he could not almost have doubted to have reduced them in a small time under the carthaginian power . and having won these islands , what way would he have made for the enterprise of italy ? he might have made use of this situation , and of his fleet , to have kept the sea open to himself , and block'd up to the romans : whereas doing the contrary , it happened otherwise ; for the carthaginian fleet being very weak , the greater part whereof were imployed in other places , it was overcome by the romans , their navigation and succor was hindred , and finally all hannibals designs were frustrated . but the advantage which hannibal might have reaped by such an enterprise , and by the getting of sicily , may easily be known by what scipio got , who being to pass with his army into africa , putting in at sicily , he thereby got great assistance and accommodation . and the carthaginians themselves were aware , that the war ought to have been handled thus : for after the death of hier● , lord of syracusa , they sent their fleet to regain sicily ; but the counsel was too late and unopportunely taken ; for fortune beginning now again to smile upon the romans , and the enterprise being undertaken with but weak forces , they did little else but raise tumults , with more of loss to those that had rebelled against the romans , then any advantage to the carthaginians . it seems likewise that hannibal , when he first endeavoured to joyn in league with philip king of macedon , whose strength by sea was very great , and his jealousies of the romans likewise very great , as also his desire to secure himself therefrom , had laid a better foundation for his designs , and might have had better success in his endeavours against the romans ; which because out of vainglorious ambition he would accelerate , he overthrew them . let us then bound hannibals praises within straiter precincts , though his fame sound very gloriously in the memory of all ages , for the greatness of his attempts , and his success therein at first ; since that advantage ceaseth which might first have counselled him to the affairs of italy : and let us only see whether he may have purchased any true glory by his so great daring , and by the readiness wherewith he buckled to battel . he who will weigh things with reason and experience , will find that wisdom ought to be of greater consideration in a worthy commander , then force of arms. which may be seen in hannibal ; for the wisdom of quintus fabius did that against him with safety , which the war waged with much loss , and more danger , by flaminius and by sempronius , and afterwards by gaius terentius , all of them consuls , and commanders of the romans armies , could not do ; who rashly hazarding the doubtful events of battel , were overcome by hannibal , and brought the affairs of rome to almost utter despair . the praise then which is given to hannibal , is great eagerness of mind against dangers : which though of it self it may make him worthy some admiration , yet such a vertue fals easily into vice , and in stead of boldness , may be termed rashness . but if we will consider hannibals actions yet a little more narrowly , we shall the better discover , that hannibal having undertaken this war unjustly , and violated the articles made between the carthaginians and the romans , he cannot deserve to be truly named valiant , the vertue of valor not consisting in the maintaining of an unjust cause . and if hannibal ought to glory of his having routed the romans , his glory will prove the less , since the captains whom he overcame were not so much cryed up , and were of lesser experience and worth then many other romans , who never had to do in any great enterprise ; and that it was not his own worth , and the worth of his soldiers which made way to his victories ; more then did the ignorance , rashness , and chiefly the discord of the roman commanders ; to whom , through some unlucky star , it was the misfortune of the commonwealth at that time to commit the guidance and command of her forces . but when he met with fabius , marcellus , or scipio , the face of affairs altered . and yet hannibal ought to have believed he should have met with these , or at least such as these , then with the others , or such as them : for the carthaginians had experienced much to their loss , in the preceding war , what the worth of the roman commanders was . hannibal might likewise have considered , how hard it would be for him to vanquish so many cities , so many roman colonies , defended by citizens who did partake of the roman name and vilor . but this was seen afterwards by experience , when he first began to undertake the taking in of cities , and when entring into umbrid ▪ and being incamped about spoletum , he spent much time there to little purpose ; and finding how strong defence was made by a little roman colony , he saw how vain his designs would be of stom● 〈◊〉 city of rome . and though many of the chief cities of italy fell into his hands , this happened through the renown of victories which he had won ; which working upon many people who did accommodate themselves to the victors fortune , they gave themselves willingly over to the carthaginians , and rebelled against the vanquished romans . but to besiege cities required time , and time afforded means to the romans , who were at their own homes , to recruit their forces , and reduced hannibal , who was a stranger , into many inconveniencies and necessities . insomuch as it is a●●rmed by writers , that when hannibal had the means of fighting afforded him ( which he so much desired , but had little reason to hope for ) by terentius the consuls rashness , who was afterwards routed and overcome ; his affairs were reduced to so great and desperate straits , as manifest signs of revolting over to the enemies camp were discovered , and in himself a mind to save himself by flying away into africa by sea. but let us take the end of war into consideration , which we will be better able to judge by , then by its beginning : and though it is usually said , that event is the fools schoolmaster , yet it often falls out , that things are known by the event , which would never have been formerly thought upon ; and the best instruction is that which is learnt by experience . hannibal , after having with various and uncertain success , but with very great and certain dangers , oftentimes tried the event of sundry battels with the romans , was constrained , not so much out of obedience to the carthaginian senate , as out of necessity to forgo italy , and to lead the remainder of his army , which was already very much lessened , back into africa , to relieve the city of carthage , which was by scipio reduced into great danger ; and with his like former boldness , though not with the like prosperous success , come to a day of battel with his enemy : wherein his army being overthrown , and with that army , which was the strength of the empire , all hopes lost of ever being able to make head against the romans , the war was finally ended upon new conditions , and by the agreement , but in effect by the ultimate ruine of the carthaginian commonwealth : and together with the loss of her liberty , she was bereft of all her maritime forces ; for amongst other grievous conditions , she was injoyned to burn all her ships , whereof she had great store ; so desirous were the romans to keep her from attempting any novelty . but how can we pass over these great actions , without reflecting upon the wonderful variation of humane affairs , and without marvelling at the several fortunes of these two powerful nations ? for the carthaginians having as conquerors over-run all italy , and bereft the romans of almost all their forces , when it seemed as if their commonwealth , following this her miraculous prosperity , was in a short time to mount to a supreme greatness of monarchy , they fell from these high hopes into the extreme of misery , being bereft not only of the gallantry of command , but of liberty . and on the other side , the romans , who having not many years before her armies so notably defeated by hannibal , as they were glad to imploy all their care about the safety of the very city of rome , did on such a sudden rise to such a height of reputation , and power , as driving the carthaginians out of spain and having put the affairs of africa into great confusion , they forced them to recieve their laws from the romans . this victory of the romans was that which opened them the way to that monarchy , at which they afterwards did in a few years arrive ; for having quell'd the carthaginians , and increased their own power by the ruine of the forces and dominion of others , there was not any other potentate who could long resist them . other people seemed not to be ashamed to yeeld to them who had conquered the carthaginians , and made themselves masters of their commonwealth . no truer , nor better reason can be 〈◊〉 for this indeed so miraculous diversity of condition and fortune which 〈◊〉 two great and powerful commonwealths , then the excellency of military discipline , which was better ordered , and understood by the romans , then by the carthaginians . for hence it rose , that every citizen being amongst the romans imployed in the militia , they had greater store of commanders and soldiers . so as though they were oftentimes worsted by hannibal , they could notwithstanding soon muster other armies , and get new forces : which the carthaginians could not do ; who having had a notable rout at zama , were totally opprest , not being ever able to rally again , because they had no other soldiers nor commanders under whose conduct they might hope for better events . but when the romans were overcome , they wanted not fabius maximus , marcellus , claudius , scipio , and many others , who behaved themselves more fortunately in that war , and did better service the commonwealth ; and they could easily send recruits unto their armies , and supply the places of such as were slain in battel , out of their own citizens of rome . which was caused by the committing of the government of the war to their consuls , which place of magistracy enduring but a year , occasion was offered to many other citizens , to get experience in military affairs , and all others were so obliged to the militia , as after the carthaginian war was ended , they who had not served in the wars for the space of four years at the least , were by the censors noted of infamy , and blotted out of the publick muster books . but the carthaginians having through the power of the barchinian faction , transferred the supreme authority of administration of arms , upon some few citizens , as it was formerly upon hannibal , the father to this man , and after him upon this hannibal , and his brother asdrubal ; when asdrubal was slain in italy , in the conflict which he had with claudius , and when hannibal the son was abandoned by his former good fortune , and by the reputation he had formerly gotten ; and the commonwealth being also wonted to make use of mercinary souldiers ; the army of antient soldiers being lost in the battel of zama , they could not recruit it with their own citizens , nor withstand the blow of so dire a mischance . these , and such like things may be argued , concerning this great action of hannibals , and these important successes of war ; but rather out of probabilities , then any certain demonstration . yet these very considerations , may serve for useful instructions in hard and difficult resolutions , to foresee what end is likely to befall the undertaking of great princes . the sixth discourse . whether it was well done by the romans , to carry the war against the carthaginians , into sicily and spain , and into macedonia and greece , against king philip ; whist hannibal waged war with them in italy . as amongst all the wars made by the romans , none was more long or troublesom , then that which they made with the carthaginians , especially when their commander hannibal did flourish , so from hence chiefly may noble matter of discourse , and useful instructions for matters of state be gathered . whilst hannibal was in italy , which was for the space 〈◊〉 fourteen years , the romans made war notwithstanding in other countries 〈◊〉 sicily , spain and africa against the same carthaginians ; and against philip king of macedon ïn greece . but as war was made against them in italy , so were they the first authors of these other wars ; which affords occasion of no small wonder to him who considers , and doth well weigh this their proceeding . one would think , that the romans being set upon at home by so powerful enemies , as it was apparent that their whole forces were not able to resist , should not have resolved by dividing the same forces to make their defence weaker ; since the main of all their affairs depended upon the success of their armies against hannlbal , how can it be thought a good advice , to hazard with part of their forces the whole fortune of their commonwealth ? a thing which when forced by necessity , is thought a great misfortune to the state wherein it happens . and when italy should be lost , as it was in great danger to be whilst hannibal was there with a puissant army , to what purpose could any acquisition serve which should be made in spain or elswhere , which must of necessity fall of it self ? and with what courage could the romans fight in forein parts , when their own country was wasted with war , their houses , wealth , and all that they had exposed to utmost danger ? so as whilst fighting against hannibal , and all their minds being inflamed , not only out of a military obligation , and out of charity to their country , but out of the natural and powerful love which every man bears to his own affairs , one man stood for many : so when abroad , the unquietness and doubt of mind keeping them afflicted and in jealousie ▪ by reason of the dubious case wherein they left whatsoever was most dear unto them , would not permit many to stand in fight for one . who can praise the suffering of danger to increase at home , out of hopes of purchasing abroad ? had the romans armies been in another country , and imployed about other affairs , reason would have advised them to have sent for them back into italy , when they saw so powerful an enemy upon their backs . for , vis unita fortior ; force when united is stronger , and better able to keep what is harmful afar off , thus we see it falls out by vertue of mother nature , in our bodies ; when the heart is ill at ease , all the spirits of the body flock thither to defend it , as the most noble part , and whereupon life it self depends . hannibal was a powerful enemy , formidable for his excellent worth and military discipline , and for the many forces which he brought with him ; and moreover italy was as it wereunarmed at this time , and wanted her valiantest commanders , and best soldiers . what could the carthaginians have more desired for hannibals prosperity , then to see the two scipio's , gnus and publius , on whom only the welfare of the commonwealth ; now so much in danger , did rest , sent into parts afar off , so as they could not , in her very greatest extremity , return to succor her ? if hannibal had had a mind to have lest italy , was not this parting of the roman forces , and the want of their best commanders , a powerful reason to make him stay ? and what advice was it to provoke other princes and people to enmity , as must needs be done by sending forces to molest spain , whilst the commonwealth was in such trouble and danger , as she ought to have made friends on all sides ? by which they incensed that nation , and drew other african princes upon their backs , who were friends and confederates with the carthaginians . and the increasing power of the romans being formerly apprehended by other people and princes , the condition of those times should have rather advised them to have cloaked such thoughts , and not to draw hatred and envy upon them : for every one must needs hold , that if the romans , being in such calamity and danger , would vex other countries with war , no province would have been free from their forces when they should have been rid of hannibal . which made the romans cause worse , and hannibals better , with those in italy , who did not much affect the so much greatness of the commonwealth , and much 〈◊〉 forein nations . wherefore the french , who first opposed hannibal whe●●●●●nt into italy , did for these respects favor his brother asdrubal afterwards , 〈◊〉 he past with succor through their country ; nay , many of them joined with his camp , and followe the carthaginian colors in italy , to maintain the war with them . if the romans did not know themselves to be sufficiently able to withstand hannibal in italy , where they had all conveniences , and he being a stranger wanted all , and could only come by them by force ; what reason could perswade them to maintain war in spain at the same time ? which war must be as incommodious to them , as it was advantageous and convenient for their enemies ; both for that that province was at their devotion , for the neerness of the city of carthage , and for the accommodation the sea afforded them , in furnishing them with all things necessary to make war ; which certainly may be done better and more commodiously at home . thus the cimb●ians , after having given many defeats to the romans in gallia , were by them overcome in italy . war is likewise made at home with less danger , out of the easiness of recruiting an army , when battels prove unfortunate . thus the romans being oft-times worsted by hannibal , did maintain and raise up their abject fortune : and the venetians being assaulted at their own homes by those of genoa , by reason of the commodity they had of assembling all their forces together , did not only wi●hstand , but did overthrow the assailants , who were gotten even into their washes , and were setled in the city of chioggia . but if we will then consider the particular condition wherein the romans were at that time , we shall find all their affairs in great disorder , and such as did advise them rather to lessen then to increase new expences , by undertaking new wars . the publick treasury was sufficiently decreased by loss of the usual . rents of so many places which hannibal was possest of in italy ; for that what they were masters of in sardinia , was to cease paying usual and great contributions ; for that the people who were subject to the romans , were so much wearied with continual wars , as they were hardly able to maintain those few soldiers which they had need of for their own defence , not in a case to furnish other armies with monies , as writers affirm . others add , that the affairs of the romans were grown to so great a strait , by maintaining so many armies so long a time in several countries , as that the scipio's writing to the senate , that they could no longer maintain their soldiers who were grown needful of all things , the commonwealth was faln to beg aid from those who had gained much in former times by publick impositions , so to provide out of private purses for the paying and victualling of the army : an example of much charity to their country , which was brought to so great a necessity ; but withall of ill advice , and but little wisdom in those who had brought it to that pass . the romans affairs were so weakned in spain , as gneus scipio , contrary to the custom of the romans , was forced to make use of many soldiers of that nation to recruit his army : which though the deceit of those barbarians , was the cause why he received a notable defeat , wherein he himself likewise lost his life . it might at first peradventure be thought an useful advice to assault the car●haginian states , so to remove hannibal by diversion from italy . but since experience proved the contrary , how can the increasing of danger at home , to carry it abroad , be praised ? 't was already eight years that gneus scipio had made war in spain , and marcellus had labored long with various successes in sicily , when hannibal was notwithstanding still so powerful in italy , as marching with his whole army from capua , he went to assault the very city of rome , where all things were full of tumult and confusion : and had not the romans had good fortune by the great store of rain and water , which falling from the skies , retarded the first assault of hannibal , all the ho●●● of so flourishing a commonwealth had been disparch'd . who then in such 〈◊〉 ity of danger , in which with great uncertainty of success the walls and gate● of rome herself were guarded , did not wish that marcellus , the two scipio's , and the rest that were at war in sicily , and in spain , had been there present , who if the city of rome should be lost , must be made a prey unto the enemy ? the very fame and honor of such a victory being sufficient to make all that the romans in so long process of time had taken from the carthaginians , return to their former obedience . on the other side , if so many commanders and roman soldiers , wasted in wars so far off , had been all joyned together in italy , how could hannibal have so long withstood so great a power ? the first onset of the carthaginian army was great , when it advanced so far , as the fortune of the romans began to give back , and the romans to confess themselves overcome , having had many great routs . but when fortune began to face about , and the worth of the carthaginian soldiers began to flag , who were deboished with the delights of capna , ( which was the cause why hannibal tarried long in italy without doing any thing of note ) reason tells us that if he had been assailed by so many roman commanders and soldiers , he must have been forced to have left italy . and he being gone , and the danger removed to further distance from home , the romans having a valiant , and an expert militia , and having won great reputation by this victory , the other enterprises which they should have afterwards have undertaken either against others , or against the carthaginians themselves at their own homes , would have proved more easie , and more certain : and experience proves clearly , that the affairs of italy would have given the law to all other proceedings ; and that upon the success thereof the whole war did depend ; for the romans could never drive the carthaginians totally out of spain , till the rout given to asdrubal , brother to hannibal , by the consul claudius , by which the power and fortune of the carthaginians growing less in italy , they fared alike in spain . but the war undertaken by the romans , against ●hilip king of macedon , at the same time when italy was all on fire with the carthag●nian war , may peradventure be thought a business of greater importance . for philip was a great prince ; and might easily have troubled the romans affairs , by reason of the neighborhood of greece , whose people were his friends and confederates . and though philip had shewed himself not to be very well affected to the commonwealth of rome , since he had first sent his ambassadors to hannibal , to treat of joyning with him in confederacy against the romans , and had afterwards set upon , and taken the ( itics of apolonia , and orico , that he might have , ( as it was suspected ) the better opportunity to offend the romans ; yet the present condition of affairs seemed rather to advise them , to dissemble their injuries and suspitions , then by unimportunely revenging the one and assertaining the other , put their affairs in greater danger , and make him a certain and open enemy ▪ who was as yet concealed and doubtful . and time might have opened the way u●to them to have made him their friend , and to have brought him into their parts ; which it was formerly known he had mind enough unto of himself ; but being put in fear and jealousie of his own affairs by hannibals so great prosperity , he was diverted from it . and counsels which bring certain mischiess with them , ought not to be undertaken out of hope of evading another evil which is further off , and uncertain , when he who useth it is in so weak and dangerous a condition , as the addition of any new inconvenience how little soever , is sufficient to ruine him : and this was the condition of the affairs of rome at that time . yet it may be said that the very authority of the romans name was a thing of great moment , and so much the greater as the event approved of their counsel . for hannibal could not have been drawn out of italy , but by troubling the affairs of africa , and by putting the car●●●nians into the same hazard and dangers , as they had endeavored to put the 〈◊〉 to . they considered then , that hannibal having shewed such constancy , and worth in leading so numerous an army , consisting of divers nations into italy , and having found that fortune ( according as is usually said ) favoured his boldness , their chief hopes of overcoming him lay in making him be his own ruine , and suffering his army to moulder away through harpships . and this manner of warfaring , used by fabius maximus had saved , and restored the commonwealth , which the different opinion on of other commanders , by hazarding themselves upon the fortune of a battel , had almost quite undone . now to compass this , it was necessary to keep the carthaginian forces so imployed abroad by diversion , as they could not relieve hannibal in italy : for if so , many of the carthaginian armies might have passed safely into italy , as the scipio's did defeat in spain , they would have so overflown italy , as there could have been no escape for the affairs of rome . this very advice was followed by the venetians , when they had their enemies at their own own homes , and were in the same danger and disorder by reasou of the rout given them by the genuses , as the city of rome was in , after the defeat at cannae . for they joyned in confederacy with barnaby vis coute , duke of millan , and making a great effort , sent many soldiers against the city of genua , and did so molest their affairs by land , as they kept off those succours , which otherwise would have been sent to their men who had taken the city of chioggia , who missing of supplies , and being fought withal , and besieged by the venetian forces , of conquerors became conquered , and fell into the hands of the venetians . moreover the romans considered , that in the wars which they made in sicily and in spain , they had this great advantage that they fought not with honnibal , a captain of singular and unparalleld valor . it was likewise held , that the roman commanders and armies , might more securely make , trial of their worth and fortune , in wars made out of italy , as they had oftentimes done ; for when they had any loss abroad , they lost nothing but those men which the fortune of war bereft them of ; but if they should overcome , they got the enemies country ; just as it befel them in spain . wherefore it being disadvantagious for them to fight in italy , it proved the better advice to temporize with hannibal in italy , and at the same time to fight with mago asdrubal , and other carthaginian commanders in sicily , and in spain . so as the losses in italy were recompeased by acqusitions made in spain , the which of all other countries , was the first that was reduced into a province , and did much inlarge the confines of the roman empire . but if the sea had been open for the carthaginians , as it would have been if the romans neglecting their fleet , had not provided for the affairs of sicily , hannibal might easily have been furnished with things necessary from the carthaginians , wherewith to reinforce his army : so as no part of italy should have been free from his forces , who unassisted or succored , could notwithstanding keep his army so long together , and attempt so many enterprises ; they therefore thought they had done enough , in entertaining asdrubal , a captain of great authority and valor , so as he could not ( as they knew his design was ) pass with a new army into italy , to joyn with hannibal , as he did after the scipio's death , and after the rebellion of many of the spanish cities , the carthaginians being moved to do their utmost , since they had lost syracusa and cap●a , which were both of them faln into the romans power . so as no assistance being given unto hannibal , all the labor was lost which he had so many years undergone in italy . on the contrary , the romans persevering in their first opinion , when the two scipio's were dead , sent p●blius scipio into spain to keep asdrubal from making his passage , diverting the forces which were to pass over with him into italy , by keeping the carthaginians molested at home : it follows not therefore by a general rule , that what was good for one of the enemies , must be hurtful for the other ; so as it were good for the carthaginians to wage war in italy , far from their own homes , this very same thing must be harmful for the romans . but since they could not be the first assailant , hannibal having faln upon them with such violence , it was reason , that the romans taking the same course , should assault the carthaginians territories . we read also , that the same hannibal , being still of the same opinion which once he was , being with autiochus in the time of his exile , whilst he was treating of making war against the romans , he perswaded him to pass over as soon as he could , and with as great a strength as he could put together , into italy ; affirming that all other enterprises would be to no purpose , whilst italy was at peace and quiet , and that the romans had means to maintain war abroad . this very same thing , for the same respects diversly considered , ought to have instructed the roman commanders and senators in the carthaginian war ; to wit , that they were not to suffer their enemies to rest quiet at home , so as ●ree from all thoughts of defending themselves , they might the better turn all their forces upon italy , and the very city of rome . and if they had taken that resolution at first , which they did afterwards by the advice of publius scipio , ( who from the conquering of africa , took the name of african ) to wage war with the carthaginians neerer their own home , they might peradventure have freed italy sooner from the so many troubles and dangers which she underwent by hannibals long abode . but it may be moreover said , that many other things did force , or at least perswade the romans to undertake these wars . sardinia was first assaulted by the carthaginians with those very forces which were destined for italy to relieve hannibal ; so as it behoved the romans to march with their armies thither , not only to maintain and defend that island , which was of such importance to the commonwealth , but for that they therein defended the welfare of italy , by keeping so many warriers afar off , who if they were free , were ready to assault her . and this advice proved very fortunate ; for quintus fabius gave so notable a rout to the carthaginians in sardinia , as they lost about forty thousand of their soldiers . the death of hiere the tyrant of siracusa , occasioned the war made in sicily , and the great commotions of that island , by which it was comprehended , that if these their designs had not been hindred by the romans , that great and famous city would have faln into the power of the carthaginians , to the great prejudice of the romans , who for the same reason ( being assisted by the mamertines ) undertook the first carthaginian war ; judging that if the carthaginians should be absolute masters of sicily , it would be a step to pass into italy . but this would have been the more incommodious at this time , for that by reason of the so many places which hannibal had taken in italy , they might have had a more easie and secure receptacle there . moreover , the romans were invited to make war with the carthaginians in spain , and to divert their forces , by reason that they understood how that province was but ill satisfied with the carthaginian government , and that it was well inclined to the romans ; which did much facilitate those enterprises which were boldly undertaken , and fortunately atchieved . the city of saguntum was also the first rise of these wars in spain ; which they thought it did not become the generosity of rome to leave in the power of the carthaginians ; so as upon any other good success , they might seem to have lost the chief cause in this contest : neither did they notwithstanding take saguntum till after eight years war in spain , when the other affairs of rome began to prosper very much ; as if the city which was the beginning of so many wars , had been reserved to be the end thereof . these and other such like reasons may be alleadged for the war undertaken against the carthaginians ; but that which they made against philip may be said to be caused rather by necessity then choice : for philip , for his part , being already resolved to follow hannibals fortune , and expecting large recompence , had sent his ambassadors several times formerly to him , to conclude a confederacie with him : wherefore the romans thinking it better to prevent the enemy , then to be by them prevented , fell suddenly upon him with their whole fleet and army , hoping to suppress him , though they did not wholly effect their design . but they continued their war against him afterwards in greece , incited by the commotions already raised in that province by the italians ; knowing that unless they should interpose themselves , greece must either fall into philips hands , whereby the power of a people that were enemies to the romans , and already very formidable of themselves , would be greatly increased ; or else they must have recourse to the assistance of king attalus , as the grecians had already protested to the romans , and so they must suffer the neighborhood of another king , who was already powerful in asia , and might at another time trouble the affairs of rome . and the wisdom of the romans was always such , as not being cast down by any adversity , they never seemed so much to apprehend present dangers , but that they had an eye to those which might ensue , and in time grow greater . and this peradventure was that which did prove the romans power and worth more then any thing else ; since , when as they were as yet but masters of a small state , and that their affairs were reduced into great difficulties , both by their so many bad successes in battel against hannibal , and by the risings of their friends and confederates , yet they resolved to maintain war at one and the same time in four several countries , to wit , in italy , sicily , spain , and greece ; and they were able to manage them all . and certainly such advice was no less useful then generous : for he who should overcome the romans in any one place , could not hope quite to subdue them , since they had other armies and valiant commanders who might make good their fortune , and raise it up again . so as things formerly alleadged for arguments to asperse this their resolution , may peradventure be allowed of in such states , and amongst such princes , where there is not that worth , discipline , or power as was amongst the romans ; but in them , or such as they , they are of no force ; and very experience , by the issue of those wars , seems to confirm and approve of the counsels by which they were undertaken . the seventh discourse . whether the def●ruction of carthage was the rise of the ruine of the roman republick carthage , a glorious and famous city , both for the command she had in africa and spain and for being long rival in glory with the common-wealth of rome , being at last to yield either to the great worth or happy genius of the romans , was not notwithstanding made tribu●ary to rome , but was burnt and destroyed even to the ground . the carthaginians were oft times overcome in battel by the romans ; and had severe laws imposed upon them ; yet were those undaunted fierce minds never well quell'd , but beginning to heighten their hopes and augment their forces , after the second carthaginian war , they molested those that were friends to the romans , and contrary to their articles , began to sail upon the sea with men of war. these things being therefore treated of in the senate of rome , caused variety of opinions : some were for the total ruining of the city of carthage , since otherwise the commonwealth of rome could not be free from their injuries and molestations ; and cato was very ●tiff of his opinion , who bringing some fresh figs which were gathered in carthage , shewed what dangers they were always subject unto by reason of their enemies neigborhood . but others endeavoring the contrary , sought to prove that totally to extinguish the carthaginians was no good advice ; and scipio nas●ica , a man of great authority , was greatly averse to this resolution , being thereunto moved ( as he said ) not through any pitty to the conquered enemy , but for the advantage of his own citizens , who when they should be free from the fear of the carthaginian forces , would suffer many evils through idleness . so as it was the common saying , and opinion , that the destruction of the carthaginians would hasten on the ruine of rome . and salust in the beginning of his history of catilines conspiracy , describing the abusive customs of the city of rome at that time , seems to be of opinion , that the overthrow of carthage did more harm to the commonwealth , by introducing idleness and pleasure , then the keeping of her flourishing and in arms , would have done . yet there were other considerations which did thwart this opinion , shewing that it was not peace and idleness , but the continually being verst in arms and war , which was the true cause of the civil discords , and change of government in rome . this it was which fomented ambition in the citizens , this it was that did too immensely increase their power . finally , it was this that divided the city , and through discord brought it to utter ruine . and how can it be said that the city of rome was ruined by peace since she never tasted thereof ? insomuch as for the space of six hundred eighty five years , that famous temple dedicated to ianus by numa pompillius , that it might stand open in time of war , and shut in time of peace , was onely twice seen to be shut ; once in the consulship of titus manlius , after the end of the first carthaginian war , and once more in augustus his time , after the naval victory over mark anthony . thus were the romans , and chiefly the most valiant amongst them , great enemies to peace ; not so much endeavoring to procure greater strength to the publick empire , as to encrease their own glory and power . therefore one war was made to beger another , no time being ever to be found wherein the city was to injoy , honest and civil leasure . and provinces , and the authority of administring war , was oft times confirmed to those who commanded their armies , who either desired to continue in their command , or occasion requiring it to be so , that they might put an end the wars begun : as it fell out in the second carthaginian war ; where the time of tarrying in that province , and the continuing of his command was prolonged to the consul scipio , who waged war in spain , to the end that he might finish what he had begun . the like was done to fabus in the wars which he made against hannibal in italy , and upon other occasions ; a thing which being done contrary to the rule of law , though it made somewhat for the publick advantage at the present , yet was it cause of great disorders afterwards . thus marius whilst he was abroad in the ju●urthan war , was created consul , and made chief commander against the cimbrians , though he ought not in his absence , and in time of contumacy , to have been chosen to that magistracy . caesar , after having commanded the roman armies five years , when he was sent to wage war in france , had his place of command cont nued unto him for five years longer ; and not herewithal content , but being accustomed to rule , he asked leave of the senate to keep abroad , and to continue in the army ; which when the senate would not give way unto , they too late opposed his desire , he being grown so powerful , by reason of his continuation in military command , as he valued not the senates authority , nor the being declared an enemy to the commonwealth . but if we will consider the beginning of civil discords , how , and where the siding began , which insected the minds of the citizens with pestiferous corruption , we shall find that this happened not in time of peace in cities , or by reason of civil affairs ; but in the camp amongst weapons , and when the commonwealth was bufied in weighty wars . for marius being drunk with the desire of military glory , and not being able to endure that it should be taken from him , or diminished by sylla , as he imagined it might happen by reason of syllas happy success in the jugurthan war , wherein having taken iugu●tha alive , he had the glory to have put an end to that war ; he began to think of establshing yet more greatness in himself , by making many of the order of cavaliers , and of the people partial to him , and impudently corrupting the citizens , first with moneys , and afterwards with open force of arms ; making the magistracy and command of the war be conferred and resolved upon in him , as he did in the consulship , and proconsulship against mithridates . the nobility being afrighted at this mans greatness , by reason of his authority and reputation with the soldiers , they mightily encreased sylla's power , who was an enemy to marius ; till at last they came to taking up arms and shedding of civil blood . but who knows not that caesar , moved thereunto more out of a desire of his own greatness , then out of his alliance with marius , raised and maintained his fraction in rome ; and that his power encreased not in peace , and in the market-place , but in war , and in the camp ? so for the same reason for which sylla was advanced a little before , it behoved the senate to confer more greatness upon pompey then became the condition of civil government ; so as the whole city was divided ; and with those arms , by which , though taken up , and made use of against enemies , the first occasion of contention among private citizens was given , the very commonwealth must be wounded , which stood in the midst between them , so as her vit●l spirit of liberty being taken away , her throat was cut by those whom she had most favoured . but whence did the so many other corruptions of those times arise , save from the so many prosperous successes of war , by which the citizens being much enriched and made proud , could not betake themselves to live parcimoniously , and with civil equality ? and it is said of caesar , that he corrupted the people of rome by moneys which he had got in the war , so to make them confer places of magistracy as he listed , upon such as were his friends , and partial to him . out of these respects the wise legislator , lycurgus , intending to lay the foundation of a long lasting government in sparta , though he introduced military exercises , to the end that the citizens might be able to defend their country ; yet he ordered the city so , as it could not much increase its power by any forgein war. but the commonwealth of rome not being ordered for peace , could never find out , not enjoy a peaceful condition . how is it then given out , that peace and idleness was the ruine of that city ? how should she beleeve that her arms should remain idle , if she would have the whole world for her enemy , as mari● said to mithidates ; that who would not recieve law from the romans , must make themselves more powerful then they ? so as the counsel which scipio gave to his romans of not utterly destroying carthage , might be good in another respect , for the preservation thereof might encrease that glory to their commonwealth , which many of her valiant citizens seemed greatly desirous of , to wit , to have easily pardoned their enemies , when they should have humbled themselves ; as the carthaginians had then done , haveing not onely with great humility begged peace of the senate by their ambassadors , but given many of their chief citizens for hostages to scipio , and great store of arms , to secure the romans that they would keep their articles . and truly the destruction of that noble city , did differ from the usual generosity of the romans , who had wont , after victory , to gr●●t the cities and kingdoms to those very enemies with whom they had fought , making both king and people in all parts or tribu●ory , or confederate to the senate and people of rome . but i see no reason at all why they should forbear the rooting out of these the romans antient enemies , for fear lest they should be undone with idleness , and that civil discords should thereupon ensue . how many years were there between the second and third carthaginian war ? and yet when was the commonwealth of rome free from foreign war , though these her enemies did not appear to be so ? the last carthaginian war being hardly ended , did not they wage war in spain with the numantines for the space of fourteen years ? and yet in these times the bounds of the roman empire may be said to have been very narrow , in respect of what they were afterwards . france , which then was mistress of more provinces then now she is , was not as yet subdued ; nay , the difficulty and length of that war bringing along with it the prorogation of command , since caesar commanded the armies for ten years together , did much increase those disorders which did at last prove the ruine of the commonwealth . but how much did pompey enlarge the bounds of the roman empire in asia ? over how many conquered kings and provinces did he triumph ? armenia , cappadocia , media , iberia , syria , arabia , phaenicia , and other nations were reduced under the romans power by this sole commander . it will seem strange , and yet it is related by authentical writers , that nine hundred cities were made subject and tributary to the roman empire by pompey , and almost as many more by caesar : and he who will consider it well , shall find that the roman commanders did flourish most , and were most cryed up , after the destruction of carthage . rome wanted then neither means nor will to exercise her arms : not to mention so many wars , which were all of them famous , if not for the greatness of acquisition , at least for other weighty accidents ; and if not for their strength , yet for the wisdom of the enemy : that of tigranes , mithridates , iugurth , and so many others , where the then almost lost name of the carthaginians did not concur . but if it had proved true , that the commonwealth of rome , when carthage should be destroyed , should have remained in idleness , so harmful to her liberty , if scipio's counsel had proved successful , and those evils had been taken away which be feared would befall the commonwealth , carthage was not only not to have been undone , but her power should have been suffered to increase ; for it is seen by what hath been said , that war of it self was not able to keep the citizens united , but was rather that which did divide them . but this peradventure might have been done by war wherein their own defence had been only conceined , and the keeping of themselves from danger : and yet it is an absurd thing to say , that an enemy must be preserved , and men must be continually in trouble and danger of war , for the conservation of a city . but say , i beseech you , was th●re not forty three years between the first and second carthaginian war ? and yet though rome was free from dangers , and from being troubled by the carthaginians , nay , for some years every where more quiet then she ever was at any other time , yet fell she not upon those great mischiefs of civil contentions , which she afterwards incurr'd in the greatest heat of her ●orest wars . this was occasioned , because the city was not as yet corrupted , as it was afterwards , because it grew old , and because there was not any that knew by correcting her disorders to return her to her first principles . what danger can ensue unto , or can harm the common liberty or authority of citizens either in war or in peace , whilst the laws are observed ? and when the laws are trampled under foot , what state can be free from the snares of the enemy ? the spartan kings had not supreme authority in war ; but war being governed by good laws , could never injure them . power intrusted in citizens with due measure and temper , was never prejudicial : and behold an example thereof . on the one side , agesilam king of sparta , being commander in chief of the army against far●●bassus , and being entred asia with great hopes of signal victories ; when he was called home by the magistracie of the ephori , readily obeyed . on the o●her side , caesar , being already returned into italy from the french enterprise , will , contrary to the will of the senate , keep the army together , and despiseth the authority thereof , cato's counsel of destroying carthage might then have proved good , not of it self , but when the romans , being safe for these enemies , and setled in a condition of not being to fear any forein forces , could have ordered unto themselves a firm and quiet civil state. it was known by experience , that the other agreement made with the carthaginians had done but little good : for they keeping still the same mind , though not the same fortune , did not let slip any occasion of throwing off the yoke of slavery which the romans had put upon them . so as the only means to rest secure from their forces , since their words were not to be trusted , was to put them out of their antient nest , and to make them live far from the sea , as they were commanded to do after that their country was destroyed , so to bereave them of the opportunity of the sea , by means whereof that commonwealth was grown great and powerful . but wherein was the quiet of rome bettered by the ruine of carthage , if they would have to do with more barbarous nations , and nations further off , not moved thereunto through fear , nor provoked by any injury , thinking their empire was only to be bounded by the confines of the earth ? what had the parthians of common with the commonwealth of rome ? what injury had they then done her , to make the romans take up arms against them ? yet crassus had a mind to find them out in those far distant parts , whereby to draw upon himself and the roman armies so many great losses and ruines as they were to undergo in that war. the overthrow of carthage should peradventure have taken from the citizens of rome their desire of continual warfaring , as it took from them the occasion of being in arms ; but it did not so ; for the cause which produced and nourish'd these thoughts , was internal , not external . so as they were not provoked to arms , but did rather provoke others ; and when they fought not for the welfare , they fought for the glory of the empire : for all the orders of that city consisted only in the exercise of the militia . but how could a city be long preserved , which was wholly bent upon those things which were the means to bring her to her end ? how could she enjoy true civil felicity , if she knew not what it was , and did not value it , but did abhor that peace and quiet which begers civil felicity ? therefore if that commonwealth had been well instituted in civil orders , and that when carthage was destroyed , she had known ( which she did not ) how to lay down arms , this had been the way to bring her to much good , nay , to the true and chief good of civil felicity , not to the ruine and perdition thereof . so as if scipio doubted that the introducing of idleness into rome might bring with it such notable disadvantage , it was perhaps , because knowing the imperfections of that government , he feared not that idleness which the laying down of arms is wont to produce , but that which is born , and doth increase with the corrupt customs of cities , by which contrary , but wholly pestiferous effects are begot en ; as the making of some citizens love pleasures , and hate labor and toil ; and others strangely proud , lovers of brawls and novelty . the athenians endeavoring to banish this sort of idleness from out their city , committed the care thereof to the chief and most severe magistrate , called areopagus . but that true and vertuous quiet which is opposed unto toil , and which as a thing to be desired ought to be sought for in a city , doth not banish , but doth nourish true generosity of mind , which makes men willingly enter , when need requires , into the dangers of war , for honesty sake , and for the defence of their country , not out of ambition and desire of self-greatness : and to free the city from the fear of her powerful and bitter enemies , the carthaginians , was not contrary to this . so as i may conclude , that it was not the destruction of carthage , but the ill government of rome , which wrought her ruine . the eighth discourse . why rome could not regain her liberty after the death of julius caesar , as she had formerly done , by driving the tarquins first out , and then appius claudius and the other decemviri . many do not without reason wonder , why the city of rome , which after having droven the tarquins out , who had reigned for above two hundred and forty years : and which having afterwards made app●us clandius , and the other decemvirl lay down their magistracy , who usurp●d tyranny , could put her self into a free condition ; why i say she could not do the like when brutus , and cassius had slain iulius casar : when it appears they ought rather to have done so now ; the people being more numerous and powerful , and the city in such greatness , as the liberty , nay rather power which the people had in ordering that commonwealth , ought to have been more esteemed and held dear . to this may be added , that in the time of kings the very name of liberty was not well known , much less was the good thereof injoyed ; wherefore a good which they had not known ought to have been of less power with them : and in the government of kings the city had been so successful , as it seemed she might run a hazard by chusing a new form of government , which she had not formerly experienced . and in the time of the decemviri the affairs of rome were also in a very weak condition ; nor ought the liberty , or command of that city be reputed a thing of such moment as it became afterwards by the wonderful felicity by which she marched to the height of all glory and greatness . besides , the government of ten , retained a certain shew of a commonwealth ; and many being therein interessed , she seemed to have thereby also a better ground for her subsistance ; whereas in caesars time , he having reduced the main of all affairs into himself , and begun to accept of the title and honors of a king , all form of a commonwealth and of liberty was lost ; and he having maintained himself in that degree onely by his own greatness , and in a city so full of nobility at that time , and of so many generously minded men , his principality must of necessity be the weaker , and easilier to be eradicated ; which when it should fall , it seemed that the former government of common-wealth must of it self rise up again . these and other such like reasons , afford occasion of seeking into the cause why contrary effects were seen to ensue . we will herein consider first , what the customs of the city of rome were in each of these times ; and what effects were prevalent in the peoples minds , men not being accustomed to imbrace such things as are truly useful , but often such as by the predominate affection are held to be so . whilst the city was in an humble condition , and that her citizens were not begun to be corrupted by an immoderate ambition of governing , there was no siding nor partaking studied amongst them , which crept on by little and little , and did so contaminate all orders , as it reduced the commonwealth to such weakness , as wanting strength to rule her self , she must fall , and being once down could not rise up again . this corruption began amongst the soldiers , in whom the commanders did permit such unbridled licentiousness , to the end that they might dispose of them as they listed to oppres their particular enemies , and sometimes against the very commonwealth : as sylla did to lessen marius his power , and marins no less to counterprize sylla by the same means , things growing into such disorder , as he made the servants of the commonwealth to take up arms against his enemies the syllania●s ; and this authority did so continue in great citizens , and in the commanders of armies , as it seemed a wonder , that pompey the great , who had exceeded all others in glory and power , after his return into italy , having prosperously ended his enterprise against mithridates , should be content to quit the army , when every one feared that he would enter rome therewithal , and do even then with rome as caesar did not long after , assume unto himself the chief government of all publick affairs : so great was the disorder , and so little was the authority either of laws or senate esteemed . but his design , who plotted tyranny in the succeeding time , prospered the better , for that this corruption which was first entred into the soldiers , was past into the nobility , and spread every day abroad amongst the people : for those who had been generals of the great enterprises of war , being grown exceeding rich , did several waies purchase the popular votes , turning and winding them as they liked best , to the end that the places of magistracy might be conferred on them , or upon their friends and adherents . neither was the very senate free from this contagion , but being long before accustomed not to be at their own command , but to depend upon the power of those who were of supreme authority in the armies , they fell headlong into the same errors into which the people were faln , manifestly adhering by way of faction , not by any civil favor , to particular citizens who headed parties , and the authors of novelties ; which was at first done with some appearance of honesty , to maintain the commonwealth , and to defend liberty against those who had been too immoderately exalted by the peoples favour , to the injury of other more deserving citizens , and to the prejudice of liberty . but in the process of time and affairs , those who had taken up arms in behalf of the commonwealth , proved no less burthensom , much power thereby encreasing in one particular person , then those themselves against whom arms were taken up . for an immoderate desire of encreasing in power and wealth , began to possess the souls of many who were already accustomed to rule longer , and with greater authority , then was sitting to be done in a civil government . so as all things were put into great confusion ; and now , not those who were worthy and valiant , but those who were most bold , & insolent found places of greatest honor in the commonwealth . hence it was , that it being observed that those who had adhered to sylla's party ( when his adversary being overcome , he was become almost the sole arbitrator of all things ) had often gotten great riches , and preferments in reward of their wicked actions , the wealth of those who were proscribed by sylla being given to these , and such being easily proscribed at his favorites pleasure , whom they would rob of their palaces or of what they valued most : many allured by hope of getting better things , and more easily then they could have done in a well-governed commonwealth ▪ loved confusion , and favoured the government of one alone , thinking that they might obtain honors , and many other favors , which are usually bestowed freely upon such as are partial to them , by those , who will preserve themselves in height of power . hence then it arose that brutus and cassi●s , the murderers of caesar , were not so backed , nor met not with that general approbation from the city , to uphold their fact , and the common liberty , as iunius brutus and virginius did , when they raised ▪ the people to free themselves from the tyranny of the tarqui●s , and of the decemviri : the latter had recourse unto the camp , and kindled a servent desire in the soldiers to vindicate the injuries , and msolencies used by the tarqui●s and by appi●s : but what favour could bru●●i and cassius expect from the soldiers , themselves being contaminated , and more desirous to preserve the chief command in one onely person , that they might keep the power in themselves , then to remit the commonwealth into liberty , whereby their uncurb'd licentionsness was to be corrected ? therefore as soon as octavius , the adopted son of iulius , and who afterwards took upon him the name of octavius caesar , and of augustus , returned after caesar's death into italy , he was freely accepted by the army , he being well beloved by the soldiery , out of memory to iulius caesar , and out of hopes that if he should succeed him in power , they might share in the same favors and priviledges . but brutus and cassius were compell'd to gather together sufficient forces to defend themselves , to have recourse for help to forein princes , and with their soldiers to fill those armies , which were to defend the liberty of rome . so much were the customs of the city altered in those times , and those generous roman spirits extinguished , who for a long time had loved the name of liberty more then any other thing , and then any other nation . and though the fact committed by caesars murtherers was approved of by the senate , yet there were many chief men , and of great authority , who being caesars friends , and depending upon him , did much de●est it ; amongst whom were marcus antonius , and lepidus , caesars intimate friends , who did openly and powerfully maintain , that br●tus and cassius were to be pursued by the publick arms , as enemies to the commonwealth , and that caesars death should be revenged . this diversity of inclination in the people , and in the senate towards the former and these latter vindicators of the liberty of rome , to boot with the diversity of customs by which the city was swayed at these several times , were much furthered by the differing conditions of the persons interessed : for the name of the tarquins was become hateful to all the common people of rome , not only because they kept them always busied in laboring their own grounds , but because they were become hateful to all people by reason of their haughty carriage ; so as they had no fautors who did desire or endeavour their return to rome , but some few young noblemen who were well pleased with that former government , by reason of their intimacie with the kings sons , which secured their insolencies . but these were not of themselves of any authority to disturb the peace and common liberty ; and those in whom the publick authority did reside , were so well disposed towards the good of their country , and so uncontaminable by any other affection , as brutus condemned two of his sons to suffer death , because they were of the number of those who had conspired in favor of the kings sons . and in the time of the decemviri , appius was not held to be proud , but cruel ; and yet not so really , but in appearance , which by the common people is held to be as bad : for he had ordered many lictors to walk always before him and his colleagues , with many fasces in their hands ; and having afterwards taken away appeals , he seemed in all his actions to aim at tyranny , which is always injurious to the people . so as it is no wonder if they did not afterwards resent that such men should be removed from government wherein they had behaved themselves so ill , and did desire to return under the government of consuls and other magistracies . to this may be added , that the people had then almost the same authority which some particular citizens did afterwards usurp , and did go about to obtain all unjust things from the senate by sedition , as these did in the ensuing times by force of arms . so as no such way being opened in the first state of the city , the people knew that when the decemviri should be driven away , they might obtain many things of favor to themselves , as indeed they did . for , appeals were not only again allowed of , but much amplified , and the tribunes of the people were declared to be sacrosancti . but caesar , using therein either his natural endowments and worth , or some wonderful cunning , had wrought himself into much favor with the people , by his humanity , magnificence , liberality , by his familiarity with all men , by easily pardoning offences , making of noble and frequent shews , by his sump●uous and costly feasts , and by his rich gifts ; and by these means secured his tyranny upon the sound foundation of universal favor , and upon the favor of many partial friends , whom he had made great , and by many singular favors bound them fast unto him , and interessed them in his own greatness and power . so as he who will consider these things duly , must confess , that in brutus and cassius the intention was more to be commended then the act ; for their danger could bring no true safety to the commonwealth , as they themselves were soon aware of , by flying from that city , which they ought to have summoned to liberty , and making themselves the heads of those who should rise up in their behalf . but the business being inopportunely undertaken , miss'd of that success which opportunity might have brought it : for caesar might easily have lost the peoples favor , either for that thinking himself sufficiently setled in his dominion , he might value it so much in the future ; or for that they being naturally given to love change , might grow weary of his too great power , which was already begun to be much suspected by his having accepted of the title of king , and of many other honors which he had formerly refused : things which made the people aware of their error , in being too conformable to the will of one sole citizen . if such an occasion had been waited for , he who should have had a mind to have restored the commonwealth to her liberty , might have had some better foundations for the effecting of his desire . and if it shall be objected , that the city could not throw off the yoke of servitude after the death of caligula and nero , though they were very vicious , and much detersted by the people ; it may be answered , that then the power of the emperors , and authority of the soldiers were too strongly confirmed , who put caligula and nero , and other of their successors to death , not out of any desire of restoring the city to liberty , as brutus and cassius had done , but for that they were weary of their empire , and hoped to be better rewarded by those who were by them cryed up for emperors in place of those that were flain . the cause of such diversity of success may likewise be known , if we will consider some things more in general . whilst the city of rome was in such a condition by reason of her laws and customs , as she was of herself well given to politick government , it was impossible to introduce tyranny , so as it could be continued there : for the body of the city not being organised so as became such a government , which is the soul of the city , such a union could not be setled there , as might assume vital form : and as it falls out in natural affairs , every thing is not made of every thing , but from this or that other assigned matter , such , or such a thing is particularly generated , answerable to the quality of the said matter , and to the vertue of the generating cause ; so in our civil actions , every state cannot be fashioned out of every state , but these things are likewise determined by a certain order ; so as from aristocracie we pass into the power of a few , from thence to a popular condition , and at last to tyranny . yet are these transitions very hard to be observed in the city of rome ; for that her government was always mixt with divers species of regiment : yet it may be seen how divers parties prevailed in divers times , so as they came to constitute a different form of government . at the beginning vertue was highly esteemed , the greatest honors and chiefest places were conferr'd upon some few that were the most famous , and most vertuous citizens , though the people had always a share therein . but ambition , and the desire of rule and riches , did afterwards mightily increase in the nobility ; who deceiving the multitude by several artifices , they reduced so much of the publick authority into themselves , to maintain their private greatness , as the laws having lost their efficacie , and the choice of the magistrates , and the resolution in all weighty and important affairs , depending upon the will of some few powerful citizens , the city wholly lost the resemblance that she had of an aristocratical state ; and took the form of being governed by a few : and those very citizens , that they might preserve the power amongst themselves , were forced to favor the multitude , by promising and permitting unto them things that were both unworthy , and unlawful . so these men , that they might domineer over more noble personages , were forced to obey the hase will of the soldiers , and of abject and insolent popular men , which reduced the commonwealth at last to a base and corrupt popular state ( though in former times the peoples authority was always great , but better moderated notwithstanding by the laws and certain considerations ) from whence it was more easie afterwards to pass to tyranny , the plotters using those very means , which it hath been observed caesar made use of , to usurp unto himself the sole government of the commonwealth . such changes have usually been seen in other cities , and at other times , where the condition of government hath given the same occasion . so athens was alwaies subject to frequent alterations of government , and particularly to tyranny ; insomuch as the wise legislator salon , who had the charge of reforming it , before his death saw it faln from the state whereinto he had reduced it , and tyranny brought in by pisi●●atus : for the corruption which was amongst the inhabitants , afforded matter and means to any one who had a mind to possess himself of the liberty thereof . and it is likewise seen of modern commonwealths , that those wherein the people have had much authority , or rather licentiousness , they have not been able to keep in a constant government , free from civil seditions , and have been but short-lived . as happened is the city of florence , wherein for the consideration above said , it was easier for them who had a mind to suppress the liberty thereof , and hard for him who desired to preserve it . so as though the house of medici hath by various accidents been sundry times driven from thence , and though alexander the first duke thereof lost his life ; the city , though otherwise noble and magnificent , being much infected with parties , and corrupted by popularity ; all endeavors of preserving it in the form of a commonwealth , and in true liberty , proved vain : and on the contrary , the commonwealth of venic● , by reason of hen excellent form of government , which though it be mixt , hath little in it of popular government , and much of the optimati , not having given way to such corruptions as use to trouble the quiet of civil life , nor afforded means to any who should goe about to plot against the publick liberty , hath been able for a very long space of time to maintain her self in one and the same condition , and free from those dangers , into which other commonwealths have faln , for not having a government of equal temper with that of hers . the ninth discourse . which is the safer way to be taken , to arrive at honor and glory in a commonwealth ; that which wa● beld by cato , or that which was pursued by caesar. julius caesar , and marcus cato , who was afterwards called uticencis , both of them very famous , and greatly cried up persons , both for their excellent indowments of mind , and for the great authority which they held both with the senate , and with the people , did both of them flourish at the same time in the commonwealth of rome : but they did so differ in manners and customs , as it may afford occasion of wonder , if we will consider how , stearing several courses , they happened both of them to arrive almost at one and the same end : and of doubt in him who shall propound unto himself the example of these two great personages , to purchase fame and power in a commonwealth , whether of the two he ought most to imitate . caesar won much love by his great humanity , liberality and magnificence ; but cato was reverenced for the austerity of his comportment , by the integrity of his life , and for the zeal he shewed in the managing of all publick affairs . those who were opprest either by poverty , or by enemies had recourse to caesar for protection ; and those who hated wicked men , and the inventers of novelties , trusted that cato would chastise and suppress them . caesar never spared for any labour by which he might hope to purchase renown and glory ; and cato by despising glory became glorious : caesar desired to shew generosity , and greatness of spirit in all his actions ; and cato delighted in nothing more then in modesty , and innocency of life : caesar was much given to all acts of grace ; and cato constant in all acts of justice : caesar seemed to take delight in sports , feasts , and banquets ; and cato profest openly to scorn all favor , save what the merit of his own worth brought with it . so as the greatness wherein the commonwealth then was , was said to be most resplendent in caesar , so the preservation of the antient form of the commonwealth , and of the customs of her first age was held to be preserved in one onely cato . these two so excellent personages took these two differing ways , yet each of them acquired great renown , fame , and authority . great was caesars glory by the many things he did in war , but cato was no less celebrated for civil affairs . caesar by his great authority could make france be first assigned unto him , and then confirmed upon him , where he kept in chief command with his army for the space of ten years ; he also made use of the peoples favour , not to aggrandise himself , but to make the greatest honors be conferred on his friends , and upon such as depended on him , which was that which made his faction so potent . and truly , he who will consider it well , will finde that as long as rome retained any form of a commonwealth , cato's power was no less then was caesars , for he oftentimes bore it even against caesar : as when the business of those that were complices with c●iline in his conspiracy , was in hand in the senate , they being accused by cato , and defended by caesar , were condemned to be put to death . and also another time , when he opposed the publishing of the law proposed , and favoured by caesar , touching the division of lands in latium , wherein cato's authority appeared to be the greater , by making caesars am●●tious designs fail of success is so popular things as were the agrarian laws . the same success had the things maintained by caesar against po●●pey , though he was more powerful then any other citizen , for having stoutly opposed metellus , who moved at the time of cataline's conspiracy , that pompey should together with his army be recalled back to rome , he carried the business ; which was the cause why these two prime citizens endeavored the friendship and good will of cato , for they doubted of compassing what they desired without his good will , so great was his authority . caesar , when cato appeared to be his bitterest enemy , procured cato's releasement , when he was imprisoned by order from the senate : and pompey , that he might be fastened to him by the bond of alliance , endevored to have his neece for wife . whence it is conceived , that cato's austere behaviour had purchased him more authority , though unarmed , in the management of the commonwealth , then the reputation of having commanded armies , and their so much obsequiousness to the people , had done to pompey and caesar. a just occasion then offers it self here of consideration , whether was the better , and safer course taken to arrive at glory , and civil greatness , or that which caesar , or that which cato took ? caesars comportments seem to have been more noble , and better defitting a civil life , as also more easie to be imitated ; and what indeed is of more importance for the happiness of a city , then quietness and concord amongst citizens ? what more proper to produce and preserve this , then magnificence , grace and affability ? all which vertues were proper to caesar , and which by a straight and speedy way guided him to the height of greatness and glory . he who desires to obtain this favour from citizens , must abstain from doing any injury , must seek out all occasions of doing good , must attribute much to others , must speak moderately of himself , must do good things , and make them appear to be so , so as he may help not onely by his actions , but by his example . rigor , severity , the neglect of all other respects , where there is onely an upright mind to do well ( things which are sufficiently commendable in cato ) may of themselves peradventure border nearer upon true vertue , but bear a less proportion with civil vertue , if respect be had to that which is found , not to that which is desired . who does not value the love of his citizens , or will not endeavor the acquisition thereof save by very upright ways , which are not always possible , meets with continual occasion of contention , from whence great and open enmities do often arise , which do at last put the city into confusion . so as such men do first ruine themselves , and then the commonwealth . when laws are observed with such extremity of rigor , it seems to be done to oppress citizens , not to preserve justice ; wherefore such a government is but little acceptable , and therefore easier to receive alteration upon any accident that shall happen : this was seen in cato's actions ; for his way of proceeding got him many enemies , who that they might make themselves able to bulk with his authority , made themselves strong by alliances and friendships , and became not onely formidable to him , but even to the commonwealth . if cato had not despised the parentage offered him by pompey , caesar had not joyned alliance with him by giving him his daughter iulia for wife , which was the occasion of both their too excessive greatness , by which they ruined the commonwealth . the people were not pleased with cato's severe way of proceeding , which made them the more easily adhere to caesar , and his associats , and so not perceiving it , became enemles to the commonwealth . therefore caesar might still continue in the peoples good opinion , and long preserve his authority and power : but cato , though his counsels did sometimes prevail , yet was not his dignity and power grounded upon so sound foundations , as that he could alwaies keep himself in the ●●me condition : nay , sometimes things were born against him in the choyce of consuls , when people much more unworthy then he were corrivals with him . the little pleasingness of his proceedings was also cause , though under pretence of honor , and publick imployment , why he was sent from the city , and in a manner banished , being sent by sea to cyprus for some concernments of that kingdom ; so as the common-wealth suffered by his absence ; and particularly cicero , who was formerly upheld by cato's authority , and held for a defender of the publick liberty , was banished . by these things the question seems cleerly enough decided , that caesars way of proceeding is much more easie and certain to bring a man to dignity and greatness , then the way which cato took . yet he who on the other side shall examine cato's manners and actions , as he will find them more praise-worthy , so will he think that they may lead by a righter and more direct way to true honor , and to that greatness which is to be desired by him that lives in a commonwealth . for he takes a safer and a more noble way to arrive at dignity , who walks by the way of true vertue , of justice , modesty and temperance , then he who endeavors the like by popular favor : for that favor which is won by a good repute , and by vertuous actions , is easily preserved by herself , and of herself ; nay , the cry'd-up honor which ariseth from publick imployments and places , if it be not grounded upon true worth , soon vanisheth , and leaves that in obscurity which did before shine forth so bright . but he who deals uprightly , doth always advance as it were by a certain natural motion , and confirms himself more and more in the habit of well-doing . so that favor which hath so good a leaning-stock , is more firm and stable ; whereas that which is purchased by extrinsecal appearances , as it is easilier gotten , so is it upon any slight occasion more easily lost . for those who are moved to favor for such reasons , are incited so to do rather out of their own humor , or for their own advantage , then out of any true affection that they bear to such persons : and therefore growing either glutted of the same things they did so like at first , or thinking that they may receive them in a larger proportion from others , they change their minds , and turn their liking elswhere . moreover , he who does that which of it self is good , can never want a reward : for though he do not purchase those exterior demonstrations which are usually gotten by worth , and which do more illustrate it , he notwithstanding feels that true content within himself which springs from well-doing , and which is held by wise men to be the best reward of good actions . for he who loves and favors equity and justice , makes the laws be observed , prefers the publike good before private interest , thinks nothing an injury wherein the commonwealth is not offended ; this man may be truly said to be a great citizen ; for that publick dignity and greatness maintains his private credit and estimation : nay , such men as these , if by any ill fortune or bad accident they fall from favor , they find always , as it were by some occult power of vertue , some others to protect them . as was seen in cato , who having drawn upon him the enmity of the greatest part of the nobility , and being but little befriended by the people for impeding the agrarian law , though he were for a while held low , he was notwithstanding created consul in rivalship with metellus , who was favored by pompey . and by a more notable example , murena himself , who was accused in judgment by cato , was not only not his enemy afterwards , but defended him against metellus ; and cato's reverend authority prevailed over metellus his fury , who being accompanied by a number of armed men , was come into the piazza to promote the law of making pompey return with his army to the city in the time of catalines conspiracie : and we read , that when he returned from cyprus , the magistrates , priests , the whole senate , and very many of the people went in such numbers to meet him , as the banks of tybur were full of them on both sides , as if he had entred into the city in triumph . and another time being in the publick assemblies put by the pretorship , by the violence of the consuls crassus and pompey , yet he , being but a private man , was accompanied home to his own house that very day with more men , then followed the magistrates . if then we will know in this diversity of affairs , which of these two courses it is best to follow , since by what you have heard , equal credit may almost be given unto both , we must weigh what his natural inclination is who will set these examples before him to follow them ; what the true end is which he proposeth unto himself , and after what form of gornment that commonwealth is ordered in which he is born , and which he serves : for without such considerations it is hard to know what course of life a man must take . he who seeks to win favor , must above all things shun affectation , as that which makes a man always suspected to be ambitious , and his actions not acceptable . for he whose genius is naturally given to humanity , and to a sweet and pleasant manner of conversation , if leaving that , he will put on a socratical severity and gravity , he cannot hope to use it so , but that some other end being discovered to be in him , he will not onely not win credit , but will sometimes become ridiculous . so on the contrary , when a man is known not to be wittily or facetiously given , but that his nature is rather given to be grave , if he will appear to be civil and very familiar , fauning and flattering with humble words , and in a base manner , he incurs the same mischief ; for such forced behavior denotes affectation , and grows tedious . cato was born with this sevetity , as he had witnessed all his life time , by all his actions . he was a sloven in his feeding and in his apparel ; he went on foot to his country-house , and sometimes when he was in place of magistracy he would give audience unshod , and in garments unfit for the bench. in fine , all his actions were unpollished , severe , despising such things as others did most value . the clean contrary was seen in caesar , who was given to quaint behaviour , humanity and grace . they therefore by their several ways proved both of them great men , and famous , because they followed their natural genius and inclinations . in the next place , the end which a man propounds unto himself , who endeavors to get honors and imployments in a commonwealth , is to be considered : for if he aim onely at the publick service , and at his countries good , it is fittest for such a one to lay aside all particular interest , and not valuing any private favor , to attend onely a punctual observance of the laws , and the depression of such citizens , who to the prejudice of the publick liberty , will become too powerful as did cato . but if one who is meerly byassed by ambition , propounds unto himself the becoming great and powerful , by any whatsoever means ; those arts and applications which are pleasing to most men , and which purchase applause , and universal liking , will certainly lead him more safely to that end , and conduce most to his purpose , as they did to caesar ; who abasing himself that he might mount the higher ; giving , that he might get the more ; being subservient unto others , to the end that he might command over them , knew so well how to cover his most affected and ambitious thoughts , as at last he did not onely attain to the greatest authority that is usually granted to any one in any commonwealth , but drew all dignity and publick authority upon himself . next it must be had in consideration , what the form of that commonwealth must be , in the which a man who lives therein , propounds unto himself the acquisition of place and honor . for if the form be optimatical , wherein vertue is esteemed above all things , certainly cato's manners and customs will better sute with such a government ; for in such a commonwealth , the magistrates in their dispensation aim chiefly at those things which were very eminent , and much commended in cato : but if the peoples authority be great in the city , caesars manners and artifices will be better beloved , and likelier to win approbation , and consequently the peoples savor in their s●●trages , which may carry them to the height of civil preserment . therefore in sp●rta , which was an optimatical commonwealth , divers men did flourish , who in their lives and manners did resemble cato ; as on the contrary , those citizens were most esteemed of in athens which was a popular commonwealth , who knew how to win the peoples good will , after caesars way : whence it was that she fell easily afterwards into the power of many tyrants ; insomuch as the liberty of the commonwealth was possest at one and the same time by thirty such men . but in rome where the government was partly popular , partly optimatical , both caesar and cato might win renown , for divers citizens were diversly minded , according to the diversity of government in the administration of publick affairs ; but in that mixture , caesar might get firmer , and more setled authority then cato in civil dissentions , because the popular faction was much the greater . so that cato siding with the senate to the very last , and being , according to his wont , and worth , unwilling , to be exposed to the licentious will and pleasure of the conquerors , he was born down , together with the senate , and reduced to the necessity of making himself away . and caesar being by the soldiers suffrages , and by force , confirmed and setled in power and authority , which were already too immoderately granted him in the commonwealth by the peoples favor ; he possest himself of the common publick liberty , and destroyed all form of civil government . the tenth discourse . to what age of the city of rome , the greatest praise and merit is to be given , for the prosperity and greatness , whereto she arrived . such and so many are the grandeurs and prosperities of the city of rome , as the consideration thereof affords always new matter of discovering divers mysteries therein very well worthy to be examined and observed : but if we shall consider amongst many other things , how her prosperity did still from time to time increase both in state and reputation , a particular desire will arise in us , of knowing to what age the chief pra●se and merit of that cities arrival at such a height of greatness and glory , is to be attributed . three ages may chiefly be numbred wherein that great city did still more and more increase , and grow greater in reputation . to wit , the first , which may be termed her infancy ; from the foundation of the city till the driving out of the tarquins , and to the first consulship of iunius brutus , and of tarquinius collatinus which was the space of two hundred twenty four years : the second , which shall be her adolesence , from that time till the beginning of the second carthaginian war ; betwixt two which times , there passed the space of two hundred forty six years : the third , her youth , which was the flowre of her years , and of her greatest prosperity , may be termed the rest of that time which past from the beginning of the said war , which was in the consulship of appius claudius , sirnamed the bold , till caesars dictatorship , the space of two hundred and twenty years , which makes up the full number of seven hundred and ten years , which the common-wealth of rome lasted , which might be so termed for the temperate government of the first kings , and for the authority which the senate held therein also , as long as their dominion lasted . for what concerns the times of emperors , no mention needs to be made thereof , for what concerns our purpose : for to boot with the corruption which insued of the first ●orm of civil government , they enjoyed , and for the most part but unworthily , the labors of other men ; and though the city maintained herself in great height for the space of four hundred years , nay , though many gallant and magnifick things were by the majesty of the empire , and by the emperors power , yet these did not concur to the first foundation of the empire , which is that which is now particularly enquired into ; but the emp●re did for the most part decline in divers parts , and in sundry times , till at last it began to hasten more headlong to ruine . the chief and greatest praise then of this most noble and most artificial fabrick may be attributed to the first that laid the first foundation : for those that succeeded them , finding that they might thereupon safely erect the great structure of the roman empire , their counsels were excited , and their work chiefly helped by those who did first think thereupon , and did so work , as the city being well ordered and disposed of with good principles , might rise to a greater degree of dignity and empire . but those of the third age , having noble examples of worth before them , and seeing so good and gallant a work already so prosperously increased and raised up , went more couragiously on to greater and more noble works , having framed a conceit unto themselves out of the former prosperous successes , that they might be able to make ( as they did ) their city the mistress and monarch of all nations . the first age was governed by seven kings , of differing natures and customs for the most part , but well fitted to what concerned the service of the new city , and romes rising greatness . for romulus , the father and founder thereof , was excellent at arms ; so as accompanied by other military men , he began the first habitation , and did so order things , as the new city might subsist of herself , without putting herself under the protection of any neighboring people . but numa , who succeeded him , that he might give the form of a true city to the new inhabitants , ordering them by certain laws , and chiefly by religious worship , did so behave himself , as in all succeeding times that city was always much given to religious affairs ; which though they were false of themselves , yet did he thereout draw good advantage concerning civil affairs . the third king , tullus hostilius , reassuming arms , bridled the boldness of the neighboring people , who conspired the ruine of the city ; and getting many victories over them , began not only to think of such things as concerned the safety of the city , but to enlarge her confines by way of arms in her neighbors territories . anus martius did study civil affairs more , and minded the multiplying of people in the city , and the making of divers orders which might reduce it to the form of a great and well-governed city . tarquinius priscus accustomed the people to know the majesty and dignity of empire ; by which reverence he , to the great service of publick affairs , increased obedience in those who both then and afterwards were to command in the city , and in the armies . but tarquinius superbus , the city being already got to her full growth , procuring his own ruine by his rashness and unbridled licentiousness , opened the way to the liberty of rome , and to her greater greatness . by which things it may be conceived , that the second age found the city already well instituted in arms and religion , much increased in people and buildings , accustomed to know the dignity and majesty of empire , she being esteemed and feared by the neighboring people , an enemy to tyranny , and finally fit to receive a good form of civil government , and able to govern herself by her own orders and forces . so as those who followed in the ensuing age , finding the way chalk'd out unto them to lead the city on to a greater degree not only of safety , but of glory , they found less of difficulty in all their undertakings : as it is usual in all things , whereunto it is harder to give a beginning , then to augment them . wherefore the praise is due to those first romans , which is given to the first invertor of things , of knowing how to put on generous thoughts , and use good counsels , when the city was so weak as she knew not how to nourish them , nor had any example of her own men . therefore in the following age , the height of praise which was given to any one that had deserved well of the commonwealth , was to honor him with the name of pater patriae , and to compare his actions to those of romulus , and of those that followed next after him ; from whom , as from the first founders of the city of rem● , it was generally granted that the rest had received power and vertue to imitate them . the custom was therefore always observed in rome , of honoring her birth-day with solemn sacrifices , as that which by its happy auspices had not only given excellent auguries , but as it were a certain vigor to the so many other felicities which did at all times accompany her . and it was particularly interpreted for an excellent augury of the city of rome's greatness , and of her increase in power and authority over all the latines , that she was born and increased from the ruines of alba , most of the latines having been colonies of the ruined city of alba. now if we shall consider what may be alleadged on the behalf of the second romans , we shall find such and so many things to be said for them , as the first garland of the glory of rome's greatness may seem to be due to them , without offence to any others . for he who shall weigh things well , shall find that this age brought forth more noble and truer examples of real worth , then any other ; so as they did not only excell themselves , but even all foreiners : for the military valor which flourished in the citizens of rome of this age , was accompanied with other excellent vertues , and especially with vast charity towards their country , not for their own glory , but out of love to her greatness and prosperity . danger was so despised by some of them , as some famous men amongst them did even sacrifice themselves and their lives for their countries welfare ; as the examples of curtius , and of the two decii do even at this day , much to their glory , shew . the generous commanders in that age did contemn riches as well as danger ; so as they overcame not only their enemies , but even themselves ; things which were praised and admired in quintus cincinnatus in fabritius , and in paulus aemilius . but how famous did they prove in matter of war , and worthy of that praise which is given to excellent commanders ? he who shall consider how enterprises were managed by the two papyrii , the father and the son , against the samnites ; what the forces of the conquered enemies were ; of what advantage their victory was to the romans ; will confess that their merits came not short of any , neither in those , nor in the following times . this age was often to withstand the galls , who were powerful and bitter enemies to the romans , by whom the very city of rome was assaulted and indangered ; for the delivery whereof furius camillus grew so famous . but this was not the only occasion of trying the roman forces against the french in those times : quintus servilius ala , and q. fabius withstood them ; when the french returning more powerful then before neer to the city of rome , by means of these illustrious commanders , their whole endeavors proved vain . in this age , divers p●ople of italy did sundry times jointly conspire against the city of rome ; which , the more formidable she grew to her neighbors , the more did a common apprehension make them arm against her : and notwithstanding , she did not only seem not daunted amidst those dangers , but having still the better of those by whom she was infested , she increased by the ruine of others . for these reasons forein forces were called in by the very italians , and pyrrbus was received into italy , that he might wage war with the romans ; whose renown was so great , as the chief honor in matters of war was given by hannibal to pyrrbus . and he who in a few words will conceive the worth of the commanders in this age , let him say that livy , who was much versed in the roman affairs , did attribute so much to the commanders of this age , as he esteemed them not only equal , but superior to alexander the great : holding for certain , that if alexander after he had conquered darius , had turned into italy , he would have left the glory that he won in persia , when he should have met with the roman forces , commanded by fabius maximus , valerius co●vinus , papyrius cursor , and titus manlius . but above all things it is worth consideration , that in this age , the city of rome , was confirmed and established with more certain and useful orders , as well in civil as in military affairs , whereby she long after was governed , and by vertue whereof , she chiefly arrived at such a height of greatness . great were the rewards which were given in rome to military worth , and those citizens were much egg'd on by glory to great undertakings , and sharp sufferings . triumph was a great ornament and glory to victorious commanders ; which was first used to honor the consul post humius , for the victory he wan over the sabins . the first equestral statu●s , were likewise an invention of this age , which were granted to consuls who overcame the latins in battel . in this age the mural and civick garlands were first used , to the end , that there might be rewards for every mans worth . the wintring of soldiers in the fields and under tents , was begun to be used by the romans in this age : a thing which proved so useful and necessary afterwards in greater and farther distant enterprises . what did more advantage the city of rome in her greatest dangers and weightiest occasions , then the authority of dictator ; a magistracy of reverend majesty , and which proved so often the true and onely remedy to maintain the affairs of rome in their less prosperous times . this was first created in rome , to resist the forces of forty populi latini , who were joyned in league together against the romans , and against whom posthumius was created the first dictator . but how reverend and unviolable the observance of military orders were with the commanders of this age , may be demonstrated by the famous examples of the severity of posthumius , and of manlius torquatus against their own sons , who for not obeying the command of their superiors , though it were accompanied with noble daring , and happy success , was punished by death . and as this age was busied in perpetual wars , new wars being perpetually raised up by the same people of latium and toscany , whom they had often overcome , so to it that fortitude , vertue of mind , and military discipline is chiefly to be attributed , by which the people of rome proved more excellent then all other nations . for this so continual exercise of arms for so many years together , did so accustom the city to military affairs , as it was not onely easie for those that followed after , to tread in the footsteps of these their predecessors , but almost necessary for the preservation of the city ; which being long accustomed to labor and warlike occupations , could not , nor would not without intestine disorder , live in idleness . and as for the orders in civil affairs , certainly no small praise is likewise due to this age ; for not to touch upon many particular laws and institutions ; the most famous laws amongst the romans of the twelve tables , made in the decemvirate of appius claudius and his colleagues , by which the city of rome was chiefly governed , were institutions of this age ; industriously taking divers things from the grecians , amongst whom more then in any other nation , all learning , and all the most noble arts did then chiefly flourish . amongst other things , great was the wisdom of allowing the latius to be free denisons of rome , for hereby the city was notably augmented , and her empire established for she did not onely for ever free her self from the vexation which she had had for the space of four hundred years by the forces of these people , whom they had often subdued , and who had often rebelled against the romans , and could not by force be kept within the bonds of obedience ; but being hereby obliged so fast , and so interessed in the same affairs with the romans , she was much assisted by them in the so many wars which the romans made afterwards . the use of colonies was of great advantage likewise to the roman empire ; for it served to ease the city when she was opprest with too many citizens , and to keep others in obedience who were daily reduced under the roman empire . and this use of colonies , though it had a certain weak beginning , when romulus sent some to inhabit in the city of fidena , yet was it oftener and more orderly introduced , and confirmed in this second age ; so as experience shewing the good of this institution to those that came after , this custom was ever after followed by the romans . this age is likewise a great argument of the civil wisdom of the citizens : for though there were therein important insurrections often made , and so great broils between the people and the nobility ; and though it were harder to keep those in obedience , who had continued to serve in the commonwealth in her wars for the space of a hundred years after the driving out of their kings , without pay , yet were they able to appease all discords without the effusion of any civil blood , as it happend afterwards in the third age , wherein great tumults arose from little ones ; so as civil wars , or at least dissentions and partakings continued amongst the citizens for about fifty years , from sylla's dictatorship to that of caesars , thereupon the final ruine of the commonwealth ensued . it also gives a great proof of the perfection of the orders observed in the city of rome in these times , that she was twice able to shake off slavery ; first , that of the kings , and then that of the decemviri ; which the third age could not do , which being once faln under the command of sylla , though he himself forewent the vast authority which was granted him , and left the city in liberty , continued notwithstanding still in factions , which soon after brought her past all remedy under caesars most express tyranny . and certainly great was the endeavor after liberty in this second age , in respect whereof all things else were set at nought ; insomuch as brutus did not pardon his own sons life , it being suspected that he had had to do with tarquin to the prejudice of liberty ; and the whole people of rome condemned manlius capitolinus to death , he who had saved the capitol and the city of rome , for being suspected his actions tended towards tyranny . those who lived in the hardest times of this second age shewed their constant generosity , when the city of rome being burnt and destroyed by the french , they would not abandon her , and go to live at veij , as their forlorn fortune , and the condition of these times seemed to advise them to do ; but kept their hopes alive for better things , which if they had then abandoned , that name and fame of rome had peradventure been for ever lost , which her happy genius promised her . so as he who shall consider the works and actions of those citizens of rome of this second age , may with reason think them worthy of great praise ; so as it may seem they had nothing to desire , whereby to have been made as illustrious in the sight of the world , and their actions equal to those of the third age , then to have had occasion of greater enterprises , as they had . but on the contrary , these mens actions are more to be commended for the integrity of their manners , for their love towards their country , and for their other noble vertues ; whereas in those of the last age the splendor of their glorious actions in war , was oft-times obscured , and stained by other vices , by ambition , avarice , and immoderate liberty ; to which things the third age was so addicted , as they brought her in the height of her greatest prosperity , to utter ruine . but before we pass this sentence , it will become us in justice to hear what those gallant romans can say in their own behalfs , who by the cried up fame of their stupendious actions , have filled the world with the glory , and wonder of the roman greatness . and how much shorter the time was wherein the supreme monarchy was founded and established , so much greater demonstration is thereof the generosity and worth of these men , who had the boldness to undertake so many enterprises , and could bring them to a good end . for , the first time that the romans carried their forces out of italy , was by reason of the carthaginian war ; wherein amongst other things , it was not only a thing commendable , but much to be wondred at , that the romans , being till then unexperienced in maritime affairs , did so soon learn that manner of discipline , as they overcame the carthaginians in many sea-fights , who for so long a time before had profess'd themselves to be sea-men , and had the first place given them by all other nations for their naval preparat●ons . but whereby can the excellent military discipline of the romans be better known , and their unvanquish'd worth , then by their deeds done in the second carthaginian war ; wherein at one and the same time they were able to maintain so many armies in italy , sicily , spain , and greece ? and yet one only city of rome could furnish them all with commanders and soldiers out of her own citizens , and italian colonies ; and that in so great a number , as that there was above eighty thousand fighting men of the roman army in the fight at cannae . on the contrary , carthage , though her dominions were large and powerful , after she had been several times routed by the romans in spain , being willing to defend africa , nay the very city of carthage , the head of the empire , was forc'd to recall that her commander in chief , and those her soldiers which she had in italy . the romans thrice overcome in battel by hannibal , took still fresh courage , and assuming new forces , did even face fortune , whom they won at last to be their friend , and in a manner obedient to their deserts . but the carthaginians , when once overcome by scipio in fight neer zama , yielded , and humbled themselves to the romans . but the last punick war , as it ended in a shorter time , and with less trouble then the former two , so brought it more glory and security to the romans ; for the very name of the formidable roman forces , was sufficient to put an end to that war ; and the final ruine of carthage which ensued , did for ever secure the common-wealth of rome from the false faith of the cathaginians . but other great and noble feats of arms , undertaken at the same time with great courage and happy augury , as the war against philip in macedonia , and in asia against antiochus , did sufficiently illustrate the roman forces , and did enlarge the confines of their empire in farthest distant nations . in the three punick wars , which lasted forty three years , with variety of fortune , they fought sometimes more for safety then for glory : but herein the people of rome shewed not only the power of their forces , but the generosity of their minds ; having undertaken the one war to revenge the injuries received from philip , in his having supplied hannibal with succors ; and the other to preserve some cities in asia , antient colonies of greece , in their liberty , and from being injuriously oppress'd by antiochus . and if it be said , that these so many enterprises were made by the italian forces ; the first and chiefest difficulty consisting in the subjugating of italy , the first and chiefest praise seems to be due to this age : but take this for granted , it must be added , that a great share of this very praise is due to the last age ; for the insubri and liguri were not assubjected by the romans , till after the end of the second carthaginian war ; the first being conquered by marcellus , the second by quintus fulvius ; who wan so much the more glory thereby , for that these are very noble parts of italy , and that the country of the ins●bri was possess'd by the galls , who were at that time very potent in those parts , and liguria was inhabited by a very fierce and warlike people . these are not then things altogether so great and glorious , as that they surpass all other things done by other men at other times : but if we shall look further into this very age of rome , we shall meet with other actions so great , and as miraculous , as their splendor will obscure the glory of those very romans , who were so cryed up in comparison of other nations , for when the city of carthage was utterly ruin'd , with which the city of rome had fought so long , and oft-times with variety of fortune , and those dangers being secured for ever , there not remaining any other potentate who could of himself gave a just counterpoise to the roman power , they march'd so fast on to monarchy , as in the space of one hundred years , between that time , and the time of caesars dictatorship , they extended the confines of the roman empire almost over the face of the whole earth . amongst the rest , great was that war which was taken against mithridates , under pretence of defending nicomedes and ariobarzanes , who were friends to the people of rome , but in effect to oppose his vast designs , wherein aspiring at the dominion of all asia , and of europe also , he became formidable even to the ve●y romans ; who though they had to do with this potent e●emy , who could put ●ogether in t●is war an army of two hundred thousand foot , and fifty thousand horse , and a fleet of three hundred ships , yet did they not only ●is●omfit mithridates , but took occasion to make other victories in nations far off ; for they marched with their armies into armenia against ●igranes , because he had favored mith●dates , and received him into his kingdom , when he was driven away by the romans . and he who will observe the roman history , will have occasion of wonder , that though the roman commanders and armies were often overcome in battel , yet in all the wars that ever they made they have at last proved victors . but the things that were done in the last years of this age , do exceed whatsoever could a● first have faln into the thought of man , thereby to settle the common-wealth in a flourishing and fortunate condition . to pass by so many oth●r glorious victories and triumphs , who can choose but admire the great deeds of ●●mpey and of caesar ? the speed which the first made in finishing so m●ny wars , his great good fortune chiefly in subjugat●ng so many eastern provinces in a very short time ; and the seconds constance and for●itude , demonstrated in so many battels , and in cu●bing so many western nations insomuch as it ●s said of both thes● , that each of them won above eight hun●red cities to the roman empire ; which certainly hath dimmed and obscured the glory and memory of a●l ant●quity . what ●esolution shall then be given in this so doubtful question , in which so many reasons may be alleaged on al● sides ? it is a great matter certainly to give a begining to things , which being afterwards increased , are won usually to proceed on more easily : and yet on the otherside , according to the known saying , they are no less to be commended who add to things begun , and do preserve what is already go●ten , 〈◊〉 are the original authors . but neither th●se nor those may be said to have won the gole ; which they can only properly be said t● do , who br●ng things already begun , and since much augmented , to the highest pitch of p●r●ection w●●ch such a thing is capable of , or whereunto , being measured w●th due respect , it can arrive . and these degre●s are found in almost all things that are effected by ●umane industry ; that ●s , the beginning , the increase , and the perfection : after which two other things follow ; declination , and final ruine , whereof we do now treat . but these several degrees may clearly enough be obse●ved in empires . in these then did the citizens of rome adoperate themselves in all the aforesaid ages so worthily , and so much to the good of the city , as each of them may seem to lay claim to the chief crown of the roman glory . it may then be said , that though many things concur to the production of any thing , yet do they not all do it after the same manner , nor are they all of equal dignity in themselves , or of equal force for the constituting of that work . thus in the foundation of romes mona●chy , certainly the founders of the city did concur from whom she received her first ●utr●men● , which help'd so much to strengthen that body , and made it fit to sustain the weight of so great an empire . those also who did next succeed them , who did add to her militia , her government , to her good orders both for war and peace , and made her ●itter for greater things , have their part therein ; and finally , those who by so many , and so signal victories , placed her , as it were , with her own hands on the top of her greatest power and dignity . but in this connumeration of things , what can be affirmed , but that the last age , which by her particular acts , and labors saw the commonwealth seated , as it were , in the throne of majesty , may with reason challenge the greatest part of this merit and glory , because she concurred as the nearest cause to the founding , and establishing of the city in that state and condition , wherein she was in her greatest excellency and glory amongst all nations . it is true , that he , who in another respect , will more consider the necessity then the dignity of the thing , may peradventure be of another mind ; for it is most certain , that had not the city of rome been first founded by romulus , and maintained by other kings in her beginning against her insulting enemies , if the capitol had not been saved afterwards from the gauls , if the so many conspiracies made by the people of italy against her rising greatness had not been repulst , there could have been no such thing as the victories and triumphs of the scipio's , marcellus , fabritius , metellus , pompey , and caesar , and of so many others ; who atchieved those things by the strength of the city , already happily begun , and encreased with much industry and valor . but as it usually falls out in natural things that their augmentation , changing as it were that first form , proves the corruption thereof , so as that subject being reduced to another condition , little count is held of precedent affairs ; so in these things which are formed by mans industry , as a more unpolished form is succeeded by another , which renders that subject more excellent and perfect , no man values the former , or considers it with a thought of praise or imitation : so we see it falls out in the more noble arts , as in painting , sculpture , architecture , and the like , which daily grow to more perfection , those are most commended in them who therein prove the greatest masters ; so as their particular praise walks hand in hand with the perfection which by their industry they have brought to that art , wherein they have with much industry and study spent their time . cincinnatus his poverty was praised , and the like of some others of those commanders , who were called up from the plough to be consuls and dictators , because they bore a certain proportion to the condition of those things , and of the city . but the magnificence of crassus , and of lucullus , had more coherence with the greatness to which the city of rome did afterwards arrive . it seems then that neither can there be any comparison made between these ages , for as they were sufficiently different between themselves , so different thoughts , studies , and exercises did become them : which things , if they had any thing of conformity between them , it was rather by likeness , or figure , or rather some dispositions of those first weaker operations , to the other greater and more noble . and as it is seen in every individual man , the same things are not proportionate nor proper to all ages , but divers things do accommodate themselves to divers ages , though the one be subordinate to the other , so as the exercises may both be the same , and different , because they are accommodated to the same aim , and end , but are notwithstanding otherwise put in use , in childhood , youth , and manhood ; just so in the point we are now upon , things suit not with a city in the second age , which were proper to her in the first , neither could the second do those things which were reserved to the third , and which would not be praised in the third , had it not done more then either the first or second . so to end this discourse , it may be said , that the city of romes happy genius produced men well adapted to her three conditions , and very excellent for what each age and condition brought forth . for if the first would have made too much hast in agrandising , and making the city famous , they might rather have disordered themselves , and by making many enemies , have encreased the difficulty of effecting those things , which when riper , proved afterwards more safe and easie : and likewise if the second should have imbraced things disproportionable for her strength , and have carried her forces out of italy , before she had therein setled the roman power , it might have proved rather the corruption then the perfection of the commonwealth . the first therefore , and the second are very much to be praised , for such things as became that age and state of the city wherein they were done . but by how much more the adoperating cause doth work upon a more noble a perfect subject , by so much doth the work prove more perfect and excellent . therefore those of the third ag● having occasion to act in greater matters , as finding the city already very spacious and powerful , the off spring of their industry and labour hath proved more noble , and they have won such praise to the commonwealth , as greater is not to be pretended unto . the eleventh discourse . how the roman empire , though it fell oftentines into the hands of base and wicked men , was notwithstanding able to maintain it self in the reign of many emperors , and how it came to be finally destroyed . as amongst all humane actions ; those commands and powers are noblest , and of greatest worth , by which a man gets to be above other men , and doth govern them in a manner as god doth rule and govern the world , so of all dominions and commands that ever were , the roman empire was greatly remarkable , and held in great esteem and reverence by all nations ; and did so far extend her self , as it may almost be said with the poet , that her confines were those of the whole world which was known to antiquity . which may be comprehended by this , that constantine the great having divided the empire between his three sons , the elder constantine , to whose third part fell the provinces of spain , france , and the greatest part of germany , together with the island of great britain , made war with his brother constantine , to whose share many other countries fell , to come to a better aggiustment of division , wherein he thought his father had dealt unequally with him . but now this so stupendious fabrick erected in the concourse of many years , by the worth and labor of so many gallant men , must finally run the fate of all humane things , must be dissolved and fall to the ground , and by her ruine occasion vast revolution of things . hence it was that so many noble cities were ruined , and the ground-work of some others laid , which proved afterwards very noble structures . hence it was that many intire regions , had their antient inhabitants driven away , and were possest by new citizens had new customs , new laws , new tongues and new fashions brought in ; and hence it was that italy , which had been the seat of so great an empire , was subject to greater alterations , and more heavy calamities then other provinces . it will not then be an unacceptable labor ( man being so naturally given to the desire of knowledge ) to seek out how , and for what causes chiefly these things happened . for that general rule , that whatsoever hath had a beginning , must have an end ; will not satisfie our inquisitive understandings . empires , as all other earthly things , have their beginning , increase , perfection , declination , and last ruine and destruction , all of them ordained and disposed of by certain causes : and though they may be seen to vary according to the variety of accidents , that is not notwithstanding chance which appears to us to be so , when we cannot penetrate into the true causes of things . in the beginning , the roman empire was governed in the form of a common-wealth , her first founders having begun to enlarge her dominion amongst her neighboring people . she continued in this her infancie , as i may call it , many years , till the times of those famous scipio's , who brought spain and africa under her dominion . but afterwards in the ensuing age , wherein caesar , pompey , and so many other famous commanders did flourish , she mounted to the height of her greatness and glory : neither did augustus caesar degenerate from the worth of them , though the form of government was changed ; but he likewise did much increase the empires confines in the eastern parts amongst the indians , and other exterior nations , and establish'd excellent orders both civil and military in the empire but this monarchy may be said to sta●d at a stay at this time , being constituted in a throne of majesty , reverenced and obeyed by all nations ; and in this condition she preserved herself for well nigh three hundred years , wherein though many and great wars were made by the so many emperors who governed in those days , yet were they rather made for the preservation , then for the enlarging of the empires confines : for there was not almost any of the barbarous and far distant nations , as well of the east , as of the west , which those emperors were not forc'd to vanquish and overcome several times , and reduce them to the obedience of the empire , from which they had rebelled . and if any one did enlarge the empire in furthest remote parts , as did the emperor trajan in armenia , india , and some others in other regions and provinces , it was notwithstanding at the same time lessened in other parts by new rebellions . but in galienus his time , who was the thirty fourth emperor , the empires supreme greatness began to decline : for though she received her mortal wound afterwards in the time of arcadius and honorius , which was above a hundred years after , yet in this intervening time , the empire being in her decaying age , grew weak , yet sustein'd herself , and like a tree whose root hath been for a long time very deeply fix'd , could not be easily eradicated ; so as though she were oftentimes shrewdly shaken by armies of sundry nations , yet was she able to resume her strength , and keep herself on foot . thus stood the roman empire then , wherein many miraculous things offer themselves to our consideration , and invite us to seek out the true occasion thereof . for on one side it appears a strange thing , that an empire arrived at such a height of greatness , when she once began to decline , hasted so fast to her ruine , there not being any other potentate left in the world , which was able to counterpoise her power , yea , which did not obey her , as subjugated by her armies ; having also so many soldiers to defend her , desirous for their own advantage to preserve the empire . but on the other side , he who shall consider , into the hands of how many base and wicked men this so great empire fell , he may very well wonder how so violent a thing could endure for so many ages , and how a dominion governed by so many tyrants could pass from hand to hand through the series of so many emperors , whereof there were above five hundred between caesars time , and that of arcadius and honorius , in whose days the roman empire began visibly to fall , by the taking of rome , by the ruine of italy , and of other provinces belonging to the empire : and yet 't is known , that the persian monarchy , which was of so great esteem amongst the antient kingdoms , was quickly ruined by its falling into the hands of princes given to idleness and pleasure , and was by alexander carried to another nation ; whereof there are many examples seen almost in every age. let us then say that another violence helped very much to sustain this violence ; of such a force is the union of alike things . thus did the corrupt customs of the people and militia of rome help to maintain the state and power of these tyrannous princes : for since people lived in rome with much licentiousness , and were ente●tained with many pastimes and publick shews made by the emperors , wherein those appeared to be most splendid who were most overgrown with vice , as were caligula and nero , who did not only make the wonted sports of hunting and of comedies be often represented with more then usual magnificence , but introd●ced new shews , as naval battels , chariots drawn by camels and elephants , and permitted all licentiousness to the soldiery , no man desired to change condition ; and the pretorian soldiers enjoying all things of use and priviledg neer unto the city , did not greatly care to be commanded by generous men : and when such princes grew tedious to them , they put them to death , proclaiming a new emperor , and receiving from the new prince many gifts in reward of their wickedness : and the disorder grew so great ▪ as sometimes the empire of the world was by the soldiers sold by outcry to who would give most for it , and at low rates , as it fell out in the time of didius-iulianus . nor was the authority of the senate able to correct this so great inconvenience ; as well for that being trodden under foot by force , it was grown very weak , as also for that the antient roman generosity was wanting in them . so as the senate having resolved , after the death of caligula , to free the city and empire from the like tyranny , and to restore her to her liberty , they could not be constant iu their resolution ; but being abased by fear , submitted soon to the obedience of claudius , of caesars linage , and accepted of him for their emperor , as soon as he was cry'd up by the pretorian soldiers . the like to which happened afterwards in many emperors ; those being confirmed by the senate , which were chosen by the army . this licence was diversly used by the soldiers themselves : for the pretorian bands ; and that army wherein the emperor was at the time of his death , pretended a particular priviledg in the choice of the new emperor . yet emperors were so often cry'd up by other armies also , which were in several provinces of the empire , as all of them desirous in galienus his time to usurp this authority , there were thirty two , who at one and the same time made use of the name and title of roman emperor . so as it seems it may be truly said , that the roman empire was preserved , not in respect to unity , or to the same form of government , but only in respect of that authority which roman armies held of making emperors , whom by reason of the said armies all provinces were to obey , there being no militia like to that of the romans , or which could resist them , or withdraw themselves from their yoke . but great was the diversity in all things , almost in all ages ; for the height of empire was arrived at by several ways : some got it by inheritance , as tiberius , caligula , nero ; and in the following , constantinus , constantius , and many others ; some , though very few , were c●●sen by the senate , many by the emperors themselves , who in their life-time chose some one for their companions and successor in the empire , calling him caesar , to whom after the former emperors death , the title of emperor , and of augustus was given : but their number were most , who got the empire through favor of the sol●iery ; wherein one and the same respect did not always prevail , but many much different considerations ; regard sometimes being had to the birth and affinity that any one had to the former emperors , sometimes to worth , and to some singular action of war , sometimes to favor , which commanders knew some way or other how to come by from their armies , and sometimes to some other such like things : whence it was that persons not onely of much differing condition , but even of divers nations , were made emperors of rome ; trajan and theodotius were spainards ; ●robus , giovinianus , and valentinus , hungaria●s ; dicclesian a dalmarian , cato a slavonian ; and some others . but that which made the difference greater , was that this empire as it was diversly gotten , so was it diversly administred : by some so tyrannically , as there is no so infamous and wicked vice , whereof you find not shameful examples in the lives of tibe●us , caligula , nero , commodus , caracalla , heliogabolus , and other of those emperors ; whereas the empire was governed by some others with such wisdom and justice , as no more perfect regal government can almost be imagined . and what excellent vertue ( not to speak of augustus ) was there to be desired in vespatian , titus , trajan adrian , antoninus , marcus aurelius , alexander severus , and such like ? whence it was , that there having been good and bad emperors in divers ages , as much of dignity , authority and power as this empire lost through the bad government of those wicked princes , it recovered as much by the valor and good government of these good and vertuous princes . and this may be alledged for the first reason , why the empire was able to preserve it self for so long a space of years . for being for a while run into many disorders , s●ch as were introduced by the baseness and negligence of other their predecessors , were by the worth of generous princes amended , and returned to their first channel . the romans antient and confirmed use of good military orders , did likewise help well towards this : wherefore though the empire were in the hands of unworthy persons , yet finding the usual armies already raised , and ready for any enterprise , they were able by means of their commanders , to wage war successfully , and to quiet such rising , and rebellions , as continually arose in so great an empire . thus tiberius did not onely return france , which had rebelled to obedience , but subjugated comagena , and cappadocia and driving out their kings , reduced them to provinces . nero drove the parthians out of armenia , and placed king tigranes there , making that kingdom tributory to the empire . claudius did not onely reduce mauritania , which by means of her commanders made insurrection against the empire ; but did himself in person pass with his army into england , to appease the risings of that island ; and yet these princes were not thought to have of themselves any great worth in them . these and some other such like causes may perhaps be alleadged why this empire could maintain it self in that greatness to which it was arrived . but to come to that which men are more curious in inquiring after , as a thing very strange of it self , as also for many other notable consequences ; to wit , to the causes of its declining and ruine , three may , in my opinion , be chiefly alleadged ; the immeasurable greatness of the empire , the simplicity and wickedness of those who governed it , and the corruption of customs , which were far different from those with which it was first founded , and wherein it grew great . humane imperfection is the cause why mans vertue , as it is not onely finite , and bounded , but weak ●●d brittle ; so hath it to do with things not onely finite and bounded , but circumscribed within no very large limits ; which were it otherwise , it would loose it self in an ocean from whence it would not know how to escape safe . and of this , to omit the examples of many other of our actions , we will onely consider , for as much as appertains to what we have now in hand , that his worth must be exceeding great , who is to rule , and command over others . phylosophers have affirmed , that such a one ought to exceed others as far in wit and worth , as he doth in dignity and power ; nay that his worth and vertue ought to we●gh against that of all those that he will rule over . but let us pass by these supreme eminences , which are rather to be desired , then ever hoped to be found . 't is very certain , that it is very hard to govern an empire well , and the greater it is , the greater is the difficulty of governing it . wherefore lycurgus , a very wise legislator , knowing that the quiet of a city , and the long preservation thereof in one and the same condition , and with a certain form of government , ought to be the true cause of ordaining good laws , would of his own election so dispose of his spartans , and of the orders of that commonwealth , as she should not be able much to enlarge her confines . but on the contrary , rome , as all the constitutions of the city , and the cities armies aimed chiefly at the enlarging the power of the common-wealth , so did she never know what belonged to the enjoyment of peace , not onely by reason of foreign forces , but not by occasion of discord between the citizens . the bounds of her empire grew to be almost immense , and she marcht with her forces to the utmost parts of the earth , subjugating the farthest distant and most barbarous nations . but at last , not having almost any foreign enemies to fight with , her citizens begun to make use of their armies which had conquered other nations , in long and deadly contentions amongst themselves ; till at last the worth and fortune of caesar prevailed , so as augustus remained sole lord of the world , and tiberius , who succeeded him , entered peaceably into so great an empire , wherein were an infinite number of soldiers , train'd up in a perpetual militia , and by reason of civil wars , accustomed to live very licentiously . the greatest acquisitions of the largest and farthest distant provinces were very lately made , there having been above cities taken by two onely commanders , caesar and pompey , and powerful nations vanquished . so as it behoved to keep a great number of soldiers in those garisons , to keep the people in obedience , which were in pares farthest distant from the senate of the empire . but the very same thing which was introduced to provide against those dangers , was cause of others , by reason of the authority which the armies had already usurped , and out of hopes afforded to the commanders of attaining this supreme dignity , by being by the soldiers cried up emperors . wherefore one onely man , though of never so much worth , not being able to supply all places , and provide for so many things as so great an empire stood in need of , and less able to correct the disorders , which in so many states , as civil humors in members farthest distant from the heart , did daily more and more encrease , the empire must needs be continually ●ext both by foreign nations , and by its own soldiers ; so as it was hardly ever free from such troubles ; nor was war sooner ended in one place , but it broke forth in another ; nay for the most part , divers roman armies fought in several places , at one and the same time , each of them endeavoring to sustain him whom they had chosen to be their emperor . therefore adrian to remedy so many disorders in the empire , which he thought did onely arise by reason of the emperors being so far off , and the largeness of the confines , resolved not to keep his certain abode in rome , but spending his whole time in travelling to visit all the parts of his dominions , to keep his subjects in their duties ; and knowing how hard a thing this would be to do , and almost impossible in so large confines , he resolved to shorten them in the eastern parts , making the river euphrates the utmost boundeur of the emire , and rest●ring all the people of the higher provinces to their liberty , even to india ; who being by his successors reduced under the obedience of the empire , and many rebellions ensuing thereupon , and much difficulty , not onely in the further dist●n● parts , b●t even in those that were nearest at hand ; constantine the great , knowing that these evils could not otherwise be help● , but by carrying the seat of the empire nearer those parts , chose the city of byzantium to be the place , which being rebuilt by him , took from him the name of constantinople . and hence it is that the indian gymnosophist , being desirous to shew alexander the great , that whil●t being born away with a desire of rule in far distant regions , he was gone so far from his own kingdom , as he gave it occasion of rebelling against him , made a hard and stiff oxe-hide be laid upon the ground , and walking upon the utmost skirts thereof , shewed him , that when the part that was trod upon gave way to the foot , another part rose up : and that so it befell many great princes , who whilst they seek to keep one part of their states low and quiet , the rest , which they keep far from , rise up in rebellion . hence it was , that many emperors , not only such as were unfit for government , but even the wisest and most valiant , knowing and confessing themselves to be opprest by the weight of so great a mass , c●ose others who in their li●e-times were to be their coadjutors in government , and who should succeed them after their deaths in the empire , which was seldom quietly possest by one alone , the armies of far distant provinces re●●sing oft-times to obey those who were chosen to succeed in the empire by other armies , though they were with all solemnity allowed and accepted of by the sen●te , as befell galba , who being created emperor by the spanish army , was not accepted of , nor obeyed by the german army . the like befell many others ; so as sometimes it was not well known who was the true emperor . and certainly , tall●in●es of the great●st height of this empire it may be known , that no one man , though of never so great worth , was able to govern it in peace and quiet . and even augustus himsel● made trial of many insurrections in spain , germany , and in the eastern p●●ts , amongst the ●cythians and parthians ; though at l●st , through his sin●ular worth and great good fortune , the whole world being reduced to an universal peace , he was able to shut up that famous temple of ianus , which was kept always open afterward , his successors having always occasion to modest themselvs with war. so as the sa●ing is made true , that suis & ipsa roma viribus ruit . but his her ruine was certainly accelerated by the lewd conditions of those into whose han●s t●e empire often fell : for through their fault , the internal causes of the states corruption were either occasioned , or much increased ; since by their ignorance , baseness avar●c● cruelty , lust , and other enormous vices , they drew on contempt and injury , the first and chief roots of all change of government : for by contempt the subjects take occasion to rebel , and chiefly the richest and noblest and from injury comes hatred , and desire of change of government . and it was the grea●er misfortune for this empire , in all other respects more fortunate then all other empires , that in those very times wherein there was greatest need of a continued succession of wise and generous princes to confirm the state , which by vertue of the great augustus was reduced from war and past disorders into peace and good government , should after him fall into the hands of three very lewd and base emperors , tiberius , caligula , and nero ; from whose enormous vices those chief evils arose to the provinces of that empire , which we but now mentioned , the contempt of that supreme dignity , both amongst for in and her own soldiers . the former , by rebelling , strove to free themselves from their obedience ; the other , through insolence , bere●t them of empire and life . ha●red , and desire of change arose likewise in the senate , which was deprived of its authority ; and particularly in those who were offended , or had any thing of generosity in them . hence ●t was , that soon after , to wit in ●ero's time , caesars linage ended ; and tha● the soldiers accustomed to much licentiousness under such princes , usurp'd the authori●y of making emperors , as they did in galba after nero's death , in otho after galba , and so in many others . his worth who commanded in chief , and his good fortune who was to succeed in the empire , was sometimes able to make a successor , but not to take this authority totally from the soldiery , through confidence of whose favor many aspired , though by bad means , to usurp the empire ; and amidst these contentions the empire must needs be divided , shatter'd , and weakened . from this root another disorder arose , which was cause of many heinous mischiefs , to wit , the general corruption of customs in all the orders of the city of rome : for subjects following , as usually they do , their princes inclinations and exercises , men began to give themselves over to an idle life ; and vertue being neither nourished , nor at first maintained , still languished more and more ; so as the art of commanding failing , good obedience was also wanting ; every body made his will his law ; nor was there any sort of wickedness , how infamous soever , from which the commanders or soldiers were restrained by any respect borne to the majesty of the prince . all reason was reduced to the sword , and every one dared to attempt as much as his power encouraged him to compass . such and so great were the vices which crept daily into men of all degrees and qualities , as it would be too laborious a thing to number them up all . this one example may suffice to shew , to what dissolu●eness and licent●ousness the affairs of rome were reduced , when galba having chosen piso lasinianus , a man very famous for his civil behaviour and military worth , his election was neither accepted of by the army , nor by the senate , because it was thought that if he should come to the empire , he would correct the many misdemeanors both of citizens and soldiers : but both of them being kill'd , and in stead of him otho was made emperor in rome , and vitellius at the same time cry'd up emperor by the army in germany . the affairs of the empire were then governed with such confusion , and grew so much worse in the succeeding age , the disorders growing to be confirm'd by a bad habit , as when any emperors should go about to correct the immoderate licentiousness of the soldiers , by reducing them to their antient discipline , were they never so good and wise princes , they were slain by the armies ; as was alexander severus , probus , and some others . so as no certain form could be given to such a government , wherein the soldier had so great a stroke in authority , making and unmaking emperors at their pleasure ; so as it might seem to resemble a popular state ; and yet the emperors commanding with supreme authority in so ample a dominion , monarchy might appear to be there formed . it is not much to be wondred at then , if this monstrous body of the roman empire being composed of almost incompatible , ill-govern'd , and m●sproportioned parts , should be sick of divers infirmities , and must at last suffer dissolution , sooner then otherwise her greatness and power promised . the negligence and pusillanimity of some emperors were likewise cause why the city-soldiers , who kept still about the city , as it were the life guard of the princes person , and who were the flower of all the rest both for valor and discipline , being long kept idle , grew so effeminate , and so unaccustomed to labor and military exercise , as when some more valiant prince would make trial of them , they found themselves deceived in the hopes they had of their prist●ne worth . wherefore the empire having already received great losses and damages in divers battels , things grew to that height , as ( not to mention many almost innumerable particulars which in this case might be produced ) when the states of the assaulted empire would defe●d themselvs against the northern nations ( as you shall shortly hear ) they were forced to take others of the same nations to oppose their violence : to so great a want both of power , soldiers , and military discipline was the empire reduced before it was so rent and so bereft of many provinces , as it was afterwards . then , as the roman empire was got to that height of power and greatness by the worth of those first antient romans , and by the excellencie of their military discipline , so her good orders being afterwards corrupted , she took so clean contrary a way to her first beginning , as it behoved her soon to fall to ruine ; it being a certain and true rule , that states do increase and are preserved by the same means by which they had their first beginnings , and are corrupted by the contrary . and he who shall consider the antient ways and works of those who laid the first foundations of this empire , and shall compare them with those which insued in the time of emperors , will find such difference therein , as the necessity of coming to such an end may soon be seen . the roman armies and their leaders , were once excellent examples of worth and discipline . who does not praise and wonder at what titus manlius did , who punisht his victorious son with death , because he fought the enemy before the sign of battel was given ? very remarkable were the severe punishments which were oft-times imposed upon the soldiers disobedience , even for slight causes , whose tumultuous proceedings were oft-time punished with decimating the whole army . but how different from these examples were those which were afterwards in the following age shewn by many of those , who waged war , and commanded the roman armies ? the commanders indulgence towards the armies , the soldiers uncurb'd licentiousness , the authority and boldness which they assumed unto themselves , both over the people , and over the very emperors , whom they were to obey , are not they monstrous things in a well ordered state ? those antient romans did so study military affairs , and so frequent were the exercises of the militia with all citizens , as when the ●●ity of rome had not extended her bounds beyond italy , she had so numerous armies , as she was able to maintain at one and the same time , but in several parts above one hundred thousand men in arms ; and yet when so many calamities and ruines befel her by the barbarians , when she commanded over so many provinces and kingdoms , her antient discipline was so lost , as for want of soldiers she was forc'd to make use of mercinary barbarians , who getting at last to be very powerful , did joyntly turn their arms against that empire , for whose defence they were called in , and whose pay they took . nor is the vanquishing and beating of the roman armies , which was for so many years unconquerable by other nations , to be attributed to the goths , or those other northern people ; but rather to the corruption of their customs , to the loss of their good discipline , and to the discord and baseness of the commanders , and soldiers of those times . for were not the french a valiant and stout nation ? to overcome whom , it behoved caesar to fight so many battels , and to make so often trial of the romans worth and fortune , and that not without much danger . did not the romans wage war in spain for the space of almost two hundred years together , before they could well conquer that nation , and get quiet possession thereof ? how often did the saxons , bavarians and other people of germany take up arms to molest the states of the empire ? yet all their commotions were still supprest . and had not the roman empire almost continual war by reason of their so many insurrections , with many other eastern nations , and chiefly with the persians ? and though sometimes they tasted of adverse fortune , yet their loss was always recovered , as also the prejudice of the reputation of the romans forces by their own commanders and soldiers , so as they were always forc'd to keep within their own confines , and under the obedience of the empire . but when they stood in greatest need , when the empire recieved so sore and so irreparable blows from the barbarians , it was brought to such weakness in the eastern parts by reason of the many great disorders which were in the head , and in all the members , which were now become incureable , ●s it was not able to sustain the force of the fierce and warlike northern nations . and beginning once to fall , when its worth was but little , it could not get up again , as it had done at other times . now if we will apply these more general considerations , to some particular chances of this empire , the true cause of its declination will the more easily be known . the affairs of the empire were almost at all times greatly molested by divers of the northern people , many of which were never reduced to the obedience of the empire , some of which had not been known till they took up arms , but of all the rest the goths proved the most famous for the ruine of the empire , and for the so many calamities of italy , and of many other nations ; and he who shall consider their beginnings and their progress , must needs wonder very much , and through confusion lose the discourse of humane wisdom ; to think how this barbarous people , and so far remote from our regions , and unknown by them , insomuch , as at this day their original is not by authors agreed upon , without or kingdom , or military discipline , falling down tumultuously at first , to possess themselves of other mens countries , should soon become so powerful , and formidable , as that they should overcome the romans , who had overcome the world . who could have imagined that a new , and unknown people , were to come from forth the utmost northern parts , to destroy so vast an empire , by which so many powerful kings , and famous warlike nations were subjected ? the most general opinion is , that these men who destroyed the empire , came from scythia into europe where they were possest of many large regions , differing amongst themselves in name and habitation ; those who lived more towards the east being called estern-goths , and others , more western-goths . but they were thought to be but new inhabitants of that country , into which they were first come from certain islands in the sarmatian ocean ; and that being worsted by some of their neighboring people , after many contestations had with them , their country being moreover of two smal a circuit for their abounding numbers , they betook themselves to seek out new seats , and other habitations . and thus they passed over very many times in very great numbers into the provinces belonging to the empire , possessing and indamaging many countries : the things a little before mentioned , being the cause why these evils , and the greater ruines which ensued were not remedied . for the empire being of a very vast extent , was continually troubled with sundry commotions in sundry parts . the princes who commanded were of little worth , and the former antient valor and discipline was no longer found in their armies , which were given over to licentiousness . hence it was that whenin the time of philip , the first of that name , but in order the nine and twentieth roman emperor , the goths fixt themselves in mysia and thrace , such forces were not sent against these novelties , as might appease them , and quell the then but small strength of these tumultuous people . for there being no loyalty in the commanders , nor valor in the soldiers , those who were sent by the empeor against such enemies , intended their own particular interest more then the service of the empire . insomuch as macrinus and decius being sent the one after the other to be chief of the enterprise , made themselves be cried up emperors by the army , having first permitted much licentiousness in the soldiers , that they might win their good will. and when the same decius was truly possest of the empire , after the death of macrinus , and of philip also , joyning battel with the goths , he found the effects of nourishing sedition in armies , and in winking at their disobedience , and at the non-performance of their military duuties ; for his army was routed and put to flight by the goths , and he seeking to save himself by running away , was drowned in a marrish ground . and when after these losses , the empire ought to have been restored , and the honor thereof vindicated by the successor with new forces ; gallus who had obtained this supream dignity by the souldiers rashness , and who was a poorly spirited man , and had come by the empire by indirect means ; that he might enjoy his leasure time in rome , which he leudly spent , he was easily perswaded to make a shameful peace with the goths , not onely permitting them to ●arry in the provinces which they were possessed of , but obliging himself to pay them a certain sum of money yearly . thus the city of rome , which was mistress of the whole world , became tributary to a barbarous people , who knew not till then what belong'd to imperial dignity , to wealth , nor to military glory : this base agreement gave a great blow to the reputation of the roman empire ; so as in galienus his time , who soon after succeeded in the empire , so many mutinies and insurrections arose , as italy it self was hardly kept in obedience ; and the goths grew so insolent , as breaking the peace which they had made with the gauls , they took many cities in bythinia , in thrace , and in macedonia : by which prosperous successes others of the goths being encouraged , who had tarried all this while at home , where they lived in narrow precincts , they sent to the emperor valens to demand abode in the provinces of the empire ; with whom fear prevailing more then the antient honor of the empire ; and the roman generosity , gave way to their request , allotting bulgaria and servia for these new inhabitants to live in ; suffering the northern nations thus to get footing , and to increase in strength , which had always been the greatest enemies to the empire , and from whom the emperors had received such injuries and shame . these easie acquisitions , and the hopes of greater matters , made alaricus king of the goths march not long after with a numerous army from his own kingdom towards italy , demanding that a place of residence might be allowed him by the emperor honorius in france ; and receiving a denial , did in his fury do greater mischief . but the same emperor valens soon felt the harm of this his ill-taken advice : for the same goths increasing through the baseness and negligence of others , and the huns , alani , and other northern people conspiring together with them , they besieged the city of constantinople , and other noble cities were endangered : which made gratianus choose theodosius for his companion in the empire , for the great repute which was had of his valor , though he were a spaniard by nation . but though he behaved himself gallantly against these enemies , and wan some brave victories ; yet since they had already got great strength , and were governed in obedience under their valiant masters and commanders , and for that the empire was still busied in other wars , it was thought expedient to come to peace with alaricus king of the goths , leading him and a great number of his men under the empires pay , to make use of them in other undertakings . for the goths being kept in continual pay by some former emperors , amongst other soldiers which served the empire , and being of themselves conversant in many wars , they were become a valiant people , and had learn'd the roman discipline , though not the corruption which overthrew it , in the roman camp. which , though it might be good for the present occasions , it did certainly prove very pernicious afterwards . for though by this peace theodosius was safe from any fear of this nation , whilst he governed together with gratianus , and also afterwards when he held the empire alone by himself , he being a person of singular worth , and one who by his industry had somewhat renewed the antient discipline amongst the soldiers , yet after his death the forces of the empire beginning again to flag , and the empire falling into the hands of his two sons , arc●dius and honorius , who succeeded their father whilst they were but young , and proved not to be of such gallant parts as the condition of those times required , many of those who commanded under theodosius in several parts rebelled , who were all of them cryed up emperors by those armies wherein they commanded ; by which occasions being invited , the goths did not only return to rise up in arms against the empire , but also other northern nations who did then inhabit germany , as the alani , franks and vandals , took up arms , and did at one and the same time assault the states of the empire in several parts ; many of them marching more particularly towards italy , and against the very city of rome , which after divers passages remained in prey to these barbarians , the antient roman worth being so decayed , as there was not any one who did so much as provide for the welfare of so stately a city , which was the queen of the world. and the emperor honorius ( a thing which is not to be mentioned without much marvel ) whilst italy and other countries were wasted with war , and the very city of rome was reduced to the utmost extremity , remained in ravenna an idle spectator of his subjects so great calamity , and of the ruine of his state , in so base and stupid a manner , as being told he might do well to provide for the preservation and safety of so many of the empires provinces , which being miserably torn in pieces , were falling into the power of the barbarians , answered , that he could live without them . after the ruine of rome , these victorious barbarians past into france , and into spain , where being recruited with other people of their own nations , and the roman armies being busied in civil seditions , and in maintaining those emperors which each of them had chosen , they had leisure to fix themselves there , and to take possession of those noble provinces , the greatest part of whose antient inhabitants being extinguished , they setled themselves there , and did long govern those dominions ; and others of them passing into africa , and having won large territories , did with the same fortune and same thoughts institute their proper kingdoms . but on the other part , other people called the huns fell into pannonia , called now by their names , hungaria , and possessing themselves likewise thereof , fixt their abode and dominion there . so as there was hardly any western province of the empire which was not at this time troubled by this fury of war , the roman princes and soldiers not having sufficient worth to withstand them : insomuch that when attila marched with a furious army to destroy italy , the empire not having any soldiers that they durst confide in to impede his passage , the romans were forced to take king theodoricus with a good number of his goths into their pay ; by whose assistance that cruel enemy was at that time kept off . but the empires weak forces being at last tyred , and some commanders being lost in whom there remained yet some worth and discipline , the greater , and almost fatal ruines of italy began ; whereinto when these cruel barbarians entred , they put all to fire and sword , bringing total destruction to many noble and populous cities . which ( according to the natural order of all things mortal , wherein corruptio unius est generatio alterius ) gave occasion to the birth of the city of venice , whereunto the remainder of the italian nobility had recourse , and saved themselves . the twelveth discourse , why th● commonwealth of rome , though she suffered many defeats in divers battels , yet did still prove victorious at last . he who shall narrowly consider the great actions of the romans , will still discover new things therein not onely worthy of praise but of admiration . their prosperity was certainly very great , but proceeding , as it is to be beleeved , from their worth , and from certain and ordinary causes . the people of rome made more wars , then ever any potentate hath been known to do , but that which occasioneth the greatest wonder is , that their success in all of them was prosperous . and that though the roman armies were in many battels overcome , yet still in the conclusion of every war the victories sided with them : it will then be worth the while to seek out the truest , or at least , the most truth-like causes thereof , by reasoning thereupon . the city of rome waged continual wars from the first foundation thereof till augustus his time , which was for above seven hundred years . the gates of that famous temple of ianus , which were never to be shut but in time of peace , stood always open , unless it were once in the consulship of titus manlius ; nor was there almost any nation known in those daies ▪ with whom the city of rome hath not at some time made trial of her forces and worth . that commonwealth in so many , and so long contentions of war , was likewise sometimes favored , sometimes frowned upon by fortune ; so as sometimes she was brought into very great danger ; yet still she prevailed at last , and triumphed over her formerly victorious enemies . long and heavy was the dispute ▪ which in her very beginning she had with so many people of italy , and chiefly with those that were nearest , who singly by themselves , and joyntly with others , did conspire against the romans , and did by all their best endeavors seek how to keep the powea of the empire low , which was ordained , as was afterwards seen , to the height of all greatness . nor was the commonwealth of rome secure from the efforts of foreign nations ; nay many times she was to withstand the fury of the french , who assailed her with great forces , that they might totally subdue her , and possess themselves of her territories , as they had done of so many other parts of italy . the commonwealth made trial of her forces , even in the beginning of her greatness with other kings ; till beginning with the first carthaginian wars , to wage war further from her confines , she proved at last a terror even to the most remote foreign countries , which she at last subjugated assuming always greater and better courage , as her empire did encrease , and her military discipline bettering by exercise , as did also her worth by prosperous success . who will not then admire these so great and unparellel'd things ? who can consider them without endeavoring to know the reasons thereof ? polybius , whilst he recounts some of these wonderful things , terming the people of rome invincible , adds ( that he may in a manner give the reason thereof ) that these people brought whatsoever enterprise , how hard and difficult soever , after many and various successes , to a good and desired end , because they were modest in prosperous , and constant in adverse fortune . these two excellent vertues are certainly requisite to whosoever propounds true and perpetual glory for his end , and does aspire thereunto : for the variety of humane affairs does not tolerate that man should arrive at the height of power , and at supreme honors by a streight and short path of continued prosperity ; therefore constancy , or let us rather term it magnanimity or fortitude is requisite for him , to the end that he may persevere in the same gallantry and grandeur of spirit , wherewith he did propound any great action to himself , without being weary or quiet till he hath effected it . and modesty is likewise necessary for him , that is to say a temperate affection , so as he may not lose himself in prosperous successes , and being puft up with pride and vain glory , may not think he is come to his journeys end , when he is not gotten half way thither ; which is the cause why many have lost their good fortune , and not reaped the true fruits of many worthy and well begun labors . so as it may be numbred amongst those things which made great kings amongst them , and which brought them to so great an eminency of power , and command , that they were endowed with these two excellent vertues , whereby they knew how to make use of both fortunes . but these may peradventure be but general rules , and not such as may give satisfaction ; for if we will look into the commonwealth of greece , we shall find many eminent examples of both these vertues , yet were they not able to carry them half the way so far towards the goal , whereat the romans arrived ; therefore are not their actions worthy that high esteem which is deservedly put upon the roman affairs . there have likewise been many famous princes in several ages , who neither wanted generosity of mind , constantly to prosecute noble actions by them begun ; nor modesty and temperance in all other affections , meerly out of a desire of glory ; and yet their enterprises have not alwaies succeeded well , nor have they inlarged their power and dominions , as did the romans . let us pass on then to other considerations wh●ch shall hereafter be looked upon , how the romans governed themselves and their counsels in their militia , what their military orders and institutions were , what state they were at first possest of , which served as it were for a ladder for them whereby to climb up to the height of such greatness and command , and we shall find that these were such amongst the romans as were not all of them together , or in such excellency in other principalities and nations , so as they were with reason to produce such effects as they did . all the offices of war were admin●stred amongst the romans by their citizens ; varying sometimes the condition of the persons , together with the names and authority of those who commanded the armies ; for they made sometimes use of noblemen , sometimes of plebeians . but they still kept amongst their own romans , all the degrees of the militia , and afforded occasion to many to exercise themselves therein , so as there was not any witty citizen , or hopefull young-man of noble extract , who was far from them . nay , it is seen , that those who were more given to the study of speculative learning , when the places , and governments committed to their charge , did so require , betook themselves , as others did , to the managing of arms , and to warlike affairs ; in such sort as even cicero , wholly given to philosophie , and the study of eloquence , when he went pro-consul into cilicia , waged war with the parthians . hence it was that they never wanted commanders , and if at any time the roman armies suffered any thing by the imprudency or infelicity of one commander , they knew quickly how to make amends by the worth and fortune of another , as it fell out at all times ; for in that commonwealth , by reason of her orders , and by her being still imployed in war , the way was alwaies open to many citizens to imploy themselves in arms , and in commands of the armies . nor was the obedience which is due by soldiers to their commanders the less for this . for a consul , or dictator had the like authority in the camp , as the person of an absolute prince could have had , who commanded his army personally . therefore by descending to more particulars , the benefit may be the more easily discerned which redounded to that commonwealth , by means of these her good orders : for if any disorder did at any time happen ( as usually there doth in any , how well soever ordered government ) through the fault of any particular citizen , whereby the commonwealth suffered prejudice in the administration of war , this might soon be amended , and the prejudice received from the enemy , might quickly be restored by the presence and worth of some other citizen . thus it fell out , that when the roman armies , whilst the bounds of the commonwealth were but smal , were overcome by the sabins , by the equi , by the capennati , by the falisci , and by others of their neighbors , with whom they waged war , they could easily stop the course of that their bad fortune , and shun runing into greater dangers . the rout which was given by the equi , and sabins , and which was the greatest given in those times , was known to be occasioned through the distaste which the army took at appius the decemviri and at the injustice , and cruelty which he used towards the soldiery . wherefore returning to the former government of consuls , quintius the new consul had the means given him of recovering the militia's formerly lost honor and credit ; by giving a great overthrow to those very enemies , who were grown so proud and insolent for their victories had over the roman army . thus likewise , when the roman armies were shamefully put to slight another time by the ●qui , ●idenates and falisci , first through the defeat of papyrius mugelanus ; and then by the like of genutius , and titinius the military tribunes , who were mean and unexpert plebeians , and who without much authority had the care of the army ; when quintus servilius was created consul , and after him furius camillus , they won the most famous victories that the romans had ever gotten till that time ( which was three hundred and fifty years after the building of the city ) against the aequi , and other of their enemies . but this may be better conceived in greater affairs , when the commonwealth was much increased . the roman armies rec●ived so notable defeats in the war which pyrrhus made against them , as the whole affairs of the commonwealth seemed to be in no little danger , having so potent and victorious an enemy within their bosoms : yet at last not being dismayed for any adverse fortune , but treating freely with their enemy , rather as vanquishers then vanquished , they reduced their affairs to such a condition , as pyrrhus thought it his best course to quit italy , and leave the romans quiet . it is herein to be considered , that the romans being so long accustomed to continual wars with their neighbors the italians , and particularly with the samnites a little before this time , against whom the romans marched with numerous armies , and had good success winning many famous victories ; insomuch as val. corvinus kill'd above thirty thousand samnites in one day , made much for their withstanding so great an enemy as pyrrhus , and for their maintaining themselves against forein forces , against the use of elephants , and other new ways of warfaring , which italy had not known before ; whence it was that the city of rome did at this time abound in valiant men , and who were expert in the militia . so as cynneas who was sent by pyrrhus to rome , told him , that he had seen a city so very full of inhabitants , as he feared if his highness should continue his war with the romans , he should go about to overcome an hydra : and pyrrhus himself hath more then once admired the worth of the roman commanders . who doth not even with wonder consider , how many commanders , and how many armies the commonwealth of rome could set out in the war with the carthaginians , and especially in that with hannibal , which did more endanger the affairs of rome then all the rest ? since it main●ained war in so many several parts at one and the same time , in italy , spain , africa , and greece . which they were able to do by reason of the infinite number of men wherewith italy was then inhabited , who were all well disciplined , by reason of their long exercise in war. we read , that when the romans made war with hannibal , they had sometimes , what of their own proper soldiers , and what of their associates , who did all neighbor neer upon them , twenty three legions , which made about an hundred thousand soldiers , for defence of their empire . moreover , whilst the common-wealth kept her forces divided in several parts , as she did with wonderful judgment in the carthaginian war , which was the sorest of all the rest , though she tasted of adverse fortune sometimes in some parts , yet were not all her forces utterly destroyed ; for that part of their forces which was yet safe and entire , was able to make good the fortune of the whole commonwealth . thus after those notable routs which the roman armies had , the one by the tygurian gauls , when the forces were commanded by lucius cassius ; the other by the cymbrians , when they were led on by caius servilius cepio , in which two battels the romans lost above eighty thousand soldiers , they were able notwithstanding to recruit themselves , and defend their affairs ; because they had another victorious army at the same time , commanded by marius , who had just at that time gloriously ended the war against iugurth . thus when the commonwealth of rome seemed to be utterly ruined by reason of the two discomfitures given them , the one at thra●ymenes , the other at cannae , she was restored again by her prosperoussuccess in war with spain . thus when two of her armies were worsted in spain , the common-wealth was preserve in safety by fortunate success of their wars in sicily and in italy . when the romans were in greater danger then ever , there being at the same time two great carthaginian armies in italy , and two most valiant generals , hannibal and asdrubal ; yet would not the romans keep all their warriors in italy , but did at the same time maintain and reinforce their armies in sardi●ia , sicily , france , and spain . and though by reason of so many wars which begot one another , the commonwealth must needs oftentimes run great hazards , especially since she oft-times exposed her armies to the doubtful event of battel ; yet did they thereby receive this of good and safety , that by reason of their continual exercise of arms , they were the more easily provided of valiant and experienced men , and were the better able to govern themselves in adverse fortune . the carthaginians , on the contrary , not being able to make use of many good commanders or soldiers , ( for they did not make use of their own peculiar militia , as did the romans , but did imploy some few of the chief of their city-factions in commanding their armies ) could not so easily recruit and reinforce their armies , when they were weakened by any adverse fortune ; nor had they whereout to pick better or more fortunate commanders , when any of theirs were faulty . insomuch as when the carthaginians were overcome by scipio in africa , they were forc'd to recal hannibal from italy , suffering the romans to take breath in those parts where they were most molested ; and hannibal himself not having means to recruit his army , which he had brought with him from africa , and which was wasted and weakened by long march , and adverse fortune , was necessitated to give way to the valor and fortune of the romans . it made not a little likewise for the government of the roman commonwealth , and for the maintaining of her in her weak beginnings , that the militia was exercised for many years without any pay to the soldiers . so as wh●lst their means was yet but small , and yet they must still be in arms , by reason of their being still infested by many of the neighboring nations , the want of monies was no cause of not maintaining their armies , as it hath been the ruine of many stat●s ; but if they happened to receive a rout , the army might be recruited by other chosen and commanded men . but afterwards when the city was much better peopled , and much stronger , so as she was able to make greater undertakings , the publick exchequer was so enriched , answerable to what became a well-ordered government , and which aspired to the heighth of empire , as she was not for this cause so incommodated , as that she must yield under the weight of war , nor yet for any her greatest mifortune . whereas in some other commonwealths , as in that of sparta , the poorness of the exchequer introduced by lycurgus his laws , hindred her from enlarging her empire ; and when she aspired thereunto , she was forc'd for want of things requisite to flie for help to the kings of persia ; so as in lieu of domineering over the rest of the grecians , she became a servant to barbarians , because she exceeded those terms and rules wherewith her government was founded and established . after these considerations , some things may be added which proved likewise very advantagious for the securing of the romans greatness : as the continuation of the militia , out of a duty imposed upon every citizen , of spending almost all the best years of his life in the camp , every one being bound to militate till he had advanced fifteen pays at least : so he who had fought in one or two battels , was not permitted to sit down and rest , but continuing in the militia , by reason of the experience he had gotten , became more useful and advantagious in the wars . amongst others , we have a notable example of one l. e. siccius , who was slain in the camp in the time of appius his decemvirate , after he had followed the wars for forty years together : and after having been in above a hundred battels . it is also a thing of great consideration , that the nerve of the roman armies consisted in their infantry , though they had some horse to strengthen them ; whence it was , that they were sooner recruited , and reinforced after a rout , for that men are sooner recruited then horses : there being greater store of them : and which the romans could the better do , because they made use of men of one onely country for their soldiers , that is to say , of their own men , and those of their associates who were at hand and ready to be joyned together , and be imployed in any action ; which doth not fall out so when armies are to be raised and recruited out of many nations , and from far distant places . but it was a great help to the romans above all other things , for the maintaining of themselves in all events of so many wars , which they made with so many powerful kings and nations , that they were possest of italy ; a province , which in those times did more abound in men and arms , then any other country ; as may be known by many things , but chiefly by this , that the commonwealth of rome had labored very long ere she could subjugate italy , which was not wholly subdued , in all the parts thereof , till after the commonwealth had extended her precincts very far : when afterwards by the forces of the same italy , she in a few years overcame all other provinces , and nations . therefore the war which was made against the romans by the neighboring people , the piceni , pel●gni , marusini , lucani , marci , and others , which was called bellum sociale , because they termed themselves fellow●companions to the people of rome ; though there were but a smal part of the italian forces in it ; yet that country being excellently well inhabited with warlike men , it was thought to be one of the hardest , and most dangerous wars , that ever the common-wealth of rome made ; nor could it be ended out by allowing those people , the franchise and liberty of roman citizens , which was as much as to grant them the thing they fought for ; for the obtaining of that , was that for which they fought . and we read , that a muster being made throughout all italy of all the soldiers which might be assembled to withstand the danger which was threatned by the barbarians , when the ●ransalpine gauls which dwelt about the rhodosius , were ●●mmoned by the other gauls , who were already possest of some parts of lombardy , that they might prepare to assault italy ; the muster role of such as were able to bear arms , amounted to seven hundred thousand foot , and threescore thousand horse , who were fit to serve upon such an occasion . and yet the greatest part of lombardy , which was possest by the said gauls , nor some other of those provinces which are now comprehended within the confines of italy , were not numbered in this muster-roll . which is so much the more to be wondred at for that this happened after the carthaginian war ; to wit , when the common-wealth of rome was not yet gotten to that height of power whereunto she arrived afterwards ; people multiplying through the greatness and felicity of the empire , and many men having been consumed in that long and sore war. to these things may be added the excellency of military discipline , which as it was in great perfection with the romans , so was it of great advantage to the obtaining of so many victories , and to the compleating of so many enterprises . for though the grecian , macedonian , and roman militia were of great esteem at one and the same time , yet that of the romans did so far exceed the others , as that it was not onely stronger , and more secure , but better fitted then the rest for all places ; and times . amongst other orders of the grecian and of the macedonian militia , wherewith the armies of alexander the great did in particular so miraculous things , the phalanx was much celebrated ; but this , though it were in it self of very great strength , it oft-times proved not so serviceable , if upon any occasion it became to be divided , or disordered : but the roman orders were not onely firm and stable , as was the phalanx , but were more adapted to every place , and every season , and proved very congruous for all warlike actions ; so as to their own great advantage , and to the prejudice of their enemies , making use of their own soldiers , the romans performed the office of whatsoever military discipline by their own men , fighting in all postures , either in whole bodies altogether , or squadron to squadron , or man to man , so as not any man was idle or useless in their camps , or battels . for whilst they minded fighting , and not flying , or free-booting , the routs which their armies did oft-times receive , were not such , but that they did in some places make their party good against their enemy , and keep some part of their army safe ; which proceeded principally from the exquisite orders of that militia . insomuch as hannibal when he came first into italy , having after his first conflicts learn'd the excellency of this militia , made his soldiers use the romans arms ; and pyrrhus did not onely betake himself to use these arms , but did mingle many italian soldiers , the better to accommodate his militia to the roman ordinances ; saying , that that discipline of the barbarians ( a name given by the grecians to all other nations ) was not at all barbarous . so when it happened that the romans receive any rout , as they did in the battels made against the two aforesaid commanders hannibal and pyrrhus , very experience in other successes made them know that it was not the goodness of any forein military discipline which bereft the romans of the victories which they were wont to bear away , but for that the romans wanted such excellent commanders as those two were . therefore when the worth of the commanders came to be equal , the goodness and excellencie of the roman military ordinances prevailed before those of those very armies , which for some other respects had the better of the romans . but to proceed upon our late consideration , we must say that the arms used by the romans were thought very convenient , and better then those of other nations , as launces which were usually given to soldiers of the first files ; whereby they received much benefit , as well to withstand the first fiercest efforts of the enemy , as to weary them in cutting those arms in peeces , being to come to closer fight ; and then whole bodies of fresh and well armed soldiers succeeded in the roman armies . for their bodies were covered with their bucklers , which were very large ones , and the short , but very sharp swords and finely tempered , used by the romans , were of great advantage to the soldiers , who might wield them in a long fight , as well to defend themselves from their enemies blows , as to let flie upon them ; which was not practised in other militia's of those times ; particularly not amongst the french , with whom the romans had often and dangerous fights , for they used very little bucklers , and long heavy swords , very sharp at the point , so as they were easily wrested , and made unuseful . therefore the routs which the roman armies received , were very few in comparison of those they gave their enemies ; and being but seldom worsted , and often victorious , the state , strength , and reputation of the empire did still increase ; so as when some adverse fortune happened , it was not sufficient to extinguish , no nor so much as long to weaken the greatness of that commonwealth . divers particular good rules observed in the administration of war , were likewise of great moment for the carrying on of the roman affairs . amongst which the diligence which was used by publick constitutions in dividing of the prey , may be numbred for one ; for they used to place the prey or booty first in publick , and did then so divide it amongst the soldiers , as those who were upon the guard shared as well thereof , as those that were forwardest in the action , and who had sackt the enemy . whereby occasion was not given for those notable disorders which have been observed to happen in these latter times , wherein upon such an occasion the loss of the whole army hath ensued . the faith also which was so exactly observed , and the fair proceedings with such cities as were subject to that dominion , won the romans the good affection of the people ; by whose favor empires are usually more upheld upon any adverse accident , then by any other thing . of these we read of many notable examples ; it being as far from that good military discipline , to bear with the insolency of soldiers , as it is introduced in these our last ages to the great prejudice of people , though friends and subjects . for such faults as these were severely punish'd ; the which is observable amongst so many other actions , for what the romans did to those people , to whom they did not only restore the goods and liberty which had been by the soldiers wickedly taken away , and so their grievances were redrest , but those were severely punish'd who had committed such things . to this may be added , that the romans , to the end that the power of the commonwealth might still prevail , and might upon any occasion be made use of , endeavored as soon as they bent their minds to greater matters , to accompany their land-forces with maritime-aids , so as the one might help the other , and the one not only be made more powerful by the other , but more secure , as it fell out , and as it may be observed in many of their actions ; but chiefly when seeing their affairs succeeded but ill with the carthaginians , who prevailed by reason of their antient maritime profession , and had likewise great advantage in their land-militia by their use of elephan●s , which the romans had not as yet well learned how to resist ; they bent themselves wholly to naval preparations , wherein they did afterwards behave themselves with such valor and prosperity , as they overcame these their so fierce and cruel enemies in a naval fight , and raised their fortune . let us in the next place observe , that the greatness and generosity of the romans was such , as not content to secure their neer neighboring dangers , and out of a desire of quiet to leave the sparkles of those wars unquench'd , from whence another fire might soon be kindled , they always endeavored to see the last sparkle quite put out . the roman army was overcome , and much endamaged by the galli gessati after the death of consul a●ilius , where their liberty being exposed to much danger upon this so sad accident , the romans would once more try the fortune of battel , wherein they had good success , and cutting in pieces above forty thousand of that nation , they did vindicate their former injuries . nor yet did they then lay down their arms , though they were freed from that their greatest danger ; but knowing that there remained yet other powerful armies of the same gauls is other parts of italy , they would continue war against them , and of assailed become assailors ; which afforded them occasion of those marcellus his notable victories , and of making themselves masters of the chiefest cities of lombardy , which were possest by the gauls . the commonwealth of rome was never in greater danger , then when asdrubal passing over the alps with a numerous army , entred italy , whilst his brother hannibal was there likewise with another powerful army . they fought asdrubal , and to their great joy their consuls were victorious : which notwithstanding , they forbare not to continue war in spain , though they were free from their greater and neerer dangers ; but with the forces they had there , went to find out , and to fight other enemy-armies of the carthaginians which were in that province ; for they knew if those armies should remain entire , the war might easily be renewed , and other impediments being removed , hannibal would be the more easily succored with necessaries which he wanted , and so might still molest the romans in italy . thus not allowing of any peace , then what might be purchased by either having totally quell'd , or at least very much weakened the enemy , the romans never laid down arms but when they were entire victors : which other princes not being able to do , have deferred their ruine for a short time , but have not totally kept it off . many other things might likewise be thought of , by which it might be evidently proved , that the romans did always prove victorious at last , and did perpetually increase their state and strength . but what we have already said , may suffice to teach such princes and nations as shall aspire to the highest degree of glory , whither it is that they ought to bend their thoughts , and which are the best means to arrive thereat : and when all other necessary accidents shall correspond , those who shall imitate the excellent worth and discipline of the romans , will not find themselves any whit deceived . the thirteenth discourse . whether the city of rome could have maintain'd herself longer in the glory and majesty of her command , if she had preserved her liberty and form of commonwealth , then she did under the government of emperors . after that caesar had robb'd his country of her liberty , and changing the antient form of government , reduced the commonwealth of rome into a monarchical form , she continued therein in a continued series of many emperors , safe and entire , or at least without any remarkable alteration or declining , for the space of about four hundred years , till the time of arcadius and honorius , wherein italy underwent many miserable ruines , as did also the very city of rome , which was the metropolis of the empire ; so as she could not resume her antient greatness , as formerly she had done after some adverse events . it appears to be , and truly is a thing worthy of deep discourse and consideration , how this so great and well-founded empire , after it began to totter , did so soon precipitate into final ruine . if the time of this its duration be measured in respect to the ordinary mutation of humane things , and more particularly of state-governments , the time of its continuance may appear to have been long enough : but if the greatness and power of the empire be taken into consideration , which was such as that there was no other potentate that could weigh against it , or rather no country which was not in some sort subject thereunto , it may very well invite us , so far as may be probably conjectur'd by so great success , and where so many various accidents concur , and have a share , to conjecture whether the roman empire would have been longer or shorter lived , if it had been still governed in the form of a commonwealth , then it did when it fell into the power of one onely man , under the government of emperors . many things may perswade us to beleeve that in whatsoever condition or form of government , this empire must have run the same fortune , and walked on with some little variation of time to the same end it did . first the vicissitude of humane affairs , which by reason of their natural imperfections , will not suffer sublunary things to be still in the same state of being , but will have it so , as being carried about in continual motion , they must sometimes be raised higher , fall sometimes lower . other people , and other nations , besides the romans , have flourish'd in other times , though not so much , nor so highly cried up . other ages have seen other great empires , so as the rise of the one hath been the fall of the other ; and it is a great truth , that lordships and empires , as do mens lives , nay as befals every thing that is born , in time wax old , and proceeding on by ordinary and natural gradations , have their beginning , increase , time of perfection , declination , and final ruine . till honorius his rule , at which time the empire began palpably to wander from its grandeur and dignity , it had continued for so many years , as the longer duration thereof would have almost exceeded the common condition of other things ; this may well be a general reason ; but one that is so approved of by other reasons , and continual experience , as it may be reputed certain in particulars , though sometimes we ignore the proximate reason . but to proceed to more particular considerations , why should we beleeve that the roman empire should have been of longer duration if it had been governed by a commonwealth , then under emperors ? not onely reason , but experience shews , that 〈◊〉 government of one alone is fittest to keep up supream power in large dominions ; since all other great powers and lordships have been founded and governed by one onely king or emperor . the city of rome is the onely example of a commonwealth which hath purchased large dominion ; nay , we may therein also observe , that as soon as she grew to be mistress of many provinces , that form of government behoved to be altered , as not fit to sustain so great a weight . in the very times of the commonwealth , when any thing was to be agitated or treated of , especially in wars of great importance and difficulty , they ran to create a dictator ; because the supreme authority which by vertue of that magistracie was granted to one man alone , was held requisite for the good administration of the most difficult businesses . the magistracy of the dictator did punctally represent the majestie , and dignitie which the roman emperors did after retain ; wherefore caesar , when he made himself the master of the commonwealth , made himself be declared perpetuall dictator ; and the name of emperor was taken from the very name used by the roman commanders , and shewed the authority which they had of emperor , which is to command over armies . and certainly the uniting the power of many in one alone , doth not onely not weaken , but doth much to the strength and power of a government or state : for it encreaseth obedience , facilitates resolutions , and hastens the execution of weightiest affairs . so as had not the roman forces , when military discipline flourished most amongst them , been with-held oftentimes , as if opprest by internal seditions , sprung from that sort of government whereof they did so much partake , and which did oft-times retard great enterprises , it may be argued that the city would have sooner gotten to that height of greatness and empire , which she arrived at , born even even by main force against all these difficulties , by the great worth of her citizens . let us observe in the next place , that though the empire of rome had changed the form of government , and reduced the supreme power into one alone , yet we finde not , that she was bereft of those arms , and helps wherewith she had been preserved whilst she was a commonwealth ; but did rather encrease them , and did very much establish forces ; for the emperors kept alwaies about their persons a great number of soldiers , for the defence of imperial majesty , which were therefore called pretorian-bands , and armies in the garrisons of provinces , which might defend , and keep them from any commotion which might be raised , either by their own subjects , or by foreign nations . nor were the emperors themselves wanting in taking order for arms and all things belonging to war ; nay , not onely those that were held valiant , but even who for all things else were esteemed cowards , and given over to all manner of vice , did either by themselves , or by their commanders undertake and finish many wars . so it seems likliest that the roman empire might govern her self , and so long preserve her greatness as she did , chiefly for being sustained by the chief authority , and reverent majesty of one onely lord , which was of such force , as it for a long time did overcome that weakness , which otherwise might have befaln the empire , by the abject baseness of many emperors ; where on the contrary , whilst it was a commonwealth , it was divided , rent , weak , and easie to have been opprest , if it had then met with the power of any great , and valiant nations , which would have supprest it , as did so many northern people do to the empire . and if the corruption of antient customs may be judged to have been the readiest and truest occasion of the ruine of this empire , the commonwealth was never free from the like , but even as for this very cause , of having faln from her good principles , that first government was altered , and the city lost her liberty , so might she have done , though she still kept the form of a commonwealth . avarice , ambition , immoderate ●ensuality , were the maladies wherewith the city of rome began to be infected , not when she was governed by emperors , but whilst she was ruled by her citizens in civil government ; and if it be objected that this did not hinder her from giving the greatest testimony of her valor in war , since in the last age of the commonwealth , when these vices and corruptions were rifest among the citizens , military discipline did flourish most , and greatest actions were done : it cannot then be said , that neither the corruption of manners in the times of emperors , did destroy the empire , nor that the integrity thereof could have longer preserved the power of the commonwealth . but so much the less for that the empire did not fall to ruine ( though it was sufficiently agitated by home-disorders ) in such sort , as that either the subjects did vindicate their liberty , or the commanders of armies divide the empire amongst them , as did alexanders commanders after his death ; but the roman commonwealth , though it was oft-times thrust at by such commotions , was still notwithstanding able to subsist , and to raise it self up again when it began to fall . but barbarous and foreign forces overthrew it at last ; with whom the famous commanders in the time of the commonwealth , not having had any occasion to t●y their worth , it cannot be said what would have succeeded upon such an occasion if the government of the commonwealth had continued till that time . it is likely , that the disorders and factions increasing much more , whereof so many p●stifero●s seeds had been sowed in all the orders of the city , the city , and territo●ies belonging thereunto being to remain the weaker , and the more exposed to the injuries of foreiners , would have been the easilier opprest , if she had been to have withstood the terrible shock of these fierce and wild northern nations , which the emperors forces did notwithstanding long resist ; insomuch as the roman empire maintained it self for the space of two hundred years after it was molested by these sorts of people ; nay , it maintained it self in dignity and majesty for about si●ty years after it was shrewdly shaken , till in the time of the emperor leo the first , rome and italy being totally abandoned , the name and power of the western empire did totally terminate . it may therefore be thought a gallant and well-advised action , that the emperors did so long temporise , and keep the arms of these so powerful nations from the more inward parts of their state , of italy , and chiefly of rome herself , like so much venom from their hearts ; with which if they should have tryed the fortune of war ; hazarding one battel or more , as upon other occasions those antient roman commanders had done , they might peradventure have brought the empire sooner to its ruine , since they had to do with a very warlike people , and whose condition was such , as they must either die , or overcome . and certainly they had done worse , if they had therein trusted and relied upon fortune , since they could have gotten nothing by the victory when they should have won it , were it not the saving of themselves for the present against those armies , who might have been succeeded by others of the same nations , and so the war to have been renewed more hotly and direfully then before , out of a desire to revenge the death of their friends ; whereas the loss of a battel or two on the romans side , might have drawn along with it the ruine of a most noble empire . it was then fortunate for the common-wealth of rome , that she met not with these people in such necessity and danger ; for if that had befaln her , which hapned in the time of emperors , that fame might peradventure have been obscured which she was happy in , of being glorious and victorious in all wars ; and the course of her so many prosperous successes might have been interrupted or broken off by this unfortunate end . yet if we will look on the other side , we may peradventure meet with other no less prevalent reasons which peradventure perswade us to the contrary . experience shews us how good the orders were wherewith the commonwealth was founded , to make great acquisitions : but it is a general rule , that states are preserved by walking in the same ways wherein they were founded ; for every thing is preserved and maintained by alike things , and are corrupted by the contraries . if the roman arms , governed by her own citizens with civil authority , were sufficient to reduce so many states and kingdoms under the power of the commonwealth , what reason have we to believe that they should not still be as able to preserve what they had gotten ; which is more easily done ? the baseness and carelesness of many of those emperors did doubtlesly open the way to the empires ruine ; for they oftentimes suffered those northern people to settle themselves in divers provinces of the empire . alaricus was permitted by honorius to inhabit with his goths in france ; and soon after becoming his colleagues , they likewise obtained some cities in spain from him . valentinianus granted likewise servis and bulgaria to other goths ; and before these , gallus had bought peace of the goths ; so as becoming more bold and insolent , they made themselves masters of thrace , thessaly , and of macedonia . thus the very emperors themselves having through their pusillanimity suffered mischief to increase at home , and these their fierce enemies to grow powerful , they could not afterwards drive them out of those places which they had possest themselves of , nor keep them long out of italy . this would not have been suffered by the generosity of the roman commanders and citizens , who when they were in a much worse condition , would by no means agree with king pyrrhus , who had assailed italy , unless he would leave them , and return to his own kingdom . and that they might draw hannibal out of italy , they betook themselves to molest the carthaginians in spain and in africa , after they had for so many years generously withstood their forces . and whilst that state continued in the form of a commonwealth , as if liberty had infused noble and generous thoughts into them , the city of rome was an example to all the world of all sorts of vertue , chiefly of magnanim●ty in undertaking great enterprises , and of fortitude and constancie in managing them , and in bringing them to a happy end . but when the commonwealth was ●uin'd , and a new sort of government brought in , that antient roman worth went astray by little and little , till at last it was quite lost . so as the ensuing ages gave as many examples of ignorance and baseness in the very emperors themselves , and in others who were of greatest degree and authority in that empire . hence then it was , that the good and antient customs being corrupted , both in civil government , and chiefly in the militia , the state being reduced to great faintness , and growing old , had not strength enough to govern it self when it met with stout opposition . the roman empire was brought to so miserable a condition when it was set upon by the northern nations , which wanted all manner of order and military discipline , as well in their commanders , as in the soldiers of their own nations , whereof the roman armies had been for a long time full ; insomuch as for above twenty years together , before the goths pass'd into italy , they put themselves into the usual pay of some of the roman emperors : and when theodosius the second , who was to make head in france against a valiant and numerous army led on by attila , it was found that the army which he had then got together retained only the bare name of a roman army , being totally composed of barbarians , vizigots , franks , burgonians , alani , and others , who notwithstanding bore away the victory for the roman emperor . the like hapned in gratianus his time , who being set upon by atalaricus king of the goths , was fain for the defence of italy to make use of goths , huns , and other soldiers of those nations . but the antient valor of the romans was no less lost in their soldiers then in their commanders : for so great an empire was grown to so great a scarcity of valiant men , and such as were fit to command the armies , which were to withstand the raging violence of these fierce and barbarous nations ; as honorius found none to whom he could commit such a charge , but one stilico , who was himself a barbarian , a hun by nation , and very perfidious ; who moved by his own interest and designs , sought to maintain his authority , and to the end that he might place his son in the empire , whilst he commanded over those forces which were raised to extinguish the gothish armies , he did not only not beat them when he might have done it , but sollicited other northern people to assault divers provinces of the empire , and so procured them more enemies . and theodosius the second , having placed all authority and hope of defending the provinces of the empire from the fury of attila , in one etius , when he had lost that commander , he had not any one fitting to undergo that charge , but was forced to leave the passage into italy free unto him . that which is reported of attila , doth greatly witness the weakness of the empire , and in what need it stood of valiant and faithfulnes ; that being fore told by his southsayers , that if he should come to a day of 〈◊〉 with the 〈◊〉 army in france , he should lose the day , but that his los● would cost the empirs dear , for they should lose one of their best commanders , ●e did put so high 〈◊〉 esteem thereupon , as notwithstanding such an 〈◊〉 , he r●fused 〈…〉 battel . the wars made by the empire many years before the times of this greatest calamity and ruine , were made against their own roman commanders , who commanded over their armies in several places , and who being in far off provinces , rebelled against the emperors , hoping that they might usurp the empire , to the which every one of them did aspire , since they saw that all ways , even the most indirect , lay open to a succession therein , so as the discipline and worth was alike in both the armies , and still the romans got the victory , that is to say , those who had the greatest power and authorety in the roman empire . but as soon as occasion was offered of trying the worth of those soldiers who served the empire against foreign forces , and that whatsoever the roman empire lost , proved an addition to their cruel and mortal enemies , the weakness thereof was soon seen , and what a loss it had suffered by the total corruption of discipline , and good antient orders . which could not have happened , if the commonwealth had still continued ; for it is not likely that valiant commanders would be found wanting in that city , where by the vertue of good military institutions , soldiers did so much flourish ; since those who had betaken themselves to other imployments , when once they took upon them the government of provinces , behaved themselves so in the militia , as they deserved commendations , for there was a certain spirit of glory in them all , and a desire of propagating the common good , as also an aptness for all things which did befit roman spirits . but as soon as the form of government being changed , the same romans began to degenerate from their antient worth , and that the chief imployments , nay the empire it self fell into the hands of foreigners , all things else must likewise suffer alteration ; and in particular , disorders in the militia , and the licentiousness of the soldiers grew to be such , as so great an empire seemed sometimes to be governed by chance : there not being any one therein who took care for the common good , nor for the observance of good orders , neither at home nor abroad . and the making of the militia mercinary , was cause of the going less in worth and discipline , as also of treachery ; insomuch as those very soldiers , who served the emperors , favored the enemy ; as it happened in theodosius his time , when those who were to guard the pirentian mountains , were bribed to let the vandals and sweeds pass into italy , without making any opposition ; which was the occasion of other mischiefs . and the treachery of his commander gallus hindred the emperor decius from pursuing a famous victory gotten of the goths , when not being so well flesht as they were afterwards , nor yet so powerful , they might have been the easilier kept back . but in time of the commonwealth , the roman commanders , and soldiers , fought for their own grandezza ; the nobility grew famous and powerful , and the people in whose name , and in that of the senate all wars were made , got honor and advantage by those things which by their arms they added to that dominion : so as amongst other actions of the commonwealth , it is not without wonder to be considered , how she could maintain so many and so numerous armies as she did , meerly out of roman soldiers . but when these respects began to fail , and that the militia grew mercinary , and that the soldier grew past all measure insolent , by reason of their commanders leudness , who permitted them to do all manner of foul things , to the end that they might have their assistance in their usurping the empire : the roman empire which had formerly wont to be so formidable to their enemies , so obedient to their commanders ; began to behave themselves poorly against their enemies , and insolently against their lord and master , troublesome to their friends whom they were sent to assist , and too unable to defend them against foreign forces : which things , as they were begotten by the change of government , so is it most apparent that they were the occasion of bringing the empire to a sooner and more miserable end . so many , and so heinous disorders could not have risen , if the city had continued in a form of common-wealth , or of civil government ; for though all the citizens might not have peradventure proved good and valiant , yet amongst so many there would still have some one been found , of such excellent worth and charity towards his country , as would have been able , if not totally to cure such disorders , at least so far to have bounded them , as they should not have run into so great a precipice . and though amongst the emperors , there were some who were endowed with excellent vertues , yet could not the affairs of the empire revert to its beginning , because there past sometimes a whole age betwixt one and another of these good ones : and the empire , for a continued series of many emperors was administred by base men , plunged in a multitude of vices ; insomuch as it became almost impossible for those who succeeded to reduce the affairs to any good condition , which had so long run to the worse . moreover no one mans abilities , though never so excellent , were able to govern so great a body , as was the roman empire , much less those of such as were so unfit , even for governments of less importance , as were many of the roman emperors . whence it was that adrian , a wise emperor , thought it fit for the welfare of the empire , to go in his own person , and consolidate it with his presence , and visit in perpetual progresses , sometimes one , sometimes another province ; for the good government whereof , they being so many , and so remote , the example of so many rebellous commanders and armies , shewed how false and unworthy the ministers had been who had been by the emperors sent thither . but in the commonwealth there were a great many citizens who were interessed in the government and greatness thereof , so as though some valiant man went to the wars , the city remained not without government or obedience ; nor did the appointing a commander in chief over one army , bereave them of others who might command more armies , if they had need to wage war at one and the same time in several places , whereof the commonwealth of rome did in all ages give notable examples . nor can it be affirmed , but that the commanders , and armies of the common-wealth have made war with people as powerful in arms , as were those northern nations , whose fury the roman empire could not resist . for , not to mention so many bitter wars made by those antient romans , the enterprises done by iulius caesar in france , were they not undertaken against people , in whom all the respects met which were considerable in those northern nations ? very numerous armies ; for we read , that one onely army , amongst many sundry people whereinto france was then divided , which was venquish'd and wholly overcome by caesar , consisted of above three hundred thousand ●ighting men . 〈…〉 went over the mountains to encounter them ; so as those barbarians began to be routed , and met with a rub to their greatest forces : and afterwards those who had advanced by another way , being gotten safe into italy , they sent to desire marius the general of the roman armies , that he would assign them some territories where they might live quietly , and they would therewithall rest contented , without endeavoring to advance their fortune any further by their arms. but they did not then obtain it of the roman general , as did the goths and other foreiners afterwards from some of the emperors , who not trusting in themselves , nor in their armies , permitted those barbarous hostile nations to live peacefully in those provinces of the empire , whereof they had injuriously possessed themselves . nay , though there were not above fifty thousand foot in the roman army , and that they were to fight with six times as many of the enemy , the roman commanders did not refuse to join battel with them , and did totally overthrow the enemies army , thereby securing italy for that time , and for many years after , from transalpine incursions . but 't is seen , that neither the number of the enemy , nor the desperate-mindedness of them with whom they fought , nor the discipline nor induration in armies and military duties , ( all which things were in these barbarous armies overcome by the romans ) were sufficient to discourage the roman commanders and soldiers , whilst the commonwealth did nourish generous thoughts in them , and in their forces . and in augustus his time also , because discipline in war was observed , drusus and tiberius nero were able to drive away the vandals , who were then called borgondi , and to frighten other people of the furthermost northern parts from coming to infest italy , as they were preparing to do . no good argument can then be inforced from what hath been said , nor can there be any rational judgment given of what would have befaln the roman empire , if it had still been kept under the antient government of a commonwealth , till the great combustions made by these northern people , by whom it was destroyed . certainly the acquisition , or preservation of states , does not depend upon the form of government , whether it be of one alone , or of a few , or of many ; for we have examples cleer enough of great empires which have been won , and preserved by a king , by the optimati , by a people , and by a commonwealth mixt of divers sorts of governments . but the strength or weakness of every state depends upon particular orders , chiefly in point of the militia , wherewith it is instituted , and the force and vertue whereof useth to be such , as even tyrannical governments , which carry with them so much of violence , ●●ve risen to a great height of power , and have preserved it long , as by woful example to others we may this day discern in the ottoman government . as then the city of rome grew great and powerful , not for being either formed of an optima●ical , or popular , or mixt government , but for her good orders and institutions in military affairs ; whence it was , that when at any time the romans had ●●d success in their battels , yet all their enterprises did still end in victory : so cannot it be alleged for a true and immediate reason of the ruine of that empire , that is fell under the government and obedience of one alone . for this supreme authority , were it either by succession , or by election , if ( as it hath been for a long course of time in so many other countries ) it had p●ssed in a setled and usual manner from one prince to another , whereby the soldier should have had no occasion to have usurped a very ●●due and harmful licentiousness in all things , and that the antient discipline , obedience , and military worth had been observed in the roman 〈◊〉 , a● it might have been , under one only lord and master , it may be safely said and believed , that that the roman empire would have suffered no more by the fury of those northern ●●undations , than it would have done if the state had continued 〈◊〉 a commonwealth ; but as the ci●●bri , 〈◊〉 , ambr●●● , all of them people of the same nations , were formerly withstood by the roman arms , so the violence of goths , huns , v●ndals , and all such like might have been stopped . it is only so far true , that the change of government afforded occasion to the ruine of the empire , forasmuch as the good orders and roman discipline were peradventure easilier corrupted , when recommended to the care and diligence of one only prince , who was oft-times unfit for government , then it would have done , had it been guarded by many citizens at once , as it was in the commonwealths time . but it is very hard to penetrate into the true causes of so great events , and so remote from our memory , which are reserved to the deeper judgment of him who is the true and supreme lord , and who governs and doth dispense states and empires by ways and ends , which are unknown to humane reason . the fourteenth discourse . why the grecians did not much extend the confines of their dominion , as did the romans ; and how greece came to lose her liberty . of all other antient people , there are two that have been greatly famous ; so as their names , and the glory of things by them done , hath been conveyed over to the memory of posterity with large acclamations ; to wit , the romans and grecians ; alike for notable examples of all worth and vertue , but sufficiently unlike for the greatness and duration of empire . for whereas the grecians did not extend their confines beyond the bounds of greece herself , nor did she long flourish in the same splendor of dignity , nor greatness of fame and dominion ; the romans did command over almost the whole world , and their empire , although the form of government was changed , endured for many ages ; for there past above eleven hundred years between the building of rome , and the time wherein she was taken and sackt by the goths . they then who shall consider these things , may with reason desire to know why these two nations did differ so much in fortune , since they were equally worthy . it was not in any one city alone , that choise men for both all civil and military worth did flourish in greece , as in italy they did in rome ; but many cities did at the same time produce citizens excellent in all manner of things . it would be a tedious thing to number vp the gallant actions of miltiades , themistocles , aristides , phocion , alcibiades , age●ilans , cimon , leonida , epaminondas , and of so many others whose ●●me rings loud amongst us : and plutarch , when he writes the lives of the most excellent romans , finds as many grecians almost to parallel to them , who are as highly cry'd up for the same vertues . yet did never any of their cities , nor gre●●e herself the country common to them all , ever rise by any of their actions to that high pitch of fortune and command , as did the city of rome , and whole italy , by the illustrious deeds of the r●mans . this diversity of success ought not to be attributed to fortune , but their certain and natural causes . if greec● should have enlarged the 〈◊〉 of her empire into the farthest distant regions , as did italy through the power and gallantry of the 〈◊〉 she must either have been reduced under the power of one only 〈◊〉 or they must all of them have been joined in an uniform 〈…〉 designs : but so many difficulties discover themselves in both the●e things , when they are considered the wonder ceaseth , why she could not encrease her dominions , answerable to the fame , vertue , and glory of things done by that nation . greece was divided into many several people , who were all of them totally , or for the most part governed by proper laws , and civill institutions in the form of a commonwealth , though they were of divers states . and though they had a general councel , which was called the a●phictyo●●s , wherein men met , who were sent from all the chief cities , to treat of the most important affairs , and such as did concern the common interests of all greece , yet did not this councel give one onely and certain government to all greece ; but it was such an assembly as are the diets which are in these times sometimes call'd in germany upon some particular occurrences ; wherein many princes , and free cities of that province meet , which do much differ in state , dignity , and form of government , and who have free votes in counselling and in resolving upon such matters as are therein treated . but amongst other people of greece , the spartans and the athenians , antient people of greece , and who for a long time , had by their worth purchast much authority , were very numerous and eminent when greece did flourish most , both for publick power , and for the admirable worth of particular citizens . for though the corinthians , the argives , the achaeans , and some other people , were of greater consideration , in respect of other lesser cities , yet they for the most part did rather follow the fortune of the lacedemonians , and the athenians , then their own . and the thebans , who for a while were in better esteem then the rest , by reason of their soldiers discipline , whom they called by a particular name , of the sacred cohort , yet because of all her citizens , onely two arrived at any celebrated honor , to wit pelopides and epaminondas , and for that her militia consisted but of five hundred men , their city never arrived at that degree of dominion and glory , as did sparta and athens . but as much as these were greater then the others , so much did they the more emulate one another , both for private worth and glory , as for publick dignity and reputation . to these did the other people of greece adhere , some being by them commanded , others by vertue of particular considerations . these two cities were highly esteemed for the orders of the first founders of such commonwealths , to with lycurgus in sparta , and in athens , theseus ; so as these people who did long before inhabit the same country , began to take name , and authority over the rest : those who did inhabit the terra firma , held for the most part with the spartans ; and those of the islands with the athenians . but yet every city was free , and hugely intent not to let the power either of the spartans or athenians encrease too much , but to keep the strength of these two chief cities so equally ballanced , as when the one of them should go about to oppress the other people of greece , the oppressed might have recourse to the other . it is therefore to be observed in all the actions of the grecians , that the rest of the people were never firm in their friendships , either to the spartans alone , or alone to the athenians ; but when the one of them began to exceed the other , they sided with the weakest ; not valuing any tie of friendship or confederacy , when they met with any such respect : so as for a long time the affairs of sparta , and of athens marcht hand in hand , though each of them both gave and received many routs , and partook both of good and bad fortune in war. sparta was strongest by land , and athens by sea ; so as they did counterpoise one another ; and therefore , and for that ( as it hath been said ) they had each of them many dependants , and confederates , they kept the forces of whole greece divided , nor was there means afforded to either of them , much to exceed the other . wherefore neither of them could busie themselves in far off affairs , nor against strangers , because they were still at contestation between themselves . and if at any time they went about to do it , they were either hindred or diverted , as were the athenians , when they past with their fleet above sicily under pretence to assist the leontinians , but in effect , to get the island to themselves ; aspiring , by advice of alcibiades ( who had higher conceptions , then any former greciah had had ) to pass over into africa against the carthaginians ; the spartans having discovered the design , and not being able to endure , that the athenians should to their prejudice , grow more powerful , resisted their forces , and succor'd messina , when the city was ready to be lost , and also assailed the athenians in their own territories , to divert them from that enterprise . the same thing , for the same occasion fell out , when the athenians passing with their fleet into egypt , had induced the egyptians to rebel against the persians ; and very powerful forces were already brought by sea from greece to cyprus , to assault the king of persia's territories ; but the lacedemonians growing jealous of their greatness , frustrated that design , opposing them so many waies , and by so many forces , as if the business had been not to have abased , but to have exalted the power of the persians , the common , and continual enemies of greece . but these things were done by the spartans , as they gave out , onely to curb the immoderate ambition of the athenians , and to maintain , and defend the liberty of whole greece ; upon which pretence they undertook , and for many years maintained that famous war , of the people of morca , which did much molest whole greece , and kept their forces very low . therefore in the time when these two greater and more famous commonwealths did flourish , they made use of their forces more against themselves then against foreiners ; and in domestick war , which was the cause why greece grew weaker , not more powerful : for whatsoever of prejudice befel either of the parties , was prejudicial to greece her self , and the fame and glory of their victories was blemish'd and lessened by the loss of those grecians that were overcome . therefore she never became formidable to other nations , as did italy , where when the fame and worth of the romans began to prevail , and the other neighboring potentates were extinguished , her force and power being all of a peece , the roman arms were dreadful to all people , nay they were all finally overcome by them . but greece never having been able to reduce her self to a condition , that all her forces should be under the power of one onely potentate , and that war was administred under the auspice of one onely commonwealth , she was of necessity to be alwaies too weak and impotent to inlarge her confines much . so as that which made the grecians be much esteemed , to wit , her having so many commonwealths , did much diminish the glory and dignity of empire , to which otherwise her many signal vertues might have carried her , if her forces had been in the power of one onely or prince , or commonwealth ; or at least if there had been a greater union , and better intelligence amongst the so many commonwealths that were in her . but too great a desire of liberty , which made it harder for one people to be obedient to another people , was directly that which made them injoy it the lesser while . for being weak , and divided amongst themselves , the way lay open to any who who would assault , and oppress them . but the better the grecians were accommodated with all vertue and discipline , which made them esteem all others besides themselves barbarous , so much the more were they born away with too much vivacity of spirit , to such an el●tion of mind , as none of them could indure to see themselves equall'd either in publick , or in private by mother , nor any city to his , nor any of his citizens to himself . so as every more valiant man , and every more generous action grew suspici●●● to others and were more envied , and disturb'd then the rest , all their ambition 〈…〉 upon themselves . it is reported that pausanias , who was 〈…〉 against the persians , did in token thereof present the temple of apollo in delphos with that famous golden trevet ; whereat the rest of the grecians being greatly scandalized , made pausanias his name be raced out , and placed in stead thereof the names of all the confederate cities , whose people were present at that victory . and 't is said of alcibiades , that full of vexation , he had wont to say , that he could not sleep for thinking of the triumphs of miltiades . but there are a thousand examples of such like things , which shews how fervently they did contend one with another in point of glory . themistocles and aristides were profess'd enemies ; so were alcibiades and ●icias , and many others of the most famous and valiantest citizens of athens : where there was such contention amongst themselves , and so great care was had that no one man should exceed another very much , notwithstanding any action which might make him more glorious and potent , as ostracism was ordained , which was , the banishment of such citizens for ten years , who were very remarkable either for excellency of parts , or prosperous fortune , more then were the rest ; by which means they lost their best citizens , nay sometime made them bocome their enemies , as was seen in alcibiades , themistocles , pericles , and some others , who were born for the aggrandising of that commonwealth , and yet through the corruption of the orders thereof proved prejudicial to it . whereupon xerxes , who favored , and gave entertainment to such men , had wont to say , that he prayed god that his enemies might still banish such citizens . the divers forms of government made likewise much against the union of the people of greece . some of their cities were much for democracie , as athens ; and some others lean'd more to aristocracie , as sparta . such d●versity of governments produced diversity of customs and cogitations ; so as they could hardly be all of them pleased with one and the same thing , every one measuring their actions with peculiar respects divided from the rest . so as when in the time of lysander king of the spartans , the city of athens was taken , to the end that they might master it the better , they changed the form of government , reducing it from a popular condition , the form of its former government , under the authority of a few , as that which did more resemble the spartan government . and in the following times , when the spartans ran the same fortune with all the other grecians , and was compell'd to obey the king of macedon , it was requisite to alter the laws and institutions of that city , which were at first ordained by lycurgus . these things did beget and maintain so great a disunion in greece , as she could not only not unite her forces together to carry them against other nations , but hardly could she defend herself with them : as was seen , when being mightily endangered by an army of the persians , which came with a great power to assault her , the war was diversly administred , they not agreeing what city should nominate the commander in chief ; the spartans would have reduced the defence to narrow passages by land , and the athenians would have put the whole fortune of greece in their fleet ; the situations of their cities , and the condition of their forces , would not permit that one and the same thing should be equally useful and commodious for them all . nor was the eminent danger of the persians so potent army able to unite the forces of all greece , but that some of the chief people , as the thessalians , argives , and thebans would be exempted from out the league ; and the argives being requested to adhere to the confederacie of so many other cities , answered , that they would rather obey the persians , then give way unto their antient rivals and enemies , the spartans . finally , the grecians having obtained a great and unexpected victory in the sea-fight at salamine , when they were to have pursued their fortune , after having beaten the ●leet , and made the enemy retire , they of themselves gave over all further hopes , and came home to their own havens ; for that the spartans envied the glory of the athenians , and fearing by reason of their being stronger at sea , that if they should have proceeded on in their success , they would not have spared their own grecians , but have domineered over them ; and soon after being more moved by envy , and their antient home-contentions , then by any hatred to the enemy , when they should have driven the remainder of the persian army out of greece , the associate cities fel upon the thebans , because severing themselves in these common dangers from the grecians , they had recourse for friendship to the persians . so as greece reaped no good by this prosperous success , because the grecians knew not how to value it , nor knew they how to use the victory when they had got it . mardonius was overthrown at the battel of platea , together with his whole army , which after xerxes his flight he commanded in chief : but what advantage got the grecians by so great a victory , save their dividing of the prey ? which made them return all of them the sooner to their own houses . nay , there arose greater and more cruel civil wars between them afterwards , then had ever been before ; and the business grew to that height , as the spartans who had always profess'd themselves more bitter enemies to the barbarians then all the rest , joined in league with them , and conspired with tissaphernes , who was governor of libia for king darius , to ruine greece . truces made between them were also often broken ; and out of too great proneness to adhibit faith to the suspitions which they had one of another , the publick faith was broken ; no tye being strong enough to keep those minds fast together , which were so divided by perpetual emulation . but of all the rest , two things are very considerable as touching this present discourse , and the judgment which is to be given thereupon ; to wit , of what strength the grecians were in military affairs , and with what princes they had to do , in the time when greece did flourish most , and had most reason to aspire to enlarge her empire . certainly he who shall well consider it , will find that warlike discipline was neither so highly esteemed of , nor of that excellencie and perfection amongst the grecians , as it was amongst the romans ; for the romans valued nothing more then military valor and discipline ; nay , for a long time they studied no sciences nor liberal arts , ( wherein those who took any delight , made use of grecians ) but did wholly give their minds to military exercises , and sought for praise from nothing but from war. whence it was , that more soldiers excellently well train'd up in millitary affairs , were to be drawn out of the city of rome , then out of other whole provinces , whereas the grecians did not give their minds to the study of war , but to learning , and to the liberal sciences , which flourish'd a long time amongst them , as either born with them , or very well cultivated by them . there were as many of them that frequented universities to become philosophers , as of those who studied the soldiers craft . how many professors were there amongst them of oratory and poetry , wherein they proved so excellent , as all that ever desired to prove good therein since , have observed their rules , and trodden in their steps . how many rare artificers have there likewise been of grecians in all the most noble arts , particularly in sculpture and picture-drawing ? the original , or at least the perfection whereof , knows no other beginning then from greece : in the memory of all ages , the names of phidias , polycl●●us , alcamenes , agl●●●hon , 〈◊〉 , parrhasius zeuxis , apelles , and of so many others are celebrated . wherefore greece was more famous for the excellencie of learning , and of the liberal arts , then for skill in the militia . yet was the city of sparta better then the rest at millitary affairs ; and athens was sufficiently famous for her fleets by sea , and her skill in maritime affairs : yet the spartan militia was bounded within 〈…〉 ere the athenians did much mind their 〈…〉 mistocles his time . and certainly , 〈…〉 ordered for the acquirement of empire : for sparta , 〈…〉 tended to arms , yet did they aim more at their own defence , and at the pres●rvation of libertie , then at the acquisition of empire ; not onely private citizens , but even the publick weal being constituted in great poverty , and restrained to a small number of citizens ; they were forbidden all commerce with foreiners , least they might corrupt the laws and customs of their country , their lives were austeer , and they were contented with a little ; whence . it was that those citizens were a long time from desiring any further greatness , it being therefore propounded to cleamenus king of sparta , by one anaxagoras of miletum , who had caused many of the cities of ionia to rebel against the king or persia ; to make use of that occasion , and take up arms ; shewing him that he might penerate even to the cities of susa , and possess himself of the wealth of all those kings ; the spartan laught at the proposition , and considering onely the length of the voyage , said , he would none of those riches , which were not worth so much labour . yet because the government of sparta preserved it self for a long time without any great alteration or change , and grew therefore the stronger , it was able to get the dominion of whole morea , and had afterwards the prime place for dignitie , and empire amongst the grecians . on the contrary , athens , which by the opportunitie of the sea , and by divers of her institutions aiming at the increasing of the city , seemed as if she onght to have inlarged her dominion beyond the confines of greece , could not make good use of her forces , nor reap the fruit which became the worth of some of her most excellent citizens , who were highly spirited , and were minded to raise their country to further greatness , because she could never order her self so as to preserve herself long in one and the same form of government , but was busied in perpetual civil disorders , precipitating herself sometimes into a corrupt popular state , sometimes into the tyrannie of a few . but the grecians seemed as if all their thoughts were usually bounded within themselves ; insomuch as it is said of some of their most famous commanders , that they did more willingly exercise themselves in wars made amongst the grecians themselves , then in wars against the barbarians ; since come what would , the advantage and honor of the victory did remain in greece . but as for what belongs to the militia , some may peradventure think , that it may be proved by some famous victories that the grecians won from the medes and persians , that they did much study military affairs , and were very good at military discipline , insomuch as for that part , there was no more to be wished for in them . to this it may be answered , that it is not to be denied , but that the grecian militia might be thought to be good and laudable when compared to that of the barbarians , withwhom they had most to do ; but that it is no waies to be held comparable to that of the romans , who did excellently well understand whatsoever belonged to the true militia , better then did any other nation in any whatsoever time . insomuch as by reason of their good orders , and of the so many victories which they wan , they propounded unto themselves the conquest of the whole world ; which out of the same reasons they effected . but it is observable in the victories which the grecians got against the king of persia's forces , that they were occasioned , not so much through the good ordering of their militia , as by reason of a certain obstinate resolution which they had put on , to defend greece from the eminent slavery of the the barbarians , the fear whereof made them bold to encounter whatsoever danger . many of their actions prove this , as amongst others , that of leonid as was sufficiently famous , who being left with onely . five hundred of his lacodimonians to guard the strieght of thermopla , fell boldly with them one night into the persian camp , where were sundry hundred thousands of men , not being perswaded thereunto out of any hopes of victory of safety , but onely out of a desire to revenge the injuries done by xerxes to greece , by the slaying of so many enemies , and by his own voluntary death . who knows not that in the naval fight at salamina , it was necessity that made the grecians so couragious ? since the athenians , who were of greatest power in that fleet , were already without any country , their city being burnt by the enemy ; so that their ultimate hope of any good consisted in that daies good success . and to make the necesfity the greater , themistocles , who was their commander in chief , chose wisely to joyn battel in a place which was far from any friends territories , thereby to bereave every one of any other hopes of safety but by being victorious . and the great multitude of the persians fleet , served rather for confusion to them then for any strength , for of above a thousand vessels which were therein , it is said that hardly two hundred entred the battel . and the victory which was obtained not long after by land against the army led on by mardonius , was rendred the less difficult by the reputation which the grecians had won by their naval victory , and by king xerxes his running away , whose soldiers proved no more couragious then did their master , for whose glory it was that they were to fight ; whereas the grecians fought for themselves , for the safety of their country , their houses , and of all that they had . but to boot with all this , it may peradventure not without truth be affirmed , that the actions of the grecians have been transferred over to the memory of posterity , for greater then what indeed they were . for greece had great store of excellent writers , who according to the custom of the nation , amplifying such deeds as might purchase glory to them , have studied very much to set them forth to the best , and to make them appear praise-worthy . wherefore salust in the beginning of his history , rendring as it were a reason why he took the pains to write , saies , that the actions of the romans may appear to be the less , out of the little care they had of putting them into writing , every one being more intent to do praise-worthy actions , then to celebrate the actions of other men ; whereas the grecians actions were made to appear , not what they really were , but such as the most excellent wits of good writers could by their adornments set them stately forth . moreover there met many things in the romans , much differing from what hath been said of the greeks ; for their whole study was to make their city powerful by any whatsoever way , that they might , as they did , draw upo● any occasion great store of soldiers from thence . this was the original of the sanctuarie , wherein wicked men driven out of other countries were received , and afterwards people of many of the neighboring cities , were allowed the priviledges of the city of rome , the more to interess them in what belonged to the honor and greatness of rome , as to that of their common-countrie , yet was not the war administred under divers names or auspices , as it was in greece , by reason of the several leagues had between several people , but by the sole authoritie of the roman commanders ▪ and still in sole respect to what made onely good for the common-wealth of rome . now if we will co●sider with what forein potentates the grecians had to make war , we shall find that this also made it the harder for them to acquire other mens countries , for just when the grecians , by reason of their having many gallant men amongst them , might have aspired at the aggrandizing of their empire , the persian monarchie was grown so powerful as it ruled over all the east ; and was not onely got near to gr●●a , by the possession of lydia , but did also possess ionia , an antient colony of the grecians ▪ so as it was a very great and difficult undertaking , to go about to possess the territories of so great a prince , who though he should receive a rout might easily recover his loss , and put himself in a safe posture of defence , by reason of the largeness of his dominion , and the multitude of soldiers that were at his command . so as join this outward impediment to the inward , which lay in their home discords , and we shall see that the routs which the grecians gave to the persians , did no further incommodate the persians , then the loss of those armies ; nor did the grecians receive any further benefit thereby , then the defending of themselves , and their safety for no long time from further dangers . but the kingdom of macedon , though of much less strength for extent of empire , became very formidable by reason of its good discipline in war , and for the great worth of some of her kings , amongst which philip the father of alexander , who as he proved a great prince , and of deep designs , so was he very pernicious to greece : for divers people of greece having recourse to him for help against some other grecians that were their enemies , they were willingly received , and their request graciously listned unto , that so he might nourish their discords , and weaken all their forces by continual wars ; by which means he made himself arbitrator of all greece ; insomuch as there were not any of them who did not sometimes apply themselves unto him , either for peace to themselves , or for help by war against others . wherefore philip discovering his intentions at last , that he was resolved to rule over all greece , he entred thereinto with powerful forces , and was no less grievous to those who first called him in , then to the rest against whom he declared his coming to be . so thebes , which was the first city which made use of his forces , and did it oftner then all the rest , was one of the first ( though with prejudice to all the rest ) that tasted the bitter fruits of her unadvised councels , being ruin'd and destroyed by the same philip ; who being much allured by the taking of that city , and by hopes of greater matters , resolved to make himself master of other cities of greece : to which design whereas all greece ought to have opposed themselves for the common interest , they went about , though by several and divided councels , to join themselves with him , and to place their own safety in his friendship and fidelity . thus did all beotia , thessaly , and other regions adhere unto him ; and the athenians , who , encouraged by demosthenes , took up arms themselves , and endeavored to raise whole greece against philip , being but in weak condition after the so many defeats received from the lacedemonians , they also had recourse to him for safety by the way of favor and peace , not only for themselves , but for all greece . so as the spartans being left almost alone to oppose philips forces , they proved much too weak to withstand such a power ; so as greece being opprest by forein forces , fell at last into the hands of the macedonians . and when there was a likelihood , by the death of philip , who had not as yet well confirm'd his government over them , that the grecians might have shaken off their yoke of servitude , alexander succeeded in the kingdom , so valiant a prince , as he was a terror not only to his neighbors , but to all the east ; who by his supreme greatness , and excellent worth , made all his soldiers so inamor'd of him , as some of the grecian commanders , who had followed him in the wars in persia , stuck not to affirm , that there was not any one in greece , who ought not to desire as the greatest happiness that could befall them , that alexander might sit in the throne , as king of persia. but after alexanders unexpected death , greece seemed to have a better opportunity offered her to remit herself into her former liberty , being just at that time in arms ; for the athenians with many other people were rebell'd against alexander , and had an army on foot of thirty thousand men , besides a numerous fleet , discontented because he would have received into their country a great many of citizens , who had been banish'd for diversity of factions . and moreover , the divisions of empire made by alexander among so many of his commanders , and the contentions which suddenly arose amongst them , were things which gave greece great opportunities of not being any more subject to be commanded by a foreiner . yet could she not lay hold thereon , either because their former valor and generosity began to fail in them , and their antient customs to be corrupted , ( for many who had received favors from philip and from alexander , loved better to be governed by one man alone , then to restore their country to her liberty ; and chiefly for that the people having for the most part had great authority in those days , the best and most valiant citizens were rewarded with banishment and other injuries for their service : ) or else it may rather be said , that the same reason of civil discord which had at first made greece weak , and not able to maintain herself in a free condition , did concur at this time likewise to make her relapse into slavery . thus the achaeans , and the argives , who together with the athenians had taken up arms against the macedonians , either out of fear of antipaters forces ( to whose share in the division of the empire after alexanders death , macedonia and greece fell , of which provinces he was formerly governor ) or else egg'd on by envy , they soon forewent the league which they had contracted , lest the city of athens might have returned to her former greatness , and so suffered the athenians to be made a prey of by the macedonians . and the spartans , out of their same antient respects , standing idle spectators of other mens miseries , and not thinking that the same afflictions might befall them , minded more to secure their own city with new fortifications , then to oppose themselves , as they ought to have done , to these forces of the enemy , and not have suffered them to increase by the forces of greece herself , and by those whom they had subjugated . after this , greece enjoyed peace and quiet ; some of them enduring patiently the macedonian government , and others not fearing ( as they ought to have don . ) the like mischief , because it was not as yet come home unto them . so when by the various accidents which befell the macedonians in their own kingdom , greece might have kept them low , or at least have kept them from further domineering , permitting cassander , antigonus , and demetrius to live peaceably and quietly for all them , and sometimes too much believing their flat●eries , and allured by a certain appearing liberty wherewith those princes thought good to keep the grecians in obedience to them , they knew not how to make use of any of so many occasions , till at last in philips time ( that philip with whom the romans had wars so long , who proved so gallant a prince , and possest himself of macedonia together with other provinces ) she returned to her antient revolts . and as philip the father of alexander made himself lord thereof , by the same means whereby he had got entrance thereinto ; for king philip entred greece , being call'd in by the argives and achaeans , who were made war upon by the aetolians , with whom many of the cities of greece were so ill satisfied , as to shun being governed by them , they voluntarily put themselves into the power of king philip ; who hae the way at last opened unto him ( to the end that no part of greece might be safe from the macedonian forces ) to fall upon sparta , with which city philip was before upon good terms and in peace : for the lacedemonians not being able to endure that the achaeans , by philips favor , should grow too great in morea , the principality whereof they had for a long time held , breaking their former agreement and confederacie made with philip , were joined with the aetolians , assisting them against the achaeans , who were friends and confederates of the same ●hilip . and after many revolutions , the business came at last to that pass , as the grecians being too late aware that they had suffered the authority of the macedonians to grow too great over them , by which some of them had been formerly tyrannically dealt withall , and others apprehending the like imminent danger , not able to endure these yet greater mischiefs , they fled to the romans , craving help and succor from them against philip ; as did the city of athens chiefly , as having suffered greatest injuries , and being wont to be the head of the greatest , and most important innovations in greece . nor was it hard for them to obtain it ; for the romans , making profession , that they had made it their business that there should be no unjust power upon the earth , but that reason , justice , and law should rule every where , did willingly imbrace the protection , and defence of the weakest , whom they found to be opprest by the more powerful : which thing under pretence of defending others , and of a noble peece of generosity , made the way to divers acquisitions the easier to them ; covering by these means their ambition of government . but the romans were very cunning herein , who in all their actions shewed as if they desired nothing but glory , by which they did miraculously win the hearts of all greece : for in the expedition which they made against philip , their armies having , at the instance of the grecians themselves past over the sea , run many hazzards , and endured much hardships ; when they had conquered philip , and drove him out of greece , they restored all those cities which had been formerly under his dominion , to their liberty ; suffering them to live under their own laws , but yet so , as made advantagiously for them , placing some of their own roman soldiers in some of the bordering towns ; alleadging that they did this for the good of greece , that being freed from the slavery of philip , they might not fall into the like of antigonus , a powerful king at that time in asia , who might be the better kept out of europe , for fear of not offending the roman greatness , then for fear of the weak forces of greece , which were already very low . but the truth was , that these places opportunely held by the romans , served to secure them of the grecians fidelitie , if at any time forgetting their obligation , and desirous of novelty , as they had alwaies appeared to be , they should have a mind , with prejudice to the roman affairs , to joyn with any other stranger prince ; for they desired that they might depend on the authority of the commonwealth of rome . so as that greece which had so many valiant soldiers and commanders , and was so famous amongst other nations , not having known how to make use of time , whilst the name of the romans was but obscure , and that their forces were busied else-where , to make way for their further greatness ; was forc'd afterwards to follow the fortune of the romans , and to confess themselves to be overcome by their more excellent worth ; and to acknowledge all that remained of good or safety to them , from their favor . but to rerurn from whence we have digrest ; and to proceed with the successes of greece in divers ages , let us say ; that it being the fa●e of greece to fall upon two so potent neighboring princes , as were the kings of persia , and macedonia , it did not onely foment their civil discords , but did hasten their final ruine , for if the grecians had had less powerful neighbors , they would either not have had recourse unto them , or else the use of their forces and assistance in their own greece would not have proved so prejudicial to them : it being a true & general rule in state affairs , that no foeign forces are to be made use of , for a mans own safety , which are much greater then his own ; for by so doing , a man must depend upon another mans will ; which where rule is in question , is usually more ready to endeavor its own conveniency and greatness , then to keep word , and to consider another mans good , though he be a friend and confederate : yet it may be affirmed , that greece having for neighbors not onely one but two great potentates , it was a thing which as it hindred her from making acquisitions abroad , so it might have been of great help unto her for the preservation of her self , and liberty , if she could have made good use thereof . for if at any time she should be opprest by one of them , she had means to have recourse to the other , from whom she might safely build for help , since self-interest concurr'd therein , for it would be dangerous for either of them to suffer the others power encrease too much , by the ruine of greece . so as if the grecians , when they were threatned ruine by philip , had known how to make use of the help which was offered them by the king of persia , they might peradventure have escaped that bad fortune ; but being exceedingly jealous one of another , they had all of them recourse to the same prince , because none of the rest might make use of his friendship and favor . thus philip the first had greatest opportunity offered him , of making himself by degrees , first , chief captain , next , arbitrator , and lastly , lord of all greece , by keeping some of her people quiet , and in peace , which he easily granted them for his own ends ; and by making war at the same time upon some others of them , and he who shall compare these antient successes of the grecians affairs , with others of the ensuing age , and nearer unto us , shall and will find very like effects which have sprung from the same occasions . for greece being once humbled , and as subjected by the roman greatness , was afterwards returned to great honor and dignity in the time of constantine who placed the seat of the empire in the antient city of biz antium ; but she knew not how to keep therein by reason of her discords . for after that the french and the venetian , had taken constantinople , though the empire returned to the aforesaid grecians , yet through many and various chances which happened afterwards , whole greece was divided ; some of them following the princes of the grecian extract , and some of them the latins , the people for the most part holding with the former , and the nobility with the latter . so as recourse being had to arms , for the deciding of so many controversies , they applied themselves for help unto the turks , and causing a great number of them to pass over into n●tolia in greece , greeces ultimate ruine did ensue thereupon . for these barbarians , who were accustomed to live among craggy mountains , inamored of the beauty and pleasantness of this country , and moved , as some say , by a certain good augurie , whereby they were advised to tarry there , promising them much happiness in that region , whereinto they were come , and called , they possest themselves of divers parts and cities of the empire , sparing no● friends , nor enemies ; and placing their regal seat amongst them , they grew soon much more powerful , being favored therein by the great dissentions which still continued amongst the grecian nobility , and other neighboring lords , as those of servia , bulgaria , and albania , interessing themselves therein , they , together with their own interests , drew along with them the destruction of many other states , and gave just occasion to postery , for ever to blame their ill taken counsels . for if the grecians had been at unity within themselves , and as solicitous to keep the turks from advancing their power , as they were to abase that of the latin princes , they might certainly have hoped to have kept that fire a far off , which hath burnt and consumed so many noble parts of christendom . since it is seen that the grecian forces , whilst their lords , after being driven from the city of constantinople by the latins , kept in the parts about natolia ( which was for above fifty years ) although they had already begun to be governed by one alone prin●e , under a just form of empire , were yet able to keep them bounded within the mountains of natolia , in barren places , not suffering them to make any acquisitions of moment , nor to enter into europe , as they did afterwards . but it was the particular imperfection of this province , and of that in all other respects , most noble nation , that she understood not , or knew not how to make use of her many and valiant forces ; since if we will look back upon antient stories , when philip had reduced greece into his power , he put so high an esteem upon the value of those soldiers as he undertook by them chiefly to effect his antient desire of making the enterprize of persia , whch not being able ( as hindred by death ) to effect , was after so gloriously ended by his son alexander , and it is related , that being thus minded , philip had already mustered two hundred thousand foot , and fifteen thousand horse in greece ; and that alexander desirous to prosecute his fathers intentions , but by different advice , building his chiefest hopes in the body of an army of but thirty thousand valiant soldiers , many of which he raised in greece , did by their valor chiefly end so many glorious enterprises . the fifteenth discourse . whether ostracism , used by the athenians , be a just thing , or no ; and whether it be useful for the preservation of a common-wealth . it was instituted by the laws in some antient commonwealths , that such as were very eminent above the rest either for riches , glory , friends , or for any other civil power , or who did exceed the other citizens for any particular worth , should be banished the city ; not out of punishment or penalty , but for the common good , to the end that equality being the better maintained , and as it were a certain consonancie amongst the several ranks of citizens observed , the government might be the safer , and more durable . which custom was for a long time observed by the athenians , and chiefly then when their commonwealth did flourish most ; and ten years was the limited time for this exilement . this law was commonly called ostracism , whereof aristotle toucheth a little in his third book of the politicks . but whether such a law be just , or no , and whether it may make for the preservation of a commonwealth or state , for which end it was instituted , is a consideration of no small moment in point of police ; there being much to be said on both sides , both in praise and dispraise of so strange a law and custom . in the behalf thereof , these things may be had into consideration : that nothing is more requisite for the long preservation of a city , especially of such a one as is governed in form of a commonwealth , where the government is in the hands of many , then equality amongst citizens ; whereof the more excellent the temper is , and the more it is tied fast by strict laws , so as it cannot be exceeded on any side , the life of that city or commonwealth will be so much the longer , more quiet , and more secure . a city may be resembled to a humane body , compounded of divers elements , and consisting of many members : and that as that humane body is more healthful and more handsom , wherein every elementary quality is better distributed , and every member better proportioned ; so that city or commonwealth wherein every degree of citizens hath a moderate authority , state and fortune , and well proportioned to the whole , doth preserve it self the longer , and keep freer from the contagion of civil seditions . though the head be the noblest part of the body , and the eyes the like of the head , yet would they not be of ornament , when either that or these were bigger then their ordinary and natural form ; they would rather take away all decorum and beauty , which is nothing but a due proportion in all things . then , though it may seem a gallant thing to shew the greatness and nobleness of a city or commonwealth that there be many very wealthy men therein , and of excellent civil gifts , and that the supreme degrees and negotiations of the commonwealth be bestowed upon these ; yet another reason may perswade the contrary ▪ for this eminencie spoils the proportion of the whole , and doth not represent a city of free-men , and partakers of the same government , but the form of a tyrannical government , consisting of lords and servants , hateful names in good governments . therefore all the best legislators have chiefly aimed at the reducing of all things , as much as may be , to an equality , in that city where they would introduce a politick government , and a peaceful and durable condition . insomuch as plato , to take away all occasion of civil discord , would have all goods to be common , in that his commonwealth which he propounded to himself for the most exact form of government : so as there should be no such name as rich , or poor , but only that of citizens of the same country , and who live under the same law. so as no man could out-doe another , by altering this so necessary and useful civil equality : which not being to be had where there is a propriety of goods , the athenians would provide against those inconveniences which the unequal condition of citizens produced , by driving at a certain time out of the city such as had caused the disorder , and who were suspected to be the authors of novelties , and of trouble to peaceful living . and truly , he who shall consider what the beginnings of those evils have been , which have inwardly vex'd and troubled both commonwealths and other states as well in antient , as in these more modern times , shall find , that all the confusions and civil disorders which have after a long time brought many states to their ultimate ruine , have sprung from this root . how was partiality , and the corruption of good and antient orders introduced in the commonwealth of rome , whence all great things may take example , if not from having suffered avarice , and the power of some citizens to increase too much ? who having made themselves so great by the continuation of military commands , and for having many ways whereby to purchase popular favor , as the commonwealth could not keep them within any bounds , nor could the laws curb them , did totally subvert that government : insomuch as it was said of caesar , that he would not have any superior to him in the city ; and of pompey , that he would have no equal . and cato had wont to say , that caesars immoderate greatness had enforc'd pompey likewise to exalt himself above what otherwise became the publick service , to the end that the one might counterpoise the other . so grant one inconve●ience , others will easily follow : and as too great eminencie in any citizen , although he be not ill-minded towards the publick , ought to be suspected ; so it is hard to rid ones self thereof when it is once brought in and tolerated , where those usual means and institutions are wanting which the carthaginians had , without falling upon violent courses , which in stead of physick proves poison to that state. the house of medici began to lay sound foundations for its greatness in florence , by means of old cosmo's great wealth ; it afterwards increased very much by the vertue and wisdom of lorenzo ; and so by little and little getting to a great height of power , which exceeded the ordinary condition of a civil state , it was no longer able to live under the laws of the country , but would assume unto it self the superiority of that government : so as when the florentines were too late aware thereof , they could not moderate that too immease greatness ; for the continued power of that family , wherein there had been excellent men for worth , and eminent degrees and dignities , purchased by them both in their own country , and elswhere , had got them so many to side partially with them , as their own faction was able upon any occasion to sustain them . the like happens also in some states wherein there is not so express a form of a commonwealth , but a supreme prince , yet also many particular lords of great authority . in such states , the too much greatness of b●rons hath oft-times proved too pernicious : for there being in all men naturally a desire of growing greater , and they having means to do so , where their power is not limited by the laws and customs of the state , they are easily induced to mount higher then stands with their degree , to equal their authority to that of the king himself , and to put for innovations prejudicial to the state. amongst many others we have a notable example hereof , in the present troubles of france , which were occasioned by having suffered some prime lords to grow too great in power , whence civil discords have risen in the kingdom , and the better to foment and sustain their parties , and to perfect their designs , they had recourse to forein forces , and kindled that fire which is not well quenched yet . it hath therefore been thought a very wary and well advised course which hath been used by some prin●es , to have an eye upon such , whose greatness and eminencie above others may render them suspected , and to allay th●s their greatness , by not admitting them into chief imployments , by taking away or lessening their priviledges , and immunities , and by lessening their authority , and universal favor by other means , according as occasions have counselled . consalv● a great and famous commander in the former age , had done excellent service to king ferdinand● ; and when in all other respects he was to have looked for great rewards , as having by his own worth gotten , and preserved the kingdom of naples , he was taken off from all imployment , and brought back into spain to spend the remainder of his years in a private condition : that prudent prince was moved thereunto , as knowing that such a man who was so generally cried up , and who was so followed and appla●ded both by the common people and the nobility , could not but be to be suspected : so as he knew it was requisite for his own security , and the like of his dominions , not to suffer him to grow greater to his masters prejudice , and therefore to take from him all command and imployment . the instructions given to this purpose in a figurative way , first by periander to thrasybalus , and after by tarqui● the proud to his son s●xt●● are very observable , to wit , to cut off the tops of the highest poppies , o● ears of corn ; whereby they would infer , that he who will rule in safety , must not suffer men to grow more eminent then others , for what concerns any civil power , which though it appear to be a thing proper to onely tyrannical si●es , yet whe● it is used with discretion and wisdom , hath another aspect , for all particular interests ought to give way where the publick good , and the preservation of universal peace and quiet of the state ( which is of a●much greater concornment ) is in question . but when this may be done by any ordinary way , as by law and custom ( as it was among the athenians and other antient people ) then this remedie proved the more just and secure . there is not any mischief in the city which stands in more need to be cured by the physick of the law , then ambition ; for ambition is such a sickness in the mind of man , as where once it takes root it never leaves the mind free and healthful till it be torn out by main force ; but rather the maladie increasing by length of time , it makes men as it were frantic● , so as the ambitious man covets all things , and is not satisfied with any thing , having neither mean nor bridle . honors , dignities , preferments how great soever they be , serve rather for tinder to make this inward fire flame the higher , then for water to quench it , insomuch as some of these vain-glorious men thought it a small matter to command the whole world , when they heard it disputed that there were more worlds then one . now to this almost natural , and ordinary defect of humanity , and altogether as harmful to the quiet of all states , as it is of it self incorrigible , 〈◊〉 will prove a wholesome cure ; and which the atheni●ns in particular 〈◊〉 their commonwealth stood in need of . for as greece did in that age abound 〈◊〉 men , who were really valiant , so ambition seemed to have set up its rest amongst them . wherefore miraculous things are written of that nation in those times . but such as wherein it may be found that true worth was greatly con●●●isnated by an immoderate desire of glory , and haughtines● . the laws of canvassing , and all other provisions thereunto tending have alwaies proved fruitless , for every little sparkle that remains of this fire , though it be covered over with ashes , may cause great combustions . it seems therefore that no other remedy is sufficient for those evils which proceed from pride and ambition , then totally to rid the city or state of such men as are desirous to exceed all others . plato said , that men who were truly wise would be as contented with not ruling over others , as most men do what in them ●ies to get pr●cedencie , and command over others . therefore where such a desire is discerned , and where there is matter to occasion it , as are great riches , high places , and vain glory , a man may with reason suppose that there is there an unsound soul , which ought to be taken away lest it infect the whole commonwealth . to take all nobility , all riches , all civil preeminencie , totally away from a city or commonwealth , as is now done in turky , and as formerly it hath been d●●e by divers princes , that they might rule the more securely , relisheth too much of barbarism , and tyranny , though it hath not proved an ill taken advice to them that have known how to use it , reputing it just , though not in self , yet as it hath suited well with such a form of government ; but to rid a city of such things , and of such men for a certain prefixt time , is such a provision as tends to the preservation of splendor and reputation , without either prejudice or danger . this is a means whereby vertue and other civil preheminences may be rewarded ; but not so , as the greater part be scorned , and opprest , for the haughtiness of some few . and he who shall well consider it , shall find that banishment from a mans country is not a thing simply , and of it self evil , or at least not so great an evil , but that it may be easily and willingly born withall , by him who values the common good so well as he ought . but that which makes banishment be thought a mischief , is the bad quality which is thereunto annexed , when it is inflicted for punishment ; there being thereby imprinted as it were in indeleble characters , that such a one is leudly given , and hath committed some fault , which is a thing naturally abhorred even by the wickedest sort of men . but set this respect aside , to live out of a mans countrie , hath no resemblance of evil , but is willingly imbraced by many as an advantage , and some endeavor it as a badg of honor , that they may have occasion to serve their prince , and to deserve well abroad . he then , who to obey the laws and ordinations of 〈◊〉 commonwealth or state shall live for a certain time from his own home , is so far from suffering thereby in his honor , as he merits thereby ; for he may say that by this his obedience he is ●erviceable to his prince and country ; though he do not act any thing . so then he receives no injury , and may , and ought to pass by any particular inconveniency , for the publick good . nay it may so happen , that that very power and great●●ss , by which a man becomes liable to the laws , is the longer and with less danger preserved unto him , though he cannot enjoy it without some parenthesis of 〈◊〉 . for we see by experience , that these greatnesses and continued prosperities do easily precipitate a man , either through the envy of others , or by being too immoderately used , and sometimes draw along with them the total ruine of the whole family . it may in the last place be alleadged , that this exemption from publick imployments , and court service , may make him retire to his private studies , and enjoy himself , which ought to be esteemed one of the chiefest blessings which man can attain unto in this life . insomuch as the philosopher said , that to be kept from preferments is a pleasant breath of wind which sweetly co●●eys the wise man to the haven of peace of mind , and of his lawful studies , which many forbear to do of themselves , least they may be thought by the world to be vile , and abject men , and of no abilities . by these things it is concluded that ostracism is a good thing , and to be praised , and that this custom of the athenians is fit to be followed and ●●tated by others . but now let us face about . what is more necessary for the preservation of a city or state then justice , without which no sort of government can last long , nor merit the name of a commonwealth or state : for , take away justice , and you take away the very being thereof , and leave nothing but a mis-shapen matter , made up of corruption and disorders . but in distributive justice , which imports so much towards good and quiet living , reason doth advise it , and all good customs do approve of it , that a geometrical proportion , not an arithmetical ought to be observed ; insomuch as it is not all men who ought equally and indifferently to share of ho●er and preheminencies in a city , but those who for some good qualities and endowments do deserve them . therefore that government where the law of ostracism is observed , must needs be subject to all change and revolts : for it cannot but be displeasing to the chiefest and best of the city , who seeing themselves whilst they are present , threatned with exile , and th● overthrow of their grandezza , and having recourse when they are absent to the favors of other princes to revenge themselves for the injury they have received , may easily disturb the peace of the city , and put the whole government into a hazardous condition . those who have been driven out of their country by reason of any civil faction , as it fell out long ago in divers cities of italy , have always been instrumental to the keeping of those cities in perpetual troubles , and of reducing some of them to slavery , which had wont to enjoy liberty . and yet what was this banishment but a kind of ostracism ? for in these civil seditions , none but such as were of greatest power and authority , and of whom the rest were most jealous , were driven out : nor was this done by the will of one only , but by their decree in whose hands the reformed government was . so as it may be said , that these cities used the law of ostracism ; which hath notwithstanding always proved prejudicial , and at long running mortal . and to say truth , to what purpose could such a law or custom serve , unless it were the more to exasperate civil diffention ? which the same athenians having learn'd by experience , they did ann●ll this their law ; for the business was come to such a height , as they drove ou● citizens out of particular spleen , not out of any publick respect ; as was done by hyparb●l● , a man of a mean condition , and no ways liable so ostracism , who for being an enemy to alcib●●les and ni●●as , was by their means banished by vertue of that law. but say the law were kept within its due bounds , and used only against such as bore greatest sway and were most eminent ; to reduce all things to an equality , is ●●● only an unjust , but a violent action , and which doth even contradict nature herself , which did not only make so many different species of things created in the w●●ld , but gave various instincts and hidden qualities to those of the same species , so as some might prove more generous and of greater worth , as is seen not only amongst men , but amongst bruit beasts , yea even amongst vegetables . then since this equality is not to be found amongst men , it is great injustice to distribute things equally in a government to those whose parts and deserts are unequal : for in conferring of honors or p●eferments in a city or state , a geometrical , not an arithmetical proportion must be observed : it is the vertue and merit of every one that must be weighed . he who is richer then another , may be serviceable to his country by great and frequent contributions to the publick . he who hath many clients and friends , may by his power and authority dispose 〈◊〉 peoples minds to believe ●ell , and act well in the cities occasions and affairs . he who is advanced above others in glory , must have de●er●●d it well of the commonwealth by some noble action , and 〈◊〉 confir●t himself therein by some other like action . and he who is ●●●re generally given to any vertue , be it or warlike or civil , is always 〈◊〉 then others to serve his country and prince upon all occasions . so as to drive 〈◊〉 men as these out of the city , is no better then to cut that member from the body which is loveliest , and fitter then the rest to be serviceable thereunto . such an insti●u●ion then can have no admittance but in tyrannical governments : and the examples alleadged of thras●●al●● and tarquin , are examples of tyran●● , who being resolved to preserve themselves by violence in their usurped dominionr , were to be jealous of all the best and most powerful men , and endeavor to be quit of th●● for their greater security . but a just prince must not imiteate such examples , ●ay , even in a politick government , these proceedings would be pernicious . for he who will thereby preserve himself , must change the form of the whole government , and reduce it to a despo●ical and servile condition : with which such orders holding some proportion and conformity , they may for a certain time prove useful for the maintaining of that tyrannie ; as it hath done to the turks in these later times , and formerly in some other nations , wherein the whole government hath related to the sole and peculiar accommodation of the lord paramount , without any respect to the good of the subject , and more according to will then to law. nor is it true , that the power of citizens , or greatness of barons in a kingdom , proves alwas harmful ; it may rather upon many occasions prove the safety of that city or state. but this may be ill u●ed , as many other things are ; the which notwithstanding whosoever should go about to take totally away from a city , would ruine it , not bring it to perfection . therefore the law ought to provide for taking away the abuse of things , not the things themselves , when they are not simply and in themselves evil . and if the authority which the roman commanders held in their armies had been well regulated , and their continuing is their military commands moderated by a shorter time , caesar could not have made use thereof as he did to the prejudice of the commonwealth , he having continued so many years commander in chief of the same army , and in the same province . nor had they needed to have raised pompey to such a height , to oppose caesars greatness : but when when they had let it run on too long , to declare him an enemy to his country , and drive him out of italy , proved a violent remedy , and mortal to the common-wealth . neither can that benefit be expected as is pretended , ( by the banishment of so many citizens , who being become too great , are for suspition drives out of their country ) of securing themselves from their power : rather injury added to ambition , serves for another incitement to make them endeavor some innovation in the city , and makes them the more sollicitous in plotting by the means of such as are their friends and adherents in their own city or state , to r●ise some revolt in it , for which they have easie recourse to the favor of other princes : so as the trouble of being offensive to those states from whence such men are expell'd , is rather increased then diminished . we have infinite examples in all ages of those , who being driven by banishment out of a city or state , have been the occasion of notable mischief and ruine thereunto : for though it cannot be denied , but that the ●o great power of citizens in a city , or of lords and barons in a kingdom , begets suspition , and is dangerous , and doth usually cause no small difficulties to the good and peaceful government of that state ; yet some other remedy th●● 〈◊〉 may be used to obviate those disorders which such excesses do 〈…〉 for that is only to suffer a ●ore to grow old and to gangrene , that they 〈…〉 wards forc●d to 〈…〉 or sword to heal it . in a well-govern'd state , 〈…〉 be had , and ca●● taken both by the law it self , and by the prince who rules is chief therein , not to suffer any one to grow to too 〈…〉 and if any 〈◊〉 do arrive at such a condition , as he begins too far to overtop the re●● , the foundation and groundwork of his power must dexterously be taken away , and of his ploting thoughts , so as he may not thereby be able to work any novelties , or disturb the publick peace : which may easily be done by his wisdom who commands in chief . the same men ought not to be suffered to continue long in the same imployments , and especially not to exercise them too long in the same place ; such things ought not to be left in their power , which may serve for fuel the more to kindle their ambitious though●● to the prejudice of the publick good , which may be done under a pretence of honor , so as the princes may not be noted for injustice , nor can the particular pers●nages account it as an injury done them . if any one do abound in riches , let him have expensive imployments , that he may lessen that wealth , which made him appear more eminent then others . if he be of too great authority in the court , or amongst the people , as having had the management of important affairs along time , send him to some place of magistracie , or other imployment a far off , and change him often from place to place . if he be great and remarkable for glorious actions done by him , give him hard and difficult imployments , wherein if he succeed not well , his reputation will soon grow less with the people , who judge by the events . but if such a one appear too much ambitious , and be so , as many men are seen to be , out of a certain vain-glory , but without any malice of heart , he may be contented and kept quiet , by confering honors upon him of glorious appearance , but little profit . but the remedy will prove peradventure harder in those who boast themselves to be more nobly descended , and of better blood then others , f●r many several respects meet often times in them , to make them great and powerful ; yet even against these remedies may be found , without passing by a violent and illegal way to the driving them out of the city or state ; their friends or kindred , may be kept low and humble , whereby their power is lessened ; if they commit any excess in case of justice , as such men out of arrogancie often do , be severe unto them , take their priviledges from them , declare them to be for a certain time uncapable of any publick imployment , and do some other such like things ; which being done , upon some just occasion , although the parties concerned be therewithall displeased , yet not being disliked by the generality , their hatching of mischievous plots against the present government and weal publick , will have less fewel to feed upon . but what shall be said of him , whose worth and vertue doth exceed that of all others ? by what pretence can a just prince , or a well-governed commonwealth humble such a man , or keep him low , or aloof from partaking of their councels ? to this it may be answered , that if this supposed personage be endowed with true vertue , he will not be subject to any suspition , nor will it be imagined that he will do any foul or wicked thing which may be prejudicial to his prince or countrie ; but that all his endeavors shall aim at the common good , and it is just and convenient that such a man should alwaies bear sway in every well-ordered commonwealth . but if the vertues which render him so great and eminent , tend to policie , that is , when a man does that which is good and honest , having his mind bent upon some other object then meer worth and honesty , as most men use to do , out of hopes of glory , or of bettering themselves ; which things notwithstanding are so far vertue● as they are helpful to the state , and have a certain resemblance o● true worth ; it will not be amiss that such a one who may be suspected to misimp●y his good endowments , be proceeded against in manner aforesaid . we may then conclude that the custom of the athenians concerning ostracism ought neither to be praised nor practised in relation to the act it self ; but may admit of commendation and imitation as far as the intention thereof reacheth , viz. to provide that the ambition or malice of a few , rob not many of their quiet , nor do perturb or confound the whole state. the end of the first book . the second book . the first discourse . why the commonwealth of ●enice hath not so far inlarged her precincts as did the roman commonwealth . men may be allowed to wonder not a little , if they take it into their consideration , why the commonwealth of venice , having so excellent laws and institutions , and having so long preserved her self in power and authority , hath not notwithstanding much inlarged the preci●cts of her empire , as did the common-wealth of rome , in a lesser space of time and in a form of government which was not void of many imperfections : the thought thereof hath made me oftentimes desire to search into the true causes of it . i find this hath been taken into consideration by some other modern writers , but to b●ot that his discourses are already buried in oblivion , it may be the things by him alleadged have not been such , as may give full satisfaction to one who shall look narrowly into the ●arrtiage of our civil actions . he was of opinion that the greatness of the roman empires was ●oly to be attributed to the vertue of her ordinations , and form of government ; from which since the venetian commonwealth doth differ●● he thinks that the cause why she hath not been able to make so great acquisitions . and he is so resolute in this opinion , as without distinguishing between things & things , between 〈◊〉 and times , he doth so equally extol all the orders and actions of the ●eman common-wealth , as he doth propound some things for example to all 〈◊〉 princes and commonwealths , as are rather to be blamed then to be imi●ated , and which were the reasons of the ruine of that commonwealth , as the di●●en●ions which was between the nobility and the common people , and other such things which are rather disorders then orders , and more apt to confound , then to establish states . insomuch as his opinion is , that if there were a city at this day in italy which had the same ●rom of government as rome had of old , that city might , as the other did , make herself mistress of the world. as if the condition of times , and the so many variou● accidents upon which humane actions , and especially the augmenting and change of states do depend , were to be held for nothing ; and that it be in the power of a wise legislator to give the empire of the world to that city , which he knows how to govern by good laws . but experience teacheth us much otherwise ; since we have known many antient commonwealths founded by very wise men , and confirm'd with excellent orders , equally for what concerns peace as war , yet not any one amongst so many hath been able , i will not say to acquire so much dominion as did the commonwealth of rome , but nor hardly able any ways to extend their prec●ncts amongst their neighbors . the int●insecal orders of the state are not simply of themselves sufficient to make so great atchievements , ( though they may peradventure concur very much thereunto : ) nor ought the state of venice her not being mistress of larger territories , be attributed to any defect in this behalf ; but many other things are to be taken into consideration , whereby the truest causes of such effects , which amidst the uncertainty of such like affairs can be found out , may be discovered by looking into . to know then whence such a diversity proceeds , we must take the business a little higher , and examine , first , what was the original beginning of these two cities , rome and venice ; what their founders were ; and then what their situation , what the inclinations , studies , and vertues of their citizens ; and lastly the condition of times , and qualities of their neighboring princes must be examined . all which things appertain to this consideration , as well as the orders of the commonwealth , and their form of government . he then who shall look upon the first founders of these two cities , willfind them , even in these the●r first beginnings , not a little differing : which occasioned differing intentions , and differing ends ; and therefore peradventure a differing state , and differing condition . the first erectors of venice , where men who were peacefully given , as those who having been wearied by the so many calamities of italy , occasioned by the inundation of the barbarians , had withdrawn themselves , that they might shun the danger of war , into that piece of marish ground in the adriatick sea , which was then greater then now it is , and the chiefest of many small islands , which by a common name were called venetiae . so as they lived for a while without any orders either military or civil ; those first inhabitants contenting themselves to live in peace and quiet , without dreaming of any greater matter : for it neither stood with the end which they propounded unto themselves in this their new abode so to do , nor did the condition of those times permit it : and they were so fenced from the arm sof enemies as then , both by the natural condition of their situation , as also by the salt waters , as they needed not to arm themselves for their own defence . therefore their citizens being by long custom inured to these thoughts , they had no thought of taking up arms , though the city were already much increased both in forces and authority , unless when they were provoked , and more to keep themselves from being injured by others , or to assist their friends and confederates , then out of ambition of rule , and of enlarging their bounds . and he who shall consider what their greatest and and most difficult enterprises were in those first times , will see they aimed all at this end . the venetians fought first with the french , and afterwards against the huns , in defence of their country , and of their liberties ; and long after with the genoeses , enforced thereunto by necessity , and provoked by many grievous injuries : for this very valiant and generous nation would not rest quiet , out of an emulation of glory in sea-affairs ; wherein though they were oftentimes worsted by the venetians , yet they still found occasion of new contests . the commonwealth of venice hath oft-times taken up arms likewise , in times neerer this our age , with greater preparation for war , and with more courage to defend their state in terta firm● , which they had already gotten with much ado , and whereof they were justly possessed ; insomuch as they have sometimes valian●ly repulsed the fury of most powerful leagues of princes , who were resolved upon their ruine . but it becomes not the mo●th of a venetian to say how oft they have taken up arms in defence of their friends and confederates , lest he may seem to upbraid others with the services his countrymen have done them . but divers people and cities assisted and preserved by their forces , do witness this . and to speak only of things of more recent memory , how great a desire hath this commonwealth shewn to the common good ? and to this purpose how careful hath she been of the liberty and glory of italy , in sustaining long and heavy war , to preserve the noble neapolitan territories in the italian princes , and the like of milan ? but he who will look further back , and see what they have done , will find that the venetians have undertaken and finished famous enterprises out of zeal to religion ; as they did in the wars of the holy land against the saracens , and divers other times against other princes , to preserve and increase the glory of the holy church , and the papal dignity : which amongst many other actions , is cleerly and nobly witnessed by the famous naval victory won from the emperor frederick barb●rossa ; for the which venice doth at this day enjoy many great priviledges , in witness of her great worth and singular merit . but it is needless now to particularize in those things whereof all histories are full : it will suffice to touch upon some things , whereby it may be conceived what the first beginnings of the city were , and what were the intentions and end of her citizens . romes ends were far different from these , who from her very beginning aimed only at empire and greatness ; being built by romalus , a fierce and ambitious man , who not content to have recovered his kingdom to his grandfather numiter , and opened the way to the lordship of alba longa , resolved by the assistance of a great many young men who followed him , to purchase a better fortune and condition for himself , and to build a new city , which must have a warlike institution to keep the minds of those stirring youth busied in military exercises , and to defend himself from his neighbors ; who finding that the new city aimed at greater designs , thought to keep is low . romulus might with reason promise himself to purchase more dominion , and to enlarge his confines ; for he built his city in a country which was possest by many people , who were weak , and at odds within themselves , so as he needed not fear any potent prince who might oppose his designs , or suppress his forces before they were somewhat better established . this was the first foundation of romes greatness ; for the city beginning soon to habituate herself to military discipline , and to turn her thoughts upon war , and aggrandising her state , she grew so confirm'd therein with time , and with continual military orders , as the militia and all things thereunto tending did continually flour● sh in her . for those that came after , following ( as it falls out for the most part ) the example of their predecessors , her citizens were always desirous of warlike glory , and of empire ; proving to be like romulus , and those other valiant men from whom they had their beginning and increase . thus they always made one war beget another , not being able to endure the suspected power of their neighbors , nor yet the injuries done unto them by their friends and confederates ; under which two pretences they made first many notable acquisitions in italy , and afterwards ( passing over the sea ) in africa , in spain , and in many other provinces . but to pass on now to another consideration , let us affirm that the situation is of great moment for the rule and dominion which one city is to have over another , as that which affords security for self defence , and opportunity to subjugate others ; this helps likewise to make a city plentiful and wealthy , without which states are hardly acquired . for where there is scarcity of livelihood , povertie is more to be fought withall then enemies , and want of wealth renders a city alwaies weak , and easie to be wasted and opprest . hence it was that sparta , though she had excellent laws and institutions , yet whilst she observed them , she could not much inlarge her dominions ; for by them the city was bound for what concerned both the private and publick condition , to be kept poor , and far from any commerce with others ; and in our time the cantons of the switzers , though they be a very valiant generation , yet being poor , and seated amongst mountains , and for the most part in barren places , their soldiers being fighting under the pay of other princes , they have not been able to do any thing for themselves , or to make any acquisitions , but have onely preserved their liberties . if we shall then consider the situation of venice , we shall certainly find it very opportune for most things , and miraculously well for some things . for if we have respect to safety ; what city can be compared to this , which without any bulwarks of walls , or garrisons of soldiers , defended by her natural scituation , is of her self safe from all injuries , and inexpugnable ? so as she is the onely example after so many ages of being untoucht by the barbarians violence . if we respect abundance of plenty and wealth , the accommodation that the sea affords her , and the so many rivers which disgorge themselves , either into the neighboring sea , or into sher own gulf , are such and so many , both for the conveyance of victuals , and of merchandize , as it is no wonder that so great a multitude of people can live in her with such abundance of all things , and not onely her own citizens , but even foreiners who inhabit there , grow rich therein . but as for empire and command , as she is miraculously accommodated for the imployment of forces in sea enterprizes , so for what belongs to the like on land , she hath not those conveniencies which peradventure are requisite . therefore it was long ere she bethought her self of purchasing any territories in terra firm● , minding onely dominion at sea , whereunto she was invited by her scitua●●on , and by the institution of her ancestors ▪ touching which it is worthy consideration , that the sea militia and discipline , upon which the commonwealth was for a long time bent , are not such as can naturally give occasion of great command , because their fleets cannot of themselves penetrate further then the rivers which fall into the sea ; wherefore all her acquisitions were onely islands , or places on the sea shore , because she had not then numerous and well disciplined armies to dive into the hearts of dominions , and to pursue victories . all cities which have placed the pitch of their power in their fleets , have had the like success . for though they may have purchased some reputation , and some precedencie by sea , yet have they not b●en able much to inlarge the confines of their command . thus the athenians and other people of greece , though they were very strong in these kind of forces , proper to that nation from whence the art of building of ships , and of navigation is thought to have its original , yet have they alwaies been esteemed weak , and but little valued by such nations , which they could not by their forces make subject to their dominions . but the city of rome , which studied more the militia by land , then by sea , and built her greatness more by armies then by fleets , having more field-room wherei● to exercise her citizens valo● , made much greater enterprizes , and made many provinces subject to her dominion . not did the romans make use of fleets by sea before they were necessitated , that they might sail into sicily and africa , to oppose the power of the carthaginians , which they had reason to be jealous of , by reason of their too great power , and vicinity but when they had occasion to make use of their soldiers by sea , they shewed no less forwardness and daring therein , then they had done by land : insomuch as the skill and experience of the carthaginians , who had long been masters at sea , was oft-times overcome and deluded by the valor and military discipline of the romans ; till at last that nation which was held to be so powerful at sea , was destroyed and beaten by the romans , who had a long time been unexperienced in maritime affairs , but very expert in land-armies , and military discipline . so as the empire of the world being contested for by these two commonwealths , it was seen that it more availed the romans to be a little superior to the carthaginians by land , then it did the carthaginians to exceed the romans much by sea. for the good orders of their armies , the valor and discipline of their soldiers , got them the victorie over the carthaginians , and opened the way to the monarchie of the world ; which had sundry times before been done by the same means , by the assyrians , persians and macedonians ; land-forces having alwaies in great acquirements prevailed over those of the sea , and the discpline of armies over the experience of maritime affairs . this is likewise more clearly seen by reason of the new monarchie founded in a short time by the turks in asia , and in greece , which was not done by sea-forces , wherein they were not any waies considerable , till of later times , but by the multitude of their cavalrie , and more by the firm ranks of their ianizaries . and to say truth , the very forces by sea are increased and maintained by those of land , for larger territories do easily furnish men , moneys , victuals , and other necessaries for the well ordering of fleets at sea. the which is likewise known by experience of the very commonwealth of venice , which before she had got any state in terra firma , could never make so numerous fleets , though she did very much study maritime affairs ; nor could she prevail in the important wars against the geno●ses , as she did afterwards , when her power was much increased and confirmed by her land territories . thus in this last●age , she hath been able to set forth at first above a hundred nimble galleys , and afterward more galleys , and greater vessels of all sorts , as hath been seen by experience in the two last wars against the turks , wherein nothing more gallant and glorious could be desired on the commonwealths behalf ; whereupon also , as the worthy and becoming fruit of such industry did the victorie of lepanto ensue , which will be memorable in all ages . and it may suffice to know what the maritime forces of the commonwealth are , and how they are abundantly supplied from land with all things to make them powerful at sea , yea , even then when the sea was blocked up for what concerned them ; that they were able to maintain so great a fleet in all seasons , for three years together . wherefore francisco foscari , duke of venice , a prince of singular wisdom , by whose advice , and under whose happy auspices , great acquisitions were made on firm land , was wont to say , that the commonwealth could not have increased much in power , if she had not imployed her forces on land enterprizes ; which because she had no● formerly done , was the cause why that greatness was much retarded and hindred , whereunto she might easily have arrived if such counsel had been sooner taken ; and by setting before her the example of the worth and glory of the romans , she might have aspired to greater empire . but those who governed the commonwealth were a long time far from any such thoughts ; being more intent upon peace and quiet , or upon such wars as might inlarge and secure her dominion by sea ; which may be clearly witnessed by what past with ●zzelino de romano , with the scalligers , the carr●●si , and with others who ruled in the next neighboring cit●es ; whereby it is seen that the venetians being contented with defending their friends , and vindicating their own injuries , dreamed not on their dominions , of which they might easily have berest them ; till when overcome by necessity , and by the insolencie of the carraesi , and by other accidents of those times , they were compell'd to apply their minds and forces thereunto , and to fix their dominion there . let us consider on the contrary , how opportunely rome was s●●ted to for●ent her citizens dispositions much to augment her dominions , almost in the midst of italy , just sitting for a principal city , being placed ( as may be said ) in the center , to the end that she may equally extend her power and forces on all sides . the city of rome stands on firm land , or terra firm● , but so neer the sea , as she may reap the commodity thereof , without being thereby endangered : she is apt to breed up armies , and to nourish men in the exercise of the militia ; not is she inconveniently seated for the transportation of her forces by sea into other far off provinces . this diversity of situation hath begot diversity of inclinations in the inhabitants . thus doth nature always adapt mens minds to those arts which they are to exercise themselves in , or else custom doth inform the habit , and turns it into nature . for as the romans following exercises conformable to the situation of their city , were more inclined to land-war , and in peace to husbandry : so the venetians invited to other things according to the diversity of place , applied their studies otherwise to defend their liberty , and to increase their wealth , using the sea ▪ militia for the one , and traffick and merchandising for the other . which whosoever shall upbraid our citizens withall , seems , not to know , that without these a city could neither have long preserved it self , nor increase in state and wealth , as it hath done : for not having any particular territories whereout to extract their livelihood , she would have been always poor and weak , and wanting other imployments , she would have been destroyed , if not by forein forces , by her own idleness , as many other cities have been , the citizens wanting wherein to imploy their thoughts , and to exercise themselves in quiet times . but if the citizens of rome were much commended for their husbandry , insomuch as of this day many famous men of that commonwealth are as much celebrated for having been good husbandmen as good commanders ; as were curtius dent●tus , quintius cinci●●tus , attalius collatsinus , marc● regulus , scipio afric●●ons , and others ; wherefore should the venetians be upbraided with their merchandising , this being an exercise as fitting and requisite for the situation of venice , as was that of tillage and husbandry to the like of rome ? if the care of cultivating the earth did not abase the minds of those antient and reverend romans , who have left so evident examples of worth to all other cities and nations , why should the industry of merchandising redound to the opprobry of the v●●●tians , seeing to the contrary with how much glory and how much publick benefit they have for so long a feries of years govern'd the commonwealth ? the studies and actions of the romans and venetians have then been different , but notwithstanding alike in this , that they aimed at the same end , though they took several ways there unto ; to wit , a● glory , at the grandeur and liberty of their commonwealth . many famous examples of fortitude , of love to their country , and of all other sorts of worthiness have been seen in each of them ; so as in our men nothing was more to be desired , unless 〈◊〉 and more frequent occasions wherein to have imployed themselves , that the greatness of their actions might have corresponded to the magnnimity of this minds . yet do not we venetians want 〈◊〉 of many 〈◊〉 who have been very famous for fortitude of mind and military worth , and he who stall examine the life and actions of many princes of the commonwealth , will find them to be such as deserve praise and celebration . such have ordel●so faller● vi●●l● , 〈◊〉 mic●●li , and h●●●rico dandule , 〈◊〉 bastione 〈…〉 cantarem , pietre 〈◊〉 , andrea grit●i , sebastiano veniero , and divers others been ; whose words might be 〈◊〉 to that of the fabri●●i , marcelli , fabii , 〈◊〉 and others of their so much 〈…〉 then if they had had a larger field to exercise themselves in , or had the 〈◊〉 of their common-wealth afforded them same equal to the merit and valor of those 〈…〉 but let us now come to consider those 〈◊〉 important 〈◊〉 of the condition of times , and their neighbors qualities . the city of venice 〈◊〉 her beginning when italy was possest by the wild northern nations , and when being perplex'd with all other sort of miseries , she fell finally into the slavery of barb●●ians , wherein she lived for the space of many years : how then could a new city aspire to empire , while the forces of the barbarians were so powerful in that province , as the most powerful roman empire was not able to withstand them , which was shook and destroyed by their fury ? it rather seems a wonder , that a city in her first and weak beginnings was able to manage so great a war , and withstand ( as she did afterwards ) the violence of two fierce and potent nations , to wit , the french , and huns : the french , when their king pipin being entred italy with puissant forces to drive out the lombards , and being scandalised that the city of venice had leaned to the friendship of nicephorus emperor of constantinople , turn'd his forces upon her to subjugate and destroy her : and the h●ns , when parting from pannonia , ( which took from them the name of hungary ) having overcome a very powerful army of the germans , and kill'd their king lodovic●s , they fell to 〈…〉 again , their fury was withstood by the 〈◊〉 , which 〈◊〉 a powerful prince , was forced to give way unto . but afterwards , the forces of these western barbarians being in time weakned by ch●●● the great , the state of italy fell again in to the western emperors who being then very powerfull , and masters both of germany and france , the forces of a weak commonwealth were not likely to contest with so great princes , with any hope of acquiring 〈◊〉 these difficulties being added unto by the cities situation , withheld the venetians a long while from thinking how to enlarge their dominions in terra sirms ; in which opinion being for a long time confirmed , and having very 〈◊〉 imployed their studies and forces in sea enterprises , ( though the 〈◊〉 of times did counsel them to the contrary giving them hopes of noble acquisitions on land ) they either despised , or knew not how to make use of the occasions which afterwards were offered . thus when the german emperors , troubled with the domestick troubles of that province , did forgo their possessions in italy , the venetians not minding then that opportunity , left the advantage to others , which they might easily have reaped : whereupon other cities of italy purchasing their 〈◊〉 from the emperors at low ra●es , framed a peculiar government unto themselves , as did florence ; and others were possest by others powerful men , as 〈…〉 and other cities of lombardy : when if the commonwealth of venice , whole power was already much increased , had been minded to have 〈◊〉 themselves of any of the imperial territories , it is not to be doubted but they might in a short time have made notable acquisitions . but when they began very late , and more provoked by injuries then by ambition of dominion , to think upon territories by land , they found divers other princes become very powerful both in 〈◊〉 , and authority , and confirm'd in the states which they 〈◊〉 under 〈◊〉 a shore lawful 〈◊〉 . wherefore they met with many difficulties , and amongst the test the wars proved very heavy unto them , which they were forc'd to 〈…〉 did not joyn against them , because they saw that if that dukes state fell into the power of the venetian commonwealth , the way would be laid open to her for much greate● matters in italy ; whereupon a noble victorie which was already almost gotten , was impeded . hereby it may be then conceived how much the condition of the times was averse to the commonwealths inlarging her precincts by land , partly by reason of her self , and partly through other various accidents ; which though they were somewhat more favorable unto her in what concerned the sea , yet met she not with small interruptions therein to her enterprises . for the eastern emperors being masters of greece , and of other states and countries , wherein the commonwealth was to have inlarged the confines of her command by sea , she could not make any great acquisitions whilst they preserved themselves in such reputation and strength , as became their state. but afterwards , when that empire began to decline , she began to increase and flourish gloriously , and her worth was waited upon by much prosperitie ; as was seen when the venetians went in companie of the french to the business of the levant , and after many noble warlike actions they took the city and empire of constantinople ; of which acquisition the commonwealth had so great a share , as that their dukes did then assume the title of signoridella quarta parte , é mezza , di tutto l' imperio della romania . and soon after with the like prosperous success , they did by sundry means reduce many islands , and chief maritime towns under their obedience ; and the commonwealth marched on apace to greater power and command . but this course of glorie and victorie by war was much slackened by the original customs and orders of the city ( as has been said ) which related more to peace , and merchant affairs , then to war. insomuch as the venetians seemed for a while to make use of these new acquisitions , rather for the better accomodation of their navigation , and traffick , then for any occasion of other enterprises , their business did therefore infinitely increase at this time ; insomuch as there was not any city famous for merchandizing in the levant , whither the venetian ships and merchants did not flock . nay , a great number of men of that nation did usually remain in those cities , through whose hands the most precious merchandise of those countries past , to the great advantage of the city , and of her private citizens . so as the genoeses plying the same places , at first a certain rivalship and emulation arose amongst them , as well for the profit of merchandizing , as for the expertness , and glory of sea affairs , till at last they came to open and cruel war : which kept the commonwealth so busied , and perplexed by disturbing navigation , and even private affairs , as for a long while they had no leasure to undertake other enterprises , though they had met with opportuity for it , and that they had been thereunto disposed . for the venetians having sundry times hazarded their fleets upon the doubtful event of battel , they tasted both prosperous and adverse fortune ; insomuch as they were to fight in their own gulf , not more for empire , then for the safety of the city . thus whilst the commonwealth spent her best years , partly in these private affairs , and merchandizing business , partly in the so long and troublesome wars against , the genoeses , another power arose in the levant , much greater , and more formidable then was the grecian empire . for the ottaman lords , beginning by divers accidents , but chiefly by reason of the discords among christians , to make notable and successful progress in their rising empire , grew quickly very great and powerful not onely by land , but also by sea , having reduced the city of constantinople into their hands , a very fit place for sea enterprises , whereby the commonwealth of venice was not onely bereft of all hopes of further increasing their dominion by sea , having so great and powerful an ●nemy to near at hand , but even what they had already got , was exposed to hazard ; so as being to maintain a bitter and difficult war , and to manage it with unequal forces against this their sore and perpetual adversarie , she had more reason to think upon her own defence , then by force of arms to win what belonged to others . let us in the next place consider the conditions of the nearest neighboring people amongst which she was to inlarge her confines , whereby we may also know what difficulties the commonwealth met with ; for at the very first she was to overcome the dalmatians , a nation not onely very valiant , but of a quick wit , given to sedition , and desirous of novelties . whence how great her difficulties were in quelling these , may be conceived by this , that the commonwealth of rome having so many , and so far distant nations , yet could she never handsomely put the yoke upon dalmatia , which never was under the roman empire until the time of qctavius augustus , but had still before notably indamaged the roman armies . it is then no wonder that the state of a commonwealth should be less , which had to contend with such enemies ; and who may not know by the actions of this commonwealth , that she rather wanted occasion then worth for the further encreasing her state and fortune ? let us now likewise consider the condition of the times wherein the common-wealth of rome had her happy beginnings , and made the first progress to her empire . which we shall find to differ much , and to be free of the so many difficulties , which the venetians met with . rome had not at her first rise any powerful neighboring prince ; for the assyrians had then the monarchie , whose confines did not extend beyond asia ; and after the concourse of many years it was carried by cyrus amongst the persians , with whom it remained for about two hundred years , till it was destroyed by alexander of macedon , who though he made greater conquests , and made his forces be felt and dreaded much further off , yet dying young in the height of his victories , he could not get into europe , nor afford the romans occasion of making trial of their forces with a powerful and valiant prince . and by his death ( he having left no issue , either legitimate or illegitimate behind him ) that monarchie was soon destroyed , and his empire was divided between his chief commanders ; so as several kingdoms were thereout framed , with which severally the romans did afterwards much to their advantage make war. so as asia having then been the chiefest seat of the empire , the provinces of europe were not at that time any waies annoied by the power thereof ; and those that were further from thence , as was italy , less then the rest . but greece which was then in high esteem for the excellencie of her inhabitants genius , for what concerned both civil and military vertues , was divided into many several peopledoms , who contending within themselves for the dignitie both of the soveraigntie of that very province , it so fell out that aspiring either wholly or chiefly thereat , they minded not the annoying of other nations by their forces . in africa the carthaginians were very strong , the power of carthage being almost at the same times as much increased , as was the like of rome in italy : so as she had the dominion of many provinces of europe , and did possess the greatest part of spain : but this power did not any waies molest the romans first designs , not did it hinder them from making qcquisitions in italy , not from confirming therein those forces with which she afterwards did subdue the world. for the carthaginians came not near the romans for little less then five hundred years , till such time as both the commonwealths inlarging their confines , they grew to be neighbors ; whereupon at last they commenced war , out of the envy and jealousie that each 〈◊〉 of other . this was the condition and 〈◊〉 of times wherein the commonwealth of rom● had 〈◊〉 rise and encrease . whence it may be observed , that though there might be some great 〈◊〉 then , yet was there none which might compare with the roman emperors , who had a greater monarchy then all the rest ; besides they were so far off , as their greatness could not impede romes increasing , though she were as yet but a new-begun city . but she met with the like prosperous condition both of affairs and times , in relation to her neerest neighbors : for rome had not only not any great contestation with any powerlike prince in her first and weakest beginning ; but for the space of three hundred and sixty years , till the first french war , she had no occasion of making trial of her forces against any powerful people ; for then italy was not only not subject to any one prince alone , who might be greater by other forces and other states , as it happened afterwards in the venetians times , but being divided into many parts , as well in respect of dominion , as of other separations , each country contained many people of differing government and power : so as latium alone of herself , which is now called campagna di roma , contained four nations , or rather communalties , the hernici , latini , volsci , and equi ; with whom the people of rome did for a long time make war. i mention not the cecinensi , the crustumeni , antinati , sabini , albani , and other nations of less esteem , against which in her beginning she exercised her forces , whilst she learned ( as a man may say ) the first rudiments of her militia . tuscany , though being taken all together she were very powerful , and whose confines were then much larger , yet was she divided into so many signories or lordships , as the forces of every people apart by themselves must needs be weak and of small moment : which may easily be known by this , that bare three hundred men of the family of the fabli were able to wage war with the veienti , who were the chief of that region , with whom they oft times fought with display'd banners , and with dubious event , and were at last supprest more by the fraud , then force of their enemies . so likewise the other parts of italy which were neerer rome were so weakly inhabited , as it is not much , that a new city , but yet well instructed in weapons , might get unto herself state and dominion : nay , he who shall consider what the increase of that commonwealth was from time to time , will wonder how that people , who got afterwards the dominion of the whole world , was so late in enlarging the confines of her territories upon her neighbors , when they were to contend in war with those that were weaker then they , and that the bounds of their empire did extend to beyond italy . for , for above the space of four hundred years , when the city was so much increased in citizens , as she raised armies of forty thousand foot , besides horse , the affairs of rome were notwithstanding in such condition , as they made war even under the walls of rome with the equi , volsci , and veientes , her first enemies . and this wonder is not a little increased , when you shall consider that military discipline did flourish even from the very first in rome , and was ever afterwards held in great esteem by her citizens , who were bent with all their might to augment the power of their city , not being content , as were the venetians , to enjoy peace and security . wherefore the romans gave easily way for friendship to all foreiners , that they might by the multitude of their citizens render their city more powerful , and fitter to worst adversaries : and their first king romulus set up a sanctuary , where all sorts of men , whether free or slaves , good or guilty , might have receptacle . but that commonwealth had also her imperfections , whereby being troubled with perpetual civil discords , she found many impediments , and much difficulty in effecting her citizens generous designs . but being gotten to a great height of power , the counterpoise of forein forces ceasing by her own greatness , she was able for a time to bear with her so many discorders , till at last she was brought to her final ruine . we must now be permitted to take some other things into consideration which appertain to particular order of this commonwealth . a city which aspires unto empire , must above all things else be well provided of arms , so as she want not any thing that is requisite for war : but she stand● no less in need of good laws , which are for many respects of great importance in all governments ; as also for that when the licentiousness of arms , intrusted in the hands of citizens , is not corrected by the authority of law , that which was destin'd for the good and preservation thereof , it turns at last to her ruine . therefore it is requisite that a city be constituted with such laws as may result both to safety from foreign enemies , and to union between her own citizens ; by which civil agreement the strength and reputation of a commonwealth is much increased . of these two conditions which ought to make a city powerful , and so as that power may continue long , the commonwealth of rome had the first in perfection , but was very faulty in the second : on the contrary , excellent provision was made by the founders of venice for the second , but much remains to be wish'd for in the former . thus then had rome a naturally warlike people , which she kept continually exercised in arms , observing exactly military discipline and orders : but she was much disorderly and confused in civil affairs , nor knew she how to keep any setled from of government , leaving too much authority in the people , and wanting usual means to suppress the immoderate power of citizens . whereas in venice , the form and order of civil government is in every particular well disposed of , and excellently well understood ; so as she is the only example which in so many ages , and so many accidents both of good and bad fortune , hath never been troubled with any important domestick discords . but then , as for military orders , they are not altogether such as are requisite for the acquiring of a large command ; for at 〈◊〉 beginning , she applied herself ( as hath been said ) to maritime affairs , not with any intent of subjugating other cities and nations , but rather ( as the condition of those times and businesses did require ) for what concerned traffick and merchandising , to which the preservation of peace did much condu●e ; and the keeping of open and free . commerce with all men ; but having since had some such thoughts too late , they were not very sevently pursued neither , but only as necessary or some occasion did dictate : for the city was nor disposed and established with certain and perpetual orders , not with any very ambition● ends for what concerned . war , and for land● militia , it hath already been said ▪ that for a long time the commonwealth was totally a stranger unto it . and therefore when at last she made it her business , for want of any fitting preparation for it in her own people and citizens , she had recourse for help to foreiners , and this 〈◊〉 growi●g stronger by time , she hath always made use for the most part of forein commanders and soldiers , brought under her pay from elswhere : which , as experience shews ▪ hath turn'd much to her damage and disorder ; for her forces being under the command and power of **** other men , she hath not bee●able upon many fi●●ing ccasions to make good use of the victories ▪ which she with great danger and 〈◊〉 hath ●on . and not to mention many other things , it is a thing very well known , that had not the 〈◊〉 great fidelity of the commandess 〈◊〉 the commonwealth of her just hopes , in the 〈…〉 the romans did not thus , who being to rig out fleets against the carthaginian , did not seek out sicilians , or grecians , or people of other nations , to command over them , but made use of their own citizens as well by sea as by land. cinci●natu● was taken from the plough , and made dictator against the subins ; cicer● being taken from pleading at the bar , was sent to the government of cilicia , and to make war against the parthians ; scipio , who parted a fresh soldier from rome is said to have gotten the knowledge of the militarie art , by the way , before he arrived at the enemy ; sylla , being sent questor into africa , with the consul marius , being till then puney in the militia , became in a few daies so well instructed therein , and raised so great an opinion of valor and military discipline of himself , as the commonwealth did very soon put their chiefest hopes in him , in all their weightiest affairs . in brief , people that are of a ready wit , and noble spirit , do easily accustom themselves by exercise to all things , and prove excellent therein ; the experience whereof hath been seen amongst our selves , for those few who have betaken themselves to land-service , have given such proof of their valor ( which is witnessed by particular histories ) as it may very well be known , that the commonwealth might have promised unto her self all gallantries from her citizens , if she had known how to make use of them . but she was run into this error , because she would ( as the conjuncture of times did almost require ) follow the example of the other princes of italy , who long before , and chiefly at that time when the commonwealth did most apply her self to land-affairs , made use of mercinary militia's , which was then heightned to a great esteem by two famous commanders of that age , braccio and sforza , who were afterwards imitated by others in this sort of militia ; wherefore the captain● whose troops did ordinarily consist of horse , led them along to the service sometimes of one , sometimes of another prince . so the venetians who were but learners in this sort of militia , saw that the popes , and kings of 〈◊〉 , the dukes of mi●an , the florentines , who bore great sway and authority in italy , made use of this sort of forces , they began no follow the footsteps which were 〈◊〉 out unto them by others . another respect may be added hereunto , which hath already been touched upon , that the commonwealth having then put her self in a certain course , which she had for a long time observed , of making use of her people and her citizen in sea-affairs , it seemed dangerous to some to make such an innovation in a city ordained for civil government , and which was greatly ●ixt therein by long custom . but it is not to be denied , but that when the aggrandizing of a state or empire is in question , this which hath been spoken of is a great fa●lt in a city which doth aspire thereunto . and it is to be observed in the roman monarchy that the happy success of their famous victories is chiefly attributed , to the discipline of their malitia , because it was excellent , and because it was exercised by their own soldiers ; and particularly in the carthiginian w●rs , which were 〈◊〉 then all the rest which the romans did ever make ; it is observable , that the carthaginians being equal to the romans both for the re●●ration and w●rth of their commanders , and superior to them in the numbers of their soldiers , to boot with the strength of their elephants , which they made use of in their battels , yet th●ir armies were overcome , which consisted of 〈◊〉 people , and assembled out of many 〈◊〉 , and yet not by the greater worth , but by the greater fidelity , constancy , and love of the roman soldiers towards their countrie . but for such abuses as 〈◊〉 it may be alledged in behalf of the commonwealth of 〈◊〉 , that she did it to 〈◊〉 th●se mischiefs into which 〈◊〉 commonwealth of 〈◊〉 can by giveng these military commands to 〈…〉 ; yet he who will truly examine the state of affairs , will find that the 〈◊〉 which is granted , limited and corrected by the laws , cannot be prejudicial to the publick good ; and the experience of the very city of venice confirms this , where so great authoritie being so often granted in commands at sea to her own citizens , yet it was never known that the commonwealth suffered any mischeif thereby , and certainly a great mistery lies in the well disposed orders of a city , by which citizens are easily kept within their duties , wherein if any one chance to fail , he is soon chastised without any disturbance to the peace of the city . which if by nothing else ▪ is sufficiently proved in the city of venice , by the long duration of that commonwealth . so as these things were very well understood and ordained by her ; and she might the more easily do it , by reason of the conditions of those her first inhabitants , as hath been said . but such freedom and licentiousness was given in rome to that warlike people , together with the government of their forces , as the laws were not so reverenced as they ought to have been ▪ and the orders of the militia being instituted by rom●lus , before those of religion and civility by numa po●pilius , military discipline was alwaies in greater esteem then the study of civil affairs . by all which considerations it is manifest , that the diversity of success in these two commonwealths , hath sprung from this diversity of institutions , and from so many accidents , and not from any one reason , as was said at the beginning ; but in this diversity both of them have their praises , and all those perfect●ons and felicity , which is grantable to humane affairs . rome was mistress of the world , but could not long enjoy this greatness and prosperity , nor yet with the quiet of her citizens . but venice , though of much meaner precincts , and condition , hath preserved her self ( as an onely example ) in her liberty for so many ages , free from all domestick troubles , and with the miraculous union and concord of her citizens . the second discourse . whether or no the commonwealth of venice be to be blamed for having taken upon her the defence of the city of pisa , when it was oppugned by the florentines . i have often , not without some , to me appearing reason , wondred , that some historians should so much blame the commonwealth of venice for having taken upon her the defence of the city of pisa against the florentines , whereby they may seem to reproach the counsels of those wise and stout senators , who had then the managing of publick affairs in their hands , for those very things , for which other princes and states , have been by other writers much celebrated . he who will know the truth of such judgements ; must take unto himself more particular , and inward considerations , for it often-times falls out , that looking into the very pith and marrow of business , the clean contrary is found to what did first appear , and the face of things do seem to alter . such actions may then be measured , either by the ordinary reasons of justice and equity else by the reasons of state , which are the more proper . if you consider 〈◊〉 action of the commonwealth according to the first measure , what is it that 〈…〉 consciences of these so ●eruplous me● ? to take upon ones self 〈…〉 a pio●● action , and be●itting great and generous princes ▪ and how miserable was the condition of the poor pisans , how much it did deserve to be imbraced and favored both out of compassion and justice , is demonstrated ( to omit for the present other particulars ) by what was done at the same time by charls the eight , king of france , whilst he was in italy , and by the so many favors afforded to the cause of pisa by all the chief of his court. charls had promised the florentines to keep the city of pisa under their dominion , being obliged unto them for their readiness in receiving them into his state , and for having afforded them all assistance and accommodation ; yet did the afflictions of the pisans appear to be so grievous , as he was moved more by compassion then by his own interest , or by his promise made to the florentines . a forein prince used this charity to the pisans , with whom he nor his kingdom had never held any friendship or confederacie , his interests being not only separate from , but contrary to their welfare : and shall it be thought a strange and irrational thing , that the commonwealth of venice , which had had the pisans for their friends and associates in divers enterprises , and who kept still friendship and commerce with that city , from whence also some of the noblest families of the commonwealth draw their original , and whose cause for the same respects was straitly annex'd unto their own , should interest herself in behalf of the pisans , to comfort them in their great affliction ? nor ought the commonwealth of venice to use greater respect to the florentines , then they had used towards her , against whose designs they had so opposed themselves in the wars formerly made against the dukes of milan and ferrara , assisting their enemies both with men and monies , as they were thought to be the chief hinderance , why the business undertaken by the commonwealth with great hopes of good success , had no better an end . the venetians were thereunto likewise moved by the example of others : for if the duke of milan , the genoeses , the lucheses , and those of sienna had assisted the pisans as much as they were able , how could the venetians , whose forces in italy were much superior to theirs , stand idly looking upon the pisans miseries , and upon the prosperity and greatness of the florentines , whereby the common troubles of italy were augmented , since they alone adhered to the french faction . but let us consider a little more particularly the cause which was undertaken to be defended by protecting the pisans , and what it was that they did endeavour . certainly nothing but the recovery of their antient liberty , whereof they were bereaved either by their several misfortunes , and by the violence of others , or at least ( as they said ) to reduce themselves to a less severe government then that of the florentines ; under whose dominion being fa●n but a little before , and the city of pisa being sold at a low rate by the vis●onti , the pisans pretended first by the favor of charls the eight , king of france , and afterwards by the like of maximilian the emperor , to be returned to their former liberty : the former having used his power , and the other his anti●nt pretences of the empire , to put them into that condition . and grant that respect were to be had to the possession which the florentines had of that city , which notwithstanding was but of later times , the florentines were likewise to have released the haven of ligo●n to the g●noeses , from whom they had taken it by violence . the venetians did not perswade the pisans to forgo their obedience to the florentines , as lodovick sfoza had formerly done ; for they minded 〈◊〉 the appeasing of the commotions of italy , then the raising of more ; they did not free them from the bond of obedience to the florentines , as did the emperor and the king of france , because they 〈◊〉 such an action did not belong unto them ; they were not the first that did 〈◊〉 the 〈…〉 of that city , as the genoeses and those of sienna had done , because they had no intention to advantage themselves by the discord and ruine of others : but the city having already totally rejected the obedience of the florentines , being thereof ●●eed by the authority of other puissant princes , and assisted by other more petty princes to maintain their liberties ; the venetians being requested and conjur'd by the pisans , when they saw them ready to fall into the depth of misery , if not assisted by them , and that their ruine would draw along with it great prejudice to the peace and liberty of all italy , they at last took upon them their protection and defence . and i herein say nothing but what is most true , and confirm'd by the testimony of those who have written upon the passages of those times . but let us consider other more particular accidents , and more weighty respects . charls the eight , king of france , was at that time pass'd into italy , to get the kingdom of naples ; an undertaking wherein he had prosperous success , which was an ill omen to italy : all the other princes of italy opposed him afterwards in his designs , ( instructed by the fall of the king of arragon , to have an eye to their own danger ) except only the florentines , who still continued in adhering to the french , the counsel of the most po●ent citizens prevailing over the opinion of the more wise . so as the french preparing to return with mighty forces into italy , they had friendship with none , nor had they any other receptacle , save with the florentines , with whom they had already made a new agreement to be by them assisted with men and monies . pisa was at the same time straitly beleaguer'd by the florentines ; and had she not been succor'd by the venetians , all her other aids were so weak , as she must speedily have faln into the florentines hands ; who being freed of the expence and trouble of that siege , would be more powerful , and more ready to assist the french , and to facilitate the enterprises which they were to attempt in italy . then if it were judged by the common opinion of all men to be just , honest and laudable to take upon them the defence of the safety and liberty of italy against the french ; how can those actions be blamed , which did tend ( as it is seen ) necessarily thereunto , by keeping foreign forces afar off , and by bereaving them of their ●riends assistance ? the affairs of the king of france did at this time ebb and flow , but for the most part ebb in the kingdom of naples : great were the king of arragons hopes of recovering the state , being therein assisted powerfully by the same venetians : the king of france , though his forces were in a readiness , was doubtful whether he should come into italy , or no. so as at such a conjuncture of time , every least thing which tended either to the augmenting or lessening of his hopes , was of great moment . pope alexander moved by these respects , did much press the venetian senate to be resolute in assisting the pisans , whilst he himself was somewhat doubtful and 〈◊〉 . the venetian senate had the florentines in good esteem , and laying aside the memory of what was past ▪ would have had them for their friends , if they would have separated themselves from the french ( who were then the 〈◊〉 enemy ) and have entred into that confederac●e whereinto all the rest of the princes of italy were entred , and by whom they had many fair offers made them , particularly to 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 of their state , if they would put on a generous 〈…〉 those forts , which as 〈◊〉 towns for their fidelity ●ere held by french garrisons , and do this by force of arms , not by treaty 〈◊〉 agreement . but if these things could not be listned unto out of a 〈…〉 such a resolution , that they might keep the florentines busied about pisa , and the french from those succors , whereby the troubles and dangers of italy were increased . but i find that these transactions have been diversly interpreted , and the senate blamed , who did not aim at succouring the oppressed pisans , not at the common safety of italy , but at their own thirst of bringing the city of pisa under their dominion . to this it is answered , that where the actions are evident , no judgement is to be given contrary thereunto ; nor ought the secrets of hearts to be searched , which is reserved to a more excellent power then what humane discourse can arrive unto ; it is certain that the defence of pisa , which was oft-times denied them , was at last undertaken by the venetians , when they being forsaken by all others , they were necessitated for the aforesaid reasons so to do . the pisans offered to put themselves wholly into the power of the commonwealth , and to set up her colours in their city , the venetians would not yeeld hereunto , nor accept of this large offer ; but the pisan ambassadors were sent back with many thanks for their affection , and were heard in what they desired , though in a differing manner ; for the commonwealth took upon her to defend the liberty of the city with the forces and authority of the commonwealth , which she did for many years , with such fervencie and general consent , sparing neither expence , labor , nor danger , as she could hardly have done more in her own defence ; they sent both foot and horse several times to the pisans under their best commanders , as also moneys and victuals , and shipping to accommodate the city with all things necessary , and to free them from the siege of the florentines by sea. yet to give a greater testimony of what their minds and intentions were in this , when it was propounded to put the city of pisa into caesars hands , and to remit the right of their cause to him , the venetians did not onely not oppose it , but counseled them so to do , desirous that this controversie might be ended , whilst their faith , and the common interests were preserved safe ; and when there was yet some opinion , that the florentines allured by this advantage , and hope , might have adhered unto the league ; but on the one side , in progress of time , the florentines obdurate resolution was discovered of governing themselves by counsels , apart from the rest of the italians ; and on the other , the deep deceits of l●d●wick sforza , who under the shadow of procureing peace and quiet , growing jealous of the greatness which the venetians might a●●ive at by the acquisition of pisa , and calculating other mens by his own , did in reality endeavor to secure himself from this his imaginary fear , by hindring the venetians from pursuing that enterprise , to the which not long before he had exhorted them . the venetian senate was inforced to maintain the cause which they had undertaken , to keep from breaking their faith unto the pisans , and to free themselves from the infamy and repute of weak advice , to which they should be subject , as if they had condescended for fear of l●d●wicks forces , or else as not knowing his cunning ; when it was already known to all men , that the endeavor of agreement with the pisans , which was agitated under the name of the collegues , was managed onely by him , and according to his will and interests . but say i pray , is this the onely enterprise wherein the sincerity , and candidness of the commonwealth is to be known in just things , and such as do concern the common good of italy ? how often hath she maintained wars , to the end that there might be a right , and an italian governor in the dukedom of milan ? which cannot be denied since the effects thereof be so appar●nt , as she would not lay down arms before she had compast this her intent , as she did by that famous agreement which was made in the city of b●l●guia the year . in which year , by means of the venetian senate maximilian sforza was restored unto his state , to whom the dukedom of milan did of right belong : and their end● in the business concerning pisa may likewise be discovered , since when the agreement was come unto , the venetians had no respect to their own advantage , but onely to the benefit of the pisans , to the preservation of their liberty as much as might be , and to the right of what belonged to their territories , which they were possest of when they put themselves into the commonwealths protection , wherein the venetians were alwaies very constant ; though the imminent war with the turks might have made them forget the dangers and interests of other mens , for their own concernments . and at last , as they would yeeld to nothing which might be prejudicial to the pisans , so to witness to the world that in reality they had no thought in maintaining this controversie , to any peculiar design of their own , in making themselves masters of that city , they put the determination of these differences , into the arbitrement of hercules duke of ferrara ; which though it had not any effect afterwards , the pisans not consenting thereunto , yet it might be discerned , that the pisans averseness thereunto , or the constancy wherein they persevered , was not fomented by the venetians , but rose either out of the meer election or necessity of the pisans themselves : but let us come to another consideration , more proper for this business , that is , to the reasons of state , wherein th● many of the same things do concur , yet they are clothed with other respects , wherewith princes building either onely or chiefly upon what may most redound to their own advantage , do not advise with counsel of equity , or do not attribute thereunto what is requisite . it is most certain , being already reduced to the greatest extremity , if they should have been abandoned by the venetians , they must have put themselves either into the power of the duke of millan , or of the florentines ; but reason of state would not permit , that in this conjuncture both of times and affairs this city should be joyned to the dominion of either of these . as for sforza his vast and disordinate drifts were already known , and how he would be the sole arbitrator of italy ; so as if he should become more haughty , and p●ft up by this important acquisition , no part of italy could remain quiet or secure either from his force or craft . and as for the florentines you have heard how resolute they were not to part from the friendship of the king of france , by how much greater the danger of whose army was in recent memory , so much the more were his friends and associats to be kept weak and under , to the end that they might not increase to the prejudice and apprehension of the rest . it was seen in what danger italy was put by forein forces , how soon the kings of aragon were driven out of their dominion , how little resolute the other princes of italy were to withstand forein forces , which having once found an open and easie way into italy , it was to be imagined that they would be cause of greater dangers and molestations to her . so as the commonwealth being to be put into a condition of being able to resist the forces of greater princes , and of not being exposed to their wills , she was necessitated to think upon increasing her power and reputation , that she might depend upon her own basis , and be well esteemed of by others . she knew particularly that 〈…〉 was a state which might accommodate or dis-accommodate the french designs , accordingly as it was well or ill affected towards them . and the keeping of the city of pisa dependant upon the venetians , might several waies be helpful ●nto them in their intentions , in seeping the french from ●according the ●ingdom of naples , and in securing themselves afterwards from the florentines , as also in winning such strength and reputation to the commonwealth with friends and 〈◊〉 , as she might provide for her own preservation , and for the like of 〈◊〉 other italians , who had the like intentions with her to maintain peace in italy , and to keep her safe from foreign forces . it was not their onely useful , but necessary for the venetian , in this conjuncture of affairs , to have footing in italy , and to have the city of pisa , if not subject to their dominion , at least dependent upon the authority of the commonwealth . now take it for granted , that that suspition might be true which they have so much divulged , who have endeavored to cast a blur upon the honor and dignity of the commonwealth , to wit , that the venetians intended to make th●mselves absolute masters of that city , only out of a design of increasing their dominion . certainly the actions of a philosopher , and those of a prince , ought not to be measured by one and the same rule ; nor must we fancy the condition of men , and of affairs , to be what peradventure they ought to be , but what they are for the most part . magnanimity is the proper vertue of princes , which makes them always busie themselves about great matters , and whereby they make themselves be dreaded and reverenced by others . therefore the desire of glory and empire is highly praised in such princes as have been greatest and most celebrated , as alexander , cyrus , caesar , charls , and all the rest of the most famous men , in whom a spirit of grandure and generosity , which did still egg them on to new and glorious enterprises , is not only commended , but even admired . if the romans , whose actions are praised and celebrated by the general consent of all men , had been content to contain themselves within the precincts of latium , their worth would have been hidden and obscured , nor would their names have been so highly cry'd up to the memory of posterity : and had not the venetians had larger thoughts then to keep within their private merchandising affairs ( as it became them to do in their weak begining ) dispising or neglecting such occasions as they sundry times met with of enlarging the bounds of their dominions , the commonwealth would not only not have gotten such esteem and reputation as it hath got , but could not have kept herself so long in liberty , amidst so many revolutions of affairs , and such movings of forein armies . it remains now only to see whether the opportunity of the times , and condition of affairs did counsel them to purchase new glory and greater empire to their commonwealth . which though it may be known by what hath been formerly said , yet it will more clearly appear by adding some other particular considerations ▪ the commonwealth was then in a more powerful condition then any prince in italy , being much stronger then them all both in land and sea-forces ; the pisans cause was generally well wish'd unto ; the florentines were but little acceptable to the rest of the princes of italy , by reason of their friendship with the french , and for this and other respects were particularly much hated by their neighbors , the genoeses , seneses , and lucheses , and all the actions of the commonwealth seemed to be favored by a certain genius . she had lately gotten the kingdom of cyprus ; she had enlarged her confines in friuli , by the acquisition of many towns in the country of go●itia ; and she prospered greatly in all that she took in hand , and won much honor . so as in this happy conjunction , the venetians ought not to abandon their good fortune , lest they might too late repent for not having known how to make good use of their prosperity . they were to be ruled by the example of things past : for having oftentimes let s●ip many opportune occasions of increasing their dominion by land , whilst their enemies were but weak and not well setled in their states , the like enterprises being by them undertaken afterwards in a less convenient time , proved more difficult unto them . others thought , that for the like reasons the venetians should have forborne to meddle with the affairs of pisa ; for ( said they ) the city was so situated , as it could not be defended by them without much expence and inconvenience , they being to take a long compass about the sea before they could furnish it with things necessary , and then the city it self was not so great a purchase , as deserved so much labor to purchase it . they added moreover , that at the same time , the friends of the other princes did much envy the commonwealth for her great prosperity ; so as it had better become the wisdom of that senate to endeavour by concealing their thoughts of aspiring to greater things , to allay this envy , then further to increase it , as they did by attempting so great a novelty . no doubt but those wise senators who sate then at the helm of government , did reflect upon these doubts and suspitions ; but it is to be believed that they were easily free of them , considering that the commonwealth , when she was not yet so powerful nor strong , had undertaken many difficult , but glorious enterprises in parts far off , and had gotten notable victories against the sara●ens , who were then very strong both by sea and land , and had placed trophies of singular worth , and great zeal to religion , in the holy land ; that she had many times taken up arms in the behalf of the emperors of constantinople , against divers other potentates , and upon occasions , had reduced many cities into her power , which had formerly belonged to that empire ; and that likewise she had for many years maintained sharp wars against the genoeses , and had put a period to many other gallant affairs by apparent victories : so as they thought that the commonwealth had reason to promise herself good success in this her noble design of taking upon her the defence of pisa , and of the affairs of tuscany . wherefore then ought they to distrust that the commonwealth might keep the city of pisa at her devotion , in times when her power and authority was much increased , and being accommodated with so many ships and gallies which were usually upon the sea , and having the island of corfu in the gulfs mouth , to receive the ships in the mid-way which sailed from the one sea to the other ? but on the contrary , who does not know how very opportune this situation was for many other things , and of what use for the commonwealth ? their having got footing in tuscany , might , according as occasions should be offered , open them the way to greater acquisitions ; and the haven of ligorn was extreamly commodious for the navigation and traffick which the city of venice holds with the western provinces : which may the better be known now , for that since the affairs which had wont to be transacted in the east , being now turn'd to the west , ships which come from thence laden with sundry sorts of merchandise , putting into the haven of ligorn , to shun further navigation , do there unload themselves , from whence their loading is afterwards brought by land to venice . so as it seems those wise senators did even then foresee what high esteem was to be put upon that situation . but their desires have at least prevailed thus far , as that this country is possest by very wise princes , who are great friends to the commonwealth ; with whom an excellent intelligence being held , as hath been of late , and as it is to be hoped it will be for time to come , commerce will always be open , safe , and free in those countries . so as no reason can perswade , that the fear of being envied by other princes , should keep the venetians from attempting so beneficial a thing : for if these thoughts ( which ought not to be admitted of by any generous prince ) should have been sufficient to have stopped the course of the commonwealths good fortune , she must not only have abstained from this , but from other enterprises ; and so her dominion and fame would have been shut up within her own washes , if that peradventure might have been permitted them . it was therefore necessary for the preservation of themselves , and of their liberty , to provide themselves of sufficient forces ( which cannot be had without territories ) to resist such as would offend them ; for the keeping of others well-affected , is not sufficient to keep off injuries . but war is not alwaies made out of fear of another princes power , and with a mind to secure ones self therefrom , but most commonly out of contempt , and out of a beleef of being able easily to effect what you undertake against them ; and envy is oftentimes more supprest in the very height of good fortune , when a mans condition is raised much above that of others , then when it is kept within common and usual precincts . but what princes envy ought the commonwealth to have feared ? if you will say any transalpin princes , they had not as then any such firm footing in italy , nor so ready forces , nor peradventure had they their thoughts so interessed , as that they were to make war upon that account with the venetians ; if you mean italian princes , every one of them were weaker then the commonwealth , and the diversity of their ends and interests would be sure to keep them from joyning together . nor was it likely that they would conspire with greater princes against the venetians , since it became all of them to apprehend forein forces , lest they might all suffer in a common ruine . and if it be said , that notwithstanding it fell out so afterwards , as was seen by the league of cambray which proved so pernicious to the common-wealth , it may be answered , that things are not done ( especially among princes ) as reason would perswade ; and no certain judgment can be given of actions wherein fancy reigns . but let it be said , that the condition of things , times and respects , were altered by reason of many much differing accidents and actions , when these more heavy wars began ; but chiefly , because the french being become more powerful in italy , by their acquisition of the state of milan , and more desirous of subduing her , they resolved to leave nothing unattempted , which might bring this their design to effect ; so as it was from hence that all the troubles and dangers came upon the commonwealth , whereas she ought rather to have expected thanks , and good offices from the crown of france ; so as peradventure there may be more reason to blame the commonwealth for having called the king of france into italy , had she been thereunto moved out of a desire of inlarging her dominions , and had not been thereunto compelled by the fraud and insufferable insolencies of lodovico sforza , to suppress the which she was inforced to have recourse to forein forces , which afterwards turned themselves upon herself . but in the defence of pisa things were otherwise ; the end was very honest , for the business was to comfort the oppressed , not to oppress others ; and enterprise which was to be approved of for the common welfare of all the italians , whereby they onely were weakened , who favored the affairs of forein princes . the reward , if the war succeeded well , was very great , for it made much for the advantage and reputation , especally at that time , of having the city of pisa either her subject , friend , dependant , or confederate . the third discourse ▪ that the commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate successes of war , after the routing of the venetian army in the action of giaradada . he who hath sought out an occasion to blame the commonwealth of venice , out of envy to her glory , and particularly to the excellency of her government , falling upon the times of her greatnest misfortunes , says , that when by her unfortunate success at the rout of giaradada she lost her state by land , she witnessed that there was neither worth , nor strength , nor power in her orders to govern an empire ; and that she had had her increase , and had to this day maintained her greatness , more out of a certain appearance , and opinion , then by any excellency of power of counsel . i find these things written in some authors , but chiefly amplified and affirmed by nicholas machiavel , a name which hath formerly been very famous for the curiosity of the matter which he took upon him to write on in his discourse ▪ but it is now so condemned to perpetual oblivion by the holy apostolick sea , as it is not lawful to name him . the misfortunes which the commonwealth underwent in those days were certainly very great , but such notwithstanding as ought rather to move compassion in all mens minds , and shew the instability of humane affairs , then to afford matter of blame , and further oppression . it is said that the imperfection of the common-wealth was discovered by these publick adversities ; and ( that i may give the very words of some men ) that there was no true worth or excellency in her orders ; yet prove they not this by any other reason then what is taken from the action it self , to wit , because she lost the day to the french , and that by the loss thereof the publick affairs were brought into exceeding great danger . but he who shall penetrate more inwardly into the truth of these things , will not rest satisfied with this judgement , framed rather from the event then out of any reason , and will speak much otherwise , and will take many other things into consideration , before he give his judgement . and if we will by this our discourse penetrate into the more inward considerations , we shall find that the form of government is as it were the soul which gives a true being to a city . for a multitude of men assembled together could not have whereof to live , nor would their place of habitation deserve the name of a city , were it not for certain orders and laws . but as the sensitive soul , which informs the animated body , cannot always make equal use of all her sundry powers and faculties ; for though she preserve her self in her own purity , and perfection , yet needing the parts of the body , and ex●rinsecal objects for her operations , she must oft times cease operating , and sometime produc●th imperfect operations ; so will it happen in a city , that though the form of government , which is as it were the soul thereof , be of it self very vigorous and perfect , yet can it not always , nor in all things shew its force and excellency , by reason of the need it stands in of instruments , and by its encountring with many extrinsecal accidents , so as it must sometimes rest wholly idle , and other sometimes do but little good by its operating ; whence i infer , that though a city be exceedingly well ordered for civil and military affairs , yet cannot she promise herself to enjoy peace long , nor long to keep herself in one and the same condition save onely as long as she shal be permitted so to do by the condition of other things , which are out of the legislators power . so likewise the adverse fortune of a commonwealth or kingdom , which may depend upon so many other occasions , is not sufficient to infer , that such states are ill ordered : but rather as he may deserve the name of a good orator , who handles his cause so as he does perswade handsomly , though he he do not always attain his end ; so ought not the legislator to be accounted less wise , nor those laws less good , by which the government is well regulated as touching peace , and the preservation of the city or state , though various accidents may produce the contrary effects . these reasons and examples do cleerly shew , how ill-grounded those oppositions are , by which , without any consideration of so many other circumstances , men will conclude that the orders of the commonwealth of venice were weak , and of no worth , because her army was worsted in the battel of geradada ; and because after that rout , the loss of the state , and so many other great losses did ensue . it is not the event , but the counsel by which things are done , which ought to give the true praise or blame to our actions . let us then see in this case which we are now upon , what the counsels were , what the hopes , what the condition of times were , and of princes , and let us look into other such circumstances , and then we shall be able to give a better judgment . the times are three ; and the affairs which upon this occasion may fall under our consideration , are of three sorts ; to wit , such as did precede the action , those wherewith it was accompanied , and those which followed after . the commonwealth , before this unfortunate accident fell out , was not only in a very prosperous condition , by reason of her happy success in the last war against the emperor maximilian , but also ( as it was thought ) in a condition of much safety , being joined in league and amity with the powerful king of france , when unexpectedly she understood that almost all the princes of christendom had conspired against her ; and almost at the same time she heard that the king of france had denounced war against her . where will you find a mind so constant ; as will not be much disturbed at such an advertisement as this ? the affection must needs be moved at the novelty of the action , and reason troubled by the greatness thereof . what had the venetian senate reason to fear at this time less then this ? the king of france , in league , friendship and confederacie with the commonwealth for many years , out of observancie whereunto the venetians had not only refused friendship with caesar , which was offer'd them with so much advantage to themselvs , but had taken up arms to defend and preserve for that king , their friend and confederate , the state of milan ; little mindful of such a service , ( as the usual affections of other men are seldom found amongst princes ) conspires her ruine , and tu●ns those arms against her , which through their friendship were grown so powerful in italy . what should move him thereunto ? not desire of revenge ; for there appeared no injury : not any fear of his own affairs ; for he had found them already very constant unto them : no self-interest ; for he ought to have been jealous of caesars greatness , who had been his perpetual enemy , and to have wished well unto the venetians , who had been his antient friends . but what shall i say of the rest ? had not caesar the like obligations to the venetians , as the king of france had , which should have kept him from such a confederacie ? nay , had he not peculiar respects which counsell'd him to the contrary ? the injuries which the french had done to the empire ; the king of france his particular hatred to him ; the high aspiring thoughts of that king , pernicious to the dignity of the empire ▪ and to the german liberty . wherefore as he could never promise himself safe and firm friendship from the french , so be ought rather to have obviated their power , then have help'd to advance it . but who could have expected that such an action should have proceeded from the admired wisdom of ferdinand king of spain , so unusual , and so harmful to himself , by reason of the prejudice and danger which he was to receive , in not preserving the state which he had won in the kingdom of naples in peace and quiet ? for which cause , the greatness of the french , their fidelity , and natural desire of novelty ought to have been ●●spected by him ; yet he assented to the increase of their power , and of his own danger . but how did those generous thoughts which pope iulius the second seemed to bear to the greatness and liberty of italy , correspond with his joining in confederacie with the transa●pine princes who went about to oppress her by the ruine of that commonwealth , which was confest by all men to be at that time the maintainer of the glory of italy , and the hope that she might again rise to her antient greatness and reputation ? what safety could the apostolick sea expect , by increasing the power of those princes in italy , who were great of themselves , whom he feared , and upon whose authority he foresaw the popes of rome must depend ? these certainly were such things as did transcend whatsoever could have faln into the imagination of the venetian senators , or of any other men how wise soever : nor was the immensity of the danger less , nor less able to molest and confound the minds of those who were to prepare for resistance against so great a war. the king of france his forces were of themselves very powerful , that kingdom being then more flourishing then it had been for many years before ▪ and become more formidable by the possession which the french had got of the dukedom of milan , which afforded them mighty conveniencies to assault the co●fines of the common-wealth . and though caesars forces were not of themselves greatly considerable , yet were they increased by the fame he gave out , that he led his army into italy to make a certain and noble prey thereof , and with a mind to restore the empire to its almost lost greatness , whereby he reconciled the mindes of the german princes and people , and got them to joyn their forces with his . moreover , the king of spains naval preparation was in particular to be feared ; to prevent the which , those sea-forces of the commonwealth were to be imployed , which should all of them have been imployed in defending the state by land from so fierce an assault . the pope added no small reputation to the league by his authority ; and his spiritual arms being accompanied with temporal forces , became the more dreadful . and though the other petty princes forces were but small , yet was their will to offend the commonwealth great ; and the kings of england , poland , and hungary were sought unto and sollicited by all these together to join with them , and to declare enmity to the venetians . if then the venetians had yielded to this so new and great preparation for war , which like thunder made both its noise and harm be heard and felt at once , what could have been said unto them ? ought not they to have been judged worthy of excuse , and their commonwealth free from the imputation that their orders were no ways good ? for as an object of immensurable force does not move , but corrupt the sense ; so the encountring with so weighty a conspiracie , was a thing not likely to incite the commonwealth to shew her vertue , but rather to disorder and to confound her . yet it is seen how she behaved herself upon such an occasion ; and whether it may be inferred from these her first counsels , as from a thing that was in her own power , that she was not worth much , or that she did any thing unworthy of herself , of her fame , or of the reputation which she held amongst other potent princes of that age. what appearance was there in her of any fear , or rather what greater sign could be desired in her of generous confidence and most noble daring ? what did she resolve to yield up of free-will ? what noise , what complaints were heard , which shewed that she would terminate that contention with vain words , which could not be ended but with arms ? the answer which was given to the french herald who came to denounce unto them , that the king was upon his march in arms against the commonwealth , was onely , that that war was intimated them from the king , when they had more reason to expect amity and peace from him ; but that they would not be wanting to their own defence , being confident that they should be able to defend themselves by their own forces , and through the right of their cause . the effects were answerable to their words ; for they betook themselves forthwith to provide for so great a war. the most expert commanders were sent for from all parts , veteran soldiers mustered in all places , in so great numbers , and so qualified , as it was agreed upon by the common consent of all , that neither that age , nor any other , for many years before had seen such an army of meer italians in italy . great and very miraculous was the union and concord both in the senate and city , wherewith men of all conditions and ages to lend their helping hand to assist their country at so great a need . there appeared so great a zeal in every one to the common good , such resolution to maintain the state and liberty of the commonwealth even to the last gasp , as those who have appeared to be no very good friends to the venetians in other things , do praise these proceedings , being forced so to do by the power of truth . but let us come to those other things which accompany the action it self ; the senate upon mature advice , resolved wisely how that war was to be managed ; they knew the enemy was very strong , the danger great , and that the wel●are of the commonwealth depended upon the preservation of that army which they had now got together . but as it would be a great rashness to hazard it upon a battel , so to keep it onely to be a safeguard to the city , shewed timorousness in them , would discourage their men , and increase the courage and reputation of the enemy . whilst they bethought themselves what to do in this great exigencie to evade both these inconveniencies , the senate ordered their commanders to march with their army to those confines of the state of milan where the enemy should appear to be likely to make their first assaults ; to the end that following their army in near , but safe quarters , and that keeping them still incommodated , and in jealousie and fear of being assaulted , they might keep them from advancing further , and from falling upon any enterprise . the commonwealths army was very strong in horse , amounting to the number of ten thousand ; and in foot , to boot with a great number of soldiers of their own country , commanded by their own orders , they had twelve thousand veteran soldiers , under experienced famous commanders , together with a great train of artillery , and all other instruments for war ; so as the senate had reason to beleeve , that they might effect their e●ds of maintaining the war , and of keeping the field ; and so spinning out time ( as it becomes those who are upon the defensive part , and find themselves to be the weaker ) secure their own affairs , and keep further dangers from them . for it oftentimes falls out through various accidents , that the greater armies be , they do so much the more easily moulder away of themselves ; and the forces of many several princes , though they be at first great and formidable , prove less fit for great enterprises , by reason of the colleagues different ends and interests . and as learned physitians use no strong and violent remedies when the sick party hath but some grudgings of an ague , and when the disease is not yet well known ; so these wise senators were of opinion , that the commonwealth being set upon and almost opprest by the sudden violence of so many enemies , it made not for their welfare and safety , to come to the violent remedy of a pitcht field , with enemies whose strength was not yet very well known . together with these reasons , the venetian senate had for their example the success of the commonwealth of rome , which finding her self assailed by powerful carthaginian forces , and her affairs being reduced to a great streight , preserved themselves from greater danger , by drawing out the war at length , and by keeping the enemy incommodated ; but the venetians had not a fabius maximus for their commander in chief , as the french had an hannibal , for there were many of those vertues in lodowick king of france , which were praised in hannibal ; chiefly a mighty thirst after glory , to purchase which he valued neither labor nor danger . ●ut alvian● a famous and cried up comm●nder , not more for his own worth , then for this misfortune of the venetians , was of a nature much contrary to that of fabius , in knowing how to make advantage of time ; and though he had many other noble qualities , as greatness of spirit in undertakings , unda●nted courage in executing what he undertook , and great experience in matter of war ; yet were these vertues little advantagious for the present occasion ; better befitting a commander who was to assist a puissant prince , desirous of glory , and in his most prosperous times , then a commonwealth , which not making use so much of force , as of occasion , was slowly , but safely arrived at that greatness , and which was now , more then formerly to proceed by the like counsels . but it may peradventure be said , that the venetian army wanted not a fabius , having nicolo orsino , count of pitigliano , who in his other actions may be truly said to resemble fabius very much , for he alwaies proceeded with the slowest and safest advices ; but in this he appeared much different , and inferior to him , since he would not succour alviano , who contrary to his order had given battel , as did fabius maximus , who readily succoured quintus minutius , chief commander of the cavalry , though contrary to his opinion he had rashly exposed himself , and part of the army to the danger of battel . but on the contrary , lodowick , king of france , was not onely like hannibal , but did much exceed him ; for hannibal knew onely how to overcome , but knew not how to make use of victory , having spent much time to little purpose , after the rout given to the romans at cannae ; but lodowick pursuing the victory , stopt not till he had regained all that he pretended unto from the state of venice . but the forces of the commonwealth did either prove less valiant , and less fortunate then formerly they had done , or else they were hurried by some occult cause upon this calamity . yet can it not be said that the senates advice was less good , who in their orders to their commanders , did alwaies lay before them the importance of the business with express and particular command to shun the necessity of joyning battel with the enemy . those prudent senators knew very well that that army was not to be hazarded upon the dubious event of battel , wherein consisted all the hopes of preserving her state by land , and that the condition of affairs were such on their side , that if they came to the trial of a battel , it must be upon too much disadvantage . the war was made at their own doors , so as if the enemy should prove victorious , the conquer'd party could not have time to rally or recruit themselves , for preservation of their own affairs ; but if the french army had been overcome , the war would not notwithstanding be at an end , the forces of the other colleagues remaining still intire : which were likelier to be ru●ned by their own disorders , and by the discords which use to happen in leagues , then by force of arms , which could not be made use of without danger . the bad advice of some commanders , or else some fatal adversity of the commonwealth would not permit that this advantage of time should be waited for ; whereupon they came to the conflict , not onely contrary to the so many aforementioned respects , but uppon such disadvantage , as with but half their forces they hazarded the whole fortune of the commonwealth . how valiantly they fought is witnessed by the general consent of all men , nor do the victorious enemies deny but that the victory was a good while doubtful ; but a few not being able longer to resist a much greater number , that notable rout ensued which drew after it so many losses and ruines ; for the french forces did not more secure the way to their army in all places , and facilitate their undertakings , then did the reputation of their victory . amidst so great amazement and astonishment , nothing was left unattempted by luigi gritti , and christofero moro , who were the provedatori del campo , to uphold the commonwealths fading fortune : they betook themselves to rally the remainder of the army , they comforted the captains and soldiers with hope of better success ; they intreated the nobility and people of brescia , and of other cities , that being mindful of their , loyalties , and of other things done in service to the commonwealth , in former wars had with philip maria visconte , they would be like themselves , and with like constancy keep themselves under the moderate command of the venetians , and abhorring the severe transalpine dominion , they would with one onely inconvenience free themselves from many grievous mischiefs . but they were all so possest with a panick fear , as no entreaties nor reason could be listned unto ; those who had escaped the battel , were unfit either for strength or valor , to attempt any thing against the enemy , no disposition to defence was found in the city , no not so much as to keep themselves from plunder ; there were but few forts at that time in the state , and those few of no condition of holding out long . what was then to be done ? to whom was any recourse to be had ? if all princes and countries were become enemies , who were to be trusted ? if all memory of former benefits were laid aside , so as least gratitude was found in those who had been most obliged , how could new men be raised , and provisions made for a new war ? the armed enemy was already at the gates , nay , even within their houses , threatning assured ruine . what was to be done in such a general dispait , but to give way and suffer the cloud to pass , which they saw there was neither wit nor counsel sufficient to withstand ? and as sometimes it falls out in greatest tempests , that the skill and labor of the marriners being overcome by the malignity of the weather , they take down their sails and suffer the ship to drive up and down whithersoever the sea carries it ; so in cases of greatest danger , into which states do sometimes fall , he that sits at the helm must comply with his fortune be it never so bad , till the fury of those tempests being past over , the commonwealth , though born down , yet not quite sunk , may rise again , and make way for her pristine greatness . the army being then to retreat , and the loss of the city drawing other losses after it , as one stone that gives against another , it was thought the best course to free the people from their former oathes , so to preserve them from sacking and plunder , which they must have undergone , if they should maintain their loyalties , and to free themselves from the tax of rebellion , if they should submit to the enemy . such a resolution might appear willing , and therefore less generous , but it was really necessary ; prejudicial to him who doth consider meerly the present condition of things , but which might prove useful in the future : at first sight , it appeared to proceed from rashness and fear , and yet it proceeded from wisdom , from charity , and in respect to the good of the state , and of the subjects . the piety nor prudence of the senate could not admit of the onely hope which was offered in this sad condition of times , to be used for withstanding so many enemies , wherefore the venetians did magnanimously refuse those helps , and assistances , which were offered them by the turks ; though but little before ( as some writers affirm ) they had been very much sought unto by other christian princes , as by frederick of aragon , and lodovic●● sforza , for the defence of their dominions ; and not long after by the emperor maximilian , to be made use of against the venetians , but neither did the justly conceived anger against so many conspiring princes , nor the desire of recovering what was lost , prevail with those most wise and religious men , but that it was over-born with the zeal of religion , and with a firm resolution of preserving the glory of their other atchievements against the infidels , immaculate ▪ neither would the reason of state , if well-understood , considered in the example of others , suffer them so to do ; and especially in the unfortunate success of the emperors of constantinople , who having unadvisedly call'd in to their assistance the ottoman princes , who were much more powerful then they , had drawn a greater ruine upon themselves , which proved the occasion of the fall of that empire . but being unwilling notwithstanding to give over all hopes of accommodating the afflicted condition of affairs with some ease , the senate resolved to have recourse to the pope , and to caesar , ( though they had then appeared their bitter enemies ) to treat of some agreement . they were moved much hereunto by the respect and reverence due to that holy see , and the pious and religious apprehension they had of ecclesiastical censures , to which they were subject ; and they trusted more in prevailing with caesar , then with the king of france : for what hopes were there to do any good by intreaties with him , who being first bound to the common-wealth by obligation and confederacie , had spurn'd at all those respects out of meer desire of novelties ? to these then they granted all that they pretended unto ; for being to make them quickly jealous of the king of france his greatness , they knew some way would be found out for the commonwealths better fortune . but how is it possible to pass over here in silence another thing , not at all differing from this , by which such base aspersions have been endeavored to be cast upon the venetians ; since by this our present discourse we go about to vindicate them , by searching into the truth ? we read in guicchiardine , a modern , and to give him his due , in many things an excellent historian , an oration published by him in the name of antonio iustiniano , sent by the commonwealth to caesar ; wherein it is said , that the venetians begging pardon at caesars hand , with much subjection and servility of mind , did offer to submit the commonwealth to be perpetually tributary to the empire , and to acknowledg to hold their liberty , lives and livelihood from him : with some other base unworthy expressions , not only not true , but not likely to be so . for first , it is very certain , that iustinian being sent ambassador to maximilian , and finding him at trent , was never admitted to have audience , peradventure for fear of offending the confederates , and making of them jealous . then , it is most certain that the senate gave no such commission : and let him who will not believe it , listen but to reason , and then he will be perswaded to the contrary . the commonwealth had then lost all her territories by land ; but at the same time she enjoyed all her state by sea , wherein were not only one or two cities , but divers provinces and noble kingdoms ; their naval accoutrements were very great , and equal , if not superior to those of whatsoever potentate at that time ; all entire and whole , not having suffered any thing by this thunder of war , which had only overrun their terra firma : their treasure but little diminished from what it was at the begining of this war , which continued afterwards , and was maintained for the space of many years : the city of venice , placed by her miraculous situation in compleat safety , all attempts which could be made against it being to prove rash and vain , as the effects proved afterwards : a great train of artillery , and of all things requisite for war ; a quiet people , and obedient at the beck of their nobility ; and a constant and resolute mind in all the nobles to demonstrate all the proofs of worth and love towards their country . but that which followed afterwards in their defence of the city of padua against the forces of all the princes of the league , will suffice to prove , that the commonwealth was not so weak either in counsel or in power , as to have recourse to th●● last extremity of making that ci●y tributary , which had maintained her first freedom for above the space of a thousand years . say , i beseech you , was not the commonwealth powerful by sea , and sufficiently valued by all other potentates , before she had any state in terra firma ? nay , she was oft-times seen to neglect occasions which were offered of making acquisitious in terra firma , thinking her self safe and powerful enough without them what was it then which could move them to make themselves servants and subjects , who had no reason to doubt not onely their liberty , but nor their chiefest , most antient , and most proper dominion , which was that of the sea , for the preservation whereof , as affairs stood then , they had no reason to make such haste to caesar for friendship ? who can with reason blame the advice , as the condition of things went then , of giving and yeelding that up to maximilian which could not as then be kept from him ; to wit , some of those cities in terra firma which he pretended right unto ; since some agreement ensuing with him by such concessions , and injuries ceasing on that part , the way might be opened to straiter , and more particular and advantagious conventions with the same caesar , who was naturally desirous of novelties , whereby the fortune of the commonwealth was again to be raised up . and this counsel tried afterwards with others had good success , when they joyned in a new confederacy with the same french against maximilian , who scorning their fr●endship , would not listen to their propositions . these were the counsels , these the actions of the venetians , from whence , some would take occasion to detract from the praise and dignity of their commonwealth , and particularly from the excellency of their government . but we may better know how injuriously this blemish is laid upon them , if we will examine how other princes and states did behave themselves , when they were in like adversity ; which i do not alleage as taxing any one , but to shew the usual course of affairs , by the example of others . observe what art the king of aragon used to preserve his state , when charls the eighth , king of france came against them in hostile manner . alphonso who possest the kingdom , having tried the extremity of fear before the danger grew near , out of the meer report of the french forces , departed from naples , leaving all things at six and sevens , whilst their army was yet in rome ; and alphonso the son , who had boasted that he would defend himself , and to that purpose had mustered a great many soldiers , retired with them into the narrow passes of the kingdom , without making any triall either of his fortune or of his valor , and yeelding rather to the fame , then to the forces of the enemy , suffered them to take free and quiet possession of that most noble kingdom . but frederick of aragon , who was reinvested in his state , by the favor of the people , and by the assistance of other princes , with which the venetians did readily joyn , what use did he make of other mens labors , and of his own fortune ? soon after the kingdom of naples was assaulted , by lodowick king of france , and by ferdinando king of spain , at which assault being much discouraged , he would not l● sten to the advice of his commanders , who advised him to keep the field , but made some slender provisions for the towns , and soon after , thinking more how to escape , then how to defend himself , he fled into ischia , and went from thence into france , and put himself into the power of the same king his enemy , contenting himself rather to live a private man in peace and safety , then to reign in trouble and danger . but what shall we ●ay of the french , who boast so much of their valor , and glory in war ? how easily when they met with the first misfortune , did they suffer themselves to be bereft of all they had before so happily acquired in the kingdom of naples ? and that so hastily , as it seemed that they had freely yeeled up the possession of so many , and so noble cities to the victors , the spainards , by agreement , and as it were in reward for the day which they had won . nor is this the onely example ; since we have seen the same french , who were faln with such fervency with their forces into italy , and had with miraculous prosperity recovered the state of milan but a little before , resolve suddenly to forgo all that they had won , and to retreat to beyond the mountains , after the ro●● which they had received from the swizzers at novara ; the succour which they met withal by the way as they fled , not being able to make them halt . who was more famous then for dexterity of wit for the managing of weighty affairs , then lodorica sforza duke of milan ? yet when a great deluge of war came upon him , what use could he make of all his artifices ? could he shew that constancy and generosity which he had many times before publickly boasted of ? the onely news of the league made against him , by lodowick king of france , and by the venetians , did so astonish him , as losing all understanding , and leaving his affairs unprovided for , he resolved at very first , upon what ought to have been his last and most desperate advice , to fly into germany , foregoing the defence of that state , which being once lost , he did afterwards in vain seek to recover . but in this point i may help my self in looking a little more backward , and trying whether the gallantry of the antients , so much commended , did produce other effects then those that i have spoken of . the romans , who conquered the whole world , met sometimes with adverse fortune , wherein let us see how they behaved themselves ; for he is very timerous who is not bold and generous in prosperous affairs . in what peril and hazard did brennus● prince , and commander of the galli senones put the city of rome after the defeat given to the roman army , under the unfortunate conduct of the fabii ? no man thought of making any defence , but sought how to save himself and the best things he had , in the capitol ; their houses , and walls were abandoned , and the very gates left open to the enemy by the roman soldiers , who fled into the city to save themselves ; and had not the good genius of that commonwealth , which was preserved for greater things sent carius camillus to succour it , the rising glory of the romans had even then been exst●●ct . but what shall we say of things that happened afterwards , when their fame grew greater ? did not the romans lose possession of all italy , after the rout given them by hannibal at cannae ? did not the cities belonging to their friends and confederates rebel every where ? and did not they themselves give over all hopes of defending them ? the resolutions taken by the souldiers , shewed what the ●●ight , what the fear of the conquered was . for some , whilst they were yet in their own houses , rendred themselves prisoners to the conquerors ; others withdrew to the sea side , intending if they could have the benefit of shipping , to go to some other prince , and seek out a new country : but with what despair the citizens of rome were possest , when they heard the news of this misfortune , in how great confusion all their orders were , may be conceived by what livy relates , who undertook not onely to write the history of the commonwealth , but to celebrate with perpetual praise the fame and merit of her citizens . and it was credibly bel●eved ( for as much as we hear ) that those valiant men , unaccustomed to know what fear was , were strucken with such amazement , as if hannibal had known as well how to make use of victory , as he did to overcome , the so great , and so long continued fortune of rome , had not onely been hereby interrupted , but totally supprest . and these very self●same carthaginians , who had so long , and so sto●●●y conte●●ed for glory , with their rival , the commonwealth of rome , when they tasted of adverse fortune , went astray from their former generosity , and suffered themselves to be born down by extremity of despair , for after the defeat which they had received by sea by the romans , they inclined to yeeld up unto them the islands of sicily , and sardi●ia , and to make themselves 〈◊〉 for ever to the senate and people of rome , and afterward being overcome in battel by scipio affricanus , they fell to find 〈◊〉 , but why do i instance in so many examples ? are not these sufficient to prove , that the valiantest and wisest men are strangely te●●ified at great and unexpected misfortunes ; and that when armies are lost , which are the instruments whereby states preserve themselves from the evils of war , good counsels must cease , as not able to keep off other greater evils which do usually follow after that a battel is lost . therefore out of the above-mentioned reasons , and by what hath been done by others upon like accidents , every one may be cleerly satisfied , that the misfortune which the state of venice underwent by reason of the ill-fought battel of giaradada , ought not to detract any thing from her other praises : for her subsequent actions , by which with singular constancie and generosity she recovered what she had lost , render her by the joint consent of all men truly glorious . the fourth discourse . whether the princes of italy did well , or no , to assault the army of charls the eight , king of france , when after having gotten the kingdom of naples , he hasted to pass over the mountains . amongst those things of sad remembrance to italy , the passage of charls the eight , king of france , to the conquest of the kingdom of naples , may be numbred amongst the saddest , and most recent : for ever since that time , the transalpine nations have had a power in italy ; and the greatness of the italian name , which began at that time to be raised up again with hopes of greater glory , all the parts of italy being under the command of our italian princes , return'd to such a declination by this blow , as it could never since recover its pristine majesty . but that which most afflicts the minds of those who are any ways generous , is to think , that this most noble country fell into such misfortunes through the fault of her own men ; and that the italian princes , to satisfie their own disordinate desires and immoderate ambition , did call in forein nations to the prejudice of italy ; and little valuing the truer and greater dangers , they stood basely looking on , and suffer'd this their common country to be rent in peeces by foreiners . the french forces did at this time pass into italy , by which she had not for a long time been molested , being called in by lodovick sforza , and maintained by other italians : but ere long they were all aware of their ill-taken counsel , being touched by the danger more at hand , by rearon of the french-mens great felicity ; which as it might have been foreseen further off , so was it not now so easily to be remedied . they therefore joined all of them together afterwards in confederacie for the safety of italy , and to oppose king charls his designs : so as after the acquisition of naples , as he would return into france by the same way which he had come in , with his army , which was notwithstanding much less numerous in men , he was opposed by the army of the confederate princes , as he came to the banks of tarus , who meant to hinder his passage , and to fight his army . for a little before , the pope , the king of the romans , the king of spain , the commonwealth of venice , and the duke of milan had joined in confederacie to this purpose ; the venetians hav●ng been the first mo●ioners thereof , and express ambassadors from all the aforesaid princes had met in venice , where the league was concluded and published . this resolution was at those times generally commended , as being ge●erous , and suiting with the honor of italy : but notwithstanding , there wanted not those then who desired they had been more moderate ; nor will it be now from the purpose to examine this business , so to draw some secure document for times to come by a diligent examination of the things done , and to know whether they were really such as deserve praise and imitation , or whether there was any thing more to be desired therein : for they appear to be attended with that wisdom , without which no action , though perchance it may have good success , deserves either to be praised or imitated by wise men . the taking up of arms to drive the french out of italy , was doubtless a resolution as much to be commenped in the italian princes , as some of them were blamed for calling of them in , and others for assisting them to the common shame and prejudice . but how these arms were to be made use of against them , and whether it was well done to hinder them when they were marching away , and to stop their passage , and force both the french and themselv●s to come to a battel , is somwhat a difficult case , and which may admit of divers considerations . it is an antient and approved proverb , that a bridg of gold ought to be made for an enemy that flies . and this is grounded upon solid reasons ; for no battel can be fought without much hazard and uncertainty of success , since there may happen many unthought of accidents , wherein the use of wisdom is excluded . therefore where to join battel is to be thought a good advice , the condition of affairs must be such , as that a man be not necessitated thereunto , but makes it his choice , and comes to it with greater hopes of overcoming , then fear of being worsted ; and likewise the advantage must be more that is to be expected from the victory , then the prejudice which depends upon the loss thereof . by thus measuring the carriage of these affairs by these rules , we may the better know what judgment to give thereof . if we consider the state of affairs before the armies drew near , there appears no necessity of fighting at that time : for the king of france led his men back over the mountains to their own homes , without prejudice or injury to any one ; so as the meeting him to stop his passage , and give him battel , proceeded from election , and from the determinate counsel of the princes that were confederates against him : but what the end of the combat was like to be , and how the business was ballanced , might be guess'd at by many particulars , before a stroke was struck . the king of france led along with him an army consisting of french and switzers ; the former excellent for the horse-militia , and the latter excellently well disciplin'd in foot-service : so as the italian militia was confess'd by all men to be far inferior to both these ; for they had wholly lost all their antient excellent institutions , and had wanted true discipline for many years , being by foremers bereft of their antient military glory . but the much different impressions which were in the soldiers themselves , was of great importance upon this occasion . the french were haughty , and puffed up by their success at naples ; they slighted the enemy , their very name seeming to have infused so much terror into all the italians , as that neither princes nor people had dared to oppose them , but afforded them free and safe passage every where . on the contrary , the italians accustomed only to such wars as were made in italy , wherein little valor was shewen , and less discipline , without almost any loss of blood , as if it were for meer shew and sport , were to fear the unusual encounter with the french , and to boot with their valor to apprehend their prosperity , which had made the way so easie to them to so great and so noble an acquisition . the kings party was likewise favored by the kings own presence , and the danger which his own person was in ; which occasioned no small daring in the french soldiery , some being thereunto stirr'd up by their natural love to their king , others by hopes of reward , and others for fear of punishment . but of all things else , the diversity of the cause ought to be of greatest moment . for the french had no hopes of safety , save what lay in their arms , being in an enemies country , the way in their return home very difficult , by reason of the craggy mountains though they should meet with no impediment by the enemy ; the army of the colleagues suffered not under the like necessity , for being at its own home , it might be sure upon any adverse fortune to have safe receptacle in every city . moreover , the italians were incited to fight , onely out of a desire of honor , or of revenge , and this was much more in the princes and commanders , then in the common soldier ; which things being well considered , might by reason of what is the usual issue of such actions , cause rather doubt , then hope of victory , if they should come to a day of battel ; or at least might make it appear , that businesses were so equally balanced , and so doubtful , as where there was no inforcing necessity , to pursue a business so full of danger , was not worth the while . we must now consider the advantage , as also the disadvantage which might happen upon the good or bad success of the battel ; which though it be in all affairs doubtful and uncertain , yet out of the aforesaid respects it was now both those in extremity . we will say that the then chief moving cause was , to drive the french army out of italy , and to restore those of aragon to their kingdom , out of which they were driven by k. charls . the confederate princes might in all liklihood have compast this their intention by other more safe , and more secure means . for what disturbance might they meet withal , in the enterprise which they were to endeavor against the french in the very kingdom of naples , from that army which hasted to pass over the mountains , and was to dissolve of it self ? and say that those people should be routed and defeated , should therefore the kingdom of naples be disposed of according to the pleasure of the italian victors ? no certainly , for the king had already left strong garisons there of his best soldiers to secure it . the victory could not be so great , and favorable for the italians , but that they must have lost some of their men ; so as if they had a mind to attempt any thing upon the affairs of naples , it had been better for them to have gone with all their forces upon that enterprise , then to give battel to those , who did not any waies oppose their design , since when they should have overcome them , they were to go with that army , lessened by the battel , and wearied with marching , to the main business of taking the kingdom of naples , where the things offered at by ferdinand would have had easier success if he had entred the kingdom with greater forces , and as he was willingly received by the city of naples , whither he might come at first with those few men he had , so would the rest of the cities willingly have revolted from the french , and have put themselves under the obedience of ferdinand , if they had seen he had forces sufficient to defend himself , and to make good their rebellion . but say that the colleagues would have secured themselves yet better from the french , to the end , that their intentions upon the kingdom of naples might not be hindred or diverted ; had it not been better for them to go with the army of the league to find out monsieur d' orleans , who at the same time had possest himself of the city of novara , to drive him out of italy , together with those of his party who had setled themselves there , then to follow those , who did of themselves that which was most desired by the league ; to wit , hasten back over the mountains ? nay , it may be further said , that unless the french should be necessitated , as seeing their king in danger , as also that army which was pursued by the italians , they would not peradventure have sent at that time more men into italy , and monsieur d'orleans would not have had any occasion to have possest himself of nevara , which did afterwards redound to the great prejudice of the colleagues , and particularly to the business of naples : for part of those forces which were promised and intended to assist ferdinand in the recovery of the kingdom , marched to the recovery of novara , out of desire whereof , lodowick sforza did at last draw himself out of the league . whence it appears , that it was rather revenge , or vain-glory , then any just reason which the princes proposed unto themselves in this their confederacy , that moved them to resolve upon fighting the french army . but let us now consider more particularly , what of advantage , what of good the colleagues might have got , if they had had the better of that battel . the best which they could hope for , for all these their pains and dangers , could be nothing else but the routing of those forces , which were not likely to make war any more in italy ; and the italians had as then no reason to think of any transalpine affairs . it may be the person of the king , who was then in the army , might peradventure be considerable , if he had faln into the power of the colleagues ; but both his life in that hurly burly was exposed to great danger , and say he had been taken prisoner , he might have found many waies how to eseape . and say althings had faln out according to the wish of the colleagues , what would the italians have gotten by having so great a prisoner , but the drawing upon themselves an inundation of foreiners , which would still have put them into greater troubles and dangers ? that warlike nation , which was at this time more then at any other , devoted to their king , would not have sat down by such an indignity , such an injury without revenging it with their own forces , and by drawing other transalpine nations who wished not well to the glory of italy , especially in military affairs to joyn with them . let us see an example of this in what followed the next age after ; where we shall find that the imprisonment of king francis , though taken by so great a prince as was charls the fifth , to whom none of the princes of the league , no not the whole league it self was to be compared , produced nothing , but longer , and more heavy wars , which ended not till the conquerors had yeelded many things to the conquered . but on the contrary , let us imagine into what ruine italy would have faln , if the army of the league had been routed and defeated , the enemy being in the state of milan wherein are so many and so noble cities , for defence whereof there were no other forces on foot , then those which were to hazard themselves in that battel ; and to raise another army which might be able to make head against so powerful enemies , and so victorious , would be a business of some time , and very hard to do if not impossible . and if the very name of the french , and the fame of their forces had made the way to so great a victory easie to them , and so easie the conquest of so noble a kingdom , what mischief had they not reason to expect , if by the discomfeiture of that army , the forces , not onely as formerly , of the kings of aragon , should have been beaten of whole italy , and also such forein forces as could be ready to afford any succor , for in that army were all the soldiers , that the king of spain had in italy ? so as there was not any state which upon such an accident could promise it self security . affairs then standing upon this foot , who can praise the advice taken by the confederates , of fighting the french ? but on the other side there want not other reasons to plead for the honor , wisdom , and maturity of the italians in this action , to boot with that noble daring which can by no means be denied them , it is very likely that the flourishing condition , and prosperity of charls king of france began at that time to make him be hated and suspected not onely by all the italian princes , but also not very acceptable to the king of 〈◊〉 ; insomuch as he who had called him into italy did already repent his rash advice , and he who did not withstand him , blamed himself for his slackness , and irresolution : so as they agreed all together to abate the so great power of that king , and to curb his prosperity , and his thoughts of further achievements . if then the king had been suffered to return without any let , safe and triumphant into his kingdom , was it not to be feared , that the french not content with their having got the kingdom of naples , would pass over the mountains the next year again with greater forces ? to what danger would the dukedom of milan and tuscany have been exposed ? upon which states it was known that the french had set their minds , neither would they have spared the rest , if they had had any opportunity offered them of advancing further . and if the italians should have seemed but to doubt their beating those soldiers , who were but the remainder of an army which had first past the mountains , and ●ad left a good part of their forces in several garrisons in the kingdom of naples , many whereof were likewise dissipated through several accidents ; what hopes had they to withstand their entire , and much greater forces , with which they were to return the next year on this side the mountains to new enterprises ? nor had they any reason to despair of victory , since the colleagues had an army for number of men much grea●er then the enemy , commanded by experienced and valiant officers , well provided both of curasiers and light horse , well disposed to all actions , and which were to fight with people opprest with fear , and who may be said to have almost run away already of themselves ; especially the advantage considered which the assai●a●ts for the most part have . it was further considered , that the french army had done nothing whereby to be dreaded , or to cool the courage of other men ; since the french had not onely not met with any occasion of fighting , but had not so much as seen the face of an enemy ; since the enemy was the rather to apprehend this encounter , for that it was unexpected , they being accustomed to find all passages open , not needing to make their way by the sword . nor was the advantage small which they might promise unto themselves , by beating a victorious army , and a warlike nation , the person of so great a king being also in that army ; wherefore in such a case , the french-mens courage was rather to fail , then to avial them . and it was to be beleeved that the enemies to that crown would the sonner appear against them , as the emperor maximilian , henry king of england , and that ferdinand king of spain would continue the more firm to the italian confederacie . then what courage , or what hope of succour would those french-men have , who were left behind for the defence of the kingdom of naples ? and the city of novara , which though it were back'd with the kings men , who to this purpose kept his army a long time together after the battel , was reduced to so great streights by the colleagues , as the king was compelled to yeed it up upon articles to sforza ; would it not soon have been taken by the sole reputation of the victo●y ? neither would this have been an occasion of dissention ( as afterwards it was ) amongst the colleagues , and which bereft them of the chiefest advantage which that confederacie could hope for . these are the considerations which we may conceive did move those princes to resolve upon following the french army , and to join battel with it . but that which amongst such diversity of reasons seems more answerable to reason , is , that the battel was not occasioned out of an absolute resolution and resolute advice , but happened party out of necessity , both armies being already drawn very near , and partly upon a resolution taken by the commanders upon the very place . but the princes of the leagues truest intention was to necessitate the king of france , when he should see so great a preparation for war to be made against him , to hasten his departure the more , and to enforce him to draw so many more of his men from the k●ngdom of naples , that so he might make his passage the surer . and that the kingdom not having sufficient garisons to defend it , might the more easily fall into the power of the aragoneses , for whom the same colleagues were preparing a fleet by sea to assault it . nor was it judged by the example of things formerly past , that the states of italy were free from the insolencies of the french , unless the pr●nces of italy should either put themselves into a posture of war , or if they should keep their forces far distant from the way whereby the king was to return for france ; since in his former passage to the enterprise of naples , though he was more necessitated to make hast , and ha● greater need of making himself friends more by favor then by force , he had notwithstanding used strange novelties in tuscany , which the florentines did much ●esent . and who could have ascertained that he would not do the l●ke in his return , in all other parts , where meeting with no obstacle , he might meet with opportunity of pleasing himself , or procuring any thing of advantage ? the colleagues seeking to provide for these mischiefs , & rather to shun new inconveniencies , then endeavor to repair their past losses , they thought it the best course that their army should follow that of the kings , so to keep him in perpetual jealousie and suspition , and hinder him if he should make any attempt ; hoping likewise , as they had like to have done , that this was the way to make the king come to some good agreement with them , which had been often endeavored , and not without hopes of good success , even when the camps were very near together . but the colleagues , incited either by the armies being so near together , by the desire of glory , or hope of victory ; or perchance being inforc'd so to do , as it usually falls out when the enemies army is reduced to straight passages , they fought the french ; the commanders of the leagu●s army , were then to have considered , that they had more reason to hope for victorie , then to fear loss in that daies fight , as the effect did in part prove , it being the common opinion , that had not their own men been put into great disorder , by their own light-horse , who fell too soon to pillage the enemies camp , they would have had a full and glorious victory . but though the business should have succeeded otherwise , they knew the state of affairs to be such , as the victory o● the kings behalf could not occasion them those great mischiefs , which upon such an occasion have been considered , the kings forces not being so great when most entire , much less being much weakened by the conflict , as could prove very formidable . such like events may teach us not to attempt such things in which it is hard to resolve , and wherein the profit which may accrue is very doubtful ; nor to bring our selves to such a condition , as the necessity of putting on another resolve , bereaves us of choice . nor will it be a less useful precept for princes , to have a great care , and to be very well advised in chusing their commanders , which are to have the chief imployment in great enterprises ; for if their nature and customs be not conformable to the thoughts and intentions of the prince , it is in vain to give them any instructions or commissions ; for oft-times a resolution is to be put on upon the main concern , wherein a mans natural inclinations may prevail over whatsoever strict command which the commonwealth of venice had experience of particularly in this daies fight , in the marquis of mantua , and some years after with much more danger and damage in bartholomi● d' alviano , at the battel of giaradada ; in both which personages , natural ardor and too vehement a desire of glory , prevailed over the senates wise and moderate counsels . the fifth discourse . whether or no the forces of leagues be fit for great enterprises . amongst those things which fall into discourse when people talk of weighty state affairs , and of war enterprises , one , and a chief one , is that of leagues , and confederacies , in which divers potentates do joyn , either out of some particular design of their own , or for their better securitie , or to abate the power of others . and the weakness of potentates who are wanting in the antient military worth and discipline , hath been the occasion why we read of more examples of such unions , in these latter times , then we have heard of formerly . so as now adaies , as also in some later times past , when any great enterprise is debated upon , recourse is forthwith had to leagues , by means and vertue whereof , it is usually thought , that greater ends may be compassed , then can be hoped for from the peculiar power and vertue of any one onely state ; and chiefly to curb and keep under those forces which do threaten whole christendom with most danger and damage . those who speak in the behalf of these leagues , and who heighten the hopes thereof , use these or the like reasons . first , because reason , & natures self doth teach us , that the multiplication of the force and vertue of the movers , makes the motion the greater , and more powerful ; and that power and perfection which in humane affairs is denied to one alone , is easily found amongst many . there is hard●y any one so weak , or so little befriended by the gifts of nature or fortune , who may not be some help to another , by adding that little which he hath to the much more of the others . this is the cause why in humane actions , and especially in such as are of the nobler sort , the perfectest are those which are most compounded : the best harmonie is composed of differing ●ones of v●yces . the perfectest state governments ( alwaies provided that they be essential and not meer idea's ) are those which being composed of the three best , do comprehend the perfections of all the three ; and it is easie to observe the like in many other things . and aristotle , when he would shew the perfection which proceeds in every thing from this concourse and union of many , doth instance in the example well known in those times of publick banquets and entertainments , where those wherein many were imployed , some in one thing , some in another , proved more noble and sumptuous , then those which were made by any one onely , though never so wealthy citizen . let us then gather by this , that such forces likewise , wherein several potentates do concur , for some noble and important action , where every one lends his assistance and advice , will be fitter to atchieve any great enterprise , then those of one onely , though never so great a prince . in war there are several offices , and several imployments , whereunto we see that one n●tion is not so proper ( be it either by reason of the several influences of the heavens , or through custom which is a second nature ) as is another : so in this mistery of war , several people prove proper for several imployments . in pitcht battels , the dutch and switzers have exceeded others , and have purchast most fame ; the italians have been alwaies esteemed for making assaults , and storming of cities ; and the spainards are held better then others at defending a strong hold , by reason of their undergoing labor and disquiet , and for their dexteritie in military actions . others are better at horse-service then on foot , as the french ; others are good at seafaring , and at mariti●e discipline , as the gen●●ses , p●●tugeses , and venetians ; and others have been p●●ticularly addicted to other exercises . so as those who are able to imploy several people , and several forces , as leagues may do , ( especially if they be made between puissant princes ) may have great designs ; for they shall have wherewith to offend , and defend , both by land and sea , and numbers enough of soldiers , ●it to undertake and accomplish whatsoever enterprise . but besides this , many things are requisite for the maintaining a long war ; arms , ammunition , victuals , money , and other things , the which no one state can sufficiently furnish , at least not without much incommodity , for any long time : but where many joy● together , and every one furnisheth somewhat which they most abo●nd in , the enterprise is s●●e not to be impeded , nor retarded , for want of any thing , nor for the difficulties which are occasioned thereby . moreover , for great enterprises , as they cannot be so soon effected , so are they subject to the hazard of ill success , when they depend upon one onely commander , who when he is lost , there is never another of equal authority , valor and experience left to succeed him ; for there are but few of those that are fit for much pains-taking , and for management of great affairs . insomuch as that state is very happy , which in more then one age meets with a generous and warlike prince ; and that prince is very fortunate who when he will not follow the wars in his own person , hath a subject of his so qualified , as becomes him to be who is to command an army , when the war is difficult , and of importance ; which is the cause why we often-times see great enterprises which are we●● begun , precipitate into great disorders and ruines . the death of alexander the great , without any legitimate heirs fit to undertake the government of such an empire , and of so weighty affairs , kept the macedonians and grecians ( of which two nations his valiant and unconquered army did consist ) from following his prosperous course , and from conquering the well , as he had done the east , and which whilst he was alive , he had proposed to himself to do . the carthaginians chiefest ruine arose from the want of commanders ; for having placed their hopes in one onely hannibal , they were forced to send for him back out of italy , to defend themselves in africa against scipio ; and his fortune forgoing him , when he was beaten they knew not whom to betake themselves unto , to uphold their tottering commonwealth . but in leagues there is no such hazard run ; since the best commanders that are in any of the confederate princes states may be imploied , and the princes themselves may serve upon an urgent occasion ; so as one commander being lost , another may be found to succeed him , of as great excellency and worth . for every state hath usually in all ages had some one man more eminent then the rest , unto whom is greatest extremities they have recourse . so as a league , if we suppose it to be like a well fabrickt humane body , may , since it hath the strength of many dominions united in it , be resembled to briar●●● for strength ; for as he had a hundred hands , to make use of as he pleased in several actions , so many do lend help to such a league , and make it stronger and fitter for any undertaking . moreover when we have to do with a very powerful prince , as it falls out in great enterprises , if we will weaken his strength , we may endeavor chiefly to keep his forces divided , and imploied in several parts , for so they are lessened , and become less apt to make resistance ; but as this will be hard for a single prince to do , though a great one , for he who will drive another man from his own home must be much stronger then be ; so is it more easily done when many are confedrates together , and this not onely because several ●orces joyned together , prove the greater ( as hath been said ) and several armies abounding with all things necessary may be thereout framed , but for the commo●iousness which several confederate states have , of assaulting the enemies country , at one and the same time , in several parts . wherefore when any great and difficult enterprise was to be undertaken ( not to speak of antient times ) but of more modren ones , against the saracens , and the turks , two nations , which have governed and domineered in these latter times with great fame and force , recourse was had to leagues , to c●●sadas , and to the unions of christian princes , by means whereof notable things have been done against those cruel barbarians . how many princes , how many several nations join'd together in the time of pope urban the second , for the recovery of the holy land ? about fifty thousand fighting men were raised , commanded in chief by godfrey of bullen , who gained so many and so famous victories , and so worthy of eternal glory ; this holy league having regained more then a hundred cities in asia , which were possest by the saracens . and in the t●me of baldwin the third , king of ierusalem , when the emperor conradus and lodowick king of france , joining together with other lesser princes , went themselves in person against the said saracens , did not they do excellent explo●ts , though couzened and be rayed by some lords of asia , they could not continue on their enterprise with like success as at the first . and hath not this last age seen one of the most signal and illustrious naval victories that was ever heard of ? which was the fight at lepanto , which was won from the turks by the league of the christian princes . but let us add somewhat more in pursuit of our former considerations . greatest enterprises , though happily begun , are oft-times left imperfect , when they depend upon the forces of one only prince ; for the rest of his neighboring princes , either out of envy , or fear of his greater prosperity , take up arms against him to make him give over the hopes of further acquisitions , and bethink himself of defending his home-affairs ; and to keep the scales more equal between him and his neighbors , and to take away the jealousies of state , which are of all other things most dangerous , and whereof we have infinite examples . but when a weighty war is to be undertaken by the forces of many joint-potentates , this suspi●ion ceases ; for leagues are usually made with other princes and neighboring states , or with such as are concern'd in common interest . and this amity or confederacie doth not only secure those states with whom the confederacie is contracted , so as the one fears not the other ; but it preserves each of them from the injuries that any may go about to do to any of the confederates . for one state supporting another by reason of their convention , things are so well and stoutly govern'd as people not being able to worst them , keep from molesting them , knowing that by offending any one confederate , they shall draw upon them the forces of all the rest , and hasten their own ruine . every one of these princes may then by reason of their strait conjunction and confederacie with others , more boldly and more resolutely undertake and accomplish any whatsoever enterprise , without danger of being diverted by any particular interest of his own . and all these considerations are better confirm'd by many notable examples . greece was assaulted by xerxes , that powerful prince of persia , with an infinite number of men both by sea and land ; almost all the several people of that province , united and confeder●ted together against this so great a warlike power : and such was the efficacie of this un●on , as that though one only greece was to withstand the forces of almost all the eastern nations who were flock'd together to that enterprise , but still under the imperial command and conduct of one and the same king xerxes , they did not only make their part good , but repulsed so puissant an enemy , much to his own prejudice the associate war which happ●ned in the time of marius and sylla , wherein many associates and confederates of the romans did conspi●e together against the commonwealth of rome ; though the confederates were all of them but weak people , as the maruceni , vestini , samnites , lucans , and other of their neighbors , yet was this war held one of the most dangerous that the people of rome did ever sustain : for these people had join'd themselves together with much fervor , to revenge themselves of the roman nobility , who had first promised them , and then denied them the liberty of being citizens of rome . and in these later ages , whole germany having confederated together against the emperor charls the fifth , was able to raise so numerous an army , though all the german princes did not concur therein , as did much perplex and endanger charls . which examples prove what many forces , though weaker being taken apart , can do when join'd together , against one potent prince . these then may seem sufficient reasons and examples to ground a favorable conclusion in the behalf of leagues , and to make them be held a strong and powerful means to order great enterprises by , and to bring them to a good end . yet there be many good considerations which may be alleadged on the contrary part ; so as he who shall mind realities , and not what the magnificencie of name or preparations do promise , will doubt much whether these leagues and confederacies do really prove what they appear to be . it is most certain , that as the truest perfection consists in union , and that whatsoever will partake of that , must be reduced to this ; so may all our humane actions prove the more successful and perfect , the more reducible they are to this unity ; and if it happen to some sometimes otherwise , it is because those some are not capable thereof either of themselves , or because their corrupted customs will not suffer them so to be : but it is not to be denied , but that in all humane actions , chiefly such wherein great affairs are concern'd , and more chiefly in matters of war , after mature advice taken , sudden execution is requisite ; and that it is necessary to reduce all things as much as may be to this unity : so as the soveraign authority consist in one only , and not in many ; for the multiplicity of those that concur ( especially by way of p●rity ) in the same action , doth not help , but rather disorder and confound . then look how much harder it is to reduce things to an unity in a league , the less gallant do they prove , and less fit for prosecution of great affairs : for they contain , and almost naturally , such contrarieties , as must occasion the sudden corruption thereof . several are the thoughts of several men , the customs of nations different , and ( which in this case is of most importance ) the counsels and resolutions by which confederate princes govern themselves , do not only differ , but are for the most part contrary , according as state-jealousies are apt to breed occasion of falling out . the powerful desire after rule never suffers right to be known , nor people to be there with contented : it is therefore to be observed , that in all ages the greatest and most signal actions in war have been done and accomplish'd by the worth and prosperity of one only prince , or at least of one sole potentate , with a series of divers princes and captains who have commanded therein . alexander the great , the commonwealth of rome , charls the great , and in these latter time ; the ottoman empire , not to mention many others who have been great and potent , though not altogether so highly cry'd up , did all of them arise to that height of glory and power by the power and worth of one only command , with the true and proper military discipline of each of them , and under the conduct of one and the same principality . on the contrary , leagues shew their weakness at the very first sight : for company and multipl●city denotes always imperfection , and in this particular makes it be known , that those things which a prince or a commonwealth cannot by reason of their weakness do of themselves , and by their own forces , they seek to effect it by the company and help of others . wherefore ( as it hath been said ) in this respect leagues have been more frequently used in these latter ages , then of old : ●or many princes and states are failing in military worth and courage , and not able of themselves to do any notable action ; so as one nation , or one prince not being able to overcome another ▪ and all of them wanting the excellencie of good orders , he who hath at any time endeavored to advance himself by some design , hath been forced to have recourse to the advantage of leagues ; of which italy , since by reason of the declination of the western empire , she hath been divided into so many members , and scignories , hath in particular afforded many examples , which may serve to teach whatsoever belongs to these leagues : whereof we do not read of any great good effect which hath ensued at last , or at least which have continued long in their first prosperity ; for their forces , though powerful enough of themselves , when met withal by contrary respects , and wearied in their first attempts , have soon gone but lamely off . and he who shall well consider such particulars as are most necessary in great undertakings , will easily see how badly they do correspond in leagues . deliberations would be wise and mature , but not slow and unseasonable ; execution would be speedy and bold ; counsels are oft-times to be taken upon unexpected accidents ; the end of all ought to be one and the same , though the offices , degrees , and authorities be different ; the respect and aim one and the same , whereunto all resolutions do tend ; to wit , the safety , glory and the greatness of that prince or state , for whom the war is made ; the reward and honor one and the same , and alike the loss and shame , so as the possibility of haveing means to lay the fault on another , do not retard the doing of what is ●itting . these are things which have alwaies been hard , and rare to be found ; yet they may the more easily be met withal in an enterprise which is undertaken by one onely wise prince , or by one well governed commonwealth ; but in leagues all things run counter byass to these important affairs . it is not alwaies generositie , but fear which makes a prince take up arms , which likewise makes others joyn with him , who otherwise do much differ from him in desires , and interest : but that brunt being over , and every one being in their former particular , and more natural condition , he who dreads war bends to idleness , and willingly takes all occasions to change war for peace ; and he who was become a friend by reason of some contingencie , not out of any good will , discovering his real affection upon some other occasion , or by reason of some change , returns to be not onely as formerly , an enemy , but more inveterate then before ; so as these ties of common interests being soon loosened either by particular interest , or by some other affection , hatred , confusion , and disorder doth thereupon ensue . the moralists ●ay , that friendship cannot long continue between those where one and the same thing is not interchangeably given and received ; and that therefore true friendship is onely found , where the end is not that which is advantag●ous or delightful ( because equal correspondencie is not usually there ) but what is honest , which alwaies is , and does still continue the same on all behalfs . in the friendship or leagues of princes , every one hath his own conveniencie , and particular benefit for his aimed at end , and then the like of others onely so far , as by accident it may square with his . but it commonly falls out , that what makes for one , makes against another ; so as the ●ame things cannot please all : wherefore a thousand accidents do easiry cause diversity of opinions , contentions and breaches , so as hardly any league hath been able to preserve it self any long time . it is also usually seen that no man minds what is recommended to the care of many ; and therefore in leagues , which are fastned together but with weak ties , whilst one doth either trust upon anothers provisions , or is ill satisfied with others omissions , men neglect their own daties , and study more to pick a hole in anothers coat , then to mind his own business . the ignomi●y which may in●ue upon such defaults , and the loss of reputation , which use to be great incitements to a noble mind , are not so much valued in things which are undertaken and negotiated by many together , because the way lies fair to excuse ones self , by laying the fault upon another , or at least the fault is lessened by others being sharers therein . thus that common benefit , which is so magnified and cried up , and which ought to be their onely object , is found onely in a certain fancied idea , and in a potentia remota , or in a vain and useless appearance , whilst none endeavor to reduce it to its true , essential , and perfect being , by laying aside their own proper and peculiar advantage , and by directing his actions to the common good of his colleagues . so as he who shall duly consider what the first intention is of making a league , and with what degrees it is proceeded in afterwards , and to what ends it is directed , will by many evident examples find it quickly so transformed , as though it meet not with any external forces , it easily dissolves and moulders away of it self . leagues made by christians against the turks have oft-times in particular met with these impediments and difficulties ; the league between pope alexander the sixt , and the three most powerful kingdoms of europe , the kingdoms of spain , fance , and portugal , and the commonwealth of venice , was stipulated with great hopes and noble intentions ; the venetian and french fleet came into the archipelag● , where they had some prosperous success ; but the forces of the other colleagues were in vain expected the first year , and it ended the second year before it had fully effected any thing , by reason of the discords which arose between the crowns of france and spain , which were occasioned by the division of naples , so as these princes turned their arms each upon other , which were intended against the infidels . the league made between pope paul the third , the emperor charls the fift , and the commonwealth of venice , against sultan soliman , likewise ended almost as soon as it was begun ; and it is too well known , as being of rescent memory , what occasions of victories were thereby lost , and out of what respects . but what greater thing could be expected from any league , then from that which god blest with the famous victory at the curz●la●● islands ? yet how slight a matter was able to re●●●d the glorious atchievements which were with reason to be expected from thence , when a slight suspition of the spainards , that the states of flanders might be molested by the french , by reason of the going of the duke of alanson , the kings brother towards those parts , was sufficient to keep back the fleet which was destied for so great affair in the levant , and to make the best season of the year pass over without any advantage ; whereupon all other things ●ell into great disorders , and the league was quickly ●erminated . neither can this natural motion of leagues be so stopt by any means or endeavors , as that all the colleagues may have the same intentions in preserving it . what greater reason can one prince have to promise unto himself the continuance of friendship and fidelity from another , then had the commonwealth of venice to expect , first , from lewis the twelfth , and then from francis the first , both of them kings of france ? since to keep from any waies violating the friendship and conjunction , which she held with the former ; she drew upon her the forces of maximilian the emperor , and exposed her state to so much labor , and danger ; and did so long maintain a great part of the expence of a weighty war , first , to free the seconds own person from prison , and then his sons ; yet ( as usually affection prevails more in the minds of princes , then common reason , or justice by which private persons govern themselves ) lewis , breaking off his antient capitulation , which he held with the commonwealth , was a great means to make all the princes of europe conspire against her ; and france , as soon as he had made what advantage he could by the agreement , laying aside all other respects , made peace for himself alone with the emperor , leaving the common-wealth exposed to great toil and danger of war. so as when any stedfastness is found in any colleague , all that is to be said is , that as he that doth observe 〈◊〉 deserves to be praised for his fidelitie , so ●e that doth rely too much thereupon , is not to be much commended for c●vil wisdom . but it may be moreover considered , that many times the colleagues began to square but badly in the very beginning of their agreement , which tends much to the prejudice of the common interest . whilst the last league against selinus the turkish emperor was in treaty , and when it was so high time to relieve cyprus , it was long and importunately argued in rome , where they were first to imploy the forces of the league ; and some of the spanish ministers were so blinded with their particular interest , as they propounded and stifly maintain'd it to the very great prejudice and loss of time , that as soon as the league should be fully agreed upon , the forces thereof should march to the sea-coasts of africa , to take in such places as they thought might make most for the advantage of spain ; not weighing that whilst they should leave their enemies powerful , with the fleet safe and entire in the levant , it was very vainly done to think of get●ing such things , which though they should succeed well , must be to no purpose , and must qu●ckly prove unfortunate , as experience shewed afterwards , and which reason could not perswade before . but if these peculiar respects be at first concealed , they break forth in the process of time , and work sometime worser effects in such of the colleagues as are either weakest , or do confide most in the confederacie . ferdinand king of spain , though falling off from the other colleagues , he joined with great offers and prot●stations with the commonwealth of venice ; yet when the city of brescia was recovered , he would keep it for himself , and appropriate the first fruit of victory to himself , which by the former , and by renewed capitulations was destin'd to others . pope clement the seven●h , the commonwealth of venice , and the duke of milan join'd together in league against caesar ; but their ends were , if not apparently contrary , at least intrinsecally different . the king of france desired by all means to free the crown of france from some prejudice which he had done it by the former agreement with caesar , and to set his sons at liberty , who were left with him in nature of hostages : but on the contrary , the other confederates chief endeavour was , to take the dukedom of milan from caesar , and to secure italy from his power . the enterprise was begun with prosperous success , the italian princes doing readily what became them ; but the king of france , when he knew how to obtain his ends by another way , and began to suspect the colleagues constancie , did neither make war on the other side the mountains , nor did he send his forces into italy , as he was bound to do : whereupon the league which was made with great preparation , with good beginning , and better hopes , ended in an agreement , which was voluntary and advantagious on the kings behalf by the recovery of his children , but inforced , and not over-secure on the behalf of the other colleagues , who fell short of th●ir conceived hopes , being abandoned by their friend and confederate , the king. to know then the truth amidst this diversity of reasons and examples , we must distinguish and consider apart for what occasions , and with what respects every league is made , what the end therein proposed is , and upon what terms and conditions it is concluded ; for by these particulars we may the better know what good or bad may be expected by joyning together in league , and whether the league be likely to be of short , or of long duration . sometimes leagues are made by princes or popularities out of necessary defence , and to provide opportunely for their own safeties ; the confederates obliging themselves by particular and stated obligations to defend each others state , when they shall be assaulted by any others from without : and such leagues as these have proved profitable , as having respect to the preservation of peace , and to a certain and honest end ; and whilst nothing but the common interest is treated of , so as they have all the same object , as well in maintaining , as in making the confederacie . the confederacie made between the pope , the king of naples , the commonwealth of florence , the duke of milan , and other lesser italian princes , did long preserve the peace of italy , and was for a while very advantagious for the colleagues ; for the only drift thereof was to constitute some assured bounds to every of their powers , and to settle them in a just temperature , making the confederates thereby the stronger and more able to withstand any one that should attempt any thing against them . sometimes again leagues are made for more necessary self-defence , and which must suddenly be actuated ; to wit , when a state is assaulted by one more powerful , and that the neighboring princes , lest themselves might suffer if they should permit a neighboring power to grow too great by the ruine of that state , do take up arms jointly for the defence thereof , in whose defence they know their own safeties are concerned , since they might soon incur the like danger , if they should not keep him at a further distance from the others home . and such a league may also at first do gallant and memorable things , if it so fall out that the condition of affairs being altered in the same league , and the colleagues interests becoming different , they will advance further with those forces , and with more full intentions to ruine that foe-potentate , and take occasion by joining in league to increase in state and power . when these respects , and their contraries already han●led are considered , these leagues do usually lose all their efficacie , since they fail in their chiefest and surest ground-work , when the truest conjunction fails , which is that of princes minds , thoughts and designs , whence conformable actions , and such as are of great efficacie and worth do arise . almost all the people of greece join'd together to defend themselves against xerxes his forces , a mighty king of persia , who came to assault them with an innumerable army ; and they got that famous victory by sea at salamis , which furnish'd them at the same time with prosperous successes at land , where they put the same king to flight : and greece was preserved at that time by vertue of that league from so great a danger , against which it appeared almost impossible that she could defend herself . so likewise in these latter times , the pope , and philip king of spain join'd with the commonwealth of venice in defence of the kingdom of cyprus , ( to whom that kingdom , as part of her territories , did chiefly belong ) when it was assaulted by powerful turkish forces ; and having put together a powerful and numerous navy , they bore away that famous and singular victory , which will be celebrated in all ages ; the turkish forces were routed and shattered at sea , and their honor and courage lessened : but when all this was done , what other thing did the victorious grecians , answerable to the hop●s which were expected from that their so grea● victory , the whole fruit whereof at their reurn home ended in the dividing of the booty ? so also the christian league by sea , did not only spend the rest of that autumn , a fit time for any enterprise which they could have undertaken , after the honor they had won in the aforesaid victory , in dividing the prey , and in other matters of small moment , but also spent all the next en●uing spring and summer idly , without being able so much as to keep together , so to keep the enemy from recruiting , to the great , notable , and woful example of what we are now in treaty of , and to shew that the forces of leagues are weak , though made between potent princes . the purchase which is got , or which is hoped for , cannot be so equally divided and agreed upon , but that some of the confederate princes will happen to have a greater share then the rest ; and every increase , b● it ●●'r so little , doth easily cause jealousie , or at least envy in the rest . almost all the potentates of europe convened together in the famous league of cambray against the commonwealth of venice , allured by the hopes of being able to divide her noble , rich , and flourishing state , which was so much a more prevailing object in the minds of the confederate princes to make them endeavor by their joynt forces to suppress the commonwealth , and bereave her of all her riches . but as soon as the colleagues first design began to discover themselves , and begot jealousies and suspition amongst them , insomuch , as the very same princes who had conspired together to ruine the commonwealth , did soon assist and succor her , being become bitterer enemies one to another , and amongst themselves ( each others greatness becoming formidable and hateful to their companions ) then they had been before out of the same reason to the venetians , against whom they had joyntly taken up arms. it was not hard , though not very reasonable , for lodowick king of france , and ferdinand king of spain , being blinded with the same desire of enlarging their territories , to joyn together in driving the aragonians from out the kingdom of naples , but afterwards they did as easily disagree , touching the dividing of what they had got ; so as the league might help to bereave others of that kingdom , but other forces were requisite for the appropriation of it to ones self , and thereunto the proper and peculiar vertue of the militia , and of good counsel was likewise required . leagues use likewise to prove advantageous when many potentates take up arms against one new prince , who is yet but weak , and not well setled in his state ; as was seen by the example of the league made by the princes of italy , against the scalligers , and certain other petty lords or tyrants ; for leagues being of some validity in their beginning , and not meeting with any stout resistance , may at the very first effort have ruined the enemy against whom such legues were made , but when they have to do with a potentate of esteem , though he be inferior of himself , to the power of the colleagues , they have not produced any great effects ; as may be known by divers confederacies made by the princes of italy , against the commonwealth of venice ; against which , as being become formidable to them all , though all italy hath more then once taken up arms , yet she hath been able to defend herself against such forces ; for the first efforts being withstood , the rest proved less difficult , by reason of the usual weakness which leagues are soon reduced unto . and it might have succeeded so with her likewise , in the times of greater danger in the leagues of cambray , had not alviano with his unseasonable resolution , of immaturely hastning on the the battel , drawn that ruin upon the commonwealth , which she might easily have escaped by temporising , and the league have been dissolved thereupon , as it was not long after . now by reassuming all these considerations , these general and true conclusions may be thereout asserted ; that leagues may prove beneficial , either when they aim simply at defence , and at the maintaining of peace , by the reputation of such an union ; or when one that is not able to defend himself by his own particular forces , is actually assaulted by one that is more powerful then he , and whom he is not able to resist of himself . for if no other good be got by such unions , yet the business is spun out the longer , and there may be a way sound out to deviate imminent ruine , by diversion . but he who will conside too much upon such unions , or be less diligent in negotiating those affairs which of himself he is not able to do , will soon finde he is deceived ; nay if he be not the more cautious , and circumspect , he may become a prey as well to him who appears to be his friend , as to his formally declared enemies . whence it is inferr'd that to make leagues out of a meer and voluntary election of increasing territories , is very uncertain , and falacious , yet may prove good if many who be strong and powerful joyn against one that is weak ; but at last the fire is greater which breaks out amongst the colleagues themselves , then that which they carried home to another mans house . but that a state which is already grown great and powerful , may be opprest by the strength of leagues , unless it begin first to totter by reason of its internal disorders , from what the experience of so many past passages teacheth , and from reason which is corroborated by custom , is a thing which no man ought to promise to himself , unless he delight in flattering himself with vain and prejudical hopes . there remains yet some things to be stated which have formerly been alleadged in the behalf of leagues , lest they may get more credit amongst men then they deserve . to that then which was said , that the multiplicity of the movers , make the greater motion , and things are better done by many , especially things of the highest nature , then by reason of the imper●ection and weakness of our humanity , can be effected by a few , it may be answered ; that it is true , that the assistance of many is requisite to the affecting of great things ; but it is also as true , that for the right carrying on of affairs , it is requisite that the second causes ( to speak in terms of natural philosophie ) should be subordinate to the first , as is seen in the order and government of the world : so doubtlesly no great enterprises can be effected without armies , commanders , and a thousand other necessaries ; but by how much the more all these are constituted under the power of one alone , by which their order and union is the greater , the work they take in hand will prove so much the more excellent and perfect . a prince , though single in what he goes about , is not forbidden the making use of soldiers of several nations in his militia , to the end that he may have an army ( as hath been said ) fitter for any military action , in businesses which are at once undertaken against several states , so as all of them be to be understood as enemies , though they be not confederates ; but the truest and securest rule in this case would be , to be so careful and diligent in training up , and in disciplining a prince his own militia , as that he may be able to provide for all actions of war , out of men of his own dominions , as we see those have done who have done the most glorious actions . the same may be said of other things belonging to war , for which a wise prince ought so to provide , as that he may rely upon himself , and not upon the friendship of others . as for the assertion , that leagues do abound in chiestains fit to command armies ; this proves not alwaies true by reason of the scarcity of excellent men which hath been found in all ages ; or say that such be to be found amongst confederate princes , they use to cause more of discord and contention , by reason that every one pretends to have the supreme command , and chiefest honor in the militia ; and more of prejudice to the leagues , then of profit or advantage . and if it be found that some leagues have effected great matters , it hath happened ( though but seldom ) where the particular respects , which we have mentioned , have concurr'd . but in the fore-named unions made by christians against infidels , no good reasons can be given which do sute well with the business now in hand , if we speak of leagues according to the ordinary acception of reason of state ; for such princes or people as were signed with the cr●ciata had all of them but one onely respect and affection , which was more prevalent with them then any other , to wit , their zeal to religion ; therefore their forces not being onely kept together by that so powerful bond , but even their souls , more heavenly then humane rewards being proposed to them , they might work miraculous effects : though they could not , even in this case , altogether sh●● those disorders which are caused by the association of so many , and by the multiplicity of sovereign lords , and of nations . the same may be said of other unions , as of those that did associate the romans , and of the hans towns of germany ; for amongst these certain particular respects did concur , which were common to them all , no respects of states concerning differing interests , and other things , which have been considered in unions which do truly and usually bear this name of leagues : for when , though against infidels , any enterprises have been attempted by leagues , out of other reasons , and other humane respects concurring more principally therein , what success they have had , and how different , though usual to leagues , may plainly be known by other examples already spoken of . the sixth discourse . why modern princes have not done actions equal to those which were done by the antients . there are some , who praising only the actions of antient times , do equally blame all modern deportments , and hold them in little or no account ; as if the way were block'd up to those who are born in our days , to keep them from arriving at any height of glory . others on the contrary labor to heap our present age with all manner of praise , and to compare it to the most celebrated and most cry'd up former times ; affirming that the antient worth is sprung up again in these our days , and in our now modern men , which come no● short of , nor differ from the former times or men , save in the veneration which is given to antiquity . they celebrate the ingenuity of modern men , for the excellencie and perfection unto which they have brought many noble arts and sciences , which were obscured and of no esteem in former times ; particularly that of the militia . in which respect , by the so many new-found ways of fortification , and expugning strong holds by their engines , and by other very miraculous inventions , it appears that the industry of modern men hath not only equall'd , but in many things much exceeded that of the antients ; and that the glory of many excellent professors of the most esteemed arts shines cleerer in the present age , for that they have not only sufficiently improved that of the militia , but also architecture , painting , sculpture , and other noble arts and disciplines , which are adornments to civil life , and have drawn them out ● obscurity wherein they were hidden for a while . i do not differ so much from the opinion of these men ; nor do i think that other mens actions ought to be so much heightned , as that through a foolish modesty or ignorance we should undervalue our own , when they deserve praise . but as for military actions , which as they are the most perspicuous to the eyes of all men , so are they most commended , or blamed by the universality of men ; when i call to mind the warlike actions done by the antients , and those done by our modern men , methinks that those do so far exceed these , as they can hardly admit of any comparison ; though these latter ages , as they have produced more excellent wits in other disciplines , so also may they glory in the valor and generosity of some princes , no less great in worth then in forces . but that which peradventure affords no less cause of wonder , and which affords particular matter for this discourse , is to consider whence it is that modern princes , though some of them have been generously minded , and of much experience and worth in military affairs , of great possessions , and strong in power , yet have they not been able to bring to pass such enterprises , as for their weighty consideration , for the shortness of time , or for the easiness wherewith they were done , can walk hand in hand with those of the antients ; amongst whom we see one only alexander , one pompey , one caesar to have subjugated many entire provinces , and conquered many nations . and not to go further in search of the like examples , since one age alone , very neer this of ours , can easily furnish us with them : were not the emperor charls the fifth , francis the first king of france , and ( if will pass by the errors of religion ) sultan solyman emperor of the turks , princes great , and valiant in all acceptations ? in whom so many endowments both of nature and fortune did concur , as hardly any thing remained to be desired in any of them , to make and constitute a potent prince , and an excellent commander , fit to undertake any action , how great or difficult soever . what was it that charls with his undaunted and dreadless spirit did not undertake ? who was ever known to be more ambitious of praise and military honor then francis , never weary , nor satisfied with toiling in arms , and in leading armies ? solyman was so fervently bent upon purchasing glory in the wa●s , as his age , though very great , was not able to asswage it ; for he dyed in the field amongst soldiers , when he was eighty four years old . these great princes were so puissant , and so remarkable for the number to soldiers which they led to battel , for military discipline , and for all that belonged to war , as their age had no cause to wonder at , nor to envy any preceding times , which were famousest for such affairs . yet he who shall particularly examine their actions , will find they come far short of the famous acts of the antients , and that they correspond not with the fame and opinion of such princes and of such forces . for if we we shall consider the deeds of those few aforesaid , not to mention so many others , what , and how many were the things done by alexander the great , who having in so short time vanquish'd the powerful persian empire , victoriously overran the whole east , and made the terror of his w●apons known to people almost unknown till then , and yet died whilst he was very young ? how many cities and provinces did pompey and caesar bring under the roman empire ? the first conquered and subjugated pontus , armenia , cappadocia , media , hiberia , syria , cylicia , mesopotamia , arabia , and iudaea ; things which though done , seem incredible : and the other , though he did not overrun so great a space of land , did no less admired things , if we will regard the condition of the conquered ; he quell'd the warlike switzers , french , and dutch , and made so many and so fortunate expeditions , as by his means only above eight hundred cities were brought under the government of rome . what can be alleadged on the behalf of these modern princes , which may compare with these for military glory ? charls the emperor led sundry times puissant armies upon several undertakings ; but what was the fruit that he reaped by his most famous expeditions ? the greatest and most victorious army which he ever put together , was that wherewith he withstood solyman , when he came to assault ●ustria : yet he never departed with it from before the walls of vienna ; so as all the trophy of victory which he got there for so much expence and labor , was only not being overcome ; for his army never saw the enemies face . the wars of germany were very difficult in this behalf ; yet therein he contended not with any prince , whose forces were of themselves equal to his ; nor were they made out of election , or hope of glory by new acquirements , but out of necessity , and for the defence as well of his own person , as of the empire ; and all the good he got thereby , was only the restoring the affairs of the crown to the former condition , so as the empires authority might not be lessened . the wars made so long between charls the emperor , and francis king of france , with no less hatred then force , did oftentimes weary both their armies ; but though caesar had several times the better , yet at last the power of france was not diminished , nor the greatness of charls his command made any whit the larger , so as he was master of so many , and so ample states rather by his right of inheritance , then by means of war ; th● enterprises of tunis and algier in africa , might have some greater appearance of generosity , the business being very difficult , and attempted with great courage , and much danger , and wherein the glory appeared to be more then the advantage ; yet the unhappy success of the one , did much lessen the honor and praise won by the other ; and these undertakings did finally produce no greater effects then the acquisition of one or two cities , and those none of the chiefest of africa : whereas one onely scipio subdued carthage , the head of so great an empire , and brought all those regions under the roman eagles . the acts done by solyman were somewhat greater then these , but not to be compared to those of old ; nor peradventure will they appear to be very famous , if we shall consider his power , and the long time that he lived emperor . he consumed much time , and many men in hungaria , making many expeditions against it , and yet got but one part thereof , which was none of the greatest provinces neither . he wan the island of rhodes ; but what glory could redound to so mighty a prince by overcoming a few knights , who were weak of themselves , and who were not succoured by others ? and yet he was therein assisted more by fraud then by force . he past with his army into persia ; but though he might say with caesar , ven● , vidi , yet could he not add vici ; for as he with great celerity over ran a great part of the persian empire , and came to the city of ta●ris , so not being able to fix in any place , or establish any conquest , he retreated to within his own confines , having lest the greatest part and the best of his men in the enemies country , routed and defeated by divers accidents . these things then , and many other the like , give just occasion of wonder , and incite curious wits to search out the truest causes of such diversity of successes . amongst which , nay , in the primary place , the different means of warfaring in those times , and in these may come into consideration , wherein if we come to more particulars , we shall meet with the use of forts and strong holds , which are become more frequent in these our ages , then they were in former times , the art of building being doubtlesly in greater perfection with us then it was with them . there is hardly any state or country now adaies , wherein there are not many towns and cities , either assisted by natural situation , or else by art reduced to much safety by many inventions found out by modern professors of fortification , so as almost every place is so fortified as it is able to hold out with a few men , against many ; and he who will in these times enter into another mans country with an army intending to possess himself thereof , must first win all the castles and strong holds upon the frontiers ; for it were ill advised to advance forwards and leave such places behind them , since his victuals may be thereby hindred , and he may several waies suffer much damage and be greatly disturbed . moreover to be ●aster of the field , & leave the cities and strong holds unreduced , would be but to labor hard to get possession for a few daies , which being founded only upon the forces of a field-army , when that should be worsted , all things formerly won , must of necessity fall of themselves . hence it is , that since much time must be spent in lying before a fort or citadel , and that many men are requisite to take it , and all this often-times in vain , the attempts of modern princes meeting with this difficulty , are not so soon nor so sadly compast , as they were by the antients who met not with such obstacles . and how can it be expected therefore that many great victories should be won , since they meet with so many rubs by means of these strong holds ? whereof we see many clear examples in the actions , of the aforementioned princes . the emperor charls made war several times with numerous armies against the king of france , propounding great matters unto himself , which proved all but vain at last , by his having met with strong cities well munited , such as required much time and labor to take them ; wherefore though his success in war was sometimes prosperous , yet it came so late , as he hardly got any advantage or benefit thereby ; as was seen when after much time spen● , and m●ny men lost before the fort of st. desir which was sea●ed in the midst of france , whither he was fortunately advanced , though he reduced it to his own power , yet was he at last forced to come to agreement with the enemy ( as finding his forces much weakened by that acquisition ) that he might fall upon another enterprise . the same , and for the same cause , befell francis king of france , who having sent his son the dolphin with powerful forces to the pyrenean mountains , to the end that he might break into spain , promising himself easier success therein , by an unexpected assault , and because he had assaulted at the same time other parts of caesars dominions with other armies : the dolphin being at the very first to take perpignano , a fort placed upon those frontiers , he there met with such , and with so many difficulties , as this sole encounter was sufficient to keep those forces from pen●trating any further . solyman being entred with a powerful army into hungarie , intending to pass into austria , wasted so much time in expugning the strong hold of buda , as it proved the safety of that country , and chiefly of vienna ; before the which he was in that respect the longer a coming , and by this delay afforded the defendants the more time to provide for their own security , so as the city being of it self very renable , it may be said that she did not onely save her self , but by the preservation thereof , all austria , and other provinces of germany , were preserved then , and several times since . so likewise in the war which was made by the same solyman , against the venetians , though he was come thither himself in person , with powerful forces both by sea and land , yet his forces being repulst by the fort of c●rfir , which was forcibly , but in vain attempted by the turks , he was forced to withdraw from before it ; whereas without the help and advantage of such a strong hold , both the island of c●rfee , and other places belonging to that state must have submitted to so great and warlike a preparation . by reason then of these difficulties , and such occasions , the undertaking of later times have proved less glorious for matter of action , then those of former daies . when alexander had overcome in battel darius the powerful king of persia , he soon made himself master of his whole kingdom , and passing further into the country , even to the ocean sea , he found the way so ope● , as the onely difficulty he met withal , was the overcoming of those fortresses of rivers and seas which nature had furnished the country with : insomuch as those who writ his actions , speak but of two strong holds of any importance , about which he was necessitated to spend some time amongst the indians in his victorious over-running so many countries . but pompey made such way in following mithridates , and in planting trophies of victories , in all places whereby he past in so many eastern provinces , amongst people that he had rather march'd over , then over-come , as it may be easily conceived that he m●● no where with any impediments by strong holds , which were able to stop the course of his victorious forces . caesar found it somewhat a harder business to subjugate those people of europe , with whom he was to fight ; but this was more out of the nature of the situations and the savageness of the people , then by reason of any stout resistance made by any well fortified cities ; yet in the space of ten years he compleated so many victories , as he subjugated there hundred several sorts of people . it these , though great princes , and most valiant commanders , had been put to the expence of moneths and years in the taking of one only fort , certainly their atchievements would have been fewer , and their glory not so much cry'd up . this was manifestly known by the example of other ages : for it may be observed , that the so great progresses of war have been made chiefly in the eastern parts , where at all times ( peradventure by reason of the largeness of the country ) the use of strong holds hath been least had ; so as not only alexander the great , and pom●ey , both of them more famous then all other commanders , but some of the roman emperors have by their chieftains subjugated spacious countries in a short time : and in later times , selymus the great turk by the same reason was able totally to subjugate the soldan of caire's empire ; for having had the better in many battels , and not meeting with any strong hold to withstand him , the whole country which was under that empire fell as a prey into the power of the turks , who were victors and masters of the field . but such acquisitions , as they are very easie to be made , so are they but seldom peacefully possest ; which was the cause why the roman emperors could never so govern those furthest eastern parts but that either by the inhabitants themselves , or by their neighboring kings , ●umults were continually raised : so as it behoved them to subjugate the same provinces several times . but if these difficulties of winning forts and strong holds did retard the course of victories , certainly they ought not to lessen the praise of modern princes and commanders ; but when they deserve it by their own military worth and industry , as great discipline , cunning , constancie , and sufferance is discovered in this sort of militia , and as such acquisitions are more stable , and less subject to the various fortune of war ; so the fewer actions of these men may for glory and praise be justly compared to the many of the others , wherein perhaps they would have equall'd them , had it not been for the concurrence of such differing accidents and respects . but if we shall continue to examine other parts appertaining to the militia , we shall find that the diversity of effects hath proceeded from the diversity of other things . the invention of guns is so new and so miraculous a thing , so out of the way of all war-engines which were known and used by the antients , as it may well be bel●eved that this must needs have made a grert alteration in the managing of the militia ; and the use and invention of gunpowder is so increased in these times , and so variously multiplied and perfected , as it may be said that men make not war now a days with steel and iron , as they were wont , but with fire . then this formidable instrument of artillery , which makes so great and irreparable havock , is the reason why commanders proceed with more caution in giving battel , and seek to spin out the war in length , to reduce the enemy to some necessity ; and that ●sing more art , and trusting less to fortune , they spend more time in bringing their enterprises to an end , but do it with more security . wherefore we seldom hear of pi●ch'd fields in these days , wherein whole armies sight with all their forces : and hence it is , that the forces of such as defend an assaulted country not being to be vanquish'd , nor much weakened but with time , unless they want fitting defence , no great p●ogress is made therein . which is not done more by time and industry then by open force . where likewise it is to be weighed , that the necessity which is now adays put upon armies of bringing along with them a great train of artillery , all their proceedings must be much more slow , and without them they can neither keep themselves from being offended by the enemy , nor yet can they undertake any enterprise , wanting such instruments without which no town nor place of importance can be taken . let us wind about a little , and see what hath been done by the antients . what a voyage did pompey the great make in the pursuit of mithridates ? he wi●h his army overran abundance of new countries , continually conquering and subjecting them , with as much ease , as if he had gone to visit them upon pleasure , and not to wage war with them . when alexander the great would go into india , he made his soldiers leave all the booty which they had got in persia , and all their baggage behind them , and choosing out some of his nimblest men , be with them made that long and difficult journy , and sent many back , thinking that a few ( but those valiant ) soldiers , would suffice him for that purpose ; for in that age , t was only worth and power which bore away the weightiest affairs . so as such princes and conductors of armies as had a strong and able militia , as was that of alexander the great , and that of the romans , not meeting with any strong holds to withstand them , nor with any soldiers 〈◊〉 worth and experience as they were , not which could withstand their assaults , they suddenly bereft the countries which they assailed of all defence , by worsting their armies wherein their sole security lay , and so made themselves easily masters of them ; and by the reputation which their men won , and the terror which they caused in their enemies , who had no where whereunto to flie or to have refuge , they made one victory make way for another , so as they might in a short time lay the ground-works of those great monarchies which the world doth now so much wonder at . to these things it may be added , that the chiefest strength of the antients , and that wherewith they atchieved their chiefest actions , lay in their infantry , which could easiliest and with greatest expedition winde about every where , and be made use of at all seasons . but changing their custom afterwards , so as those that commanded great armies would have their foot aided continually , and back'd by good store of horse , they could neither begin , nor finish great enterprises , as made best for them ; being to consider the season , the country , and other conveniencies , and their horses being to have meat , which they could not always , nor in all places come by . wherefore now that by reason of the greatness of their empire , the turks confines are so separated , and so far distant one from another , it may be hoped that other princes may rest the quieter , and the more secure from their ●ncursions , for that their land-forces consisting much in cavalry , they cannot move so suddenly , nor lead on their numerous armies so easily nor so commodiously , nor do such notable things by land ; and which the self-same respect may make it be doubted that they may bend their studies more to sea-affairs . together with all these respects , the condition of times and of potentates is not slightly to be considered , if therein we meet with a generous prince , and one that is desirous of military glory . for if he chance to make trial of his arms and worth with a prince of equal , or not much inferior state , valor , and military discipline , he cannot hope by any power he hath to make any great acquisitions , because he will meet with a just counterpoise to his worth and power : for though he may peradventure be puffed up with some good success , yet is he not sure but that he may have some adverse fortune , whilst his enemy is still strong , thou●h as yet wo●sted . what did francis king of france leave unattempted to get footing in italy ? how many armies did he lead thither ? how much treasure did he spend in those attempts ? when was he ever weary or satisfied with warfaring ? yet being withstood by the emperor charls the fifth , who was of equal force and worth , and was resolute to keep the french out of italy , all his endeavors proved vain , finding it very hard to get any thing , and impossible to keep what he had gotten , that state being befriended and back'd by too great princes . whence it was , that by reason of the resistance which each of these great potentates made against the other , knowing that they could not much exceed one another , and each of them having an eye upon the affairs of italy , they both of them did still much endeavor friendship and consederacie with the princes of italy , and chiefly with the common-wealth of venice . for , what neither of them could effect of themselves , which was to keep the others forces suppressed in italy , they thought they might the easilier do it , by joining with some other italian potentate ; so the many wars which happened between them , and chiefly in sav●y , and in the state of milan , must at last be ended by agreement without any advantage to either party , both their forces , being weakned , but neither of their hatreds or emulations slackned , though charls the fift , by the unexpected death of francisco sforza , did at last reduce that state to his dominion . hence it was also that charls and solyman , greatly fearing to encounter each other , did very much shun the having to do together , and to hazard that glory to the uncertain events of war , which they had ●●th so much labor arrived at . and this was the cause why charls though he was a bold and valiant prince , when his brother ferdinand was in great danger by reason of solymans forces , resolved importunately to pass into africa ; for being resolute that he would not march against solymans forces , nor contend with them , he would witness to the world that it was neither labor nor danger , that kept him from turning to the defence of hungary , and austria , which were then assaulted by the turks ; but because he esteemed the business of africa very necessary . and when a greater necessity wrought it so that they were to take up arms one against the other , and that numerous armies had taken the field , yet they kept still aloof off , the fear , and apprehension which each had of the others power and fortune being alike ; so as at last so great an accumulation of soldiers disbanded , neither party having seen the face of an enemy ; whilst charls would not give way that his army should go from before the walls of vienna , to go find out the enemy , not would solyman advance further to meet him , though he had at first publickly given out that he went from constantinople to fight with charls the emperor before his own doors . so as you may clearly see , that it was the counterpoise of these two great princes of one and the same age , which kept their forces confined within certain bounds , which for their valor and other respects might have carried the trophies of victory into the furthest remote countries . now on the other side let us examine the condition of times and potentates with whom those famous commanders of old had to wage war : al●x●nder the great , found the kingdom of persia , wherein he successfully made his first expeditions , for extent of empire very rich and powerful , but wherein was an ill disciplined militia , and commanded by unexperienced leaders , and men of no valor ; wherefore exceeding the persians in worth and discipline , though he came short of them in numbers , he may be said to have been better then they for matter of war , and therefore willingly imbraced all occasions of joyning pattel with them . and for what concerns the eastern kings and nations , which he afterwards brought under his power , who knows not how unfit they were for war , of themselves weak , not joyned in confederacie for common defence , nor sustained by strong holds , nor by the strength of a well ordered militia ? insomuch as the greatest glory that can be attributed to alexander , is for the generosity of his mind , which moved him to venter upon so many enterprises , in desert and almost unknown countries , rather then for that he overcame great difficulties in fight , and brought them to an end . the same almost may be observed by the things done in the eastern parts by p●●pey the great . it is true that caesar met with greater difficulties in the things he did in france and in spain , for he waged war with people who knew how to manage their arms , and who were till then thought unvanquishable ; wherefore he spent more time there . yet these provinces were divided into many kings and popularities , none of which were very strong of themselves , nor were they very secure by the assistance of others to make them able to resist an army of veteran , and excellently well disciplined soldiers , as was that which was commanded by caesar : so as it seems we may with reason conclude that if these cried up commanders had met with powerful and valiant armies , able to be compared with theirs , and that these had been guided and upheld by the experience and worth of great commanders , their fames would certainly have been less , not would they have so easily have assubjected so many countries , and erected their trophies of victories in so many regions as they did . but besides all these considerations , we may perhaps with reason weigh , the arts and waies which these an●ient warriers made use of ( to boot with what belonged to the militia ) to make their acqusitions and glory the greater : for he who shall consider their actions , may therein discern so inflamed a desire of praise and glory as it seems this was the onely thing which they propounded to themselves for reward of all their labor and danger , and for the end of all their undertakings ; for they have left many noble examples behind t●em , not onely of military valor , but of equity , clemencie , temperance , and of other glorious vertues which ●ssisted them very much in winning favor , and affection with the people , and likewise the love of many of those very princes who were overcome by them . thus we read of alexander , that he confirmed their kingdom● to many indian kings whom he overcame , and did inc●ease them to some others ; and being contented with obedience from them , and rec●iving such things as were necessary for his voyage , he seemed rather to aspire after the glory of new acquisitions , then to reap any advantage by what he had already won : but pompey , not like a victorious chie●tain in war , but rather like a friend and arbi●rator composed the differences between those princes of the east , restored the antient lords to their kingdoms , and gave new states to such others as did deserve them . insomuch as it was from his lib ral●ty that phar●●ces was to acknowledge the kingdom of bosphorus , antiochus , that of sile●tia , tygranes , the kingdom of armenia , ariobarzanes , that of cappadocia , diotarus , the li●e of galitia , and did onely reduce such countries into provinces , and made them im●edia ely subject to the senate and people of rome , wherein he found no legitimate lords and masters , as it fell out in syri● , iudea and some other regions . it was by reas●on of these proc●edings , that many people and pr●nces , did voluntarily submit to the empire of alexander and of the romans . wherefore darius when he was overcome by alexander , adm●●ing his great continencie and humanit●e , prayed the gods that if the fail of that empire was destined , the glory and succession of the kingdom of ●ersia might fall upon alexander . all ●istories are f●ll of such examples of worth and vertue in things done by the romans ; but now adaies princes and commanders do but little mind the imitation of these men and wage war , not out of a desire of glory , as did those magnanimous artients ; but onely out of revenge and cruelty . or else to turn all the fruit and benefit of victory upon themselves leaving nothing safe nor intire to the conquered . whence it ensues that they who fears these extreams , desperately resolve to do their utmost , and hazard all , rather then to submit themselves to the power and discretion of those on whom they 〈◊〉 their ultimate ruine depends . ●y this means , proceedings march a slower pace , and all acquisitions become more difficult , so this immoderate desire of having all things for th●r own service , working a contrary eff●ct to their intentions , keeps the confines of their dominions more narrowly bounded , and the●eby lessens that glory which they seem to aspire so much at . if then our princes and chieftains will walk in the waies of the antients , they will finde that justice , clemencie , and moderate empire , are stronger and more secure engins to take strong holds , then those wh●ch they in these times make use of . and if they be not faulty in the tru●st worth , they will find sufficient valor and discipline in their soldiers , to bring to pass wh●tsoever great enterprises , and to exalt their name to such a height of glory , and so illustrate themselves and their age as they may in all things be deservedly compared to the famousest and most cried up of the antients . the seventh discourse . what the cause is why italy hath enjoyed so long peace and quiet in these latter times . he who shall call to mind what troubles italy for a long time hath suffered under , which after the passage of charls the eight , king of france , till the peace made at bolognia , was for the space of thirty five years continually infested with better wars , and subject to all those greater evils which the wickedness of man hath found out to his own undoing , may justly think her very happy in this present , and the last preceding age , wherein after so long a combustion she hath enjoyed so happy and quiet a peace : for though in this time some little sparkles may have broken forth , yet have they not spread much , nor lasted long ; but being confined within some small circuits , the greater and more noble parts of italy have remained safe and untouched by this flame . wherefore those princes who this mean while have had the government of the several states of italy , are certainly much to be praised , and the people of italy are chiefly to acknowledg so great a benefit from their wisdom and vigilancie . yet because there have divers accidents happened , which have opened the way to princes wherein to walk directly on to this right end of peace and concord , it may be worth the while , particularly to examine from what causes this good hath proceeded ; for thereby it may likewise be known how the like may be preserved . it is a proposition sufficiently known , and indubitably true , that sublata causa tollitur effectus ; take away the cause , and the effect which proceeds from thence will cease . wherefore by truly examining the causes from whence the wars and molestations of italy did proceed , we may perceive how these ceasing , she hath remain'd in that peace and quiet , which may be said to be the true , proper , and most natural condition of a state ; all other workings in a good government , and even war it self being ordained for peace : whereby as ci●ies and kingdoms enjoy civil felicity , so must that state be most perfect , wherein the perfectest workings are exerc●sed to the most p●rfect end . peace is of it self introduced into a state by taking away the impediments which do disturb it , just as health is introduced into our bodies by taking away those ill humors which keep them from their perfect and natural condition . now if we will take into our consideration , whence as from the principal occasions , that h●rmony ( if i may so call it ) which the concord of the italian princes had so long produced , and preserved with such liking and consolation of all men , was spoil'd and corrupted , we shall find that two affect●ons which do usually accomp●ny empire , and which at this time grew very powerful in some princes , were those roots from which so many mischiefs did afterwards put forth , to wit , fear and ambition ; fear of losing ones own state , ambition of possessing what belongs to another . the fear of the king of aragons just indignation made lodovic storza think upon novelties , made him have rec●urse for help to france , and made him believe that was best for him , which proved his ruine : but it w●s ambit●on of add●ng new territories to that crown , and glory to himself , which made charls the eight , king of france , but young both in years and experience , think upon nothing but how to effect his desires , by accept●ng of sforzas proff●r of passing into italy , which proved the sepulchre of so many soldiers , and of so many g●lant commanders of that warlike nation , by the so many wars which arose from that spring-head , and which brought no other advantage to the authors . but let us make a little further enquiry . the so famous , and as it may justly be termed , so pernicious war to all italy , made by the league of so many christian princes , who had all conspired the ruine of the commonwealth of venice , whence did it arise but from these two w●cked seeds , fear and ambition ? many princes apprehended the greatness of the republick , which was already much increased by the prosperous success in war wherein she was associated by the french , whereby she was become very formidable , especially to the princes of italy ; wherefore they all desired her abasement for their own security . nor was the emperor maximilian totally free from this fear , who had learnt by late experience how powerful the forces of the commonwealth were grown , which had bereft him of some towns belonging to him . but lodovick king of france ( the thir●t after empire being always u●quenchable ) growing still more desirous to possess the whole state of milan , whereof he had already gotten the greatest part , and repenting himself that the cities of cremona and giaradada were fallen to the ventians , was egg'd on by this spur of ambition to join in conspiracie with the other princes against the commonwealth , which had so lately and so many several ways deserved so very well at his hands . after these ensued many long wars , though not equally grievous , which had many various and uncertain events , and which were fomented and maintain'd by these seeds of all discord , fear and ambition . when the greatness and power of the emperor charls the fifth was increased and confirm'd in italy , the commonwealth apprehended that her state in terra firma would not by reason thereof be very safe : she therefore willingly took up arms , accompa●ied by the french , to secure herself from the danger she conceived she lay under by reason of the continual neighborhood of a greater and more powerful neighbor , by having a particular prince of that state , who might be duke of milan . francis king of france desired likewise to see the emperor bereft of that state , but out of other respects ; to wit , because his ambition was such as would never suffer him to give way to the fortune of charls the emperor , and to see charls so much superior to him , especially in italy , where his predecessors the kings of france , and he himself with no less fervencie , though with worse success , had labored so long , with such expence , and with the loss of so many men , only to retain and keep some territories . this was the tree , from which the boughs or sprouts could not be so fast cut off , but that one war soon succeeded another ; wherewith italy was long perplex'd , till in the year . the princes being tyred , and the people ruin'd , agreement was made in that famous meeting at bolognia , in which so sound foundations of the peace and quiet of italy were laid , as they may almost be said to have continued till now , with fair hopes of longer continuance . for though f●r thus many years there have been some commotiens in italy , made both by her own inhabitants , and by foreiners , yet in respect of the calamities she underwent in those former ages , they may rather be termed uprores then wars . this condition of affairs and of affection● being changed , and the materials being removed by which the fire of war was fed , italy remained in great tranquility . soon after this introduction of peace , the stat● of milan , by the imma●ure death of francisco sf●rza , who left no issue behind ●im , fell into the power of charls the emperor , and afterwards into his son philip's ; in which princes no such respect concurr'd as lately have been mentioned , whereby the peace of italy might be troubled , as it had been before : for these princes , by reason of their other great possessions , being peacefully masters of so fair and noble a part of italy , as is the kingdom of naples and dukedom of milan , they had no reason to trouble the peaceful condition of affairs , either out of any apprehension of their own businesses , or out of a desire to enjoy what appertained to others . they were treed from fear not onely by the friendship solemnly established , and ratified by the other portent●tes of italy , but much more by their own power and greatness , and th● knowledge that to intreach upon one , might easily move all the rest , and afford occasion of bringing ●orein forces into italy , whereby to disturb ●heir own setled possession of so large and nobe a share ●hereof , kept th●m from dreaming upon the possessing of other mens estates . so likewise the commonwealth of venice was at this time in such a condition , as being only to covet peace , she might hope to injoy it safely , because she was neither so great nor powerful , as to hope after new acquisitions , being counterpoised by greater forces in italy , who upon the least discovery in her of taking up arms , would oppose her , and not suffer h●r to increase , to their prejudice ; neither was she yet so weak , as she might dread being easi●y opprest by others , so as to secure herself from such a danger , she might be constrained to think upon novelties , or to procure new friends the c●u●ch territories , being secured no less by the reverence due to religion , then by force of arms , remained safe and quiet ; nor had the popes any reason either to fear their own affairs , not yet to desire a greater temporal ●state ; for having recovered many cities which the church had formerly lost , discords being ceased , and the faction wherew●th she had been troubled be●ng almost e●●inguished , and the authority of the barons of rome being moderated , that holy see was in a condition of as great dignitie and safety , as she had been at any time before ; and duke cos●o de medici , duke of florence being allied to the favor and friendship of a potent prince , wherein he was very fortunate , was safe enough ; and being likewise a new prince in ●uscany , he was to think , as he wisely did , rather how to setle himself well in his noble dominon , then to dream of becoming the author of new wars , and of increasing his state. hence it was that the forces of these greater potenrates being ballanced and theit thoughts tempered , all occasions of making any great change or alteration of states in her was taken away , such as had hapned in the former ages , through the commotions of the very princes of italy . as for such dangers as might happen from abroad , italy was at this time secured by various accidents . if w● shall first consider the empire , from whence her greatest troubles had often t●mies come , those emperors knew very well , by what had succeeded to charls in the imperial dignity , that they had not forces sufficient wherewith to betake themselves to forein enterprises out of any particular interest or ambition , without the help of germany , which was but little inclined to increase their power and authority . but ( though the moderate minds of those princes , which was alwa●es inclined to justice and equity must be greatly praised ) the eminent danger their states lay in by reason of the turks forces , was above all other things able to keep them from thinking of molesting other mens states ; which turks , being so near and so powerful neighbors , have kept them busied and molested , and in a condition of thinking rather how to secure their own affairs , then to increase their fortune by new acquisi●ons , not onely when they were forced to take up arms for the defence of hungary and austria , but even in time of peace , and greatest security . the french i must confess have been more intent to trouble the peace of italy , on which they had a long time set their minds , out of a desire to get some footing there . but though the forces of that flourishing and powerful kingdom were very formidable before these civil discords , yet experience hath shewed that their attempts , when they have had none to receive and to uphold them in italy , have caused more dread then damage ; for their armies being to be furnished with all necessaries from a far off , they have been overcome by weaker ●orces , and oft-times by their own wants . therefore because in these later times , when they past over the mountains , they were not con●ederate , as formerly they had been , with any great potentate in italy , therefore have they been able to ●arry there but a while , nor have they made the noise of their trumpets be heard a far off , though they havenever let 〈◊〉 any occasion out of a desire of novelty and glory ; so as all those who have at any time been ill satisfied by the imperi●lists , and then by the spainards , have been easily received into friendship with them . this was the defence of sie●na imbraced , a city opprest by the severe government of caesars officers . thus were the ferne●s taken into protection , to keep them in their possession of parma and piacenza , out of which the emperor would have driven them : thus was the prince of salerno listned unto , who by his favor , and the insurrection of the people furthered the hopes of great acquisitions in the kingdom of naples . thus paul the fourth met with good correspondencie in henry king of france , as soon as he discovered himself to be ill affected towards caesar , and that he would take up arms against him ; for he hoped to attain those things by the friendship and conjunction of a powerful prince , and one , who according to his desire , was apt to commotions , wherein he had had but ill success at the same time in italy , by reason of the weak assistance of the senesi ; but all this while , and upon all these ocasions , it may be truly affirmed that these were rather tumults then wars ; which ( as hath been said ) was occasioned chiefly , for that such a disposition of mind and of affairs , was found in the princes of italy , as they did not much , ●or all at a time interess themselves in these wars . and though some of the popes did busie themselves therein , yet since these wars were not treated of as any thing belonging to the church , or immediately appertaining to the apostolick see , they were neither favored by the other princes of italy , nor yet imbraced by the succeeding popes , with the same thoughts , because their ends , nor interests were not the same ; nay they did rather endeavor to appease , then to foment them . and those who were the raisers and furtherers of these novelties , and of the coming of forein forces , being weak of themselves , and not being seconded by any , they could not long make good the war , not having sufficient forces of themselves , nor being able to make such use of the transa●●●ne forces , but that they were exceeded by those who opposed them , and who were of greater force and friendship in italy ; as was particularly seen in the wars of sienna , which lasted longest , and were the forest that happened in these latter times . for the ●rench having no other receptacle in italy then what was given them by the senest , who had called them in , and being stoutly opposed by charls the emperor , who was stronger by reason of the many opportune aids which he received from the duke of florence , they could not long continue , not fi● their abode in italy . in which occurrences the state of venice may justly challenge no smal share of commendation . for that notwithstanding the so many offers , and pressures made unto her , to take up arms , and to make use of such occasions as presented themselves , to augment her fortune , she notwithstanding , with less aspiring thoughts , but certainly with very wise and safe advice , continuing in her newtrality did rather endeavor by her many good offices to withdraw fewel from the fire which had already burst forth in italy , then to make it flame the higher by intere●●ing herself therein , and by joyning with either party . whereby she did not undoubtedly advantage herself onely , but whole italy , where she being one of the chief potentates ; by keeping quiet and newrer , not inclining to either party was the reason why the imperial and french forces , counterpoising each other , could not effect any of their designs , which might have proved prejudicial to the liberty and peace of italy . hence then it ensues , that the best advice for the preservation of this peace and quiet of italy , is to keep affairs so equally ballanced , as that the princes who have dominions there , may neither have reason of fear , nor of ambition , which ( as hath been said ) have in former times been cause of her perturbances . in which happy condition she will still continue , if the princes of italy shall know so to moderate their desires , and keep themselves so closely annexed together by an union of mind , and by good intelligence , that the one may not fear the other for any desire of novelty which may be found in them , nor discover themselves to be so weak by their divisions as out of the easiness of the prey , ambition may move others to aspire after their states . the e●ghth discourse . whether citadel● and strong holds , much used by our modern princes , be commodious , and of true safety to a state , or no ? forts and strong holds are of late grown into so great esteem , as princes seem now adaies to mind nothing more then these for the security of their states . yet this business may admit of such various considerations , as it is not peradventure easie to be discerned , whether a prince that is thus advised be in the right way to effect that which he propounds unto himself , which is , the securing of his affairs . to know then what ought truly to be thought in this case , we must first consider what this art of fortification is of it self , on which so much study , and expence is bestowed , and whether it be grounded upon such undeniable principles and reasons , as by means thereof the benefit at which it aims , of preserving cities and states in safety , may be expected from it . certainly this first consideration admits of no ● smal doubt or difficultie ; for we are taught by modern exper●ence , that all the waies whereby a strong hold may be assaulted and take● , are not yet so well known , as being reduced under general terms , as that it may be asserted , that thereby an art is found out which contains all sorts of possible offence , and wh●ch is governed by a cert●in and true rule to effect the intent thereof , and to come to the perfection thereof . nay , rather we find to the contrary , that the professors of this art do not agree well in their principles ; and that time makes it subject to such alterations , by reason of the new waies which the wit of man finds out as well for offence as defence , as it seems it must be confest , that this is not in reality a true art , or at least , that it is so imperfectly known and used , as that strong holds are but a weak foundation for the safety of a state , though they be never so many , and be in esteem by military men . for , say nothing else does it , the experience of more then one age doth evidently prove , that is a short time they become vain and useless ; since a fort which was formerly greatly esteemed , and held to be almost impregnable , hath now by the invention of new engins , and wa●es of opugn●ng it , lost that reputation , and is thought little less then ridiculous : and it may be beleeved , that the same may befal any strong holds which are in these daies built , by reason of the new waies of offending which many do daily with much study and industry labour to finde out . whence it is that princes find they have often spent much time , workmanship and moneys , in a business , which in time of need can but little avail them ; and ● they wi●l reap any benefit thereby , they must continually be at new expence both of monies and men , keeping them continually busied in new works and fabricks , adding alwaies , or altering many things about their forts , to fit them to the use of the present times and militia . but give it for granted , that such strong holds may be brought to rather an imaginable , then a possible perfection and security , certainly they are no way serviceable of themselves , but are like dead and useless things , which have need to be as it were inanimated and be made useful by good garisons , who may keep and defend them . and if otherwise , they serve for the conveniencie and service of the enemy which makes it yet more questionable , whether strong holds be a greater safety or weakening to a state ; and where there are many and very great ones , the doubt is made the greater ; since so many soldiers must be imployed in their defence , as if the prince be not very powerful , he shall hardly find forces sufficient to keep several armies ( as they may be termed ) on foot , some within the forts , and some in the campagnia . nor can it be made good , that strong holds are of themselves sufficient to secure the whole state ; for though they may entertain the enemy for a while , and stop the first brunt of an impetuous assault , yet at last , unless they be back'd with forces from without , and timely succored and relieved , being overcome either by power , length of time , or necessity , they must yield and fall into the power of the enemy : which cannot be denied , no not by the very professors and favorers of fortification . and yet it cannot be denied , but if a prince have sufficient forces to keep the field in his own country , he may thereby keep himself from being injured ; for men do not easily put things to hazard , where they think to meet with stout opposition ; and the only opinion and reputation of such forces , is able to keep off the greatest dangers : for the enemy who did design to assault such a state , becomes jealous and doubtful , nor is he bold enough to enter far into such a state as is guarded by a good army , and chiefly in situations ( such as are almost in all countries ) as are naturally fortified by hills , vallies , or rivers ; where it is hard to enter , and harder to retreat . and if any well experienced captain command over such forces , he will be likely enough to defeat the enemy , without endangering himself , by keeping him from victuals , and so imployed and busied in sun●ry ways , as he shall neither be able to keep long in the country , nor much less imploy himself in the taking or sacking of any cities ; since he knows he is hourly subject to surprisals , and to be ru●n'd ; and strong holds securing nothing but those quarters where they are situated , they do not secure the state , if they be but a few ; and if many , they require all the forces for their own defence , and leave the enemy master of the field , to the prince his prejudice , and the peoples despair . so also , if they be but little ones , and incapable of such works , and so many men as are requisite to make them hold out long , they and the soldiers which defend them are lost ; and if they be great , and contain large plots of ground , as is most in fashion in these days , they may be more perfect in themselves , but they need so many men to defend them , as those forces which ought to be imployed for the safeguard of the whole country , or a great part thereof , are bounded within a little compass , in defence of some city or ci●adel . and yet these very soldiers , when drawn out into the field , may do much better service ; for being fashioned into the body of an army , they become as it were a moveable fort , which secures at once many cities , and a great tract of country : nay , by these the enemy is much ●●damaged , and the troubles and danger of war are kept far from a mans own home . for ( as hath been said ) diversions , and preventions may be made by these forces , they may be carried into another mans state , and set another mans ho●se on fire , before it take head in ones own house ; but he who placeth his safety in strong holds , puts himself into a condition of being at his enemies disposal , in whose will it lies to choose what shall make most for his advantage , with great prejudice to the opposing party : for he may either pass by the for●s , over-ru● the country , enrich his soldiers by booty , impoverish the subjects of that country which is assaulted , and cannot be releived , by reason that the forces thereof are disperst and imploid in the defence of the strong holds ; or if he will make any certain archievement , he may sit down before any fort , and without indangering his own men , whilst he shall live upon the enemies territories , he may in time , take it by siege , and effect his own desires ( for as hath been said ) no strong hold can promise it self long safety where no succour is ready at hand . but let us come a little closer to the business , and let us suppose that these strong holds may be brought to such a condition as they may be assuredly able to resist any open force which shall come against them , and not be deceived in that their beleef , as often times they are ; how can they secure themselves from treacherie , and from such dangers as they may be subject unto by the negligence of soldiers , or falsehood of the commanders that have the custodie thereof ? in which case the princes danger is so much the greater , and more irreparable , for that his enemy is in the dominions , in a well munited seat , from whence he cannot hope to drive him , without much labor and difficultie . but in greater cities wherein are a multitude of people , and where these cautions and suspitions are not to be found , others no whit inferior to these do arise ; for such quantities of victuals is requisite to feed the many men that are therein inclosed , as no prince is able to provide for so , as may serve them for a long time ; and if this fail , to what end serves walls , weapons , or soldiers ? to this may be added that the safety of such strong holds , does in a great part depend upon the pleasure of the people , who being of themselves naturally fickle , do often favor forein princes out of very slight reasons , and sometimes out of a meer desire of noveltie ; and plot by sedition , and by open force against the present state , and deliver themselves , and the city into another mans power : and though they may afterwards repent themselves of their folly , they know not how to mend it , when a powerful army is within the city walls ; nor can this be done by him who defends the state , because he cannot keep so many forces together as are able to defend several places at ●nce , and because loving his subjects , as a legitimate prince ought to do , he is loath to destroy a city of his own though whole armies be therein . but if the state be open and not pestred with fortifications , though it may the more easily be lost by sudden assaults , or by ill affected subjects , it will be the more easily regained , and as soon as the prince who is deprived thereof , shall have means to rallie his forces which by misfortune may have been beaten , he soon makes head again , and recovers what he had lost , the enemy not having any safe hold wherein to abide . and of this there are many apparent examples . if the commonwealth of venice , in the times of her greatest calamitie , had had her state in terra firma so well provided of strong holds , as now it is , she might not peradventure have run so great a misfortune , she had not so soon lost so many and so noble cities as she did ; but it may be alleadged on the contrary , that if in that evil crisis of affairs wherein she was brought to such adversity , she had had so many important forts as now she hath , and that they had faln into the power of the enemy , she would not certainly have so soon recovered her losses , and restored herself into her pristine power and greatness as she did . we likewise see the state of milan , which fell so often into the power of the french , it staid not long under their dominio● , for not finding any strong and royal forts , wherein they could make any safe abode , nor having time to erect any by reason of their continual wars , or for want of monies , the defenders of that state did often times prevail ; and every accident , either of the change of the peoples minds , or of their enemies increase of forces , were sufficient to drive them out : which would not have happened if they had but once been masters of any strong holds , from whence they could not have been expel'd , without a long and hard siege . guide ubald● d. of urbin , a prince but of small territories , but very wise , and well experienced in war , moved by these respects , after he had recovered his state which was formerly taken from him by duke valentine , he resolved to slight all the strong holds that were there , knowing that they could not at first preserve his state unto him , and when hee should lose it , they would make the difficultie of regaining it the greater . when charls the eighth , king of france , going to win the kingdom of naples past through tuscany , the forts which the florentines had built for their own securitie , were the very things whereby they were most indamaged , and these falling into the power of the french , whose forces they thought they were not able to withstand , they put the florentines to vast expence , and made them undergo great slavery , out of a desire of recovering them . whereas if that state had la●n open , the king , who was bound upon other enterprises , passing forward , would no waies have troubled the affairs of that commonwealth . the like , and almost out of the like respect , did afterward befall duke cosimo , when the emperor charls the fifth would keep some castles belonging to that state in his own power , which should otherwise have been left free to cosimo ; and which was the occasion of that saying , chele fortezza sonoi ceppi della toscana , that strong holds are the fetters of tuscany . these are the greatest mischiefs which strong holds use to bring with them ; but there are others not altogether so grievous , but more certain and irreparable . for who can deny but that the excessive charge which princes are at , not onely in building fortresses , but more in muniting , and guarding them doth sufficiently exhaust the publick exchequer , and necessitate the disbursing of such moneys in times of peace , as ought to be kept for the more urgent occasions of war. and certainly he who could see what vast sums the commonwealth of venice hath spent for some late years past in making and muniting so many forts both by sea and land , would be very much astonished , and would confess that so great a mass of treasure would ●be● sufficient to provide for any war how great soever , and to withstand for a good while any potent enemy . it may peradventure likewise be said , and not untruly , that whilst a prince reposes much confidence in being able to maintain his state by means of these strong holds , and by the assistance of a few soldiers , he is not so careful as he ought to be of other things which belong to the mili●ia , which are notwithstanding real and secure foundations of a state. the lacedemonians would not therefore suffer their cities to be begirt with a wall because they beleeved that by the thoughts of such securitie , their citizens would become more careless and negligent in managing their arms , by sole means whereof they thought that the forces of an enemie might and ought to be kept afar off . which that wise man would likewise infer who said , that the walls , which ought to secure a city should be made of iron not of stone . and a spartan being demanded by an athenian , what he thought of the walls of athens ? answered , that he thought they were very handsome for a city which was to be inhabited by women ; inferring , that it is not necessarie , nor honorable , for able , valiant men , to secure themselves from their enemies by such means . it is likewise usually seen , that a prince , who thinks he shall be able to curb his subjects , to gov●rn them and rule them as he pleaseth by means of bulwarks and castles , and that therefore he needs not the love of his subjects , is much less mindful of those things which become a good prince , and which purchase affect●on . yet we are taught by many evident examples that the peoples love or hatred is that which doth most preserve unto him , or bereave him of his state , and makes them more ready or backward to render him obedient ; as is of late seen in flanders ; which so many fortresses ▪ and armies hath not in so long a time been able to reduce to the devotion of its ligit●mate prince . and it may generally be observed , that such governments as have lasted longest , have been preserved , not by the advantage of strong holds , whereof some have not had any , but by vertue of a good militia , and of the subjects love . the romans were accustomed , when they had won any new country , to send new inhabitants thither , who being placed either in the antient cities , or in others built by themselves , they called roman colonies ; and by these mens valor , as people devoted and obliged to the senate and people of rome , out of remembrance of their desert , and in gratitude for the good which they had received , they easily kept the new subjects in loyalty to the commowealth , and the countries which they had won by their arms , in obedience . the which , being moved thereunto by the same respects , the venetians did likewise in candia , sending many of their own gentlemen thither to make colonies , and to defend and maintain that island . but the turks , in a very violent manner , but answerable to the custom of their government , do almost totally destroy the antient inhabitants of their new-gotten countries , chiefly the richest and the most noble , from whom they take their l●nds and possessions , and give the revenues thereof to be made use of by the sold●ery , making timari thereof ( as they term it ) which are pays or revenues assigned over to the soldiers , upon condition that they are to maintain a certain number of horse , by which means they keep a great number of warriors continually on foot , who se●ving for garrisons for the safety of the new acquired country , are notwithstanding always ready to serve in any other place , and upon all occasions as they shall be commanded , to the greater benefit and safety of the state , then forts and strong holds can do to those other nations which make most use of them . but other princes , who have had greater abundance of territories , if you will respect their inhabitants , did use to leave great store of land upon their confines desert and unmanured , as at these times the persians did upon their confines towards the turks , to render it more difficult for a numerous army to pass through them to their prejudice , or in case they do , to make any long abode there : which hath often been of great use to them , as hath been seen , when very mighty armies have been led on by the ottoman emperors against the persians , they have most commonly been wasted and destroyed by their own sufferings and wants . from these things it appears it may be inferr'd , that there are other arts and ways which may much better do that for which fortifications were first found out , and for which they are now a-daies so much used , especially amongst christian princes . and yet if we will face about , some other , and those no contemptible arguments will be found , which will plead for the very great advantage which princes and states receive from fortifications . it is most assuredly certain , that to secure a mans self by all means possible from offence , is a precept not only taught by reason , but dictated by nature , which , as it were by some occult and miraculous counsel , hath pleased to divide those nations by a long series of high tow'ring mountains , and to secure them from the injuries which the diversity of climate hath produced in their several affections and customs , and consequently a certa●n natural enmity ; and hath likewise provided in all parts more eminent seats amongst mountains , and more inclosed ones amidst vallies , wherein the inhabitants may preserve themselves safe from the force and violence , which the stronger use to exercise upon the weaker . so as fortification may be said to be an art which doth imitate and help nature , because her operations are like those of the others , and do sometimes reduce the workmanship of nature to more perfection and use . and though this be not grounded upon so certain principles as those of the sciences , yet doth she govern herself by a kind of reason in such things wherein she is versed . and thus much may serve to prove that she deserves the name of art ; neither ought she to be ever a whit undervalued , because new things and new rules are daily found out by the industrie of those that study her , since it is proper to natural and eternal things to keep themselves always in such a condition , as that they suffer not any alteration . but say what thing it is , which of all humane operations , wherein such certainty and constancie is to be found ? no man will notwithstanding say , that men are to live idly , or totally to betake themselves to contemplation , and despise so many arts , which are the ornaments of civil life , because we cannot proceed therein by way of demonstration to one only and certain truth . nor can it be said that this arts of fortification is of late invention , for it is very antient , and hath been known almost in all ages , and by all nations ; but sometimes in lesser , sometimes in greater perfection , according to a certain variety and vicissitude which time causeth as well in arts , as in all other things . the antients had their forts , and engines of war to take them , which by a general name they called tormenta : amongst other engines which served to batter down forts , the rams were much known and used ; and we find mention made of many other sorts of instruments belonging to the offence and defence of cities ; and of these some so miraculous , as their force may be said to cause no less wonder then do our guns now-a-daies . to this purpose we read , that when scipio would vanquish a certain city in spain , the defenders thereof threw certain irons over the walls , so artificially ordered , as they therewith drew up such of the enemies soldiers as came neer the walls , to the top thereof . and it is related of that famous archimedes , that he invented an engine which was used in defence of his country syracusa , by which an armed gally might be raised by force out of the water , and drawn up on the town-walls . how can it be then said , that such art of fabricking was unknown to the antients , if they used such study and industry in defending and in oppugning forts ? nay , many of their most cry'd up commanders have been praised particularly for this ; and the romans , who were very excellent at all things belonging to the militia , were very good at this also , and did thereby preserve their state , which they had almost lost by fighting : for hannibal in his prosperous course of victory , was forced to keep so long , and spend so much time before some small , but strong and well-walled castles , and colonies of the romans , as the safety of the city of rome was in a great part attributed thereunto . but to speak no more of these antient proceedings , do we not see that many forts and castles have been built in not many ages ago in many places , and chiefly in italy ? which though the use of cannon renders now of no use , yet compare such fortresses with the manner of warfaring in those days , and they may be held almost equal to ours , or at least they shew that men did study as much then to secure themselves from being injured by the enemy , and the better to maintain their states and territories by that art , as they do now . the so many sieges and beleaguering of cities , whereof mention is made in all ages , do cleerly prove that the use of fortification is of very antient use , and hath been continued in all ages , though it be now reduced to much greater perfection . now if we shall consider what advantage is made by fortifica●ions , we shall find them to be many , and of great importance : for it is sufficiently manifest , that a country wherein are no strong holds , is alwaies in apparent danger , and left almost at the discretion of the enemy ; who whilst they may safely at unawares enter thereinto , not meeting with any obstacle , have it alwaies in their power , if not to prejudice the main affairs of that state , at least to vex the people by fire and rapine , of whose safety and preservation the prince ought alwais to be careful . we may find sad example of this by the late and well known passages of the country of friuli in the late wars which the state of venice had in terra firma ; being totally destitute of strong holds , it became a prey to whosoever would assault it ; insomuch as it was not onely ruined and destroyd by regular armies , but by such as passed tumultuously over the mountains ; the inhabitants thereof being only so long secure , as the venetian army was permitted to remain amongst those confines ; but as soon as being summoned from thence , upon other occasions , it behoved to be gone from thence , the enemies returned again to fresh and secure depredations ; which will likewise befal any region which is not defended , and maintained by fortresses . and where the members of a state are far asunder , if it must be defended onely by the soldiers sword , many armies will scarcely be able to secure it ; whereas by means of strong holds , the same people who are able to defend them , will likewise serve in a great part to preserve the country ; as well because many of the inhabitants may there finde safe refuge , as likewise for that is no good advice nor usually imbraced by good commanders to advance forward , and to leave the forts of the enemy placed in fitting parts upon the frontiers behinde them , the state is preserved from greater dangers . as on the contrary , the state wherein there are no strong holds , though it be provided of a good and valiant militia , yet must it depend upon the various chance of war , and hazard all upon the uncertain event of battel ; and if any thing of misfortune befal , the whole country is left to the discretion of the enemy , and the armies not having any safe place whereunto to retreat are totally defeated by one rout ; as it happened in the last age in the soldan of cairo's most famost empire , which soldan being overcome in several battels by selymus ottoman , and wanting time to rally his army , and strong holds whereunto to have refuge , did in a short time lose his whole kingdom and the empire of the mammalucchi was overthrown ; which was before very famous for military discipline , and esteemed very secure , by reposing its safety in the valor of strong and able men . to this may be added , that strong holds do not onely secure states from these utmost hazards of adverse fortune , but make very much for the keeping it away , and often-times they reap the intention of true securitie , without any hazard ; for when he who intends to assault a state , shall consider that his attempts are likely to prove tedious and difficult , and that it is doubtful whether he shall be therein victorious or on , he does not so easily fall upon the business ; but when the war is once begun fortresses do assuredly sufficiently keep from comming to join battel ; for the assailant will not easily hazard himself upon the danger of a pitch'd field ; because he sees he shall be debarr'd the chief fruits of victorie ( which is the getting of some city or place of importance ) by strong holds : and so also he who is assaulted , the more he sees his affairs in a good posture by the means of strong holds , the more he endeavors to prolong the time , to the end that he may defeat him by his own incommodities , without much use of weapons : whence ● . is that in these times , wherein the perfection of fortifying is much increased , field battels are seldom fought ; for to fight makes not for the advantage of either of the parties out of the above said considerations ; since the wit and industry of the commanders seems to prevail over fortifications and do in a great part take that uncertainty from war which useth to be found therein . in the condition of the present affairs and times , it is also seen that as much time is spent in the taking of one onely fort , as in former ages , and when another manner of militia was in use , was spent in taking in whole provinces . which peradventure is likewise the cause why the princes of these later ages , though some of them have been very powerful and valiant , have not made any great progress in all the wars which they have made : wherefore it seems it may be affirmed that fortification is a very noble and excellent art , because it helps to compass the ultimate and true end which ought to be the aim of war in a well regulated state , to wit , peace and securitie . what is then to be resolved upon in this diversitie of allegations ? it is a true and general rule , that all things cannot suit with all things , nor ought we in the actions belonging to civil life to seek for that which is simply , and of it self good , for it would be in vain to do so ; divers things prove useful to divers ends , and to divers persons , and they ought to be accommodated to the condition of times , quality of customs , and to other particular accidents . therefore the same manner of proceeding in the government , and preservation of their states becomes not several princes , but several waies . such princes as have large dominions , and powerful forces , may securely repose 〈◊〉 safety in their militia , and soldiery , they have no great need of castles or strong holds ; and if they will have any , it may suffice them to have them placed upon their utmost confines , to secure their country from sudden incursions , and for the opportunitie and securitie of such garisons as such princes use to keep in their provinces , which are furthest remote , and at a great distance from their imperial seate ; as the roman emperors did in former times , and as the ottoman lords do now , who trusting in their own power , do endeavor much more the taking of forts which do appertain to other men , then the making of new ones themselves , which they stand not so much in need of , for that their greatness keeps them free from being injured by others . but lesser princes ought to govern themselves by another rule , and stand more in need of strong holds ; for not having any large territories , nor much money to keep a great many soldiers continually in pay , what they cannot do by force or reputation , they do by the advantage of fortifications ; for they keep what belongs unto them so well guarded by a few soldiers , as sometimes the forces of any whatsoever powerful prince are not able to pluck them out of their nest , nor yet to bereave them of any part of their state : whereof we have had many examples in these later times . and amongst the rest , the defence of malta is very remarkable , which being assaulted by the forces of so great a prince as was solyman , the few knights of malta were so able to defend it , as the turks were forced not without some shame , and much to their prejudice , to quit it , after having spent much time , and lost many men before that fort. and the turks having learned by the experience of others , the good of strong holds being now to have a better esteem of them , then formerly they have had , especially in places furthest off from the seat of the empire , where all things necessaie cannot be provided for , but in a long time , and with much inconveniencie . they have to this purpose built many forts in the parts which they have lately gotten in persia ; and have therein done very wisely ; for whereas the former ottoman emperors , reaped no good by their enterprises upon persia , but as soon as their armies were withdrawn , the country which they had over-run , but not gotten , returned to the obedience of its former lords , now , by degrees from time to time , they have by their forts so confirmed themselves in the possession of such places as they have once taken , as the persians , being a people little verst in the expugning of strong holds , have but small hopes of ever driving them out from such spacious territories , first gotten by force of arms , and afterwards by such means maintained by them , & by a safe possession secured unto them . so as the use of fortresses are sometime according as place and occasion shall serve of no smal service , not only to pe●tie princes , but even to the greatest . but as for the number of these strong holds , for the time , form , and other accident , which ought to be observed in the building of them , no such certain rule can be given as can serve all men at all times . only this may be said , that a wise prince ought to consider herein , not only what he designs to do , but what his estate , and what his forces are ; otherwise that which was intended for a cure and sustenance , may prove poison and ruin to the state. as when a prince will make such , and so many forresses , as that by reason of too great and inconsiderate expence in time of peace , in maintaining them , he must of himself consume ; then that will prove true which hath formerly been considered , that a prince of no great fortune , not being able to garrisonise or furnish so many fortresses with things necessary , not to draw forth the body of a well-adjusted army into the field , in greatest danger of war , will find he hath not secured , but increased his own dangers , and hath put the total of his affairs in great disorder and confusion . fortresses then , as all other things in a well ordered government , ought to be disposed of with good judgment , and a well regulated temper ; 〈◊〉 as their number and greatness may be proportionable to the condition of the state , and of the prince his forces : they must not be placed idly in all places , but only upon the frontiers , and in places fit for that purpose ; and so as the natural situation of the place may assist art as much as may be , and be also thereby assisted ; for such fortresses may be maintained in greater security , and with fewer soldiers . but above all things , all possible care must be had , that in time of greatest need they may be succor'd ; for no fort can hold out long against a great force , unless it be supplied by new garrisons , munitions , and with all other necessaries . it is also very advantagious for fortresses , that there be good store of good earth or mould within them , whereby they may several ways accommodate themselves for defence , according as the approaches to take them are made ; and also to have ready opportunity to use the benefit of many retrears , and to gain time , which is the proper and grearest conveniencie for fortresses . so as if fitting provisions and respects be had , fortresses so built will prove advantagious for a prince or state , not only in the opinion of soldiers , but even of statesmen . but when they are made without judgment or art , it is not the ●ault of the work , but of him who knows not how to use it , if such good effects do not ensue thereupon as are desired : which happens not only in strong holds , but in all other things , which being ill used , lose their efficacie . thus then those arguments are easily answered by these distinctions , and by what hath been alleadged in the behalf of strong holds , which might at first occasion any doubt : for the art of fortification ought not to be despised , because it hath not alwaies been the same ; rather it ought to be so much the more esteemed , because we see it grows every day to greater perfection by new inventions , and by experiences . thus it fares also with the art of building of ships and houses , with that of sculpture , physick , painting , and of all other excellent disciplines , which ( experience being the best introductress ) did not arrive at such excellencie and estimation suddenly , but in process of time . and notwithstanding , this art of fortification hath in this our age gotten some more setled rules , and ( as a man may say ) more certain principles , since the use of batteries and of other manner of attaques introduced by modern men , whereby she doth govern herself in the whole , and in every one of her particular members , in form , distance , proportion of parts , and in other things , which are alwaies the same , where the seat will permit it . variety of noble wits have added so much of ornament and of perfection of late to this noble profession , as all doubts which may be put whether there be a true art thereof , or no , are evidently cleered : and though sometimes she may vary by reason of the diversity of situations , or by any other accidents which cannot be comprised within one and the same rule , this ought not to detract from the dignity of the artificers thereof , then it doth from the polititian ( who certainly is the chiefest archi●ector in all our civil operations ) to proceed by probable arguments , and oftentimes alter his advice , that he may fit his actions to the circumstances which do accompany them . nor doth it follow , that such an art should be the worse thought of , because it doth not alwaies compass its end , which is the preservation of such a city , or such a country where such fortifications are erected ; since that likewise depends upon various accidents , which no humane art or wisdom is able to foresee nor when foreseen , to provide alwaies by any industry a due remedy against them . it may as well be said , men ought to forbear building of ships , and deprive themselves thereby of the traffick and commerce which is held with far distant countries , because many ships perish in the seas . the physitians care doth not alwaies cure the sick party ; the orator doth not alwaies compass his ends by his perswasive oratory : ought men therefore to forbear navigation , physick , or perswasion ? if a wicked and persidious man betray a fort unto the enemy which was recommended to his trust , ought this to be attributed to the evil and imperfection of forts ? what thing is there so good , as may not be abused by wicked men ? 't is only vertue which hath this priviledg ; all other adorments of humanitie would be ex●inct , and expell'd the world. if a fort be lost for being badly garrisoned , ill defended , or by some other sinister accident ; ought the fault which is committed by the prince his negligence , the commanders ignorance , or by the soldiers cowardise , be laid upon the defect of the fort , which is of it self well made ? but say , i beseech you , are such disorders and dangers as may arise in a state , by want of care in a prince , by the per●idiousness of commanders , or cowardise of soldiers , become so peculiar to forts and citadels , as the same by the same occasion may not happen in armies , and in all other defences howsoever attempted ? wherefore then by seeking for such perfection in forts , as is not found in other things , shall we by the loss of that advantage which may be thereby received , and is often received , leave the state in the hands of chance , and to the discretion of him who doth design to assault it . nor ought it to be said , that strong holds should be despised , and the whole safety of the state be placed in the militia , as in a thing of firmer foundation , because it is not every prince that can alwaies keep an army in pay , nor would this be sufficient to keep a state from unexpected assaults , which hath many several confines . moreover , he who placeth all his hopes of securing his state in armies , and in openly fighting his enemies , must oftentimes ( as it hath been said ) hazard all to fortune , and put himself upon the danger of a thousand accidents ; and unless field-forces be back'd by strong holds , and equal to those of the enemy who doth assault them , they must remain idle and of no use : for not being able to withstand the shock , what can they do else but retreat , and suffer him who shall be stronger to make himself master of the whole country ? whereas by the help of fortresses , a few are able to resist many , and to gain time , the only true remedy of him who is the weaker , and who is to resist and withstand the forces of one that is more powerful . nor ought the example of the spartans be of any validity to perswade the contrary , who would not secure their cities with walls , or any other fortifications ; because having only to do with other people of greece who were weaker then they , they thought themselves safe without such helps ; and that by doing so , they purchased more praise and reputation : but when they were to wage war with the persians and macedonians , who were powerful enemies , even they sought to put themselves in a posture of defence , by having recourse to narrow passages ; and to keep off the enemy , assisting the natural situations of the places by fortifications . moreover , the syartans had but small teritories , and but a few places to guard , and were much given to the militia ; so as they who will reap advantage by following their counsels , must be lords of cities , all the inhabitants whereof must be soldiers , and all of them desirous to preserve the state , as were the spartans . but the reason why the duke of urbin did slight some of his forts , was peradventure because he knew himself too weak to defend them ; and besides , because he thought it better not to invite others to wage war with him , either out of a jealousie of them , or out of a desire to make themselves masters of them , he being to consider all forces as they related to his , or if he would make use of other mens assistance he must depend upon them . and for what concerts the strong holds of tuscany , it may be said in the first place , that it was the imprudencie of pietro de medici , not the castles which did trouble and disorder the florentines : and secondly , that it may be duke cosimo would not so easily have gotten caesar to have confirmed him in the possession of that state , had it not been that he might thereby secure himself of his faith in that new dominion ; but the accidents which may occur are so many , as it is impossible to comprehend every particular under one and the same rule . and is it not a vain thi●g to affirm , that strong holds ought not to be made use of , because if it so fall out as the state which wants them be lost , it may be the more easily recovered ? for that is no more then to expose a mans self to mortal wounds , out of hopes that when he is hurt he may find a cure . and what prince can assure himself that though he hath been negligent in muniting his state with forts , his enemy when he shall have made himself master of his state , will not fortifie such seats as he shall find commodious for his safety . but if it be said , that a prince grows wicked , covetous , and cruel towards his subjects through his too much confiding in strong holds , it is no● easily to discern that these so far remote affairs have any thing to do with the vices of the mind , and if they ought to be taken into such consideration , the reason would reach no further then to castles and citadels ; but in greater and more important fortifications , the prince is so much the more bound to preserve the love and loyaltie of his subjects , in that he stands in the more need of them for the safety of the city thus fortified , for if it should fall into the enemies hands by the peoples rebellion , the loss would be the greater . but it may be the consideration of expence which that prince puts himself unto , who builds many strong holds , may seem to bear more weight with it then any of the rest , whereas his chief care ought to be , to accumulate treasure in time of peace , against wars shall happen ; to which it may be answered , that states cannot be preserved without charges and expence ; and that if a prince should go about to procure the like securitie to himself by his militia , as he doth by his strong holds : he must be at infinite more expence , and such as none but great kingdoms and empires are able to undergo . but if a prince proceed therein with such temper and judgement as hath been spoken of , and which is also requisite in all things else , he can incur no danger by fortifications , of running into those disorders and necessities , which many careless men , and such as know not how to govern do fall . we will then conclude , that fortifications are very useful in all states , but chiefly in small ones , and those more then any others , which have many confines , and powerful neighbors , for such states have need of good guards , and have not wherewith to keep armies perpetually on foot , as the turks do in these times , nor to make desarts as do the persians , nor to institute colonies in several parts , as was the custom of the antient romans ; and if the commonwealth of venice did imitate them therein , it was but once ; and with more desire to the self-inhabitants of the island of candia at her devotion , then to defend it from forein forces ; but now that the turks power is grown so formidable , it would be altogether unuseful , and not of any moment , without strong holds , and a well paid militia ; therefore the care and study which princes take more in these latter times then they did formerly in fortification must needs be praised by whosoever considers things with a right judgment . the ninth discourse . whether the opinion of pope leo the tenth were good or no , and his counsel safe , of driving forein nations out of italy , by the help of other transalpine forces . italy had been molested with wars by forein nations , almost continually for the space of thirty years , when in the time of the popedom of leo the tenth , she seemed to have some hopes of quiet , and of enjoying some better condition , after her so many and so grievous vexations and ruines , which had called to mind the unhappy memorie of the former calamities which she had undergone by the invasion of the northern armies . but the wounds of the late evils remained yet uncured ; for two noble members of this province were faln into the hands of forein princes , the state of milan being at the devotion of francis king of france , and the emperor charls the fifth being possest of the kingdom of naples ; which princes being now weakned and weary with so many wars , so as the one could not exceed the other , and having at that time their thoughts elsewhere bent , being governed more by necessitie peradventure then by their own wills , they seemed to rest satisfied with what they did already posses in italy , and that they would suffer her to enjoy at least some rest after her past molestations . in this posture of affairs , pope leo , who had often negotiated with several princes about the business of arms , and had endeavored ( as he said ) the liberty of italy , and chiefly the preservation of the dukedom of milan in the government of the sforza's , was much displeased to have the power of strangers any longer continued , and particularly that the church should be berest of two noble cities , parma and piacenza , which were become members of the state of milan . therefore with a haughty and generous mind , he resolved not to prefer an unsecure quiet , before some present troubles , so to shun other molestations and dangers , which he thought might grow the greater by such a peace , in future , if not to himself , at least to the church . and knowing that he should not be able either of himself , nor by joining with other italians , to drive forein potentates out of italy , he resolved to join with some foreiners against some other foremers , with design ( as he said ) that when some of them should be forced to forgo italy , it might be the easier to expel the rest . leo having thus put on this noble and generous resolution , it may seem to merit praise by all men , as to the intention ; but as for the means he took to compass it , it is not so easily to be agreed upon ; for many and weighty respects do concur thereunto ; for some of which , this action may seem to be as wise , as glorious ; and if we will reflect upon other some , there will appear much more of difficulty and danger therein , then of security and hopes . that all transalpin●rs might be driven out of italy , was a thing desired , and not without cause by all italians , and which ought to be his chi●fest care and endeavor who had such territories , degree and authority in that province , as leo had . the antient dignity of the italian honor seemed to appear in the pop●s majesty , and in the splendor of the court of rome . ●ut as for the effecting of this business , it did planly appear that all the power of the italian pot●ntates was too weak ; since two great princes and warlike nations , had fo● many past years , though with various fortune , got footing there , and still kept their possession , so as their power could suffer no disturbance , but must be confirmed and consolidated , and must become more formidable to the church , and to all the italian princes , unless it were by some of the same forein nations . if the sole forces of the italian princes , when italy by reason of a long peace did flourish most , were not sufficient to stop the french forces , which were then but new in those parts , and but meanly assisted ; what reason was there to believe , that this province should ever be raised up again of herself , and should by means of her own forces return to her pristine fortune and digni●y , after having been so long vexed by cruel wars , and having lost two of her noblest members . wherefore though to administer fresh fuel , as it were , to this fire of war , as would be done by the authority and forces of the apostolick sea , if they should jo●n with caesar , or with the king of france , might be troublesom and dangerous , yet might it be beneficial , or at least hopeful , since it might so fall out , that the fortune of war being various , and subject to unexpected chances , some good effect might ensu● thereupon for the liberty of italy ; the forces of those princes who did oppose her , growing much the weaker , or else by their growing weary of the work , and by their tu●ning themselves to some other undertaking . whereas on the contrary , to suffer them to settle there , and to get in time greater authority over the people , and more love to the states which they had gotten , was a certain and irreparable ruine , and an utter abolishing of all hopes of ever restoring the states which were postest by strangers into the hands of the italian princes . but the fear lest both these princes , who were grown so powerful in italy , might join together against the territories of the church , or those of other italian princes , to divide them amongst themselves , as had happened not many years before , when the emperor maximilian and lewis the twelfth , king of france , who had been formerly at such great enmity one with another , grew good friends by dividing the lands between them which belonged to the venetians ; might chiefly perswade the pope to quit neutrality , and to side with the one or the other of these princes . leo knew , that upon many past occasions he had done things not only of but little satisfaction , but of much disgust to both these princes and nations , more particularly to the french , who were alwaies jealous of his cunning ; so as great emulation growing in them both , and a desire of commanding over all italy , and finding that affairs were so equally poised between them in this province , as the one could not much exceed the other , nor make any new acquisition , it was with reason to be feared , that being void of all hopes of having the pope to side with either of them , from whose friendship they might for many reasons expect very considerable assistance , they might at last convene together to the total oppression of the liberty of italy . nor was leo's neutrality in this conjuncture of time and affairs able to secure him from such a danger , since he had formerly openly declared himself and taken up arms in company with others ; and chiefly since the french knew , that he was no waies pleased with their dominion in italy , as well for the common affairs , as for his own particular dislike that they had possessed themselves of the cities of parma and piacensa , which were returned to the obedience of the apostolick sea by his predecessor iulius . so as the churches state , and that of the florentines , which was under the same popes protection and government , grew to be those alone which were exposed to the injuries of all men ; for the venetians were still firm to the french , and the other lesser princes adhered some to the fortune of the french , some to that of the imperialists . it was then the most useful , safe , and requ●site counsel , to join in friendship by particular and reciprocal obligations , either with caesar , or with the king of france : by doing which , to boot with security , many good effects might follow , to wit , that the adverse party being supprest and driven out of italy , that party which should yet remain there as friend , and free from the jealousie or rivdship of any forein prince , was likely to afford a long peace ( a thing very necessary in respect of the many late afflictions ) and such accidents might the more probably happen in process of time , whereby italy might more easily free herself from the se●vitude of one only lord and master , then she should have done from the like of two ; it being unlikely that two principalities should meet with one and the same fortune , at one and the same time . but if nothing else of good had happened during this discord and contention between these two princes , their states must be subject to the expences and troubles which do necessarily accompany war ; so as some revenge would be had upon these forein nations , for the so many calamities which they had brought upon italy ; and that saying of the scripture would be verified , to revenge a man upon his enemies , by other enemies . the emperors of rome , when the empire began to decline , and the antient italian worth and discipline was almost lost , they not having forces sufficient of their own to withstand the northern nations , made use of the soldiers of the same northern nations to drive their fellow-foreiners out of italy ; as particularly of the goths , of whom they had several times great numbers in their armies . but say that one of these forein princes could not have worsted the other , though assisted by the apostolick sea , even in this condition of affairs hopes would not be wanting , whilst war should continue between them : for after having long wrestled together , especially since the quarrel arose out of hatred and warlike emulation , it was not unlikely that they would rather quit the terititories which they held in italy to some third persons , then to yield one to another , so as it might remain in their own power : concerning which surrender , particularly of the state of milan , many treaties had been formerly . leo had likewise a very fresh example of councels taken by the venetian senate , which in the same case was confirm'd by experience to be very wisely done : for that senate finding that their state was fallen into great misfortunes , and reduced to so low an ebb , as she was not able to recover of herself , they joined with some of their very enemies , against other some of their enemies ; whereby they did not only separate them , but did revenge themselves much to the prejudice of those that they had excluded from their friendship , and did thus recover the state which had been usurped from them . but leo's advice was afterwards the better approved of by the particular issue of this very business : for having after many several cogitations of mind join'd in confederacie with caesar , the city of milan was taken from the french by their joint-forces , and the cities of pa●ma and piacensa were recovered to the church ; not without great hopes , had it not been for the unexpected and unfortunate death of pope leo , that the french should have then been totally expulsed out of italy , and maximilian sforza reinvested into the state of milan , according to agreements made by the pope , which would have greatly secured the liberty of the church , and of whole italy . which when it should have so succeeded , there was reason enough to hope , that the french would join in driving the imperialists out of the kingdom of naples , being satisfied ( without any other reward ) with having revenged themselves for their received injuries , and with seeing the imperialists reduced to their condition , for what concerned the affairs of italy . and it might be hoped that this might the easilier be done , by reason of the far distance of caesars territories , and by reason of many ill humors which began already to grow in several places ; whereby be might be necessitated to bend his forces and thoughts elswhere , and leave his affairs in italy but weakly defended . leo then may seem to have grounded his councels well , like a wise prince ( as he was ) upon good foundations , for as much as may be effected by humane wisdom , where so many other accidents do concur . yet were there not wanting some who did greatly blame this resolution of pope leo's , taxing him with inconsiderateness , because being led on by vain hopes , he had unnecessarily imbroil'd himself again in war : and if we shall look more narrowly into this business , we shall find that many considerations were wanting ; which may raise at least some rational doubts , whether the pope were more to be praised , or to be blamed for this action . it is most certain , that war in it self is troublesom to princes , grievous to the people , and subject to many various and uncertain chances . so that as every wise prince ought alwaies to avoid it , where there is no express necessity , it appears that this prince ought to have had it in more horror then any other , in respect of the times , and of his degree and place , which ought rather to have made him endeavor peace and quiet between christian princes . the dominion of the church was by his predecessors means arrived already to such a largness , as it might seem better to become the succeeder to augment the safety thereof by procuring friendship with other princes , and by a constant neutrality , then to expose himself to new troubles and dangers , by adding more states thereunto . italy having been much afflicted , and brought in almost every of her parts to great misery and calamity , for having been the seat of war for the space of thirty years , did not onely much desire peace and quiet , but did chiefly expect it from the popes councels and actions , by reason of his supreme authoritie , and of the zeal he ought to have born to the publick good . how could it then deserve praise , that when forein princes seemed to be inclined to suffer italy to remain quiet , he should afford them occasion and means of imbroiling her in new troubles and calamities ; which were certainly to insue by reassuming arms , where the advantage which might 〈…〉 gotten was very doubtful and questionable ? but , that which in this case 〈◊〉 to be considered , is , that leo's intention being to drive the foreiners out of italy , and to vindicate her liberty , he should have chosen some good means to have done it . many antient and modern experiences might have taught him , how hard a matter it might be to keep the french on the other side of the mountains . the romans were not more troubled with any other nation then with the french , in freeing italy from forein invasions ; for she was oft-times assaulted by them , and many of her parts possest by them , and the empire it self was endangered by their forces . and of late years since the passage of charls the eighth , though they had proved variety of fortune , yet kept they still the same resolution of waging war in italy , and of keeping footing in this province , not being frighted from this resolution by any misfortune how great soever ; but being once beaten back , they returned with great fury to seek out novelties ; and at this very time that we now speak of , they were possest of the dutchy of milan . therefore to secure himself from the french , it was not sufficient to drive them once out of italy ; for the forces of that large kingdom being still very powerful , and they being alwaies prepared for novelty , their desire bore them chiefly thereunto , where it had done formerly , so as italy remained still exposed to new incursions , and subject to the miseries of war. therefore this intention of pope leo's , of keeping the french long out of italy , could not peradventure have been compassed but in a long process of time , and with much variety of success , no , not though italy had been all of a peece , and in greater power and prosperitie then she then was . whereas at this time the commonwealth of venice being now returned to great power , was joined in confederacie with the king of france by vertue of antient capitulations ; nor was it to be hoped for , that out of any uncertain hopes , and of long expectation , she should easily forgo such a friendship : and as for other princes , they were but weak , and their ends not constant nor conformable . and on the other side , caesar was very bare of monies , and had many other irons in the fire , so as the greatest weight and care of managing this war was likely to fall unto the popes share , wherein if he should slacken never so little , all that had been done would have been to no effect ; and those places , which by reason of this confederacie with the church , were taken from the french , would quickly and easily have faln into their hands again . but say that charls had been able to have imploted all his forces about this business , the greater they had been , the greater share would he have pretended in the business : and the less able had the pope or any others been to oppose his forces . charls the great , a prince of excellent worth , freed italy from the slavish yoke of the northern barbarians , driving the lombards from thence , who had had the chief command there for three hundred years ; but he would therefore make the greatest advantage thereof unto himself , creating his son pipin , king of italy ; nor ought any of charls his promises to be thought sufficient to shun such a danger , to which it was known he was much more moved out of a fervent desire to draw the pope into this confederacie of excluding the king of france , then that he had any waies quitied his desire to the dukedom of milan . what reason was there then to beleeve , that when caesar should be become more powerful in italy , and should have driven out the french , he should likewise be expell'd from thence , when his territories and authority should be there the greater ? it is rather to be beleeved , that by his increase of power , italy should be in a worse condition , and the danger thereof the more , for whilst these two princes stood upon equal terms , and with an invererate mind did counterpoise one another , the other states were the more secure , it being unlikely that any one of the parties would permit that the others should increase , or be heightned by the ruine of any of the princes of italy ; but he that should be assaulted by one was sure to be assisted by the other ; so as leo ought chiefly to have endeavored in this conjuncture of affairs to have kept these scales even by his neutrality ; for whilst the business stood thus , it behoved the very enemies of the italians to value their friendship , for their own good , and for the preservation of their states . it is not easie to decide whether it did really conduce more to the good of italy , that the pope should continue in his neutrality , or by his joining with some one of these forein princes who at that time had so great an influence upon italy , the success being to depend upon many very much differing accidents ; for since humane wisdom is not able to provide against them all , she cannot find any secure way which leads to that destin'd end . let us say then ( still keeping our selves within some general rules ) in the first place , that to join in friendship and confederacie with a more powerful p●ince , and one who is a near neighbor , when the increase of power is intended by this conjunction , is never to be done without danger , nor ought such a resolu●ion ever be taken but out of great necessity ; especially not by such princes , who are not so weak , as they need a leaning stock , not to depend in all things upon the event of anothers fortune . now leo had no such reason to forgo the little quiet which he had then purchast by plunging into a sea of leagues and confederacies , which are very hard to be laid fast hold of with princes of great powerl , desirous of glory , who pretend the same things , and between whom war is not so easily ended , as it is reassumed . the churches patrimonie was sufficiently secured by the majesty of religion , by pontifical power , by the moneys which by many waies she may be supplied with , and by her dominions , being at this time much inlarged by iulius the second . so as leo's intention is to be praised for having his thoughts so carefully bent upon the libertie of italy . it is likewise to be desired that he had had either more judgement or temper , to know and chuse an opportune time , and a sitting occasion ; and yet it is likewise a general rule , that to wait for the advantage of time , when affairs are upon great strieghts , do usually bring notable advantages , and sometimes by new and unexpected waies . italy was long under the obedience of the western emperors : if at that time when their power and authority was so great , the popes would have call'd in forein forces , and made use of them to reduce the government of italy under the churches power , or else into the hands of some other italian princes , italy would in the first place have certainly been given in prey to the insolencie of foreign soldiers , and at last she would peradventure have been brought to a worse condition . but by temporising , such occasions arose , as the church increased her dominions by certain lawful donations without the shedding of blood , and all italy remained subject to her own proper and particular lords ; and the western emperors being long vex'd and troubled by the wars of germany , were forced to forgo the affairs of italy . moreover , though caesar's fortune and power was then very great , yet was it subject to great alterations , by reason that he was a new prince in his dominions , because that they were far divided one from another , and for that many were apprehensive of so fast increasing greatness . so as many more opportune and better grounded occasions might peradventure arise of compassing such an intent , and the war made against him by the germans , which tended so much to his danger , might prove such a one . by making fit use of which accidents , caesar's power might receive a rebuke as concerning the affairs of italy , if the french forces had been any ways received , or that the italians had been of the same mind as formerly they had been more unseasonably . therefore to separate the friendship of the french totally from the italians , as leo did for as much as in him lay , discovering a double injury to them , since the king of france might think that fraud was join'd to ill will , could not be but an ill-taken advice . he had done better to have somewhat allaied their power as to the affairs of italy , then to have quite extinguish'd it , till the italians might get some better light how to recover their liberty . the venetian senate took another course , though they had therein the same intent : for whilst the affairs of these two princes , charls the emperor , and francis king of france , were in the greatest heat of war in italy , they would apply themselves to each of their fortunes , and according to the condition of time and affairs , they often changed friendship ; being still constant in their aim , which was to keep their forces as equally ballanced as they could , and that they should both be weakened by their contention one with another : but when occasion was offered of falling upon one without too much advantage to the other , ( as it did in the last wars made by the venetians in italy , after king francis was let out of prison ) they stood firm and resolute , not being easily perswaded upon any conditions to lay down arms. for on the one side , caesars power did decline by reason of many adverse chances , and the affairs of naples were in great confusion and danger : and on the other side , the affairs of france were not much bettered as to the prejudice of the liberty of italy ; for a chief article in this confederacie was , that the state of milan should be restored to francisco sforza , as at last it was . but leo in this conjuncture of affairs did precipitate himself into friendship with the imperlalists , and drew the enmity of the french upon him , so as his danger became almost equally the same , whatever event the war should have ; and the sequel did more demonstrate this by the imprisonment of clement , and by the slavery which caesars greatness threatened to all italy . so as it appears to reason , and by the sequel , that a noble and magnificent fabrick , as leo's proposition touching the freeing of italy from the subjection of foreiners , was really to be esteemed , was not built upon of true and solid a foundation as was able to support so great a weight . but for the present , after many various accidents , the condition of affairs may be esteemed either good , or at least less bad ; forasmuch as italy , through philip the king of spains great wisdom and moderation of mind , hath enjoyed a long and peaceful condition , and flourisheth no was much as she hath done in many preceding ages , to the peoples great comfort , and to the singular praise of the late princes . the tenth discourse . whether the counsel taken by the emperor charls the fifth , and by his commanders , of not parting from the walls of vienna , when solyman was come with very great strength from constantinople to assault it , deserve praise , or blame . as two great and famous princes , not only for the largeness of their dominions , but for their particular warlike valor , the emperor charls the fifth , and solyman ottoman the grand signior of the turks , did both of them flourish in one and the same age ; so amongst the most memorable things of those times , the stupendious preparations for war made by the above-named princes in the year . was most remarkable , and variously thought of . all possible means was used by both of them , and the whole world put into arms ; so as the fortune of these two empires was judged to depend upon the worth and prowess of these two armies . but the success did no ways answer the fame of so great princes , and the noise of the preparation ; for neither did the imperial army stir at any time from the walls of vienna , nor did the turkish army come within many miles of them . now since more recent businesses have recalled this to memory , it may prove no unuseful consideration to represent what of praise , or of blame may be given to this resolution put on by the emperor charls , and his commanders . many were of opinion then , and the same may now be thought , that in this case , or in the like , the managing of war in this manner , standing only upon defence , and expecting to be assaulted by the enemy , did much withdraw from the reputation of the christian militia , which was already much in the wane , and was sufficient to awaken fresh spirits and boldness in the turks to undertake any thing the more easily against them in the future ; since the flower of all the soldiery of all the strongest and most esteemed nations of christendom , being assembled under the conduct and auspice of a mighty prince , the head of all christendom , and in a business of such weight , which had drawn the eyes of the whole world upon it , not any the least thing was put forth against these enemies , no army brought to face them , nor put in a posture of seeming really to desire battel ; none of their forts were assaulted , no country of theirs prejudiced : why were so many valiant men brought from their own homes into far distant regions ? why such expence ? why such preparation for war ? was it that so strong and flourishing an army should rot and moulder away about the walls of vienna ? what could have better decided the question which till then was disputable , in behalf of the ottoman princes , and of the turkish militia , and against the true honor of war , which our princes and soldiers have long laid claim unto , and sometimes atchieved , then after so great a preparation of arms , after so cried up an enterprise with intention to quell the turkish forces , to halt so long , and to so little purpose , not knowing what resolution to take , but that that camp , then which no former age had for a long time seen a greater , nor a more noble one , should stand still , like an unmoveable fort ? being overcome by truth , we must confess that the hopes of victory for christian princes was lost , or at least brought to this pass , as not to lose , must be termed conquest ; but neither could this be done by taking this course . no christian prince had usually so great and so setled a militia , as could continually maintain such an army in the field , as was at this time put together with much pains and industrie ; so as by drawing out the war in length , they might think to weary and disorder the enemy , and finally to overcome at last . but on the contrary , the turks , who have continually a numerous well ordered army , may easily upon whatsoever occasion send forth very powerful armies to vex the christian princes , taking sometimes one place , sometimes another , without ever quitting them , or being driven out from them : whereof there hath been so many proofs already made , whilst we do nothing but make a defensive war against the turks , as till this time hath most commonly been done in this very business , and by those very princes who managed this war ; the experience whereof hath been too evident , and too much prejudicial , by the affairs which unhappily be●el king ferdinand , whose whole army being cut in peeces in hungary , and the noblest cities of that province totally lost , might teach for certain , that wh●lst the turkish forces should remain safe and intire , the danger of vienna , and of the other cities of austria and hungary was not quite over , but onely deferred for a season , which delay might peradventure prove unfortunate , by reason of the weakness which is brought upon the forces of princes by long lying idle , and especially those of such princes as keep not a continual militia on foot . whereas the turks , who have an army alwaies ready and well paid , and who by making one war continually spring from another , keep them alwaies well disciplined , might at another time with greater forces assault the same territories of the house of austria , as it happened not many years after . so as had they not been freed from greater , and more eminent dangers by solymans death , the authors of this advice might have repe●●ed it , and all the rest might have had cause of greater sorrow , for having lost so far an occasion of making trial of the valor of christian commanders and soldiers in a pitch'd battel ; whereas we want not clear and memorable exampl●s , how far the true zeal of religion , and a noble forwardness hath been often favored from heaven with prosperous success ; as when divers princes of europe crost the seas to wage war with the saracens , and to recover , as they did , the holy land from the infides , driving them out of divers cities of asia , whereof they were possest . but these are not the sole examples ; for he who shall call to memorie greater actions done by famous commanders , will know that they were well advised when they assaulted the enemy , not waiting for him at their own doors ; since the advantages , and damages are great and evident which do accompanie those who manage the war diversly in this principal point . he who assaults the enemy within their own confines , enheartneth his soldiers , infuseth fear into the enemy , carries all loss and danger from his own home to that of his enemy : but he that staies expecting that the enemies forces should come home to him , minding onely to withstand him , encourageth the very enemy , and makes him the more bold and insolent , puts his own subjects in despair , by making them maintain their own armies , and exposing them to the rapine of the enemy . moreover if any adverse chance befal whilst the enemy is in the bowels of their state , all that they have is made a prey of , and irrecoverably lost . we read of cyrus , in whom we have the character of a most excellent commander , that king cyaxares being encamped in his friends country , and staying there to expect the enemy , he advised him to change his resolution , and to enter the confines of the assyrians , and set upon them at their own doors , and shewing him the advantage he might make thereof , perswaded him to do so ; by which mean he got a notable victory , worsting a great many of the enemy with a much lesser number . it was alwaies caesars course , who was the true master of good militia , both to pre-occupate the enemy , and to be the first that should assault , when battel was to be given ; thinking that the courage which the so doing infused into the soldiers , did to boot with other benefits , help much to the getting of the victory ; wherefore he taxed pompey of an error , because he did not so in that famous battle of pharsalia . the romans understanding that hannibal was coming with a powerful army to prejudice them in italy , though the first defence was made by mountains and craggy situations which he was to overcome , yet they thought fit to fight him before he could get into italy , and so keepe the war the furthest off them that they could . but scipio not being able to bring him to battel , though he met with him at the banks of rhodanus , as soon as they heard that the enemy was got on this side the mountains , the romans would not notwithstanding withdraw their armies , as if they had been afraid to come before the walls of rome , which hannibal gave out he would assault , but sent their men with the same consul scipio to beyond the river po to fight him , wisely knowing that the danger doth increase so much the more , by how much nearer the enemy approaches to the heart of the country . and the same romans understanding afterwards that asdrubal was coming with a great army in italy to assist his brother hannibal , they resolved to meet him beyond the river metarus , to prevent the enemy , knowing that to eschew this danger , was to occasion other great dangers . thus the victory gotten over asdrubal bereaved hannibal of the victories which he was likely to have gotten , if the romans had been slower , or less resolute in encountring the enemy . the imperial commanders ought to have taken the same advice , and might have done it ; for the turks must make a much longer march into hungary and austria , then we to assault their confines , which are now grown too near us . moreover the turks chiefest strength lying in their horse , which cannot march till the earth afford fodder for their cavalry , and being to come out of hotter countries into a colder region , they cannot without much difficulty and incommodity march into the field in the first season of the year , as others may do , whose condition doth differ from theirs , both in the condition of militia , and in the temperature of the air , wherein the first skirmishes are to be made . so as it appears to be very strange , nay , indeed a very great wonder , that having made so great a preparation for war , they would not so much as in thought pre-occupate the enemy , and enter into the upper hungaria , from which country they might have been furnished with many commodities , and upon occasion , secure themselves by a fortunate day , a long time from turkish incursions , for it was not likely that by solymans departing that year without having done any thing , he should forsake the guardianship and protection which he had taken upon him of the king of hungary , but rather aspire to make himself master of that kingdom , as he did , being more encouraged thereunto by the weakness and backwardness of the imperialists , who if when they had done their utmost , had done nothing at all , and the turks knowing that charls the emperor being implo●ed in other very considerable wars , would not be alwaies able to afford his brother so great assistance , was not this a great incitement to them quickly to renew the war , to the greater prejudice and danger not onely of hungary , which ferdinand laid claim unto , but even to the like of ferdinands own territories ? and not long after the fact it self shewed what might have been foreseen by reason ; for solyman could not onely not be perswaded to quit the protection which he had taken of his pupil king steven , but before he should come to any accord with ferdinand , demanded tribute from austria ; and the conditions both of the war and peace growing daily worse and worse , the greatest part of hungary being lost after the notable discomfitures of the german armies at essechlo and buda , and the other part continuing still in great danger , the certain loss was known which did redound unto them by not hazarding a battel at this time , when the fears and hopes were at least alike on both sides . but say that this had been too rash , or too difficult a thing to have been effected , what hindred them or disswaded them from passing through their own countries , and marching with their army to between dava and sava , a country which had not at all been prejudiced by the late wars , and therefore fit to furnish their army with victuals , and where there are many mountainous seats , which were advantagious for the imperialists , and incommodious for the turks in respect of their cavalry ; whereby they might have preserved two provinces , which were patrimon●al states of the house of austria , and therefore ought to have been the more carefully kept , carinthia and stiria ; which being abandoned , were left a secure prey unto the ●urks , who utterly destroyed them by fire and sword , endangering likewise the loss of some of their chief cities ; for the way would have been block'd up , and kept solyman from coming thither , if it had been first possessed by the imperialists , and solymans reputation would have been much lessened , if he had tarried behind , leaving that country untouched , which he was come to assault with so great an army . but to do as the imperialists did , to keep so many men with so great a train of art●llery and all necessaries for war , barely to defend one city , which lay not open , but was begi●t with walls , which was held to be a strong for●ress , and which being but meanly provided of men , had formerly repulsed great turkish forces ; what was it , but by this new and prejudicial example to confirm the turks , and even our own men , in the opinion , that the christian militia was inferior to that of the turks , and that our princes being intent upon their own defence , and not without some fear to imploy their utmost endeavors therein , were for their parts to suffer the turks to enjoy their large empire in peace and safety ? which the ottoman princes have brought to so vast a greatness , not by letting their forces lie idle , and by being content to defend that title which they had gotten at first , but by going every where to find out the enemy , fighting him upon all occasions , and by making their way by their swords into other mens countries . how oft have the turks entred into the consinus of persia , nay , wrought themselves in even to her inmost parts , chiefly intending to come to a day of fight with the persians armies , which they have often enected ? though the persians were rather to be feared , then to be despised , for their antient honor in war , and for the manner of their militia ; and yet at last they have in these last wars got safe possession of the chiefest part of this most noble kingdom . what then is more to be said , but that if this way of proceeding have proved prosperous to those that have walked therein , he who takes another way walks on towards destruct on , and either through ignorance , or too great a thirst after quiet and secu●ity , involves himself into greater troubles and difficulties ? and though the loss be made by peece-meal , which may peradventure make it appear the less , yet at last the whole falls into more certain , though a later ruine . and to speak of more modern affairs ; how had not only the commonwealth of venice , but several other states of christian princes been preserved from the turkish power and insolencie , if the leagues fleet , shunning all occasion of fight , had retreated without that famous victory of lepa●●● ? but it was afterwards more cleerly seen , that charls his intent on in this war was far from joining battel with the turks , either that he would not hazard his glory and honor , or manifestly confess himself interior to solyman in forces , when hungary and austria being assaulted at another time by the same solyman , in stead of succoring of assisting his brother who was in emient danger , he went to try new adventures in africa , of a much more inconsiderable nature . if a day of battel be ever to be had , what else was there to be done to keep off the ruine which doth threaten christendom every day more and more ? he who hazards , may lose ; but he may also win : and he who stands idly , and does nothing , whilst he endeavors security by useless means , does by degrees daily fall into new dangers , and doth as it were voluntarily ( but for certain , basely ) submit himself to the yoke of a grievous and unworthy slavery . if germany and italy had been so forward to furnish men and monies for this enterprise , ( the authority of so great a prince who was the chief author and head thereof , being considered ) as upon other occasions which did happen not long after , these assistances might have been sooner hoped for . when were the whole forces of germany seen so united , as they were at this time ? nay , it was rather to be doubted that many seeds of discord were to grow , which were already spread abroad throughout this province , by reason of religion and state-policie , whereby germany might be weakned and divided . from whence then was there any good to be hoped for against this so formidable enemy , if so great a preparation for war proved altogether vain and useless ? the condition of present times , and of long custom , will not suffer us now to hope that we may see what formerly fell out in that famous councel of clerement , that at the words of an hermite , at the bare exhortations of a pope , christian princes and people should readily take up arms against the infidels , being content for bond of firm union to be all of them signed with the sign of the cross. but now when any such thing is treated of , such disputes are made upon every point , every one looks so much to their own particular ends ( not measuring things aright , nor minding the common interest in comparison of their own ) as leagues and unions being contentiously handled , slowly concluded , and untimely dissolved , there comes no good of them . wherefore it cannot be said , that they thought by delay to reserve occasions prepared for victory , to which the cause which was then in hand ought not a little to have excited them ; to wit , the maintaining of king ferdinand in his just pretences to the kingdom of hungary ; from whom , without any right , and unprovoked by any injury , it was attempted to be taken . very shame should likewise have been able to have made them not suffer so miserable a spectacle of such devastations and ruines as were made by the barbarians in carinthia and stiria , whilst they stood looking on with so great an army ; at which the imperial commanders being at last moved , they went about ( though late ) to revenge these injuries ; and their boldness being assisted by fortune , the freebooters were routed , and almost quite discom●●ted in all places where they were assaulted . so as it appears it may be pleaded by this late example , that they might have done greater things , if they had attempted it . moreover , so many military men might very well have known what advantage might have been gotten by giving battel , since in this posture of affairs great rewards were to be expected from the victory , and but small loss , had they been beaten : for the christian army , if victorious , might have penetrated into the turks dominions , where there are no strong holds , save some few upon the frontiers ; and not meeting with any obstacles , might have marched even to before constantinople , planting their trophies in sundry places , by one sole victory . whereas on the contrary , the imperialists , upon any adverse fortune , had many strong holds whereunto to have retreated , and by maintaining them , might have retarded the course of the turks victories , and have recruited their broken forces . but say , i pray you , who could assure the imperialists , that they should avoid the hazard of a battel ? was it not rather to be believed , ( especially if we will consider the boldness of the turks , who are wont to meet but with weak resistances ) that answerable to what they gave out , they would advance and force the christians to give battel , as the voyage taken by solyman did promise , who kept not within his consines , but was entred into the imperialists country , so far as some of his horse troops made inrodes even to newstat a town standing in the same champaine country , and not far from vienna ? and say that being assaulted by the enemy , they had been forced to fight , who can deny but that both before , and after the conflict , the business would have proved hazardous to the imperialists , since they were to fight at their own homes , and in their own defence ? for great is that astonishment which is caused by the bold coming on of an enemy , and men are alwaies readier to run away there where they have best means of saving themselves ; and in case of adverse fortune , the danger is greater when the enemy is in the bowels of the state ; and if the inhabitants overcome , the less good redounds by the victory , because the enemy hath time to rally , and to defend himself . these were therefore notable disadvantages , which were unaviodable whilst the imperialists camp remained fixt before the walls of vienna , and thereby made themselves to depend upon the enemies resolution . notwithstanding all this , he who shall duely consider the present condition of the affairs of the empire , of the militia , and of all other things which belongs to such a business , may peradventure be of a different opinion , and judge otherwise , and if not commend , at least excuse the resolution taken by the imperialists , of not parting with their army from before the walls of vienna , and from the river danubius . that the turkish empire is very great , and potent , is a thing too well known by us to our cost ; but the care how to prevent the maladie and weakness into which christendom is fallen by the greatness of such an enemy , hath been so long in cogitat●on , as to use violent means , might bring ruine upon her , rather then procure her safety . christian princes have not in this age a setled , well disciplined , well ordered militia , and kept in perpetual pay , as the turks have , and as the romans , and some other empires have formerly had ; whence it is that numerous armes cannot be raised without length of time , and much difficulty ; and for want of continual exercise , by which the soldiers of one and the same nation have been known to be able to supply every military office , recourse must be had to several nations , for men fit for several actions in war ; so as it is thought that either by natural inclination ; or by antient custom , or by meer opinion , every nation is best , some for one thing , some for another ; as also because there are but very few in any place , who are well instructed in military affairs . for no militia is entertained except it be in time of need , or some few who are kept in garrisons , with little or no exercise . the charge also of assembling soldiers from several , and far distant countries , as also all things which belong to war , is much the greater ; and whereof not any one state of our princes is compleatly furnished . so as put all these together , it is from hence , that when any enterprise hath been to be taken against the turks in these times , with numerous and powerful forces , they have not been able to be got together in any reasonable time , nor well ordered ; which delay arising from necessity , hath hindred our preventing the enemy , and our assaulting them at their own doors . but particularly , is it not very well known , that at this time whereof we now speak , caesar was to assemble soldiers from so many nations , subject to other dominions , and to joyn together the auxiliary forces of germany and italy , as in doing thereof so much labor and time was spent , as before the imperial army was mastered at vienna , solyman was already come to belgrade ? so as , to have resolved upon preventing the enemy , and of assaulting his confines before the arrival of his army , was impossible , though it had been thought expedient to have done so ; nor ought reason to prevail over experience ; and this so much the less , for that there wants not other reasons to prove that the turks are readier at their counsel , and speedier at their executions , then we can be . but let us suppose that all prolixity and difficulties therein might have been helped , and that it had depended upon the free will of the imperial commanders to assault the turks within their consines ; say , i beseech you , what design could the imperialists have had to euer into the enemies country ? should they perhaps have stood idly expecting the shock of the turkish army , if it should advance towards them ? or if solyman should not have advanced , but have shunned the encounter , should they have marched on and forced him to fight ? or should they have endeavored to have taken some of the towns , or forts which were held by the turks , by assault ; and carry the perjudice home to him , who would have brought it to them in the defence of another man ? let us examine all these things , by considering the last proposition . in what place should the imperial army have incamped , which would not have been very incommodious for them , and far off ? they were not yet absolutely possest of divers cities upon the frontiers of hungary , as they were afterwards . but let us argue the business in general ; if the place were weak which they should assault , what honor should they win thereby ? or would the advantage of such an acquisition have been answerable to the expence , and to the expectation had of such an army ? besides , such purchases are to little purpose ; for such places are soon regained by him who is master of the field ; and if the imperialists would have attempted the taking of any strong place , and should not have effected it soon and easily , to how great danger did their army expose it self ? they must either raise their siege , with loss of honor , and with those other bad consequencies which follow in such like cases ; or else they must keep their station , and be cut in peeces , when a powerful turkish army should come , and find the imperialists scattered and busied about the taking in of strong holds ; as afterwards fell out upon the like occasion of buda ; which might teach commanders , with what temper they are to proceed when they fall upon such affairs , and when they have to do with a potent enemy . but it may be yet more strongly urged , that whilst the turkish forces should keep themselves safe and inire , the imperialists had but little hopes of keeping what they should happily have gotten . were not modon● and corone recovered from the turks by the imperial forces , under the ensigns of the same charls ? yet these very towns were soon after abandoned , and forsaken , because they knew they were not able to maintain them against the turkish pussant forces . have not the imperialists and spaniards made oft-times many attemp●s in africa , and had good success therein ? yet in whose possession are these very places now , which were gotten with so much charge and danger ? did not the turks soon repossess themselves of those places from whence they were driven ? the league made against the turks in the year . wherein the same and forces of the same emperor charls were interessed , did it not 〈◊〉 castel 〈◊〉 a fortress fit for their greatest designs ? but how long were we able to keep it , though it were strongly garrisoned ? these experiences may serve to shew , that the good gotten by such cost and labor , hath not at last proved any thing , save dishonor in forgoing what was gotten . but to fall upon the other head ; if the imperial army should have continued incamped in any strong situation of the enemy which they might have taken , without attempting any thing more ; how would it have been in any better condition , then it was when incamp'd before vienna ? rather on the contrary , the danger was greater and more evident of falling into mighty disorder , especially for want of victuals , by their going from the banks of 〈◊〉 , from whence alone they could have been safely and oppor●●●ely furnished therewithal ; for they were to provide for the victualing of a great many , and the enemy did abound in horse , whereby their succors might have been cut off . it may peradventure be alleadged , that they might have preserved a great tract of country from the inrodes , plunder , and firing made by the turks . but first , they were not certain to make this advantage , the country being large , and exposed to such accidents as these ; nor were they able , without dividing their forces , to supply all places : and the turks seeing this place well guarded , if they should have taken their way above the danubius , as they did beneath it towards the alps , finding the fields more large and open in those parts in moravia , silesia , and austria , they might have made larger inrodes , and with less danger : whereas having quartered themselves in the mountainous situations of stiria and carinthia , they might at least revenge the injury , and in some sort preserve their honor by killing many of them , who being disbanded , were gone to pillage the country . it is commonly advantagious to advance towards the confines of a state , where the passes are narrow and difficult , either by the ruggedness of the situations , or by reason of ●orts upon their frontiers , so as the enemy may be by these advantages kept afar off . but what was there in king ferdinands states , which could perswade him to take this course ; the country being large , open , and where many armies would not have been sufficient to have kept out an army which was resolved to enter , as these did ? but it may be said again , that this was not a loss which would counterpoise ( as might very well have happened by reason of their own inconveniencies ) the breaking up of that army , whereon the defence of king ferdinands states did relie , and which was of so great a concernment to all christendom . and it may be also added , that the further the imperialists had advanced , whereby they might the better have met with the enemy , and have fought him , if they should not afterwards have done it , their fear would have appeared to have been so much the greater , and that they had repented to have proceeded so far ; whereby they should not only no have increased , but have lessened the reputation of the force and worth of that army . but for what concerned their marching forward to encounter the enemy , with a resolution of giving him battel at his own home at which the considerations made to the contrary do seem chiefly to aim , it is business of so weighty , and so numerous consequences , as it deserves to be well examined . it is a general rule , that it is requisite the assailant should have greater forces then he who is assailed , or at least equal forces : and is there any one so blinded with desire , as that he does not see the imperialists disadvantage in this behalf ? solyman brought with him an army consisting of one hundred and forty thousand fighting men , and almost as many men more for other camp-occasions , furnished with artillery and all other requisites for war , an army verst in victories , and which was then to fight in the sight of their lord and master , a fortunate and valiant prince ; and who are promised by their law , that whosoever dies fighting for his welfare and glory , shall be eternally rewarded in heaven : an opinion which hath much advantaged the turkish affairs in point of war. entire obedience , excellent military discipline , patient undergoing all wants , and great toil and labor , are things whereunto the turkish armies are accustomed ; in vertue whereof it is , and not by chance , that they have had so many victories : and it was the opinion of all men , that these things did at this time abound in that army . now on the other side , the imperial army was far short of this in numbers , the fighting men not exceeding the number of fourscore and ten thousand , whereof there were but thirty thousand horse . it is hard to say what men might promise to themselves from the commanders and soldiers gallantry , since no precedent nor subsequent trial hath been known to be made against this enemy : marry , such disorders as are usually seen in our present mili●ia , might easily be therein seen ; the spaniards mutinies before they were come to the camp , the like of the italians after their arrival , great and open hatred amongst the nations which were in the same camp , as if they had been in two enemies camps , insomuch as they were like to ●all together by the ears more then once , the spaniards and italians being jointly highly incensed against the dutch ; the commanders at variance amongst themselves , envying one anothers glory , raisers of commotions and disobed●ence amongst the soldiery , as was seen by the last of punishments inflicted upon some of them . now what the issue in likelihood might prove betwixt two such armies as you have here described of the imperialists and of the turks , any man may judge , who is capable of ordinary reason , without any further experience of war. but to proceed to the other heads : what situation could there be chosen which was not disadvantagious for the imperialists ? the parts of hungary , wallach●a , and of the neighboring places where the armies were to m●et , consisted all of open champaigns , where most assuredly the horse ( wherein the turkish camp did so abound ) have the better of foot ; and worth is overcome by numbers , where the lesser army may be circumvented by a greater multitude , and better use may be made of horse , which may either advance where they find advantage , or retreat without any prejudice where they cannot withstand the enemy . therefore the imperial commanders knowing the disadvantage thereof in that situation which they had taken , though they were secured by the city of vienna , and by the river danubius , yet they stood alwaies with their squadrons in order for any assault ; their foot was divided into three great squadrons , whereof one stood firm in the midst , and betwixt this and the other two were the horse quartered , so as they did inclose the whole body of the army , which was surrounded and secured by great store of artillery . another reason may be added , which is , that in case of misfortune , the imperialists army might suffer a greater discomf●ure then that of the turks ; for it would be harder for the former to keep any of their foot entire , or gens d' arms , then for the turks to preserve their light-horse , which were always ready according as occasion should serve , either to charge , or sustain a charge , and save themselves . wherefore it may be said , that the hazard was not the same , and therefore not to be put to the trial , as affairs stood . and if it be advantagious to assault an enemy at his own door , the affording rest to soldiers , whereby to be the better able to withstand and to repell with victory those who come to assault them , and are wearied by their long march , and the inconveniences thereof , hath also something of good in it . nor must we be govern'd by examples wherein the same accidents meet not ; for general rules are not to be observed at all times , and especially not in war , which is subject to so many variations . if cyrus , and the romans , when the first went to fight the assyrians , and the other the carthaginians , had been in that condition as those were of whom we now speak , we may perswade our selves ( such was their known wisdom ) that they would have done otherwise : and if the romans chose to meet hannibal first on the other side the mountains , and afterwards at his first entrance into italy , it may be said , besides the diversity of accidents which counsell'd them so to do , that our princes have no such militia , nor so ready , as the romans had , nor had they means of recruiting their armies so soon as the romans could do in case of adverse fortune ; and that they were able to maintain so many armies , not only in italy , but in spain , africa , and greece , at the same time when hannibal was in italy , shews , that as they were forward in giving battel , so they knew how to supply themselves again : which the imperialists could not at this time have done , if they should have lost that army , which they had taken such pains to assemble together from so many several parts . it is acknowledged , that to put ones self upon the hazard of a battel , is a thing which is done by wise commanders when they are back'd with another army , which may afford them means of fighting a second time , or at least whereby they may easily 〈◊〉 in case of adverse fortune ; else a whole state is adventured upon one only battel . as for the success of the battel of lepanto , it was accompanied with some accidents which are seldom seen to happen : for the turks gave ou● m●n battel , which was willingly entertained by us , because we might make use of the advantage of the venetian gallious , by whose artil●ery their fle●t was divided and scat●ered before they could come to a further conflict . but the next year , the condition of affairs being altered , they took another course : for the turks , who were taught by their former bad success , not being willing to join battel with our greater vessels , and our men being wisely well-advised not to divide nor separate their slighter gallies from the greater , as finding themselves either weaker therein , or at least not stronger , there was nothing done , though the fleets were several times very neer . in this point likewise , the land-militia , and that of the sea doth differ ; for as for sea-fights , the christian forces are in number equal in shipping to the turks , but sufficiently beyond them for matter of worth and discipline : marry , in land-armies the turks do far exceed the christians in numbers ; and as for valor and good discipline , they cannot as yet be accounted inferior , unless we will , to detract from the enemy , and to our own shame , as having been so oftentimes beaten by so base and unexpert men . but howsoever it be , we cannot but have a great esteem of the turkish power , which their continued prosperitie hath made so . what reason was there then that a new army , made up of so many several nations , wherein the soldiers did hardly know their captains , and were much less known by them , who had not as yet done any military act jointly , nor well learnt how to know , nor follow their colours , not acquainted with the country , and wanting all those things through which , by the true art of war victories are gotten , should advance , and give battel to an enemy so formidable both for same and forces ? nor can the event of a set battel be truly judged by what befel those of the turkish camp , who disbanding from the rest , went , though in great parties , to pillage the enem●es country , the business not being any thing alike ; the turks had the disadvantage of the countries situation , of being loaded with prey , of being in disorder ( as commonly befals those who go to plunder , not to fight ) and of other accidents . but besides all this , he who relates this business , mentions not any baseness in the turks , but saies , that notwithstanding these disadvantages , they defended themselves generously to the utmost of their power . but what did the same solyman ( who cannot be denied to have been very valiant , and greatly experienced in matter of war ) though he had all the advantages that have been mentioned ? he did not advance with his army as near as , as he might have done , nor did endeavor to enforce others , nor to be enforced himself to fight , but rather went out of his direct way , which he had taken to come to vienna , and kept for the most part in strong and commodious seats , as between the two rivers of sava and drava ; and i● a powerful and van glorious prince , who professed that he had undertaken that war meerly out of a desire of glory would make use of haesitatious counsels , where the consequences were so great and so heavie ; how would it have becomed charls , a prince no less wise then valiant , and who was necessituted by many other important affairs of some other states of his , to leave germany suddenly , as he did , to have put himself upon the dubious events of battel , whereby to indanger almost his whole fortune ? when marius was sent against the cymbrians , who were faln down into italy ( which was thought to be as considerable a war as any that the romans had made ) the same circumstances concurring thereunto , whereby to infuse terror , as do now to make the turkish forces so formidable ; as crueltie , barbarism , the great number of the enemy , and the fame of the victories which they had won ; the wise commander would not ( though many occasions had offered themselves , and that he was taxed by the unexperienced , of timerousness ) come to a pitch'd field with such an enemy till for many moneths space he had kept the army accustomed to the performance of duties , and to military actions , and chiefly till he had acquainted them with the aspect of the enemy , and how to have the bett●r of them in light skirmishes , which were not notwithstanding attempted but upon great advantage . and if caear used to prevent the enemy , and to be the first that should assault ; it is to be considered that he commanded a veteran army , of whom he had by long wars had much experience . so as the same example is not to be made use of in a new and tumultuous army , and of so different conditions . but let us likewise consider what were the reasons which made these two princes take up arms ; for by the first rise of wars the reason of their administration , and the good means whereby to conduce them to a good end , is best known . the war was offensive on the turks behalf , undertaken with great surquedrie , and with great hopes of victory and glory ; solyman having propounded unto himself to revenge the injuries done by ferdinand , then king of bohemia , to iohn king of hungary , who reigned under his guardianship and protection . but whether this was his true intention or no , or but pretended , that he might possess himself of the kingdom of hungary ( as afterwards he did ) it was most certain , that he could not compass his end of beating the forces of these two austrian brothers , charls , and ferdinand . caesar on the other side , being usually distracted and busied , as now in particular , in other wars , had betaken himself to this , to defend the assaults which were threatned his brothers territories , as also the honor of his family , or rather that of all germany ; or , to confine ones self to narrower bounds , it may be said , that this contention of war did pa●ticularly concern the oppugning , and the defence of the city of vienna . so●yman , who had formerly little to his honor , been driven from before the walls of that city , professed to return thither with greater forces , being firmly resolved to reduce it to his power , and to challenge the emperor to a pitch'd battel . charls on the contrary , having brought his forces about that city , had propounded unto himself the keeping of it , and to frustrate this so great furie and boasting of solymans . now then , whilst vienna was preserved , and that she was kept free from all dangers , and that solyman was so curbed and frightned by the imperialists forces , as that he du●st not advance , or make good his word which he had publickly professed , did not the imperialists effect the business they had taken in hand , without the effusion of blood ? did they not preserve their own honor , and do service to all christendom ? if this army ( as the success of bittel is more uncertain and dubious , then any whatsoever other humane action ) had received any no●able defeat , when would this wound have ever been cured ? the afflicted body of christendom must have its wounds long kept open , and have still ul●●cerated more and more . how would caesars particular enemies have been encouraged to fall upon his territories , and to have endangered and molested his own particular affairs , whilst he should have shewed courage enough , but little good counsel in defending another mans right , which did not immediately concern himself ? had the t●rks in former times been made retreat to their own confines , as now they were , without having made any acqu●sition , they had not been masters of so many christian kingdoms , as now they are . and had their forces proved still vain , their militia would have been imbased , and they would have been discouraged from troubling others without any good to themselves ; which peradventure would have been the safest and securest way of weakning so great a power as that , by temporizing , affording them thereby occasion of growing idle , and of falling into domestick disorders , so as they might the more easily have received a blow , and have been overcome both by cuning and force . nor will it avail to affirm the contrary , as if the future dangers and troubles had been certainly to have happened , or that they might have been made greater by a new commotion of war ; for it was more answerable to reason , that when solyman should have done his utmost with his whole forces , assisted by his own presence , he would have suffered the estates of austria , and of germany to have remained quiet , if king ferdinand had rested content with his own patrimonie , and with the kingdom of bohemia , together with the hopes of succeeding in the empire , without intricating himself in new troubles , by obstinately maintaining his pretences to the kingdom of hungary , drawing thereby the fury of the turkish forces upon him , as he often did . so as king ferdinando and his councellors are more to be blamed for those many mischiefs which ensued afterwards , and for those which we are still threatned with by the so near neighborhood of the turkish forces then charls the emperor and his commanders . for they seeing king iohn taken into so powerful a protection as that of the ottoman empire , so as it was impossible to put the dutch in possession thereof by driving of him out ; all anger and ambition ought to have been laid aside , contenting themselves rather with the neighborhood of so weak a prince as the king of hungary , then with that of so powerful and formidable a potentate , to whom four empires and eighteen kingdoms do yield obedience . these things may be on all sides variously considered , as various judgments may be given on those actions which are not of a setled , ordinary , and natural condition , but which through various accidents do flote up and down , as it happens in counsels concerning war. the truth is , that the forces , hope ; fears , and almost all other consequences of these two empires were ( as it were ) equally ballanced in this behalf : so as it was a work not discernible by humane wisdom , or by any true grounds , whether to have come to a pitch'd field , or to abstain from doing so , would have been the better advice . in either of the armies , the flower of the mil●tia of the warlike nations both of east and west was assembled , a vast number of soldiers , excellent commanders , most valiant princes , and of as great renown as any of whatsoever former age , and who had both of them won famous victories . great were the rewards , great the inconveniences , which were proposed on all sides according to the various success of such a days fight ; immortal glory , shame not to be rased out , high hopes , greatest fears . so as it is no wonder if in this parity of objects which presented themselves before the eyes both of the imperialists and turks , a battel , for which both parties were prepared and disposed , did not ensue . in which case he who will detract any thing from the imperialists in not daring to fight , must praise their wisdom as much , and their mature advice ; it being a rule generally approved of by the universal consent of all men , that where the business is doubtful and difficult , we must rather adhere to that which holds us from doing any thing , then to what eggs us on : for , had i wist , comes too late , and is always to no purpose ; whereas whilst things are whole and entire , place is left for new counsels . paula peruta a gentleman of venice his soliloquie ; wherein he makes and takes a brief examination of the whole course of his life . what do i do ? what think i ? what do i look for ? my age hastens already apace to the end of my life , and i mind not that end of glory to which i am ordained . those good things which i must shortly for go , stand alwaies fixt before my bodily eies , and i turn not the eyes of my mind towards those things which are prepared for me to injoy eternally ; it is high time to know my error , and then to amend it . old age which useth to dead the affections of the flesh , ought now to quicken the zeal of the spirit ? o my soul summon thy thoughts about thee , which have straid so long in the affairs of this world ; know thy noble condition , and the true end for which thou wert created ; let all things that proceed from thee be worthy of thee . throw from thee that vail , which as if thou hadst been blind , hath made thee go groping and groveling through the waies of worldly desires , in danger of falling into the ditch of some habitual sin ; wh●reby it would have been the harder for thee to rise again , and reassume the right way . great are the acknowledgments which thou owest to thy creator , who hath made thee out of nothing ; made thee so much more noble then the souls of all his other creatures , he made thee partaker of so many excellent gifts , chiefly of liberty , whereby thou maist increase the merit of thy good works , as he never suffers his grace to forsake thee , which thou mayst very often be aware of , finding remorse of conscience as often as thou fallest into any sin , and so many incitations to excite thee to the despisal of earthly things , and to the love of such as are celestial , as certainly thou art very much unworthy so great a benefit , if thou dost resist it any longer , or else a very bad friend unto thy self , if knowing the trust good , thou chusest to deprive thy self thereof . assuredly , if i shall take a true scrutinie of my life , i shall find that i have made my self a receptacle of all vanity ; thou who oughtest to have been a temple of perpetual prayer , of immaculate goodness , of pure love to divine things . i do not consider my first and tender age , wherein the use of reason being but weak , that which ariseth from thence is not much considerable ; yet the tears and crying to which those very years are subject , might afford me occasion when i was greater of contemplating the mistery , and of knowing that the condition of this worldly life . whereinto i was marching was but a valley of tears , a fountain of miserie ; wherefore i should have taken the greater heed not to have suffered my self to be insnared in the love of those things , where wormwood lies hidden under honey , and where weeping attends alwaies nigh upon laughter . in the pueritia , which succeeded mine in●●ncie , i did not accustom my self ( as i ought to have done ) to labor and sufferings , to humble and devo●t thoughts , whereby the power of the flesh might have been weakened , and the soul exalted ; but i was detained by pleasures and effeminacie ; i betook my self so to follow and love vanity , as i began to suck in what corrupt customs taught me , more then what was learnt me by my tutors . i thought riches , honors , and all worldly greatness , to be the garnishings wh●rewith men , and chiefly such as are nobly born , ought to adorn themselves ; i called the lives of such as lived better , and more retired from the world , meer madness . these conceptions grew more firmly fixed in me afterwards , when passing through the other ages , i saw them praised and practised by mens common consent , and chiefly by those who were esteemed the wisest , and most happy ; so as it was harder for me to pluck out those thoughts from out my heart , which had in process of time taken so deep rooting . but if i reflect upon the years of my youth , which are as it were the sp●ing of our age , on which every thing seems to smile , and doth , as it were grow green , what can i remember which may make me satisfied with my self , or from whence i may affirm , that i have gathered such fruit , as i would now in my old age be fed withal ? as i first 〈◊〉 into my youth , i was , as it were challenged a●d defied to a gallant wrestling by the se●ces , and worldly delights , and parted from them very many times overcome , seldom with the victorie . i betook my self to my studie , and chiefly to that of rherorick , and of philosophie ; wherein having the luck to light upon excellent masters , i made some advancement ; i will not say , that now i am sor●ie for it , for the fear least the time that i imploied therein might have been spent worse : but surely , i cannot deny but that i did thereby foment that affection which doth sometimes preva●c●●e better ; to wit , to the desire of praise , and of self-estimation . knowledge doth oft-times puff up him that is master of it , so as he forg●●s to glory in the lord : i dare not say i possessed it , for hardly could i taste the waters of the over-flowing fountains of learning , through the shallowness of wit , and other affairs that i was busied in ; yet man doth easily flatter himself , and attributes unto himself more then falls to his share . which is the cause why ambition is seen to get into all places , yea even into their most secret retirements who forsake the world , being a vice which is the harder to be cured , for that it keeps close and hidden . but what shall i say more ? what could i answer , if i should be asked what fruit i reaped by these my studies ? i might peradventure say , that the little of philosophie which i learnt hath more awakened my understanding in knowing the truth of things . but say i pray , what need hath he to have recourse to the candle light of humane knowledge , who hath the bright sun-shine of grace in him , and to whom infallible truth is revealed ? i did for a while give my self to study moral●ie , wherein i took such delight , as i wrote a book thereof , which i was afterwards perswaded to print , and so to impart it unto others : i learned how to become morally good ; it is true i did ; but is not the first precept in this knowledge , that the doctrine of manners , is it of self very vain ? for it consists in doing , in action , not in knowing ; it had been much better , that setting his commandements before mine eies , who is the true and real master of that christian life which i live , and have yet to live , i should have imploied my time in observing the precepts of the divine law , rather then in collecting the documents of philosophers ; who wanting the taste of that truest , chiefest , and most excellent vertue , which divine love doth so much the more afford , as it is the more ardently inflamed , applied themselves to a certain mediocritie , which is better discerned or known in their idea , or in their writings , then in the affections or actions which they go about to moderate . afterwards , when i was come to mans estate , being commanded so to do by him whom i ought to obey , and it being a thing also which i my self did much desire , i betook my self to write the history of my country ; a good and gallant work . but what proportion can the good reward which i hoped for thereby , bear with the pains i took , which was truly very great ? had i spent part of the time and study which i imployed therein , in the reading of divine books , i cannot doubt but that i should have been inflamed with the love of spiritual things , which for so long a time i did so little relish . and to pass by other things , i cannot deny , as best knowing mine own intrincecal affections , but that whilst i labored so much to celebrate the fame and glory of others by these my writings . i often felt within my self a certain tickling and delight out of the hope which i flattered my self withal , and wherewith i nourished my thoughts , that by these my labors i my self might likewise reap some honor ; and ( as the poets say ) live in my fame after my death . oh gross vanity ! and when this affection ( with which i must confess i was sometimes drunk ) gives place to reason , i acknowledge , that amongst all vanities none is greater then wordly glory ; which is vain , because man glories of that which is none of his , for he hath received every good thing , especially the endowments of the soul , from god : vain , because it is nothing of it self ; it hath no true existenc●e , it is made up of various opinions of men , and of theirs most , who know least ; vain , because it reflects upon that which is not in us , upon that which is a trivial and common accident , to wit our fame , the memory whereof we do with so much vanity desire to propagate . tell me thou humane soul , which are so much ●●amored of this bare shadow of good , which doth not at all belong unto thee , if after thou art departed out of this world , thou couldst have any thing to do with humane affections , what good would this folse glory do thee , which thou dost so much do●e upon , as thou dost sometimes lose the way which leads to true heavenly glory : if thou shalt be damned , and in the eternal torments of hell , thinkest thou that the satisfaction of this thy glory shall be able any waies to ease those immense and unconceivable torments ? and in thou shall be fixt in heavenly bliss , what need in that abode hath he of worldly glory , who is glorified with eternal glory ? who is satisfied , who is content , who is for ever blessed ? but since i examine mine own waies , i return to consider my life . some few years since i gave myself to the government of my country ; wherein i found the way so plain and easie , and the savor and grace of my country so far above my merits , as i soon got into great honors , and into the chiefest imployments , which i still containe in , and do imploy my time . but my talent is so small , as though i spend it all , i know it is but little . and if i spend all , how can i , according to humane respect , be blamed ? or what reason have others to complain more of me , then i have of my self ? since so little a part of my life remains , or almost none at all , wherein i may recollect my thoughts , what time have i to think of my end ? to repent me of my sins ? to endeavor amendment ▪ and yet i see i am not diligent in doing any thing . the most troublesom , yea , and the most contented thoughts wherewith my mind is now incumbred , will vanish as a shadow , or as smoak before the winde , and shall be withered as flowers by the suns beams ; and yet whilst this mind of mine is continually involved in these afficuous cares , it is so filled with the fantasms of those things wherein i imploy my self all the day long , as i most meditate onely upon them , and though unwillingly , have them alwaies before mine ties , at all times , in every place , and upon all occasions : so as all contemplation of nobler and better things which i sometimes turn my self unto , is alwaies mixt with these base affections , and troubled with these clouds of worldly thoughts . alas , how hard is it to serve two masters , god and the world ? the world measures its actions by its worldly respects ; he who makes that his stay , who lives acco●d●ng to that , can make no new laws to himself , but must govern himself by those which are commended , and practised by those who walk in the waies of the world . but how far different from these are gods waies ? patience , humility , poverty , obedience , self-denial , and the giving over of all worldly care , are things which are abhorr'd by the worldly wise , but otherwise to god. how badly do the fallacious rules of worldly wisdom agree with the instructions of true christianitie , especially those of this corrupt age , wherein heavenly and divine things are often troubled and confounded with a certain vain name of reason of state. crowns , empires , kingdoms , and all power is given by god ; and though the weakness of our reason be such as it cannot penetrate into the infinite abyss of his wisdom , yet does he dispose and order all things with certain and infallible ends , though unknown to us . therefore unless that great , and omnipotent lord god , by whom kings do not onely reign upon earth , but the earth it self is sustained and held up with a miraculous equality of weight , do not keep the city , how vain is all this your learning , o ye wise men of the world ? and you princes , how vain are all your forces to maintain your lordships and states ? thou , whosoever thou art , who dost manage the weightiest affairs of principalities , put thy heart into the hands of thy god , and he will infuse worthie and becomming thoughts into thee ; he will give thee true wisdom and true fortitude . the world builds nothing but towers of babell ; nor is it aware thereof , till its desig●s , and many years labors , being overthrown by its own confusion , it sees its rashness laid low ; and those thoughts which aimed at heaven thrown , down to hell. but i return again unto my self . i see that these many years past wherein i approach to old age , i imploy my time in studies , thoughts , and imployments , of differing natures in themselves , but all conformable to what tends to my prejudice . for they robb'd me of my rest , have still oprest me with many cares , and led me astray from more holy desires , to which , if i had bent my mind in time , i might hope now to sit and feed at the table of those true good things which now i want . what do i then do ? what do i think ? what do i expect ? why do i not change my thoughts and exercises , if i know that those wherein i have hitherto spent my time do me no good ; nor for all the labor i have taken , have made me ere a whit more happy then i was at first ? nay , i may say , they have made me more wretched , since i have consumed the greatest part of my life wofully , and without any profit . do i peradventure hope , that whilst i my self do not change , the nature of those things wherein i am verst should alter ? that trouble should turn to delight ? that the affairs of the world , so full of anxious cares , should turn to the peace and solace of the soul ? that worldly good shall assume a new vertue of makeing their possessors well apaid and satisfied ? that these brackish waters of the pleasures of the age , of which the more we drink , the more we are athirst , should become sweet and savory , and afford any true delight or content ? men who are blind in what concerns their own good , are wont to pervert the nature of things ; to make them their masters who are given to them to be servants . such are the goods of fortune , as the common people call them , because they know not how to raise themselves up to the knowledge of that mystery whereby their supreme author and free donor doth dispense them . but what greater misery is there then this humane felicity ? the true lord and god is made known unto us , and yet we continue to adore the idols of avarice , ambition , and vain glory : look but upon those huge ●eaps of ●uine which thou maist every day see in the city of rome , who was once the queen of the world : where are now her immense treasures ? where the majesty of her empire ? where the pomp of so many triumphs ? the memory of so many victories ? all these , being made the prey of time and death , 〈◊〉 buried in these ruines . but thou who livest by other precepts , and who hast a truer knowledge of thy eternal life , and eternal death , consider better what the nature of these goods are , to which thou hast been sometimes ●ar●ed , with a less moderate affection , by the torrent of continual custom . if they be not of great worth , as truly they are not , why dost thou so much love them ? why endeavorst thou so much to be master of them ? why dost thou dread the loss of them so much ? and if they have any thing of good in them , why dost thou not call to mind how soon thou art to forgo them ? how comes it to pass this our happie worldly man is not aware , that if the increase of these goods could make him happy , he makes himself miserable , whilst through overmuch loving them , he is more intent upon purchasing the little which he lacks , then in injoy●ng the very much which he possesseth , whilst the fear of loosing it doth continually molest his mind ? a greater vexation then which the so●l hath none , because it hath no bounds . we look upon their outside onely , and are enamored of a certain handsome , but vain appearance which is in them , taking them for the guids of our life . but if we would consider their infide , and discover the deceipt and cousenage which is woven therein , we would shun them , as some holy men have done , least we be by them , and with them hurried down into hell and damnation . we have our happiness within us , and seek for it elsewhere . he who will search his own house well , what wealth shall he find there whereby to inrich himself with precious treasure , which is hidden from us because the darkness of our affections lead us astray . if thy heart be fraught with pure ●houghts , if thy soul be purged of all earthly passions , so as the rai●s of that true and lively sun which is alwaies re●dy to illuminate thee , may pen●trate thereinto , thou shalt soon discover there j●w●ls of such vertue , price , and worth , as thou maist thereby purchase the worlds peace and heavens glory . thou shalt find those affections which now rage tumu●tuously within thee , become quiet and obedient to reason ; and those dissonant sounds which do so perturb thy mind , will agree with so just proportion , as they will make a sweet harmonie in thy soul , and will prove a refreshing to the troubles of the world , a figure of heavenly m●lodie , and of the glory of paradice . o you fathers , you good and holy fathers , who being within your closter live in peace and quiet , f●r from the world , and the cares thereof , not onely in your person , but in your very thoughts ; if there may be any affection found without affection , and envy without sin , i do assuredly envy in you those your leasure times , wherein you giv● your selves wholly to prayer and meditation ; an idleness , which is true business tru● entertainment , and the true nutriment of the soul. what are crowns , scepters , and to be clothed in purple , but bo●ds whereby to keep those miserable ones , whom the world terms happy , fastned to perpetual vexation , and troublesom ●ar●s ? with you , o fathers ! it is that peace doth inhabit ; peace which k●eps you at unitie within your selves , keeps your affections obedient to reason , and your reason a devout hand-maid to god. how can he who lives in the worlds militia , taste of these fruits of true peace ? so full of cares , and destracted with so many thoughts ? who is continually to combate with those enemies who wage within him , to wit the affections of worldly things , to the which we our selves , do as it were furnish forces against our selves , by finding out new objects , and new materials whereby to increase them . we worldly men will feed the soul with meat which belongs not to her , wherefore it is no wonder if we be never satisfied , and if one appetite beget another even in infinitum ; you , you are they who teach us by your lives and examples , that nature is satisfied with a little ; and that man can never be said to be rich by abundance , nor poor by want ; other goods , other endowments , other ornaments are requisite then those the world seeks after ; the further a man advances therein , the further he finds himself entred into an intricate and confused labyrinth , and after having made a long voyage , he findes himself further from his journies end then when he first set forth . but i perceive that i praise mary , and follow martha ; i know which is the right and safe way , and i take an intricate and dangerous way to lead me to my desired end . i am busied , sollicited , and troubled with many things , and yet i know that one thing is onely necessarie , that there is but one th●ng which can so become the companion of my life , as it will never forsake me . i serve the world , and being given over to cares i entertain them more and more ; love of children , houshold government , administration of goods , the commonwealths business , are things which i would fain free my self of ; but i neither know how , nor when to do so . i endeavor to be less affectionate in having to do with worldly things ; to taste them for nutriment , not to be drunk with them ; but how hard is it to fix the slippery appetite so , as it fall not from the use to the abuse of those things , whereunto it is continually excited by the provocation of its perpetual companion , sin ? he who stands alwaies near the fire , though he thrust not himself into it , so as he be burnt and consumed , yet he must feel a troublesom heat ; and which is worse , the soul which is outwardly warmed with these earthly affections , freezes inwardly for what concerns divine things : prayers grow luke-warm , a●ms-deeds scarce , fastings not usual ; and in brief , the thoughts of the soul are choaked by the cogitations of the body . yet i am much comforted , that i find in my self continually a desire of becoming better ; which is a sign that i have not lost the princi●les of well doing , and that i am not given over by the immen●e grace of my creator . though i sail through the troublesom sea of this world ; though my actions and thoughts flote up and down , not knowing where to find a haven to put into ; yet ( thanks be given to god ) this ship of my soul which contains many precious wares in her which were assigned over unto her , hath not made shipwrack . the integrity of communication , puritie of conscience the knowledge of the truest good , things which i have not used according to their worth , are yet preserved at their true price and value ; so as they may one day enrich my soul. thou my lord , thou my creator , thou my redeemer , to whom my thoughts are better known then to my self , let this my reverent affection be acceptable to thy charitie ; through thy great goodness pardon my imperfections , and supply my defaults by thy infinite merit , so as i may totally despise these earthly things ; free me from these fetters ; keep not mine eyes fixt upon the earth , but turn them unto thee that art the summum bonum , and my souls sole felicitie ; ●ince thou knowest far better then my self what way i had best walk in to purchase salvation . if i be called to take pains in this state , and to use my talent in this civil life , do thou , o lord , so assist my weakness by thy great grace and goodness , as that acknowledgments may onely be made to thee , the author of all my goodness for all my happy succes●es ; thine be all honor and praise ; and suffer me not to lose that reward of my worldly labors , which thou thy self hast bin pleased that i should purchase by undergoing them in thy name , and by pi●ecting all my actions to thee . grant , o lord , that i may so think upon my mortal children , as that i may not forget thee my eternal father ; govern thou all my faculties so , as i may know thou gavest me them , that thou preservest them to me , and that it is my dutie to make use of thy graces ; that i may love my earthly country , yet not so , as to make less esteem of my heavenly country ; that i may serve and obey my commonwealth with integritie of conscience , with an intention to serve her , and not my self , and for thy glory , not for mine own . this is a miraculous work of thy hand , and which is onely to be acknowledged from thee . she is the onely example , in having for so long a series of years , preserved her self in libertie , in power , and in the true religion : therefore if i cannot with fervor of spirit serve thee immediately , grant yet that i may serve thee not unworthily nor unusefully in this most excellent creature of thy making . and since it now falls to my share to serve my country in this holy city of rome , as her ambassador to pope clement the eighth ; grant that by serving this thy vicar upon earth , i may serve thee the better , who art the true and supreme lord of heaven . of thy great goodness give me that which i do not deserve ; accept of my good will , for the good works which i ought to do ; and infuse thy spirit into this thy vicar , the common father of thy people , and shepheard of thy sheep , who is so full of zeal and charitie ; so as that he may be able to draw this weathe●beaten ship of christianitie out of the storming sea of these troublesom times and that she be being gotten into the haven of peace and safety , may with hands lifted up to heaven say , this is the day which the lord ●ath made , let us rejoyce therein , and let us always bless his most holy name . finis . the power of kings, and in particular of the king of england learnedly asserted by sir robert filmer, kt. ; with a preface of a friend, giving an account of the author and his works. filmer, robert, sir, d. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the power of kings, and in particular of the king of england learnedly asserted by sir robert filmer, kt. ; with a preface of a friend, giving an account of the author and his works. filmer, robert, sir, d. . [ ], p. printed for w.h. & t.f. and are to be sold by walter davis ..., london : . reproduction of original in yale university library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng monarchy. monarchy -- great britain. political science -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the power of kings : and in particular , of the king of england . learnedly asserted , by sir robert filmer , kt. with a preface of a friend : giving an account of the author and his works . in magnis voluisse sat est — london : printed for w. h. & t. f. and are to be sold by walter davis in amen-corner , near paternoster-row . . the preface . whoso would go about to speak sir robert filmer's worth , hath no more to do but onely to number and to name his writings , as they were written in the following order . questio quodlibetica , or a discourse of usury , written about . and first published in the year . patriarcha , or the natural right of kings maintained , against the unnatural right of the people to govern , or chuse themselves governours . written about the year . and never published till of late . of the blasphemy against the holy ghost . published in the year . the anarchy of a limited and mixed monarchy , or observations upon mr. hunton's treatise on that subject . first published in the year . the free-holders grand inquest , touching our soveraign lord the king , and his parliament . in the year . of the power of kings : and in particular , of the king of england . first published in the same year . observations upon mr. hobbes ' s leviathan , mr. milton against salmasius , and h. grotius de jure belli & pacis , concerning the original of government . to which those upon mr. huntons book being re-printed , were annexed in the year . observations upon aristotle's politicks , touching forms of government . published in the same year . and the advertisement to the jury-men of england touching witches , with the difference between an english and an hebrew witch . in the year . whoso would give his writings their due , hath done it already , in saying that they are his. of which , who reads any one , may have some cause to wonder how he came to be sufficiently furnished to write that ; but who proceeds yet farther to read them all , will have more abundant cause to wonder , should any else but he have wrote the rest . his political writings are chiefly levell'd against a doctrine but too generally embrac'd of late that , all men are born equal . to disprove which , though it might be sufficient to appeal to the practice and experience of mankinde , whether all nations have not still with one consent mounted their kings upon thrones ; and whether all the masters of philosophies and religions have not constantly appeared in their chairs , and in their pulpits , while their disciples have humbly presented themselves at their feet ? not to speak of all the several heights of authority , or extents of command , which either popular oratory have attained to by their wit , or conquerours have raised themselves to by their arms. our author himself is an undeniable proof of his own assertion , and has given us the best evidence that all men are not equal by birth , while he himself hath no equal in writing . so impossible is it for him to treat either of the means of acquiring , or the rights of exercising soveraignty , without acquiring and exercising a new soveraignty over his readers . for does he overcome others ? even we at the same time are made captives without resistance , and are his by right of conquest . or does he govern in their stead ? even then all readers are insensibly under his command , as much as if they were his subjects , and are his by right of natural soveraignty . a reason so far exalted above ours as his , makes him appear like those kings of old , who were in stature much superiour to their subjects , and seemed so far to overtop the rest , as if nature it self had marked them out for heads of all . to be short , no power , whose cause our author pleads , can be so absolute , as what he obtains over us at the same time himself . and yet of so sweet a tyranny , who that are under it can complain ? arguments so prevailing , who is able to withstand ? and where the mastery is gained over us by no other force than that of perswasion , who would forego the pleasure of obedience ? the empire which wit and eloquence have over men , seems to be like that command which musick hath over the wilde beasts , that civilizes and subdues them at one and the same time . and we , while we read this author , feel the highest of rational pleasures , even then when we are made at once both better subjects , and wiser men. the power of kings : and in particular , of the king of england . to majestie or soveraignty belongeth an absolute power not subject to any law. it behoveth him that is a soveraign , not to be in any sort subject to the command of another ; whose office is to give laws unto his subjects , to abrogate laws unprofitable , and in their stead to establish other ; which he cannot do , that is himself subject to laws , or to others which have command over him : and this is that which the law saith , that the prince is acquitted from the power of the laws . the laws , ordinances , letters-patents , priviledges , and grants of princes , have no force but during their life ; if they be not ratified by the express consent , or at least by sufferance of the prince following , who had knowledge thereof . if the soveraign prince be exempted from the laws of his predecessors , much less shall he be bound unto the laws he maketh himself ; for a man may well receive a law from another man , but impossible it is in nature for to give a law unto himself , no more than it is to command a mans self in a matter depending of his own will : there can be no obligation which taketh state from the meer will of him that promiseth the same ; which is a necessary reason to prove evidently , that a king cannot binde his own hands , albeit that he would : we see also in the end of all laws these words , because it hath so pleased us ; to give us to understand , that the laws of a sovereign prince , although they be grounded upon reason , yet depend upon nothing but his meer and frank good will. but as for the laws of god , all princes and people are unto them subject ; neither is it in their power to impugne them , if they will not be guilty of high treason against god ; under the greatness of whom , all monarchs of the world ought to bow their heads , in all fear and reverence . a question may be , whether a prince be subject to the laws of his countrey that he hath sworn to keep , or not ? if a soveraign prince promise by oath to his subjects to keep the laws , he is bound to keep them ; not for that a prince is bound to keep his laws by himself or by his predecessors , but by the just conventions and promises which he hath made himself ; be it by oath , or without any oath at all , as should a private man be : and for the same causes that a private man may be relieved from his unjust and unreasonable promise , as for that it was so grievous , or for that he was by deceit or fraud circumvented , or induced thereunto by errour , or force , or just fear , or by some great hurt ; even for the same causes the prince may be restored in that which toucheth the diminishing of his majesty : and so our maxime resteth , that the prince is not subject to his laws , nor to the laws of his predecessors , but well to his own just and reasonable conventions . the soveraign prince may derogate from the laws that he hath promised and sworn to keep , if the equity thereof cease , and that of himself , without consent of his subjects ; which his subjects cannot do among themselves , if they be not by the prince relieved . the forraign princes well-advised , will never take oath to keep the laws of their predecessors ; for otherwise they are not sovereigns . notwithstanding all oaths , the prince may derogate from the laws , or frustrate or disanul the same , the reason and equity of them ceasing . there is not any bond for the soveraign prince to keep the laws , more than so far as right and justice requireth . neither is it to be found , that the antient kings of the hebrews took any oaths , no not they which were anointed by samuel , elias , and others . as for general and particular , which concern the right of men in private , they have not used to be otherwise changed , but after general assemblies of the three estates in france ; not for that it is necessary for the kings to rest on their advice , or that he may not do the contrary to that they demand , if natural reason and justice do so require . and in that the greatness and majesty of a true soveraign prince is to be known , when the estates of all the people assembled together in all humility present their requests and supplications to their prince , without having any power in any thing to command , or determine , or to give voice ; but that that which it pleaseth the king to like or dislike , to command or forbid , is holden for law. wherein they which have written of the duty of magistrates , have deceived themselves , in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the prince ; a thing which oft-times causeth the true subjects to revolt from the obedience which they owe unto their soveraign prince , aud ministreth matter of great troubles in commonwealths ; of which their opinion , there is neither reason nor ground . if the king should be subject unto the assemblies and decrees of the people , he should neither be king nor soveraign , and the commonwealth neither realm nor monarchy ; but a meer aristocracy of many lords in power equal , where the greater part commandeth the less ; and whereon the laws are not to be published in the name of him that ruleth , but in the name and authority of the estates ; as in an aristocratical seignory , where he that is chief hath no power , but oweth obeisance to the seignory ; unto whom yet they every one of them feign themselves to owe their faith and obedience : which are all things so absurd , as hard it is to see which is furthest from reason . when charles the eighth , the french king , then but fourteen years old , held a parliament at tours , although the power of the parliament was never before nor after so great , as in those times ; yet relli then the speaker for the people , turning himself to the king , thus beginneth : most high , most mighty , and most christian king , our natural and onely lord ; we poor , humble , and obedient subjects , &c. which are come hither by your command , in all humility , reverence , and subjection , present our selves before you , &c. and have given me in charge from all this noble assembly to declare unto you , the good will and hearty desire they have , with a most fervent resolution to serve , obey , and aid you in all your affairs , commandments , and pleasures . all this speech is nothing else but a declaration of their good will towards the king , and of their humble obedience and loyalty . the like speech was used in the parliament at orleans to charles the th , when he was scarce eleven years old . neither are the parliaments in spain otherwise holden , but that even a greater obedience of all the people is given to the king ; as is to be seen in the acts of the parliament at toledo by king philip , . when he yet was scarce twenty five years old . the answers also of the king of spain unto the requests and humble supplications of his people , are given in these words : we will , or else , we decree or ordain ; yea , the subsidies that the subjects pay unto the king of spain , they call service . in the parliaments of england , which have commonly been holden every third year , the estates seem to have a great liberty , ( as the northern people almost all breathe thereafter ) yet so it is , that in effect they proceed not , but by way of supplications and requests to the king. as in the parliament holden in octob. . when the estates by a common consent had resolved ( as they gave the queen to understand ) not to treat of any thing , until she had first appointed who should succeed her in the crown ; she gave them no other answer , but that they were not to make her grave before she were dead . all whose resolutions were to no purpose without her good liking , neither did she in that any thing that they requested . albeit by the sufferance of the king of england , controversies between the king and his people are sometimes determined by the high court of parliament ; yet all the estates remain in full subjection to the king , who is no way bound to follow their advice , neither to consent to their requests . the estates of england are never otherwise assembled , no more than they are in france or spain , than by parliament-writs and express commandments , proceeding from the king ; which sheweth very well , that the estates have no power of themselves to determine , command , or decree any thing ; seeing they cannot so much as assemble themselves , neither being assembled , depart without express commandment from the king. yet this may seem one special thing , that the laws made by the king of england , at the request of the estates , cannot be again repealed , but by calling a parliament ; though we see henry the eighth to have always used his soveraign power , and with his only word to have disannulled the decrees of parliament . we conclude the majesty of a prince to be nothing altered or diminished by the calling together , or presence of the estates : but to the contrary , his majesty thereby to be much the greater and the more honourable , seeing all his people to acknowledge him for their soveraign . we see the principal point of soveraign majesty and absolute power to consist principally in giving laws unto the subjects without their consent . it behoveth , that the soveraign prince should have the laws in his power , to change and amend them according as occasion shall require . in a monarchy , every one in particular must swear to the observation of the laws , and their allegiance to one soveraign monarch ; who , next unto god , ( of whom he holds his scepter and power ) is bound to no man : for an oath carrieth always with it reverence unto whom , and in whose name it is made , as still given to a superiour ; and therefore the vassal gives such oath unto his lord , but receives none from him again , though they be mutually bound , the one of them to the other . trajan swore to keep the laws , although he under the name of a soveraign prince was exempted ; but never any of the emperours before him so sware : therefore pliny the younger , in a panegyrical oration , speaking of the oath of trajan , gives out , a great novelty , saith he , and never before heard of , he sweareth , by whom we swear . of these two things the one must come to pass , to wit , the prince that swears to keep the laws of his country , must either not have the soveraignty , or else become a perjur'd man , if he should but abrogate but one law contrary to his oath ; whereas it is not only profitable that a prince should sometimes abrogate some such laws , but also necessary for him to alter or correct them , as the infinite variety of places , times and persons shall require : or if we shall say , the prince to be still a soveraign , and yet nevertheless with such conditions , that he can make no law without the advice of his councel or people ; he must also be dispensed with by his subjects , for the oath which he hath made for the observation of the laws ; and the subjects again which are obliged to the laws , have also need to be dispensed withal by their prince , for fear they should be perjur'd : so shall it come to pass , that the majesty of the commonweal enclining now to this side , now to that side ; sometimes the prince , sometimes the people bearing sway , shall have no certainty to rest upon ; which are notable absurdities , and altogether incompatible with the majesty of absolute soveraignty , and contrary both to law and reason . and yet we see many men , that think they see more in the matter than others , will maintain it to be most necessary , that princes should be bound by oath , to keep the laws and customs of their countreys : in which doing , they weaken and overthrow all the rights of soveraign majesty , which ought to be most sacred and holy , and confound the soveraignty of one soveraign monarch , with an aristocracy or democracy . publication , or approbation of laws , in the assembly of the estates or parliament , is with us of great importance for the keeping of the laws ; not that the prince cannot of himself make a law , without the consent of the estates or people ( for even all his declarations of war , treaties of peace , valuations of the coin , charters to enable towns to send burgesses to parliament , and his writ of summons to both houses to assemble , are laws , though made without the consent of the estates or people ; ) but it is a courteous part to do it by the good liking of the senate . what if a prince by law forbid to kill or steal , is he not bound to obey his own laws ? i say , that this law is not his , but the law of god , whereunto all princes are more straitly bound than their subjects ; god taketh a stricter account of princes than others , as solomon a king hath said ; whereto agreeth marcus aurelius , saying , the magistrates are judges over private men , princes judge the magistrates , and god the princes . it is not only a law of nature , but also oftentimes repeated among the laws of god , that we should be obedient unto the laws of such princes , as it hath pleased god to set to rule and reign over us ; if their laws be not directly repugnant unto the laws of god , whereunto all princes are as well bound as their subjects : for as the vassal oweth his oath of fidelity unto his lord , towards and against all men , except his soveraign prince : so the subject oweth his obedience to his soveraign prince , towards and against all , the majesty of god excepted , who is the absolute soveraign of all the princes in the world. to confound the state of monarchy , with the popular or aristocratical estate , is a thing impossible , and in effect incompatible , and such as cannot be imagined : for soveraignty being of it self indivisible , how can it at one and the same time be divided betwixt one prince , the nobility , and the people in common ? the first mark of sovereign majesty is , to be of power to give laws , and to command over them unto the subjects : and who should those subjects be that should yield their obedience to the law , if they should have also power to make the laws ? who should he be that could give the law , being he himself constrain'd to receive it of them , unto whom he himself gave it ? so that of necessity we must conclude , that as no one in particular hath the power to make the law in such a state , that there the state must needs be popular . never any commonwealth hath been made of an aristocracy and popular estate , much less of all the three estates of a commonwealth . such states , wherein the right of soveraignty is divided are not rightly to be called commonweals , but rather the corruption of commonweals ; as herodotus hath most briefly but truely written . commonweals which change their state , the soveraign right and power of them being divided , finde no rest from civil wars . if the prince be an absolute soveraign , as are the true monarchs of france , of spain , of england , scotland , turkey , moscovy , tartary , persia , aethiopia , india , and almost of all the kingdoms of africk and asia ; where the kings themselves have the soveraignty , without all doubt or question , not divided with their subjects : in this case it is not lawful for any one of the subjects in particular , or all of them in general , to attempt any thing , either by way of fact or of justice , against the honour , life , or dignity of the soveraign , albeit he had committed all the wickedness , impiety , and cruelty that could be spoke . for as to proceed against him by way of justice , the subject hath not such jurisdiction over his soveraign prince , of whom dependeth all power to command , and who may not only revoke all the power of his magistrates , but even in whose presence the power of all magistrates , corporations , estates and communities cease . now if it be not l●wful for the subject by the way of justice to proceed against a king , how should it then be lawful to proceed against him by way of fact or force ? for question is not here what men are able to do by strength and force , but what they ought of right to do ; as not whether the subject have power and strength , but whether they have lawful power to condemn their soveraign prince . the subject is not only guilty of treason in the highest degree , who hath slain his soveraign prince , but even he also which hath attempted the same , who hath given counsel or consent thereto ; yea , if he have concealed the same , or but so much as thought it : which fact the laws have in such detestation , as that when a man guilty of any offence or crime , dyeth before he be condemned thereof , he is deemed to have died in whole and perfect estate , except he have conspired against the life and dignity of his soveraign prince . this only thing they have thought to be such , as that for which he may worthily seem to have been now already judged and condemned ; yea , even before he was thereof accused . and albeit the laws inflict no punishment upon the evil thoughts of men , but on those only which by word or deed break out into some enormity ; yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the violating of the person of his soveraign prince , although he have attempted nothing , they have yet judged this same thought worthy of death , notwithstanding what repentance soever he have had thereof . lest any men should think [ kings or princes ] themselves to have been the authors of these laws , so the more straitly to provide for their own safety and honour ; let us fee the laws and examples of holy scripture . nabuchodonosor king of assyria , with fire and sword destroyed all the country of palestina , besieged jerusalem , took it , rob'd and razed it down to the ground , burnt the temple , and defiled the sanctuary of god , slew the king , with the greatest part of the people , carrying away the rest into captivity into babylon , caused the image of himself made in gold to be set up in publick place , commanding all men to adore and worship the same , upon pain of being burnt alive , and caused them that refused so to do , to be cast into a burning furnace . and yet for all that , the holy prophets [ baruch . jeremy . ] directing their letters unto their brethren the jews , then in captivity in babylon , will them to pray unto god for the good and happy life of nabuchodonosor and his children , and that they might so long rule and reign over them , as the heavens should endure : yea even god himself doubted not to call nabuchodonosor his servant , saying , that he would make him the most mighty prince of the world ; and yet was there never a more detestable tyrant than he : who not contented to be himself worshipped , but caused his image also to be adored , and that upon pain of being burnt quick . we have another rare example of saul , who possessed with an evil spirit , caused the priests of the lord to be without iust cause slain , for that one of them had received david flying from him ; and did what in his power was to kill , or cause to be kill'd , the same david , a most innocent prince , by whom he had got so many victories ; at which time he fell twice himself into david's hands : who blamed of his souldiers for that he would not suffer his so mortal enemy , then in his power , to be slain , being in assured hope to have enjoyed the kingdom after his death ; he detested their counsel , saying , god forbid that i should suffer the person of a king , the lords anointed , to be violated . yea , he himself defended the same king persecuting of him , when as he commanded the souldiers of his guard , overcome by wine and sleep , to be wakened . and at such time as saul was slain , and that a souldier , thinking to do david a pleasure , presented him with saul's head ; david caused the same souldier to be slain , which had brought him the head , saying , go thou wicked ; how durst thou lay thy impure hands upon the lords anointed ? thou shalt surely die therefore . and afterwards , without all distimulation , mourned himself for the dead king. all which is worth good consideration : for david was by saul prosecuted to death , and yet wanted not power to have revenged himself , being become stronger than the king ; besides , he was the chosen of god , and anointed by samuel to be king , and had married the king's daughter : and yet for all that , he abhorred to take upon him the title of a king , and much more to attempt any thing against the life or honour of saul , or to rebel against him ; but chose rather to banish himself out of the realm , than in any sort to seek the kings destruction . we doubt not but david , a king and a prophet , led by the spirit of god , had always before his eyes the law of god , exod. . . thou shalt not speak evil of thy prince , nor detract the magistrate ; neither is there any thing more common in holy scripture , than the forbidding not only to kill or attempt the life or honour of a prince , but even for the very magistrates , although , saith the scripture , they be wicked and naught . the protestant princes of germany , before they entred into arms against charles the emperour , demanded of martin luther , if it were lawful for them so to do , or not ; who frankly told them , that it was not lawful , whatsoever tyranny or impiety were pretended ; yet was he not therein by them believed ; so , thereof , ensued a deadly and most lamentable war , the end whereof was most miserable ; drawing with in , the ruine of many great and noble houses of germany , with exceeding slaughter of the subjects . the prince , whom you may justly call the father of the country , ought to be to every man dearer and more reverend than any father , as one ordained and sent unto us by god. the subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against the prince , how naughty and cruel soever he be : lawful it is , not to obey him in things contrary to the laws of god , to flie and hide our selves from him ; but yet to suffer stripes , yea , and death also , rather than to attempt any thing against his life and honour . o how many tyrants should there be , if it should be lawful for subjects to kill tyrants ? how many good and innocent princes should as tyrants perish by the conspiracy of their subjects against them ? he that should of his subjects but exact subsidies , should be then , as the vulgar people esteem him , a tyrant : he that should rule and command contrary to the good liking of the people , should be a tyrant : he that should keep strong guards and garrisons for the safety of his person , should be a tyrant : he that should put to death traitors and conspirators against his state , should be also counted a tyrant . how should good princes be assured of their lives , if under colour of tyranny they might be slain by their subjects , by whom they ought to be defended ? in a well-ordered state , the soveraign power must remain in one onely , without communicating any part thereof unto the state , ( for in that case it should be a popular government , and no monarchy . ) wise polititians , philosophers , divines , and historiographers , have highly commended a monarchy above all other common-weals . it is not to please the prince , that they hold this opinion ; but for the safety and happiness of the subjects . and contrarywise , when as they shall limit and restrain the soveraign power of a monarch , to subject him to the general estates , or to the council ; the soveraignty hath no firm foundation , but they frame a popular confusion , or a miserable anarchy , which is the plague of all estates and commonweals : the which must be duely considered , not giving credit to their goodly discourses , which perswade subjects , that it is necessary to subject monarchs , and to give their prince a law ; for that is not only the ruine of the monarch , but also of the subjects . it is yet more strange , that many hold opinion , that the prince is subject to his laws , that is to say , subject to his will , whereon the laws which he hath made depend ; a thing impossible in nature . and under this colour , and ill-digested opinion , they make a mixture and confusion of civil laws , with the laws of nature and of god. a pure absolute monarchy is the surest commonweal , and without comparison , the best of all . wherein many are abused , who maintain that an optimacy is the best kinde of government ; for that many commanders have more judgment , wisdome , and counsel , than one alone . for there is a great difference betwixt councel and commandment . the councel of many wise men may be better than of one ; but to resolve , determine , and to command , one will always perform it better than many : he which hath advisedly digested all their opinions , will soon resolve without contention ; the which many cannot easily perform : it is necessary to have a soveraign prince , which may have power to resolve and determine of the opinions of his council . finis . plato redivivus, or, a dialogue concerning government wherein, by observations drawn from other kingdoms and states both ancient and modern, an endeavour is used to discover the present politick distemper of our own, with the causes and remedies ... neville, henry, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing n estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) plato redivivus, or, a dialogue concerning government wherein, by observations drawn from other kingdoms and states both ancient and modern, an endeavour is used to discover the present politick distemper of our own, with the causes and remedies ... neville, henry, - . the second edition, with additions. [ ], p. printed for s.i. and sold by r. dew, london : . written by henry neville. cf. dnb. errata: p. [ ]. reproduction of original in union theological seminary library, new york. page has print missing in filmed copy. pages -end photographed from princeton university library copy and inserted at end. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng prerogative, royal -- england. political science -- early works to . great britain -- politics and government -- - . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion plato redivivus : or , a dialogue concerning government . wherein , by observations drawn from other kingdoms and states both ancient and modern , an endeavour is used to discover the present politick distemper of our own , with the causes , and remedies . non ego sum vates , sed prisci conscius aevi . pluribus exemplis haec tibi mysta cano. res nolunt male administrari . the second edition , with additions . london , printed for s.i. and sold by r. dew , . the publisher to the reader . courteous reader , all the account i can give thee of this piece is ; that about the middle of october last it was sent to me , accompanied with a letter without a name , and written in a hand altogether unknown to me , though different from the character of the dialogue it self , and the argument . the letter was very short ; and contained only , that the writer having the fortune to meet with this discourse ( of which he denied to be the author ) he thought it very fit to be sent to me , to the end if i thought it could be of any advantage to me , and no prejudice , i might publish it if i pleased , and make my best of it . when i had opened it , and perceived that it treated of government , and of the present times ; i supposing it to be something of the nature of those scurrulous libels which the press spawns every day , was extreamly displeased with my servant , for receiving in my absence , and in these dangerous days , such a pacquet , without taking any account or notice of the messenger who brought it : 'till he , to appease me , assured me , that the bearer did look like a gentleman , and had a very unsuitable garb to a trapan ; and that he did believe he had seen him often at my shop , and that i knew him well . when i had begun to read it , and found no harm , i was resolved to peruse it in the company of a gentleman , a worthy friend of mine ; who , to his exact skill and learning in the laws of his country , hath added a very profound knowledge in all other literature ; and particularly , the excellence of platonick philosophy . when we had joyntly gone through it , he was clearly of opinion , that although some might be angry with certain passages in it , yet the discourse reflecting upon no particular person , was very uncapable of bringing me into any danger for publishing it ; either from the state , or from any private man. when i had secured my self against damnum emergens , we went about the consideration of the other part of the distinction of the schools , which is lucrum cessans , and i made some objections against the probability of vending this dialogue to profit ; which , in things of my trade , is always my design , as it ought to be . my first fear in that behalf was , that this author would disgust the reader , in being too confident and positive in matters of high a speculation . my friend replied , that the assurance he shewed was void of all sawciness , and expressed with great modesty : and that he verily believed that he meant very faithfully and sincerely towards the interest of england . my next doubt was , that a considerable part of this treatise being a repetition of a great many principles and positions out of oceana , the author would be discredited for borrowing from another , and the sale of the book hindred . to that my friend made answer , that before ever oceana came out , there were very many treatises and pamphlets , which alledged the political principle , that empire was founded in property , and discoursed rationally upon it : amongst the rest , one entituled a letter from an officer in ireland , to his highness the lord protector , ( which he then shewed me ) printed in . as i remember ; which was more than three years before oceana was written : and yet , said he , no man will aver that the learned gentleman who writ that book had stollen from that pamphlet . for whosoever sets himself to study politicks , must do it by reading history , and observing in it the several turns and revolutions of government : and then the cause of such change will be so visible and obvious , that we need not impute theft to any man that finds it out : it being as lawful , and as easie for any person , as well as for the author of oceana , or that pamphlet , to read thucidides , polybius , livy or plutarch : and if he do so with attentiveness , he shall be sure to find the same things there that they have found . and if this were not lawful , when that any one person has written in any science , no man must write after him : for in polity , the orders of government ; in architecture , the several orders of pillars , arches , architraves , cornishes , &c. in physick , the causes , prognosticks and crisis of diseases , are so exactly the same in all writers , that we may as well accuse all subsequent authors to have been but plagiaries of the antecedent . besides this , the learned gentleman added , that oceana was written ( it being thought lawful so to do in those times ) to evince out of these principles , that england was not capable of any other government than a democracy . and this author out of the same maxims , or aphorisms of politicks , endeavours to prove that they may be applied naturally and fitly , to the redressing and supporting one of the best monarchies in the world , which is that of england . i had but one doubt more , and that was an objection against the title , which i resolved at the first not to mention , because i could salve it by altering the title page . but since i had opportunity , i acquainted the gentleman with it : and it was , that certainly no man would ever buy a book that had in front of it so insolent and presumptuous a motto as plato redivivus ; for that he must needs be thought not only vain in the highest degree , but void of sence and iudgement too , who compares himself with plato , the greatest philosopher , the greatest politician ( i had almost said the greatest divine too ) that ever lived . my counsellor told me that he had as great a resentment of any injury done to plato as i , or any man could have . but that he was hard to believe that this man intended to compare himself to plato , either in natural parts or learning ; but only to shew that he did imitate his way of writing , as to the manner of it ; ( though not the matter ) as he hath done exactly . for plato ever writ these high matters in easie and familiar dialogues , and made the great philosophers , and learned men of that age ; as simias , cebes , timaeus , callias , phaedon , &c. yea and socrates himself , the interlocutors , although they never heard any thing of it till the book came out . and although talking of state affairs in a monarchy must needs be more offensive than it was in the democracy where plato lived . and therefore our author has forborn the naming the persons who constitute this dialogue ; yet he does make a pretty near representation and character of some persons , who , i dare swear never heard of this discourse , nor of the author's design . this convinced me , and made me suffer the title to pass . so that i have nothing more to say to thee , courteous reader , but to desire thee to pardon the faults in printing , and also the plainness and easiness of the style , and some tautologies : which latter i could easily have mended , but that i thought the author did not let them pass out of neglect , but design : and intended that both they , and the familiarity of the words and expressions , suited better with his purpose of disposing this matter to be treated in ordinary conversation amongst private friends , than full periods and starch'd language would have done ; which might have been impropriety . the next request i have to thee is , that if thou dost believe this discourse to be a very foolish one , as it may be for ought i know ( for i am no fit iudge of such matters ) that thou wilt yet vouchsafe to suspend thy censure of it for a while , till the whole impression is vended : that so , although neither the publick nor thy self may ever reap any benefit or profit by it , i may be yet so fortunate by thy favour as to do it . which will make me study thy content hereafter in something better ; and in the mean time remain , thy friend and servant . errata . pag. ii. lin . . for we r one . p. . l. . ' for sphynx r. oedipus . p. . l. ult . r. iussu . p. . l. . r. endeavested , p. . l. . r. ●eirotonia . p. . l. . for of r. or . l. . r. the mending . p. . l. . for or r. and. p. . l. . for of r. or , p. . l. . for ●is will r. his writ , p. . l. . r. most monarchies , p. , l. . for is r. by an . political discourses and histories worth reading . . the works of the famous nicholas machiavel , citizen and secretary of florence , containing , . the history of florence . . the prince . . the original of the guelf and ghibilin factions . . the life of castruccio castracani . . the murther of vitelli , &c. by duke valentino . . the state of france . . the state of germany . . the discourses on titus livius . . the art of war. . the marriage of belphegor , a novel . . nicholas machiavel's letter , in vindication of himself and his writings : all written in italian , and from thence newly and faithfully translated into english. in folio , price bound , s. . i ragguagli dj parnasso ; or advertisements from parnassus , in two centuries , with the politick touchstone , written originally in italian , by that noble roman trajano boccalini . englished by the earl of monmouth : in folio price bound s. . the history of the affairs of europe , in this present age , but more particularly of the republick of venice , written in italian , by battista nani , cavalier and procurator of st. mark : englished by sir robert honiwood , knight ; in folio , price bound s. . the history of the government of venice , wherein the policies , councils , magistrates , and laws of that state are fully related , and the use of the balloting box , exactly described : written in the year , in octav. price bound s. . the history of the turkish empire , from the year , to the year , containing the reigns of the three last emperours , viz. sultan morat , sultan ibrahim , and sultan mahomet th , his son , the th emperour now reigning : by paul rycaut , esq late consul of smyrna . in folio , price bound s. . the present state of the ottoman empire in books , containing the maximes of the turkish polity , their religion and military discipline , illustrated with divers figures . written by paul rycaut , esq late secretary to the english ambassadour there , and since consul of smyrna . the fourth edition , in octavo , price bound s. him for near two moneths , had certain necessary occasions , which called him for some time into the country . where he had not been above three weeks , before he heard , by meer accident , that the gentleman of venice was fallen dangerous sick of a malignant feaver . which made him post away immediately to london , to assist and serve him in what he might . but he found him almost perfectly restored to his health by an eminent physician of our nation , as renowned for his skill and cures at home ; as for his writings both here and abroad : and who besides his profound knowledge in all learning , as well in other professions as his own , had particularly arriv'd to so exact and perfect a discovery of the formerly hidden parts of human bodies , that every one who can but understand latine , may by his means know more of anatomy than either hypocrates , or any of the ancients or moderns did , or do perceive . and if he had lived in the days of solomon , that great philosopher would never have said , cor hominis inscrutabile . this excellent doctor being in the sick mans chamber , when the other english gentleman , newly alighted , came to visit him . after some compliments and conversation of course , they begun to talk of political matters , as you will better understand by the introduction , and by the discourse it self . the first day . the introduction . english gentleman . the sudden news i had of your sad distemper , and the danger you were in , has been the cause of a great deal of affliction to me , as well as of my present and speedy repair to london , some weeks sooner than i intended : i must confess i received some comfort to hear at my arrival of your amendment , and do take much more now to find you up , and as i hope recover'd ; which i knew would be a necessary consequence of your sending for this excellent physician , the esculapius of our age , it being the first request i had to make to you , if by seeing him here in your chamber i had not found it needless . for the destiny of us english-men depends upon him , and we either live or dye infallibly , according to the judgment or good fortune we have , when we are sick , either to call or not call him to our assistance . noble venetian . i am infinitely obliged to you , for your care of me , but am sorry it has been so inconvenient to you , as to make you leave your affairs in the countrey sooner than you proposed to your self to do : i wish i might be so fortunate in the course of my life , as to find an opportunity of making some part of an acknowledgment , for this and all the rest of your favours , but shall pray god it may not be in the same kind ; but that your health may ever be so entire , that you never need so transcendent a charity , as i now receive from your goodness : and as to this incomparable doctor ; although , i must confess , that all the good which has happen'd to me in this country , as well as the knowledge i have received of persons and things , does derive from you ; yet i must make an exception , as to this one point ; for if i can either read , or hear , this gentleman 's excellent writings , and the fame he worthily injoys in my country , would have made it inexcusable in me , to implore the help of any other ; and i do assure you , that , before i left england , it was in my ambition to beg your mediation towards the bringing me into the acquaintance and favour of this learned person , even before i had any thoughts of becoming the object of his care and skill , as now i am the trophy of both . doctor . well , gentlemen , you are both too great to be flatterers , and i too little to be flattered , and therefore i will impute this fine discourse you both make about me , to the overflowing of your wit , and the having no object near you to vent it upon but me . and for you , sir , if my art fail me not , the voiding this mirth , is a very good sign that you are in a fair way to a perfect recovery . and for my countryman here : i hope whilst he has this vent , that his hypocondriack distemper will be at quiet , and that neither his own thoughts , nor the ill posture of our publick affairs will make him hang himself , for at least this twelve months : only , gentlemen , pray take notice , that this does not pass upon me , nor do i drink it like milk ( as the french phrase it ) being mindful of what a grave gentleman at florence replyed to a young esquire , who answered his compliments with , oh , sir , you flatter me , i prencipi s'adulano i pari vostri si coglionono ; that last word i cannot render well into latin. english gentleman . well , doctor , we will not offend your modesty : the next time we do you justice , it shall be behind your back , since you are so severe upon us . but you may assure your self that my intention of recommending you to this gentleman , was for his own sake , and not for yours : for you have too many patients already , and it were much better , both for you and us , that you had but half so many : for then we should have more of your writings , and sometimes enjoy your good conversation ; which is worth our being sick on purpose for . and i am resolved to put my self sometimes into my bed , and send for you , since you have done coming to our coffee-house . but to leave this subject now , i hear you say , that this gentleman is in a perfect way of recovery ; pray is he well enough to hear , without any prejudice to his convalescence , a reprehension i have to make him ? doct. yes , yes ; you mav say what you will to him , for your repremands will rather divert than trouble him , and prove more a cordial than a corrosive . eng. gent. then , sir , pray consider what satisfaction you can ever make me , for the hard measure you have used towards me , in letting me learn from common fame and fortune , the news of your sickness , and that not till your recovery ; and for depriving me of the opportunity of paying the debt i owe to your own merit , and to the recommendation of those worthy persons in italy , who did me the honour to address you to me . and this injury is much aggravated by the splendour of your condition , and greatness of your fortune , which makes it impossible for me ever to hope for any other occasion to express my faithful service to you , or satisfie any part of the duty i have to be at your devotion . to be sick in a strange country , and to distrust the sincerity and obedience of — noble ven. pray , sir , give me leave to interrupt you , and to assure you , that it was not any distrust of your goodness to me , of which i have had sufficient experience ; nor any insensibleness how much your care might advantage me ; much less any scruple i had of being more in your debt ; which if it had been possible for me to entertain , it must have been thought of long since , before i had received those great obligations , which i never made any difficulty to accept of . it was not , i say , any of these considerations , which hindred me from advertising you of my distemper ; but the condition and nature of it , which in a moment depriv'd me of the exercise of those faculties which might give me a capacity of helping my self in any thing . but otherwise i assure you that no day of my life shall pass , wherein i will not express a sence of your favours , and — doct. pray now , sir , permit me to interrupt you ; for this gentleman , i dare say , looks for no compliments ; but that which i have to say , is ; that the desire you signified to me , to give you some account of our affairs here , and the turbulency of our present state , will be much better placed , if you please to address it to this gentleman whose parts and studies have fitted him for such an employment ; besides his having had a great share in the managing affairs of state here , in other times : and really no man understands the government of england better than he . eng. gent. now , doctor , i should tell you , i pari miei si coglionono , for so you your self have baptized this kind of civility ; but however , this is a province that i cannot be reasonably prest to take upon me , whilst you are present , who are very well known to be as skillful in the nature and distemper of the body politick , as the whole nation confesses you to be in the concerns of the natural . and you would have good store of practice in your former capacity , if the wise custom amongst the ancient greeks were not totally out of use . for they , when they found any craziness or indisposition in their several governments , before it broke out into a disease , did repair to the physicians of state ( who , from their profession , were called the seven wise men of greece ) and obtain'd from them some good recipes to prevent those seeds of distemper from taking root , and destroying the publique peace . but in our days , these signes or forerunners of diseases in state are not foreseen , till the whole mass is corrupted , and that the patient is incurable , but by violent remedies . and if we could have perceived the first symptoms of our distemper , and used good alteratives , the curiosity of this worthy gentleman had been spared , as also his command to you , to give him some light into our matters ; and we unfortunate english-men had reposed in that quiet , ease , and security , which we enjoy'd three hundred years since . but let us leave the contest who shall inform this gentleman , lest we spend the time we should do it in unprofitably , and let each of us take his part ; for if we speakall , it will look like a studied discourse fitted for the press , and not a familiar dialogue . for it ought to be in private conversation , as it was originally in the planting the gospel , when there were two sorts of preaching ; the one concionary , which was used by the apostles and other missionaries , when they spoke to those who had never heard of the mysteries of christian religion , possibly not so much as of the jewish law , or the history of christ : the duty of those was to hear , and not reply , or any way interrupt the harrangue : but when the believers ( called the church ) assembled together , it was the custom of such of the auditors , to whom any thing occurred , or ( as s. paul calls it ) was revealed , to interpose and desire to be heard , which was called an interlocutory preaching , or religious conversation ; and served very much to the instructing and edifying those who had long believed in christ , and possibly knew as much of him as their pastor himself ; and this is used still amongst many of our independent congregations . doct. i have ( besides the reason i alledged before , and which i still insist upon ) some other cause to beg that you will please to give your self the trouble of answering this gentleman's queries ; which is , that i am very defective in my expressions in the italian language ; which though i understand perfectly , and so comprehend all that either of you deliver , yet i find not words at hand to signifie my own meaning , and am therefore necessitated to deliver my self in latin , as you see . and i fear that our pronunciation being so different from that which is used in italy , this worthy person may not so easily comprehend what i intend , and so be disappointed in the desire he hath to be perfectly instructed in our affairs . noble ven. really , sir , that is not all ; for besides that , i confess your pronunciation of the latin tongue to be very new to me , and for that reason i have been forced to be troublesom to you , in making you repeat things twice , or thrice . i say besides that your latinity , as your writings shew , and all the world knows , is very pure and elegant , which it is notorious to all , that we in italy scarce understand : gentlemen there never learning more latin , than what is necessary to call for meat and drink , in germany or holland , where most of the hosts speak a certain franck , compounded of dutch , latin , and italian . and though some of us have latin enough to understand a good author , ( as you have of our language ) yet we seldom arrive to speak any better than this franck , or can without study comprehend good latin , when we meet with it in discourse . and therefore it is your perfection in that tongue , and my ignorance in it , that makes me concur with you , in desiring this gentleman , to take the pains of instructing my curiosity in italian . eng. gent. i shall obey you in this , and all things else , upon this condition , that both you and the doctor will vouchsafe to interrogate me , and by that means give me the method of serving you in this : and then that you will both please to interrupt and contradict me , when you think i say any think amiss , or that either of you are of a different opinion , and to give me a good occasion of explaining my self , and possibly of being convinced by you , which i shall easily confess ; for i hate nothing more than to hear disputes amongst gentlemen , and men of sence , wherein the speakers seem ( like sophisters in a colledge ) to dispute rather for victory , than to discover and find out the truth . doct. well , all this i believe will be granted you ; so that we have nothing to do now , but to adjourn , and name a time when to meet again . which i , being this gentlemans physician , will take upon me to appoint , and it shall be to morrow morning about nine of the clock , after he has slept well , as i hope he will , by means of a cordial i intend to send him immediately . in the mean time , not to weary him too much , we will take our leaves of him for this night . noble ven. i shall expect your return with great impatience , and if your cordial be not very potent , i believe the desire of seeing you will make me wake much sooner than the hour you appoint . and i am very confident , that my mind aswell as my body , will be sufficiently improved by such visits . it begins to be darkish , boy light your torch , and wait on these gentlemen down . both. sir , we wish you all good rest and health . noble ven. and i , with a thousand thanks , the like to you . the second day . doct. well , sir , how is it ? have you rested well to night ? i fear we come too early noble ven. dear doctor , i find my self very well , thanks to your care and skill , and have been up above these two hours , in expectation of the favour you and this gentleman promist me . doct. well , then pray let us leave off compliments and repartees , of which we had a great deal too much yesterday , and fall to our business , and be pleas'd to interrogate this gentleman what you think fit . noble ven. then , sir , my first request to you , is , that you will vouchsafe to acquaint me for what reasons this nation , which hath ever been esteemed ( and very justly ) one of the most considerable people of the world , and made the best figure both in peace , treaties , war , and trade , is now of so small regard , and signifies so little abroad ? pardon the freedom i take , for i assure you it is not out of disrespect , much less of contempt that i speak it : for since i arrived in england , i find it one of the most flourishing kingdoms in europe , full of splendid nobility and gentry ; the comliest persons alive , valiant , courteous , knowing and bountiful ; and as well stored with commoners , honest , industrious , fitted for business , merchandise , arts , or arms ; as their several educations lead them . those who apply themselves to study , prodigious for learning , and succeeding to admiration in the perfection of all sciences : all this makes the riddle impossible to be solved ; but by some skillful sphynx , such as you are ; whose pains i will yet so far spare , as to acknowledge , that i do in that little time i have spent here , perceive that the immediate cause of all this , is the dis-union of the people and the governours ; the discontentment of the gentry , and turbulency of the commonalty ; although without all violence or tumult , which is miraculous . so that what i now request of you , is , that you will please to deduce particularly to me , the causes of this division , that when they are laid open , i may proceed ( if you think fit to permit it ) from the disease , when known , to enquire out the remedies . eng. gent. before i come to make you any answer , i must thank you for the worthy and honourable character you give of our nation , and shall add to it , that i do verily believe , that there are not a more loyal and faithful people to their prince in the whole world , than ours are ; nor that fear more to fall into that state of confusion , in which we were twenty years since ; and that , not only this parliament , which consists of the most eminent men of the kingdom , both for estates and parts ; but all the inhabitants of this isle in general ; even those ( so many of them as have their understandings yet entire ) which were of the anti-royal party , in our late troubles , have all of them the greatest horrour imaginable , to think of doing any thing , that may bring this poor country into those dangers and uncertainties , which then did threaten our ruin ; and the rather for this consideration ; that neither the wisdom of some , who were engaged in those affairs , which i must aver to have been very great , nor the success of their contest , which ended in an absolute victory , could prevail , so as to give this kingdom any advantage ; nay , not so much as any settlement , in satisfaction and requital of all the blood it had lost , mony it had spent , and hazzard it had run . a clear argument why we must totally exclude a civil war from being any of the remedies , when we come to that point . i must add further , that as we have as loyal subjects as are any where to be found , so we have as gracious and good a prince : i never having yet heard that he did , or attempted to do , any the least act of arbitrary power , in any publick concern ; nor did ever take , or endeavour to take from any particular person the benefit of the law. and for his only brother ( although accidentally he cannot be denyed to be a great motive of the peoples unquietness ) all men must acknowledge him to be a most glorious and honourable prince ; one who has exposed his life several times for the safety and glory of this nation ; one who pays justly and punctually his debts , and manages his own fortune discreetly ; and yet keeps the best court and equipage of any subject in christendom ; is courteous and affable to all ; and in fine , has nothing in his whole conduct to be excepted against , much less dreaded ; excepting , that he is believed to be of a religion contrary to the honour of god , and the safety and interest of this people , which gives them just apprehensions of their future condition : but of this matter , we shall have occasion to speculate hereafter ; in the mean time , since we have such a prince , and such subjects , we must needs want the ordinary cause of distrust and division , and therefore must seek higher to find out the original of this turbulent posture we are in . doct. truly you had need seek higher or lower to satisfie us , for hitherto you have but enforced the gentleman's question , and made us more admire what the solution will be . eng. gent. gentlemen , then i shall delay you no longer : the evil counsellors , the pensioner-parliament , the thorow-pac'd iudges , the flattering divines , the buisie and designing papists , the french counsels , are not the causes of our misfortunes , they are but the effects ( as our present distractions are ) of one primary cause ; which is the breach and ruin of our government ; which having been decaying for near two hundred years , is in our age brought so near to expiration , that it lyes agonizing , and can no longer perform the functions of a political life , nor carry on the work of ordering and preserving mankind : so that the shifts that our courtiers have within some years used , are but so many tricks , or conclusions which they are trying to hold life and soul together a while longer ; and have played handy-dandy with parliaments , and especially with the house of commons , ( the only part which is now left entire of the old constitution ) by adjourning , and proroguing , and dissolving them ( contrary to the true meaning of the law ) as well in the reign of our late king , as during his majestics that now is . whereas indeed our counsellors ( perceiving the decay of the foundation , as they must , if they can see but one inch into the politicks ) ought to have addrest themselves to the king to call a parliament , the true physician , and to lay open the distemper there , and so have endeavour'd a cure , before it had been too late , as i fear it now is : i mean the piecing and patching up the old government . it is true , as the divine machiavil says , that diseases in government are like a marasmus in the body natural , which is very hard to be discovered whilst it is curable ; and after it comes to be easie to discern , difficult if not impossible to be remedy'd ; yet it is to be supposed that the counsellors are , or ought to be skilful physicians , and to foresee the seeds of state-distempers , time enough to prevent the death of the patient ; else they ought in conscience to excuse themselves from that sublime employment , and betake themselves to callings more suitable to their capacities . so that although for this reason the ministers of state here are inexcusable , and deserve all the fury which must one time or other be let loose against them , ( except they shall suddenly fly from the wrath to come , by finding out in time , and advising the true means of setting themselves to rights ) yet neither prince nor people are in the mean time to be blamed for not being able to conduct things better . no more than the waggoner is to answer for his ill guiding , or the oxon for their ill drawing the waggon , when it is with age and ill usage broken , and the wheels unserviceable : or the pilot and marriners , for not weathring out a storm when the ship hath sprung a planck . and as in the body of man , sometime● the head and all the members are in good order , nay , the vital parts are sound and entire ; yet if there be a considerable putrifaction in the humors much more , if the blood ( which the scripture calls the life ) be impure and corrupted ; the patient ceases not to be in great danger , and oftentimes dies without some skillful physician : and in the mean time the head and all the parts suffer , and are unquiet , full as much , as if they were all immediately affected . so it is in every respect with the body politick , or commonwealth , when their foundations are moulder'd : and although in both these cases , the patients cannot ( though the distemper be in their own bodies ) know what they ail , but are forced to send for some artist to tell them ; yet they cease not to be extreamly uneasie and impatient , and lay hold oftentimes upon unsuitable remedies , and impute their malady to wrong and ridiculous causes . as some people do here , who think that the growth of popery is our only evil , and that if we were secure against that , our peace and settlement were obtain'd , and that our disease needed no other cure. but of this more when we come to the cure. noble ven. against this discourse , certainly we have nothing to reply : but must grant , that when any government is decay'd , it must be mended , or all will ruine . but now we must request you to declare to us , how the government of england is decay'd , and how it comes to be so . for i am one of those unskilful persons , that cannot discern a state marasmus , when the danger is so far off . eng. gent. then no man living can : for your government is this day the only school in the world , that breeds such physicians , and you are esteemed one of the ablest amongst them : and it would be manifest to all the world for truth ; although there were no argument for it , but the admirable stability and durableness of your government , which hath lasted above twelve hundred years entire and perfect ; whilst all the rest of the countreys in europe , have not only changed masters very frequently in a quarter of that time , but have varied and altered their polities very often . which manifests that you must needs have ever enjoy'd a succession of wise citizens , that have had skill and ability to forwarn you betimes of those rocks against which your excellently-built vessel might in time split . noble ven. sir , you over-value , not only me , but the wisdom of my fellow citizens ; for we have none of these high speculations , nor hath scarce any of our body read aristotle , plato , or cicero , or any of those great artists , ancient or modern , who teach that great science of the governing and increasing great states and cities ; without studying which science no man can be fit to discourse pertinently of these matters ; much less to found or mend a government , or so much as find the defects of it . we only study our own government , and that too chiefly to be fit for advantagious employments , rather than to foresee our dangers . which yet i must needs confess some amongst us are pretty good at , and will in a harangue made upon passing a law , venture to tell us what will be the consequence of it two hundred years hence . but of these things i shall be very prodigal in my discourse , when you have leisure and patience to command me to say any thing of our polity ; in the mean time pray be pleased to go on with your edifying instruction . eng. gent. before i can tell you how the government of england came to be decayed , i must tell you what that government was , and what it now is : and i should say something too of government in general , but that i am afraid of talking of that subject , before you who are so exact a judge of it . noble ven. i thought you had been pleased to have done with this discourse , i assure you , sir , if i had more skill in that matter than ever i can pretend to , it would but serve to make me the fitter auditor of what you shall say on that subject . eng. gent. sir , in the course of my reasoning upon this point , i shall have occasion to insist and expatiate upon many things , which both my self and others have publish'd in former times . for which i will only make this excuse , that the repetition of such matters is the more pardonable , because they will be at least new to you , who are a stranger to our affairs and writings . and the rather because those discourses shall be apply'd to our present condition , and suited to our present occasions . but i will say no more , but obey you , and proceed . i will not take upon me to say , or so much as conjecture , how and when government began in the world , or what government is most ancient : history must needs be silent in that point , for that government is more ancient than history . and there was never any writer , but was bred under some government , which is necessarily supposed to be the parent of all arts and sciences , and to have produced them . and therefore it would be as hard for a man to write an account of the beginning of the laws and polity of any countrey , except there were memory of it , ( which cannot be before the first historiographer ) as it would be to any person without records to tell the particular history of his own birth . doct. sir , i cannot comprehend you , may not historians write a history of matters done before they were born ? if it were so ; no man could write but of his own times . eng. gent. my meaning is , where there are not stories , or records , extant ; for as for oral tradition , it lasts but for one age , and then degenerates into fable : i call any thing in writing , whereby the account of the passages or occurrences of former times is derived to our knowledge , a history , although it be not pend methodically , so as to make the author pass for a wit : and had rather read the authentick records of any country , that is a collection of their laws and letters concerning transactions of state , and the like , than the most eloquent and judicious narrative that can be made . noble ven. methinks , sir , your discourse seems to imply , that we have no account extant of the beginning of governments ; pray what do you think of the books of moses , which seem to be pend on purpose to inform us how he , by gods command , led that people out of egypt into another land , and in the way made them a government ? besides , does not plutarch tell us , how theseus gathered together the dispersed inhabitants of attica , brought them into one city , and under one government of his own making ? the like did romulus in italy , and many others in divers countries . eng. gent. i never said that we had not sufficient knowledge of the original of particular governments ; but it is evident , that these great legislators had seen , and lived under other administrations , and had the help of learned law-givers and philosophers , excepting the first who had the aid of god himself . so that it remains undiscovered yet , how the first regulation of man-kind began : and therefore i will take for granted that which all the politicians conclude : which is , that necessity made the first government . for every man by the first law of nature ( which is common to us and brutes ) had , like beasts in a pasture , right to every thing , and there being no property , each individual , if he were the stronger , might seize whatever any other had possessed himself of before , which made a state of perpetual war. to remedy which , and the fear that nothing should be long enjoyed by any particular person ( neither was any mans life in safety ) every man consented to be debar'd of that universal right to all things , and confine himself to a quiet and secure enjoyment of such a part as should be allotted him : thence came in ownership , or property ; to maintain which it was necessary to consent to laws , and a government to put them in execution . which of the governments now extant , or that have been formerly , was first , is not possible now to be known ; but i think this must be taken for granted , that whatsoever the frame or constitution was first , it was made by the perswasion and meditation of some wise and vertuous person , and consented to by the whole number . and then , that it was instituted for the good and preservation of the governed , and not for the exaltation and greatness of the person or persons appointed to govern : the reason why i beg this concession is , that it seems very improbable , not to say impossible , that a vast number of people should ever be brought to consent to put themselves under the power of others , but for the ends abovesaid , and so lose their liberty without advantaging themselves in any thing . and it is full as impossible that any person ( or persons so inconsiderable in number as magistrates and rulers are ) should by force get an empire to themselves . though i am not ignorant that a whole people have in imminent dangers , either from the invasion of a powerful enemy , or from civil distractions , put themselves wholly into the hands of one illustrious person for a time , and that with good success , under the best forms of government : but this is nothing to the original of states . noble ven. sir , i wonder how you come to pass over the consideration of paternal government , which is held to have been the beginning of monarchies ? eng. gent. really i did not think it worth the taking notice of , for though it be not easie to prove a negative , yet i believe if we could trace all foundations of polities that now are , or ever came to our knowledge since the world began ; we shall find none of them to have descended from paternal power ; we know nothing of adam's leaving the empire to cain , or seth : it was impossible for noah to retain any jurisdiction over his own three sons ; who were dispersed into three parts of the world , if our antiquaries calculate right ; and as for abraham , whilst he lived , as also his son isaac , they were out ordinary fathers of families , and no question governed their own houshold as all others do ; but when iacob upon his death-bed did relate to his children , the promise almighty god had made his grandfather , to make him a great nation , and give his posterity a fruitful territory , he speaks not one word of the empire of reuben his first-born , but supposes them all equal : and so they were taken to be by moses , when he divided the land to them by lot ; and by gods command made them a commonwealth . so that i believe this fancy to have been first started , not by the solid judgement of any man , but to flatter some prince , and to assert , for want of better arguments , the jus divinum of monarchy . noble ven. i have been impertinent in interrupting you , but yet now i cannot repent of it , since your answer hath given me so much satisfaction ; but if it be so as you say , that government was at first instituted for the interest and preservation of mankind , how comes it to pass , that there are and have been so many absolute monarchies in the world , in which it seems that nothing is provided for , but the greatness and power of the prince . eng. gent. i have presumed to give you already my reason , why i take for granted , that such a power could never be given by the consent of any people , for a perpetuity ; for though the people of israel did against the will of samuel , and indeed of god himself demand , and afterwards chuse themselves a king ; yet he was never such a king as we speak of ; for that all the orders of their commonwealth the sanhedrim , the congregation of the people , the princes of the tribes , &c. did still remain in being , as hath been excellently proved by a learned gentleman of our nation , to whom i refer you ; it may then be enquired into , how these monarchies at first did arise . history being in this point silent , as to the ancient principalities , we will conjecture , that some of them might very well proceed from the corruption of better governments , which must necessarily cause a depravation in manners ( as nothing is more certain than that politick defects breed moral ones , as our nation is a pregnant example ) this debauchery of manners might blind the understandings of a great many , destroy the fortunes of others , and make them indigent , insuse into very many a neglect and carelesness of the publick good ( which in all setled states is very much regarded ) so that it might easily come into the ambition of some bold aspiring person to affect empire , and as easily into his power , by fair pretences with some , and promises of advantages with others , to procure followers , and gain a numerous party , either to usurp tyranny over his own countrey , or to lead men forth to conquer and subdue another . thus it is supposed that nimrod got his kingdom ; who in scripture is called a great hunter before god , which expositers interpret , a great tyrant . the modern despotical powers have been acquired by one of these two ways , either by pretending by the first founder thereof , that he had a divine mission and so gaining not only followers , but even easie access in some places without force to empire , and afterwards dilateing their power by great conquests . thus mahomet and cingis can began , and established the sarazen and tartarian kingdoms ; or by a long series of wisdom in a prince , or chief magistrate of a mixt monarchy , and his council , who by reason of the sleepiness and inadvertency of the people , have been able to extinguish the great nobility , or render them inconsiderable ; and so by degrees taking away from the people their protectors , render them slaves . so the monarchies of france , and some other countries , have grown to what they are at this day ; there being left but a shadow of the three states in any of these mocarchies , and so no bounds remaining to the regal power ; but since property remains still to the subjects , these governments may be said to be changed , but not founded or established ; for there is no maxim more infallible and holding in any science , than this is in the politicks , that empire is founded in property . force or fraud may alter a government ; but it is property that must found and eternise it : upon this undeniable aphorisme we are to build most of our subsequent reasoning , in the mean time we may suppose , that hereafter the great power of the king of france may diminish much , when his enraged and oppressed subjects come to be commanded by a prince of less courage , wisdom , and military vertue , when it will be very hard for any such king to govern tyrannically a country which is not entirely his own . doct. pray , sir , give me leave to ask you by the way , what is the reason that here in our country , where the peerage is lessened sufficiently , the king has not gotten as great an addition of power as accrews to the crown in france ? eng. gent. you will understand that , doctor , before i have finisht this discourse ; but to stay your stomach till then , you may please to know that in france the greatness of the nobility which has been lately taken from them , did not consist in vast riches and revenues , but in great priviledges , and jurisdictions , which obliged the people to obey them ; whereas our great peers in former times had not only the same great dependences , but very considerable revenues besides , in demesnes , and otherwise : this vassallage over the people , which the peers of france had , being abolisht , the power over those tenants , which before was in their lords , fell naturally and of course into the crown , although the lands and possessions divested of those dependences did and do still remain to the owners ; whereas here in england , though the services are for the most part worn out , and insignificant ; yet for want of providence and policy in former kings , who could not foresee the danger a ▪ far off , entails have been suffered to be cut off ; and so two parts in ten of all those vast estates , as well mannours as demesnes , by the luxury and folly of the owners , have been within these two hundred years purchased by the lesser gentry and the commons ; which has been so far from advantaging the crown , that it has made the country scarce governable by monarchy : but if you please , i will go on with my discourse about government , and come to this again hereafter ? noble ven. i beseech you , sir , do . eng. gent. i cannot find by the small reading i have , that there were any other governments in the world anciently than these three , monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy . for the first , i have no light out of antiquity to convince me , that there were in old times any other monarchies , but such as were absolutely despotical ; all kingdoms then , as well in greece ( as macedon , epirus , and the like ; and where it is said , the princes exercised their power moderately ) as in asia , being altogether unlimited by any laws , or any assemblies of nobility or people . yet i must confess , aristotle , when he reckons up the corruptions of these three governments , calls tyranny the corruption of monarchy ; which if he means a change of government , ( as it is in the corruptions of the other two ) then it must follow , that the philosopher knew of some other monarchy at the first , which afterwards degenerated into tyranny , that is , into arbitrary power ; for so the word tyranny is most commonly taken , though in modern languages it signifies the ill exercise of power ; for certainly arbitrary government cannot be called tyranny , where the whole property is in the prince ( as we reasonably suppose it to have been in those monarchies ) no more than it is tyranny for you to govern your own house and estate as you please : but it is possible aristotle might not in this speak so according to terms of art , but might mean , that the ill government of a kingdom or family is tyranny . however we have one example , that puzzles politicians , and that is egypt , where pharaoh is called king ; and yet we see , that till ioseph's time he had not the whole property ; for the wisdom of that patriarch taught his master a way to make a new use of that famine , by telling him , that if they would buy their lives , and sell their estates ( as they did afterwards , and preserve themselves by the kings bread ) they shall serve pharaoh ; which shews that ioseph knew well , that empire was founded in property : but most of the modern writers in polity , are of opinion , that egypt was not a monarchy till then , though the prince might have the title of king , as the heraclides had in sparta , and romulus and the other kings had in rome ; both which states were instituted common-wealths . they give good conjectures for this their opinion , too many to be here mentioned ; only one is , that originally ( as they go about to prove ) all arts and sciences had their rise in egypt , which they think very improbable to have been under a monarchy . but this position , that all kings in former times were absolute , is not so essential to the intent i have in this discourse , which is to prove , that in all states , of what kind soever , this aphorisme takes place : imperium fundatur in dominio . so that if there were mixed monarchies , then the king had not all the property ; but those who shared with him in the administration of the soveraignty , had their part , whether it were the senate , the people , or both ; or if he had no companions in the soveraign power , he had no sharers likewise in the dominion or possession of the land. for that is all we mean by property , in all this discourse ; for as for personal estate , the subjects may enjoy it in the largest proportion , without being able to invade the empire : the prince may when he pleases take away their goods , by his tenants and vassals ( without an army ) which are his ordinary force , and answers to our posse comitatus . but the subjects with their money cannot invade his crown . so that all the description we need make of this kind or form of government , is , that the whole possession of the country , and the whole power lies in the hands and breast of one man ; he can make laws , break and repeal them when he pleases , or dispense with them in the mean time when he thinks fit ; interpose in all judicatories , in behalf of his favourites , take away any particular mans personal estate , and his life too , without the formality of a criminal process , or trial ; send a dagger , or a halter to his chief ministers , and command them to make themselves away ; and in fine , do all that his will or his interest suggests to him . doct. you have dwelt long here upon an argumentation , that the ancients had no monarchies , but what were arbitrary . eng. gent. pray give me leave to save your objections to that point , and to assure you first , that i will not take upon me to be so positive in that ; for that i cannot pretend to have read all the historians and antiquaries that ever writ ; nor have i so perfect a memory as to remember , or make use of , in a verbal and transient reasoning , all that i have ever read ; and then to assure you again , that i build nothing upon that assertion , and so your objection will be needless , and only take up time . doct. you mistake me , i had no intent to use any argument or example against your opinion in that ; but am very willing to believe that it may be so . what i was going to say was this , that you have insisted much upon the point of monarchy , and made a strange description of it , whereas many of the ancients , and almost all the modern writers , magnifie it to be the best of governments . eng. gent. i have said nothing to the contrary . i have told you de facto what it is , which i believe none will deny . the philosopher said it was the best government ; but with this restriction , ubi philosophi regnant , and they had an example of it , in some few roman emperours ; but in the most turbulent times of the commonwealth , and factions between the nobility and the people , rome was much more full of vertuous and heroick citizens , than ever it was under aurelius or antonius : for the moderns that are of that judgement , they are most of them divines , not politicians , and something may be said in their behalf , when by their good preaching , they can insuse into their imaginary prince ( who seems already to have an image of the power of god ) the justice , wisdom , and goodness too of the deity . noble ven. we are well satisfied with the progress you have hitherto made in this matter ; pray go on to the two other forms used amongst the ancients , and their corruptions , that so we may come to the modern governments , and see how england stands , and how it came to decay , and what must rebuild it . eng. gent. you have very good reason to hasten me to that ; for indeed , all that has been said yet , is but as it were a preliminary discourse to the knowledge of the government of england , and its decay : when it comes to the cure , i hope you will both help me , for both your self and the doctor are a thousand times better than i at remedies . but i shall dispatch the other two governments . aristocracy , or optimacy , is a commonwealth , where the better sort , that is , the eminent and rich men , have the chief administration of the government : i say , the chief , because there are very few ancient optimacies , but the people had some share , as in sparta , where they had power to vote , but not debate ; for so the oracle of apollo , brought by lycurgus from delphos , settles it ; but the truth is , these people were the natural spartans . for lycurgus divided the country or territory of laconia into shares ; whereof nine thousand only of these owners were inhabitants of sparta ; the rest lived in the country : so that although thucidides call it an aristocracy , and so i follow him , yet it was none of those aristocracies usually described by the politicians , where the lands of the territory were in a great deal fewer hands . but call it what you will , where ever there was an aristocracy , there the property , or very much the over-ballance of it , was in the hands of the aristoi , or governours , be they more or fewer ; for if the people have the greatest interest in the property , they will , and must have it in the empire : a notable example of it is rome , the best and most glorious government that ever the sun saw ; where the lands being equally divided amongst the tribes , that is the people ; it was impossible for the patricii to keek them quiet , till they yielded to their desires , not only to have their tribunes , to see that nothing passed into a law without their consent , but also to have it declared , that both the consuls should not only be chosen by the people ( as they ever were , and the kings too before them ) but that they might be elected too , when the people pleased , out of plebeian families . so that now i am come to democracy . which you see is a government where the chief part of the soveraign power , and the exercise of it , resides in the people ; and where the style is , iessu populi authoritate patrum . and it doth consist of three fundamental orders . the senate proposing , the people resolving and the magistrates executing . this government is much more powerful than an aristocracy , because the latter cannot arm the people , for fear they should seize upon the government , and therefore are fain to make use of none but strangers and mercinaries for souldiers ; which , as the divine machiavil says , has hindred your commonwealth of venice from mounting up to heaven , whither those incomparable orders , and that venerable wisdom used by your citizens in keeping to them , would have carried you , if in all your wars you had not been ill served . doct. well , sir , pray let me ask you one thing concerning venice : how do you make out your imperium fundatur in dominio there ? have the gentlemen there , who are the party governing , the possession of the whole territory ? does not property remain entire to the gentlemen , and other inhabitants in the several countries of padua , brescia , vicenza , verona , bergamo , creman , trevisi , and friuli , as also in the vltramarine provinces , and islands ? and yet i believe you will not deny , but that the government of venice is as well founded , and hath been of as long continuance as any that now is , or ever was in the world. eng. gent. doctor , i shall not answer you in this , because i am sure it will be better done by this gentleman , who is a worthy son of that honourable mother . noble ven. i thought you had said , sir , that we should have done complimenting ; but since you do command me to clear the objection made by our learned doctor , i shall presume to tell you , first how our city began . the goths , huns , and lombards coming with all the violence and cruelty immaginable , to invade that part of italy which we now call terra firma , and where our ancestors did then inhabit , forced them in great numbers to seek a shelter amongst a great many little rocks , or islands , which stood very thick in a vast lake , or rather marsh , which is made by the adriatique sea , we call it laguna ; here they began to build , and getting boats , made themselves provisions of all kind from the land ; from whence innumerable people began to come to them , finding that they could subsist , and that the barbarous people had no boats to attack them , nor that they could be invaded either by horse or foot without them . our first government , and which lasted for many years , was no more than what is practised in many country parishes in italy , and possibly here too , where the clerk , or any other person , calls together the chief of the inhabitants to consider of parish-business , as chusing of officers , making of rates , and the like . so in venice , when there was any publick provision to be made by way of law , or otherwise , some officers went about to persons of the greatest wealth and credit , to intreat them to meet and consult ; from whence our senate is called to this day consiglio de pregadi , which in our barbarous idiom is as much as pregati in tuscan language : our security increased daily , and so by consequence our number and our riches ; for by this time there began to be another inundation of sarazens upon asia minor , which forced a great many of the poor people of greece to fly to us for protection , giving us the possession of some islands , and other places upon the continent : this opened us a trade , and gave a beginning to our greatness ; but chiefly made us consider what government was fittest to conserve our selves , and keep our wealth ( for we did not then much dream of conquests , else without doubt we must have made a popular government ) we pitcht upon an aristocracy , by ordering that those who had been called to council for that present year , and for four years before , should have the government in their hands , and all their posterity after them for ever , which made first the distinction between gentlemen and citizens ; the people , who consisted of divers nations , most of them newly come to inhabit there , aud generally seeking nothing but safety and ease , willingly consented to this change , and so this state hath continued to this day ; though the several orders and counsels have been brought in since , by degrees , as our nobility encreased , and for other causes . under this government we have made some conquests in italy , and greece , for our city stood like a wall between the two great torrents of goths and sarazens ; and as either of their empires declin'd , it was easie for us , without being very warlike , to pick up some pieces of each side ; as for the government of these conquests , we did not think fit to divide the land amongst our nobility , for fear of envy , and the effects of it : much less did we think it adviseable to plant colonies of our people , which would have given the power into their hands , but we thought it the best way for our government to leave the people their property , tax them what we thought fit , & keep them under by governours and citadels , and so in short make them a province . so that now the doctors riddle is solved ; for i suppose this gentleman did not mean that his maxime should reach to provincial governments . eng. gent. no , sir , so far from that , that it is just contrary ; for as in national or domestick government , where a nation is governed either by its own people or its own prince , there can be no settled government , except they have the rule who possess the country . so in provincial governments , if they be wisely ordered , no man must have any the least share in the managing affairs of state , but strangers , or such as have no share or part in the possessions there , for else they will have a very good opportunity of shaking off their yoak . doct. that is true ; and we are so wise here ( i mean our ancestors were ) as to have made a law , that no native in ireland can be deputy there : but , sir , being fully satisfied in my demand , by this centleman ; i beseech you to go on to what you have to say , before you come to england . eng. gent. i shall then offer two things to your observation ; the first is , that in all times and places , where any great heroes or legislators , have founded a government , by gathering people together to build a city , or to invade any countrey to possess it , before they came to dividing the conquered lands , they did always very maturely deliberate under what form or model of government they meant to live , and accordingly made the partition of the possessions ; moses , theseus , and romulus , founders of demacracies , divided the land equally : licurgus who meant an optimacy , made a certain number of shares , which he intended to be in the hands of the people of laconia . cyrus , and other conquering monarchs before him , took all for themselves and successors , which is observed in those eastern countries to this day , and which has made those countries continue ever since under the same government , though conquered and possessed very often by several nations : this brings me to the second thing to be observed , which is , that wherever this apportionment of lands came to be changed in any kind , the government either changed with it , or was wholly in a state of confusion : and for this reason licurgus , the greatest politician that ever founded any government , took a sure way to fix property by confounding it , and bringing all into common : and so the whole number of the natural spartans , who inhabited the city of lacedemon , eat and drank in their several convives together : and as long as they continued so to do , they did not only preserve their government entire , and that for a longer time than we can read of any common-wealth that ever lasted amongst the ancients , but held as it were the principality of greece . the athenians , for want of some constitutions to fix property , as theseus placed it , were in danger of utter ruine , which they had certainly encounter'd , if the good genius ( as they then call'd it ) of that people , had not raised them up a second founder , more than six hundred years after the first , which was solon : and because the history of this matter will very much conduce to the illustrating of this aphorisme we have laid down , i will presume so much upon your patience as to make a short recital of it , leaving you to see it more at large in plutarch and other authors . the lands in the territory of attica which were in the possession of the common people , ( for what reason history is silent ) were for debt all mortgaged to the great men of the city of athens , and the owners having no possibility of redeeming their estates , were treating to compound with their creditors , and deliver up their lands to them : solon ( who was one of those state physicians we spake of , ) was much troubled at this , and harangued daily to the nobility and people against it , telling them first , that it was impossible for the grecians to resist the medes ( who were then growing up to a powerful monarchy ) except athens the second city of greece did continue a democracy ; that it was as impossible the people could keep their empire , except they kept their lands , nothing being more contrary to nature , than that those who possess nothing in a country can pretend to govern it . they were all sensible of his reasons , and of their own danger , but the only remedy ( which was , that the great men should forgive the common people their debts ) would not at all be digested ; so that the whole city now fully understanding their condition , were continually in an uproar , and the people flock'd about solon , whenever he came abroad , desiring him to take upon him the government , and be their prince , and they would make choice of him the next time they assembled . he told them no , he would never be a tyrant , especially in his own country ; meaning , that he who had no more share than other of the nobles , could not govern the rest , without being an usurper or tyrant : but this he did to oblige his citizens , he frankly forgave all the debts that any of the people owed to him , and released their lands immediately ; and this amounted to fifteen attick talents of gold , a vast sum in those days ; and betook himself to a voluntary exile , in which he visited thales , and went to the oracle of delphos , and offer up his prayers to apollo for the preservation of his city : in return of which ( as the people then believed ) the hearts of the great ones were so changed and inlarged , that they readily agreed to remit all their debts to the people , upon condition that solon would take the pains to make them a new model of government , and laws suitable to a democracy , which he as readily accepted and performed ; by vertue of which that city grew and continued long the greatest , the justest , the most vertuous , learned and renowed of all that age ; drove the persians afterwards out of greece , defeated them doth by sea and land , with a quarter of their number of ships and men ; and produced the greatest wits and philosophers that ever lived upon earth . the city of athens instituted a solemn feast in commemoration of that great generosity and self-denial of the nobility ; who sacrificed their own interest to the preservation of their country : which feast was called the solemnity of the seisactheia , which signifies recision or abolition of debts , and was observed with processions , sacrifices and games , till the time of the roman's dominion over them ( who encouraged it , ) and ever till the change of religion in greece , and invasion of the sarazens . the roman's having omitted in their institution to provide for the fixing of property , and so the nobility called patricii , beginning to take to themselves a greater share in the conquer'd lands than had been usual ( for in the first times of the commonwealth under romulus , and ever after , it was always practised to divide the lands equally amongst the tribes ) this innovation stirred up licinius stolo , then tribune of the people , to propose a law ; which , although it met with much difficulty , yet at last was consented to ; by which it was provided , that no roman citizen , of what degree soever , should possess above five hundred acres of land ; and for the remaining part of the lands which should be conquer'd , it was ordered to be equally divided , as formerly , amongst the tribes : this found admittance , after much oposition , because it did provide but for the future , no man at that time being owner of more lands than what was lawful for him to possess ; and if this law had been strictly observed to the last , that glorious commonwealth might have subsisted to this day , for ought we know . doctor . some other cause would have been the ruine of it , what think you of a foreign conquest ? eng. gent. oh doctor , if they had kept their poverty they had kept their government and their vertue too , and then it had not been an easie matter to subdue them , quos vult perdere iupiter dementat ; breach of rules and order causes division , and division when it comes to be incurable , exposes a nation almost as much as a tyrannical government does . the goths and vandals , had they invaded in those days , had met with the same success which befell the cymbri , and the teutones . i must confess , a foreign invasion is a formidable thing , when a commonwealth is weak in territory and inhabitants , and that the invader is numerous and warlike : and so we see the romans were in danger of utter ruine when they were first attacqued by the gauls under brennus : the like hazzard may be fear'd , when a commonwealth is assaulted by another of equal vertue , and a commander of equal address and valour to any of themselves . thus the romans run the risk of their liberty and empire , in the war of hannibal ; but their power and their vertue grew to that heighth in that contest , that when it was ended , i believe , that if they had preserved the foundation of their government entire , they had been invincible : and if i were alone of this opinion , i might be ashamed ; but i am backt by the judgement of your incomparable country-man machiavil ; and no man will condemn either of us of rashness , if he first consider , what small states , that have stood upon right bottoms , have done to defend their liberty against great monarchs ; as is to be seen in the example of the little commonwealth of athens , which destroyed the fleet of xerxes , consisting of a thousand vessels , in the streights of salamis , and before the land army of darius of three hundred thousand in the plains of marathon , and drove them out of greece ; for though the whole confederates were present at the battel of platoea , yet the athenian army singly under their general miltiades , gain'd that renowned battel of marathon . noble ven. i beseech you , sir , how was it possible , or practicable , that the romans conquering so many and so remote provinces , should yet have been able to preserve their agrarian law , and divide all those lands equally to their citizens ; or if it had been possible , yet it would have ruin'd their city , by sending all their inhabitants away ; and by taking in strangers in their room , they must necessarily have had people less vertuous and less warlike , and so both their government and their military discipline must have been corrupted ; for it is not to be imagined , but that the people would have gone with their families to the place where their lands lay : so that it appears that the romans did not provide , in the making and framing their first polity , for so great conquests as they afterwards made . eng. gent. yes , surely they did ; from their first beginning they were founded in war , and had neither land nor wives but what they fought for ; but yet what you object were very weighty , if there had not been a consideration of that early : for assoon as that great and wise people had subdued the samnites on the east , and brought their arms as far as the greek plantations , in that part of italy which is now called the kingdom of naples ; and westward , had reduced all the tuscans under their obedience , as far as the river arnus , they made that and the river volturnus ( which runs by the walls of capua ) the two boundaries of their empire , which was called domicilium imperii . these were the ne plus ultra , for what they conquered between these two rivers , was all confiscated and divided amongst the tribes ; the rustick tribes being twenty seven , and the vrbane tribes nine , which made thirty six in all . the city tribes were like our companies in london , consisting of tradesmen . the country tribes were divided like shires , and there was scarce any landed man , who inhabited in the city , but he was written in that tribe where his estate lay ; so that the rustick tribes ( though they had all equal voices ) were of far more credit and reputation than the vrbane . upon the days of the comtia , which were very well known , as many as thought fit amongst the country tribes , came to give their voices , though every tribe was very numerous of inhabitants that lived in the city . now the agrarian did not extend to any lands conquered beyond this precinct , but they were lest to the inhabitants , they paying a revenue to the commonwealth ; all but those which were thought fit to be set out to maintain a roman colony , which was a good number of roman citizens , sent thither , and provided of lands and habitations , which being armed , did serve in the nature of a citadel and garison to keep the province in obedience , and a roman pretor , proconsul , or other governour , was sent yearly to head them , and brought forces with him besides . now it was ever lawful for any roman citizen to purchase what lands he pleased in any of these provinces ; it not being dangerous to a city to have their people rich , but to have such a power in the governing part of the empire , as should make those who managed the affairs of the commonwealth depend upon them ; which came afterwards to be that which ruined their liberty , and which the gracchi endeavoured to prevent when it was too late ; for those illustrious persons seeing the disorder that was then in the commonwealth ▪ and rightly comprehending the reason , which was the intermission of the agrarian , and by consequence the great purchases which were made by the men of rome ( who had inriched themselves in asia and the other provinces ) in that part of italy which was between the two rivers , before mentioned , began to harrangue the people , in hopes to perswade them to admit of the right remedy , which was to confirm the agrarian law with a retrospect ; which although they carried , yet the difficulties in the execution proved so great , that it never took effect , by reason that the common people , whose interest it was to have their lands restored ; yet having long lived as clients , and dependents of the great ones , chose rather to depend still upon their patrons , than to hazard all for an imaginary deliverance , by which supineness in them , they were prevail'd with rather to joyne ( for the most part ) with the oppressors of themselves and their countrey , and to cut the throats of their redeemers , than to employ their just resentment against the covetous violators of their government and property . so perished the two renowned gracchi , one soon after the other , not for any crime , but for having endeavoured to preserve and restore their common-wealth ; for which ( if they had lived in times suitable to such an heroick undertaking , and that the vertue of their ancestors had been yet in any kind remaining ) they would have merited and enjoyed a reputation equal to that of lycurgus , or solon , whereas as it happen'd they were sometime after branded with the name of sedition , by certain wits , who prostituted the noble flame of poetry ( which before had wont to be employed in magnifying heroick actions ) to flatter the lust and ambition of the roman tyrants . noble ven. sir , i approve what you say in all things , and in confirmation of it , shall further alledge the two famous princes of sparta , agis , and cleomines , which i couple together , since plutarch does so ; these finding the corruption of their commonwealth , and the decay of their ancient vertue , to proceed from the neglect and inobservance of their founders rules , and a breach of that equality which was first instituted ; endeavour to restore the laws of lycurgus , and divide the territory anew ; their victory in the peloponnesian war , and the riches and luxury brought into their city by lisander having long before broken all the orders of their common-wealth , and destroyed the proportions of land allotted to each of the natural spartans : but the first of these two excellent patriots perished by treachery in the beginning of his enterprize , the other began and went on with incomparable prudence and resolution , but miscarried afterwards by the iniquity of the times , and baseness and wickedness of the people ; so infalliably true it is , that where the policy is corrupted , there must necessarily be also a corruption and depravation of manners , and an utter abolition of all faith , justice , honour , and morality ; but i forget my self , and intrench upon your province : there is nothing now remains to keep you from the modern policies , but that you please to shut up this discourse of the ancient governments , with saying something of the corruptions of aristocracy and democracy ; for i believe both of us are satisfied that you have abundantly proved you assertion , and that when we have leisure to examine all the states or policies that ever were , we shall find all their changes to have turn'd upon this hinge of property , and that the fixing of that with good lawes in the beginning or first institution of a state , and the holding to those lawes afterwards , is the only way to make a commonwealth immortal . eng. gent. i think you are very right ; but i shall obey you , and do presume to differ from aristotle , in thinking that he has not fitly called those extreams ( for so i will stile them ) of aristocracy and democracy , corruptions ; for that they do not proceed from the alteration of property , which is the vnica corruptio politica : for example , i do not find that oligarchy , or government of a few , which is the extream of an optimacy , ever did arise from a few mens getting into their hands the estates of all the rest of the nobility : for had it began so , it might have lasted , which i never read of any that did . i will therefore conclude , that they were all tyrannies ; for so the greeks called all usurpations , whether of one or more persons , and all those that i ever read of , as they came in either by craft or violence , as the thirty tyrants of athens , the fifteen of thebes , and the decem-viri of rome ( though these are first came in lawfully ) so they were soon driven out ; and ever , were either assassinated , or dyed by the sword of justice ; and therefore i shall say no more of them , not thinking them worth the name of a government . as for the extream of democracy , which is anarchy , it is not so : for many commonwealths have lasted for a good time under that administration ( if i may so call a state so full of confusion . ) an anarchy then is , when the people not contented with their share in the administration of the government , ( which is the right of approving , or disapproving of lawes , of leagues , and of making of war and peace , of judging in all causes upon an appeal to them , and chusing all manner of officers ) will take upon themselves the office of the senate too , in manageing subordinate matters of state , proposing lawes originally , and assuming debate in the market place , making their orators their leaders ; nay , not content with this , will take upon them to alter all the orders of the government when they please ; as was frequently practised in athens , and in the modern state of florence . in both these cities , when ever any great person who could lead the people , had a mind to alter the government , he call'd them together , and made them vote a change. in florence they call'd it , chiamar il popolo a parlamento e ripigliar lo stato , which is summoning the people into the market-place to resume the government , and did then presently institute a new one , with new orders , new magistracies , and the like . now that which originally causes this disorder , is the admitting ( in the beginning of a government , or afterwards ) the meaner sort of people , who have no share in the territory , into an equal part of ordering the commonwealth ; these being less sober , less considering , and less careful of the publick concerns ; and being commonly the major part , are made the instruments oft-times of the ambition of the great ones , and very apt to kindle into faction : but notwithstaning all the confusion which we see under an anarchy , ( where the wisdom of the better sort is made useless by the fury of the people ) yet many cities have subsisted hundreds of years in this condition ; and have been more considerable , and performed greater actions , than ever any government of equal extent did , except it were a well-regulated democracy ; but it is true , they ruine in the end , and that never by cowardize or baseness , but by too much boldness and temerarious undertakings , as both athens and florence did ; the first undertaking the invasion of sicily , when their affairs went ill elsewhere ; and the other by provoking the spaniard and the pope . but i have done now , and shal pass to say something of the modern policies . noble ven. before you come to that , sir , pray satisfie me in a point which i should have moved before , but that i was unwilling to interrupt your rational discourse ; how came you to take it for granted , that moses , theseus , and romulus were founders of popular governments ? as for moses , we have his story written by an insalliable pen ; theseus was ever called king of athens , though he liv'd so long since , that what is written of him is justly esteem'd fabulous ; but romulus certainly was a king , and that government continued a monarchy , though elective , under seven princes . eng. gent. i will be very short in my answer , and say nothing of theseus , for the reason you are pleased to alledge : but for moses , you may read in holy writ , that when , by god's command , he had brought the israelites out of egypt , he did at first manage them by accquainting the people with the estate of their government , which people were called together with the sound of a trumpet , and are termed in scripture , the congregation of the lord ; this government he thought might serve their turn in their passage , and that it would be time enough to make them a better when they were in possession of the land of canaan ; especially having made them judges and magistrates at the instance of his father-in-law , which are called in authors , praefecti iethroniani ; but finding that this provision was not sufficient , complained to god of the difficulty he had , to make that state of affairs hold together ; god was pleased to order him to let seventy elders be appointed for a senate , but yet the congregation of the lord continued still and acted : and by the severall soundings of the trumpets , either the senate or popular assembly were called together , or both ; so that this government was the same with all other democracies , consisting of a principal magistrate , a senate , and a people assembled together , not by represention , but in a body . now for romulus , it is very plain , that he was no more then the first officer of the commonwealth , whatever he was called , and that he was chosen ( as your doge is ) for life ; and when the last of those seven kings usurpt the place , that is , did reign injussu populi , and excercise the government tyrannically , the people drove him out ( as all people in the world that have property will do in the like case , except some extraordinary qualifications in the prince preserve him for one age ) and afterwards appointed in his room two magistrates , and made them annual , which two had the same command , as well in their armies as in their cities , and did not make the least alteration besides , excepting that they chose an officer that was to perform the kings function in certain sacrifices ( which numa appointed to be performed by the king ) left the people should think their religion were changed : this officer was called rex sacrificulus . if you are satisfied , i will go on to the consideration of our modern states . noble ven. i am fully answered , and besides am clearly of opinion , that no government , whether mixt monarchy or commonwealth , can subsist without a senate , as well from the turbulent state of the israelites under moses till the sanhedrin was instituted , as from a certain kingdom of the vandals in africa ; where after their conquest of the natives , they appointed a government consisting of a prince and a popular assembly , which latter , within half a year , beat the kings brains out , he having no bulwark of nobility or senate to defend him from them . but i will divert you no longer . eng. gent. sir , you are very right , and we should have spoken something of that before , if it had been the business of this meeting to discourse of the particular models of government ; but intending only to say so much of the ancient policy as to shew what government in general is , and upon what basis it stands , i think i have done it sufficiently to make way for the understanding of our own , at least when i have said something of the policies which are now extant ; and that with your favour i will do . i shall need say little now of those commonwealths , which however they came by their liberty , either by arms or purchase , are now much-what under the same kind of policy as the ancients were . in germany , the free towns , and many princes make up the body of a commonwealth called the empire , of which the emperour is head ; this general union hath its diets or parliaments , where they are all represented , and where all things concerning the safety and interest of germany in general , or that belong to peace and war , are transacted ; these diets never intermeddle with the particular concerns or policies of those princes or states that make it up , leaving to them their particular soveraignties : the several imperial cities , or commonwealths , are divided into two kinds , lubeck's law , and collen's law , which being the same exactly with the ancient democracies and optimacies , i will say no more of them . the government of swizerland , and the seven provinces of the low-countries were made up in haste , to unite them against persecution and oppression , and to help to defend themselves the better , which they both have done very gallantly and successfully : they seem to have taken their pattern from the grecians , who when their greatness began to decline , and the several tyrants who succeeded alexander began to press hard upon them , were forced to league themselves ( yet in severall confederacies , as that of the etolians , that of the achaians , &c. ) for their mutual defence . the swisses consist of thirteen soveraignties ; some cities which are most aristocraticall , and some provinces which have but a village for their head township . these are all democracies , and are govern'd all by the owners of land , who assemble as our free-holders do at the county-court . these have their general diets , as in germany . the government of the united provinces has for its foundation the union of vtrecht , made in the beginning of their standing upon their guard against the cruelty and oppression of the spaniard , and patcht up in haste ; and seeming to be compos'd only for necessity , as a state of war , has made modern statesmen conjecture that it will not be very practicable in time of peace , and security . at their general diet , which is called the states general , do intervene the deputies of the seven provinces , in what number their principals please ; but all of them have but one vote , which are by consequence seven , and every one of the seven hath a negative ; so that nothing can pass without the concurrence of the whole seven . every one of these provinces have a counsel or assembly of their own , called the states provincial , who send and instruct their deputies to the states-general , and perform other offices belonging to the peace and quiet of the province . these deputies to the states provincial , are sent by several cities of which every province consists , and by the nobility of the province , which hath one voice only : the basis of the government lies in these cities , which are every of them a distinct soveraignty ; neither can the states of the province , much less the states general , intrench in the least upon their rights , nor so much as intermeddle with the government of their cities , or administration of justice , but only treat of what concerns their mutual defence , and their payments towards it . every one of these cities is a soveraignty , governed by an optimacy , consisting of the chief citizens , which upon death are supplyed by new ones elected by themselves ; these are called the vrnuscaperie or herne , which council has continued to govern those towns , time out of mind ; even in the times of their princes , who were then the soveraigns ; for without the consent of him , or his deputy , called state holder , nothing could be concluded in those days . since they have instituted an artificial minister of their own , whom they still call state-holder , and make choice of him in their provincial assemblies , and for form sake defer something to him , as the approbation of their skepen and other magistrates , and some other matters : this has been continued in the province of holland , which is the chief province in the succession of the princes of orange , and in the most of the others too : the rest have likewise chosen some other of the house of nassaw . this government ( so oddly set together , and so compos'd of a state , intended for a monarchy , and which , as almanacks calculated for one meridian , are made in some sort to serve for another , is by them continued in these several aristocracies ) may last for a time , till peace and security , together with the abuse which is like to happen in the choice of the herne , when they shall elect persons of small note into their body , upon vacancies , for kindred or relation , rather than such as are of estate and eminency , or that otherwise abuse their power in the execution of it , and then it is believed , and reasonably enough , that those people ( great in wealth , and very acute in the knowledge of their own interest ) will find out a better form of government , or make themselves a prey to some great neighbour-prince in the attempting it ; and this in case they in the mean time escape conquest from this great and powerfull king of france , who at this time gives law to christendom . i have nothing now left to keep me from the modern monarchies , but the most famous commonwealth of venice , of which it would be presumption for me to say any thing whilst you are present . noble ven. you may very safely go one if you please ; for i believe strangers understand the speculative part of our government , better than we do ; and the doctrine of the ballat which is our chiefe excellency : for i have read many descriptions of our frame , which have taught me something in it which i knew not before ; paricularly , donato gianotti the florentine , to whom i refer those who are curious to know more of our orders , for we that manage the mechanical part of the government are like horses who know their track well enough , without considering east or west , or what business they go about . besides , it would be very tedious , and very needless , to make any relation of our model , with the several counsels that make it up , and would be that which you have not done in treating of any other government : what we have said is enough to shew what beginning we had , and that serves your turn , for we who are called nobility , and who manage the state , are the descendents of the first inhabitants , and had therefore been a democracy , if a numerous flock of strangers ( who are contented to come and live amongst us as subjects ) had not swelled our city , and made the governing party seem but a handfull ; so that we have the same foundations that all other aristocracies have , who govern but one city , and have no territory but what they govern provincially ; and our people not knowing where to have better justice , are very well contented to live amongst us , without any share in the managing of affairs ; yet we have power to adopt whom we please into our nobility , and i believe that in the time of the roman greatness , there were five for one of the inhabitants who were written in no tribe , but look'd upon as strangers , and yet that did not vitiate their democracy , no more than our citizens and common people can hurt our optimacy ; all the difficulty in our administration , hath been to regulate our own nobility , and to bridle their faction and ambition , which can alone breed a disease in the vital part of our government , and this we do by most severe laws , and a very rigorous execution of them . doct. sir , i was thinking to interpose concerning the propriety of lands in the territory of padua , which i hear is wholly in the possession of the nobility of venice . noble . ven. our members have very good estates there , yet nothing but what they have paid very well for , no part of that country , or of any other province , having been shar'd amongst us as in other conquests : 't is true , that the paduans having ever been the most revengeful people of italy , could not be deterr'd from those execrable and treacherous murders which were every day commited , but by a severe execution of the laws as well against their lives as estates : and as many of their estates as were confiscated , were ( during our necessities in the last war with the turks ) exposed to sale , and sold to them that offered most , without any consideration of the persons purchasing ; but it is very true that most of them came into the hands of our nobility , they offering more than any other , by reason that their sober and frugal living , and their being forbidden all manner of traffick , makes them have no way of employing the money which proceeds from their parsimony , and so they can afford to give more than others who may employ their advance to better profit elsewhere . but i perceive , doctor , by this question , that you have studied at padua . doct. no really , sir , the small learning i have was acquired in our own university of oxford , nor was i ever out of this island . noble ven. i would you had , sir , for it would have been a great honour to our country to have contributed any thing towards so vast a knowledge as you are possessor of : but i wish that it were your countrey , or at least the place of your habitation , that so we might partake not only of your excellent discourse sometimes , but be the better for your skill , which would make us immortal . doct. i am glad to see you so well that you can make yourself so merry , but i assure you i am very well here ; england is a good wholsome climate for a physician : but , pray let our friend go on to his modern monarchies . eng. gent. that is all i have now to do : those monarchies are two , absolute , and mixt ; for the first kind , all that we have knowledge of , except the empire of the turks , differ so little from the ancient monarchies of the assyrians and persians , that having given a short description of them before , it will be needless to say any more of the persian , the mogull , the king of pegu , china , prestor-iohn , or any other the great men under those princes , as the satrapes of old ; being made so only by their being employed and put into great places and governments by the soveraign ; but the monarchy of the grand seignior is somthing different ; they both agree in this , that the prince is in both absolute proprietor of all the lands , ( excepting in the kingdom of egypt , of which i shall say somthing anon ) but the diversity lies in the administration of the property ; the other emperours as well ancient as modern using to manage the revenue of the several towns , and parishes , as our kings , or the kings of france do ; that is , keep it in their hands , and administer it by officers : and so you may read that xerxes king of persia allowed the revenue of so many villages to themistocles , which assignations are practised at this day , both to publick and to private uses , by the present monarchs . but the turks , when they invaded the broken empire of the arabians , did not at first make any great alteration in their policy , till the house of ottoman the present royal family did make great conquests in asia , and afterwards in greece ; whence they might possibly take their present way of dividing their conquered territories ; for they took the same course which the goths and other modern people had used with their conquered lands in europe , upon which they planted military colonies , by dividing them amongst the souldiers for their pay or maintenance . these shares were called by them timarr's , which signifies benefices , but differ'd in this only from the european knights-fees , that these last originally were hereditary , and so property was maintained , whereas amongst the ottomans , they were meerly at will ; and they enjoyed their shares whilst they remained the sultan's souldiers , and no longer ; being turn'd out both of his service , and of their timarr's , when he pleases . this doubtless had been the best and firmest monarchy in the world , if they could have stayed here , and not had a mercinary army besides , which have often ( like the praetorians in the time of the roman tyrants ) made the palace and the serraglio the shambles of their princes ; whereas if the timariots , as well spahis or horse , as foot , had been brought together to guard the prince by courses ( as they used to do king david ) as well as they are to fight for the empire ; this horrid flaw and inconvenience in their government had been wholly avoided . for though these are not planted upon entire property as david's were , ( those being in the nature of trained-bands ) yet the remoteness of their habitations from the court , and the factions of the great city , and their desire to repair home , and to find all things quiet at their return , would have easily kept them from being infected with that cursed disease of rebellion against their soveraign , upon whose favour they depend for the continuance of their livelihood : whereas the ianizaries are for life , and are sure to be in the same employment under the next successor ; so sure , that no grand seignior can , or dares go about to disband them , the suspicion of intending such a thing having caused the death of more than one of their emperours . but i shall go to the limited monarchies . doct. but pray , before you do so , inform us something of the roman emperours : had they the whole dominion or property of the lands of italy ? eng. gent. the roman emperours i reckon amongst the tyrants , for so amongst the greeks were called those citizens who usurpt the governments of their crmmonwealths , and maintain'd it by force , without endeavouring to found or establish it , by altering the property of lands , as not imagining that their children could ever hold it after them , in which they were not deceived : so that it is plain that the roman empire was not a natural but a violent government . the reasons why it lasted longer than ordinarily tyrannies do , are many ; first , because augustus the first emperour kept up the senate , and so for his time cajold them with this bait of imaginary power , which might not have sufficed neither to have kept him from the late of his uncle , but that there had been so many revolutions and bloody wars between , that all mankind was glad to repose and take breath for a while under any government that could protect them . and he gain'd the service of these senators the rather , because he suffered none to be so but those who had followed his fortune in the several civil wars , and so were engaged to support him for their own preservation ; besides , he confiscated all those who had at any time been proscribed , or sided in any encounter against him ; which , considering in how few hands the lands of italy then were , might be an over-ballance of the property in his hands . but this is certain , that what ever he had not in his own possession , he disposed of at his pleasure , taking it away , as also the lives of his people , without any judicial proceedings , when he pleased : that the confiscations were great , we may see by his planting above sixty thousand souldiers upon lands in lombardy ; that is , erecting so many beneficia , or timarr's , and , if any man's lands lay in the way , he took them in for neighbourhood , without any delinquency . mantua vae miserae nimium vicina cremonae . and it is very evident that if these beneficia had not afterwards been made hereditary , that empire might have had a stabler foundation , and so a more quiet and orderly progress than it after had ; for the court guards , call'd the praetorians , did make such havock of their princes , and change them so often , that this ( though it may seem a paradox ) is another reason why this tyranny was not ruin'd sooner ; for the people , who had really an interest to endeavour a change of government , were so prevented by seeing the prince , whom they designed to supplant , removed to their hand , that they were puzled what to do , taking in the mean time great recreation to see those wild beasts hunted down themselves , who had so often prey'd upon their lives and estates ; besides that , most commonly the frequent removes of their masters , made them scarce have time to do any mischief to their poor oppressed subjects in particular , though they were all slaves in general . this government of the later romans is a clear example of the truth and efficacy of these politick principles we have been discoursing of . first , that any government ( be it the most unlimitted and arbitrary monarchy ) that is placed upon a right basis of property , is better both for prince and people , than to leave them a seeming property , still at his devotion , and then for want of fixing the foundation , expose their lives to those dangers and hazzards with which so many tumults and insurrections , which must necessarily happen , will threaten them daily : and in the next place , that any violent constraining of mankind to a subjection , is not to be called a government , nor does salve either the politick or moral ends , which those eminent legislators amongst the ancients proposed to themselves , when they set rules to preserve the quiet and peace , as well as the plenty , prosperity , and greatness of the people ; but that the politicks or art of governing is a science to be learned and studied by counsellors and statsemen be they never so great ; or else mankind will have a very sad condition under them , and they themselves a very perplexed and turbulent life , and probably a very destructive and precipitous end of it . doct. i am very glad i gave occasion to make this discourse : now i beseech you , before you go to the mixt monarchies , not to forget egypt . eng. gent. 't was that i was coming to , before you were pleased to interrogate me concerning the roman empire . the egyptians are this day , for ought i know , the only people that enjoy property , and are governed as a province by any of the eastern absolute princes . for whereas damasco , aleppo , and most of the other cities and provinces of that empire , whose territory is divided into timarr's , are governed by a bashaw , who for his guards has some small number of janizaries or souldiers ; the bashaw of egypt , or of grand cairo , has ever an army with him ; and divers forts are erected , which is the way european princes use in governing their provinces , and must be so where property is left entire , except they plant colonies as the romans did . the reason why selim , who broke the empire of the mamalukes , and conquered egypt , did not plant timarr's upon it , was the laziness and cowardliness of the people , and the great fruitfulness of the soil , and deliciousness of the country , which has mollifi'd and rendred effeminate all the nations that ever did inhabit it . so that a resolution was taken to impose upon them , first the maintaining an army by a tax , and then to pay a full half of all the fruits and product of their lands ( to the grand seignior ) which they are to cultivate and improve : this is well managed by the bashaws and their officers , and comes to an incredible sum ; the goods being sold , the money is conveyed in specie to the port , and is the greatest part of that prince's revenue . and it is believed , that if all the lands had been entirely confiscated , and that the grand seignior had managed them by his officers , he would not have made a third part so much of the whole , as he receives now annually for one half : not only because those people are extreamly industrious where their own profit is concerned : but for that , it is clear , if they had been totally divested of their estates , they would have left their country , and made that which is now the most populous kingdom of the world , a desart , as is all the rest of the turkish dominions , except some cities . and if the people had removed as they did elsewhere , there would not only have wanted hands to have cultivated and improved the lands , but mouths to consume the product of it ; so that the princes revenue by the cheapness of victual , and the want of labourers , would have almost fallen to nothing . noble ven. pray god this be not the reason that this king of france leaves property to his subjects ; for certainly he hath taken example by this province of egypt , his subjects having a tax ( which for the continuance of it , i must call a rent or tribute ) impos'd upon them to the value of one full half of their estates , which must ever increase as the lands improve . eng. gent. i believe , sir , there is another reason ; for the property there , being in the nobility and gentry , which are the hands by which he manages his force both at home and abroad , it would not have been easie or safe for him to take away their estates . but i come to the limited monarchies . they were first introduced ( as was said before ) by the goths , and other northern people . whence those great swarms came , as it was unknown to procopius himself , who liv'd in the time of their invasion , and who was a diligent searcher into all the circumstances of their concernments , so it is very needless for us to make any enquiry into it , thus much being clear , that they came man , woman , and child , and conquer'd and possest all these parts of the world , which were then subject to the roman empire , and since christianity came in have been so to the latin church , till honest iohn calvin taught some of us the way how to deliver ourselves from the tyrannical yoak , which neither we nor our forefathers were able to bear . whence those people had the government they establisht in these parts after their conquest , that is , whether they brought it from their own country , or made it themselves , must needs be uncertain , since their original is wholly so ; but it seems very probable that they had some excellent persons among them , though the ignorance and want of learning in that age hath not suffered any thing to remain that may give us any great light ; for it is plain , that the government they setled , was both according to the exact rules of the politicks , and very natural and suitable to that division they made of their several territories . whenever then these invaders had quieted any province , and that the people were driven out or subdued , they divided the lands , and to the prince they gave usually a tenth part , or thereabouts ▪ to the great men , or comites regis ( as it was translated into latine ) everyone ( as near as they could ) an equal share . these were to enjoy an hereditary right in their estates , as the king did in his part and in the crown ; but neither he , nor his peers or companions , were to have the absolute disposal of the lands so allotted them , but were to keep a certain proportion to themselves for their use : and the rest was ordered to be divided amongst the free-men , who came with them to conquer . what they kept to themselves was called demesnes in english and french , and in italian , beni allodiali . the other part which they granted to the free-men , was called a feud : and all these estates were held of these lords hereditarily , only the tenants were to pay a small rent annually , and at every death or change an acknowledgment in money , and in some tenures the best beast besides : but the chief condition of the feud or grant , was , that the tenant should perform certain services to the lord , of which one ( in all tenures of free-men ) was to follow him armed to the wars for the service of the prince and defence of the land. and upon their admittance to their feuds , they take an oath to be true vassals and tenants to their lords , and to pay their rents , and perform their services , and upon failure to forfeit their estates ; and these tenants were divided according to their habitations into several mannors , in every one of which there was a court kept twice every year , where they all were to appear , and to be admitted to their several estates , and to take the oath above mentioned . all these peers did likewise hold all their demesnes , as also all their mannors , of the prince ; to whom they swore allegiance and fealty : there were besides these freemen or francklins , other tenants to every lord , who were called villains , who were to perform all servile offices and their estates were all at the l●●●● disposal when he pleased ; these consisted mostly of such of the former inhabitants of these countries , as were not either destroyed or driven out , and possibly of others who were servants amongst them , before they came from their own countries . perhaps thus much might have been unnecessary to be said , considering that these lords , tenants , and courts , are yet extant in all the kingdoms in europe ; but that to a gentleman of venice , where there are none of these things , and where the goths never were , something may be said in excuse for me . noble ven. 't is true , sir , we fled from the goths betimes , but yet in those countries which we recovered since in terra firma , we found the footsteps of these lords , and tenures , and their titles of counts ; though being now provinces to us , they have no influence upon the government , as i suppose you are about to prove they have in th●se parts . eng. gent. you are right , sir ; for the governments of france , spain , england , and all other countries where these people setled , were fram'd accordingly . it is not my business to describe particularly the distinct forms of the several governments in europe , which do derive from these people ( for they may differ in some of their orders and laws , though the foundation be in them all the same ) this would be unnecessary , they being all extant , and so well known ; and besides , little to my purpose , excepting to shew where they have declined from their first institution , and admitted of some change . france , and poland , have not , nor as i can learn , ever had any free-men below the nobility ; that is , had no yeomen ; but all are either noble , or villains , therefore the lands must have been originally given , as they now remain , into the hands of these nobles . but i will come to the administration of the government in these countries , and first say wherein they all agree , or did at least in their institution , which is , that the soveraign power is in the states assembled together by the prince , in which he presides ; these make laws , levy money , redress grievances , punish great officers , and the like . these states consist in some places of the prince and nobility onely , as in poland , and anciently in france ( before certain towns , for the encouraging of trade , procured priviledges to send deputies ; which deputies are now called the third estate ) and in others , consist of the nobility and commonalty , which latter had and still have the same right to intervene and vote , as the great ones have both in england , spain , and other kingdomes . doct. but you say nothing of the clergy ; i see you are no great friend to them , to leave them out of your politicks . eng. gent. the truth is , doctor , i could wish there had never been any : the purity of christian religion , as also the good and orderly government of the world , had been much better provided for without them , as it was in the apostolical time , when we heard nothing of clergy . but my omitting their reverend lordships was no neglect , for i meant to come to them in order ; for you know that the northern people did not bring christianity into these parts , but found it here , and were in time converted to it , so that there could be no clergy at the first : but if i had said nothing at all of this race , yet i had committed no solecism in the politicks ; for the bishops and great abbots intervened in the states here , upon the same foundātion that the other peers do , viz. for their great possessions , and the dependence their tenants and vassals have upon them ; although they being a people of that great sanctity and knowledg , scorn to intermix so much as titles with us profane lay-ideots , and therefore will be called lords spiritual . but you will have a very venerable opinion of them , if you do but consider how they came by these great possessions , which made them claim a third part of the government . and truely not unjustly by my rule , for i believe they had no less ( at one time ) than a third part of the lands in most of these countries . noble ven. pray , how did they acquire these lands ? was it not here by the charitable donation of pious christians , as it was elsewhere ? eng. gent. yes , certainly , very pious men ; some of them might be well meaning people , but still such as were cheated by these holy men , who told them perpetually , both in publick and private , that they represented god upon earth , being ordained by authority from him who was his viceroy here , and that what was given to them was given to god , and he would repay it largely both in this world and the next . this wheedle made our barbarous ancestors , newly instructed in the christian faith ( if this religion may be called so , and sucking in this foolish doctrine more than the doctrine of christ ) so zealous to these vipers , that they would have pluckt out their eyes to serve them , much more bestow , as they did , the fruitfullest and best situate of their possessions upon them : nay , some they perswaded to take upon them their callings , vow chastity , and give all they had to them , and become one of them , amongst whom , i believe , they found no more sanctity than they left in the world. but this is nothing to another trick they had , which was to insinuate into the most notorious and execrable villains , with which that age abounded ; men , who being princes , and other great men ( for such were the tools they work'd with ) had treacherously poisoned , or otherwise murdered their nearest relations , fathers , brothers , wives , to reign , or enjoy their estates ; these they did perswade into a belief , that if they had a desire to be sav'd , notwithstanding their execrable villanies , they need but part with some of those great possessions ( which they had acquired by those acts ) to their bishopricks or monasteries , and they would pray for their souls , and they were so holy and acceptable to god , that he would deny them nothing ; which they immediately performed , so great was the ignorance and blindness of that age ; and you shall hardly find in the story of those times , any great monastery , abbey , or other religious house in any of these countries ( i speak confidently , as to what concerns our own saxons ) that had not its foundation from some such original . doct. a worthy beginning of a worthy race ! noble ven. sir , you maintain a strange position here , that it had been better there had been no clergy : would you have had no gospel preached , no sacraments , no continuance of christian religion in the world ? or do you think that these things could have been without a succession of the true priesthood , or ( as you call it , of true ministry ) by means of ordination ? do's not your own church hold the same ? eng. gent. you will know more of my church , when i have told you what i find the word church to signifie in scripture , which is to me the only rule of faith , worship , and manners ; neither do i seek these aditional helps , of fathers , councels , or ecclesiastical history , much less tradition : for since it is said in the word of god itself , that antichrist did begin to work even in those days ; i can easily believe that he had brought his work to some perfection , before the word church was by him applied to the clergy : i shall therefore tell you what i conceive that church , clergy , and ordination , signified in the apostolical times . i find then the word church in the new testament taken but in two sences ; the first , for the vniversal invisible church , called sometimes of the first-born ; that is , the whole number of the true followers of christ in the world , where-ever resident , or into what part soever dispersed . the other signification of church is an assembly , which though it be sometimes used to express any meetings ( even unlawful & tumultuous ones ) as well in scripture as prophane authors ; yet it is more frequently understood , for a gathering together to the duties of prayer , preaching , and breaking of bread ; and the whole number so congregated is , both in the acts of the apostles , and in their holy epistles , called the church ; nor is there the least colour for appropriating that word to the pastors and deacons , who since the corruptions of christian religion are called clergy ; which word in the old testament is used , sometimes for gods whole people , and sometimes for the tribe of levi , out of which the priests were chosen : for the word signifies a lot ; so ●● dispencer of the christian faith. and i cannot sufficiently admire why our clergy , who very justly refuse to believe the miracle which is pretended to be wrought in transubstantiation , because they see both the wafer and the wine to have the same substance , and the same accidents ( after the priest has mumbled words over those elements ) as they had before , and yet will believe that the same kind of spell or charm in ordination can have the efficacy to metamorphose a poor lay-ideot into a heavenly creature ; notwithstanding that we find in them the same humane nature , and the same necessities of it , to which they were subject before such transformation ; nay , the same debauch , profanness , ignorance , and disability to preach the gospel . noble ven. sir , this discourse is very new to me . i must confess i am much inclined to joyn with you in believing , that the power priests exercise over mankind , with the iurisdiction they pretend to over princes and states , may be a usurpation ; but that they should not have a divine call to serve at the altar , or that any person can pretend to perform those sacred functions without being duly ordained , seems very strange . eng. gent. i am not now to discourse of religion ; it is never very civil to do so in conversation of persons of a different belief ; neither can it be of any benefit towards a roman catholick , for if his conscience should be never so cleerly convinc'd , he is not yet master of his own faith , having given it up to his church , of whom he must ask leave to be a convert , which he will be sure never to obtain ; but if you have the curiosity when you come amongst the learned in your own country ( for amongst our ordination-mongers , there is a great scarcity of letters and other good parts ) you may please to take the bible , which you acknowledg to be the word of god as well as we , and intreat some of them to shew you any passage , the plain and genuine sense of which can any way evince this succession , this ordination , or this priesthood , we are now speaking of ; and when you have done , if you will let your own excellent reason and discourse judg , and not your priest , ( who is too much concerned in point of interest ) i make no doubt but you will be convinced that the pretence to the dispensing of divine things by virtue of a humane constitution , and so ridiculous a one too , as the ordination practised by your bishops and ours ( who descend and succeed from one and the same mother ) is as little justifiable by scripture and reason , and full as great a cheat and vsurpation , as the empire which the ecclesiasticks pretend to over the consciences and persons of men , and the exemption from all secular power . noble ven. well , sir , though neither my faith nor my reason can come up to what you hold , yet the novelty and the grace of this argument has delighted me extreamly : and if that be a sin , as i fear it is , i must confess it to my priest ; but i ask your pardon first , for putting you upon this long deviation . eng. gent. well , this digression is not without its use , for it will shorten our business ( which is grown longer than i thought it would have been ) for i shall mention the clergy no more , but when-ever i speak of peerage , pray take notice that i mean both lords spiritual and temporal , since they stand both upon the same foot of property . but if you please , i will fall immediately to discourse of the government of england , and say no more of those of our neighbours , than what will fall in by the way , or be hinted to me by your demands ; for the time runs away , and i know the doctor must be at home by noon , where he gives daily charitable audience to an infinity of poor people , who have need of his help , and who send or come for it , not having the confidence to send for him , since they have nothing to give him ; though he be very liberal too of his visits to such , where he has any knowledg of them : but i spare his modesty , which i see is concerned at the just testimony i bear to his charity . the soveraign power of england then , is in king , lords , and commons . the parliaments , as they are now constituted , that is , the assigning a choice to such a number of burroughs , as also the manner and form of elections and returns , did come in , as i suppose , in the time of henry the third , where now our statute-book begins ; and i must confess , i was inclined to believe , that before that time , our yeomanry or commonalty had not formally assembled in parliament , but been virtually included , and represented by the peers , upon whom they depended : but i am fully convinced , that it was otherwise , by the learned discourses lately publisht by mr. petit of the temple , and mr. attwood of grays-inne , being gentlemen whom i do mention honoris causa ; and really they deserve to be honor'd , that they will spare some time from the mechanical part of their callings ( which is to assist clients with counsel , and to plead their causes , and which i acknowledg likewise to be honourable ) to study the true interest of their country , and to show how ancient the rights of the people in england are , and that in a time when neither profit nor countenance can be hop'd for from so ingenious an undertaking . but i beg pardon for the deviation . of the three branches of soveraign power which politicians mention , which are enacting laws , levying of taxes , and making war and peace , the two first of them are indisputably in the parliament ; and when i say parliament , i ever intend with the king. the last has been usually exercis'd by the prince , if he can do it with his own money : yet ' because even in that case it may be ruinous to the kingdom , by exposing it to an invasion , many have affirmed that such a power cannot be by the true and ancient free government of england , supposed to be intrusted in the hands of one man : and therefore we see in divers kings reigns , the parliament has been consulted , and their advice taken in those matters that have either concerned war or leagues ; and that if it has been omitted , addresses have been made to the king by parliaments , either to make war or peace , according to what they thought profitable to the publick . so that i will not determine whether that power which draws such consequences after it , be by the genuine sence of our laws in the prince or no ; although i know of no statute or written record which makes it otherwise . that which is undoubtedly the kings right , or prerogative , is to call and dissolve parliaments , to preside in them , to approve of all acts made by them , and to put in execution , as supream or soveraign magistrate , in the intervals of parliaments , and during their sitting , all laws made by them , as also the common law ; for which cause he has the nomination of all inferiour officers and ministers under him , excepting such as by law or charter are eligible otherwise ; and the power of the sword , to force obedience to the judgements given both in criminal and civil causes . doct. sir , you have made us a very absolute prince ; what have we left us ? if the king have all this power , what do our liberties or rights signifie whenever he pleases ? eng. gent. this objection , doctor , makes good what i said before , that your skill did not terminate in the body natural , but extend to the politick ; for a more pertinent interrogatory could never have been made by plato or aristotle : in answer to which , you may please to understand , that when these constitutions were first made , our ancestors were a plain-hearted , well-meaning people , without court-reserves or tricks , who having made choice of this sort of government , and having power enough in their hands to make it take place , did not foresee , or imagine , that any thoughts of invading their rights could enter into the princes head ; nor do i read that it ever did , till the norman line came to reign ; which coming in by treaty , it was obvious there was no conquest made upon any but harold , in whose stead william the first came , and would claim no more after his victory , than what harold enjoy'd , excepting that he might confiscate ( as he did ) those great men who took part with the wrong title , and french-men were put into their estates ; which though it made in this kingdom a mixture between normans and saxons , yet produced no change or innovation in the government ; the norman peers ●●ing as tenacious of their liberties , and as active in the recovery of them to the full , as the saxon families were . soon after the death of william , and possibly in his time , there began some invasions upon the rights of the kingdom , 〈…〉 gat grievances , and afterwards 〈…〉 plants and discontents , which grew to that height , that the peers were fain to use their power , that is , arm their vassals to defend the government ; whilest the princes of that age , first king iohn , and then henry the third , got force together . the barons call'd in lewis the dauphin , whilst the king would have given away the kingdom to the sarazens , as he did to the pope , and armed their own creatures ; so that a bloody war ensued , for almost forty years , off and on ; as may be read in our history : the success was , that the barons or peers obtained in the close two charters or laws for the ascertaining their rights , by which neither their lives , liberties , or estates , could ever be in danger any more from any arbitrary power in the prince ; and so the good government of england , which was before this time like the law of nature , onely written in the hearts of men , came to be exprest in parchment , and remain a record in writing ; though these charters gave us no more than what was our own before . after these charters were made , there could not chuse but happen some encroachment upon them : but so long as the peers kept their greatness , there was no breaches but what were immediately made up in parliament ; which when-ever they assembled , did in the first place confirm the charters , and made very often interpretations upon them , for the benefit of the people ; witness the statute de tallagio non concedendo , and many others . but to come nearer the giving the doctor an answer , you may please to understand , that not long after the framing of these forementioned charters , there did arise a grievance not foreseen or provided for by them ; and it was such an one that had beaten down the government at once , if it had not been redressed in an orderly way . this was the intermission of parliaments , which could not be called but by the prince ; and he not doing of it , they ceast to be assembled for some years : if this had not been speedily remedied , the barons must have put on their armour again ; for who can imagine that such brisk assertors of their rights could have acquiesced in an omission that ruin'd the foundation of the government , which consisting of king , lords , and commons , and having at that time marched near five hundred years upon three leggs , must then have gone on hopping upon one ; which could it have gone forward ( as was impossible whilest property continued where it was ) yet would have rid but a little way . nor can it be wonder'd at , that our great men made no provision against this grievance in their charters , because it was impossible for them to imagine that their prince , who had so good a share in this government , should go about to destroy it , and to take that burden upon himself , which by our constitution was undeniably to be divided between him and his subjects : and therefore divers of the great men of those times speaking with that excellent prince king edward the first about it , he , to take away from his people all fear and apprehension that he intended to change the ancient government , called speedily a parliament , and in it consented to a declaration of the kingdoms right in that point ; without the clearing of which , all our other laws had been useless , and the government itself too ; of which the parliament is ( at the least ) as essential a part as the prince ; so that there passed a law in that parliament that one should be held every year , and oftner if need be ; which like another magna charta , was confirmed by a new act made in the time of edward the third , that glorious prince : nor were there any sycophants in those days , who durst pretend loyalty by using arguments to prove that it was against the royal prerogative , for the parliament to entrench upon the kings right of calling and dissolving of parliaments ; as if there were a prerogative in the crown , to chuse whether ever a parliament should assemble , or no ; i would desire no more , if i were a prince , to make me grand seignior . soon after this last act , the king , by reason of his wars with france and scotland , and other great affairs , was forced sometimes to end his parliaments abruptly , and leave business undone , ( and this not out of court-tricks , which were then unknown ) which produced another act not long after , by which it was provided , that no parliament should be dismist , till all the petitions were answered ; that is , in the language of those times , till all the bills ( which were then styled petitions ) were finished . doct. pray , sir , give me a little account of this last act you speak of ; for i have heard in discourse from many lawyers , that they believe there is no such . eng. gen. truly , sir , i shall confess to you , that i do not find this law in any of our printed statute-books ; but that which first gave me the knowledg of it was , what was said about three years ago in the house of commons , by a worthy and learned gentleman , who undertook to produce the record in the reign of richard the second ; and since i have questioned many learned counsellors about it , who tell me there is such a one ; and one of them , who is counted a prerogative-lawyer , said it was so , but that act was made in factious times . besides , i think it will be granted , that for some time after , and particularly in the reigns of henry the th , henry the th , and henry the th , it was usual for a proclamation to be made in westminster-hall , before the end of every session , that all those that had any matter to present to the parliament , should bring it in before such a day , for otherwise the parliament at that day should determine . but if there were nothing at all of this , nor any record extant concerning it ; yet i must believe that it is so by the fundamental law of this government , which must be lame and imperfect without it ; for it is all one to have no parliaments at all but when the prince pleases , and to allow a power in him to dismiss them when he will , that is , when they refuse to do what he will ; so that if there be no statute , it is certainly because our wise ancestors thought there needed none , but that by the very essence and constitution of the government it is provided for : and this we may call ( if you had rather have it so ) the common-law , which is of as much value ( if not more ) than any statute , and of which all our good acts of parliament and magna charta itself is but declaratory ; so that your objection is sufficiently aswered in this , that though the king is intrusted with the formal part of summoning and pronouncing the dissolution of parliaments , which is done by his writ , yet the laws ( which oblige him as well as us ) have determin'd how and when he shall do it ; which is enough to shew , that the kings share in the soveraignty , that is , in the parliament , is cut out to him by the law , and not left at his disposal . now i come to the kings part in the intervals of parliament . noble ven. sir , before you do so , pray tell us what other prerogatives the king enjoys in the government ; for otherwise , i who am a venetian , may be apt to think that our doge , who is call'd our prince , may have as much power as yours . eng. gent. i am in a fine condition amongst you with my politicks : the doctor tells me i have made the king absolute , and now you tell me i have made him a doge of venice ; but when your prince has power to dispose of the publick revenue , to name all officers ecclesiastical and civil that are of trust and profit in the kingdom , and to dispose absolutely of the whole militia by sea and land , then we will allow him to be like ours , who has all these powers . doct. well , you puzzle me extreamly : for when you had asserted the king's power to the heighth , in calling and dissolving parliaments , you gave me such satisfaction , and shewed me wherein the law had provided , that this vast prerogative could not hurt the people , that i was fully satisfied , and had not a word to say ; now you come about again , and place in the crown such a power , which in my judgment is inconsistent with our liberty . eng. gent. sir , i suppose you mean chiefly the power of the militia , which was , i must confess , doubtful , before a late statute declar'd it to be in the king : for our government hath made no other disposal of the militia than what was natural , viz. that the peers in their several counties , or jurisdictions , had the power of calling together their vassals , either armed for the wars , or onely so as to cause the law to be e●●cuted by serving writs ; and in case of resistance , giving possession : which lords amongst their own tenants did then perform the two several offices of lord-lieutenant , and sheriff ; which latter was but the earls deputy , as by his title of vice-comes do's appear . but this latter being of daily necessity , and justice itself , that is , the lives , liberties and estates of all the people in that county depending upon it , when the greatness of the peers decay'd ( of which we shall have occasion to speak hereafter ) the electing of sheriff was referred to the county-court , where it continued till it was placed where it now is by a statute . for the other part of the militia , which is , the arming the people for war , it was de facto exercised by commission from the king , to a lord-lieutenant ( as an image of the natural lord ) and other deputies ; and it was tacitely consented to , though it were never setled by statute ( as i said before ) till his majesties happy restauration . but to answer you , i shall say , that whatever powers are in the crown , whether by statute or by old prescription , they are , and must be understood to be intrusted in the prince , for the preservation of the government , and for the safety and interest of the people ; and when either the militia , which is given him for the execution and support of the law , shall be imploy'd by him to subvert it ( as in the case of ship-money it was ) or the treasure shall be mis-apply'd , and made the revenue of courtiers and sycophants ( as in the time of edward the second ) or worthless or wicked people shall be put into the greatest places , as in the reign of richard the second ; in this case , though the prince here cannot be questionable for it ( as the kings were in sparta , and your doges i believe would be ) yet it is a great violation of the trust reposed in him by the government , and a making that power , which is given him by law , unlawful in the execution . and the frequent examples of justice inflicted in parliament upon the king's ministers for abusing the royal power , shews plainly that such authority is not left in his hands to use as he pleases . nay , there have be fallen fact troubles and dangers to some of th●se princes themselves , who have abused their power to the prejudice of the subjects ; which although they are no way justifiable , yet may serve for an instruction to princes , and an example not to hearken to ruinous councils : for men when they are enraged do not always consider justice of religion , passion being as natural to man as reason and vertue , which was the opinion of divine machiavil . to answer you then , i say , that though we do allow such powers in the king , yet since they are given him for edification and not destruction , and cannot be abused without great danger to his ministers , and even to himself ; we may hope that they can never be abused but in a broken government : and if ours be so ( as we shall see anon ) the fault of the ill execution of our laws is not to be imputed either to the prince or his ministers ; excepting that the latter may be , as we said before , justly punishable for not advising the prince to consent to them ending the frame ; of which we shall talk more hereafter : but in the mean time i will come to the kings other prerogatives , as having all royal mines , the being serv'd first before other creditors where mony is due to him , and to have a speedier and easier way than his subjects to recover his debts and his rents , &c. but to say all in one word , when there arises any doubt whether any thing be the king's prerogative or no , this is the way of deciding it , viz. to consider whether it be for the good and protection of the people that the king have such a power ; for the definition of prerogative is a considerable part of the common law , by which power is put into the prince for the preservation of his people . and if it be not for the good of his subjects , it is not prerogative , not law , for our prince has no authority of his own , but what was first intrusted in him by the government , of which he is head ; nor is it to be imagined that they would give him more power than what was necessary to govern them . for example , the power of pardoning criminals condemned , is of such use to the lives and estates of the people , that without it many would be exposed to die unjustly ; as lately a poor gentleman , who by means of the harangue of a strepitous lawyer was found guilty of murder , for a man he never kil'd ; or if he had , the fact had been but man-slaughter ; and he had been inevitably murdered himself , if his majesty had not been graciously pleased to extend his royal mercy to him ; as he did likewise vouchsafe to do to a gentleman convicted for speaking words he never utter'd ; or if he had spoken them , they were but foolishly , not malitiously spoken . on the other side , if a controversie should arise , as it did in the beginning of the last parliament , between the house of commons , and the prerogative-lawyers , about the choice of their speaker , these latter having interested his majesty in the contest , and made him , by consequence , disoblige , in limine , a very loyal , and a very worthy parliament ; and for what ? for a question , which if you will decide it the right way , will be none : for setting aside the presidents , and the history when the crown first pretended to any share in the choice of a speaker , which argument was very well handled by some of the learned patriots then , i would have leave to ask , what man can shew , and what reason can be alledged , why the protection and welfare of the people should require that a prerogative should be in the prince to chuse the mouth of the house of commons , when there is no particular person in his whole dominion that would not think it against his interest , if the government had given the king power to nominate his bayliff , his attorney , or his referree in any arbitration ? certainly there can be no advantage either to the soveraign or his subjects , that the person whose office it is to put their deliberations into fitting words , and express all their requests to his majesty , should not be entirely in their own election and appointment ; which there is the more reason for too , because the speakers for many years past have received instructions from the court , and have broken the priviledges of the house , by revealing their debates , adjourning them without a vote , and committed many other misdemeanours , by which they have begotten an ill understanding between the king and his house of commons , to the infinite prejudice both of his majesties affairs , and his people . since i have given this rule to judge prerogative by , i shall say no more of it ; for as to what concerns the king's office in the intervals of parliament , it is wholly ministerial , and is barely to put in execution the common law and the statutes made by the soveraign power , that is , by himself and the parliament , without varying one tittle , or suspending , abrogating , or neglecting the execution of any act whatsoever ; and to this he is solemnly sworn at his coronation : and all his power in this behalf is in him by common law , which is reason itself , written as well in the hearts of rational men , as in the lawyers books . noble ven. sir , i have heard much talk of the kings negative voice in parliaments , which in my opinion is as much as a power to frustrate , when he pleases , all the endeavours and labours of his people , and to prevent any good that might accrue to the kingdom by having the right to meet in parliament : for certainly , if we in venice had placed any such prerogative in our duke , or in any of our magistracies , we could not call ourselves a free people . eng. gent. sir , i can answer you as i did before , that if our kings have such a power , it ought to be used according to the true and genuine intent of the government , that is , for the preservation and interest of the people , and not for the disappointing the counsels of a parliament , towards reforming grievances , and making provision for the future execution of the lawes ; and whenever it is applyed to frustrate those ends , it is a violation of right , and infringement of the king's coronation-oath ; in which there is this clause , that he shall confirmare consuetudines , ( which in the latine of those times is leges ) quas vulgus elegerit . i know some criticks , who are rather grammarians than lawyers , have made a distinction between elegerim and elegero , and will have it , that the king swears to such laws as the people shall have chosen , and not to those they shall chuse . but in my opinion , if that clause had been intended onely to oblige the king to execute the laws made already , it might have been better exprest by servare consuetudines , than by confirmare consuetudines ; besides that he is by another clause in the same oath sworn to execute all the laws . but i shall leave this controversie undecided ; those who have a desire to see more of it , may look into those quarrelling declarations , pro and con , about this matter , which preceded our unhappy civil wars . this is certain , that there are not to be found any statutes that have passed , without being presented to his majesty , or to some commissioned by him ; but whether such addresses were intended for respect and honour to his majesty , as the speaker of the house of commons and the lord mayor of london are brought to him , i leave to the learned to discourse ; onely thus much we may affirm , that there never were yet any parliamentary requests , which did highly concern the publick , presented to any king , and by him refused , but such denials did produce very dismal effects , as may be seen in our histories ancient and late ; it being certain , that both the barons wars , and our last dismal combustions , proceeded from no other cause than the denial of the princes then reigning to consent to the desires of the states of the kingdom : and such hath been the wisdom and goodness of our present gracious prince , that in twenty years and somewhat more , for which time we have enjoy'd him since his happy restauration , he hath not exercis'd his negative voice towards more than one publick bill ; and that too , was to have continued in force ( if it had passed into an act ) but for six weeks , being for raising the militia for so long time ; and as for the private bills , which are matters of meer grace , it is unreasonable his majesty should be refused that right that every englishman enjoys , which is not to be obliged to dispence his favours but where he pleases . but for this point of the negative vote , it is possible that when we come to discourse of the cure of our political distemper , some of you will propose the clearing and explanation of this matter , and of all others which may concern the king's power and the peoples rights . noble ven. but pray , sir , have not the house of peers a negative voice in all bills ? how come they not to be obliged to use it for the publick good ? eng. gent so they are , no doubt , and the commons too ; but there is a vast difference between a deliberative vote which the peers have with their negative , and that in the crown to blast all without deliberating . the peers are co-ordinate with the commons in presenting and hammering of laws , and may send bills down to them , as well as receive any from them , excepting in matters wherein the people are to be taxed : and in this our government imitates the best and most perfect commonwealths that ever were ; where the senate assisted in the making of laws , and by their wisdom and dexterity , polisht , fil'd , and made ready things for the more populous assemblies ; and sometimes by their gravity and moderation , reduced the people to a calmer state , and by their authority and credit stem'd the tide , and made the waters quiet , giving the people time to come to themselves . and therefore if we had no such peerage now upon the old constitution , yet we should be necessitated to make an artificial peerage or senate in stead of it : which may assure our present lords , that though their dependences and power are gone , yet that we cannot be without them ; and that they have no need to fear an annihilation by our reformation , as they suffered in the late mad times . but i shall speak a word of the peoples rights , and then shew how this brave and excellent government of england came to decay . the people by the fundamental laws , that is , by the constitution of the government of england , have entire freedome in their lives , properties , and their persons ; nether of which can in the least suffer , but according to the laws already made , or to be made hereafter in parliament , and duly publisht : and to prevent any oppression that might happen in the execution of these good laws , which are our birth-right , all tryals must be by twelve men of our equals , and of our neighbourhood ; these in all civil causes judge absolutely and decide the matter of fact , upon which the matter of law depends ; but if where matter of law is in question , these twelve men shall refuse to find a special verdict at the direction of the court , the judge cannot controul it , but their verdict must be recorded . but of these matters , as also of demurrers , writs of errour , and arrests of judgment , &c. i have discours'd to this gentleman ( who is a stranger ) before now ; neither do's the understanding of the execution of our municipal laws at all belong to this discourse : onely it is to be noted , that these juries , or twelve men , in all trials or causes which are criminal , have absolute power , both as to matter of law and fact ( except the party by demurrer confess the matter of fact , and take it out of their hands . ) and the first question the officer asks the foreman , when they all come in to deliver their verdict , is this , is he guilty in manner or form as he is indicted , or not guilty ? which shews plainly , that they are to examine and judge , as well whether , and how far the fact committed is criminal , as whether the person charged hath committed that fact. but though by the corruption of these times ( the infallible consequences of a broken frame of government ) this office of the juries and right of englishmen have been of late question'd , yet it hath been strongly and effectually vindicated by a learned author of late , to whom i refer you for more of this matter . i shall say no more of the rights of the people , but this one thing , that neither the king , nor any by authority from him , hath any the least power or jurisdiction over any englishman , but what the law gives them ; and that although all commissions and writs go out in the king's name , yet his majesty hath no right to issue out any writ ( with advice of his council , or otherwise ) excepting what come out of his courts ; nor to alter any clause in a writ , or add anything to it . and if any person shall be so wicked as to do any injustice to the life , liberty , or estate of any englishman , by any private command of the prince , the person agrieved , or his next of kin ( if he be assassinated ) shall have the same remedy against the offender , as he ought to have had by the good laws of this land , if there had been no such command given ; which would be absolutely void and null , and understood not to proceed from that royal and lawful power which is vested in his majesty for the execution of justice , and the protection of his people . doct. now i see you have done with all the government of england ; pray before you proceed to the decay of it , let me ask you what you think of the chancery , whether you do not believe it a solecism in the politicks to have such a court amongst a free people ; what good will magna charta , the petition of right , or st. edwards laws do us to defend our property , if it must be entirely subjected to the arbitrary disposal of one man , whenever any impertinent or petulant person shall put in a bill against you ? how inconsistent is this tribunal with all that hath been said in defence of our rights , or can be said ? suppose the prince should in time to come so little respect his own honour and the interest of his people , as to place a covetous or revengeful person in that great judicatory , what remedy have we against the corruption of registers , who make what orders they please ; or against the whole hierarchy of knavish clerks , whilst not only the punishing and reforming misdemeanours depend upon him , who may without controul be the most guilty himself , but that all the laws of england stand there arraigned before him , and may be condemned when he pleases ? is there , or ever was there any such tribunal in the world before , in any countrey ? eng. gent. doctor , i find you have had a suit in chancery , but i do not intend to contradict or blame your orthodox zeal in this point : this court is one of those buildings that cannot be repaired , but must be demolished . i could inform you how excellently matters of equity are administred in other countries ; and this worthy gentleman could tell you of the venerable quaranzia's in his city , where the law as well as the fact , is at the bar , and subject to the judges , and yet no complaint made or grievance suffered : but this is not a place for , it this is but the superstructure ; we must settle the foundation first ; every thing else is as much out of order as this . trade is gone , suits are endless , and nothing amongst us harmonious : but all will come right when our government is mended , and never before , though our judges were all angels : this is the primum quaerite ; when you have this , all other things shall be added unto you ; when that is done , neither the chancery ( which is grown up to this since our ancestors time ) nor the spiritual courts , nor the cheats in trade , nor any other abuses , no not the gyant popery itself , shall ever be able to stand before a parliament , no more than one of us can live like a salamander in the fire . noble ven. therefore , sir , pray let us come now to the decay of your government , that we may come the sooner to the happy restauration . eng. gent. this harmonious government of england being founded as has been said upon property , it was impossible it should be shaken , so long as property remain'd where it was placed : for if , when the ancient owners the britains fled into the mountains , and left their lands to the invaders ( who divided them , as is above related ) they had made an agrarian law to fix it ; then our government , and by consequence our happiness had been for ought we know immortal : for our constitution , as it was really a mixture of the three , which are monarchy , aristocracy , and democracy ( as has been said ) so the weight and predominancy remain'd in the optimacy , who possessed nine parts in ten of the lands ; and the prince but about a tenth part . in this i count all the peoples share to the peers , and therefore do not trouble myself to enquire what proportion was allotted to them , for that although they had an hereditary right in their lands , yet it was so clog'd with tenures and services , that they depended , as to publick matters , wholly on their lords , who by them could serve the king in his wars ; and in time of peace , by leading the people to what they pleased : could keep the royal power within its due bounds , and also hinder and prevent the people from invading the rights of the crown ; so that they were the bulwarks of the government ; which in effect was much more an aristocracy , than either a monarchy or democracy : and in all governments , where property is mixt , the administration is so too : and that part which hath the greater share in the lands , will have it too in the jurisdiction : and so in commonwealths , the senate or the people have more or less power , as they have more or fewer possessions ; as was most visible in rome , where in the beginning , the patricii could hardly bring the people to any thing ; but afterwards , when the asiatick conquests had inricht the nobility to that degree , that they were able to purchase a great part of the lands in italy , the people were all their clients , and easily brought even to cut the throats of their redeemers the gracchi , who had carried a law for restoring them their lands . but enough of this before . i will not trouble myself nor you , to search into the particular causes of this change , which has been made in the possessions here in england ; but it is visible that the fortieth part of the lands which were at the beginning in the hands of the peers and church , is not there now ; besides that not only all villanage is long since abolished , but the other tenures are so altered and qualified , that they signifie nothing towards making the yeomanry depend upon the lords . the consequence is , that the natural part of our government , which is power , is by means of property in the hands of the people , whilest the artificial part , or the parchment , in which the form of government is written , remains the same . now art is a very good servant and help to nature , but very weak and inconsiderable , when she opposes her , and fights with her : it would be a very impar congressus , between parchment and power : this alone is the cause of all the disorder you heard of , and now see in england , and of which every man gives a reason according to his own fancy , whilest few hit the right cause : some impute all to the decay of trade , others to the growth of popery ; which are both great calamities , but they are effects , and not causes ; and if in private families there were the same causes , there would be the same effects . suppose now you had five or six thousand pounds a year , as it is probable you have , and keep forty servants , and at length , by your neglect , and the industry and thrift of your domesticks , you sell one thousand to your steward , another to your clerk of the kitchen , another to your bayliff , till all were gone ; can you believe that these servants , when they had so good estates of their own , and you nothing left to give them , would continue to live with you , and to do their service as before ? it is just so with a whole kingdom . in our ancestors times , most of the members of our house of commons thought it an honour to retain to some great lord , and to wear his blew coat : and when they had made up their lord's train , and waited upon him from his own house to the lords house , and made a lane for him to enter , and departed to sit themselves in the lower house of parliament , as it was then ( and very justly ) called ; can you think that any thing could pass in such a parliament that was not ordered by the lords ? besides , these lords were the king 's great council in the intervals of parliaments , and were called to advise of peace and war ; and the latter was seldom made without the consent of the major part ; if it were not , they would not send their tenants , which was all the militia of england ( besides the king's tenth part . ) can it be believed , that in those days the commons should dislike any thing the lords did in the intervals , or that they would have disputed their right to receive appeals from courts of equity , if they had pretended to it in those days , or to mend money-bills ? and what is the reason , but because the lords themselves at that time represented all their tenants ( that is , all the people ) in some sort ? and although the house of commons did assemble to present their grievances , yet all great affairs of high importance concerning the government , was transacted by the lords ; and the war which was made to preserve it , was called the barons wars , not the war of both houses : for although in antienter times the word baron were taken in a larger sense , and comprehended the francklins or freemen ; yet who reads any history of that war , shall not find that any mention is made of the concurrence of any assembly of such men , but that simon monford earl of leicester , and others of the great ones , did by their power and interest manage that contest . now if this property , which is gone out of the peerage into the commons , had passed into the king's hands , as it did in egypt in the time of ioseph , as was before said , the prince had had a very easie and peaceable reign over his own vassals , and might either have refused , justly , to have assembled the parliament any more ; or if he had pleased to do it , might have for ever managed it as he thought fit : but our princes have wanted a ioseph , that is , a wise councellor ; and instead of saving their revenue , which was very great , and their expences small , and buying in those purchases which the vast expences and luxury of the lords made ready for them , they have alienated their own inheritance ; so that now the crown-lands , that is , the publick patrimony , is come to make up the interest of the commons , whilest the king must have a precarious revenue out of the peoples purses , and be beholding to the parliament for his bread in time of peace ; whereas the kings their predecessors never asked aid of his subjects , but in time of war and invasion : and this alone ( though there were no other decay in the government ) is enough to make the king depend upon his people ; which is no very good condition for a monarchy . noble ven. but how comes it to pass that other neighbouring countries are in so settled a state in respect of england ? does their property remain the same it was , or is it come into the hands of the prince ? you know you were pleased to admit , that we should ask you , en passant , something of other countries . eng. gent. sir , i thank you for it , and shall endeavour to satisfie you . i shall say nothing of the small princes of germany , who keep in a great measure their ancient bounds , both of government and property ; and if their princes now and then exceed their part , yet it is in time of troubles and war , and things return into their right chanel of assembling the several states , which are yet in being every where : but germany lying so exposed to the invasion of the turks on the one side , and of the french on the other ; and having ever had enough to do to defend their several liberties against the encroachments of the house of austria ( in which the imperial dignity is become in some sort hereditary ) if there had been something of extraordinary power exercised of late years , i can say inter arma silent leges : but besides their own particular states , they have the diet of the empire , which never fails to mediate and compose things , if there be any great oppresson used by princes to their subjects , or from one prince or state to another . i shall therefore confine myself to the three great kingdoms , france , spain , and poland ; for as to denmark and sweden , the first hath lately chang'd its government , and not only made the monarchy hereditary , which was before elective , but has pull'd down the nobility , and given their power to the prince ; which how it will succeed , time will shew . sweden remains in point of constitution and property exactly as it did anciently , and is a well-governed kingdom . the first of the other three is france , of which i have spoken before , and shall onely add , that though it be very true , that there is property in france , and yet the government is despotical at this present , yet it is one of those violent states , which the grecians called tyrannies : for if a lawfull prince , that is , one who being so by law , and sworn to rule according to it , breaks his oaths and his bonds , and reigns arbitrarily , he becomes a tyrant and an usurper , as to so much as he assumes more than the constitution hath given him ; and such a government , being as i said violent , and not natural , but contrary to the interest of the people , first cannot be lasting , when the adventitious props which support it fail ; and whilst it does endure , must be very uneasie both to prince and people ; the first being necessitated to use continual oppression , and the latter to suffer it . doct. you are pleased to talk of the oppression of the people under the king of france , and for that reason , call it a violent government , when , if i remember , you did once to day extol the monarchy of the turks for well-founded and natural ; are not the people in that empire as much oppressed as in france ? eng. gent. by no means ; unless you will call it oppression for the grand seignior to feed all his people out of the product of his own lands ; and though they serve him for it , yet that does not alter the case : for if you set poor men to work and pay them for it , are you a tyrant , or rather , are not you a good common-wealths-man , by helping those to live , who have no other way of doing it but by their labour ? but the king of france knowing that his people have , and ought to have property , and that he has no right to their possessions , yet takes what he pleases from them , without their consent , and contrary to law ; so that when he sets them on work he pays them what he pleases , and that he levies out of their own estates . i do not affirm that there is no government in the world , but where rule is founded in property ; but i say there is no natural fixed government , but where it is so ; and when it is otherwise , the people are perpetually complaining , and the king in perpetual anxiety , always in fear of his subjects , and seeking new ways to secure himself ; god having been so merciful to mankind , that he has made nothing safe for princes , but what is just and honest . noble ven. but you were saying just now , that this present constitution in france will fall when the props fail ; we in italy , who live in perpetual fear of the greatness of that kingdom , would be glad to hear something of the decaying of those props ; what are they , i beseech you ? eng. gent. the first is the greatness of the present king , whose heriock actions and wisdom has extinguished envy in all his neighbour-princes , and kindled fear , and brought him to be above all possibility of control at home ; not only because his subjects fear his courage , but because they have his virtue in admiration , and amidst all their miseries cannot chuse but have something of rejoycing , to see how high he hath mounted the empire and honour of their nation . the next prop is the change of their ancient constitution , in the time of charles the seventh , by consent : for about that time the country being so wasted by the invasion and excursions of the english , the states then assembled petitioned the king that he would give them leave to go home , and dispose of affairs himself , and order the government for the future as he thought fit . upon this , his successor lewis the eleventh , being a crafty prince , took an occasion to call the states no more , but to supply them with an assemble des notables , which were certain men of his own nomination , like barbones parliament here , but that they were of better quality : these in succeeding reigns ( being the best men of the kingdom ) grew troublesome and intractable ; so that for some years the edicts have been verified ( that is in our language ) bills have been passed in the grand chamber of the parliament at paris , commonly called the chambre d' audience , who lately , and since the imprisonment of president brouselles and others during this king's minority , have never refused or scrupled any edicts whatsoever . now whenever this great king dies , and the states of the kingdom are restored , these two great props of arbitrary power are taken away . besides these two , the constitution of the government of france itself , is somwhat better fitted than ours to permit extraordinary power in the prince , for the whole people there possessing lands , are gentlemen ; that is , infinitely the greater part ; which was the reason why in their asembly of estates , the deputies of the provinces ( which we call here knights of the shire ) were chosen by , and out of the gentry , and sate with the peers in the same chamber , as representing the gentry onely , called petite noblesse . whereas our knights here ( whatever their blood is ) are chosen by commoners , and are commoners ; our laws and government taking no notice of any nobility but the persons of the peers , whose sons are likewise commoners , even their eldest , whilest their father lives : now gentry are ever more tractable by a prince , than a wealthy and numerous commonalty ; out of which our gentry ( at least those we call so ) are raised from time to time : for whenever either a merchant , lawyer , tradesman , grasier , farmer , or any other , gets such an estate , as that he or his son can live upon his lands , without exercising of any other calling , he becomes a gentleman . i do not say , but that we have men very nobly descended amongst these , but they have no preheminence , or distinction , by the laws or government . besides this , the gentry in france are very needy , and very numerous ; the reason of which is , that the elder brother , in most parts of that kingdom , hath no more share in the division of the paternal estate , than the cadets or younger brothers , excepting the principal house , with the orchards and gardens about it , which they call vol de chappon , as who should say , as far as a capon can fly at once . this house gives him the title his father had , who was called seignior , or baron , or count of that place ; which if he sells , he parts with his baronship , and for ought i know becomes in time roturier , or ignoble . this practice divides the lands into so many small parcels , that the possessors of them being noble , and having little to maintain their nobility , are fain to seek their fortune , which they can find no where so well as at the court , and so become the king's servants and souldiers , for they are generally couragious , bold , and of a good meen . none of these can ever advance themselves , but by their desert , which makes them hazard themselves very desperately , by which means great numbers of them are kill'd , and the rest come in time to be great officers , and live splendidly upon the king's purse , who is likewise very liberal to them , and according to their respective merits , gives them often , in the beginning of a campagne , a considerable sum to furnish out their equipage . these are a great prop to the regal power , it being their interest to support it , lest their gain should cease , and they be reduced to be poor provinciaux , that is , country-gentlemen again : whereas , if they had such estates as our country-gentry have , they would desire to be at home at their ease , whilest these ( having ten times as much from the king as their own estate can yield them , which supply must fail , if the king's revenue were reduced ) are perpetually engaged to make good all exorbitances . doct. this is a kind of governing by property too , and it puts me in mind of a gentleman of good estate in our country , who took a tenants son of his to be his servant , whose father not long after dying , left him a living of about ten pound a year : the young man's friends came to him , and asked him why he would serve now he had an estate of his own able to maintain him : his answer was , that his own lands would yield him but a third part of what his service was worth to him in all ; besides , that he lived a pleasant life , wore good clothes , kept good company , and had the conversation of very pretty maids that were his fellow-servants , which made him very well digest the name of being a servant . eng. gent. this is the very case ; but yet service ( in both these cases ) is no inheritance ; and when there comes a peaceable king in france , who will let his neighbours be quiet , or one that is covetous , these fine gentlemen will lose their employments , and their king this prop ; and the rather , because these gentlemen do not depend ( as was said before ) in any kind upon the great lords ( whose standing interest is at court ) and so cannot in a change , be by them carried over to advance the court-designs against their own good and that of their country . and thus much is sufficient to be said concerning france . as for spain , i believe there is no country ( excepting sweden ) in christendom , where the property has remained so intirely the same it was at the beginning ; and the reason is , the great and strict care that is taken to hinder the lands from passing out of the old owners hands ; for except it be by marriages , no man can acquire another man's estate , nor can any grandee , or titulado , or any other hidalgo there , alienate or ingage his paternal or maternal estate , otherwise than for his life ; nor can alter tenures , or extinguish services , or dismember mannors : for to this the princes consent must be had , which he never gives , till the matter be debated in the consejo de camera , which is no iunta or secret consejo de guerras , but one wherein the great men of the kingdom intervene , and wherein the great matters concerning the preservation of the government are transacted , not relating to foreign provinces or governments , but to the kingdom of castile and leon , of which i only speak now . it is true , there have been one or two exceptions against this severe rule , since the great calamities of spain , and two great lordships have been sold , the marquisate del monastero , to an assent ista genoese , and another to sebastian cortiza a portuguese , of the same profession : but both these have bought the intire lordships , without curtailing or altering the condition in which these two great estates were before ; and notwithstanding , this hath caused so much repining amongst the natural godos ( as the castilians call themselves still for glory ) that i believe this will never be drawn into an example hereafter . now the property remaining the same , the government doth so too , and the king 's domestick government , over his natural spaniards , is very gentle , whatever it be in his conquer'd provinces ; and the kings there have very great advantages of keeping their great men ( by whom they govern ) in good temper , by reason of the great governments they have to bestow upon them , both in europe and the indies ; which changing every three years , go in an age through all the grandees , which are not very numerous . besides , castile having been in the time of king roderigo over-run and conquered by the moors , who governed there despotically , some hundreds of years , before it could be recovered again by the old inhabitants , who fled to the mountains ; when they were at length driven out , the count of castile found a tax set upon all commodities whatsoever , by the moors , in their reign , called alcaval , which was an easie matter to get continued ( when their old government was restored ) by the cortes , or states ; and so it has continued ever since , as the excise has done here , which being imposed by them who drove and kept out the king , does now since his happy restauration remain a revenue of the crown . this alcaval , or excise , is a very great revenue , and so prevented , for some time , the necessities of the crown , and made the prince have the less need of asking relief of his people , ( the ordinary cause of disgust , ) so that the cortes , or assembly of the states , has had little to do of late , though they are duly assembled every year , but seldom contradict what is desired by the prince ; for there are no greater idolaters of their monarch in the world than the castilians are , nor who drink deeper of the cup of loyalty : so that in short , the government in spain is as ours was in queen elizabeths time , or in the first year after his now majesties return , when the parliament for a time complimented the prince , who had by that means both his own power and the peoples : which days i hope to see again , upon a better and more lasting foundation . but before i leave spain , i must say a word of the kingdom of arragon , which has not at all times had so quiet a state of their monarchy as castile hath enjoyed ; for after many combustions which happened there , concerning their fueros and privilegios , which are their fundamental laws , the king one day coming to his seat in parliament , and making his demands , as was usual , they told him that they had a request to make to him first ; and he withdrawing thereupon , ( for he had no right of sitting there to hear their debates ) they fell into discourse how to make their government subsist against the encroachments of the prince upon them , and went very high in their debates , whch could not chuse but come to the king's ear , who walked in a gallery in the same palace to expect the issue ; and being in great passion , was seen to draw out his dagger , very often , and thrust it again into the sheath ; and heard to say , sangre ha de costar ; which coming to the knowledg of the estates , they left off the debate , and sent some of their number to him , to know what blood it should cost , and whether he meant to murder any body . he drew out his dagger again , and pointing it to his breast , he said , sangre de reys ; leaving them in doubt , whether he meant that his subjects would kill him , or that he would do it himself . however , that parliament ended very peaceably , and a famous settlement was there and then made , by which a great person was to be chosen every parliament , who should be as it were an umpire between the king and his people , for the execution of the laws , and the preservation of their government , their fueros and privilegios , which are their courts of justice , and their charters . this officer was called . el iusticia d' arragon , and his duty was to call together the whole power of the kingdom , whenever any of the aforesaid rights were by open force violated or invaded , and to admonish the king , whenever he heard of any clandestine councils among them to that effect . it was likewise made treason , for any person of what quality soever , to refuse to repair upon due summons to any place where this iusticia should erect his standard , or to withdraw himself without leave , much more to betray him , or to revolt from him : besides , in this cortes , or parliament , the old oath which at the first foundation of their state was ordered to be taken by the king at his admittance , was again revived , and which is , in these words : nos que valemos tanto camo nos , y podemos mos , os eligimos nuestro rey , conque nos guardeys nuestros fueros y privilegios ; y si no , no. that is , we who are as good as you , and more powerful , do chuse you our king , upon condition that you preserve our rights and priviledges ; and if not , not . notwithstanding all this , philip the second , being both king of castile and arragon , picked a quarrel with the latter , by demanding his secretary antonio perez , who fled from the king's displeasure thither , being his own country ; and they refusing to deliver him ( it being expresly contrary to a law of arragon , that a subject of that kingdom should be against his will carried to be tryed elsewhere ) the king took that occasion to invade them with the forces of his kingdom of castile ( who had ever been rivals and enemies to the aragoneses ) and they to defend themselves under their iusticia , who did his part faithfully and couragiously ; but the castilians being old soldiers , and those of arragon but county-troops , the former prevailed , and so this kingdom in getting that of castile by a marriage ( but an age before ) lost its own liberty and government : for it is since made a province , and governed by a vice-roy from madrid , although they keep up the formality of their cortes still . doct. no man living that knew the hatred and hostility that ever was between the english and scots , could have imagined in the years , and , when our king was with great armies of english upon the frontiers of scotland , ready to invade that kingdom , that this nation would not have assisted to have brought them under ; but it proved otherwise . eng. gent. it may be they feared , that when scotland was reduced to slavery , and the province pacified , and forces kept up there , that such forces and greater might have been imployed here , to reduce us into the same condition ; an apprehension which at this time sticks with many of the common people , and helps to fill up the measure of our fears and distractions . but the visible reason why the english were not at that time very forward to oppress their neighbours , was the consideration , that they were to be invaded for refusing to receive from hence certain innovations in matters of religion , and the worship of god , which had not long before been introduced here ; and therefore the people of this kingdom were unwilling to perpetuate a mungrel church here , by imposing it upon them . but i do exceedingly admire , when i read our history , to see how zealous and eager our nobility and people here were anciently to assert the right of our crown to the kingdom of france ; whereas it is visible , that if we had kept france ( for we conquered it intirely and fully ) to this day , we must have run the fate of arragon , and been in time ruined and opprest by our own valour and good fortune ; a thing that was foreseen by the macedonians , when their king alexander had subdued all persia and the east ; who weighing how probable it was , that their prince having the possession of such great and flourishing kingdoms , should change his domicilium imperii , and inhabit in the centre of his dominions , and from thence govern macedon , by which means the grecians , who by their vertue and valour had conquered and subdued the barbarians , should in time ( even as an effect of their victories ) be opprest and tyrannized over by them : and this precautious foresight in the greeks ( as was fully believed in that age ) hastened the fatal catastrophe of that great prince . doct. well , i hope this consideration will fore-arm our parliaments , that they will not easily suffer their eyes to be dazled any more with the false glory of conquering france . noble ven. you need no great cautions against conquering france at this present , and i believe your parliaments need as little admonition against giving of money towards new wars or alliances , that fine wheedle having lately lost them enough already ; therefore , pray , let us suffer our friend to go on . eng. gent. i have no more to say of foreign monarchies , but only to tell you , that poland is both governed and possessed by some very great persons or potentates , called palatines , and under them by a very numerous gentry ; for the king is not onely elective , but so limited , that he has little or no power , but to command their armies in time of war ; which makes them often chuse foreigners of great fame for military exploits : and as for the commonalty or country-men , they are absolutely slaves or villains . this government is extreamly confused , by reason of the numerousness of the gentry , who do not always meet by way of representation as in other kingdoms , but sometimes for the choice of their king , and upon other great occasions , collectively , in the field , as the tribes did at rome ; which would make things much more turbulent if all this body of gentry did not wholly depend for their estates upon the favour of the palatines their lords , which makes them much more tractable . i have done with our neighbours beyond sea , and should not without your command have made so long a digression in this place , which should indeed have been treated of before we come to speak of england , but that you were pleased to divert me from it before : however , being placed near the portraicture of our own country , it serves better ( as contraria juxta se posita ) to illustrate it : but i will not make this deviation longer , by apologizing for it ; and shall therefore desire you to take notice , that as in england by degrees property came to shift from the few to the many , so the government is grown heavier and more uneasie both to prince and people , the complaints more in parliament , the laws more numerous , and much more tedious and prolix , to meet with the tricks and malice of men , which works in a loose government ; for there was no need to make acts verbose , when the great persons could presently force the execution of them : for the law of edward the first , for frequent parliaments , had no more words than a parliament shall be holden every year , whereas our act for a triennial parliament , in the time of king charles the first , contained several sheets of paper , to provide against a failer in the execution of that law ; which if the power had remained in the lords , would have been needless : for some of them , in case of intermission of assembling the parliament , would have made their complaint and address to the king , and have immediately removed the obstruction , which in those days had been the natural and easie way : but now that many of the lords ( like the bishops which the popes make at rome , in partibus infidelium ) are meerly grown titular , and purchased for nothing but to get their wives place , it cannot be wondred at if the king slight their addresses , and the court-parasites deride their honourable undertakings for the safety of their country . now the commons succeeding , as was said , in the property of the peers and church ( whose lands five parts of six have been alienated , and mostly is come into the same hands with those of the king and peers ) have inherited likewise , according to the course of nature , their power ; but being kept from it by the established government , which ( not being changed by any lawfull acts of state ) remains still in being formally , whereas virtually it is abolished ; so that for want of outward orders and provisions , the people are kept from the exercise of that power which is faln to them by the law of nature ; and those who cannot by that law pretend to the share they had , do yet enjoy it by vertue of that right which is now ceased , as having been but the natural effect of a cause that is no longer in being : and you know sublata causa , t●llitur . i cannot say that the greater part of the people do know this their condition , but they find very plainly that they want something which they ought to have ; and this makes them lay often the blame of their unsetledness upon wrong causes : but however , are altogether unquiet and restless in the intervals of parliament ; and when the king pleases to assemble one , spend all their time in complaints of the inexecution of the law , of the multiplication of an infinity of grievances , of mis-spending the publick monies , of the danger our religion is in by practices to undermine it and the state , by endeavours to bring in arbitrary power , and in questioning great officers of state , as the causers and promoters of all these abuses ; in so much , that every parliament seems a perfect state of war , wherein the commons are tugging and contending for their right , very justly and very honourably , yet without coming to a point : so that the court sends them packing , and governs still worse and worse in the vacancies , being necessitated thereunto by their despair of doing any good in parliament ; and therefore are forced to use horrid shifts to subsist without it , and to keep it off ; without ever considering , that if these counsellers understood their trade , they might bring the prince and people to such an agreement in parliament , as might repair the broken and shipwrack'd government of england ; and in this secure the peace , quiet and prosperity of the people , the greatness and happiness of the king , and be themselves not only out of present danger ( which no other course can exempt them from ) but be renowned to all posterity . noble ven. i beseech you , sir , how comes it to pass , that neither the king , nor any of his counsellors could ever come to find out the truth of what you discourse ? for i am fully convinced it is as you say . eng. gent. i cannot resolve you that , but this is certain , they have never endeavoured a cure , though possibly they might know the disease , as fearing that though the effects of a remedy would be , as was said , very advantagious both to king and people , and to themselves ; yet possibly , such a reformation might not consist with the merchandize they make of the princes favour , nor with such bribes , gratuities and fees as they usually take for the dispatch of all matters before them . and therefore our counsellors have been so far from suggesting any such thing to their master , that they have opposed and quashed all attempts of that kind , as they did the worthy proposals made by certain members of that parliament in the beginning of king iames's reign , which is yet called the undertaking parliament . these gentlemen considering what we have been discoursing of , viz. that our old government is at an end , had framed certain heads , which , if they had been proposed by that parliament to the king , and by him consented to , would , in their opinion , have healed the breach ; and that if the king would perform his part , that house of commons would undertake for the obedience of the people . they did believe that if this should have been moved in parliament before the king was acquainted with it , it would prove abortive : and therefore sent three of their number to his majesty : sir iames a croft , grandfather or father to the present bishop of hereford ; thomas harley , who was ancestor to the honourable family of that name is herefordshire ; and sir henry nevill , who had been ambassador from queen elizabeth to the french king. these were to open the matter at large to the king , and to procure his leave that it might be proposed in parliament : which , after a very long audience and debate , that wise prince consented to , with a promise of secresie in the mean time , which they humbly begged of his majesty . however , this took vent , and the earl of northampton ; of the house of howard , who ruled the rost in that time , having knowledg of it , engaged sir r. weston , afterwards lord treasurer and earl of portland , to impeach these undertakers in parliament before they could move their matters ; which he did the very same day , accompanying his charge ( which was endeavouring to alter the established government of england ) with so eloquent an invective , that if one of them had not risen , and made the house acquainted with the whole series of the affair , they must have been in danger of being impeached by the commons : but however it broke their designe , which was all that northampton and weston desired , and prevented posterity from knowing any of the particulars of this reformation ; for nothing being moved , nothing could remain upon the journal . so that you see our predecessors were not ignorant altogether of our condition , though the troubles which have befallen this poor kingdom since , have made it much more apparent : for since the determination of that parliament , there has not been one called , either in that king's reign , or his son 's , or since , that hath not been dissolved abruptly , whilst the main businesses , and those of most concern to the publick , were depending and undecided . and although there hath happened in this interim a bloody war , which in the close of it , changed the whole order and foundation of the polity of england , and that it hath pleased god to restore it again by his majesty's happy return , so that the old government is alive again ; yet it is very visible that its deadly wound is not healed , but that we are to this day tugging with the same difficulties , managing the same debates in parliament , and giving the same disgusts to the court , and hopes to the country , which our ancestors did before the year . whilst the king hath been forced to apply the same remedy of dissolution to his two first parliaments , that his father used to his four first , and king iames to his three last , contrary to his own visible interest , and that of his people ; and this for want of having counsellors about him of abilities and integrity enough to discover to him the disease of his government , and the remedy : which i hope , when we meet to morrow morning you will come prepared to enquire into ; for the doctor says , he will advise you to go take the air this afternoon in your coach. noble ven. i shall think it very long till the morning come : but before you go , pray give me leave to ask you something of your civil war here ; i do not mean the history of it ( although the world abroad is very much in the dark as to all your transactions of that time for want of a good one ) but the grounds or pretences of it , and how you fell into a war against your king. eng. gent. as for our history , it will not be forgotten ; one of those who was in employment from the year . to . hath written the history of those years , a person of good learning and elocution ; and though he be now dead , yet his executors are very unwilling to publish it so soon , and to rub a sore that is not yet healed . but the story is writ with great truth and impartiality , although the author were engaged both in councils and arms for the parliaments side . but for the rest of your demand , you may please to understand , that our parliament never did , as they pretended , make war against the king ; for he by law can do no wrong , and therefore cannot be quarrelled with : the war they declared was undertaken to rescue the king's person out of those mens hands who led him from his parliament , and made use of his name to levy a war against them . noble ven. but does your government permit , that in case of a disagreement between the king and his parliament , either of them may raise arms against the other ? eng. gent. it is impossible that any government can go further than to provide for its own safety and preservation whilst it is in being , and therefore it can never direct what shall be done when it self is at an end ; there being this difference between our bodies natural and politick , that the first can make a testament to dispose of things after his death , but not the other . this is certain , that where-ever any two co-ordinate powers do differ , and there be no power on earth to reconcile them otherwise , nor any umpire , they will , de facto , fall together by the ears . what can be done in this case de jure , look into your own country-man machiavell , and into grotius , who in his book de jure belliac pacis , treated of such matters long before our wars . as for the ancient politicians , they must needs be silent in the point , as having no mixt governments amongst them ; and as for me , i will not rest my self in so slippery a place . there are great disputes about it in the parliaments declarations before the war , and something considerable in the king's answers to them ; which i shall specifie immediately , when i have satisfied you how our war begun ; which was in this manner : the long parliament having procured from the king his royal assent for their sitting till they were dissolved by act , and having paid and sent out the scottish army , and disbanded our own , went on in their debates for the settling and mending our government : the king being displeased with them for it , and with himself for putting it out of his power to dissolve them , now the business which they pretended for their perpetuation was quite finished , takes an unfortunate resolution to accuse five principal men of the commons house , and one of the peers , of high-treason : which he prosecuted in a new unheard-of way , by coming with armed men into the commons house of parliament , to demand their members ; but nothing being done by reason of the absence of the five , and tumults of discontented citizens flocking to white-hall and westminster , the king took that occasion to absent himself from his parliament . which induced the commons house to send commissioners to hampton-court to attend his majesty with a remonstrance of the state of the kingdom , and an humble request to return to his parliament , for the redressing those grievances which were specified in that remonstrance . but the king , otherwise counselled , goes to windsor , and thence northwards , till he arrived at york ; where he summons in the militia , that is , the trained-bands of the county ; and besides , all the gentry , of which there was a numerous appearance . the king addressed himself to the latter with complaints against a prevailing party in parliament , which intended to take the crown from his head ; that he was come to them , his loving subjects , for protection ; and , in short , desired them to assist him with moneys to defend himself by arms. some of these gentlemen petitioned his majesty to return to his parliament , the rest went about the debate of the king's demands ; who , in the mean time , went to hull , to secure the magazine there , but was denied entrance by a gentleman whom the house had sent down to prevent the seizing it ; who was immediately declared a traytor , and the king fell to raising of forces : which coming to the knowledge of the house , they made this vote , that the king , seduced by evil counsel , intended to levy war against his parliament and people , to destroy the fundamental laws and liberties of england , and to introduce an arbitrary government , &c. this was the first time they named the king , and the last : for in all their other papers , and in their declaration to arm for their defence ( which did accompany this vote ) they name nothing but malignant counsellors . the kings answer to these votes and this declaration , is that which i mentioned ; wherein his majesty denies any intention of invading the government , with high imprecations upon himself and posterity if it were otherwise : and owns that they have right to maintain their laws and government . this is to be seen in the paper it self now extant ; and this gracious prince never pretended ( as some divines have done for him ) that his power came from god , and that his subjects could not dispute it , nor ought he to give any account of his actions ( though he should enslave us all ) to any but him . so that our war did not begin upon a point of right , but upon a matter of fact ; for without going to lawyers or casuists to be resolved , those of the people who believed that the king did intend to destroy our liberties , joyned with the parliament ; and those who were of opinion that the prevailing party in parliament did intend to destroy the king or dethrone him , assisted vigorously his majesty with their lives and fortunes . and the question you were pleased to ask never came ; for both parties pretended and believed they were in the right , and that they did fight for and defend the government : but i have wearied you out . noble ven. no sure ▪ sir , but i am infinitely obliged to you for the great care you have taken and still have used to instruct me , and beg the continuance of it for to morrow morning . eng. gent. i shall be sure to wait upon you at nine a clock , but i shall beseech both of you to bethink your selves what to offer , for i shall come with a design to learn , not to teach : nor will i presume in such a matter to talk all , as you have made me do to day ; for what i have yet to say in the point of cure , is so little , that it will look like the mouse to the mountain of this days discourse . doct. it is so in all arts , the corollary is short , and in ours particularly . those who write of the several diseases incident to humane bodies , must make long discourses of the causes , symptomes , signs and prognosticks of such distempers ; but when they come to treat of the cure , it is dispatched in a few recipes . eng. gent. well , sir , for this bout , i humbly take my leave of you ; nay , sir , you are not in a condition to use ceremony . doct. sir , i forbid you this door ; pray retire : to stand here , is worse than to be in the open air . noble ven. i obey you both . doct. i shall wait on you in the evening . the third day . noble ven. gentlemen , you are very welcome : what , you are come both together ! doct. i met this gentleman at the door : but methinks we sit looking one upon another , as if all of us were afraid to speak . eng. gent. do you think we have not reason , in such a subject as this is ? how can any man , without hesitation , presume to be so confident as to deliver his private opinion in a point , upon which , for almost year ( for so long our government has been crazy ) no man has ventured ; and when parliaments have done any thing towards it , there have been animosities and breaches , and at length civil wars ? noble ven. our work to day is , to endeavour to shew how all these troubles may be prevented for the future , by taking away the cause of them , which is the want of a good government ; and therefore it will not be so much presumption in you , as charity , to declare your self fully in this matter . eng. gent. the cure will follow naturally , if you are satisfied in the disease , and in the cause of the disease : for if you agree that our government is broken , and that it is broken because it was founded upon property , and that foundation is now shaken ; it will be obvious , that you must either bring property back to your old government , and give the king and lords their lands again , or else you must bring the government to the property as it now stands . doct. i am very well satisfied in your grounds ; but because this fundamental truth is little understood amongst our people , and that in all conversations men will be offering their opinions of what the parliament ought to do at their meeting , it will not be amiss to examine some of those expedients they propose , and to see whether some or all of them may not be effectual towards the bringing us to some degree of settlement , rather than to venture upon so great a change and alteration as would be necessary to model our government anew . eng. gent. sir , i believe there can be no expedients proposed in parliament that will not take up as much time and trouble , find as much difficulty in passing with the king and lords , and seem as great a change of government , as the true remedy would appear , at least i speak as to what i have to propose ; but however , i approve your method , and if you will please to propose any of those things , i shall either willingly embrace them , or endeavour to shew reason why they will be of little fruit in the settling our state. doct. i will reduce them to two heads ( besides the making good laws for keeping out arbitrary power , which is always understood : ) the hindering the growth of popery , and consequently the providing against a popish successor ; and then the declaring the duke of monmouth's right to the crown , after it hath been examined and agreed to in parliament . eng. gent. as for the making new laws , i hold it absolutely needless , those we have already against arbitrary power being abundantly sufficient , if they might be executed ; but that being impossible ( as i shall shew hereafter ) till some change shall be made , i shall postpone this point : and for the first of your other two , i shall divide and separate the consideration of the growth of popery from that of the succession . i am sorry that in the prosecution of this argument , i shall be forced to say something that may not be very pleasing to this worthy gentleman , we being necessitated to discourse with prejudice of that religion which he professes ; but it shall be with as little ill breeding as i can , and altogether without passion or invectives . noble ven. it would be very hard for me to suspect any thing from you that should be disobliging ; but pray , sir , go on to your political discourse , for i am not so ignorant my self , but to know that the conservation of the national religion ( be it what it will ) is assential to the well ordering a state : and though in our city the doctrinals are very different from what are professed here , yet as to the government of the state , i believe you know that the pope or his priests have as little influence upon it , as your clergy have here , or in any part of the world. eng. gent. i avow it fully , sir , and with the favour you give will proceed . it cannot be denyed but that in former times popery has been very innocent here to the government , and that the clergy and the pope were so far from opposing our liberties , that they both sided with the barons to get a declaration of them by means of magna charta : it is true also , that if we were all papists , and that our state were the same , both as to property and empire , as it was years ago , there would be but one inconvenience to have that religion national again in england , which is , that the clergy , quatenus such , had and will have a share in the soveraignty , and inferiour courts in their own power , called ecclesiastical ; this is , and ever will be a solecism in government , besides a manifest contradiction to the words of christ our saviour , who tells us , his kingdom is not of this world : and the truth is , if you look into the scriptures , you will find , that the apostles did not reckon that the religion they planted should be national in any country , and therefore have given no precepts to the magistrate to meddle in matters of faith and the worship of god ; but preach'd , that christians should yield them obedience in all lawfull things . there are many passages in holy writ which plainly declare , that the true believers and saints should be but a handful , and such as god had separated , and as it were taken out of the world ; which would not have been said by them , if they had believed that whole nations and people should have been true followers of christ , and of his flock : for certainly none of them are to be damn'd , and yet christ himself tells us , that few are saved , and bids us strive to get in at the strait gate ; and therefore i conceive it not to be imaginable , that either christ or his apostles did ever account that the true religion should be planted in the world by the framing of laws , catechisms , or creeds , by the soveraign powers and magistrates , whether you call them spiritual or temporal , but that it should have a progress suitable to its beginning : for it is visible that it had its original from the power and spirit of god , and came in against the stream , not onely without a numa pompilius , or a mahomet , to plant and establish it by humane constitutions and authority , but had all the laws of the world to oppose it , and all the bloudy tyrants of that age to persecute it , and to inflict exquisite torments on the professors of it , in nero's time ( which was very early ) the christians were offered a temple in rome , and in what other cities they pleased , to be built to jesus christ , and that the romans should receive him into the number of their gods ; but our religion being then in its purity , this was unanimously refused , for that such a god must have no companions , nor needed no temples , but must be worshipped in spirit and truth . the successors to these good christians were not so scrupulous ; for within some ages after , the priests to get riches and power , and the emperors to get and keep the empire ( for by this time the christians were grown numerous and powerful ) combined together to spoil our holy religion , to make it fit for the government of this world , & to introduce into it all the ceremonious follies and superstitions of the heathen ; and which is worse , the power of priests , both over the persons and consciences of men. i shall say no more of this , but refer you to innumerable authors who have treated of this subject , particularly to a french minister , who hath written a book , entituled , la religion catholique apostolique romaine instituee par nume pompile ; and to the incomparable machiavel in his posthume letter , printed lately in our language , with the translation of his works . but i have made a long digression ; and to come back again , shall onely desire you to take notice , when i say that anciently popery was no inconvenience in this kingdom , i mean onely politically , as the government then stood , and do not speak at all of the prejudice which mens souls did and will ever receive from the belief of those impious tenents , and the want of having the true gospel of jesus christ preached unto them , but living in perpetual superstition and idolatry : the consideration of these matters is not so proper to my present purpose , being to discourse onely of government . notwithstanding therefore , as i said before , that popery might have suited well enough with our old constitution , yet as to the present estate , which inclines to popularity , it would be wholly as inconsistent with it , and with the power of the keys , and the empire of priests ( especially where there is a forreign jurisdiction in the case ) as with the tyranny and arbitrary power of any prince in the world. i will add thus much in confirmation of the doctor 's assertion , that we ought to prevent the growth of popery , since it is now grown a dangerous faction here against the state. noble ven. how can that be , i beseech you , sir ? eng. gent. sir , i will make you judg of it your self ; i will say nothing of those foolish writings that have been put forth by mariana , emanuel sa , and some others , about the lawfulness of destroying princes and states in case of heresie , because i know all the conscientious and honest papists ( of which i know there are great numbers in the world ) do not only not hold , but even abhor such cursed tenents ; and do believe , that when the pope , by excommunication hath cut off any prince from the communion of the church , can go no further , nor ought to pretend a power to deprive him of his crown , or absolve his subjects from their oaths and obedience : but i shall confine my self to the present condition of our papists here . you know how dangerous it is for any kingdom or state to have a considerable , wealthy , flourishing party amongst them , whose interest it is to destroy the polity and government of the country where they live ; and therefore if our papists prove this party , you will not wonder why this people are so eager to depress them . this is our case : for in the beginning of queen elizabeths reign , there was an alteration of religion in our country , which did sufficiently enrage the holy father at rome , to see that this good cow would be milked no longer . he declares her an heretick and a bastard , ( his sanctity not having declared null that incestuous marriage which her father had contracted before with his brothers wife , and which that king had dissolved to marry her mother ) and afterwards excommunicated our queen , depriving her , as much as in him lay , of the kingdom ; some of the zealots of that party ( having a greater terrour for those thunder-bolts than i believe many have now ) began to conspire against her ; and plots grew at length so frequent , and so dangerous , that it was necessary ( as the parliaments then thought ) to secure the queen , by making severe laws against a people , who did not believe themselves her majesties subjects ; but on the contrary , many of them thought themselves in conscience obliged to oppose and destroy her : and although that excommunication , as also the pretended doubtfulness of the title ▪ both died with that renowned queen , yet a new desperate conspiracy against the king her successor and the whole parliament ensuing , not long after her decease , those rigorous laws have been so far from being repealed , that very many more , and far severer , have been since made , and are yet in force . now these laws make so great a distinction between protestants and papists , that whereas the former are by our government and laws , the freest people in the world , the latter are little better than slaves , are confined to such a distance from their houses , are not to come near the court , which being kept in the capital city , mostly deprives them from attending their necessary occasions ; they are to pay two third parts of their estates annually to the king , their priests are to suffer as traitors , and they as felons for harbouring them ; in fine , one of us , if he do not break the municipal laws for the good government of the country , need not fear the king's power , whereas their being what they are , is a breach of the law , and does put them into the princes hands to ruine them when he pleases ; nay , he is bound by oath to do it , and when he does it not , is complained against by his people , and parliaments take it amiss . now judge you , sir , whether it is not the interest of these people to desire and endeavour a change , whilest they remain under these discouragements , and whether they are not like to joyn with the prince ( whose connivance at the inexecution of those laws is the onely means and hope of their preservation ) whenever he shall undertake any thing for the increase of his own power , and the depressing his parliaments . noble ven. what you say is very undeniable , but then the remedy is very easie and obvious , as well as very just and honourable , which is the taking away those cruel laws , and if that were done they would be one people with you , and would have no necessity , and by consequence no desire to engreaten the king against the interest and liberty of their own country . eng. gent. you speak very well , and one of the reasons amongst many which i have , to desire a composure of all our troubles by a setled government , is , that i may see these people ( who are very considerable , most of them , for estates , birth and breeding ) live quietly under our good laws , and increase our trade and wealth with their expences here at home ; whereas now the severity of our laws against them , makes them spend their revenues abroad , and inrich other nations with the stock of england ; but as long as the state here is so unsetled as it is , our parliaments will never consent to countenance a party , who by the least favour and indulgence may make themselves able to bring in their own religion to be national , and so ruine our polity and liberties . noble ven. i wonder why you should think that possible ? eng. gent. first , sir , for the reason we first gave , which is the craziness of our polity , there being nothing more certain , than that both in the natural and also the politick body any sinister accident that intervenes , during a very diseased habit , may bring a dangerous alteration to the patient . an insurrection in a decayed government , a thing otherwise very inconsiderable , has proved very fatal , as i knew a slight flesh-wound bring a lusty man to his grave in our wars , for that he being extreamly infected with the french disease , could never procure the orifice to close ; so although the designs both at home and abroad , for altering our religion , would be very little formidable to a well-founded government , yet in such an one as we have now , it will require all our care to obviate such machinations . another reason is the little zeal that is left amongst the ordinary protestants , which zeal uses to be a great instrument of preserving the religion establish'd , as it did here in queen elizabeths time ; i will add the little credit the church of england hath amongst the people , most men being almost as angry with that popery which is left amongst us ( in surplices , copes , altars , cringings , bishops , ecclesiastical courts , and the whole hierarchy , besides an infinite number of useless , idle , superstitious ceremonies , and the ignorance and vitiousness of the clergy in general ) as they are with those dogma's that are abolished ; so that there is no hopes that popery can be kept out , but by a company of poor people called fanaticks , who are driven into corners as the first christians were ; and who only in truth conserve the purity of christian religion , as it was planted by christ and his apostles , and is contained in scripture . and this makes almost all sober men believe , that the national clergy , besides all other good qualities have this too , that they cannot hope to make their hierarchy subsist long against the scriptures , the hatred of mankind , and the interest of this people , but by introducing the roman religion , and getting a foreign head and supporter , which shall from time to time brave and hector the king and paliament in their favour and behalf , which yet would be of little advantage to them , if we had as firm and wise a government as you have at venice . another reason , and the greatest , why the romish religion ought to be very warily provided against at this time , is , that the lawful and undoubted heir to the crown , if his majesty should die without legitimate issue , is more than suspected to imbrace that faith ; which ( if it should please god to call the king , before there be any remedy applied to our distracted state ) would give a great opportunity ( by the power he would have in intervals of parliament ) either to introduce immediately that profession , with the help of our clergy , and other english and foreign aids , or else to make so fair a way for it , that a little time would perfect the work ; ●nd this is the more formidable , for that ●a very zealous and bigot 〈…〉 and therefore may be supposed to act any thing to that end , although it should manifestly appear to be contrary to his own interest and quiet ; so apt are those who give up their faith and the conduct of their lives to priests ( who to get to themselves empire , promise them the highest seats in heaven ; if they will sacrifice their lives , fortunes , and hopes , for the exaltation of their holy mother , and preventing the damnation of an innumerable company of souls which are not yet born ) to be led away with such erroneous and wild fancies . whereas philip the second of spain , the house of guise in france , and other great statesmen , have always made their own greatness their first aim , and used their zeal as an instrument of that ; and instead of being cozen'd by priests , have cheated them , and made them endeavour to preach them up to the empire of the world. so i have done with the growth of popery , and must conclude , that if that should be stopt in such manner , that there could not be one papist left in england , and yet our polity left in the same disorder that now afflicts it , we should not be one scruple the better for it , nor the more at quiet ; the growth and danger of popery not being the cause of our present distemper , but the effect of it : but as a good and setled government would not be at all the nearer for the destruction of popery , so popery and all the dangers and inconveniences of it would not only be further off , but would wholly vanish at the sight of such a reformation . and so we begin at the wrong end , when we begin with religion before we heal our breaches . i will borrow one similitude more , with our doctor 's favour , from his profession . i knew once a man given over by the physitians , of an incurable cachexia , which they said proceeded from the ill quality of the whole mass of blood , from great adustion , and from an ill habit of the whole body . the patient had very often painful fits of the chollick , which they said proceeded from the sharpness of the humour which caused the disease ; and , amongst the rest , had one fit which tormented him to that degree , that it was not expected he could out-live it ; yet the doctors delivered him from it in a small time : notwithstanding , soon after the man died of his first distemper . whereas if their art had arrived to have cured that ( which was the cause of the other ) the chollick had vanished of it self , and the patient recovered . i need make no application , nor shall need to say much of the succession of the crown ( which is my next province ) but this i have said already , that it is needless to make any provision against a popish successor if you rectifie your government ; and if you do not , all the care and circumspection you can use in that particular , will be useless and of none effect , and will but at last ( if it do not go off easily , and the next heir succeed peaceably , as is most likely , especially if the king live till the people's zeal and mettle is over ) end probably in a civil war about title ; and then the person deprived may come in with his sword in his hand , and bring in upon the point of it both the popish religion , and arbitrary power : which , though i believe he will not be able to maintain long ( for the reasons before alledged , ) yet that may make this generation miserable and unhappy . it will certainly be agreed by all lovers of their country , that popery must be kept from returning , and being national in this kingdom , as well for what concerns the honour and service of god , as the welfare and liberty of the people ; and i conceive there are two ways by which the parliament may endeavour to secure us against that danger ; the first by ordering such a change in the administration of our government , that whoever is prince , can never violate the laws , and then we may be very safe against popery ; our present laws being effectual enough to keep it out , and no new ones being like to be made in parliament that may introduce it ; and this remedy will be at the same time advantagious to us against the tyranny and incroachments of a protestant successor , so that we may call it an infallible remedy both against popery and arbitrary power . the second way is by making a law to disable any papist by name or otherwise , from inheriting the crown ; and this is certainly fallible , that is , may possibly not take place ( as i shall shew immediately ; ) and besides , it is not improbable that an heir to this kingdom in future times , may dissemble his religion , till he be seated in the throne ; or possibly be perverted to the roman faith after he is possest of it , when it may be too late to limit his prerogative in parliament ; and to oppose him without that , will i fear , be judged treason . doct. but sir , would you have the parliament do nothing , as things stand , to provide ( at least , as much as in them lies ) that whoever succeeds be a good protestant ? eng. gent. yes , i think it best in the first place to offer to his majesty the true remedy ; & if they find him averse to that , then to pursue the other which concerns the succession , because the people ( who are their principals , and give them their power ) do expect something extraordinary from them at this time ; and the most of them believe this last the only present means to save them from popery , which they judge ( and very justly ) will bring in with it a change of government . but then , i suppose , they may be encouraged to propose in the first place the true cure ; not only because that is infallible , as has been proved , but likewise because his majesty in probability will sooner consent to any reasonable demand towards the reforming of the government , and to the securing us that way , than to concur to the depriving his onely brother of the crown . and possibly this latter ( as i said before ) may be the only way the parliament can hope will prove effectual : for if you please to look but an age back into our story , you will find that henry the eighth did procure an act of parliament , which gave him power to dispose of the crown by his last will and testament ; and that he did accordingly make his said will , and by it devise the succession to his son edward the sixth , in the first place , and to the heirs of his body ; and for want of such , to his daughter mary , and to the heirs of her body ; and for want of which heirs , to his daughter elizabeth , our once soveraign of immortal and blessed memory , and the heirs of her body ; and for want of all such issue , to the right heirs of his younger sister , who was , before he made this will , married to charles brandon duke of suffolk , and had issue by him . by this testament he disinherited his elder sister , who was married in scotland ; and by that means did , as much as in him lay , exclude his majesty ( who now , by god's mercy , reigns over us ) as also his father and grandfather . and to make the case stronger , there passed an act long after , in the reign of queen elizabeth , that it should be treason during that queen's life , and a premunire afterwards , to assert that the imperial crown of england could not be disposed of by act of parliament : yet after the decease of that queen , there was no considerable opposition made to the peaceable reception and recognition of king iames of happy memory . and those who did make a little stir about the other title , as the lord cobham , sir walter rawleigh , and a few others , were apprehended & condemn'd according to law. and , notwithstanding that , since , in the reign of k. charles the first , there was a bloody civil war , in which men's minds were exasperated at a high rate ; yet in all the course of it , the original want of title was never objected against his late majesty . i do not urge this to aver that the parliament , with the king's consent , cannot do lawfully this , or any other great matter ; which would be an incurring the penalty of that law , and a solecism in the politicks : but to shew , that when the passions of men are quieted , and the reasons other than they were , it happens oftentimes that those acts which concern the succession fall to the ground of themselves , and that even without the sword , which in this case was never adoperated . and that therefore this remedy in our case may be likely never to take place , if it please god the king live till this nation be under other kind of circumstances . doct. sir , you say very well : but it seems to me , that the last parliament was in some kind of fault , if this be true that you say ; for i remember that my lord chancellor did once , during their sitting , in his majesty's name offer them to secure their religion and liberties any way they could advise of , so they would let alone meddling with the succession , and invited them to make any proposals they thought necessary to that end . eng. gent. hinc ille lachrimae . if this had been all , we might have been happy at this time ; but this gracious offer was in limine , accompanied with such conditions that made the parliament conjecture that it was only to perplex and divide them ; and did look upon it as an invention of some new romanza , ( counsellors and those too , possibly , influenced by the french ) to make them embrace the shaddow for the substance , and satisfying themselves with this appearance , to do their ordinary work of giving money , and be gone , and leave the business of the kingdom as they found it . for it was proposed , that whatsoever security we were to receive , should be both conditional and reversionable : that is , first , we should not be put into possession of this new charter ( be it what it will ) till after the death of his majesty who now is ; whereas such a provision is desirable , and indeed necessary for us for this only reason , that when that unfortunate hour comes , we might not be , in that confusion , unprovided of a calm , setled and orderly , as well as a legal way to keep out popery . whereas otherwise , if we be to take possession in that minute , it must either miscarry , or be gotten by a war , if it be true that possession be nine points of the law in other cases , it is in this the whole ten : and i should be very unwilling , in such a distraction , to have no sanctuary to fly to , but a piece of parchment kept in the pells ; and to have this too , as well as other advantages , in the power and possession of him in whose prejudice it was made : this had been almost as good an expedient to keep out popery , as the bill which was thrown out that parliament ; which provided , that in the reign of a king that should be a papist , the bishops should chuse one another upon vacancies . those counsellors who put my lord chancellor upon this proposal , were either very slender politicians themselves , or else thought the parliament so . if magna charta and the petition of right had not been to take place till after the decease of those princes who confirmed them , neither had the barons shed their blood to so good purpose , nor the members of the parliament in tertio caroli , deserved so glorious an imprisonment after it was ended . the other condition in this renowned proposal is , that all provision and security which is given us to preserve our religion , shall cease immediately , whenever the prince shall take a certain oath to be penned for that purpose ; and i leave it to all thinking men to determine what that will avail us , when we shall have a king of that profession over us , who shall not have so much zeal for his religion , as he who is now the next successor hath ; but shall possibly prefer his ambition , and his desire to get out of wardship , before the scruples of his confessor ; and yet may afterwards , by getting absolution for , and dispensation from such oaths and compliance , employ the power he gets himself , and the security he deprives us of , to introduce violently what worship and faith he pleases . this gracious offer had the fatality to disguist one of the best parliaments that ever sate , and the most loyal ; so that laying it aside , they fell upon the succession , the only thing they had then left , and were soon after dissolved , leaving the kingdom in a more distracted condition than they found it ; and this can no way be composed , but by mending the polity , so that whoever is king cannot ( be he never so inclined to it ) introduce popery , or destroy whatever religion shall be established : as you see in the example of the dutchy of hanover , whose prince some fourteen years since , was perverted to the roman church , went to rome to abjure heresie ( as they call the truth ) return'd home , where he lived and governed as he did before , without the least animosity of his subjects for his change , or any endeavour of his to introduce any in his government or people , and dying this last spring , left the peaceable and undisturbed rule of his subjects to the next successor , his brother the bishop of osnaburg , who is a protestant , and this because the polity of that dukedom has been conserved entire for many years , and is upon a right basis : and if our case were so , we should not onely be out of danger to have our religion altered ( as i said before ) whoever is king , but should in other things be in a happy and flourishing condition . but i have made a long and tedious digression to answer your demands : now 't is time you assist me to find the natural cure of all our mischiefs . doct. stay , sir , i confess my self to be wonderfully edified with your discourse hitherto , but you have said nothing yet of the duke of monmouth . eng. gent. i do not think you desire it , though you were pleased to mention such a thing , for i suppose you cannot think it possible , that this parliament ( which is now speedily to meet by his majesties gracious proclamation ) can ever suffer such a thing to be so much as debated amongst them . doct. sir , you have no reason to take that for granted , when you see what books are printed , what great and honourable persons frequent him in private , and countenance him in publick ; what shoals of the middle sort of people have in his progress this summer met him before he came into any great town , and what acclamations and bon-fires have been made in places where he lodged . eng. gent. these things , i must confess , shew how great a distemper the people are in , and the great reason we have to pray god of his mercy to put an end to it by a happy agreement in parliament . but certainly this proceeds only from the hatred they have to the next successour and his religion , and from the compassion they have to the duke of monmouth ( who as they suppose , hath suffered banishment and dis-favour at court , at his instance ) and not from any hopes of expectations that the parliament will countenance any pretence that can be made in his behalf to the succession . doct. it may be when we have discoursed of it , i shall be of your mind , ( as indeed i am enclined already ) but yet nothing in war is more dangerous than to contemn an enemy ; so in this argumentation that we use to secure our liberties , we must leave nothing unanswered that may stand in the way of that , especially the duke of monmouth's claim , which is pretended to confirm and fortifie them , for ( say some men ) if you set him up , he will presently pass all bills that shall concern the safety and interest of the people ; and so we shall be at rest for ever . eng. gent. well , i see i must be more tedious than i intended ; first then , the reasoning of these men you speak of , does in my apprehension , suppose a thing i cannot mention without horrour , which is , that this person should be admitted immediately to the possession of the crown to do all these fine matters ; for otherwise , if he must stay till the death of our soveraign who now reigns ( which i hope and pray will be many years ) possibly these delicate bills may never pass , nor he find hereafter the people in so good a humour to admit him to the reversion , which if it could be obtain'd ( as i think it impossible politically ) yet the possession must be kept by a standing army , and the next successour cannot have a better game to play , nor a better adversary to deal with , than one who leaps in over the heads of almost all the protestant princes families abroad , besides some papist who are greater ; and when we have been harrassed with wars , and the miseries that accompany it some few years , you shall have all these fine people , who now run after him , very weary of their new prince : i would not say any thing to disparage a person so highly born , and of so early merit ; but this i may say , that if a lawful title should be set on foot in his favour , and a thousand dutch hosts , and such like , should swear a marriage , yet no sober man , that is not blinded with prejudice , will believe , that our king ( whom none can deny to have an excellent understanding ) would ever marry a woman so much his inferiour as this great persons mother was ; and this at a time when his affairs were very low , and he had no visible or rational hopes to be restored to the possession of his kingdoms but by an assistance which might have been afforded him by means of some great foreign alliance . well , but to leave all this , do these men pretend that the duke of monmouth shall be declared successour to the crown in parliament , with the king 's concurence or without it ; if without it , you must make a war for it , and i am sure that no cause can be stated upon such a point , that will not make the assertors and undertakers of it be condemned by all the politicians and moralists of the world , and by the casuis t s of all religions , and so by consequence , it is like to be a very unsuccesful war. if you would have this declar'd with the king's consent , either you suppose the royal assent to be given , when the king has his liberty either to grant it , or not grant it , to dissolve the parliament , or not dissolve it , without ruine or prejudice to his affairs : if in the first case , it is plain he will not grant it , because he cannot do it without confessing his marriage to that duke's mother , which he hath already declared against in a very solemn manner , and caused it to be registred in chancery ; and which not only no good subject can chuse but believe , but which cannot be doubted by any rational person ; for it would be a very unnatural , and indeed a thing unheard of , that a father who had a son in lawful matrimony , and who was grown to perfection , and had signalized himself in the wars , and who was ever intirely beloved by him , should disinherit him by so solemn an asseveration ( which must be a false one too ) to cause his brother to succeed in his room . and whereas it is pretended by some , that his majesties danger from his brothers counsels and designs may draw from him something of this ; beside that they do not much complement the king in this , it is clear , his brother is not so popular , but that he may secure him when he pleases , without hazard , if there were any ground for such an apprehension . but we must in the next place suppose that the king's affairs were in such a posture , that he could deny the parliament nothing without very great mischief , and inconvenience to himself and the kingdom ; then i say , i doubt not , but the wisdom of the parliament will find out divers demands and requests to make to his majesty of greater benefit , and more necessary for the good of his people than this would be ; which draws after it not only a present unsetledness , but the probable hazard of misery and devastation for many years to come , as has been proved . so that as on the one side the parliament could not make a more unjustfiable war than upon this account , so they could not be dissolved upon any occasion wherein the people would not shew less discontent and resentment , and for which the courtiers would not hope to have a better pretext to strive in the next choice to make their arts and endeavours more successful in the election of members more suitable to their designs for the continuance of this present mis-government ; for if this parliament do mis-spend the peoples mettle , which is now up , in driving that nail which cannot go , they must look to have it cool , and so the ship of this commonwealth , which if they please may be now in a fair way of entering into a safe harbour , will be driven to sea again in a storm , and must hope for , and expect another favourable wind to save them ; and god knows when that may come . doct. but sir , there are others , who not minding whether the parliament will consider the duke of monmouths concern , so far as to debate it , do yet pretend , that there is great reason to keep up the peoples affections to him ; and possibly to foment the opinion they have of his title to the crown , to the end , that if the king should die re infectà , that is , before such time as the government is redrest , or the duke of york disabled by law to succeed , the people might have an head , under whose command and conduct they might stand upon their guard , till they had some way secured their government and religion . eng. gent. what you have started is not a thing that can safely be discoursed of , nor is it much material to our design , which is intended to speculate upon our government , and to shew how it is decayed : i have industriously avoided the argument of rebellion , as i find it coucht in modern polititians , because most princes hold , that all civil wars in mixt monarchies must be so , and a polititian , as well as an oratour , ought to be vir bonus , so ought to discourse nothing , how rational soever , in these points under a peaceable monarchy , which gives him protection , but what he would speak of his prince if all his councel were present . i will tell you only , that these authors hold , that nothing can be alledged to excuse the taking arms by any people in opposition to their prince from being crimen lesae majestatis , but a claim to a lawful jurisdiction , or co-ordination in the government , by which they may judg of , and defend their own rights , and so pretend to fight for , and defend the government ; for though all do acknowledg , that populi salus is , and ought to be the most supreme , or soveraign law in the world ; yet if we should make private persons , how numerous soever , judg of populi salus , we should have all the risings and rebellions that should ever be made , justified by that title , as happened in france , when la guerre du bien publique took that name , which was raised by the insatiable ambition of a few noble men , and by correspondency and confederacy with charles , son of the duke of burgundy , and other enemies to that crown . doct. but would you have our people do nothing then , if the king should be assassinated , or die of a natural death ? eng. gent. you ask me a very fine question , doctor : if i say , i would have the people stir in that case , then the king , and his laws take hold of me ; and if i should answer , that i would have them be quiet , the people would tear me in pieces for a iesuit , or at least , believe that i had no sense of the riligion , laws , and liberty of my countrey . de facto , i do suppose , that if the people do continue long in this heat which now possesseth them , and remain in such a passion at the time of the kings death without setling matters , they may probably fall into tumults and civil war , which makes it infinitely to be desired , and prayed for by all good english men , that during the quiet and peace we injoy , by the blessing of his majesties life and happy reign , we might likewise be so wise and fortunate , as to provide for the safety and prosperity of the next generation . doct. but if you would not have the people in such a case , take the duke of monmouth for their head , what would you have them do ? eng. gent. doctor , you ask me very fine questions ; do not you know that machivel , the best and most honest of all the modern polititians , has suffered sufficiently by means of priests , and other ignorant persons , who do not understand his writings , and therefore impute to him the teaching subjects how they should rebel and conspire against their princes , which if he were in any kind guilty of , he would deserve all the reproaches that have been cast upon him , and ten times more ; and so should i , if i ventured to obey you in this . i am very confident , that if any man should come to you , to implore your skill in helping him to a drug that might quickly , and with the least fear of being suspected , dispatch an enemy of his , or some other , by whose death he was to be a gainer ; or some young lass that had gotten a surruptitious great belly , should come to you to teach her how to destroy the fruit ; i say , in this case you would scarce have had patience to hear these persons out ; much less would you have been so wicked to have in the least assisted them in their designs , no more than solon , lycurgus , periander , or any other of the sages could have been brought to have given their advice to any persons who should have begged it , to enable them to ruine and undermine the government of their own commonwealths . doct. sir , this reprehension would be very justly given me , if i had intended by this question to induce you to counsel me , or any other how to rebel ; my meaning was to desire you ( who have heretofore been very fortunate in prophesying concerning the events of our changes here ) to exercise your faculty a little at this time , and tell us , what is like to be the end of these destractions we are under , in case we shall not be so happy as to put a period to them by mending our government , and securing our religion and liberty in a regular way . eng. gent. doctor , i will keep the reputation of prophecy , which i have gained with you , and not hazard it with any new predictions , for fear they should miscarry ; yet i care not , if i gratifie your curiosity a little in the point , about which you first began to interrogate me , by presaging to you , that in case we should have troubles , and combustions here , after his majesties decease ( which god avert ) we must expect a very unsuccesful end of them , if we should be so rash and unadvised , as to make the great person we have been lately speaking of , our head ; and that nothing can be more dangerous and pernitious to us than such a choice . i have not in this discourse the least intention to except against , much less to disparage the personal worth of the duke of monmouth , which the world knows to be very great , but do believe that he hath courage and conduct proportionable to any imployment that can be conferred upon him , whether it be to manage arms , or counsels ; but my opinion is , that no person in his circumstance can be a proper head in this case ; for the people having been already put on upon his scent of the title to the crown , will be very hardly called off , and so will force the wiser men , who may design better things , to consent that he be proclaimed king immediately , except there be some other head , who by his power , wisdom , and authority , may restrain the forwardness of the multitude , and obviate the acts of some men , whose interest and hopes may prompt them to foment the humours of the people . now the consequences of hurrying a man to the throne so tumultuously , without the least deliberation , are very dismal ; and do not only not cure the politick distempers of our countrey , which we have talked so much of , but do infinitely augment it , and add to the desease our state labours under already ( which is a consumption ) a very violent feaver too ; i mean war at home , and from abroad , which must necessarily follow in a few years : nor is it possible to go back , when once we have made that step ; for our new king will call a parliament , which being summoned by his will , neither will nor can question his title or government , otherwise than by making addresses , and by presenting bills to him , as they do to his now majesty . nob. ven. it seems to me , that there needs nothing more than that ; for if he consent to all laws as shall be presented to him , you may reform your government sufficiently , or else it is your own fault . eng. gent. we have shewed already , and shall do more hereafter , that no laws can be executed till our government be mended ; and if you mean we should make such as should mend that ( besides that it would be a better method to capitulate that , before you make choice of your prince , as wise people have done in all ages , and the cardinals do at rome in the conclave before they choose their pope ) i say besides this , it is not to be taken for granted that any bills that tend to make considerable alterations in the administration , ( and such we have need of , as you will see anon ) would either in that case be offered or consented to ; both prince and people being so ready to cry out upon forty-one , and to be frighted with the name of a common-wealth , even now when we think popery is at the door ; which some people then will think farther off , and so not care to make so great alterations to keep it out ; besides the great men and favourites of the new prince will think it hard that their king should be so bounded and limited both in power and revenue , that he shall have no means to exercise his liberality towards them , and so may use their interest and eloquence in both houses to dissuade them from pressing so hard upon a prince who is a true zealous protestant , and has alwaies headed that party and who is justly admired , if not adored by the people ; and considering too that all the power they leave him , will serve but to enable him to defend us the better from popery and arbitrary power ; for which latter monarchy was first instituted . thus we may exercise during a parliament or two , love-tricks between the prince and his people , and imitate the hony-moon that continued for about two years after his majesties restauration till the ill management of affairs and the new grevances that shall arise ( which will be sure never to fail till our true cure be effected , notwithstanding the care of the new king and his councellors ) shall awaken the discontents of the people , and then they will curse the time in which they made this election of a prince , and the great men for not hindring them . then men will be reckoning up the discontents of the peers , sometime after they had made a rash choice of h. the th in the field , who ( had then no title ) when they saw how he made use of the power they gave him to lessen their greatness , and to fortifie himself upon their ruins ; when it comes to this , and that the governing party comes to be but a little faction , the people ( who never know the true cause of their distemper ) will be looking out abroad who has the lawful title ( if the next heir be not in the meantime with an army of english and strangers in the field here , as is most likely ) and look upon the prince of orange , or the next of kin , as their future saviour ( in case the duke be dead in the mean time , and so the cause of all their distrust taken away ) thus most men , not only discontented persons , but the people in general , lookt upon his majesty that now is , as their future deliverer during our late distractions , when his condition was so weak that he had scarce wherewithall to subsist , and his enemies powerful at home and victorious abroad , which will not be i fear , our case . i prophesy then ( because you will have me use this word ) that if nobles or people make any such unfortunate choice as this during the distractions we may be in upon his majesties death , we shall not only miss our cure , or have it deferred till another government make it ; but remain in the confusion we now suffer under ; and besides , that shall be sure to feel , first or last , the calamity of a civil and foreign war , and in the mean time to be in perpetual fear of it , and suffer all the burden and charge which is necessary to provide for it , besides all the other ill consequences of a standing army . to conclude , i assure you in the faith of a christian , that i have made this discourse solely and singly out of zeal and affection to the interest of my countrey , and not at all with the least intention to favour or promote the cause or interest of the d. of york , or to disparage the duke of monmouth , from whom i never received the least unkindness , nor ever had the honour to be in his company ; and to whom i shall ever pay respect suitable to his high birth and merit . noble ven. well , sir , your reasoning in this point has extreamly satisfied me ; and the doctor , i suppose , was so before , as he averred ; therefore pray let us go on where we left . eng. gent. i cannot take so much upon me as to be dictator in the method of our cure , since either of you is a thousand times better qualified for such an office , and therefore shall henceforth desire to be an auditor . doct. pray , sir , let us not spend time in compliments , but be pleased to proceed in this business , and we doubt not but as you have hitherto wonderfully delighted us , so you will gratifie us in concluding it . eng. gent. i see i must obey you , but pray help me , and tell me in the first place , whether you do not both believe , that as the causa causarum of all our distractions is ( as has been proved ) the breach of our government ; so that the immediate causes are two : first , the great distrust on both sides between the king and his people and parliament ; the first fearing that his power will be so lessened by degrees , that at length it will not be able to keep the crown upon his head : and the latter seeing all things in disorder , and that the laws are not executed ( which is the second of the two causes ) fear the king intends to change the government , and be arbitrary . noble ven. i am a stranger , but ( though i never reflected so much upon the original cause , as i have done since i heard you discourse of it ) yet i ever thought that those two were the causes of the unquietness of this kingdom : i mean the jealousie between the king and his people , and the inexecution of the great laws of calling parliaments annually , and letting them sit to dispatch their affairs : i understand this in the time of his majesties grand-father , and father , more than in his own reign . eng. gent. then whoever can absolutely lay these two causes asleep for ever , will arrive to a perfect cure ; which i conceive no way of doing , but that the king have a great deal more power or a great deal less : and you know that what goes out of the king must go into the people , and so vice versa : insomuch that the people must have a great deal more power , or a great deal less : now it is no question , but either of these two , would rather increase their power than diminish it ; so that if this cannot be made up by the wisdom of this age , we may see in the next , that both the king will endeavour to be altogether without a parliament , and the parliament to be without a king. doct. i begin to smell , that you would be nibbling at the pretence which some had before his majesties restauration , of a commonwealth or democracy . eng. gent. no , i abhor the thoughts of wishing , much less endeavouring any such thing , during these circumstances we are now in ; that is , under oaths of obedience to a lawful king. and truly if any themistocles should make to me such a proposal , i should give the same judgment concerning it , that aristides did in such a case . the story is short ; after the war between the greeks and the persians was ended , and xerxes driven out of greece , the whole fleet of the grecian confederates ( except that of athens which was gone home ) lay in a great arsenal ( such as were then in use ) upon the coast of attica ; during their abode there , themistocles harrangues one day the people of athens ( as was then the custome ) and tells them , that he had a design in his head , which would be of infinite profit and advantage to the commonwealth ; but that it could not be executed without the order and authority of them , and that it did likewise require secresie ; and if it were declared there in the market place , where strangers as well as citizens might be present , it could not be concealed , and therefore proposed it to their consideration what should be done in it : it was at length concluded that themistocles should propose it to aristides , and if he did next morning acquaint the people that he gave his approbation to it , it should be proceeded in : themistocles informs him that the whole fleet of their confederates in the war against the medes had betaken themselves to the great arsenal upon their coast , where they might be easily fired , and then the athenians would remain absolute masters of the sea , and so give law to all greece ; when aristides came the next day to deliver his judgment to the people , he told them that the business proposed by themistocles , was indeed very advantageous , and profitable to the athenians ; but withal , the most wicked and villanous attempt that ever was undertaken ; upon which it was wholly laid aside . and the same judgment do i give , doctor , of your democracy at this time . but to return to the place where i was , i do belive that this difference may easily be terminated very fairly , and that our house need not be pulled down , and a new one built ; but may be very easily repair'd , so that it may last many hundred years . noble ven. i begin to perceive that you aim at this , that the king must give the people more power , as henry the third , and king iohn did , or the parliament must give the king more , as you said they did in france in the time of lewis the eleventh ; or else that it will come in time to a war again . eng. gent. you may please to know , that in all times hitherto , the parliament never demanded any thing of the king , wherein the interest and government of the kingdom was concerned ( excepting acts of pardon ) but they founded their demands upon their right , not only because it might seem unreasonable for them to be earnest with him to give them that which was his own , but also because they cannot chuse but know , that all powers which are fundamentally and lawfully in the crown , were placed there upon the first institution of our government , to capacitate the prince to govern and protect his people : so that for the parliament to seek to take from him such authority , were to be felo de se , as we call a self-homicide ; but as in some distempers of the body the head suffers as well as the inferiour parts , so that it is not possible for it , to order , direct and provide for the whole body as its office requires , since the wisdom and power which is placed there , is given by god to that end ; in which case , though the distemper of the body may begin from the disease of some other part , or from the mass of blood or putrefaction of other humours ; yet since that noble part is so affected by it , that reason and discourse fails , therefore to restore this again , remedies must be apply'd to , and possibly humours or vapours drawn from the head it self , that so it may be able to govern and reign over the body as it did before , or else the whole man , like a slave , must be ruled and guided ab extrinseco , that is by some keeper : so it is now with us , in our politick disease , where granting ( if you please ) that the distemper does not proceed from the head , but the corruption of other parts , yet in the cure , applications must be made to the head as well as to the members , if we mean poor england shall recover its former perfect health ; and therefore it will be found , perhaps , essential to our being , to ask something ( in the condition we now are ) to which the king as yet may have a right ; and which except he please to part with , the phenomena of government cannot be salved ; that is , our laws cannot be executed ; nor magna charta it self made practicable ; and so both prince and people , that is , the polity of england , must die of this disease , or by this delirium must be governed , ab extrinseco , and fall to the lot of some foregin power . noble ven. but , sir , since the business is come to this dilemma , why may not the king ask more power of the parliament , as well as they of him ? eng. gent. no question but our present councellours and courtiers would be nibbling at that bait again , if they had another parliament that would take pensions for their votes ; but in one that is come fresh from the people , and understand their sense and grievances very well , i hardly believe they will attempt it ; for both council and parliament must needs know by this time-a-day , that the cause of all our distractions coming ( as has been said an hundred times ) from the king 's having a greater power already than the condition of property at this present can admit , without confusion and disorder ; it is not like to mend matters for them to give him more , except they will deliver up to him at the same instant their possessions , and right to their lands , and become naturally and politically his slaves . noble ven. since there must be a voluntary parting with power , i fear your cure will prove long and ineffectul , and we reconcilers shall , i fear , prove like our devout cappuchin at venice ; this poor mans name was fra. barnardino da udine , and was esteemed a very holy man , as well as an excellent preacher , insomuch that he was appointed to preach the lent sermons in one of our principal churches , which he performed at the begining with so much eloquence , and applause , that the church was daily crouded three hours before the sermon was to begin ; the esteem and veneration this poor fryar was in , elevated his spirit a little too high to be contained within the bounds of reason ; but before his delirium was perceived , he told his auditory one day , that the true devotion of that people , and the care they had to come to hear his word preached , had been so acceptable to god and to the virgine , that they had vouchsafed to inspire him with the knowledg of an expedient , which he did not doubt , but would make men happy & just even in this life , & that the flesh should no longer iust against the spirit ; but that he would not acquaint them with it at that present , because something was to be done on their parts to make them capable of this great blessing , which was to pray zealously for a happy success upon his endeavours , and to fast , and to visit the churches to that end ; therefore he desired them to come the wednesday following to be made acquainted with this blessed expedient . you may imagine how desirous our people were , to hear something more of this fifth-monarchy ; i will shorten my story , and tell you nothing of what crouding there was all night , and what quarrelling for places in the church ; nor with what difficulty the saffi , who were sent by the magistrate to keep the paece , and to make way for the preacher to get into the pulpit , did both ; but up he got , and after a long preamable of desiring more prayers , and addressing himself to our senate to mediate with the pope , that a week might be set apart for a jubilee and fasting three days all over the christian world , to storm heaven with masses , prayers , fasting and almes to prosper his designs ; he began to open the matter , that the cause of all the wickedness and sin , and by consequence of all the miseries and affliction which is in the world , arising from the enmity which is between god and the devil , by which means god was often cross'd in his intentions of good to mankind here , and hereafter , the devil by his temptations making us uncapable of the mercy and favour of our creator ; therefore he had a design ( with the helps before mentioned ) to mediate with almighty god , that he would pardon the devil , and receive him into his favour again after so long a time of banishment and imprisonment ; and not to take all his power from him , but to leave him so much as might do good to man , and not hurt ; which he doubted not but he would imploy that way , after such reconciliation was made , which his faith would not let him question . you may judge what the numerous auditory thought of this ; i can only tell you , that he had a different fort of company at his return , from what he had when he came , for the men left him to the boys , who with great hoops instead of acclamations , brought him to the gondola , which conveyed him to the redentor , where he lodged ; and i never had the curiosity to enquire what became of him after . doct. i thank you heartily for this intermess ; i see you have learnt something in england : for , i assure you , we have been these twenty years turning this , and all serious discourses into ridicule ; but yet your similitude is very pat ; for in every parliament that has been in england these sixty years , we have had notable contests between the seed of the serpent , and the seed of the woman . eng. gent. well sir , we have had a michael here in our age , who has driven out lucifer , and restored the true deity to his power : but where omnipotency is wanting ( which differs the frier's case and mine ) the devil of civil war and confusion may get up again , if he be not laid by prudence and vertue , and better conjurers than any we have yet at court. noble ven. well gentlemen , i hope you have pardoned me for my farce . but , to be a little more serious , pray tell me how you will induce the king to give up so much of his right as may serve your turn ? would you have the parliament make war with him again ? eng. gent. there cannot , nor ought to be , any change , but by his majesty's free consent ; for besides , that a war is to be abhorred by all men that love their country , any contest of that kind in this case ( viz. to take away the least part of the kings right ) could be justified by no man living . i say , besides that , a civil war has miscarried in our days , which was founded ( at least pretendedly ) upon defence of the people's own rights : in which , although they had as clear a victory in the end , as ever any contest upon earth had , yet could they never reap the least advantage in the world by it : but went from one tyranny to another , from barebones parliament , to cromwell's reign ; from that , to a committee of safety ; leaving those grave men , who managed affairs at the beginning , amazed to see new men , and new principles governing england . and this induced them to co-operate to bring things back just where they were before the war. therefore this remedy will be either none , or worse than the disease : it not being now as it was in the barons time , when the lord who led out his men , could bring them back again when he pleased , and rule them in the mean time , being his vassals . but now there is no man of so much credit , but that one who behaves himself bravely in the war , shall out-vye him ; and , possibly , be able to do what he pleases with the army and the government : and in this corrupt age , it is ten to one , he will rather do hurt than good with the power he acquires . but because you ask me how we would perswade the king to this ? i answer , by the parliament's humbly remonstrating to his majesty , that it is his own interest , preservation , quiet and true greatness , to put an end to the distractions of his subjects , and that it cannot be done any other way , and to desire him to enter into debate with some men authorized by them , to see if there can be any other means than what they shall offer to compose things ; if they find there may , then to embrace it , otherwise to insist upon their own proposals : and if in the end they cannot obtain those requests , which they think the only essential means to preserve their country , then to beg their dismission , that they may not stay , and be partakers in the ruin of it . now , my reasons why the king will please to grant this , after the thorough discussing of it , are two . first , because all great princes have ever made up matters with their subjects upon such contests , without coming to extremities . the two greatest , and most valiant of our princes , were edward the first , and his grandchild edward the third : these had very great demands made them by parliaments , and granted them all ; as you may see upon the statute-book . edward the second , and richard the second , on the contrary , refused all things till they were brought to extremity . there is a memorable example in the greek story of theopompus king of sparta ; whose subjects finding the government in disorder for want of some persons that might be a check upon the great power of the king , proposed to him the creation of the ephores ( officers who made that city so great and famous afterwards ) . the king finding by their reasons ( which were unanswerable , as i think ours now are ) , that the whole government of sparta was near its ruin , without such a cure ; and considering that he had more to lose in that disorder than others , freely granted their desires ; for which being derided by his wife , who asked him what a kind of monarchy he would leave to his son ? answered , a very good one , because it will be a very lasting one . which brings on my second reason , for which i believe the king will grant these things ; because he cannot any way mend himself , nor his condition , if he do not . noble ven. you have very fully convinced me of two things : first , that we have no reason to expect or believe that the parliament will ever increase the kings power : and then , that the king cannot by any way found himself a new , and more absolute monarchy , except he can alter the condition of property , which i think we may take for granted to be impossible . but yet , i know not why we may not suppose that ( although he cannot establish to all posterity such an empire ) he may , notwithstanding , change the government at the present ; and calling parliaments no more , administer it by force , as it is done in france , for some good time . eng. gent. in france it has been a long work ; and although that tyranny was begun , as has been said , by petition from the states themselves , not to be assembled any more ; yet the kings since , in time of great distraction , have thoughr fit to convocate them again ; as they did in the civil wars thrice : once at orleans , and twice at blois . i would not repeat what i have so tediously discoursed of concerning france already , but only to intreat you to remember that our nation has no such poor and numerous gentry , which draw better revenues from the king's purse , than they can from their own estates ; all our country people consisting of rich nobility and gentry , of wealthy yeomen , and of poor younger brothers who have little or nothing , and can never raise their companies , if they should get commissions , without their elder brothers assistance amongst his tenants , or else with the free consent and desire of the people , which , in this case , would hardly be afforded them . but we will suppose there be idle people enough to make an army , and that the king has money enough to arm and raise them : and i will grant too , to avoid tediousness ( although i do not think it possible ) that the people will at the first , for fear , receive them into their houses , and quarter them against law ; nay , pay the money which shall be by illegal edicts , imposed upon the subjects to pay them ; yet is it possible an army can continue any time to enslave their own country ? can they resist the prayers , or the curses of their fathers , brothers , wives , mothers , sisters , and of all persons wherever they frequent ? upon this account all the greek tyrants were of very short continuance ; who being in chief magistracy and credit in their commonwealths , by means of soldiers and satellites , usurped the soveraignty . but did ever any of them , excepting dionysius , leave it to his son ? who was driven out within less than a year after his fathers death . many armies of the natives have destroyed tyrannies : so the decemvirate was ruined at rome , the tarquins expelled before that : our own country has been a stage , even in our time , where this tragedy has been sufficiently acted ; for the army , after the war was done , fearing the monarchy should be restored again , held councils , got agitators ; and though there were often very severe executions upon the ring-leaders , did at length , by their perseverance , necessitate their officers to joyn with them ( having many good head-pieces of the party to advise them ) ; and so broke all treaties . and the parliament too , adhering to a small party of them who consented to lay aside kingly government , and afterwards drove them away too , fearing they would continue to govern in oligarchy . i am far from approving this way they used , in which they broke all laws , divine and humane , political and moral : but i urge it only to shew how easily an army of natives is to be deluded with the name of liberty , and brought to pull down any thing which their ring-leaders tell them tends to enslaving their country . 't is true , this army was afterwards cheated by their general ; who without their knowledge , much less consent , one morning , suddenly made himself tyrant of his country . it as true , that their reputation ( not their arms ) supported him in that state for some time ; but it is certain that they did very often , and to the last , refuse to be instrumental to levy moneys , though for their own pay : and so he , against his will , was fain to call from time to time parliamentary conventions . and it is most certain that he did , in the sickness of which he died , often complain that his army would not go a step farther with him : and , de facto , some months after his death , they did dethrone his son , and restore the remainder of the old parliament , upon promise made to them in secret ( by the demogogues of that assembly ) that a commonwealth should be speedily framed and setled . noble ven. sir , i am satisfied that an army raised here on a sudden , and which never saw an enemy , could not be brought to act such high things for the ruin of their own government ; nor possibly , would be any way able to resist the fury and insurrection of the people . but what say you of a forreign army , raised by your king abroad , and brought over , whose officers and soldiers shall have no acquaintance or relations amongst the people here ? eng. gent. all forces of that kind must be either auxiliaries or mercenaries : auxiliaries are such as are sent by some neighbour prince or state , with their own colours , and paid by themselves : though possibly , the prince who demands them may furnish the money . these usually return home again , when the occasion , for which they were demanded , is over : but whether they do or not , if they be not mixed and over-ballanced with forces which depend upon the prince who calls them , but that the whole weight and power lies in them , they will certainly , first or last , seize that country for their own soveraign . and as for mercenaries , they must be raised ( 't is true ) with the money of the prince who needs them , but by the authority and credit of some great persons who are to lead and command them : and these , in all occasions , have made their own commander prince ; as f. sforza at milan drove out by this trick the visconti , ancient dukes of that state ; and the mamalukes in egypt made themselves a military commonwealth . so that the way of an army here would either be no remedy at all , or one very much worse than the disease to the prince himself . noble ven. well sir , i begin to be of opinion , that any thing the king can grant the parliament ( especially such a parliament as this is , which consists of men of very great estates , and so can have no interest to desire troubles ) will not be so inconvenient to him , as to endeavour to break the government by force . but why may he not , for this time , by soothing them , and offering them great alliances abroad for the interest of england , and ballancing matters in europe more eaven than they have been ; and , in fine , by offering them a war with the french , to which nation they have so great a hatred ; lay them asleep , and get good store of money , and stave off this severe cure you speak of , at least , for some time longer ? eng. gent. there has been something of this done too lately ; and there is a gentleman lies in the tower , who is to answer for it . but you may please to understand , that there is scarce any amongst the middle sort of people , much less within the walls of the house of commons , who do not perfectly know , that we can have no alliance with any nation in the world that will signifie any thing to them , or to our selves , till our government be redressed and new modelled . and therefore , though there were an army landed in this island , yet that we must begin there , before we are sit to repulse them , or defend our selves . and the fear and sense of this people universally is , that if we should have any war , either for our own concerns , or for those of our allies , whilst matters remain as they do at home , it would certainly come to this pass , that either being beaten , we should subject this kingdom to an invasion , at a time when we are in a very ill condition to repell it ; or else , if we were victorious , that our courtiers and counsellors in fragrante ( or as the french cry , d'emble ) , would employ that mettle and good fortune to try some such conclusions at home as we have been discoursing of . and therefore , if any war should be undertaken without parliament , you should see the people rejoyce as much at any disaster our forces should receive , as they did when the scots seized the four northern counties in . or before that , when we were beaten at the isle of rhee , or when we had any loss in the last war with holland . and this joy is not so unnatural as it may seem to those who do not consider the cause of it ; which is the breach of our old government , and the necessity our governors are under to make some new experiments : and the fear we are in , that any prosperity may make them able to try them , either with effect , or at least with impunity . which consideration made a court-droll say lately to his majesty , ( who seemed to wonder why his subjects hated the french so much ) ; sir , it is because you love them , and espouse their interest : and if you would discover this truth clearly , you may please to make war with the king of france ; and then you shall see , that this people will not only love them , take their parts , and wish them success ; but will exceedingly rejoyce when they are victorious in sinking your ships , or defeating your forces . and this is sufficient to answer your proposal for alliances abroad , and for a war with france . besides this ( to wind all up in a word ) it is not to be imagined , that so good and wise a prince as we have at this time should ever be induced ( when he comes to understand perfectly his own condition ) to let his own interest ( granting his power to be so , which is very false ) contest with the safety and preservation of his people , for which only it was given him ; or that he will be any way tenacious of such prerogatives , as now , by a natural revolution of political circumstances , are so far from continuing useful to his governing the people , that they are the only remora and obstacle of all government , settlement and order . for his majesty must needs know , that all forms of regulating mankind under laws were ordained by god and man , for the happiness and security of the governed , and not for the interest and greatness of those who rule ; unless where there is melior natura in the case . so god governs man for his own glory only , and men reign over beasts for their own use and service ; and where an absolute prince rules over his own servants whom he feeds and pays ( as we have said ) , or the master of a great and numerous family governs his houshold ; they are both bound by the law of god and nature , and by their own interest , to do them justice , and not insaevire or tyranize over them , more than the necessity of preserving their empire and authority requires . doct. but sir , considering the difficulty which will be found in the king , and possibly in the parliament too , to come up to so great an alteration at the first , and the danger that may happen by our remaining long in this unsetled condition , which does hourly expose us to innumerable hazards , both at home , and from abroad ; why may we not begin , and lay the foundation now , by removing all his majesty's present council by parliament ; which is no new thing , but hath been often practised in many kings reigns ? eng. gent. first , the council , that is , the privy council which you mean , is no part of our government , as we may have occasion to shew hereafter ; nor is the king obliged by any fundamental law , or by any act of parliament to hearken to their advice , or so much as to ask it ; and if you should make one on purpose , besides that it would not be so effectual as what we may propose , it would be full as hard to go down either with king or parliament . but besides all this , you would see some of these counsellours so nominated by parliament , perhaps prove honest , and then they would be forced to withdraw as some lately did , because they found , i suppose , that till the administration be alter'd , it is impossible that their councils can be imbraced , or any thing be acted by them which may tend to the good of their country ; those who have not so great a sence of honour and integrity , will be presently corrupted by their own interest , whilst the prince is left in possession of all those baits and means to answer such mens ectpectations : it being most certain , that if you have a musty vessel , and by consequence dislike the beer which comes out of it , and draw it out , causing the barrel to be immediately fill'd with good and sound liquor , it is certain by experience , that both your new drink , and all that ever you shall put into the cask , till it be taken in pieces , and the pipes shaved , and new model'd , will be full as musty , and unsavoury as the first which you found fault with . noble ven. now , sir , i think we are at an end of our questions , and i for my part am convinced , that as the king cannot better himself any way by falling out with his people at this time , so that his goodness and wisdom is such , that he will rather chuse to imitate the most glorious and generous of his predecessors , as edward the first , and edward the third , than those who were of less worth , and more unfortunate , as edward the second , and richard the second . and therefore we are now ready to hear what you would think fit to ask of so excellent a prince . eng. gent. i never undertook to be so presumptuous ; there is a parliament to sit speedily , and certainly they are the fittest every way to search into such matters ; and to anticipate their wisdom would be unreasonable , and might give them just offence . but because all this tittle tattle may not go for nothing , i shall presume to give you my thoughts , how the cure must be wrought , without descending to particulars . the cause immediate ( as we have said ) of our disease , is the inexecution of our laws ; and it is most true , that when that is alter'd for the better , and that all our laws are duly executed , we are in health ; for as we can never have the entire benefit of them , till our government is upon a right basis ; so whenever we enjoy this happiness , to have the full benefit of those constitutions , which were made by our ancestors for our safe and orderly living , our government is upon a right basis ; therefore we must enquire into the cause why our laws are not executed , & when you have found and taken away that cause , all is well . the cause can be no other than this , that the king is told , and does believe , that most of these great charters or rights of the people , of which we now chiefly treat , are against his majesties interest , though this be very false ( as has been said ) yet we will not dispute it at this time , but take it for granted , so that the king having the supreme execution of the laws in his hand , cannot be reasonably supposed to be willing to execute them whenever he can chuse whether he will do it or no ; it being natural for every man not to do any thing against his own interest when he can help it ; now when you have thought well what it should be that gives the king a liberty to chuse whether any part of the law shall be currant or no , you will find that it is the great power the king enjoys in the government ; when the parliament hath discovered this , they will no doubt demand of his majesty an abatement of his royal prerogative in those matters only which concern our enjoyment of our all , that is our lives , liberties and estates , and leave his royal power entire and untoucht in all the other branches of it ; when this is done , we shall be as if some great heroe had performed the adventure of dissolving the inchantment we have been under so many years . and all our statutes from the highest to the lowest , from magna charta to that for burying in woollen , will be current , and we shall neither fear the bringing in popery , nor arbitrary power in the intervals of parliament , neither will there be any dissentions in them ; all causes of factions between the country and court-party being entirely abolisht ; so that the people shall have no reason to distrust their prince , nor he them . doct. you make us a fine golden age ; but after all this , will you not be pleased to shew us a small prospect of this canaan , or country of rest ; will you not vouchsafe to particularize a little what powers there are in the king , which you would have discontinued ? would you have such prerogatives abolished , or placed elsewhere ? eng. gent. there can be no government if they be abolished . but i will not be like a man who refuses to sing amongst his friends at their entreaty , because he has an ill voice ; i will rather suffer my self to be laught at by you in delivering my small judgment in this matter , but still with this protestation , that i do believe that an infinity of men better qualifi'd than my self for such sublime matters , and much more the house of commons , who represent the wisdom as well as the power of this kingdom , may find out a far better way , than my poor parts and capacity can suggest . the powers then which now being in the crown do hinder the execution of our laws , and prevent by consequence our happiness and settlement , are four ; the absolute power of making war and peace , treaties and alliances with all nations in the world , by which means , by ignorant councellours , or wicked ministers , many of our former kings have made confederations and wars , very contrary , and destructive to the interest of england , and by the unfortunate management of them , have often put the kingdom in great hazard of invasion : besides that , as long as there is a distinction made between the court-party and that of the country , there will ever be a jealousie in the people , that those wicked councellours ( who may think they can be safe no other way ) will make alliances with powerful princes , in which there may be a secret article by which those princes shall stipulate to assist them with forces upon a short warning to curb the parliament , and possibly to change the government . and this apprehension in the people will be the less unreasonable , because oliver cromwel ( the great pattern of some of our courtiers ) is notoriously known to have inserted an article in his treaty with cardinal mazzarin , during this king of france's minority , that he should be assisted with ten thousand men from france upon occasion to preserve and defend him in his usurped government , against his majesty that now is , or the people of england , or in fine , his own army , whose revolt he often feared . the second great prerogative the king enjoys , is the sole disposal and ordering of the militia by sea and land , raising forces , garisoning and fortifying places , setting out ships of war , so far as he can do all this without putting taxations upon the people ; and this not only in the intervals of parliament , but even during their session ; so that they cannot raise the train-bands of the country or city to guard themselves , or secure the peace of the kingdom . the third point is , that it is in his majesties power to nominate and appoint as he pleases , and for what time he thinks fit , all the officers of the kingdom that are of trust or profit , both civil , military , and ecclesiastical , ( as they will be called ) except where there is ius patronatus ; these two last powers may furnish a prince who will hearken to ill designing councellours , with the means either of invading the government by force , or by his judges and other creatures undermining it by fraud ; especially by enjoying the fourth advantage , which is the laying out and imploying , as he pleases , all the publick revenues of the crown or kingdom , and that without having any regard ( except he thinks fit ) to the necessity of the navy , or any other thing that concerns the safety of the publick . so that all these four great powers , as things now stand , may be adoperated at any time , as well to destroy and ruine the good order and government of the state , as to preserve and support it , as they ought to do . nob. ven. but if you divest the king of these powers , will you have the parliament sit always to govern these matters ? eng. gent. sir , i would not divest the king of them , much less would i have the parliament assume them , or perpetuate their sitting : they are a body more fitted to make laws , and punish the breakers of them , than to execute them . i would have them therefore petition his majesty by way of bill , that he will please to exercise these four great magnalia of government , with the consent of four several councils to be appointed for that end , and not otherwise ; that is , with the consent of the major part of them , if any of them dissent . in all which councils his majesty , or who he pleases to appoint , shall preside ; the councils to be named in parliament ; first all the number , and every year afterwards a third part : so each year a third part shall go out , and a recruit of an equal number come in : and in three years they shall be all new , and no person to come into that council , or any other of the four , till he have kept out of any of them full three years , being as long as he was in . and this i learnt from your quarantia's at venice : and the use is excellent ; for being in such a circulation , and sure to have their intervals of power , they will neither grow so insolent as to brave their king , nor will the prince have any occasion to corrupt them , although he had the means to do it , which in this new model he cannot have . these men in their several councils should have no other instructions , but to dispose of all things , and act in their several charges , for the interest and glory of england ; and shall be answerable to parliament , from time to time , for any malicious or advised misdemeanor : only that council which manages the publick revenue , shall ( besides a very copious and honourable revenue which shall be left to his majesty's disposal for his own entertainment , as belongs to the splendor and majesty of the government ) have instructions to serve his majesty ( if he pleases to command them , and not otherwise ) in the regulating and ordering his oeconomy and houshold ; and if they shall see it necessary , for extraordinary occasions of treating foreign princes and ambassadors , or presenting them , and the like ostentation of greatness ; to consent with his majesty moderately to charge the revenue to that end . i verily believe that this expedient is much more effectual than either the iustitia of aragon was , or the ephores of sparta : who being to check the king almost in every thing , without having any share in his councils , or understanding them , could not chuse but make a sullen posture of affairs ; whereas these both seem , and really are the king's ministers , only obliged by parliament to act faithfully and honestly ; to which , even without that , all other councellors are bound by oath . as for the other council , now called the privy council , the king may still please to continue to nominate them at his pleasure , so they act nothing in any of the matters properly within the jurisdiction of these four councils , but meddle with the affairs of merchants , plantations , charters , and other matters , to which the regal power extendeth . and provided that his majesty call none of the persons employed in these other four councils during their being so , nor that this council do any way intermeddle with any affairs , criminal or civil , which are to be decided by law , and do belong to the jurisdictions of other courts or magistrates , they being no established judicatory , or congregation , which either our government or laws do take notice of ( as was said before ) but persons congregated by the king , as his friends and faithful subjects , to give him their opinion in the execution of his regal office. as for example , the king does exercise , at this time , a negative voice as to bills presented to him by the parliament , which he claims by right ; no man ever said that the privy council had a negative voice ; yet former kings did not only as their advice as to the passing or not passing of such bills , but often decided the matter by their votes ; which , although it be a high presumption in them , when they venture to give him council contrary to what is given him by his greatest council , yet never any of them have been questioned for it ; being looked upon as private men , who speak according to the best of their cunning , and such as have no publick capacity at all . but if this be not so , and that this council have some foundation in law , and some publick capacity , i wish in this new settlement it may be made otherwise , and that his majesty please to take their counsel in private ; but summon no persons to appear before them ; much less give them authority to send for in custody , or imprison any subject , which may as well be done by the judges and magistrates ; who , if secrecy be required , may as well be sworn to secrecy as these gentlemen ; and i believe can keep counsel as well , and give it too . nob. ven. but would you have none to manage state-affairs , none imprisoned for secret conspiracies , and kept till they can be fully discovered ? you have made an act here lately about imprisonments , that every person shall have his habeas corpus , i think you call it : so that no man , for what occasion soever , can lie in prison above a night , but the cause must be revealed , though there be great cause for the concealing it . eng. gent. this act you mention , and a great many more which we have to the same purpose , that is , against illegal imprisonments , shews that for a long time the power over men's persons has been exercised ( under his majesty ) by such as were very likely , rather to employ it ill than well ; ( that is ) would rather imprison ten men for honourable actions ; such as standing for the people's rights in parliament , refusing to pay illegal taxes , and the like ; than one for projecting and inventing illegal monopolies , or any other kind of oppressing the people . this made first magna charta , then the petition of right , and divers other acts besides this last , take that power quite away , and make the law and the judges the only disposers of the liberties of our persons . and it may be , when the parliament shall see the fruit of this alteration we are now discoursing of , and that state-affairs are in better hands , they may think fit to provide that a return , or warrant of imprisonment from one of these four councils ( which i suppose will have a power of commitment given them , as to persons appearing delinquents before them ) wherein it shall be expressed , that if the publick is like to suffer or be defrauded , if the matter be immediately divulged ; i say in this case , the parliament may please to make it lawful for the judge to delay the bailing of him for some small time , because it is not to be judged , that these councellours so chosen , and so instructed , and to continue so small a time , will use this power ill ; especially being accountable for any abusing of it to the next parliament . and i suppose the parliament , amongst other provisions in this behalf , will require that there shall be a register kept of all the votes of these several councils , with the names as well of those who consented , as of such who dissented : and as to the former part of your question , whether i would have none to manage state affairs ; i think there are very few state affair that do not concern either peace and war , and treaties abroad , the management of the arms , militia , and posse comitatus at home ; the management of all the publick moneys , and the election of all officers whatsoever ; the other parts , of state affairs , which are making and repealing of laws , punishing high crimes against the state , with levying and proportioning all manner of impositions upon the people , this is reserved to the parliament it self ; and the execution of all laws to the judges , and magistrates ; and i can think of no other affairs of state than these . doct. do you intend that the council for chusing officers shall elect them of the king's houshold , that is , his menial servants ? eng. gent. no , that were unreasonable , except any of them have any jurisdiction in the kingdom , or any place or preheminence in parliament annexed to such office ; but in these things which concern the powers and jurisdictions of these several councils ( wherein , la guardia della laberta , as machiavil calls it , is now to be placed ) i shall not persume to say any thing , but assure your self , if ever it come to that , it will be very well digested in parliament , they being very good at contriving such matters , and making them practicable , as well as at performing all other matters that concern the interest and greatness of the kingdom . doct. i have thought that the ephores of sparta were an admirable magistracy , not only for the interest of the people , but likewise for the preservation of the authority of the kings , and of their lives too ; for plutarch observes that the cities of mesene and argos had the same government with lacedemon , and yet for want of erecting such an authority as was in the ephores , they were not only perpetually in broils amongst themselves , and for that reason ever beaten by their enemies , whereas the spartans were always victorious , but even their kings were the most miserable of men , being often call'd in question judicially , and so lost their lives , and many of them murdered by insurrections of the people : and at last in both these cities , the kings were driven out , their families extirpated , the territory new divided , and the government turn'd into a democracy . and i ever thought that this expedient you propose ( for i have heard you discourse of it often before now ) would prove a more safe , and a more noble reformation than the institution of the ephores was , and that a prince who is a lover of his country , who is gracious , wise and just , ( such a one as it has pleased god to send us at this time ) shall be ten times more absolute when this regulation is made , than ever he was or could be before ; and that whatsoever he proposes in any of these councils will be received as a law , nay , as an oracle : and on the other side , ill and weak princes shall have no possibility of corrupting men , or doing either themselves or their people any kind of harm or mischief : but have you done now ? eng. gent. no , sir , when this provision is made for the execution of the laws , ( which i think very effectual , not to say infallible ) although it is not to be doubted , but that there will be from time to time many excellent laws enacted ; yet two i would have passed immediately , the one concerning the whole regulation of the elections to parliament , which we need very much , and no doubt but it will be well done ; that part of it which is necessary to go hand in hand with our settlement , and which indeed must be part of it , is , that a parliament be elected every year at a certain day , and that without any writ or summons , the people meeting of course at the time appointed in the usual place ( as they do in parishes at the church-house to chuse officers ) and that the sheriffs be there ready to preside and to certifie the election . and that the parliament so chosen shall meet at the time appointed , and sit and adjuorn as their business is more or less urgent : but still setting yet a time for their coming together again ; but if there shall be a necessity ( by reason of invasion or some other cause ) for their assembling sooner , then the king to call the councellors of these four councels all together , and with the consent of the major part of them , intimate their meeting sooner ; but when the day day comes for the annual meeting of another parliament , they must be understood to be dissolved in law , without any other ceremony , and the new one to take their place . doct. i would have this considered too , and provided for , that no election should be made of any person who had not the majority of the electors present to vote for him ; so the writ orders it , and so reason dictates ; for else , how can he be said to represent the county , if not a fifth part have consented to his choice , as happens sometimes , and may do oftener ? for where seven or eight stand for one vacant place , as i have know in our last long parliament , where the votes being set in columns , he who has had most votes , has not exceeded four hundred of above two thousand who were present . noble ven. this is a strange way ; i thought you had put every man by himself , as we do in our government , and as i understood they do in the house of commons , when there is any nomination , and then , if he has not the major part , he is rejected . eng. gent. this is very material , and indeed essential ; but i make no doubt , but if this project should come in play in parliament , this and all other particulars ( which would be both needless and tedious to discourse of here ) will be well and effectually provided for . the next act i would have passed , should be concerning the house of peers , that as i take it for granted , that there will be a clause in the bill concerning elections , that no new boroughs shall be enabled to send members to parliament , except they shall be capacitated thereunto by an act ; so it being of the same necessity as to the liberty of parliament , that the peers ( who do and must enjoy both a negative and deliberative voice in all parliamentary transactions , except what concern levying of money originally ) be exempted from depending absolutely upon the prince , and that therefore it be declared by act , for the future , that no peer shall be made but by act of parliament , and then that it be hereditary in his male line . noble ven. i am not yet fully satisfied how you can order your matters concerning this house of peers , nor do i see how the contests between the house of commons and them , can be so laid asleep but that they will arise again : besides the house of commons must necessarily be extreamly concerned to find the house of peers , which consists of private persons , though very great and honourable ones , in an instant dash all that they have been so long hammering for the good of all the people of england whom they represent ; were it not better now , you are upon so great alterations , to make an annual elective senate , or at least one wherein the members should be but for life , and not hereditary . eng. gent. by no means , sir , the less change the better , and in this case the metaphysical maxime is more true than in any , viz. entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate ; for great alterations fright men , and puzzle them , and there is no need of it at all in this case . i have told you before , that there is a necessity of a senate , and how short this government would be without it , and how confused in the mean time ; the roman senate was hereditary amongst the patricii , except the censor left any of them out of the roll during his magistracy , for some very great and scandalous offence ; and in that case too there was an appeal to the people , as in all other causes , witness the case of lucius quintius and many others . to shew that there can be no need of such a change here as you speak of , you may please to consider , that all differences between the several parts of any government , come upon the account of interest ; now when this settlement is made , the house of peers , and the house of commons , can have no interest to dissent ; for as to all things of private interest , that is , the rights of peers , both during the sitting of parliaments , and in the intervals , is left to their own house to judge of , as it is to the house of commons to judge of their own priviledges ; and as for the contest of the peers jurisdiction as to appeals from courts of equity ; besides that i would have that setled in the act which should pass concerning the lords house ; i believe it will never happen more , when the government is upon a right foundation ; it having been hitherto fomented by two different parties , the court-party sometimes blowing up that difference to break the session , lest some good bills for the people should pass , or that the king by rejecting them , might discontent his people ; to avoid which dilemma , there needed no more , but to procure some person to prosecute his appeal before the lords ; some honest patriots afterwards possibly might use the same policy which they learnt from the courtiers , to quash some bill very destructive , in which they were out-voted in the commons house ; otherwise it is so far from the interest of the commons to hinder appeals from courts of equity , that there is none amongst them , but know we are almost destroyed for want of it : and when they have considered well , and that some such reformation as this shall take place ; they will find that it can never be placed in a more honourable and unbyas'd judicatory than this ; and i could wish that even in the intermission of parliamentary sessions , the whole peerage of england , as many of them as can conveniently be in town , may sit in their judicial capacities , and hear appeals in equity , as well as judge upon writs of errour . now as to your other objection ( which is indeed of great weight ) that the house of commons must needs take it ill , that the lords should frustrate their endeavours for the peoples good by their negative ; if you consider one thing , the force of this objection will vanish ; which is , that when this new constitution shall be admitted , the lords cannot have any interest or temptation to differ with the commons , in any thing wherein the publick good is concerned , but are obliged by all the ties in the world , to run the same course and fortune with the commons , their interest being exactly the same ; so that if there be any dissenting upon bills between the two houses , when each of them shall think their own expedient conduces most to the advantage of the publick ; this difference will ever be decided by right reason at conferences ; and the lords may as well convince the commons , as be convinced by them ; and these contests are and ever will be of admirable use and benefit to the commonwealth ; the reason why it is otherwise now , and that the house of peers is made use of to hinder many bills from passing , that are supposed to be for the ease of the people , is , that the great counsellors and officers which sit in that house , do suggest ( whether true or false ) that it is against his majesties will and interest that such an act should pass , whereupon it has found obstruction ; but hereafter if our expedient take place it cannot be so , first , because our king himself cannot have any designs going ( as was proved before ) which shall make it his advantage to hinder any good intended his people , whose prosperity then will be his own . and then because in a short time , the peers being made by act of parliament , will consist of the best men of england both for parts and estates , and those who are already made , if any of them have small estates , the king if he had the interest , would not have the means to corrupt them , the publick moneys , and the great offices being to be dispensed in another manner than formerly ; so their lordships will have no motive in the world to steer their votes and councils , but their own honour and conscience , and the preservation and prosperity of their country . so that it would be both needless and unjust to pretend any change of this kind . besides , this alteration in the administration of our government being proposed to be done by the unanimous consent of king , lords , and commons , and not otherwise , it would be very preposterous to believe , that the peers would depose themselves of their hereditary rights , and betake themselves to the hopes of being elected ; it is true , they have lost the power they had over the commons , but that has not been taken from them by any law , no more than it was given them by any ; but is fallen by the course of nature , as has been shewn at large ; but though they cannot lead the commons by their tenures , as formerly , yet there is no reason or colour that they should lose their co-ordination , which i am sure they have by law , and by the fundamental constitution of the government ; and which is so far from being prejudicial to a lasting settlement ( as was said ) that it infinitely contributes to it , and prevents the confusion which would destroy it . if i should have proposed any thing in this discourse which should have intrenched upon the king 's hereditary right , or that should have hindred the majesty and greatness of these kingdoms from being represented by his royal person , i should have made your story of the capuchine fryar very applicable to me . noble ven. i see you have not forgiven me that novel yet ; but pray give me leave to ask you one question : why do you make the election of great officers , to be by a small secret council , that had been more proper for a numerous assembly ; as it is in most commonwealths ? eng. gent. it is so in democracies , and was so in sparta , and is done by your great council in venice ; but we are not making such a kind of government , but rectifying an ancient monarchy , and giving the prince some help in the administration of that great branch of his regality ; besides , it is sufficient , that our parliament chuses these councils , ( that is always understood the lords and commons , with the kings consent ) besides , it is possible , that if such a regulation as this come in debate amongst them , the parliament will reserve to it self the approbation of the great officers , as chancellor , judges , general officers of an army , and the like ; and that such shall not have a settlement in those charges , till they are accordingly allowed of ; but may in the mean time exercise them . as to particulars , i shall always refer you to what the parliament will judge fit to order in the case ; but if you have any thing to object , or to shew in general , that some such regulation as this cannot be effectual towards the putting our distracted country into better order ; i shall think my self oblig'd to answer you , if you can have patience to hear me , and are not weary already ; as you may very well be . noble ven. i shall certainly never be weary of such discourse ; however i shall give you no further trouble in this matter ; for i am very fully satisfied , that such reformation , if it could be compassed , would not only unite all parties , but make you very flourishing at home , and very great abroad : but have you any hopes that such a thing will ever come into debate ? what do the parliament-men say to it ? eng. gent. i never had any discourse to this purpose , either with any lord , or member of the commons house , otherwise than as possibly some of these notions might fall in at ordinary conversation : for i do not intend to intrench upon the office of god , to teach our senatours wisdom . i have known some men so full of their own notions , that they went up and down sputtering them in every mans face they met ; some went to great men during our late troubles ; nay , to the king himself , to offer their expedients from revelation . two men i was acquainted with , of which one had an invention to reconcile differences in religion ; the other had a project for a bank of lands to lye as a security for summs of money lent ; both these were persons of great parts and fancy ; but yet so troublesome at all times , and in all companies , that i have often been forced to repeat an excellent proverb of your country : god deliver me from a man that has but one business ; and i assure you there is no mans reputation that i envy less , than i do that of such persons ; and therefore you may please to believe that i have not imitated them in scattering these notions , nor can i prophesie whether any such apprehensions as these will ever come into the heads of those men who are our true physitians . but yet to answer your question , and give you my conjecture ; i believe that we are not ripe yet for any great reform ; not only because we are a very debauch'd people ; i do not only mean that we are given to whoring , drinking , gaming and idleness ; but chiefly that we have a politique debauch , which is a neglect of all things that concern the publick welfare , and a setting up our own private interest against it ; i say , this is not all , for then the polity of no country could be redrest : for every commonwealth that is out of order , has ever all these debauches we speak of , as consequences of their loose state. but there are two other considerations which induce me to fear that our cure is not yet near . the first is , because most of the wise and grave men of this kingdom are very silent , and will not open their budget upon any terms : and although they dislike the present condition we are in as much as any men , and see the precipice it leads us to , yet will never open their mouths to prescribe a cure ; but being asked what they would advise , give a shrug like your country-men . there was a very considerable gentleman as most in england , both for birth , parts , and estate , who being a member of the parliament that was called , . continued all the war with them ; and by his wisdom and eloquence ( which were both very great ) promoted very much their affairs . when the factions began between the presbyters and independents , he joyned cordially with the latter , so far as to give his affirmative to the vote of no addresses ; that is , to an order made in the house of commons , to send no more messages to the king , nor to receive any from him . afterwards , when an assault was made upon the house by the army , and divers of the members taken violently away , and secluded ; he disliking it ( though he were none of them ) voluntarily absented himself , and continued retired ; being exceedingly averse to a democratical government , which was then declared for , till cromwell's usurpation ; and being infinitely courted by him , absolutely refused to accept of any employment under him , or to give him the least counsel . when cromwell was dead , and a parliament called by his son , or rather by the army , the chief officers of which did , from the beginning , whisper into the ears of the leading members , that if they could make an honest government , they should be stood by ( as the word then was ) by the army . this gentleman , at that time , neither would be elected into that parliament , nor give the least advice to any other person that was ; but kept himself still upon the reserve . insomuch that it was generally believed , that although he had ever been opposite to the late king 's coming to the government again , though upon propositions ; yet he might hanker after the restoration of his majesty that now is . but that apprehension appeared groundless when it came to the pinch : for being consulted as an oracle by the then general monk , whether he should restore the monarchy again or no , would make no answer , nor give him the least advice ; and , de facto , hath ever since kept himself from publick business ; although , upon the banishment of my lord of clarendon , he was visited by one of the greatest persons in england , and one in as much esteem with his majesty as any whatsoever , and desired to accept of some great employment near the king ; which he absolutely refusing , the same person , not a stranger to him , but well known by him , begged of him to give his advice how his majesty ( who desired nothing more than to unite all his people together , and repair the breaches which the civil war had caused , now my lord clarendon was gone , who by his counsels kept those wounds open ) might perform that honourable and gracious work : but still this gentleman made his excuses . and , in short , neither then , nor at any time before or after ( excepting when he sate in the long parliament of the year . ) neither during the distracted times , nor since his majesty's return , when they seemed more reposed , would ever be brought , either by any private intimate friend , or by any person in publick employment , to give the least judgment of our affairs , or the least counsel to mend them , though he was not shye of declaring his dislike of matters as they went. and yet this gentleman was not only by repute , and esteem a wise man , but was really so , as it appeared by his management of business , and drawing declarations , when he was contented to act ; as also by his exceeding prudent managing of his own fortune , which was very great , and his honourable living and providing for his family ; his daughters having been all marryed to the best men in england ; and his eldest son to the most accomplisht lady in the world. i dare assure you , there are above an hundred such men in england , though not altogether of that eminency . noble ven. methinks these persons are altogether as bad an extreme as the loquacious men you spoke of hefore . i remember when i went to school , our master , amongst other common-places in the commendation of silence , would tell us of a latine saying , that a fool whilst he held his peace did not differ from a wise man ; but truly i think we may as truly say , that a wise man whilst he is silent does not differ from a fool ; for how great soever his wisdom is , it can neither get him credit , nor otherwise advantage himself , his friend , nor his country . but let me not divert you from your other point . eng. gent. the next reason i have to make me fear that such an expedient as we have been talking of , will not be proposed suddenly , is the great distrust the parliament has of men , which will make most members shy of venturing at such matters , which being very new , at the first motion are not perfectly understood , at least to such as have not been versed in authors who have written of the politicks ; and therefore the mover may be suspected of having been set on by the court-party to puzzle them , and so to divert , by offering new expedients , some smart mettlesome debates they may be upon concerning the succession to the crown , or other high matters : for it is the nature of all popular counsels ( even the wisest that ever were , witness the people of rome and athens , which machiavil so much extols ) in turbulent times , to like discourses that heighten their passions , and blow up their indignation , better than them that endeavour to rectifie their judgments , and tend to provide for their safety . and the truth is , our parliament is very much to be excused , or rather justified in this distrust they have of persons , since there hath been of late so many and so successful attempts used by the late great ministers , to debauch the most eminent members of the commons-house , by pensions and offices ; and therefore it would wonderfully conduce to the good of the common-wealth , and to the composing our disordered state , if there were men of so high and unquestionable a reputation , that they were above all suspicion and distrust , and so might venture upon bold , that is ( in this case ) moderate counsels , for the saving of their country . such men there were in the parliament of . at least twenty or thirty , who having stood their ground in seven parliaments before , which in the two last kings reigns had been dissolved abruptly and in wrath , and having resisted the fear of imprisonment and great fines for their love to england , as well , as the temptation of money and offices to betray it , both inferred by the wicked councellours of that age , tending both to the ruine of our just rights , and the detriment of their masters affairs ; i say , having constantly , and with great magnanimity and honour made proof of their integrity , they had acquired so great a reputation , that not only the parliament , but even almost the whole people stuck to them , and were swayed by them in actions of a much higher nature than any are now discoursed of , without fear of being deserted , or as we say , left in the lurch , as the people of france often are by their grandees , when they raise little civil wars to get great places , which as soon as they are offered , they lay down arms , and leave their followers to be hang'd ; but although these two reasons of the silence of some wise men , and the want of reputation in others , does give us but a sad prospect of our land of promise , yet we have one consideration , which does incourage us to hope better things ere long . and that is the infallible certainty that we cannot long continue as we are , and that we can never meliorate , but by some such principles , as we have been here all this while discoursing of , and that without such helps and succours as may be drawn from thence , we must go from one distraction to another , till we come into a civil war , and in the close of it be certainly a prey to the king of france , who ( on which side it matters not ) will be a gamester , and sweep stakes at last ; the world not being now equally ballanced between two princes alike powerful , as it was during our last civil war ; and if as well this danger , as the only means to prevent it , be understood in time , ( as no doubt it will ) we shall be the happiest and the greatest nation in the world in a little time ; and in the mean time , enjoy the best and most just easie government of any people upon earth . if you ask me whether i could have offer'd any thing that i thought better than this , i will answer you as solon did a philosopher , who askt him whether he could not have made a better government for athens ? yes , but that his was the best , that the people would or could receive . and now i believe you will bear me witness , that i have not treated you as a wise man would have done in silence ; but it is time to put an end to this tittle-tattle which has nauseated you for three days together . noble ven. i hope you think better of our judgments than so ; but i believe you may very well be weary . doct. i am sure the parish priests are often thanked for their pains , when they have neither taken half so much as you have , nor profited their auditory the hundredth part so much . eng. gent. the answer to thank you for your pains , is always , thank you , sir , for your patience ; and so i do very humbly both of you . noble ven. pray , sir , when do you leave the town ? eng. gent. not till you leave the kingdom . i intend to see you , if please god , aboard the yacht at gravesend . noble ven. i should be ashamed to put you to that trouble . eng. gent. i should be much more troubled if i should not do it ; in the mean time i take my leave of you for this time , and hope to wait on you again to morrow . what , doctor , you stay to consult about the convalescence ? adieu to you both . doct. farewell , sir. nullum numen abest si sit prudentia . finis . a general draught and prospect of government in europe, and civil policy shewing the antiquity, power, decay, of parliaments. with other historical and political observations relating thereunto. in a letter. rymer, thomas, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing r estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a general draught and prospect of government in europe, and civil policy shewing the antiquity, power, decay, of parliaments. with other historical and political observations relating thereunto. in a letter. rymer, thomas, - . [ ], p. printed for tho. benskin, in greens-rents near fleetbridge, london : . with three initial contents leaves. running title reads: a general draught or prospect of government in europe, &c. pages marked. reproduction of the original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language 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images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a general draught and prospect of government in europe , and civil policy . shewing the antiquity , power , decay , of parliaments . with other historical and political observations relating thereunto . in a letter . dimidium plus toto . — medium non deserit unquam coeli phoebus iter , radiis tamen omnia lustrat . claud. london : printed for tho. benskin , in greens-rents near fleetbridge . . the contents . too narrow conceptions of parliaments . civilians , instruments of servitude . common lawyers how biassed . my lord cook 's etymologies . holy scripture teaches not politicks . caesar in the gospel . europeans particularly love liberty . arbitrary sway inconsistent with a civil people . the gospel disposes not to slavery . power , not titles , makes a king. declining power casts the greatest shadow . modern french parliament in scarlet robes . the english without pontificalibus . jupiters scepter what . pastors of a m●re excellent species than the flock . king a politick creature . mixt government ordinary in europe . in asia and africa , tyrannical . og the king of bashan . land of gyants . excellency of kingly government . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 cyclopses rul'd without parliaments . tyrants ordinarily men of great vertues . tarquin the proud left off the use of the senate . authority of the senate lost , emperors but tenants at will to the army . the common council in gaul and britain the german people and laws transplanted . the government in germany . pharamond . what names for the common council in england , france , and germany . curia , hoss . reichs versamblung . conventus . placitum . synodus . dyet . parliament . populus . & principes , often used for the same assembly . hundreds . sheriffs . iuries . queen edburga . germany the source of our people and laws . charlemain governed by annual parliaments . what power they had in his time . succession referred to the parliament . the elector princes . fallacies of an aristocracy . the golden bull. aristocracy when begun in the church . english laws in danger . pretences of conquest . magna charta . in germany title by the sword. imperial crown . lex regia . civil law. the french insensibly enslaved . the english arms in france . the project of a new sort of parliament . it some check upon the king. the clauses mandato regis , expresso mandato , expressissimo mandato regis . lewis the eleventh his character . la royauté hors du page . remonstrances for the parliament . abhorrers . the war called le bien publique . alexander sforza , his advice . finesse . franc-archers laid aside . adventuriers soldiers . guard of switzers establisht . the parliamentary changed into a military government . improbe factum . different times require different laws . radamanthus his way of judging . kings most reserved when they had no bounds . the venetians . how they dealt with their princes . what the ordinary policy in germany . the emperor adorned with titles . the jura majestatis where . count palatine iudge , when the emperor is impeacht . the legislation where . religion . war and peace . iurisdiction . the princes . furstenrecht . chamber at spires . taxes . chief magistrates . electors . what they assume . flowers of the imperial crown . tarquinius priseus his artifice . the emperors of old time came to the states . maximilian . the regiment instituted . their platform . charles the fifth . his new model . the assembly of the deputies . they managed by ferdinand the second . the privy council . expedients . reason of state. the iesuits like not a mixt government . turken-stewer , or aid against the turk . caesar and the electors combine against the diet. the roman decemviri . the states wanting to themselves . differences about religion . the protestants out-voted . the german dyet encumbred . french in a manner defunct . the former from charles the fifth . this from lewis the eleventh . the english parliament still vigorous . legereté of the french. the english steady . dance not after the french politicks . magna charta . petition of right . annual parliaments . uncertainty of historians . records not accurate . forms fallacious . civilians breath a forreign ayr . rules of common law too short . divines no statesmen . kingly race may degenerate . sons of hercules . tasso . the emperor aurelian . his account of cabals . parliaments necessary . cyclopean presumption . hesiod's proverbial paradox . cyrus moderate . cambyses . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 romulus torn in pieces . roman civil empire fell to barbarians . charlemain . austrians influenced by iesuits . the french court's correspondence with avignon . potestate absolutâ mortified by the english arms. lewis the eleventh . standing army . english generosity . conquest a compendious title . gunpowder-treason . pensioned parliament . not subject to the mischiefs in france , or germany . division in religion avoyded . poets and divines regard not second causes . jure divino . latin service a mark of roman slavery . iudges durante beneplacito . the three states . stands , reich-stands . why so called . who they are . the three governing parts of the common-wealth in polybius . the three states of sparta . of the romans . of france . the clergy a mixt state with the laiety . the three states of germany according to tacitus . according to hincmar in charlemain's time . seniors who . when hereditary . proclamations to call the states . particular writs when first used . imperial cities . electors , when a several state. the clergy never a distinct state in germany . the emperour one of the states . charlemain a german . sacri imperii minister . tricks of state , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 sir , see the effect of your commands . the want of time , of books , and assistance in this my retirement , make me very uncapable of the undertaking . but my obedience and performance with a kid , will i hope be accepted , when i cannot sacrifice an hundred bulls . without farther ceremony or introduction , according to my apprehension , when we enquire into the authority and nature of parliaments , our thoughts should be raised above all prejudice and particularities ; we should not conceive of them , as of some creature form'd and nourisht under this or that constitution , but have a notion as large and general , as is that of government of civil society . we must not be confin'd to the writers of this or that age , or countrey ; but consult the universal reason and sense of humane kind , where civil government has been exercised . much less is any particular profession or faction of writers , to be the only authors of credit with us , in this enquiry . our knowledge must be something digested ; and an impartial result from a consideration of all as well times and countries , as writers and customs . the civilians , with their bartolus and baldus , are not to dictate to us on this occasion . these were bred out of the corruption of the roman liberty ; and were instruments of servitude from the beginning . their work was by hook and crook , to rap and bring all under the emperours power ; that was their study , that their province . but they were always ignorant of the practises of better times , and utter strangers to the just rights of a free-people ; their rules and their maxims were , in effect , no other , than so many stripes , so many marks and items of slavery to the subjects . then , for the municipal lawyers of every nation , they also are educated under too narrow a dispensation to think justly in these matters . the letter is their sphere where they show their activity , even , sometimes , to the perverting and turning it against the reason and intentions of the legislator . their small niceties , and their subtleties , and their inferences , are too fine drawn to bear or support a matter of this weight and circumference . their deductions and argumentations must ever be taken with some grains of allowance ; the cause here requires other forms and considerations . we are not to stick at the letter , but go to the foundation , to the inside and essence of things . by their acquaintance with the customs and laws , they may aid and direct , but not over-rule ; they may apply their observations to strengthen the fundamental reason , but are not to perplex and subvert the form of government . my lord cook tells us , parliament is derived from parler le ment , i. e. from speaking the mind . he might as honestly have taught us that firmament is firma mentis , a farm for the mind ; or fundament , the bottom of the mind . my lord cook , how sage soever otherwise , in parliament-house is no more authority than thomas aquinas . and take him from his ordinary element , his reasons are many times as ridiculous as his etymologies . then for the holy scripture ; the design of it is no more to teach us politicks , than to make us philosophers . ahaz's dial is no president for our time or measures ; nor may the theocracy of the iews authorize us to set up for king jesus . our blessed saviour did not distinguish whether caesar demanded tribute , as tribune and servant of the people ; and whether the roman empire remained still democratical , ( as caesar pretended ) or was monarchical , as , in effect , it prov'd . the holy ghost neither alter'd the complexion , nor refin'd the education ; but a shepherd , notwithstanding the oracles he delivered , continued the same in other circumstances , as if he never had been inspir'd . in like manner , where-ever christ is preached , the soul-saving doctrine in no wise operates upon the policy or civil constitutions ; but leaves those affairs to be influenc'd by the ordinary prudence and discretion . whether it be some particular generosity in our nature , that renders us impatient of slavery : or whether the temperateness of the climate inclines us to a moderation in our government : or whether it may be some favourable aspect of the planets , ( as ptolomy would perswade us ) that disposes europe to the love of liberty . so far as any record or history can inform us , that arbitrary and unlimited domination , so familiar in the eastern parts of the world , amongst us did always shew uncouth , and to be stared upon no less than their elephants . and indeed to us seem altogether inconsistent with a civil people . and it can be no more the business of the gospel to reconcile us to that yoak , than it is to emasculate our complexion and nature , to change the temper of our climate , or to turn our stars from their course . all power is from god , and we are to be subject to the higher powers ; this all consent to ; this is doctrine alike true in holland , as in france , at venice , as at constantinople . but where this high power and soveraignty rests , in whom 't is lodged , this is a point not so obvious : nor can the s. s. or holy fathers any way help us in the discovery . the customs and particular laws of every nation , are only capable to direct us in that scrutiny . obedience is as much a duty , and rebellion as black a sin where the people are king , as where a single person has the soveraign sway . the title of king , monarch , or emperour , the scepter , the crown , the royal throne , with all the robes and pomps and badges of soveraignty , and the precedence before other christian kings , have the shadow of majesty , but have none of the substance , as bodin truly observes . the caesars were never so absolute , as when the senate had the show , and the name of all . but afterwards when their power declin'd , then did their shadows lengthen , and the titles swell beyond all sobriety and proportion . the french parliaments in their scarlet robes , know none of that soveraign power which their plain ancestors so long had exercised in their grey jackets . the pontificalibus and formality , derogates from the antiquity and independency . and our house of commons may seem in a manner , ( if i may so say ) to have committed some kind of solecism , in taking a mace to be carryed before them , but that their simplicity and plainness otherwise sufficiently demonstrates them the true , sincere , original , fundamental , common councel , constituted and form'd before forms and pageantries and fopperies obtain'd in our english world . for badge and ornament they had iupiter's scepter ; which pluto interprets to be , not a tipt batoon , or glittering engraven thing , but the laws and legislative power . homer has taught the world to call kings pastors of the people . we commit not the charge of our cattle to any one of the herd , nor for our sheep do we choose one out of the flock to be their shepherd ; but set over them a more excellent sort of animal , some man is appointed for the neatherd , and for the shepherd , to govern and take the charge of them . now since for the conduct and sway over men , the world is not furnisht with any species more noble than man , art supplies what wanted in nature ; an artificial man is fram'd , a politick creature , a king that never dyes , that can do no wrong , that cannot be deceived , whose counsels and determinations are the result of the joynt experience and wisdom of a whole nation . now whether this artificial , may be call'd a mixt sort of government , as the antients imagin'd . or that it be originally , essentially , and fundamentally a democracy monarchical in the administration , as bodin and our modern politicians seem to understand . this certainly is the government that always has obtain'd in europe ; and that which all , amidst their commotions , distractions , and convulsions , in some manner or other , with more or less success and perfection , have tended to , as the center , and onely place of rest . if therefore the jews had desired a king after the manner of the europeans , their importunity peradventure might not have been so provoking to the almighty . and we should have found another kind of catalogue of their fair qualities , than that delivered us by the prophet . for however their asian or african neighbours might have domineer'd it , and bluster'd ; a calmer gale was always wont to breath amongst us in europe , and , god be thankt , we are many degrees northern latitude from og the king of bashan , and the lands of those other gyants , amalekites , and philistines . the first writers amongst us had their imaginations so over-born with the excellency of kingly government , that they fancied in heaven iupiter to be the king of the gods. and yet they thought the common councel so necessary and essential , that homer represents even iupiter , upon a great occasion , calling his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , his parliament of the gods. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i have heard divines observe something of this kind , as figured of god almighty from those words , let us make man. those words in the plural number to them seemed to import , as if god summon'd a parliament of the trinity , to consult upon that arduous affair . our christian poets have taken the same liberty , and fancied this , as an image of greatness , where could be no accession to the wisdom and omnipotence . but again , homer ( whom plato in his book of laws , mentions as a prophet , and one who reveals those things concerning government , by inspiration , which are not by humane knowledge to be attain'd ) to shew the utmost inhumanity and barbarity of the cyclopses and their government , tells us , they neither held parliaments for counsel , nor had right . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . he joyns parliament and right , as of late days guicciardine does parliament and liberty ; as if parliament , right , and liberty , were to stand and fall together . and indeed amongst the greeks , how many persons , excellent otherwise , have been branded for tyrants and monsters , and made odious to all posterity , because they affected a more singular and unbounded power than was consistent with the customs and constitutions of their country ? nor was this policy less known or practiz'd by the latines . none of the antient kings of italy or rome exercis'd other government than by parliament , till tarquin the proud with much stratagem and artifice attempted a new way . but how fatal did he find that innovation ? afterwards that the caesars usurped the empire , when their power was the highest , they affected to have all done in the name of the people and senate . neque tam parvum quicquam , neque tam magnum publici privatique negotii , de quo non ad patres conscriptos referrebatur . and notwithstanding the antient liberty and government was so run down , yet on some occasions , the authority of the senate would be exerting itself . they declared nero an enemy of the state , and their sentence had its effect . nor could ( the delight of humane kind ) titus , though so far engaged in love and honour , stem the authority of the senate , in favour of his dear berenice ; but was forced to dismiss her , because they forbad the banes. and in effect , the power of the senate once gone , that of the emperors signified little ; the giddy souldiers broke all rules and measures . they mutinied , and made and unmade emperours , where , and when , and whom they had a mind to . so that the emperour was onely tenant at will to the army . our botchers of history , shew a jolly succession of monarchs on their file for britain in those days . but caesars commentaries are of much better credit , who represents the government of gaul and britain , as muchwhat the same in his time ; says he of britain , summa imperii bellique administrandi communi consilio permissa est cassivellano , &c. the chief command and conduct of the war , was by the common councel committed to cassivellaun . compare these words with what he writes of the gauls , l. . re in controversiam deductâ totius galliae consilium bibracte indicitur , eodem conveniunt undique frequentes multitudines , suffragiis res permittitur , ad unum omnes vercengentorigem probant imperatorem . here the counsel of all gaul , by reason of the war , put it to the vote who shall be their general ; and it was carried with a nemine contradicente for vercengentorix . and 't is beyond dispute , that their government continued the same in the times of which dion cassius and tacitus write . nor is their uniformity so strange , considering the authority of the druyds , and their correspondence in both nations . when the english and french came from germany to people britain and gaul , the german liberty and moderate sway were transplanted with them ; and still the common councel had the main stroke in all weighty affairs ; for to that policy had they also been educated . the scheme of the german government appears in these passages of tacitus . de minoribus rebus principes consultant , de majoribus omnes . in lesser matters the principal men onely , in the greatest affairs all consult . elsewhere he says of them , vbi rex vel princeps audiuntur authoritate suadendi magis quam jubendi potestate . where the king or prince are heard for the reasons they bring to perswade , rather than for any authority to command . hereby 't is manifest , that in germany also the people had their share in debating and directing all affairs of moment . when therefore the french under waramond , or pharamond , came to settle and mix with the gauls , whatever other differences might happen , in point of government they were agreed before hand , both resting upon the same basis , the common councel . accordingly in those first days , we find them making their kings , and again upon occasion unmaking them by general consent . hence come these phrases so frequent in aimoinus , sigebert , engenhardus , and the other writers of those times . consensu francorum , electione francorum , secundum morem francorum , in regem electus , &c. on the other hand , franci regno deturbant , a francis repudiatur , depositus ac detonsus in monasterium detrusus est , a francis in monachum tonsuratur , &c. where we may note , that our authors intend by their per francos , as much as per consensum francorum , or secundum morem francorum , which is , by the common counsel , and not in any unusual , mutinous , and tumultuous way , as some might object . nor are we to imagine the government presently altered , so often as we find the historians varying their phrase . we must now and then be content with such words as the monks of those times were pleased to coyn for us , and have new barbarous names for the same old civil constitution . whether they speak of germany , of the french , or of our nation , they indifferently diversifie , and employ for the same common assembly amongst others , the appellations and circumlocutions following . sometimes they call it curia , and curia imperialis , and curia regalis , curia solennis , generalis curia , magna curia . concelebranda patrum solenni curia coctu , curia roncaliis jampridem indicta coïret , say their poets . which is expessed in the german tongue , by hove , koniglicher hove , grossen hoff. elsewhere it is call'd congregationes , which the germans render reichsversamblung . sometimes it is call'd concilium principum , totius germaniae concilium , concilium generale . gunther says , concilium procerum toto de corpore regni convocat . and the monk of paderborn , who liv'd about eight hundred years ago , in his annals of charles the great , anno . et rex wormatiam carolus collegit in urbem , francorum proceres ad concilium generale . imperialia . concilia postquàm cessavere , omnes pene deformitates introductae sunt , says cardinal cusan . elsewhere these were called conventus , conventus generalis , conventus imperatorem . convenire generaliter populum suum praecepit . habuit populi sui generalem conventum . habitoque juxta morem conventu generali . the monk of paderborn thus versifies . anno . ad duriam vicum properant , nam rege jubente , illic conventus populi generalis habetur . elsewhere , venit , & ad fontes fluvii cui lippia nomen , conventum fieri procerum jussit generalem . anno . publicus in paderbrunon conventus habetur . most commonly it was called placitum . compendii placitum generale habuit . aimoinus . rex pipinus habuit placitum suum in nivernis regino , an. , and an. . tenuit placitum in loco qui dicitur paderbrunnon . abbas stadensis in chr. an. ▪ imperator habito placito , &c. and the aforesaid monk , anno . conventum placiti generalis habere , cum ducibus se velle suis denunciat illic . regino calls it synodus . an. . carolus habuit synodum in wormatiaâ . . habuit synodum ad valentinianos . . synodum habuit in wormariâ . . habuit synodum in villâ quae dicitur duria . . in lippa synodum tenuit . convenerant multi episcopi , abbates , & , principes ad imperialem synodum . trithem . abb. afterwards in germany , diet was the name that generally prevailed , as that of parliament in france and england . now these quotations and authorities shew , not only that by all this variety of names were understood the same common councel , but that the principes , proceres , primores , duces , patres , &c. imported no more in truth , nor signified other manner of men , than the very same with populus . and the same assembly by one writer barely called populus , or conventus populi , is by another stiled . conventus procerum , conventus principum , &c. which those terms secundam morem , juxta morem , more solenni , ut solebat , more fully demonstrate ; which seem to refer and send us back to tacitus , consultant de majoribus omnes . this i the rather note , because i find mr. petty ( amongst many other his excellent memorials ) observing the like in old records of parliament , where those somewhere called populus , and vulgus , and the commons , are otherwhiles dignified with the gay additions of noble , most noble , most illustrious , most gracious , seigniors , monseigniours , and sires the commons and likewise for that some unwary and superficial readers from this root have propagated and improved many errours of pernicious consequence to our ancient and fundamental policy and government . the french incorporating and growing one people with the former inhabitants , had a much easier province ; they setled , and pursued their native customs and forms of government , nor met with that difficulty and opposition which in this nation attended the english and saxons . these had a much harder game to play . these could in no wise fix , or find any sure footing , without first clearing their way , and driving the britains up by themselves , into a corner of the land. and after much tumbling and bustle , we find them formed into a heptarchy . how regularly they mov'd as to civil affairs , how closely they followed their country-customs , or where they innovated and varied from their german forms and policy , in those dark times , is hard to be traced . some footsteps however appeared then , which remained to posterity , as the division of the countrey into hundreds , after the german manner described by tacitus . besides the other royalties in the people , as that of appointing sheriffs , and choosing annual magistrates , the jurisdiction and power of life and death by our juries , &c. and even before all came united under one monarch , we find the people interposing their authority , and ( for the miscarriages of queen edburga ) providing that thereafter , no queen shall sit by the king , nor have the title of queen , but be called only the kings wife . gens itaque occidentalium saxonum reginam juxta regem sedere non patitur , nec etiam reginam appellari , sed regis conjugem permittit , &c. asser. menev. & mals . but i shall not repeat what cambden and selden , and our other antiquaries have collected on this occasion ; but germany being the source both of our people and laws , i choose rather petere fontes . and thence it may be concluded how far we do stare super vias antiquas , and continue firm upon the old bottom . when the people and senate of rome had transferred all their right upon charles the great ( or charlemain , as the french call him ) and germany was made the seat of the western empire , one might think , if there could be an opportunity of introducing a new form of policy , this was the time . yet charles , so victorious , so august , so great , the like in no age before him or since ever known on this side the alps , notwithstanding all that power and fortune , and the imperial crown that adorn'd him , his language was still the high german , and his government did still in the old parliamentary way go on and prosper . therefore we find him every year with his parliament . eginhardus , who was his son-in-law , and chancellour , says of him , rex sic ad publicum populi sui conventum qui annuatim ob regni utilitatem celebrabatur , ire , sic domum redire solebat . and aimoynus , l. . c. . generalem conventum quotannis habuit . and to these parliaments , under god , so far as humane reason may judge , does hincmar ( archbishop of rheims , and chancellour in those times ) ascribe his happy reign . secunda divisio , qua totius regni status anteposito , sicut semper , omnipotentis dei judicio , quantum ad humanam rationem pertinebat , conservari videbatur , haec est , consuetudo tunc temporis erat , ut non saepius sed bis in anno duo placita tenerentur , unum quando ordinabatur status totius regni ad anni vertentis spacium , quod ordinatum nullus eventus rerum , nisi summa necessitas , quae similiter toti regno incumbebat , mutabat , in quo placito generalitas universorum majorum ●am clericorum quam laicorum conveniebat , alterum cum senioribus tantum & praecipuis consiliariis . all this seems but a paraphrase upon the passage afore-cited out of tacitus , as to the form of government . the princes and seniors are for the matters of less weight ; the former here mentioned , was the generale placitum , which the germans more particularly call , die jahrlicke versamblung , the yearly assembly . whose business ( he tells us ) was to order the state of the kingdom . he shows us likewise how binding these their ordinances were , and not to be contraven'd unless upon the utmost necessity , not a suggested , invisible , courtnecessity , but quae toti regno incumbebat , a necessity that lay upon the whole kingdom . in effect , the parliament ordered , and he executed their orders ; his office was the administration . amongst other particulars , we find him in parliament adjusting the matter of succession , as eginhard , and the abbot of staden , an. . informs us , of which the monk of paderborn , an. . vnde duces , ac primores solenniter omnes atque magistratus , ad concilium generale vndique collegit , natoque suo ludovico cunctorum cum consilio jus omne regendi tradidit imperii , successoremque paterni imposito designavit diademate regni . and accordingly his son lodowic by general consent of parliament did succeed him ; post mortem patris aquisgrani summo omnium francorum consensu administrationem accepit , anony . an. . de reb . gest . pip. car. & lud. the same author tells us , that this ludowic , lotharium filium primogenitum consortem imperii constituere volens , aquisgrani in conventu , more solito , instituto , eum coronavit . in like manner we have the son of arnulph chosen in parliament to succeed his father . regino , an. . proceres & optimates ad forachem congregati ludovicum silium praefati principis , quem ex legitime matrimonio susceperat , regem super . se ●reant , & coronatum , regiisque ornamentis indutum in fastigio regni sublimant . nor was this done onely out of formality , and for the greater state and solemnity on those occasions , for we sometimes find them refusing to grant what the emperour labour'd to obtain . amongst other instances , we have this last named arnolph , an. , attempting to get the parliament make his son zundelbolk king of lorrain . but they would not gratifie him . filium zundelbolk , an. . ordinibus convocatis regno lothoraii praeficere voluit , minime tamen optimates praedicti regni eâ vice adsensum praebuere . regino , l. . but the next year after he prevailed , says the same author : anno vero sequenti in conventu wormatiae instituto , omnibus adsentientibus id demum obtinuit . hitherto these appear to be the same germans , ubi rex vel princeps audiuntur authoritate suadendi , ●agis quam jubendi potestate . and seeing that this of succession , is one of those points that are of greatest importance , 't is strange how the right of electing the emperors came afterwards to be left in so few hands , and to be setled in the seven only , who , in course of time got the name of princes electors . neither the occasion , nor the time when this custom began , can be discovered . some would deduce it from charles the great . some from otho the third , who reigned about the year . others from otho the fourth , an. . others again from henry the second , who was emperour , an , . from which uncertainty we may only gather , that the custom was very ancient . but it is not to be imagined that the other states by any publick act transferred the right upon those seven . amongst the fallacies and cheats of state , whereby the rich men may impose upon the poorer sort , and worm them out of all their share in the government , aristotle reckons these : that it be penal for the rich to be absent from the common councils , to refuse being in office , to want , or omit the exercise of arms , not to serve upon iuries , &c. but the poorer sort may use their discretion , it shall not be penal to them ; they may choose whether or no they will be present in common council , bear office , be at the charge of arms and training , be impannel'd upon iuries , &c. in these cases this specious liberty fools and bewitches them : for so long as no restraint is upon them , and they are not excluded or slighted , or disrespected any way in the matter , they rather follow their private occasions at home , and the business of their family . and thus by degrees insensibly is the commonwealth and government changed . and that is effected by art and trick , which openly and fairly could never have been brought to pass . we need not think that the germans were over-reached by any the like sophistry and deceitful laws ; but 't is likely , that to many it was sufficient , that it lay in their choice whether they would act or no ; and in that security many sate down : some could not conveniently spare time from their family ; some were indifferent which way the world went ; some could not part from their dear delights , their pots and their hounds ; and some staid at home , because they could not make that show , and appear in a pomp and equipage like their neighbours . by reason of these , and a many the like weighty considerations , together with a general degenerateness , supineness , and neglect of the publick , the affairs of state became abandon'd , and shuffl'd into a very few hands ; insomuch that few besides those now called the seven electors , made any great figure , or much labour'd in that sphere . but those seven were suffered from time to time by a silent usurpation to manage all , till insensibly it grew into a custom . so that ( under charles the fourth , when the priviledges and rights of every body came to be stated , and reduced by general consent into a standing law ) in the beginning of the golden bull , this ministry of the seven electors is said to be an ancient and laudable custom . some will have these electors to be a committee of the whole empire , and that ( there being one king , one duke , one marquess , one count , with the churchmen ) all the several orders in the empire are represented by them ; and consequently that their act is vertually the act of the empire . but it seems more reasonable , that this sort of an aristocracie sprung up to overtop the ancient more popular government , by the negligence or inadvertency of the other orders ; who were satisfied in seeing the emperour thereby effectually held within compass , and had no care or consideration farther . for all their fears and apprehensions had risen from the emperour , and , so be that they might be secured against his encroachments and oppression , they were content to set up those electors ; to oppose the emperour , and stand as a bulwark betwixt him and them . and therefore by their free act in the golden bull , they settle and confirm to the electors that prerogative , which no prescription otherwise could have made just and authentick : above an hundred years before , in the church had the government changed face ; an aristocracy obtain'd , and the election of the pope ceased to be longer popular . about the same time , in england also , the old laws and policy ran a dangerous risque from an inundation of arbitrary power , that threatned to break down all the ancient banks and barriers . for the normans , having come amongst us , partly by consent , partly perforce , pust up and wanton with their new acquisitions and swing of fortune , they could not well be kept within bounds . now and then speeches of conquest and holding by the sword , and the like bugtitles , were bandyed to and fro amongst the giddy courtiers , with now and then a sally and inroad upon the people , trampling property under foot . these insolencies and invasions kept the nation awake , and put them upon their guard , to wait an opportunity whereby their ancient rights and customs might be reduced into form , and solemnly recognis'd by succeeding kings in the great charter . thus was the cockatrice crushed in the egg ; and an early stop put to arbitrary sway in england ; and the government returned to its old center of parliaments again . germany , in this juncture , lay most open and exposed . the emperor , lord of the world , and head of the nations , successour to those caesars that had broken down all forms and fences , so that liberty and property lay wast every where before them . these owed all their power to the sword. the imperial crown , the lex regia , the whole bulk and body of the civil law , were wholly and entirely their own proper creature ; and what more might be devised to make a prince unlimited , uncontrolable , great , and barbarous , and render him a cyclops or a leviathan ? but the result was , the customs and liberties of the germans were far more ancient and more sacred to them , than any new song that the civilians could teach them . therefore all this long rattle of imperial prerogative onely alarm'd them , and made them provide the better for their security . and as their danger was the most threatning , and arm'd with stronger titles and pretensious than in other nations ; so have they with more care sought their preservation . and the golden bull with them was framed , and had the same effect as magna charta with us ; which they strengthen and make supplements to , by new capitulations upon occasion , according as the emperors abuse their power , or that tricks are devised , by colour of the letter , to elude the honest intention of that fundamental law and constitution . thus we see it true , in respect of soveraignes , as well as of subjects , that evil manners are the cause of good and wholesome laws . the french have no golden bull , nor magna charta ; peradventure , because no king of theirs had those pretentions of conquest , as the normans here ; nor had that imperial title of the sword , and the civil laws , as the caesars , to transport them beyond the bounds of moderation and reason . which put them upon other measures , and gave them opportunity step by step , slily , insensibly , and surely , to effect what more openly could never have succeeded . ` as in the fable , the storm and violence of the wind could not force away the travellers cloak from him ; but the sun coming silently upon him , dissolves him presently , makes him unbutton , and strips him of all . noise and bluster make the people the more obstinate and tenacious . but things remote affect them not . they never see consequences , nor lay ought to heart that is not immediately present before their eyes . if any thing now and then in the course of their kings reign happen'd that was shocking , all was lookt upon as some personal and accidental slip only , without foundation for continuance , or without giving jealousie of being repeated to posterity . about an hundred years after magna charta was establisht , was that project of the modern parliament in france set on foot , to render unnecessary the ancient assembly of the states , and consequently to alter the government . but the english arms gave check to their wanton career , and for a long time diverted them from pursuing that design , or bringing it to any head . however , this new assembly and vice-parliament was cultivated and improved daily . they assumed all the power , they consulted and determined the weighty affairs ; and in case the king offered any violence to the laws , they encounter'd and oppos'd his exorbitant courses ; they lay before him his coronation-oath , and plyed him with remonstrance upon remonstrance , till they brought him to reason . neither war nor alliance could be made , nor could any his edict or command have effect , till ratified and approved by them . so that to the unwary multitude these serv'd the turn as well ; these were as effectual and sufficient , and more ready and expeditious than the great old parliament . but afterwards came new-fashioned kings to reign , who would not be overcome by reasons or remonstrances . and yet then also , was a formal complyance of this parliament thought necessary ; and , as an expedient , when not satisfyed in conscience that an edict ought to be ratifyed , was introduced that clause , mandato regis ; which imported , that they did not ratifie such an edict upon their own judgment , but that they were over-ruled by the kings particular command . afterwards again came the expresso mandato , and expressissimo mandato regis , according as they passed it with a greater reluctancy , and greater violence had been offered to their judgment . but henry the fourth , who had fought through all opposition into his kingdom , and had subdued to his will all that had fac'd him in the field , grew impatient , after so great contrasts , to find his resolutions crost , and contested by tame gownmen ; therefore , to rid himself at once of all those verbal frays and formalities , made a law , that thereafter the kings edicts should be ratified and emologated upon sight , without more formal trifling and dispute . thus were those remains of soveraign power , that had surviv'd in this diminutive parliament , baffl'd and extinct , without much labour . but as they never possessed the vigor and spirit of the ancient assembly ; the people were never so stupid to trust , or lay much stress on their valour and performance . and therefore did more early show their resentment ; nor without a general convulsion and civil war , could bear the apprehension of a court-design to lay aside the old parliament . it was the boast of lewis the eleventh on this occasion , that he had mis la royauté hors du page , he had so ordered matters , that the royal state should be no more a pupil ; in him it came of age to dispose things , and act of its own head , and should not need to be tutor'd or be under a guardian any longer . this was a prince of a particular humour , and of singular endowments . it was no wonder if he did not like the check of a parliament ; he had before attempted by two or three rebellions to free himself from the authority of his king and father . the good old king charles , the seventh , weathered the open violence , but fear of poyson overcame him ; insomuch , ●hat he durst neither eat nor drink any thing , but af●●r five days fasting dyed . and now lewis being king , his first work was to clear the court from all who had serv'd his father , and pack off all the princes of the blood , and ancient nobility , and to create a new set of nobles and courtiers for his purpose . the people took the alarm , and clamour'd for a parliament to regulate disorders , and prevent the evils that threatned and hung over them . a parliament , a parliament , was the cry and expectation throughout the kingdom . the bishop of paris and clergy , the courts of justice , and the city , ( the three bodies of greatest consideration and gravity ) presented to him their several remonstrances . he ( dissembling being his talent ) took all kindly ; and to break their discontents , or divert them , he took six persons out of each of their companies , to be of his ordinary counsel ; in show onely ; for in effect he was still the same . and amongst the prosligate rabble about the court , there wanted not in the mean time a sort of wretches who made an hubbub , and as formally declared their detestation and abhorrence of their practises that had importun'd the king with their remonstrances , and call'd it an unparallell'd violation of their duty . nay , ( philip de comines tells us , ) the courtiers went so far , they call'd it rebellion to mention a parliament . nor was it strange such cattle then should be sheltered about the court , when a mounte bank was set up for lord chancellor , taylors and barbars ( iohan de doyac , olivier le diable dit le dain , &c. ) the prime ministers of state. this jarring and misunderstanding was followed by a civil war , which was call'd the publick good . this produc'd a parliament . and this parliament would no longer trust lewis single with the administration of affairs ; but appointed him thirty six commissioners , ( curateurs ) to be his assistants . however , lewis's excellency lay in playing an after-game . in the war , he had sent to his allie alexander sforza for aid ; who returned him answer , that men he had none to spare , but would give advise which should be as effectual ; so the italian advis'd him always to agree with his enemies upon any conditions , then find the opportunity to cut their throats . according to this , bodin speaks of him , pacem inire coactus est , sed eos omnes clam aut apertè , paucis admodum exceptis , necandos curavit fratrem , quoque carolum veneno . this is the dexterity which comines so much labours to gloss over , and set a countenance upon ; these the belles actions , and the finesse , which the modern french so much celebrate at this day ; all is copyed from this original . perjuries and poysons were his ordinary arms , yet none so devout , none so superstitious , none made the like largesses to the church . but his masses and pilgrimages did always portend some strange horrid murder about to be executed . these were but personal vices ; his eajoling the citizens , and affected gallantry to their wives , was politick enough . but what prov'd most effectual to his design of changing the government , and excluding parliaments , was his laying aside the franc-archers ; who hitherto had been the train'd-bands , and ordinary militia of the country . in the war ( call'd the pulick good ) he found that those franc-archers ( being men of a setled habitation , and way of living ) took part with their landlords and neighbours against him ; therefore from thence-forward he slighted them , and by beat of drum from town to town , gathered and listed such as voluntarily offer'd themselves to his service . these were then called adventurers , because they sought their adventure by the fortune of war ; as afterward when charles the eighth carryed them over the alps , they got the name of souldiers , from the sold or pay they received upon that expedition . but as this lewis could not trust the militia , so within a little time he began to think himself not safe amongst his adventurers . these yet were not remote enough from the interest of their countrey , and had some small sense of its oppression . thereupon , for the more immediate guards of his person , he takes into pension four thousand switzers . and by that establishment , seems to have compleated his design , and alter'd the old parliamentary , into a military government . and now it was not so hard a matter to borrow money of the citizens , and otherwise make those levies which no king before him ever attempted . thus it was that he brought the royalty hors du page ; or , rather ( according to the paraphrase of their historian mezeray ) hors du sense & du raisonne . though in germany the condition of their parliaments is not altogether so deplorable and desperate ; yet of later times there have not wanted lusty endeavours by force and by artifice to destroy them . right and wrong are ever the same , but times and manners vary faces very much . one while instead of all other penalty for a crime , it was sufficient that the law censur'd it with an improbè factum . to say he that does so , or so , is to blame , was more effectual and coercive in those saturnian days , than are racks and gibbets with us . radamanthus his way of administring iustice in all causes between party and party , was by putting them both to their oaths , and determining their right accordingly . this , says plato , was a proper and ●eady way in that age , when every body was possessed with the fear of god. but , says he , this would not do , now in our times , when some make it a question whether there be a god or no ; others make a doubt whether god regards what we do on earth ; most and the worst of men have a conceit , that though there be a god , yet they can pacifie him with their vile adulations , their mummeries and their masses ; so that they may still be as wicked as they please . therefore , says he , when mens opinions are chang'd , the laws also must be chang'd ; for , otherwise , if our iudges now were to make radamanthus their president , we should all be over head and ears in perjuries . the like may be observ'd in relation to sovereigns . in old times at first there was onely a simple confidence betwixt them and their people . and never were kings so reserv'd , as then when they had no bounds . afterwards , the misbehaviour of some princes introduced that check of a coronation-oath . and where that is the only check , `t is an argument they had never yet been there tainted with the atheism , and infidelity , which plato mentions ; but had continually liv'd and rul'd with that simplicity and religious fear , so memorable in those days when minos and radamanthus were king and chief justice of crete . claude seisselle reckons several refrains , bridles , that curb the french kings . but now when the old parliament is obsolete , this would be remarkt upon , as a graceless unmannerly metaphor , in the refined language . in the state of venice , at first their prince was as absolute as any barbarian ; till having strayed , and given some instances of humane frailty , new curbs and new tyes were devised for him . but the italian prov'd still too witty to be held by any . the venetians however would not be dallyed withal , they would not suffer the transgressour to rejoyce long in his extravagance , but pursued him with exemplary punishment : sabellicus reckons to the number of twelve that lost their heads for slipping their bridles . at the length , when the venetians found that neither the simple trust was sacred , nor the coronation-oath inviolable , nor the exemplary punishment effectual to contain their prince within the bounds that were consistent with a free people ; they concluded that the publick safety could not be sufficiently provided for , and secured against their prince , till they stript him of all the reality and substance , leaving him barely the formalities and trappings , and empty shadow of soveraignty . now to come to the germans ; what ever shifts other people have been put to , to maintain their liberty , they ( it should seem ) never trusted the soveraignty out of their own hands . so that whether it be a mixt , or what other sort of government you call it ; the great affairs were always reserv'd to be determin'd in parliament ; there was the supreme power , there was the majesty . yet no people have been forwarder in adorning their prince with all the titles and expressions of greatness , and an arbitrary , uncontrolable power , than they . all the acts and laws run in his name ; and are called caesars laws , and caesars constitutions . where the emperor and the empire are named , he constantly has the precedence . in the publick ordinances and recesses , every thing from him are stiled precepts and commands ; from the states merely obedience and prayers , though he cannot wag a finger without their consent . they every where speak of , and own in him a fulness of power vollncommenheit . and this they give also to the king of the romans at the same time ; to show the emptiness and vanity of it . as both are call'd heads of the empire , though the latter has no power at all , during the emperors life . they and all the world salute him by the title of imperial majesty . and the german style will not allow majesty to any other kings ; die koniglicher wurde , not die koniglicher maht , the kings worship , not majesty . yet after all , aeneas sylvius says , in germ. c. . imperatorem , & regem , & dominum vestrum esse fateamini , precario tamen ille imperare videtur , nulla ejus potestas est . the shadow and flourish onely were in the emperor ; but the jura majestatis , the vis imperii , the essentials of majesty were always reserv'd and exercis'd by the common assembly , as by the particulars may more plainly appear . . one of the rights of soveraignty is to be above the law , and to give laws to the people . neither of these royalties belong to the emperour ; he may be call'd to account for violating the laws . in the golden bull , the forms and proceedings against him are stated . ` t is there said to be the custom , and accordingly setl'd and agreed for law , that the electors may impeach the emperor , in the assembly of the states ; and the count palatine of the rhine , as chief elector , is to be the president or judge . for the legislation , or making laws , the emperor proposes , the states are free which propositions they will proceed upon . when an act is to be passed , the electors have six votes , the princes six , the cities two , the emperor has but one ( the last ) vote . without a majority he can do nothing : they can decree without him if he is absent . the ordinances are to be confirm'd by his seal and subscription ; but if the states persist , he must of necessity comply . even charles the fifth in vain contested that point , as may be seen in sleidan , i. . these sanctions are regularly subscribed by caesar , and by some of the states for the empire ; and are enrolled ( at mentz ) in the chancery of the empire . the several members of the states are sworn to be true to the emperor and to the empire ; and are said to be subjects of the emperor , and of the sacred empire . . in matters of religion , in all times , the head of the state had the supreme direction , as it was said of tiberius , deûm munere summum pontificem summum hominem esse . and the first christian princes , before the papal tyranny usurpt upon them , were always the chief pontifs , and receiv'd the pontifical habit from that colledge . but upon the reformation in germany , anno . both the emperor and pope were excluded , and their pontifical supremacy abrogated . in the point of religion , the emperor was not consider'd as the chief and head of the empire , but as a party : for by joyning himself to the roman catholicks , he made their cause and concern his own . it was therefore agreed and concluded , that the states onely should determine in matters of religion ; and that with a tender hand , in an amicable way onely . . war and peace are transacted in the name of the emperor ; but in effect , all is reserv'd to the states . he must at the least have the consent of the electors . yet any prince of the empire may levy souldiers , may make leagues and associations without any bodies leave . . for jurisdiction , and the last appeal , the civilians say the emperor is fons omnis iurisdictionis ; but here it is far otherwise . the princes , in causes touching their life , their honour , or their see , always claim'd their priviledge das fursten-recht ( they call it ) to be try'd by their peers the princes of the empire . the common pleas were tryed by the emperor , and attended his motion , till by the increase of suits , that judicature was no longer sufficient , the judges grew corrupt , and many other inconveniencies appearing , the states in their assembly at franckford , an. . ordered a place certain for the decision of those ordinary causes ; whereupon the imperial chamber at spires was erected . all the process and decrees of the court ran in the emperors name , and are under his seal ; and it is call'd caesars court. but it is also call'd the court of the empire . the emperor onely named the president ; by the states were the rest of the judges appointed ; and the other officers of the court by the elector of mentz arch-chancellour of the empire . the states likewise execute the sentence . they visit and reform the court by their commissioners ; and to these visitors are the appeals , not to the emperor . yet some voluntary referenccs that were made to the emperor and his privy-council , and to their arbitration , gave them opportunity of late to usurp a jurisdiction . . taxes are all levyed in the emperors name ; but in truth nothing of that nature can be done without the assembly of the states . nor is the emperor trusted with the money in his exchequer ; the states keep it till it be employ'd ; they have their several treasuries . sometimes the several circles keep their respective money ; sometimes a publick treasury is agreed upon , and one or more pfenning-meisters ( pennymasters ) appointed . anno . they ordered seven treasurers , one to be named by the emperour , and six by the states . these swear to the states . and if any be by special oath or obligation bound to the emperor or other particular state , he is uncapable of that trust . these are accountable to the states onely . if the occasion for which the tax was rais'd be taken away , the money cannot be diverted to other uses , but by the consent of the states . . the chief magistrates are , none of them , made by the emperor . the count elector palatine is vicar or protector of the empire , and has the charge of it in the emperors absence . the three ecclesiastical electors , who are chosen by their chapters , are of course the arch-chancellours of the empire . the states appoint the ( reichs-skak-meister , or reichs-psenning-meister ) the treasurer of the empire . sometimes they leave the general to be nam'd by the emperor , and the ten circles appoint their several directors or counsel for him . for the other particulars , as the inspection and care of coyning money , the hearing and sending ambassadours , &c. the emperour has no great matter of advantage above the other states . on a common account , where the concern is general the states must be consulted ; and nothing can be done without their consent and approbation . the electors are in possession , and exercise a particular soveraignty in some points of greatest moment . they are the trustees and representative of the whole empire , in their election of the emperor . and hereupon they undertake likewise to loosen his power , or tye it up short ; and make what capitulations they please with him . and thereby would assume to themselves more than the other states will ever be content to allow them . but the emperour singly , besides the name , and pomps , and empty titles , has very little of the substantial soveraignty entrusted with him . the investiture of the great fiefs belongs to him . this is a prerogative goodly in show , and were of moment , could he lay any conditions or charge on the person invested ; but nothing is left to his will ; he cannot deny , nor delay the lawful heir . nor does the fee for want of heirs escheat to the emperor , but to the publick patrimony . he grants priviledges , where a third person or the publick is not injur'd . he founds universities , grants fairs , makes denizens , &c. he creates kings , princes , dukes , marquises , counts , poet-laureats , doctors , &c. he gives onely the bare titulary honor of prince , but not the qualifications ; he cannot make him capable to sit and vote amongst the other princes of the empire . so that here the states are not subject to that imposition which the roman senate once suffer'd under tarquinius priscus , who created an hundred new senators , to the end he might be sure of a court-party , by his creatures , and have a majority of votes in the house . in short , the germans seem to have observ'd the rule in politicks , that he who is the most high in name and dignity , should in real power be the least considerable . yet in the last age , the states gave way to several innovations , which prov'd of mischievous consequence afterwards . it had anciently been the custom for the assembly of the states , to send for the emperor to come to them upon occasion ; so hincmar tells us of charles the great , rogatu ipsorum in concilium veniebat , quotiescunque voluntas esset ut ad eos veniret ; similiter quoque quanto spacio voluissent , cum iis consisteret , &c. ep. . c. . upon their message to him , he came to the assembly , as often as they had a mind he should come to them ; and in like manner he stayed so long with them as they desired . and this custom continued , as may be seen in lehem . l. . c. . and c. . till under maximilian . and then the states began to go to the emperor . this maximilian likewise , upon pretence of sudden occasions that admitted not delays , would now and then be acting single , and usurping in several particulars the power that of right could only be exercised by the states . therefore the states , an. . to take off these pretences , and prevent all attempts of this kind , and partly , peradventure , for their own ease , substituted in their absence a committee , which they call'd the regiment , and the members regents . this regiment was an epitome of the whole empire , and was endued with all the powers and soveraignty accordingly . it consisted of twenty persons , who were chosen out of the several orders of the states ; and took an oath to be true to the emperor , and to the sacred empire . the emperor or his proxie was their president ; but lest this might give too great advantage to the emperor , an elector was added , as a joynt-president with the emperor or his proxie . no person of dependance on , or particular obligation to the emperor , was capable of being a member . the emperor had no more vote than any one of the twenty regents ; nor could determine ought , unless the majority were for him . these were not simply to consult , but had the execution also . this constitution held for some years . and then the annual assembly returned , and resumed their power , and acted again . but in case of sudden necessity , left another expedient for the emperor . they constitute for him a councel consisting of eight persons , four chosen by the electors , and four by the other states . these were sworn to be true to the emperor and to the empire , scweren der keyserlichen majestat und dem heiligen reichs getreu , &c. but charles the fifth coming to reign , he was upon the new model immediately . he restor'd the regiment , but the conditions altogether different . now it consisted not of twenty , but twenty two persons . he as emperor would have two votes added ; thereby in effect to be master of five votes ; two as emperor , one as president ; one for austria , and one for burgundy . the former regiment might , according to the old custom , send for the emperor to come to them . now it was order'd that caesar might call them to what place he had a mind . formerly , if the emperor came not , they might proceed without him ; now , charles the fifth forbad them to make leagues and allyances , or do ought in his absence . the oath was alter'd , and the members were only sworn to the emperor , and said to be the councel of the emperor ; whereas the former was called the councel of the empire . in the former constitution , the elector in the name of the empire subscribed their ordinances ; here , with the electors subscription is joyned that of the president , in the name of the emperor . in short , the former was constituted by the states , and entrusted with their power , to be a check upon the emperor ; this was formed by caesar , to quiet the people , and entertain them with a show ; whilst he the more insensibly made his advances to invade their ancient rights , and usurp all the power into his own hands . the next project in case of emergencies , was the assembly of the deputies . this consisted of the six electors , six other princes , and two cities ; to which were after added four princes more . this continued till an. . with some effect . afterwards it prov'd of little consequence , court-artifice prevailing , and the ferdinands found a way to manage the deputies , and render them as unprofitable to the publick , as charles the fifth had made the regiment . the second ferdinand called what deputies he knew would vote for him , the rest he excluded , and supplyed their place with others , who he understood were entirely at his devotion , as he told my lord digby , ambassadour with him , an. . lundorp , tom. . amongst these projects , may be mentioned the councel of the emperours court , and the privy-councel . these also , that they might show as if the empire had the interest in them , were at the first sworn to the elector of mentz , as arch-chancellour of the empire . which oath came after some time to be omitted . thus we have seen that the custom of the empire was to have a yearly assembly ; these at the end of their session always appointed the time and place for their next meeting . if necessity for them sooner , then was the emperor to call an assembly extraordinary ; which happening frequently , the states for their ease appointed the regiment , and other expedients . this gave a president for the emperors to devise something of the like nature , which they might more easily pervert to their own arbitrary interest and advantage . if it have but the name or resemblance , the people look no farther ; they see not into the trick and secrets of it ; they are led by the appearance so long , till they are past recovery , and no way is left them for a retreat . and indeed the emperors of the last age ceased to deal bonâ fide ; the old german honesty wore out of fashion . and they no longer treated on the square with their people . artifice and juggle came in place : and in the days of charles the fifth , began to get a specious appellation , and be named ( forsooth ) reason of state. but more especially , since the jesuits there have refined upon the court-sophistry , and minc'd away all the old remains of morality and conscience ; for the jesuits could the worst of all other , endure these same mixt governments . they would have the pyramid inverted , and the whole stress of things rest upon one single leg , that their art might play the more freely , and they the more cleverly trip it down . this broad-bottom'd monarchy , and government founded on the people , puts them to other measures ; a dose of poyson , or consecrated dagger , will not do the work . they must here go about and about , make slow approaches , ripen a plot of many years , and draw a long concatenation of intrigue , ere they can think to compass their design . when the commonwealth has but one neck , the jesuit will have it under his girdle ; if not , one blow does the feat , and his dexterity is admirable . therefore in germany the jesuits have left no stone unturned , for their part , to bring all the soveraign power from the states to the emperor . and to that end , of late times the emperor ( whether by their influence upon his councels or no , is not our enquiry ) has employed all the undue practises , and set all engines a-work , to render the publick assembly useless , burthensome , and odious to the people . on this foot , care has been taken that some vexatious tax should be the only result and conclusion of every session ; aid against the turk , was a constant perpetual pretence ; money the head of all his proposals , money the effect and substance of all his speeches . this affair once adjusted , other debates were out of doors , grievances not then longer to be toucht upon , but all adjourn'd to another session . besides the mischievous devises to embroyl the states amongst themselves , and turn all their heat upon fruitless disputes and altercations . in the second place , the electoral colledge have not been too fair in their respects to the diet. these could be content that betwixt caesar and themselves all the matters of state be transacted . and have sometimes accordingly strecht a text of the golden bull to serve a turn ; and collogued with him , that he again might be complacent to them ; till that amongst them the publick patrimony and common right and prerogatives of the empire become engrost in a few hands , and made a spoyl to their unreasonable ambition . these electors must every one , under his hand and seal , signifie their consent to the emperor , before he can summon an assembly of the states . they got to themselves the making of the emperor . and now in effect the states cannot meet without their order . they were wont to be reckoned six electors , to some purposes seven , now they make eight ; but before they fill up the number of the roman decemviri , they will remember their fate . these ten ( as livy tells us ) having got all the supreme authority for a time into their hands , that they might reign absolute , took an oath together never to call the common councel . yet their tyranny held not long . this cheat would not down with the old romans ; but with a general indignation they break over the forms and captivity of the letter , for that old law in homer , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . to free their country from slavery , they executed an unwarranted piece of justice upon these ten usurpers , or ten tarquins , as some body then call'd them . lastly , the states have not a little been wanting to themselves , in the affair of this their so ancient and fundamental prerogative . one principal cause ( amongst many others ) has been their differences about religion . for the protestants being sure to be out-voted in the dyet , think they can barter with caesar for better conditions . and are therefore well enough content that the yearly assembly be neglected . in a word , the german diet is still on foot , rather incumberd , and clogged , and puzled , than destroyed . the parliament of france seems quite antiquated and subdued ; the ghost and shadow of the defunct has appeared three or four times since lewis the eleventh . but to revive that assembly in its full and perfect vigor , requires a miracle like the resurrection . so that in effect , we may date the demise of the parliamentary soveraignty in france , from lewis the eleventh ; and the decay of that in germany from charles the fifth . it is in england onely that the ancient , generous , manly government of europe survives , and continues in its original lustre and perfection . were there not something in that saying of the emperor maximilian , that the french king is a king of asses ; yet however that same legereté , on which the french so value themselves , is but , in plain english , a lightness of humour , by the which they are easily piped into a new mode of government . but our english ancestors have always been of a more steady principle ▪ more wise , and more weigh'd , than to dance after their politicks . the reformation of religion leaves no room at our court for jesuitical infection , so fatal to the germans . nor , on the other hand , have we yet had any swisse guards , or lewisses for our kings . ours have still been true english original , no copies of the french. magna charta , instead of being superannuated , renews and recovers its pristine strength , and athletick vigor , by the petition of right , with our many other explanatory or declaratory statutes . and the annual parliament is as well known to our laws , as ever it had been famous amongst the customs of france and germany . i have not formally answered many objectons that might be started ; nor much regarded the single instances of some historians ; and perhaps may be judged lame in several particulars that i have slighted . take all together , you may as easily find an answer , as raise a scruple . but the short of what i would have said , is , you are not to expect truth from an historiographer royal : it may drop from their pen by chance , but the general herd understand not their business ; they fill us with story accidental , incoherent , without end , or side , and never know the government or policy where they write . even the records themselves are not always accurately worded . the style of the court , and a form of words , imposes upon many . names are taken for things , ceremonies for essentials . the civilians are vassals to a for reign jurisdiction . caesar , the sword , the military , imperial ( or rather imperatorial ) discipline , is to them for scepter and civil policy . the germans , an. . were for excluding them from all offices , and places of trust . limnaeus , l. . de jure publ . our common lawyers are for comparing and measuring by their rule , what is antecedent and above their rules and comparisons . christs kingdom is not of this world ; nor ought the divines 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to meddle in this political province . in the general notion , monarchy or kingly government is the most easie , and the most excellent . but corruption coming into the world , neither the sons of iupiter , nor the sons of hercules , found perfection entayled upon them ; nor were exempt from their share of humane frailty . many ( says tasso ) are servants by fortune , who are naturally princes : some again , though descended from an hundred kings , are yet born to be slaves ; and ( maugre all their high race of royal progenitors ) will be commanded , and governed , and managed by a minion , or a mistress . these are , really and indeed , slaves ; but are not judged such , because the people , who onely look on the outside , judge of mens conditions , as in plays , where he is call'd a king , who , clad in purple , and glistering with gold and gems , does personate agamemnon : if he does not represent him well , he has the name of king nevertheless ; onely 't is said , the king was out in his part , or , the king acted his part scurvily . and flavius vopiscus , in aurel. caes. tells us , aurelius caesar dicebat , colligunt se quatuor aut quinque , atque unum concilium ad decipiendum imperatorem capiunt ; dicunt quod probandum sit ; imperator qui domi clausus est , vera non novit , cogitur hoc tantum scire , quod illi loquuntur ; facit judices quos sieri non oportet ; amovet a republicâ , quos debebat retinere , quid multa ? ut dioclesianus ipse dicebat , bonus , cautus , optimus venditur imperator . aurel●us caesar was wont to say , four or five get together about the emperor ; all their consult is , how to cheat him ; what they say , is to be law ; the emperor , who is shut up from other counsel , never knows the true state of things ; but is forced to understand just so much onely , as they tell him ; he makes iudges , who the least of all should be ; turns out of commission those who ought to be the quorum ; in a word ( according to dioclesian's saying ) the emperor , so good , so wary , and so too too good , is bought and sold before his face . if then it be true , that he who is of royal extraction , clad in purple , and called a king , is not always naturally such ; it was wisdom , certainly most seasonable , to find the means that might correct , and ( as it were ) ensure nature against the impotence and tyranny of the minion or mistress which tasso mentions . and if the observation of aurelius caesar be just , that cabals are so pernicious ; and that four or five persons who get the prince into their hands and possession , shall abuse , and cheat , and betray him to his face , in spite of all his goodness , his caution , and royal vertues ; if , i say , these things be true , the necessity of parliaments cannot be disputed . homer reckoned it barbarity in the degree remotest from all things of god and goodness , and a cyclopean presumption to rule without parliaments . old hesiod in his homely way gives an aenigmatical reproof to those kings that would be grasping all , and be so absolute , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . as if he had said , these fools know not , how much more the half is than the whole ; and that a shoulder of mutton , with the love of the people , is more worth than the ragoust , and the hautgousts , and all the french kickshaws whatsoever . plato tells us , that even in asia , they who performed any great atchievements , or enlarged the empire , were those ( as the grand cyrus , for example ) who slackened the prerogative , and admitted the people to a share in the government . but such as cambyses , who against all sense and reason stretcht and strutted upon the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the lordly domination , brought all again into confusion and ruine . amongst the latins , even the founder of the roman name , romulus , because he took upon himself an arbitrary power , to rule without the senate , they ( it is thought ) tore him to pieces , insomuch , that they left nothing of his body for a spectacle to the rabble ; as afterwards their successors unluckily did , who kill'd caesar. the imperial power that began with the caesars , was onely magnum latrocinium , one huge horrid oppression . military government , martial law , barbarous nations , goths and vandals , over-ran , and made havock of the old civil roman empire . in britain , gaul , and germany , all this while , liberty , and a participation in the government , was the common right and inheritance unalienable ; the common councel was the basis and hinge , however the administration roul'd . afterwards , when germany gave us people , it gave us a german and a free people . about an. dom. . charlemain ( or charles the great ) united france and germany under one head , and one empire ; pire ; all histories are full of his reign and actions : he rul'd more solenni , secundum morem , in the old customary parliamentary way , every where . the nations round about submitted and took laws from him ; and he submitted all again to the ( ordinatum ) the ordinance of parliament . an annual parliament was then reckoned the custom , and inviolable right of the people . and thus the affairs of state proceeded , and this scheme of government continued in germany , till the late unhappy divisions about religion , weakning and embroyling the states , gave way to the austrian ambition , new projects , and jesuitical artifice ; so that the assembly of the states , at this day , keeps on foot ( indeed ) but sick , heavy , and unweildy . the french court had much sooner learnt the terms de proprio motu , & potestate absolutâ , by their neighborhood and correspondence with the pope at avignon . but so long as the english arms kept them in mind of their mortality , it was no time for them to think of ruling without a parliament . but when charles the seventh had sent home the english , lewis the eleventh , with ( olivier le diable ) his barbars , and his cut-throat devils , thought no attempt too wicked for them . he ( forsooth ) was hors du page ; he wanted not to be led , he was past an infant ; and a lowd outcry he made against the unmannerly , clump-fisted , bumpkin parliament . but when the bien publique , or war for the publick good , hindred him from bringing about his design openly and directly , he compast it , in effect , by slighting the militia , and laying his project of a standing army . in england we have also heard of minions , and mistresses , and cabals ; and have had unhappy princes . but the laws and old customs of the land , the generosity of the people , and the genius of the nation , have still prevailed , and been too strong for all their practises and machinations . when the normans came to the crown , after some years of ease and pr●sperity , they began to forget on what conditions they had entered . conquest was a short , a compendious title , and without intricacy . and now likewise the church-men were every where agog for changing the government both of church and state , into absolute monarchy . but the best on 't was , the pretences were visible and notorious . besides that the temporal and spiritual , the prince and the prelatical lord could not agree who should be supreme . which differences gave breath to the people , and put into their hands an opportunity to assert their ancient just rights , and bottom all upon the parliament again . and now , since the great charter , and petition of right , and the many other declarations , what can threaten us ? neither the gunpowder treason , nor the late more sacred invention of a pensioned parliament , could take effect . no room is left amongst us for a standing army , which enslaved the french. and ( our franc-archers ) our militia continues after the old model , nor , with us , as in germany . , is the papist like to bear up against , and balance our protestant votes in parliament ; thereby to render the constitution useless and unpracticable . and it may be hoped , we shall never so far give way , and be gull'd by jesuitical artifice , to find another division in religion amongst us ; that may favour their designs , and , under other names , do their work as compleatly . you need not be caution'd to distinguish plato the divine , from plato the philosopher . poets and divines , you know , have a particular way of expression , and give their thoughts a turn different from that of other people . they attribute every thing to god ; though the whole operation and train of causes and proceedings ●e never so natural and plain before their face , the images they make are often taken in the grossest sense , and worshipped by the vulgar ; and many times the statesman is willing to contribute to their idolatry . hence it comes , that for the persians , zoroaster was said to receive his laws from horomasis ; trismegistus , for the aegyptians , from mercury ; minos for the cretans from iupiter ; charondas for the carthaginians from saturn ; lycurgus for the lacedemonians from apollo ; draco and solon for the athenians from minerva ; numa pompilius for the romans from aegeria ; xamolxis for the scythians from vesta ; and all these as truly , as mahomet had his alcoran from the angel gabriel . this sort of doctrine went currant enough whilst monkery and ignorance sat in the chair ; but now in an age of history and humane reason , the blind traditions go hardly down with us . so that iure divino at this day makes but a very litigious title . nor was it consistent with the brevity of a letter , to observe minutely how long the remains of the roman domination continued amongst us ; as , namely , that the roman was the only authentick language for judicial matters in germany , till the reign of rudolph the first , about the year . in england till edward the third , in france till francis the first . but in church affairs , that old mark of slavery is not yet worn off : the spiritual emperor will remit nothing , he still holds his vassals to the roman tongue even in divine service ; onely in england , and where the reformation has prevailed , this , with the other appurtenances of roman bondage , are no longer necessary . nor is it proper in this general draught to reflect on all the several steps , and little dispositions to change , in each nation . as how sometimes a practice has prevailed against the form and letter ; sometimes the form of words has been necessary , but the practice obsolete . the use in commissions of the phrase , pour en jouyr tant qu'il nous plaira , was not known in france till lewis the eleventh tryed its vertue ; which occasioned their parliament , an. . to ordain that notwithstanding the clause tant qu'il nous plaira , offices should not be voyd save only by death , resignation , or forfeiture ; as pasquier in his recherches informs us . but peradventure , since it has been so much controverted of late amongst us who are the three states , and the word occurring so frequently in the german tongue , you may expect some account who they be that have the name of states in germany . they express the word states in their own language , and call them stands , and reich-stands , because , says goldastus , the empire stands and rests upon them , as upon its basis and pillars . status imperii dicantur , quod in illis , ceu membris , id est , basibus & columnis , ipsum imperium stet & subsistat . those are said to be stands , who have the right to sit and vote in the common assembly of the empire . hi quidem status , reichs-stands appellantur , ideo , quod statum & locum votandi & sedendi in comitiis imperii habent ; hâc quippe unicâ & propriâ quasi notâ , status ab aliis imperii subject is secernuntur , arumaeus , c. . de comitiis . so that all the question is , how many several ranks , or distinct orders , there may be of these stands . from polybius we have had a particular account of mixt governments , where he calls those that represent the monarchical , the aristocratical , and the popular state 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the three governing parts of the common-wealth . so the king , the senate , and the ephori at sparta ; the consuls , the senate , and the tribunes at rome , were there the three states , and had each their particular shares in the government . the like seems to have obtain'd in france , under the names of the king , the peers , and the third state. nor did the power of the clergy , how great soever otherwise , make any new distinct order , but they were mixt and included with the other states ; as their learned archbishop claude seisselle in his treatise of the french monarchy , shows us . in germany how the government has been shared , and who have had a right of voting in old times , we may learn from what has before been cited out of tacitus ; the rex , the principes , and the omnes , denote the three states , who had their several shares , and right of voting in the government . the same distinction continued still under the western empire . hincmar , at the yearly assembly , or generale placitum under charlemain , does comprehend all under the terms of seniores and minores . so that the emperor , the seniors , and the commons , seem to have then been the three states . senior ( which the germans exprest in their ealdermen ) we may suppose , was a word grew currant in the provincial , or vulgar roman about that time ; and afterwards was diversifyed into sieur , and sire , and sir , and monsignior , and monsieur , and was ordinarily applyed to men in great office. cum seniori urbis nunciata fuissent , &c. seniores loci illius , &c. nihil per me feci , nisi quae mihi , a dominis nostris & senioribus imperata sunt , &c. tempore senioris nostri , &c. ex parte senioris mei caroli , &c. these and the like passages , in gregory turonensis , may show the extent of the word , and that the seniores in hincmar , were the same with the principes in tacitus . nor did the signiories become hereditary till otho the first his reign . but what most affected the government , and proved of greatest consequence in this affair , was the innovations that hapned in frederic the third his time : for whereas formerly a proclamation was wont to be issued out , for summoning the assembly , whereupon , delecti ex singulis civitatibus , says aymoinus , from every town and city were chosen the burgesses and citizens to go their representatives to the assembly ; now so many griev'd at the charge , neglected the proclamations , that oftentimes the assembly could not proceed for want of a competent number of members . wherefore frederic let the proclamations alone , and instead thereof , sent particular letters to the several towns ; and henceforward none took themselves obliged to attend , who had not letters directed to them . many of the poorer towns were glad to be excused , and private gentlemen left off going : so that within a little time the government was brought into a few hands , and every day rendered less and less popular . those cities that preserved their share in the government , and right of voting , by continuing to send their representatives to the assembly , are now therefore called imperial cities . although the electoral princes had a name much sooner , yet were they still one and the same state with the other princes , till under this frederic , in the dyet at francford , an. . they parted , and became a particular assembly , and voted severally , and from that time got the name of a distinct state , and form'd a new sort of an aristocratie by themselves . yet all this while the clergy did never set up for a separate order in the common-wealth , but always made a mixt state with the layety ; mixt they are in the electoral state , and mixt in that of the princes , where the geistlicher and weltlicher , ghostly and worldly ( as they call 'um ) together with the counts , barons , and other gentlemen , make but one state. they have indeed a particular bench ( die geistliche bank ) to sit upon by themselves , save that the arch-duke of austria , and duke of burgundy , onely sit upon it above them . now whether we fix our notion of the three states upon the doctrine of the ancients , as delivered by polybius ; or call them the states , who have a right of voting ; the emperour is clearly one of the states . nor is it material that the ordinary stile and form of words seem to imply the contrary : for if the saying , emperor and the states , argues the emperor himself to be none of the states , by the same reason the form so frequent in their recesses or publick ordinances , chur fursten , fursten , und standen , that is , elector-princes , princes , and states , will exclude the electors , and the other princes also , from being either of them states . the form emperor and states , does no more prove him to be none of the states , than with us the saying king and parliament , does imply , that the king is no part of the parliament . i shall not trouble you with the disputes , what were the bounders of anstrasia and newstria , or whether by the devolution of this western empire , germany was added to france , or france to germany . or whether more properly charlemain be to be reckoned amongst the french or the germans . his having been born at ingelsheim , as most affirm ; or at carolsburg in the upper bavaria , as many believe ; and his speaking the german tongue , with this testimony of eginhardus , viz. mensibus juxta patriam linguam nomina imposuit ; cum ante id tempus apud francos partim latinis , partim barbaris nominibns appellarentur , ianuarium appellavit wintermonat , februarium horning , martium lenkmonat , &c. these , i say , are urged by the germans , as no mean arguments . but these matters concern not our enquiry . if you cannot reconcile the emperor his being somewhere said to be sacri imperii minister , and elsewhere declared to have no superiour , nisi deum & ensem , but god and the sword ; bartolus tells you , de verbis non curat jureconsultus . the intention is to be regarded before the words . the intention of the states in that declaration , an. . was none other than to exclude the wild pretensions of the pope ; to deny a forreign jurisdiction , not to confess or introduce any new subjection in themselves : limitata ex certâ causâ confessio non nisi limitatum producat effecium . but i cannot conclude without some reflection on these frauds a la mode , the ruse and finesse , which the french so loudly boast at this day . lewis the eleventh would not have his son learn more latin than qui nescit dissimulare , nescit regnare . the old romans had another sort of spirit ; we are told in livy , haec romana esse . non versutiarum punicarum , neque calliditatis graecae-apud quos fallere hostem gloriosius — dolo quam virtute : 't is like a roman , to deal openly and roundly ; not to practice the carthaginian leger-de-main tricks , or graecian cunning , whose glory is to circumvent and by fraud not vertue overcome an enemy . the venetians at this day are commended for the same style . il procedere veramente regio regli affari publici , il negotiare saldo , e libero , e senza artisicio , o duplicita ; non masquerato , non finto , ma sincero , e del tutto alieno da ogni dissimulatione e fallacia . their proceedings in publick affairs , ( says our author ) is truly royal ; they negotiate upon the square , frankly , and without artifice , or double dealing , not disguised , or upon the sham ; but sincere , and every way far from all dissembling and tricks . and indeed the bugie and inganni , and little italian shifts , would better become duke valentine and the petty princes , than any kingdom or commonwealth of true strength and solid reputation . the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the sophistries and state-pretences of this kind . however furbisht up , and gloss'd over of late by our politick brokers , were all stale cheats , and worn out even in aristotle's time . thus have i hinted matters to you , and onely toucht upon heads , without anticipating your reflections and applications . i have not treated you like a stranger , but as one thorowly informed before-hand , and to whom all those difficulties are familiar , which i can onely discover at a distance . and after all , i must fly from your judgment , to your good nature . finis . a satyr against common-wealths h. p. approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing p estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a satyr against common-wealths h. p. [ ], p. printed for joseph hindmarsh ..., and francis hicks ..., london : . preface signed: h.p. poem. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- anecdotes - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - elspeth healey sampled and proofread - elspeth healey text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a satyr against common-wealths . fallitur egregio quisquis sub principe credit servitium : nunquam libertas gratior extat quam sub rege pio . claudian . de laudibus stiliconis . london , printed for joseph hindmarsh bookseller to his royal highness , and francis hicks , bookseller in cambridge , , a preface to the reader . in vain do we give kings the pompous titles of great and mighty : in vain has heaven allotted them a power , resembling that of its own , free and uncontrolable , if like billiard-table kings they are onely set up to be shaken and thrown down by the saucy touches of their humble vassals . if their authority has such confinements , as some men would have us persuaded it has , princes are at best but glittering pageants , all the professions of steady loyalty but solemn impertinencies , and heaven it self is a sharer in the gaudy delusion . it is not long since this isle was reckon'd amongst the blackest instances of treason and rebellion , when the best of kings and the best of men fell by the rude violence of a consecrated axe ; ever since we have felt the unfortunate consequences of that dismal blow ; a blow which like that that was given to the worlds great redeemer , rent the vail of the church of england in two , abolish'd all its pious canons , and made them give place to the new-fangled whimsies of religious hypocrites ; a fact so horrid and unexampled , that if we may believe salmasius , cui simile nec praeterita secula vidêrunt , nec ventura forsitan videbunt . all this was done under the flattering disguises of religion , by men who had the impudence to boast of a more than ordinary inspiration , and who pretended to have received more light from heaven , than that ass whom the antients fondly accused for drinking up the moon , who could throw themselves into all the postures of religion , with as great facility as a skilfull tumbler can act the italian strades , and with a sort of popular piety cheated three nations into a belief , that whatsoever they did , was highly lawful , so true is that which machiavel says , fere omnes homines magis specie , & colore rerum , quàm rebus ipsis permoventur & judicant . in vain do our learned tribe go about to reclaim these men by dint of argument , all their sober reasonings are to them but important trifles , and were always accounted too weak baits to catch the carpes of geneva lake . and who i pray would take the pains to convince a taylor by a syllogism , who perhaps after the consummation of a pair of breeches , creeps into a coffee-house , where after he has lin'd his pallet with that factious juice , he looks upon his long and limber fingers to have been contriv'd by nature for the handling of a scepter , and curses the bitter fates that had dwindled it into a needle , away he goes home , and performs the offices of distributive justice upon his apprentices shoulders , and fancies every piece of parchment cut from an old bond to make his measures withal , little less to be than clippings from of magna charta . such a knave as this deserves no other logick than what the pillory can afford him , to make his ears pay for the petulancy of his tongue . another sort of man there is , whom in the country language we may call substantial , who perhaps has got fourscore pounds a year , and joys in having a little dove-coat annex'd to his farm-house , who is famous all over the neighbouring villages for his little chesnut mare , who in a race at a late wake signalized her self by distancing a cart-horse ; such a man as this you can never convince by dint of argument , he tells you roundly that at the first opportunity be'l draw his yard and half of rapier to defend his religion and rusty bacon from the rude insults of arbitrary power : you would laugh in your sleeve ( if you have any ) to hear his brisk and debonair reasonings , about the authority of the commons of england , and you cannot imagine with what deference and regard he is entertain'd amongst the mobile , beeause he gives them to know the transactions of state , and fills the whole lordship with news ; 't is odds but you shall see him at the next election of a knight of the shire , brandishing in his campagn coat and mountero , at the head of a troop of dapper-day-labourers , on whom prodigal fortune has munificently bestow'd two pounds a year , and who with complicated interests are striving to set up their idol representative . now the defections of such a man as this from the principles of loyalty , we cannot think to obviate by the most improved reasonings ; his prejudices stop up all the avenues of his soul , hindring the least beam of truth to enter in , and enlighten his understanding : his too fervent zeal for his principles will not give him the leisure to be convinced , and his ignorance baffles all the attempts of reason : as he does not take up any opinion for the affinity it bears to truth , so neither does he relinguish any for its opposition to the same , if his interest invites him he easily accords with any thing , and his reason finds no regrets in entertaining a profitable error : as you cannot disengage him from his mistakes , so neither can you settle him in a truth , although you bring all the credentials of a firm demonstration , and the reason is , because a discourse to him is no more than it is to a school-boy , the jingling of a noun and verb together . if then any thing will do , it must be satyr , and we may if we observe , find in the dullest apprehensions a quicker resentment of a jest than of an argument , the one renders that ridiculous , which the other perhaps cannot make appear to be false , and satyrs are like those indian apes , of whom i have read , that when alexander came into those parts , they straight rally'd thelr deformed squadrons , rank'd themselves in battalia , camp'd and decamp'd with all the moving solemnities of a real army , and brought greater affronts upon that all-conquering army with their martial grimaces , than all the force of darius and parus , i have made the comparison , let some courteous reader make out the application . for this cause it is that i have ridicul'd all the commonwealths that lay in my way , from great old rome to little modern geneva ; what i have said on this theam , if the peruser be not too phlegmatick , must needs create in him some fastidious thoughts of that way of governing . more especially i have hinted at our late pretended republican powers , and in particular at their monstrous innovations about religions ; where i have let any thing slip from my pen , that may seem extravagant , i hope it will not be look'd upon as an unruly effort of my own , but onely as an endeavour to expose the giddy enthusiasts of those times . i shall say nothing neither as to the matter or manner of the verse , i know the whole poem will labour under the imputations of uneasie roughness , yet i could never imagine that smoothness should be so absolutely necessary in the dressing up of a satyr ; it always seeming to me as disagreeable to see a satyr cloath'd in soft and effeminate language , as to see a woman scold and vent her self in billings-gate rhetorick in a gentile and advantageous garb. i have no more to say , onely to desire the reader to be as favourable as he can to the first endeavours of an unexperienc'd pen , which is all from h. p. a satyr against common-wealths . ( ) i 'le not forbear — for who can longer stay when loyal muses bid me not delay but nodding promise an auspicious way ? thus caesar once heaven's anger to attone beck'nd to , by a god , pass'd rubicon , to scourge his own republick , haughty rome . a commonwealth ! curse on that nauseous name which from the devil with damnation came ; he first set up the curs'd reforming trade , and boldly sought heaven's empire to invade ; till blasted by joves thunder , down he fell , state-holder to the commonwealth of hell. 't is a poor sneaking form of government ; kings , gods : but they , the people represent ; here men with swinging trowsers awe . and divine collar-bands give law. tell me my muse for thou knows best — is it not worth a jest ? to see a pair of representatives leaving their charge of children , and their wives , who th' other day in their nown country sate as referees about a broken pate ? and talk'd sedition over table-beer at the next sessions streight appear to manage government 's grand affair ? would it not make a stoick laugh to see those men of mickle glee , who in their parish-church all their devotion owe to a fring'd cushion or a matted pew , distinguish'd from the crowd of the church-militant , by a gilt bible of alma mater's print ? and ' mongst the rout for devotees do pass , ' cause their devotion 's height'nd by their bass , at the next opening of a parliament , loudly dispute about church-government ; and with grave speeches , tell you to an hair where lies the placket of the roman whore. nay and unravel , with the greatest ease rash calvin's mystical decrees . can tell the intrigues of the celestial powers ; and open heaven as a chest of drawers : in this box , they give out the elect must lye , in that reprobates damn'd to eternity . ( ) lash satyr , lash with furies hissing snake those knaves , who kill'd their king for conscience-sake . 't was conscience was the fatal dog and bell that led those blinded bigots down to hell. in outward show they hated worldly coin , yet conscience still , like christmas-box , took in cavaliers feasters , and without a sin. they us'd the cutting hanger of the spirit ; as switz his sword for money , not for merit . had they seen jove when danae's lap he wet with golden showers , to heav'en he near had got , tho a god , to guinies he had turn'd him streight . they made a golden calf without a sin ; each attribute had a jacobus been . conscience in them was very free , and kind , it was the spaniel dictate of the mind that leap'd for every thing , that rump ordain'd . what ever government was fram'd by fate , shock fetch'd and carried still the glove of state ; o conscience ! conscience ! what thou art i 'le tell ; thou art the goodman's goose , that with each yell , when danger 's nigh , saves the souls capitol . thou art the bad man's * peak , that straightway turns all the souls softer dictates , into stones . like the prodigious hebrews rod , that turn'd the aegyptian waters all to blood . ( ) from presbyter to independent pass : we 'l throw some grains in nol the brewer's face , 't is true he 'd have his beer both old , and strong , but his religion always new and young. h' abus'd the catholick faith in pious mock , and primitive religion , stil'd old hoc . yet for all his zeal , to reform the rout , he always wore a popish snout ; the red upon his nose as poets tell ; look'd like what we a scarlet hood do call , couchant on surplice theological . not in hell his nose more piercing flames could find tipt with damnation , while on earth he reign'd : prometheus did not his whole man inspire , his nose onely was damask'd with that fire . ( ) this england once was thy unhappy state , when best of monarchs felt the worst of fate . when they had sent the martyr to his grave ; they threw hey jinks what government they 'd have : they fillip'd up what powers should prevail , and stead of head the counter threw up tail , for proof of which , to the english rump was given , a pair of span-new breeches , sent from heaven . these were their arms , by which a man may guess , codpiece , and conscience was the good old cause . long had the english nation been fed with the manna of a monarch's reign ; long had one dish , their cravings satisfi'd , their weak and squeamish stomachs cloy'd , at last , their vitious palats , not content , would have an ollio of government : something of every thing they crave , an anarchy or nothing they would have . the gods , who never punish with remorse , gave 'em their wish , although they wish'd a curse . ' stead of the royal oak , which long had stood , the top , the glory , of the wood : from off the poplar tree , the giddy rout wedg'd their blockish sovereigns out . from thence they hew'd those logs of power , and whittl'd scepters , as you whittle scures . a brace of patriots from each county sent , sate like the ghosts of deceas'd government . and without the house of lords — made but a rigdel parliament . these ap'd their sovereign with as good a meen as dives's guinies did the lawful coin. they rob'd the land , by wars before decay'd , and whilst they robb'd they wept and pray'd , t' attone the mighty sin they fast in tears , they pray'd by sabbaths and rebell'd by years . thus the gods punish'd charles's foes , thus the gods reparteed all their rebellious vows . ( ) tame tarquin ! that so easily was won to part with all the splendours of a crown ; unking'd he fell in age and glory green , when rome was young and in her teens . the latin rebels push'd him from his throne , and put a brace of consuls in his room : these clubbing in conjunction did dispence like planets their united influence . a snivelling peer that lov'd his spouse too well , rather than be a cuckold would rebell ; for 's country's sake he thought it was no sin : for well knew he that petticoat and property with the same letters did begin . lucrece the chast , the fair , of noble blood would not be buss'd for all that 's good , she would not truckle to her loves decree , she would not kiss , poor heart , not she . bravely the noble doxy strove , though at last forc'd to pay her tax of love. when the lascivious scene was done , and the slut saw she was not made a queen , she tore her hair and dainty quoif , with a sharp ponyard ended all the strife , and quickly did the little job of life . for this the roman bullies seiz'd his crown , for this they threw the mighty lecher down , and in his stead two consuls fill'd the chair , almanack kings that lasted but a year : they and their senate all reform'd anew from cit and bumkin to the nobler crew . the alphabet it self was crost , the letters that made rex were lost and s. p. q. did rule the roast , at last their civil wars made such a stir , they were forc'd to accept the kingly power a monarch of three syllables an emperour . ( ) speak out venetian punk , thou that do'st prate of a republick of so long a date ; an idle common-wealth , that has these several hundred years been making glass ! each puny mortal there , pretends to power , a calcin'd cobler makes a senator . a covie of islands seated in the sea , make up this proud venetiae : ' mongst th' quae-genus-monsters she is found , onely in th' plural sense declin'd ; some bits of earth from th'continent purloyn'd make up the wonders of that place ; famous for bawds , and mighty pretty lace ; each suppliant punk unto her lord does pay the glorious tribute of poynt-veny . each senator for 's crown a thimble takes ; and hieroglyphick bobbings scepters makes . a duke they have , god-wot , so low in stock , that his toes stink for want of royal sock . his stingy meals , hardly deserve a rhime , he keeps an exc'llent house in peas-cod-time ; at second hand he buys his cloaths , and runs on tick for hose and shoes : scarcely odd money they allow the crotchet , to keep the devil out of 's pocket . ( ) stand off you little dwindling states , make room holland the buttock of the world is come although not half so generous as the bum that freshly does discharge it's nat'ral load relieves the hungry earth with dung and food : but they like greedy leaches still suck in they drink , and eat , and drink again , till like them too you 'd think they 'd burst their skin they love their ransack'd , sordid pelf so well that their low countries may be reck'ond hell pluto and they in the same region dwell . frugal they are beyond all measure , they 'l damn their very souls for treasure . they hate free spending as they hate free-grace and count it fond arminianism in purse their dortish synod has determin'd thus . for gold they search the world and traverse indies , for sickly earth that has the jaundies ; they 'l change their athanasian faith for a rich diamond or an elephants tooth : give 'em a china dish or persian cap , they 'l streight turn turks and nice for mecca swap ; of an english herring they make no bones , their commonwealth consists of milts and roanes ; the apostles here in great esteem are had onely because they practis'd fishing trade , these knaves those pious anglers imitate , and boldly british gudgeons captivate . to let you see what good they wish unto the commonwealth of fish , elziver prints with greatest care he can fishmonger hobs's great leviathan , a book which proves men to be whales , a state of nature stuck with finns and scales , they are a people fit for satyr , their low countries are no better , than the pudenda of modest nature . those netherlands of which they boast , are but creation below the waste . ( ) cold switzers that amongst your other ills have planted a republick upon hills ; their snow that on their mountains lies , gives them kib'd heels and consciences ; that cold and dirty clime puts them hard to 't , they ne'r can make a law without their boot , neither do justice without riding coat . they fetch all their dictators from the plow , who scarcely any other purple know , but when with frosts their fire burns blew . a cold and barren soil's the reason why , kind heaven ne'r thaws 'em into monarchy . 't is strange that there a commonwealth should thrive , or that republick weeds or alps should live . these men so much extoll'd by fame , at first from hannibal's vinegar bottle came ; when he to cut an easier way did use that acid , peevish , and ill-natur'd juice , the riggling animals that thence did rise leap'd into men , and made this brutish race . ( ) of all the commonwealths of greatest fame once more step forth romulian dame let your rebublick consuls if they can , match the victorious macedonian , a king , whese actions spake him more than man. sauny the great who'th race of men subdued , conquer'd the world was drunk and spu'd . to th' furthest east he spread his victories , his glories set where the sun's glories rise ; a fight to him was but a drinking bout , with his enemies lives he paid the shot , their veins like pitchers emptied out , he grudg'd over one world tipling to stand , he wou'd have drunk a dozen in a hand , finely faith he firkt the persian ninny , whose father got his kingdom by a whinny , mounted on buceph'lus this bully crack'd to ride inch and half-stone with any king beside , match him all latium , match him if you can , consuls you had when commonwealths began , conquer'd a lust or two but ne'er a man. poplicola of whom fame speaks so loud demolish'd his farm-house to please the croud , to pull it down he thought 't was best , cause 't was a cock-loft higher than the rest . for these and such like things by livy told , amongst records of fame he stands enroll'd . ( ) all hail geneva ! to thy lake all health , whom calvin made a common-wealth : calvin a bishop grudg'd to see lord it in robes of soveraignty . he push'd the miter'd moppet from his throne , he threw the mighty lawn-sleeves down : bishop and bible both believe me got a translation at geneva . she cleansed away the filthy rags of rome , landress she was to the whore of babylon ; with gospel-soap she purg'd her popish sins , stifned her rites and starch'd her disciplines ; women reform'd there at their will , women the strapping sex that spells so ill . the city dames more zealous far than wise put the apocrypha under their pies , and made bumfodder of the maccabees . judith they forc'd to stop a broken pane , and gave holofernes his head again . christ-cross out of their alphabet they turn'd each babe an horn-book had true protestant . tell me religious roysters , tell me now why you are so angry when the organs blow ? our thoughts like theban stones disorder'd lie , till that religious harmony shapes and cements them into unity . i hate that common-wealth of all the worst , i hate their prick-ear'd senate and their priests , who love a common whore , but hate the common-prayer . ( ) fain would i know eternal dunces why you hate the godlike sway of monarchy ? a government in heaven allow'd , where the bright monarch makes his throne a cloud , and gently aws the angelick lovely croud . where cherubins like glorious muses sit , and praise the almighty power in numbers fit , in the seraphick strains of heavenly wit. grosly then must they err who do affirm , that common-wealths are of an heavenly stem , and make an hans-town of the new jerusalem . no , base republicks you can n'er agree with that delightful unity . your tide of rule runs in divided streams . glow-worms of power , you shine in sep'rate beams ▪ i hate that gaudy sanhedrim of lights , who by gommittees rule the nights ; i mean the stars , whose short commissions run all in the name of the departed sun. give me the glittering monarch of the day ; at whose approach those tapers sneak away . he reigns by day and all the night he drinks , he sips and revels on the ocean's brinks , and like a monarch never shrinks . the epilogue being an anti-republican catch . ( ) let the speculative sot , who thinks and lives not , tell the world what paps alma-mater has got ; let him if he please his appetite bilk , and huzza the king's health in a glass of her milk : from the nipples of the vine ( the wiser do know ) that a brisk and more generous liquor do's flow . ( ) would you be a bard sir , of any regard sir ? believe me wine is the best crambo word sir. homer was drunk as e'r son of a woman was , when he hickupt so often 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and the old greekish rhimer had been dabling in claret , when he made that reeling verse we call pindarick . ( ) a pox of old noll , who our barrels did toll , and excis'd each caviliers affluent bowl . to be reveng'd of him , and his council of asses , let 's break on the table all common-wealth glasses , boy , take that venice glass to republican saints ; we 'll drink the king's health in true english flints . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e * a river famous for it's petrifying quality . letters that often occur in roman history for senatus populusque . a happy handfull, or green hopes in the blade; in order to a harvest, of the several shires, humbly petitioning, or heartily declaring for peace. fuller, thomas, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (thomason e _ ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing f thomason e _ estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; :e [ ]) a happy handfull, or green hopes in the blade; in order to a harvest, of the several shires, humbly petitioning, or heartily declaring for peace. fuller, thomas, - . [ ], , [ ] p. printed for john williams at the sign of the crown in st. pauls church-yard, london : . epistle dedicatory signed: john williams. a collection of petitions, remonstrances and declarations from various parts of the kingdom. -- thomason catalog. annotation on thomason copy: "vide single sheets in fol. printed about a month before this in ⁰"; "may. d". reproduction of the original in the british library. eng england and wales. -- parliament -- early works to . political science -- sources -- early works to . great britain -- history -- commonwealth and protectorate, - -- early works to . great britain -- politics and government -- - -- early works to . great britain -- constitution -- early works to . a r (thomason e _ ). civilwar no a happy handfull, or green hopes in the blade;: in order to a harvest, of the several shires, humbly petitioning, or heartily declaring for fuller, thomas b the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the b category of texts with fewer than defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion a happy handfull , or green hopes in the blade ; in order to a harvest , of the several shires , humbly petitioning , or heartily declaring for peace . diadem psal. . . seek peace , and follow after it . london , printed for john williams at the sign of the crown in st. pauls church-yard , . to his highness the lord general monck . my lord , what formerly was in single arrows , is here bound in a sheaf , i conceive it good that by such conjunction , they might mutually reflect light one on another . posterity will probably be pleased to look back on such passages . some love to see the little coats they then did wear when children . alas , these all were the essayes in the infancy of our liberty , now grown a stripling , god send it to be a man ! yet they differ rather in sound than in sense , variously expressing the same matter . so many men , and but one minde , is admirable ; prompted certainly by the spirit of unity inditing them . factious petitions , gave the beginning , and loyal declarations must give the end to our miseries . but here is the difference , the first were made by the scum , these by the cream of the nation . aeneas did beg the boon of the sybil , that she would not write her oracles ( according to her usual course ) in leaves of trees blown away with every wind . these declarations formerly were printed in leaves or single papers , which are soon lost , not to say , the best of papers so printed , are oft consigned to the worst of uses . this is a way to preserve , and to propagate them . i remember the verse of the poet , singula cum valeant sunt meliora simul , take each of them asunder , good as either , then needs they must be best , all put together . what ( as single stars ) was good , must be best in a constellation . god happily perfect what is so hopefully begun by your honour , though my voice is too weak to be the eccho to the sound of the whole nation : your honours most humble servant , john williams . an express from the knights and gentlemen of cheshire , now engaged with sir george booth : to the city and citizens of london , and all other free-men of england . worthy citizens , and all other our english free-men and brethren , as we are english-men we are all incorporated into one body , and though distinct and different families , fortunes , and qualities , yet fellow members and coheirs of one and the same birth-right ; not onely by nature , as we are the sons of men ( nature obliging all in one common and equal bond of freedom and unity , ) but by certain sacred laws and customs of peculiar and inherent right to this nation ; general , equal , and impartial to all , without respect of persons , rank , quality , or degree , derived through all successions of ages , by the blood , justice , and prudence of our fore-fathers to us their posterity , as ours , and the right of our children after us , not dis-inheritable : though this age were wholly made up of apostates and traytors to common justice and freedom , and should make sale of , and deliver up their children as slaves and vassals , yet english right abideth , to wit , our just laws and liberties , and may justly be re-inforced as opportunity may present ; sometimes they sleep , but never die , their total extinguishment is not to be imagined , so long as any englishman , or english blood abideth : and whoever undertaketh ( though by arms or otherwise ) their recovery and redemption is justified in that very action by the laws of god , of nations , nature , reason , and by the laws of the land ; and within the bowels of our nation amongst our selves no war can be justified , but upon that score , the contrary is sedition , murde● treason , tyranny and what not , and the instruments thereof no other in the eye of english freedom and right , but as bears , wolves , and other beasts of prey . now right worthy and noble citizens , and all other our english brethren , let us consider and lay to heart the sad and deplorable condition of our native countrey : oppression , injustice , and tyranny reigneth ; division , discord , and distimulation fomented and fostered ; trade and industry discouraged , our land rent into parties and factions , and the common band of unity cancell'd , our fundamental laws supplanted , high courts of justice introduced , the blood of war sh●d in times of peace ; arbitrary and illegal imprisonments , patents , monopolies , excise , and other payments brought upon us , and continued contrary to magna charta , and the petition of right ; no form or face of government of english constitution amongst us ; the name and athority of the people in parliament usurped and abused , and the stamp thereof put upon strange and prodigious actions , vexing and oppressing the people with dayly changes and alterations in government , as the interest of some few ambitious grandees alter and change , or get advantages one of another , and all under the name of a common-wealth , when as the nature is not practised or intended at all , it being utterly inconsistent with their very temper and interest ; they are wrapt up and compounded of nothing but guilt-blood , and tyranny ; and equal and common justice ( the essence of a common-wealth ) are utterly repugnant thereto ; and whatsoever they can do must be planted and maintained by sword and violence against the very heart and sence of the nation ; and they know not where or how to centre an oligarchy , or something they would have to be masters of the people , and perpetuate their power and tyranny , and therefore would amaze and confound us with their new debares of a coordinate power , or senate for life , such as our english , laws and liberties know not of , and of pernicious consequence to this nation ; so that from these men that thus handle the stern at westminster , there is no expectation of any just settlement of peace , or freedom from oppression ; especially considering the apostacy , hypocracy , deceipt , and perjury of those men , their manifold solemn engagements , oaths , vows , protestations , appeals unto heaven ; promises , remonstrances , declarations , all by them broken again and again , never keeping faith , truce , or oath , being unbounded , unlimited , certain to nothing , not to be held either by the law of god or man , of conscience or reason ; and from such persons in government , good lord deliver us , and all the good people of england ; and that all this is true of them , your consciences ( noble citizens , and all other the free-people of england ) can witness , there is no tongue , no pen is able to vindicate them in this point ; it is known of all , owned by all , and can be denied by none ; how then can any honest or just man shed any blood in their quarrel , or lend them assistance ? surely that blood will be required at their hands , and we doubt not but you will be carefull what you do . and therefore from those considerations and just provocations , that we have taken up arms in pursuance of , and inquisition after our government , laws , and liberties , that every english-man may be protected and secured in his religion , liberty , and property ; and though it may be suggested , that we intend to introduce prosecution for conscience into the land again , we do hereby ( in the presence of almighty god ) protest and declare against all coercive power in matters of religion , and that to the utmost of our strength ( through gods assistance ) we will endeavour , to the hazzard of our blood and fortunes , the freedom and protection of all vertuous and religious people , by what name soever differenced from us , equal with our selves : and that no forreign , or other authority , save only the civil be exercised in england : that the practise of the law be reformed ; all corrupt statutes repealed ; annual elections of all officers and magistrates , with the constant succession of parliaments restored ; our fundamental laws cleared and asserted ; and whatever is contrary there to be abolished : that no trials be admitted in england for life , limb , liberty or estate , but by the good old way of juries ; and that they be restored to their original power and purity : that all extrajudicial and illegal proceedings by high-courts of justice , or otherwise , with all illegal and arbitrary committees , be strictly provided against : that the excise , and all other payments and taxes , ( such as our ancestors never knew of ) together with all monopolies and patents destructive to trade and the common good of the nation be also abolished ; and , that our parliaments and magistrates be secured from all force and violence ; and utterly cleared from all boundlesse prerogative , and unlimited priviledge : that the right of the poor in the commons of england , all donations for charitable uses , and all lands formerly belonging to the people , be restor'd again : and that mercy and justice be truly established amongst us . and for these ends , and what else may be of publick good to the nation , we do desire , and indeed challenge , as of english right , the speedy election of a new free parliament . and thus , most noble citizens , brethren and fellow freemen of england , we have dealt truly and plainly with you , and given you the real grounds and reasons of our taking up arms ; looking upon you as the most concern'd in the nation , and therefore hold our selves the more obliged to give you this early advice of our candid and just intentions in this undertaking , that you may not be deluded or frighted ( though falsly ) into any strange opinion of us , either through your own mistake , or by the pollicy of those men who will leave no means unattempted to render us as publick enemies , rebels and traitors , plunderers , tyrants and persecutors , or whatever is odious and monstrous , to engage you in blood . believe us , right worthy citizens , and free-born english brethren , we have no design of fire or sword , or of evil toward you or your city , or any part of the nation , or any person in it : we know there are thousands amongst you that are satisfied in us ; it may be indeed that many or most of the gathered separate churches may be fearfull and jealous of us , and so may be induced to arms against us ; but we do again and again protest before almighty god , and the whole world , that we have no other purpose towards them , but that they with us , and we with them , may be bound up as friends and brethren in the common cause of our countrey , that every english-man may have english freedom and right ; and we do not desire to wrong man , woman , or childe the worth of a shoo-latchet : therefore we hope you will first well advise before you proceed in a new war , lest you bring not only your own , but others blood on your heads , ( for we are resolved to presecute this to the last drop of our blood . ) the case of england is laid before you , our laws and liberties , they are yours as well as ours , and for which we have all engaged in the first war , and not to be so slightly valued as to be set at stake against the private ends of some ambitious and corrupt persons : salus populi , suprema lex ; let the people live , and their enemies perish . therefore we beseech you , we conjure you as english men , to stand by your native countrey , and your countrey's cause : our voice is , and it is no other than the consent and voice of the people , a new free parliament , a new free parliament ; it is the english man's main birth-right , which we are resolved to put the people in possession of , or to perish with our swords in our hands . but if you will not joyn , but degenerate , we hope notwithstanding ( by gods blessing ) to carry on this work : yet to that just and glorious work we may challenge your concurrence , it being your duty as well as ours to endeavour the procurement thereof ? and therefore to you make it our proposal , to your militia , to the army , and the whole people , for the prevention of a new war , and the effusion of english blood , that you would be instrumental with us for the speedy election of a new free parliament , for the ends aforesaid ; and in the interim all hostility to be forborn ; and that a day may be appointed , and the people suffered to go to their free elections , and we shall quietly submit to their authority ; heartily desiring , that all revenge , division , rancor , and animosity of spirit may be for ever buried in one general act of oblivion ; and that all parties , sects , and sorts , ( now jarring and making up interests one against another ) may reconcile , cement , and concenter in the common brotherhood of english freedom and right ; in , and for which we are . sir george booth to a friend of his in london . sir , my last to you of the second instant , i understand you have committed to open view , the publication whereof was of general satisfaction to your friends here , and for which we all hold our selves obliged . i have sent you here inclosed an express from the knights and gentlemen engaged with me , and beg this further addition to your former many favours , that you would please to take the care upon you , to get the same printed and published , for the undeceiving of those amongst you , and all other that are yet doubtfull or unsatisfied in us . the messenger will inform you of the present state and condition of affairs with us , to whom i refer you . in haste i rest , sir , your most affectionate friend and servant , george booth . manchester aug. . . alleyn mayor . at a common-council holden in the guildhall , london , on tuesday the . of december , . this court having taken notice of divers affronts put upon the right honorable thomas alleyn , the present lord mayor of this city , with many false and scandalous aspersions cast upon his lordship , and the committee appointed by this court to confer with the lord fleetwood touching the peace and safety of this city : as if they had deserted their trust , or betrayed the rights and liberties of this city . and in particular , that the said committee seemed satisfied with the limitations of parliament , called the seven principles , or unalterable fundamentals , printed in a late scandalous pamphlet stiled , the publick intelligencer . the said committee here openly declaring ; that they never heard the said principles , or had them any way communicated to them , much lesse ever consented to the same , or any of them . this court being deeply sensible of these great indignities , doth declare , that the said lord mayor is so far from deserving any of the said affronts or aspersions , that he hath highly merited the great honour and esteem of this court and the whole city , having in all things demeaned himself with much prudence and faithfull integrity to this city and court , which doth therefore return his lordship their most hearty thanks . and that the said committee in all their transactions , touching the peace and safety of this city , have also discreetly and faithfully discharged their trust , to their own trouble , and great satisfaction of this court . and whereas this court and city hath been lately represented by some , as having deserted their first cause and declarations in the use of all lawfull means for the maintenance of the true reformed protestant religion according to the scriptures ; the support and maintenance of a settled lawfull magistracy , a learned pious ministery , and publick universities , with the ancient fundamental laws of the nation , just rights , properties and liberties of all persons : and for these ends will endeavour , all they lawfully may , the speedy convening of a free parliament to sit and act without interruption or molestation , by any persons whatsoever . sadler . to the right honorable , our worthy and grave senators , the lord mayor , aldermen , and comonalty of the city of london , in common council assembled . the humble petition and address of divers young men , on the behalf of themselves and the apprentices in and about this honorable city . most humbly sheweth , it hath pleased the good and only wise god , for our and the nations crying sins , to manifest his displeasure for many years together against these our flourishing , now sadly divided , distracted and almost ruined nations : and yet blessed be god , this honorable city hitherto hath been no proportionable sharer in the calamities which our brethren in other parts of these now miserable nations have suffered , which are now aggravated by our divisions , and such a general decay of trading , as doth exceed the worst of former times ; all which we look upon as a most sad presage of some art , and dismal judgement very near at hand , if not our sudden ruine ; together with the destruction and utter dissolation both of church and state , which will inevitably ensue as a just reward upon our multiplied provocations , under the most signal manifestations of gods most gracious presence , and the most engaging mercies that ever people did enjoy ( unlesse it please our most gracious god whose name hath been exceedingly dishonored , by the violation of many sacred and solemn oaths ) amongst us to work our deliverance out of this contexture of dangerous mischiefs , into which we have already wound our selvs : or which as the innundations of mighty waters may suddenly break in upon us : and being sadly sensible of the calamities under which the three nations groan , for want of a well-ordered and established government . we being members in the same pollitical body , cannot but sympathize with the rest of our brethren : and forasmuch as our endeavours may contribute very much thereto , and the well or ill management of your talents in the discharge of your trusts may now make these nations happy , or else make them irrecoverably miserable . we hold our selves obliged in conscience to god and our countrey , both by the laws of god and the land , in the behalf of our selves , and all good and peaceable people in the land , and the many thousands that know not their right hand from their left ; and in the behalf of the children unborn , who in time to come may have cause to blesse or curse the day of their birth for your sakes , do make this humble addresse to you , as the only means under god now left us to redresse these growing mischiefs which make us and the three nations in these times of our great trouble cry unto you ( as those of macedonia did in the apostles vision ) come and help us . and we beseech you , our most grave and worthy senators , as you tender the welfare of these bleeding nations , to stand in the wide gap of our breaches , with your prayers , improving your councils , and every talent ( which god hath reposed in you ) for the honour of god , and the peace of his church , by a reall reformation , and we question not but our most gracious god will then break through the thick clouds of these black and dark providences , and return unto us our judges as at the first , and our counselors as at the beginning , with the abundance of the blessings of peace , that judgement may run down our streets , and righteousness as a mighty stream . and we humbly desire the two great pillars of the land , magistracy and ministry may be asserted and encouraged : in order unto which , we humbly present unto your grave and serious consideracions . first , the priviledges of the gospel which we do enjoy at this day , in the faithfull preaching and dispensing of gods holy word and sacraments , together with the labours of so many of his faithfull servants in the ministry , and the liberty of these sacred ordinances , being the best and choicest of our national blessings ; in respect of which , we may well say ( with holy david ) god hath not dealt so with any nation : which with thankfulnesse we desire to ackowledge as a great mercy to this land : and should the lord remove this candlestick out of its place , as we have just cause to fear he will , unlesse we do repent ) then may we indeed complain with phineas his wife , the glory is departed from our israel , and a dark and dismal night of black and gloomy ignorance , error and prophanenesse will envelope our valley of vision . and to the end that this choice blessing ( which we account more precious than our lives ) may be conveyed to posterity , we most humbly desire the ministry may be countenanced and encouraged , the universities upheld and maintained , which have nursed many famous preachers for piety and learning in this and former ages , and your authority used for the terror of evil doers , but the praise of them that do well . secondly we esteem and assert , as our undoubted birth-right , the freedom and priviledges of our parliaments , as being the great charter of the people of england , which we account equally dear with our lives ; in the enjoyment of which we yet hope , under god , to see a happy and lasting settlement both in church and scate . therefore we most humbly desire , that a new election may be made , or else that those worthy gentlemen chosen to serve as members in the late free parliament , may be restored to their priviledges , and sit without disturbance or force from the army , that they may consider in this evil time , what england , scotland , and ireland ought to do , which ( with submission to your grave judgements ) we humbly conceive to be the most probable means under god to establish the true protestant religion , reform the laws , secure our liberties and preserve our lives and outward concernments , to promote learning end encourage vertue , whereby peace with our neighbour nations may be renewed and established , the army satisfied , their arrears paid , and trading restored . in all which , most grave and worthy senators , your own concernments ( as well as ours ) are so deeply engaged , that we perswade our selves you will be instumental to further our desires , by all peaceable and lawfull means , and we hope it will put an end to our divisions , which ( if god in mercy prevent not ) may soon break out into another civil war , and render us as a prey to a forreign enemy , for a kingdom divided against it self cannot stand . now we leave it unto you our most grave and worthy senators , duly to consider , if you part with these our great national blessings , whether you will not discover a palpable breach of trust , and leave your names for a reproach to the generations following , who will in the ages to come rise up and call you blessed , if you be carefull to preserve them now , and convey them to posterity : and now we beseech the lord to strengthen both your hearts and hands , and give you wisdom from on high to direct you in all your consultations , as may be most for the honour of god , the peace of his church throughout the world , and the settlement , safety and happinesse of these poor nations : and by his assistance we resolve to stand by you and with you , to the utmost hazzard of our lives and all that is deare unto us , to promote the same . munday . december . this day the lord mayor , aldermen , and common council being assembled , the fore-recited pitition was presented by several young-men and apprentices , in behalfe of themselves and several thousands which have subscribed the same ; the which being received , was ordered to be read , and thereupon a committee chosen to consider thereof , and to give their speedy report unto the next court concerning the same . at the same court it was likewise ordered , that the lord general fleetwood should be desired to draw off the soldiers , unto their several quarters ; it being then also ordered , that every common council man in his several precinct , should give notice to the house-keepers within the same , that they should keep their servants and apprentices at home , thereby to preserve the peace of the city . to his excellency the lord general monck . the vnanimous representation of the apprentices and young-men inhabiting in the city of london . humbly sheweth , that the glory of our nation , and the greatest comfort of our lives in our civil interests , consists in the priviledges and liberties to which we were born , and which are the undoubted inheritance of all the free people of england , among which the grand and essential priviledges which discriminates free-men from slaves , is the interest which every man hath in the legislative power of the nation , by their representatives assembled in parliament : without which , however we may flatter our selves , or be flatter'd by others , we are truly no better than vassals govern'd by the will and pleasure of those who have no relation to us , or our common interest . now how much this dear priviledge of the people hath been assaulted by the open violence of some , and secret artifice of others , and to what a deplorable condition we are brought at this present period , when heavy taxes are imposing upon mens estates , and new laws upon our persons , without any consent of the people had in a free parliament , and how generally , through the said distractions in government , trading is decayed , and how much we are likely to suffer thereby in our times and places , we cannot but remonstrate to your excellency , constrain'd through the sense of our present sufferings , and apprehensions of greater , to implore your assistance , most humbly beseeching your excellency , by that ancient love you have born to your native countrey , zeal to our liberties , by that great renown you have lately gain'd in opposing the cruel raging of the sword , by the common cries of the people , and by the hopes and cheerful expectation of all england now fix'd upon you ; and lastly , by your own personal concern in the same common cause as a free-born english man , that you would be pleased to use those great advantages divine providence hath now put into your hands , to the securing your native countrey from those dangerous usurpations , and preserving us in those liberties to which we were born . that no tax may be imposed , nor new law made , nor old abolisht , but with the consents of the people had by their representatives in parliament , freely to be chosen without terror or limitations , and freely to sit without any oath or engagement previous to their entrance , without which special liberties the parliament cannot in any construction be esteemed the free assembly of the people ; and by your excellency's asserting of those our undoubted rights in your present advantages , you will certainly , by the blessing of god , and unanimous concurrence of the people , accomplish our ends , and will thereby gain the hearts and hands of the whole nation , and the city in particular , and purchase to your self a name that shall make every true english man call you blessed , and posterity shall hereafter delight to recount the famous acts of their worthy patriot . this was delivered to his excellency at s. albans , on thursday febr. . . by persons elected for that purpose , and had a very cheerfull reception . the declaration of the nobility , gentry , ministry , and commonalty of the county of kent . together with the city and county of canterbury , the city of rochester , and the ports within the said county . having with sadnesse weighed the multiplied calamities wherein we are at present involved , how friendlesse we are abroad , and how divided at home ; the loud and heart-piercing cries of the poor , and the disability of the better sort to relieve them ; the total decay and subversion of trade , together with the forfeiture and losse of the honour and reputation of the nation ( what is more dear to us than all these ) the apparent hazzard of the gospel , through the prodigious growth of blasphemies , heresies and schism , all which own their birth to the instability of our governors , and the unsettlement of our government . lastly , how in all these an universal ruine threatneth us , and will ( if not timely prevented ) doubtlesse overwhelm us . we thought it our bounden duties , both as christians , out of tendernesse to our religion ; as english men , to our countrey ; and as friends , to our selves and our relations , to represent and publish to the world our just griefs for , and our lively resentments of this our deplorable condition , and to seek all lawfull and probable means to remedy and redresse the same . wherefore having the leading examples of the renowned cities of london and exeter , together with the counties of the west , before our eyes ; and the clamors and out-cries of the people always in our ears , ( whereof the one encourageth , and the other enforceth us to this our declaration ) we thought that we would not be silent at such a time , when our silence would speak us to be assentors to our own ruine , or abettors of such proceedings as have neither law nor equity to support them . we therefore the nobility , gentry , ministry , and commonalty of the county of kent , together with the city and county of canterbury , the city of rochester , and the ports within the said county , do by these presents unanimously declare , that our desires are for a full and free parliament , as the only probable means , under god , to lead us out of this maze and labyrinth of confusions in which we are at present engag'd ; that is , that the old secluded members , so many of them as are surviving , may be re-admitted into the house , and that there may be a free election of others to supply the places of those who are dead , without any oath or engagement previous to their entrance ; these we shall own as the true representatives of the people ; these we shall with our lives and fortunes , to the uttermost of our power , assist , and with all cheerfulnesse submit to , and acquiesce in whatsoever they shall enact or ordain . thus concluding , that all publick spirited men , and good patriots , will with all readinesse joyn and concur with us in a matter of so universal concernment , and that we shall finde opposition from none , but such as prefer their own private interests , and temporal respects , to their religion , and laws of the land ; we shall as bodily subscribe our names , as we do heartily declare our desires . advertisement . the forward zeal of some wel-disposed persons , to expresse their cordial and unanimous concurrence with their countrey-men of the several counties and cities of england , having caused a declaration , imperfect in a very weighty and material clause thereof , to be printed and published , in the name of the county of kent , &c. it was thought fit that the genuine and true copy of the said declaration should be set forth , as it was intended to be presented to the speaker , and to the present great arbitrator of the nations peace and happinesse , general monck ; but through the mis-informations of some unquiet spirits , ( who while they may have leave to accuse , will leave no man innocent , nor the state without trouble ) the persons of many gentlemen are secured , and others threatned , by a great force march'd into the countrey , the presentation was necessarily omitted , and the names and subscriptions not exposed to publick view , for reasons very obvious and evident . a narrative of the meeting of some gentlemen , ministers and citizens at the town-hall in canterbury . together with their declaration presented to the mayor at the common burghmoote . understanding that the late procedure of some of the principal gentlemen and citizens , inhabitants of the city of canterbury hath been represented above as a malignant design , tending to tumult and sedition ; we thought fit to publish to the world a brief narrative of the same , together with the declaration it self , that both the one and the other being cleared from the malicious aspersions and calumnies of our adversaries ; the whole nation may judge between them and us , and so give sentence according to the merit of the cause . whereas some peaceable and well-minded gentlemen with some godly and sober ministers , perceiving the people generally bent for a free parliament ( as in the following declaration is expressed ) and hearing that the cities of london and exeter had lately declared for the same , thought it neither unmeet to follow so leading presidents , not unseasonable to joyn their votes with the general desires of the whole nation ; to which end it was resolved to present this following draught to the common burghmoote , and to desire their concurrence therein . thus in an orderly manner , without tumult or noise , without arms in their hands or thoughts , or without anger or threats in their looks ; divers gentlemen , ministers and citizens went to the town-hall on jan. . the mayor , aldermen and common councel then sitting , and presented the declaration at the door , desiring that after a serious perusal thereof , they would be pleased to joyn with them , in a business which they judged agreeable , not only to the sense of that court , but also of the whole county and nation : but when it was mentioned to be put to the vote , whether the paper should be read or not ; some of the bench protested against it , although they knew nothing of its contents ; and in conclusion ( having a long time rather wrangled than debated ) the dissenters ( being but seven of twenty four ) quitted the court , not leaving enough to make a burghmoote quorum ; whereupon , the gentlemen ( who though rudely treated , had quietly attended ) withdrew re infecta , and returned home with as little tumult as at first they came : thus was there nothing done to surprise or disturb the court , nothing to raise a tumult , nothing to cause a second kentish insurrection , as our adversaries give it out : no , the design was not arms , but peace ; not tumult , but settlement ; not to surprize and disturb the court , but to desire an amiable correspondence with the same , to the end that the intended declaration might be made the more authentick by the formal intervention and assent in open court , of the magistracy of so considerable a corporation ; and that the declarers themselves might not be thought to tread in any oblique paths , or to proceed in a clandestine manner : but being disappointed ( as you see ) , herein , it was thought fit to strengthen and confirm our declaration , and to make good the title it bears , by private subscriptions , as well through the whole county as this city ; wherein we had , in three dayes time , proceeded so far , that many thousands were then collected ; whereupon , some gentlemen ( from the slie insinuations and false representations of our aversaries ) were secured in several prisons , to the discouragement of well-begun , and well-meant undertaking ; neither can the gentlemen understand wherein they have offended , or how they should merit imprisonment , since there was no order , nor prohibition to the contrary : although they conceive , that had they proceeded therein , they had not trangressed any known laws of the land ; it being the subjects birth-right modestly to represent their grievances by way of petition , remonstrance or declaration . wherefore lest ( through our silence , and the present suppression of our declaration ) the aspersions of our adversaries might be thought deservedly cast upon us ; we thought fit to publish the same , together with this narrative , deeming that as we have done nothing herein worthy the present severity , so the impartial reader will in his private judgement , absolve us from all guilt or demerit . neither shall we answer our adversaries by way of recrimination , nor ( although we can by undoubted testimonies sufficiently prove it ) say , that the same men who now appear so zealous assertors of the parliaments interests and proceedings , did as eagerly joyn with the army , crying them up as much , with whom they would live and dye , as they decryed this present power in their late interruption , as not consisting with the interest of the nation . no , though this might serve to invalidate their testimony , we shall enlarge no further , but refer to the declaration it self . to the right honourable will lenthal speaker to the parliament . by him to be communicated to the members sitting at westminster . whereas we the gentlemen and freeholders of this county of berks , were generally met together at abingdon , upon some intimation of an election of a knight of the shire , in pursuance of your order , for the filling up of this parliament ; and that some solicitations were used throughout the county for voyces , and being jealous to be surprised therein by any clandestine carriage of the writ : and whereas at this meeting it was further taken into consideration , that this county have with the rest of this nation been deeply sensible of many insupportable grievances and oppressions of late dayes , occasioned through the want of a real , setled , and regular government ; and in particular , that the commissioners for the militia having formerly charged the country to provide arms , which was done accordingly , the said commissiooners do yet direct their warrants for the bringing in of twenty shillings for every foot arms ; which we are very confident is besides the intent of the act which impowers them , and are ignorant otherwise by what authority they proceed therein ; that therefore having seriously consulted the remedies which might be proper for these and the like inconveniences for the future , and by gods blessing reduce us unto a firm , free , and legal settlement of our rights , civil and religious : wee conceived it to be our duty towards god and our country , without any private ends whatsoever , to declare our selves in this sense , that we take it the most satisfactory expedient for it , will be the recalling of all those members that were secluded in . and that before the first force upon the parliament . and , that in the elections which shall bee of any other members in the vacant places , such due course may be taken , as that the country may not any way be surprised , or over-awed therein : and that the secluded members may be admitted to sit without any oath or engagement to restrain their freedome in the least ; wherein we shall be ready to defend you and them with whatsoever is dearest unto us , against all opposition : and pray unto almighty god for his assistance to the happy accomplishment of what may best conduce to the peace and safety of this nation . [ this is subscribed by most of the chief gentlemen and freeholders of the county of berks. ] a concurrent declaration of the inhabitants of the city and liberties of westminster : with the declaration of the people of england for a free parliament . whereas by a wonderful revolution of the divine providence , those members of the long parliament which were strangely brought in by the army ( may the . . ) and as strangely outed by them ( octob. the . . ) are now strangely returned to sit in the house as before , we judge it our concernment to call to minde the act by them made and published , immediately before their forcible interruption , intituled , an act against raising of money upon the people out their consent in parliament : which act of theirs proceeds in these words , and be it further enacted , that no person or persons shall after the . of october , . assess , levy , collect , gather or receive any custome , imposts , excise , assesment , contribution , tax , tallage , or any sum or sums of money , or other impositions whatsoever , upon the people of this commonwealth , without their consent in parliament , or as by law might have been done before the . of november , . and be it further enacted and declared , that every person offending against this act shall be , and is hereby adjudged to be guilty of high treason , and shall forfeit and suffer as in case of high treason . hereupon we judged it meet and equitable to make this following declaration . we do therefore declare that we do freely , cordially , and unanimously assent to the equity of this act , as consonant to the fundamental laws of our nation , the benefit whereof we doubt not but we may justly claim , as our birth-priviledge in all such cases and concernments . and accordingly we do declare that we are ready and willing , as soon as an opportunity is given us , to make choice of such persons as may declare our consent in parliament , for the raising of such sums of money , as by them shall be thought necessary to defray the publick charges , and manage the publick concerns of the nation , seeing most of those persons that were formerly chosen by us for this purpose , are either taken away by death , or by seclusion debarred from sitting in the house . and we do hereby declare further , that we neither do , nor shall ever give our consent , that any assesment should be made , or imposition laid upon us by any person or persons whatsoever , until our consent be so declared by persons thus chosen and intrusted by us for this end and purpose . and therefore if any person or persons whatsoever shall contrary to the forementioned act , and the fundamental laws of this nation , lay any assesment or imposition upon us before our consent is thus declared , under what pretence or colour soever of authority or necessity it shall be done , we do hereby declare to the world , that we are under manifest constraint and force , and our goods and estates are violently extorted from us , contrary to law and justice , which injuries we shall no longer bear than an opportunity shall be offered us to right our selves , and repossess those priviledges that pertain to us by the laws of our nation . and hereunto so universal and unanimous is our concurrence , that it would be endless for us to subscribe our names ( which neither this , nor any such papers could contain ) but yet if any doubt or mistrust of the truth of the matter hereby declared should be conceived or pretended by any , and the members of parliament now ( whom we conceive it doth in a special manner concern ) shall desire a visible testimony hereunto , for their further satisfaction and more full assurance of the truth and realty hereof , we shall be ready upon the least intimation thereof by them given us , in the several cities and counties of the land , to own and subscribe to what is hereby declared , and act accordingly . for some proof of the premises , we the inhabitants of the city and liberty of westminster , capable of the choice of two burgesses to serve in parliament , have to this present delaration subscribed our hands , and so much the rather that we might hereby take occasion to signifie to the whole nation our cordial concurrence with the common councel of london , in what was done by that honourable court , in the behalf of the city of london in their declaration of . decemb. for a free parliament . the humble desires of the kinghts , gentlemen , ministers , freeholders and inhabitants of the county and burrough of leicester . delivered to his excellency , the lord general monk , at st. albans the thirtieth of january , . by george fawnt esquire , high sheriffe of the said county , willam boothby , richard orton , and richard halford esquires , entrusted for that purpose by the whole county . we the knights , gentlemen , ministers , free-holders , and inhabitants of the county of leicester , humbly conceiving , that the first force put upon the parliament , hath been an encouragement and occasion to all the rest : and finding that your excellency ( under god ) hath been the principal means , for repairing the last interruption , are the more encouraged to desire your assistance , in the promoting of these our just desires as a visible means of an happy peace and settlement of these nations . and whereas every free-born person of england is supposed to be present in parliament , by the knights and burgesses of the place where he liveth , and thereby is presumed to give his consent in all things that pass in parliament ; there is not ( as we are credibly informed ) one knight for all the counties in wales , nor for divers counties in england , and some of them the greatest in england , as that of yorkshire . we therefore desire , that all vacant places be supplied , whether they became vacant by death , or judgment of parliament : and that those that were secluded by force in the year . may sit again . and that no previous oath or engagement be put upon any , that is chosen by his countrey to sit and vote freely in parliament . that the fundamental laws of england , the priviledges of parliament , the liberties of the people , and the property of goods , may be asserted and defended , according to the first declaration of parliament , when they undertook the war ; and no taxes or free-quarter imposed upon any , without authority of parliament . that the true protestant religion may be professed and defended , all heresies , sects and schisms discountenanced and suppressed ; a lawfull succession of godly and able ministers continued and encouraged ; and the two universities , and all colledges in both of them , preserved and countenanced . that a fitting and speedy course be taken , for the paying and discharging the arrears of such officers and soldiers as submit to authority of parliament , and that they may be speedily reduced to a lesser number , for the easing of the great taxes and burthens of these nations . the humble address , and hearty desires of the gentlemen , ministers , and free-holders of the county of northampton . presented to his excellency the lord general monck , at his arrival at northampton , january . . we the gentlemen , ministers , and free-holders of the county of northampton , humbly conceiving , that the first force put upon the parliament hath been an encouragement to open the way to all the rest ; and finding that your excellency under god hath been the principal means for the repairing of the last interruption , are the more encouraged , and ( having the conveniency of your presence now amongst us ) to desire your assistance in the procuring these our just desires , as the visible means of a happy peace and settlement of these nations . . that whereas every free-born subject of england is supposed to be present in parliament by the knights and burgesses of the place where he liveth , and thereby is presumed to consent to all things that passe in parliament : so it is now , that there is not one knight for all the counties in wales , nor for divers counties in england , and some of them the largest in england , as that of yorkeshire . . that no free-born subject of england may have any taxes levied upon him , without his consent in parliament . . to that end , that all vacant places may be supplied , whether they became vacant by death or seclusion ; and that those that were secluded by force in the year may sit again ; and that no previous oath or engagement may be put upon any that is chosen by his countrey to sit and vote freely in parliament . . that the fundamental lawes of england , the priviledges of parliament , the liberty of the subject , and the property of goods , may be asserted and defended , according to the first declarations of the parliament , when they undertook the war . . that the true protestant religion may be professed and defended , all heresies , sects and schisms discountenanced and suppressed , a lawfull succession of godly and able ministers continued and incouraged , and the two universities , and all colledges in both of them , may be preserved and countenanced . . that all the soldiery that will acquiesce in the judgment of a free and full parliament , in the promoting and setling a happy peace upon those foundations , may have their arrears paid , and as many of them as the parliament shall think necessary , may be continued in the publick service ; and that as many of them as have been purchasers of lands from the parliament , may either enjoy their bargains , or their money paid back with interest , and some considerable advantage over and above , for their satisfactions , as the parliament shall judge expedient for the publick good of the nation . this address was prepared by the gentlemen , &c. abovesaid , to be presented to general monck , at his entrance into northampton . to his excellency the lord general monck . the congratulation and addresse of us the knights , divines , free-holders , and others of the county of bucks. humbly sheweth , that with all possible gratitude we admire the wise and gracious dispensation of things by almighty god , who hath moved your self , and other the worthy officers with you to such just and honorable resolutions , as to put your selves into the breach then , when tyranny , irreligion , and all confusion , like a mighty flood were ready to break in upon us . an occasion in which , whether the noblenesse of the attempts , or the happinesse of the successe were more considerable , after times will take pleasure to discourse : and we at present congratulate these your sentiments of honour and conscience . sir , our credit abroad is impaired , our trade at home is decayed , our fundamental laws are violated , our primitive apostolick religion endangered : the cause of all which we humbly conceive is the force and violence put upon the parliament in the year . and since to obviate all which evils we request the total removal of that force , and that all surviving members so secluded , be restored to the discharge of their trust vacancies be supplied by free elections according to law , that no previous oaths or engagements be put upon any of them that shall be chosen to sit and vote in parliament . sir , this is our desire , and as we observe 't is the voice of the whole people , and that is the voice of god ; we doubt not but that you have been reserved for such a time as this : in pursuance of which we are ready to hazard our lives and estates . a declaration of the city and county of gloucester . being deeply affected , and most sadly sensible of the present miseries , which both our selves and the whole nation lie under : we cannot be altogether silent in the expressions of our griefs , and declaration of our desires and thoughts of the most probable means ( by gods assistance ) to give some remedy to our present sufferings , and prevention of our yet greater calamities , which threaten our speedy ruine : the cause of all proceeding ( as we conceive ) is from that unhappy disorder in that great wheel of government . and that after all our great sufferings and trials , the vast expence of treasure and blood for our rights , liberties , and priviledges of parliament , ( which we take to be the good old cause ) such persons in whom we have already lodged our trusts , and who have sufficiently manifested their endeavours to perform the same , namely , nathaniel stephens , esq sir john seymore , kt. edward steephens , esq john steephens , esq and the right honorable thomas lord fairfax , have been since december . and still are denied the freedom of sitting , and voting in parliament . the restauration of which members we desire with all freedom to their former capacities . and declare we shall not otherwise consent to pay tax , or other impositions , or hold our selves bound by any law to be made , without a restitution of these our representatives , with a supply of all vacancies , by a free election , according to the fundamental laws and constitutions of this nation , it being the undoubted birth-right of all the free-born people of england , that no tax or other imposition be exacted from them , or any new law imposed upon them , but by their consents had by their representatives , in a full and free parliament . and we further declare our hearty desires , for the burying all former animosities and differences , by a full and general act of oblivion and indempnity , with satisfaction to be given to purchasers , under any act of sale ; as by parliament shall be thought fit . and that no officer or soldier , that hath ventured his life for the freedom of his countrey , and shall continue faithfull to those principles , may hereby receive any discouragement . we also declare , that we shall freely and willingly consent , that all such shall receive their arrears , and be continued so long as the parliament shall think fit , in order to the safety and preservation of the nation , and that such liberty be allowed to tender consciences , as is not opposite to the scriptures , or the established laws of this nation . we also declare , that in pursuance of these our just desires , we shall not be wanting to the uttermost of our powers , to engage our selves by all lawful ways and means , with our fellow brethren , in the just vindication of our liberties , and shall neither count our lives or fortunes too dear to hazard for the redemption thereof , and herein we shall not doubt the ready concurrence of all those in the three nations , whose peace , prosperity and safety is equally concerned with ours . this declaration being subscribed by great numbers of considerable persons of that county , was to have been presented to the speaker by some of them ; but considering how sir robert pye , and major finchers handsome behaviour was unhandsomly rewarded with imprisonment , for a particular of the same nature , it was thought more proper to preserve the liberty of personages of so much worth til a better opportunity , and therefore it is thought fit thus to communicate this , for the vindication of this county and satisfaction of the whole nation . the remonstrance of the knights , gentlemen , and freeholders of the county of gloucester . we do claim and avow it to be our undoubted birth-right and liberty , that no new laws , much lesse any new government , can or ought to be imposed upon us ; nor any taxes , contributions , or free-quarter taken of us without the consent of the people of this nation in a free-parliament assembled ; which liberties have been often confirmed to us by the great charter , the petition of right , and many other statutes : and parliaments being the only bulwarks and defence of our liberties , as men and christians ought to be , freely elected , and to sit and vote without interruption or opposition by any persons whatsoever : the priviledges whereof we are all bound to maintain and defend , and to assist and maintain each other in the defence thereof . and therefore we resolve , according to our bounden duty , to joyn with the lord mayor and common-councel of the city of london , and all other counties in england in pursuance thereof . and we do not doubt but all true hearted english men who love their own liberties , and are not willing to be made slaves , or to enslave their brethren , will joyn with us herein . a letter agreed unto and subscribed by the gentlemen , ministers , free-holders and sea-men of the county of suffolk . presented to the right honorable , the lord mayor , aldermen , and common-councel of the city of london , assembled january . . right honorable , please you to accept this paper as a testimony , that we are highly and gratefully sensible of those breathings and essayes towards peace , which your renowned city hath lately declared to the world : as we earnestly wish , that our serious and unanimous concurrence may ripen them to a perfect accomplishment . we are willing to consider it as an omen of mercy , when we observe the nation in general , lifting up its vows to heaven for a free and full parliament ; 't is that alone in its genuine sense which our laws prescribe and present to us , as the great patron and guardian of our persons , liberties , and properties , and whatsoever else is justly precious to us . and if god shall by your hand , lead us to such an obtainment , after-ages shall blesse your memory . 't is superfluous to spread before you , your merchandise decay'd , your trade declin'd , your estates wither'd . are there not many within your walls , or near them , that in your ears deplore such miseries as ehese ? your lordship may believe , that our prayers and persons shall gladly promote all lawfull means for our recovery . and we entreat , that this cheerful suffrage of ours may be annex'd as a label to your honorable intendments . this letter was delivered according to its superscription , by robert broke , philip parker , and thomas bacon , esquires . the declaration of the gentry of the county of norfolk , and of the county and city of norwich . we the gentry of the county of norfolke , and county and city of norwich , being deeply affected with the sense of our sad distractions and divisions , both in church and state , and wearied with the miseries of an unnatural civil war , the too frequent interruptions of government , the imposition of several heavy taxes , and the loud out-cries of multitudes of undone , and almost famished people , occasioned by the general decay of trade , which hath spread it self throughout the whole nation , and these counties in particular ; and having met together , and consulted what may best remedy , and remove our , and the nations present grievances and distractions , do humbly conceive , that the chief expedient will be , the recalling of those members that were secluded in , and sate before the force put upon the parliament , ( we of the county of norfolk ) being by such seclusion , deprived of any person to represent us in parliament ) and also by filling up the vacant places thereof , and all to be admitted without any oath or engagement , previous to their entrance ; which being done , we shall be ready to acquiesce , and submit in all things , to the judgement and authority of parliament , without which authority , the people of england cannot be obliged to pay any taxes . this declaration , subscribed by three hundred gentlemen , was delivered to the honourable will . lenthall , speaker of the parliament , on saturday the . of jan. . by the lord richardson , sir john hobart , and sir horatio tounsend , baronets . a declaration of the gentry of the county of devon , met at the general quarter sessions at exeter , for a free parliament : together with a letter from exeter . to the right honourable william lenthall speaker of the parliament . we the gentry of the county of devon , finding our selves without a regular government , after your last interruption designed a publick meeting , to consult remedies , which we could not so conveniently effect till this week , at our general quarter sessions at exon : where we finde divers of the inhabitants groaning under high oppressions , and a general defect of trade , to the utter ruine of many , and fear of the like to others , which is as visible in the whole county , that occasioned such disorders , that were no small trouble and disturbance to us ; which , by gods blessing upon our endeavours , were soon supprest and quieted , without blood . and though we finde , since our first purposes , an alteration in the state of affairs , by your re-assembling at the helm of government , yet conceive , that we are but in part redrest of our grievances ; and that the chief expedient for it will be the recalling of all those members that were secluded in . and sate before the first force upon the parliament . and also by filling up the vacant places . and all to be admitted , without any oath and engagement , previous to their entrance . for which things , if you please to take a speedy course , we shall defend you against all opposers , and future interrupters , with our lives and fortunes . for the accomplishment whereof , we shall use all lawful means , which we humbly conceive may best conduce to the peace and safety of this nation . exon . of jan. . sir , the inclosed copy of what this grand meeting , to which the most considerable of the gentry have subscribed . mr. bampfield , recorder of exon , is gone this night post to deliver it to the speaker . that the cornish men have done more , is no news . this city in very great numbers , lordly exprest their desires for a free parliament . the apprentices and young men of the city , got the keys of the gates , and keep them lockt , without taking notice of the magistrates , and less of the souldiers . a letter and declaration of the lords , knights , gentlemen , and ministers of the county of york , and of the lord mayor , aldermen and common-councel of the gity of york . presented to general monck feb. . . at his quarters at drapers-hall london , by sir thomas wharton knight , brother to the lord wharton , john dawney , thomas harrison , and john legard esquires . as also a letter , with the said declaration inclosed , delivered by the said gentlemen to the lord mayor directed to him , and to the common-councel of the city of london . to his excellency the lord general monck . my lord , we finde our selves constrained by writing to supply the omission of acquainting your lordship with our thoughts and desires when you passed through our county , which we had then done , if upon so short notice we could have met for a mutual vnderstanding ; your lordship will finde in the inclosed declaration the sum of our apprehensions . we thought it not necessary to multiply particulars , but leave all other things to a duly constituted parliament ; neither have we been sollicitous to multiply subscriptions , trusting more to the weight of the proposals , than to the number of subscribers ; yet we may safely affirm this to be the sense of the generality of the county and city , as your lordship sees it is of others . we have onely to add our earnest desires to your lordship , that you would be pleased to further the accomplishment of what we have represented with such seasonable speed , as that the fear of friends , and the hopes of enemies concerning a dangerous confusion amongst us , may be prevented . your lordships very humble servants , thomas fairfax , faulconberge , bar. bouchier , vicecomes . christopher topham , mayor , &c. the declaration . we being deeply sensible of the grievous pressures under which we lye , and the extream dangers we are exposed to at this time , through the violent alteration of our government , the mutilation and interruption of parliaments : and having no representatives to express or remedy our grievances , have thought it meet ( according to the example of other counties ) to declare and desire , that if the parliament begun november . . be yet continued , the members that were secluded in the year . be forthwith restored to the exercise of their trust , and all vacancies filled up , that right may be done to their persons , to parliaments , and the people that have chosen them . if otherwise , that a parliament may be presently called without imposing of oaths or engagements ( the greatest prejudice to civil or christian liberty ) or requiring any quallifications , save what by law or ordinance of parliament before the force in . are already established . and untill this , or one of these be done , we cannot hold our selves obliged to pay the taxes that are or shall be imposed . we not enjoying the fundamental right of this nation to consent to our own laws by equal representatives . subscribed by esquires thomas lord fairfax , tho. lord viscount fauconberge , barrington bourchier esq . high sheriff , christ . topham , mayor , sir thomas wharton , knight of the bath . sir christ . wivel bar. sir john hotham , bar. sir tho slingsby , bar. sir wil. cholmly , bar. sir fran. boynton , bar. sir roger langly , bar. sir hen. cholmly , kt. sir tho. remington , kt. john dawney , henry fairfax , tho. harrison , john legard , william fairfax , william gee , william osbalston , robert wivel , thomas hutton , gustavus boynton , henry bethel , metcalf robinson , henry stapleton , george marwood , robert redman , william adams , col. lancelot parsons william daulton , james moyser , robert belt , henry marwood , john vavasour , john gibson , john micklethwait , bryan fairfax , bryan layton , thomas lovel , wil. rooksby , capt. nicholas bethel , john jackson , thomas yarborough , walter bethel , john riccard , john adams , richard levie , cregory crake , james driffeild , &c. ministers . mr. edward bowles , mr. nath. jackson , mr. witton , mr. waterhouse , mr. bentley , mr. nasebit , &c. the said declaration was also subscribed by the aldermen and common-councel of the city of york . to the right honourable , the lord mayor and common-councel of the city of london . my lord and gentlemen , having taken notice of some vigorous inclinations of your lordship and the city , towards the asserting your common freedomes as english men , too much of late violated , and being now also our selves constrained , from a like sense , to manifest our resolutions to the same effect , in a declaration sent to general monke , whereof the inclosed is a copy ; we have thought good to give your lordship an account of our intentions , as that to which we are most firmly resolved to adhere , wishing it may effect the end by our selves , and ( as we are perswaded ) by your lordship , and all good people of that city intended . we remain , york feb. . . your lordship 's very humble servants , thomas fairfax faulconberge , bar. bouchier , vicecomes . christopher topham , mayor , &c. which letter , with the declaration therein inclosed , was also the same day delivered by sir thomas wharton , and the rest of the said gentlemen , to the lord mayor of london , desiring it might be communicated to the common-councel , according as by the letter it was desired . the same day also a particular letter was presented to the lord general monke from the lord fairfax , dated feb. . in confirmation of the said declaration , which was delivered by mr. bryan fairfax , who was sent up on purpose with the said letter . the declaration of the gentry , ministers , free-holders of the county and city of lincolne . we the gentry , ministers , and free-holders of the county and city of lincolne , being truly sensible of our miseries and grievances , namely the sad consequents of intestine war , the fear of invasion from abroad , at this time of our distractions and divisions both in church and state , the violent alteration of government , the heavy imposition of unheard of taxes ; all which of late years hath ruined our trade , and impoverished the whole nation , and are all occasioned by reason of the many violences and breaches made upon our known established laws and fundamental liberties , do therefore humbly propose and declare ( having first met and consulted , as other countries have done ) that the onely remedy for our said grievances , will be for a free , full parliament , speedily to be called and assembled , to sit according to our said known established laws , wherein the free votes of all free people of this nation might be included , since that such onely have a legal capacity to enact laws and statutes that may equally binde all the free people of this nation ; and therefore if any persons ( how ever impowred ) not having the authority of such a parliament , shall take upon them to lay impositions upon the free people of this commonwealth , or to prescribe or enjoyn any limitations , restrictions , or quallifications whatsoever , not formerly agreed upon in full parliament . we do declare our selves not obliged thereto , as being destructive to the freedome and undoubted priviledges of parliament . a declaration of all the watermen in about the city of london , between gravesend and stanes . or , a hue and cry after col. whitton and his decoys . whereas it hath been seemingly by the insinuatious of some few of us , cast on our whole company , that we would lay our shoulders , and stretch out our helping hands , for the upholding of something , which to our selves is both unknown and uncertain , and may likewise in probability be a cause of disturbance , if not breaking the peace of the nation : we , to manifest our innocency in the one particular , and vindicate our selves from the scandal thereof , as also to shew our real and hearty concordance with all other , noblemen , gentlemen , citizens and others , of the several counties of england , whose declarations are exposed to the publick view , doe cordially , unanimously , and freely declare . that the list annexed of our names to a petition pretended by our consent to be presented to the members sitting at westminster , is not at all by us owned , neither doe we know any other authors or abettors thereof , than some few here under-mentioned our names in truth being gained by colonol whitton , under the pretence to put down hackny coachmen ; but by him converted to another use , and that so contrary to our thoughts and intentions , that we would sooner have quitted our nearest relations , than have consented to such ebulliences . for the undeceiving therefore of the gentry of this nation , to whom many , yea , most of us are obliged , and consequently not unknown ; for the rectifying the judgments of such as know us not , and for the satisfaction of the whole free-born subjects of england who with us claim a birth-right in magna charta , and the petition of right , we doe further , with one consent , declare . that we conceive it fitting , for the redressing the grievous wants and pressures that lie upon all the good people of this nation , that according to fundamental right , the people in parliament may have their representatives , who may receive their grievances , and present them in their behalf , whereby to obtain a remedy . and because faction and schism hath already too great a root , that honest and prudential men may be elected , whose estates ( as to temporals ) and religion ( as to spirituals ) may oblige them sincerely to endeavour a settlement both in church and state . the onely meanes for attaining of which ends , we conceive by the blessing of god , to be a full and free parliament , which as we know the nation groans for , so we cordially desire , and we shall not acquiesce , till we have regained that our undoubted right , hitherto unquestioned priviledge , and never to be denied lawful demand . in the defence whereof we shall account nothing too dear to lose , being ready to quit not onely our employments , but to lay aside our relations , and lay our lives at stake . this representation is owned by ten thousand of us ( which if desired ) shall be acknowledged both with our hands and hearts , against all the malicious underminings of col. whitton the painter , and his decoys : who upon the tendring that forged petition to the watermens hall , being conscious that the rankness of the trepan would be presently sented , addrest themselves to mr. pryn , to en their protest against it , their names are hereunto annexed . viz. wil. lemond . josias smith . wil. crop. wil. goodale . thomas slator . tho. wasborn . john howard . wil. bugby . robert crop. tho. vincent . john foster . john lee . wil. sound . jacob meade . wil. clerk . martin craul . roger phillips . fran. borrick . richard thusee . wil. butler . the remonstrance of the noblemen , knights , gentlemen , clergy-men , free-holders , citizens , burgesses , & commons of the late eastern , southern , & western associations , who desire to shew themselves faithful and constant to the good old cause , the priviledges and freedom of parliament , the liberty and property of the subjects , laws of the land , and true reformed religion , which they were formerly called forth and engaged to defend by declarations of parliament , the protestation , and solemn national league and covenant . we the noblemen , knights , gentlemen , clergy-men , freeholders , citizens , burgesses and commons of the late eastern , southern , and western associations of england , whose names are hereunto subscribed , having for a long season with bleeding hearts , perplexed spirits , weeping eyes , and over-much patience and silence , beheld the miserable publick distractions , intollerable oppressions , various revolutions , great tumults , and destructive confusions , wherewith our former most glorious , flourishing churches and nations ( for want of a setled government , and free parliament ) have many years by-past been violently rent in pieces , wasted , consumed , made the very hissing , scorn , laughing-stock of all neighbour countries , whether friends or foes , christians or infidels ; and thereby exposed to the justly dreaded hostile invasions of combined forraign romish adversaries , whose emissaries have been very active , instrumental in our late combustions and changes ; being now deeply sensible of the deplorable , desperate condition and imminent ruine , not onely of our own persons , families , posterities , but of our dearest , exhausted , enthralled , dying native country , and protestant religion too , far dearer to us than our lives or private interests , the preservation whereof is the supreamest law ; and calling to our minds the first publick ends and causes for which we took up arms ( since totally perverted , subverted , oppugned by ambitious , self-advancing commanders , officers of the army , and others contrary to their trusts and commissions ) with the manifold oaths , protestations , vowes , solemn league and covenant , and other sacred as well as civil obligations lying upon our consciences , engaging us all in our several places and callings in this day of englands trouble , and extream danger , to put our helping hands and best advice to obviate those perils , and remove those disorders , grievances , confusions , which menace utter desolation both to her and us , if we should any longer fit stupidly silent , or unactive in our spheres , like persons altogether uninterested or unconcerned in these perillous times of unprefidented exorbitancies , usurpations , tyrannies over our persns , estates , lawes , liberties , and parliaments themselves , by ambitious , turbulent self-seekers and incendiaries , and of universal decay of trade by sea and land ; have thereupon conceived it our necessary bounden duties in this sad posture of our sacred and civil concernments both as christians and english freemen , by this our joynt remonstrance to tender to the rest of our english brethren throughout the whole nation , of what rank , calling , or condition soever ; such just , legal , safe , rational , honest and christian proposals , as through gods blessing upon our and their unanimous , vigorous prosecution of them against all self-ended opponents , may redeem us from our present bondage , dangers , schisms , confusions , frequent rotations of publick government , and restore our tottering church , state , kingdoms , religion , to their pristine unity , tranquillity , purity , stability , dignity , felicity , and secure them against all future concussions and convulsions . for which end we all passionately desire , and shall unanimously and cordially endeavour by all lawful meanes within our orbs , . that a legal , full and free parliament of england may be speedily summoned , according to the prescription of caroli , c. . enacted for this purpose , not hitherto put in execution ; and that free elections of able knights , citizens and burgesses , by and of all well-affected persons to peace , and the old parliaments good cause , to represent them therein , may be no wayes disturbed , nor restrained by force of armes or otherwise . . that the said parliament may safely , freely meet at westminster on the third monday in january next , to consult of , vote , and settle the peace , government of our distracted churches and nations , without the interruption , disturbance , force or dissolution of any commanders , officers or souldiers of the army , or other tumultuous persons whatsoever , under pain of being declared , prosecuted , executed as traitors and enemies to the publique . . that the full power of the militia both by sea and land be delivered up to this parliament , on the first day of their convention therein , for the better assurance of their free and peaceable session , and not continued as a distinct body or interest in opposition , contradistinction , or super-inspection , but in real subordination to the parliament and people . . that the whole frame and settlement of the government of our nations be entirely referred to the parliaments unanticipated consideration , the proper judges thereof , without any antecedent restrictions , presciptions , or impositions , by the army-officers , or any others . . that the supreme ▪ management of all civil , politique , military affairs , and appointment of all great officers of state , and ministers of justice , shall be in all the surviving members of the long parliament , without secluding any , as in a general council of state and safety only ( who are all desired to meet for that purpose ) till the new free parliament shall assemble , and no longer . . that the preservation of the peace , government of each county , shall be in the hands of such sheriffs , conservators of the peace , and other antient officers , as the free-holders of every county , shall publickly elect in their county-court , according to their antient rights and liberties ; and of every city and corporation in the mayors , sheriffs , bailiffs , and other officers elected by them , according to their charters , customs , and in none other officers imposed on them , till the parliament shall take further order therein . . that no taxes , contributions , excises , imposts , new customs , militiaes , or other payments whatsoevet , shall be henceforth imposed , assessed , levied upon , or paid by the people , but by their common grant and consent in free and full parliament , by act of parl. under pain of high treason in the imposers , assessors , collectors , and voluntary payers thereof ; this being the peoples indubitable birth right , acknowledged , declared , confirmed by manifold acts and declarations old and new . . that such an act of indempnity may be agreed on and assented to in this parliament by common consent , as may secure and indempnifie all persons , whose future peaceable deportment till this act passed shall demerit it . . that care may be therein taken for the speedy satisfaction of all just arrears of all officers and souldiers , duly listed before the . of may last , who shall peaceably and dutifully submit to the free convening and safe sitting of this desired parliament . that all others who shall tumultuously oppose or interrupt the summoning , assembling , or sitting thereof , shall forfeit all their commands , arrears , indempnity , and incur the penalty of traitors and publick enemies to the parliament and nation . . that an effectual course may be taken for the setled old maintenance , succession , protection and encouragement of a godly , learned , painful orthodox preaching ministry ▪ throughout the three nations . . that due care and order may be taken for the speedy detection , banishment , and execution of the lawes against all jesuits , seminary priests , freers , and other romish emissaries , or seducers whatsoever , employed to divide , corrupt , seduce the people ; and the oath of abjuration duly tendered by justices of peace and other officers , to all persons who shall be accused and justly suspected to be such , for their better detection . . that the causes of the great extraordinary decay of all sorts of trade , merchandise , shipping , scarcity of bullion , coin , with all frauds and abuses in manufactures , dilatory vexatious proceedings , extortions in courts of law and equity , may be diligently enquired into , redressed , punished , and the great destruction and waste of timber in all parts inhibited under severe penalties . . that all treasurers , receivers , collectors , farmers of any monies , customes , excises , rents , revenues , taxes , imposts , sequestrations , or other goods , profits whatsoever to the use of the publick , may be speedily called to account in each county , by fitting unaccountable persons appointed for that end , and all their frauds and abuses therein enquired of , and condignly punished . . that all good laws formerly enacted for the preservation and defence of the persons , lives , liberties , properties of the subjects , against illegal imprisonments , banishments , restraints , confinements , corporal punishments , execution by any person or persons , powers , committees , council of state , military , civil officers , or judicatures whatsoever , and against all unjust taxes , confiscations , sequestrations , rapines , plunders , may be ratified ; and the late and future violations of them exemplarily punished . . that every person who shall from henceforth canvas for voices to make himself a knight , citizen , burgess or baron of the ports , in the next , or any ensuing parliament , either by letters of recommendation from great men , feasting the electors before , at , or after elections , gifts , bribes , or otherwise , shall upon due proof thereof , be made uncapable to sit or serve in parliament . . that all members of parliament , officers of state , justices , sheriffs , mayors , recorders , shall henceforth take a corporal oath , to the best of their knowledge , skill , power , inviolably to preserve the fundamental laws , liberties , franchises of the free-men of england , and to give all lawes for the defence of them in charge to the grand jury , in their respective assizes , and general sessions of the peace , that they may enquire and present all offences against , and violations of them , to be condignly punished according to law . . that all unnecessary garrisons , supernumerary souldiers , and sea-men , may be speedily paid off , dismantled , disbanded , and all superfluous officers , excessive fees , and extortions whatsoever , taken away , for the impoverished peoples ease : and the manifold extortions , abuses of gaolers , marshals , messengers , and other detainers of prisoners , punished and redressed . . that able , faithful consciencious , fitting persons , fearing god and hating covetousnesse , may be preferred to all offices , places of publick trust , and administration of justice ; and detur digniori , made the only rule in all elections and preferments whatsoever . . that all universities , colleges , schools of learning in our three nations , with all lands , rents , annuities , gifts , revenues , for their support , may be constantly maintained , preserved from rapine , and all mis-imployments , substractions of them , and of any lands , rents , annuities , monies , gifts , legacies to them , or any other publick or charitable use whatsoever , diligently enquired after and reformed . all which proposals we are resolved by gods gracious assistance with unanimity , constancy , and activity , in our several stations , with our lives and fortunes , to prosecute and accomplish , to our powers , by all just and legal wayes , with what ever else may conduce to the peace , safety , unitie , wealth , prosperity of our lacerated , macerated , naufragated church and state ; wherein as we shall constantly pray for gods divine assistance and blessing upon our weak endeavours , without which they will be altogether succeslesse : so we cannot but confidently expect , and shall importunately desire the cordial concurrence , assistance , prayers of all other noblemen , knights , gentlemen , clergy-men , free-holders , citizens , burgesses , and english freemen , without the smallest opposition , that fo righteousness and peace may kiss each other , and glory once more dwell within our land , wherein they have been strangers over-long : and let all the people ( by their joynt subscriptions ) say , amen , amen , amen . the declaration of the gentlemen , free-holders , and inhabitants of the county of bedford . we the gentlemen , free-holders , and inhabitants of the county of bedford , being truly sensible of the heavy pressures that we lie under , having all our civil and religious rights and liberties daily invaded , cannot in this common day of calamity , be silent , but with the rest of the nation , make some enquiry after the way of peace and settlement : and having met , and considered , thereof , doe humbly propose , as the most probable meanes , under god , to compose all our differences , and cement all our breaches both in church and state , the assembling of a full and free parliament , without any previous oaths , or engagements , or qualifications whatsoever ( saving what was in the year . before the force put upon the parliament . ) or the re-admitting of the secluded members to the execution of their trusts , with a full and free supply of their vacancies by death . and until one of these be done , we do declare , we shall not hold our selves engaged to pay the taxes imposed upon us , without our consents so first had in parliament . the declaration of the gentry , clergy , and commonalty of the county of essex . were it not that our former too unhappy zeal ( in idolizing those persons who are now become , by far more oppressing than the egyptian task-masters ) at this time seconded with silence , would bespeak us stupid and insensible ; we needed not to repeat the sighs and groans of an oppressed and almost ruined kingdome : but lest a tacit silence should render us complaint with their sacrilegious and regicidious proceedings , we are necessitated to declare our present thoughts and future resolutions . we cannot look upon our present rulers without casting an eye upon a militant church , and there we finde them converting a house of prayer into a den of thieves ; an orthodox , learned and reverend clergy , by them reduced to the extremest want , under pretence of propagating the gospel ; and those ( who are yet permitted to exercise their ecclesiastical function ) treatned to be deprived of gods allowance , except in effect , they will forsake him , and fall down to their baal . we cannot look into our cloathing towns , but we behold famine ready to assault them , the poor and diligent labourer , for want of work , not able to buy him bread , so that those , who before wrought with their hands at home , are now forced to wander abroad , and work with their tongues to beg life , whilst we , who although willing , are hardly able ( through the oppression which lyes upon us ) to relieve them : and when we look upon the instruments of these our miesries , and consider their persons and qualifications , we cannot finde one publick spirit ( not one wise man ) among them ; their number is inconsistent with our laws , and a large part of that small number are reputed relatives to gaoles and brothil-houses : persons who outwardly profess god , but in their lives and actions utterly deny him , who through their most perfidious treacheries , and reiterated perjuries , have blasted the honour of our nation , and rendred our religion contemptible to all our enemies ; who ( while they pretend to strive for religion and liberties of the people ) have no other cause but cains , thinking their sins greater than can be forgiven ; and therefore per fas , aut nefas , they endeavour to lay a foundation for their own security , although in the church and kingdomes desolation . these premises considered , we conceive our selves obliged , and therefore readily and unanimously we do declare , that with our lives and fortunes we will protect , abet , and assist all tho e worthy remonstrators of the most renowned city of london , ansd the several counties of this kingdome , in the pursuance of their several declarations for a full and free parliament ; which is the onely means ( under god ) to bring us out of this miserable confusion , in which at present we are plunged . and we further declare , that we will pay no tax , or other imposition whatsoever , but by authority from our representatives in a full and free parliament : into whose hands we shall commit our lives and fortunes , and into whose results we will ever acquiesce . our eyes are up unto our god for help , and thence our hopes are fixed on general monke , that god hath called him forth to be the vmpier and determiner of our divisions and oppressions , by whom he will lead us through the wilderness of our present confusion , and bring us to our desired canaan . in this confidence we pray to god to bless , direct , and keep him . advertisement . this our declaration had came forth a week since , had not the trappanning diligence of an unworthy member of our country endeavoured the surprizal of it and us : let not three hundred and thirty hands ( an inconsiderable number for so great a county ) bespeak this declaration forged , we being forced to do in one day the work we had cut out for seven ; had we had time , we had brought ten thousand hands , such as upon a good occasion , will bring hearts suitable to the merits of their cause . the declaration of the gentry of the county of nottingham . and of the town of nottingham , presented by way of address to his excellency the lord general monck , the . of february , with a letter to his excellency , and another to the speaker of the parliament . what the people of this land have suffered in their greatest concernments , both religious and civil , by the late disorders , and frequent change of government , hath for a long time been the argument of a general and sad complaint both to god and man : what the most publick sense of the nation is , as to the means of setling it in the possession of its antient and native liberties , is sufficiently known by the several declarations of so many counties already presented and published : what god in great mercy hath done by your excellencies means , as his chosen instrument , to revive our dying hopes , in plucking us as a brand out of the fire , and that with so gentle a hand , is the wonder and rejoycing of our souls . in testimony therefore of our thankfulness to god , and our grateful sense of your excellencies most valiant and wise management of the power he hath intrusted you with : as also to evidence as fellow-members our concurrence and sympath , with those other parts of this great body : we the nobility gentry , ministry and commonalty of the county of nottingham , and of the county of the town of nottingham do declare , that as it is our judgement that the nation ought , so it is our earnest desire , and shall be our endeavour by the use of all lawful means that it may be free in its members in parliament , deputed from all parts , impowred by antient and undoubted right to elect , the best expedient whereto , at present , we conceive to be either an admission of the members secluded in . and a filling up of vacancies by new elections , or the speedy calling of another parliament with such qualifications as were then agreed on before there as a force upon the house . we also claim it with the rest of the nation as our uniquestionable right , that nothing be imposed upon us by way of tax , or otherwise , but by our consents first given and declared in a full and free parliament . and now , considering how great things in prosecution of these just ends are already done for us , as we do in most humble manner bless and praise his glorious name that hath thus far answered our desires , so we do most earnestly beseech him to perfect in his due time what is so happily begun , and in order thereto to bless and conduct your excellency through all the remaining difficulties that may obstruct our present necessary settlement upon the true lasting foundation of our known laws and priviledges . in the vindication whereof we beseech your excellency to be confident , not only of our best wishes and thanks , but also of our utmost assistance to the hazard of our lives and fortunes . my lord , this enclosed was intended to be presented to your excellencies before we had notice of your excellencies happy removal of all force , excluding members from sitting in parliament wherein though our desires are thereby granted , yet we cannot but address the same to you , that it may appear what your excellency hath done therein is according to our sense and desire , as well as those of other counties that have gone before us in time , though not in affection , and that we shall in our places and callings be ready to make good what we have publickly declared for , as the parliament and your excellency shall command us , and remain nottingham , feb. . . my lord , your excellencies most humble and faithful servants . mr. speaker , we being desirous amongst other counties to express our thanks to the lord general monke , for his endeavours in our restitution to peace and settlement , and to manifest our adherence to him , and those under his command , in the further prosecution of those good ends mentioned in our address to him , after we had subscribed and ordered these gentlemen to wait upon him with the same , we received the joyful news , that all force was removed , and a free admission given to all members to sit in parliament , whereby our desires are so far accomplished , that we might have acquiessed therein , but only that we would not have our intentions and desires , though obtained , buried in oblivion , we thought fit to present that address to the lord general , and judge it our duties to express our thankfulness to god for your re-admission , and our readiness in our places and callings , to assist you in what you have so happily begun , and humbly desire that by your authority our militia may be so setled that we may be serviceable to your commands , and capacitated to defend our selves against any discontented persons that may upon this change endeavour a disturbance of the publick peace , or deny your authority . nottingham , feb. . . sir , your humble and faithful servants . the declaration of sir charles coot knight and baronet , lord president of the province of connavght : and the rest of the council of officers of the army in ireland . present at dublin concerning the re-admission of the sucluded members . since the authority of parliament became openly violated , and that by their own waged servants of the army in england , by whom . of the members of parliament were torn from the parliament house in dec. . and imprisoned , and a . other members denied entrance into the house , and about fifty more voluntarily withdrew themselves to avoid violence , making in all of secluded members about two hundred and fifty , when the remaining members charged the army with the guilt of that force , and sent to the then general of the army for the restitution of those excluded members which was denied them , how many and manifold have been the miseries and calamities under which these nations have laboured , and do stil labour , is evident to all equal minded men . the godly ministers of the gospel despised : the ministry it self villified : tythes , and other means of their maintenance ( particularly in ireland ) taken from them , and mis-applied ; the protestant religion shaken , and almost overturned ; anabaptists , quakers , and other sectaries set up and countenanced ; heresies and schisms increased ; the fundamental laws of the land trampled upon , and an arbitrary government endeavoured to be introduced ; the civil rights , properties and liberties of the people in their persons and estates broken in pieces ; impositions and taxes on the people without example laid and increased in an excessive manner and measure , whereby thousands of families have been ruined , and enforced to beg their bread ; manufacture at home discouraged , publick trade and commerce abroad interrupted ; the nations become deeply indebted , and generally impoverished ; the reformed protestant churches abroad exposed to great danger , wanting the wonted support of england , which ( under god ) was the bulwark and chief strength of the protestant religion throughout all christendome , and finally the english nation ( which was alwayes deservedly ) in so high honour and estimation at home and abroad , as it was a bridle and terrour to their enemies , and a countenance and support to their friends , and allies , is now become ( we tremble and grieve to have so just cause to speak it ) a scorn and dersion to all nations round about us ; and all this is brought to pass to satisfie the avarice , ambition , lusts , and fears of a few inconsiderable persons of anabaptistical and other fanatique spirits , who have made it their business to occasion still one trouble on the neck of another , so to imbroil and continue the nations in division , war , and bloody confusion , that sober men might not have time or leisure ( with maturity of judgement or counsel ) to look into the inwards of their designs or actings ; and after we had beheld all this with bleeding hearts , and calling to minde that when in december . the said force was put upon the parliament , the then remaining members sent sundry times to the general to know why he imprisoned their members , and desired him to set them at liberty , which was not done ; and we gathering from all this , that if the house were once freed from the force of an army , and they again restored to freedome and liberty of sitting and and acting , they would then upon the firmer grounds ( in conscience of their duties to god and their country , and in testimony of their high resentment of that breach of priviledges of the parliament , have taken into the house those excluded members , and filled vacant places by due and orderly elections of the people ( and after so many years unhappy interruption unite again in a full and free parliament , and there assert the rights and priviledges of parliament , and liberties of the people , which from the very beginning of the war of england have been not the least ground of their contest with the late king , and ever since , and joyn their counsels and endeavours for restoring these nations to peace and tranquillity . and thence it was , that on the . day of december . several officers of the army here , on the behalf of themselves , and those under their commands , by their joynt declaration , declared and published their stedfast resolutions to adhere to the parliament in defence of its priviledges , and the just rights and liberties of the people of these nations as men and christians ; in which declaration afterwards concurred the whole army of ireland , but now finding much contrary to our expectations , that when the members of parliament now assembled at westminster , were in decemb. . ( by an extraordinary providence ) restored to their freedome and liberty of sitting and acting as in parliament ; and that divers of those formerly excluded members of parliament on the . of decem. . ( as they had formerly done in may . ) offered themselves to discharge their trusts for the several counties and places for which they were elected , and formerly served those their fellow-members assembled at westminster , did not onely deny them admittance , but also voted and ordered the utter exclusion of all the excluded members with this further addition , that none of them should be chosen in future elections to sit in this parliament , whereby they have a more unnatural violence taken away from above the one half of the people of england , their representatives in parliament , and limited and abridged in a high degree the liberty and freedome of the people in further elections , which denial and order of theirs in a time when they were under no force , is so much the more strange , in regard that in december . when they were under a force , they transferred that guilt for themselves to the army , and pretended a willingness to re-admit those members if it were in their power , as is formerly mentioned . and whereas lieut. gen. ludlow had placed in ireland several officers who are anabaptists , and persons of the like fanatique spirits , ( many of whom had been very active in the late conspiracies and actings of the factious part of the army in england , even against those members of parliament now sitting at westminster ; of which officers so placed by lieut. gen. ludlow , it was found necessary to purge the army , and to put in their places persons more soberly minded and well affected to the parliament ; yet after all that done , and after lieut. gen. ludlow stood justly deservedly charged with high treason , the said lieut. gen. ludlow himself , and some others of the like principles with him , were by a report from the councel of state proposed to be appointed to governe not onely the army , but also the whole nation of ireland , to the astonishment of the people and army here , to the unsetling of those persons so well deserving , to the hazard of the peace of the nation and army ( and which is above all ) to the endangering even of religion it selfe . and here it is observable , that those members now sitting at westminster , by their declaration of . of january . since their restitution to their present liberty of sitting ) have published that extravagant councels and actions , have engaged the nations in a great debt and charge , which it seems necessitates their laying a new increase of charge on the nations , and yet so indulgent they are to those persons , that in a high degree created that necessity of so unreasonably charging the people , and whose estates might well bear a great part of that burden , as without so much as any suit made to them by those delinquents , they granted them indempnity for their persons and estates , whereby it seems the said members now sitting at westminster , hold it fit , that those who are of sober spirits , and offended not the parliament , should out of their estates pay for those extravagant mens delinquency , rather than the delinquents themselves . and although the said lieut. gen. ludlow , and miles corbet esq . together with col. john jones , and col. mat. tomlinson , stand impeached from hence most justly of high treason , and that charge against them , being known to the house , and there remaing , yet they have admitted two of those persons , namely the said lieut gen. ludlow , and miles corbet actually to sit in the said house . and now the greatness of those miseries which have befaln these three nations in general , by such late actings in england , and those heightned with many aggravations in the circumstances of them ( too many and too long to be repeated ) as it hath begotten in us , and in all good men in the three nations deep impression of astonishment and horror , so it is evident , that if it be any longer continued , it will perpetually nourish dishonour to god , grief to all god men , and ( we doubt and fear ) utter infamy and destruction to the three nations . in contemplation whereof , and considering how god hath in his justice blasted all attempts that since the year . have been made for re-setling of these nations in peace and tranquillity , and that after all the trials and various changes of government which we have in all that time with much long-suffering and patience endured , there is no way visible to us under heaven whence deliverance may be probably wrought or expected , but from the care and wisdome of a free and full parliament in england , which ( by the experience of all former ages hath been found the best and only expedient for providing remedies to be applied to so great and general mischiefs arising in church or state . and considering also that the marks of the true reformed religion according to the word of god , and of the fundamental laws of the land , and of our now dying liberties and freedome , are not yet so utterly razed and defaced , but that some footsteps of them do yet remain , so as ( by the wisdome of a full and free parliament ) they may be again renewed and firmly re-established ; and considering likewise that our hopes of having the said excluded members restored , and of new elections to be made for vacant places , whereby there might be a full and free parliament , as there was on decem. . . and the antient and long contested liberties of the people might be asserted , are much contrary to our expectations , and contrary to the fundamental laws of the land , and indeed contrary to all justice and become frustrated ; and considering further how unjust and unreasonable a thing it is , that of above five hundred members , whereof the commons house of parliament usually consisted , there were but four and forty or thereabouts , when that fatal vote passed for the keeping out the aforesaid excluded members by the prevalency of a major part of the said . persons ( not much exceeding those who voted then on the contrary side ) which assumes to it self the supreme authority , not onely of england , but also of the three nations , without president or example of any former age , there being above two hundred and fifty which stand eleven years excluded , without so much as the least offer of an impeachment against them in all that time ; which unexampled and unparallel'd assumption in those men is not possible to continue but by the force of an army poisoned with anabaptistical and corrupted principles , to the continual grief and unsupportable burden and charge of the three nations . and besides that act of the aforesaid persons chasing away ( for so it now appears ) about two hundred and fifty members , of above five hundred chosen by all the several parts of england , according to the known laws of the land , to represent the whole nation in parliament ; and after the forcible exclusion of so many , that the four and forty persons remaining ( amongst whom we believe there are some worthy patriots who are not so fully concurring in the actings of the rest of their number , as violently over-voted them , which is a further aggravation of the others guilt ) should dare to usurp to themselves as is formerly mentioned , contrary to all the laws , the supreme power not only of england , but also of ireland and scotland , is a thing which none but conquerors or tyrants would attempt , and in all circumstances is so hideous and monstrous to be endured by a free people , formerly famous to all the world for wisdome and valour , as the english nation have been , as it will be incredible to all posterity and lastly considering , that as in all ages , and more particularly since the beginning of the late horrid rebellion in ireland , our brethren in england have abundantly manifested a tender and compassionate sense of the condition in ireland , and were careful to relieve us in our lowest estate , as bone of their bone , and flesh of their flesh ; which we do , and shal ever acknowledge with humble thankfulnesse , and ( as a debt which we well know to be due from us to them above all people in the world ) shall be for ever as tender of their happinesse and welfare , as of our own , which indeed is involved in theirs , and without whom ireland cannot be happy . we therefore remaining constant in the reasons of our said declaration of dec. . . for adhering to the parliament in defence of its priviledges , and the just rights and liberties of these nations ; all which we see now are apparently more and more violated by the ▪ not admission of the said excluded members , and by not filling the vacant places , whereby the house might be full ; and being freed from force , might uninterruptedly act according to their judgements and consciences , towards re-setling the peace of these nations , which otherwise in all humane probability can never be restored to peace and tranquillity . we do therefore declare for a full and free parliament in england , consisting not only of those that sate on oct. . . but also of all such of the members of parliament imprisoned , excluded , or withdrawn in december . as are yet living , whom we desire may be restored to the freedome and liberty of sitting , and acting according to the trust committed to them by the several counties and places which did chuse them , that so they may be no longer debarred from discharging their said trust , and that vacant places may be speedily supplied by free and due elections of the people , yet so as none of the persons to be admitted or elected , be any of those who have been in arms , or otherwise aiding , abetting , or assisting the late king or his son in the late war against the parliament , and that the house being so filled , may proceed unanimously to consult the best meanes for re-setling the peace of the nations , the re-establishment of true religion ( the surest foundaon , as of all righteous government , so of all the happinesse of a nation ; ) the fundamental lawes of the land ( whereby all mens rights and properties are preserved ) and the liberties and freedom of the people which are supported by those lawes . and for those ends , and in discharge of our duty to god , and to our country , we do resolve , by the blessing of almighty god ) to joyn with our brethren in england , ireland , and scotland , who have or shall joyn with us for the ends aforesaid ; and do resolve , for the maintenance and preservation thereof , to hazard our lives and estates , and all that is dear to us : and we doubt not but all our brethren in the said nations , who disdain to be made slaves , will joyn with us herein , as being with wisedom and reason desirous to deliver over to their posterity that liberty and freedom which was conveyed to them at so dear a rate by our ancestors . and then we trust , that by the great mercy of god , will speedily follow a happy settlement of these yet miserable and distracted nations ; and consequently that the true protestant religion , in the power and purity thereof , may be established ; the godly , learned , and orthodox ministers of the gospel maintained by their tythes , and other their accustomed rights ; their persons supported and countenanced ; the universities and all other seminaries of learning cherished ; heresies and schisms suppressed , needless impositions and taxes on the people removed , and no charge to be laid on any of the nations , without their own free consents , given by their representatives , in their several and respective parliaments ; manufactures , and publique trade and commerce , at home and abroad advanced ; justice in its due and wonted course administred ; the just debts of the nation satisfied ; the treasure and revenues thereof preserved , and returned to their right and proper channels ; the arreares of the army , and other publique debts duly satisfied ; the armies and forces continued in due obedience to the supreme authority , and not presume as some have done , to give lawes thereunto , which hath been the root of a great part of our miseries ; the nations enriched , united and strengthened ; the reformed protestant churches abroad supported and countenanced ; the honour of the english nation restored , to the comfort of friends , and terror of enemies ; the plantation of ireland in the hands of adventurers and souldiers , and other english and protestants advanced , as a farther accession of honour and greatness to the english nation : and so by the blessing of god , all will shortly terminate in the glory of god , the peace and tranquillity of these nations , the strengthening of them against forreign invasion , and intestine rebellion , and the comfort , contentment of all the good people in these nations , which the lord of his mercy grant . dated at dublin , febr. . . sir charls coote william l. cawfield sir theo. jones sir oliver st. ceorge sir hen. ingoldsby sir john king col. chidley coote col. john cole col. will. warden col. richard coote col. john georges col. hen. owen lt. col. tho. scot lt. col. w. purefoy lt. col. oliver jones maj. tho. barrington maj. alex. staples maj. rich. bingley maj. george pepper lt. col. h. smithwick capt. henry baker cap. rob. fitz gerald cap. cha. wenman . cap. adam molineux col. hum. barrow cap. sam. foley cap. john salt cap. simon garstin col. cha. blunt col. hen. slade cap. ant. stamp cap. art. purefoy cap. george s ▪ george cap. peter purefoy cap. thomas curd cap. tho. newcomen cap. tho. newburgh cap. hen. thrimpton lt. hugh clotworthy lt. peter flower lt. her. langrish lt. rich. morrick lt. brian jaques lt. richard butler lt. john ottway lt. john evelin lt. tho. flint lt. edw. harrington corn . art. vsher corn . donw . prothers corn . w. pinsent ensign john hiad tho. sheppard . mar. quarter-master w. f. john payn comptr. a declaration of the gentry of somerset-shire , who were of the late kings party . whereas god by many gracious appearances ha●h raised the hearts of this nation to a great confidence , that their tottering condition draws near to an establishment , by the re-settlement of their antient , just , and solid foundations ; we doe declare , that in thankfulness to our great and good god , we hold our selves bound to look upon , and with humble longings ; to wait for the accomplishment of this great work , as the largest national blessing we are capable of ( being presented to our hope without blood and ruine . ) and likewise that we set up pillars in every of our hearts to the honour of his excellency the lord general monck , who hath not as others , either feared or affected the tyrannical greatness of our oppressors ; but as he undertook the redemption of his countrey with singular resolution , and hath carried it on hitherto with unparallel'd prudence , so we doe not in the least doubt , but that by the good hand of god he will perfect it with shining and glorious sincerity . and because we finde ( as we hope ) the last engine of the enemies of our peace now set on work for the embroiling of the spirits of the well-meaning people of england , by suggesting an unchristian inclination remaining in us , of waiting opportunities of revenge : we do here in the sight of god , and to all the world , disown and abhor all animosity and revengeful remembrance of sides and parties in the late war : and do promise and resolve to co-operate within our sphere towards the publique settlement , with such faithfulness and constancy , as neither to occasion or entertain the least jealousie upon the account of any past difference whatsoever , fully resolving to submit to the determinations of the parliament both in ecclesiastical and civil affairs , which we hope will remove all occasion of jealousie and distinction for the future . john lord paulett . sir francis paulett . sir amos paulett . william paulett esq. edward phillips . william helliar . peregrine palmer henry barkley . charles berkley . thomas warr . john brice . robert hawly . john bonvile . francis windham . thomas pigott . william wandrond . george waldrond . edward berkley . francis hawly . george speake . john tynt . sam. gorges . george syddenham . francis harvey , &c. an alarum to the counties of england and wales . with the ab-renunciatiation of the oath . by tho. fuller , b. d. our nation , which long since hath lost the lustre and well-being , now at last-strugleth for the life and being thereof . our many [ temporal ] miseries are reducible to two principal heads . daily . decrease of trading . . increase of taxes : so that every hour the burden groweth weightier , and the back of our nation weaker to support it . . 't is sad to see , in cloathing countreys , what swarms there are of poor people , the true objects of charity ; if any were as able to give , as they worthy to receive relief : for they would work , and can work , yet cannot work , because there are none to employ them . . as for the sea ( which is the land of port-towns ) it returneth small benefit ; for since dunkirk was ours ( more to the credit than benefit of our nation ) the fire of searobberies is removed out of the chimney , and scattered about the house , not lesse destructive , but more diffusive : so that our merchants could better guard themselves against that single staple of pirates , than many lesser ones sprung since every where , the cause why rich men will not ( as poor cannot ) adventure . . our second misery is , increase , yea , superfetation of taxes , so long as so numerous an army is maintained : for though some of their souldiers will preach gratis ( conscientious to take nothing for that which they know is worth nothing ) yet none will fight at so cheap a rate . . some will say , that what the souldier receiveth with one hand , he returneth with another , expending his pay in victuals , cloaths , &c. whereby coin , by circulation , is continued in our country . this i deny ; for some grandees greatned by the times , have made their monies over in banks beyond the seas , which are put into mortmain , or a dead hand , whereby no profit accreweth to our commonwealth . others having gotten the estates of lords , live after the rate yoomen , whose discretion therein is to be commended , for proportioning their expences ( for fear of afterclaps ) rather according to their original , than present condition . . the increase of taxes must inevitably cause the ruine of our nation : for though still there be wealthy men left ( as they shew it in their cowardise , and fear to engage for the general good ) yet they grow thinner every day whilst such as are left no root of their own , rather than they will wither will turn suckers on the stock of others . so that the greatest happiness rich men can promise to themselves , is only to be last devoured , though the comfort of the lateness will not countervail the sadness for the certainty of their destruction . indeed it is miraculous that our nation hath subsisted so long , and few there are that would believe that the whole candle of our english wealth could last so long , as we have beheld it burning in the socket , but now giving the last blaze , if god be not merciful , and men discreet to prevent it . . pass we from the sad malady , to the sole remedy thereof , i say sole , not exclusively of divine miraculous power , but according to humane apprehension , this is a free and full parliament . indeed free-parliament is a tautology , like a reasonable-man , who , if not reasonable , is no man ; as the other , if not free , no parliament . but the late frequent forces put on parliaments hath made the needless epethite become necessary , to express what kinde of parliaments we desire . not such in which every word must be spoken under correction of the sword , but wherein every member , without fear of violence ( to interrupt or dissolve them ) may follow the dictates of their own judgement . . nor ought a parliament onely bee free from force , but also from any abjurations , or previous engagements . let them take heed of renouncing any thing , save what is simply sinful in it self , as the forsaking of the world , flesh , and devil , as was solemnly promised for them in their baptism . but it is bad to bee busie with other ab-renunciations , especially of the royal family . . look backward , and we may say with david , the vows of the lord are upon us ; i mean on so many of us as are of fifty years of age . the oath of supremacy ( not to mention the covenant ) is the eldest brother , to whom the inheritance of our consciences do belong . . look forwards , it limiteth gods providence , which is an hainous offence ; wee know not what a day , month , year , &c. may bring forth . this age hath the least reason of any to meddle with the edge-tools of such oathes which in a short ( but strict ) time hath seen so many strange things , that now nothing is strange unto us . have wee not seen o. cromwell from a private gentleman gradatim ascend to bee protector of three nations , and by his courage and wisdome rather than any right ) a more absolute power possessed by , and larger tribute paid unto him than to any king in england . his son and successour ( counted bad by many for his goodness and milde spirit ) for eighth months was congratulated by the most considerable persons of our nation . now if some twenty years since an oath had been tendred unto us to abjure the family of cromwels from ever having the supream magistraey in our nation ; such an oath would have seemed safe , but yet it was not lawful to take it , because none knew what was in the womb of teeming time , though utterly improbable to our belief . . besides , the imposers of this oath may miss the mark they propound to themselves , viz. assurance of their own , and discovery of the opposite party ; for many now pass not for the taking or breaking of any oath , and assurance of such is hard in keeping , and indeed not worth the having . other will behold the oath as temporary , and expiring with the power of the imposers . as for the conscientious indeed , esfusing it out of pure principles of piety , it is a barbarous act for persons in power , to turn executioners to strangle tender consciences , whose cordial fear of an oath should be encouraged . . as the parliament must be free , no vassal , but enfranchised from the sword , so must it bee full , no cripple , but entire and compleat in all the members thereof . our land hath lately groaned under the most grievous monopoly as ever was , or can be , when a handful of men have grasped to themselves the representing of a whole ( not to say three ) nation , most of them being but burgesses , who though equal in votes , are not equal in their representation with the knights of the shires . if they presume that the rest excluded by them ( far more considerable for birth , estates , number , love of the people , and what not ? ) are vertually included in them , it is an intollerable presumption . that what pertaineth to all should be handled by all , is a truth so clear and strong , that they must offer a rape to their own reason that deny it . such also is this maxim , vnrepresented , vnconcluded : so that if so few have in them the notion of a parliament , it is a bare notion indeed , especially seeing this handful of men were ( say the cavaliers ) dissolved by the death of the king ; dissolved ( said cromwell ) by his sword ; dissolved ( say some great ones ) by an act of their own ( entred into the journall book of the parliament ) dissolved must their own consciences say , by their voluntary accepting of elections in later parliaments . . now the members of a free and full parliament ( the onely hope of humane help ) ought thus to be qualified : . let them be godly , and well-affected indeed , and not in the canting language of the times . . men of estates , who will be tender in taxing others , as striking them thorough themselves , whilst such who bear nothing care not how much they burthen others , as if paying were as easie as voting , and money as free as words . . men of spirits , no dull souls , all the sparks of whose activity are quenched in their own flegm . . no gainers by the continnance of the army . demetrius the silver-smith was no fool ( what ever else he was ) so sticking for the shrine of diana , by which craft he got his gain . . men of moderation , a quality not opposed to diligence , but to violence , not unactiving men , but regulating their activity . . this their moderation must appear in considering all interests , seeing there be no two interests in the nation so contemptible , which if united , and twisting their discontents together , cannot draw trouble on all the rest : especially the sectarian ( though presented i beleeve by their party , through a multipling glass ) are considerable on a politick score of their numbers and pious account of their conscience ; for , though many of them carry the latter in their purses , who when they finde the moisture of profit to fail them , will fall off like leaves in autumn ; yet can i not be so uncharitable , but to beleeve that many of them ( having the heat of their affections above the light of their judgements ) follow erroneous consciences ; besides , having gone loose so long , they must needs swell , if hardly girded on a sudden . . this moderation also must be used by all other persons , to work themselves to be ( if not pleased ) contented with the decisions of a free parliament . all must sit down losers save such alone , who can plead , that they have been no sinners in our nation . the grand design must be to have none , or , ( if that be impossible ) as few as may be , utterly ruined . i confess two hungry meals makes a third a clutton , and such who have long fasted from their detained estates , will be not onely greedy but ravenous to recover them . yea , such will shrewdly plead , that they now expect moderation from them , who never used moderation to them . however , in such a general danger , men must depose their animosities , labouring , first , to reconcile their spirits , then , their perswasions , the later being at less distance than the former . and men must divide , where they cannot get the whole , seeing few will pity his starving who will eat no bread at all , because he can recover but half of his own loaf . . it will be objected that such a full p. is still but an empty parliament , having no house of lords therein : but know , if both hands of a man be bound , no hope of liberty from himself ; but if one be untied , it may do the brotherly office to unloose the other : let us be content to row in a sculler till we can get a pair of oars . and such surely is the ingenuity and publick spiritness of the peers , that laying aside personal interest ( which upon debate may appear more ) they will suspend their rights , immunities , and priviledges , and submit all to the determination of a free parliament to acquiesce therein . . god give our nation seasonably to understand their own strength , that the wars begun may be ended amongst our selves before forreigners become the arbitrators of our differences , who will demand great wages for little work , yea and turn their owne paymasters thereof . and may that great general ( whose intentions long have stood in the dark to our nation , whilst our nations desires were all the while in light to him , understand that vox populi is vox dei , and interpret , that god calleth unto him by the declarations of all counties , to be chiefly instrumental in asserting our liberties , and we shall have cause for ever to bless the day of his nativity . . indeed had providence fixed our nativities under the duke of muscovy , whose list is his subjects law , we would ( because we must ) work our selves patiently to the obedience of his power . but seeing god hath given us , with st. paul , to be free-born , acts . . ( though also , with the centurion , we have given great summs , not to obtain , but contrive this freedome ) let us not tamely lose our birth-right , and vigorously endeavour their preservation . . the story is well known of the old woman , who having but a small parcel of wood , would leasurably roast her goose ▪ stick by stick , till her wood was all burnt , and her goose still raw . if the several counties singly engage one after another , all will be overthrown , and nothing effected as to our relief . let the two and fifty shires of england and wales ( with the city of london , which eminently is two and fifty more ) be all as one , and unanimously advance the work , and not doe as they dealt with poor cheshire , using it as joab used vriah , putting him forward on action , then falsly ret , eating from him , and leaving him a prey to his enemies . but i hope our old shipwracks will be new sea-marks to us , documented by former nocuments , to steer a course for the general good . . there is so englishman so inconsiderable , but he may , at the least in a single capacity , be contributive to the happiness of his native country , the wise with their brains , the rich with their purses , the learned with their pens , the strong with their persons , all with their prayers . and if now they suffer this opportunity which god puts into their hands , to slip through their fingers , they may hereafter have more years to bemoan their folly , than minutes to amend their misery ; it being better now to say , we will not , than three years hence to say , we cannot pay our taxes . the declaration and address of the gentry of the county of essex , who have adhered to the king , and suffered imprisonment or sequestration , during the late troubles . may it please your excellency , we the gentlemen of the county of essex , taking notice how industrious some pernicious and desperate persons have been to raise a jealousie , that all who adhered to the king have such a a settlement of rancour and revenge in their hearts , against those who were of a different party , that the blessing of a firm and lasting peace , so long wisht for , and now hoped to be in a near propinquity , is not likely to take its due and desired effect , have thought fit to express the true sense of our hearts , in a declaration which we have enclosed herein , conceiving it very fitting , not to make the same more publick , till it hath first arrived at the view of your excellency , whom god hath been pleased to make so signally eminent in the delivering of this nation from those pressing miseries it hath so long lay panting and groaning under ; and for which , as we can never enough magnifie his mercy , so can we not sufficiently express that high honour and respect which we retain in our hearts towards your excellency , the great and worthy instrument he hath been pleased to make use of therein . my lord , we subscribe our selves , your excellencies most humble and devoted servants . chelmesford , april . . this was subscribed by the gentry , whose names are expressed under the subsequent declaration , and superscribed to his excellency the lord general monck . the declaration . whereas almighty god hath raised this distracted nation to some hopes of re-settlement on just , known , and lasting foundations : we magnifie his mercy from the bottom of our hearts , and shall ever pay a most grateful acknowledgment to his excellency the lord gen. monck as the signal instrument of so great a deliverance . and whereas some pernicious and desperate persons have laboured to raise a jealousie , that those who adhered to the king doe still in their hearts detain revenge against such as were of a different party : we think our selves bound to declare to all the world ( in the presence of god ) that we detest and abhor all thoughts of animosity or revenge against any party or persons whatsoever . for as we could wish the late divisions had never been begotten , so we desire they may for ever be buried , and shall think those persons the greatest and common enemies of our country who shall offer to revive them . and we also declare , that we will thankfully submit and attend the resolutions of the next ensuing parliament , for a just and happy settlement of church and state , that so at last ( by cods blessing ) that so those odious marks of sides and parties may for ever be blotted out , and a perfect union may again be restored to this distressed nation . edward russel , esq. sir henry appleton , baronet . sir benjamin ayloff , baronet . sir denner strutt , baronet . sir humfrey mildemay , knight sir john tirell , knight sir granmer herris , knight sir edmund peirce , knight sir henry wroth , knight william ayloff , fsq . james altham , esq. gamaliel capel , esq. anthony browne , esq. charles fytche , esq. thomas argal , esq. stephen smith , esq. salter herris , esq. henry pert , esq. john fanshaw , esq. thomas roberts , esq. richard humphrey , esq. john lynn , esq. dr. john michaelson , richard symons , esq. anthony kempson , esq. william herris , esq. william bramston , esq. john brown , gent. nicholas serle john vavasour , gent. john green , gent. james cookson , gent. fdmund coole , gent. this declaration and address was agreed upon by the subscribers at a general meeting , at chelmesford in essex , april . . sir benjamin ayloffe , and sir edmond peirce being then appointed and desired to present them to his excellency , which was done accordingly at st. james's the th . of the same moneth . a declaration of the knights and gentry in the county of dorset , who were in his late majesties army . upon a due consideration of the dangerous jealousies which are promoted ; partly , by the cunning of a close , and malicious faction of separatists , and partly , by the unwarranted liberties of an heady and intemperate sort of people , which falsely tearm themselves royallists : — to the great dissettlement of sober and well-minded persons , and sufficient to blast the hopes we have of returning to our antient freedomes , without a more than ordinary appearance of divine aid , to support , and re-unite us in this our critical necessity . we have thought it highly expedient to declare our seuse , and resolves , in the particular of adherence to the largest assurances of amicable agreement , and correspondence imaginable : looking upon our selves as obliged by an indispensible tye of religious charity , to compassionate and forgive one another , as we expect to be forgiven : and we do further declare , that we are so far from justifying those unchristian animosities , which reign in divers turbulent spirits , even of our own party ( by reputation at least ) that we disclaim any society with men of those wilde principles ; and that to all honest purposes , we will never put any difference , betwixt such as shall now unite with us , in order to the publick peace , and those who first engaged in the same perswasion with our selves , submitting all to the resolves of parliament , upon whose determinations we beseech god to bestow his benediction . sir hugh windham , sir gerard naper , sir john strangwayes , giles strangwayes , john hardy , henry coker , edward hull , henry butler , maximilian mohune , robert mohune , henry hoskins , james hoskins , george strangwayes , nicholas strangwayes , robert lawrence , bruen lawrence , arthur fookes , george brown , major vdvehall , rob. chamberlain , rob. strode , jo. strode of slape , humphrey bishop , john bishop , robert culliford , george cary , george penny , tho. turbervile , george tubervile , tho. paulet , cap. hoare , major dolline , hugh hodges , rich. willoughby , john pesing , john gillin●ham ▪ william elsing , robert ernsly , john dawe , john fisher , ellis collins . the declaration of the gentry of the county of kent , who have adhered to the king , and suffered imprisonment or sequestration during the late troubles . whereas it hath pleased almighty god , after so many trialls , and so long distraction , to raise us to large hopes of resettlement of this nation upon just , known , and lasting foundations ; wee therefore desire from our hearts to render to god the glory of his mercies , and a full tribute of honour to his excellency the lord general monck , who hath been so eminently instrumental in these beginnings of deliverance . and forasmuch as we understand that some malicious and desperate persons ( regarding neither the mercies of god , nor the miseries of their country ) have endeavoured to beget a pernicious jealousie , that those who adhered to the king , do still retain a spirit of revenge against all that were of a contrary party : we do therefore declare in the presence of god , that we utterly abhor all revengeful thoughts and actions against any party or persons whatsoever . and as we have great reason to wish those divisions had never been born , so we hope , and will do our utmost they may never be remembred , and shall look on all persons as the worst and common enemies of this nation that shall offer to revive them . in pursuance whereof we further declare ( as his excellencies army hath given us a noble example ) that we will thankfully acquisce in the resolutions of the next ensuing parliament for a due and just settlement of church and state . col. richard spencer , esquire , thomas lennard , esquire , thom. peyton , kt. and baronet , roger twysden , kt. and bar. edward hales , baronet , richard hardress , baronet , william man , knight , stephen lennard , knight , john boys , knight , col. thomas colpepper , col. edward wilsford , col. george newman , col. henry norwood , robert barnham , esquire , daniel treswel , esquire , thomas collepepper , esquire , thomas herlackenden , esq. francis twysden , esq. john best , esq. edward barham , esq. rich. master esq. francis clerk , esq. edward darell , esq. william rook esq. joh. boys of h●ad , esq. wi●liam kingsley , esq. richard hulse , esq. james newman , esq. john pownoll , gent. william somner , gen● . a declaration of the nobility and gentry that adhered to the late king , in and about the city of london . after the miseries of a civil war , and the many vain and fruitless attempts toward settlement upon several interests and imaginary forms of government , it having pleased almighty god by unexpected and wonderful meanes to give these nations a probable hope of being restored to those lawes and priviledges which have been transmitted to them from their ancestors . we doe declare , that we think our selves obliged , next to divine providence to attribute this glorious work to his excellency the lord general monck , who as he had the courage to assert the publick liberty , and the prudence to carry it on against so many difficulties , has also had the happinesse to lead us thus far through the wilderness of confusion , without passing the red sea of blood . and because the enemies of the publick peace have endeavoured to represent those of the king's party as men implacable , and such as would sacrifice the common good as their private passions . we doe sincerely profess that we doe reflect upon our past sufferings from the hand of god , and therefore doe not cherish any violent thoughts or inclinations to have been any way instrumental in them ; and if the indiscretion of any spirited persons transports them to expressions contrary to this our sense , we utterly disclaim them , and desire that the imputation may extend no farther than the folly of the offenders . and we farther declare , that we intend by our quiet and peaceable behaviour to testifie our submission to the present power , as it now resides in the council of state in expectation of the future parliament , upon whose wisedome and determinations , we trust god will give such a blessing , as may produce a perfect settlement both in church and state . and as his excellency hath not chosen the sandy foundation of self-concernment , but the firm rock of national interest , whereon to frame our settlement : it is our hope and prayer that when the building comes to be raised , it may not like rome have its beginning in the blood of brethren , nor like babel be interrupted by the confusion of tongues . but that we may all speak one language , and be of one name , that all mention of parties and factions , and all rancour and animosities may be thrown in and buried like rubbish under the foundation . subscribed by the marquiss of dorchester the earl of northampton the earl of devonshire the earl of barkshire the earl of dover the earl of peterborough the earl of norwich the earl of corke the earl of carbery the earl of desmond the viscount ogle the viscount grandison the viscount lumley the viscount brounker the lord lucas the lord bellasis the lord loughborough the lord lexinton the lord brereton tho. fuller bp. of kerry sir william compton sir francis vane john russel wil. ashburnham edward villers thomas howard will. howard sir jarvis clifton knight and baronet sir tho. corbet bar. sir tho. littleton bar. sir john greenvil knight and baronet sir wil. thorold bar. sir tho. prestwich bar. sir orlando bridgman sir ed. pie sir lewis kirke sir tho. smith sir rob. stapleton sir wil. coney sir nich. crisp sir hugh cartwright sir sutton cony sir henry chichley sir wil. morton sir ed. savage sir tho. armstrong sir john stephens sir humph. bennet sir wil. howard sir hen. wroth sir wil. dacres sir rich. malevory sir arthur gorge sir anthony jackson sir robert bolles george morley d. d. tho. warmstry d. d. jer. taylor d. d. phil. king d. d. e. penrodock will. legg george penrodock tho. lower herbert price tho. panton robert ruthen coll. fretswel john jeffryes adrian scrope wil. burgh john mayard ed. rosecarack and many others . finis . politick maxims and observations written by the most learned hugo grotius translated for the ease and benefit of the english states-men. by h.c. s.t.b. grotius, hugo, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (thomason e _ ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing g thomason e _ estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; :e [ ]) politick maxims and observations written by the most learned hugo grotius translated for the ease and benefit of the english states-men. by h.c. s.t.b. grotius, hugo, - . campanella, tommaso, - . h.c., s.t.b. [ ], [i.e. ], [ ] p. printed for humphrey moseley, and are to be sold at his shop at the princes armes in saint paul's church-yard., london, : :. original title not traced. based on: campanella, tommaso. realis philosophiæ epilogisticae partes quatuor. p. , misnumbered , . annotation on thomason copy: "decemb. ". reproduction of the original in the british library. eng political science -- early works to . a r (thomason e _ ). civilwar no politick maxims and observations: written by the most learned hugo grotius translated for the ease and benefit of the english states-men. b grotius, hugo c the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the c category of texts with between and defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - john pas sampled and proofread - john pas text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion politick maxims and observations written by the most learned hvgo grotivs translated for the ease and benefit of the english states-men . by h.c. s.t.b. london , printed for humphrey moseley , and are to be sold at his shop at the princes armes in saint paul's church-yard , ; to the reader . i shall not beg pardon for this addresse to the english readers . what is here presented to view , is the digest of the immortal hugo grotius . the subject matter was first lent by that learned frier campanella but hee was rather the occasion than the author . for campanella's share of this work , was onely a piece of his philosophia realis , which had slept forgotten , had not grotius ' wak'd it by these admirable observations . and these speak the author so fully , that you 'l confesse he travail'd farther , while he sate stil , then ever vlysses was feign'd to do ; and ( without the encounters of circe and the sirens ) not onely {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} , but {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} now if you suspect the english falls short of grotius own latine , i would gladly know who it is that can reach it ? but if you look for the sense faithfully renderd ( and-reasonably you can expect no more ) i assure you 't is done ; and that on his word who hath chosen rather to lose his livelyhood , than to subscribe to a lye . farewell . to the most learned hugo grotius the author . our ages wonder , by thy birth the fame of belgia , by thy banishment the shame : who to more knowledge younger didst arrive than forward glaucius , yet art still alive : whose masters oft ( for suddenly you grew to equall and passe those , and need no new ; to see how soon , how far thy wit could reach ) sat down to wonder , when they came to teach : oft then would scaliger contented be , to leave to mend all times to polish thee , and of that paines effect did highlyer boast , than had he gain'd all that his fathers lost : when thy capella read ( which till thy hand had clear'd , grave and learned did under stand , though well thou might'st , at such a tender age have made ten lessons of the plainest page ) that king of criticks stood amaz'd to see a work so like his own set forth by thee : nor with lesse wonder on that work did look , than if the bridgroom had begot the book , to whome thy age and act seem'd to unite , at once the youth of phoebus and the light . thence lov'd thee with a never dying flame , as the adopted heir to all his fame . for which care , wonder , love , the riper daies paid him with just and with eternall praise ; who gain'd more honour from one verse of thine , than all the canës of his princely line . in that he joy'd , and that oppos'd to all , to titius spright , to hungry schoppius gall . to what ( with cause disguised ) bonarcius writes , to delrio's rage , and all his loyolites but though to thee , each tongue , each art be known , as all thy time that had imploy'd alone , though truth do naked to thy sight appear , and scarce can we doubt more , then thou canst cleer , though thou at once do'st different glories joyne , a lofty poet and a deep divine , canst in the purest phrase cloath solid sence , scaevola's law in tulli's eloquence . though thy imployments have excel'd thy pen , shew'd thee much skil'd in books , but more in men . and prov'd thou canst at the same easie rate . correct an author and uphold a state . though rare praise , do a full truth appear to spain and germany , who more do fear ( since thou thy aid didst to that state afford ) the swedish counsels then the swedish sword . all this yet of thy worth makes but a part , and we admire thy head lesse then thy heart ; which when in want was yet too grave to close ( though woo'd ) with thy ungratefull countries foes . when their chief ministers strove to entice , and would have bought thee , at what ever price : since all our praise and wonder is too small , for each of these , what shall we give for all ? above the reach or stroke of fortune live , not valuing what she can take or give ; for low desires oppresse the loftiest state , and who lookes down on vice , looks down on fate . falkland . manipvlvs politicvs or , politique maxim's and cautions . part i. chap. i. of politique communities . . the sense and apprehension of mans self-insufficiency , was the first thing that link'd men into communities . for man finding himselfe unable to stand alone , was compell'd by necessity to betake himselfe to the support of others . . dominion therefore requires the union of many into one body , which is called thence a community , a policy or body ; because no man can politically be his owne lord nor the lord of any one singular person . . dominion is two fold . . naturall , or . violent . by the naturall , the soule rules the body , parts , and affections . by the uiolent , the affections sometimes lord it over the reason . observator . . man is borne to hold society with all men : an evident signe whereof is , his speech , and naturall tender affections , if they be not corrupted by education . . . there is a threefold community . of soules or mindes . . of bodies . . of fortunes . first , the community of minds , which is call'd religion , and that is the chiefe community , which is the very soule of policy , & the shield of naturall justice : and it is the great tye that links man to god , and man to man , whence religion hath its name , à religando . observat. this religious union , is evident amongst the jewes , but more amongst true christians : amongst mahumetans very little : amongst pagans none at all : unlesse we rather regard the bare sound of the name , then any morall effect . . the community of bodies . this stands in the second ranck of tye's or combinations . by this the great turk rules over mahumetans , iewes and christians , which under his empire are united in body , although in soule and religion far differing . . community of fortunes or goods , obtaines the third place . by this the turk rules over the turks , and ragusians too , and the king of spaine over the genoese , neapolitane and spaniard : for the geneoese have estates lying in that kings territories , and traffique there . some communities there are mixt of all these three . chap. ii. of the function and degrees of lords and rulers , whence flowes the divers kinds of republiques and regiments , &c. of their circulations , &c. hee naturally rules , that excells in vertue . he naturally serves that is inferiour in vertue , or has none at all . where the contrary is , there the dominion is violent . . politique excellency consists either in the . mind , or . body , or . both . . he rules best that excells in both , as caesar did . he rules next-best that excells in mind , as vlysses . thirdly , he that excells in body , that is , in strength and activity , as ajax . observator . but being it is naturall for the soule to excell the body : he that by strength of body over-rules them that excell in mind , rules violently : as of old the giants , and afterwards brennus , and attila , and many more . . the first thing that gained dominion amongst men , was . power . . wisedome . . love . the mixture of all three is rare , and admirable . power without wisdom is brutishand barbarous . tyranny , this is lyon-like dominion . wisedome without love , is but a cheating hypocritical dommion . this is fox-like . hence lewis the ii. of france , gain'd the title of lewis the fox . but love cements all , and makes dominion durable . hence poets say that cupid ( or love ) is the antientest of all the gods , for indeed love made the world and harmony preserves it . . the supreme power is the power of the sword , that is the power of life and death , which resides in them to whom the last appeale in criminalls is referred . . dominion of one good man is called monarchy dominion of one evill men , tyranny . the dominion of many good ones , aristocracy . the dominion of many bad ones , oligarchy . the dominion of all good ones , policy . the dominion of all bad ones , democracy . it is the office ( or duty ) of those that rule . to teach and instiruct their subjects . defend their subjects . nourish or feede their subjects . to maintaine the rights of their subjects which seeing no king can undergoe of himselfe alone , he does the . by priests , doctors , and lawes . . by souldiers . . by husband-men , merchants and artificers . . by judges , that judge according to law . on the other side , the people owe to their prince two things . reverence & . . obedience . . those are called kings which preferre the publique before their own private good : but tyrants which doe the contrary . . a kingly government , does very rarely degenerate ( except by degrees ) into a democratique , yet in athens it did so : which originally was a monarchy . . when a popular state , by mis-government , is corrupted ; there springs up in lieu of it , either a tyrant , as pisistratus , at athens , or a * king : as cosmo medices , at florence . or vassalage under strangers , those of pisa , by this meanes , became slaves to the florentines . common-wealths by luxury and pride , shrink and contract themselves into an oligarchy . so some fell into the hands of a decemvirate or government by ten-men : which lasted not long , but was quelled ( observe it ! ) by the people rising under the conduct of virginius : so the athenians , under the conduct of thrasybulus , cut off and suppressed the thirtie tyrants . . strife betwixt commons and nobles , encreaseth a common-wealth : but if the commons bee conquerour , so as to draw the nobles to their bent : the republique goes to wrack : as it hapned in florence : a state of all others most subject to changes . but if the noblest win the day , tyranny forthwith steps in : as heretofore in genoa : and the republique falls to ground . but contentions about the change of religion , or the sharing of state ( which by a new name , we call levelling ) is ever the utter undoing of all , especially where the conquerors are but few . yet in flanders , holland , and friesland ; they are not so much wasted by varieties of religion , as the french , polack , and english are : because they are compell'd into union by the common enemy the spaniard . observator . the strife of peares and people , so long as they keepe from down-right blowes , may be reckoned in the number of those which herod calles , good and advant ageous contentions : but when by ambition and avarice the sedition of the apuleij and the gracchi , and after them the warrs of sylla and marius crept in , the republique of rome began to look monarchish : which as jul. caesar ! invaded upon a popular accompt : so would pompey have probably done , upon the senates . in some places , such is the education of divers that are called noble-men ; that you may expect vertue from any men , sooner then from them . strifes about religion are there most pernicious and destructive , where provision is not made * , for dissenters : that they may live secure : and the supreme magistrate makes not their security good to them in good earnest , whereupon tumults and jarrs about religion have risen that have vexed germany , but almost quite destroyed both france and the netherlands . so much for internal changes . externall follow . such are forraign invasion , plagues , inundations , and conflagrations uuniversall . which disasters oft-times so change the face of things , that inhabitants are glad to begin the world again . these we may not ( as the author here seemes to do ) impute to any magicall fatality , in the numbers of . or . ( which yet he laies , have been experimentally found ominous ) nor yet to the ill-complexion of starrs , that ( as i may say ) attend the horoscope of such and such kingdomes and commomvealths : ( though i will not deny , but god ( the great demiurgus ) brings many plagues upon men , and cities , by the ministry of the planets ) but ascribe these calamities to the finger of god : which writ the period of the assyrian empire upon the wall . dan , . and levell'd sodom and gomorrah , with the plain wheron they stood . gen. . . cities and countries are sometimes destroyed by naturall causes , but yet the hand of god may set them on work : as if aetna ( by its eruptions ) should destroy sicily , or vesevo , campania : ( as it has sometimes done ) earthquakes in italy are naturally frequent : by reason of the many hollow grots and mountaines in that country , but if they bring destruction to whole countries , or cities , ( as they have not long since done ) vere digitus dei — firy sins of that sodom , &c. the city of venice is subject to oblimation : or the casting up of mud , and sands ; which may in time choake her up , and be her ruine : which of her self is so admirably complexion'd , that she can never perish . observator . some remedies for this disease ( though perhaps not strong enough ) shee has already invented : and may devise more and better : yet this advantage her seas bring , that they are her bulwark against strangers : upon confidence whereof , shee has no militia of her own ; yet fears a tyranny from her own strength : and hence perhaps it may fall out , that by hyring of forreign commanders , she may at last come to ruine . chap. iii. of the essence , constitution , and division &c. princedome and dominion , &c. the romans , upon the suddain emergencies of danger , by war , or seditions , did chuse themselves an extemporarie monarch : which they called a dictatour : whence at last ( by the authors leave ) we may inferre thus much : that a monarch is the best & safestengine for any people , in time of war or danger . hence homer makes his wise-man , [ ilysses vote clearly for that ; to carry on the grecian warre — it is not good to have many heads ( say's he ) let there be one chief , one king ! for . the dominion of one good man , is alwaies better then the dominion of many , nay , of all good ones . yea , . the male-administration of one , is much to be desired , rather then that of many , or of all in a princedome , or rule . . simply and naturally , god is the sole lord paramount : as having power-absolute over all : whose will ( as most wise ) is a law to it self , and transcends the whole scale and predicament of things . but . man is onely lord in degree and measure : because his will cannot be a law ; unlesse regulated and bound up by the law of god , either naturall , or positive . . hee knows not how to rule a kingdome , that cannot manage a province nor can he wield a province , that cannot order a city ; nor he order a city , that knows not how to regulate a village : nor hee a village , that cannot guide a family : nor can that man govern well a family that knowes not how to governe himselfe : neither can any govern himselfe unlesse his reason be lord , will &c. and appetite her vassalls : nor can reason rule , unlesse her selfe be ruled by god , and [ wholy ] be obedient to him . ergo . without the divine rule , no man is truely a king , or prince , according to nature , but rather to be counted , a scourge of god , &c. executioner of men . but neither , according to the divine rule , is any prince simply a lord : but a ruler and pastor of his people : * and the vice-gerent of the lord god by whom kings reign . . therefore ought a good prince so farre to excell his subjects in vertue , as the shepheard does his flock : who is of a superiour species to them : now seeing all men are equall as to the species , it must here follow that princes ( as such ) must have somewhat of god , &c. peculiar impresses of elohim , the deity in them . therefore . wisdome alone rules best of all : not sophisticall , but philosophicall [ yet ] not the wisdome of the cloister , or the * cell , but civil wisdome , not opposite , but subservient to god . . the dominion of the the . male over . the female is naturall . . father . his children . oldmen . young men . strong . the weake . schollars . master nature doth bring forth men . . of strong intellectuals , though weake in constitution of bodies to be priests , philosophers , councellors . . active and strong bodies , with couragious minds to be — souldiers . . gross braines and rude hands to be husbandmen . . heavy and robustuous for the cavalry or horsemen . . laborious and nimble-handed to weaving , and other manufactures . . ready tongues , and learned , for embassies , and orations . . other sharp wits for merchandize . . just men for the bench , or tribunall . . weak in body and mind , for * service , and to be instruments for their betters . . men of abilities both of body and mind , to be commanders , kings , and masters of the militia . . that therefore there is the best republique , where every man bends himselfe to those duties and imployments which nature hath fitted him for : for then reason and wisdom bear sway : and that the worst , where men are put upon imployments , which are contrary to thein grain , and genius : for then fortune , and chance , ( that is the force of ignorance ) rule the rost . . whence magistrates are chosen , because they are the sons of nobles , or sons of ☞ friends of such as are in present power , or for their wealth , or bought honour , and not because they are good , or wise men ; there the republique falls to ground . . a common-wealth goes to wrack soonest , when the portion makes marriages , and equality of wealth , and not an equall * strength of body and mind , whence ( according to the pythagorean ) the best issue is to be expected : * though plato think ( more rightly ) the best breed to be of strong bodies , and good wits : or on the contrary . . all mischiefs sway , where women have the liberty to do , and say what they please , &c. . these wee count citizens who not onely are capable and partakers of dignities and honors , in the republique , but such , as by any function , be it never so mean ( as the members of the body ) contribute to the use and advantage of the whole . the rest wee count strangers , excrements of a common-wealth : such as are many noble-men now adaies . . the [ true ] office of the noblenesse or peereage [ in any republique ] is to defend that , and private persons . the office of the commons to seed , and sustaine it . the office of the wiser sort , to rule and instruct it . he that takes no prosession , or calling at all upon him is to be look'd upon , as an excrement , or drone : but they that mediate betwixt god and man , are to be esteemed as the diviner part of a common-wealth : such are the legitimate priest-hood . chap. iv. of laws and customes , and that which is called the reason of state . . that * good men may be borne , and imployed in those offices and functions , to which they were born , every community stands ever in need of a law . . as virtue is the private law , of individualls [ or singular persons ] so law is the publique vertue of a community . therefore being virtue is the rule of actions , and affections in a particular person , ordained by the decree of a potent and * pliant reason , for a chief private good : so law is the rule of affections , and actions publique : constituted and published from the dictates of common reason , which respect the chiefest common good . . the chief good is preservation : & that either private or publique . which is ( as far as may be gathered ) from conservatives [ simply ] or expulsives of destructives . simply to coserve is to enternize [ or perpetuate ] therfore simply , both the private & publique chief good is from [ god ] that eternall chief entity . but partiall from other things : as namely , instrumentally and dispositively from the rules of reason . . wherefore — no republiques ☞ can make laws , where there is not common reason and common consent ; unlesse where by common reason ( and consent ) the matter is put into the hands of the wise-men ; such as were solon , lycurgus , and numa . or unto one whom god has delegated [ for his vicegeret ] as moyses , &c. as for minos and mahomet , either craft or the the devill led them on , to be apes of the true messengers from god , as moses was . observat. here the observator steps in and saies , i see no reason why the edicts of one or many rulers may not deserve the name of lawes , not at all awaiting the peoples consents : for neither in prescribing medicines , do physicians require the consent of their patients . . the eternall and first law is that , whereby god did fashion , create , govern , and change all things and bring them about to his own ends : even changable things , unchangably . from this is derived the law naturall planted in the minds of men , and in the whole volum of nature which is * gods art , and natures directory : neither can it be violated but by god : [ and that by him ] as a lord , not as a legislator . from the law naturall is is derived the law of nations , common to all men . from the law of nations , the positive civill law is derived , and so farre as it is agreeable to nature , it is invariable : but as it serves present necessities , it may , and sometimes ought , to be altered . god himselfe also gave a positive law — which is immutable , where it containes the law of nature , where our necessities [ onely ] mutable , as the law of moses in the decalogue , remains [ in full force ] for ever , but not in the forbidding of swines-flesh : which was made on purpose to * avoid leprosie . yet , ☞ no man can alter lawes , but he that made them , or he that is created his substitute , for that very purpose . observator . note . this observation cannot refer to any thing in the antecedent paragraph . nature is the work of reason without us . humane reason , is the work of nature within us . the will [ of man ] is ( of its own nature ) mutable : but reason immutable , except improperly : namely , when the matter about which which she is conversant is mutable . . politique reason , which some call the reason of state : and of old , was the same with equity , does transgresse the [ strict ] letter of the law , but not the sence and scope of it : becauses it does not abrogate or interpret , &c. any thing but for a greater good : as in the case of fabius vitulanus : to whom the roman senate granted his life which was forfeited to the law : and horace that slew the three curatis , * in the quarrell of the roman empire . but the reason of state , as it is now adaies , is nothing else but a devise of tyrants , that carries the face of equity , supposing it lawfull for them to transgresse , not onely their owne , but even the lawes of god , either to gaine or maintain their petty dominions . but , the difference between reason of state , and equity is this . for equity respects the publique good and truth : but reason of state looks upon [ onely ] the private and seeming good of the power in being . now since machiavel was found to play achitophel , the name being confessedly impious , princes began , ( that they might cover the shame of it ) to call it the reason of good government . which names though given by a knavish godfather , may bear an honest meaning . as for example . cleonymus put to death the ephori of lacedamon by a right reason of state : but so does not the [ great ] turk his brethren : because although he seem to do it for the common good ; yet being it is against the law of god , and some other way might bee found out to prevent their aspiring to the throne , the fact is [ barbarous and ] unreasonable . . a good prince wants not this reason of state , because his owne goodnesse is a perpetuall shield unto him : and if any rise up against him : all the people stand for him : as for david : whom his rebellious son had deprived of his kingdom . but a thousand thousand machiavillian arts cannot protect a wicked prince : because , cause , he is [ both ] odious to the people , and to god the king of all [ the world ] now , hee that jarrs with [ god ] the prime cause , does foolishly depend upon second causes : as it happen'd to caesar * borgia : who under themost wary , and provident [ discipline and ] mastership of machiavell , lost , both his life , and fortune . thus are machiavillians alwaies taken in their owne snare : for want of divine and heavenly knowledge , and by conceiting that by their owne wisdome they can fathome , and foresee , all things . . those lawes are best , which are . short . . easie . . few . and . fitted to the manners [ or genius ] of the people and the publique good . tyrannical lawes are many , and [ those ] obscure , difficult , like so many snares : that serve the turnes of some one , or few , but not at all accommodated , either to the manners , or advantage of the publique . . where lawes are often changed : they are the forerunners of the instant raine of a republique : as florence found it therefore [ by sad experience . observator . lawes belonging to governments , ought not to be alter'd unlesse necessity compell : nor yet others , but where the profit is [ very ] evident , and [ very ] great . . where there are more laws to * punish , then to direct or instruct , it is a sign of an ill tempered government . . the acts of laws are : to command what is good : to restrain what is evill : and to tollerate things indifferent . . reward , and punishment are the two [ ] spurrs of the law [ to prick men forward to observation ] of them . observat. no law can stand without punishment [ of the transgressors of ] and where no punishment is expressed , there it is arbitrary : otherwise it were rather a counsellthen a law : but whether a reason ought to be annexed to every law , it cannot universally be defined : saleucus , and charondas , and plato too , follow'd this course ; being to make laws for free people , they thought good to use perswasions . where as seneca ( having an eye upon his * own times ) affirmes : a law with a preface to be a foolish thing : being a law should command and not perswade : and dio chrysostome compares custome , to a king , but law to a tyrant : in that custome gives law to men willing [ to receive it ] but law binds the unwilling also . . the three guardians or keepers of laws are , . honour . . love . . fear . hee that secures not his law by these three , is either a weak or ignorant lawgiver , or elsea tyrant &c. . where a thing which once was good , becomes hurtfull , it is to be forbidden : where an evill thing does prosit [ the publique ] if it be evill of punishment , and not evill of offence , it is to be commanded . where in its own nature indifferent as it falls out , good or evill to the republique , it is to be [ according ] commanded or forbidden . . the laws of men make rather good citizens , then simply good men . yet princes [ and rulers ] ought to be simply good , because they are the * light and the law of others . . the law ought to make and ordain equality as the nurse of the common-wealth , but not a levelling ; for as the observator saies excellently , such strings make no harmony but an equality opposite to that destructive * consiming inequality , which is fatall to common-wealths . for example : extrem poverty makes theeves , insidious , perjur'd , ignorant , and instruments , of rich wicked men . on the contrary , very rich men are proud , luxurious , unlearn'd , contumelious , [ and i may adde out of * aristotle , injurious too ] very crasty men are [ commonly ] given to change . very stupid , are voluntarily servants [ or slaves ] onely moderatemen are stable in their place , and stations where they live . the florentine republique was ever the most unstable , by reason of the subtlety of their wits : the venetian , the most firm and stable of all , by reason of a mediocrity : and allay of dullnesse . . a good custome is a second law : which does more preserve a common-wealth , then the law it self . five customes , made rome , the princesse of republiques : as cato in salust witnesseth . . publique wealth . . private poverty . . just government abroad . . freedome of speech at home . . unliablenesse to fears , or designes . all these [ customes ] the commonwealth of venice observes as a law : except onely that shee lies open to fear : yet not in her counsels : but from forraigners , through want of a militia of her own . for want of the first [ publique wealth ] the genoesse , are not lords of the sea : nor of the new world , &c. for want of the fifth [ that is unliablenesse to feare , and desire ] the genoesse are as it were servants to forraign princes . for want of the third [ vix , just government abroad ] the french could never fix their dominion , without the verge of france . in which the spaniard is peccant too : every where severely and ceremoniously lording it ; not at all regarding the manners , [ and temper ] of the people [ they rule over . ] for want of the fourth [ custome ] [ that is freedom of speech ] the florentine republique went to wrack . observator . manners doubtlesse ( i.e. customes ) can do more then laws : and either add vigour to the , or take it from them . customs have brought laws under their subjection . obs. customs are either from . disposition of people or . institution and education . . for disposition : the french now have much of the old gaules in them : humanity and ficklenesse saies the observator : give me leave to adde feaverish valour in warre : ( which l. florus observes in their progenitors the gaules ) * in their first onsets they are more then men , in their second , lesse then women . . for education : what power that has over nature , consult xenophon , about the persians and lacedomonians . . good governors bring in good customes , ill men and women ill customes . ergo , neither ill men , nor [ any ] woman are fit to rule : the law of nations is the custome of the whole species . ( ) all mankind . . not a rigid but easie government fit the n●rthern nations , ☞ as being by nature a fierce people , and will hardly brook the fetters of a republique ; as tartars , muscovites , suedes , germans , switzers , &c. where they have kings by succession , the people have much liberty , and the prince little power ; yet after the roman culture , they began to live more severely [ and regularly , then before . ] but for southern people , especially those that live under the tropiques , no dominion fits them but the despotique ( ) lordly rule : and the severest lawes : because they are weak in strength : but strong in subtlety . for which reason they were ever [ very much ] addicted to ceremonies , superstitions , &c. observat. the muscovite and tartar are * slavishly governed : for there the north bears easterly . the king dome of swethland is become hereditary , by occasion of religion : but under such lawes , as are observed in elective kingdomes . . eastern people incline much to the disposition of the southern : as the western to the northern , by reason of the sea adjoyning to them : and for other causes : but the spaniard is like in conditions to the african by his vicinity , or neighbourhood . chap. v. of legislators . . a legislator is he , who foundeth a new empire : commonly upon new laws , religion and armes , rites , and fortunate essayes , or enterprises : as moyses , a good legislator , mahomet a * wicked one . a lawgiver therefore is either a god , as christ : or the messenger of god as moses : or a subtle politician , ☞ that can counterfeit the good ones : as minos , osiris , jupiter , mahomet , zamolxis , and the like : who to gain belief and love from the people , feigned themselves to be sent from god . for ☞ a lawgiver should be most renowned , most wise , most divine , and most reverend . observator . to pretend the commands of god might perhaps bring some successe to a * skillfull man , amongst a rude and ignorant people : as sertorius amongst the spaniards : or to the spaniard ( now * grown civill , and learned too ) amongst the americans : by the help of naturall philosophie , physick , and astronomic : but in a learned age , and place , this plot and artifice , is cold [ and ridiculous . ] . every artist , because is wise , is a king in his owne art : for a physician , hee 's lord and ruler over a sicke king : and so a mariner , in a tempest , saies to the priests and captaines , and the principall men , sit you here ; stand thou there , &c. therefore must the lawgiver be versed in all these arts : at least understand their ends : how they conduce either to the prosit , or prejudice of the republique — to purge out the superfluous and retain the necessary . hence it was plato banish'd poets out of his republique : because they were full of lies , and ribaldry : and by crying up wicked men , cry'd down goodnesse , and discouraged vertue . hence moyses expell'd false prophets and painters ( that pictured the deity ) and hucksters , and whoremongers , &c. a legislator must bee throughly skill'd , in the temperament and manners of countries , by the * air and the earth : as likewise happy or unhappy accidents that usually befall such and such a place , &c. as inundations , fires , leprosies , famines , &c. . legislators ought to reform and purifie , not exth pate religion . . the noblest profession in mountainous countries , are , . shepheards , as in switzerland , and scythia . in plain conutries . husbandmen : as in aegypt . in maritime countries . seamen and merchants : who for the profit they bring in ; the monies that they returne [ and exchange ] and arts and trades they bring from forraigne countries : have ever been held in highest place and esteem . but where other ( especially superfluous ) arts are preferred before these , imminent , both losse and ruine must needs follow after . . a divine legislator hath the idea of his own repubque in the court of heaven . the humane [ lawgiven ] in the government of the universe : and mans body . . man ( male and female ) are the elements of a republique : who consists of . soul. . body , and external . . goods . . the soul of a republique , is wisdome and religion . . the body , a senate or [ grand ] councell : or whoever bear any office advantagious to the publique . . for externall good [ the republique hath ] souldiers , mercenary , and auxiliary : and forraign merchants and artificers . for spirits , she hath lawes . for eyes , the searchers into arts , and sciences . for ears , spies and merchants . for a tongue , preachers , and doctors , and embassadors . for hands , her own militia : for feet , husbandmen and tradesmen . . as naturally the soul rules the * spirits policically , but the body despotically [ ( . ) by an imverious , and arbitrary way ] and the body rules the estate as the soule dictates to it : so religion has a politique dominion over lawes , and the senate : but over souldiers , tradesman , & such like , both * senate , law , and religion , rule proportionably . . goods of the mind are first to be look'd after : next , those of the body . those of fortune , in the third place . observat. the lawes of friendship , have a stricter tie then those of civill society . here endeth the first part of politique maxims and cautions . manipvlvs politicvs or , politique maxim's and cautions . part ii. chap. vi . of colonies and cities . they that rule over countries lying under several climes , must either govern them by distinct laws , or make exchanges of inhabitants , by mutuall transplantations . so the romans ( to secure their empire ) carried colonies over into germany , that by their example , the germanes , ( unaccustomed to romane lawes , ) might be the better acquainted with , and subject to them : observator . the trans-rhine ( which are the true , and proper ) germanes , for the much greatest part , were never conquer'd by the romans : but retain'd ( sans mixture ) their own language , and manners , till , under lotharius , they ●oluntarily submitted to the romane yoak . you shall find more germane families in italy , then roman families in germany . . colonies are best made up of citizens bred up in the metropolis of the kingdome : or in the neighbouring towns : for example either of romans or latines ; and because so many be planted , as will be able to defend the province [ and any enemy whatever ] . if colonies be sent from a free-state , it is good to build their cities on the tops of the hills , for defence of their liberty : if from a monarch , better in the plain . . that cities may wax great , 't is expedient they be situate [ either ] upon the banks of rivers , or [ neare ] the sea-shore , and in a plain ; where necessaries for life are easiest to be had : & commerce with strangers is most convenient : but , for the defence of liberty and lawes , and the non-impayring of valour , they are more commodiously seated upon mountaines and rocks . withall great respect is to be had to the wholesomnesse of water and air , and winds , and the prospect to the severall quarters of the heavens . . planters of colonies are to be divided — into . governors : as priests , and judges . . protectors : as soul-diers and commanders . . artizans : and such as * feed the republique . as husbandmen , shepherds , and the like . observator . nothing hinders but he that vses husbandry , may also follow a trade , either by himselfe , or his wife rules that prescribe exact proportions of allowances for every person in a plantation , do often faile in the practique . plaines bear most corn , mountaines most wool , hence &c. came chaffering , and exchanging and merchandizing , and stamping of goynes , &c. and for want of souldery [ hereupon ] were forts , and guns invented . chap. vii . of the instruments to gain & keep kingdomes , &c. to gain , keep and govern kingdomes , there are three [ principal l ] instruments : the . tongue , . sword , . treasure . . for the tongue ; t is the instrument of religion , and prudence . that is , of the goods of the minde . . the sword is the [ proper ] instrument of the body and its goods . . treasure is more [ the instrument ] of fortunes , and estates : which serves the body and minde [ onely ] secondarily : but the true instruments are the tongue and the sword . . they that use the sword only , founding their power upon that , those quickly lose their dominion ; as tamberlaine , attila , and brennus , and most of the northern nations . the jesuites in japan gaine [ first ] soules , then kingdomes to spaine and the papacy , by their tongues . there be that gaine dominion by crying up some new sect , built upon some specious colour of truth , by sowing discord betwixt the old religion , & the new sect , which shall be attempted and fitted to the gust and palate of the multitude : but such dominion is of it selfe not very long liv'd . ring-leaders of heresies , although [ commonly ] they gain much , they keep little : as for example , john of leydon , dulcinus & theudas . observat. john of leydon was an ignorant fellow , a person of of no worth at all , who through the hatred against the priests of his time ( whose lives were abominable in the eyes of all men ) gathered together a rabble of the basest people . they that use well the sword and tongue , do lay the foundations of durable dominion ; but then the sword must be just , and the tongue veracious . thus did moses build the empire of the jews , [ namely , in veracity and justice , ] which impious machiavell never took into consideration . p. . the law of moises survived the empire of the jews , but mahomets laws shall sink with his empire : thus fell the laws of alexander with his person and power ; thus numa's , belus , and minos , pythagoras , and zamolxis his lawes are extinct , even for want of justice and veracity . he , that knows not how to give lawes to those he conquers , doth quickly lose the kingdome he has gain'd . thus charles the fifth lost tunis and germany which he had wonne , for want of skill to secure his conquest by the addition of lawes and colonies . this misfortune often befell king pirrhus ; but not so the romans . observ. he had need be a very wise man , that can give lawes to men of a different religion , that shal be lasting and fitted to the disposition of them that receive them , as it appears by the romans in jewry , who did the utmost of their endeavour , & with all their skill strived , to establish the state and tranquility of that untractable people , by lawes , conforme to their tempers and humors , as the excellent orations of king agrippa , and josephus made to their countrymen , [ the jews ] do witnesse . . he that defends his dominions by sword and tongue , preserves them better and more safely , then he that makes use but of onely one . for . men of arts are [ usually ] oppressed by men of armes . thus saturn ( being a priest , as antient kings were ) left his kingdome to jupiter ; and perseus the warriour , dethron'd atlas the [ scholler and ] astrologer : thus was pythagoras supported by souldiers ; * and the pope , till such time as he felt the use of his weapons , was often made a prey to his enemies , and many times ( good man ) to his friends . observator . here the thrice worthy grotius , notes well upon this late passage , concerning the bishop of rome ; that the benigne aspects of opportunity , made way for that power which the pope now enjoyes : as for instance , the christian world split into many petty kingdomes , italy torn in pieces , and sluggish withall : an age too dull to apprehend the meaning of that artifice in due time , and diverse other causes , which you may find in guicciardin , and machiavell . . he that uses only armes for the defence of his empire , and neglects witt and eloquence , makes but a paper building , rules but weakly : and this is the reason why the emperor of germany prevailes no more , having a people of different perswasions in religion to rule over : and usually such princes become a prey to those that make the best use of their witts . hence came it that the popes did so frequently make and un-make emperors at their pleasure . therefore ( as salust observes ) did the romans [ wisely ] ever exercise both mind and body together . for , he that exerciseth both , makes his empire last longest , as the king of the turkes , and abassines , and the dake of muscovy . fabulous philosophy affirms as much , whiles it gives pallas ( the goddesse of wisdome ) a book and a spear to make her invincible ; but to mars only arnour , who ( as the poets sings ) was therefore often conquered . hence was it that . the northern nations that fell like swarms of bees upon the southern regions , who excell'd them in religion and policy , received laws from them they had conquered : so the tartars and the turks a northern people , had lawes from the conquered arabians , and religion too ; and the hunns , vandals , lombards , and goths , from the romans , whose territories they had invaded . here the observator justly gives a check to the author , and saies that , both the goths that rul'd in italy and spain , and the vandals in asrick , to alienate and estrange the minds of their own people from the romans , jeroboam-like , end : avoured with barbarous cruelties to promote the arian heresia , by all possible means they could . . god that he might plant religion and learning among the northern people , and armes and numbers amongst the southern , did often make an enterchange , and engrafted them one into an other , like plants to make them the more generous ; but in both destroyed the degenerous plants from the sonnes of japhet : empires descended from sem , priesthood and laws from cham , servants , and as the author ( but mistakingly ) affirms , tyrants ; for ( as the observator notes ) the greatest tyrants that ever were , came rather out of asia , then africa , which was chams portion . chap. viii . of the causes of policies , and first of the first cause , god , and religion . there are three causes ( if we speak politically ) which found and govern empires , that is . god . . prudence . . occasion . but in some , one is more evident then the other . as in the kingdome of the jews , god was most evident ; in that of the romans prudence ; in that of the spaniard occasion : albeit ( to speak physically ) god is the cause of all causes . . all dominations ( except impious machiavels ) have confessed , that prudence hath not power sufficient to foresee the good and evill , which all waies and in all things do await them : therefore did all nations fly to god , some by a straight , others by a crooked way . therefore , the assyrian , aegyptian , and persian kings , consulted the will and pleasure of god , and implored his ayde , by astrology in the starres : the greeks by oracles of the sibylls : the romans by sooth-saying and auguries , whom the brasilians do but a little recede from : but the christians in a direct path [ seek god ] and fly to the spirit of god in his prophets , * and councellors , and his ministry . . every princedome is protected by its own proper angell , and every law as it is good is from god , neither can their be any law established which is void of all good ; as divines and nature teach us . . the priesthood supplies the place of god in every dominion , and therefore no common-wealth , no assembly of men , either was , or can be , without a priesthood , because not without god . . priests ought to be wise , but rather in contemplatives then practicalls ; valiant , but most in suffering ; sober , liberall , ingenious , true , not lying so much as in jeast , faithfull , cheerfull , but enclining more to austerity , then scurrillity ; gentle , prone rather to meeknesse then rusticity , whose character should be piety , wisdome , charitie , and tender-heartednesse , without hypocrisie . priests consult what is to be done , rulers command that to be done , which is contemplated or cousidered , and souldiers and artificers put commands and consultations in execution . . religion ever ought to be had in high esteem and veneration , not in vulgar and mean account . . the priesthood ought not to be prostitute to the people , lest it lose its honour and reverence . therefore aristotle , no less ignorantly then impiously , would make old souldiers priests . here the author puts the foole upon the calvinists ( under which notion he comprehends the worst of schismaticks ) who ( saith he ) both all and some , count themselves priests , which the famous observator here seems to prove , to defend , out of places ( with reverence be it spoken ) mis-urged both out of the scripture and fathers , in defence of common or universall unction . and ( by an injurious concession ) makes the calvinist guilty of the schismatiques phrensies : whereas 't is most evident , both out of calvin , and beza , in their severall discourses , and conflicts with the antiministeriall enthusiasts , that they were quite of an other temper , and opinion ; ever bearing high for an ordinate ministry : though they brought not clean , or primitive hands , to that great work . . that religion which contradicts naturall policy , ought not to be retained . therefore the maccabees in time of necessity taught , that warre might be piously made on the sabbath day , when the jewes under pompey and antiochus ( being that day assailed ) not defending themselves , perished . god gives no law to his people , [ whereby his people should be destroyed ] which is opposite to their own being . observator . rituall lawes , do easily give place to occasions , and times : whence comes the hebrew proverb : the life endanger'd , violates the sabbath : and that [ other ] the sabbath was given into the hands of man , and not man into the hands of the sabbath : yet the foolish gloss of some jewes was such , that some of them kept themselves in the self same posture , both night and day : and therefore paid dear for their superstition ; being not onely by pompey , but by nebuchadnezzar , sossius , and titus , taken captives upon the sabbath day . . the doctrine of fatall necessity is pernicious , in , and to commonwealths : for it makes subjects seditious , and princes tyrannous : both pleading necessity for the mischief they act : and thus much cicero acknowledged . but . this doctrine of necessity does no hurt among the turks , because they are rude , and illiterate , and are kept within compasse by force , not by law . but in italy , where they are a sharp witted people , it would make them stark mad , and all turne libertines , and lay all their sinns upon gods score , as the author of all evill : but above all , it would make their princes tyrants , in imitation ( forsooth ! ) of god , craftily imputing their own offences to their subjects , that they might [ god-like ] torment them , to their owne glory : then which , what can bee more destructive to a commonwealth ? . sophisticall sciences that thwart religion , ought to be banish'd the common-wealth : as plato teacheth . aristotle his school , did the jewes much mischiefe , under antiochus ; and now to christians : as averroes did too , both to us , and his own saracens . see s. vincentius [ lirinensis , ] observat. what is spoken here of aristotle does very well agree with the opinion of the antient christians . in whose iudgement aristotle was accounted impious . in the judgement of all the greeks , and ( amongst the latines ) saint austin , plato's philosophy is more consonant to christianity : aristotle coming but very lately into esteeme , and reputation , with the world . animadversions . what the fryer , or grotius affirme of aristotle is onely true , accidentally , & vitio utentis : and so all the sect of philosophers fall ( as well as aristotle ) under tertullians character , that they are patriarchs of heretiques : but i am clearly of opinion , that plato's idea's in the head of an enthusiast , or national theologue , have done much more hurt to christianity , then aristotles subtleties ever did : who being ( as himself justly boasts ) the father of syllogisme , and the first discoverer of fallacy , might advance all truths ( both natural , morall , and sacred ) more , ( did not men abuse him to sophisticall ends ) then all the whole race of philosophers ever did , or will do . . religion that is repugnant to common policy , although it be beneficiall to one particular city or province , is subject to a change , or reformation : and therefore cannot last long , as the decree of moyses , about the choise meates : and the apostles , of abstaining from idols , and things strangled . . there are therefore some lawes , convenient for time , and place , [ and person ] as abstinence from swines flesh , for the jewes , subject to leprosie . . other lawes are eternall , profitable for all nations : as to honour our parents . . some againe are pernicious to all places , and times : as that a man doth sin by destiny , and does profit in any thing without liberty [ in some degree ] of his own wil. observator . here grotius affirmes that the law of not eating swines flesh is of so long continuance , that it not onely remaines in use amongst the jewes at this day , but with the mahometan arabians , and abassin christians : and not without good cause : for that food in those regions begets the scab . as for that antient custom of abstaining from blood and strangled things , it was a long time observed by the christians , either out of hope to gaine the jewes , or out of reverence to antiquity : and that it has nothing in it contrary to republiques , or communities , the continued observation of it , through christian greece , and all the east , and the edict of leo the emperor , make evident . . all religions and sects have their proper circles and revolutions ; as republiques have from monarchy into tyranny : thence into aristocracy , thence into oligarchy , from that into a polity , and so into a democracy ; and then revert back again into monarchy at last : either by the same , or some other track . so , when sects arrive at atheisme , the very extremes of all mischiefe fall upon the peoples head : and the fiercenesse of gods wrath breaks in upon them : upon which , ( but through many affections ) they return to their pristine good condition . ☞ but when once they come to that passe , that they deny the providence of god , and the immortality of the soule , they must needs suffer either an [ absolute ] change , or a reformation : because the curb of conscience is taken out of the peoples mouth : and so being themselves wicked , they become a prey to no lesse wicked princes : and thereupon , tyred with evils past , they gladly embrace any lawgiver , whether hee be good or bad . . the sects of philosophers , passed not from one opinion to an other , ☞ any further then epicurus : and there they stopt : who denying god , and providence , all their sects were utterly destroy'd , as laertius [ excellently ] observes . the religion established by moyses , when once the sadduces crept in , that denyed the immortality of the soul , suffer'd a reformation by our lord christ * who brought immortality to all our soules . when the gentiles fell into down-right atheism , they fell into a world of miseries : as appears under the romane emperors : whose lawlesse licentiousnesse marr'd all : as cato in salust , and lucan , the poet , observe . the sect of the libertines , that held sin to be no sin , spring out of the calvinists , as the author ( but most slanderously ) affirmes . most of the transylvanians , deny the immortality of the soul , and the holy trinity . that most impious book of the three impostors , the fryer would gladly fasten also upon the reformed churches : but , as grotius notes , it was father'd long since upon the emperor frederick the second : but adds withall , that hee never saw the man , that saw that book . . the author ( as it becomes a fryer to do , ex officio ) pleados high for the temporall sword of the pope , and an armed priesthood : affirming that the great turk , the king of persia , tartarie , moors , and the king of fez , living all under an unarmed , naked priesthood , are , by that meanes , split into so many hereticall opinions : whereas the kings of france , spain , germany , and the republique of venice , and [ many ] other potent princes united in one religion under an armed priest , the pope , have no heresies started amongst them , but with manifest hazard of their crownes and kingdomes . observator . the sophie [ of persia ] after many years , began to innovate some thing in the rites of prayer and fasting : & made white hats ( or turbants ) for the cognizance of his faction : — but at long running , the posterity of this sophy , by pretences of sanctity , so bewitch'd the people , that in the end , they translated the crown of persia from the assumbetan kings , to their own . . & . these two paragraphs , savour altogether of the cell , and the cowle : asserting the necessity , ( at conveniency ) of the papall power , in temporalls , over christian princes . because ( saies he ) the pope . poyzes the differences of christendome , being umpire of peace and war . . that he [ alwaies ] takes part with those that suffer wrong : neither permits he any king to invade an other christian kings dominion . . hee links and unites christian princes , against the [ common ] enemies of the christian faith . and , . by his * crusado's and indulgences and excommunications , for good , and against evill rulers , he does erect and defend the christian commonwealth . so that without that pope ( to speak as a man , and politiquely ) christianity had , ere this , gone to utter ruine . and the author adds his opinion ( in fine ) that all christian princes , would be as one : secure from one an other , and from strangers too , and bee alwaies victorious : would they but once make one grand senate at rome . and , that the reason why never any one prince could attain an universall monarchy , over the rest of christian princes , was no other , then the temporall power of his holinesse ; which was a curb in their months . but ( saies hee in the close of all ) 't is likely that the monarchy of christendom , will by little , and little , fall totally into the popes hands . the observator answers thus , to these two paragraphs . he that , with care and diligence , will look into story , shall find that [ farre ] more warrs have been raised amongst christians by the popes of rome , then have been composed . but so farr is it from them , that they either could or would oppose themselves against the spaniard ( that glutton of empires ) that , on the contrary , the papall authority [ alwaies ] gave colour and countenance to the spanish avarice ; as navarre can [ sadly ] witnesse : and france , in the times of henry the third . and lately , with most notorious injustice , armes were raised against the duke of mantua ; yet would h●e receive no assistance at all from the pope , although no bad man . the papall [ bulls and ] edicts if they availe any thing at all , it is with such as are not able to resist them . they catch poor flyes , but eagles break through them . that christendom fell not long since into the hands of an universall monarch , it was no thanks to the papall power , that hindred it : but the germanes were hindred by their own discords , and germany hindred france , and france spain , just as the persian and tartar keep the turk [ from being emperor of the world . ] . charles the great , and constantine declared themselves defenders of the pope ; but henry and frederick enemies : for under frederick those pernicious factions of guelfes & gibellines ( that is , imperialists , and pontificians ) arose in italy . julian [ the apostat ] endeavoured to make gentilisme and judaisme aemulate one the other , and vie for the mastery , but perished under the attempt . the mahometan sect has many defects in it . first , because if their armes faile , they fall . . because it admitts not of divers princes . . because in many things it opposes god . and. . because it is as a place of torture to all its enemics . the duke of muscovy ( a country assailed by no man ) defends himselfeby his scituation and schisme ; and stands rather by the discords of christendome , then upon his own bottom , as indeed the turk himselfe partly doth . charles the fifth , was a man that bid fairest for the universall monarchy . when constantius countenunced the arians , and julian paganisme , the pope was not a man in power , had no dominion then . here therefore then is an error [ or fallacy ] of no cause , put for a cause . here in this paragraph , the fryar seems to dream of the return of a golden age , of innocence , under one ( i know not what ) monarch of all , as adam was at first , and seems to point at the spaniard for the man : the observator suspects some poison here ; but i think there is much more vanity then venome . . that the world may be governed by one man , the empire of augustus does partly prove it . that the spaniard does rule the hemisphears by religion , which is the very soule of an empire , and dominion , being all in the whole , and wholly in every part . . if the world were governed by one man , as alexander said by one sun , warres would cease , and pestilence , by communication of arts and medicines , and by transmigration from infected into wholesome ayre : by the same transmigrations might inundations and fire be avoided ; so famine likewise might be averted , by transportation of provision from plentifull into needy countries , &c. animad. these are but the fumes & fancies of an idle braine , doting upon the spanish interest , and the papall ; and so i dismisse them proceeding to chap. ix . of the second cause of gaining and governing kingdomes , which is prudence . a monarchy is fitter to gain a common-wealth then to conserve dominion . monarchy is sooner depraved then many rulers . grotius confesses then a few ( as oligarchy ) which i undèrstand not ; neither of them gives their reason , nor i my assent . the observator adds . for duration , no common-wealth in the world is worth the naming , but the venetian : and yet the egyptian , assyrian , and french kingdomes have lasted longer then that . some are kings . by nature rationall [ as it were kings of wisdome ] as socrates and cato . . by fortitude , as domitian and vitcllius . . by both , as alexander . augustus . and david . . more by nature then fortune , as scipio , and hannibal . more by fortune then nature , as tiberius & galba . . prudence ( the second cause of dominion ) does properly belong to those that are truely kings ; and to such next under god , is dominion due which prudence is directly opposite to craft or subtlety , which is proper only to machiavels tyrant . prudence is consonant to god , that is to eternall wisdome . craft agrees to nothing but a mans own will and pleasure : that is , acts all arbitrarily . prudence is magnanimous , craft base , yet proud . prudence [ alwaies ] advances wise and valiant men , and puts them in place of power and trust . craft depresses and destroyes them , that she may rule over bastard-subjects , when the legitimate are cut off . prudence treasures up riches for the good of mens souls and that their numbers may encrease : craft aymes at money and strong holds , and rejoyces in the diminution and lessening of her subjects . prudence even in losing conquers , craft by conquering is a loser . prudence is mercifull , craft is cruell . prudence is that of principall men and chieftaines , such as cesar , craft belongs to servile persons , such as davus . prudence has an eye to the stern , but craft to the oare . prudence makes lawes for every mans good , but craft only for her own . prudence punishes , and gains good-will by it , and makes subjects the better ; craft punishes and becomes odious , and the people the worse for 't . it is proper to magnanimity and valour , to gain dominions , as to cesar , and charles the fifth ; but to justice and temperance to preserve them , as to the venetians : and he that is adorned with all vertues , is fit for both , as augustus . . he that acquires dominions , must have such a prudence as is magnanimous , stout , liberall , just , &c. but somewhat inclining to pride , boldnesse , prodigality ; but severity mixt with it , &c. he that keepes and preserves dominions , must have the same prudence , but inclining to pusillanimity , to fear , tenacity , and [ some ] licentiousnesse , &c. . hee that gaines a kingdome , different from him in religion : must either translate the seat of his empire thither : as the turk did into constantinople : or else translate the inhabitants into an other region , as nebuchadnezzar did the jewes , into babylon : and plant new colonies , in the metropolitane cities of the conquer'd province ; which shall be of thine own religion , and laws ; place [ new ] preachers there , change laws , and bring down the chief of the people ; as cyrus did in lydia , and the spaniniard in america : but if they will buckle to thy religion : thou maist make them artists , and mechanicks , serviceable to thy colony : if not , doom them to slavery , and transplant them farre enough [ be sure ] from thy seat imperiall . but if they embrace the same religion with thee ( as the neapolitanes with the spaniards ) treat them gently , receive them into common friendship , and change not their customes , nor polirie , but by degrees : let the supreme judges be made out of thine own men ; the inferiour out of theirs . if they did violently oppose thine entrance , levell the peers , with the people : but if they did receive the as friends : transplant them out of their native soyle , and drill them with honors , rewards , and promotions ; but be sure let not the chief heads be left behind : for they will either grow insolent , upon familiarity , and render thee odious to the people , or else they will rebell . by these defects , pyrrhus and charles the fifth , lost all the provinces they had gain'd , on a suddain . but beware , lest by calumnies , and fraud , you depresse any man ; for by that meanes you [ only ] prepare ruine and conspiracies against your self , and so alienate their affections , that upon the least occasion , they will rebell against you . . he that invades an others kingdome , must not stick at the mischiefs following . viz. to strike at the head , change lawes , pull down forts , and castles ; extinguish the blood-royall , or translate it . animad. this savours of machiavel : whom the fryer so much detests : or ( which is worse ) of the jesuit . . a prince should be known to do no evill , except that of punishment : and that too , such as the people wish : as to fleece usurers , and ravenous magistrates , to banish superfluous , and effeminate arts : doom the sluggish to the oare : to punish adultery , pride , and all enormous sins and sinners . . the people are kept in obedience , by [ plenty of ] provisions , souldiers by good pay : nobles by honors . . for the advance , and encrease of republiques , and kingdomes ; these rules following are to be observed . . all persons must take upon them those functions and callings , for which nature has fitted them . . magistrates are to be chosen , rather by nature then fortune . . the greater good is ever to be preferred before the lesse , and the common before the private . . let there be a free community of goods , of knowledge , and of religion . . foment the emulations of aspiring to honors , by vertue . . preferre ever divine things before humane . . let every man learn this logick . viz. that god is : ergo , he is wise , and good : ergo , he has a tender care over us : ergo , he is just : and we are his children , and therefore after death , will reward or punish us . if this be not so , ergo , god is not just , not good , ergo , neither is he god : the contrary whereof ; all nature , the fabrick of the universe , and its severall parts , and the use . order and function of cach particle of it , do wonderfully [ and loudly ] proclaim . as also his revealing himselfe to his saints [ on earth ] angells , and devills , and policies , and all sciences in the world , [ confessing it . ] chap. x. of the third cause , &c. viz. occasion . the occasions of acquiring dominion , are innumerable . but the chief are , i. thine own valour , and numbers ; and the imbecillity of thine enemies , and their associates . . the division of the province to be surprized , into petty kings , or jarring . republiques ; but especially into various seots , and schisms . . but most of all , if any man call thee in , for his protectour . . if the rulers son be in his minority . . if the ruler be hated of his people . . if the people be covetous of change . . if the nobles [ or patricians ] may be bought and sold [ as those of rome were , in jugurths daies . ] . if there be any interregnum , &c. . all grosse and enormous sins , and vices , are so many inlets , and doors for a conqueror , to come in by : as idolatry , and anthropophagie above the rest . chap. xi . of the decay , downfall , and change of monarchies : and the cause and remedies thereof . all monarchy dies , or sinks [ at least ] either . through want of vertue in him that succeeds in it : so the assyrian monarchy ended in sardanapalus . or . for want of a successor ; which evill augustus prevented , by adopting sons , to succeed him . . by division , or discord of many successors : so the romane monarchy under constantius , became a dyarchy under constantine , and constance , and afterwards , in arcadius and honorius , and the spanish monarchy was rivall'd by alonzo , ferdinand , and sanctius . the turk prevents this mischief by killing his brethren : but the king of china by banishing them into some mountain : which the king of the abassines does likewise . . because the kings son is young and contemptible , as the son of scanderbeg , and antiochus , and alexander the great : and the last duke save one , of the line of sforza duke of millaine : who all being minors and pupills , were commited to guardian kinsmen , or tutors , or strangers , and so , were either murther'd or deposed . . the election of a king , if it be made by souldiers , is dangerous , and schismaticall ; because they are [ easily ] carried from one to another , in their affections . for , souldiers are naturally a dull kind of people : and value them most , who pay them best , at present : not at all considering , the publique good : as it happen'd in the times of galba , vitellius , vespasian , and otho in the romane state ; and under omri in israel : with very much dammage [ to the publique . ] . election also made by all the people , is dangerous : for they understand not the deep designes , of hidden , and disguised tyrants : but are distracted , and carried away with smooth orators , whithersoever they please to lead them . besides , the people are ever at odds , with one another , and alwaies changing opinions . hereupon florence by such popular elections , sustained a world of dammage , and prejudice . neither does the populacy confide in their nobles , but call in strangers to pacifie their tunmults ; so the florentines call'd in the commander of athens : by whom , they were more devour'd then before . the remedy is : if onely the heads of families be summon'd to election : but this is a weak one . . elections are best made by a prudent senate : out of the body of the senate it self ; as the pope , out of the conclave of cardinalls . . if an election suffer a schism in it , or fracture , viz. an interregnum ( or as they cal it ) a vacant see ; the empire may go to wrack ; and therefore the germane emperor doth make choice of his successor before his death ; as also the king of fez , before he dies , advances one of his own sons into his throne . observat. it often falls out otherwise : for the romane emperour of time dies and appoints no successor : and the polack cannot endure any such thing should be done in that kingdom . . the best is not alwaies elected : but he whom the dying king loves best : as solomon chose rehoboam . observat. the odd number over does best in elections : and therfore the king of bohemia was superadded to the six old electors of germany . . a monarchy may bee ruin'd likewise , by the insolency and pravity of a mans children [ as in tarquin the proud ] or of his wife : who often hates the best deserving men : as sophia , the wife of justinian the emperor , hated narses [ the gallant eunuch ] who therefore call'd in the lombards into italy , to the hazard of the whole empire . ☞ . monarchy may be in danger also , and be ruin'd by the authority of some prophet , or [ bold popular ] preacher : that dares cry it down . the instance here is made in samuel , and the pope : which is an handsome comparison indeed . here the fryer draws the curtain , and laies open the whole scene of the popes encroachments upon temporall princes : which part i leave the fryer to act by himself , and thither referre the reader : only he tells us ( pag. . ) that never any prince prosper'd that opposed his holinesse , but fell at last ; as frederick of swevia , roger guiscand , &c. yet some princes call'd a councell against julius the second , and pope eugenius the fourth . all clergy-men ( under the papacy ) love the pope in their heart , princes only for preferment . armed religion was alwaies invincible , vid. animad supr. it is better for a prince to yeeld to the priest , as theodosius did to ambrose , then to treat him ill , as eudoxa did chrysoctome ; for he was confirmed in his throne , whereas she dyed an infamous death . . division in religion , albeit monarchy be not preached downe , does destroy ☞ it , as it appears in france , germany , and poland , &c. for it divides mens minds ; and therefore both their bodies , and fortunes , and armes , and both parties hate the king : the evill , because he favours the good , and the good , because he does not extinguish the evill . obser. here grotius ( the great est advocate and favouror of toleration that lived in our age ) opposes the fryar , and affirms , that there does not upon difference in opinions , seem so much hazard of divulsion ( as he calls it ) of minds , or animosity amongst men , if the magistrate would compell the ministry to forbear mutuall and publique railings , and resutations one of another , and if by a publique law of state , every man might be secure in the use and exercise of his own religion , as it is in japan and poland ; which liberty the reformed churches of france being abridged of , tumults and warrs , were occasioned by it . . a monarchy also failes by its own vastnesse and bulk , for which reason it cannot [ well ] be governed by one , and he is therefore faine to call to his assistance some to lend their shoulders to this great burthen , who afterwards will admitt no superiours , and so share the government ; as we have often seen it fall out in the roman empire . the remedy for this is , to keep an empire within its own bounds , lest the commanders and governors , being at too great a distance , usurpe the dominion : as the monarch of japan [ is a great example of this ] who never sets foot beyond his sixty six kingdomes ; and the king of china can * claime nothing beyond those bounds which he hath set himselfe , by walls and rocks , woods , and seas . another remedy for this disease is , for a prince to keep the wives and children of governors and provincialls [ abroad ] at home with him [ as pledges ] and engage them by oath to fidelity and allegiance , &c. which in part the king of spain observes . . sometimes a kingdom 's lost for want of provisions , because it has no fruitfull soyle about it : this is the condition of genoa , and venice , and therefore they provide against this [ mischief ] by merchants and factors , and exchangers of commodities , by granaries , munitions , &c. . a monarchy may also fall by pestilence ; against which , * the king of the abassines has provided a movable city , and so removes his seat at pleasure for the benefit of wholesomer ayre ; which thing the tartars [ now ] and heretofore the veientes observed ; nay the very birds do the same : but with us there be officers for health purposely appointed , which the author calls magistratus sanitatis , like our masters of the pest houses . a monarchy likewise is ruined by invasion of forraign princes , that over-power the right owner ; as the king of persia was by alexander of macedon ; and the sultan of aegypt by selemus the great turk . the best remedy against this , is the love of the subjects to their prince , & their gallantry on his behalfe ; next is , to procure a strong & ready militia , and to enter into league with many princes , that may over-power the rivall of his crown : as the macchabees did with the romans , being affraid of antiochus , and the venetian with the french when they fear'd the spaniard . neither is it amisse to sow seeds of discord and hatred amongst the powers you stand in fear of ; as the spaniard does betwixt the turk and persian , ths abassine and muscovite , polack and transilvanian , all around , &c. and amongst the nobles of france , which is his rivall . when the nobility grow too rich and potent , as the nobles of iapan , and often those of naples , and the french likewise and the german peers , they have destroyed the monarchy under which they lived , defining every one to live for himselfe . the remedy for this is , to cut off entailes of land & honours ; the author means in the words , ne feuda transeant ad haeredes that they be not established , as the turk does . next is to levell their forts and strong holds with the ground , or garrison them with the princes own souldiery , and then under pretence of advancing , to humble the nobles . . a kingdome may be lost too , by the treachery of a kings owne souldiers , as it happened to antiochus . the remedy against this is , to keep them in their dutie by art and cunning , and divide them ; and to fortifie thy selfe with a strong guard of thy best friends , whom thou must oblige with perpetuall favours , and benefits , as the turk does his janizaries . . a crown may be lost by the suddain incu●sion of barbarous people . the remedy against this is , to oppose wisdome and religion to barbarous folly : so pope leo opposed attilla , and jaddus the high priest in hierusalom , clad in his priestly robes , met , and adored , and so pacified alexander the great . . a man may lose his kingdome too for want of souldiery of his owne , and by entertaining too many auxiliaries and mercenary men ; which was the ruine of lodovick sforza , duke of millaine , &c. the remedy of this is to have a choice militia of thine owne alwaies in readinesse ; to arme and unite thine own men , but to disarme and dissipate the strangers . for this reason also it is expedient , that none [ of any family ] but the first-born inherit any estate , and let the rest be made souldiers ; or else do as the turk does , keep schooles or colledges of cloistered boyes , to be trained up in military discipline , which shall know no other father but the monarch . . sometimes a kingdome is lost after a victory , by the insolency of the conquering army ; or after a truce [ or league ] as it happened to carthage after the first punick warre , under hamilcar . the remedy for this is , on a sudden to divide the army into distant quarters : and not to be embodyed till the generall commands . . a kingdome may bet lost for want of present pay for the souldiery , when the warre is on foot , as it fell out to maximilian of austria . publique treasuries are the best remedy against this . besides the rich ( at such a pinch ) are to be compeli'd by religion ] be meanes sure anathema's and terrors of ecommunication ] and other penalties , to throw all their money and plate into the publique treasury : for so , neither can they rebell , and hereby is the kingdome confirm'd , and established : which was usuall at rome , and venice . and it is lawfull too , in extreamity , to melt down consecrate church plate : and to make the very souldiers themselves part with their gold to this publique purpose : but to sweeten them with fair hopes , and the pillage of the field . thus did caeser , in the beginning of the civill warre : and thus did henry ( the third i take it ) king of france the frer advises too : to make leaden coin ( if need be ) to be currant as long as the war shall last , as the venetians have done . . kingdomes are lost too , by the luxury of the conquering army , that does breake and effeminate it self : by the spoiles , and delicates of conquer'd provinces : as it fell out , to the lombards , goths , huns , and gaules ; who possessing themselves of southern kingdomes , full of delights and pleasures . they [ quickly ] lost , both their strength and empire : which happen'd also to all kings of naples ; by reason of the soft delicacies of air , and soyle . josuah found out a good remedy for this ; who would not quite extinguish all the natives , [ of canaan ] that his people might [ still ] have some body , whereon to whet , and exercise their valour . so [ scipio ] nasica advis'd [ the romanes ] not quite to destroy carthage , lest rome should grow effeminate [ by losing her rivall . ] . by joyning in commerce and traffique , &c. with two potent princes . thus came the raguscan to serve the turk , and thus the genoesse , to be under the spaniard : but the [ wise ] venetian prevented this . for he would never put to sea with the spaniard ; neither would he ever traffique with him , nor hold any thing by way of tenure or homage , in the king of s'pains dominions , [ as the genoesse and others do ] . heavy taxes , and impositions , often lose kingdomes , and enrage the people into mutinies , and rebellion ; as it hapned in israel under rehoboam ; and the duke of alva in flanders . . the cruelty of provincialls : may be the losse of a kingdom : which rule by pride and avarice . this the axe must cure , as goesar borgia did by orcus of cesena . punishments must ever be exacted by the sword , tributes by the tongue ; the militia by both . . a crown gain'd , may be lost , if the issue royall find friends to help them to their right : as in the case of ioas : who was establish'd in his throne by the high priest : against athaliah and her usurpation , &c. . a kingdome may be lost by the conspiracy of strong and potent men ; as the tarquins were erected by brutus , and lucretius , and the magi of persia by darius and his complices . hidden vertue in any man is a dangerous thing , especially if it be afraid of the prince that rules : for it will at last break out to the princes loss , if not ruine : as it did in brutus and his confederate . valour and light must be ever set high on a candlestick . smother'd fire may do , and indeed ever does , most mischief . observat. how dangerous it was for tiberius to advance seianus [ himselfe a well born person ] to so great honor : the frince perceived and remedied : but not without hazard . therefore both hee from that time forward and others , took a course to cast honors upon meaner persons : and those but temporary . animad. this observation becomes a man born in a popular state : but god himself seems to make it a curse : when the honorable person is overtop'd by mean fellowes . isa. . , . & . the conspiracy of one man with himselfe to murder a king , &c. is inevitable , as that of adad against the * king of edom : and pausanias against philip of macedon : and frier clement against henry the third of france . a conspiracy of many is hardly to be avoided : therefore probity and the peoples love [ when all is done ] is the strongest guard a prince can have . . lastly , a kingdome may be lost , when the subject are wasted by warre : and so through want of defendants , it lies open to invasion ; as now ( saies the author ) spaine does . enfranchizing , or endenization , is the onely cure for this disease : by admitting forreigners into your freedome : as the romans did the latines : and so fill up your number . chap. xii . of the fall and change of republiques where many govern , &c. . to take off the dissentions , between peers , and people , the author would have them all participate of honors : as , at this time , it is amongst the biscainers : or , as amongst the jewes , that one family chosen out of all the rest should rule . observat. 't is expedient , that betwixt the peers , and the plebeians , there should be a middle sort , and degree of persons , as a seminary of nobility : such as were the knights and gentlemen of rome : for this degree is a kinde of tye , or ligament of both the other . . the peeres contend with the people [ usually ] about honours , offices , tributes , and matrymonie , and lands , and the like : and if the nobility get the day , the republique is ruin'd ; for it is necessary for them to keep under a jealous and suspicious people , and thence comes their downfall . but if the people gain the day , the matter 's worse then before , for either the nobles are driven into banishment , or else they call in strangers , and so the people become a prey to every crafty citizen , or forreign potentate , or valiant commander . if once the nobles mix and couple themselves with the plebians , to the end they may partake of the government with them ; they grow vile and despicable both together , and so the common-wealth falls to ground ; as it alwaies happened in the florentine republique , and divers times in that of genoa . the remedy is , if the people ( of a middle size betwixt the nobles and the pelting plebeian ) get the upper hand , and share magistracies and honours now and then , and lands and provinces also , by such contentions rome flourished and grew great , and yet granted the honour of victories , and the credit of them , to the commons : but florence perished under them . . a republique is often destroyed , when lawes are made to the advantage of great ones , and pressure of the people . . when the powers in being , usurpe anthority [ over the people ] and keep guards for their defence ; as the decemviri did at rome , and the thirty tyrants at athens . . the luxury of the nobles , and their neglect of armes [ and arts ] makes them vile and cheap in the peoples eyes ; and so makes a republique sink into a base democracy . . when a patrician grows too rich or potent , and emulations grow rife about priority , then the republique 's lost : so sylla when he had subdued marius , and cesar when crassus was slaine , and pompey conquered ( who were then rivalls in the empire ) carried all before them , and were tyrants at pleasure . . correspondency with some forraign prince , of any person in power , may ruine a republique . . when any fawning poplicola , in a time of famin , or other occasion , endeavours to gain the people by opportunity and advantage , and by such arts , gets the power into his own clutches ; these must be lookt to , and suppressed , as metius was in rome , &c. and manlius &c. which king david neglecting in absosom , run the hazard [ of his life and crown . ] . a republique falls : to ground oft-times , because it wants a militia ; when the people & patritians mutually fear one another , and thereupon call in forraign commanders , which is usuall in venice . which commanders after some signal victory obtained , either themselves seize upon the common wealth ( as sforza did at millain , * and bartholomew coline might have done at venice ) or else they betray it to forraign princes , as malatesta did florence . . the faction of citizens , that bear affection to some faction of strangers , ruine a republique ; so all the republiques of italy split themselves into guelfes and gibellins , or ( which was worst of all ) into neuters ; whereupon dire and dismall slaughters and times ensued . a republique must never be neutrall , because it must necessarily be a prey to the conqueror , not being supported either by friends or enemies [ nec amicis nec inimicis fota lat. ] . a republique falls , when the people confide not in the nobility , nor the nobility in them ; and therefore they call in a forraign umpire , that will devour them both : as florence call'd in king robert , & * , the duke of athens . the remedy is , to commit the vmpirage of the quarrell ( not to strangers , but ) to religious men , priests that are natives ; as moises did by gods command , and as the observator well notes , the old gauls did to the druides , and oft times both they and the germans , to [ godly and ] grave matrons . but this latter is a crude observation . . changes of republique are innumerable , as their causes are . read the florentine history ( for that city ran through all varieties of change ) and in opposition to that the roman . chap. xiii . of the fate and change of popular , or democratique state , &c. . a democracy , or popular state assuredly goes to wrack , when ignorant plebeians rule , that canno agree amongst themselves , and determine all things ☞ by chance or affection . . popular elections are ever attended with jarring , and noise of the multitude , and obstreperous rabble . . in the senate or parliaments of popular states , he that has the smoothest tongue , is likeliest to cheat the people , and make himselfe be elected , [ rules in chief ] though he be the veriest knave in the pack . it marres a popular state , when the poorest of the people endeavour to grow rich by publique offices , and the wealthier sort grow tyrannous by their riches . it is dangerous to call in a stranger to the administration of justice , as the florentines used to do ; for this is a symptome of dissention amongst the natives , and oft brings ruine with it , [ yet has it been practised else-where of late , but with like successe . ] . this paragraph about provisions and supplying the publick necessities by corn , &c. is treated of in the precedent chapter . . the next barre of a democratique state is , the generall that fights their battails abroad , and returnes home a king as well as a conqueror ; as sforza returned to millain , and cesar to rome , &c. observ. the romans provided excellently against this mischief , they had ever at hand good store of sitt and able men for the conduct of any warre , and ever and anone changed their commanders , whereby they both secured their liberty , and by emulation provok'd them to vertue and valour . . an other engine to batter down democracy , is a publique benefactor : that has got power into his hands : and pretends himself in hazard of his life by conspirators : and thereupon desires a kind of life guard for the safety of his person , against his accusers & those he would accuse , and so being thus well provided , hee invades the throne , ( if i may so say ) and dubbs himself king ; so did pisistratus at athens . to prevent this : the people must commit themselves , to the care and providence of wise and religious men : reposing all trust , and confidence in them : for by not believing solon the philosopher , who discover'd to them the design of pisistratus , the athenians lost their liberty . . a common wealth may fall , by the approach of suddain [ and unexpected ] dangers : the common people being dull & heavy in deliberations . so the romanes lost saguntum whilst they [ slowly ] consulted , how to get it : and the venetians cyprus , whilst they coldly deliberate how to relieve it . in this case a dictator must must speedily be pitch'd upon : to rule , and dispatch every thing as himself sees most expedient , without counsell or controll of any man . necessity it self will compell the people to pitch upon none , but the best and ablest man for that service : as the practice of the romanes [ in that case ] does witnesse . . a popular state may miscarry too by some wealthy citizen : who does favour and foster poets and oratours , and preachers , & grammarians , and all sorts of men , that have eloquence or wit , and by his riches , keeps an academy in his own house : of men that can blazon , & trumpet forth his praises and worth to the people &c. thus became cosmo medices dake of florence . let no man , that sets his wits and tongue to sale , have any pare in any senate or parliament . greece quite lost her self , by the liberty of orations : so did germany and france [ by sermons ] and the switzers too late provided a remedy against this disease . the last paragraph concerning the danger of change . all change ( be it never so little ) of the antient state of things , in a commonwealth , or kingdome is either , a sign , or cause , or con-cause , or preparation , to an universall change of minds : and ( by consequence ) of all the republique , or princedome revolting from its own principles . as new meates , and new exercise , beget a new habit of body . so darius by affecting to wear a macedonian sword , did foretell that his kingdome should be ruin'd by the armes of macedon . therefore the change even of old fashions in apparell , of banquets and marriages , and of womens behaviour , and of old discipline , and the pravity and corruption of youth ( as censorinus notes ) new lawes and tributes ought ever to be avoided : for they either suddenly , or totally , destroy a kingdom : whereupon the venetian will not change so much as his old originall garbe in his cloths for ( as solomon saies ) hee that failes in the least things , shall by degrees come to nought . the corollarie , and conclusion . it is probitie , and pietie , that preserves a king and people : and not the unlearned craft , and subtlety of machiavell : for all vertue , and power , derives its originall from hun : who is the essentiall power , and wisdom of his father that governs all things . to whom be all glory . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a e- aphor. . max. . addit . * he was a dubs equall to a king . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} * grotius favours toleration corruptions externall . add. venice subject to oblimation . addit . an excellent gradation . conclusion thereupon . * victrii domini de , &c. * animadvers. they are like to make but sorrie servants and instruments : that are weak bath in body and mind . * valor lat. * observator . * lat. optimis nascuntur . * volentis . yhe divine law . law naturall . qua est ars dei : ejusdemque directrix . law of nations . positive law . * lepram non ] alendam . lat. * in the behalf of ] or rather for the empire . * casar , valentine borgia , lat. ] * punitive quam instructive . * under nero . * aliorum lux & lex . * inequalitas consumptrix . lat. * rhetor . * primus impetus major quam virorum ; secundus minor quam paeminarum . flor. * addictè despoticè . * perversus . l. ] * perito . cunning ] * iam eruditis . a body politique how actuteda . * spiritus . ] sing , i at . pro rata . * nutritios ] reip. l. * of croton● . dux . lat. * vicarium , &c. papam . * the lat. is ambiguous . add. cruciatus lat. franceruns franks . condemnationes lat. * or possess * civitatem portat idem . l. * he means . ehud & eglon. lud. . . . . * or colion . * or generall dux . i ragguagli di parnasso, or, advertisements from parnassus in two centuries : with the politick touch-stone / written originally in italian by that famous roman trajano bocalini ; and now put into english by the right honourable henry, earl of monmouth. de' ragguagli di parnaso. english boccalini, traiano, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing b estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) i ragguagli di parnasso, or, advertisements from parnassus in two centuries : with the politick touch-stone / written originally in italian by that famous roman trajano bocalini ; and now put into english by the right honourable henry, earl of monmouth. de' ragguagli di parnaso. english boccalini, traiano, - . monmouth, henry carey, earl of, - . [ ], p. : port. printed for humphrey moseley ... and thomas heath ..., london : . translation of: de' ragguagli di parnaso. reproduction of original in huntington library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - mona logarbo sampled and proofread - mona logarbo text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion carent nihilo cari deo hen : do : cary baro de leppington comes monmouthensis , et honble : ord : balnia eques . portrait guil : faithorne fe : i raggvagli di parnasso : or advertisements from parnassus ; in two centvries . with the politick tovch-stone . written originally in italian by that famous roman , trafano bocalini ; and now put into english by the right honourable , henry earl of monmouth . london , printed for humphrey moseley , at the prince's arms in st pauls church-yard , and thomas heath in russel-street , near the piazza of covent-garden , . the translators epistle to his countreymen the readers . the spaniard mendosa may seem to have reason on his side , when he saies , el ambition de la emprenta es una colpa que no basta arrepentirse : ambition to be in print , is a fault past repentance . which he goes about to make good , by asserting , that , una dia es siempre maestro del otro ; y contra lo que si scribe oy , estarà manana quien sabe mas : one day is master of another , and whatsoever is written to day , there will be somebody who will know more to morrow . and this he likewise seeks to prove , saying , y quien no supo menos ayer ? and who knew not less yesterday ? but all this is but a seeming truth , and nullum simile est idem . for , as for his first position ; if knowledge be the thing of this world which is most to be aspired unto , ( as certainly it is ) to impart this knowledge unto others , is so far from being a fault , as it is rather a great piece of charity , which is truely said to cover a great many faults . does not our saviour say , no man lights a candle to set it under a bushel ? and if monopolizing any earthly commodity , be an adjudged grievance ; to monopolize learning , is questionless the worst of monopolies . in the next place , what he brings for proof of this his position , may receive this answer : that if nothing should be written to day , there would but few know more to morrow . and so likewise for answer to his question of our yesterdaies knowledge , it would be as much as that of this day , had nothing been either said or done yesterday . but alas ! i am not so happy as to be concern'd herein ; who not having any thing of mine own worthy of my countreymen , doe but present them with that in english , which was written many years ago in italian ; and part whereof ( though not above the fourth part , and some of that but in part also ) hath been formerly printed in our language by some others , who may peradventure have forborn publishing the rest of the ragualia's , or advertisements , which you have fully and faithfully here laid down before you ; as not thinking them all so highly seasoned , nor so full of salt , as those which they have pickt out , and which belike made more for their then present purpose . but as for my part , i must confess , that after having at the desire of some friends , fallen upon this translation , i found so much gusto in it , and not any thing that without injury to my author , i thought i could leave out ; as i shal believe them to be of a queasie and deprav'd stomack , who shall not find enough therein to please their palats : for my author is an ambodexter , plaies rarely well at the back-sword , gives sometimes very home and sharp stockadoes ; and in fine , laies about him hard on all sides , without any fear ( marry i cannot say as usually it follows ) or wit : for believe me , you will find no lack of that in him , but sufficient to please all parties , howsoever they stand affected . and having said this , i leave him to your further perusal , hoping that the more you read him , the better you will like him , as did , and doth , your compatriot , monmouth . a table of the contents of the first century of advertisements . advert . . the society of polititians open a ware-house in pernassus , wherein are sold divers sorts of merchandize , very usefull for the vertuous living of those that are learned . advert . . the usual guard of pernassus having taken a poetaster , who had been banished pernassus , upon pain of death , found a paire of cards in his pocket ; which when apollo saw , he gave order that he should read the game of trump in the publick schools . advert . . apollo having notice how henry the fourth , that potent king of france , was most wickedly assassinated , ordered for the indempnity of his beloved french , that powerful succour should be sent from arcadia into france . advert . . whilst michel angelo buonaroti was copying forth the ilfavoured fore-front of seneca's house , he was asked by pierius valeriano , wherefore he did so ? and buonaroti gives him the reason . advert . . the contention which arose between many learned men , touching which is the best political law , which the most praise-worthy order in the flourishing commonwealth of venice , is decided , and fully ended by the very venetian liberty , which with the joynt agreement of all the learned men , was chosen umpire . advert . . a learned laconick is severely punished by the laconick senat , for not having used requisite brevity in his discourse . advert . . the censors of learning do severely punish one of their associates , who in his more mature years , seemed to be pleased with italian poetry . advert . . apuleius his golden ass , and plautus his asinaria , complain to apollo of their masters great severity , and receive no very pleasing answer . ib. advert . . a summary of what the learned in sciences have sowed and reaped . advert . . menante comes into the politicians ware-house , and by the merchandizes which the learned buy there , he studies how to know the quality of their wits . advert . the excellent vertue of loyalty and faithfulness being secretly departed from pernassus , apollo , when he knew where she had hid her self , sent the muses , melpomene & thalia , to perswade her to return . advert . . in the general diet of the learned , appointed by apollo to be held in helicon , his majesty , contrary to all mens expectations , decrees eternity to the name of vicenzo pinti , called in the court of rome , the knight of the lute . advert . . john francisco peranda with much ado gets leave of apollo to be admitted into pernassus , and despiseth fracastoro's proffer , who would have restored him to his eyesight , which he had lost . advert . . the italian academies send commissioners into pernassus to obtain some remedy from apollo for their corruptions ; and find the business impossible to be effected . advert . . anneus seneca being accused before apollo of two fowle vices which were commonly found in all the sects of moral philosophers , doth excellently well defend his own cause , and the like of his associates . advert . . ambassadors are sent from the college of gardners , to apollo , to obtain some instrument from him , whereby they might without any cost or charge , cleanse their gardens of all improfit able hearbs , and are laught at by his majesty . advert . . a doubt arising upon the truth of an usual saying , that a man must eat a peck of salt with another , before he can perfectly know him . apollo makes the point be argued in a general assembly of learned men , which he causeth to be called for that purpose . advert . . the hircanians send ambassadors to apollo , to be resolved by his majesty in the important article , whether it be lawful for the people to kill a tyrant ? advert . . nero the emperor , for a very singular commendation given him by cornelius tacitus , rewards him with a gift of mules laden with crowns of gold. advert . . the vertuosi visit the chief church in pernassus , and begg of god an important favour . advert . . apollo , to encourage senators of free countries , to cultivate liberty , without affecting tyranny , causeth an exceeding wofull spectacle to be shewn in melpomene's amphitheatre . advert . . the inthroned cademians , having admitted the chief she-poets , or poetesses into pernassus , apollo commands that they be taken from thence . advert . . justus lipsius being solemnly admitted into pernassus , the next day after his entrance , did , contrary to all mens expectation , accuse tacitus for being impious , and reaps but little credit thereby . ib. advert . a mournful day in pernassus , in commemoration of the unhappy introduction of the grace-cup . advert . . the principal monarchies abiding in pernassus , ask the illustrious venetian liberty , by what means she obtains the benefit of so exquisite secrecy , and such exact obedience from her nobility ? and received from her their desired satisfaction . advert . francis the first , that potent king of france , meeting the lady philosophy naked , profered her his royal mantle ; which would not be accepted . advert . . apollo complains bitterly of the muses , for that they inspire many mean wits with poetical fury ; and they defend themselves excellently well . advert . . torquato tasso presents apollo with his poem of giurusalemme liberata , or godfrey of bullen ; for which lodovico castelvetro and aristotle , are severely reprehended by his majesty . advert . . cornelius tacitus is chosen prince of lesbos ; whither being come his success proves not good . advert . . apollo being aware of the great disorder occasioned amongst men by the flight of fidelity ; by assistance of the muses , and of the sublimest heroick vertues , procures her return to fernassus . advert . . in the time of carneval , the vertuosi in pernassus run races , an●… make other demonstrations of mirth and jollity . advert . . the militia of ianisaries , seeing one of their souldiers ill rewarded , mutiny in the ottoman monarchy , and are by apollo quieted . advert . . apollo f●…ees carlo sigonio , and dionigi atanigi , the first being accused of ingratitude by pietro vittorio , and the other by hanibal caro. advert . . publius terentius being by order from giasone del maino , an urban pretor , charged with fornication , is by apollo freed , with much derision to the pretor . advert . . publick audience is given by apollo , wherein by wise answers , he decide ▪ many affairs of his vertuosi . advert . . harpocrates being found by apollo to be ignorant , is driven out of pernassus . advert . . a learned roman desires a receipt from apollo , to make him forget certain great injuries which he had received at a great prince his court. his majesty gives him some of the water of lethe to drink ; but with bad succes . advert . . the duke of laconia is accused before apollo to have idolatrized a favorite of his , for having advanced a faithful secretary to the highest state-preferments ; and he defends his cause excellen●…ly well . advert . . the people of the island of mitilene , their prince being dead without issue , argue whether it will be better for them to chuse a new prince , or to set up liberty in their countrey . advert . . james creyton , a scotchman , having incenst the vertuosi in pernassus , by a proud defiance , was so shamed by them through a bitter jest , as without ending the dispute , they forced him to forgo pernassus . advert . . after strict examination of such as were to be chosen , the list of governors is filled up in pernassus . advert . . argus makes proffer of himself to the duke of venice , to guard the virginity of their illustrious commonwealth ; and his offer is not acc●…pted . advert . . the florentines in their pastime called the calcio , admit of a spruce ●…orreign courtier , who wins the prize . ib. advert . . batista platina being bastinadoed by agustino niso , complains to apollo ( little to his reputation ) of the injury received advert . . apollo knowing what mischief over-much riches causes to poets , exhorts the magnanimous king of france , francis the first , to moderate his profuse liberality which he used towards them . advert . . apollo having found out the first inventor of guns , as he is about to punish him severe●…y for his fault therein committed ; the artificer defends himself very well . advert . . the roman monarchy desire to be resolved by cornelius tacitus in a politick doubt ; and receive full satisfaction therein by melibeus , the mantuan shepherd , who was casually there . advert . . the vertuosi of pernassus , in the assembly of focide , decide the mystery of an host ; and find the keeping of an inn to be a noble heroick vertue . advert . . a literato severely punished for saying that duels were somet●… necessary . advert . . the ●…ukes , marquisses , and other titulati of pernassus , complain grievously to apollo , that their honorable title of excellency , should be given to doctors of law and physick . ib. advert . , 〈◊〉 marquiss who caused his genealogy to be made by scipio ammerati , found himself so ill dealt with by him , as he re-demands the reward he gave h●…m . advert . . a dispute arising amongst the vertuosi , touching the truth of certain sayings and speeches of wisemen , their true meanings were argued and resolved in the general dyet celebrated in helicon . advert . . apollo at last grants admittance into pernassus to francisco sforza , duke of millan , which he had long denied to do , upon a hard condition , which h●… accepted of . advert a dangerous contention which arose amongst the pedagogs in pernassus , upon a very slight occasion , is appeased by apollo . advert . . for remedy of many disorders which are found in history , a general assembly of historians being summoned , apollo publisheth a severe edict against them , and many historians are reprehended for their errors . advert . . apollo , to secure the rivers of his state from piracy , makes bernardo capello general of the ionick sea , an gives him excellent direct●…ons . advert . . the prince of epire's first son being born ▪ he is thereat so afflicted , as he forbids that any shews of joy be made for it in his state. advert . . apollo erects a new tribunal in pernassus , for the punishment of flatterers ; but succeeds very unfortunately therein . advert . . apollo being very far in love with tasso's good conditions , creates him prince-poet , and lord high-constable of italian poetry . advert . . a literato desires of apollo , the art of memory , for which he is laught at by his majesty . advert . juven●…l refuseth a challenge given him by francisco berni , to contend with him in satyrical poetry . advert . . domitio corbulone being severely prosecuted by the quarantia criminale ( a venetian magistracy , consisting of forty men ) for some words spoken by him in his government of pindo , which were formerly declared by apollo's publick edict , to be tyrannical ; is at last ac●…uitted with much praise . advert . . the chaire of private tranquillity being void by diogenes the cynicks promotion to a higher degree , apollo offers it to the famous ●…hilosopher crates ; who refuseth it . advert . . many people having wasted themselves in keeping great tables , and going gloriously attired ▪ desire their princes to make a pragmatical law for the moderation of such expences ; but obtain not their suit . advert . . johannes bodinus presents apollo with his six books of his commonwealth ; wherein it being found that he approves of liberty of conscience , he is sentenced to be burn'd . advert . . apollo punisheth a poet severely , for having been so desperate as to blaspheme . advert . . the vertuosi of pernassus visit the temple of divine providence , whom they thank for the great charity which she hath shewn to mankind advert . . the most excellent paolo peruta , by order from apollo , declares in the publick politick schools , what the genuine signification is , of that precept in policy , that to reigne securely , the people must be kept under . ib. advert . . a noble born laconick senator , having committed a great fault , the duke of laconia thinks it wisdom to pass by it . advert . . andrea alciati finding himself injuriously persecuted ▪ in his place of magistracy , flies for help to apollo , but finds none . advert . . ●…he lady victoria colonna begs of apollo in name of all the feminine sex , that such married men as are adulterers , may suffer the like infamy as unchast wives do . advert . . cesar having taxed marcus brutus of ingratitude , in a full assembly of great personages , they challenge one another . advert . . certain subjects desire their princes that the infinite multitude of laws which they live under , may be reduced to a lesser number ; and that the governors of provinces may be forbidden to publish every day new proclamations . advert . . the vertuosi of italy beg of apollo ▪ that philosophy may be treated on in the italian tongue , and are denied their request . advert . . apollo shews unto his literati the true meaning of the latine sentence , homo longus , raro sapiens , a tall man is seldom wise . advert . . the ruota di parnasso having decided a point in difference between the military men , and the literation the military mens behalf , are aware of their error , and withdraw their sentence . advert . . aristotle being besieged in his countrey-house by many princes , is by them forced to revoke his definition of a tyrant . advert . . by order from apollo , a general reformation of the world is published by the seven wise men of greece , and by the other literati . advert . . apollo hearing of the happy alliance of the two illustrious daughters of charls emanuel with the two noble princes of mantua and modena , commands that extraordinary demonstrations of joy be made thro●…ghout his whole dominions . advert . the antient commonwealth of rome , and the modern vene●…ian liberty , argue together , w●…at the true rewards of honour be , by which well ordered commonwealths do acknowledge the worth of their well-deserving senators . advert . . the people of lesbos , after cornelius tacitus ran away from them , chuse anna momorancy , by apollos appointment , for their prince . advert . the excellent b●…lognian physitian , jovanni zecca , sels in pernassus the true antidote again●… the french pox. advert . . the literati of parnassus do with great solemnity , celebrate the holy day dedicated to the laudable lawrel-leaves . advert . . apollo having highly commended the king of spains decree , that no advocates nor proctor should go into the indies : the doctors of law quarrel grievously with his majesty for it . advert . . the chiefest literati of pernassus desire apollo that tacitus may re-compose those books of his annals and histories which are lost . advert . . apollo being advertised that ignorant men took up arms against learning , puts himself in posture to defend his ver●…uosi . advert . . justus lipsius , to make amends for his fault in having accused tacitus , is so intent thereupon , as he is accused before apollo to have idolatrized him ; for which , after a seigned punishment , he is at last praised and admired by his majesty . advert . . the queen of italy being much intreated by her chiefest princes , and by apollo's self to pardon the injuries done by those italian commanders who took up arms against her , in assistance of forreign nations ▪ denies to do it . advert . . the whole generation of sheep , send their publike ambassadors to apollo , by whom they make their desires known , that they may be a●…d to have sharp teeth , and long horns , and their desire is laughed at by his majesty . advert . . nicholas machiavel being banished pernassus upon pain of death , was found hidden in a friends library , for which his former sentence of being burn'd was executed . advert . . apollo visits the prisons , and in his visitation dispatches the causes of many literati accused of sundry faults , and imprisoned for debt . advert . . a great prince in discharge of a vow that he had made , carries a rich vessel to the temple ; which the priest receiving with shew of great sadness ; the prince desires the reason thereof ; and receives satisfaction . advert . . apollo forbids the shepherds of arcadia to fatten hogs any more ; and being earnestly intreated to revoke that his decree , denies it . advert . it being observed that pero trasea , in company of his son in law elvidius priseo , frequented the houses of the chiefest poetesses of pernassus ; he is severely reprehended for it by apollo ib. advert . . a chief senator of poland , whilst he corrects another senator , who is a friend of his , is made aware that he himself is he who goes astray , and needs amendment . advert . . a controversie arising between the governors of pindo , and of libetro , in point of iurisdiction : apollo punisheth them both . advert . . apollo sentenceth hanibal caro to pay his forfeited security , for the wounds which he gave castelvetro . advert . . dante aligieri being assaulted by night in his countrey-house , and ill used by some disguised vertuosi , is relieved by the great french ronsard . advert . . all the princes of the world beseech apollo that he will insert into their people the love of their countrey . advert . . apollo makes a general hunting of pismires and tortoises , as being both of them beasts of evil example to mankind . advert . . apollo refuseth to receive a censure presented him by a literato , which was made upon the poem of an italian vertuosi . a table of the contents of the second century of advertisements . advert . . the province of phosides , doth by her ambassadors complain to apollo , that his majesties officers do not any whit observe their priviledges ; and are not only not listened to in what they do say ; but receive a harsh answer . advert . . apollo makes use of the unfortunate count st paul , to frighten the nobility in kingdoms from rebelling against their natural lords , at the pressure of forreign princes . advert . great euclid , for having distasted some powerfull men , is cruelly beaten by their bravoes . advert . . in a duel which hapned between an italian poet , and a vertuosi of spain , the spaniard being wounded to death , did so gallant an action before he expired , as apollo gave order that he should be solemnly buried at the publick charge . ibid. advert . . apollo having used great diligence to come by any of the idols of princes , proceeds with severity against one , who fell in●… the iudges power . advert . . all the monarchies of the world , affrighted at the over-great power and successful proceedings of the german commonwealths , consult in a general diet , how to keep themselves from being in time oppressed by them advert . the people of phosides , treating how they might rise in rebellion , by reason of the relation which their ambassadors made unto them , who were formerly sent to apollo , to pray hat their priviledges might be observed : the remedy fittest to be applyed to such a disorder , is discussed in his majesties council . adver . . a great controversie arising in point of precedency , between the prince of bisagnano , and dr. juliano corbelli of st marino . apollo refers the consideration thereof to the congregation of ceremonies , by which it is decided . advert . . apollo publisheth a very severe edict against some literati , who under a cloke of feigned picty , cover downright avarice . advert . . the city pretor , or chief iustice of pernassus , complains bitterly before apollo of the triumviri ; a magistracy newly instituted by his majesty , that in an edict of theirs published against minius , and other ministers of princes obscenities , they have violated his iurisdiction . advert . . the inhabitants of phocides fall into open rebellion , by reason that the priviledges of their country ●…re not observed by apollo's officers ; they are pacified by a senator , and send new ambassadors to his majesty . advert . . whilst some poets paralleld the greatness of rome with that of naples , a dangerous dispute arose between them ; apollo , to the end that his vertuosi might know what to say and believe in a business of such importance , commits the cause to the rota of pernassus , who decide it . advert . . theodoricus , that famous king of italy , having oft-times prest very much to be admitted into pernassus , is a waies denied by apollo , for a very important reason . advert . . apollo , according to his usual custom of the first day of every month , hears the petitions of such as desire to be admitted into pernassus . advert . . at a publick meeting , force ( contrary to the custom of the plebeian court ) pretending to take place of reputation ; that beautiful lady , with excellent resolution , finds a remedy for her reputation , which was in great hazard . advert . . giovan francisco pico , count of mirandola , that he might the more quietly attend his studies , entreats monsignor dino da mugello , auditor of the exchequer in pernassus , that the reformers , by reason of the too great noise which they alwaies make in their profession , may be removed further from his neighbourhood ; and is not heard in his desire . advert . . tacitus being excluded from out of the most famous commonwealths of europe , makes a grievous complaint to apollo ; and is by them with much honour received again , and much made of . advert . the blindman of forli , that famous italian mountebank , being , to the wonder of all the senat of vertuosi , admitted by apollo into pernassus , is by his majesty put upon an imployment of importance . advert . . luigi alemanni having in an elegant oration set forth the praises of the french nation , repented that his action afterward , and desired leave of apollo , to make his recantation ; but was not permitted so to do . advert . . corbulone having with much honour ended his prefixt time of government in pindo , a patent to continue the same iurisdiction for one year longer , is graciously sent him by apollo ; which he refuseth to accept of . advert . sebastian veneri , duke of venice , after his admittance into pernassus , desires apollo that he may have the precedency given him before hereditary kings and monarchs ; and obtains a favourable decree from his majesty advert . . apollo being greatly moved to compassion , by seeing a poor souldier , who had lost both his hands in the wars , go a begging , doth sharply reprehend princes for their ingratitude to military men . advert . . apollo greatly compassionating the lamentable shipwrack which his vertuosi make in great princes courts , to secure their navigation , commands some of the chief literati of his state , to make a card whereby men may sail by land . advert . . ariadeno barbarossa being driven by a sudden storm , splits upon the scogli cursolari , and maturino romagasso , captain of the guard of the gulf of lepanto , endeavours his escape , when he might have taken him prisoner . advert . . epictetus , a stoick philosopher , who finding his sect to grow much deformed , asks leave of apollo to ground a new sect of reformed stoicks ; and is rather reprehended by his majesty , then commended . advert . . the nobility of the commonwealth of achaia , not being able any longer to indure the insolency of the commons , who governed the state , send ambassadors to apollo , to obtain a prince , who may govern them ; and receive a gracious answer . advert . . apollo having for a just cause removed gulielmo budeo from the lord treasures place , confers the aforesaid place upon diego covarruvia , a noble spanish literato , and dean of the college of the grand sages of this court , though he was much gainsaid therein by the french monarchy . advert . . monsieur jovanni de la casa having presented apollo with his most useful galateo , meets with great difficulties in many nations , in having it observed . advert . . apollo finding that wicked men , by making use of the sword of iustice to injure honest men , do make his tribunals become very hatefull , to remedy so great a disorder , institutes a committee of the greatest subjects of this state ; but hath but bad success therein . advert . . marcus brutus desires lucius brutus , to shew him the perfections of the conspiracy which he so happily brought to pass against the tarquins ; and the imperfections of that conspiracy which he so miserably executed upon cesar. and receives desired satisfaction from him . advert . . marcus cato having , to the infinite dislike of princes , writ the word libera underneath the motto , pugna pro patria , which was set upon his gate , is commanded by apollo to put it out . advert . . socrates being found dead in the morning on his bed , apollo useth all possible diligence to learn the true reason of so sudden a death . advert . . the hereditary princes in parnassus , do very much press apollo , that the emperor tiberius may be removed from their classis , and placed in that of tyrants ; and he defends his cause victoriously before his majesty . advert . . hippocrates having advised apollo how to prevent the frequent deaths of sick folks , occasioned through the ignorance of physicians , and proving unfortunate in that his advice , is in great danger of being severely punished by his majesty . advert . . francisco mauro , a noble italian poet , having married the most vertuous lady , laura terecino , is soon after jealous of her , and kils her . advert . . thais , that famous curtizan of the comick poets , is at last , though after much debate , admitted into pernassus ; who , much to apollo's satisfaction , tels what good she hopes to bring to his court. advert . . the ambassadors of the province of marca being sent to this court , in a publick audience , complain unto his majesty of an unfortunate affair which hath befalne his inhabitants of that province ; for which apollo provides sufficient remedy , with singular demonstration of true love and affection . advert . . gonzalvo ferrante cordova , desires apollo that the title of magno , or great , may be confirmed unto him ; and instead of being granted his request , rece●…ves a very u satisfactory answer . advert . . many of the french nobility intreat their monarchy , that according as the nobility of commonwealths doe , it may be lawfull for them to use merchandizing ; and are by her shamefully denied . advert . . the honourable title of messere being faln into a miserable condition , is shamefully driven out of the kingdom of naples ; and not being received into rome ( as it is thought it should be ) for its last refuge hath its recourse to apollo , who assignes it a very satisfactory abode . advert . . the censors of pernassus , having by order from apollo , published a rigorous edict against hypocrites , are forced to moderate it by reason of a weighty particular discovered unto them by plato . advert . . the immense bulk of the ottoman empire , which was thought by the wise men to be everlasting , doth now of it self so destroy it self , as it threatens present ruine . advert . . the prince of helicon desires by an ambassador of his , from apollo , the priviledg of ordaining birthright amongst the nobles of his state ; which his majesty denies to grant . advert . . the duke of alva being accused of cruelty , for having with exquisite deligence caused two of the prime subjects of his new principality of achaia , to be imprisoned , slain , and afterwards secretly buried in their very prisons , defends himself stoutly before apollo . advert . . a chief subject of the province of macedonia , being hired by the prince of epire at a great salary , when he came to know the right cause why that pension was given him , doth magnanimously refuse it . advert . . the tenth of june is observed as a sad and mournful day in pernassus , in memory of the unfortunate loss of the decads of titus livy . advert . . apollo having appointed hospitals to every nation , for their fools , puts down that of florence , by reason of the few fools that are found amongst the florentines , and adds the revenue thereof to the lombards hospital , which by reason of the greater number of fools that flock thither , was run far in arrears . apollo's sea-captains , having in one of their assemblies made many useful decrees for their militia , his majesty orders that they be made known to courtiers , and commands the punctual observancy of them . advert . . natalis comes , an historian , is severely punished by apollo , for having said somewhat in an assembly of the literati , which did hainously offend his majesty . advert . . the chief monarchies of europe and asia , which now reside in pernassus , fall sick at one and the same instant , and not being to be cured by esculapius , hippocrates , or any other able physician , they are restored to their health by a skilful farrier . ib. advert . . the achaians being much incensed against the duke of alva , for his cruel proceeding against their two chieftains , take up arms , and drive him out of their state. advert . . an italian gentleman , for having lost much bloud in the service of a great prince , is honoured by him with a noble order of knighthood , who being but slightly esteemed of by those of his own countrey , asks apollo by what reasons he may satisfie those his deriders , that he was the more richly rewarded , in that he was paid in honour , and not in gold or silver . advert . . apollo finding that his having allowed the use of the part of one grain of hypocrisie to his vertuosi , had wrought very bad effects , does not only recall that his favour by publick edict , but thunders out exceeding severe punishments against hypocrites . advert . . guiccardine having spoken many things prejudicial to the reputation of the marquiss of piscara , in an assembly of divers vertuosi , that renowned commander doth sufficiently justifie himself before apollo . advert . . the duke of alva being accused of cruelty , for having with exquisite diligence caused two of the prime subjects of his new principality of achaia , to be imprisoned , slain , and afterwards secretly buried in their very prisons , defends himself stoutly before apollo . advert . . giovan francisco pico , not being able to reconcile the differences between plato and aristotle , apollo commands those two great philosophers to end the business in a publick disputation ; and being therein obey'd , they do not notwithstanding part friends . advert . . gonsalvo ferrante cordua , not having obtained the confirmation of his desired title of magnus , from the reverend college of historians , demands another place in pernassus of apollo , from whence he is likewise excluded . advert . . a barque loaded with inventors of new grievances running shipwrack upon the shore of lepanto , his majesty treats them well , though he do greatly abominate such like men . advert . . by letters intercepted , which were sent by an express from some princes to the lake of avernus , people come to know that the enmities wh●…ch are seen to reign in the nations of the world , are occasioned by the cunning of their princes . advert . . the prince of the laconicks nephew , b●…ing after his uncles death ; to return to a private fortune , shews no well composed minde in making so dangerous a passage . advert . . antonio perez of aragon , having presented apollo with his book of relations , his majesty does not only refuse to receive it : but commands it to be presently burn'd . advert . . apollo , to afford pastime to his literati , makes two useful scenes be represented upon melpomene's theatre : in one of which he shews the lesser princes with what wariness they ought to preserve themselves from a greater potentate ; and in the other , lets senators of republicks know how ill advised they are , who through partiality , side with a subject of their own faction , who notoriously aims at tyranny . advert . . lewis de la tremoglia , a noble french baron , renounceth his nobility ; and all the priviledges which he thereby enjoyed , in presence of the monarchy of france . advert . . don ferrante gonsaga being governor of corinthus , is exhorted by domitio corbulone , severely to resent a great excess , committed by a chief personage of that city : which counsel gonsaga wisely refutes . advert . . the prince of macedon accuseth the nobility of athens of treason before apollo , who are freed from that imputation , by his majesties councel of war. advert . . a shop-keeper is condemned to the gallies at the very instant that he was seised on by the serjeants , not being so much as examined . ●… advert . . bernardino rota , a famous neapolitan poet , being greatly beloved by the vertuosi of all professions in pernassus , is accused before apollo , for having purchased so general a good liking by some ill means . advert . . a carpenter being cudgeled somewhat severely for having uttered certain insolent words against the most noble scaliger , to his greater calamity , complains first of him to the lord chief iustice , and afterwards appeals to apollo . advert . . the great emperor maximilian the first , having said in a great assembly of the chiefest princes of this state , that the mahometan religion was nothing but policy , proves by excellent reasons to the very teeth of the ottoman monarchy , who complained hainously thereof to apollo , that he had said nothing but truth . advert . . anneus seneca , after having read moral philosophy in the publick schools of pernassus , obtains a writ of ease from apollo ; and being desirous to endow the philosophy-school with a rich revenue , is not suffered by his majesty so to do . advert . . diego covarruvia , after having for a short space exercised the place of his majesties chief treasurer , betakes himself to the stoicks sect. advert . . cornelius tacitus being imprisoned at the complaint of some great princes , for having made some politick spectacles , which were very prejudicious to their government , is freed by apollo . advert . . many carriers , who contrary to the laws , brought great store of beans into pernassus , are taken prisoners by the scouts . advert . . seneca having bought great store of poultrey in a countrey-house of his , which lies in the gnides territories , those people come to the true reason of that his forestalling the market . advert . . the grand-child to the prince of the laconicks , asks counsel of apollo , what course he should take to live with reputation in laconia . advert . . isabella of aragon , dutchess of milan , being continually prosecuted by adverse fortune , is brought to a very unhappy condition in the city of ephesus . advert . . many of the literati who do much apprehend the severity of the reformation , which by order from apollo , is now in treaty in pernassus , do seditiously rise in rebellion against the reformers ; and his majesty appeaseth the tumult by applying a fitting remedy . advert . . many princes believing that the disorder of their courts , which were abandoned by courtiers , proceeded from the injurious speeches used by cesar caparoli , in his chapter della corte , desire apollo that it may be remedied , and obtain their desire . adve●…t . . learned seneca , seeing that his late reformation of his former too splendid way of living , was ill taken by the universality of pernassus , distributes his immense riches in a work which was greatly commended by all men . advert . . some princes of pernassus , having spent a great mass of wealth n a stinking sort of merchaudize , and having thereby incurred great debts , are forced to confess themselves bankrupts , and to leave pernassus . advert . . certain prime politicians of pernassus pray the ottoman monarchy to tell them the true reason why she makes short war with her enemies , and are by her satisfied . advert . . the vertuosi of pernassus , after having paid in the accustomed donative of a million of conceits to his majesties treasurer , according to their wont , ask a favour of him . advert . . the arcadians being up in arms against their prince for certain new taxes imposed upon them , he wisely appeaseth them by delivering up unto them , him who had perswaded him thereunto . advert . . marcus portius cato , whilst he reprehends salustius crispus for flattering the emperor tiberius , is severely taxed by him for beingtoo obstinate . advert . . apollo having by a new edict inhibited poets to make use of any fabulous creature in their verses , at the fervent intreaties of the poets , his majesty revokes the said edict . advert . . giovangirolimo aquaviva , having overcome a very great difficulty , is with much honour admitted into pernassus . advert . . the duke of laconia , to revenge himself by way of law , upon a chief senator of state , for some private distastes that he had taken at him , commanded fleminio cartaro , his iudge of assize , to proceed severely against him upon some heads which he would give him and he denies to obey him . advert . . some princes of this state having presented apollo with a book of the reason of state , the vertuosi of pernassus not approving of the definition of state therein given , publish a new one , which was very much displeasing to those princes . advert . . marcantonio moreto desires apollo that he may have leave to make an oration in the publick schools of pernassus , in the praise of the ●…lemency of the most glorious king of france , henry the fourth ; but is denied it . advert . . a literato presents apollo with an oration made by him in praise of the present age ; which is laid aside by his majesty , as not grounded upon truth . advert . . christopher columbus , and other famous discoverers of the new world , desire apollo that immortality may be aecreed them for their noble daring ; but are denied it . advert . . sigismond king of polonia , prefers a paladine to the prime dignities of his kingdom , who proving persidious , the polack nobility , thinking the publick reputation was concern'd in this private palatines misdemeanor , revenge themselves severely upon him . advert . . apollo having a notorious hypocrite in his hands , punisheth him severely . advert . . apuleius his ass having given his master two kicks in the breast , is severely punished by him . advert . . paulus jovius presents apollo with his most elegant histories , which give full satisfaction to his majesty and the college of vertuosi ; and notwithstanding some opposition that is made , he is admitted with great applause into pernassus . advert . . a very famous literato , who was imprisoned by the iudges of assise for being a pratler , is freed by apollo , as not guilty of such a crime . advert . . philip the second , king of spain , being offended at what the duke of alva had told apollo , concerning his government of flanders , whilst he seeks to revenge himself upon that his minister of state , is sent for by apollo , who was acquainted with what had past , and is by him pacified . advert . . pompey the great having invited many noble lords of rome to be present at the dedication of the magnificent theatre which he had built in pernassus , they refuse to come . advert . . peter aretine being again assaulted , apollo , in respect of the lewd conditions of that satyrical vitious poet , commanded that no process should be made upon that riot . ib. advert . . apollo having received news by an express poet , whereas he was much rejoyced , communicates it to his literati with great iubile . advert . . a more then usual sweet odor issuing from the delphick library , apollo goes himself in person thither to discover the miracle , and soon finds the occasion of so great a novelty . a table of the contents of the politick touchstone . why the neapolitans are so strangely opprest , and hardly treated by the spaniards . genua excuses her freedom in pernassus . the spanish monarchy complains that her falshoods are discovered . the spanish monarchy comes to pernassus , and desires apollo to be cured of an issue ; but is dismist by the politick physitians . a secretary of monsieur de guise is punished for having spoken amiss . the spaniards endeavour the getting of savioneda , but in vain . ib. sir tho. moore , an englishman , asks apollo when heresies will cease . the french desire apollo that he will teach them the true spanish perfume for gloves . ibid. the spanish monarchy goes to the oracle of delphos , to know whether she shall ever obtain the universal monarchy of the whole world ; and receives a negative answer . philip the second , king of spain , after some dispute concerning his title , enters in great state into pernassus . all princes , commonwealths , and states , are justly weighed in the scales by lorenzo de medici . why the monarchy of spain withdrew her self into her palace . the duke of alva being arrived at pernassus , in complementing with prospero colonna , he falls to cuffs with him about titles , whereof he had defrauded the colonnesi . boccace is assassina●…ed by salviati . the sicilian ambassadors cannot obtain audience from apollo ; but are disgracefully driven away by his majesty . ib. sigismondo battori hath learne the latine tongue . the french are freed out of the mad mens hospital by the spaniards . some for examples sake are made a spectacle to the people . ib. a discovery made , that the spanish officers are wholly concern'd in their own profits . maximilian the emperor is advertised of the tumults sprung up amongst his sons . the dogs in the indies are grown wolves . ib. the spanish monarchy visits the queen of italy , and there pass between them complements full of kindness . the monarchy of spain throws her physician out of the window . the cardinal of toledo's summa is not admitted into the library of pernassus . almansor , that was king of the moors , meeting with the kingdom of naples , they two fall a weeping , and rehearse their miseries brought upon them by the oppression of the spaniards . the conte di fuentes is admitted into pernassus . all the states of the world are censur'd in pernassus for their errors . the spanish monarchy invites the cardinal of toledo to be secretary of state : who refuseth : and why . apollo detesteth the means that are recommended to him , for getting of monies . the first information . the society of polititians open a ware-house in parnassus , wherein are sold divers sorts of merchandize , very usefull for the vertuous living of those that are learned . the business so many moneths in agitation between the society of polititians , and the ministri camerali , touching the opening of a publick ware house in parnassus , with large priviledges for polititians , was the last week fully concluded ; and they yesterday made a glorious shew in the piazza , of all such things as men stand most in need of : wherefore menante thinks not much to acquaint you here with the chiefest of them , firmly believing , that all gallant men will be pleased with the notice thereof . in the first place , great store of stuffing , or bombast , not prized by the meaner sort of men , but highly esteemed by understanding courtiers , is sold in this ware-house : for those of great capacity , know that the shavings of those finest clothes which wise men weave with the superfine wool of forbearance , serves to stuff up the pack-saddles of slavery , to the end that they may sit the more easily upon the backs of those wretched courtiers , and not gall their lean sides so horribly , as the sides of some are seen to be , who though they be known to detest labour , are perswaded notwithstanding to go to court , with assured hopes of spending their time there merrily , and to command others , though they themselves serve . it is very observable , that some young men , though they live at home in the. fathers houses , have bought good store of this pretious stuffing , to bolster up some smal pack saddles , which they make use of in private houses , to the end that they may not come like raw colts unto the court , and that when they shall first undergo that weighty pack-saddle of court servitude , they may not commit those senceless absurdities , which cause the court colt-breakers , to lash them with bitter distastes , the better to inure them to that toilsom slavery . there is likewise sold in the same ware-house , store of pensils , which are very excellent for those princes , who upon urgent occasions are forced to paint white for black unto the people : and although this be a merchandize proper onely for princes , yet do these false cheaters provide themselves thereof , who setting their best leg forward , mind only mocking and cosenage , and to feed the silly multitude with fair words , and foul deeds . they have also abundance of spectacles , very wonderfull , and of great use : some of them serve to give light to those libidinous men , who amidst their goatish lusts , grow so short sighted , as they cannot discern between honour and shame , not know a friend from an enemy , a meer stranger from a kinsman , nor any thing else to which respect ought to be given . so great is the riddance which these polititians make of these kind of spectacles , as it is evidently known that few men see well in carnal affairs . there are other spectacles of a clear contrary operation , which keep men from seeing the light ; and the polititians affirm , that though they be generally good for all men , yet are they particularly more useful for courtiers , then those which enlarge the sight . for many loathsom things present themselves often to the sight of worthy men ; upon which , if you shall turn your back , you may peradventure draw upon you the ill will of potent men ; and to behold them , is to martyrize ones self . he who upon such an occasion puts a pair of these miraculous spectacles upon his nose , shall thereby free himself from the trouble of seeing the naucious things of this wicked and corrupted world , and shall make the foolish rabble believe that he eyes them very accuratly . others serve to preserve the sight of unworthy men , who the very day that they have received any new dignity , lean towards ingratitude . the masters of the ware-house say that they are made of the tenacious memory of benefits received , and past friendships . but very miraculous is the workmanship of those spectacles which make fleas appear to be elephants , and pigmies giants ; these are greedily bought up by great personages , who putting them upon the noses of unfortunate courtiers , do thereby work such an alteration in the eye-sight of those wretches , as , if their lord do but lay his hand upon their shoulders , or do but cast an artificial smile upon them , they take it as acceptably as a reward of hundred crowns a year . but the spectacles lately invented in flanders , are bought at the dearest rates by men of highest rank , which they give to their servants , thereby making rewards and dignities appear near unto them , which their sight cannot reach unto , and which peradventure they shall never arrive at as long as they live . there are sold moreover in the same shop ( but at a very dear rate ) humane eyes , which are of admirable use ; for it is not to be beleived how much men better their own affairs , when they look upon them with the eyes of other men . nay the very polititians themselves affirm , that a man cannot arrive at that so excellent vertue so much endeavored by great men , of nosce te ipsum by any other instrument better then by these . there are certain compasses also sold in the same shop , not made of silver , brass , or steel , but of the purest interest of unspotted reputation , which is to be found in point of honour ; and they are exceeding good to measure a mans own actions by : for it is known by experience , that compasses made of the base materials of capriciousness , and of sole interest , prove not just to those who in all their affairs desire to draw paralel lines . these compasses are excellently good for those who know how to use them exactly , to take the just latitude of those ditches which other men out of honour are forced to leap clean over , so to keep from falling into the midst , and from burying themselves shamefully in the mire of indiscretion . nor can scapethrifts who have but the purse of a private man , yet will spend like a prince , learn the requisite vertue of cutting their coats according to their cloath , by any instrument better then by this . they do likewise sell mathematical instruments , used by surveyors , which are very necessary perfectly to deliniate those with whom one hath to treat in great affairs , or to impart important secrets . the same shop vents likewise great store of certain iron instruments , not unlike such as are used by surgeans and tooth-drawers ; and they serve to enlarge the jawes of unfortunate courtiers , who being to make vertue of necessity , are oft-times forced to swallow down great pompions , instead of little mastick pils . they have likewise great store of besoms , made of circumspection , which the wariest courtiers make provision of , diligently to clense the staires both morning and evening , from those dangerous beans scattered thereupon by such malignant people , who delighting more in spoyling other mens affairs , then in accommodating their own , practice nothing but how to break the neck of reputation of men of honour . there you may likewise have ( but at the weight of gold ) very fine ink , which being well made use of upon paper , by the labour of learned writers , serves to imbalm and perfume the dead bodies of vertuous men ; whereas the bodies of the ignorant cast forth a horrible stench , and are soon turned to ashes : and by this ink only are the names of learned men eternized in memory , when the like of the ignorant , perish as soon as their eyes are closed : a balsom certainly of more then humane vertue , since those who anoynt themselves therewith , live after death , and parting only with their body from the world , abide there eternally in the memory of their writings . these polititians enrich themselves likewise much by an oyle which they sell , which hath sundry times been experimented to be good for the strengthening of courtiers stomacks , to the end , that without weakening the complexion of patients , these unfortunate people may chearfully digest the bitter distastes which they are so often enforced to swallow down at court. there is likewise sold in little glass viols ( of which menante , who writes these things , had the good fortune to come by some very cheap ) odoriferous humane sweat , very admirable to perfume those , who by the fragrancy of the musk , and civet of their honourable labours , desire to appear amongst the learned with pen in hand . the same shop vents much pa●…te-royal , very good to sharpen the appetite of certain obstinate stoicks , to the end that they may greedily swallow down the loathsom things of this world ; which , though they nauseate others very much , and go absolutely against the stomacks of good men ; yet some , that they may not draw upon them the displeasure of powerfull men , and so disorder their own affairs , are forced to seem very desirous of them , and to hunger after them . there are moreover in this shop many boxes of perfumed comfeits , very good to sweeten the breath of such councellers , secretaries , and senators , as are bound to suffer their secrets to putrifie in their bodies . in a room apart , they sell horse . trammels , made of iron of maturity , which though they be abhorred by some foolish people , as instruments fit for beasts , yet advized men have purchased them so much credit , as they are bought at dear rates by those forward and precipitate wits , who strangely apprehending the juditious maturity of the weekly carrier , delight in speedily dispatching their affairs by the post. but there is no merchandize in this ware-house which sels better , then certain fans , not made of the feathers of ostriches or peacocks , or any other better coloured bird , but of herbs and flowres ; and because andrew matthiolo , the delfick herbarist , found out amongst those flowres and herbs , the infernal wolfebane , the wary vertuosi of parnassus have clearly discovered , that those mysterious fans serve not to coole ones self in the heat of summer , but to drive those troublesome flies from ones nose , which some unadvised men indeavouring to chase away violently with a dagger , have shamefully cut their own noses . the second advertisement . the usual guard of parnassus having taken a poetaster , who had been banished parnassus , upon pain of death , found a paire of cards in his pocket ; which when apollo saw , he gave order that he should read the game of trump in the publick schools . to the end that the ignorant sort of people , by their sottishness of soul , may not profane the vertuous habitations of parnassus , apollo sent many years agoe for two companies of riming poets from sicily , who were very fortunate in their meeter , and had their conceits at their fingers ends , whose office was to scoure the country , and keep the fields free . these some eight daies agoe took a poetaster prisoner , who was banished from parnassus upon forfeiture of life if he should ever return thether ; and who , though he were interdicted the use of books , or exercise of pen , yet he was seen every day , in despite of apollo , and in scorn of the soveraign muses , to defile paper with verses , and even to pretend to the sublime name of poet. the misdements of this fellow were much aggravated by a pair of cards , which the sergeants , whilst they were searching him , found in his pocket ; which , as conducing only to vice , are capitally condemned : they being therefore forthwith brought to apollo , he was strangely astonished at the bruitishness of the invention found out by vitious men , to spend their time , and waste their reputation and means : but his majestie did much more wonder , when he understood that the foolishness of these men was arived at that height , that they called that play , which is done in so very great earnest , and that they thought it a delight , sport , and pastime , to hazard that money which is purchased with so much labour , and which serves for so many things , as without it , aristotle would be thought ignorant by the modern world , and alexander the great , a plebeian . apollo asked this man , what game he used to play most at ? who answering , trump ; apollo commanded him to play at it ; which when he had done , apollo penetrating into the deep mysteries thereof , cryed out , that the game of trump , was the true court-philosophy ; a science necessary for all men to learn , who would not live blockishly . and appearing much displeased at the affront done this man , he first honoured him with the name of vertuoso ; and then causing him to be set at liberty , he commanded the beadles , that the next morning a particular colledge should be opened , where , with the sallary of crowns a year , for the general good , this rare man might read the most excellent game of trump ; and commanded upon great penalty , that the platonicks , peripateticks , and all other the moral philosophers , and vertuosi of parnassus , should learn so requisite a science ; and that they might not forget it , he ordered them to study that game one hour every day ; and though the learneder sort thought it very strange that it should be possible to gather any thing that was advantagious for the life of man , from a base game , used only in ale-houses ; yet knowing that his majesty did never command any thing which made not for the bettering of his vertuosi , they so willingly obeyed him , as that school was much frequented . but when the learned found out the deep mysteries , the hidden secrets , and the admirable cunning of the excellent game of trump , they extolled his majesties judgement , even to the eighth heaven , celebrating and magnifying every where , that neither philosophy , nor poetry , nor astrologie , nor any of the other most esteemed sciences , but only the miraculous game of trump , did teach ( and more particularly , such as had business in court ) the most important secret , that every the least trump , did take all the best coat-cards . the third advertisement . apollo having notice how henry the fourth , that potent king of france , was most wickedly assassinated , ordered for the indempnity of his beloved french , that powerfull succour should be sent from arcadia into france . on the two and twentieth of this present moneth , late at night ; apollo heard by an express post , sent with all speed from the university of paris , the sad news of the murder committed upon the glorious king of france , henry the fourth ; which news did so afflict his majestie , as in testimony of his inward grief , he presently vailed his face with a thick dark cloud , from which for three whole daies he showred down great store of tears : and all the letterati , both spaniards , english , flemmish , germans , and italians , did with abundance of tears , bewaile the unfortunate mischance of so great a king. it must not be here forgot that apollo amidst his deepest sighes , was heard to break forth into these words , that the world was come to the poynt of being ready to return to its first principles , since the wicked perfidiousness of some was grown to that height of impiety , as they would expose their lives to the hangmans hands , rather to purchase bad , than good fame . two daies after the posts arival , solemn obsequies were ordered for so mighty a monarch ; so as not only all parnassus was covered with blacks , but every of the letterati put on his long mourning weede . and to shew to all the sacred colledge of the vertuosi , that the father of learning was departed this world , the mecenas of the vertuosi , and the very muses themselves , did with dishevel'd hair , assist at the obsequies in widowy apparel : a piece of sorrow not seen in parnassus since the death of octavianus augustus . the learned of all the colledges , and several sects of philosophers , made above two hundred mournfull orations ; and yet of all the vertues of so great a king , his more then humane valor was only praised ; and t is very true , that by reason of the many sighs of the vertuosi , the orators were scarce heard : so as apollo esteeming it a piece of cruelty to rub the sore of so bitter a wound by continual remembrance , as was done by scollership , throughout the whole world , he commanded that the obsequies of so magnanimous a king , should be no farther proceeded in , since such , and so great was the loss , as , lest the world might live in perpetual affliction , men should strive soon to forget it : and so much the rather , for that the heroick vertues of this invincible king , were arived at such a height of eminency , as they stood no more in need of being praised by men . and for that the noble kingdom of france may vie and weigh even with greece it self in point of learning ( as is clearly testified by the delfick library , so fully fraught with infinite labours of the french vertuosi ) for the indempnity of that florishing kingdom , so dear unto his majesty . and for the better safety of his beloved french , apollo commanded that pack-horses should immediately be sent from arcadia into france : some of the vertuosi wondred much at this his majesties resolution , and told him , that france , which was furnished with so numerous and so noble a cavalry , as that she did not only nor know nor fear danger , but did so farr despise it , as that she went in quest thereof even by night , with the lanthorn of her undaunted heart , that having with her invincible sword won so famous a kingdom , she would be so well able to maintain her self in this her present misfortune , as not to stand in need of arcadian pack-horses . to this apollo answered . that his beloved french in this their modern calamity , and for the better security of their flourishing kingdom , needed no armed cavalry ; but that since the peace and quiet of the kingdom did chiefly depend upon the unity of their natives , that this peace and unity could not be better come by , by any other means , then by the perpetual remembrance of the miserable wasting of their country , cruel sacking of their cities , of the woful loss they had undergon , not onely of means , but of reputation in their last years civil wars ; and that nothing was so good to put them still in mind of these so sad afflictions , as these pack-horses , which by instinct of nature , did detest passing a second time by the same way , wherin formerly they had run hazard of breakng their necks . the fourth advertisement . whilst michel angelo buonaroti was coppying forth the ilfavoured fore-front of anneus seneca's house , he was asked by pierius valeriano , wherefore he did so ? and buonaroti gives him this reason , although the habitation of anneus seneca , for pleasantness of situation , beautiful gardens , abundance of fresh and clear waters , multitude of lodgings , good both for summer and winter , and for all other exquisite delights which may be imagined for humane accommodation , may compare in all points to neros famous house of gold , yet the forefront thereof is like the rotten rack of a carriers stable : yet did the famous michel angelo buonaroti draw out the designe thereof the other day ; which when pierius valeriano , as he was passing by , saw , he wondred very much , that so famous an architecter should mispend his time in drawing so loathsome a thing ; which made him ask buonaroti , what singular thing he could see in that frontispiece , which deserved the pensil of so famous a man as himself ? to which , as the same pierius told me , he answered in these words ; sir , the skilful do so clearly discern in this front which appears to you so ugly , all the rules of dorick , tomick , corinthian architecture , and of composts which are , and yet appear not , as by the opinion of vitruvius himself , it ought to be added as the eight , to the seven wonders of the world . my most vertuous iohnghirollimo aquaviva , duke of atri , commanded me to draw this copy which you see , and told me , he intends to send it to naples , to some of the barons there , who are his good friends , and who being besotted with the vanity of seeming to be more then what they are , have very much need ocularly to discover in the workmanship of this fore-front , how wise men govern their affairs , who are , and doe not appear . the fifth advertisement . the contention which arose between many learned men , touching which is the best political law , which the most praise-worthy order in the flourishing commonwealth of venice , is decided , and fully ended by the very venetian liberty , which with the joint agreement of all the learned men , was chosen umpire . the gallant dispute which arose some six dayes ago between some letterati of the state , deserves to be written ; who whilst they were discoursing of the famous order , gallant laws , and other rare institutions , which maintain the illustrious republick of venice in so great luster , there arose variety of opinions between them which deserved the greatest commendation : and for that every one of these vertuosie defended their own opinion as the best ; to the end that so great a difference might be quietly decided , they joyned unanimously in this resolution ; that they would all of them personally appear before the most illustrious venetian liberty , to whom they would first make known their several sences , and would afterwards acquiesce in her judgement . this was then made known to that illustrious lady , who was gratiosluy pleased to give those vertuosi what satisfaction they desired . peter crenitus spoke first , and said : that since it was agreed upon by all men , that all sublunary things , are first born , grow , and increase afterwards , and in process of time decay ; it seemed very strange to him , that onely the commonwealth of venice , was seen still to flourish the more , the elder it grew ; and that the laws , orders , and wholesome institutions , which after a relaxation , are at last quite forgotten in other principallities , were known to increase in vigour , and exactness , and to be more diligently , and readily observed only in venice : which was the cause that in the venetian commonwealth those reformations of government , those reassumings of state were never seen , which with infinite tumults the roman and florentine commonwealths had so often used : it being the peculiar vertue of the venetian senate , to perpetuate her self in her flourishing liberty , by the punctual observance of her ancient laws ; and that those defects not being seen in venice , which as it appears other potentates know not how to shun ; and that all diligence though never so exquisite , doth soon terminate in that supine negligence , which bereaves all principalities both of liberty and life , he thought he might assuredly affirm that thorough such wisdome , the republick of venice should last as long as the world did . next spake angelo politiano , saying ; that he admired the wise venetian commonwealth , for what peter crinito had related , and for a thousand other most excellent orders : but that he thought it to be a very rare thing , that an aristocratical commonwealth , the true foundation whereof was held by the most understanding writers upon common-wealths , to consist in the parity of means amongst the nobility ; could be so long maintained in so much peace and greatness , in that disproportionable inequality of riches which was apparently seen in the venetian nobility ; in which though there were the two so hazardous extreams of immense wealth , and great poverty , yet that defect did not appear in venice , which humane laws seem not able to inhibit , that the rich should trample upon the poor , who though they did greatly envy the fortune of the wealthy , yet either by reason of the immense charity which reigns in all the venetian nobility towards the publick liberty , or that the very great riches of those that possessed them were not made use of to the injury of inferiours ; the poor as well as the wealthy did live peacefully and modestly together in that happy country . after politiano spoke pierio valeriano , and said , that the onely miracle which was to be wondred at in the venetian commonwealth , was the rare and miraculous situation of her metrapolitan city , from which he thought that the venetians , ought immediately to acknowledge the great benefit of their glorious liberty , as that which hath still preserved them from the forces of many forraign princes , who have endeavoured to put upon them the chain of servitude . then said iulius scalager , that the stupendiousness of the venetian liberty , which fild the whole world with wonder , was , that the very nobility which sate at the healm , did not only patiently pay the ancient grievous taxes of the publick treasury , but with incredible readiness did oft times impose new ones upon themselves , which were afterwards rigorously exacted by the receivers : and that it had been often seen that the noble venetians , upon any urgent occasion of the commonwealth , rather then to lay any new impositions upon the people , would open their own coffers ; and did this in so ample a manner , and with so strange alacrity for the publick liberty , as this action deserved the preheminence over all the miracles which were observed to be in the fortunate venetian freedome ; as that which made it appear clearly to the whole world , that they were fully indued with that excellent quality which doth eternise republicks , of having their nobility so hugely in love with living free , as they did chearfully prefer the publick interest before their own profit . next said bernardo tasso , that he had lived long in venice , where he found nothing to be more wondred at , then to see those very noble venetians , who did so much delight in pleasures , pastimes and idleness , govern the publick affairs with such gallantry , as they seemed to others to be men of exemplary lives , and lords born to perpetual labour . when tasso had done , francisco berny according to his wonted pleasantness , which did much delight the venetian liberty , said ; that the rarest and most admirable thing , that great wits were to admire in the state of venice , was that all the channels of that city being full of gudgins , the venetian senators did notwithstanding take so few of them , as they were deservedly held by all nations to be the salt of the earth . then sabilico followed , and said , that whilst he writ the venetian history , having diligently observed the excellent institutions of that glorious liberty , he found nothing more to wonder at therein , then that the publick treasury should be so faithfully managed , even by needy senators ; as to have their hands greased with one penny of st. marks , was held by the nobility not onely to be a capital excess , but great infamy . iaccopo sanazzarro said then , that it appeared strange to him in the venetian commonwealth , that there being many of the nobility but of mean fortunes , they did notwithstanding with incredible patience tolerate their private miseries , not so much as in a thought , coveting the mass of publick wealth , by those seditious frumentary , and agrarian laws , with which the famous commonwealth of rome was so much vexed by her citizens ; and that it was a thing praise worthy , and to be wondred at , to see that in venice , the poor nobleman strove only through vertue and worth to comfort himself amidst his miseries ; studdying to make himself worthy to be imployed by his country in advantagious imployments ; which made that vertue , worth and honesty , served instead of a rich patrimony to the poor noble venetian . iovanni ioviano pontano added , that all that had been said was very miraculous ; but that the greatest thing which he had alwaies observed in the venetian liberty was , that the immense wealth , which some of the nobility possessed , did not puff them up with pride and vain glory , as many were seen to be in other commonwealths ; that therefore it was a rare custome in venice , that such senatours who were as rich as princes , knew how to live at home in their own houses like private citizens , and did not differ at all in the piazza's from the poorest men . and that the venetians onely know how to separate the evils of ambition and pride , and the being attended by multitudes of the meaner sort of citizens , from great riches , which the famous roman liberty either could not , or would not prohibit in caesar , in pompey , and in many other wealthy senators . when pontano had ended his discourse , the commendador hannibal caro said , that above all other stupendious things in the commonwealth of venice , he had alwayes much admired to see the mighty prince of so famous a liberty , observed with so much obsequiousness , reverence , king-like majesty , and citizen authority ; and that the coherence of so great veneration , with limited authority , the long extent of the prince his empire , with modesty , was a temper not known to the wisdome of the ancient legislators of former republicks , and which was happily practised onely by the venetian senate . bartolomeo cavalcanti replyed next , that as pontano had observed it for a great rarity in the venetian commonwealth , that store of wealth did not make rich senators wise , so was it a much greater portent to see , that the orders of that excelse liberty , the sacred laws of that eternal commonwealth were such , as even the chiefest places , did not fasten any thing of ambition or pride to them who did exercise them with great authority ; a particularity the more worthy of observation ; for that the like was never seen in whatsoever other principallity , or well constituted common-wealth , as being a thing which did directly oppugne nature . and that when he was in venice , he did not admire the rich treasure of st. mark , the arsenal , the grand cannale , with the stately palaces of the cornari , grimani , foscari , and other magnificent buildings , built at vast expence in that miraculous city , wonders onely obvious to the eye of ordinary men ; but that it appeared marvelous to him to see signior sebastiano vinieri , lately general of so powerful a fleet , so famous for the glorious naval victory which he obtained against the turks , to return a private man to venice , and to walk the piazza with that decent modesty , as he appeared not to differ in any thing from those senators who never stird from the city ; and that it was a singular thing , that in the venetian common-wealth , the nobles therof could behave themselves so modestly and civilly at home , who when they were imployed abroad in important magistracy , and great commands , could with splendid and princely liberality make themselves known to the world , not to be barely citizens of a well regulated republick , but men born to command those who were descended from royal bloud ; and that therefore he believed that there was no nation in the world that knew better how to obey modestly , and command gallantly , then the venetian nobility : a thing so true , that whereas in other states , they were forced for the honour of their publick magistrates to put their senators in mind with what magnificency of spirit they should make good the majesty of their publick imployments ; the venetian senate had several times been necessitated to make severe laws to inhibit those who did exercise any authority or jurisdiction out of the city , the using of any splendid magnificency . thus said cavalcanti , when flavio biondo added ; that when he was in venice , he was much amazed to see , that in a meer aristocrasie , the citizens and plebeains lived with such satisfaction in that happy country , as that for many months that he tarried there , he could never discern whether the publick venetian liberty was better beloved , and held dearer by the nobility which commanded , or by the bare common sort of citizens who obeyed . then followed paulus iovius , who said , that not only to himself , but to many great princes , with whom he had discoursed at large of the miraculous government of the state of venice , it seemed very strange that the senat of that commonwealth studied nothing more then peace , and yet with great vigilancy and asseduity did perpetually prepare for warr ; and that armed peace was only seen in the flourishing venetian state. iovius was followed by iohn bocatchio , who said , that the true salt which preserved the venetian liberty from the putrifaction and corruption of all abuse , was that supreme queen of all laws , that excellent institution , so inviolably observed by her , that neither the greatness of parentage , abundance of wealth , nor the merits of fore-fathers were considered in the preferment of senators to high places , but the sole worth of him who pretended to the magistracy , was weighed : whence it was that there was many vitious and ignorant gentlemen of venice , but only the most vertuous and well-deserving commanded , and governed with that wisdom which was known to all the world . but leonardo aretine , after having much commended bocatchios opinion , added , that the excellent custom of the state of venice , in not conferring places upon her nobility by skips and leaps , but by degrees and gradation , was that sound basis whereon the greatness and eternity of such liberty was grounded ; and that it was an excellent rule , that whatsoever noble man would arive at the supreme dignities , he must even from his youth begin at the meanest magistracies : a wholsom custom which produceth the important effect of maintaining that true and essential equality amongst the nobles of an aristocracy , which makes liberty long-liv'd : for with those that understand state affairs , the parity of wealth is not that which equals senators in a commonwealth ; but the making all the nobles march on towards the grandeur of the highest dignities , beginning at the meanest imployments . a law well worthy the venetian wisdom ; which because the ancient roman commonwealth did want , her liberty was but short-liv'd , and yet was still molested with dangerous infirmities , and tumultuous insurrections . for the base abuse of giving the consulship of a free country , and the chief places in the army , to pompey and cesar , and other rich subjects in the prime of their youth , was no better then to deal with them rather like men born of royal bloud , like lords and masters of their countries liberty , then like senators of a well regulated republick . for since it is a certain truth , that that is a well ordered commonwealth , where the hopes of some yet higher dignity remains , even to the worthyest senators , and men of great merit , which may serve for sharp spurs to such as are ambitious of glory , to make them make haste in the streight path of vertue , that they may the sooner arive at the gole of the desired magistracy ; what greater preferment remained to be hoped for in their age , by cesar and pompey , who in their youth obtained from the commonwealth of rome , not without much imprudency , the highest honours , and supremest dignities , then that absolute tyrannical power , to which cesar openly , and pompey more cunningly did afterwards aspire ? a great mis-government , and from which the famous roman liberty might presage her death . though the most glorious venetian liberty gave great signes that she was very well pleased with aratines opinion , she notwithstanding commanded the remainder of the vertuosi , to speak theirs . then thus began benedetto varchi ; my republick of florence , which never had the luck to work peace and union between her noble families , and that mutual love which doth perpetuate the liberty of commonwealths , was at last compelled to fall into servitude . wherefore this appears to me to be the rarest of humane miracles , that a noble venetian , though never so highly offended by the murder of his children , and in his own person , being more violently wrought upon by his fervent charity towards the freedom of his country , then frighted by the rigor of magistrates , can with a free soul put on the hard resolution of forgiving his enemy ( at that very instant ) the injury which he hath received . certainly a most admirable resolution , and so much the more worthy of wonder , as that it is evidently seen , that the noble venetian knows how to trust the senat willingly with the revenge of any injury he can receive , when sensual men are very loath to remit the like into the hands of god , from whom we receive all that we have of good . thus said varchi , when lodovico dolci added , that if that were true , which is confessed by all men , that the rarest and most considerable vertue in a prince , was to be able with ease , and without any danger , to disarm his captain general , and to receive perfect obedience from him , even then when he knew he was sent for back by an incensed prince , and one who did much suspect his loyalty ; his opinion was , that of all other things which the rest had mentioned of rare in the state of venice , this was to be preferred , that she did not only with great ease , disarm her captain generals at sea ; but that when her chiefest ministers knew that the senat was highly displeased with them , and that therefore they were sure to be severely punished : though they were absent well arm'd , and in great command , if it should so happen that they should be sent for by the state , they would with great readiness obey , and laying down their arms , and authority of chief magistrates , hasten to venice to receive judgement from their friends and kin●…ed , though it might cost them their lives . the examples whereof had been so often seen in venice in his time , as it had filled the whole world with wonder . that therefore he thought he might justly say he should be much injured , if the so great authority of the state of venice , the so great submission , obedience , and unheard of charity of the venetian nobility to the publick liberty , were not preferred before all those admirable laws , and excellent institutions , which others had spoken of before him . the most s●…ene venetian liberty , which without replying any one word to these vertuosi , had heard all these her so many lawdable customs , and her so many miraculous prerogatives , said to lodovico ●…olci , that what he had said , was very considerable ; but that it was a benefit which the ottaman emperors likewise enjoyed , but that she acknowledged all her grandesta from one only prerogative , which she was exactly mistress of , and wherein she knew she did excell all principalities , and all commonwealths , as well past as present ; which had not yet been touched upon by any of those vertuosi . then said dionigi antonigi , that the greatest wonder , and which ought to be praised even to the skies , was , to see that the dreadful tribunal of the councel of ten , and the supreme magistracy of the state-inquisitors , could with three balleting balls , easily bury alive any cesar or pompey , which began to discover himself in that well-governed state. attonigi had no sooner spoke his opinion , but ierolimo mercuriali added , that whilst he exercised his charge of reading in the so famous schools of physick in padua , it happened that some plebeians in venice , being gon according to their custom , to the sea-side to sollace themselves with some young courtisans which they had carried along with them , they were so beaten by some noble venetians , as the former betaking themselves unto their swords , slew one of the others , and handled the rest but ill . for which fault , being sent for by the judges , those plebeians , although they saw all the judges in the power of the offended nobility , yet they hoped so much in the uprightness of the senat , and in the exact justice of the tribunals for offences , as they stuck not to make their appearance , and go to prison : nor were they deceived in their opinion ; for the judges finding by the defence which they made , how they had been molested by those noble venetians , they were as innocent , set at liberty , to the eternal glory of the uncorrupt venetian justice . and that it was a prodigie not formerly seen , and which could not be believed , but by those that practised it , that the noble man , though of powerfull parentage , famous for his riches , and of great authority through the honours he had received in the commonwealth , the citizen proved the harder adversary in pleading , than the noble man. and that if the politick precept written by great men , was true , that aristocrasies never died when the young nobility used modesty , and the tribunals maintained equal justice , he could not see when the most happy venetian liberty , which was so severe in punishing the licentiousness of her nobles , and so exquisitly just in her tribunals , should ever have an end . learned ermolao barbaro would be the last that spake , who said ; that tyranny being then introduced in free countries , when the most important secrets of commonwealths was communicated but to a few senators , the excellent venetian liberty , to shun splitting upon so dangerous a rock , communicated secrets , and had the most important business of her state discust in the supreme magistracy of the pregadi : wherein were above senators , and that it seemed very strange to him , that the commonwealth of venice could find that secrecy in so great a number of senators , which princes did often in vain endeavor with such diligence , and through such liberal gifts , in one sole secretary , and a couple of councellers . then did the most excellent lady of the venetian liberty rest her hand upon ermolao barbaro's shoulder , and said unto him ; you have found out that pretious jewel , which i so much glory in , and for which i deserve to be envied by all the world ; for secrecy is no less necessary for the well governing of states , then good councel . the sixth advertisement : a learned laconick is severely punished by the laconick senat , for not having used requisite brevity in his discourse . that unluckie laconick letterato , who exprest that in three words , which was judged by the laconick senat , might have been said in two , and which was reputed a more then capital fault , by those laconicks who are more penurious of words , then courteous men are of pence ; after eight moneths long and teadious imprisonment , received his sentence five daies agoe ; which was , that he should read only once over the warr of pisa , written by guicchardino ; the laconick read over the first leaf with much agony ; but so horribly teadious did that rabble of discourse appear to him , as the unfortunate wretch threw himself down before his judges feet , who had sentenced him , and earnestly entreated them that they would condemn him to row in the gallies during life , that they would immure him between two walls , and that for mercies sake they would flea him alive ; for to read those endless discourses , those so teadious councels , those empty harangues made at the taking in of a pigeon-house , was a punishment which surpast all the bitter pains of child-birth , and all the most cruel deaths that ever the pittiless perillus could think upon , at the instance of the most cruel tyrants . the seventh advertisement . the censors of learning do severely punish one of their associates , who in his more mature years , seemed to be pleased with italian poetry . a vertuoso was taken yesterday by the marshals belonging to the court of the censors of learning , who was found with his spectacles on his nose , reading some italian poetry ; and this morning early , by order from apollo , he received three sound lashes with a cord first , and was afterward told , that being , as he was , of the age of years , he should learn to apply himself to graver studies , and leave the reading of those madrigals , songs , and sonnets , to be idlely spent by those spruce youngsters , in whom those things were tolerated , which were severely punished in old men . the eighth . advertisement . apuleius his golden ass , and plantus his assinaria , complain to apollo of their masters great severity , and receive no very pleasing answer . the eight of this present moneth , apuleius his glorious golden asse , and the famous assinaria of plantus , appear'd before apollos majesty ; to whom in the name of all sorts of pack-horses , they joyntly said , that if those creatures deserved to be better treated , which were of little charge , and much use , they had more reason to complain of their masters , than any other beasts ; for though by their perpetual labour , they bore the greatest weight in their masters house , both by day and night ; and for their food were contented with a little course grass and water , and made it a holy day when they got but a little bran ; yet they were so indiscreetly dealt withall through their masters ingratitude and cruelty , as that miserable beasts that they were , they became the spectacle of all brutish usage ; and that since they could not mollifie their masters cruelty by humble prostrating of their service , they did in all submission beseech his majestie , to the end that some bounds , though not utter period , might be put to their ass like sufferings , he would vouchsafe to command their masters to use more gratitude , atleast more humanity to so meritorious beasts . to which apollo answered , that the severity used by masters to their pack-horses , for which they so much complained , arose not from their masters cruelty , since there was none that hated the profit of his own patrimony ; but that it was occasioned through the great sloathfulness , and monstrous dulness of the pack-horses : for which their masters were forced by store of bastenadoes to egg them on to do that which they had not spirit enough to do by any vivacity of their own wit : and that they who would judge aright of the cruelties used to any whosoever , must not regard so much his genius , who useth severity , as the parties condition who complains of ill usage . the ninth advertisement . a sommary of what the learned in sciences have sowed and reaped . the harvest is already over , and the whole encrease of this year is brought by the possessers thereof into their grainaries ; which though it hath been various , according to the nature of the grounds , and condition of seed , which hath been thereupon sown ; yet the harvest may be said in general , to be penurious . since by the publick calamity of mankind , peoples wits are become steril and barren , as well as is the aire and earth . those who have sowed the study of the law , have usually had a great encrease , and many are much enriched thereby , particularly those who have cultivated the fields in the common pleas ; their harvest is so plentifull , as it yields fifty for one . greater things have been seen in the fruitfull fields of the courts at rome , where particularly silvestro aldobrandini , and markantonio borghese , two roman advocates , each of whose sons were popes , having sowed the study of the law with much cost , and infinite labour , and watered it with their sweat , have filled their granaries with rich treasure , and their sons who have practised the same husbandry , have thereby purchased principalities for their families , and divine dignities for themselves . those who have sowed the study of phisick , have likewise had a good harvest ; but not to be compared with that of the law ; for it gives only twelve for one . the plowers of poetry have seen their fields make a beautifull shew in the spring of their age , and had great reason to expect a rich harvest ; but when in the beginning of iuly , the season of earing began , they saw their sweat and labours dissolve all into leaves and flowres ; so as having laboured in vain , the poets find themselves pil'd and pol'd , not having meat to eat : wherefore this sort of husbandry , as being more for appearance then profit , is almost given over : but little greek hath been sown , there being in these times but small vent thereof ; which may peradventure be occasioned because the bread which is made of such grain , although it hath formerly been the daily food of a numerous nation , it seems notwithstanding that it proves hard of digestion to the squeasie stomacks of modern weak-wits . hence it is that some of the more learned sort have only sowed so much thereof in their gardens as will serve for their houshold expence , and rather not to appear ignorant , than to seem learned ; and to maintain seed , but not to make merchandize thereof . the seed of hebrew is almost quite lost ; for it being no longer in use , there are but very few that sow any ; and certainly it redounds much to the general shame of all men , that this tongue is not ambitiously aspired unto , since god by his speaking in that language , hath given it so great reputation . the husbandmen of philosophy have even lost their seed ; and therefore the world is about to give over such merchandize , as that which requireth the fruitfull fields of subtile wits , and infinite study to make it grow and come to maturity ; and since it yields but little fruit , and but very few buyers of that little , to intend it , is to loose the principal . they who have sowed good turns ( contrary to the opinion of many ) have had a most plentifull harvest : and certainly such seed is as pretious as wonderfull : for , of many bushels-full thereof , if one onely grain spring up and prosper , it yields so abundant an encrease to the husbandman , as it makes him rich . it is true , that only magnanimous minds , and men of great liberality , attend the most noble husbandry of sowing benefits ; for the costive avaricious men , whose greediness is such , as they would reap before they sow , dare not venture to throw that seed upon the ground , which they see is for the most part lost . those who have sown threats and injurious words , have reaped great store of actual offences ; the sowers of curses , reap great store of maledictions . those likewise who have sown tribulation , have reaped so plentifull a harvest of thorns , as they have filled their granaries therewithall , even up to the top , for their own use , and from those that shall descend from them , even to the sixtieth generation . the tenth advertisement . menante comes into the politians ware-house , and by the merchandizes which the learned buy there , he studies how to know the quality of their wits . to make an exact judgement of every mans genius , it is very behooffull to frequent those places where vertuous exercises are used , and those shops wherein vitious things are sold , and to observe them that frequent them . for libraries serve as well to make known the lovers of learning , as living riotously denotes out gamsters , or cooks shops gluttons ; nor is there a better way to discover vain men , then to frequent barbers shops often , and to observe who those ganemedes are , who those narcissi , who having the patience to sit two hours under the barbers hands , will be trim'd with such exquisite diligence , as they spend more time in turning up their beard , then a faire lady doth in dressing her head : they think that every hair which stands out of order , will make them appear so many fowle fiends when they are in company . menante therefore , who is very well acquainted with this piece of skill , entertains himself often in the aforesaid ware-house opened in parnassus , by the colledg of polititians , the which he doth , that he may come to know the genius of many of this court , by the qualities of ware which they buy there , that he may afterwards give a more exact account thereof to his friends and acquaintance . three daies since iohn baptista sanga , a famous secretary in the court of rome , happened into this the polititians shop , who asked one of the young men if they had any cole to sell , or no ? he was answered , yes : and straightway some cole was shewed him ; which when the courtier saw , he agreed upon the price , and bought forty load thereof . menante wondred to see the courtier buy so great a quantity of cole , which he knew was very disproportionable for him , who kept but one servant ; and being very well acquainted with this sanga , he with great confidence asked him , why , having none but himself and servant in the house , he made so great provision of cole ? to the which sanga freely answered , that he burnt no wood in his kitchin. menante then asked him whether he did it for that he found it cheaper to burn cole ? to the which sanga freely answered ; that living in the court , he was forced to measure his affairs by the surplusage of his reputation , not by sparing money ; and that he hated wood-fires because they made a great smoak , and but little live coles ; and that the burning of cole was very good for those that did not love their porredg should smell of smoke ; and that he did not desire that the quality of his victuals should be judged of by those hounds which are only good at smelling out what men do by the smoke of his kitchin-chimney , but by the copious adorning of his table . next to sanga , epictetus entred the shop , a philosopher , who for the excellency of his soul , is of high esteem in parnassus ; and therefore very well known , admired , and observed by menante . this man desired the foremen of the shop that they would shew him all the sorts of furs , or fur'd garments that they had ; and immediately they brought unto him many minerver skins , sables , and other very pretious furs ; which notwithstanding this philosopher liked not ; and therefore told a very spruce polititian who looked to the venting of wares , that the skins they shewed were too glorious , and therefore not for his purpose ; but that he desired some such furr as they wore , who would appear to be good men . when the polititian knew what epictetus would be at , he led him into a room apart from the ware-house , from whence he came out not long after , clad in a lizards skin , lined with lambskins . and epictetus having put the lizards skin inward and the lambskin outward , menante ran after him , and told him he had put his garment on the wrong side outwards . but he was much amazed , when that wise philosopher , after having smiled a little at him , answered , it may be my menante , that you know how to put on spanish buskins , but not how to wear these skins : this robe is worne as you see , the lizards skin must be worn inward ; i should never attain the end of my intents , if any one hair thereof appear without . menante then returned into the shop , where he found a great prince , who desired to be shewn some ramaivoli da ministrare : and because they shewed only four , he desired them to bring all they had in the shop ; which was forthwith done . the prince drew then from out his bosom a lift of all his servants names , which were in all . and first did exactly examin the condition of every several courtier , and according to their deserts , bought for every one of them a particular ramaivoli ; very great ones were chosen for those of great deserts , and much lesser for the rest ; and menante observed it for a great rarity , that the ramaivoli of some ancient courtiers , and old servants , who despising the prince his service had behaved themselves negligently in their several places , were very little . certainly a singular piece of justice , to measure a courtiers merits more by the assiduety of his service , then by the length of time which he hath been at court. menante , who wondred much at the bestowing of so many ramaivoli , told that prince , to whom he ought particular service , that in the courts of other great princes , he had observed that cooks made use of one only ; wherewith , not with many scruples , but at their own discretion , they did dish up their porredg . then said the prince unto menante , friend , i my self have observed that way of proceeding which you speak of , till now ; but with very bad consequence : for having made use of very unequal dishes in serving out porredg to my courtiers , and giving it out to them only as i liked , i have unwisely kindled in them a fire of such jealousie , rancor , and hatred , as they mist but a little of utterly undoing me and my state : a fault which hath made me see clearly , that a prince who will have faithfull servants , and carefull officers , must resolve to be just in his ministring unto them : for courtiers greedily longing to taste of the porredg of their princes favour , when they see their fellows porrenger run over with fat , and their own empty and lean , they turn the love which they ought to bear unto their master , into hatred , their observance into disrespect , their service into disservice ; and grow the more incenst against their lords , for that they impute the so unequal dishing up of their porredg , more to want of love , ingratitude , and partiality , then to inconsiderateness . and in such like injustice , they complain more of the scarcity of their masters good graces , then of their own small pittance . and to pretend that a courtier , whose leggs his prince shall cut off with the sword of disgraces , should speedily run to do him service , is as great a piece of folly , as is theirs who intending to make their horse run the faster , hold in his bridle . this prince was no sooner gone out of the shop , but another man entred , who desired that he might see some clokes which would hang to the ground , for he was to buy such a one . forthwith divers were brought unto him , which he could not dislike , neither for colour nor cloath ; only they were all of them too short . this man was of somewhat a low stature ; and that those clokes should prove too short for him , which were long enough to reach to the heels of the talest size of men , seemed strange to menante . wherefore coming up to this stranger , he asked him who he was , and of what profession ? to which the other freely answered , that he was a sicilian ; and that having built and finished two gallies at his own charge , he meant to put to sea with them , and gain by freebooting ; but because he knew that trade was very hatefull to the world , and but of small reputation to him that used it , he would provide himself of a long cloke , that he might cover his intention , and the interest which moved him to take up that occupation ; and that his pretence might be thought to be , that he had taken it up only to fight against the ignorant , and such as hated learning . when menante had heard this , he boldly said to the sicilian , that he did but lose his labour , for that all the gloath made in england , was not sufficient to make such long clokes for pyrats , but that two handfuls and a half of thieves leggs would still be seen . soon after a vertuosi came into the shop , who desired to see some yard wands , whereof many were presently shewed him ; one of which he seemed to like ; and as he was about to pay for it , his servant told him that he needed not to be at that expence , for he had a very just yard at home . to which his master answered , that the yard which he had at home , was just enough for himself ; but that in measuring others , he clearly saw that it was needfull to use forreign yards ; for having had some occasion of measuring the stomack of forreiners with the yard wand of simplicity , and of the candor of his own soul , he found he was much mistaken . afterwards menante saw lorenzo gambara , a famous briscian poet , enter the shop , who seeing a beautifull indian parret sitting upon a bench , seemed so delighted to hear her speak , as he asked her price ; and was told that it would be crowns . gambara , who if he could have made his bargen well , might have had the parret much cheaper , said he did not dislike the price ; but the mischief was , he had nat so much ready money ; wherefore instead of ready money , he would give them the bed he lay on , the curtains , and other furniture of his house , to be prized by two indifferent men . and the bargain being soon accepted of by those of the shop , gambara took the parret to carry her home . which when menante saw , he was much scandalized at the poets so rash resolution , having till then , taken him for a man of good understanding ; and therefore pitying his simplicity , he asked him why he , who by the clothes he wore , seemed not to have money to cast away , should out of an humor of having a parret , not only foolishly bereave himself of his houshold-stuff , but even of his very bed , the only repose for bodily labour , and the labour of the mind . to which he answered , know my good friend , that to purchase so pretious a jewel as this parret , i would not only deprive my self of all my worldly wealth , but i would sell my self to my skin , and become a slave in the gallies , rather then miss her . i am a lombard born , given to the usual defect of those of my nation , of having a free tongue , and a clear heart ; noble vertues in former times , but now great faults , and which have caused much harm in courts , and elsewhere , which i hope to amend by buying this pretious bird ; which will teach me the vertue which is unknown to us lombards , and but too well known and practised by other nations , of suppressing the true sense of the soul , and of speaking only such words as please others , and which are got without book . the eleventh advertisement . the excellent vertue of loyalty and faithfulness being secretly departed from parnassus , apollo , when he knew where she had hid her self , sent the muses , melpomene and thalia , to perswade her to return . the noble palace of fidelity , which was formerly frequented by princes , chief officers , and abundance of the senators of the most famous commonwealths , is of late so little frequented , as it appears to be the house of desolation : in so much , as on the of this present month , the abode of so excellent a vertue was seen to be shut up : which , as soon as apollo heard of , he commanded that the gates should be broken open , and that fidelities self should be asked the reason of so great a novelty . his majesties command was forthwith obeyed ; and the house was found to be totally void of inhabitants . which when the vertuosi heard , they put on mourning weeds , sprinkled themselves over with ashes , and made other demonstrations of true sorrow ; and apollo in particular was so much grieved , and those very effects of inward sorrow were discerned in him , which he shewed when the sad and memorable accident hapned of his son phaeton . and his majesty very well knowing that all humane government would be quite overthrown , when the firm foundation of fidelity which sustains , so great a building should fail , he immediately caused proclamations to be every where made , wherein he granted even to the ignorant sort of people , and to all others that were incapable of the noble prerogative of living with honor in the memory of men , a hundred years of immortality , to be given to whosoever should find out where so renowned a vertue had hid her self . and he gave letters patents for the making good his word , out of the bank of homer , virgil , livie , and of wealthy tacetus , all of them chief merchants in parnassus , who by their pretious ink , doe use the noble traffick of eternizing peoples names in the memory of other men . the largeness of the reward , invited many to go in search of her ; and much diligence being used in the pursuit , the royal majesty of fidelity was found in the dog-kennel of that famous hunter acteon , and the beautifull adonis . this so strange news was quickly brought to apollo , who immediately dispatched away the two learned muses , melpomene and thalia , with charge to bring her from that place so unworthy of her presence , and to re-conduct her to her wonted habitation ; but all was in vain , for that famous princess bitterly bewailing her own unfortunate condition ; say ( said she ) you divine goddesses , to my lord apollo , that fraud who hath ever been my capital enemy , hath at last got the victory , in the dispute which hath been perpetually had between her and me , and that base self-interest , which in these unfortunate times doth tyrannize over the souls in all the best nations , hath banished me from out the heart of man , which was formerly wholly mine . let his majesty likewise know , that the whole world is so sunk in the mud of filthy pollution , as that fidelity which hath been alwaies resolute to serve her prince honourably , even to the effusion of her last drop of bloud , and to the emission of her utmost spirits , and which was formerly so admired and coveted , is now accounted a foolish and vain ostentation ; and tell him , that to have a fradulent soul , full fraught with perfideousness , and ready to use all execrable infidelity , thereby the better to fit ones self to the time , place , and person , is now a daies cryed up for wisdom , sagacity , and wariness of wit ; and unfortunate i , nautiated to see such approbrious things , was forced to put on the resolution you see , to live amongst these dogs , amongst which i now fully find that faithfulness toward their masters , which i have alwaies so much laboured to ingraff in the self-interessed and perfidious heart of man. the twelfth advertisment . in the general diet ●…f the learned , appointed by apollo to be held in helicon , his majesty , contrary to all mens expectations , decrees eternity to the name of vincenzo pinti , called in the court of rome , the knight of the lute . t is four moneths since apollo intimated the holding of the general diet of the learned , on the eight of the present at helicon ; where all the poet-princes , the nobility and burgesses of the vertuosies universities , being met together early in the morning in the great hall , his majesty sate under his cloath of state , of transplendent eternity , invironed by the most illustrious muses . and because apollo had given notice in his edicts , whereby he specified the calling of the diet , that he had done it to give eternity to the name of a vertuoso whom he would propound unto them . divers were the opinions of the learned , touching who it should be that he would nominate ; but the most general opinion pitcht upon iustus lipius , a flemish gentleman , whose writings filled parnassus with such fragrancy , as they had provoked in all the vertuosi , rather a ravenous desire of devouring them , then an appetite to taste them . others said , that when the publick entry should be made , and audience given in the great hall , eternity should be given to the most famous name of the most illustrious and vertuous cardinal serafino olivieri , the prince of modern scholers , who being lately come to the confines of parnassus , was met with unaccustomed demonstrations of honour , by most of the vertuosi , who wondred that a man who had been imployed all his life-time in the laborious charge of the rota romana , the court of exchequer , could come to the exact knowledge of divinity and philosophy , that he should be the prime lawyer of his time , a famous mathematician , able astrologer , and as well verst in the greek as latine tongue ; and that which made the wonder greater , was , that a prelat so skilfull in so many sciences , so full of vertues , should die a learner ; for thinking that he knew but little , he in his eightieth year of age began to learn the arabick tongue . the reputation of so noble a personage was increased by his famous library , the which was yet more famous , for having a master more learned then all his books ; whilst the reverend colledg of vertuosi stood expecting , which of these two so famous men should be named , apollo propounded vincenzo pinti , called in the court of rome , the knight of the lute , for his excellent skill on that instrument . the vertuosi were so astonished at the election of so base a person , as they in all humility told his majestie , that they would willingly obey his commands , but that they only desired to put his majestie in mind that his most faithfull colledg of vertuosi , were unwilling to admit of a fidler into their society . to this apollo answered , that he foresaw that the colledg would wonder at this his choice , yet wished them willingly to decree immortality to this man , for he knew how to command what was necessary , though it appeared strange to them : the business was then carried by a secret scrutiny , and eternity was favourably decreed to the name of the knight of the lute , who was forthwith brought into the colledg of the vertuosi , by the masters of the pegasean ceremony . then said apollo to the knight ; you vincenzo , are the first of your profession that was ever admitted into this learned colledg ; an honour reserved only for those who by their perpetual pains taking , are come by the knowledge of learning ; but the present necessity of your person hath forced us to take this resolution : see therefore that you teach both princes and privat men the necessary art of tuning lutes , wherein many are so ignorant , as they break the strings by scruing them up too high ; and some humorous phantastical mad wits are more particularly recommended to you , and which i am certain you will meet withall , who being obstinately resolved to make the great base strings act the part of trebles , they do so strangely stretch them , as though they be very great and strong , yet they break them , and quite ruine the lutes . the thirteenth advertisement . john francisco peranda with much ado gets leave of apollo to be admitted into parnassus , and despiseth jerolomo fracasto●…o's p●…ffer , who would have restored him to his eyesight , which he had lost . though it be many years since signior iohn francisco perando did much solicite his majestie that he might be admitted into parnassus , and that he used great means to obtain his request , yet apollo would never give way thereunto ; for since he brought nothing into parnassus but a volumn of his letters , his majestie , who is much nauceared with such compos●…urs , said that he was resolved rather to throw the greatest part of the infinite volumns of letters which were in the library , out of it , then add one new one to it . for nothing but writings of invention , and nocturnal labours being received into the delfick library , the innumerable volumns of letters that were there were but troublesom , and took up a great deal of room . and that all men being full of ambition and vain glory , and the manner of modern writing being reduced to the naked speaking what they think , without any artifice , and that there be but few men who want business , and who cannot write , the easie admittance of every one that writes letters , into parnassus , would occasion so great an inconvenience , as every one , though never so meanly learned , would print great volumns of his own letters , only to make the miseries and base affairs of his own house known : an error of the greater consequence , for that immortality is not sold at so cheap a rate in parnassus : and that to these so many respects , it was yet further added , that it was discovered many had been so ambitiously presumptious , as to publish false letters written to such a king , or such a great prince , whom they had never seen , nor had ever had any business with them ; a falshood the more worthy consideration , for that in all true letters , the vivacity of an unlooked for conceit , sprang from the reallity of the fact , was that which was admired ; whereas feigned letters were alwaies full of affectation , a thing so much abhorred by good wits . the noble caitaneans , did notwithstanding so much favour this their servant , as they overcame all these difficulties ; moreover they made it appear to his majestie , that of all letters that had been yet printed , peranda's deserved the first place . wherefore apollo , by reason of this testimony , and for that there were many of peranda's letters appertaining to history , which would be very acceptable to all the vertuosi , he granted his request , and gave him the first place amongst all the italian secretaries . and though in honouring this vertuoso , apollo ( according to his custom ) had respect only to his merits , there were notwithstanding some lavish tongues which durst affirm , that this was done in favour to the illustrious cardinal henry caietan , a prince who for the magnificency of his works , for his undaunted courage , his laudable customs , candid genius , purity of soul , and for all the most excellent gifts of nature wherewith he was richly adorned , is usually called his majesties best beloved . it must not be forgotten , that when ( according to custom ) all the vertuosi were permitted to pass their censures upon perandas writings , claudeus ptolomeus said that they deserved to be corrected , because there were many words in them which were not tuscan . but the censurer bad ptolomeus hold his peace , for that in learned writing , the ingenious vertuosi noted the conceptions , and that they were only malignant pedants who censured words . and peranda having lost his eye-sight some years before his death , ierollomo fracastoro proferred to restore him to his sight again ; which if he should effect , peranda promised him crowns for his cure. the phisitian being then to do his work , peranda was set down in a chaire , and asked the phisitian whether all things were in readiness wherewith to restore his eye-sight ? the phisitian said there was nothing wanting , for he had all his instruments and plasters . these things which you have named , said peranda , do but little import towards giving me that comfort which i desire by my eye sight : tell me , how goes the world ? even as it did , said the phisitian , when you fell blind . if it be so , replies peranda , i will not lay out my money in recovery of that eye-sight which i willingly lost that i might not see the present world drowned in those inormious and hatefull loathsomnesses , which do so much nauceate good mens eyes . the fourteenth advertisement . the italian academies send commissioners into parnassus to obtain some remedy from apollo for their corruptions ; and find the business impossible to be effected . the commissioners sent to this court from the italian academies , had not audience till the twentieth of the present month ; at which time they told his majestie , that the fundamental principles of all academies being excellently good and vertuous , the schollers were at first very studious , and diligent in their disputations , and all other learned exercises ; but that this so ardent desire of knowledge did with time so cool in them , as also those vertuous exercises ; that whereas at first academies were frequented by privat men , and held in great reputation by princes ; in process of time they grew so forsaken and despised , as they had often , to the great discouragement of learning , been inhibited ; as proving rather prejudicial , than advantagious . and that though many remedies had been applyed to this evil , yet none of them had procured the desired operation : wherefore the italian academies being much devoted to his majestie , were forced to have recourse to him , whom they did humbly beseech that he would be pleased to give them some preservative medicine against so great corruption . these commissioners were very graciously received , and listened to by apollo , who recommended the business to the reformers of learning : to whom when the commissioners came , they found them so imployed in the important business which they are perpetually troubled with , di far delle sancie fuse , with making much of nothing , as that they excused themselves , as not being then at leasure to attend that business . wherefore the commissioners returned again to apollo , who referred them to the regio collateral ; where the academies demands were often disputed and discust ; and yesterday they had for their last answer , that all those gentlemen after much debate and proposals , were at last resolved that the saying was true , that omnia orta occidunt , & aucta senes●…unt . wherefore it was impossible to prevent , but that a pair of shooes , how neat and spruce soever they were at the first , should in process of time become torne and ilfavoured . that therefore the lovers of learning should be very diligent , in suddenly suppressing whatsoever academy had swarved too farr from the good rules of its first institution , and at the same time found new ones , to the end that the world ( little to the credit of the vertuosi ) might not be full of unprofitable academies , but might alwaies enjoy the benefit which it receives from good ones . the fifteenth advertisement . anneus seneca being accused before apollo of two fowle vices which were commonly found in all the sects of moral philosophers ; doth excellently well defend his own cause , and the like of his associates . the last night , to the infinite wonder of all the vertuosi in parnassus , anneus seneca , that prince of moral philosophers , and one so well beloved by his majestie , was made prisoner ; various were the discourses which so great a novelty occasioned . some thought that it might be , for that his majestie would have him give a very particular account to the world , by what philosphical precepts he had in so short a time of his serving nero , gotten the worth of seven millions and a half , by which so great riches , he had cast so fowle a shame upon that poverty , and upon that moderation of mind , which in his writings he had made so particular profession of . a thing so much the more scandalous , as by the testimony of many historians , it plainly appeared he had been a frequent cheater of legacies , which he had fowlly extorted from wealthy men . others said that he was imprisoned for the adultery which some will not stick to say he committed with agrepina ; and many were of opinion that it was for having been cause of the pysonian conspiracy against nero , wherein it was firmly held that seneca had not only a hand , but that he had so fowlly given himself over to ambition , as after so great a fault committed , he had suffered himself to be perswaded he might become emperor . nor were there wanting those who constantly affirmed that apollo was exceeding angly with this philosopher , for that nero himself had confest that the wicked paracide which he had committed , was not only done by sencca's knowledge , but by his perswasion , not out of any love he bore to his master , but to make him commit so horrid a wickedness , that he might ascertain his own so unexhaustable riches which he had accumulated to his own shame , and his masters prejudice . but after his examination , seneca found , that not only he , but all his fellow moral philosophers were accused for having very much scandalized all men by two fowl vices which they are given unto above above all other men , to wit , of being revengefull , and ingratefull . t is said that seneca acknowledged these accusations to be true , but that he , nor the rest of moral philosophers , ought not to be blamed for what was laid to their charge , since even thereby their goodness did manifestly appear ; for good men never offend any ; and consequently , since they gave no occasion of being injured , it ought not to be held strange , if they were more mindfull of injuries received , then other men , it being common amongst men , that they know not how to pardon injuries , who best know they never deserved them . and that likewise for ingratitude which moral philosophers were daily seen to use towards their benefactors , it was no blockishness in them , as was every where affirmed by their illwillers , but that therein the candor and great goodness of their souls , was clearly discern'd : for moral philosophers being guided in all their actions by their very cautious souls , did know by the instinct of nature that all the good and graces which they in this world did receive from men , did proceed from the all-powerful hand of god ; it was therefore no wonder that they did not own them from men . the sixteenth advertisement . ambassadors are sent from the colledg of gardners , to apollo , to obtain some instrument from him , whereby they might without any cost or charge , cleanse their gardens of all improfitable hearbs , and are laught at by his majestie . ambassadors from all the gardners of the world , are come to this court , who have acquainted his majestie , that were it either from the bad conditions of their seed , the naughtiness of the soyle , or from the evil celestial influences , so great abundance of weeds grew up in their gardens , as not being any longer able to undergoe the charges they were at in weeding them out , and of cleansing their gardens , they should be forced either to give them over , or else to inhaunce the price of their pompions , cabiges , and other hearbs , unless his majestie would help them to some instrument , by means whereof they might not be at such excessive charge in keeping their gardens : his majestie did much wonder at this the gardners foolish request , and being full of indignation , answered their ambassadors , that they should tell those that sent them , that they should use their accustomed manual instruments , their spades and mathooks , for no better could be found , nor wished for , and cease from demanding such impertinent things . the ambassadors did then couragiously reply , that they made this request , being moved thereunto by the great benefit which they saw his majestie had been pleased to grant to princes , who to purge their states from evil weeds , and seditious plants , which to the great misfortune of good men , do grow there in such abundance , had obtained the miraculous instruments of drum and trumpet , at the sound whereof , mallows , henbane , dogs-caul , and other pernitious plants of unusefull persons , doe of themselves willingly forsake the ground , to make room for lettice , burnet , sorrel , and other usefull hearbs of artificers and citizens , and wither of themselves and die , amongst the brakes and brambles out of the garden ( their country ) the which they did much prejudice ; and that the gardners would esteem it great happiness if they could obtain such an instrument from his majestie . to this apollo answered , that if princes could as easily discern seditious men , and such as were unworthy to live in this worlds garden , as gardners might know nettles and henbane , from spinnage and lettice , he would have onely given them halters and axes for their instruments , which are the true pickaxes by which the seditious herbs ( vagabonds , which being but the useless luxuries of humane fecundity , deserve not to eat bread ) may be rooted up . but since all men were made after the same manner , so as the good could not be known from the bad , by the leaves of face , or stalks of stature ; the instruments of drum and trumpets were granted for publick peace-sake to princes , the sound whereof was chearfully followed by such plants as took delight in dying , to the end , that by the frequent use of gibbets , wholsom herbs should not be extirpated instead of such as were venemous . the ambassadors would have replyed again ; but apollo with much indignation , bad them hold their peace , and charged them to be gon from parnassus with all speed , for it was altogether impertinent and ridiculous to compare the purging of the world from seditious spirits , with the weeding of noysom hearbs out of a garden . the seventeenth advertisement . a doubt arising upon the truth of a usual saying , that a man must eat a peck of salt with another , before he can perfectly know him . apollo makes the point be argued in a general assembly of learned men which he causeth to be called for that purpose . the common saying , that to know a man exactly , one must eat a peck of salt with him , being questioned by some vertuosi , apollo being unwilling that the addages of the learned , which are general rules , and inviolable laws , by which his vertuosi steer their lives ; being i say , unwilling that the truth of them should be any waies scrupled at ; many daies since made it be disputed very exactly and diligently in a general assembly of the vertuosi : where this saying was proved to be so true , as many of the assembly were of opinion that half a peck more should be added to the former dose ; grounding their judgements upon this apparent reason , that the shamefull vice of dissembling , and infamous practice of hypocrisie being known daily to encrease amongst men , it stood with all the grounds of good arithmatick , that as corruptions encreased in wicked men , necessary remedies should be multiplyed by the learned , whereby stoutly to resist vice in its rise . but not so farr to shame the present age , as to shew , that whilst the malady of vice encresed in the world , remedies grew less , the wiser sort of the vertuosi thought it not good to alter the ancient measure ; wherefore it was generally concluded by them all , that the saying was very true , for what concerned men ; but was very false in women , who without eating either salt or oyle , knew the very thoughts of their husbands the first night they lay with them . the eighteenth advertisement . the hircanians send ambassadors to apollo , to be resolved by his majestie in the important article , whether it be lawfull for the people to kill a tyrant ? ambassadors came the of this present monenth from the warlike nation of hircania to this court , where two daies after they had audience given them in great pomp by his royal majestie : for the vertuosi being very desirous to see the customs and habits of forreiners , came in great numbers to honour personages so quallified . the ambassadors being brought before apollo , the chiefest of them said , that the famous nation of hircania being at present miserably opprest by a prince , who with unheard of cruelty did tyrannize over them , had been perswaded by the fame of his majesties wise and true answers , to send them so farr a journey as to parnassus , only to know the true decission of that weighty question , whether or no it were lawfull for the common people to kill a tyrant ? it is not to be believed how strangely apollo was incenst to hear such a question propounded ; he was so mightily moved to anger against those ambassadors , as giving no other answer , he straitway rose up in an unwonted fury , and commanded , that for example to others who should dare to propound so pernitiously seditious doubts , they should be immediately drag'd out of the hall ; which was accordingly done . such an action appeared so hidious to the illustrious muses and the senat of vertuosi , as not any one of them durst intercede with his majestie in the behalf of these unfortunate ambassadors . but apollo seeing much confusion and amazement in the faces of his beloved muses , and vertuosi , said , he thought he had too slightly revenged himself upon those ambassadors , for this their so scandalous and perfidious demand ; for that it was not only not lawfull for the people to dispute so seditious an article , but that they should keep it like fire , from entring into their brests , since such a doubt would be apt to cause more mischief in the world , then paris his apple had done . for those that were born in a republicks liberty , had no occasion to raise any such dispute ; since in a free country , every light shadow , little semblance farr-fetcht suspition , or least jealousie that a senator should affect to tyrannize over his free country , was sufficient to cause revenge be taken by a halter or hatchet , without cavelling upon such foolish words , and calling in question a business of so great importance ; for in a well governed commonwealth , if a senator should incur any such suspition , any colour , shew , or suspition , though never so remote , ought to serve for so convincing proofs , as the party accused must first be hanged , and his process to be made afterwards by usual course of law. but that in monarchies , where the base plebeians were incapable of themselves to discern between a lawfull prince and a tyrant , they ought , for the great commodity which the peoples ignorance gives to such as are ambitious , seditious , lovers of novelty , and such as dispair of their own affairs , of painting out wicked tyrants for legitimate princes , and legitimate princes for cruel tyrants ; to keep the world from slaughter and execrable confusion , they ought , i say , according to tacitus his precept ; bonos imperatores voto expetere qualescunque tollerare . tacit. lib. . hist. to pray for good princes , and to bear with any . this being said , apollo , who out of his innate goodness cannot endure that any should part distasted from him , though they by their impertinencies have given occasion of offence , commanded that the ambassadors should be sent for back ; who when they appeared before his majestie , he said unto them , beloved hercanians , to people who love to live peacefully , ferenda regum ingenia , nec usui crebras mutationes , tacit. lib. . ann. princes humors are to be born withall , and then especially when they are occasioned by puniard , venem , or any other mischievous machination : for the alwaies just god being the only competent judge of princes , and not the people , who are continually carried about by seditious men , you ought , quomodo sterilitatem , aut nimios imbres , & cetera naturae mala , ita luxum , vel avaritium dominantium tollerare . to tollerate the luxury or avarice of soveraigns , as you do barrenness , too much rain , and other evil of nature . the ninteenth advertisement . nero the emperor , for a very singular commendation given him by cornelius tacitus , rewards him with a gift of mules loaden with crowns of gold. very singular is the news which happened this very week in parnassus , of mules loaded with gold , which nero the emperor sent to cornelius tacitus : all the vertuosi were much astonished at so rich a present , and forthwith ran to tacitus his house , some to know the true worth of so much treasure ; others to know what had occasioned so rich a gift ; and they found that the reward came to crowns which nero gave for the praise which the historian gave him , when he said that nero had not infra servos ingenium , tacit. annal. lib. . the most learned of this state said , that though nero's gift was very splendid , yet tacetus had deserved much more from him in that excellent praise which he gave him , that his genius was not to be subject to the base dominion of a servant , was more worth then many rich treasures , because there are but few princes that deserve such praise . on the contrary , the meaner sort of the learned thought that reward did so farr exceed tacetus his merit , as they did not stick to speak ill of so heroick an action , terming it one of neroes prodigallities , and one of those inconsiderate profuseness used by shallow pated princes , when by giving past number or measure , they deserve rather to be esteemed foolish squanderers , then vertuously liberal . wherefore these men , more moved out of envy to tacitus , then out of any love they bore to neroes honor , told nero , that most of the learned in parnassus did not approve that he should reward two or three bare words written by the historian , with so great a mass of money , who had said so many obsenities to his prejudice , as did totally obscure that praise which he had so highly rewarded . 't is said for certain , that neros answer was ; that as excellent picture-drawers did the better set off the figures which they draw , by dark shadows , so true historians , by the liberal mention of vices , and not the bare imperfection of heroes , whosememories they doe by their writings eternize , purchase believe of the praises which they give them , no more shamefull invectives being to be spoken of princes , then exagerated praises , without making any mention of those defects which are so joyned to humanity ; which when they are truely related , they were true testimonies of the writers impartiallity ; and that therefore he did the more value the imputation written of him by tacetus , for that the praise which he gave him , did exceed all the shamefull things which he could possibly write of him : for as all the most exquisite vertues which a prince can be indued with , were directly darkned if he suffered under the execrable vice of subjecting himself to a servant , so the vertue of knowing how to be master of those that serve , did so well quallifie any whatsoever prince , as the splendor of so sublime a vertue , did sufficiently cover the fowlest faults : and that all this was not without good reason ; for as it was impossible to deny but that the unfortunate man who undid himself in seeking the philosophers stone by his furnaces and limbecks , was a mad man fit to be chained up ; so it must be confest that the prince who having made an ignorant servant of his , a golden ox , did adore him like an idol , was of necessity to be esteemed a fool past all recovery . the twentieth advertisement . the vertuosi visit the chief church in parnassus , and begg of god an important favour . yesterday being the first day of april , according to the custom of this court , the illustrious poets , accompanied by the muses , went to visit the chief temple in parnassus , and with great devotion beseeched gods divine majestie , that he would vouchsafe for his mercies sake , to preserve his faithfull vertuosi from the lies of such persons , who being wholly composed of malignity , are notwithstanding held by princes to be exact honest men . the xxi . advertisement . apollo , to incourage senators of free countries , to cultivate liberty , without affecting tyranny , causeth an exceeding wofull spectacle to be shewn in melpomene's amphitheater . apollo firmly believing , that in free countries , more then in any other sort of government , laws are instituted for the common good , that therein men set their minds more to undertake ; and to perform gallant works , and that learned sciences , and all civil pollicy do there florish most ; doth much abhor those tyrants who commit outrages upon the liberty of a well regulated commonwealth : as those who to maintain an usurped power , are bound to hate men of great worth , and to persecute their excellent vertues with the same severity , with the which lawfull princes punish vice ; and though their genius lead them to encline to clemency , they are notwithstanding necessitated to use cruelty , and to govern the state vitiously , it being very true , that nemo unquam imperium flagitio quaesitum bonis artibus exercuit . tacit. lib. . hist. no man did ever govern that empire well , which he came by ill . his majestie , to affright the inhabitants of free countries from committing like wickednesse , caused the senators that were resident in that state , to meet yesterday in melpomenes stately theatre ; and having made cesar the dictator appear on the other side of the theatre , he brought in his sister actia , together with his nephew augustus , and his daughter iulia , and the children which she had by her husband marcus agrippa , lucius , and gaius cesar , agrippa posthumus , giulia , and agrippina , with the numerous issue that the latter bore to her so famous husband germanicus . it was a sad and miserable spectacle to cesar , to see how by his prodigious ambition , he had not only drawn on his own cruel death , but had totally extinguished his bloud , which happened in a short time after : for certainly it was a very compassionate spectacle to see , that of so copious an offspring as proceeded from his eldest sister octavia , and giulia , daughter to augustus , there was not any one who had not ended their lives , either by poyson , sword , famin , or some other miserable death . to this cesar's so great heart-grief , was added the immence rage which assailed him when he saw the roman empire which he had purchased to his so great reputation , and with the effusion of his bloud , should passe after augustus his death , into that cruel and bloud-thirsty family of the claudii , which did so detestably persecute the bloud of the giulii , from whom they had inherited so glorious an empire . nor was the compunction less which this so very sad sight caused in all the lookers on ; for thereby the usual calamity of tyrants was recal'd into their minds , who are not only unable to evade divine inevitable justice of laying the foundations of new tyranny , by their own violent deaths , but that god , who is still severe in punishing the wickedness of ambitious men , would not permit that his progeny who had dared to undertake so horrid an excess , should long enjoy the power of state which had been so ignominiously gotten : and which by divine providence fell soon into the power of a family , who forced by good policy , to extinguish the first tyrants whole race , took publick revenge for subjugated liberty . moreover it was a calamity which the eyes of the cruellest men that were in that theater could not behold , not the hearts of the most ambitious tollerate , to see that all tyrannies are laid with the materials of so many violent deaths , which the unslackt lime of such wicked injustice with the sand of so many horrible cruelties , and with the water of large lakes of humane blood : whilst all the vertuosie wept to see this so lamentable spectacle , apollo said with so fearful a voice , as infused terrour into every one ; behold said he , you tyrants , who are so desirous of soveraignty , these that you have here before your eyes are the ends of your proud thoughts ; in these unfortunate tragedies does the longing , and immoderate thirst which such as you have over dominion terminate ; and those who have impiously made themselves masters of their countries liberty , bring their families to this greatness that you see . thou caesar , who by thy wicked going about to inslave the so noble roman republick didst make it appear , that thou either didst not know , or didst not fear god , see and behold to what height of infelicity he is able to bring thee , and all thine . though caesar gave apparent signes that he was much confused and afflicted to hear these words ; yet apollo the more to rent in pieces the soul of this ambitious man , and to comfort his vertuosie , who were much afflicted at this so horrid sight , and to encourage senators to preserve the liberty of their country , commanded that the humane neptune of the sea , the alwaies glorious prince andrea d'oria should be admitted into the theater , with all his most excellent family . whereupon caesar , beholding the happiness of that renowned family , and the glory of those senators , who in the commonwealth of genoa were esteemed , honour'd and observed , as mindful of the great benefit which they had received from that new founder of their new liberty ; and that that prince of every happy memory , had left so glorious a fame of his modesty behind him in those citizens ; the envy he bore to the grandezza of those heroes did torment him more then his own misfortune : and he then knew , that when he and those that descended from him had conquerd france , he should have done better , and more advisedly , if he had undertaken , as did that glorious prince andrea d'oria , to reestablish the liberty of his country , which was faln into the disorder of a confused dimocrasie , and to beat down the tyranny of that ignorant people , with those very weapons with which he had trampled upon the senates authority : and to have planted a perfect aristocracy in his country , and so have won unto himself the high title , and glorious prerogative of being the second founder of the roman liberty , by the doing whereof , he and his posterity mought have been as famous in rome , as the family of the dorii shall ever be glorious in the noble republick of genoa , as long as the world shall last . the xxii . advertisement . the inthroned academians , having admitted the chief she-poets , or poetesses into parnassus , apollo commands , that they be taken from thence . the inthroned academians , contrary to their ancient institutions , did some few months since admit into their academy the vertuous ladies , victoria colonna , veronica gambera , laura teracina , and other famous lady-poets of parnassus ; which was done with so great applause of the vertuosie , as the academians set on fire by the beauty of those ladies , were not onely very frequent at their learned exercises ; but did every day publish such poesie , as made the very muses wonder : but it was not long ere his majesty smelt a very displeasing savour ; wherefore he commanded the chief of the inthroned , by no means to admit any longer such like parties : for he had found at last , that womens true poetry consisted in their needle and spindle ; and that the learned exercises of women , together with the virtuosie , was like the sporting and playing of dogs , which after a while ends in getting upon one anothers backs . the xxiii adverisement . justus lipsius being solemnly admitted into parnassus , the next day after his entrance , did , contrary to all mens expectation , accuse tacitus for being impius , and reaps but little credit thereby justus lipsius ( as hath been formerly said ) arrived some few daies ago upon the confines of this state , whose writings , though they were presently voted worthy to be read by all the vertuosi , and to be deservedly placed amongst the eternal labours of the learned , in his majesties library ; and that consequently eternity should be decreed unto his name in full senate , with as plenary prerogative as hath at any time been granted by this state to any other subject , yet the publick entrance of a person so highly qualified was deferred till tuseday was sevennight last ; because the noble flemish nation would signalize her self upon this occasion , with extraordinary demonstration of honour to this her citizen : wherefore they erected many triumphant arches with much splendor and magnificency in the chiefest places of pernassus . the cavalcata was remarkable ; for many of the learned in all sciences favoured this senator , who having received from his majesty the noble title of vniversall in all sciences , every one thought he was knowing in an things , and every one wondred when they saw , that at the very first meeting lipsius saluted the noblest romans who went to meet him , by name , as if he had particularly known them . his learned writings were carryed by caius valerius patercolus , who though his age had made him lame , yet to shew himself thankful to lipsius for some good turn he had received from him , did beg this favour of his majesty . by express order from apollo , lipsius rode in the midst between moral seneca , and politick tacitus ; but a great uprore was likely to have risen hereupon ; for tacitus having alwaies formerly granted the right hand to seneca , by reason of his prerogative of age , and his reputation in the most prised sciences ; yet he did so hotly contest with him for it upon this occasion , as upon the noise thereof all the learned moralists running in to aid seneca , and a squadron of polititians to assist tacitus , it was feared some great scandal might be occasioned thereby : but the moralists struck saile , for they knew that if it should come to blowes , they should not be able long to resist those insolent polititians , who not having any regard to what is just or honest , thought it not dishonourable , but rather great worth to overthrow their enemies , though it were by treachery : but all the business was quieted upon the appearance of the masters of the pegasean ceremonies , who by order from the honourable , the lord censors , said to seneca , that since sciences , as fruits in rome , and fish in venice , had their seasons , he might do wel to yeild the right hand for that time to tacitus , and that for the most apparent injury which he should thereby receive , he should solace himself with the remembrance of what honours had been done unto him in the better times of his former daies ; wherein those very self-same moral sciences , which in these present unfortunate times are reputed meere predantickness , and old mouldy things , were in so great esteem , as that they were valued as the very pretious jewel of all learning ; and the rather , for that this present age , which consists wholly of self interest and violence , did so highly exalt the practice of policy , as that by scandalous example it permitted peripatetical philosophie , which was the supream ladie of all humane sciences , to be troden underfoot . seneca obeyed the censors command , but much against his will ; for moral philosophers who make so great shew of seeming humility , are even borne with intence ambition . when lipsius was come to the foro delphico , he was not permitted to see the splendor of his majesty in open air , nor was he met and received at the foot of the pallace staires by the muses ; for those who write inventions of their own , and who are beloved by apollo and the muses are onely thought worthy of those singular favours : whereas lipsius his learned writings were onely found to be laborious , and miraculous for the variety of reading that was in them ; a thing so common to all the trans-alpine writers , whose braines are thought to lye in their backs , as it is usual with italians , whose braines lye in their heads , to invent alwaies new things , and to labour with matter taken out of the mine of their owne ingeniosity , with much sweat and toyl , nor with stuff , borrowed from other writers ; it being a thing thought belonging to beggerly , botchers , and to broken criticks , to peice out the tatterd gownes of the learned , but to cut out new clothes , after a new manner , and with imbroideries not formerly seen , a thing belonging to an experienced and skilful tailor somsay that lipsius was thus smally favoured by apollo , and by the muses , and that they were offended with him , for that they having indued him with so noble a talent , as he might like a tacitist have written the civil wars of flanders , a thing so much desired by the colledge of the vertuosi ; yet he for certain respects which his majesty held unworthy , had hitherto resisted the inspiration given him , by his majesty and the divine goddesses : but this last is a suspition grounded onely upon likelyhoods , whereas the former is sustained by truth . apollo stood to see this cavalcata in his little cabinet , which stands close by auroras lodging , and which italian poets call the celestical balcony , and he was clad in a white cloude , which ( as upon like occasions is usual ) just when lipsius enterd the foro delfico , was by a western wind a little rarified ; so as his majesty by the spendor of one only beam with which he beheld this his vertuoso , cleansed him from all the stains of ignorance , which till then remained in him , and made him become a perfect litterato . when lipsius was afterwards come into the great hall where audience is given ; just as he began his oration , with humble thanks to apollo , for the incomparable grace he had vouchsafed him , he was forced to hold his peace , by reason of a sore mischance which befell the learned pausanias , a greek writer , who was sate on the cronologist classis ; where he fell into so deep a sound , as he was thought dead , and all the reverend cosmographists ran to help him , pausanias familiar friends said , that that accident might be occasioned by meer weakness ; for that it being late , he had not refresht his soul in his library , as he used to do before he came out of his house , by taking two spoonfuls of conserves made of pindarus his poesies ; but euterpe whose humble servant pausanias professeth himself to be , sprinkling two of thucidides substantial sentences in his face , made that vertue return into him which was almost lost . then pausanius , not considering how great a fault he committed in hindring lipsius from ending his oration : o devouring time ( exclaimed he , being overcome with greif of soul ) o envious old age , which by your sharp and biting teeth , consume even those things , which were made by men , to the end that they might for ever live upon the earth ; how is it possible that the vicissitude of things should be so certainly affixt to the variation of time , as that my beloved greece , formerly the mother of learning , the queen of sciences , the honoured and safe habitation of liberal arts , the garden of the world , the natural country of the famous vertuosi in all sorts of learning , the onely place in the world eternized by my pen , should now be wholly become ignorance , totally savedg , uninhabited , and so dismantled of all those both publick and private edifices , wherewith thou didst formerly so much abound , as now there is nothing to be seen in thee but poor cottages , and that the famous athenian orators , phylosophers and historians , are become in these our unfortunate daies , base oile-men in constantinople : whereas on the contrary ; flanders , which in my time was nothing but soletary woods , incumbred with marish grounds , full of savedg beasts , and men more savedg , where nothing was to be seen but hideous caverns , poor cottages , inhabited by beggers , should now be become a very fruitful , beautiful , and pleasant province ; inhabited by civil , wealthy and industrious men , full of noble cities , adorned with both publick and private edifices , very sumptuously built ; and which makes the wonder the greater , that it should be a happy country , where the learning of the ancient greeks and latins , seem to have tane up her eternal abode : all the learned grecians , as aristotle , plato , demosthenes , and pindorus , were so moved at what pausanius had said , as also many others who could not forbear shedding of tears ; but before lipsius his ceremonies could be compleated , fell into so great lamentations , as being followed therein by the other vertuosi ; lipsius , who knew that his oration could not be heard , by reason of the great noise which those sighs and groans made , came down from his seat , being satisfied for the injury which pausanius had given him by that interruption , with the consolation he received from the encomium he had made of his country the flemmish nation . it was believed by all the learned of this state , that great intimacy and friendship was contracted between cornelius tacitus and giustus lipsius , by reason of the many reciprocal courtesies which had past between them ; but to the wonder of all the learned in parnassus , the contrary happened : for two daies since , lipsius accused tacitus for having said some very impious words in his first book of histories . his majestie much incenst to hear such an accusation , commanded tacitus to appear before him the next morning , and to make his defence ; tacitus obeyed this command with such undaunted alacrity , as his learned friends , who had been much astonished , were greatly cheered . i , who give you an account of these informations , was present when beato renano , and flavio orsino , both of them being tacitus his good friends , drew lipsius aside , and earnestly entreated him that he would desist from that accusation , which would prove a great dishonour to himself , if he should not be able to make it good , and would prove very unfortunate if he should prove it : for tacitus being the first politick baron of parnassus , and therefore much followed by potent men , who have long hands , and short consciences , they would certainly in time work their revenge . to this lipsius answered , that howsoever he would discharge his conscience ; which being said , he appeared before apollo , where came likewise tacitus attended by the most pollisht vertuosi of this court. then lipsius thus began ; that he was a friend to socrates , a friend to plato , but a greater friend to truth . here tacitus interrupted him , and bad him leave those preambles , which smelt so rammish in that place , and fall roundly to his impeachment , for his fellow polititians could not with patience hear premeditated preludiums from them from whom they expected fowle performances . then replyed lipsius , you in your first book of history have taken the freedom to say , that god cares not otherwise for mans welfare , then in what concerns punishment ; a conceit so much the more impious , for that it would be a great fault in an earthly prince , much more in god ( whose peculiar vertue , mercy is , and charity to all mankind ) to say a thing so exorbitantly wicked . your very words ( said he ) are these ; nec enim unquam attrocioribus populi romani cladibus , magisve justis judiciis approbatum est , non esse cura deis securitatem nostram , esse ultionem . tacit , lib. . hist. t is true that you may plead in excuse of this your great fault , that you were led thereinto by unwary lucan , who having said the same thing before you , wrot these verses : foelix roma quidem , civesque habitura superbos : si libertatis superis , tam cura placeret , quam vindict a placet . blest rome , great citizens might well have had , had the gods minded her good as well as bad . when tacitus had heard this , it grieves me , said he , my lipsius , that you who have boasted your self to be the only oracle of my obscurest meanings , have so grosly erred in a poynt which so much imports my reputation . for those words of mine which you have now recited , are so farr from being impious and wicked , as you accuse them to be , as i will prove them to be pious and holy : and that you may know i speak truth , i will by a circumlocution of many words , interpret that my conceit , which according to my custom , being exprest in few , you cannot conceive . after having in the beginning of my histories , acquainted the reader with what i intended to treat of in my whole work , i said , i undertook a labour full of various chances ; atrox praeliis , discors seditionibus , ipsa etiam pace savum , quatuor principes ferro interempti , tria bella civilia , &c. cruelty in wars , seditious discord , savageness even in peace , four princes assassinated , three civil wars , &c. when i had related the great calamities and miseries which the romans suffered after nero's death , i said they were so many in number , and such in quality , as it had never at any time been better verified , by the bitter sufferings of the romans , and by divine justice , that that same god who had formerly so favoured and protected the people of rome , as being as it were inamored of their greatness , it seemed his only care was , to render them perpetually victorious , triumphant , and masters of the world , was seen so to change his mind after nero's death , as it did evidently appear ; non esse curae deis securitatem nostram : which is , that he had quite given over the care of their welfare ; esse ultionem ; which is , that he minded only to take revenge for the great distastes which they had given him . is it then lipsius ! a wicked conception to say , that by reason of the great excesses committed by the people of rome , both before , and after the death of nero , gods care of protecting them from all evil , was turned to severe justice in afflicting them with all sorts of misery . the thing which you have said ( said lipsius ) is very pious ; but it doth not square with the words which i accuse of wickedness , which will then receive the interpretation and sence which you give them , when the words , securitatem nostram were only to be understood of the people of rome ; but they being universal , it is apparent that you comprehend all mankind : that by the word nostram , upon which i perceive you chiefly ground your self ( replyed tacitus ) i only understood the people of rome , lucan makes it clear unto you , who you were pleased to say , led me into this error ; he expressing my very conceit in verse , mentions only the romans ; affirming that rome would have been perpetually happy , and would have kept with her citizens in continual glory , if god almighty had been as well pleased to preserve her in her ancient liberty , as he was to revenge himself of her . and do not you think it to be true , lipsius , that the romans , who could never put a period to the insatiat ambition which they had to rule over the whole world , did so provoke gods anger against them , by laying so many noble monarchies and gallant commonwealths dessolate , by having plundred the world , and filled it with fire and bloud , to satiate their unquenchable thirst after wealth , as after having delivered them over into the hands of cruel tyrants , by whom they made tryal of the most deplorable miseries , he at last permitted , that by exemplary shame , they should be trampled upon by the most barbarous nations of the earth ? certainly a most unfortunate end ; but much merited by the roman ambition , cruelty , and avarice : precipices into which the divine majestie of god causes those empires to fall , which know not how to prefix bounds to their insatiate desire of reigne . but to make your error appear yet more clear unto you , do you remember , lipsius , that ever i made use of that word , nostram , or nostri , in any other part of my writings ? i remember ( said he ) that you mention how tiridates , king of armenia , who was sent to rome by corbalone , to acquit himself before nero , of some imputations that were laid upon him , did capitulate with corbalone before he took his journey , that no servitude at all should be made to appear in him tiradates , that he should not be made to lay down arms any where during his journey , that he should be admitted to visit the governors of the countries , without being kept out of dores , and that he might be suffered to keep the same grandezza in ceremonious observances , as did the consuls ; which way of proceeding was laughed at by corbalone , and esteemed a barbarous vain-glory , as you your self do in these words publish ; silicet externae superbiae sueto , non erat notitia nostri : apud quos jus imperii valet , innania transmittantur . tacit. lib. . annal. doubtless , by one accustomed to forrein pride , no notice was taken of us : needless things are forborn amongst those that stand upon the right of empire . and in another place , relating how much the discord of her enemies made for the quiet and greatness of the roman empire , you say , maneat quaeso , duretque gentibus , si non amor nostri , at certe odium sui quando vergentibus imperii satis nihil jam praestare fortuna majus potest quam hostium discordia . tacit. de morib . germ. let there i pray continue amongst the nations if not a love of us , at least a hatred amongst themselves , since to the declining fate of the empire , fortune can now grant nothing greater then her enemies discord . then said tacitus , do you believe , lipsius , that by the words , non erat notitia nostri , and si non amor nostri , i did intend all mankind , or only the people of rome ? lipsius then grew pale , and said , i now my tacitus , perceive my error , i humbly crave your pardon , and freely confess , that the more your writings are read , the less are they understood , and that your annals and histories are not to be read by a meer gramarian , such a one as i am . the xxiv . advertisement . a mournfull day in parnassus , in commemoration of the unhappy introduction of the grace-cup . this first day of may ( a day by all nations consecrated to jollities ) is so sad a day in parnassus , as not only the muses , poets , and all the vertuosi are clad in mourning , but the publick market places , open tarraces , and schools of learning , are all covered with blacks , for that it appears by the testimony of pollidore virgil , on this day of unhappy memory , first through the ambition of princes , and then through the foolish vain-glory of privat people , the pestiferous use of the grace-cup was introduced . never in the memory of the learned , did there happen so sad a calamity in parnassus , and more bitterly bewailed by all the vertuosi , then the direfull spectacle of beholding that pretious liquor , wine , the only delight of tables , without which , eating would be a laborious task , fit only for porters , cruelly driven from the table ; and certainly not without reason : for what greater misery can befall mankind , then to be reduced to drink according to another mans discretion , and to be brought to that sad condition , even to beg for gods sake a glass of wine from a mean servant , who many times minds thee not , and oft-times does not hear thee , which that a man might live as long as nestor , he ought to have alwaies in his hand , or hold it to his mouth ? and what more cruel means could there be invented to torment a gallant man , then to make him stint his drinking when a savory bit hath provoked a lusty thirst in him ? and is it not a spectacle able to make a man die for anger , to see drink brought sometimes in too little a glass , oft-times half empty , and in so unequal a thirst , to drink still the same measure ? and which makes the grievance the greater , to have the wine alwaies changed ? for the gluttonous , and wicked butlers cannot be perswaded to bring out their best wines to feasts , but keep it for themselves . in this the literatie's so great affliction , the glorious german nation , which is free from so severe a slavery , pittying the misery of the spaniards , itallians , and french , moved a treaty with the princes , to exterminate from out the world , the known pernitious practice of the grace-cup : but the princes answered resolutely , they would never give way that the glory of the bottle-house should be taken from their festivals . and though to facilitate the business on the behalf of the literati , it was propounded that wine should stand still upon the tables , that it should alwaies be good , that in the butteries , or bottle-houses , si facesse la speca delle minestre che spesse volte ammorbano di caccio riscaldato ; they should spend their porredg seasoned with tosted cheefe ; but they were not listned unto : so as the business apappearing to be desperate , andrea marone , a famous brescian poet , stept forth , and in the presence of apollo , the muses , and of all the learned in parnassus , did very fluently on the sudden make a stout invective against so cruel an invention in heroick verse ; and proved conclusively by the authority of esculapius , hippocrates , galen , and other famous phisitians , that hectick feavers and tissicks , which were but little known before , were mightily encreased by the sorrowfull introduction of the grace-cup , and the three-ounce glasses . for those silly people who were foolishly perswaded to drink by the ounce , drunk but by scruples , thereby purchasing unto themselves pale and weak complexions ; whence it happened , that in these present times , wherein the vanity of good breeding was more respected , then substantial drinking with chearfulness , the strong complexion of old lusty men was wholly lost . in the end of his oration , this poetical orator averred by the testimony of the muses , that when the custom of drinking great carrowses was given over , the race of homers and virgils was wholly lost , and the world was pester'd with hide-bound poets . the xxv . advertisement . the principal monarchies abiding in parnassus , ask the illustrious venetian liberty , by what means she obtains the benefit of so equisite secrecy , and such exact obedience from her nobility ? and received from her their desired satisfaction . the controversie which arose some few daies since amongst divers of the literati , and which was decided ( as hath been said ) by the illustrious venetian liberty , hath afforded this state of parnassus much occasion of discourse . but more particularly it raised such an envy in the powerfull monarchies of spain , france , england , and poland , as two daies since they went to the aforesaid liberty of venice , and told her that they wondred very much to see that she should find such faithfull secrecy in all her nobility , when they had very much desired ( but all in vain ) to obtain so much from one single secretary , and a pair of councellers : a calamity affirmed by these powerfull queens , to be so much the greater , as that in this present fraudulent age , the first weapons which some princes use to draw against their enemies , was to corrupt other potentates chief officers with vast sums of gold ; they therefore desired to know of her , by what means she in her weightiest affairs obtained so much secrecy from her nobility , and such obedience also in the certain danger of their ruine ? to this the venetian liberty answered , that she did allure her nobility to the vertue of secrecy by rewards , and frighted them from the vice of disobedience by punishments . the aforesaid monarchies replyed , that they likewise made use of the same means , yet could not compass the same ends . that , said the venetian liberty , is because the rewards given by monarchies , are poor , and the punishments slight , in comparison of those which were practised in well governed commonwealths . to this , answer was made , that monarchies could affirm the contrary ; for the rewards of free countries , compared with the profuse liberallity which great kings use towards their chief ministers of state , was but beggery : for it was never known that the state of venice rewarded the fidelity of any of her senators with the rich donatives of castles , citadels , cities , and other noble and rich fee-farms , with which princes did often remunerate their ministers of state ; the greatest rewards used by the venetian commonwealth to her most meritorious senators being to promote them to greater magistracies , and that by degrees , and not without their having taken much pains ere they could come by it . moreover , that the greatest part of her imployments being rather expencefull then profitable , they only brought with them an increase of reputation . that then for the poynt of punishment , certainly punishments inflicted by the resolute will of princes for great offences , were incomparably more severe and dreadfull then those which were decreed against a senator by any senat , which were usually rather mild and circumspectious , then precipitate and cruel : and that there was a great disproportion between a prince who judged his vassal , and a senator , who by his sufferage punisht his equal , his friend , one of his own bloud . that the state of venice used no worser gibbits , gallowses , fetters , ropes , nor fire in their nobilities misdemerits , then were used in spain , france , england , and poland , unless it were the cavala orfano , which was the venetians utmost severity . that if kings had not that channel in their kingdoms , they could notwithstanding sew up their disloyal officers in sacks , and cause them to be thrown into deep rivers and wells . the illustrious venetian commonwealth did then smile , and said , that in lieu of those fee-farm rents which princes bestow with such a limited authority upon their well deserving servants , she gave unto her loyal and obedient nobles , the kingdom of candia , corfu , and the other islands subject to her dominions , the states of dalmatia , istria , freuli , padua , vicenza , verona , brescia , bergamo , crema , and that most majestical miracle of the most royal cities , venice : and all this with full authority to command and govern them absolutely ; so as her nobility were not to be esteemed as privat men , but as kings , and great princes , who in the weighty affairs of the commonwealth , were faithfull to themselves ; whereas the servants of princes were faithfull to others ; and that the detestation which the noble venetians had of selling the commonwealths secrets to forrein princes , arose from the infinite disproportion between what they should lose by their fellonious dealing , and what they got by their loyalty : that there was no proportion or comparison between the remorse which a minister of state feels for having betrayed his prince , and the fear a senator had to be unfaithfull to his free country : because to be unfaithfull to others , was to betray himself . lastly the venetian liberty said , that the rewards which princes give to their secretaries , and other state-ministers , did often produce pernitious effects , and clean contrary to the intention of the givers : for that they did not only make the officer grow more coole in his masters service , since he had nothing more to hope for from him ; but that princes minds being so mutable , and the plots of their court-rivals so frequent , it often hapned that the servant sought by his disloyalty , and by suppressing his master ; to secure that reward , which by his good service he had got . all which were pernitious effects , and wherein their rewards fell so much the shorter , for that the patrimony of the venetian nobility encreasing alwaies with the greatness of their empire , the love of their senators was daily encreased more and more , and their charity towards the weal-publick . then she said , the disproportion in punishments between her and monarchies , was far greater , for she had often had experience , that when her nobles have even been in arms , and much importun'd by forrein princes , if she should but mention unto them the senats displeasure , and their degradation from nobility , there was not any venetian senator , who would not with unspeakable chearfull obedience hasten to venice , with firm resolution rather to lose his life between two pillars , then to be deprived of that liberty which is so highly valued by generously minded men ; and that there was not any senator of venice , who would not willingly suffer death , rather then put himself in subjection to any whatsoever forrein prince . the reason why , because the noble venetian was a fish which being born in those waters of liberty , could not live out of venice , in the element of servitude . the xxvi . advertisement . francis the first , that potent king of france , meeting the lady philosophy naked , profered her his royal mantle ; which would not be accepted . the bountifull king of france , francis the first , met casually yesterday the lady philosophy , leaning upon aristotle and plato , as she went sporting her self in parnassus : and seeing her to be naked , the king had a strange compunction of mind to see that the very queen of all human sciences , who ought to abound in all the most exquisite delights , should be so poor , as that she should not have wherewithall to cover her self . wherefore that magnanimous king , throwing off his royal cloak or mantle , which was all imbroidered with flowre-de-luces made of diamonds , would therewithall have covered that beautifull lady ; when first having rendred all due thanks to so great a king , for so courteous an offer , she said , that she who had no shame to hide , nor deformities to cover , might without any prejudice to her reputation , walk naked in parnassus . the xxvii . advertisement . apollo complains bitterly of the muses , for that they inspire many mean wits with poetical fury ; and they defend themselves excellently well . apollo finding the products of modern italian poets , for the most part very imperfect in similies , metaphors , allegories , hyperboles , and other figurative expressions , with which they deck and adorn their learned poems , sent two daies agoe for the muses to come unto him , with whom he bitterly complained , that the most noble poetical fury was inspired into certain ignorant people , who not able to undergo the labour of purchasing by their perpetual study , the perfection of poetry , published poor poems , by which that poetry lost much reputation , which is the delight of learning , the only recreation of the learneds labours , the very restorative of the vertuosi , the jewel of all liberal arts ; not without much imputation of blame to them the muses , who were desired by the choicest vertuosi , that poetical fury might only be inspired into laborious wits , and such as were in love with learning , and who might make themselves worthy to receive so singular a grace from them . 't is said that polyhimnia in the name of all the other muses , answered his majesty , that they , in the inspiring of poetical fury , and the flowing vein of elegant verses into others , were alwaies used to have respect to the fruitfulness , and natural vivacity of mens wits ; and that his majestie very well knew , that the gift of poetical fury must of necessity precede the knowledgs of arts , sciences , and learning , to the end that those who should have received so particular a favour from the muses , might afterwards improve the talent which was given them , by perpetual study ; and that his beloved pindarus , when they first inspired him with poetical fury , he was altogether void of all those pretious sciences , with which he afterwards did so richly adorn himself . when polyhimnia had thus ended , erato added , that the bad poems of some late italian vertuosi , was not to be attributed to the idleness of the poets , but to the misery of the present times , wherein none of those liberal mecena's being to be found , who were formerly the maintainers of poetry , such sciences were now only prized by modern men , as brought with them certain and present advantage ; not such as brought only delight and reputation ; an unhappiness which was the cause why in this present age , such studies were only plyed , as serve to feed the body , and those not regarded which only feed the soul. whence it was , that even they , the muses , were with much sorrow , forced every day to see that those very elevated and noblest spirits , which they did most intirely love , and into whom they had inspired all the most excellent poetical fury that they were able , did rather violently resist the gift of poetry , and the instigation of their minds , bigg with verse , then pursue it . and that therefore the best italian wits , being forced , even for necessity of bread , to abandon the noble study of poetry , to which they were naturally addicted , did so greedily thrust themselves into more gainfull studies , as that a noble italian wit , even then when he was most inflam'd with the composure of an elegant stanza , was forced to forgo that his laudable labour , and for the getting of a couple of crowns to turn advocate in a civil case at law. that if his beloved virgil did by his taking-verses , so much increase the honour of poetry , it was because he was perpetually encouraged by augustus his bounty . that it was impossible for modern poets to cultivate by their assiduous studies , those fields of poetry , which produced nothing but barren brakes ; and that it even broke the hearts of her and of her fellow-muses , to put his majestie in mind , that iovan andrea dell ' anguilara , a noble italian poet , died for meer want in a lodging in the street torre di nona , at rome ; and that sanazzarro being reduced to a great scarcity of all necessaries , died mad in the same city ; and that lodovicus ariosto , and torquatus tasso , resplendent lights of italian poetry , were so hardly dealt withall by the avarice and ingratitude of the present times , as all the vertuosi saw them enter into parnassus , without clokes , and with tattered clothes . the xxviii . advertisement . torquato tasso presents apollo with his poem of giurusalemme liberata , or godfrey of bullen , for which lodovico castelvetro , and aristotle , are severely reprehended by his majestie . torquato tasso , two daies after his admittance into parnassus , presented his learned and elegant poem of giurusalemme liberata before apollos feet , and desired that if it should be thought worthy , it might by his majestie , be consecrated to immortality . apollo gratiously received the poem , and according to the ancient custom of this court , gave it to the reformer of the library ( who at this present is lodovico castelvetro ) that it might be renewed . after two months space , tasso applyed himself to castelvetro , who told him , that having diligently perused his poem , he found not that he had therein observed the rules of poetry , published by aristotle : that therefore he did not think it fit to be placed amongst the publick writers of the delfick library , wherefore he might do well to amend those errors , and then return to him , and he would again renew it . tasso was much astonished at this unexpected answer ; wherefore being incenst , he forthwith went to apollo , and told him , that with much labour , and infinite pains-taking , he had composed the aforesaid poem , in the weaving whereof , he had only observed the talent which nature had given him , and which his caliope had inspired into him : wherein he thought he had fulfilled all the duties of poetry , and that his majestie having prescribed no laws thereunto , he knew not with what authority aristotle had published any rules to be observed in it : and that he never having heard that there was any other lord in parnassus , but his majestie his fault in not having observed aristotles rules , was an error of ignorance , and not of any malice . by these words of tasso , apollo was as highly offended against aristotle , as princes use to be when their authority is intrench upon ; in so much as he forthwith commanded the guard of german poets to bring that bold philosopher bound unto him ; which they did . apollo with an incenst countenance , and irritated voice , asked aristotle , whether he had been so shamefully impudent , as to dare to prescribe laws , and publish rules to be observed , to the high conceptions of the vertuosi , in whom he had alwaies been pleased that there should be an absolute liberty of writing and inventing . for the lively wits of his literati being loose from any tie of rule , and free from the chains of precepts , did greatly to his contentment , every day , enrich the schools and libraries with gallant composures , woven with new and curious inventions ; and that to make the wits of conceited poets , subject to the bondage of law and rules , was to infringe the grandezza , and to take from the alluring delights of their products , and greatly to inslave the wits of learned men , who when they handled their pen with wonted and unbridled liberty , they divulged such writings , as by reason of their novelty and elegancy , did not only afford delight to him and his beloved muses , but even admiration ; as was evidently seen in the advertisements of a modern , menante , wherein under metaphors and jesting tales ( a new invention ) important politick affairs , and choice moral precepts , were couched . and that the poem of his beloved tasso , being received by the general good applause of all the world , it did evidently appear , that he had punctually observed all the rules of exquisite poetry that could be prescribed . poor aristotle trembled at the hearing of these words , and humbly beseeched his majestie that he would commiserate his old age , and that such a philosopher as he , might not suffer for anothers ignorance , saying , that he had writ the rules of poetry , not in that sence in which it was afterwards understood by the ignorant , as if without observing his rules and precepts , no poem could possibly arive at perfection ; but that only to facilitate the art of poetry , he had shewed the way wherein the best poets had walked : that the only fault which he had committed , and for which he humbly craved his majesties pardon , was , that having found long before , that the ignorant took those his observations for laws , and peremptory precepts , blinded with that ambition which robs all men of their eye sight ; for that that error had encreased his honour and reputation , he had given his majestie thereby so high a displeasure : and that he confest that the brains of high strained poets might write poems so absolutely perfect , as they might serve others for rules and laws to be observed , without keeping his laws and precepts : and that the truth of this that he had said was clearly proved by the politicks which he had published , which in comparison to the madly wrested reason of state which was now practised by many , was meer foppery . the xxix . advertisement . cornelius tacitus is chosen prince of lesbos ; whither being come , his success proves not good two months ago the prince of lesbos departed this life , whereupon the electors of that state , who as every one knows , obey an elective prince , sent ambassadors to apollo , desiring him that he would be pleased to name a man unto them worthy of so high preferment , and they would willingly chuse him for their lord and master . many worthy letterati were propounded by apollo ; the ambassadors thought , that since cornelius tacitus was famed farr above all others for matter of policy , he was fittest to be chosen . but before the business passed any further , they went to visit him , and asked him , in case they should chuse him for their prince , how he would govern them : tacitus speaking at large unto the ambassadors of himself , said , that all men knew what his abilities were in the well governing a state ; since the whole world set such an estimation upon his writings , as he thought he might justly boast , that it was governed by the modern princes , according to the rules of his politicks : that having shewn others the true practice of the most exact reason of state , they might easily believe he should know better then any other , how to put it in execution in his own state. and though upon this occasion he durst undertake upon the sudden , in their presence , to make a compleat discourse upon the means that were to be used by a prince who would govern an elective kingdom well , yet to let them see that he with much reason was acknowledged by the most understanding polititians , to be the master of that art , he would tell them in two words , what satisfaction he intended to give them in his government . which was , that he would diligently imitate the late prince in those actions which he should know gave content unto the people , and that he would exceedingly detest him in those which they were displeased with . he then added , that what he had said , was the very extract of all true policy , the quintescence distilled by him , and only by him thought upon ; and that relying much upon them , he had imparted unto them this secret , which if it were made common , shop-keepers , and even the meanest sort of men , would know how to rule kingdoms , and govern empires . the ambassadors were much pleased with what tacitus had said , and did assure him that he should be the man that should be chosen ; they only advertised him , that when he should be created their prince , it would behove him to speak in a more usual stile , that he might be the better understood by the people of lesbos , who were not so learned as those of parnassus . to which tacitus answered , that it was necessary for one like him , who profest to speak more sentences then words , to speak obscurely ; for sententious meanings , and politick precepts , lost much reputation , when they were spoken in trivial latin : and he , to the end that he might not communicate that political science to the base rabble-rout , which ought only to be known to great kings , used that manner of language ; that therefore his conceptions were understood only by the choicest wits , whose accurate pallats were able to rellish them ; yet for the general good of those that understood but little , he would bring with him for his interpreters , mercerus , lipsius , fulvius orsinus , and that he would bring with him as far as from italy , the most affable courtius pecchena , whom ferdinand the great duke of tuscany , the best scollar that ever came out of tacitus his schoole , had offered him , whensoever he should have occasion to use him . the ambassadors returned to lesbos much satisfied with these answers , and made such relation of tacitus his miraculous wisdom , as by the general applause of all the people , he was presently chosen , and declared prince . but the success of tacitus his government in his principality , proved clean contrary to the expectation which was had of him : for soon after he had taken possession , he began first to sow , and then to nourish great discord between the nobility and the common people : and because the nobility was of more worth , and better advised then the vulgar , who were kept under by the power of great ones , tacitus secretly and cunningly adheared to the weaker side ; wherefore the heads of the people growing very bold with the nobility , by reason of the stout assistance which they received from the prince , they exercised bruitish insolencies , by means whereof , in less then a months space , a dreadfull fire of civil warr was kindled in lesbos . tacitus this mean while appearing in publick to be a well-wisher to the general peace , interposed himself as a mediator to compose those differences , which in privat he wished might never have an end ; and shewed himself to be so zealous of all their goods , as he became the absolute arbitrator of the differences between both sides : and making use of the calamities of others , as an instrument whereby to agrandize his authority , he first infused great fear into the people , that they would be quickly cut in pieces by the power of the nobility , if they did not all the sooner find out some remedy for their preservation . by this means he easily obtained their good wils , that a militia of forrein souldiers should be admitted into the metropolitan city , to keep them from being over-powered by the nobility , which militia he honested by the name of souldiers of peace : and they , with approbation of the nobility , were permitted to be armed , under pretence , that by them he would curb the people , who were already grown too insolent . the souldiers were three thousand in number , and an intiment confident of tacitus was by him given them for their chief commander . and to the end that they might be faithfull to him , and ready to serve him upon all occasions , he obliged them not only by othes , gifts , and all demonstrations of liberality ; but made them as partial to him , as they were hatefull to the nobility and common people , by permitting them to commit all sorts of cruelty and plunder against the nobility and commons of lesbos , tacitus being thus fortified in his power and greatness , did in a few daies fill the senat and city lesbos , as also the whole state , with promooters and spies , which he incensed against the chiefest of the nobility of lesbos , who under pretence of divers faults , were bereft of their estates and imployments , wherewith he exalted and agrandized their accusers . wherefore the chief men of the senat , some through avarice , some through ambition , and very many to save their own lives , became wicked ministers of their princes cruelty and ambition , by accusing , and falsly calumniating the greatest subjects of the state. moreover , such senators as he knew he could not oppress by false accusations , he imployed them abroad in forrein negotiations , which were expensive , and could cause no jealousies ; then by little and little he disarmed under colour of various pretence , the ancient officers who had the charge of the militia , and put their arms into the hands of such as were affectionate to him ; and whilst by this deep and wicked cunning , he abased the powerful , he exalted new men , chosen out of the meanest sort of the people , and who did wholly depend upon him , to be senators , and other supream magistrates . then under colour of securing the state from being invaded by forrein princes , he began to begirt it round with strong citadels , which he put into the custody of forreiners , who were his friends . and because he could not endure that the people and nobility should be armed , and knew that to disarm them , would be a dangerous business , he made use of a safe way to disarm his subjects by long peace , by idleness , or wantonness , and by using severe justice upon such as did any waies dispute these their necessary recentments : and totally to irradicate all vertue from out his subjects souls , he caused costly theaters to be built in the chiefest cities , wherein pastimes , comedies , huntings , and other delightfull spectacles , were perpetually represented , by the over-much use whereof the people and the nobility , gave over their ancient care of publick affairs , and the thought of military exercises : and as one who knew very well , that to come by his desired end of erecting a tyrannical government over a people who were born free-men , and had long lived in liberty , it was requisite to glut them with perpetual plenty and abundance , tacitus gave himself wholly to provide that great store of all good things , should alwaies be found in his state. thus farr tacitus his affairs past on successfully ; but when he would go about the last precept of tyranny , by laying snares for the lives of some great senators which he was jealous of , he contracted so cruel and so universal a hatred against him , as lest he might be opprest by a great conspiracy which he found was plotted against him , he fled disguised six daies since from lesbos , and returned to lead a privat life in parnassus . his nephew pliny , who as all the vertuosi know , was always the best friend that ever tacitus had , was the first that came to visit him ; he with a roman freedom , greatly reprehended his friend , that having prescribed such approved rules of well governing states , to others , he himself should prove so unfortunate in his principality of lesbos . the same pliny relates that cornelius tacitus gave him these very words for answer ; heaven ( my pliny ) is not so far distant from earth , nor doth snow so far differ in colour from cole , as the exercise of empire is far from , and unlike unto the theory of politick precepts , and the best rules of reason of state : for that sentence which in galba's person i teach piso , and which hath won me so much credit amongst men , as it hath been thought to be the answer of an oracle , and which the ignorant think may easily be put in practice , hath in the use thereof proved very unfortunate to me : the reason is , because the metamorphosis is too great , when from being a privat man , one becomes a prince . and know pliny , that privat men hate and detest many things as great defects , and apparent vices in princes , which are vertuous and excellent perfections . i tell thee this , for that when i was first chosen prince of lesbos , i was resolved to steer the navigation of my principality by the assured north star of the aforesaid sentence ; and therefore i diligently informed my self of all my predicessors actions , firmly resolving to imitate him in those which were praised , and to shun those which were blamed in him : i knew that he had greatly offended the senat by assuming too much authority , by which he had taken unto himself the affairs of all the magistrates ; in so much as little more then the bare name of magistracy remained unto them . i found he was much hated for the little esteem he made of the nobility , and for that he would have all the affairs of the senat depend upon him : and i knew also , that in his austeere manner of life , by which it appeared he desired to govern the state of lesbos rather by absolute dominion , and as an hereditary prince , then as an elective lord by limited authority , he had distasted all men . whilst i was a privat man , i thought this way of government to be bruitish , and altogether tyrannical , and therefore i resolved to shun it . but know , that the very first houre took upon me my principality , i found those my first wholsom resolutions to be so grub'd up and eradicated by the cursed power of rule , as to say it properly unto you , vi dominationis convulsus & mutatus . tacit. lib. . annall . i began to think those my predicessors actions , which whilst i was a privat man ; i esteemed so foolish , insolent , and tyrannical , to be excellently good , and not things done out of phancy , or by chance , but good precepts politick resolutions , and necessary state-reason : so as not able any waies to resist the violent ambition of government , i thought i should be baser then a pack-bearer , if i did not arrogate unto my self the whole power of command in lesbos , where the prince lives with much limited authority ; which my inordinate desire did occasion that bad satisfaction in the senat , and whole people of lesbos , which hath made me run upon the rock which you see . all which disorders ( my pliny ) are occasioned not through my ignorance , but through my knowing too much : for in the principality of lesbos , where people live between liberty and slavery , nec totam libertatem , nec totam servitutem patipossunt . tacit. lib. . hist. they can neither endure to be wholly slaves , nor wholly free . he who will reigne long quietly there , must not only resolve to leave things as he found them , but must be of a peacefull spirit , so farr from ambition , as that he may be able to put in practice the hard precept , of living himself , and suffering others to live : so as men who are absolutely polititians , as i am , who are incited by nature to affect sole dominion , and who will measure all things by their reason of state , prove very unfortunate in elective principalities . the xxx . advertisement . apollo being aware of the great disorder occasioned amongst men by the flight of fidelity ; by assistance of the muses , and of the sublimest heroick vertues , procures her return to parnassus . it cannot be said by the tongue of man , how greatly apollo was troubled at the secret and sudden departure from parnassus some weeks since ( as you have heard ) of the illustrious vertue , fidelity : for his majestie could not with patience think that the world should be deprived of so beautifull a princess : his afflictions were increased by hearing of the great disorders which arose in all places , between the people and sacred friendship , the only delight of man-kind ; since she saw her self forsaken by fidelity , lest she might receive some fowl affront from fraud , she would no longer live amongst men , who being freed from the oath of allegeance to their princes , and from the severe bond of love , by which they are bound unto their privat friends , they grew so very perfidious , and so savagely seditious , as allowing all sorts of wickedness to be lawfull , they drive away pure fidelity by treachery , from human familiarity , and holy peace by sedition , filling the whole world with bloud , theft , and all perfidious and cruel confusion . apollo was moreover perpetually troubled with the just appeals of princes , who publickly protested , that by reason of their subjects hainous infidelity , they were forced to forgo the government of man-kind . wherefore apollo thought it necessary ( as a remedy for so great disorder ) to call a diet of the states-general , which he did on the twentieth of the last month , whither he summoned the princes poets , and the deputies of all vertuous nations ; who not failing to appear on the prefixt day , such hatred was discovered in many people against their princes , as they said openly , that not through any disloyalty , but that driven by dispair , they had for ever banisht that loyalty from out their hearts ; which , as being very prejuditial to them , they were resolved never any more to acknowledge ; by reason that it was basely abused by many princes . for in times past subjects loyalty served as a means to force princes to barter civil and courteous proceedings , with their peoples faithful service ; but now they saw clearly that the vertue of humble and prostrate obedience , was accounted the baseness of an abject mind ; and the merit of a voluntary and uncorrupt loyalty , necessity of service . by which fowle way of proceeding , publick disorders were so far advanced , as many were forced to put on the resolution which now was seen , only that capricious princes might clearly know , that the authority of commanding was soon lost , when the ill usage of subjects , and ingratitude towards them , had so exceeded all humane patience , as they had made nations which were naturally well disposed to obey , resolve to admit of no more masters , but rather hazard themselves in a free government , then to be so undervalued , rent in pieces , and cruelly dealt with by princes . though the anger of princes towards their people was great , and the peoples distastes greater , yet the illustrious muses , assisted by the heroick vertues , who laboured very much to bring a business of so great concernment to a happy end , did at last by their dexterity , mollifie and appease the minds of incenst princes , and the hearts of venomed people : and the diet was dissolved upon these articles of agreement ; that the people should solemnly promise to admit again of loyalty into their bosoms , and swear to make her absolute mistress of their hearts : and that princes should be bound to banish avarice and cruelty from out their breasts , and possess their souls fully with liberality and clemency , which were the things that made subjects loyal and obedient . since it plainly appeared by authenticate faith , and was witnessed by gaius plinius , and the rest of natural historians , that sheep which did so willingly obey their shepherds , did infinitely abhor butchers : and that it was impossible to make doggs ( though naturally very faithfull and loving to men ) wag their tails , and leap about them , who gave them more blowes then bits of bread . the xxxi . advertisement . in the time of carneval , the vertuosi in parnassus run races , and make other demonstrations of mirth , and jollitie . the time of the vertuosi's festivals , and publick rejoycings being come , apollo caused macrobius to publish by sound of trumpet , in the chaire appropriated thereunto , aulus gelius his saturnalia ( whom the reformers of the modern pedantry call messer agillio ) his pleasant attick nights ; and the pleasant genial or jovial dayes of alessandro de gli alessandri , and finally the merry bacchenalia of the romans , the lords of the world , and supream princes of learning , all of them festival and merry daies , and consecrated by the genius of gallant men : and by his majesties particular edict it was commanded that they should be chearfully celebrated by all the nations of the vertuosi which inhabit parnassus , according to the institutions and customes of their several countries . as soon as this so joyfull news was made known to the people , the rich publick libraries were opened in parnassus , and the famous libraries of privat men , into which during those daies of jubile , it was lawfull for every one to enter , to come out of , and to tarry there as long as they listed , to surfet by their perpetual reading upon the savory viands which the vertuosi have first seasoned , and then disht up at the plentifull table of their composures . it was an honourable and a joyfull spectacle to see the publick invitations made by plato , by athenaeus , and the other great princes of the court , throughout the whole streets and houses of parnassus , where the vertuosi drank deeply of the falerno of learning , and filled their bellies till they were ready to burst with good discipline . only the doctors of law , seeing the shop of their tribunals , and of their litigious traffick shut , were sad , and died for hunger amidst such plenty of savory meats , and abundance of merriments : for meer pettifoggers being many ages before declared by his majestie to be meere asses , he inhibited them to feed upon the sweet food of divinity , philosophy , poetry , astrology , and other savory sciences , upon which the acutest wits do only feed . wherefore the pettifoggers were seen , much to their shame , to go through kitchins licking of ladles , whereas other scienced men were served with all the delicacies of learning ; and then it was that high-minded spirits did detest the sordid study of law-cases , and great volumes of trivial law , as that which being only able to fatten the fowle great body of wealth , makes curious wits die of the hectick feaver : but above all the rest , the invitation made by pliny , was the most famous , to which the most learned in all sciences that were in parnassus , being come , they were all satisfied according to their several pallats , with costly and pleasant cates. and though at that splendid feast they did for the most part only eat and swallow gudgins , yet were they all so well drest , and handsomly disht in by that copious . wit , as they were eaten by all the guest with much delight , praised for their excellency , and taken for truths . the third day of the feast there appeared two load of neapolitan villanelle fruits of parthenope , which for being come from that vertuous climat , were suddenly bought up and eaten by the hunger-starv'd wits of the litterati ; but because through their much slipperiness , or glibness , they occasioned dangerous fluxes in most that eat them , such impurities were forthwith forbidden by the censors to be any more brought into parnassus . the same day tansillus clad like a gardner , presented apollo with a basket full of neapolitan brocali , the excellencies whereof he did so exagerate in four stanzas which he on the sudden recited , as having perswaded his majestie to taste them , as soon as by the very smell he found them to be ordinary coleworts , he turned towards tansillus , and said , all your poetry will never make your neapolitan brocali prove any thing bu●… common coleworts ; and coleworts do not deserve the praise of so much prittle prattle . soon after , a handsom peasant of ferrara , called pastor fido , presented his majestie with an odoriferous handsom tart : apollo not staying for the usual hour of dinner , fell to eat it with such an appetite in the open street , as he lickt his lips and fingers ends , according to the countrey-fashion , when he tasted the pastoral tart ; and seemed so delighted with that food , as he thought it not only good manners , but even requisite to give part thereof to the illustrious muses , left that they , who are alwaies big with verse , by longing to taste thereof , might miscarry , or might be delivered of a poem marked with some fowl spot of ignorance . whilst the muses , being called by his majestie , did together with apollo , eat the tart of that fortunate shepheard with such delight , the vertuosi who stood looking on , longed very much to taste so savory a thing . wherefore his majestie gave every one of them a piece of it ; and the tart was so commended , as they all confest there could nothing of more delicate in that kind be eaten . there was only one of the vertuosi who said it nauseated him , as being too melli●…uous ; to whom apollo , being much incensed , said , that sweetness was the friend of nature , and that those that were not mightily delighted therewithall , had a depraved taste , and that he was certainly a malignant , if he did not confess that that delicate tart , being seasoned with more conceptions then words , was raised up with the paste of capons skins ; and that he made himself to be known to be one of those sowre detractors , who blinded by envy , blame such things as are to be imitated by extraordinarily fruitfull wits : but his majesties anger , and the dread which the vertuoso was in , were turned to laughter , when the tart being wholly eaten , signco●… giovandalla casa , took the plate whereon it stood , and licking it with equal greediness and unmannerliness , told his majesty and the muses , that in things that do ravish with delight , men were not masters of themselves , nor could they remember gallateo's rules , and that in time of carneval , it was lawfull to commit exorbitances . his majestie went afterwards about the foro massimo , and was much delighted to see every corner full of canvasing and disputations , and the piazza throng'd with orators , who made learned orations in praise of the learned sciences ; and bitter invectives against ignorance . some phantastical italian poets added to his majesties mirth , many of which being mounted upon benches , sung an infinite number of verses ex tempore , which shewed they could not imitate the latine poets , who through difficulty of feet , by which their verses walk , are forced to goe leasurely . and now apollo dismist the muses , who went sporting themselves for many hours through the gladsom street with their inamored poets ; and were much delighted in mauro's shop , wherein were great store of large and little beans , with which some of those dieties cram'd their bellies full : and it was noted for a very strange thing , that they liked the empty husks better then those that had kernels in them . they then cast their eye upon monsieur casa's oven ; they entred where varchi was kneading , and from thence went into the shop where iovan baptista marini made spanish buskins , whereof whilst coppetta would have puld on one , and it proving to be very streight , he used violence in plucking of it on , that he tore it , so as ( which occasioned much laughter in the , rest ) he pulled off one of the straps , and gave a strapping fart . as apollo returned afterwards to his royal palace , some courtiers of great princes desired they might have leave to make some mascherades ; to whom his majestie answered , that they needed not to mask or disguise their faces , for that their souls were so well masked , as they might go any where safely , for he assured them they could not be known , neither by the eye , nor yet by the judgement of any man , how wise soever . the next day , according to custom , they ran races with their coaches ; and it fell out odly amongst those of four wheels , for many charrets appearing at the first starting with new wheels well greased , and swift horses , cornelius tacitus appeared there with a three-wheel'd charret , swathed round about , and drawn by lean weather-wrung-jades , which he had hired . and then it was that tacitus made his skill appear ; for being started , whilst all the other skilfull coachmen belaboured themselves in the cource , and deafned all the lookers on with the noise they made in whipping their horses , and speaking unto them , crying , stand up ; tacitus very tacitly , no waies discomposing himself , by his rare dexterity , and admirable skill , did so seasonably switch and put on his horses , and did so judiciously guide his disordered charret , as he was come to the staff or post , before the other fleeter charrets had driven two thirds of the way . whereby all the vertuosi of this state discerned how much the dexterity of a juditious wit , exceeds strength or force in all things in so much , as the wisest said , that they who carry on their business handsomly , with skill and dexterity , are fit to bring any disordered enterprize to a good end . the vertuosi were not so much delighted in seeing the courtiers run on foot naked : for they were much troubled to see what injustice was used in the inequality of the starting-places ; which the ignoble and poor vertuosi took from farr off ; whereas they that were noble and wealthy , were so near the staff , as without running , they might touch it , if they would but put forth their hand : so as by such inequality , they thought it rather a thing purchast by fortune , then gotten by industrious labour , when at court a poor litterato comes by the staff of honor and supream dignities . yet in this last race it was observed , that many noble and rich men came behind , and the poor mean runners won the reward : and though some say they did it through the humorousness of princes , and by favors backt by court ; yet the more judicious sort affirm , that it is necessary for such who by their dexterity and fair behaviour , know how to gain their princes love , and have the wit to arive at highest preferments from them , to have good legs to run withall . but great was the mirth which was caused in all the people , by a chance which hapned between two very noted personages of the court , who ( as it often falls out ) whilst the one thought to keep the other back , they justled one another , and grew so angry , as giving over the chief business of who should win the race , in the midst of the way ( which was very dirty ) they indiscreetly fell together by the ears , and after having cruelly bespattered one another , by foul accusations , and shamefull calumnies , they became a ridiculous spectacle to the lookers on ; and for their greater shame , were hist at by them . this , though it appeared ridiculous to the foolish rabble , was notwithstanding thought so worthy consideration by his majestie , that , as being very exemplary , he gave order that it should be cut in marble by praxiteles , that it might serve everlastingly for a lesson to wrangling courtiers . it merits memory , that whilst servius honoratus , master of the barbary horse which won the race , went crying through parnassus ( as the custom is ) long live virgil , that gallant personage , who counts that shame , which other poets account glory , caused servius to be bastinadoed by his servant daretes ; for which act , though apollo was much troubled at it , virgil justified himself , saying , that he had left such memory behind him in the world , as his name ought to be exalted and celebrated for his own worth , not for the gallantry of a horse . of former years the prizes were readily , and without any ceremony given to those that won them , by the governor of parnassus , and by the urban pretor ; but this year apollo would give them with his own hands : wherefore he caused it to be intimated to all the potentates that were in parnassus , by the publick parators , that they should appear in the royal hall , that they might be present at so important a ceremony : it seemed a great novelty to those princes , to hear that his majesty would have those princes who were summoned only upon weighty occasions , assist at an action which in former years was thought but mean. yet his majesties commands being upon pain of punishment , they all appeared . then apollo said , i know , my lords , that you very much wonder why i my self should now do that with so much solemnity , which formerly was performed by my officers without any manner of ceremony : but because not only all your happiness , but even all the greatest satisfaction which the the people over whom you command , does depend on this sole action ; for your own advantage i would have you present at it . learn then of me , all you rulers of the earth , to banish all privat passions from out your hearts ; and in rewarding those that serve you , govern your selves by their deserts , not by your own humors , and giving ( as you see me do now ) the prize of dignities , and reward of honours to those who by their honorable and laborious course of life have deserved them , you and your posterity will reigne happily for ever : when by doing otherwise , you will dishonour your selves , ruine your states , and of great princes , which now you are , you wil in time run evident danger of becoming privat foot souldiers , only for that you would be inamored of stinking carrion . the xxxii . advertisement . the militia of ianisaries , seeing one of their souldiers ill rewarded , mutiny in the ottoman monarchy , and are by apollo quieted . to the great terror of all the potentates of this state of parnassus in the ottaman quarter such an uproar arose , as alarms were given throughout the whole city ; and that potent signory presently drew forth her numerous armies , and as if she would come to a general battle , she ordered them in divers squadrons ; wherefore the germans , spaniards , and princes of italy , growing very jealous , took up arms also , and sent out their scouts to learn the reason of those rumors ; who brought back word , that the whole militia of janisaries were mutinied against the ottaman monarchy . apollo , who was presently advertised thereof by the pretorian bands of satirical poets who keep corps de gard continually in foro delfico , caused the uprore to be quieted , and then gave command that the ottaman monarchy , and the chief commanders of the janisaries who had mutinied , should appear before him : and because the ottaman monarchy , as also the janisaries would present themselves before apollo , accompanied by multitudes of men , they were told by the lyrick poets , who supply the place of porters , that in such occasion of tumults , people came modestly attended to princes ; wherefore the ottaman monarchy with his chief visier , and the gianasary who had been the occasion of this uprore , without any other company , were admitted unto his majesties audience . apollo demanded of the janisary the true cause of that tumult ? who answered , that he , accompanied by a spahi , with evident danger of losing their lives , had taken by surprise the important town of testis in persia : for which action , which was of infinite advantage to the ottaman empire , the spahi was largely rewarded by being made captain general of the asian cavallery , and that he who had merited as much , as the spahi was so ingratefully dealt withall , as he was only made spahi della porta ; which fowle partiallity was so much detested by the whole militia of janiaries , as they had joyntly taken up arms to revenge so great an injury . apollo having heard this , turned to the ottaman monarchy , and told her that he much wondred why such a princesse as she who professed to recompence the worth and merit of her souldiers with infinite rewards , had shewed her self so partial towards that janisary . to which the ottaman monarchy answered , that she had not so highly rewarded the janisary as he had done the spahi ( though he very well knew it became him so to have done ) out of an important reason , that it was well known to all men , that she took the young sons of her christian subjects , whereof he made three choices ; making such as were of best natural parts , a seminary of youths , who when they came to years of being imployed , they were placed in several services of the chamber , and about the very person of the ottaman emperors ; and to these , when they came to more mature years , the government of provinces was given , the care of armies , and the absolute command of his greatest empire . that out of the second choice he made his mighty horse-militia , and his gentil husmini della porta , called spahi . and out of the third , which was the refuge , and those of weakest natural parts , he formed his formidable militia of janisaries . and if it should so fall out , that a spahi should by his worth exceed the expectation which was had of him ( as was seen in the spahi who had surprised the fort of testis ) , he was admitted into the first rank ; but if it should happen that any extraordinary worth should be found in a janisary , by which he might have done some act of much merit , yet they were never raised to any higher degree by the ottaman emperors , than to the degree of spahi . and that the reason of this his resolution was ready ; for that the first seminary of bassaes , as also the second of the spahi , and the third of the janisaries , every one of them abundantly loving the brethren of their own classis , to give the command of armies , or government of provinces to men of the first or second seraglio , who were very few in comparison of the janisarie militia , was no waies dangerous ; but that to intrust places of jelousie in the hands of a captain , or other officer , who was come out of the janisarian body , would be an indiscreet and dangerous advice , by reason of the great retinue of so dreadfull a militia that such a subject would have : and so much the more , for that whereas the bassa's and spahi's being men highly minded , and who do not willingly subject themselves to their equals , live continually in strife , jelousies , and emulation , by reason of their pretences to the same preferments ; whereas the janisaries , as being an ignorant sort of people , did not only live in greater union , but would greatly admire , love , and even adore those who by their extraordinary worth , were got out of their classis . that therefore , to advance one to the supream power of a general , who would be followed and beloved by so mighty a militia , would be no better then to nurse up a serpent in ones bosom , which did misbecome a wise prince to do . and that the ottaman emperors held it for an infallible maxim in policy . that that militia on which the perpetuity , greatness and selicity of an empire was grounded , should be commanded in chief by a foreiner ; who would be obeyed by the army , or rather out of the reverence which the souldiers bear unto their prince , then for any merit , valor , nobility , or attendance they should find in the reiner . when apollo had heard this justification made by the ottaman empire , he did so much admire her wisdom , as he commanded that janisary to be quiet : and turning to some vertuosi that stood by , and said , that without reading wicked bodine , or mischievous machiavil , he found who was a perfect polititian ; since such barbarous princes , and who profess utter enmity to learning ; were the kings of men , in the exact understanding how to govern the world , and in the exquisite practice of the best state-reason . the xxxiii . advertisement . apollo frees carlo sigonio , and dionigi atanigi , the first being accused of ingratitude by pietro vittorio , and the other by hannibal caro. vvhilst apollo sate this morning in the tribunal of gratitude , in the company of the other judges , carlo sigonio , a learned noble man of modena , was brought before his majestie by the keepers of the prison , fast bound ; whom piero vittorio a florentine , complained against bitterly , for that this sigonio being seased on by the sargeants , who were carrying him to prison for a debt of a thousand duckets which he ought to paulo manutio , he , to keep his friend from suffering such an affront , and from the prejudice of long imprisonment , had with such liberality , as was more then he could well do , disburst the thousand duckets to manutio , which having afterwards re-demanded of sigonio , he had set several times for the payment of it , but sigonio still broke his word , so as finding himself at last abused , he was inforced much against his will , to imprison him ; and that seeing his former friendship strengthened by so great a courtesie , was turned into hatred , he was much grieved that sigonio in so just a cause should so often falcifie his promise ; he therefore desired , that as an unacknowledging and ungratefull man , he might receive condign punishment , according to the laws of gratitude . apollo did so little value vittorio's impeachment , as openly taking upon him sigonios protection , he said that they broke their words who did not fulfil such things as were in their power to do ; but as for the promise of paying of monies upon a prefixt day , they were only to blame , who coyning monies by the malignity of a lying intention , and not by the meer want of coyne , did not make good their promise . then turning to vittorio , he said , that such a one as he ought to consider , that the courtesie he had done to sigonio , was one of those whereof the obligation of gratitude was lost , when all that was rigorously exacted , which was known to be deserved by a friend : for such courtesies as did exceed the condition of the receiver , were done by the vertuosi , only to discover their magnanimous liberal mind , and only the more to oblige a man : and that great good turns done to such friends as were of ability , were sufficiently rewarded by purchase of the fame of being bountifull and liberal . as apollo had ended this cause , the impeachment was heard which the commendador hannibal caro made against dionigi atonigi , wherein it was alleadged , that when mario molza died for having had to do with too many women , he left a little daughter of his to his custody , which when she came to be sixteen years old , he gave to wife to atonigi with a portion of crowns : in which resolution , the violence of his affection to atonigi , had overcome the consideration of his beggerly estate , which ought to have kept him from making that alliance . and that atonigi being thus well dealt withall by his dear friend , was not ashamed in recompence of so great a good turn , to acknowledge it by the beggerly gift of a douzen shirts , and four hand-towels : and that after so great ingratitude , the very marriage day he had very discourteously forbidden him his house ; he then added with tears in his eies , that he having bred up that young woman as if she had been his own beloved daughter , she likewise loved him as if he had been her father , and that to see himself deprived of her so dearly prized conversation , was the thing of the world that did most torment him . apollo answered caro , that doubtlesly atonigi had done amiss ; and therefore commanded , that to compleat the gift of twelve shirts , and four hand-towels , he should immediately add a douzen handkerchifs , and eight night-caps , with which demonstration of gratefulness , caro should think himself well rewarded by atonigi . when caro heard this judgement given by apollo , he was not only ( as it became him to have been ) not appeased , but growing very outragious , he freely said , that in this discourteous act of atonigi , tacitus his sentence was proved very true upon himself , that , benificiaeo usque laeta sunt , dum videntur exolviposse , ubi multum antevenere , pro gratia odium redditur . tacit. lib. : ann. benefits are so long welcom , as there is any appearance of a possibility of repayment , which when it is much exceeded , hatred is repaid instead of love . apollo hearing this , answered caro somewhat angerly , that tacitus his sentence was very true , but very badly understood by him , and by many others : for great benefits were usually seen to berepaid with infinite ingratitude , more through the impertinency of the benifactor in exacting gratitunde of anothers obligation , then through the discourtesie of the receiver . then growing more incenst , his majestie said to caro , do not you know , signor hanibal , that the extraordinary affection which guardians bear their women-wards , when they are once grown into their teens , is usually turned into libidinous love ? and are you one of those special officers , whereof i have known divers , that for having helpt a friend to a rich wife , will be paid for their good turn , by a nights lodging with the bride ? and in so many years as you have lived in the well pollisht court of rome , have not you learnt , that as well wives , as principalities , cannot be given to a friend , with intension of reserving the use of them to ones self , without running apparent danger of having the difference decided by the sword ? then apollo said thus to atonigi ; my beloved dionigi , injoy thy dear wife in peace and quiet ; and if caro shall at any time tax thee of ingratitude , call you him impertinent , and so you shall give him his due name . the xxxiv . advertisement . publius terentius being by order from giasone dol maino , an urban pretor , charged with fornication ; is by apollo freed , with much derision to the pretor . publius terentius lives in a little , but very well accommodated house in the quarters of the commick poets attended only by his maid-servant bacchide , and davus his man-servant . and though bacchide in the flowre of her age was very handsom , and a great friend of terentius , & of many other commick poets , yet now being very old , and therefore somewhat deform'd , she lives modestly , and without any scandal , in terentius his house , and without offence unto the neighbours . but some ten daies since , giasone mayno a modern pretor of urban , commanded terentius upon a certain penalty , that he should put bacchide out of his house , and so free himself from the shame of keeping a publick concubin . terentius did not only not obey this command , but refused to pay the amercement ; wherefore the pretor gave order for arresting his body , and he was yesterday taken ; whereat apollo was so highly offended , as he said in publick , that even in parnassus the wicked abuse was brought in , by his rather malitious then ignorant officers , of being quick-sighted in appearance ; but blind in the substance of affairs . wherefore giving order that terentius should be forthwith set at liberty , he caused giasone , to the infinite shame of so great a lawyer , to be cast into the same prison ; and did not only publickly disgrace him , by taking from him the place of pretor , but did exceedingly grieve him by substituting philippo decio in his place , who was his capital enemy . and decio being gone yesterday to apollo , to receive the mace and tipstaff , the particular ensignes of the pretorian dignity , his majestie told him , that he might learn that by giasons punishment , that good judges , who in the administration of justice , did mind more the pleasing of god , then making merry with men , the alessi were first driven out of the dores of respected poets , and then the bacchidi . the xxxv . advertisement . publick audience is given by apollo , wherein by wise answers , he decides many affairs of his vertuosi . the contentment of princes who love to see their people well satisfied , consisting chiefly in the often hearing all mens grievances ; apollo , to boot with his other often audiences , gives publick audience every thursday in his great hall , attended by his senats , collaterals , and full parliaments of this court. and because that therein vertuous resolutions are had , and such as are worthy to be known by those who living far from this state , have the curiosity to hear news from parnassus ; menante , who was present at the last audience , expresly that he might satisfie his customers , will now give you a true relation of all the chief things that hapned there . the first who addrest themselves to apollo in this audience , were two honourable ambassadors , who told his majestie that they were sent from mankind , who weary of the necessity they were in , of eating every morning and evening , did much bewail , that human wit , so highly indued , and capable of understanding and knowing all things , who together with their mothers milk , did drink in the unexplicable curiosity of still learning , should notwithstanding be wholly busied in fordid occupation of cultivating the earth , and in other painfull exercises , only to provide food for himself , as bruit beasts do ; that therefore they were sent to his majestie to ask councel , whether mankind should do well to beg of gods divine majestie that he would be pleased to grant men the benefit of living long without meat , as he had done to dormise , snakes , bears , and otheir animals . a thing which they desired , only to the end that they might with a fasting mind or stomack , which doth so much better the operations of the intellect , apply themselves to the study of all those sciences which belonged properly to men . this request which was thought to be very honorable , and full of vertuous zeal , by all that heard it , was much derided by apollo ; who answered the ambassadors , that those who through strange conceits , and extravagant novelties , thought to new mould the world , did alwaies fancy unto themselves ridiculous things . and then he asked the ambassadors what obligation the earch had to so great a god. the ambassadors answered , she was bound to propuce green grass and plants . apollo reply'd , if it were so , why , for the space of years and more , that the earth had absolutely obeyed the will of her creator , were there no woods seen but on mountains and in desert places ? the ambassadors said , this was because men for their plowing ( which was the sustenance of mans life ) did with their axes cut down the woods in such places as were aft to bear corn. apollo asked them then again , to what case the world would be reduced , if husbandmen had not weeded and purged it of such superfluous plants as the earth produced ? the ambassadors answered , that then doubtless the world would be so overgrown with wood , as it would be uninhabitable . apollo asked once more , whether they did believe that men did busie themselves in cutting down of woods , rather out of a desire that free commerce might be had among nations , or that they might reap the abundance of fruit which the earth produced , being sown and planted by mans industry ? to this the ambassadors reply'd , that the great abundance of pleasant products which by mans industry the earth brought forth , made the noble art of husbandry appear not painfull , but full of delight . the ambassadors having clearly learnt by this answer , and by the precedent interrogatives made by apollo , that if men did neither eat nor drink , the world would be so ful of woods and forrests , as it would rather be a fitting habitations for bears , wolves , and other wild beasts , then for men , departed the audience much confused . they being gone , menenius agrippa came to apollo , and told him , that he having happily ended the important and difficult business of making peace between the senat of rome , and the common people , who being distasted , had withdrawn themselves into the aventine mountain ; that he might purcase more grace from his majesty , and a more honorable place in parnassus , he acquainted him now , that he had bethought himself of another handsom story ; by which he hoped to agree the great disunion between the hollanders and the spaniard . apollo laught to hear this , and answered menenius . that mens humors were so alter'd in process of time , and that hatred was grounded so inveteraly in them , as not only rediculous tales were not able to appease those obstinate people , nor make them lay down their perfidiousness which they proposed unto themselves when first they rebel'd , of purchasing their liberty at the price of bloud , or else to die in the quarrel : but neither were the sad tragedies able to effect it , which to that purpose had been represented upon the scene of the low-countries by the spaniards , for above the space of fifty years . menenio being departed with this little satisfaction ; paolo vitelli , that famous conductor of the state of florence , appeared with his head cut off ( a most horrid spectacle ) in the audience ; who complained bitterly of that republick , for that in a precipitous-manner , without any confession made by himself , or any of his friends ( who were imprisoned for his sake ) which did any waies prejudice his innocency , he out of slight suspitions , and not being suffered to speak for himself , had his head struck off in florence the very next morning after his imprisonment : and that the judgement was hastned , not for that the importancy of the fact was such as could brook no delay ; but to hinder the intercession of great princes , who would have moved to assist him . apollo seemed much to abhor that judgement ; and because he greatly loved , and admired the worth of that military man , he desired the judges that they would give their opinions in the case . who when they had heard the relation of the process , gave sentence for vitelli's innocency : wherefore apollo by publick decree did restore vitelli to his former ancient reputation . paolo thanked his majesty , and very humbly beseeched him , that for his satisfaction , and to keep other commonwealths from giving such precipitous judgements , he would be pleased to shew some rigorous rescentment against the florentines . apollo wisht vitelli to be quiet , for that his son alessandro making use of the fair occasion which fell into his hands after the death of duke alexander , had so revenged his fathers death , as had infinitely surpassed all the tearms of the guardian-ship , for which he was impeached . as soon as apollo had given satisfaction to vitelli , carmagnuolo , a famous venetian captain , who had likewise been beheaded , complained bitterly before his majesty against the state of venice , who out of vain suspitions had unjustly taken off his head : and then he delivered his process and his sentence into apollo's hands . apollo , without either receiving or perusing the process , willed carmagnuolo to rest content , for no review , nor yet appeal was allowed of , from any sentence maturely given by an aristocratical senat ( as was that of venice ) out of the great presumption he had of her exact administration of justice . carmagnuolo being gon from the audience , an african ( to the wonder of every one ) was seen to enter the hall , leading in his hand a lusty lyon , by a little chain , which lyon was so very tame , as it fawn'd upon its master like a little whelp . this man presenting himself before apollo , in the name of hanibal the carthaginian , gave him that lyon , which his majesty was very well pleased withall ; who asked the african what art he had used to tame , so fierce , ravenous , jealous , and cruel a beast ? the african answered , by feeding him continually with his own hand . apollo turned then towards the princes , who for the honour of that audience , were there in great numbers , and said unto them , learn , lords , by the miracle of this lyon which you see is become so tame , that fair treatment doth domestichize even savage beasts ; doe you the like by your subjects , and make them not come hardly by their food , through your angersom taxes upon things necessary for human life ; for by so doing , you shall not be beloved , served , and honoured by your own natural subjects only , but even by the most forrein and barbarous nations of the earth . this being said , two armed foot-souldiers appeared in the audience , who when they had presented his majesty with their credential letters , told him , that they having forsaken their country , wives , children , and means , to serve princes , without any respect to their own lives ; that whilst they bore arms in the most remote wars , by vertue of the not only cruel , but inhuman military laws , they were cruelly slain , hung up upon trees , shot to death , by their superiors , even for the smallest faults . and that through the unheard of cruelty of modern commanders , the ancient punishment for shaping out of their quarters , of having their share of provant in barley , and other less severe executions , being now no longer in use , every least misdemeanor , were it but of omission , was punisht with death ; and not he who understood , or knew most , was thought the best judge in the camp , but he who was most resolute in executing cruelty ; and that the inhumanity of military laws was grown so great , as the circumspection , equity , and consideration which they ought to have who judge not beasts , but men , was esteemed poorness of spirit , and idle folly . that therefore the universality of souldiers so sorely afflicted , did humbly beseech his majesty , that he would be pleased to order the moderation of so inhuman laws . there was not any one in the audience , how severe soever , who was not mov'd to hear the barbarity of these military laws : only apollo shewed no compunction , but with an angry countenance , thus answered those souldiers ; who forceth you to forgo your own homes , and to change the wholsom human laws under which you are born , with those severe ones which are practised in war ? he who falls down of himself , deserves not to be raised up , nor is there any mercy to be hoped for from one who is so very cruel to himself . this request having received its answer , much to the delight of all the vertuosi that were at the audience , the famous printers appeared before . apollo , namely , sebastian grifo , guilielmo ruell of lyons , christofano plautino of antwerp , the giunti of florence , giolito , valgresi , and many others from venice ; and amongst these the learned aldo manutio did not disdain to make one , who in the name of all his fellows , told apollo ; that of all modern inventions found out by the wit of man , he thought the precedency ought to be given to the press , both for the use and admirable felicity thereof : a benefit , which had the ancient litterati had , they would not have so lamented the burning of former libraries ; and that now the press had not only for ever secured the past and present labours of the vertuosi , but had made the way to learning much more easie ; and that his majesties state wanting so excellent an invention , if he should so please , they would for the publick good , bring it upon their own cost and charges , into parnassus . apollo absolutely refused that offer , and said , that men praised the art of printing upon very indiscreet grounds ; for it was that that had infinitely obscured the glory of the liberal sciences : for having made libraries more numerous then good , they were admired only by the ignorant ; and that when with infinite labour , the writings of other men were copyed out by the pen , such as deserved not to pass through the hands of his litterati , they and their shame died in the house of their unfortunate author : whereas now so great abundance of foolish and ignorant volumes were printed , as that libraries were shamefully cram'd with them , to the little reputation of the liberal sciences , and of his litterati ; and that by the reason of the unexhausted store which were printed of the learned labours of the vertuosi , the homers , virgils , ciceros divine and painfull labours , which for the miracle of their wits , ought to be shewn to men only upon some particular daies of the year , were polluted by flies and moths in every book binders shop : that therefore they might be gon when they pleased , for he would by no means admit of the break-neck of the too ambitious litterati into parnassus . presently after this , seneca the moralist appeared before his majestie , who had caused his cruel enemy publio suilio to be personally cited before that audience ; and rather in rage then anger , complained of certain injurious words which that man had spoken to the prejudice of his reputation ; wherefore he pressed that he might be punished as a slanderer . apollo commanded suilio to repeat the words by which seneca took himself to be so highly injured . suilio confest ingeniously , that moved thereunto rather out of truth , then any privat hatred , upon a certain occasion which arose , he had reproached seneca with these words used by him , qua sapientia , quibus philosophorum preceptis ; intra quadrienium regia amicitiae , ter millies sestertium paravisset ? romae testamenta , & orbos velut indagine ejus capi . italiam & provincias , immenso fenore hauriri . tacit. lib. . annall . seneca perceiving that apollo was very much scandalized at the excessive getting of seven millions and a half of monies in so short a time , told apollo , the world knew his wealth , though it were very great , proceeded not from any greedy desire he had of riches , but from neros meer liberality . apollo , who did not approve of senecas excuse , said freely to him , that the floud of that his immence wealth , which was very shamefull in such a philosoper as he was , especially when gotten in the twinkling of an eye , must of necessity have received troubled waters from the torrents of fowl industry . to which seneca answered , that his condition was not to be considered according to suilios rotten tongue , which was so accustomed to lying , as he lived only by the infamous practice of slander and back-biting , but by the so much praised and admired writings which he had published . suilio finding himself thus bitterly offended by seneca , answered boldly , that it was not the pen which exactly shew'd what men were , but the leading of their lives : for works , not words , were the true touchstone whereby to know the true allay of mens genius . seneca being about to reply , apollo , who was nauseated by that hatefull difference , turned towards him , and bad him say no more ; for great riches gotten by any whosoever in a short time , brought but little of reputation with them , and that it behooved of necessity , that to the sweet of so rich treasure , the sowre of publick mumurs should be added . at last , fetching a deep sigh from the bottom of his heart , apollo said , i heartily wish , o seneca , that either thou hadst never been born , or that thou hadst not left the seed of so many punctual followers of thy behaviour . seneca quitted the audience with this but smally satisfactory resolution . when the two noble princesses , the roman lucrece , and katherin sforza , bowed to apollo , to whom lucretia ( to whose share it fell to speak first ) said , that by witness of all historians who had written the affairs of rome , the fowle outrage which tarquin the proud had done her , having been the only powerfull cause why the kingdom of rome was turned into so famous a commonwealth , and which was so much celebrated throughout the world , she had not notwithstanding obtained so honourable a place in parnassus as she thought she deserved , and which in the opinion of all the vertuosi , was due unto her : and that helen of greece , who compared to her , had been the occasion of but trivial novelties , had obtained a much higher place . she therefore desired , that if his majestie should think she had suffered wrong , she might be righted . apollo answered lucretia , that the change of the roman servitude into liberty , and the driving of the tarquins out of rome , was attributed to the outrage done to her , by those only who understood but little of the worlds affairs ; but that those who saw further into state-affairs , knew very well , that the tarquins lost so famous a kingdom , when by their bad comportments they made themselves so hatefull to the plebeians , on whose good will their greatness was grounded ; for it was hard to bring such a kingdom as was that of the romans ( which by reason of the infinite priviledges it enjoyed , might be said to live in a sort of liberty ) to receive total bondage , without openly provoking the enmity of the senat , and of the whole roman nobility , which were by natural instinct given to be very desirous of liberty , and consequently very jealous of their countries priviledges . that therefore the tarquins , though undergoing some indignities , ought tenaciously to have endeavored the not losing the affection of the people of rome , which was that which did not only maintain them in power , but which might have setled them in a perfect monarchy : which leaning-stock , when through their ignorance they lost , they gave a fitting occasion for the nobility to joyn upon any the least accident which might occur with the common people , and to take up arms aaainst them , just as it fell out by the outrage which they had committed against her . he further told lucretia , that if she should obtain from him the place in parnassus which she desired , she would only have taught people the trivial document , that princes in their lust ought above all things , to avoid the staining the bloud of their great ones ; but that being in the place she was in , she clearly proved that important politick precept , that when a prince knows not how to keep the nobility and common sort of people divided , and hath not wit enough to make either the one or the other of them greatly partial to himself , but through ignorance makes both of them his enemies ; it is as easie to drive him out of his dominions , as it is to throw down an oak , how great soever , whose roots are first cut away . with this answer lucretia was dismist the audience , when catherin sforsa , princess of imola and forli , told his majestie , that her husband being cruelly murthered by the conspiracy of some of her disloyal subjects , and the castle holding out for her , she , to the end that both her state and her own person might not fall into her enemies power , made them believe that she would deliver up the castle to them , if they would permit her to go thereinto , that so she might make her souldiers give way to the surrendring of it , and that for their security , she would deliver up her little children as hostages unto them ; and that when she was got into the castle , she from off the walls threatned the conspirators with condign punishment for the wickedness they had committed : wherefore the conspirators seeing themselves thus deceived , protested openly , that unless she would deliver up the castle unto them , they would cut her children in pieces before her face : that she was not at all astonished at these their horrid threats , but plucking up her clothes , and shewing them her privacies , she bad them do what they would with her children , for she had still the mould to cast others in . for which her resolution , she was highly commended by all historians . she desired that apollo would poynt out for her what place he should best please , in parnassus . the judges differed much in their opinions concerning this demand ; some of them thought it to be an act of shameless and affronted impudency . but apollo affirming , that to keep still within the terms of modesty , was the duty of privat women , said that princesses who were descended of high and noble bloud , upon any weighty occasions which should occur unto them , were bound to shew manliness . the vote given by cino of pistoia upon this occasion , is not to be past over in silence , who said ; that that place was worthy to be seen by all men , out of which was come that famous champion iovanni d' medici , father to that great cosmo , who having been the happy founder of the flourishing tuscan monarchy , from which italy now receives so great splendor and ornament , hath deserved immortal fame and glory throughout all ages . katherin sforza having obtained the favor she desired , a court-notary drew near to apollo , who acquainted his majestie , that giovan pico , count of mirandola , that phenix of all sciences , and only ornament of all vertue being some few daies sithence departed this life , had by his last will and testament , left a legacy of threescore and ten thousand crowns , to be disposed of to some such pious use as his majesty should please to appoint . apollo being told this , forthwith commanded that an hospital for the incureable , should be built with those monies , where all diligent care and charity should be used for the cure of such as were sick of ambition , an infirmity from which those that were affected with it , could never free themselves , licineo mecenate , the delight of that state , whose house is a secure haven for all the vertuosi , and a sanctuary for the litterati , said then , that he by the disposal of his whole patrimony amongst the vertuosi , having deserved the prerogative that all such as use any extraordinary liberality towards the litterati , should be called mecenati , was much grieved that his name should be irregularly and lavishly used , by mean and hunger-starv'd foolish scholars , for some little reward which they might receive from princes . apollo was much troubled at mecenates complaint , and to the end that that glorious title might be perpetually maintained in its due decorum , he decreed that for the time to come , no man under the pain of infamy , should presume to give the honorable title of mecenas to any prince , from whom he had not formerly received costly and curious food and rayment during life . then great tamberlan the scythian appeared before apollo , in so great pomp , as gave much delight to all the audience , who were likewise very much pleased with the novelty of his phantastical face and habit . this truely singular man who had the vain glory to be called the emperor of the east , having ( according to the custom of his nation ) only bowed his head a little to apollo by way of salute , said , that he who by his worth had raised himself from the mean condition of a shepheard , to such a greatness , as to have formed a vast empire , and to be the man alone , who of all the princes of the universe , had discomfeited the numerous ottaman armies in open field , and taken the prince of so dreadful an empire prisoner , to the end that he might obtain a fitting place in parnassus , was not satisfied , but rather thought himself much injured by finding himself placed in the classis of famous commanders , and not in that ( which he thought he had very well deserved to be ) of founders of great kingdoms , wherein he found romulus , caesar , pharamond , ottaman , and many others placed . apollo answered tamberlan , that great difference being put in parnassus , between overrunning a number of great kingdoms with numerous forces , and the founding of an empire , he did ill to pretend to the place of founders of monarchies , which was only granted to such , who to the worth of knowing how to purchase , had the singular wisdom joyned , of knowing how to maintain . for the gallantry of many souldiers shared in acquisitions , but the safe preserving of what was got , shewed the exquisite wisdom of one only prince ; and that the prerogative of founders of kingdoms was only granted in parnassus to such , who had so well joyned the vertue of maintaining , to the valor of archieving , as they had so well ordered and established the states which they had won , as to transmit them happily over to the third heir . a thing which had been so little observed by him , as even his own immediate sons could not keep the states which he had won at the expence of so much bloud ; and that according to tacitus his precept , neither prince , nor any privat captain , who would win the fame of being wise and advised in the mannaging of arms , ought nova moliri , nisi prioribus firmatis : attempt new things , unless they had setled former : for he , longinquis itineribus percursando , quae conservari nequibant ; following after what was not to be kept , had imitated those base smel-feasts , who eating more then they could well digest , were with shame compelled to cast up what they had eaten . and that though alexander the great , at his first entrance into parnassus , had extraordinarily affected the same prerogative of a founder of new monarchies ; yet by reason of his indiscreet way of warfaring in asia ( which he rather overrun as a ringleader of robbers , then subjugating as a great king , by the true rules of military art ) he could not obtain it . tamberlan went much afflicted from the audience , when alexander vellutelli appeared before apollo , who presented his majestie with his commentary upon petrarks sonnets . apollo , before he would take the book , asked vellutello what stile he had used in commenting upon the rhimes of that excellent poet. and vellutello answering , that first he endeavored to shew the occasion why the sonnet was made , and that afterwards he gave the true signification of the words , and made known the poets conceit ; apollo bad him keep his commentaries to himself ; for , for his part he loved those commentators upon poets , which discovered unto the reader the authors subtilty in weaving of his poem ; who shewed wherein the excellency of his verse lay , which were his flourishes , which his figures , and which the other poetical beauties ; and that the italian poems were so perspicuous of themselves , as they needed not any such commentators , who supplyed only the base office of interpreting words to gross and ignorant people . vellutello received this very small satisfaction from apollo , when a certain personage appeared before his majestie , who told him , that he having commanded the famous province of pamphillia , had willingly given over his command , meerly out of a desire of living retiredly ; wherefore he desired that the same place might be alloted to him in parnassus , which those vertuosi enjoy , who have proved by their actions , that they are masters of that excellent vertue of moderation . apollo answered this man , that kingdoms are sometimes renounced by vertue of a soul inamor'd of that felicity which men enjoy in a vertuous privat life ; oft-times to satisfie sons who are arived at years fitting to rule people , and sometimes to shun the tumults of rebellion , or out of fear of some potent enemy , and not seldom through unaptness for government ; wherefore he would be informed what was fitting to be done in this weighty business , by examiners deputed to the like affairs ; who if they should find that he had done so gallant an action , and which is so strongly withstood by humane nature , as to relinquish a kingdom , mearly out of a well disposed mind , he would willingly grant him a sublime place amongst those other demi-gods , who had preferred the peace of a private life , before the hazards of reigning ; and he should be the more content to do this , for that the execrable ambition of reigning was so disproportionably now increased amongst men , as that to come by kingdoms , they did not onely gladly imbrace any whatsoever wicked enterprizes , but all means which were used to compass so abominable ends , were by men esteemed to be good and vertuous , though they were infinitely wicked and inhumane ; that if they should find he had renounced government , either to please his children , grown already fit for rule ; or that he might see the succession of his empire settled in his blood during his own life , he would give him an honourable place amongst those prudent princes , who by quickly giving over their states to their children , have known how to shun coming to some woful end with them , who were become impatient of living a private life : but if it should be found , that being under the great weight of government , wherein men ought to shew the greatest worth , he had renounced his kingdom out of poorness of spirit , incapable of such greatness , he might then return back again : for the true moderation of the soul being seen in gallantly undergoing cases of adversity , not in losing a mans self in prosperity , his parnassus was very unlike those wicked times of nero. quibus inertia pro sapientia suit . tacit. vitae agricoll : when slothfulness was taken for wisdom . presently after the duke of rhodes , a man not well thought of in this state , by reason of his apparent foul vices , came to apollo , to whom he grievously complained of the lewd life that his people led ; for he said , that gluttony , lust , implacable enmity , by which his subjects made the streets run with humane blood , did very much reign in his state ; and that the moneys which they ought to spend vertuously in feeding their families , they viciously threw them away at dice , the very seminary of contention ; and such severe punishments as keep men from doing ill in other places , not proving any ways valid for the cure of so great an infirmity in his state , he humbly beseeched his majestie for some opportune remedy to this his so great necessity . apollo answered the duke , that it being impossible but that people should be their princes apes , he might compass his desired end , when abandoning the idleness , lust , play , and bloody customs , to which he was so greatly given , he would amend his own ways ; for the best bezar to cure the members of a languishing body , was to be applyed to the ill-affected head , it not being possible but that a prince , who himself lives devilishly , should have worse devils then himself to his subjects . this prince being gone , a young stoick , of appearing civil behaviour , complained grievously to apollo , that whilst being yet but a novice , he was , without any reason , expelled the house wherein he had much desired to spend all his days . apollo inquired of epictetus , who was there present , wherefore the stoicks of his sect had dismist that young novice . epictetus answered , because for six moneths space that that young man had been a novice , not the least imperfection could be found in him , though all his proceedings had been narrowly pryed into by many of his sect . apollo hearing this , seemed much to abhor the nature of that young man ( who appeared to the whole audience to be very modest and well composed ) and said , that he must certainly have devilish vices hid within him , who had not the excellent vertue of discovering some of those imperfections , which all men that were made of flesh did so abound in the very first day of their conversation with other men . thus was the young stoick dismist when giacomo 〈◊〉 came in a great heat into the hall , and told apollo , that being sent for by the genoeses to write the story of their countrey , he was persecuted by them , and accused of viciousness , and at once lost both his life and his reputation , onely for that some of them found him resolute to obey the truth in things that were past , with that liberty which becomes 〈◊〉 historian , without respect of persons . apollo , contrary to the belief of all men , did not onely seem not any ways to compassionate what had be●…en this his vertuoso ▪ but in a resenting manner told buonfadio , that though the fault for which he was proceeded against was false , yet he had deserved to be treated as he had been by the genoeses , for his foul indiscretion . for to profess that a man will write things prejudicial to the honour of great parsonages , whilst they and their children are alive , though the things he write be true , was rather an act of imprudency and rashness , then of an incorrupted mind , that greatly loves truth ; and that he was a greater fool who believed he could save his life from the anger of a powerful man , whose reputation he had asperst with his pen , though but slightly , much more if he should wholly dishonour him ; and that historians might do very wisely to imitate grape-gatherers , and others , who had skill in fruits , who knowing they stould not please men if plucking unripe grapes from the vines , and green apples from apple-trees , they should bring them to the market , had that requisite patience ( which would likewise very well become historians ) to stay till time might bring things to perfection ; and that the great master of wise historians , tacitus , when in his writings he mentioned those great senators who tiberio regnante penam vell infamiam subire , who underwent punishment or disgrace in tiberius his reign , when they had any posterity living , wisely took his pen from off his paper , chusing rather to erre against the laws of history , then to prejudice the reputation of such families , who were known to value nothing so much as their honour ; for that singular man thought it to be a thing of too eminent danger to an historian , nimis ex propinquo diversa arguere . tacit. lib. . annal. to contradict actions too near at hand . buonfadio went away much afflicted from the audience , by reason of this publick reprehension ; when with unspeakable gravity zeno the great founder of the sect of stoicks , drew near to apollo , to whom , after he had saluted him , he said , that being to go upon a far ambassy , for affairs much importing the prince of guido , he desired to take his leave of apollo's majestie , and to kiss his hands , before he took his journey . apollo perceiving that the prince of guido was himself present at the audience , asked him with a very angry countenance , if there were not other litterati in parnassus , to make use of upon that his occasion , and whether he were one of those princes , who through avarice , and out of a malitious intent of being able to break his word with less danger , committed such indignities , as to send stoicks to lie at inns. his majestie complained afterwards very much of the stoicks , who making open profession to have abandoned ambition , and all worldly pomp , did not withstanding wind themselves so willingly into state affairs , wherein great impieties being often times committed , it were an excellent thing that they were not onely negociated by ignorant people , but even not known unto them . then turning to zeno , he in a no less angry manner said unto him , that he having promist before both god and man to attend one profession , if he should afterwards publikely undertake another imployment , it was an action of infinite scandal ▪ and that such a one as he , the founder of so famous a sect ▪ should , by greatly abhorring the courts of princes , and by sequestring himself wholly from their affairs , make tacitus rather appear alyar to all the world , then a teller of truth , who had termed the stoick sect , arrogant . et quae turbidos , & negotiorum appetentes faciat . tacit. lib. . annal : which makes men turbulent , and desirous of business . zeno was thus dismist the audience with scorn , when many princes together in company presented themselves before apollo , who told him , that they did love to learn sciences as well as did the other vertuosi of pernassus , and that they did esteem the liberal arts very highly ; but that the mountain of vertue being very steep and craggy , it was so difficult to get to the top of it , as the lovers of learning weakening always their stomacks , disturbing their heads , breaking sometimes the vain of their breasts , and spoiling their eye-sight , the litterati were generally seen to fall into the dangerous diseases of hectick feavers , tisicks , and into hypocondriacal indispositions ; that therefore they humbly desired his majestie that he would be graciously pleased so to facilitate the way unto this mountains top , as princes who were not accustomed to such insufferable labours , might have some encouragement to arrive at the top of it . to these apollo answered , that the onely means whereby to make the way to the liberal arts easie , was the fervent love of learning , the taking delight in reading the fruitful labours of his litterati , and to study out of pleasure ; but that princes being accustomed by their moneys to possess at night whatsoever of exquisite they had desired in the morning , would likewise possess themselves of the precious treasures of sciences in their pastimes and idle delights ; wherefore they did abhor such things as were onely to be come by by labour and toil ; and that the famous francisco maria della ●…overe , ought to incourage them to clime the mountain : who thinking learning the onely recreation of elevated souls , the delight and sole contentment of great men , was , to the glory of the liberal arts , to the honour of italian princes , and to the singular glory of the present age , become the most universal and best grounded litterato which the present time had in all the choicest sciences ; he therefore wisht them not to think the study of learning so hard a business , nor so laborious a thing but pleasant past me and recreation , and that so they might as easily come to the mountains top , as if they had made the journey in a coach with six horses . these princes seemed to depart very well satisfied with this answer ; when luca guarico appearing before his majestie , said , that he having foretold iovanni bentivoglio , that bolognian tyrant , that he should that year be driven out of his country ; which accordingly succeeded , bentivoglio had inhumanely made him be ceased on by sergeants , and caused him to have fifty lusty stripes given him with a rope ; which having much discomposed all his bones , had also wounded his reputation . he therefore desired his majestie that he would be pleased to rescent that high peice of injustice in such sort as he should best like . apollo seemed to all men rather to laugh at the harm and 〈◊〉 that was done to this man , then any way to compassionate him ; and asked by what art of divination he had foretold this calamity to bentivoglio ? guarico answered , by the excellent science of judicial astrologie which he had very much studied . apollo replyed , why did not the same astrology which made you foresee other mens misfortunes , admonish you of your own mishaps ? guarico answered , because through his parents negligence , he knew not what day he was born on . apollo then laught , and greatly despising guarico's vain and unfortunate study , told him , he was a great fool , and worthy the misfortune which had befallen him ; for wise men hated to be the first bringer of ill news , even to men of the meanest sort , much more to princes , whose ears were so delicate , as they delighted in nothing but good news ; wherefore it was better to flatter them , by foretelling them a long and happy life , and to assure them that they should quickly enjoy many things which they desired , and be very happy . for to foretel princes who were jealous of their lives and good fortunes , that their death was near at hand , or any other bad accidents , and to profess the doing of this by a false art , which onely became foolish people , was to shew that a man did desire all those misfortunes should befal them which he did prognosticate . guarico was no sooner dispatcht , but count s. paul appeared , a noble prince of france , who sorely complained unto his majestie against lodowick the eleventh king of france , who after having pardoned him , and sealed his pardon with many oathes , had made his head be struck off . apollo , with much cruelty , answered the count , that he ought not to blame king lodowick so much for this his misfortune , as his own imprudency ; for when subjects arrive once at so great rashness as to take up arms against their lords and masters , they were very great fools if they did trust them at any time after . for nothing of more shameful being to be seen in a state , then that a man should walk therein who had plotted his princes death and the ruine of his state ; all princes thought it less shameful to break their words , then to live with such a blur in their face . that therefore they onely ought to confide in such like pardons as made a prince be praised for clemency ; but that for such as brought shame with them , they ought to trust no more unto them then to a rotten rope . as apollo was a little advanced , iovan-paolo lancellotto , a famous perugian lawyer , appeared , who presented unto his majestie his compleat commentaries which he had lately made upon his admirable canonical institution . this noble vertuoso was chearfully and lovingly received by his majestie : yet apollo told him , he had been very ill advised to gloss upon the argument of his well filed institution , for such eminent wits as he , who were absolutely masters of the matters which they write upon , using very artificially a succinct and pithy brevity , as if they gave others the substance and quintescence , by them extracted not without much pains from the difficultest sciences shewed , and that much to their honour , that they writ to such as were learned , who did fully understand the subject they treated on ; which leaving without any commentaries , they made it appear unto the world , that what seemed hard and obscure to others , was very easie and clear to themselves : that if it hapned afterwards that other vertuosi commenting upon the learned labours of other men , for the publike benefit of the lovers of learning , they did so wittily adorn them with various acceptions of several significations , as they made them oft times speak excellent things , and which their authors never dreamt of , as it luckily befel aristotle , illustrated by averoe's his eminent wit ; and homer , who being most happy of all other writers , in having learned commentators , was very much inriched by the learned labours of other men . the last that appeared was claudius nero the emperor ; who signified to apollo , that being at last aware of his wife agrippina's shameful incontinency , who blinded by the violent ambition of government had given her self over to the imbracements of his base servant pa●…antes , he was resolved to take such revenge upon her , as the world saw he had done upon messalina , who had likewise been an unchaste wife of his . but that this wicked woman , being gotten into thali●…'s 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a safe sanctuary , by reason of the great respect which was given to that illustrious muse , he could not get agrippina into his hands . he therefore earnestly desired his majestie to command that that dishonourable woman might be put out from thence , to the end 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he might wash away the shameful stain wherewith she had tainted his reputation . apollo was never seen to rage more , no 〈◊〉 when in the fiery house of leo , then at this 〈◊〉 of the emperor 〈◊〉 : to whom with a threatning voyce and gesture , he said , he might do well to hasten quickly out of that audience ▪ for he whose first wi●…e 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , fell by marrying another into the same ●…it of infamy , deserved rather to be buried there alive , then to be holpen out by any one . the xxxvi . advertisement . harpocrates being found by apollo to be ignorant , is driven out of pernassus . this morning apollo sent for harpocrates , that great m●…ster of silence , to come unto him ; and told him , that he had still admired his perpetural taceturnety , but that now he much desired to hear him discourse , for that silence was to be wondered at in him , who upon occasion could give content to the curious litterati , by his copious speaking . harpocrates hearing this , shrunk up his shoulders , and made signs that he could not speak . apollo●…ad ●…ad him lay aside his affected silence , and discourse upon some elegant subject . harpocrates still continued to put his finger to his mouth . when apollo , with somewhat an angry countenance , commanded him to speak ; harpocrates drew then near to his majesties ear , and in a very submiss voyce said ▪ that the world was grown so depraved in its customs , ●…as they deserved chiefly to be esteemed wise , who had eyes to see , judgement to observe , and mouth to hold their peace . apollo being mightily offended at this answer , turned to those that were about him , and said , he had at last discovered that harpocrates was a piece of useless flesh , and commanded him to be packing out of pernassus ; for he had discovered him to be one of those gross pated coxcombs , whereof there were very many in the world , who under colour of a vertuous silence , did hide and palliate gross ignorance . the xxxvii . advertisement . a learned roman desires a receipt from apollo to make him forget certain great injuries which he had received at a great prince his court. his majestie gives him some of the water of lethe to drink , but with bad faccess . the learned roman who some days ago came to pernassus , had audience given him yesterday by apollo . to whom he said , that he was much disquieted in his mind , by reason of divers injuries which he had received from ●…undry of his ill-wishers in a great prince his court ▪ dove le persecutio 〈◊〉 s●…●…ssercitano co●… artificii di ●…essanta cara●… , where persecutions are exercised cunningly , and to an excessive height ; and the more for that he could not be revenged without pulling greater ruine upon himself , then what his enemies had occasioned him ; and yet he found not that he had so vertuous a soul , as to put on the generous resolution of pardoning offences : wherefore to free himself from the hellish torment which he continually lived in , he addrest himself unto his majesty , humbly beseeching him that he would prescribe him som receit , whereby he might cleanse his soul from the many passions of hatred , wherewith it was foully polluted . apollo appeared clearly to commisserate this gentlemans unhappiness ; insomuch , as he commanded a great bowl of the water of lethe to be given him to drink , so prepared , as it should make hateful things be forgotten , but should in no sort prejudice the remembrance of benefits received . the gentleman drunk up the water with much greediness ; which to the great wonder of all men was found to have the vertue onely of making him forget such injuries as he had received from men of a inferior fortune then he was ; and that those which he had received from his betters , were rather more deeply graven in his mind then forgotten . whereupon many began to murmure , that that vertue was not found in the lethean waters , which had been so much discourst of by the poets . when his majestie did assertain them all , that the waters of lethe had , as they should ever have the same vertue , but that it had not wrought the desired effect in that gentleman , because men nobly born , and of generous hearts , did usually write injuries received from mean men , in sand ; but over hand blows given by men of power , in characters never to be blotted out ; for that it became nobility to forget offences out of magnanimity , not to pardon them out of ▪ necessity . the xxviii . advertisement . the duke of laconia is accused before apollo to have idolatrized a favorite of his , for having advanced a faithful secretary to the highest state-preferments ; and he defends his cause excellently well . the now duke of laconia hath so highly exalted a subject of his ( for whom he hath a great affection ) from a low and mean fortune , to the highest state-dignities , as he hath not only admitted him into the laconick senat ( a preferment ambitiously coveted for the eminency thereof , even by great princes ) but having infinitely enriched him by giving him great revenues , hath made him be as much honoured , and respected as highly as any whatsoever personage of the state. this famous duke was accused before apollo some few days ago , by those who did much envy the advancement of this his servant , for idolatrizing a favorite . apollo being highly incenst against this prince for so hainous a fault , without further informing himself ( as upon all occasions he is used to do ) of the truth of the impaachment , sent immediately for luigi pulci , provost-marshal of this state ▪ and threatned to punish him severely , if he did not within half an hour bring the duke of laconia a prisoner unto him , in the most shameful manner he could devise . pulci did diligently obey , for he dragg'd that prince along immediately before his majestie , loaded with irons . apollo , who was presently advertised of this attachment by an express messenger , gave order that the greatest bel should be rung , whereby the quarantia criminale should be summoned , which was done ; whither the duke being brought , apollo having himself acquainted him with the fault which was laid to his charge , told him in a very angry manner , that he aforded him onely one half hours space to make his defence in : and in the interim ( as if the prince his case had been altogether desperate ) he commanded that he should be condemned to eternal infamy , who having committed so foul an indignity , as to adore a servant of his own , was not worthy to live amongst the vertuous princes of the phebean court. the duke began then thus to defend himself , most mighty sir , and father of the vertuosi , i have so arm'd my conscience with the breast-plate of innocency , and have behaved my self so vertuously in all my actions , as i am more then certain that i have never deserved ill at your majesties hands , nor am i any whit affrighted at your majesties anger , nor at this precipitate judgment , that the horrible sentence of my infamy should precede the cognizance of my cause : i onely wonder to see , what i thought never to have seen , that the foulness of an impeachment , even in the justest of tribunals , as this is , should be able so greatly to indanger the reputation of one of my condition . but i rest pacified with gods will , who will have the gold of innocency refined in the fire of calumny , by the test of persecution . i freely confess unto your majestie , that i have exalted my friend much more then my accusers have informed against me ; and in this my action , which hath been made by relation to appear so hainous to your majestie , i am onely sorry that i have not shew'd my self so grateful to this my friend , as his deserts challenge , i should have been . and if those who accuse me and other princes of prodigallity , of giddy-headedness , and of poorness of spirit , born to serve servants , did not suffer themselves to be blinded with malice and envy , when they see a courtier greatly beloved , and rewarded by his master , but would with an unbyassed mind consider the merits of court favorites , they would stile that vertuous liberality , which they now call vicious prodigallity ; those gifts the debt of gratitude , which they term inconsiderate actions , and that a vertuous affection , to which they attribute the infamy of idolatrizing minions . but it appertains not to common men to penetrate , abditos principis sensus , et si quid ocultius parant . tacit. lib. . annal. into the secret of princes . whence it falls out that ignorant men call vertuous gratitude , the effect of an abject mind . the principality of laconia ( as is very well known to your majestie ) is elective ; wherein the neighbouring princes have always had a greater stroke then he who was governor , not onely out of the common end of all elective princes , in procuring potent friends to those of their blood , after their own death ; but by reason of the adherence which forreign princes have for no small ends , with such senators as have the prerogative of chusing a new prince : whose followers they work upon by those means , which are too well known to all men . and your majestie likewise knows , that the prince of macedonia had by his subtilty got so great a power in my state , and was so far encreased in strength above all the grecian princes , as he was not onely the sole arbitrator of all greece , but aspired at an universal monarchy : it is moreover known to your majestie , that the same prince of macedonia , under pretence of friendship , and of taking the dukes of laconia into his protection , did with deep designs labour their suppression : and because the prince of epires greatness kept him from achieving so high designs , he either totally to remove , or at least to weaken that obstacle very much , did occasion those insurrections of the commonalty , and rebellions of the nobles in the principality of epire ( more by his gold and underhand dealing , then by open force of arms ) which did so much weaken the state of epire. and i will not here repeat ( since it is sufficiently known to all men ) how my wise predecessor , knowing that the suppression of epire was a manifest may to the ruine of the laconick empire , resolved openly to assist afflicted epire with puissant forces , so to secure himself from the ambition of ●…o potent an enemy ; and how that that good prince whilst he had these wise considerations dyed ; not without great presumptions that he was poysoned by the procurement of the prince of macedonia , who was not able to endure that the division of epire ( which he thought so sure ) should be hindered . in this unhappy crisis of affairs , i had this dignity conferred upon me ; and that i might not come byso unhappy an end as my predecessor did , i , in the beginning of my principality , seemed to be of a remiss spirit , and totally incapable of the great affairs of state , and onely busied my self in reforming the magistrates of my dominion , together with the abuses , and other vices of my people , appearing publikely to be a main enemy to the prince of epire , but inwardly knowing very well , whither the prince of macidonia's plots tended . and knowing that whatsoever evil befel the prince of epire , tended to the lessening of me , i put on a resolution of assisting him , that i might establish my own state which was in manifest danger : but to secure my life from those misfortunes whereinto my predecessor fell , i was forced to be very secret in my proceedings . and it is well known to your majestie , as to all the rest of these honorable judges , that amongst many imperfections of elective kingdoms , the greatest is , that they less enjoy the so important benefit of secrecy in their state-ministers , then any other sort of principality : for mens manners are so depraved , as that such as are senators , are for the most part greedy merchants in their high places , by which they strive to reap all possible advantage . finding my self in such straits at the entrance into my principality , and knowing that for certain i was to split upon the rock of infidelity , if i should in a business of this weight , make use of those ordinary secretaries , who i knew for certain , were long since pensioners to forrein princes ; great god ( from whose goodness i acknowledge this great mercy ) opened my understanding , and it was he who propounded unto me , this my , i will not say servant ( for i have found such singular worth in him , as will not suffer him to be stiled by so base a name ) but dear friend ; and to him who had served me with all fidelity for eight years space , whilst i led a privat life , i discovered that secret of my heart , which i thought very dangerous ever to have dreamt of . and then i was aware that the excellency and chiefest praise of a secretary , did not consist ( as many men believe ) in knowing how to speak eloquently , but how faithfully to be silent . and this i say , because i so happily made use of this my officer in the important business which i had in hand , as i luckily deceived the subtile prince of macedonia , which no wit , how cunning so ever , could do at any time before . and by means of this my so faithful secretary , i succored that prince my friend , whom i publickly profest to persecute , no man ever penetrating into my councel ; and i have had fortunate success in the mystery of cheating and abusing , even those who make publick profession to be masters of that art ; and by this handsom under-hand-dealing , i have reduced the formerly ruinous and precipitate state of epire , into the condition that now it is : it being risen from so deplorable a condition , to the high pitch of being the only true arbitrator of whole greece . and the macedonians who had fancied unto themselves universal monarchy , and who thought to have sipt up every mans state in less then a months time , are fallen from this their height of hopes , into the pit of desperation , and quite giving over their ambitious conceits of possessing themselves of other mens states , have much ado to preserve their own . apollo having heard this , ran joyfully to embrace the prince of laconia , and with a great deal of tenderness , spake thus unto him ; you , duke of that noble nation , who express much in few words , have had to doe with a man of such worth , and one , who to say truth , hath very few that are like him , amongst all the laconick senators ; i mean this friend of yours , as if you should give unto him your whole state , you would notwithstanding die ungratefull . for in these unfortunate times , wherein through the perfidiousness of many , princes secrets are sold by the candle , to who will bid highest for them , that servant who in weighty affairs proves faithful to his master , cannot be so much rewarded as he deserves . the xxxix . advertisement . the people of the island of mitilene , their prince being dead without issue , argue whether it will be better for them to chuse a new prince , or to set up liberty in their countrey . the inhabitants of the famous island of mitilene , whose natural prince did not only die lately himself , but together with his life , left the whole royal line extinguished ; being without a prince to govern them , disputed in many of their congregations , whether it were better for them to live still under a monarchy , and chuse a new prince , or put on that noble resolution which had made so many people fortunate , of erecting a free state. great and dangerous contentions arose touching a business of this weight ; and t is said that one of the chiefest citizens , in the last congregation that was assembled to this purpose , spake thus : beloved fellow-citizens , of all the felicities which men receive from god in this world , two are the greatest ; that they are born men , not beasts ; and free , not slaves . and surely there is good reason for this ; for what greater happiness can any man receive in this life , then to obey only the laws of god and men ? what jewel is to be compared to the rich treasure full of all the most pretious oriental stones , of securing life , means , and reputation from the will of one particular man , inclined to commit so many impertinent things ? none that is here , acknowledgeth liberty to be more lovely then my self ; and that it is a pretious gift , which immortal god bestowes of meer grace on those whom he loves ; he who knows not this , i pronounce him to be blind , him a fool who doth not highly esteem it , and him an enemy to himself and countrey , who doth not heartily endeavor it . but my dear friends , you must consider , that as those pretious stones are most esteemed of , which are rareliest found amongst men ; so we must grant that perfect liberty is a pretious jewel , and much desired by mankind , because it is rarely found amongst men . and know , that as the carbuncle and diamond are created by an absolute heavenly vertue , and such counterfeit stones are poor and base , which men make in imitation of the divine artificer ; so liberty may be rather said to be a divine manifacture , then any humane work . if it were possible to institute a free state so easily as i perceive you imagin , there where monarchy hath a long time reigned , since liberty is a thing so much desired by all men , there would be no monarchy left in the world : for people to come by so great a happiness , would all of them lay claim to liberty . and yet since there are many monarchies , and but few commonwealths , we must needs see , that to erect liberty in a country , is rather an impossible then a difficult thing , and a gift which ought rather to be beg'd of god by prayer , then to be hoped for from any humane wisdom : nor be not moved by the example of so many commonwealths , which with so much happiness to those people , are lately instituted in germany : for examples square not , unless where the same circumstances agree ▪ too great is the disproporion between the germans ( who are born in a sort of middle liberty , from which condition , passage is easily made to intire liberty ) and us , who having alwaies undergon all servitude from our princes , are so 〈◊〉 from being able to purchase perfect liberty , as we cannot pass from this , into the other extream , without exposing our selves and country to manifest ruine . i grant that some princes prove sometime phantastical , insolent , very beasts ; and that it is a species of great felicity to secure ones self from these evils ; but say you with me , that there is not a more phantastical , insolent , or bestial government in the world , then that of an ill ordered commonwealth , of a free tumultuous state. all who have written , or reason'd of politick affairs , confess that a people like us , born , bred up , and who have lived even to their decrepid age in servitude , are altogether uncapable of living free . commonwealths being more formed by the good condition of citizens dispositions , proportioned to live free , then by laws : for as a new vine soon grows dry if it be planted by an aged tree ; and on the contrary , does grow up prosperously , and bring forth fruit in great abundance if it be placed near a plant , which as if it were her husband , is of like age with it self ▪ so the new vine of liberty scorns to take root , and to bring forth satisfactory fruit , if it be placed near an antient tree of a people grown old in servitude . for the ambition of the nobility , and sedition of the common people who are capital enemies to living free , would for certain so suck up the radical moysture which gives life to the new vine , as they would in a short time make it wither and become dry . this truth which i relate , is evidently seen in the as perspicuous , as rare example of all the past and present liberties of the immortal venetian commonwealth , which being planted whilst yet a young vine , together with the little bush of the venetian people , though born but a little before in those moorish and fennish grounds , takes such deep and strong root , as it now gives savory fruits of secure liberty to its citizens . it is folly for us to hope for alteration of customs , which are not changed so easily as apparrel : for mans genius affecting quietness in all its operations , a soul which knows how to submit it self to a citizen , who though his superior in being a magistrate , is yet his inferior in all other respects ; how being rich and young , to honour a poor old man with submission , to bestow all his love upon his country ( next to his god ) yea rather then upon his children or wealth , ▪ to preser the publick good before privat interest ; to judge uprightly in civil and criminal affairs between friends and parents , to tremble at the severity of the laws in a ●…ee state ; to possess the wealth of a prince , and have the mind of a privat man , so far to mortifie himself , as humbly to begg the favorable vote of his inferior ; and finally to have the taceturnity in publick affairs , and to possess all those habits worthy of a free-man , which are observed to be so exactly in every noble venetian ; is a doctrine which is not learnt by books ▪ nor by the mouthes of men ; but which is brought from the womb ; and suckt in with the mothers milk , by such as are born in free countries . if ( as i understand many of you are minded to do ) you will send to venice , to receive the laws of living free , from that excellent commonwealth , doubtlesly rare ones will be given you ; but laws , no less then habits , do not square with ●…ll men . god would be too gracious to men if they were permitted , in the midst of iuly , when they are scorched by the sun , to go into the woods , and take from thence the greatest plane-tree which they should find there , and 〈◊〉 it into their own gardens , so to enjoy the shade thereof . liberty , like a young tree , planted amongst men , is very hard to rear up ; for it must be continually watered with new laws , according to occasion●… which every day arise , and prun'd by severe justice . nor must men be impatient in these cases ; for no man enjoys the noon-day-comfort of a great tree standing in his court-yard , which was not first planted but a little sprig by his great great gandfathers . and it hath been gods will , that trees and commonwealths , should with much difficulty arive at long life , and be long in bringing forth their fruits . and very exceeding great pains and labour was taken to make that very plant of the glorious venetian liberty , what the world sees it now to be ; and those ancients who planted it , partook of no good thereby , but only pain and toyle in bringing it up ; whereas now their twentieth generation enjoy the verdure , the noon-day-comfort and freshness thereof . for though it be above ●… years since it was planted in those washes , yet is it not so long since it became so perfect , and so secure a plant of true liberty , as that it fears not the wind of forrein princes pride , nor the frost of domestick seditions : add to these things ( my fellow-citizens ) that it is not so much the laws , though they be very good ones , nor yet the other particulars which i have touched upon , which have maintained , do maintain , and will maintain the venetian commonwealth in perpetual greatness , as is the miraculous and singular situation of those marish and fenny grounds , which we cannot partake of . all that understand any thing in state-affairs , confess that the senat is the heart and fountain of life of every free state. skilful fencers , when they will overthrow their enemy with few blows , make a thrust at their heart ; and princes who have en-deavored to subdue commonwealths , have made their first blow at the metropolitan city of the free state , only to dissipate the senat ; for these are the mortal wounds which kill all , even the most potent liberties : for the senat being routed , and consequently the heart of the commonwealth struck through , it dies immediately . an imperfection which monarchies have not , the greatness of whose empire is alwaies where the kings person is ; as the duke of guise made proof of , who by his taking of paris , did rather accelerate his own death , then hasten on his own greatness . the dictator cesar proves this which i affirm , to be true : who to tyrannize over his country , made himself master of rome ( which pompey was very indiscreet in abandoning ) only that he might defeat the senat : a thing which hanibal , the true master of militia , and sole honor of africa , knew before him , and endeavored it , but knew not how to effect it : and which after him , the emperor charls the fifth , that founder of the greatness of the spanish monarchy , knew very well how to do , and did practice it against the florentines and the 〈◊〉 . this mortal wound could never be given to the state of venice , whose metropolis , where the senat abides , is fortified , and armed with the proof-armor of marishes and washes ▪ wherefore i think i may conclude , that their wils are good , who desire to bring in liberty of living free in our country ; but their wisdom is but weak : and that they who are for a prince , intend well , and are excellently well advised ; and in taking a resolution in this our so weighty business , i desire you all to remember , that the florentine nobility , which through the impertinency of the seditious people , could never bring in a perfect form of living free in their country , not being able any longer to undergo the cruel and bloudy insolences of the base plebeians , were forced to call in a forrein tyrant , the duke of atene , only that by extraordinary severity , he might afflict the common people of florence , who did so abuse their liberty . though these reasons were thought very efficacious by the wiser sort , yet could they not make the people resolve upon chusing a new prince : wherefore the business was carried , for living free , and that ambassadors should be sent to venice to receive the laws of living free , from that commonwealth , which was suddenly done . the ambassadors were received and welcom'd by the venetian commonwealth with incredible magnificency , and the venetian government , orders and laws were shewn unto them , which the ambassadors caused to be exactly copied out , and registred , and so departed . and being returned to mitilene , they made their report , and read in publick senat , the laws which they had brought with them , which gave very bad satisfaction to all the common people , and to the greatest part of the nobility : for the people could by no means indure , that by the venetian laws they should be excluded from publick government , saying that that country merited not to be called free , where all did not command : and the wealthier nobility being accustomed under monarchy , to purchase favors from the favorits , and to obtain places of magistracy ( which they did shamefully execute ) from their princes , storm'd , and said publickly , that that was a most unfortunate country , where men were inhibited the making free use of their monies ; which was purchased by industrious men at the cost of so much sweat , not only to buy meat and clothes , but to purchase therewith such things which encreased reputation : and that it was much better for citizens to be ruled over by a prince , whose good will might be won by a thousand several waies , then to be govern'd by inexorable laws , when they were administred by a numerous senat ; where a little not being sufficient , and enough not being alwaies to be had , whereby to make so many prevaricate and break the laws , it might truely be said to be incorruptible . and that under monarchies , the chiefest of the nobility did from the first , execute the prime places of the principality ; and that in commonwealths it was sad for them to begin together with the meanest senators , at the lowest imployments , and come slowly by degrees to places of highest dignity : that it required more then the usual years of man to arive at the supreamest preferments ; and the rigor of bestovving places of magistracy only according to mens meer merit , vvas a precept first invented by tyrants , to keep potent men lovv , and to exalt the mean. but amongst all these bad satisfactions , nothing distasted three parts of four of the nobility more , then the severe magistracy of the censors , which they heard was used by the venetians , who perpetually did severely and strictly examin all mens behaviours ; wherefore they said freely , that if the nobility were so severely proceeded with in the state of venice , the noble venetians were slaves amidst their liberty , and the people of miteline free amidst their servitude , for very dread of these things , all , with a loud voice cryed out , monarchy , monarchy : and that if any one would set up liberty in mitilene , let them burn all laws and statutes ; for such understood that to be perfect liberty , where none obeyed , all commanded , and every one did what he list . the xl. advertisement . james creyton , a scotchman , having incenst the vertuosi in parnassus , by a proud defyance , was so shamed by them through a bitter jest , as without ending the dispute , they forced him to forgo parnassus . james creyton , a scotchman , the prodigie of nature for learning , came some daies ago to this court with such vain-glorious pomp , and self-oftentation , as moved as much nauseousness in the compleatest vertuosi of this state , as wonder in the meaner sort of people , who are usually ignorant , to see that a young fellow of but years of age , should pretend to be exactly knowing in all sciences , when the chiefest vertuosi know the continual study of years is but a short time to be master of one only science . this creyton the next day after his entrance into parnassus , caused a paper to be fixed upon the gates of all the colledges , and upon the pillars of all the delfick portici , wherein in large capital letters these words were written , nos iacobus crytonius , scotus , cujuscumque rei propositae ex improviso respondebimus . we iames creyton , a scothman , will answer ex tempore to whatsoever shall be propounded , this bold defiance , which was thought by many to be very arrogant , did so nettle the vertuosi , as many of them framed arguments even in the hardest sciences , wherewith they thought to choak him at very first . but an acute satyrical poet bereft the whole colledge of the litterati of the pleasure of that dispute : for the very night after the posting up of this defiance , he underwrit in those very papers , these sharp words : and he that will see it , let him go to the signe of the faulcon , and it shall be shewn him . creyton was so stung with this biting jest , as he presently departed from parnassus , much ashamed and confused ; having first made known unto his majesty that he thought he could no longer appear with his honour amongst those vertuosi , who had done him the affront to deal with him as with a juglar and mountebank . the xli . advertisement . after strict examination of such as were to be chosen , the list of governors is filled up in parnassus . after long expectation , the distribution of the governments of this state was yesterday published with general satisfaction , it is not to be imagined what diligence and circumspection was used by his majesty and his state-ministers in the choice of them : for first they were carefull to chuse old men to govern the people , only that i polledri non habbiano a por bardella a cozzoni , coults might not put tramels upon their pacers : and it was a thing worth much consideration , that of so many as put for it , they chose only men of slow wits , cold natures , such as were perplext and irresolute in all their actions , and drousie , even to the point of appearing foolish ; whereas they excluded those who for the vivacity of their spirits , seemed fit to have been preferred before them . and this was done because those wise men who were chosen to examin , verily believe , that bold , and over-lively wits are not very fit to govern others , they themselves standing in need of a bit and caveson , to keep them from falling into ditches ; for experience hath taught all men , that such men , with their too irresolute wits , do rather disquiet people , then prove instruments of keeping them in that peace and good satisfaction , which ought to be their chiefest care who are the governors of provinces ; and it is a thing known to all men , that those electors hold it for an infallible maxim , that he succeeds best in the government of cities , who being of a slower wit , and setled mind , knows best how to fit himself for making his abode there , as it were the signe of an inn : for the world , which is much ruled by it self , is much disquieted and imbroyled by the chymera's of some sharp wits , who being overwise in all their waies , intempestivis remediis delicta accendunt . tacit. lib. . annal. make things worse by unseasonable remedies . hence it was , that in the strict examination that was made in this so weighty business , the ignorant were not excluded , but only those who were too wise , and who having their heads full of querks , and new inventions , are enemies to those ancient customs , to which the people being accustomed , think themselves wronged by being bettered by new laws . 'ts true , they studied to find out flexible people , of easie and supple wits , who could accommodate their own nature to that of others ; nor did they admit of any officer who had not past four years in the study of that important philosophy , of living , and suffering to live : a basis whereon all peoples quiet , and the assurance of all good government which can be expected from the good governor of aprovince , is securely grounded ; in whom they thought not the knowledge of the laws and statutes to be so necessary , as that they should be verst in that gentle way of proceeding , and in that dexterity of judgement , which is not registred in books . a consideration so much the more necessary , for that some lawyers who have had the governments of several provinces , have behaved themselves but foolishly therein : witness bartolo , the very light of the law , who with all his legal knowledge , was forc'd to leap out of the window at the palazzo di todi , to shun being seized on by those who could no longer endure his impertinencies ; who had a fair tongue , but foolish pate . and it is very certain , that they did drive avvay certain great beastly fellows , even with bastenadoes , who proudly playing the peacocks , and publikely professing severity , delight much with their grave looks to threaten men with death in publike assemblies : and they excluded from all hopes of government , brutish busirides , who thirsting after humane blood , think they can mend the world , with pillories , gallowses and axes : but they mightily loved those who laboured more to inhibit them to punish faults , and who underwrite capital sentences in ink , made of tears . the next day after the publication of the bestowing of governments , all the provosts came before the regio collaterale , where apollo was in person , and there with solemn ceremonies , they made oath between his majesties hands , that they would leave the world in the same happy condition as they found it ; it being high treason in this state , where tacitus his rule is observed ( that super omnibus negotiis , melius atque rectius olim provisum , et que converterentur , in deterius mutari . tac. lib. . annal. that better provision was made for all things in former times , and all alterations made since have proved to the worse ) to make any the least innovation in governments . these oathes being taken , the great delfick chancellor , placed in a high seat , said , you gentlemen officers , his majesties pleasure is , that in the places which are bestowed upon you , you be sure to have a strict care to your ways ; and that you swell not so with ambition as to play rex , but that you remember you are but counterfeit princes , whose empire is but weak , grounded upon a frail sheet of paper , and fortified by a little wax . then marcus tullius cicero made an oration in praise of those new officers , affirming that they were so wise and good , as they were able to new mould the world . and this oration being ended , apollo , with a pleasing countenance , did with his own hands give every one of them their letters patents , and commanded them to go presently to their several charges . it was a thing which caused astonishment in all men to see , that as soon as ever their patents were delivered , his majesties formerly clear and serene face towards those his officers , was changed into a dreadful & angry aspect , as if he had hated them deadly , and the civilities , proffers , and friendly demonstrations of those signori del collaterale , were changed in the twinkling of an eye into threats and accusations ; insomuch , as they themselves who had been so very circumspect in making that election , swore to every one that those officers were a company of greedy companions , publike sellers of justice , and birds of prey ; and before they departed , by order from his majestie , an urtamartino taken out of the pegasean stable , was given to those who were governors of the chiefest provinces , an instrument thought necessary by all wise men , to beat down some imperious fellows , who defiring to domineer in other mens houses , do with ready money purchase hatred , laying the blame of all their impertinences , insolences and ill usage committed against the master of the house , upon their own discomposed and hasty nature . i was told by very credible people , that after this salustius crispo president of the collaterale , taking the governour of libetro ( whom he much favoured and loved ) aside , told him , that he should do well to be very negligent in the beginning of his government , but be exquisitely diligent in the end thereof ; remembring always , that to begin ones imployments acribus innitiis , i●…ioso fine . tac. lib. . annal. with strict beginnings , and neglective end , was to imitate the asses trot , which is so usual to the common sort of officers ; that in his administration of justice in things of dispute between ordinary people , he should do them exact right without any respect of persons ; but that in controversies which might arise between the nobility , or people of better rank , he should use the dexterity of a wary judgement , with the rigour of justice , remembring always that the accusations of powerful men were so hateful to princes as they besprinkled the officers garments with certain spots and stains of bad impression , which could never be washt away with any sope of innocency ; that therefore with such he should so use the buckler of dexterity , with the sword of justice , as no wounds of distaste might be given or received by either party : for it being requisite for princes , for their own affairs , to have the nobility satisfied , the officer must know exactly the art of drawing rotten teeth with a piece of cotton ; that in his government he should strive omnia scire , sed non omnia exequi , tacit. vita agric. to know all things , but not to put all things in execution ; for to go about to wash a blackmoor white , were to play the mad man ; and that in this so corrupt age , officers might do more wisely to bear with some ancient disorders in the people , then with very little of satisfaction , to afflict ones self , with introducing good where it was not welcome , that he should shun contentions with neighbour officers , who were subjects to the same prince , and that such differences as he could neither cloak nor shun , he should like a gown-man defend them with his pen ; but that he should neither seek for , nor yet shun differences with neighbouring princes : but defend such as should arise , like a souldier with his sword , observing still the temper , as to shew reverence towards forreign princes , and zeal towards his own prince : that being placed in government to decide quarrels , and to put an end to other mens differences , he should keep himself from kindling new ones , as he would do from fire , holding it for a certain rule , that officers won infinite reputation , when at the very instant that they were set upon , they could resolve to give over with loss : mercè che delle mosche pigliate con le natiche , mai non si trovo chi facesse utila ritratto : and that he should think that nothing did more shew an officers lightness , then to seem greedy of disputes and quarrels , whereof wise-men would give fourteen to the dozen ; that in some things he should do well to prefer the publike peace , before the rigor of justice , taught by books ; that he should never be over angry , for any whatsoever impertenency which should be seen or heard of in his government ; and that if he could not do this , he should not onely forbear from acting , but even from speaking in the heat of anger ; and should recommend the consideration of all things to cool blood ; that in vveighty affairs he should avoid to appear undaunted , bold and resolute , but take pleasure in taking the crab out of his hole vvith his princes hand , armed vvith the gantlet of authority ; for though the officer had authority to act , ●…tvvas notvvithstanding good often times , not to use that authority : that he should avoid such governments , as he vvould do precipices , vvhere any of the blood-royal lived , or any of the kindred of court-favorites ; which vvere the silla and caribdis , and inevitable quicksand of ruine to all officers : and that he should not be ambitious of governing in provinces , vvherein vvere many of the nobility , to govern vvhom , vvas to lead a heard of foxes , and a flock of hens to feed , and be bound to bring them all back again to their folds at night : but that he should esteem such governments best , which being full of mean and ignorant people , received full satisfaction if they had plenty of bread in their market-places : that he should keep conversation and acquaintance at large with all that were in his government , but stri ct friendship with none ; that he should avoid that retiredness which made men be hated , and that domestical familiarity , which caused scorn , but use such gravity as purchased love and respect to the officer , that he should abhor to converse with base men , and communicate onely with persons of his own profession ; and that he should be wary of making any one his friend , to whom he might not at the very same instant become a capital enemy , without any prejudice to himself ; for in officers houses mushromes grew in an instant to be as high as ciprus trees ; that he should by all means shun having to do with those great ones in cities , who love to have many followers , and make profession of arms ; for that giddy-headed officers cannot more shamefully nurse up a serpent in their bosoms , then by lending an ear to the intercessions which such men make for unruly people , who are imprisoned for seditious faults ; every one being ready to spend their lives in his service , who hath once saved them : that in publike audiences he ●…hould observe great gravity speak little , but resolutely , imploying his ears more then his tongue in such places ; and that he should there shun to argue the points of reason with advocates ; for an ignorant man that speaks , knowing better what he hath to say , then a learned man that listens unto him ; an officer who will on the sudden argue a case with an advocate , cannot make good his reputation against him , who hav●…ng first studied the business , comes prepared , without being so insolent as to use his authority instead of reason ; that he should praise , and yet shun the hateful and foolish customs of provinces ; and that he should patiently bear with the stinking pride of advocates , and the affronted impertinencies of proctors , and maintain their honour in publike , whose faults he might correct in private , that he should practice that golden sentence of tacitus , utilissimus idem , ac brevissimus bonarum , malarumque rerum delectus , cogitare quid aut nolueris sub alio principe , aut volueris . tacit. lib. . hist. it is the most useful and ready choice of both good and bad things , to consider what you like or dislike under another prince ; with such circumspection , as to shun a defect in his predecessor , he should not fall himself into the other extream . as a certain prince had foolishly done , who to avoid the over much pleasantness which was blamed in his predecessor , betook himself to unheard of severities ; that he might account business his pastime , eminent spirits making the pleasure they take in commanding and exercising authority over others , serve instead of picquet or lurch : that he should be more careful in well governing his own house , then in curbing seditions in the city , for that provincialists are more troubled at the immodesty of an officers favorite , then at a foul insolency committed by a townsman ; that he should abhor forestalling of markets , and that he should esteem those hiscapital enemies who should propound unto him such unlawful gains ; and that he should firmly believe that the onely gainful merchandize becoming an honorable officer , was to engage himself deeply in the traffick of purchasing glory and honor ; by which rising still to higher preferments , he in a short time would abound in wealth and reputation ; that he should shun prodigallity a●…d avarice ( shameful extreams in officers ) that he should set aside one fourth part of the day for the dispatch of civil causes , and the other fourt part in deciding criminal affairs , & the rest in being hospital , on which an officers reputation did wholly depend ; that he should always have an eye to his judges hands ; that he should not resolve any thing in difficult affairs , before he were fully possest of the whole business ; for sudden resolutions were very dangerous in such like cases : and that he should always behave himself so therein , as if he did rather grieve to have done too little , then too much ; that he should so accommodate his own genius to the nature of those of the province , as to be gentle with those that were pleasant and peaceful , and severe with those that were stubborn and seditious ; that above all things he should curb the insolencies of sergeants and marshals-men , who in many places are grown so insufferably bold , as they have not onely caused wicked scandals to princes , who in all other respects are glorious and happy , but have rendred such states hateful where the bridle hath been let loose to such like rascals , wholly made up of insolency ; for he was ill advised who gave much authority to one who knew not what discretion meant ; that not to appear foolish , he should not acquaint his prince with every trivial affair , nor keep from him the knowledge of things of importance , least he might be thought to neglect him ; that he should believe that wary judges did threaten more then punish , and that he should not forget , that officers govern men , who are subject to a thousand imperfections , infinitely addicted to errour , and not angels , who cannot sin ; that therefore in his government he should rather affect to be reputed pleasing then cruel ; that he should avoid baals , and publique feasts , which do abase the personages of officers ; that in the shameful faults of noblemen , he should be severe against the delinquents person , not touching upon the honour of his family ; that he should many times rather wink at carnal faults , then seem over desirous to punish them ; that by wisely appearing pleased , he should rather make the world believe that his subjects were good , then make them become such through rigour ; for those that boast they have hanged i know not how many hundred men in their governments , glory in their infamy . the xlii . advertisement . a●…gus makes proffer of himself to the dukes of venice , to guard the virginity of their illustrious commonwealth , and his offer is not accepted . argus never had any imployment in pernassus till now , since he proved so unfortunate in watching fair io ; for though many great princes would by large salaries have hired him to guard their ladies honour , he hath always refused to take upon him the care of any ladies reputation , having clearly found in io's unfortunate business , that women , when they are lewdly inclined , or are strongly solicited , are not to be secured , no not by a thousand argusses : yet of late days , being very needy , he offered himself to andrea gritti , and other princes of the venetian state , to guard their beautiful liberty , so as he might be well paid for his pains , and he would bind himself to keep continually ninety eight of his hundred eyes awake to watch over that illustrious princess . argus was graciously listened unto by gritti , and the rest of the dukes of venice , who first presented him with a purse full of many millions of crowns , which they said they gave him for the good will that they found in him , but that they had no need of his ayd in this affair ; for their liberty needed not his hundred eyes to guard her honour , her own chaste inclination being sufficient to do it , assisted by the six eys , by the vigilant and dreadful magistracy of the three state-inquisitors , who wrought so by the sword of justice , which they did continually brandish over the heads of the libenus , as that their liberty , though she be exceeding fair , was looked upon with chast eyes , even by the most ambitiously lustful , and coveted with a perfect platonick love . the xliii . advertisement . the florentines in their pastime called the calcio , admit of a spruce forreign courtier , who wins the prize . the noble florentines plaid the last tuesday at the calcio in the phebean field , which all the litterati of pernassus came to see ; and though some , to whom it was a new sight to see many of those florentine gentlemen fall to down right cuffs , said , that that manner of proceeding in that which was but play and sport , was too harsh , and not severe enough in a real combat ; yet the vertuosi took delight to see it , for many praised the gamesters swift running , their nimble leaping , and their strength ; others were very well pleased with the invention of the game , which was very good to breed up youth to run , leap and wrastle ; and many believed this to be the cause why it was instituted in that formerly so famous commonwealth : but the quicker sighted politicians , argued from the going together by ears of those young florentines , that some great mysterie lay concealed in that sport ; for that common-wealths are fuller of intestine hatred , and hidden ranchor of spirit , then are monarchies , by reason of the continual flocking to magistrates , and frequent denials which are given to senators of such places as they desire , receiving doubtlesly more distastes thereby one from another , then is observed to fall out between people who live in a monarchy ; and it being impossible but that some violent passion of anger must burst forth in a liberty full of distastes , the politicians affirmed , that the common-wealth of florence had done very well and wisely in introducing the calcio amongst her citizens , to the end that having the satisfaction of giving four or five good round buffets in the face to those to whom they bare ill will , by way of sport , they might the better afterwards appease their anger . an evaporation which if it should be had upon another occasion by a dagger , it would have much indangered the publike liberty . the same politicians affirm for certain , that the sancsi introduced the famous gioco della pugna in their commonwealth , and the venesians the assaulting of the bridge in theirs , for no other end but this . but it hapned that a spruce courtier who was a spectator at this sport , being asked by that famous pietro caponi , who by the bold answer he gave to a king of france , won eternal fame , how he liked their calcio ; who answered , the sport was very pleasant , but that those florentines did not play well . and the game of calcio being particular to the florentine nation , and altogether unknown in ●…ther parts , caponi thought the courtier had said amiss ; wherefore he asked him , whether he thought he could play better ? the courtier answered freely , that if they would permit him to play with them , he would teach those florentine gentlemen the true art how to take the ball , how to ●…un with it , how to repulse the wrastlers dextrously , who would take it away , and other excellent master like tricks . caponi laught to hear the courtier boast thus , and having acquainted all the florentine gamesters with what he said , they joyntly invited him to play . the courtier made himself ready , and entred the lists ; where the florentines promising themselvs much pastime in buffetting and abusing him , made him a round , and presently the ball was thrown up in the ayr by men appointed thereunto : which came no sooner to the ground , but that the nimble courtier ran towards it , and having taken it up , clap it under his left arm ; those of the contrary party ran to take it away from him : but he with great strength justled one , and thrust away another ; and whereas the florentines , who were masters of the sport , thought to have thrown him down , they were thrown down themselves ; for the sturdy courtier did so freely lay about him on all sides with his arm , shoulders , head , and every part of him , as he made all keep aloof , so as the greatest part of the florentines of the adverse part , were thrown to the ground ; and some of them received such blows on their breasts , as they could hardly breathe for a good while after . and the courtier having overcome all that withstood him , threw the ball over the lists , and won the prize . at which he florentines were so astonished , as they took a solemn oath never to admit of any courtier more to play with them ; as those who in running had winged heels ; and are rather devils then men in justling , thrusting , making men keep back , and making room for themselves in croudes , and making way there , where people flock most ; in the art of never suffering the ball to fall to the ground when they have gotten it , nor ever to be taken from them , and in giving their adversaries such deadly squelches as they shall never rise again . the xliv . advertisement . batista platina , being bastenado'd by agustino niso , complains to apollo ( little to his reputation ) of the injury received . batista platina , who keeps the pastrey shop in the corner of the herb-market as he the other day was raising a piece of dainty paste , agustino niso da sessa , that famous neapolitan philosopher entred his shop , and took up the rowling pin wherewith platina made his paste , and did so cudgel him with it , as certainly he would have slain him , had not some of the vertuosi , who heard the noise , run in , and hindred him . platina being thus ill dealt withal , caused himself to be brought before apollo ; to whom he sorely complained of niso , and said , that he was not so much grieved at the blows he had received , as that he had never deserved to be so foully affronted by that philosopher , whom he had always so deerly loved . apollo did with much grief rescent niso's extravagancy , and gave order for him to be forthwith sent for : who when he appeared , was ask'd by his majestie , what had moved him so to dishonour such a vertuoso as platina . niso boldly replyed , that by reason of platina's evil proceeding with him , he was forced so to revenge a shameful slash , which he had given him over the face from one ear to another . platina with tears , said to niso , i have always admired your worth agustino , and loved you as dearly as my own soul , and you , without any cause , have offended your friend , whom you were bound to love and reward . niso turned then to apollo , and told him , that he being desirous some few days before to give a private supper to some neapolitan vertuosi , had sent to platina's shop for a veal pye , for which he was presently paid ; and that platina , whom he had never offend , had to no end placed his arms over his shop door , whereby he had published him throughout parnassus , to be one of those useless persons , who delighting in gluttony , study nothing but how to eat vvell . platina excused himself , and said that he had placed his arms over his door , to honour him , not out of any infamy to him . apollo then bad platina hold his peace ; for you ( said he ) have well deserved the mischief vvhich hath befallen you ; for the arms of men of honor , and of such a philolosophers as is my beloved niso , ought to be seen in libraries , no●… i●… cooks shops , vvhere none but those of smell feasts ought to ha●…g ; for there is no fouller defect nor vice , then to study hovv to please the pallat , and to make the base and shameful profession to hunt after good victuals . the xlv . advertisement . apollo knowing what mischief over-much riches causes to poets , exhorts the magnanimous king of france , francis the first , to moderate his profuse liberallity which he used towards them . the illustrious king of france , francis the first , he , who whilst he lived , did not onely place learning on his right hand , but always saluted the litterati by taking off his hat ; whom he so loved , as that he enriched many of them , so as by authentick faith made to apollo , it appears ; that so great a king was the first , who by his profuse liberality to the vertuosi of that his noble kingdom of france , had planted such learning there , as taking deep root afterwards , hath brought forth infinite volumes of the labours of the learned french , which have much enriched the delphick library ; and that using still the same bounty to such as lovelearning , he feeds a great many of the litterati very plentifully in his royal palace in parnassus , to whom he pays very liberal provisions . a magnanimity and splendor , which till now was very pleasing to apollo , who much to his discontentment , is come at last to the knowledge that this kings munificence towards the litterati , produces bad effects ; for that over-much riches , according to their custom , begins to blemish the souls of many vertuosi , with such vices as luxury and ease bring with them , which have so produced the moth of idleness even amongst the vertuosi of this state , as that many famous poets have so far given over their studies , as even ovid himself , who formerly to the wonder of all men did every day inrich the delfick liberary with some one elogie or other , since he grew into so domestical acquaintance with so great a king , suffered nothing to proceed from his pen in a whole year , save four epigrams made in praise of the four seasons of the year . wherefore apollo perceiving that this kings liberallity towards his vertuosi occasioned even the overthrow of learning ; to the end that the intents and perpetual desire which they have to learn still somew●…at whilst they are poor , might not be extinguished , sent two days since for king francis , whom he told , that he much loved and admired the great liberallity which he used towards his vertuosi ; but that for the indempnity of sciences he was forced to will him to be more moderate therein ; for that learning , which is born and bred in poverty , was requisitely to live therein , as in her particular element : that therefore he should not permit poets to purchase any thing by his royal munificence , but meat and cloathing ; the one modest , the other mean : for that he clearly perceived , that they in the abundance of bodily wealth , grew poor in the like of their souls , vitious amidst riches , in delitiousness , idle ; or that the like disorder was found in them , as was observed to be in hens , which , the fatter they are , lay the fewer eggs ; poets being like crickets , who sing not but out of meer necessity : and that they follow not the chase , like dogs , for pleasure ; but like falcons and goshawks , for meer hungar . the xlvi . advertisement . apollo having found out the first inventor of guns , as he is about to punish him severely for his fault therein committed ; the artificer defends himself very well . t is now some fifty years since polidor virgil had a pension given him by his majesty of twenty crowns a month , together with maintenance for himself , two servants , and their horses , ; only that he might endeavor to find out the inventors of all things which had been thought upon by extraordinary wits for the benefit of man : for apollo thought such men deserved so well for their industry , as that they were to be kept in perpetual memory . and his majesty being infinitely troubled that the art of warfaring ( which was alwaies cruel ) should now be arived at so great a height therein , by the new invention of guns , as that in all late wars much more use was made of fire , then of the sword : and being grieved even to the very heart , that so many men should be destroyed , and cities ruined in a short time by this diabolical invention , he commanded pollidor virgil , that with all speed he should find him out ( if at least so devilish an instrument could be found out by any humane creature ) who had the cruel heart to introduce a scourge amongst men , so like to dreadful thunder . pollidor obeyed , and in a short time did not only learn that the inventors of guns was a dutchman ; but found him out , and delivered him alive into the power of the court. apollo being hereat overjoy'd , commanded the judges of assize , that they should do exemplary justice upon this so cruel enemy to mankind . these gave sentence immediately , that the dutchman should be put alive into a cannon , to which fire being given , he might be torn in pieces by his own hellish invention . all things tending thereunto were already in order , and the unhappy dutchman was brought to punishment , when in those his last streights he intreated that he might be permitted to speak but a word or two before his majestie in his own defence . he had his desire granted ; and being brought before apollo , spake thus ; illustrious king of light ! shall he be condemn'd to so cruel a punishment by your majesties judges , who are esteemed to be just by all the world , who hath laboured to deserve favour from god , and good will from men , by inventing things beneficial for mankind ? it is the intention , purpose , and mind of a man that makes the fault , which , whatsoever excess may insue upon any mans work , yet is it not imputed to any one whose will was good , and his intention holy . i call god to witness , and your majesties own light , which sees all things , that i did not invent guns to afflict mankind ( as i find many do wrongfully think ) but out of zeal , charity , and piety ; and if any mischief hath since insued thereby , it was more then i intended : for being vexed at the very soul to see , that through the ambition and avarice of those that rule , men were by divers waies drawn , will they , nil they , to the slaughter of war , i bethought my self , that people could not receive a greater benefit from any one , then to acquit the world of the vast expence of bloud occasioned by war ; being very sure , that if princes should want souldiers , they would not wage war so much , and would content themselves with their own fortunes , when man to man with their weapons in their hand , they must overcome that enemy , whose state they would usurp . for the danger of losing their lives , would make them lay aside the insatiable ambition which they have of domineering over the whole world . to arive then at this so holy end , and wherein i thought the whole felicity of mankind did consist , i bethought my self of this invention of guns , firmly believing , that out of horror of this so dreadfull instrument , all men would be so terrified , as they would abominate the mystery of war. i did the rather believe this , for that i saw men were mightily affrighted with thunder from heaven , though they knew that god in his mercy makes more thunder be heard for terror , then bolts seen for punishment ; that notwithstanding many when they see the lightning which precedes the thunder , run into corners to hide themselves ; nay others have built themselves chambers of iron for security . wherefore i did firmly believe that no man would ever be so rash or cruel to himself , as to expose his life to the manifest danger of death , by incountring with earthly thunder , so like in all respects to the thunder of heaven ; and levelled at the life of man , not to affright , but to kill him . if the contrary to what i believed , have since fallen out , and if men be grown so superlatively foolish and cruel to themselves , as out of a desire to appear gallant , to go even with delight against the mouth of the cannon , and i to be blamed for other mens rashness and beastiallity ? apollo was so moved to hear this dutchman so gallantly defend himself , as turning his punishment into favour , he commanded that he should be rather rewarded then censured ; and with tears in his eyes , said , that by reason of their beastiallity who dare sell their lives for the poor price of six pence a day , he was compelled to be pleas'd that cruel inventions should daily more increase , whereby to rid the earth of this lewd sort of men ; and since that neither fire nor sword were able to do it , he earnestly desired the majesty of his creator , that he would once more open the chateracts of heaven , and quickly powre down new deluges of water upon the earth , to wash those wicked men from off the earth ( without harming such as love peace ) who forgetting that they are obliged to multiply mankind , have taken upon them the cruel trade of annihilating it by fire and sword . xlvii ▪ advertisement . the roman monarchy desire to be resolved by cornelius tacitus in a politick doubt ; and receive full satisfaction therein by melibeus , the mantuan shepherd , who was casually there . the illustrious roman monarchy , which before it was trampled upon by the barbarous northern nations , lived here in parnassus in that height of glory , which no other human worth could ever arive at ; under pretence of going a hunting , went in disguise the other day to find out co●…nelius tacitus , who for his recreation was retired to his countrey-house ; and told him , that she was come to him only to be resolved in a doubt which had a long time troubled her mind , the which she had conferred about with many other great polititians , and had not received such satisfaction from them , as she hoped to do from him , who was the greatest statist and arch-flamming of all modern policy . and that the business which so much troubled them , was , that the kingdom of france , spain , egypt , soria , the commonwealth of carthage , and the rest of the immence states which she possest in asia , africa , and europe , were of themselves formidable to every one , before they were joyned to her but that being all of them united in her person , instead of strengthening her , they had made her weaker then she was before ; a thing which they did the more wonder at , for that it was evidently know , that many threads made a strong rope , and many little twigs a strong rafter ; and yet an infinite number of principalities being joyned together , had not formed that eternal and great monarchy , which men did expect ? tacitus answered to this , that the question was of weight , and therefore deserved to be maturely consulted , that he would return the next day to parnassus , where when he should have cast his eye over his annals and histories , he believed he should thereout draw such an answer , as would give her majestie full satisfaction . the roman monarchy was very well pleased with this answer ; and just as she was going to take her leave and be gon , melibeus , that famous shepherd , who had brought a dish of curds and cream , and two new cheeses that very morning , as a present to tacitus , and had heard the question asked by that great monarchy , desired her that she would be pleased to stay , for that he would instantly give full satisfaction to her in that which she desired to know : tacitus and the roman monarchy smiled upon melibeus , and bad him hold his peace , and go look to his sheep , for that was his profession . melibeus then boldly answered , that no sort of men whatsoever knew better how to discourse of , and resolve state-affairs , then shepherds ; that princes should be happy if they used the same charity in governing their subjects , as shepherds do in feeding their flocks , and the people most happy if they would imitate sheep in their obedience to their princes . tacitus and the roman monarchy marvailed much at this bold and resolute answer of this shepherd ; wherefore they bad him freely make his conceit known : with which permission melibeus thus began ; most powerfull queen , ( as it is well known to my virgil ) am a shepherd of mantua , and i should much injure this my gray head and beard which you see , if i were not absolute master of my profession . i say then , that in so many years that i have had the charge of sheep , i have clearly learnt , that a shepherds power and greatness , consists not ( as many that are covetous and ambitious believe ) in having many millions of sheep ; but only in having so many as a good shepherd may keep with his eye , govern with his rod , and rule with his whistle . and the reason is apparent ; for shepherds are beggers when they have too few sheep : for great poverty forceth him to milk them too dry , and to shear them too close . shepherds are alwaies wealthy and happy in a mean ( wherein all perfection consists ) whereas in immensity they run certain danger , for that it is very hard to govern such a number of sheep as is disproportionable to the forces of any one man. whence it is , that silly sheep , when in too numerous flocks , first grow lean , and then of necessity die , through the meer carelesness of him that looks unto them . this disorder is occasioned , for that flocks of too disproportionate a greatness , instead of good institutions , are full of fowl confusions ; and the proverb frequently made use of , and diligently observed by us shepherds , is true , that a few sheep will not supply the necessities of a shepherds cottage ; many will ; and infinity beget confusion ; and are rather prejuditial , than of use . princes and commonwealths were happy if they had the property of cammels , to stoop down humbly to the ground to take up the load of government ; and if they could put a period to their pride and ambition , by rising up on their legs , and not suffering any more load to be laid upon them , when they know they have sufficient for their strength to bear : but men do all their life-time , long to grasp a great stack of hay , to the end that they may at one burthen carry it all home to their own barns ; which falling afterwards by the way , they find that after so much industry and pains , they have laboured in vain . hence it is , that for and odd years that i have been a shepherd in arcadia , i never had in my penfolds above sheep , which affording me the certain gain of crowns a year , i have still been held to be very fortunate by all the shepherds of arcadia . i therefore think that shepherd unhappy , who being blinded by avarice , thinks to grow rich in one day , by having many flocks of sheep , which not being able all of them to be looked unto by the masters eye ( which is that which fattens the sheep , and which is the flocks chiefest felicity ) he commits them to the custody of careless boys , and oft-times rents them out to cruel shepherds , who out of greediness to reap a little interest more then the sheep can yield , do lose the principal . neither have there wanted amongst us shepherds those alexanders the great , who to asswage their thirst of government , have not been ashamed to ask of god , that he would create new worlds . for in our arcadia was one menalcas , one that did alwaies envy me , and was my mortal enemy ; who thinking he should be able to crush me if he could get more sheep then i had , was not content with sheep which he had , but that he might make himself absolute monarch of all the shepherds of arcadia , took up money at use , sold the greatest part of his patrimony , and having got together a good sum of money , he sent for three flocks of sheep , each of them consisting of from spain , france , and england , where he knew the best sheep were , and paid excessively for their transporting ; which being strangers , and not acquainted with the shepherd , nor yet understanding his voice nor whistle , they were but ill-favoredly led to their pasture in the morning , and brought back again at night to their folds . wherefore menalcas , to bring his sheep to better obedience , which went still wandring up and down , set dogs upon them ; which not being known to the sheep , were alwaies hated by them , and they were the more incenst , for that to their natural hatred , they added offences ; which begot such obstinacy , dispair , and disobedience in the sheeps hearts , as they began infinitely to abhor their shepherds , and the being guarded by dogs . moreover when they found they were to be milkt or shorne , they hid themselves in woods ; and then it was that all the shepherds of arcadia , knew that dispair may make conies turn lions . wherefore the spanish sheep grew so inraged , as they even ventur'd to bite the shepherds ; the french kickt the pail down with their feet , wherein they had been miklt ; and the english sheep , that they might not obey strange shepherds , nor have their wool torn off by unknown dogs , forbore to graze , chusing rather to die for hunger , then to live in that slavery . it was more strange to see , that the same profit of cheese , wool , and lambs , which those forrein sheep so willingly yielded to their own country shepherds , were with so ill-will paid to menalcas , as thinking they were not only ill treated , but tyrannically massacred , they seemed to be glad that they were become barren , and laught to see their shepherd undone . menalcas being exceedingly afflicted at this novelty , was forced to send to switzerland for a new regiment of dogs , to bring his sheep to better obedience ; which remedy proved both chargeable and unfortunate ; for these dogs growing so cruel to the sheep , as even to worry them , and eat them up ; this cruelty wrought such effect in the sheep , as they began resolutely to throw off all obedience . so as afflicted menalcas fell at last into the misfortune of listning to a florentine , a damn'd master of policy , who told him , that wary shepherds had no better way to make forrein sheep which were disobedient , serviceable unto them , then by keeping them poor and lean ; which as soon as it was put in practice , proved so prejuditial both to the sheep and sheepherd , as menalcas could not get so much as one cheese , nor half a tod of wool from his sheep , and the sheep died for want of meat . and in one months space , menalcas lost both his interest and principal ; and ( which caused much mirth in all the arcadian shepherds ) from being a happy shepherd of a noble flock , fell , through his greedy ambition to be a woful merchant of sheep-skins : a great misfortune , wholly occasioned through the ignorance that men have of shepherds arethmatick , which differs so from the merchant-like arethmatick used in other affairs , as menalcas who gained crowns a year by sheep , fell far short of getting a thousand , by a thousand . for it is true , that in common arethmatick twice five , makes ten , and thrice five , fifteen , and so forward ; but in pastoral arethmatick , twice five , makes three , thrice five makes one , and four times five , makes that cypher which ruins as many as by grasping at too much , holds fast nothing . the xlviii . advertisement . the vertuosi of parnassus , in the assembly of focide , decide the mystery of an host ; and find the keeping of an inn to be a noble heroi●…k vertue in the assembly which some daies past was celebrated in focide by the vertuosi , for decission of some controversies which arose amongst the vertuosi , it was resolved to the wonder of all men , that inn keeping was not a sordid occupation , but a most worthy heroick vertue , only fit for such high spirited men , and men of worth , who born to be liberal and splendid , cannot endure that their purses should be strung with avarice , nor that the coffers wherein they keep their gold lockt up with the key of niggerliness ; for they think that the use of money serves for nothing , but the more to inable gallant men to do gallant things . the wonder was yet the greater , for that it was said , the vertuosi concur'd so unanimously in this declaration , as it mist but a little , that this vocation , held at first so sordid , was not added as an eight to the seven liberal sciences . the meaner sort of the litterati could hardly believe that this paradox was approved by the noblest sort of parnassus : for aristotle , plato , averoes ▪ and many other antient litterati of the first classis , did highly praise this resolution of the assembly , confessing all , that no nobler art , no more honorabler exercise , nor greater advantage could be had or made by great men , then that of inn-keeping : alwaies provided that they should be very circumspect in lodging certain quallified passengers , who upon occasions which daily occur , might with half a penful of ●…nk ▪ and one little word , make their host happy , and not only pay for their supper and horse meat , but make good the losses he had suffered by such as feed upon other mens costs , and pass for noddies . presently upon this declaration , many generously minded men of parnassus , and who were formerly verst in the noble husbandry of sowing good turns , and reaping gratitude , betook themselves to the chief high-waies , where they have built commodious inns to take sturgeons with pilcherts . and alberto pio , conte de carpi , one of his majesties councel of state , dispatcht away an express by post , to acquaint his nephew octavius aquaviva , who was then in the court at rome , with this news . this nobly minded prince , and worthy successor to his vertuous forefathers , as soon as he had read the letter of so high advertisement , took post , and riding to●…ds the high-way which leads from rome to tus●…ny , did ●…mmediately erect a publick and royal 〈◊〉 in viterbo , with the signe of the blew lyon , where he nobly treated all the princes , and other gallant gentlemen that past by that way ; and did this with such host-like chearfulness , as having twice lodged cardinal nicolas sfondrato very ▪ suddenly , the said cardinal being afterwards made pope , remembring how good cheer his host had made him at viterbo , and considering the noble bloud , and great worth and me●…s which did 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so great a prelate , he caused him to be sent for to rome , and discoursing with him of what he had eaten at his inn , did gratefully requite him with a sallet of boyl'd succory , a dish of delicate porredg , with wardens rosted in the embers , and with a cardinals cap , in despight of some poorly conditioned fellows , who are not ashamed to give scurvy nic-names to the accommodation which we receive by being well lodged , and which ought to be esteemed a great happiness . the xlix . advertisement . a litterato severely punished for saying that duels were sometimes necessary . the argumentation had three daies ago between certain litter●… in the peripatetick portico , whether his majestie had done well or no , to forbid duels upon so severe penalties , was very remarkable for the m●…fortune it occasioned to some : for the disputation was no sooner ended , but those who had held that oft-times such differences might arise between souldiers and other persons , as not being to be decided but by the sword , duels were necessary , were seised upon and condemned to the gallies . the wonder of this so sudden sentence was increased , it being clearly seen , that even justice her self , which was never known to shew any passion in any whatsoever occasion , did not at this time conceal her anger against those that were sentenced . some of the wisest of this court say , that she had much reason to appear so incensed , since her reputation was so deeply concern'd by those who had dared to affirm that it was possible for some differences to fall out amongst men , as were not to be decided by her laws , without the use of duels . the l. adverisement . the dukes , marquisses , and other titulati of parnassus , complain grievously to apollo , that their honorable title of excellency , should be given to doctors of law , and physick . the duke of aganippe's wife fell sick the last week of a dangerous feaver ; he therefore forthwith called together a colledg of the best physitians of this court , wherein for his better satisfaction , he would be present himself . and it fell out , that whilst these physitians were arguing the business amongst themselves , they gave the title of excellency to one another : whereat the duke was so scandalized , as not being able to endure that so high a title , and which in this our age is so ambi●…ously coveted by great men , should be frequently used by those thread-bare doctors ; not tarrying to hear their result , departed from them , and went to find out divers princes to whom the title of excellency is given ; and told them they must make head , and no waies tollerate that so ●…ignal a title should be abused by doctors of ●…aw and physick . the princes were so wel pleased with this motion , as ●…y immediately presented themselves before apollo , and complained grievously that the princely title of excellency should be used by those doctors , for whom the title of sir , or master , was too much . apollo gave them no other answer , but that they should send for the parties to appear ; which was done . so as the doctors of both these professions appeared the next day before apollo , who ( the princes their adversaries being present ) said it was well known to all men , that lawyers and physitians were in the world long before there were any dukes or princes , who had their beginnings only since the goths , and other barbarous nations passing into italy , divided it amongst them , into petty principalities , till when the names of dukes , marquisses , and earls were never heard of ; and that the doctors of law and physick , from the first plantation of learning , had the title of excellency given them , which they had ever since peacefully possest ; and that those first titolati which were seen in italy , took upon them the title of excellency , as being a thing which was highly esteemed of by lawyers and physitians ; and that since the titolati were of much later standing then doctors , no justice would permit that the latter should deprive the more ancient , of the title of excellency : and that if the princes their adversaries thought that that 〈◊〉 was of less repute for being used to sholars , they might leave it , and take to themselves one which they should like better ; but that they were very sorry , that in these modern times the liberal sciences should be of so small esteem , as it should be accounted a dishonour that physitians and doctors of law should use the title of excellency , which the ancient dukes took from doctors , as a thing which they did much value . and then they added , that for the eternal glory of learning and to incourage men to learn the liberal sciences , the rewards of honorable studies ought rather to be increased then diminished . to this the princes answered , that the first foundation laid by the doctors , that the titolati had taken the title of excellency from them , was false ▪ for that the most of them had purchast it at deer rates from supream princes . to this the doctors reply'd , that if to enjoy the title of excellency at dear rates , made for any advantage in this dispute , the doctors of both these professions might say that they had paid dearly for the degree of doctor , which brought with it the ●…itle of excellency to the colledg which had given them that degree . the princes reply'd with a great deal of contempt and derision , that it was very strange that doctors should pretend to parallel their excellencies which might cost them crowns , with that of dukes and princes which required many thousands ; and that the difference between the one and the others excellency , was easily discerned by the difference of the price . it appeared strange to apollo , that the princes should presume to enjoy the name of excellency at a dear rate : and he told them , that they by their monies had purchased the substance of the estate which they possest , not the vain-glorious title . but that doctors who did first possess the substance of learning by their perpetual labour and watchings , might justly say that they had purchast the title of excellency , when they parted with their monies for the degree of doctor . to this the princes answered with a deep sigh fetcht even from the bottom of their heart , that his majestie was in the wrong ; for many of them had purchast the title without any state ; when to a castle or place wh●… they had enjoy'd from their supreme prince with the title of baron or lord , they had purchast the title of duke or prince , only that they might be honoured with the title of excellency . apollo was so much distasted hereat , as he presently made an edict , whereby he commanded all kings and emperors , that for the future they should abstain from such like mercandize , as from a thing unlawfull ; and granted all priviledges and prerogatives which the law by way of charity doth afford to widows , orphans , idiots , and other miserable people in demanding full restitution ex capite enormissimae saesionis , to those silly people who would throw away their money to buy smoak without roast-meat . then to rid himself of this troublesom controversie between the princes and doctors , he referred it to the tribunal of the sage grandees of the liberal sciences , who upon hearing of the fact , were to determin it : before whom when the dukes and doctors appeared , after two hours dispute , those judges gave sentence , that though the title of excellency which was used by doctors , and given to princes , was of the same matter , quality and substance , yet it was the goods of fortune which was honoured in princes with the title of excellency , and in doctors , those of the mind . the dukes thought then that the sentence was favorable on their behalf ; wherefore with a scornful smile they said to the doctors , these judges have cleared the question once for ever . at the hearing whereof , the doctors , who smiled inwardly at the simplicity of these titolati , not to give themselves any further trouble , answered nothing . but when the princes had conferred with their learned councel , who told them that the sentence made for the doctors , they prest his majestie that they might be suffered to appeal : apollo troubled at the princes pressures , bad them be quiet ; for they vilified the title of excellency , who bought it with their monies ; not they who had won by their labour and study : and that if the dukes , and other t●…tolati would purchase infinite honor to themselves , they should open their purses , and by rewarding the professers of learning acquire unto themselves the title of liberal ; which with men of sound judgement , and perfect understanding , was thought to be much above that of excellency , highness , nay even that of cesars sacred imperial majesty . the li. advertisement . a marquiss who caused his genealogy to be made by scipio ammerati , found himself so ill dealt with by him , as he redemands the reward he gave him . at scipio ammerato's first entrance into parnassus he opened a publick shop , where he still professes the mystery of making genealogies , and pedigrees for principal families , at which he is so expert , as he hath the chief work in this court of that nature . wherefore some months ago a marquiss of some condition desired him that he would draw a pedigree of all his family , and endeavor carefully to find out the first original thereof , for which he would not be unthankful to him , and in part of payment he presently gave him crowns of gold. ammerato spent divers months in this business , and at last found all that was possible to be found of that lords family , and drew it up into an exact form . by that genealogy it was seen that this lords predicessors had been marquisses for above one hundred years , and that the first of his family that possessed any estate was a captain , who for his good service done to an emperor of germany , had a castle given him , which was called marquiss . ammeratus found that this captains father was a physitian , that this physitian was the son of a notary , that the father of this notary was an oyl-man , descended from a serjeant , who for some roguery was hanged ; that this serjeant was son to a matrix-maker , who was descended from a gentleman of savoy , who for having conspired against his prince , was put to death : whose son , when he was very young , being sent by the prince of savoy to shift for himself , was taken into the house of meer charity by the said matrix-maker , who having taught him his art , adopted him his son . the gentleman of savoy was son to a great count , whose father , grand-father , great grand-father , and great great grand-father had been of good esteem in that county , which was purchast by a courtier , a great favorit to the prince of that time . this courtier was found by authentick records , to be the son of a certain jew , whose name was salamon , who becoming afterwards a christian , was called arnoldo ; and this jew being come from rhodes , his pedigree could be no further pried into : ammirato having arived at this , presented the lord with this genealogy ; who seeing the great bulk thereof , not looking into the contents , seemed to be well satisfied , and gave ammirato a thousand crowns . but when he read the loathsomness of his family , and the mean condition of divers who were registered in his genealogy , he returned to ammirato , and told him that instead of an honorable pedigree which he had desired him to make , he had composed an infamous libel against him . then giving him back his genealogy , re-demanded the moneys which he had given him , saying , he used to reward those who would cover his shame , not those who would lay it open to the world . but he was soon quieted , when ammirato told him he should do wisely in not being over-curious in seeking far into the antiquity of his house ; for that the wheel of this world turning continually round , and in a short space of time laying those low , who a little before were at the highest pitch , they who were too ambitiously desirous to know who their progenitors were from the flood , would find many in their genealogy stained with the like blemishes as his was . the lii . advertisement . a dispute arising amongst the vertuosio touching the truth of certain sayings and speeches of wise men , their true meanings were argued and resolved in the general dyet celebrated in helicon . the sayings , sentences and answers of the wise , are the laws , acts , and statutes which are observed by the vertuosi in this state ; and therefore apollo is very careful that they may be perfectly true , and exactly good . and because many days since a great dispute arose amongst the literati touching the truth of some of them ; according to custom , in a business of so great weight , the general diet of the vertuosi was intimated in helicon : wherein the first thing that was called in question was , whether or no the common saying was true , that wise men and fools are cozened by fair words and foul deeds . many were for the affirmative , saying , that the cunning of divers modern wits was arrived at that height of double dealing , as there were many good people , who being fed with good words , were afterwards paid with bad performances ; and that it was daily seen , that double dealers did by their fallacious speeches turn and winde plain meaning men as they listed , and led them by the nose at their pleasure , though they were held generally to be wise men . yet it was resolved by the major part of the dyet , that in times past the saying was allovv'd of with much reason , and practised as a true one ; but that novv adays by the overdaring boldness of dissemblers , vvho vvere openly seen to cheat and cozen the eyes of the simplest , and very ideots vvere so opened , as believing onely such things as they savv plainly by noon-day , and touched vvith their hands , none but fools vvere cheated vvith good vvords and bad deeds ; for vvise men vvho vvere avvare of these vvicked mens vvays , did not onely not at all believe them , but holding them to be crosbiters and cutpurses . shunn'd them as they vvould do the plague : so as such as these being upbraided with their double dealing , durst no longer shevv their faces amongst honest men ; but like ovvls and bats , appeared onely by night , to hide their shame by darkness . it vvas next taken into consideration , vvhether the proverb , omne solum forti patria est , to a stout man all the vvorld is his countrey , vvere absolutely true or no. the first day , vvhich vvas vvholly spent in hot disputation upon this point , the dyet seemed to think it vvas a great error to question a sentence , vvhich till then vvas held undeniable by the unanimous consent of all schools ; since it vvas plainly seen , that gallant and worthy men were cherished and welcome vvheresoever they came ; and that no prophet being approved of in his ovvn countrey , men highly minded , and of generous spirits , had reason to account that their countrey , vvhere their vvorth vvas valued ; and vvhere , vvithout being envyed by their neighbours , every man was valued according to his true vvorth , that they onely should esteem that for their countrey wherein they were born , whose foolish behaviours abroad made them be accounted odious foreigners ; yet the adverse party had the better , so as the saying was repealed as false : for by the vertuosi of the dyet , it was found to be directly contrary to the divine will of god : for god being pleased , for reasons unknown to man , to make the whole fabrick of the earth of a like fertillity and pleasantness ; and yet it being his will , that the most barren mountains should be as well inhabited by men , as the most fruitful valleys , and the scorch'd and frozen climates , as well as the temperate , he with wisdom worthy of himself , did infuse into the heart of man so excessive a love unto his countrey , thereby obfuscating his judgement and understanding ; as he hath taken from man the knowledge of better , who still thinks that countrey the most delicious where he is born : a love so necessary , as were humane creatures deprived thereof , they would abandon the craggy alpes , the frozen northern parts , and the scorched southern ones , and with infinite confusion flock all of them to the temperate countreys of europe and asia ; and that wilde beasts , and all other creatures did clearly evidence this , who governing themselves by natural precepts , were seen to live perpetually in those countreys wherein they were bred ; and though they were swift of wing , and fleet of foot , yet they were contented with the small circuit of their own countrey . that therefore hares , when hunted from their seats by dogs , in flying from them are so frighted with the sight of new countreys as fearing new places , more then the hounds teeth , they return to dye where they were first started . that the curiosity of man had observed , that swallows by so long a tract both by sea and land , return to build their nests in the same place from whence they went the year before . after this averdment , it was much disputed by the deputies of the dyet , whether the proverb festina lente , were true or no ? and it was said , that it being impossible at one and the same time both to run and walk slowly , the proverb contained contrarieties , and was therefore impossible to be put in practise ; for slowness could not consist with swiftness , and that it was impossible to use mature deliberation , where precipitation was wisdom . and in this particular tacitus his opinion was much approved , who freely said , that nullus cunctationis locus est in co concilio , quod non potest ●…duri , nisi peractum : quia non cunctatione op●…s ubi per●…tior fit quies quam temeritas . tacit. lib . histor. there is no room for delay in that advice , which admits not of praise till it be executed ; for where pawsing is more dangerous then rashness , there needs no delay . in this variety of opinion , the dyet that they might maturely resolve the business , caused the emperor flavius vespatianus to be sent for , whom they demanded in what sense he who first used that saying festina lente , dict understand it ; and whether by those words he would teach others mature haste . to this vespatian answered , that he did not set up the impress of the anchor and the do●…phin , with the motto which was so well known , in that sense which was afterwards commonly given unto it ; for he very well knew , that many occasions might happen , wherein precipitation was to be esteemed great wisdom , and according to the french , first to act , and then to argue and resolve . but that by festina lente , he would have wisely admonished his romans lente festinare , to be flower in making feasts , for that in rome where there were many beagles which were very well sented to find out wild beasts , though in never so secure a harbour ; and great store of swift-greyhounds , and abundance of those two legged animals , who being of a wilde nature , fiunt occupantis , have no certain owner , the too frequent use of feasts was nothing else but to hunt for horns , and fill ones budget with them . after this interpretation of his impress , given by vespatian , which was fully satisfactory to the whole dyet . it was propounded , whether the usual proverb , rosso mal pel●… , beware of a red head were true or no ? and because of all men , those that have red hair drink most , and therefore are accounted brave fellows , jovial companions , truth tellers , and pleasantly disposed , no ways revengeful nor cruel , but much given to pastime ; red hair seemed to be best , for those who desired to appear before men with countenances which might purchase them good will and credit amongst men . the dyet did unanimously vote for the repealing of the proverb , and vvith a joynt vote declared it to be false . when at the very instant that the decree vvas entring , the vertuous lady victoria colonna , vvho in the dyet represented the vvhole university of poetesses , briskly opposed it , and caused the vvhole dyet to alter their opinion . for she told them , that they had revoked the truest saying that ever proceeded from the mouth of any vvise philosopher : for ( said she ) the proverb rosso mal pelo , did not vvarn men ( as it vvas commonly believed ) to bevvare of red hair , but vvomen , and especially married vvives , that they should by all means avoid it , as a treacherous hair . for there being but fevv men of that complexion , if one of them chance to be more then ordinary gracious with a lady , he is sooner taken notice of for a whore-master , then those vvhose more ordinary hair serves to cloak their knavery . the interpretation given by the lady victoria , appeared to the vvhole dyet to be true , and vvorthy the judgement of so noble a poetess . so as vvhen this controversie vvas ended , the great delfick chancellour questioned the saying , ubi bonum ibi patria , great diligence vvas used in the discussing a business of such importance : and the literati said , that the greatest part of humane felicity , consisting in the vvealth vvhich men possess , they knevv not v●…hy that should not be esteemed a mans happiest countrey , vvhere his greatest riches lay , for the countrey vvhere men live by their labour , and by vvages purchast by svveat , vvas by vvise men esteemed an unfortunate abode , not a delicious countrey . it vvas notvvithstanding unanimously agreed upon , that in former times the proverb vvas held to be very true , but that in these days , vvherein the ravenous nails of fischi , promoters vvere grovvn longer then vultures clavvs , or lyons pavvs , and vvherein great revenues , upon occasion of any delinquency imputed to vvealthy men , served of times for conclusive proofs , and undeniable arguments , to enrich princes treasury by confiscasions , it vvas a blessed thing to live in italy , and have a mans estate in iapan . the liii . advertisement . apollo at last grants admittance into parnassus to francisco sforza , duke of milan , which he had long denyed to do , upon a hard condition , which he accepted of . count fr. sforza , he who by his extraordinary military valor purchast the dukedom of millan , whereby he rendred his family as famous and honourable as the like of the greatest princes . though years be past , since at the great desire of the souldiery and literati , he came to the confines of this state , yet he was never suffered by apollo to enter into parnassus ; and though the chiefest princes of this court , who did always admire the great worth of so gallant a man , have perpetually interceded for him , his majestie notwithstanding , without ever making the cause known , hath always denyed him that favour . but being prest thereunto much more then usually eight moneths ago by lodowick the eleventh , king of france . apollo answered resolutely , that he infinitely loved sforza's worth and extraordinary merit , but that for good respects he would not admit so scandalous a man into parnassus . to this that king , who was so knowing , couragiously answered , that in respect of the dukes extraordinary military valour , his excellency in councel , his singular dexterity , his quick dispatch , his continually uncorrupted faith , and his other heroick vertues , wherein he did so abound , he thought that the true patron of worthy commanders , and the idea of a prince greatly wise in peace , and infinitely valliant in war , was rather to be admitted into parnassus , then any thing that was scandalous . to this reply apollo answered , that he did not gain-say the dukes great deserts ; but that man beginning happily already to discern the false alchimy of the militia , and the unhappy use of the souldiers craft , he would not , by admitting of the duke into parnassus , renew the reputation of rash and hiddy giddy men ; and so much the rather , for that the foolish sort of men , for their greater calamities , were more encouraged to despise the danger of navigation , for one onely ship that returned safe into the haven , then they were terrified for that were sunk in the sea . apollo added , that he was more desirous to admit the duke into parnassus , then the duke was to be there : wherefore he wish'd king lewis to tell him , that he would very willingly grant his request , if at his entrance into parnassus he would onely bring such with him , as had come to an unfortunate end in the pay they took from the sforzeses militia . the duke thought this condition to be hard and shameful ; and was long in dispute with him self , whether he should accept of it or no ; for the desire of glory pleaded on the one side , but then he was deterd to know that the militia promising so fairly , and coming off so ill , he was to bring with him the unfortunate attendance of those that were miserable , and much to be bemoned . in this so great doubt , this heroes endelss desire of glory got the upperhand ; wherefore he signified to apollo by his secretary simonetta , that he willingly accepted of what was proffered him in his majesties name ; and apollo immediately appointed a day for his entrance , which was the of this present moneth . when the princes and famous commanders of this court knew this the dukes resolution , they were much troubled thereat , and left nothing undone to make him change his resolution , which they knew was to bring great prejudice to the whole militia . but the duke , standing still stedfast to his resolution , resolutely answered those princes , that he was fully resolved to purchase a place in parnassus at what rate soever , let whatsoever mischief befal the mysterie of war. for that fisher-man was not to be esteemed ungrateful to his occupation , who being grown very wealthy by the great gain he had got by fishing , burnt his boat , and tore his nets . he presently therefore called for such as he did most confide in , whom he commanded to muster together all those souldiers who had miscarryed in the sforzese militia , which were a very infinite number ; and the next wednesday about a clock , the duke all armed made his entrance : never was there a sadder nor more woful spectacle beheld : for it exceeded all the greatest miseries , and made tears to fall even from the hardest hearted men , to see an infinite number of young men , well provided of fortunes , who lived at ease , enjoying all delights in their fathers houses , dead of hunger , and starved in hospitals ; some lying dead in ditches , many on the high-ways , and an infinite number drown'd , serving for food to dogs and fishes , others all rent with wounds , some trod to death by horses , others begging their bred by the high-way , not having received sufficient recompence from those princes in whose service they had lost their blood , and exposed their lives to a thousand dangers , to carry them back to their own houses , which they had so unfortunately forgon . and every one wept when they saw a yong gentleman of about twenty years old , who being shot into the eye by a cross-bow arrow , whereof he dyed , and who having been told by guido bonati , a famous astrologer , that if he would be so wise as to keep in his own countrey , he might assuredly live to be fouscorce year old ; the same guido bonati tenderly imbracing him , said , o unfortunate young lad , why wert thou so foolish as to sell years of life for sixpence ? then fearful curses were heard against the first introducers of war. the next day after the dukes entry , the most accomplished literati came to apollo , and told him , he very well knew that there was no difference between the miseries of war and courtiers unhappiness . for if war were miserable , courts were nothing but afflictions ; if souldiers were unhappy , courtiers were unfortunate ; that therefore since the sad spectacle of duke sforza's entrance into parnassus had infused such dread into all the militia , as it was abhorr'd by all men , it would be equally advantagious to the world , if when any courtier were admitted into parnassus , who was risen from a mean condition to the supremest dignities , he should ( as the duke had been ) be accompanied by all those miserable courtiers , who suffering under the avarice and ingratitude of several princes , dyed despairing . this advice was rejected by apollo as pernitious , who said , that men had more need be incouraged to go to court , then terrified from going thither ; for though but few came by any dignities , wealth or honor , yet all of them inriched their souls with the purchase of several vertues ; which was so true , as he thought he deserved not the name of a compleat gentleman , who having spent many years in court , had not been scozzonato , had not learnt his lesson well . the liv. advertisement . a dangerous contention which arose amongst the pedagogs in parnassus upon a very ssight occasion , is appeased by apollo . yesterday about eight of the clock a great alarm was sounded in the gramarian quarters , which made all the vertuosi run to see what the matter might be : and they found that the schoolmasters , panegyrical writers and commentarors , were fallen so foully together by the ears in brigadoes , as there was much ado to part them the dispute which arose between them was , whether the word consumptum were to be written with a p , or onely with a t. apollo was much troubled at this dispute , not onely for the mean cause of the quarrel , but for that paulus manutius ( vvho vvas thought to be a chief actor in this brabble ) hit lambino in the face ( vvho stifly maintained the contrary opinion ) with a roman stone , vvhereon consumptum vvas vvritten vvith a p , vvherevvith he broke his nose . apollo , vvho vvas at first much incensed at the pedanticks mean folly , vvas so highly scandalized at this nevv excess , as he commanded the pretor urbano to rid parnassus of that sottish crevv of pedants . but aftervvards , at the intreaties of cicero , quintillian , and others of the chiefest literati of this court , vvho interceded for those bravvling people , saying , that those pedanticks could not fall out for any matter of moment , vvho vvere onely acquainted vvith slight affairs , his majestie vvas appeased . the lv. advertisement . for remeady of many disorders which are found in history , a general assembly of historians being summoned , apollo publisheth a severe edict against them , and many historians are reprehended for their errors . the general assembly of all historians , vvhich vvas intimated some moneths ago by the censors , by express order from apollo , to meet in delos , vvas ended tvvo days ago , much to his maj. satisfaction , by reason of the excellent orders that therein vvere established in a business , wherein the eternal fame of those things consist , which are composed by gallant men . this caused the more general content in all the vertuosi , for that modern writers have strayed far from those laws which they devoutly promised to observe when they took the oath of historians before apollo ; and because the importance of the business doth deserve it , menante will not grudge to give you the very edict which was published yesterday morning in his majesties name by the sound of trumpet in the market places , and afterwards posted upon all the colledge gates of this state. we phoebus , by the grace of god emperor of the fixed stars , king of planets , prince of the zodiack , duke of light , marquis of generation , and earl of all visible things ; to all our faithful vertuosi , and well-beloved literati , health . we having much to our displeasure found , that many modern historians have much wandred from that way of truth , which was walked in to the publique good of others and their private honor , by our faithful pen-men dionysius , livy , salust , tacitus , and many others ; to the end that future ages which do so eagerly read history , may be sure to find truth from the pens of faithful writers , and not be abused by lies given out unto them by flattering and malicious ignorant historians , do by this our edict , which is to continue for ever , call into the memory , and give notice to all those who undertake the noble work to eternize by their writings the actions of famous men , that they must always remember , that being to write , not to the present , but to those that are to come , they publish writings full of that historical truth , which renders the names of sincere pen men glorious and eternal to future ages : and that they should value the blame and threats of such as are justly taxed for their unworthy actions , but as dung ; there being no more woful folly , then continually to labor with pen in hand how to shame themselves , by writing falsehoods , without any advantage to those whom they flatter , declaring , that to publish false histories , is to assassinate the vertuosi who read them : and therefore our will and pleasure is , that those who run into so enormous excesses , be irremissably punish'd by the like assassination . and because it is apparent that princes have arrogated so much authority even over the free pens of historians , as not to suffer any thing to be written of them , though it be true , which is not fully to their satisfaction ( a pretension which hath so banished historical truth from the pens of writers ) as the great wits of our choicest vertuosi being frighted by the base fawnings whereby modern princes will be flattered , the weighty imployment of writing history , reserved onely for the choicest pen-men , is now adays ( to the great shame of the present age and infinite damage of the future ) fallen in the hands of ignorant people : we therefore by reason of this foul disorder , are forced to put princes in mind , that their authority ceasing with their lives , they are fools if they believe they are able after their deaths to hinder our vertuosi from writing the truth of their actions to future times . and we do more particularly advertise the same princes , that their valliant carrying of themselves in affairs which require freedom , is the cause why our faithful historians , esteeming themelves offended by so much severity , out of meer rage of revenge , after he lives of such emperors , write rather invectives then histories , as the emperors tiberius , 〈◊〉 , 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 , have to their great shame ●…ound . and to obviate the great inconvenience , occasioned by their ignorance ▪ who in these modern times do 〈◊〉 the worth of history by their sottish writings , o●… will and pleasure is and we do expresly command , that hereafter no man , of what degree o●… condition soever he be , shall dare to write history , unless he be first approved of for purity of language , by iulius caesar ; for ●…ence by livy ; for policy , by tacitus ; for the good understanding of princes interest , by guicchardin . and more over under pain of perpetual infamy , we do expresly prohibit for the future , the writing particular histories of any whatsoever city , unless it be the metropolis of some empire , kingdom ▪ or great province : and this we do , to the end that the precious jewel of time be not mispent in mean things , both by him that writes , and by him that reads . and for the same reason we ordain , that it shall not be lawful for any writer , to publish the life of any commander , unless he have commanded in chief in some armies , or had deserved his pay twenty times told , won some provinces , besieged and taken some strong holds , and have sought two set battels at least in open fields . and to take away all abuses that may be committed by ambitious men , we declare , that those whose lives any one shall undertake to write , have the same requisite parts as were in bellisarius , in narsetes , in godfrey of bullen , in alexander fernese . and to rid the world as much as may be of a certain arrogant ambition which is known to reign in many , we likewise command . that it be not lawful to write any particular history of any family , unless it be made appear to our colledge for history , that it hath maintained it self famous and illustrious in the world for full five hundred years , with plenty of personages who have put a period to important wars , and honourable undertakings ; and that in this particular they take our glorious and well-beloved families of the orsina's , caietans and collenesses for their examples . and because it is well known by many former examples , that to suffer an ambitious man to write his own acts , is to put a naked sword into a mad mans hands , we do expresly command , that it shall not be lawful for any one to write any commentary or formal story of his own life , unless he have given in sufficient security to contain himself within the terms of modestie and truth ; and unless he be declared by our colledge of historians to be so eminent a personage , as his actions deserve to be consecrated to immortality for the good of future ages . and to extirpate the wicked vice of flattery out of the world , to the which ( to our infinite grief ) we see our vertuosi are much inclined , we do expresly command , that it be not lawful for any writer to publish the life of any whatsoever hero , though he be emperor or king , before he be dead , allowing mention of men whilst alive to be onely made in general histories , or in some short particular elogies . moreover , to shun the infinite follies which are daily seen in many histories , our express wil & pleasure is , that it be not lawful for any writer to compose the historie of any particular foreign nation , unless he have lived for the space of twenty years in that countrey , whose story he will write . and for the like reason we do forbid any whatsoever vertuosi to undertake to write history , unless he have travelled many provinces ; unless he have been secretary or counsellour to some great prince , or be not senator to some famous common-wealth ; and chiefly unless he have spent two third parts of his life in following courts , which we have judged to be the more requisite , for that in our delfick library we find some histories written by courtiers , who are altogether ignorant of the purity of languages and of all the most important precepts of the art of writing history ; but so abounding in smart politick precepts , as they make clearly appear that it is the particular vertue of accomplished courtiers to publish to posterity , not such things as they have gathered up by hear-say , but the most hidden intrinsical meanings of princes , which they by their quick speculative wits have known how to penetrate into . and because in many volumenous histories , we read bitter invectives against the nation which is an enemy to the place where the author of the history lives , we do here renew our edicts published in this particular some years ago ; wherein for the indemnity of historical truth from the blames imputed by one nation to another adverse nation , we have ordained , that an abatement shall be allowed of per cent . and because we are assured , that the sad loss to learning , of the greatest part of our beloved livies pretius dechads , is occasioned soly by lucius florus , we do expresly command , that from henceforth it be not lawful for any one to epitomize or write a breviate of the writings of any whatsoever historian . so also , with all the plenary power that we have over learning , we forbid all our vertuosi , at any time hereafter to write the universal history of the world , or of any particular nation , which like the famous romans , french or saracins have done gallant acts , compendiously , or in small volumes ; as many have done to little or no purpose , who have written the actions of all nations , from the beginning of the world to their own times , in a few sheets ; experience having taught all men , that the reading of things so succinctly written , is altogether unuseful , it being unpossible to reap that abundant fruit , which is tasted in particular histories , where not meerly res gesta , the thing done is related , but the reasons and counsels thereof . in the last place , we put the reverend preisthood in mind , that they attend to the reading and writing of sacred things ; and leave the writing of profane histories to those lay people , who think it a meretorious truth not a sinful murmuring , to asperse the actions of princes , or private men , who have done things amiss . given at our zodiack , the day after our entrance into libra , the year of our laborious course , . after the publication of so severe an edict , it was whispered in this court ( but because the business was carryed very secretly ; and menante , who advertiseth nothing but truths , tells it not for an assured verity ) that many historians , yea even of the first classis , were severely reprehended : for t is said , that iulius caesar was commanded , that within twenty days he should not fail to add the breaking open of the roman exchequer in his commentary , punctually as it passed ; and that he should therein mention certain other particulars , which being more then meanly loathsom , he had forborn to relate , lest it might entrench too nearly upon himself . that uetonius tranquillus was severely reprehended , for that having made more open profession then any other literato , to be very circumspect in his writings , he had notwithstanding recounted such obscene lasciviousness of tiberius , of not forbearing in his lust to make use of sucking caildren , pollutions which howsoever ought not to be spoken of , not onely in respect that historians cannot affirm those lewd actions for truths , which in point of lust are done in the dark , when doors are shut ; but for that such things ( though truths ) ought not to be touched upon , which for the great scandal which they occasion , ought rather to beburied in oblivion , then divulged ; it being the end of all historians to insert vertue into mens minds , not to instruct vice . t is said indeed , that dion was told in milder terms , that history , which ought to be wholly real truths , the very pitch of politick instructions , needed not to be filled with the so often reiteration of those prodigies , with which he had so heaped up his writings , as they did even choak those that read them . and which was the more tedious , for that they had exceeded the bounds of discretion , both in their numbers and qualities : for apollo his self smiled to see him write of so many showers of blood and stones ; he not remembring that he had ever exhaled such meteors , which were afterwards congealed into blood , or turned into stones . it is said , that titus livius , the father of the roman histories , blushed not a little at this reprehension which was given to dion ; perhaps , because he found himself guilty of the like errors : but it is certainly affirmed by all , that lampridius was severely proceeded against ; for by order of the whole congregation , his histories were turned back upon his hands , and he was freely told , that he should go and teach those execrable lusts in the publike classis , wherewith he had so delighted himself to fill his shameful papers , wherein he had written the lives of heliogabalus , caracalla , and other lascivious monsters of nature : it is also noised that machiavel was reproved for his mad and desperate policy , with which he had so freely filled his histories , and other writings , as he openly manifested his desire was to draw his readers into the same ditch of impiety whereinto himself was shamefully fallen . t is said , that in the next place the congregation found fault with guicchardin , for his having spoken amiss of the venetian commonwealth , the which was called by the whole assembly , the sanctuary of the vertuosi , the true seat of perfect liberty , the bulwark against barbarians , the mint of libraries , the salt of humane wisdom , glory of the italian nation ; and many do believe , that guicchardin in the face of the whole congregation , did not onely acknowledge , but bewail his error , alledging for his excuse , that meer envy to see the state of venice grow daily more glorious in her eternal liberties , whilst the florentines , by their domestick factions , lost their freedom , had made him so foully prevaricate ; but that the fame of venice , the glory of that excellent councel , whereby she did ( as a rare and onely example ) daily increase both in state and reputation , was arrived at that height of splendor , as was not to be obscured by the pen of whatsoever passionate writer . it is also said , that ialiano goselini . secretary to the senat of millan was sent for by the censors ; who told him , that certainly he thought he spoke to drunken men , when in the life wihich he writ of don ferrante gonsaga , where he makes mention of the apostolick sea , he did not stick to say , that her greatness was caesars particular care ; and whilst goseleni was about to defend what he had said , he was bid to go make ballads , invented for flattery , it being the business of history to write real truths . and because girola●…o conestaggio , conestaggio , gentleman of genua , had taken his history of portugal out of the delfick library , which had been there many years before , and had in lieu thereof given in another edition of the same history , which ( as he said ) was corrected in some places : the overseers of the library , finding that he had rather abused then corrected that edition , which he had not reprinted ( as he gave out ) for the general good , but to give satisfaction to some , whose reputations were deservedly taken by him , he was told , that if he did not bring back the first edition into the library within eight days , the assembly would put some affront upon him . for the ruine of the portugueses being occasioned by those who had the care of instructing king sebastian in his youth , it was very necessary , that by the unhappy end of so great a king , and by the miserable calamities of the portugueses , princes should be taught to know , that the learned masters which are to have the care of breeding up their children in their youth , ought to be commanders of tryed valour , and senators of known politick prudence . the lvi . advertisement . apollo , to secure the rivers of his state from pyracie , makes bernardo capello general of the ionick sea , and gives him excellent directions . appollo being desirous to provide against many evils which learning suffers under by the frigots of ignorant pyrats , in the rivers of corinth , declared bernardo capella two days ago , in the great senat of litterati , to be admiral or general of the ionick sea ; whom he strictly commanded , that to that purpose he should levy foot , and was content that he should take along with him some of the best born young poets of that state ; who to begin the mysterie of bearing arms , did offer themselves to serve his majestie upon this occasion . apollo afterwards sent for capello , whom he strictly commanded , under the pain of being declared to be wofully ignorant , that he should molest none with his gallies , but the frigots of ignorant pyrats ; and that he should suffer merchants ships , of what nation soever , to go free , together with their merchandize , to do them all possible honour ; and that he should be ayding to them upon all occasions , as they well deserved , for that by theirnoble industry , men enjoyed the commodities of the remotest countreys ; to the end that the zeal that his majestie desired to shew unto the world , of defending his subjects and their faculties from the rapine of pyrats , might not be turned into a greater inconvenience by his filling the seas with new and a worser sort of sea robbers . his majestie then said , it would be too shameful a thing that the robbing of publike merchants ships should be done in the name of the most exquisitely vertuous prince , who should be much to blame if he imployed his prime nobility in such an exercise , wherein they should begin their militia with shame enough , if their first action should be to pillage merchants ships . and to the end that all the world might know , that his majesty had no interest in a business of such weight , save only the publick good ; he charged capello to kill as many pyrats as he should take ; not only the more to terrifie so pernitious a race of men , but that so usefull a work might not by taking of ransoms , be turned into a publick prejudicial merchandice ; it being proved by many things which had hapned , that such pyrats as had first been prisoners , and had afterwards purchast their liberties , did very willingly expose themselves afterwards to all sorts of danger to reimburse the money which they had paid for their ransom . the last and chiefest order which his majesty gave to capello , was , that his charge being only to guard the rivers belonging to parnassus , he should keep himself from going out of them at any time ▪ as he would do from fire , lest he might fall upon the same shame as those fools do , who forsaking their marriage-bed to commit adultery with other mens wives , became cuckolds . the lvii . advertisement . the prince of epire's first son being born , he is thereat so afflicted , as he forbids that any shews of joy be made for it in his state. the last letter that came from epire , bears date the of this present month , and they tell us of the birth of a son to the prince of epire ; and say that he being the first-born , the people of that country were not only exceedingly joyed to see their prince his succession secured , but that they and many of the neighbouring lords prepared to make extraordinary demonstrations of gladness . but the prince was the only man who in this publick rejoycing was so very sad , as he forbad the steward of his house , who went to take order for the expence of bone-fires , fire-works , and other expressions of joy for the birth of their young master , to shew any signes of jollity ; and bad him make the fountains run with . wi●…e , to proclaim open court for forty daies in his house , spend a hundred thousand crowns in tilt and turney , when he himself should have a son 〈◊〉 ; the lord steward wondred much at this the princes answer , to whom he said , what means this , si●… , is not the child that is bo●… your son , your wife having brought him forth twelve months after you were married ▪ i now find , said the prince , that privat me●… are not much acquainted ●…ith the interests of princes . but to let you see that i have reason for what i say , tell me how old i am ▪ eighteen the twel●…th of 〈◊〉 month ▪ replyed the steward . confess then , said the prince , that the child 〈◊〉 now born , is my brother , not my son ; for privat men 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 children from their brethren by their birth●… ; but pri●… by 〈◊〉 age : and know that those shall be my best beloved sons , who shall be 〈◊〉 ●…o me when i shall be years old ; and when any such shall be born , i will be content that extraordinary joy shall be shewn : for when sons are born to a young prince as i am , bels should rather toll out for sorrow , to funerals , than trumpets sound for joy : a prince who marries whilst he is young , runs hazard of having a multitude of sons , which is the true stone of offence , of whatsoever state ; this is so great a truth , as a king can receive no greater blessing from heaven , than to have but one only son alive . moreover , a prince who hath many sons whilst he is young , ought not to covet long life ; for as fathers desire to die with supreme power in their hand ; so sons , when they come to certain years of age , have not patience to wait till the fruit of government grow to be ripe by their fathers death : for many great kings have had sons , who blinded with a desire of reigning , would rather hazard their healths with eating green grapes in iune , then tarry till they should be ripe in september . if it be so , said the steward , i must confess the condition of princes is to be deplored in that , wherein we privat men do envie them . know then , said the prince , that when my son ▪ who is now born , shall come to be one and twenty years old , and i shall not put him into full possession of this my principality , if he shall then chance to contrive any thing against my person , or my state , it is i that shall therein have erred more then he . for it will be as great a discourtesie in me , not to resigne over unto him my state then , as it would be inhumanity in me , if when i should be eating at a plentifull table , i should see him stand by , ready to starve for hunger , and not bid him eat . the lviii . advertisement . apollo erects a new tribunal in parnassus , for the punishment of flatterers ; but succeeds very unfortunately therein . the civil and vertuous life which the litterati lead in this state of parnassus , is not so much to be attributed to the severe punishment threatned to such as are vitiously given , as to the great rewards held out to such as are vertuous ; nor yet to the good genius which the litterati are generally of , as to apollos wisdom , who hath appointed several distinct tribunals for every vice , for every fault omitted , and judges thereunto appropriated ; for his majestie hath learnt by the late disorders , that when his ministers are troubled with but a few affairs , they dispatch them accurately well ; whereas those that have great store of business upon their hands , are neither speedy , nor very just in their dispatches . nor was apollo aware , till six months since , of the great disorder which reignes in this state , wherein many severe tribunals being erected against all such principal vices whereinto men do most usually fail , there was no judge nor punishment set apart for the vice of flattery , which his majestie doth so much detest , and which is so pernitious both to princes , and privat men . so as his majestie thought that disease was so generally diffused amongst men , chiefly because there was neither physitian , nor apothecary appropriated thereunto : wherefore his majestie who is alwaies vigilant in the extirpation of all vice , and in procuring indempnity to his vertuosi , thought it very necessary to correct so great an error , and to curb so wicked a vice . he therefore of his own meer motion , erected a tribunal six months ago in this court , under severe punishments against flatterers : for his pleasure was , that such as should be found guilty of so foul a fault , should be tied to the infamous chain which is in the chief market-place , and flead live by marsia , who was very skilful thereat , having learnt it at his own charges : and for the more severe punishment of so enormous a vice , he chose the chief satirical poets of the state , as the greatest enemies of flatterers , to be their judges . peter aratine was made lord chief justice , iuvenal the first advocate ; ariosto attorney-general ; francis berna , chief notary , who had nicholas franco , and cesar caporali for his substitutes ; and six months being past since the erecting of the tribunal , in all which time no complaint came in against flatterers , though flattery were seen to be daily used in parnassus ; apollo , that he might have occasion to punish those wicked persons , made use of a great many spies , who diligently watching over them , might accuse them before the tribunal . this remedy wrought good effect ▪ for ere long they found bartolomeo cavalcanti , who flattering a foolish prince ; given to hunting , wantonness , all sorts of delights , neglecting the government of his state so far , as he had transferred the care thereof into the hands of one that was mercenary , ignorant , and very passionate , he termed him vigilant , indefatigable in taking pains , an enemy to all pastime , which he had wholly placed in following business . cavalcanti was suddenly seased upon ; who upon examination , presently confest all that could he desired . wherefore the judge using all the mercy to him that could stand with justice , allowed him three daies to make his defence , and martia brandisht his knife about , and put all other things in order ; when the judge coming to examin the prince who was flattered , found , that though he was notoriously known to be what was said of him , he pretended notwithstanding , that cavalcanti had not only spoke truth , but that in the praise which he with reason gave him , he came short of his deserts : so as being asked if he had any thing to alleadg against cavalcanti , or whether he thought himself offended by his gross flattery , the prince being much incenst , answered , that he had no reason to complain of one that had said truth , and that he did not esteem those praises which he ought to reward , injuries : and added , that he did very much wonder , and was greatly scandalized at that new tribunal , which seemed to be invented rather to defame men of honour , then to punish cheaters . aretin being much moved at this answer , with more freedom then became him , asked with what face he could pretend that cavalcanti had not lied basely in praising such a blockhead as he was , so notoriously stupid , unfit for government , which he had totally turned over to a vitious favorite of his ? the prince hearing this , advanc'd with unexpressible rage , and told aratine , tune dirai , e farai tante , e tante lingua fracida , marcia , senza sale , ch'al fin si trovera , pur un pugnale meglior di quel d'achille , epiu calzante . saggio son io , et tu sei un fortante nutrito del pan d'altri , del dir male , un piede hai in chiasso , l'altro allo spedale stropecciato , ignorante , et arrogante . thou 'lt talk , and do so many sottish things , with that thy rotten , base , unworthy tongue , as that a dagger will be found ere long , better then that achilles with him brings . i 'm wise , and thou a rascal underling bred up at others tables , men t' abuse , one foot i' th' hospital , th' other i' th' stews : thou art an arrogant sot , aratine . the attorney-general , the notaries , and all the other officeres , were so incenst to hear such words given to a judge , the court sitting , as they all fell with violent hands upon the prince , to carry him to prison . but he that was better at his hands than head-piece , did not only defend himself , but assisted by his attendance , struck one of aratines eyes almost out , broke iuvenals arm , and berna's jaw-bone ; and poor ariosto , who betook himself to his heels , when he saw the scuffle begin , fell down the stairs , and bruised himself terribly . when apollo heard of this disorder , he was not so much grieved at the affront done to the tribunal , nor the harm done to his poets , as for that he now evidently saw , that there was no cure for flattery , nor no punishment to be found for it , since men were become so blind , as they esteemed the fawnings of flatteries , not injuries , but favours worthy of reward . whereupon , much to his grief , he abbrogated the tribunal , and confest it was impossible to punish a fault which no body would complain of . the lix . advertisement . apollo being very far in love with torquato tasso's good conditions , creates him prince poet , and lord high constable of italian poetry . torquatus tasso being every day more and more admired in parnassus ; for his heroick and lyrick verses , for his prose , poetry , and finally in all sorts of compositions , apollo was so i●…mar'd of the smoothness of his pen , of the newness of his conceptions , his easie vain , and of his pleasant wit , as he used the other day , extraordinary signes of affection towards him : for of his own meer motion , he created him prince-poet , and lord high-constable of all italian poetry : and at the same time with great solemnity , gave him the royal ensigns used to be given to poets laureat , of being allowed to keep parrets in his windows , and apes at his gate . it is strange , that upon this occurrency , tasso did not only make himself known to deserve the honour which his majestie had done him , but worthy of much higher preferments . for he did not as many others do , who being exalted by fortune , or by the pleasure of princes , from a mean condition , to supreme dignities , think it is sufficient if they put on the stately robe of that new magistracy , though they leave their souls covered with an old base jacket , made of course cloth , and all tattered ; but he immediately after having received so high an honour ▪ clothed his soul with those heroick and royal vertues , which becomes a poet laureat . for at the very instant that he received those royal ensignes from his majesty , he kept open court in his house for daies together ; in all which time , the vertuosi of all professions were fed with such abundance and curiosity of delightfull viands , as there was not any one litterato in all parnassus , who did not gorge himself with vertuous composures , more then his stomack could digest , and who was not drunk with his savory conceptions . and all this with so great plenty of all exquisite science , as his majesty and all the muses marvailed very much how the unexhausted multitude of so many elegant conceits , disht in with the choicest phrases , and smoothest way of delivery , could be served out by so fruitfuul a wit. but during this jubile , and this feassio'●… celebration , which gave general satisfaction , some pilfering poets broke open tassos most privat desk , where he kept his choicest compositions , and stole away aminta , which they divided amongst themselves ; an injury whereat tasso was so much grieved , as it imbittered all his past delights . and the authors of so shameful a theft being discovered , and pursued by the sergeants , they fled into the house of immitation , as into a secure sanctuary ; from whence they were taken by the provost marshal , by apollos express command , and shamefully led to prison . and one of them being found with the prologue of the said pastoral about him , he was forthwith punished according to the sergeants custom , and questioned super aliis , & complicibus . whereupon the wretch having the rope on , named of his companion pick pocket . poets , all of them base people , who being given over to play , and to all lewdness , tend nothing else but to steal away the conceits of others labours , making themselves merry therewithall , abhorring to live gloriously in the world by the labour of their own studies . urbanus the chief justice , using the due rigor of the law upon these sawcy companions , sentenced them to the gallows ; and the other morning many gibbits were set up in the chief market-place , at the number whereof apollo being much moved , he told the judge , that though those thieves deserved the utmost punishment , he should notwithstanding give them some other severe exemplary chastisement ; for the detested cross-bars of gallowses , made justice be interpreted cruelty : they therefore deserved the name of good officers , who made themselves known to be well sighted in forbidding faults ; whereas such as thirsted after bloud , seemed to take delight in having gallowses often seen in the piazzas , thinking that they had betterd their condition , when they had got the name of being great hangmen . the lx. advertisement . a litterato desires of apollo , the art of memory , for which he is laught at by his majesty . on last tuesdaies audience , a poor thread-bare litterato presented himself before apollo , and told his majesty , that by reason of his small learning , he durst not appear in the common schools ; and that his ignorance in sciences proceeded from his very bad memory ; for he remembred but very little of what he read : and that having a great desire to be a scholar , he humbly craved some remedy which might produce in him as tenacious a memory as those great litterati have , who remember whatsoever they do read : and be chiefly desireth the gift of local memory , whereby he had heard that they reaped great honor who had it . apollo told him , that the lovers of learning got good memories by perpetual reading ; and that local memory was a thing onely practised by mountebanks , and by the common sort of litterati , who are sed with ostentation , and a certain vain-glory to appear more then what they are ; and not by sound and well-grounded schollars , who esteemed it a ridiculous thing , good only to make the common people wonder . the petitioner replyed , that if it were so , he desired to better his memory by usual means . apollo said again , that memory could not be better perfected , then by continual study , and assured him , that thereby he might compass his desire . the schollar replyed again , he had found the contrary : for having lately been very diligent in studying virgil the miracle of the latin poets , he remembred but very few of those infinite delicacies which he had observed in him , all which deserved never to be forgotten . apollo was not pleased with this answer ; for with some shew of anger , not usual with him in giving audience , at which times he puts on miraculous patience ; he bad him go study virgil again , and that he would remember much more the second time , than he had done the first . then turning to those that were near him , he said , he hated their impertinances , who having been but a quarter of an hour in a mill , would come forth as much bemealed , as those millers who keep there day and night all the daies of their life . the lxi . advertisement . juvinal refuseth a challenge given him by francisco berni , to contend with him in satyrical poetry . some latin and itallian poets fell some few daies ago , a comparing the itallian and latin poetry , when lodovico ariosto thinking that the latins did too much undervalue itallian poetry , by too highly exalting their own , said that the itallians yielded to the latins for the heroick verse , which was grave and stately in the latin tongue , and did observe a delightful cadence , by coupling the dactils and spondeas so excellently well ; but that in lyrick poetry , he was of opinion they might march hand in hand together ; and that for what concerned satyrical verse , the itallians were so far advanced , as in the tartness of their pleasant conceptions , in the mordacity of their more grave affairs , and in their easie expressing their conceits , they far exceeded the latins . the latins approved not of ariostos opinion , and said in their own defence , they saw not why the italian poets should so much presume upon their skill in satyrical poetry , there not being any one of them who might deservedly be compared to iuvenal , nor who durst vie with persius . francisco berni was present at this discourse , who having gon beyond all the terms of the bitterest backbiting , had so wounded even aretines self with his cutting verses , as he bore the shamefull badges thereof in his face , brest , and hands . this man told the latin poets , that iuvenal in respect of him , was an ignorant fellow in satyrical poetry ; and that he would maintain this truth which he had spoken , fairly and freely , the first and second time , and even till blood came , in a bush of bryars , not only against iuvinal , but against whatsoever other satyrical poet , yea though he had the advantage of a commentator . it is not to be said how highly all the latin poets were incenst at the hearing of these words ; who to abate the edge of this arrogant mans too great presumption , and to maintain the name of latin , so much injured , they had like to have used superchery to him ; but horatio venosino , desirous that this question might be fairly and honorably decided , appeased the incenst mindes of the latin poets , and told berni , that he lied in all that he had said to the prejudice of iuvinals honor ; and that he had slandered a poet whose pens he was not worthy to make clean , and that he in iuvinals name accepted the challenge . he therefore wisht him to appear the first day in bellona's field , with eights and thirds , where iuvinal should give him a good account of himself , with his heroick verses in his hand . this being said , berni , accompanied with his brother-poets , went to arm himself , and horatio hasted to find out iuvinal , whom he acquainted with all that had past between him and barni . iuvinal being astonished at the novelty of the business , pawsed a good while , then said , horatio , if you have accepted the challenge in my name , try you the business with him , for i dare not . as for latin poets , i fear no mans face , neither do i care a fig for a thousand ; but i tremble at the very naming of an italian satyrist . horatio seeing his own honor , and the like of all latin poets in such danger , encouraged iuvinal , and bad him remember that he was the prince of satyrical poets , and that such a one as he , who had deserved the happiness to have commentators , a thing so much coveted by learned poets , ought not to be afraid of bernies railing ; and told him there was no proportion to be held between the powerfull weapons of heroick verse , between the excellent blade of the latin tongue , and the faint italian verse , made by chance , and so strictly tied to rhime , as italian poets having their hand bound up with the cords thereof , they could make no down-right blows , nor lead a streight stockado , as occasion should require , as was clearly seen by mauro , who in the dangerous combat which he had , when labouring in the bean-field , he was set upon by an enemy , and thinking to make a full and mortal thrust at his belly , his rithme forced him to give it him on his back , which purchast him the name of treachery . the more the venetian poet incouraged and inheartned iuvinal , the more did his fear encrease . the news of this challenge was by this time so spread abroad amongst the vertuosi , as it came to apollos ears , who was very much pleased thereat , for he delighted exceedingly to see two litterati buckle together in fury , and wound one anothers reputation handsomly ; for , for the most part , the vertuosi speak and write , but so so in cold bloud ; but when heated and chafed with anger , they do things beyond human wit , in defence of their reputation , and to purchase renown . wherefore hearing of iuvinals backwardness , he caused him speedily to be sent for , and sharply upbraided his cowardliness , and recommended the reputation of latin satyres unto him . then iuvinal said thus in his own defence to his majesty ; sir , i have the same courage that i formerly had , nor do i fear to encounter a dozen latin satyrists ; i beseech your majesty to remember , that the excellency of satyrical poetry consists not in having a bold wit , quick spirit , a detracting talent , in sharp bitter reparties , handsom sonnets , and ready replies ; but in the condition of the times wherein men live : for in corrupt times , the vein of satyres is very fluent ; and the times wherein i lived , cannot any waies be compared to the wickedness and cosenage of this present age . if berni should appear within the lists , and should assail me within the launce of modern vices , such as were not known in my daies , would he not drive me out of the list ? apollo hearing this answer , had no more to say , but declared , that though iuvinal baulked the quarrel , he suffered not in his honour , nor did he do any thing misbecoming an honourable cavalier poet ; for it was not bernis wit that he feared , but his corrupt times , too unequal to those of iuvinals . the lxii . advertisement . domitio corbulone being severely prosecuted by the quarantia criminale , ( a venetian magistracy consisting of forty men ) for some words spoken by him in his government of pindo , which were formerly declared by apollo's publick edict , to be tyrannical ; is at last acquited with much praise . the city of pindo , and all its large territories , being filled by great store of murderers , and dangerous factions ( by the too much lenity of some of its late governors ) which did greatly anoy the peace of good men ; apollo , to curb the licentiousness of his most seditious subjects by exemplary punishment , sent severe domitio corbulone some two months ago to that government : who so carried himself , as in a short space the people of that state were reduced from mighty seditions , into a peaceful condition . and enquiring of some of his confidents , what the people thought of him , they freely told him , that his rigorous proceedings against many , had so affrighted the uuniversality , as he was hated by all of them . corbulone was overjoyed at this answer , and replyed to those his beloved friends in the well-known saying , oderint dum metuant : let them hate , provided they fear . this was suddenly reported to apollo , as a capital fault . his majesty liked not this accusation , and committed the examination thereof to the quarantia criminale : for it had been long before published by a decree from his majesty ; that whatsoever prince , were he either legitimate , natural , or hereditary , who should dare to use such insolent and rash words , should be held and reputed an abominable tyrant ; and that if any officer should , though at unawares , let them escape his mouth , he should suffer capital punishment , corbulone was therefore cited to appear before the court ; which he did the next day ; where the cause was severely canvast by the judges : and whilst all the people of parnassus expected to see some rigorous sentence pass upon corbulone , he was by his majesties approbation , gratiously absolved , and sent back to his government with more plenary aurhority then before : for the judges declared , that such words were abominable , and altogether tyrannical in princes which have the means to be gratious , but very honorable in an officers mouth , who hath nothing in his power but the detested lash of justice : that prince being truely to be admired , who could make himself be beloved by his subjects , and reverenced : that officer to be reputed very sufficient , who had the genius to make himself be feared and obeyed . the lxiii . advertisement . the chair of privat tranquillity being void by diogenes the cynicks promotion to a higher degree ; apollo offers it to the famous philosopher crates ; who refuseth it . the cynick diogenes , he who for so many years , to the general advantage , and his own particular glory , had the publick chair in these schools , wherein his office was to praise poverty , solitariness , and peace of mind : by whose perswasion , atalus , the very king of treasures , put on that admirable resolution , of forgoing all his riches , and become a stoick in parnassus , was by reason of his great deserts , exalted two months ago to the sublime dignity of the muses arch-flamming ; so as so noble a place being void , his majestie bestowed it upon the famous crates ; who went yesterday to apollo , and contrary to all mens expectation , refused so noble a chaire ; saying , that the charge of poverty , and of the souls peace , being greatly injured by diogenes his promotion to that immense dignity , he could not discharge his duty with that fervency , with that purity and integrity of heart as the place required : for the very first day that he should undertake the imployment , he should necessarily be so puft up with ambition , and should have so great a desire to obtain the same dignity which his predecessor had obtained , as would drive from out his mind , though never so well composed , that sincerity which makes an orator speak from his heart , not from his mouth ; and that the necessity of his ambition , and his violent desire arose not from any vice , but from that laudable zeal of reputation , which is most intense in even the most mortified vertuosi of parnassus : for if in process of time he should not receive the same honor from his majsty as diogenes had done , the world would think that the whole had happened , not by reason of his humility , not for that he preferred a privat life before publick magistracy , quiet before business , or poverty before riches , but because his majestie had not found such deserts in him , as he had done in diogenes . so as having his soul perturbed by the violence of ambition , he could not hope to reap any advantage by exagerating the praises of humility , the contempt of riches , and of the vanity of worldly greatness ; it being impossible that any man should be so efficatiously eloquent , as to be able to perswade others to that sort of life , which the standers by must needs say , was abhor'd by the perswader . the lxiv . advertisement . many people having wasted themselves in keeping great tables , and going gloriously attired , desire their princes to make a pragmatical law for the moderation of such expences ; but obtain not their suit . people subject to princes who live in parnassus , learning by experience , that luxury and vanity in apparel , are so much increased , as that there is no patrimony , how great soever , which may not be quite consumed in a short time by womens vanity , and mens ambition ; and plainly seeing , that bravery was grown to so great a height , as a whole portion , though very great , was not sufficient to buy jewels for a young maid that was to be married ; which was the cause why parents could not marry off their daughters : it being likewise known that delicacies for the pallat , were oflate years so prodigiously doted on , as modern gormandizing hath quite ruined those families , which were made great by antient parcemony : they by joynt consent presented themselves all , some few daies ago before their several princes , whom they earnestly desired that some remedy might be found out to prevent this their so apparent ruine . all the princes were very well pleased with this their peoples petition ; and then it was that they knew it to be true , what many have written , that peremptory or pragmatical laws ought only then to be published to the people when they themselves desire them : for if they be inacted against their wils , they seldom produce good effects ; the reason is , because prodigality never frightens scapethrifts , till they have been acquainted with the hideous and dreadful face of poverty . all the princes therefore by common consent , caused many excellent pragmatical laws to be made by understanding men , wherein luxuriousness and superfluity being abridged , nothing but decency was seen in apparel , and men did eat to live , not to ruine both their lives and fortunes by gluttony . and because a thing so much desired , might be brought to pass , the princes gave order that this law should be proclaimed on the of this present moneth ; but the preceding night the farmers of the customs , toll takers and excise-men , came all of them to their several princes , and told them , that if they published the pragmatical act , which they understood was penn'd , they desired to have abatements made of the great rents which they paid ; for the greatest revenues of the custom house , and of all gabels arising out of silks which came from naples , gold-thread from florence , rich draperies made at millan , and other accoutrements belonging to apparel and the livelihood of man , which were brought from foreign parts , the price of the customs would fall infinitely by reason of this law. the princes were so confused to hear this , as when the deputies of the nations came the next day to receive the edict which was to be proclaimed , they told them , that having heard the just appeals made by the receivers of their customs , who were better verst in that affair , they resolved not to impair themselves for the bettering of others : that if they could invent any law , wherein the princes interests were not concerned , they would give them all possible satisfaction therein , to witness the fatherly love they bore unto their subjects ; but that to empty the publick purse , to the end that those of privat mens might be filled , was a fraudulent desire , and clean contrary to charity , which thinks it a piece of cruelty to macerate ones self that another man might grow fat . the people departed much unsatisfied , by reason of this peremptory and interessed answer ; and confessed , that to go about to cure the peoples disorders , when the medicines touched upon the common taxes , was to undertake to cure an incureable cancar . the lxiv . advertisement . johannes bodinus presents apollo with his six books of his commonwealth ; wherein it being found that he approves of liberty of conscience , he is sentenced to be burnt . johannis bodinus , that famous french litterato , was deservedly imprisoned in a dark dungeon the very first day that he presented apollo with the six books of his commonwealth ; for his majesty would by no means permit that the wicked tenet which he had published in his republick , that it made much for the quiet of states , to allow of liberty of conscience , should pass without some exemplary punishment ; an opinion which was alwaies held by his majesty , and by his best politick litterati , to be no less wicked then false ; as that which makes her desciples rather seditious , then wise statesmen ; nothing being more prejuditial to a principality , then the want of unity . severe process was therefore made against bodine , and he was yesterday condemned in the high court of parliament , to be burnt , as a seducer of the people , a publick stirrer up of sedition in ambitions men , and as a notorious atheist : bodin craved mercy of his majesty , confessing his opinion to be false and wicked , and abjuring it as such a one ; but that being deceived by the ottaman empire , wherein with much peace to the state , all religions were allowed of , desired them that they would shew some pitty towards him . the judges were then more incenst at bodin , and told him , that he deserved the greater punishment , for that he being a christian , had dared to publish the wicked precepts , especially in matters of religion , of those turks , who ought to be abominated for their wicked impieties , not only in profane , but in sacred things . yet before they would proceed further with bodine , the judges were resolved to know of the ottaman monarchy , how she governed her self in this particular ; intending , by what was found out afterwards , to impose the same punishment upon her , if it should be proved that she had given so scandalous an example unto the world , as to allow her people liberty of conscience . the ottaman monarchy was then sent for in great haste , who was asked by the judges , whether it were true , or no , that she had let the reyns of religion so loose in her state to her subjects , as every one might believe what he listed ? the ottaman monarchy wondred much at this demand , and with great vehemency answered , that she was not so unexperienced in the affairs of the world , as not to know that the peace of states , and the universal quiet of the people , could not be had by any more secure means , then by the unity of religion ; and that in all her empire , no other religion was either preached or believed by her mossulmans , but only mahometism . the judges hearing so clear an answer , they turned to bodin , and in great anger said unto him , that if a mahometan , ignorant of that true divinity which discovers the greatness of god unto men , and the truth of his holy law , spoke so clearly of the unity of religion which was to be observed in an empire , what ought he to do who was a schollar , and born in the most christian kingdom of france ? to this bodin answered , that the ottaman monarchy confessed with their mouthes the necessity of an unity in religion , which was not really practised in their states , wherein were christian catholicks , hereticks , grecians , jacobines , nestorians , jews , and people of many other religions , which was the cause of his mistake . thou knowst full little ( said the ottaman empire to bodin ) of the proceedings touching religion , which is used in my house ; for thou oughtest not to say for all this , that i grant my subjects liberty of conscience , because men of all the several religions which thou hast named are seen in my empire . thou must know that i having conquered innumerable provinces for the space of years and more , most of which were formerly subjects to several christian princes ; and having found by experience , that people newly assubjected , easily rebel , if they be forced to change their religion , as those who are more obstinate in defending the faith wherein they were born , then in defending their estates , countrey , and lives ; i , that i may govern in peace , have alwaies used to suffer them to live in the same laws , as well sacred as civil , wherein i found them ; bereaving only the christian latins of their religion , taking their priests from them , and forbidding them to rebuild their churches which are fallen , or to erect new ones . so by little and little the memory of their ancient religion failing in them , together with their sacred exercises , their children , if not they themselves , or at least their grand children , at last become mahometans . wherein i have had so good success , as the many provinces which i possess in asia , which were formerly full of christians , are all of them now turned such mahometans , as my emperors being used to take many children from their christian subjects , wherewith to recruit their janisary-souldiers , there are now but very few to be found in asia . i proceed otherwise in greece , for i grant them the free use of the grecian rites ; and the cause of this diversity is , because there being no grecian prince who can cause jealousie to my greatness , and consequently the grecians which live in my empire , not being able to be fomented by any prince of their own religion , they do not trouble me so much as do the latins , who have many and potent princes , which is the cause i take such care to annihilate their religion . but i am so watchfull that all my mahometan subjects should punctually observe the religion profest in my state , as it is not lawfull for any of them to prevaricate . i give you for a clear example of all this , that i having the persian , who is held an heretick by my religion , no turk that is my subject , dare upon pain of life believe , much less preach the persian faith ; nor is that heresie permitted in my states : for though my last emperors , by reason of the divisions of germany , and the great jealousies which are amongst all christian princes , might much to their advantage have made war in hungary , and so extend my empire even to austria , the acquisition of which province would throw open the gates unto me , to conquer italy ; yet they have been wisely better advised , rather to weaken the persian heretick , then to make war upon the christian princes , who being so far distant in poynt of belief , from my religion , do not frighten me so much as the persian hereticks do ; for there is a great difference between tolerating infidelity in a state ( from which the passage to true belief is so hard ) and the permitting of heresie , a plague which so easily infects any kingdom , how great soever ; as the germans , english , flemmings , french , and others have seen and tryed . and know that i have rooted out all sciences and learning from out my dominion , only to the end that my subjects may live in such simplicity as is most requisite for my religion ; and to this purpose i have considerately , and upon severe punishment , inhibited the translation of my alcheron , which is written in the arabick tongue , into vulgar turkish language ; having learnt at the cost of some christian kingdoms , what mischief the translation of the bible into vulgar languages hath occasioned , which falling into the hands of ignorant people , i hear that in those parts where this abuse is introduced , even poor silly women spend more time in disputes about religion , then in spinning . wherefore to free my self from the evil of heresie , which may be introduced into my empire by ambitious men , i have commanded , that whosoever shall propound any doubts in religion , be answered by the scimiter . because the heresies which now reigne in the christian religion , have opened all mens eyes , so as they may discern , that those who have first sowed them , are more moved by ambition of governing the earth , then out of charity ( as they would make blockheads believe ) of sending mens souls to heaven by their new positions . my subjects sobriety , who are all of them bound to drink water , makes much for the keeping of my territories from the contagion of heresie ; and i say this , for that i see the fire of heresie amongst christians , breaks most forth there , where they drink merriliest . i very well know that all divisions in states are very dangerous , but especially those which arise in point of religion ; because people do not only not love , honour , or faithfully serve those who are not of the same religion with them , but hold them to be beasts , and bear them that cruel hatred which we see reigns amongst nations of different religion . add hereunto , that as it is impossible for a man to live without a head , so is it for diversity of factions ; and where there are two religions , there must of necessity be two heads ; and every fool knows whether or no one kingdom can at one and the same time receive two kings : and thou bodin oughtest so much the less to have published the seditious opinion which hath caused thee so much sorrow , for that thou knowst better then any other , that the modern heresies which now reign in many chri●… kingdoms , have been sowed and fomented by great princes , to whom lutherans , calvinists , and many others like thy self , have served to seduce the people , and to be bawds to their ambition ; only that they may thereby be followed by the mal-content nobility , who greedily imbrace new sects out of a desire to better their condition , and by plebeians , who follow them out of avarice , and a detestation which they bear to their own unfortunate condition . and if for the quiet of empires , all the people of one and the same kingdom , ought to be under one and the same human law ; how much more for the same reasons , and out of the same considerations , ought this to be endeavored in matters of religion ? which being bred with us in our mothers belly , hath taken such deep rooting in our hearts , as she is become the absolute queen of all our affections , and of all our passions ; and therefore she ought to be so much the better regulated in every state , for that we cannot live without her , nor can we be touched in any thing which is more ticklish . these things are all of them so true , as i will boldly affirm , that even bruit beasts , could they speak , or could we understand their yelping , braying , and other noises which they make , would be heard to praise god , even as we do , who hath created them , and who doth feed them . i remember , that many years ago i heard a polititian discoursing of this very article ; and because he esteemed it too wicked to god-ward , and seditious towards princes , i desired to inform my self of him , whether there were any prince , or commonwealth in the world , who did permit so wicked a thing in their dominions ? and he freely told me , that even the most modern hereticks themselves , who had cryed up liberty of conscience in other mens states , would by no means allow of it amongst themselves : for they hated to see their own houses burn with the same fire which they by their seditions had kindled in other mens habitations : and of this , said he , geneva , which i call the sink of all seditious impiety , is an evident example , where they who endeavor to raise new heresies , are condemned to be burnt . the same man told me moreover , that in germany , where so many modern heresies were invented in their hans towns , only to suppress the house of austria , liberty of conscience was permitted ; but that it would be evidently dangerous to imitate them , for that the example of others would prove unfortunate to those who had not all the same requisite circumstances , as those whom they set before them for a president . he said that the hans towns of germany live without any apprehension of any enemy-prince , who might aspire to deprive them of their liberty , that their emperors were weak , and that their citizens were not only by nature far from the ambition of governing the country ; but were forced by necessity , to live and die what they were born . for if it should so fall out , that any one to better his condition , should presume to make himself head of any heresie , the power of all the other free towns , who were joyntly interessed in liberty , with that city where factions began to arise , would presently assist with arms in hand to beat down that faction moreover , that though the diversity of religions occasioned in those cities by the liberty of conscience , were less dangerous in them , yet could it not be said that they were totally free , nor that the humor was not pernitious , and apt to occasion deadly evils ; and that no father of a family was ever induced to set his own house one fire , for having the means of quickly quenching it by a neighbouring river : but that in empires , and great kingdoms it fared otherwise ; for in them there were oft-times brothers to him who governed in chief , and other princes of the bloud ; and there were alwaies therein great store of particular privat men , eminent for birth , riches , and adherents , who were all of them ambitious , and out of a thirst of reigning , thought any enterprize , how desperate soever , easie : and that to boot with these , they had potent forreign enemies , upon whom they confined , who were more then ready to foment such heads of faction as should appear to arise ; as had lately been seen in france , and in flanders ; and that as well the lay princes electors , as every other prince of the empire , who had imbraced the present heresies , did not live with liberty of conscience , but with a particular thirst , accommodated to human interest : as appeared clearly in the lutheran impiety , which taking its beginning in the dukedom of saxony , to the end that he who declared himself to be head thereof , might not grow too great , the rest of the heretick princes had introduced the new sects of calvin , zwinglius , and of others in their states , with such confusion to sacred things , as it might be truely said that there was as many heresies in germany , as princes and potentates that did rule there : and that which made me wonder most , was to hear , that some subjects in germany were forced to alter their religion at their princes pleasure ; an inconvenience which was seen to happen so often amongst them , as some cities have past sundry times from one heresie to another in less then one months space . all which are things of very bad example , and an excellent means to introduce that atheism amongst men , which i said i thought was not to be found amongst beasts . wherefore bodin , as a horse which is long suffered to go without a bridle , becomes fierce and unserviceable to man ; so people , when they have the reyns of religion let loose in their necks , grow wild , seditious , unruly , and no longer apt to be governed or ruled by a prince : for he who is not taught by a sound and well regulated religion , to love , honor , and fear god , cannot obey , honor , nor fear man. so great a truth , as it is the nature of all people , who alwaies err in the extreams , to despise humane laws , when they are miss-led in those that are divine : for the freedom which they have to offend the majestie of god , provokes them against their prince , who gave them that liberty . this truth which i tell you , is apparently seen in those who seduced the flemmish to change their religion , and to rebell against their natural prince , who to bring them to so wicked an enterprize , permitted them to plunder churches , and church-men ; and when at last they would have refrained , and regulated them in their highest towring tumults , they found that when god is despised , men are so likewise . the government of people is a weighty affair for any prince how wise soever , nor is it possible for him alone to support so heavy a burthen ; but being assisted by religion , it becomes so easie unto him , as one prince may govern many millions of men ; for very many are so ill conditioned , as they despise human laws , yet do they often fear divine ones ; and many who little esteem the anger of an earthly prince , dread the king of heaven , and live peaceably . bodin was sorely cast down , when he heard the ottaman emperor speak so solidly of the care which princes ought to have of the unity of religion ; and was then more grieved when the judges told him , that it was wicked ignorance to maintain that princes are lords of mens bodies , and not fit to rule their souls ; as if the allegiance which by gods command , subjects owe their princes , be not as well a duty of the soul , as of the body ; and that god hath constituted the most christian kings of france , and other earthly princes , only that they might feed their ambition by reigning , and pass away their time in delight , wallowing in the plenty of so many earthly blessings , and had not made them his lieutenants on earth , to the end that they may observe his holy law ; for these reasons , all the lords of parliament ordered that he might be immediately punished by fire , who had publisht a tenet fit only to set the world on fire . the lxv . advertisement . apollo punisheth a poet severely , for having been so desperate as to blaspheme . apollo doth so abhor blasphemy above all other vices , as two daies ago he caused a poets tongue to be struck through with a naile in the delfick temples porch , who had presumed to say that nature had dealt injuriously with him , in having indowed him with a princely soul , and allotted him but a beggarly fortune . and though many litterati earnestly beseeched his majesty that he would in some sort mittigate this punishment , he did not only deny to do it , but in a great rage said , that such wits deserved the severest punishments , who being born to a poor fortune , consumed all their time in afflicting themselves by seeking out new conceits which might make poverty appear unto them more shamefull and insupportable , which they should imploy in seeking out such instructions as might make it appear less shamefull , and more tollerable ; and that he would teach men of but mean fortunes , by this example , how to accommodate their minds to their means ; it being a hatefull piece of petulancy to envy great princes fortunes ; whilst others in tattered clothes died of hunger . the lxvi . advertisement . the vertuosi of parnassus visit the temple of divine providence , whom they thank for the great charity which she hath shewn to mankind . this morning , according to the ancient custom of this court , all the prince-poets , and the litterati-lords of parnassus , went to visit the temple of divine providence , to whom giovan ioviano pontano made a learned oration , wherein he highly praised the infinite charity , and immence love which she had shewed to mankind in creating frogs without teeth : for it would have been of no advantage to man , that this world , canopied by so many heavens , full of so many stars , should not only abound in all things necessary ; but even be fully fraught with all most exquisite delitiousness , if gallant men who inhabit it , should be forced to wear iron buskins to defend themselves from being bitten by such fastidious and importunate animals ; whereas now there needed no fence against such rascally companions , who are composed of nothing but mouth and voice , but a good pair of ears , which vallue not the noise which they know can do them no harm . the lxvii . advertisement . the most excellent paolo peruta , by order from apollo , declares in the publick politick schools , what the genuine signification is of that precept in policy ; that to reigne securely , the people must be kept under . the usual precept in policy , that to reign securely , the people must be kept under , is as true , as it is wrongfully understood , and worse practised by many princes ; who out of their insatiate avarice , interpret the best politick sentences , in such sense as makes most for their present advantage . wherefore apollo being much displeased , that so singular a precept should be so grosly abused , sent a few daies sithence , for paolo peruta , who at this present time reads the ordinary morning politicks in the publick schools in parnassus ; and commanded him , that for the benefit of princes , and the peoples profit , he should declare publickly what was the true and genuine sense of so signal a precept ? peruta obeyed , and on an appointed day , when the school was full of all the greatest princes of this court , he took the chair , and said , that as an exquisite prince could be likened to nothing better then to a good shepherd , so people might be very fitly compared to a very numerous flock of sheep ; and that to the end that one onely shepherd might commodiously govern a great many sheep , the divine majestie had made them to be lowly minded , and had created them without the weapons of horns or teeth : for otherwise , to the great prejudice of mankind , every sheep must of necessity have a shepherd alloted him : for god having armed the head and hands of man with a stout heart , and wise genius , he became not obedient and submissive to his shepherd , as many princes did believe , by being often shorn and continually milked , or by being hindred from growing fat in good pastures by angersome vexations ; for the true way to keep the people low , was not to afflict them perpetually by pinching taxes , was not to reduce them to shameful poverty , by grating penalties , but to avoid the arming of their head with that ambition of command , which people so delight in , as the appetite is encreased by satiety : which true means , and safe counsel , is onely known , and succesfully practised by the ottaman emperors , who knowing very well how dangerous a thing it is for states to arm their subjects with ambition , authority , or the attendance of many souldiers , think it a capital error , and the ruine of their states , to give any place of command to a native turk ; certainly a most happy custom , and which plainly teacheth princes , that the true meaning and genuine interpretation of so useful a precept in policy , is onely , that it is a dangerous thing to arm the head of subjects with ambition , not their hands with swords ; to keep them humble , by not giving them places of too great attendance , not to desire their poverty by taking their means from them ; for that almighty god not having made sheep humble and obedient for any want they have of wool , milk or lambs , did thereby teach princes to use all means possible , that their subjects may increase in wealth , and that they may abound in goods ; it being very true , that people by increasing their private patrimonies , make chains wherewith they keep themselves fast bound up ; for lest they may lose their wealth got by so much toil , they did so religiously study peace , as the ancient romans , who were true masters of the reason of state , found no better means to make the warlike french , whom they had newly conquered , quiet and obedient to their republike , then by affording them all possible means of growing rich ; an advice which proved so fortunate unto them , as that politick tacitus speaking of the french , the most warlike people of all europe , doth not onely call them dites , & imbelles , lib. . annal. but freely affirms , gallos quoque in bellis flo●…uisses . tacit. vita agric. which plainly shews , that great riches gotten by the french , had brought that formerly warlike nation into such a wretchless slothfulness , as it seemed an old wives tale , that the french knew ever how to manage arms ; whereby we are made aware , that riches by disarming men , keeps them submiss in the humility of peace ; whereas on the contrary every one sees , that the not being content with their present condition , makes men greedy of novilties . for men are not abased , as ignorant people believe , by being poor , but need begets in them such an immence desire of change of fortune , as makes those that are in bad condition , venture upon any how desperate or dangerous soever an undertaking ; it having been often times experienced , that nothing arms people more then poverty . which produceth desperation , not when it is occasioned by the earths barrenness , by adventures at sea , by mens carelessness , by the misfortune of factors , or other humane accidents ; but when caused by the prince his avarice , who foolishly perswades himself he shall become a rich shepherd by keeping his sheep poor . wherefore that chair man of polititians affirms , that to go about to reduce subjects to loyalty , and principallities to peace , by keeping them poor , was neither better nor worse , then to pretend to cure the dropsie , by giving the sick party over much drink . to prove all which to be truth , it is daily seen in all insurrections , princes meet with no sorer enemies , then mal-contents , and such as have not wherewithal to live commodiously ; who in the garboils of commotions , prove always devils , whereas those who are wealthy are obedient and peaceful . the lxviii . advertisement . a nobly born laconick senator , having committed a great fault , the duke of laconia thinks it wisdom to pass by it . you have formerly heard , how that the laconick state is governed by an elective prince ; and how that the laconick senate is reputed and celebrated for the best that is in parnassus . the duke of laconia to supply the place of a senator that was deceased , advanced the second son of the prince of mitilene to that so high dignity . and not above a fortnight sithence , this gentleman , much to the dukes regrete , committed a fault , which his highness had severely punished in other senators ; and he seeming not to take notice of it , many of his senators were troubled at it , and advised him to use the same punishment for the same fault . to which the duke answered , that the same punishments were not to be inflicted for the same faults , where there was a disparity in the personages ; and that god , whose will it was that no sublunary thing should be without somewhat of amiss , had so ordained it , as that the finest currel should not be without its rubbish ; and that in so famous a senat as was that of the laconicks , eminent personages added much to the splendor of it , and were oft times of great assistance to the state upon urgent emergencies . but that this advantage was counterpoised by a notable allay , that such persons were not so easily governed , nor held in as others , over whom the whole power of command , and absolute authority of the law being to be exercised , they were not of the same reputation , nor advantage to elective princes , as were senators highly descended ; and that the sythe of equal justice did fortunately fell grass of an equal height ; but that the wary mower , who spyed a great shrub amongst lesser grass , hoisted his sythe , lest he might break it , or blunt the edge thereof , a piece of wisdom whereby elective princes , whose prerogative it was to chuse senators , were taught not to promote personages of extraordinary birth to that degree , unless they do formerly resolve to bear with many things in them , which they would severely punish in ordinary subjects . the lxix . advertisement . andrea alciati finding himself injuriously persecuted in his place of magistracy , flies for help to apollo , but finds none . andrea alciati , who was not onely very well versed in the profession of law , but was in great esteem with apollo , and all the vertuosi of parnassus , for his great insight in all the choicest learning which makes men be so highly prized in this court ; knowing the sour of obeying , and sweet of commanding ; the meaness of a priva●…e life , and the gallantry of being , or of but personating a prince , applyed himself from his very first entrance into parnassus , to the perillous practise of gorvernment ; till at last he was deputed a trianual president of the isle of negrapont , by the prince thereof , where with undaunted sincerity , he administred such exact and severe justice as is pleasing to god , and hateful to proud and insolent people who though they be born to serve , will notwithstanding tyranize ; and so it fell out , that those who had been severely punished for their insolences by the rigour of the lavv , waited for the coming of the sessions , a time usually longed for by the lewdest sort of men , that they might revenge themselves of their president , and wherein they charged him with bitter accusations . alciati seeing himself so wickedly dealt withal by his ill-wishers , had forthwith recourse to the prince of negrapont , who is at present in this court , and demanded such protection of him , as is due to those officers who discharge their duty faithfully . the prince ( as many others do ) that he might win his subjects good will , lent a favorable ear to the accusers , increasing thereby their insolence , and alciaties vexation ; who for his last refuge , appealed this very morning to apollo , complaining that he had been persecuted for doing justice ; and did not onely require his majesties protection , but boldly prayed him , that he might have a new tryal , but such personages as were unconcerned , and not swayed by passion . apollo , not onely as if alciati had been a man of no merit , but even a publique offendor was much incenst at him , and drove him away ; wherefore many of the standers by , who very well knew his worth , and how wrongfully he was persecuted , were witnesses unto his majestie of them both . but apollo , continuing in his former opinion , bad alciati ( though he was very submiss in his carriage ) get out of his sight . his majesties great wisdom being known to be such , as that all his actions pass for necessary precepts for men to govern their lives by , the standers by wondred why he should deal so hardly with one who deserved help ; and not being able to believe but that his majestie concealed somewhat in his mind , that was worthy to be known , they asked him , why he who always sought all possible means how to comfort the afflicted , did now add to the affliction of this innocent person . then apollo freely unbosoming himself said , that if alciati were poor , he would have taken him into his protection ; but that he being wealthy enough , so as he might compass his ends of coming to higher preferment a safer way , he deserved to be treated thus , and worse , for betaking himself to an imployment wherein there was certain danger , and which was onely fit for such , who not being able to eat bread at home , were necessitated to take any the most hazardous course to live ; and that men who were well to live , and had honourable imployments , though they might be very expensive , ought onely study how to win reputation and glory . to this alciati answered , that he , to the end he might be better esteemed of in the world , and that he might not be pointed at , as a plebeian clad in silk , had carryed himself with such reputation in all his honourable imployments , as would make any man , how meanly soever born , appear to be highly descended . apollo being still more incensed at alciati's words , replyed , with what face canst thou affirm that thou hast gone about to joyn reputation to thy means , having taken shameful ways to work thy intent ? dost thou not know the true attestat of guicchardin , that oracle of italian historians , that it is more usual for an officer to run hazard , then for a merchant to break , or a sea-man to drown ? dost not thou know , that no gally-slaves , nor any other men how miserable soever , eat courser biscat , or swallow down more bitter distastes then those who sit at the helm of government ? and knowest thou not that many princes after having highly displeased their subjects , by their avarice and cruelty , use to quiet and appease them , and to purchase their good will , by delivering up unto them such an officer , as by his punctual performance of justice , have well deserved their princes protection ? and art thou alone he that doth not know , that these men desire nothing but the pleasure of command , and the profit of revenue ? and that they abhor rumors , which they are so far from believing , that they proceed from the execution of that true justice , which is displeasing to him that tastes thereof , as they firmly believe it proceeds from the officers ignorance and wickedness ? though nothing be more certain , then that he who will administer upright justice , must as requisitely make the people complain , as the chyrurgion who will perfectly cure a wound that is gangren'd , must make the sick party cry out : and neither hipocrates , nor yet my beloved esculapius could ever yet find out any such medicine for a malady , as would make the patient lick his lips ; and the chiefest mischief is , that a man who hath his knee out of joynt , would beat the chyrurgion , who useth all his best skil to put the bone again into its right place . the lxx . advertisement . the lady victoria collonna begs of apollo in name of all the feminine sex , that such marryed men as are adulterers may suffer the like infamy , as unchaste wives do . the most excellent lady , the lady . victoria colonna , a princess of exemplary chastity , came before his majestie three days ago , and said , in behalf of all the feminine sex , that all women did so affect chastity , a vertue wherewith they were particularly endued , as they did not any whit envy strength , which was a vertue attributed to the masculine gender ; for they very well knew , that a woman whose soul was not chaste , was a stinking carcase , but that with much reason they did bewail the great disparity which was seen to be observed between the husband and the wife , in the particular of punishment for adultery . for wives could in no sort be contented that marryed men should think themselves so much at liberty , as even the punishment of shame ( which men of honor had wont to apprehend so much ) could not keep them from being false unto their wives . in which disorders she affirmed , they were so far advanced , as many husbands were not onely not ashamed to keep concubines openly in their houses , but were grown sometimes so hardy to take them into bed with their wives : which excesses were occasioned , because the same severe punishments were not provided for adulterous husbands , as were thundered out , and put in practice against unchaste wives . and that in this particular the laws were so partial to marryed men , as if they should find their wives in adultery , they would not be satisfied till they should have revenged the injury with their own hands . by reason of which notorious grievances , the feminine sex were forced to have recourse to the clear fountain of justice , to the end that they might receive competent remedy for this their oppression , by the publication of parity of punishment for the same fault ; and that if his majestie should not like of this , that he would at least be pleased to allow women the like liberty in point of adultery , as men pretended to lay claim unto : and that this like liberty was not desired , to the end that women might make use of it , but onely that by the terror thereof , they might curb their lustful husbands . to this request apollo answered , that the law of loyalty ought to be alike between the husband and the wife ; and that the violation thereof ought to be no less punished in the one , then in the other : but that the more exact chastity was desired in wives , in the weighty respect that men might be sure to father no children but their own , in which regard the excellent vertue of chastity was given to the female sex : for the certainty of their issue was so necessary to husbands in the generation of mankind , as were not their mothers endued with chastity , their sons would lose as well their inheritance , as their fathers affection ; which was so great a truth , as wise nature herself had given chaste mates to all earthy animals , where the male shares in hatching the eggs , or in bringing up the young ones . to the end that fathers might think the pains for the welfare of their children , well bestowed , and value their costs as consolations , and great gains . at this answer an honourable blush stole upon the cheeks of the lady victoria , who with a roman ingenuity confest the simplicity of her request to apollo ; and said , it would be too great a shame to the female sex , if they should suffer themselves to be exceeded in chastity by brute beasts who though they follow nothing else with greater propenseness then their delight , yet not to berive the father of his ehildren , or the children of their fathers by their libidinousness , keep their chastity ; and that husbands had so great reason to desire their wives might prove chaste , as the lavvs against adultery in married vvomen appeared to be too merciful ; for the vvounds vvhich husbands gave their vvives by their unchasteness , did onely pierce the skin ; but that marryed vvomen , by their adulteries did kill their husbands vvith eternal infamy , and did dishonor their ovvn children . the lxxi . advertisement . caesar having taxed marcus brutus of ingratitude , in a full assembly of great personages , they challenge one another . so great hath the hatred alvvays been betvveen caesar the dictator , and marcus brutus , as there could never be any reconciliation made between them , though it hath been much endeavoured by the prime subjects of this state. t is true that to avoid the displeasing of apollo , they have both of them been so discreet as to shun meeting in the streets , much less the having any intercourse between them . but the flames of hatred long kept concealed in a passionate mans bosome , in process of time must needs break forth . this is said , because in a great assembly which was had the other day of the chief of this state , wherein caesar hapned to be , it was impossible to perswade brutus to withdraw himself , who esteemed it poorness of mind to yield to that his capital enemy at this meeting . caesar ( though in covered words ) said somewhat which reflected upon brutus , taxing him with ingratitude ; and ( as it usually fals out where there is not a perfect good understanding beween people ) doubtful words being taken in the worse sense , and small injuries being held hainous offences ; brutus boldly gave caesar the lye , and at the same instant accompanied the lie with its necessary correllative , laying his hand upon his dagger . caesar slew like an enraged lyon upon brutus , and certainly some great mischief had been done , had not the princes that were present interposed themselves , and parted them . the next day caesar published a manifesto against brutus , wherein in high language he said , that it was known to the whole world , that 〈◊〉 civil wars he met with no more cruel enemy then marcus brutus , 〈◊〉 was worse to him then even pompey's self : and though he with the ●…d of victory and revenge , which he had in his hand , might by goo●…●…son of war , have secured his own life , by taking away that of brut●… , yet chusing rather to use clemency then just rigour , he did so clearly and fully pardon him that offence , which would never have been forgotten by any other man , as ( as if injuries had been great obligations ) he turned his hatred into love , his revenge into favour , and this with such integrity as in his last will and testament , he declared him to be his heir , with which magnanimity the people of rome were so pleased , as after his murther , they preferred the revenge of so great ingratitude before their own liberty , which upon that occasion they might easily have recovered . and if the common sort of people , who use rather to move out of base interest , then out of any genurosity , did so much detest this ingratitude in brutus , how much more ought brutus to do so , who had received the obligation ? and that if brutus his behaviour towards him was not open and shameful ingratitude ; sure no man was ever ungrateful ; and he should be forced to believe that ingratitude was a vain name in the abstract , and that there was no such thing in the concrete thereof . brutus finding his honour much concerned in this caesars manifesto , answered him presently in a writing which he published , that since he had never deserved ill at caesars hands , he could not acknowledge the pardon which he said he had given him for taking up arms against him , as a favour . for he who takes up arms to defend his free countrey from a tyrant , did but what was his duty to do , and did not therein misdemerit , but ought rather to be commended even by the enemy . and that caesar after his victory at pharsalia , did not oblige those unto him whose lives he pardoned ; for he onely won the good opinion of his enemies , who pardoned injuries received not injuries done unto them . and if it were faults , not merits which deserved to be pardoned , then they who took up arms to defend the roman liberty ought to pardon caesar , not caesar them . for the fault was his , who would usurp upon his countreys liberty , the merit theirs that did defend it . and that though it vexed his very soul to hear himself taxed of ingratitude by caesar , yet he was more troubled to think he should hold him for so great a villan , as that , though with pardon of life for so doing , he could forget the injurious usurping the countreys liberty , which all worthy senators ought to keep always deeply ingraven in their hearts . and that that being onely true clemency which proceeds immediately from meer meekness , certainly caesar merited nothing at those senators hands , whom he pardoned for defending their liberties . for he did it not out of any worthiness of mind , but onely to secure his own tyrannie : for very well knowing , that to grow cruel after victory , towards the chief senators , was to incite the people of romes publique hatred , and highly to incense the prime senators , he gave other men their lives to secure his own . that for his having declared him in his will to succeed in part of his inheritance , he would have caesar know , that he treated not with ignorant people , or such as did not very well know his deep cunning , hid under that feigned benevolence and false liberality , since it was not out of any affection to him , that he had named him to be his heir , but onely to ma●… him lay down his arms , and to make him become an enemy to his ●…ntrey , and to blot out of his mind the desire of recovering liberty , a servitude which ambitious tyrants purchase at a contemptible rate from base and avaricious senators ; not from such as he , who were so far from selling their or their countreys liberty for any sum of gold , how great soever , as they sought to purchase it at the expence of theit blood . and that the trick of basely lulling chief senators asleep , by sending them to be ambassadors , was past from caesar into augustus , whose will and testament : tertio gradu primores civitatis scripserat , plerosque invisos sibi . tacit. lib. . annal. was not as tacitus had formerly , but foolishly affirmed , iactantia , gloriaque ad posteros ; but onely that those senators , who were his sorest enemies , allured with hopes of reaping more benefit in servitude , then in a free condition , might become instruments to tiberius , in training him up in that tyrannie , which they were bound to make head against . brutus concluded this his writing ; saying , that he was so far from acknowledging it a favour to have his life given him by caesar , as he would have taken it for a greater obligation from him if he had bereaft him of it , since a worthy senator cannot acquire a more glorious life , then to be torn in pieces by the publike tyrant , such a senators life being formidable unto the tyrant , for being a valiant defendor of liberty ; and that tyrants gave a glorious life to such senators as they were cruel unto , whereas they asperse those with shame who too greedy of life , did interchange the base benefit of their received pardon , with the shameful oblivion of the injury done them in bereaving them of their publike liberty . caesar who was by nature haughty , was so incenst at this answer , as he challenged brutus to a single duel in campo marte ; which brutus willingly accepted , but abhorring to fight with men half dead , he bad him first go cure those wounds which he had given him in the senat , and then return to receive more with the same dagger , with which he would be ready to wait upon him . to this scornful answer of brutus ; caesar did as sconfully reply , that the alledged impediment should not keep him from meeting him in the field , for that brutus very well knew , that those his wounds were very well cured by his nephew augustus , and by the whole triumpherate , with the corresive of proscription . that therefore he should onely appear armed in the field , and leave behind him those cassii and caschi , and other swaggering companions , which he was accustomed to make use of in his supercheries and foul play to men of honor . to this brutus answered , that his custom was to put a great difference between enemy and enemy ; and that such as he , fought onely with the arms of military worth , to propagate the roman empire , against the hanibals , jugurthans , mitredates , and other foreign princes ; but that tyrants , and ravinous wolves cloathed in lambs skins , ought to be dealt withal with like treachery , and to have traps laid for them , as is usually done for crafty foxes . the lxxii . advertisement . certain subjects desire their princes that the infinite multitude of laws which they live under , may be reduced to a lesser number ; and that the governors of provinces may be forbidden to publish every day new proclamations . the great abuse in some states is certainly much to be blamed , where not onely the princes are prone enough in publishing every day new laws , but do permit the governors of their provinces to run into the same error . which being often changed , and all of them commencing their government with an ardent desire to mend the world the very first week , shame themselves with divulging certain new proclamations according to their own fancies , and full of those many extravagancies which use to abound in them , who having framed new conceits in their brains , are not so well advised as to weigh them with practice , which is that true hammer whereby to discern between pure silver , and false alchymie . for zeal to the publike good , not regulated by a perfect judgement , injures a gallant man in his reputation , more then any bad intention . the liberty of this manner of proceeding , causeth those states wherein it is used , to abound so much in edicts , proclamations , constitutions , and an infinite medly of new laws , as men live therein in great confusion ; it being very true , that corruptissima republica plurimae leges . tacit. ter●…io lib. annal. a most corrupted cou●…rey abound most in laws ; and the worst is , that every officer being resolute in the observance of such proclamations as are by him published , foolishly forgets those made by his predecessors , so as the people not able to discern in this so great disorder , what things are lawful , what unlawful , receive the worser satisfaction thereby , for that they have oft-times found , that many of them , to vent their anger against one they hate , or to give a purging pill to a rich churmuggion , have made use of absolute proclamations and edicts which have lost their validity , be contrary usance . to the end then , that some cure might be found out for so many evils , the people who live under them , chose certain commissioners long since , to acquaint their princes therewith . these earnestly desired that the multitude of laws , which bred confusion amongst the people , might be abrogated ; and that the governors of provinces might be inhibited the making of new ones for the future . most of the princes judged this the commissioners request to be very just ; and that they might consult the better thereof , they met in clios house , where some that were zealous of their subjects good , were of opinion , that with as much brevity as might be , all the ancient statutes should be made an end of ; and being made void , new ones might be enacted , which might bring quiet , not confusion to the people . but the princes who were of a contrary opinion , were greater both for number and quality ; they freely affirmed , that those things which had been tollerated by their ancient predecessors , ought to be presumed to proceed rather from wisdom , then from ignorance ; for it was always to be believed , that their fore-fathers had examined & digested matters concerning the government of their people , much more accurately then modern men do , who were then seen to run into great disorders , when out of novelty they would abrogate those ancient customs , which experience had found to be good ; and that it was to be thought a high presumption , that the world without ever being aware of , oramending her errors , had lived long in those customs , which others would correct , as being prejudicial . and that princes , who ought to study nothing more then how to dilate their own authority , committed a mortal error , when they tyed up their ownhands , and made rods for their own breeches , becurtiling their jurisdiction . whilst the princes were thus discussing the business , the commissioners desires to hear the result , made some little noise at the chamber door : at which the princes being very angry , they grew so hot , as having no other weapons , they broke some forms which came first to their hands , and making use of the feet thereof for cudgels , they beat away the commissioners ; who crying out , help , help , many philosophers came from the peripatetick school , who withheld the princes , and freed the others from being further mischiefed . the princes thinking it fitting to acquaint the philosophers with the reasons which had moved them to this resentment , said , gentlemen , these rascals , under pretence of grievances , proclamations , statutes , and confusion by new laws , have dared to come even within our doors , to assassinate us , adding insolence to their impertinent demands ; for we having out of our fatherly charity , given free leave to these ingrateful people to keep as many hounds and greyhounds as they please to take hares and goats withal , permission to lay gins to catch partridge and pheasants , to make nets to take finshes and sparows , to lay lime-twigs wherewithal to take black-birds and thrushes , to make hooks , pastes , drag-nets , weels , and twenty other things , that they may want no fish : these rascals will not notwithstanding permit us poor princes , who even consume our selves in studying how to serve them , to take half a dozen fat becchifichi , for our own use . the lxxiii . advertisement . the vertuosi of italy beg of apollo , that philosophy may be treated on in the italian tongue , and are denyed their request . the italian litterati have these many years been very instant with his majestie , that he would be pleased to enable the italian tongue to treat of philosophical matters , and have used all the possible means they could to get it effected : but apollo would never grant it , saying , that the liberal sciences were no longer esteemed , then when they were handled in greek and latin ; for the metaphisicks , and the other soveraign sciences , would suffer an infinite alloy , if the admirable secrets thereof being taught in italian , should be communicable even to hosts and hostlery ; moreover , if all the liberal sciences were suffered to be written in the italian tongue , the most noble latin tongue , in which all men confess the true majestie of writing , and speaking elegantly doth consist , would go near to be lost . the italians were not onely not satisfied with these alledged reasons , but continued still so fervent in their former desire , as his majestie seemed to be inclineable to give them content , when all the liberal sciences doubting lest some resolution might be taken , which would be displeasing to them , bad the italian litterati be quiet , for they would by no means undergo the shame of being discust in insipid italian circumlocutions , but would be argued in their ordinary latin terms . alexander picolomini was there present , who freely said , that the greek and latin philosophers were fools , if they believed that the italian writers were so ill read , as that they did not very well know , that philosophy being a natural science ; and therefore known even to children , would wholly lose her reputation , it being treated of in italian , the world should know , that she were wholly hid under scholastical terms , which being neither greek nor latin , seemed rather to be slavonick words , which being translated into italian would discover the cheating tricks of philosophers , who spend nights and days in the study of philosophy , to learn names more then realties . the lxxiv . advertisement . apollo shews unto his litterati the true meaning of the latin sentence , homo longus , raro sapiens , a tale man is seldom wise . to the wonder of apollo , and all the standers by , above litterati , all of them beyond the usual size of men , appeared on tuesday last in the publike audience . every one knew that the assembling together of so many vertuosi , all of them of extraordinary stature and greatness , must needs have somewhat of meaning in it , and so it had ; for reverend cino , auditor di rota in parnassus said , in the name of all his fellows , that all those vertuosi who his majestie saw there , were known by the whole world to be well skilled in the liberal arts , which his majesties delfick library might likewise sufficiently witness ; and that notwithstanding they were scoft and laught at by most of the litterati in parnassus , and held for fools and shallow witted people : wherefore , such injuries being altogether insupportable , they were forced to have recourse unto his majestie . and to the end that some remedy might be found for so great an abuse , which might occasion many inconveniences , those litterati of a more then usual stature and greatness of body , demanded place and time ( always provided it might stand with his majesties approbation ) where and when , hand to hand , two to two , three to three , or in what greater numbers the contrary party should choose , they would dispute vvith the vertuosi of small , and of middle stature in all sorts of sciences , and venture their reputations thereupon : but that vvhen his majestie should think they had given sufficient tryal of themselves , and should have proved themselves to be real vertuosi ; their humble request was , that he vvould be pleased to dec●…e the proverb to be false and erronous , vvhich says . homo longus , raro sapiens , vvhich vvas the rise of all the scandal . his majestie gave ear to cino's complaint vvith a pleasing countenance ; and told him , that he vvas sensible of the rash judgement vvhich his vertuosi gave of them ; but that the proverb being true , he neither could nor vvould declare it to be false ; and that homo longus vvas not to be understood ( according to the vulgar misinterpretation ) for any extraordinary proportion of body , but in respect of resolution and deliberations taken in affairs ; for too much delay and length of time in dispatching business , vvas a clear evidence of vvant of vvit , simplicity , and of a drousie understanding ; for he vvas onely to be accounted vvise , vvho vvas resolute in his affairs , and vvho being able to resolve upon any sudden occasion , dispatched business vvith admirable dexterity of vvit . the lxxv . advertisement . the ruota di parnasso having decided a point in difference between the military men , and the litterati on the military means behalf , are aware of their error , and withdraw their sentence . the precedency between arms and learning is still obstinately disputed on both sides , between the litterati and millitary-men in parnassus . and it was resolved in the last ruota , that the question should be argued , if at least the name of science and discipline might be attributed to the exercise of war. which doubt was of such consequence , as the victory of the whole cause depended thereupon ; wherefore both parties were very diligent in informing the auditors ; and vigetius in particular was not sparing for any pains , in procuring that the sentence might prove favourable on his side . the business was very subtilly can vast and argued , and the court seemed wholly to incline to the litterati ; but the princes used such forcible arguments , as it was resolved , that military men in their exercise of war , might use the honourable names of science and discipline . the litterati were much displeased at this d●…cision , who exclaimed all of them , that learning would be much defiled , if she , who adorns mens minds with good precepts , should be forced to communicate her honourable names with the military art , which fills the body with wounds , and the soul with the ●…oulest vices . the litterati were in this despair , when unexpectedly all the butchers of the world were seen to appear in parnassus ; which slovenly sort of people , all besmeared with blood , with hatchets and long knives in their hands , infused such fear into the litterati , as apprehending some general slaughter , and to be cut in pieces , they fled away to their own houses , where they fortified themselves . but they were better pleased when those dreadful people made signs of peace , and desired to be heard . apollo that he might know what they meant , sent some deputies to them : to whom those butchers stoutly said , that hearing that the court had decided , that the art of sacking and firing of cities , of cutting their inhabitants in pieces , and in fine , that the cruel mystery of killing men , and of dispeopling the world , and of calling with sword in hand , mine thine , should be termed a science and discipline , they also , who did not profess the killing of men , nor any thing that tended to the destruction of mankind , but the kill●…ng of calves and muttons to feed men withal , demanded that their art might be honoured by the same illustrious names . the military-men appeared as if they had no souls amidst this rabble rout , when they saw so base sort of people should desire that their so opprobrious trade , should be paralell'd with the art of warfaring , which was practised by the greatest princes , and prime nobility of the world . and the same signori auditori di ru●…ta , when they saw the butchers appear in the pallace , and heard their demands , they were aware of the injustice which but a little before they had done to all the vertuosi by their decision . wherefore they again propounded the same question , and unanimously agreed , that the mysterie of war , though it were sometimes necessary , was notwithstanding so cruel and so in humane , as it was impossible to honest it with civil tearms . the lxxvi . advertisement . aristotle being besieged in his countrey-house by many princes , is by them forced to revoke his definition of a tyrant . aristotle the prince of peripateticks , that he might the better attend his study , withdrew himself some days ago , to his countrey-house , where unexpectly he was besieged by night , by some princes , with a great number of foot and horse , who after having with incredible speed made their trenches and gabbiouns , prepared their cannon to play upon the house . when apollo heard of this so great novilty , he forthwith dispatcht away the two famous satyrical poets , lodovico adi●…sto , and francisco berni , with two legions of veteran saterists towards them , who with all military skill endeavoured to raise the siege , but in vain ; for though the poets let fly disfamatory verses , yet the arms these princes wore were so excellently vvell tempered , as they were proof against every pungent terzetta . so as no good being to be done by force , apollo , who would be sure that nothing might befal that excellent vertuosi , whereby the peripatetick philosophy might be any ways prejudiced , dispatched away into the field that great lover of learning , federico feltrio duke of urban , who upon parley vvith those princes , by his rare dextrousness obtained a suspension of arms ; and at the first entrance into discourse , those princes complained greatly against aristotle , for having given so malignant a definition of a tyrant in his politica , as it included or comprehended every good prince ; and in great anger said , that if ( as aristotle had been bold to affirm ) those princes vvere to be esteemed tyrants , vvho intended more their ovvn profit , then the like of their subjects , they knevv ▪ not vvhere that potentate , hovv good or ancient soever he vvere could be found , vvho might not be concerned in that so universal definition . as if the end of every good shepherd vvere not to milk and shear his sheep , but onely so far to love them , as to dy of hunger themselves , so their flock might grovv fat : and that aristotle discovered himself to be too grofly ignorant if he seemed not to knovv , that gain vvas the end of all merchandizing , and that the vvhole vvorld vvas but a great publike shop . and that if the very lavv of nature did so commend vvell regulated charity , as fathers vvere seen to love themselves better then their ovvn proper children , with what ground of reason would aristotle oblige princes to love the good of others better then their own . and upon this occasion the princes added , that the litterati were grown to such petulancy in many important particulars , as blinded by proud presumption , they had not feared to intermeddle in the very greatest concerns of princes ; and even to give laws to reason of state ; not knowing ( poor people that they are ) that the insight into politick affairs is so far from the common judgement of any wit , how good soever , as none ought to discourse thereof , but men who have spent their whole time in the government of kingdoms , and in the affairs of great princes , though they may peradventure want that philosophy , rhetorick , and other sciences registred by the litterati in their scribled papers : for policy not having so much theory , as that a grammar may be thereout composed , which may teach men the art how to govern states well , consisted wholly in practise ; of the which , none but such as had learnt it from great princes secretaries , and in state-councils , ought to discourse , lest they become ridiculous for writing things which deserves the rod. by these words , duke federico found that the princes had just reason to be incensed ; wherefore he easily prevailed with aristotle to revoke his former definition of a tyrant , and to make a new one , which might satisfie those so highly offended princes . then aristotle suddenly recanted , and said , that tyrants were a certain sort of men in the old time , the race whereof was wholly lost now . the princes having received such satisfaction as they desired , presently quitted their quarters : and being gone towards their own states , aristotle , being half dead with fear , returned to parnassus , assuring all the vertuosi , that his philosophical precepts failed him very much against the fear of death ; and bad the litterati attend their studies , and let alone the reason of state , which it was impossible to treat of , without running evident danger of being esteemed criminal by princes . the lxxvii . advertisement . by order from apollo , a general reformation of the world is published by the seven wise men of greece , and by the other litterati . the emperor iustinian , that great compiler of statutes , and books of civil law , some few daies since shewed a new law to apollo , to have his majesties approbation of it : wherein men were strictly forbidden killing themselves . apollo was so astonished at this law , as fetching a deep sigh , he said ; is the good government of mankind , iustinian , fallen then into so great disorder , as men , that they may live no longer , do voluntarily kill themselves ? and whereas i have hitherto fed an infinite number of philosophers , only that by their words and writings they may make men less apprehensive of death , are things now reduced to such calamity , as even they will now live no longer , who could not formerly frame themselves to be content to die ? and am i amongst all the disorders of my litterati all this while supinely asleep ? to this iustinian answered , that the law was necessary , and that many cases of violent deaths having hapned , by many mens having desperately made themselves away , worse was to be feared , if some opportune remedy were not soon found out against so great a disorder . apollo then began diligently to inform himself , how men did live in the world ; and found that the world was so impaired , as many valued not their lives nor estates , so they might be out of it . these disorders necessitated his majesty to provide against them with all possible speed ; so as he absolutely resolved to create a congregation of all the most famous men that were in his dominions , for wisdom and good life . but in the entrance intoso weighty a business , he met with difficulties impossible to be overcome ; for when he came to chuse the members of this congregation , amongst so many moral philosophers , and the almost infinite number of vertuosi , he could not find so much as one , who was indowed with half those parts which were requisite to be in him , who ought to reform his companion : his majesty knowing very well , that men are better reformed by the exemplary life of their reformers , then by any the best rules that can be given . in this great penury of fitting personages , apollo gave the charge of the universal reformation to the seven wise men of greece , who are of great repute in parnassus , as those who are conceived by all men to have found out the receit of washing blackmoors white . which antiquity , though still in vain , hath so much laboured after . the grecians were much rejoyc'd at this news , for the honor which apollo had done their nation ; but the latins were much grieved at it , thinking themselves thereby much injured . wherefore apollo very well knowing how much the ill satisfaction of those that are to be reformed , in their reformers , hinders the fruit which is to be hoped by reformation ; and his majesty being naturally given to appease his subjects imbittered minds , more by giving them satisfaction , then by that legislative power which men are not well pleased withall , because they are bound to obey it . that he might satisfie the romans , who were much distasted , to the seven wise men of greece , he added marcus cato , and anneus seneca : and in favour to the modern italian philosophers , he made iacopo mazzoni da casena , secretary of the congregation , and honored him with a vote in their consultations . the day of the last month , the seven wise men , with the aforesaid addition , accompanied by a train of the choicest vertuosi of this state , went to the delfick palace , the place appropriated for the reformation : and the litterati were very well pleased to see the great number of pedants , who with their little baskets in their hands , went gathering up the sentences and apothegmes , which fell from those wise men as they went along . the next day after the solemn entrance , the assembly being met to give a beginning to the business , t is said talete milesio , the first wise man of greece , spake thus ; the business ( most wise philosophers ) about which were are all met in this place , is ( as you all know ) the greatest that can be treated on by human understanding : and though there be nothing harder then to set bones that have been long broken , wounds that are fistuled , and incurable cancars , yet difficulties which are able to affright others , ought not to make us despair of their cure ; for the impossibility will increase our glory , and will keep us in the esteem we are in ; and 〈◊〉 do assure you that i have already found out the true antidote against the poyson of all these present corruptions : i am sure we do all believe that nothing hath more corrupted the present age , then hidden hatreds , feigned love , impiety , the perfideousness of double-dealing men , cloaked under the specious mantle of simplicity , love to religion , and of charity ; apply your selves to these evils gentlemen , by making use of fire , razor , and lay corrosive plasters to these wounds which i discover unto you ; and all mankind , which by reason of their vices , which leads them the high-way to death , may be said to be given over by the physitians , will soon be made whole and will become sincere and plain in their proceedings , true in what they say , and such in their sanctity of life , as they were in former times . the true and immediate cure then for these present evils , consists only in necessitating men to live with candor of mind , and purity of heart , which you will all confess with me , cannot be better effected , then by making that little window in mens brests , which , as being most requisite , his majesty hath often promised to his most faithful vertuosi : for when those who use such art in their modern proceedings , shall be forced to speak and act , having a window wherein one may see into their hearts , they will learn the excellent vertue of being , and not appearing to be ; and will conform their deeds to their words , their tongus which are accustomed to dissembling , to sincerity of heart , and all men will banish lies and falshood , and the infirnal spirit of hypocrisie will abandon many who are now possest with so foul a fiend . talete's opinion did so please he whole congregation , as being put to the vote , it was clearly carried for the affirmative ; and secretary mazzoni was commanded to give apollo a sudden account thereof , who perfectly approved the opinion , and gave command that that very day , the little window should be begun to be made in mans brest . but at the very instant hat the surgeans took their instruments in hand to open mens brests , virgil , plato , aristotle , averoes , and other of the chief litterati went to apollo , and told him that he was not ignorant that the prime means whereby men do with much ease govern the world , was the reputation of those who did command ; and that so pretious a jewel not being to be exposed to danger at any time by wise princes , they beseeched his majesty to consider in what esteem of holy life , and good demeanor , the reverend philosophical synod , and the honorable colledge of the vertuosi , were held by all the litterati of parnassus ; that therefore they earnestly desired him ( as it became him to do ) to have a care of their honors , who by the fame of their goodness , increase the glory of parnassus : and that if his majesty should unexpectedly open every mans brest , the greater , and better sort of those philosophers , who formerly were highly esteemed , ran evident hazard of being shamed ; and that he might peradventure find fowlest faults in those whom he had formerly held to be immaculate . that therefore , before a business of such importance should be taken in hand , he would be pleased to afford his vertuosi a competent time , to wash and cleanse their souls . apollo was greatly pleased with the advice of so famous poets and philosophers , and by a publick edict , prorogued the time of making the wind ows for eight daies ; during which time , every one did so attend the cleansing and purging of their souls from all fallacies , from a hidden vice , from conceal'd hatred , and counterfeit love , as there was no more hony of roses , succory , cassia , scena , scamony , nor laxative syrups to be found in any grocers or apothecaries shop in all parnassus : and the more curious did observe , that in the parts where the platonicks , peripateticks , and moral philosophers did live , there was then such a stink , as if all the privies of those countries had been emptied : whereas the quarters of latin and italian poets , stunk only of cabbadg-porrage . the time allotted for the general purging was already past , when the day before they were to begin making the windows , hippocrates , galen , cornelius celsus , and other the most skilfull physitians of this state went to apollo , and said , is it then true , sir , you that are the lord of the liberal sciences , that this microcosme must be deformed , which is so nobly and miraculously framed , as if any chief muscle , any principal vein be but touched , the human creature runs evident danger of being slain ? and that so much mischief should be done only for the advantage of a few ignorant people ? for not only the wiser sort of men , but even those of an indifferent capacity , who have converst but four daies with any quacksalver , know how to penetrate even into the innermost bowels . this memorandum of the physitians wrought so much with apollo , as he changed his former resolution , and by ausonius gallus , bad the philosophers of the reformation , proceed in delivering their opinions . then solon thus began ; in my opinion , gentlemen , that which hath put the present age into so great confusion , is the cruel hatred , and spitefull envy which in these daies is seen to reigne generally amongst men . all help then for these present evils , is to be hoped for from infusing charity , reciprocal affection , and that sanctified love of our neighbour , which is gods chiefest commandment into mankind ; we ought therefore to imploy all our skill in taking away the occasions of those hatreds , which in these daies reign in mens hearts ; which if we be able to effect , men will do like beasts , who by the instinct of nature , love their own species ; and will consequently drive away all hatred and rancor of mind . i have been long thinking , my friends , what the true springs head may be of all human hatred , and am still more established in my old opinion , that it proceeds from the disparity of means , from the hellish custom introduced amongst men of meum and tuum ; the rise of all scandal ; an abuse , which if it were introduced amongst the beasts of the earth , i assure my self , that even they would consume , and waste themselves with the self-same hatred and rancor wherewith we so much disquiet our selves : the not having any thing of propriety , and the equallity which they live in , is that which maintains that peace among them , which we so much envie in them . men , as you all know , are likewise creatures , but rational ; this world was created by almighty god , only that mankind might live thereupon , as bruit beasts do ; not that avaritious men should divide it amongst themselves , and should turn what was common , into that meum and tuum , which hath put us all into such confusion . so as it clearly appears , that the depravation of mens souls by avarice , ambition , and tyranny , hath occasioned the present inequality , and disproportionate division . and if it be true ( as we all confess it is ) that the world is nothing else but an inheritance left to mankind by one only father , and one only mother , from whom we are all descended like brethren ; what justice is it that every one should not have a share thereof equal with his companion ? and what greater disproportion can there be imagined by those that love what is just , then that this world should be such , as that some possess more thereof then they can govern , and others have not so much as they could govern . but that which doth infinitely aggravate this disorder , is , that usually good and vertuous men are beggars ; whereas wicked and ignorant people are wealthy . from the root of this inequality it then ariseth , that the rich are injurious to the poor , and that the poor envy the rich , for pride is proper to the rich , to beggars desperation . hence it is that the rich mans oppressing the weak , appears to be natural ; and the ill-will which poor men bear to the rich , is innate in them . now gentlemen , that i have discovered the malady unto you , it is easie to apply the medicine : i therefore think , that to reform this age , no better counsel can be taken , then to divide the world anew , and to allot an equal part thereof to every one . and that we may fall no more upon the like disorders , i advise , that for the future , all buying and selling be forbidden ; so that parity of goods will be instituted ; the mother of publick peace , which my self and other law-makers , have formerly so much laboured for . solons opinion suffered a long debate ; which though it was not only thought good , but necessary by bante of periandro , and by pittaco , yet it was gainsaid by the rest ; and senecas opinion prevailed , who with very efficacious reasons made it appear , that if they should come to a new dividing of the world , the great disorder would necessarily follow , that too great a share would fall to fools , and too little to gallant men : and that the plague , famin , and warr , were not gods most severest scourges , with which god , when offended , did afflict mankind ; but that his severest scourge for the punishment of man , and which out of his mercy , he made not use of , was to enrich rascals . solons opinion being laid aside , chilon spake to this purpose ; which of you , my fellow-philosophers , doth not know that the immoderate thirst that men now adaies have after gold , hath filled the world with all the mischiefs which we all see and feel ? what wickedness , what impiety , how execrable soever , is it , which men do not willingly commit , if thereby they may accumulate riches ? conclude therefore unanimously with me , that no better way can be found out , whereby to extirpate all the vices wherewith our age is opprest , and to bring in that sort of life which doth best become men , then for ever to banish out of the world the two infamous mettals , gold and silver ; for so the occasion of our present disorders ceasing , the evils will likewise necessarily cease . chilons opinion was judged to have a very specious appearance ; but when it came to the test , it would not endure the hammer : for it was said , that men took so much pains to get gold and silver , because they are the measure and counterpoise of all things ; and that to make provision of all things necessary , it was requisite for men to have some mettals , or other thing of price , by which he might purchase what was fitting for him ; and that if there were no such thing as gold or silver , men would make use of some other thing instead of them , which rising in value , would be as much coveted and sought after , as gold and silver now were ; as was plainly seen in the indies , where cockle-shels were made use of instead of money , and more vallued then either gold or silver . cleobelus particularly being very hot in refuting this opinion , said , with much perturbation of mind ; my masters , banish iron out of the world , for that is the mettal which hath put us into the present condition . gold and silver serve for the use which is ordained by god , to be the measure of all things ; whereas iron , which is produced by nature for the making of plow-shears , spades , and mattocks , and other instruments to cultivate the earth , is by the mallice and mischief of men , turned to the making of swords , and daggers , and other deadly instruments . though cleobolus his opinion was judged to be very true , yet it was concluded by the whole congregation , that it being impossible to expel iron , without grasping iron ; and putting on corslets , it would be a great piece of imprudency to multiply mischiefs , and to cure one wound with another . 't was therefore generally concluded , that the ore of gold and silver should be still kept , but that the refiners of them should be wisht for the future to be sure to cleanse them well , and not to take them out of the fire , till they were certain they had taken from both the mettals , that vein of turpentine which they have in them , which is the reason why both gold and silver stick so close to the fingers even of good and honest men . this being said , pittacchus with extraordinary gravity , began thus ; the world , learned philosophers , is fallen into that deplorable condition , which we so labour to amend , only because men in these daies have given over travailing by the beaten road-way of vertue , and take the by-waies of vice ; by which , in this corrupted age , they obtain rewards only due to vertue . things are brought to that woful state , as none can get entrance into the palace of dignity , honor , or reward ( as formerly they had wont to do ) by the gate of merit and vertuous endeavour , but like thieves , they climb the windows with ladders of tergeversation ; and some there are , who by the force of gifts and favours , have opened the root , to get thereby into the house of honour . if you will reform this our corrupted age , my opinion is , that you should do well to force men to walk by the way of vertue , and make severe laws , that whosoever will take the laborsom journey which leads towards the obtaining of supreme honors and dignities , must travail with the waggon of desert , and with the sure guide of vertue , and take away so many thwart by-waies , so many little paths , so many crooked lanes , found out by ambitious men , and modern hypocrites , which multiplying faster in this our miserable age , then locusts do in africa , have filled the world with contagion . and truely what greater affront can there be put upon vertue and merit , then to see one of these companions arive at the highest preferments , when no man can guess what course he took to come by it ? which makes many think they have got it by the magick of hypocricy , whereby these magicians do inchant the minds even of very wise princes . pittacho's opinion was not only praised , but greatly admired by the whole assembly , and certainly would have been approved of as very excellent , had not periandro made those already almost resolved philosophers alter their minds : for this philosopher lively opposing the opinion of so great a philosopher , said , gentlemen , the disorder mentioned by pittachus , is very true ; but the thing which we ought chiefly to consider , is , for what reason princes who are so quick-fighted , and interessed in their own state-affairs , do not bestow in these our daies their great places ( as they were wont to do of old ) on able and deserving men , by whose service they may receive advantage and reputation ; but instead of them , make use of new fellows , raised out of the dirt and mire , without either worth or honor . you know , gentlemen , that the opinion of those who say , that it is fatal to princes to love carrion , and to imploy undeserving servant , in places of greatest trust , is so false , as for the least interest of state , they neglect their brethren , and wax cruel even against their own children , so far are they from doting upon their servants in things wherein the welfare of their state lies . princes do not act by chance , as many foolishly believe they do , nor suffer themselves to be guided in their proceedings by their passions , as we do ; but whatsoever they do , is out of interest ; and those things which to privat men appear errors and negligence , are accurate politick precepts . all that have written of state-affairs , freely confess that the best way to govern kingdoms well , is to confer places of highest honour and dignity upon men of great merit , and known worth and valor . this is a truth very well known to princes ; and though it be clearly seen that they do not observe it , he is a fool that believes they do it out of carelessness . i , who have long studied a point of so great weight , am verily perswaded , that ignorant and raw men , and men of no merit , are preferred by princes , in conferring their chief offices and honors , before learned and deserving men , not out of any fault in the prince , but ( i blush to say it ) through default of the vertuosi . i acknowledge that princes stand in need of learned officers , and men of experienced valor : but none of you will deny but that they likewise need men that are loyal and faithful . and it is evident , that if deserving men , and men of worth and valor were but as faithful as they are able , as gratefull as they are knowing , we should not complain of the present disorders , in seeing undeserving dwarfs , become great giants in four daies space , and should not bewail the wonder of seeing wild gourds in a short space overtop the best fruit-trees , nor to see ignorance seated in the chair of vertue , and folly in vallors tribunal . 't is common to all men to think much better of themselves then they deserve ; but the vertuosi do presume so very much upon their own good parts , as they rather pretend to add to the princes reputation , by having any honors conferred upon them , then to receive credit themselves by his munificence : and i have known many so foolishly blown up , and inamored of their own worths , as they have thought it a greater happiness for a prince to have an occasion of honouring such a one , then good luck for the other to meet with so liberal a prince . so as these men acknowledging all favours confer'd upon them , to proceed from their own worth , prove so ungrateful to their princes and benefactors in their greatest necessities , as causing themselves to be nauseated as very perfidious men , they are abhorred , and are causes of this present great disorder , why princes , in such as they will prefer to great places , and high dignities , instead of merit , vertue , and known worth , seek for loyalty and trust , that they may meet with thankfulness when they stand in need of it ; which they rather expect from those who pretending to no merit of their own , acknowledge all their good fortunes to proceed meerly from their princes liberality . periandro having ended his discourse , bias spake thus ; all of you , most wise philosophers , sufficiently know that the reason of the worlds being so depraved , is only because mankind hath so shamefully abandoned those holy laws which god gave them to observe , when he bestowed the whole world upon them for their habitation : nor did he place the french in france , the spaniards in spain , dutch in germany , and bound up the fowl fiend in hel , for any other reason , but for the advantage of that general peace which he desired might be observed throughout the whole world . but avarice and ambition ( spurs which have alwaies egg'd on men to greatest wickedness ) causing the french , italians , dutch , grecians , and other nations to pass into other mens countries , have caused these evils which we ( i wish it prove not in vain ) endeavor to amend : and if it be true , as we all confess it is , that god hath done nothing in vain , and that there is much of mystery in all his operations ; wherefore think you , hath his divine majesty placed the inaccessable perenian mountains between the spaniards and italians ; the rocky alpes between the italians and germans ; the dreadful english channel between the french and english ; why the mediterranean sea between africa and europe ; why hath he made the infinite spacious rivers of euphrates , indus , ganges , tigres , danubius , nilus , rheine , and the rest ; save only that people might be content to live in their own countries , by reason of the difficulties of fords and passages ? and his divine majesty knowing very well that the harmony of universal peace would be out of tune , and that the world would be filled with uncurable diseases , if men should exceed the bounds which he had alloted them ; that he might make the waies to such great disorders the more difficult , he added the multitude and variety of languages , to the mountains , precipices , to the violent course of rivers , and to the seas immenceness : for otherwise , all men would speak the same language , as all creatures of the same species , sing , bark , and bray , after one and the same manner . 't is then mans boldness in boaring through mountains , and in passing over not only the largest and most rapid rivers , but even in manifestly and rashly hazarding himself and all his substance in a little woodden vessel , not fearing to cross the largest seas therein ; which caused the ancient romans ( not to mention the many other nations who have run into the same rashness ) to ruine other mens affairs , and discompose their own ; not being satisfied with their dominion over whole italy . the true remedy then for so great disorder is , first to force every nation to return home to their own countreys ; and to the end that the like mischiefs may not insue hereafter , i am of opinion , that all bridges built for the more commodious passing over rivers , be absolutely broken down ; and the ways made for passing over the mountains may be quite spoil'd , and the mountains be made more inaccessable by mans industry , then they were at first made by nature ; and i would have all navigation absolutely forbidden , upon severest penalty , not allowing so much as the least boats to pass in , over rivers . bias his opinion was very attentively listened unto ; and after being well examined by the best wits of the assembly , it was found not to be good : for all those philosophers knew , that the greatest enmities which are known to reign between nation and nation , are not natural ( as many foolishly conceive them to be ) but are occasioned by cunning princes , who are great masters of the known proverb , divide , & impera . and that that perfection of manners being found in all nations joyned together , which was not to be had in any particular province , men easily learn that exact wisdom by travelling through the world , which was peculiar to great ulysses , who having travelled through many countreys , had seen and observed the fashions of divers nations ; a benefit which was much furthered by the use of navigation ; which was very necessary for mankind , were it onely for that god ( as well became the immencity of his power ) having created this world of almost an incomprehensible greatness , having filled it with pretious things , and endowed every province with somewhat of particular navigation , which is the rarest invention that could ever have been thought on , or put in practice by humane wit , had brought it into so little a compass , as the aromaticks of the molucchi , though above fifteen thousand miles from italy , do so abound in italy , as if they grew there . thus ended bias , when cleobelus rising up , seeming with a low bow to crave leave to speak ; said thus , i clearly perceive wise gentlemen , that the reformation of the present age , a business of it self very easie , becomes by the diversity and extravagancy of our opinions , rather impossible then difficult . and to speak with the freedom which becomes this place , and the weight of the business we have in hand , it grieves my heart to find even amongst us that are here , that common defect of ambitious and slight wits , who getting up into publike pulpits , labor more to shew the rarity of their own wits , by their new and curious conceits , then to profit their auditory by useful precepts and sound doctrines : for to raise man out of the foul mire and dirt whereinto he is fallen , what need we undertake that dangerous manifacture of making little windows in mens breasts , according to thales his advice ? and why should we undertake the laborous business of dividing the world into equal partitions , according to solons proposition ? and the course mentioned to be taken by chilo , of banishing gold and silver from out of the world ? or that of pittacchus , of forcing men to walk in the way of merit and vertue ? or lastly , that of bias , that mountains should be raised higher , and made more difficult to pass over then nature hath made them , and that for the future the miracle of navigation should be extirpated , which shews to what pitch mans ingenuity can arrive , are they not sophistical fancies , and mear chimera's ? our chiefest consideration ought to be , that the remedy to be applyed to the undoing evils , may be easie to be put in execution , that it may work its effect soon and secretly without any no●…e , and that it may be chearfully received by those who are to be reformed : for by doing otherwise , we shall rather deform the world , then reform it . and certainly not without reason ; for that physician deserves to be blamed , who should ordain a medicine for his sick patient which is impossible to be used , and which would afflict him more then his disease . therefore it is the requisite duty of reformers , to provide themselves of a sure remedy , before they take notice of the wound : that chyrurgion deserves to be punished , who first opens the sick mans vein , and then runs for things to close it up withal ; it is not onely foolishness , but impiety , to defame men with publishing their vices , and to shew to the world that their maladies are grown to such a height , as it is not in the power of man to cure them . therefore tacitus , who always speaks to the purpose if he be rightly understood , doth in this particular advise men , omittere potius pravallada , & adulta vitia , quam hoc assequi , ut palem fieret , quibus flagitiis impares essumus . those who would fell an old oak , are ill advised if they fall to cut down the top boughs : wise men do , as i do now , lay the ax to the greatest root . i then affirm , that the reformation of the present world consists wholly in these few vvords , premiar i buoni , e punire gli scelerati , in rewarding the good , and punishing the bad . here cleobelus held his peace , whose opinion thales mileseus , did with such violence oppose , as he shevved hovv dangerous a thing it is to offend such ( though by telling truth ) vvho have the repute to be good and vvise . for he vvith a fiery countenance broke forth into these vvords ; my self , and these gentlemen , most vvise cleobelus , since you have been pleased to reject our opinions as sophistical , and meer chimera s , did expect from your rare wisdom , that for cure of these present evils , you had brought some new and miraculous bezoar fron the indies , wheras you have propounded that for the easiest cure , which is the hardest and most impossible that could ever be fancied by the prime pretenders to high mysteries , caius plinius , and albertus magnus . there is not any one of us , my cleobolus , that did not know , before you were pleased to put us in mind of it , that the reformation of the world , depends wholly upon rewarding such as are good and punishing the wicked . but give me leave to ask you , who are those that in this our age are perfectly good , and who exactly ill ? and i would know , whether your eye can discern that which could never yet be found out by any man living , how to know true goodness from that which is counterfeit ? do not you know ▪ that modern hypocrites are arrived at that height of cunning , as in this our unhappy age , those are accounted to be cunningest in their wickedness , who seem to be most exactly good ? and that such really perfect men who live in sincerity and singleness of soul , with an undisguised and unartificial goodness , without any thing of hypocrisie , are thought to be scandalous and silly ? every one by natural instinct loves those that are good , and hate those that are wicked , but princes do it both out of instinct and interest . and when hypocrites , or other cunning cheaters are listened unto by great men , and good men supprest or undervalued , it is not by the princes own election , but through the abuse of others . true vertue is known onely and rewarded by god , and vices discovered and punisht ; for he onely penetrates into the depth of mens hearts , and we by means of the windovv by me propounded , might have penetrated thereinto , had not the enemy of mankind sovved tares in the field where i sovved the grain of good advice . but nevv lavvs , hovv good and vvholsome soever , have ever been and ever vvill be vvithstood by those vitious people vvho are thereby punished . the assembly vvere mightily pleased vvith the reasons alledged by thales ; and all of them turning their eyes upon periandro , he thinking himself thereby desired to speak his opinion , began thus , the variety of opinions which i have heard , confirms me in my former tenet ▪ that four parts of five that are sick , perish because the physicians know not their disease ; who in this their error may be excused , because men are easily deceived in things wherein they can walk but by conjecture . but that we , who are judged by apollo to be the salt of the earth , should not know the evil under which the present age labours , redounds much to our shame , since the malady which we ought to cure , lies not hidden in the veins but is so manifestly known to all men that it self crys aloud for help . and yet by all the reasons i have heard alledged , methinks you go about to mend the arm , when it is the breast that is fistula'd . but gentlemen , since it is apollo's pleasure , that we should do so , since our reputation stands upon it , and our charity to our so afflicted age requires it at our hands , let us , i beseech you , take from off our faces the mask of respect , which hath been hitherto worn by us all , and let us speak freely . the great disorder hath always reigned amongst men , which doth domineer so much at the present , and which god grant it may not still reign ; that whilst powerful men by their detestible vices , and by their universal reformation , have disordered the world , men go about to re-order it by amending the faults of private men . but the falshood , avarice , pride and hypocrisie of private men ( though i must confess them to be hainous evils ) are not the vices which have so much depraved this our age ; for fitting punishments being by the law provided for every fault , and foul action , mankind is so obedient to the laws , and so apprehensive of justice , as a few ministers thereof make millions of men tremble , and keeps them in , and men live in such quiet peace , as the rich cannot , without much danger to themselves oppress the poor , and every one may walk safely both by day and night with gold in their hand , not onely in the streets , but even in the high-ways : but the worlds most dangerous infirmities are then discovered , when publique peace is disturbed ; and of this we must all of us confess , that the ambition , avarice and diabolical engagement , which the swords of some powerful princes hath usurped over the states of those who are less powerful , is the true cause , and that which is so great a scandal to the present times : t is this , gentlemen , which hath filled the world with hatred and suspicion , and hath defiled it with so much blood , as men who were by god created with humane hearts , and civil inclinations , are become ravenous wilde beasts , tearing one another in pieces with all sort of inhumanity . for the ambition of these men hath changed publike peace into most cruel war , vertue into vice , the charity and love which we ought to bear to our neighbours , into such intestine hatred , as whereas all lyons appear lyons to a lyon , the scotch man appears unto the english , the italian to the german , the french to the spaniard , the german , spaniard , french , and men of all other nations to the italian , not to be men , not brethren , as they are , but creatures of another species : so as justice being oppressed by the unexplicable ambition of potent men , mankind , which was born , brought up , and did live long under the government of wholesome laws , waxing now cruel to themselves , lives with the instinct of beasts , ready to oppress the weaker . theft which is the chief of all faults , is so persecuted by the laws , as the stealing of an egg is a capital fault , and yet powerful men are so blinded with the ambition of reigning , as to rob another man perfidiously of his whole state , is not thought to be an execrable mischief , as indeed it is , but an noble occupation , and onely fit for kings ; and tacitus , the master of policy , that he may win the good will of princes , is not ashamed to say , in summa fortuna id aequius quod vallidus , & sua retinere privatae domus , de alienis certare regiam laudem esse , li. . an. if it be true ▪ which is confest to be so by all politicians ▪ that people are the princes apes , how can those who obey , live vertuously quiet , when their commanders do so abound in vice ? to bereave a powerful prince of a kingdom is a weighty business , which is not to be done by one man alone . to effect so foul an intent ( observe what the thirst of dominion can do in an ambitious mind ) they muster together a multitude of men , who that they may not fear the shame of stealing their neighbours goods , of murthering men , and of firing cities , change the name of base thief into that of a gallant souldier , and valliant commander ; and that which aggravates this evil is , that even good princes are forced to run upon the same rocks , to defend their own estates from the ravinousness of these harpyes . for these to secure their own estates , to regain what they have lost , and to revenge themselves of those that have injured them , possess themselves of their states : and being allured by gain , they betake themselves to the same shameful trade , which they did so much abhor before . which hath caused the art of bereaving other men of their territories , become an highly esteemed science ; and is the reason why humane wit , which was made to admire and contemplate the miracles of heaven , and wonders of the earth , is wholly turned to invent stratagems , to plot treasons ; and hands , which were made to cultevate the earth which feeds us , into knowing how to handle arms , that we may kill one another . this is that which hath brought our age to its last gasp ; and the true way to remedy it is , for princes who use such dealings ▪ to amend themselves , and to be content with their own present fortunes ; for certainly it appears very strange to me , that there should be any king who cannot satisfie his ambition with the absolute command over twenty millions of men . princes , as you all know , were ordained by god on earth , for the good of mankind ; i therefore say it will not do well onely to bridle the ambition which princes have of possessing themselves of other mens estates ; but i think it necessary that the peculiar engagement which some men pretend their swords have over all estates , be cut up by the root ; and i advise above all things , that the greatness of principalities be limitted ; it being impossible that too great kingdoms should be governed with that exact care and justice which is requisite to the peoples good , and to which princes are obliged . for there never was a monarchy excessively over great , vvhich vvas not in a short time lost by the carelessness and negligence of those that were the governors thereof . here periandro ended ; whom solon thus opposed : the true cause of the present evils which you with much freedom have been pleased to speak of , vvas not omitted by us , out of ignorance ( as you peradventure may believe ) but out of prudence . the disorders spoken of by you , that the weak were oppressed by those of greater power , began vvhen the world vvas first peopled . and you know , that the most skilful physician , cannot restore sight to one that was born blind . i mention this , because it is much the same thing to cure an eye that is infirm , as to reform antiquated errors . for as the skilful physician betakes himself the very first day that he sees an illaffected eye water , to his clouts and cauters , and is forced to leave his patient vvith a bleer eye ; vvhen if the eye vvere quite blind , it vvere too late to seek for remedy ; so reformers should oppose abuses vvith severe remedies , the very first hour that they commence . for when vice and corruption hath got deep rooting , it is wiselier done to tolerate the evil , then to go about to remedy it out of time , with danger to occasion worse inconveniences ; it being more dangerous to cut of an old wen , then it is misbecoming to let it stand . moreover we are here to call to mind the disorders of private men , and to use modesty in so doing ; but to be silent in what concerns princes , and to bury their disorders , which a wise man must either touch very tenderly , or else say nothing of them ; for they having no superiors in this world , it belongs onely to god to reform them , he having given them the prerogative to command , us the glory to obey . and certainly not without much reason ; for subjects ought to correct their rulers defects onely by their own good and godly living . for the hearts of princes being in the hands of god , when people deserve ill from his divine majestie , he raiseth up pharoahs against them , and on the contrary , makes princes tender hearted , when people by their fidelity and obedience deserves gods assistance . what solon had said , was much commended by all the hearers ; and then cato began thus : your opinions most wise grecians are much to be admired ; and by them you have infinitely verified the tenet which all the litterati have of you : for the vices , corruptions , and those ulcerated wounds , which the present age doth suffer under , could not be better nor more lively discovered and pointed out . nor are your opinions , which are full of infinite wisdom , and humane knowledge , gain-said here ; for that they were not excellently good ; but for that the malady is so habituated in the veins , and is even so grounded in the bones , as that humane complexion is become so weak , as vital virtue gives place to the mightiness of vice , whereby we are made to know clearly , that the patient we have in hand is one sick of a consumption , who spits putrifaction , and whose hair fals from his head : the physician hath a very hard part to play , gentlemen , when the patients maladies are many , and the one so far differing from the other , as cooling medicines , and such as are good for a hot liver , are nought for the stomach , and weaken it too much . and truly this is just our case ; for the maladies which molest our present age , and wherewithal all other times have been affected , do for number equal the stars of heaven , or the sea-sands , and are more various , and further differing one from another , then are the flowers of the field . i therefore think this cure desperate , and that the patient is totally incapable of humane help : and my opinion is , that we must have recourse to prayers , and to other divine helps , which in like cases are usually implored from god. and this is the true north-star , which in the greatest difficulties leads men into the haven of perfection : for pauci prudentia honesta ab deterioribus , utilia ab noxiis discernunt , plures aliorum eventis docentur . tacit. lib. . annal. and if we will approve , as we ought to do , of this consideration , we shall find , that when the world was formerly fallen into the like difficulties , it was no thought of man , but gods care that did help it , who by sending universal deluges of water , razed mankind , full of abominable and incorrigible vice from off the world . and gentlemen , when a man sees the walls of his house all gaping and runious , and the foundations so weakened , as in all appearance it is ready to fall , certainly it is more wisely done to pull down the house , and build it anew , then to spend his money , and waste his time in piecing and in patching it . therefore since mans life is so foully depraved with vice , as it is past all humane power to restore it to its former health , i do with all my heart beseech the divine majestie , and counsel you to do the like , that he will again open the cataracts of heaven , and send new deluges of water upon the earth , and so by pouring forth his wrath upon mankind , mend the incurable wounds thereof by the salve of death : but withal , that a new ark may be made , wherein all boys of not above twelve years of age may be saved ; and that all the female sex , of what soever age be so wholly consumed , as nothing but the unhappy memory thereof may remain . and i beseech the same divine majestie , that as he hath granted the singular benefit to bees , fishes , beetles , and other annimals , to procreate without the feminine sex , that he will think men worthy the like favour . for gentlemen , i have learnt for certain , that as long as there shall be any women in the world , men will be wicked . it is not to be believed how much cato's discourse displeased the whole assembly , who did all of them so abhor the harsh conceit of a deluge , as casting themselves upon the ground , with their hands held up to heaven , they humbly beseeched almighty god , that he would preserve the excellent femal sex , that he would keep mankind from any more deluges , and that he should send them upon the earth onely to extirpate those discomposed and wilde wits , those untnuable and blood thirsty souls , those hetorotrical and phantastick brains , who being of a depraved judgement , and out of an overweening opinion which they have of themselves , are in truth nothing but mad men , whose ambition was boundless , and pride without end ; and that when mankind should through their misdemerits become unvvorthy of any mercy from his divine majestie , he would be pleased to punish them with the scourges of plague , svvord and famine , and that he vvould make use of his severest and of all others most cruel rod , as it is recorded by seneca , of inriching mean men ; but that he should keep from being so cruel , and causing such horrid calamity , as to deliver mankind unto the good vvill and pleasuree of those insolent vvicked rulers , vvho being composed of nothing else but blind zeal , and diabolical folly , vvould pull the vvorld in pieces if they could compass and put in practice the beastial and odde caprichios , vvhich they hourly hatch in their heads . cato's opinion had this unlucky end , when seneca thus began : rough dealings is not so greatly requisite in point of reformation , as it seems by many of your discourses , gentlemen , to be ; especially when disorders are grown to so great a height : the chief thing to be considered is to deal gently with them . they must be toucht with a light hand , like wounds which are subject to convulsions . it redounds much to the physians shame , when the patient dying with the potion in his body , every one knows the medicine hath done him more harm then his malady . it is a rash advice to go from one extreme to another , passing by the due medium : for mans nature is not capable of violent mutations ; and if it be true , that the world hath been falling many thousand years into the present infirmities , he is onely not wise , but a very fool who thinks to restore it to its former health in a few days . and if a sick man , who formerly being fat , and after a long sickness is grovvn very lean , think in the first week of his convalessence to return to his former fatness by much eating , he must surely burst : but he will happily compass his desire , if he will eat moderately and have that patience which brings whatsoever knotty business to perfection . for quae longo tempore extenuantur corpora , lentè reficere oportet . hip. lib. . aph. moreover , in reformation , the conditions of those who do reform , and the quality of those that are to be reformed , ought to be exactly considered . we that are the reformers , are all of us philosophers , learned men , if those that be to be reformed , be onely stationers , printers , such as sell paper , pens and ink , and other such things appertaining to learning , we may very well correct their errors : but if we shall go about to mend the faults of other occupations we shall commit worse errors , and become more ridiculous then the shoomaker who would judge of colours , and durst venture to censure apelles his pictures . and upon this occasion i am forced to put you in mind of a fault which is usual amongst us the litterati , who for four cujus , which we have in our heads , pretend to know all things ; and are not aware , that when we first swarve from what is treated on in our books , we run riot , and say a thousand things from the purpose . i say this , gentlemen , because there is nothing which more obviates reformations , then to walk therein in the dark ; which happens , when the reformers are not perfectly well acquainted with the vices of those that are to be reformed . and the reason is apparent , for nothing makes men persevere more , and grow obstinate in their errors , then when they find that he that reforms , is not well informed of their defects who are to be reformed . and to prove this to be true , which of us is it , gentleman , that knows what belong to the false hook of notaries , to the prevarications of advocates , the simony used by judges , proctors imbroylings , the abuses of apothecaries , taylors filtching , butchers thieving , and of the cheating tricks of a thousand other artificers ? and yet all these excesses must be by us corrected . and if we shall go about to amend such disorders , which are so far from our profession , shall not we be thought as blind , as he who goes about to stop a hogshead , which being full of clefts , scatters out wine on every side ? this is enough , gentlemen , to let you know , that reformation is then likely to proceed well , when marinors talk of winds , souldiers of wounds , shepherds of sheep , and herdsmen of bullocks . it is manifest presumption in us to pretend to know all things , to believe that there are not three or four men of every trade and occupation , who fear god , and love their own reputation , is meer malice , and rash judgement . my opinion therefore is , that three or four of every trade or occupation , who are of known goodness and integrity , be sent for by us , and that every one reform his own trade ; for when shoo-makers shall speak their opinion touching shoes and slippers , taylors touching clothes , chyrurgions concerning searclothes , cooks of lard and pickel'd meats , and every one shall correct his own trade , we shall work a reformation worthy of our selves , and of the present occasions . though seneca's opinion was mightily praised by petacchus and chilo , who finding the other philosophers to be of another opinion , entred their protestation , that it was impossible to find out a better means for the reformation of mankind , then what had been mentioned by seneca , yet did the rest of their companions abhor it more then they had done cato's proposition ; and moved with indignation , told him , that they much wondred , that by taking more reformers in into them , he would so far dishonour apollo , who had thought them not onely sufficient , but excellently fit for that business . that it was not wisely advised to begin the general reformation by publishing their own weakness ; for all resolutions which detract from the credit of the publishers , want that reputation which is the very soul of business , and that jurisdiction , which is more jealous then womens honor , should be handled so prodigally by such a one as he , who was the very prime sage of latin writers ; and that the very vvisest men did all agree , that twenty pound of blood taken from the very life-vain , was well imployed to gain but one ounce of jurisdiction ; and that he is mad , who holding the svvord by the handle , gives it to his enemy to rescue it from him by the point . the whole assembly vvere mightily afflicted , vvhen by the refutation of seneca's opinion , they found smal hopes of effecting the reformation ; for they relyed but little upon mazzoni , vvho vvas but a novice , nor could they think that he could speak any thing to the purpose ; vvhich though mazzoni did by many signs perceive , yet no vvhit discouraged , he spoke thus ; it vvas not for any merit of mine , most vvise philosophers , that i vvas admitted by apollo into this reverend congregation , but out of his majesties special favour ; and i very vvell knovv , that it better becomes me to use my ears then my tongue in so grave an assembly as this , i being to learn and hold my peace . and certainly i should not dare to open my mouth upon any other occasion ; but reformation being the business in hand , and i lately coming from vvhere nothing is spoken of but reformation and reformers , i desire , that every one may hold their peace , and that i alone may be heard to speak in a business vvhich i am so verst in , as i may boast my self to be the onely euclide of this mathematick . give me leave , i beseech you , to say , that you , in relating your opinions , seem to me to be like those indiscrete physicians , vvho lose time in consulting , and in disputing , vvithout having so much as seen the sick party , or heard his story for himself . we , gentlemen , are to cure the present age of the foul infirmities vvherevvith vve see it is opprest . we have all laboured to find out the reasons of the maladies , and hovv to cure them , and none of us hath been so vvise as to visit the sick party . i therefore advise , gentlemen , that vve send for the present age to come hither , that we interrogate it of its sickness , and that we may see the ill affected parts bare naked , and so the cure will prove easie , which you hold so desperate . the whole assembly was so pleased at this mazzoni's motion , as the reformers immediately commanded the age to be sent for , which was presently brought in a chair to the delphick palace by the four seasons of the year . he was a man full of years , but of so fresh and strong a complexion , as he seemed likely to live yet many ages ; onely he was short breath'd , and his voyce vvas very weak : which the philosophers wondring at ; they asked him , why his face being ruddy , which was sign that his natural heat was yet strong in him , and that his stomach was good : why , i say , he was so full of pain ? and they told him , that a hundred year before , when his face was so yellow , as he s●…med to have the jaundice , he spoke freely notwithstanding , and seemed to be stronger then he was now . that they had sent for him to cure him of his infirmity , and bad him therefore freely speak his griefs . the age answered thus , soon after i was born , gentlemen , i fell into these maladies which i now labour under . my face is now so fresh and ruddy , because people have pe●…er'd it , and coloured it with lakes ; my sickness resembles the ebbing and flowing of the sea , which always contains the same water , though it rise and fals ; with this vicissitude notwithstanding , as when my looks are outwardly good , my malady ( as at this present ) is more grievous inwardly ; and when my face looks ill , i am best within . for what my infirmities are , which do so torment me at the present , do but take off this gay jacket , wherewith some good people have covered a rotten carcass , that notwithstanding breathes and view me naked , as i was made by nature , and you will plainly see i am but a living carcass . all the philosophers then hasted , and having stript the age naked , they saw that the wretch pargeted with aparences four inches thick , all over his body . the reformers caused ten razors to be forthwith brought unto them , and every one of them taking one , they fell all to scrape away the pargeting aforesaid ; but they found them so far eaten into his very bones , as in all that huge colossus , they could not find one ounce of good live flesh . at which they were much amazed , then put on the ages jacket again , and dismist him ▪ and finding that the cure was altogether desperate , they assembled themselves close together , and forsaking the thought of all publike affairs they resolved to prepare for ●…r indempnity of their own reputations . mazzoni writ what the rest of the reformers dictated , a manifesto , wherein they witnessed to the world the great care apollo ever had of his litterati's vertuous living , and of the welfare of all mankind ▪ and what pains the reformers had taken in compiling the general reformation . then coming to particulars they set down the prizes o●… ca●…biges , s●…rats , and pompions . and all the assembly had already underwritten the reformation , when thales put them in mind , that certa●… h●…glers , who sold lupins , and black cherryes , vented such smal measures , as it was a shame not to take order therein . the assembly thankt thales for his advertisement , and added to their reformation , that the measures should be made greater . then the palace gates were thrown open , and the general reformation was read in the place appointed for such purposes , to the people who were flockt in infinite numbers to the market-place , and was so generally applauded by every one , as all parnassus rung with shouts and vociferations of joy ; for the meaner sort of people are pleased with every little thing ; and men of judgement know that vitia erunt , donec homines , tacit. lib. . hist. as long as there be men , there will be vices . that men live on earth , though not well , yet as little ill as they may ; and that the height of human wisdom lay in being so discreet as to be content to leave the world as they found it . the lxxviii . advertisement . apollo hearing of the happy alliance of the two illustrious daughters of charls emanuel with the two noble princes of mantua and modena , commands that extraordinary demonstrations of joy be made throughout his whole dominions . yesterday about nine of the clock , the usual guard of the pegasean tower gave notice by two stroaks of the bell , that two men were discovered on the castalian plain , which hasted towards parnassus ; whereupon the litterati ran presently to the walls and to the gates , to see what the matter might be . and soon after hearing the sound of a horn , knew that it was one that came post , with his guide : the more inquisitive litterati ran to meet him , and when they heard that he was sent from italy to apollos majesty , they all earnestly desired to know whether he brought news of any gallant italian product , or of any taking piece lately printed ? to which the post answered , only that he brought dispatches to apollo , of incredible joyful news ; wherefore he was waited upon to the royal palace by an infinite number of litterati . when he had presented his letters to apollo , all the standers by , who very attentively observed his majesties face , found , that still as he read , his countenance cleared up . having read the letters , he with incredible joy uttered these words ; o how happy union ! let my beloved queen of italy know , that i desire her to come speedily to me . these words caused various conjectures in the vertuosi , and divers were the interpretations they gave thereof ; but the most common was , that the necessary league , which is so much desired by all good men , was at last concluded in italy , against that enemy to learning , the ottaman empire . this mean while the queen of italy was seen to come walking apace towards apollo's royal palace leaning upon her bellisario . when apollo heard she was coming to the stairs , he ran with great joy to meet her , and having imbraced her in his arms ; i heartily rejoyce ( said he ) together with your majesty , at the happy news which i but now received by letters from my italian academies , of the match which his highness charls emanuel duke of savoy hath made of his two daughters , with the most noble princess of mantua , and modena . what think you of the conjunction of so illustrious princes , of the union so much desired , so much wisht for by me and you , of these your two beloved sons ? are not these contentments which do fully counterpoise your late troubles ? yes indeed , answered the queen of italy , and i confess unto your majesty , that now all my desires , all my consolations are accomplished : for i never did desire any thing more earnestly , then that my italian princes should add the conjunction of bloud , as now they have done , to their joynt important interests of state : so as i am wholly composed of joy , seeing that strong gerion of many of my italian princes , formed into one body , which may secure me from those future evils , the fear wherof hath hitherto so afflicted me . then that powerful queen , attended by all the princes and nobility of parnassus , went to visit the temple of fruitfulness , which promis'd assured and happy offspring to these so fortunate couples . being returned to her royal palace , she was congratulated by all the chiefest princes reciding in this state , and in the presence of so many great heroes , she gave the honorable title of first and chiefest italian warrier , to charls emanuel duke of savoy , the father of so fortunate offspring , and author of italies so great felicity , to whom she immediately sent the usual signes of golden launce and trunchion . apollo , to witness his joy for this so gladsom news , caused it to be proclaimed by sound of trumpet , that in respect thereof , extraordinary signes of joy should be shewed throughout all his dominions ; and upon this occasion gave leave at the earnest request of his litterati , the which he had hitherto so resolutely denied , that stage-players should be admitted into parnassus . tilting and turney were in the next place proclaimed ; and the first day the paladines of spanish romansas , amadisi , don florestano , and many others appeared within the lists , who gave such proofs of themselves as did exceed ; and all men wondred to see palaces made all of diamonds , built by words . the second day the french paladins , and those of other nations , orlando , rinalde , gradasso , sacrapante , and many others appeared at turney , who behaved themselves so couragiously as they made all men know , that ariosto had writ sparingly of them . the third day caro , molza , sanga , and other polite courtiers appeared in the field , who valiantly challenged those other noble champions to the combat ; but they , scorning to have to do with men who had not made profession of arms , refused the challenge ; wherefore those courtiers did by sound of trumpet again denounce ; they challenge a second time , which was still slighted by the other paladins . the courtiers published a third defiance ; which not being accepted of , all the spectators fel a●… hissing at them . wherefore apollo , seeing so great a scorn put upon those paladins who had been rendred so famous by the poets , was much offended , and commanded them to put their launces in their rests , and to quell the over-daring of those courtiers . the champions then suddenly obeyed ; and it was a strange prodigious thing , to see how those spruce courtiers , did with a dexterous lye , with an ill turn done in time unhorse those paladins , though their arms were inchanted . then the couragious bradamante and marsica , incenst to see those famous paladins so dishonored , took their launce , and with more then manly fury , spur'd on their steeds towards the cavaliers , so to recover the military reputation which the others had so shamefully lost ; but both of them being incountred by great purses full of gold , spread their legs abroad , forsook their saddles , and fell to the ground flat upon their backs ; by reason of these signal acts , the prize of the tilting was awarded to the courtiers , who had got the trick of unhorsing people , and of setting them beside the saddle , not by their launces or counter-bufs , but only by meer words . the lxxix . advertisement . the ancient commonwealth of rome , and the modern venetian liberty , argue together , what the true rewards of honour be , by which well ordered commonwealths do acknowledge the worth of their well-deserving senators . though the flourishing commonwealth of rome , formerly the worlds mistriss , be now reduced by reason of her great misfortunes , into a far differing condition from what she was in ; yet in memory of her pristine greatness she still lives well esteemed , and much honored in parnassus ; not only for that her politick precepts are held by all men in power , as divine answers ; but because she is believed to be the true oracle of military affairs : as also for that nor princes nor privat men , take any more praise-worthy or heroick examples wherewith to adorn their minds more frequently , or more advantagiously from any other place . and though so splendid a princess hath been sundry times deflowred and ravisht , as wel by her own ingrateful and ambitious citizens , as by her barbarous enemies , by augusto's and silla's proscriptions ; as by the general sacking of t●…tilla and atilla , and other kings of forrein nations ; yet doth she excellently well recover her past dishonor , and her present misery , by the fame of her antient greatness . this so famous princess , came some few daies since to visit the venetian liberty ; a lady of greatly famed chastity , and the best beloved and highest esteemed of as many as are in this plebeian court , for the opinion of her great wisdom , and for the reputation of her unexhaustible wealth . and whilst the roman liberty discoursed of her past greatness , and the venetian commonwealth of her present felicity , 't is known that the roman commonwealth said to the venetian liberty , that she being purely aristocratical , and consequently the most perfect form of a commonwealth , did doubtlesly by her excellent laws which promised her long life , surpass any , either past or present republick . but that though to maintain peace at home , and war abroad , the orders she observed were excellently good , yet had she not made such acquisition of states , as was expected from the wisdom , and as well publick as privat wealth of so famous a republick ; which was thought to happen by reason of her being very backward in giving such rewards as were usually given by well ordered commonwealths , to her well deserving senators ; and that she , the commonwealth of rome , acknowledged all the glory she had in having won the whole world in so short a time , to proceed wholly from the extraordinary worth of her senators , whereunto they were awakened , not by any wealthy gifts , but by the rewards of eternal honor in erecting their statues , by their triumphant vestments , trophies , by the building and dedication of famous temples , baselisks , and theatres , and chiefly by that glory so much coveted by those who do thirst after eternal fame of stately roman triumphs : rewards which raised such military valor , such excellent civil vertue in her citizens , as the insuing nations did admire , but could not imitate : and that the venetian liberty was so backward in rewarding the worth and merits of her honorable senators , with the memorial of perpetual honors , as she might very well be termed ingratefull ; and that infinite noble men of venice , having done things worthy the sublimest triumphs , both in times of peace and war , and all those rewards which eternize the memory of great senators , she thought it very strange to see a narnesan statue on horseback in padua , and one of bergamasco in the midst of venice , and that the famous services of andrea gretty , of sebastian venieri , and of a thousand other famous venetian senators , who had not only excelled the gatta melati , and the colleoni , in parts both of soul and body , but might deservedly be paralel'd with pompey and cesar , were not recompenced with the reward of perpetual memory , which their glorious actions had deserved . menante , who writes all these things with great integrity and faithfulness , had it from a very good hand , that the venetian liberty , not any whit at all moved , answered the roman republick ; that she had not so inlarged her territories as the romans had done theirs , not for that ( as she gave her self to believe ) the thirst after glory and fame was wanting in her senators ; but for the clean contrary ends which the two common-wealths had propounded unto themselves ; for the venetian senators made peace the utmost bounds of their ambition , whereas the roman senat made war theirs . and that she had clearly learnt by her most unfortunate end , that too greatly disproportionate atchievements made by states , did disorder all the politick laws of whatsoever well-governed commonwealth ; but chiefly such as were aristocratical , the nobility whereof being to consist but of a few , and not sufficient to govern a great state , the wholsom laws of living free , would be filled with confusion , should the number of the nobility be rendred immensly great . as her majestie of rome had by her infinite calamities , made it appear unto the world , who by adding people whom she had subjected to the number of roman citizens , did happily aggrandize her state , but much lessen her liberty . and that for her part she was satisfied with so much empire , as might serve to secure the venetian liberty from forrein forces ; and that she did not covet the greatness of state , out of an ambitio●… to command , but out of glory not to serve : that as for honorable rewards which well ordered commonwealths ought to barter with worth , and therewith to reward the merits of her senators , she took her self to be injured by being stiled ungratefull ; for eternal trophies , and perpetual triumphant arches were seen in venice , not made of brittle marble , or mettals subject to the violence of fire , but of incorruptible materials , wherewith she largely rewarded her well deserving senators , as it very well became her to do ; to the end that the memory of their worthy actions might be gloriously conveyed to futurity . to this the roman liberty answered , that she had often seen all the rooms of her highness's palace , and does not remember that she ever saw any trophies , triumphant arches , or other things to perpetuate the memory of her nobility . hereupon the venetian liberty caused many of her nobility of all ages to enter the room , whom she stript naked , and then opened their brests , and then much to her astonishment , the roman liberty saw all those triumphant arches , trophies statues , and other stately triumphs , which they by their glorious actions had merited of their country , erected in the hearts of her gritti , venieri , capelli , grimani , bragadini , basqualigi , and other of her deserving senators : and that which encreased the wonder of the roman dame , was to see in the hearts of those noble venetians , a fervent charitable desire to reward the egregious works of so deserving senators , in their posterity ; and a fire of emulation to imitate those worthy heroes , and to do acts which they saw were so gloriously rewarded . then the venetian liberty with testimony of great affection , said thus unto the roman lady ; such as we , ought to recommend the vertue and deserts of our citizens to posterity , by these triumphant arches , and with these demonstrations which you , madam , see written in the hearts of my senators . these are the statues , and other publick memorials which wisdom awakens in the hearts of honorable senators who thirst after glory . these are the places where trophies , and other publick memorials of deserving senators should be erected , and not in piazza's : for the memory which the nobility of a commonwealth keeps eternally in their hearts , of the deserts of such as have done glorious actions , is that which awakes emulation and true vertue : things which alwaies produce good effects tending to the service of a free country ; whereas triumphs , trophies , statues , and such like things , which are so familliarly seen built in your streets of rome , in memory of your well-deserving senators , hath served only to procure them that number of followers of the rabble sort of people , which occasioned the ambition of reign in your unfortunate senators , silla , marius , sinna , crassus , pompey , and cesar , which was that which put upon you the unfortunate and shameful chain of servitude , which you now drag at your heels : a great disorder , and from whence i know that you doe acknowledge all those evils to proceed , which have made you so famous even in calamities . and know , that our senators do very fitly resemble those young virgins who marry , being chaste both of mind and body , : for as those careless husbands hazard the making of them whores , by sending them abroad to all balls and festivals ; so free commonwealths do imprudently infuse into the minds of their civil and well composed senators , a desire of becoming tyrants , by the rewards of publick memorials , which purchase popular breath , and the attendance of the rabble rout . the lxxx . advertisement . the people of lesbos , after cornelius tacitus ran away from them , chuse anna momorancy , by apollos appointment , for their prince . after the unhappy success which ( as you heard by some of our last ) cornelius tacitus had in his principality of lesbos , and his flight from that state , nothing was left unindeavored , neither by himself , nor by other princes who were his friends , to induce apollo to work so with the people of lesbos , as that he might again return to his principality , but all to no purpose ; for his majestie was ever constant in his assertion , that no good was ever to be hoped from the government of princes , who for such like offences grew bitter to their people . but for satisfaction to the men of lesbos , who continually prest him by their ambassadors , that he would propound unto them a new prince ; he nominated anna momorancy , an honorable french baron ; who was received with great satisfaction to the people of lesbos , and proclaimed prince of that state. 't is certainly true , that some vertuosi who were very well acquainted with the affairs of lesbos , made a long , and an exact series of many abuses which reigned in that state , from whence they said grew great inconveniences , and did accurately name the waies which were to be held to reduce the affairs of lesbos to a much better condition : and this they gave to momorancy , who told those his friends , that the amending of disorders in a principality by new laws and magistrates , was to be undertaken only in hereditary states , where the children , and other successors of the defunct prince , did usually so tenaciously inherit their predecessors thoughts , as they esteemed it a secure foundation of their government , and a necessary piece of policy , to be very jealous in the observancy thereof ; but that in elective principalities , wherein successors used often to undo what their predecessors had done , either out of curiosity , or to cast dirt in the faces of former princes , it was a difficult business to begin to reform those things which wholly depending upon an exquisite and exact observancy of giving orders , required that many successive princes should be of the same mind ; which being hard to be found in elective states , he said that the best advice which could be given to such an one as he in the government of lesbos , was to shun novelty , and resolve to live according to the ancient laws , whatsoever they were ; and to leave things as he found them ; for in houses that are rented , wise men are contented to live in the old rooms ; and they are over-curious who build new apartements , which 'tis ods but that they will be thrown down , either out of the caprichiousness or ill-will of the next comer . the lxxxi . advertisement . the excellent bolognian physitian , jovanni zecca , sels in parnassus the true antidote against the french pox. three daies ago certain papers were posted up in all the publick places of parnassus , wherein were written these words ; the famous bolognian physitian iovanni zecca , is arived in this city , who having found out the true and secure receit to keep men from taking the french pox , incites all men to provide themselves thereof ; the rich shall have it for reasonable rates , the poor for gods sake . this stirred up great curiosity amongst the litterati to have a receit so necessary for these times ; and so much the rather , for that they knew zecca to be one of the rarest in his profession , and an excellent good writer . and believing all that the receit consisted of oyles , electuaries , powders , and other such medicinal ingrediences , they wondred exceedingly when they saw zecca shew them a picture drawn by the life , of a gallant gentleman whose nose was eaten off with the french pox ; telling them the way how to use this receit , was , that just as they were about to lie with a woman whose health they suspected , they take this picture out of their bosom , which he gave them , and which as many as should fixedly look upon , and seriously contemplate , they might be confident that this medicine taken in by the eye , would have such operation , as they should never be infected with that loathsom disease . some were so curious , as they suddenly ran to make experience of this new receit ; and they say they found it to be exceeding good : for they who in the greatest height of lust did fixedly look upon , and attentively contemplate this picture , cashiering their carnal thoughts , and calling to mind how shameful a thing it was for a man to lose his nose , which was the ornament of the face , the seat and proper place of reputation ; whilst they considered that men ran hazard of encouraging so great a shame , by eating a bit , which though it was savory in the chewing , proves stinking and unpleasant even to a mans very imagination , when it is swallosed down , it did so dead all carnal desire in men who valued their reputation , as the self inconsiderate instrument of lust , though it be wholly void of judgement and discretion , was so apprehensive of the danger which his beloved correllative ran by that act , as preferring the health thereof before its own pleasure , it withdrew more speedily into its habitation , then do tortoises when stones are thrown apace at them . the lxxxii . advertisement . the litterati of parnassus do with great solemnity celebrate the holy day dedicated to the lowdable lawrel-leaves . yesterday the solemn festival dedicated to the lawrel leaves , was celebrated by all the litterati with great pomp and joy ; a festival instituted in parnassus ever since dafne's memorable accident , to exhilerate his majestie , who was much afflicted at the remembrance of so sad a metamorphosis ; on which solemn day , only poets , emperors , and other heroes are permitted to come into the stately colledg of the litterati with garlands on their heads , whilst those that have not deserved so great a prerogative , are not suffered to stir out of their own dores , lest they should profane the solemnity of so great a day by their naked heads . petrarch , who had of old obtained the honor of that imployment from apollo , made a learned oration in praise of those so honored leaves ; but whilst he was making his oration , a strange chance befel that worthy poet ; for after having by his encomium exaggerated the praise of that plant so dearlypriz'd by his maj. as that it is respected even by thunder ; and having spoken of the noble prerogative which it enjoies , of being that where with the temples of emperors , and glorious heroes are only surrounded ; he fell to make a long and bitter invective against the ignorance of the present times , wherein learning having lost much esteem , those very self-same so famous leaves , which in better time were held in such esteem , was now so basely and scornfully used by the ignorant modern men , as they did not only make use thereof for the signes of their base tipling-houses , but were not ashamed to put it into their provocative sawces , gellies , eels , and even into their rosted olives . petrarch was so very fervent , and had such commotion of mind , and compunction of spirit , in recounting these so strange neglects , as he fell down in a swound ere his oration was perfected , nor could they bring him to himself again , till the fair lady lawra , all sorrowful as she was , was thrown into the bosom of her beloved poet. petrarch was much honored for this accident , which made the whole colledg of the vertuosi plainly see how intirely and intimatly he loved that honour'd lawrel which he had praised with such elegancy in his italian verses . but it hapned that presently after this swouning , a very bitter disticon , or caplet of verses were fixt upon the delfick porch ; wherein it was said , that that swouning fit had not befallen petrarch for any sorrow for the injuries done to the lawrel-leaves , but for remembrance of those savory olives ; and this was the disticon : non amor hunc laurae , sed amica jecus●…ula lauro quem memori spirant , examinavit odor . 't was not the love to lawra made him swound , but scent of lawrel broths did him confound . the publick garblers of poetry , by express order from his majesty , brought these two latin verses to the test , and found clearly that they issued from martials abundant phancy , who was soon after imprisoned . then petrarch accompanied with a squadron of italian poets , ran towards the royal palace ; and it being feared that he came to complain of martial , he was met by catullus , tibullus , and propertius , who first imbraced him , and then earnestly intreated him that he would add to the glory which he had received by the accident which befell him whilst he was making his oration , the great good will he should get of all the vertuosi , if he would pass by marshals disticon as but a merriment . and they moreover told him , that all men knew that injuries written by loquatious poets , did not touch to the quick , when those that were concerned could laugh at them ; and that truths did only nettle and seek revenge . petrarch would not be advised by the poets , but angerly answered them , that he in his reading had learnt the vertue not to offend any ; but that when he found himself so nearly touched , he could not forgive ; wherefore inraged with anger , and desirous of revenge , he came to apollo , and with bitter words exaggerated the injury done him by martial , and did so incense apollo against him , as his majesty banished him for ever out of parnassus , and the precincts thereof ; and the sentence was ready to be put in execution , when martials advocate produced a motu propriae , which had been published many years before by his majesty , wherein it was ordained , that a jest , though it were bitter , provided it were witty , eloquent , quick , facetious , and that it had salt in it , and that it were not spoken out of premeditated mischief , but had escaped from a lively and ready wit , suddenly at unawares , deserved praise rather then punishment , as a fault which sprung rather from the vivacity of wit , then from the malice of mind ; for that even the wisest men could not forbear breaking a witty and facetious jest , which proceeded from a ready sharp wit ; and that though for many respects it ought neither to have been written nor said , yet it deserved to be listned unto , and read by men given to curiosity , for the quick vivacity thereof . the lxxxiii . advertisement . apollo having highly commended the king of spains decree , that no advocates nor proctors should go into the indies : the doctors of law quarrel grievously with his majesty for it . the abode of parnassus owes not its happiness only to apollos excellent government , nor to its being inhabited by the prime select wits of the world , but to the vertuous living of her inhabitants , the perfection of their manners , and to the exquisiteness of all the best laws which cul'd from out the whole world , are diligently introduced , and observed in that state. for those who live there , are bound to bring with them the best customs of their countries : a thing which hath been so advantagious to every privat man , and hath brought so great reputation to the publick , as it appears evidently , that the country is to be esteemed happy , which lives not only by her own laws , but by choice laws pickt out from all other civil nations . wherefore apollo being informed that the potent kings of spain have upon several penalties prohibited the passing of any proctors or advocates into the indies , intituled it a most holy edict , and highly praised the piety of those monarchs who have shewed such charity to the new world , as to preserve it from that disease which hath filled the old world with so many sad controversies . his majestie moreover gave present order that so excellent an edict should be registred in a table of brass , which should to eternal memory be fixt in the chief market-place , next to the twelve tables of the famous roman laws . i must not forget to let you know that the doctors of law were mightily scandalized hereat , who earnestly recommended unto his majesty the indempnity of their reputations ; saying , that if they might not obtain so much favour , as that this law might not be published , it would afford occasion to many to imitate the anconitans , norcinans , recanetesans , and others , who , with no little dishonor to learning , had banished those professers of law , who were held in so great admiration by other people , as they verily believed nothing could be well said , or done , without the liking of a learned-lawyer : and that they did the more earnestly beseech his majesty to consider their case , for that the indempnity of the sacred liberal sciences , wherein the students of law had spent so much time and monies , was therein likewise concern'd . apollo , contrary to the opinion of all men , was strangely offended at this their pressure , and in great anger answered those doctors . that he could not but very much wonder at their boldness , who durst affirm in his presence , that they had spent both time and monies in learning the liberal sciences , as if the delfick law were not sufficiently known to the whole world , wherein the study of the law was declared to be no liberal science , but a meer mechanical mystery , introduced in the world to afflict manking , studied without any delectation of the soul , or speculation of the understanding , and without the assistance of the sacred muses , which was so necessary in all good sciences , and only practised for meer avarice of gain , to fatten a fowl filthy beast with monies , who though he wholly wanted that vivacity of wit , which is so much loved by learning , it was sufficient to become a great advocate , if he had but an oxes brain , and a porters complexion . the lxxxiv . advertisement . the chiefest litterati of parnassus desire apollo that tacitus may re-compose those books of his annals , and histories which are lost . yesterday the chiefest litterati of parnassus met together in the publick schools , and after having discoursed long together , they all of them presented themselves unanimously before apollo , to whom the learned florentine pietro vittorio , in the name of all the rest , said , that those vertuosi whom his majesty saw there , did most humbly desire a favour of him , which would be the greatest and most acceptable that he could ever grant to his litterati ; who bitterly bewailing the infinite loss which learning hath had of the greatest part of the annals and histories of that father of human wisdom , and true inventer of modern policy ; cornelius tacitus did humbly beseech his majesty to command that so excellent personage , that he would amend the wrong which the injury of time had done to his honour , and to the publick profit of the vertuosi , by re-making whatsoever is now found wanting of those his most excellent labours . apollo , contrary to expectation , startled at this request which appeared so reasonable , and with an appearance of dislike , answered , o my ignorant litterati ! do not you think that the princes of the world are sufficiently known in state-affairs , that you would have them more learned in that science , in which , to your misery be it spoken , they already know too much ? since t is clearly seen that some of them by practising a devilish and infernal reason of state , have brought both sacred and profane things to utmost confusion . hath not the common miseries and scandals occasioned by the severe and wretched government of some princes , made you see , that modern policy , wholly framed by your so beloved tacitus , hath like a contagious disease , infected the world ? do not you already sufficiently know that the now practised reason of state , by which the people are rather flead then shoarn , rather suckt dry then milkt , rather opprest then govern'd , is now grown so exorbitant , as it is great folly to desire it should rage yet more ? think you not that some moderate princes have learnt precepts enough to pill and poll their people from tiberius his cruel government , and nero's ravenous life , so exactly written by your tacitus , that you would have them see whether they could pick out some conceal'd precept to imbitter the fifth act of your sorrowful servitude , in the lives of caligula and domitian , which god out of his great goodness to you , hath raced out of the world , only that the obscenity and cruelty used by those monsters of nature , might be for ever forgotten ? the loss of the greatest part of tacitus his labours , o my vertuosi , hath been a happy gain unto the world : how happy would men be , if the unfortunate remainders of them , preserved for the utmost calamity of mankind , were no waies to be found ; and that the world were governed according to the modesty and integrity of ancient monarchs , who thought men to be rational creatures , not beasts with two legs ( as many modern princes by their usages seem to think them ) created so by god for their good , as if he had made mice only to fatten cats . but you , monsieur vittorio , whom i find to be one of those that desire that ●…acitus should be rendred intire ; give me leave to have a word or two in privat with you , who have spoken in the name of the rest ; do not you think that your princes are become learned physitians to cure cancar of the florentines seditian , by reading the very first page of tacitus his annals , which they have so well studied and put in practice ? happy had the world been , if tacitus had been alwaies tacit : therefore fare you well , you and your posterity , i am sorry to see that men are no wiser then thrushes , whose excrement proves their own ruine ; ●…urdus malum sibi cacat . the lxxxv . advertisement . apollo being advertised that ignorant men took up arms against learning , puts himself in posture to defend his vertuosi . the suspitions of war which the litterati have had for these divers months past , are at last proved true ; for the post which came to apollo on tuesday night last brought letters from divers princes well adicted to learning , which said , that for certain the ignorant took up arms against the litterati ; and that they had already raised many thousands of barbarians , mortal enemies to the liberal sciences . upon the hearing whereof , apollo forthwith reinforced the garrisons of the chiefest towns of phosides , pindus , and libetrus , and then commanded ori●…sto and berni , that they should presently take into pay , two brigadoes of italian satyrical poets , and that the brigadoes of the latin poets , perseus , and iuvenal , being muchlessened , should be recruited with poets from itally , who did abound in that sort of militia : and then declared torquatus t●…ssus to be leader of the heroick italian poets , who chose his father bernardo for his lieutenant , and that good old father thought himself much honored in obeying so gallant a son . virgil was made general of the heroick latin poets , and lucan was his lieutenant . hanibal caro in a great assembly of poets , all of the first classis , assisted therein more by the favours of the house of fernese , then by his own deserts , was declared general of the italian lyrick poets ; which place would have been bestowed on petrarch , guidicchion , or monsieur de la casa , if their habit would have permitted them to have worn a murrion , or brest-plate . horrace had the free voice of the whole army , to be general of the latin lyrick poets . vigetius was made camp-master general of the whole army , and iulius frontinus serjeant major ; iohn francisco pico , count of mirandola was made standard-bearer , and in his standard-general , bore the famous ensigne of an open book ; ovidius naso was made treasurer-general ; and afterwards all necessary provisions and expedition for war were made : in so much as apollo had already so formidable an army of vertuosi in the field , as he held himself sure of the victory . but to so great a body of militia , the soul , money , was wanting : some propounded the raising of publick taxes upon the people , to provide for so urgent a necessity ; but that being found to be a pernitious way , and that it was dangerous to distaste the people with new grievances , who ought to be eased , that they might become their friends ; and that it was impossible to preserve a state amidst the troubles of war , when assaulted by a potent army , if it be inhabited by ill affected people : the care of providing monies , was referred by apollo , to his general councel of war ; who soon fell upon what is infinitely misliked by those who understand little , but loved and commended by good polititians , to wit , to lay tribute upon places of small importance ; but trusty , and far from the enemies confines . so great was the love which every one shewed to learning , and their hatred against the ignorant so intense , as the people of parnassus , to keep themselves from falling into their hands , and from seeing that horrid beast , that dreadful monster of nature , which is so displeasing to the vertuosi , of a man that can neither write nor read , as not only those places which were appointed by apollo , but even those that were not put into the list , ran to his majestie , and desired as a singular favour to be made tributary , and to pay composition : only ephesus refused openly to obey apollo : whereat his majesty was so offended , as finding the more they were perswaded , the more obstinate they grew , he thought it necessary to use force ; which they of ephesus being made acquainted by some of the vertuosi , who were their intimate friends , they forthwith sent ambassadors to his majesty , all of them noted men , and prime citizens ; who told him that the loyal city of ephesus would so willingly run with their lives and means to the defence of the state , as they would think it a particular favour , and singular grace , if upon that occasion his majestie would cause the publick and privat goods of the men of ephesus to be sold to whom would offer most ; and that what monies might be thereby raised , might be delivered into his treasurers for the occasions of the war ; and that their denial of becoming feudatory , or of paying composition , was not occasioned out of any disobedience to his majesty , or disaffection to learning ; but for that they foresaw that they should assuredly be made feudatory to a cruel tyrant , whose government , for the love they bore their country , their lives and honour , they were resolved to shun , though by the hazard of what they held dearest . apollo was so well satisfied by those of ephesus , as he embraced the ambassadors one by one , and thanked them very much for their readiness to serve him ; and then told them , that to secure them from being ill dealt withall by any new power ; that though seneca the tragedian had offered high for their composition , yet he would make-them feudatory to ovidius naso , who was so affectionate to the country of ephesus , as was well known to the vertuosi , from whom they might expect to be dealt withall with all humanity . to this the ambassadors answered ; that they beseeched his majesty to remember , that whilst ausonius gallus was their prince , the people of ephesus were at perpetual variance with him , which ended with their sending him out of their state sorely and shamefully wounded ; and that now that his majestie knew how great reason the people of ephesus had to abhor their new infeoffment , he might use his pleasure ; for they were resolved willingly to undergo any calamity , rather then to give his majesty any distaste . these reasons alleadged by the ambassadors with such generous humility , did so convince apollo , as he told them they might live secure , that ephesus should never be commanded by any but himself ; because he very well knew , that those who had driven their prince out of their state , and had dealt so ill with him , had much reason to apprehend the being made tributary a second time ; for every new prince , how meek or gentle soever he were , must be necessitated to use severity , and exercise all those cruel resentments which the seditious neopolitan baron received from the austere kings of aragon , so to secure himself from being treated as was his predecessor . the lxxxvi . advertisement . justus lipsius , to make amends for his fault in having accused tacitus , is so intent thereupon , as he is accused before apollo to have idolatrized him ; for which after a feigned punishment , he is at last praised , and admired by his majestie . the most observing litterati of this state , have often noted , that when any vertuosi hath through human frailty committed an error , he doth , for the hatred he beats to vitious actions , amend it by falling into the other extream : and divers affirm that democrit●…s did not put out his eyes for the benefit of contemplation , but to make amends for a fault which he had commited in having looked upon a handsom young woman with a more wanton eye then became a philosopher . and it is also reported that harpecretes , to correct an error which he had committed in having been too loquacious at a feast , for which he was greatly blamed , fell into the other extream of never speaking again . nor ought the poets sentence to be held true ; dum vitant stulti vitia , in contr●…ia currunt : since the dogg which hath been scalded with boyling water , is esteemed wise for staying within dores when it rains : as also it is the councel of a wise man , to hate eels after a man hath been bitten with a snake . this is said , because iustus lipsius was so heartily sorry for , and did so repent his having so unfortunately accused tacitus , as to amend a fault for which he was much blamed by all the vertuosi of this state , he soon after went to tacitus , and humbly asked him pardon for the injury he had done him : who knowing what honour a man wins by being ready to forgive , which magnanimity becoming a roman senator , did not only freely forgive lipsius , but did heartily thank him for having afforded him an occasion of doin●… so glorious an act , as sincerely to forgive an injury received . the wonder of so great indulgency , and the easiness in obtaining his so much desired pardon , being added to the ancient great devotion which lipsius ( who was alwaies very partial to tacitus ) bore to so sublime an historian , did so much encrease his love and veneration , as he frequented tacitus his house more then his own , delighted to discourse with him more then with any other of the litterati , was not better pleased with any other conversation , did not celebrate any historian more , and did all this with such partiality of inward affection , as he strove to imitate him in his quaintness of speaking more by conceits then words , in his brevity of succinct speaking , full of gravity , matter , sententiousness , and so as was only perspicuous to good understanders , procuring thereby the envy and hatred of all the vertuosi depending upon cicero , and the cesarian faction , who did not approve thereof , and presumed by an antonomasia , to call him his author , and not caring for what others said of him , he affected nothing more then to appear a second tacitus . this unusual affection amongst friends , not used to masters , and which did exceed all love born to consanguinity , begot such jealousie in mercerus , beatus rhenenus , fulvius orsinus , marcus antonius muretas , and in other of tacitus his followers , as for meer envie , though under the colour of revenging the injury which lipsius had formerly done their friend tacitus , they accused lipsius before apollo of the same impiety , which he had accused tacitus of : saying to his majesty , that he did not love tacitus as a friend , did not honor him as a master and patron , but did adore him as his apollo , as his god. this accusation , which as it fares in faults of high treason , seems through the atrocity thereof , to be sufficiently proved by bare allegation , did much trouble apollo ; who esteeming himself offended by lipsius , he made be forthwith brought bound unto him by a pretorian cohort of lyrick poets ; and with an angry countenance , and threatning way , asked him what he thought of one cornelius tacitus , an oylmans son of ternio ? to this ●…ipsius answered , that he held tacitus to be the chief of all intelligent historians ; the father of human wisdom , the oracle of the true reason of state , the master of polititians , the coryfeus of all such writers as had arived at the glory of using more conceits then words in their writings , the true rule whereby to learn to write the actions of great princes , with the learned light of their true occasion ; a great piece of art , and which was only known by the noblest sort of historians , as that which rendred them very glorious , who knew how to make use of it , and him learned , who had the judgement to consider it , the idea of historical truth , the true teacher of princes , schoolmaster of all courtiers , the true touchstone whereby the world might try the genius of princes , the standard whereby men might exactly weigh the real worth of privat men , the book which princes who would learn how to command subjects wel ; who desired to know how to obey wel , ought to have continually in their hands . apollo knew by this so affected encomium , and by so exaggerated praises , that lipsius did openly , and with a bare face adore ta●…itus : wherefore being highly incenst , he said , what think you then of me , lipsius , who am the father of learning , the supreme master of all sciences , absolute prince of the liberal arts , and the monarch of vertue , if with such impiety and impudence you idolatrize a writer who is so hateful to all good men , and so much detested by the professers of the latin tongue , for the newness of his phrase , the obscurity of his speech , his vitious brevity , and for his so cruel political doctrine , by which he rather forms severe tyrants then ; just princes , vitious subjects , then such as are indued with that naked goodness which makes government so easie to princes ; it being clearly seen , that he by his impious precepts converts lawful princes into tyrants , transforms natural subjects , who ought to be mild and obedient sheep into , wily foxes , and creatures which nature hath wisely ordained without or teeth or horns , into ravenous wolves and head-strong buls ; a great doctor of fallacies , the only artificer of tyranny , a new zenofon of a cruel and execrable tiberipedia ; the true forger of cunning cheating , of saying things which he intends not , of perswading that to others , which he himself believes not ; of seeming fervently to covet that which he desires not , and of appearing to hate what he loves ; an excellent master to teach men the wicked doctrine of concealing what they think , and of speaking falshoods ; the architecture of fallacies , and the only and so excellent author of rash judgements , as most commonly he interprets mens wicked actions for sanctified ones , and their good ones for diabolical ? and wilt thou alone , amongst so many of my faithful vertuosi , even to my very face adore one for thy god , who by his writings shews he does not know that there is a god ? who being composed of nothing but impiety , hath divulged that cruel and desperate policy , which doth so shame princes that practice it , and so much afflict people that make trial of it ? who hath taught princes as well as privat men , the wicked art of double dealing , the fraudulency to do what they do not say , and to say what they mean not to do ; which is practised by some , only that they may learn the wicked doctrine to paint out that for black , which is white , how to wind people about by fair speeches , and foul deeds ; of deceiving all men by laughing when a man is angry , and weeping when well pleased ; and of measuring love , hatred , and all human vertue , only by the wicked compass of self-interest ; one vvho is read by good men , only that they may knovv the nevv and deep fetches , by vvhich unhappy mankind in this present age , so miserably , and vvith such publick calamity vvhirld about , and to discover the execrable hypocrisie vvhich many disciples of such a master have practised , that they may be esteemed by the simpler sort of people , to live the lives of saints , though by obeying tacitus his precepts , they doe things vvhich even the devils of hell vvould blush to doe : are not you , lipsius , avvare , hovv since your tacitus is so frequently read , many princes svverve from the wonted fashion of governing their people with meekness and clemency , & many privat men have forsaken their former purity of life : many of ●…acitus his writings were not lost ( as divers ignorant people affirm ) by the deluge of barbarians , which came to conquer italy : they were missing before then , not by the ignorance of people , who in those troublesom times were busied in war ; but for that those ancient people in whom the sincerity of soul , and purity of the new christian religion did reign , did detest that writer which is now so much beloved ; and set up by many ( as i see he is by you ) to be adored for their golden calf . tacitus is in all his parts unworthy to be read by honest men ; for there be more impieties in him , then leaves , lines , words , sillables , nay then letters : but it must be confest that the life which he hath written of tiberius ( a fit prince for the pen of such an historian ) is altogether unsufferable ; which to the great benefit of mankind , was for many ages hidden in some secret parts of germany , till by the pestiferous curiosity of a german , which proved more fatal to the world then his compatriot , the inventer of guns , it was brought to light at the same time when that noble province began to be infected by the modern heresie ; only that tacitus might by so great a prodigie subvert profane things , when luther molested the sacred ones : writings integrally wicked , and lost for a while , because the ancients liked them not : and now ( to the great shame of the present age ) only admired by those polititians , who being followers of so great impiety , have learnt from the master of fallacies , the doctrine of entertaining men with words as long as they live , of feeding them with smoak ; of filling them with wind , and of bringing them by vain hopes to utter beggery . certainly an infernal doctrin ; which being sowed by the husbandman , tacitus , only for the benefit of princes , is now so greedily imbraced by every privat man , as tacitus , who was formerly esteemed an author only fit for princes , is now so frequently handled by all men , as shop-keepers and porters , seem to understand nothing better then reason of state ; and to the great derision of an art so highly esteemed by gallant men , the world is full of base teachers of policy . lipsius was half dead to hear apollo speak thus bitterly : yet taking courage at his very last gasp , he beg'd pardon of his majesty for any other fault that he had committed ; and then freely said , that his obligations to tacitus were such , so great the honor , which by means of this his beloved author , he had won amongst the flemmish , germans , english , french , spaniards , and italians , as though he should love and honour him as his earthly god , he thought he should not do enough to discharge his duty to the full , and exactly shew his gratitude : for having left ordinary writings behind him in the world , they were only his labours upon tacitus , which had made him merit an admittance into parnassus , and immortal renown amongst men : and that if he who drove a great trade with another mans money , was to be born withall , if he did even adore him , who at his pleasure might make him turn bankrupt ; how much more did he deserve at least to be excused , if not commended by his majesty , if he were extravagant , and did exceed the bounds of duty , in his loving and honoring of tacitus , since his whole stock of credit with the vertuosi was founded only in him ? and that since his entrance into parnassus , he had been so beloved and respected by the litterati , as his house had been as much frequented as those of the most famous writers ; but that since he committed the gross fault of offending tacitus , statim relictum illius limen , nemo adire , nemo s●…lari : tacit. lib : . annal. that therefore he would rather hate himself , and die , then lessen the reverence he bore to that his author : for he thought it a lesser loss to lose his life , then the height of honor which by tacitus his means he was arived at . apollo was scandalized to hear lipsius speak thus ; and growing still more angry , blamed him , for that in his presence he had by so impudent an asseveration , rather shewed his stif-neckt stubbornness of persevering in so wicked obstinacy , then repent and ask pardon for his fa ult : and chiefly his majesty could not indure that he should term idolatry , gratitude , and obstinacy , constancy . wherefore he commanded the same cohort of lyrick poets to drag him out of dores , who was not worthy to look upon his lord and master , whom he had so highly offended ; and that having first stript him of all his learning , they should declare him to be shamefully ignorant , and then burn him as a wicked idolater . lipsius was already brought to the place of execution , when his dearest friends advised him to bethink himself better , and save both his life and reputation , by craving his majesties pardon . lipsius , whilst in this very desperate condition , did so increase in constancy and boldness , as he bad apollo use his pleasure , he could not make him die ignorant , who was possest with gratitude , the queen of all human vertues ; that therefore the flames which should consume his body , would give a greater splendor of glory , then of fire ; and that he protested at that very last minute of his life , he was so far from acknowledging the fault which was laid to his charge , of having loved and honored his tacitus too much , that in commemoration of the infinite obligations which he ought him , it grieved him more then death , to think he should die ungrateful ; and that the present agony which they might all perceive him to be in , arose not from the terror of death , but from his immense sorrow to have heard his tacitus termed by his majesty , a wicked atheist ; an injury , which if it had been done to that most wise writer by any other then his majesty , he would not , though in that his last moment of life , have left it unrevenged , at least by words , and that with the liberty which most properly belonged to him who desired not to live , he witnessed to all the world , that tacitus did so far know god , as being he alone , who of all the writers of the gentiles , had by his great wisdom arived at the knowledg , how much the faith of things unseen , avails in matters of religion , or which cannot be proved by reason , he had said , sanctiusque , ac reverentius visum , de actis deorum credere quam scire . tacit. de morb. germ. most holy words , and worthy to be considered by those divines , who in their writings were at a loss through too sophistical subtilties . apollo being full of wonder , and infinitely astonished at the things he had heard , caused lipsius immediately to be set at liberty , and straitly imbracing him , said , o my dear vertuoso ! with how much consolation to my self , and how much to your advantage have i tried your patience and constancy , and by the injurious speeches which i have uttered against tacitus , which are the very same which they accuse him with , who neither study him nor understand him , have i made proof of your devotion towards that excellent historian , who even deserves my wonder . and by what i have heard you say , i find that you have been delighted in reading him , and long studied him to your profit : for i know that the defence , which so much to your glory you have made , is your own , but taken out of my and your dearly beloved tacitus . apollo then turned towards the vertuosi , who out of a curiosity to hear that judgement , were flockt in great numbers to the hall ; and said , o my beloved litterati ! admire , and ever imitate the honored constancy of this my glorious vertuoso , and let the infinite love , and everlasting veneration of that prince be ingraven in your hearts , who keeps up your reputation ; and forget not that his power precipitates more easily , who loseth his princes good will , then houses doe whose foundations fail . therefore you who follow the court , learn to know , that nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile ac fluxum est , quam fama potentiae , non sua vi nixae . tacit. lib. . annal. a most certain rule which teacheth every one to imitate lipsius in loving , honoring , and in ever faithfully serving their prince : for as it is great impiety in holy things , to have any other god save him who created man , the heavens and earth , so ought you never to have any devotion for any prince , not expect or desire any good from any other lord , save from him who out of confidence in your loyalty , and out of the extraordinary affection which he bears you , owns you to all the world , not for his servants , but for his dear friends , and by the supreme authority which he suffers you to exercise in his state , makes you appear unto his vassals no less princes then himself : and because the wisdom of princes out of their jealousies of those that rule , is usually accompanied with suspition , and court-favorits being alwaies envied , alwaies narrowly observed by their rivals , and alwaies persecuted by such as malign them . that you may overcome so many difficulties , and still preserve your selves in the favors which you have won , love your princes with all your heart , observe them with all your soul , and serve them with all possible loyalty : and like my lipsius , chuse rather to die , then to think , much less to do any thing which may indanger the least loss of their favours . and believe for certain , that then your ruine begins , when you suffer your selves to be perswaded that you may better your condition , by using simulation and falshood with your princes , who both know , see , and understand more then is possible to be exprest : for those who think to live securely by dissembling with princes , who though they should know nothing themselves , have so many who can put them in mind , and who want not a thousand malignant spirits to wake them when they are asleep , are like those fools who think to confine gypsies , and hope to cheat mountebanks . the lxxxvii . advertisement . the queen of italy being much intreated by her chiefest princes , and by apoll's self to pardon the injuries done by those italian commanders who took up arms against her , in assistance of forrein nations , denies to do it . doubtlesly the palace wherein the queen of italy keeps her residence , is even by the testimony of vitruvio's self acknowledged to be the most magnificent , and richliest adorn'd palace in all parnassus . here amongst other stupendious and delightful things , is the fore court to a large amphitheatre , at the upper end whereof stands the statue of the queen of italy on horseback , all of pure gold , dedicated to the great bellizarius , a grecian ; and that of narses , a grecian also , which was erected at the lower end of the court , for his perpetual glory , by the same queen , but is now thrown to the ground , and is broken all in pieces , for that notorious injury which she received from him ; so that whereas it was formerly the envie of great men , and served to put men in mind of so great a commanders merit , it now serves to shew his shame , who out of the rage of privat disdain , did profane so great a merit , and observed that glory which deserved envie . on the right hand of the fore-front of this so miraculous court , are the faces of those famous italian commanders , drawn by apelles , and other prime painters , who having by their arms , and by their expence of bloud , delivered italy from the slavery of barbarians , are by their grateful country kept in ever honored memory . and on the left hand of the same court , to the perpetual shame of ungratefull persons , those italian captains are hung upon gallowses , by the heels , who forgetting the obligation due to a mans country , which equals that of children to their parents , took up arms in assistance of babarous nations , and forein princes , to put fetters upon their italy . then to the infamy of so shamefully ungrateful people , the opprobries and reproaches are added , which poets in all sort of satyrical verses , and orators in daily invectives make against such misdemeriting men ; to the end that men may learn by those severe resentments , to shun committing faults which i ring eternal infamy with them : and to the end that military men , who are wont without weighing what princes they serve , to run where they may have best and most ready pay , may learn to love their country so well , as that they may think it greater charity to kill themselves , then to take up arms against her . menante , who before he can send this weeks gasetta to his loving customers , is bound to carry it to the urban pretor , cannot give you ( as he ought to do ) the names of those italians in his papers , who are painted in so ignominious a posture ; but he tels you that the posterity of those souldiers who suffer the punishment of so long shame , when they enter into that court , blush to think that their ancestors have so shamefully villified their house , and do therefore with much compunction of soul , continually bewail their predecessors misdemerits . these gentlemen by themselves , and by the intercession of the greatest princes of this state , have , and do still much importune the queen of italy that she will be pleased at last to pacifie her anger , and give way that those nobly descended souldiers may be freed from that shameful opprobry ; and apollo himself , at the intreaty of the best princes of italy , did earnestly mediate the same , but all in vain : for she still continuing her indignation , answered apollo , and the other who had intreated her , even with tears which for meer anger fell from her eyes ; that she had patiently born with the ruines , plundrings , affronts , and other utter desolations which she had received from the goths , ostrogoths , huns , vandals , and other barbarous nations , which had so miserably torn and wasted her , as being accidents which all princes were subject unto , and more particularly she , who by the pleasantness of her situation , fruitfull soyl , and great riches which she had got in time of peace , did not only allure , but even call in forrein nations to her ruine ; who thirsted after her wealth , and were desirous to change their barren countries with the fruitful fields of italy . but that her dearly beloved children , should take up arms against her their tender mother , which they ought to have imployed in her defence , were wounds which perpetually cry'd for revenge , so wicked an ingratitude as was incapable of pardon , so sad a wickedness as could not be out-done by any whatsoever cruel hatred . that therefore finding her self so deeply wounded in the concernment of her liberty , their intreaties made her the more obstinate in her hatred , was the reason why his majesties mediation did the more irritate her revenge , and why their humility who beg'd her pardon , made her the more to glory and wax cruel in her revenge , and that the very length of time made that injury continually appear more fresh , which she neither could nor would pardon : not only for that she knew she had never deserved so ill at her italians hands , but for that she knew she had been wickedly betrayed , assacinated , and so opprobriously made slave by those on whose neck she had trampled , only out of their execrable avarice , who ought least to have done it , and from whom she did least expect it : and that therefore every one might learn from the punishment of others , and from her well put on resolution , that whosoever doth offend his country in so shameful a manner , did not only commit an excess which was impardonable , but did so shamefully stain his honor , as the blur thereof was not to be washt away with any sope . the lxxxviii . advertisement . the whole generation of sheep , send their publike ambassadors to apollo , by whom they make their desires known , that they may be allowed to have sharp teeth , and long horns , and their desire is laughed at by his majestie . the vvhole generation of sheep have sent four ambassadors to this court ; who had audience given them this day by his maj. wherein a great apuleian weather said , that sheep did very vvell knovv , that god the creator of all things had been so charitable to all creatures , and so just , as that he recompenced their imperfections and defects vvith gifts equivolent . so as amongst so great a multitude of bruit beasts , there was not any one who could with reason say he was ill dealt withal by his divine majestie . onely the sheep thought he had treated them like a father in law , and dealt partially with them ; for having created them with great imperfections , he had not bestowed on them any equivolent vertue , whereby though they might not secure their state , they might at least live in that peace and quiet in the world as other beasts did . for though he had made hares unspeakably timerous , had given them sharp teeth , but not a heart to bite , yet he had made them so swift of foot , as he did thereby secure them from being injured by any other beast , how fierce soever ; and that the fox had no reason to complain of his want of footmanship , since god had given him so wisely a pate , as he happily escaped the deceits of other wild animals ; and that he had also recompenced the wolfs slowness , by indowing him with so bold a heart , so sharp teeth , and with so circumspect a genius , as being a terror to other bruit beasts , he made himself be respected even by man ; and that it was likewise clearly seen in the birds of the ayr , that his maj. had used the like charity ; for he had given those larger wings , and made them swifter of flight , to whom he had denyed the use of feet , with which he had indowed pheasants , partridges and quails , in recompence for their short wings , and want of feathers in their tails : that onely sheep , being created with an unspeakable stupidity of wit , heartless , slow of foot , and without those teeth to bite with , which makes other creatures be so much respected , they thought they were abandoned by that divine charity , which had shewed great love even to harmful beasts : and the weather further added , that for the utmost and greatest calamity of so unarmed sheep , god had given them lyons , tygers , bears and wolves , the most implacable and fiercest beasts that inhabit the world for their enemies ; so as sheep seemed to be created only to feed those inraged beasts , who know not what satiety means . the same ambassador also said , that to these insufferable injuries which the sheep received from their enemies , the ill usage was added which they received from their shepherds , which was onely occasioned by their being altogether unarmed ; for had they teeth wherewith sometimes to bite those indiscrete shepherds , who are so uncharitable in milking them , and so indiscrete in sheering them , perhaps they would deal more piously with them , and their sheerers would learn to handle their sheers without cutting their skins . wherefore the whole generation of sheep , that they might no longer undergo such calamities and oppressions , did earnestly beglong horns , and sharp teeth , wherewith to procure respect . to this request apollo answered , with a chearful countenance , that the sheep had in this their request shewed their simplicity , since they knew not that of all the four footed beasts that were upon the earth , there were not any that were more favoured by god , nor which received greater priviledges from him then they : for whereas the rest were forced to seek their meat with cark and care , and a thousand dangers , many of them spending the night season , which was destined for sleep and rest , in eating , for that it was not safe for them to be seen by day ; pasture grounds were reserved and bought at dear rates onely for sheep , by men who had the command of all beasts , and were lords of the earth , that in the night season they were with great care and diligence defended from their enemies in their folds ; and whereas other beasts were persecuted even by beasts themselves , and by men ; and that to procure their death , many did nothing but make nets , feed dogs , and lay snares ; sheep out of a particular grace injoyed the noble prerogative to have all these things done by men , to secure them from their enemies : and that the creator of the world having ●…hewed exceeding great love towards sheep instead of ravenous teeth , and swift legs , had granted them the powerful weapons of wool , cheese , and of their riches wherewith they did so aquire mans love , as that men did perpetually persecute wolves , lyons , tygers , and all their other cruel enemies , with all sort of weapons , meerly for the affection which they bore to sheep . and that sheep being reputed the worlds delight and wealth , for the singular advantages which they afforded mankind , they hapned to be the most numerous of any sort of beasts ; so as sheep being fed and defended by their shepherds vigilancy and charity , they were foolish to desire ravenous teeth and sharp horns . and finally , apollo said , that they ought to revenge themselves for the severity which some shepherds used towards them , in milking and sheering them , onely by their obedience and humility , by yielding them great store of wool , and much cheese , and by studying how to be fruitful ; it being sheeps greatest felicity , that those shepherds that dealt ill with their flocks , were cheifly cruel to themselves ; for it was a certain truth , that wounds shamefully given to sheep , did usually kill the shepherd . wherefore he wished them to keep more from being desirous to bite their shepherds , then they would do from the wolves teeth . for such sheep could not esteem themselves so happy , who by their humility and obedience did secure their shepherds from all harm , as those were unhappy , who delighted to put them in fear . the lxxxix . advertisement . nicholas machiavel being banished parnassus upon pain of death , was found hidden in a friends library , for which his former sentence of being burnt was excuted . though nicholas machiavel was banished parnassus and the territories thereof many years ago , upon severe punishment ; as well to whosoever durst give receptacle to so pernicious a man in his library , yet was he found the last week secretly hidden in a friends study , where he was made prisoner . he was presently sentenced by the judges of assize , and was this day to have been burnt , when he signified unto his majestie his desire , that he might first be permitted to say somewhat in his defence before the tribunal-seat which had condemned him . apollo using his wonted clemency , bad him send his advocates , and he should have fair hearing . machiavel replyed , he desired to be heard himself ; and that florentines needed no advocates to speek for them , and his demand was granted . machiavel was then brought to the bar ; where he spoke thus in his own defence , lo here , you soveraign of learning , that nicholas machiavel , who hath been condemned for a seducer and corrupter of mankind , and for a dispercer of scandalous politick precepts : i intend not to defend my writings , i publikely accuse them , and condemn them as wicked and execrable documents for the government of a state. so as if that which i have printed be a doctrine invented by me , or be any new precepts , i desire that the sentence given against me by the judges , be put in execution . but if my writings contain nothing , but such politick precepts , such rules of state , as i have taken out of the actions of princes which ( if your majestie will give me leave ) i am ready to name , whose lives are nothing but doing and saying of evil things ; what reason is there that they who have invented the mad desperate policies written by me should be held for holy , and that i who am onely the publisher of them should be esteemed a knave and an atheist ? for i see not why an original should be held holy , and the copy thereof beburnt as execrable ; and why i should be so much persecuted , when the reading of history ( which is not onely permitted , but commended by all men ) hath the particular vertue of turning as many as do read them with a politick eye , into so many machiavels : for people are not so simple as many believe them to be , but that those who by the greatness of their wits have been able to find out even the most hidden secrets of nature , may not also have the judgement to discover the true ends of all princes actions , though they be cunningly hidden . and if princes , that they may do what they will with their subjects , will have them to be block-heads and dunces , they must do as the turks and muschovites do , inhibit learning , which is that which makes blinde understandings quick sighted , otherwise they will never compass their ends ; for hypocrisie , which is now so familiarly used in the world , hath onely a star-like vertue , to incline , not to force men to believe that which likes them best that use it . these speeches wrought much upon the judges , and they were ready to revoke the sentence , when the atorney general told them , that machiavel was deservedly condemned for the abominable and execrable precepts which were contained in his writings ; and that he ought again to be severely punished , for that he was found by night amongst a flock of sheep , whom he taught to put false teeth , dogs teeth in their mouthes , thereby indangering the utter ruine of all shepherds ; a people so necessary , as it was an indescent and angersom thing to think that they must by means of this wicked machiavel be forced to put on breast-plates and gauntlets , when they would milk or sheer their sheep ; and to what price would wool and cheese grow hereafter , if shepherds were to be more aware of their sheep , then of wolves ; and if they could no longer keep their flocks in obedience with th●… whistle and their wand , but must make use of a regiment of murrions , and make no longer hurdles of cords to keep them in by night , but walls , bulwark , ditches and counterscarfs after the modern manner . the judges thought these accusations to be too weighty ; wherefore they ordered , that the sentence should be executed against this wicked man , and published a fundamental law , that he should henceforth be held as a rebel to mankind , who durst teach such scandalous things ; all of them confessing , that it was not the wool , cheese nor lambs which made men prise sheep so much , but their great simplicity and meakness , and that it was impossible so great numbers of them should be governed by one onely shepherd , unless they were totally deprived of horns , teeth , and wit. and that to go about to make simple men wickedly malicious , and to make those moulds see , which out of a great deal of circumspection , wise nature had made blind , would be to put the whole world in combustion . the xc . advertisement . apollo visits the prisons , and in his visitation dispatches the causes of many litterati accused of sundry faults , and imprisoned for debt . by ancient custom apollo never intermeddles in civil affairs , but leaves them wholly to be proceeded in by the judges ; for ( as it hath been said ) he is so exactly diligent in chusing his officers , as every one in this state may be sure to have justice rightly administred : but in criminal affairs , wherein the life and reputation of his litterati are concerned , he with great diligence and exemplary patience , will understand , know and see into every the least circumstance . so as his majestie having reserved the whole power of judicature therein unto himself , his other judges have little to do in this tribunal , but to give in information against the guilty . certainly a most excellent custom , and worthy to be known and imitated by those unwary princes , who shamefully abandoning the protection of the accused party , which they ought to take so to heart , leave it to the discretion of one onely judge , who is oft times corrupt , sometimes ignorant , and always passionate ; a thing so detestable , as where good laws are established , a hundred judges are thought too little a number to judge the life of one man. hence it is apollo many ages ago did very wisely in parnassus institute the custom of visiting ptisons , where all criminal causes of the prisoners are decided by his majestie , and the civil of such as are in for debt . on tuesday last then , his majestie attended by all the criminal and civil benches , went to the pegasean prisons ▪ where the prisoners appeared . the first was felino sandeo , very famous in the canonical laws . angelo de malefiis , who was to open the cause , said , that that lawyer was two years ago made deputy of that island by the prince of andro , where he shamefully suffered some chief men of his government to tyranize over , and to afflict the poor , the widows and orphans , and that he suffered these insolent people , to pay artificers by bastonadoing them . this information being given in ; apollo turned to felino , and asked him , how it was possible such a one as he could commit the excess which he stood accused of ? felino answered , that he had sufficiently witnessed his knowledge in the laws , and his resolution to punish tyrants , in his other governments which he had had of focide , pindus , libetres and mittilene ; but that in andro he had omitted doing his duty , not out of ignorance , but out of meer wisdom ; and that the prince of andro's ill nature had been the onely cause of this his errour ; for having found that many personages of singular worth , and gifts of mind , who had been governors of the isle of andro before him , had endangered themselves onely for having administred justice exactly , and done their duty compleatly well ; and this onely through the malicious persecutions of those who were not suffered to tyranize , he had of purpose neglected his duty , and what he knew he ought chiefly to have done : and that the prince of andro was not onely faulty in easily believing all sort of wickedness in his state-ministers , upon the very first impression , but very desirous to hear accusations which malicious men do often make against able and honest officers , and appeared a friend to the impeachers : wherefore for such like proceedings , he had not onely not feared to treat his prince so ill ; but was glad to pay him with such 〈◊〉 as he had deserved . apollo mightily admiring felino's defence , did not onely gratiously imbrace him as innocent ; but commended his error , as one who wisely knew how to commodate his actions to his princes genius , and iudged him innocent of the fault which he had confessed ; and afterward said publikely , that princes who were not eagerly ●…vent in protecting their officers , and who were friends to such informations as was made against them by the scum of people , deserved not to be served by men of honor . then because he turned his eyes upon 〈◊〉 baldo dalla rovere , duke of urbine , he remembred all men of the good government of his son francisco maria , and of the custom which he holds in his state , where he punisheth those officers severely , who in the administration of justice hold not the ballance upright , as also those who persecute them without reason . next cornelius tacitus , who had been imprisoned some weeks before , upon the accusations of the most famous philosophers of the state , was brought before apollo , and accused for having spoke a miss of poverty , since in his annals he had not stuck to call her summum malorum . tacit. lib. . an. and diogenes the cinick , who pleaded against him ; told apollo , that it being apparent that men who were wealthy , hated to take pains , and sit up late to acquire learning , he would have all men to know , that poverty was the true foundation of all science , which if it should be hated , would prove the greatest calami●…y which could befal the liberal arts. after diogenes , the attorney bossio , demanded , that tacitus his fault being evidently true , his sentence might be pronounced . and apollo decreed , that tacitus should first abjure the words which he had said , and that he should be imprisoned for the space of four years in saxum seriphum . then tacitus with his wonted vivacity of wit , and his usual liberty of language , said , sir , i know not why i should be commanded to praise poverty , when these judges who are to condemn me , think her to be so shameful a thing , as they have not doubted to place her amongst the true tokens of torture which they would not have done if a wealthy mind might have been found in a poor man. this defence wrought such confusion in the minds of all the visitors , as apollo , lest the world might take notice of the shame that was put upon the doctors , judges and tribunals , by an accused person , thought it a lesser evil to let him have his liberty . next to tacitus , nicholas perenotta da granuela was brought into the visitation ; and it was informed , that he was imprisoned for publishing a volume de bono libertatis . of the which ( as it appeared in his process ) he was so capital an enemy , as that he was the chiefest cause why the emperor charls the fifth , did inslave many famous common-wealths of europe . apollo having heard the relation , decreed , that parenotto should be banished pernassus for ever , as he who had impudently gain-said the delfick edict , wherein the litterati are strictly forbidden to write of such things whereof they do not make publike profession . for that the vertues of sobriety , chastity , and other honorable moral sciences were made ridiculous , when celebrated by men given to lust , and glu●…ony , and to other vices . as if such vertues had not power i enough to drive vice from out the souls of men , and in lieu thereof to , introduce good and honest life ; and as if it were 〈◊〉 which wicked men whisper continually up and down the streets , that the liberal sciences are onely learnt to be made merchandise of , and to make men understand them , but neither believe nor practise them . perenotto's cause being over , an unfortunate doctor of law , was brought loaded with irons , before apollo , who was imprisoned , for that not being onely a very excellent advocate , but very skilful in all other choice sciences ; either blinded by folly , or contaminated by lewdness of mind , he from being a gainful advocate in his countrey , and a well reputed litterato , was become a shameful and wretched souldier ; changing by so unhappy a metamorphosis his pen into a sword , his book into harquebuses , the defending of men with his mouth , to killing them with daggers , and the reading of good discipline in a famous university , into the desperate exercise of assaulting strong holds . apollo being very much offended with so undeserving a man , in much anger said unto him , ah thou traytor and rebel to learning , knowest thou not that the woful exercise of war is onely fit for such ignorant people , who like so much unuseful flesh , are onely good for the ●…bles of war ; and altogether unworthy to be followed by those to whom their deserving parents have left the rich and honourable patrimony of the liberal sciences ; which some princes have prohibited in their states , for no other reason , but that they open the eyes of the blind , and enlighten the souls of foolish people , making them know the cunning and imposturism which the princes of the world have used to make an occupation seem profitable and honourable , which is so much to be abhorr'd . and this being said , his majestie gave sentence , that that doctor should for ever be inhibited admittance into any library , that he should be forbidden the contentments of writing and reading ; and that for the example of others , he should be declared to be ignorant . the unifortunate doctor hearing so sad a sentence , pleaded loud for mercy ; and said , that his error not having proceeded out of malice , but out of meer ignorance , he was a subject fit for his majesties pitty ; and that it was not the desire of riches , nor the thirsting after mans blood , which had made him gird the sword about him , and betake him to the mysterie of war , but onely that he might purchase glory thereby . apollo was then more incensed ; and replyed unto the doctor thus , and what glory ( thou wicked one ) couldst thou hope for , by the unhappy practice of killing men , of plundering countreys , burning cities , deflowering virgins and in murthering them that thou mayest make them consent to so barbarous dishonesty ? knows thou not that my litterati are those that with their pen eternize the names of military men ? knowest thou not that all glo●…y won by the sword , uniess when taken up for religion , or for the defence of a mans countrey is false alchimy and merchandize , fit onely for hair-brained fools ? when the honour which my vertuosi win by their learning , and by handling their pen , is always the purest refined gold which will bear the test. the doctors cause having received this end , giovan giorgio tressino that famous vicentian poet , came before apollo , and throwing himself down before his feet ; said , sir , your majestie knows that unfortunate i , to amend the many inconveniences , which are in the italian tongue even to this day , was the first who when i published my poem of italia liberaia endeavoured to bring the omicron , eupselon , omega , and other greek letters , which i thought very requisite for that language , into my own tongue ; so to shun the frequent equivocations which are evidently seen therein , for want of such letters ; in which enterprize having been at great charges , i contracted those debts for which i am now imprisoned ; for men who by natural instinct , veteribus , etiam quae ●…sus evidenter arguit stare malunt did not approve of this my new invention . and unless your majestie put in betwixt my misery , and my creditors rage , i , who have taken such pains for the service of learning , am like to end my days in the stench of this loathsom prison . apollo was very sensible of tressino's misery ; and asked him , whether he was in case to pay his creditors any moneys by the moneth ? to which tressino answered , he could not assign over unto them more then five crowns a moneth . which apollo , turning towards the creditors , desired them to be contented with . but they , who would have the whole sum , answered discourteously . and apollo asking them , whether or no they were so inhumane as to be paid by the price of blood ? the merchants with their wonted incivility answered , that he must either resolve to pay the whole debt , or that parting with his personal estate , he should according to the laws made against bankrupts , wear a green hat , and they vvould be satisfied . apollo was so very angry at this their inhumanity , as rising up upon his feet , and turning towards tressino's creditors ; will you then ( said he ) be paid by this vertuoso's shame , and loss of honor ? what law is that which you alledge , which will have men forgo their reputation , without which they are not worthy to live ? and if even amongst the most barbarous nations which inhabit the earth , there be no law found that a man shoul lose his life for debt , how can there be a law in my state , where all exquisiteness of law is professed , which bereaves a man of his honor , which is much more dear to man then life ? what crueller wilde beast can there be , what more venemous asp or viper , then he who regards not his reputation ? good lavvs , and such as ought to be obeyed , do never disrobe a man of his honor , but love that those who vvant it , should by all means possible endeavor the purchase thereof , that they should covet it more then any earthly treasure , and set a greater valuation upon it . the creditors mightily affrighted at these words , ran from the visitation . whereupon cressino somewhat encouraged , told apollo , that if his majestie would endow him vvith a povver of making knights , he vvas sure his creditors vvould take the honor of knighthood from him in full payment of his debts . apollo at the hearing of this foolish request , broke forth into loud laughter ; and told tressino , he vvas sorry to see him still pursue ridiculous novelties . tressino replied , that his request was no nevv invention , but a thing much used ; and that the famous roman republique , and after them many great lords , vvho might very vvell have paid their creditors vvith ready money , paid the obligations of blood , and debts due for long and costly service with lavvrel , and the order of knighthood . then apollo smiled again , and told trissino , that he built castles in the arte ; for he must be another manner of man then he , that would sell meer smoak for good merchandize . tressino being dispatcht , process was read against a base humerous doctor of the law , whose name the higher powers will have concealed ; where it was said , that in governments which he had had , he would often in publick audiences , with great pride and surquedry , behave himself insolently , even with noble and honorably conditioned personages , saying that he would send them to the gallies , would have their heads taken off , and make them be hanged before the palace gate . the doctor said in excuse of this his error , that he did this to make himself terrible to the people , and to make himself be obeyed . apollo , after he had put him in mind that good officers , and men of honor , made themselves dreadful to the people by an equally rigorous , and uncorrupt justice , and not by insolent threats , gave order that that doctor , whose genius appeared fitter to command slaves , then men of honor , should be sent to be auditor of the gallies . immediately after , beneventano's cause was heard , who shooting at a great wolf with a gun charged with small hail-shot , the wolf being lightly hurt , flew upon him according to his custom , and with his teeth tore his left thigh : those that were present at the visitation , wondred very much why he should be questioned , who deserved rather to be comforted for the danger he had run , and cured of the wounds he had received . but apollo , who was not well pleased that one of his litterati should have committed so great a piece of folly , since he had alwaies told his vertuosi that they must take off their hats to cruel and dangerous beasts , and suffer them to pass by quietly , or else shoot at them with a musket loaded with ram'd bullets , and so lay him flat on his back , condemned the litterato to the usual punishment of imprudency , that none should excuse his error ; none should pitty him , and that all men should laugh at him . this cause was no sooner ended , but cratippus , the athenian philosopher appeared at the visitation , and the information against him was , that the duke of ephesus had given to him his only son to be brought up by him ; to whom when he came to mature years , he relinquisht the government of his state , wherein the young prince proved as unapt , as he proved famous for philosophy : for he was timerous in the handling of arms , and incapable of state-affairs ; and the singular goodness and honesty which he had learnt of cratippus , which would have been greatly admired in a privat man , was in him interpreted want of wit : that therefore the philosopher not having instructed that young prince in such things as were to be known by one who was to govern so numerous a people , the duke of ephesus re-demanded the sallary he had given him . apollo was mightily displeased with cratippus his imprisonment ; and turning to the duke who was there present , told him , that he should not blame cratippus for his sons unap●…ss to government , but his own bad choice ; for that vertuoso having taught his p●…pel the science which he did publickly profess , had fully discharged his duty : and that such a one as he , ought to know that arsenals , armories , and state-councels , were schools for princes children ; and that the scholarship which they ought to learn , was the philosophy , the poetry which was several times every week read in the wise senat of venice , that captains , counsellers , and secretaries of state , were the best instructers of princes children ; and the memory of their ancesters , the glorious actions of such princes , as both in peace and war had done things worthy to be admired and imitated , the rods wherewith they ought to be whipt . constantius albicini was next brought before apollo , whom his majesty did mightily abominate , as one who was publickly known to be a prime finder out of vexatious inventions . his process said , that he being requested by an avaritious prince , to invent some new way for him , how to raise money from his subjects without offending or angring them , advised him to give out , that he was likely to be unexpectedly assaulted by his enemies , who would possess themselves of his state ; that therefore it was necessary to fortifie the metropolitan city ; to effect the which so requisite work , he must proclaim a new tax , which would be easily granted by them who apprehended the danger of their lives , goods , and honors ; that then he should in all haste begin the works which he must continue for one year , that the second year he should proceed therein more slowly , and that the third year he should give it quite over ; for that the people being accustomed for those two years space to pay such an imposition , would willingly continue the payment of it . and because the chief magistrate of the city had a rich revennue worth forty thousand crowns a year , which this covetous prince did much thirst after , he told him , that to make himself master thereof , and to invite the citizens to make a free gift thereof unto him , he was only to provide two friends , the one of which should stand up in a publick councel , and should advise , that it were good and fit to reward the prince for his excellent government , with freely parting with two years revennue unto him ; and that the other friend , whilst the proposition was discussing , should say openly , that to give their suffrages in secret , was an action misbecoming a faithful people towards their prince , where the ungrateful and disloyal had opportunity to obscure the fidelity of loyal subjects . that therefore men should speak their mind alowd , and the votes be so decided ; for the rabble-rout , allured by the shortness of the time , would grant that for a few years , which they should never regain . it was aver'd in the same process , that this same constanso had confest that he had told the same prince , that an exeellent way to get money of his subjects , was to inhibit somewhat which was greatly desired , and much used in his state , as the extravagancy in aparrel , costly jewels , and too exorbitant portions ; that if any one should afterward desire a dispensation therein , it might be granted him ; but upon a good acknowledgment , and upon paying well for the seals . apollo having heard this wicked mans so great iniquity , and wondring that so much rascallity could be found in any one man , brake forth into these words ; puniendos rerum atrocium ministros . tacit. lib. . ann. and then gave sentence , that this divel incarnate should be thrown into the boat where melossus , melampus , lisisca , and other poets dogs were kept , by which he was presently torne in pieces and devoured . this being over , the commendador hanibal caro , was brought to the visitation , and his majesty was told , that the quarrels between the commendador and castelvetro , were wel known unto him ; which could no otherwise be accommodated , then by taking security that they should not offend one another . after which castelvetro passing one morning often before the commendadors house ; the poet did so call to mind the injury he had received by that rigorous sentence , as by a railing sonnet , which was a thing prohibited , he wounded castelvetro's honor . apollo , contrary to all mens beleef , commanded that the commendador should be presently set at liberty ; and said that castelvetro deserved to be severely punisht for his being so foolishly adventurous : for knowing that he had so hainously offended a revengful man , he did foolishly to trust his life upon money-security ; and so much the rather for that castelvetro knew that the marchigiani , who were otherwise very gallant men , but very bloudy , have less patience then discretion . caro's cause being ended , aristides , that great athenian senator was brought to the visitation , who was imprisoned for having given out great quantity of corn to the people of athens in a very hard year . aristides imprisonment appeared altogether unjust to most of the visitors ; but apollo , who was of a contrary opinion , told them in severe words , that in free countries , where people are more jealous of the publick liberty , then in any other sort of principality , in exercising charity , men should observe that pious precept , of not letting the right hand know what the left hand did : for in all commonwealths , too vain-glorious alms , and done out of too much ostentation , were very dangerous ; that therefore he should hereafter forbear to use such charity towards the poor , which smelt more of ambition , then of any true zeal or piety ; and which might make men suspect that they were rather done out of a desire of purchasing principalities on earth , then to gain the kingdom of heaven . pietro pomponatio , a mantuan , appeared next all besmeared with sweat , and very ill acoutred , who was found composing a book , wherein by foolish and sophistical arguments he endeavored to prove , that the soul of man was mortal . apollo , not able to look upon so wicked a wretch , commanded that his library should be presently burnt , and that he himself should be consumed in the same flames ; for that fool deserved not the advantage of books , who laboured thereby only to prove that men were beasts . pomponatio cryed out then with a loud voice , protesting that he believed the mortality of the soul only as a philosopher . then said apollo to the executioners , let him be burnt only as a philosopher . a prisoner was afterwards heard , who said that he being of coos , had entred bond for one , who was not sent thither as governor by his prince , and who having committed many larcenaries , fled from thence by night , wherefore he was forced to pay the whole summe which was laid to the charge of that thief-officer . apollo wondring at this mans imprisonment , turned to the prince of coos , who was there president , and told him , that the sure way to have an officer rule well , lay not in his security to stand a trial , but was only grounded upon the princes good choice : that therefore the prisoner who had entred security upon firm belief that his lord and master would never have imployed such lewd men in places of such importance , should by all means be set at liberty ; and that the punishment belonging of right to him that had done the fault , the prince should pay his forfeiture , who had been so abusive in his charge , of whom he might at his leasure repair himself . to which the prince answered , that his officer was a stranger , another princes subject ; and therefore he could have no right against him . apollo reply'd , that he having been so very a fool , as to make use of a forreiner , whilst he might be served by his own subjects , he had no reason to complain of his loss : for that shepherd who was so foolish , as to lead other folks sheep to feed , ought to blame none but himself , if when he brought them back at night to their folds , he could neither shear nor milk them . this was the end of that imprisoned security , which the prince of coos liked not , though all the visitors were well pleased with it . tito strozzi , the famous ferara poet was the next that appeared , imprisoned upon the suit of francisco filelpho , who having given him some moneys to deliver to cintio geraldi , a creditor of his ; strozzo , as soon as he had it ; lost it at play ; which filelpho complained of in the visitation . apollo , who knew that strozzi wanted a leg , merrily asked filelpho , whether if a man should have bought a blind horse in his market of tolentino , the buyer might redemand his money which was ill laid out ? to which filelpho answered , that whosoever bought a beast that was palpably defective , could blame nothing but his own folly . if it be so , saies apollo , you have judged aright filelpho in your own cause . filelpho understood then whither his majesties question tended , and being much afflicted , answered , that he was not ignorant of the common proverb , that one must be carefull how he deals with those that nature hath markt ; but that he did not hold it to be alwaies true : know filelpho , said apollo , that proverbs are nothing else but experimented sentences , approved sayings ; and i tell you , that mother nature in procuring men , may be fitly said to imitate a conscientious potter , who when he takes his vessel out of the furnace , if he find any that have holes in them , that be not sufficiently baked , or that have any other imperfection , to the end that unwary people may not take them for good , he breaks off one of their ears , or gives them some other mark of being amiss . and because all men cannot be born equally honest , as nor can all the potters pots come equally perfect out of the furnace ; as let a garden be never so well looked unto , and weeded , it is impossible but some nettles , or other weeds will spring up ; dame nature , who greatly hates cheaters , and crosbiters , to the end that honest men be not deceived by hollow brains , crafty pates , and half-baked wits , as soon as she sees any such born , she puts out one of their eys , breaks an arm or leg , by which evident signs , tying a bel about the horses neck that is given to kicking , and fastning a board to the oxes horns which use to thrust therewith , she admonisheth all men to be aware of such . amalteo's cause was discust immediately after , who was imprisoned for having called nero's liberality which he used to cornelius tacitus , when he rewarded him for the praises he had given him , with mules loaded with gold , foolish prodigality , that ipsi non aderat infrae servos ingenium . tacit. lib. . ann. the fault committed by amalteo , appeared to apollo , and to all the visitors to be so hainous ; and the rather , for that all the schools in parnassus hold it for an undeniable maxim , that whatsoever excessive gift given by a magnanimous prince to a vertuoso , in reward for any favour received from him , should not be termed prodigality : for a prince that thirsts after true glory , of which , unum insatiabiliter parandum , prosperam sui memoriam . tacit. lib. . ann. the merit of one pen ful of that pure ink , which smoothly laid on paper , makes mens names glorious and immortal , cannot be sufficiently rewarded by mou●… of diamonds and rubies . apollo was therefore so highly incenst against amalteo for this so great fault , as he adjudged him to live two years amongst the ignorant . presently after appeared a litterato in the visitation , who did not only believe that damn'd and execrable opinion , that the man was happier who had his purse full of gold , then he who had his head full of knowledg ; but did by all the industry he had , endeavor to insinuate it into other men . apollo being much moved at the hainousness of this fault , sentenced the guilty person to be sew'd up in a sack , and to be thrown with his head downward into the deepest part of aganippa's well . it must not here be omitted , that this rascal was so obstinate in his erronious opinion , as that he would not only not gain-say himself at the hour of death ; but still affirmed more obstinately then ever , that he died in the true opinion , that study was but merchandize , and that scholarship was only learnt out of a design to get money ; and that therefore it appeared that philosophy and theology , were without all doubt the noblest ; but physick and law , were the most esteemed , and most imbraced sciences . baiardo , one of the judges of assize of this court , read afterwards the process made against manfredo , king of naples , wherein it was proved , that by night he had stoln lisbia from catullus , that so dearly loved her , whom he sent home stript , and rob'd of all her jewels , after he had enjoy'd her many weeks : which injury catullus did so lowdly complain of in the visitation , as it grew near the point of insolency ; for highly incenst with anger , without respect either to the place , or persons before whom he spake , he called manfredo a base bastard . apollo , to shew his judges that it was not possible to teach a too highly exasperated mind to keep within bounds , though he seemed to be much offended at the little respect catullus had born him , gave him but a gentle reprehension ; and then commanded that manfredo , gratis ubique ; should be set at liberty , and said that bastards were most commonly vitious , and given to ribaldry , only to increase the glory and prerogative of holy marriage ; and that wise nature , to teach male . asses to have only to do with she asses , and mares to couple only with stallions of their own kind , had so ordered it , that from the coupling of he asses and mares , nothing should come but mules , beasts so damnably given to kicking , only to the end that men , to shun the getting of spurious issue , might be the more ambitious to beget legitimate children , who might in coming from the mothers womb , bring down gods blessing with them . and that therefore bastard-children not being bound to live vertuously , it was of courtesie when they lived well . catullus not being herewith satisfied , but growing still more mad , apollo , with some appearance of anger , bad him hold his peace ; for he who kept a piece of stinking flesh in his house , ought not complain if it were troubled with flies . catullus being thus dismist , the same baiardo read a process made against scipio ammirato , a polititian , who was convinced of having committed many hainous offences ; as for having taught a prince who punisht his people with new and vexatious taxes , to honest them by the names of donatives , subsedies , and aids , to the end that they might cause no innovation in his state ; and who stuck not to term a most hateful imposition , the mountain of piety . moreover for that he had taught an eminent citizen of phosides , who desired to be attended by roaring boys and hectors , being backt by whom he might tyrannize , and make himself be dreaded by all men ; that he should keep in his house an open apertiment with dice , cards , tables , and have a bawdi house the next dore to him , for that these were the true dequois , or call-ducks , which ticed in the scum of the city , and the lewdest sort of people : and that he should advise the prince of epire , who was a bitter enemy to the laconians , and who sorely persecuted some senators that were of a military genius , and being gallant men , cared not to be assumed to the principality of laconia , lest the publick practice of persecution , might draw the hatred of the senat upon them , which was exasperated to see the vertue and merit of the most eminent senators in such sort persecuted , that i say , he should advise that prince to colour over so great and apparent lewdness , with pretence that those senators had deep designs . apollo marvailed much at this polititians so great perfidiousness , and after having freely declared , that now much to his dislike , he had found that polititians were gypsies , cheats , coney-catchers , and pick-pockets , he gave order that this monster of nature should be thrown headlong down from the tarpeian rock . this was ammirato's end , when the same baiard●… gave in process against the judge of guido , who was not only convinced by the testimony of divers witnesses , but by his own confession , that he had openly made sale of justice , to him that would give most for it . apollo highly offended at the immensity of such a fault , gave sentence that the guilty party should undergo the usual punishment for sale of justice : which was , that he should be flead alive . the serjeants did already drag the wretch to the place of execution , when he fetching a deep sigh , cryed out , o unfortunate man that i am , o my monies , by which i might have lived in all sorts of delitiousness , how through my want of wit , are you now become the cause of my shameful and dreadful death . these words which were heard by all the visitors , wrought very much with his majesty ; who sending to have the judge brought back , asked him what it was he complained of ? and what relation his fault in the administration of justice , which is granted to men of worth and merit , had to the money which he said he had spent so ill ? sir , said the judge , the office whereby i have deserved so ill at your majesties hands , was not granted by the prince of guido to my learning , nor to my deserts , but to unlucky crowns , which i gave two years ago for the place : so as i may very well complain of having purchast so great misery by my ready-money . apollo having heard this , gave order immediately that the prisoner should be set at liberty ; and said that he judged and declared him to be innocent : that therefore he should presently return to his charge , and to the eternal infamy of the prince of guido , continue the ignominious merchandize of selling justice ; for it was impossible to keep a man from selling that which he had bought . the last that appeared in the visitation , was the famous bartolomeo d'alviano , whom the attorney-general accused , for that in a dispute which arose betwixt him and iulius cesar scaliger , he had called him a scurvy scholar . apollo much resented this excess in alviano , and said unto him , if my litterati , adorn'd with so many vertues , full of science , who have perfect knowledge of the course of the heavens , of the vertue of hearbs , who understand the propriety of plants , the worth of minerals , and all the miracles of nature , are not truely noble , who are they that deserve to be termed noble ? perhaps those that are ignorant ? perhaps those vitious people , who being sunk even to the chin in idleness , sports , gluttony , and lust , have nothing praise-worthy in them ; but the vertues and long series of their predecessors glory ? and if gold , for the vertue it hath of not being consumed by fire , eaten by rust , corroded by aquafortis , and for other rare qualities , was deservedly reputed the king of mettals ; if the diamond and ruby , for their incredible hardness , were the princes of all jewels ; why should not my litterati , who know and understand so much more then all other men , deserve to be rather termed demy gods than kings ? and said that there was a great difference between innobling the body by rich vestments , and cloathing the soul with pretious sciences . then apollo turned toward alviano , and said unto him , my alwaies famous sabellico , bembo , giovio , guicchardine , who have so by their pens illustrated thee , and the labours of my vertuosi , which have rendred thee immortal : when did they ever deserve to be by thee rewarded by so inormous an injury , by such ingratitude ? this so exasperated discourse of apollo was the more efficacious with the visitors , in that it was accompanied by the noise of all the litterati that stood by , who incredibly incenst against alviano , cry'd out for justice : after this , the court , by order from apollo , voted for sentence , and propounded all sorts of severe punishments for the prisoners penalty . this was alviano's case , when the state of venice hearing of this so important accident , and being very tender of alviano's honor , came in all haste to the visitation , and prostrating her self before his majesties feet , with a generous submission , said , that she would never rise from before them , till she had obtained full and free pardon from his majestie , for that her couragious captain : and that though she might plead a new edict of his majesties , wherein it was declared , that those who should have taken up arms against barbarous nations in defiance of free countries , should never lose his majesties favour for any fault they should commit , though capital ; yet she beg'd her dear alviano's pardon , who had lost so much bloud for her , suffered so many hardships , and run so many dangers , from his majesties meer grace , which all the world knew belonged to him of justice . when the litterati had heard th●…se affectionate intreaties , and had called to mind what gracious acceptions that noble queen had alwaies given in her court to all the vertuosi that repaired thither , their conceived anger was so appeased , as they cryed out aloud , orace , grace . whereupon apollo raising up that noble queen from the ground with his hand , placed her first amongst the illustrious muses ; and then told her , that he could not deny any thing that she demanded , he willingly forgave alviano for point of punishment ; but he would have him give fitting satisfaction to learning , and to his vertuosi whom he had so offended . the alviano , before almost half dead for fear ( so much doth the fear of shame more terrifie a man of honor , then certain danger of death ) took courage , and said , that being so low of stature as they all saw he was , he ought to be born withall , if his cholar was soon stirred , which was that which had caused him to do amiss ; but that confessing his error , he declared to all the world , that he who was of choice learning , and good demeanor was as noble as any one born of the house of austria , or of the bloud-royal of france , although his father were a hangman . the xci . advertisement . a great prince in discharge of a vow that he had made , carries a rich vessel to the temple ; which the priest receiving with shew of great sadness ; the prince desires the reason thereof , and receives satisfaction . not many daies since , a prince of great quality , carried a very rich vessel of god to the temple , in acknowledgment of a singular favour which he had received from god. and because the priest at the receiving of it , appeared to be much afflicted , even to the shedding of tears , the prince had the curiosity to know the occasion of his sadness , and desired the priest that he would tell it him . to the which , that man who feared god , in down-right weeping said , that he could not chuse but weep when he saw any gifts brought to the temple , for that it put him in mind of the ancient piety of men in former times , who endeavoured to inrich the temples with what they had of most pretious , and thought those vessels of gold and pretious stones very necessary for divine worship , which men now adaies , unmindful of the true religion , and more in love with their own accommodation , then with the honor of god , appropriate to themselvs even in things of basest imployments : and that the present condition of the true religion was in some states infinitely deplorable ; for whereas formerly the wealth of sacred things served to augment true piety , and to add to the greatness and majestie of religion , they were now become t●…umpets which summoned thieves to come from wicked caves , and rob the sacred patrimony of god and of his saints . and that they were the more wicked thefts , in that their authors were not ashamed to gild them over with the spacious name of reformed religion . nay the ignorance of some people is grown to such a height , as they suffer themselves to be perswaded , that to deform the ancient religion , so constantly believed by their fathers , grandfathers , and great grandfathers , by gormandizing , thefts , and by all sort of libidinousness , is the next way to reform it : as if to plunder a man , to rob and kill him , would be believed by any man that is in his right wits , to be the next way to clothe him , to honor him , and to raise him from death to life . the xcii . advertisement . apollo forbids the shepherds of arcadia to fatten hogs any more ; and being earnestly intreated to revoke that his decree , denies to do it . by letters of the of this present sent from arcadia , certain news is come of the commandment given by order from his majesty , to titerus , co●…idon , mi●…as , melibeus , and the rest of the shepherds of that country , that upon pain of severe punishment , they must no longer dare to fatten hogs . the people of those parts were generally so troubled at this news , as this morning , montanus and damon , two of the chiefest shepherds of that province came to apollo in name of all the arcadian shepherds ; who humbly desired his majesty not to deprive them of their choicest cates , and of their hogs-flesh , wherewith they did so plentifully feed their families . to this apollo answered , that he loved husbandmen and shepherds better then nobility , because men that bring in profit and advantage , deserve to be better beloved by princes , then such as are rather prejudicial then of any use ; but that having publisht his edict for many respects , and by mature delibration , he would by no means recall it ; for that pagan avarice had learnt an execrable politick precept , from the usefull custom of husbandmen , of fatning hogs in the autumn , that they might kill them at winter . the xciii . advertisement . it being observed that pero trasea , in company of his son in law elvidius priseo , frequented the houses of the chiefest poet esses of parnassus ; he is severely reprehended for it by apollo ▪ it hath been observed by such vertuosi who delight to pry into other mens actions , that pero trasea , accompanied by his son in law , elvidius priseo , did very much frequent the houses of the lady victoria colonna , the lady veronica gambera , and other chief lady-poets of this court : and although the extraordinary good opinion which is generally held of trasea's honesty , makes it very hard to believed that so grave a senator can commit a foul fact ; yet the great frequency of his visits , and the length of them , hath occasioned such scandal even amongst the best men , as the unseemliness thereof hath come to apollo's knowledg : who to quench the flames of murmur , sent for tresea two daies ago to come to him , and charged him to acquaint him with the business which he had with those ladies ? trasea answered , that he went to those ladies only to exercise his charity in reading every day a chapter in boetius severinus , de consolatione philosophiae . apollo seemed to be much offended with this answer ; wherefore he said , trasea , if you will merit favour from god , and love from men , by using your endeavors to consolate the afflicted , go comfort those miserable wretches who lie perishing in hospitals , and those unfortunate people that are led to the gallows : for to spend whole daies like sardenapalus , amongst women , and hope to make men believe that you exercise there only your spiritual parts , is a piece of hypocrisie able to move laughter in fools , and to make those burst for anger , who know that men who go often to the mill are easily bemealed ; and a man of your parts ought to know , that when a woman conceives twins , if they be both male children , they are wrapt within one filme ; and so likewise if they be both females : but if the one be male , and the other female , wise nature parts the female from the male , in a particular filme . so as nature by not confiding in the cohabitation of a brother with a sister , in so tender age , teacheth all men , that people cannot be secure even of such as you are : and he who relies upon his own strength , trasea , in such like occasions , is more rash then wise . and because these disorders ought to be corrected , both for your reputation and mine ; i straitly command you , that for the future you forbear such dangerous doings ; for the world is not so great a blockhead ( as i perceive you foolishly conceive ) but that it very well knows that visits made to handsom women by such as you are , after a second time grow suspitious to those that know that all men are pleased with what is handsom , stimulus carnis is a natural vice in all men ; and that lust is no waies better refrained , then by keeping far from fair creatures . therefore let him that will keep from committing error , avoid all occasion . and all your philosophy cannot make a man believe , but that every man made of flesh , is pleased with a savory morsel : wherefore i put you in mind , that one like you , who make such profession of not staining your reputation with the spots of lasciviousness , ought to shun all that allure thereunto : for it is not only a great piece of folly ; but an infinite rashness , worthy to be punisht , to make gun-powder in a smiths shop , with hope to make people believe there is no danger in it . the xciv . advertisement . a chief senator of poland , whilst he corrects another senator , who is a friend of his , is made aware that be himself is he who goes astray , and needs amendment . there are at this time in the king of polands court , two senators , who are very great friends ; the one of them professeth openly to be ill satisfied with his king , and therefore blameth the manner of his government , and even to the point of malice , censures and cavils at all his actions . the other senator was much displeased with this his friends manner of proceeding , and went so counter-bias to this his friend , as he did not only praise such actions of his kings as deserved blame , but to purchase his favour ; stuck not to do unworthy things himself . this man being much scandalized at his friends dangerous way of proceeding , told him one day , that it was not only imprudency , but great rashness , by thus carping at his princes actions , to irritate his hatred from whom he might expect all good ; and that to serve in court , meerly to demerit the princes favour , was the greatest folly that could be committed . the other courtier answered him thus ; your so free reprehending me , clearly shews the cordial affection you return for the great love i bear you ; and i thank you for it : but know that both we aim at the same end of acquiring the highest preferments and dignities in court , though we take contrary courses . you walk the usual and beaten way , but i take a neerer cut , which is only known to the most accomplisht courtiers ; and i foretell you , that i am likely to compass my ends sooner then you . in hereditary monarchies , where the brother , children , and others of the bloud-royal , do together with the state inherit usually the friendships , enmities , and all the interests of the deceased prince , the way you take , and which was first taught you by tacitus ( that the favor of them that rule , must be forced from them even by indignities ) is admirable good . but in an elective state , as our poland is , and particularly under an old king , who may justly be thought not likely to live long ; the way i take to seem displeased at the court proceedings , is the safer for such a one as i am . and the advertisement given to men , to be either exceeding hot , or passing cold in their actions ; and that by all means they should shun lukewarmness , was worthy of him that gave it . the first court-preferments by which men proceed to the highest dignities , you see they are already possest by others : so as not able to work my self into the kings favour by fervency of zeal , i have betaken my self to the other extremity of being all snow , by appearing mal-content . and you , who for what i see , have not the fortune to burn in the favour of our prince , and do abhor to fly to the other extream of freezing in discontent of the present state , i prognosticate for certain that by being lukewarm , you will part old and gray-headed from the court , just in the same condition as you came thither young and beardless : for in elective kingdoms the new comer in , being usually an enemy , no less to the firiends , then to the actions of his predecessor ; those who were friends to the former government , are abhor'd , as not confiding ; those who are lukewarm , are shun'd as foolish ; and the malcontents are diligently sought after , and allowed to come under the cloth of state , as deer friends , and secure instruments to perpetuate their greatness . the xcv . advertisement . a controversie arising between the governors of pindo , and of libetro , in point of jurisdiction : apollo punisheth them both . some great fault being committed in the city of libetro , the governor of the place pursues the delinquents with his whole rout of serjeants and catchpools , and overtakes them in the territory of pindo : he besiegeth them in a countreymans house , which he soon begirts with his men , and threatnes to burn it , if they would not render themselves . this mean while the governor of pindo hearing of this uprore , comes to that place to defend his jurisdiction ; and brings along many armed men with him : and finds that the besieged had already delivered themselves up into the governor of libetro's hands , who led them to be imprisoned in his own country . the governor of pindo complains bitterly of the injury done to him in his jurisdiction , and demands that the prisoners be again assigned over unto him ; which he promises to restore within a few daies ; when by the former assignation , he might be somewhat repaired in his reputation . but the governor of libetro did not only deny to do so , but made the prisoners march the faster into his own territories . he of pindus , provoked by so great a scorn , commanded his men to fall on , and by force to bring back the prisoners , who being valiantly defended by those of libetro , so foul and bloudy a scuffle insued , as many were wounded . the news hereof was soon brought to apollo , who being highly distasted with both those his officers , commanded the provost-marshal of campagnia , alvigi , pulci , to bring them bound before him , in a shameful manner which was soon done . his majesty with great patience first heard the reasons alleadged by both those his officers ; and then judging the governor of libetro to be in the wrong , for having rashly disturbed another mans jurisdiction , he deprived him of his government , and declared him incapable of ever having any imployment within his jurisdiction ; and as for the governor of pindo , whom he acknowledged to have reason on his side , he condemned him to the gallies for ten years ; laying so heavie a sentence upon him , thereby to teach him , and all other officers , that those who serve under the same prince , must defend their right of jurisdiction , only with their pen , and reserve their arms till they should be disturbed by forreiners . the governor of pindo bewailed his misfortune bitterly , being sorry , that having so fair an occasion to deserve well at his masters hands , by shewing his own modesty upon this occasion , and the others impertinency , he had ignorantly turned anothers rashness into his own fault . a sad thing certainly , and worthy to be considered by all princes officers , as that which shews it is a great error to refrain impertinences by insolencies , and to amend a fault by a trespass : the xcvi . advertisement . apollo sentenceth hanibal caro to pay his forfeited security , for the wounds which he gave castelvetro . after the disimprisonment of the commendador hanibal caro , who , as you have heard , was pardon'd by apollo , when he visited the prisons , bossio , the atorny-general , pretending that his maj. had only pardon'd the punishment , for having wounded castelvetro , but not the monies which he by breach of security had forfeited , de non offendendo , cited the fernesi , who were his sureties to pay the crowns , which was the covenanted forfeiture . caro , who conceiv'd he had received ful and plenary pardon for the one fault , as wel as for the other , put his maj. in mind thereof yesterday , and complained of the trouble given him by the atorny-general . apollo answered , that he intended only to pardon the excess committed in wounding , not the monies covenanted for for security ; and gave order that without further reply , the forfeiture should be paid to castelvetro . the atorney-general , when he heard his maj. order , hasted to apollo , and told him , that the forfeiture being made payable to the exchequer , it ought not to be paid to castelvetro . this custom appeared so new to apollo , as he said in anger to bossio , shall castelvetro be prejudiced by being wounded , and shal the advantage of the monies redound to me ? is there such a custom as this introduced in parnassus , the laws wherof i intend should serve for a rule of the best government to all other places ? bossio told apollo , that this was the custom , not only of all the tribunals of italy , but of the most places of europe . apollo growing still more incenst against bossio , said , that the prince who would maintain peace amongst his people , ought rather to forbid faults upon pain of severe punishments , then foment them with easie chastisements , and make base merchandize of mans bloud . and that in carnal pleasures , in pleasing the pallat , in delights of hunting , and for the enjoyment of other worldly contents , since men were too naturally given to evil , and were therein p●…odigal beyond their power , who did not perceive that men were invited to revenge offences , by introducing so scandalous a custom , revenge being to mans depraved genius , the greatest contentment and satisfaction that can be taken : and therefore bad him go and see that caro made paiment of the crowns which were forfeited , not into the exchequer , but to castelvetro's self ; for it was reason that he should receive the advantage of the monies , who had been prejudiced by wounds . what his majesty had commanded , was forthwith put in execution : and because caro made resistance , not only because he would not do the office himself , but that he shewed a great deal of passion even whilst he told out the money , every one clearly perceived that his majesty had very discreetly foreseen , that the vexation to do a mans enemy good , did much allay revenge , even in those that were most given to passion . the xcviii . advertisement . dante aligieri being assaulted by night in his country-house , and ill used by some disguised vertuosi ; is relieved by the great french ronsard . vvhilst famous dante allegieri was the other day in a country-house of his , which he had built in a very solitary place to exercise his poetry in , some litterati got secretly into his house , where they did not only take him prisoner , but holding a dagger at his throat , and harquebuses at his sides , they threatned to kill him , unless he would tell them the true title of his poem , whether he called it comedy , tragi-comedy , or heroick poem : and dante answering them , that they used him not like one of his quality , and that if they would ask him the question in parnassus , he would satisfie them : the litterati , that they might have their desire immediately , beat and buffeted him ; and not being able by these insolencies to compass their intents , they grew so outragious , as taking the rope which hung upon the bucket by the well side , they fastned it to a beam of the house , and went about to hang dante therewith ; who cry'd out , help , help , murder , murder ; and so great was the noise he made , as it was heard by ronsard the prince of french poets , who had a country-house not far from that of dante : this generous frenchman took up his sword immediately , and ran towards the noise ; whereupon the litterati fearing lest some others might be with ronsard , ran away ; but not so soon but that the frenchman both saw and knew them . dante was set at liberty , clothed , and brought to parnassus by ronsard ; where the news of so foul a riot being heard , apollo was very much grieved at it ; and his honor pressing him to know the delinquents , he first examined dante , who told him all that had past , and said he knew not who they were that had dealt so inhumanly with him ; but that it might be that ronsard , who had not only seen them , but had severely reprehended them for that their insolency , might peradventure know them . ronsard was forthwith sent for , who denied not only that he knew any of them , but said he had not seen them . the judges , by reason of this contrariety between what dante had said , and ronsards deposition , feared that the frenchman , thinking it a base thing to accuse any man , would not discover the delinquents . when apollo heard of this , he was very angry with ronsard , and commanded to give him the rack : wherefore ronsard was quickly secured , who persisting in his denial , the judges gave order that he should be put to the rack , as one who was likely to know somewhat . ronsard being stript , bound , and bidden to speak the truth , was raised from the ground . the generous frenchman , instead of complaining , as is usual in such cases , desired the judges that they would not let him down all that day , affirming that he held it too inestimable a content , rather to suffer so , then to offend any one . the judges finding by this his constancy , that they should do no good by the rope , caused ronsard to be let down , and began to think upon some other torment ; and of as many as were propounded , the judges liked none better then that which perillo's devilish wit found out ; who said , that a better way to torment a frenchman , then either ropes or fire , was to set him without either spur or switch , upon a slow dul horse : and so they did . it was a miraculous thing to see , that ronsard was no sooner set on horseback , but belabouring him with his legs , wrying his body twenty several waies , and shaking the bridle to make the horse go fast , he grew to such impatiency , and was surprised with such an agony of mind , as being quite out of breath , he cryed to the serjeants that were by his side , take me down , friends , for i am dead ; take me down quickly , and i will tell all ; and let them suffer the punishment that have done the fault : those you enquire after , were , monsignor carrieri of padua , iacapo mazzoni of cesena , and another whom i know not ; but you may know from the other two that i have named . the xcix . advertisement . all the princes of the world beseech apollo that he wil insert into their people the love of their country . the ambossador from all the princes of the universe , who came long since to parnassus , had on thursday long audience from his majesty , and the common report is , that in the name of all his princes , he made a sore complaint , that their people committed every day such shameful excesses , so inormous actions , as that they had made the art of reigning much more difficult then it was : that they were so far advanced in their disorders , as a prince could not now give a city , or any strong hold in custody to a souldier , without running evident danger of being in a short time treacherously assassinated ; and that they could not be so circumspect nor wary in chusing a captain-general , or other officer of war , but that they were soon brought into the sad condition of being forced to fear their servant friend , then their prince enemy ; and that the peoples iniquity was no less , then the commanders perfidiousness : for their people were so shamefully given over to a vitious curiosity , as they began in a short time to hate any prince , how good soever ; shewing the same desire and liking to change princes , as they had to change meat at their tables : that hence it arose , that princes in their greatest needs were not only not assisted by their people , and defended by them with that affection and charity as they were bound to do ; but it was every day seen how they were shamefully betrayed by them , and for a little money sold to their enemies . and that the princes had at last learnt , that for certain all these evils were occasioned through the little love which people bore unto their countries ; and that rome , the queen of the world , and mother of empire , could succesfully extend the confines of her dominion from the east to the west , only by means of the cordial love which her citizens bore her : that whereas amongst them , banishment was as terrible as death , many modern princes , that they may not be without subjects , nor have their countries unpeopled , were forced to forbid men the forgoing of their country , upon pain of forfeiting their estates . that therefore all the princes of the world did jointly signifie unto his maj. that all the remedies they could use against this so grievous evil , had proved invalid , and that therefore they humbly intreated him that he would be pleased to insert into the hearts of subjects , that fervent charity , and that immence love unto their countries , as was seen to be in the subjects of commonwealths , and wherein doubtlesly the chief greatness , and richest treasure lay , of whosoever reigned . apollo answered the ambassador , that princes might make their subjects love their countries much better then he could by good government , and equal justice , and by liberality , and procuring them perpetual abundance : for that all men , who by natural instinct , bore an excessive love to whatsoever country they were born in , were easily induced not to love it , when it was made odious to them by incommodious living : for men would rather be benumn'd with cold , then stand by a fire , which filling the house with smoak , made their eyes water . the xcvii . advertisement . apollo wakes a general hunting of pismires and tortoises , as being both of them beasts of evil example to mankind . yesterday morning zenofon , apollos master-hunt , gave order to acteon , adonis , and to the other chiefest hunters of this state , that they should be ready with their dogs the next day , for that his majesty was resolved to make then a general hunting ; and every one thinking that apollo , according to his custom , would have gon to the mountain ida , or to the hill of helicon , w●…ere were great store of gotes , stags , wild bores , and other wild beasts ; his majesty , as he came forth of the gate , declared the intended chase to be against pismires and tortoises ; which he said he intended to rout out of the earth , for the great benifit of mankind . then many of the vertuosi , desirous to know why his majesty had conceived such anger against those animals , told him , that they thought the tortoise was not only the emblem of mature delay , but the very type of those poor vertuosi , who carried the houses of their patrimony , and the whole substance of learning about with them ; and that pismires , which taught men to labour in the summer of their youth , to lay up food for the winter of their age , ought rather be assisted then pursued by his majesty , as an admirable example of providence . to these apollo answered , that what they had said , was true ; but that all men being more inclined to vice then to vertue , had learnt most scandalous examples from those animals ' , and did not imitate them in their good things : for some passionately given to avarice , and being shamefully inslayed to their own interests , had learnt the wicked custom of keeping continually with their head , feet , hands , and with all their members , hid within the husk of their interest , and to carry about them the houses of their own commodities , with so much sordidness and obstinacy never to come out of them , as that they had made the sole interest of peculiar utility their idol , only from the tortoise : whence it happened that such as these , when they wer made use of to take upon them the care of widows and orphans , they presently turned them to their own advantage ; and that the same men , if they were imployed by princes in publick affairs , the very first day of their magistracy they began to draw the water to their own mill. and that as for the pismires , many had learnt from them the unhappy example of toyling and moyling both day and night , not ever taking so much as one hour of lawfull recreation , to the end that they may heap up by all , yea though unlawful means , the grain of that wealth , which was afterwards mar'd by the rain of gods anger , or stolne away by mice , by thieves , serjeants , judges , atorneys , who alwaies lie in wait for the wealth of these avaritious wretches , who like pismires , not caring ( though they abound in all things ) to be lean and ill-favoured , suffering like dogs in their life and reputation , did so drown themselves in their sordid scraping , as they cared not though they were persecuted , ill treated , and troad upon by all conditions of men , even as pismires were . and that god having placed that vertuous providence which is void of all defect , in the miraculous bees , men should look upon those , and imitate them , who with the love of all men , and without doing any the least harm , build their houses full of honey taken from flowres ; whereas with the general hatred of all men , pismires stole grain from others grainaries ; and that the bees made both honey and wax , not only for their own accommodation , but for the general good of mankind : a most pretious instruction ; that those exercises , and those imployments are holiest and most blest by god , which have the publick benefit joyned to their own advantage ; whereas pismires accumulated riches stolne from others , only for their own use . the c. advertisement . apollo refuseth to receive a censure presented him by a litterato , which was made upon the poem of an italian vertuoso . apollo had already ended the toilsom course of day , when descending in his radient charriot to the west , a vertuoso , whose name menante doth wisely conceal , for fear of drawing some mischief upon himself , came before apollo , and presented his majestie with a very severe censure which he had made upon the poem of an italian vertuoso . apollo did openly appear to be so little satisfied with that present , as manifest signes of anger were seen in him : in so much as turning to petrach who was by him , he said that it was great folly in men who not considering how they were addicted to whom they presented any thing , would offer spectacles to those that are blind , a lute to him that is deaf , or wine to an abstenious man. his majestie then turned towards the litterato , who would have presented him with the book , and told him , that the good of melloans was given to such as he was , and the outside to hogs ; that therefore he should carry such trash as those in a cart to the common-shore , or throw them into the river , and that he should present him with what of good and vertuous he had found in that work ; which he would not only very willingly read , but be beholding to him for it . the unlucky fellow answered , that he had only minded the errors of the poem , not taking notice of such things in it as deserved praise . whereat apollo was so incenst , as though at that time ( as it falls out continually in his setting ) the beams of his face were very much sweetned and allaid ; yet through anger his countenance grew as fiery as if it had been noon-day , and answer'd that unlucky wretch thus ; it grieves my very heart to have met with one of those malitious fools , who labour by their pens to purchase that shame , which wise men so much abhor : and though your shameful demeanor deserves a much greater pennance , i will at this time be content with this which i now give you : pick out with your hands , without the help of a sive or fan , all the darnel and chaf which you shall find in a bushel of corn , which i will presently cause to be given you by my factor general columella , and bring it to us , we will tell you what you shall do with it . the bushel of corn was forthwith delivered out unto him by columella , which was so ful of darnel and chaf , as he spent much time in cleansing it , and presented it to his majesty in a great hand-basket . apollo bad him carry the darnel to the market and sell it , and he would freely give him all the money he could make of it . the silly soul said he did not only dispair to find any customer for that despicable commodity , but that to appear in the market with a basket full of such vile stuff , would make him be laught at . apollo bad him then go give the darnel to somebody , and thereby purchase a new friend ; the wretch reply'd , he durst not present so poor a thing to any man , which if he should do , he should be but derided . then apollo's fury being very much over , he said , if the refuse cul'd from such things as were good , were not fitting merchandize for wise men , and that they were neither worth selling nor giving , he was convinced out of his own mouth that he had been ill advised when he undertook the business of leaving the roses which he found in the poem by him censured , to make an unuseful and shameful collection of the thorns or prickles : and that in the reading of other mens labours , the wary vertuosi imitated the bee , which knew how to gather honey even from bitter flowres . and that there being no sublunary thing which was not kneaded with some imperfections ; some bran would be found in the works of homer , virgil , livy , tacitus , and hyppocrates , who were the wonders of writing , if a man would be curious in sifting them ; but that he was satisfied if the flowre of his vertuoso's composures were currant merchandize : that the defects of good authors were conceal'd by the juditious and friendly readers , and publisht only by such as are malitious . and that to make profession of taking out the worst things only out of other mens writings , was the office of base beetles which spent their lives with much gusto amidst the filth of excrements : a thing very far from the practice of those honoured litterati who feed advantagiously upon good things . and that since his beloved poets thought time the most pretious jewel which the east produced , he could not well see how he could be so very a fool as to believe that they would cast away their hours in perusing his malitious detractions , which they might advantagiously spend in reading the works of pindarus , sophocles , ovid , and of his beloved heracli . this unfortunate censurer was no sooner parted full of confusion from apollo , when he against whom the censure was made came hastily in , earnestly desiring permission that he might reply by way of apology to his malevolent friend . apollo smiled , and told him , that he appeared as little wise , who would by his apology put a value upon other mens prating , as censurers appeared malitious : that it was the greatest part of gross ignorance , to lend an ear to the back-biting babling of those whisperers , who not having sufficient parts to publish their own talents , foolishly believe they may win credit by carping at others ; and that the travailer who being annoi'd with the noise of grashoppers in the midst of scorching iuly , should alight from his horse to kill them all , were a very fool ; whereas he were wise , who though he had a pair of good ears , would seem to be deaf , pass on his way , and let them sing and burst . the end of the first century . the second century . the i. advertisement . the province of phosides , doth by her ambassadors complain to apollo , that his majesties officers do not any whit observe their priviledges ; and are not onely not listened to in what they do say , but receive a harsh answer . the well peopled province of phosides , vvho rebelled some years ago against the ignorant , and voluntarily submitted themselves to be governed by apollo ; from whom they obtained such ample priviledges , as those of phosides might be said to live in a sort of liberty , hath now sent her ambassadors to this court , to complain of his majesties officers , who do no vvays observe the priviledges granted them , desiring that they may be better observed . apollo not being vvell pleased with this business , referred it to the council of state , from vvhom tvvo days ago the ambassadors received their final ansvver , that the lords of the council did very much vvonder , and vvere scandalized , that the people of phosides should understand the affairs of the world so little , as not to knovv that priviledges , exemptions and immunities given to people nevvly purchased , vvere like those cherries vvhich vvere given to little children to quiet them vvhen they cry ; vvhich vvhen they vvere quieted , vvere taken from them . the prime ambassador stoutly replied , that if it vvere the custom of pernassus so foully to abuse simple people , phosides vvould quickly cry again that she might be pacified vvith cherries of nevv priviledges . to him francis guichardin , lord president of the council ansvvered , that they should do vvell first to consider their present condition , for they should find that they had suffered themselves to be brought to such a point of slavery by the citadels and strong holds , which in time of peace they had permitted to be built amongst them ; as if they returned to complain and cry , they might be quieted by scourges , without any danger to apollo's affairs . the ii. advertisement . apollo makes use of the unfortunate count st. paul , to frighten the nobility in kingdoms from rebelling against their natural lords , at the pressure of foreign princes . appollo much to his displeasure hath learnt , how that some princes that they may vanquish their enemies , do not use open force ( as was the custom of ancient hero's ) with armed men in the field , but make use of fraud and cozenage ; whereat they are so good , as they have been thereby able happily to atchieve very great enterprizes : for the first arms that these draw against their enemies , is shamefully to corrupt the loyalty of other mens subjects , and to incite the nobles to rebel . apollo to remedy so great disorders , gave command to iovanni francisco lottoni , register of his majesties moral precepts , that the miserable count s. paul , for a publique example of very great misfortune , should be carried in an open chair by beggars , and set before the porch of the delphick temple : this great prince , with his hands without fingers , and so shamefully torn , as they seem to be mangled by dogs , is shewed by lottoni to the people , who in great numbers pass in and out through that temple , to whom he crys aloud , faithful vertuosi , lovers of learning , and holy moral records , take example by the calamity of this so miserable prince , who hath lost the use of his hands , which god preserve still free to you ; and learn at the cost of others , what it imports to be always pulling of crabs out of their holes with your own hands , for the advantage of other men . the iii. advertisement . great euclid , for having distated some powerful men , is cruelly beaten by their bravoes . the freshest news from libetro brought by the ordinarry post from ephesus , bears date the fourteenth of this present moneth ; and they tell us , that on the sixth of the same , about noon , euclide , that prince of the mathematicks , was set upon by some under the uranian porch , who beat him so cruelly with sand bags , as they left him for dead . apollo was mightily disturbed at this novelty ; and the rather , for that though euclide was better beloved , and more made of by the greatest princes of this state , then any other litterato , yet this so great excess appaared to be made by the command of some powerful personages ; for euclide was first seized on by two of these swash-backlers , and held fast , whilst other two beat him , who were seen to be backed by many armed men . there are many occasions alledged for this so great resentment ; but the most generally received opinion is , that some potent subjects of this state are very much ill satisfied with euclid , for the mathematical instrument which he some few days before published in the schools , wherein was conclusively shewed , that all the lines of the thoughts , and actions both of princes and private men , meet in this centre , how to take money handsomely from another mans purse , and put it into ones own . the iv. advertisement . in a duel which hapned between an italian poet , and a vertuoso of spain , the spaniard being wounded to death , did so gallant an action before he expired , as apollo gave order that he should be solomnly buried at the publike charge . a great dispute arose some few days ago between a spanish vertuoso , and an italian poet touching a certain lady , who challenging each other , met in bellona's forum , and the business being to be disputed without defensive weapons , proved vrey cruel . for being armed onely with two short and sharp terzetti , at the first encounter they grapled , and the spaniard having received two mortal wounds , fell to the ground , and said these words to a friend of his who run in to help him , hermano azeme plazer d'enterarme , sin che ninguna mi desnude , do me the courtesie friend , to bury me before i be stript naked . which being said , his wounds bled so much as he dyed . the de sire which this spaniard made to his friend , that he might not be stript , being noised abroad in parnassus , made all men ( as it commonly falls out in things forbidden ) the more desirous to see him naked ; especially since it was made by one of that wise nation , which doth not onely never speak by chance , but never suffers a word to escape their mouthes which carries not mistery and great sense with it . and apollo's self had the curiosity to know why that litterato at the very point of death , did so earnestly desire not to be stript naked . so as commanding him to be stript , it was found that he who went so sprucely drest , and had a ruff about his neck so curiously wrought as it was more worth then all his other clothes , had never a shirt on ; which caused much laughter throughout all parnassus ; only apollo was much astonished at this novelty , and did mightily exaggerate the gallantry of this litterato , who in the very agony of death was so sensible of his honor , as he closed his eyes with zeal to his reputation . for which excessive worth , which vvas a clear evidence of an extraordinary great mind ; he commanded that he should be solemnly buried at the publike charge , con la pompa censoria : the which was done with so great a concourse of the litterati of all nations , as more were never seen to be at any roman triumph . afterwards flavius quintillian ; in a funeral oration which he made in praise of this vertuoso , did much exaggerate the happiness of the powerful monarchy of spain , whose greatness lay not ( as he said ) in the gold and silver shops of peru , of nova spagna , rio della plata , and in the castiglia dell'oro ; nor yet in the numberless number of kingdoms which she was master of ; but onely in the honorable condition of her nation . since it being clearly seen that this spanish vertuoso , in that his great calamity , endeavoured first not to suffer in his reputation , before he took order to have his wounds cured , it was an evident proof , that it was peculiar to the honourable spanish nation to prefer honor before life ; and that the spaniards were more careful not to commit any unworthy act , then they were of life . and quintillian concluded his oration with a cruel invective against philosophers , who will not admit that two contraries can be found in one and the same subject , when great appearance and infinite substance , vain glory and sollidness , were visibly seen to reign , even in their greatest extreams amongst spaniards . the v. advertisement . apollo having used great diligence to come by any of the idols of princes , proceeds with severity against one , who fell into the iudges power . apollo , much to his displeasure , perceiving the great disorders , occasioned not onely in great empires , but also in little states , by the blindness of those princes who assubject themselves to some one of their servants : since neither his majesties exhortations , nor the sad calamities which many princes have undergone by so great folly , hath been able to make them avoid the hard destiny of being violently hurried into hell by these inconveniences : his majestie , not to abandon his protection of the governors of the world , resolved some moneths since , to proceed with severity against such servants ; who by their prodigious ambition , and devillish cunning , go about to command their masters ; insomuch , as some years ago , he laid great fines upon such , and promised great rewards to any who would discover them to his judges . and about a fortnight since , the magistracy was told of one of these . who being afterwards taken , had the rack given him ; whereupon he confessed all the wicked tricks which he had used , not onely to enslave , but even to make his master adore him . when apollo saw the process made against this wicked one , he was much troubled to find that those very princes who are jealous of their own children , either through their own blockishness , or by the fraud of others , can bring themselves to the shameful infamy of becoming a slave to one of their ignoble servants ; and he thought it very strange , that a son or nephew of a prince , who that he might rule his father , or domineer over his uncle , had shewn himself to be infinitely ambitious , and to thirst after government , and who at last had compast his desires , could then so metamorphose himself , as to relinquish that power which he by so many practises had gotten over a superior , to one who was so far beneath him , a great wonder certainly , and which mans vvit can give as little reason for , as for the hidden vertue of the load-stone . apollo , to the end that princes might learn to keep themselves from committing such indignities , by seeing vvhat punishment vvas inflicted upon this court-favorite , caused all the princes that are resident in this court , to meet tvvo days ago in the great hall of audience , in vvhose presence , and to their greater confusion , he caused atorney bossio to read aloud the shameful process made against this vvicked one ; wherein vvhen he vvas asked vvhat tricks he had used to get the command over his master ? made ansvver , that from the very first day that he came to court , he used all possible diligence to observe his princes genius , and finding that he vvas mightily given to lasciviousness , he used all his rhetorick to praise a vice so misbecoming a king , making it appear to be an egregious vertue , and then all his industry to be imployed by him therein ; vvhich vvhen he had obtained , he studied diligently hovv to fit him vvith those vvho mig ht satisfie his lust . that aftervvards under divers pretences , as that they vvere either vitious , or enemies to the prince , he had by degrees removed all the princes honest servants from the court , vvho he knevv might have reduced him to have lived vertuously , and that he had put confidents of his own in their places , who were likewise given to carnallity , and to all other sorts of vice , by whose means he had endeavoured that his master should quite lose some signal endowments which he had by nature , and which he had received by his former good education . that then under pretence that they were unfaithful , he had so wrought it , as all the old state-ministers were turned out , whose just sorrows for their prince his loose life , he had made the prince believe were but seditious backbitings , and so had made their places be conferred upon men void of counsel or wisdom , and who cared not for their princes interest ; for he onely desired confidence in them , and that they would stick close to him : and that he had so surrounded his master with such as these , as it was impossible for him to hear truth from any one that was faithful to the common good , which truth ought always to be joyned to a prince , as is his shadow to his body . that then , to the end that he himself might alone govern the state , he had brought his prince to be so in love with idleness , as taking delight in nothing but pleasant gardens , conntrey-houses , and hunting , he hated to hear of business , or of any thing that concerned his state. that moreover , he had brought him to believe , that his having made him fall out with his own son , and the princes of the blood , proceeded from his great zeal unto his service , and his love to the publique good of his people ; and that he had so besotted him by his cunning tricks , as the unfortunate prince called that the vigilancy of a faithful servant , an ease to his labours , charity towards the publike affairs , which was known by the veriest fools of his state to be tyranie , and as such abhord : and had made him believe , that his idleness , slothfulness and negligence was honourable repose . that besides all this , to the end that the prince might never awake out of so shameful a sleep , and opening his eyes , might be aware of his own simplicity , and of other mens wicked ambition , he had filled his house with flatterers , who by their infamous perswasions , cryed up his folly for great worth ; the peoples universal hatred , for immeasurable love ; publique fault finding , for exagerated praise ; confusion , for excellent government ; the tyrany of a wicked personage , for excellent service ; termed extortions , justice ; prodigallity , liberallity ; his slothfulness and baseness in having quite given over the government of his state , honorable labour , and diligent rule . all the princes who heard the wickednesses confest by this perfidious man , were so astonished at the hearing thereof , as they said , it was charity to hang him ; and that therefore perillous should be desired to invent some new torment whereby this monster of nature might be by piece-meal torn in pieces , and made to dye a lingring death ; to the end that no man might ever commit such wickedness hereafter . and the princes were so moved with the foulness of this process , as they earnestly desired his majestie to use extraordinary rigour to such who should suffer themselves to be so shamefully treated by their fraudilent servants . and because apollo being so touched at the very soul , with the vertuous desire made unto him by these princes , let fall some tears : the foolisher sort of people believed that it was occasioned through his great joy to see the princes so much detest that vice , which he desired they might shun : but the wiser sort of vertuosi who were there present , knew very well , that apollo bewailed the blindness of princes , who are so drunk , as hating their own errors in others , did earnestly desire that those vices should be punished with extraordinary severity , in which the most of them , without being aware of it , were dipt even up to the eyes . so pernitious is it in princes to idolatrize minnions , as knowing it , and blaming it in their companions , they are not aware of it in themselves , but do highly commend it ; and they who boast themselves to be the onely aristarchi of the world , are those who fall into this shameful error . the vi. advertisement . all the monarchies of the world affrighted at the over-great power and successful proceedings of the german common-wealths , consult in a general dyet how to keep themselves from being in time opprest by them . the general dyet which all the monarchies of the world intimated four moneth ago , to be held at pindo the of the last moneth , and which by excluding all the commonwealths of europe , occasioned great jealousies in them , lest a general league might be concluded against all free countreys . being at last dissolved , on the of the present moneth , and the princes being already returned to their own states , it is known for certain , that it was called for no other end , but against the infinite number of commonwealths which have of late been instituted amongst the switzers , grisouns , bearnois , and other people of germany ; particularly against those which with so much scandal to monarchy , begin to rise between the hollanders and zealanders in the low-countreys . when all the monarchies of the world , according to their custom were set down in a great hall ; it is said their lord chancellor spoke thus : most high and mighty monarchs , and rulers of mankind , it may clearly be seen , by the sad and dangerous condition which you are in , that there is nothing under the sun which is perpetual , nor which doth not threaten present ruine . since monarchy her self , which by all understanding polititions hath always been held for the sovereign queen of all policy , hath got so great a rent and cleft in her fabrick , as it is not onely evidently seen that she is not of that eternal foundation which those who understand state affairs , have continually asserted her to be , but seems to be neer ruine . monarchies from the very beginning of the world to this present day have governed so happily , and won such reputation , as of all sorts of governments , they have been cheifly praised , and have always had the victory over commonwealths , their enemies . and though it was thought that the immence roman liberty , by having destroyed so many famous monarchies , would have put the whole world at liberty , yet at last ( though after a long time ) she her self turned into a principality , which is the certain end , and inevitable death of all commonwealths . and though the prime wits of the world have laboured sufficiently to institute long lived common-wealths , against the eternity of monarchy , yet could they never compass their intent . olegarchies being known to be the insufferable tyrany of a few , have been soon turned to principalities ; and the institutors of democracy could never find out a good way how to curb the people , so as it might have the chief authority to command , but after bloody seditions hath precipitated into cruel slavery , and hath nursed up a serpent in her bosom ; some ambit●…ous citizen , who by the certain way of the universal affection of ignorant people hath known how to get the chief lordship over the free countrey . moreover , we have often seen popular government prove so hateful to the nobility , as first the romans , after the death of caesar ; and then the florentines when alexander duke of medecis was slain , chose rather to live under new princes , then return to the cruel servitude of the plebeians , who are always seditious . and the very aristocratical governments , which of all others hath cost so much sweat , have at last ended in monarchies ; for the founders of such republicks , could never perfectly compass those two important qualities , which make aristocracy eternal ; of maintaining such an equality amongst the nobility , but that there would arise an odious disproportion of honours and riches amongst them , the fruitful mothers of tyrany ; and of giving such satisfaction to signal subjects , to the haughty minds of citizens excluded from publike government , so as they may be content to live servants in that countrey , which hath the name of being free. and those who have boasted to make mixt commonwealths eternal , have been likewise mightily deceived ; for as in humane bodies , the four elements whereof they are composed , after an agreement of long health , do at last alter , and that which proves most predominant kills the man ; so the mixture of monarchy , aristocracy and democracy in a common-wealth , one of the three humors getting at length the upper hand , she must needs in length of time alter ; which alteration changing the form of government , at last bereaves liberty of her life , as we may have seen a thousand examples in former times ; for all that learned men have set down in writing , and proved by good grounds of reason , doth not prove true in practice ; it being clearly seen , that licurgus , solon , and other legislators for living free , who have thought to tame the unvanquishable spirits of men by the excellent provision of holy institutions , and to curb the malice of the ambitious by severe punishments , have been more then much abused in their opinions . but now ( nor can i speak it without great terror and grief of heart ) we plainly see with our own eyes , that the germans , being excellent artificers , no less of commonwealths , then of clocks and watches , have at last invented those eternal liberties , which for so many ages the wisdom of ancient philosophers have in vain sought for , and from whence monarchies have great reason to apprehend their death and utter extirpation . never was there a more golden sentence said ( most glorious monarchs ) then that , that every least despised sparkle is apt to occasion great combustions . for who would ever have believed that that little spark of of liberty which first arose amongst the switzers , would have been able to kindle a fire , which should afterwards dilate it self so far in germany , as the world now sees and wonders at ? and what man how wise soever , could have foretold , that in so short a time it would have caused the combustion of so many cities and warlike nations ; which to the great shame and infinite danger of monarchy , have vindicated their liberty ? certainly it is a thing almost miraculous to believe , that the little liberty which began to have a being amongst the switzers , a poor people , and husbandmen of a very barren soyl , and which was so much despised by you , should afterwards be able to infect the most warlike nations of germany with the same disease ; and which is yet the greatest miracle , who could ever have foreseen , that these commonwealths should in so short a time win such credit with all potentates , as well in civil affairs , as for matter of arms , as that they should not onely be held the supreme umpires of peace and war in europe , but the very greatest terror of the chiefest princes of the world. the commonwealths of germany ( most illustrious princes ) are trumpets which should awaken you from the too supine sleep wherein you have so long lain . know your evils , look upon your dangers , which cry aloud for speedy remedy . since in the german commonwealths you see not onely aristocracy grounded , with so wise laws , as they promise long life , but that which all men thought impossible , quiet and peaceful democracy . the commonwealth of rome , which with an unparalel'd ambition proposed unto her self as her ultimate end , the absolute dominion of the world ; that she might arive at so immense an tent , was forced to be continually in arms , and to put weapons into her citizens hands , who by continual command of armies , and by the long government of large provinces , filled their private houses with treasures befitting any king , but very disproportionable for senators of well regulated republiques ; and by the too great authority which was unwisely and fatally given them by the senate , of bestowing even whole kingdoms on whom they best liked , they swole so big with the wind of ambition , as that equality of authority , which is the soul of free countreys , was wholly disordered in the roman nobility . by reason of these disorders it was , that first the silli and marii arose in rome , and then the fatal pompeys and caesars , who after long and bloody civil wars , slew that so famous liberty . and for the last calamity of monarchy , it cannot be hoped that this wide gate should ever be opened in the well-regulated german commonwealths , where all ambition of commanding over vanquished people , and neighbour nations , being utterly banished , the glorious resolution and firm purpose reigns onely in them , of not yielding obedience unto any . a happy resolve , which maintains that necessary equality between the citizens of those hans-towns , and between the chief senators ; and works this effect , that whilst they wage not war to impose that slavery upon others , which they themselves seem so to shun , their neighbours do neither hate them , nor are they jealous of them . so as it is no wonder if they promise unto themselves long lives , and think themselves unvanquishable by the power of whatsoever potentate ; for they are of opinion , that the best politick precept which by others is to be admired in the german hanf-towns , is to detest the acquisition of neighbouring nations ; for with like wisedom they enjoy that publike peace with foreigners , and that private agreement amongst their citizens , which makes their freedom formidable abroad , and safe at home . this that i say , is clearly seen by the miseries into vvhich the roman liberty , after six hundred years , did at last fall ; vvhich not to speak any thing of the infinite acquisitions vvhich she made in italy and elsevvhere ) by the last conquest vvhich she vvoud make of france ( a kingdom vvhich hath alvvays proved fatal to foreigners vvho endeavoured to subjugate it ) fell headlong into caesars tyranny : and the florentines , by their obstinate ambition of making those of pisa slaves , did so disorder their ovvn common-vvealth , as they may serve to teach the world , that it is better and safer for republiques to have their neighbouring cities and nations confiderates and friends , then subjects and enemies . this disorder is not seen in the hans-tovvns of germany , vvho resting content vvith their own liberty , suffer those who joyn vvith them to live free under the government of their ovvn lavv ; vvhence it is , that in germany , and in universal concerns , there appears but one onely commonvvealth to be in germany , but many in particulars ; and the arms of the freemen of that warlike nation , serve onely for instruments of peace , and to preserve their ovvn , not to intrench upon the liberties of other men . a thing which certainly forbodes much evil to monarchy ; for what more pernitious or cruel enemy can a prince have , then he who assaults him with pretence of communicating liberty to a subjugated people : these are the arms by which the german hans-towns have so dilated themselves : and certainly not without good reason ; for people cannot kill that enemy , who instead of death , fire and plunder , brings them liberty , which by instinct of nature , is so much desired by all men . lo then , illustrious monarchs , how the german hans-towns are little in particular , each of them contenting themselves with their own liberties ; but immensly great in general , for that they do all communicate in the interests of publique liberty . so as a prince cannot have to do with one , but he must offend all ; a disorder which is so much the greater , for that like a contagious disease , or enraged cancer , it every day encreaseth by degrees , taking in new cities , and new people , and assembling them all to their own liberty the first day of their purchase , naturalize foreign nations , make enemies dear friends ; wherefore it may well be doubted , that in a short time the whole world will be infected with this contagious disease ; and the danger is the more dreadful in these unfortunate times , wherein the liberty of commonwealths is gotten into so high an esteem , as our own subjects fear not to call it the onely filicity of mankind . whence it is , that ( when men can think to enjoy it quietly , and that as it is in the hans-towns of germany , every one may live in liberty under the laws of their own countrey ) it is so infinitely coveted , as it is purchased , though at the expence of much blood . and if such a disease hath been able to enlarge it self so far in so short a time amongst dissolute people , people so given over to gluttony and drunkenness , what shall we think it may do if it should fasten in italy or spain , or in the other sober nations of europe , the most of which , as we all know , are so affected to monarchy . the business about which you are here met , is as you have heard , most mighty monarchs , of importance , and requires the more speedy remedy , for that if the hollanders and zealanders shall once have laid a good foundation , and shall have perpetuated themselves in that liberty which they have usurpt against the powerful king of spain , their natural lord , you may well , from so foul a scandal , fear your utter extirpation . and you as well the most christian , as the most powerful kingdom of france , which in this so majestical an assembly do deservedly hold the first place , amongst the greatest monarchs of the world , you very well knew that in your last troubles , it was oft talk of ; and perhaps agreed upon by your seditious enemies , how to kindle in your bosom ; and amongst your faithful french men , the fire of the german liberty ; so far are the evils advanced ; which to those that understand so much , it may suffice me to have touch upon . this discourse made by the lord chancellor did infinitely trouble those great monarchs . and many princes , whose states lay neerest those republicks , finding what danger they were in , were extraordily afflicted . wherefore they fell suddenly to think upon remedies ; and as the most immediate , a strait league was propounded to be made by all monarchies , against commonwealths , hoping that by open force of so many princes joyned together , they might easily be mastered . but in this opinion , which at first seemed very plausable to every one , great difficulties were afterwards discovered : for some princes put the dyet in mind , that it was not onely indiscretion , but great rashness to affront with mercenary souldiers , whose interest in the war was but the poor pay of six pence a day , a nation which took up arms for the defence of liberty ; and which was that important reason of mens proving so couragious ; and to this purpose , charls duke of burgundies unfortunate case was instanced in ; who though he was held to be the thunder of war , the orlando and mars of his times , was notwithstanding , together with the greatest part of his army , cut in pieces by the switzers , onely because each man that fights in defence of liberty , hath twenty hands , and as many hearts . and it was considered ; that it being impossible for the princes to vanquish so many commonwealths in as short time ( as the business required ) the expence of much time would likewise make it altogether infeasable ; for that the hollanders and zealanders had taught all princes , that if people who defended their liberties were long trained up in war , they became unconquerable ; and this was said to happen , because the charity of a free countrey , doth not onely make the hearts of the citizens thereof undaunted , and their hands nimble , but makes their souls faithful , and quickens their wits . and it was further said ; that that prince took a bad business in hand , who could not fight his enemy with canons loaded or charged with gold , which was that which routed all armies , and won all battels , and which had the wonderful effect of destroying a mans loyalty and concerning this particular , reflection was had upon the modern actions of the hollanders and zealanders , who out of the very great affection which they bore to the liberty of their countrey , had so gallantly resisted , not onely the steel and iron , but even the gold of that valiant and rich spanish nation , which knows so well how to make use both of the one and the other , as it was held a thing almost miraculous ; that at one and the same time they could defend their new common-wealth , no less against the open force of the spaniards ; then against the concealed designs of the french and english ; and cheifly against the subtil cunning of that crafty fox the prince of orange : all which ( though under various and specious pretences of liberty ) had as great a mind to make themselves masters of those states , as the king of spain had to reduce them under his ancient dominion . to this , a second , and much more important difficulty was added ; for consultation was had , what the colleague monarchs should do with the german commonwealths , when by their forces they should have conquered them . for answer to which , the common reason of nations , and the ordinary use of leagues was urged ; which is , that the acquisition of enemies states made by colleagues , if any of them be of the number of the colleaguing princes , that they should be restored to their ancient lords : by vertue of which law , the roman empire desired , that when the victory should be gotten , those cities and hans-towns should be restored to her , which had withdrawn themselves from her authority . and the house of austrea pretended with good reason , to repossess her ancient dominion over the greatest part of the switzers , and other people , who to make themselves free , had shook off the yoke of her government . though all these pretensions were by the senate acknowledged to be just , yet did the princes so much stomach them , as after a long dispute , it was at last resolved , that no more should be spoken thereof : and it was then said , that it being impossible for the two aforesaid reasons , that the monarchies should by open force subjugate the commonwealths of germany , they should for the future so wisely strengthen and fortifie themselves , as that the malady of the german hans-towns , which till then had made such and so prejudicial progress , should grow no greater . and it was resolved , that it being very palpable , that the many large priviledges which were granted by some too prodigal princes to their vassals , in a middle way of living free , and this not without great occasion , had made them affect total liberty ; that therefore such priviledges , as being scandalous , and very pernitious to monarchy , should not onely not be granted hereafter , no not to any desert , how great soever ; but that every potentate should cunningly by little and little , endeavor to take them from their people , and bring them so wholly into servitude , as they should not have any the least ken of those priviledges which had heightned their minds to affect total freedom : and hereupon some former emperors of germany , and dukes of burgony , were severely reprehended , who were not onely fools in granting their people prejudicial exemptions , but ignorantly avaritious in selling them for a small sum of money , vvhereby they had put themselves and other monarchies upon great difficulties . and for their greater severity , these princes decreed , that all form , all footsteps of levelling , should from the very root be extirpated from amongst their subjects ; the wisest of the dyet affirming , that the great inequality of the gentry in a kingdom , was that which secured them from ever bringing in a form of free government : and the monarchy of spain was so stiff in this opinion , as she freely said , she spoke it knowingly , that nothing had more preserved the dukedom of millan from living in that freedom , after the death of philip maria viscount , which was then talked of being instituted therein , then the great disproportion of wealth , which hath always been observed to be in that noble dukedom , not onely between the nobility and people of millan , but even between the nobility it self , which had also been the reason why , in the rich kingdom of naples , no speech was ever heard to be made by those barons , of levelling or living free , no not when they had so fair an occasion presented them of doing so by the failing of the blood royal , and by many other interregni which they had had in their troubles ; for that the nobility of kingdoms had this of natural instinct , rather to admit of any subject how barbarous soever for their king , then to see not onely barons of late edition , but even doctors and shop-keepers made equal ( which liberty would do ) like to them . moreover , it was hinted , as an excellent means whereby to weaken the german hans-towns , that the potentates of europe would forego the so pernitious custom of buying at a deer and dishonorable rate the schum of the switzers , grisouns , and other german nations , it being sure that if they should be left in their own countreys , those unquiet , seditious and disorderly spirits , which much to their profit , they send abroad , would cause such fractions at home , as they would be seen to turn those weapons upon themselves , which now they sell to unwise princes at the weight of gold . but the many jealousies which have always reigned , which reign now more then ever , and which it is to be believed , will for ever reign amongst the greatest kings of christendom , wrought so , as for fear , lest the one might leave all the refuse to be made use of by the other , so salutiferous a memorandum was publiquely praised by all , and in private abhorred by every particular . but it is true , that to make monarchy as pleasing to the people as it was possible for princes to do , these underwritten articles were with great solemnity penned , established , and sworn unto in the dyet to be inviolably kept . i. that since to love and fear god with all ones heart , was the wisest piece of policy , and the most perfect state-reason which could be learned and practised by princes , they should not for the future make use of his most holy name ( as many had formerly done ) as a means whereby to get money from their people ; and to hurry them or wheel them about with divers sects , and new religions , such as made most for their worldly interests ; but to obtain that favour from his divine majestie , which brings abundance of all that is good to princes who fear god , and to people who obey his holy laws . ii. that for the future they should be content so to milk and shear the sheep of their flock , as that they should not onely not flea them , but not so much as touch a bit of their skin , being mindful that men were creatures which had understanding , not beasts which knew nothing ; that therefore there was a great deal of difference between shepherds who shore and milked sheep , and prince-shepherds , who shore and milked men ; the latter being to use the shears of discretion , instead of those of meer interest , which are onely made use of ( and that always unfortunately ) by greedy shepherds ; it having been often seen , that publike hatred hath been able to metamorphize the simple sheep of subjects , into skittish mules , who have driven their indiscrete shepherd out of the fold with kicking . iii. that they should keep their people within the bounds of fear , not with such a caprichious beastiality as makes the government of one man alone dreadful , and then totally pernitious , when he will judge mens lives by his sole arbitrary power ; but by being inexorable in those faults onely which not deserving pardon , had need to be punished with all the severity that the law allows . iv. that they should be spairing of publike moneys to unworthy personages , prodigal to such as did deserve well ; for that they being so hardly drawn from the subjects , every prince who would deserve the name of a good shepherd , was bound to give them so much satisfaction , as to see that their moneys were not prodigally wasted in hunting , tilting , feasting , in inriching bawds , buffoons and flatterers ; but that they were judiciously laid out for the advantage of publike peace . v. that they should for the future confer dignities and magistracy to such as were most worthy , having respect onely to the merit of the desirer , not to any affection of the recommender ; for that he did truly deserve to be accounted a fool , who to honor or advantage another , shamed himself , and disparaged his own gifts . vi. that they should bury their own odd conceits , and for ever banish their private passions : and to the end that they might put on that excellent resolution which makes princes so happy , and kingdoms so flourishing , of absolutely submitting themselves to the good and publike interest of their people , they should totally abandon their own wilful opinion . vii . that they should appear to be absolute monarchs of their states , in executing the results of their most important affairs , but in consulting thereupon , onely the heads of a well ordered aristocracy ; being sure that four fools who did advise together , made better resolves , then any the best greatest wit could do alone . viii . that making god their example whose lieutenants princes were on earth , they should pardon homecide onely out of compassion , born to minority in yerrs , to the greatness of the offence received more in honor then in life , to certain sudden furies ; which makes a man not master of himself bereaving him of all judgement and reason ; but not for greediness of money ; for that princes could not introduce a more wicked traffick in their tribunals , then to make merchandize of mens blood . that therefore fraudulent homicides committed out of premiditated malice should by no means be forgiven , not onely for not drawing down gods anger upon them , but for the administration of that right justice which they were bound to give unto their subjects ; for that princes by pardoning hainous offences , purchased onely the praise of being avaritiously and wickedly merciful . ix . that they should firmly believe themselves to be absolute lords and masters of their subjects ; not as shepherds are of their sheep , who may sell them to the shambles ; but onely utendo , not abutendo , by using , not by abusing them ; for people imbittered by bad usuage , could not live long with that ill satisfaction , which is the fruitful mother of bad resolutions . x. that they should think the true heaping up of riches consisted in giving content unto their people , and in making them of subjects , brothers and children ; and that the excellent art of taking sturgions with pilchards , was nothing else , then to purchase the rich treasure of mens hearts by a wise liberality , and to cheapen love by clemency : for to fill their coffers with gold , raised out of the taxes and exactions ( as some princes do ) was not onely to swell that spleen which did so impare the health of a sound body , but did oft times serve as sharp spurs , and loud sounding trumpets , to make foreigners arm themselves that they may make themselves masters of so great wealth . xi . that in their insolences and extravagancies , they should by no means relie upon their subjects love , which was as soon lost by using an impertinancy , or by a distaste given , as it was won by a courteous or liberal action . neither should they build upon their peoples former patience ; for that the minds and humors of men did change and vary with times , places ' and persons . that therefore they should not wax proud of their peoples being grosly ignorant or that they were altogether unarmed , nor should they presume too much upon them ; for there was never any kingdom yet , which was not very full of such unquiet , ambitious and male-content nobility , as would serve for sure guides to blind people ; and for learned school-masters , who would teach ignorant people the important precept , and the seditious doctrine , that to come out of the laborinth of the slavery of monarchy , which was governed only by insolency , and the irregular fancy of a hair-brained prince , like these 's , they must follow the clew of arms ; which was more dangerous to a prince , for that despair caused in people by such proceedings , though they were weak , unarmed and ignorant , would make them find arms , courage and judgement in every corner . xii . that they should wear the powerful militia of boundless empire ( which the laws will have princes to have even over the lives of men , for terror of the wicked ) by their side , for the security of such as good ; but that they should never make use of it , & that they should freely deliver up such as were guilty , to the power of sacred justice , for the ranker of hatred and revenge was never a whit lessened by inflicting cruel torments upon the guilty . that therefore to the end that delinquents might appease their so incensed souls , even at the bitter point of death , they should let all favour in criminal causes proceed from themselves ; and that the sword of justice should be onely exercised by their magistrates . xiii . that in laying on of taxes , as great caution as could be should be had to such things as tended to the feeding and cloathing of the poor , who live out of the sweat of their brows ; and that they should lay the heavier impositions upon such things as belonged to the delights , luxuries and superfluities of the wealthy , who living idly upon their rents , minded nothing but great gaming , and inventing new vices . xiv . that above all things , they should be very careful , that all publike provisions should be modestly exacted , and by discret parsonages ; for it hapned oft times , that people were more troubled with the condition of him that gathered the taxes , and the violent manner of gathering it , then with the tax it self . xv. that they should use all possible industry in feeding the common people with bred , the nobility with degrees of honour ; and that to arrive at so happy ends , they should suffer free commerce amongst their subjects of selling and buying the fruits and incomes of their lands , and the gain of their traffick : but that they should be very careful to fill their state-magazines with corn , and all things necessary for the life of man , bought and brought in from foreign parts ; which was a rich and happy traffick , which paid princes the use of a hundred for one , when by the great plenty occasioned thereby , they had lost their principal . xvi . that for the better content of their nobility , who always thirst after glory and honor , they should confer places of magistracy , and other chief dignities onely upon the noble subjects of their states . and that they should keep , as from fire , from giving them that mortal wound , which had caused woful subversions in the greatest kingdoms of europe , of admitting foreigners into places of imployment , thereby to inrich and aggrandize them , and of exalting mean and ignorant persons to a higher degree then the jealousie of the state will bear , meerly out of their capretious affections ; and that in a particular of so great concernment , they should imitate the wisdom which wise nature had taught dogs , who cannot endure that a strange dog should come within the doors where they live , onely out of fear that they should steal their masters favour from them , which they are very jealous of , and that bread which is deservedly their due for having by their continual watchfulness , kept the house in safety . xvii . that in the edicts which they should publish , they should imitate well governed commonwealths , the end of whose laws is always seen to be the common good , not private interest , as it is often found to be in principalities . xviii . that they should for ever banish from out their houses , those flatterers , buffouns and minions , who do so stain the reputation of any great prince ; and that they should not onely be inamored of the vertue , worth and merit of their magistrates , and deliver themselves wholly up unto their power , but that they should even worship them . xix . and because to be cast in suits , did redound as little to the reputation of private men , as for princes to go to law with their vassals , and carry the cause against them , be it right or wrong , all such disputes should be first made known to men learned in the law , and commence no suit , wherein their right did not evidently appear to all men . and that to free themselves from the stain of rapine and tyrany , they should appear more content when they had not onely lost the cause , but were condemned in damages , then over-joyed when the sentence went on their side . xx. that answerable to the custom of good commonwealths , the ultimate end of their thoughts should hereafter be the peace and quiet of their states , which makes the people that enjoy it so happy ; and that they should vent their over much ambition in acquiring the singular glory of well governing their people , which god hath given them , and not to affect other mens dominions by fire , rapine , and the effusion of mane blood . that they should make poormens faults pecuniarly punishable ; but that they should punish proud wealthy men in their lives , making them pay composition of blood , that they might make the whole world see , that they punishmens faults out of zeal to justice , not for greediness of money ; he being a great enemy to publike peace , whom riches made proud , and spurred him up to commit faults . xxi . that they should endeavour to effect the good and vertuous living of their subjects , more by their own examples , then by rigour of law , it being impossible to keep people from committing those faults which their princes are addicted unto . xxii . that in the government of their states , they should not use that carelessness which is proper to princes who possess great kingdoms , or that too exact diligence which doth so disquiet the people , and which is usually seen in princes , who having great wit , command over a little , state , but that they should sail with the safe north wind of nequid nimis . xxiii . that they should punish onely great ●…aults with the rigour of the law ▪ and seem not to see , or take notice of little ones , or ( as becomes princes who govern men , not angels ) freely pard on them ; that for faults of a middle sort , they should use such punishments as were suitable to the misdemenors ; and that they should shun , shewing themselves too severe in punishing at the present , to deter future excesses ; that they should chi●…fly study that the princes clemency might clearly be seen in the punishment of any guil●…y person , either in mitigating the pain , changing the punishment , or by pardoning confiscated goods . xxiv . that private injuries , as well as publique offences should always be vindicated by the cha●…table arm of justice ; and that when any of their subjects should offend them , they should not hate the whole family , but onely the party offending , with whose punishment their anger should cease , and should shun the custom of preserving rancor , and of transmitting those eternal fewds and immortal defiances to their heirs , which making men dispair , were not onely very dangerous to princes , but made monarchies be hated . xxv . that all of them should as soon as may be , endeavour to free their people from the disease , which so much molests their minds , afflicts their bodies , and consumes their estates of the eternity of law suits ; and that of all things they should keep themselves from that foul fault of reaping profit out of yearly revenues , that so they might shun the publike hatred which they would incur , when people should see that these so great disorders served only for leeches , to suck money out of the very bowels of their afflicted people , who finding no greater hell in this life , then the torment of pleading , and of being in the hands of ravenous judges , advocates , notaries and sergeants , it was the duty of every good prince , rather by his own expence to free his people from being so pilled and pooled , then to make use of them for a rich , though very wicked commodity . xxvi . that they should preserve such grain , oyl and wine , and other things which appertain to the food of man , as grew in their dominions , yea even in years of greatest abundance ; and when their was much superfluity of them , and should by no means make sale thereof to foreign nations ; for since no man can secure himself of the next years plentiful harvest , princes could commit no greater folly then to be blamed for that scarcity which even god himself sends . xxvii . that the greatest advantage which commonwealths have over monarchies , lying in their being free from the impediment of women . all princes should keep their wives , and all other women of their blood , from having any thing to do in government , or in publike affairs ; as those who by their indiscrete and avaritious proceedings , had caused sad tragidies in many principallities . and that they should firmly believe , that the great polititian tacitus , had never said a greater truth then non imbecillem tantum , & imparem laboribus sexum : sed si licentia adsit , saevum , ambitiosum , potestatis avidum . tacit. . annal. that it is not onely a weak sex , and unfit for business ; but if permitted , cruel , ambitious and greedy of power . these articles being agreed upon , and sworn unto , the same lord chancellor heartily desired the monarchs of the diet , that ( to the end that the world might not see the scandalous example of the states of holland and zealand ) they would quite lay aside all other whatsoever kind of private interest ; and that if ( as they were obliged to do , both out of wisdom and state-policy ) they would give no assistance to the spaniards , so as they might the better witness to the world , that it was impossible for rebellious people to purchase liberty by seditious arms ; that they would not at least assist the hollanders and zealanders , it being great folly , and very bad counsel , to precipitate or overthrow their own affairs , by so shameful an example , to the end that they might discompose the affairs of other men . all these monarchs , with a wonderful consent , answered the lord chancellor ( so possitively can princes , who are born , brought up , and have continually lived in the tiberian art of simulation , promise that with their mouthes , which their heart never dictates to them ) that that should by all means be done , which they in private knew they would never execute . the vii . advertisement . the people of phocides treating how they might rise in rebellion , by reason of the relation which their ambassadors made unto them , who were formerly sent to apollo , to pray that their priviledges might be observed : the remedy fittest to be applyed to such a disorder , is discust in his majesties royal council . it is not to be believed , how much the inhabitants of phocides were incensed , when they heard the relation which their ambassadors made , who were sent by them to parnassus , by reason of the breach of their priviledges ; for they could not endure that to boot with the prejudice of loss of priviledges , they should be scornfully treated , like boys . wherefore horn-mad with anger , they stormed , and freely profest that they would by arms defend the priviledges of their countrey , and that even with the loss of their last drop of blood , they would therewith endeavor to recover their lost liberty ; and that if any thing of ill should befal them , they should deerly pay for it , who were about to enslave them . the nevvs of this sedition was soon brought to apollo ; and the business was argued many mornings in his majesties council ; and though some of the chief thereof said , it was requisite to dispatch away immediately a legion of poets to phocides , who might keep that incensed people in obedience ; yet the opinion of isabel queen of spain prevailed , who for the excellency of her wit , hath deservedly the prime place in that council . she said , that to provide soon for the prevention of insurrections in states , which were wholly in slavery to their princes , was excellent council ; but that in such states , as by reason of many large priviledges , lived in a medium between slavery and liberty , rather then to prevent them with dangerous remedies , it might be wisely done , to tarry till the disorders were begun , whereby wise princes might much advantage themselves ; for then they might justly take from them all those priviledges , which are sharp thorns in the eyes of those that govern . the viii . advertisement . a great controversie arising in point of precedency , between the prince of bisagnano , and dr. juliano corbelli of st. marino . apollo refers the consideration thereof to the congregation of ceremonies , by which it is decided . a difference arose a while ago in point of precedency , between the prince of bisagnano , and iuliano corbelli , doctor of law at s. marino , a little castle in romania , but very famous for the great pre-eminency of liberty which it enjoys , for it is governed like a common-wealth : and though the doctors pretensions were so despised by the neapolitan barons , as it was thought presumptuous , yet was not corbelli any whit discouraged ; but appealing to apollo , his majestie referred the business to the congregation of ceremonies in parnassus ; before whom the prince scorned to appear , complaining , that in a cause which was so clear on his side , he should be made to appear in judgement against a man born in so base a countrey , as produced nothing but swine-herds , he himself being an illustrious neapolitan baron . yet lest sentence might be given against him for his contumacy , he was forced to acquaint the congregation with what he had to alledge for himself ; who having very diligently perused the evidences produced by both parties , gave judgement six days since on the doctors side , who being born in a free-countrey ; was ( as they said ) to walk hand in hand with kings ; much more to be preferred before a neapolitan baron . then , as for the fee or tribute which the prince possest in bisagnano ; they said , that it was declared by a decree made long before by his majestie , that he did truly deserve the name of prince , who obeyed no king ; not he who in anothers lordship , commanded over poor vassals , by vvhom he might be daily accused , abused and persecuted in court leet , and other tribunals ; in which case the titles of prince , duke or marquis was no real thing , but a kind of false alchimy , which was very like those glass eyes which squint eyed people wear to honest the ill-favouredness of their faces , not to make them see ; then , as for his noble blood , upon which the prince , being descended from the noble family of sanceverini , did ground his best pretension , they said , that the congregation did not at all consider it , the clear testimony of the anatomists being produced by the contrary party ; wherein it being clearly proved , that the bones , nerves , flesh and bowels of men were all made after the same manner , it denoted evidently that true nobility vvas placed in the brains , not in veins . the ix . advertisement . apollo publ sh●…th a very severe edict against some litterati , who under a cloak of feigned piety , cover downright avarice . apollo finding for certain that a new race of wicked men are sprung up in parnassus , and in his other states , who though they have made gold their idol , yet to cover their unquenchable thirst after riches , do so confidently make use of the cloke of feigned goodness , as they have dared to exercise the devilish art of hypocrisie bare faced ; his majesty to provide for the indempnity of those silly ones , who think all to be gold that glisters , and of those blockheads who cannot discern an eel from an adner , by an edict of his published on tuesday last , doth in the first place affectionately exhort all souls living , to walk by the so beaten way of honoured antiquity , of bene vivere , & laetari ; which proceeds from gods great grace to good men ; assuring every one that men may win favour from god , and good will from men , even amongst great riches , if they be honorably gotten , and well distributed : wherefore he exhorted all men , that forgoing fiction , and all manner of double ▪ dealing , as things which gave an ill savor even to good things , and which made mens devotion appear hypocrisie , they should live with that purity of soul , and that candidness of manners , which made even stones look lovely , much more men ; and that if there were any one , who would by a holy life make that profession of piety , which is so suspected in men who have avarice joined to their great riches , that their devotion should by all means begin from the contempt of money , distributing it out unto the poor , and laying it out in pious works ; which if they should not do , they should be held from those crafty companions who make use of piety more to deceive men , then to please god. the x. advertisement . the city pretor , or chief iustice of parnassus , complai●… bitterly before apollo of the triumviri ; a magistracy newly instituted by his majesty , that in an edict of theirs published against mignus and other ministers of princes obsenities , they have violated his iurisdiction . apollo having learnt by many sad examples which have hapned , that printing , which it is to be believed , was at first by divine councel suggested into the cavalier iohn of mentz , only to facilitate the learning of the most illustrious sciences , to such as are desirous of knowledge , is made use of by wicked men , not onely as an excellent instrument to staine mens minds , with impiety , obsceneness and evil speaking ; but that ambitious men serve themselves thereof for damn'd weapons to make people rebel against their natural princes : apollo , i say , by wholsom and divine councel ( as the event hath shewn ) did many years ago institute the remarkable magistracy of the triumviry , whose office it is to send such books as are infected with impiety , sedition , and such obscenities as corrupt good manners , to the pest-house . this magistracy some three daies ago , under pain of grievous punishment , sent express command to all favorits , bawds , flatterers , and others whom their princes do idolize , who live desolutely , that they should not dare any more to stir out of dores , to the end that these monsters of nature might not ( to the great scandal of good men ) be seen to go so vain-gloriously trampling the street upon their pacing horses , and in their rich coaches , as if they triumphed over the world , who by their lewd manner of living , having extorted those rewards from vitious princes , which are only due to deserving men , are not worthy to eat bread . the city pretor made a great complaint to apollo of this novelty , accusing the triumviry of having exceeded the bounds of their authority , and very much intrencht upon his jurisdiction . the triumviry were immediately sent for by his majesty , who defending their cause exceedingly well , said that they had by length of time clearly learnt , that certain obscene living books which walked up and down the streets , caused greater scandal in well composed minds , and free from all pollution , then did machiavil , bodin , aratin , and other writers of wickedness , and obsceneness , which were found hid in many libraries ; a disorder which ought the rather to be corrected , for that the wicked manners of living men , made a much greater impression in mens minds ; then the filth that was read in dead authors , whose damn'd writings many forbore to read , out of meer abhorition of such things , many for fear of offending god , and of being punisht by men , many for that they had not many of those forbidden books , or for want of curiosity , or love of idleness ; but that men of holy lives , much against their wils , and not without offence , were forced to read , study , contemplate , and honour these bawds , flatterets , and other ministers of vitious princes , who neither cared for gods honor , nor their own reputation , who were scandalous two leg'd books , which were daily seen to walk the streets ; and that he must be armed with more then humane vertue , who would not be contaminated and scandalized to see the sole aspects of these hateful men . the xi . advertisement . the inhabitants of phocides fall into open rebellion , by reason that the priviledges of their country are not observed by apollo's officers ; they are pacified by a senator , and send new ambassadors to his majesty . the polititians precept is very true ; that people who have lived long in a half liberty , with large priviledges , are very hardly reduced to tollerate whole slavery . this is said , because the uproars of phocides occasioned by the not observancy of their priviledges ( as you heard at large by the last post ) have still increased more and more , in so much as on the ninth of this present month , more incenst then over , since such satisfaction as was desired , was denied them by apollo's officers , the phocidians took up arms , and running through the city , cryed out , liberty , liberty . when the chief magistrate of phocides , much troubled at such a novelty , desired a parley of the people that were in arms , who when they were all assembled in the chief piazza ; t is said , that the uprightest and most experienced senator of phocides spake thus ; the most dangerous enterprise ( my most beloved phocidians ) which subjects can undertake , is to grow stubborn , and rebel against their prince : for princes are not so merciful as to pardon injuries of so high a nature ; which though they sometimes forgive , they never forget ; whence it is , that such excesses never pass without their condigne punishment : for as it falls out in all offences which are either through wisdom winkt at , or pardoned per force , they are in their due time and place , the more severely revenged , by having their vindication retarded to a more opportune time . and god deliver us , and all other people that suffer such calamities as we do , from those cruel revenges , which princes who are offended in state-affairs , use after long meditation to take , against their disloyal people ; and rebellion is so far from being forgotten ( even by most merciful princes ) as an amendment of many hundred years loyalty cannot so cancel it cut of exasperated minds , but that the memory of such signal injuries are transmitted over to the twentieth generation ; since by their importance they infuse such diffidence into him that reigns , and such suspitions as occasion perpetual odium between the vassal and the soveraign lord ; from whence afterwards the great disorder ariseth , as that natural subjects , which are no other then the princes beloved children , and therefore ought to be treated with terms of fatherly love , and governed by laws of charity , are reputed cruel enemies , conquered people , subjugated by force of arms ; and therefore according to the politick precept , treated like slaves : which things at last produce that great inconvenience , that even lawful princes , grievously moved by such hainous offences against their rebellious subjects , become cruel tyrants . i ( fellow citizens ) speak not now as an officer of the prince , in aggravating the condition of our slavery , but as one who would produce peace in this our country ; and if you shall not think my councel good , i will willingly be one of the first who will joyn with you in your resolution , being better contented to err with many , then to be wise with a few . but before you proceed further in a business of such importance , i earnestly intreat you , and heartily beg of you , even by these tears which fall so abundantly from mine eyes , that you will maturely consider , that for the most part , popular insurrections meet with unfortunate ends : which happens not only because resolutions in so weighty affairs are taken in hot bloud , when men are most incenst , and when mens minds are most incombred with the foolish passion of fury , whereas they ought to be put on in cold bloud , and when the mind is most maturely setled ; but because upon such like occasions , rash and precipitous councels are more willingly imbraced and listned unto , then such as are mature and quiet . for with people that are up in commotion , he is alwaies thought wisest , who is most adventurous , and he most zealous of his countries liberty , who adviseth to things most headlong . here ( beloved citizens ) is a business in which consists the total of our safety , the good of our children , the happiness of our country , which ought to be so dear unto us , being all of them things of great importance , wherein surely we ought to proceed with much circumspection , since repentance will not serve the turn , ●…nce the punishment of such a sin is never pardoned , but the infamy thereof indures for ever , and the danger of punishment grows then greatest when the prince hath taken a thousand oaths to pardon it : for princes think it no shame , nor breach of word , to revenge rebellion in their subjects , though it be pardoned , but great honour , and an obligation which they owe unto their honours . we know for certain that apollo will take from us those priviledges , which we are bound to defend with the effusion of our blouds , and loss of lives ▪ great is the injury that is done us , and such as ought by no means to be suffered by us , who upon other occasions have proved our selves to all the vertuosi of parnassus , to be resolute ; the injury his majesty doth us , is notorious , and peradventure fit to be rescented ; but in revenging offences given , and in preventing such as are feared , we must be sure to proceed so , as not to fall upon such resolves , as may be more prejuditial to us then the loss of our priviledges , which now we go about to defend by force . for very foolish and unfortunate is that rescentment which brings with it more loss and shame then the injuries which are desired to be vindicated . a most true rule , which admonisheth us not to enter upon so dangerous a game , without assured hope of overcoming ; for unpardonable injuries ought either never to be done to any whosoever , more especially not to powerful men , or upon certainty that they can never be revenged . i urge this , for that whosoever puts on the fatal resolution of taking up arms against his prince , must be sure to have sufficient forces of himself to resist his princes power , or so ready and lustly forein aids as may secure him from being supprest . we ( my fellow phocedians ) know very well our forces are but weak ; and that no prince will assist us ; it therefore appears to me to be a horse-like piece of beastiality , when we find our selves fast bound to the charret , to kick against the wheels , and so spoyle our legs . it is rash folly to doe that which brings with it certain and severe punishment : we may truely say we have been assaulted in the streets by those rascally officers who thirst after the goods of their fellow-subjects , who would take from us the rich jewels of our priviledges ; they are armed by the princes power , we unarmed passengers ; will it not then be unwisely done of us to exasperate them by resistance ? t is great wisdom willingly to part with our jewel so to save our lives . the minds of princes who are born and brought up in the ambition of reigning , are alwaies in motion , are continually working , nor are they ever quiet till they get total domination over their subjects ; and it is an experienced proposition , that all things are loosned with the same cords wherewith they were bound ; and it is very observable upon this our occasion ; for if it be true , that we must all confess , that princes grant priviledges to their people more out of necessity , and when forced so to do , then out of free will ; who is he that knows not that it is the same necessity which keeps them from breaking them ? and doth not every one know that the effect cannot keep on foot , when the cause faileth ? apollos desire of depriving us of our priviledges , ariseth not ( as we complain ) from discourtesie , not from ingratitude , not from falcifying his word , but from the alteration of this our afflicted country . phocides ( as you all know ) confined formerly upon the ignorant , who are capital enemies to apollo and his vertuosi , and therefore were we honored with the gift of priviledges which we now endeavor to defend ; the which he gave us ( as it is usual with princes to do ) because we had lately , of our own accord , put our selves under the dominion of parnassus ; we are now by process of time become natural subjects ; and ( which hath more impaired our condition then any thing else ) we are , by the litterati's dilating their dominions , become no longer confiners , but inland inhabiters ; all which things gives us to understand , that princes observe other mens priviledges inviolably , as long as the cause why they were granted remains . by these things which i have told you ( my beloved ) you may know that your taking up arms of rebellion , will , as they usually do , aggrivate their evils , who have boldly , but unwisely taken them up . but before we proceed further in these our tumults , i earnestly desire every one of you , not to mind so much the just reason which we have to re●…sent the apparent injury which is done us , as the unfortunate end which this our insurrection will have : for men cannot more maturely shun committing errors , then by meditating long upon the evils which they may produce . and above all things , i straitly conjure you all to remember , that non tantum est decora victoribus libertas ; quantum intollerantior servitus iterum victis . tacit. lib. . annal. this senators perswasions prevailed so much with these inraged people , as after a short consultation , four ambassadors were sent to this court from the senat and people of phocides , who presenting themselves this morning before apollo , told him , that the people of phocides , who were his majesties most devout servants , having learnt at last , that nothing can be more foolishly nor more rashly done , then for a servant to capitulate with his master , found that the priviledges , exemptions , and immunities which people owe unto their princes goodness , were nothing but occasions of scandal , and seminaries of discord between the prince and his vassals ; that therefore the phocidians being very unwilling that any thing should fall out between his majesties love , and their loyalty , which might hinder their delight in their soveraign prince , did voluntarily renounce all priviledges , immunities , and exemptions formerly granted them , and that with all the humility that became most devoted vassals , they did only presume to put his majesty in mind , that princes who did command their subjects lovingly , were alwaies faithfully served by them . the xii . advertisement . whilst some poets paralleld the greatness of rome with that of naples , a dangerous dispute arose between them ; apollo , to the end that his vertuosi might know what to say and believe in a business of such importance , commits the cause to the rota of parnassus , who decide it . vve hear from pindus by letters of the tenth of this present month , that some poets speaking before the perepatetick portal , of the greatness of the city of rome , in comparison of that of naples , luigi tansillo let these words fall from his mouth , that the suburbs of naples was bigger then all rome ; which petulant falshood being gainsaid by caro , he gave tansillo the poetical lie ; that the nobility of parthenope being thereat much incenst , would have used violence to caro ; who being succoured by the marcheggian poets , his countreymen , both parties fell to prohibited rhimes , and even to sonnets with stings in their tails , with which they were likely to have made a bloudy bickering , when the city recorder , who was soon advertised of the uprore , sent mutio iustinopolitano speedily thither , who did not only quickly appease the tumult , but made both parties pass their words not to offend each other . and because the litterati have formerly taken up arms upon the same occasion , and therewith caused bloudy business , apollo , to the end that for the future men might know how to speak and believe touching these two great cities , committed the cause to be considered on by the rota di parnasso , whom he commanded suddenly to fall upon the business , and to decide it . wherefore upon several daies hearing of both parties , the rota three daies since publisheth this decission . coram reverendo patre domino cino , die maii , . domini unanimes tenuerunt . that the city of naples should alwaies yield for majesty to the city of rome , and rome to naples , for pleasantness of situation . that rome should confess there were more people in naples , and that naples should firmly believe there were more men in rome . that the wits and wines of naples had need to be sent by sea to rome , to receive perfection in that court , and to be made more pleasing to the pallat of gallant men ; whereas the roman only was perfectest at home ; as one which without ever going out of the city , might be said to have travailed all the world over . that naples should be held the metropolitan amongst all cities of the universe for breaking of colts , and rome for managing of men : that there were more cavaliers in naples , in rome more commendums . that in rome they only deserved the title of cavalier , who bore the badg upon their cloke ; whereas all the gentlemen of naples , without having any badg upon the cloke , were deservedly called cavaliers , the cross which they bore upon their naked skin , making them sufficiently worthy of so honourable a prerogative . the xiii . advertisement . theodoricus , that famous king of italy , having ofttimes prest very much to be admitted into parnassus , is alwayes denied by apollo for a very important reason . the powerful king of italy , theodoricus , from the very first day that he came upon these confines , hath by several ambassies continually prest apollo that he might be admitted into parnassus , but still in vain ; for as oft as the proposal was made , he received a favourable denial : which put him at last into such a rage , as he had the boldness to burst forth into these blasphemous words , that apollo was partial in admitting such great princ●…es into parnassus , who by their vertuous actions had merited eternal fame , since many princes were seen to have glorious places in his court , only because they had governed petty principalities in italy ; and he who for many years had had the whole and sole government thereof , was shamefully kept out . when apollo had heard the complaints of so great a prince , he gave him to understand by the delfick chancellor , that he should do well to be quiet ; for to be plain , he did not think him worthy admittance into parn●…ssus ; since the world ought to thank none but him for the horrible atheism which was of late introduced in many provinces of europe ; for whereas the doubts about religion risen up amongst divines , were after some dispute cleared , and their errors taken away by the councels , which were made capable of declaring what was truth , and were all extirpated out of the world , by making bonefires of such as were obstinate . when he , as the head thereof , took upon him the protection of the wicked sect of the arrians , he did not only turn heresies , which require whole armies to root them out , into interest of state , but with unheard of affrontedness , he made the whole world see , that he made use of heresie , to work division amongst people , to weaken princes who were his enemies , to have adhearers in his neighbours states , to make himself head of new sects ; and to steal away the hearts of other mens subjects ; and that in his heart he had no other esteem of holy religion , but as of a powerful means , and excellent way to obtain government . the xiv . advertisement . apollo , according to his usual custom of the first day of every month , hears the petitions of such as desire to be admitted into parnassus . apollo thinks nothing more unworthy of himself , then to retard , though for never so little a space , the deserved reward of glory from those vertuosi , who by their learned writings have deserved eternal fame . whence it is that his majesty doth not only give such continual audience as is requisite , to such litterati who have occasion to desire admittance into parnassus , but hath deputed many ages ago the first day of every month , for the examination of their writings and persons , wherein all other affairs being laid aside , he only attends that business . 't is true , that not to profane those vertuous places of parnassus , by bringing thereinto such as have not been yet adjudged worthy of so honorable an aboad , the solemnity of so famous an action is not cellebrated in his majesties usual residence or palace royal , but without the walls of parnassus , in the famous phoebean field , where yesterday morning , being the first day of september , great store of pavillions being erected for his majestie , for the illustrious muses , prince poets , and learned lords of this court , apollo attended by a glorious train , came very early to the appointed place , where without any delay , commencement was given to the business . it is not to be believed how great a concourse of litterati of all professions , desirous to purchase so honorable an habitation ; appeared there that day : in so much as his majesties guard , who are strictly charged to carry themselves civilly to all men , had very much to do to keep back the infinite number of those who prest to be admitted into the audience . and though the number of pretenders be infinite , yet such are the indowments which are required at their hands who are to be admitted into such an habitation , as there are but few that attain their desired ends : for in this affair , where neither the favour of friends nor yet riches avail any thing , his merit who is to be admitted into the fruition of so great a happiness is weighed very censoriously in a just scale . here , before he pass further in the narration which he is to make , menante must acquaint all those who will read these his advertisements , with apollo's usual and laudable custom , never to begin any action of importance , without first using some of those acts of grace to his litterati , which makes princes be so beloved by their people . you must all know then , that before any writer , or illustrious personage , who in his life-time hath done any action worthy of eternal fame , be admitted to make his request known , the heads of all sciences appear before apollo , who draw forth each of them a ball from forth a well closed urne , where amidst as many other silver balls as there are sciences , three only golden balls are placed , with this order , that they who have the luck to draw forth the golden ball , shall enjoy the noble priviledg of nominating what vertuoso of their profession they best please ; to whom ( yea though he be yet alive on earth ) apollo doth by particular favour give that immortallity , and eternity of fame , which is usually only granted to such who have put a period to their humanity : a custom certainly as noble as profitable , and altogether worthy of his deep judgement , who brought it into this state , as that which serves for sharp spurs to those thirsty souls after glory , who by their honorable writings , or signal actions , have purchast that fame which is the first rise , and utmost bounds of every vertuous soul. so as since apollo doth liberally reward the pains and merits of his vertuosi before their due time , 't is no wonder if they so greedily affect the pretious coyn of eternal fame , as they think it great consolation , to consume themselves in continual managing their pen , and even killing themselves with perpetual study , esteeming it great and honorable usury to pass by some few years of their present life , to purchase that eternity which will make them live gloriously in all future ages , in the memory of men . the first who had the good fortune to draw the golden ball out of the afore-named urne , was francisco berni , the head of those italian poets who have wittily written facetious things in triplets . the second was petrarch , the prince of italian lyrick poets : the third cornelius tacitus , the chief of politick historians . francisco berni being gotten up upon a very high seat which is set of purpose in that place , for such like affairs , said with a loud and audible voice , that the prime man in these present times for pleasant triplets , was girolomo magagnati , the flowry wit of venice , whose savory rhimes he read in publick , and were much admired , not only by all the litterati of parnassus , but by the illustrious muses , and by apollo's self : and divers of the litterati taxed berni of imprudency , for that having propounded a personage of such eminency to apollo , he was not aware that he might peradventure nurse up a serpent in his bosom . but both apollo and the muses , and greatest part of poets did commend berni's ingenuity even to the skies , who like a loyal and honest florentine , could prefer another mans merits , though with hazard of his own reputation . after this , when they came to voting , all the litterati were favourable in their voices ; wherefore the delfick chancellor proclaimed aloud , eternal fame , and endless glory to girolomo magagnati ; at which words the whole colledg of vertuosi did with general applause answer placet . the writings of so fortunate a poet being consecrated to eternity , they were delivered out in a bason of gold to all the publick libraries from whence they were afterwards with the accustomed ceremony , to the delfick library . but because the illustrious ferdinand , cardinal and duke of mantua had taken la boscareccia clomira , the last and best of magnati's poems into his protection , apollo , in favour to so learned a prince , who was a publick lover of learning , and a liberal mecenas to the vertuosi , would have so lovely a pastoral appear in his presence ; wherefore berni , the solicitous promoter of all this business , came presently to the dore of the pavillion , and took that fair maid by the hand , who being waited upon to the court , not only by the rest of the noble princes , and learned mantuan barons , but even by great virgil's self , was likewise attended by dametas , corridon , titerus , niso , mirtillo , and other famous shepherds of arcadia , together with their fair nymphs ; a spectacle so acceptable to his majesty , and so pleasing to the muses , and to the whole colledg of the vertuosi , as they did not remember that they had ever received any greater consolation . when the fair clomira was presented to apollo , she fell down at his feet , and adored his royal presence ; and then rising up to the muses throne , she humbly kist the hem of their garments ; then returning to her place , she undauntedly related all the misfortunes of her love , which she had suffered to attain the marriage of her beloved igeta . then apollo , having greatly praised the constancy of so lovely a shepherdess , fell to expatiate himself upon the commendations which she deserved , for having preserved her chastity untoucht , in her so long peregrination , though cloathed in mans aparrel , in this so corrupt age . whilst apollo spake these words , a voice was heard , which amongst the infinite number of vertuosi who were flockt together to see this delightful sight , said these identical words ; if she should come into our country , she might bid her virginity goodnight . the most excellent pietro vittorio , one of the publick censors , rose up then , and asking who it was had been so rash as to utter such misbecoming words in that sacred place , commanded that he should be found out . apollo , with his a●…customed gravity , admonished the censor , that it became good men , even by wresting the words , alwaies to interpret another mans sayings in the best sense , it being the signe of an ill affected mind , to understand those things sinisterly , which might admit of a good construction ; and that he who had spoke so , deserved rather to be thanked by the judges , for the severe correction which he gave to the wicked men of his country , then to be reprehended : that therefore he who had received publick admonition , should amend his manners . and this being said , gave order that an honorable place should be allotted to the faithful clomira and her beloved igeta , amongst the other famous shepherds of arcadia . then berni drew from forth his bosom , magagnati's special writ of proxie , and giving it to the delfick chancellor , first kneeled , and then in magnaties name took the oath of allegiance which is wont to be given to all the litterati who are judged to deserve place in parnassus . wherefore berni , in the behalf of magagnaty , swore , that as he formerly had done , so for the future he would make it appear by his actions , that he did believe with his heart , and profess by his mouth , that mans true wealth lay in possessing the rich treasure of knowledg ; that he would in all places , and at all times , shew himself to be an implacable enemy to the ignorant , a ready friend to the vertuosi . and this being said , his majesties lord treasurer came to berni , accompanied by the chief exchequer officers of this state , who by the agreement made by the lord chancellor , obliged his majesties royal delfick treasury , that when the pleasant tersets , clomira , the life of st. longinus , la vernata , la meditation poetica , a noble panegyrick upon cosmo the second , great duke of ●…uscany , and the other elegant works of the vertuoso giorolimo magagnati should be lost either by fire , deluges , or any other imaginable way , apollo should out of his own royal patrimony , alwaies keep the name and fame of so famous a poet alive and glorious amongst men . the solemnity of this covenant being ended , the famous petrarch mounted the same chair ; and turning towards apollo , said , sir ! the most polished , neat , polite writer which we in these times have of italian lyrick poetry , is that reverend father don angelo grillo , a noble vertuoso of genua , whom i so much glory to have amongst the number of my followers , as i find a particular ambition in me , that i may now name him in this place , and in this age , wherein the guidiccioni , the bembi , and my beloved iovan di casa failing , and all the rest of the most observed former italian poets , nothing is usually seen in the modern ones , but a certain natural abounding vein , without the solidity of those poetical precepts which put a difference , in the opinion of the litterati , betwixt the verses of one that is born a poet , which are sung on the sodain , from those which such vertuosi who having study and art joyned to the natural talent of poetry , are continually filing , and by candle-light severely censuring their composures . this being said , every one might perceive by a certain humming that was heard amongst the litterati of so honorable a senat , how much every one was pleased at the nomination of a personage of such splendor : wherefore apollo , in whose face great joy might be discerned , said to petrarch , well beloved ! you have named a vertuoso who is indeed worthy of your choice , and who●…ly conformable to our desire : and though we love don angelo dearly , and consequently wish such length of daies unto him , as he himself desires ; yet great is our curiosity of quickly enriching this our senat by the purchase of so cryed up a personage ; to the end that my vertuosi may see and know how they are qualified , who deserve to be beloved by stones , much more by men . then the rime morale , pietosi affetti , pompee funebri , and other sacred poems , together with the prose of so flourishing a wit , being read in publick by petrarch , they for their delicacy deserved so the publick praise , as ( though it were unusual ) the senat not being able to tolerate that where there was so much worth , votes should be given in privat , viva voce , vivisque suffragiis , immortality was with extraordinary applause granted to the name and writings of the reverend father don angello grillo , with all the solemnity of proclamations , oaths and allegiance , and the lord treasurers obligations before mentioned . petrarch being retired to his own place , cornelius tacitus mounted the aforesaid chair , but with great trouble of soul to his majesty , the muses , and the whole colledg of litterati ; for , remembring that after the entrance made by so miraculous a writer into parnassus , so many ages ago , he having enjoyed the prerogative of taking out the golden ball times , he had never had the fortune to name any latin historian who might be truely stiled a polititian , they were very much troubled that modern histories , which write the naked bare narration of things , should want that politick salt , which makes the reading of history very delightful , and him very wise and learned , who delights in such like studies . but wary tacitus being much pleased with the trouble which he perceived to be in them all , said to apollo , at last most serene monarch of the stars ( though to my great affliction , it hath been long first ) that happy day so much by me desired , is come , that my detractors , who have imputed the failing or want of politian historians of my classis ; to my harsh , short , and therefore obscure stile , to my defect of alwaies joyning the reason of things , to the things written ; a way of writing which they said was shun'd as vitious and rash , rather then not imitated for its difficulty , shall have reason to know their great error , and to be quiet , when at this present time , in that famous court of rome , which having alwaies been that true trojan horse , hath sent forth continually heroes of singular vertue , and more then humane valour , there lives an elegant politick historian at last , a well relishing latin writer of the annals of his times , one who for the shortness of his stile , for his frequent sentences , for the pith of policy , his handsom way of narration and document , and for knowing how in the very narratives , to shew in two words , the occasion thereof , hath known how to imitate me so , as for the grace of this senat , and for the glory of the liberal sciences ( far be all boasting from these my expressions ) i will not call him by his own proper name of paulus emillius santorius , a famous prelat in the court of rome , but i will boldly term him another tacitus . it is not to be believed how overjoy'd apollo and all the litterati were , when tacitus nam'd one who was as acceptable to them , as the imitaters of tacitus are rare to be found . so as tacitus having with a lowd audable voice read the annals of so delightsom an author , they gave such satisfaction to ever one , as with publick and gracious suffrages , the name of paulus emillius santorius , was judged by the colledg of the litterati , to deserve the same immortality of fame , and the same glory , with which maximus cornelius tacitus had formerly been honored . when tacitus had given the accustomed oath of allegiance , and the lord treasurer had performed his part for the greater security of the immortality of so famous a writer , an end was put to t he nomination of such writers as were yet alive . whereupon they fell immediately to the admission of such litterati as had arived at parnassus , after their deaths , for the writings , and actions which they had done whilst they were living . the first then who presented himself before apollo , was marius equicola , who spake thus unto his majesty , i ( most gloricus prince of planets ) very well know my own affrontedness in pretending for the rich reward , and pretious patrimony of that eternal fame which they enjoy , who you think worthy of the glorious patrimony of parnassus , by my weak endeavors in those my writings , wherin i was made to shew the nature of love ; but the great benignity which your majesty useth towards the lovers of learning , doth so largely supply the smallness of mens merits , as i do thereby dare to crave the exorbitant usury of receiving much , for the little that i give . when apollo had heard the request of this vertuoso , if you have brought nothing else with you ( friend mario ) said he , then that little volume which you have there of the nature of love , i am sorry that i must tel you , you have taken pains to no purpose ; having laboured to shew the world the nature of that love , which is so well kno●…n to all men , as that there is not any one that knows not in some sort how to conceal it ; you might have deserved a chief place in this my state , i tell you , if you had bestowed your labour in writing the nature of hatred , which every ignorant common person knows so well how to palliate with the name of good-will , and cover with the false cloke of love , as the world is full of the complaints and appeals of those unfortunate people , who for having trusted too much , exclaim of being assassinated by their friends . marius equicola departed much afflicted from the court , by reason of this his majesties resolute answer , next to whom came sforza oddo , a famous perugian doctor of law , who laid at his majesties feet , his compleat treatises , della compendiosa sostitutione , and della restitutione in integro , and the volumes of his learned conciglis ; which in a short , but pithy oration , he desired might be consecrated to immortality . this litterato was very acceptably and graciously received by his majesty , and by the colledg of the vertuosi ; but , but little honour was done to those his works ; not for that they were not compleatly learned , but for that treatise of law being of very little esteem in this state , sforza was only admired for the sweetness of his disposition , and for his being very much verst in all the most commendable sciences . immortality was therefore , but coldly , and with weak applause decreed to sforza , and to his writings ; and when he had taken the accustomed oath of allegiance between the chancellors hands , he was told by the master of the pegasean ceremonies , that his business being ended , he might be gone . sforza replyed , that he could not , nor ought not to be gon before his majesties exchequer was bound to keep his name and fame alwaies alive in mens memories , as he had seen done to magagnati , and others . apollo hearing this dispute , he spake thus to sforza ; know most honored litterato , that i willingly bind my royal exchequer , for security of perpetual fame to those my vertuosi who are admitted into parnassus ; but this belongs not to doctors of the law , with whose writings i out of good reason proceed otherwise ; for knowing that the infinite volumes of modern lawyers , have put those laws into so great confusion , in the clearness and perspicuity whereof mans greatest felicity lies , as to end suits which are made everlasting ; the capricio s of privat men are more imbraced and followed , then the decrees of princes , and in the multitude of the variety of common opinions , the opinions of writers are rather imbraced then weighed : i foresee that within a short time princes will be forced to free mankind , afflicted by so great disorder , with extirpating out of the world the writings of those iurisconsulti who by their infinite cavilings , have turned the administration of sacred justice into an execrable merchandize . wherefore i should too much injure my exchequer , if i should oblige it to keep the fame of those infinite volumes written by the doctors of law , perpetually alive , which i foresee for certain will shortly all be burnt , as being publike prejudicial enemies to mankind . sforza , by reason of this unexpected answer of apollo , looked very pale , and being much afflicted , reassumed his writings consecrated to immortality ; and putting them under his left arm , took from out his bosom , three excellent comedies made by him , de morti vivi , and della erofilamacchia , and della prigione d'amore : andshewing them to his majheld up in his right hand , said ; most illustrious prince of the zodiack , i rather desire to obtain certain immortality amongst the italian comick poets , then that of the doctors of law , which , as your majesty hath said , is so manifestly exposed to the danger of fire . i am so delighted with the sight of this so glorious abode in parnassus , as i will not leave any thing unindeavoured , that i may never depart from thence . i therefore humbly beseech your majesty not to think me unworthy thereof . apollo then commanded the vertuosissimo alexandro picolommeni , called lo stordito intronato , the prince of italian comick poets that he should acquaint the colledg of the litterati with his opinion of those commodities , which picolommini having done , and therein highly exaggerated sforza's wit , immortality was again decreed unto him , by all the litterati of parnassus ; and all the aforesaid solemnities being performed , sforza departed very much joy'd from the royal audience . giovanni desp●…uterio , a dutch schol-master , presented apollo next with his grammer , and earnestly desired to be admitted into parn ssus . to whom apollo answered , that being cloy'd with so nausty a generation , by reason of the musty , mouldy disputations and questions which daily arose in parnassus , between the pedanticks , he was resolved rather to lessen their number , which was grown too great , then ever to adde any one more to them , that therefore he might depart when he pleased . though apollo had so clearly excluded despauterius , yet was not he a whit discouraged ; but with a pedantick petulancy , answered , sir , if your majestie shall please to give such satisfaction to my demands , as i desire , i am so far from intending to displease your majestie , or any of your litterati in parnassus , as i promise and oblige my self to teach my easie grammar to all such children as shall come to my school gratis . appollo replyed , that he was not the first , who under pretence of so charitable a work , had intruded themselves into parnassus ; that donato first , then guarin , scopa and m●…rcinello next , and many other grammarians , who by their excessive number had so defiled parnassus , had made use of the same fair pretence , who being afterwards grown wealthy by the profuse liberallity of their schollars parents , whereas their large donatives , ought to have encouraged them in so good a work , they contrary to all mens expectation , had wrought the contrary effect ; for being already become rich , as soon as they saw they could live plentifully upon their own incomes , they abandoned their profession of teaching , and impiously spurn'd at that charity which seemed first to be so deeply graven in their hearts ; so as such being become unuseful in parnassus , were a visible incumbrance to him , and to his litterati . apollo further added , that notwithstanding all that had been said , that he would willingly allow despauterius an abode in parnassus ; but upon condition , that whensoever he should shut up his school , he should restore all the moneys to the parents , which he had taken for instructing their children . when despauterius had heard this proposal made by apollo , he , without further replying , made all the haste he could out of the court ; and answered iohn baptist guarina , who reprehended him for his shamedenying to accept of his majesties offer , that it being usual with all men to be soon glutted with any one , and to love new things , the usual custom of curtizans , to put forth part of their moneys which they had got in their youth , to keep themselves thereby from being necessitated to turn bawds when they grow old , was more then platonick wisdom , and therefore worthy to be admired and imitated by every one . and that it became a wary man , so to consider his own interest , together with his charity used to his neighbour , as that that love failing , wherewith all men were at last cloy'd , a man might live commodiously of himself , without running the hazard of being forced to beg his bread when he should be old and decrepit . dispauterius was no sooner gone from the audience , but olao magno the curious writer of the gothish affairs , and of the other northern nations , and the historian of so many famous kingdoms of china , came joyntly thither ; who when they had presented their writings unto his majestie , made the usual request that they might be consecrated to immortallity . then titu , livius the soverain prince of latin historians , who was appointed by apollo to give his opinion of them , did mainly oppose them , accusing them for fabulous , and rather written to shew their own curious capacious inventions , then the solid truth which he was obliged to do , who would deserve the name of a perfect historian . all the litterati to whom apollo also referred it , joyned in this opinion with li●…y ; for they thought it a very scandalous action to admit of the slack compositions of those vainly curious wits , who had fill'd their writings with incredible things , and therefore meerly fabulous , amongst the strict historical writings . onely the polititian tacitus differed from the opinion of livy , and of the other historians , who said , that these men who had described , and recounted the actions of the most remote northern nations , and of the furthest eastern people , ought not to be proceeded with , with such rigour , as was exactly observed with those who wrote the histories of known nations , and neighboring people , for that with every one , omne ignotam pro magifico est , tacit. vita agric. and that it was very true , majoracredi de ab●…ntibus , tacit. lib. . hist. this opinion of tacitus , though it were singular , was approved of by his majestie , whereupon the northern histories , and those of china , together with the names of their authors , were with the wonted solemnities consecrated to eternity . 't is true , that apollo told olao , that by all means he must moderate the greatness of those northern eagles , which prey'd upon elephants , and carried them up into the ayr ; which appeared so disproportionable to him , and his colledge of litterato's , as it would not be born withal , no not in plinies mouth . and he said to the author of the china history , that he should reduce the immence metrapolitan city of so many kingdoms , inhabited by many millions of men to some credible measure ; and particularly , that he should bring the palace of that king , which he had affirmed to be many miles long , to such a form , as vitruvius should not laugh at him for it , saying , that if that building were so great as he had described it to be , the halls must needs be half a mile long , and the chambers little less ; which if it were true , the whole academy of architects had reason to say , that to bring the meat hot to the table , the servants of so great a king must ride post . these two mens business being ended , thomaso bozio entred the court , a noble aggobine vertuoso , no less famous in the court of rome for his sanctity of life , then for his learning , wherewith he was abundantly endowed ; and was therefore received , and looked upon by apollo , and by the whole colledge of vertuosi , with extraordinary demonstrations of love . this so famous personage presented apollo with his learned writings , de signis ecclesiae dei , and his other noble pieces , which were all of them exceedingly praised and celebrated by the censors . they onely said , that in his book deruinis gentium adversus machiavellum , there were many things observed , which deserved to be censured and corrected , in that wicked writers desperate policy ; but that notwithstanding , since they saw not that there was any the least mention made in all that book , of the ruines of any nation or people , they were of opinion that those words de ruinis gentium should be cancelled as superfluous , and placed in the frontispiece of the book , onely to make the title more stately and glorious . this caveat of the censors was so readily pursued by apollo , and the colledge of vertuosi , as apollo complained very much of the great abuse of many writers , who to make their works seem more learned and curious to others , do fraudulently give them glorious and stately titles , not minding that they were very far differing from what was contained in their works : a cheat which being only committed for the advantage of the book-sellers , to make the books more vendible , was much like the falshood of those merchants , who selling their corn in sacks , lay the worst and rotten stuff in the bottom , and cover it over with very good grain which they put at the top : and the writers who were truely vertuosi , ought to think , that noble matter , learnedly handled in the bodies of their books , did render their titles ( though not so curious ) as famous as a title unlike the matter treated on , did infinitely shame whatsoever elegant composition . apollo having said these things , immortality ( according to the custom of this court ) was graciously granted to the name and writings of this renowned litterato . bozio's admittance into parnassus being had , as hath been said , an italian poet appeared before the pavillion where audience was given , on horseback , with a guide before him , who that he might come time enough to the daies solemnation of admittance of the litterati into parnassus , had taken post at corinth ; this man , as soon as he got off horseback , presented himself before apollo with his boots and spurs on ; to whom he delivered a book of songs made by himself ; and then desired that the glory of eternal fame might be decreed to his name and stanza's . it is not easily to be believed with what joy this litterato was received by the whole senat : wherefore apollo having received his song-book with shew of extraordinary affection , as soon as he had read certain madrigals , and sonnets full of lascivious and obscene conceits , he , as if he had had a serpent , or some other perilous beast , threw the song-book into the midst of the room ; and afterwards growing very red in the face , through anger , go ( said he ) and publish these your lascivious ribaldries in the stews and bawdi-houses ; for in my state , which is the habitation of all chaste vertue , such ruffion pieces as this are not admitted . i myself ( and i glory to speak it in this place have been a lover , and consequently i love amorous poetry ; but this must be when love is handled with such terms of civility by modest poets , which i so much admire in my most modest petrarch , : nor can i sufficiently wonder how some modern poets can be so shameless as to make use of learning , which was wholly brought into the world to sow vertue amongst men , therewith to teach others the use of wicked lust ; and the practice of every most detestable vice : nor can i imagin how it can be possible that any man should be so sullied with the sluttery of uncleanness , as that he dare publish those obscenities with his pen , in clear day-light , and in the sight of the whole world , which are committed by libidinous men , not without blushing , and remorse of conscience , in the dark , secretly within sheets in close chambers ; and that they do not only not acknowledg such slips to be actions which bring with them eternal infamy , but that they are grown so blind , as that they hope to win same unto themselves , and purchase eternal glory by those things which deserve perpetual punishment . apollo had not made an end of speaking , when the unfortunate poet went out of the hall , and he and his guide getting upon the same horses whereon they came , left parnassus as fast as they came thither : and to his greater scorn , his book , which no man durst touch with their hands , as if it had been infectious , was by the publick aparators kickt out of the court. in this interim a base mountebank forced the guard at the dore of the pavillion , and with a box which he had under his arm , and a dog which he led in his hand , entred the court ; the dore-keepers ran immediately to keep so unworthy a fellow from coming before his majesty , and taking him by both the arms , pluck him out of the pavillion : the mountebank being very strong , strugled hard to keep in , and cryed out aloud that he would be heard : apollo was sorry to see the poor wretch so handled , and commanded the souldiers to forbear further troubling him ; the mountebank then spread his cloke upon the ground , and opening his box , drew forth a great sheet of vellum , at which a large seal was hanged ; and shewing it to his majesty , to the muses , and to the colledg of litterati , said , sir , to prove that the sope which i for the general good deliver out to every one , to take away whatsoever stain of shame or dishonour ( unless it be the disgrace of having married a whore ) out of the vestments of peoples reputation , is miraculous , and the only thing in the world ; let all men behold this my priviledg , granted me by the invincible and alwaies glorious prince , charls the first , king of france ; who thought this my secret worthy so singular a favour , only because i took avvay that great spot of oyle from off his royal robe , with this my sope , not any waies injuring the stuff , which ariadeno barbarosso threw upon it . wherefore i earnestly beseech your majesty , and all those who are in this consecrated place , that my commodity may be fully tryed ; and if every one find it not to be the rare thing which i have said , i desire it may immediately be burnt . apollo seemed to be much taken with the vivacity of this bold mans wit , whom he asked what his dog was good for ? the charletan answered , that the modern world being become sensual , he gathered company together to hear him , with this his dog which could shew tricks . if it be so ( said apollo ) this your occupation seems to me to be much like to the catching of birds ; for you with your prating play the fowlers part who whistle ; your sope is the bait which is put upon the bird-lime , your dog the owle , those that hear you and believe you , the guls , who leaving some feathers of small money in the bird-lime of your merchandize , makes your quarry good . but since you are unfortunately falne upon this place , where such as you are , are but little credited , and your commodities not like to go off , for that my litterati have no stains at all in their aparrel , do me and my vertuosi the pleasure to see your dog play : the charletan obeyed , and made his dog , which was singularly well taught , shew many tricks , which it did so handsomly , and with such understanding , obeying whatsoever his master bad him do , as he seemed to have human sense . the graver sort of the senat wondred very much to see apollo waste the time appointed for businesses of such weight , in looking upon such trivial pleasure , especially since his majesty seemed to be much delighted with the dogs tricks , which continued a good while : but their wonder turned soon into admiration , when apollo , whose property it is to extract excellent documents , and useful precepts , even out of the vilest things that he looks upon , cryed out , oh the glory of knowledg ! oh the great felicity of my illustrious vertues ! the only rich patrimony of mankind : o my dearly beloved litterati , rejoice with me , cheer up your hearts , since now you see with your eyes , the great power of knowledg , the worth of science , when a little knowledg which a man hath been able to teach a dog , is sufficient not only to make both him and his master live plentifully , but to cause him to enjoy the greatest content which can befall a large soul , of seeing the world , and getting good gain thereby , and yet there be some who value them not , who despise them , and persecute them as being prejuditial . the mountebank being liberally rewarded , and dismist by order from apollo , a vertuoso appeared before his majesty , who whilst he lived in the world , by reason of his pleasant pregnant wit , and his graceful comportment , having been the delight of the roman court , was by all men known to be that baldo cataneo , who was so admired by the vertuosi of that court , for his pleasant witty conceits , and his gravity in more serious affairs , both in prose and in verse , as he deserved the munificent allessandro peretti cardinal montalto for his liberal mecenas . this poet presented apollo with the first canto's of his argonautica , a poem composed by him in eight lined stanzas ; and bitterly bewailing his misfortune in dying in the flowre of his age , said , his death was for no other cause displeasing to him , save only that he must now lay before his majesties feet , that immature fruit of his brain , which if he had lived longer , he hoped would by increase of years have been so perfected , as it would have been more then meanly pleasing to the litterati : which calamity was the reason why for his small desert , and by reason of the misfortune of this poem , he now desired that immortality unto his name , of meer grace and favour , which he had hoped to have been able to have challenged of right and justice . apollo with great humanity , but in words and gesture , answered cataneo , that both himself , and all the vertuosi of parnassus were very sensible of his immature death , both bad him comfort himself in the benign laws of parnassus , since thereby for the better encouragement of his litterati , the good mind , and vertuous intention of his beloved poets being had in more regard , then the quality of the compositions which they brought to parnassus , they gave with the same liberality the reward of intire immortality , to poems which were but begun by the pregnant brains of the litterati , and which were interrupted , not by lasiness , but by death , as if they had been brought to their full perfection . thus was immortality favorably decreed to the name and writings of baldo cataneo , who being with wonted solemnity , placed by the masters of the pegasean cerimonies , amongst the demi . gods who enjoy the signal prerogative of immortality to their names and fames ; a litterato appeared in the royal audience , who by his gown , after the grecian fashion , and by the evident signe of his beard , was known by the greatest part of the senat , for that famous timotheo greco , who having gaged his beard about the dispute of a syllable , with francisco filelfo , that famous poet of marcha , it was by the severe victor cut off ; whereupon all the spectators began again to laugh , and greatly to wonder how timotheo , who had never been very wise , had so much to his prejudice , dared to present himself in that place , to demand a residence in parnassus , which is only granted to the litterati of highest esteem . yet timotheo , spake boldly thus to apollo : i may truely say i have been rather a lover of learning , then that by my perpetual study i may have deserved the name of a perfect litterato , though i come empty-handed before your majesty , and i dare demand a place in parnassus amongst your litterati ; yet i hope i shall not part from your royal presence , without receiving some favour from that your immense benignity , which doth largely reward the bare intense desire which men have of knowledg . timotheo was upon his knees ( as the custom is ) whilst he made this his petition to apollo , when ( a thing that was never at any time before observed to be done to any personage how eminent soever ) his majesty beckned to him to stand up , and bad him be covered : and then commanded , that according to the custom , the senat should give their suffrages touching timotheus admittance : the litterati , who had but an ill opinion of timotheo , and therefore were sorry to see him enter the court , firmly believed , that by the extraordinary favour done to one whom filelfo had so affronted , his majesty would try the stedfastness of his senators opinions in giving their votes ; and whether they would be diverted by his extraordinary usage towards any whosoever : wherefore they did not only all of them joyntly give him the repulse , but many of them shewing themselves more zealous of the glory of parnassus then they needed , said freely , that the great affront put by filelfo upon timotheo , did not only mark him out to every one for an ignorant person , but for a great babler , a thing which his majesty and the whole senat did much detest . you my faithful litterati ( answered apollo ) have given a very ill judgement of this my vertuoso , one , than whom ( and let not this be offensive to any one ) mine eyes never beheld a more glorious personage , and to whom the glory of eternal fame , with all the most priviledged prerogatives , ought rather to be given . o how signal , how immense , how praise-worthy was the glory which thou ( my dear timotheo ) didst get in the loss of the wager which thou didst lay with filelfo , how much ought it to be commended , admired , and rewarded by me , and by these my litteratio more then all the actions ever done by any whoever thirsted after glory . thou art he alone , who to this day hast known how , by keeping constant to thy oath made , and by making good thy word , to purchase that crown of glory of maintaining promise both to god and man , which most commonly is so abusefully measured by the compass of interest , both by princes and privat men , as there can no so strict form of oath be found , no faith whereby to bind men , from which they cannot tell how to acquit themselves , not only by a thousand evasions , but even by affronted impiety . thine then timotheo , be the chief and most honorable place of this my senat ; and let all men learn by the glory which 〈◊〉 this day adjudge thee worthy of , that men win so much honour by constantly keeping their word when it is once given , yea though it be prejudicial to their own affairs ; as glory is by all men esteemed beyond comparison , greater then the love of any thing that is earthly . this was the end of fortunate timotheus his business , when ferdinando of aragon , the catholike king of spain , appeared with great gravity in the court , and attended by a great many lords , who complained grievously , that it being a hundred years since he had earnestly prest to be admitted into parnassus , he could never obtain his desire ; and that it was not only he alone , but even all those that knew him , that thought it a great injury done him , to be denied that abode , which was easily granted to many that were inferior to him , both in merit and state. apollo answered king ferdinando , that it was the antient custom of parnassus , that princes who desired to be admitted into his state , should be chosen by the votes of the litterati of their own nation , as those who knew best their kings deserts , and that he would by no means break those orders which by so long a concourse of time had still proved good ; and then his majesty having commanded that they should again go to their votes , he in a grave manner minded the nation of arragon , how straitly she was bound , both to god and man , to weigh the merits of her kings , with the ballance of a soul free from all passion : the votes being given , they were all found to be negative ; for which reiterated injury , ferdinando being highly incensed , sir , said he ; can then such a king as i be so ill dealt withall , and scorned by his ungrateful nation , without being able to receive remedy for such injustice , for so manifest injury from apollo's self ? what other nation , either in antient or modern times , is there in all the world , which ought to acknowledg it self more obliged unto its prince , then is arragon to me its king , and so great benefactor ? who from that obscurity of fame which every one knows she was in , have made her to be held in high esteem by all the nations of the earth , by the glorious union which i made between the powerful kingdom of castiel and her , by queen isabels marriage . whilst king ferdinando with strange alterations of mind , said these things , it was observed that some of the chief arragon senators shook their heads , which he , taking to be done to his yet greater disgrace , grew so incenst , as apollo observing it , to avoid some foul inconvenience which might ensue thereupon , made him aware of his great error , which blinded with passion , he committed in that his cause ; telling him , that princes did then make their nations great and powerful when they united them to an inferior nation ( as the kings of france had done by the important acquisition of britany ) and not to a more numerous and potent kingdom . for in the first case , by aggrandizing her empire , men made their nation mistriss ; whereas in the other , by lesning her dominion , they made her a slave . whilst king ferdinando departed the audience , no waies appeased by this his majesties wise answer ; to the great admiration of the whole colledg , a sparrow-hawk came flying into the court , and lighting upon the publick chair , infused wonder into all the spectators , who took it for some prodigious thing , which signified some great matter . and the souldiers of the guard running to drive her out of the pavillion , his majestie commanded them to let her alone . then the roman augures or southsayers rose up and desired apollo that they might interpret that augury ▪ apollo laught at the request of those vain men , and told them , that futurities were so hidden by immortal god , from men , as he was a meer fool who pretended he could foretell them by the flying of birds , or any such like thing which hapned by chance ; and that if they would make use of their art of augury , by their ordinary interessed ends of making ignorant men more obedient and ready in the execution of such things as they desired , shewing them that the will of god concurred with mans command , they should know that parnassus was no aboad for such fools as could be whirld about by the holy and sacred pretences of malitious interessed men . apollo having said these things , and great silence insuing thereupon , the hawk spake thus : that vertue which is thought to be only peculiar to man , is not only known by other animals , but loved by them , and greedily imbraced , is clearly proved by the aptness which is seen in birds , to learn several tunes which they hear sung by others , and by their learning to speak like man ; by the corveting and dancing of four-footed beasts , and by other things which they see , or are taught , the which they do as gracefully imitate , as they do easily learn. this truth ( most glorious prince of the planets ) is sufficient to make the wonder cease in all those that hear me , why i , a savage bird , who live by rapine , and am therefore thought to have a cruel heart , and to be fiercely minded , should desire the so happy and blessed aboad of parnassus . to adorn the soul with vertue , the desire of good conversation is not only infused by god into men , who are indued with an understanding able to know all things , but into all sorts and conditions of creatures : and since i very well know that those are only admitted into parnassus , who by their words and acts , either have taught , or are able to teach holy precepts , good doctrine , and vertuous things , i certainly may with much reason pretend to be thought very worthy to live in these fortunate habitations . i know that all these glorious litterati will grant me , that mans subsistence , that the good beginnings , better progress , and best end of all vertuous life depends upon the education which parents give their children ; this as necessary , as badly known science of breeding up children well , is notwithstanding very ill practised by men , and very well known by the instinct of nature to bruit animals : i , if it may stand with your majesties approbation , am come to instruct in parnassus ; listen therefore gentlemen , and admire ; amongst us birds there is no more immense love then that which children bear to their fathers : but i find mans ignorance to be so gross , that amongst them the greatest enemies which children have , are their fathers : for the unbowel'd love which they bear unto them , is more prejudicial to them , then is their enemies implacable hatred . love even to ones own children , hath its bounds and limits , which those who exceed , occasion ruine to their children ; and that you may judge of other animals , by the example which i shall shew you of us birds ; we do so affectionately love our young ones , as to feed them upon urgent necessity with flesh torne out of our own breasts , is not our utmost charity to them ; but we do notwithstanding ( as men unfortunately do ) love them when they are old ; but by the wise instinct of nature , only so long as they must of necessity be fed by us ; for when we find their claws begin to grow sharp , and their wings strong , the first fit for prey , the other for flying , we use the last and most perfect bounds of charity in not loving them any longer ; not for that that paternal affection which lives in fathers even after their childrens death , ceaseth to be amongst birds , but because that infinite affection of parents to do what is best and most convenient for their children , requires it should be so ; the love of fathers to their children is not only useful , but necessary ; but only so long as they are not able of themselves to get their living , and harmful , and directly pernitious , if they assist them when they are able by their own labours and industry to live plentifully of themselves : for certainly mens children would be very industrious , if their parents would only love them till that time which god hath prefixt unto us , and that they would do like me , who when i see my young ones can fly currantly , i shew them hedges full of sparrows , that they may live plentifully : so men , when their children are become men like themselves , should shew them princes courts , and chief metropolitan cities , wherein much business is transacted ; to the end that they might maintain themselves not like idle and unusefull lumps of flesh buried in sloathfulness , and total ignorance , but by their own vertuous industry . apollo having heard so necessary a lesson for men , after having highly praised the sparrow-hawk , and deputed it a safe and honourable place in parnassus , he said , now at last , my beloved vertuosi , we find clearly , that the immortal god having infused full and perfect wisdom into bruit-beasts , for what concerns their preservation and propagation ; the true philosophy which makes men wise , and to which by continual study and speculation they ought to attend , is to observe their natural instincts , and diligently to practice them in what concerns themselves ; for so they might lead their lives happily , not by the capriciousness of several sects of philosophers , so far differing in opinion amongst themselves , but by living according to holy and prudent natural precepts ; and as it would be a foul disorder if birds , and other bruit animals should feed their children till they grow old in their nests and dens ; so it must be confest that parents do very ill , who taking more care how to accumulate wealth and riches for their children , then to leave them the pretious and alwaies permanent patrimony of learning , which fire cannot consume , deluges devour , nor tyrants take away , instead of breeding up men that may be useful for their own families , and serviceable to their countries , and to the world , do most unfortunately breed up unuseful and vitious lumps of flesh , who not knowing wherein else to spend their lives , girting their swords about them , that to the end that they may appear true gentlemen , imitate those unfortunate pismires , who are then sure to fall into rain , when they put on wings . for it is evident that those great patrimonies which are got by learning , are ruined by the use of arms. thus said apollo , when the famous philip commines , lord of argenton , appeared before his majesty , and shewed his memorials to the senat of litterati ; and then desired , that together with their author , they might be consecrated to immortality . when argentonne had made his demand , apollo commanded titus livius , prince of the colledg of history , to give his opinion upon argentons memorials ; who said , he saw no reason why that french lord should desire that his writings should be placed amongst the learned labours of historians which were preserved in the delfick library ; since there was in them no gravity of stile , no strength of eloquence , no good contexture of times , no frequent sentences , no orations , nor any other thing worthy an indifferent historian : but that he having woven these his memorials according to the vain fantastick way of romance , in sundry chapters , wherein are handled the weighty matters of fact , between the two glorious and potent princes , lewis the twelfth , king of france , and charls , duke of burgony , the first known by all men to be wise , the other valiant , he thought him fitter to be placed amongst the writers of romances , then in the historical classis . apollo was so little satisfied with this relation of livy , as not without some commotion of mind , he answered , livy , those requisites which as i perceive by your relation , you think ought first to be had in consideration in a perfect historian , are those which i think ought to be considered last in my vertuosi . history is meat not only well seasoned to please the curious pallat , but substantially and magnificently served in to please the soul ; and therefore more respect is to be had therein to profit , then to pleasure : and you are very much deceived if you believe , that to the study of history it be requisite to have a neat polite phrase , either in latin , greek , french , or italian ; the sole end of so honorable a study , is to come by that wisdom , which is only drunk in by the reading of past affairs . and though i highly commend your stately stile , and cesars so polished speaking , yet i would have you know , that those things which you hold the first ; are the last in a perfect historian . truth is the soul of history , which makes it long liv'd , and well esteemed of amongst men , as also the knowledg how to explain the deep councels , most secret thoughts of princes , all the cunning intriegoes used in times of peace and war , in the government of their states ; which though they be written in poor law-latin , affords such content to vertuous minds , as doth eternize his writings , who hath wit enough to weave such histories . and amongst these i esteem judicious commines the chief , and doe not only think him very worthy a place in parnassus , but command that the first place amongst french historians be assigned to him . it grew now very late , and apollo having taken great pains in listning to the reading of so many writings , and hearing so many requests , was very weary ; when berni , mauro , molza , and other pleasant and jovial poets , to make his majesty merry , brought a poet into the court , so sordidly aparrelled , with his clothes all tattered , and smelling of smoak , as he was not unlike a chimney-sweeper : this man having moved great laughture in the senat , came before apollo , to whom with a rude discomposed reverence , he presented a very greasie poem . his majesty asked him who he was ? who answered , that he was the author of the famous poem di bovo d' antona . apollo seemed then to have heard of him , and told him that he was the ariosto of ballad-makers ; apollo listned then so attentively to one whole canto of that poem , scowling sometimes , as he made all men wonder that his majesty could so much as cast an eye upon so foolish a thing . apollo , who observed his litterati's amazement , said , that he much admired that writer , whom they so much scorned and laught at , since knowing so little , he had the courage to write so much . a thing which might make many of them blush , who knowing much , had writ little : and that the excuse made by many was very naught , and altogether unbecoming a vertuoso ; that there was no more need of writing verses , since princely virgil had writ , that matters of physick being treated on by hippocrates and galen , ought not be toucht upon by any others ; and that he spent his time in vain , in writing about the mathematicks , who had well considered euclids writings ; for there was no book which had not somewhat of good in it ; and that conceits and doctrines were found in many latin poets , in more writers of physick , and in some authors of the mathematicks , which did not only equal , but exceed any in virgil , hippocrates , or euclid ; and that he hated some wits , who having noble talents in several sciences , able to eternize their names , did cloke their sloathfulness , and hatred of writing with the name of modesty . but when apollo gave order to platina to take that greasie poet into his pastery to make him clean , to the wonder of all men , all the bels of parnassus were heard to sound an alarm , and presently after mutio iustinopolitano came out of breath into the court , and brought the dreadful news , that the monarchies and commonwealths of all the world being falne at ods , a bloudy battel was likely to insue , unless some speedy remedy were found out . apollo , though at the very instant hearing of this so sodain chance , he was able of himself to put on a resolution worthy of his own wisdom ; yet in a business of such danger , he would hear the opinion of his council of state , though tumultuary given . and though most were for quenching the sparkles of so dangerous a fire , with the usual guards of the palace , with two legions of satyrical poets , and with the pretorian lyrick souldiers , and that his majesties royal person should be reserved for a more urgent remedy , when all other hopes failed , yet tacitus his sole opinion prevailed with apollo , who resolutely said , ire ipsum , & opponere majestatem imperatoriam debuisse , cessuris ubi principem longa experientia , eundemque severitatis , & munificentiae summum vidissent . tacit. lib. . ann. wherefore apollo marched speedily toward parnassus , where the ordinary guards of provincial poets , and the company of curasiers of italian litterati , who were in all haste sent before , found not only the chief streets chained up , and the foro massimo secured with good corps de guard , but the habitations of all the monarchies and common-wealths well fortified , and furnisht with armed men ; and the monarchs , as well as the consuls , dukes , standard-bearers , burgamasters , and other chieftains of commonwealths , were even then with their pikes couched ready to fall on : when the princes and commonwealths hearing of his majesties approach , bore such reverence to his royal presence , as throwing their weapons on the ground , greatly fearing to be seen and known , fell flat down : which made every one see how much the presence of a prince who is well beloved and feared by his people , prevails with his subjects in such and other like cases of urgent danger . the tumults being thus quieted , as soon as apollo came to his own palace , he sent for all the monarchies and commonwealths that were resident in parnassus ; and all of them readily appearing , he bad the consul marcus marcellus acquaint him with the true reason of those tumults . the consul said , that at a certain meeting , wherein were many monarchs , roman consuls , dukes of venice , florentine confalonieri , and dutch burgamasters , it fell into discourse whether monarchies or republicks were the better government ; that philippo maria vissinte , duke of millan , had the boldness to say , that all republicks , especially aristocracies , were insufferable governments of many tyrants ; that the illustrious dukes of venice , as those that enjoy the perfectest aristocracie that ever was , having given him the lie , all monarchies and commonwealths , being concerned in common by this difference , were , as his majesty might see , falne together by the ears . apollo was the more displeased hereat , for that by an edict of his publisht long ago , he had commanded upon pain of grievous punishment , that this so ancient question , and which had been so often discust by the litterati , should be no more disputed ; but that every one should rest content with his present condition . then turning to duke philip , who was the sole author of this disturbance , he said , that having spoken too inconsiderately of aristocracies , he ought to know , that well governed states were discerned from such as were tyrannical , by their peaceable and long life ; for tyrannical governments being alwaies full of conspiracies of the nobles , and of the commonalties rebellions , lasted but awhile , and that it might easily be seen what satisfaction the people of venice enjoyed by the long time that that flourishing commonwealth had lived , and by the continual peace that she had enjoyed at home : and that to make this truth appear the more plain to all the monarchies that were there present , he would put them in mind of a business which had lately falne out in venice , whereby every one might see with what , and with how much modest liberty people did live in that well governed commonwealth : for vettore calergi , a noble venetian , having left behind him one only daughter with the rich portion of half a million of crowns ; yet the marriage of this so rich maid was so modestly endeavoured by the venetian nobility , as her mother might quietly marry her to whom she liked best ; who wisely chose vicenso gremani , a noble venetian , and next akin to her daughter , for her daughters husband . now tell me ingeniously ; philip , what would have become of this young maid , if such a thing had hapned in one of your monarchies ? to answer your majesty ( said the duke ) with that ingenuity of soul , and liberty of language as becomes this place , doubtlesly if such a thing had hapned in any monarchy , such designs would have been had upon so rich a dowry , well befitting any queen , as with much violence ( covered over notwithstanding with the cloak of charity towards the young maid ) they would have imprisoned the mother , shut the young maid up into some monastery , or other place , only to inrich some of their favorites with this great dowry , for more then three or four such things as this , hath been done in the like case , both in italy , and elsewhere in my time , and formerly , well vvorthy to be joyned to the letters of phalaris of agrigentum . the xv. advertisement . at a publick meeting , force ( contrary to the custom of the plebean court ) pretending to take place of reputation : that beautiful lady , with excellent resolution , finds a remedy for her reputation , which was in great hazard . it is very well known in parnassus , that in all publick meetings , reputation hath alwaies had the precedency of force , and taken the right hand . but it hapned the last morning when apollo made his solemn entry into leo , force had the insolency ( wherewith he is alwaies accompanied ) to contend for place with reputation ; who , had she not been able by her excellent dexterity to overcome so dangerous a rub , had certainly received some notable affront ; yet was she very much distasted at that her enemies petulancy used toward her . wherefore the vertuosi , who were wholly devoted to that most excellent princess , incouraged her , and exhorted her , by no means to indure the insolency of that rash fellow ; and bad her moreover remember , that she was the right hand of all potentates , and the only instrument wherewith princes did rule and sway the world : that therefore she should take heart , and resolve to buckle with that hairbraind companion , whom she would so bear down , with the majesty of her countenance , at the very first incounter ; that ( as it had hapned a thousand times ) she would easily throw him down at her feet . the lady-reputation answered those her beloved vertuosi , who so incouraged her , with much meekness and civility , that she greatly cherished their good will ; but that she could neither praise , nor follow their advice : wishing them to remember , that her whole power , authority , and greatness , being grounded only upon mens opinions , which was so uncertain and various , and not upon the strength of armed men , nor upon the security of inexpugnable citadels , she must in this her adversity , proceed with great circumspections , and admirable dexterity : and that there was a great disparity between her and force , who though once discomfeited , might easily recover , and the second battle be made with greater strength , which would be the more dangerous for her , for that her enemy would to his former violence , add disdain and shame for the first discomfeiture ; but that if it should so fall out that she should not with the sole majesty of her person , and authority of aspect , bear her enemy to the ground , or worst her enemy at the very first incounter ; like an elephant which falling to the ground , cannot get up again , she should be wholly rob'd of all her greatness , which purchast her the reputation which she had amongst men : which considerations were the more necessary for her , for that she had found nothing to be more dangerous to her , then to go about to maintain that authority and reputation in strength and vigor , by force of arms , which was only grounded upon opinion : but that she would provide for the indempnity of her authority ; by her usual remedies , and would incounter force with her usual arms , and would be sure to overcome him . then she added , that force used those extraordinary terms of insolency against her , not because his own power was increased , but for that by reason of some privat disorders of her own , he found her not to have that grace and majesty which she had wont , nor to be had in such veneration by men , as formerly . having said this , the lady-reputation departed , and withdrew her self to her chamber , from whence she was not seen to stir forth for the space of some months ; but with great severity studied her amendment , banishing all privat interests for ever , clearly finding that her credit was much lesned , for having given her self too much over unto them . in the next place she wholly busied her self in sweeping with the besom of severe reformation , all sordid baseness out of her house , from whence she also extirpated avarice , over-much ambition , and all other privat , dishonest , and scandalous passions . this princess having thus corrected her privat disorders , upon a certain morning when she was to be present at some publick action , she adorned her self with purity of soul , sincerity of heart , liberality , and with other her choicest vertues ; and taking upon her the noble mantle of immence love to deserving persons , and of publick charity , she appeared with such majesty at the place where she was expected by the other illustrious vertues , and purchast such veneration and respect from the lookers on , as even force himself ( so great was the devotion which that sight wrought in him ) was seen to tremble , and upon that occasion did not only give her the precedency of the right hand ; but beg'd it as a high prerogative , that he might at that solemnity carry up her train . the xvi . advertisement . giovan francisco pico , count of mirandola , that he might the more quietly attend his studies , entreats monsignor dino da mugello , auditor of the exchequer in parnassus , that the reformers , by reason of the too great noise which they alwaies make in their profession , may be removed further from his neighbourhood ; and is not heard in his desire . the contentions , which now are greater then ever , and more obstinate between the two chief lights of philosophy , aristotle and plato , having produced the two mighty sects of platonicks and peripateticks in parnassus , which fill the colledg of litterati with troublesom disputes , and dangerous controversies ; apollo , who joies in nothing more then in the peace and quiet of his vertuosi , imployed giovan francisco pico , count of mirandola , and lord of concorde , many months agoe , in according so important controversies , who he hears hath laboured so much therein , as that the business is already brought to some good accommodation . but such a business requiring very much quiet , pico is much molested by the house of the reformers , which is next to his apartiment ; for by the continual great noise which they make , in beating water with morter , they do much annoy him ; wherefore pico came yesterday before dino da mugello , auditor of the exchequer in parnassus , and desired that he might enjoy the priviledg of scholars , in having all noisom occupations removed from his neighbourhood . the reformers answered dino , that there being no proportion to be held between their reforming the ignorant , who were drowned in the dirt of so many corruptions , and the agreeing the frivolous controversies of philosophers , they ought not to be any waies incommodated ; and that it was known to all men , that princes wrought strange effects in their states , only by keeping the house of reformation open . mirandola reply'd , that he did not only much marvel , but was scandalized at the reformers foolish pretention , the vainness of whose employment was easily known , in that their long endeavours had produced just nothing but infinite noise . dino said then again with much freedom , that there was nothing more necessary , nor of greater consequence in any whatsoever state , then that the house of reformation should still be kept open , and should make a noise , for very great was the good that redounded thereby ; but that all men had not judgement enough to discern it : for reformation was not introduced by wise princes in their states to do the world good , and to make men vertuous , but that it might serve for a curb and rampire against abuses , and to keep them from growing so powerful , as that in a few years they might overrun the whole world : moreover it wrought the excellent effect of keeping a prince continually in reputation with his subjects , by shewing them that he had a careful eye to the general good ; for men were as well contented with their princes good-will , as with the good effects which they see proceeds from thence : a thing so true , as the greatest error which could be committed by any that rule , was to let men see by their leaving the reyns loose to all corruption and abuses , they cared not how the world went. the xvii . advertisement . tacitus being excluded from out the most famous common-wealths of europe , makes a grievous complaint to apollo ; and is by them with much honour received again , and much made of . though the most excellent caius cornelius tacitus be esteemed the oracle for policy in this court of parnassus , and therefore is highly reputed by the greatest monarchs of europe , yet envie being alwaies a capital enemy to vertue , some malitious people by their continual ill offices , have rendred this so illustrious personage , so hateful to most of the chastest commonwealths that reside in this state , as some few daies agoe they joyntly forbad him their houses . in so much as the very venetian liberty , which professeth exact chastity before all others , and is farthest from suspition , shut her dore upon him the other day ; for these chaste princesses think it stands not with their honour to converse with him who is held by men to be the only architect of tyranny . tacitus soon resented this so signal affront , both in words and writing , not only with all the republicks that are resident in this state , but even with apollo's self , to whom with great commotion of mind , he grievously complained , that he had been most wickedly assassinated by his ancient ill-willers , and that in very deed , the ancient and modern republicks were not more obliged to plato , aristotle , licurgus , or to any other legislater , or instituter of living free , then to him , if his annals and histories were examined and well considered by learned men , not over-byassed with passion . these complaints took deep rooting in the minds of these famous literato's , who not too much to distate so excellent a writer , and that they might be sure not to prejudice their own peculiar interests , resolved to meet together in the temple of concord , to the end that they might jointly resolve , whether it stood with their reputation to hold domestick conversation with tacitus . and after long dispute , they all agreed , that the familiar acquaintance of so politick , and so wise a writer , was more requisite for commonwealths , then for monarchies ; for they had clearly found , that tacitus his end in writing tiberius his life , was not ( as many who understood little of state-affairs had given out ) to form the type of a tyrannical government ; but that that excellent writer , by his so particular narration of the enormous cruelties , not only of inhuman tiberius , but of caligula , claudius , nero , and of the other most cruel tyrants which were emperors since , used against the roman nobility , had no other intention , then to let the senators of commonwealths see , into what deplorable calamities they run , when preferring the hatred of their privat passions , and their own self-interests before the publick good , they suffered the pretious jewel of their countries liberty , which they ought so diligently to keep and preserve , to be stoln away from them by cruel tyrants . for it being a precept exactly practiced by tyrants , wholly to extirpate the nobility which formerly bore any sway , that so they themselves might reigne securely , the inhumanity of tiberius , and others such as he , who succeeded him in the roman empire , was not used by them out of any thirst they had after human bloud , but out of meer politick necessity , and tyrannical prudence . the xviii . advertisement . the blind man of forli , that famous italian mountebank being , to the wonder of all the senat of vertuosi , admitted by apollo into parnassus , is by his majesty put upon an imployment of importance . christofano de sordi , called the blind man of forli , a famous italian mountebank , him to whom it is said , that the illustrious euterpe gave the fluent vein of singing verses ex tempore , in guiderdon , for a receit which he gave her where with to make her hair yellow , hath these many years been standing at parnassus gate , where he hath still been troublesom to apollo , sometimes by submiss prayers , sometimes by fervent pressures , and many times with importunate complaints , was so bold the last week ( which caused much laughture in the litterati ) to post up certain papers in the chiefest places of parnassus , wherein he divulged , that if there were any sprightly wit amongst the learned poets , who durst contend with him in singing verses ex tempore to his harp , he challenged him to meet him in euterpe's open field , where he would make it evidently appear , that there was never a poet in parnassus of so flowing a vein as could hold up against the fluency of his verses sung ex tempore , or that was worthy to carry his harp after him . apollo , who had ever formerly laught at the fond pretensions of this unworthy fellow , did on thursday last , of his own meer motion , in publick senat decree immortality to his name ; and commanded , that with the usual pomp of solemn attendance , he should be admitted into parnassus , and brought into his presence . the next morning the triumphant gate of parnassus was thrown open to the blind man of forli , by which such vertuosi enter , who by his majesty are judged worthy the glorious abode in parnassus ; whereat the learned barons , the prince-poets , and all the potentates of this court did so rage , as just when he set his foot upon the threshold of the dore , a great monarch was heard to say , that parnassus began now to be an aboad for trivial companions , since mountebanks and quacksalvers were admitted thereinto . these words being spoken somewhat aloud , were heard by the blind man ; who presently asked his guide who that was that had spoken so ill of him ? be quiet , said the guide , take off your hat , and , as it becomes you , make a low leg to him that hath injured you , for it was the powerful king of england , henry the eight . then said the blind man boldly , master henry , if you will play orlando's part , and choak me with your bravadoes , get you back to england , for we are all equal in parnassus ; and if mountebanks be not worthy of parnassus , i wonder how you came thither , who very well know with what ballads you cheated the english. king harry grew highly incensed at so sharp an answer , and would have taken the blind man by the beard , which was very long , and would have pul'd it off , but he withheld himself when he considered better , how unwise men of honour are , when they contend with such as have no honour to lose . as soon then as the blind man was come before apollo , he bad his guide give him his harp , and then desired his majesty that he would favour him with a theme ; whereupon ( to the teeth of all hidebound poets , who are half a year in squeesing out a woful sonnet ) he offered himself to sing a hundred octavoes ex tempore : apollo laught at the blind man , who did pretend to give satisfaction , with his silly ex tempore verses , in that place , where the best poets , with their well filed , and long studied verses , could scarcely do it ; and said unto him , i did not admit you into this place , for any pleasure i take in your verses sung ex tempore , but only that you may teach my litterati , in a publick school , which shall be assigned you , the important art of walking well and safely . giorolomo morone , secretary to sforzo , duke of millan , when he heard that blind men were to teach such as could see , how to walk ; broke forth into loud laughter ; to whom apollo , without any manner of alteration , said , moreover , i bear with this your wonder , which by the astonishment which i see in the faces of these my litterati , is common to many : but know that the waies of this present age , being so stony , and full of bad passages , as you all find them to be , blind men who walk leasurely , leaning upon a guide , and with a staff in their hand , who raise their feet high , and grope their way as they go , are excellent good to teach those hasty wits , those lively , inconsiderate , rash , and impatient spirits , how to walk safely , who being impatient of all circumspection , do abhor considerate mature delay ; and i am well pleased that you are not only an example of this truth unto your self , but unto all others . then turning to the blind man , he bad him take morone by the hand , and that he should walk two hundred paces with him ; which was done : and it fell out , that whilst the blind man and morone were walking thus , the blind man found by his staff wherewith he tryed the way before him , that he was come to a bad passage ; wherefore he held back morone , and bad him ( who was heedlesly walking over it ) stay : for , said he , morone , we are come to a place where we may break our necks ; lift your foot high , and let us be careful how we pass over this dangerous place : try every place of it with your staff , as i do , and diligently measure the length , breadth , and depth of this hole , unless you will have us fall into it . open the eyes of your judgement , which is the true lanthorn , which in darkest times , and places of greatest danger , serves for the sun. morone punctually obeyed the blind man ; and though with some trouble and expence of time , they at last overcame all hindrances , and past over the dangerous passage . apollo then bad morone turn back , and to consider well the dangerous hole , which , guided by a blind man , he had happily escaped ; which when he had done , he run full of amazement and apprehension , and threw himself down before his majesties feet , and humbly craving pardon for his having laughed , confest that by the guidance of a silly blind man , he had prosperously past over that deadly ford of the fraudulent marquiss of piscara , wherein himself , who was judged to be one of the best guides of all the italian princes , broke his neck . the xix . advertisement . luigi alemanni having in an elegant oration set forth the praises of the french nation , repented that his action afterward , and desired leave of apollo , to make his recantation , but was not permitted so to do . luigi alemanni , a noble florentine poet , gave himself to hate the spanish nation deadly , ever since his country was overcome by the forces of the emperor charls the fifth ; an action which would have purchast him much love amongst the italians , had he not obscured this his glory , with the common ignorance of many modern italians , of not knowing how to hate the spaniards , without declaring partiality to the french , of whom alemanni grew so inamoured , as much to his majesties admiration , he asked leave to make a publick oration in praise of them ; a resolution which did not only redound to his own particular shame , but to the shame of all italy ; every one being scandalized that so famous a florentine poet should extoll the praise of that nation , from whose sole ambition italy may justly acknowledg all her present slavery to proceed . alemanni made this his oration , and did therein very much exaggerate the glory of the french nation , terming it the overthrow of the famous roman liberty , only because it gave the arms of tyranny into cesars hands , wherewith that ambitious man did afterwards slay the liberty of his country : he said that the french had in their wars perpetual victory , in africa , asia , and europe , and ruled with infinite glory . he stiled the french monarchy , the triumphant princess over the whole world , her enemies scourge , and the only means and instrument of the yet remaining liberty of italy : he attested for truth , that france was the most numerous nation that was under the sun ; he said it was rich , fruitful , well armed , united , strong , well peopled with such as were most devoted to their king ; all which he said were things requisite in a kingdom , which will be held to be formidable and lasting . this oration made alemanni be followed by an infinite number of french ; so as being made strangely much of , by many of the barons of that nation he was easily perswaded to go into france , where he found that true , which his best friends had taught him , that if he desired to love the french men , he should by all means shun going to france ; for he had not been twenty daies in the french court , when he was so used by those people , and so distasted at them , as he was forced to fly from france , as full of ill affection to it , as he went thither with ravishment ; insomuch as he presented himself the other day with a much imbittered mind before apollo , and told him , that having in that his oration very falsly exaggerated the praise of the french nation , to the end that truth might prevail , he desired leave to make his recantation ; for by the unfortunate experience which he had made of the french , he had found them to be so indiscreet , so furious , impertinent , and so phantastically humerous , and ingratefull beyond all human creatures , as that they were no less capital enemies to the italians , though they knew they had many there that sided with them , then they were to the english , spaniards , germans , dutch , and all other forein nations . to this apollo readily answered him , that he did not only deny him the leave he had asked , but straitly charged to repeat the same oration again in praise of the french ; and that amongst the other singular vertues of that warlike nation , he should mention the infinite glory which they had won by appearing to be mortal enemies to all forein nations . which singular vertue he said the italians were so far from , as they were not ashamed to become the apes of all the most barbarous parts of the world in their discourse , aparrel , feeding , and in all other their actions : in so much , as if the jews did rule in any part of the earth , it was to be believed , that to curry favour with that base generation , many of them would not be ashamed to wear yellow hats . the xx. advertisement . corbulone having with much honour ended his prefixt time of government in pindo , a patent to continue the same iurisdiction for one year longer , is graciously sent him by apollo ; which he refuseth to accept of . domitio corbulone having happily ended the first year of his government of pindo , apollo , who was very well satisfied with him , sent him his letters patents to continue in the same government the next year ; though corbulone knew very well that all the people of his government did very much desire his continuance in pindo , yet he had importuned apollo to send one with all speed to succeed him in that place : and though he foresaw that apollo would interpret his refusal sinisterly , yet he again desired to be changed ; and had his request granted . being returned to parnassus , his friends desired to know why he had refused to continue still in that imployment , which many other great personages were ambitious of ? corbulone answered them , that he who would preserve his body in health , and keep up his reputation , must be so much master of himself , as to be able to rise from the table with an appetite , and to quit governments when people seemed to be best satisfied with him : for officers ( though they were foolish and untoward , were alwaies adored by the people the first six months , well enough believed the second six months ; but that though they were good , they were hated the third six months ; and at the end of two years , the people grew sick of those that were best ; not for any misdemerits of the governor , but through the peoples too great curiosity , who as easily grow weary of good things , as they do of bad . that therefore that servant or officer of a prince deserved to be esteemed wise , who havng done some special good service to his prince , could resolve to leave the court , and leave his master in love with him , and not to tarry till that unfortunate time , which will at last happen in all courts , of being shamefully driven out of dores ; either for some small fault , which is able to cancel any former merit , how great soever , or else for that not only privat men , but princes are subject to be glutted with the same conversation still , and do daily love new things , and take delight in growing worse . the xxi . advertisement . sebastian veneri , duke of venice , after his admittance into parnassus , desires apollo that he may have the precedency given him before hereditary kings and monarchs ; and obtains a favourable decree from his majesty . though the illustrious prince , sebastian venieri , duke of venice , had a place alotted unto him in parnassus by apollo's extraordinary favour , worthy the magnanimity of so great a prince , before he made this his desire unto him ; yet would he not appear in publick , before the controversie was decided which was on foot , before his majesties own tribunal , to which of the three colleagues the glory of the naval victory which he obtained at the scogli corzolari did of due belong : the which being afterwards decided by apollo , in manner as shall be hereafter said , prince venieri made his publick solemn entrance on horseback , which was in this regard very remarkable , because none were suffered to honour , accompany , or serve this illustrious duke at his entrance , save free-men , who were looked upon in parnassus with envy , tenderly beloved , and honoured with such observance , as that they are deservedly called by all the vertuosi , princes of privat persons . the whole colledg of the vertuosi were extraordinarily joy'd to see to what sublime degree venieri's merit had brought a privat man , and infinitely honoured the immortal venetian commonwealth , which by having so largely rewarded the desert of one of her senators , had thrown the gate of merit and gallant actions wide open ; which many monarchs either keep close shut , or else out of a capricio , open it rather to unworthy , then to deserving men . it was afterwards observed for a very rare thing , that at the princes entrance , the grecians , who since the fall of their empire , have lived in a perpetual melancholy , never taking joy in any thing , being now overjoy'd , were seen to dance and rejoyce upon this occasion , as if prince veniero had been one of their nation ; and that all the jollity of that shew had belonged to them . some said that this was , because the grecians being reduced into great calamity , could not hope to be freed from their slavery by any other potentate then by the state of venice , at whose victory obtained by this prince against the tyrannical ottaman empire , they did rejoyce as if it had been an act of their own : to boot , they were mightily gladded to see the duke of venice wear the ancient stately grecian habit ; as if it were a happy and secure augury , that the greatness of the ancient grecian empire would be renewed in the immortal commonwealth of venice , when god should be appeased in his just anger against the schism of that nation . not long after this solemnity , when all the princes , together with the senat of poets , went in good order to visit the chief temple of that state , to beg of god to stir up the hearts of princes to be liberal towards the vertuosi : prince venieri , who was placed by the master of the pegasean ceremonies ( according to the ancient custom ) amongst the rest of the dukes of venice , boldly said , that he ought of right to have precedency before the greatest hereditary kings and monarchs of the world . the masters of the ceremonies did then humbly beseech venieri , that he would be content with his accustomed place , and shun both giving and receiving great distastes in parnassus by this hateful novelty . venieri answered resolutely , that common men observed customs , such as he would have what was just , who very well knowing what was their due , did not live according to past errors , but did correct them . some great princes laughed openly at this novelty endeavoured by venieri ; but others who were of a more refined judgement , began through apprehension , to look pale , and were heard to say , that it belonged to fools to laugh at great mens pretentions , who being excellently well nosed spannels , never wag their tails till they be very near the partridg : for wise men thought , that were the business never so hard , it might be effected when it was taken in hand by such a one as prince venieri ; and that it was to be considered , that so great a personage as he , would not set his rest of reputation upon a game , unless he were sure of five and fifty in his hand . when the masters of the ceremonies found venieri to be so resolute , that they might prevent the scandal which they feared such a novelty might occasion , hasted to apollo , and acquainted him with what had hapned . his majesty did not only not abhor prince venieri's pretention ( as many thought he would have done ) but contrary to the opinion of most of the vertuosi that were about him , did mightily admire it ; and wondred very much that that singular man should find out an inconveniency , which was not observed by as many elective princes as were in parnassus . and because manifest danger of great scandal appeared to be in delay of resolution , and that the business required expedition , without citing the parties to appear , using the plenipotentiary power which he hath over his litterati ; he at the very instant decreed , that prince venieir should be placed according to his desire , above all hereditary monarchs ; and said , generari , & nasci principibus fortuitum , nec ultra aestimator . tacit. lib. . hist. that to be begotten or born of princes , was chance , nor was it otherwise to be esteemed of ; that it appeared not only to be high injustice , but infinite ignorance ; that hereditary monarchies , which without any precedent merit , fell to princes only by blind fortune , or by the relation of bloud , should in his state , where vertue was only had in consideration , be preferred before personages of worth , who by their rare vertue , and singular merit , knew how to get a principality in a well regulated election of worthy electors . the xxii . advertisement . apollo being greatly moved to compassion , by seeing a poor souldier , who had lost both his hands in the wars , goe a begging , doth sharply reprehend princes for their ingratitude to military men . this morning , as apollo went out of dores , a souldier who had lost both his hands in the wars , came before him and beg'd an alms : apollo asked him how he came to be so maimed ; the souldier answered , that whilst he was handling his pike in a battel , in the service of a great prince , both his hands were shot off by a canon . apollo commanded a liberal alms to be given to the poor man , and bad some princes who were by him , remove away that unfortunate witness of their ingratitude , from the eyes of the world , that sad example of the miserable condition of souldiers in these modern daies : for it was a spectacle which did too much afflict the soul of the vertuosi , to see that miserable souldier beg his bread , who had deserved from the prince whom he had served , a rich patrimony , whereby to give that alms to others , which he was now forced to beg for himself . the xxiii . advertisement . apollo greatly compassionating the lamentable shipwrack which his vertuosi make in great princes courts , to secure their navigation , commands some of the chief litterati of his state to make a card whereby men may sail by land. apollo being every day more grieved then other , at the sad shipwracks which many of his litterati do often make in the courts of great princes ; who having loaded their vessels ( their minds ) with the sweat of sciences , thereby to merit their princes favour , are unfortunatly lost upon the sands of some hired lodging , drowned in the whirlpool of a shameful hospital , and sometimes split upon the rocks of beggery and dispair , the wealth of infinite vertues not being able to free them from so lamentable calamities , would by all means find out a remedy for so great evils , that his vertuosi might make safe navigation in all courts , but particularly in that of rome , which is placed in so dangerous a climat ; and all this for the advantage of learning , which looseth much reputation , when men see how little they get thereby , who spend their whole life in obtaining it . meditating therefore maturely with himself , that since portugal pilats , and those of biscay , england , holland , and zealand , by only observing the sun , moon , and stars , with a little stone in their hand , knew how to bridle the dreadful ocean , which they so freely cut through into all parts , and at all seasons , as they had made road-waies all over it ; why his vertuosi by their powerfull aids of astronomy , cosmography , mathematicks , meteors , and chiefly by their dexterous wits , sharpned by perpetual reading , could not invent as safe a navigation by land , as the pilats of the aforesaid nations had found out by sea . to secure therefore land navigation ( for as much as might be done by learning ) apollo some months ago instituted a committee of choice men in all sciences , necessary for such a business , and made ptolomy , that prince of cosmographers , the chairman ; to whom he gave aristotle for his companion in the meteors , euclid in the mathematicks , guido bonati in the astronomy , and to these he added count baltazar of castiel , one very much verst in the deep court oceans ; and for the better carrying on of whatsoever was requisite to so weighty a business , his majesty gave order that the famous carthaginian hannae , palinurus , columbus , il cortese , terrante magaglianes , americo vespuci , vasco di gama , all of them being the chiefest pilats that ever sailed on the seas , should be admitted into this committee . in the first place then ( as was very fitting ) an exquisite card whereby to sail by land , was made by ptolomy , which with singular skill , was struck through with lines on all parts ; and not only divers learned astralobes , but a new artificial quadrant was invented , to learn the true elevation of courtiers deserts , and the latitude and longitude of rewards with which their service ought to be acknowledged : 't is true that guido bonati took very much pains to find out the true height of the court of rome's pole ; yet nor he , nor any other of the committee , could ever by any astralobe adjust the course of the sun of any humerous princes phantastical wit ; but the genius of a prince being the true and safe north star , which court-marriners ought to observe in their land-navigation ; these gallant men did all of them much wonder , how a star which was so certain for navigation by sea , was not only not firm and stable in land-navigation , but was continually carried about by the two contrary motions , of interest , and passion , whence such dangerous court-difficulties and troubles doe arise , as doe often occasion fowle shipwracks . they discovered greater difficulties in the motions of the wandring stars ( princes officers ) for they were so far from being carried about , as they ought to be , by the primum mobile ( their princes service ) as they were often seen to go retrograde thereunto , nay the committee were past all expression amazed , when they by their observation found for certain , that the inferior heavens ( the officers ) did by the course of their privat passions and interests , often hurry about the aforesaid primum mobile ; so as by reason of these accidents , the business grew so confused , as the committee could never come at the perfect knowledg of the motions of so many sphears , as was necessary for those to do , who were to publish the certain and assured rules thereof . their obstacles grew greater , when they came to score out the compass of winds , whose number they found not to be certain and bounded , as is seen in navigation by sea ; but that they were little less then infinite : for besides the four master-winds , the princes will , his childrens desires , the authority of his brethren , and other princes of the bloud , and the opinion of the councel , an infinite number of half-winds were discovered , court-officers , princes favorits , make-mirths , flatterers , and even pandors , all of them so irregular , and upon some occasious so boysterous as they begot great difficulty in contriving the compass : so as these pilats thought the condition of court-navigators to be very miserable , who were to fit their sails ( their wits ) to such a multitude of winds . yet for all these difficulties , these famous men were never disheartnep , but buckled themselves closer to the business by how many the more flats , sholes , and quick-sands , silla's and caribde's , vast whirlpools of rivals , enviers , malcontents , persecuters , and heteroclite spirits they found in the vast ocean of the court. the astralobes and quadrants being made , and the compass being brought to the greatest perfection that might be , the committee thought to make trial : wherefore eight spruce courtiers were listed , all of them well provided of patience ( a necessary biskat ) for such as have courage enough to plough the tempestuous ocean of the court. and whilst these were ready to hoist sail , and only staid for a favourable wind , there hapned a thing altogether incredible ; for a favourable north wind blowing , to which all the eight courtiers suddenly spread abroad their sails ( their hopes ) the sails of only one of them were seen to swel , and make a prosperous voyage , whilst the rest of the courtiers stirred not one whit from their place . the gentlemen of the committee were strangely confused , when they found that in land-navigation , prosperous winds ( the princes favour ) did not blow alike in all the sails of equally deserving cou●…tiers : much greater was the wonder , when the same prosperous wind returning to blow again ; to the which some other courtiers who were ready for their journey , displaid their sails , there was one , who being without either mast or sail ( without any merit ) who stood idle in the haven , to learn before he put himself upon so dangerous a navigation as court-service ; this man i say was by a blast of that prosperous wind , hurried from the haven of his quiet , carried into the high sea of imployments , much above his capacity , and yet did make a happy voyage , got great riches and honors . a novelty which appeared so strange to these pilats , as magaglianes being astonished at so great a wonder , said , gentletlemen , i should never have imagined there had been so great a diff●…rence between sea-navigation , and that of land ; and these extravagant passages which i see , makes me greatly doubt the good success of this our enterprise ; but patience overcomes all difficulties ; therefore let us proceed . then a courtier that was a great vertuoso displaid his sails ( his faithful service ) to a prosperous west wind ( his princes favour ) and by his swolne sails ( fair words from his master ) thinking that he had made a long voyage , when he had calculated what way he had made , found himself to be just in the same place as he was before he hoisted sail , having been still fed in all his long journey ( his assiduous service ) with false hopes and expectation , not meeting with any real substance . but a stranger thing then all this , was , when they saw both the south and the north wind blow at one and the same time so furiously from the fantastick brain of an extravagant prince , as that the unfortunate courtiers being molested by two contrary winds , knew not which way to turn their tacklings ; so as between these two winds , many vertuosi were miserably drowned . at this so strange a novelty columbus cryed out , i now find for certain gentlemen , that navigation by sea , wherein these extravagancies are not met with , is so safe a business , as it may be compared to travailing by land in a litter . columbus had no sooner said these things , when the whole committee were aware that certain courtiers that were vertuosi , lying in the haven , were in great danger of being drown'd in the court-sea , which was swolne much more then usual , raised a great storm , the greatest anchor-cable-ropes of the most exquisite court-patience , broke short in two , every thing threatned shipwrack ; and yet the air of the prince his countenance was very calm , the pleasant west wind of his content was only seen to blow ; the danger appeared plainly , no wind of the princes anger was discerned , and yet the court-navigators ran hazard of perishing in the haven : notwithstanding all this , in this so inraged tempest , one bold courtier had courage enough to put out of the haven , and was not only not drowned , as every one believed he would have been , but that horrible cross wind which would have indangered any other man , though never so well experienced , proved so prosperous a wind to him , as in a short time it brought him to the haven of great dignities : a thing certainly very strange , and which did much astonish the gentlemen of the committee , who wondred that those tempestuous storms should in land-navigation prove prosperous winds to some few , which even in the safest harbours did shipwrack many . but it seemed yet more strange , when the skie being clear , no claps of thunder heard , no lightning seen , some thunderbolts did notwithstanding fall , which burnt two unfortunate courtiers ; this unusual accident made the members of the committee muse , why thunderbolts shot from an incensed prince , should not be preceded by such thunder and lightning , whereby to admonish courtiers to escape them , as those are which are shot by the all powerful hand of god against mankind , when he is angry with them . soon after a courtier was seen to be assaulted by a terrible tempest ( persecutions ) who after having long defended himself from the fury of the high going sea ( his princes anger ) and from the boysterous winds of cruel calamities , that he might keep himself from being swallowed up , was forced to throw all his merchandize overboard , and after having spent the main mast of his hope , and that his deserts leaked water of dispair , split himself upon the rocks ( the ingratitude of an not acknowledging prince . ) then ( which appeared very strange ) the vessel of this courtiers service being after so hard an incounter , broken and sunk , the tempest of court-persecutions ceased , the sea of the princes anger was appeased , the rock which had been the cause of his shipwrack , turned to a safe haven , the courtiers sunk ship rose again from underneath the water , fairer , stronger , and better tackle then befored , and was again loaded with the merchandize of his merits , the which he afterwards bartered at dear rates , for great dignities , and rich revennues . this appeared very strange to these pilats , and to the whole committee , neither could they sufficiently wonder , how in land-navigation , shipwracks could prove fortunate to navigators . but continuing to make new experiences , they commanded a very wary courtier , that he should display the sails of his talent to a wind which blew from the south , and he steering his course fortunately full north , after many daies sail , the court-pilat , to find where he was , took the altitude of the pole of his desert , with his astralobe , and not without much wonder , found , that though he had still kept the fore-castle ( his good service ) directly towards the north ( his princes interests ) he had sailed southward . the courtier at first alloted the cause of this disorder , to his not having kept the rudder of his soul faithful ( as he ought to have done ) towards the north of his masters service ; bu●… when he found both by the card , and by the compass which he held in his hand , that he had alwaies steered the ship of his actions aright , he clearly found that the error of his unfortunate voyage was occasioned , because the north-star of his princes mind was turned by malignant men , which are alwaies about him , towards the south . then vespucci , gama , and the other pilats , desired the committee that they would give over the business , as being a desperate cure ; and said , that nothing made the navigation by sea so certain , as the immutability of the north-star : and that having clearly found , by the last unfortunate experience , that princes minds ( which was the certain north-star of land-navigation ) were carried about and diverted by malicious courtiers , to saile on the tempestuous court-seas , was not a resolution to be put on by wise men , but by such as were desperate . at this instant the committee saw a spruce neat courtier , who had sailed so prosperously in the court of rome , and in other courts for seventy years space together , as that he had not only overcome tempestuous storms , and boisterous winds of persecution , but had even broken the hard rocks which his ship had given against ; this man pursuing on his voyage prosperously with a most favourable wind , was drowned for having only unfortunately falne upon a company of sedges ( a catchpoles impertinences ) an accident which did so astonish the gentlemen of the committee , as they resolved to make trial only of one other courtier who was outward bound , and then to be quiet : they commanded him therefore to put to sea ; and it hapned that whilst he was sailing in a road which was held by all men to be very safe , his ship at unawares gave against a rock , and split in pieces ; the committee very much blamed the courtiers ignorance , who knew not how to shun that rock ; but he clearly shewed them that it was not specified in the card , wherefore all the pilats fixt their eyes upon the chairman ptolomy , as if they did tacitly accuse him of ignorance , having left out that rock in his card , which had occasioned so great evil . but ptolomy having well viewed and considered the place , and all the coast about , shewed them clearly , that no man living that had ever made that passage before , had ever seen any rock in that place , therefore he could not specifie it in the card which he had made , and that it arose up at that very instant that the unfortunate courtier fel upon it . the committee finding then that in land navigation , rocks arose every moment in the midst of medows , and other places , which were held to be so safe , as that they might be passed over with great security in the obscurest nights ; they broke up the committee , accounting the undertaking to be desperate and unfeasable , and commanded that none should presume to sail by land , except it were at full noon , carrying the lanthorn of discretion every one of them in the fore-castle of their proceedings , morning and evening , with their bare knees on the ground , and their hands lift up to heaven , beseeching god to grant them a good voyage , for to bring the ship of hope in safety into a court haven , depended more upon the immediate help from heaven , then upon any humane wisdom . the xxiv . advertisement . ariadeno barbarossa being driven by a sudden storm , splits upon the scogli cursolari , and maturino romagasso , captain of the guard of the gulf of lepanto , endeavours his escape , when he might have taken him prisoner . ariadeno barbarossa , a great pyrat , being overtaken some daies ago with a cruel storm , fell upon the scogli corsolari , wh●…re he lost many ships , and an infinite many of men : yet he suddenly bet●…ok himself with those that were escaped , to repair those his gallies , whi●… were yet unsplit ; when the news of such a wrack being brought to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 forthwith gave order to maturino romagasso , who had the custo●… 〈◊〉 the lepanto gulf , to go and seize upon that publick thief . it is known that vigilant romagasso did at that very instant charge a trusty mariner to go with all possible diligence and secrecy to those rocks , and to wish ariadeno to remove from those rocks , and save himself as well as he could . the mariner wondred very much at romagasso's resolution ; whom he asked why he would save the life of that his deadly enemy , whom he had now so fair accasion to seize upon ; and that if he who was held apollo's right eye , only that he might keep the rivers of lepanto free from so pernitious a pyrat , what other man , how great soever , should be paralel'd to him , when he should have vanquished barbarossa ? 'ts said that romagasso repli'd in these i●…entical words ; my friend , the greatness which you see i am now in , is so annext to barbarossa's power , as i cannot discomfeit him without ruining my self . and know , that the very first day that i should have committed this error , thou shouldst see me be the most abject fellow of all this court : for faithfulness in officers is almost banished out of the world , more through the ingratitude of who commands , then through his falshood who ought to obey . whence it is that disorders are grown so great , as that officer whose ultimat end is not to keep his prince in perpetual need of his service , is more man , then a wise man. and the modern militia of us captains , is turned to publick merchandize ; which is not occasioned out of any fault of ours , but for the defect which is even graven in the bones of many princes , of making no account of clothes , but when it rains . the xxv . advertisement . epictetus , a stoick philosopher , who finding his sect to grow much deformed , asks leave of apollo to ground a new sect of reformed stoicks ; and is rather reprehended by his majestie , then commended . epictetus , that famous stoick , had this day long audience of apollo , to whom he was overheard to say with great submissness , that the exemplary life , certainty of doctrine , holy customs , quiet and fruitful leasure , that he had formerly seen in the sect of stoicks , had forced him to imbrace that sect , in which he had lived with great satisfaction for the space of years ; but that it being now much falne from the former severity of life , and good behaviour , nothing of good remained in it , but the bare and still reverenced name , at which he was both much afflicted and scandalized , and was forced to forgo it , that he might still live in his antient purity of demeanour , poverty of life , humility , and peace of mind . that therefore ( if it should stand with his majesties approbation ) he , and some other of his fellow-philosophers who were of the same mind , desired to withdraw themselves , and to ground a new sect of reformed stoicks . apollo , not without some apparent signes of displeasure , answered epictetus , that he was so far from being willing to multiply the sects of his philosophers , as for the good of sciences , unity of opinion , and for many other weighty respects , he was resolved to reduce them to a lesser number ; and that if the stoicks were any waies fallen from their former good orders , he wisht him to know , that such a one as he , ought rather to hide their defects , then scandalously publish them to the world by new reformations ; it not being possible to admit of a sect of reformers , without necessarily acknowledging a deformation : and that a philosopher so cry'd up for wisdom , and sincerity of soul , as was epictetus , should not endeavour to purchase reputation to himself , by defaming others ; and the rather , for that by the laying a foundation of new reformed stoicks , he made it appear evidently to the whole world , that the stoicks disorders were grown so great , as that they were become incorrigible , even by the exemplary life of such a one as himself : that therefore it was the duty of every good stoick , when he saw his sect forget their rules , to strive to reduce them to their duties by his own good example , it not being only shameful ingratitude , but wicked impiety to abandon his sect in its most urgent occasions , and greatest necessity : for certainly that pilat were very wicked , who seeing his ship ready to be lost in a fearful storm at sea , should abandon his companions , and seeking to save himself in the ship-bo●…t , could find in his heart to laugh at those that were in distress : and that if he should open the dore in parnassus to reformed sects , that progressus in infinitum , must of necessity follow , which ought to be so shun'd by every wise prince . for every thing necessarily growing old and corrupt in time , by consequence the reformed stoicks transgressing their rules , would in time divide themselves into new reformed sects . and because the planting of vinyards , and founding of sects of philosophers walked hand in hand , it was to be considered , that the wise husbandman , when he saw his vinyard , which before was very fruitful , go to ruine for want of dressing , did not suddenly fall to plant a new one , but endeavoured by dilligence and assiduous labour , to make it fruitful again , and never resolved upon the planting of a new vinyard , till he clearly found , that it was impossible to reduce the impair'd vinyard to its former condition , by any whatsoever diligence . in which case , at the same time that he plants his new vinyard , he plucks up the old one by the very roots , and turns it into earable ground ; for otherwise , in a short time , he would have foolishly encombred his whole patrimony with wild grapes . apollo said also , that epictetus should reflect much upon the unfortunate condition of the present times , wherein the whole world being infected with the pernitious disease of polititians , whose particular profession it is , not to adhibit faith to such actions as have a certain affected appearance of extraordinary goodness , it was shrewdly to be feared , that they would interpret his good will , and excellent intention , of laying a new foundation of reformed stoicks , to be but hypocrisie ; giving it out ( as it is their custom to do ) in every corner , that epictetus , a philosoper of so well a compos'd soul , would forsake the old stoick sect , whereof he was but the tail , out of ambition to become the head of a new one . the xxvi . advertisement . the nobility of the commonwealth of achaia , not being able any longer to indure the insolency of the commons , who governed the state , send ambassadors to apollo to obtain a prince , who may govern them ; and receive a gracious answer . the modern commonwealth of achaia , which ( as all men know ) is meerly democratical , is by reason of the insolent peoples great sedition , so full of tumults , slaughters , rapine , and all other sort of confusion , as the nobility , opprest by the violence of the seditious people , to free their countrey from so cruel tyranny , thought it a more tolerable condition to live under the command of any one prince , how cruel or avaritious soever , then to suffer the insolency of a domineering people : insomuch as they said it was necessary for the common good , to call in a forreign prince , who might govern the afflicted state , and might curb the insolency of the rabble-rout : and to this purpose they summoned the people to a parley , and deplored the publick miseries ; the sole remedy whereof they said was , to submit the countrey unfortunately free , to the command of a prince . the ignorant people , who in weighty resolves know not what they grant , nor what they deny , easily assented that a forreign prince should be sent for , who re-ordering the confused state , might govern their country , which was incapable of living free . in this assembly two ambassadors were chosen , who were to obtain from apollo , a prince fitting for their urgent affairs . the ambassadors came to this court three daies ago , who having made their desires known in a publick audience , they were answered in his majesties name . that he would quickly send them away contented . many prime subjects of this state , used all the means they could , to be sent to command so noble a principality ; amongst the most remarkable whereof , were anna momoranci , a famous french baron , very much assisted by francis the first , king of france , and don ferdinando di toledo , duke of alva , befriended by the most catholike king philip the second ; not so much out of any affection he bore to that his servant , as to rid his court of one , who not able to tolerate an equal , much less a superior , was very troublesom to him and to his court. apollo resolutely chose the duke of alva ; wherein he did so highly displease the king of france●… , who complained grievously that apollo's majesty had preferred the duke of alva , a man in rigour of justice not only severe , but inexorable , as had plainly appeared in his government of flanders , before one of so exquisite goodness , and of so exact judgement in state-government , as momoranci was known to be . apollo answered king francis , that he had preferred the duke of alva before momoranci , who was a gentleman of a mild and sweet spirit , only by reason of his extraordinary severity ; which was very requisite in this present occasion , the other being unaccustomed to the difficulty of taming a coltish people , born free , with the cudgel of new servitude . and the k. of france not being herewithall satisfied , but saying with some commotion of spirit , that his french men , when occasion did require , could also not only be severe , but cruel : apollo in an angry tone , bad him hold his peace , and told him , he wondred that sheep and lambs should pretend to play the part of wolves , as if there had never been any gaspero colonni , any monsieur de la nove , and so many other great and little flies , which none of his generation could ever find the way how to keep from about their noses . the xxvii . advertisement . apollo having for a just cause removed gulielmo budeo from the lord treasurers place ; confers the aforesaid place upon diego covarruvia , a noble spanish literato , and dean of the colledg of the grand sages of this court , though he was much gainsaid therein by the french monarchy . gulielmo budeo , a parisian , who for his being very expert in the knowledg of monies , hath for many years , and with much reputation , exercised the place of lord treasurer in this court , was on the sudden on munday last , not only with great disgrace removed from that place , but by express order from his majesty , banisht for ever out of parnassus ; which affront was the greater , for that it is said , that the occasion of this so high resentment was , because he was infected with those modern heresies , which being invented by ambitious men , only to make subjects rebel against their princes , are not worthy to be followed by those who professing learning , ought to let the world see that they do not only know , but do infinitely abhor the popular errors of the ignorant , who are apt to be carried about by the impostures of impiety . after budeo his expulsion , it was suddenly noised in parnassus , that his majesty had destin'd diego covarruvio to be treasurer , a great spanish lawyer , a man as excellent for learning , as for his plain-dealing , and sincerity of an irreprehensible life . as soon as this apollo's resolution was known in parnassus , it begot great jealousies in the french monarchy , who thought it stood not with her advantage , that a spaniard should be called up to so high a magistracy , wherein she was much interessed . the jealousie and suspition of so great a queen , was the more augmented by covarruvia's austerity , his steadfastness to what was just , his inflexibility , and for that alwaies preferring his princes honour and service before all other respects , he seemed to value the favour or hatred of any whatsoever prince in this court , very little , or not at all , as long as he with uncorrupt sincerity discharged the place of primo savio grande . this powerful monarchy sent first ( according to the fashion of great courts ) divers of her friends to apollo , who appearing to be well wishers to covarruvia , and very zealous of the publick good , did in a seeming way of praising him , blame him , and persecute him by the cheating way of feigned favours . but this way of proceeding being too well known to apollo , these hypocrites did easily receive a repulse from his majesty , in so much as the very french monarchy her self , taking off her mask of court-dissembling , did at an extraordinary audience which she obtained from apollo , appear so implacable an enemy to covarruvia , as she could acquaint him , not only with the greatest faults that he had committed even from his birth , but with every his least imperfection ( so narrowly do princes observe the waies of those who were likely to come to advancement in great courts . ) apollo , who infinitely wondred to hear the french monarchy make so strict a scrutiny into the life and manners of covarruvia , with that freedom which is proper to her ; reply'd , that he did not so much abhor human imperfections in his vertuosi , but that if amongst a hundred defects , they had put one pair of perfections , one only rare vertue , he thought he had got an excellent officer for his service , it being his custom to counterpoise vices with vertues ; and that covarruvia ( whatsoever he were in other things ) in his charge of savio grande , which he had for many years discharged with such sincerity and discretion , had not only proved himself worthy of the lord treasurers place , which he was resolved to give him , but of any other whatsoever better place in parnassus ; and that he would honour so high a place , by removing that signal subject from the sublime senat of the savi . to this the french monarchy answered , that the lavi grande of parnassus were twelves , so as his majesty had scope enough to satisfie her in what she desired , by chusing other instead of covarruvia ; which would be the easilier done , for that the savi grande were all of them men greatly learned , and of singular worth . all the standers by perceived that apollo was highly displeased at this pressure , who angerly answered the french monarchy , that it was a very wicked resolution to give distaste unto , and take from the reputation of such officers , who by their assiduous service , had deserved chiefest imployments from their prince ; and that when a prince took out any person from a senat , or from a colledg , to advance him to a higher preferment , it was a dangerous thing to chuse the worthiest ; for in such elections , the prince his intention , were it never so good , was interpreted partiality ; and that upon such occasions , the true judge of worth was senioriti , and that covarruvia being dean of the senat of the savt grande , he had such a vantage of labour , and such advancement of merit , as he could not without some apparent injury , be left out by his prince ; for in all senats , that senator deserved the prime preferment , who had laboured longest at the continual duties of his place : a just and good precept ; which when it was inviolably observed , every honored vertuoso propounded to himself his princes service for the ultimate end of all his labours ; whereas by doing otherwise , to the ruine of justice , and confusion of all business even the savi grande ( a senat whereon did consist the good government of the state ) and all other his good and best officers , forgoing the honorable way of merit , and vertuous endeavour , would betake themselves to the shameful idolatry of adoring such as by their favour in court , were likeliest to help them : that therefore for the aforesaid weighty respects , he , not out of any passionate affection which he bore to covarruvia's person , but for the duty he ought unto his merits , would reward that vertuoso's labors with the lord treasurers place , and encourage the other savi grandi , willingly to take pains in their places , since they saw their reward was not only certain , but ( which was a thing of more importance ) lay only in the prince his bosom . to all these things the french monarchy answered , that his majesty was patron and supreme arbitrator of all rewards and punishments in parnassus ; that therefore without any prejudice to his honour , he might gratifie her in her request . to this new pressure , apollo more incenst then formerly , reply'd , nor am i , nor any man in the world , master of that reward which is proposed by just princes , to the labours and deserts of faithful officers ; for the highest dignities are by good princes conferred upon their servants out of obligation , though modest officers acknowledg to receive them out of their princes favourable liberality . and know , french monarchy , that that prince who doth not reward him that hath deserved well at his hands , commits a greater tyranny then he , who without any reason , sheds his subjects bloud , and takes away their livelihoods . after so resolute an answer , the french monarchy confest ingenuously , that covarruvia being by nation a spaniard , he was consequently one whom she could by no means confide in . apollo was so incens'd at these words , as he broke forth into sudden fury , and said , get you hence , you who will play the master in other folks states , and learn confidence at home ; i , for my part , glory at my home to be an humble slave to mens merits , which when nothing but it is found in an officer , although he be naturally never so discourteous , yet god , whose will it is , that he who does well , should be rewarded , takes it in good part . whereas on the contrary , his divine majesty ( the true master of metamorphosis ) hath made those self-affectionate people , in whom princes , in the collation of their highest dignities , do only require confidence , prove perfidious , and so strangely ingrateful ( only to confound mans depraved judgement ) as they have revenged themselves of received benefits , as if they had been mortal injuries , as is clearly known to all men , by so many unfortunate examples which have hapned in princes courts ; by which you princes may learn , that to do righteously , is to be preferr'd before all other human interest ; for when a prince exalts one that is ungrateful , though otherwise known to be deserving , all the shame redounds to him that hath received the reward ; whereas when it falls out otherwise , all the shame and loss redounds unto the prince , who foolishly thinks that he may receive advantage from men by offending god. the xxviii . advertisement . monsieur jovanni de la casa having presented apollo with his most usefull galateo , meets with great difficulties in many nations , in having it observed . the reverend signor iovanni della casa , who ( as you have heard by our former letters ) was with extraordinary pomp , admitted into parnassus , after having visited all the illustrious poets , and ended his complement with all the principi literati of this court , presented apollo with his beautiful and useful gallateo , which was so much approved of by his majesty , as he forthwith gave strait charge that it should be inviolably observed by all nations . and at the same instant commanded casa to make presently a galatea , for that the women of this modern age , had as much need of amendment , as had the men . this edict caused great commotion in some that were subject to apollo's dominion ; for neither intreaties , nor threats , were able to make those of marca give way to the receival thereof , who freely profest they were resolved rather to forgo their country and their children , then leave their laudable custom of honouring their masters with sincerity of heart , and loving their friends with candor of mind , rather then with coursies , and other court-ceremonies , gotten without book . it met with greater difficulties amongst princes ; for the most powerful french monarchy would never give way to the observancy of gallateo's rules , nisi si , & in quantum : which she ingenuously profest she would rather mind , then good manners , which she would only observe with a certain outward shew . the spanish monarchy promist to submit to gallateo's rules , provided monsieur de la casa would leave out one chapter : that when she should be at table with other princes , she would not have it be reputed ill manners , if she should take a bit with her hand , from off her neighbours trencher ; neither would she be thought to be over-greedy , if she should chance to eat all her next companions whole part . the venetians said , that they would willingly admit of gallateo , if that monsieur de la casa would declare , that to endeavour by all means possible , to know another mans affairs , was not ill manners , but arerequisite point of policy . all the italian princes readily imbraced gallateo , only said they would be allowed to eat on both sides their mouthes , without being held ill-mannered . but the dutchmen stormed mightily , for they did not only deny being bound to the italian sobriety in d●…inking , but did obstinately require gallateo to declare , that the dutchmens overmuch drinking , and being continually drunk , was one of their chiefest vertues , and one of the most requisite things that their princes and commonwealths did for their safety-sake , desire in their people . the which request was blamed by all the litterati , as impertinent and absurd , and therefore gainsaid : wherefore the dutch were very much exhorted , and desired to submit themselves to gallateo , touching the particular of sobriety ; because they were even pointed at by the best nations of europe , for their immoderate drinking , and being so often drunk . to which the dutch did stoutly answer , that those sober men deserved to be esteemed drunk , that living under the slavery of princes , were hardly used , and grieved every day by the capriciousnesse and beastly passions of one man , and that the drunken dutch ought to be highly esteemed , who had wit enough , both to vind cate their liberty , and to maintain it when they had got it . and added , that they were to be chained up for fools , that did not believe that the drunkenesse of the german nation , was the true foundation of so many famous republiques as were seen there . for the safety of a state , and the peoples universal peace , depending wholly upon the fidelity of state officers , and upon the candor and sincerity of every mans soule , what greater jewel could there be desired , then to see the germans by their drinking too much wine , continually vomit up their very intimate secrets , and most concealed thoughts : they added , that it was clearly seen by long experience , that those did best counsel their countreys , who having drowned their private interest , and choaked their fair pretences ( which sobriety useth to beget in mens minds ) with good store of wine , spake like germans from their hearts , and not as doe the italians , and those of other sober nations , from the mouth outward onely , with false and feigned words . they said also , that the dutch , which did so much affect the glorious name of souldiers , as was well known to all men , had not patience to listen unto the counsels and deliberations of of sober men , which were usually apprehensive , and full of lewd circumspection , covered over with the vaile of wisdome ; but to the end that their resolutions might be bold and generous , they would not suffer any man to counsel his countrey , whilst he was fasting ; but when by having drunk much wine , they had inflamed their hearts with generosity : it being the proper vertue of wine , rather to drive fear from the heart , then to rob the understanding of judgement . and that therefore the germans with much reason , de reconciliandis invicem inimicis , & jungendis affinitatibus , & adsciscendis principibus , de pace denique , ac bello plerunque in conviviis consultant : tanquam nullo magis tempore ad simplices cogitationes pateat animus , aut a magnas incalescat . tacit. de mor. germ. that whether it concern the reconciling of enemies , the making of affinities , the chusing of princes ; finally , be it about peace or war , they for the most part consult upon it in their cups ; as if the soule were at no time more open for civil thoughts , or set on fire for great ones , and they further added , that if the italian sobriety were introduced amongst the germans , those false hearts , and double minds , those deep thoughts , those turn-coats , full of treachery , conspiracies , plots , of false souls , masked over with hidden hatred , and feigned love , would begin to be found in that faithfull and sincere nation , wherein the nations which glory in their sobrietry , do so much abound ; a thing so true , as the french , who have been held to be so glorious by all the world , for their ancient candor and sinceri●…y of soul , in being alwayes faithfull to their king ; since many of them have given over the laudable custom of taking off their cups , and being drunk after the dutch fashion , had suffered themselves to be wound about into such treacheries as the world took too much notice of . and that if that little window to be contrived in the breasts of men , the better to discover the hearts of certaine damnable cheaters , who being devils inwardly , study to appeare outwardly , angels , was thought to be so necessary for the good of mankind ; with what ground of reason could any man blame the laudable custom of being drunk , it being clearly seene , that by drinking of too much wine , mens bodies became diaphanous and transparent . for these reasons , which were very much approved of , and praised by apollo it was resolved , that as touching the particular of sobriety in drinking ; the noble german nation should not be subject to gallateo's precepts ; the use of being drunk , being rather a piece of publick cunning amongst the dutch , then a vice of private men : it being apparently known , that those nations are very well advised , both in times of peace and warre , who , like the dutch , deliberant , dum fingere nesciunt ; constituunt , dum errare non possunt . tacit. de mor. germ. deliberat whilst they know not how to counterfeit , and doe ordaine whilst they cannot err . the xxix . advertisement . apollo finding that wicked men , by making use of the sword of iustice to injure honest men , do make his tribunals become very hatefull , to remedy so great a disorder , institutes a committe of the greatest subjects of this state ; but hath but bad success therein . the perfidiousness of wicked men is arrived at that height , as that the sacred seats of justice , erected for the safety of good men , and to punish the wicked , are made use of to persecute and afflict those that are honest , and mean well ; a disorder which his majesty is very angry at ; who can by no means tolerate , that through the so much mischief of wicked men , the seats of justice should become hatefull : wherefore apollo , to try whether the wit of man could find the true antidote to this raging poyson , chose many moneths agoe , some of the best philosophers , skilfullest politicians , and men most esteemed for wisdom , that are in the state of parnassus ; all which he caused to be shut up in that apartment which stands by the delphick library , and straitly commanded them not to stir from thence , till they had healed so dangerous a wound by fitting remedies . all the vertuosi of parnassus thought such a business might be dispatched in a few hours ; but it was eight months ere these men opened their dores , at which time they desired audience of apollo , whom they told , that after having been so long shut up in that place , wherein they had diligently examined a thousand opinions , and maturely sifted an infinity of applications , they could find no expedient means whereby severely to punish false accusations , without affrighting true ones . the xxx . advertisement . marcus brutus desires justius brutus to shew him the perfections of the conspiracy which he so happily brought to pass against the tarquins , and the imperfections of that conspiracy which he so miserably executed upon caesar. and receives desired satisfaction from him . marcus brutus , who lives still discontented in this court of parnassus , because that important business which he undertook of recovering the roman liberty , by the murder of the tyrant caesar , did not succeed well ; went the other day to finde out lucius brutus , whom he earnestly desired to aquaint him with the reason , why both of them , being spurd on by the same generous thought of reducing their countrey into liberty ; they did so much differ in the effect , adding , that he should be very much satisfied by knowing the excellency of his conspiracy and what the faults were of that which he himself plotted against caesar. menante , who by great good fortune was by , when this demand was made ; assures every one that lucius brutus did thus answer his kinsman . a good intention is not sufficient cozen marcus , to reap renown by great actions , it must be accompanied by judgment . know then that in purging the roman empire from the ill humors of tyranny , wherewith i found her greatly opprest , i successfully imitated the art which skilful physicians use in restoring health to a body that is sick of a malignant feaver : which had you done , you would not only not have committed that great error which caused so many mischiefs to your self , and to our whole country , but should have happily acquired that glory , which hath made me immortal . know then , that when i resolved to restore liberty to our country , i did first exactly consider the body of the state of rome in its sick condition , the quantity , and quality of the humors which she did abound within her sickness of servitude ; and like a wise physician , i prepared the peccant materials , and digested the crude humors , with the syrrop of discontent and bad satisfaction which i dayly sowed in the people of rome against the tarquins ; and the insolency committed against lucretia , proved very lucky to me : for the unbridled lust of the tyrant tarquin , brought the people of rome to that point of hatred and dispair , which i had always desired , so that finding the materials of discontent to be excellently well prepared , by the water of the common peoples continual exclamations , with two onely ounces of laxative syrrope of roses ( resolution ) which i knew how to make , by appearing head of the inraged romans , with permition of the sick commonwealths militia , the bad humors of tyranny were purged out , without the pains of death , or any alteration of tumults , in lieu whereof the health of liberty returned to our country . but you cozen did not duly consider any of these important particulars . for having with a rash resolution given your self over in prey to the zeal of recovering lost liberty , the light of your understanding was so blinded , as made you fall into a more cruel servitude , and this was , when by the immature counsel which you put into action against caesar in the capitol , you gave the roman liberty a strong purgation , compounded of colloquintida , and antimony , and other violent ingred ents , with which whilst you thought to evacuate the crude humors , you did infinitely increase that malady , which having first wrought your ruine and the like of all your associates , occasioned at last that so famous sickness ( the sad proscription ) which did kill outright the most excellent roman liberty ; and the proverb is as true as common , that conspiracies are not made out of curiosity of changing the prince his face , but for the important interest of changing tyranny into liberty . and therefore in a business of such concernment , a man must confine himself by the charity which he bears unto his country , within the bounds of the love of liberty , and hatred of the publick tyrant ; and among other considerations which ought to be had in a business of so great concernment , the chiefest is , to consider with exact diligence , the means whereby a tyrant hath possest himself of his countries liberty , which whilst they continue in their vigour and strength , that citizen wishes no good unto his country ; but is rather a cruel enemy thereunto , who by plotting against the tyrants life , is cause of greater slavery to his fellow citizens , and of much greater scandals to his country . the tarquins maintaind themselves in their usurped liberty , by the love which they had cunningly won from the romans , which when by their cruelties , libidinousness , and avarice , they had lost , the foundation of their greatness failed ; and therefore it was not hard for me to restore my country to her ancient liberty . for i did not drive the tarquins out of rome by my conspiracy , till being ready to be thrown headlong down by the publike hatred , i gave then a justle . but you did not do so ; for it is evident that caesar had possest himself of the publike liberty , by the great good opinion he had in his army , of which he had so many years been head , and by the miraculous affection of the people of rome , which he had won by his profuse liberality . and by killing him whilst he was master of these two powerful means , you did nothing else but change caesar ( who did study to secure himself in the state , onely by his clemency , and by his obliging every body ) into augustus , who having seen the unfortunate end which tyrants make , by using the indulgencies of pardons , thought it a safer way for the perpetuating of his dominion , to make use of that cruel great proscription , the onely cause whereby after having reigned happily so long , he had power to transmit the roman empire , as hereditary , into the person of tiberius . the xxxi . advertisement . marcus cato having to the infinite dislike of princes , writ the word libera underneath the motto , pugna pro patria , which was set upon his gate , is commanded by apollo to put is out . since the first day that marcus cato , one of the lavii grandi of this court built his house in parnassus , he made these words pugna pro patria , be ingraven , and written in gold letters upon his portal , to the which some few days ago he added libera : which the princes of this state observing , they made great complaints to apollo , protesting that unless that seditious word , which might set all the world on fire , were rased from off the portal , great mischiefs were likely to arrive in parnassus . and did further very much desire , that cato , being the first instituter of that wicked generation of men , who that they may appear to the base plebeians to be lovers of truth , do practice an impertinent liberty , and superstitious pride over men , might for the correction and dread of others , be severely punisht . cato was immediately sent for by apollo , whom his majesty blamed for having given just occasion of complaint and rumor to princes , by the addition of that word . cato boldly answered , that good men ought not to forbear to do or say any thing that became them , and what their consciences bad them do , for the threats of whatsoever princes ; that it was a cruel thing , and which onely became ignorant and malicious men to cozen others with , sentences which were onely specious in words : and that he thought it was great impiety to make the common people understand , that they were bound to defend that , even with their lives and faculties , as a thing properly belonging to them , wherein they had not the least interest : that therefore the word libera was necessary , to declare the full signification of the sentence : for as it would be a great folly in one to take upon him to defend the title of a house , which he had onely hired , so that country deserved to be defended by teeth , and hands , even to the effusion of the last drop of blood , wherein a man commanded like a master , not that wherein he obeyed like a slave . apollo answered cato , that he was in a great error ; for it was not onely gross ignorance , but tending to sedition , to affirm that princes had not authority to compel their people to take up arms , and to defend their common country , when they were assaulted by their enemies . cato replyed , that he did not deny but that princes had such authority , but confest he said that there was neither any power or violence , which could inforce a man who took up arms against his will , to shoot right forward , but that he might let his first shot flye rather towards his friends then towards his enemies . to this apollo answered , that princes had likewise authority to force their souldiers to shoot justly , and to behave themselves couragiously , but that they must be good princes who have this authority , such as by their liberality , and great love , shown in their excellent government , did force their subjects to defend their princes dominions , with the same gallantry and undanted valor , as they did their own private patrimony : and that onely avaritious princes , and such as thirsted after their subjects blood were too far from reaping any good by those soldiers , whom they forst to go to the wars ; as that they found them to be cruel enemies . that therefore he commanded him , to take the word that was added to the sentence , immediately from off his gate , which was not onely superfluous for the reasons which he had given , but for that when it was otherwise , gallant men understood it to be there , though it were not written ; it not being fitting that the baser sort of people should be acquainted with the great secret , that that is onely the freemans country where he is born ; the slaves , that where he is best accommodated . the xxxii . advertisement . socrates being found dead in the morning on his bed , apollo useth all possible diligence ta learn the true reason of so suddain a death . this morning socrates was found dead in his bed , who , was well when he lay down the last night ; and his body , being exceedingly swoln , many do more then suspect that he was poysoned , and the perepateticks , bitter enemies to the socratical sect , were very much blamed ; the rather , for that every one knows that aristotle , the prince of so great a sect , is very well verst in handling poyson . the very same morning , socrates his whole family was imprisoned , out of which nothing could be got , but that some days before socrates was seen to be very much troubled , and seeming to be exceedingly grieved inwardly , he oft times cryed out , o corrupt world , o depraved age , o most unfortunate mankinde . apollo who was exceedingly grieved at the loss of so famous a phylosopher , commanded that his body should be carefully opened , and that it should be seen , whether any signes of poyson were to be found by his bowels , which being done , all his intrails were found to be open . whence it was cleerly known , that socrates , having taken too much wind of scandal , at the great discomposures , and infinite misbehaviors which he was necessitated to see in this depraved age , did even burst . great were the obsequies which were made for this noble pesonage ; and marcus tullius cicero , ( one who was very affectionate to the socratical sect ) having in an elaborate oration infinitely praised the truth of so famous a philosophers doctrine , and his exemplary life , did with many tears bewail the sad calamitie of these present times , wherein it being under pain of severe punishment , forbidden to play the satyr , gallant men who saw things every day committed , which ought to be publikely declaimed against , were forst to see , to say nothing , and to burst for vexation . the xxxiii . advertisement . the hereditary princes in parnassus , do very much press apollo , that the emperor tiberius may be removed from their classis , and placed in that of tyrants , and he defends his cause victoriously before his majesty . it is above year since tiberius , who succeeded augustus , was admitted into parnassus , and had an honorable place alotted him , amongst the legitimate hereditary princes , where he hath lived with such glory and splendor , as he hath always been held by the greatest potentates of parnassus , to be the prince of wisdom , the very picture of vigilancy , not onely the counceller , but the oracle of all those princes who go about by violence and severity to establish not onely a new tyranny , but the mastery of any newly conquered state. for though it be to be confest by all men , that caesar the dictator was he who laid the first foundations of the roman empire , and that augustus raised up the walls thereof even to the highest cornish , it is not yet to be denyed but that tiberius , when by happily transmitting it over to his nephews son caligula , he made it hereditary in the blood of the iuli●… and claudii , did wisely establish it , and gave it compleat perfection . a great action certainly , and onely becoming that tiberius , who knowing so excellenly well how to conceal his own private passions , made himself be known to be an excellent dr. in the cunning art of discovering other mens thoughts ; by which he may be said to have set the roof over the roman monarchy . a great conspiracy was discovered some few days ago against this so mighty an emperor , which was long before plotted against him by the greatest princes of this court , who accused him before his majesty of being a tyrant , as he who to the prejudice of augustus his heirs , had by wicked means possest himself of the empire , which they said he had governed with unheard of barbarous cruely for the space of two and twenty years , shewing himself always to be an implacable enemy of the nobility , ravenous over the wealthy , bloody to men of great worth , and ungrateful to those that had served him faithfully ; and this shameful accusation was aggravated by the testimony of cornelius tacitus , who having ever appeared by all his actions in this court , to be circumspect , suffered himself notwithstanding to be so far carryed away by the violent passion of hatred against tiberius , as he made affidavit before his majesty , that under the rigorous government of this monster of nature , nobilit●… , opes , omissi , gestique honoris pro crimine , & ob vertutus certicimum exitium . tacit. lib. . hist. this accusation wrought much with apollo , who truely said that it was a great error , to have placed so cruel a tyrant in the honorable classis of legitimate princes ; and at the same instant gave command that tiberius should have notice given him , to appear in the court the next day , and defend himself against that accusation . then did all men call to mind the unfortunate condition of princes , when tiberius was seen to come out of his house alone , and forsaken by all his friends , to appear before the judges ; who though he thought that disertion to be an evident sign of his condemnation , yet entered he the court with an undanted spirit ; where though he was received with severe looks , and threatning jestures , both by his majesty and the whole senate of vertuosi , yet he seemed even then to be fullest of courage , when his danger appeared to be greatest . silence being then proclaimed , egiddio bossio the atturney general , read the accusation to tiberius , and then tiberius was commanded to say what he could in his own defence . whereupon he thus began : prince of learning ! the accusations laid unto my charge by my ill-willers , are two ; that i possest my self of the roman empire by bad means ; and that by the government thereof i have used much cruelty towards the nobility and other subjects of much merit and worth : the first is false ; for how can it be objected that i came by the roman empire fraudulently , since by his last will and testament augustus made me his heir , i confess that agrippa posthumus , and germanious were neer allyed in blood to augustus , but it must be considered that augustu , was not so great a fool , as to be deceived by any , how crafty and fraudulent a wit soever , in so important an affair , as the leaving of an heir who might succeed him in so great an empire . it must be believed that some weighty respect moved him to prefer me , who was not at all akin to him , before his nephews : and thought i could upon this occasion , much to my praise , relate the excellent art i used to work my self into the good will and affection of this great prince , i will in this place onely mention this , that if augustus had found such qualities in those of his blood , as he knew were requisite in him who was to be his heire , and which by all exquisite diligence i endeavoured to make appear to be in me , neither would the love which tacitus says augustus bore to my mother , nor her allurements , nor all my cunning , ever have been sufficient to induce that wise prince to do so cruel an act as to disinherit his nephews , and make a stranger his heir . but it will make for me , in this place , and upon this occasion to make known that my action , from whence i have always acknowledged my access unto the roman empire , as that which did compel augustus to love me so immeasurably . it is wel known to al men that after the death of marcus agrippa , augustus gave me his daughter giulia for wife ; it is likewise known to all men , what a one that great princess proved ; so as being scorned , by the pride and lasciviousness of that unchaste woman , when i found my honor wounded , i knew how to make use of that very occasion for my greater advancement , which was likely utterly to ruine all the hopes of my good fortune , wherein i had made so good a progress . for considering , that if ( as my honor bound me to do ) i should revenge the injury done me by my wife by putting her to death , the little respect which i should have born to augustus his blood , might alienate him from me , and make him give over his intentions of exalting me : and long arguing with my self the great difference that there was between an injury received from a wife of a disproportionable greatness to her husband , and that which is done by ones equal , i put on the bitter resolution of preferring the glory which i should win by obtaining the roman empire , before the shame of being publikely cuckolded by iulia. tiberius had gon thus far in pleading his own excuse , when a lowd voice was heard in the court to cry out thrice , o traytor . tiberius thinking that this was meant by him , protested to apollo that that scorn was put upon the court , and not upon him ; apollo finding how little he was respected by that rash fellow , whosoever he was that had said those words , commanded that he should be diligently sought for , and imprisoned , which was forthwith done , and it was found to be iacomo count of marcia , a famous prince of the blood of france ; yet apollo preferring the injury done unto himself , before the linage of that prince , commanded him to be led to prison . then the count did publikely profess , that he had not said those words either to injure his majesty , or tiberius , but that to unburthen himself of somewhat which lay heavy in his heart , he had called himself traytor , not meaning tiberius , nor any other person ; for when he was marryed to the unchaste queen iane , by his foolish proceeding against her , ( who had brought with her the kingdom of naples for her portion ) as if she had been a private gentlewoman , and by the severity which he like a coxcomb used towards her , he to his infinite shame , lost both his wife , and kingdom and consequently his reputation ; and was forst to flye from naples , and to bury himself alive in a monastery in france , where he dyed for meer madness ; and that he had learnt by tiberius his wise demeanor in the like case , that it had been more honorable for him to have lived a cornuted king in naples , then a private man of honor in france . apollo did then pardon the disturbance which that noble frenchman had occasioned , and bad tiberius proceed to make his defence , who said : and because the too great connivance at the shameful life which my wife led in rome , would certainly have rendred me contemptible both to the senate and people of rome , ( a thing which would have been of equal danger to such a personage as i , who lived in hope of that greatness which i afterward acquired , as the resentment of such an injury by way of revenge would have been ) i chose the middle way between these two dangerous extreams , which in dubious resolutions proves always best . so as not to be an eye-witness of that injury which i could neither revenge nor tolerate , i went from rome under a pretence of living privatly , and hid my self in rhodes . this my modesty , this great respect which i bore to augustus his blood , was the true and chief cause which did not only induce him to love me , but which did oblige him to demonstrate that his love , in such sort as the world hath seen since his death , for this pr. who was as wise as he was glorious , pittying my so much scorned condition , and infinitely loathing his daughters infamous life , behaved himself so rigorously towards her , as his demeanor may serve for a rule to every wise prince , how to handle their unchast daughters . if then so great patience , if the respect , reverence , and perfect obedience , and so many other lawful pieces of cunning , which i continually used to work my self into augustus his affection , be vitious comportments , and fraudulent deceits , ( as my enemis have represented them to your majesty ) i refer my self to those who are to judge upon my reputation . i now come to the second article of my impeachment . i acknowledge the cruelty which i am accused to have used towards the romish nobility to be true , and all that tacitus hath said of me in that point , to be very true ; but i desire that such difference as ought to be , be put between the cruelties used by a new prince , and those which are practised by an ancient and hereditary prince : for if i have taken away any mans life out of an innate cruelty , or thirst after humane blood , or out of any capricious inhumanity , i submit my self to the rigour of the cornelian law , as if i were one of the meanest and most abject plebeians of this state ; but if it were meer state necessity which forced me to be cruel to those of augustus his blood , to the chiefest senators , the commanders of any extraordinary worth , and in fine , even to worth it self ; i desire every one to consider how new princes are necessitated to do horrid and cruel acts , though it be much against their inclination . and upon this occasion , i will for my defence make use of my implacable accuser tacitus his words . he hath openly profest that the horrible proscription made by augustus ( which i confess did surpass all the most immense cruelties , that were ever commanded by cruel man ) was done not out of any inclination to severity by those who of themselves did infinitely blame such an act , but onely out of meer state necessity . sane proscriptionem civium , divisiones agrorum , neque ipsis quidem qui fecere laudatas . tacit. lib. ●nnal . these are tacitus his words . which if it be true , am i to be condemned for having wisely known how to establish my self in a new principality , and for having had the wit to execute those precepts , which not only every other politician , but even tacitus hath publisht ? and if it be true that indulgence , mansuetude , and clemency are then vices in a prince , when such signal vertues are used towards those , who though they be pardoned , keep malice in their hearts , and covet revenge ; is there any one here present who thinks that if i should have suffered agrippa posthumus , germanicus , and the others of augustus his blood , to have lived , that they would ever have sincerely loved my greatness ? and if it be a grounded precept in policy , that princes ought to indeavour above all things , to reign void of jealousie , and if a prince can never be said to be safe in a state , whilst those live who were driven out of it , or who pretend more right thereunto then he , will not every one , how little knowledge soever they have of worldly affairs , confess with me , that it was not any innate cruelty in me , but meer necessity of state policy which forst me to appear so severe towards those of augustus his blood : for a prince is wise in his cruelty , when ( as tacitus himself says he runs danger by being merciful . moreover , the many slaughters , which i , and after me many other emperors gave order for , against the chiefest of the roman senators , ought not to be imputed to our cruelty , ( as they do unjustly affirm who do now persecute me ) but to the indiscreet pride of those senators , who though they law liberty banisht from out their country , y●t through a proud stubbornness of not putting on the cloak of humbleness , or rather through a foolish ostentation of free speaking , when they were inslaved , and of commanding in subjection , did every day more and more irritate princes to use all sorts of severity and inhumanity , against people so proudly spirited . hence it is sir , that neither tacitus , nor any other who writes my story , could ever say that i was severe against any citizens , or any of the roman , or provincial plebeians ; for they never gave me any just occasion of suspition , but onely say that which i confess to be true , that i did persecute the noblest of the roman senate , the which i did to abase them , to terrifie them , to make them mistrustful one of another , to disunite them , and to make them indure that slavery , which i saw they did abhor : nor can any politician teach me any better rules then these , to be made use of to the nobles of a country , which being but a little before bereft of its liberty , will not onely not accommodate it self to servitude , but foolishly pretends to limit the princes authority in commanding , and in servitude keeps the pride of freedom , and an inraged mind , upon any good occasion , to revenge the injury done unto its liberty : whence it is , that hang-men , spies , and atturney-generals are the fittest instruments to establish a mans self in those new states which but a little before hath lost the liberty of a free commonwealth ; for every cruel action is held a prudent resolution , when it secures the life , the state , and honor of that new prince , who knows how to use it . moreover i heartily desire every one to consider , that those who boasting of their worth and great vertue in the roman senate , would be known to be of a better condition then the rest did it not for that they were inamored of vertue , not out of that onely nobleness of minde which ought to be in every one , who can be content to dye a private man , but that they might have a noble retinue , to win popular favour , & the armies love : a great truth , & which hath not been better taught to such a prince as my self by any writer , then by thee tacitus : for thou freely sayst , that new princes meet with no worser nor more wicked a subject , then that worthy senator , who makes use of vertue , to chalk out the way to the ambition which he hath of government . for after thou in thy annals hast painted to the life the demeanor of that traytor sejanus , thou sayst these following words , which cleerly prove my intention . palam compositus pudor , intus summa adipiscendi libido ; ejusque causa modo largicio , & luxus , saepius industria ac vigilantia , haud minus noxiae , quoties parando regno finguntur . tacit. lib. . ann. and thou hast said well : for in a new state , not being yet secured in an hereditary descent , and where the tumultuous choosing of a prince hath so large a scope , as it is lawful even for him that murders the prince to aspire unto the empire , those great subjects , those worthy , and all-deserving officers , who are so much admired by private men , as they are thought by them to merit their princes integral love , the highest preferments , best rewards ; are notwithstanding known by him that reigns to be most pernitious , & fit to be rooted out . so as , the condition of the roman empire being no less disorderly in her hereditary succession , then greatly tumultuous in her election , required in me that severe way of proceeding , which was onely able to save my life and preserve the state. nor can i see how any man can blame the cruelty which i used towards the roman nobility , and the worthiest subjects of the empire , since it would have been thought a great defect , and much mis-becoming such a one as me , if i should have used that clemency towards them , that mildness , and familiarity , which caesar to his cost did , whose miserable end , dos cleerly teach all men , that states which are fraudulently possest , ought to be establisht by extraordinary severity . for the nobility of subjugated commonwealths , make use of the new princes clemency , only as of an excellent means to suppress him by conspiracies : nor doth it any whit at all avail ( as a man would think it should do ) for the allaying of that rage of hatred , or quenching the great and perpetual desire which they have to vindicate the injury done them in their lost liberties , though thereby they run the greatest hazards and danger that can be incur'd . the judges did much approve of tiberius his defence , for they did not onely allow of augustus his last will and testament , and consequently of the legitimacy of tiberius his succession , but they also considered that he being a new prince , no ways allyed in blood to augustus , and there being many roman senators better born then himself , according to the true rules of tyrannical policy , he was forced to use cruelty there where that veneration and majesty was wanting , which the being born of royal blood brings with it , and made his way , by sword and poyson , making himself be dreaded by those , who presumed too much upon themselves , and dared to paragonise their privat nobility , with his immense fortune who reigned ; and that where to use clemency was prejudicial to the new princes , the use even of unusual severity ought to be esteemed lawdable . the xxxiv . advertisement . hyppocrates having advised apollo how to prevent the frequent deaths of sick folks , occasioned through the ignorance of physicians , and proving unfortunate in that his advice , is in great danger of being severely punisht by his majesty . hyppocrates , that great physician told apollo some few days ago , that the world was so pesterd with ignorant physicians , as unless some suddain remedy were taken for it , all mankind would be destroyed : for that sick folks were cured by ignorant physicians , by new experiments , by contrary medicines , and rather by mounte banks receits , then by canonical and true rules of art ; whence it was that many sick folks dyed , who if they had been administred unto by learned physicians , might easily have been restored to their former healths . apollo being advised by so famous a man , resolved to remedy so great an evil . wherefore some six months ago he constituted a colledge of the most famous physicians that the world ever had , the chief whereof were cornelius caelsus , galen , avesine , fracastoro , filopio , l'altozmari , and the most meritorious girolimo mercuriale , and made hyppocrates , that prince of physick , head of the colledge , which he endowed with ample authority to provide experimented physick , and of known vertue for mankinde . these physicians first distributed out their orders , and physicians were sent into all places , who for the greater safety of mens healths and long lives , were commanded to use nothing to their patients , but common glisters , roman oyntments , usual purges ; and in pestilent feavers pectoral waters ; but that when they should have occasion to let blood , to cure malignant feavers , double tertians , or other grievous maladies , they should be commanded to acquaint the colledge speedily with every particular accident that befel the sick party , with the condition of his sickness , with his several accesses of feaver , and that in such cases they should be very careful of sending the water and excrements of the sick person every morning and evening to the colledge , to the end that they might with better satisfaction to the sick party , take order for necessary medicaments . the physicians very willingly did what they were commanded by the colledge . but it was not long ere the world was aware that those orders which were given with so much zeal to the publike good , wrought not that good effect which his majesty perswaded himself they would have done ; for the physicians who administred physick to the sick , were so perplext in putting on due resolutions in their observations of the several alterations and changes of the maladies , as they durst not upon any suddain accident that should arrive , succor the sick parties with any requisite and speedy help , but shewing more obedience to the colledge , then charity to their patients , refused to meddle with those maladies which would admit of no delay , without express order from their superiors ; and truely it was sad to see , that the time which should have been spent in the cure of their patients , was imployed to no purpose by those physicians in writing eloquent relations , and many learned advices to those of the colledge , to whom with all dilligence they sent the water and excrements of the sick , which altering by reason of the length of the way , it unfortunately fell out that the colledg not being able to make any perfect judgement thereby , the recipes which they sent proved oft times clean contrary to the malady of the patient ; moreover , the sickness whereof the physitians had given an exact account , changed also before the answer could be brought ; wherefore they were forced to send new relations , and new advertisements , which occasioned the necessary ruine of the sick parties , and oft times whilst they lay expecting medicaments from a far off , they arrived after the parties were dead , to whom they should have been applyed . all which were so foul inconveniences , as many men dyed more then had wont to do , insomuch as apollo hearing thereof , he marvelled how so charitable a resolution could have so bad success . wherefore apollo thinking himself much abused by hyppocrates , who under a pretence of publike charity , minded chiefly his own ambition , said in a publike audience , that he now found , that physicians neer at hand , though peradventure ignorant , were better for sick persons , then those that were more learned , if afar off ; and afterwards dismist the colledge , resolving to take some notable revenge upon hyppocrates . but was disswaded from it by esculapius his earnest intreaties , who confessing hippocrrtes ambition , excused it by alleadging the common desire which all men of honor have to command , that they may not seem to hold the candle unto others , but be held to be somewhat more then ordinary . the xxxv . advertisement . francisco mauro , a noble italian poet , having marryed the most vertuous lady , laura terecino , is soon after jealous of her , and kills her . from the very first day that the lovely l. lauro terecina was admitted into parnassus , & that the most excellent euterpe had taken her to be her waiting woman , she began to be much courted by many amorous poets , but those that made oftnest addresses to her , and which she peradventure liked better then the rest , were francisco maria molza , and francisco mauro , being both of them very famous poets of this court. illustrious euterpe considering laura's youth , her exquisite beauty , and how she was courted by so many vertuosi , resolved to mary her speedily , and acquainting laura with her intention , she found her very ready to obey her . euterpe left it to her choice whether she would chose mauro or molza for her husband . vertuous terracina who would not resolve upon a business of such importance , by what was most pleasing to her eye , as many foolish women use to do , but , as the wiser sort do , by what appeared best unto her judgement , desired that she might see both their poetries ; which after she had perused several times , and duly considered them , she laid aside le fitche del molza as related in a weak and languishing stile , and chose mauro's fava , wherein she thought she found quainter conceits , and that it was more solidly written . the match being concluded , the marriage was soon celebrated . and maurus being so meanly stockt as that he had nothing to trust to but his capitola della fava , had by his wife by way of joynter , ●… octavoes ready paid down , besides an infinite number of madrigals , sonets , and songs , made by that vertuous lady . they had been marryed above a year , when mauro observed that his wife wore a very rich garter imboidered all over with pearl on her right leg , and on the other an usual slight one ; and not being onely moved thereat , but greatly scandalized , for that he had often marked , that his wife was very proud of that garter , and that when she met with any vertuosi she would hold up her coats on that side higher then in modesty she ought to have done , he askt his wife what the meaning thereof might be , and whether there was any thing of secret therein or no ? lawra told him , that edward the sixth king of england , in acknowledgement of her devotion towards him , had given her that garter , which for her greater honor she wore upon solemn days , and that as being very affectionate to that great king , she had sworn to serve him upon all occasions , and to be always his most devoted faithful servant . mauro grew so mad hereupon , as flying upon her , he said . hast thou then been so affronted thou wicked baggage , as ( being the wife of an honorable poet ) to shame me , under the colour of honor , by knowing an other man , and by receiving gifts from any other then thy husband , and shall not i , being thus injur'd in my honer , revenge my self ? and this being said , it nothing availing the unfortunate and miserable terecina to beg pardon , nor to protest that she had never in any manner whatsoever injur'd her nuptial bed , he laid hold upon a prohihibited verse of six syllables , which he had about him , wherewith he stabd her sundry times in the throat , and kill'd her . this bestial resentment did not only mightily displease all the l. poetesses of this state , but did very much trouble all the greatest litterati of parnassus : so as both of them in great numbers appeared before apollo , and with bitter words aecused mauro , who was there present , that without having any just occasion , to the great scorn of the honor of knighthood of one of the greatest kings of europe , he had vilanously slain the most vertuous lady of all parnassus . to this mauro couragiously answered , that it was true , he deserved to be severely punished by his majesty ; not for the just revenge he had taken of his unchaste wife , but for that he had so long deferred the revenge due to the reputation of a man of honor , it being many months since he was aware of the lewdness of that garter . all the princes that stood by were strangely moved to hear mauro utter these words , who not being able to indure that honors conferd by them upon noble forraigners , who did adhere and were affectionate to them should be accounted vituperius , raised a great noise in the court , when apollo to quench the fire in the beginning , which he foresaw was likely to break forth into a great combustion , said thus unto them . writeo you princes , in you●… hearts , with characters not to be rased out , this misfortune which hath befaln laura tercina , for which mauro ought rather to be remunerated by me , and commended by you , then punisht by my judges , and by you blamed : and believe it for a certain truth , that these favors , and honors which princes confer upon forreigners , are plain preludiums to their wanton desires of domineering , which they continually meditate how to bring about . the souls of subjects are linkt to their princes by the straight bond of chaste , and holy matrimony , and therefore , as chaste wives , they ought not so much as with their eys , to acknowledge or know any other p. then him whom gods laws hath set over them and the laws of men , so far is it from being lawful for them to love them with their hearts , and vow loyalty to them : and you are great fools , if to revenge the infidelity of your subjects you wait the time till you can take them in the very act of adulterous fellonies . for wounds which cause dishonor , are warded , and put by by good fencers before they hurt , they are fools that cure them when they are received ; the very self same hour that you see any subject of yours but cast an eye upon a forrain prince , do as mauro did , hold not your thumbs underneath your girdles , but imploy gallowses and ropes ; and if upon your greatest occasions , and particularly when you wiil appear with honor before an enemy prince with your subjects arms in hand , be not seen with a pair of horns on your head . the xxxvi . advertisement . thais , that famous curtizan of the comick poets , is at last though after much debate , admitted into parnassus ; who much to apollo's satisfaction , tells what good she hopes to bring to his court. in the great councel which was yesterday held in parnassus by all the litterati , and the most famous personages of this state , many , learned in all the liberal arts , who were lately come to this court , were propounded to have honourable places allowed them in parnassus ; amongst which thais , that common whore of the comick poets , was named for one , and found favourable suffrages , being extraordinarily assisted by publius terrentius , who was so partial on her behalf , as he held secret practice with all the poets . and it hapned that whilst the gates of parnassus were opened to her , to the end that she might present her self before apollo , and the senate of the vertuosi , to thank them for the favor she had received , the illustrious cardinal alexander fernese , accompanyed by a train of prelates , withstood thais as she was about to enter , crying out aloud , that if so unworthy a person , from whom nothing but publick scandal could be expected , should be admitted into parnassus , he for his part would rather be gone from thence , then see vertuous places profaned with such polutions , which were onely aboads for those litterati , as by their words , writings , and exemplary lives , could prescribe wholsom precepts unto others , and that he knew there were many vertuosi who would put on the same resolution . whilst the cardinall spoke thus , and that he endeavoured by force to keep her out of the gate , she was so strongly assisted by a numerous squadron of poets , who backt terrentius , as there began a very dangerous dispute at the gate . but wary thais , who knew that she had always come by the worst in all the quarrels that she at any time before had ever been the occasion of , said aloud , that she did no ways intend to enter into parnassus by force , but with the goodwill of every one , and more particularly by the approbation of those most illustrious and holy prelates : and that if they were thought worthy of an aboad in parnassus who could give excellent councel unto others , and wise precepts , she should be unjustly dealt withal if she should be denyed to inhabit in those venerable places , and that though she knew she might of right claim an aboad in parnassus , yet she would acknowledge it as a singular favor , and especially from those that did most withstand her : and that those that did not love to see her in parnassus , were much deceived in the ill opinion they had of her , for that there was not any one in those blest habitations , to whom she was not able to give such advertisements , as wiser nor more necessary , could not be given by any whatsoever moral philosopher ; and that it was not so much for the purchasing of eternity to her name , that she desired to live amongst the vertuosi in parnassus , as to be assisting unto many by her perpetual walking in the streets , and admonishing every one to live modestly ever amongst their neighbours ; and to shun the foul vice of calling their companion whore , as they would shun death ; if their own consciences were not cleer : for that there being many wrangling courtiers , they had oft times faln at such odds , as by blows and calumnious speeches they had wounded their reputations : and that officers who went to have the government of provinces , could not learn the important and difficult philosophy of getting monies in their governments , with reputation , from any more learned instructress , then from her , for that onely thais knew the accurate art of fleecing the flock with such diligence and dexterity , as they would rather seem to be tickled and rejoyce , then exclaim or make any noise , in which practice she boasted her self to be so singular , as she had seen her sweethearts a thousand times , to be then most in love with her , when being flead to the quick , and galled to the very bones , she had sent them raw and naked to the hospital , from whence they have notwithstanding sent her amorous epistles . that they who were greedy of riches , who did everywhere , and by all means , sweat and labour after the accumulating of gold , might learn by her onely unfortunate example , that wealth ill got , through gods just anger vanisht into smoak ; for of all the innumerable monies which she had suckt from out the veins of her lovers , and the great riches which she robd many families of , she had now nothing remaining but those four lashes which every one might see upon her back ; when if god had given a blessing to the monies which had past through her hand , instead whereof she had had a thousand curses ; she might have vyed for wealth with any princess . next , that every one might learn , by her face which was so pleasing to her friends , by her flatteries , and falacies with which she used to delude and allure and intice those ill advised young men which she got into her hands ; by her continual smiles , by which she covered her ravenous minde , and that sharp rasor , wherewith without any manner of discretion or piety she did shave , nay , even flea her lovers ; never to trust appearances , grateful acceptance , fair words , and offered courtesies , and never to give themselves over into any ones power , unless they had first perfectly anatomised them . for many such as she , had pleasing aspects , good looks , and sweet breaths , whose disguises being taken off by discreet persons , and their inside of their souls discovered , they were found to be stinking carren , full of festered wounds , and to have false souls , and fraudulent hearts , and infinitely interessed . then turning towards cardinal fernese ; thais said , and who when i shall have opened my house in parnassus , ought more to frequent my schoole then your excellency my most illustrious sir , wherein you may learn that important vertue of newtrality , which the popes nephews , such as your self , have so much need of : a science wherein i am so well known , as i may read it in the schooles ; for never being whilst i lived in the world , without twenty pamphilioes , all inamored of me , who all of them hated one another by reason of the jealousie which useth to be among young rivals , yet by my sagacity i have always known how to behave my self so dexterously with them , as i have rather taken their weapons from them , then put them into their hands : by which means i was able to reap great advantage from them , without ever loosing any one of them . a rare precept , and a piece of cunning as singular , as hard to be put in practice : and the more necessary for such as your lordship , for that you do not like me , who keep my lovers fast imprisoned by the strong chains of lust ; but you hold those whom you have been a benefactor unto , by the weak thred of gratitude ; which is broken by every least shadow of distaste , though it be unwarily given . and i have known many such as you , who by having unwisely been inamored on some one person , have not onely lost their own interest , but greatly ruined that friends fortune whom they would exalt , by the jealousies which they have raised in all the rest of their followers , foolishly furnishing them with weapons , whereby they have forced those , who would otherwise have been very grateful , to change the defect of partiality , with the vice of ingratitude . all which are so true and necessary advertisements , as if they be observed as they ought to be , by such as you are , you shall never have any reason upon any dislike , to complain more of your friends infidelity , then of the hatred of those that love you . it being an observed rule by such as i am , that he who will be attended by many loving followers , must not be adulterously in love with one onely person . the xxxvii . advertisement . the ambassadors of the province of marca being sent to this court , in a publike audience complaine unto his majesty of an unfortunate affair which hath befaln his inhabitants of that province , for which apollo provides sufficient remedy , with singular demonstration of true love and affection . the marchian orator who came the last week to this court , made his solemn entrance yesterday , being attended by the greatest part of the nobility , and being clad in a long mourning weed , he appeared in the colledge of the litterati , where after having made his low reverence to apollo , he spoke thus . monarch and father of learning , and you other princes of the cujus who hear me speak , whilst learning flourisht in the world , la marca was so famous therein , as she had the fame to have poets , philosophers , orators , and other great personages no whit inferior to those of mantua , athens , or rome ; in so much as she hath been by some great wits compared to greece her self , that fruitful mother of all sciences . but since her litterati have been hewen in pieces and starved by barbarians , learning hath been also so trampled upon by them , as after the burning of so many famous libraries , wherein the labors of the most learned writers perisht , having lost the noble latin tongue , the very rase of doctors were quite lost , whose ruine hath occasioned the very last displanting of the noble province of marca ; for the noble marchians being first called by the famous city of iesi piceini aesini after the lamentable loss which they had of dipthongs , as i have said they are remained piceni asini : so as truely i do not know any other greater calamity that ever befel any nation , which can be compared to this of ours , which by the loss of one onely dipthong , hath so far lost her ancient reputation , as the unfortunate marchians cannot traffick , nor appear in the company of any gallant men , but they must be twitted in the teeth with asino . here the orator with abundance of tears ended his discourse , nor was there any one litterato in that audience who were not very sensible of the marchians misfortune , insomuch as apollo himself being much moved at the misery of so noble a province , called for some paper and ink , and with his own hand did again set the dipthong to iesi ; and commanded virgil , who was the regent of scanning verses , that the first syllable of iesi should be pronounced long ; and ordained upon pain of grievous punishment , that no man for the future should dare to call the marchians asini , since it was very true that mother nature had sowed l'asinita in so just a measure amongst all the nations of the world , as every one had a share thereof equal to her companion . the xxxviii . advertisement . gonzalvo ferrante cordova desires apollo that the title of magno or great may be confirmed unto him , and instead of being granted his request , receives a very unsatisfactory answer . gonsalvo ferrante cordova , called by the spaniards il gran capitano , appeared some days ago in parnassus , with a noble train of many castilian gentlemen , and having in a haughty oration related unto his majesty , his famous actions in war , demanded the confirmation of the title magnns , which was given him by the consent of the whole militia , and by all the historians of europe . gonzalvo was graciously received by apollo , who bad him give in in writing all his military enterprises , and commanded afterwards that they should be diligently examined by giovani giovanno pontano , by francisco guicchardin , and by the most reverend paulus iovius , and that they should make an exact report thereof to the senate of history , to the end that if they should be found to be such as did deserve the title of magnus , they might confirm it unto him by his majesties authentick letters pattents . gonsalvo delivered unto those historians a very perfect commentary of all his actions , which were by them diligently examined , and weighed ; and afterwards made a full relation thereof in open colledge , where they resolved what answer should be given to gonsalvo ; who being sent for into the court , titus livy the master of the colledge , told in the name of the whole senate ; that they had very exactly considered his war enterprises , and had at last concluded that for what he had done in granada , being things done under the command of a c. who was his superior , according to the stile of the court of parnassus they were not to be reckoned upon , the whole glory of victory in such cases being given to the captain general , who commanded the army in chief ; and that though he had been general at the business of driving the moors out of the kingdom of granada , they thought the action was not such as might deservedly confer the glorious title of magnus upon the commander in chief ; for it was no great business for all spain to drive out a few moors , who were divided amongst themselves , out of granada . then livy added , that his enterprises done in affrica , in the taking in of some small places , were not thought worthy to be considered in a subject , who demanding the high prerogative of the title of magnus , must make it manifest unto the world that he had atchieved enterprises which were t●…ly great ; and that it appeared cleerly by his writings , that he had won all his reputation in military affairs , in the war which he managed in the getting of the kingdom of naples , wherein two field battles were famous and worthy consideration ; the one given at saminara , the other at garigliano ; which if they were sufficient to purchase a man the title of magnus , there were so many bellisarii , narsetti , carli martelli , scanderbegs , and other famous captains in parnassus , who had done more memorable acts , as their would be more magni in the world then parvi , to this gonsolvo replyed , that he thought that in the neapolitan war , they ought not to reflect upon particular actions , but to the whole noble work and enterprise which he had gloriously brought to an end , by winning a flourishing and strong kingdom unto his king and master . livy replyed , that they had also taken into their consideration , his winning of the whole kingdom of naples , wherein he seemed to suffer much in his reputation , as having therein used more fraud , then true military valor ; and th at therefore the history colledge , had adjudged that neapolitan enterprise not to deserve the name of an honorable atchievement ; and that he was therefore to know that the glorious title of magnus was by a particular prerogative onely granted to those who had atchieved valiant enterprises , by their meer military worth and vertue : that therefore the colledge could not possibly think that gonsalva could pretend to have won the kingdom of naples by force of arms , whereinto being called but a little before as a friend , by the ill-advised neapolitan kings ; and that he might defend them , afterwards when those unfortunate kings stood in greatest need of help , and just then when they had put the whole kingdom into his hands , he had the heart to declare himself their enemy , which whether it was an action fitting to confer the title of magnus upon him that did effect it , the history colledge would make gonsalva himself judge . livy said moreover , that his obscu●…e catastrophe , might be added to what had been said ; misbecoming such a one as gonsalvo , who desiring to be stiled magnus , desired to be the protosavio of the world , since after the acquisition of such a kingdom , not knowing how to secure his reputation , he most ignorantly suffered himself to be disarmed , to have the government of naples afterwards taken from him , and to be brought back to spain and be confined , and dye there mad . gonsalva then exclaimed , and said : that pompey had made a much more unfortunate end then he , and yet had obtained the title of magnus . to which livy answered , that according to the institutions of parnassus , those who to compass an empire lost their lives , or came by any other unfortunate end , lost no reputation ; nor had pompey the great any ways done so , who had always the same generous thought , ( though he knew how to conceal it ) as c●…sar had . in fine , livy said , that the two inexcusable errors which gonsalva made in his managing the taking of the kingdom of naples , did much derogate from his desire , for that he did not onely exceed the bounds of a commanders liberality , and authority , when after the conquest of so great a kingdom , by rewarding so many barons . commanders , and other deserving men , he had purchast unto himself an attendance of so many signal subjects , not having the requisite head of leaving means unto his king to shew himself thankful to those who had served him : and that with affability , and behavior far differing from the austerity of his nation , he had appeared openly to affect that attendance and love of the neapolitan barons , which ought mainly to be avoided by such a oneas he , who was the officer of a king naturally very jealous , by which foolish proceeding he raised in him those jealousies , which he could not free himself of without gonzalva's ruine of reputation ; and that the apprehension of affecting the government of other mens kingdoms , was neither given , nor born withal in wise men ; for to be lukewarm in such cases , proved always a mortal advice to them that used it . gonsalvo was much incenst to hear livy speak thus , who could not forbear saying that he had served his king with such loyalty as became a castilian baron , that the cunning how to betray a mans prince , was not known in spain , and that the lords of his nation reputed it a greater honor to receive injuries from their kings , then to betray them . to this livy replyed , that if he were of so well a composed mind , he might do well to desire to be stiled an honest man , which should willingly be granted him , and not magnus , which he should have then deserved when he should have thought it more glorious to dye king of naples , then to be confined to a poor castle of spain , onely for having deserved such a reward as could not be countercambiated by any thing else , then by the ingratitude which was used towards him . then gonsalva , without bearing any respect to the place wherein were so many eminent persons , said , that they proceeded unjustly with him ; for that blaming his constant loyalty , they affirmed unto him in publike , that he should have received a better reward in ●…arnassus ; if he had been guilty of a thousand trecheries ; and that king ferdinando's ingratitude did not onely not obscure his reputation , but did infinitely add unto his glory ; and that the reason of state which taught men that to measure their actions onely by the compass of interest , not by the yard of reputation , was a do●…e which better became great kings and princes , then such captains as he was , in whom perjuries , treasons , and i recherie , were always accounted infamous , whereas the gaining of kingdoms by supreme potentates , though by foul means , were termed glorious atchievements . livy then replyed unto gonsalva in bitter language , that the italians were not so ignorant but that they very well knew that the title which was given him in the business of naples was capitano major , which in italian or in english is general , not magnus ; that he put too great a value upon himself ; and that the history colledge had rather bereave bawdy-houses of the title of signoria , where it was buryed through the vanity of ambitious men , then that they would send the so highly esteemed name of magnus thither . the xxxix . advertisement . many of the french nobility intreat their monarchy , that according as the nobility of commonwealths do , it may be lawful for them to use marchandizing ; and are by her shamefully denyed . many of the nobility of france , went some few days ago to visit the illustrious venetian liberty , and though they did much admire the laws of living free , the excellent orders by which she maintains her self in that liberty , which is now so hard to be found amongst men , yet they infinitely admire , and envy the greatness of the noble venetians , and did chiefly wonder , that the prime senators of so excelse a commonwealth , did freely exercise marchandising , which their kings of france had declared to be mechanick , and they thought it very strange that the french nobility should be made to believe , that the exercise of arms , wherein men usually lose all their own estate , should be more noble then that of marchandise , which doth very much inrich men . wherefore some of the prime nobility of france , appeared not many days ago before their monarchy , humbly desiring that she would be pleased , to declare by publike edict that it was as honorable for her nobility to follow traffick and marchandising , as it was held to be in the famous commonwealths of venice , genua , and in many other republicks . the french monarchy was much moved at this unexpected request ; and as if something of unseemly , or misbecoming had been asked her , she with injurious words and an angry countenance , bad them be gone ; and they thinking themselves greatly wronged , by being in so severe a manner denyed a request which they thought to be so just , appealed presently to apollo , to whom they gave a particular account of all that had past between them and their monarchy , and made the same request unto his m●…jesty . apollo , who thought the french nobility had demanded nothing but what was just , signifyed un●…o the french monarchy , that if she should not satisfie her nobility in the point that they might follow marchandising , without any blemish to their honor , he could not choose but gratifie them therein . when the french monarchy heard so great a novelty , that she might prevent so great a r●…ne which she foresaw was likely to fall upon her , came presently before apollo , to whom she said , that his majesty knew the true basis of her greatness , and her chiefest power lay in the swords of her nobility , who having drunk in the opinion together with their milk , that merchandising was a thing as becoming mechanick men , as mis-becoming those that were nobly born , and that the mystery of war , the managing of arms , were the true traffick , and proper merchandise of the noblesse : and that to overthrow those solid foundations , would be no better then to annihilate not onely the kingdom of france , but those likewise of spain , england , poland , and other monarchies ; which knowing very well the great necessity that powerful potentates have of always keeping their noblesse armed , had by mysterious cuning kept them from any thought of merchandising , and that it was most certain that as soon as her noblesse should taste the sweets of trading , they would presently throw away their arms , whereunto they were bred up , preferring the continual gain of traffick , before the perpetual expence of war ; and that the effect which the use of merchandising produced amongst senators , was plainly seen in all common-wealths , where for greediness of maintaining traffick , they were seen to be too much inclined to peace . the same monarchy did likewise put his majesty in mind of the necessity she had of keeping her noblesse in arms , for she had found in all her most important actions , that a few of the noblesse had overcome great armies of plebeians ; for there was no comparison to be made between the valor and fidelity of the noblesse who fought to win their princes favor , and to purchase glory ; and those foot taken up in the streets , who took up arms onely for the poor gain of three crowns a month . apollo was much satisfyed with these reasons alleadged by the french monarchy ; wherefore he not long after told those french noblesse , who were returned to receive an answer of their business , that having reflected maturely upon their request , he thought it not convenient , that the french noblesse famous throughout all the nations of the world , for being born warriers , and whose true element was the perpetual managing of arms , should now obscure their glory by the sordid gain of merchandise ; and that the ends of republicks did very much differ from those of monarchies : for the exercise of merchandise , which by its continual gain did evidently abase mens spirits , made the expence of war seem odious and disarmed those who gave their minds thereunto , was not only good , but very excellent in commonwealths ; where such senators whose genius led them to the wars living in perpetual jealousie of their liberty , were not a little suspected in free countries , who desired that their senators should rather be prudently wise , and greatly given to peace , then overmuch warlike ; and thus were these french noblesse dismist by his majesty . and t is publikely said in this court , that they were so exasperated by this repulse , as one of them was heard to say , o great god! what cheats , what cozenages are these which are put upon the noblesse in monarchies ? and how can it be conceived by any man , what humane law , what justice of god doth command , that to gain for a mans self by merchandise should be thought shameful , and to plunder by arms for others , should be held an honorable imployment . the xl. advertisement . the honorable title of messere , being faln into a miserable condition , is shamefully driven out of the kingdom of naples ; and not being received into rome , ( as it thought it should be ) for its last refuge hath its recourse to apollo , who assigns it a very satisfactory aboad . in the publike meetings of the seats of justice at naples , ( which the neapolitans call chiazza ) it was two months since resolved , that the title of messere should be expel'd that kingdom , upon pain of grievous punishment if his worship were not gone within three days . and because that honorable title thought it had not deserved so scornful usage , to appease those princes and lords who were so highly incenst against him , he alleadged the authority of giovanni scopa , antonio mancinello , and other excellent grammarians , who did all agree , that the barbarians , who from the northern parts overran italy , they had not onely through their ignorance of the latin tongue , corrupted the supreme title of here into sire , but that those that followed after , changed that likewise into messere which signified as much as my here which is my master ; and that such a title with which the kings of france are pleased to honor their sacred persons , was unworthily so abused by the italians ; but it being hereunto answered , that in the important business of titles no respect was had to the true worth thereof , but to the rate according to which it went in the market , unfortunate messere was forced to hide himself in the houses of some worshipful very old men , who complained very much that worshipful messere should be so hardly dealth withal , even by shop-keepers , with which they remembred that in former times the kings of naples made their own stile to be honored , and reverenced . but the business growing at last desperate , messere took his journey for rome by the weekly carryer , at the same time that those honorable titles of ●…agnifici , spectabili , sereni , and generosi , fled secretly from the kingdom for fear of the like affront . when messere was come to rome , he was but badly received , by those courtiers who long before had thought it much scorn to be cloyed with the jacket of illustre , molto illustre , and who hoped shortly to manumit l'illustrissimo . wherefore messere took his way towards parnassus , whether he came some few days ago , and presenting himself before apollo , acquainted him first with all his persecutions , and then earnestly intreated his majesty , that he would appoint him out some aboad , where he might rest quiet , till such time as the flood of ambition , which had infected even good men , were parted from the world . apollo did much compassionate the persecutions of that honorable title , and having first communicated the business to the censors , he resolved to recommend him to the care of the ambassador of marca , by whom being received with great demonstrations of love , and carryed home into his country , letters of the twelfth of this month , are come by the ordinary post from marca , which say that that kinde and loving nation hath not onely willingly received messere , but hath in great pomp admitted him into its country , under an imbroydered cloth of state ; and that messere in recompence of that very great civility , taught the marchians the very next day after his arrival , the true way of rosting the leaf of a hog , and of sopping their bread in the dripping-pan , letting that smoak go up the chimney ; which the neapolitans , and other nations which study appearance more then substance , feed much upon . the xli . advertisement . the censors of parnassus , having by order from apollo , published a rigorous edict against hypocrites , are forced to moderate it , by reason of a weighty particuler discovered unto them by plato . the publike censors of this court , having learnt for certain , that a kind of goodness which is lately discovered in some of the litterati of parnassus , is but a composure of artificial appearances , and real falshood , and that hellish hypocrisie gets every day more footing in mens minds , to the end that all parnassus may not be infected with so contagious a disease , published by order from his majesty , a severe edict six days ago against hypocrites . and is it not a great wonder that plato himself who is held by all the vertuosi of parnassus to be the true idea of all purity and sincerity , and the very pattern of goodness , should presently appear before the censors tribunal , and openly opposing himself to the edict which was so generally well received , saying with his wonted freedom , that through the manifest ignorance of modern men , in judging upon the true condition of mens manners , it was a very pernitious resolution which was tane in parnassus , to extirpate all that hypocrisie , by which in these unfortunate times , even good men were forced to keep up their reputation ; for plain-dealing men , people of open hearts and cleer mindes , enemies to cunning and double dealing , who in former times were honored and admired like so many demi-gods , were so far from being well esteemed of in this present age ; as to speak the naked truth , and to proceed in all a mans actions with sincerity , were nor esteemed good nor vertuous things , but rather scurrility , a relaxed life , a licentious way of proceeding , an unpolisht behaviour ; wherefore even the best men , and those that formerly walked in the approved way of bene vivere , & latari , and who appeared to be capital enemies to hypocrisie , yet that they might by so wicked a vice maintain that credit and reputation , which they saw they lost by living honestly , were much against their will inforc'd to use hypocrisie . the censors did so much approve of this counsel given by plato ; as they soon embraced it , and by a new edict which they published , complained , that in this so depraved age , to the calamity of good men , and great good fortune of knaves and varlets , words freely , and merily spoken in publike by jovial people , were more censured , then all the wick edness done in privat by modern hypocrites ; wherefore apollo , ( though much against his will ) granted leave to all gallant people of whatsoever sex to use , without incurring any punishment , the four-scoreth part of one grain of fine hypocrisie . the xlii . advertisement . the immense bulk of the ottoman empire which was thought by the wisest men to be everlasting , doth now of it self so destroy it self , as it threatens present ruine . the vast fabrick of the ottoman empire , ( as is well known to all those that deal in pernassus ) is of so large a circuit , as it seems to be a great city , the walls whereof being built ( though the princes thereof be barbarous and illiterate ) in an excellent way of politick architecture , are of so solid materials , and with so corresponding bulwarks , courtines , platforms , ditches , ravelins , scarfes , & counterscarfes , as it was not onely thought by many of those who of late did consider it , to be as eternal as the world , but seemed as if by means of those emperors who are still more and more ambitious to make it greater by the addition of new appertiments , it would like nero's golden house , possess whole pernassus ; the strong bulwarks of tauris , servan , giorgia , darbecca , and most of all those of armenia , are not only almost all of them faln to the ground , but that strongest bastion of the lesser asia , hath lost so large a collop , as it threatens sodain ruine ; so as those walls which seemed to be everlasting , do now of themselves moulder away and fall to ruine . a novelty which makes the beholders wonder very much , and puts them in minde of the instability of humane greatness ; for though nothing appear more potent and immortal to the eyes of men then great empires , yet we see they sodainly and easily are overthrown . for if a man will demolish a tower which is strongly built , he must labour long about it with canon and pick-axe ; but to the ruine of any empire how great and potent soever , one onely puff ( though but very weak ) of a princes folly , or of a private mans ambition , who hath good store of followers , mony , and wit , is able to make it totter , and fall , before the ruine be expected . the xliii . advertisement . the prince of helicon desires by an embassador of his , from apollo , the priviledge of ordaining birthright amongst the nobles of his state ; which his majesty denies to grant . the prince of helicons embassador , who came three days since to pernassus , had audience given him yesterday by apollo ; whom he acquainted that his prince , after having imbellished his flourishing state , with all those singular ornaments which render great kingdoms respected , wanted nothing , but that the numerous nobility which he had instituted there , might keep up their greatness perpetually ; and because he knew that it was riches which onely preserved the splendor of great families , he foresaw that the gallantry of his state would through peoples usual fruitfulness , in a short time turn to its former mean condition , if the fathers estate should be divided in equal parts amongst many brethren : and that the famous nobilities of france , spain , germany , poland , and other kingdomes , had maintained their greatness many hundreds of yeers , onely by the advantage of birthright ; wherefore his prince ( who was much his majesties servant ) did humbly beseech him that he would vouchsafe to grant him the priviledge of instituting the law of birthright amongst the nobility of his state . apollo answered the embassador , that he perceived his prince did not consider what he asked ; for it seemed he did not well know what it imports in a state , by rich patrimonies , and pretence of nobility to put the bulls horns upon the head , and woolves teeth in the mouths of meek sheep , ready to be milkt with both hands , and shorn to the very quick , when they wanted the pretension of that vain-glorious nobility , which teaching others onely how to command like lords , made the base slavery of obeying known ; and that those potentates who had indeavoured to found and maintain a great nobility in their states , by the institution of birth-right , were at last aware that they had foolishly made them the heads of those people , who when they had wealthy men for their guides , and such as were remarkable for their nobility , were dreadful to all princes ; and that great families in all states served onely for lanterns , which in the obscu●…est times of revolutions , gave light to the common people who walked in the dark . wherefore in states where there was a numerous nobility , it behoved princes to live with the punctilio of respect which was an unsufferable burthen ; which those kingdoms wanted , where no such impediments being found , their possessors might justly and with much reason term themselves true and absolute masters of their states : and that there wanted not examples of noble men in france , flanders , and elsewhere , who in foul insurrections made by themselves , durst take upon them the title of fathers of their country , and the peoples protectors ; and who that they might tyrannise over the people , and give laws even to their natural princes , were not ashamed to guild over their seditious taking up of arms against their king , with the specious and charitable pretence of publick good . to this the embassador answered , that the example of the warlike nobility of france , was the only thing which had induced his prince , to desire it so much in his state , for he found cleerly that the trechery of those who had made insurrections against their king , had been overcome by the glorious french noblesse ; and that the noble kingdom of france , being armed by a no less numerous then warlike noblesse , had taught the whole world , how much a numerous noblesse imports in a kingdom ; for 't was they alone who by their unvanquishable swords had quenched the fire of those french insurrections , which in a kingdom that had wanted so great a benefit , would have burnt eternally . apollo answered , that all this would have been true , if the french insurrections , of which he spake , had been raised onely by the people , but that being apparently kindled by a great many of the noblesse of that kingdom , the physician would prove very ridiculous who should glory in the cure of a malady , of which through his gross ignorance he had been the onely cause : and that every wise prince ought to keep from the fault of nursing up and nourishing companions and brothers in his kingdom , since those monarchs reigned most securely , who put the greatest distance between their greatness , and the lowliness of their subjects . that it nauseated his majesty , as much as ignorance it self did , to see that there should be so arrogant and vain-glorious subjects in one of the chiefest kingdoms of europe , who by the proud pretence of their nobility , durst affirm they were as nobly born as the king himself ; as if any comparison which was not infinitely ridiculous and hateful , could be made between a spindle , and the mast of a tree , between flyes and elephants , between commanding , and obeying . and apollo added , that it was this monstrous petulancy which made the ottoman emperors hold it the chief means of their security and greatness , and that not without reason , not to allow any the least shadow of pretence to nobility in their dominions : and that those who would see narrowly into the effects which the noblesse occasion in a kingdom , did not so much blame the resolution of those emperors , as some did who understood very little of worldly affairs . for those great princes , who in their affairs minded onely substance and not appearance , did infinitely abhor the boasting and vain-glory of those things which seemed to be , and were not : and they abhord to see that a nobleman who had no experience , or was not any ways skild in the affairs either of war or peace , should notwithstanding through the sole pretence of his empty nobility , think those qualifications in the militia to be due to him , which a prince is so necessitated to confer upon the only worth and merit of such commanders whose hairs were grown gray under a murrion , and who by perpetually wearing of curasses in actions of war had made their breasts and backs as hard as horn ; and that that which above all other things made such people hateful , was to see them so wilful , as not to obey antient commanders of a less noble extract , though they themselves were but young ; it being certainly an insufferable pretension , to desire thorow fool●…sh ostentation , that the gifts of fortune should be esteemed by a prince to be indowments of minde . in fine , apollo said , that he though tit was greater cruelty , & high in●…ustice , that the estate should not be equally divided amongst those brothers who had one and the same father and mother . that he thought it fit some prerogative should be given to the primogeniture , but that it should be such as should make him appear to be the head of his house , not the master of his brethren : and that the rich and just right of eldership which fathers ought to leave in their families was love and concord between his children . and that it would be both great folly , and cruelty to introduce that primogeniture amongst private men , which occasioning such scandals in the blood of princes , as might be seen registred in history , was onely born withal for the publike peace sake , which the people would not enjoy , if kingdoms were divided , and that primogeniture being onely advantagious to princes , subjects who were excluded from paternal inheritance , were necessitated for their subsistance to take pay of them , and to be trained up in war , by which princes secured their states ; that they might be furnisht with the same abundance of military men as now they had with high injustice and the peoples ill will , if they should admit all brothers to paternal inheritances ; for that was onely the laudable primogeniture which neither princes , nor parents , but brothers themselves by joynt agreement do erect in their families , when one onely of them betaking himself to propagation , all the rest labour to augment the common patrimony . apollo concluded his answer with this , that he absolutely denyed to grant the prince of helicon the primogeniture which he desired , because he could no longer behold those horrid tragedies , and cruel machinations which were plotted amongst brethren in those states where the use of primogeniture was practised ; for those who were excluded from paternal inheritance , left no sort of cruelty , or trechery unindeavoured to recompence the foul injustice which was done them . moreover , that all primogeniture being grounded with much loss of blood , he feared he should not be able to find out any form of priviledge with so strong and strict proviso's , as would be able , to keep people excluded from their inheritance from making , by a dagger in their hand , their fathers last will and testament ineffectual . the xliv . advertisement . the duke of alva being accused of cruelty , for having with exquisite diligence caused two of the prime subjects of his new principality of achaia , to be imprisoned , slain , and afterwards secretly buryed in their very prisons , defends himself stoutly before apollo . soon after the duke of alva had tane possession of the new principality of achaia , of which you heard at large by our late letters , that severe spirit , who being wholly composed of wariness , and vigilancy , seemed to be indowed by nature with all requisites in a prince , who will with security govern states newly acquired . after he had exactly observed the humors , and behaviors of some chief men of the state , he indeavoured to know who they were who had occasioned those many popular insurrections which had so much indangered the free state of achaia : and at last he found apparently that all the former evils had had their rise from the ambition of two principal men , who being wealthy , liberal , courteous , and more ambitious of government then became subjects , to be : qualities , which in any whatsoever corrupted commonwealth , or newly founded principality , make him who possesseth them formidable , and by those means infinitely beloved by the people ; the prince , to secure the quiet of his state , thought it very necessary to rid the world of so dangerous subjects ; so as with admirable dexterity and secrecy he got them both into his hands , and with necessary resolution , made them be put to death and buryed the very hour that they were imprisoned . this cruel and resolute action , not usually heard of , nor seen , in a state , which never having known what belonged to servitude , was not acquainted with those severe resentments which princes through jealousie of state use to take , gave that bad satisfaction to the nobility , which the severity of a new prince usually doth , when it is exercised against those ambitious popular chieftains who by their seditions abuse liberty , and precipitate it into tyranny ; and was of great terror to the common people ; who though they were much incenst against their prince , yet when they saw their leading men vvere tane from them , they neither had courage nor vvit to move ; but as is usual upon such like occasions , changed their insolency into admiration or vvonder , their boldness into fear , their acting of resentments into complaints by vvord , and to threatning that revenge , vvhich of themselves they had not vvit to execute . the end of their rancor vvas then , the making of such appeals to apollo against their prince , as his majesty straitly commanded him to make his present appearance in parnassus , and plead his justification against those imputations . alva obeyed , and having acquainted his majesty vvith their tedious conditions , shevved him cleerly , that to secure himself in the government of his new principality , he was necessitated to use the wonted remedy of taking off the heads of the seditious people , which apollo seemed to be but little satisfyed with ; but told alva , that though the death of those two seditious men might be requisite , yet he could not approve of the manner ; for that princes who in the important resolution of putting any of their subjects to death , did not proceed by the rules of known justice , injured their own reputation , and interest ; and that princes were obliged to make known to all the world , the true reason which made them proceed with severity against their subjects ; and that the delinquents punishment ought to be publick , not onely for the prince his justification , but to terrifie others , and keep them from doing amiss . the prince grew pale , to hear apollo speak thus positively , and answered , that the aforesaid two persons were so mightily beloved by the people , as if they should have been proceeded against by the usual course of justice , and that they had been executed ( as he acknowledged they should have been ) in the publike piazza , it was odds but that the people would by violence have taken them from the hands of justice ; which disorder though it might have been prevented by guards of armed men , yet it was most certain , that the publike death of such prime men , and who were so dearly beloved by their state , would have caused such compunction , & such alteration in the minds of his vassals , as , if not at that instant , they would at least at some other time leave nothing unattempted to revenge it . which respects made him keep from purging the body of his state , from those malignant humors which it abounded in , by approved medicines ; for certainly he should have stirred up such store of more pernicious humors , as would have much aggravated the malady . that it was a trivial politick precept , to frighten the meaner sort of people from committing wickedness , by the spectacle of mechanicks in the piazza's , and other publike places ; but that personages of quality , who were beloved by the people , and whom princes put to death , onely for the safety of their state , their deaths and burials must ensue their imprisonment , in secret places ; for to punish signal men publikely upon scaffolds , did not beget fear in men , but rage of revenge . apollo then asked the prince , how long it had been since he had learned that precept ; the prince answered that whilst he was a young man he learned it of a florentine , who was his master in the politicks ; apollo asked him again , why he practised the contrary in the memorable , and fatal resolution which he took in the business of prince egmont , and count horn ; alva boldly answered his malesty , that the interests were different in him who governed a province as an other mans substitute , and in him who was absolute prince thereof ; and that nature had made men wiser in governing their own particular affairs , then those of their masters ; and that many who seemed to be blinde in the government of other mens states , were more then argus-eyed in their own affairs . the xlv . advertisement . a chief subject of the province of macedonia , being hired by the prince of epire at a great salary , when he came to know the right cause why that pension was given him , doth magnanimously refuse it . the prince of epire , who gives great pensions to the chief counsellors of divers of his neighbouring potentates , hath for a long time past , paid great sums of money yearly to a chief baron of macedonia , who is very well beloved , and hath many followers in that nation : who believing that this the prince of epires liberality , proceeded from meer love , & sincerity of mind , to free himself from the superiority of any other prince , which might disturb him in his service , that he might be the more able to serve the prince of epire to the utmost of his power , sold all his estate in macedonia , and by the monies which he got for it , purchast great store of land in epire , whither he went to make his aboad , intending for the future to make epire his countrey ; and applyed himself with such assiduity , and so faithfully to the service of that prince ; as he surpast all the rest of his highness servants in his diligence , and care in all those things of importance , wherein he was trusted . but going to the pay-masters to receive his wonted half years pension , he much to his astonishment found , that by order from the treasurers , his pension was taken away . which he presently acquainted the prince with , and complained that whilst the merits of his service increased , his reward was lessened . the prince answered , that he having changed his country , and being of a friend become his servant , his case was altered . that he could purchase that of his equals which though he named it not , yet the baron might be wise enough to understand ; that upon all occasions he could purchase loyalty , and diligence a great deal better cheap of his own vassals . the baron understood then whither the pension tended that had been assigned him by the prince of epire , and blushing very much , stoutly answered him , sir , the reputation which i live in in my countrey , hath cost me an ounce of blood for every ten pounds worth thereof , in all the war that hath hapned in europe since i wrote man ; let not your highness think me so great a prodigal , as that i will sell it you for shillings the pound . and after this having withdrawn himself from his new barony which he had purchast in epire , he took his leave of the prince , and returned to his own country , admired and commended by all men for that his noble resolution , but imitated but by a few . the xlvi . advertisement . the tenth of june is observed as a sad and mournful day in parnassus ; in memory of the unfortunate loss of the decads of titus livy . yesterday which was the tenth of iune , was ( according to custom ) observed as a day of mourning in pernassus ; for that on that unfortunate day , by the burning of the library in the capitol , the greatest part of livies decads were lost ; which loss is bitterly bewayled , and will ever be so by all the lovers of learning . on which day , in sign of extraordinary sorrow , the royal palace dis-robes it self of all its majesty : and together with all publick schools , and chief market places , is lined with mourning bays ; and the very delphick library , ( a thing not done upon any other sad occasion ) is shut up all that day . honorable obsequies were made to so famous writings ; and the ceremony being ended , rafael volaterano in a mournful oration lamented so great a loss : and just as he was in the height of his inveighing against the ignorance of those sacrilegious persons , it happened that a nimble poet , were it either out of meer compunction of mind , or that he would purchase reputation , by shewing the whole colledge of vertuosi , how very sensible he was of that loss , broke forth into so loud lamentations , as the orator could be no longer heard , and not being able to quiet himself , though he was willed to do so by the censors ; apollo who was present at the obsequies , and who upon this mournful occasion had covered himself with a dark cloud , being impatient to hear that noise , and that he might the better behold his face who wept so downrightly , by the violence of his beams rarifyed the cloud , and found it to be caesar caporali , who not caring to see the yet remaining decads of that admirable writer , did with such lamentations bewayl those that were lost : which extraordinary affection caused so lowd a laughter in all the standers by , as volaterrano's oration , which in the midst thereof was interrupted by the general lamentings of the literati , could not be ended by reason of every ones great laughter . the xlvii . advertisement . apollo having appointed hospitals to every nation , for their fools , puts down that of florence , by reason of the few fools that are found amongst the florentines , and adds the revenue thereof to the lombards hospital , which by reason of the greater number of fools that flock thither , was run far in arrears . it being found by long experience , that there is no nation in the world , wherein there are not great store of fools , apollo , that he might find timely remedy , according to his custom , for mens miseries , erected many hundred years ago , an hospital for fools in every nation ; which he indowed with rich revenues ; to the end that they might be furnished with all things requisite for the cure of such as divine justice had for their misdemerits punisht , by making them shallow braind . and because the hospital of the noble florentine nation , by reason of the very few fools that it produceth , is at little or no cost , and it being on the contrary seen , that there is so great a concourse of lombard fools , as their hospital is not able to receive them all , nor can supply the great expence which it is forced to be at ; his majesty some few daies ago , of his own meer motion , put down the hospital of the florentine fools , and gave the revenues thereof to that of lombardy , the lombards being for the most part besotted with the foul indignity of playing the hectors , holding it to be a great honor , to be followed by a great number of swashbucklers . the xlviii . advertisement . apollo's sea-captains , having in one of their assemblies made many usefull decrees for their militia , his majesty orders that they be made known to courtiers , and commands the punctual observancy of them . the many meetings had by his majesties sea-captains , ended not before yesterday ; whereupon the general , andrea doria , came this morning with the constitutions therein established to apollo , to have his majesties royal assent thereunto : it is known that his majesty received great satisfaction by the decree made touching the gallislaves , who when they are beaten by the masters mate , may not turn about to look upon him , not fence the blow , not complain , and much less rail at him that beats them , upon pain of undergoing thrice as many lashes ; but they must so patiently , and so contentedly receive their correction , as their great humility moves the masters mate to be rather charitable then severe unto them . after apollo had much commended this decree , he gave order that it should be judiciously intimated to all those miserable creatures , who for their secret misdeserts , are by divine justice condemned to tug at an oar in the court of rome , or in any other court , to the end that they may learn with patience to suffer the blows ( the misusage ) the lashes ( the distasts ) which they in courts receive from their masters ; and that they do not murmur thereat , but may rather thereby with courage suffer tribulation , and betake themselves with the better will to the oar of slavery , and by so doing , inforce the prince to be rather liberal and gracious towards them , then to redouble their blows ( their discourtesies ) their lashes ( their ill usage . ) for to murmur , complain , or call their master ingrateful , doth beget in him such obstinacy , not to reward one who may otherw●…se be of some desert , even as the curses and blasphemies which the gally-slaves use to those that correct them , are the true causes which draws on their more severe correction . which is so true a thing , as princes hold it for an undeniable maxim , that an open enemy , and a distasted courtier , differant nomine , nonre . the xlix . advertisement . natalis comes , an historian , is severely punisht by apollo , for having said somewhat in an assembly of the literati , which did hainously offend his majesty . vvhilst natalis comes , the latin historian discoursed some daies since under melpomenes porch , together with many other literati of this court , of the glory of those great princes , who have left eternal memory behind them , of their honorable actions ; according to the custom of historians , tearmed the seisure or getting of a kingdom , made by a potent prince , without any title of right or justice , a glorious atchievement : which being suddenly carried to apollo's ear by those malignant spirits , which both the air and earth doe continually abound in , his majesty grew so incenst against natalis , as at the very instant that he was brought prisoner to him , he forbad him entrance into any of the libraries for three year : and though his majesty hath been intreated by the chief historians of this state , to shew some mercy to this his vertuoso , he hath not only denied to doe it , but hath freely said , that since there could be no greater wickedness committed , then the unjust liberty which some princes have usurped to bereave one another of their states ; an action which hath filled the whole world with those sad disorders , wherewith mankind is so much afflicted ; he thought it too sore an iniquity , that any so perfidious literato should be found in his state , who should dare to call those wicked thefts , which are not committed without a million of aggravating circumstances , glorious atchievements . the l. advertisement . the chief monarchies of europe and asia , which now reside in parnassus , fall sick at one and the same instant , and not being to be cured by esculapius , hippocrates , or any other able physitian , they are restored to their health by a skilful farrier . every one in parnassus did infinitely wonder , that upon one and the same day , all the chief monarchies of europe and asia should fall desperately sick , which many thought occasioned through the putrifaction of the air , or by some unauspitious aspects of the heavens . apollo did not only send excellent remedies to all those potentates , but all the chief physitians of this court ; and commanded that great esculapius should himself be assistant to their cure , so as no remedy was left untri'd by so rare physitians , that so eminent personages might recover their healths ; but all proved to no purpose ; for all the physitians did infinitely wonder , that though their medicines were most generous , and very proper for the malady , yet they did not work according to their particular vertues ; that their manna , laxative syrup , and sena it self , though given in great quantity , should rather prove restringent , then cause usual evacuations ; by reason of which strange novelties , wise esculapius , and the rest of the rare physitians , thinking that nature yielded to the malady by reason of her weakness , gave over the cure , as desperat . it hapned in this interim , that a learned politician went meerly by way of visit , to see one of those sick princes , who had ben his antient master ; from whom he understood the condition of his sickness , and then desired to know what remedies were apply'd unto him ; and when he was satisfied in this his desire , he found fault with the medicines which were given him , and exclaimed mightily against the physitians , not sticking to call them all ignorant puppies , and forthwith sent with all speed for the farrier of parnassus , who is trusted with the cure of pegasus . who suddenly appearing , he staid not to hear the relation of the sickness , from the patients own mouth , as physitians use to doe , but without either feeling of pulse , or casting of water , he presently knew the quality of the infirmity , and straitwaies made a composition of dragons bloud , bolearmenick , whites of egs , and spreading it upon lint , made plasters of it , and applyed them to those princes , and then made large swathes for their legs and arms , afterwards he gave them a laxative potion to drink in a syrup , ordained by galen . these medicines which were very much blamed and laught at by esculapius , hippocrates , and all the prime physitians , did in a few hours work so well with these princes , as they soon forsook their beds , and ran skipping and leaping about more nimbly then ever they had done before . whereupon all the vertuosi of parnassus , when they saw such admirable effects , were much astonished , that empires , kingdoms , and great states which could not be cured of the disorders which they were run into , by skilfull physitians , with their rubarbs , and other canonical medicines , should be so soon restored to their healths , by a drench for a horse , given them by a silly farrier . the li. advertisement . the achaians being much incenst against the duke of alva , for his cruel proceeding against their two chieftains , take up arms , and drive him out of their state. vvhilst the duke of alva , after the execution of the two chief heads of the people ( whereof you lately heard ) sought to secure his state , by using great severity in the taking away of mens lives , his countrey grew still more and more unquiet , it not being alwaies true , that to fall at the first , in new gotten and jealous states , to the extirpating of such as are most eminent , either for birth , attendance , worth , or riches , does free princes of the jealousies which they have of the nobility and people : for some chief men of achaia , as soon as they saw those two ring-leaders of theirs put to death , only because they were much esteemed and beloved by the people , began to apprehend their own ruine : and because gallant men cannot live long in fear of danger , they thought it not only a safe way to be speedy , but ( not being able to live quietly and void of suspition ) they fell chearfully upon rash counsels ; many of the best wits of achaia made themselves the peoples heads , being grieved to see that the love which they bore to those two who made so unfortunate an end , should be judged a fault deserving death . so as the duke of alva's severity wrought the effect , which is usual in new tyrannies which are crept into free countries , by reason of the discord between the nobility and commonalty , of reuniting the nobles and plebeians in perfect love and charity , that so they may recover that liberty by union , which they lost by foolish civil discord . the whole people of achaia therefore , led on by the nobility , took up arms upon an appointed day , and falling fowle upon their prince , drove him easily out of the state. and it is now two daies since alva recovered parnassus , and came immediately to do his obeysance to his majesty , who did not only rece●…ve him very coolly , but was sorry that he had been deceived in the good opinion he had had of him . the duke would have excused himself , and have alleadged reasons for his discrimination , but apollo bad him hold his peace , and told him that such a one as he ought to know , that it was unwisely done by them who intended to make a free people willingly to accept of slavery , to use cruelty ( as he had done ) at the very first beginning , and open inhumanity against the chief personages of the state ; whereby the people being made to despair , they would try all means to free themselves from that heavy yoak of servitude , which they were unacquainted with ; and that a business of such importance must be purchast by length of time , by little and little , insensibly introducing slavery amongst the people , and bereaving them of their liberty , whilst they were not aware of it . the duke reply'd , that he had learnt by augustus his proscription , by which extinguishing all the prime nobility of rome , he bereaft the people of their chieftains , that new principalities were to be grounded by such means as he had used which counsel he had likewise learnt of tacitus , who saies , nihil ausuram plebem principibus amotis . tacit. lib. . annal. to this apollo answered , that he failed alwaies in his resolutions , who governing his own present actions by former examples , had not the same requisite circumstances as they had whom he took for his safe president ; and that he ought to have considered , that in new principalities , he could only safely practise that ta●…quinian precept of cutting off the heads of the highest poppies , and which great augustus knew so well how to put in execution , who had the like circumstances as that great emperor had , who being armed , and victorious , could not only with safety make that so famous proscription , but might easily quel any popular insurrection in rome , by the same forces whereby he had annihilated the roman nobility : and that the duke wanting that leaning-stock , in the using of the same severities which augustus had happily practised , was much deceived ; and that the example of the unfortunate duke of athens , who was called in by the florentines to govern their countrey , being very like his case , did make it clearly appear to the whole world , that principalities whereunto others are called by reason of the dissention of citizens , are not secured by sudden and severe cruelties used against the chief subjects , but by cunningly keeping up , and heightning those divisions between the nobility and common people , which having occasioned the expulsion of the antient liberty from out the commonwealth , had introduced new slavery ; and that such princes ought , above all things , to keep themselves from doing any thing which might cause such universal distaste , as through meer dispair , might make the people reunite themselves with the nobility ; and that he saw every day more clearly , that the spaniards wit was miraculous in the well governing of those people , which being born , and having perpetually lived under monarchy , received all servitude willingly ; but that in governing nations that were either naturally free , and indowed with ample priviledges , or which being lately past from liberty into slavery , nec totam libertatem , nec totam servitutem pati possunt . lib. . hist. was a business which did not suit well with the wits of those nations , which having promptum ad asperiora ingenium . tacit. lib. . annal. were extrordinary prompti ferocibus . the lii . advertisement . an italian gentleman , for having lost much bloud in the service of a great prince , is honoured by him with a noble order of knighthood , who being but slightly esteemed of by those of his own countrey , asks apollo by what reasons he may satisfie those his deriders , that he was the more richly rewarded , in that he was paid in honour , and not in gold or silver . the gentleman of italy who came to this court the last week , did not ( as many did believe ) negotiate the publick affairs of any prince , but treated of some things concerning his own particular self : for being brought to have audience of his majesty , he told him , that having for many years served a great prince in his important wars , for the much bloud which he had lost , and monies which he had therein spent , he was rewarded by that liberal prince with a most noble order of knighthood ; and that when he returned to his own countrey , that rich reward was laught at by those his fellow-citizens , who love nothing but ready money : that therefore he most humbly beseeched his majesty that he would be pleased to furnish him with such reasons as might serve him to convince those his deriders . to this apollo answered , that he might sufficiently satisfie every one by giving an account of the annual revenue of the commendum of his order of knighthood . the gentleman said , the order of his knighthood had no advantage of commendum . to which apollo said , that his affairs being in so sad a condition , it could not by any conclusive reason be proved , that the honour of knighthood added more to him who received it , in point of honour and reputation , then what he had formerly merited by his honourable actions ; but that it was the simplicity of mind , and sincerity of heart , which did believe well in the favour of princes . the liii . advertisement . apollo finding that his having allowed the use of the part of one grain of hypocrisie to his vertuosi , had wrought very bad effects , does not only recall that his favour by publick edict , but thunders out exceeding severe punishments against hypocrites . you heard by our former expresses , that the gallant men of this court , who follow the noble rule of bene vivere & laetari , not being sufficiently informed of the malice and wickedness of those false hypocrites , who by way of loose life , and corrupted customs , have the liberty of speaking from their hearts , were by plato's means perswaded to desire leave of the censors , that they might make use of a little hypocrisie ; which they obtained with very bad consequence ; for they soon were aware that hypocrisie is like a contagious disease , never so little whereof spreads soon over the whole body : a disorder which those gallant men which have been spoken of , found to be very true : who though they did strangely abhor so lewd a vice , and consequently bore a mortal hatred to hypocrites , yet that eightieth part of one grain of hypocrisie which they took , was sufficient to infect , in a few daies , all their sincere and plain dealing . for they grew so in love with the credit and reputation which they got by that seeming modesty , and counterfeit devotion and charity , as they gave themselves wholly over , both in soul and body , in prey to that horrid vice , which but a little before they did so much detest : and all this with such disorder to the affairs of this state , as in a short time whole parnassus was nothing but hypocrisie . as soon as apollo found this inconvenience , he resolved by all means possible , to extirpate so venemous a plant by the very root from out his state. and knowing that cankers , and fistulated wounds must be cured by fire and razor , he forthwith fell upon an extraordinary piece of rigor ; for on tuesday morning he caused an edict to be published in the place appointed for such purposes , whereby he strictly commanded every one that was subject to his jurisdiction , that within three daies he should cleanse his soul from that wicked filth of hypocrisie ; declaring , that from that time forward , he did annul and make void that permission which a little before was by his censors granted to gallant men , of the use of the eightieth part of one grain of hypocrisie : and that those three daies being over , which he peremptorily prescribed as the utmost limit of time to all men ; all such as should be found guilty of so infamous a fault , should not only be declared open enemies to all vertue , uncapable or any fame or glory , or of ever acquiring any honour , but he declared them to the whole world , to be viperous creatures , shamelesly infamous ; and that by all the plenipotentiary power which he had over his vertuosi , he declared them from that time forward to be grosly ignorant . moreover , that so ho●…id a monster should for the time to come , be for ever banished from out his vertuosi , and be by them detested and abhorred ; he commanded that those who should be known to be guilty of so fowle a fault , might without any punishment to the inflicters , be shamed , vituperated , and rendred infamous ; as putrified members , fit to be amputated from the body of the literati , by satyrical poets with their biting verses , by orators with their stinging invectives , and by all the vertuosi , with all sorts of weapons apt to derogate from the same of any man : and that not only all ●…nds and sorts of testimony , how weak soever , should serve for full proof against any one that was impeached of so wicked a fact , but that it should be lawfull for any man to bastenado , or stone one who was noted for an hypocrite , though it were but by suspition , or any other remote cause : and that to be much scandalized at matters of small moment ; to speak much of charity , without ever giving any alms ; to wear a threadbare cloke , and yet be very rich ; to appear poor in publick , and yet live plentifully at home ; to be damnably avaricious , and yet boast of angelical devoutness : to speak slow , and with a weak voice , and under colour of finding fault with publick vices , to speak bitterly against particular men ; to bow the head with much humility , and yet to have a proud mind ; and to preach that to others , which it was plainly seen that they themselves did not practice ; should be esteemed and reputed sufficient proofs to condemn any one of such a vice . the better sort of the literati of this state , thought this his majesties edict too severe ; who to secure their lives and reputations from the ignorance of the meaner sort of people , who are not wise enough to discern between true and counterfeit goodness , presented themselves before apollo , whom they desired that wicked hypocrites might be severely punished , but so as that good and honest men might not incur the danger of being hardly dealt with ; and they said that judicial astrologers , and hypocrites , were a certain race of men , who were alwaies banisht , and yet every place abounded with them ; not for that princes wanted authority to extirpate them out of their countries , but for that those very princes who did prohibit them , did nourish and foment them ; and that the only cure for hypocrisie was , that princes should love , cherish , inrich , and exalt such as being ambitious of glory , thirsting after riches , and desirous of their good will , who affected those things out of meer worth and merit ; and that they should suffer great hypocrites , who covered their devilish pride with the cloke of humility , an unquenchable thirst after gold , with a vail of poverty , and execrable ambition of dominiering over the whole world , by seeming to despise the world ; to live in their condition of appearing humility , of feigned poverty , counterfeit solitariness , and retired life : a councel whereby princes would be sure to keep from erring ; for if piety , humility , contempt of worldly vanities , which some do so much boast of , were realities , and things done from the heart , they would by this way of proceeding , give men their own delights , when they should be justly punished by their own false weapons , it being very true , that princes could not better discover hypocrites , then by suffering them ( like oysters ) to stew in their own water . the liv. advertisement . guiccardine having spoken many things prejudicial to the reputation of the marquiss of piscara , in an assembly of divers vertuosi , that renowned commander doth sufficiently justifie himself before apollo . don francisco ferrando d'avalo , marquiss of pis●…aro , being told some few daies ago , that in an assembly of the best historians of this state of pernassus , francis guiccardine had spoken words of him , tending much to his dishonour : piscara , who was naturally high minded , and very proud , was so incenst at the injury done him by guiccardine , as he made his complaint to apollo ; to whom his majesty , who very well knew guiccardine's circumspect proceeding , and exact wisdom , answered , that it not being likely that guiccardine should have spoken of him , otherwise then became a true historian , and free from any passion of an ill-affected mind , he would , as in justice he ought to do , hear them both speak for themselves , before he would resolve any thing in the cause : and that if he should find that guiccardine , in speaking of a man of his quality , had unjustly wounded his reputation , he would take such course as he should think himself sufficiently satisfied . which being said , he forthwith gave guiccardine to know by the publick censors , that he was to appear before him at ten of the clock the next morning , to make good the words which the marquiss of piscara pretended he had spoken to the prejudice of his reputation . at the news hereof , the literati , who were very curious , and hoped to hear somwhat of execellent discourse in that point-blank argumentation , came in great numbers thither . guiccardine failed not to meet at the appointed time , and freely told the marquiss , who was there likewise present , that he might very well have purchased favour from the emperor charls the fifth , by discovering the conspiracy unto him , which many princes of europe had plotted against him , but that in the worlds eye he had thereby purchased eternal infamy ; not only for that most men did firmly believe , that from the very beginning his intention was to prove false to cesar , but for that though he had been still faithfull to him , yet that by so many cosenages , and such double-dealing , he should have encouraged so great princes , and inticed them to joyn in conspiracies with himself , that he might have occasion to betray them , and aggrandise himself by sins which he had by fallacies and flatteries drawn on , appeared generally to be an action of infamy . though all the vertuosi thought this to be a very hainous impeachment which guiccardine had made against the marquiss ; yet that commander , who in most desperate cases was still most undaunted , answered guiccardine , that it was an usual fault amongst historians , but infinitely unsufferable , to be mistaken in their penetrating into the hidden sense of their actions , who had done great things both in peace and war , and in rendring the true reasons thereof , to give so rash judgements , as they were oft times seen to blame worthy actions , and praise such as were to be blamed ; and that he was very much scandalized that there was not some severe laws published by the colledg of vertuosi , against men who by their pens do daily occasion great shame , and irrepairable blame to others ; which laws should ordain , that historians ( as it well became their profession ) should only meddle with the bare narration of things done , and that they should leave the judgement thereof , and the princes secret meanings therein to be judged of by the reader , and that with all due reverence & respect to the place wherein he spake , they lyed who durst say , that from the beginning , ierollimo marone discovered unto him the conspiracy which was a framing by the greatest princes of christendom against cesar , his intention was to prove false to his master . for those who understood the true bounds of policy , knew that whilst a man communicates a conspiracy to any great officer , which is in agitation against his prince , the officer ought at that very instant to resolve whether he liked the business or no ; for to be doubtfull in such a case , was interpreted by princes to be an ill-taken resolution , a mind not only contaminated , but already wholly putrified with the disease of rebellion , and that he had not encouraged marone ( as guicciardine had been bold inconsiderately to say ) with an intention of double-dealing , nor yet to purchase his princes favour by the sins of others ; nor had he inticed the princes who endeavoured to make him rise , to discover unto him all the particulars of the conspiracy , but by strict tye of honour , and to serve his master compleatly ; as also because the weighty business which he had in hand did force him so to do : for such wounds ought not to be discovered to their princes by wary officers blindly bound up without knowledg of the particulars , but plainly laid open with perfect knowledg of every the least circumstance ; and that for one like him , to have shewn the least negligence , or to have been never so little remiss in a business of so great jealousie , would have been thought so shameful an omission , as would have redounded to his apparent damage , and perpetual blame ; and that the reason hereof was very evident ; for he who heard conspiracies plotted against his prince , must have his eyes open , and his ears stretcht out , and must be exquisitely diligent in perfectly understanding and discovering every particular ; for by doing otherwise , a man might be justly thought by his prince to be a foolish servant , and an unfaithful officer ; and that in such cases , negligence was rather punished then excused ; that therefore before he was to reveal the conspiracie to cesar , as it became him well to doe , he would inform himself of all the particulars of each person that had a hand in it , and of every other necessary circumstance : and that he did not believe there was any one in that honorable place , who did not very well know , that no greater misfortune , nor mo●…e certain danger could befall a souldier of reputation , then to be sought unto by great princes to betray his master : for to quit a mans self of a business , to the undertaking whereof he is as good as compelled by the intreaties of powerfull personages , and think to save both his life and reputation , was to act the part of common ignorant people ; and that the only way for a wise man to shun splitting against so dangerous a rock , was to live with such a reputation of honour in all his actions , to be so ambitious of doing his prince faithful servic , and appear so desirous of purchasing a place ●n his affection , as that these good parts , and honorable qualities might deter any one from communicating any such wicked affair unto him . but that though he had very much observed this rule , yet had it no waies availed him ; he knew not by what dishonourable action , by what appearing avarice , or by what appearance of inclination to commit wickedness , he had encouraged the princes that conspired against cesar , to make marone acquaint him with a business so dissonant from his genius , so contrary to his nature . that he did not deny , but that after the noble victory at pavia , wherein his comportments were witnessed to the world by paulus iovius , he was not well satisfied with cesar , as thinking his service not sufficiently acknowledged , nor himself enough rewarded ; but that he did not think any such behaviour in a prince so wise , should be thought sufficient to make one rebel against him ; for if his distaste ar ose , from not being so highly favoured by his prince , as he thought his fidelity deserved , they might consider , that by discovering the conspiracy , they had furnisht him with monies , whereby he might purchase so m●…ch of the emperors favour as he knew he wanted , to obtain the supreme dignity of general , and the government which he so much desired of the dutchy of millan , and which afterwards he had , that no man who profest himself to be an honourable souldier , could receive a greater affront , then being sought unto , to do an unworthy action ; for whosoever treated with any one about such an action , shewed clearly that he thought him he treated with , to be a man inclin'd to wickedness . that he could not ( as he knew it became him to have done ) revenge this great injury done him by marone , with his dagger , because his princes service , which required other resolutions from him , kept him from so doing . and that if his duty to cesar had not moved him ( as certainly it ought ) to propagate such a machination , certainly he should have been moved thereunto , more out of rage to revenge himself for that great injury which the princes did him , when they seemed to esteem one like him , a traitor , and vainly ambitious , then out of any other reason : and that he should have been very simple , if he should have imbarqued himself in the business , by reason of their promises ; who for reward of his treachery , assured him that they would make him king of naples ; for that spaniards , of which he gloried to be one , were better pleased with such a little marquisat as piscara , gotten by loyalty , and by fighting valiantly in their prince his service , then with the kingdom of naples , purchast by treachery . that francisco davalo was not so shallow-brain'd , nor so little vers'd in worldly affairs , as not to know , that the princes of the league ; who did so much covet his rebellion , aimed more at keeping cesar from the total acquisition of the dukedom of millan , then at the making him king of naples . and that it was known to him , as it was to the whole world , by so many sad examples which had happened , that great princes , after they had imbarqued an ambitious personage , out of their several ends , in vaine hopes , and wrought him into the certain danger of treachery , and after having made good use of him , did so totally abandon their protection , not only because graviorum facinorum ministri , quasi exprobrantes aspiciuntur . tacit. lib. . ann. but to give examples to their subjects , not to commit the like wickednesse , by proving compleatly ●…famous , as they were likely to be the first who would deliver them up into the power of their incensed prince ; as ( to leave the more hatefull examples of modern times ) the world saw it formerly fared with charls duke of burgundy , towards the unfortunate and ill advised count saint paul , unluckily imployed by him ; and that though spaniards were thought by all men to be puft up with the wind of ambition , yet was it not that vain-glory , with which some princes of europe have of late years swoln many french ballowns , and not a few flemmish pilots . but that those of his nation being very hard to be imbarqued in the getting of great riches by indirect waies , sinned only in their too immense desire of being honoured and respected in the places , which they by their faithfull service had deserved of their prince ; and that they were far from coveting by oblique and shamefull waies , those greatnesses which they saw they could not arrive at , with secure peace and quiet : that to be a coy-duck for other mens ambition , so to becom afterward the peoples laughing-stock , or town-talk , was a thing abhorred by his spain ; and that it would have been too great a folly for one like him , to suffer himself to be perswaded that the kingdom of naples , which was alwaies hereditary in the bloud of spain , and which would never accept of any baron of the kingdom , though some of them had been very powerfull and ambitious , and who by the effusion of their bloud , had driven out princes borne of the royal bloud of france , who would have conquered it , would accept of him , who was inferior to many barons of that kingdom , and of a nation so hatefull to the neapolitans . that in hereditary kingdoms , as was that of naples , kings were there borne , not made or chosen : and that those fools who would aspire thereunto by any other means then by lawfull succession of the bloud-royal , did climbe up a mountain of misery , to fall down headlong with the greater shame into the valley of infamy : and that if any one should compasse it by fraudulent means , he would be like those ridiculous kings of beffana , who that they might afford pastime to the rabble-rout , failed soon after their creation . that he had alwaies kept firm to the resolution which he was born with ; rather to die a glorious commander , then a shamefull king. that he had rather sought to deserve , then that he ever coveted greater titles then that of a marquiss ; and that having observed by what he had read , and in consideration of the present times , that all conspiracies begin merrily , with high thoughts , but end basely with weeping , he was contented to serve the prince whom god had set over him , with those means which he had beene pleased to bestow upon him ; for too immense greatnesse promised by forreign princes to such as he was , were but breaknecks . apollo was so well pleased with pescara's apology , as he answered guicciardine , who still affirmed , that to intice the prime princes of europe , with so much duplicity of heart , to joyne with him in conspiracy , of purpose that he might have the better occasion to discover it afterwards , had rendered the marquiss eternally infamous , that pescara had not inticed any prince to joyne with him in framing any conspiracy against the emperor , that afterwards he might make advantage by revealing it : in which case he would justly have incurred infamy ; but that much to his praise he had used requisite double dealing , to discover the complices of the conspiracy , and every other particular , which for his masters better service , he was to know ; and that the marquiss was the more to be praised , for that by his honourable fraud , he knew how to overcome the princes so artificial deceits ; and that upon that occasion he had so fully done what became him to doe , as he deserved to be imitated by every worthy commander who might fall upon the like misfortune . in conspiracies which are communicated to others , both he who accepted thereof , and joyned therein , and he who refused , yet held his peace , incurred the same penalty ; in so dangerous affairs , the best counsel was to precipitate into the sudden , but clear revelation of so unfortunate enterprises : and that in the most mortal infirmities of conspiracies , two of the politick hippocrates his aphorismes were very true : that , qui deliberant desciverunt , and that in ejusmodi conciliis periculosius est deprehendi quàm audere . and that they that were desired to enter into a conspiracy , were fooles , and self-murderers , if in so miserable a case they pitcht their thoughts onely upon the sweet of revenge , the accumulating wealth , or preferments to principalities , and kingdoms , which might be propounded to them in reward of such wicked actions ; and those wise and charitable , who held before their eyes the pictures of fetters and gibbets , which are the right rewards , and certain acquirements of desperate and ambitious people , and of such as were giddy-headed . the lv. advertisement . giovan francisco pico , not being able to reconcile the differences between plato and aristotle , apollo commands those two great philosophers to end the business in a publique disputation ; and being therein obey'd , they do not notwithstanding part friends . the task which as you heard of late the count giovan francisco pico della mirandola , that phenix of the vertuosi undertook by order from apollo , of reconciling the immortal differences which are discust between the two supreme luminaries of philosophy , plato and aristotle , hath been to so little purpose , as not having given any satisfaction to his majesty , nor to his literati , it hath kindled new , and much more eager argumentations in pernassus . wherefore apollo for the quiet of his state , for the agreement between his vertuosi , and for the honour of philosophy , caused plato and aristotle to be sent for on the first day of the last month , to appear before him , to whom with an austeer look he said ; that there being but one truth of all sciences , they much injured philosophy by the diversity of their opinions ; that he did love peace and agreement between his vertuosi ; that he likewise knew that the multitude of sects , was that which occasioned great mischief in states ; and that he might obtain from them such concord between themselves , which he knew to be altogether necessary for his state , he was pleased to use such respect to them both , as not to proceed against them with violence , but did let them know that he should be very glad that both of them would so much honour philosophy , as to agree in opinion , in point of the greatest differences that were between them . then turning towards aristotle , he said , that it made not for his honour to dissent from the opinions which so great a master as plato had read unto him in the schools ; and then told plato , that he suffered much in his reputation , that the world should see so great a rebel as aristotle should issue out of his school . both plato and aristotle seemed very willing to yield to each others opinion , when by good arguments , and sufficient reasons , they should be made appear to be the better ; and joyntly agreed that they would dispute the business in two several chairs , hand to hand , without any moderator . apollo did not only accept of so glorious a defiance , but for the consolation of his vertuosi , made papers be fixt that very hour upon the gate of the greatest philosophy-school , and in other publique places , wherein all the vertuosi were invited to come and see so gallant a spectacle ; and to the end that those who inhabit in far countries , might have time to come to pernassus , and be present at so famous a contest , he allowed the two philosophers twenty daies to appear in the field . the mean while , for the vertuosis better commodity , many skaffolds were built about the great court of urania ; and on the day appointed for the disputation , adriano , orlando , ciprione and many other modern musitians , sung first in several chorusses , their excellent compositions , accompanied not only by the organs , viols , harps , and other grave instruments which are used at the meetings of the vertuosi , but ( according to the defect of the modern age ) with the interposition of the lute , cornet , theorbo , and of the very violin , taken but a little before out of the ignorant consort of trivial fidlers , who play fum fum in the meanest assemblies . the musick being ended , the two famous paladins of philosphy appeared in the field , and their dispute held for six hours together ; but it was not notwithstanding possible to meet with the desired agreement . for in the curious philosophical wrestling , which is so delightfull to the vertuosi , the arms of solid and stout arguments are only made use of , backs of efficacious reason , strange nimbleness of foot in apparent demonstrations ; and yet that last effort which is so pleasing to the spectators of seeing the enemy thrown flat upon his bac●… , overthrown and convinced by undeniable arguments , doth never ensue : for philosophical wrestlers , though they fall resolutely to catch where they catch can , yet by means of distinctions which they have at their fingers ends , they still keep themselves on foot . these two great luminaries of philosophy gave such content to the standers by , as they did infinitely admire the reach of humane intellect , which having waded through all the heavens by the excellency of her specula●…ion , did not only exactly know the quantitas , qualitas , and the motus of them , but is arrived even at the knowledg of god himself , and of the divine nature , of which she can discourse very handsomly . with these wonders did the disputation end , which afforded as much content to the literati , as if those two philosophers had been perfectly reconciled and agreed ; only apollo , by the apparent sadness which was seen in his face , disturbed the universal mirth ; wherefore great averroes askt him , whether aristotle and plato had not given him such satisfaction as he desired : to which apollo answered with a sigh fetcht from the bottom of his heart ; that those two princes of philosophy had fully satisfied the opinion which all men had of them ; but that he had seen that in this argumentation , which would keep his mind perpetually afflicted : for he was forced to bewail the infinite corrupt condition of this age , wherein sensuallity was grown so great amongst men , as he who saw their hidden passions , had clearly found , that many were come to these disputations even from far countries , rather to please the itch of the ear , by hearing the musick , then to feed their souls by those vertuosissimi , which he said were introduced into the world by those wicked mountebanks , who in their defect of too much mingling pleasure with profit , were gone so far , as having admitted of jack-puddings , and pantalouns into their company , many flockt to them rather to laugh at their sports and wantonness , thento buy useful medicines for their maladies . the lvi . advertisement . gonsalvo ferrante cordua , not having obtained the confirmation of his desired title of magnus , from the reverend colledge of historians , demands an other place in pernassus of apollo , from whence he is likewise excluded . gonsalvo cordua was very much grieved at the repulse which he received from the history colledge when he was denyed the title of great ; and to try whether the favor and recommendation of princes were available to effect business in pernassus , which justice could not do , he addrest himself for help to his king ferdinando ; whom having acquained with his business ; and received for answer from that wise king , that he should have thought them very simple who should have favoured a subject of his in obtaining the title of great to be conferred upon him , which made him little : that he was none of those who would commit so great an error , as to desire such glory might be atchieved by others , as did greatly lessen his honor , and that his conscience told him , he must be so charitable to himself , as to endeavour that the whole glory of the purchase of the kingdom of naples might be attributed more to his wisdom , then to cordua's valour . wherefore gonsalvo being much incens't at so resolute and sharp an answer , went presently to apollo , and told him , that since it had not pleased the colledge of historians to think him worthy to be ranked with pompey , alexander , charles the emperor , and others , who for their glorious actions had deserved the title of great ; that yet he might be favoured with adm●…ttance into the squadron of his majesties gens d'armes , wherein was that famous bellisarius , bartholomeus alvianus , pietro navarro , antonio de leva , count petigliano , lorenzo de ceri , and many other famous warriours . apollo graciously granted gonsalvo what he desired ; but it fell out that whilst in his majesties presence , the ceremony of putting on the accustomed upper weed was a performing , whereat all the chief military men of this court gave their attendance , bossio the atturney general accused gonsalvo of perjury . apollo , who doth very much abhor those who are noted for falsifying their words with men , much more those who are perjured before god , allowed the atturney-general three days to make good his impeachment , and ordered that gonsalvo's business might be adjourned until then . gonsalvo being very much troubled at this foul imputation , told the atturney bossio , that he had always profestfidelity , and that he did not onely wonder , but was very much scandalized , that so wicked an accusation should be laid upon such a one as he , born and bred up in a kingdom where loyalty to his king , and fidelity to every privat man , did abound as much as in any other place of the world . bossio answered him , desiring that he would be pleased to relate the case of the imprisonment of the duke of calavria , how it had been carryed , for for what appeared to him , it would be proved , that he was not troubled without reason . gonsalvo said , that having besieged the young duke of calavria in the castle of taranto , who was son to frederick the last king of naples , he capitulated with that young duke when he resolved upon rendering , that he should have free leave to go whither he pleased best , and that he plighted his faith to keep this promise , and therupon he received the holy eucharist ; but that afterwards falsifying his oath , he made sure of the dukes person , whom he sent with a good guard prisoner into spain . apollo seemed then to be mightily offended with gonsalvo , and told him , that so wicked and execrable an action rendred him altogether unworthy of any place in pernassus , and therefore willed him to get quickly out of his state. gonsalvo was much confused and astonished at this so severe sentence , and answered in his excuse , that though he acknowledged it to be a very foul action , yet that he was necessitated to do it for his kings service ; for it being a practised rule amongst good politicians , that no prince doth securely possess any conquered state , whilst they live who were driven out of it , the noble acquisition of the kingdom of naples , could not be esteemed a compleat victory , unless he had secured that prince his person : apollo was so far from allowing of gonsalvo's excuse , as growing much more incenst , he bad him be sure not to be seen any more above two days in pernassus , which should not be a receptacle for those , who by their actions shewed they more respected the service of men , then the good will of god. then did his majesties masters of the ceremonies , drive gonsalvo out of the house ; who whilst he went disconsolately down the stairs , told the atturney bossio , that apparent wrong was done unto him ; for caesar , who to purchase the roman empire , had not onely violated the laws of god and man , but was the first author of that wicked saying , that all things were lawful which conduced to government , was seen to have a glorious place in pernassus , from whence he was so unjustly driven out . 't is said that bossiv boldly answered gonsalvo , that caesars example did not square with him ; for it was one thing to commit foul actions , thereby to purchase a kingdom to a mans self , and another thing to do the like to purchase one for ones master . for by the laws both of god and man , a pander deserved greater punishment , who meerly out of the malignity of a depraved mind delighted in doing ill , then he who committed fornication out of the frailty of the flesh . the lvii . advertisement . a barque loaded with inventors of new grievances running shipwrack upon the shore of lepanto , his majesty treats them well , though he do greatly abominate such like men . the dreadful storm at sea occasioned some days ago by the furious southwest winds , drove a vessel upon the strand of lepanto ; to the succor whereof , all the inhabitants along the river side made in , ( for they saw it was fraught with passengers ) and were so fortunate therein , as though the barque split , they saved above fourscore persons that were in her ; who were by order from apollo commodiously lodged , and were then askt , who they were , whence they came , and whither they were bound . they answered they were all of them italian arcigogalanti , and were lately come from italy : which when his majesty understood , though he be naturally very courteous , yet doth he so abominate those cruel enemies of mankind , as he had almost repented the ayd which he had given them , thinking those wicked ones unworthy of commiseration , who spend their lives in nothing else but in inventing execrable grievances , by which many modern princes so cruelly torment their miserable people . yet some vertuosi said , that since there were so many of those rascals in that barque , all of them come from italy , they must needs believe that they brought the good news to pernassus , that the italian princes had put on the noble resolution of purging their states from that wicked sort of men . apollo commanded that they should be asked , wherefore they parted from italy , and whither they were going ; they answered , that having happily finished all the most witty inventions , whereby to empty the peoples purses , and fill the princes coffers therewith , since they had raised the gabels and taxes as high as it was possible for them to do , and having nothing more to work upon in italy , they had ran over france , and spain , in which noble kingdoms they had so behaved themselves , as they had left eternal memory in both of them of the florentines , and ge●…efes . that afterwards endeavouring to get into england , the low-countries , germany , and poland , all of them provincees abounding with gold , and wealthy inhabitants , and where they thought to have done wonders , they were driven out with cudgels by those people who were born to a kind of liberty , and who might be said to be sheep , which giving their shepherds a little milk by way of recognition or fealty , in a certain little mark'd measure . and vvho vvill not suffer themselves ( as it is usual elsevvhere ) to be milked at discretion . wherefore like those famous trojans led on by aeneas , they vvent plowing up the sea vvith that their little vessel , to finde out nevv people and nevv countreys , vvhere to the praise and glory and profit of princes , and to that perpetual desolation of the people , vvhich occasioneth security in reigning they might use their talent , and open their shop . when the literai had heard these things , many of them presently beseeched his majesty that he would publikely revenge the injuries done to so many nations , which through the malignity of that race of vipers had been flead by their avaricious princes , with the rasor of exorbitant grievances , making them be burnt in the remainders of that their vessel . but apollo , whose deep judgement exceeds all humane wisdom , having understood the shameful profession of those rascally people , commanded that their entertainment should be doubled , and that they should be better treated ; and causing mony to be given them , and great store of victuals , sent them to constantinople , willing them to see whether they could reduce the ottoman empire , which was so capital an enemy to learning into that desolation , and desperation by their exorbitant damn'd new inventions , into which they boasted themselves to have brought france , spain , and italy . the lviii . advertisement . by letters intercepted , which were sent by an express from some princes to the lake of avernus , people come to know that the enmities which are seen to reign in the nations of the world , are occasioned by the cunning of their princes . a post was robbed on monday night last between the coasts of pindus and libetrum , which some great princes had dispatcht away in much haste , towards the lake of avernus . and because the post had no injury done to his person , it was believed that the excess was committed onely to take his letters from him , as it proved afterwards . for they onely took from him a packet directed to the three infernal furies , alecto , tisiphone , and megera , by which it is known for certain , and not without great scandal , that some great princes did hire those furies , to sow , and foment perpetual strife and discord , not onely between nation and nation , but oft times between the subjects of one and the same prince . and to aggravate the distastes , there was a letter of exchange found in that packet , of ten thousand crowns for six months pay . the subjects to these princes who writ these letters , have sent them by some of their deputies to apollo , heavily complaining that their princes , who ought to study nothing more then the peace , and unanimous agreement , not onely of their own particular subjects , but that also of all nations , did by ready mony purchase sedition amongst others , and mischief to themselves ; and that they had not till now learnt , that it was meerly the cunning and machinations of princes , which caused those several divisions and inhate hatreds between nations , which are the true root of those evils wherewith mankinde is so afflicted ; which if they were extirpated out of the world , men would injoy the comfort to see the french love the english ; the spanyard the french : the germans the italians : and perfect peace would be amongst all men . whilst these deputies were reasoning thus , apollo was seen to weep bitterly out of meer compunction of what he had heard . insomuch as the standers by believed that his majesty would have broken out into some great heat against the princes who were accused of so foul faults , when he spoke thus . my friends , your complaints are as true , as grievous ; but you must know , that the excesses which you now complain of , are not occasioned by the ill nature of princes , but out of the peoples seditious spirits ; whose instability is such , as the universal peace of mankinde cannot be better compassed by any other means , then by sowing that discord amongst nations , and those divisions which you now so much complain of : for long experience hath taught princes ; that the great frame of reigning securely is wholly grounded upon the sound foundation of dividing well . and it is apparant , that were it not for princes that govern them , people would of themselves fall into greater seditions , then those which are sown amongst them for the publike peace , and universal good of all men . all which , my welbeloved , are necessary evils , though it exceedingly grieve me to see , that the disease of universal discord which reigns amongst men , cannot be sooner cured by any other medicine , then by that bitter pill , which you complain so much of . the lix . advertisement . the prince of the laconicks nephew , being after his uncles death , to return to a private fortune , shews no well composed minde in making so dangerous a passage . the prince of the laconicks nephew , who during his uncles life of famous memory , did with extraordinary authority govern that state ; by reason of the choice which was made some few days ago , of a new prince , was two days since to return to a private life . and because the parting from authority after the sweet thereof hath been a while tasted , is a thing much more fearful then the parting of the soul from the body ; and it having formerly hapned in parnassus , that the too great ambition of government hath so suffocated the vertue of humility and those vital spirits of the minds moderation , which keep a well composed heart alive , as so great a passage is not to be made without reluctaney ; apollo compassionating such sad cases , that he might provide for the saving of so great mens honors , in that time of terror , instituted in parnassus many years ago , the charitable company of commiseration , whereof the chief moral philosophers of this state are members . the night preceding the day , wherein this prince was to make so sore a change of condition , reverend petrarch made him a v●…si with his book de remedi is utriusque fortunae , as also learned giorolimo cardano , with his work de utilitate capienda ex adversis : and annaeus seneca the worthy president of the company , with the precious writings of boetius severinus de consolatione philosophiae : whom after a long preamble of fair words , they acquainted with the sad return he was to make the next morning to a private life . certainly most unwelcom news ; and which he heard with such impatiency and disturbance , as with exclamations which deafened all that heard him , and howlings which reacht heaven , he began to lament and bewail his perverse fortune , by which he said he was assassinated : crying out that she had hardly suffered him to tast the sweet of government , the suavity of command , when she hurryed him down to the miseries of a private life , making him to swallow down the unpleasant potion of changing command , for obedience ; oft recommending his honor in this his agony to these his comforters , and earnestly desiring that they would not abandon him in this his urgent necessity . then both seneca , cardano , and petrarch , did with unspeakable charity imbrace this prince , intreating him couragiously to undergo this his adversity , and the more to comfort him , they alleadged all they could in praise of a privat life , letting him know how great a happiness men found in knowing how to govern themselves and their affairs , and making him often repeat those words of the master of the politick sayings ; quam arduum , quam sub ectum fortunae , regendi cuncta onus . tacit. lib. . annal. excellent words , which being chewed by a palat that knows truly how to taste them , are of such efficacy , as they had the power to make the great emperor charles the fift , ( who had been more ambitious of government then any other ) to withdraw himself into a monastery , and become an hermit . but these consolations wrought so little upon this lord , as he said more then once to those reverend comforters , that to prefer a private life before reigning , was a most odious paradox ; a thing which , was uttered by the mouth , but not believed by the heart : a doctrine which they did mainly hate , who went about to make others believe it . the next morning this gentleman was stript of all his jurisdiction , which caused such a passion of the heart in him , as the comforters not being able to keep alive the spirits of his patience , he swowned three times in their hands , wherefore the unfortunate gentleman was carryed half dead out of the palace ; who when he saw his own private house , fell into yet greater agonies ; so as these comforters laboured very much to make him use in so dangerous a nick of time the vertue of a well-composed minde , which men of strong complexions can shew in cases of adversity , when they seem to do that cheerfully , of meer choice , which they are forc'd unto by inevitable necessity . but this gentleman despairing every hour more and more in his misfortune , grew so horn-mad as to call every man ungrateful ; and it was cleerly seen that the new prince his happiness , the grandetsa of his nephews , and the prosperity of his more intimate servants and friends , did vex him more then his own calamity . when he was come to his paternal house , he had not heart enough to look upon it , but still kept his eye fixt upon the place where he had been . wherefore the comforters to do the very utmost that they could , to save this gentlemans reputation ; which was in so evident danger of being lost , blind-folded him : he was no sooner come into the hall , ( so drunk are men with the thought of rule , when they have once tasted it ) but he called for the agents , and princes embassadors , as if he had been under the cloth of state in the palace , and would negotiate with them , having no business at all , and seemed as if he would still govern the world , though he had no authority ; entertaining himself continually with grave affairs , not having any thing to do . by which actions this ill advised gentleman made every one know , that the being in greatness , with absolute power of command , makes men seem wise ●…olomons to others ; who when they return to their private fortunes , are found to have no more brains then a goose : the lx. advertisement . antonio perez of aragon , having presented apollo with his book of relations , his majesty does not onely refuse to receive it , but commands it to be presently burnt . antonio perez , formerly secretary to philip the second king of ●…pain , knowing the ill opinion which people have of a secretary who parts distasted from his prince , as soon as he was got into france , he published in his own discharge , those his unfortunate relations , for which he hath been so much blamed : for whilst he should have endeavoured by all means possible to conceal them , he had the boldness to present them on thursday morning to apollo ; who as soon as he saw the book and was informed of the contents thereof , he was so incens'd against him , as he made it be immediately burnt in the chief market-place , and told perez , that he had given his relations such a place in pernassus , as they deserved : to the end that other his fellow secretaries might take example , and might learn to prefer secresie and faithful silence before the love of their own lives , or of themselves . for as he deserved the name of a wicked man , who upon any new distast discovers the secrets wherewith he was trusted in time of former friendship ; that secretary was to be held a thousand times more base and infamous , who for whatsoever bad usage he could receive from his prince , published those secrets to the world , which being made acquainted withby his prince , when he had formerly had confidence in him , should not onely not be willingly divulg'd , but ought not be extorted from him by any whatsoever fortune . the lxi . advertisement . apollo to afford past-time to his literati , makes two useful sceans be represented upon melpomenee's theater . in one of which he shews the lesser princes with what wariness they ought to preserve themselves from a greater potentate ; and in the other , lets senators of republicks know how ill advised they are who thorough partiality side with a subject of their own faction , who notoriously ayms at tyranny . the ancient romans , carthagenians , athenians , and other the famousest commonwealths and monarchies of the world , have with much reason always thought publike shews and entertainments to be the best means to maintain states in that universal peace , and quiet to every particular man , which is easiest received by a people , who live content and satisfyed in perpetual jollities . wherefore the ancient romans built magnificent theaters , and amphitheaters , in which to delight their subjects , pleasant spectacles were ( not without immense charges ) represented : it being a dangerous advice for such as govern , to keep their people discontented , and buryed in sloath and idleness . hence it is that apollo doth not imploy himself more willingly in any business , then in what may rejoyce the minds of his literati , by diversity of shows . it is true , that whereas in rome , athens , carthage , and other places ; all the delights which the people found in those shows , were occasioned sometimes by the obscenity of players , oft times by the cruelty of their gladiators , and their hunting of wild-beasts , the delight of the vertuosi of this state consists wholly by extracting useful precepts from noble representations , thereby to inrich their minds . apollo therefore having finisht the icy way of winter , when he was to begin his pleasant journey of the spring , was pleased , for the better satisfaction of his literati , to have extraordinary solemnities used at his entrance into aries : to which purpose he caused two several shows to be represented on two several days in melpomene's theater , which were extraordinary useful , and of great content . the first that entered upon the theater , were the associates , confederates , friends , and the sort of militia which the romans called auxiliary souldiers . and to the end that his vertuosi might be the better satisfyed by the sight of so numerous armies , he commanded that such souldiers should appear upon the theater , with the same arms , ensigns , and with all those warlike instruments , with which they had served in the roman armies ; and all this was performed with so great a number of foot and horse , with so magnificent pomp of regal ensigns , and with the sound of divers instruments of war , with such rich acoutrements , and other things thereunto appertaining , as all that were present at it freely confest , that they never saw so curious a show in pernassus . after that this militia had marched divers times round , both within the theater and without it , apollo sent for the chief leaders thereof , and bad them withdraw for a while to within their quarters , and that they should return to the theater in the very same posture , in which they ended their unfortunate militia with the romans . not long after , those very souldiers who had appeared upon the theater in the aforesaid pomp , were seen to come naked with their hands tyed behind them , stript of all their goods , loaded with irons , full of wounds , ill handled by executioners , rob'd by the avarice of rapacious consuls , proconsuls , by the emperors agents , and other officers of the roman empire . so as the romans who at their first entry made so stately a show , whom pernassus had seen so noble an auxiliary militia , who had raised their empire to such an immensity , and who were so glad to hear their civil government so exagerated by all the literati , in being able to dilate their empire by the blood of other men , were forced to quit the theater , and to hide themselves in holes , that so they might shun hearing the scorn and injurious speeches which were uttered against them by all the literati that were present at the show . for the noble vertuosi , hating from their very souls the roman cruelty , and ingratitude used towards those nations , who by their expence of blood had deserved so well at their hands , asked where was the faith , where the sacred friendship , where the gratitude used to those their friends , to those who had so well deserved of the people of rome , and by their lives had exalted their empire to so great a height ? and whether these were actions becoming that roman senate , who made so great a show , and boasted so much of religion , faith , and unviolable friendship , insomuch as all did detest that execrable reason of state , which following onely that which brings men apparent advantage can so impiously turn its back upon what is just and honest , and which when her occasions are served , forgets all obligations , how great so ever . as soon as this miserable sight was ended , guiccardin by order from apollo , got up into a very high place , and made a long political discourse upon the little discretion , and upon the want of charity , of great monarchs towards petty princes , that are of less power then they : wherein he said , that when in a state consisting of many princes , one prince more great then any of the rest , took up arms to bear down one of the other , all the rest , to keep from being supprest , should think their companions loss , their own ruine , a means to bring them into slavery , a preparation for their overthrow ; and that therefore , absolutely forgetting all private hatreds , and heart-burnings , they should all of them imbrace the publike cause , and ●…un by their common forces joyntly to asswage that fire which was likely in a short time to reduce their own homes into ashes : for in former times , asia and africa , not at all betaking themselves to arms , were unfortunate spectators of the servitude of whole italy , subjugated by the famous romans : and in more modern times , the whilome powerful kingdom of hungary , to it s now great sorrow , laught at the overthrow of the grecian empire ; that therefore in like dangers , every prince should have the two golden sentences of that master of true policy tacitus , written in their hearts ; omnibus perire quae singuli amittant . tacit. in vita agriculae . it being very true that in such like cases , singuli dum pugnant , universi vincuntur . and that they should esteem such honors as were done them by those who were more powerful then they , shameful disgraces ; alliances which they might contract with them , preparations to betray them ; the advantage which they might get by pensions , hooks bayted with poyson ; tricks to lull them asleep , onely that they may afterwards , with a little mony purchase that their liberty , which cannot be payd by mountains of gold . and that above all things else , they should take example by the slavery which they had seen of the romans associates , and should think that the ambition which the more powerful have to reign having no orison , the accomplishment of conquering an enemy , was the beginning to subjugate a friend . the second day apollo commanded , that upon the same theater , all those great senators should first appear who had assisted caesar his tyranny , and that of augustus , out of the interest of private ambition , or out of meer avarice , which being forthwith done , he gave order that all those should appear who were wickedly slain in the cruel proscription made by the triumviri , and in augustus his long reign , and those who had been put to death by tiberius his cruelty , caligula's bestiality , and by nero's fierce nature . this was the most sad and lamentable spectacle that was ever seen represented in the memory of man in any place whatsoever ; for then all pernassus broke forth into deep sighs , and shed tears in abundance , when those that had assisted caesar in his tyranny , saw that not onely tiberius , caligula , claudius , and nero , but even augustus himself , forgetting the obligations which they ought to their posterity who had ayded them in atchieving their tyrannical power were by them destroyed and cruelly put to death . for children not inheriting their fathers humors , as they do their estates , many of the sons of those senators , who following caesars , and augustus his colours , had appeared enemies to publike liberty , were afterwards cruelly slain by the insuing tyrants , onely for that they discovered too much their love to live free ; others for proving more vertuous senators , then would stand with tyrannical govenment : and an infinite number by the meer bestiality of those that governed . this so horrid sight , at first occasioned great silence , wherein the vertuosi considered , that since not any plebeian appeared amongst the vast number of those that were slain , nor any other principal subject of the provinces , but onely worthy senators , and gentlemen of infinite desert ; the cruelties used by the tyrants who reigned in the roman empire , against the senators , and nobler sort of gentry , were for the most part occasioned , thorow the defect of the nobility ; who not able to preserve publike liberty by peace , ( as they ought to have done ) could never submit themselves to receive that total servitude which must of necessity be imbraced under the government of one onely man : but by their many conspiracies , by continual misgovernment of their tongues , and by their pride of speaking like free men , whilst they were in slavery , did so provoke and anger them that reigned , as made them become cruel butchers of the roman nobility . this useful consideration being ended , those unfortunate senators , who to make caesar , and augustus great , had with their swords in hand , and with so much effusion of blood , banisht liberty from out their country , ran as if they had been mad , to embrace their children , grandchildren , and great grand-children who had been so tyrannously treated ; but being by them driven away with reproachful speeches , those senators more afflicted then ever , said ; you have reason to look upon us your progenitors , with an incensed eye , and to drive us like enemies out of your sight ; for you may truly say these your wounds were occasioned by these our hands , the tyranny which hath made you so miserable by our imprudency , your calamities by our foolish ambition , all the inhumanities whereinto we have most imprudently hurryed you , by our unfortunate jars , and deplorable discord ; and now , when repentance serves onely to make our afflictions the greater , we cleerly see by this your miserable spectacle , that nothing is sweeter , that there is no greater consolation , no greater jubile of content then by forgetting injuries , pardoning offences , and embracing enemies , to live in a free country , in such peace as eterniseth commonwealths , so to keep from falling by desire of revenge , into those mischiefs into which we are ran , who out of our capricious humors having lost the liberty of our country , have wickedly precipitated our families , and our blood into those dire miseries which we are bound to behold ; and have learnt to know at last , by the blood which you have lost , that great dignities , and supreme magistracies in a free country ought to be conferred upon the vertue and merit of honorable senators , and ought to be sought for by such , not upon those who endeavor the procurement thereof , ( as we have wickedly done ) by private disorders , sedition , and civil wars ; there not being any greater folly , then for a senator to adhere unto a friend that is a tyrant , out of vain hopes of bettering his condition , and family in publike slavery . the lxii . advertisement . lewis de la tremoglia , a noble french baron , renounceth his nobility , and all the priviedges which he therby injoyed , in presence of the monarchy of france . vvhen the illustrious french monarchy , was ( like the king of bees ) invironed the other day by an infinite number of the barons of his nation , monsignior lewis de la tremoglia a noble french lord came before her majesty , and boldly said , that though he were born a noble man of france , yet he freely renounced his nobility , and all the priviledges thereunto belonging , contenting himself to be numbred in the third rank of the people of france , those who were present at this so great novelty , say , that the french monarchy , which never knew what fear meant , shewed manifest tokens of apprehension at the hearing of this his so resolute deliberation , and some are of opinion that it was occasioned , for that tremoglia being known by all the nobility of france to be greatly wi●…e , the french monarchy doubted lest this example might make many others take the same resolution ; a disorder which might , if not altogether deprive him of the gallant and couragious sword of his warlike nobles , might at least very much weaken it by the admirable worth whereof she had not onely founded , and augmented so powerful a kingdom , but did maintain it in great tranquility . this opinion was increased , for that the french monarchy seemed not onely not to be offended at this scandalous resolution , of tremoglio's but taking him by the hand , led him into his privat cabinet , where for a good while he had private discourse with him . the french barons who stood without , though they were very desirous to 〈◊〉 what past between tremoglia and their monarchy , yet could 〈◊〉 ●…t possibly learn any thing of it ; they onely observed by tremoglia's laying often his hand upon his breast , that he seemed as if he made some oath to the french monarchy to keep some certain promise which those ●…arons thought might be , that he would never discover the reason to any one , which had made him put on so strange a resolution . every one wondered to see that so gallant a personage could resolve to relinquish the honor of the french nobility , which is held in so great esteem , as those who have purchased it at the prise of much blood , thought they came cheaply by it . but some great men of this court , whose usual custom it is to indeavour to know , and freely to speak their minds of all mens actions , said , that tr●…moglia having found at last vvith vvhat tricks the french monarchy doth fetch about her nobility , vvould by renouncing his nobility , let the vvorld knovv , that the condition of the common people of france , vvho satisfie their impositions by ready mony , vvas much better then that of the nobility who being bound to serve their king in his vvars , pay it vvith their blood . the lxiii . advertisement . don ferrante gonsaga being governor of corinthus , is exhorted by domitio corbulone severely to resent a great excess , committed by a chief personage of that city : which counsel gonsago wisely refutes . don ferrante gonsaga was sent some weeks ago to be governour of corinthus ; an important and difficult charge , that province abounding in a powerful , and wealthy nobility , given to be proud , and lovers of arms : who do not onely ( according to the usual custom ) deal hardly with those that are less powerful , but by reason of their ancient factions , living still contentiously , it seldom happens that the governour is of such intellectuals as to give full satisfaction both to apollo , and to the people . gonsaga had not past over his first months government , when one of the chief of the nobility chanced to commit a very inconsiderate insolency . don ferrante seemed not onely to be much perplext how to revenge , but appeared to many to be very sad for what had happened . domitio corbulone a gallant roman , and a great friend to gonsaga , told him that he had now another fair occasion , which required the same resolution which he took when he was governor of cicily , against those spanish souldiers who mutinyed : that therefore he ought rather to rejoyce , then to be troubled , for what had now happened in his government ; for governors of provinces where there was a seditious nobility , might think themselves fortunate , when at the entrance into their government any great personage should commit some heynous fault , by whose exemplary punishment , the unquiet nobility might be so terrifyed , as the government of the whole province might be the better for it a long time after : which he said was so true a document , as others who had practised it had reaped much honor thereby . for when the charge over t●… roman forces which were afterwards to fight in armenia , was giv●…●…im , he finding that through the meer simplicity of those who had the care thereof the souldiers were grown to be very licentious , not observing any manner of military discipline , by his meer resolution which he put on in the very beginning of his charge , of condemning two souldiers to undergo the severest punishment , the oneor that when he was working in the trenches , he had not any arms at all about him ; the other , because he wore a dagger without a sword , he reduced that so licencious army to the exact obedience of the good ancient military discipline ; and he further said , that the world was so well pleased with this his severity , as tacitus himself having authenticated it in his annals as an undoubted maxim in policy , fit to be imitated by all officers , had transmitted it to posterity in these words ; intentumque & magnis delictis inexo●…abilem scias , cui tantum asperitatis etiam adversus levia credebatur . ferrante answered corbulone , that one sort of government was to be used with souldiers in armies , and an other sort with citizens in the government of provinces . that commanders in war judged according to their humors and with free authority , but governors of cities were bound to observe laws , and having their hands thereby bound , they must be thereby regulated . that he very well knew that many officers , to the end that they might humble the insolent , quiet the seditious , and pacifie the tumultuous , used unheard of severities at their very entrance into command upon such delinquents as fell first into their hands ; but that he had likewise observed that those that did so , ran danger at last , by their bruitish way of proceeding . for he strayed very far from the right way , who thought to attain good ends by unjust means . for god who did abhor that faults should be punished by greater faults , could not any ways tolerate without exemplary punishment upon the judges , that injustice should be done to any one , though it tended to the universal quiet . that he loved onely such understanding officers who could conscienciously apply fitting punishments to faults ; that he desired rather that men might err on the charitable side , then exceed in rigor ; and that he had observed that those who begin their government with too much severity , must either continue it with too barbarous cruelty , or lose their credit by altering their maner of government : that he had rather leave corinth with the reputation of being a too indulgent , then too severe an officer , that all times , places , and persons not being alike , that officer was very unwise who would put himself upon a necessity to proceed always after one & the same maner ; & him wise , who being sometimes indulgent , sometimes severe , & sometimes cruel , who knew how to keep himself free in all his ways of proceeding , could upon any excess suddainly committed , or by too powerful a personage , or in times of trouble , or when to punish insolency with usual severity , would rather aggravate then amend the malady , make men believe that he had past over such a fault meerly out of his own clemency , which he could not possibly punish according to the rigor of the laws , out of important respects . that he confest he might infuse the same terror into the nobility of his government , by using extraordinary rigor toward that powerful delinquent , which corbulone had infused into his whole army , by his severe proceeding with those two soldiers ; but that then corbulone must likewise confess , that upon another occasion , at another time , or in another place , that same noble man , or any other m●…●…ommit a greater insolency , which was for the good of the coun●… 〈◊〉 be winkt at ; nay , sometimes praysed and rewarded ; that this was a great advantage , which was gotten by the advised officer , only by a judicious variety in his proceedings : and that too much rigor in a government to frighten delinquents , was only then good when it was used towards the meaner sort of people , who through their innate timerousness do more dread punishment then love reputation . but that the nobly born ( who usually erred more in revenging the injuries done unto his honor , then through any malignity of minde ) thought himself injured by the too great severity of the law , and together with his kindred and friends who account that shame , whotever it be , as done to their whole generation , grevv so incenc'd , and inraged , as to aff●…ont the too humerous officer in his reputation , and study revenge . by all vvhich he cleerly savv that the officer vvas ill advised , vvho vvhilst he might carry himself freely in all his actions , should by his cruel usage of the nobiliy exceed the terms of that equal justice which ought to be so adequate to the crime committed . that to proceed otherwise , was foolishly to put fetters upon a mans own feet , by obliging him to be equally severe to all sorts and conditions of men , and make himself slave to shameful & dangerous cruelty . to this corbulone replyed , that he was not wise enough to weigh businesses with the distinctions of time , place and persons ; but that practice being the rule that he went by , he knew that the punishment of those two foot souldiers , had kept him from being trou●…led with using many the like severities . but , said gonsaga , it would have proved otherwise if you had used the same cruelty to any of the chief officers of the army : and that the custom used by gardners was excellently good , and very fit to be imitated by all wise governors of provinces , who make scare-crows of the filthiest rags and ●…outs about the house , to frighten birds from eating their fruit , and not of rich silks and velvets . the lxiv . advertisement . the prince of macedon accuseth the nobility of athens of treason before apollo , who are freed from that imputatoon , by his majesties councel of war. the duke of athens dyed about the last of september , and difference arose between the prince of macedon , and the lord of epire touching the succession of that state. the prince of macedon , being called in by the people , took possession of athens , against whom the lord of epire came with a numerous army , and besieged his enemy in the city of epire , and according to the modern way of warfare , begirt it with trenches and forts ; and that he might bring the defendants the sooner to yield , he assaulted macedonia with an other flourishing army , making great progress there , and doing much harm . the prince of macedon , who knew he could not long maintain himself in the besieged city , and defend his own patrimony , to keep from loosing both , resolved to yield , and was contented to deliver up possession of whole athens , to the enemy , upon condition he should restore such place unto him as he had taken in macedon . as soon as the nobility of th●…●…esieged city heard of this resolution , the chief of them came un●… prince and told him , that as they had called him in to be their lord and master , so would they never acknowledge any other prince but he ; and that if he would but be of good courage , he should find them ready to defend that state even to the last drop of their bloods . to this the panswered , that the danger of his becoming a private foot souldier , was too great , that therefore for the better security of his fortune , he was resolved to deliver up athens to the lord of epire. those lords did then again beseech their prince to confide in his subjects , who did not onely assure him that they would defend attica , but that they would likewise recover macedon ; and lastly conjured him to remember , that they who with such readiness , and singular affection , had chosen him to be their prince , did not deserve in this their urgent necessity , to be so ungratefully abandoned , and given up in prey to the prince of epire ; who was much inraged against them for being rejected by them in that election ▪ the offers and intercedings of these noble men , did not only not at all incourage this prince , but at the very self same time he dispatched away a herald to the enemies camp to conclude the agreed on capitulation ▪ then the people of athens , that they might not be sold as slaves to that their enemy , whom they knew they had so hainously offended , seised on their prince and made him prisoner , and secured his person in the palace putting a numerous and faithful guard upon him of the best men of the city . this mean while the deputies of the prince of epire came to conclude the agreement , to whom the nobility of athens answered , that it was they that must be treated with in the point of surrender , who were so far from making any agreement with the prince of epire , as they willed him to know , that they were resolved to defend their country , and sent away the deputie●… with this resolute and stout answer . the next day the young men of athens sallyed forth armed , and in a couragious assault slew many of the enemy ; and soon after making many other sallies , put the enemies camp into such confusion , as the prince of epire , who thought himself before to be very sure of the business , began much to doubt the victory , and after many months siedge , in all which time the citizens of athens appeared to have no less resolute hearts , then ready hands , came to parley with the enemy , who had already enough of the business ; and on the of this present month such advantagious conditions were agreed upon for the people of athen●… as became free men , which being done , they sent the prince of macedonia home to his own state ; who three days since came to apollo , and did not only complain bitterly of the hard proceedings used ●…to him by the nobility of athens , but prest very hard that they should be hung up in effigies as traytors , in the great pegasean tower , for this their execrable rebellion . his majesty thought this a very weighty business , wherefore he referred it to his counsel of war : the reasons of both sides were divers times heard , and discust by the counsel , which at last gave sentence , that the offers of the a●…tick nobility being made so chearfully to the prince of macedon , and they being by him refused , it being apparent that he was resolved for other particular ends of his own , to give over the defence of the city , it was lawful for those noble men , when their prince had abandoned that protection of the people , to which all princes stand deeply bound , to use that expedient though it were very severe . a thing done by il signor lodovico oriosto , caused much wonder in all those who were present at this so signal sentence ; who when he had heard the judgement given , took his hat from off his head , and like a mad man , threw it on the ground ; then lifting up his eyes to heaven , and fetching a deep sigh , uttered these words in a sorrowful tone , dii immortale , homo homini quid praestat ? stulte intelligens quid interest ? the lxv . advertisement . a shop-keeper is condemned to the gallies at the very instant that he was seised on by the serjeants , not being so much as examined . the shop-keeper who dwelt at the signe of the two crowns in mercers street , was four daies since taken prisoner by the serjeants ; and being immediately upon his being taken , carried to the haven , and put into the gallies ; whole pernassus wondred very much hereat , to see that the execution of the judgement should precede process . 't is said that this was done at the instance of the chief monarchs of the world then resident in this state , who held themselves mightily offended with that shop-keeper , because he sold publiquely meer smoke ▪ a commodity which princes pretend is not to be sold by private men ; and therefore it is thought , that by his example they would affright others from not troubling them in things which concern their jurisdiction ; and although the less solid sort of men thought that the shop-keeper's fault deserved not so great a resentment , yet those who see further into the interest of great princes , say that they dealt very gently with him ; for meer smoke serving princes upon many occasions instead of ready money , all their richest treasure would soon be exhausted , when the so current money of meer smoke becoming of no reputation amongst people , princes should be forced , like to common people , to pay their debts in ready coyn . the lxvi . advertisement . bernardino rota , a famous neapolitan poet , being greatly beloved by the vertuosi of all professions in pernassus , is accused before apollo , for having purchast so general a good liking by some ill means . bernardino rota , a noble neapolitan poet , to the great wonder of all the literati of th●…s court , is so strangely beloved by the whole colledg of the vertuosi ; as he is stiled by every one , the delight of pernassus . and truely it appears a great miracle to every one , that since there are more then capital jars , divisions , and enmities between the greeks and latins , between the latins and italians , between physitians and doctors of law , between the peripatetick and platonick philosophers between the grammarians , and all other professions of the vertuosi , only la rota is rather adored then beloved , by all , and by each of them . and because it appears very strange to every one , that if so amiable a nature proceed only from the vertue of the soul , it be not found to be in any other of the vertuosi of this state , its being only seen to be in la rota , hath made every one suspect , that this man who appears to have a candid and liberal soul , is in effect otherwise ; and that he hath won this universal good will by the vice of playing jack of both sides , a vice which his majesty doth so much detest ; and therefore being questioned by marioulo in the tribunal della vicaria , he was made prisoner two daies since ; and it hapned , that whilst the tipstafs of the court , searched him to see whether he had any weapons about him or no , they found a great deal of storax and incense bound up in a paper in his pocket . severe process was made by the judges against la rota . but apollo , the better to inform himself of what was proved against this his vertuoso , commanded that he should be brought into the quarantia criminale ; where his majesty asked him , whether he did inchant mens minds by the magick of flattery , by the sacriledg of assisting others in their fowl vices , or whether it was only by the chains of vertue , that he did so straitly fasten unto him his literati , and chiefly that he should tell him what use he made of that storax and incense which was found about him . to which la rota answered ; that he had purchast the love of all the vertuosi in pernassus , only by detesting to imitate others in their contentions , and that he won upon the affections of all men , and made them love him , by the sincerity of his soul , and candidness of heart , by not desiring to know , much less to busie himself in other mens affairs , and by practicing the excellent vertue with all men , in all places , and at all times , of seeing , hearing , and concealing the actions of his loving friends and companions , and by divulging only such as might purchase others glory and reputation , and chiefly by applying himself to every ones humor , and that to the purpose , that he might rather make himself be idolatrized then beloved by all men , he used to perfume every one with the storax of praise , and with the incense of commendations , which was found about him . apollo then spoke alowd , and said , o you that are overswaid with passion , who are so obstinate in your opinions ; learn from this my most wise poet , the art so necessary for men , of applying your selves to the humor of those with whom you converse . this is the way to live in the world , this is the true means to make men flock after you , by making your selves slaves to all men , so to arrive afterwards at the happy condition of commanding all men . the lxvii . advertisement . a carpenter being cudgeled somewhat severely , for having uttered certain insolent words against the most noble scaliger , to his greater calamity , complains first of him to the lord chief iustice , and afterwards appeals to apollo . julius cesar scaliger , that famous literato of verona , caused some curious shelves to be made some few daies ago in his library , by a carpenter , which being finished , a dispute arose between them , not so much concerning the price , as the ill workmanship ; and whilst they were at variance , the carpenter being more bold then became him ( as is the fashion of plebeians , who negotiating for the most part with the common sort of people , weigh not their words , when they have to do with people of quality ) said , that scaliger was subject to the fault of other noble men , to stand upon hard tearms with poor artificers . scaliger was so touched to the quick with this injury , as appearing presently to be very well satisfied with the shelves ; and with their price , he caused the money to be forthwith paid unto the carpenter , which he demanded . the carpenter answering , that he was fully satisfied , scaliger reply'd , that it now rested that he must likewise have his satisfaction , which lay in teaching such arrogant fellows as he , how to govern their tongues ; which being said , he commanded a servant of his , to take a cudgel , and therewithall conjure out the fowl fiend of insolence that was in him ; wherein he was instantly obeyed . the miserable carpenter being soundly beaten , presented himself all bleeding before the chief justice , and complained grievously of scaliger for having treated him so ill . the justice , before he would resolve on any thing , would ( as it became him ) inform himself fully of the fact ; and when he heard the insolent words wherewith the carpenter had provoked scaliger , he commanded the goaler forthwith to give that insolent fellow three sound lashes with a rope ; which was done . whereupon the cudgel'd carpenter went about pernassus crying , and exclaiming more against the justice , then against scaliger . the literati of this court differed in their opinions touching the chief justice his act ; some of them blamed him extreamly , for that by that action he did too much encourage the nobility , who were naturally given to deal too injuriously with the common sort of people ; and some of these , who bore ill will to the chief justice , egg'd on the carpenter to complain to apollo , both of scaliger , and of the chief justice . his majesty , who had a little before been very particularly informed of all that had passed in this business , speaking to the carpenter , & those who were back-friends to the chief justice , who had egg'd him on to make his appeal , said , that he as much hated the insolent proceedings of his nobility with the common sort of people , as he was very much distasted that shop-keepers , and others of the meaner sort of men , should by bold speeches injure the reputation of those who live only to purchase honour and renown ; and that the common sort of people were much deceived , if they did believe that such justice was practised in pernassus , as wrought no other effect then what would make the rabble-rout insolent , and that it was great folly to trouble a noble man , who having moderately revenged himself for an injury done unto him by a plebeian , had only deserved punishment if he should have basely put it up , and so much the more , for that it did much misbecome such a personage as scaliger , to apply himself to courts of justice for injuries done unto him by such people , and thereby become the table-talk of justices and notaries . that he much commended the discretion of the emperor charls the fifth , who as he was returning with his emperess from a turney which was made about toledo , did not only not resent an action done by the d. of infantaga , who cut a provost marshal soundly over the head , that whipt on his horse , bidding him ride faster , though the action was done against a publique officer , and in his presence , but with like justice as ought to be used to a noble man injured by a plebeian , gave the duke to understand , that if he pleased , he might hang that sawcy fellow ; which the duke would not only not suffer to be done , but with a castilian magnanimity , beseeched the emperor to pardon the provost marshal , and accompanied the wound with crowns which he sent the wretch , that he might be the better cured . then apollo added , that there being three chief felicities which made humane men happy , peace , justice , and plenty , unless princes who govern the world , were the more circumspect , severe justice served only to make the rabble-rout proud ; universal peace , to make men cowards ; and perpetual plenty , to make people who living formerly by the sweat of their brows , were industrious , idle , of no use , and vagabonds : and that it being very true , that princes were the shepherds of mankind , the common people the sheep , and the nobility the dogs which guard the flocks , and keep them from the wolves ; it was likewise as true , that by all right of good government , the nobility ought to be maintained bold , and to be rather armed with iron collars of generosity , to defend them from the wolves , then through the fear of equal justice ( so peculiar to ignorant men ) be cow'd in such manner , as that the very sheep with the horns of unsupportable insolence , durst dare to butt at them . the lxviii . advertisement . the great emperor maximilian the first , having said in a great assembly of the chiefest princes of this state , that the mahometan religion was nothing but policy , proves by ●●cellent reasons to the very teeth of the ottoman monarchy , who complained hainously thereof to apollo , that he had said nothing but truth . vvhilst some daies ago the emperor maximilian the first , lodovick the eleventh king of france , matthias corvino king of hungary , stephano battori king of poland , and the famous andrea gretti , prince of the venetian republick , were reasoning together ( as it is the custom of great princes to do ) touching the affairs of the world , they spent much time in considering the greatness of the ottoman empire ; and whilst every one spake their opinion of that government , the emperor maximilian did freely confess that there were many military disciplines practised in the ottoman empire , which were worthy of admiration , but that the mahometan sect was throughout so impure and foul , as it seemed to be altogether unworthy the practice of men ; and that a desire of piety was manifestly seen in many institutors of divine laws , although the religion which they profest , was notoriously false ; their errors being occasioned meerly out of their ignorance of divine things ; but that the infinite impieties which were discovered in the ottoman sect , were wholly malitious in giving laws to her followers ; mahomet having proved himself to be a better politician then divine ; it being clearly seen , that to purchase followers who would imbrace that new sect , he had more respect in the forming of his alcharon to satisfie the body then the soul , and to aggrandize an earthly kingdom , then to make others gain heaven . and that in other sects , the institutors there of made use of divine precepts , for the bettering of human affairs , very cunningly cloaking over all their impieties , lest people when they should come to the knowledge of their foule hypocrisie , might be scandallized . but that mahomet alone , out of a meer greediness of government , did affrontedly laugh at sacred things , to raise the value of prophane ones . these words , though they past between princes of such eminency , were suddenly brought to the ottoman monarchy , who took them so ill , as he immediatly gave the emperor maximilian to understand by a bassa of his , that he would , as it became him to do , defend with his arms , the contrary to all that he had spoken to the prejudice of his laws ; and at the same instant that he sent this ambassy , he made ready his numerous army . maximilian nothing affrighted at this defiance , summoned the diet at ratisbon , that he might have such assistance from germany against so potent an enemy , as is usually given either first or last . apollo , who was soon acquainted with this news to the end that he might appease those two great monarchs , called an assembly of all the princes the next day ; who when they appeared , he much complained of the ottoman monarchy's barbarous proceedings , since even in pernassus , where argumentations , and difference in opinion being only decided by the rule of truth , he had dared to use force . he then told them , that he had summoned that honorable assembly , only that they might hear from the emperor maximilian's own mouth , all he reasons which had induced him to accuse the mahometan sect , as being composed of nothing but policy . his majesty afterwards commanded the emperor to begin his justification . whereupon maximillian , with such majesty as became him , began thus . i was moved to say that the mahometan sect was nothing but policy , meer ambition , and interest of reigning , and that the first institutors thereof were more ambitious then pious , out of these clear reasons . for that mahomet , to the end that his armies might be free from those incumbrances , and expence of wine , wherewith the militia of christian princes is so much molested , did forbid the use thereof to those of his sect ; a precept wholly political , as that which frees the turkish souldier from that expence which doth so abound in the christian militia , particularly where there be dutchmen , or northern souldiers , who consume more in drinking , then in meat , clothes , or even in providing themselves with arms. moreover the great advantage which their princes receive from their souldiers sobriety , though it be known to all men , yet are they more particularly known to me , who whilst i made war in the world , was much more troubled with my dutch souldiers drunkenness , then with my enemies arms. add to this , that whereas amongst the turks , the fields serve either for arable ground , or pasture , our grounds are encumbred with vines . the other more then political institution of the mahometan law is , that the greatness of a prince consisting in the multitude of his vassals ; the mahometan law , to the end that her disciples may have so great a benefit , permits them by a rare example of unbounded lust , to have at one and the same time , but in divers places , plurality of wives , and as many concubines as they please , without any sin unto their soul , or prejudice to their honour : a thing which more resembling the custom of beasts , then any institution of man , is altogether unfitting to be named , much more to be practised by any nation : a law , which by reason of the unexhaustible multitude of children which the fathers of families have in the ottoman empire , is altogether political : for the infinite number of turks serves not only for abundance of food for powder in the ottoman wars , but to reap the same benefit , which we christian princes doe out of that trite politick precept , of keeping the people low : for the custom which many of us have of burthening the people with extraordinary taxes and impositions , so to keep them low , and by the severity of our penal laws , which are now become matter of money , are things which breeding ill bloud in our vassals , doth oft-times make them rebel . but wise mahomet hath only known how to keep the people low perpetually , and yet with their delight and satisfaction , which was never yet known to any other politick legislator ; for infinite number of children being of necessity to be born unto the turks , through their plurality of wives , and abundance of concubines , politick mahomet , to the end that he may bring the wealthiest families in a short time to beggery , hath not been ashamed to command in his alcharon , that bastards , which are by all laws so much detested , should share equally in paternal inheritance with children lawfully begotten . and if it be true which i have often read , and heard said , that a tailor of constantinople shewed solyman the emperor thirty of his sons , and that one giambelat , a man famous amongst the turks for his fruitfulness , had eight sons born in one and the same night , and left fourscore sons alive when he died , what is the richest inheritance of whatsoever turk alive , which being equally divided amongst so many children , will not beco●…●…r , and their families be perpetually kept low , and forced to beg th●… pay of their prince by following the wars ? and if that be true , which we princes have daily experience of , that the souldier that fears not death , overcomes all difficulties which he undertakes , and happily compasseth his end , whatsoever it be , and that it be impossible to withstand the most inconsiderable man that is , who despiseth his own life ; what more politick and devillish precept could be infused into men by any ambitious legislator , thereby to get the government of the whole world , then that of fate , which wicked mahomet hath injoyned his followers to believe ? who being shamefully seduced by so false a doctrine , believe firmly that all men have the prefixt and inevitable day of their deaths written in their forehead in divine characters , though not discernable by the eye of man. a law as wicked before god , as greatly miraculous to aggrandize an empire , to which infernal institution , the extent of the ottoman empire is solely attributed . to these may be added the other powerful precept , that it is not lawfull for the ottoman emperors to restore any kingdom to any whatsoever prince , where they have built a moschey . a rule , which ( as every one may easily discern ) is only made to overcome the great difficulty which all princes meet with , of keeping states newly acquired , and to make the militia so obstinate in the defence thereof , as those provinces which were conquered by victorious arms , are only lost by such arms as were conquered . nor is the decree given to the ottoman emperors , less politick then this , that they shall not be allowed , either for the maintaining of their memory alive , or for the burial of their bodies , or out of any pious zeal , to build any moschey , unless they have first acquired some kingdom ; a law only instituted to excite the basest and most cowardly minded ottoman emperors , to the ambition of glory , and propagating empire . but of all the precepts that i have touched upon , or that can be related by any other , there is none , in my opinion more political , then that of their not admitting of any women into their moscheys , to pray there ; a most wicked law , and which doth manifest , that the mahometan sect doth more affrontedly make use of religion as a pretence whereby to reigne , then any other sect that was ever heard of . for what doth such a law denote , but that mahomet is content to oblige only the masculine sex to sacred things , to the end that he might from them receive the advantage of loyalty , obedience , and meekness of spirit , and of the curb of piety , which moderating mans too great inclination to sensuality , makes him keep the right rode of not offending any one ; and receive the other advantages which by a well-regulated religion , men partake of from peaceable commerce ; which because he cares not to receive from women , who are not apt to raise insurrections , to acquire nor keep states , he is content to say , only to keep them from falling headlong into all kinde of lasciviousness , when they shall see themselves utterly excluded from all heavenly glory ; that if they live chastly , they shall , when their lives are ended in this world , pass into a place , where if they do not enjoy the blessings of heaven , they shall not at least suffer any evil ; a shameful doctrine , and such a one as never any legislator durst dream of , in making a foolish and ignorant division , or distinction between the souls of men and women . i shall conclude this my justification with this last and chiefest politick law ; that mahomet knowing very well how much it mak●… 〈◊〉 monarchy , that monarchs should keep their vassals in exact obedience , as is due to all that reigne , hath not stuck to say , that those mens souls shall not share of salvation in the world to come , who for any faults committed by them , or for any other misdemerits , die in their princes displeasure . as if a man how wicked soever he be , may not reconcile himself to god , either by contrition , repentance , or condign penance for offences done unto man. though the colour which appeared in the ottoman monarchies countenance shewed plainly how much she was confused , yet according to her accustom'd affrontedness , she would have reply'd , when apollo beckning to her to be silent , asked her , whether it were true or no , that by the mahometan law , no man might dispute touching the articles of her faith , but that it was to be made good by force of arms ; and the ottoman monarchy answering , that it was true , apollo reply'd , that she her self had confest those things to be true , which the emperor maximilian had affirmed . for as wealth honestly come by by good men , was maintained and defended by justice , and plundered goods , by the same violence by which they were taken ; so truth was defended by reason , but falshood by violence and obstinacy . the lxix . advertisement . anneus seneca , after having read moral philosophy in the publick schools of pernassus , obtains a writ of ease from apollo ; and being desirous to endow the philosophy-school with a rich revenue , is not suffered by his majesty to do so . seneca having for above the space of forty years read philosophy in the publick schools of pernassus , to his infinite praise , and the nnspeakable good of the publick ; apollo ( as to one who had so wel deserv'd ) gave him the last week a writ of ease ; and the place being sued for by very many , apollo bestowed it upon plutarch . and because seneca , by reason of his rich patrimony , had discharged his place with regal magnificency , to the end that so honorable a place might not fall short of its antient splendor under plutarch , who was but poor in respect of seneca , he indowed it with an annual rent of crowns a year : a piece of magnanimity whereby he hath won immortal fame from all the vertuosi of this state. but when he came before apollo to acquaint him with so honourable a donation , instead of being commended for that his so glorious action , he was , contrary to the expectation of all men , much blamed by his majesty , and in these very words reprehended : seneca , to trouble the fountains head when a man hath quench'd his thirst , is an action full of malice ; nor should i ever have imagined that such a one as you would have gone about to vituperate that school , whereby you have been honoured ; i must praise your excellent intention , but greatly blame the deed , and ( as pernitious ) not suffer it to be done . it is great wisdom to keep such places poor , as must of necessity be discharged by men of worth : to the end , that answerably to the publick good , they may be provided of men ; which should it be otherwise , to the great prejudice of my literati , men would be provided of such wealthy imployments . the school which you have given over , will alwaies be sought for by such literatias your self , whilst it is but of poor means ; but were it indowed with the large revenue which you would now give it , even ignorant men , out of avarice would so endeavour the having of it , as by means of favour which such men by unwarrantable waies know how to win , it would be very hard , if not impossible , to keep it from them . the lxx . advertisement . diego covaruvia , after having for a short space exercised the place of his majesties chief treasurer , betakes himself to the stoicks sect. diego covarruvia had discharged the honorable place of his majesties chief treasurer , just two months , with so general satisfaction to all men , as every one clearly saw how well advised princes are when they promote subjects to places of highest dignity , from but a little inferior places of magistracy : this personage of exquisite judgement , after having freely imparted his several resolutions to his domestick friends , he unexpectedly gave up the place of treasurer into his majesties hands , and betook himself to be a stoick . many literati of this state who were very great friends to this glorious vertuoso , when they heard so strange a novelty , went to covarruvia , and seemed very sorry , that by quitting a place of such dignity , he had forgone the fair occasion which he had of making himself famous , and gratifying his friends . then they bad him consider his own reputation , which by this unexpected resolution he did totally bury ; since not only such as did envie and maligne him , but even his very best friends , might blame that action ( and peradventure not without reason ) as proceeding rather from a melancholy humour , from fickleness of mind , as a lover of novelties , from weakness of wit , as unfit for such an imployment , and uncapable thereof , then to the lawdable desire of a solitary life , whereby he would cloke his being unfit for such a place . it is well known that covarruvia answered these objections very resolutely , thus ; my friends , the resolution which you see i have taken , is not ( as you believe ) any new caprichio , but an antient resolution which i have ever had since i learnt by court-fallacies , by the perfidiousness of courtiers , and by the instability of earthly affairs , that this worlds greatness , which is gotten with so much toyle and labour , managed with such cark and care , and possest with so much danger , was nothing else but meer vanity ; and i did not that at my first entrance into the court , which i have done of very late , only that i might enter into this famous sect , with all the reputation that becomes one like me ; for i did not desire that the world should imagin that i had imbraced the stoick sect , out of a meanness of spirit ( which is a friend to idleness , and an enemy to labour ) for weakness of parts , as not fit to attain the most supreme dignities , for not being able to bear with the bitter distastes of court , or for any dislike that my home-affairs had occasioned in me ; but only that i might attain to that happiness as is usually enjoy'd in a solitary and vertuous life , by such , who being given to learning , desire nothing but much knowledg : now , that i have abandoned the happy condition that you all know i was in , only that i might retreat to a better life , my friends , enemies , and enviers will certainly praise my resolution ; for then doth a man with much honour embrace poverty , when he forgoes riches , and when to enjoy a solitary life , he gives over weighty and gainful negotiations . and such men as i , do with glory spurn at the pomp and vanity of this world , when by their honourable labour and service in princes courts , they have known how to compass the prime places , and supreme dignities . the lxxi . advertisement . cornelius tacitus being imprisoned at the complaint of some great princes , for having made some politick spectacles , which were very prejudicious to their government , is freed by apollo . the whole colledg of the literati were much astonished , when they heard that cornelius tacitus , one so famous in pernassus , one so well beloved by apollo the first counseller of state , chief chronicler , and master of his majesties sentences , was seised upon the last night by express order from the lords censors . it was soon after known , that this had hapned by reason of a complaint made by divers great princes , that tacitus by his seditious annals and histories , had made certain spectacles which were very pernitious to princes ; for let the simplest person put them on his nose , they would make him so sharp-sighted , as to see into the very hearts of other men , and discover their most secret thoughts : and that which they said they neither could nor would any waies indure , was , that he shewed unto the people , the very essence and quality of princes-souls , what they were indeed inwardly , and not what through the necessary tricks of government they were forced to make themselves appear to be outwardly . yesterday morning the counsel of the chief monarchs of this state came before the censors , amongst which , for tacitus his greater honour , who was to be tryed , apollo would make one . this advocate told them , that all the understanding men of the state knew very well that princes for the peace and quiet of their kingdoms , were oft times necessitated to do unwarrantable actions , which , to maintain the peoples opinion of their being good princes ( as is fitting for all to do that will govern ) they had wont to palliate with specious pretences of good intentions , and great zeal towards the publick good , those pieces of policy which they would be no longer able to use , if the true meaning of their minds were known to all men ; and that if it were possible for people to be governed without submitting themselves to their jurisdiction , princes would willingly renounce their princely ●…itles , and their power of command , as having found at last , that principalities are nothing but unsupportable burthens , affairs so full of difficulty and danger , as they could not taste any one savory bit , at those their plentiful tables , which jealous men do so envie , which did not stink of arsnick ; but that if experience had made the world know , that all mankind would soon suffer under sad confusion , were it not for wise princes who do govern them , it was fitting that they should be permitted to use all those just waies which were requisite for them for the well-governing their subjects : for , if for cultivating grounds , husbandmen were not denied oxen , ploughs , and mattocks ; if tailors for the cutting out and making up of clothes , were allowed needle and sheers ; and smiths , hammers and pincers ; wherefore should monarchs be henceforward denied to throw dust in their subjects eyes , or cast a mist before them , which was the best advantage , and the most necessary instrument for the right government of states , which any polititian had ever yet found out in any of the most excellent reasons of state. all which things princes , by reason of tacitus his seditious inventions , should now be no longer able to do ; it being clearly seen that the devillish spectacles invented by that alwaies seditious tacitus , to boot with what hath been said of their making the people sharp-sighted , had also another pernitious effect , by sticking so close to mens noses , as princes were now no longer able , as formerly they had with as much ease as advantage done , to throw dust in their subjects eyes , though it were most artificial , and super-fine , but that they would be aware of their being abused . the complaints made by the monarchs , seemed to be very just , both to apollo , and all the censors ; and they therefore thought worthy of mature consideration ; and after a long discourse had about so weighty a business , their opinion seemed to prevail ; who voted that tacitus with his scandalous annals , and seditious histories , should be banished the company of man. but his majesty , that he might not disgrace the prince of political history , and not to distast gallant men , by depriving them of their delights , was content that tacitus should be told , he might do well to make as few of those spectacles as possible he could , which were indeed so pernitious to princes ; and that he should chiefly be sure not to part with any but to choice personages , to the secretaries , and privy councel of princes , to the end that they might know the more easily how to govern the people ; and that above all things , as he valued his majesties favour , he should keep from communicating them to such seditious people , who in troublesom times might serve for lanterns to the simpler sort of people , who suffered themselves easily to be governed , when not being inlightned by learning , they might be said to be blind , and want a guide . the lxxii . advertisement . many carriers , who contrary to the laws , brought great store of beans into parnassus , are taken prisoners by the scouts . this morning , being the twentieth of this present moneth , the field-scouts met with some carriers , who brought store of beans into pernassus , a sort of pulse which was long since banished out of all apollo's dominions ; for his majesty having found in many unfortunate former occasions , that many passionate literati , that they might vent their mad passions which burn'd within their bosoms , whilst they made use of these beans in the senat , have utterly undone themselves and their whole families , to the end he might maintain peace and concord amongst his vertuosi , did many years since forbid the sale of any such pulse under pain of severe punishment ; it having been used by divers instead of musket-bullets , only to blast the reputation of honest men . it was learn'd from the same carriers , that this inhibited . merchandize was sent from ignorant and malignant countries , to such perfidious courtiers of this state , who study nothing else but how to scatter beans upon other mens stairs , only to make such simple people fall and break their necks , who firmly believe that no man can walk safely any where , but with the feet of upright meaning , and good conscience . whereupon apollo did very much wonder to see , that through the malignity of the times , all princes courts are so pestered with these malignant spirits , as they study more how to discompose other mens affairs , then how to accommodate their own . the lxxiii . advertisement . seneca having bought great store of poultrey in a countrey-house of his , which lies in the gnides territories , those people come to the true reason of that his forestalling the market . soon after that ( as you have heard ) the most excellent annaeus seneca obtained a writ of ease from his majesty , from further exercising his place of chairman in the moral philosophy-school , he , that he might refresh his eminent wit , which was much harras'd in his perpetual studies , withdrew himself to a pleasant countrey-house of his , seated in the territories of gnido , from whence they write , that this so famous literato , at his very first coming thither , made so great a provision of cocks , hens , and capons , as they that saw them in the place where they were kept , judged them to amount to the number of above five hundred ; a thing which all the inhabitants of gnido did much wonder at ; and those speculative wits , who spend more time in vainly prying into other mens actions , then in the well governing of their own , were of opinion , that seneca had avarice joyned to the other faults which were imputed to him ; and that therefore he had forestalled , and bought up all those poultrey ( which was an action misbecoming a man of his parts ) only that he might inhance the price of them . and it was said by the same letters , that some thought that he had added the detestable vice of gluttony , to his infinite thirst after riches . but it being observed in process of time , that seneca spent three hours daily after dinner , in looking upon those his poultrey : it was at last known , that this great philosopher learn'd from that sort of poultrey , the art , wherein he did not only exceed all other writers , but hath been followed therein by an infinite number of others , of crowing well , and scraping ill ▪ the lxxiv . advertisement . the grand-child to the prince of the laconicks asks counsel of apollo , what course he should take to live with reputation in laconia . that grand-child of the prince of laconia , who ( as you heard by the last post ) through the froward stubbornness of his mind , betook himself to the general scandal of his government , to lead a privat life , being much afflicted and troubled in mind , is this morning returned to pernassus ; and presenting himself before his majesty , told him , that much to his sorrow and trouble , he had at last found that to be true , which had been often told him by his best and dearest friends ; that most men were so full of ingratitude , as they loved fortune only , and not the persons of their beneficent princes ; a fault which occasioned that which good men were sorry to see , that they were as sure to fail their friends when their fortunes failed them , as tacitus had reason to say , that intuta erant adversa . tacit. lib. . annal. for much to his grief , he found the chain of munificence whereby he had endeavoured to fasten unto him the affection of an infinite number of friends , in his uncles kingdom , from whom he expected a return of much gratitude , to be but very weak : and that if it were true which many elective princes had together with himself experienced to be true , that a stroke of ingratitude gave the deadliest wound which could be received by a noble mind , and that to sow benefits , and reap neglects , was the saddest and most sorrowful exercise which could be practised by a prince , he deserved not only to be pittied by his majesty , and by all good men , but to be assisted by advice : and that in this his horrid change of fortune , to see himself not only little respected by those whom he knew not , but wounded by the speeches of those his dearest friends , whom he had endeavoured to oblige , and scorn'd by the actions of those which had formerly adored him , was an affliction which did so inwardly grieve him , as he was not able to support to strange a metamorphosis . that therefore since he was forced to pass from principality to a privat life , from commanding to obeying ; he greatly desired to know from his majesty , what course he should take to live with reputation in laconia . to this apollo briefly answered , that he should first inform himself in the court of rome , where all the examples of the most heroick vertues did abound , and then imitate the great splendor of edward cardinal fernese , who by a princely generosity , and profuse liberality used towards all men , had made the court , and the whole nobility of rome so in love with him , as he was now more honoured and observed in anothers popedom , then the great alexander cardinal fernese was formerly in the popedom of his uncle , paul the third . to this the prince reply'd , that he knew the counsel which his majesty gave him , to be very true , but that the receit being very costly , he thought it to be too dear ; that therefore he humbly beseeched him to teach him a cheaper remedy . apollo laughed , and freely told this prince , that to pretend to be beloved and honoured by the people , to be attended and followed like a great prince , and yet to keep his purse close ty'd , his cellar-dore shut , his granaries lockt up and close bar'd , was a greater vanity than to pretend to open the gates of heaven by impious blasphemy ; for the face of a sordid covetous man was much more dreadful to the people , than the face of lucifer himself ; whereas liberality used towards friends , to keep men in perpetual protection , and to be continually ready to patronize them , defend , help , and assist them in their oppressions , was the true magick , and pious inchantment by which men were fascinated , and that they did strangely hate such avaritious people , who being unwilling to bait their hooks with little pilchards , dare not venture at catching a great sturgeon . the lxxv . advertisement . isabella of aragon , dutchess of milan , being continually prosecuted by adverse fortune , is brought to a very unhappy condition in the city of ephesus . that famous dutchess of milan , isabella of aragon , who by unparallel'd example of misfortune , within the space of a few months , lost her grand-father , father , brother , and her nephew , having all of them been kings of naples , as also her paternal kingdom of naples , and the dukedom of milan , which was her husbands and her sons patrimony , when she subscribed her name to any letter that she writ , after her name of isabella of aragon , dutchess of milan , added ( as she had good reason to do ) the only unfortunate . for , fortune , when she once begins to persecute any one , never leaves her malignity ; till she have buried them alive in the grave of most deplorable misery . her unfortunate condition did daily so impair , as to the woful example of the vicissitude of human greatness , she lives now in ephesus , where from the ●…st day that she entred into pernassus , she gets her living by the sad and woful means of selling tinder and matches , as she goes along the streets . the lxxvi . advertisement . many of the literati who do much apprehend the severity of the reformation , which by order from apollo , is now in treaty in pernassus , do seditiously rise in rebellion against the reformers ; and his majesty appeaseth the tumult by applying a fitting remedy . all those that submitted to the reformation which is at this time treated of in pernassus with much severity , took up arms in a seditious manner some eight daies ago , and ran to the reformers houses , carrying links and fire-brands with them to burn those reverend reformers in their own houses . who , as soon as they were aware of the uprore , fortified themselves within their house , and they from within , and the other from without , let fly at one another , so as a very bloudy and cruel skermish was begun ; and those without grew so outragious , as they fastned a petar to the gate . apollo , who was soon advertised of this disorder , that he might prevent any inconvenience which might arise from this tumult , sent forthwith his guard of provincial poets thither , who were commanded in chief by the great french ronsard , ordering him to let those men in arms know in his name , that they should immediately lay down those their seditious arms , upon pain of being from that very instant declared to be ignorant ; and that as soon as they should apply themselves to him , he would be ready to hear their grievances . these men immediately obeyed his majesties commands , before whom when they appeared , apollo with an angry countenance asked them , whether or no they were those rash , those insolent people , who pretended to live in that disorderly and abusive way of licentiousness , and not be made return to the way of well-living , from which it was evidently known that they had very much gone astray . sir , said iovanni scopa , a neapolitan , in name of all that were to be reformed , we ingenuously confess that our faults are heynous in condition , in number infinite , and very fitting to be amended ; we are so far from hating ( as your majesty may perchance believe ) reformation , and the reformers , as we do greatly love it and them ; but the rage to see that the end of our reformers is far from the pretence wherewith they palliate their reformation , hath put into our hands these weapons of despair . for if those who pretend our reformation , as zealously intending our welfare , should let us plainly see that they desire nothing of us but our own good , we should as willingly submit to the pleasing yoke of reformation , as any man of honour ought to do ; but it is long since , that after our so many sufferings , we have at last clearly found , that this reformation is not introduced out of any charitable intentions towards us , not out of a desire to remove scandals , but out of a wilely end , to keep those grand literati , who do so much hate a privat life , and covet nothing but food for their ambition , in the power which they have of dominiering over their inferiors . hence it is , sir , that this our reformation meets with so many complaints , and such venim against our reformers ; who foolishly perswading themselves , to be able to correct mens vices , and to purge the world of that ignorance which doth so much deform it , by their only outward appearing good intention to reformation , are pleased with our complaints , their main ends being , that the world may believe , that our complaint , which is occasioned by their fowl proceedings with us , springs from our being nauseated with our correction ; and yet the clean contrary to this is true : for finding our selves griev'd by the evil opinion which men have , more then they ought to have , and daily more and more opprest by those whose power is greatest in pernassus , there is not any one that doth listen unto us , nor mind what we say , though we cry never so lowd for justice . for men of power are alwaies honoured and exalted , though they deserve the contrary ; and such wretched people as we , are opprest and afflicted , let our deserts be never so good . and hence it is that we who are ill at ease , do continually complain more of the physick not proportionate to our disease , then of our malady it self ; and of our physitians , whose end in curing us , is not ( as it ought to be ) our health , but their daily gain in exercising their authority , and in feeding their ambition by the food of other mens injuries . but that which afflicts us most , sir , is , that in this our corrupt and depraved age , the important business of reformation should be begun by the most threadbare and ruin'd people that are in pernassus . we ( as your majesty may see ) are for the most part hunger-starv'd grammarians , broken correctors of the press , woful ushers of schools , and poor vulgar poets , of so miserable a condition , as we live by conceits , which we daily borrow from the fruitful wits of latin poets and orators , so as if our daily necessities were not abundantly supplyed by the bounty of our alwaies most reverend callepine , if we were not fed by the free defrayment of our cornucopia , and clothed out of the wardrobe of mario nizzolio , what sort of people , how poor so ever , could be compared to us ? but to speak unto your majesty with that freedom which becomes such as are overwhelmed with despair , the thefts of ausonius gallo , the execrable avarice and immense ambition of seneca , martials unpolished language , aristotles perfidiousness , catullus , tibullus , and propertius their unbridled lusts , the bac bitings of iuvenal and perseus , lucians impiety , ovids obsceneness , and those libidinous treaties of virgil , which it is not fit for me to name in this place , for fear of offending your majesties chaste ears , are those who through their dissolute vices have brought the state of pernassus into the miserable condition that now it is in : and yet these whom i may freely say are the true authors of so many scandals , are all of them great personages , the chief lords of learning , and are so powerful in this court , as their vices are reputed vertues : and that which makes us rage the more in our despair , is , that these our reformers do rather stand in fear of such men as these , then that they have courage to correct their enormities : and yet your majesty greatly desires that the justice which is exercised in this your state , should be like the generosity of the falcon , whose proper instinct it is to prey upon that pigeon , which of many others that fly before her , hath the rankest wing . and certainly it does not only appear to be foolish , but is a very sad thing , that when a body hath received mortal wounds in its most principal parts ; these our reformers , for the cure thereof , do apply medicines only to the ball of the foot , or wash the heels with rose-water ; by which shameful way of proceeding , they rather seem to mock the world , then to mind the mending of men . and what a hellish piece of charity is this which our reformers use towards us , in being so curious in discovering our defects , and in making us lose our reputation , and the good opinion which hitherto men have had of us , without induing us with that amendment and vertue , wherein these our reformers profess themselves to be so great masters ? and , sir , if these men do so compassionate a straw which they see in our eyes , why take they not the beam away which is in their own ? a hellish charity , i must say again , to seem as if they did bewail other mens evils , and indeed make merry with their own miseries . is it not a great piece of cruelty to put a probe of iron into a wound which a man minds not to amend , or else knows he cannot cure ? who knows not that mens vices have so long corrupted their manners , as a man may say this world was born lame , or maimed ? which being most true , is it not gross ignorance in our reformers to believe that in three or four daies they will be able to make him walk upright , who was born with a lame leg ? evils , which by reason of long continuation , are incureable , ought rather to be winked at by wise men , then exasperated by corroding medicines ; it being of ill example , and of very bad consequence to make him known to be lame , who for ought any man knows , hath no defect in his legs : for men who are in perfect charity with their neighbours , do first secretly cure their defects , before they discover them to the world ; for no man ever won renown by robbing another man of his honour . but that which troubles us most , is , to see that for the cure of our poverty , we have seneca proposed unto us , who was master of so immense riches , which god knows how he came by ; to the humble and abject , insolent aristotle , and gluttonous martial , to those that die for hunger . and if it be true , which any man who is in his right wits cannot deny , that a gluttonous physitian is not likely to do any good by perswading another to keep a strict diet ; what good is there to be expected from his reformation , whilst martial , who is so obscene in his verses , wils us to speak modestly ? aristotle ( who to revenge injurious words , made use of poyson even to his prince ) to pardon injuries received ; when chastity is recommended unto us by ovid , the father of all lasciviousness ; piety by lucian , who so openly plaid upon god ; ausonius gallo , who so shamefully sackt ●…gypt , which was given to him to govern , admonishing us to abstain from other mens goods : and when chaste love is prescribed unto us by virgil , who hath made himself so infamous by so highly celebrating his alexis ? nothing , sir , hath greater operation or fruit in matter of reformation , then when those that are to be reformed , think well of their reformers , and then the good example of great men . for he who cures an a king head , enlivens all the rest of the body ; but he who to cure the megrim , anoints the feet only , doth both oleum & operam perdere . therefore that such fruit may be gathered from this reformation , as is wished for by honest men , we beg that as a special favour from your majesty , which in all justice ought not to be denied us , that we may be permitted to put the reformers in mind of such things as shall be thought fit for the increase of their honour , and for the universal good , and that they may have plenary power to correct our misdemeanors , that so we proceeding with them in tearms of love , and they with us in tearms of charity , the reformation proving essential , and not only in appearance , may abundantly produce amendment both in life and manners . although the standers by thought that la scopa had spoke too freely in apollo's presence ; yet his majesty commended the proposition as very just , and calling for a particular of such things as they desired should be reformed , did first dismiss the auditory , which was very great , and afterwards did by writing commend a business of that importance , to his regio collaterale , induing them with ample authority to decide it actually as they should in reason , sola veritate facti , inspecta , omni , & quacun ue appellatione remota . the negative to this was often broacht , and disputed : and though the greatest part of the collaterale , thought the desire of those that were to be reformed , very just ; yet after a long argumentation had thereupon , giacomo menocchio , one of the chiefest of those counsellers being brought into the collaterale , said , with an incens'd countenance , and in an angry tone ; you through your hair-braind rashness , make your selves appear to be a rabble of insolent people , since you have presumed to go about to reform poets , philosophers , and others of the chiefest literati of this court , whose names you are not worthy to take within your mouthes , and by your bold-faced behaviour , have committed high treason , having so highly offended your superiors ; who time out of mind , find themselves in peacefull possession , and enjoy the ius quaesitum of reforming others , without being ever to be reformed by any one . nor must you by playing the good companions , live according to your own humors , but in spight of your hearts submit your jobernols to the sacred precepts of nature ; which not without a great mystery , is contented , that greater fishes devour the lesser ; nor is it possible to take from small flies , special priviledge which they have over lean cattel , without overthrowing the whole body of the civil law. the lxxvii . advertisement . many princes believing that the disorder of their courts , which were abandoned by courtiers , proceeded from the injurious speeches used by cesar caparoli , in his chapter della corte , desire apollo that it may be remedied , and obtain their desire . divers princes complained bitterly to apollo on wednesday morning , that their courts which were formerly in such high esteem with all men , as every one believed that all consolation , and chearfull passing away time , all sorts of learning to enrich the mind with noble vertues , all means to come by wealth and honourable preferments , were only to be found in them , were now become so abhorr'd , as being accounted by all men to be but meer snares , and publick hospitals for unfortunate people , they were very much troubled to find out men to serve them ; and that those few who came to court , were none but shallow-pated people , driven from their own houses by despair , hunger , and poverty : who if they were not immediately enricht at their very first coming to the court , and did not suddenly obtain such degrees of honour and supreme dignities , as they had first propounded unto themselves in their vast desires , grew forthwith so foolishly impatient , as like unbroken colts , and tender-mouthed horses , if they were but lightly touched with the spur , or had but never so little a check with the bridle given them in the court , after having first insolently kickt at their masters with their heels , they would discourteously forsake their service . and that whereas formerly the noblest and wealthiest personages thought it a great favour to be received into court , though they had but lodging , bread and beer , and six pence a day for other expences besides allowed them : they did not only complain now of the scarcity of all these , but even the most inconsiderable people did not stick to demand great sallaries . which disorder , if it were not the sooner prevented , one of two inconveniences must necessarily follow : either princes must shortly live desolate in their courts without attendance ; or they must afford matter of murmur to their people , by altering their publick expences to supply the new charge of their courtiers sallaries . and that they had at last found that cesar caporali was the only occasioner of so many disorders ; who not content to have shamed them to all nations by that his seditious chapter written in defamation of the court , but was ever seen to whisper the sad miseries which courtiers were to undergo , into the ears of such as had a mind to apply themselves to court service . apollo thought the complaint of these princes to be very just ; wherefore he forthwith forbad that famous poets chapter of the court. the chief literati of pernassus , when they first heard this so rigorous edict published , very much prest his majesty that he would be pleased to alter that his resolution , which would so much afflict the very souls of his beloved vertuosi ; but all was in vain , for apollo was resolute in his answer , bidding them be quiet , for he would by no means desert the courts of princes ; which were the only whetstones to sharpen mens wits , the true schools wherein men learnt that vertuous dissimulation , which is so necessary for such as sail upon the vast ocean of this world , that patience , that sagacity which all men wanted who were not trained up there ; and that to make princes imbase that their so currant money of hope , which served courtiers for rich sallary , would be to turn the world up-side-down . the lxxviii . advertisement . learned seneca , seeing that his late reformation of his former too splendid way of living , was ill taken by the universality of pernassus , distributes his immense riches in a work which was greatly commended by all men . it is certainly a thing worthy much consideration , that the works of the learned anneus seneca , so full of holy precepts , and of so excellent instructions for the life of man , as they make their author to appear a man of singular goodness , yet he daily grows so much less in esteem in pernassus , as he is not much valued by the greatest part of the vertuosi of this court : which seneca perceiving , and fearing lest the abundance of his servants , his rich apparel , store of plate , and the greatness of his wardrobe might lessen his reputation , not only with those that were his rivals , and did envy him , but even with his loving and learned friends , shut up his dores not long since ; sold all his apparel , plate , and wardrobe , and dismist at once three parts of his family ; a resolution which was infinitely commended by all the literati of this court , and which renew'd seneca's reputation which was almost lost ; but it soon began to decrease again ; for those quick-ey'd cou●…tiers , who being careless of their own behaviours , busie themselves wholly in prying into other mens carriages , quickly learnt , that seneca had bettered his estate by the sale of his personal estate ; so as what he thought should have bettered his reputation in the world , did much impair it . wherefore it being by this accident clearly made known that the mystery of hypocrisie , which is so easily practised amongst shallow-pated people , is impossible to be made use of with safety to reputation in courts which are full of men , who erring more in knowing too much , then in not knowing how men are naturally given , judge not by mens words , but by their deeds . which made seneca perceive at last it was not harder to make an iron clock without a file , then to be able to use hypocrite amongst great wits , without danger of being discovered to be a pillary bird . and perceiving likewise that the profession of affected goodness won but little credit in a man who was very rich , and avaritious withal ; that he might not see the death of those his writings , which had given him so long and so honourable a life , he put on an honorable resolution , which was totally to give over the way of appearance , which he had been long accustomed to , and to betake himself to realities , which only occasion the reputation of true goodness . it is whispered in court that this alteration was occasioned , for that apollo being told by seneca's rivals , that though this philosopher did no longer use plate at his table , yet he fed more deliciously then ever ; his majesty said , that the true reformation of good men , consisted not in the not using of silver vesse's at their tables , and in the eating of fat capons notwithstanding in earthen dishes ; wherefore seneca much moved with this sharp repremand , resolved he would be no longer scorned for spending so immense a wealth only upon his belly and his back , divided his whole estate , consisting of three millions and a half , into four equal parts , wherewith he founded as many publick hospitals , and indowed them with rich revenues , and ordered that the four sorts of fools wherewith the world did abound , should be therein commodiously cured . the first was to be for those foolish people who throw away their estates , waste their wits , and lose their reputations in seeking for the philosophers stone ; fools that are indeed to be pittied , for whom all good people ought to pray : the second for those ignorant hiddy giddy people , who data opera seek for riches by exorcisms and inchantments . the third was for the cure of such idle fools , worthy of punishment : who not caring to know things past , by the reading of history , foolishly imagin they may arrive at the knowledg of foretelling things to come , by astrology . the fourth was for the advantage of such simple folks , who having wasted all their estates , and not having one farthing left , do notwithstanding still proudly boast of their noble families . the lxxix . advertisement . some princes of pernassus , having spent a great mass of wealth in a stinking sort of merchandise , and having thereby incurred great debts , are forced to profess themselves bankrupts , and to leave pernassus . in the exchange of pernassus , the most important bankruptship is discovered that ever hapned in the memory of man ; for it fell not out ( as usualy ) between private merchants , but between the most potent princes of this state , in so much as no payments of monies are made any where , and merchants refuse to pay letters of exchange , every one standing at a gaze till they see where this business will end , which hath drawn along with it the breaking of divers other merchants who were considerable . the rich indian fleet , almost wholly fraught with sugars , which entred some daies ago into the gulf of lepanto , was the cause of these so many disorders . some of the chief princes of pernassus bought all the sugar , which brought in great store of money ; and then they provided many magazines and ware-houses , and made great provisions of cauldrons , and other brass vessels , and were at such an expence with all this , as they took up monies at huge high interest from merchants at all marts by exchange and bartering . the true end of these princes was to know for certain , whether they could happily compass the difficult business of preserving turds , a business which had been formerly endeavoured by many great men , but still unfortunately : many rich lords were so resolved upon the undertaking of this stinking occupation , as they neither spared for cost nor labour to bring this their stinking designto their desired end , for they put all their minnions , hephestion , idols , flatterers , and bawds into the great caldrons which they had prepared , to whom they were not ashamed to pay all the most abject and base slavery and obedience . these unfortunate confectioners cover over this scum of people which are so fatal to men of power , with the sugar of honourable imployments , and highest dignities : and though it was clearly seen , that by reason of their stinking lewd conditions , they did not only not become ever a whit the sweeter in merit and vertue , but the more sugar was heaped upon them by those unfortunate princes , the more they stunk in the nostrils of men of honour , yet did they daily persist the more in that their woful occupation , and the obstinacy of those ill advised princes was so fatal , as the worser they found their business to proceed , the more did their diligence and expences increase , together with the impossibility and shame of the fowle undertaking ; those foolish merchants did still beleeve , that the infinite quantity of sugar and fragrant musk had power to make the stink of those their shameful favorites sweet and odoriferous . but at last , though late , they found their business impossible to be effected : and having consumed all their sugar they were aware that those their idols had not only shamefully infected theircourts by their insufferable stench , but had infinitely defamed them , who for want of caution had doated upon so unsavory carrion ; wherefore they quit the enterprise ; and because the moneys which they had taken up at use , were already grown due , for fear of their creditors , they have all played least in sight ; and the more to aggravate so great a disorder , we hear that a great king , who that he might confectionate a base minnion of his was for certain the first who advised to this miserable merchandize , fell unfortunately off horseback as he fled away , and is since dead . his majesty was very much troubled at these disorders , and to hinder the like inconveniences for the future , hath commanded , that on the first day of august ( a remarkable day , since not only the universal banckrupt , but the death of that great king hapned on that day ) so sad a misfortune should be publickly commemorated , and if the example of so great a monarch could not deter powerful men from the like undertaking , it must be granted that this calamity was occasion'd through the same weakness of brain , by which privat men are blinded , and for avarice undo themselves in pursuit of the philosophers stone . the lxxx . advertisement . certain prime politicians of pernassus pray the ottoman monarchy to tell them the true reason why she makes short war with her enemies , and are by her satisfyed . menante , who for the better satisfaction of his customers to whom he sends his weekly gasetta's , is very diligent in prying into the very secretest passages of pernassus , having discovered the other day that some politicians of this court desired audience of the ottoman monarchy , was so watchful , as when they went to that mighty queen , he went along with them in company ; and heard scipio decastro , whom those politicians call their file-leader , beseech her majesty that she would vouchsafe to acquaint those politicians , that were with him , with the true reason wherefore she makes but short war with the princes who are her enemies , even when she was victorious , and certain to make greater acquisitions , and did prosecute others even to their uttermost ruine . i have heard that the ottoman monarchy did after no barbarous manner answer them ; you must know gentlemen , that i never use to lay down arms , when i make war against nations , which though never so great , are divided into several principalities , wherein i finde discord and faction to reign , till i have totally conquered them : as i did in the grecian empire , whose division into several despoters , and the intestine discord which reigned amongst them , did i confess , throw open the gates unto me , and made way for my acquisition of that famous empire . likewise when i go against a prince who is abandoned by his friends , i never make peace with him till i have fully conquered him ; as was cleerly seen in the expedition which i made against the soldan of chaire . but when i fall upon aprince whom either through his own power , or the adherence of his friends , i know i cannot utterly ruine in a short time , i use to make but short war with him , and that out of many important reasons . for knowing that it is a great piece of folly to desert ones own country , out of hopes to conquer what belongs to another man , and infinitely detesting the opinion , that lesser armies , provided they be well disciplined , are fitter for war , then huge vast hosts of men , ( an opinion which i hold to be wholly erroneous , as that which hath brought many princes to utter desolation ) and loving onely the secure though costly way of overcoming by an unexhaustible multitude of souldiers , if i should make war long in a province , i must so sack the cities and people thereof , as i must lay it wholly waste ; so as to the end that the subjugated people may in time of peace recover the losses which they have suffered by war , i use to grant peace unto them , upon any little acquisition of state that i have made . moreover , i make short war with my enemies , to the end that i may enjoy that great benefit which ascertains all enterprises , of assayling weak people with my veteran souldiers , and such as are ignorant in matter of militia , i content my self with having made my self master of some little part of their country , for that when they shall be by their long training up in wars accustomed to war-faring , and become fit not onely to defend that part of their country which yet remains unto them , but to recover what they have lost , i endeavour to make peace with them ( which is usually desired by those who fight against a more powerful enemy ) upon the best conditions that i can . and know , that this my advisedness is of such importance , as i may boldly say , it is from thence that i acknowledge the best part of my greatness ; for no purchase , how great soever it be , can justly be compared to the great loss which a prince undergoes , when by many years obstinate war , he inures his enemy to be a warriour . and in the wars which i have had of late with the emperors of the house of austria , i have been contented to gaul them a little , and have not utterly subdued them , not onely out of the aforesaid reason , of not inuring the germans , and hungarians to war , who are valiant people , bred up in wars , and naturally given to thirst after the hazard thereof , but for that i have by long experience found at last , that the dilating of empires lies not , ( as many foolishly believe ) in over-running many provinces in one year , but in taking some few , and in making those sure . for as much as eating is not requisite for making a man fat , so the aggrandising of states depends not upon making of infinite acquisitions , but the making of a man fat , and the dilating of empires consist wholly in little eating , and in good digestion , and this not without good reason . for to maintain states whichare newly gotten , by power and arms , is a very laborious business , and even then very hard when the conquered nation is weak . for the change of a natural prince for a forraigner ▪ chiefly when he is of a differing religion and nation , is so hateful a burthen to people , as they cannot accustom themselves to bear it without much difficulty . but it is exceeding difficult to keep a state newly won , which is inhabited by stout and warlike m●…n , nay even then when being utterly vanquished , and their prince lost , they know not to vvhat or to vvhom to betake themselves . but vvhen one hath possest himself of a province belonging to a povverful prince , who wants not onely forces to defend what he is yet master of , but to regain what he hath lost , all that is gotten is of hard digestion , and almost impossible to be kept . but as all sorts of meat , though never so hard of digestion , concoct well when they are moderately eaten ; so acquisitions made of warlike people , and whose ancient prince lives still in power and greatness , ought to be small ones , to the end that they may be easily digested , and that people that are subjugated may of enemies be made friends , and of strangers , natural subjects . moreover i use to make but short war with a prince , whose ruine tending to the depression of other powerful princes , may occasion too much state-jealousie , and for this onely reason i did not continue the war which i made last against the house of austria in hungary ; for the jealousie of losing vienna , which is accounted theout-bulwark of germany and italy , might certainly have drawn upon me the joynt forces of the empire of germany , and of the princes of italy : and the great error which i committed in my unfortunate taking of the island of cyprus , made me know the danger that i may undergo by the christian leagues ; for for one island which i may call a desart , i lost by the naval rout which was given me at the battel of lepanto my reputation at sea , which god knows when i shall recover ; a loss which hath done me more harm then seven kingdoms of cyprus can do me good . these gentlemen thanked the ottoman monarchy , who wisht them upon any occurrency , that they would freely demand of her whatsoever they desired , for she would willingly give them all satisfaction ; saying that they understood the theory of policy which was learnt by books , and that she , though ignorant of letters , might boast she was able to read in the schools that good and sound practical policy , which was learnt by the governing of states , and managing of arms. the lxxxi . advertisement . the vertuosi of pernassus , after having paid in the accustomed donative of a milli●…n of conceits to his majesties treasurer , according to their wont , ask a favour of him . those who exactly understand the affairs of this state , know that the vertuosi of pernassus do not onely pay into the exchequer , the tythe of all the fruits of their wits , but a tax which is laid upon every one according to his talent . whence it is that ovid pays in to the publike receivers , yeerly eight elegies , virgil fourscore heroick verses , horace five odes , martial eleven epigrams , and others according as they are taxed . moreover the vertuosi do every year by name of a donative ( yet such a donative as if it be not willingly given , may without the loss of its modest title , be levyed out of their goods by the serjeants , and sold by the candle ) pay in into the delphick treasury a million of conceits , which are after liberally distributed by the muses to the meaner sort of the literati , who wanting invention , deserve assisting for the meer love which they bear to learning ; and upon this so large a donative , his majesty is pleased to grant his vertuosi some such gracious favors as they are permitted to demand . so as the last week after the donative was prepared , the vertuosi resolved in a general assembly to beg seven boons of apollo , which were all put in a scedule which was to be presented unto him . but the polisht class●…s of politicians told them , that upon occasion of demanding graces from a prince out of merit , they must shun the error of demanding many things ; not onely for that princes , who do quickly take distaste when they are to acquit themselves of an obligation , era annoyed at the demand of many favours , but for that it always falls out that he who asks many things , is rewarded with the slightest . that therefore in such a case it were wisely done to beg but one onely boon , provided it were of moment , which upon such an occasion could not be denyed by the prince without a mark of much ingratitude . the politicians advice was much commended by the whole colledge of vertuosi , and was followed by them . wherefore the next day bernardino biscia , and tiberio cerasi , the vertuosi's aadvocates , were sent unto his majesty , who when they had presented apollo with the donative , did humbly beseech him , that in chusing judges for his courts of justice , and other officers for publike magistracy , he would be pleased to chuse men of a benign nature , of a courteous genius , humble spirit , and patient minde ; and that he would send certain hyteroclical , bankrupts , phantastical , proud , insolent men , who were so arrant beasts , as did more vex and grieve those miserable men who had suits at law , by their discomposed phantastical brains , then the suits themselves did ; to be boatsons and auditors in the galleys , where they might ercise their vexatious talents of wit amongst slaves , which were so unsupportable to free-born men . the lxxxii . advertisement . the arcadians being up in arms against their prince for certain new taxes imposed upon them , he wisely appeaseth them by delivering up unto them , him who had perswaded him thereunto . the prince of arcadia , a prince who was much beloved and reverenced by his people , was perswaded some months ago by a wicked projecter to impose some new gabels upon his people , who after having complained bitterly to their prince against this projector , and desired that he might be banished the state as a most pernicious person , and that the gabels imposed by his advice might be taken away , finding that their petitions were without any fruit , and that whilst they bore respect unto their prince , their grievances were increased by the greedy tax-takers , their patience being overcome , turned into such fury ( as it always falls out when superiors seem not to value or care for the peoples complaints ) as taking up arms , and all of them publikely rebelling , they resolved to remedy their inconveniencies by disorders . they fell furiously first upon the collectors of these new gabels , and then their sedition increasing , they besieged the prince in his castle , whither for his greater safety he had withdrawn himself ; nor satisfyed with all this insolency , they threatned worser mischief if they did not quickly receive the satisfaction which they desired . in the midst of these troubles the prince consulted with those whose judgements he most relyed upon , whether it were less shameful for him to seek his safety by flight , or to appease the people by anulling the new gabels . when the news of this insurrection , and the princes intention of quieting those tumults with so much infamy to himself , was known by some of his neighboring princes , who very well knew that their interest were concerned in this arcadian insurrection , they suddainly with their whole courts betook themselves to arms , and getting on horseback , entred the castle , where they found the prince of arcadia , who just then made the edict for revocation of these gabels be published . these princes earnestly desired him that he would neither injure nor shame himself nor his neighbours so much as to be discouraged at this the peoples insurrection , for it would be too scandalous an example to the subjects of his other neighbour princes , when it should be known that the people of arcadia having rebelled against their prince by reason of taxes , they had through fear and force of arms caused him to revoke them . that therefore to the loss of his last drop of blood he should defend that his authority which other princes had kept unviolated among a much greater and more dreadful people ; and amidst a thousand dangers had so long continued their subjects grievances , taxes , and gabels , as there not being any man alive that can truly say he ever knew any of them taken off , even those which were at first sessed but for a limited time , were by all nations thought to be immortal . they told him likewise , that he was to consider that the common people which are ensatiable in all their desires , by the bad example of taking away these new gabels might grow so bold as to demand the abolishment of the old ones . all which things did upon this urgent occasion admonish him to appease the incensed people by the usual remedy which had been with good success practised by great princes , of d●…livering up the first inventer of those gabels into the peoples power , to the end that by his ruine who had advised the mischief , the tumult might be quieted ; a remedy which they said was so much the more certain , for that the common people who take up arms upon like occasions resemble dogs , which when they bark violently at any one , were appeased by the satisfaction of biting a stone which had been thrown at them , and had hurt them . the prince of arcadia answered these princes , that he very well knew the counsel which they gave him was good , but that he thought it too unjust . to which one of them replyed , that in extremities a man must have courage enough to know how to use corrosives for cankers . the prince of arcadia did then imbrace the propounded proposition , and immediately caused publike proclamation to be made throughout all his country , that he being seduced by this wicked projector , was pleased that his beloved people who thought themselves so highly injured by him , should take what revenge they pleased of that sedicious fellow . and soon after the inventer of those grievances was delivered into the power of those inraged people , who first with their teeth , then with their hands , and lastly with all sort of arms did so deal with him , as having made more pieces then one of him , they dragged him in triumphant manner through all the streets of the city . the which being done , the prince opened the castle gates , and was thanked by all the people , who ran joyfully to kiss his hands for the satisfaction , which he had given them ; and he taking them all into his favor , continued in the peaceful receiving of those his new taxes , which were willingly payed by the people , they being satisfyed with that revenge : so proper is it to the common people inragedly to bite the dart which hath wounded them , and affectionately to kiss the hand that threw it . the lxxxiii . advertisement . marcus portius cato whilst he reprehends salustius crispus for flattering the emperour tiberius , is severely taxt by him for being too obstinate . all that come to this court do infinitely wonder , why marcus portius cato , a personage so famous as he is celebrated and exalted even to the skyes by all writers for his austere manners , integrity of life , wisdom , and for his excessive love , which he hath always shewed to his country , is not held in so high esteem by his majesty , as so cryed up a subject seems to deserve : for though from the first day that he entred pernassus he hath ever aymed at honorable imployments , yet could he never obtain any : nay the best literati of this court , who do exceedingly favor him , have cleerly found a resolution in his majesty , by no means to make use of such a man. the reason of this apollo's aversion , forasmuch as is said by them who are quickest sighted , is , for that apollo having well examined cato's minde and genius , his majesty holds him to be but an impetuous , proud , impertinent fellow , a capricious wit of the first head , one that means well , but judges ill , and one who is all zeal , crusted up in imprudency ; which qualities are very hateful to apollo , who thinks it very ill done to bestow publike imployments upon such companions , as ought onely to be conferred upon men civilly behaved , and upon such as are so far from giving distaste to any who have business , as they know it chiefly becomes them to give at least satisfactory words to all men . this cato hapned to be present two days ago , when salustius crispus , one of tiberius his intimate servants , did not onely openly flatter his master , but to the end that he might obtain some very chief place , had humbled himself to some of the most abject courtiers , but such as were well esteemed by the emperor : at which base action cato seemed to be so scandallized , as mightily reprehending salust ; he told him , that men ought to obtain places from their princes by deserts ; and that preferments obtained by the means of unworthy people , did not become men of worth ; and that his praising of tiberius , a man who was known to all the world to be so vitious , had purchast him as much blame , as he might have won praise by putting him in minde of his faults . to this reprehension salust without any the least alteration of minde , answered ; to be free spoken doth not always help , nor do men always win reputation thereby , as you believe ; and as it is folly to sow good seed in the sands , so all counsel is cast away when it is given to obstinate people , and where there is no hope of doing any good thereby . for suadere principi quod oporteat , multi laboris . assentatio ergo principem quemcumque sine affectu &c. tacit. lib. . hist. but upon such occasions as these , goodness , or honesty must be accompanyed with wisdom ; and who hath not wit enough to fit the sayles of his interest to every favourable wind that blows , is a fool if he sayle in the tempestuous sea of the court , wherein those obstinate men who cannot accommodate their wits to place , time , and persons , do either perish in their first voyage , or run hazard of dangerous tempests all their life time , without ever gaining the haven of their coveted desires . know cato , that they are pointed at by all men as great fools , who standing in need of other mens assistance , mar their business , onely because they will stand upon the punctilio of what is meet , and on the scruples of reputation . the greatest wisdom of a perfect courtier , consists in knowing how to fit himself to all humors ; without which it is impossible to come to any good in court : and he who attains to his desired greatness of obtaining a principal dignity or a great office , is much more admired by every one for the dignity whi●…h he possesseth , then undervalued for the means he used to come by it . every stain of honor which is committed for the bettering of a mans condition , is excellently well washt away , if he can make vertuous use of his new obtained honor. and to preach chastity ( as you do ) in bawdy-houses , or fasting in time of carnevale , is no better then to make musick to them that are deafe , or to light the blinde with torches . and of this which i say , i will crave no other testimony then your own , when in the roman commonwealth where you made publike profession of being chief corrector of the press , you did but badly govern your own private condition , without ever being able to better the publike affairs . the lxxxiv . advertisement . apollo having by a new edict inhibited poets to make use of any fabulous creature in their verses , at the fervent intreaties of the poets , his majesty revokes the said edict . four days since , the urban pretor of pernassus , publisht an edict in the usual places by sound of trumpet , and by order from apollo , that his majesty being resolved by no means to tolerate that men who should speak nothing but truths , should invent falshoods , and having heard that poets in their writings had mentioned tritons , basilisks , unicorns , sirens , hypogriffiks , phenixes , sphinxces , centaurs , and other animals , as realities , being creatures which mother nature did never create , and that many mischiefs arose from the publishing of such things ; understanding particularly that many notorious cheaters sold the unicorns horn at great rates to simple people , and the other aforesaid things , did by that his decree declare the aforesaid creatures and other things to be express lyes , meer fables , and poetical fictions . that therefore his pleasure was that poets should for the future forbear committing any such disorders , and that they should make use of nothing in their verses , save what was really produced by nature , upon pain of being banisht pernassus . the capricious poets were scandalized at this news , wherefore they assembled themselves suddainly together in their academy , where by common consent they chose sannezzarro for their spokesman to request the revocation of that edict which was so prejudicial to their poetry . sanezzarro presented himself forthwith before the pretor , complaining bitterly , that in an age which did so abound in lyes the vertuous inventions of poets should onely be forbidden , a thing the more worthy consideration , for that by exempting the invention of all fabulous things from their poems , the very soul thereof was taken away . and that the poets , who had always been obedient to all his majesties commands , would willingly submit to the rigor of this edict , if it were made universal . that it was very well known that infinite things , yea which much commendeed encomiums , were named for truths by both the meanest , and best literati of pernassus , which were no where to be found ; and that it would be as acceptable as useful to declare them to be false . the pretor wisht sanezzarro freely to name those things , which were with admiration named for truths in pernassus , and yet were false ; for apollo who was no respecter of persons , would assuredly make them be put into the same edict . then said sanezzarro , uninteressed men , people who love the publike good better then their own private affairs , officers who are not slaves to their passions , princes who are not ambitious of coveting what belongs to other men , are publikely said to live by thousands and thousands in the world , and yet it is better known to apollo then to any other , whether any such phenixes be to be found in egypt , arabia , or in any other part of the earth ; that therefore if his majesty would insert these chimera's into his edict , and make the law general , poets would have no just cause of complaint . this being said , the pretor went presently to apollo , and acquainted him with sanezzarro's desire ; who did so much wonder at the request made by sanezzarro , as he said these very words to the pretor . now i perceive the poets have reason for their complaint , and that my edict is not universal , therefore revoke it without more ado : for i will rather take the shame upon my self , to let my literati know , that i was inconsiderate in the publication of this edict , then shame all mankind by making it know that men absolutely uninteressed are meerly fabulous . the lxxxv . advertisement . giovangirolimo aquaviva , haveng overcome a very great difficulty , is with much honor admitted into pernassus . in the assembly of the vertuosi which was held for that purpose on thursday last , the credential letters brought by a gentleman who was sent to this court from signior givangirolimo aquaviva duke of atri , were read ; who afterwards delivering his embassie , did in very handsome language desire that the duke his master might be admitted into pernassus ; and in the same assembly the good deserts of the said duke were diligently examined , and maturely discust , and this noble duke being found to be very well verst in all the liberal sciences and arrived at the height of excellency in the mathematicks ; by his majesties express order who was ever very partial to this noble family , wherein learning seems rather to be hereditary , then purchas'd by long study , was created superintendent of the triangles and lineatore maggiore di euclide : after this the wonted cavalcata was decreed unto him , and being accompanyed by the lord poets , and the other learned princes of fruitful parthenope , with many of their servants in rich liveries , the shew was very noble , and worthy so deserving a prince ; but the greatest wonder was , to see the duke discourse a long time with homer , and pindarus not making use of valla , or any other interpreter , certainly a very glorious action in these times , and which purchas'd the duke the more glory , for that the vertuosi of pernassus did consisider that this princes learning was of the very finest sort which makes them so much respected who are therewith indued . nor did he this out of necessity to eat bread , nor to make use of it ( as many do ) for a patrimony , but onely that , though he was born of noble blood , and very rich , he might not be thought an ignorant plebeian , and an unlearned begger : for this prince always held that perfect nobility , and true riches did onely consist in vertue . the duke was already come with his noble cavalcata into the via sacra , when it was made known unto him in his majesties name , by a publike messenger , that he must return back , for there was so great an impediment found in him , as by vertue of the pegasean pragmatical law he could not be admitted into pernassus . upon this unfortunate news il rota , il tansillo , and many other neapolitan poets of the first classis , hasted to apollo , and understood that the impediment arose , for that the illustrious octavius cardinal aquaviva , when he was prelate in the court of rome , had exercised the place of maistre d'hostelle under pope gregory the fourteenth , and that since it was known in pernassus , that the formerly stately courts of princes , through the tricks and inventions of beggerly mastre d'hostels were infected with the sordid contagion of foul avarice , it was enacted by a very severe edict , that for the future , not onely such as had exercised the hateful office of maistre d'hostelle in princes courts should never be admitted into pernassus , but that all that descended from them , or were any ways allyed unto them , even to the fortieth degree , should be for ever excluded . the duke was very much troubled at this unfortunate rub ; but having known that edict long before , he had foreseen the difficulties , which he might meet withal in pernassus , so as to remove away all obstacles , he took a letter out of his bosom written with his own hand unto his son , wherein he did expresly forbid him to accept of that place ; but the business of maistre d'hostel is so odious in this court , as the letter in justification of the duke , was not read , nor any ways taken into consideration ; and now the business grew desperate , and the cavalcata began to return backwards , when cesare caporale a poet , who having been greatly obliged to the house of aquaviva , hasted to apollo , to whom he largely attested , that signior octavio , as he was nobly minded , so had he always lived in a liberal manner , and that he was not made maistre d'hostelle by that free handed pope for having a narrow soul , and given to getting , but onely that by the dignity of that so honorable a degree , he might shew him to be a person fit to be made a cardinal , as it soon after fell out ; and that whilst he did discharge that place , he studyed nothing more then how to feed the vertuosi plentifully , to protect the literati , and to reward those that deserved well ; a piece of generosity , wherin he did always shew such liberality and greatness , as finding that certain roguish butlers , mingled water with wine in the popes cellar , he commanded by a severe and noble edict , which even to this day is punctually observed , that it should not be lawful for any one for the future to have any water in those cellars . apollo was so well pleased with this decree , as he commanded that it should be written in large letters of gold by croessis that famous millanese scribe and chief writer of text-hand , in the delphick library , and that for the honor and glory of the famous family of the aquavive , and for the dukes reputation who had inriched the present age with so deserving a son , it should be carryed before him in the cavalcata , which was the noblest and most admired thing that was seen therein : and to compleat the dukes contentment , and the splendor of his house , his majesty decreed the title of mecenas to signior octavio cardinal aquaviva , and sent it him by an express messenger yesterday in forma dignum . the lxxxvi . advertisement . the duke of laconia to revenge himself by way of law upon a chief senator of state for some private distastes that he had taken at him , commanded fleminio cartaro , his iudge of assize , to proceed severely against him upon some heads which he would give him , and he denyes to obey him . the duke of laconia to take revenge for some distastes which he pretended to have received from a chief senator of his state , began under other pretences to trouble him at law ; and having made him be imprisoned , he commanded flaminio cartaro one of his judges of assize , to make severe process against him , and gave him some heads in writing , whereupon to examine him . cartaro when he had considered the quality of the person against whom he was to proceed , and the faults which were pretended to be laid to his charge , easily perceived that the duke would vent his private rage of hatred against that so signal personage , by colour of justice . and thinking it misbecame a man of his place to serve as a minister to other mens passions , and knowing that the purchase of unjust princes favors by the shedding of innocent blood would soon be severely vindicated both by god and man ; rather then to stain his reputation by so foul an action , put on that generous resolution , which ought to be imitated by all judges in the like case ; he escaped by night out of laconia , and some six days ago came to this court. the duke of laconia as soon as he heard cartaro was fled , and knew what way he took , sent forthwith two embassadours to apollo , who earnestly desired his majesty that for weighty state-interest cartaro might be kept forthcoming , and sent back to their prince . apollo who before he would take any resolution , would know the truth of the business from cartaro's self , caused him to be immediately sent for , and before the embassadors asked him the reason of his so sudden and secret flight from laconia . who plainly and very particularly acquainted apollo with the truth of what had hapned between him and the duke of laconia , and then added , that had it been in an hereditary state , he would in giving judgement have obeyed his princes will ; but that in an elective principality , as was that of laconia , where brevi momento summa verti possunt , tacit. lib. . annal. and where in the twinkling of an eye , he might command in chief , who did formerly obey , and where new princes are usually either of a differing genius , or contrary factions to the former , when a prince , say it be not out of private hatred , but justly doth vex any great officer , he should not finde either judges , advocates , or serjeants ready to serve him . for new princes , who commonly do not approve of their predecessors actions , when they cannot cudgel the ass ( the dead prince ) vent all their rage and fury upon the pack-saddle ( the judge whom they have in their power ) and that in faults committed by great men , and executed by those that are meaner , the known proverb was very true , that the weakest went to the wall ; for it was not onely the custom of angry dogs , but even of judicious men , to revenge themselves upon the stone , when they cannot come by the arm that threw it : and that this his doctrine was so true , as he could give them the example of a famous doctor of castel bolognese , who was forced to feel the tempest of that rage , which was not possible to shower down upon those great dogs , which had good teeth to bite withal . the lxxxvii . advertisement . some princes of this state having presented apollo with a book of the reason of state , the vertuosi of pernassus not approving of the definition of state therein given , publish a new one , which was very much displeasing to those princes . the greatest princes of this court , did with general applause present apollo two days ago with a book which treated of the reason of state : and press'd very much , that as being a very meritorious work it might be put into the delphick library . apollo who knew very well how much princes abhor those writings , which treating of state-affairs , discover their souls , fashions , and inward intentions to the meaner sort of men , wondered very much when he saw it was greatly desired by them that the book might be published to the world ; and as it commonly falls out in such like cases , he sorely suspected , lest these princes might in such a business hide some private ends of their own ; whereupon according to the practice of this court , the book was assigned over to the library censors , who did the more diligently consider it , for that they likewise did apprehend some cheat , which they soon found out . they therefore told his majesty the next day , that those princes did so highly celebrate the book of the reason of state which they had presented unto him out of self-interest ; for nothing being treated of therein but the politicks in genere , there was no mention made therin of that reason of state which the title promised ; and that reason of state being of the politicks , the author of the book had craftily , ( and peradventure bribed so to do by the princes ) given it the specious definition which belongs to the whole body of the politicks ; saying , that the reason of state was the knowledge of fitting means to ground , maintain , and inlarge a state ; by which gilded definition they endeavoured to make the reason of state appear to be a good thing , which learned men , and such as did more fear god , then flatter princes , freely termed the devils law. apollo did infinitely dislike the falshood used by that author , and immediatly gave order , that the title of reason of state should be taken from that book ( which otherwise was very elegantly written , ) and that of the politicks , put in the place of it : at which , the princes were infinitly displeased ; when not long after , one mightily cried up for his skill in the politicks , did with excellent reasons refute the former erroneous definition of the reason of state , and gave it publickly another definition ; which was , that the reason of state was a law useful for commonwealths , but absolutely contrary to the laws , both of god and man. a definition which being written in letters of gold , and afterwards affixed upon the columns of the peripatetick porch , was approved of by all the literati for as absolutely true , as the other was in extremity false . the princes , who thought that this new definition was published onely to put a scorn upon them , were so highly incensed , as some of them moved to take up arms against the literati , and to end that important business with sword in hand ; but the wiser sort did mollifie the rage of the more capricious , and did joyntly present themselves before apollo , where lewis the twelfth , that famous king of france , speaking to his majesty in the name of all the other princes , complained , that a definition was given to the reason of state , by the literati , which was very wicked ; which if his majesty should not soon recal , their states should be put into confusion . apollo answered king lewis , that he did from that time forward declare the definition given lately by his vertuosi to the reason of state , to be utterly scandalous , and wicked ; but that to provide against the evil which so free a definition might occasion amongst their subjects , it was not a good remedy to cloake it over with fair words , as the author of the book had done ; for mischiefs were not cured by concealing ; and that he and all the rest of the princes would confess the definition to be true , which they seemed so much to dread , if they would call to mind , that when they did any thing , which for the impiety thereof , did neither agree with the laws of god , nor man , if they were afterwards asked by any one why they had done so impious a thing ; they were ready to alleadge the reason of state for the occasion thereof . then turning to lewis the twelfth , apollo said ; the better to manifest the truth of what i say , to your self , and to all these princes which are here present , i will make use of one of your actions , which will make it appear clearly , that the definition of state , published by my literati , and which you do now so much oppugn , is very true . you know , your first wife was sister to charles the eighth , your predecessor in the kingdome of france ; and i know , you likewise remember that you did adhere to the conspiracy made by francis duke of burgundy , by charles duke of burgundy , and by many other great lords , against the kingdome of france , and that you were taken prisoner by king charles your sisters husband ; and that whilst the putting of you to death as a rebel was in agitation , your wives efficacious prayers was that which saved your life . you know likewise , that charles being dead a little while after , you succeeded him in his kingdom , and that you might marry the queen dowager , wife to the late charles , you got to be divorc'd from your former wife , which you excused by pretending that your marriage with so great a princess was done by compulsion ; as if there needed violence to marry the sister of so great a prince to any one ; you your self know lewis , that this divorce was neither answerable to the laws of god nor man : tell me then what was the reason that moved you to banish that wife your bed , to whom you confess you owe your life . king lewis freely answered apollo , that doubtless it was the reason of state that had compelled him so to do ; for the queen dowager of france having in her , the noble dowry of the dukedome of britany , he had marryed her , to the end that that province which was of so great importance , and from which france had formerly received so much mischief , should not again be disunited from his kingdom . see then said apollo , how you made that marriage which you knew did neither agree with the laws of god nor man , being forced to do so by reason of state ; by which example , you and all these princes may cleerly see that the definition made by my literati of the reason of state is most true ; now then since you are convinced of the foul impiety thereof , know that the best means that you can and ought to use to keep your self and your state from being damnifyed thereby , is , not to use it , for it is too bare-faced hypocrisie to seem more to abhor fould words , then foul deeds . the lxxxviii . advertisement . marcantonio moreto desires apollo that he may have leave to make an oration in the publike schooles of pernassus in the praise of the clemency of the most glorious king of france , henry the fourth , but is denyed it . mercantonio moreto a famous french orator , told apollo some few days since , that having exactly examined all the vertues of all the french kings , and compared them with the valor and glory of king henry the fourth , he found that there was not any of them that might be compared to him ; and that to make the french adore so gallant a king , and to incite all christian princes to heroick vertue , he desired his majesty to give him leave to declame in the praise of so glorious a king publikely in the rhetorick school : and because to speak of all the vertues which did abound in so great a king , would require more then a months space to do it ; to the end that his oration might not exceed the usual time of one hour , he would onely celebrate that admirable vertue of clemency , which was so peculiar to his henry , as that he cleerly found , by the use thereof he had so far exceeded all humane mansuetude , as that he bordered upon heavenly mercy : for he had pardoned such injuries in his most implacable enemies , as would never have been forgotten by any one save by a king of france ; a vertue which appeared to be so much the more eminent in that great monarch , for that in these so corrupt present times , to pardon injuries vvas not thought to be an heroick and vertuous action , but base and abject covvardise . the same moreto told every one , that contrary to vvhat he could ever have believed , apollo vvas highly incensed at that his request , and that with an angry countenance he said , he was grosly ignorant in going about to celebrate the most revengeful and implacable k. that did ever live for his mercifulness : and that if he would praise the infinite valor of henry the fourth his invincible constancy in adverse fortune , moderation in prosperity , his excellent knowledge in military affairs ( wherin he had far exceeded all kings and commanders who had ever purchased the glorious name of warlike ) the more then humane vivacity of his spirit , the vigilancy of his indefatigable minde , or his dexterous government of that great kingdom , he nor his literati , who were partially addicted to so puissant a king , could not hear any more melodious harmony : but that since that noble acquisition which he made of france , he had revenged himself much more cruelly upon his enemies , then merciless augustus had done by his execrable proscription ; & that pernassus was no place to exaggerate falshoods in : notwithstanding this so resolute answer , moreto was not discouraged , but with great observancy replyed ; that having exactly considered all the vertues of his king , he did again affirm unto his majesty that he found not that any one of them did shine more brightly in him then his clemency . then apollo looking with a very pleasant countenance upon moreto , said , t is plainly seen thou honest french man , that thou art onely a meer grammarian , for thou seemest not to know that that king onely ought not to be vindicative , who ( as did augustus ) kills his enemies when he hath conquered them ; for to take an evil wishers life away , to the end that he may not see his enemies triumphs and prosperity ; to the end that he may not suffer a thousand torments and deaths hourly , is a kind of pitty . he is to be accounted revengeful , and infinitely cruel , who suffers him to live , who confounds him with pardon , and who doth continually martyrise and torment him by his worthy actions and perpetual prosperity , as yours and my beloved henry hath been observed to do more then all the kings that ever were on earth ; who still growing more and more cruel , by his perpetual felicity , by shewing to the world his justice , liberality , advisedness , and great piety ; did still the more afflict those his enemies , who that they might render him odious to his people of france , did openly affirm , that if ever he should come to be king of that powerful monarchy , he would surely prove the utter and final ruine thereof . and how much did it grieve the enemies of so great a king thinkest thou moreto , when they saw his victory compleated , and his fortune confirmed by his own worth , and valor ? and with what an eye thinkest thou they did behold him conqueror , triumphing , and not onely adored , but reverenced by his people , according to the ancient custom of france ? so glorious , as the very first day that he mounted the throne , he became the absolute arbitrator of the world . dost not thou believe it did much more grieve these mens hearts to see the king of navar , whose suppression they had so much indeavoured , become the most glorious king of france , then when they thought themselves surest of his down-fall ? and then confirmed in his kingdom by so plentiful an issue , as they are forced to confess they were sent him by heaven ? dost not thou believe moreto , that these his malevolents esteem so great happiness , such prosperity given by god to this our king , to be their shame and misery ? they are perpetually tortured , who for their greater confusion are suffered to live , being forced to see the halcyon days of this powerful kingdom of france . the lxxxix . advertisement . a literato presents apollo with an oration made by him in praise of the present age : which is laid aside byish majesty , as not grounded upon any truth . some few daies since a famous literato presented apollo with an eloquent oration composed by him in praise of the present age , wherein he clearly shewed how much of latter times goodness , godliness , and all sorts of vertue are increased in the world , and concluded , that from such excellent beginnings , mankind might securely hope , that that happy . golden age so cry'd up by the poets , was now very nigh at hand . this literato and his oration found but cold acceptance at apollo's hands ; and being asked whether he had so well considered the age which he had so highly praised , as he ought to have done , and with what spectacles he had viewed and contemplated it , he answered , that he had not only viewed the courts of a great many famous princes , the most accurately that he could , but had travailed over the greatest part of europe , in all which courts and countries he had diligently observed the lives of those who commanded in chief , and their fashions who obeyed , and that he had observed nothing in them which was not highly to be praised ; and that then in passing his judgement upon all the particulars of the present age , which appeared to him to deserve praise , he , not aiding himself by any spectacles , made only use of the eyes of his judgement , which he thought were not dim sighted . apollo reply'd , that surely he had written that his oration in the dark , for that the true state of the present age , the true intimate intentions of those that govern in it , and the real meanings of those that live in it , could not be seen , no not by linceus's eyes , unless a man did put the purest politick spectacles upon his nose , whereby he might see the truth of passions , which lay deeply hid in the breasts of modern men ; who were so mysterious in all their proceedings , as their inward meanings appeared least outwardly . which being said , apollo caused a pair of excellent spectacles to be given to that literato , which were lately made in tacitus his forge , and bad him view the present age through them , and then tell him whether it appeared to be the same which he had so exalted in his oration . the other obey'd , and after having well contemplated and considered the age through those spectacles ; sir , said he , that which i now see wi●…h these spectacles , is not the age wherein we now live , but a world full of ostentation , and outward appearance , with very little substance of true vertue , where an infinite number of men are lined with feigned simplicity , clad with the false alchumy of appearing goodness ; but full fraught with cosenage , tricks , and plots , where nothing is more studied , then how to over-reach ones companion , and to hurl his neighbour into the hell of wicked enterprises , by false pretence of sanctified meanings . i see a world full of interest , in which i cannot discern charity , and candid love between the father and the son ; and by these miraculous spectacles i plainly see , that the world is nothing but a large shop , where all things under the moon are bought and sold ; so as the true meaning of men that live therein , is meer gain , and how to heap up monies ; and in fine , the world is so ugly , as it is hateful to me to keep these spectacles on my nose ; for certainly mankind might be truely termed miserable , if our present age , which i have deservedly praised in my oration , were in any the least degree like this which i behold . truely , said apollo , the world which you now have seen with these politickspectacles , is the very same which you glory so much in having praised , where those who will pass their judgement without making use of these penetrating spectacles , are like those unfortunate wretches , who putting their hands into a hole to find a creafish , pluck out a toad . the xc . advertisement . christopher columbus , and other famous discoverers of the new world , desire apollo that immortality may be decreed them for their noble daring , but are denied it . christophano colombo , ferrante cortese , magelin pizzaro , gama , americo vespuchi , and many other famous discoverers of the new world , appeared two daies since in this court : never was there seen a more signal pleasing spectacle in pernassus , nor fuller of curiosity , then the entrata made by these gentlemen , who were met , accompanied , visited , welcomed , and lodg'd by the princely poets , with as much affection and honour as men deserve , who by their incessant labour , and numberless hazards , have inriched the universe with a new world. nor is it to be believed what consolation the vertuosi received , for having at last come to the clear and distinct knowledg of the quantity and quality of that great machine of the earth , which immortal god hath created to be an habitation for men : in so much as ptolomy , varro , and other cosmographers did very often visit these gentlemens houses ; not being able to satisfie their curiosity of seeing those parts of asia , africa , and whole america together with the cape of good hope , and the straits of magelen , which for so many thousand years were unknown to antiquity . astrologers have hardly satisfied their desires by the purchast knowledg which they had of the stars of the other pole. aristotle was greatly amazed when these gentlemen told him , that the torrid zone did not only not burn through the heat of the sun , as all philosophy-schools did hold affirmatively , but that it is rather too humid , and that it is inhabited by an infinite number of people : and it was a novelty which appeared to surpass all human miracles , to hear that the winters were there too cold and rainy , when the sun was perpendicular over the peoples heads : by which he clearly found how many falshoods he and other philosophers had published of the torrid zone , and how fallacious it was to give positive judgement , out of meer conjectures upon the wonders of the all powerful god miraculously fabricated ; and he was very much pleased to arrive at last at the knowledge of the true cause of the flowing of the river nile , whereof , together with many other philosophers , he remembred he had said many foolish things . seneca the tragedian made use of so great a novelty , arrived in pernassus to his immortal glory , boasting every where , that being inspired by divine poetical fury , he had by his famous verses foretold for above years ago so great a discovery : and some literati , who laughing at him , said that seneca in that his tragedy spoke but by guess , tasted of his majesties displeasure ; who thinking that the honour of the muses was much concern'd by that incredulity , made them inhabit for many daies amongst the ignorant . dantz aligieri won more glory , who had affirmatively held in his verses , that the antartick pole , which had never been seen by any in his daies , was un grand crosiero . these famous hero's had audience on tuesday last in the royal hall , where apollo was assisted by the muses , who were come thither out of a curiosity to see the faces of those men who had courage enough not to dread the incensed seas , and to plough them up ( though they were unknown unto them , and full of shelves and rocks ) even in the darkest and most tempestuous night . columbus , after having kist the last step of the royal throne , and the nethermost hem of the muses garment , and made low reverence to the colledg of literati , said in a stately oration for him and his companions , that the two glorious princes , ferdinand of aragon and isabella of castile having extirp'd the wicked mahometan sect from out the catholick kingdoms of spain , at the expence of much gold and bloud , god was resolved to gratifie them with a gift worthy of so great piety : and that therefore his divine majesty having debarred the courage and curiosity of men in former times from discovery of the new world , had reserved it to remunerate the zeal which he had discovered in those two famous and powerful princes , to his service ; who being born to propagate the holy christian religion amongst infidels , had piously caused it to be planted amongst those idolaters ; and that the ever living god having at last permitted men to make discovery of the new world , he himself first , and then those other famous pilats that were there with him , had so succesfully sailed over all the vast ocean , as after having discovered new and large provinces , and very rich kingdoms , they following the same source which his majesty had laboured so much in , from the east to the west , had compassed the whole world about . by which their fortunate fate , not only cosmography , astronomy , and the meteors , but even physick , and the other praise-worthy sciences had received singular advantage ; and that to boot with the curiosity of infinite diversity of customs and rites , newly discovered by them amongst incredible numbers of people : they had also inriched the old world with spices , and medicines excellently good for the life of man , and with such riches , as they had caused rivers of gold and silver to run throughout europe , and great store of pretious stones ; and that in reward for so great labours , they only desired that that eternal fame might be granted to them and to their memory , for the purchase whereof they had freely undertaken , and happily finished that which appeared so dreadful to men of former times . columbus's speech was attentively listned unto ; and it was immediately decreed by his majesty , that these so famous heroes should be preferred before the argonauts , and that the glorious ship-victory , with which mageline had first compassed the world , should be placed in heaven amongst the fixt stars , and that the names of so illustrious men should be ingraven with indilable characters in the tables of eternity , in the foro massimo . and whilst nicholas perinotto the delphick chief chancellor , held forth the decree that it might be the more binding , mario molza appeared in the royal hall , a cry'd up poet , but very deformed , as not having any hair either on his head or face , who was yet rendred more monstrous by his having no nose , his face full of gum and scabs , who pointing with his finger to his wounds , said with a lowd voice , these which you see , sir , in my face , are the new worlds , the new customs and rites of the indians ; these are the jewels , pearls , drugs , astrology , meteors , cosmography , these are the rivers of gold wherewith these new and unfortunate argonauts of the french pox , who are come into pernassus only to add scorn and derision to our mischiefs , have enriched and filled the world ; these are the new receits which they have brought with them to infect mankind with a disease so contagious , so cruel and shameful , as it is greatly disputed amongst the learned , whether it do more pollute the body , or shame reputation : these hair-braind men have enrich'd and beautified the world with these jewels wherewith you see my face blistered , and my body wounded ; these implacable enemies of mankind have corrupted the very generation of man. then turning towards colombo , molza began to unty his briches , but the muses , to keep their eyes from being contaminated with the sight of any obscenity , commanded the under officers to hinder him from so doing ; which molza perceiving ; i , said he , most divine dieties ; will shew no dishonesty in this august place , but the woful calamities , and miserable wounds brought by these men from their stately new worlds , which are unknown to all former physick and chyrurgery . and how , signor christophano , would you have men taste the odoriferousness of those aromaticks which you so much glory to have brought from the indies , if the french pox , wherewith you have so perfumed the world , be a capital enemy to the nose ? i know not with what face you can say , that god , to reward the merits of your potent princes , hath bestowed upon them the world which you have discovered , when it is much more true , that his divine majesty hath made use of you to transplant the pestiferous french pox , which is so sore a scourge to the libidinous , into europe . and how dare you say that you have enrich'd the world with drugs , if pepper , cynamon , and cloves cost thrice as much now as they did , before you did imbitter those dolci fichi , which i have so highly praised in my verses , with the arsnick , and nax vomica of those tortering plasters , and shameful incissions which i dare not name in this place ? and do you think that your having brought such quantity of gold and silver as you speak of , from the new world , into the old , can be termed our felicity , when our greatest happiness would have been , never to have been acquainted with any of those damn'd mettals which are the chief cause of all our evils ? but you and your companions may doubly glory , first for having put the old world into such confusion , with the great store of gold which you say you have brought with you , and then for having brought the new world to a final ruine , by introducing the sword . but what need hath europe of so much gold , since all things necessary for human life grow daily dearer , and the peoples poverty increaseth every day ? and not to conceal that which ought to make you odious to his majesty , and to all his vertuosi , it is not any thi●…st after honour , nor ( as you have falsely affirmed ) the desire of that glory which eternizeth mens memories , which hath eg'd you on to so dangerous and damnable an enterprise , but incited by avarice , spur'd on by ambition , and driven on by the thirsting after that gold which your country doth value so lightly , is that which made you rashly pass those hercules his pillars , which wise antiquity set for bounds to the insatiable curiosity of man ; and for proof of what i say , did not you , signor christophano , compel your kings of spain to pay your good deserts , by making you be brought prisoner from your judges , and fettered as a publick thief of the regal treasure ? and you , marquiss pizzaro , did not you play the trick of a special gentleman to antabalipa king of peru , in robbing him of the great store of gold which you found he had ? and fully to compleat your infamy , did not you rebel against the emperor your master ? an action so much the more shameful , for that such bruitishness is seldom seen to fall out amongst the spanish nobility . for these reasons , sir , and for the evil behaviour which these famous argonauts of torters have used to the indians , wrought off their legs in the forges of gold , are so far from receiving any favour from your majesty , as they ought to be cudgeled out of pernassus , as pernitious people , and fatal to mankind . molza's discourse appeared to apollo , and to the reverend colledg of literati , to deserve better consideration then did appear at the first ; wherefore colombo was answered in his majesties name , that he should take back the french pox , the gold and silver which he found in his judges , and that he and his companions should with all speed quit pernassus ; for that he had gained enough ; and because mans happiness consisted in living in a little world well inhabited by men , and not in being master of many great worlds , for the most part uninhabited by men , and only fraught with wild beasts . the xci . advertisement . sigismond king of polonia , prefers a paladine to the prime dignities of his kingdom , who proving perfidious , the polack nobility , thinking the publick reputation was concerned in this privat palatines misdemeanour , revenge themselves severely upon him . sigismund augustus , that famous king of poland , being strangely affectionate to one of the chief of his nobility , raised him to be the greatest , richest , and most powerful paladine of his kingdom ; but with bad success to his family : for this great personage , were it either through his particular vice of ingratitude , or for that the fatal destiny of princes will have it so , and that human mischief requires it , that benefits which for their immensity cannot be rewarded , should be paid with the wicked coyn of ingratitude ; or else that it be the particular defect of great men , to love ( like generous animals ) liberty above all things , and to hate being fettered by the chain of obligation ; when this paladine found that he could expect nothing more from the king , nor that the king could confer no more upon him ; he did not only not stick to shew himself manifestly ingrateful , but had the audacity to discover himself upon some important occasions , his deadly enemy . this man being stained with so enormous a fault , was found the night preceding , the of this present month , dead in his bed , stab'd through with many daggers : and a note was left upon his head , which advised the judge not to trouble any body concerning that fault , which the paladines of warsavia , of uratislavia , and of posna , confessed to have committed with their own hands , out of justifiable reasons . this accident , very hainous , as well in consideration of him that was slain , as of those that slew him , was of so much greater wonder in pernassus , in that the authors of so great a riot , were held to be the dearest and most intimate friends that the slain paladine had ; wherefore the aforesaid note was held to be fictitious ; but it was afterwards believed to be true by those paladines being retired into their own palatinates , who were that very day seen in pernassus . apollo , who much loves the peace of polonia , fearing lest it might be disturbed by so sad an accident , which had made the chief lords of that kingdom take up arms , caused peace immediately to be treated of between the murtherers , and the sons of him that was slain ; who out of such reverence as became them , signified unto his majesty , that to give him satisfaction , they would readily forget the injury which they had received by their fathers death ; but that to wipe the tears from off their eyes , and to cure their wounded hearts , they desired only so much satisfaction , as that their enemies might declare whether their miserable father had so much distasted those his friends , as did deserve so cruel a resentment ; this request seemed very reasonable to apollo , who immediately gave order that the delinquents should have notice given them thereof . they returned answer , that having long before observed the great ingratitude of that paladine towards the king his benefactor , they had often severely admonished him to forbear those actions , which did so much misbecome such a one as he was , but that all being in vain , the interest of the publick reputation of the polack nobility , had forced them with their daggers to revenge the injury which was thereunto done by this ungrateful person . when apollo had read this justification , 't is said he confest , that since many riotous excesses were committed out of good intentions , and meer punctilio's of honour ; judges and princes must some times not only bear with delinquents , but punish the offended , and afterwards sent the note of justification to the sons of the slain paladine ; who being more vertuously minded then was their father , came to apollo , and told him , that having considerately reflected upon their fathers demeanors towards his so well deserving king , and upon the occasion which had forced those paladines to bereave him of his life , they saw they were compelled to pardon the publick revenge which they had taken , for the so great offence done to the polack nobility ; and that they very well knew , that a noble man who had received great advantages by his princes munificence , if he should afterwards prove ungrateful , did so cut up even by the very roots , all hopes of greatness and honour , which the nobility of a great kingdom might deserve , as that any whatsoever cruel revenge was taken in that behalf deserved to be excused , if not justified : for that princes terrified by the shameful example of the ingratitude of noble personages , ought not to be blamed , when in the bestowing of their most eminent dignities , they sought for that gratitude amongst the meaner sort of people , which they feared they should not find in the haughty nobility . the xcii . advertisement . apollo having a notorious hypocrite in his hands , punisheth him severely . so implacable is the hatred which apollo bears to hypocrisie , as till he published that severe edict against them , of which you were fully informed by our late dispatches , he promised great rewards to those who would discover such devils to his judges . and having had certain notice of one of them some six daies ago , his majesty made him suddenly be laid hands on ; and causing him to be brought before him ▪ at the very first sight he knew him to be a compleat hypocrite ; wherefore having stript him of all appearances , fictions , and a number of falshoods , and lastly pluckt from off his back his glittering cloke of feigned honesty , wherewith he was wholly covered , and shewed him to his vertuosi who were there about him in his naked tearms of devillish hypocrisie , and then to the terror of others who trade in such wickedness , gave order that he should be close tied to the gate of the delphick temple , which was suddenly done . never was there any monster seen , any wild beast , or any infernal hag , more horrid and dreadful then he , who made use of counterfeit goodness to cover real vice . for then in this lewd companions eyes , who had formerly a commiserating countenance , an incredible intense malignity was discovered , a tyrannous pride in his speech , which was formerly all humility ; and in all his actions , wherein he first seemed to be content with a little , and to be scandallized with having much , such a voracity of possessing the whole world , as he publickly affected that all humane kinde should be reduced to beg bread of him . besides , so envious a genius was discovered in him , as he desired nothing more , then that the sun should shine upon none but himself and his affairs ; which was so apparent a truth , as that his monstrous leanness was seen to proceed more from other mens prosperity , then from his own misery . in fine , he was so horrid and frightful a spectacle , as the people durst not come into the temple for fear of coming near him . the chief literati of this state did then much wonder how it was possible that these fraudulent hypocrites , with one only grain of musk of appearing sanctity , could make the noisom jakes of their stinking and most abominable wickedness appear so odoriferous to blockish men , as with a little orpine of affected goodness , they can cover over such wicked vices . and the wonder was greater , to consider where the eyes and judgement of lasie men were , when bewitch'd with the cunning of such raskals , they flock like fools after them , whom they should fly from , as from the plague . the xciii . advertisement . apuleius his ass having given his master two kicks in the breast , is severely punished by him . it is sufficiently known to all the professors of learning , that next to the famous pegasean horse , apuleius his golden ass is the beast of highest esteem in all perna●…sus . beroaldo the bolognian , who by apollo's own self is chosen to have care of this highly prized steed , for which he hath three crowns a month sallary allotted him , was currying him the other day before the stable-dore , whilst apuleius himself , to make his ass the more sleek , was stroaking down his hair with his hand ; and it hapned that the ass , without any bad intention to his master , flung out with his heels , and hit his master on the breast , throwing him backward on the ground half dead : and certainly apuleius was sorely hurt , for the apothecaries had much adoe to recall him to life , by many comfortable applications . but as soon as he was come to himself , he laid hold on the pitchfork which he found in the stable , and revenging himself upon his unwary steed , laid load upon him therewith , and having well basted him , went his waies . then beroaldo much afflicted for the misfortune which had befalne his beloved beast , taking him about the neck and kissing him , said , my golden ass , what dire destiny of thine and mine was it that hath drawn upon thee this misfortune of being so sorely beaten , to the great affliction of thy dear beloardo ? the brotherly love which i bear thee , forceth me to tell thee that thou hast dearly paid for the misfortune which hath hapned unto thee , for having foolishly , and with no advantage to thy self , dealt so hardly with thy master . the ass , as if the so many blows which he had received from h●…s master , had been so many special favours , chearfully answered beloardo thus ; know my beloardo , that it was neither unadvertency , nor bestiality which made me do that to my master apuleins , which you saw , and which doth so much displease you , but t is a thing which i have long premeditated , and resolved to do ; and know that the bastenadoes which i but now received ▪ though i feel them to be very sore , were notwithstanding very pleasing to me ; for these fifty blows which i have now at once received , will save me , i am assured , above a hundred every month , and a thousand every year . and you shall see , beloardo , that apuleius will deal more circumspectively with me hereafter for my late resentment : i know that it is necessary and useful , suddenly to obey whatsoever is commanded , and with patience to undergo whatsoever hard usage we receive from our masters ; such masters i mean as suffer themselves to be overcome by the humility of those that serve them , and who will return gratitude and better usage , for the good service that is done them ; but to put on the resolution which i have done , and doth like me , with such indiscreet beasts , such as you know our master apuleius is , who delights to dominier over such as i am , is the way to make them wiser . and wo unto him who living in all submissness with an humorous master , hath not heart enough so to resent himself once a year , as may turn injuries into better observances : nor are we burthen-bearing beasts more beaten then mules are , for any other reason but that they are excellently well skil'd in kicking , whilst we patiently undergo the lash ; and you know much better then i , beroaldo , that in these times with masters , nihil profeci patientia , nisi ut graviora , tanquam ex facili toler antibus imperentur . tacit. vita agric. the xciv . advertisement . paulus iovius presents apollo with his most elegant histories , which give full satisfaction to his majesty and the college of vertuosi , and not withstanding some opposition that is made , he is admitted with great applause into pernassus . paulus iovius , bishop of di nocera , that noble and famous historian , after having been long expected by all the literati of this court , came some daies since to the confines of pernassus , where he was soon visited by an infinite number of poets , and of the greatest historians , and welcomed with many learned refreshments and entertainments . moreover , all those men who were famous for arms or learning , and of whom he had made honourable mention in his elogies , and other writings , after having past their complements with him , accompanied him with a numerous and noble attendance unto the palace royal , where the senat of the vertuosi were met : he there presented apollo with all his excellent compositions , which were acceptably received by his majesty , who assigned them over to the censori bibliothecarii . these caused edicts to be posted up the next day in all the publike places of pernassus , wherein notice was given to every one , that the histories , and other writings of the reverend paulus iovius , being to be consecrated to immortality , they had prefixt five daies for the first , five for the second , and five more for the last peremptory tearm , for every one to come in that had any thing to alleadg against him . the day being thus appointed , all the literati met together in the great council-hall , where iovius appeared before apollo , where the censori bibliothecarii made an honorable relation of the writings of that famous prelat , and did infinitely praise the purity of the latin tongue , the loftiness of his stile , his perspicuous method , the infinite variety of things treated of therein , the exquisite diligence used in the texture of those his eternal labours , which they said were such , as that there was not any latin historian , who since the declination of the roman tongue and empire , had advanced further in the latin history . only some over-curious literati said , they could have wished for some of the policy , and some of those sentences , taken from the very bowels of the reason of state , in that prelats writings , which the latin and italian tacitus are censured to be too full of . then he was bitterly reprehended for the vast voragini which were in his histories ; and the censors , not without discovery of some passion , told him , that if the vertuosi could not with patience see the defaults of such worthy writers as livy ▪ tacitus , dion , and other famous historians , whose labours through the injury of time , were lost ; it was altogether intolerable in his . nor was his excuse taken for good which he alleadged , that the books which were wanting , were lost in the sacking of rome , for the censors freely told him , that if he had spent those pretious hours in filling up what was wanting in his history , which he had thrown away in entertaining the cardinals , fernese and carpi , w●…th his pleasant genius in the winter evenings , he would have pleased his friends the literati better . the censors having made their relation , the hall-dores were thrown open , and every one had leave to make what objections they pleased against iovius , for any thing that they found amiss in his writings . wherefore he was accused by natalis comes , for having too much praised cosmo de medici , the great duke of tuscany ; and that being bribed , he had published such prowesse in the marquisses of pescara and vasto , as a maker of romances could have said but little more of the antient paladines of france . the censors reply'd to this accusation of natalis comes , that they had observed that iovius had used diversity of ink in his praises of the great duke cosmo , and the two marquisses , but that they found that by edict from his majesty , the like license was given to historians , as was permitted unto poets , to imbroider their mecenas's garments with gold and pretious stones , in hatred to certain greedy curmuggions , who value not the leaving of a good name behind them to posterity . that therefore it was not only lawfull , but very praise-worthy in bishop iovius to exaggerate the praises of the princes his benefactors , and to barter his purest quill with their liberalities : and though it be his bounden duty to hold his peace , who is censured , as the masters of the pegasean ceremonies had signified unto iovius at his first entrance into the hall ; yet overcome with anger , he was not able to contain himself , but turning to natalis comes , said , what humane praise may , i will not say a man , but a demi-god deserve , which ought not fully to be given to my great cosmo , the second italian augustus ? soon after francisco berni objected , that he had pursued the memory of lorenzo de medici too bitterly . to which the censors answered , that iovius was so far from deserving blame for that his action , as those seditious historians were rather to be punished , who invited ignorant people to rebellion by their encomium upon brutus and cassius , and such like , and who provoked fierce spirits , beastial wits , and desperate persons to plot conspiracies against good princes . lastly giorolimo mutio iustinopolitano , said , that that iovius his histories being full of falshoods , deserved better ●…o be burn'd , than to have eternity decreed unto them . the censors wisht mutio to instance in the places wherein iovius had lied : who answered , that he knew not any thing himself , but that he had heard it commonly said so ; whence they all found mutius to be one of those ignorant fellows , who accuse iovius for a lier without having read him . the xcv . advertisement . a very famous literato , who was imprisoned by the iudges of assise for being a pratler , is freed by apollo , as not guilty of such a crime . the vertuosi of this state are bound to speak with as much premeditation and weighing of their words , as other men write in other parts ; for ●…pollo's pleasure is , for the general good , that to hear his li●…erati discourse upon any whatsoever business , be as profitable as to study books ; wherefore the speeches of every one be so narrowly watcht , as every least error is sure to receive exemplary punishment . it hapned some three daies ago , that a very learned vertuoso discoursing upon some poetical matter , fell into an incidental digression , wherein he so far expatiated himself , as when he had finished it , he could not reassume the thread of his former discourse , which was not only noted for a great error , but the censors being forthwith acquainted with it , he was imprisoned . and the fault appearing to be true , not only by the testimony of divers , but by his own confession , the judges proceeded with much rigour against him , and inhibited him the use of writing or reading . this miserable literato , to the end that this severe sentence might either be totally taken off , or at least much mitigated , had recourse to apollo , who , though he much abhor'd that one of his vertuosi should be esteemed a prater , yet that he might upon better grounds judge this literato , he would know from the accused partie 's own mouth , what the matter was ; which is certainly an excellent way of proceeding , and which if it were imitated by princes who govern the world , they would not be so much troubled with other mens faults . the vertuoso acquainted apollo with all that had been laid to his charge ; who having heard his confession , did immediately revoke the sentence ( so far doth the justice differ which god infuseth into the hearts of princes , from what judges learn in their decrees ) for finding that the digression into which that literato had falne , and wherein he had so inlarged himself , was much more delicate than his first discourse , his maj●…sty thought he had no waies misdemerited by that his forgetfulness , since the error committed was not occasioned through his desire to prate , but out of ambition to purchase honour to himself , by making that digression . and therefore he commanded the judges to set him at liberty , for he was not to be blamed for much discourse , who discoursed well . the xcvi . advertisement . philip the second , king of spain , being offended at what the duke of alva had told apollo , concerning his government of flanders , whilst he seeks to revenge himself upon that his minister of state , is sent for by apollo , who was acquainted with what had past , and is by him pacified . there was never any court wherein there were not of those malitiously minded men , who reporting what ought to be concealed , are very desirous to raise scandals , and to kindle enmity amongst their neighbours . this is said , for that duke alva , formerly prince of the achaians , had no sooner told apollo , that ( though he foresaw it would be occasion of great scandal ) he had caused the heads of prince egmont and count horn to be publickly shewed upon the skaffolds in brussels , only because men are of another opinion when they govern another mans state , than when their own peculiar estate is concerned : but the news thereof was forthwith brought to the wise king of spain , philip the second , who being highly offended with that his minister of state , resolved to revenge so great an injury by arms ; and therefore he commanded some of the gentlemen of his chamber , to arm themselves suddenly , and evil intreat the duke of alva , wheresoever they should meet him . this resolution of the kings was discovered , and being forthwith made known to apollo , his majesty sent for the king of spain and the duke of alva to come to him ; who when they appeared , the king being highly incensed , complained bitterly upon the duke , that meerly out of ambition of perpetuating himself in the government of flanders , he had put his patrimony into the present inextricable troubles , a thing the more worthy of punishment , in that he himself had confest his dealing so badly with his king , with the same freedom as others glory in honorable actions . the duke answered in his own defence to this complaint made against him by the king , that he had fought for his king , in africa , in germany , in france , in flanders , and in italy , and still with victory ; and that his faithful and honorable actions had been so ill rewarded in peace , that not only men of the long robe , who were unfit for war , had been preferred before him in those provinces from whence he had driven out the enemy , but even women , whereby he was either en tertained idlely afterwards in the court , or else in imployments misbecoming such a one as he , only that he might idolatrize the power of ruy gomes di selva , and other subjects who were mean in comparison of him , and yet were in greater esteem then he , in his kings court ; a thing which misbecoming him to suffer , and which he could in no waies digest , as being altogether contrary to his genius , and he one that could not suffer indignities , was not only interpreted by his malevolents , but even by his king ; to be an intolerable pride in him , in not being willing to tolerate an equal , much less a superior to himself in court ; that it was true , that to preserve his reputation , and to keep such a one as he from being numbred amongst the rank of ordinary courtiers in the court of spain , he had endeavoured to eternize himself in the government of flanders , which he would intentively have endeavoured to have reduced into a peaceful condition if he had thought he could have governed it in peace . the king of spain was much incenst at this so resolute answer , and said , that his state-minister having confest his fault twice over , nothing remained but condemnation . nay rather ( said apollo to the king of spain ) i must by absolving the duke from all that you lay to his charge , admonish such great kings as you , to deal well with those commanders , who having purchased the glory of true military valour at the expence of their bloud , deserve their kings full favour ; for it is just and reasonable , that kingdoms , and great provinces , should be governed by those in times of peace , who had the courage to acquire them in war , or who by their arms have defended them against the publick enemy ; but because many of you care not to do what is just , nor what out of gratitude ought to be done , since i find you slow in learning by the advantagious reading of history , how you ought to satisfie and content those commanders , who with their weapons in their hands , have deserved to be largely rewarded , be not at least ashamed to take example in a business of such importance , from the ottoman emperors , who in the troublesom times of war , give the charge of generalissimo of their armies , and therein all usefull and advised liberty , to none but to their chief vziiers , aso sublime dignity , as he who possesseth it , governs the vast ottoman empire in supreme authority , as sole arbitrator of peace and war. wherefore the chief viziers , knowing that their places are much more advantagious and honourable in peace then in war , behave themselves very faithfully in their warlike expeditions , to the end that through their worth , they may maintain the dignity which they possess ; moreover they hasten to get the victory , that they may discharge so great an imployment , by the acquisition of new states , and by subduing the enemy . philip , 't is neither in my power , nor yet in the power of any other prince , to make men love the advantage of other men , more then their own : and the true art of making commanders eternally loyal , is ( as i have said ) to shew them honorable and gainful peace at home , amidst the troubles of war. the xcvii . advertisement . pompey the great having invited many noble lords of rome to be present at the dedication of the magnificent theatre which he had built in pernassus , they refuse to come . pompey the great having finished his stately fabrick of a theatre in pernassus , which was no whit inferior to that which he erected in rome , when he was to dedicate it , resolved to celebrate the shew of gladiators ; and amongst many other princes , invited some modern roman lords to the entertainment , who did not only excuse themselves , alleadging they had not heart enough to behold so bloudy a spectacle , but confest that they were much scandallized to think that their fore-fathers did not only not detest that cruel pastime , to see men become so merciless one to another , but that even women delighted in so horrid barbarism ; and that they would be bold to say , that such like spectacles were a shame to those that saw them , and did but little honour to those that caused them to be represented . it is known that pompey readily reply'd , that he should very much admire and love the civility and humanity of the present romans , in abhorring the shedding of humane bloud , if they had not stained this their worthiness with the shameful curiosity of flocking with the basest sort of people , to see men put to death by the hangman . the xcviii . advertisement . peter aretine being again assaulted , apollo , in respect of the lewd conditions of that satyrical vitious poet , commanded that no process should be made upon that riot . this last night past , peter aretine , as he returned from visiting his beloved titian , was assaulted by one who gave him a fowl slash over the face , which may be said to be the twentieth blow that he hath received , either by pugniard or cudgel , wherewith people as quick of hand as he was of tongue , have so cut his face , hands , and breast , as they look like a sea-card . apollo was much displeased at this riot , and commanded the attorney-general to be diligent in finding out the delinquent . aretine was strictly examined , who swore that he neither knew , nor could he imagin who it was that had hurt him . 't is said , that apollo having heard aretines examination , his majesty commanded that no further process should be made thereupon ; for since aretine could not so much as imagin who it was that had dealt so ill with him , he must of necessity be guilty of one of those two defects which deserve no compassion , either of having offended so many , as he could not number his enemies , or of forgetting those that had done him injuries worthy resentment . the xcix . advertisement . apollo having received news by an express poet , whereat he was much rejoyced , communicates it to his literati with great iubile . so greatly is apollo pleased with mens vertuous proceedings , as he doth maintain an infinite number of men , not only in italy , and the other parts of europe , but in all parts of the world where learning flourisheth , to whom he gives large salaries , to give him speedy notice by expresses of all the honorable actions , and worthy works , that either any prince , or privat man doth perform in any whatsoever kingdom . which being after freely communicated by his majesty to his beloved literati , serves them for a learned and useful lecture . this was the cause why the royal hall of audience was filled betimes the next morning with an infinite number of the literati of pernassus , who had heard , that on tuesday about eight of the clock at night , a poet was come unto his majesty , that they might partake of the news he brought from italy , which being the soveraign queen of all provinces , the supreme monarch of all the most famous kingdoms of the world , and the particular seat of all the most reputed sciences , is not only looked upon by apollo , and all the other favourable planets , but by all the fixt stars , with those benigne aspects which beget in men the vivacity of a sprightly genius , born to new inventions of the quaintest and rarest things , and the knowledg how to talk well , and do better , together with the delightfull vain of writing learnedly , and the easie apprehension of all the liberal sciences . apollo appearing then in the hall , drew first the letters from out his bosom , which were brought to him by the post from italy , and shewing them to all the lookers on , said , my beloved literati , the world which never ceased in producing princes of eminent vertue , and private men of excellent learning , will likewise for ever hereafter produce great store of the like ; for by gods particular goodness , learning , which by the inundation of barbarous people , hath some time been seen to go less , cannot notwithstanding perish . rejoyce then all of you together with me , be blithe and chearfull ; for so the acceptable and happy news requires you to be , which i have now received from italy , where my most vertuous francisco maria della rovere , duke of urbin , and the prince of all the modern literati , perceiving that that sacred justice , which eternal god hath pleased should inhabit upon earth , to the end that there should no difference arise amongst men touching meum and tuum , and that it be not suddenly lul'd asleep by the unfortunate labours of an infinite number of lawyers , who by their writings have buried the wholsom laws in the ditches of cautions , and confusions , so as it is now become prejuditial to that height , as suits at law , may now be added as a fourth plague to the former three , wherewith the living god is wont to scourge mankind ; a punishment which afflicting the mind , and consuming the wealth of whatsoever rich patrimony is more cruel then their war , plague , or famin : a disorder which , my beloved , is the more harmful to human kind , for that though it be known , and complained of by every one , yet hath it been given over as an uncureable disease , nor was there ever any physitian found yet , who durst undertake the amendment thereof ; but that god who by his inscrutable judgements hath suffered such a disorder to reign thus long amongst men , now at last hath out of his innate goodness which suffers not mischiefs nor errors to reign long upon earth , raised up a new justinian , who hath drawn sacred justice , out of that obscurity and confusion , wherein the unwary lawyers by their imbroiled writing had thrown her : for the illustrious francisco mario della rovere , hath set forth a holy edict , which commands that no advocate in pleading for his clyent before any judge of his state , shall be suffered to alleadg any thing but the very laws themselves , accursius his gloss , the comment of bartolo , baldo , paolo de castro , giasone ; and in criminal affairs , angelo de maleficii , and some few others : this is so excellent a decree , my beloved , as i cannot but with tears call to mind , that law-suits have been so inhumanely immortal in all tribunals , as that more disputes have been raised , then have been able to be decided in any one mans life-time . and yet every one knows , that even amongst the turks ( who are wise in this point , though ignorant and without books they have been known to be resolv'd and decided at one only audience . add to this , my beloved , that the most pernitious disease of everlasting pleadings , which ought to have been banish'd out of the territories of all princes who fear god , and covet their peoples welfare ; is for the final infelicity of man , become a dreadful and mortal merchandize of unprofitable men , who whilst they suck the vital bloud out of artificers , husbandmen , merchants , and others that are of service for commerce , and waste all their wealth ; nothing is so much magnified in the world , as the great incomes left by advocates , notaries , sergeants , proctors , and judges . his majesty having said this , he went accompanied by an infinite company of vertuosi who had heard him , to the chief temple of pernassus ; whither being come , he beseeched god that he would grant many years of long life to francisco mario , for the universal good , that he would fill the world with princes of like conditions , and that he would awake the like honorable and holy thoughts in other earthly potentates , as so wise a prince had put in execution in his happy patrimony ; for it was a misery and affliction not to be indured by the best composed minds , to sea the administration of justice reduced to that confusion , as the common , more common , nay most common opinions of privat doctors being more alleadged at the bar , then the authority of the law it self , suits were grown so chargeable and so eternal , as it were better for men to part with their patrimonies , then to defend it with much anguish of mind before such cruel harpyes . the c. advertisement . a more then usual sweet odor issuing from the delphick library , apollo goes himself in person thither to discover the miracle , and soon finds the occasion of so great a novelty . some six daies since , an extraordinary and miraculous sweet odor proceeded from the delphick library , which increasing every day more and more , did very much astonish the vertuosi of this state : and not being able to guess at the reason of so strange an accident , they earnestly requested apollo that he would discover it unto them . his majesty being likewise moved at the novelty , went the next morning early to the library ; and though the perfume of that odor came so generally dispers'd from all parts of the library , as the literati could not discern any particular place from which it proceeded ; yet apollo immediately found out the very fountains head from whence such fragrancy did flow . and going directly to the place , where , in an urn of purest oriental christal , beset with pearls and rubies , the little less then divine writings of seneca the morallist are kept , he first honoured those happy writings , took up the urn with both his hands , and then turning towards his vertuosi , who thinking themselves unworthy to behold writing so exquisitely excellent , were on their knees with head bowed towards the ground , my dearest literati ( said he ) learn from this strange fragrancy which you find doth proceed from the immortal labours of my beloved anneus seneca , that if by your late watchings you will make your sanctified precepts savour well in the world , and will perfume your persons with glorious fame ; you must , as seneca did at last , live answerable to your writings , and do as you say . the end of the second century . the politick touchstone . chap. i. why the neapolitans are so strangely opprest , and hardly treated by the spaniard . ever since it pleased almighty god to give the neapolitans into the power of pharaoh , as a severe punishment for their great treachery used to their former kings ; the wary kings of spain did ordain by a law , which hath been ever punctually observed since , that that unbridled horse which the state bears for her ensign , boasting that he can indure neither saddle nor bridle , should be brought once every six months into the publick market-place , and that exact diligence should be used in chusing a formal colledg of politick farriers , who should order whatsoever was thought necessary to tame so fierce , so inconstant , and so seditious an animal , which hath often chosen rather to be ridden by two kings at one and the same time , then by one . this unfortunate steed was yesterday led out of the stable by the spaniards who had the looking to him ; and because he was so consumed as he could not well stand upon his legs , he was drawn with ropes into the market-place . it was a sad spectacle to see that steed which was formerly so glorious , become now so lean , as you might count his bones ; he was cruelly crest-fallen , and broken-winded , by reason of the many blows he had given him , his nose was slit ; yet the jealous spaniards keep shackles day and night upon his feet , a caveson upon his nose , a bit in his mouth , a spectacle on his eyes , as if they were afraid of him , and certain to receive quickly some great damage by him . these wise farriers did diligently consider this horses condition ; and after having advised long about him , not without much dispute , at last they concluded unanimously , that his rack should be raised up a handful higher then ordinary , and that the third part of his allowance of corn should be taken from him : some moral philosophers , and therefore good men , hapned to be present when this severe resolution was taken , who being greatly moved to pitty , to see him so extenuated ; they asked the farriers why they were so cruel , as to diminish the food of that macerated horse , which was reduced to such weakness , as he had nothing left but skin and bone , and a little spirit , which could only keep him alive for some few weeks . the wisest of these farriers turning towards the philosophers , told them in a shameful manner , that they might have done much better in attending their disputations about entitie and quidditie , then to reason of those politick affairs whereof they were so very ignorant : that if it had fallen to their share to have the government of this capricious beast , they would have found their charity rewarded with kicking and biting , wherewith he had ofttimes very unthankfully rewarded some of his most bountifull masters ; and would have been thrown all broken and bruised into ditches : for it was the custom of that fickle and seditious beast , to vex his masters with all sorts of unruliness , yea though they were never so good unto him , unless he were hardly used by them , and brought by fasting , to that weak condition which they saw he was in : and that to make right judgement of that horse , and how he ought to be governed , they must not consider his lean sides , and weak legs , but the lewdness of his genius , which was more phantastical , seditious , and capricious now , and more given to love novelty then ever . and they further said , wo to the spaniards , if the fierce neapolitan horse had power and means to do that mischief which he did phancy both night and day in that his paltery pate , which was alwaies naturally an enemy to the present government . all which things did make it appear clearly unto the world , that the present neapolitan oppressions proceed not from the cruelty of the spanish nations , nor from the avarice of the kings officers , nor yet from the king of spains neglect ; but from advised counsel , it being great charity to bereave him by all severe waies , of the means of doing ill , who could never be taught to do well , by any good usage or courtesie . that they must therefore all confess , that the detestable cancer of the seditious neapolitan dispositions could not be cured by any better appropriated medicine , than by the corrosive oyntment of the spanish severity . genua excuses her freedom in pernassus . for these many years last past , the illustrious liberty of genua hath not been admitted to visit , nor to have domestical conversation with the renowned venetian commonwealth , and other chast italian and forreign liberties : for though she hath formerly lived in pernassus with a great repute of chastity , yet she hath much lost her reputation of late years by her too domestick conversation with the perfidious spanish nation ; the which ( to the great loss of her honour ) she hath not only accommodated with the best lodgings of her house , but hath permitted her prime nobility to serve her . for which disorders , which in such a lady are held to be very heynous , many have spoken freely of her , that she hath not only contracted too great a familiarity , with people who seek to insnare her chastity ; but it is publickly said , that she hath granted things to be the spaniards , which are exceeding prejudicial to her honour ; and her thirsting after the spanish gold is much talked of : an avarice which is as proper to a base dishonest whore , as it is altogether misbecoming a chast madam . by which disorders it plainly appears , that so noble a princess , who before she lived so lewdly , was numbred amongst the loveliest and most beautiful commonwealths , is now become deformed in her members : for the dorii's nose is grown four inches longer , and the spinola's right leg half a handful . to this great inequality of members , the infinite shame is added , which is cast upon her by mens publick discourse , that her citizens serve spaniards for bawds ; and things are so far proceeded , as there are some who do freely affirm that the kings of spain would have been dishonest with this lady ; and that they may know in what terms they stand with her , and what they may hope for from her , they have some few daies since , sent her a love-letter in form of a citation , by an officer of theirs which they have in italy , named enriques gusman , count de fuentes , which they say did contain very exorbitant things and which touched much upon her honour . by which all men perceive that the care and affection which the spaniards seem to bear to this noble lady , hath nothing in it of the platonick , but is a meer lust to dominier over her . whereupon the renowned liberty of genua , as soon as she got so presumptuous a letter into her hands , first broke his nose that brought it with a pantufle which she took from off her foot ; and then shewed such resentment to the impudent fellow that sent it , by way of words , and such willingness and resoluteness , if n●…ed should require , to come to action , as she hath fully regained that reputation amongst men , which without any fault of hers , she had formerly lost . whereupon so honorable a lady , to give the world a more particular account of her worthy actions , and chast thoughts , hath made it plainly appear to all men , by her ambassadors which she hath sent to all the princes of europe , that the domestick conversation which she holds with the spaniards , is not only for her own honour , and the advantage of her citizens , but very usefull for italy , wherewith her interest is as nearly joyned , as is that of any other of her potentates . for in former times , and now more then ever , she hath held , and doth still hold the adverse nation o●… spain so opprest by change , and change upon exchange , and by exorbitant use , as she doth thereby make more cruel war upon the spaniards , than do the hollanders and zealanders by their fleets and forces . the spanish monarchy complains that her falshoods are discovered . it is not known whether it were occasioned through the malice of any of the french , or by chance , or as some have very much suspected , through the plotting of that nation which is so implacable an enemy to the french for these many years , that the royal palace of the french monarchy fell on fire , and so great and fearful were the flames , as the neighbouring monarchies began to fear lest that fire might end with the ruine of their states . so as every one for their own concern , ran to quench the fire of their neighbours house . the english ( though naturally enemies to the french ) brought with all speed the water of their thames ; the germans , those of the mause and rhein ; the venetians did almost drain all their marish grounds ; and the most wise dukes of tuscany hasted to quench that fire with their arno , which wise men thought was to end with an universal combustion . and truely it was strange to see , that the very monarchy of spain her self , which was held to be so great an enemy to the french , did bestir her self amongst other friends , to quench that fire , at which it was generally believed she did rather desire to warm her self : in so much as every one wondred to see how solicitous and charitable she was in bringing thither not only the waters of her tagus and heber , but the very ocean it self , of which she is absolute mistriss , when the english and hollanders permit her to be so . for politicians giving a sinister interpretation to the spaniards charity , would needs have it pernicious for the french , to admit in their necessities , of aid from the spaniards , who having been alwaies mortal enemies to the french , were rather to be esteemed the contrivers of the ruine of that kingdom , then zealous of its good ; as being men who measuring the actions of all that reign , only with the compass of self-concernment , do often not admit of piety towards god , in what belongs unto the actions of princes , much less of charity towards men . and such politicians became the more abominable , for that it was plainly seen , that the spaniards in their diligence and charity of bringing water to that fire , did not only equal , but out-doe the best friends that the french had . and that which was yet more miraculous , and which won much honour to the spanish nation amongst simple men , was , that when flanders and austria , her antient patrimonies , were cruelly pestered with the fire of war , she had preferred the welfare of the french before charity to her self . but no human help , no water whatsoever was able to quench any sparkle of so terrible a fire , for all the diligence and remedies that could be had , the flames of that bloudy civil war did daily more and more increase . wherefore the best and most devout of the sillier sort of people began to listen to politick records , and to suspect that the spanish monarchies charity was wholly interest ; which is indeed the spaniards proper charity : wherefore they resolved to believe appearances no longer , but to look into the barrels which the spaniards brought ; and see what was in them . wherein , instead of water to quench the fire , they found them filled with pitch , oyle , turpentine , and devillish dissention to increase it . some french barons were found to use the like treachery , who appearing more charitable then the rest , applyed the self-same barrels and materials which were lent them by the spaniards . wherefore they were immediatly put to death by the justly offended french monarchy , and were burnt in the same fire which they had with such sedition and treachery fomented in their own country ? and the spaniards were not only forbidden further assistance , but were proclaimed to be hypocrites by sound of trumpet , and it was made known to all men by a particular edict of the french monarchy , that if any one , at any time hereafter should be induced to believe that it were possible for the spaniards to have any charity for the french , they should be held to be great coxcombs : and that if he should persist in his error after the first admonition , he should be tost in a blanket as a seditious malignant . 't was a wonder to see , that when the spaniards and aforesaid french forbore their said assistance the french combustion , which was held by judicious men , to be unquenchable by human means , ceased of it self ; so as the famous golden flowre-de-luces , formerly so troden under foot , sprung up more resplendant and glorious then before ; and france , which through many mens too much ambition , laboured for above forty years under intestine combustions , became peaceful and quiet in the twinkling of an eye . which made it appear clearly to all men , that the spaniards were the first authors of that fire in france , which under specious pretences of religion and charity , they would have made the world believe their intentions were to quench . 't is said by all men , that the spanish monarchy retired her self into her royal palace , and did not suffer her self for many daies to be seen by any one , giving her self over to a deep melancholy , and that not without shedding abundance of tears , she freely confest she would rather have lost two of her best kingdoms , then to see those her holy pretences , whereby she had often-times , much to her advantage , vented stinking arsafetida , for musk , and ambergrees , so quell'd and derided . she thought she had lost her richest treasure , and the unexhaustable veins of gold and silver in peru and the new world , by being deprived of being ever able to paint white for black to the common sort of people . she thought it very hard for her to be reduced to that pass which she had alwaies seen the french to be , of winning kingdoms barely by the sword : whereas formerly she knew she had set the whole world on fire , only by her appearing holy pretences , in lieu of a formidable army . she was very much grieved to have lost so much credit amongst men , as she ran danger of not being believed in the future , though she spake truth , whereas formerly her false pretences , and her hypocrisie , were taken for sacred truths , and perfect devotion . the spanish monarchy comes to pernassus , and desires apollo to be cured of an issue , but is dismist by the politick physitians . though apollo did not only give sudden order for the solemn entry of the spanish monarchy , who came four months ago to this court , but also for a publick consistory of the literati in the royal hall of audience , where the muses were all to be present ; yet was not the ceremony performed til some two daies ago ; for she spent four months time in agreeing with the prince-poets touching the titles that she should give to , and receive from every man ; and in what manner she should receive them , and be received by them in visits . which made the vertuosi wonder , and bitterly bewail the condition of the present times , which were infected with so much vanity : but the vertuosi werè more afflicted when they heard that many learned princes did openly forbid that great queen to visit them ; affirming that they feared to receive some affront from her ; for they had received fresh letters from italy , wherein they were advised by their friends , to be aware what they did in that point , for it was the usual custom of spaniards to visit people more to injure them , then honour them ; and that therefore they thought it a great piece of folly , instead of shunning affronts , to wait for them at home , and receive them with cap in hand . and though so potent a monarchy , to the great wonder of all men , seemed more close-handed in giving satisfaction to others in titles , then in giving them gold , she hath notwithstanding received what greatest contentment she could desire in point of title from the prince-poets ; and from all the potent vertuosi who mind realities more then vain-glory . 't is true , that it hath much detracted from the reputation of so great a queen , in this court , to see , that though she hath great need of friends , she appears so indifferent in alienating those who desire nothing of her but good words . every one noted it for a great singularity , that when the master of the ceremonies told her that that nice punctilio which she stood upon was hatefull , fit for a barbarous king , but far unworthy so great a queen as she , she should in a rage reply , that she wondred at him , and at all masters of ceremony ; since he seemed not to know that a prince without gravity , was like a peacock without a tail . it is impossible to write with what curiosity of desire , so great a princess was expected and looked upon by these literati : for people flockt from all the parts of pernassus , to behold that powerful queen , who with such strange success , had in so short a time united great kingdoms under her , and made so formidable an empire of them , as there is not any one prince in the world , who hath not for fear of her put on a coat of male , and an iron brestplate . this queen attended by a numerous navy , arrived happily some months ago in the island of lesbos , and the lady republick of genua lent her her famous haven gratis , though by a certain antient prerogative , the family of the dorii received a great rent for it . the spanish monarchy is young in respect of that of france , england , and the other antient monarchies of europe , but of a much larger body then any of them , and disproportionably great for her years : whence it is believed , that if she should continue to grow as long as humane bodies use to do , she would become so great a gyantess , as she would arrive at that immeasurable height of universal monarchy , at which the roman monarchy arrived . but the accidents which attend state-affairs , say for certain , that she will grow no greater ; and that she is grown in her tenderest years to the utmost height that ever she will be at . which is clearly proved by this undeniable argument , that she hath more ado to grow an inch in these present times , then two handfuls heretofore . this powerful lady is of so ssallow a complexion , as she shadows upon the moor : and therefore is rather proud in her behaviour , then grave ; and all her actions relish much more of cruelty , than severity : wherefore having never been able to learn the so necessary art for princes of pardoning ; it is that which in the opinion of many , doth most impede her growth : for boasting her self of nothing more then in being called doctor of the science of knowing how to cut off the heads of those detested poppies , which in her state-gardens overtop the rest , she joyes it should be said , that in this art she hath exceeded that great tarquin , who was the first inventer of such a secret. being then so bold and resolute in her severities , she is very costive in conferring favours , which proceed but very seldom from her : and she is so arrogant in those few which she confers , as they are not very acceptable : yet in outward shew she is wholly composed of civility and complement ; but who can prie into her heart with politick spectacles , will find nothing therein but pride , avarice , and cruelty ; in so much as they who have convers'd longest with her , tell us that no princess gives better words , and worser acts . whence it is , that taken as a mistriss , men like her very well , but as a soveraign very ill . her hands are extraordinary long , which she turns whither she lists , and where it makes most for her advantage , without distinguishing between friend and foe , kindred or strangers ; she hath harpye's nails , and so hard and tenacious fingers , as they never let go what once they grasp . her eyes are black , but very sharp-sighted ; a squint-ey'd look , wherewith whilst she seems to look fixedly upon one , she is very intent in observing another ( a very dangerous thing for princes ) for having of late years her face turned towards algiers , she fixt her eyes upon marselles : and much greediness is seen in her eyes , for she sees nothing with them , which she doth not in her heart desire : so as those who are most speculative say , that this queen doth thirst immoderately after what 's another mans , and that she never had friend , whom she did not soon make her slave . all which things witness to the world , that she is fitter to command slaves , than free-men : for she expects more then any other princess , to be served not only by her subjects , but even by her friends . she stands so much upon her punctilio , as she will not be civil , even on good occasions which have often times come home unto her . she exceeds all past and present princes , in knowing how to cover all her diabolical interests with a cloak of double brocato : and though she be every day seen to do unhandsom things , yet she boasts of nothing more then of her conscience : wherefore the french , who have been so often deceived under the colour of holy pretences ; have at their own cost learnt at last ; then to take up arms and get on horseback , when with her beads in her hand , they see her treat of business full of religious pretences , and charity towards her beloved neighbour ; she is so skilful in riding , as she hath not only successfully tamed the noble neapolitan coureer , but the very untoward spanish mules , who are so naturally given to lay about them with their heels . she is of so much more suspicious a genius then all other queens , as setting her own nation aside , she hath declared her distrust of all others that are subject unto her , though she hath found them upon all occasions to be very faithful : which makes so much for her prejudice , as those who mind the worlds affairs , say , that were it only out of this respect , it is impossible for her to grow greater . and this is occasioned , because no queen loves less to be loved , and more to be feared by her subjects then she : and therefore politicians think it a great piece of folly in her , to believe so firmly that she can make people adore her , by ill usage : yet she allures people to serve her by these hateful customs ; for her great store of wealth is that loadstone which violently draws the souls , even of such unto her , whose duty it being to abhor her , ought to seek her lessening . she is very accurate in petty affairs ; but in matters of great importance , no princess suffers her self to be more easily deceived . she shews a great deal of wisdom and understanding in arguing and resolving upon matters of weight ; but be it either out of her innate slowness , or by the cunning of her state officers ( who are greedy merchants of great affairs ) or for that she thinks nothing is done with decorum , which is not long looked for , she is so slow in putting her resolves into execution , as the face of affairs altering with the times , resolutions which are at first wisely taken , prove unfortunate . she is therefore held by all men , to be better at ordering of plots and businesse , then in the managing of arms , wherein she is very hearty , greatly constant , and doth strangely undergo all hardships , but is so little resolute , as her too great circumspection hath many times the face of fear : so as she appears fitter to keep states , then to acquire them ; and many singular men laugh at her , for that she will regulate all her actions by certain sound and mature advice , not leaving any thing to the hands of that fortune or fate , which hath so favoured the french , and made them so glorious , when they have shewed much boldness , but little advisedness in their actions . and some think that this happens because she is as sparing of her own bloud , as greedy of that of other people ; which makes the most understanding warriours laugh at her for aspiring at universal monarchy , without fighting : the which she doth , because being used to make great acquisitions by alliances , she abhors the fearful french fashion , of purchasing other peoples patrimonies at the price of her own bloud . being therefore more advised then adventurous , she is more prejudicial to her enemies in peace , than in war : wherefore the french who have hitherto lived with her in a supine carelessness , have after their so many calamities , learnt at last , to double-bolt their dores when they have made peace with the spaniards . she is very careless of her own riches , but so greedy of what is anothers , as she cares not to desert her own patrimonial estate , so she may come by those of others . she is of so deep thoughts , and of so conceal'd a soul , as it lies not in the skill of men to find out her ends : nay linceus himself with his acute eye-sight cannot so much as penetrate the outmost film thereof : whereas short-sighted men can see even into the bowels of the french , and of the men of other nations . but he who will judge of this great ladies genius and customs , must believe her to be in all her negotiations clean contrary to what she appears to be outwardly . and although amongst the vertues that have been named , she hath many enormous vices , yet she hath the good fortune to have all things in her , held vertues , and admired for such ; wherefore many wise princes think it an honour to them to imitate her even in her vices . she is of a strong constitution , which makes many men think her to be long-liv'd : she suffers only in having her members so far distant , a thing which doth infinitely weaken so great a body : and though by the assistance of the genoweses , and her alliance with the duke of savoy , she endeavours to unite them ; yet does she but little good therein , by reason of the diversity of interest of these two potentates . but so great a princess is prejudiced by nothing more , then by her own spanish state-ministers , which she makes use of in all great imployments , wherein they carry themselves so proudly , and with such hateful haughtiness , as they will not be only honoured as men , but even adored as gods. an impertinency which hath made the spanish government tedious and nauseous , not only to the italians and flemmish , but even to the very spaniards themselves . all that behold so powerful a queen , wonder to see that she should all her life-time be troubled with leeches , and those for the most part of genua ; and some of them are so great as good big eels . and it is not known whether her not shaking them off proceeds from impotency , from negligence , or from the destiny of great princes , to whom it is alwaies fatal to have these ugly animals suck out their very life-bloud . this potent princess being come into the royal hall before apollo , made her left arm be untied by some of her servants , and shewing it naked to apollo , and the whole college of literati , spake thus : lord and father of learning ! this which you see , is that stinking issue of flanders , which the french , germans , and some italian princes who seem to be my friends , and that unbowel'd beyond-sea renegado made in me so many years ago , for the jealousies they had of me . i confess that the before named princes had reason to be jealous of me , when after the death of henry the second , they saw france falne into the calamity of infant kings , and that i , in their minority , sought to sow discord in that kingdom : now that there is no more cause for these suspitions , and that ( i do not blush to say it ) i have been sentenced to pay charges in the great contention which i had with the french , and particularly with that mad prince of bearne , i desire your majesty that so troublesom an issue may be closed up , since every one sees that it is become so inraged a canker by reason of the abundance of humors that have confluence thither , as i wish to god it may not prove my ruine . i did not pass into italy meerly out of mine own ambition , nor had i so immoderate a thirst ( as my enemies affirm ) to command it all . every one knows that i was called in , and haled by meer force , by the italian princes own selves , to free them from the fear of being lorded over by the french : and there is none in europe that does not know , that i lose so much of my principal , every year in the states which i hold in italy , as they serve but to weaken and oppress me . happy had it been for my spanish palace , which i would have tiled over with silver and massie gold , if i had never medled with the italians , a double-dealing people , full of fallacies and interests , and who are only good to imbarque people in dangerous businesses without bisket , and then to abandon them in their greatest necessities ; professing nothing more openly , then to take crafish out of their holes with other mens hands . and i strangely wonder why italy , which ( as every one knows ) hath suffered her self to be overrun by all forreign nations , should now make such profession of chastity to me , as she cannot see me move never so little , but she is afraid i should bereave her of the honour of her liberty : and though the greatness which the kingdom of france is at present in , does secure italy , and all the aforesaid princes from the fear they have of my power ; yet , if your majesty shall be so pleased , i am ready to give security to every one de non offendendo ; provided this my so troublesome issue may be closed up . the issue was forthwith by order from his majesty , very diligently considered by the politick physitians , and having held a careful council thereupon , they said , that it being clearly seen that the spanish monarchy was affected with a continual ardent thirst of rule , she had need of that issue , by which those gross humors might be purged away , which fell upon her stomack from peru , and occasioned that unquenchable thirst . and these able physitians considered , that if the aforesaid monarchy had not had that issue , it was apparently dangerous that the pernitious humors of peru might mount to the head of italy , to the manifest ruine of her so principal members , which remain as yet unviolated ; and that the monarchy of spain might fall into a dropsie of universal monarchy : for which inconveniences , they said excellent provision was had by this issue of flanders ; which ought to be kept open , whilst peru did subminister such pernitious humors to the kingdom of spain . she was much displeased with this resolution , wherefore , greatly incenst , she said , sir , if by the malignity of others i must so shamefully consume away by administring oyntment to this canker , which my enemies term a diversive issue ; others who least believe it , may pechance bring clouts to it . the meaning of this was soon understood by the french , english , and italians , who reply'd , that they feared nothing less : for they sent but the scum of their states to flanders , whereas the spaniards spent their gold , and very life-bloud therein . for , to secure themselves from the formidable power of spain , and from the spaniards ambition , which they found had no orison ; the english , french , germans , and italians , were forced answerable to tacitus his aphorism . consiliis & astu res externas moliri , armaprocul habere . a secretary of monsieur de guise is punisht for having spoken amiss . monsieur de guise his secretary , speaking yesterday with some french barons of the late tumults in france , as he mentioned his masters party , called it the holy league ; which when apollo heard , he caused him to have the strappado given him thrice in publick , and made him be told he might learn to put a difference between a holy league , and a devillish rebellion . the spaniards endeavour the getting of savioveda , but in vain . since the ill advised princes of italy made use of the spanish pickax , to take the french nail out , which was fixt in the table of millan , which ax entred so far into the table it self , as it was never able to be got out by any whatsoever pincers ; all the potentates of europe , and more particularly the princes of italy , who were aware , that the spaniards , after having inslaved millan , did openly aspire to get the absolute dominion of all italy ; to the end that they might secure the remaining liberty that was left them ; they made an agreement amongst themselves , that once every five and twenty year , the chain which the spaniards forged for the italian slavery , should be exactly measured by people purposely deputed thereunto . and coming not many daies ago to the act of measuring , the italian princes found much to their amazement , that the so hateful chain was increased by five prejudicial links : the politick smiths were immediately sent for , who very diligently took test , or say of the iron which was added to the chain , and they found that the first link was made at piombine , the second at finale , the third at correggio , the fourth at portolungone , and the last at monaco . the princes wondred exceedingly hereat , and many of them were ashamed of themselves , to find that by their supine blockheadishn●…s , the spaniards had increased the chain of the italian slavery much more in time of peace , then they would have done with four armies in time of war. they were therefore so incens'd against the spaniards for these exorbitant novelties , as they freely told them , that if they would not keep themselves within the bounds of honesty and modesty , in case the italian files were not sufficient to reduce that woful chain to its due measure , they would make use of those of france ; and if they could not thereby compass their ends , they would bring enough from germany and england ; and that if put to despair , they would provide themselves of those excellent damask blades which are made in turkey . whilst the italian princes were in this dispute , a post came to them dispatcht in all hast from italy , advertising them that the spaniards were hammering another link in savioneda , to add unto the chain of their slavery . at the news whereof the state of venice straight waies threw open her arsenal , and all the princes of italy hasted to take up arms : the warlike french nation commanded her nobility to get on horseback ; the germans put themselves in order to pass over the mountains ; numerous fleets of english , hollanders , and zealanders , hasted towards the straits of gebraltar ; when just as the whole world was up in arms , a new post came with the joyful and certain news , that the spaniards had done their utmost endeavour to make the important link of sabioneda ; but that they had lost their labour ; for as they were sodering it , it knapt in two . sir thomas moore , an englishman , asks apollo when her●…sies will cease . sir thomas moore , that englishman , who the very first day that he was received into pernassus , was honoured with the title of singular and holy literato , and who lives much afflicted in this court , being perpetually cruciated by reason of the wicked heresies which proceed from his countrey , and from elsewhere ; and which having chased true christian piety from out the hearts of men , hath put both holy and profane things into a horrid confusion ; this singular mans affliction grew so really great , as he was perpetually seen to bemoan the heresies of the seduced people , and the seducers open atheism . this so famous personage came yesterday before apollo , and earnestly desired his majesty that he would let him know when the present disorders and heresies which were crept into the christian religion , and which were invented and sown by wicked men , either out of ambition of getting , fear of loss , or desire of revenge , should have an end . to this apollo suddenly answered ; you shall see ( my beloved moore ) the mischiefs of the present heresies cease , when the spaniards contenting themselves with their own spain , will cause no further jealousies in other princes : and when the house of austria resting content with her antient patrimony of auspurg in germany , shall bound her ambition of dominiering over the whole world . for the present heresies being nothing else but a league of potentates , against the greatness of the house of austria , the evils will not cease before the true occasion thereof be taken away . the french desire apollo that he will teach them the true spanish perfume for gloves . great and eternal is the emulation between the two warlike and potent nations of france and spain . there is no singularity in france , which is not ambitiously coveted by the spaniards ; nor are the french ever quiet , till they have made themselves masters of those rarities , which they see spain indued with . and because the perfuming of gloves with ambergrees , is a particular invention and gift of the spaniards , the french have left nothing untried , how to come to the like perfection . they have been at great cost in providing themselves of musk , ambergrees , civet , and of all the odoriferous drugs which come from the east ; but all in vain : for neither hath their expence , nor their diligence been able to make them obtain their desired end . yet before they would give over their business as desperat , the noble french nation had recourse to apollo's majesty , who is the bringer forth of all aromaticks , whom they earnestly desired , that he would vouchsafe to teach the french the true spanish perfume , wherewith to dress amber-gloves . 't is very certain that apollo was not seen to laugh so heartily at the down-fall of unfortunate icarus , as he did at the request of these frenchmen . he commanded the priests that were by him , to smell to their hands , and tell him of what they smelt . the priests obeyed , and told his majesty they smelt very well . then said apollo to the french , nature alwaies helps mens defects , with somewhat of rare vertue ; and that therefore she had given the monopoly of making sweet gloves to that nation whose hand did stink insufferably . the spanish monarchy goes to the oracle of delphos , to know whether she shall ever obtain the universal monarchy of the whole world ; and receives a negative answer . the spanish monarchy parted very privatly from pernassus yesterday morning two hours before day , in a coach with six horses ; carrying along with her only some of her chief court-confidents , which caused great jealousies . and the french monarchy was particularly so moved hereat , as she presently took post , and followed after the spanish monarchy , to know the reason of this voyage ; and overtook her just as she arrived at delphos , at apollo's oracle . before which the spanish monarchy presenting her self , those who were then present , say , that she made this supplication unto it . o eternal and resplendent lamp of the world , heavens right eye , which art not only the producer of day , but of all good that befalls mankind ! thou knowst that all my thoughts have for this long time been set upon the universal monarchy , which only the romans arrived unto : thou knowst what effusion of bloud and treasure it hath cost me to compass my intent . the watchings , sweat , and cunning industry which i have used to atchieve so important a designe , are only known to thee ; and thou likewise knowst , that by the valour of my nation , the dexterousness of mine own wit , and my monies efficacy , it is not many years since i sowed s●…ch troubles and civil wars in france , and whereupon i had chiefly grounded my hopes , as that i was near compassing my desire ; nothing remained to overcome all difficulties , but to joyn naples to millan ; which if i shall at any time be able to do , i may safely say i have done the deed . but since , were it either through my fatal misfortune , through the impossibility of the business , or through the power of my cruel enemies who appeared against me , the scandallous revolutions which i have been so long a plotting , and sowing amongst the french , are in despit●… of me , turned on the sudden into that peace and tranquillity which it breaks my very heart to think on : that i may not utterly ruine those my people , whom i have almost brought to utter desolation , by this undertaking which i propounded unto my self , and that i may be no longer the discourse of people , i now present my self before your majesty , humbly beseeching you to give me a clear answer , whether that universal monarchy whi●…h i have so much set my heart upon , and which is the only scope of all my actions , be by the will of heaven destin'd to me and to my nation . and this i desire to know , to the end that if the business prove impossible , i may appease my self , and set my mind in quiet ; or if it be feasible , i may incourage my spaniards in the possibility thereof ; for to tell thee the truth , who seest the hidden thoughts of men , by the so many hardships and sufferings which i have undergon by sea and land , by the so many conspiracies and counter-plots , which have been framed against me by my implacable enemies , and which are framing faster now then ever , i begin to be totally discouraged . after this request the temple shook , and a great earthquake followed immediately after ; when these words proceeded from the mouth of apollo's minister . the universal monarchy shall again return to the noble italian nation , when she shall have banished all those intestine discords which have made her a slave to other nations . this sad answer being given , the spanish monarchy went much afflicted out of the temple , and was very much astonished ; and when she saw the french monarchy present her self before her , she first past usual complements with her , then taking her by the hand , drew her aside ; and having acquainted her with what answer she had received from the oracle , she told her , that since the universal monarchy was by the will of heaven to return again to the italian nation , france would as soon make trial of new cesar's , as spain should do of second scipio's : that therefore to secure themselves , she thought the b●…st course would be to divide italy between them . she offered to teach her the same receit which ( as she affirms ) she had made happy trial of in the indies , by which they would so secure themselves from the italian nation , as nothing should remain in the world , of that wicked generation of men , but the bare name . suffer me ( reply'd the french monarchy ) to forget that unfortunate division that my king , lodovick the twelfth , made lately with you ; and we will then speak further of this business : for the french are not deceived the second time so easily , as i perceive you fancy they are . then , for the receit which you propose unto me to secure our selves from the italians , keep it i beseech you for your self . for , to rout out men from out the world , to enjoy the naked earth without inhabitants ( as it hath been your practice to do in the indies ) is a politick precept which is not found in the french reason of state. i have at my cost , learn'd to content my self with a little , provided it be good . and therefore i ground my greatness more upon the multitude of my subjects , then upon the largeness of my dominion . and provided that my frenchmen enjoy some satisfaction in this world , i am content that others may do the like . the business of agreement concerning italy , will require time ; and you know by experience , that purgations taken to preserve ones self from apprehended malladies , do often bring them the faster on . i will be bold to tell you , with that liberty which is proper to my nature , that the business of subjugating whole italy , is not so easie a thing as i perceive you perswade your self it is . for when i had the same caprichio , it proved pernitious to me ; wherefore i believe it will prove little better to you : for to my great loss , i have learn'd , that the italians are a sort of people who watch alwaies how to escape out of our hands , and which are never tamed under forreign slavery ▪ and though like crafty apes , they transform themselves into the customs of those nations which rule over them , yet they preserve their antient hatred concealed inwardly in their heart . and they are expert merchants of their slavery ; for they make you believe they are become good spaniards , by only pu●…ng on a pair of sicilian slops , and us that they are become frenchmen , by putting on a cambrick band : but when they come to the point of business , they shew more teeth then a thousand saws . they are very like those greedy dames , who by their alluring smiles , soundly fleece their sweet-hearts , without ever coming to the conclusive point which they would be at . believe me therefore , who have paid dearly for my learning of it , that you shall reap nothing but loss and shame in going about to subdue italy . philip the second , king of spain , after some dispute concerning his title , enters in great state into pernassus . philip the second , that potent king of spain , who came two months ago to this court , was not permitted to make his publick entry till yesterday : the reason why , was because in some triumphant arches which were built for him with great magnificence , by the spanish nation , these words were written . philippo secundo , hispaniarum , utriusque siciliae , & indiarum regi catholico , italiae pacis auct●…ri felicissimo . at which words the greatest part of the italian princes being displeased , they desired they might be cancelled , saying they would by no means acknowledge that peace from the spaniards , which they bought with ready moneys from the hollanders and zealanders . this aromatick business suffered a long dispute ; and though the italian princes did sufficiently prove that the present peace of italy ought not to be owned from any good intention in the spaniards , who would have wholly overrun it , had it not been for that great diversion ; yet in the greatest heat of this contention , the queen of italy with her wonted wisdom quenched the fire . for having summoned all her princes together , she bad them leave ostentation and boasting to the spaniards , and that minding realities , they should not stick to feed them with smoak . the cavalcata was the stateliest that was ever seen in pernassus , both for the number and quality of princes who came thither to favour and honour that great king ; who was placed amongst those monarchs who have been held famous in the world , more for their wisdom and sagacity in peace , then for their valour shewn in war. and therefore the impressa which he bore in his chief standard , which was a writing pen , afforded much wonder to the literati ; with which pen , as is fully witnessed by all historians , he had caused greater ruine and hurleyburleys in france , and wheresoever else he had occasion to use it , then his father charls the fifth could have done with all the cannons of europe . this impressa was much commended by all the college of the vertuosi ; writers having attributed it to great honour , that a pen in the hand of one that knew how to use it , had done such remarkable things . so great a king is alwaies treated in pernassus , alla grande , for even the chiefest monarchs of europe have thought it an honour to serve him : in so much as , as he was under the barbers hands the next day after his entry , the queen of england held the basin to his neck , and the warlike king of france , henry the fourth thought it great glory that he was able to wash his head ; which he did with such dexterity , as if he had been bred up to that exercise ; though some malignants say it was without sope , and with very strong lye . this great monarch was presented by all the vertuosi of pernassus , with many pieces of poetry , and other elaborat writings , which he rewarded very liberally . he gave twenty crowns in gold to a literato who presented him with a solid discourse , wherein he shewed how the noble parthenope , and the whole flourishing kingdom of naples , which is now brought to utter desolation , by the plundering of souldiers , judges lewdness , by the barons pilling and polling , and by the general ransacking of the vice-roys , who are sent from spain to grow rich there , might be brought to its antient glory and splendor , and gave the discourse to his confessor , and willed him to have a care of it , as of that which was written very highly ▪ but he gave twelve thousand crowns a year rent to an excellent politician , who gave him a long treaty ; but clean contrary to the other , wherein was discust what way might be taken to afflict that kingdom of naples much more then it is now , and how it might be reduced to such calamity and misery , as that generous steed without or saddle or bridle , which the city of naples gives for her impresse , might be brought to bear a pack-saddle and a heavy burthen patiently , nay even to draw in a cart ; and moreover he made him a grandee of spain , affirming that it was discreetly written according to the true terms of good policy . all princes , commonwealths , and states , are justly weighed in the scales by lorenzo de medici . since it is clearly seen , that the commonwealth of rome , after the acquisition which she made of whole italy , could in a short space arrive at that universal monarchy , which was , and is so famous , and to which many ambitious princes have since in vain aspired : the empire and kingdoms which were afterwards built out of the ruines of so great a monarchy , came to a great contest , whether it were possible to hinder that potentate who should be suffered to grow to such a greatness of stature and strength , as that he was not to be counterpoised by anyone single other prince , as the commonwealth of rome could never be , after she had once got to be mistriss of italy , from arriving in a short time at universal monarchy . since it is evidently known by many occasions which have hapned , that peoples aid and succour are but vain hopes , and wofull remedies , by reason of the diversity of interests , and infinite jealousies , which use to reign amongst colleagues ; and the empires and kingdoms which arose in the world after the ruine of the roman empire , to the end that they might shun those calamities and dissolutions which those potentates underwent , who were opprest by the roman power , did wisely make an agreement , that all the princes of europe should meet together every fifteenth year , and that their forces should be weighed , and a due counterpoise and allay should be given to him who should be found to be grown to such a greatness , as might prove dangerous to his neighbours . many great wits were propounded for the honourable imployment of this poysing ; but for above these hundred last years , it hath alwaies been discharged by the princely house of medici , and particularly by the great lorenzo . at which prerogative , though many thought the pope was highly offended , and the venetian senat , who have been alwaies as watchful at least , if not more , to maintain the power of potentates equal as well in italy , as elsewhere , as lorenzo , or any of the florentines , yet all historians do agree that the weight of this business was bequeathed to lorenzo . the first day of august then , all the princes and potentates of europe met at phocides , to be present at the important affair of having perfect knowledge of their own actions , and ( that which imports more by much in matters of state ) of those of others . by antient and just prerogative the aristocratical monarchy of the apostolick sea , was put first into the scales ; and because the weight thereof did not exceed six millions of pounds the last fifteen years , and now it was found to weigh seven millions and a half , every one knew that the addition of the dukedom of ferrara was the occasion thereof : and then a vail being taken off , the sacred sharp edged sword appeared , shining as clear as the sun amidst spiritual and temporal authority . and because a thing of so great esteem cannot be weighted by the scales of humane judgement ; it was honoured , adored , and admired only by the minds of all men . next to this , the roman empire was brought to the scales by the seven princes electors ; which was found in the old books to have weighed seventy millions of pounds . but her healthful complexion being spoiled by the irregular living of many of her emperors , which made her be dreaded by every one ; she is fallen into such dangerous sicknesses , as after a long quartane ague hath terminated in a hectick feaver , which hath so macerated her , as nothing is seen to remain in her in this our age , but skin and bones . yet though she be so much lessened in revenue , she makes a fair appearance by the stately motion of her body . moreover , to the end that her intrinsecal imperfections may not be known , good people haue much imbellished her outwardly , and honested her with the antient title of august , and the majestical name of cesar. but when she came to the scales , she was found to be altogether empty within ; no feather being so light as the name of a prince without authority , is idle . the weight therefore of the roman empire did not exceed pound ; and this redounded certainly to the infinite shame of the lay electors , who were thought to be those that by their cunning had brought her to that unfortunate condition : for the common opinion was , that they had wrought it so , as those cities , and states which they themselves could not enjoy , should by rebelling against the empire , vindicate their liberty ; to the end that those emperors might not have power to regain those states by force of arms , which they had possessed themselves of with so much perfidiousness : so as to the miserable example of the vicissitude of humane affairs , the formerly dreaded roman empire , hath wickedly wasted her antient dominions , by her subjects avarice and ambition , and is now reduced into a lodging , with the miserable salary of seven duckets a month ; which is given her rather by way of recognition and alms , than as any due tribute : in so much as the house of austria , is forced to maintain the imperial dignity ( which is now brought to so low a condition ) out of her own patrimonial estate . and though this so great misery moved commiseration in many princes ; yet those who did remember the henrie's insolences , the cruelty of the fredericks , the seditions , impieties , and plunderings used by many other emperors in italy , affirmed freely , that it was not the rapacity of the electors , nor the germans infidelity ; but that it was the great wisdom of all the princes of europe , who for the good of the publick peace , cut the talons , and pluckt the chief feathers of the eagle , which had alwaies made profession to live by rapine ; and which made her self believe that all the people of europe , like so many tame pigeons were her prey . and it was observed by many , that the princes of italy did very much rejoyce to see the roman empire reduced to so great ruine , as those who remembred what hard usage they had often received from thence in italy . then was the flourishing and warlike nation of france brought to the scales by her famous peers ; a four-square edifice , of five hundred and fifty miles extent on every side , full of an infinite well armed nobility on horseback , who do not only maintain peace at home , but make so great a king formidable to all nations ; where are seen great abundance of sacred personages , which render her religious ; of learned men who do beautifie her ; of merchants and artificers who enrich her ; and of husbandmen who do make her abound in all good things . but nothing makes the beholders wonder more , then to see that the kingdom of france is a sea which is sailed upon , and a land which is sowed by all wines . the antient weight of this famous kingdom , was twenty millions of pounds ; but when she was weighed the last fifteen years , by reason of the great calamities she was put into by some of her disloyal barons , she reached not to twelve millions . and at this present she doth not only equal , but exceed her weight , in the best of her former times ; for she weighs millions , a thing which all men have much wondred at ; in so much as the spaniards put their spectacles upon their noses , and did observe very punctually , whether the weights were just or no. since bressia is added to the antient kingdom of france , given unto her by the duke of savoy ; which because it flanks the city of lions , hath increased her weight above one million . next the many kingdoms of spain were put into the scale by the spanish grandees . and to the great amazement of those old men that remembred that some sixscore years before those kingdoms were but meanly esteemed of ; the weight came to twenty millions : and they assured themselves , that by the addition of so many other states which were yet to be put into the scales , she would not only equal , but exceed the greatest weight of the french monarchy . they did then forthwith put into the scales , the flourishing kingdom of naples , which was believed would add two millions to the weight ; but did take a million and a half from the weight thereof . at which the spaniards being much astonished , said , that lorenzo had either used some cosenage , or else the scales of necessity must not be just ; since it was not to be believed that the weight should grow lesser by addition . and growing into great choler , the spaniards said that the medici should do well to be once quiet , and not add new offences , and things hateful to the spaniards , to the insufferable distastes of flanders , marselles , and aldighiera . lorenzo , without any the least alteration , reply'd to these resentful words , that his scales were just ; but that the neapolitans and millaneses did not add any weight thereunto , being so far distant from the strength of spain , and full of people who did so unwillingly undergo the dominion of forreigners ; and that the indies were void of inhabitants ; that the love and multitude of subjects , the fertility and conjunction of states , was that which weighed down his scales . then answering with some more shew of anger to the particular of flanders , marselles , and aldighiera , lorenzo said , that as long as the spaniards would keep themselves within the bounds of honesty , they should alwaies be beloved , honoured , and served by his gre●… dukes of tuscany ; but that they were very much deceived , if they thought they should ever be able to draw the medici out of florence , as they had done the unfortunate sforz out of millan : that states could not be deposited into the hands of princes , as monies were , with a mind to recall them in a fitting time : and that the merit of any gift , how great soever , was lost when one went about to reassume it . then the princes , who heard words begin to multiply , interposed themselves between lorenzo and the spaniards ; and breaking off that hot discourse , bad them proceed on to the scales . the spaniards put then thereinto the dukedom of millan , which withdrew likewise a million from the weight ; whereat the spaniards were so astonished , as they would not put flanders into the scales , fearing to receive som further affront . 't was said , that if they would have put in the indies , they might have done some good , but not such miracles as some wide mouthes speak of , who speak of millions of crowns with as much ease as pigeons eat pease . the english were next called in , who put their kingdom into the scales , formidable for the strength of its miraculous scituation , for the mountains wherewith she is invironed , serve for walls , made like bulwarks by gods own hand ; and the sea supplying the place of a deep ditch , makes her a redoubted kingdom , by reason of the commodity she hath to assail others , and the insufferable difficulties which they mee●… with , who will assault her . this kingdom the last fifteen years , weighed fifteen millions ; but at the present it comes short of nine ; the occasion of this decrease , to boot with the apostasie of that kingdom , was said to be because the king is of a forreign nation , a stranger to the kingdom , and therefore must require some time to sit fast in the saddle , and to get his foot into the stirrup of that his new kingdom : the english to add to the weight of their nation , would put the kingdom of scotland into the scales ; when all the scots nobility appeared with their swords drawn , and boldly said , they would never suffer that their kingdom should be joyned to the kingdom of england . 't is very certain that the king of england seemed not to be any whit offended with these men who had spoken so boldly in his presence , and in the presence of all the princes of christendom who were there present : but told them in very mild words , that this union of the scots would be of infinite commodity . to which the scots answered , that the sad example of the miseries of flanders was fresh in memory , which when she saw her counts become kings of spain , did foolishly believe that she should master the spaniards ; but it was not long ere flanders was sackt by the spaniards , not spain by the flemmish . and to fill their miseries up to the brim , the emperor charls the fifth , and king philip his son , who were formerly flemmish , being become spaniards , the unfortunate flemmish , for having lost their prince , from being natural subjects , began to be accounted strangers , and to have their loyalty suspected . and therefore flanders which was the native countrey of charls the fifth , and philip the seconds patrimony , in terms of modern policy , was become a conquered state ; and was therefore begun to be governed by forreiners , with such jealousies , hard dealings , such grievousness of new gabels , aids , contributions , and donatives , which ingendered those ill humors , and gave that bad satisfaction , which was the rise of the civil war that insued ; which after an unspeakable profusion of gold , an infinite effusion of bloud , and an incredible loss of honour to the flemmish , is turned by the spaniards into a merchandize . that the scots had learn'd by these deplorable miseries , not to suffer their kings to leave their countrey , and royal abode of their antient kingdom , and carry it to a greater kingdom whereunto he was lately called : which should they do , the scots were to expect all the calamities from their cruel enemies the english , when scotland should be united to england , and the scottish kings were become englishmen , which inferior nations are forced to suffer by superiors who rule over them . that scotland for misfortune would be like flanders ; and the english for their pride , cruelty , and avarice , like the spaniards . those that were present at this dispute , say , that the spaniards told the king of england , that those scots who had spoken with such arrogance in his majesties presence , ought to be punished . to whom the king of england answered , that the spaniards should not give that advice to others , which had proved so very pernitious to themselves . but commanding that they should forbear the business of the scales , assured the scots , that ere long he would give them full satisfaction . the vast ottoman empire was next put into the scales , which the last fifteen years arrived at the weight of millions ; but was found to weigh less then millions now . a novelty whereat those princes were much amazed , and particularly the venetians , who could not believe so great an abatement ; wherefore they desired that it might be again weighed , and more exactly : and it was found , that in the little interim of time betwixt the first and second weighing , it weighed less by pounds ; a thing which made it appear evidently to all men , that the ottoman empire , formerly the terror of the world , hasted towards its ruine ; which all the princes were very glad to see . 't is true , that the wiser sort of men observed that the spaniards jollity was altered , fearing lest the turks depression might turn to the exaltation of the venetian commonwealth . the senators of poland brought their kingdom next unto the scales , which by reason of the seditious heresies which they have suffered to creep in amongst them , by reason of the little authority which their king hath over them , and the over-great power which their paladines have arrogated to themselves , did not now weigh full out six millions , whereas formerly it weighed above twelve . after this , the wise grandees of the terra ferma , and the dreadful magistracy of the councel of ten , brought the flourishing state of venice , to the scales , miraculous for her greatness , and for her situation : she proved of good weight , for she weighed eight millions ; which was said to be , by reason of the mass of gold gotten in so long a time of peace , into her treasury by her wise senators . then the swissers , grisons ; and other free people of germany , brought their republick to the scales , which the princes desired might be weighed severally apart ; which the germans were contented with , if the poyser were able to do it . but when lorenzo had put the commonwealth of basil into the scales , he found that the greatest part of the other free states of germany were so link'd together , as it was impossible to separate them one from another . which made sweat appear upon the brows of many ambitious princes ; wherefore lorenzo , being necessitated to put them all together into the scales at once , was not able to raise up the heavier scale . the duke of savoy was brought next unto the scales by knights of the annuntiation , who weighed as much as he had done the last fifteen years : but when lorenzo put into the scales the noble prerogative which the same duke charls emanuel enjoyes , of being stiled il primo guerriero italiano , it added a million and pounds to his former weight . then with equal pomp and majesty to that of kings , did the duke of lorain appear ; whose state , though it were but small , equalled the weight of great kingdoms ; which hapned through his good fortune of having his territories so seated , as he can put great difficulties upon the low countries , by impeding the passage of succours which the spaniards bring from italy ; which raised him to such a height of reputation , as he sold that his adhearance at the weight of gold , to him that would give most for it ; in such sort , as after having assisted the spaniards as much as any of the devoutest french barons of the holy league , turning to the french who won the field , he faced about so fairly , as so great a king as was harry the fourth of france , the great duke of tuscany , and the duke of mantua were glad to have alliance with him . and to add to the spaniards jealousie , the very immortal state of venice did so affectionately take one of those princes into pay , as had not that illustrious lady vowed perpetual chastity , and had not her privy parts been sown upon the very first day of her birth , by venetian gentlemen who are very jealous of her chastity , many men thought she would have married him . the duke of savo●… was known to envy this prince his felicity very much ; for he being likewise placed as a bar between the french and the spaniards of millan , as was the duke of lorain between the french and the spaniards of flanders , yet had he received hard usage , both from the french when they were his enemies , and from the spaniards when his friends ; instead of so many good turns and advantages which he found in the dukes of lorain : so as every one thought the duke of savoy did now clearly perceive that the spaniards had practised pernitiously against him . next , the most flourishing state of the great dukes of tuscany was brought to the scales by the otto di balia ; very admirable for the excellent cond●…tions of her inhabitants , all of them being fructiferous , and who have alwaies taken pains both with their brains and bodies , for the exact government , perpetual plenty , peace and quiet which she enjoyes . so as she being altogether substance , weighed as much as any whatsoever famous monarchy . and lorenzo was observed to rejoice very much , when he saw that his successors , according to the model which the great cosmo had left them , had known how to build strong cittadels upon the foundations of churches and hospitals , which he and his ancestors had laid in their countrey , in the time of the florentine liberty . wherefore lorenzo , the more to shew the worth and wisdom of the princes of his family , put the sound headpiece of ferdinand the great into the scales , which weighed so very much , as the scales fell over and over , and broke the great chain which governed them , and all things went topsey turvey . all the princes were then aware of the prerogative which the court of rom●… hath in producing men of singular wisdom ; for that all knew so great a scholar came out of that school . the breaking of the scales was the cause why some italian princes who were yet to the fore , could not be weighed . wherefore it was agreed upon , that the monarchy of spain being according to antient custom , to be weighed against all the princes and potentates of italy , the particular weight of every italian prince should be calculated by the general weight of them altogether . a large and just ballance was therefore brought into the midst of the greater hall , into which on the one side were put all the kingdoms belonging to the monarchy of spain , and on the other all the italian princes : and the scales were found to stand in equal ballance . a thing which the italian princes were much troubled at ; who whilst they were in that agony , it was observed by all that looked on , that the powerfull monarchy of france , by one only loving smile which she cast upon the scale wherein the italian princes were placed , made it , to the great joy of all men , suddenly weigh down on their side . it must not be forgotten , that the spaniaros , when they saw the duke of savoy ( who refused the last fifteenth year to be put into the same scale with the rest of the italian forces ) put himself into the scale , to counterpoyse the spanish forces , in a threatning manner , bit their fingers at him ; the which when he saw , he with great generosity said unto them , you gentlemen of spain , it is now no longer time to feed men with hopes , i have at last clearly discovered all your tricks ; and do so call to mind your past actions ; as for the future , i will score up my accounts with another cole ; for yours , which till now i have only made use of , hath stained and scorched my hands too much . your baits of hope have not brought me yet to be such a fool , as to make me forgo the little bit of bread which i have yet in my mouth , to snatch at the shadow of the great spanish inheritance which i see in the bottom of the water . and the spaniards further complaining that the dukes of parma , modena , and urbine , the lord of mirandola , and the famous roman barons , gazitani , colonesi , and orsini , who have all of them the golden fleece , and are their pensioners , were weighed together with the italian forces ; whereas by the orders of that knighthood , and by the pensions which they received , they were bound to adhere to the spanish interest , and to contribute unto the spaniards greatness : they were by them answered , that the lords and princes of italy received the honour of the golden fleece , and rich pensions from the spanish monarchy , just as do those honorable ladies , who receive presents from their sweet hearts by way of courtesie ; not out of any intention to do the foule thing you wot of . why the monarchy of spain withdrew her self into her palace . because for many daies past the monarchy of spain had not been seen to come abroad , nay that not only she had been all this while retired into her own house , but had continually kept the gates of her palace shut ; the italian princes , and especially the venetians , who are not only the diligent observers of the actions , but the most subtile pryers into the very thoughts of that great queen , began to grow exceeding jealous of such a novelty : and because it was still impossible for them to know what might be the meaning of so much solitariness , they all concluded that there must needs be some great mystery in it . the venetians out of a jealousie for their states becoming impatient of any delay , with ladders set against the palace of the said monarchy , got in at the windows , and saw her hard at work ; and with a state-minister of hers , called the conte di fuentes , and some other sturdy fellows , very busie in stopping up all the holes in her house : whereupon the witty venetians very well foreseeing to what end all this pains was taken , advised their friends to arm themselves ; for the spaniards , as soon as ever they had stopped up the holes of supplies , would be sure to fall a hunting of the rats , to make a great massacre of them . the duke of alva being arrived at pernassus , in complementing with prospero colonna , he falls to cuffs with him about titles ; whereof he had defrauded the colonnesi . don fernando di toledo duke of alva , some few daies ago , came to pernassus , and according to an express order from apollo , diligent examination having been made of his actions , was , by the military men , found worthy to be admitted into pernassus amongst those famous captains ; who fighting with patience and art , knew rather how to overcome their enemies without bloudshed , then with open force and desperateness , to hazard the fortune of kingdoms in the doubtfull chance of a set battel . but because lodovick guicchiardin , a very judicious writer of the affairs of flanders gave in a complaint , that for some distastful things which he had written of the duke , he had been evil intreated by him , he was fain to wait yet a good while to clear himself of that foule imputation : for in pernassus there is yet in force an edict very strictly observed by apollo , wherein that prince or private man is declared to be fallen into a premunire , and liable to the penalty of reproach , that should dare to affront any historian , or other writer , for things written , though little for his honour , yet ( howsoever ) true : but so potent were the dukes friends , that guicchiardin was content to withdraw the suit ; whereupon he was admitted into pernassus with all the greatest solemnities possible , and had a place among his majesties gens d'armes , commanded by the famous quintus fabius maximus , who for his singular wariness was sirnamed cunctator . and it hapned , that among other princes and great commanders whom this duke visited , that one was the most excellent signior prospero colonna , of whom he was received with all sorts of honour , and so much the more , because he understood that the duke made publick profession of being a disciple , a follower , and imitator of that slow , but sure way of waging war , used by this signior prospero . but in this visit , there fell out a strange accident , and in truth a very troublesome chance : for at the first meeting , the duke having given to signior prospero the title of vostra merce , he grew into such a rage , that taking so base a title for a great affront , he said with an angry voice ; duke , i thought thou hadst come into my house to reverence one that is greater then thy self , not to undervalue him : but because the men of the house of colonna answer injuries done by words , with deeds , get thee out of this house , for in the street , with weapons in hand , i will make it good upon thee ▪ that they which proceed with such as i am , in base uncivil tearms , deserve not to be admitted into any commerce with men of honour . the duke was amazed at this so resolute resentment which he observed in that great commander , and resisting the violence that signior prospero used to thrust him out of the chamber , he fell to fisticuffs with him . and because the spaniards that were in the dukes company , seeing him struggle with colonna , came in to help him , the italians that waited upon signior prospero , did the same too : so that a great many men being gotten into a very narrow place , there insued a very cruel scuffle ; the noise whereof being heard into the street , was the occasion that the news of so dangerous an accident was suddenly carried to apollo : who in great hast dispatch'd away thither the lord lieutenant of that place , with a guard , which took the duke out of prospero's hands ; and having quieted the uprore , commanded the spaniards , who had been already shrewdly handled , to get them home again . then signior prospero , before any body could give in sinister information against him , presented himself before apollo , to whom it is reported , that with great haughtiness of mind , he spake these words : sir , it is well known to every one , that those of the house of colonna , which have been men of my quality , have alwaies enjoy'd the title of excellency , antequam abraham fuerit , and ere the spaniards were in rerum natura . now , that this nation should undertake to misuse such a one as i am , as at this very instant the duke of alva hath had the audaciousness to do in mine own house , is a thing by no means to be indured . for if the abjectness of him that makes the trespass , doth infinitely aggravate the injury to him against whom it is made , how is it possible that an italian baron of my quality , should contain himself within the bounds of modesty , when he sees he is so much undervalued by that spanish nation , whose miseries within these four daies , the whole world did so pitty , that the christians were fain to have gatherings for them in their churches , to free them from that wretched slavery , wherein they were so unfortunately oppressed by the moors of granada . the spaniards enjoy the dominion over the greatest part of italy , where , by such as i am , though every day they threaten us with cruel and universal slavery , they are lov'd , honoured , yes , and serv'd . and they with their portentous avarice have deprived us of our estates ; and in the deplorable sack of rome , with their unexpressible sensuality , have bereft our chastest matrons of their honours : yet that now in return of so prostrated a patience , they would fain take from us this little vapour of honour that we have left , and these poor titles , the unhappy remainders , and lamentable reliques of the italian reputation , is a thing so hard to be digested , that by every honorable baron of italy it ought to be revenged ; not with verbal complaints as i do , but with the daggers point . they that were present at this passage , say , that all the while signior prospero was speaking , apollo look'd something smiling : and still the angrier colonna grew , the more did the mirth of his majesties divine and resplendent face appear ; insomuch , that when signior prospero had broken forth into those over-daring words , that the gross abuses which the spaniards offer to the italians , ought to be revenged with the daggers point , he burst out into a downright laughter , and said , prospero , thou hast been , and alwaies wilt be , too cholerick . and i must needs tell thee , i am infinitely scandalized , that such a one as thou who hath alwaies made particular profession of a sound judgement , should wonder that slaves , which for twenty years together have been fed in a galley with black and musty bisket , when they light upon a batch of manchet , use to fill themselves , till their guts be ready to crack . yet that their outragious greediness , and every indecent action with which they use to gorge themselves , is so far from being odious to those good honest men which look on ▪ that it rather moves them to pitty . do you italians therefore give way too , that the spaniards ( men so newly come into the world , and but lately gotten out of the slavery under the moors of granada ) may glut themselves with diet so delicious to their taste , and with the honoured titles they have met with in italy . for i assure you , that as soon as ever they shall be satiated with these vanities , they too , as well as the french , will be so fair conditioned , that , not only to such as you , but to the very grooms of their stables , they will very gladly give the title of excellence . and let me tell thee , that if thou hadst that discretion , and that perfect knowledg of worldly things , as i ●…ould with thee , thou would'st very well know , that these exorbitances , and this so odious manner of behaviour which the spaniards use in italy , whereat thou art so extreamly vex'd , is as so much of the best sugar for you italians , and as so much of the bitterest poyson for the spanish nation : which if to her valour , to her subtilty , and to that inexplicable ambition of hers , she had added amiable conditions , by absolutely casting out that remainder of liberty which is not yet quite gone ; she would soon have made her self entire mistress of the universe . all whose insolencies would be revenged , not with the daggers point by you italians , but with all manner of cruelty by the monarchy of spain her self , upon her own spanish officers , who with their vapouring , distast the good servants of so great a queen , and make her soveraignty unpleasing to all her subjects . disorders , against which , some course of necessity must be taken , since they greatly hinder the main subsistence of that universal monarchy , to which with the publick ha●…e of all italy , it will not ever be possible for her to attain . and with this answer , apollo sent home again signior prospero , very well satisfied . after which , appeared before apollo , the duke of alva , with all his retinue , so mel●…ncholike , that the great store of unguentum album , then on their faces , made that those spaniards did not look so black as the moores come from granada , ordinarily use to be . then apollo , interrupting the duke in the complaints which he was about to make against colonna , said , duke , i like not that disorder which i understand hath lately fallen out ; and so much the less , as the cause of such a tumult hath been unjust , and no less dishonourable on your part . and upon this occasion i am pleased to put you italians in mind , that your not only being covetous ( as by every one you are known to be ) but your not using to be prodigal in giving others those titles which are desired , is a manifest signe of a malign nature . since ingenuous nobleness is known by shewing little greediness after titles , in receiving them ; and much liberality in giving them : for , not to speak of such as are due , even by those honours as are superfluous , he acquires more reputation to himself that gives them , then he that receives them . and for you spaniards , that would so rigorously ingross great titles to your selves alone , you are so far from increasing your good estimation by it , that you are rather grown so odious and ridiculous to people , that the italians ( born to scoff at every one ) when in their comedies they would represent to the world a perfect braggadochio , instead of a neapolitan , do not undeservedly personate it by a spaniard : a thing whereof you spaniards should be much ashamed : and i wonder you perceive not , that your intent of attaining to universal dominion , by means of affronting all men , is a going the clean contrary way to work . the hearts of men , duke , are taken with that bait of courtesie , with the whistle of gratitude , of civilities , and of being courteous ; for very ignorant doth that fowler shew himself , that ( as i see you spaniards foolishly do ) goes into a dove house to catch pigeons with a drum. and i tell you moreover , that if ever any nation had reason to bait the italians with honou●…s and dignities to bring them into their nets , and take them with their bird-lime , 't is you spaniards , because of the ends which you have upon italy . and besides , you should consider , that with those states of naples and milan , you are fastened there but with wax : for so long shall you govern those two members which you have there , as till the italians shall resolve to drive you out : who if after your ruine , they could be sure to keep themselves from falling into the hands of the french , you know very well , that with only a little trouble which they might give you in the port of genoua , they could put you into a thousand inextricable distresses . all which are things that admonish you to give satisfaction at least in words , to those , to whom by the dominion which you have in italy , you will be forced to give so many bitter distastes by your deeds . as for the affront which you say you have received from signior prospero ; i tell you plainly , that whatsoever mischief may be done you , upon such a titular occasion as this , i shall not only no●… express any resentment against it , but imagin that you have paid your self for it before-hand . then the duke would have excused himself , by saying that he had instructions from his king , how he was to carry himself towards the barons of italy in point of titles ; when apollo told him that the spanish insolence over the italians , reached not but to the neapolitans , and the milaneses ; and his majesty added , that if much passion had not blinded the spaniards , they might very well know that their grandees , whom spain it self cannot contain , and which in italy , will needs be playing the gyants ▪ when they come to be compared with the barons of rome , and those too but of the middle size , prove meer dwarfs . with that a cloud , white as snow , beginning by little and little to cover the person of apollo , the priests that were about him ▪ perceived that his majesty would prophesie . whereupon all of them being falne prostrate upon the earth , the duke , and the rest that were with him did the same . then was his majesties divine voice perceived to come out of that hollow cloud , and with a most delightful accent , thus it spake . i prognosticate to you , spaniards , that with your troublesome and odious behaviour , you will enforce the nobility of italy , mistress of the cruel sicilian even-song , to plot against you some bloudy neapolitan night-service . it being a custom most proper to the italians , with greater fury to revenge the insolencies of words , then the injuries of blows : as those who having short patience , and long hands , are not only born with hearts much inclined to great resolutions , but so that they use not to revenge their wrongs ( which when they do , they do to purpose ) till those which have done them , have quite forgotten them . and you , to your infinite ruine shall then find them , with arms in their hands , to be doughty orlando's : when you shall be fully perswaded that they are grown to be but so many over-jaded and dry-basted asses . boccace is as●…ssinated by salviati . leonardo salviati , a man ( as far as the present times , and the condition of the modern tuscans allow it , of singular learning , did an action two daies agoe , which hath been infinitely blamed by all the vertuosi . for about two a clock at night , at the entrance of forum maximum , having affronted signior giovanni boccacio , prose-master major to his majesty , he gave him many wounds , with which he so disfigured and maim'd him , that his most intimate acquaintance , which have seen him since this mischance , affirm that it is not possible to know him for that same bonny boccace which formerly he was . and that which infinitely aggravated so foul a fault , was , that salviati did not thus inhumane trespasses for any particular distast given him by boccace ; but at the request of the giunti , printers at florence , for greediness after five and twenty crowns , which they gave him by way of reward for so impious an act . in so much , that this morning , cavalier leonardo salviati , a man born of so noble a family , was , out of the publick pulpit , standing in the rostra , proclaimed a publick and notorious asassinate . the sicilian ambassadors cannot obtain audience from apollo ; but are disgracefully driven away by his majesty . in the port of pindus , about two daies agone there arrived a ship , which set on shore some ambassadors from sicily , sent by those of that island to apollo , about matters of great importance , who having given his majesty notice of their arrival , demanded audience . no sooner did apollo hear sicilians named , but he shewed open signes of extream indignation against them , and commanded luigi pulci , provost marshal of campania , to tell them he would not so much as see them , much less hear them ; and that therefore they should get them aboard again . for because of that insupportable wrong which he had received from the sicilians , he had of a long time firmly resolved never to have any commerce more with that nation . the ambassadors returning to their ships , obeyed his majesties commands ▪ to whom they sent an humble petition , wherein th●…y declared , that they were sent to give his majesty an account of the new drudgeries , the unheard of oppressions , the miserable impositions which they suffer from the spaniards . and that so calamitous were the afflictions wherein the miserable sicilians found themselves involved , that they not only deserved to be graciously listened to by his majesty , but were worthy to be pittied and bewailed by the most barbarous scythians that ever the earth bore . the petition was presented to apollo by the reverend father t●…maso fazzello , a very elegant writer of the affairs of sicily , who assured his majesty , that at this present , the miserable condition of the sicilians surpassed the utmost of all humane afflictions . apollo told fazzello again , that the sicilians demerits were such , as they had thereby made themselves most worthy of the hard usages whereof they complained so much . that therefore as soon as may be , he should give the ambassadors to understand , that if within two hours they did not pack out of the haven of pindus , he would have without more ado , their ship sunk with his cannon : for he was absolutely resolv'd not to see the face of any that was of that most unadvised nation , which was the first author of those horrid scandals , that had brought excessive miseries upon her self , and other people of europe : for having attracted that inhumane and ambitious spanish nation , before utterly unknown to italy , and the other provinces of europe , when with fatal resolution , they made themselves subjects to the kings of aragon . they then likewise gave the beginning to that fatal and cruel tragedy , whereof did the italian princes know what the conclusion of the last scene of the fifth act is likely to be , they would keep a perpetual fast , and upon their naked knees continually pray for the obtaining of divine aid , to free themselves from those mischiefs , against which it is apparent that humane remedies are not able to do any more good . fazzello then reply'd , that his majesty was not to be offended with the sicilians ; but that queen ioane the second , by her ever to be deplored adoption of peter of aragon , had occasioned the present evils of the spanish government in italy ; and that with very good reason , he might vent his discontents against that indiscreet and unchast lady . to this apollo answered , that indeed , those who had not an exact insight into princes secret thoughts ( as he for his part had ) laid the blame of the present slavery of italy , upon that queen ; but the truth was otherwise : for it was a clear case , that she would never , to defend her self from the french kings , have fallen into that error , of adopting a spaniard for her king , had she not first seen him a powerfull one , by his rule over the kingdom of sicily : and that the kings of aragon were no sooner called to the government of that island , but they began those designs upon italy , which for the italians exceeding great torment , have had but too good success : and that they were all so u●…questionably deserv'd by the sicilians , that to seek to lessen the calamities in which they did pennance for the sins of their indiscretion , was as heinous a kind of impiety , as it were an act of highest charity , to make them yet more severe , that they may serve for a manifest example to all nations , what bitter fruits the plant of wicked and cruel resolution doth in time bring forth , when out of a desperate rage , people run headlong into that abyss of subjecting themselves to the dominion of a forrein nation ▪ fazzello reply'd ▪ that all this had been very true , had the sicilians altered the rule of an italian king , to make themselves slaves to barbarians : but that having by their vesper changed the indiscreet and hairbrain'd french , into considerate and grave spaniards , it seemed that the intention of the sicilians having been good , deserved not such an odium from his majesty . at that , apollo grew extreamly incens'd againk fazzello too ; and full of indignation , he said to him , and dost thou think that was not a very lewd ignorance of the sicilians to remove from the insolence , the prodigality , the carelessness of the french government , to the cruelty , to the avarice , and to the insupportable strictness of the spanish ? were the sicilians only ignorant of that which is known to every man , that the dominion of the spanish over countries , is eternal : and therefore out of all question , deadly ? whereas the government of the french is just like a violent fever , though it may be very dangerous , yet it yields one some hope of life , and there are many medicines with which it may be cured ; as indeed you cured it with your sicilian vespers . a glorious vesper certainly , had you not by that physick brought your health into an infinitely worse condition . for , fazzello , those people that are wise , never take up the arms of rebellion , but when they are sure to gain very well by it , and to change bondage into liberty : for the fish which perceives he cannot make his passage out of the boyling oyle into cold water , thinks it less hurtfull for him , to stay in the frying-pan , than to make an escape , and leap into the glowing fire . sigismondo battori hath learned the latine tongue . yesterday , late in the evening , arrived at this court , the ordinary post of germany , who made every one joyful with the welcom tidings he brought , that the most illustrious sigismondo battori , late prince of transilvania , was grown so much in love with the latine tongue , that to his exceeding great glory , he spake and wrote it , with the purity and sincerity of cesars stile . whereupon all the vertuosi earnestly besought apollo , that for so joyful news , there might be made all those demonstrations of gladness , which when any prince is become learned , were usually made to encourage great men to love learning . but because his majesty sees into the inside of all things , he denied those vertuosi their request , and told them , that pernassus then only feasted , when princes took their learning , out of the free choice of a noble mind , and meer love to their books , not constrained by any necessity at all . and that they must all know that prince battori had attained to this elegancy of the latine tongue , not out of any ambition to shew himself learned , nor out of a vertuous curiosity to know many things , but out of the necessity he was put to , of correcting for his credit's sake , that simple boyish misconstruction which he committed in gender , number , and case , then , when in the hungarian war , he made that fatal resolution of taking up arms against the turks , that he might adhere to the emperor of germany ; of whom , having so strong and lively pretences upon the principality of transilvania , he should have stood in more fear , then of threescore and ten ottoman emperors . the french are freed out of the mad-mens hospital by the spaniards . some two daies ago , did apollo now at last cause to be releas'd out of the mad-mens hospital , a great number of french , that had lain there many years : during which time , in their raging fits , they had committed both against themselves and their friends , many lamentable trespasses , and had given cause sufficient for tears to all europe . now , because by affidavit formally given in to the court , of the most illustrious physicians ( or medici ) of florence , who have alwaies been assisting in the cure of the dangerous malady of that nation , it was made fully to appear , that they were recovered , they have been dismiss'd . but before their departure out of pernassus , his majesty sent for them , and told them , that for the future they should understand how to enjoy so flourishing and potent a kingdom with more discretion then formerly they had ; and that above all things , they should remember , that for the recovery of their healths , they had been wholly obliged to the spaniards , who with only appearing armed in france , and particularly in paris , had returned some brains into the beetle-heads of those frenchmen , that formerly had played such mad pranks in france . many and hearty thanks did then these frenchmen return to his majesty , and said they should be so far mindful of the wholsom counsel he gave them , that in measuring the distances of places , they would hereafter accustom themselves to make use of the italian mile , that so they might avoid that woful name of league : but as for the recovery of their brains , they were altogether beholding for that , to their most generous , and ever victorious king , henry the fourth , who with the splendor of his valour , had opened the eyes of the french , that had been foully blinded with spanish hypocrisie : besides that the spaniards , which had been the first authors of that lamentable french tragedy , had so cunningly gotten a trick to make way for themselves in france , with their glittering and most beloved double pistolets , that they had made both the foolish and the wise too , to run out of their wits . some for examples sake are made a spectacle to the people . apollo , to his singular discontent , was informed that the greater part of modern princes do not for the subduing of their enemies , make use according to the custom of the antient heroes , of open force , but sometimes of fraud : in the exercise of which they so much preval , that only by the powerful means thereof , they have made shift to bring their most important enterprises to pass . whence it is ; that the first weapon which these draw against their enemies , is that so shamefull one of corrupting the loyalty of their discontented subjects , and of stirring up the nobility to rebellion . wherefore to remedy such grievous disorders , about thirty years ago his majesty gave command that the most unfortunate , the count st. paul , the prince of orange , and the duke of guise , should be brought in a wheele-barrow by iohn francesco lottini , privy register of moral precepts in this court , and set under the porch of the delphick temple . whereupon these three great princes , with their hands fingerless , and all pittifully mangled , looking as if the dogs had gnawn them , were shewn by lottini , to the people that went in and out of the temple : to whom with a loud voyce thus he spake ; ye faithful vertuosi , devoted to learning , and sacred morality , take example by the so wretched calamity of these unfortunate princes , deprived of the use of their hands ( which god send you ever to enjoy ) and learn to know what comes of it , when men will be perswaded to be so simple , as to draw crabs out of their holes with their own hands , for the benefit of others . a discovery made , that the spanish officers are wholly concern'd in their own profits . three daies ago , about one a clock at night , forty carts of hay were seen to enter the royal palace of the spanish monarchy : and because the unseasonableness of the time filled with jealousie the french , the venetians , and other potentates , that live in perpetual jealousie of so formidable a princesse's greatness ; with exact diligence , inquiry was made , whether the carts carried any thing prejudicial under the hay ? and the spies brought in word , that under the hay were hidden chests full of mattocks , spades , and pickaxes . and because these are tools that belong to pioneers , the french were resolved to stand to their arms , and the venetians would needs lanch out those gallies that were in their arsenal ; when it was resolved , that before they would discover themselves , they should do well to be informed whether the spaniards had brought any other quantity of those instruments , or whether they expected any from some other place . and they were assured , that neither formerly had they received any , nor for the future did they expect any . and the spies added , that as soon as those chests were taken down , they were not carried into the royal magazine ; but all the grandees of spain , and the prime officers of that mighty monarchy , suddenly divided amongst them , those mattocks , those spades , and those pickaxes , with which the next morning , very early , with all speed , they fell to digging of ditches , to drawing of channels , to making of banks , and to loading the earth with a thousand aqueducts , every one with so much labour and diligence drawing the water to his own mill , as they had brought the publick affairs to such a sad condition , that the mills of the commonalty of spain could grind no longer for want of water . maximilian the emperor is advertised of the tumults sprung up amongst his sons . this last night there came in three posts to the emperor maximilian the second ; and instantly it was divulged , that they brought news , how matthias the arch-duke had taken up arms against his brother rodulphus the emperor , with which he seditiously claimed the kingdoms of hungary , of bohemia , of austria , and the absolute soveraignty over other provinces . these unhappy tidings infinitely troubled the emperors mind ; for he very well knew , that the discord arisen amongst his sons , afforded to the enemies of the house of austria that contentment , which they so much desired to see . whereupon yesterday morning very early , he presented himself before apollo , and with tears trickling down his cheeks , he desired to know when the disasters of the house of austria , long since begun by a cruel conspiracy of all germany against it , would come to an end , and for what demerit such bitter punishments were inflicted upon his family ? to this demand apollo answered after this manner ; great emperor , the persecutions , and all the troubles of your family will then cease , when it shall wholly give over those ambitious thoughts of desiring to dominier over hungary and transilvania ; which thoughts have put germany into such jealousies , that to secure her antient liberty from the power of your house , she studies nothing else but how to keep it down . for the germans fearing much greater mischiefs from your acquisitions , then from the turks victories , are absolutely resolved rather to lose vienna , then to take in buda : and then will the potent conspiracy begun against you be dissolved , and all germany heartily affect your arch-dukes , when laying aside their present ambition , they shall make it appear to all men , that they desire to be the other german princes equals , not their superiors . the doggs in the indies are grown wolves . vpon the twelfth of this moneth , about mid-night , came to apollo , a post sent from lisbon in all hast ; and told him that he had brought news of very great concernment from the west indies . very early next morning , all the literati ran to the palace-royal , to know what was the news . and the spaniards were the first , who with much carefulness , demanded if there were discovered in the indies some second monte di●…otossi , or some new rio della plata , whither they would fain go , and there sow the holy word of god ? the french were very inquisitive to know whether there were any new world found , that by making the spaniards so very potent ; might perfect the ruine of the old . but it was taken for a very bad signe , to see apollo , after he had read the letters , grow exceeding sad ; and that muffled up in a thick cloud , he fell a weeping bitterly . for which novelty , every one conceived that the post had brought very unhappy news . whilst then the place was full of literati , and every sort of vertuosi , which much afflicted , were there waiting to know the cause of his majesties so evident sadness ; after many claps of thunder , and infinite store of lightning , they heard a dreadful voice , which spake thus ; fast , be mortified , cloath your selves in sack-cloth , sprinkle your selves with ashes , eat your bread mingled with tears , o ye that inhabit the earth , and with prayers appease the wrath of god ; with a contrite heart , and a pure spirit , beseech him that of his infinite mercy he would vouchsafe to free that part of mankind as dwels in the old world , from those portentous novelties , which for certain have hapned in the new . at such terrible news , the vertuosi for very grief fell a swouning ; and believing that the west - indies had either been consumed by fire , or drowned by water , were much afraid of the same disasters . for which all the people of pernassus being in a terrible fright , with abundance of tears , sighs , and howlings , whose like was never heard , cried out , mercy ! mercy ! and humbly intreated his majesty that he would reveal to his devoted subiects , what those mischiefs were , from which they were to beseech almighty god that they might be freed . then from the same royal seat was heard a second voice , giving them all to understand , that the dogs which the spaniards had transported into the indies , to preserve the flocks from wolves , were grown wolves themselves ; and that so ravenous ones , as in devouring sheep , they surpassed in greediness and cruelty , the very tigres . after so unhappy tidings , there was heard a publick lamentation of all the literati , every one bitterly complaining , that the dogs which had charge of the sheep , should become such greedy wolves , that they devoured the flocks . ●…o what guardians shall the shepheard here-after trust their flocks , the guardianship of dogs , which have been so faithful to their shepheards , being no longer secure ? and why came there into the world the species of sheep , the most unfortunate of all animals , since they must be a prey , both to wolves their enemies , and to dogs their friends ? whilst all the nations in pernassus , for the great affright they were in , look'd as if they would sink into the ground , only the flemings , and the rest of the low-countrey-men were observed to go up and down pernassus undaunted , encouraging every one to cheer up , and not to be out of heart , saying there was no calamity threatned to any man , which may not be happily avoided by stout resolutions proceeding from spirits unmoved . whereupon the flemmings cry'd aloud to every one , that likewise in their countrey , the dogs whom the spanish shepheards had set to keep the flemmish flock , were grown to be such ravenous wolves , that with savage cruelty they devoured the sheep , and had consumed all the flemmish flock , if by the resentment of that couragious resolution , which is known to all the world , they had not taken a course ●…or it . that therefore if those mischiefs which are reported to have ●…en out in the new world , should happen in the old , every one ought to know that the true way for chasti●…g of those dogs which have a scurvy quality of worrying sheep , was to give them some low-countrey nux vomica , and make them burst , as they deserved . the spanish monarchy visits the queen of italy , and there passe between them complements full of kindenesse . so great was the affright which the most illustrious queen of italy was in , when she perceived that the most puissant kings of france , at that time become lords of the kingdom of naples , pretended to the soveraignty over the dutchy of millan : and though they made a shew of continuing in their antient amity , yet did they very cruelly lay snares , both against her life and reputation ; and all this with such bitterness of minds enraged , that what with the machinations of money , what with the crafty wiles of the pen , they held up , even in peace , a cruel war for many years . now whilst the heart-burnings and jealousies betwixt these two queens were at the fiercest , and their minds were observed to be poysed with the most deadly feud ; the monarchy of spain , beyond all expectation , went with a train worthy her greatness , to give the queen of italy a visit ; who entertained her with such demonstrations of honour , and of intimate affection , that all the literati , who in the face both of the one and the other princess , took more notice of the motions and dispositions of the mind , then of their fine verbal complements , knew for certain , that there was grown between them a perfect and real reconciliation . nay , never since the memory of man , did there happen in pernassus any peace or concord , which did more astonish the vertuosi there , and make them more curious to know the true cause of so strange a thing . and because the philosophers , the poets , and other literati , of whatsoever science , are but dim-fighted in the art of discovering the true ends of those wary resolutions which great princes take , they made their recourse to the university of the politicians , whose peculiar profession it is , by the light of that knowledge which they have of all potentates interests to know how to penetrate into the abditos princip●…m recessus , & quicquid occultius habent . from whom they received this answer ; that the queen of italy , to secure her liberty from the arms of so potent a nation , was inforced to joyn with the spanish monarchy ; but that perceiving how she also having gotten into her hands the kingdom of naples and the dutchy of millan , did with more earnest ambition , with more profound artifices , and with more fraudulent machinations , than the french themselves , put in for the soveraignty of all italy , and that to compass this end in the minority of henry the second 's sons , she endeavoured to embroil france , and how for the base panders of her vast ambition , and for agents for the common bondage of italy , she made use of some principal ( but indiscreet ) italian princes , she began to hate her so extreamly , that by every sort of flight , the one sought the ruine of the other : but that since , by the unfortunate end which at last the business of savioneda came to , the monarchy of spain plainly perceived that the purchase of all italy was not feasible , and a business utterly to be despaired of , she gave over that ambition of being mistress of it all , to wh●…h she was before wholly addicted ; and observing that the greater part of her troubles in flanders , and elsewhere , had sprung from those ambitious thoughts , she perceived there was no better way for the setling of her own affairs , then to let others live in quiet : and because she palpably found , that without the friendship , the favour and aid of the italian princes , it was not possible for her quietly to possess the kingdom of naples , and the dutchy of millan , she was desirous with that visit , to pacify the troubled mind of that queen . a policy , which the ●…oliticians called a very good one : for what manner of men would begin to rouse up themselves , if the spaniards should but make as if they would fall upon brescia , b●…rgamo , turino , and genoua , when for offering to take in that poor petty town of savioneda , there were contrived against them ( and that by those from whom it was least expected ) such machinations , that the quail ●…ad bin caught in the trammelli , and could not have avoided falling into the spaniels mouth , had she not couragiously resolved to make a breach in the net , and so to save her life by getting out at a torne mesh . the monarchy of spain throws her physician out of the window . this morning the monarchy of spain having sent for her physician in ordinary , presently after she her self with her own hands , threw him out of the window of her royal palace : so that the poor wretch having all his bones broken to fitters , died immediately . an accident which seemed so much the stranger , in that the physician was held by all the court to be a very honest man , and in the exercise of his profession , admirable . diverse were the discourses made upon so notorious a novelty . but apollo desiring to know the true cause of this hideous resentment , from the spanish monarchy her self , she told him , how about forty years ago , by some fittes that she had , and by other signes which were discovered , she was afraid that in process of time , she should catch some dangerous french disease or other , of the royal house of bourbon ; and to provide aga●…nst the mischief she foresaw , she ask'd counsel of her physician ▪ who prescribed her a tedious , fulsom , and chargeable purge , of divers oyles of holy leagues , of insurrections of people , of rebellions of nobles , of cauteries , and other very painfull medicines , in which she had wasted her stomack , weakened her strength , and quite lost her appetite : and that the infinite store of syrops , and the many medicines taken with so much anguish , had procured nothing but the acceleration of the malady ; which had it not been for that unlucky and unseasonable purge , would perhaps never have come : besides , that the continual and ravenous leeches which were applyed to many parts of her body , had so suck'd out the best vital bloud of h●…r spanish gold , that by reason of her weakness of constitution , she was not able to evacuate those bad humours of flanders which have so much oppressed : her for which disorders , all occasioned by the exceeding bad counsel of that indiscreet doctor , she was so vex'd at him , that she seriously swore to him , that if to free her from future infirmities , he ever prescribed her a purge again , she would throw him out of the window . and that perceiving the low-countrey ach , which at this present she feels in her shoulders , to be an absolute french pox , she had asked counsel of the same doctor , how she might be rid of it : who unmindfull of his former errors , very simply prescribed her the other purge , for all the world just like the first : and that hereupon , overcome with passion , throwing him out of the window , she was desirous to punish him for his first fault in his second . and she conceived that he had deserved the misfortune , because he had not learn'd by that case which had proved so unlucky to her spaniards , to know , that purges made before the time , for evils that are but feared , work not those good effects which the physician believes , and the patient desires . the cardinal of toledo's summa is not admitted into the library of pernassus . the most illustrious and right reverend francisco cordouese cardinal of toledo , a personage of exemplary life , an exquisite divine ; and a prime philosopher , one , that while he lived , did more honour to gods word in the pulpit , than any other preacher whatsoever , appeared some few daies agone in pernssus , being met at the borders of this state , by alexander de hales , and by monsignor cornelio musso , bishop of bitonto , and entertained all the way at his majesties charge . this honoured literato presented his writings to the reverend college of the vertuosi ; and those which treated of philosophy were not only praised , but admired , as likewise the commentaries which he had made upon the subjects of divinity , were received by all the sacred wr●…rs with extraordinary applause ; and presently they were carried in a sumptuous urne under a canopy , into the delphick library , and with the name of so great an author consecrated to eternity . only his summa , though very learned , was not received by those vertuosi ; who plainly said ; there was such a multitude of these kinds of summaries and collections in his majesties library , that some of them seemed superfluous : for an infinite number of the greatest divines had with such diligence handled matters appertaining to private mens c●…nsciences , that they had put to arbitrement the salvation of mens souls , upon a three farthing business ; and that the world did very much desire to see a compleat collection made of cases touching the consciences of great princes : a subject very necessary for the universal tranquillity , and yet wholly omitted by divines . in which collection men should exactly discourse upon those act●…ons of princes , wherewith they so often put the world in confusion ; filling it with pillages , plunders , and so many murthers , that many of them blinded with an ambition of reigning upon the earth , have made it flow withrivers of humane bloud . and the most judicious college of the literati hearing these particulars , desired that they should dispute and resolve upon these present questions , viz. whether christian piety doth admit of that pretence of right ▪ which the violence of the sword hath usurp'd upon other mens estates ? w●…ether a principality taken either by force or fraud , from another prince , may be held by one that hath the true fear of god in him ? whether the determination of governing a kingdom that is conquered , with a purpose only to impoverish and waste it , that he may reign over it without jealousie , may be put in practice by him that hath been bred up in the christian faith ? and whether to set and cry up meer damn'd policy , called ragione di stato so high , that at this instant she tramples upon all laws , humane and divine , be not a more detestable and accursed idolatry , then to adore nebuchadnezzars image and the golden calf ? lastly , the college declared , that then their desires should be fully satisfied ; when there should be found one divine so truely fearing god , that with his writings he had affrighted princes from doing amiss , as ( 't is confess'd ) many of them have with a great deal of pains terrified private men . for it seemed to them unreasonably strange , that such a multitude of learned divines should so trouble themselves to dispute of the strict account which shop keepers were to give to the divine majesty , even for idle words ; and yet should forbear to make any mention of those horrid offences which great princes commit , when with armed troops plundering mens states , they bring all things , both sacred and prophane , to utter destruction . and that their ministers should , with far greater benefit to mankind , and eternal rewards to themselves , have discoursed upon the actions of lewis the twelfth , and francis the first , both kings of france ; of ferdinand king of aragon , and of the emperor charls the fifth , whose souls departed this world charg'd with the heavy load of half a million of homicides ( all of them committed out of an ambition to reign ) for which they were to give a very strict account to god ; when to stuff up volumns with the venial sins of privat persons . all which would be things very necessary , to the end that mankind , so much afflicted by the ambition of princes , may one day receive that consolation , which with so much anxiety it longeth for , that those which reign may be frighted from evil-doing ; and be brought to know , that hell was made as well for mighty persons as for mean. almansor , that was king of the moors , meeting with the kingdom of naples , they two fall a weeping , and rehearse their miseries brought upon them by the oppression of the spaniards . the most famous king of the moors , almansor , he that for many years governed the noble kingdom of granada in spain , met yesterday with the kingdom of naples , and walking to and again , began to discourse with him : and after he had for a good while viewed well the chain which this kingdom of naples wore about his legg , he told him , that being of morisco ▪ work , he thought he had often seen and handled it : and a little while after , with gestures of much amazement , he assured him that he knew it very well , and that it was the very same , with which he and the mauritanian kings , his predecessors , had for seven hundred years , kept many kingdoms of spain in bondage : and that therefore he earnestly intreated him , that he would discover to him , how , by whom , and when he was enchained . a good eye , and a very excellent memory hast thou almansor ( answered then the kingdom of naples ) for this unhappy chain which thou seest upon my legg , was brought from spain by consalvo cordoua , called il gran capitano : and therefore i think it very likely to be the same you speak of : and 't is now a hundred years that i have been in that miserable slavery which you see me in . from which i know not whether ever i shall be able to free my self : because , by reason of the excessive power to which i see the spanish forces are risen , having utterly lost all hope of aid that i can expect from men , i know my antient liberty lies all in the powerful hand of god , who must renew upon me the miracles of the red-sea , if ever i recover . the years ( reply'd almansor ) do agree very well ; for it was but a little before thy bondage that the spaniards loosned from off the kingdom of granada's legg , this chain , with which they have bound thee : but do me the singular favour , good neapolitan kingdom , to tell me how it was possible for the spaniards to make themselves masters of such a kingdom as thou art , so potent , and so far distant from their forces . by fraud , almansor ( said the kingdom of naples ) did the spaniards get footing in italy ; for with open force they would never have been able to have made such notable atchievements , and ( as you say very well ) so infinitely surpassing their forces , and those too lying so far off . but listen , and you will be amazed at the exceeding large conscience which in matters of state , a king of spain had , though he used incomparable artifices to be taken amongst fools for a saint macarius painted upon a wall : for you will hear a tragedy , according to the rules of my christian religion , cruel and impious ; but according to the tearms of modern policy , the most witty , as ever any nation represented upon the stage of the world. alfonso my king , to his final , and my principal ruine , gave his grandchild isabella ( ●…or from that unhappy marriage , had my ruine its beginning ) for wife to giovanni galeazzo duke of millan . at first the unfortunate princes childhood , afterwards his unspeakable sottishness , encouraged lodovico sforza to seise upon his nephews estate . alfonso ( as it behooved him ) sought to hinder this usurpation . of which ●…ent lodovico being aware , and knowing , that without the ruine of my kings , 't was impossible for him to compass the end of his unjust desire , he threw himself headlong upon that resolution which since proved so fatal to him , to me , and all the italian princes , of calling the french into italy , for the gaining of me . my kings , to defend themselves from so puissant enemies , called in to their aid , that good soul , ferdinand king of aragon , their cousin ; who shewed himself such a loving kinsman , and so faithful a friend , that instead of driving out the french , he shared me out betwixt himself and them ; and to perfect the tragedy in all points , a little after this unhappy dividend , he made war upon the french , whom having overcome , he forced to return into france , with abundance of shame and loss . whereupon the good king ferdinand , without any scruple of conscience , became my absolute soveraign : and then it was that he clapt on my legg this chain , which you have taken notice of for your countrey-making and workmanship . and i make a question , whether in the chronicles of the saracens , of the moors , or of the turks ( which you must needs have read ) there be found registred a more treacherous act , committed by a king , who would needs be esteemed a man of a most saint-like conscience , and one that bare a very good mind , and who but a little before had received from the apostolike sea , the glorious title of the catholick king. certainly ( reply'd almansor ) in the chronicles which you have named , one may reade of very foul actions done by divers princes , out of an ambition after soveraignty ; but this which you have related of ferdinand , goes beyond them all . but ( said the kingdom of naples ) if you almansor , and your nation have held the kingdom of granada enchain'd so many hundreds of years , what course did the spaniards take to set it at liberty ? that fatal union ( reply'd almansor ) of the kingdoms of castile , with those of aragon , which ensued upon the marriage of ferdinand and isabella , was it that occasioned the kingdom of granada's liberty , and most unhappy union ! which the greatest potentates of europe have bewailed , do bewail , and with true tears everlastingly shall bewail , no less then i have done , and do ; as that which hath been the true and onely root from which have sprung all those mighty subversions of states that at this day are seen in many parts of europe ; and more notoriously in italy . and believe me ( neapolitan kingdom ) i had reigned happily in spain to this very day , had not that pestilent union broke the neck of my greatness . for those so fierce jealousies that were between these castilians and the aragonians , were my impregnable citadels , which would have made me reign in spain eternally . yet take it upon my word , the assistances that the popes gave to ferdinando and isabella , did greatly hasten on my suppression . peace good almansor ( quoth the kingdom of naples ) no more of that , if you love me : for after you were driven out of spain , the popes suffered so great miseries from that ambitious nation , that it may be very truely said , they then purchased with ready money , those infinite calamities which they have met withall . for , although the sea apostolike was very well contented to see the mauritanian kings driven out of spain ; yet did that great pleasure prove extreamly painful , by my servitude which followed soon upon it : the popes having never dreaded any thing more , then that i should fall into the hands of some potent prince , who might make them live in those perpetual jealousies , wherein finding themselves at this instant plunged up to the very eyes , many of them , and specially those that have most insight in the affairs of the world , take but little rest in their beds . a clear testimony of the truth of what i tell you , was that lamentable and most vil●…anous sack of rome , committed by the spaniards a little ●…fter my bondage ; with which ingratitude they paid the apostolical sea all they were in her debt , both for the release of the tribute of naples , and those succours besides , that they had from her in the war of granada . a calamity which passing the bounds of any the do ▪ efullest miseries , hath so open'd the eyes of even the most drowsie-witted men , that every one begins to perceive what it is , out of a zeal towards piety , to unchain lions . for no sooner did the spaniards perceive themselves freed from that encombrance , which the moors of granada were to them ; but by reason of that ambition which they openly declared , of desiring to sway the universe , there were discovered not only in italy , but all europe over , most important jealousies of state , most troublesom differences in points of religion : in so much , as i have heard it maintained by men of very good understanding in the affairs of the world , that perhaps it would have been better for the princes of europe , that you had still reigned in granada , then that the spaniards should have come over into italy , to get from us such important estates as now they possess there . which disorder hath caused such an alteration even in matters of religion , that they which know how to discourse of the true causes of the weighty resolution of princes , stick not to say , that the fear which germany was in of the monstrous power of the emperor charls the fifth , was the occasion that the moors which were in granada , are changed into those many hereticks which our age beholds in germany , and elsewhere . ( a race of men so execrable , that with their hainous impiety they have defiled a great part of europe . ) to this very sad disorder of sacred things , are added the prejudices both publick and privat , which my ruine hath both brought , and continually doth bring to the italian princes ; and more particularly to the popes . for no sooner had the king of spain clapt this chain about my legg , but they began to aspire to the soveraignty of all italy : and to come quickly to it , they had a very excellent way of interessing themselves in the differences that were in agitation between the italian and french princes , touching the possession of the dutchy of millan ; in which , that man of men , charls the fifth , carried his matters so , that he made himself to be known for a grand-child worthy of his grand-father by the mothers side . for having with the forces of the italian princes , driven the french out of italy , instead of re-investing the sforzi into the state , as had been agreed upon between him and the other confederate princes , by the deceitfulness of a thousand turkish cavils which he made a shift to invent against those poor dukes , he made himself absolute master of that so important dukedom . hold ! good neapolitan kingdom ( saith almansor ) and make a stop here . well ; if that disorder hath likewise ensued , that the noble state of millan is fallen into the spaniards hands , what hinders them , that they do not suddenly take in all italy ? and if your slavery hath made it apparent to the world , that the aids and succours of princes , serve rather for the benefit of him that gives them , then for the profit of him that receives them ; why did not the italian princes rather suffer the french to rule over millan , then by receiving aid from the spaniards , run the hazard that so important a member of italy , as that dutchy , should fall , as indeed you say it did fall , into the power of the kings of spain . what hinders ? ( reply'd the kingdom of naples ) why the power of the kings of france , defending from the spanish ambition , that remainder of liberty which is yet left in italy : for those glorious kings , for the interest of their own greatness , will not endure it , that the soveraignty of all italy should fall into the power of the ambitious spaniard , who hath not been able to quench his vehement thirst of reigning with the purchase of all the new world which he hath discovered , and so much of the old as he doth possess . besides that the italian princes , who know in how shrewd danger of a mischievous and most wretched slavery , they stand , are so united together , that although they be many in number , yet make they up but one body ; and the spaniards which have used , and still do use all possible artifices to disunite them , perceive that they were as good let it alone . but as for the state of millan , you must know it was judged safer for the publick liberty of italy , that the said dutchy should fall into the power of the spaniards , then if it had remained in the hands of the french ; who bordering upon italy , if once they had possession of never so little a part in it , 't is a thousand to one but they would make themselves absolute masters of all . but in the spaniards the case was clean contrary : for their forces , though very great , yet lie so far off , that with a great deal of difficulty , can any be transported such a long way by sea , out of spain into italy , for the making good of what they have gotten there already ; much less such as would be sufficient for subduing of the whole . you say true ( quoth almansor ) but go on in your relation to me , of the prejudices which your falling into the spaniards hands hath brought to the popes . know ( reply'd the kingdom of naples ) that whereas formerly the popes were a terror to my kings ; now the case is clean otherwise ; for they live in extream torment , lest one day there should happen to be an union of naples with millan ; which they perceive to be the scope of all the spaniards intentions ; whereupon the spaniards ( whose proper nature it is , to reap singular profit from the fear in which they perceive they have put their neighbouring princes ) have arrogated to themselves such high authority in the court of rome , that they boastingly give themselves out for the true arbitrators of all important matters that are handled therein . besides what i have told you , there is this more ; when the kings of naples were not kings of spain , the popes with every slight , threatning to deny the investiture , got from my kings principalities , dukedoms , marquissates , and other great estates , by way of present ; besides , that the kings bought their friendship with alliances , and every other sort of liberality . but that fear being now over , if the popes will aggrandize their kinsmen with the titles of important states , they must pay for them with ready money . and the subtile kings of spain , over and above the precious gold of intreaties which they will have howsoever for the first payment , sell afterwards at dear rates . important interests , and grievous disorders ( quoth almansor ) are these you have told me ; but how comes it to pass that you , kingdom of naples , who are the magazine of silks , the granary of italy , go so ragged , and are so lean ? as long as the spaniards ( answered the kingdom of naples ) that come naked out of spain , will within four daies after they are arrived at my house , be covered all over with gold ; needs must i strip my self to cloath so many , and such pittifull tatter-de-mallions . moreover , did you but behold the greediness of the vice-roys , that are sent to my house to repair their fortunes ; and did you know the rapines of the secretaries , of a thousand officers , and other courtiers , whom every viceroy brings with him , all thirsting after my bloud , you would extreamly wonder how it were possible for me to satisfie the ravenous and dog-like unsatiableness of such a company of starvelings . as for that small store of flesh you see about me , the spaniards say they find it written in a certain book of a florentine , which hath given out rules of the cruel and desperate modern policy , that being a conquer'd kingdom , i must ( like those barbary-horses which are employed only in running of races ) be kept low . and how ( added then almansor ) are the millanois handled ? why they too ( reply'd the kingdom of naples ) are bathed in the same water , wherewith you see me so wet . only this difference there is betwixt us , that at millan it drops in , and in my house it powres in amain . the true causes of this diversity of usage , are the qualities of the lombards inclinations , very much unlike to those of my neapolitans : for the nobility of the state of millan is naturally humorous , free , resolute , and far from those vices that are most proper to my neapolitans , of flattery and affectation : but so ready to lay about them , and of that wavering disposition , as i dare say , were there but one head-piece of cremona amongst my barons , it would be sufficient to obstruct that on-forced donative , that hath brought me to live upon bread and onions : which though it had been often demanded by the spaniards in millan , and that in very high tearms , they were told again , that they should mind their own livelihoods . besides that the neighbourhood of the grisons , of the duke of savoy , and of the venetians , are some cause , why the kings of spain proceed in millan with more discretion . when the popes stood to their arms , i was then , for their sakes , much respected too . but withdraw , good almansor , for i see my most capital enemy , don pietro di toledo coming this way , and i would not by any means he should perceive that i make my moan to you : and certainly , even for this , may my slavery be tearmed most unhappy , that i am enforced to call this miserable condition which you see hath brought me to the last gasp , a most happy golden age. the conte di fuentes is admitted into pernassus . don pietro enriquez gusman , count of fuentes , was admitted the last consistory into pernassus , but with a very severe censure , because apollo would be exactly resolved whether in the time that for many years he had governed the dutchy of millan , he had given any distast to those italian vertuosi , who for the admirable fruitfulness of their wits , born to the invention of elegant things , are deservedly called by his majesty , the first born sons of learning . and albeit that among other objections made against that truely famous man , that accusation did him most prejudice , wherein he was ●…axed for giving his mind to that mischievous husbandry of sowing jealousies , and planting contentions ( by which he had made those italian potentates whose friendship he should have procured with all the skill he had , to be suspected by his king ) more then to the government of the people , yet were the difficulties of the heaviest accusations taken off by the conclusive proof of his having been in italy a prodigy of nature , a monster never seen before , a spanish officer that hated money . for which things f●…ntes was declared to be very worthy of a residence in pernassus . and because apollo took him for a singular lover of justice , and a capital enemy to roaring boyes , of which sort of rascallity he knew that he had purged the state of millan , and that he had laden with it the gallies of spain , he gave him the superintendency over the satyrick poets , with full authority to punish some poets that in pernassus playing the libellers with their defamatory verses , wounded the honour , and maimed the reputation of persons of quality . and the lord high chancellor of the court sent to the count the patent of his admission in a very rich basin of gold , together with all the acts of grace , prerogatives , honours , and pensions accustomed : but with a restraint under apollo's own hand , wherein his majesty strictly commanded him ; that he should not by any means presume to stir out of dores in the month of march. bitterly did fuentes make his moan to apollo of this so strange a restraint , not used in the letters patents of bartolomeo alviano , of pietro navarro , of antonio di leva , of the marquiss of pescara , and of other commanders that were his camerades there . and with all subtilty of rhetorick he besought him that it might be taken off : but all in vain ; for apollo bad him plainly be quiet : since were not he himself in that month withheld by the important respect of not leaving the world without light , he would have pretermitted his wonted journey , that he might not afflict mankind with an evil quality he hath , which is , to stir up pernicious humors in men , and not be able to dissolve them . that therefore he would not at that time have a person seen in pernassus , which had the same defect , more then himself . for all this , the spanish nation ( liberal in making a great shew of matters that go on their side , and most skilfull in concealing such as go against them ) did with artificial fires , with squibs , and vollies of cannon-shot , make signes of extraordinary jollity for the admission of the count into pernassus . in which it hapned , that an hour within night , while the court wherein the royal palace of the monarchy of spain stands , was thronged with princes , who taking delight in beholding those rarities , went up and down disporting themselves ; fuentes , whether out of a seditious genius , or the dictate of a mind desirous of novelty ; or out of some private distast , or to disturb the quiet of italy , offered to dismount him in war , who commanded in peace . forth he came ; and as he was going to fasten a long squib of wild-fire upon an italian prince , it took fire so suddenly , that it went off in his hand , and the flash did so singe his face , having monstrously besmutted him , that immediately he went out of pernassus ; some say , to get himself cured in some secret place : others say 't was for shame , that the dammage and affront which he would have done to another , was returned upon himself . but the more common opinion is , that he will come no more into this state , lest people should jeer him , for having by such an action , utterly lost all that honour and reputation , which for so many years he had purchased by his upright government of millan , and by his most important enterprises in flanders . all the states of the world are censured in pernassus for their errors . apollo having no business which runs more in his mind , then that the princes of the universe should by the upright government of their states , give that satisfaction to the people as they ought , did many hundreds of years ago ; introduce into pernassus an admirable custom : which was , that every year the names of the chiefest potentates on earthshould be written in little scedules , and the princes should be drawn out of an urne , one by one : whom , in the presence of all the sacred college of the literati , the publick censor of politick affairs should put in mind of the disorders which he had observed in the government of their states , withall binding the said princes , either out of hand with important reasons , to make good the things laid to their charge , or within the space of a month to amend them . an institution certainly most noble and religious ; seeing that in the progress of so many ages that it hath been put in practice , it hath been an occasion that many princes have mended an infinite number of their errors . besides , that knowing they must be called to such a strict account , they study to live so vertuously , that they may not come to be disgraced in the presence of so many princes . on the day appointed them , all the potentates of the universe appeared before apollo ; and count baldassar castiglione , politick censor , told giovanni della casa , nuntio for the apostolike sea in this state , and who was first drawn out of the urne , that it seemed to him a very scandalous thing , and altogether unworthy the majesty of popes , that there should be seen in rome , some potent famlies , to whom it was , instead of a rich patrimony , to make themselves known to forreign princes , ill-affected to the greatness of the seaapostolike , for such as upon any occasion are ready by the forces of their faction , to put the popes to a great deal of trouble ; and that with much truth he could say , that in all his time , he had not seen a more foul and execrable act , then that which the emperor charls the fifth did , when he rewarded the cruel seditions , and shameless treacheries which cardinal ●…ompeo colonna used towards pope clement the seventh , with the most noble charge of the government of naples . monsignor giovanni then ask'd the count , how long 't was since he had frequented the roman court ? and he answering , threescore and ten years ago : the nuntio reply'd , he should go thither again , now : for he would find , that the pompei , the fabritii , the prosperi , and the ascanii of the family of colonna , the virginii , and other principal barons of the house of the orsini , had eaten such store of sowre grapes , as their grand-childrens , and great-grand-childrens teeth are so set on edge , that they cannot chew so much as their pottage . for the popes , who tied those exorbitances about their fingers , knew so singularly well how to put tarquin's precept in practice , that they had brought the poppies formerly as tall as cypresses , to the low growth of ridiculous shrubs . at this answer , the count held his peace . then turning to the roman empire , which was the next that was drawn , he told him , ●…hat the present disorders which were seen , not only in the large patrimony of the house of austria , but all germany over , were caused by the negligence of the now emperor rodolphus ; and earnestly desired that his majesty would embrace the government of his so great states , with more care , remembring , that princes , rulers of mankind , bear a heavier weight upon their shoulders , and have taken a more laborious work in hand , then any the most toiling earth-delver whatsoever can deal in . the roman empire returned the censor many thanks for this advice ; and then very gravely answered , that it was a mischance common to all princes , when scandals arose in their states , to be accused of negligence , although it were notoriously manifest , that since those scandals had been occasioned by the machinations of over-potent enemies , they could not be avoided by never so wary a prince . that therefore he left it to every one's consideration , whether the prodigious felicities of the most puissant house of austria , in inheriting by alliances , the states of flanders , the kingdoms of spain , naples , sicily , bohemia , hungary , portugal , and the acquisition of the dukedom of millan , had not raised up in all the princes of germany , italy , and europe , such devillish jealousies , as have caused the past and present desolations which are seen in her antient patrimony : to which , not all the emperors that have been since maximitian the first , though they have been accounted very valiant and wife princes , ever knew how to apply any salve which did not infinitely inflame the ulcer of the german disorders , to which there flocked so many , and such malignant humors , that man might truely say , it was incureable : and that besides this , he desired them to remember the little authority that the modern emperors have in germany ; and that it was not only incivility , but open injustice , to require that one which had his hands fast bound , should do with them the feats of orlando . that moreover he left to every ones consideration , the quality of the empire , which being elective , they that served had more authority in it then they that commanded . besides , he put them in mind of the house of austria's present weakness in germany ; which impious men having by the sedition of heresie , rob'd of his subjects hearts , ( a robbery of that consequence , that those states may be given for lost , in which so diabolical a seed is sown ) the lateemp . saw himself clean stript of the obedience of the greater part of his vassals . and therefore he intreated every one to reflect upon the quality of those cousins which the german house of austria hath in spain ; for they will find that the germans being a people born to liberty , to secure themselves from the monstrous power of so great a family , take impious and over-thwart revenge of even those that would not be secure , from suffering slavery under the spaniards , if they for mens sins sake , should ever come to get the government of the universe : from which , by the meer goodness and mercy of god , they are still kept the farther off , by how much the nearer , by their subtilties , they endeavour to come to it . and that they should all remember , how , the first that both in italy , and out of it , did with all manner of irreverence , and disrespect , dishinherit the empire of his majesty , were the very same cousins of his in spain ; which all men plainly perceived , by the usurpation of finale , and by other imperial fee-farms , which they have seised upon . all which things , stirring up very dangerous humors , without dissolving them , have brought it so to pass , that the house of austria in germany , is cruelly battered by very powerful enemies ; while the spaniards were very busie only with threatnings , in filling the whole world with jealousies and distastes . lastly , he earnestly pressed , that the whole college of the literati would well consider how , to the miserable barrenness of sons , which is seen in the modern emperor , was added a lamentable fruitfulness of brothers , one of which hurried on by the violent instigation of ambition , made no scruple at the last , to give a push to his house that was tumbling down headlong . all which have been accidents so unlucky , that they would have made the world have taken king solomon himself for a blockhead . with these replies which seemed to every one very weighty , the censor was pacified . who turning himself towards the warlike french monarchy , told her that all the vertuosi of pernassus did earnestly desire her that she would regulate the furious , restless , fantastical , and too-too rash brains of her frenchmen , reducing them to those terms of discretion , wariness , and calmness of mind , as they see is in the noble italian and spanish nations : and it took off much from her reputation , that the kingdom of france , which holds the first place amongst the principal monarchies of the world , should be inhabited by infinitely hasty , and hairbrain'd men . to this advice the french monarchy reply'd , that the censor not well informed of the interests of her kingdom , had censured the prime vertues that she most fancified in her frenchmen ( as madness , levity , heedlesness , and a hasty nature , which had made her so dreadfull and formidable a queen ) for defects : since her frenchmen , at any , though never so slight a beck of hers , did with alacrity and readiness of mind , expose themselves to those dangers , in which they saw that other princes could not force their wary , circumspect people to engage neither by halters , bastenado's , nor all the cruel tortures they could put them to . and that in those many battels which she hath had with divers valiant nations , she hath learned to know that armies composed of soldiers , that have but little wit , and much courage ( so they be directed by a general of worth ) carried the victory from those that made more profession of being circumspect , and wondrous wise . so much the more highly was the answer of the monarchy of france extolled by castiglione , by how much the more apparently he knew by the quality of her most puissant kingdom , that the french possessed all those endowments and vertues of mind , as were necessary in a nation , for the founding , enlarging , and maintaining of a huge command . then the censor turning to the high and mighty monarchy of spain , he told her , it was generally observed , that nothing did give greater satisfaction to all sorts of people , but more particularly to those which we●…e subjects to forreign nations , then the humanity and courteous behaviour of those that rule over them : and that she sending none to govern naples , mill an , and sicily , but her spanish dons , these with their usual castillian strutting , and with unsufferable spanish ostentation , incomparably much greater then the kings of spain themselves , either would or could have used in those states , did so turn the stomacks even of her good and faithful subjects , that they made the spanish government infinitely odious to men . and that moreover he desired that in all negotiations , whether of more or less weight , she would use more expedition : seeing that by reason of her over-much tediousness and perplexity in the determining of important affairs , she had lost very fair occasions , which were presented her for the aggrandizing of her power . very much did the spanish monarchy thank the censor for the warnings he had given her ; and to clear her self , she said , that noble gentleman , which had a young wife extreamly handsom , but naturally inclin'd to wantonness , would shew himself circumspect ; if he liked it better , that a houshold-servant of his , which was a spruce gallant , should rather be infinitely hated , then much beloved , of his wife : and as for that tediousness of coming to a resolution in her affairs , which she knew to be faulty and full of danger , it was not in her power to remedy it : for ●…od almighty having , not without important reasons , created her spaniards in all and every thing , of a geni●…s differing from that of the ●…rench , as long as these were in their determinations , rather hair-brain'd then good at action , she by being slow and unresolved , obey'd the will of god , who had appointed that it should be so . presently after was drawn the monarchy of poland ; to whom count baldassare said , that all the princes of europe desired that the present king sigismond should have used against those sedi●…ious nobles which lately rebelled against him , some severity worthy of so grievous an offence , only that he might thereby terrifie other nobles from committing the like . to this the polack monarchy answered , that in her elective kingdom , those punishments inflicted upon the nobility had alwaies proved dangerous , which in an hereditary state were beneficial : and that kingdom , which one hath received as a donative from a nobility that had the election of the king in her own power , could not be governed with that rigor which in hereditary states was necess●…ry , without running an evident hazard of ●…umbling down headlong from his greatness . ●…or that senat whose election of love gave one a kingdom , if it were throughly moved by that most powerful passion of hate , knew as well how to take it away again : for the wary senators used to reserve to themselves those necessary instruments , whereby they might be able , upon every occasion of dissatisfaction , to repent their liberality . a●…d that the pre●…ent ki●…g sigismond being the fi●…st of his stock that reigned in poland , was in all his thoughts to aim at nothing more , then wi●…h extraordinary diligence to get the good will of the nobility of his state , that so by his dearly esteemed memory , he might perpetuate the succession of so great a kingdom in his own stock . an advice so much the more necessary for her king sigismond , in that the polacks , though they had their king by way of election , yet they never defrauded the bloud-royal of the succession ; if he that reigned , knew but how by his gentleness to gain the universal good-will of the nobility . for poland , being a nation which knew not how to live in an absolute freedom , yet so much abhor'd total servitude , as that king ( a thing common to all elective principaliti●…s ) was amongst them the most sharp-fighted and vigilant in the affairs of his state , that most of all made as if he did not see , and made the greatest shew that he desired not to know all things . not only the censor , but the whole college of the vertuosi admitted for excellent , the justification of the polack monarchy . and because the most famous english monarchy was drawn out of the urn , the censor , with something an angry countenance , yet in gentle words , told her , that if humane wisdom were necessary for any person , it was was most necessary for princes , because of the important business which they had in hand , of governing mankind : and that the chiefest and truest wisdom of men , being the fear of god , little store of discreet government could be expected from him who had committed the impious and detestable ●…olly , of falling away from his divine majesty . that therefore he required her to let the present iames the sixth know , that the politick precept which england and scotland had impudently put in practice , of conforming religion to ambition , and making use of her for a winch ▪ to turn and wind the people , was a point of policy that either was unknown to the antients , or which they durst not use ; for fear of offending god. that therefore she should put him in mind to have alwaies before his eyes , the deplorable calamities of the greek empire , which although for ampleness of state , for multitude of subjects , and wealthiness of treasure , it did vastly surpass the kingdom of england ; yet , because to avoid being subject to the divine supremacy of the pope , it disagreed from the catholike religion , it so much deserved the divine anger , that the world hath beheld it made slave to the basest and most barbarous nation as ever , since the memory of men , reigned upon the earth . that therefore she should give notice to the now-king iames , that he ought so much the more to reconcile himself to god , in that he being soveraign over two kingdoms , so great enemies to one another , it was not possible for him , without especial assistance from god , to establish the union of those two great crowns ; that therefore he should know , that every day he did more and more provoke him against himself , when spending the greater part of the day in defending the manifest errors of his sect , he busied himself in nothing but disputations of religion . at this severe and just censure of castiglione , the english monarchy was seen to fall a crying . and after this , the censor turning towards the vast ottoman empire , told him , that the cruelty which he used so much , upon slight suspicions , against his most principal officers , was judged by all the world to be a savage action , every one being of opinion , that men of extraordinary worth and high deserts , should never be questioned , but for grievous delinquencies , and such as had been proved against them : and that if the ottoman princes might be justified in taking away their officers lives ; yet the custom of seizing upon their goods , and making them to be carried to the royal treasury , or casna , and so utterly to deprive the children of them , had no colour of justice in it ; for every one conceived , that by this cruel rigor , mens estates were rather proceeded against then their demerits . with admirable gravity answered the ottoman empire to this so open reproof , saying , that he was grown up to that greatness , in which all men saw him , only by those two powerful means , of reward without measure , and of punishment without limit : and that the only foundation of the tranquillity of every state being laid in the fidelity of the more important ministers thereof , princes were to seek after nothing with greater care , then by immense rewards to allure them to loyalty , and by infinite chastisements to frighten them from treachery . and that it not being possible for those officers , which had in their power the forces of emperors , and government of states , to trespass but in matters of greatest moment ; it were the course of a simple prince , in suspicions of highest consequence ▪ to draw up processes , to allow apologies , and to hear the defendants justifications : whereas in such cases as these , the prince that will not endanger all , must strive to take his officer unawares , and secure his own affairs , by making the execution of the punishment , precede even the accusation it self . and that it hath often-times fallen out , that by a hasty punishment , he hath prevented the consummation of very foul treasons : which resolution , though he must confess it to be very severe , yet he knew it was one cause , that in his state there were seen no counts of st. paul , no princes of orange , no●… colligni's , no dukes of guise , d'aumale , du main , de mercurie , and other odious monsters of disloyalty , as have been seen elsewhere , to the shame of those princes that with halters , daggers , and axes , have not known how to prevent so dangerous offences : it being in matters of state , a rule as common as 't is certain ▪ that , that officer which gives his prince never so little cause to suspect his fidelity , forfeits his life ; since those commanders that have in their power the charge of armies , are ( no less then the wives of honorable persons ) obliged to live with such purity of mind , that they must be without , not only any fault , but any the least suspicion of an unchast desire . that for his taking away of his b●…ssa's goods after their deaths , he could very truely tell them , that the pensions , the donatives , and wealth wherewith other princes reward their servants , were in comparison of those inexhausted riches which he bestows upon his well-deserving officers , poor pittiful things : as the royal treasures which rusten , mehemet , ibrahin , and many others left behind them , have fully and amply testified : and that the greatest fore-cast which a prince ought to have in rewarding his servants , consisted in taking a course , that it might never be possible for others to employ those immense riches wherewith he had purchased their infinite fidelity , to the detriment of him that had been so liberal . that he had learned by the most lamentable disorders which hapned in the states of other potentates , how it was a most pernicious thing for princes , that the extraordinary wealth left by a deserving officer , should pass to his children , whether by that vertue , by that valour , and by that same loyalty which was in their father , they had first deserved it from the prince , or not . and that he confisc●…ted the great inheritances of his bassa's , not out of avarice , as many wrongfully judged ; but that he might not make those subjects , who for being descended from fathers of noted worth , put the prince in certain hope that they would imitate their progenitors in vertue , by the convenience of living idle , consequently to grow vicious too ; and that he kept the gates of his treasury alwaies open to his officers heirs , th●…t he might restore to them their paternal inheritances doubled , whensoever by loyalty and valour they should deserve them : and that how apt great riches possessed by a vicious man , and an ambitious subject , were to dist●…rb the peace of any kingdom , how great soever , was a thing known to every man , by the fresh examples which the world hath seen in france and flanders . while the ottoman empire spake these things , he observed that the french monarchy by shaking her head , did shew ( as it seem'd ) that she by no means approved of these discourses . whereupon something passionately he said ; most renowned queen , my custom of seizing upon my bassa s inheritances , makes well for my greatness , and the tranquillity of my state ; and for the friendsh●…p that is betwixt us , i could wish that the like were observed in your france . for you know well to what use henry duke of guise did put that vast deal of wealth , wherewith the liberal king francis the fi●…st , and king henry his son , rewarded the deserts of duke francis his father . for wo to that prince , who because he knows not how to be severe to others , is so cruel to himself , as absurdly to breed up serpents in his bosom . you , i , and all the rest of us that bear rule , know that the sweetest honey that men can tast , is soveraignty ; and there being no man that for never so little of it , would not gladly adventure to lose his life ; princes ought to be still most vigilant in keeping all the avenues to government block'd up , and by all possible severity to hold every one out of the reach of ambition . nay they ought to order their matters so , that every privat m●…n whatsoever , may despair of ever being able to tast of so pleasant a liquor . and i tell you plainly , had your duke of guise but offered to think in my state , that which with so much scandal he publickly made bold to put in execution in your kingdom ; that very first day would i have shew'd him the same play which your henry the third ( though urged to it by most of the italian ●…rinces ) knew not how to resolve upon , till the last day of his insufferable vexarions ; and just then when the sore of the french commotions was grown to be an incureable canker . for where ambition reigns amongst the nobles , princes are enforced to shew themselves totally severe , keeping the gibbets alwaies ina readiness , for punishing of the seditious and rebellious ; and their treasury open to reward the peaceable and loyal ; that prince being unworthy of command , that hath not a genius to make himself obeyed : neither is there any thing more scandalo●…s ●…n a state , then that the prince should live in jealousie of that officer which ought to live in fear of him . but it is proper for you princes of europe , that making a profession of learning , and of living according to rules of great policy , call me barbarian , and my safe manner of proceeding tyrannical , to suffer your selves by your heroical vertues , of clemency and mildness , to be brought to the shamefull condition of suffering ▪ most unworthy things . impossible it is to say , how much the ottoman empire did with his discourse offend all the vertuosi of the sacred college , who standing up in very great wrath , told him , that with reasons in hand they would make it good to him , that all the particulars which he had spoken , were most wicked conceits , unworthy to be uttered by a person that had a soule , and as much to be listened to by men that made profession of honour . at which the ottoman empire smiling said , that in the politick conceits , by which others governed kingdoms , respect was had to the commodiousness of moral precepts , which by well regulated customs , were serviceable to goodness . and that yet the tranquillity and peace of states were to be preferred before all other humane interests . then the censor , to cut off so odious a disputation , turning to the great dukedom of muscovy , told him , that among the greatnesses of a prince , it was called the second noblest prerogative , to have command over people that were lovers of learning ; and that it was not only little for his credit , but a thing for which he incurr'd much reproach , that he should so much give his mind to have his subjects brought up in gross ignorance ; for he was scoffed at by every one , that having banished the liberal arts , he had given his people leave only to learn how to write and read . to this censure the dukedom of muscovy answered , that the hideous fire , which he had observed learning alwaies kindled in those states where it was admitted , had made him resolve , by no means to give way that so scandalous a cockle should be sown in his dukedom : for men being as much princes heards , as sheep are private persons flocks , it were the height of madness to arm those humane sheep ( subjects ) which by reason of the much simplicity that god created in them , are , though many , easily governed by one only shepheard , the prince , with that craft and malice , which learning engrafts into the brains of those that entertain it : and that it was no more the proper quality of fire to give heat , then of books to transform the simple sheep into most corrupted wolves . lastly , that he held it for a thing unquestionable , that if the germans , the hollanders , and the zealanders , had been kept by their princes , in the simplicity of their antient ignorance , and they withall had given charge , that the pure minds of those nations should not have been contaminated with the pestilence of greek and latine literature ; they would never with such havock of the old religion , and the casting out of many princes which formerly governed them , have had the judgement to know how to settle in their countries , those perfect forms of commonwealths , which the wit of solon , the wisdom of plato , and all the philosophy of aristotle to boot , could never attain unto : this answer so troubled the minds of the censor , and of the whole college of the literati , that with threatning countenances they said , that the arguments alleadged by the great duke of muscovy , were most manifest blasphemies : nay it seemed that the literati were minded to doe themselves right by arms ; but their courages were cooled when they saw the major part of the more potent monarchies betake themselves to their weapons in defence of the muscovite ▪ who growing yet bolder by the ready assistance which he perceived he should have from so many potentates , freely said , that if there were any present who would deny that learning did infinitely hinder the tranquillity and good government of states , and that the prince might with more ease command a million of idiots , then a hundred learned men , born to command , not to obey ; he lied in his throat . at this generous defiance , the vertuosi were all in a pelting chafe , and couragiously said , that the muscovite had spoken with insolence worthy of an idiot ; and that they would make it evident to him , that men without learning were two-legged beasts . already was the scuffle begun , when the censor cryed out , hold ! bear due respect to this place where you are all assembled to amend disorders , and not to commit scandals . and such was the reverence every one bare to the majesty of the censor , that the minds of the princes , and the hearts of the vertuosi , though stark mad for anger , and enraged with disdain , were wholly paci●…ied on a sudden . here it is not to be concealed , that the duke of urbin , who before sate in the classis of princes , as soon as he saw the fray begun , went on the other side to help the vertuosi , and placing himself in the first rank , shewed a mind resolved to lose his state , so he might but defend the liberal a●…ts . all tumults then being appeased , the censor told the most renowned venetian liberty , who was drawn out of the urne , that the hardest bone which aristocracies could never gnaw ( as she well knew ) was the bridling of the young nobility , which when by over-much licentiousness it had distasted the better sort of citizens , had often occasioned the ruine of the most famous commonwealths ▪ and that to his great grief , he heard that the young nobility of venice did by their proud demeanor give offence to many honorable citizens of that state ; who loudly complained , that as the insolence of the nobil●…ty increased , the punishments abated . that he therefore wished her to remember , it was a dangerous thing in aristocracies , for those which should glory of being wholly freed from the perils which a state is subject to , that obeys the caprichio of one prince , to be heard complain of being baffled by many tyrants . to these things the venetian liberty answered , that the disorder recounted by the censor , was true , and withall dangerous ; but that pride and insolence are so annexed to authority of command , that they seemed to be all of a birth ; and that the excessive licentiousness which the nobility of all aristocracies exercised over the citizens , was reputed by all the famous men that have discoursed of commonwealths , a desperate cure : for though it were necessary that insolences should be restrained by severe punishments ; yet on the other side , aristocracies should forbear openly to chastise noblemen , though seditious : and this , that they may not by disgracefull , sufferings bring the people to undervalue that very nobility , which having in their hands the government of the state , ought for the main interest of the publick conservation of liberty , to be maintained in highest reputation . and that if in her venice , the more stubborn and insolent nobles were not openly punished in st. marks place , between the two columns so often , as , it seemed , many desired , that yet by the gran consiglio , by the pregadi , by the collegio , and other superior magistrates who dispose of publick offices , there was , with the torments of disgraceful repulses , made a terrible massacre of those seditious nobles , who in a free countrey were discovered to bear tyrannous minds ; and that in venice there were seen many persons of very noble families , whose antient reputation had been shot to fitters , with harquebuses charged with bullets made of rags , and that being by such odd blows sometimes felled to the ground , they were never able to rise again to honours and dignities . and that there could not be invented , no not by perillus himself , a more torturing rack for the tearing of ones body limb from limb , then that which a noble venetian hath sometimes undergon , when in the rival ship about offices of credit , and much stood for , he hath seen go before him , a person younger then he , only because he was known by the senate to be more deserving . castiglione not only admired at the justification of the renowned venetian liberty ; but infinitely praised both the circumspectness and the severity which she used in punishing and chastising her nobility , in case either of any demerit , or of any defect . presently after , the censor said to the dukedom of savoy ; that his state being placed between the confines of france and italy , he was necessitated with all possible diligence to maintain neutrality between those princes upon whom he did confine . but that in these last tumults of france , having openly discovered himself to be wholly spanish , he had put not only his own , but the states of all the italian princes in great trouble ; and that while with the bellows of his forces he had puffed in the fire of the french commotions , enkindled by spanish ambition , he ought to believe , that that flame would burn up friends and kindred , before it could come at the other italian potentates that were enemies . the dukedom of savoy readily answered the censor , that the adherence of his last duke to the spaniard was true . but the fair advantage which he had of three sevens in hand , had enforced him to set his rest , hoping to have gotten the famousest prime as ever any prince whatsoever had at cardes . upon which hazard he had so much the more willingly put himself , because it seemed a thing appointed by destiny , that those moneys which had been gotten at play , should at the same game be lost . that afterwards if by his ill fortune , in the fourth card that was dealt him , he should happen to be affronted by an ugly court-card , with which he should have the worst game that could be in the pack , yet he knew that honest good fellows would have confessed , that though the resolution were very full of danger , yet they themselves , not to wrong the cards , would have plai'd it no otherwise . the censor understood the metaphor , and highly praised that dukes resolution : who , because from a little feaver , he might have received as a donative , the command of the greater part of the world , when not only without any note of indiscretion , but to his infinite glory , he threw the dy of all the greatness of his fortunes , in the tables of chance , he might once more say those famous words ; aut caesar , aut nullus . then the censor turned to the great duke of tuscany , and sharply reprehending him for rousing up the wasp with those gallies of his , he put him in mind of the calamities and troubles which the knights of st. iohn suffered in rhodes , in tripoly , and the great hazard they ran at last in malta , only because like fools they would needs be fastening of squibs upon the bull : and that every discreet christian prince should rather favour the turks present carelesness , then with injuries that yield but little benefit , nay which may bring much danger and damage to awaken them , and enforce them to set their minds again upon maritime affairs , which now-a-daies they had given over . he likewise recalled to his memory the many complaints , of infinite multitudes which continually crie out , that by his hindering of the trade between italy and the levant , all the drugs that came from beyond-sea , were grown excessive dear . to this reproof the grand dukedom of tuscany answered , that the power of a prince could not be tearmed perfect , unless with a considerable party of men of war , he had some command upon the sea : and that his gallies were very necessary , not only for the tuscan greatness , but for the securing of the liberty of all italy ; as those which served for a school to mariners , as a seminary both for sea-captains , and sea-souldiers . he confessed that the damage they did to trading , was true ; but that withall he desired every one to remember , that the mystery of war , both by sea and by land , could not be learned by souldiers , nor practised by princes , without bringing some damage along with it . and that since tuscany did breed a numerous rascallity of turbulent mad-caps , and extravagant humors , he had yet farther very great need of those gallies , which were as the scavengery of his state , by which he kept it cleanly , employing them for slaves , which had done mischiefs already , and for souldiers , those heteroclitick dispositions , who by reason of their restless natures , 't was thought were likely to do worse . with wonderful applause was the great dukedom of tuscany's apologie approved of , both by the censor , and the whole college . whereupon the count told the comomnwealth of genoua , which was drawn last , that the use of exchange which she allowed her nobility , caused the great disorder of enriching the private , and withall , impoverishing the publick stock : whose in-comes would have yielded a notable sum of gold , had the king-like wealth of her nobles been employed in the just traffick of merchandize . and that together with the prohibition of exchange , her nobles should give over that dangerous conversation with the spaniards , which so much lessened her reputation . with a readiness that much took all the literati , the common-wealth of genoua answered , it was true that the exchanges wrought that effect which the censor had intimated , and therefore vvere most pernicious in any monarchy ; but that yet , vvithout any prejudice to the publick interests , they might be permitted in a vvell ordered republick ; for the most substantial and sure treasures of a free state , vvere the riches of the nobility or gentry , & of all the body politick one with another . athing vvhich happened not in monarchies , vvhere betvveen the princes possessions , and privat mens goods , there vvas a partition-wall of the largest size , made up of meum & tuum : because in monarchies the change of state happens ordinarily with no great matter of concernment to the people , only changing the name of matthew to that of martine : but in the subversion of commonwealths , where liberty was to be changed into bondage , the publick treasure was made out of the peculiar goods of private men , who then would profusely lay out all their estates , to defend as long as breath lasted , every mans peculiar liberty . as for the dangerous commerce that her nobility held with the spaniards , she desired every one throughly to consider whether the entercourse of her genoueses were hurtfull to the spaniards , or the familiarity of the spaniards to the genoueses : for certainly they would find that the frying-pan stood in no great fear of being smutted by the kettle . the spanish monarchy invites the cardinal of toledo to be secretary of state : who refuseth : and why . t is given out up and down this court , that the high and mighty monarchy of spain hath invited the most illustrious cardinal of toledo for her chief secretary of state , with a large pension , to assist as her divine in the counsel-royal , that so nothing be determined there , which may be against her conscience . this news hath filled all this court with great admiration , every one knowing how much this prelate did work against the interests of her king , in the re-benediction of the most christian king henry the fourth : wherefore no man could imagin the reason why so sharp-witted a princess should desire to make use of a person so little to be trusted in a business of highest importance . those that most profess the knowledg of the subtile spaniards manner of proceeding , did even in this , observe the old cunning of the spanish kings ; whose peculiar custom it is , never to give over , till with pensions , with honorable places of command , and with all courteous demonstrations of affection , they have brought over to their side , all those eminent persons whom they perceive to be estranged from their interests , and from whom they know , that at a pinch , they may receive services . they that are most inward wi●…h this great cardinal , report that his grace cheerfully accepted of the ●…oble charge propounded to him : but upon this condition , though , which by the spaniards was immediately rejected . for he said , that when by the authority of holy scripture , by the doctrine of the holy fathers , by the institutions of the canons , he had made it evident to the co●…nsel-royal , that the results of it disagreed with the laws of god and man , he would then desire but power to hinder the execution of them ; all to no other end , then to let the world know , that the kings divi●…e was in that counsel only to assist the conscience of his king , with knowledge of the will of his lord god ; not for a vizard to settle upon him the rule of kingdoms over men : for he conceived it would be too shameful an action , that such a one as he should be employed to authenticate the diabolical impiety of modern policy , and make silly souls believe , that the nastiest assa foetida that would outstink a polecat , is as pure musk as ever came from the levant . apollo detesteth the means that are recommended to him , for getting of monies . extraordinary is the want of money which at this time is in pernassus ; for not only his majesties exchequer , and treasures , and the greatest princes of this court , but likewise the gentlemen , the merchants , and the artisans are in great distress for it ; in so much , that many daies since the commissioners for apollo's royal patrimony , and others deputed by his majesty over this business , did a long time consider and consult , what course was to be taken for the remedying of this disorder . and it was resolved by all to be very expedient , that likewise into pernassus should be introduced that admirable custom observed by many princes in italy , of selling the publick revenues to private men , they which bought them , paying the honest rent of six in the hundred ; and that it should be lawful also for private men to put out their money to such as had need of it , at the return of eight in the hundred , by the name of consideration . this course which these gentlemen so highly approved of , as soon as ever it was proposed to apollo , was immediately rejected , as most pernicious to all estates publick and private : and his majesty then said , that he would not by any means , by the engaging to another the publick revenues of his estate , give an odious president to other princes , for encumbring in their life times , those incomes , which as they had received free , so they ought to transmit them to their successors . for by such inventions as these , there was not only a doore opened to the ruine of estates , but the way was levelled for the avarice and malice of those princes , who either because they reign in states elective , or because in hereditary , they have no successor of their own race , would dismember those publick rents , which are the true store-houses , and the secure magazines that preserve and aggrandize kingdoms . a disorder , which being by the excessive malice of some princes introduced into their states hath extreamly weakened them . and upon the very same subject his majesty said further , that in many states , the taxes and imposts were now-adaies observed to be much increased , because the new-entring princes have found the publick revenues mortgaged by their predecessors ; and that they themselves , to provide for the urgent necessities of their states , and the private exigents of their families , were enforced to invent new taxes , and even against their wils , with odious impositions to overload their afflicted and tired subjects . which errors men should so much the more fear that they would one day ruine their states , by how much the more princes , not to run the manifest hazard of enkindling great commotions in their jurisdictions , and being no longer able to charge the people with new taxations , should at last be constrained to grow desperate , and to seize upon the rents , colouring their rapacity with the pretence , that it was more then their predecessors could doe to empawn them so prodigally and maliciously , to the prejudice of the state , and of their successors . and that states being subject to the sentence of the sword , and the tribunal of violence , if it should happen that a kingdom , where the disorder of engaging the publick revenues , was practised , should be usurped and taken on him , by any potentates ; the new prince by relinquishing the ordinary payments , would have , if not a just , at least a colourable reason , to commit that cruel outrage of ruining the patrimony of infinitely many widows , orphans , and other poor creatures that had had all their estates laid out upon the purchase of the publick revenues . and that he knew , the abuse of alienating the publick revenues , was gone so far , that many princes with unheard of avarice and greediness , had either ransacked their own estates , or suffered them to run to ruine ; and this horrid cruelty they would have to be taken for politick wit , so to weaken , in elective states , a hated successor ; in hereditary a stranger . and lastly apollo said , that it was most wickedly resolved upon , that private men by the purchase of the publick revenues , and the mischievous bringing in of consideration-money , should fetch gain out of meer and bare money , without putting it forth upon any commodities ; it being a most abominable thing , that men born to live by the sweat of their brows , to manure the earth , and attend upon the multiplication of cattel , should be maintained by those usuries which are got out of a dead heap of money . a piece of bruitishness that is good for nothing but to make industrious men lean , and usurers fat. finis . the bounds & bonds of publique obedience, or, a vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government, or to a government supposed unlawfull, but commanding lawfull things likewise how such an obedience is consistent with our solemne league and covenant : in all which a reply is made to the three answers of the two demurrers, and to the author of the grand case of conscience, who professe themselves impassionate presbyterians. rous, francis, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing r ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing r estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the bounds & bonds of publique obedience, or, a vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government, or to a government supposed unlawfull, but commanding lawfull things likewise how such an obedience is consistent with our solemne league and covenant : in all which a reply is made to the three answers of the two demurrers, and to the author of the grand case of conscience, who professe themselves impassionate presbyterians. rous, francis, - . [ ], p. printed for john wright ..., london : . in reply to: a religious demurrer, a second part of the religious demurrer, and the grand case of conscience stated. written by francis rous. cf. halkett & laing ( nd ed.). errata: p. . reproduction of original in huntington library. eng solemn league and covenant ( ) grand case of conscience stated. religious demurrer. allegiance -- early works to . political science -- early works to . a r (wing r ). civilwar no the bounds & bonds of publique obedience. or, a vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government, or to a government supposed ascham, antony c the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the c category of texts with between and defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - judith siefring sampled and proofread - judith siefring text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the bounds & bonds of publique obedience or , a vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government , or to a government supposed unlawfull , but commanding lawfull things . likewise how such an obedience is consistent with our solemne league and covenant . in all which a reply is made to the three answers of the two demurrers , and to the author of the grand case of conscience , who professe themselves impassionate presbyterians . london printed for iohn wright at the kings head in the old-bayley , , the bounds and bonds of publique obedience , or a vindication of our lawfull submission to the present government , or to a government supposed unlawfull , but commanding lawfull things . i know not by what fate or misfortune it comes to passe , that in the disquisition of a truth ( though a simple uniforme thing ) yet the contests about it , are usually infinite , and it is as difficult a thing to disincumber it feom errours , as it is a good field from weeds and brambles ; which when the country man hath burnt to ashes , and thinks he hath quite destroyed , the next yeare to his astonishment he sees them return more numerous then before . surely our unhappinesse in the e●adication of civill errours is , that we speake more to the affections then to the iudgement , and therefore offer passion in stead of reason , or make one but the counterfeit of the other , or else not affecting one anothers persons , we fling headily into opposite paths or principles , in which not treading together at first , we cannot possibly meet together at last , and in this aberration we loose both truth and our selves . thus we finde it in these three severall answers to the first treatise , in which ( and the unhappilier , to give foundation to practicable errors ) they at the very entry of the controversie mistake principles , in jure publico , in the riginall of magistracy and government , in the nature of possession , prescription , right of extream necessity , of assertory & promissory oaths , &c. things which were otherwaies stated and proved in that discourse to which they have bin referred ; i should not so disertly tell these tripartite answerers , that they do suponere quodlibet , ut probetur quidlibet , were it not but that i see them so majesterially peremptory to prescribe to others , and to necessitate us into action of the greatest prejudice that may be betwixt man & man ; that i finde one of them give such a losse to his passion , that it carries him into direct blasphemy , advising that a committee might treat with god , yea sentence the blessed trinity . lastly because all the world knows they give that obedience which to attaine publique desolation they will not allow toothers ; wherefore as the subtilties of the vop●●rs are so fine and delicate , that they passe upwards on every hand about us imperciptibly till at last we heare them over our heads formd into thunder , lightning and tempests , even so the fumes of these private mens passions passe so subtilly through their soft words , that if we who converse with them , be not maturely advisd of them , their insinuation will draw us into fire and flame , into blood and desolation , into the calamities of a war , which perhaps may end as distantly from our and their now covenant intentions as the two former have already done . the question which was first asserted stands still unshaken and almost untoucht , and in all th●se answers it is evidently granted , that we of the people may lawfully give obedience to an unlawfull power ; this onely is denied , that it may be not with an acknowledgement of their authority and right , which is very uncasuistly and unconscientiously inserted here , because that is not the peoples present case , but the governours , these onely asserting that , contenting themselves with simple obedience from us . the first argument of the first demurrer is formed against the incapacity of the persons governing , and it runs thus : ob. that which is now termed a parliament , is neither formally , materially , nor effectually a parliament , such as is requisite for this kingdom , either according to the mind of god , or the necessities of the state . first , because the change which is made in it , is not made by those who first constituted it , unlesse it be by conquest . the modern modell containes not the whole , nor the major part of the peoplee secondly , the alteration is made by the commons only , the nobility as illustrior pars populi , appeared not in it . ans. though this argument ( with the rest ) relates more to the commanders then to the obeyers , ( of whom our controversie onely is ) and that we of the people have a right to do lawfull things , though there were no magistrate lawfull or unlawful to oversee us , yet i shall not stop at these advantages , but oppose to the main of this argument , the main of our creation and conservation . for we have nothing else to doe in the world , but to praise god and love our neighbour . the circumstance of the magistrate is onely to be an encouragement of this , and to see that it be done with security : and if he doe this ( whatever he be ) we are beholding to him , and should praise god for him , and then why not obey him ? though this were granted , that one magistrate was unjustly ejected by another , and one government by another , yet that relates onely to those who co-operated in it whilst it was doing . how can such a supposed guilt in them , be in any part continued upon , and ascribed to us of the low ranke of the people ? or now especially that we come into it after it is done , and after we are under the full possession of a present power ? people by the effects of it , sustaine punishment enough if they lose a good magistracy , must they likewise be punisht because it is lost , though they were no con-cause of it ? the authour of the grand case of conscience , p. . infers yes , and therefore makes our new commotions necessary : because we can do nothing just in a state , where , ( through the defect of a legal magistracy ) we can have no justice , yea though the things we do be in themselves just . for ( quoth he ) judgement is then onely just , when it is exercised by the higher powers , the legall magistracy of that kingdome , where it is acted . i answer , things are considerable , onely so far as they may reach the ends for which they are . the end of every magistrate is to see justice executed in case it be violated : iusto enim non ponitur lex . the end of justice is to be a measure of equity , that is , of equality . justice or the proportion of equality is either comutative or distributive . but neither of these relate so essentially to the legall magistrate , that nothing may be done truly and conscienciously just , without he co-operate in it . as for commutative equality , if titius lend sempronius ten bushels of such a quantity , which bushels have the publique mark upon them , and sempronius pay him ten other every way of the same equality , but that there wants the former mark , or that the said bushels have another mark , will you say sempronius hath not intrinsically done titius justice , or hath not justly satisfied him in his quantity ? especially if in the mean time no more of that former marke can be had ? as for distributive justice , we know that st. paul advised the corinthians to avoyd the iegall magistracy and the judgement of the higher powers of that countrey , and rather to end things by arbitrement among themselves , which had been an advice unjust , and to the scandall of christianity , if things in themselves just might not be done but by the justice of the legall magistrate . this therefore is but according to an old axiome of justice , provisio hominis tollit provisionem legis . thus much i have thought fit to answer in generall to this objection ; but now more particularly i answer to its terms . and first , why is not this effectually a parliament , seeing it is the supream present power of the whole nation , no part excluded ? which in this controversie is the very term of the question . i hope he means no criticisme by the word parliament ; if he doth , it signifies onely a publique speaking or consulting together for the publique . moreover , the authour would be ( i am sure ) much perplext , if i should aske him , how he knoweth so indubitably that this is not a parliament or supreame power requisite for this kingdome , according to the mind of god ? he must pardon us if we thinke formes no more then persons are to last here alwaies ; or that the changes which have been , and still are to be of both , must never be done but according to the customary formalities of a quiet people , but rather according to the extreame necessity of a state . for if he aske me , what it is that forms in-organizd people into a government , of what sort soever ? i answer , necessity . if , what makes or takes away a law in a government established ? i answer , necessity . if , what takes away a government it selfe ? i answer , according to himselfe . page . that which first gave it being , viz. necessity . of which there are severall degrees ; for in a peaceable state a word may take away that which in a disturbd state must be taken away by the sword : after which it is but equall that he who gives the last blow , should in that quarrell give the last word , and leave us to a peremptory obedience , unlesse we would have no quarter in the world , or be like the old servati in bello , who were sold , confind to chains all their lives , or condemnd to dig perpetually in mynes ; all which it seems this authour would have the conclusion of this argument , or else we are more beholding to the charity of enemies , then to his . if we will not be perswaded by the states arguments , yet let us hear what grotius , among others , determined long agoe , for all the world in this case . if a king have but part of a supream power ( which consists in making and taking away lawes , in laying universall taxes ) and the people or senate have the other , the king may be forcibly opposed if he invade that part which is not his , because for so much he hath no right nor power . this is to hold , although such a king have the militia alone ; for that ( in his hand ) relates onely to forraigne warre , it being unconceivable how they who share in supreame . rights , can be exempt from a right of defending them . when war shall happen betwixt such fundamentall and supreame parties , the king may loose all his share by the right of war . lib. . c. . § . de jubel . & pa. ] which right of warre betwixt those who divide a whole kingdome , if it end clearly to the reduction of one party , is not called so properly conquest as victory . this authour uses the name of the first onely for the hatred every one bears to it , because it swallows the rights and persons of the whole ; whereas victory relates onely to a part of either , as beginning and ending in civill warres , where disputes of right arise betwixt those of the same jurisdiction and country , and of the same common law . but we have arguments more authentique then these , to shew that such changes may be according to the mind of god ; and the demurrer all his life will never prove the contrary , dan. . , . gods power is an everlasting power , and his kingdome is from heneracion to generation ; all the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing , and according to his will he worketh in the army of heaven , and in the inhabitants of the earth , and none can stay his hand , nor say unto him what dost thou ? that is , god as universall lord , and king of kings , governes both angels , men , and divels , and all must submit to him , because of his supreame irresistibility . psalm . . . god is the iudge , he maketh low , and he maketh high . it must be confest that by him princes raigne ; but our authour had rather perpetually imbroile our bodies and soules , then clearly say , by whom it is that princes cease to reign . for then this controversie would easily he reconc●l'd , and we as easily one to another . wee have shewn how the reason of constituting , and of changing governments , is still one and the same , viz. supreame necessity : but the demurrer objects that our change hath not beene done by the same order of persons , who were in the old , viz. by major part of lords , and major part of the commons . although he is againe besides the state of the question , shewing onely how they who are the supream power of the land , ought not to command us , rather then that we may not obey them in lawfull things ; yet i shall here make another sort of reply , which will be very short to those who profess themselves presbyterians , that is , originally parliamentarians . kingdoms which are supream in themselves , and communicate not in one anothers lawes , are all of them iure gentium , in a state of war , unless they be mutually bound by leagues to the contrary ; which leagues if they come to be broken , usually have the conditions of invasion annexed , and the time and places nominated for beginning it ; and because there is nothing any longer due by law , or league from the party injured , where now the sword is onely to end the controversie , therefore what ever shall be acquired in this state of things from the party injuring , rightly changes all titles in iure publico , and in the right of governing what is acquired ; but in one and the same kingdome , where the supremacie of power and right lies divided ( as grotius page . states it ) there , if they differ fundamentally , denying one anothers rights and powers , they are then immediately in the same state of war with those other separate kingdoms ; here onely is the difference , that these in their concurrence and constitution , making but one , have none of those ordinary cautions , as leagues have for their right of invading one another by the way of war : a circumstance no more necessary betwixt them , then that in the marriage of two persons , a lawyer should come after the minister hath conjoyn'd them , and tell them in what cases they may again proceed to divorce , and after their divorce , what kinde of marriages they should make next . even so war is suppos'd in that case , as well as divorce in this ; but because war begins there where law ends , and reciprocally , and hath nothing but necessity for its equity , and that all the degrees of necessity cannot at first be foreseen , nor where security may at the end of all be presum'd off , therefore there neither is , nor ever was any fixt rule in any countrey , what people should be bound to do at the end of a a vvar. i hope the presbyterians neither of england , nor scotland intend to deny what all the world knowes , that they concluded the king under the necessity of vvar , as well as others who conjoyned with them , and having stated his case there , they of the kirke long agoe frankly declared , that he not satisfying for the blood of three kingdoms , was not to touch the scepter any more , but as mr. hinderson applyed in his newcastle conference the th . of hester . that if his majesty reforme not according to their way , he and no lesse then his fathes house were to perish : by which what could hee and they understand lesse , then change of government ? a thing , why now so horrid for the other party to think on , seeing they gave first intimation of it ? they joyntly declared , that the king was not to judge any thing for himselfe , nor upon what tearms his readmittance to simple liberty could stand with their security ; * for , his vvar when it ended ( as they said who imprisoned him ) continued the same necessity upon them , which made them take armes at the beginning . therefore they themselves concluded , that nothing could be changed in the kings concernment , according to the old forme and constitution of the kingdom , which relates to a time of peace , and not to a time of war . but the nobility whom he here stiles , illustrior pars populi , concurred not to this change ; therefore it is formally and fundamentally unlawfull . in the first place , i understand not , and i beleeve the lords doe as little , what he meanes by putting them into such improper latine . for they alwaies understand themselves to be rather of the two comites regis , then partem populi ; and therefore as if they were an integrant part of the kingdome , form'd to themselves a separated house , a jurisdiction over the people , & lay as a barre betwixt the king and them ; whether that power of their's had any congruity with the other supreame and legislative rights of the people or no , is not now the question , but rather this , whether according to their mutuall engagements , their rights of a separated house were rightly lost to the house of commons , or no ? this is by them affirmed , and the state of venice as profound platonists deny the other ; for otherwise noble men would be as difficulty reformed as kings , and therefore they rarely conferre illustrious titles of nobility on any but those who are in illustrious offices , things separable from persons , by which meanes all offices with them are questionable : but to return , that which according to themselves thus excluded the king , by the same logicke excluded the lords ; and if they either directly or indirectly concurred to the ruine of the rest of the kingdome , then the argument runs strong , that the house of commons were bound to preserve it , and that the rest rightly owe their whole protection under god to them ▪ but because i will suppose nothing here , the argument of matter of fact must judge one as well as the other . wherefore if any will aske whether there was not a warre undertaken last yeare very eminently dangerous to the whole parliament and their party ; the army , and country committees , and that by the contrivance of the royall party here , the scots nation in the north , ormond in ireland , it will be past denying ; likewise whether the house of lords in that extremity declared with the commons that the scots were enemies to the kingdome , or upon the first or second request gave their concurrence for counties to arme themselves for their defence ; the ●oyce of all parties must needs say no : so that , that house undertook to act a part as dangerous to the rest of the parliament , as they did , who were actually in armes against their party every where . and how then should they expect to bestill necessary to them , and to their securities , who had put them into such apparent extremity and necessities ? as for the exclusion of some members of the house of commons , i hope the sincere presbyterians wonder not at that act , because the kirk and state of scotland was preserved by such an act last year , and by the concourrence of the same meanes which did this here . yea though they who from thence invaded our nation , declared as much for the covenant and presbytery as the kirke it selfe , save only that the kirke had the good luck to speake the last word . they who sit at top in the state are tanquam in nubibus , to the eyes of us of the people . wee know not how they manage their counsels , nor contrive their tran●actions , that is best determined by and amongst themselves . it is enough for us if they be of a number competent to act ; and be persons who enter by vertue of free election , and s●t in the legall place . for in a case where five are chosen to a businesses , and that any three of them are to be of the qu●rum , though two of them be never so accidentally or violently detained , yet what the other three doe is to all intents and purposes valid , which is the present case . by this gentlemans favour , we have an axiome of law , which saith that in partner-ship or society ( as the civill law calls it ) when matter of extreme prejudice is agitated betwixt those who are of equall contribution either of art or mony , then potior est conditio negantis : nothing ought in this case to be concluded against the negatives , though fewer in number , which was the parliaments case when after the equall provocations of a prince by warre and imprisonment some of the same house thought he might have been securely readmitted into the government again , and others thought it evidently dangerous . in this case the difference was as it were legall betwixt the members , but not to be decided any way but by force , there being no other tribunall to judge them , and their house might not judge of it , because there they were parties and judges , a thing allowed no where ; and if otherwise , then the major part might legally vote the other out of the house at pleasure . but what was at last determined by any number above forty with the speaker in the legal place , seemes not out of form to us of the people ; which was the case of the house of lords when most of them & many of the commons at the beginning of the first war , fled to the king under pretence of force from westm. yea when the five members were forc't from sitting , yet the rest of the house sat and acted without them , and voted a committee , ian. . to sit in london , and there to take into consideration the breach of priviledges , the safety of the king and kingdome , and preservation of ireland , which was accordingly done by vertue of those votes , made when members were thus forct away . all our scruples therefore are concerning things to us practicably lawfull or unlawfull in themselves , as for the will of the major part of the people , how will the demurrer prove that they had not rather obey this present power , then seeke to be rid of it by the hazards and calamities of another war ? they usually looke after nothing but their rents , markets , and reasonable subsistances , they are the luxurious and ambitious part onely which pretends to new troubles . the peoples question thereof is not how the change was made , but an sit whether it be so changed or noe ? for if according to its formality that be not rightly done ; it concerneth not their consciences no more then the thunder or lightning over their heads doth , which are things totally out of their power , much lesse may they lawfully desolate neighbours for them . but he hath found one firme axiome , that when part of any thing is cut off , the whole qua tale is destroyed quià dum cessat forma , cessat formatum ; ergo the late force on the parliament hath made this no parliament . i wish he had taken the paines to give either a distinction or an instance in his axiome , or have drawn up his inference into a syllogisme ; for i feare we shall finde wide impertinence in the first , and a grosse non sequitur , in the last as he hath ordered it . the question disputed here is not whither the denominated parliament now sitting at westminster be a parliament according to the old forme and composure of parliament or no , but whither tht parliament now sitting at westminster , be the supreame power of the kingdome or no , and to be obeyed in lawfull things . his argument runs thus ; the surpeme power of the kingdome consists in a parliament of king , lords and commons . but at westminster there is not a parliament consisting of king , lords and commons . ergo at westminster , there is no true parliament at all nam dum cessat forma , cessat formatum . i thought he had been so good a logician , as to have understood that the conclusion of his syllogisme ought to have been contradictory to the question , from which it is as distant as if he would have concluded that two and three make five , which is very true , but how is it any thing to the purpose ? however i will doe him the favour to deny his major — for we speake of powers which now are , and he himselfe hath all along condoled the e●ection of the king , and of house of lords , as things which are not . sed non entium nultae sunt affectiones ; & so consequently they who are now nothing , make nothing now at westminster , or anywhere else . but doth it follow however , that there can not be now any supream power at westminster ? at all if he had proved this , he had proved something . but pe●●aps the very word parliament poses him , or else he would thereby impose on others . i must confesse words are dangerous , when they are not fully explained : and possibly the king mistook himselfe very much upon the very alphabet and word of his title , supposing he could not be named king , unlesse he were ab●olute , as he observed other kings were ; whereas by our constitution he was but one of three , who concurred to the making and abrogating a law , and it belong'd to the commons alone , to lay an universall taxe ; so that he was in most things rather prince by office , then king by power , in tanto , non in toto . even so the word parliament , as it hath been popularly understood , signifies the assembly of severall houses , deliberating and concluding what was judged for the good of the publique . but it is a contradiction to say a parliament cannot at all be truly so called , unles so understood ; we know there are eight parliaments in france , which are not of such a constitution , though of the same denomination . and if severall persons plenipotentiarily deputed to conclude for the publique good of the people , sit now at westminster , and that the other concurrent powers be civily dead ; why may not we congruously enough still call them a parliament ? his axiome therefore serves onely against himselfe , and the true english of dum cessat form● cessat formatum ; is this , that seeing the old forme of this state , as it was in the supremacy of kings lords and commons ▪ hath in that relation ceased to be , and is civilly dead , not being able any longer to act any thing ; and that a civill body as well a naturall , cannot live without a head one day ; it followes then by this position , that the regall government is gone , and that we are in the state of a republique ; no other power now informing or actuating us , besides that which pretends to such a state ; and where i pray you is that to be found now , but at westminster . in the next place he offers a case , if the king , when hee came to accuse the five members , had detained all but forty and the speaker ; and had forc't them to vote , that the whole legislative power resided in himselfe ; would we have deemed this a valid vote ? especially seeing some votes since this session were adjudged null , because the house was under a force . by which it seemes ( quoth he ) that with some new veritas non est perpetua ; and duo dum faciunt idem , non estidem . to the first i answer positively , that such a vote attained by the king , had beene no wayes duely valid . but what is this to the purpose ? for the question should have beene after the king had detained such a vote , and had got us all into his full possession , whether we of the people might have obey'd him ever after in lawfull things . secondly , if he would have the people understand this case to be parallel , to the late exclusion of the members , he prevaricates grosly againe ; for he supposes the very forty in the house , with the king , to have been under a force ; whereas in the parliaments late case , none but those who were out of the house , were under restraint ; the former were supposed to be forc't to a particular vote , the latter were kept from voting at all : besides they who de facto voted in the house , have publiquely declared that they past their votes , with all wonted freedome , and were rescued as it were from an overawing power , which concludes against his argument abundantly . as in this argument he hath done truth little service ; so he hath ( by his mistake ) done kingly government lesse . for if princes who have us in their full possession , may be obey'd in no lawful things , after they acquire an addition of some other powers unlawfull ; then he would dislove most of their governments , and have absolv'd us from allegiance to king charles long before this parliament began ; by which sort of arguing the royallists i see will have no great prise this gentleman . but the parliament hath already declared the votes made under a force are null ; this vote i suppose he meanes past , after boyes and apprentices of the towne , had entred the house , and made the speaker propound , and the members vote what they pleas'd . here indeed there were forced votes ; but surely this proves not , that they who voted , when the members were last excluded , voted in that manner . besides the parliament which knowes better then we of the people , what their owne disorders within their house are , are only fit to vote , what votes have beene forc't upon them , and they since that time have declared , they never transacted things with greater freedome and lesse overawing . from whence i easily see that his axiomes will serve him nothing at all . for we acknowledge veritatem esse perpetuam , if we speake of naturall and mathematicall truths , where there is no medium proportionis , to varie the thing ; as , all number are even or odd ; because there is no middle number , so all lines are either crooked or straight : but morall & civil things are alwaies in change , because humane actions are invested with such an infinity of circumstances and accidents ; for which reason duo dum faciunt idem non est idem ; for no two men in the world can act the same thing in all the same circumstances : thus we heare that omnis des●nitio in jure est periculosa ; and summum jus aliquando sit summa miuria , which cannot be but in regard of those various accidents which perplex our actions , and make them like that famous flower the marvell of peru , which changes the colour of it 's leaves every day . his last axiome , that no man ought to take advantage of his owne wrongfull act or of anothers : is impertinent and no way beloning to us of the people . if he intends it to the present governours , he had best to take heed againe , that he determine not against severall lines of our kings : for the clearing of whose titles after usurpations , the judges were ancienty sore put to it , to make this one axiome for all . that the imposition of the crowne takes away all defects , and stops in blood . and if this be true , then we and our forefathers for the most part , have live'd ●nder no better titles then plenary possession , to which they submitted , either because they knew no better titles , or could have none of better to command them , or because they were resolved they might lawfully submit in lawfull things , which therefore as it now seemes , is not so much our present question as our present passion . two principall inconveniences hee findes in this present government , and by the goodnesse of the fruit hee hopes hee may judge of the tree . where i must againe admonish him , that the civill fruit of a government is alike in all governments , especially as to the meum and tuum of a people besides , if the tree and the fruits here were alike , then a good axiome were spol'd ; malus homo potest esse bonus civis , & bonus magistratus , a man bad to himselfe , may be a good magistrate and a good common-wealths man . his first inconvenience is , that wee have now made the basis of the state , a quick-sand ; and it stands like nebuchadnezzars image , upon a mixt footing , part iron , part clay . i answer , that it stands not now on so mixt a footing as before ; for the concurrence of king , lords , and commons , for the product of a supream act , was a mixture of things very heterogeneous , to enter into one and the same composition : by reason whereof , supremacy confin'd as it were on a battable ground ; and if we will believe persidents , king sometimes gain'd upon the other two , sometimes the lords topt both , and now all is more united then ever in the sole sufferage of the people . toleration is the next inconvenience , it being but equitable , that if wee thinke it lawfull to force people to submit to the orders of the state , the same people be compel'd to adhere to an established confession of faith in religion . for it is presum'd that obedience is fully as due to god as to man . i answer , the christian religion is not tolerated amongst us , it is enjoyn'd , as much as one man can passe it upon another ; for , the finall penalty of neglecting it here is not to be required of us mutually in this life . secondly , the confessions of faith , which he would have men forc't too , are ( as i conceive he meanes ) but logicall deductions out of scripture , ergo not indubitably , true enough to be by force obtruded on mens faiths ; it is not enough to say here , that they who compile them verily believe them true , and intend not to deceive , which is all that can be said . for then they doe no more but quote themselves , and we are taught that it is a popish opinion to beleeve any company of men are infallible , in what they purpose : wherefore the magistrate can doe no more safely , then recommend not force , their notions and logick on the people . but in a case of meum and tuum , or in a morall thing he may be more peremptory then in a divine , because those things are certainlyer knowne to us as men , then what is of divine revelation and inference . he feares that by an obedience to an unlawfull power , he may assert its unlawfulnesse ; and should our servants rise against us , and command us by threats to performe a lawfull act , which is but transient we might yeild to avoid their force : but if they should affirme that the government of the family were theirs by right , and that they intended to perpetuate it over us ; we should thinke it a great sinne to betray that place and power wherein god hath naturally and morally placed us . this indeed is a very fine subtilty to end in nothing : and i am sure what ever the basis of the state be , the basis of his argument is put on a quick-sand . for if he intend truth thereby , he should have proved this maine thing ; that the former magistrate was our naturall parent , and that we all derive from him , as from a genarcha , which being so evidently false , is as ill supposed . for in this confusion of families in the world , in which the originall families are lost ; we owe no naturall duty to any , but to those from whose blood we derive . secondly , though it were true , that the chiefe magistrate were our naturall parent , yet it followes not , but there may be a case wherein he might be refrained from government ; the law supposes many , which is sufficient to oppose this gentlemans single judgement ; and if he be indeed a presbyterian , he hath already concluded as much in the last kings case , by concurring to invest his person with the accidents of warre , in detayning him prisoner at holmby , and newcastle &c. thirdly , i understand not what he meanes by gods placing a magistrate morally over us . for god he is our divine and supreame magistrate ; our parent is our naturall and domestik magistrate , and those who command the state wherein we are , are our civill publique subordinate magistrates under god ; and every particular man who is arrived to the maturity of reason , is , ( if any such be ) his owne morall or private magistrate . for the principle of a humane or morall action , is a minde acting freely according to vertue , and those lawes which are written within us . but if by a morall magistrate , he meanes such a one only , as is seated over us , and hath a care that we live conformably to vertue , and honesty in relation to others ; then it followes , that whoever hath the capacity so to hold inspection over us , is a sufficient magistrate ; but that can onely be he under whose full possession we actually are . moreover he is to know againe , that states cannot looke so strictly after vertue , as after publique quiet . for morall vertue is a private thing , and by reason of the free concurrence of the will , cannot be discovered certainely , but by those who are able to look within a man : but that which is ad alterum , and concernes rather wrong , then right , belongs to the politicall magistrate , as a thing which cannot without confusion have redresse otherwayes . for the chiefe convenience of a state , is , that people might be kept from inconvenience , or incommoding one another ; and that they may be conserv'd in a liberty to doe other good things according to piety and honesty : so that he who doth things in themselves good , though under an unlawfull civill magistrate , doth not by those acts assert any magistrates right ; but his only who originally gave law and rules for those internall acts , and that is gods right alone . lastly , whereas in this argument , he saith a father of a family so abused should in his required submission , sin , if he betrayed his place and power which god had naturally given him . i answer that there is a difference betwixt betraying a place so given , and loosing it by force ( which indeed is his first supposition ) the one cannot be done without sin , because it is done voluntarily and totally by himselfe , but it is not our sin if we be forc't out of a place ; to which we are compelled by a principle without us , and totally besides our power . but there is a lawfuller power visible enough to religious eyes , though for the present in an ecclipse , and suspended . it is not lawfull for a man to marry another woman whilst his owne wife is in a sound , or for a woman to marry another man , whilst her husband is in captivity or restraint , and willing to come to her if he might . to this i answer ; first , how knowes he certainely that the other power is onely in an ecclipse or suspended ? or if it be onely in an ecclipse , doth it follow that we of the people might not doe lawfull actions by the suppliment of other lights , whilst we cannot have that of the sun ? must we all that while cease to be men for the absence of that which we cannot help ? the presybterian party would not have that understood so ; when the king was in prison at holmby . there be no more suns in the world but one , but there are many magistrates , and such who give better light one then the other , for which reason god first chose not monarchy for the jewes , certainly in an ecclipse , the sun is never out of his naturall orbe , though his light and influence may be suspended and intercepted from us , but when a prince is in a forraigne country , and lives under the lawes of another magistracy , and that all lawes and di stributions of justice and magistracy in the country he pretends to , are made without him and against him , will you according to the lawes of nature , nations , or policy , say he alone , and in that condition , is the supreame power or authority of that country , or rather that we of the people do nothing but sinne in his absence , though we do things in themselves lawfull ? if you will aske how he came to be out of his orbe or country , ? i am sure it was against the advice either of presbyterian or independent . it is easily granted , that a man may not marry another woman , so soone as his wife falls into a swound . but you must againe be reminded that the nature of marriage and of government differ extreamly there , where you suppose them most to agree . for marriage is not alwaies necessary to every particular man . but the publique body of a people cannot be without government one day , no more then a man can be without a head , because a smalltime serves to the ruine of a man . secondly , to take this or that woman to wife , is a thing of free choice ; but it is not so alwaies with the people in relation to kings , who have many of them committed great rapes upon them , as i beleeve this gentleman will acknowledge . a woman may not marry another husband , whilst her first is in captivity , and willing to come to her if he might . these cases of marriage still makes a very bad paralell with our present case . for first , we have been taught by all parties in this warre , that a king of england is not as a husband to the people of england . for a husband is he who alone makes and abrogates the laws of his owne family , as a right of his propriety , which a king of england could not doe alone in this state . secondly , where was this prince ever crowned by which this author meanes solemnly married to this state ? where was the benedictio sacra , the anointing or the oath of contract taken by him ? i am sure the covenant hath made no provision for him . to this purpose is that argument in the grand case of conscience , [ viz. ] the apostle commands wives to submit to their husbands , surely quà husbands , not quà men but sheuld a stranger come to anothers wife and ca●l himselfe husband ( having before either imprisoned or slaine the right full husband ) and require submission , surely though shee might hee forced , yet it were a sinne to submit to him thus as a husband . i answer , to submit in adultery is a plaine sinne ; but for a woman to submit in lawfull things to the power of a stranger is no sinne , though he please to call himselfe her husband , or exercise the government of the family . there is the same mistake of husband here , as in the former , so that the argument built thereupon , of it selfe fals to the ground . but if by this he meanes that in matter of supreame command , we of the people may not obey any but the husband or the king , why then did the presbyterian party for so many years oppose , and not totally submit to their now supposed husband ? why did they commissionate so many thousand men , who by accidents of warre had the power , though not the chance to kill him ? nay in the parliaments case it was alwaies conjoyntly argued by them , that it was he the husband , that would have killed them the supposed wife , for which reason the kirke of scotland long ago sent him a bill of divorce , unlesse he satisfied for the blood of three kingdoms . which of the two parties it was that at last killed him , belongs not much to the satisfaction of us the people , though here questioned because those parties as tot hat act differ'd no more ( if he will further argue it ) then dim n●tio and obtruncatio capitis doe , for they who after a long warre , and by long imprisonment dispoyl'd him of that regall power ( here so much argued for ) did according to the terme of the civill law , diminuere caput regis , and they who in consequence of his civill death , tooke away his naturall life , did obtrune are caput regis . if he had been kill'd in an action of warre before , should the souldier , or he who gave the souldier commission have answered for his life ? as for the submission of a wife to a stranger as to her husband , which is indeed a sin , i earnestly pray the author seriously to consider , whether he can excuse us and all our forefathers from sin , ever since this kingdome long agoe fell under the power of an usurping king , if this his way of arguing be true ? as for the second demurrer , i consider he hath given account to another very worthy pen , which hath left little for my gleaning in such a field ; however i shall see what hath escaped his hand , that the world may witnesse at last , that truth hath lovers , as well as errour and passion have cham ions . this author and the grand case of conscience begin with st. paul ro. . that wee must submit to higher powers , not that wee may lawfully submit , and that not for wrath onely , but for conscience sake , which is of things necessary , not of things lawfull : wherefore ( say they ) it is ill said that we may lawfully submit in lawfull things , obedience as a matter of conscience being a thing necessary . i grant it either in lawfull or necessary things , when obedience is required from those who actually have the whole sepremacy of power in themselves . if i hold this lawfull , and he hold it necessary , we are not contrary ; he onely makes what i allow more allowable . but the reason wherefore the apostle requires obedience to such , not onely for wrath ( which is onely in regard of the power which they who are supreàme have to destroy us ) but for conscience sake is , least by our resisting them we unnecessarily disturbe and draw calamity on others , and likewise in regard of their authority from god , tyrants even in title not arriving to the great dominions of the earth , without gods secret order , god having clearly stated the government of the world for ever in himselfe as his cheife prerogative , he not being known or feared any way so much as by dominio n , which made st. augus . in c. dei . rightly say , potestates omnes sunt a deo , non omnes voluntates , so that the reason wherefore god permits sometimes such princes to attaine to these powers , is the same wherefore he permits devils in his government of the world , a nimrod , or a pharaoh , a caesar , or a herod , an antichrist or a turke , who as bad , and as usurping as they are , and seeme to us in exercising so severe , though so secret a part of gods justice , yet fulfill severall prophecies , which shewes they come not to what they are , meerely by humane contrivance by chance or accident . the grand case of conscience . p. . distinguisheth betwixt authority or power , and rulers deputed to the exercise of that authority . the first is by gods positive ordinance , the other bu● by his permission . here he grants enough as to our case , which is of obedience , for if he can assure me that it is consonant to gods permissive will that such persons be my magistrates , i am well satisfied then , that gods will is , i must be their subject , gods free admission of one being the necessary exclusion of all the rest , so that subjection is not a thing now of my choice , but of my necessity . but the demurrer , p. . would know what difference there is in popular obedience to lawfull powers , and unlawfull powers , if obedience be necessary to both . i answer , if the powers here supposed by him agree equally in their supremacy , and absolutenesse , and differ onely as one is got lawfully , the other unlawfully , then the difference of our obedience to either , is onely in the difference of things commanded , as they are either lawfull or unlawfull ; neither can the author ( now arguing so much for a lawfull power ) conscienciously tell us , that the lawfulnesse of the civill power commanding can make our obedience necessary to an unlawfull thing commanded ; but rather that it makes that power then become to us in some manner unlawfull , and worse to us of the people , then if we were under the absolute command of an unlawfull power which exacts nothing but lawfull things . the knot of this point lies here , whither a civill circumstance ( such as is the magistrate either lawfull or unlawfull ) can vitiate an act of morall duty ? i believe his distinction p. . of a government constituted or constituting , serves nothing for the discovery of a supreame lawfull power in it selfe . for i hold that whatever was once a sin may alwaies be called a sin , though with rooting or without rooting . not but that god and we may make good use of other mens bad actions if they be such , for which reason poore beggers may in their extremities receive necessary almes from those who came to their estates by wrong and oppression ; the receipt whereof they do not justify the title of such estates , much lesse doe wee justifie the unlawfull title of a supreame magistrate , from whose care we receive necessary protection . i say much lesse , because cases of estates are juris privati and have courts to judge of them , but the other is so much juris publici , that there is no mortall court to judge of it , for which reason how will these authors ( what governours soever they desire ) evidently prove that they originally had lawfull titles , or that they at first did not forcibly take the people to themselves , but that the people voluntarily resigned themselves to them which was not in nimrods case . from whence this may be inferd to the satisfaction of the grand case of conscience , p. . that , if he had that desired governour , yet according to himselfe he would not owne him long , because he were not sure to have in him a supreame power , such as the apostle , ro. . in his sence understands necessary for the kingdome of england . but in our sence of plenary possession , which was the case of the apostles time , we can easily see first , how our present power is the higher ( the whole kingdome now receiving all law protection and subordinate magistracy , from them ) and how they may be in lawfull things obeyed according to the same apostle ; and to the duty of our creation and being in this world . the case of conscience p. . acknowledgeth that a government may be altered ; but it must be done still by the higher powers , whom we ought equally to obey in submitting to an altered , as to a continued for me ▪ but it is a sinne if a party forcibly lay the higher powers low , and exact obedience as to the legall authority . i thought that he who in his sence understood the covenant in terminis eternall , would not have allowed a change of government here ; no more then he might allow the scots ( though upon never so much reason to themselves ) to change their doctrine or discipline ; because we swore during all our lives , to preserve that which was established among them , at the time of our swearing . but i now see we may well distinguish betwixt the covenant it selfe , and some covenanters , the covenant being as open for one change , as for the other . secondly , if a government though never so reasonably reformed or altered , be never in any lawfull things to be obeyed , ( termes which he did ill to leave out of his argument ) unlesse by the concurrence of all the higher powers ; then farewell all the old consequences of solis populi suprema lex , and the presbyterians form● . armes are unjustifiable . how corrupt and tyrannicall are most of the governments of the world , and yet how many of those supreame powers hath he observed to reforme themselves ? or diminish any thing in themselves , to alter for the better ? although the taking away of something in a government , may be as necessary , as continuing any old or new thing in it . certainly these authors have read but few of ionases , who voluntarily renounce themselves to settle a tempest . thirdly , our alteration was made by the present supreame power of the people : and the reason wherefore both houses laid the exercise of regall power aside for some yeares , made the commons as they have agrued it , lay it aside for altogether . viz. salus populi suprema lex ; the laying of it aside for some yeares is argument enough to us of the people ; that it might be laid aside for more yeares , and that one king might be laid aside as well as another . for to us it seemes effectually all one , non esse & non operari , for a thing not to be at all , and in this world to doe nothing at all . if they sinned who did this , is that any thing to any but themselves ? it is an axiome of good law noxa sequitur caput . thus whilst his argument should have been against our lawfull obedience , it is against their exacting it , as to the legall authority , which yet is grosly false ; for they exact it not as to the old legall authority , but as to the present supreame power of the people , non nomine regis , sed nominepopuli : and yet in one good sence it may be still called the same legall authority , because we have still under it the same lawes for our properties as before , and continued in life by them , as our lives themselves are . case of cons. p. . it is objected that this principle of obeying those onely who are in plenary possession of all supreame power , is fit onely to destroy states : for then should none governe any longer then their swords and strengths could beare them up . i conceive ( according to what is already proved ) that nothing can befound , either more consonant to christian charity , or to the preservation of states , then this our principle of obedience ; besides he knowes no kingdome in the world , where people doe not obey upon this same plenary possession ; allegiance alwayes relating to protection . and if according to his consequence , we should suspend all obedience till we have infallibly found out that per●on who derives a knowne and an undubitable right from him who was the first in compact ( because according to these authors intermediate intrusions , are violations of rights , and may not be obeyed even in things lawfull ) then i pray you of what can we resolve lesse , then certainly to extirpate one another ? which will come to passe ere we finde what we search for in such a blind scuffle ; and for feare of doing a lawfull thing under the inspection of one , who is suppos'd to have done another thing unlawfully , must we resolve of doing all unlawfull things by warre our selves , and desert unnecessarily , the cares of wife and children , of church and neighbour ? for non-obedience in a state is but a chimaera , neutrality , a state without relation ; there is no subsistence for it in any state , and unlesse you will allow me to concurre with others , and under others in lawfull things , i must leave the world ; my subsistence being onely in a conjunction with others here in this jurisdiction . the two demurrers p. . & p. . except against this our present obedience , beeause the present powers is yet new : neither is there a totall cessation of all hopes of recovery . philosophers hold that the definition of a man belongs to an infant , as well as to one of many yeares . because after the organization of the parts , he is informed with the same principle of life and reason , as a growne man is ; and having the same forme , is the same thing . even so the present power hath possest all the parts of this kingdome gives them life in the administration of publique justice and protection , which are the soule of a state , and the power which preceded this , what did it infuse more vitall then this ? and now that that is taken away , if this other did not presently enter into its place ; the common-wealth were dead , and each man were left in his naturals , to subsist of himselfe , and to cast how hee could in such a state of warre , defend himselfe from all the rest of the world , every man in this state having an equall right to every thing . wherefore let every man , especially , they who would informe consciences , take heed of affecting popular revenge , vvhich must also reach themselves at last : for vvhen they have once frighted people from lawfull actions , vvhat can they th●n commit but the un'avvfull ? into what an unhappy transport are we fallen , that such a principle should be derived from our church , the very papists being ever ready to obey in things lawfull , though the state seemed to them unlawfull . these will judge better of the state now then of the church , the one inviting and incouraging us to lawfull things , the other deterring us from them . but to return to the argument ; i have already shewed , that new or old powers , never can signifie good or bad powers . the uncertaine hopes of recovering in the future , proves that the thing is certainly lost for the present , and it is our obedience at this time which this q●estion relates to however the king of portugals acquisition , or usurpation was presently acknowledged by our king and others , although the king of spaine then had and still hath great hopes of recovering it , he being alwaies hannibal ad portas , and never removing out of his own dominion into another forreigne magistracy . the first demurrer p. . conc●ives our present condition like that of israel , betwixt david and absalom , at which time ( quoth he ) the people had grievously sinned , had they rendrd obedience to absaloms commands and substitutes , so long as david was living . this is very true , but farre from the purpose . for absalom was not a fundamentall legislative party in the state of israel , as the house of commons lately was , and so could not pretend such a right of warre . secondly david had his army hard by in the same kingdome with absalom . we have none here but the parliaments , all the kings forces and adherents being dissipated . thirdly the israelites scruples are supposed during the time of warre in israel , our after the war is ended . but if he mean by this fallacious paralell , that the israelites ought not to have opposed david at all in the way of warre , then how will he salue the scruples of his own breast , who promoted the course of war as well as others against the king ? the author of the grand case of conscience is very ingenuous in his contest with his adversary to forme a syllogisme with foure terms , and their be able to finde them out , and to answer the fallacy : so that whilst he wrastles thus stoutly with himself , he can have but a faire fall in his own shaddow , to prevent which i shall take the pains to part them both . his syllogisme ( as he imputes it to his adversary ) is p. . . if the people of the roman empire did submit to the power of claudius and nero , who by force were put upon them , then the people of england may lawfully submit to a change of government though beleeved unlawfull . but they did submit . ergo those of england may . here he excepts against the equality of inference made betwixt those whose persons were without due title forc't upon people , but still in the same government ; and those persons who without right of title force themselves upon , us now in another government , but what if the syllogisme be indeed and vertually onely this ? if the people of the roman empire were required by the apostle to continue obedience to claudius and nero , then the people of england may lawfully continue obedience to their present governours . but those might , ergo these may . his distinction of persons intruding wrongfully into the same government , and into a different government according to his former position satisfies not conscience in either , because both are supposed unlawfull and differ only secundum m●jus & minus quae non var●ant speciem so that if obedience were not a sin in one , it is not a sin in the other . if he say , obedience to intruders into the same government is not a sin , then he hath dispatcht all controversie concerning the exclusion of the kings line , and that the parliamens fault as to him was that they rather changed the government then the governours , which he acknowledgeth more plainly p. . where speaking concerning the persons comming to power , he saith it is not materiall who puts them in , nor what men are put into powers ordained by god . but to come nearer to the point , he cannot say that of the usurping caesars , which may be said of the parliament . for these are the representers of the people of england , and were lawfully a third part of the supreame power before the change of government . caesar had no part of supreame right , but what he rather usurped then acquired by any dicision of right , or fundamentall legislative controversie betwixt the senate and him . to say as the demurrer , p. . that caesar had gotten the consent of the senate , and added compact to his conquest , is absurd , unlesse he meanes he had gotten the senate so into his power , that he had them in a condition of quarter ; in which case as the law saith principum rogamina sunt mandata , without doubt if the peoples submission to caesar were lawfull upon his changing a republique into a monarchy , after the senate had for bad the approach of his army , and that he had expelled many members from the senate , why may not a lawfuller obedience be given to those of a senate it self , who have changed monarchy into a republique ? these two changes are so farre alike , that they frustrate this authors distinction of persons intruding unlawfully into the same , and into a different government . he followes his objection still , p. . arguing that though people did de facto , obey such false possessors , and vsurpers , yet that proves not the lawfulnesse of our obedience , nam a facto ad jus non valet consequentia ; their submission should have been proued legall . if he hath a quarrell to us for our peaceablenesse , yet why should he quarrell with st. paul ? he bad the romans submit in the same kinde ; and unlesse we had prophets on purpose to tell governours , as well as us of the people , who must alwaies succeed according to the minde of god , then the state of the world , the nature of politick justic● of society and religion is such that we may & ought to submit in obedience to those who plenarily possesse , protect and command us lawfull things . surely he did not consider his axiome well , for a facto ad jus valet consequentia , from fact wee inferre many civill rights , as custome and prescription , &c. neither is it necessary to prove their submission legall , is it be prov'd absolutely necessary and equitable . and yet we conceive another case ( besides that before mentioned ) wherein this submission to a new power may be call'd legall . for the end of all law and government is to preserve our persons and estates ; and they who are in supremacy of power , have power to preserve or destroy both if they please ; and therefore have as great a power over our lawes , which are lesse , then our lives . so soone as one supreame power is expelled by another , law , life , and estate fall all into the hands of the succeeding power ; and what it doth not actually take away , stands in effect as deriving from it ; and if that supreame power make a sanction for our obedience to it ( as alwaies is immediately done ) then we may say our submission is legall , or else the supreame power cannot make a law . to that argument where we assert , that the authority which excluds all other authorities must be obey'd , or else all authority falls to the ground ; the grand case of cons. answers obliquely still , that notwithstaning , such authority can never illegally get the legall p●wer ; nor can it exclude others from their authority . in which answer he plainely contradicts himself , p. . for caesars power was ( according to himselfe ) legall , and yet got by a circumstance very illegall ; the senate being empty , and intimidated , and not so much in their own , as in his power . this argument is so farre from concerning us , that it is directed onely against those princes who ab origin , drive from illegall acquisitions . of which he will doe well to speake largelyer , when he can assure my conscience by infallible evidence of right , that i may safely sweare or destroy men upon it , that there was ever such a man in england as william the conquerour , or any other ancient king , from whom titles are said to be derived , either legally or illegally : this is a proposition , which i beleeve he in the midst of his peremptorines was not aware off , no more then i now doubt in whose hands the present possession of the kingdom ; is for which reason they assert their authority , and it is his part to shew how infallibly it appeares to be anothers by indubitable right ab origine . but because it is argued that in the disquisition of a right title , none are so blind as the people ( who among other burthens have the imposition of other mens judgements cast upon them ) therefore an usurped title to them is true enough to exact obedience . hence the grand case of cons. answers , p. . that then by the rule of contraries it followes , that when titles are visibly unlawfull , people are disengaged from obedience to them . to this i reply , that this answer is nothing but a meere repetition of the question , and hath no medium of proofe annexed to it ; the very question being this conclusion , viz. whether obedience be lawfull to titles visibly unlawfull ? secondly , it hath been shown , that non-obedience and subsistence in a state are incompatible ; every man in a state stands in a relation , and must either command or obey ; and owes something to him , by whose care he● sleepes quietly in his bed . thirdly , if by disengagement from obeying a lawfull title , he meanes that we may choose whither we will obey or no , then though disengag'd , wee ma● obey . these answers helpe us halfe way over the next dificulty . we may not any way affirme the right of the vsurper , or deny interpretatively the just title of the heire , without the guilt of treachery , lying and falsenesse , if not of vow-breaking , in suffering a theife to take my purse , i cannot helpe it ; if i must part with that or my life , i chuse to loose my purse ; not for feare least i breake the fifth or eight commandement , but least i breake the sixt , in being guilty of selfe murther ; yet rather then say he hath authority to take it , i must loose my life . in point of protection among theeves , i may desire some to preserve mee from others , yet may i not say their robbery is just , or joyne or ply with them in robbing others . to say no more of the certaine evidence , and of the indubitablenesse of ancient originall titles ( which is here the maine of the argument ) i answer that simple obedience to an establisht vsurper , doth not alwaies interpretatively affirme his right , or deny anothers , but affirmes rather the irresistibility of the possessors present power . god is the supream magistrate of al the world , and by reason of his omnipotent presence every where , we cannot exclude him from the cognizance of , or right to any of our actions ; but our earthly magistrates may fall into such circumstances , that they may have neither personall or virtuall presence with us , and therefore may be said to be civilly dead , according to the former axiome , idem est non esse & non operari , to doe nothing and be nothing is to us the same thing , motion being the chiefe evidence of life . in his case of the thiefe , i desire any man to consider whether ( as he hath put it ) he hath not clearely broken one commandement , besides those which he hath named , viz. the third , because it is an untruth to say the parliament requires not obedience from any of us , unlesse we all acknowledge the lawfulnesse of their authority , which is the second false supposition here . when officers gather taxes for the state , they have no commission to demand our declarations of the states authority first , but onely to receive the money taxed , which this author knowes is a truth knowne to every one . as for the peoples conjoyning and complying with the state to robbe another , by obeying to the prejudice of another ; he must meane it in a robbery either of power , or of riches . for power , the people aime not at it , their condition alwaies is l●rge who ever sits at top . and for getting by the warre , i hope the presbyterian party which had the authorizing of taxes , as well as others , knowes as well as the people themselves , that this is a grosse prevarication . last of all there is difference betwixt willing compliance , and necessary subjectiion , which is the peoples case . he objects againe p. . if obedience be necessary then a title once wrong'd can never be lawfully righted , it will be sinne to helpe the weaker party , or to rescue our selves from perpetuall slavery . here he is started suddainly into two other questions . first , how a title may be recovered ? and secondly , how we of the people may rescue our selves from the slavery of any titles ? these two relate to the future , which is of gods secret disposing ; our question is of the present only . but i pray you what doe people get when warres for recoveries of dubious rights are long and calamitous ? what are the people of france or the people of spaine better for the long and hereditary anger of their two kings ? or what was the world better for alexanders conquering it ? the houses which are burnt , and the millions of bodies left dead in the field , are the peoples ; and princes scorning to derive from them , still trample them to dung . we talke of some titles wronged , as if their rights were so certaine , and so necessary to live under , as god almighties is , who yet disposes of the changes which are made here among his chiefe officers , and not we ; who is it then that can right wronged titles , but he alone who makes all titles right ? to that case where it is argued , that if the masters mate had throwne him over-board , and by power would suffer no other to guide the ship but himselfe , if the mariners will not obey him commanding aright for the safe guiding of the ship , the ship must needs perish and themselves with it ; it is answered by the grand case of cons. p. that the case should not have been of a mate as a partner ( which is false ) but of a party of the seamen , who coming to shore should bring the other obeying party to punishment , especially for acknowledging the vsurping stearesmans right , which is still falsely suppos'd in our case . here i desire this casuist to pull off his maske and speake plainly , whether he doth not plead for his owne punishment , as one who at the beginning of our warre principally incouraged us not to be guided by the then pretending stearesman , whom they of his party said aside , and stear'd a while themselves ; the scots declaring that he was not fit to touch the helme againe , till hee had satisfied , &c. besides , this is true , that they then required obedience from compounding royalists , although to them they seemed an unlawfull power and magistracy , as to the dispencing of publique and private justice . secondly , the reason wherefore these marriners might not acknowledge him the right master , ( as he hath varied the case ) is rather because this is in an inferiour thing de jure privato , master and marriners being accountants to the merchants who have a court of justice to judge the fact ; but what court is there in this world to call that power , which here is the supreamest to any account ? thirdly , he supposes the usurper and the complyers to be brought to account by the others , but not till they come to shore ; whereas in our case we can do nothing but in the ship , that is in the common-wealth , when we leave that , we go into another world , our true patria where indeed we doe not call one another , but are all called together to an account by our supreame magistrate , whose sentence we would faine prejudge here by a confusion of the ship in via . the grand case of conscience , p. . adviseth that seeing we are so unsetled , we should use meanes for a settlement , though by its procurement wee were more unsetled : if a man be at the rivers brinke he would advise him to keepe out of the water , but if at once he leap into the middle of the river , he would perswade him to come to the bank , although he wade through much water to come thither . i see according to this horrid tenent , that if god ( as the scotch phrase hath it ) comes not to the whole length of our desire , then there must be no peace betwixt man and man in this world . mr. ste. marshall preacht lately , that god was to be thankt for some thing , that church doores were yet open to those who had a zeale , and a will to congregate , that they were not under their enemies swords , nor compounding with them ; hee saw how they might be worse if god should through their peevishnesse let them see forraigne armies at their doores , who have both faces tongues , religions & affections different from ours ; and wil not care for firing our houses and churches , or for giving us lawes againe in an unknown tongue , and perhaps religion too . can he think the notion of our church government would be a charme to such swords and consciences ? or rather can he assure us of his prophecy here , that if we begin new troubles , we shall certainly have victory ? for his argument supposes it must needs end so , and that by his perswasion we shall wade to the bank . if we were indeed in the midst of the water ( that is in the midst of warre and confusion ) then being engaged for life , we might endeavour to wade through , though the streame were running deepe with our own and childrens innocent bloods , for after all metaphors , that is the element which he means . thus in no diseases but those which are supposeddeadly , may we use desperate remedies , such as may endanger the destruction of the whole body ; but may a man indanger his whole body , when it is not for the cure of himselfe but of another , and by the killing also of others besides himselfe , wife and children ? i will not name what sort of subtilty this gentleman hath used in this argument , nor def●ne with what conscience here he seekes to satisfie anothers ; for , lest we of the people should bogle at comming on the stage to act our late tragedy over againe , hee would impose it on our beleifes , that we are still in the middle act of it and that we ought to finish it . it is high time for him to consider whither if we run along with him in this we should not shut up compassion from our brethren , and shut out a great part of our gratitude towards god ; although i confesse some scars and haltings may remaine yet , after the warre it selfe is ended . methinks he should finde every thing both in nature and christianity more favourable for our present peace , then for our third warre , especially seeing all our former warres have ended very contrary to the expectation of those who were hottest to begin them . but i consider that passion is the last hold out of which we are beaten , of which the fuller men are , the lesse do they ( through a great judgement on their spirits ) perceive into what deformities they doe transport them , it being the nature of all intoxications that their defects are better perceivd by any , then by those who are opprest by them . the second part , that this obedience to the present government , is not contrary to , but consistent with our solemn league and covenant . by these steps we are come at last ad sacras columnas , to those sacred pillars on which the holy covenant hangs almost in every church , as a sanctum aeternitati a law sacred to eternity . the hands which hung it there , have not ( they say ) power to take it downe againe . who therefore may undertake to tell these persons , that they actually are or else may be freed from it , seeing they finde themselves obliged if they can , to tie all the world with them in the same sort of knot ? here is certainly a zeal● worthy to be ●ixt on that , which should obliege alwayes ; and the world must confesse that there hath been no publique oath taken by any person anywhere ; who have been more scrupulously attent not to double with their god in relation to his part in contract . but yet let not these consciences be scandalized if i say it was compild by none but mortall men , taken onely by such , and as a promissory oath cannot possibly be free from those exceptions , and accidents wherewith time changes the constitution of all those things , which it doth not absolutely destroy , wherfore upon a sober review of al i doubt not , but as many oaths and leagues are transient , so to shew that this according to its nature , and as it is originally a league or covenant , that is , as it is a formall compact , relating to the publique and united corporation of severall nations and magistracies ( by which each people were united together , and without which neither people were respectively to act any thing separately within and against themselves ) i say i doubt not but to shew that such a covenant , uppon what hath interven'd is expir'd to us the people of england , and that without any default of ours ; and though our magistrate would give it a new life and obligation ; yet to many principall things it can obliege no longer ; and for the next we are to consider that though something of our first end in reformation streame through the covenant ; yet its spring head rises higher then it ; which end we are in all formes to pursue still , & are now left ty'd to so much of the covenant onely as we were oblieged to for all our dayes withall our mights and soules , before we took it at all . lastly , if it were granted , that the covenant is not expired , yet i shall here shew , that our submission to this present government is no way inconsistent with it . in which few words , though i have stated the maine of its difficulties , yet ere i apply my selfe to answer objections , i shall briefly premise what i have observed others have omitted , it being hard to finde how we may be unti'd from a thing , till we have found how the knot at first was made . whatsoever we can say , affirme or deny , is either assertory or promissory the first relates to the time past or present ( is if i affirme titius to be , or have been at rome ) and therefore upon the very saying or swearing , the whole truth and obligation is fulfilled , and past with the time which accompanied it . the other relates to the time present , as it is then sincerely said or sworne ; and to the future for the sincere fulfilling them , which yet is dubious , conditionall , and not in our powers ; as when titius promiseth sempronius .l . when his ship returnes . for this reason some say all promissory oathes ase absoutely unlawfull , because oathes must be true and certaine ; but all future effects of things are uncertaine . i answer , that for so much as concerns the forme of my oath here , it is true and certaine , that my minde and words went truly together in the act of swearing , and that i will make my deed and words goe truly together , when the suppos'd condition betwixt us ( and which , as we mutually consent to , is in neither of our powers at present ) shall absolutely come to passe . this was the case of abrams servant , when he swore to take a wife for isaac ; a future ( in severall circumstances ) very uncertaine , both in respect of what might happen to the servant , to isaac and to the virgin we know what hapne'd to iob's children and family through the accident of warre , and the malice of the devill ; and how ioseph was shuffled away by his owne friends and kindred . it is not enough to say , such suppos'd tacite conditions cannot be in oathes ; for first , if such conditions be in promises , and that i may lawfully make a promise to another , then i may lawfully sweare a promissory oath to him , which we see cannot be separated from such conditions as are not , cannot , and need not be exprest betwixt us at the beginning . for ( to take away the supposition of fraud betwixt us ) we both agree in this that we cannot foresee with what circumstances our futures may be perplext . therefore it is sufficient that we swore things not necessary , but possible ; such as might happen or not happen , because depending on things which depend not totally on us , nor on our will , but rather mixtly on the wills of others , and on that which to us is change or fortune , for which reason he is not forsworne , who effects not alwaies what he by oath promiseth , no more then he sinnes , who alwaies effects not his simple promise . secondly , this tacite condition in a promissory oath , and in things naturally and morally possible , is proved by the very nature and definition of the oath . for it is onely an attestation , and imprecation of god in such manner , that if the promiser faile , he would have him to whom he promist , understand , that be puts himselfe under gods severe wrath . from hence it is to be noted , that the bare promise obliged as strictly before he swore , as after he swore ; and of the reason is , because he was obliged by nothing , but by that which was in pact . the investing it with an oath , or with gods punishment , relates onely to the penalty : so that a promissory oath signifies no more , then such a penalty upon such a promise : but a penalty ( as we know ) in law and equity relates onely to that which is unlawfull , such as is the violation of a pact . the addition of never so many penalties , to a thing in it selfe unlawfull , can never fasten any obligation on me to doe it ; nor can severall penalties to an obligation in it selfe lawfull , adde anything to the first ius or right of it , but onely to my future feare , least i doe injustice . the capitall question therefore in these cases will be . what the nature of the things are to which we obliged our selves at first ? for according as they stand or fall , our relations or obligations , to them stand or fall whither we will or no . thirdly , we finde such tacite conditions , conceal'd , and suppos'd in the oathes of solomon to bathsheb●● ; of david , concerning nabals house ; of god concerning the destruction of ninevah , and of abrams servant concerning isaacs wife , &c. by a reflection on all this , viz. that seeing there may be a promise , and consequently a promissory oath ; and that the nature and obligation of a promise , and of such an oath , is one and the same , we have gain'd a great point , that the covenant ( which is a promissory oath ) is not in its owne nature of an eternall obligation , but is involved in tacite conditions and accidents of the world , which may justly incumber us from effecting it , or from being further obliged to it , as well as other promises may , which yet are made bonâfide at the beginning . the difficulty onely is to see , whither de facto that hath interven'd , which hath now taken away the formall and originall obligation , which we of the people had to it at first , by authority of our magistrate ; and so taken away , as we may be secure and out of feare of the penalty , which we then submitted to in it . i shall not here make use of what others have laboriously argued ; that the matter of the covenant is such , as we cannot be obliged to , but let it be as good or as bad as men please to suppose ; i say in the first place , that all the good or bad , was form'd into a politicall oath , authorized upon two kingdomes , by the sanction of two publique magistracies ; who as collaterals obliged themselves to cooperate faithfully together , and obliged those of their distinct nations , to cooperate respectively and subordinately with them , for attaining a former end in such a way of reformation , as is therein exprest ; but by such meanes , as they in their publique and respective capacities , not we in our particulars should judge most consonate to equity and true to religion . for which reason we happily are pointed at there , onely in our private places and callings . here therefore there is a relation of severall things concurrent , viz. of two magistracies united as a meanes for the easier reaching the end of those respective reformations , which they were obliged to make before they entred in league , and of two people , who by the union of their respective magistracies , passe ( for so much as is therein exprest ) into an union one with another , and are to have their private capacities and endeavours managed by them , and never against them by any virtue of this league . besides it is a considerable circumstance in the magistrates managing the whole , that states or civill constitutions by reason of the diseases of ambition and avarice , are naturally as much subject to future changes , as any other things are ; and without the supposition of tacite conditions , we may as little sweare to preserve the state of a publique body , as we may sweare to preserve the state of our own particular bodies , or as a parent may to preserve his childe , which when it shall be taken away by diseases , or by justice , he may be sorry for the losse , but may not justly complaine of it . and indeed so it is come to passe without any default in us of the english people , or of our publique magistrate ( under whom we were to act in these private places and callings ) that neither of us can be said to have laid the covenant aside , although we could not keepe it from expiring ; because the failing was in that which was never suppos'd to be in our powers viz. in many conditionall things which camecr osse , and in the breach of fidelity in another collaterall and concurring power . if you please to object here as an aggravation , and an incitement for us of the covenanted people to rise kill and slay , that the covenant is buried not as a thing really expired and dead , but that the people out of interest must be told so , onely because the former magistracy is really laid aside and changed , which if people should throughly consider , would quickly make them finde matter enough in the covenant to take armes . i shall not in the way of answer to this repeate any thing concerning the cause , the meanes , and the concurrences to this our present change ; every covenanter both of england and scotland , knowing well that there was no change of government here , till the covenant was nationally broke ( and so many here were insnared , both royalists and parliamentarians ) by the scots , who thought to have us'd it for a change of government , and as a stratagem to give law in another judicatory : neither shal i argue in this place , how compatible any change may be with a covenant so conditionall , in which kings as parties are totally excluded from judging either for themselves or for others , which point shall be further argued at last ; but i shall content my selfe to take what is here granted in the objection , viz. that the government is really changed ; the consequence then to us of the people will be , that seeing by the fourth article of the covenant , we may not without apparent breach of it , act the sence of the covenant , but as we receive it from our respective and supream judicatory of england onely , and that the said government which it relates to , is confest to be gone , have you not then clearely confest that the obligation to act any thing publiquely by covenant is likewise gone ? according to an old axiome , sublato relat● tollitur correlatum . if this present government which we are chang'd to , and which now protects us , should thinke fit by the way of covenant to give a new life , to that remaining part of it , which may be observed , yet you will not allow any obedience to them , though in things never so lawfull ; neither will that fourth article allow me to obey any forreigner , nor those without whose consent the covenant was made , and consequently without whom it is to be interpreted , as the late proceedings of the scots at the hague plainely shew : so that after all this , if i in my private capacity be as you say still indispensibly obliged by it , to begin or assist to publique troubles , do you not fall into a worser absurdity , and maintaine an oath against the fifth commandment , or against all magistracy , which is an impossibility ? nothing ever cautiond in termes more expressely for our duty of making discoveries , of bringing to condigne punishment , of our supreame respective iudicatories and the like then the covenant did , which are things relating to none but our supream magistracy , unlesse you please plainly to assert another absurdity , that every single man who hath taken it , is thereby absolvd from his magistrate , and is made one himselfe to judge of the other , and thereby authorizd not by way of toleration to professe but to establish what religion he would , to punish at his own tribunall whom he would , and to reforme the state as he would . for he to whom you will allow a capacity of making warre , hath also a capacity of making peace , and lawes for the security of his peace . thus we see how the government is changed , and the formall obligation of the covenant at an end ; but what if i should grant you by the way of supposition , that in case both the covenant and the former government were standing together in as full force as you desire , and as it was when the scots first delivered the king up to the parliament of england ? i would then know of you whither if our parliament had then for reasons best known to themselves ( and of which wee can never judge competently ) declared us of the people , free from any further obligation of the covenant , might we justly have thought our solemne league at an end , and that we ought to act nothing publiquely any longer by it ? if you will say we should have been still obliged to act upon it , then i aske you againe under whom ? for i have proved it must be alwaies under a magistrate , and you have all along proved that it must onely be under our lawfull magistrate , how lawfull soever the thing be in it self which is commanded , you would not allow the king to be the person to be obeyed , whom you thought fit to keepe in an imprisonment . the parliament ( according to our supposition ) would not be any longer obliged to it , or be obeyed in it , and the scots acknowledge themselves in the article to be the supreame judicatory onely of scotland , and i cannot act publiquely by a private capacity or magistracy . ergo in such a case , the covenant how good soever , had not obliged any longer , nor is it in it selfe eternall . you will not deny perhaps but one man may free another from an oath when it is for the worldly profit of him who pleases to release it , as every man may throw away any thing of his owne right ; but you will not allow it in sacred things where god is a party . i answer , that though no parent can dispence his wife or childe from the feare of god and the duties they owe to him , yet he allowed him to break the childs vow for giving him a sacrifice , and both to be guiltles ; and then why may not we be now absolved , if our publique parent judges it not fit that wee should be any longer tide formally to a conditionall oath ; though it have relation to some sacred things ? you will say no , because the parent did not as a party solemnly concurre to the childs vow , and having never consented he might the better dissent ; but our publique parent did concurre at a party to our oath . the parliament and people tooke the covenant joyntly together , and it is said that if the father heare the vowes , and contradicts them not in the same day , then he confirms them , and cannot break them without iniquity , to this i reply , first , that v. . it is said the childe is free after the dissent of the parent , and that the parent is charged with whatsoever was amisse in him , which is excuse enough for us of the people . secondly , the difference is great in a maine point of the paralell ; because after the concurrence of the father to the childs vow for sacrificing something to god , that might be compleated in the temple without his further helping it on ; but we cannot doe any thing in our case without the cooperation of our publique parent all along , neither can he do any thing without the concurrences of many other possible , but uncertaine conditions , and if he in effect finde those conditions have come contrary to his publique endeavours , what may we doe ? will it be enough for us to rest in having attempted the utmost of our private endeavours with him ? or will you authorize every man upon private judgement or interpretation to begin a warre in his own sence . a league or pact authorized betwixt private neighbours over a whole nation or over part of it , is not as a league betwixt prince and prince : because these have conditions exprest how and when to begin warre upon one another in case their leagues be broken . but there is no such thing exprest in terminis in that covenant which we have made one with another , and which we made subordinately to our magistrate : so that if we or the magistrate faile , we are equally left to gods justice solely and to the forfeiture of our own penalties due to him , and every one is to answer for his owne deficiency in his own station : and being left to our selves againe , we are left to act onely so much of our oath or of the ancient end of it , as we were bound to before we swore : which is a great deale ; because we were bound by precept before wee were by promise all the dayes of our lives to do our utmost for the glory of god , and the good of our neighbour . secondly , princes or states who by the supremacy of their powers , are able to make lawes for their separated kingdomes ; when they unite their supream powers , they are able to make a common law for all their kingdoms together , which is called a league or compact ; but a law when it comes to be broken ( which is a publique thing , and therefore of every mans interest ) may be vindicated publiquely by warre , and by those who have a posse regni . but i cannot say the same may be done for the covenant , for quo jure can it be done ? the scots indeed by one way of arguing make it greater then a law , and by another make it lesse ; which is when they one while affirme it unalterable and unreformable as a divine text , and another while confesse it was not made by the joynt concurrence of all those who with them are essentiall to the making a publique law . i conceive we may safely say it is of a constitution inferriou● to that of a law , and therefore its obligation is lesse , though its penalty be greater to the failers in it . it was made use of , only as a convenient instrument or meanes , for the better attaining some lawes as its end . a law it was not because it was not made by all the then legislative powers of the kingdome . for the kings concurrence in england if not in scotland , was then held requisite for passing a law and he ever dissented from this covenant . halfe the inferiour sort of the people have not any interest in it , nor have taken it : and not having any obligation to it , how i pray you can they justly be drawne into the penalty due to it ? as they must all be , if a warre ( which is effectually a penall thing ) be begun though by a part of the nation ; for the nature of warre is such , that it puts a whole kingdome into imminent danger of desolation , though but begun in a part , and by a party of it . thus far i have endeavoured to shew the true fast and loose of all promissory oaths , and how their obligations cease according to the nature of the things which they are affixed to . the author of the grand case of conscience p , . objects , that if inconvenience may break a promise or disengage an oath , then many may be cheated , and david was much mistaken , psal. . . who saith he shall dwell in gods tabernacle , who sweareth to his own hinderance and changeth not . i answer , david speaks here of an oath violated by a change onely in the promiser , who by his oath hath past a right to another : and therefore can no longer dispose of it againe ; the party to whom he swore may dispose of it as he pleaseth and may dispense him of it ; because no man hath a right to make another man keepe his owne , longer then he please himselfe . it is a duty to pay a debt , but not to receive it . finally , this is nothing to those cases where the change is not in us , but in other persons , and in things which relate principally and conjoyntly to the fulfilling of the oath or promise . for if i promise titius a sword at such a time , and he then chance to be mad , ( an accident not exprest betwixt us at first ) am i bound to put it into his hands in this change because i was the first promiser ? wheras it is said , that the obligation of somethings end , because they can be no longer kept , as that of the kings person &c. he ans. p. . that if men shall by violence put an end to the thing , that thereby the obligation may end too , that is a breach of covenant . a woman promiseth to be faithful to her husband so long as he lives ; but if she , to marry another , kills him , she breaks her promise . i grant it easily that they who use violence to break lawfull contracts , sin grievously ; which is a thing now confest in every church of scotland ; but what is that to those who use no violence to breake them at all ; nor can helpe it when it is done although many be undone by it ? one thing i most earnestly desire to learne in this question propounded ( i guesse ) concerning the kings death ; which was a consequence of the others breach and tamperings . if by the covenant we were indispensably obliged to preserve his person , how came it to passe , that we were obliged by the same couenant to wage warre against him ? i have heard of a distinction betwixt his power and his person , but never of any betwixt his person and himselfe . so that if the covenant could have dispenced any souldier of england or scotland to kill his person by an accident of warre ( as his life was oft in danger before he came to the scaffold ) his death had beene violent , and the obligation to preserve him had ended , and yet according to this argument the covenant had not been broken . why then should these men thinke the world so dull as not to understand plainly enough , that the covenant provided for his death more wayes then one ? true it is , that the covenant held out a faint and a conditionall preservation of him , and after all no man can sincerely stretch it further : from whence if we will let him judge this one controversie , he hath left it recorded to posterity , in his suppos'd book chap. . in vaine is my person excepted by a parenthesis of words , when so many hands are armed against me with swords : moreover in his chap. of the covenant , he feared it provided for him in a logick too loose and circumstantiall . from all which what did he conclude , but that he would not allow of a covenant-argument for his life ? i know the answer here is obvious , that bullets were not shot directly against him ( as few are against any in a towne or in a battell ) and that if he would have withdrawne his person , he should have beene out of danger ; but then i pray you what advantage had he in this by covenant , more then any common souldier of either side ? who when they retire , are equally out of danger , nay he had lesse advantage , for by preserving him , they meant keeping him after he was rescued from others , and by keeping him they meant not him primarily , but something else , to which all consideration of him was to give way . as for others which were to be brought to punishment , they had some of them leave to go beyond the seas , others to enjoy liberties at home ; and of all the excepted persons , there was never any of them who was here deprived of life , but as our troubles and warres increast , their number ( which was strange ) lessen'd even to six or seven at last , and most of those out of the kingdome . i know they have distinctions wherefore so much might be remitted to those , and not to the king , although he had on his behalfe the word preservation in the covenant ; but these distinctions are but their strong justifications for that which is the bottome of this argument , if all covenanters durst speake plainly alike . he objects . p. . that if according to covenant we should preserve the priviledges of parliament , against a malignant party that would have taken away but five members ; why not against an heriticall party which took away above two hundred ? i answer , that when the five membere were in danger , there was a session of neere all the lords , and of all the commons to authorize the people to bring others before them to condigne punishment : but where is there now any session of a supream power in this land , before whom we ought to bring the present parliament ? under what formall supream magistracy can we now cooperate or receive publique orders , but from them ? who have commanded no such thing against themselves . lastly the covenant makes not us private men magistrates , neither doth it authorize us to a war disertly , as to a penalty . certainly he doth not meane that the remaining members make no house , because there are more now kept out , then are admitted into it . for would not such an argument clearly determine , that the house of lords was never a house , since the major part followed the king , under pretence , that they durst not sit any longer at westminster ? or else if the ●itting of so many members as are enough for a legall vote be illegall , after others are forc●t away ; how shall we justifie that session with a new speaker , when the rest were forc't to the armies protection from the citizens servants and apprentices , who forc't them , and indangerd their lives in the house ? or how shall we justifie the house of commons for sitting , when the five members durst not appear ? though force should not be used without a desperate occasion be given ( in which case the preservation of the substance , is alwaies above the consideration of a formality as hath bin argued by the parliament ever since their first warres yet they know few or many sitters in the house , is not a thing of our examination , if they be above forty . the second demurrer p. . objects that we have sworne by no terrour to withdraw our selves from this blessed union , but to continuein it all our lives against all opposition . if there were nothing else in the world yet these words sufficiently prove that we are now absolutely absolved from the covenant ; for first , they relate to a state and time of vnion , in which we were according to the united strengths of two nations , two magistracies , and of the respective magistracies and people here enabled , yea commanded to make great opposition against those who then were actually united in armes against the parliament . but now that we are supposed by these authors to be dis-united as our enemies are , and that the magistracy is changed , our state of subordination somewhat varyed ; that the links of our former chaine are broken ; and that the commons act alone without a king , as the lords & commons acted before without one , and that the scotish nation by their invasion , and their attempting to divide the king from us , and us one from another , by their declaration made preparatorily for division , thereby to favour invasion afterward , have in the face of all the world broken whatever was of nationall union and peace , yea and all that which was of confidence betwixt our selves at home , and ( which was yet more horrid ) in incouraging one principall army in ireland to fall off from the advantages it had against the bloody rebells , to turne their swords against the parliament it selfe , only out of a by end of ambition , yea now ( that the war being ended ) we are to enter into an vnion of cohabitation or in cooperation ( as they have done in scotland it selfe ) with those who during their united hostilities occasiond our nationall union , are we i say after all this , in the selfe same union which they at first hoped might have been continued to them & us for all our lives ? that union suppos'd the warre which then was , with the rest , of the circumstances , and if we wish the same effect or union now , do we not thereby wish the same cause or warre againe amongst us ? as we were to oppose armes to armes , so union to union , and certainly that union of the parliaments of both kingdoms was at an end , ever since the scotch army here received their money , and returned , home , leaving the delinquents of both nations dis-united and clearly reduced to receive condigne punishment , ( as the covenant calls it ) at the respective judicatories of both kingdoms ; and if it ended not then , yet it could not bee consistent with their declaration and divisions presently after ; and if not then , yet i am sure it could not be consistent with their nationall invasion , and tampering to divide all in england and ireland , the effect whereof hath been a change of government here , and hath made them totally distinct forrainers to us . the demurrers premisses in this argument by a new logick , relate onely to a state of publique vnion , and his conclusion relates only to a state of publique dis-union , of the consequences whereof the covenant saith nothing at all in any article ; it enjoyn●s the bringing of delinquents to condigne punishment , and those private persons likewise among our selves , who should helpe on , either divisions amongst us , or the invasion of either nation first . but whether should they be brought to punishment ? the covenant answers , either before the respective judicatories of each kingdome ( who onely have power to judge of what is condigne ) or before no body . it speakes likewise how we should unitedly venture our lives against the enemy which then was : it doth not , or at least ought not to sweare us to get the better of them for ever , nor that we should in a rout or dis-union end our lives against all opposition , and without quarter . if the termes of our utmost endeavours , and all the dayes of our lives , are to be understood litterally , and that we must not survive any violation of the covenant , then why do these gentlemen , ( who conclude themselves in the state of the covenant thus understood ) thinke of living till to morow ? the termes of forever , or for all the dayes of our lives are not in our contracts to be understood naturally , but morally ; for we finde it plainly in the judicial law , that after a jew had taken a servant , and bor'd a hole through his eare he was ( as the text saith ) to serve him for ever , although one of them might poss●bly have dyed the next day , and both of them after a while might have beene made captives to others . the law calls the league of marriage individua vitae consue●udo , a c●habita●ion for all the dayes of our lives . for so it should be ex voto contrahenti●m , in the sincere desires of the contractors ; yet we know , one ordinarily dyes before the other , and that many conditions may happen to legitimate their divorce afterwards , though the contract was never so religiously made in the presence of almighty god at first . the scots in their late proceedings with their king at the hague pag. the . interpret the words of utmost endeavour , as morally as we doe here ? for the commissioners of the kirk said , they us'd their utmost endeavours to save the kings life according to covenant ; but how ? they answer , that it was in papers , messages , declarations , testimonies , and protestations onely ; they name not warre , or bloodshed , for they protested against that way last yeare , as contrary to covenant , when the parliament of scotland invaded us ; and i hope for the reputation of the religion they professe , they have not altered their publique commentary of that sacred text contradictorily so soone . to conclude , either wee are still in the vnion of the end of the covenant , or we are not : if we be in it , then these breake the covenant , by seeking to dis-unite us : if we be not in it , where then is the article for our private forming a warre upon it ? and under whom , if not under our english supreame iudicatory ? and if they call us not out to revenge that which was more then a bare falling off from the covenant last yeare amongst ourselves , ( when the scots exercis'd such high hostilities , and were the first shatterers of all our frame ( which otherwise might by gods blessing have cemented againe ) how durst these private trumpets sound the alarum , and open the wounds of the nations once more ? though the respective iudicatory of that kingdome now cannot make that which was once done , undone ; yet by the present punishment of the kirke , it is acknowledged that they hold the covenant to have been more then nationally broken , in regard of the harme and damage which was done to us after it was broken . for there is a great deale of difference betwixt ceasing to helpe according to a league , and acting hostily contrary to it , especially when no such penalty is in such a league exprest betwixt the parties . but you will object , that if the covenant were so broken in one or two points by them , yet it doth not follow , that the whole covenant is broken thereby , and dead in every part . i have answered before that we are no longer obliged to any thing in it by the way of league and covenant ; the reason here is , because here in leagues everything is to be observed con●unctively , otherwise all is broken ; which is so true and cleare , that if we looke upon gods league and covenant with israel , we shall finde the same thing pronounc't there . god said , if yee keepe my commandements , i will be your god , and will maintaine you in your plenty , and in your land : yet he said , that if they broke any one commandement in their part of covenant , they were guilty of all , and that all should be at an end betwixt them : just as st. iohn in the conclusion of his revelation saith , who ever shall diminish but one word of that booke defaceth the whole , and looseth the whole benefit which he might expect thereby in the holy city , by vertue of the second covenant . it is asserted , that there is no clause in any oath or covenant , which in a common sence forbids obedience to a present government : to this the grand case of conscience answers , that the covenant engages to another government , therefore it forbids obedience to this , and oathes ought to bee their owne interpreters . here he at first begs the question , whether the covenant can now engage us or no ? seeing it hath beene proved , that that which is now nothing , cannot now engage us to any thing ; and conseqently our submitting to , and acting under the present government , cannot be contrary to covenant ; because things which are contrary one to the other , must have actuall being together at the same time . but the very being of this government , supposes the nullity of the covenant , whose death ( as it was other where contrived before ) gave life to that mutation here afterwards . secondly , though the covenant were still valid and in force , yet when we were sworne to it first , it found us actually out of that government here pointed at , viz. of king lords and commons . for that is the supreame government of a country , which makes a supreame law there : but at that time the supreamest humane law , which ( according to these gentlemens opinions ) was ever made in england or scotland , or perhaps in all the world , was made without the king in those kingdomes , and against his dissent . for which reason the covenant engages not so positively for king or kingly government , as for the vnion of the covenanters in any forme and against any opposition ; whereupon the presbyterians when it was ( as most conceiv'd ) in their power , to restablish king or kingly gove●nment , they omitted both for many dayes of their lives , without question ; because they conceiv'd it not a government absolutely necessary by covenant . when d. hamilton entred england so hostilely for that end , and as he thought by vertue of covenant , yet he was excommunicated for it by the oracles of the covenant . lastly , the reigne of the covenant since the first day of its birth and obligation , was never yet a r●gall reigne , no not for one day anywhere ; so that the change which is , is not determinatly contrary to that principle , out of which ( according to the circumstances of security ) any government may be moulded for any place . for which reason if i should grant you that the covenant were not expir'd , and had not beene so palpably broken , as it was betwixt the nations ; yet scotland ( if they had pleas'd ) might have beene govern'd by a king , and england by a free state , & yet both consonantly enough to covenant and without any contrariety , because the circumstances of securitie in one might have been different from the circumstances of security in the other ; which though different , might as well have been mutually maintained as their discipline differing from ours might have beene preserv'd by us . from all which it appears , that that oath is cloudy in the positive or set government which we ought to have , and so cannot be justly called it's owne interpreter , besides a reformation according to the word of god ; and the example of the best reformed churches , supposes such a latitude of logick as would ( if all sides should be heard ) give us as much exercise as all our wa●res have . and certainly the covenant is alike undefin'd in religion and in civill government . for we swore to bring the church discipline in the three kingdoms , to as neer a similitude as the constitution of the places would bear , not into the very same ; and as for the civill government , it was to receive its forme in the security of that , just as water doth receive not onely the figure of the pot or glasse into which it is put , but its conservation from being totally lost and spilt . but how then will you free your selfe from this contradiction in asserting that the civill state is unalterable by covenant , when that of the church which formes the other is so much alterable ? and seeing that of the state receives from this , not only its form and being , but what ever else you alone please to attribute to your security in it ? from whence i conclude again , that a change of government is consistent with covenant , & that a submission to it in lawful things is much more , and consequently it ingages not to any one determinate government , and so is not against this of ours . i beleeve it hath been a frequent observation of many , who have calmely converst with our divines and others zealous for presbytery , that they have found them little satisfied with that sort of presbytery , which our parliament modelled for us of this nation ; as having little affinity with the couenant . my beliefe is , that they in that discernd not the consequence of their own dissatisfaction . for if their consciences regulated by covenant , can admit no civill government , but the kingly ( which they so much argue for here ) and if the covenant and a scotch presbytery ( whose right they hold to be divine ) be essentially linkt together , then we and they may all of us learne , not onely from direct inferences , but from the declar'd experience of the sonne , the father , the grandfather , and great grandmother , that is of the three last scotch kings and one queene . that if the scotch presbitery come out of the covenant then kingly government cannot derive from it , because they are jurisdictions incompatible and inconsistant in the same place , and if one can conserve it , then may we say as much of the other . how much mary queene of scotland experienced of this , let the world judge by that which she wrote both with inke in her letters , and with her blood on the scaffold . for how came she to be beheaded in england , but by mr. knox ( and the kirkes having done little better than ) put her into the hands of those who could not keepe her long alive with security to themselves ? king iames hath writ and argued largely concerning his dangers & sufferings under it , & it is yet remembred in what dialect they of the presbytery were wont to preach and pray against him to his face , and he not know how to remedy it , or by what right to top theirs . when he came into england he profest his deliverance from that subjection not of small satisfaction to his minde , and therefore at this di●tance he contrived how to extinguish or check that ●ate there , & after some progresse in that worke he himselfe dyed peaceably in a milder country , but k. charles with that crown inherited the consequences of that undertaking , for his first troubles began in the controversie of that presbytery ; and what a preservation he thought the covenant ( from which it seemes their presbytery is so inseparable ) might be to him and what his fate was and who helpt it on , nay who diverted him from agreement here , all the world knowes and in his writings likewise he hath showne to the world that he himselfe was not ignorant of it ; this only is the wonder , that in the midst of this their specious zeale for kingly government , the covenant should be so silent concerning royall posterity , or for their succession , in case the scots or english souldiers had kill'd the king casually before he had given them the satisfaction which they required , the consideration of all this , with some other lately offer'd to the young prince at the hague , by the scotch commissioners , and the satisfaction which they in their late declaration require from him , as they did from his father , have questionlesse made him scruple , so long at his adventure into that country , though so much invited . for they told him p. . . that for longer then these eight yeares , yea ever since that queene mary , their fundamentall priviledge hath beene to assemble in parliament ; and to conclude there of themselves , either without king or kings commissioners ; and that if his majesty refuse those their reasonable desires , they shall be constrained in so great an extremity , to doe what is incumbent on them , to preserve religion , and the kingdom from ruine . here they plainly acknowledge , and assume that supreame power and right , which shall be proved here more evidently towards the conclusion . but because i intend truth here in the simplicity of my heart , and no way to swell this argument , either with passion in my selfe , or with scandall to any man else therfore i shall sincerely unfold what hath long been a mistery to my selfe , and for confirmation of what i have asserted here so positively , i shall give the reader the expresse word of our great english covenant-champion , and of master hinderson especially the scotch champion , betwixt whose fingers the covenant it selfe was moulded . o●●t ●●ind cafe of oonscience , p. , saith , but they who are now for the right of the son , and continuance of the government , are as much against the vices in and about him , as about the father . and should he doe as his father hath done , they who are now for the performance of this oath and covenant , would as truly joyne against him as against the father . who can call this regall language ? which yet will be lookt on as the english presbyterian-alarum , though but by one man . hee had done well in speaking of the performance of covenant by us all if he had offered a catalogue of all that which would fulfill the covenant in all its termes without any further interpretation ; but that which is supposed eternall for time is likewise infinite as to the matter which it may relate to by the application of humane logick . mr. hinderson in his newcastle conference , with the king p. . . saith , that the reforming power is in kings and princes , quibus deficientibus , it comes to the inferiour magistrates , quibus deficientibus , it descends to the gr●sse of the people , but yet supposing still ( as he saith ) that they be all of them rightly , inform'd . for which reason though he conceal'd it from the king , yet he meant , that the reformation of any of those three powers , according to the covenant must be judged & reformed afterwards , by some other body of men here not named . for i conceive that he who is ultimatly to judge of the reformation and of its publique obligation , judgeth likewise of the reformers themselves though never so high or never so low ; and to this strange opinion he would faine intitle two english episcopall champions bilson and iewell . here i must confesse i was at a stand , concerning the nature and interest of the covenant , and was sorry to see that i was no plainlyer told whether it would carry me ( laden with so great a curse ) nor where it would set me downe . at last i found in the same author . . . speaking of the subordination of powers , under which people were finally to obey , that he would not willingly tell his majesty , whether the church was subordinate to the civill power , either to king or to parliament , or to both : for ( quoth he ) i utterly desol●ima such a headship as the kings of england have claimed , or such a supremacy as the houses of parliament crave , with appeales from ecclesiastiall iudicature to themselves . no man may thinke but mr. henderson meant this for the jurisdiction of england , as well as of scotland , for hee spake of houses of parliament which were plurall in england onely ; and though it may seeme strange at the first view , to heare one say , that the scotch nation state the supremacy of england in their country , or that they endeavour a direct change of government , here , ( which they have indirectly attempted for a long while . ) let every man judge not by our subtilties , but by the kirkes declaration , july , , p. . . their words are , that their king after his oath of coronation in scotland , shall assure them under his hand and seale , to injoyne the solmne league and covenant , establish and practise the prerbyteriall government , directory , confession and catechisme , as they are approved by the severall assemblies of their kirke and parliament , in all his dominions , and that he shall never endeavour any change thereof . no man will say but states like judges ought to act , ex bono & aequo conjunctively . so that though these things which here they would impose upon us perpetually , were never so good , yet they being unequitably deriv'd upon us from their supreame judicatory ( in whose possession we are not so fully now , as they were last yeare in ours ) we ought to abominate their designe , as much as they might the like obtrusion of their presbitery from hence , without power there to rectifie it ever after . for these presbiterians with us grant ▪ that good and lawfull things may not be practiz'd under a power unlawfull , as they say the scots would be here . however here i at last found who was my supream right magistrate in the kirk● sence , but then i conceiv'd i was in a great snare , because i saw the jus publicum of a kingdome totally though secretly changed . i saw all things of direct religion , and whatsoever related collaterally to its security , lodged there , and by the kirke prejudged from the judgement of all other authorities in scotland especially . but because religion and its security draws in all humane concernments , and that two supreame collaterall powers cannot stand in one and the same place , in the same time , for the same person , but for contrary actions , therefore i knew not whither of the two supreame powers the ecclesiasticall or the civill i should in this case throw away , for they could not in this contest by the judgement of any be both obeyed together ; and i stood in a miserable case betwixt a jaylour and a devill the kirke giving me to the devill if i obeyed the civill power and the civill power giving me to the jaylour if i obey'd the kirke , which was ( to speake the truth ) the state of the whole kingdome of scotland last yeare , betwixt the the kirkes excommunication , and the parliaments order which authoriz'd duke hamiltons expedition , in vindication of the covenant here : in which difference we have no reason but to like the effect , however we may dislike such a cause here . wherefore to answer this ●scruple , i positively say , that in whatsoever is of pact betwixt man and man , or of policy in the covenant , i ought solely to follow the civill magistrate , and the church here ought to follow the magistrate likewise , as a case relating to the disquits to the warres , and to the recovering the peace of earthly kingdomes : if otherwise , then the civil jurisdiction ought clearely to be managed by the ecclesiastique ; which is stated so no where ( that i know of ) but in romagna and dutchy of ferrara and the other places belonging to the pope . this i speak not as desirous to detract any thing from the sacred function of the ministery as it containes it selfe in its own function , no man being able rationally to object any thing wherefore some might not ex officio , be deputed to excite others to vertue and sanctity of life . but yet who can say they are not subject to the infirmities of ambition , avarice , and severe passions as well as other men ? or have not our antagonists ( whether they would or no ) observ'd them in these cases of worldly rights and interests , to have as oppositly , yet as peremtorily differ'd one from another , as people of any family ever did ? the devill not being able to get the text on his side , by his wiles oft got the commentary , so that we are to be excus'd , if we hold many things in church-men , to be but as an apohrypha at best , which yet for esteem sake is alloted a place before anything else , next after the genuine text , having thus openly stated the scruples of my own and of many more consciences , and to take off maskes not from the faces , but from the consciences of these three , and the multitude of other scotch casnists , who have talkt so speciously for our covenant , vindication of an heirs just title , our submitting to it , and joyning with others immediately , least right suffer wrong one day ; i cannot ( i say ) but aske the same men plainly ; what difference in effect they find● , betwixt the titles and right of the prince of wales , and of the n●w king of scotland , notwithstanding all their obligation of covenant , to submit to him as such ? it is not enough by covenant to preserve an aery title onely to a prince , and by the same covenant , to suspend all the rest of his solid power , and right ? certain●ly his royall commands ( notwithstanding all this talke ) are no more obey'd in scotland now , then the episcopall commands of our countryman , the bishop of c●alcedon are now obey'd in turkey . but what hinders him from exercising any kingly right in scotland as yet ? the covenant which is not yet satisfied . how is it then , that some of our presbyterians say , that the same covenant indispensably opens the doore to him here ? if the ●ing aske the scots why they put the law of the covenant so to his obedience , 〈◊〉 the first thing which determines all his other rights afterwards ? they can onely say , that they swore it in his fathers raigne , and it is now eternall . though i censure nothing here , yet i cannot but conclude-hence ; that they of themselves , as well as our parliament , have made a law above all other lawes , ( and more then a reformable magna charta ) for the government of the kingdome which may be exercised according to it , without kings , and against kings . the first thing which was ever offer'd to him from the kingdome of scotland , was an authority by far transcending his own , viz. that of excommunication . for ( as their late proceedings with him at the hagu● shew ) hee was by that subtilty tryed whether he would refuse first to acknowledge iames graham ( alias montrosse ) or that great power of the churches , by which he might be awed to greater things afterwards . to backe this likewise the commissioners of the synode said ( p. ) that they negotiated with him in a capacity altogether , distinct from the commissioners of parliament , as being persons commissioned by the kirke , which is commisioned with a iusdivinum our bishops certainly never undertook such a jurisdiction & supremacy , and unlesse these had witnessed so much of themselves to all the world , no one would believe that in such a poore country , and so much forme of religion , there could be such high passions of ambition . besides if it be a true rule , that he who is the maker , ought to be the interpreter of a law , then let all the world observe one thing , that the kirk having made the covenant ( as the principle of all supream rights both of state and religion ) then they alone ought to give the interpretation of it from time to time ; as they de facto did not onely last yeare , contrary to the interpretation of their owne parliament , but also for many yeares together have peremptorily prest it upon ours : so that it makes a fundamentall change of government there , though differently from what our parliament hath made here , the jus publicum both of religion and security of state with them , lying in the covenant , and that lying in the brests of churchmen , chosen by one another : and our's lying in the power of laymen , chosen by the people , and judging by the common lawes of equity and necessity , and of the word of god . it were in vaine to say the kirke onely recommends their interpretation to the state . for last yeare they did it with a penalty upon the parliament , their whole army , and the body of the people which obey'd them ; if it be a penalty to bee given to the devill , and to bee put into a state of eternall death . wherefore they there are , ( or else none are anywhere ) the true judges of right , who make themselves judges of wrong and of punishment . to conclude how practicable soever the covenant was at first , or how erroneously soever we may now conceive it to be extinct , or to be a principle fitted to justify a change of kingly government , which was actually made first of all by it and their presbytery in scotland ; yet it being originally but a politicall or condition all oath , relating to our former unions when warre w● , and to our cooperation under our respective magistrates only , not in a way contrary to the fifth commandment ; and that all the magistracy which we enjoy , and by whom we are now fully possest , if they have not laid it aside , yet call us not out to act the remaining part of it ; and that it interprets not it selfe : so that each private man is not made by it his owne magistrate ; and that there is no penal article in it obliging us private men to pursue a publique warre upon the magistrates , or any other mens bare neglect or misinterpreting it to themselves ; who therefore can contrary to all this , peremptorily warrant us now , yea necessitate us to begin , or assist to the desolation of warre and bloodshed upon it ? especially seeing it is made very dubious at least whither we be now tyed to it at all or no : further more how good so ever it was at first , yea though that other nation had not given it it 's mortall wound , when they attempted to give us ours , both in england and in ireland , ( which was the cause of this effect of change of government here ) yet if when it was in force , it should any other way have received a bad tincture of passion or ambitious policy among our selves , why might it not by our magistrates order , have been as well carried out of our churches as the brazen serpent was out of the temple , after it was unhappily perverted to its wrong end ? if otherwise , and that it must at all hazards be indirectly made a snare to peaceable consciences even after it is extinct ( as hath been proved ) i shall desire any pious spirit to judge , whither it doth not in such a case deserve much of campanellas censure which he gave upon the spanyards india treasury , that it was gotten in blood , sailes home in a sea of blood , and never rests till it be all laid out in blood . the reader may be pleased to take notice that though these replyes for the most part touch but on simple obedience to a government supposed unlawfull , but commanding lawfull things , yet they virtually extend to our acting under such a government . it is to be presumed that our adversaries not contesting profestly what hath been publiquely argued in that point , do conceive the difficulties of acting under involved in those of our submission to such a power . the distinction of active and passive obedience , is but a nicety , and if one be not a sin , the other is not . they are in a manner the same thing , derive from the same principle , and differ but gradually , just as the morning and the noone light do , which derive both from the same planet . for he who takes paines to furnish in a ●axe , and he who tooke paines to execute the office of a judge or of a justice of peace in honest things by vertue of commissions and orders from the same supreame ( but illegall ) magistracy , doe both of them what they doe , by vertue of the same originall submission which is a passive obedience . if this be otherwise , then ( according to these authors opinion ) we and all our forefathers have sinned , in obeying those actively or passively , who by unjust usurpation have come betwixt us and them , who derive from the first who were in compact , unlesse the lapse of time can justifie the viciousnesse of an action ( which is impossible ) or that we may lawfully obey those who plenarily possesse and protect us , and command us lawfull things . finis . errata . p. . losse , r. loose . imperciptibly r. imperceptibly . insinuation r. insinuations . p. . l. . may be not r. may not be , beholding r. beholden . p. . heneration , r. generation p. . but in one , r & in one p. . understand , r. understood . offices r. officers . p. . a businesses , r. busines , p. . pretends r. pretend , thereof r. therefore . p. . but it is a contradiction r. is it a contradiction . p. . for detain'd r. attain'd for dislove , r. disolve . p. . best to take heed r. best take heed p. . king r. kings . p. . purpose r. propose . p. . found r. swound . p. . at last r. at least . p. . drive r. derive . p. . ply , r. comply , for or , r. nor p. . large , r. subjection . p. . person r. persons next r. rest . p. r. change r. chance . p. . true to religion r. to true religion . p . dispence him of it , r. dispence with him for it . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a e- whence the difficulty of perswading civill truth . ●irst demur . demur . p . case of con. p. . . ● pag. . the end of magistracy , subsevient to the end of our being . all justice or just things relate not essentially to the legall magistrate . of commutative justice vid. p. . . cor. . of distributive justice . this present parliament is effectually a parliament . vid p. . necessity above formes of , government . the difference betwixt conquest & victory vid. p. . object . answer . the state of kingdoms as separated , and as mixt in themselves . of the ri●ht of war betwixt fundamentall parties . page . of the house of lords . of secluded members . the negative when prevalent in equall partnarship . whither the transactions of the legall number of the house be invaled , when any members are forct away ? of the present consent of the major part of the people . ob. answ. whither the present power be the suprem ? whither it be a parliament ? object . ans. the case of the kings comming to the house of commons not parallel . the case of the apprentices entring and forcing the house not parallel . the parl. votes against force , still observed & are the same still . vvhy actions of government must change . how wrong hath been fitted for a title . 〈…〉 bac. h. . ob. object . of toleration . ob. ans. the magistrate in a state , not as a father of a family . vvhy states cannot looke so strictly after vertue , as after publique quiet o● . ob. ans. of the ecclips suspention and extinction of supream powers . the union of people to a government not like a marriage . obj. ans. a king of england , why not as a husband to the people of england . ob. answ. of taking away the kings life . ob. ans. of obedience for wrath , and for conscience sake . tyrants in titles from whom . of our lawfull submission to a magistrate who rules by gods permissive will ob. ans. obedience necessary to lawfull and unlawfull powers how different . how we may have a right to take what another may not have aright to give . the difference betwixt privat title and publique . of possession . object . answer . of supream powers altering themselves by joynt concurrence . how seperatly ob. ans. demur p. . of non obedience . ob. ans. what time makes a form'd government . obj. ans. our condition different from israels betwixt david and absalom . obedience to false governours in the right or wrong government varies not the sin of obedience . wherein caesars case & the parl. disagree wherein cesars case & the parl. agree , as to justifie our obedience . obj. ans. in what sen●● the present submission 〈◊〉 legall . of the 〈◊〉 evidence of 〈◊〉 ri●●ts , to as to satisfie con●●●e●ce for actions of w●r u●on them . ob. ans. object . demn . p. . ans. obedience some times asserts not a title but power . they who obey a wrong authority r●bbe not the ri●h●● . obj. ans. of the recovery of dubious rights , and the benefit which people get by most warres . obj. answer . the case of the master of the ship thrown over board . ob. answ. whether we be actually in the unsettlement & deepes which he supposes ? when the whole body may be hazarded for a disperate remedy & when not . joh. . . notes for div a e- we are still obliged to many things of the covenant but not qua league or covenant . of promissory ●nd assertory oathes . vvhither a promissory oath , which alwaies involves a tacite condition , be lawfull . ob. ans. gen. . . . of tacite conditions in oathes concerning things possible . the obligation of a pact , or promise with an oath , or without an oath , is all one k●ngs . . . sam. . jo. ● . . gen. . . . argu. the covenant a politicall or state oath . the subordinate conditions of this oath . ob. ans. o● change of ●●●●●nment , 〈◊〉 the 〈◊〉 cause , or as an effect of ●●●hers for●●● breach of covenant can ●●●her way authorize us to 〈◊〉 against this government . the covenant obliges us not against the ●i●th commandement . page . the covena●● make 〈◊〉 eac● man a magistrate . obj. ans. num . how a superiour may free an inferiour from ●n oath even in that which belongs to god . the difference btewixt this our league and those of prince● for authorizing war the obligation of the covenant , how lesse then the obligation of a ●ra war how an unjust penalty for the meere breach of covenant . object . ans. of the obligation of such a promise as may be fulfill'd solely by the promiser . ob. answ. of the obligation for preserving the kings person by covenant . how the words of preservation in covenant , provided more for the kings suffering , then the words of punishment provided for delinquents sufferings . ob. ans. how 〈◊〉 that the excluding member , ought to be brought by 〈◊〉 before the excluded . ob. ans. the coveant relates onely to a time of u●nion , with and under the magistrate . how the league of nationall union came to be ended of bringing those who would divide us to condigne punishment . the meaning of our utmost endeavours , and of all the dayes of our lives in the covenant . the covenant how more then broke by the scots hostility . obj. ans. whither the nationall breaking of one part of the covenant put an end to the whole . ob. ans. the covenant ( of all oathes ) interprets itselfe least , especially in the positive government , which it would establish , and in religion . though the covenant were in force , yet a change of government might be consistent with it . how the covenant necessarily points at some change of government . scotch presbytery fit for any government but the kingly . the judgement ●● experience of mary queen of scotland . of king iames . of king charles vid. scotch declaration , july . p. . of the prince . vid. decla . p. . . scotch proceed , at the hague with the prince , p. . the supream power in scotland in whom . how the scots state the supremacy of england in scotland . how the scotch presbyterians & ours oppose one another . two supremacies in the same place , how in●●●sistent . whether atrue title doth ( according to covenant ) authorize obedience the king of ● scotlands present case , & the actual change of government there by their interpretation of the covenant against kings . page . page . the interpretation of the kirke is not recommendatory to the state the conclusion philosophicall rudiments concerning government and society. or, a dissertation concerning man in his severall habitudes and respects, as the member of a society, first secular, and then sacred. containing the elements of civill politie in the agreement which it hath both with naturall and divine lawes. in which is demonstrated, both what the origine of justice is, and wherein the essence of christian religion doth consist. together with the nature, limits, and qualifications both of regiment and subjection. / by tho: hobbes. de cive. english hobbes, thomas, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing h thomason e _ estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (thomason tracts ; :e [ ]) philosophicall rudiments concerning government and society. or, a dissertation concerning man in his severall habitudes and respects, as the member of a society, first secular, and then sacred. containing the elements of civill politie in the agreement which it hath both with naturall and divine lawes. in which is demonstrated, both what the origine of justice is, and wherein the essence of christian religion doth consist. together with the nature, limits, and qualifications both of regiment and subjection. / by tho: hobbes. de cive. english hobbes, thomas, - . vaughan, robert, engraver. [ ], , [ ] p. : ill. (metal cuts) printed by j.g. for r. royston, at the angel in ivie-lane, london : . a translation of: de cive. with an additional title page, engraved, "philosophicall rudiments concerning goverment and civill society", signed "ro: vaughan sculp:". variant (probably earlier): this title page in another engraving, "philosophicall elements of goverment and civill society". annotation on thomason copy: "march. · "; the in the imprint date has been crossed out. reproduction of the original in the british library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- philosophy -- early works to . natural law -- early works to . authority -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion philosophicall rudiments concerning goverment and civill society 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . by thomas hobbes of malmesbury ro : vaughan sculp : philosophicall rudiments concerning government and society . or , a dissertation concerning man in his severall habitudes and respects , as the member of a society , first secular , and then sacred . containing the elements of civill politie in the agreement which it hath both with naturall and divine lawes . in which is demonstrated , both what the origine of justice is , and wherein the essence of christian religion doth consist . together with the nature , limits , and qualifications both of regiment and subjection . by tho : hobbes . london printed by j. g. for r. royston , at the angel in ivie-lane . . to the right honourable , william , earle of devonshire , my most honoured lord. may it please your lordship , it was the speech of the roman people ( to whom the name of king had been render'd odious , as well by the tyrannie of the tarquins , as by the genius and decretals of that city ) 't was the speech i say of the publick , however pronounced from a private mouth , ( if yet cato the censor were no more then such ) that all kings are to be reckon'd amongst ravenous feasts . but what a beast of prey was the roman people , whilst with its conquering eagles it erected its ▪ proud trophee● so far and wide over the world , bringing the africans , the asiaticks , the macedomans , and the achaeans , with many other despoyled . nations , into a specious bondage , with the pretence of preferring them to be de●…zons of rome ? so that if cato's saying were a wise one , 't was every whit as wise that of pontiue telesinus ; who flying about with open mouth through all the companies of his army , ( in that famous encounter which he had with sylla ) cryed out , that rome her selfe , as well as sylla , was to be raz'd ; for that there would alwayes be wolves and depraedatours of their liberty , unlesse the forrest that lodg'd them were grubb'd up by the roots . to speak impartially , both sayings are very true ; that man to man is a kind of god ; and that man to man is an arrant wolfe : the first is true , if we compare citizens amongst themselves ; and the second , if we compare cities . in the one , there 's some analogie of similitude with the deity , to wit , justice and charity , the twin-sisters of peace : but in the other , good men must defend themselves by taking to them for a sanctuary the two daughters of war , deceipt and violence : that is in plaine termes a meer brutall rapacity : which a●…ong● men object to one another ; as a reproach , by an inbred custome which they have of beholding their own actions in the persons of other men , wherein , as in a mirroir , all things on the left side appeare to be on the right , & all things on the right side to be as plainly on the left ; yet the naturall right of preservation which we all receive from the uncontroulable dictates of necessity , will not admit it to be a vice , though it confesse it to be an unhappinesse . now that with cato himselfe , ( a person of so great a renowne for wisdome ) animosity should so prevaile instead of judgement , and partiality instead of reason , that the very same thing which he thought equall in his popular state , he should censure as unjust in a monarchical , other men perhaps may have leisure to admire . but i have been long since of this opinion , that there was never yet any more-then-vulgar-prudence that had the luck of being acceptable to the giddy people ; but either it hath not been understood , or else having been so , hath been levell'd and cryed downe . the more eminent actions and apothegms both of the greeks and romans have been indebted for their eulogies not so much to the reason , as to the greatnesse of them , and very many times to that prosperous usurpation ( with which our histories doe so mutually upbraid each other ) which as a conquering torrent carryes all before it , as well publick agents as publick actions , in the streame of time. wisdome properly so call'd is nothing else but this , the perfect knowledge of the truth in all matters whatsoever . which being derived from the registers and records of things , and that as 't were through the conduit of certain definite appellations , cannot possibly be the work of a suddaine acutenesse , but of a well-ballanc'd reason , which by the compendium of a word , we call philosophy . for by this it is , that a way is open'd to us , in which we travell from the contemplation of particular things to the inference or result of universall actions . now look how many sorts of things there are which properly fall within the cognizance of humane reason , into so many branches does the tree of philosophy divide it selfe . and from the diversity of the matter about which they are conversant , there hath been given to those branches a diversity of names too : for treating of figures , t is call'd geometry ; of motion , physick ; of naturall right , moralls ; put all together , and they make up philosophy . just as the british , the atlantick , and the indian seas , being diversly christen'd from the diversity of their shoares , doe notwithstanding all together make up the ocean . and truly the geometricians have very admirably perform'd their part . for whatsoever assistance doth accrew to the life of man , whether from the observation of the heavens , or from the description of the earth , from the notation of times , or from the remotest experiments of navigation ; finally , whatsoever things they are in which this present age doth differ from the rude simplenesse of antiquity , we must acknowledge to be a debt which we owe meerly to geometry . if the morall philosophers had as happily discharg'd their duty , i know not what could have been added by humane industry to the completion of that happinesse , which is consistent with humane life . for were the nature of humane actions as distinctly knowne , as the nature of quantity in geometricall figures , the strength of avarice and ambition , which is sustained by the erroneous opinions of the vulgar , as touching the nature of right and wrong , would presently faint and languish ; and mankinde should enjoy such an immortall peace , that ( unlesse it were for habitation , on supposition that the earth should grow too narrow for her inhabitants ) there would hardly be left any pretēce for war. but now on the contrary , that neither the sword nor the pen should be allowed any cessation ; that the knowledge of the law of nature should lose its growth , not advancing a whit beyond its antient stature ; that there should still be such siding with the severall factions of philosophers , that the very same action should bee decryed by some , and as much elevated by others ; that the very same man should at severall times embrace his severall opinions , and esteem his own actions farre otherwise in himselfe then he does in others ; these i say are so many signes , so many manifest arguments , that what hath hitherto been written by morall philosophers , hath not made any progress in the knowledge of the truth ; but yet have took with the world , not so much by giving any light to the understanding , as entertainment to the affections , whilest by the successefull rhetorications of their speech they have confirmed them in their rashly received opinions . so that this part of philosophy hath suffered the same destiny with the publick wayes , which lye open to all passengers to traverse up and down or the same lot with high wayes and open streets ; some for divertisement , and some for businesse ; so that what with the impertinencies of some , and the altercations of others , those wayes have never a seeds time , and therefore yield never a harvest . the onely reason of which unluckines should seem to be this ; that amongst all the writers of that part of philosophy , there is not one that hath used an idoneous principle of tractation . for we may not , as in a circle , begin the handling of a science from what point we please . there is a certain clue of reason , whose beginning is in the dark , but by the benefit of whose conduct , wee are led as 't were by the hand into the clearest light , so that the principle of tractation is to be taken from that darknesse , and then the light to be carried thither for the irradiating its doubts . as often therefore as any writer , doth either weakly forsake that clue , or wilfully cut it asunder , he describes the footsteps , not of his progresse in science , but of his wandring from it . and upon this it was , that when i applyed my thoughts to the investigation of naturall justice , i was presently advertised from the very word justice , ( wich signifies a steady will of giving every one his owne ) that my first enquiry was to be , from whence it proceeded , that any man should call any thing rather his owne , then another mans . and when i found that this proceeded not from nature , but consent , ( for what nature at first laid forth in common , men did afterwards distribute into severall impropriations , i was conducted from thence to another inquiry ; namely to what end , and upon what impulsives , when all was equally every mans in common , men did rather think it fitting , that every man should have his inclosure ; and i found the reason was , that from a community of goods , there must needs arise contention whose enjoyment should be greatest , and from that contention all kind of calamities must unavoydably ensue , which by the instinct of nature , every man is taught to shun . having therefore thus arrived at two maximes of humane nature , the one arising from the concupiscible part , which desires to appropriate to it selfe the use of those things in which all others have a joynt interest , the other proceeding from the rationall , which teaches every man to fly a contre-naturall dissolution , as the greatest mischiefe that can arrive to nature ; which principles being laid down , i seem from them to have demonstrated by a most evident connexion , in this little work of mine , first the absolute necessity of leagues and contracts , and thence the rudiments both of morall and of civill prudence . that appendage which is added concerning the regiment of god , hath been done with this intent , that the dictates of god almighty in the law of nature , might not seem repugnant to the written law , revealed to us in his word . i have also been very wary in the whole tenour of my discourse , not to meddle with the civill lawes of any particular nation whatsoever , that is to say , i have avoyded coming a shore , which those times have so infosted both with shelves , and tempests . at what expence of time and industry i have beene in this scrutiny after truth , i am not ignorant ; but to what purpose , i know not . for being partiall judges of our selves we lay a partiall estimate upon our own productions . i therefore offer up this book to your lordships , not ●avour ▪ but censine first , as having found by many experiments , that it is not the credit of the author ▪ ●…or the newnesse of the work , nor yet the ornament of the style , but only the weight of reason , which recommends any opinion to your lordships favour and approbation . if it fortune to please , that is to say , if it be sound , if it be usefull , if it be vulgar ; i humbly offer it to your lordship as both my glory , and my protection ; but if in any thing i have erred , your lordship will yet accept it as a testimony of my gratitude , for that the means of study which i enjoyed by your lordships goodnesse , i have employed to the procurement of your lordships favour . the god of heaven crown your lordship with length of dayes in this earthly station , and in the heavenly . jerusalem , with a crown of glory . your honours most humble , and most devoted servant , tho. hobbs . the authors preface to the reader . reader , i promise thee here such things , which ordinarily promised , doe seeme to challenge the greatest attention , and i lay them here before thine eyes , whether thou regard the dignity or profit of the matter treated of , or the right method of handling it , or the honest motive , and good advice to undertake it , or lastly the moderation of the authour . in this book thou shalt finde briefly described the duties of men , first as men , then as subjects , lastly , as christians ; under which duties are contained not only the elements of the lawes of nature , and of nations , together with the true originall , and power of justice , but also the very essence of christian religion it selfe ● , so farre forth as the measure of this my purpose could well bear it . which kinde of doctrine ( excepting what relates to christian religion ) the most antient : sages did judge fittest to be delivered to posterity , either curiously adorned with verse , or clouded with allegories , as a most beautifull and hallowed mystery of royall 〈◊〉 h●●ity ; left by the disputations of p●…e men , it might be de filed ; other philosophers in the mean time , to the advantage of mankinde , did contemplate the faces , and motions of things , others , without disadvantage ; their natures , and causes . but in after times . socrates is said to have been the first , who truly loved this civill soience , although hitherto not throughly understood , yet glimmering forth as through a cloud in the government of the common weale , and that he set so great a value on this , that utterly abandoning , and despising all other parts of philosopy , he wholly embraced this , as judging it onely worthy the labour of his minde . after him comes plato , aristotle , cicero , and other philosophers , as well greeke , as latine , and now at length all men of all nations , not only philosophers , but even the vnlgar , have , and doe still deale with this as a matter of ease , exposed and prostitute to every mother-wit , and to be attained without any great care or study , and which makes mainly for its dignity , those who suppose themselves to have it , or are in such employment , as they ought to have it , doe so wonderfully please themselves in its idaea , as they easily brooke the followers of other arts to be esteemed and styled ingenuous , learned , skilfull , what you will ; except prudent : for this name , in regard of civill knowledge , they presume to be due to themselves onely . whether therefore the worth of arts is to be weighed by the worthinesse of the persons who entertain them , or by the number of those who have written of them , or by the judgement of the wisest ; certainly this must carry it , which so neerly relates to princes , and others engaged in the government of mankinde , in whose adulterate species also the most part of me●… doe delight themselves , and in which the most excellent wits of philosophers have been conversant . the benefit of it when rightly delivered ( that is ) when derived from true principles by evident connexion , we shall then best discerne , when we shall but well have considered the mischiefes that have befallen mankinde in its counterfeit and babling form ; for in such matters as are speculated for the exercise of our wits , if any errour escape us , it is without hurt ; neither is there any losse , but of time onely : but in those things which every man ought to meditate for the steerage of his life , it necessarily happens ; that not onely from errours , but even from ignorance it selfe , there arise offences , contentions , nay even slaughter it selfe . look now , how great a prejudice these are , such , and so great is the benefit arising from this doctrine of morality , truly declared . how many kings ( and those good men too ) hath this one errour , that a tyrant king might lawfully be put to death , been the slaughter of ? how many throats hath this false position cut , that a prince for some causes may by some certain men be deposed ? and what blood-shed hath not this erroneous doctrine caused , that kings are not superiours to , but administrators for the multitude ? lastly , how many rebellions hath this opinion been the cause of , which teacheth that the knowledge whether the commands of kings be just or unjust , belongs to private men ; and that before they yeeld obedience , they not only may , but ought to dispute them ? besides , in the morall philosophy now commonly received , there are many things no lesse dangerous then those , which it matters not now to recite . i suppose those antients foresaw this , who rather chose to have the science of justice wrapt up in fables , then openly exposed to disputations : for before such questions begā to be moved , princes did not sue for , but already exercised the supreme power . they kept their empire entire , not by arguments , but by punishing the wicked , and protecting the good ; likewise subjects did not measure what was just by the sayings and judgements of private men , but by the lawes of the realme ; nor were they kept in peace by disputations , but by power and authority : yea they reverenced the supreme power , whether residing in one man or in a councell , as a certain visible divinity ; therefore they little used as in our dayes , to joyn themselves with ambitious , and hellish spirits , to the utter ruine of their state ; for they could not entertain so strange a phansie as not to desire the preservation of that by which they were preserved ; in truth , the simplicity of those times was not yet capable of so learned a piece of folly . wherefore it was peace , and a golden age , which ended not before that saturn being expelled , it was taught lawfull to take up arms against kings . this i say , the antients not only themselves saw , but in one of their fables , they seem very aptly to have signified it to us ; for they say , that when ixion was invited by jupiter to a banquet , he fell in love , and began to court juno her selfe ; offering to embrace her , he clasp't a clowd , from whence the centaures proceeded , by nature halfe men , halfe horses , a fierce , a fighting , and unquiet generation ; which changing the names only , is as much as if they should have said , that private men being called to counsels of state , desired to prostitute justice , the onely sister and wife of the supreme , to their own judgements , and apprehensions , but embracing a false and empty shadow instead of it , they have begotten those hermophrodite opinions of morall philosophers , partly right and comely , partly brutall and wilde , the causes of all contentions , and blood-sheds . since therefore such opinions are daily seen to arise , if any man now shall dispell those clowds , and by most firm reasons demonstrate that there are no authenticall doctrines conccening right and wrong , good and evill , besides the constituted lawes in each realme , and government ; and that the question whether any future action will prove just or unjust , good or ill , is to be demanded of none , but those to whom the supreme hath committed the interpretation of his lawes ; surely he will not only shew us the high way to peace , but will also teach us how to avoyd the close , darke , and dangerous by-paths of faction and sedition , then which i know not what can be thought more profitable . concerning my method , i thought it not sufficient to use a plain and evident style in what i had to deliver , except i took my begining from the very matter of civill goverment , and thence proceeded to its generation , and form , and the first beginning of justice ; for every thing is best understood by its constitutive causes ; for as in a watch , or some such small engine , the matter , figure , and motion of the wheeles , cannot well be known , except it be taken in sunder , and viewed in parts ; so to make a more curious search into the rights of states , and duties of subjects , it is necessary , ( i say not to take them in sunder , but yet that ) they be so considered , as if they were dissolved , ( i. e. ) that wee rightly understand what the quality of humane nature is , in what matters it is , in what not fit to make up a civill government , and how men must be agreed among themselves , that intend to grow up into a well-grounded state. having therefore followed this kind of method ; in the first place i set down for a principle by experience known to all men , and denied by none , to wit , that the dispositions of men are naturally such , that except they be restrained through feare of some coercive power , every man will distrust and dread each other , and as by naturall right he may , so by necessity he will be forced to make use of the strength hee hath , toward the preservatiō of himself . you will object perhaps , that there are some who deny this , truly so it happens , that very many do deny it . but shall i therefore seem to fight against my self because i affirm that the same men confesse , and deny the same thing ? in truth i do not , but they do , whose actions disavow what their discourses approve of . we see all countries though they be at peace with their neighbours , yet guarding their frontiers with armed men , their townes with walls and ports , and keeping constant watches . to what purpose is all this , if there be no feare of the neighbouring power ? wee see even in well-governed states , where there are lawes and punishments appointed for offendors , yet particular men travell not without their sword by their sides , for their defences , neither sleep they without shutting not only their doores against their fellow sebjects , but also their trunks and coffers for feare of domestiques . can men give a clearer testimony of the distrnst they have each of other , and all , of all ? how since they doe thus , and even countreyes as well as men , they publiquely professe their mutuall feare and diffidence ; but in disputing they deny it , that 's as much as to say , that out of a desire they have to contradict others , they gainsay themselves . some object that this principle being admitted , it would needs follow , not onely that all men were wicked ( which perhaps though it seeme hard , yet we must yeeld to , since it is so clearly declar'd by holy writ ) but also wicked by nature ( which cannot be granted without impiety ) but this , that men are evill by nature , followes not from this principle ; for though the wicked were fewer then the righteous , yet because we cannot distinguish them , there is a necessity of suspecting , heeding , anticipating , subjugating , selfe-defending , ever incident to the most honest , and fairest condition'd ; much lesse do's it follow that those who are wicked are so by nature , for though from nature , that is from their first birth , as they are meerly sensible creatures , they have this disposition , that immediately as much as in them lies , they desire and doe whatsoever is best pleasing to them , that either through feare they fly from , or through hardnesse repell those dangers which approach them , yet are they not for this reason to be accounted wicked ; for the affections of the minde which arise onely from the lower parts of the soule are not wicked themselves , but the actions thence proceeding may be so sometimes , as when they are either offensive , or against duty . vnlesse you give children all they aske for , they are peevish , and cry , i and strike their patents sometimes , and all this they have from nature , yet are they free from guilt , neither may we properly call them wicked ; first , because they cannot hurt ; next , because wanting the free use of reason they are exempted from all duty ; these when they come to riper yeares having acquired power whereby they may doe hurt , if they shall continue to doe the same things , then truly they both begin to be , and are properly accounted wicked ; in so much as a wicked man is almost the same thing with a childe growne strong and sturdy , or a man of a childish disposition ; and malice the same with a defect of reason in that age , when nature ought to be better governed through good education and experience . vnlesse therefore we will say that men are naturally evill , because they receive not their education and use of reason from nature , we must needs acknowledge that men may derive desire , feare , anger , and other passions from nature , and yet not impute the evill effects of those unto nature . the fonndation therefore which i have laid standing firme , i demonstrate in the first place , that the state of men without civill society ( which state we may properly call the state of nature ) is nothing else but a meere warre of all against all ; and in that warre all men have equall right unto all things ; next , that all men as soon● as they arrive to understanding of this hatefull condition , doe de●ire ( even nature it selfe compelling them ) to be freed from this misery . but that this cannot be done except by compact , they all quitt that right which they have unto all things . furthermore i declare , and confirme what the nature of compacts is ; how and by what meanes the right of one might be transfer'd unto another to make their compacts valid ; also what rights , and to whom they must necessarily be granted for the estabishling of peace , i meane what those dictates of reason are , which may properly be term'd the lawes of nature ; and all these are contain'd in that part of this booke which i entitle liberty . these grounds thus layd , i shew farther what civill government , and the supreme power in it , and the divers kinds of it are ; by what meanes it becomes so , & what rights particular men , who intend to constitune this civill government , must so necessarily transfer from themselves on the supreme power , whether it be one man , or an assembly of men , that except they doe so it will evidently appeare to ●e no civill government , but the rights which all men have to all things , that is the rights of warre will still remaine . next , i distinguish the divers kindes of it , to wit , monarchie , aristocratie , democratie , and paternall dominion , and that of masters over their servants , i declare how they are constituted , and i compare their severall conveniences and inconveniences each with other : furthermore , i unfold what those things are which destroy it , and what his or their duty is who rule in chiefe . last of all , i explicate the natures of the law , and of sinne , and i diginguish law from counsell , from compact ' from that which i call right ; all , which i comprehend under the title of dominion . in the last part of it which is entituled religion , lest that right which by strong reason i had confirm'd the soveraigne powers in the preceding discourse have over their subjects , might seem to be repugnant to the sacred scriptures , i shew in the first place how it repugns not the divine right , for as much as god overrules all rulers by nature , ( i. e. ) by the dictates of naturall reason . in the second , for as much as god himselfe had a peculiar dominion over the jewes by vertue of that antient covenant of circumcision . in the third , because god doth now rule over us christians by vertue of our covenant of baptisme ; and therefore the authority of rulers in chiefe , or of civill government , is not at all , we see , contrary to religion . in the last place i declare what duties are necessarily requir'd srom us , to enter into the kingdome of heaven ; and of those i plainly demonstrate , and conclude out of evident testimonies of holy writ , according to the interpretation made by all , that the obedience which i have affirm'd to be due from particular christian subjects unto their christian princes cannot possibly in the least sort be repugnant unto christian religion . you have seene my method , receive now the reason which mov'd me to write this ; i was studying philosphie for my minde sake , and i had gathered together its first elements in all kinds , and having digested them into three sections by degrees , i thought to have written them so as in the first i would have treated os a body , and its generall properties ; in the second of man and his speciall faculties , and affections ; in the third , of civill government and the duties of subjects : wherefore the first section would have contained the ●irst philosophie , and certaine elements os physick ; in it we would have considered the reasons os time , place , cause , power , relation , proportion , quantity , figure , and motion . in the second we would have beene conversant about imagination , memory , intellect , ratio●ination , appetite , will , good and evill , honest and dishonest , and the like ; what this last section handles , i have now already shewed you . whilest i contrive , order , pensively and slowly compose these matters , for i onely doe reason , i dispute not . it so happen'd in the interim , that my country some few yeares before the civill warres did rage , was boyling ●ot with questions concerning the rights of dominion , and the obedience due from subjects , the true forerunners of an approaching war ; and was the cause which ( all those other matters deferr'd ) ripen'd , and pluckt from me this third part . therefore it happens that what was last in order , is yet come forth first in time , and the rather , because i saw that grounded on its owne principles sufficiently knowne by experience it would not stand in need of the former sections . i have not yet made it out of a desire of praise ( although if i had , i might have defended my selse with this faire excuse , that very few doe things laudably , who are not affected with commendation ) but for your sakes readers , who i perswaded my selse , when you should rightly apprehend and throughly understand this doctrine i here present you with , would rather chuse to brooke with patience some inconveniences under government ( because humane affairs cannot possibly be without some ) then selfe opiniatedly disturb the quiet of the publique ; that , weighing the justice of those things you are about , not by the perswa●ion and advise of private men , but by the lawes of the realme , you will no longer suffer ambitious men through the streames of your blood to wade to their owne power ; that you will esteeme it better to enjoy your selves in the present state , though perhaps not the best , then by waging warre , indeavour to procure a reformation for other men in another age , your selves in the meane while either kill'd , or consumed with age ; farthermore , for those who will not acknowledge themselves subject to the civill magistrate , and will be exempt from all publique burthens , and yet will live under his jurisdiction , and looks for protection from the violence and injuries of others , that you would not looke on them as fellow subjects , but esteeme them for enemies , and spies , and that yee rashly admit not for gods word all which either openly or privately they shall pretend to bee so . i say more plainly , if any preacher , confessor , or casuist , shal but say that this doctrin is agreeable with gods word , namely , that the chief ruler , nay any private man may lawfully be put to death without the chiefes command , or that subjects may resist , conspire , or covenant against the supreme power , that ye by no means beleeve them , but instantly declare their names . he who approves of these reasons , will also like my intention in writing this book . last of al , i have propounded to my self this rule through this whole discourse ; first , not to define ought which concerns the justice of single actions , but leave thē to be determined by the laws . next not to dispute the laws of any government in special , that is , not to point which are the laws of any country , but to declare what the laws of all countries are . thirdly not to seem of opinion , that there is a lesse proportion of obedience due to an aristocraty or d●mocraty , then a monarchy ; for though i have endeavoured by arguments in my tenth chapter to gain a belief in men , that monarchy is the most commodious government ( which one thing alone i confesse in this whole book not to be demonstrated , but only probably stated ) yet every where i expresly say , that in all kind of government whatsoever , there ought to be a supreme and equall power . fourthly , not in any wise to dispute the positions of divines , except th●se which strip subjects of their obedience , and shake the foundations of civill government . lastly , lest i might imprudently set forth somewhat of which there would be no need , what i had thus written , i would not presently expose to publique interest , wherefore i got some few copies privately disperst among some of my friends , that discrying the opinions of others , if any things appeared erroneous , hard , or obscure , i might correct , soften , and explain them . these things i found most bitterly excepted against : that i had made the civill powers too large , but this by ecclesiasticall persons ; that i had utterly taken away liberty of conscience , but this by sectaries ; that i had set princes above the civil laws , but this by lawyers ; wherefore i was not much moved by these mens reprehensions , ( as who in doing this did but do their own business ) except it were tye those knots somewhat faster . but for their sakes who have a litle been staggered at the principles themselves , to wit the nature of men , the authority or right of nature , the nature of compacts and contracts , and the originall of civill government , because in finding fault they have not so much followed their passions , as their common sense , i have therefore in some places added some annotations whereby i presumed i might give some satisfaction to their differing thoughts ; lastly i have endevoured to offend none beside those whose principles these contradict , and whose tender mindes are lightly offended by every difference of opinions . wherefore if ye shall meet with some things which have more of sharpnesse , and lesse of certainty then they ought to have , since they are not so much spoken for the maintenance of parties , as the establishment of peace , and by one whose just grief for the present calamities of his country , may very charitably be allowed some liberty , it is his only request to ye readers , ye will deign to receive them with an equall mind . the index of the chapters under the titles of liberty . chap. i. of the state of men without civill society . chap. ii. of the law of nature concerning contracts . chap. iii. of the other lawes of nature . chap. iv. that the law of nature is a divine law. empire . chap. v. of the causes , and first originall , of civill government . chap. vi. of the right , whether we consider it in an assembly , or in one person , 〈◊〉 which he hath who is endued with supreme authority . chap. vii . of the three kindes of government , democraty , aristocraty , and monarchy . chap. viii . of the right which lords and masters have over their servants . chap. ix . of the rights which parents have over their children , and of a kingdome paternall . chap. x. a comparison of the three kinds of government each with other , according to the inconveniences of each one . chap. xi . the places and examples of scripture concerning the right of government , which make for proof of the foresaid doctrines . chap. xii . of the inward causes which dissolve all civill government . chap. xiii . of the duties of those men who sit at the helm of state. chap. xiv . of lawes , and sinnes . religion . chap. xv. of gods government by nature . chap. xvi . of his government by the old covenant . chap , xvii . of his government by the new covenant . chap. xviii . of those things which are necessary for our entrance into the kingdom of heaven . rex est qui posuit metus , et diri mala poctoris ? quom non ambitio●…pot●ns et nun quam stabilis fauor vulgi praecipitis mouet qui tuto positus ●oco infra se vi●et . omnia philosophicall elements of a true citizen . liberty . chap. i. of the state of men without civill society . i. the introduction . ii. that the beginning of civill society is from mutuall fear . iii. that men by nature are all equall . iv. whence the will of mischieving ariseth . v. the discord arising from comparison of wills. vi. from the appetite many have to the same thing . vii . the definition of right . viii . a right to the end gives a right to the means necessary to that end . ix . by the right of nature every man is judge of the means which tend to his own preservation . x. by nature all men have equall right to all things . xi . this right which all men have to all things is unprofitable . xii . the state of men without civill society is a meere state of warre ; the definitions of peace and warre . xiii . war is an adversary to mans preservation . xiv . it is lawfull for any man by naturall right to compell another whom he hath gotten in his power to give caution of his future obedience . xv. nature dictates the seeking after peace . i. the faculties of humane nature may be reduc'd unto four kinds ; bodily strength , experience , reason , passion . taking the beginning of this following doctrine from these , we will declare in the first place what manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties bare towards each other , and whether , and by what faculty they are born , apt for society , and so preserve themselves against mutuall violence ; then proceeding , we will shew what advice was necessary to be taken for this businesse , and what are the conditions of s●ciety , or of humane peace ; that is to say , ( changing the words onely ) what are the fundamentall lawes of nature . ii. the greatest part of those men who have written ought concerning common-wealths , either suppose , or require us , or beg of us to believe , that man is a creature ( * ) born sit for society : the greek , call him 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and on this foundation they so build up the doctrine of civill society , as if for the preservation of peace , and the government of man-kind there were nothing else necessary , then that men should agree to make certaine covenants and conditions together , which thems●lves should then call lawes . which axiom , though received by most , is yet certainly false , and an errour proceeding from our too slight contemplation of humane nature ; for they who shall more narrowly look into the causes for which men come together , and delight in each others company , shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it could happen no otherwise , but by accident : for if by nature one man should love another ( that is ) as man , there could no reason be return'd why every man should not equally love every man , as being equally man , or why he should rather frequent those whose society affords him honour or profit . we doe not therefore by nature seek society for its own sake , but that we may receive some honour or profit from it ; these we desire primarily , that secondarily : how by what advice men doe meet , will be best known by observing those things which they doe when they are met : for if they meet for traffique , it 's plaine every man regards not his fellow , but his businesse ; if to discharge some office , a certain marketfriendship is begotten , which hath more of jealousie in it then true love , and whence factions sometimes may arise , but good will never ; if for pleasure , and recreation of mind , every man is wont to please himself most with those things which stirre up laughter , whence he may ( according to the nature of that which is ridiculous ) by comparison of another mans defects and infirmities , passe the more currant in his owne opinion ; and although this be sometimes innocent , and without offence ; yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted with the society , as their own vain glory . but for the most part , in these kind of meetings , we wound the absent , their whole life , sayings , actions are examin'd , judg'd , condemn'd ; nay , it is very rare , but some present receive a fling before they part , so as his reason was not ill , who was wont alwayes at parting to goe out last . and these are indeed the true delights of society , unto which we are carryed by nature . ( i. e. ) by those passions which are incident to all creatures , untill either by sad experience , or good precepts , it so fall out ( which in many never happens ) that the appetite , of present matters , be dul'd with the memory of things past , without which , the discourse of most quick and nimble men , on this subject , is but cold and hungry . but if it so happen , that being met , they passe their time in relating some stories , and one of them begins to tell one which concernes himselfe ; instantly every one of the rest most greedily desires to speak of himself too ; if one relate some wonder , the rest will tell you miracles , if they have them , if not , they 'l fein them : lastly , that i may say somewhat of them who pretend to be wiser then others ; if they meet to talk of philosophy , look how many men , so many would be esteem'd masters , or else they not only love not their f●llowes , but even persecute them with hatred : so clear is it by experience to all men who a little more narrowly consider humane affaires , that all free congress ariseth either from mutual poverty , or from vain glory , whence the parties met , endeavour to carry with them either some benefit , or to leave behind them that same 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 some esteem and honour with those , with whom they have been conversant : the same is also collected by reason out of the definitions themselves , of will , good , honour , profitable . for when we voluntarily contract society , in all manner of society we look after the object of the will , i. e. that , which every one of those , who gather together , propounds to himselfe for good ; now whatsoever seemes good , is pleasant , and relates either to the senses , or the mind , but all the mindes pleasure is either glory , ( or to have a good opinion of ones selfe ) or referres to glory in the end ; the rest are sensuall , or conducing to sensuality , which may be all comprehended under the word conveniencies . all society therefore is either for gain , or for glory , ( i. e. ) not so much for love of our fellowes , as for love of our selves : but no society can be great , or lasting , which begins from vain glory ; because that glory is like honour , if all men have it , no man hath it , for they consist in comparison and precellence ; neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in my selfe ; for every man must account himself , such as he can make himselfe , without the help of others . but though the benefits of this life may be much farthered by mutuall help , since yet those may be better attain'd to by dominion , then by the society of others : i hope no body will doubt but that men would much more greedily be carryed by nature , if all fear were removed to obtain dominion , then to gaine society . we must therefore resolve , that the originall of all great , and lasting societies , consisted not in the mutuall good will men had towards each other , but in the ( * ) mutuall fear they had of each other . born sit ] since we now see actually a constituted society among men , and none living out of it , since we discern all desirous of congresse , and mutuall correspondence , it may seeme a wonderfull kind of stupidity , to lay in the very threshold of this doctrine , such a stumbling block before the readers , as to deny man to be born sit for society : therefore i must more plainly say , that it is true indeed , that to man , by nature , or as man , that is , as soone as he is born , solitude is an enemy ; for infants have need of others to help them to live , and those of riper years to help them to live well , wherefore i deny not that men ( even nature compelling ) desire to come together . but civill societies are not meer meetings , but bonds , to the making whereof , faith and compacts are necessary : the vertue whereof to children , and fooles , and the profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defects , is altogether unknown ; whence it happens , that those , because they know not what society is , cannot enter into it ; these , because ignorant of the benefit it brings , care not for it . manifest therefore it is , that all men , because they are born in infancy , are born unapt for society . many also ( perhaps most men ) either through defect of minde , or want of education remain unfit during the whole course of their lives ; yet have they infants , as well as those of riper years , an humane nature ; wherefore man is made sit for society not by nature , but by education : furthermore , although man were born in such a condition as to desire it , it followes not , that he therefore were born sit to enter into it ; for it is one thing to desire , another to be in capacity ●it for what we desire ; for even they , who through their pride , will not stoop to equall conditions ; without which there can be no society , do yet desire it . the mutuall fear ] it is objected : it is so improbable that men should grow into civill societies out of fear , that if they had been afraid , they would not have endur'd each others looks : they presume , i believe , that to fear is nothing else then to be affrighted : i comprehend in this word fear , a certain foresight of future evill ; neither doe i conceive flight the sole property of fear , but to distrust , suspect ; take heed , provide so that they may not fear , is also incident to the fearfull . they , who go to sleep , shut their dores , they who travell carry their swords with them , because they fear theives . kingdomes guard their coasts and frontiers with forts , and castles , cities are compast with walls , and all for fear of neighbouring kingdomes and townes ; even the strongest armies , and most accomplish●● for fight , yet sometimes parly for peace , as fearing each others power , and lest they might be overcome . it is through fear that men secure themselves , by flight indeed , and in corners , if they think they cannot escape otherwise , but for the most part by armes , and defensive weapons ; whence it happens , that daring to come forth , they know each others spirits ; but then , if they fight , civill society ariseth from the victory , if they agree , from their agreement . iii. the cause of mutuall fear consists partly in the naturall equality of men , partly in their mutuall will of hurting : whence it comes to passe that we can neither expect from others , nor promise to our selves the least security : for if we look on men full-grown , and consider how brittle the frame of our humane body is , ( which perishing , all its strength , vigour , and wisdome it selfe perisheth with it ) and how easie a matter it is , even for the weakest man to kill the strongest , there is no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others : they are equalls who can doe equall things one against the other ; but they who can do the greatest things , ( namely kill ) can doe equall things . all men therefore among themselves are by nature equall ; the inequality we now discern , hath its spring from the civill law. iv. all men in the state of nature have a desire , and will to hurt , but not proceeding from the same cause , neither equally to be condemn'd , for one man according to that naturall equality which is among us , permits as much to others , as he assumes to himself ( which is an argument of a temperate man , and one that rightly values his power ) another supposing himselfe above others , will have a license to doe what he lists , and challenges respect , and honour , as due to him before others , ( which is an argument of a fiery spirit : ) this mans will to hurt ariseth from vain glory , and the false esteeme he hath of his owne strength ; the others , from the necessity of defending himselfe , his liberty , and his goods against this mans violence . v. furthermore , since the combate of wits is the fiercest , the greatest discords which are , must necessarily arise from this contention ; for in this case it is not only odious to contend against , but also not to consent ; for not to approve of what a man sai●h is no lesse then tacitely to accuse him of an errour in that thing which he speaketh ; as in very many things to dissent , is as much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from ; which may appear hence , that there are no warres so sharply wag'd as between sects of the same religion , and factions of the same common-weale where the contestation is : either concerning doctrines , or politique prudence . and since all the pleasure , and jollity of the mind consists in this ; even to get some , with whom comparing it , may find somewhat wherein to tryumph , and vaunt it self ; its impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutuall scorn and contempt either by laughter , or by words , or by gesture , or some signe or other ; then which there is no greater vexation of mind ; and then from which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to doe hurt . vi. but the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other , ariseth hence , that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing ; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common , nor yet divide it , whence it followes that the strongest must have it , and who is strongest must be decided by the sword. vii . among so many dangers therefore , as the naturall lusts of men do daily threaten each other withall , to have a care of ones selfe is not a matter so scornfully to be lookt upon , as if so be there had not been a power and will left in one to have done otherwise ; for every man is desirous of what is good for him , and shuns what is evill , but chiefly the chiefest of naturall evills , which is death ; and this he doth , by a certain impulsion of nature , no lesse then that whereby a stone moves downward : it is therefore neither absurd , nor reprehensible ; neither against the dictates of true reason for a man to use all his endeavours to preserve and defend his body , and the members thereof from death and sorrowes ; but that which is not contrary to right reason , that all men account to be done justly , and with right ; neither by the word right is any thing else signified , then that liberty which every man hath to make use of his naturall faculties according to right reason : therefore the first foundation of naturall right is this , that every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members . viii . but because it is in vaine for a man to have a right to the end , if the right to the necessary meanes be deny'd him ; it followes , that since every man hath a right to preserve himself , he must also be allowed a right to use all the means , and do all the actions , without which he cannot preserve himself ix . now whether the means which he is about to use , and the action he is performing , be necessary to the preservation of his life , and members , or not , he himself , by the right nature , must be judg ; for say another man , judg that it is contrary to right reason that i should judg of mine own perill : why now , because he judgeth of what concerns me , by the same reason , because we are equall by nature , will i judge also of things which doe belong to him ; therefore it agrees with right reason ( that is ) it is the right of nature that i judge of his opinion , ( i. e. ) whether it conduce to my preservation , or not . . nature hath given to every one a right to all ( that as it was lawfull for every man in the ( * ) bare state of nature , or before such time as men had engag'd themselves by any covenants , or bonds , to doe what hee would , and against whom he thought fit , and to possesse , use , and enjoy all what he would , or could get . now because whatsoever a man would , it therefore seems good to him because he wills it , and either it really doth , or at least seems to him to contribute toward his preservation , ( but we have already allowed him to be judge in the foregoing article whether it doth or not , in so much as we are to hold all for necessary whatsoever he shall esteeme so ) and by the . article it appeares that by the right of nature those things may be done , and must be had , which necessarily conduce to the protection of life , and members , it followes , that in the state of nature , to have all , and do all is lawfull for all . and this is that which is meant by that cōmon saying , nature hath given all to all , from whence we understand likewise , that in the state of nature , profit is the measure of right . in the meere state of nature ] this is thus to be understood : what any man does in the bare state of nature is injurious to no man ; not that in such a state he cannot offend god , or break the lawes of nature ; for iujustice against men presupposeth humane lawes , such , as in the state of nature there are none : now the truth of this proposition thus conceived is sufficiently demonstrated to the mindfull reader in the articles immediately foregoing ; but because in certaine cases the difficulty of the conclusion makes us forget the premises , i will contract this argument , and make it most evident to a single view ; every man hath right to protect himself , as appears by the seventh article . the same man therefore hath a right to use all the means which necessarily conduce to this end by the eight article : but those are the necessary means which he shall judge to be such by the ninth article . he therefore ●ath a right to make use of , and to doe all whatsoever he shall judge requisite for his preservation : wherefore by the judgement of him that doth it , the thing done is either right , or wrong ; and therefore right . true it is therefore in the ●are state of nature , &c but if any man pretend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preservation , which yet he himself doth not confidently believe so , he may offend against the lawes of nature , as in the third chapter of this book is more at large declar'd it hath been objected by some : if a sonne kill his father , doth he him no injury ? i have answered , that a so●ne cannot be understood to be at any time in the state of nature , as being under the power and command of them to who● he ownes his protection as soon as ever he is born , namely either his fathers , or his mothers , or his that nourisht him , as is demonstrated in the ninth chapter . xi . but it was the least benefit for men thus to have a common right to all things ; for the effects of this right are the same , almost , as if there had been no right at all ; for although any man might say of every thing , this is mine , yet could he not enjoy it , by reason of his neighbour , who having equall right , and equall power , would pretend the same thing thing to be his . xii . if now to this naturall proclivity of men , to hurt each other , which they derive from their passions , but chiefly from a vain esteeme of themselves : you adde , the right of all to all , wherewith one by right invades , the other by right resists , and whence arise perpetuall jealousies and suspicions on all hands , and how hard a thing it is to provide against an enemy invading us , with an intention to oppresse , and ruine , though he come with a small number , and no great provision , it cannot be deny'd but that the naturall state of men , before they entr'd into society , was a meer war , and that not simply , but a war of all men , against all men ; for what is war , but that same time in which the will of contesting by force , is fully declar'd either by words , or deeds ? the time remaining , is termed peace . xiii . but it is easily judg'd how disagreeable a thing to the preservation either of man-kind , or of each single man , a perpetuall war is : but it is perpetuall in its own nature , because in regard of the e●uality of those that st●ive , it cannot be ended by victory ; for in this state the conquerour is subject to so much danger , as it were to be accounted a miracle , if any , even the most strong should close up his life with many years , and old age . they of america are examples hereof , even in this present age : other nations have been in former ages , which now indeed are become civill , and flourishing , but were then few , fierce , short-lived , poor , nasty , and destroy'd of all that pleasure , and beauty of life , which peace and society are wont to bring with them . whosoever therefore holds , that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawfull for all men , he contradicts himself ; for every man , by naturall necessity desires that which is good for him : nor is there any that esteemes a war of all against all , which necessarily adheres to such a state , to be good for him , and so it happens that through feare of each other we think it fit to rid our selves of this condition , and to get some fellowes ; that if there needs must be war , it may not yet be against all men , nor without some helps . xiv . fellowes are gotten either by constraint , or by consent ; by constraint , when after fight the conqueror makes the conquered serve him either through feare of death , or by laying fetters on him : by consent , when men enter into society to helpe each other , both parties consenting without any constraint . but the conqueror may by right compell the conquered , or the strongest the weaker , ( as a man in health may one that is sick , or he that is of riper yeares a childe ) unlesse he will choose to die , to give caution of his future obedience . for since the right of protecting our selves according to our owne wills proceeded from our danger , and our danger from our equality , it s more consonant to reason , and more certaine for our conservation , using the present advantage to secure our selves by taking caution ; then , when they shall be full growne and strong , and got out of our power , to endeavour to recover that power againe by doubtfull fight . and on the other side , nothing can be thought more absurd , then by discharging whom you already have weak in your power , to make him at once both an enemy , and a strong one . from whence we may understand likewise as a corollarie in the naturall state of men , that a sure and irresistible power confers the right of dominion , and ruling over those who cannot resist ; insomuch , as the right of all things , that can be done , adheres essentially , and immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising . xv. yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature ( i. e. ) of war , by reason of that equality of power , and other humane faculties they are endued withall . wherefore to seek peace , where there is any hopes of obtaining it , and where there is none , to enquire out for auxiliaries of war , is the dictate of right reason ; that is , the law of nature , as shall be shewed in the next chapter . chap. ii. of the law of nature concerning contracts . i. that the law of nature is not an agreement of men , but the dictate of reason . ii. that the fundamentall law of nature is to seek peace where it may be had , and where not , to defend our selves . iii. that the first speciall law of nature is not to retain our right to all things . iv. what it is to quit our right , what to transfer it . v. that in the transferring of our right the will of him that receives it is necessarily required . vi. no words but those of the present tense transferre any right . vii . words of the future , if there be some other tokens to signifie the will are valid in the translation of right . viii . in matters of free gift our right passeth not from us , through any words of the future . ix . the definition of contract , and compact . x. in compacts our right passeth from us , through words of the future . xi . compacts of mutuall faith in the state of nature are of no effect , and vain ; but not so in civill government . xii . that no man can make compacts with beasts , nor yet with god without revelation . xiii . nor yet make a vow to god. xiv . that compacts oblige not beyond our outmost endeavour . xv. by what meanes we are freed from our compacts . xvi . that promises extorted through feare of death in the state of nature are valid . xvii . a latter compact contradicting the former , is invalid . xviii . a compact not to resist him that shall prejudice my body is invalid . xix . a compact to accuse ones self is invalid . xx. the definition of swearing . xxi . that swearing is to be conceived in that forme which he useth that takes the oath . xxii . an oath superaddes nothing to the obligation which is made by compact . xxiii . an oath ought not to be prest , but where the breach of compacts may be kept private , or cannot be punisht , but from god himself . i. all authors agree not concerning the definition of the naturall law , who notwithstanding doe very often ▪ make use of this terme in their writings . the method therefore , wherein we begin from definitions , and exclusion of all equivocation , is only proper to them who leave no place for contrary disputes ; for the rest , if any man say , that somwhat is done against the law of nature , one proves it hence , because it was done against the generall agreement of all the most wise , and learned nations : but this declares not who shall be the judg of the wisdome and learning of all nations : another hence , that it was done against the generall consent of all man-kind ; which definition is by no means to be admitted ; for then it were impossible for any but children , and fools , to offend against such a law ; for sure , under the notion of man-kind , they comprehend all men actually endued with reason . these therefore either doe naught against it , or if they doe ought , it is without their joint accord , and therefore ought to be excus'd , but to receive the lawes of nature from the consents of them , who oftner break , then observe them , is in truth unreasonable : besides , men condemne the same things in others , which they approve in themselves ; on the other side , they publickly commend what they privately condemne ; and they deliver their opinions more by hear-say , then any speculation of their own ; and they accord more through hatred of some object , through fear , hope , love , or some other perturbation of mind , then true reason . and therefore it comes to passe , that whole bodyes of people often doe those things by generall accord , or contention , which those writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature . but since all doe grant that is done by right , which is not done against reason , we ought to judg those actions onely wrong , which are repugnant to right reason , ( i. e. ) which contradict some certaine truth collected by right reasoning from true principles ; but that wrong which is done , we say it is done against some law : therefore true reason is a certaine law , which ( since it is no lesse a part of humane nature , then any other faculty , or affection of the mind ) is also termed naturall . therefore the law of nature , that i may define it , is the dictate of right ( * ) reason , conversant about those things which are either to be done , or omitted for the constant preservation of life , and members , as much as in us lyes . right reason . ] by right reason in the naturall state of men , i understand not , as many doe , an infallible faculty , but the act of reasoning , that is , the peculiar and true ratiocination of every man concerning those actions of his which may ●…r redound to the dammage , or benefit of his neighbours . i call it peculiar , because although in a civill government the reason of the supreme ( i. e. the civill law ) is to be received by each single subject for the right ; yet being without this civill government , ( in which state no man can know right reason from false , but by comparing it with his owne ) every mans owne reason is to be accounted not onely the rule of his owne actions which are done at his owne perill , but also for the measure of another mans reason , in such things as doe concerne him . i call it true ; that is , concluding from true principles rightly fram'd , because that the whole breach of the lawes of nature consists in the false reasoning , or rather folly of those men who see not those duties they are necessarily to performe toward others in order to their owne conservation ; but the principles of right reasoning about such like duties are those which are explained in the , , , , , and . articles of the first chapter . ii. but the first and fundamentall law of nature is , that peace is to be sought after where it may be found ; and where not , there to provide our selves for helps of war : for we shewed in the last article of the foregoing chapter , that this precept is the dictate of right reason ; but that the dictates of right reason are naturall lawes , that hath been newly prov'd above ; but this is the first , because the rest are deriv'd from this , and they direct the wayes either to peace , or self-defence . iii. but one of the naturall lawes deriv'd from this fundamentall one is this , that the right of all men , to all things , ought not to be retain'd , but that some certain rights ought to be transferr'd , or relinquisht : for if every one should retain his right to all things , it must necessarily follow , that some by right might invade ; and others , by the same right , might defend themselves against them , ( for every man , by naturall necessity , endeavours to defend his body , and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his body ) therefore war would follow . he therefore acts against the reason of peace , ( i. e. ) against the law of nature , whosoever he be , that doth not part with his right to all things . iv. but he is said to part with his right , who either absolutely renounceth it , or conveys it to another . he absolutely renounceth it , who by some sufficient signe , or meet tokens , declares that he is willing that it shall never be lawfull for him to doe that again , which before , by right , he might have done ; but he conveys it to another , who by some sufficient signe , or meet tokens , declares to that other , that he is willing it should be unlawfull for him to resist him , in going about to do somewhat in the performance where he might before , with right , have resisted him ; but that the conveyance of right consists meerly in not resisting , is understood by this , that before it was convey'd , he , to whom he convey'd it , had even then also a right to all , whence he could not give any new right : but the resisting right he had , before he gave it , by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy his rights , is utterly abolisht : whosoever therefore acquires some right in the naturall state of men , he onely procures himself security , and freedome from just molestation in the enjoyment of his primitive right : as for example , if any man shall sell , or give away a farme , he utterly deprives himself only from all right to this farme , but he does not so from others also . v. but in the conveyance of right the will is requisite not onely of him that conveys , but of him also that accepts it . if either be wanting , the right remaines : for if i would have given what was mine , to one who refus'd to accept of it , i have not therefore either simply renounc'd my right , or convey'd it to any man ; for the cause which mov'd me to part with it to this man was in him onely , not in others too . vi. but if there be no other token extant of our will either to quit , or convey our right , but onely words ; those words must either relate to the present , or time past ; for if they be of the future onely , they convey nothing : for example , he that speaks thus of the time to come , i will give to morrow , declares openly that y●t he hath not given it ; so that all this day his right remains , and abides to morrow too , unlesse in the interim he actually bestowes it : for what is mine , remains mine till i have parted with it . but if i shall speak of the time present , suppose thus ; i doe give , or have given you this to be received to morrow , by these words is signified that i have already given it , and that his right to receive it to morrow , is conveyed to him by me to day . vii . neverthelesse , although words alone are not sufficient tokens to declare the will ; if yet to words relating to the future , there shall some other signes be added , they may become as valid , as if they had been spoken of the present : if therefore , as by reason of those other signes , it appear , that he that speaks of the future , intends those words should be effectuall toward the perfect transferring of his right , they ought to be valid ; for the conveyance of right depends not on words , but ( as hath been instanc'd in the . article ) on the declaration of the will. viii . if any man conveigh some part of his right to another , and doth not this for some certain benefit received , or for some compact , a conveighance in this kind is called a gift , or free donation . b●t in free donation those words onely oblige us which signifie the p●esent , or the time past ; for if they respect the future , they oblige not as words , for the reason given in the fore-going article : it must needs therefore be , that the obligation arise from some other tokens of the will : but , because whatsover is voluntarily done , is done for some good to him that wils it ; there can no other token be assigned of the will to give it , except some benefit either already receiv'd , or to be acquir'd ; but is suppos'd , that no such benefit is acquired , nor any compact in being ; for if so , it would cease to be a free gift : it remains therefore , that a mutuall good turne without agreement be expected ; but no signe can be given , that he , who us'd future words toward him who was in no sort engag'd to return a benefit , should desire to have his words so understood , as to oblige himselfe thereby . nor is it suitable to reason , that those who are easily enclined to doe well to others , should be oblig'd by every promise , testifying their present good affection : and for this cause , a promiser in this kind , must be understood to have time to deliberate , and power to change that affection as well as he to whom he made that promise , may alter his desert . but he that deliberates , is so farre forth free , nor can be said to have already given : but if he promise often , and yet give seldome , he ought to be condemn'd of levity , and be called not a donour , but doson . ix . but the act of two , or more , mutually conveighing their rights , is call'd a contract . but in every contract , either both parties instantly performe what they contract for , insomuch as there is no trust had from either to other ; or the one performes , the other is trusted , or neither performe . eeither both parties performe presently , there the contract is ended , as soon as 't is performed ; but where there is credit given either to one , or both , there the party trusted promiseth after-performance ; and this kind of promise is called a covenant . x. but the covenant made by the party trusted with him , who hath already performed , although the promise be made by words pointing at the future , doth no les●e transfer the right of future time , thē if it had been made by words signifying the present , or time past : for the others performance is a most manifest signe that he so understood the speech of him whom he trusted , as that he would certainly make performance also at the appointed time ; and by this signe the party trusted knew himselfe to be thus understood , which , because he hindred not , 't was an evident token of his will to performe . the promises therefore which are made for some benefit received ( which are also covenants ) are tokens of the will ; that is , ( as in the foregoing section hath been declared ) of the last act of deliberating , whereby the liberty of non-performance is abolisht , and by consequence are obligatory ; for where liberty ceaseth , there beginneth obligation . xi . but the covenants , which are made in contract of mutual● trust , neither party performing out of hand , if there ( * ) arise a just suspicion in either of them , are in the state of nature invalid : for he that first performes by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men studying their owne advantage , either by right , or wrong , exposeth himself to the perverse will of him with whom he hath contracted ; for it suites not with reason , that any man should performe first , if it be not likely that the other will not make good his promise after ; which , whether it be probable , or not , he that doubts it , must be judge of , as hath been shewed in the fore-going chapter in the . article . thus , i say , things stand in the state of nature , but in a civill state , when there is a power which can compell both parties , he that hath contracted to perform first , must first performe ; because , that since the other may be compell'd , the cause which made him fear the others non-performance , ceaseth . arise ] for , except there appear some new cause of fear , either from somewhat done , or some other token of the will not to performe from the other part , it cannot be judg'd to be a just fear ; for the cause which was not sufficient to keep him from making compact , must not suffice to authorize the breach of it , being made . xi . but from this reason , that in all free-gifts , and compacts , there is an acceptance of the conveighance of right required : it followes , that no man can compact with him who doth not declare his acceptance ; and therefore we cannot compact with beasts , neither can we give , or take from them any manner of right , by reason of their want of speech , and understanding . neither can any man covenant with god , or be oblig'd to him by vow , except so far forth as it appeares to him by holy scriptures , that he hath substituted certaine men who have authority to accept of such like vowes and covenants , as being in gods stead . xiii . those therefore doe vow in vain , who are in the state of nature , where they are not tyed by any civill law , ( except by most certain revelation the will of god to accept their vow , or pact , be made known to them ) for if what they vow , be contrary to the law of nature , they are not tyed by their vow , for no man is tyed to perform an unlawfull act , but if what is vowed , be commanded by some law of nature , it is not their vow , but the law it self which ties them ; but if he were free before his vow , either to doe ▪ it , or not doe it , his liberty remaines , because that the openly declar'd will of the obliger is requisite to make an obligation by vow , which in the case propounded is suppos'd not to be : now i call him the obliger to whom any one is tyed , and the obliged him who is tyed . xiv . covenants are made of such things onely as fall under our deliberation , for it can be no covenant without the will of the contractor , but the will is the last act of him who deliberates ; wherefore they on●ly concerne things possible , and to come ; no man therefore , by his compact , obligeth himself to an impossibility . but yet , though we often covenant to doe ▪ such things as then seem'd possible when we promis'd them , which yet afterward appear to be impossible , are we therefore freed from all obligation ? the reason whereof is , that he who promiseth a future , incertainty receives a present benefit ; on condition , that he return another for it : for his will , who performes the present benefit hath simply before it ; for its object , a certain good valuable with the thing promised ; but the thing it selfe not simply , but with condition if it could be done ; but if it should so happen , that even this should prove impossible , why then he must perform as much as he can . covenants therefore oblige us not to perform just the thing it selfe covenanted for , but our utmost endeavour ; for this onely is , the things themselves are not in our power . xv. we are freed from covenants two wayes , either by performing , or by being forgiven : by performing , for beyond that we oblig'd not our selves . by being for-given , because he whom we oblig'd our selves to by forgiving , is conceiv'd to return us that right which we past over to him ; for , forgiving , implies giving : that is , by the fourth article of this chapter , a conveyance of right to him to whom the gift is made . xvi . it s an usuall question , whether compacts extorted from us , through fear , do oblige , or not : for example , if to redeeme my life , from the power of a robber , a promise to pay him ● . next day ; and that i will doe no act whereby to apprehend , and bring him to justice , whether i am tyed to keep promise , or not ? but though such a promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect , yet it is not to be accounted so , because it proceeded from fear , for then it would follow that those promises which reduc'd men to a civill life , and by which lawes were made , might likewise be of none effect , ( for it proceeds from fear of mutuall slaughter , that one man submits himselfe to the dominion of another : ) and he should play the fool finely , who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of his redemption . it holds universally true , that promises doe oblige when there is some benefit received ; and that to promise , and the thing promised , be lawfull : but it is lawfull , for the redemption of my life , both to promise , and to give what i will of mine owne to any man , even to a thief . we are oblig'd therefore by promises proceeding from fear , except the civill law forbid them , by vertue whereof , that which is promised becomes unlawfull . xvii . whosoever shall contract with one to doe , or omit somewhat , and shall after covenant the contrary with another ; he maketh not the former , but the latter contract unlawfull : for , he hath no longer right to doe , or to omit ought , who by former contracts hath conveyed it to another ; wherefore he can conveigh no right by latter contracts , and what is promised , is promis'd without right : he is therefore tyed onely to his first contract ; to break which is unlawfull . xviii . no man is oblig'd by any contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill , wound , or any other way hurt his body ; for there is in every man a certain high degree of fear , through which he apprehends that evill which is done to him to be the greatest , and therefore by naturall necessity he shuns it all he can , and 't is suppos'd he can doe no otherwise : when a man is arriv'd to this degree of fear , we cannot expect but be will provide for himself either by slight , or fight . since therefore no man is tyed to impossibilities , they who are threatned either with death , ( which is the greatest evill to nature ) or wounds , or some other bodily hurts , and are not stout enough to bear them , are not obliged to endure them . farthermore , he that is t●ed by cont●act is trusted , ( for faith only is the bond of contracts ) but they who are brought to punishment , either capitall , or more gentle , are f●ttered , or strongly guarded , which is a most certain signe that they seem'd not sufficiently bound from non resistance by th●ir contracts . it s one thing if i promise thus : if i doe it not at the day appointed , kill me . another thing if thus : if i doe it not , though you should offer to kill me , i will not resist : all men , if need be , contract the first way ; but there is need sometimes . this second way , none , neither is it ever needfull ; for in the meer state of nature , if you have a mind to kill , that state it selfe affords you a right ; insomuch as you need not first trust him , if for breach of trust you will afterward kill him . but in a civill state , where the right of life , and death , and of all co●po●all punishment is with the supreme ; that same right of killing cannot be granted to any private person . neither need the supreme himselfe contract with any man patiently to yeeld to his punishment , but onely this , that no man offer to def●nd others from him . if in the state of nature , as between two realmes , there should a contract be made , on condition of killing , if it were not perform'd , we must presuppose another contract of not killing before the appointed day . wherefore on that day , if there be no performance , the right of warre returnes ; that is , an hostile state , in which all things are lawfull , and therefore resistance also . lastly , by the contract of not resisting , we are oblig'd of two evills to make choice of that which seemes the greater ; for certaine death is a greater evill then fighting ; but of two evi●ls it is impossible not to chuse the least : by such a compact therefore we should be tyed to impossibilities , which is contrary to the very nature of compacts . xix . likewise no man is tyed by any compacts whatsoever to accuse himself , or any other , by whose dammage he is like to procure himselfe a better life , wherefore neither is a father oblig'd to bear witnesse against his sonne , nor a husband against his wife , nor a sonne against his father ; nor any man against any one , by whose meanes he hath his subsistance ; for in vain is that testimony which is presum'd to be corrupted from nature ; but although no man be tyed to accuse himself by any compact , yet in a publique tryall he may , by torture , be forc'd to make answer ; but such answers are no testimony of the fact , but helps for the searching out of truth ; insomuch as whether the party tor●u●'d his answer be true , or false , or whether he answer not at all , whatsoever he doth , he doth it by right . xx. swearing is a speech joyned to a promise , whereby the promiser declares his renouncing of gods mercy , unlesse he perform his word ; which definition is contained in the words themselves , which have in them the very essence of an oath , to wit , so god help me , or other equivalent , as with the romans , doc thou jupiter so destroy the deceiver , as i slay this same beast : neither is this any let , but that an oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory , as promissory ; for he that confirmes his affirmation with an oath , promiseth that he speaks truth . but though in some places it was the fashion for subjects to swear by their kings ; that custome took its originall hence , that those kings took upon them divine honour ; for oathes were therefore introduc'd that by religion , and consideration of the divine power men might have a greater dread of breaking their faiths , then that wherewith they fear men , from whose eyes their actions may lie hid . xxi . whence it followes , that an oath must be conceived in that forme which he useth , who takes it ; for in vain is any man brought to swear by a god whom he beleeves not , and therefore neither feares him . for though by the light of nature it may be known that there is a god , yet no man thinks he is to swear by him in any other fashion , or by any other name then what is contain'd in the precepts of his own proper , that is , ( as he who swears imagines ) the true religion . xxii . by the definition of an oath we may understand , that a bare contract obligeth no lesse , then that to which we are sworn ; for it is the contract which binds us , the oath relates to the divine punishment , which it could not provoke , if the breach of contract were not in its selfe unlawfull ; but it could not be unlawfull if the contract were not obligatory . furthermore , he that renounceth the mercy of god obligeth himselfe not to any punishment , because it is ever lawfull to deprecate the punishment howsoever provok'd , and to enjoy gods pardon if it be granted . the onely effect therefore of an oath is this , to cause men who are naturally inclin'd to break all manner of faith , through fear of punishment , to make the more conscience of their words and actions . xxiii . to exact an oath , where the breach of contract , if any be made , cannot but be known , and where the party compacted , withall wants not power to punish , is to do some what more then is necessary unto self-defence , and shewes a mind desirous not so much to benefit it selfe , as to prejudice another . for an oath , out of the very form of swearing , is taken in order to the provocation of gods anger , that is to say , of him that is omnipotent against those who therefore violate their faith , because they think , that by their own strength they can escape the punishment of men ; and of him that is omniscient against those , who therefore usually break their trust , because they hope that no man shall see them . chap. iii. of the other lawes of nature . i. the second law of nature is to perform contracts . ii. that trust is to be held with all men without exception . iii. what injury is . iv. injury can be done to none but those with whom we contract . v. the distinction of justice into that of men , and that of actions . vi. the distinction of commutative , and distributive justice examin'd . vii . no injury can be done to him that is willing . viii . the third law of nature concerning ingratitude . ix . the fourth law of nature , that every man render himselfe usefull . x. the fifth law , of mercy . xi . the sixth law , that punishments regard the future only . xii . the seventh law , against reproach . xiii . the eighth law , against pride . xiv . the ninth law , of humility . xv. the tenth , of equity , or against acceptance of persons . xvi . the eleventh , of things to be had in common . xvii . the twelfth , of things to be divided by lot. xviii . the thirteenth , of birth right , and first possession . xix . the fourteenth , of the safeguard of them who are mediators for peace . xx. the fifteenth , of constituting an umpire . xxi . the sixteenth , that no man is judge in his own cause . xxii . the seventeenth , that umpires must be without all hope of reward from those whose cause is to be judged . xxiii . the eighteenth , of witnesses . xxiv . the nineteenth , that there can no contract be made with the umpire . xxv . the twentieth , against glutony ; and all such things as hinder the use of reason . xxvi . the rule by which we may presently know , whether , what we are doing , be against the law of nature , or not . xxvii . the lawes of nature oblige only in the court of conscience . xxviii . the lawes of nature are somtimes broke by doing things answerable to those lawes . xxix : the lawes of nature are unchangeable . xxx . whosoever endeavours to fulfill the lawes of nature is a just man. xxxi . the naturall and morall law are one . xxxii . how it comes to passe , that what hath been said of the lawes of nature is not the same with what philosophers have delivered concerning the vertues . xxxiii . the law of nature is not properly a law , but as it is delivered in holy writ . i. another of the lawes of nature is , to performe contracts , or to keep trust ; for it hath been shewed in the foregoing chapter that the law of nature commands every man , as a thing necessary , to obtain peace ; to conveigh certain rights from each to other , and that this ( as often as it shall happen to be done ) is called a contract : but this is so farre forth onely conducible to peace , as we shall performe our selves , what we contract with others , shall be done , or omitted ; and in vaine would contracts be made , unlesse we stood to them . because therefore , to stand to our covenants , or to keep faith , is a thing necessary for the obtaining of peace , it will prove by the second article of the second chapter to be a precept of the naturall law. neither is there in this matter , any exception of the persons , with whom we contract , as if they keep no faith with others ; or hold , that none ought to be kept , or are guilty of any other kind of vice : for he that contracts , in that he doth contract , denies that action to be in vaine , and it is against reason for a knowing man to doe a thing in vain ; and if he think himself not bound to keep it , in thinking so , he affirms the contract to be made in vain : he therefore , who contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep faith , he doth at once think a contract to be a thing done in vaine , and not in vaine , which is absurd . either therefore we must hold trust with all men , or else not bargain with them ; that is , either there must be a declared warre , or a sure and faithfull peace . iii. the breaking of a bargain , as also the taking back of a gift , ( which ever consists in some action , or omission ) is called an injury : but that action , or omission , is called unjust , insomuch as an injury ; and an unjust action , or omission , signifie the same thing , and both are the same with breach of contract and trust : and it seemes the word iniury came to be given to any action , or omission , because they were without right ; he that acted , or omitted , having before conveyed his right to some other . and there is some likenesse between that , which in the common course of life we call injury ; and that , which in the schools is usually called absurd . for even as he , who by arguments is driven to deny the assertion which he first maintain'd , is said to be brought to an absurdity ; in like manner , he who through weaknesse of mind does , of omits that which before he had by contract promis'd not to doe , or omit , cōmits an injury ▪ and falls into no lesse contradiction , then he , who in the schools is reduc'd to an absurdity . for by contracting for some future action , he wills it done ; by not doing it , he wills it not done , which is to will a●thing done , and not done at the same time , which is a contradiction . an injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation , as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation . iv. from these grounds it followes , that an ( * ) injury can be done to no man but him with whō we enter covenant , or to whō somewhat is made over by deed of gift , or to whom somwhat is promis'd by way of bargain , and therefore damaging and injuring are often disjoyn'd : for if a master command his servant , who hath promis'd to obey him , to pay a summe of money , or carry some present to a third man ; the servant , if he doe it not , hath indeed damag'd this third party , but he injur'd his master onely . so also in a civill government , if any man offend another , with whom he hath made no contract , he damages him to whom the evill is done , but he injures none but him to whom the power of government belongs : for if he , who receives the hurt , should expostulate the mischief ; and he that did it , should answer thus , what art thou to me ? why should i rather doe according to yours , then mine owne will , since i do not hinder , but you may do your own , and not my mind ? in which speech , where there hath no manner of pre-contract past , i see not , i confesse , what is reprehensible . injury can be done against no man ] the word injustice relates to some law : injury to some person , as well as some law. for what 's unjust , is unjust to all ; but there may an injury be done , and yet not against me , nor thee , but some other ; and sometimes against no private person , but the magistrate only ; sometimes also neither against the magistrate , nor any private man , but onely against god ; for through contract , and conveighance of right , we say , that an injury is done against this , or that man. hence it is ( which we see in all kin● of govern●ent ) that what private men contract between themselves by word , or writing , is rel●ast againe at the will of the obliger . but those mischiefes which are done against the lawes of the land , as theft , homicide , and the like , are punisht not as he wills , to whom the hurt is done , but according to the will of the magistrate ; that is , the constituted lawes . v these words just , and unjust , as also justice , and injustice , are equivocall ; for they signifie one thing when they are attributed to persons , another when to actions : when they are attributed to actions , just signifies as much as what 's done with right , and unjust , as what 's done with injury : he who hath done some just thing is not therefore said to be a just person , but guiltlesse , and he that hath done some unjust thing , we doe not therefore say he is an unjust , but guilty man. but when the words are applyed to persons ; to be just , signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing , to study how to doe righteousnesse , or to indeavour in all things to doe that which is just ; and to be unjust , is to neglect righteous dealing , or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract , but some present benefit ; so as the justice or injustice of the mind , the intention , or the man , is one thing ; that of an action , or omission , another ; and innumerable actions of a just man may be unjust , and of an unjust man , just : but that man is to be accounted just , who doth just things because the law commands it , unjust things only by reason of his infirmity ; and he is properly said to be unjust who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment annext unto the law , and unrighteousnesse by reason of the iniquity of his mind . vi. the justice of actions is commonly distinguisht into two kinds ; commutative , and distributive , the former whereof they say consists in arithmeticall , the latter in geometricall proportion , and that is conversant in exchanging , in buying , selling , borrowing , lending , location , and conduction , and other acts whatsoever belonging to contracters , where , if there be an equall return made , hence they say springs a commutative justice : but this is busied about the dignity , and merits of men ; so as if there be rendred to every man 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 more to him who is more worthy , and lesse to him that deserves lesse , and that proportionably , hence they say ariseth distributive justice : i acknowledge here some certaine distinction of equality ; to wit , that one is an equality simply so called , as when two things of equall value are compar'd together , as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver ; the other is an equality , secundum qu●d , as when a . pound is to be divided to an hundred men , . pounds are given to . men , and . to . where there is no equality between . and . but when it happens , that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed , every one of them shall take an equall part , whence it is called an equall distribution : but such like equality is the same thing with geometricall proportion . but what is all this to justice ? for neither , if i sell my goods for as much as i can get for them , doe i injure the buyer , who sought , and desir'd them of me ? neither if i divide more of what is mine to him who deserves le●se , so long as i give the other what i have agreed for , do i wrong to either ? which truth our saviour himself , being god , testifies in the gospell . this therefore is no distinction of justice , but of equality ; yet perhaps it cannot be deny'd , but that justice is a certain equality , as consisting in this onely ▪ that since we are all equall by nature , one should not arrogate more right to himselfe , then he grants to another , unlesse he have fairly gotten it by compact . and let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of justice , although now almost generally receiv'd by all , lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else , then the breach of faith , or contract , as hath been defin'd above . vii . it is an old saying , volenti non fit iniuria ( the willing man receives no injury ) yet the truth of it may be deriv'd from our principles . for grant , that a man be willing that that should be done , which he conceives to be an injury to him ; why then that is done by his will , which by contract was not lawfull to be done ; but he being willing that should be done , which was not lawfull by contract , the contract it self ( by the article of the foregoing chapter ) becomes void : the right therefore of doing it returnes , therefore it is done by right ; wherefore it is no injury . viii . the third precept of the naturall law , is , that you suffer not him to be the worse for you , who out of the confidence he had in you , first did you a good a turn ; or that you accept not a gift , but with a mind to endeavour , that the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift . for without this he should act without reason that would conferre a benefit where he sees it would be lost ; and by this meanes all beneficence , and trust , together with all kind of benevolence would be taken from among men , neither would there be ought of mutuall assistance among them , nor any commencement of gaining grace and favour ; by reason whereof the state of warre would necessarily remain , contrary to the fundamentall law of nature : but because the breach of this law is not a breach of trust , or contract , ( for we suppose no contracts to have pass'd among them ) therefore is it not usually termed an iniury , but because good turns and thankes have a mutuall eye to each other ; it is called ingratitude . ix . the fourth precept of nature , is , that every man render himself usefull unto others : which , that we may rightly understand , we must remember that there is in men , a diversity of dispositions to enter into society , arising from the diversity of their affections , not unlike that which is found in stones , brought together in the building , by reason of the diversity of their matter , and figure ; for as a stone , which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other stones then it fils up it selfe , neither because of the hardnesse of its matter cannot well be prest together , or easily cut , and would hinder the building from being fitly compacted , is cast away , as not fit for use : so a man , who for the harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself , and detaining of necessaries from others ; and being incorrigible , by reason of the stubbornnesse of his affections , is commonly said to be uselesse , and troublesome unto others . now , because each one not by right onely , but even by naturall necessity is suppos'd , with all his main might , to intend the procurement of those things which are necessary to his own preservation ; if any man will contend on the other side for superfluities , by h●s default there will arise a warre , because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending , he therefore acts against the fundamentall law of nature : whence it followes ( which wee were to shew ) that it is a precept of nature ; that every man accommodate himselfe to others . but he who breaks this law may be called uselesse , and troublesome . yet cicero opposeth inhumanity to this usefulnesse , as having regard to this very law. x. the fift precept of the law of nature is : that we must forgive him who repents , and asketh pardon for what is past ; having first taken caution for the time to come . the pardon of what is past , or the remission of an offence , is nothing else but the granting of peace to him that asketh it , after he hath warr'd against us , & now is become penitent . but peace granted to him that repents not , that is , to him that retains an hostile mind , or that gives not caution for the futures that is , seeks not peace , but oportunity , is not properly peace but feare , and therefore is not commanded by nature . now to him that will not pardon the penitent , and that gives future caution , peace it selfe it seems is not pleasing ; which is contrary to the naturall law. xi . the sixth precept of the naturall law is , that in revenge and punishments we must have our eye not at the evill past , but the future good . that is : it is not lawfull to inflict punishment for any other end , but that the offender may be corrected , or that others warned by his punishment may become better . but this is confirmed chiefly from hence , that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one another , provided he give caution for the future , as hath been shewed in the foregoing article . furthermore , because revenge , if the time past be onely considered , is nothing else but a certain triumph , and glory of minde , which points at no end , ( for it contemplates onely what is past ; but the end is a thing to come ) but that which is directed to no end is vain ; that revenge therefore which regards not the future , proceeds from vaine glory , and therefore without reason . but to hurt another without reason introduces a warre , and is contrary to the fundamentall law of nature ; it is therefore a precept of the law of nature , that in revenge wee look not backwards but forward . now the breach of this law , is commonly called cruelty . xii . but because all signes of hatred , and contempt provoke most of all to brawling and fighting , insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives , ( that i say not their peace ) then suffer slander , it followes in the seventh place , that it is prescribed by the law of nature , that no man either by deeds , or words , cou●tenance , or laughter , doe declare himselfe to hate , or scorne another . the breach of which law is called reproach . but although nothing be more frequent then the scostes and jeers of the powerfull against the weak , and namely of judges against guilty persons , which neither relate to the offence of the guilty , nor the duty of the judges , yet these kind of men do act against the law of nature , and are to be esteemed for contumelious . xiii . the question whether of two men be the more worthy , belongs not to the naturall , but civill state , for it hath been shewed before , chap. . art. . that all men by nature are equall , and therefore the inequality which now is , suppose from riches , power , nobility of kindred , is come from the civill law. i know that aristotle in his first book of politiques affirmes as a foundation of the whole politicall science , that some men by nature are made worthy to command , others onely to serve , as if lord and master were distinguished not by consent of men , but by an aptnesse , that is , a certain kind of naturall knowledge , or ignorance ; which foundation is not onely against reason ( as but now hath been shewed ) but also against experience : for neither almost is any man so dull of understanding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himselfe , then to yeeld himselfe to the government of another ; neither if the weaker and stronger doe contest , have these ever , or after the upper hand of those . whether therefore men be equall by nature , the equality is to be acknowledged , or whether unequall , because they are like to contest for dominion , its necessary for the obtaining of peace , that they be esteemed as equall , and therefore it is in the eight place a precept of the law of nature , that every man be accounted by nature equall to another , the contrary to which law is pride . xiv . as it was necessary to the conservation of each man , that he should part with some of his rights , so it is no lesse necessary to the same conservation , that he retain some others , to wit the right of bodily protection , of free enjoyment of ayre , water , and all necessaries for life . since therefore many common rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable state , and that many peculiar ones are also acquired , hence ariseth this ninth dictate of the naturall law , to wit , that what rights soever any man challenges to himselfe , he also grant the same as due to all the rest : otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former article . for what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of society , but to attribute equall right and power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter into society ? but to ascribe equall things to equalls , i● the same with giving things proportionall to proportionals , the observation of this law is called meeknes , the violation 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the breakers by the latines are styled immoditi & immodesti . xv. in the tenth place it is commanded by the law of nature , that every man in dividing right to others , shew himselfe equall to either party . by the foregoing law we are forbidden to assume more right by nature to our selves , then we grant to others . we may take lesse if we will , for that sometimes is an argument of modesty . but if at any time matter of right be to be divided by us unto others , we are forbidden by this law to favour one more or lesse then another . for he that by favouring one before another , observes not this naturall equality , reproaches him whom he thus undervalues : but it is declared above , that a reproach is against the lawes of nature . the observance of this precept is called equity ; the breach , respect of persons . the greeks in one word term it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . xvi . from the foregoing law is collected this eleventh . those things which cannot be divided , must be used in common , ( if they can ) and ( that the quantity of the matter permit ) every man as much as he lists , but if the quantity permit not , then with limitation , and proportionally to the number of the users : for otherwise that equality can by no means be observed , which we have shewed in the forgoing article to be commanded by the law of nature . xvii . also what cannot he divided , nor had in common , it is provided by the law of nature ( which may be the twelfth precept ) that the use of that thing be either by turns , or adjudged to one onely by lot , and that in the using it by turns , it be also decided by lot who shall have the first use of it ; for here also regard is to be had unto equality : but no other can be found , but that of lot . xviii . but all lot is twofold ; arbitrary , or naturall ; arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of the contenders , and it consists in meer chance ( as they say ) or fortune . naturall is primogeniture ( in greek 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , as it were given by lot ) or first possession . therefore the things which can neither be divided , nor had in common , must be granted to the first possessour , as also those things which belonged to the father are due to the sonne , unlesse the father himselfe have formerly conveighed away that right to some other . let this therefore stand for the thirteenth law of nature . xix . the precept of the law of nature is , that safety must be assured to the mediators for peace . for the reason which commands the end , commands also the means necessary to the end . but the first dictate of reason is peace ; all the rest are means to obtain it , and without which peace cannot be had . but neither can peace be had without mediation , nor mediation without safety ; it is therefore a dictate of reason , that is , a law of nature , that we must give all security to the mediators for peace . xx. furthermore , because , although men should agree to make all these , and whatsoever other lawes of nature , and should endeavour to keep them , yet doubts , and controversies would daily arise concerning the application of them unto their actions , to wit , whether what was done , were against the law , or not , ( which we call , the question of right ) whence will follow a fight between parties , either sides supposing themselves wronged ; it is therefore necessary to the preservation of peace ( because in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on ) that both the disagreeing parties refer the matter unto some third , and oblige themselves by mutuall compacts to stand to his judgement in deciding the controversie . and he to whom they thus refer themselves is called an arbiter . it is therefore the . precept of the naturall law , that both parties disputing concerning the matter of right submit themselves unto the opinion and judgement of some third . xxi . but from this ground , that an arbiter or judge is chosen by the differing parties to determine the controversie , we gather , that the arbiter must not be one of the parties : for every man is presumed to seek what is good for himselfe naturally , and what is just , onely for peaces sake , and accidentally ; and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by the law of nature so exactly as a third man would do : it is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the law of nature , that no man must be judge or arbiter in his own cause . xxii . from the same ground sollowes in the seventeenth place , that no man must be judge who propounds unto himself any hope of profit , or glory , from the victory of either part : for the like reason swayes here , as in the foregoing law. xxiii . but when there is some controversie of the fact it selfe , to wit , whether that bee done or not , which is said to bee done , the naturall law wills , that the arbiter trust both parties alike , that is , ( because they affirm contradictories ) that hee believe neither : he must therefore give credit to a third , or a third and fourth , or more , that he may be able to give judgement of the fact , as often as by other signes he cannot come to the knowledge of it . the . law of nature therefore injoynes arbiters , and iudges of fact , that where firm and certain ●ignes of the fact appear not , there they rule their sentence by such witnesses , as seem to be indifferent to both parts . xxiv . from the above declared definition of an arbiter may be furthermore understood , that no contract or promise must paste between him and the parties whose iudge he is appointed , by vertue whereof he may be engaged to speak in favour of either part , nay , or be oblig'd to judge according to equity , or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equall . the judge is indeed hound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equall by the law of nature re-counted in the . article . to the obligation of which law nothing can be added by way of compact . such compact therefore would be in vain . besides , if giving wrong judgement , he should contend for the equity of it , except such compact be of no force , the controversie would remain after judgement given , which is contrary to the constitution of an arbiter , who is so chosen , as both parties have oblig'd themselves to stand to the judgement which he should pronounce . the law of nature therefore commands the judge be to dis-eng●g'd , which is its precept . xxv . farthermore , forasmuch as the lawes of nature are nought else but the dictates of reason , so as , unlesse a man endeavour to preserve the faculty of right reasoning , he cannot observe the lawes of nature , it is manifest , that he , who knowingly , or willingly , doth ought , whereby the rationall faculty may be destroyed , or weakned , he knowingly , and willingly , breaks the law of nature : for there is no difference between a man who performes not his duty , and him who does such things willingly , as make it impossible for him to doe it . but they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty , who doe that which disturbs the mind from its naturall state ; that which most manifestly happens to drunkards and gluttons : we therefore sin in the place against the law of nature by drunkennesse . xxvi . perhaps some man , who sees all these precepts of nature deriv'd by a certain artifice from the single dictate of reason advising us to look to the preservation , and safegard of our selves , will say , that the deduction of these lawes is so hard , that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly known , and therefore neither will they prove obliging : for lawes , if they be not known , oblige not , nay , indeed are not lawes . to this i answer , it 's true , that hope , fear , anger , ambition , covetousnesse , vain glory , and other perturbations of mind , doe hinder a man so , as he cannot attaine to the knowledge of these lawes , whilst those passions prevail in him : but there is no man who is not somettmes in a quiet mind ; at that time therefore there is nothing easier for him to know , though he benever so rude and unlearn'd , then this only rule , that when he doubts , whether what he is now doing to another , may be done by the law of nature , or not , he conceive himselfe to be in that others st●ad . here instantly those perturbations which perswaded him to the fact , being now cast into the other scale , disswade him as much : and this rule is not onely easie , but is anciently celebrated in these words , quod tibi ●ieri non vis , alteri nè feceris : do not that to others , you would not have done to your self . xxvii . but because most men , by reason of their perverse desire of present profit , are very unapt to observe these lawes , although acknowledg'd by them , if perhaps some others more humble then the rest should exercise that equity and usefulnesse which reason dictates , those not practising the same , surely they would not follow reason in so doing ; nor would they hereby procure themselves peace , but a more certain quick destruction , and the keepers of the law become a meer prey to the breakers of it . it is not therefore to be imagin'd , that by nature , ( that is , by reason ) men are oblig'd to the ( * ) exercise of all these lawes in that state of men wherein they are not practis'd by others . we are oblig'd yet in the interim to a readinesse of mind to observe them whensoever their observation shall seeme to conduce to the end for which they were ordain'd . we must therefore conclude , that the law of nature doth alwayes , and every where oblige in the internall court , or that of conscience , but not alwayes in the externall court , but then onely when it may be done with safety . the exercise of all these lawes ] nay among these lawes some things there are , the omission whereof ( provided it be done for peace , or self-preservation ) seemes rather to be the fulfilling , then breach of the naturall law ; for he that doth all things against those that doe all things , and plunders plunderers , doth equity ; but on the other side , to doe that which in peace is an handsome action , and becomming an honest man , is dejectednesse , and poornesse of spirit , and a betraying of ones self in the time of war. but there are certain naturall lawes , whose exercise ceaseth not even in the time of war it self ; for i cannot understand what drankennesse , or cruelty ( that is , revenge which respects not the future good ) can advance toward peace , or the preservation of any man. briefly , in the state of nature , what 's just , and unjust , is not to be esteem'd by the actions , but by the counsell , and conscience of the actor . that which is done out of necessity , out of endeavour for peace , for the preservation of our selves , is done with right ; otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach of the naturall law , and an injury against god. xxviii . but the lawes which oblige conscience , may be broken by an act , not onely contrary to them , but also agreeable with them , if so be that he who does it be of another opinion : for though the act it self be answerable to the lawes , yet his conscience is against them . xxix . the lawes of nature are immutable , and eternall : what they forbid , can never be lawfull ; what they command , can never be unlawfull : for pride , ingratitude , breach of contracts , ( or injury ) inhumanity , contum●ly , will never be lawfull ; nor the contrary vertues to these ever unlawfull , as we take them for dispositions of the mind , that is , as they are considered in the court of conscience , where onely they oblige , and are lawes . yet actions may be so diversified by circumstances , and the civill law , that what 's done with equity at one time , is guilty of iniquity at another ; and what suits with reason at one time , is contrary to it another . yet reason is still the same , and changeth not h●r end , which is peace , and defence ; nor the meanes to attaine them , to wit , those vertues of the minde which we have declar'd above , and which cannot be abrogated by any custome , or law whatsoever . xxx . it 's evident by what hath hitherto been said , how easily the lawes of nature are to be observ'd , because they require the endeavour onely , ( but that must be true and constant ) which who so shall performe , we may rightly call him just . for he who tends to this with his whole might , namely , that his actions be squar'd according to the precepts of nature , he shewes clearly that he hath a minde to fulfill all those lawes , which is all we are oblig'd to by rationall nature . now he that hath done all he is oblig'd to , it a just man. xxxi . all writers doe agree that the naturall law is the same with the morall . let us see wherefore this is true . we must know therefore , that good and evill are names given to things to signifie the inclination , or aversion of them by whom they were given . but the inclinations of men are diverse , according to their diverse constitutions , customes , opinions ; as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense , as by tasting , touching , smelling ; but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life , where what this man commends , ( that is to say , calls good ) the other undervalues , as being evil ; nay , very often the same man at diverse times , praises , and dispraises the same thing . whilst thus they doe , necessary it is there should be discord , and strife : they are therefore so long in the state of war , as by reason of the diversity of the present appetites , they mete good and evill by diverse measures . all men easily acknowledge this state as long , as they are in it , to be evill , and by consequence that peace is good . they therefore who could not agree concerning a present , doe agree concerning a future good , which indeed is a work of reason ; for things present are obvious to the sense , things to come to our reason only . reason declaring peace to be good , it followes by the same reason , that all the necessary means to peace be good also , and therefore , that modesty , equity , trust , humanity , mercy ( which we have demonstrated to be necessary to peace ) are good manners , or habits , ( that is ) vertues . the law therefore , in the means to peace , commands also good manners , or the practise of vertue : and therefore it is call'd morall . xxxii . but because men cannot put off this same irrationall appetite , whereby they greedily prefer the present good ( to which , by strict , consequence , many unfore-seenevills doe adhere ) before the future , it happens , that though all men doe agree in the commendation of the foresaid vertues , yet they disagree still concerning their nature , to wit , in what each of them doth consist ; for as oft as anothers good action displeaseth any man , that action hath the name given of some neighbouring vice ; likewise the bad actions , which please them , are ever entituled to some vertue ; whence it comes to passe that the same action is prais'd by these , and call'd vertue , and dispraised by those , and termed vice . neither is there as yet any remedy found by philosophers for this matter ; for since they could not observe the goodnesse of actions to consist in this , that it was in order to peace , and the evill in this , that it related to discord , they built a morall philosophy wholly estranged from the morall law , and unconstant to it self ; for they would have the nature of vertues seated in a certain kind of mediocrity betweene two extremes , and the vices in the extremes themselves ; which is apparently false : for to dare is commended , and under the name of fortitude is taken for a vertue , although it be an extreme , if the cause be approved . also the quantity of a thing given , whether it be great , or little , or between both , makes not liberality , but the cause of giving it . neither is it injustice , if i give any man more , of what is mine own , then i owe him . the lawes of nature therefore are the summe of morall philosophy ▪ whereof i have onely delivered such precepts in this place , as appertain to the preservation of our selves against those dangers which arise from discord . but there are other precepts of rationall nature , from whence spring other vertues : for temperance also is a precept of reason , because intemperance tends to sicknesse , and death . and so fortitude too , ( that is ) that same faculty of resisting stoutly in present dangers , ( and which are more hardly declined then overcome ) because it is a means tending to the preservation of him that resists . xxxiii . but those which we call the lawes of nature ( since they are nothing else but certain conclusions understood by reason , of things to be done , and omitted ; but a law to speak properly and accurately , is the speech of him who by right commands somewhat to others to be done , or omitted ) are not ( in propriety of speech ) lawes , as they proceed from nature ; yet as they are delivered by god in holy scriptures , ( as we shall see in the chapter following ) they are most properly called by the name of lawes : for the sacred scripture is the speech of god commanding over all things by greatest right . chap. iv. that the law of nature is a divine law. i. the same law which is naturall , and morall , is also wont to be called divine , nor undeservedly , as well because reason , which is the law of nature , is given by god to every man for the rule of his actions ; as because the precepts of living which are thence derived , are the same with those which have been delivered from the divine majesty , for the lawes of his heavenly kingdome , by our lord iesus christ , and his holy prophets and apostles . what therefore by reasoning we have understood above concerning the law of nature , we will endeavour to confirme the same in this chapter by holy writ . ii. but first we will shew those places in which it is declared , that the divine law is seated in right reason . psalm . , . the● mouth of the righteous will be exercised in wisdome , and his tongue will be talking of iudgement : the law of god is in his heart . jerem. . . i will put my law in their inward parts , and write it in their hearts . psal . . . the law of the lord is an undefiled law , converting the soule . ver . . the commandement of the lord is pure , and giveth light unto the eyes . deuteron . . . this commandement which i command thee this day , it is not hidden from thee , neither is it far of , &c. vers . . but the word is very nigh unto thee , in thy mouth , and in thine heart ; that thou maist doe it . psal . . . give me understanding , and i shall keep thy law . vers . . thy word is a lamp unto my feet , and a light unto my paths . proverbs . . the knowledge of the holy is understanding . john . . christ the law-giver himselfe is called the word . vers . . the same christ is called the true light that lighteth every man that cometh in the world . all which are descriptions of right reason , whose dictates , we have shewed before , are the lawes of nature . iii. but that which wee set downe for the fundamentall law of nature , namely , that peace was to be sought for , is also the summe of the divine law , will be manifest by these places . rom. . . righteousnesse , ( which is the summe of the law ) is called the way of peace . psal . . . righteousnesse and peace have kissed each other . matth. . . blessed are the peace-makers , for they shall be called the children of god. and after saint paul in his . chapter to the hebrewes , and the last verse had called christ ( the legislator of that law we treat of ) an high-priest for ever after the order of melehizedeck ; he addes in the following chapter , the first verse , this melchizedeck was king of salem , priest of the most high god , &c. vers . . first being by interpretation king of righteousnesse , and after that also king of salem , which is , king of peace . whence it is cleare , that christ the king in his kingdome placeth righteousnesse and peace together . psal . . . eschue evill and doe good , seek peace and ensue it . isaiah . , . unto us a child is born , unto us a sonne is given , and the government shall be upon bis shoulder , and his name shall be called wonderfull , counsellour , the mighty god , the everlasting father , the prince of peace . isaiah . . how beautifull upon the mountaines are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings , that publisheth peace , that bringeth good tidings of good , that publisheth salvation , that saith unto sion , thy god reigneth ? luke . . in the nativity of christ , the voice of them that praised god saying , glory be to god on high , and in earth peace , good will towards men . and isaiah . . the gospell is called the chastisement of our peace . isay . . righteousnesse is called the way of peace . the way of peace they know not , and there is no judgement in their goings . micah . , . speaking of the m●ssias , he saith thus , hee shall stand and food in the strength of the lord , in the majesty of the name of the lord his god , and they shall abide , for now shall he be great unto the end of the earth ; and this man shall be your peace , &c. prov. . . my sonne forget not my law , but let thine heart keep my commandements , for length of dayes , and long life , and peace , shall they adde to thee , iv. what appertains to the first law of abolishing the community of all things , or concerning the introduction of meum & tuum , we perceive in the first place how great an adversary this same community is to peace , by ●hose words of abraham to lot , gen. . . let there be no strife i pray thee , between thee and me , and between thy heard-men , and my heard-men , for we be bretbren . is not the whole land before thee ? separate thy selfe i pray thee from me . and all those places of scripture by which we are forbidden to trespasse upon our neighbours , as , thou shalt not kill , thou shalt not commit adultery , thou shalt not steal , &c. doe confirm the law of distinction between mine , and thinc ; for they suppose the right of all men to all things to be taken away . v. the same precepts establish the second law of nature of keeping trust : for what doth , thou shalt not invade anothers right , import , but this ? thou shalt not take possession of that , which by thy contract ceaseth to be thine ; but expressely set down , psal . . vers . . to him that asked , lord who shall dwell in thy taberna●l● ? it is answered , vers . . he that sweareth unto his neighbour , and disappointeth him not ; and prov. . . my sonne if thou be surety for thy friend , if thou have stricken thy hand with a stranger , thou art snared with the words of thy mouth . vi. the third law concerning gratitude is proved by these places , de●t . . . thou shalt not muzzle the oxe when he treadeth out the corn ; which saint paul . cor. . . interprets to be spoken of men , not oxen onely . prov. . . who so rewardeth evill for good , evill shall not depart from his house . and deut. . , . when thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it , then proclaim peace unto it . and it shall be if it make thee answer of peace , and open unto thee , then it shall be that all the people that is so●nd therein , shall be tributaries unto thee , and they shall serve thee . proverbs . . devise not evill against thy neighbour , seeing he dwelleth securely by thee . vii . to the fourth law of accommodating our selves , these precepts are conformable , exod. . , . if thou meet thine enemies oxe , or his ass● going astray , thou shalt surely bring it back to him again ; if thou see the asse of him that hateth thee lying under his burden , and wouldest forbear to help him , thou shalt surely help with him , vers . . also , thou shalt not oppresse a stranger . prov. . . strive not with a man without a cause , if he have done thee no harme . prov. . . a wrathfull man stirreth up strife , bus he that is slow to anger , appeaseth strif● . . . there is a friend that sticketh closer then a brother . the same is confirmed , luke . by the parable of the s●maritan , who had compassion on the jew that was wounded by theeves , and by christs precept , matth. . . but i say unto you , that ye resist not evill , but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek , turn to him the other also , &c. viii . among infinite other places which prove the fifth law , these are some . matth. . . if you forgive men their trespasses , your heavenly father will also forgive you● but if you forgive not men their trespasses , neither will your father forgive your trespasses . math. . . lord how oft shall my brother sinne against me , and i forgive him ? till seven times ? jesus saith unto him , i say not till seven times , but till seventy times seven times : that is , toties quoties . ix . for the confirmation of the sixth law , all those pla●es are pertinent which command us to shew mercy ; such as mat. , . blessed are the mercifull , for they shall obtain mercy . levit. . . thou shalt not avenge , nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people . but there are , who not onely think this law is not proved by scripture , but plainly disproved from hence , that there is an eternall punishment reserved for the wicked after death , where there is no place either for amendment , or example . some resolve this objection by answering , that god , whom no law restrains , refers all to his glory , but that man must not doe so ; as if god sought his glory , ( that is to say ) pleased himselfe in the death of a sinner . it is more rightly answered , that the institution of eternall punishment was before sin , and had regard to this onely , that men might dread to commit sinne for the time to come . x. the words of christ prove this seventh , matth. . . but i say unto you , that whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause , shall be in danger of the judgement , and whosoever shall say unto his brother racha , shalt be in danger of the counsell , bi●… whosoever shall say , thou foole , shall be in danger of hell fire . prov. . . hee that uttereth a slander is a foole . prov. . . hee that despiseth his neighbour , finneth . . . grievous words stir up anger . prov. . . cast out the scorner , and contention shall goe out , and reproach shall cease . xi . the eighth law of acknowledging equality of nature , that is , of humility , is established by these places . mat. . . blessed are the poor in spirit , for theirs is the kingdom of heaven . prov. . , . these six things doth the lord hate , yea seven are an abomination unto him : a proud look , &c. prov. . . every one that is proud is an abomination unto the lord , though hand joyne in hand , he shall not be unpunished . . . when pride cometh , then cometh shame , but with the lowly , is wisdome . thus isay . . ( where the comming of the messias is shewed forth , for preparation towards his kingdome ) the voyce of him that cryed in the wildernesse , was this : prepare ye the way of the lord , make strait in the de●art a high way for our god. every valley shall be exalted , and every mountain , and hill , shall be made low ; which doubtlesse is spoken to men , and not to mountains . xii . but that same equity which we prov'd in the ninth place to be a law of nature , which commands every man to allow the same rights to others they would be allow'd themselves , and which containes in it all the other lawes besides , is the same which moses sets down , levit. . . thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self ; and our saviour calls it the summe of the morall law , mat. . . master , which is the great commandement in the law ? jesus said unto him , thou shalt love the lord thy god with all thine heart , and with all thy soul , and with all thy mind ; this is the first and great commandement , and the second is like unto it , thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self . on these two commandements hang all the law and the prophets . but to love our neighbor as our selves , is nothing else , but to grant him all we desire to have granted to our selves . xiii . by the tenth law respect of persons is forbid ; as also by these places following , mat. . . that ye may be children of your father which is in heaven ; for he maketh the sun to rise on the evill , and on the good , &c. collos . . . there is neither greek , nor jew , circumcision , nor uncircumcision , barbarian , or scythian , bond , or free , but christ is all , & in all . acts . . of a truth , i perceive , that god is no respecter of persons . chron. . . there is no iniquity with the lord our god , nor respect of persons , nor taking of gifts ecclus . . . the lord is judge , and with him is no respect of persons . rom. . . for there is no respect of persons with god. xiv . the eleventh law , which commands those things to be held in common which cannot be divided , i know not whether there be any expresse place in scripture for it , or not ; but the practise appears every where in the common use of wels , wayes , rivers , sacred things , &c. for else men could not live . xv. we said in the twelf●h place , that it was a law of nature , that where things could neither be divided , nor possess'd in cōmon , they should be dispos'd by lot , which is confirm'd as by the example of moses , who by gods command , numb . . . divided the severall parts of the land of promise unto the tribes by lot : so acts . . by the example of the apostles , who receiv'd matthias , before justus , into their number , by casting lots , and saying , thou lord , who knowest the hearts of all men , shew whether of these two thou hast chosen , &c. prov. . . the lot is cast into the lappe , but the whole disposing thereof is of the lord. and which is the thirteenth law the succession was due unto esau , as being the first-born of isaac , if himself had not sold it , ( gen. . . ) or that the father had not otherwise appointed . xvi . saint paul writing to the corinthians , epist . . chap. . reprehends the corinthians of that city for going to law one with another before infidell judges who were their enemies , calling it a fault , that they would not rather take wrong , and suffer themselves to be defrauded ; for that is against that law , whereby we are commanded to be helpful to each other . but if it happen the controversie be concerning things necessary , what is to be done ? therefore the apostle , ver. . speaks thus , i speak to your shame . is it so that there is not one wise man among you , no , not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren ? he therefore , by those words confirmes that law of nature which we call'd the fifteenth , to wit , where controversies cannot be avoided , there by the consent of parties to appoint some arbiter , and him some third man ; so as ( which is the law ) neither of the parties may be judge in his own cause . xvii . but that the judge , or arbiter , must receive no reward for his sentence , ( which is the . law ) appears , exod. . . thou shalt take no gift ; for the gift blindeth the wise , and pervert●th the words of the righteous . ecclus. . . presents and gifts blind the eyes of the wise . whence it followes ; that he must not be more oblig'd to one part then the other , which is the . law , and is also confirm'd , deut. . . ye shall not respect persons in judgment , ye shall hear the small as well as the great ; and in all those places which are brought against respect of persons . xviii . that in the judgement of fact , witnesses must be had , ( which is the . law ) the scripture not only confirmes , but requires more then one , deut. . . at the mouth of two witnesses , or three witnesses , shall he that is worthy of death be put to death . the same is repeated , deut. . . xix . drunkennesse , which we have therefore in the last place numbred among the breaches of the naturall law , because it hinders the use of right reason , is also forbid in sacred scripture for the same reason . prov. . . wine is a mocker , strong drink is raging , whosoever is deceived thereby is not wise . and chap. . , . it is not for kings to drink wine , lest they drink , and forget the law , and pervert the judgement of any of the afflicted : but that we might know that the malice of this vice consisted not formally in the quantity of the drink , but in that it destroyes judgement and reason , it followes in the next verse , give strong drink to him that is ready to perish , and wine to those that be heavy of heart . let him drink , and forget his poverty , and remember his misery no more . christ useth the same reason in prohibiting drunkenesse , luk. . . take heed to your selves , lest at any time your hearts be overcharg'd with s●rsetting and drunkennesse . xx. that we said in the foregoing chapter , the law of nature is eternall , is also prov'd out of the fifth of s. matth. . verily i say unto you , till heaven and earth passe , one jot , or one tittle , shall in no wise passe frō the law , and psal . . v. . every one of thy rightcous judgements endureth for ever . xxi . we also said , that the lawes of nature had regard chiefly unto conscience ; that is , that he is just , who by all possible endeavour strives to fulfill them . and although a man should order all his actions ( so much as belongs to externall obedience ) just as the law commands , but not for the lawes ●ake , but by reason of some punishment annext unto it , or out of vain glory , yet he is unjust . both these are proved by the holy scriptures . the first , esay . . let the wicked forsake his way , and unrighteous man his thoughts , and let him return unto the lod , and he wil have mercy upon him , and to our god , for he will abundantly pardon . ezek. . . cast away from you all your transgressions where by you have transgressed , & make you a new heart , and a new spirit ; for why will you die o house of israel ? by which , and the like places , we may sufficiently understand that god will not punish their deeds whose heart is right . the second out of the . of isay . the lord said , forasmuch as this people draw near me with their mouth , and with their lips doe honour me , but have removed their heart far from me , therefore i will proceed , &c. mat. . . except your righteousnesse shall exceed the righteousnesse of the scribes and pharisees ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven ; and in the following verses our saviour explains to them how that the commands of god are broken , not by deeds only , but also by the will ; for the scribes and pharises did in outward act observe the law most exactly , but for glories sake onely ; else they would as readily have broken it . there are innumerable places of scripture in which is most manifestly declar'd that god accepts the will for the deed , and that as well in good , as in evill actions . xxii . that the law of nature is easily kept , christ himself declares in the . chapter of saint matthew , , . come unto me , &c. take my yoke upon you , and learn of me , &c. for my yoke is easie , and my burthen light . xxiii . lastly , the rule by which i said any man might know whether what he was doing , were contrary to the law , or not , to wit , what thou wouldst not be done to , doe not that to another , is almost in the self same words delivered by our saviour , mat. . . therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you , do you even so to them . xxiv . as the law of nature is all of it divine , so the law of christ by conversion , ( which is wholly explain'd in the , , and . chapter of s. matthewes gospell ) is all of it also ( except that one commandement of not marrying her who is put away for adultery , which christ brought for explication of the divine positive law , against the jewes , who did not rightly interpret the mosaicall law ) the doctrine of nature : i say the whole law of christ is explain'd in the fore-named chapters , not the whole doctrine of christ ; for faith is a part of christian doctrine , which is not commprehended under the title of a law ; for lawes are made , and given , in reference to such actions as follow our will , not in order to our opinions , and belief , which being out of our power , follow not the will. quisquamne regno gaudet ? o fallax bonum ! quantum malorum fronte quam blanda tegis ? necesse est ut multos timeat , quem multi timent . auro venexum bibitur : expertus loquor . dominion . chap. v. of the causes , and first begining of civill government . i. that the lawes of nature are not sufficient to preserve peace . ii. that the lawes of nature , in the state of nature ; are silent . iii. that the security of living according to the lawes of nature consists in the concord of many persons . iv. that the concord of many persons is not constant enough for a lasting peace . v. the reason why the government of certain bruit creatures stands firm in concord onely , and why not of men . vi. that not onely consent , but union also , is required to establish the peace of men . vii . what union is . viii . in union the right of all men is conveighed to one . ix . what civill society is . x. what a civill person is . xi . what it is to have the supreme power , and what to be a subject . xii . two kindes of cities , naturall , and by institution . it is of it selfe manifest , that the actions of men proceed from the will , and the will from hope , and feare , insomuch as when they shall see a greater good , or lesse evill , likely to happen to them by the breach , then observation of the lawes , they 'l wittingly violate them . the hope therefore , which each man hath of his security , and self-preservation , consists in this , that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour , either openly , or by stratagem . whence we may understand , that the naturall lawes , though well understood , doe not instantly secure any man in their practise , and consequently , that as long as there is no caution had from the inva●ion of others , there remains to every man that same primitive right of selfe-defence , by such means as either he can or will make use of ( that is ) a right to all things , or the right of warre ; and it is sufficient for the fulfiling of the naturall law , that a man be prepared in mind to embrace peace when it may be had . ii. it is a fond saying , that all lawes are silent in the time of warre , and it is a true one , not onely if we speak of the civill , but also of the naturall lawes , provided they be referr'd not to the mind , but to the actions of men , by the third chapter , act. . and we mean such a war as is of all men against all men ; such as is the meer state of nature ; although in the warre of nation against nation a certain mean was wont to be observed . and therefore in old time there was a manner of living , and as it were a certain oeconomy , which they called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , living by rapine , which was neither against the law of nature , ( things then so standing ) nor voyd of glory to those who exercised it with valour , not with cruelty . their custome was , taking away the rest , to spare life , and abstain from oxen fit for plough , and every instrument serviceable to husbandry , which yet is not so to he taken , as if they were bound to doe thus by the law of nature , but that they had regard to their own glory herein , left by too much cruelty , they might be suspected guilty of feare . iii. since therefore the exercise of the naturall law is necessary for the preservation of peace , and that for the exercise of the naturall law security is no lesse necessary , it is worth the considering what that is which affords such a security : for this matter nothing else can be imagined , but that each man provide himselfe of such meet helps , as the inv●sion of one on the other may bee rendered so dangerous , as either of them may think it better to refrain , then to meddle . but first it is plain , that the consent of two or three cannot make good such a security ; because that the addition but of one , or some few on the other side , is sufficient to make the victory undoubtedly sure , and hartens the enemy to attacque us . it is therefore necessary , to the end the security sought for may be obtained , that the number of them who conspire in a mutuall assistance be so great , that the accession of some few to the enemies party may not prove to them a matter of moment sufficient to assure the victory . iv. farthermore , how great soever the number of them is who meet on selfe-defence , if yet they agree not among themselves of some excellent means whereby to compasse this , but every man after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours , nothing will be done ; because that divided in their opinions they will be an hinderance to each other , or if they agree well enough to ●ome one action through hope of victory , spoyle , or revenge , yet afterward through diversity of wits , and counsels , or emulation , and envy , with which men naturally contend , they will be so torne and rent , as they will neither give mutuall help , nor desire peace , except they be constrained to it by some common feare . whence it followes , that the consent of many , ( which consists in this onely , as we have already defined in the foregoing section , that they direct all their actions to the same end , and the common good ) that is to say , that the society proceeding from mutuall help onely , yeelds not that security which they seek for , who meet , and agree in the exercise of the above-named lawes of nature ; but that somewhat else must be done , that those who have once consented for the common good , to peace and mutuall help , may by fear be restrained , le●t afterward they again dissent , when their private interest shall appear discrepant from the common good . v. aristole reckons among those animals which he calls politique , not man only , but divers others ; as the ant , the bee , &c. which though they be destitute of reason , by which they may contract , and submit to government , notwithstanding by consenting , ( that is to say ) ensuing , or eschewing the same things , they so direct their actions to a common end , that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any seditions . yet is not their gathering together a civill government , and therefore those animals not to be termed politicall , because their government is onely a consent , or many wills concurring in one object ; not ( as is necessary in civill government ) one will. it is very true that in those creatures , living only by sense and appetite , their consent of minds is so durable , as there is no need of any thing more to secure it , and ( by consequence ) to preserve peace among them , then barely their naturall ●nclination . but among men the case is otherwise . for first among them there is a contestation of honour and preferment ; among beasts there is none : whence hatred and envy , out of which arise sedition and warre , is among men , among beasts no such matter . next , the naturall appetite of bees , and the like creatures , is conformable , and they desire the common good which among them differs not from their private ; but man scarce esteems any thing good which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment , more then that which others doe possesse . thirdly , those creatures which are voyd of reason , see no defect , or think they see none , in the administtation of their common-weales ; but in a multitude of men there are many who supposing themselves wiser then others , endeavour to innovate , and divers innovators innovate divers wayes , which is a meer distraction , and civill warre . fourthly , these brute creatures , howsoever they may have the use of their voyce to signify their affections to each other , yet want they that same art of words which is necessarily required to those motions in the mind , whereby good is represented to it as being better , and evill as worse then in truth it is : but the tongue of man is a trumpet of warre , and sedition ; and it is reported of pericles , that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thundered , and lightened , and confounded whole greece it selfe . fiftly , they cannot distinguish between injury and harme ; thence it happens that as long as it is well with them , they blame not their fellowes : but those men are of most trouble to the republique , who have most leasure to be idle ; for they use not to contend for publique placcs before they have gotten the victory over hunger , and cold . last of all , the consent of those brutall creatures is naturall , that of men by compact onely , ( that is to say ) artificiall ; it is therefore no matter of wonder if somewhat more be needfull for men to the end they may live in peace . wherefore consent , or contracted society , without some common power whereby particular men may be ruled through feare of punishment , doth not suffice to make up that security which is requisite to the exercise of naturall justice . vi. since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace , and to make a lasting defence , it is requisite that in those necessary matters which concern peace and selfe-defence , there be but one will of all men . but this cannot be done , unlesse every man will so subject his will to some other one , to wit , either man or counsell , that whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the common peace , it be received for the wills of all men in generall , and of every one in particular . now the gathering together of many men who deliberate of what is to be done , or not to be done , for the common good of all men , is that which i call a counsell . vii . this submission of the wils of all those men to the will of one man , o● one counsell , is then made , when each one of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest , not to resist the will of that one man , or counsell , to which he hath submitted himselfe ; that is , that he refuse him not the use of his wealth , and strength , against any o●hers whatsoever ( for he is supposed still to retain a right of defending himselfe against violence ) and this is called union . but we understand that to be the will of the counsell , which is the will of the major part of those men of whom the counsell consists . viii . but though the will it self be not voluntary , but only the beginning of voluntary actions ( for we will not to will , but to act ) and therefore falls least of all under deliberation , and compact ; yet he who submits his will to the will of an other , conveighs to that other the right of his strength , and faculties ; insomuch as when the rest have done the same , he to whom they have submitted hath so much power , as by the terrour of it hee can conforme the wills of particular men unto unity , and concord . ix . now union thus made is called a city , or civill society , and also a civill person ; for when there is one will of all men , it is to be esteemed for one person , and by the word ( one ) it is to be knowne , and distinguished from all particular men , as having its own rights and properties : insomuch as neither any one citizen , nor all of them together ( if we except him whose will stands for the will of all ) is to be accounted the city . a city therefore ( that we may define it ) is one person , whose will , by the compact of many men , is to be received for the will of them all ; so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular person , to the maintenance of peace , and for common defence . x. but although every city be a civill person , yet every civill person is not a city ; for it may happen that many citizens , by the permission of the city , may joyne together in one person , for the doing of certain things . these now will be civill persons , as the companies of merchants , and many other convents ; but cities they are not , because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the company simply , and in all things , but in certain things onely determined by the city ; and on such terme● as it is lawfull for any one of them to contend in judgement against the body it selfe of the sodality , which is by no means allowable to a citizen against the city : such like societies therefore are civill persons subordinate to the city . xi . in every city , that man , or counsell , to whose will each particular man hath subjected his will ( so as hath been declared ) is said to have the supreme power , or chiefe command , or dominion ; which power , and right of commanding , consists in this , that each citizen hath conveighed all his strength and power to that man , o● counsell ; which to have done ( because no man can transferre his power in a naturall manner ) is nothing else then to have parted with his right of resisting . each citizen , as also every subordinate civill person , is called the subject of him who hath the chiefe command . xii . by what hath been sayed , it is sufficiently shewed , in what manner , and by what degrees many naturall persons , through desire of preserving themselves , and by mumutuall feare , have growne together into a civill person , whom we have called a city ; but they who submit themselves ▪ to another for feare , either submit to him whom they feare , or some other whom they confide in for protection ; they act according to the first manner who are vanquished in warre , that they may not be slain ; they according to the second , who are not yet overcome , that they may not be overcome . the first manner receives its ▪ beginning from naturall power , and may be called the naturall beginning of a city ; the latter from the counsell , and constitution of those who meet together , which is a beginning by institution . hence it is , that there are two ▪ kinds of cities , the one naturall , such as is the paternall , and despoticall ; the other institutive , which may be also called politicall . in the first ▪ the lord acquires to himselfe such citizens as he will , in the other the citizens by their own wills appoint a lord over themselves , whether he be one man , or one company of men endued with the command in chiefe . but we will speak in the first place of a city politicall or by institution , and next of a city naturall . chap. vi. of the right of him , whether counsell , or one man onely , who hath the supreme power in the city . i. there can no● right be attributed to a multitude out of civill society , nor any action to which they have not under seale consented . ii. the right of the greater number consenting , is the beginning of a city . iii. that every man retains a right to protect himselfe according to his own free will , so long as there is no sufficient regard had to his security . iv. that a coercive power is necessary to secure us . v. what the sword of justice is . vi. that the sword of justice belongs , to him who hath the chiefe command . vii . that the sword of war belongs to him also . viii . all judicature belongs to him too . ix . the legislative power is his onely . x. the naming of magistrates and other officers of the city belongs to him . xi . also the examination of all doctrines . xii . whatsoever he doth is unpunishable . xiii . that the command his citizens have granted is absolute , and what proportion of obedience is due to him . xiv . the lawes of the city bind him not . xv. that no man can challenge a propriety to any thing against his will. xvi . by , the lawes of the city onely we come to know what theft , murder , adultery , and injury is . xvii . the opinion of those who would constitute a city , where there is no body should have an absolute power . xviii . the marks of supreme authority . xix . if a city be compar'd with a man , he that hath the supreme power is in order to the city , as the humane soul is in relation to the man. xx. that the supreme command cannot by right be dissolv'd through their consents by whose compacts it was first constituted . i. vve must consider first of all what a ( * ) multitude of men ( gathering themselves of their owne free wills into society ) is , namely , that it is not any one body , but many men , whereof each one hath his owne will , and his peculiar judgment concerning all things that may be propos'd . and though by particular contracts each single man may have his own right , and propriety , so as one may say this is mine , the other , that is his ; yet will there not be any thing of which the whole multitude , as a person distinct from a single man , can rightly say , this is mine , more then anothers . neither must we ascribe any action to the multitude , as it 's one , but ( if all , or more of them doe agree ) it will not be an action , but as many actions , as men. for although in some great sedition , it 's commonly said , that the people of that city have taken up . armes ; yet is it true of those onely who are in armes , or who consent to them . for the city , which is one person , cannot take up armes against it selfe . whatsoever therefore is done by the multitude , must be understood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up ; and that he , who being in the multitude , and yet consented not , nor gave any helps to the things that were done by it , must be judg'd to have done nothing . besides , in a multitude not yet reduc'd into one person , in that manner as hath been said , there remaines that same ●…te of nature in which all things belong to all men , and there is no place for meum & tuum , which is call'd dominion , and propriety , by reason that that security is not yet extant which we have declar'd above to be necessarily requisite for the practise of the naturall laws . multitude , &c. ] the doctrine of the power of a city over it's citizens , almost wholly depends on the understanding of the difference which is between a multitude of men ruling , and a multitude ruled : for such is the nature of a city , that a multitude , or company of citizens , not onely may have command , but may also be subject to command , but in diverse senses ; which difference i did beleeve was clearly enough explained in this first article ; but by the objections of many against those things which follow , i discern otherwise ; wherefore it seemed good to me , to the end i might make a fuller explication , to adde these few things . by multitude , because it is a collective word , we understand more then one , so as a multitude of me● is the same with many me● ; the same word , because it is of the singular number , signifies one thing , namely , one multitude ; but in neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will given to it by nature , but to either a severall ; and therefore neither is any one action whatsoever to be attributed to it : wherefore a multitude cannot promis● , contract , acquire right , conveigh right , act , have , possesse , and the like , unlesse it be every one apart , and man by man ; so as there must be as many promises , compacts , rights , and actio●s , as men. wherefore a multitude is no naturall person ; but if the same multitude doe contract one with another , that the will of one man , or the agreeing wills of the major part of them , shall be received for the will of all , then it becomes one person ; for it is endu'd with a will , an● therefore can doe voluntary actions , such as ar● commanding , making lawes , acquiring and transferring of right , and so ●orth ; and it is oftner call'd the people , then the multitude . we must therefore distinguish thus . when we say the people , or multitude , wills , commands , or doth any thing , it is understood that the city which commands , wills and acts by the will of one , or the concurring wills of more , which cannot be done , but in an assembly ▪ but as oft as any thing is said to be done by a multitude of men , whether great , or small , without the will of that man , or assembly of men , that 's understood to be done by a subjected people , that is , by many single citizens together , and not proceeding from one will , but from diverse wills of diverse men , who are citizens , and subjects , but not a city . ii. next , we must consider that every one of the multitude ( by whose meanes there may be a beginning to make up the city ) must agree with the rest , that in those matters which shall be propounded by any one in the assembly , that be received for the will of all which the major part shall approve of ; for otherwise there will be no will at all of a multitude of men , whose wills and votes differ so variously . now if any one will not consent , the rest notwithstanding shall among themselves constitute the city without him : whence it will come to passe , that the city retaines its primitive right against the dissentour , that is , the right of war , as against an enemy . iii. but because we said in the foregoing chapter , the sixth article , that there was requir'd to the security of men , not onely their consent , but also the subjection of their wills in such things as were necessary to peace and defence ; and that in that union , and subjection , the nature of a city consisted ; we must discerne now in this place , out of those things which may be propounded , discuss'd and stated in an assembly of men , ( all whose wills are contain'd in the will of the major part ) what things are necessary to peace , and common defence : but first of all , it is necessary to peace , that a man be so farre forth protected against the violence of others , that he may live securely , that is , that he may have no just cause to fear others , so long as he doth them no injury . indeed , to make men altogether safe from mutuall harmes , so as they cannot be hurt , or injuriously kill'd , is impossible , and therefore comes not within deliberation , but care may be had there be no just cause of fear ; for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others , which if it be not had , no man is suppos'd to have submitted himselfe to ought , or to have quitted his right to all things , before that there was a care had of his security . iv. it is not enough to obtain this security , that every one of those who are now growing up into a city , do● covenant with the rest , either by words , or writing , not to steal , not to kill , and to observe the like lawes ; for the pravity of humane disposition is manifest to all , and by experience too well known how little ( removing the punishment ) men are kept to their duties , through conscience of their promises . we must therefore provide for our security , not by compacts , but by punishments ; and there is then sufficient provision made , when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury , as apparently it prove a greater evill to have done it , then not to have done it : for all men , by a necessity of nature , chuse that which to them appears to be the lesse evill . v. now the right of punishing is then understood to be given to any one , when every man contracts not to assist him who is to be punished . but i will call this right , the sword of justice . but these kind of contracts men observe well enough , for the most part , till either themselves , or their n●ar friends are to suffer . vi. because therefore for the security of particular men , and , by consequence for the common peace , it is necessary that the right of using the sword for punishment , be transferred to some man or counsell , that man or counsell is necessarily understod by right to have the supreme power in the city . for he that by right punisheth at his own discretion , by right compells all men to all things which he himselfe wills ; then which a greater command cannot be imagined . vii . but in vain doe they worship peace at home , who cannot defend themselves against forrainers ; neither is it possible for them to protect themselves against forrainers , whose forces are not united ; and therefore it is necessary for the preservation of particulars , that there be some one counsell , or one man , who hath the right to arm , to gather together , to unite so many citizens in all dangers , and on all occasions , as shall be needfull for common defence against the certain number , and strength of the enemy ; and again , ( as often as he shall finde it expedient ) to make peace with them . we must understand therefore , that particular citizens have conveighed their whole right of warre , and peace , unto some one man or counsell ; and that this right ( which we may call ●he sword of warre ) belongs to the same man , or counsell , to whom the sword of justice belongs ; for no man can by right compell citizens to take up armes , and be at the expences of warre , but he who by right can punish him who doth not obey . both swords therefore , as well this of war , as that of justice , even by the constitution it selfe of a city , and essentially , doe belong to the chiefe command . viii . but because the right of the sword is nothing else but to have power by right to use the sword at his own will , it followes , that the judgement of its right use pertaines to the same party : for if the power of judging were in one , and the power of executing in another , nothing would be done . for in vain would he give judgement , who could not execute his commands , or if he executed them by the power of another , he himselfe is not said to have the power of the sword , but that other , to whom he is onely an officer . all judgement therefore in a city belongs to him who hath the swords , ( i. e. ) to him , who hath the supreme authority . ix . furthermore , since it no lesse , nay it much more conduceth to peace to prevent brawles from arising , then to appease them being risen ; and that all controversies are bred from hence , that the opinions of men differ concerning meum & tuum , just and unjust , profitable and unprofitable , good and evill , honest and dishonest , and the like , which every man esteems according to his own judgement ; it belongs to the same chiefe power to make some common rules for all men , and to declare them publiquely , by which every man may know what may be called his , what anothers , what just , what unjust , what honest , what dishonest , what good , what evill , that is summarily , what is to be done , what to be avoyded in our common course of life . but those rules and measures are usually called the civill lawes , or the lawes of the city , as being the commands of him who hath the supreme power in the city . and the civill lawes ( that we may define them ) are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chiefe authority in the city , for direction of the future actions of his citizens . x. furthermore , since the affaires of the city , both those of warre , and peace , cannot possibly be all administred by one man , or one counsell , without officers and subordinate magistrates , and that it appertains to peace , and common defence , that they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies , to search into neighbouring counsels , prudently to wage war , and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the city , should also rightly exercise their offices ; it is consonant to reason , that they depend on , and be chosen by him who hath the chiefe command both in war , and in peace . xi . it is also manifest , that all voluntary actions have their beginning from , and necessarily depend on the will , and that the will of doing , or omitting ought , depends on the opinion of the good and evill of the reward , or punishment , which a man conceives he shall receive by the act , or omission ; so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opinions of each ; wherefore by evident and necessary inference , we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of peace , that no opinions or doctrines be delivered to citizens , by which they may imagine , that either by right they may not obey the lawes of the city , that is , the commands of that man , or counsell , to whom the supreme power is committed , or that it is lawfull for to resist him , or that a lesse punishment remaines for him that denies , then him that yeelds obedience . for if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of naturall death , another forbids it under pain of eternall death , and both by their own right , it will follow that the citizens , although innocent , are not onely by right punishable , but that the city it selfe is altogether disolved ; for no man can serve two masters : nor is he lesse , but rather more , a master , whom we believe we are to obey for feare of damnation , then he whom we obey for feare of temporall death . it followes therefore , that this one , whether man , or court , to whom the city hath committed the supreme power , have also this right , that he both ( * ) judge what opinions and doctrines are enemies unto peace , and also that he forbid them to be taught . judge what opinions , &c. ] there is scarce any principle , neither in the worship of god , nor humane sciences , from whence there may not spring dissentions , discords , reproaches , and by degrees war it selfe ; neither d●th this happen by reason of the falshood of the principle , but of the disposition of men , who seeming wise to themselves , will needs appear such to all others ▪ but though such dissentions cannot be hindered from arising , yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme power , that they prove no hinderance to the publique peace . of these kind of opinions therefore i have not spoken of in this place . there are certain doctrines wherewith subjects being tainted , they verily believe that obedience may be refused to the city , and that by right they may , nay ought , to oppose , and fight against chiefe princes , and dignities . such are those , which whether directly , and openly , or more obscurely , and by consequence require obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed . i deny not , but this reflects on that power which many living under other government , ascribe to the chiefe head of the church of rome , and also on that , which elsewhere out of that church , bishops require in theirs , to be given to them ; and last of all , on that liberty which the lower sort of citizens under pretence of religion doe challenge to themselves ; for what civill war was there ever in the christian world , which did not either grow from , or was nourisht by this root ? the judgement therefore of doctrines , whether they be repugnant to civill obedience or not , and if they be repugnant , the power of prohibiting them to be taught , i doe here attribute to the civill authority ; for since there is no man who grants not to the city the judgement of those things which belong to its peace , and defence , an● it is manifest , that the opinions which i have already recited do relate to its peace , it followes necessarily , that the examination of those opinions , whether they be such , or not , must be referred to the city , that is , to him who hath the supreme authority . xii . last of all , from this . consideration , that each citizen hath submitted his will to his who hath the supreme command in the city , so as he may not employ his strength against him ; it followes manifestly , that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands , must not be punisht ; for as he who hath not power enough , cannot punish him naturally ; so neither can he punish him by right , who by right hath not sufficient power . xiii . it is most manifest by what hath been said , that in every perfect city ( that is , where no citizen hath right to use his faculties , at his owne discretion , for the preservation of himselfe , or where the right of the private sword is excluded ) there is a supreme power in some one , greater then which cannot by right be conferr'd by men , or greater then which no mortall man can have over himself . but that power , greater then which cannot by men , be conveigh'd on a man , we call ( * ) absolute : for whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the city , that he can , unpunisht , d●e any thing , make lawes , judge controversies , set penalties , make use , at his own pleasure , of the strength , and wealth of men , and all this by right , truly he hath given him the greatest dominion that can be granted . this same may be confirm'd by experience in all the cities which are , or ever have beene ; for though it be sometimes in doubt , what man , or counsell , hath the chief command , yet ever there is such a command , and alwayes exercis'd , except in the time of sedition , and civill war , and then there are two chiefe commands made out of one : now those seditious persons who dispute against absolute authority , doe not so much care to destroy it , as to conveigh it on others ; for removing this power , they together take away civill society , and a confusion of all things returnes . there is so much obedience joyn'd to this absolute right of the chief ruler , as is necessarily requir'd for the government of the city , that is to say , so much as that right of his may not be granted in vaine . now this kind of obedience , although for some reasons it may sometimes , by right , be deny'd , yet because a greater cannot be perform'd , we will call it simple . but the obligation to performe this growes not immediately from that contract by which we have conveigh'd all our right on the city , but mediately from hence , that , without obedience , the cities right would be frustrate , and by consequence there would be no city constituted . for it is one thing if i say , i give you right to command what you will ; another , if i say , i will doe whatsoever you command ; and the command may be such , as i would rather die then doe it ; forasmuch therefore as no man can be bound to will being kill'd , much lesse is he tyed to that , which to him is worse then death : if therefore i be commanded to kill my self , i am not bound to doe it ; for though i deny to doe it , yet the right of dominion is not frustrated , since others may be found , who being commanded , will not refuse to doe it ; neither doe i refuse to doe that which i have contracted to doe . in like manner , if the chief ruler command any man to kill him , he is not tyed to doe it , because it cannot be conceiv'd that he made any such covenant ; nor if he command to execute a parent , whether he be innocent , or guilty , and condemned by the law , since there are others , who , being commanded , will doe that , and a son will rather die , then live infamous , and hated of all the world . there are many other cases , in which , since the commands are shamefull to be done by some , and not by others , obedience may , by right , be perform'd by these , and refus'd by those ; and this , without breach of that absolute right which was given to the chief ruler . for in no case is the right taken away from him , of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him . but they who thus kill men , although by right given them from him that hath it , yet if they use that right otherwise then right reason requires , they sin against the lawes of nature , ( that is ) against god. absolute ] a popular state openly challengeth absolute dominion , and the citizens oppose it not , for in the gathering together of many men , they acknowledge the face of a city ; and even the unskilfull understand , that matters there are rul'd by counsell . yet monarchy is no lesse a city , then democra●y , and absolute kings have their counsellours , from whom they will take advice , and suffer their power , in matters of greater consequence , to be guided , but not recall'd . but it appears not to most men how a city is contain'd in the person of a king ; and therefore they object against absolute command : first , that if any man had such a right , the condition of the citizens would be miserable : for thus they think , he will take all , spoil all , kill all ; and every man counts it his onely happinesse that he is not already spoil'd and kill'd . but why should he doe thus ? not because he can ; for unlesse he have a mind to it , he will not doe it . will he , to please one , or some few , spoil all the rest ? first , though by right , that is , without injury to them , he may doe it , yet can he not doe it justly , that is , without breach of the naturall lawes , and injury against god. and therefore there is some security for subjects in the oaths which princes take . next , if he could justly doe it , or that he made no account of his oath , yet appeares there no reason why he should desire it , since he findes no good in it . but it cannot be deny'd but a prince may sometimes have an inclination to doe wickedly ; but grant then that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute , but so much onely as suffic'd to defend thee from the injuries of others , which , if thou wilt be safe , is necessary for thee to give ; are not all the same things to be feared ? for he that hath strength enough to protect all , wants not sufficiency to oppresse all . here is no other difficulty then , but that humane affaires cannot be without some inconvenience . and this inconvenience it self is in the citizens , not in the government ; for if men could rule themselves , every man by his own command , that 's to say , could they live according to the lawes of nature , there would be no need at all of a city , nor of a common coercive power . secondly , they object , that there is no dominion in the christian world absolute ; which indeed is not true , for all monarchies , and all other states , are so ; for although they , who have the chief command , do● not all those things they would , and what they know profitable to the city , the reason of that is not the defect of right in them , but the consideration of their citizens , who busied about their private interest , and carelesse of what tends to the publique , cannot sometimes be drawn to performe their duties without the hazard of the city . wherefore princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their right , and prudently remit somewhat of the act , but nothing of their right . xiv . neither can any man give somewhat to himselfe ; for he is already suppos'd to have what he can give himself ; nor can he be oblig'd to himselfe , for the same party being both the obliged , and the obliger , and the obliger having power to release the obliged , it were meerly in vain for a man to be obliged to himselfe , because he can release himself at his own pleasure ; and he that can doe this , is already actually free . whence its plaine , that the city is not tyed to the civill lawes ; for the civill lawes are the lawes of the city , by which , if she were engag'd , she should be engag'd to her selfe . neither can the city be oblig'd to her citizen , because , if he will , he can free her from her obligation ; and he will , as oft as she wills , ( for the will of every citizen is in all things comprehended in the will of the city ) the city therefore is free when she pleaseth , that is , she is now actually free ; but the will of a councell , or one who hath the supreme authority given him , is the will of the city ; he therefore containes the wills of all particular citizens : therefore neither is he bound to the civill lawes ( for this is to be bound to himself ) nor to any of his citizens . xv. now because ( as hath been shewn above ) before the constitution of a city all things belong'd to all men , nor is there that thing which any man can so call his , as any other may not , by the same right , claime as his own , ( for where all things are common , there can be nothing proper to any man ) it followes , that ( * ) propriety receiv'd its beginning when cities receiv'd theirs , and that that onely is proper to each man which he can keep by the lawes , and the power of the whole city , ( that is ) of him on whom its chief command is conferr'd . whence we understand , that each particular citizen hath a propriety , to which none of his fellow-citizens hath right , because they are tyed to the same lawes ; but he hath no propriety in which the chief ruler ( whose cōmands are the lawes , whose wi●l contains the will of each man , and who , by every single person , is constituted the supreme judge ) hath not a right . but although there be many things which the city permits to its citizens , and therefore they may sometimes goe to law against their chief ; yet is not that action belonging to civill right , but to naturall equity ; neither is it concerning what ( * ) by right he may do● who hath the supreme power , but what he hath been willing should be done , and therefore he shall be judge himself , as though ( the equity of the cause being well understood ) he could not give wrong judgment . propriety receiv'd its beginning , &c. ] what 's objected by some , that the propriety of goods , even before the constitution of cities , was found in fathers of families , that objection is vaine , because i have already declar'd , that a family is a little city : for the sonnes of a family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their father , distinguisht indeed from the rest of the sons of the same family , but not from the propriety of the father himself ; but the fathers of diverse families , who are subject neither to any common father , nor lord , have a common right in all things . what by right he may doe , &c. ] as often as a citizen is granted to have an action of law against the supreme , i. e. against the city , the question is not in that action , whether the city may , by right , keep possession of the thing in controversie , but whether by the lawes formerly made she would keep it ; for the law is the declared will of the supreme : since then the city may raise money from the citizens under tow titles , either as tribute , or as debt , in the former case there is no action of law allowed ; for there can be no question whether the city have right to require tribute : in the latter it is allowed , because the city will take nothing from its citizens by fraud , or cunning , and yet if need require , all they have , openly ; and therefore he that condemnes this place , saying , that by this doctrine it is casie for princes to free themselves from their debts , he does it impertinently . xvi . theft , murther , adultery , and all injuries are forbid by the lawes of nature , but what is to be called theft , what murther , what adultery , what injury in a citizen , this is not to be determined by the naturall , but by the civill law : for not every taking away of the thing which another possesseth , but onely another mans goods is the●… but what is ours , and what anothers , is ▪ a question belonging to the civill law. in like manner , not every killing of a man is murther , but onely that which the civill law forbids ; neither is all encounter with women adultery , but onely that which the civill law prohibits . lastly , all breach of promise is an injury , where the promise it selfe is lawfull , but where there is no right to make any compact , there can be no conveighance of it , and therefore there can no injury follow , as hath been said in the second chapter , artic. . now what we may contract for , and what not , depends wholly upon the civill lawes . the city of laced●mon therefore rightly ordered that those young men who could so take away certain goods from others as not to be caught , should ●oe unpunisht ; for it was nothing else , but to make a law that what was so acquired should be their own , and not another . rightly also is that man every where s●ain , whom we kill in warre , or by the necessity of selfe-defence . so also that copulation which in one city is matrimony , in another will be judged adultery . also those contracts which make up marriage in one citizen , doe not so in another , although of the same city ; because that he who is forbidden by the city ( that is by that one man , or councell , whose the supreme power is ) to contract ought , hath no right to make any contract , and therefore having made any , it is not valid , and by consequence , no marriage . but his contract which received no prohibition , was therefore of force , and so was matrimony : neither addes it any force to any unlawfull contracts , that they were made by an oath , ( * ) or sacrament , for those adde nothing to the strenghning of the contract , as hath been said above chap. . artic. . what therefore theft , what murther , what adultery , and in generall what injury is , must be known by the civill lawes , that is , the commands of him who hath the supreme authority . that they were made by an oath or sacrament , &c. ] whether matrimony bee a sacrament ( in which sense that word is used by some divines ) or not , it is not my pu●…pose to dispute : onely i say , that the legitimate contract of a man and woman to live together , i. e. granted by the civill law , whether it be a sacrament , or not , is surely a legitimate marriage ; but that copulation which the city hath prohibited is no marriage , since it is of the essence of marriage to be a legitimate contract . there were legitimate marriages in many places , a● among the jewes , the grecians , the romans , which yet might be dissolved ; but with those who permit no such contracts , but by a law that they shall never be broke , wedlock cannot be dissolved , and the reason is , because the city hath commanded it to be indissoluble , not because matrimony is a sacrament . wherefore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be performed in the temple , to blesse , or ( if i may say so ) to consecrate the husband and wife , will pe●haps belong only to the office of clergy-men , all the rest , namely who , when , and by what contracts marriages may be made , pertains to the lawes of the city . xvii . this same supreme command , and absolute power , seems so harsh to the greatest part of men , as they hate the very naming of them ; which happens chiefly through want of knowledge , what humane nature , and the civill lawes are , and partly also through their default , who when they are invested with so great authority , abuse their power to their own lust . that they may therefore avoyd this kind of supreme authority , some of them will have a city well enough constituted , if they who shall be the citizens convening , doe agree concerning certaine articles propounded , and in that convent agitated and approved ; and doe command them to be observed , and punishments prescribed to be inflicted on them who shall break them : to which purpose , and also to the repelling of a forraign enemy , they appoint a certain and limited return , with this condition , that if that suffice not , they may call a new convention of estates . who sees not in a city thus constituted , that the assembly who prescribed those things had an absolute power ? if therefore the assembly continue , or from time to time have a certain day , and place of meeting , that power will be perpet●all . but if they wholly dissolve , either the city dissolves with them , and so all is returned to the state of war , or else there is some where a power left to punish those who shall transgresse the lawes , whosoever , or how many soever they be that have it , which cannot possibly be without an absolute power : for he that by right hath this might given , by punishments to restrain what citizens he pleaseth , hath such a power , as a greater cannot possibly be given by any citizens . xviii . it is therefore manifest , that in every city there is some one man , or councell , or court , who by right hath as great a power over each single citizen , as each man hath over himselfe considered out of that civill state , that is , supreme and absolute , to be limited onely by the strength and forces of the city it selfe , and by nothing else in the world : for if his power were limited , that limitation must necessarily proceed from some greater power ; for he that prescribes limits , must have a greater power then he who is confin'd by them ; now that confining power is either without limit , or is again restrained by some other greater then it selfe , and so we shall at length arrive to a power which hath no other limit , but that which is the terminus ultimus of the forces of all the citizens together . that same is called the supreme command , and if it bee committed to a councell , a supreme councell , but if to one man , the supreme lord of the city . now the notes of supreme command are these , to make and abrogate lawes , to determine war and peace , to know , and judge of all controversies , either by himselfe , or by judges appointed by him ; to elect all magistrates , ministers , and counsellors . lastly , if there be any man who by right can doe some one action which is not lawfull for any citizen or citizens to doe beside himselfe , that man hath obtained the supreme power : for those things which by right may not be done by any one or many citizens , the city it selfe can onely doe : he therefore that doth those things useth the cities right , which is the supreme power . xix . they who compare a city and its citizens , with a man and his members , almost all say , that he who hath the supreme power in the city , is in relation to the whole city , such as the head is to the whole man ; but it appeares by what hath been already said , that he who is endued with such a power , ( whether it be a man , or a court ) hath a relation to the city , not as that of the head , but of the soule to the body . for it is the soule by which a man hath a will , that is , can either will , or nill ; so by him who hath the supreme power , and no otherwise , the city hath a will , and can either will or nill . a court of counsellors is rather to be compared with the head , or one counsellor , whose only counsell ( if of any one alone ) the chief ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment : for the office of the head is to counsell , as the soules is to command . xx. for asmuch as the supreme command is constituted by vertue of the compacts which each single citizen , or subject , mutually makes with the other ; but all contracts , as they receive their force from the contractors , so by their consent they lose it again , and are broken ; perhaps some may inferre hence , that by the consent of all the subjects together , the supreme authority may be wholly taken away . which inference if it were true , i cannot discerne wha● danger would thence by right arise to the supreme commanders . for since it is supposed , that each one hath obliged himselfe to each other , if any one of them shall refuse , whatsoever the rest shall agree to doe , he is bound notwithstanding ; neither can any man without injury to me , doe that which by contract made with me , he hath obliged himselfe not to doe . but it is not to be imagined that ever it will happen , that all the subjects together , not so much as one excepted , will combine against the supreme power , wherefore there is no feare for rulers in chiefe , that by any right they can be despoyled of their authority . if notwithstanding it were granted , that their right depended onely on that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen , it might very easily happen , that they might be robbed of that dominion under pretence of right ; for subjects being called either by the command of the city , or seditiously flocking together , most men think that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the greater part ; which in truth is false ; for it is not from nature that the consent of the major part should be received for the consent of all , neither is it true in tumults , but it proceeds from civill institution , and is then onely true , when that man or court which hath the supreme power , assembling his subjects , by reason of the greatnesse of their number , allowes those that are elected a power of speaking for those who elected them , and will have the major part of voyces , in such matters as are by him propounded to be discust , to be as effectuall as the whole . but we cannot imagine that he who is chiefe , ever convened his subjects with intention that they should dispute his right , unlesse , weary of the burthen of his charge , he declared in plain termes , that he renounces and abandons his government . now because most men through ignorance esteem not the consent of the major part of citizens only , but even of a very few , provided they be of their opinion , for the consent of the whole city , it may very well seem to them , that the supreme authority may by right be abrogated , so it be done in some great assembly of citizens by the votes of the greater number ; but though a government be constituted by the contracts of particular men with particulars , yet its right depends not on that obligation onely , there is another tye also toward him who commands ; for each citizen compacting with his fellow , sayes thus , i conveigh my right on this party , upon condition that you passe yours to the same ; by which means ▪ that right which every man had before to use his faculties to his own advantage , is now wholly translated on some certain man , or councell , for the common benefit ; wherefore what by the mutuall contracts each one hath made with the other , what by the donation of right which every man is bound to ratifie to him that commands , the government is upheld by a double obligation from the citizens , first that which is due to their fellow citizens , next that which they owe to their prince . wherefore no subjects how many soever they be , ●an with any right despoyle him who bears the chiefe rule , of his authority , even without his own consent . chap. vii . of the three kindes of government , democraty , aristocraty , monarchie . i. that there are three kindes of government onely , democraty , ariristocraty , monarchie . ii. that oligarchy is not a diverse form of government distinct from aristocraty , nor anarchy any forme at all . iii. that a tyranny is not a diverse state from a legitimate monarchy . iv. that there cannot be a mixt state fashioned out of these severall species . v. that democraty , except there be certain times and places of meeting prefixt , is dissolv'd . vi. in a democraty the intervalls of the times of meeting must be short , or the administration of government during the intervall committed to some one . vii . in a democraty particulars contract with particulars to obey the people ; the people is oblig'd to no man. viii . by what acts aristocraty is constituted . ix . in an aristocraty the nobles make no compact , neither are they oblig'd to any citizen , or to the whole people . x. the nobles must necessarily have their set meetings . xi . by what acts monarchy is constituted . xii . monarchy is by compact oblig'd to none for the authority it hath receiv'd . xiii . monarchy is ever in the readiest capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to good government . xiv . what kind of sin that is , and what sort of men are guilty of it , when the city performes not its office towards the citizens , nor the citizens towards the city . xv. a monarch made without limitation of time hath power to elect his successor . xvi . of limited monarchs . xvii . a monarch retaining his right of government , cannot by any promise whatsoever be conceived to have parted with his right to the meanes necessary to the exercise of his authority . xviii . how a citizen is freed from subjection . i. vve have already spoken of a city by institution in its genus ; we will now say somewhat of its species . as for the difference of cities , it is taken from the difference of the persons , to whom the supreme power is committed ; this power is committed either to one man , or councell , or some one court consisting of many men . furthermore , a councell of many men , consists either of all the citizens , ( insomuch as every man of them hath a right to vote , and an interest in the ordering of the greatest affaires , if he will himselfe ) or of a part onely ; from whence there arise three sorts of government : the one , when the power is in a councell , where every citizen hath a right to vote , and it is call'd a democraty . the other , when it is in a councell , where not all , but some part onely have their suffrages , and we call it an aristocraty . the third is that , when the supreme authority rests onely in one , and it is stiled a monarchy . in the first , he that governes is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the people . in the second , the nobles . in the third , the monarch . ii. now , although ancient writers of politiques have introduc'd three other kindes of government opposite to these , to wit , anarchy or confusion to democraty , oligarchy , that is , the command of some few , to aristocracy , and tyranny to monarchy , yet are not these three distinct formes of government , but three diverse titles given by those who were either displeas'd with that present government , or those that bare rule . for men , by giving names , doe usually , not onely signifie the things themselves , but also their own affections , as love , hatred , anger , and the like , whence it happens that what one man calls a democraty , another calls an anarchy ; what one counts an aristocraty , another esteemes an oligarchie ; and whom one titles a king , another stiles him a tyrant ; so as we see these names betoken not a diverse kinde of government , but the diverse opinions of the subjects concerning him who hath the supreme power . for first , who sees not that anarchy is equally opposite to all the forenam'd formes ? for that word signifies that there is no government at all , that is , not any city . but how is it possible that no city should be the species of a city ? farthermore , what difference is there between an oligarchie , which signifies the command of a few , or grand●●s , or an aristocraty , which is that of the prime , or chief heads , more then that men differ so among themselves , that the same things seeme not good to all men ? whence it happens , that those persons , who by some are look'd on as the best , are dy others esteem'd to be the worst of all men . iii. but men , by reason of their passions , will very hardly be perswaded that a kingdome , and tyranny , are not diverse kindes of cities , who though they would rather have the city subject to one , then many , yet doe they not beleeve it to be well govern'd unlesse it accord with their judgements : but we must discover by reason , and not by passion , what the difference is between a king , and a tyrant : but first , they differ not in this , that a tyrant hath the greater power , for greater then the supreme cannot be granted ; nor in this , that one hath a limited power , the other not ; for he , whose authority is limited , is no king , but his subject that limits him . lastly , neither differ they in their manner of acquisition ; for if in a democraticall , or aristocraticall government some one citizen should , by force , possesse himself of the supreme power , if he gain the consent of all the citizens , he becomes a legitimate monarch ; if not , he is an enemy , not a tyrant . they differ therefore in the sole exercise of their command , insomuch as he is said to be a king , who governs wel , and he a●… tyrant that doth otherwise . the case therefore is brought to this passe , that a king legitimately constituted in his government , if he seeme to his subjects to rule well , and to their liking , they afford him the appellation of a king , if not , they count him a tyrant : wherefore we see a kingdome , and tyranny , are not diverse formes of government , but one and the self-same monarch hath the name of a king given him in point of honour , and reverence to him , and of a tyrant in way of contumely , and reproach . but what we frequently finde in bookes said against tyrants , took its originall from greek , and roman writers , whose government was partly democraticall , and partly aristocraticall , and therefore not tyrants onely , but even kings were odious to them . iv. there are , who indeed doe think it necessarily , that a suprem● command should be somewhere extant in a city ; but if it should be in any one , either man , or councell , it would follow ( they say ) that all the citizens must be slaves . avoiding this condition , they imagine that there may be a certaine form of government compounded of those three kinds we have spoken of , yet different from each particular , which they call a mixt monarchie , or mixt aristocraty , or mixt democraty , according as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent then the rest : for example , if the naming of magistrates , and the arbitration of war , and peace , should belong to the king , judicature to the lords , and contribution of monies to the people , and the power of making lawes too altogether , this kind of state would they call a mixt monarchie forsooth . but if it were possible that there could be such a state , it would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject ; for as long as they all agree , each single citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be ; but if they disagree , the state returns to a civill war , and the right of the private sword , which certainly is much worse then any subjection whatsoever : ( * ) but that there can be no such kind of government hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing chapter , artic : , , , , , , . but that there can be no such kinde of government ] most men grant , that a government ought not to be divided , but they would have it moderated , and bounded by some limits . truly it is very reasonable it should be so ; but if these men , when they speak of moderating , and limiting , do understand dividing it , they make a very fond distinction . truly , for my part , i wish that not onely kings , but all other persons endued with supreme authority would so temper themselves as to commit no wrong , and onely minding their charges contain themselves within the limits of the naturall , and divine lawes : but they who distinguish thus , they would have the chief power bounded , and restrain'd by others ; which , because it cannot be done , but that they who doe set the limits , must needs have some part of the power , whereby they may be enabled to doe it , the government is properly divided , not moderated . v. let us see a little now in the constituting of each form of government , what the constitutours doe . those who met together with intention to erect a city , were almost in the very act of meeting a democraty ; for in that they willingly met , they are suppos'd oblig'd to the observation of what shall be determin'd by the major part : which , while that convent lasts , or is adjourn'd to some certain dayes , and places , is a clear democraty ; for that convent , whose will is the will of all the citizens , hath the supreme authority ; and because in this convent every man is suppos'd to have a right to give his voice , it followes , that it is a democraty by the definition given in the first article of this chap. but if they depart , and break up the convent , and appoint no time , or place , where , and when they shall meet again , the publick weal returns to anarchy , and the same state it stood in before their meeting , that is , to the state of all men warring against all . the people therefore retains the supreme power no longer then there is a certain day and place publiquely appointed , and known , to which whosoever will , may resort . for except that be known and determined , they may either meet at divers times , and places , that is in factions , or not at all ; and then it is no longer 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the people , but a dissolute multitude , to whom we can neither attribute any action , or right : two things therefore frame a democratie , whereof one ( to wit the perpetuall prescription of convents ) makes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the people , the other ( which is a plurality of voyces ) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the power . vi. furthermore , it will not be sufficient for the people , so as to maintain its supremacy , to have some certain known times , and places of meeting , unlesse that either the intervals of the times be of lesse distance , then that any thing may in the mean time happen whereby ( by reason of the defect of power ) the city may be brought into some danger , or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be , during the intervall , granted to some one man , or councell . for unlesse this be done , there is not that wary care , and heed taken for the defence and peace of single men which ought to be , and therefore will not deserve the name of a city , because that in it for want of security , every mans right of defending himselfe at his own pleasure , returns to him again . vii . democraty is not framed by contract of particular persons with the people , but by mutuall compacts of single men each with other . but hence it appears in the first place , that the persons contracting , must be in being before the contract it selfe , but the people is not in being before the constitution of government , as not being any person , but a multitude of single persons ; wherefore there could then no contract passe between the people and the subject . now , if after that government is framed , the subject make any contract with the people , it is in vain , because the people contains within its will , the will of that subject to whom it is supposed to be obliged ; and therefore may at its own will and pleasure disengage it selfe , and by consequence is now actually free . but in the second place , that single persons doe contract each with other may be inferred from hence , that in vain sure would the city have been constituted , if the citizens had been engaged by no contracts to doe , or omit what the city should command to be done or omitted . because therefore such kind of compacts must be understood to passe as necessary to the making up of a city , but none can be made ( as is already shewed ) between the subject and the people , it followes , that they must be made between single citizens , namely that each man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part , on condition that the rest also doe the like , as if every one should say thus , i give up my right unto the people for your sake , on condition , that you also deliver up yours , for mine . viii . an aristocraty , or councell of nobles endued with supreme authoritie , receives its originall from a democraty , which gives up its right unto it , where we must understand that certain men distinguisht from others , either by eminence of title , blood , or some other character , are propounded to the people , and by plurality of voyces are elected , and being elected , the whole right of the people , or city , is conveigh●d on them , insomuch as whatsoever the people might doe before , the same by right may this court of elected nobles now doe ; which being done , it is clear that the people , considered as one person , ( its supreme authority being already transferred on these ) is no longer now in being . ix . as in democraty the people , so in an aristocraty the court of nobles is free from all manner of obligation ; for seeing subjects not contracting with the people , but by mutuall compacts among themselves , were tyed to all that the people did , hence also they were tyed to that act of the people in resigning up its right of government into the hands of nobles . neither could this court , although elected by the people , be by it obliged to any thing ; for being erected , the people is at once dissolved , as was declared above , and the authority it had as being a person utterly vanisheth . wherefore the obligation which was due to the person must also vanish , and perish together with it . x. aristocraty hath these considerations , together with democraty ; first , that without an appointment of some certain times , and places , at which the court of nobles may meet , it is no longer a court , or one person , but a dissolute multitude without any supreme power ; secondly , that the times of their assembling cannot be disjoyned by long intervalls , without prejudice to the supreme power , unlesse its administration be transferred to some one man : now the reasons why this happens , are the same which we set down in the fifth article . xi . as an aristocratie , so also a monarchy is derived from the power of the people , transferring its right , ( that is ) its authoritie on one man : here also we must understand , that some one man , either by name , or some other token , is propounded to be taken notice of above all the rest , and that by a plurality of voyces the whole right of the people is conveighed on him , insomuch as whatsoever the people could doe before he were elected , the same in every respect may he by right now doe , being elected ; which being done , the people is no longer one person , but a ●u●e multitude , as being only one before by vertue of the supreme command , whereof they now have made a conveyance from themselves on this one man. xii . and therefore neither doth the monarch oblige himselfe to any for the command he receives , for he receives it from the people ; but as hath been shewed above , the people , as soon as that act is done , ceaseth to be a person , but the person vanishing , all obligation to the person vanisheth . the subjects therefore are tyed to perform obedience to the monarch , by those compacts only by which they mutually obliged themselves to the observation of all that the people should command them , ( that is ) to obey that monarch , if he were made by the people . xiii . but a monarchy differs as well from an aristocraty , as a democratie , in this chiefly , that in those there must be certain set times and places for deliberation , and consultation of affaires , that is , for the actuall exercise of it in all times , and places ; for the people , or the nobles not being one naturall person must necessarily have their meetings . the monarch who is one by nature , is alwayes in a present capacity to execute his authority . xiv . b●cause we have declared above in the . . and . articles , that they who have gotten the supreme command are by no compacts obliged to any man , it necessarily followes , that they c●n doe no injury to the subjects ; for injury according to the definition made in the third article of the third chapter , is nothing else but a breach of contract : and therefore where no contracts have part , there can be no injury . yet the people , the nobles , and the monarch may diverse wayes transgresse against the other lawes of nature , as by cruelty , iniquity , con●umely , and other like vices , which come not under this strict , and exact notion of injury . but if the subject yeeld not obedience to the supreme , he will in propriety of speech be said to be injurious as well to his fellow subjects , because each man hath compacted with the other to obey , as to his chief ruler in resuming that right , which he hath given him , without his consent . and in a democraty , or aristocracy , if any thing be decreed against any law of nature , the city it selfe ( i. e. ) the civill person sinnes not , but those subjects only by whose votes it was decreed for sinne , is a consequence of the naturall expresse will , not of the politicall , which is artificiall ; for if it were otherwise , wise , they would be guilty , by whom the decree was absolutely disliked : but in a monarchie , if the monarch make any decree against the lawes of nature , he sins himselfe , because in him the civill will and the naturall are all one . xv. the people who are about to make a monarch , may give him the supremacy either simply without limitation of time , or for a certaine season , and time determined ; if simply , we must understand that he who receives it , hath the selfe ▪ same power which they had , who gave it , on the same grounds : therefore that the people by right could make him a monarch , may he make another monarch : insomuch as the monarch to whom the command is simply given , receives a right not of possession onely , but of succession also , so as he may declare whom hee pleaseth for his successor . xvi . but if the power be given for a time limited , we must have regard to somewhat more then the bare gift onely : first , whether the people converghing its authority , left it selfe any right to meet at certain times , and places , or not . next , if it have reserved this power , whether it were done , so as they might meet before that time were expired , which they prescribed to the monarch . thirdly , whether they were contented to meet onely at the will of that temporary monarch and not otherwise . suppose now the people had delivered up its power to some one man for term of life onely ; which being done , let us suppose in the first place , that every man departed from the counsell without making any order at all concerning the place where ( after his death ) they should meet again to make a new elect on . in this case it is manifest by the fifth article of this chapter , that the people ceaseth to be a person , and is become a dissolute multitude , every one whereof hath an equall , to wit , a naturall right to meet with whom he lists at divers times , and in what places shall best please him ; nay , and if he can , engrosse the supreme power to himselfe , and settle it on his own head . what monarch soever therefore hath a command in such a condition , he is bound by the law of nature ( set down in the article of the third chapter of not returning evill for good ) prudently to provide , that by his death the city suffer not a dissolution , either by appointing a certain day , & place , in which those subjects of his who have a mind to it may assemble themselves , or else by nominating a successor : whether of these shall to him seem most conducible to their common benefit . he therefore who on this foresaid manner hath received his command during life , hath an absolute power , and may at his discretion dispose of the succession . in the next place , if we grant that the people departed not from the election of the temporary monarch , before they decreed a certain time and place of meeting after his death , then the monarch being dead , the authority is confirmed in the people , not by any new acts of the subjects , but by vertue of the former right , for all the supreme com●and ( as dominion ) was in the people , but the use , and exercise of it was only in the temporary monarch , as in one that takes the benefit , but hath not the right . but if the people after the election of a temporarie monarch , depart not from the court before they have appointed certain times , and places to convene , during the time prescribed him ( as the dictators in ancient times were made by the people of rome ) such an one is not to be accounted a monarch , but the prime officer of the people ; and if it shall seem good , the people may deprive him of his office even before that time , as the people of rome did , when they conferred an equall power on minutius master of the horse , with quintus fabius maximus , whom before they had made dictator . the reason whereof is , that it is not to be imagined , that , whether man or counsell who hath the readiest , and most immediate power to act , should hold his command on such termes as not to be able actually to execu●e it ; for command is nothing else but a right of commanding , as oft as nature allowes it possible . lastly , if the people having declared a temporary monarch , depart from the court on such termes , as it shall not be lawfull for them to meet without the command of the monarch , we must understand the people to be immediately dissolved , and that his authority who is thus declared , is absolute ; forasmuch as it is not in the power of all the subjects to frame the city a new , unlesse he give consent who hath now alone the authority . nor matters it , that he hath perhaps made any promise to assemble his subjects on some certain times , since there remains no person now in being , but at his discretion , to whom the promise was made . what we have spoken of these four cases of a people electing a temporary monarch will be more clearly explain'd by comparing them with an absolute monarch , who hath no heir apparent ; for the people is lord of the subject in such a manner as there can be no heir but whom it self do●h appoint . besides , the spaces between the times of the subjects meeting may be fi●ly compar'd to those times wherein the monarch sleepes , for in either the acts of commanding ceases , the power remaines : farthermore , to dissolve the convent , so as it cannot meet againe , is the death of the people ; just as sleeping , so as he can never wake more , is the death of a man : as therefore a king , who hath no heir , going to his rest , so as never to rise again , ( i. e. ) dying , if he commit the exercise of his regall authority to any one till he awake , does by consequence give him the succession ; the people also electing a temporary monarch , and not reserving a power to convene , delivers upto him the whole dominion of the country : furthermore , as a king going to sleep for some season , entrusts the administration of his kingdome to some other , and waking takes it again ; so the people having elected a temporary monarch , and with all retaining a right to meet at a certain day , and place , at that day receives its supremacy again . and as a king who hath committed the execution of his authority to another , himself in the mean while waking , can recall this commission againe when he pleaseth ; so the people , who during the time prescribed to the temporary monarch , doth by right convene , may if they please , deprive the monarch of his authority . lastly , the king , who commits his authority to another while himself sleeps , not being able to wake againe till he whom he entrusted , give consent , loses at once both his power , and his life ; so the people , who hath given the supreme power to a temporary monarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command is absolutely dissolv'd , and the power remaines with him whom they have chosen . xvii . if the monarch promise ought to any one , or many subjects together , by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may suffer prejudice , that promise or compact whether made by oath , or without it , is null : for all compact is a conveyance of right , which by what hath been said in the fourth article of the second chapter , requires meet , and proper signes of the will in the conveyer . but he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end , doth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his right to the means necessary to that end . now he who hath promis'd to part with somewhat necessary to the supreme power , and yet retaines the power it selfe , gives sufficient tokens , that he no otherwise promis'd it then so farre forth as the power might be retain'd without it ▪ whensoever therefore it shall appear that what is promis'd cannot be perform'd without prejudice to the power , the promise must be valued as not made , ( i. e. ) of no effect . xviii . we have seen how subjects , nature dictating , have oblig'd themselves by mutuall compacts to obey the supreme power . we will see now by what meanes it comes to passe that they are releas'd from these bonds of obedience . and first of a●l this happens by rejection , namely , if a man cast off , or forsake , but conveigh not the right of his command on some other ; for what is thus rejected , is openly expos'd to all alike , catch who catch can ; whence again , by the right of nature , every subject may heed the preservation of himselfe according to his own judgement . in the second place , if the kingdome fall into the power of the enemy , so as there can no more opposition be made against them , we must understand that he , who before had the supreme authority , hath now lost it : for when the subjects have done their full indeavour to prevent their falling into the enemies hands , they have fulfill'd those contracts of obedience which they made each with other , and what , being con●…uer'd , they promise afterwards , to avoid death , they must , with no lesse endeavour , labour to performe . thirdly , in a monarchy , ( for a democra●y , and aristocraty cannot fail ) if there be no successour , all the subjects are discharg'd from their obligations ; for no man is suppos'd to be tyed he knows not to whom , for in such a case it were impossible to perform ought . and by these three wayes all subjects are restor'd from their civill subjection to that liberty , which all men have to all things , to wit , naturall , and salvage , ( for the naturall state hath the same proportion to the civill , i mean liberty to subjection , which passion hath to reason , or a beast to a man : ) furthermore , each subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will of him who hath the supreme power , namely , if he change his soile , which may be done two wayes , either by permission , as he , who gets license to dwell in another country ; or command , as he , who is banisht : in both cases he is free from the lawes of his former country , because he is tyed to observe those of the latter . chap. viii . of the rights of lords over their servants . i. what lord and servant signifie . ii. the distinction of servants into such as upon trust enjoy their naturall liberty , or slaves , and such as serve , being imprison'd , or bound in fetters . iii. the obligation of a servant arises from the liberty of body allow'd bim by his lord. iv. servants that are bound are not by any compacts tyed to their lords . v. servants have no propriety in their goods against their lord. vi. the lord may sell his servant , or alienate him by testament . vii . the lord cannot injure his servant . viii . he that is lord of the lord , is lord also of his servants . ix . by what means servants are freed . x. dominion over beasts belongs to the rights of nature . i. in the two fore-going chapters we have treated of an institutive , or fram'd government , as being that which receives its originall from the consent of many , who by contract and faith mutually given , have oblig'd each other . now followes , what may be said , concerning a naturall government , which may also be call'd , acquired , because it is that which is gotten by power , and naturall force . but we must know in the first place by what means the right of dominion may be gotten over the persons of men . where such a right is gotten , there is a kind of a little kingdome ; for to be a king , is nothing else b●t to have dominion over many persons ; and thus a great family is a kingdom , & a little kingdome a family . let us return again to the state of nature , and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth , and suddainly ( like mushromes ) come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each other : there are but three wayes only whereby one can have the dominion over the person of ano●her ; whereof the first is , if by mutuall contract made between themselves ( for peace , & self-defences sake ) they have willingly given up themselves to the power and authority of some man , or councel of men , & of this we have already spoken . the d is , if a man taken prisoner in the wars , or overcome ; or else distrusting his own forces , ( to avoid death ) promises the conquerour , or the stronger party , his service , i. e. to do all whatsoever he shall command him ; in which contract the good which the vanquisht , or inferiour , in strength doth receive , is the grant of his life , which by the right of war in the naturall st●te of men he might have depriv'd him of , but the good which he promises , is his service and obedience . by vertue therefore of this promise , there is as absolute service and obedience due from the vanquisht , to the vanquisher , as possibly can be , excepting what repugns the divine lawes ; for he who is oblig'd to obey the commands of any man before he knowes what he will command him , is simply , and without any restriction tyed to the performance of all commands whatsoever . now he that is thus tyed , is call'd a servant , he to whom he is tyed , a lord . thirdly , there is a right acquir'd over the person of a man , by generation ; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following chapter . ii. every one that is taken in the war , and hath his life spar'd him , is not suppos'd to have contracted with his lord , for every one is not trusted with so much of his naturall liberty , as to be able , if he desir'd it , either to flie away , or quit his service , or contrive any mischief to his lord. and these serve indeed but within p●isons , or bound within irons , and therefore they were call'd not by the common name of servant onely , but by the peculiar name of slave , even as now at this day un serviteur , and un serf , or un esclave have diverse significations . the obligation therefore of a servant to his lord aris●th not from a simple grant of his life , but from hence rather , that he keeps him not bound , or imprison'd , for all obligation derives from contract ; but where 's no trust , there can be no contract , as appears by the . chap. artic. . where a compact is defin'd to be the promise of him who is trusted . there is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardon'd life , whereby the lord affords him his corporall liberty ; so that if no obligation , nor bonds of contract had happen'd , he might not onely have made his escape , but also have kill'd his lord , who was the preserver of his life . iv. wherefore such kind of servants a● are restrain'd by imp●isonm●nt , o●bonds , are not comprehended in that definition of servants given above , because those serve not for the contracts sake , but to the end they may not suffer ; and therefore if they flie , or kill their lord , they offend not against the lawes of nature , for to bind any man is a plain signe , that the binder supposes him that is bound not to be sufficiently tyed by any other obligation . v. the lord therefore hath no less dominion over a servant that is not , then over one that is bound , for he hath a supreme power over both , and may say of his serva●t no lesse then of another thing , whether animate , or inanimate , this is mine ; whence it followes , that whatsoever the servant had before his servitude , that afterwards becomes the lords ; and whatsoever he hath gotten , it was gotten for his lord : for he that can by right dispose of the person of a man , may surely dispose of all those things which that person could dispose of . there is therefore nothing which the servant may retaine as his own against the will of his lord ; yet hath he , by his lords distribution , a propriety , and dominion over his own goods , insomuch as one servant may keep , and defend them against the invasion of his fellow servant , in the same manner as hath been shewed before , that a subject hath nothing properly his owne against the will of the supreme authority , but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow subject . vi. since therefore both the servant himself , and all that belongs to him are his lords , and by the right of nature every man may dispose of his owne in what manner he pleases ; the lord may either sell , lay to pledge , or by testament conveigh the dominion he hath over his servant , according to his own will and pleasure . vii . farthermore , what hath before been demonstrated concerning subjects in an institutive government , namely , that he who hath the supreme power can doe his subject no injury ; is true also concerning servants , because they have subjected their will to the will of the lord ; wherefore , whatsoever he doth , it is done with their wills , but no injury can be done to him that willeth it . viii . but if it happen that the lord either by captivity , or voluntary subjection doth become a servant or subject to another , that other shall not onely be lord of him , but also of his servants , supreme lord over these , immediate lord over him . now because not the servant only , but also all he hath are his lords ; therefore his servants now belong to this man , neither can the mediate lord dispose otherwise of them then shall seeme good to the supreme . and therefore , if sometime in civill governments , the lord have an absolute power over his servants , that 's suppos'd to be deriv'd from the right of nature , and not constituted , but slightly pass'd over by the civill law. ix . a servant is by the same manner freed from his servitude , that a subject in an institutive government , is freed from his subjection ; first , if his lord enfranchize him , for the right which the servant transferred to his lord over himselfe , the same may the lord restore to the servant again . and this manner of bestowing of liberty is called manumission ; which is just as if a city should permit a citizen to conveigh himselfe under the jurisdiction of some other city . secondly , if the lord cast off his servant from him , which in a city is banishment ; neither differs it from manumission in effect , but in manner onely : for there , liberty is granted as a favour , here , as a punishment : in both , the dominion is renounced . thirdly , if the servant be taken prisoner , the old servitude is abolished by the new ; for as all other things ; so servants also are acquired by warre , whom in equity the lord must protect , if he will have them to be his . fourthly , the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a successour , the lord dying ( suppose ) without any testament , or heire , for no man is understood to be obliged , unlesse ●e know to whom he is to perform the obligation . lastly , she servant that is put in bonds , or by any other means deprived of his corporall liberty , is freed from that other obligation of contract , for there can be no contract where there is no trust , nor can that faith be broken which is not given , but the lord who himselfe serves another , cannot so free his servants , but that they must still continue under the power of the supreme , for , as hath been shewed before , such servants are not his , but the supreme lords . x. we get a right over irrationall creatures in the same manner , that we doe over the persons of men , to wit , by force and naturall strength ; for if in the state of nature it is lawfull for every one , by reason of that warre which is of all against all , to subdue , and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good , much more will the same be lawfull against ●rutes ; namely at their own dis●retion , to reduce those to servitude which by a●t may be tamed , and ●●tted for use , and to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpe●uall warre , as da●gerous and no●ious . our d●mi●io● therefore over beasts , hath its originall from the right of nature , not from divine positive right : for if such a right had not been before the publishing of the sacred scriptures , no man by right might have killed a beast for his food , but he to whom the divine pleasure was made manifest by holy writ ; a most hard condition for men indeed whom the beasts might devoure without injury , and yet they might not destroy them : forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of nature , that a beast may kill a man ; it is also by the same right , that a man may slay a beast . chap. ix . of the right of parents over their children , and of hereditary government . i. paternall dominion ariseth not from generation . ii. dominion over infants belongs to him or her who first hath them in their power . iii. dominion over infants is originally the mothers . iv. the exposed infant is his from whom he receives his preservation . v. the child that hath one parent a subject , and the other a soveraign , belongs to him , or her in authority . vi. in such a conjunction of man and woman , as neither hath command over the other , the children are the mothers , unlesse by compact or civill law , it bee otherwise determined . vii . children are no lesse subject to their parents , then servants to their lords , and subjects to their princes . viii . of the honour of parents , and lords . ix . wherein liberty consists , and the difference of subjects and servants . x. there is the same right over subjects in an hereditary government , which there is an institutive government . xi . the question concerning the right of succession , belongs only to monarchy . xii . a monarch may by his will and testament , dispose of his supreme authority . xiii . or give it ; or sell it . xiv . a monarch dying without testament , is ●ver supposed to will that a monarch should succeed him . xv. and some one of his children . xvi . and a male rather then female . xvii . and the eldest rather then the yonger . xviii . and his brother if he want issue before all others . xix ▪ in the same manner that men succeed to the power , doe they also succeed to the right of succession . i. socrate● is a man , and therefore a living creature , is a right seasoning , and that most evident , because there is nothing needfull to the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence , but that the word man , be understod , because a living creature is in the definition it selfe of a man , and every one makes up the proportion which was desired , namely this , man is a living creature ; and this , sop●roniscus is socrates his father , and therefore his lord , is perhaps a true inference , but not evident , because the word lord is not in the definition of a father : wherefore it is necessary to make it more evident , that the connexion of father and lord be somewhat unfolded . those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove the dominion of a parent over his children , have brought no other argument then that of generation , as if it were of it selfe evident , that what is begotten by me , is mine ; just as if a man should think , that because there is a triangle , it appeares presently without any farther discourse , that its angles are equall to two rights . besides , since dominion ( that is ) supreme power is indivisible , insomuch as no man can serve two masters , but two persons male and female , must conc●rre in the act of generation , its impossible that dominion should at all be acquired by generation onely . wherefore we will with the more diligence in this place , enquire into the original of paternal government . ii. wee must therefore returne to the state of nature , in which , by reason of the equality of nature all men of riper yeares are to be accounted equall ; there by right of nature the conqueror is lord of the conquered : by the right therefore of nature , the dominion over the in●ant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power , but it 's manifest that 〈◊〉 who is newly born is in the mothers power before any others , insomuch as she may rightly , and at her own wil , either breed him up , or adventure him to fortune . iii. if therefore she breed him ( because the state of nature is the state of warre ) she is supposed to bring him up on this condition , that being grown to full age he become not her enemy ; ( which is ) that he obey her . for since by naturall necessity w● all desire that which appears good unto us , it cannot be understood that any man hath on such termes afforded life to another , that he might both get strength by his years , and at once become an enemy ; but each man is an enemy to that other whom he neither obeys nor commands . and thus in the state of nature , every woman that bear● children , becomes both a mother , and a lord. but what some say , that in this case , the father by reason of the preeminence of sexe , and not the mother , becomes lord , signifies nothing , for both reason shewes the contrary , because the inequality of their naturall forces is not so great , that the man could get the dominion over the woman without warr● , and custome also contradicts not ; for women , namely amazo●s , have in former times waged war against their adversaries , and disposed of their children at their own wils , and at this day in divers places , women are invested with the principall authority . neither doe their husbands dispose of their children , but themselves ; which in truth they do by the right of ●…ture ; fo●asmuch as they who have the supreme power , are not tyed at all ( as hath bin shewed ) to the civill lawes . adde also that in the state of nature it cannot be known who is the father , but by the testimony of the mother ; the child therefore is his whos 's the mother will have it , and therefore hers ; wherefore originall dominion over children belongs to the mother , and among men no lesse then other creatures : the birth followes the belly . iv. the dominion passes from the mother to others , divers wayes , first , if she quit and forsake her right by exposing the child . he therefore that shall bring up the childe thus exposed , shall have the same dominion over it , which the mother had . for that life which the mother had given it ( not by getting , but nourishing it ) she now by exposing , takes from it ; wherefore the obligation also which arose from the benefit of life , is by this exposition made voyd . now the preserved , oweth all to the preserver , whether in regard of his education as to a mother , or of his service , as to a lord ; for although the mother in the state of nature , where all men have a right to all things . may recover her sonne again ( namely by the same right that any body else might doe it ) yet may not the so●n● rightly transferre himselfe again unto his mother . v. secondly , if the mother be taken prisoner , her sonne is his that took her , because that he who hath dominion over the person , hath also dominion over all belonging to the person , wherefore over the sonne also , as hath been shewed in the foregoing chapter , in the fifth article . thirdly , if the mother be a subject under what government soever , he that hath the supreme authority in that government , will also have the dominion over him that is born of her , for he is lord also of the mother ; who is bound to obey him in all things . fourthly , if a woman for societie sake give her selfe to a man on this condition ; that be shall bear the sway ; he that receives his being from the contribution of both parties , is the fathers , in regard of the command he hath over the mother ; but if a woman bearing rule shall have children by a subject , the children are the mothers : for otherwise the woman can have no children without prejudice to her authority . and universally , if the society of the male and female be such an union , as the one have subjected himselfe to the other , the children belong to him or her that commands . vi. but in the state of nature , if a man , and woman contract so , as neither is subject to the command of the other , the children are the mothers for the reasons above given in the third article , unlesse by pacts it be otherwise provided . for the mother may by pact dispose of her right as she lists , as heretofore hath been done by the amazons , who of those children which have been begotten by their neighbours , have by pact allowed them the males , and retained the females to themselves ; but in a civill government , if there be a contract of marriage between a man and woman , the children are the fathers ; because in all cities , viz. constituted of fathers , not mothers governing their families , the domesticall command belongs to the man , and such a contract , if it be made according to the civill laws , is called matrimony ; but if they agree only to lye together , the children are the fathers , or the mothers variously , according to the differing civill lawes of divers cities . vii . now because by the third article the mother is originally lord of her children , and from her the father , or some body else by derived right , it is manifest that the children are no lesse subject to those by whom they are nourisht , and brought up , then servants to their lords , and subjects to him who beares the supreme rule , and that a parent cannot be injurious to his sonne as long as he is under his power . a son also is freed from subjection on the same manner as a subject and servant are . for emancipation is the same thing with manumission , and abdication with banishment . viii . the enfranchised son , or released servant , doe now stand in lesse fear of their ●ord and father being deprived of his naturall and lordly power over them , and ( if regard be had to true and inward honour ) doe honour him lesse , then before . for honour ( as hath been said in the section above ) is nothing else but the estimation of anothers power ; and therefore he that hath least power , hath alwayes least honour . but it is not to be imagin'd that the enfranchiser ever intended so to ma●ch the enfranchised with himself , as that he should not so much as acknowledge a benefit , but should so carry himself in all things , as if he were become wholly his equall ; it must therefore be ever understood , that he who is freed from subjection , whether he be a servant , sonne , or some colony , doth promise all those externall signes , at least whereby superiours used to be honour'd by their inferiours . from whence it followes , that the precept of honouring our parents , belongs to the law of nature , not onely under the title of gratitude , but also of agreement . ix what then , will some one demand , is the difference between a sonne , or between a subject , and a servant ? neither doe i know that any w●iter hath fully declared what liberty , and what slavery is . commonly to doe all things according to our own phancies , and that without punishment , is esteem'd to be liberty ; not to be able to doe this , is judg'd bondage ; which in a civill government , and with the peace of mankind cannot possibly be done , because there is no city without a command , and a restraining right . liberty , that we may define it , is nothing else but an absence of the lets , and hinderances of motion , as water shut up in a vessell is therefore not at liberty , ●ecause the vessell hinders it from running out , which the vessell being broken , is made free . and every man hath more or lesse liberty , as he hath more or lesse space in which he employes himself : as he hath more liberty , who is in a large , then he that is kept in a close prison . and a man may be free toward one part , and yet not toward anothert as the traveller is bounded on this , and that side with hedges , or stone walls , lest he spoyle the vines , or corne , neighbouring on the high way . and these kinde of le●s are externall , and absolute ; in which sense all servants , and subjects are free , who are not fetter'd and imprisoned . there are others which are arbitrary , which doe not absolutely hinder motion , but by accident ; to wit , by our own choyce , as he that is in a ship is not so hindered , but he may cast himselfe into the sea , if he will : and here also the more wayes a man may move himselfe , the more liberty he hath , and herein consists civill liberty ; for no man , whether subject , sonne , or servant , is so hindred by the punishments appointed by the city , the father , or the lord , how cruell soever , but that he may doe all things , and make use of all meanes necessary to the preservation of his life and health : for my part therefore i cannot finde what reason a meer servant hath to make complaints , if they relate onely to want of liberty , unlesse he count it a●misery to be restrained from hurting himselfe , and to receive that life , ( which by warre , or misfortune , or through his own idlenesse was forfeited ) together with all manner of sustenance , and all things necessary to the conservation of health , on this condition only , that he will be rul'd : for he that is kept in by punishments layd before him , so as he dares not let loose the reines to his will in all things ; is not opprest by servitude , but is governed and sustained . but this priviledge free subjects and sonnes of a family , have above servants , ( in every goverment , and family , where servants are ) that they may both undergoe the more honourable offices of the city or family , and also enjoy a larger possession of things superfluous . and herein layes the difference between a f●ce subject , and a servant , that he is free indeed , who serves his city onely ; but a servant is he who also serves ▪ his fellow subject : all other liberty is an exemption from the lawes of the city , and proper only to those that bear rule . x. a father , with his sonnes and scrvants growne into a civill person by vertue of his paternall jurisdiction , is called a family . this family , if through multiplying of children , and acquisition of servants , it becomes numerous , insomuch as without casting the uncertain dye of warre , it cannot be subdued , will be termed an hereditary kingdome ; which though it differ from an institutive monarchy , being acquired by force in the original , & manner of its constitution ; yet being constituted , it hath al the same properties , and the right of authority is every where the same , insomuch as it is not needfull to speak any thing of them apart . xi . it hath been spoken , by what right supreme authorities are constituted . wee must now briefly tell you by what right they may be continued . now the right by which they are continued , is that which is called the right of succession . now because in a democratie , the supreme authority is with the people , as long as there be any subjects in being , so long it rests with the same person ; for the people hath no successour . in like manner in an aristocra●y , one of the nobles ●ying , some other by the rest is substituted in his place , and therefore except they all dye together , which 〈◊〉 suppose will never happen , there is no succession . the querie therefore of the right of succession takes place onely in an absolute monarchy . for they who exercise the supreme power for a time onely , are themselves no monarchs , but ministers of state . xii . but first , if a monarch shall by testament appoint one to succeed him , the person appointed shall succeed ; for if he be appointed by the people , he shall have all the right over the city which the people had , as hath been shewed in the . chap. art. . but the people might choose him , by the same right therefore may he choose another ; but in an hereditary kingdome there are the same rights as in an institutive ; wherefore , every monarch may by his will make a successour . xiii . but what a man may transferre on another by testament , that by the same right may he yet living , give , or sell away ▪ to whomsoever therefore he shall make over the supreme power , whether by gift , or sale , it is rightly made . xiv . but if living , he have not declared his will concerning his successour by testament , not otherwise , it is supposed , first , that he would not have his government reduced to an anarchy , or the state of warre , ( that is ) to the destruction of his subjects ; as well because he could not doe that without breach of the lawes of nature , whereby he was obliged to the performance of all things necessarily conducing to the preservation of peace , as also because if that had been his will , it had not been hard for him to have declared that openly . next , because the right passeth according to the will of the father , we must judge of the successour according to the signes of his will. it is understood therefore , that he would have his subjects to be under a monarchicall government rather then any other , because he himselfe in ruling , hath before approved of that state by his example , and hath not afterward either by any word or deed condemned it . xv. furthermore , because by naturall necessity all men wish them better from whom they receive glory , and honour , then others ; but every man after death receives honour and glory from his children , sooner then from the power of any other men : hence we gather , that a father intends better for his children , then any other persons . it is to be understood therefore , that the will of the father , dying without testament , was , that some of his children should succeed him , yet this is to be understood with this prov●so , that there be no more apparent tokens to the contrary : of which kind , after many successions , custome may be one , for he that makes no mention of his succession , is supposed to consent to the customes of his realme . xvi . among children the males carry the preheminence , in the beginning perhaps , because for the most part ( although not alwayes ) they are ●itter for the administration of 〈◊〉 matters , but specially of wars ; but afterwards , when it was grown a custome , because that custome was not contradicted ; and therefore the will of the father , unlesse some other custome or signe doe clearly repugne it , is to be interpreted in favour of them . xvii . now because the sonnes are equall ▪ and the power cannot be divided , the eldest shall succeed ; for if there be any difference by reason of age , the eldest is supposed more worthy , for nature being judge , the most in years ( because usually it is so ) is the wisest . but other judge there cannot be had . but if the brothers must be equally valued , the succession shall be by lot , but primogeniture is a naturall lot , and by this the eldest is already prefer'd , nor is there any that hath power to judge , whether by this , or any other kind of lots the matter is to be decided . now the same reason which contends thus for the first-born sonne , doth no lesse for the first born daughter . xviii . but if he have no children , then the command shall pass to his brothers & sisters , for the same reason , that the children should have succeeded if he had had them : for those that are nearest to us in nature , are supposed to be nearest in benevolence ; and to his brothers , sooner then his sisters , and to the elder sooner then the yonger ; for the reason is the same for these which it was for the children . xix . furthermore , by the same reason that men succeed to the power , doe they also succeed to the right of succession : for if the first-born dye before the father , it will be judged , that he transferred his right of suc cession unto his children , unlesse the father have otherwise decreed it , and therefore the nephewes will have a fairer pretence to the succession , then the uncles . i say all these things will be thus , if the custome of the place ( which the father by not contradicting , will be judged to have con●ented to ) doe not hinder them . chap. x. a comparison between . kinds of government , according to their severall inconveniences . i. a comparison of the naturall state with the civill . ii. the conveniences and inconveniences of the ruler and his subjects are alike . iii. the praise of monarchy . iv. the government under one cannot be said to be unreasonable in this respect , namely because one hath more power then all the rest . v. a rejection of their opinion , who say that a lord with his servants cannot make a city . vi. exactions are more grievous under a popular state , then a monarchy . vii . innocent subjects are lesse exposed to penalties under a monarch , then under the people . viii . the liberty of single subjects is not lesse under a monarch , then under a people . ix . it is no disadvantage to the subiects , that they are not all admitted to publick deliberations . x. civill deliberations are unadvisedly committed to great assemblies , by reason of the unskilfulnes of the most part of men . xi . in regard of eloquence . xii . in regard of faction . xiii . in regard of the unstablenes of the lawes . xiv . in regard of the want of secrecy . xv. that these inconveniences adhere to democraty , forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with the esteeme of wit. xvi . the inconveniencies of a city arising from a king that is a childe . xvii . the power of generalls , is an evident sign of the excellence of monarchy . xviii . the best state of a city is that , where the subiects are the rulers inheritance . xix . the nearer aristocraty drawes to monarchy , the better it is , the further it keeps from it , the worse . i. vvhat democraty , aristocraty , and monarchy are , hath already been spoken , but which of them tends most to the preservation of the subjects peace , and procuring their advantages , we must see by comparing them together ; but first let us set forth the advantages , and disadvantages of a city in generall , lest some perhaps should think it better , that every man be left to live at his own will , then to constitute any civill society at all . every man indeed out of the state of civill government hath a most entire , but unfruitfull liberty ; because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all at his own will , must also by reason of the same liberty in others , suffer al at anothers wil ; but in a constituted city , every subject retains to himselfe as much freedom as suffices him to live well , and quietly , & there is so much taken away from others , as may make them not to be feared . out of this state , every man hath such a right to all , as yet he can enjoy nothing in it , each one securely enjoyes his limited right ; out of it , any man may rightly spoyle , or kill one another ; in it , none but one . out of it we are protected by our own forces ; in it , by the power of all . out of it no man is sure of the fruit of his labours ; in it , all men are . lastly , out of it , there is a dominion of passions , war , fear , poverty , slovinlinesse , solitude , barbarisme , ignorance , cruelty . in it , the dominion of reason , peace , security , riches , decency , society , elegancy , sciences , and benevolence . ii. aristotle in his seventh book , and fourteenth chapter of his politiques saith , that there are two sorts of governments , whereof the one relates to the benefit of the ruler , the other to that of the subjects ; as if where subjects are severely dealt wi●h , there were one , and where more mildly , there were another form of government ; which opinion may by no means be subscribed to , for all the profits and disprofits arising from government are the same , and common both to the ruler , and the subject ; the dammages which befall some particular subjects through misfortune , folly , negligence , sloth , or his own luxury , may very well be severed from those which concern the ruler , but those relate not to the government it selfe , being such as may happer in any form of government whatsoever . if these same happen from the first institution of the city , they will then be truly called the inconveniencies of government , but they will be common to the ruler with his subjects , as their benefits are common ; but the first and greatest benefit , peace , and defence , is common to both , for both he that commands , and he who is commanded , to the end that he may defend his life , makes use at once of all the forces of his fellow-subjects ; and in the greatest inconvenience that can befall a city , namely the slaughter of subjects , arising from anarchy , both the commander , and the parties commanded , are equally concerned . next , if the ruler levie such a summe of vast monies from his subjects , as they are not able to maintain themselves , and their families , nor conserve their bodily strength , and vigour , the disadvantage is as much his , as theirs , who with never so great a stock , or measure of riches , is not able to keep his authority or his riches without the bodies of his subjects ; but if he raise no more then is sufficient for the due administration of his power , that is a benefit equall to himselfe and his subjects , tending to a common peace , and defence ; nor is it imaginable which way publick treasures can be a grievance to private subjects , if they be not so exhausted , as to be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire , even by their industry , necessaries to sustain the strength of their bodies , and mindes ; for even thus the grievance would concern the ruler , nor would it arise from the ill institution , or ordination of the government , ( because in all manner of governments subjects may be opprest ) but from the ill administration of a well established government . iii. now that monarchy of the soresaid forms , of democraty , aristocraty , and monarchy , hath the preheminence , will best appear by comparing the conveniences and inconveniences arising in each one of them . those arguments therefore that the whole universe is governed by one god ; that the ancients preferr'd the monarchicall state before all others , ascribing the rule of the gods to one jupiter ; that in the beginning of affairs , and of nations , the decrees of princes were held for laws ; that paternall government instituted by god himselfe in the creation , was monarchicall ; that other governments were compacted * by the artifice of men out of the ashes of monarchy , after it had been ruined with seditions ; and that the people of god were under the jurisdiction of kings , although i say these do● hold forth monarchy as the more eminent to us , yet because they doe it by examples and testimonies , and not by solid reason , we will passe them over . compacted by the artifice of men , &c. ] it seems the ancients who made that same fable of prometheus pointed at this . they say , that prometheus having stolne fire from the sunne , formed a man out of clay , and that for this deed he was tortured by jupiter with a perpetuall gnawing in his liver , which is , that by humane invention ( which is signified by prometheus ) laws and justice were by imitation taken from monarchy , by vertue whereof ( as by fire removed from its naturall orbe ) the multitude ( as the durt and dregs of men ) was as it were quickned and formed into a civill person , which is termed aristocraty , or democraty ; but the authour ▪ and abettors being found , who might securely and quietly have lived under the naturall jurisdiction of kings , doe thus smart for it , that being exposed still to alteration , they are tormented with perpetuall cares , suspitions , and dissentions . iv. some there are who are discontented with the government under one , for no other reason , but because it is under one ; as if it were an unreasonable thing that one man among so many , should so farre excell in power , as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest ; these men sure , if they could , would withdraw themselves from under the dominion of one god. but this exception against one is suggested by envie , while they see one man in posaession of what all desire : for the same cause they would judge it to be as unreasonable , if a few commanded , unlesse they themselves either were , or hoped to be of the number ; for if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equall right , surely an aristocraty must be unreasonable also ; but because we have shewed that the state of equality is the state of warre , and that therefore inequality was introduc'd by a generall consent ; this inequality whereby he , whom we have voluntarily given more to ; enjoyes more , is no longer to be accompted an unreasonable thing . the inconveniences therefore which attend the dominion of one man , attend his person , not his vnity . let us therefore see whether brings with it the greater grievances to the subject , the command of one man , or of many . v. but first , we must remove their opinion who deny that to be any city at all , which is compacted of never so great a number of servants under a common lord. in the . artic. of the . chapter , a city is defined to be one person made out of many men , whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the wills of them all , insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties of each single person for the publick peace and safety ; and by the same article of the same chapter , one person is that , when the wills of many are contained in the will of one , but the will of each servant is contained in the will of his lord , as hath been declared in the . article of the . chapter , so as he may employ all their forces and faculties according to his own will , and pleasure ; it followes therefore that that must needs be a city , which is constituted by a lord , and many servants ; neither can any reason be brought to contradict this which doth not equally combat against a city constituted by a father , and his sonnes ; for to a lord who hath no children , servants are in the nature of sonnes ; for they are both his honour , and safeguard ; neither are servants more subject to their lords , then children to their parents , as hath been manifested above in the . article of the . chapter . vi. among other grievances of supreme authority one is , that the ruler , beside those monies necessary for publick charges , as the maintaining of publick ministers , building , and defending of castles , waging warres , honourable sustaining his own houshold , may also , if he will , exact others through his lust , whereby to enrich his sonnes , kindred , favourites , and flatterers too . i confesse this is a grievance , but of the number of those which accompany all kindes of government , but are more tolerable in a monarchy then in a democraty ; for though the monarch would enrich them , they cannot be many , because belonging but to one , but in a democraty , look how many demagoges , ( that is ) how many powerfull oratours there are with the people ( which ever are many , and daily new ones growing ) so many children , kinsmen , friends , & flatterers , are to be rewarded ; for every of them desire not onely to make their families as potent , as illustrious in wealth , as maybe , but also to oblige others to them by benefits for the better strengthning of themselves . a monarch may in great part satisfie his officers and friends , because they are not many , without any cost to his subjects , i mean , without robbing them of any of those treasures given in for the maintenance of war , and peace ; in a democraty ; where many are to be satisfied , and alwayes new ones , this cannot be done without the subjects oppression . though a monarch may promote unworthy persons , yet oft times he will not doe it ; but in a democraty all the popular men are therefore suppos'd to doe it , because it is necessary ; for else , the power of them who did it would so encrease , as it would not onely become dreadfull to those others , but even to the whole city also . vii . another grievance is , that same perpetuall fear of death which every man must necessarily be in , while he considers with himself that the ruler hath power not onely to appoint what punishments he lists on any transgressions , but that he may also in his wrath , and sensuality , slaughter his innocent subjects , and those who never offended against the lawes . and truly this is a very great grievance in any forme of government wheresoever it happens : ( for it is therefore a grievance because it is ; not , because it may be done ) but it is the fault of the ruler , not of the government ; for all the acts of nero are not essentiall to monarchie ; yet subjects are lesse often undeservedly condemn'd under one ruler , then under the people : for kings are onely severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent counsells , or oppose them with reproachfull words , or controule their wills ; but they are the cause that that excesse of power which one subject might have above another becomes harmlesse ; wherefore some nero or caligula reigning , no men can undeservedly suffer , but such as are known to him , namely courtiers , and such as are remarkable for some eminent charge , and not all neither , but they onely who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy ; for they that are offensive , and contumelious , are deservedly punisht ; whosoever therefore in a monarchy will lead a retired life , let him be what he will that reignes , he is out of danger : for the ambitious onely suffer , the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent : but in a popular dominion there may be as mane nero's , as there are oratours who sooth the people ; for each one of them can doe as much as the people , and they mutually give way to each others appetite ( as it were by this secret pact , spare me to day , and i le spare thee to morrow ) while they exempt those from punishment , who to satisfie their lust , and private hatred , have undeservedly slain their fellow-subjects . furthermore , there is a certain limit in private power , which if it exceed , it may prove pernicious to the realme , and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for monarchs to have a care that the common-weale do thence receive no prejudice . when therefore this power consisted in the multitude of riches , they lessened it by diminishing their heaps , but if it were in popular applause , the powerfull party without any other crime laid to his charge , was taken from among them . the same was usually practised in democraties ; for the athenians inflicted a punishment of ten yeares banishment on those that were powerfull , meerly because of their powers , without the guilt of any other crime , and those who by liberall gifts did seek the favour of the common people , were put to death at rome , as men ambitious of a kingdome . in this democraty and monarchy were eaven ; yet differ'd they much in same , because fame derives from the people , and what is done by many , is commended by many : and therefore what the monarch does , is said to be done out of envie to their vertues , which if it were done by the people , would be accounted politie . viii . there are some who therefore imagine monarchy to bee more grievous then democraty , because there is lesse liberty in that , then in this . if by liberty they mean an exemption from that subjection which is due to the lawes ( i e. ) the commands of the people , neither in democraty , nor in any other state of government whatsoever , is there any such kind of liberty . if they suppose liberty to consist in this , that there be few lawes , few prohibitions , and those too such , that except they were forbidden , there could be no peace ; then i deny that there is more liberty in democraty then monarchy ; for the one as truly consisteth with such a liberty , as the other : for although the word liberty , may in large , and ample letters be written over the gates of any city whatsoever , yet is it not meant the subjects , but the cities liberty , neither can that word with better right be inscribed on a city which is governed by the people , then that which is ruled by a monarch ; but when private men or subjects demand liberty , under the name of liberty , they ask not for liberty , but dominion , which yet for want of understanding , they little consider ; for if every man would grant the same liberty to another , which he desires for himselfe , as is commanded by the law of nature , that same naturall state would return again , in which all men may by right doe all things , which if they knew , they would abhor , as being worse then all kind of civill subjection whatsoever ; but if any man desire to have his single freedome , the rest being bound , what does he else demand but to have the dominion ? for who so is freed from all bonds , is lord over all those that still continue bound . subjects therefore have no greater liberty in a popular , then in a monarchicall state , that which deceives them , is the equall participation of command , and publique places ; for where the authority is in the people , single subjects doe so far forth share in it as they are parts of the people ruling ; and they equally partake in publique offices so far forth as they have equall voices in choosing magistrates , and publique ministers . and this is that which aristotle aim'd at , himself also , through the custome of that time , mis-calling dominion liberty , in his sixth book , and second chapter of poli. in a popular state there is liberty by supposition ; which is a spe●ch of the vulgar , as if no man were free out of this state. from whence , by the way , we may collect , that those subjects , who in a monarchy deplore their lost liberty , doe onely stomack this , that they are not receiv'd to the steerage of the common-weal . ix . but perhaps for this very reason some will say , that a popular state is much to be preferr'd before a monarchicall ; because that , where all men have a hand in publique businesses , there all have an opportunity to shew their wisedome , knowledge , and eloquence , in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment , which by reason of that desire of praise which is bred in humane nature , is to them who excell in such like faculties , and seeme to themselves to exceed others , the most delightfull of all things ; but in a monarchy , this same way to obtain praise , and honour , is shut up to the greatest part of subjects ; and what is a grievance , if this be none ? i le tell you : to see his opinion whom we scorne , preferr'd before ours ; to have our wisedome undervalued before our own faces ; by an uncertain tryall of a little vaine glory , to undergoe most certaine enmities ( for this cannot be avoided , whether we have the better , or the worse ) to hate , and to be hated , by reason of the disagreement of opinions ; to lay open our secret counsells , and advises to all , to no purpose , and without any benefit ; to neglect the affaires of our own family : these , i say , are grievances . but to be absent from a triall of wits , although those trialls are pleasant to the eloquent , is not therefore a grievance to them , unlesse we will say , that it is a grievance to valiant men to be restrained from fighting , because they delight in it . x. besides , there are many reasons why deliberations are lesse successefull in great assemblies , then in lesser councells ; whereof one is , that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the preservation of a common-weal , we must not onely understand matters at home , but forraign affaires too ; at home , by what goods the country is nourished , and defended , and whence they are fetched ; what places are fit to make garrisons of ; by what means souldiers are best to be raised , and maintained ; what manner of affections the subjects bear toward their prince , or governours of their country , and many the like : abroad , what the power of each neighbouring country is , and wherein it consists ; what advantage , or disadvantage we may receive from them ; what their dispositions are both to us-ward , and how affected to each other among themselves , and what counsell daily passeth among them . now , because very few in a great assembly of men understand these things , being for the most part unskilfull ( that i say not incapable ) of them , what can that same number of advisers with their impertinent opinions contribute to good counsells , other then meer letts and impediments ? xi . another reason why a great assembly is not so ●it for consultation is , because every one who delivers his opinion holds it necessary to make a long continued speech , and to gain the more esteem from his auditours , he polishes , and adornes it with the best , and smoothest language , now the nature of eloquence is to make good and evill , profitable and unprofitable , honest and dishonest , appear to be more or lesse then indeed they are , and to make that seem just , which is unjust , according as it shall best suit with his end that speaketh . for this is to perswade ; and though they reason , yet take they not their rise from true principles , but from vulgar received opinions , which , for the most part , are erroneous ; neither endeavour they so much to fit their speech to the nature of the things they speak of , as to the passions of their mindes to whom they speak , whence it happens that opinions are delivered not by right reason , but by a certain violence of mind . nor is this fault in the man , but in the nature it selfe of eloquence , whose end ( as all the masters of rhetorick teach us ) is not truth ( except by chance ) but victory , and whose property is not to inform , but to allure . xii . the third reason why men advise lesse succefully in a great convent is , because that thence arise factions in a common-weal , and out of factions , seditions , and civill war ; for when equall oratours doe combat with contrary opinions , and speeches , the conquered hates the conquerour , and all those that were of his side , as holding his counsell , and wisedome in scorne : and studyes all meanes to make the advise of his adversaries prejudiciall to the state , for thus he hopes to see the glory taken from him , and restored unto himself : farthermore , where the votes are not so unequall , but that the conquered have hopes by the accession of some few of their own opinion at another sitting to make the stronger party , the chief heads do call the rest together , they advise a part how they may abrogate the former judgment given , they appoint to be the first and earliest at the next convent , they determine what , and in what order each man shall speak , that the same businesse may again be brought to agitation , that so what was confirmed before by the number of their then present adversaries , the same may now in some measure become of no effect to them , being negligently absent , and this same kind of industry and diligence which they use to make a people , is commonly called a faction ; but when a faction is inferiour in votes , and superiour , or not much inferiour in power , then what they cannot obtain by craft , and language , they attempt by force of armes , and so it comes to a civill warre . but some will say , these things doe not necessarily , nor often happen ; he may as well say , that the chief parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory , and that the greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters . xiii . it followes hence , that when the legislative power resides in such convents as these , the laws must needs be inconstant , and change , not according to the alteration of the state of affaires , nor according to the changeablenesse of mens mindes , but as the major part , now of this , then of that faction , do convent ; insomuch as the laws do flote here , and there , as it were upon the waters . xiv . in the fourth place , the counsels of great assemblies have this inconvenience , that whereas it is oft of great consequence , that they should be kept secret , they are for the most part discovered to the enemy before they can be brought to any effect , and their power , and will , is as soon known abroad , as to the people it selfe commanding at home . xv. these inconveniences which are found in the deliberations of great assemblies do so farre forth evince monarchy to be better then democraty , as in democraty affairs of great consequence are oftner trusted to be distrust by such like committees , then in a monarchy , neither can it easily bee done otherwayes ; for there is no reason why every man should not naturally rather minde his own private , then the publique businesse , but that here he sees a means to declare his eloquence , whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenuous , and wise , and returning home to his friends , to his parents , to his wife , and children , rejoyce , and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behaviour : as of old all the delight marcus cariclanus had in his warlike actions , was , to see his praises so well pleasing to his mother . but if the people in a democraty would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of warre , and peace , either on one , or some very few , being content with the nomination of magistrates , and publique ministers , that is to say , with the authority without the ministration , then it must be confest , that in this particular , democraty and monarchy would be equall . xvi . neither do the conveniencies or inconveniences which are found to be more in one kind of government then another , arise from hence , namely , because the government it self , or the administration of its affairs , are better committed to one , then many ; or on the other side , to many , then to some few ; for government , is the power , the administration of it , is the act , now the power in all kind of government is equall ; the acts only differ , that is to say the actions , and motions of a common-weale , as they flow from the deliberations of many , or few , of skilfull , or impertinent men . whence we understand , that the conveniences , or inconveniences of any government , depend not on him in whom the authority resides , but on his officers , and therefore nothing hinders , but that the common-weale may be well governed , although the monarch be a woman , or youth , or infant , provided that they be fit for affaires , who are endued with the publique offices , and charges ; and that which is said , woe to the land whose king is a childe , doth not signifie the condition of a monarchy to be inferiour to a popular state , but contrariwise , that by accident it is the grievance of a kingdome , that the king being a childe , it often happens , that many by ambition , and power , intruding themselves into publique counsels , the government comes to be administred in a democraticall manner , and that thence arise those infelicities which for the most part accompany the dominion of the people . xvii . but it is a manifest sign , that the most absolute monarchy is the best state of government , that not onely kings , but even those cities which are subject to the people , or to nobles , give the whole command of warre to one only , and that so absolute , as nothing can be more ( wherein by the way this must be noted also , that no king can give a generall greater authority over his army , then he himselfe by right may exercise over all his subjects ) monarchy therefore is the best of all governments in the camps . but what else , are many common-wealths , then so many camps strengthened with armes , and men against each other , whose state ( because not restrained by any common power , howsoever an uncertain peace , like a short truce , may passe between them ) is to be accounted for the state of nature , which is the state of war. xviii . lastly , since it was necessary for the preservation of our selves to be subject to some man , or councell , we cannot on better condition be subject to any , then one whose interest depends upon our safety , and welfare ; and this then comes to passe when we are the inheritance of the ruler ; for every man of his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance . but the lands , and monies of the subjects are not onely the princes treasure , but their bodies , and wildy minds ; which will be easily granted by those who consider at how great rates the dominion of lesser countries is valued , and how much easier it is for men to procure mony , then money men ; nor doe we readily meet with any example that shewes us when any subject , without any default of his own , hath by his prince been despoiled of his life , or goods , through the sole licenciousnesse of his authority . xix . hitherto we have compared a monarchicall , with a popular state ; we have said nothing of aristocracy ; we may conclude of this , by what hath been said of those , that , that which is hereditary , and content with the election of magistrates ; which transmits its deliberations to some few , and those most able ; which simply imitates the government of monarchs most , and the people least of all , is for the subjects both better , and more lasting then the rest . chap. xi . places and examples of scripture of the rights of government agreeable to what hath beene said before . i. the beginning of institutive government from the consent of the people . ii. judicature and wars depend on the will of supreme commanders . iii. that they who have the chief authority are by right unpunishable . iv. that without a supreme power there is no government , but anarchy . v. that from servants and sons there is a simple obedience due to their lords , and parents . vi. absolute authority proved by most evident places as well of the new ▪ as the old testament . i. vve have in the . chapter , and the . article , so derived the originall of institutive , or politicall government from the consent of the multitude , that it appears they must either all consent , or be esteem'd as enemies . such was the beginning of gods government over the jewes instituted by moses , if ye will obey my voice induced , &c. ye shall be unto me a kingdome of priests , &c. and moses came , and called the elders of the people , &c. and all the people answered , and said : all that the lord hath spoken we will do , exod. . ver . , , , . such also was the beginning of moyses his power under god , or of his vicegerency . and all the people saw the thunderings and lightenings , and the noyse of the trumpet , &c. and they said unto moyses , speak thou unto us , and we will hear . exod. . , . the like beginning also had sauls kingdome . when yee saw that nahash king of the children of ammon came out against you , yee said unto me , nay , but a king shall raign over us , when the lord your god was your king ; now therefore behold the king whom yee have chosen ▪ and whom yee have desired . sam. . . but the major part only consenting , and not all ( for there were certain sons of belial , who said , how shall this man save us ? and they dispised him , sam. . . ) those who did not consent were put to death as enemies ; and the people said unto samuel , who is he that said , shall saul reign over us ? bring the men that we may put them to death . sam. . . ii. in the same . chapter , the . and . articles , i have shewed , that all judgment and wars depend upon the will and pleasure of him who beares the supreme authority ; that is to say , in a monarchy , on a monarch , or king ; and this is confirmed by the peoples owne judgement . wee also will be like all the nations , and our king shall judge us , and goe out before us , and fight our battels . sam. 〈◊〉 . . and what pertaines to judgements , and all other matters , whereof there is any controversie , whether they be good , or evill , is confirmed by the testimony of king solomon . give therefore thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy people , that i may discerne between good and evill , . kings . . and that of absolom , there is no man deputed of the king to heare thee . . sam. . . iii. that kings may not be punished by their subjects , as hath been shewed above in the sixth chapter , and the twelfth article , king david also confirmes , who , though saul sought to stay him , did notwithstanding refrain his hand from killing him , and forbad abishai , saying , destroy him not ; for who ca●● stretch forth his hand against the lords anointed , and be innocent ? sam. . v. . and when he had cut off the skirt of his garment , the lord forbid ( saith he ) that i should doe this thing unto my master the lords anointed , to stretch forth mine hand against him . sam. . . and commanded the amaleki●e , who for his sake had slain saul , to be put to death . sam. . . iv. that which is said in the . chapter of judges , at the . verse . in those dayes there was no king in israel , but every man did that which was right in his own eyes ( as though where there were not a monarchy , there were an anarchy or confusion of all things ) may be brought as a testimony to prove the exexcellency of monarchy above all other forms of government , unlesse that by the word king may perhaps be understood , not one man onely , but also a court , provided that in it there reside a supreme power , which if it be taken in this sense , yet hence it may follow , that without a supreme and absolute power ( which we have endeavoured to prove in the sixth chapter ) there will be a liberty for every man to doe what hee hath a minde , or whatsoever shall seem right to himselfe ; which cannot stand with the preservation of mankinde , and therefore in all government whatsoever , there is ever a supreme power understood to be somewhere existent . v. we have in the . chapter , the . and . article , said , that servants must yeeld a simple obedience to their lords , and in the . chapter , article . that sonnes owe the same obedience to their parents . saint paul sayes the same thing concerning servants , servants obey in all things your masters according to the flesh , not with eye service , as men-pleasers , but in singlenesse of heart , fearing god. colos . . . concerning sonnes , children obey your parents in all things , for this is well pleasing unto the lord. colos . . . now as wee by simple obedience understand all things which are not contrary to the lawes of god ; so in those cited places of saint paul , after the word all things , we must suppose , excepting those which are contrary to the lawes of god. vi. but that i may not thus by peece ▪ meale prove the right of princes , i will now instance those testimonies which altogether establish the whole power , ( namely that there is an absolute and simple obedience due to them from their subjects ) and first out of the new testament . the scribes and pharis●es sit in moyses seat ; all therefore , whatsoever they bid you observe , that observe , and do● . mat. . . whatsoever they bid you , ( sayes he ) observe , that is to say , obey simply . why ? because they sit in moyses seat ; namely , the civill magistrates , not aaron , the priests . le● every soule be subject to the higher powers , for there is no power but of god , the powers that be are ordained of god ; whosoever therefore resisteth the power , resisteth the ordinance of god , and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation . rom. . . now because the powers that were in saint pauls time were ordained of god , and all kings did at that time require an absolute entire obedience from their subjects , it followes that such a power was ordained of god. submit your selves unto every ordinance of man for the lords sake , whether it bee to the king as supreme , or unto governours , as unto them that are sent by him , for the punishment of wicked doers , and for the praise of them that doe well , for so is the will of god. pet. . . again saint paul to titus , put them mind to bee subject to principalitiies and powers , to obey magistrates , &c. chap. . vers . . what principalities ? was it not to the principalities of those times , which required an absolute obedience ? furthermore , that we may come to the example of christ himselfe , to whom the kingdome of the jewes belonged by hereditary right , derived from david himselfe ; he when he lived in the manner of a subject , both paid tribute unto caesar , and pronounced it to be due to him . give unto caesar ( saith he ) the things which are caesars , and unto god , the things which are gods. mat. . . when it pleased him to shew himselfe a king , he required entire obedience goe ( said he ) into the village over against you , and straightway yee shall finde an assetyed , and a colt with her , loose them , and bring them unto me ; and if any man say ought unto you , yec shall say the lord hath need of them . mat. . . this he did therefore by the right of being lord , or a king of the jewes . but to take away a subjects goods on this pretence onely , because the lord hath need of them , is an absolute power . the most evident places in the old testament are these , goe thou near , and heare all that the lord our god shall say , and speak thou unto us all that the lord our god shall speak unto thee , and we will hear it , and doe it . deut. . . but under the word all , is contained absolute obedience . again to joshua . and they answered joshua saying , all that thou commandest us , we will doe , and whithersoever thou sendest us , we will goe ; according as we hearkened unto moyses in all things , so will we hearken unto thee , onely the lord thy god be with thee , as he was with moyses ; whosoever hee be that doth rebell against thy commandement , and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandest him , he shall be put to death . joshua . , , . and the parable of the bramble . then said all the trees unto the bramble , come thou , a●d reign over us ; and the bramble said unto the trees , if in truth yee anoint me king over you , then come and put your trust in my shadow ; and if not , let sire come out of the bramble , and devoure the cedars of lebanon . juages . vers . , . the sense of which words is , that we must acquiese to their sayings , whom we have truly constituted to be kings over us , unlesse we would chuse rather to be consumed by the fire of a civill warre . but the regall authority is more particularly described by god himselfe , in the . sam. . vers . . &c. shew them the right of the king that shall reign over them , &c. this shall be the right of the king that shall reign over you ; he will take your sons , and appoint them for himself , for his chariots , and to he his horsemen , and some shall runne before his chariots , &c. and he will take your daughters to be confectionaries , &c. and he will take your vineyards , and give them to his servants , &c. is not this power absolute ? and yet it is by god himself styled the kings right ; neither was any man among the jewes , no not the high priest himselfe , exempted from this obedience . for when the king ( namely solomon ) said to abiathar the priest , get thee to anathoth unto thine ●wn fields , for thou art worthy of death , but i will not at this time put thee to death , because thou ●arest the ark of the lord god before david my father , and because then hast been afflicted in all wherein my father was afflicted . so solomon thrust out abiathar from being priest unto the lord. kings . . . it cannot by any argument be proved , that this act of his displeased the lord ; neither read we , that either solomon was reproved , or that his person at that time was any whit lesse acceptable to god. chap. xii . of the internall causes , tending to the dissolution of any government . i. that the judging of good and evill belongs to private persons , is a seditious opinion . ii. that subjects do● sinne by obeying their princes , is a seditious opinion . iii. that tyrannicide is lawfull , is a seditious opinion . iv. that those who have the supreme power , are subject to the civill lawes , is a seditious opinion . v. that the supreme power may be divided , is a seditious opinion . vi. that faith , and sanctity , are not acquired by study and reason , but alwayes supernaturally infused , and inspired , is a● seditious opinion . vii . that each subject hath a propriety , or absolute dominion of his owne goods , is a seditious opinion . viii . not to understand the difference between the people and the multitude , prepares toward sedition . ix . too great a taxe of monies , though never so just and necessary , prepares toward sedition . x. ambition disposeth us to sedition . xi . so d●th the hope of successe . xii . el●quence alone without wisdom , is the only faculty needfull to raise seditions . xiii . how the folly of the common people , and the eloquntion of ambitious men , concur to the destruction of a common-weale . i. hitherto hath been spoken by what causes , and pacts , common-weals are constituted , and what the rights of princes are over their subjects ; now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes which dissolve them , or the reasons of seditions . now as in the motion of naturall bodies , three things are to be considered , namely , internall disposition , that they be susceptible of the motion to be produced ; the externall agent , whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produced ; and the action it selfe : so also in a common-weale where the subjects begin to raise tumults , three things present themselves to our regard ; first the doctrines and the passions contrary to peace , wherewith the mindes of men are ●itted and disposed ; next their quality and condition who sollicite , assemble , and direct them already thus disposed , to take up armes , and quit their allegiance ; lastly , the manner how this is done , or the faction it selfe : but one , and the first which disposeth them to sedition , is this , that the knowledge of good and ●vili belongs to ●ach single man. in the state of nature indeed , where every man lives by equall right , and have not by any mutuall pacts submitted to the command of others , we have granted this to be true , nay in the first chapter , article . that the civill lawes were the rules of good and evill , just and unjust , honest and dishonest ; that therefore what the legislator commands , must be held for good , and what he forbids for evill ; and the legislator is ever that person who hath the supreme power in the common-weale , that is to say , the monarch in a monarchy . we have confirmed the same truth in the eleventh chapter , article . out of the words of solomon ; for if private men may pursue that as good , and ●…n that as evill which appears to them to be so , to what end serve those words of his ? give therefore unto thy servant an understanding heart to judge thy people , that i may discern between good and evill . since therefore it belongs to kings to discerne betweene good and evill , wicked are those , though usuall sayings , that be onely is a king who does righteously , and that kings must not be obeyed , unlesse they command us just things , and many other such like . before there was any government , just and unjust had no being , their nature onely being relative to some cōmand , and every action in its own nature is indifferent ; that it becomes just , or unjust , proceeds from the right of the magistrate : legitimate kings therefore make the things they command , just , by commanding them , and those which they forbid , unjust , by forbidding them ; but private men while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evill , desire to be even as kings , which cannot be with the safety of the common weale . the most ancient of all gods commands is , gen. . . thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evill ; and the most ancient of all diabolicall tentations , chap. . vers . . yee shall be as gods , knowing good and evill ; and ▪ gods first expostulation with man , vers . . who told thee that thou wert naked ? hast thou eaten of the tree , whereof i cōmanded thee that thou shouldest not ●at ? as if he had said , how comest thou to judge that nakedness , wherein it seemed good to me to create thee , to be shamefull , except thou have arrogated to thy selfe the knowledge of good and evill ? ii. whatsoever any man doth against his conscience is a sinne , for he who doth so , contemns the law. but we must distinguish ; that is my sinne indeed , which committing , i doe beleeve to be my sinne , but what i beleeve to be another mans sin , i may sometimes doe that without any sin of mine ; for if i be commanded to doe that which is a sin in him who commands me , if i doe it , and he that commands me be by right , lord over me , i sinne not ; for if i wage warre at the commandement of my prince , conceiving the warre to be unjustly undertaken , i doe not therefore doe unjustly , but rather if i refuse to doe it , arrogating to my selfe the knowledge of what is just and unjust , which pertains onely to my prince . they who observe not this distinction , will fall into a necessity of sinning , as oft as any thing is commanded them , which either is , or seems to be unlawfull to them : for if they obey , they sin against their conscience , and if they obey not , against right . if they sin against their conscience , they declare that they fear not the paines of the world to come ; if they sinne against right , they doe as much as in them lyes , abolish humane society , and the civill life of the present world . their opinion therefore who teach , that subjects sinne when they obey their princes commands , which to them seem unjust , is both erroneous , and to be reckoned among those which are contrary to civill obedience ; and it depends upon that originall errour which we have observed above in the foregoing article ; for by our taking upon us to judge of good and evill , we are the occasion , that as well our obedience , as disobedience , becomes sin unto us . iii. the third seditious doctrine springs from the same root , that a tyrannicide is lawfull ; nay , at this day it is by many divines , and of old it was by all the philosophers , plato , aristo●ls , cicero , seneca , plutarch , and the rest of the maintainers of the greek , and roman anarchies , held not only unlawfull , but even worthy of the greatest contempt . and under the title of tyrants , they mean not onely monarchs , but all those who bear the chief rule in any government whatsoever ; for not pisistratus onely at athens , but those thirty also who succeeded him , and ruled together , were all called tyrants . but he , whom men require to be put to death as being a tyrant , commands either by right , or without right ; if without right , he is an enemy , and by right to be put to death ; but then this must not be called the killing a tyrant , but an enemy : if by right , then the divine interrogation takes place , who hath told thee that he was a tyrant , hast thou eaten of the tree whereof i commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat● for why doest thou call him a tyrant , whom god hath made a king , except that thou being a private person , usurpest to thy self the knowledge of good and evill ▪ but how pernicious this opinion is to all governments , but espcially to that which is monarchieall , we may hence discerne , namely , that by it every king , whether good or ill , stands exposed to be condemned by the judgement , and slain by the hand of every ●…rtherous villain . iv. the fourth adversary opinion to civill society , is theirs , who hold , that they who bear rule are subject also to the civill lawes ; which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true in the . chap. ar●ic . . from this argument , that a city can neither be bound to it self , nor to any subject ; not to it selfe , because no man can be obliged except it be to another ; not to any subject , because the single wills of the subjects are contained in the will of the city , insomuch , that if the city will be free from all such obligation , the subjects will so too ; and by consequence she is so ; but that which holds true in a city , that must be supposed to be true in a man , or an assembly of men , who have the supreme authority , for they make a city , which hath no being but by their supreme power . now that this opinion cannot consist with the very being of government , is evident from hence , that by it the knowledge of what is good and evill , that is to say , the definition of what is , and what is not against ▪ the lawes , would return to each single person : obedience therefore will cease as oft as , any thing seemes to be commanded contrary to the civill lawes , and together with it , all coercive jurisdiction , which cannot possibly be without the destruction of the very essence of government ; yet this errour hath great props , aristotle , and others ; who , by reason of humane infirmity , suppose the supreme power to be committed with most security to the lawes onely ; but they seem to have lookt very shallowly into the nature of government , who thought that the constrainning power , the interpretation of lawes , and the making of lawes , ( all which are powers necessarily belonging to government ) should be left wholly to the lawes themselves . now although particular subjects may sometimes contend in judgement , and goe to law with the supreme magistrate , yet this is onely then , when the question is not what the magistrate may , but what by a certain rule he hath declared he would doe ; as , when by any law the judges sit upon the life of a subject , the question is not whether the magistrate could by his absolute right deprive him of his life ; but whether by that law his will was that he should be deprived of it ; but his will was , he should , if he brake the law , else , his will was he should not : this thetefore , that a subject may have an action of law against his supreme magistrate , is not strength of argument sufficient to prove that he is tyed to his own lawes . on the contrary , it is evident , that he is not tied to his owne lawes , because no man is bound to himself . lawes therefore are set for titius , and caius , not for the ruler : however , by the ambition of lawyers , it is so ordered , that the lawes , to unskilfull men seeme not to depend on the authority of the magistrate , but their prudence . v. in the fifth place , that the supreme authority may be divided , is a most fatall opinion to all common-weales . but diverse men divide it diverse wayes . for some divide it so as to grant a supremacy to the civill power in matters pertaining to peace , and the benefits of this life , but in things concerning the salvation of the soul they transfer it on others ; now , because justice is of all things most necessary to salvation , it happens , that subjects measuring justice , not as they ought , by the civill lawes , but by the precepts and doctrines of them , who in regard of the magistrate , are either private men , or strangers , through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their princes , through fear falling into that which they most feared : now what can be more pernicious to any state , then that men should , by the apprehension of everlasting torments , be deterred from obeying their princes , that is to say , the lawes , or from being just ? there are also some who divide the supreme authority so as to allow the power of war , and peace , unto one , ( whom they call a monarch ) but the right of raising monies they give to some others , and not to him : but because monies are the sinewes of war , and peace , they who thus divide the authority , doe either really not divide it at all , but place it wholly in them , in whose power the money is , but give the name of it to another , or if they doe really divide it , they dissolve the government : for neither upon necessity can war be waged , nor can the publique peace be preserved without money . vi. it is a common doctrine , that faith and holinesse are not acquired by study , and naturall reason , but are alwayes supernaturally infused , and inspired into m●n : which , if it were true , i understand not why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith ; or why any man , who is truly a christian , should not be a prophet ; or lastly ; why every man should not judge what 's fit for him to doe , what to avoid , rather out of his own inspiration , then by the precepts of his superiours , or right reason . a return therefore must be made to the private knowledge of good and evil ; which cannot be granted without the ruine of all governments . this opinion hath spread it self so largely through the whole christian world , that the number of apostates from natural reason is almost become infinite , and it sprang from sick-brained men , who having gotten good store of holy words by frequent reading of the scriptures , made such a connexion of them usually in their preaching , that their sermons signifying just nothing , yet to unlearned men seemed most divine ; for he whose non-sense appears to be a divine speech , must necessarily seeme to be inspired from above . vii . the seventh doctrine opposite to government , is this , that each subject hath an absolute dominion over the goods be is in possession of . that is to say , such a propriety as excludes not only the right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods , but also of the magistrate himself , which is not true ; for they who have a lord over them , have themselves no lordship , as hath been proved , chap. . artic. . now the magistrate is lord of all his subjects , by the constitution of government . before the yoke of civill society was undertaken , no man had any proper right ; all things were common to all men ; tell me therefore , how gottest thou this propriety but from the magistrate ? how got the magistrate it , but that every man transferred his right on him ? and thou therefore hast also given up thy right to him ; thy dominion therefore , and propriety , is just so much as he will , and shall last so long as he pleases ; even as in a family , each son hath such proper goods , and so long lasting , as seeme good to the father . but the greatest part of men who professe civill prudence , reason otherwise ; we are equall ( say they ) by nature ; there is no reason why any man should by better right take my goods from me , then i his from him ; we know that mony sometimes is needfull for the defence and maintenance of the publique ; but let them , who require it , shew us the present necessity , and they shall willingly receive it . they who talk thus , know not , that what they would have , is already done from the beginning in the very constitution of government , and therefore speaking as in a dissolute multitude , and yet not fashishioned government , they destroy the frame . viii . in the last place , it 's a great hindrance to civill government , especially monarchicall , that men distinguish not enough between a people and a multitude . the people is somewhat that is one , having one will , and to whom one action may be attributed ; none of these can properly be said of a multitude . the people rules in all governments , for even in monarchies the people commands ; for the people wills by the will of one man ; but the multitude are citizens , that is to say , subjects . in a democraty , and aristocraty , the citizens are the multitude , but the court is the people . and in a monarchy , the subjects are the multitude , and ( however it seeme a paradox ) the king is the people . the common sort of men , and others who little consider these truthes , do alwayes speak of a great number of men , as of the people , that is to say , the city ; they say that the city hath rebelled against the king ( which is impossible ) and that the people will , and nill , what murmuring and discontented subjects would have , or would not have , under pretence of the people , stirring up the citizens against the city , that is to say , the multitude against the people . and these are almost all the opinions wherewith subjects being tainted doe easily tumult . and forasmuch as in all manner of government majesty is to be preserv'd by him , or them who have the supreme authority , the crimen laesae majestatis naturally cleaves to these opinions . ix . there is nothing more afflicts the mind of man then poverty , or the want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of life , and honour ; and though there be no man but knowes that riches are gotten with industry , and kept by fruga●…ty , yet all the poor commonly lay the blame on the evill government , excusing their own sloth , and luxury , as if their private goods forsooth were wasted by publique exactions ; but men must consider , that they who have no patrimony , must not onely labour that they may live , but fight too , that they may labour , every one of the jewes , who in esdras his time built the walls of jerusalem , did the work with one band , and held the sword in the other . in all government we must conceive that the hand which holds the sword is the king , or supreme councell , which is no lesse to be sustained , and nourisht , by the subjects care and industry , then that wherewith each man procures himself a private fortune ; and that custom●s , and tributes , are nothing else but their reward who watch in armes for us , that the labours and endeavours of single men may not be molested by the incursion of enemies ; and that their complaint , who impute their poverty to publick persons , is not more just , then if they should say that they are become in want by paying of their d●bts : but the most part of men consider nothing of these things , for they suffer the same thing with them who have a disease they call an incubus , which springing from gluttony , it makes men believe they are invaded , opprest , and stifled with a great weight : now it is a thing manifest of it selfe , that they who seeme to themselves to be burthened with the whole load of the common-weal , are prone to be seditious ; and that they are affected with change , who are distasted at the present st●…e of things . x. another noxious disease of the mind is theirs , who having little employment , want honour and dignity . all men naturally strive for honour , and preferment , but cheifly they who are least trouroubled with caring for necessary things ; for these men are invited by their vacancy sometimes to disputation among themselves concerning the common-weal , sometimes to an easie reading of histories , politiques , orations , poems , and other pleasant books , and it happens , that hence they think themselves sufficiently furnisht both with wit , and learning , to administer matters of the greatest consequence . now because all men are not what they appear to themselves , and if they were , yet all ( by reason of the multitude ) could not be received to publique offices , its necessary that many must be passed by . these therefore conceiving themselves affronted , can desire nothing more , partly out of envy to those who were preferred before them , partly out of hope to overwhelm them , then ill successe to the publique consultations ; and therefore it s no marvell if with greedy appetites they seek for occasions of innovations . xi . the hope of overcomming is also to be numbred among other seditious inclinations ; for let there be as many men as you wil , infected with opinions repugnant to peace , and civill government , let there be as many as there can , never so much wounded and torne with aff●onts , and calumnies , by them who are in authority , yet if there be no hope of having the better of them , or it appear not sufficient , there will no sedition follow ; every man will dissemble his thoughts , and rather content himself with the present burthen , then hazard an heavier weight ; there are four things necessarily requisite to this hop● . numbers , instruments , mutuall trust , and commanders . to resist publique magistrates without a great number , is not sedition , but desperation . by instruments of war i mean all manner of armes , munition , and other necessary provision , without which number can doe nothing , nor arms neither without mutuall trust ; nor all these without union under under some commander , whom of their own accord , they are content to obey ; not as being engaged by their submission to his command ( for we have already in this very chapter , supposed these kind of men not to understand , being obliged beyond that which seems right and good in their own eyes ) but for some opinion they have of his vertue , or military skill , or resemblance of humours . if these ●our be near at hand to men grieved with the present state , and measuring the justice of their actions by their own judgements , there will be nothing wanting to sedition and confusion of the realme , but one to stirre up and quicken them . xii . salust his character of cataline , ( then whom there never wa● a greater artist in raising seditions ) is this , that he had great eloquence , and little wisdome ; he separates wisdome from eloquence , attributing this as necessary to a man born for commotions , adjudging that as an instructresse of peace , and quietnesse . now , eloquence is twofold . the one is an elegant , and cleare expression of the conceptions of the mind , and riseth partly from the contemplation of the things themselves , partly from an understanding of words taken in their own proper , and definite signification ; the other is ▪ a commotion of the passions of the minde ( such as are hope , fear , anger , pitty ) and derives from a metaphoricall use of words fitted to the passions : that forms a speech from true principles , this from opinions already received , what nature soever they are of . the art of that is logick , of this rhetorick , the end of that is truth , of this victory . each hath its use , that in deliberations , this in exhortations ; for that is never disjoyned from wisdome , but this almost ever . but that this kind of powerfull eloquence , separated from the true knowledge of things , that is to say , from wisdome , is the true character of them who sollicite , and stirre up the people to innovations , may easily be gathered out of the work it selfe which they have to doe ; for they could not poyson the people with those absurd opinions contrary to peace and civill society , unlesse they held them themselves , which sure is an ignorance greater then can well befall any wise man , for he that knows not whence the lawes derive their power , which are the rules of just and unjust , honest and dishonest , good and evill , what makes and preserves peace among men , what destroyes it , what is his , and what anothers , lastly , what he would have done to himselfe ( that he may doe the like to others ) is surely to be accounted but meanly wis● ; but that they can turn their auditors out of fools into madmen ; that they can make things to them who are ill-affected seem worse , to them who are well-affected seem evil ; that they can enlarge their hopes , lessen their dangers beyond reason : this they have from that sort of eloquence , not which explains things as they are , but from that other , which by moving their mindes , makes all things to appear to bee such as they in their mindes prepared before , had already conceived them . xiii . many men who are themselves very well affected to civill society , doe through want of knowledge , cooperate to the disposing of subjects mindes to sedition , whilst they teach young men a doctrine conformable to the said opinions in their schooles , and all the people in their p●lpits : now they who desire to bring this disposition into act , place their whole endeavour in this , first , that they may joyn the ill affected together into faction and conspiracy ; next , that themselves may have the greatest stroke in the faction : they gather them into faction , while they make themselves the relators , and interpretors of the counsels and actions of single men , and nominate the persons and places , to assemble and deliberate of such things whereby the present government may be reformed , according as it shall seem best to their interests . now to the end that they themselves may have the chief rule in the faction , the faction must be kept in a faction , that is to say , they must have their secret meetings apart with a few , where they may order what shall afterward be propounded in a general meeting , and by whom , and on what subject , and in what order each of them shall speak , and how they may draw the powerfullest , and most popular men of the faction to their side : and thus when they have gotten a faction big enough , in which they may rule by their eloquence , they move it to take upon it the managing of affaires , and thus they sometimes oppresse the common-wealth , namely where there is no other faction to oppose them , but for the most part they rend it , and introduce a civill warre , for folly and eloquence concurre in the subversion of government in the same manner ( as the ●able hath it ) as heretofore the daughters of palias king of thessaly , conspired with medea against their father ; they going to restore the decrepit old man to his youth again , by the counsell of medea , they cut him into peeces , and set him in the fire to boyle , in vain expecting when he would live again ; so the common people through their folly ( like the daughters of palias ) desiring to renew the ancient government , being drawne away by the eloquence of ambitious men , as it were by the witchcraft of medea , divided into faction , they consume it rather by those flames , then they reforme it . chap. xiii . concerning the duties of them who bear rule . i. the right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise . ii. the safety of the people is the supreme law. iii. it behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many , not the propriety of this , or that man. iv. that by safety is understood all manner of conveniencies . v. a querie , whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects soules , as they shall judge best according to their owne consciences . vi. wherein the safety of the people consists . vii . that discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people . viii . that to have souldiers , armes , garrisons , and monies in a readinesse , in time of peace , is also necessary for the defence of the people . ix . a right instruction of subjects in civill doctrines , is necessary for the preserving of peace . x. equall distributions of publick offices , conduces much to the preservation of peace . xi . it is naturall equity that monies be taxt according to what every man spends , not what he posaesses . xii . it conduceth to the preservation of peace , to keepe downe ambitious men . xiii . and to breake factions . xiv . laws whereby thriving arts are cherisht , and great costs restrained , conduce to the enriching of the subiect . xv. that more ought not to be defined by the lawes , then the benefit of the prince and his subiects requires . xvi . that greater punishments must not bee inflicted , then are prescribed by the lawes . xvii . subiects must have right done them against corrupt judges . i. by what hath hitherto been said , the duties of citizens and subjects in any kind of government whatsoever , and the power of the supreme ruler over them are apparent ; but we have as yet said nothing of the duties of rulers , and how they ought to behave themselves towards their subjects ; we must then distinguish between the right , and the exercise of supreme authority , for they can be divided ; as for exa●ple , when he who hath the right , either cannot , or will not be present in judging trespasses , or deliberating of affaires ▪ for kings sometimes by reason of their age cannot order their affaires , sometimes also though they can doe it themselves , yet they judge it fitter , being satisfied in the choyce of their officers and counsellors , to exercise their power by them . now where the right and exercise are severed , there the government of the common-weale , is like the ordinary government of the world , in which god , the mover of all things , produceth naturall effects by the means of secondary causes ; but where he , to whom the right of ruling doth belong , is himselfe present in all judicatures , consultations , and publique actions , there the administration is such , as if god beyond the ordinary course of nature , should immediately apply himself unto all matters ; we will therefore in this chapter summarily and briefly speak somewhat concerning their duties who exercise authority , whether by their own or others right . nor is it my purpose to descend into those things , which being divers from others , some princes may doe , for this is to be left to the politicall practices of each common-weale . ii. now all the duties of rulers are contained in this one sentence , the safety of the people is the supreme law ; for although they who among men obtain the chiefest dominion , cannot be subject to lawes properly so called , that is to say , to the will of men , because to be chief , and subject , are contradictories ; yet is it their duty in all things , as much as possibly they can , to yeeld obedience unto right reason , which is the naturall , morall , and divine law ; but because dominions were constituted for peaces sake , and peace was sought after for safeties sake , he , who being placed in authority , shall use his power otherwise then to the safety of the people , will act against the reasons of peace , that is to say , against the lawes of nature ; now as the safety of the people dictates a law by which princes know their duty , so doth it also teach them an art how to procure themselves a benefit ; for the power of the citizens , is the power of the city , that is to say , his that bears the chief rule in any state . iii. by the people in this place we understand , not one civill person , namely the city it selfe which governs , but the multitude of subjects which are governed ; for the city was not instituted for its own , but for the subjects fake ; and yet a particular care is not required of this or that man ; for the ruler ( as such ) provides no otherwise for the safety of his people , then by his lawes , which are universall ; and therefore he hath fully discharged himselfe , if he have throughly endeavoured by wholesome constitutions , to establish the welfare of the most part , and made it as lasting as may be ; and that no man suffer ill , but by his own default , or by some chance which could not be prevented ; but it sometimes conduces to the safety of the most part , that wicked men doe suffer , iv. but by safety must be understood , not the sole preservation of life in what condition soever , but in order to its happines . for to this end did men freely assemble themselves , and institute a government , that they might , as much as their humane condition would afford , live delightfully . they therefore who had undertaken the administration of power in such a kinde of government , would sinne against the law of nature ( because against their trust who had committed that power unto them ) if they should not study , as much as by good laws could be effected , to furnish their subjects abundantly , not only with the good things belonging to life , but also with those which advance to delectation . they who have acquired dominion by arms , doe all desire that their subjects may be strong in body and mind , that they may serve them the better , wherefore if they should not endeavour to provide them , not only with such things whereby they may live , but also with such whereby they may grow strong and lusty , they would act against their own scope and end . v. and first of all , princes doe beleeve that it mainly concerns eternall salvation , what opinions are held of the deity , and what manner of worship he is to be adored with ; which being supposed , it may be demanded , whether chief rulers , and whosoever they be , whether one or more , who exercise supreme authority , sin not against the law of nature , if they cause not such a doctrine , and worship , to be taught and practised ( or permit a contrary to be taught and practised ) as they beleeve necessarily conduceth to the eternall salvation of their subjects ? it is manifest that they act against their conscience , and that they will , as much as in them lies , the eternall perdition of their subjects ; for if they willed it not , i see no reason why they should suffer , ( when being supreme they cannot be compelled ) such things to be taught and done , for which they beleeve them to be in a damnable state . but we will leave this difficulty in suspence . vi. the benefits of subjects respecting this life only , may be distributed into foure kindes . . that they be defended against forraign enemies . . that peace be preserved at home . . that they be enrich't as much as may consist with publique security . . that they enjoy a harmelesse liberty ; for supreme commanders can conferre no more to their civill happinesse , then that being preserved from forraign and civill warres , they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by their own i●dustry . vii . there are two things necessary for the peoples defence ; to be warned , and to be forearmed ; for the state of common-wealths considered in themselves , is natural , that is to say , hostile ; neither if they cease from fighting , is it therefore to be called peace , but rather a breathing time , in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the other , values his security n●t according to the pacts , but the forces and counsels of his adversary ; and this by naturall right , as hath been shewed in the second chapter , . artic. from this , that contracts are invalid in the state of nature , as oft as any just fear doth intervene ; it is therefore necessary to the defence of the city , first , that there be some who may as near as may be , search into , and discover the counsels and motions of all those who may prejudice it ; for discoverers to ministers of state , are like the beames of the sunne to the humane soule , and we may more truly say in vision politicall , then naturall , that the sensible , and intelligible species of outward things , not well considered by others , are by the ayre transported to the soule , ( that is to say to them who have the supreme authority ) and therefore are they no lesse necessary to the preservation of the state , then the rayes of the light are to the conservation of man ; or if they be compared to spiders webs , which extended on all sides by the finest threds , doe warn them , keeping in their small holds , of all outward motions ; they who bear rule can no more know what is necessary to be commanded for the defence of their subjects without spies , then those spiders can when they shall goe forth , and whether they shall repair , without the motion of those threds . viii . farthermore , it s necessarily requisite to the peoples defence , that they be fore-armed . now to be fore-armed is to be furnisht with souldiers , armes , ships , forts and monies , before the danger be instant ; for the listing of souldiers , and taking up of armes after a blow is given , is too late , at least if not impossible . in like manner , not to raise forts , and appoint garrisons in convenient places , before the fromiers are invaded , is to be like those country swains ( as demosthenes said ) who ignorant of the art of fencing , with their bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first f●lt the smart of the strokes . but they who think it then seasonable enough to raise monies for the maintenance of souldiers , and other charges of war , when the danger begins to shew it self , they consider not surely how difficult a matter it is to wring suddainly out of close ▪ fisted men so vast a proportion of monies ; for almost all men , what they once reckon in the number of their goods , doe judge themselves to have such a right and propriety in it , as they conceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to imploy but the least part of it for the publique good . now a sufficient stock of monies to defend the country with armes , will not soon be raised out of the treasure of imposts , and customes ; we must therefore , for fear of war , in time of peace hoord up good summs , if we intend the safety of the common-weal . since therefore it necessarily belongs to rulers for the subjects safety to discover the enemies counsell , to keep garrisons , and to have money in continuall readinesse , and that princes are by the law of nature bound to use their whole endeavour in procuring the welfare of their subjects , it followes , that it s not onely lawfull for them to send out spies , to maintain souldiers , to build forts , and to require monies for these purposes , but also , not to doe thus , is unlawfull . to which also may be added , whatsoever shall seeme to conduce to the lesning of the power of forraigners whom they suspect , whether by sleight , or force . for rulers are bound according to their power to prevent the evills they suspect , lest peradventure they may happen through their negligence . ix . but many things are required to the conservation of inward peace , because many things concur ( as hath been shewed in the foregoing chapter ) to its perrurbation . we have there shewed , that some things there are which dispose the minds of of men to sedition , others which move and quicken them so disposed . among those which dispose them , we have reckoned in the first place certaine perverse doctrines . it s therefore the duty of those who have the chief authority ; to root those out of the mindes of men , not by commanding , but by teaching ; not by the terrour of penalties , but by the perspicuity of reasons ; the lawes whereby this evill may be withstood are not to be made against the persons erring , but against the errours themselves . those errours which in the foregoing chapter we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of the common-weal , have crept into the mindes of ignorant men , partly from the pulpit , partly from the daily discourses of men , who by reason of little employment , otherwise , doe finde leasure enough to study ; and they got into these mens mindes by the teachers of their youth in publique schooles . wherefore also , on the other side , if any man would introduce sound doctrine , he must begin from the academies : there , the true , and truly demonstrated foundations of civill doctrine are to be laid , wherewith young men being once endued , they may afterward both in private and publique instruct the vulgar . and this they will doe so much the more cheerfully , and powerfully , by how much themselves shall be more certainly convinced of the truth of those things they profess , and teach ; for seeing at this day men receive propositions , though false , and no more intelligible , then if a man should joyne together a company of termes drawn by chance out of an urne , by reason of the frequent use of hearing them ; how much more would they for the same reason entertain true doctrines suitable to their own understandings , and the nature of things ? i therefore conceive it to be the duty of supreme officers to cause the true elements of civill doctrine to be written , and to command them to be taught in all the colledges of their severall dominions . x. in the next place we shewed that grief of mind a●ising from want did dispose the subjects to sedition , which want , although deriv'd from their own luxury , and sloth , yet they impute it to those who govern the realm , as though they were drained and opprest by publique pensions . notwithstanding it may sometimes happen that this complaint may be just , namely , when the burthens of the realm are unequally imposed on the subjects ; for that which to all together is but a light weight , if many withdraw themselves , it wil be very heavy , nay , even intollerable to the rest : neither are men wont so much to grieve at the burthen it self , as at the inequality . with much earnestnes therefore men strive to be freed from taxes , & in this conflict the lesse happy , as being overcome , do envy the more fortunate . to remove therefore all just complaint , it s the interest of the publique quiet , and by consequence it concernes the duty of the magistrate , to see that the publique burthens be equally born . furthermore , since what is brought by the subjects to publick use , is nothing else but the price of their bought peace , its reason good , that they who equally share in the peace , should also pay an equall part either by contributing their monies , or their labours to the common-weal ; now it is the law of nature ( by the . article of the . chapter ) that every man in distributing right to others , doe carry himself equall to all ; wherefore rulers are by the naturall law obliged to lay the burthens of the common-weal equally on their subjects . xi . now in this place we understand an equality , not of money , but of burthen , that is to say , an equality of reason between the burthens , and the benefits . for although all equally enjoy peace , yet the benefits springing from thence , are not equall to all ; for some get greater possessions , others lesse ; and againe , some consume lesse , others more . it may therefore be demanded whether subjects ought to contribute to the publique , according to the rate of what they gain , or of what they spend , that is to say , whether the persons must be taxt , so as to pay contribution according to their wealth , or the goods themselves , that every man contribute according to what he spends . but if we consider , where monies are raised according to wealth , there they who have made equall gain , have not equall possessions , because that one preserves what he hath got by frugality , another wastes it by luxury , and therefore equally rejoycing in the benefit of peace , they doe not equally sustaine the burthens of the common-weal : and on the other side , where the goods themselves are taxt , there every man , while he spends his private goods , in the very act of consuming them he undiscernably payes part due to the common-weal , according to , not what he hath , but what by the benefit of the realm he hath had ; it is no more to be doubted ▪ but that the former way of commanding monies is against equity , and therefore against the duty of rulers , the latter is agreeable to reason , and the exercise of their authority . xii . in the third place , we said that that trouble of minde which riseth from ambition was offensive to publique peace . for there are some who seeming to themselves to be wiser then others , and more sufficient for the managing of affaires then they who at present doe govern , when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their vertue would prove to the common-weale , they shew it , by harming it ; but because ambition and greedinesse of honours cannot be rooted out of the mindes of men , it s not the duty of rulers to endeavour it ; but by constant application of rewards , and punishments , they may so order it , that men may know that the way to honour is , not by contempt of the present government , nor by factions , and the popular ayre , but by the contraries . they are good men who observe the decrees , the lawes and rights of their fathers ; if with a constant order we saw these adorned with honours , but the factions punisht , and had in contempt by those who bear command , there would be more ambition to obey , then withstand ; notwithstanding it so happens sometimes , that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much fiercenesse , so a stiffe neckt subject must be flatter'd for fear of his powe● ; but as that happens when the rider , so this , when the commander is in danger of falling . but we speak here of those , whose authority aund power is intire . their duty ( i say ) it is to cherish obedient subjects , and to depresse the factious all they can ; nor can the publique power be otherwise preserved , nor the subjects quiet without it . xiii . but if it be the duty of princes to restrain the factious , much more does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions themselues . now i call a faction , a multitude of subjects gathered together , either by mutuall contracts among themselves , or by the power of some one , without his or theirs who bear the supreme rule : a faction therefore is as it were a city in a city ; for as by an union of men in the state of nature a city receives its being , so by a new union of subjects , there ariseth a faction . according to this definition , a multitude of subjects who have bound themselves simply to obey any forreign prince , or subject , or have made any pacts , or leagues of mutuall defence between themselves against all men , not excepting those who have the supreme power in the city , is a faction . also favour with the vulgar if it be so great , that by it an army may be rais'd , except publique caution be given , either by hostages , or some other pledges , contains faction in it ; the same may be said of private wealth , if it exceed , because all things obey mony . forasmuch therefore as it is true , that the state of cities among themselves is naturall , and hostile , those princes who permit factions , doe as much as if they received an enemy within their walls , which is contrary to the subjects safety , and therefore also against the law of nature . xiv . there are two things necessary to the enriching of subjects , laobur and thrife ; there is also a third which helps , to wit the naturall increase of the earth , and water , and there is a fourth too , namely the militia , which sometimes augments , but more frequently lessens the subjects stock . the two first are only necessary . for a city constituted in an island of the sea , no greater then will serve for dwelling , may grow rich without sowing , or fishing , by merchandize , and handicrafts only ; but there is no doubt if they have a territory , but they may be richer with the same number , or equally rich , being a greater number ; but the fourth , namely the militia , was of old reckoned in the number of the gaining ar●s , under the notion of booting or taking prey ; and it was by mankind , ( disperst by families ) before the constitution of civill societies , accounted just and honourable ; for preying , is nothing else but a warre waged with small forces ; and great common-weales , namely that of rome , and athens , by the spoyles of warre , forraigne tribute , and the territories they have purchased by their armes , have sometimes so improved the common-wealth , that they have not onely not required any publique monies from the poorer sort of subjects , but have also divided to each of them both monies and lands . but this kind of increase of riches , is not to be brought into rule and fashion : for the militia in order to profit , is like a dye wherewith many lose their estates , but few improve them . since therefore there are three things only , the fruits of the earth and water , labour and thrif● , which are expedient for the enriching of subjects , the duty of commanders in chief , shall be conversant onely about those three . for the first , those lawes will be usefull which countenance the arts that improve the increase of the earth , and water , such as are husbandry , and fishing . for the second , all lawes against idlenesse , and such as quicken industry , are profitable ; the ar● of navigation ( by help whereof the commodities of the whole world , bought almost by labour only , are brought into one city ) and the mechanicks , ( under which i comprehend all the arts of the most excellent workmen ) and the mathemacicall sciences , the fountains of navigatory and mechanick employments , are held in due esteem and honour . for the third , those lawes are usefull , whereby all inordinate expence , as well in meats , as in clothes , and universally in all things which are consumed with usage , is forbidden . now because such lawes are beneficiall to the ends above specified , it belongs also to the office of supreme magistrates , to establish them . xv. the liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from the lawes of the city , or that they who have the supreme power cannot make what laws they have a mind to ; but because all the motions and actions of subjects , are never circumscribed by lawes , nor can be , by reason of their variety ; it is necessary that there be infinite cases , which are neither commanded , nor prohibited , but every man may either doe , or not doe them , as he lifts himselfe . in these , each man is said to enjoy his liberty , and in this sense liberty is to be understood in this place , namely , for that part of naturall right , which is granted and left to subjects by the civill lawes . as water inclosed on all hands with banks , stands still and corrupts ; having no bounds , it spreds too largely , and the more passages it findes , the more freely it takes its current ; so subjects , if they might doe nothing without the commands of the law would grow dull , and unwildly , if all , they would be disperst , and the more is left undetermined by the lawes , the more liberty they enjoy . both extremes are faulty , for lawes were not invented to take away , but to direct mens actions , even as nature ordained the banks , not to stay , but to guide the course of the streame . the measure of this liberty is to be taken from the subjects , and the cities good ; wherefore in the first place it is against the charge of those who command , and have the authority of making lawes , that there should be more lawes then necessarily serve for good of the magistrate , and his subjects ; for since men are wont commonly to debate what to do , or not to do , by naturall reason , rather then any knowledge of the lawes , where there are more lawes then can easily be remembred , and whereby such things are forbidden , as reason of it selfe prohibites not of necessity , they must through ignorance , without the least evill i●tention , fall within the compasse of lawes , as gins laid to entrap their harmelesse liberty , which supreme commanders are bound to preserve for their subjects by the lawes of nature . xvi . it is a great part of that liberty which is harmlesse to civill government , and necessary for each subject to live happily , that there be no penalties dreaded , but what they may both foresee , and look for ; and this is done , where there are either no punishments at all defined by the lawes , or greater not required then are defined ; where there are none defined , there he that hath first broken the law , expects an in definite or arbitrary punishment , and his feare is supposed boundlesse , because it relates to an unbounded evill ; now the law of nature commands them who are n●t subject to any civill lawes , ( by what we have said in the third chapter , artic. . ) and therefore supreme commanders , that in taking revenge and punishing , they must not so much regard the past evill , as the future good , and they sin , if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment , then the publique benefit ; but where the punishment is defined , either by a law prescribed , as when it is set down in plain words , that he th●t shall doe thus , or thus , shall suffer so and so ; or by practice , as when the penalty , ( not by any law prescribed , but arbitrary from the beginning ) is afterward determined by the punishment of the first delinquent ( for naturall equity commands that equall transgressors be equally punished ) there to impose a greater penalty then is defined by the law , is against the law of nature . for the end of punishment is not to compell the will of man , but to fashion it , & make it such as he would have it who hath set the penalty . and deliberation is nothing else but a weiging , as it were in scales , the conveniencies , and inconveniencies of the fact we are attempting ; where , that which is more weighty , doth necessarily according to its inclination prevaile with us . if therefore the legislator doth set a lesse penalty on a crime , then will make our feare more considerable with us , then our lust ; that excesse of lust above the feare of punishment , whereby sinne is committed , is to be attributed to the legislator ( that is to say ) to the supreme , and therefore if he inflict a greater punishment , then himselfe hath determined in his lawes , he punisheth that in another , which he sinned himselfe . xvii . it pertaines therefore to the harmlesse and necessary liberty of subjects , that every man may without feare , enjoy the rights which are allowed him by the lawes ; for it is in vain to have our own distinguisht by the lawes from anothers , if by wrong judgement , robbery , theft , they may bee again confounded ; but it falls out so , that these doe happen where judges are corrupted ; for the fear whereby men are deterred from doing evill , ariseth not from hence , namely , because penalties are set , but because they are executed ; for we esteeme the future by what is past , seldome expecting what seldome happens . if therefore judges corrupted either by gifts , favour , or even by pitty it self , do often forbear the execution of the penalties due by the law , and by that meanes put wicked men in hope to passe unpunisht : honest subjects encompast with murtherers , theeves and knaves , will not have the liberty to converse freely with each other , nor scarce to stirre abroad without hazard ; nay , the city it self is dissolved , and every mans right of protecting himself at his own will returnes to him . the law of nature therefore gives this precept to supreme commanders , that they not onely doe righteousnesse themselves , but that they also by penalties cause the judges , by them appointed , to doe the same ; that is to say , that they hearken to the complaints of their subjects ; and as oft as need requires , make choice of some extraordinary judges , who may hear the matter debated concerning the ordinary ones . chap. xiv . of lawes and trespasses . i. how law differs from counsell . ii. how from covenant . iii. how from right . iv. division of lawes into divine and humane : the divine into naturall and positive ; and the naturall into the lawes of single-men , and of nations . v. the division of humane , that is to say , of civil lawes into sacred and secular . vi. into distributive and vindicative . vii . that distributive , and vindicative , are not species , but parts of the lawes . viii . all law is supposed to have a penalty annex● to it . ix . the precepts of the decalogue of honouring parents , of murther , adultery , theft , falsewitnesse , are civill lawes . x. it s impossible to command ought by the civil law contrary to the law of nature . xi . it s essential to a law , both that it self , and also the lawgiver be known . xii . whence the law-giver comes to be known . xiii . publishing , and interpretation , are necessary to the knowledge of a law. xiv . the division of the civill law into written , and unwritten . xv. the naturall lawes are not written lawes ; neither are the wi●e sentences of lawyers , nor custome , lawes of themselves , but by the consent of the supreme power . xvi . what the word sinne most largely taken , signisies ▪ xvii . the definition of sin. xviii . the difference between a sin of infirmity , and malice . xix . vnder what kind of sinne atheisme is contained . xx. what treason is . xxi . that by treason , not the civill , but the naturall lawes are broken . xxii . and that therefore it is to be punisht not by the right of dominion , but by the right of war. xxiii . that obedience is not rightly distinguisht into active , and passive . i. they who lesse seriously consider the force of words , doe sometimes confound law with counsell , sometimes with covenant , sometimes with right . they confound law with counsel , who think , that it is the duty of monarchs not onely to give ear to their counsellours , but also to obey them , as though it were in vaine to take counsell , unlesse it were also followed . we must fetch the distinction between counsel , and law , from the difference between counsell , and command . now counsell is a precept in which the reason of my obeying it , is taken from the thing it self which is advised ; but command is a precept in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the commander . for it is not properly said , thus i will , and thus i command , except the will stand for a reason ; now when obedience is yielded to the lawes , not for the thing it self , but by reason of the advisers will , the law is not a counsell , but a command , and is defined thus , law is the command of that person ( whether man , or court ) whose precept containes in it the reason of obedience ; as the precepts of god in regard of men , of magistrates in respect of their subjects , and universally of all the powerfull in respect of them who cannot resist , may be termed their lawes ; law and counsell therefore differ many ways ; law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth , counsell to them who have no power . to follow what is prescribed by law , is duty , what by counsell , is free-will . counsell is directed to his end that receives it , law , to his that gives it . counsell is given to none but the willing , law even to the unwilling . to conclude , the right of the counsellour is made void by the will of him to whom he gives counsell , the right of the law-giver is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a law imposed . ii. they confound law , and covenant , who conceive the lawes to be nothing else but certain 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , or forms of living , determined by the common consent of men : amongst whom is aristotle , who defines law on this manner , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is to say , law is a speech limited according to the common consent of the city , declaring every thing that we ought to doe ; which definition is not simply of law , but of the civill law ; for it is manifest that the divine lawes sprang not from the consent of men , nor yet the lawes of nature ; for if they had their originall from the consent of men , they might also by the same consent be abrogated ; but they are unchangeable . but indeed that 's no right definition of a civill law ; for in that place a city is taken either for one civill person , one will , or for a multitude of men who have each of them the liberty of their private wills ; if for one person , those words , common consent , are ill placed here , for one person hath no common consent ; neither ought he to have said , ( declaring what was needfull to be done ) but commanding ; for what the city deolares , it commands its subjects . he therefore by a city understood a multitude of men declaring by common consent ( imagine it a writing confirm'd by votes ) some certain formes of living ; but these are nothing else but some mutuall contracts which oblige not any man ( and therefore are no lawes ) before that a supreme power being constituted which can compell , have sufficient remedy against the rest , who otherwise are not likely to keep them . lawes therefore , according to this definition of aristotle , are nothing else , but naked , and weak contracts , which then at length , when there is one who by right doth exercise the supreme power , shall either become lawes , or no lawes , at his will and pleasure : wherefore he confounds contracts with lawes , which he ought not to have done ; for contract is a promise , law a command . in contracts we say , i will do this ; in lawes , doe this . ( * ) contracts oblige us , lawes vie us fast , being obliged . a contract obligeth of it self , the law holds the party obliged by vertue of the universall contract of yeelding obedience ; therefore in contract its first determined what is to be done , before we are obliged to doe it ; but in law we are first obliged to performe , and what is to be done , is determined afterwards . aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civill law thus , a civill law is a speech limited by the will of the city , commanding every thing behoofefull to be done , which is the same with that we have given above in the . chap. art . . to wit , that the civill lawes are the command of him ( whether man , or court of men ) who is endued with supreme power in the city , concerning the future actions of his subjects . contracts oblige us . ] to be obliged , and to be tyed being obliged , seems to some men to be one , and the same thing , and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words , but none indeed . more cleerly therefore , i say th●… , that a man is obliged ●y his contracts , that is , that he ought to performe for his promise sake ; but that the law tyes him being obliged , that is to say , it compells him to make good his promise , for fear of the punishment appointed by the law. iii. they confound lawes with right , who continue still to doe what is permitted by divine right , notwithstanding it be forbidden by the civill law : that which is prohibited by the divine law , cannot bee permitted by the civill , neither can that which is commanded by the divine law , be prohibited by the civill , notwithstanding that which is permitted by the divine right , that is to say , that which may be done by divine right , doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civill lawes ; for inferiour lawes may restrain the liberty allowed by the superiour , although they cannot enlarge them : now naturall liberty is a right not constituted , but allowed by the lawes . for the lawes being removed , our liberty is absolute ; this is first restrained by the naturall , and divine lawes , the residue is bounded by the civill law , and what remains may again be restrained by the constitutions of particular towns , and societies ; there is great difference therefore between law , and right . for law is a setter , right is freedome , and they differ like contraries . iv. all law may be divided , first according to the diversity of its authors into divine and humane , the divine , according to the two wayes whereby god hath made known his will unto men , is twofold , naturall ( or morall ) and positive ; naturall is that which god hath declared to all men by his eternall word borne with them , to wit , their naturall reason ; and this is that law which in this whole book i have endeavoured to unfold ; positive is that , which god hath revealed to us by the word of prophesie , wherein he hath spoken unto men as a man : such are the lawes which he gave to the jewes concerning their government , and divine worship , and they may be termed the divine civill lawes , because they were peculiar to the civill government of the jewes , his peculiar people . again , the naturall law may be divided into that of men , which alone hath obtained the title of the i aw of nature , and that of cities , which may be called that of nations , but vulgarly it is termed the right of nations . the precepts of both are alike , but because cities once instituted doe put on the personall proprieties of men , that law , with speaking of the duty of single men , we call naturall , being applyed to whole cities , and nations , is called the right of nations . and the same elements of naturall law , and right , which have hitherto been spoken of , being transferred to whole cities and nations , may be taken for the elements of the lawes , and right of nations . v. all humane law is civill . for the state of men considered out of civill society , is hostile , in which , because one is not subject to another , there are no other lawes , beside the dictates of naturall reason , which is the divine law. but in civill government the city onely , that is to say , that man , or court , to whom the supreme power of the city is committed , is the legislator , and the lawes of the city are civill . the civill lawes may be divided according to the diversity of their subject matter , into sacred , or secular ; sacred are those which pertain to religion , that is to say , to the ceremonies , and worship of god ( to wit what persons , things , places , are to be consecrated , and in what fashion , what opinions concerning the deity are to be taught publiquely , and with what words , and in what order supplications are to be made , and the like ) and are not determined by any divine positive law. for the civill sacred lawes are the humane lawes ( which are also called ecclesiasticall ) concerning things sacred ; but the secular under a generall notion , are usually called the civill lawes . vi again , the civill law ( according to the two offices of the legislator , whereof one is to judge ; the other to constrain men to acquiesce to his judgements ) hath two parts ; the one distributive , the other vindicative , or penall . by the distributive it is , that every man hath his proper right , that is to say , it sets forth rules for all things , whereby we may know what is properly ours , what another mans ; so as others may not hinder us from the free use and enjoyment of our own ; and we may not interrupt others in the quiet possession of theirs ; and what is lawfull for every man to doe or omit , and what is not lawfull . vindicative is that whereby it is defined what punishment shall be inflicted on them who break the law. vii . now distributive , and vindicative , are not two severall species of the lawes , but two parts of the same law. for if the law should say no more , but ( for example ) whatsoever you take with your net in the sea , be it yours , i●s in vain ; for although another should take that away from you which you have caught , it hinders not , but that it still remains yours ; for in the state of nature where all things are common to all , yours , and others , are all one , insomuch as what the law defines to be yours , was yours even before the law , and after the law ceases not to bee yours , although in another mans possession . wherefore the law doth nothing , unlesse it bee understood to bee so yours , as all other men be forbidden to interrupt your free use , and secure enjoyment of it at all times , according to your own will , and pleasure . for this is that which is required to a propriety of goods , not that a man may be able to use them , but to use them alone , which is done by prohibiting others to be an hinderance to him . but in vain doe they also prohibit any men , who doe not withall strike a fear of punishment into them ; in vain therefore is the law , unlesse it contain both parts , that which forbids iujuries to be done , and that which punisheth the doers of them . the first of them which is called distributive , is prohibitory , and speaks to all , the second which is styled vindicative , or paenary , is mandatory , and onely speaks to publique ministers . viii . from hence also we may understand , that every civill law hath a penalty annexed to it , either explicitly , or implicitly ; for where the penalty is not defined , neither by any writing , nor by example of any one who hath suffered the punishment of the transgressed law , there the penalty is understood to be arbitrary , namely , to depend on the will of the legislator , that is to say , of the supreme commander . for in vain is that law which may be broken without punishment . ix . now because it comes from the civill lawes , both that every man have his proper right , and distinguisht from anothers , and also that he is forbidden to invade anothers rights , it followes , that these precepts ( thou shalt not refuse to give the honour defin'd by the lawes unto thy parents : thou shalt not kill the man whom the lawes forbid thee to kill : thou shalt avoid all copulation forbidden by the laws : thou shalt not take away anothers goods against the lords will : thou shalt not frustrate the laws and judgements by false testimony ) are civill law●s . the naturall lawes command the same things but implicitly ; for the law of nature ( as hath been said in the . chap. art. . ) commands us to keep contracts , and therefore also to performe obedience when we have covenanted obedience , and to abstaine from anothers goods when it is determin'd by the civill law what belongs to another ; but all subjects ( by the . art. of the . chap. ) do covenant to obey his commands who hath the supreme power , that is to say the the civfll lawes , in the very constitution of government , even before it is possible to break them ; for the law of nature did oblige in the state of nature , where first ( because nature hath given all things to all men ) nothing did properly belong to another , and therefore it was not possible to invade anothers right ; next , where all things were common , and therefore all carnall copulations lawfull ; thirdly , where was the state of ▪ warre , and therefore lawfull to kill ; fourthly , where all things were determined by every mans own judgement , and therefore paternall respects also : lastly , where there were no publique judgements , and therefore no use of bearing witnesse , either true , or false . x. seetng therefore our obligation to observe those ▪ aws , is more ancient then the promulgation of the laws themselves , as being contained in the very eonst●t●tion of the city , by the vertue of the naturall law which forbids breach of covenant , the law of nature commands us to keep all the civill laws ; for where we are ●tyed to obedience , before we know what will be commanded us , there we are universally tyed to obey in all things ; whence it followes , that no civil law whatsoever , which tends not to a reproach of the dei●y ( in respect of whom , citie● themselves have no right of their own , and cannot be said to make lawes ) can possibly be against the law of nature ; for though the law of nature forbid theft , adultery , &c. yet if the civill law command us to invade any thing , that invasion is not theft , adultery , &c. for when the i acedemonians of old permitted their youths by ▪ a certaine law , to take away other mens goods , they commanded that these goods should not bee accounted other mens , but their own who took them ; and therefore such surreptions were no thefts . in like manner , copulations of heathen sexes , according to their lawes , were lawfull marriages . xi . it s necessary to the essence of a law , that the subjects be acquainted with two things , first , what man or court hath the supreme power , that is to say , the right of making lawes . secondly , what the law it self sayes ; for he that neither knew either to whom or what he is tyed to , cannot obey , and by consequence is in such a condition , as if he were not tyed at all . i say not that it is necessary to the essence of a law , that either one , or the other be perpetually known , but onely that it be once knowne ; and if the subject afterward forget either the right he hath who made the law , or the law it self , that makes him no less● tyed to ohey , since he might have remembred it , had he had a will to obey . xii . the knowledge of the legislator depends on the subject himselfe ; for the right of making lawes could not be conferr'd on any man without his owne consent , and covenant , either exprest , or suppos'd ; exprest , when from the beginning the citizens doe themselves constitute a forme of governing the city , or when by promise they submit themselves to the dominion of any one ; or suppos'd at least , as when they make use of the benefit of the realme , and lawes , for their protection and conservation against others ; for to whose dominion we require our fellow subjects to yeeld obedience for our good , his dominion we acknowledge to be legitimate by that very request ; and therefore ignorance of the power of making lawes , can never be a sufficient excuse ; for every man knowes what he hath done himselfe . the knowledge of the lawes depends on the legislator , who must publish them , for otherwise they are not lawes ; for law is the command of the law-maker , and his command is the declaration of his will ; it is not therefore a law , except the will of the law-maker be declar'd , which is done by promulgation . now in promulgation two things must be manifest , whereof one is , that he or they who publish a law , either have a right themselves to make lawes , or that they doe it by authority deriv'd from him or ●hem who have it ; the other is the sense of the law it selfe . now , that the first , namely publisht lawes proceed from him who hath the supreme command , cannot be manifest ( speaking exactly and philosophically ) to any , but them who have received them from the mouth of the commander , the rest beleeve , but the reasons of their beliefe are so many , that it is scarce possible they should not believe . and truly in a democratical city where every one may be present at the making of laws if he will , he that shall be absent , must beleeve those that were present ; but in monarchies and aristocraties , because it s granted but to few to be present , and openly to heare the commands of the monarch or the nobles , it was necessary to bestow a power on those few of publishing them to the rest ; and thus we beleeve those to be the edicts and decrees of princes , which are propoūded to us for such , either by the writings , or voices of them , whose office it is to publish them ; but yet when we have these causes of beliefe , that we have seen the prince , or supreme councell constantly use such counsellors , secretaries , publishers , and scales , and the like arguments for the declaring of his will ; that he never took any authority from them ; that they have bin punisht who not giving credit to such like promulgations have transgrest the law ; not onely he who thus believing shall not obey the edicts and decrees set forth by them is every where accus'd , but he that not believing , shall not yield obedience , is punisht ; for the constant permission of these things is a manifest signe enough , and evident declaration of the commanders will ; provided there be nothing contain'd in the law , edict or decree , derogatory from his supreme power : for it is not to be imagin'd that he would have ought taken from his power by any of his officers as long as he retaines a will to governe . now the sense of the law , when there is any doubt made of it , is to be taken from them to whom the supreme authority hath committed the knowledge of causes , or judgements ; for to judge is nothing else then by interpretation to apply the lawes to particular cases ; now we may know who they are that have this office granted them , in the same manner , as we know who they be that have authority given them to publish laws . xiv . againe the civill law according to its two fold manner of publishing , is of two sorts , written & unwritten ; by written , i understand that which wants a voice , or some other signe of the will of the ●egislator that it may become a law : for all kind of laws are of the same age with mankinde , both in nature , and time , and therefore of more antiquity then the invention of letters , and the art of writing ; wherefore not a writing , but a voice is necessary for a written law , this alone is requisite to the being , that to the remembrance of a law ; for we reade , that before letters were found out for the help of memory , that lawes contracted into meetre , were wont to be sung . the unwritten is that which wants no other publishing then the voice of nature , or naturall reason , such are the lawes of nature . for the naturall law although it be distinguisht from the civill , for as much as it commands the will , yet so farre forth as it relates to our actions it is civill ; for ▪ example , this same , thou shalt not covet , which onely appertaines to the minde , is a naturall law onely , but this , thou shalt not invade , is both naturall and civill ; for seeing it is impossible to prescribe such universall rules , whereby all future contentions which perhaps are infinite , may be determined , it s to be understood that in all cases not mentioned by the written lawes , the law of ●aturall equity is to be followed , which commands us to distribute equally to equals ; and this by the vertue of the civill law , which also punisheth those who knowingly and willingly doe actually transgresse the lawes of nature . xv. these things being understood , it appeares first , that the lawes of nature , although they were describ'd in the books of some philosophers , are not for that reason to be termed written lawes : and that the writings of the interpreters of the lawes , were no lawes , for want of the supreme authority ; nor yet those orations of the wise , ( that is to say ) judges , but so farre forth as by the consent of the supreme power they part into custome , and that then they are to be received among . the written lawes , not for the customes sake ( which by its own force doth not constitute a law ) but for the will of the supreme commander , which appeares in this , that he hath suffer'd his sentence , whether equall , or unequall , to passe into custome . xvi . sinne , in its largest signification , comprehends every deed , word and thought , against right reason : for every man by reasoning seeks out the meanes to the end which he propounds to himselfe . if therefore he reason right ( that is to say , beginning from most evident principles , he makes a discourse out of consequences continually necessary , ) he will proceede in a most direct way ; otherwise hee 'l goe astray , that is to say , he will either doe , say , or endeavour . somewhat against his proper end , which when he hath done , he will indeed in reasoning be said to have erred , but in action and will to have sinned , for sin followes errour , just as the will doth the understanding : and this is the most generall acception of the word , under which is contain'd every imprudent action , whether against the law , as to overthrow another mans house , or not against the law , as to build his owne upon the sand. xvii . but when we speak of the lawes , the word sinne is taken in a more strict sense , and signifies not every thing done against right reason , but that onely which is blameable , and therefore is call'd malum culpae , the evill of fault ; but yet if any thing be culpable it is not presently to be term'd a sinne , or fault , but onely if it be blameable with reason . we must therefore enquire what is to be blameable with reason , what against reason . such is the nature of man , that every one calls that good which he desires , and evill which he eschewes ; and therefore through the diversity of our affections , it happens that one counts that good , which another counts evill ; and the same man what now he esteem'd for good , he immediately looks on as evill ; and the same thing which he calls good in himselfe , he tearmes evill in another ; for we all measure good and evill by the pleasure or paine we either feele at present , or expect hereafter ; now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies ( because they increase their honours , goods , and power ) and of equalls , ( by reason of that strife of honours which is among them ) both seeme and are irkesome , and therefore evill to all ; and men use to repute those evill , that is to say , to lay some fault to their charge from whom they receive evill ; its impossible to be determined by the consent of single men whom the same things doe not please and displease , what actions are , and what not to be blam'd . they may agree indeed in some certaine generall things , as that theft , adultery , and the like are sinnes , as if they should say that all men account those things evill to which they have given names which are usually taken in an evill sense ; but we demand not whether theft be a sinne , but what is to be term'd theft , and so concerning other in like manner , for as much therefore as in so great a diversity of censurers , what is by reason blameable , is not to bee measur'd by the reason of one man more then another , because of the equality of humane nature , and there are no other reasons in being , but onely those of particular men , and that of the city , it followes , that the city is to determine what with reason is culpable : so as a fault , that is to say , a sinne , is that , which a man do's , omits , sayes , or wills , against the reason of the city , that is , contrary to the lawes . xviii . but a man may doe somewhat against the lawes through humane infirmity , although he desire to fulfill them , and yet his action as being against the lawes , i● rightly blam'd , and call'd a sinne : but there are some , who neglect the lawes , and as oft as any hope of gain and impunity doth appear to them , no conscience of contracts and betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation . not only the deeds , but even the mindes of these men are against the lawes . they who sinne onely through infirmity , are good men even when they sinne ; but these even when they doe not sin , are wicked ; for though both the action , and the mind be repugnant to the lawes , yet those repugnancies are distinguisht by different appellations , for the irregularity of the action is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , unjust deed ; that of the mind 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , injustice , and malice ; that is , the infirmity of a disturbed soule , this the pravity of a sober mind . xix . but seeing there is no sin which is not against some law , and that there is no law which is not the command of him who hath the supreme power , and that no man hath a supreme power which is not bestowed on him by our own consent ; in what manner will he be said to sinne , who either denies that there is a god , or that he governs the world , or casts any other reproach upon him ? for he will say , that he never submitted his will to gods will , not conceiving him so much as to have any being . and granting that his opinion were erroneous , and therefore also a sin , yet were it to be numbred among those of imprudence or ignorance , which by right cannot be punished . this speech seems so farre forth to be admitted , that though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful , yet is it to be refer'd ( * ) to sins of imprudence ; but that it should be excused by imprudence or ignorance , is absurd . for the atheist is punisht either immediately by god himselfe , or by kings constituted under god ; not as a subject is punished by a king , because he keeps not the lawes , but as one enemy by another , because he would not accept of the lawes ; that is to say , by the right of warre , as the giants warring against god : for whosoever are not subject either to some common lord , or one to another , are enemies among themselves . ( yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence ) many find fault that i have referr'd atheisme to imprudence , and not to injustice ; yea by some it is taken so , as if i had not declared my selfe an enemy bitter enough against atheists : they object farther , that since i had elsewhere said that it might be knowne there is a god , by naturall reason , i ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the law of nature , and therefore not only guilty of imprudence , but injustice too ; but i am so much an enemy to atheists , that i have both diligently sought for , and vehemently desired to find so ●e law whereby i might condemne them of injustice ; but when i found none , i enquired next what name god himselfe did give to men so detested by him . now god speaks thus of the atheist : the fool hath said in his heart , there is no god. wherefore i placed their sinne in that rank which god himselfe referres to ; next , i shew them to be enemies of god. but i conceive the name of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper , then that of an unjust man. lastly , i affirme that they may under that notion be justly punishe both by god , and supreme magistrates , and therefore by no meanes excuse or extenuate this sinne . now that i have said that it might be known by naturall reason that there is a god , is so to be understood , not as if i had meant that all men might know this , except they think that because archimedes by naturall reason found out what proportion the circle hath to the square , it followes thence , that every one of the vulgar could have found out as much . i say therefore , that although it may be knowne to some by the light of reason that there is a god , yet men that are continually engaged in pleasures , or se●king of riches and honour , also men that are not wont to reason aright , or cannot do it , or ●are not to doe it , lastly , fools , in which number are atheists , cannot know this . xx. seeing that from the vertue of the covenant whereby each subject is tyed to the other to perform absolute and universall obedience ( such as is defined above chap. . art . . ) to the city , that is to say , to the soveraign power , whether that be one man or councel , there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the civill lawes , so that that covenant contains in it self all the laws at once ; it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the generall covenant of obedience , doth at once renounce all the lawes ; which trespasse is so much worse then any other one sinne , by how much to sinne alwayes , is worse then to sinne once ; and this is that sin which is called treason ; and it is a word or deed whereby the citizen , or subject , declares that he will no longer obey that man or court to whom the supreme power of the city is entrusted , and the subject declares this same will of his by deed , when he either doth , or endeavours to do violence to the soveraigns person , or to them who execute his commands , of which sort are traytors , regicides , and such as take up armes against the city , or during a warre , flye to the enemies side ; and they shew the same will in word , who flatly deny that themselves or other subjects are tyed to any such kind of obedience , either in the whole , as he who should say that wee must not obey him ( keeping the obedience which we owe to god intire ) simply , absolutely , and universally ; or in part , as he who should say , that he had no right to wage warre at his own will , to make peace , list souldiers , levie monies , electing magistrates , and publique ministers , enacting lawes , deciding controversies , setting penalties , or doing ought else , without which the state cannot stand , and these and the like words and deeds are treason by the naturall , not the civill law. but it may so happen , that some action which before the civill law was made , was not treason , yet will become such , if it be done afterwards . as if it be declared by the law , that it shall be accounted for a sign of renouncing publique obedience ( that is to say for treason ) if any man shall coyn monies , or forge the privi● seale , he that after that declaration shall doe this , will be no lesse guilty of treason then the other , yet he sinnes lesse , because he breakes not all the laws at once , but one law only ; for the law by calling that treason which by nature is not so , doth indeed by right set a more odious name , and perhaps a more grievous punishment on the guilty persons , but it makes not the sinne it selfe more grievous . xxi . but that sinne which by the law of nature is treason , is a transgression of the naturall , not the civill law , for since our obligation to civill obedience , by vertue whereof the civill lawes are valid , is before all civill law , and the sin of treason is naturally nothing else but the breach of that obligation ; it followes that by the sin of treason , that law is broken which preceded the civill law , to wit , the naturall , which forbids us to violate covenants , and betrothed ●aith . but if some soveraign prince should set sorth a law on this manner , thou shalt not rebell , he would effect just nothing : for except subjects were before obliged to obedience , that is to say , not to rebell , all law is of no force ; now the obligation which obligetto what we were before obliged to , is superfluous . xxii . hence it followes , that rebels , traytors , and all others convicted of treason , are punisht not by civill , but naturall right , that is to say , not as civill subjects , but as enemies to the government , not by the right of soveraignty , and dominion , but by the right of warre . xxiii . there are some who think that those acts which are done against the law , when the punishment is determined by the law it selfe , are exp●ated , if the punished willingly undergoe the punishment ; and that they are not guilty before god of breaking the naturall law ( although by breaking the civill lawes , we break the naturall too , which command us to keep the civill ) who have suffered the punishment which the law required , as if by the law , the fact were not prohibited , but a punishment were set instead of a price , whereby a licence might be bought of doing what the law forbids ; by the same reason they might inferre too , that no transgression of the law were a sin , but that every man might enjoy the liberty which he hath bought by his own perill . but we must know that the words of the law may be understood in a twofold sense , the one as containing two parts ( as hath been declared above in the seventh art. ) namely , that of absolutely prohibiting , as , thou shalt not doe this ; and revenging , as , he that doth this , shall be punisht ; the other , as containing a condition , for example , thou shalt not doe this thing , unlesse thou wilt suffer punishment ; and thus , the law forbids not simply , but conditionally . if it be understood in the first sense , he that doth it , sins , because he doth what the law forbids to be done , if in the second , he sins not , because he cannot be said to doe what is forbidden him , that performs the condition ; for in the first sense , all men are forbidden to doe it ; in the second , they only who keep themselves from the punishment . in the first sense , the vindicative part of the law obligeth not the guilty , but the magistrate to require punishment ; in the second , he himselfe that owes the punishment is obliged to exact it , to the payment whereof , if it be capitall , or otherwise grievous , he cannot be obliged . but in what sense the law is to be taken , depends on the will of him who hath the soveraignty . when there is therefore any doubt of the meaning of the law , since we are sure they sinne not who doe it not , it will be sin if we doe it , howsoever the law may afterward be explained ; for so to doe that which a man doubts whether it be a sin or not , when he hath freedome to forbear it , is a contempt of the lawes , and therefore by the . art. of the third chapter , a sin against the law of nature . vain therefore is that same distinction of obedience into active and passive , as if that could be expiated by penalties constituted by humane decrees , which is a sinne against the law of nature , which is the law of god ; or as ●…though they sinned not , who sinne at their own perill . integer vitae sce●erisque pur●s non eget mauri jaculis nec are● , nec venenatis gravida sagittis fusce pharetra . sive per syrtes iter aestuosas , sive facturus per inhospital●… caucasum , vel quae loca fabulosus lambit hidaspis . religion . chap. xv. of the kingdome of god , by nature . i. the proposition of the following contents . ii. over whom god is said to rule by nature . iii. the word of god three-fold ; reason , revelation , prophesie . iv. the kingdome of god two-fold ; naturall , and prophetique . v. the right whereby god reigns , is seated in his omnipotence . vi. the same proved from scripture . vii . the obligation of yeelding obedience to god , proceeds from humane infirmity . viii . the lawes of god in his naturall kingdome , are those which are recited above in the . and . chapter . ix . what honour and worship is . x. worship consists either in attributes , or in actions . xi and there is one sort naturall , another arbitrary . xii . one commanded , another voluntary . xiii . what the end , or scope of worship is . xiv . what the naturall laws are , concerning gods attributes . xv. what the actions are , whereby naturally wee doe give worship . xvi . in gods naturall kingdome , the city may appoint what worship of god it pleaseth . xvii . god ruling by nature only , the city , that is to say , that man or court who under god hath the soveraign authority of the cioy , is the interpreter of all the lawes . xviii . certaine doubts removed . xix . what sin is in the naturall kingdom of god ; and what treason against the divine majesty . i. wee have already in the foregoing chapters , proved both by reason , and testimonies of holy writ , that the estate of nature , that is to say , of absolute liberty , such as is theirs , who neither govern , nor are governed , is an anarchy , or hostile state ; that the precepts whereby to avoyd this state , are the lawes of nature ; that there can be no civill government without a soveraigne ; and that they who have gotten this soveraigne command must be obey'd simply , that is to say , in all things which repugne not the commandments of god : there is this one thing only wanting to the complete undestanding of all civill duty , & that is , to know which are the laws and commandments of god ; for else we cannot tell whether that which the civill power commands us , be against the lawes of god , or not ; whence it must necessarily happen , that either by too much obedience to the civill authority , we become stubborne against the divine majesty ; or for feare of sinning against god , we runne into disobeditnce against the civill power : to avoid both these rocks , its necessary to know the divine lawes ; now because the knowledge of the lawes , depends on the knowledge of the kingdome , we must in what followes , speak somewhat concerning the kingdome of god. ii. the lord is king , the earth may be glad thereof , saith the psalmist , psal . . v. . and againe the same psalmist , psal . . v. . the lord is king , be the people never so unpatient , he s●teth betweene the cherubins , ●e the earth never ▪ so unquiet , to wit , whether men will , or not , god is the king over all the earth , nor is he mov'd from his throne , if there be any who deny either his existence , or his providence . now although god governe all men ▪ so by his power , that none can doe any thing which he would not have done , yet this , to speake properly , and accurately , is not to reigne , for he is sayed to reigne , who rules not by acting , but speaking , that is to say , by precepts and threatnings ; and therefore we account not inanimate , nor irrationall bodies , for subjects in the kingdome of god , although they be subordinate to the divine power ; because they understand not the commands , and threats of god ; nor yet the atheists , because they beleeve not that there is a god , nor yet those who beleeving there is a god ; doe not yet beleeeve that he rules these inferiour things ; for even these , although they be govern'd by the power of god , yet doe they not acknowledge any of his commands , nor stand in awe of his threats . those onely therefore are suppos'd to belong to gods kingdome , who acknowledge him to be the governour of all things , and that he hath given his commands to men , and appointed punishments for the transgressours ; the rest , we must not call subjects , but enemies of god. iii. but none ▪ are said to governe by commands , but they who openly declare them to those who are govern'd by them , for the commands of the rulers are the lawes of the rul'd , but lawes they are not , if not perspicuously publisht , in so much as all excuse of ignorance may be taken away . men indeed publish their lawes by word or voice , neither can they make their will universally knowne any other way ; but gods lawes are declar'd after a threefold manner : first , by the tacit dictates of right reason , next , by immediate revelation , which is suppos'd to be done either by a supernaturall voice , or by a vision or drcame , or divine inspiration : thirdly , by the voice of one man whom god recommends to the rest , as worthy of beliefe , by the working of ●rue miracles ; now he whole voice ▪ god thus makes use of to signifie his will unto others , is called a prophet . these three manners may be term'd the threefold word of god , to wit the rationall word , the sensible word , and the word of prophecy : to which answer , the three nanners whereby we are said to heare god , right reasoning , sense , and faith . gods sensible word hath come but to few ; neither hath god spoken to men by revelation except particularly to some , and to diverse diversely ; neither have any lawes of his kingdome beene publisht on this manner unto any people . iv. and according to the difference which is between the rationall word and the word of prophecy , we attribute a two-fold kingdome unto god : naturall , in which he reignes by the dictates of right reason , and which is universall over all who acknowledge the divine power , by reason of that rationall nature which is common to all ; and propheticall , in which he rules also by the word of prophecy , which is peculiar , because he hath not given positive lawes to all men , but to his peculiar people , and some certaine men elected by him . v. god in his naturall kingdome hath a right to rule , and to punish those who break his lawes , from his sole irresistable power ; for all right over others is either from nature , or from contract . how the right of governing springs from contract , we have already shewed in the . chapter . and the same right is derived from nature , in this very thing , that it is not by nature taken away ; for when by nature all men had a right over all things , every man had a right of ruling over all as ancient as nature it selfe ; but the reason why this ▪ was abolisht among men , was no other but mutuall fear , as hath been declared above in the second chapter , the . art . reason namely dictating that they must foregoe that right for the preservation of mankinde , because the equality of men among themselves according to their strength and naturall powers was necessarily accompanied with warre , and with warre joynes the destruction of mankinde . now if any man had so farre exceeded the rest in power , that all of them with joyned forces could not have resisted him , there had been no cause why he should part with that right which nature had given him ; the right therefore of dominion over all the rest , would have remained with him , by reason of that excesse of power whereby he could have preserved both himselfe and them . they therefore whose power cannot be resisted , and by consequence god almighty , derives his right of soveraignty from the power i● selfe . and as oft as god punisheth , or slayes a sinner , although he therefore punish him because he sinned , yet may we not say that he could not justly have punisht or killed him although he had not sinned . neither , if the will of god in punishing , may perhaps have regard to some sin antecedent , doth it therefore follow , that the right of afflicting , and killing , depends not on divine power , but on ●…si●s . vi. that question made famous by the disputations of the antients , why evill things befell the good , and good things the evill , is the same with this of ours , by what right god dispenseth good and evill things unto men , and with its difficulty , it not only staggers the faith of the vulgar concerning the divine providence , but also of philosophers , and which is more , even of holy men . psal . . v. , , . truly god is good to israel , even to such as are of a clean heart ; but as for me , my feet were almost gone , my steps bad well nigh slipt . and why ? i was grieved at the wicked , i do● also see the ungodly in such prosperity . and how bitterly did job expostulate with god , that being just , he should yet be afflicted with so many calamities ? god himselfe with open voyce resolved this difficulty in the case of job , and hath confirmed his right by arguments drawn not from jobs sinne , but from his own power . for job and his friends had argued so among themselves , that they would needs make him guilty , because he was punisht ; and he would reprove their accusation by arguments fetcht from his own innocence : but god when he had heard both him and them , refutes his expostulation , not by condemning him of injustice , or any sin , but by declaring his own power , job . . v. . where wast thou ( sayes he ) when i laid the foundation of the earth , &c. and for his friends , god pronounces himself angry against them , job . . v. . because they had not spoken of him the thing that is right , like his servant job . agreeable to this is that speech of our saviours in the mans case who was born blind , when , his disciples asking him whether he or his parents had sinned , that he was born blind , he answered , john . v. . neither hath this man sinned , nor his parents , but that the works of god should be manifest in him ; for though it be said , rom. . . that death entred into the world by sinne , it followes not , but that god by his right might have made men subject to diseases , and death , although they had never sinned , even as he hath made the other animalls mortall , and sickly , although they cannot sinne . vii . now if god have the right of soveraignty from his power , it is manifest , that the obligation of yeelding him obedience lyes on men by reason of their * weaknesse ; for that obligation which rises from contract , of which we have spoken in the second chapter , can have no place here , where the right of ruling ( no covenant passing between ) rises only from nature . but there are two species of naturall obligation , one when liberty is taken away by corporall impediments , according to which we say that heaven and earth , and all creatures , doe obey the common lawes of their creation : the other when it is taken away by hope , or fear , according to which the weaker despairing of his own power to resist , cannot but yeeld to the stronger . from this last kinde of obligation , that is to say from fear , or conscience of our own weaknesse ( in respect of the divine power ) it comes to passe , that we are obliged to obey god in his naturall kingdome ; reason dictating to all , acknowledging the divine power and providence , that there is no kicking against the pricks . ( by reason of their weaknesse ) if this shall seem hard to any man , i desire him with a silent thought to consider , if there were two omnipotents , whether were bound to obey ; i beleeve he will confesse that neither is bound : if this be true , then it is also true what i have set down , that men are subject unto god because they are not omnipotent . and truly our saviour admonishing paul ( who at that time was an enemy to the church ) that he should not kick against the pricks , seems to require obedience from him for this cause , because he had not power enough to resist . viii . because the word of god ruling by nature onely , is supposed to be nothing else but right reason , and the laws of kings can be known by their word only , its manifest that the laws of god ruling by nature alone , are onely the naturall lawes , namely those which we have set down in the second and third chapters , and deduced from the dictates of reason , humility , equity , justice mercy , and other morall vertues befriending peace , which pertain to the discharge of the duties of men one toward the other , and those which right reason shall dictate besides , concerning the honour and worship of the divine majesty . we need not repeat what those naturall laws , or morall vertues are , but we must see what honours , and what divine worship , that is to say , what sacred lawes , the same naturall reason doth dictate . ix . honour , to speak properly , is nothing else but an opinion of anothers power joyned with goodnesse , and to honour a man , is the same with highly esteeming him , and so honour is not in the party honoured , but in the honourer ; now three passions do necessary follow honour thus placed in opinion ; love , which referres to goodnesse ; hope , and feare , which regard power . and from these arise all outward actions , wherewith the powerfull are appeased , and become propitious , and which are the effects , and therefore also the naturall signes of honour it selfe . but the word honour is transferred also to those outward effects of honour , in which sense , we are said to honour him , of whose power we testifie our selves , either in word , or deed , to have a very great respect ; insomuch as honour is the same with worship now worship is an outward act , the sign of inward honour ; and whom we endeavour by our homage to appease , if they be angry , or howsoever to make them favourable to us , we are said to worship . x. a●l signes of the mind are either words or deeds , and therefore all worship consists either in words or deeds ; now both the one and the other are referred to three kindes ; whereof the first is praise , or publique declaration of goodnesse ; the second , a publique declaration of present power , which is to magnify 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; the third , is a publique declaration of happinesse , or of power , secure also for the future , which is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . i say , that all kindes of honour may be discerned , not in words only , but in deeds too ; but we then praise , and celebrate in words , when we doe it by way of proposition , or dogmatically , that is to say by attributes , or titles , which may be termed praysing , and celebrating , categorically , and plainly , as when we declare him whom we honour to be liberall , strong , wise ; and then , in deeds , when it is done by consequence , or by hypothesis , or supposition , as by thanksgiving , which supposeth goodnesse ; or by obedience , which supposeth power ; or by congratulation , which supposeth happinesse . xi . now whether we desire to praise a man in words , or deeds , we shall find some things which signify honour with all men , such as among attributes , are the generall words of vertues and powers , which cannot be taken in ill sense , as good , faire , strong , just , and the like ; and among actions , obedience , thanksgiving , prayers , and others of that kinde , by which an acknowledgement of vertue and power is ever understood : others , which signify honour , but with some , and scorne with others , or else neither ; such as in attributes , are those words which according to the diversity of opinions , are diversly referred to vertues or vices , to honest or dishonest things ; as that a man slew his enemy , that he fled , that he is a philosopher , or an orator , and the like , which with some are had in honour , with others in contempt . in deeds , such as depend on the custome of the place , or prescriptions of civill lawes , as in saluting to be bare-headed , to put off the shoes , to bend the body ; to petition for any thing standing , prostrate , kneeling , forms of ceremony , and the like . now that worship which is alwayes , and by all men accounted honourable , may be called naturall , the other , which followes places , and customes , arbitrary . xii . furthermore , worship may be enjoyned , to wit by the command of him that is worshiped , and it may ▪ bee voluntary , namely such as seems good to the worshipper : if it be enjoyned , the actions expressing it , do not signify honour , as they signify actions , but as they are enjoyned : for they signify obedience immediately , obedience power ; insomuch as worship enjoyned consists in obedience , voluntary is honourable onely in the nature of the actions , which if they doe signify honour to the bebolders , it is worship , if not , it is reproach . again worship may be either publique or private , but publique , respecting each single worshipper , may not be voluntary , respecting the city it may ; for seeing that which is done voluntarily , depends on the will of the doer , there would not one worship be given , but as many worships as worshippers , except the will-of all men were united by the command , of one ; but private worship may be voluntary , if it be done secretly , for what is done openly is restrained , either by lawes , or through modesty , which is contrary to the nature of a voluntary action . xiii . now that we may know what the scope and end of wopshipping others is , we must consider the cause why men delight in worship : and we must grant what we have shewed elsewhere , that joy consists in this , that a man contemplate vertue , strength , science , beauty , friends , or any power whatsoever , as being , or as though it were his own , and it is nothing else but a glory , or triumph of the mind conceiving it selfe honoured , that is to say , lov'd and fear'd , that is to say , having the services and assistances of men in readinesse . now because men beleeve him to be powerfull whom they see honoured ( that is to say ) esteemed powerfull by others , it falls out that honour is increased by worship , and by the opinion of power , true power is acquired ; his end therefore who either commands , or suffers himself to be worshipt , is , that by this meaus he may acquire as many as he can , either through love , or fear , to be obedient unto him . xiv . but that we may understand what manner of worship of god naturall reason doth assigne us , let us begin from his attributes : where , first it is manifest , that existence is to allowed him ; for there can be no will to honour him , who , we think , hath no being . next , those philosophers who said , that god was the world , or the worlds soul , ( that is to say , a part of it ) spake unworthily of god , for they attribute nothing to him , but wholly deny his being . for by the word god we understand the worlds cause ; but in saying that the world is god , they say , that it hath no cause , that is as much , as there is no god. in like manner , they who maintain the world not to be created , but eternall ; because there can be no cause of an eternall thing , in denying the world to have a cause , they deny also that there is a god. they also have a wretched apprehension of god , who imputing idlenesse to him , doe take from him the government of the world , and of mankind ; for say they should acknowledge him omnipotent , yet if he minde not these inferiour things , that same thred bare sentence will take place with them , quod supra nos , nihil ad nos ; what is above us , doth not concern us ; and seeing there is nothing for which they should either love , or fear him , truly he will be to them as though he were not at all . moreover in attributes which signifie greatnesse , or power , those which signifie some finite , or limited thing , are not signes at all of an honouring mind : for we honour not god worrhily ▪ if we ascribe lesse power , or greatnesse to him then possible we can ; but every finite thing is lesse then we can , for most easily we may alwayes assigne and attribute more to a finite thing ; no shape therefore must be assigned to god , for all shape is finite ; nor must he be said to be conceived , or comprehended by imagination , or any other faculty of our soul ; for whatsoever we conceive is finite : and although this word infinite signifie a conception of the mind , yet it followes not , that we have any conception of an infinite thing : for when we say that a thing is infinite , we signifie nothing really , but the impotency in our owne mind , as if we should say we know not whether , or where it is limited : neither speak they honourably enough of god , who say we have an idea of him in our mind ; for an idea is our conception , but conception we have none , except of a finite thing : nor they , who say that he hath parts , or that he is some certaine in●ire thing , which are also attributes of finite things : nor that he is in any place ; for nothing can be said to be in a place , but what hath bounds and limits of its greatnesse on all sides : not that he is moved , or ▪ is at rest ; for either of them suppose a being in some place : nor that there are more gods , because not more infinites . farther more concerning attributes of happinesse , those are unworthy of god which signify sorrow ( unlesse they be taken not for any passion , but by a me●onomy for the effect ) such as repentance , anger , pity : or want , as appetite , hope , concupiscence , and that love which is also called lust , for they are signes of poverty , since it cannot be understood , that a man should desire , hope , and wish for ought , but what he wants and stands in need of : or any passive faculty ; for suffering belongs to a limited power , and which depends upon another . when we therefore attribute a will to god , it is not to be conceived like unto ours , which is called a rationall desire ; for if god desires , he wants , which for any man to say , is a con●…lie ; but we must suppose some resemblance which we cannot conceive . in like manner when wee attribute fight and other acts of the senses to him , or knowledge , or understanding , which in us are nothing else but a tumult of the minde raised from outward objects pressing the organes , wee must not think that any such thing befalls the deity ; for it is a signe of power depending upon some other , which is not the most blessed thing . he therefore who would not ascribe any other titles to god , then what reason commands , must use such as are either negative , as infinite , eternall ; incomprehenfible , &c. or superlative , as most good , most great , most powerfull , &c. or indefinite , as good , just , strong , creat●ur , king , and the like , in such sense , as not desiring to declare what he is ( which were to circumscribe him within the narrow limits of our phantasie ) but to confesse his own admiration , and obedience , which is the property of humility , and of a minde yeelding all the honour it possibly can doe . for reason dictates one name alone , which doth signify the nature of god ( i. e. ) existent , or simply , that he is ; and one in order to , and in relation to us , namely god , under which i● contained both king , and lord , and father . xv. concerning the outward actions wherewith god is to be worshipped ( as also concerning his titles ) its a most generall command of reason , that they be s●gnes of a mind yeelding honour ; under which are contained in the first place , prayers . qui fingi● sacros ●uro , vel 〈…〉 more vult●… , non f●●it ille de●s , qui rog●t , ill● f●cit . for prayers are the signes of hope , and hope is an acknowledgement of the divine power , or goodnesse . in the second place , than●giving ; which is a signe of the same ▪ affection , but that prayers go● before the bene●it , and thanks follow it . in the third , 〈◊〉 , that is to say oblations and sacrifices , for these are thanksgivings . in the fourth , not to s●…re by any other ; for a mans oath ▪ is an imprecation of his wrath against him if he deceive , who both knowes whether he doe , or not , and can punish him if he doe , though he be never so powerfull ▪ which only belongs to god : for if there vvere any man from whom his subjects malice could not lye hid , ●…nd whom no humane power could resist , plig●ted faith would suffice without swearing , which , broken , might be punisht by that man ; and for this very reason 〈◊〉 would be no need of an oath . in the fifth place , to speak w●●ily of god ; for that is a sign of fear , and feare is an acknowledgement of power . it followes from this precept : that we may not take the name of god in vain , or use it rashly ; for eithe● are inconsiderate . that we● must not swear where there is no ●eed ; for that is in vain ; but need there is none , unlesse it be between cities to avoyd or take away contention by force , which necessarily must arise , where there is no faith kept in pro●…ses , or in a city , for the better certainty of judicature . also , that we must not di●…ute of the divin●●…ure : for it is supposed that all things in the naturall kingdom of god are enquired into by reason only , that is to say , out of the principles of naturall science ; but we are so far off by these to attain to the knowledge of the nature of god , that we cannot so much as reach to the full understanding of all the qua●●ties of our own bodies , or of any other creatures . wherefore there comes nothing from these disputes , but a rash imposition of names to the divine majesty , according to the small measure of our conceptions . it followes also ( which belongs to the right of gods kingdome ) that their speech , is inconsiderate , and rash , who say , that this , or that , do●h not stand with divine justice ; for even men count it an affront that their children should dispute their right , or measure their justice otherwise then by the rule of their commands . in the sixth ▪ whatsoever is offered up in prayers , thanksgivings , and sacrifices , must in its kind be the best , and most ●…ning honour ; namely , prayers must not be rash , or light , or vulga● , but beautifull , and well composed . for though it were absurd in the heathen to worship god in an image , ye● was it not against reason to use poetry , and musick , in their churches . also oblations must be clean , and presents sumptuous and such as are significative either of submission , or gratitude , or commemorative of benefits received ; for all these proceed from a desire of honouring . in the seventh . that god must be worship● not privately onely , but openly , and publiquely in the sight of a●● men ; because that worship is so much more acceptable , by how much it begets honour , and esteem in others ( as hath been declared before in the . a●… . ) unlesse others therefore see it , that which is most pleasing in our worship , vanisheth . in the last place that we use our best c●deavour to keep the lawes of nature . for the undervaluing of our masters command , exceeds all other affronts whatsoever ; as on the other side , obedience is more acceptable then all other sacrifices . and these are principally the naturall lawes concerning the worship of god , those i mean which reason dictates to every man ; but to whole c●…es , every one whereof is one person , the same naturall reason farther command● an uniformity of publique worship . for the actions done by particular persons , according to their private reasons , are not ▪ the cities actions , and therefore not the cities worship ; but what is done by the city , is understood to be done by the command of of him , or them who have the soveraignty , wherefore also together with the consent of all the subjects , that is to say , uniformly . xvi . the naturall lawes set down in the foregoing article concerning the divine worship , only command the giving of naturall signes of honour ; but we must consider that there are two kindes of signes , the one naturall , the other done upon agreement , o● by expresse , or tacite composition . now because in every language , the use of words , and names , come by appointment , it may also by appointment be altered ; for that which depends on , and derives its force from the will of men , can by the will of the same men agreeing be changed again , or abolisht . such names therefore as are attributed to god by the appointment of men , can by the same appointment be taken away ; now what can be done by the appointment of men , that the city may doe ; the city therefore by right ( that is to say , they who have the power of the whole city ) shall judge what names or appellations are more , what lesse honourable for god , that is say , what doctrines are to be held and profest concerning the nature of god , and his operations . now actions doe signify not by mens appointment , but naturally , even as the effects are signes of their causes , whereof some are alwayes signes of scorn to them before whom they are committed , as those , whereby the bodies uncleannesse is discovered , and whatsoever men are ashamed to doe before those whom they respect ; others are alwayes signes of honour , as ●o draw near , and discourse decently and humbly , to give way , or to yeeld in any matter of private benefit : in these actions the city can after nothing , but there are infinite others , which , as much as belongs to honour , or reproach , are indifferent ; now these , by the institution of the city , may both be made signes of honour , and being made so , doe in very deed become so . from whence we may understand , that we must obey the city in whatsoever it shall command to be used for a sign of honouring god , that is to say , for worship ; provided it can be instituted for a sign of honour , because that is a sign of honour , which by the cities command is us'd for such . xvii . we have already declared which were the laws of god , as wel sacred as secular , in his government by the way of nature onely . now because there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning , and that it so falls out , that men are of different opinions concerning the most actions , it may be demanded farther , whom god would have to be the interpreter of right reason , that is to say , of his lawes . and as for the secular lawes , i mean those which concern justice , and the carriage of men towards men , by what hath been said before of the constitution of a city , we have demonstratively shewed it agreeable to reason , that all judicature belongs to the city , and that judicacature is nothing else but an interpretation of the laws , and by consequence , that every-where cities , that is to say , those who have , the soveraign power , are the interpreters of the lawes , as for the sacred lawes , we must consider what hath been before demonstrated in the fifth chap. the . art . that every subject hath transferr'd as much right as he could on him , or them , who had the supreme authority : but he could have transferred his right of judging the manner how god is to be honoured , and therefore also he hath done it ; that he could , it appeares hence , that the manner of honouring god before the constitution of a city was to be fetcht from every mans private reason ; but every man can subject his private reason to the reason of the whole city : moreover , if each man should follow his own reason in the worshipping of god , in so great a diversity of worshippers , one would be apt to judge anothers worship uncomely , or impious ; neither would the one seem to the other to honour god : even that therefore which were most consonant to reason , would not be a worship , because that the nature of worship consists in this , that it be the sign of inward honour ; but there is no sign but whereby somewhat becomes known to others , and therefore is there no sign of honour but what seems so to others ; again , that 's a true sign which by the consent of men becomes a sign , therefore also that is honourable , which by the consent of men , that is to say , by the command of the city , becomes a sign of honour . it is not therefore against the will of god , declared by the way of reason onely , to give him such signs of honour as the city shall command ; wherefore subjects can transferre their right of judging the manner of gods worship on him or them who have the soveraign power ; nay , they must doe it , for else all manner of absurd opinions , concerning the nature of god , and all ridiculous ceremonies which have been used by any nations , will bee seen at once in the same city , whence it will fall out , that every man will beleeve that all the rest doe offer god an affront ; so that it cannot be truly said of any that he worships god ; for no man worships god , that is to say , honours him outwardly , but he who doth those things , whereby hee appeares to others for to honour him . it may therefore bee concluded , that the interpretation of all lawes , as well sacred , as secular , ( god ruling by the way of nature only ) depends on the authority of the city , that is to say , that man , or councell , to whom the soveraign power is committed , and that whatsoever god commands , he commands by his voyce . and on the other side , that whatsoever is commanded by them , both concerning the manner of honouring god , and concerning secular assaires , is commanded by god himselfe . xviii . against this , some man may demand , first , whether it doth not follow , that the city must be obeyed if it command us directly to affront god , or forbid us to worship him ? i say , it does not follow , neither must we obey ; for to affront , or not to worship at all , cannot by any man be understood for a manner of worshipping ; neither also had any one , before the constitution of a city , of those who acknowledge god to rule , a right to deny him the honour which was then due unto him ; nor could he therefore rransfer a right on the city of commanding any such things . next , if it be demanded whether the city must be obeyed if it command somewhat to be said , or done , which is not a disgrace to god directly , but from whence by reasoning disgracefull consequences may be derived : as for example , if it were commanded to worship god in an image , before those who account that honourable ? truly it is to be ( * ) done . for worship is instituted in signe of honour , but to worship him thus , is a signe of honour , and increaseth gods honour among those who do so account of it ; or if it be commanded to call god by a name which we know not what it signifies , or how it can agree with this word , god ? that also must be done , for what we do for honours sake , ( and we know no better ) if it be taken for a signe of honour , it is a signe of honour , and therefore if we refuse to doe it , we refuse the enlarging of gods honour . the same judgement must be had of all the attributes and actions about the meerly rationall worship of god which may be controverted , and dispu●ed ; for though these kind of commands may be sometimes contrary to right reason , and therefore sins in them who command them , yet are they not against right reason , nor sins in subjects , whose right reason in points of controversie is that , which submits its selfe to the reason of the city . lastly , if that man , or councell , who hath the supreme power , command himselfe to be worshipt with the same attributes , and actions , where with god is to be worshipt , the question is , whether we must obey ? there are many things which may be commonly attributed both to god , and men ; for even men may be praised , and magnified ; and there are many actions whereby god , and men , may be worshipt ; but the significations of the attributes , and actions , are onely to be regarded : those attributes therefore , whereby we signify our selves to be of an opinion , that there is any man endued with a soveraignty independent from god , or that he is immortall , or of in●inite power , and the like , though commanded by princes , yet must they be abstained from ; as also from those actions signifying the same , as prayer to the absent ; to aske those things which god alone can give , as rain , and fair weather ; to offer him what god can onely accept , as oblations , holocausts ; or to give a worship , then which a greater cannot be given , as sacrifice ; for these things seeme ▪ to tend to this end , that god may not be thought to rule , contrary to what was supposed from the beginning ; but genuflection , prostration , or any other act of the body whatsoever , may be lawfully used even in civill worship ; for they may signifie an acknowledgment of the civill power onely ; for divine worship is distinguisht from civill , not by the motion , placing , habit , or gesture of the body , but by the declaration of our opinion of him whom we doe worship ▪ as if we cast down our selves before any man , with intention of declaring by that signe that we esteeme him as god , it is divine worship ; if we doe the same thing as a signe of our acknowledgment of the civill power , it is civill worship . neither is the divine worship distinguished from civill by any action usually understood by by the words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 whereof the former marking out the duty of servants , the latter their destiny , they are words of the same action in degree . truly it is to be done ] we said in the . article of this chapter , that they who attributed limits to god , transgrest the naturall law concerning gods worship ▪ now they who worship him in an image , assigne him limits , wherefore they doe that which they ought not to doe , and this place seemes to contradict the former . we must therefore know first , that they who are constrained by authority , doe not set god any boonds , but they who command them ; for they who worship unwillingly , doe worship in very deed , but they either stand or fall there , where they are commanded to stand or fall by a lawfull soveraign ; secondly , i say it must be done , not at all times , and every where , but on supposition that there is no other rule of worshipping god beside the dictates of humane reason ; for then the will of the city stands for reason : but in the kingdome of god by way of covenant , whether old , or new , where idolatry is expressely forbid , though the city commands us to worship thus , yet must we not do it ; which , if he shall consider , who conceived some repugnancy between this , and the . article , will surely cease to think so any longer . xix . from what hath been said may be gathered , that god reigning by the way of naturall reason onely , subjects doe sinne , first , if they break the morall laws , which are unfolded in the second and third chapters . secondly , if they break the lawes , or commands of the city in those things which pertain to justice . thirdly , if they worship not god , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . fourthly , if they confesse not before men , both in words , and deeds , that there is one god most good , most great , most blessed , the supreme king of the world , and of all worldly kings , that is to say , if they doe not worship god. this fourth sinne in the naturall kingdome of god , by what hath been said in the foregoing chapter , in the second article , is the sinne of treason against the divine majesty ; for it is a denying of the divine power , or atheisme ; for sinnes proceed here , just as if we should suppose some man to be the soveraign king , who being himselfe absent , should rule by his vice-roy , against whom sure they would transgresse who should not obey his vice-roy in all things , except he usurpt the kingdome to himself , or would give it to some other , but they who should so absolutely obey him , as not to admit of this exception , might be said to be guilty of treason . chap. xvi . of the kingdome of god under the old covenant . i. superstition possessing forrain nations , god institued the true religion by the means of abraham . ii. by the covenant between god and adam , all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands of sur●ours . iii. the manner of the covenant between god and abraham . iv. in that covenant is contained an acknowledgement of god , not simply , but of him who appeared unto abraham . v. the lawes unto which abraham was tyed , were no other beside those of nature , and the law of circumcision . vi. abraham was the interpreter of the word of god , and of all lawes among those that belonged to him . vii . abrahams subjects could not sinne by obeying him . viii . gods covenant with the hebrews at mount sinai . ix . from thence , gods government took the name of a kingdome . x. what lawes were by god given to the jewes . xi . what the word of god is , and how to be known . xii . what was held the written word of god among the jewes . xiii . the power of interpreting the word of god , and the supreme civill power were united in moises while he lived . xiv . they were also united in the high priest , during the life of joshuah . xv. they were united too in the high priest untill king s●uls time . xvi . they were also united in the kings untill the captivity . xvii . they were so in the high priests after the captivity . xviii . deniall of the divine providence , and idolatry , were the onely treasons against the divine majesty among the jewes , in all things else they ought to obey their princes . i. mankind , from conscience of its own weaknesse , and admiration of naturall events , hath this , that most men beleeve god to be the invisible maker of all invisible things , whom they also fear , conceiving that they have not a sufficient protection in themselves ; but the imperfect use they had of their reason , the violence of their passions did so clowd them , that they could no● rightly worship him . now the fear of invisible things , when it is sever'd from right reason is superstition . it was therefore almost impossible for men without the the speciall assistance of god to avoyd both rocks of atheisme and superstition : for this proceeds from fear without right reason , that , from an opinion of right reason , without feare . idolatry therefore did easily fasten upon the greatest part of men , and almost all nations did worship god in images , and resemblances of finite things ; and they worshipt spirits , or vain visions , perhaps out of fear calling them devills . but it pleased the divine majesty ( as we read it written in the sacred history ) out of all mankind to call forth abraham , by whose means he might bring men to the true worship of him , and to reveal himselfe supernaturally to him , and to make that most famous covenant with him and his seed , which is called the old covenant , or testament ; he therefore is the head of true religion ; he was the first that after the deluge taught , that there was one god , the creatour of the universe ; and from him the kingdome of god by way of covenants , takes its beginning . joseph . antiq . jewes . lib. . cap. . ii. in the beginning of the world god reigned indeed , not onely naturally , but also by way of covenant , over adam , and eve , so as it seems he would have no obedience yeelded to him , beside that which naturall reason should dictate ; but by the way of covenant , that is to say , by the consent of men themselves . now because this covenant was presently made void , nor ever after renewed , the originall of gods kingdom ( which we treat of in this place ) is not to be taken thence . yet this is to be noted by the way , that by that precept of not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evill ( whether the judicature of good and evill , or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden ) god did require a most simple obedience to his commands , without dispute whether that were good , or evill , which was commanded ; for the fruit of the tree , if the command be wanting , hath nothing in its own nature , whereby the eating of it could be morally evill , that is to say , a sinne . iii. now the covenant between god and abraham , was made in this manner . gen. . v. , . i will establish my covenant between me and thee , and thy seed after thee in their generations , for an everlasting covenant , to be a god unto thee , and to thy seed after thee . and i will give unto thee , and to thy seed after thee , the land wherein thou art a stranger , all the land of canaan , for an everlasting possession , and i will be their god. now it was necessary to institute some sign whereby abraham and his seed should retain the memory of this covenant ; wherefore circumcision was added to the covenant , but yet as a sign onely . vers . . this is my covenant which yee shall keep between me and thee , and thy seed af●er thee , every man-child among you shall be circumcised , and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin , and it shall be a token of the covenant between me and you . it is therefore covenanted , ▪ that abraham shall acknowledge god to be his god , and the god of his seed , that is to say , that he shall submit himselfe to be governed by him , and that god shall give unto abraham the inheritance of that land wherein he then dwelt , but as a pilgrim , and that abraham for a memoriall sign of this covenant , should take care to see himselfe , and his male seed circumcised . iv. but seeing that abraham even before the covenant acknowledged god to be the creatour and king of the world , ( for he never doubted either of the being , or the providence of god ) how comes it not to be superfluous , that god would purchase to himself with a price , and by contract , an obedience which was due to him by nature , namely by promising abraham the land of canaan , upon condition that he would receive him for his god , when by the right of nature he was already so ? by those words therefore , to be a god unto thee and to thy seed after thee , wee understand not that abraham satisfied this covenant by a bare acknowledgement of the power , and dominion which god had naturally over men , that is to say , by acknowledging god indefinitely , which belongs to naturall reason , but he must definitely acknowledge him , who said unto him , gen. . v. . get thee out of thy country , &c. gen. . v. . li●t up thine eyes . &c. who appear'd unto him , gen. . v. . in the shape of three celestiall men , and gen. . v. . in a vision ; and vers . . in a dream , which is matter of faith . in what shape god appeared unto abraham , by what kinde of sound he spake to him , is not exprest , yet it is plain that abraham beleeved that voyce to be the voyce of god , and a true revelation ; and would have all his to worship him , who had so spoken unto him , for god the creatour of the world , and that his faith was grounded on this , not that he beleeved god to have a being , or that he was true in his promises , that which all men beleeve , but that he doub●ed not him to be god , whose voice , and promises he had heard , and that the god of abraham signified not simply god , but that god which appeared unto him , even as the worship which abraham owed unto god in that notion , was not the worship of reason , but of religion , and faith , and that , which not reason , but god had supernaturally revealed . v. but we read of no lawes given by god to abraham , or by abraham to his family , either then , or after , secular , or sacred ( excepting the commandement of circumcision , which is contained in the covenant it selfe ) whence it is manifest , that there were no other lawes , or worship , which abraham was obliged to , but the lawes of nature , rationall worship , and circumcision . vi. now abraham was the interpreter of all lawes , as well sacred as secular , among those that belonged to him , not meerly naturally , as using the lawes of nature onely , but even by the form of the covenant it selfe , in which obedience is promised by abraham not for himselfe onely , but for his seed also ; which had been in vain , except his children had been tyed to obey his commands : and how can that be understood , which god sayes gen. . vers . . . ( all the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him ; for i know him , that he will command his children , and his houshold after him , and they shall keep the way of the lord to doe justice , and judgement ) unlesse his children and his houshold were supposed to be obliged to yeeld obedience unto his commands . vii . hence it followes , that abrahams subjects could not sinne in obeying him , provided that abraham commanded them not , to deny gods existence , or providence , or to doe somewhat expresly contrary to the honour of god. in all other things , the word of god was to be fetcht from his lips only , as being the interpreter of all the lawes , and words of god. for abraham alone could teach them who was the god of abraham , and in what manner he was to be worshipped . and they who after abrahams death were subject to the soveraignty of isaac or iacob ; did by the same reason obey them in all things without sin , as long as they acknowledged , and profest the god of abraham to be their god ; for they had submitted themselves to god simply , before they did it to abraham , and to abraham before they did it to the god of abraham ; againe , to the god of abraham before they did it to isaac : in abrahams subjects therefore , to deny god was the only treason against the divine majesty , but in their posterity it was also treason to deny the god of abraham , that is to say , to worship god otherwise then was instituted by abraham , to wit , in images ( * ) made with hands , as other nations did , which for that reason were called idolators . and hitherto subjects might easily enough discern what was to be observed , what avoyded in the commands of their princes . [ in images made with hands ] in the . chap. . article , there wee have shewed such a kinde of worship to be irrationall ; but if it be done by the command of a city to whom the written word of god is not known , nor received , we have then shewed this worship in the . chap. art . . to be rationall . but where god reigns by way of covenant , in which it is expresly warned not to worship thus , as in the covenant made with abraham , there , whether it be with , or without the command of the city , it is ill done . viii . to goe on now , following the guidance of the holy scripture , the same covenant was renewed , gen. . vers . , . with isaac , and gen. . vers . . with iacob , whote god stiles himselfe not simply god , whom nature doth dictate him to be , but distinctly the god of abraham and isaac , afterward being about to renew the same covenant , by moysos , with the whole people of israel , exod. . v. . i am saith h● the god of thy father , the god of abraham , the god of isaac , and the god of jacob. afterward when that people , not only the freest , but also the greatest enemy to humane subjection , by reason of the fresh memory of their ae gyptian bondage , abode in the wildernesse near mount si●ai , that anti●●t covenant was propounded to them all to be renewed in this manner , exod. . ver . . therefore if yee will obey my voice indeed , and keep my covenant , ( to wit , that covenant which was made with abraham , isaac , and iacob ) then shall yee be a peculiar treasure unto me , above all people ; for all the earth is mine , and yee shall be to me a kingdome of priests , and an holy nation . and all the people answered together , and said , all that the lord hath spoken , will we doe , vers . . ix . in this covenant , among other things , we must consider well the appellation of kingdom not used before ; for although god both by nature & by covenant made with abraham , was their king , yet owed they him an obedience and worship only naturall , as being his subjects ; & religious such as abraham instituted , as being the subjects of abraham , isaac , & iacob , their naturall princes ; for they had received no word of god beside the naturall word of right reason , neither had any covenant past between god and them , otherwise then as their wils were included in the will of abraham , as their prince ; but now by the covenant made at mount sinai , the consent of each man being had , there becomes an institutive kingdome of god over them . that kingdom of god so renowned in scriptures and writings of divines , took its beginning from this time , and hither tends that which god said to samuel , when the israelites asked a king , . sam. . . yhey have not rejected thee , but they have rejected me , that i should not reign over them ; and that which samuel told the israelites , . sam. . . yee said unto me , nay , but a king shall reign over us , when the lord your god was your king , and that which is said , jer. . vers . . i will make a new covenant , &c. although i was an husband unto them ; and the doctrine also of judas galil●us , where mention is made in ioseph . antiq. of the iewes , . book , . chap. in these words . but judas galilaeus was the first authour of this fourth way of those who followed the study of wisdome . these agree in all the rest with the pharisees , excepting that they burn with a most constant desire of liberty , beleeving god alone to be held for their lord and prince , and will sooner endure even the most exquisite kinds of torments , together with their kins folks , and dearest friends , then call any mortall man their lord. x. the right of the kingdome being thus constituted by way of covenant , let us see in the next place , what lawes god propounded to them ; now those are knowne to all , to wit , the decalogue , and those other , as well judiciall as ▪ ceremoniall lawes , which we find from the . chap. of exodus to the end of deuteronomie , and the death of moyses . now of those lawes deliver'd in generall by the hand of moyses , some there are which oblige naturally , being made by god , as the god of nature , and had their force ever before abrahams time ; others there are which oblige by vertue of the covenant made with abraham , being made by god as the god of abraham , which had their force even before moyses his time , by reason of the former covenant ; but there are others which oblige by vertue of that covenant onely which was made last with the people themselves , being made by god , as being the peculiar king of the israelites . of the first so●t are all the precepts of the decalogue which pertaine unto manners , such as , honour thy parents , thou shalt not kill , thou shalt not commit adultery , thou shalt not steale , thou shalt not ●eare false witnesse , thou shalt not covet ; for they are the lawes of n●…e ; also the precept of not taking gods name in vaine , for it is a part of naturall worship , as hath beene declar'd in the foregoing chap. art. . in like manner the second commandement of not worshipping by way of any image made by themselves ; for this also is a part of naturall religion , as hath beene shewed in the same article . of the second sort is the first commandment of the decalogue , of not having any other gods ; for in that consists the essence of the covenant made with abraham , by which god requires nothing else , but that he should be his god , and the god of his seede : also the precept of keeping holy the sabbath ; for the sanctification of the seventh day is instituted in memoriall of the six dayes creation , as appeares out of these words , exod. . ver . , . it is a perpetuall covenant , ( meaning the sabbath ) and a signe betweene me , and the children of israel for ever , for in sixe dayes the lord made heaven , and earth ; and on the seventh day he rested , and was refreshed . of the third kind are the politique , judiciall and ceremoniall lawes , which onely belong'd to the jewes . the lawes of the fi●st and second sort written in tables of stone , to wit the decalogue , was kept in the ark it selfe . the rest written in the volume of the whole law , were laid up in the side of the arke . deut. . ver . for these retaining the faith of abraham might be chang'd , those could not . xi . all gods lawes are gods word ; but all gods word is not his law. i am the lord th● god which brought thee out of the land of aegypt , is the word of god 〈…〉 is no law : neither is all that which for the better deolaring of gods word is pronounc't , or written together with it , instantly to be taken for gods word : for , thus saith the lord , is not the voice of god , but of the preacher or prophet ; all that , and onely that , is the word of god which a true prophet hath declar'd god to have spoken . now the writings of the prophets comprehendng as well those things which god , as which the prophet himselfe speaks , are therefore called the word of god , because they containe the word of god. now because all that , and that alone , is the word of god which is recommended to us for such , by a true prophet , it cannot be knowne what gods word is , before we know who is the true prophet ; nor can we beleeve gods word , before we beleeve the prophet . moyses was beleev'd by the people of israel for two things , his miracles , and his faith ; for how great , and most evident miracles soever he had wrought , yet would they not have trusted him , at least he was not to have beene trusted , if he had call'd them out of aegypt to any other worship then the worship of the god of abraham , isaac , and jacob their fathers . for it had beene contrary to the covenant made by themselves with god. in like manner two things there are , to wit , supernaturall praediction of things to come , which is a mighty miracle , and faith in the god of abraham their deliverer out of aegypt , which ▪ god propos'd to all the jews to be kept for marks of a true prophet . he that wants either of these is no prophet , nor is it to be receiv'd for gods word which he obtrudes for such . if faith be wanting , he is rejectin these words , deut. . ver . , , , , . if there arise among you a prophet , or a dreamer of dreams , and giveth thee a signe , or a wonder , and the signe or the wonder come to passe , whereof he spake unto thee , saying , let us goe after other gods , &c. that prophet , or that dreamer of dreames shall be put to death . if praediction of events be wanting , he is condemn'd by these , deut. . ver . , . and if thou say in thine heart , how shall we know the word which the lord hath not spoken ? when a prophet speaketh in the name of the lord , if the thing follow not , nor come to passe , that is the thing which the lord hath not spoken , but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously . now , that that is the word of god which is publisht for such by a true prophet , and that he was held to be a true prophet among the jewes , whose faith was true , and to whose praedictions the events answer'd , is without controversie ; but what it is to follow other gods , and whether the events which are affirm'd to answer their praedictions , doe truly answer them , or not , may admit many controversies , specially in praedictions which obscurely , & aenigmatically foretell the event such , as the praedictions of almost all the prophets are , as who saw not god apparently like unto moyses , but in darke speech●s , and in figures . numb . . ver . . but of these we cannot judge otherwise then by the way of naturall reason ; because that judgment depends on the prophets interpretation , and on its proportion with the event . xii . the jewes did hold the booke of the whole law which was called deuteronomie , for the written word of god , and that onely , ( forasmuch as can be collected out of sacred history ) untill the captivity , for this booke was deliver'd by moyses himselfe to the priests to be kept , and layd up in the side of the ark of the covenant , and to be copyed out by the kings ; and the same a long time after by the authority of king josiah acknowledg'd againe for the word of god. kings . ver . . but it is not manifest when the rest of the books of the old testament were first receiv'd into canon , but what concernes the prophets , isaiah and the rest , since they foretold no other things then what were to come to passe , either in or after the captivity , their writings could not at that time be held for prophetique , by reason of the law cited above . deut. . ver . , . whereby the israelites were commanded not to account any man for a true prophet but him whose prophecies were answer'd by the events ; and hence peradventure it is that the jew● esteem'd the writings of those whom they slew when they prophesied ; for prophetique afterward , that is to say , for the word of god. xiii . it being known what lawes there were under the old covenant , and that word of god receiv'd from the beginning ; we must farthermore consider with whom the authority of judging , whether the writings of the prophets arising afterward , were to be receiv'd for the word of god , that is to say , whether the events did answer their praedictions or not , and with whom also the authority of interpreting the lawes already receiv'd , and the written word of god , did reside ; which thing is to be trac't through all the times , and severall changes of the commonwealth of israel . but it is manifest that this power during the life of moyses , was intirely in himselfe ; for if he had not been the interpreter of the lawes and word , that office must have belong'd either to every private person , or to a congregation , or synagogue of many , or to the high-priest , or to other prophets . first , that that office belong'd not to private men , or any congregation made of them , appeares hence , that they were not admitted , nay they were prohibited , with most heavy threats , to heare god speake , otherwise then by the means of moyses ; for it is written , let not the priests and the people break through to come up unto the lord , lest he break forth upon them . so moyses went downe unto the people , and spake unto them . exod. . , . it is farther manifestly , and expresly declar'd , upon occasion given by the rebellion of core , dathan and abiram , and the two hundred and fifty princes of the assembly , that neither private men , nor the congregation should pretend that god had spoken by them , and by consequence that they had the right of interpreting gods word ; for they contending , that god spake no lesse by them then by moyses , argu● thus , yee take too much upon you , seeing all the congregation are holy , every one of them , and the lord is among them ; wherefore then lift yee up your selves above the congregation of the lord ? numb . . ver . . but how god determin'd this controversie is easily understood by the . and . verses of the same chapter , where corah , dathan , and ahiram went downe alive into the pit , and there came out fire from the lord , and consumed the two hundred and fifty men that offer'd incense . secondly , that aaron the high priest had not this authority , is manifest by the like controversie betweene him ( together with his sister miriam ) and moyses ; for the question was , whether god spake by moyses only , or by them also , that is to say , whether moyses alone , or whether they also were interpreters of the word of god. for thus they said , hath the lord indeed spoken onely by moyses ? hath he not also spoken by us ? numb . ver . . but god reprov'd them , and made a distinction betweene moyses and other prophets , saying , if there be a prophet among you , i the lord will make my self● knowne unto him in a vision , and will speake unto him in a dreame : my servant moyses is not so , &c. for with him will i speake mouth to mouth , even apparently , and not in darke speeche● , and the similitude of the lord shall he behold , wherefore then were yee not afraid to speake against my servant moyses ? ibid. ver . , , . lastly , that the interpretation of the word of god as long as moses liv'd , belong'd not to any other prophets whatsoever , is collected out of that place which we now cited concer-cerning his eminency above all others , and out of naturall reason , for as much as it belongs to the same prophet who brings the commands of god to unfold them too ; but there was then no other word of god , beside that which was declar'd by moyses ; and out of this also , that there was no other prophet extant at that time , who prophesied to the people , excepting the . elders who prophesied by the spirit of moyses ; and even that joshu●h , who was then moyses his servant , his successour afterward , beleev'd to be injuriously done , till he know it was by moyses his consent , which thing is manifest by text of scripture , and the lord came downe in a clowd , &c. and tooke of the spirit that was upon moyses , and gave it unto the . elders . numb . . ver . . now after it was told that they prophesied , joshuah said unto moyses , forbid them my lord : but moyses answered , why enviest thou for my sake ? seeing therefore moyses alone was the messenger of gods word , and that the authority of interpreting it pertain'd neither to private men , nor to the synagogue , nor to the high priest , nor to other prophets , it remaines , that moyses alone was the interpreter of gods word , who also had the supreme power in civill matters ; and that the conventions of corah with th● rest of his complices against moses , and aaron , and of aaron with his sister against moyses , were rais'd , not for the salvation of their soules , but by reason of their ambition , and desire of dominion over the people . xiv . in joshuahs time the interpretation of the lawes , and of the word of god , belong'd to ele●zar the high priest , who was also under god , their absolute king ; which is collected first of all out of the covenant it selfe , in which the common-wealth of israel is called a priestly kingdome , or as it is recited in the pet. . . a royall priesthood , which could in no wise be sayd , unlesse by the institution and covenant of the people , the regall power were understood to belong to the high priest . neither doth this repugne what hath beene said before , where moyses , and not aaren , had the kingdome under god ; since it is necessary that when one man institutes the forme of a future common-wealth , that one should governe the kingdome which he institutes , during his life , ( whether it be monarchie , aristocraty , or democraty ) and have all that power for the present , which he is bestowing on others for the future ; now , that eleazar the priest , had not onely the priesthood , but also the soveraignty , is expressely set downe in joshuahs call to the administration ; for thus it is written . take thee joshuah the son of nun , a man in whom is the spirit , and lay thine hand upon him , and set him before eleazer the priest , and before all the congregation , and give him a charge in their sight , and thou shalt put some of thine honour upon him , that all the congregation of the children of israel may be obedient , and he shall stand before eleazar the priest , who shall aske counsell for him after the judgment of urim , before the lord , at his word shall they goe out , and at his word shall they come in , and all the children of israel with him , even all the congregation . n●m . . v●r . , , , . where to aske counsell of god for whatsoever is to be done , ( that is ) to interpret gods word , and in the name of god to command in all matters , belongs to eleazar ; and to goe out , and to come in at his word ; that is to say , to obey , belongs both to joshua● , and to all the people . it s to be observ'd also , that that speech , part of thy glory ; clearely denotes that joshuah had not a power equall with that which moyses had . in the meane time it is manifest , that even in ioshuahs time , the supreme power and authority of interpreting the word of god , were both in one person . xv. after ioshuahs death follow the times of the iudges untill king saul , in which it is manifest that the right of the kingdome instituted by god , remained with the high priest ; for the kingdome was by covenant priestly , that is to say , gods government by priests ; and such ought it to have been untill that form with gods consent were changed by the people themselves , which was not done , before that requiring a king god consented unto them , and said unto samuel , hearken unto the voyce of the people in all that they say unto thee ; for they have not rejected thee , but they have rejected me that i should not reign over them . . sam. . . the supreme civill power was therefore rightly due by gods own institution to the high-priest ; but actually that power was in the prophets , to whom ( being raysed by god in an extraordinary manner ) the israelites ( a people greedy of the prophets ) submitted themselves to be protected , and judged , by reason of the great esteem they had of prophecies ; the reason of this thing , was , because that though penalties were set , and judges appointed in the institution of gods priestly kingdome , yet , the right of inflicting punishment , depended wholly on private judgement , and it belonged to a dissolute multitude , and each single person , to punish or not to punish according as their private zeale should stirre them up . and therefore moyses by his own command punisht no man with death ; but when any man was to be put to death , one or many stirred up the multitude against him or them , by divine authority , and saying , thus saith the lord. now this was conformable to the nature of gods peculiar kingdome . for there god reignes indeed where his lawes are obeyed , not for fear of men , but for fear of himselfe ; and truly , if men were such as they should be , this were an excellent state of civill government , but as men are , there is a coercive power ( in which i comprehend both right and might ) necessary to rule them ; and therefore also god from the beginning prescribed lawes by moyses for the future kings . deut. . vers . . and moyses foretold this in his last words to the people , saying , i know that after my death ye will utterly corrupt your selves , and turn aside from the way that i have commanded you , &c. deut. . . when therefore according to this prediction there arose another generation who knew not the lord , nor yet the works which he had done for ispael , the children of israel did evill in the sight of the lord , and served b●laam , iud. . , . to wit , they cast off gods government , that is to say , that of the priest , by whom god ruled , and afterward , when they were overcome by their enemies , and opprest with bondage , they looked for gods will , not at the hands of the priest any more , but of the prophets . these therefore actually judged ▪ israel , but their obedience was rightly due to the high priest ; although therefore the priestly kingdome after the death of moyses , & ioshuah , was without power , yet was it not without right . now that the interpretation of gods word did belong to the same high priest , is manifest by this , that god , after the tabernacle , & the ark of the covenant was consecrated , spake no more in mount ; sinai , but in the tabernacle of the covenant , from the propitiatory which was between the cherubims , whether it was not lawfull for any to aproach except the high priest ; if therefore regard be had to the right of the kingdome , the supreme civill power , and the authority of interpreting gods word , were joyned in the high priest ; if we consider the fact , they were united in the prophets who judged israel ; for as iudges , they had the civill authority , as prophets , they interpreted gods word , and thus every way hitherto these two powers continued inseparable . xvi . kings being once constituted , it s no doubt but the civill authority belonged to them , for the kingdome of god by the way of priesthood , ( god consenting to the request of the israelites ) was ended , which hierom also marks speaking of the books of samuel , samuel ( sayes he ) eli being dead , and saul slain , declares the old law abolisht ; furthermore the oaths of the new priesthood , and new soveraignty in zadok , and david , do testifie ▪ that the right whereby the kings did rule , was founded in the very concession of the people . the priest could ▪ rightly doe whatsoever every man could rightly doe himselfe ; for the israelites granted him a right to judge of all things , and to wage warre for all men ; in which two are contained all right whatsoever can be conceived from man to man. our king ( say they ) shall judge us , and goe out before us , and fight our battails , . sam. . . iudicature therefore belonged to the kings , but to judge is nothing else then by interpreting to apply the ▪ facts to the lawes ; to them therefore belonged the interpretation of lawes too : and because there was no other written word of god acknowledged beside the law of moyses , untill the captivity , the authority , of interpreting gods word , did also belong to the kings ; nay , forasmuch as the word of god must be taken for a law , if there had been another written word beside the mosaicall law , seeing the interpretation of lawes belonged to the kings , the interpretation of it must also have belonged to them . when the book of deuteronomie ( in which the whole mosaicall law was contained ) being a long time lost , was found again , the priests indeed asked counsell of god concerning that book , but not by their own authority , but by the commandement of iosiah , and not immediately neither , but by the meanes of holda the prophetesse ; whence it appears that the authority of admitting books for the word of god , belonged not to the priest ; neither yet followes it that that authority belonged to the prophetesse , because others did judge of the prophets whether they were to be held for true , or not ; for to what end did god give signes , and tokens to all the people , whereby the true prophets might be discerned from the false , namely , the event of predictions , and conformity with the religion ●stablisht by moyses , if they might not use those marks ? the authority therefore of admitting books for the word of god belonged to the king , & thus that book of the law was approved , and received again by the authority of king iosiah , as appears by the fourth book of the kings , . . chap. where it is reported that he gathered together all the severall degrees of his kingdome , the elders , priests , prophets , and all the people , and he read in their cares all the words of the covenant , that is to say , he caused that covenant to be acknowledged for the mosaicall covenant● , that is to say , for the word of god , and to be again received , and confirmed by the israclites ; the civill power therefore , and the power of discerning gods word from the word of men , and of interpreting gods word even in the dayes of the kings was wholly belonging to themselves . prophets were sent not with authority , but in the form , and by the right of proclaimers , and preachers , of whom the hearers did judge ; and if perhaps these were punisht who did not listen to them plainly , teaching easie things , it doth not thence follow , that the kings were obliged to follow all things which they in gods name did declare , were to be followed : for though iosiab the good king of iudah were slain because he obeyed not the word of the lord from the mouth of neobo king of aegypt , that is to say , because he rejected good counsell though it seemed to come from an enemy , yet no man i hope will say that iosiah was by any bond either of divine , or humane lawes obliged to beleeve pharoah neobo king of aegypt , because he said that god had spoken to him . but what some man may object against kings , that for want of learning , they are seldome able enough to interpret those books of antiquity in the which gods word is contained , and that for this cause it is not reasonable that this office should depend on their authority , he may object as much against the priests , and all mortall men , for they may erre ; and although priests were better instructed in nature , and arts then other men , yet kings are able enough to appoint such interpreters under them ; and so , though kings did not themselves interpret the word of god ; yet the office of interpreting them might depend on their authority ; and they who therefore refuse to yeeld up this authority to kings , because they cannot practise the office it selfe , doe as much as if they should say that the authority of teaching geometry must not depend upon kings , except they themselves were geometricians . we read that kings have prayed for the people , that they have blest the people , that they have consecrated the temple , that they have commanded the priests , that they have removed priests from their office , that they have constituted others : sacrifices indeed they have not offered , for that was hereditary to aaron , and his sonnes ; but it is manifest , as in moyses his life time , so throughout all ages from king saul to the captivity of babylon , that the priesthood was not a maistry , but a ministry . xvii . after their returne from babylonian bondage , the covenant being renewed , and sign'd , the priestly kingdome was restor'd to the same manner it was in from the death of ioshuah to the beginning of the kings ; excepting that it is not expresly set downe that the return'd jewes did give up the right of soveraignty either to esdras ( by whose directions they ordred their state ) or to any other , beside god himselfe . that reformation seemes rather to be nothing else then the bare promises , and vowes of every man to observe those things which were written in the booke of the law ; notwithstanding , ( perhaps not by the peoples intention ) by virtue of the covenant which they then renewed , ( for the covenant was the same with that which was made at mount sinai ) that same state was a priestly kingdome , that is to say , the supreme civill authority , and the sacred were united in the priests ; now , howsoever through the ambition of those who strove for the priesthood , and by the interposition of forraigne princes , it was so troubled till our saviour iesus christs time , that it cannot be understood out of the histories of those times , where that authority resided ; yet it 's plaine , that in those times , the power of interpreting gods word was not severed from the supreme civill power . xviii . out of all this , we may easily know how the ●ewes in all times ●om abraham unto christ were to behave themselves in the commands of their princes ; for as in kingdomes meerly humane men must obey a subordinate magistrate in all things , excepting when his commands containe in them some treason , so in the kingdome of god the i●we● were bound to obey their princes , abraham , isaac , jacob , moyses , the priest , the king , every one du●…ng ●heir time in all things , except when their commands did containe some treason against the divine majesty . now treason against the divine majesty was , first the deniall of ●is divine providence , for this was to deny god to be a king by nature ; next , idolatry , or the worship not of other ( for there is but one god ) but of strange gods , that is to say , a worship though of one god , yet under other titles , attributes , and rites , then what were establisht by abraham , and moyses , for this was to deny the god of abraham to be their king by covenant made with abraham , and themselves ; in all other things they were to obey ; and if a king or priest having the soveraign authority , had commanded somewhat else to be done which was against the lawes , that had been his sinne , and not his subjects , whose duty it is , not to dispute , but to obey the commands of his superiours . of the kingdome of god by the new covenant . i. the prophesies concerning christs dignity . ii. the prophesies coneerning his humility and passion . iii. that jesus was that christ . iv. that the kingdome of god by the new covenant , was not the kingdome of christ , as christ , but as god. v. that the kingdome by the new covenant is heavenly , and shall beginne from the day of judgment . vi. that the government of christ in this world , was not a soveraignty , but counsell , or a government by the way of doctrine , and perswasion . vii . what the promises of the new covenant are , on both parts . viii . that no lawes are added by christ , beside the institution of the sacraments . ix . repent ye , be baptized , keep the commandements , and the like forms of speech , are not lawes . x. it pertains to the civill authority to define what the sinne of injustice is . xi . it pertains to the civill authority to define what conduces to the peace , and defence of the city . xii . it pertains to the civill authority to judge ( when need requires ) what definitions , and what inferences are true . xiii . it belongs to the office of christ to teach morally , not by the way of speculation , but as a law ; to forgive sinnes ; and to teach all things whereof there is no science properly so called . xiv . a distinction of things temporall from spirituall . xv. in how many seveverall sorts the word of god may be taken . xvi . that all which is contained in holy scripture , belongs not to the canon of christian faith. xvii . that the word of a lawfull interpreter of holy scriptures , is the word of god. xviii . that the authority of interpreting scriptures , is the same with that of determining controversies of faith. xix . divers significations of a church . xx. what a church is to which we attribute rights , actions , and the like personall capacites . xxi . a christian city is the same with a christian church . xxii . many cities do not constitute one church . xxiii . who are ecclesiasticall persons . xxiv . that the election of ecclesiasticall persons , belongs to the church , their consecration to pastors . xxv . that the power of remitting the sinnes of the penitent , and retaining those of the impenitent , belongs to the pastors , but that of judging concerning repentance belongs to the church . xxvi . what excommunication is , and on whom it cannot passe . xxvii . that the interpretation of scripture depends on the authority of the city . xxviii . that a christian city ought to interpret scriptures by ecclesiasticall pastors . i. there are many cleare prophesies exta●…t in the old testament concerning our saviour jesus christ , who was to restore the kingdome of god by a new covenan● , partly foretelling his regall dignity , partly his humility and passion . among others concerning his dignity , these ; god blessing abraham , ●akes him a promise of his sonne isaac , and ●ddes , and kings of people shall be of him , gen . vers . . jacob blessing his sonne judah ▪ the scepter ( quoth be ) shall not depart from judah , gen. . vers . . g●d to moyses , a prophet ( saith he ) will i raise them up from among their brethren like unto thee , and will put my words in his mouth , and he shall speak unto them all that i shall command him , and it shall come to passe , that whosoever will not bearken unto my words , which he shall speak in my name , i will require it of him , deut. . vers . . isaias , the lord himselfe shall give thee a signe , behold a virgin shall conceive , and bear a sonne , and shall call his name emanuel , isai . v. . the same prophet , unto us a child is born , unto us a sonne is given , and the government shall he upon his shoulders ; and his name shall be called wonderfull , counsellour , the mighty god , the everlasting father , the prince of peace , isai . vers . . and again , there shall come forth a rod out of the stemme of jesse , and a branch shall grow out of his roots ; the spirit of the lord shall rest upon him , &c. he shall not judge ▪ after the sight of his eyes , neither reprove after the hearing of his cares , but with righteousnesse shall he ●udge the poor , &c. and he shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth , and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked , isay . vers . , , , , . furthermore in the , , , , , , , . ch. of the same isay , there is almost nothing else contained but a description of the coming , and the works of christ . jeremias , behold the days come , saith the lord , that i will make a new covenant with the house of israel , and with the house of judah , jerem. . . and baruch , this is our god. &c. afterward did he shew himselfe upon earth , and conversed with men , baruch . vers . , . ezekiel , i will set up one shepheard over them , and he shall feed them , even my servant david , and i will make with them a covenant of peace , &c. ezek. . vers . , , . daniel , i saw in the night visions , and behold one like the sonne of man came with the clouds of heaven , and came to the anti●ut of dayes , and they brought him near before him , and there was given him dominion , and glory , and a kingdome , that all people , nations , and languages should serve him , his dominion is an everlasting dominion , &c. dan. . vers . , . haggai , yet once it is a little while , and i will shake the heaven , and the earth , and the sea , and the drye land , and i will shake all nations , and the desire of all nations shall come , haggai . v. . zachariah , under the type of joshuah the high priest : i will bring forth my servant the branch , &c. zach. . v. . and again , behold the man whose name is the branch , zach. . v. . and again , rejoyce greatly o daughter of sion , shout o daughter of jerusalem , behold thy king cometh to thee , he is just , having salvation , zach . v. . the jewes moved by these , and other prophesies , expected christ their king to be sent from god , who should redeem them , and furthermore bear rule over all nations . yea this prophesie had spread over the whole roman empire ( which vespasian too , though falsly , interpreted in favour of his own enterprises ) that out of judea should come he that should have dominion . ii now the prophesies of christs humility and passion , amongst others are these . isa . v. he hath born our grieses , and carried our sorrowes ; yet we did esteem him stricken , smitten of god , & afflicted , and by and by , he was appressed , he was afflicted , yet he opened not his mouth ; he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter , and as a sheep before her shearer is dumb , so opened he not his mouth , &c. vers . . and again , he was cut out of the land of the living , for the transgression of my people was be stricken , &c. vers . . therefore will i divide him a portion with the great , and be shall divide the spoyle with the strong , because he hath poured ou● hi● soule unto death , and he was numbred with the transgressours , and he 〈…〉 the sinne of many , and made intercession for the transgressours , vers . . and that of zachery , he is lowly , riding upon an asse , and upon a cols the foale of an asse . zach. . vers . . iii. in the reign of ti●●rius caesar , jesus our saviour a galil●●n began to preach , the sonne ( as was supposed ) of joseph , declaring to the people of the jewes , that the kingdome of god expected by them , was now come , and that himselfe was a king , that is to say , the christ : explaining the law , choosing twelve apostles , and seventy disciples , after the number of the princes of the tribes , and seventy elders ( according to the pattern of moyses ) to the ministry ; teaching the way of salvation by himselfe and them ; purging the temple , doing great signes , and fulfilling all those things which the prophets had foretold of christ to come , that this man , hated of the pharisees , ( whose false doctrine and hypocriticall sanctity he had reproved ) and by their means , of the people accused of unlawfull seeking for the kingdome , and crucified , was the true christ , and king promised by god , and sent from his father to renew the new covenant between them and god , both the evangelists doe shew ( describing his genealogie , nativity , life , doctrine , death , and resurrection ) and by comparing the things which he did , with those which were foretold of him , all christians doe consent to . iv. now from this , that christ was sent from god his father to make a covenant between him and the people , it is manifest , that though christ were equall to his father according to his nature , yet was he in●erior according to the right of the kingdom ; for this office to speak properly , was not that of a king , but of a vice-roy , such as moyses his government was ; for the kingdom was not his , but his fathers ; which christ himselfe signified when he was baptized as a subject , and openly profest , when he taught his disciples to pray , our father , thy kingdome come , &c. and when he said , i will not drink of the blood of the grape , untill that day when i shall drink it new with you in the kingdome of my father , mat. . ve●● . . and saint paul. as in adam all die , so in christ shall all be made alive ; but every man in his own order ; christ the first fruits ▪ afterward they ▪ that are christs , who beleeved in his coming ; then cometh the end when he shall have d●livered up the kingdom to goa even his father , &c. . cor. . vers . , , . the same notwithstanding is also called the kingdome of christ : for both the mother of the sonnes of ze●●die petitioned christ , saying , grant that these my two sonnes may fit , the one on thy right hand , the other on thy left , in thy kingdome , mat. . vers . . and the theef on the cross , lord remember when me thou comest into thy kingdom , luke . vers . . and saint paul , for this know yee , that no whormonger , &c. shall enter into the kingdome of god , and of christ , ephes . . ver . . and elsewhere , i charge thee before god , and the lord iesus christ , who shall judge the quick and dead at his appearing , and his kingdome , &c. tim. . ver . . and the lord shall deliver me from every evill worke , and will preserve me unto his heavenly kingdome , ver . . nor is it to be marvelled at , that the same kingdome is atttibured to them both , since both the father , and the son , are the same god , and the new covenant concerning gods kingdome , is not propounded in the name of the father , but in the name of the father , of the son , and of the holy-ghost , as of one god. v. but the kingdome of god , for restitution whereof christ was sent from god his father , takes not its beginning before his second comming , to wit , from the day of judgement , when he shall come in majesty accompanied with his angels : for it is promis'd the apostles , that in the kingdome of god , they shall judge the twelve tribes of israel . ye which have followed me in the regeneration , when the soune of man shall sit in the throne of his glory , ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of israel , mat. . ver . . which is not to be done till the day of judgement ; christ therefore is not yet in the throne of his majesty , nor is that time when christ was conversant here in the world call'd a kingdome , but a regeneration , that is to say a renovation , or restitution of the kingdome of god , and a calling of them who were hereafter to be receiv'd into his kingdome ; and where it is said , when the son of man shall come in his glory , and all the holy angels with him , then shall he set upon the throne of his glory , and before him shall be gathered all nations , and he shall separate them one from another , as a shepheard divideth his sheep from the goates , mat. . ver ▪ . we may manifestly gather , that there will be no locall separation of gods subjects from his enemies , but that they shall live mixt together untill christs second comming ; which is also confirm'd by the comparison of the kingdome of heaven , with wheat mingled with darnell , and with a net containing all sorts of fish : but a multitude of men , enemies and subjects , living promis●uously together , cannot properly be term'd a kingdome . besides , the apostles , when they askt our saviour , whether he would at that time when he ascended into heaven , restore the kingdome unto israel ? did openly testifie , that they then , when christ ascended , thought the kingdome of god not to be yet come . farthermore , the words of christ , my kingdome is not of this world ; and , i will not drinke , &c , till the kingdome of god come : and , god hath not sent his son into the world , to judge the world , but that the world through him might be sav'd . and , if any man heare not my words , and keepe them , i judge him not ; for i came not to judge the world , but to save the world. and , man , who made me a judge or divider betweene you ? and the very appellation of the kingdome of heaven testifies as much . the same thing is gathered out of the words of the prophet jeremiah , speaking of the kingdome of god by the new covenant , they shall teach no more every man his neighbo●r , sayi●g , 〈◊〉 the lord , for they shall all k●… me 〈◊〉 the least of them , to the greatest of the● , saith the lord , ●er . ●… . which cannot be understood of a kingdome in this world. the kingdome of god therefore , for the restoring whereof christ came into the world , of which the prophets did prophesie , and of which praying wee say , thy kingdome come , ( if it must have subjects locally separated from enemies , if judicature , if majesty , according as hath beene foretold , ) shall begin from that time , wherein god shall separate the sheep from the goats , wherein the apostles shall judge the twelve tribes of israel ; wherein christ shall come in majesty , and glory ; wherein lastly , all men shall so know god , that they shall not need to be taught , that is to say , a● christ his second comming , or the day of judgement ; but if the kingdome of god were now already restor'd , no reason could be rendered why christ having compleated the work for which he was sent , should come againe , or why we should pray , thy kingdome come . v i. now , although the kingdome of god by christ to be establisht with a new covenant , were heavenly , we must not therefore thinke , that they , who beleeving in christ would make that covenant , were not so to be govern'd here on the earth too , as that they should persevere in their faith , and obedience proms●'d by that covenant . for in vaine had the kingdome of heaven beene promis'd , if we were not to have been led into it ; but none can be led , but those who are directed in the way . moyses , when he had instituted the priestly kindome , himselfe though he were no priest , yet rul'd , and conducted the people all the time of their p●reg●ination untill their entrance into the promis'd land ; in the same manner is it our saviours office ( whom god in this thing would have like unto moyses ) as he was sent from his father , so to governe the future subjects of his heavenly kingdome in this life , that they might attaine to , and enter into that , although the kingdome were not properly his , but his fathers . but the government whereby christ rules the faithfull ones in this life , is not properly a kingdome , or dominion , but a pastorall charge , or the right of teaching , that is to say , god the father gave him not a power to judge of me●m and t●●m as he doth to the kings of the earth ; no● a coercive power , nor legislative ; but of shewing to the world , and teaching them the way , and knowledge of salvation , that is to say , of preaching , and declaring what they were to doe , who would enter into the kingdome of heaven . that christ had receiv'd no power from his father to judge in questions of me●m and t●um , that is to say , in all questions of right among those who beleev'd no● , those words above cited doe sufficiently declare : man , who made me a judge , or divider betweene you ? and it is confirm'd by reason ; for seeing christ was sent to make a covenant between god and men , and no man is ob●…'d to performe obedience before the ●…ontract be made , if he should have judg'd 〈…〉 questions of right , no man h●d been ●…ed to obey his sentence . but that the dis●…erning of right was not committed to christ in this world , neither among the faithfull , nor among infidels , is apparent in this , that that right without all controversie belongs to ▪ princes as long as it is not by god himselfe derogated from their authority ; but it is not derogated before the day of judgement , as appeares by the words of saint paul , speaking of the day of judgement , then commeth the end when he shall have delivered up the kingdome to god even the father , when he shall have put downe all rule , and all authority , and power , cor. . ver . . secondly , the words of our sauiour reproving jamos , and iohn , when they had said , vvilt thou that we call for fyer from heaven , that it may consume them ( namely the samaritans , who had denyed to receive him going up to jerusalem ) and replying , the son of man is not come to destroy soules , but to save them ; and those words , behold i send you as sheep among vvolves ; shake off the dust of your feet , and the like ; and those words , god seut not his son into the world , to judge the world , but that the world through him might be sav'd ; and those , if any man heare my words , and keep them not , i judge him not , for i ca●e not to judge the world , &c. doe all shew , that he had no power given him , to condemne or punish any man. we reade indeed that the father judgeth no man , but hath committed all judgement to the son , but since that both may , and must be understood of the day of future judgement , it doth not at all repugne what hath beene sayed before . lastly , that he was not sent to make new lawes , and that therefore by his office , and mission , he was no legislatour properly ▪ so called , nor moyses neither , but a bringer and publisher of his fathers lawes , ( for god only , and neither moyses , nor christ , was a king by covenant ) is collected hence , that he sayed , i came not to destroy ( to wit the lawes before given from god by moyses , which he presently interprets ) but to fulfill ; and , he that shall break one of the least of these commandements , and shall teach men so , he shall be called least in the kingdome of heaven . christ therefore had not a royall , or soveraigne power committed to him from his father in this world , but consiliary , and doctrinal● onely ; which himselfe signifies , as well then when he calls his apostles , not hunters , but fishers of men ; as when he compares the kingdome of god to a graine of mustard seed , and to a little leaven hid in meale . vii . god promis'd unto abraham first , a numerous seed , the possession of the land of canaan , and a blessing upon all nations in his seed , on this condition , that he , and his seed should serve him ; next unto the seed of abraham according to the flesh , a priestly kingdome , a government most free , in which they were to ●e subject to no humane power , on this condition , that they should serve the god of abraham on that fashion which moyses should teach . lastly , both to them , and to all nations , a heavenly , and eternall kingdome , on condition that they should serve the god of abraham , on that manner which christ should teach . for by the new , that is to say , the christian covenant , it 's covenanted on mens part , to serve the god of abraham , on that manner which jesus should teach ▪ on gods part , to pardon their 〈◊〉 , and bring them into his ●…stiall kingdome . we have already spoken of the quality of the heavenly kingdome above in the . article ; but it is usually call'd , sometimes the kingdome of heaven , sometimes the kingdome of glory , sometimes the life eternall . what 's required on mens part , namely to serve god as christ should teach , contain●s two things , obedience to be performed to god , ( for this is to serve god ) and faith in jesus , to wit , that we beleeve jesus to be that christ who was promis'd by god : for that only is the cause why his doctrine is to be followed , rather then any others . now in holy scriptures , rep●ntance is often put in stead of obedience , because christ teacheth every where , that with god the will is taken for the de●d ▪ but repentance is an infallible sign of an obedient mind . these things being understood , it will most evidently appear out of many places of sacred scripture , that those are the conditions of the christian covenant which we have nam'd , to wit , giving remission of sins , and eternall life on gods part , and repenting , and beleeving in jesus christ , on mens part . first , the words , the kingdom of god is at hand : repent yee and beleeve the gospell , mark . . contain the whole covenant : in like manner those , thu● it is written , and thus i● 〈◊〉 christ to suffer , and to rise from the dead the third day ; and that repentance , and r●mission of s●nne● should be preached in his name among all nations , begining a● jerusalem , luke . vers . , . and those ▪ repent and be converted , that your sin● may be : bl●tted ou● , when the timos of refreshing shall come , &c. acts . vers . . and sometimes one part is expresly propounded , and the other understood , as here , he that beleeveth in the sonne , hath everlasting life ; he that beleeveth not the sonne , shall not see life , but the wrath of god abideth on him , iohn . vers . . where faith is exprest , repentance not mentioned ; and in christs preaching , repent , for the kingdome of heaven is at hand , mat. . . where repentance is exprest , faith is understood . but the parts of this new contract a●… most manifestly , and formally set down there , where a certain ruler bargaining as it were for the kingdom of god , asketh our saviour , good master , what shall i do● to inher it eternall life , luke . v. . but christ first propounds one one part of the price , namely observation of the commandements , or obedience , which when he answered that he had kept , he adjoynes the other , saying , yet lackest thou one thing ; sell all that thou last , and distribute to the poor , and thou shalt have treasune in heaven , and come , follow me , v. . this was matter of faith. he therefore not giving sufficient credit to christ , and his heavenly treasures , went away sorrowfull . the same covenant is contained in these words : hee that beleeveth , and is baptized , shall be saved , he that beleeveth not , shall be damned , mark . vers . , . where faith is exprest , repentance is supposed in those that are baptized ; and in these words , except a man be born again of water , and the holy ghost , he cannot enter into the kingdome of heaven , iohn . vers . . where to be born of water , is the same with regeneration , that is to say , conversion to christ . now that baptisme is required in the two places cited just before , and in divers others , we must understand , that what circumcision was to the old covenant , that baptisme is to the new : seeing therefore , that was not of the essence , but served for a memoriall of the old covenant , as a ceremony or signe ( and was omitted in the wildernesse ) in like manner this also is used , not as pertaining to the essence , but in memory , and for a signe of the new covenant which wee make with god ; and provided the will be not wanting , the act through necessity may be omitted ; but repentance and faith , which are of the essence of the covenant , are alwayes required . viii . in the kingdome of god after this life there will be no lawes ; partly because there is no roome for lawes , where there is none for sinne ; partly because laws were given us from god , not to direct us in heaven , but unto heaven let us now there fore enquire what laws christ ) establisht not himselfe , for he would not take upon him any legislative authority , as hath been declared above in the sixth article , but ) propounded to us for his fathers . wee have a place in scripture , where he contracts all the lawes of god publisht till that time , into two preceps , thou shalt love the lord thy god with all thine heart , with all thy soul , and with all thy minde , this is the greatest , and first commandement . and the second is like unto it , thou shalt love thy neighbo●r as thy selfe . on these two commandements hangs all the law , and the prophets , mat. . vers . , , , . the first of these was given before by moyses in the same words , deut. . vers . . and the second even before moyses , for it is the naturall law , having its begining with rationall nature it selfe ; and both together is the summe of all lawes : for all the lawes of divine naturall worship , are contained in these words , thou shalt love god ; and all the lawes of divine worship due by the old covenant , in these words , thou shalt love thy god , that is to say god , as being the peculiar king of abraham , and his seed ; and all the lawes naturall , and civill , in these words , thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy selfe ; for he that loves god and his neighbour , hath a minde to obey all lawes , both divine , and humane . but god requires no more then a minde to obey . wee have another place , where christ interprets the lawes , namely , the ●ifth , sixth , and seventh entire chapters of saint mutthewes gospell . but all those lawes are set down , either in the decalogue , or in the morall law , or are contained in the faith of abraham , as that law of not putting away a wife is contained in the faith of abraham : for that same , two shall be one flesh , was not delivered either by christ first , or by moyses , but by abraham , who first publisht the creation of the world . the lawes therefore which christ contracts in one place , and explaines in another , are no other then those to which all mortall men are obliged , who acknowledge the god of abraham . beside these , we read not of any law given by christ , beside the institution of the sacraments of baptisme , and the eucharist . ix . what may be said then of these kinde of precepts , repent , be baptized , keep the commandements , beleeve the gospell , come unto me , s●ll all that thou hast , give to the poor , follow me , and the like ? we must say that they are not lawes , but a calling of us to the faith , such as is that of isa ▪ come , buy wine , and milk without monie , and without price , isai . ve●s . . neither if they come not , doe they therefore sinne against any law , but against prudence onely ; neither shall their infidelity be punisht , but their former sinnes . wherefore saint john saith of the unbeleever , the wrath of god abideth on him ; he saith not , the wrath of god shall come upon him ; and , he that beleeveth not , is already judged ; he saith not , shall be judged , but is already judged . nay it cannot be well conceived , that remission of sinnes should be a benefit arising from faith , unlesse we understand also on the other side , that the punishment of sinnes is an hurt proceeding from infidelity . x. from hence , that our saviour hath prescribed no distributive lawes , to the subjects of princes , and citizens of cities , that is to say , hath given no rules whereby a subject may know , and discerne what is his owne , what another mans , nor by what form● , words , or circumstances , a thing must be given , delivered , invaded , possest , that it may be known ●y right to belong to the receiver , invader , or possessour , we must necessarily understand that each single subject ( not only with unbeleevers , among whom christ himselfe denyed himselfe to be a judge and distributer , but even with christians ) must take those rules from his city , that is to say , from that man , or councell , which hath the supreme power ; it followes therefore , that by those lawes , thou shalt not kill , thou shalt not commit adultery , thou shalt not steal●● , honour thy father and mother , nothing else was commanded , but that subjects , and citizens , should absolutely obey their princes in all questions concerning meum & tuum , their own and others right ; for by that precept , thou shalt not kill , all s●…ughter is not prohibited ; for he that said , thou shalt not kill , said also , whosoever doth work upon the sabbath , shall be put to death , exod . vers . . no , nor yet all slaughter the cause not being heard ; for he said , slay every man his brother , and every man his companion , and overy man his neighbour , ex● . . v. . and there fell of the people about three thousand men , v. . nor yet all slaughter of an innocent person ; for iephte vowed , whosoever cometh forth , &c. i will offer him up for a burnt offering unto the lord , jud. . vers . . and his vow was accepted of god. what then is forbidden ? onely this : that no man kill another , who hath not a right to kill him , that is to say , that no man kill , unlesse it belong to him to doe so . the law of christ therefore concerning killing , and consequently all manner of hurt done to any man , and what penalties are to be set , commands us to obey the city only ▪ in like manner , by that precept , thou shalt not commit adultery , all manner of copulation is not forbidden , but only that of lying with another man● wife , but the judgment which is another mans wife , belongs to the city , and is to be determined by the rules which the city prescribes : this precept therefore commands both male and female to keep that faith intire which they have mutually given , according to the statutes of the city . so also by the precept , thou shalt not steal , all manner of invasion , or secret surreption is not forbidden , but of another mans only : the subject therefore is commanded this only , that he invade not , nor take away ought which the city prohibits to be invaded or taken away ; and universally not to call any thing murder , adultery , or theft , but what is done contrary to the civill lawes . lastly , seeing christ hath commanded us to honour our parents , and hath not prescribed , with what rites , what appellations , and what manner of obedience they are to be honoured , it is to be supposed that they are to be honoured with the will indeed , and inwardly , as kings and lords over their children , but outwardly , not beyond the citties permission , which shall assign to every man ( as all things else , so also ) his honour ; but since the nature of justice consists in this , that every man have his own given him , its mauifest , that it also belongs to a christian city to determine what is justice , what injustice , or a sinne against justice ; now what belongs to a city , that must be judged to belong to him or them who have the soveraigne power of the city . xi . moreover , because our saviour hath not shewed subjects any other lawes for the government of a city beside those of nature , that is to say , beside the command of obedience , no subject can privately determine who is a publique friend , who an enemy , when warre , when peace , when truce is to be made , nor yet what subjects , what authority , and of what men , are commodious , or prejudiciall to the safety of the common-weale . these , and all like matters therefore are to be learned , if need be , from the city , that is to say , from the soneraign powers . xii . furthermore , all these things , to build castles , houses , temples ; to move , carry , take away mighty weights ; to send securely over seas ; to contrive engines , serving for all manner of uses ; to be well acquainted with the face of the whole world , the courses of the starres , the seasons of the yeare , the accounts of the times , and the nature of all things ; to understand perfectly all naturall and civill rights ; and all manner of of sciences , which ( comprehended under the title of philosophy ) are necessary partly to live , partly to live well ; i say , the understanding of these ( because christ hath not delivered it ) is to be learnt from reasoning , that is to say by making necessary consequences , having first taken the beginning from experience ; but mens reasonings are sometimes right , sometimes wrong , and consequently that which is concluded , and held for a truth , is sometimes truth , sometimes errour ; now , errours even about these philosophicall points doe sometimes publique hurt , and give occasions of great seditions , and injuries : it is needfull therefore , as oft as any controversie ariseth in these matters contrary to publique good , and common peace , that there be some body to judge of the reasoning , that is to say , whether that which is inferred , be rightly inferred or not , that so the controversie may be ended ; but there are no rules given by christ to this purpose , neither came he into the world to teach logick . it remaines therefore that the iudges of such controversies be the same with those whom god by nature had instituted before , namely those who in each city are constituted by the soveraign . moreover , if a controversie be raised of the accurate and proper signification ( i. e. ) the definition of those names or appellations which are commonly us'd , in so much as it is needfull for the peace of the city , or the distribution of right , to be determin'd , the determination will belong to the city ; for men by reasoning doe search out such kind of definitions in their observation of diverse conceptions , for the signification whereof , those appellations were us'd at divers times , and for divers causes ; but the decision of the question whether a man doe reason rightly , belongs to the city . for example . if a woman bring forth a child of an unwonted shape , and the law forbid to kill a man , the question is , whether the childe be a man. it is demanded therefore what a man is . no man doubts , but the city shall judge i● , and that without taking an account of aristotles definition , that man is a rationall creature . and these things ( namely right , politie , and naturall sciences ) are subjects concerning which chrit denies that it belongs to his office to give any praecepts , or teach any thing , beside this onely , that in all controversies about them , every single subject should obey the lawes , and determinations of his city . yet must we remember this , that the same christ as god could not onely have taught , but also commanded what he would . xiii . the summe of our saviours office was to teach the way , and all the meanes of salvation , and aeternall life ; but iustice and civill obedience , and observation of all the naturall lawes is one of the meanes to salvation ; now these may be taught two wayes ; one , as theorems by the way of naturall reason , by drawing right and the natural lawes from humane principles , and contracts ; and this doctrine thus deliver'd is subject to the censure of civill powers : the other , as lawes , by divine authority , in shewing the will of god to be such ; and thus to teach , belongs onely to him to whom the will of god is supernaturally knowne , that is to say , to christ . secondly , it belong'd to the office of christ to forgive sinnes to the penitent , for that was necessary for the salvation of men who had already sinn'd ; neither could it be done by any other ; for remission of sinnes followes not repentance naturally , ( as a debt ) but it depends ( as a free gift ) on the will of god supernaturally to be reveal'd . thirdly , it belongs to the office of christ to reach all those commandements of god , whether concerning his worship , or those points of faith which cannot be understood by naturall reason , but onely by revelation , of which nature are those that he was the christ ; that his kingdome was not terrestriall , but celestiall ; that there are rewards , and punishments after this life ; that the soule is immortall ; that there should be such , and so many sacraments , and the like . xiv . from what hath beene sayed in the foregoing chapter , it is not hard to distinguish betweene things spirituall , and temporall , for since by spirituall , those things are understood ; which have their foundation on the authority , and office of christ , and unlesse christ had taught them , could not have beene known , and all other things are temporall , it followes , that the definition , and determination of what 's just , and unjust , the cognizance of all controversies about the meanes of peace , and publique defence , and the examiuation of doctrines , and books in all manner of rationall science , depends upon the temporall right , but those which are mysteries of faith , depending on chrit his word , and authority onely , their judgements belong to spirituall right ; but it is reasons inquisition , and pertaines to temporall right to define what is spirituall , and what temporall , because our saviour hath not made that distinction ; for although saint paul in many places distinguish betweene spirituall thiugs , and carnall things , and calls those things spirituall , which are of the spirit , to wit , the word of wisdome , the word of knowledge , saith , the gift of healing , the working of miracles , prophesie , divers kindes of tongues , interpretation of tongues , rom. . . cor. . , . all supernaturally inspired by the holy ghost , and such as the carnall man understands not , but he only who hath known the mind of christ , . cor. . , , . and those things carnall which belong to worldly wealth , rom. . . and the men carnall men , cor. . vers . , , . yet hath he not defined , nor given us any rules whereby we may know what proceeds from naturall reason , what from supernaturall inspiration . xv. seeing therefore it is plain that our saviour hath committed to , or rather not taken away from princes , and those who in each city have obtained the soveraignty , the supreme authority of judging & determineing al manner of cōtroversies about temporal matters , we must see henceforth to whom he hath left the same authority in matters spirituall . which because it cannot bee known , except it be out of the word of god , and the tradition of the church , we must enquire in the next place what the word of god is , what to interpret it , what a church is , and what the will and command of the church , to omit that the word of god is in scripture taken sometimes for the sonne of god , it is used , three manner of wayes , first , most properly for that which god hath spoken ; thus whatsoever god spake unto abraham , the patriar●hs , moses , and the prophets , our saviour to his disciples , or any others , is the word of god. secondly , whatsoever hath been uttered by men on the motion , or by command of the holy ghost ; in which sense we acknowledge the scriptures to be the word of god. thirdly , in the new testament indeed the word of god most frequently signifies the doctrine of the gospell , or the word concerning god , or the word of the kingdome of god by christ : as where it is said that christ preach't the gospell of the kingdome , mat. . vers . . where the apostles are said to preach the word of god , acts . vers . . where the word of god is called the word of life , acts . vers . . the word of the gospell , acts . vers . . the word of faith , rom. . vers . . the word of truth , that is to say , ( adding an interpretation ) the gospel of salvation , eph. . . and where it is called the word of the apostles ; for saint paul sayes , if any man obey not our word , &c. . thess . . vers . . which places cannot be otherwise meant then of the doctrine evang●licall . in like manner where the word of god is said to be sowen , to encrease , and to be multiplied , acts . vers . . and chap. . vers . . it is very hard to ceive this to be spoken of the voye● of god , or of his apostles ; but of their doctrine , easie . and in this third acception is all that doctrine of the christian faith which at this day is preacht in pulpi●s , and contained in the hooks of divines , the word of god. xvi . now the sacred seripture is intirely the word of god in this second acception , as being that which we acknowledge to be inspired from god ; and innumerable places of it , in the first : and seeing the greatest part of it is conversant either in the prediction of the kingdome of heaven , or in prefigurations before the incarnation of christ , or in evangelization , and explication after , the sacred scripture is also the word of god , and therefore the canon and rule of all evangelicall doctrine , in this third signification , where the word of god is taken for the word concerning god , that is to say , for the gospel . but because in the same scriptures we read many things politicall , historicall , morall , physicall , and others which nothing at all concern the myste●ies of our faith , those places although they contain true doctrine , and are the canon of such kind of doctrines , yet can they not be the canon of the mysteries of christian religion . xvii . and truly it is not the dead voyce , or letter of the word of god , which is the canon of christian doctrine , but a true and genui●e determination ; for the minde is not governed by scriptures , unlesse they be understood . there is need therefore of an interpreter to make the scriptures canon , and hence followes one of these two things , that either the word of the interpreter is the word of god , or that the canon of christian doctrin is not the word of god : the last of these must necessarily be false ; for the rule of that doctrine which cannot be knowne by any humane reason , but by divine revelation only , cannot be lesse then divine ; for whom we acknowledge not to be able to discern whether some doctrin be true or not , its impossible to account his opinion for a rule in the same doctrine . the first therefore is true , that the word of an interpreter of scriptures , is the word of god. xviii . now that interpreter whose determination hath the honour to be held for the word of god , is not every one that translates the scriptures out of the hebrew , and greek tongue , to his latine auditors in latine , to his french , in french , and to other nations in their mother tongue ; for this is not to interpret . for such is the nature of speech in generall , that although it deserve the chiefe place among those signes whereby we declare our conceptions to others , yet cannot it perform that office alone without the help of many circumstances ; for the living voice hath its interpreters present , to wit , time , place , countenance , gesture , the counsell of the speaker , and himselfe unfolding his own meaning in other words as oft as need is . to recall these aids of interpretation , so much desired in the writings of old time , is neither the part of an ordinary wit , nor yet of the quaintest , without great learning , and very much skill in antiquity ; it sufficeth not therefore for interpretation of scriptures , that a man understand the language wherein they speak ▪ neither is every one an authentique interpreter of scriptures , who writes comments upon them : for men may erre , they may also either bend them to serve their own ambition , or even resisting . draw them into bondage by their forestallings ; whence it will follow that an erroneous sentence must be held for the word of god. but although this could not happen , yet as soon as these commentators are departed , their commentaries will need explications , and in processe of time , those explications , expositions ; those expositions new commentaries without any end : so as there cannot in any written interpretation whatsoeve be a canon , o● rule of christian doctrine , whereby the controversies of religion may be determined . it remains , that there must bee some canonicall interpreter whose legitimate office it is to end controversies begun , by explaining the word of god in the judgements themselves , and whose authority therefore must be no lesse obeyed , then theirs who first recommended the scripture it selfe to us for a canon of faith ; and that one , and the same person be an interpreter of scripture , and a supreme judge of all manner of doctrines . xix . what concerns the word ecclesia , or church , originally it signifies the same thing that concio , or a congregation does in latin ; even as ecclesiastes , or church-man , the same that concionator , or preacher , that is to say , he who speaks to the congregation : in which sense wee read in the acts of the apostles , of a church confused , and of a lawfull church , acts . vers . , . that , taken for a concourse of people meeting in way of tumult ; this , for a convocated assembly . but in holy writ by a church of christians , is sometimes understood the assembly , and sometimes the christians themselves , although not actually assembled , if they be permitted to enter into the congregation , and to communicate with them . for example . tell it to the church , mat. . vers . . is meant of a church assembled ; for otherwise it is impossible to tell any thing to the church ▪ but hee laid waste the church , acts . vers . . is understood of a church not assembled . sometimes a church is taken for those who are baptized , or for the professors of the christian ●aith , whether they be christians inwardly , or feignedly , as when we reade of somewhat said or writ●…n to the church , or said or decreed , or done by the church ; sometimes for the elect onely , as when it is called holy , and without blemish , ephes . . vers . . but the elect , as they are militant , are not properly called a church ; for they know not how to assemble , but they are a future church , namely in that day when sever'd from the reprobate , they shall bee triumphant . againe a church may bee ●ometimes taken ( for all christians collectively , ) as when christ is called the head of his church , and the head of his body the church , eph. . vers . . colos . . vers . . sometimes for its parts , as the church of ephesus , the church which is in his house , the seven churches , &c. lastly , a church as it is taken for a company actually assembled , according to the divers ends of their meeting , signifies sometimes those who are met together to deliberate , and judge , in which sense it is also called a councell , & a synod ; sometimes those who meet together in the house of prayer to worship god , in which signification it is taken in the cor. . vers . , . . . &c. xx. now a church which hath personall rights , and proper actions attributed to it , and of which that same must necessarily be understood , tell it to the church , and , he that obeys not the church , and all such like ●ormes of speech , is to be defin'd so , as by that word may be understood , a multitude of men who have made a new covenant with god in christ , ( that is to say , a multitude of them who have taken upon them the sacrament of baptisme ) which multitude , may both lawfully be call'd together by some one into one place , and he so calling them , are bound to be present either in person , or by others . for a multitude of men , if they cannot meet in assembly , when need requires , is not to be call'd a person ; for a church can neither speak , nor discerne , nor heare , but as it is a congregation . whatsoever is spoken by particular men , ( to wit , as many opinions almost as heads ) that 's the speech of one man , not of the church ; farthermore , if an assembly be made , and it be unlawfull , it shall be considered as ●●ll . not any one of these therefore who are present in a tumult shall be tyed to the decree of the rest , but specially if he dissent ; and therefore neither can such a church make any decree ; for then a multitude is sayd to decree somewhat , when every man is oblig'd by the decree of the major part . we must therefore grant to the definition of a church ( to whith we attribute things belonging to a person ) not onely a possibility of assembling , but also of doing it lawfully . besides , although there be some one who may lawfully call the rest together , yet if they who are called may lawfully not appeare ( which may happen among men who are not subject one to another ) that same church is not one person . for by what right they , who being call'd to a certaine time , and place , doe meet together , are one church ; by the same , others flocking to another place appointed by them , are another church . and every number of men of one opinion is a church , and by consequence there will be as many churches as there are divers opinions , that is to say , the same multitude of men will at once prove to be one , and many churches . wherefore a church is not one , except there be a certaine , and known , that is to say , a lawfull power , by meanes whereof every man may be oblig'd to be present in the congregation , either himselfe in person , or by proxie ; and that becomes one , and is capable of personall functions , by the union of a lawfull power of convocating synods , and assemblies of christians ; not by uniformity of doctrine ▪ and otherwise , it is a multitude ; and persons in the plurall , howsoever agreeing in opinions . xxi . it followes what hath beene already said by necessary connexion , that a city of christian men , and a church , is altogether the same thing , of the same men , term'd by two names , for two causes : for the matter of a city & a church is one , to wit the same christian men . and the forme which consists in a lawfull power of assembling them is the same too ; for 't is manifest that every subject is oblig'd to come thither , whither he is summon'd by his city . now that which is call'd a city , as it is made up of men , the same , as it consists of christians , is styled a church . xxii . this too is very cohaerent with the same points , if there he many christian cities , they are not altogether personally one church : they may indeed by mutuall consent become one church , but no otherwise , then as they must also become one city ; for they cannot assemble but at some certaine time , and to some place appointed . but persons , places , and times , belong to civill right , neither can any subject or stranger lawfully set his foot on any place , but by the permission of the city , which is lord of the place . but the things which cannot lawfully be done but by the permission of the city , those , if they be lawfully done , are done by the cities authority . the universall church is indeed one mysticall body , whereof christ is the head , but in the same manner , that all men together acknowledging god for the ruler of the world , are one kingdome , and one c●ty , which notwithstanding is neither one person , nor hath it one common action , or determination . farthermore where it is said that christ is the head of his body the church , it manifestly appeares , that that was spoken by the apostle of the elect , who as long as they are in this world , are a church onely in potentiâ , but shall not actually be so before they be separated from the reprobate , and gather'd together among themselves , in the day of judgement . the church of rome of old was very great , but she went not beyond the bounds of her empire , and therefore neither was she universall , unlesse it were in that sense , wherein it was also said of the city of rome , orbem jam totum victor romanus habebat , when as yet he had not the twentieth part of it . but after that the civill empire was divided into parts , the single cities thence arising were so many churches , and that power which the church of rome had over them , might perhaps wholy depend on the authority of those churches , who having cast off the emperours were yet content to admit the doctours of rome . xxiii . they may be called church-men who exercise a publique office in the church . but of offices there was one a ministery , another a maistery ; the office of the ministers was to serve tables , to take care of the temporall goods of the church , and to distribute ( at that time when all propriety of riches being abolisht , they were fed in common ) to each man his portion ; the maisters according to their order , were called some apostles , some bishops , some presbyters , that is to say , elders ; yet not so , as that by the name of presbyter , the age , but the office might be d●stinguisht ; for timothy was a presbyter although a young man ; but because for the most part the elders were receiv'd into the maistership , the word , denoting age , was us'd to signifie the office . the same maisters , according to the diversity of their employments were called some of them apostles , some prophets , some evangelists , some pastors or teachers . and the apostolicall worke indeed was universall ; the propheticall to declare their owne revelations in the church ; the evangelicall to preach , or to be publishers of the gospell among the infidels ; that of the pastors to teach , confirme , and rule the minds of those who already beleev'd . xxiv . in the election of church-men two things are to be considered , the election of the persons , and their consecration , or institution , which also is called ordination . the first twelve apostles christ himselfe both elected , and ordain'd . after christs asc●nsion matthias was elected in the roome of judas the traitour , the church ( which at that time consisted of a congregation of about one hundred and twenty men ) choosing two men : and they appointed two , joseph and matthias ; but god himselfe by lot approving of ma●●ias . and saint paul calls these twelve the first , and great apostles , also the apostles of the circumcision . afterward were added two other apostles , paul , and barnabas , ordain'd indeed by the doctours , and prophets of the church of a●…h , ( which was a particular church ) by the imposition of hands , but elected by the command of the holy ghost . that they were both apostles is manifest in the . of the acts v. , . that they receiv'd their apostleship from hence , namely because they were separated by command of the spirit for the work of god , from the rest of the prophets , and doctours of the church of antioch , saint paul himselfe shewes , who calls himselfe for distinctions sake an apostle separated unto the gospell of god , rom. . ver . . but if it be demanded , further by what authority it came to passe that that was receiv'd for the command of the holy ghost , which those prophets and doctours did say proceeded from him , it must necessarily be answer'd ; by the authority of the church of antioch : for the prophets & doctours must be examined by the church before they be admitted ; for saint john saith , beleeve not every spitit , but try the spirits , whether they are of god , because many false prophets are gone out into the world ; but by what church , but that to which that epistle was written ? in like manner saint paul reprooves the churches of galatia , because they judaized , gal. . v. ●… . although they seemed to doe so by the authority of peter , for when he had told them that he had reprehended peter himselfe with these words , if thou being a iew , livest after the manner of gentiles , and not as doe the iewes , why compellest thou the gentiles to live as do● the iewes ? not long after he questions them , saying , this onely would i learne of you : received ye the spirit by the works of the law , or by the hearing of faith ? gal. . ver●… . where it is evident , that it was judaisme which he reprehended the galathians for , notwithstanding that the apostle peter compelled them to judaize . seeing therefore it belonged to the church , and not to peter , and therefore also not to any man , to determine what doctors they should follow , it also pertained to the authority of the church of antioch to elect their prophets and doctors . now because the holy ghost separated to himself the apostles paul & barnabas , by the imposition of hands from doctors thus elicted , its manifest , that imposition of hands , & consecration , of the prime doctors in each church , belongs to the doctors of the same church . but bishops , who were also called presbyters , although all presbyters were not bishops , were ordain'd somtimes by apostles ( for paul & barnabas when they had taught in derbe , lystra , and i●onium , ordained elders in every church , acts . v. . ) sometimes by other bishops , for titus was by paul left in crete , that he should ordain elders in every city , tit. . v. . and timothy was advised not to neglect the gift that was in him , which was given him by prophesy with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery , . tim. . v. : and he had rules given him concerning the election of presbyters . but that cannot be understood otherwise , then of the ordination of those who were elected by the church ; for no man could constitute a doctor in the church , but by the churches permission . for the duty of the apostles themselves was not to command , but to teach ; and although they who were recommended by the apostles , or presbyters , were not rejected , for the esteem that was had of the recommenders , yet seeing they could not be elected without the will of the church , they were also suppos'd elected by the authority of the church . in like manner ministers , who are called deacons , were ordained by the apostles ; yet elected by the church ; for when the seven deacons were to bee elected , and ordained , the apostles elected them not , but look yee out , ( say they ) among you brethren seven men of honest report . &c. and they chose stephen , &c. and they set them before the apostles , acts . vers . . . it is apparent therefore by the custome of the primitive church under the apostles , that the ordination , or consecration of all church-men , which is done by prayer , and imposition of hands , belonged to the apostles , and doctors ; but the election of those who were to be consecrated , to the church . xxv . concerning the power of binding , and loosing , that is to say of remitting , and retaining of sinnes , there is no doubt , but it was given by christ to the pastors then yet for to come , in the same manner as it was to the present apostles : now the apostles had all the power of remitting of sins given them , which christ himselfe had ; as the father hath sent me ( sayes christ ) so send i you , john . vers . . and he addes , whose soever sins yee remit , they are remitted , and whose soever sins ye retain , they are retained . vers . . but what binding and loosing , or remitting and retaining of sinnes , is , admits of some scruple . for first , to retain his sinnes who being baptized into remission of sins , is truly penitent , seems to be against the very covenant it selfe of the new testament , and therefore could not be done by christ himselfe , much lesse by his pastors , and to remit the impenitent , seems to be against the will of god the father , from whom christ was sent to convert the world , and to reduce men unto obedience ; furthermore , if each pastor had an authority granted him to remit and retain sinnes in this manner , all awe of princes , and civill magistrates , together with all kind of civill government would be utterly destroyed . for christ hath said it ▪ nay even nature it ●elfe dictates , that we should not feare them who slay the body , but cannot kill the soule , but rather feare him who can ca●t both soule and body into hell , mat. . vers . . neither is any man so mad as not to choose to yeeld obedience rather to them who can remit , and retain their sinnes , then to the powerfullest kings . nor yet on the other side , it is to be imagined , that remission of sinnes is nothing else but an exemption from ecclesiasticall punishments ; for what evill hath excommunication in it , beside the eternall pains which are consequent to it ? or what benefit is it to be received into the church if there were salvation out of it ? we must therefore hold , that pastors have power , truly , and absolutely to forgive sinnes , but , to the penitent , and to retain them , but , of the impenitent . but while men think that to repent , is nothing else but that every one condemn his actions , and change those counsels which to himselfe seem sinfull , and blameable , there is an opinion risen , that there may be repentance before any confession of sinnes to men , and that repentance is not an effect , but a cause of confession , and thence , the difficulty of those who say that the sins of the penitent are already forgiven in baptisme , and theirs who repent not , cannot be forgiven at al , is against scripture , and contrary to the words of christ , whose soever sins ye remit ▪ &c. we must therefore ●o resolve this difficulty know in the first place , that a true acknowledgement of sin is repentance , for he that knows he hath sinned , knows he hath erred , but to will an errour is impossible , therefore he that knowes he hath sinned , wishes he had not done it , which is to repent . farther , where it may be doubtfull , whether that which is done be a sin or not , we must consider , that repentance doth not precede confession of sins , but is subsequent to it : for there is no repentance but of sinnes acknowledged . the penitent therefore must both acknowledge the fact , and know it to be a sinne , that is to say , against the law. if a man therefore think , that what he hath done , is not against the law ; its impossible he should repent of it . before repentance therefore , its necessary there be an applicacation of the facts unto the law , but it s in vain to apply , the facts unto the law without an interpreter ; for not the words of the law , but the sentence of the law-giver is the rule of mens actions ; but surely either one man , or some men are the interpreters of the law , for every man is not judge of his own fact whether it be a sin or not , wherefore the fact of which we doubt whether it be a sinne or not , must be unfolded before some man or men , and the doing of this is confession . now when the interpreter of the law hath judged the fact to bee a sinne , if the sinner submit to his judgement , and resolve with himselfe not to do so any more , t is repentance ; and thus , either it is not true repentance , or else it is not antecedent , but subsequent to confession . these things being thus explained , it is not hard to understand what kinde of power that of binding and loosing is ; for seeing in remission of sinnes there are two things considerable , one the judgement or condemnation whereby the fact is judged to be a sinne ; the other , ( when the party condemned does acquiesce , and obey the sentence , that is to say , repents ) the remission of the sinne , or , ( if he repent not ) the retention : the first of these , that is to say , the judging whether it be a sinne or not , belongs to the interpreter of the law , that is , the soveraign judge ▪ the second , namely remission , or retention of the sinne , to the pastor , and it is that concerning which the power of binding and loosing is conversant . and that this was the true meaning of our saviour christ in the institution of the same power , is apparent in the . of mat. vers . , , , . thus , he there speaking to his disciples , sayes . if thy brother sinne against thee , goe , and tell him his fault betweene thee and him alone , ( where we must observe by the way , that if thy brother sinne against thee , is the same with , if he doe thee injury ; and therefore christ spake of those matters which belonged to the civill tribunall ) he addes , if he heare thee not ( that is to say , if he deny that he hath done it , or if having confest the fact , he denies it to be unjustly done ) take with with thee yet one or two , and if he refuse to heare them , tell it the church . but why to the church , except that she might judge whether it were a sinne or not ? but if he refuse to hear the church , that is , if he doe not submit to the churches sentence , but shall maintain that to be no sin , which she judges to be a sinne , that is to say , if he repent not ( for certain it is that no man repents himselfe of that action which she conceives not to be a sinne ) he saith not , tell it to the apostles , that we might know that the definitive sentence in the question , whether it were a sin or not , was not left unto them , but to the church ; but let him be unto thee ( sayes he ) as an heathen , or publican , that is , as one out of the church , as one that is not baptized , that is to say , as one whose sinnes are retained . for all christians were baptized into remission of sinnes . but because it might have been demanded who it was that had so great a power , as that of withholding the benefit of baptisme from the impenitent , christ shewes that the same persons to whom he had given authority to baptize the penitent into the remission of sinns , and to make them of heathen men , christians , had also authority to retain their sins who by the church should be adjudged to be impenitent , and to make them of christian men heathens ; and therefore presently subjoynes , verily i say unto you , whose soever sinnes yee shall binde upon earth , they shall ●ee bound also in heaven , and whose soever sins yee shall loose upon earth , they shall be ●oosed also in heaven : whence we may understand , that the power of binding , and loosing , or of remitting , and retaining of sinnes , which is called in another place , the power of the keyes , is not different from the power given in another place in these words , goe , and teach all nations , baptizing them in the name of the father , and of the sonne , and of the holy ghost , mat. . ver . . and even as the pastours cannot refuse to baptize him whom the church judges worthy , so neither can they retaine his sinnes whom the church holds fitting to be absolv'd , nor yet remit his sinnes whom the church pronounceth disobedient . and it is the churches part to judge of the sinne , the pastours , to cast out , or to receive into the church those that are judg'd . thus saint paul to the church of corinth , do not ye judge , saith he , of those that are within ? yet he himself pronounc't the sentence of excommunication against the incestuous person , i indeed ( saith he ) as absent in body , but present in spirit , &c. xxvi . the act of retaining sinnes is that which is called by the church excommunication , and by saint paul , delivering over to satan , the word excommunication , ●ounding the same with 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , easting out of the synagogue , seems to be borrowed from the mosaicall law , wherein they who were by the priest adjudged ●eprous , were commanded to be kept a part out of the camp , untill by the judgement of the priest they were againe pronounc't cleane , and by certaine rights ( among which the washing of the body was one ) were purified , levit. . ver . . from hence in processe of time it became a custome of the jewes , not to receive those who passed from gentilisme to judaisme , ( supposing them to be uncleane ) unlesse they were first washed , and those who dissented from the doctrine of the synagogue , they cast out of the synagogue ; by resemblance of this custome , those that came to christianity , ( whether ●hey were jewes , or gentiles ) were not receiv'd into the church without baptisme ; and those that dissented from the church were depriv'd of the churches communion . now , they were therefore said to be deliver'd over to satan , because all that was out of the church , was comprehended within his kingdome the end of this kind of discipline was , that being destitute for a time of the grace ▪ and spirituall priviledges of the church , they might be humbled to salvation ; but the effect in regard of secular matters , that being excommunicated , they should not onely be prohibited all congregations , or churches , and the participation of the mysteries , but as heing contagious they should be avoided by all other christians , even more then heathen : for the apostle allowed to accompany with heathen , but with these not so much as to eate , cor. . ver . , . seeing then the effect of excommunication is such , it is manifest in the first place , that a christian city cannot be excommunicated , for a christian city is a christian church , as hath been declar'd above in the . art. and of the same extension ; but a church cannot be excommunicated ; for either she must excommunicate her selfe , which is impossible ; or she must be excommunicated by some other church , and this , either universall , or particular . but seeing an universall church is no person , ( as hath been prov'd in the . artic. ) and therefore neither acts , nor does any thing , it cannot excommunicate any man ; and a particular church by excommunicating another church doth nothing ; for where there is not one common congregation , there cannot be any excommunication . neither if some one church ( suppose that of jerusalem ) should have excommunicated an other ( suppose that of rome ) would it any more have excommunicated this , then her selfe : for he that deprives another of his communion , deprives himselfe also of the communion of that other . secondly , no man can excommunicate the subjects of any absolute government all at once , or forbid them the use of their temples , or their publique worship of god ; for they cannot be excommunicated by a church which themselves doe constitute ; for if they could , there would not onely not remain a church , but not so much as a common-weale , and they would be dissolved of themselves ; and this were not to be excommunicated , or prohibited : but if they be excommunicated by some other church , that church is to esteem them as heathen ; but no christian church by the doctrine of christ , can forbid the heathen to gather together , and communicate among themselves , as it shall seem good to their cities , especially if they meet to worship christ , although it be done in a singular custome , and manner : therefore also not the excommunicated , who are to be dealt with as heathen . thirdly , a prince who hath the soveraign power , cannot be excommunicated ; for by the doctrine of christ , neither one , nor many subjects together can in●erdict their prince any publique , or private places , or deny him entrance into any assembly whatsoever , or prohibit him the doing of what hee will within his own jurisdiction ; for it is treason among all cities , ●o●any one , or many subjects joyntly to arrogate to themselves any authority over the whole city ; but they who arroga●e to themselves an authority over him who hath the supreme power of the city , doe arrogate the same authority over the city it selfe . besides , a soveraign prince , if he be a christian , hath this farther advantage , that the city whose will is contained in his , is that very thing which we call a church ; the church therefore excommunicates no man , but whom it excommunicates by the authrity of the prince : but the prince excommunicates not himselfe , his subjects therefore cannot doe it . it may be indeed that an assembly of rebellious citizens or traytors ▪ may pronounce the sentence of excommunication against their prince , but not by right . much lesse can one prince be excommunicated by another , for this would prove not an excommunication , but a provocation to warre by the way of affront : for since that is not one church which is made up of citizens belonging to two absolute cities , for want of power of lawfully assembling them , ( as hath been declar'd before in the ▪ art. ) they who are of one church are not bound to obey an other , and therefore cannot be excommunicated for their disobedience . now , what some may say , that princes , being they are members of the universall church , may also by the authority of the universall church be excommunicated , signifies nothing : because the universall church ( as hath beene shewed in the . art. ) is not one person , of whom it may be said that shee acted , decreed , determin'd excommunicated , absolv'd , and the like personall attributes , neither hath she any governour upon earth at whose command she may assemble , and deliberate : for to be guide of the universall church , and to have the power of assembling her , is the same thing as to be governour ▪ and lord over all the christians in the world , which is granted to none , but god onely . xxvii . it hath beene shewed above in the . art. that the authority of interpreting the holy scriptures consisted not in this , that the interpreter might without punishment , expound , and explicate his sentence & opinion taken thence , unto others , either by ▪ writing , or by his owne voice ; but , that others have a not right to doe , or teach ought contrary to his sentence ; insomuch as the interpretation we speak of is the same with the power of defining in all manner of controversies to be determined by sacred scriptures : now we must shew that that power belongs to each church , and depends on his , or their authority who have the supreme command , provided that they be christians ; for if it depend not on the civill authority , it must either depend on the opinion of each private subject , or some forraigne authority ; but among othe● reasons , the inconveniencies that must follow private opinions cannot suffer its dependance on them ; of which this is the chiefe , that not onely all civill obedience would be taken away ( contrary to christ his praecept ) but all humane society and peace would be dissolved ( contrary to the lawes of nature ; ) for seeing every man is his owne interpretet of scripture , that is to say , since every man makes himselfe judge of what is pleasing and displeasing unto god , they cannot obey their princes before that they have judg'd whether their commands be conformable to the word of god , or not ; and thus either they obey not , or they obey for their owne opinions sake , that is to say , they obey themselves , not their soveraigne ; civill obedience therefore is lost . againe , when every man followes his owne opinion , it 's necessary that the controversies which rise among them will become innumerable , and indeterminable ; whence there will breed among men ( who by their own naturall inclinations doe account all dissention an affront ) first hatred , then brawles and warres , and thus all manner of peace and society would vanish . we have farthermore for an example , that which god under the old law required to be observed concerning the book of the law , namely , that it should be transcribed , and publiquely us'd , and he would have it to be the canon of divine doctrine , but the controversies about it not to be determined by private persons , but onely by the priests . lastly , it is our saviours prec●pt , that if there be any matter of offence between private persons , they should hea●… the church . wherefore it is the churches duty to define controversies , it therefore belongs not to private men , but to the church , to interpret scriptures . but that we may know that the authority of interpreting gods word , that is to say , of determining all questions concerning god , and religion , belongs not to any forraign person whatsoever , we must consider first what esteem such a power carries in the mindes of the subjects , and their civill actions : for no man can be ignorant that the voluntary actions of men by a naturall necessi●y , doe follow those opinions which they have concerning good , and evill , reward , and punishment ; whence it happens that necessarily they would chuse rather to obey those by whose judgement they beleeve that they shall be eternally happy , or miserable . now , by whose judgement it is appointed what doctrines are necessary to salvation , by their judgement doe men expect their eternall blisse , or perditidition ; they will therefore yeeld them obedience in all things . which being thus , most manifest it is that those subjects who believe themselves bound to acquiesce to a forraign authority in those doctrines which are necessary to salvation , doe not per se constitute a city , but are the subjects of that forraign power . nor therefore although some soveraign prince should by writing grant such an authority to any other , yet so , as he would be understood to have retained the civill power in his own hands , shall such a writing be valid , or transferre ought necessary for the retaining , o● good administration of his command ; for by the . chap. . art●● . no man is said to transferre his right , unlesse be give some proper sign , declaring his will to transferre it ; but he who hath openly declared his will to keep his soveraignty , cannot have given a sufficient sign of transferring the means necessary for the keeping it . this kinde of writing therefore will not be a sign of will , but of ignorance in the contractors . we must consider ne●t how absurd it is for a city , or soveraign , to commit the ruling of his subjects consciences to an enemy ; for they are , as hath been shewed above in the . chap. . artic . in an hostile state , whosoever have not joyn'd themselves into the unity of one person . nor contradicts it this truth that they doe not alwayes fight : ( for tr●ces are made between enemies ) it is sufficient for an hostile minde , that there is suspition , that the frontiers of cities , kingdomes , empires , strengthned with garisons , doe with a fighting posture and countenance , though they strike not , yet as enemies mutually he hold each other . lastly , how unequall is it to demand that , which by the very reason of your demand , you confesse belongs to anothers right ? i am the interpreter of scriptures to you who are the subject of anothers realme . why ? by what covenants past between you and me ? by divine authority . whence knowne ? out of holy scripture . behold the book , read i●… in vain , unlesse i may also interpret the same for my self ; that interpretation therefore doth by right belong to me , and the rest of my private fellow-subjects ; which we both deny : it remains therefore that in all christian churches , that is to say , in all christian cities , the interpretation of sacred scripture depend on , and derive from the authority of that man , or councell , which hath the soveraign power of the city . xxviii . now because there are two kindes of controversies , the one about spirituall matters , that is to say , questions of faith , the truth whereof cannot be searcht into by naturall reason , such are the questions concerning the nature , and office of christ , of rewards and punishments to come , of the sacraments , of outward worship , and the like : the other , about questions of humane science , whose truth is sought out by naturall reason , and syllogismes , drawne from the covenants of men , and definitions ( that is to say , significations received by use , and common consent of words ) such as are all questions of right , and philosophy ; for example , when in matter of right it s questioned whether there be a promise , and covenant , or not ? that is nothing else , but to demand , whether such words spoken in such a manner be by common use , and consent of the subjects , a promise or covenant ; which if they be so called , then it is true that a contract is made , if not , then it is false : that truth therefore depends on the compacts , and consents of men . in like manner when it is demanded in philosophy whether the same thing may entirely be in divers places at once ; the determination of the question depends on the knowledge of the common consent of men about the signification of the word entire : for if men when they say a thing is entirely●…somewhere doe signifie by common consent that they understand nothing of the same to be elsewhere , it is false that the same thing is in divers places at once : that truth therefore depends on the consents of men , and by the same reason in all other questions concerning right , and philosophy : and they who doe judge that any thing can be determin'd , ( contrary to this common consent of men concerning the appellations of things ) out of obscure places of scripture , doe also judge that the use of speech , and at once all humane society , is to be taken away ; for he who hath sold an whole field , will say , he meant one whole ridg● , and will retaine the rest as unsold ; nay , they take away reason it selfe , which is nothing else but a searching out of the truth made by such consent . these kinde of questions therefore need not be determin'd by the city by way of interpretation of scriptures , for they belong not to gods word , in that sense wherein the word of god is taken for the word concerning god , that is to say , for the doctrine of the gospell ; neither is he who hath the soveraigne power in the church , oblig'd to employ any ecclesiastical doctours for the judging of any such kind of matters as these ; but for the deciding of questions of faith , that is to say , concerning god , which transcend humane capacity , we stand in need of a divine blessing ( that we may not be deceiv'd at least in necessary points ) to be deriv'd from christ himselfe by the imposition of hands . for , seeing to the end we may attaine to aeternal salvation , we are oblig'd to a supernatural doctrine , & which therefore it lis impossible for us to understand , to be left so destitute , as that we can be deceiv'd in necessary points , is repugnant to aequity . this infallibility our saviour christ promis'd ( in those things which are necessary to salvation ) to his apostles untill the day of judgement ; that is to say , to the apostles , and pastors succeeding the apostles who were to be consecrated by the imposition of hands . he therefore who hath the soveraigne power in the city , is oblig'd as a christian , where there is any question concerning the mysteries of faith , to interpret the holy scriptutes by clergy-man lawfully ordain'd . and thus in christian cities the judgement both of spirituall and temporall matters belongs unto the civill authority : and that man , or councell who hath the supreme power , is head both of the city , and of the church ; for a church , and a christian city is but one thing . chap. xviii . concerning those things which are necessary for our entrance into the kingdome of heaven . i. the difficulty propounded concerning the repugnancy of obeying god , and men is to be remov'd by the distinction betweene the points necessary and not necessary to salvation . ii. all things necessary to salvation are contain'd in faith , and obedience . iii. what kind of obedience that is which is requir'd of us . iv. vvhat faith is , and how distinguisht from profession , from science , from opinion . v. vvhat it is to beleeve in christ . vi. that that article alone that jesvs is the christ , is necessary to salvation , is prov'd from the scope of the evangelists . vii . from the preachings of the apostles . viii . from the easinesse of christian religion . ix . from this also , that it is the foundation of faith. x. from the most evident words of christ and his apostles . xi . in that article is contain'd the faith of the old testament . xii . how faith , and obedience concur to salvation . xiii . in a christian city there is no contradiction betweene the commands of god , and of the city . xiv . the doctrines which this day are controverted ab●●t religion doe for the most part relate to the right of dominion . i. it was ever granted that all authority in secular matters deriv'd from him who had the soveraigne power , whether he were one man , or an assembly of men , that the same in spirituall matters depended on the authority of the church , is manifest by the next foregoing proofs ; and besides this , that all christian cities are churches endu●d with this kind of authority : from whence a man though but dull of apprehension may collect , that in a christian city , ( that is to say , in a city whose soveraignty belongs to a christian prince , o● councell ) all power , as well spiritual , as secular , is united under christ , and therefore it is to be obey'd in all things ; but on the other side , because we must rather obey god then men , there is a difficulty risen , how obedience may safely be yeelded to them , if at any time somewhat should be commanded by them to be done which christ hath prohibited . the reason of this difficulty is , that seeing god no longer speakes to us by christ , and his prophets in open voice , but by the holy scriptures , which by divers men are diversly understood , they know indeed what princes , and a congregated church doe command , but whether that which they doe command be contrary to the word of god , or not , this they know not , but with a wavering obedience between the punishments of temporall , and spirituall death , as it were sailing betweene scilla and cary●●is , they often run themselves upon both : but they who rightly distinguish betweene the things necessary to salvation ▪ and those which are not necessary , can have none of this kind of doubt , for if the command of the prince , or city be such , that he can obey it without hazard of his aeternnll salvation , it is unjust not to obey them , and the apostles praecepts take place : servants in all things obey your masters according to the flesh . children obey your parents in all things . col. . v. , . and the command of christ , the scribes and pharisees sit in moyses chair , all things therefore whatsoever they command you , that observe , and doe . mat. . v. . on the contrary , if they command us to doe those things which are punisht with aeternall death , it were madnesse not rather to chuse to dye a naturall death , then by obeying , to dye eternally ; and then comes in that which christ sayes , feare not them who kill the body , but cannot kill the soule . mat. . v. . we must see therefore what all those things are , which are necessary to salvation . ii. now all things necessary to salvation are comprehended in two vertues , faith , and obedience : the latter of these if it could be perfect would alone suffice to preserve us from damnation ; but because we have all of us beene long since guilty of disobedience against god in adam , and besides we our selves have since actually sinned , obedience is not sufficient without remission of sinnes ; but this , together with our entrance into the kingdome of heaven is the reward of faith , nothing else is requisite to salvation ; for the kingdome of heaven is shut to none but sinners , that is to say , those who have not perform'd due obedience to the lawes ; and not to those neither , if they beleeve the necessary articles of the christian faith. now , if we shall know in what points obedience doth consist , and which are the necessary articles of the christian faith , it will at once be manifest what we must doe , and what abstaine from , at the commands of cities , and of princes . iii. but by obedience in this place is signified not the fact , but the will and desire wherewith we purpose , and endeavour as much as we can to obey for the future : in which sense the word obedience is aequivalent to repentance , for the vertue of repentance consists not in the sorrow which accompanies the remembrance of sinne ; but in our conversion to the way , and full purpose to sinne no more , without which that sorrow is said to be the sorrow not of a penitent but a desperate person : but because they who love god cannot but desire to obey the divine law , and they who love their neighbours cannot but desire to obey the morall law , which consists as hath beene shewed above in the . chapter , in the prohibition of pride , ingratitude , contumely , inhumanity , cruelty , injury , and the like offences , whereby our neighbours are prejudic't , therefore also love or charity are aequivalent to obedience . justice also ( which is a constant will of giving to every man his due ) is aequivalent with it . but that faith and repentance are sufficient for salvation , is manifest by the covenant it selfe of baptisme ; for they who were by peter converted on the day of pentecost , demanding him what they should do ? he answered , repent , and he baptiz'd over● one of you in the name of jesus for the remission of your sins . act. . v. . there was nothing therefore to be done for the obtaining of baptisme , that is to say , for to enter into the kingdome of god , but to repent , and beleeve in the name of jesus ; for the kingdome of heaven is pro●is'd by the covenant which is made in baptisme ▪ farthermore , by the words of christ answering the lawyer who a●k● him what ●e should doe to inherit eternall life , thou knowest the the commandements , thou shalt not kill , thou shalt not commit adultery , &c. which refer to obedience ; and , sell all that thou ●ast , and come , and f●llow me , which relates to ●aith , luke . ver . . mar. . ver . . and by that which is said , the just shall live by faith , ( no● every man , but the just ) for justice is the same disposition of will which repent●… and obedience are ; and by the words of saint mark , the ●ime is fulfilled , and the kingdome of god is at hand , repent yee , and beleeve the gospell , by which words is not obscurely signified that there is no need of other vertues , for our entrance into the kingdome of god , excepting those of repentance and faith : the obedience therefore which is necessarily requir'd to salvation is nothing else but the will , or endeavour to obey , that is to say , of doing according to the lawes of god , that is the morall lawes , which are the same to all men , and the civill lawes , that is to say , the commands of soveraignes in temporall matters , and the ecclesiasticall lawes in spirituall ; which two kinds of lawes are divers in divers cities , and churches , and are knowne by their promulgation , and publique sentences . iv. that we may understand what the christian faith is , we must define faith in generall , and distinguish it from those other acts of the minde wherewith commonly it is confounded . the object of faith universally taken , namely for that which is beleev'd , is evermore a proposition , ( that is to say a speech affirmative , or negative ) which we grant to be true : but because propositions are granted for divers causes , it falls out , that these kind of concessions are diversly called : but we grant propositions sometimes which notwithstanding we receive not into our mindes ; and this either for a time , to wit , so long , till by consideration of the consequencies , we have well examin'd the truth of them , which we call supposing ▪ or also simply , as through feare of the lawes , which is to professe , or confesse by outward tokens ; or for a voluntary compliance sake , which men use out of civility to those whom they respect , and for love of peace to others , which is absolute yeelding : now the propositions which we receive for truth , we alwaies grant for some reasons of our owne , and these are deriv'd either from the proposition it selfe , or from the ●●rson propounding ; they are deriv'd from the proposition it selfe , by calling to minde what things those words which make up the proposition doe by common consent usually signifie : if so , then the a●…t which we give is called knowledge , or science : but if we cannot remember what is certainly understood by those words , but sometimes one thing , sometimes another seeme to be apprehended by us , then we are said to thinke ; for example , if it be propounded that two and three ●…akes five ; and by calling to minde the order of those numerall words , that it is so appointed by the common consent of them who are of the same language with us , ( as it were by a certaine contract necessary for humane society ) that five shall be the name of so many unities as are contain'd in two and three taken together , a man assents , that this is therefore true because two and three together , are the same with five . this assent shall be called knowledge , and to know this truth is nothing else but to acknowledge that it is made by our selves ; for by whose will and rules of speaking the number .. is called two , ... is called three , & ..... is called five , by their will also it comes to passe , that this propositionis true , two and three taken together makes five . in like manner if we remember what it is that is called theft , and what injury , we shall understand by the words themselves , whether it be true that theft is an injury , or not . truth is the same with a true proposition , but the proposition is true in which the word consequent , which by logicians is called the praedicate , embraceth the word antecedent in its amplitude , which they call the subject , and to know truth is the same thing as to remember that it was made by our selves in the common use of words : neither was it rashly , or unadvisedly said by plato of old , that knowledge was memory : but it happens sometimes that words although they have a certaine , and defin'd signification by constitution , yet by vulgar use either to adorne , or deceive , they are so wrested f●om their owne significations , that to remember the conceptions for which they were first impos'd on things is very hard , and not to be maistered but by a sharpe judgement , and very great diligence . it happens too , that there are many words which have no proper , determin'd , and every where the same signification ; and are understood not by their owne , but by vertue of other signes us'd together with them . thirdly , there are some words of things unconceivable ; of those things therefore whereof they are the words , there is no conception ; and therefore in vaine doe we seeke for the truth of those propositions , which they make out of the words themselves : in these cases , while by considering the definitions of words we search out the truth of some proposition , according to the hope we have of finding it , we thinke it sometimes true , and sometimes false ; either of which apart is called thinking , and also beleeving ; both together , doubting . but when our reasons for which we assent to some proposition , derive not from the proposition it selfe , but from the person propounding , whom we esteeme so learned that he is not deceiv'd , and we see no reason why he should deceive us , our assent , because it growes not from any confidence of our owne , but from another mans knowledge , is called faith : and ▪ by the confidence of whom , we doe beleeve , we are said to trust them , or to trust in them . by what hath been said , the difference appeares first betweene faith , and profession ; for that is alwaies joyn'd with inward asse●… ▪ this not alwayes 〈◊〉 that is an inward perswasion of the minde , this an outward obedience . next , betweene faith , and opinion ; for this depends on our own● reason , that on the good esteeme we have of another . lastly betweene faith and knowledge ; for this deliberately takes a proposition broken , and chewed ; that swallowes downe whole and enti●● . the explication of words , whereby the matter enquir'd after is propounded , is conducible to knowledge ; ●ay , the onely way to 〈◊〉 , is by de●… : but this is prejudiciall to faith ; for those things which exceede humane capacity , and are propounded to beleev'd , are never more evident by explication , but on the contrary more obscure , and harder to be credited . and the same thing befalls a man who endeavours to demonstra●● the mysteries of faith by naturall reason , which happens to a sick man , who will needs chew before he will swallow his wholsome , but bi●…r pill● , whence it comes to passe , that he presently brings them up againe , which perhaps would otherwise , if he had taken them well downe , have prov'd his remedy . v. we have seene therefore what it is to beleeve . but what is it to beleeve in christ ? or what proposition is that which is the object of our faith in christ ? for when we say , i beleeve in christ , we signifie indeed whom , but not what we beleeve . now , to beleeve in christ is nothing else but to beleeve that jesus is the christ , namely hee , who according to the prophesies of moyses , and the prophets of israel , was to come ▪ into this world to institute the kingdome of god : and this sufficiently appeares out of the words of christ himselfe to martha : i am ( saith he ) the resurrection and the life , he that beleeveth in me , though he were dead , yet he shall live , and whosoever liveth , and beleeveth in me , shall never dye . beleevest thou this ? she saith unto him , yea lord , i beleeve that thou art the christ the so● of god , which should come into the world . john . ver . , , . in which words we see that the question beleevest thou in me ? is expounded by the answer , thou art the christ . to beleeve in christ therefore is nothing else but to beleeve jesus himselfe saying that he is the christ . vi. faith and obedience both necessarity concurring to salvation , what kinde of obedience that same is , and to whom due , hath beene shewed above in the . article : but now we must en●●i●e what articles of faith are requisite : and ( * ) i say , that to a christian there is no other article of faith requisite as necessary to salvation , but only this , that jesus is the christ . but we must distinguish ( as we have already done before in the . article ) betweene faith , and profession . a profession therefore of more articles ( if they be commanded ) may be necessary ; for it is a part of our obedience due to the lawes ; but we enquire not now what obedience , but what faith is necessary to salvation . and this is prov'd first out of the scope of the evangelists which was by the description of our saviours life to establish this one article ; and we shall know that such was the scope , and counsell of the evangelists , if we observe but the history it selfe . saint matthew beginning at his genealogy shewes that jesus was of the linage of david , borne of a virgin , chap. . that he was adored by the wise men as king of the jewes ; that herod for the same cause sought to slay him , chap. . that his kingdome was preacht both by john the baptist , and himselfe , chap. , . that he taught the lawes , not as the scribes , but as one having authority , chap. , , . that he cur'd diseases miraculously , chap. , . that he sent his apostles the preachers of his kingdome throughout all the parts of judea , to proclame his kingdome , chap. . that he commanded the messengers sent from john to enquire whether he were the christ or not , to tell him what they had seene , namely the miracles which were onely competible with christ , chap. . that he prov'd and declar'd his kingdome to the pharisees , and others by arguments , parables and signes , chap. . and the following chapters to the . that he maintain'd himselfe to be the christ against the pharisees , that he was saluted with the title of king , when he entred into jerusalem , chap. . that he forewarn'd others of false christs , and that he shewed in parables what manner of kingdome his should be , chap. , , , . that he was taken , and accused for this reason , because he said he was a king ; and that a title was written on his crosse , this is jesus , the king of the jewes , chap. , . lastly , that after his resurrection , he told his apostles that all power was given unto him both in heaven , and in earth , chap. . all which tends to this end , that we should beleeve jesus to be the christ . such therefore was the scope of saint matthew in describing his gospell ; but such as his was , such also was the rest of the evangelists , which saint iohn sets down expresly in the end of his gospel , these things ( saith he ) are written , that ye may know that jesus is the christ , the sonne of the living god. iohn . vers . . i say , that to a christian . ] although i conceive this assertion to be sufficiently proved by the following reasons , yet i thought it worth my labour to make a more a●…ple explication of it , because i perceive that being somewhat new , it may possibly be distastfull to many divines . first therefore when i say this article , that jesus is the christ , is necessary to salvation ; i say not that faith onely is necessary , but i require justice also , or that obedience which is due to the lawes of god , that is to say , a will to live righteously . secondly , i deny not but the profession of many articles , ( provided that that profession be commanded by the church ) is also necessary to salvation ; but seeing faith is internall , profession externall , i say that the former onely is properly faith ; the latter a part of obedience ; insomuch as that article alone sufficeth for inward beleefe , but is 〈◊〉 sufficient for the outward profession of a christian . la●●ly , even as if i ●ad said that true and inward r●pentance of ●innes was onely necessary to salvation , yet were it not to be held for a par●… , because we suppose justice , obedience , and a mind reformed in all manner of vertues to be contained in it : so when i say that the faith of one article i● sufficient 〈◊〉 salvation , it may well be lesse wondred at , seeing that in it so many other articles are contained ▪ for these words , jesus is the christ , do signifie that jesus was that person whom god bad promised by ▪ his prophets , should come into the world to establish his kingdom , that is to say , that jesus is the sonne of god , the creatour of heaven and earth , born of a virgin , dying for the sinnes of them who should beleeve in him ; that he● was christ , that is to say a king ; that he reviv'd ( for else he were not like ▪ to reign ) to judge the world , and to reward every one according to his works , for otherwise he cannot be a king ; also that men shall rise again , for otherwise they are not like to come to judgement . the whole symbol of the apostles is therefore contained in this one article ; which notwithstanding i thought reasonable to contract thus , because i found that many men for this alone , without the rest , were admitted into the kingdome of god , both by christ , and his apostles ; as the thief on the crosse , the eu●uch baptized by philip , the two thousand men converted to the church at once by saint peter . but if any man be displeased that i doe not judge all those eternally damned , who doe not inwardly assent to every article defined by the church ( and yet doe not contradict , but if they be commanded , doe submit ) i know not what i shall say to them ▪ for the most evident testimonies of holy writ which doe follow , doe wit●●old me from altering my opinion . vii . secondly , this is proved by the preaching of the apostles . for they were the proclamers of his kingdome , neither did christ send them to preach ought but the kingdome of god , luke . vers . . act. . vers . . and what they did after christ his as●●n●●on may be understood by the accusation which was brought against them , they drew jason ( sa●… saint luke ) and certain brethren unto the rulers of the city , ●rying , these are th● men that have turned the world upside down , and are come hither also , whom jason hath received ; and these all do contrary to the decrees of caesar , saying that there is another king , one jesus . acts . vers , . it appears also what the subject of the apostles sermons was , out of these words : opening , and alleadging out of the scriptures ( to wit , of the old testament ) that christ must needs have suffered , and risen again from the dead , and that this jesus is the christ . acts . vers . , . viii . thirdly , by the places in which the easinesse of those thing● which are required by christ to the attaining of salvation , is declared . for if an internall assent of the minde were necessarily required to the truth of all and each proposition which this day is controverted about the christian faith , or by divers churches is diversly defined , there would be nothing more difficult then the christian religion ; and how then would that be true , my yoke is easie , and my burthen light ? mat. . vers . . and that litle ones doe beleeve in him ? mat. . vers . . and that it pleased god by the foolishnesse of preaching , to save those that beleeve ? cor. . vers . . or how was the thiefe hanging on the crosse sufficiently instructed to salvation ? the confession of whose faith was contained in these words , lord remember me when thou comest into thy kingdome ; or how could saint paul himselfe , from an enemy , so soon become a doctor of christians ? ix . foutthly , by this , that that article is the foundation of faith , neither rests it on any other foundation . if any man shall say unto you , loe here is christ , or he is there , beleeve it ●ot , for there shall arise false christs , and false prophets , and shall shew great signes , and wonders , &c. mat. . vers . whence it followes , that for the faiths sake which we have in this article , we must not beleeve any signes , and wonders . although we , or an augell from heaven ( saith the apostle ) should preach to you any other gospel , then what we have preacht , let him be accursed . gal. . . by reason of this article therefore we might not trust the very apostles , and angels themselves ( and therefore i conceive not the church neither ) if they should teach the contrary . beloved , beleeve not every spirit , but try the spirits whether they are of god , because many false prophets are gone out into the world , hereby know yee the spirit of god , every spirit that confesseth jesus christ is come in the flesh , is of god , &c. john . vers . , . that article therefore is the measure of the spitits whereby the authority of the doctors , is either received , or rejected . it cannot be denied indeed , but that all who at this day are christians , did learn from the doctors , that it was jesus who did all those things whereby he might be acknowledged ▪ to be the christ ; yet it followes not that the same persons beleeved that article for the doctors , or the churches , but for jesus his own sake ▪ for that article was before the christian church , although all the rest were after it , and the church was founded upon it , not it upon the church . mat. . vers . . besides , this article , that jesus is the christ , is so fundamentall , that all the rest are by saint paul said to be built upon it , for other foundation can no man lay , then that which is layd , which is jesus christ ( that is to say , that jesus is the christ ) now if any man build upon this foundation , gold , silver , precious stone , wood , hay , stubble ; every mans work shall be made manifest ; if a●y mans work abide which he hath built thereupon , he shall receive a reward ; if any mans work shall be bu●nt , he shall suffer losse , ●ut he himselfe shall be sa●ed . cor. ▪ vers . , , . &c. from whence it plainly appears , that by foundation is understood this article , that jesus is the christ : for gold , and silver , precious stones , wood , hay , stubble ( whereby the doctrines are signified ) are not built upon the person of christ ; and also , that false doctrines may be raised upon this foundation , yet not so , as they must necessarily be damned who teach them . x. lastly , that this article alone is needfull to he inwardly beleeved , may be most evidently proved out of many places of holy scriptures , let who will be the interpreter : search the scriptures , for in them yee think yee have eternall life ; and they are they which testify of me . john . . but christ meant the scriptures of the old testament only , for the new was then not yet written . now , there is no other testimony concerning christ in the old testament , but that an eternall king was to come in such a place , that he was to be born of such parents , that he was to teach , and doe such things ; whereby , as by certain signes , he was to be knowne ▪ all which testify this one thing , that jesus who was so born , and did teach , and doe such things , was the christ . other faith then was not required to attain eternall life , besides this article . whosoever liveth and beleeveth in me , shall never dye . john . vers . . but to beleeve in jesus ( as is there exprest ) is the same with beleeving that jesus was the christ ; he therefore that beleeves that , shall never dye , and by consequence , that article alone is necessary to salvation . these are written that yee might beleeve that jesus is the christ the sonne of god , and that beleeving yee might have life through his name . jo. . vers . wherefore he that beleeves thus , shall have eternall life , and therefore needs no other faith. every spirit that confesseth that jesus christ is come in the flesh , is of god. jo. v. . and whosoever beleeveth that jesus is the christ , is born of god , jo. . vers . . and , who is he that overcometh the world , but he that beleeveth that iesus is the son of god ? jo. v. . if therefore there be no need to beleeve any thing else , to the end a man may be of god , born of god , and 〈◊〉 the world , then that iesus is the christ ; that one article then is sufficient to salvation . see , here is water , what doth ●inder me to be baptiz●d ? and philip said , if thou beleevest with all thine ●e●… , thou m●ist . and he an●●ered and sai● , i beleeve that iesus christ is the 〈◊〉 of god. act● . vers . , . if then this article being beleeved with the whole heart , ( that is to say , with inward faith ) was sufficient for baptisme , it is also sufficient for salvation . besides these places there are innumerable others which doe clearly , and expres●y affirm the same thing . nay , wheresoever wee read that our saviour commended the faith of any one , or that he said , thy faith hath ●●ved thee , or that he healed any one for his faiths sake ; there the proposition beleeved was no other but this , iesus is the christ , either directly , or consequently . xi . but because no man can beleeve iesus to be the christ , who , when he knowes that by christ is understood that same king who was promised from god by moyses , and the prophets , for to be the king , and saviour of the world , doth not also beleeve moyses , and the prophets , neither can he beleeve these , who beleeves not that god is , and that he governs the world ; it is necessary that the faith of god , and of the old testament be contained in this faith of the new . seeing therefore that atheisme , and the deniall of the divine providence , were the only treason against the divine majesty in the kingdome of god by nature , but idolatry also in the kingdome of god by the old covenant ; now in this kingdome wherein god rules by way of a new covenant , apostasie is also added , or the renunciation of this article once receiv'd , that jesus is the christ : truly other doctrines , provided they have their determination from a lawfull church , are not to be contradicted ; for that is the sinne of disobedience , but it hath been fully declar'd before that they are not needfull to be beleev'd with an inward faith. xii . faith and obedience have divers parts in accomplishing the salvation of a christian ; for this contributes the power , or capacity , that the act , and either is said to justifie in its kinde . for christ forgives not the sins of all men , but of the penitent , or the obedient , that is to say the just , i say not the guiltlesse , but the just ; for justice is a will of obeying the lawes , and may be consistent with a sinner , and with christ the will to obey is obedience ; for not every man , but the just shall live by faith : obedience therefore justifies because it maketh just in the same manner as temperance maketh temperate , prudence prudent : chastity chaste , namely essentially ; and pu●● a man in such a state , as makes him capable of pardon . againe , christ hath not promis'd forgivenesse of sinnes to all just men , but only those of them w●o beleeve hi●… to be the christ . faith therefore just●fies in such a sense as a judge may be said to justifie who absolves , namely by the sentence which actually saves a man ; and in this acception of justification ( for it is an aequivocall terme ) faith alone justifies , but in the other , obedience onely : but neither obedience alone nor faith alone doe save us , but both together . xiii . by what hath been said hitherto , it will be easy to discerne what the duty of christian subjects is towards their soveraignes , who as long as they professe themselves christians cannot command their subjects to deny christ , or to offer him any contumely ; for if they should command this , they would professe themselves to be no christians : for seeing we have shewed both by naturall reason , and out of holy scriptures , that subjects ought in all things to obey their princes and governours , excepting those which are contrary to the command of god ; and that the commands of god in a christian city concerning temporall affairs , ( th●t is to say , those which are to be discust by humane reason ) are the lawes and sentence of the city deliver'd from those who have receiv'd authority from the city to make laws , and judge of controversies ; but concerning spirituall matters , ( that is to say those which are to be defin'd by the holy scripture ) are the lawes , and sentences of the city , that is to say the church ( for a christian city , and a church ( as hath beeen shewed in the foregoing chapter in the . arr. are the same thing ) deliv'rd by pastors lawfully ordain'd , and who have to that end authority given them by the city ; it manifestly followes , that in a christian common weale , obedience is due to the soveraign in all things , as well spirituall , as temporall , and that the same obedience even from a christian subject is due in all temporall matters to those princes who are no christians , is without any controversie ; but in matters spirituall , that is to say those things which concern gods worship , some christian church is to be followed ; for it is an hypothesis of the christian faith , that god speaks not in things supernaturall , but by the way of christian interpreters of holy scriptures . but what ? must we resist prince● when we cannot obey them ? truly no ; for this is contrary to our civill covenant . what must we doe then ? goe to christ by martyrdome ; which if it seem to any man to be an hard saying , most certain it is that he beleeves not with his whole heart that iesus is the christ the sonne of the living god ( for he would then desire to be dissolved , and to be with christ ) but he would by a feigned christian faith elude that obedience which he hath contracted to yeeld up unto the city . xiv . but some men perhaps will wonder , if , ( excepting this one article , that iesus is the christ , which only is necessary to salvation in relation to internall faith ) all the rest belong to obedience , which may be performed , although a man doe not inwardly beleeve , ( so he doe but desire to beleeve , and make an outward profession , as oft as need requires , of whatsoever is propounded by the church ) how it comes about that there are so many tenets which are all held so to concern our faith , that except a man doe inwardly beleeve them , he cannot enter into the kingdome of heaven : but if he consider that in most controversies the contention is about humane soveraignty ; in some , matter of gain , and profit ; in others , the glory of wits ; he will surely wonder the lesse . the question about the propriety of the church , is a question about the right of soveraignty ; for , it being known what a church is , it is known at once to whom the rule over christians doth belong : for if every christian city be that church which christ himselfe hath commanded every christiā subject to that city , to hear , then every subject is bound to obey his city , that is to say , him , or them who have the supreme power , not only in temporall but also in spirituall matters ; but if every christian city be not that church , then is there some other church more universall , which must be obeyed . all christians therefore must obey that church just as they would obey christ if he came upon earth . she will therfore rule either by the way of monarchy , or by some assembly : this question then concerns the right of ruling . to the same end belongs the question concerning infallibility ; for whosoever were truly , and internally beleeved by all mankinde , that he could not erre , would be sure of all dominion , as well temporall as spirituall , over all mankinde , unlesse himselfe would refuse it ; for if he say that he must be obeyed in temporalls , because it is supposed he cannot erre , that right of dominion is immediately granted him . hither also tends the priviledge of interpreting scriptures . for he to whom it belongs to interpret the controversies arising from the divers interpretations of scriptures , hath authority also simply and absolutely to determine all manner of controversies whatsoever ; but he who hath this , hath also the command over all men who acknowledge the scriptures to be the word of god. to this end drive all the disputes about the power of remining , and retaining sinnes ; or the authority of excommunication . for every man , if he be in his wits , will in all things yeeld that man an absolute obedience , by vertue of whose sentence he beleeves himselfe to be either saved , o● damned . hither also tends the power of instituting societies ; for they depend on him by whom they subsist , who hath as many subjects as monks , although living in an enemies city . to this end also refers the question concerning the iudge of lawfull matrimony ; for he to whom that judicature belongs , to him also pertains the knowledge of all those cases which concern the inheritance , and succession to all the goods , and rights , not of private men onely , but also of soveraign princes . and hither also in some respect tends the virgin-life of ecclesia●ticall persons ; for unmarried men have lesse coherence then others with civill society : and besides , it is an inconvenience not to be slighted , that princes must either necessarily forgoe the priesthood ( which is a great bond of civill obedience ) or have no hereditary kingdome . to this end also tends the canouization of saints which the hea●he● called apotheosis ; for he that can allure forraign subjects with so great a reward , may bring those who are greedy of such glory to dare , and doe any thing . for what was it but an honourable name with posterity ? which the decii and other romans sought after , and a thousand others who cast themselves upon incredible perils ? the controversies about purgatory , and indulgencies , are matter of gain . the questions of free-will , iustification , and the manner of receiving christ in the sacrament , are philosophicall . there are also questions concerning some rites not introduced , bur left in the church not sufficiently purged from gentilisme ; but we need reckon no more . all the world knows that such is the nature of men , that dissenting in questions which concern their power , or profit , or preeminence of wit , they slander , and curse each other . it is not therefore to be wondred at , if almost all tenets ( after men grew hot with disputings ) are held forth by some or other to be necessary to salvation , and for our entrance into the kingdome of heaven ; insomuch as they who hold them not , are not only condemned as guilty of disobedience ( which in truth they are after the church hath once defined them ) but of infidelity , which i have declared above to be wrong out of many evident places of scripture ; to which i adde this one of saint pauls , let not him that eateth , despise him that eateth not , and let not him that eateth not , judge him that eateth ; for god hath received him . one man esteemeth one day above another , another esteemeth every day alike . let every man be fully perswaded in his own mind , rom. . v. , . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e the introduction . that the beginning of mutuall society is from f●ar . annotation . annotation . that men by nature are all equall . whence the wil of mischieving each other ariseth . the discord from comparison of wits . from the appetite many have to the same thing . the definition of right . a right to to the end gives also a right to the means . by the right of nature every man is judge of the means which tend to his preservation . by right of nature all men have equall right to all things . annotation the right of all to all is unprofitable . the state of men without society is a state of war. the definition of war , and pace . war is an adversary to mans preservation . that by the right of nature it is lawfull for any man to compell him whom he hath in his power to give him caution for his future obedience . that the law of nature is not an agreement of men , but the dictates of reason . annotation . that is the fundamentall law of nature to seek peace where it may be had , and where not , to defend our ▪ selves . the first special law of nature is , that our rights to all things ought not to be retain'd . what it is to quit our right , what to convey 〈…〉 it . the will of the receiver must necessarily be declar'd before the right be convey'd . words convey not , except they relate to the time present . words of the future suffice to convey , if other testimonies of our will be not wanting . in matters of free gift words of the fi●ure ●onveigh no right . the definition of contract , and covenant . in covenants we passe away our rights by words signifying the future . covenants in the state of nature are in vain , and of none effect , not so in civill government . annotation that no man can make compacts with beasts , neither with god without revelation . nor yet vow to god. compacts oblige not beyond our utmost endeavours . in what manner we are freed from compacts . promises forc'd from us through feare of death are not valid in the state of nature . a latter compact contradicting the former is invalid . a promise not to resist him that prejudices my body is invalid . the compact of self-accusation is invalid . the desinition of an ●ath . the swearing must be conceiv'd in that fashion which he uses , who takes it . swearing addes nothing to the obligation which is by compact . an oath is not to be prest but where the breach of contract can either be kept private , or not be punisht but from god alone . the second law of nature to perform contracts . that faith is to be kept with all men without exception . injury defin'd . an injury can onely be done to him with whom we contract . annotation . the distinction of justice into that of men and actions . the distinction of commutative and distributive justice examin'd . no injury can be done to him that is willing . the third law of nature of ingratitude . the fourth law of nature , that every man render himself usefull . the fift law of nature of mercifulnesse the sixth law that punishments onely regard the future . the seventh law of nature against slander . the eight law against pride the ninth law of humility . the eleventh law , of things to be had in common . the . law , of things to be had in common . the . law , of things to be divided by ▪ lot . the . law , of birth-right and first possession . the . law , of the safety of those who are mediators for peace . the . law , of appointing an umpire . the . law , that no man must be judge in his owne cause . the . law , that arbiters must be without all hope of reward from the parties whose cause is to be iudged . the . law , of witnesses . the . law , that no contract is to be made with the judge . the . law , against gluttony , and such things as hinder the use of reason . the rule by which a man may presently know whether what he is about to act , be against the law of nature , or not . the lawes of nature oblige only in the court of conscience . annotation . the lawes of nature are sometimes broken by an act agreeable to those lawes . the lawes of nature are immutable . he who endeavours to fulfill the lawes of nature , is just . the naturall law is the same with the morall . whence it comes to passe , that what hath been said concerning the law , is not the same with what hath been delivered by philosophers concerning the vertues . the law of nature is not properly a law , but as it is delivered in holy scripture . the naturall , and morall law 〈◊〉 divine . which is confirmed in scripture in generall . specially in regard of the fundamentall law of nature in seeking of peace . also in regard of the first law of nature in abolishing all things to be had in common . also the second law of nature , concerning faith to be kept . also of the third law , of thankfulnesse . also the fourth law , of rendring our selves usefull . also of the fifth law , concerning mercy . also of the sixth law , that punishment onely looks at the future . also of the seventh law , concerning slander . al●o of the eighth , against pride al●o of the ninth , of equity . also the . against respect of persons . also of the . law , of having those things in common which cannot be divided . also of the . of things to be divided by lot. also of appointing a judge . also of the . law , that the arbiters must receive no reward for their sentence . also of the . concerning witnesses . also of the . law , against drunkennesse . also in respect of that which hath been said , that the law of nature is eternall . also that the lawes of nature doe pertain to conscience . also that the lawes of nature are easily observ'd . lastly in respect of the rule by which a man may presently know whether what he is about to act be against the law of nature , or not . the law of christ is the law of nature . that the lawes of nature suffice not for the co●servation of peace . that the lawes of nature , in the state of nature , are silent . that the security of living according to the lawes of nature , consists in the agreement of many . that the agreement of many is not constant enough to preserve a lasting peace . why the government of some bruit creatures stands firm in concord alone , and not so of men . that not onely consent , but union also is required to establish the peace of men . what un●on is . in union , the right of all men is transferred to one . what civill society is . what a civill person is . what it is to have the supreme power , what to be subject . two kinds of cities , naturall , and by institution . there can no right ●e attributed to a multitude considered out of civill society , nor any action to which they have not given their particular consents . annotation . the beginning of a city is the right of the major part agreeing . that every man retains a right of protecting himself according to ●is owne judgement , as long as he is not secured . that a co●r●ive po●er is ●●cessary for security . what the sword of justice is . that the sword of justice belongs to him who hath the chiefe command . that the sword of warre belongs to him also . the power of judicature belongs to him . the legislative power is his also . that the naming of magistrats and officers , belongs to him also . the examination of doctrines belongs to him likewise . annotation . whatsoever he doth is unpunishable . that be hath an absolute dominion granted him by his citizens , and what proportion of obedience is due unto him . annotation . that he is not tied to observe the lawes of the city . that no man can challenge a propriety in ought against him who hath the supreme power . annotation . annotation . it is known by the civill laws what theft , murther , adultery , and injurie are . annotation the opinion of those who would constitute a city , where there should not be any one endued with absolute power . the notes of supreme authority . if the city be compared with a man , hee who hath the supreme command , is in order to the city , a● the hu●… soule is to the man , by chap. 〈◊〉 . artic. . that the supreme power cannot by right be dissolved by their consents , by whose co●…pacts it was co●…tuted . there are three kinds of government onely . democraty , aristocraty , and monarchy . oligarchie is no state of a city distinct from aristocratie ; neither is anarchie any state at all . that a tyranny is not a diverse state from alegitimate monarchy . that there can no mixt state be form'd out of these fore-nam'd kindes of government . annotation . that democraty , except it have certain times and places of meeting prescrib'd , is dissolv'd . in democratie , the intervals of the times of conve●ing must be short , or the administration of the government committed to some one . by what acts an aristocraty is framed . in an aristocraty the nobles make no contract , nor are they obliged to any citizen , or to the whole people . the nobles must necessarily have their set meetings . by what acts a monarchy is framed . that the monarch is by compact obliged to none , for the authoritie he hath received . a monarch is ever in the readier capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to well governing . what kind of sin that is , and what sort of men are guilty of it , when the city performs not its office to the citizens , not the citizens towards the city . a monarch made without limitation of time may elect his successors . of limited monarchs . a monarch retaining his right of government , cannot by any promise whatsoever , be conceiv'd to have parted with his right to the means necessary to the exercise of his authority . my what beanes a subject is freed from his subjection . what lord and servant are . the distinction of servants unto such as upon trust enjoy their naturall liberty ; or slaves , and such as serve , being imprison'd or settered . the obligation of a servant ariseth from that freedome which is granted him by his lord. servants that are bound are not obliged to their lord by any contract . servants have no propriety in their goods against their lord. the lord may sell his servant , or alienate him by testament . the lord cannot be injurious to his servant . he that i● lord of the lord , is lord also of the servants . by what meanes servants are freed . the dominion over beasts is by the right of nature . paternact dominion riseth not from generation . dominion over infants belongs to him who who first hath the● in his power . dominion over infants is originally the mothers . the exposed infant is his that preserves him . the sonne of a subject and chiefe , is his that commands . in such a conjunction of male and female , as neither hath the commanding power over the other , the children are the mothers , except by pact , or civill law , it be otherwise determined . children are no lesse subject to their parents , then servants to their lords , and subjects to their city . of the honour due to parents and lords . wherein liberty doth consist , and the difference between subjects and servants . there is the same right in an hereditary , which there is in an institutive government . the question concerning the right of succession , belongs onely to monarchy . a monarch may dispose of the command of his government by testament . or give it away , or sell it . a monarch dying without testament , is ever understood to will , that a monarch should succeed him . and some one of his 〈…〉 children . and a male rather then female . and of the males , the eldest rather then the yonger . and his brother if he want issue before all others . in the same manner that men succeed to the power , doe they also succeed to the right of succession . a comparing the state of nature with the civill . the gains and losses of the the praise of monarchy . annotation the government of one cannot be said to be evill in this respect , namely because one hath more power then all the rest . rejection of their opinion , who say that a lord with his servants cannot make a city . the exactions are more grievous under command of the people , then under the monarch . innocent subjects are lesse obnoxious to punishment under a monarch then under the people . single persons have no lesse liberty under a monarch , then under the people . it is no disadvantage to the subjects that they are not all admitted to the publique deliberations . civill deliberations are unadvisedly committed to many , by reason of the unskilfulnesse of most men . by reason of their eloquence . by reason of faction . by reason of the unsetlednesse of the laws . for want of secrecy . these inconveniences do adhere to democraty , forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with an opinion of wit. the inco nveniences of government proceeding from a king who is a childe . the power of generalls is an argument of the excellency of monarchy . the best state of a common-weale , is that where the subjects are the rulers inheritance . aristocraty is so much better by how much it approaches nearer to monarchie , the worse by how much it is more distant from it . the beginning of institutive government from the consent of the people . the power of judicature , and determination of warres , depend on the will of the supreme officer . they who have the supreme authority , are by right unpunishable . that without a supreme power , there is no government ●ut confusion . that servants and sonnes , owe their lords and parents simple obedience . the absolute power of princes proved by most evident testimonies of the scripture , as w●ll new as old . that the judgement of good and evill belongs to private persons , is a seditious opinion . that subjects doe sin in obeying their princes , is a seditious opinion . that tyrannicide is lawfull , is a seditious opinion . that even they who have the supreme power are subject to the civill lawes , is a seditious opinion , that the supreme power may be divided is a seditious opinion . that faith and holiness are not acquired by study and reason , but are ever supernaturally infused and inspired , is a seditious opinion . that single subjects have any propriety , or absolute dominion over their own goods , is a seditious opinion . not to know the difference between a people and a multitude prepares to sedition . too great a tax of money , though never so just and necessary , disposeth men to sedition . ambition disposeth men to sedition . so doth the hope of successe . eloquence alone without wisdom is the onely faculty needfull to raise seditions . how the folly of the common people , and the eloquence of ambitious men , concurre to the dissolution of a common-weale . the right of supreme authority is distinguisht from its ex●r●ise . the safety of the people is the supreme law. it is the duty of princes to respect the common benefit of many , not the peculiar interest of this , or that man. by safety is understood all manner of benefits . query , whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects soules , as they shall judge best in their own c●nsciences . wherein the safety of the people consists . that discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people . to have souldiers , armes , garrisons , and money , in readiness in times of peace , is necessary for the peoples defence . a right instruction of subjects in civill doctrines is necessary for the preserving of peace . equall distribution of publique burthens conduceth much to the preservation of peace . it s naturall equity that monies be ●axt according to what every man speuds , not to what ●e posseseth . it conduces to the preservation of peace , to depresse the ambitious . and to dissolve factious . lawes whereby gaining arts are cherisht , and great expences restrained , do● conduce much to the enriching of the subject . that more ought not to be determined by the lawes , then the benefit of prince and subjects require . that greater punishments must not be inflicted , then are prescribed by the lawes . subjects must have right restored to them against corrupt judges how law differs from counsell . how it differs from a covenant . annotation how it differs from right . the division of lawes into divine and humane , and of the divine into naturall and positive , and of the naturall into those lawes of single men , and those of nations . the division of humane , that is to say , civill lawes , into secular and sacred . into distributive and vindicative distributive and vindicative are not two species of the lawes . all law is supposed to have a penalty annext to it . the precepts of the decalogue of honouring parents , of murther , adultcry , these , false witnesse , are the civill lawes . it is not possible to command ought by the civill law , contrary to o●e lawes of nature . it is essentiall to a law , that both it and the legislator be knowne . whence the legislator is knowne . promulgation and interpretation are necessary to the knowledge of a law. the civill law divided into written and unwritten . that the naturall laws are not written laws , neither are the sentences of lawyers , or custome , laws of themselves , but by the consent of the supreme power . what the word sin ▪ taken in its largest sense signifies . the definition of sin. the difference betweene a sinne of infirmitie and malice . under what kind of sin a●h●isme is contained . annotation . what the sinne of treason is . treason breaks not the civill , but the naturall law. and therefore is punisht not by the right of soveraignty , but by the right of warre . obedience not rightly distinguisht into active and passive . the proposition of the following contents over whom god is said to raign . the word of god three fold , reason , revelation , prophesy . the kingdome of god two-fold : naturall and prophetique . the rigbt whereby god governs is seated in his omn p●te●●e . the same proved from scripture . the obligation of yeelding obedience unto god , proceeds from humane infirmity . annotation the lawes of god in his naturall kingdome , are those which are above set down in the second and third chapters . what honour and worship are . worship consists either in attributes , or in actions . and there is one sort naturall , and another arbitrary . one commanded , another voluntary . 〈…〉 what the end or aim of worship i● . what the naturall lawes are concerning gods attributes . 〈◊〉 what those actions are , whereby , naturally we do give worship . in the naturall kingdom of god the city may appoint what worship it pleaseth . god ruling by nature onely , the city , that is say , that man or court which under god hath the soveraignty , is the interpreter of all the lawes . certain doubts removed . annotation ▪ what is sin in the naturall kingdom of god , and what treason against the divine majesty . superstition possessing forraign nations , god ●nstituted the true religion by the means of abraham . by th● covenant between god , and adam , all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands of superiors the manner of the covenant between god and abraham . in that covenant is contained an acknowledgement of god , not simply , but of him who appeared unto abraham . the lawes to which abraham was tyed , were no other , but those of nature , and that of circumcision . abraham among his own was the interpreter of the word of god , and of all lawes . abrahams subjects could not sin in obeying him . annotation gods covenant with the hebrewes at mount sinai . from thence gods government was called a kingdom . what lawes were by god given to the jewes . what the word of god is , and how to be knowne . what was held for the written word of god among the jewes . the power of interpreting the word of god , and ●he supreme civil power were united in moyses while he lived . they were also united in the high priest during the life of joshuah . they were also united in the high priest , untill king sauls time . they were united in the kings untill the captivity . the same were united in the priests after the captivity . among the jewes the deniall of the divine providence , and idolatry , were the onely treasons against the divine majesty : in all other things they ought to obey their princes . the prophesies of christs dignity . the prophesies of christs humility and passion . that jesus was the christ . that the kingdom of god by the new covenant was not the kingdome of christ , as christ , but as god. that the kingdome of god by the 〈◊〉 covenant is heavenly , and begins from the day of iudgement . the government of christ in this world was not a soveraignty , but counsell , or a government by way of doctrine , and perswasion what the promises of the new covenant are on both parts . there are no lawes added by christ , beside the institution of the sacraments . that these and the like forms , repent , be baptized , keep the commandements , are not lawes . it belongs to the civill authority to define what the sinne of injustice is . it belongs to civill authority to define what conduces to the peace and safety of the city . it belongs to the civill authority to judge ( when need requires ) what definitions and what inferences are true . it belongs to the office of christ to teach morality , not as a speculation , but as a law ; to forgive sins , and to teach all things whereof there is no science properly so call'd . a distinction of things temporall from spirituall . the word of god many wayes taken . all things contained in scripture , belong not to the canon of christian faith . the word of a lawfull interpreter of scriptures , is the word of god. the authority of interpreting scriptures , is the same with that of determining controversies of faith . divers significations of a church . what a church is to whom we attribute rights , actions , and the like appellations proper to a person . a christ●… city is the same with a christian church . many cities do● not constitute one church . who are clergy-men . the election of church-men belongs to the church , their consecration to the pastors . the power of remitting sinnes to the penitent , and retaining those of the impenitent , belongs to the pastors , but judgement of the repentance to the church . what excommunication is , and on whom it cannot passe . the interpretation of scripture depends on the authority of the ci●y . a christian city must interpret scriptures by clergy-men . the difficulty propounded concerning the repugnaney of obeying god , and men , is to be remov'd by the distinction betweene the points necessary , and not necessary to salvation . all things necessary to salvation are contain'd in faith , and obedience . what kind of obedience that is which is requir'd of us . what faith is , and how distinguisht from profession , from science , and from opinion . what it is to beleeve in christ . that that article alone , that iesus is the christ , is necessary to salvation , is prov'd out of the scope of the evangelists . annotation by the apostles sermons . by the easinesse of christian religion . by this , that it is the foundation of faith. by the plai● words of christ and his apostles in this article is contained the faith of the old testament . how faith and obedience doe con●ur to salvation . in a christian city there is no contrariety be weene the command of god , and of the city . the doctrines which this day are controverted about religion , doe for the most part belong to the right of dominion . political aphorisms: or, the true maxims of government displayed wherein is likewise proved, that paternal authority is no absolute authority, and that adam had no such authority. that there neither is or can be any absolute government de jure, and that all such pretended government is void. that the children of israel did often resist their evil princes without any appointment or foretelling thereof by god in scripture. that the primitive christians did often resist their tyrannical emperors, and that bishop athanasius did approve of resistance. that the protestants in all ages did resist their evil and destructive princes. together with a historical account of the depriving of kings for their evil government, in israel, france, spain, portugal, scotland, and in england before and since the conquest. approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing h e estc r this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) political aphorisms: or, the true maxims of government displayed wherein is likewise proved, that paternal authority is no absolute authority, and that adam had no such authority. that there neither is or can be any absolute government de jure, and that all such pretended government is void. that the children of israel did often resist their evil princes without any appointment or foretelling thereof by god in scripture. that the primitive christians did often resist their tyrannical emperors, and that bishop athanasius did approve of resistance. that the protestants in all ages did resist their evil and destructive princes. together with a historical account of the depriving of kings for their evil government, in israel, france, spain, portugal, scotland, and in england before and since the conquest. locke, john, - . two treatises of government. languet, hubert, - . vindiciæ contra tyrannos. defoe, daniel, ?- , attributed name. ferguson, robert, d. , attributed name. harrison, t. (thomas), fl. - . the third edition. [ ], , [ ] p. printed for tho. harrison at the west end of the royal exchange in cornhill, london : . variously attributed to daniel defoe, john locke, robert ferguson, and the printer, thomas harrison. the most complete discussion of this difficult issue may be found in: r. ashcraft and m.m. goldsmith, "locke, revolution principles, and the formation of whig ideology," historical journal , no. ( ): - . text consists of material plagiarized or adapted from a number of pamphlets including john locke's "two treatises of governement" and hubert languet's "vindiciæ contra tyrannos". copy cropped at head, affecting pagination. reproduction of the original in the bodleian library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by proquest via their early english books online (eebo) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). the general aim of eebo-tcp is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic english-language title published between and available in eebo. eebo-tcp aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the text encoding initiative (http://www.tei-c.org). the eebo-tcp project was divided into two phases. the , texts created during phase of the project have been released into the public domain as of january . anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source. users should be aware of the process of creating the tcp texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data. text selection was based on the new cambridge bibliography of english literature (ncbel). if an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in ncbel, then their works are eligible for inclusion. selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. in general, first editions of a works in english were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably latin and welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so. image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in oxford and michigan. % (or pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet qa standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. after proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of instances per text. any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of tcp data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng great britain -- politics and government, ( - ) -- early works to . political rights -- england -- early works to . political science -- philosophy -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - john latta sampled and proofread - john latta text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion political aphorisms : or , the true maxims government displayed . wherein is likewise proved , that paternal authority is no absolute authority , and that adam had no such authority . that there neither is or can be any absolute government de jure , and that all such pretended government is void . that the children of israel did often resist their evil princes without any appointment or foretelling thereof by god in scripture . that the primitive christians did often resist their tyrannical emperors , and that bishop athanasius did approve of resistance . that the protestants in all ages did resist their evil and destructive princes . together with a historical account of the depriving of kings for their evil government , in israel , france , spain , portugal , scotland , and in england before and since the conquest . the third edition . london , printed for tho. harrison at the west end of the royal exchange in cornhill . . political aphorisms : or the true maxims of government displayed . it is evident that no rule or form of government is prescribed by the law of god and nature ; for that then they would be both immutable , and the self-same in all countries . for the better proof whereof , it is necessary to shew , how far government proceeds from nature , and how far from man ; to wit , that man is sociable , and inclined to live together in company , which proceeds from nature , and consequently also from god , that is author of nature ; from whence do proceed all private houses , then villages , then towns , then castles , then cities , and then kingdoms and common-wealths ( as aristotle saith in his book of politicks ) . tho government in like manner , and jurisdiction of magistrates , which does follow necessarily upon this living together in company , be also of nature ; yet the particular form or manner of this or that government , in this or that fashion , as to have many governors , few , or one , and those either kings , dukes , earls , or the like ; or that they should have this or that authority more or less , for longer or shorter time , or be by succession , or election themselves and their children , or next in blood : all these things ( i say ) are not by law natural or divine ( for then , as hath been said , they should be all one in all countries and nations ) for god said , gen. . . it is not good that man should be alone , i will make him an help-meet ( or assistant like unto himself ) : so that as this first society of our first parents was of god , and for so great purpose as the one to help and assist ( not destroy or inslave ) the other : so all other societies , as proceeding from this first , stand upon the same ground of god's ordinance , for the self-same end of mans utility or happiness ; all which is confirmed by the consent and use of all nations throughout the world ; which general consent cicero calleth ipsius vocem naturae , the voice of nature her self . for there was never yet any nation found either of ancient times , or of later days , by the discovery of the indies , or else-where , where men living together , had not some kind of magistrate , or superior to govern them ; which evidently declareth , that magistracy is also from nature , and from god that created nature ( though not in this or that particular form : ) which point our civil law doth prove in like manner , in the beginning of our digest , de origine juris civilis & omnium magistratuum , of the beginning of the civil law , and of all magistrates , which beginning is referred to the first principle of natural instinct , and god's institution . though common-wealths and government of the same by magistrates are of nature ; yet the particular forms or manner of governments are not of nature , but are left unto every nation and country to chuse what form of government they like best , and think most fit for the natures and conditions of the people . by the state of nature we are all equal , there being no superiority or subordination one above another ; there can be nothing more rational , than that creatures of the same species and rank promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature , and the use of the same faculties should also be equal one amongst another , without god by any manifest declaration of his will had set one above another , and given him superiority or soveraignty . were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men , there would be no need of any other state ; for every one in that state being both judg and executioner of the law of nature , which is to punish according to the offence committed . men being partial to themselves , passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far in their own cases , as well as negligence and unconcernedness makes them too remiss in other mens . this makes every one willingly give up his single power of punishing to one alone , of more , as they shall think most convenient , and by such rules as the community , or those authorized by them to that purpose , shall agree on , with intention in every one the better to preserve himself , his liberty and property . what is it but flattery to the natural vanity and ambition of men , too apt of it self to grow and increase with the possession of any power , who would perswade those monarchs in authority , that they may do what they please , because they have authority to do more than others ; since rational creatures cannot be supposed , when free , to put themselves into subjection to another for their own harm , which were to put themselves in a worse condition than in the state of nature , wherein they had liberty to defend their lives and properties against the invasions of any man or men whatsoever ; whereas by giving up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power of any man , they have disarm'd themselves , and armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases . i have been the longer in speaking of the state of nature , and the natural instinct to society and government , for that it is the fountain of all the rest that ensueth in a common-wealth ; but if we respect god and nature , as well might all the diversity of governments , which have been , and now are in the world , have followed one law , as so different , but that neither god , nor nature ( which is from god ) hath prescribed any of those particular forms , but concurreth or permitteth such which the common-wealth appoints . can any man say that god and nature did not concur as well with italy when it had but one prince , as now when it hath so many , and the like with germany , and also with switzerland , which was once one common-wealth under the dukes and marquesses of austria , and now are divided into thirteen cantons or common-wealths , under popular magistrates of their own ? england also was first a monarchy under the britains , and then a province under the romans , and after that divided into seven kingdoms at once , under the saxons , and after them of the danes , and then the normans , and then the french , and now a monarchy again under the english ; and all this by god's providence and permission , who suffered his own peculiar people the jews to be under divers manner of governments at divers times ; at first under patriarchs , abraham , isaac and jacob ; then under captains , as moses , joshua , and the like ; then under judges , as othoniel , ebud and gideon ; then under high priests , as eli and samuel ; then under kings , as saul , david , and the rest ; then under captains and high priests again , as zorobbabel , judas maccabeus , and his brethren ; until the government was lastly taken from them , and they brought under the power of the romans . and last of all that god does concur with what magistrate or magistrates the community thinks fit to appoint , is plain by the testimony of holy scripture , as when god said to solomon , by me kings rule , and nobles , even all the judges of the earth , prov. . . that is , by his permission they govern , tho chosen by the people ; and st. paul to the romans avoucheth , that authority is not but of god , and therefore he that resisteth authority , resisteth god , rom. . which is to be understood of authority , power and jurisdiction in it self according to the laws of every country . all politick societies began from a voluntary union and mutual agreement of men , freely acting in the choice of their governours , and forms of government . all kings receive their royal dignity from the community by whom they are made the superiour minister and ruler of the people . aristotle , cicero , augustin , fortescue , and all other politicians agree , that kingdoms and common-wealths were existent before kings ; for there must be a kingdom and society of men to govern , before there can be a king elected by them to govern them ; and those kingdoms and societies of men had ( for the most part ) some common laws of their own free choice by which they were governed , before they had kings , which laws they swore their kings to observe , before they would crown or admit them to the government , as is evident by the coronation-oaths of all christian and pagan kings continued to this day . the safety of the people is the supreamest law ; and what they by common consent have enacted , only for the publick safety , they may , without any obstacle , alter when things require it , by the like common consent . the lawful power of making laws to command whose politick societies of men , belongeth so properly unto the same intire societies , that for any prince or potentate , of what kind soever upon earth , to exercise the same of himself , and not by express commission immediately and personally received from god , or else by authority derived at first from their consent , upon whose persons they impose laws , it is no better than meer tyranny . laws they are not therefore , which publick approbation hath not made so . hooker's eccl. pol. l. . § . . whosoever ( says aristotle ) is governed by a man without a law , is governed by a man , and by a beast . as every man , in the delivery of the gift of his own goods , may impose what covenant or condition he pleases ; and every man is moderator and disposer of his own estate . so in the voluntary institution of a king , and royal power , it is lawful for the people , submitting themselves , to prescribe the king and his successors what law they please , so as it be not unreasonable and unjust , and directly against the rights of a supream governour . no man can be born an absolute king ; no man can be a king by himself ; no king can reign without the people . whereas on the contrary , the people may both be , and are by themselves , and are in time before a king. by which it appears that all kings were and are constituted by the people , because , by the law of nature , there is no superiority one above another ; and god has no where commanded the world , or any part thereof , to be governed by this or that form , or by this or that person ; therefore all superiority and authority must , and does proceed from the people , since , by the law of god and nature , there is no superiority one above another . aristotle saith , that the whole kingdom , city , or family , is more excellent , and to be preferred before any part or member thereof . succession was tolerated ( and appointed in the world ) to avoid competition , and inter-regnum , and other inconveniences of election . 't is plain , from what hath been said , that all government proceeds from the people . now i will prove that they have authority to put back the next inheritors to government , when unfit or uncapable to govern : and also to dispossess them that are in lawful possession , if they fulfil not the laws and conditions by which , and for which their dignities were given them ; and when it is done upon just and urgent causes , and by publick authority of the whole body , the justice thereof is plain ; as when the prince shall endeavour to establish idolatry , contrary to the laws of the land ; or any religion which is repugnant to the scripture , as popery , &c. or to destroy the people , or make them slaves to his tyrannical will and pleasure : for as the whole body is of more authority than the head , and may cure it when out of order ; so may the weal-publick cure or purge their heads , when they are pernitious or destructive to the body politick ; seeing that a body civil may have divers heads by succession or election , and cannot be bound to one , as a body natural is : which body natural , if it had ability to cut off its aking or sickly head , and take another , i doubt not but it would do it , and that all men would confess it had authority sufficient , and reason so to do , rather than the other parts should perish , or live in pain and continual torment : so may the body politick chuse another head and governour in the room of its destructive one ; which hath been done for many ages , and god hath wonderfully concurred therein ( for the most part ) with such judicial acts of the common-wealth against their evil princes ; not only prospering the same , but by giving them commonly some notable successor in place of the deprived , thereby both to justify the fact , and remedy the fault of him that went before . first , king saul was slain by the philistines by god's appointment , for not fulfilling the law and limits prescribed unto him . ammon was lawful king also , yet was he slain , for that he walked not in the way prescribed him by god , king. . and david and josiah were made kings in their rooms , who were two most excellent princes . shalum , pekahiah , and pekah , three wicked and idolatrous kings of israel , were , by god's just judgment , slain one after another . and all the kings of israel , who violated the covenant and conditions annexed to their crowns , did , for the most part , lose their lives , and underwent the utter extirpation of their posterities from the crown . rehoboham ( for only ) threatning to oppress the people , was deserted by them , who chose jeroboham his servant in his stead , which was approved on by god. if i should instance all the kings over the children of israel whom god permitted ( and appointed ) to be slain , and those that were carried away captive by the heathens for their unjust government , i should be too copious . but i will leave the hebrews , and give you several examples of the depriving of evil princes of the government , in france , spain , portugal , &c. and last of all in scotland and england ; and of the happiness and prosperity that did attend those kingdoms upon such acts , which can be imputed to nothing but the blessing of almighty god which attended those proceedings ; and by consequence he approved thereof , and does approve of such acts. there has been two great changes made of the royal line in france ; the first from pharamond to the line of pepin , the second from pepin to hugo capet . childerick the third was deprived for his evil government , and pepin was chosen king in his stead , whose posterity reigned for many years after him , and were brave kings , as history doth testify . lewis the third , and charles sirnamed le-gross , were both deprived by the states of france for their ill government , and such who were thought more worthy , appointed in their stead . all french histories do attribute to these great changes that have been made by the people , the prosperity and greatness of their present kingdom . henry the third , before he was king of france , was chosen king of polonia : but for departing thence without leave , and not returning at his day , was deprived by publick act of parliament . if i were to mention all the acts of this nature throughout europe , i should be too tedious , therefore i will mention only some few . in spain , flaveo suintila was deprived for his evil government , together with all his posterity , and sissinando chosen in his room . don pedro , sirnamed the cruel , for his injurious proceedings with his subjects , they resolved to dethrone him ; and to that intent sent for a bastard brother of his , named henry , that lived in france , desiring him to come , with some french men , to assist them in that act , and take the crown upon himself . which he did , by the help of the spaniards , and slew him in fight hand to hand , and so enjoyed the crown , as doth his off-spring to this day . this henry was a most excellent king , as well for his courage in war , as for his other brave qualities . in portugal , don sanco the second , was deprived , by the universal consent of all portugal , and don alanso his brother set up : who , amongst other great exploits , was the first that set portugal free from all subjection , dependance , and homage to the kingdom of castile . and his son , who was his successor , builded and founded above forty great towns in portugal : who was likewise a most rare prince , and his off-spring ruleth there to this day . cisternus , king of denmark , for his intolerable cruelty , was deprived , and his wife and three children disinherited , and his uncle frederick was chosen king in his stead , whose off-spring remaineth in the crown . in scotland , the nobility and gentry , &c. took arms against durstus their king , for his intolerable cruelty , and slew him and his confederates in battel , ( and put by his sons , lest they should imitate their father's vices ) and elected even , his brother , king ; who leaving a bastard son , the kingdom was conferred on him . crathy cinthus having surprized and slain donald for his tyranny , he was unanimously elected king. ethus was , for his evil government , deprived , and gregory made king in his stead . buchanan , a scots-man , speaking of his country , saith , that it was free from the beginning , created it self kings upon this very law , that the empire being conferred on them by the suffrages of the people ; if the matter required it , they might take it away by the same suffrages . of which law many footsteps have remained even to our age. i will end this narration with examples out of england , ( before and since the conquest ) archigallo , emerian , vortigern , sigibert king of the west-saxons ; beornred , and alured king of northumberland , were all deprived of their thrones for their evil government , and such who were thought more worthy preferred in their stead . king edwin being deprived for his unjust government , the crown was given to his brother edgar , who was one of the rarest princes that the world had in his time , both for peace and war , justice , piety , and valour : he kept a navy ( saith stow ) of three thousand and six hundred ships , distributed in divers parts for defence of the realm ; and he built and restored forty seven monasteries at his own charge , &c. the crown of england hath been altered by the community , and settled upon those from whom they expected more justice than from the right heirs ; witness the electing and crowning of edelwald and casebelian ; egbert not next in blood , edward , adalston , and harold , who were all illegitimate ; and edred , against the right of his two nephews , canutus a foreigner , and hardiknute , without title , and edward the confessor , against the right heirs . after the conquest , anno. . robert the elder brother was put aside , and william rufus , the third son of william the conqueror , was elected : after whose death , henry the first , his younger brother ( though not next heir ) was chosen by the people , not summoned by writ . after the death of henry the first , stephen was chosen king against the right of maud , the daughter of henry the first . after his death henry the second was admitted king , against the right of his mother maud. after the death of richard the first , king john ( earl of morton ) was elected , and arthur the right heir disinherited . henry the third was chosen against the right of eleanor prince arthur's sister . at the death of henry the third , the states of the kingdom met and setled the government , by appointing officers , and what else was necessary for the defence of the realm , and edward the fourth was set up by the people during the life of henry the sixth . now it is plain , that the kings and queens of england , ever since william rufus's time , have proceeded from those who were set up by the people against the next heirs . king edward the second , richard the second , and richard the third , were , for not governing according to the laws of the land , deprived of the government , and edward the third , and henry the fourth and seventh , were preferred in their rooms , which were most rare and valiant princes , who have done many important acts in this kingdom , and have raised many families to nobility , put down others , changed states both abroad and at home , altered the course of descent in the blood royal , and the like ; which was unjust , and is void at this day , if the changes and deprivations of the former kings were unlawful , and consequently all those princes that have succeeded them ( which yet never failed of a constant lineal descent ) were usurpers ; and those that do pretend to the crown of england at this day , have no title at all , ( which was yet never denied ) for that from those men they descended , who were put in the place of the aforementioned , deprived by the common-wealth : and this is , and hath been the custom and practice of all kingdoms and common-wealths , to deprive their princes for their evil government ; and that god hath , and does concur with the same , is plain from the examples before-mentioned , of the prosperity and happiness that hath attended those acts. the barons , prelates , and commons took a solemn oath , that if king john should refuse to grant and confirm their laws and liberties , they would wage war against him so long , and withdraw themselves from their allegiance to him , until he should confirm to them by a charter , ratified with his seal , all things which they required : and that if the king should afterwards peradventure recede from his oath , as they verily believed he would , by reason of his double-dealing , they would forthwith , by seizing on his castles , compel him to give satisfaction . he afterwards breaking his oath and promise , the barons said , what shall we do with this wicked king ? if we let him thus alone he will destroy us and our people ; it is expedient therefore that he should be expelled the throne , we will not have him any longer to reign over us : and accordingly they sent for lewis the prince of france , to be their king , and swore fealty to him , but they afterwards discovering that he had sworn that he would oppress them , and extirpate all their kindred , they rejected him , and set up henry the third . the bishops of hereford , lincoln , and several earls , barons and knights for each county , being deputed to go to edward ii , and demand a surrender of the crown , said to him , that unless he did of himself renounce his crown and scepter , the people would neither endure him , or any of his children , as their soveraign ; but disclaiming all homage and fealty , would elect some other for king who should not be of the blood ; upon which the king resigned his crown , &c. by the common usage of england , which is the common law of england , kings may be deprived for evil government , and others set up in their stead , is plain from the afore-going examples . richard the first being taken prisoner by the emperor in his return from the holy land , it was decreed , that the fourth part of all that year's rents , and of all the moveables , as well of the clergy as of the laity , and all the woolls of the abbots of the order of cistersians and of semphringham , and all the gold and silver chalices , and treasure of all churches , should be paid in towards the ransom of the king , which was done accordingly . if all this was given for the liberty of one man ; certainly much more ought to be given now , when all our liberties and properties , and even our religion too lies at stake , if necessity required it , which god forbid . by the law of nature , salus populi , the welfare of the people , is both the supream and first law in government , and the scope and end of all other laws , and of government it self ; because the safety of the body politick is ever to be preferred before any one person whatsoever . no human law is binding which is contrary to the scripture , or the general laws of nature . religion doth not overthrow nature , whose chiefest principle is to preserve her self ; and god doth not countenance sin in the greatest , but rewards the punisher , witness jehu , &c. the end for which men enter into society , is not barely to live , but to live happily , answerable to the excellency of their kind , which happiness is not to be had out of society . all common-wealths are in a state of nature one with another . as magistrates were designed for a general good ; so the obligation to them must be understood so , as to be still in subordination to the main end ; for the reason of all law and government is the publick good. government being for the benefit of the governed , and not for the sole advantage of the governours , but only for theirs with the rest , as they make a part of that politick body , each of whose parts and members are taken care of , and directed in their peculiar function for the good of the whole , by the laws of the society . the end of government being the preservation of all as much as may be , even the guilty are to be spared where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent . the publick power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society ; and the principal use of that power is to give laws unto all that are under it , which laws in such cases we must obey , unless there be reason shewed which may necessarily inforce that the law of reason or of god doth injoyn the contrary . hooker eccl. pol. l. . § . . t. cicero saith , there is one nature of all men ; that even nature it self prescribes this , that a man ought to take care of a man who ever he be , even for this very cause , that he is a man. if otherwise , all human consociation must necessarily be dissolved ; therefore , as there are two foundations of justice : first , that no hurt be done to any ; next , that the profit of all , if it can be done , be advanced . that all magistates and governours do proceed from the people , is plain from the following examples in scripture ; deut. . , . the children of israel are commanded to make judges and officers throughout their tribes . deut. . , . when thou art come into the land , &c. and shalt say , i will set a king over we , like as all the nations that are about me : thou shalt in any wise set him king over thee , whom the lord thy god shall choose : one from among thy brethren shalt thou set over thee ; thou mayst not set a stranger over thee . so god did only reserve to himself the nomination of their king ; by which he designed to make his people more happy than they could expect by their own peculiar choice ; he knowing the heart of man , and corruption of his nature , would be sure to nominate such who was most fit to govern his people . god did not require the jews to accept of him for king whom he should chuse , but left it to their own free will , whether they would accept him or no , is plain from the following examples . upon the death of saul , david was set up by the appointment of almighty god , yet there was only the tribe of judah that followed david and made him king , eleven tribes following ishbosheth , saul's son , whom they made king ; and though david had a long war against the house of saul , yet he calls them not rebels , neither do we find that god punished them , or sent any judgment upon them for not accepting of david as king ; and when rechab and banah had slain ishbosheth , and brought his head to david at hebron , saying , behold the head of thine enemy ! yet david , instead of rewarding them , caused them to be slain for killing of ishbosheth , whom he calls a righteous person , not a rebel : after whose death all those tribes came to david , and made a compact with him for the performance of such conditions which they thought necessary for the securing of their liberty before they made him king : sam. chap. , , , . the making of solomon king by david his father , was not thought sufficient without the peoples consent , else why did the people anoint solomon , and make him king the second time . we read , judg. . , , . that after gideon had slain zebah and zalmunna with the midianites , the children of israel said unto gideon , rule thou over us , both thou and thy sons , and thy sons son also ; for thou hast delivered us from the hand of midian . but he refusing their offer , they afterwards made his bastard-son abimelech king , though he had threescore and ten lawfully-begotten sons . zimri having slain baasha king of israel , reigned in his stead , but the children of israel hearing thereof , rejected him , and made omri the captain of the host king of israel , kings . , . the kingdom of edom appointed a deputy to rule over them instead of a king , and gave him royal authority , there being then no king in edom , kings . . see macchab. . , , . & . , . & . to . by which it is further apparent that their kings and governours were chosen by the people . as propinquity of blood is a great preheminence towards the attaining of any crown , yet it doth not bind the common-wealth to yield thereto , and to admit at hap-hazard every one that is next by succession of blood , ( as was falsly affirmed by r. l'estrange and many others , when the parliament would have disinherited the duke of york as unfit to govern this nation , he being a papist ) if weighty reasons require the contrary , because she is bound to consider well and maturely the person that is to enter , whether he be like to perform his duty and charge to be committed to him : for to admit him that is an enemy or unfit to govern , is to consent to the destroying of the common-wealth . see how god dealt in this point with the children of israel , sam. . after he had granted to them the same government as the other nations round about them had , whose kings did ordinarily reign by succession as ours do at this day , and as most of the kings of the jews did afterwards : yet that this law of succeeding by proximity of birth , though for the most part it should prevail , yet he shewed plainly that upon just causes it might be altered , as in the case of saul , who left behind him many children , yet not any of them succeeded him , except ishbosheth , who was not his eldest son , who was anointed king by abner the general captain of that nation , to whom eleven tribes followed , until he was slain ; and then they chose david . and jonathan , saul's other son , so much praised in holy scripture , being slain in war , his son mephibosheth did not succeed in the crown , though by succession he had much greater right to it than david ▪ god promised david that his seed should reign ( for ever ) after him — yet we do not find this performed to any of his elder sons , nor to any of their offspring , but only to solomon his younger and tenth son. rehoboam , the lawful son and heir of king solomon , coming to shichem , where all the people of israel were assembled together for his coronation and admission to the crown , ( for until that time he was not accounted true king ) who refusing to ease them of some heavy impositions which they had received from his father , ten tribes of the twelve refuse to admit him their king , and chose jeroboam his servant , and made him their lawful king , and god allowed thereof ; for when rehoboam had prepared an hundred and fourscore thousand chosen men , who were warriours , to reduce those ten tribes to the obedience of their natural prince , god commanded them to desist by his prophet shemaiah , and so they did . these and the like determinations of the people about admitting or refusing of princes to reign or not to reign over them , when their designments are to good ends , and for just causes , are allowed by god , and oftentimes are his own special drifts and dispositions , though they seem to come from man. he who is set up or made king by the consent of the people , hath a just title against the next heir of the blood and his issue , who are put by the crown ; else most of the princes now reigning in europe would be usurpers , and want good titles to their crowns , they or their ancestors being set up by the people , which were not the right heirs of the royal stock . the laws of the commonwealth is the very soul of a politick body . kings and emperors always have been , are , and ought to be subject to the laws of their kingdoms ; not above them , to violate , break or alter them at their pleasures , they being obliged by their coronation-oaths , in all ages and kingdoms , inviolably to observe them : for st. paul saith , a prince is the minister of god for the peoples good , and tribute and custom are paid to him , that he may continually attend thereto . the defence and procuration of the common-wealth is to be managed to the benefit of those who are committed , not of those to whom it is committed . a just governour for the benefit of the people , is more careful of the publick good and welfare , than of his own private advantage . allegiance is nothing but obedience according to law , which when the prince violates , he has no right to obedience . there is a mutual obligation between the king and people , which whether it be only civil or natural , tacit , or in express words , can be taken away by no agreements , violated by no law , rescinded by no force . a kingdom is nothing else but the mutual stipulation between the people and their kings . the supream authority of a nation belongs to those who have the legislative authority reserved to them ; but not to those who have only the executive , which is plainly a trust when it is separated from the legislative power ; and all trusts by their nature import , that those to whom they are given are accountable , though no such condition is specified . if the subject may in no case resist , then there can be no law , but the will and pleasure of the prince : for whoever must be opposed in nothing , may do every thing ; then all our laws signify no more than so many cyphers : and what are the law-makers but so many fools or mad-men , who give themselves trouble to no purpose ? for if the king is not obliged to govern by those laws that they make , to what purpose are the people to obey such laws ? whether another has right to my goods , or , if he demand them , i have no right to keep them , is all one . if the king sue me by pretence of law , and endeavour to take away my money , my house or my land , i may defend them by the law ; but if he comes armed to take away my liberty , life and religion , which are mine by the laws of god and man , may i not secure them with a good conscience ? every man has a right to preserve himself , his rights and priviledges , against him who has no authority to invade them : and this was the case of moses , who seeing an egyptian smiting an hebrew , he slew him . and samson made war upon the philistines for burning his wife and her father , who were both but private persons , who knew they could have no other kind of justice against them , but what the law of nature gives every man. we ought ( saith the learned junius brutus in his discourse of government ) to consider that all princes are born men. we cannot therefore expect to have only perfect princes , but rather we ought to think it well with us if we have gained but indifferent ones : therefore the prince shall not presently be a tyrant if he keep not measure in some things , if now and then he obey not reason , if he more slowly seek the publick good , if he be less diligent in administring justice . for seeing a man is not set over men as if he were some god , as he is over beasts , but as he is a man born in the same condition with them : as that prince shall be proud , who will abuse men like beasts ; so that people shall be unjust , who shall seek a god in a prince , and a divinity in this frail nature . but truly if he shall wilfully subvert the republick ; if he shall wilfully pervert the laws ; if he shall have no care of his faith , none of his promises , none of justice , none of piety ; if himself become an enemy of his people , or shall use all or the chiefest notes we have mentioned , then verily he may be judged a tyrant , that is , an enemy of god and men : and by how much longer he is tolerated , the more intolerable he becomes , and they may act against him whatever they may use against a tyrant either by law or just force . tyranny is not only a crime , but the head , and , as it were , the heap of all crimes ; therefore is he so much the more wicked than any thief , murtherer , or sacrilegious person , by how much it is more grievous to offend many and all , than particular persons . now if all these be reputed enemies , if they be capitally punished , if they suffer pains of death , can any invent a punishment worthy so horrid a crime ? the laws are the nerves and sinews of society ; and as the magistrate is above the people , so is the law above the magistrate , or else there can be no civil society . he who makes himself above all law , is no member of a common wealth , but a meer tyrant . if a magistrate , notwithstanding all laws made for the well-governing a community , will act plainly destructive to that community , they are discharged either from active or passive obedience , and indispensibly obliged by the law of nature to resistance . is it not reasonable and just i should have a right to destroy him who threatens me with destruction ? for by the fundamental law of nature , man being to be preserved as much as possible , when all cannot be preserved , the safety of the innocent is to be preferred ; i say , he who having renounced his reason , the common rule and measure god hath given to mankind , by endeavouring to destroy me , is thereby become as a beast of prey , and ought to be treated accordingly . the laws ( says tully ) are above the magistrates , as the magistrates are above the people . he who is destructive to the being of another , hath quitted the reason which god hath given to be the rule betwixt man and man of justice and equity , hath put himself into the state of war with the other , and is as noxious as any savage beast that seeks his destruction . no man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it : for if there be no appeal on earth , for redress or security against any mischief the prince may do , then every man in that society is in a state of nature with him , in respect of him . thucidides l. . saith , not only those are tyrants who reduce others into servitude , but much rather those , who when they may repulse that violence , take no care to do it ; but especially those who will be called the defenders of greece and the common country , but yet help not their oppressed country . if a man may be a wolf to a man , nothing forbids but that a man may be a god to a man , as it is in the proverb . therefore antiquity hath enrolled hercules amongst the number of the gods , because he punished and tamed procrustes , busyris , and other tyrants , the pests of mankind , and monsters of the world. so also the roman empire , as long as it stood free , was often called the patrocine against the robberies of tyrants , because the senate was the haven and refuge of kings , people and nations . it is as lawful , and more reasonable , to prevent the overthrowing of our religion , laws , rights and priviledges , from any man or men whatsoever amongst our selves , as from a foreign power ; because one acts contrary to the laws of god and the country , and the other being not subject to the laws of the country , can be no ways bound by it . it was thought no injustice in the ship to cast out the prophet , when they found he was likely to prove the wrack of them all ; and the almighty shewed he approved of their act , by quieting the storm when he was gone . the scripture , that hath set us none but good examples , tells us , that some princes should not have one of their race left that pisseth against the wall : now what were their faults but idolatry and oppression of their people ? then how can it be a sin in a nation to free themselves from an idolatrous and oppressing king ? when it is done by the greatest and most considerable part thereof , it does silently imply a consent of god ; for it cannot be covetousness or ambition that moves such a multitude . when once the christian religion is become a part of the subjects property by the laws and constitutions of the country , then it is to be considered as one of their principal rights : and so may be defended as well as any other civil right ; since that those different forms of government that the jews were under , is no rule for the government of any nation or people whatsoever . the principles of natural religion give those who are in authority , no power at all , but only secure them in the possession of that which is theirs by the laws of the country . that cause is just which defends the laws , which protects the common good , which shall preserve the realm : and that cause is unjust which violates the laws , defends the breakers of the laws , protects the subverters of the country . that is just which will destroy tyrannical government ; that unjust which would abolish just government ; that lawful which tends to the publick good , that unlawful which tends to the private . but alas , that bug-bear dagon of passive obedience , is a notion crept into the world , and most zealously , and perhaps as ignorantly defended : here all our laws and decrees , by which we are governed , are of the peoples choice ; first made by the subject , and then confirmed by the king. here a king cannot take our sons and daughters , our fields and vineyards away , unless we please to give him them . where was the doctrine of passive obedience , when elisha prayed for blindness to come upon those who were sent by the king of syria to fetch him ? and when he commanded the door to be shut , and the messenger to be held fast who was sent for his head by the king of israel ? and when azariah , with fourscore valiant priests , thrust out vzziah , their lawful king , out of the temple ? and when elijah destroyed the two captains with fire from heaven , with the hundred men under their command , who were sent at twice , by king ahaziah , to fetch him ? and when the children of israel slew amasiah , their lawful king , for his idolatry , without any appointment in scripture , or prophecy of his downfal ? and yet that is no where called rebellion , neither were they punished by his son , whom they had made king in his father's stead . and when mattathias slew the king's commissioner , for compelling men to idolatry ? and when mattathias and his friends pulled down the altars which were adapted to idols , macc. . , . where was the doctrine of passive obedience when the edomites revolted from jehoram , and made themselves a king ? and libnah did also revolt , because of his evil government , chron. . without any appointment , or foretelling of their revolt by god in scripture , or being called rebels . and when saul's subjects swore that saul should not kill jonathan ; and they rescued him that he died not ? sam. . . and when david ( though a private man ) armed himself with six hundred men , no doubt but he designed to have fought saul and his army , if the men of keliah would have assisted him , and have been true to him ; when he enquired of the lord , whether the men of keliah would deliver him and his men into the hands of saul ? upon the lord 's answering , they would deliver them up , he and his men departed the city , sam. . can any man imagine their meaning was to run up and down the country together , and fly before saul and his army , if they had been able to cope with any number he could bring or send against them ? if resistance was unlawful , and a sin , surely david , a man after god's own heart , would have known it ; and then he would not have involved the six hundred men that came to his assistance in the sin of rebellion , but have told them , that the prince was not to be resisted , though never so great a tyrant . where was the doctrine of passive obedience , when constantine the great aided the oppressed christians and romans , against the tyranny and persecution of the emperors , maxentius and maximinius , with force of arms , with which he conquered those persecutors in several battels , fought against them at the christians earnest importunity ? and when the primitive christians resisted lucinius their emperor , for persecuting them contrary to law ; and constantine the great joined with them , who held it his duty , saith eusebius , to deliver an infinite multitude of men , by cutting off a few wicked ones , as the pests and plagues of the time. and when the primitive christians of constantinople opposed asper's being made emperor ; but leo being named , they consented thereto . an when the christians , under the king of persia , resisted him for persecuting them , and was assisted by theodosius the roman emperor , who told the king of persia , he was ready to defend them , and no ways to see them suffer for religion ? and when the christians of armenia the greater , made a league with the romans for the securing of their persons and their religion , against the persians under whom they lived ? and when the novatians , assisted by the orthodox , resisted and beat the macedonians , though they were assisted by constantius the emperor , with four thousand men to drive them from pap●lagonia ? and when the primitive christians destroyed julian's idolatrous temple in his reign ? where was the doctrine of passive obedience , when the lutheran churches defended themselves against the emperor charles the fifth ? and when the protestants austria took up arms , anno , against matthias king of hungaria , for denying them the free exercise of their religion ? and when queen elizabeth assisted the hollanders against their lawful soveraign ? and when she assisted the protestants of france , against their lawful soveraigns charles the ninth , and henry the third ? and when king charles the first , and the bishops and clergy of england assisted the protestants of france ? and when the protestant princes of germany invited gustavus adolphus , king of sweeden , to come into germany to assist the protestants against their lawful prince for persecuting them ? and when the protestants joined with him upon his arrival ? and when king charles the first assisted them with men from england ? so that , according to this christian doctrine of passive obedience , queen elizabeth , and king charles the first , with the bishops and clergy of england , and several other princes and states , have been guilty of st. paul's damnation ; for they that are aiding and assisting to rebels , are as guilty as those that are actually in it . lucifer calaritanus , a famous christian , wrote a book against constantius the emperor , which he sent him to read ; wherein he calls him , and his idolatrous bishops , blasphemers ; and charges him with inviting the christians to idolatry , and tells him , he ought to be put to death for so doing , by the command of god , in deut. . where god says , that he that ( but ) intices secretly to idolatry , shall be put to death . and this was approved on by the great bishop athanasius , and those christians that were with him , who calls it , the light of truth , the doctrine of the true faith : how came you ( says he to calaritanus ) to understand the sense and meaning of the scripture so perfectly , if the holy ghost had not assisted you in it ? now i would fain know , whether , he that is aiding and assisting towards the bringing in of idolatry , ( as the popish religion is ) is not as worthy of death , as he that only inticeth to idolatry ? and this is the case of many who call themselves of the church of england , who are for the restoration of king james , and by consequence of idolatry . surely if god had commanded the yoke of subjection to the tyrannical will of princes , 't is strange that neither the prophets , elisha and elijah , nor azariah , nor david with his followers , nor the jews under their kings , nor the primitive christians after their religion was established by laws , nor any of the reformed churches , should not have known this doctrine of passive obedience . in the barons wars , under simon of monfort , the king and his sons were taken prisoners ; but the prince escaping , fights simon and kills him : the historians of those times calls him not a rebel or a traytor , but a martyr for the liberties of church and state. if resistance be unlawful upon any account whatsoever , then were all those people guilty of rebellion , who in all ages have resisted or turned out their evil and destructive kings and governours ; and then the jews were guilty of this sin , for slaying and turning out several of their kings , without any appointment from god in scripture . so likewise the primitive christians did involve themselves under the guilt of st. paul's damnation , for resisting of their kings and emperors ; and likewise the christians in all ages since , who have resisted their princes by turning them out , &c. and then bishop athanasius , ( author of our creed ) and those christians with him , did also come under the guilt of st. paul's damnation , for approving of calaritanus's book , which , according to the doctrine of passive obedience , was a treasonable and rebellious book ; for the incendiaries to rebellion , are as guilty as they that are actually in it . and then all those princes that have been set up by the people , in the room of those whom they have turned out , ( for their evil government ) were usurpers ; and consequently all those who have succeeded them , where the descent of the blood is altered , are intruders , usurpers , and no lawful kings . were the doctrine of passive obedience , without reserve , a true doctrine , no doubt but we should have had a better account thereof than from a few court-divines , who have most learnedly interpreted the will and pleasure of the prince against the laws of nature , or of the country , to be the powers which st. paul requires obedience unto , under the pain of damnation . so by consequence the law ceaseth to be the powers ; then we are in a worse condition than in the state of nature . with what face can any man assert that passive obedience , without reserve , is the doctrine of the gospel ? which is charging god with as palpable a contradiction as any two things can be , it being diametrically opposite to the law of self-preservation , which is the law of nature , and the decree of the almighty , which law is sacred , and not to be infringed by any man. god never commanded any thing contrary to the law of nature , unless it were in the case of abraham in commanding of him ( as a tryal of his faith ) to offer up his son isaac . protection is the only cause of allegiance and obedience , is plain , from the example of david and his six hundred men , who were protected from saul and his army , by achish king of the philistines , who gave them ziklag to live in , and david and his men fought for the philistines against the geshurites , gezrites and the amalekites , and subdued them . david owed no allegiance to saul , who sought his destruction , is plain ; for when achish told david that he and his men should go with him to fight against the children of israel ; david offered his service , and said to achish , surely thou shalt know what thy servant can do . then achish said unto david , therefore i will make thee keeper of my head for ever . so david and his men went in the rear of the army ; and when the lords of the philistines would not let david and his men , fight for them , lest they should betray them into the hands of saul and his army , then david expostulated with achish , and said , what have i done ? and what hast thou found in thy servant , so long as i have been with thee unto this day , that i may not go fight against the enemies of my lord the king ? sam. chap. , , . this is a plain case , that david intended to fight saul and his army . now the intention of the mind is as bad as the act ; and yet it is no ways said , that david repented thereof , or of his arming the six hundred men ( before mentioned ) with design to fight his lawful soveraign king saul . the primitive christians took protection to be the only cause of allegiance : for when julian the apostate was chosen emperor of the romans , ( not by the free consent of the people , but ) by the souldiers , during the life of constantius the lawful possessor of the throne . the christians did not reckon themselves obliged to fight for constantius against julian ; for they troubled not their heads with the rights of princes . augustus , tho he had violently usurped the throne , yet he was confirmed in it by the people and senate of rome , who established it in his family by a long prescription , when st. paul's and st. peter's epistles were wrote , of obedience to the laws to kings and magistrates : so that we see that obedience was required to an usurper under the pain of damnation , when the government was confirmed to him by the people , that is , by the majority , for it cannot be thought by every body consented thereto . apolonius thyanaeus , writing to the emperor domitian , saith , these things have i spoken concerning laws ; which if thou shalt not think to reign over thee , then thy self shalt not reign . in matrimony , which is the nearest and strictest obligation of all others , by which those who were two , are made one flesh , if one party forsakes the other , the apostle pronounceth the party forsaked to be free from all obligation , because the party deserting violates the chief conditions of marriage , &c. cor. . . and shall not the people be much more absolved from their allegiance to that king who has violated his oath , and the laws of the land , the very cause for which they swear allegiance to him ? absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society ; and therefore can be no form of civil government , which is to remedy the inconveniencies of the state of nature . no man , or society of men , have power to deliver up their preservation , or the means of it , to the absolute will of any man ; and they will have always a right to preserve what they have not power to part with . no power can exempt princes from the obligation , to the eternal laws of god and nature . as no body can transfer to another more power than he has in himself , and no body has an absolute arbitrary power over himself , or over any other , to destroy his own life , or take away the life and property of another ; therefore a man cannot give such authority to any , or subject himself to the arbitrary power of another : for the law of nature is an eternal rule to all men , whose actions must be conformable to that law , which is the will of god. for the fundamental law of nature being the preservation of mankind , no human law can be good or valid against it ; and much less the will and pleasure of a prince against the law and custom of the country , which shall be prejudicial to the subject . as the happiness and prosperity of kingdoms depend upon the conservation of their laws ; if the laws depend upon the lust of one man , would not the kingdom fall to ruin in a short space ? but the laws are better and greater than kings , who are bound to obey them . then is it not better to obey the laws , rather than the king ? who can obey the king violating the law ? who will or can refuse to give aid to the law when infringed ? it is impossible any body in a society should have a right to do the community harm . all kings and princes are , and ought to be bound by the laws , and are not exempted from them , and this doctrine ought to be inculcated into the minds of princes from their infancy . let the prince be either from god , or from men , yet to think that the world was created by god , and in it men , that they should serve only for the benefit and use of princes , is an absurdity as gross as can be spoken ; since god hath made us free and equal : but princes were ordained only for the peoples benefit , that so they might innocently preserve human and civil society with greater facility , helping one the other with mutual benefits . in all disputes between power and liberty , power must always be proved , but liberty proves it self ; the one being founded upon positive law , the other upon the law of nature . with what ignorance do some assert , that adam was an absolute monarch , and that paternal authority is an absolute authority ? for that the father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will , and the father is not to be resisted by his child ? and that adam had a monarchical , absolute , supream , paternal power ? and that all kingly authority is a fatherly authority , and therefore irresistable ? and that no laws can bind the king , or annul this authority ? how could adam be an absolute monarch , when god gave him the herbs but in common with the beasts ? gen. . , . can it be thought that god gave him an absolute authority of life and death over man , who had not authority to kill any beast to satisfy his hunger ? certainly he had no absolute dominion over even the brutal part of the creatures ( much less over man ) who could not make that use of them as was permitted to noah and his sons , gen. . . where god says , every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you ; even , as the green herbs , have i given you all things . is it not as reasonable to believe , that god would have cursed adam if he had killed his son abel , as cain for killing him ? cain was very sensible every one had , by the law of nature , a right to kill him for being guilty of blood , when he said , every one that found him should slay him , gen. . . god made no exemption to the greatest man living who should be guilty of innocent blood , when he said , he that sheddeth mans blood , by man shall his blood be shed , gen. . . neither noab or his sons were exempted from this great law ; and therefore could have no absolute authority : since god has no where given any man such authority , there can be no such authority ; for the community cannot make themselves slaves by investing such an authority in any man : should they do it , it is not binding , it being against the law of nature . if noah was heir to adam ( i ask ) which of noah's sons was heir to him ? for if by right it descended to all his sons , then it must have descended to all their sons , and so on ; if so , then are all men become equal and independent , as being the off-spring of adam and noah : if it descended only to the eldest , and so on , then there can be but one lawful monarch in the world , and who that is , is impossible to be found out ; so that paternal monarchical authority , take it which way you will , it comes to just nothing at all . where human institution gives it not , the first-born has no right at all above his brethren . no man has an absolute authority over the creatures ( much less over mankind ) because they were given ( for the use of all men ) as occasion should serve : should any man or men destroy them for their will and pleasure , beyond what is necessary for the use of man , or for his preservation , it would be a sin , and therefore could be no authority ; for god authorizes no man to commit a sin , tho he often permits it . the law of god and nature gives the father no absolute dominion over the life , liberty or estate of his child , and therefore he can have no absolute authority ; and where there is no absolute authority , there can be no absolute subjection due . there is an eternal obligation on parents to nourish , preserve , and bring up their off-spring , and under these circumstances obedience is due , and not otherwise . what is a father to a child more than another person , when he endeavours to destroy him ? nay , is he not so much the more odious as the act is more barbarous , for a father to endeavour to destroy his own off-spring , than for another person endeavouring it ? certainly in such a case no passive obedience can be due , it tending to his destruction ( not for his good ) which is no fatherly act , and therefore not to be submitted to . he that lets any person whatsoever destroy him , when it is in his power to preserve his life by defending himself , does tacitly consent to his own death , and therefore is guilty of his own blood as well as he that destroys him : whereas by defending himself , there can be but one guilty of blood , ( which is the invader ) in which defence , if he kills the other , his blood lies at his own door : by which it follows , that passive obedience to unjust violence is a sin , but resisting such violence is no sin , but the duty of every man. the first duty that i owe is to god , the second to my self in preserving my self , &c. the third to my parent and soveraign , in obeying them in all things reasonable and lawful . by all the precepts in scripture which require obedience to parents , homage and obedience is as due to the one as to the other ; for 't is nowhere said , children obey your father , and no more ; the mother is mentioned before the father in lev. . . ye shall fear every man his mother , and his father . sure solomon was not ignorant what belonged to him as a king , or a father , when he said , my son , hear the instructions of thy father , and forsake not the law of thy mother : and our saviour says , matth. . . honour thy father and mother . and ephes . . . children , obey your parents , &c. if paternal authority be an absolute authority , i ask , whether it be in the eldest of the family ? if so , whether a grandfather can dispense with his grand-child's paying the honour due to his parents by the fifth commandment ? 't is evident in common sense , the grandfather cannot discharge the grand-child from the obedience due to his parents , neither can a father dispense with his child's obedience due to the laws of the land ; therefore the obedience required to parents in scripture is not to an absolute authority , for there can be no absolute authority where there is an authority above it . with what folly and ignorance do some assert , that the kings of england are absolute , as proceeding from william the conqueror ? to which i answer , that a conqueror has no right of dominion ( much less any absolute authority ) over the wife and children of the conquered , or over those who assisted not against him . conquest may claim such a right as thieves use over those whom they can master , which is a right of tenure , but no tenure of right . conquest may restore a right , forfeiture may lose a right , but 't is consent only that can transact or give a right . there is no other absolute power , than over captives taken in a just war. if the possession of the whole earth was in one person , yet he would have no power over the life or liberty of another , or over that which another gets by his own industry , for propriety in land gives no man authority over another . william the conqueror made a league or compact with the nobles and lords of the land , to the performance of which , he takes an oath to observe the ancient laws of the realm , established by his predecessors the kings of england , and especially of edward the confessor ; as likewise did henry the first , with the emendations his father had made to them . stephen who succeeded henry , made a compact , and promised a meloration of their laws according to their minds . william rufus , henry the first , and stephen get the consent of the people by promising to grant them their usual laws , and ancient customs . henry the first , richard the first , king john , and richard the second , oblige themselves at their coronations to grant them , and then the people consented to own them as their king ; and richard the first , and king john were conjured by the arch-bishops not to take upon them the crown , unless they intended to perform their oaths . if any king refused so to do , the nobles thought it their concern to hinder his coronation , till he had either made or promised this engagement . what can be more absurd than to say , that there is an absolute subjection due to a prince , whom the laws of god , nature and the country , have not given such authority ? as if men were made as so many herds of cattel , only for the use , service and pleasure of their princes . but some do object , that the anointing of kings at their coronations makes their persons sacred , unquestionable and irresistable , for any tyrannical or exorbitant actions whatsoever . to which i answer , that every christian's ▪ baptism is a sacrament of christ's institution ; a spiritual unction and sanctification which makes a person as sacred , yea more holy than the anointing of kings can or doth of it self , ( that being no sacrament ) a truth which no christian can , without blasphemy , deny : and yet no christian is exempted from resistance , censure , or punishments , according to the nature of his crime ; and therefore the anointing of kings at their coronations cannot do it ; it being a ceremony of the jews , not instituted by christ , or any ways commanded to be continued by the apostles , or their successors ; it signifying only the chusing or preferring one before another , and so became the ceremony of consecrating to any special office , and so was ordinarily used in the enstalling men to offices of any eminency . the reign of a good king resembles that of heaven , over which there is but one god , for he is no less beloved of the vertuous than feared of the bad ; and if human frailty could admit a succession of good kings , there were no comparison , power being ever more glorious in one , than when it is divided . 't is not the title of a king , but the power ( which is the laws ) which is invested in him , which makes the difference betwixt him and other men in the executing of this power : his person is sacred , and not to be resisted , he being above every soul contained in the same society , and therefore cannot be resisted , or deprived of his office by any part , or by the whole community , without the greatest sin of robbery and injustice imaginable . if a government ( say some ) may be disturbed for any unlawful proceedings of the governour , or his ministers , how can any government be safe ? to which i answer , that it is not lawful for every private man to fly into the bosom of his prince , for he is no competent judg , be he of never so great a quality ; else a king was the most miserable man living , lying at the mercy of every desperate fellow's censure . it is impossible for one , or a few oppressed men , to disturb the government , where the body or the people do not think themselves concerned in it , and that the consequences seem not to threaten all ; yea when it does , yet the people are not very forward to disturb the government ; as in king charles the second's time , when the charters were condemned , and seized upon in order to make us slaves , and the laws perverted to the loss of many innocent lives , and many other oppressions too many to insert , and yet no body offered to disturb the government ; i say , till the mischief be grown general , and the designs of the rulers become notorious , then , and then only , will the people be for righting themselves . whosoever , either ruler or subject , by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people , and lays the foundation for overturning the constitution and frame of any just government , he is guilty of the greatest crime , i think , a man is capable of , being to answer for all those mischiefs of blood , rapine and desolation , which the breaking to pieces of governments brings on a country ; and he who does it , is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind , and is so to be treated accordingly ; and how far the late king james was guilty of this , i leave the world to judg . finis . the author's advertisement . just as i had finished this book , i received a reply to my former book , which i thought to have answered ; but finding the arguments to be frivolous and weak , and my necessary avocations allowing me but little time , therefore i forbore answering it . advertisements . the doctrine of passive obedience , and jure divino disproved . price d. the letter which was sent to the author of the doctrine of passive obedience and jure divino disproved , &c. answered and refuted . wherein is proved , that monarchy was not originally from god. that kings are not by divine appointment , but that all government proceeds from the people . that the obedience required in scripture , is to the laws of the land , and no otherwise . that resisting of arbitrary power is lawful . that the oath of allegiance to the late king james was dissolved before the prince of orange ( our present king ) landed . that upon the non-performance of an oath on one side , the other becomes void , is plainly prov'd from several examples in scripture . that protection is the only cause of allegiance ; and that obedience or allegiance is due to the present government , is proved from scripture , law and reason : and those texts of scripture which relate to government , of monarchy , are explained . price stitch'd d. both written by the same author , and printed for tho. harrison . the free-holders grand inquest touching our sovereign lord the king and his parliament to which are added observations upon forms of government : together with directions for obedience to governours in dangerous and doubtful times / by the learned sir robert filmer, knight. filmer, robert, sir, d. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing f estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the free-holders grand inquest touching our sovereign lord the king and his parliament to which are added observations upon forms of government : together with directions for obedience to governours in dangerous and doubtful times / by the learned sir robert filmer, knight. filmer, robert, sir, d. . p. in various pagings : port. [s.n.]. london : mdclxxix [ ] after "the author's preface" follow three special title pages: reflections concerning the original of government ..., london, -- the anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy ..., london, -- an advertisement to the jury-men of england touching witches ..., london, . imperfect: tightly bound with loss of print. reproduction of original in the harvard law school library. the free-holders grand inquest -- observations upon aristole's politiques touching forms of government -- directions for obedience to government in dangerous or doubtful times -- observations concerning the original of government -- the anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy -- an advertisement to the jury-men of england touching witches. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder 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characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . witchcraft. great britain -- politics and government -- - . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - rina kor sampled and proofread - rina kor text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion augustissimi caroli secundi dei gratia angliae scotiae franciae et hiberniae rex bona agere & mala pati regium est page . . the free-holders grand inquest , touching our sovereign lord the king and his parliament , to which are added observations upon forms of government . together with directions for obedience to governours in dangerous and doubtful times . by the learned sir robert filmer , knight . claudian ▪ de laudibus stiliconis . fallitur egregio quisquis sub principe credit servitium : nunquam libertas gratior extat quàm sub rege pio . — london , printed in the year mdclxxix . the author's preface . there is a general belief , that the parliament of england was at first an imitation of the assembly of the three estates in france : therefore in order to prepare the understanding in the recerche we have in hand , it is proper to give a brief accompt of the mode of france in those assemblies : scotland and ireland being also under the dominion of the king of england ; a touch of the manner of their parliaments shall be by way of preface . . in france , the kings writ goeth to the bailiffs , seneschals , or stewards of liberties , who issue out warrants to all such as have fees and lands within their liberties , and to all towns , requiring all such as have any complaints , to meet in the principal city , there to choose two or three delegates , in the name of that province , to be present at the general assembly . at the day appointed , they meet at the principal city of the bailiwick . the king 's writ is read , and every man called by name , and sworn to choose honest men , for the good of the king and commonwealth , to be present at the general assembly as delegates , faithfully to deliver their grievances , and demands of the province . then they choose their delegates , and swear them . next , they consult what is necessary to be complained of , or what is to be desired of the king : and of these things they make a catalogue or index . and because every man should freely propound his complaint or demands , there is a chest placed in the town-hall , into which every man may cast his writing . after the catalogue is made and signed , it is delivered to the delegates to carry to the general assembly . all the bailiwicks are divided into twelve classes . to avoid confusion , and to the end there may not be too great delay in the assembly , by the gathering of all the votes , every classis compiles a catalogue or book of the grievances and demands of all the bailiwicks within that classis , then these classes at the aslembly compose one book of the grievances and demands of the whole kingdom . this being the order of the proceedings of the third estate ; the like order is observed by the clergy and nobility . when the three books for the three estates are perfected , then they present them to the king by their presidents . first , the president for the clergy begins his oration on his knees , and the king commanding , he stands up bare-headed , and proceeds . and so the next president for the nobility doth the like . but the president for the commons begins and ends his oration on his knees . whilst the president for the clergy speaks , the rest of that order rise up , and stand bare , till they are bid by the king to sit down , and be covered , and so the like for the nobility . but whilst the president of the commons speaks , the rest are neither bidden to sit , or be covered . thus the grievances and demands being delivered , and left to the king and his counsel , the general assembly of the three estates endeth , atque ita totus actus concluditur . thus it appears , the general assembly was but an orderly way of presenting the publick grievances and demands of the whole kingdom , to the consideration of the king : not much unlike the antient usage of this kingdom for a long time , when all laws were nothing else but the king's answers to the petitions presented to him in parliament , as is apparent by very many statutes , parliament-rolls , and the confession of sir edw. coke . . in scotland , about twenty dayes before the parliament begins , proclamation is made throughout the kingdom , to deliver in to the king's clerk or master of the rolls , all bills to be exhibited that sessions , before a certain day : then are they brought to the king , and perused by him : and onely such as he allows are put into the chancellour's hand , to be propounded in parliament , and none others : and if any man in parliament speak of another matter , than is allowed by the king , the chancellour tells him , there is no such bill allowed by the king. when they have passed them for laws , they are presented to the king , who , with his scepter put into his hand by the chancellor , ratifies them , and if there be any thing the king dislikes , they raze it out before . . in ireland , the parliament , as appears by a statute made in the tenth year of hen. . c. . is to be after this manner : no parliament is to be holden but at such season as the king's lieutenant and councel there , do first certifie the king , under the great seal of that land , the causes and considerations , and all such acts as they think fit should pass in the said parliament . and such causes and considerations , and acts affirmed by the king and his councel to be good and expedient for that land : and his licence thereupon as well in affirmation of the said causes and acts , as to summon the parliament under his great seal of england had and obtained . that done , a parliament to be had and holden after the form and effect afore rehearsed , and if any parliament be holden in that land contrary to the form and provision aforesaid , it is deemed void , and of none effect in law. it is provided , that all such bills as shall be offered to the parliament there ; shall first be transmitted hither under the great seal of that kingdom , and having received allowane and approbation here , shall be put under the great seal of this kingdom , and so returned thither to be preferred to the parliament . by a statute of and of philip and mary , for the expounding of poynings act , it is ordered , for the king 's passing of the said acts in such form and tenor as they should be sent into england , or else for the change of them , or any part of them . after this shorter narrative of the usage of parliaments in our neighbour and fellow kingdoms , it is time the inquisitio magna of our own be offered to the verdict or iudgment of a moderate and intelligent reader . reflections concerning the original of government , upon i. aristotle's politiques . ii. mr. hobs's leviathan . iii. mr. milton against salmasius . iv. h. grotius de iure belli . v. mr. hunton's treatise of monarchy . vi. another treatise of monarchy , by a nameless author . arist. pol. lib. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . london , printed in the year mdclxxix . the anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy . or , a succinct examination of the fundamentals of monarchy , both in this and other kingdoms , as well about the right of power in kings , as of the original or natural liberty of the people . a question never yet disputed , though most necessary in these times . lucan . lib. . libertas ( — populi quem regna coercent libertate perit : — neque enim libertas gratior ulla est quàm domino servire bono — claudian . london , printed in the year mdclxxix . an advertisement to the jury-men of england , touching witches . together with a difference between an english and hebrew witch . london , printed in the year mdclxxix . the argument . a presentment of divers statutes , records , and other precedents , explaining the writs of summons to parliament : shewing , i. that the commons by their writ are onely to perform and consent to the ordinances of parliament . ii. that the lords or common councel by their writ are only to treat , and give counsel in parliament . iii. that the king himself only ordains and makes laws , and is supreme iudge in parliament . with the suffrages of hen. de bracton . jo. britton . tho. egerton . edw. coke . walter raleigh rob. cotton . hen. spelman . jo. glanvil . will. lambard . rich. crompton will. cambden , and jo. selden . the free-holders grand-inquest touching our sovereign lord the king , and his parliament . every free-holder that hath a voice in the election of knights , citizens or burgesses for the parliament , ought to know with what power he trusts those whom the chooseth , because such trust is the foundation of the power of the house of commons . a writ from the king to the sheriff of the county , is that which gives authority and commission for the free-holders to make their election at the next county-court-day after the receipt of the writ ; and in the writ there is also expressed the duty and power of the knights , citizens and burgesses that are there elected . the means to know what trust , or authority the country or free-holders confer , or bestow by their election , is in this , as in other like cases , to have an eye to the words of the commission , o●… writ it self : thereby it may be seen whether that which the house of commons doth act be within the limit of their commission : greater or other trust than is comprised in the body of the writ , the free-holders do not , or cannot give if they obey the writ : the writ being latine , and not extant in english , few free-holders understand it , and fewer observe it ; i have rendred it in latine and english. rex vicecomiti salut ' . &c. quia de advisamento & assensu concilii nostri pr●… quibusdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis , nos , statum , & defensionem regni nostri angliae , & eccles●… anglicanae concernen ' , quoddam parliamentum nostru●… apud civitatem nostram west . duodecimo die novembr●… prox . futur ' teneri ordinavimus , & ibid. cum praelat●… magnatibus & proceribus dicti regni nostri colloquiu●… habere & tract : tibi praecipimus firmiter injungent●… quod facta proclam . in prox . comitat ' tuo post receptione●… hujus brevis nostri tenend ' die & loco praedict . duos mili●… gladiis cinct ' magis idoneos & discretos comit ' praedict●… & de qualib . civitate com' illius duos cives , & de qu●…libet burgo duos burgenses de discretior ' & magis suffcientibus libere & indifferenter per illos qui proclam ' h●…jusmodi interfuerint juxta formam statutorum inde ed●… & provis ' eligi , & nomina eorundum milit ' , civium ●… burgensium , sic electorum in quibusdam indentur ' int●…te & illos qui hujusmodi election ' interfuerint , inde confidend ' sive hujusmodi electi praesentes fuerint vel absentes , inseri : eósque ad dict' diem & locum venire fac ' . ita quod iidem milites plenam & sufficientem potestatem pro se & communitate comit ' praedicti , ac dict' cives & burgenses pro se & communitat ' civitatum & burgorum praedictorum divisim ab ipsis habeant , ad faciendum & consentiendum his quae tunc ibid ' de communi consilio dicti reg . nostri ( favente deo ) contigerint ordinari super negotiis ante dictis : ita quod pro defectu potestatis hujusmodi , seu propter improvidam electionem milit ' civium aut burgensium praedictorum , dicta negotia infecta non remaneant quovismodo . nolumus autem quod tu nec aliquis alius vic' dicti reg . nostri aliqualiter sit electus . et electionem illam in pleno comitatu factam , distincte & aperte sub sigillo tuo & sigillis eorum qui electioni illi interfuerint , nobis in cancellar ' nostram ad dict' diem & locum certifices indilate , remittens nobis alteram partem indenturarum praedictarum praesentibus consut ' una cum hoc breve . teste meipso apud westmon . the king to the sheriff of greeting . whereas by the advice and consent of our councel , for certain difficult and urgent businesses concerning us , the state and defence of our kingdom of england , and the english church : we have ordained a certain parliament of ours , to be held at our city of the day of next ensuing , and there to have conference , and to treat with the prelates , great men and peers of our said kingdom . we command and straitly enjoyn you , that making proclamation at the next county-court after the receipt of this our writ , to be holden the day , and place aforesaid : you cause two knights , girt with swords , the most fit , and discreet of the county aforesaid : and of every city of that county two citizens ; of every borough , two burgesses of the discreeter and most sufficient ; to be freely , and indifferently chosen by them who shall be present at such proclamation , according to the tenor of the statutes in that case made and provided : and the names of the said knights , citizens and burgesses so chosen , to be inserted in certain indentures to be then made between you , and those that shall be present at such election , whether the parties so elected be present , or absent : and shall make them to come at the said day , and place : so that the said knights for themselves , and for the county aforesaid , and the said citizens , and burgesses for themselves , and the commonalty of the aforesaid cities , and boroughs , may have severally from them , full and sufficient power to perform , and to consent to those things which then by the favour of god shall there happen to be ordained by the common-councel of our said kingdom , concerning the businesses aforesaid : so that the business may not by any means remain undone for want of such power , or by reason of the improvident election of the aforesaid knights , citizens , and burgesses . but we will not in any case you or any other sheriff of our said kingdom shall be elected ; and at the day and place aforesaid , the said election made in the full county-court , you shall certifie without delay to us in our chancery under your seal , and the seals of them which shall be present at that election , sending back unto us the other part of the indenture aforesaid affiled to these presents , together with this writ . witness our self at westminster . by this writ we do not find that the commons are called to be any part of the common councel of the kingdom , or of the supream court of iudicature , or to have any part of the legislative power , or to consult de arduis regni negotiis , of the difficult businesses of the kingdom . the writ only sayes , the king would have conference , and treat with the prelates , great men , and peers : but not a word of treating or conference with the commons ; the house of commons which doth not minister an oath , nor fine , nor imprison any , but their own members ( and that but of late in some cases ) cannot properly be said to be a court at all ; much less to be a part of the supream court , or highest judicature of the kingdom : the constant custom , even to this day , for the members of the house of commons to stand bare , with their hats in their hands in the presence of the lords , while the lords sit covered at all conferences , is a visible argument , that the lords and commons are not fellow commissioners , or fellow counsellors of the kingdom . the duty of knights , citizens , and burgesses , mentioned in the writ , is only ad faciendum , & consentiendum , to perform and to consent to such things as should be ordained by the common councel of the kingdom ; there is not so much mentioned in the writ as a power in the commons to dissent . when a man is bound to appear in a court of justice , the words are , ad faciendum & recipiendum quod ei per curiam injungetur : which shews , that this word faciendum is used as a term in law to signifie to give obedience : for this , we meet with a precedent even as ancient as the parliament-writ it self , and it is concerning proceedings in parliament . . ed. . dominus rex mandavit vicecom ' quod &c. summon ' nicolaum de segrave , & ex parte domini regis firmiter ei injungeret , quod esset coram domino rege in proximo parl. &c. ad audiendum voluntatem ipsius domini regis &c. et ad faciendum & recipiendum ulterius quod curia domini regis consideraret in praemissis : our lord the king commands the sheriff to summon nicholas segrave to appear before the lord our king in the next parliament to hear the will of the lord our king himself , and to perform and receive what the kings court shall further consider of the premises . sir ed. coke to prove the clergy hath no voice in parliament ; saith , that by the words of their writ their consent was only to such things as were ordained by the common councel of the realm . if this argument of his be good , it will deny also voices to the commons in parliament , for in their writ are the self-same words , viz. to consent to such things as were ordained by the common councel of the kingdom . sir edw. coke concludes , that the procuratores cleri , have many times appeared in parliament , as spiritual assistants , to consider , consult , and to consent ; but never had voice there ; how they could consult , and consent without voices he doth not shew : though the clergy ( as he saith ) oft appeared in parliament , yet was it only ad consentiendum , as i take it , and not ad faciendum , for the word faciendum is omitted in their writ ; the cause , as i conceive is , the clergy , though they were to assent , yet by reason of clerical exemptions , they were not required to perform all the ordinances or acts of parliament . but some may think , though the writ doth not express a calling of the knights , citizens , and burgesses to be part of the common councel of the kingdom ; yet it supposeth it a thing granted , and not to be questioned , but that they are a part of the common councel . indeed if their writ had not mentioned the calling of prelates , great men , and peers to councel , there might have been a little better colour for such a supposition : but the truth is , such a supposition doth make the writ it self vain and idle ; for it is a senseless thing to bid men assent to that which they have already ordained : since ordaining is an assenting ; and more than an assenting . for clearing the meaning and sense of the writ , and satisfaction of such as think it impossible but that the commons of england have alwayes been a part of the common councel of the kingdom , i shall insist upon these points . . that anciently the barons of england were the common councel of the kingdom . . that until the time of hen. . the commons were not called to parliament . . though the commons were called by hen. . yet they were not constantly called , nor yet regularly elected by writ until hen. . time . for the first point m. cambden in his britania , doth teach us , that in the time of the english saxons , and in the ensuing age , a parliament was called , commun●… concilium , which was ( saith he ) praesentia regis , praelatorum , procerumque collectorum , the presence of the king , prelates and peers assembled ; no mention of the commons : the prelates and peers were all barons . the author of the chronicle of the church of lichfield , cited by m. selden , saith , postquam rex edvardus , &c. concilio baronum angliae , &c. after king edward was king ; by the councel of the barons of england he revived a law which had layen asleep threescore and seven years : and this law was called the law of st. edward the king. in the same chronicle it is said , that will. the conquerour anno regni sui quarto apud londin ' , ha●… concilium baronum suorum , a councel of his barons and of this parliament it is , that his son hen. . speaks saying , i restore you the laws of king edward the confessor , with those amendments wherewith my father amended them by the councel of his barons . in the fifth year , as m. selden thinks , of the conquerour , was a parliament or principum conventus , a●… assembly of earls and barons at pinenden heath i●… kent , in the cause between lanfranke the arch-bishop of canterbury , and odo earl of kent . the king gave commission to godfrid , then bishop of constan●… in normandy , to represent his own person for hearing the controversie ( as saith m. lambard ; ) and caused egelrick the bishop of chichester ( an aged man , singularly commended for skill in the laws and customes of the realm ) to be brought thither in a wagon for his assistance in councel : commanded haymo the sheriff of kent to summon the whole county to give in evidence : three whole dayes spent in debate : in the end lanfranke and the bishop of rochester were restored to the possession o●… detling and other lands which odo hath withholden ▪ . ed. . fol. . there is mention of a parliament held under the same king william the conquerour , wherein all the bishops of the land , earls and barons , made an ordinance touching the exemption of the abby of bury from the bishops of norwich . in the tenth year of the conquerour : episcopi , comites , & barones regni regia potestate ad universalem synodum pro causis audiendis & tractandis convocati , saith the book of westminster . in the year of william . there was a parliament de cunctis regni principibus ; another which had quosque regni proceres : all the peers of the kingdom . in the seventh year was a parliament at rockingham-castle in northampton-shire . episcopis , abbatibus cunctique regni principibus una coeuntibus . a year or two after , the same king , de statu regni acturus , &c. called thither , by the command of his writ , the bishops , abbots , and all the peers of the kingdom . at the coronation of hen. . all the people of the kingdom of england were called , and laws were then made ; but it was per commune concilium baronum meorum , by the common councel of my barons . in his third year , the peers of the kingdom were called without any mention of the commons : and another a while after , consensu comitum & baronum , by the consent of earls and barons . florentius wigoriensis saith , these are statutes which anselme and all the other bishops in the presence ▪ of king henry , by the assent of his barons ordained : and in his tenth year , of earls and peers ; and in his . of earls and barons . in the year following the same king held a parliament , or great councel with his barons spiritual and temporal . king hen. . in his tenth year had a great councel or parliament at clarendon , which was an assembly of prelates and peers . . hen. . saith hovenden , was a great councel at nottingham , and by the common councel of the archbishops , bishops , earls and barons , the kingdom was divided into six parts . and again , hovende●… saith , that the same king at windsor ( apud wind●… shores ) communi concilio of bishops , earls , and barons , divided england into four parts . and in hi●… year a parliament at windsor of bishops , earl●… and barons . and another of like persons at northampton . king richard . had a parliament at nottingham in his fifth year , of bishops , earls , and barons : thi●… parliament lasted but four days , yet much was don●… in it : the first day the king disseiseth gerard de canvil of the sherifwick of lincoln , and hugh bardol●… of the castle and sherifwick of york . the second day he required judgment against his brother iohn who was afterwards king ; and hugh de nova●… bishop of coventry . the third day was granted to th●… king of every plow-land in england s. he required also the third part of the service of every knights f●… for his attendance into normandy , and all the woo●… that year of the monks cisteaux , which , for that 〈◊〉 was grievous , and unsupportable , they fine for mo●…ny . the last day was for hearing of grievances●… and so the parliament brake up ; and the same yea●… held another at northampton of the nobles of th●… realm . king iohn , in his fifth year , he and his great m●…met , rex & magnates convenerunt : and th●… roll of that year hath commune concilium b●…ronum meorum , the common councel of my baron●… at winchester . in the sixth year of king henry . the noble●… granted to the king , of every knights fee , two mark●… in silver . in the seventh year he had a parliament at london , an assembly of barons . in his thirteenth year an assembly of the lords at westminster . in his fifteenth year of nobles both spiritual and temporal . m. par. saith that . h. . congregati sunt magnates ad colloquium de negotiis regni tractaturi , the great men were called to confer and treat of the business of the kingdom . and at merton , our lord the king granted by the consent of his great men , that hereafter usury should not run against a ward from the death of his ancestor . . hen. . the king sent his royal writs , commanding all belonging to his kingdom , that is to say , arch-bishops , bishops , abbots and priors installed , earls and barons , that they should all meet at london , to treat of the kings business touching the whole kingdom : and at the day prefixed , the whole multitude of the nobles of the kingdom met at london , saith mat. westminster . in his year , at the request , and by the councel of the lords , the charters were confirmed . . hen. . at winchester the king sent his royal writs to arch-bishops , bishops , priors , earls and barons , to treat of business concerning the whole kingdome . . hen. . the king commanded all the nobility of the whole kingdom to be called to treat of the state of his kingdom . mat. westm ' . . hen. . the king had a treaty at oxford with the peers of the kingdom . m. westminster . at a parliament at marlborow . hen. . statutes were made by the assent of earls and barons . here the place of bracton , chief justice in thi●… kings time , is worth the observing ; and the rathe●… for that it is much insisted on of late , to make fo●… parliaments being above the king. the words i●… bracton are , the king hath a superiour , god ; also th●… law by which he is made king ; also his court , viz the earls and barons . the court that was said i●… those days to be above the king was a court of earls and barons , not a word of the commons , or th●… representative body of the kingdom being any pa●… of the superiour court. now for the true sen●… of bractons words , how the law , and the court 〈◊〉 earls and barons , are the kings superiours ; the●… must of necessity be understood to be superiours , 〈◊〉 far only as to advise , and direct the king out of hi●… own grace and good will only : which appea●… plainly by the words of bracton himself , wher●… speaking of the king , he resolves thus , nec potest 〈◊〉 necessitatem aliquis imponere quod injuriam suam corrig●… & emendat , cum superiorem non habeat nisi deum ; 〈◊〉 satis ei erit ad poenam , quod dominum expectat ultore●… nor can any man put a necessity upon him to corre●… and amend his injury unless he will himself , sin●… he hath no superiour but god ; it will be sufficie●… punishment for him , to expect the lord an avenge●… here the same man , who speaking according to som●…mens opinion saith , the law and court of earls a●… barons are superiour to the king ; in this place tel●… us himself , the king hath no superiour but god : th●… difference is easily reconciled ; according to the d●…stinction of the school-men the king is free from t●… coactive power of laws or councellors : but may be su●…ject to their directive power , according to his ow●… will : that is god can only compell , but th●… law and his courts may advise him. rot. parliament . hen. . nu . . the commons expresly affirm , iudgment in parliament belongs to the king and lords . these precedents shew , that from the conquest untill a great part of henry the third's reign ( in whose dayes it is thought the writ for election of knights was framed ) which is about two hundred years , and above a third part of the time since the conquest to our dayes , the barons made the parliament or common councel of the kingdom : under the name of barons ; not only the earls , but the bishops also were comprehended , for the conquerour made the bishops barons . therefore it is no such great wonder , that in the writ , we find the lords only to be the counsellours , and the commons called only to perform and consent to the ordinances . those there be who seem to believe that under the word barons , anciently the lords of court-ba●…ons were comprehended , and that they were called to parliament as barons ; but if this could be proved to have been at any time true , yet those lords of court-barons were not the representative body of the commons of england , except it can be also proved that the commons , or free-holders of the kingdome chose such lords of court-barons to ●…e present in parliament . the lords of manors ●…ame not at first by election of the people , as sir edw. coke , treating of the institution of court-ba●…ons , resolves us in these words : by the laws and ordinances of ancient kings , and especially of king al●…red , it appeareth , that the first kings of this realm ●…ad all the lands of england in demean ; and les grand manors and royalties they reserved to themselves , and of the remnant they , for the defence of the real●… enfeoffed the barons of the realm with such iurisdiction as the court-baron now hath . coke's institute●… first part , fol. . here , by the way , i cannot but note that if th●… first kings had all the lands of england in demean , 〈◊〉 sir edward coke saith they had ; and if the fir●… kings were chosen by the people , ( as many thin●… they were ) then surely our forefathers were a ver●… bountiful ( if not a prodigal ) people , to give all th●… lands of the whole kingdom to their kings , wit●… liberty for them to keep what they pleased , and t●… give the remainder to their subjects , clogg'd an●… cumbred with a condition to defend the realm●… this is but an ill sign of a limited monarchy by original constitution or contract . but to conclude th●… former point , sir edward coke's opinion is , th●… in the ancient laws , under the name of barons were comprised all the nobility . this doctrine of the barons being the comm●… councel , doth displease many , and is denied , a●…tending to the disparagement of the commons , an●… to the discredit , and confutation of their opinio●… who teach , that the commons are assigned councello●… to the king by the people , therefore i will call in m●… pryn to help us with his testimony : he in his boo●… of treachery and disloyalty &c. proves that before th●… conquest , by the laws of edward the confesso●… cap. . the king by his oaths was to do iustice 〈◊〉 the councel of the nobles of his realm . he also resolves , that the earls and barons in parliament a●… above the king , and ought to bridle him , when he exor●…tates from the laws . he further tells us , the peers an●… prelates have oft translated the crown from the right he●… . electing and crowning edward , who was illegitimate ; and putting by ethelred , the right heir after edgars decease . . electing and crowning canutus , a meer foreigner , in opposition to edmund the right heir to king ethelred . . harold and hardiknute , both elected kings successively without title ; edmund and alfred the right heirs being dispossessed . . the english nobility , upon the death of harold , enacted that none of the danish bloud should any more reign over them . . edgar etheling , who had best title , was rejected ; and harold elected and crowned king. . in the second and third year of edw. . the peers and nobles of the land , seeing themselves contemned , entreated the king to manage the affairs of the kingdome by the councel of his barons . he gave his assent , and sware to ratifie what the nobles ordained ; and one of their articles was , that he would thenceforward order all the affairs of the kingdom by the councel of his clergy and lords . . william rufus , finding the greatest part of the nobles against him , sware to lanfranke that if they would choose him for king , he would abrogate their over-hard laws . . the beginning , saith mr. pryn , of the charter of hen. . is observable ; henry by the grace of god of england , &c. know ye , that by the mercy of god and common councel of the barons of the kingdom , i am crowned king. . maud the empress , the right heir , was put by the crown by the prelates and barons , and stephen , earl of mortain , who had no good title , assembling the bishops and peers , promising the amendment of the law●… according to all their pleasures and liking , was by th●… all proclaimed king. . lewis of france crowned king by the barons in stead of king john. all these testimonies from mr. pryn may satisfie , that anciently the barons were the common councel ▪ or parliament of england . and if mr. pryn could have found so much antiquity , and proof for th●… knights , citizens , and burgesses , being of the common councel : i make no doubt but we should have heard from him in capital characters : but alas he meets not with so much as these names in those elder ages . he dares not say the barons were assigned by the people , councellors to the king ; for he tells us , every baron in parliament doth represent hi●… own person , and speaketh in behalf of himself alone ▪ but in the knights , citizens , and burgesses , are represented the commons of the whole realm : therefore every one of the commons hath a greater voice in parliament than the greatest earl in england . nevertheless maste●… pryn will be very well content if we will admi●… and swallow these parliaments of barons for the representative body of the kingdom ; and to that purpose he cites them , or to no purpose at all . but to prove the treachery and disloyalty of popish parliaments , prelates , and peers , to their kings : which i●… the main point , that master pryn by the title of hi●… book is to make good , and to prove . as to the second point ; which is , that untill the time of hen. . the commons were not called to parliament : besides , the general silence of antiquity which never makes mention of the commons coming to parliament untill that time ; our histories say , before his time only certain of the nobility were called to consultation about the most important affairs ▪ of the state : he caused the commons also to be assembled by knights , citizens , and burgesses of their own appointment : much to the same purpose writes sir walter raleigh , saying , it is held that the kings of england had no formal parliaments till about the th year of king hen. . for in his third year , for the marriage of his daughter , the king raised a tax upon ▪ every hide of land , by the advice of his privy councel alone . and the subjects ( saith he ) soon after this parliament was established , began to stand upon terms with their king , and drew from him by strong hand , and their swords , their great charter ; it was after ●…he establishment of the parliament , by colour of it , that ●…hey had so great daring . if any desire to know the ●…ause why hen. . called the people to parliament , ●…t was upon no very good occasion , if we believe sir walter raleigh ; the grand charter ( saith he ) was not originally granted regally and freely ; for king hen. . did but usurp the kingdom , and therefore the ●…etter to assure himself against robert his elder brother , ●…e flattered the people with those charters : yea , king john ●…hat confirmed them , had the like respect : for arthur d●… britain was the undoubted heir of the crown , upon whom john usurped : so these charters had their original ●…rom kings , de facto , but not de jure : and then afterwards his conclusion is , that the great charter had ▪ ●…rst an obscure birth by usurpation , and was fostered , and ●…ewed to the world by rebellion : in brief , the king cal●…ed the people to parliament , and granted them magna charta ; that they might confirm to him the crown . the third point consists of two parts ; first , that ●…he commons were not called unto parliament until hen. . dayes , this appears by divers of the prec●…dents formerly cited , to prove that the barons we●… the common councel . for though hen. . called a●… the people of the land to his coronation , and agai●… in the . or . year of his reign ; yet alwayes h●… did not so ; neither many of those kings that di●… succeed him , as appeareth before . secondly , for calling the commons by writ , find it acknowledged in a book , intituled , the privilege and practice of parliaments , in these words ; l●… ancient times after the king had summoned his parliament , innumerable multitudes of people did ma●… their access thereunto , pretending that privilege ●… right to belong to them . but king hen. . havi●… experience of the mischief , and inconveniences by occasion of such popular confusion , did take order that no●… might come to his parliament but those who were spec●…ally summoned . to this purpose it is observed b●… master selden , that the first writs we find accompani●… with other circumstances of a summons to parliamen●… as well for the commons as lords , is in the ●… hen. . in the like manner master cambden speaking of the dignity of barons hath these words king hen. . out of a great multitude which w●… seditious and turbulent , called the very best by writ ●… summons to parliament ; for he , after many troubles a●… vexations between the king himself , and simon ●… monefort , with other barons ; and after appeased : d●…decree and ordain , that all those earls and barons u●…to whom the king himself vouchsafed to direct h●… writs of summons should come to his parliament , an●… no others : but that which he began a little before h●… death , edward . and his successours constantly o●…served and continued . the said prudent king edwar●… summoned always those of ancient families , that were most wise , to his parliament ; and omitted their sons after their death , if they were not answerable to their parents in understanding . also master cambden in another place saith , that in the time of edw. . select men for wisdom and worth among the gentry were called to parliament , and their posterity omitted if they were defective therein . as the power of sending writs of summons for elections , was first exercised by hen. . so succeeding kings did regulate the elections upon such writs , as doth appear by several statutes , which all speak in the name and power of the kings themselves ; for such was the language of our fore-fathers . in ric. . c. . these be the words , the king willeth and commandeth all persons which shall have summons to come to parliament ; and every person that doth absent himself ( except he may reasonably and honestly excuse him to our lord the king ) shall be amerced , and otherwise punished . hen. . c. . our lord the king , at the grievous complaint of his commons , of the undue election of the knights of counties , sometimes made of affection of sheriffs , and otherwise against the form of the writs , to the great slander of the counties , &c. our lord the king , willing therein to provide remedy , by the assent of the lords and commons , hath ordained , that election shall be made in the full county-court , and that all that be there present , as well suitors as others , shall proceed to the election freely , notwithstanding any request , or command to the contrary ▪ hen. . c. . our lord the king ordained , that a sheriff that maketh an undue return , &c. shall incur the penalty of l. to be paid to our lord the king. h. . c. . our lord the king , by the advice and assent of the lords , and the special instance and request of the commons , ordained , that the knights of the shire be not chosen , unless they be resiant within the shire the day of the date of the writ : and that citizens and burgesses be resiant , dwelling , and free in the the same cities and burroughs , and no others , in any wise . hen. . c. . our lord the king , willing to provide remedy for knights chosen for parliament , and sheriffs , hath ordained , that they shall have their answer , and traverse to inquest of office found against them . hen. . c. . whereas elections of knights have been made by great out-rages , and excessive number of people , of which most part was of people of no value , whereof every of them pretend a voice equivalent to worthy knights , and esquires ; whereby man-slaughters , riots , and divisions among gentlemen shall likely be ▪ our lord the king hath ordained , that knights of shires be chosen by people dwelling in the counties , every of them having lands or tenements to the value of l. the year at the least , and that he that shall be chosen , shall be dwelling and resiant within the counties . . h. . our lord the king ordained , that knight●… be chosen by people dwelling , and having l. by the year within the same county . h. . c. . the king , willing to provide for the ease of them that come to the parliaments and councels of the king by his commandment , hath ordained that if any assault or fray be made on them that com●… to parliament , or other councel of the king ; the par●… ▪ which made any such affray or assault , shall pay doubl●… damages , and make fine and ransom at the kings wil●… . h. . c. . the king considering the statutes of h. . c. . & . hen. . c. . and the defaults of sheriffs in returning knights , citizens , and burgesses , ordained ; . that the said statutes should be duely kept . . that the sheriffs shall deliver precepts to maiors , and bayliffs to chuse citizens and burgesses . . the penalty of l. for a sheriff making an untrue return concerning the election of knights , citizens and burgesses . . the penalty of l , for maiors or bayliffs , making untrue returns . . due election of knights must be in the full county-court , between the hours of eight and eleven before noon . . the party must begin his suit within moneths after the parliament began . . knights of the shire shall be notable knights of the county , or such notable esquires , or gentlemen born of the said counties as shall be able to be knights , and no man to be such knight which standeth in the degree of a yeoman , and under . the last thing i observe in the writ for election of members for parliament , is , that by the express words of the writ , citizens and burgesses for the parliament were eligible at the county-court as well as knights of the shire ; and that not only free-holders , but all others , whosoever were present at the county-court , had voices in such elections : see the stat. . hen. . cap. . i have the longer insisted on the examination of the writ , being the power , and actions of the house of commons are principally justified by the trust which the free-holders commit unto them by virtue of this writ . i would not be understood to determine what power the house of commons doth , or may exercise if the king please : i confine my self only to the power in the writ . i am not ignorant that king hen. . in the cause of the duke of britain , and king iames in the business of the palatinate asked the councel of the house of commons ; and not only the house of commons , but every subject in particular by duty and allegiance , is bound to giv●… his best advice to his sovereign , when he is though●… worthy to have his councel asked . . edw. . nu . . all the merchants of england were summoned by writ to appear at westminster in proper person , to confer upon great business concerning the kings honour , the salvation of the real●… and of themselves . in passages of publick councel it is observable ( saith sir rob. cotton ) that in ancient times the kings of england did entertain the commons with weighty causes , thereby to apt and bind them to a readiness of charge ; and the commons to shun expence ha●… warily avoided to give advice . . edw. . the lords and commons were called to consult how the domestick quiet may be preserved , the marches of scotland defended , and th●… sea secured from enemies . the peers and commons having apart consulted , the commons desired not to be charged to councel of things of whic●… they had no cognisance ; de queux ils n' ont pas de cognisance . . edw. . justice thorp declaring to the pee●… and commons that the french war began by thei●… advice : the truce after by their assent accepted and now ended : the kings pleasure was to hav●… their counsel in the prosecution : the commons , being commanded to assemble themselves , and when they were agreed , to give notice to the king , and the lords of the councel ; after four days consultation , humbly desire of the king that he would be advised therein by the lords and others of more experience than themselves in such affairs . . ric. . the parliament was called to consult whether the king should go in person to rescue gaunt , or send an army . the commons , after two dayes debate , crave a conference with the lords , and sir thomas puckering ( their speaker ) protests , that councels for war did aptly belong to the king and his lords ; yet since the commons were commanded to give their advice , they humbly wished a voyage by the king. . ric. . at the second session , the commons are willed to advise upon view of articles of peace with the french ; whether war or such amity should be accepted ; they modestly excuse themselves , as too weak to counsel in so weighty causes . but charged again , as they did tender their honour and the right of the king ; they make their answer , giving their opinions , rather for peace , than war. for fuller manifestation of what hath been said touching the calling , election , and power of the commons in parliament , it is behooful to observe some points delivered by sir edw. coke in his treatise of the jurisdiction of parliaments ; where , first , he fairly begins , and lays his foundation , that the high court of parliament consisteth of the kings majesty sitting there , and of the three estates ; . the lords spiritual . . the lords temporal . . and the commons . hence it is to be gathered , that truly and properly it cannot be called the high court of parliament , but whilst the king is sitting there in person : so that the question now a days , whether the parliament be above the king , is either false or idle : false , if you exclude , and idle if you include the king's person in the word parliament : the case truly put , and as it is meant , is , whether the three estates ( o●… which is all one , the lords and commons ) assembled in parliament be above the king : and not whether the king with the three estates be above the king : it appears also that they are much mistaken , who reckon the king one of the three estates as mr. pryn , pag. . and many others do ; for the three estates make the body , and the king is caput ▪ principium , & finis parliamentor , as confesseth sir edw. coke . secondly , sir edw. coke delivers , that certain it is , both houses at first sate together , and that it appears in edward the third's time , the lords and commons sat●… together , and the commons had no continual speaker . if he mean , the lords and commons did sit , and vote together in one body ; few there be that will believe it , because the commons never were wont to lose , or forego any of their liberties , or privileges ; and for them to stand now with their hats in their hands ( which is no magistratical posture ) there , where they were wont to sit and vote , is an alteration not imaginable to be indured by the commons . it may be , in former times , when the commons had no constant speaker , they were oft , and perhaps for the most part , in the same chamber , and in the presence of the lords , to hear the debates and consulations of the great councel , but not to sit , and vote with them : for when the commons were to advise among themselves , the chapter-house of the abby of westminster was oft-times their place to meet in , before they had a settled house , and their meetings not being very frequent , may be the reason , i conceive , why the name of the house of commons is not of such great antiquity , or taken notice of ; but the house of lords was only called the parliament-house : and the treatise called , modus tenendi parliamentum , speaks of the parliament as but of one house only . the house , where now the commons sit in westminster , is but of late use , or institution : for in edward the sixth's dayes it was a chappel of the colledge of saint stephen , and had a dean , secular canons and chorists , who were the kings quire at his palace at westminster , and at the dissolution were translated to the kings chappel at white-hall . also i read , that westminster-hall being out of repair , ric. . caused a large house to be builded betwixt the clock-tower , and the gate of the great old hall in the midst of the palace court : the house was long and large , made of timber , covered with tiles , open on both sides , that all might see and hear what was both said and done : four thousand archers of cheshire , which were the kings own guard , attended on that house , and had bouche a court , and d. by the day . thirdly , he saith , the commons are to chuse their speaker , but seeing after their choice the king may refuse him , the use is ( as in the conge d'eslire of a bishop ) that the king doth name a discreet , learned man whom the commons elect : when the commons have chosen , the king may allow of his excuse , and disallow him , as sir john popham was , ( saith his margin . ) fourthly , he informs us , that the first day of the parliament four iustices assistants , and two civilian●… ( masters of the chancery ) are appointed receivers 〈◊〉 petitions , which are to be delivered within six dayes following : and six of the nobility , and two bishops , calling to them the kings learned councel , when nee●… should be , to be tryers of the said petitions , whether the●… were reasonable , good , and necessary to be offered and propounded to the lords . he doth not say , that any 〈◊〉 the commons were either receivers , or tryers 〈◊〉 petitions : nor that the petitions were to be propounded to them , but to the lords . fifthly , he teacheth us , that a knight , citizen , 〈◊〉 burgess , cannot make a proxy , because he is electe●… and trusted by multitudes of people : here a questio●… may be , whether a committee , if it be trusted to 〈◊〉 any thing , be not a proxy ? since he saith , the hi●… power of parliament to be committed to a few , is hold●… to be against the dignity of parliaments ; and that 〈◊〉 such commission ought to be granted . sixthly , he saith , the king cannot take notice of 〈◊〉 thing said , or done in the house of commons , but by 〈◊〉 report of the house . surely , if the commons sa●… with the lords , and the king were present , 〈◊〉 might take notice of what was done in his presence . and i read in vowel , that the old usage w●… that all the degrees of parliament sate together , 〈◊〉 every man that had there to speak , did it openly , bef●… the king and his whole parliament . in the eliz. there was a report , that the commons were against the subsidies , which was to●… the queen : whereupon , sir henry knivet said , it should be a thing answerable at the bar for any man to report any thing of speeches , or matters done in the house . sir john wolley liked the motion of secrecy ; except only the queen , from whom , he said , there is no reason to keep any thing : and sir robert cecil did allow , that the councel of the house should be secretly kept , and nothing reported in malam partem . but if the meaning be , that they might not report any thing done here to the queen , he was altogether against it . seventhly , he voucheth an enditement or information in the kings bench against of the commons , for departing without license from parliament , contrary to the kings inhibition : whereof six submitted to their fines , and edmund ployden pleaded , he remained continually from the beginning to the end of the parliament : note , he did not plead to the jurisdiction of the court of kings bench , but pleaded his constant attendance in parliament , which was an acknowledgment , and submitting to the jurisdiction of that court : and had been an unpardonable betraying of the privileges of parliament by so learned a lawyer , if his case ought only to be tryed in parliament . eighthly , he resolves , that the house of lords in their house have power of iudicature , and the commons in their house : and both houses together . he brings records to prove the power of judicature of both houses together , but not of either of them by it self . he cites the edw. . for the judicature of both houses together : where nicholas de segrave was adjudged per praelatos , comites , & barones , & alios de concilio , by the prelates , earls and barons , and others of the councel . here is no mention of the judgment of the commons . others of th●… councel , may mean , the kings privy councel , 〈◊〉 his councel learned in the laws , which are called by their writs to give counsel ; but so are not the commons . the judgment it self saith , nichol●… de segrave confessed his fault in parliament , and submitted himself to the kings will : thereupo●… the king , willing to have the advice of the earl●… barons , great men , and others of his councel , enjoyned them by the homage , fealty , and alleg●…ance which they owed , that they should faithfull counsel him what punishment should be inflicte●… for such a fact : who all , advising diligently , sa●… that such a fact deserves loss of life and member●… thus the lords ( we see ) did but advise the kin●… what judgment to give against him that deserte●… the kings camp to fight a duel in france . ninthly , he saith , of later times , see divers not ab●… iudgments at the prosecution of the commons by t●… lords : where the commons were prosecutors , the●… were no judges , but ( as he termes them ) gener●… inquisitors , or the grand inquest of the kingdom . th●… judgments he cites are but in king iames his daye●… and no elder . tenthly , also he tells us , of the iudicature in t●… house of commons alone ; his most ancient preceden●… is but in queen elizabeths reign , of one tho. lon●… who gave the maior of westbury l. to be elect●… burgess . eleventhly , he hath a section , entitled , the hous●… of commons ( to many purposes ) a distinct court : an●… saith , nota , the house of commons to many purposes , 〈◊〉 distinct court : of those many purposes he tells but one that is , it uses to adjourn it self . commissioners tha●… be but to examine witnesses , may adjourn themselves , yet are no court. twelfthly , he handles the privileges of parliament , where the great wonder is , that this great master of ●…he law , who hath been oft a parliament-man , could ●…ind no other , nor more privileges of parliament ●…ut one , and that is , freedom from arrests : which , he ●…aith , holds , unless in three cases , treason , felony , and ●…he peace . and for this freedom from arrests , he cites antient precedents for all those in the house of lords , but he brings not one precedent at all for the commons freedom from arrests . it is behooful for a free-holder to consider what power is in the house of peers ; for although the free-holder have no voice in the election of the lords , yet if the power of that house extend to make ordinances that bind the free-holders , it is necessary for him to enquire what and whence that power is , and how far it reacheth : the chief writ of ●…ummons to the peers was in these words , carolus dei gratia , &c. reverendissimo in christo patri g. eadem gratia archiepiscopo cantuarien●…i , totius angliae primati & metropolitano , salutem . quia de advisamento & assensu concilii nostri , pro qui●…usdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis , nos & statum & defensionem regni nostri angliae , & ecclesiae anglica●…ae concernentibus , quoddam parliamentum nostrum apud w. &c. teneri ordinavimus , & ibidem vobiscum , & cum ●…aeteris praelatis , magnatibus & proceribus dicti regni nostri angliae colloquium habere , & tractatum : vobis ●…n fide , & dilectione quibus nobis tenemini firmiter injungendo mandamus , quod consideratis dictorum negotioru●… arduitate , & periculis imminentibus , cessante quacunqu●… excusatione dictis die & loco personaliter intersitis , nobiscum & cum caeteris praelatis , magnatibus , & procerib●… praedictis , super dictis negotiis tractaturi , vestrumque concilium impensuri , & hoc sicut nos & honorem nostr●…ac salvationem regni praedicti , ac ecclesiae sanctae , expeditionemque dictorum negotiorum diligitis , nullatenus omittati●… praemonentes decanum & capitulum ecclesiae vestrae ca●…tuariensis , ac archidiacanos , totumque clerum vestrae di●…cesis , quod idem decanus & archidiaconi in propriis pe●…sonis suis , ac dictum capitulum per unum , idemque cler●… per duos procuratores idoneos , plenam & sufficientem po●… statem ab ipsis capitulo & clero habentes , praedictis die ●… loco personaliter intersint , ad consentiendum hiis quae tu●…ibidem de commune concilio ipsius regni nostri , divin●… favente clementia , contigerint ordinari . teste meipso ap●… west . &c. charles by the grace of god , &c. to the mo●… reverend father in christ w. by the sam●… grace arch-bishop of canterbury , primate and metropolitan of all england , health . whereas by th●… advice and assent of our councel , for certain difficult and urgent businesses concerning us , the stat●… and defence of our kingdom of england , and 〈◊〉 the english church : we have ordained a certa●… parliament of ours to be holden at w. &c. a●… there to have conference , and to treat with you th●… prelats , great men , and peers of our said kingdo●… we straitly charge and command , by the fai●… and love by which you are bound to us , that co●…sidering the difficulties of the businesses aforesai●… and the imminent dangers , and setting aside all excuse you be personally present at the day and place aforesaid , to treat and give your counsel concerning the said businesses : and this , as you love us and our honour , and the safeguard of the foresaid kingdom and church , and the expedition of the said businesses , you must no way omit . forewarning the dean and chapter of your church of canterbury , and the arch-deacons , and all the clergy of your diocese , that the same dean , and the arch-deacon in their proper persons , and the said chapter by one , and the said clergy by two fit proctors , having full and sufficient power from them the chapter and clergy , be personally present at the foresaid day and place , to consent to those things , which then and there shall happen by the favour of god , to be ordained by the common councel of our kingdom . witness our self ●…t westm. the same form of writ mutatis mutandis , concluding with , you must no way omit . witness , &c. ●…s to the temporal barons : but whereas the spiritu●…l barons are required by the faith and love ; the temporal are required by their allegiance or homage . the difference between the two writs is , that the lords are to treat and to give counsel ; the commons ●…re to perform and consent to what is ordained . by this writ the lords have a deliberative or a ●…onsultive power to treat , and give counsel in difficult businesses : and so likewise have the judges , barons ●…f the exchequer , the kings councel , and the ma●…ters of the chancery , by their writs . but over and ●…esides this power , the lords do exercise a decisive or iudicial power , which is not mentioned or found in their writ . for the better understanding of these two different powers , we must carefully note the distinction between a iudge and a counsellor in a monarchy : the ordinary duty , or office of a iudge is to give judgment , and to command in the place of the king ; but the ordinary duty of a counsellor is to advise the king what he himself shall do , or cause to be done : the iudge represents the kings person in his absence , the counsellor in the kings presence gives his advice : iudges by their commission o●… institution are limited their charge and power , and in such things they may judge , and cause their judgments to be put in execution : but counsellors have no power to command their consultations to b●… executed , for that were to take away the sovereignty from their prince , who by his wisdom is to weigh●… the advice of his councel , and at liberty to resolv●… according to the judgment of the wiser part of hi●… councel , and not always of the greater : in a word ▪ regularly a counsellor hath no power but in th●… kings presence , and a iudge no power but out o●… his presence ; these two powers , thus distinguished ▪ have yet such correspondency , and there is so nee●… affinity between the acts of judging , and counselling ; that although the ordinary power of the judg●… is to give judgment : yet by their oath they ar●… bound in causes extraordinary , when the king pleaseth to call them , to be his counsellors ; and o●… the other side , although the proper work of a counsellor be only to make report of his advice to his sovereign , yet many times for the ease only , and by the permission of the king , counsellors are allowed to judge , and command in points wherein ordinarily they know the mind of the prince ; and what they do is the act of the royal power it self : for the councel is always presupposed to be united to the person of the king , and therefore the decrees of the councel are styled , by the king in his privy councel . to apply this distinction to the house of peers : we find originally they are called as counsellors to the king , and so have only a deliberative power specified in their writ , and therefore the lords do only then properly perform the duty for which they are called , when they are in the kings presence , that he may have conference and treat with them : the very words of the writ are , nobiscum ac cum praelatis , magnatibus & proceribus praedictis super dictis negotiis tractaturi vestrumque concilium impensuri , with us and with the prelates , great men and peers to treat and give your councel : the word nobiscum implieth plainly the kings presence . it is a thing in reason most absurd , to make the king assent to the judgments in parliament , and allow him no part ●…n the consultation ; this were to make the king ●… subject . councel loseth the name of councel , ●…nd becomes a command if it put a necessi●…y upon the king to follow it : such imperious councels , make those that are but counsellors ●…n name to be kings in fact : and kings themselves to be but subjects . we read in sir ro●…ert cotton , that towards the end of the saxons , and ●…he first times of the norman kings , parliaments stood 〈◊〉 custom-grace fixed to easter , whitsontide , and christmas ; and that at the kings court , or palace , parliaments sate in the presence , or privy chamber from whence he infers , an improbability to believe the king excluded his own presence ; and unmannerly f●… guests to bar him their company who gave them the●… entertainment . and although now a-days the parliament sit not in the court where the kings houshol●… remains , yet still even to this day , to shew that parliaments are the kings guests , the lord steward o●… the kings houshold keeps a standing table to entertain the peers during the sitting of parliament ; and he alone , or some from , or under him , as the treasurer , or comptroller of the kings houshold take●… the oaths of the members of the house of commo●… the first day of the parliament . sir richard s●…roop steward of the houshold of our sovereign lord the king , by the commandment of the lords sitting in full parliament i●… the great chamber , put i. lord gomeniz and william weston to answer severally to accusations brough●… against them . the necessity of the king's presence in parliamen●… appears by the desire of parliaments themselves i●…former times ; and the practice of it sir robert cotto●… proves by several precedents : whence he conclude●… that in the consultations of state , and decisions of private plaints , it is clear from all times , the king w●… not only present to advise , but to determine also . whensoever the king is present , all power of judging which is derived from his , ceaseth : the votes of the lords may serve for matter of advice , the fina●… judgment is only the kings . indeed , of late years ▪ queen mary , and queen elizabeth , by reason of thei●… sex , being not so fit for publick assemblies , have brought it out of use , by which means it is com●… to pass , that many things which were in former times acted by kings themselves , have of late been left to the judgment of the peers ; who , in quality of judges extraordinary , are permitted for the ease of the king , and in his absence , to determine such matters as are properly brought before the king himself sitting in person , attended with his great councel of prelates and peers . and the ordinances that are made there , receive their establishment either from the kings presence in parliament , where his chair of state is constantly placed ; or at least from the confirmation of him , who in all courts , and in all causes is supream judge . all judgement is by , or under him ; it cannot be without , much less against his approbation . the king only and none but he , if he were able , should judge all causes ; saith bracton , that ancient chief justice in hen. . time . an ancient precedent i meet with cited by master selden , of a judicial proceeding in a criminal cause of the barons before the conquest , wherein i observe the kings will was , that the lords should be judges , ●…n the cause wherein himself was a party ; and he ●…atified their proceeding : the case was thus , earl godwin having had a trial before the lords under king hardicanute , touching the death of alfred ( son to king ethelbert , and brother to him who was afterward edward the confessor ) had fled out of england ; and upon his return , with hope of edward the confessor's favour , he solicited the lords ●…o intercede for him with the king ; who ( consulting together ) brought godwin with them before the king to obtain his grace and favour : but the king ▪ ●…resently , as soon as he beheld him , said , thou traytor godwin , i do appeal thee of the death of my brother alfred , whom thou hast most trayterously slain ; then godwin excusing it , answered , my lord the king , may it please your grace , i neither betrayed nor killed your brother , whereof i put my self upon the iudgment of your court : then the king said , you noble lords , earls , and barons of the land , who are my liege men now gathered here together , and have heard my appeal , and godwins answer , i will that in this appeal between us , ye decree right iudgment , and do true iustice. the earls and barons treating of this among themselves , were of differing judgments ; some said that godwin was never bound to the king either by homage , service , or fealty , and therefore could not be his traytor , and that he had not slain alfred with his own hands : others said , that neither earl nor baron , nor any other subject of the king could wage his war by law against the king in his appeal ; but most wholly put himself into the kings mercy , and offer competent amends . then leofric consul of chester , a good man before god and the world , said , earl godwin next to the king , is a man of the best parentage of all england , and he cannot deny but that by his counsel alfred the kings brother was slain , therefore for my part i consider , that he and his son , and all we twelve earls who are his friends and kinsmen , do go humbly before the king , laden with so much gold and silver as each of us can carry in our arms , offering him that for his offence , and humbly praying for pardon ; and he will pardon the earl , and taking his homage and fealty , will restore him all his lands . all they in this form lading themselves with treasure , and coming to the king , did shew the manner and order of their consideration , to which , the king not willing to contradict , did ratifie all that they had judged . hen. . in lent there was an assembly of all the spiritual and temporal barons at westminster , for the determination of that great contention between alfonso king of castile , and sancho king of navarre , touching divers castles , and territories in spain , which was by compromise submitted to the judgment of the king of england . and the king , consulting with his bishops , earls , and barons , determined it ( as he saith ) himself in the first person , in the exemplification of the judgement . of king iohn also , that great controversie touching the barony that william of moubray claimed against william of stutvil , which had depended from the time of king hen. . was ended by the councel of the kingdom , and will of the king : concilio regni , & voluntate regis . the lords in parliament adjudge william de weston to death for surrendring barwick castle , but for that our lord the king was not informed of the manner of the judgment , the constable of the tower , allen buxall , was commanded safely to keep the said william untill he hath other commandment from our lord the king. ric. . also the lords adjudged iohn lord of gomentz for surrendring the towns , and castles of ardee : and for that he was a gentleman , and bannaret , and had served the late king , he should be beheaded , and for that our lord the king was not informed of the manner of the iudgment , the execution thereof shall be respited untill our lord the king shall be informed . it is commanded to the constable of the tower , safely to keep the said john , untill he hath other commandement from our lord the king. in the case of hen. spencer bishop of norwich , ric. . who was accused for complying with the french , and other failings ; the bishop complained , what was done against him , did not pass by the assent and knowledge of the peers ; whereupon it was said in parliament , that the cognisance and punishment of his offence did , of common right , and antient custom of the realm of england , solely and wholly belong to our lord the king , and no other : le cognisance & punissement de commune droit & auntienne custome de royalme de engleterre , seul & per tout apperteine au roy nostre seignieur , & a nul autre . in the case of the lord de la ware , the judgment of the lords was , that he should have place next after the lord willoughby of erisbe , by consent of all , except the lord windsor : and the lord keeper was required to acquaint her majesty with the determination of the peers , and to know her pleasure concerning the same . the inference from these precedents , is , that the decisive or iudicial power exercised in the chamber of peers , is merely derivative , and subservient to the supreme power , which resides in the king , and is grounded solely upon his grace and favour : for howsoever the house of commons do alledge their power to be founded on the principles of nature , in that they are the representative body of the kingdom ( as they say ) and so being the whole , may take care , and have power by nature to preserve themselves : yet the house of peers do not , nor cannot make any such the least pretence , since there is no reason in nature , why amongst a company of men who are all equal , some few should be picked out to be exalted above their fellows , and have power to govern those who by nature are their companions . the difference between a peer and a commoner , is not by nature , but by the grace of the prince : who creates honours , and makes those honours to be hereditary ( whereas he might have given them for life onely , or during pleasure , or good behaviour ) and also annexeth to those honours the power of having votes in parliament , as hereditary counsellours , furnished with ampler privileges than the commons : all these graces conferred upon the peers , are so far from being derived from the law of nature , that they are contradictory and destructive of that natural equality and freedom of mankind , which many conceive to be the foundation of the privileges and liberties of the house of commons : there is so strong an opposition between the liberties of grace and nature , that it had never been possible for the two houses of parliament to have stood together without mortal enmity , and eternal jarring , had they been raised upon such opposite foundations : but the truth is , the liberties and privileges of both houses have but one , and the self same foundation , which is nothing else but the meer and sole grace of kings . thus much may serve to shew the nature and original of the deliberative and decisive power of the peers of the kingdom . the matter about which the deliberative power is conversant , is generally the consulting and advising upon any urgent business which concerns the king , or defence of the kingdom : and more especially sometimes in preparing new laws ; and this power is grounded upon the writ . the décisive power is exercised in giving judgment in some difficult cases ; but for this power of the peers , i find no warrant in their writ . whereas the parliament is styled the supreme court it must be understood properly of the king sitting in the house of peers in person ; and but improperly of the lords without him : every supreme court must have the supreme power , and the supreme power is alwayes arbitrary ; for that is arbitrary which hath no superiour on earth to control●… it . the last appeal in all government , must still b●… to an arbitrary power , or else appeals will b●… in infinitum , never at an end . the legislative power is an arbitrary power , for they are termini convertibiles . the main question in these our dayes is , where this power legislative remains ? or is placed ; upon conference of the writs of summons for both houses , with the bodies and titles of our ancient acts of parliament , we shall find the power of making laws rests solely in the king. some affirm , that a part of the legislative power is in either of the houses ; but besides invincible reason from the nature of monarchy it self , which must have the supreme power alone ; the constant antient declaration of this kingdom is against it . for howsoever of later years in the titles and bodies of our acts of parliament it be not so particularly expressed who is the author and maker of our laws , yet in almost all our elder statutes it is precisely expressed , that they are made by the king himself : the general words used of later times , that laws are made by authority of parliament , are particularly explained in former statutes , to mean , that the king ordains , the lords advise , the commons consent , as by comparing the writs with the statutes that expound the writs , will evidently appear . magna charta begins thus , henry by the grace of god , know ye , that we of our meer and free will have given these liberties . in the self-same style runs charta de foresta , and tells us the author of it . the statute de scaccario h. . begins in these words , the king commandeth , that all bailiffs , sheriffs , and other officers , &c. and concerning the justices of chester , the king willeth &c. and again , he commandeth the treasurer and barons of the exchequer upon their allegiance . the stat. of marlborough , hen. . goeth thus : the king hath made these acts , ordinances , and statutes , which he willeth to be observed of all his subjects , high and low . edw. . the title of this statute is , these are the acts of king edward ; and after it follows , the king hath ordained these acts ; and in the first chapter , the king forbiddeth and commandeth , that none do hurt , damage , or grievance ●…o any religious man , or person of the church : and in the thirteenth chapter , the king prohibiteth that none do ravish or take away by force , any maid within age . edw. . it is said , our sovereign lord the king hath established these acts , commanding they be ●…bserved within this realm : and in the fourteenth chap. the words are , the king of his special grace granteth , that the citizens of london shall recover in an assise , damage with the land. the stat. of west . . saith , our lord the king hath ordained , that the will of the giver be observed and in the . chap. our lord the king hath ordained , that a woman after the death of her husband shal recover by a writ of entry . the stat. of quo warranto saith , our lord the king at his parliament , of his special grace , and for affection which he beareth to his prelates , earls , and barons , and others , hath granted , that they that have liberties by prescription shall enjoy them . in the stat. de finibus levatis , the kings words are , we intending to provide remedy in our parliament have ordained , &c. . edw. . c. . the king wills , that the chancellor , and the iustices of the bench shall follow him ▪ so that he may have at all times some neer unto him tha●… be learned in the laws : and in chap. . the words are , our lord the king , after full conference and debate had with his earls , barons , nobles , and other great men , by their whole consent , hath ordained &c. the stat. de tallagio ( if any such statute there be ) speaks in the kings person , no officer of ours ▪ no tallage shall be taken by us ; we will and grant. . edw. . begins thus , our lord the king willeth and commandeth . the stat. of . the same king , saith , our lord the king , by the assent of the prelates , earls , and other great states , hath ordained . . edw. . it is provided by our lord the king and his iustices . the stat. of carlile saith , we have sent our command in writing firmly to be observed . . edw. . begins thus , king edw. . at his parliament at the request of the commonalty by their petition before him , and his councel in parliament , hath granted , &c. and in the th chap. the king willeth , that no man be charged to arm himself otherwise than he was wont . . edw. . our lord the king , at the request of his people , hath established these things , which he wills to be kept . . of the same king there is this title , our lord the king by the assent &c. and by the advice of his councel being there , hath ordained , &c. in his year , it is said , because our lord king edw. . hath received by the complaint of the prelates , earls , barons ; also at the shewing of the knights of the shires , and his commons by their petition put in his parliament , &c. hath ordained , by the assent &c. at the request of the said knights and commons , &c. the same year in another parliament you may find , these be the articles accorded by our lord the king , with the assent , &c. at the request of the knights of the shires , and the commons by their petition ●…ut in the said parliament . in the year-book edw. . . pl. . it is said , the king makes the laws by the assent of the peers and commons ; and not the peers and commons . the stat. of . ric. . hath this beginning , rich●…d the . by the assent of the prelates , dukes , earls and barons , and at the instance and special request of ●… commons , ordained . there being a statute made ric. . c. . against lollards , in the next year the commons petition him , supplient les commons que come un estatute fuit fait , &c. the commons beseech , that whereas a statute was made in the last parliament , &c. which was never assented to , nor granted by the commons , but that which was done therein was done without their assent . in this petition the commons acknowledge it a statute , and so call it , though they assented not to it . ric. . nu . . the commons desire , some pursuing to make a law which they conceive hurtful to the commonwealth ; that his majesty will not pass it . as for the parliaments in hen. . hen. . hen. . edw. . and ric. . reigns , the most of them do agree in this one title , our lord the king by the advice and assent of his lords , and at the special instance and request of the commons , hath ordained . the precedents in this point are so numerous that it were endless to cite them . the statutes in hen. . days do for the most part agree , both in the titles and bodies of the acts ▪ in these words : our lord the king by the assent of the lords spiritual and temporal , and the commons i●… parliament assembled , and by the authority of the same , hath ordained . unto this kings time we find the commons very often petitioning , but not petitioned unto . the first petition made to the commons that i meet with among the statutes , is but in the middle of this king hen . reign , which was so well approved , that the petition it self is turned into ●… statute : it begins thus , to the right worshipfu●… commons in this present parliament assembled sheweth to your discreet wisdoms , the wardens of the fellowship of the craft of upholsters within london , &c. this petition , though it be directed to the commons in the title ; yet the prayer of the petition is turned to the king , and not to the commons ; for it concludes , therefore it may please the kings highness by the advice of the lords spiritual and temporal , and his commons in parliament , &c. next for the statutes of hen. . they do most part agree , both in their titles , and the bodies of the acts , with those of his father king hen. . lastly , in the statutes of edw. . qu. mary , q. elizabeth , k. iames , and of our sovereign lord the king that now is , there is no mention made in their titles of any assent of lords and commons , or of any ordaining by the king , but only in general terms it is said , acts made in parliament : or thus , at the parliament were enacted : yet in the bodies of many of these acts of these last princes , there is sometimes mention made of consent of lords and commons , in these or the like words : it is enacted by the king , with the assent of the lords and commons ; except only in the statutes of our lord king charles , wherein there is no mention , that i can find , of any consent of the lords and commons ; or ordaining by the king : but the words are , be it enacted by authority of parliament : or else , be it enacted by the king , the lords spiritual and temporal , and commons ; as if they were all fellow-commissioners . thus it appears , that even till the time of k. ed. . who lived but in our fathers dayes , it was punctually expressed in every king's laws , that the statutes & ordinances were made by the king. and withal we may see by what degrees the styles , and titles o●… acts of parliament have been varied , and to whose disadvantage . the higher we look , the more absolute we find the power of kings in ordainin●… laws : nor do we meet with at first so much as th●… assent or advice of the lords mentioned . nay , 〈◊〉 we cast our eye upon many statutes of those that b●… of most antiquity , they will appear as if they we●… no laws at all ; but as if they had been made only to teach us , that the punishments of many offenc●… were left to the meere pleasure of kings . the punitive part of the law , which gives all the vigo●… and binding power to the law , we find committed by the statutes to the kings meer will and pleasure , as if there were no law at all . i will offer a few precedents to the point . edw. . c. . saith , that sheriffs , coroners , a●… bailiffs , for concealing of felonies , shall make grievo●… fines at the kings pleasure . chap. . ordains , that such as be found culpabl●… of ravishing of women , shall fine at the kings pleasure . chap. . saith , the penalty for detaining a priso●…er that is mainpernable , is a fine at the kings pleasure , or a grievous amercement to the king ; and , he th●… shall take reward for deliverance of such , shall be at th●… great mercy of the king. chap. . offenders in parks or ponds shall ma●… fines at the kings pleasure . chap. . committers of champerty , and extortioners , are to be punished at the kings pleasure . chap. . purveyors , not paying for what they tak●… shall be grievously punished at the kings pleasure . chap. . the king shall punish grievously the sheriff , and him that doth maintain quarrels . chap. . the king shall grant attaint in plea of land where it shall seem to him necessary . edw. . saith , whereas of late , before certain persons deputed to treat upon debates between us and certain great men , it was accorded , that in our next parliament provision shall be made by us , and the common assent of the prelates , earls , and barons , that in all parliaments for ever , every man shall come without force and armour . and now in our next parliament the prelates , earls , barons , and commonalty have said , that to us it belongeth , through our royal signory , straitly to defend force of armour at all times , when it shall please us , and to punish them which shall do otherwise , and hereunto they are bound to aid us their sovereign lord at all seasons when need shall be . edw. . takers away of nuns from religious houses , fined at the kings will. if by the default of the lord that will not avoid the dike , underwoods , and bushes in high-wayes , murder be done , the lord shall make fine at the kings pleasure . edw. . if a gold-smith be attainted for not assaying , touching , and working vessels of gold , he shall be punished by ransome at the kings pleasure . hen. . the commons desire they may have answer of their petitions before the gift of any subsidy ; to which the king answers , he would conferr with the lords , and do what should be best according to their ad●…ice ; and the last day of parliament he gave this an●…er , that that manner of doing had not been seen , nor used in no time of his progenitors or predecessors , that they should have any answer of then petitions , or knowledge of it before they have shewed , and finished all their other business of parliament , be it of any grant , business , or otherwise , and therefore the king would not in any wayes change the good customs and usages made and used of antient times . hen. . c. . whereas one savage did beat and maime one richard chedder esquire , menial servan●… to tho. brook , knight of the shire for somerset-shire , the statute saith , savage shall make fine and ransom at the kings pleasure . hen. . it is said , potestas principis non est inclusa legibus , the power of the prince is not included in the laws . hen. . nu . . we read of a restitution i●… bloud , and lands of william lasenby , by the king , by the assent of the lords spiritual , and commons ; omitting the lords temporal . hen. . in a law made , there is a clause , that it is the kings regalty to grant or deny such of their petitions as pleaseth himself . hen. . c. . an ordinance was made for to endure as long as it shall please the king. hen. . c. . hath this law , the king o●… sovereign lord , calling to his remembrance the duty of allegiance of his subjects of this his realm , and that by reason of the same they are bound to serve their prince and sovereign lord for the time being in his wars , for the defence of him , and the land , against every rebellion , power , and might reared against him , and with him to enter and abide in service in battel , if case so require ; and that for the same service , what fortune ever fall by chance in the same battel , against the mind and will of the prince ( as in this land some time past hath been seen ) that it is not reasonable , but against all laws , reason , and good conscience , that the said subjects , going with their sovereign lord in wars , attending upon him in his person , or being in other places , by his commandement within the land , or without ; any thing should lose or forfeit , for doing their true duty and service of allegiance ; be it therefore enacted , that no person that shall attend upon the king , and do him true service , shall be attainted therefore of treason , or any other offence by act of parliament , or otherwise . also the chap. of the same year saith , where every subject by the duty of his allegiance is bounden to serve and assist his prince and sovereign lord at all seasons when need shall require , and bound to give attendance upon his royal person , to defend the same when he shall fortune to go in person in war for defence of the realm , or against his rebels and enemies , for the subduing and repressing of them , and their malitious purpose . christopher wray , serjeant at law , chosen speaker , eliz. in his speech to her majesty , said , that for the orderly government of the commonwealth , three things were necessary : . religion . . authority . . law. by the first , we are taught not only our duty to god , but to obey the queen , and that not only in temporals , but in spirituals , in which her power is absolute . mr. grivel in the eliz. said in parliament , he ●…ished not the making of many laws ; since the more we make , the less liberty we have our selves ; her majesty not being bound by them . for further proof that the legislative power is proper to the king , we may take notice , that in antient time , as sir edw. coke saith , all acts of parliament were in form of petitions : if the petitions were from the commons , and the answer of them the king 's , it is easie thereby to judge who made the act of parliament : also sir io. glanvil affirms , that in former times the course of petitioning the king was this , the lords and speaker , either by words or writing , preferr'd their petition to the king ; this then was called the bill of the commons , which being received by the king , part he received , part he put out , and part he ratified ; for as it came from him , it was drawn into a law. also it appears , that provisions , ordinances , and proclamations , made heretofore out of parliament , have been alwayes acknowledged for laws and statutes : we have amongst the printed statutes , one called the statute of ireland , dated at westminster , feb. hen. . which is nothing but a letter of the king to gerard son of maurice justicer of ireland . the explanations of the statute of gloucester made by the king and his iustices only , were received alwayes for statutes , and are still printed with them . also the statute made for the correction of the twelfth chapter of the statute of gloucester , was signed under the great seal , and sent to the justices of the bench after the manner of a writ patent , with a certain writ closed , dated by the kings hand at westminster , maii edw. . requiring that they should do and execute all and every thing contained in it , though the same do not accord with the stat. of gloucester in all things . the provisions of merton made by the king at an assembly of prelates , and the greater part of the earls and barons , for the coronation of the king , and his queen elinor , are in the form of a proclamation , and begin provisum est in curia domini regis apud merton . hen. . a provision was made , de assisa praesentationis , which was continued and allowed for a law untill the stat. of west . . which provides the contrary in express words . in the old statutes it is hard to distinguish what laws were made by kings in parliament , and what out of parliament : when kings called peers only to parliament , and of those how many , or whom they pleased , ( as it appears anciently they did ) it was no easie matter to put a difference between a councel-table , and a parliament : or between a proclamation and a statute : yet it is most evident , that in old times there was a distinction between the kings special or privy councel , and his common councel of the kingdom : and his special councel did sit with the peers in parliament , and were of great and extraordinary authority there . in the stat. of westm. . it is said , these are the acts of k. edw. . made at his first parliament by his councel , and by the assent of bishops , abbots , priors , earls , barons , and all the commonalty of the realm . the stat. of acton burnell hath these words , the king for himself , and by his councel , hath ordained and established . in articulis super chartas , when the great charter was confirmed at the request of the prelates , earls , and barons , are found these two provisions : . nevertheless the king and his councel do not intend by reason of this statute to diminish the kings right . . notwithstanding all these things before-mentioned , or any part of them , both the king and his councel , and all they that were present , will and intend , that the right and prerogative of his crown shall be saved to him in all things . the stat. of escheators hath this title , at the parliament of our sovereign lord the king , by his councel it was agreed , and also by the king himself commanded . edw. . where magna charta was confirmed , this preamble is found , at the request of the commonalty , by their petition made before the king and his councel in parliament , by the assent of the prelates , earls , and barons , &c. the statute made at york edw. . goeth thus : whereas the knights , citizens , and burgesses desired our sovereign lord the king in his parliament by their petition , &c. our sovereign lord the king , desiring the profit of his people , by the assent of his prelates , earls , barons , and other nobles of his realm , and by the advice of his councel being there , hath ordained . . edw. . in the statute of purveyors , where the king , at the request of the lords and commons , made a declaration what offences should be adjudged treason : it is there further said , if per-case any man ride armed with men of arms against any other to slay him , or rob him , it is not the mind of the king , or of his councel : that in such cases it shall be adjudged treason . by this statute it appears , that even in the case of treason , which is the kings own cause , as , whereas a man doth compass , or imagine the death of our lord the king , or a man do wage war against our lord the king in his realm , or be adherent to the kings enemies in his realm , giving to them aid or comfort in the realm , or elsewhere ▪ in all these cases it is the kings declaration onely that makes it to be treason : and though it be said , that difficult points of treason shall be brought and shewed to the king , and his parliament , yet it is said , it is the mind of the king and his councel , that determines what shall be adjudged treason , and what felony , or trespass . edw. . the commons presenting a petition to the king which the kings councel did mislike , were content thereupon to amend and explain their petition : the petition hath these words , to their most redoubted sovereign lord the king , praying , your said commons , that whereas they have prayed him to be discharged of all manner of articles of the eyre &c. which petition seemeth to his councel to be prejudicial unto him , and in disinherison of his crown if it were so generally granted . his said commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of him , or of his crown perpetually , as of escheats , &c. but of trespasses , misprisions , negligences , ignorances , &c. and as in parliaments the kings councel were of supereminent power , so out of parliament kings made great use of them . king edw. . finding that bogo de clare was discharged of an accusation brought against him in parliament , commanded him nevertheless to appear before him and his councel , ad faciendum & recipiendum quod per regem & ejus concilium fuerit faciendum , and so proceeded to the examination of the whole cause , edw. . edw. . in the star-chamber ( which was the ancient councel-table at westminster ) upon the complaint of eliz. audley , commanded iames audley to appear before him and his councel ; and determined a controversie between them , touching land contained in her jointure , rot. claus . de an. edw. . hen. . in a suit before him and his councel , for the titles of the manors of serre and st. lawrence in the isle of thanet in kent , took order for the sequestring the profits till the right were tried . hen. . commanded the justices of the bench to stay the arraignment of one verney in london , till they had other commandment from him and his councel , hen. . rot . . in banco . edw. . and his councel in the star-chamber heard the cause of the master and poor brethren of saint leonard's in york , complaining that sir hugh hastings , and others , withdrew from them a great part of their living , which consisted chiefly upon the having of a thrave of corn of every plow-land within the counties of york , westmorland , cumberland , and lancashire , rot. pat . de an . . edw. . part . . memb . . hen. . and his councel in the star-chamber , decreed , that margery and florence becket should sue no further in their cause against alice radley widow , for lands in wolwich and plumsted in kent , for as much as the matter had been heard first before the councel of edw. . after that before the president of the requests of that king hen. . and then lastly before the councel of the said king , hen. . in the time of hen. . an order or provision was made by the kings councel , and it was pleaded at the common law in bar to a writ of dower ; the plaintifs atturney could not deny it , and thereupon the judgment was , ideo sine die . it seems in those days an order of the kings councel , was either parcell of the common law , or above it . also we may find , the judges have had regard , that before they would resolve or give judgment in new cases , they consulted with the kings privy councel . in the case of adam brabson who was assaulted by r. w. in the presence of the justices of assise at westminster , the judges would have the advice of the kings councel : for in a like case , because r. c. did strike a juror at westminster which passed against one of his friends , it was adjudged by all the councel that his right hand should be cut off , and his lands and goods forfeited to the king. green and thorp were sent by the judges to the kings councel , to demand of them whether by the stat. of edw. . . a word may be amended in a writ , and it was answered that a word may be well amended , although the stat. speaks but of a letter or syllable . in the case of sir thomas ogthred , who brought a formedon against a poor man and his wife ; they came and yielded to the demandant , which seemed suspitious to the court ; whereupon judgment was staid , and thorp said that in the like case of giles blacket it was spoken of in parliament , and we were commanded that when any like should come we should not go to judgment without good advice ; therefore the judges conclusion was , sues an counseil & comment ils voilent que nous devomus faire , nous volums faire , & autrement nient en oest case ; sue to the councel , and as they will have us to do , we will do ; and otherwise not in this case , edw. . thus we see the judges themselves were guided by the kings councel , and yet the opinions of judges have guided the lords in parliament in point of law. all the judges of the realm , barons of exchequer , of the quoif ; the kings learned councel , and the civilians , masters of chancery , are called temporal assistants by sir edw. coke , and though he deny them voices in parliament , yet lie confesseth , that by their writ they have power both to treat , and to give councel . i cannot find that the lords have any other power by their writ : the words of the lords writ are , that you be present with us the prelates , great men , and peers , to treat and give your counsel : the words of the judges writ are , that you be present with us , and others of the counsel ( and sometimes with us only ) to treat and give your counsel . the judges usually joyned in committees with the lords in all parliaments , even in queen eliz. reign , untill her th year ; and then upon the th of november , the judges were appointed to attend the lords . and whereas the judges have liberty in the upper house it self , upon leave given them by the l. keeper , to cover themselves , now at committees they sit always uncovered . the power of judges in parliament is best understood , if we consider how the judicial power of peers hath been exercised in matter of judicature : we may find it hath been the practice , that though the lords in the kings absence give judgment in point of law , yet they are to be directed and regulated by the kings judges , who are best able to give direction in the difficult points of the law ; which ordinarily are unknown to the lords . and therefore , if any errour be committed in the kings bench , which is the highest ordinary court of common law in the kingdom , that errour must be redressed in parliament . and the manner is , saith the lord chancellor egerton , if a writ of errour be sued in parl. upon a iudgment given by the iudges in the kings bench , the lords of the higher house alone , ( without the commons ) are to examine the errours . the lords are to proceed according to the law , and for their iudgments therein they are to be informed by the advice and councel of the iudges , who are to inform them what the law is , and to direct them in their iudgment ; for the lords are not to follow their own discretion or opinion otherwise . hen. . the commons made sute that w. de la pool d. of suffolk , should be committed to prison for many treasons , and other crimes ; the lords of the higher house were doubtful what answer to give ; the opinion of the iudges was demanded , their opinion was , that he ought not to be committed , for that the commons did not charge him with any particular offence , but with general reports and slanders : this opinion was allowed . . hen. . a parliament being prorogued , in the vacation the speaker of the house of commons was condemned in a thousand pounds damages in an action of trespass , and committed to prison in execution for the same : when the parliament was re-assembled , the commons made sute to the king , and lords , to have their speaker delivered . the lords demanded the opinion of the judges whether he might be delivered out of prison by privilege of parliament ; upon the judges answer it was concluded , that the speaker should remain i●… prison according to the law , notwithstanding the privilege of parliament , and that he was speaker ; which resolution was declared to the commons by moy●… the kings serjeant at law , and the commons were commanded in the kings name by the bishop 〈◊〉 lincoln ( in the absence of the arch-bishop of canterbury , then chancellor ) to chuse another speaker . hen. . a question was moved in parliament , whether spiritual persons might be convented before temporal iudges for criminal causes ? there sir iohn fineux and the other judges delivered their opinion , that they might and ought to be ; and their opinion allowed and maintained by the king and lords , and dr. standish who before had holden the same opinion , w●… delivered from the bishops . i find it affirmed , that in causes which receive determination in the house of lords , the king hath 〈◊〉 vote at all , no more than in other courts of ministerial iurisdiction . true it is , the king hath no vote at all if we understand by vote , a voice among others : for he hath no partners with him in giving judgement . but if by no vote is meant he hath no power to judge ; we dispoil him of his sovereignty : it is the chief mark of supremacy to judge in the highest causes , and last appeals . this the children of israel full well understood , when they petitioned for a king to judge them ; if the dernier reso●… be to the lords alone , then they have the supremacy . but as moses by chusing elders to judge in small causes , did not thereby lose his authority to be judge himself when he pleased , even in the smallest matters ; much less in the greatest , which he reserved to himself : so kings by delegating others to judge under them , do not thereby denude themselves of a power to judge when they think good . there is a distinction of these times , that kings themselves may not judge , but they may see and look to the iudges , that they give iudgment according to law , and for this purpose only ( as some say ) kings may sometimes sit in the courts of justice . but it is not possible for kings to see the laws executed , except there be a power in kings both to judge when the laws are duely executed , and when not ; as also to compell the judges if they do not their duty . without such power a king sitting in courts is but a mockery , and a scorn to the judges . and if this power be allowed to kings , then their judgments are supream in all courts . and indeed our common law to this purpose doth presume that the king hath al●… laws within the cabinet of his breast , in scrinio pectoris , saith crompton's jurisdiction . . when several of our statutes leave many things to the pleasure of the king , for us to interpret all those statutes of the will and pleasure of the kings iustices only , is to give an absolute arbitrary power to the justices in those cases wherein we deny it to the king. the statute of hen. . c. . makes a difference between the king , and the kings iustices , in these words , divers notorious felons be indicted of divers felonies , murders , rapes : and as well before the kings iustices , as before the king himself , arreigned of the same felonies . i read , that in an. . hen. . sate in the e●…chequer , and there set down order for the appearance sheriffs , and bringing in their accounts ; there w●… five marks set on every sheriffs head for a fine , b●…cause they had not distrained every person that mig●… dispend fifteen pounds lands by the year , to receive t●… order of knighthood , according as the same sherif●… were commanded . in michaelmas term , . edw. . sate th●… dayes together in open court in the kings bench. for this point there needs no further proofs , b●…cause mr. pryn doth confess , that kings themselv●… have sate in person in the kings bench , and other cou●… and there given iudgment , p. . treachery and d●…loyalty , &c. notwithstanding all that hath been said for t●… legislative and judicial power of kings , mr. pry●… is so far from yielding the king a power to ma●… laws , that he will not grant the king a power to hinder a law from being made ; that is , 〈◊〉 allows him not a negative voice in most case which is due to every other , even to the mea●…est member of the house of commons in his judgment . to prove the king hath not a negative voice , 〈◊〉 main , and in truth , his only argument insisted o●… is a coronation-oath , which is said anciently so●… of our kings of england have taken , wherein th●… grant to defend and protect the just laws and custom●… which the vulgar hath , or shall chuse : iustas leg●… & consuetudines quas vulgus elegerit : hence m●… pryn concludes , that the king cannot deny any ia●… which the lords and commons shall make cho●… of ; for so he will have vulgus to signifie . though neither our king , nor many of his predecessors ever took this oath , nor were bound to ●…ake it , for ought appears ; yet we may admit ●…hat our king hath taken it ; and answer , we may be confident , that neither the bishops , nor privy councel , nor parliament , nor any other whosoever they were that framed , or penn'd this oath , ever intended in this word vulgus the commons in parliament , much less the lords : they would never so much disparage the members of parliament , as to disgrace them with a title both base and false : it had been enough , if not too much , to have called them populus , the people ; but vulgus , the vulgar , the rude multitude ( which hath the epithet of ignobile vulgus ) is a word as dishonourable to the composers of the oath to give , or for the king to use , as for the members of the parliament to receive ; it being most false : for the peers cannot be vulgus , because they are the prime persons of the kingdom : next , the knights of the shires are , or ought to be notable knights , or notable esquires , or gentlemen , born in the counties , as shall be able to be knights : then the citizens and burgesses are to be most sufficient , none of these can be vulgus : even those free-holders that chuse knights , are the best and ablest men of their counties ; there being for every free-holder , above ten of the common people to be found to be termed the vulgar : therefore it rests that vulgus must signifie the vulgar or common people , and not the lords and commons . but now the doubt will be , what the common people , or vulgus , out of parliament , have to do to chuse laws ? the answer is easie and ready ; there goeth before quas vulgus , the antecede●… consuetudines , that is , the customs which the vulghath , or shall chuse . do but observe the nature 〈◊〉 custom , and it is the vulgus or common people only who chuse customs : common usage time out 〈◊〉 mind creates a custom , and the commoner 〈◊〉 usage is , the stronger and the better is the custom no where can so common an usage be found , 〈◊〉 among the vulgar , who are still the far great●… part of every multitude : if a custom be commo●… through the whole kingdom , it is all one with the common law in england , which is said to be common custom . thus in plain terms to protect the customs which the vulgar chuse , is to swear to protect the common laws of england . but grant that vulgus in the oath , signifies lord●… and commons , and that consuetudines doth not signifie customs , but statutes , ( as mr. pryn for a desperate shift affirms , ) and let elegerit be the future or preterperfect tense , even which mr. pryn please yet it cannot exclude the kings negative voice ; for as consuetudines goeth before quas vulgus , so doth justas stand before leges & consuetudines : so that not all laws , but only all just laws are meant . if the sole choice of the lords and commons , did oblige the king to protect their choice , without power of denial , what need , or why is the word justas put in , to raise a scruple that some laws may be unjust ? mr. pryn will not say that a decree of a general councel , or of a pope is infallible , nor ( ●… think ) a bill of the lords and commons is infallible just , and impossible to erre ; if he do , sir edward coke will tell him that parliaments have been utterly deceived , and that in eases of greatest moment , even i●… case of high treason : and he calls the statute of hen. . an unjust and strange act. but it may be mr. pryn will confess that laws chosen by the lords and commons may be unjust , so that the lords and commons themselves may be the judges of what is just , or unjust . but where a king by oath binds his conscience to protect just laws , it concerns him to be satisfied in his own conscience , that they be just , and not by an implicite faith , or blind obedience : no man can be so proper a judge of the justness of laws , as he whose soul must lie at the stake for the defence and safeguard of them . besides , in this very oath the king doth swear , to do equal and right iustice and discretion , in mercy and truth in all his iudgments : facies fieri in omnibus judiciis tuis aequam & rectam justitiam & discretionem in misericordia & veritate : if we allow the king discretion and mercy in his iudgments , of necessity he must judge of the justness of the laws . again , the clause of the oath , quas vulgus elegerit , doth not mention the assenting unto , or granting any new laws , but of holding , protecting , and strengthning with all his might , the just laws that were already in being : there were no need of might or strength , if assenting to new laws were there meant . some may wonder , why there should be such labouring to deny the king a negative voice , since a negative voice is in it self so poor a thing ; that if a man had all the negative voices in the kingdom , ●…t would not make him a king ; nor give him power to make one law : a negative voice is but a ●…ivative power , that is , no power at all to do or act any thing ; but a power only to hinder the power of another . negatives are of such a malignant or destructive nature , that if they have nothing else to destroy , they will , when they meet , destroy one another , which is the reason why two negatives make an affirmative , by destroying the negation which did hinder the affirmation : a king with a negative voice only , is but like a syllogisme of pure negative propositions , which can conclude nothing ▪ it must be an affirmative voice that makes both a king , and a law , and without it there can be no imaginable government . the reason is plain why the kings negative voice is so eagerly opposed : for though it give the king no power to do any thing ; yet it gives him a power to hinder others : though it cannot make him a king , yet it can help him to keep others from being kings . for conclusion of this discourse of the negative voice of the king , i shall oppose the judgment of a chief iustice of england , to the opinion of him that calls himself an utter barister of lincolns inn , and let others judge who is the better lawyer of the two : the words are bracton's , but concern mr. pryn to lay them to heart ; concerning the charters and deeds of kings , the iustices nor private men neither ought , nor can dispute ; nor yet if there rise a doubt in the kings charter , can they interpret it ; and in doubtful and obscure points , or if a word contain two senses , the interpretation , and will of our lord the king is to be expected , seeing it is his part to interpret ; who makes the charter : full well mr. pryn knows , that when bracton writ , the laws that were then made , and strived for , were called the kings charters , as magna charta , charta de foresta , and others : so that in bracton's judgment the king hath not only a negative voice to hinder , but an affirmative , to make a law , which is a great deal more than master pryn will allow him . not only the law-maker , but also the sole iudge of the people is the king , in the judgment of bracton ; these are his words : rex & non alius debet judicare , si solus ad id sufficere possit , the king and no other ought to judge , if he alone were able . much like the words of bracton , speaketh briton , where , after that he had shewed that the king is the viceroy of god , and that he hath distributed his charge into sundry portions , because he alone is not sufficient to hear all complaints of his people , then he addeth these words , in the person of the king : nous volons que nostre jurisdiction soit sur touts iurisdictions , &c. we will that our iurisdiction be above all the iurisdictions of our realm , so as in all manner of felonies , trespasses , contracts , and in all other actions personal or real we have power to yield , or cause to be yielded , such iudgments as do appertain without other process , wheresoever we know the right truth as iudges . neither was this to be taken , saith mr. lambard , to be meant of the kings bench , where there is only an imaginary presence of his person , but it must necessarily be understood of a iurisdiction remaining and left in the king 's royal body and brest , distinct from that of his bench , and other ordinary courts ; because he doth immediately after , severally set forth by themselves , as well the authority of the kings bench , as of the other courts . and that this was no new-made law , mr. lam●…d puts us in mind of a saxon law of king edgars . nemo in lite regem appellato , &c. let no man i●… suit appeal unto the king , unless he cannot get right a●… home , but if that right be too heavy for him , then l●… him go to the king to have it eased . by which i●… may evidently appear , that even so many years ag●… there might be appellation made to the kings persae whensoever the cause should enforce it . the very like law in effect is to be seen in the laws of canutus the dane , sometimes king of th●… realm , out of which law master lambard gathe●… that the king himself had a high court of iustia wherein it seemeth he sate in person , for the words b●… let him not seek to the king , and the same court ●… the king did judge not only according to mee●… right and law , but also after equity and goo●… conscience . for the close , i shall end with the suffrage ●… our late antiquary sir henry spelman , in his glossary , he saith , omnis regni iustitia solius regis est , &c. all iustice of the kingdom is only the king 's , and h●… alone , if he were able , should administer it ; but th●… being impossible , he is forced to delegate it to ministers whom he bounds by the limits of the laws ; the positive laws are only about generals ; in particular cases , they are sometimes too strict , sometimes too remis●… and so , oft wrong instead of right will be done , if w●… stand to strict law : also causes hard and difficult d●…ly arise , which are comprehended in no law-books , ●… those there is a necessity of running back to the king , t●… fountain of iustice , and the vicegerent of god himself who in the commonwealth of the iews took such cause to his own cognisance , and left to kings not only the example of such iurisdiction , but the prerogative also . of privilege of parliament . what need all this ado , will some say , to sift out what is comprised in the writ for the election of the commons to parliament , since it is certain , though the writ doth not , yet privilege of parliament gives sufficient power for all proceedings of the two houses ? it is answered , that what slight esteem soever be made of the writ , yet in all other cases the original writ is the foundation of the whole business , or action : and to vary in substance from the writ , makes a nullity in the cause , and the proceedings thereupon : and where a commissioner exerciseth more power than is warranted by his commission , every such act is void , and in many cases punishable : yet we will lay aside the writ , and apply our selves to consider the nature of privilege of parliament . the task is the more difficult , for that we are not told what the number of privileges are , or which they be ; some do think that as there be dormant articles of faith in the roman church , which are not yet declared ; so there be likewise privileges dormant in the house of commons , not yet revealed , we must therefore be content in a generality to discourse of the quality or condition of privilege of parliament , and to confine our selves to these three points : . that privilege of parliament gives no power ; but only helps to the execution of the power given by the writ . . that the free-holders by their elections give no privilege . . that privilege of parliament is the gift of the king. first , the end or scope of privilege of parliament is not to give any power to do any publick act , not warranted by the writ : but they are intended as helps only to enable to the performance of the duty enjoyned , and so are subservient to the power comprised in the writ : for instance , the grand privilege of freedom from arrests doth not give any power at all to the house of commons to do any act ; but by taking away from the free-holders and other subjects the power of arrests , the commons are the better inabled to attend the service to which they are called by the king. in many other cases the servants , o●… ministers of the king are privileged , and protected much in the same nature . the servants in houshold to the king may not be arrested without special licence : also the officers of the kings courts of justice , have a privilege not to be sued in any other court but where they serve and attend ; and to this purpose they are allowed a writ of privilege . likewise all such as serve the king in his wars , or are imployed on forreign affairs for him , are protected from actions and sutes . nay the kings protection descends to the privileging even of laundresses , nurses , and midwives , if they attend upon the camp , as sir edw. coke saith , quia lotrix , seu nutrix , seu obstetrix . besides the king protects his debtors from arrests of the subject till his own debts be paid . these sorts of protections are privileges the common law takes notice of , and allows : and hath several distinctions of them ; and some are protections , quia profecturus , and others are , quia moraturus : some are with a clause of volumus for stay of suits : others with a clause of nolumus for the safety of mens persons , servants , and goods : and the kings writs do vary herein according to the nature of the business . but none of these privileges or protections do give any power ; they are not positive , but privative : they take away and deprive the subject of the power , or liberty to arrest , or sue , in some cases only : no protection or privilege doth defend in point of treason , felony , or breach of the peace : privileges are directly contrary to the law , for otherwise they should not be privileges , and they are to be interpreted in the strictest manner , as being odious and contrary to law : we see the use of privileges ; they do but serve as a dispensation against law , intended originally , and principally for the expediting of the kings business ; though secondarily , and by accident there do sometimes redound a benefit by them to the parties themselves that are protected . strictly , and properly every privilege must be against a publick or common law , for there is no use or need of a private law to protect , where there is no publick law to the contrary : favours and graces which are only besides , and not against the law , do not properly go under the name of privileges , though common use do not distinguish them : i know no other privilege that can be truly so called , and to belong to the house of commons , which is so vast and great , as this privilege of their persons , servants , and goods : this being indeed against the common law , and doth concern the whole kingdom to take notice of it , if they must be bound by it . touching this grand privilege of freedom from arrests , i read that in the hen. . the commons did not proceed to the punishment of offenders for the breach of it , untill the lords referred the punishment thereof to the lower house . the case is thus reported , george ferrers gentleman , servant to the king , and burgesse for plymouth , going to the parliament house was arrested in london , by process out of the kings bench for debt , wherein he had before been condemned as surety for one welden at the sute of one white : which arrest signified to sir thomas moyl speaker , and to the rest ; the serjeant ( called saint-iohns ) was sent to the counter in breadstreet to demand ferrers : the officer of the counter refused to deliver him , and gave the serjeant such ill language that they fall to an affray : the sheriff coming , taketh the officers part , the serjeant returned without the prisoner : this being related to the speaker and burgesses , they would sit no more without their burgess ; and rising , repaired to the upper house , where the case was declared by the speaker before sir thomas audley chancellor , and the lords and iudges there assembled , who judging the contempt to be very great , referred the punishment thereof to the house of commons it self . this privilege of freedom from arrest●… is the only privilege which sir edward coke finds to belong to the house of commons ; he cannot , or at least he doth not , so much as name any other in his section of the privileges of parliament : neither doth he bring so much as one precedent for the proof of this one privilege for the house of commons ; which may cause a doubt that this sole privilege is not so clear as many do imagine . for in a parliament in the eliz. richard coke , a member , being served with a subpoena of chancery , the lord chancellor thought the house had no such privilege for subpoena's as they pretended ; neither would he allow of any precedents of the house committed unto them , formerly used in that behalf , unless the house of commons could also prove the same to have been likewise thereupon allowed , and ratified also by precedents in the court of chancery . in the of eliz. sir edw. hobby , and mr. brograve , attorney of the dutchy , were sent by the house to the lord keeper , in the name of the whole house , to require his lordship to revoke two writs of subpoena's , which were served upon m. th. knevit , a member of the house , since the beginning of parliament . the lord keeper demanded of them , whether they were appointed by any advised consideration of the house , to deliver this message unto him with the word required , in such manner as they had done , or no : they answered his lordship , yea : his lordship then said , as he thought reverently and honourably of the house , and of their liberties , and privileges of the same , so to revoke the said subpoena's in that sort , was to restrain her majesty in her greatest power , which is , iustice in the place wherein he serveth under her , and therefore he concluded , as they had required him to revoke his writ , so he did require to deliberate . upon the of february , being wednesday , eliz. report was made by mr. attorney of the dutchy , upon the committee , for the delivering of one mr. hall's man ; that the committee found no precedent for setting at large by the mace any person in arrest but only by writ , and that by divers precedents of records perused by the said committee , it appeareth that every knight , citizen or burgess which doth require privilege , hath used in that case to take a corporal oath before the lord chancellor , or lord keeper , that the party for whom such writ is prayed , came up with him , and was his servant at the time of the arrest made . thereupon m. hall was moved by the house to repair to the lord keeper , and make oath , and then take a warrant for a writ of privilege for his servant . it is accounted by some to be a privilege of parliament to have power to examine misdemeanours of courts of justice , and officers of state : yet there is not the meanest subjest but hath liberty , upon just cause , to question the misdemeanour of any court or officer , if he suffer by them ; there is no law against him for so doing ; so that this cannot properly be called a privilege , because it is not against any publick law : it hath been esteemed a great favour of princes to permit such examinations : for , when the lords were displeased with the greatness of pierce gaveston , it is said , that in the next parliament , the whole assembly obtain of the king to draw articles of their grievances , which they did . two of which articles were , first , that all strangers should be banished the court and kingdom : o●… which gaveston was one . secondly , that the business of the state should be treated of by the councel of the clergy and nobles . in the reign of king henry the sixth , one mortimer , an instrument of the duke of york , by promising the kentish men a reformation , and freedom from taxations , wrought with the people , that they drew to a head , and made this mortimer ( otherwise iack cade ) their leader : who styled himself captain mend-all : he presents to the parliament the complaints of the commons , and he petitions that the duke of york and some other lords might be received by the king into favour , by the undue practices of suffolk and his complices , commanded from his presence ; and that all their opposites might be banished the court , and put from their offices , and that there might be a general amotion of corrupt officers : these petitions are sent from the lower house to the upper , and from thence committed to the lords of the kings privy councel , who , having examined the particulars , explode them as frivolous , and the authors of them to be presumptuous rebels . concerning liberty , or freedom of speech , i find , that at a parliament at black friars in the of henry the eighth , sir tho. more being chosen speaker of the house of commons : he first disabled himself , and then petitioned the king , that if in communication and reasoning , any man in the commons house should speak more largely than of duty they ought to do , that all such offences should be pardoned , and to be entred of record ; which was granted . it is observable in this petition , that liberty or freedom of speech is not a power for men to speak what they will , or please , in parliament ; but a privilege not to be punished , but pardoned for the offence of speaking more largely than in duty ought to be ; which in an equitable construction must be understood of rash , unadvised , ignorant , or negligent escapes , and slips in speech : and not for wilful , malicious offences in that kind ; and then the pardon of the king was desired to be upon record , that it might be pleaded in bar to all actions . and it seemeth that ric. strood and his complices , were not thought sufficiently protected for their free speech in parliament , unless their pardon were confirmed by the king in parliament , for there is a printed statute to that purpose in h. ths time . touching the freedom of speech , the commons were warned in q. eliz. dayes not to meddle with the queens person , the state , or church-government . in her time the discipline of the church was so strict , that the litany was read every morning in the house of commons , during the parliament , and when the commons first ordered to have a fast in the temple upon a sunday , the queen hindred it . ian. saturday , eliz. the case is thus reported : mr. paul wentworth moveth for a publick set fast , and for a preaching every morning at of the clock , before the house sate : the house was divided about the fast , were for it , and an against it ; it was ordered , that as many of the house as conveniently could , should on sunday fortnight after , assemble , and meet together in the temple-church , there to hear preaching , and to joyn together in prayer , with humiliation and fasting , for the assistance of god's spirit in all their consultations , during this parliament , and for the preservation of the queens majesty and her realms : and the preachers to be appointed by the privy councel that were of the house , that they may be discreet , not medling with innovation or unquietness . this order was followed by a message from her majesty to the house , declared by mr. vice-chamberlain , that her highness had a great admiration of the rashness of this house , in committing such an apparent contempt of her express command , as to put in execution such an innovation , without her privity , or pleasure first known . thereupon mr. vice-chamberlain moved the house to make humble submission to her majesty , acknowledging the said offence , and contempt , craving a remission of the same , with a full purpose to forbear the committing of the like hereafter : and by the consent of the whole house , mr. vice-chamberlain carried their submission to her majesty . eliz. mr. peter wentworth , and sir henry bromley , delivered a petition to the lord keeper , desiring the lords of the upper house to be suppliants with them of the lower house , unto her majesty for entailing the succession of the crown . whereof a bill was ready drawn by them . her majesty was highly displeased herewith , as contrary to her former strait command , and charged the councel to call the parties before them : sir thomas henage sent for them , and after speech with them , commanded them to forbear the parliament , and not to go out of their several lodgings ; after , they were called before the lord treasurer , the lord buckhurst , and sir thomas henage ; mr. wentworth was committed by them to the tower , sir henry bromley , with mr. richard stevens , to whom sir henry bromley had imparted the matter , were sent to the fleet , as also mr. welch the other knight for worcestershire . in the same parliament mr. morrice , attorney of the court of wards , moved against the hard courses of the bishops , ordinaries , and other ecclesiastical judges in their courts , used towards sundry learned , and godly ministers and preachers ; and spake against subscription , and oaths ; and offer'd a bill to be read against imprisonment for refusal of oaths : mr. dalton opposed the reading of it , as a thing expresly against her majesties command , to meddle in : doctor lewin shewed , that subscription was used even at geneva : at two of the clock the same day , the speaker , mr. coke , ( afterwards sir edward coke ) was sent for to the court , where the queen her self gave him in command a message to the house : she told him , it being wholly in her power to call , to determine , to assent , or dissent to any thing done in parliament : that the calling of this was only , that the majesty of god might be more religiously observed , by compelling , by some sharp laws , such as neglect that service : and that the safety of her majesties person , and the realm might be provided for : it was not meant they should meddle with matters of state , or causes ecclesiastical , ( for so her majesty termed them ) she wondred that any could be of so high commandement , to attempt ( they were her own words ) a thing so expresly contrary to that which she had commanded : wherefore with this she was highly offended : and because the words spoken by my lord keeper , are not now perhaps well remembred , or some b●… now here that were not then present . her majesties present charge and express command is , that no bill touching the said matter of state or reformation in causes ecclesiastical , be exhibited , and upon my allegiance ( saith mr. coke ) i am charged , if any such bill be exhibited ; not to read it . i have been credibly informed , that the queen sent a messenger , or serjeant at arms , into the house of commons , and took out mr. morrice , and committed him to prison : within few dayes after , i find mr. wroth moved in the house , that they might be humble suitors to her majesty , that she would be pleased to set at liberty those members of the house that were restrained . to this it was answered by the privy counsellors , that her majesty had committed them for causes best known to her self , and to press her highness with this suit , would but hinder them whose good is sought : that the house must not call the queen to account for what she doth of her royal authority : that the causes for which they are restrained may be high and dangerous : that her majesty liketh no such questions ; neither doth it become the house to searc●… into such matters . in the eliz. the commons were tol●… their privilege was yea , and no : and tha●… her majesties pleasure was , that if the speaker perceived any idle heads which would not stick to hazard their own estates ; which will meddle with reforming the church , and transforming the commonweal , and do exhibit bills to that purpose ; the speaker should not receive them till they were viewed and considered by those , whom it is fitter should consider of such things , and can better judge of them : and at the end of this parliament , the queen refused to pass bills which had passed both houses . in the of eliz. the queen said , she was sorry the commons medled with chusing and returning knights of the shire for norfolk , a thing impertinent for the house to deal withal , and only belonging to the office and charge of the lord chancellor , from whom the writs issue , and are returned . hen. . the of october , the chancellor before the king declared , the commons had sent to the king , praying him that they might have advice , and communication with certain lords about matters of business in parliament , for the common good of the realm : which prayer our lord the king graciously granted , making protestation , he would not do it of duty , nor of custom , but of his special grace at this time : and therefore our lord the king ●…harged the clark of the parliament , that this protestation should be entred on record upon the parliament-roll : which the king made known to them by the lord say , and his secretary ; how that neither of due nor of custom , our lord the king ought to grant any lords to enter into communication with them of matters touching the parliament , but by his special grace at this time he hath granted their request in this particular : upon which matter , the said steward and secretary made report to the king in parliament ; that the said commons knew well that they could not have any such lords to commune with them , of any business of parliament , without special grace and command of the king himself . it hath heretofore been a question , whether it be not an infringing , and prejudice to the liberties and privileges of the house of commons , for them to joyn in conference with the lords in cases of benevolence , or contribution , without a bill . in the eliz. on tuesday the first of march , mr. egerton , attorney general , and doct. carey came with a message from the lords ; their lordships desired to put the house in remembrance of the speech delivered by the lord keeper , the first day for consultation and provision of treasure , to be had aginst the great and imminent dangers of the realm ; thereupon their lordships did look to have something from the houses , touching those causes before this time ( and yet the parliament had sate but three dayes , for it began feb. . ) and therefore their lordships had hitherto omitted to do any thing therein themselves . and thereupon their lordships desired , that according to former laudable usages between both houses in such like cases , a committee of commons may have conference with a committee of lords , touching provision of treasure against the great dangers of the realm , which was presently resolved by the whole house , and they signified to their lordships the willing , and ready assent of the whole house . at the meeting , the lords negatively affirm , not to assent to less than three subsidies , and do insist for a second conference . m. francis bacon yielded to the subsidy , but opposed the joyning with the lords , as contrary to the privileges of the house of commons ; thereupon the house resolved to have no conference with the lords , but to give their lordships most humble and dutiful thanks with all reverence for their favourable and courteous offer of conference , and to signifie that the commons cannot in those cases of benevolence , or contribution joyn in conference with their lordships , without prejudice to the liberties and privileges of the house : and to request their lordships to hold the members of this house excused in their not-assenting to their lordships said motion for conference , for that so to have assented without a bill , had been contrary to the liberties and privileges of this house ▪ and also contrary to the former precedents of the same house in like cases had . this answer delivered to the lords by the chancellor of the exchequer , their lordships said , they well hoped to have had a conference according to their former request , and desir'd to see those precedents by which the commons seem to refuse the said conference . but in conclusion it was agreed unto , upon the motion of sir walter raleigh , who moved , that without naming a subsidy , it might be propounded in general words , to have a conference touching the dangers of the realm , and the necessary supply of treasure to be provided speedily for the same , according to the proportion of the necessity . in the eliz. serjeant heal said in parliament , he marvail'd the house stood either a●… the granting of a subsidy or time of payment , whe●… all we have is her majesties , and she may lawfull ▪ at her pleasure take it from us ; and that she had ●… much right to all our lands and goods , as to an●… revenue of the crown ; and he said he could pro●… it by precedents in the time of h. . k. john and k. stephen . the ground upon which this serjeant at law went , may be thought the same sir edw. coke delivers in his institutes , where he saith , the first kings of this realm had all the lands of england in demesne , and the great manors & royalists they reserved to themselves , & of the remnant for the defence of the kingdom enfeoffed the barons : from whence it appears , that no man holds any lands but under a condition to defend the realm ; and upon the self-same ground also the kings prerogative is raised , as being a preheminence , in cases of necessity , above , & before the law of property , or inheritance . certain it is , before the commons were ever chosen to come to parliament , taxes or subsidies were raised and paid without their gift . the great and long continued subsidy of dane-gelt was without any gift of the commons , or of any parliament at all , that can be proved . in the h. . a subsidy of marks in silver upon every knights fee was granted to the king by the nobles , without any commons . at the passing of a bill of subsidies the words of the king are , the king thanks his loyal subjects , accepts their good will , & also will have ●…so : le roy remercie ses loyaux subjects , accept leur ●…enevolence , & ausi ainsi le veult : which last words of ainsi le veult , the king wills it to be so , ●…re the only words that makes the acts of sub●…idy a law to bind every man to the pay●…ent of it . in the eliz. the commons , by their speaker , complaining of monopolies , the queen spake in private to the l. keeper , who then made answer touching monopolies , that her majesty hoped her dutiful and loving subjects would not take away her prerogative , which is the chiefest flower in her garland , and the principal and head pearl in her crown and diadem , but that they will rather leave that to her disposition . the second point is , that the free-holders , or counties do not , nor cannot give privilege to the commons in parliament . they that are under the law cannot protect against it , they have no such privilege themselves as to be free from arrests , and actions : for if they had , then it had been no privilege , but it would be the common law : and what they have not , they cannot give ; nemo dat quod non habet , neither do the free-holders pretend to give any such privilege , either at their election , or by any subsequent act ; there is no mention of any such thing in the return of the writ ; nor in the indentures between the sheriff , and the free-holders . the third point remains , that privilege of parliament is granted by the king. it is a known rule , that which gives the form gives the consequences of the form ; the king by his writ gives the very essence , and form to the parliament : therefore privileges which are but consequences of the form , must necessarily flow from kings . all other privileges and protections are the acts of the king ; and by the kings writ . sir edw. coke saith , that the protection of mens persons , servants , and goods , is done by a writ of grace from the king. at the presentment of the speaker of the house of commons to the king upon the first day of parliament , the speaker in the name and behoof of the commons , humbly craveth that his majesty would be graciously pleased to grant them their accustomed liberties and privileges ; which petition of theirs , is a fair recognition of the primitive grace and favour of kings in bestowing of privilege , and it is a shrewd argument against any other title : for our ancestors were not so ceremonious nor so full of complement as to beg that by grace , which they might claim by right . and the renewing of this petition every parliament argues the grant to be but temporary , during only the present parliament ; and that they have been accustomed , when they have been accustomably sued , or petitioned for . i will close this point with the judgment of king iames , who in his declaration touching his proceedings in parliament . resolves , that most privileges of parliament grew from precedents which rather shew a toleration than an inheritance ; therefore he could not allow of the style , calling i●… their ancient and undoubted right and inheritance , but could rather have wished that they had said , their privileges were derived from the grace and permission of his ancestors and him : and thereupon he concludes , he cannot with patience endure his subjects to use su●… antimonarchicall words concerning their liberties , except they had subjoyned , that they were granted unto them by the grace and favour●… of his predecessors : yet he promiseth to be careful of whatsoever privileges they enjoy by long custom and uncontrolled and lawful precedents . observations upon aristotle's politiques , touching forms of government . together with directions for obedience to governours in dangerous and doubtful times . the preface . in every alteration of government there is something new , which none can either divine , or iudge of , till time hath tried it : we read of many several wayes of government ; but they have all , or most of them , been of particular cities , with none , or very small territories at first belonging to them . at this present the government of the low-countries , and of swisserland , are not appropriated either of them to any one city , for they are compounded of several petty principalities , which have special and different laws and privileges each of them ; insomuch that the united provinces , and united cantons are but confederacies and leaguers , and not two entire commonweals ; associates onely for mutual defence . nay , the cantons of swisserland are not only several republicks , but reputed to have different forms of commonweals ; some being said to be aristocratically governed , and others democratically ▪ as the mountaineers : and some of the cantons are papists , and some protestants , and some mixt of both : we do not find that any large or great dominion or kingdom united in one government , and under the same laws , was ever reduced at once to any kind of popular government , and not confined to the subjection of one city : this being a thing not yet done , requires the abler men to settle such a peaceable government as is to be desired : there being no precedent in the case ; all that can be done in it , is , at first to enquire into such other governments , as have been existent in the world. as a preface to such an enquiry , the sacred scripture ( if it be but for the antiquity of it ) would be consulted ; and then aristotle , the grand master of politiques ; and after him the greek and latin historians that lived in popular times , would be diligently examined . to excite others of greater abilities to an exacter disquisition , i presume to offer a taste of some doctrines of aristotle , which are usher'd in with a briefer touch of the holy scriptures . it is not probable , that any sure direction of the beginning of government , can be found either in plato , aristotle , cicero , polybius , or in any other of the heathen authors , who were ignorant of the manner of the creation of the world : we must not neglect the scriptures , and search in philosophers for the grounds of dominion and property , which are the main principles of government and iustice. the first government in the world was monarchical , in the father of all flesh. adam being commanded to multiply , and people the earth , and to subdue it , and having dominion given him over all creatures , was thereby the monarch of the whole world ; none of his posterity had any right to possess any thing , but by his grant or permission , or by succession from him : the earth ( saith the psalmist ) hath he given to the children of men : which shews , the title comes from fatherhood . there never was any such thing as an independent multitude , who at first had a natural right to a community : this is but a fiction , or fancy of too many in these dayes , who please themselves in running after the opinions of philosophers and poets , to find out such an original of government , as might promise them some title to liberty , to the great scandal of christianity , and bringing in of atheism , since a natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed without the denial of the creation of adam . and yet this conceit of original freedom is the only ground upon which not only the heathen philosophers , but also the authors of the principles of the civil law ; and grotius , selden , hobs , ash●…am , and others raise , and build their doctrines of government , and of the sever●… sorts or kinds , as they call them , of common-wealths . adam was the father , king , and lord over his family : a son , a subject , and a servant or a slave , were one and the same thing at first ; the father had power to dispose , ●… sell his children or servants , whence we find , that at the first reckoning up of goods i●… scripture , the man-servant , and the maid-servant are numbred among the possessions and substance of the owner , as other goods wor●… ▪ as for the names of subject , slave , and tyrant , they are not found in scripture , but what we now call a subject or a slave , is then named no other than a servant : i cannot learn that either the hebrew , greek or latin have any proper and original word for a tyrant or a slave , it seems these are names of later invention , and taken up in disgrace of monarchical government . i cannot find any one place , or text in the bible , where any power or commission is given to a people either to govern themselves , o●… to choose themselves governours , or to alter the manner of government at their pleasure ▪ the power of government is settled and fixed by the commandement of honour thy father ; if there were a higher power than the fatherly , then this commandement could not stand , and be observed : whereas we read in scripture , of some actions of the people in setting up of kings , further than to a naked declaration by a part of the people of their obedience , such actions could not amount , since we find no commission they have , to bestow any right ; a true representation of the people to be made , is as impossible , as for the whole people to govern ; the names of an aristocracy , a democracy , a commonweal , a state , or any other of like signification , are not to be met either in the law or gospel . that there is a ground in nature for monarchy , aristotle himself affirmeth , saying , the first kings were fathers of families ; as for any ground of any other form of government , there hath been none yet alleged , but a supposed natural freedom of mankind ; the proof whereof i find none do undertake , but only beg it to be granted : we find the government of gods own people varied under the several titles of patriarchs ▪ captains , iudges , and kings ; but in all these the supreme power rested still in one person onely : we no where find any supreme power given to the people , or to a multitude in scripture , or ever exercised by them . the people were never the lords ●…nointed , nor called gods , nor crowned , nor ●…d the title of nursing-fathers , gen. . . the supreme power being an indivisible beam of majesty , cannot be divided among , or settled upon a multitude . god would have it fixed in one person , not sometimes in one part of the people , and sometimes in another ; and sometimes , and that for the most part , no where as when the assembly is dissolved , it must rest in the air , or in the walls of the chamber when they were assembled . if there were any thing like a popular government among gods people , it was about the time of the judges , when there was no king in israel ; for they had then some small show of government , such as it was , but it was so poor and beggarly , that the scripture brands it with this note , that every man did what was right in his own eyes , because there was no king in israel ; it is not said , because there was no government , but because there was no king ▪ it seems no government , but the government of a king , in the judgment of the scriptures could restrain men from doing what they listed ▪ where every man doth what he pleaseth , it may be truly said , there is no government ; for the end of government is , that every man should not do what he pleased , or be his own iudge in his own case ; for the scripture to say the●… was no king , is to say there was no form o●… government in israel . and what the old testament teacheth us , we have confirmed in the new : if saint paul had onely said ▪ let every soul be subject to the higher powers , and said no more : then men might have disputed , whether saint paul , by higher powers , had not meant as well other governours as kings ; or other forms of government , as monarchy ; but the good luck is , saint paul hath been his own interpreter or comment : for , after the general doctrine of obedience to be given by all men to the higher powers , he proceeds next to charge it home , and lay it to the conscience under pain of damnation , and applies it to each particular mans conscience ; saying , wilt thou not be afraid of the power ? which power he expounds in the singular number , restraining it to one person , saying , he is the minister of god to thee ; it is not , they are the ministers to thee ; and then again , he beareth not the sword in vain ; and then a third time in the same verse , lest thou should'st forget it , he saith , for he is the minister of god , a revenger to wrath &c. upon thee : if saint paul had said , they are the ministers of god , or they bear not the sword in vain , it might be doubted , whether [ they ] were meant of kings onely , or of other governours also ; but this scruple is taken away by the apostle himself . and as st. paul hath expounded what he means by higher powers , so st. peter also doth the like : for the self-same word that st. paul useth for higher , in saint peter is translated supreme ; so that though in our english bibles the words differ , yet in the original they are both the same ; so that st. paul might have been englished , let every soul be subject to the supreme power ; or st. peter might have been translated , whether to the king as to the higher ; yet there is this difference , that whereas st. paul useth the word in the plural number , st. peter hath it in the singular , and with application to the king. it will be said , though st. peter make the king supreme , yet he tells us the king is a humane ordinance , or a creature of the people's . but it is answered , kings may be called an humane ordinance , for being made of one of the people , and not by the people ; and so are humane in regard of their material cause , not of their efficient . if st. peter had meant that kings had been made by the people , he must also have meant that governours had been made by the people , for he calls the governours as well an ordinance of man , as the king ; for his woods are , submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the lord's sake , whether it be to the king as supreme or whether it be to governours : but saint peter sheweth , that governours are not made by the people ; for he saith , they that are sent by him ( not by them ) for the punishment of evil doers : so that the governours are sent by the king , and not by the people : some would have sent by him , to be sent by god ; but the relative must be referr'd to the next antecedent , which is the king , and not god. besides , if governours be sent by god , and kings by the people , then governours would be supreme , which is contrary to saint peter's doctrine ; and it will follow , that the people have not the power of choosing representers to govern , if governours must be sent of god. the safest sense of saint peter's words is , submit your selves to all humane laws , whether made by the king , or by his subordinate governours . so the king may be called a humane ordinance , as being all one with a speaking law : the word in the original is , be subject to every humane creation ; it is more proper to call a law made by a king a creation of an ordinance , than the peoples choosing or declaring of a king , a creation of him . but take the words in what sense soever you will , it is most evident , that saint peter in this place , takes no notice of any government or governours , but of a king , and governours sent by him , but not by the people . and ●…t is to be noted , that st. peter and st. paul , ●…he two chief of the apostles , wrote their epistles at such a time , when the name of a popular government , or of the people of rome was at least so much in shew and in name , that many do believe , that notwithstanding the emperours by strong hand usurped a military power ; yet the government was for a long time in most things then in the senate and people of rome ; but for all this , neither of the two apostles take any notice of any such popular government ; no , nor our saviour himself , who divides all between god and caesar , and allows nothing that we can find for the people . observations upon aristotles politiques , touching forms of government ▪ what cannot be found in scripture , many do look for in aristotle ; for if there be any other form of government besides monarchy , he is the man best able ●…o tell what it is , and to let us know by what name ●…o call it , since the greek tongue is most happy in ●…ompounding names , most significant to express the nature of most things : the usual terms in this age of aristocraty and democraty are taken up from him ●…o express forms of government most different from monarchy : we must therefore make inquiry into aristotle touching these two terms . true it is , aristotle seems to make three sorts of government , which he di●…inguisheth by * the sove●…ignty of one man , or of a ●…w , or of many , for the ●…ommon good. these ( he saith ) are rig●… or perfect governments , 〈◊〉 those that are for the priva●… good of one , or of a few , 〈◊〉 of a multitude , are transgressions . the government of a monarchy for the common good , he calls a kingdom . the government of a few more than one , an aristocratie ; either bee●… the best men govern , or because it is for the best of 〈◊〉 governed : when a multitude governs for the com●… good , it is called by the common name of all governments , a politie . it is possible that one 〈◊〉 few may excell in vertue , but it is difficult for many excell in all vertue , except in warlike affairs , for 〈◊〉 is natural in a multitude ; therefore , in this sort of government their principal use is to war one for another and to possess the arms or ammunition . the transg●…sions of government before spoken of , are these : ●…ranny is the transgression of the kingdom ; and d●…mocratie is the transgression of the politie . for ty●… is a monarchy for the benefit of the monarch , the olig●…chy , for the profit of the rich ; the democratie for the ●…nefit of the poor . none of these are for the com●… good. here aristotle , if he had stood to his own prin●…ples , should have said an oligarchy should be for 〈◊〉 benefit of a few , and those the best ; and not for the 〈◊〉 of the rich : and a democratie for the benefit of 〈◊〉 and not of the poor only ; for so the opposition ●…eth ; but then aristotle saw his democratie wou●… prove to be no transgression , but a perfect politie , 〈◊〉 his oligarchy would not be for the benefit of a few , and those the best men ; for they cannot be the best men , that seek onely their private profit . in this chapter , the mind of aristotle about the several kinds of government , is clearliest delivered , as being the foundation of all his books of politiques , it is the more necessary to make a curious observation of these his doctrines . in the first place , he acknowledgeth the government of one man , or of a monarchy , and that is a perfect form of government . concerning monarchy , aristotle teacheth us the beginning of it ; for , saith he , the * first society made of many houses is a colony , which seems most naturally to be a colony of families , or foster-bretheren of children and childrens children . and therefore at the beginning cities were , and now nations , under the government of kings ; the eldest in every house is king ; and so for kindred sake it is in colonies . thus he deduced the original of government from the power of the fatherhood , not from the election of the people . this it seems he learnt of his master plato , who in his third book of laws affirms , that the true and first reason of authority is , that the father and mother , and simply those that beget and ingender , do command and rule over all their children . aristotle also tells us from homer , a that every man gives laws to his wife and children . in the fourth book of his politiques , cap. . he gives to monarchy the title of the b first and divinest sort of government , defining tyranny to be a transgression from the first , and divinest . again , aristotle in the eighth book of his ethicks , in the chapter , saith , that of c the right kinds of government , a monarchy was the best , and a popular estate the worst . lastly , in the third book of his politiques , and the sixteenth chapter concerning monarchy , he saith , that d a perfect kingdom is that wherein the king rules all things according to his own will ; for he that is called a king according to the law makes no kind of government . secondly , he saith there is a government of a few men , but doth not tell us how many those few men may , or must be ; only he saith they must be more than one man , but how many , that he leaves uncertain . this perfect government of a few , any man would think aristotle should have called an oligarchy , for that this word properly signifies so much ; but in stead of the government of a few , aristotle gives it a quite other name , and terms it an aristocraty , which signifies the power of the best ; the reason why it is called an aristocraty , saith aristotle , is for that there the best men govern , or ( because that is not always true ) for that it is for the best of the governed ; by this latter reason any government , and most especially a monarchy , may be called an aristocraty , because the end of monarchy is for the best of the governed , as well as the end of an aristocraty ; so that of these two reasons for calling the government of a few an aristocratie , the first is seldome true ; and the latter is never sufficient to frame a distinction . this aristotle himself confesseth in his next chapter , saying a that the causes aforesaid do not make a difference , and that it is poverty and riches , and not few , and many , that makes the difference between an oligarchy , and democraty ; there must be an oligarchy where rich men rule , whether they be few or many : and wheresoever the poor have the sovereignty , there must be a democraty . now if aristotle will allow riches and poverty to make a difference between an oligarchy and a democrat●… : these two must likewise make the difference between an aristocraty and a polity : for the only difference aristotle makes between them is , in their ends , and not in their matter ; for the same few men may make an aristocraty , if their end be the common good ; and they may be an oligarchy , if they aim only at their private benefit . thus is aristotle distracted and perplexed how to distinguish his aristocratie , whether by the smallness of their number , or by the greatness of their estates . nay if we look into aristotles rhetoriques , we shall find a new conceit , not only about aristocratie , but also about the sorts of government : for whereas he has taught us in his politiques , that there be three sorts of right or perfect government , and as many sorts of wrong , which he calls transgressions or corruptions , he comes in his rhetoriques , and teacheth us that there be four sorts of government . a a democratie , when magistracies are distributed by lots . . in an oligarchy by their wealth . . in an aristocratie by their instructions in the law. it is necessary for these to appear the best from whence they have their name . . b a monarchy according to the name , wherein one i●… lord over all . here we see aristocratie is not distinguished by smallness of number , nor by riches , but by skill in the laws ; for he saith those that are instructed in the laws govern in an aristocratie : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a point 〈◊〉 dreamt of in his politiques ; by which it seems aristotle himself did not know well what he would ha●… to be an aristocratie . and as he cannot teach us truly what an aristocratie is , so he is to seek to tells us where any aristocratie ever was ; even himself seems to doubt , whether there be any such form of government , where he saith in his third book of politiques , cap. . a it is impossible for any mechanical man to be a citizen in an aristocratie , if there be any such government as they call aristocratical . his [ if ] makes him seem to doubt of it ; yet i find him affirm that the commonwealth of carthage was aristocratical ; he doth not say it was an aristocratie , for he confesseth it had many of the transgressions which other commonwealths had , and did incline either to a democratie or an oligarchy . b the government of carthage did transgress from an aristocratie to an oligarchy . and he concludes , that if by misfortune there should happen any discord among the carthaginians themselves , there would be no medicine by law found out to give it rest ; wherein me-thinks aristotle was a kind of prophet , for the discords between the citizens of carthage , were the main cause that hannibal lost not only italy , but carthage it self . by these few collections we may find how uncertain aristotle is in determining what an aristocratie is , or where or when any such government was ; it may justly be doubted whether there ever was , or can be any such government . let us pass from his aristocraty , to his third sort of perfect or right government ; for which he finds no particular name , but only the common name of all government , politia : it seems the greeks were wonderfully to seek , that they of all men should not be able to compound a name for such a perfect form of government ; unless we should believe that they esteemed this kind of commonwealth so superlatively excellent , as to be called , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the government of all governments , or polity of polities . but howsoever aristotle in his books of politiques vouchsafe us not a name , yet in his books of ethiques he affirmeth it may very properly be called a a timocratical government , where magistrates are chosen by their wealth : but why aristotle should give it such a name i can find no reason ; for a polity by his doctrine is the government of many , or of a multitude , and the multitude he will have to be the poorer sort , insomuch that except they be poor , he will not allow it to be the government of a multitude , though they be never so many ; for he makes poverty the truest note of a popular estate ; and as if to be poor and to be free were all one , he makes liberty likewise to be a mark of a popular estate ; for in his th book , and th chapter , he resolves , that b a popular state is where free men governe , and an oligarchy where rich men rule ; as if rich men could not be free men : now how magistrates should be chosen for their wealth , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , among all poor men is to me a riddle . here i cannot but wonder why all our modern politicians , who pretend themselves aristotelians , should forsake their great master , and account a democraty a right or perfect form of government , when aristotle brands it for a transgression , or a depraved , or corrupted manner of government . they had done better to have followed aristotle , who ( though other grecians could not , yet he ) could find out the name of a timocraty for a right popular government : but , it may be , our politicians forbear to use the word timocraty , because he affords an ill character of it , saying , that of all the right kinds of government a monarchy was the best , and a timocraty the worst ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . yet afterwards aristotle in the same chapter makes amends for it , in saying , a democraty is the least vicious , because it doth but a little transgress from a timocraty . but not to insist longer on the name of this nameless form of government , let inquiry be made into the thing it self , that we may know what aristotle saith is the government of many , or of a multitude , for the common good. this many , or multitude is not the whole people , nor the major part of the people , or any chosen by the people to be their representors . no , aristotle never saith , or meaneth any such thing ; for he tells us a the best city doth not make any artificer , or handicrafts-man a citizen . and if these be excluded out of the number of citizens , there will be but a few left in every city to make his timocratical government , since artificers or mercenary men make far the greatest part of a city ; or to say a a city is a community of free men , and yet to exclude the greatest part of the inhabitants from being citizens , is but a mockery of freedom ; for any man would think that a city being a society of men assembled to the end to live well , that such men without whom a city cannot subsist , and who perform necessary works , and minister to all in publick , should not be barred from being citizens , yet says aristotle , b all those are not to be deemed citizens without whom a city cannot subsist , except they abstain from necessary works ; for he resolves it c impossible for him to exercise the work of vertue , that useth a mechanical or mercenary trade . and he makes it one of his conclusions , that d in ancient times among some men , no publick workman did partake of the government , untill the worst of democraties were brought in . again aristotle will have his best popular government consist of free men , and accounts the poorer sort of people to be free men ; how then will he exclude poor artificers , who work for the publick , from participating of the government ? further it is observable in aristotle , that , quite contrary to the signification of the greek names , the government of a multitude may be termed an oligarchy if they be rich , and the rule of a few a democratie if they be poor and free . after much incertainty of the nature of this politique government , which wants a name ; aristotle at last resolves that this general commonweal or politia is compounded of a democratie and oligarchy ; for , a to speak plainly , a polity is a mixture of a democratie and an oligarchy . that is , one perfect form is made of two imperfect ones ; this is rather a confounding than compounding of government , to patch it up of two corrupt ones , by appointing an oligarchical penalty for the rich magistrates that are chosen by election , and a democratical fee for the poor magistrates that are chosen by lot. lastly it is to be noted , that aristotle doth not offer to name any one city or commonweal in the world , where ever there was any such government as he calls a politie : for him to reckon it for a perfect form of government , and of such excellency as to carry the name from all other , and yet never to have been extant in the world , may seem a wonder ; and a man may be excused for doubting , or for denying any such form to be possible in nature , if it cannot be made manifest what it is , nor when , nor where it ever was . in conclusion , since aristotle reckons but three kinds of perfect government , which are , first , a monarchy of one ; secondly , an aristocraty of a few ; thirdly , a polity of a multitude ; and if these two latter cannot be made good by him : there will remain but one right form of government only , which is monarchy : and it seems to me , that aristotle in 〈◊〉 manner doth confess as much , where he informs us a th●… the first commonweal amo●… the grecians , after kingdom ▪ was made of those that wages war : meaning that the grecians , when they left to be governed by kings , fell to be governed by an army : the●… monarchy was changed into a stratocraty , and not into an aristocraty or democraty : for if unity in government , which is only found in monarchy , be once broken , there is no stay or bound , untill it come to a constant standing army ; for the people or multitude , as aristotle teacheth us , can excell in no ver●… but military , and that that is natural to them , and therefore in a popular estate ▪ b the sovereign power is i●… the sword , and those that a●… possessed of the arms. so that any nation or kingdom that is not charged with the keeping of a king , must perpetually be at the charge of paying and keeping of an army . these brief observations upon aristotle's perfect forms of government , may direct what to judge of those corrupted or imperfect forms which he mentions ; for rectum est index sui & obloqui , and he reckons them to be all one in matter and form , and to differ only in their end : the end of the perfect forms being for the good of the governed ; and of the imperfect , for the benefit only of the governours . now since aristotle could not tell how to define or describe his right or perfect forms of government , it cannot be expected he can satisfie us concerning those he calls imperfect : yet he labours and bestirrs himself mainly in the business , though to little purpose ; for howsoever the title of his book be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of politiques , and that he mentions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for a special form of government , which hath the common name of a policy : yet when he comes to dispute in particular of government , he argues only about democracies and oligarchies , and therein he is copious , because only those which he calls corrupt forms of governments were common in greece in his dayes . as for an aristocracy , or a policy which he mentions , they are only speculative notions , or airy names , invented to delude the world , and to perswade the people , that under those quaint terms , there might be found some subtile government , which might at least equal , if not excell monarchy : and the inventers of those fine names were all but rebels to monarchy , by aristotles confession , where he saith , the first commonweals of greece after kings were left , were made of those that waged war. l. . c. . as aristotle is irresolute to determine what are ●…uly perfect aristocracies and policies , so he is to seek in describing his imperfect forms of government , as well oligarchies as democracies , and therefore he is driven to invent several forts of them , and to confound himself with subdivisions : we will alledge some of his words . the cause why there be many kinds of commonweals is , for that there are many parts of every city . sometimes all these parts are in a commonweal , sometimes more of them , sometimes fewer : whence it is manifest , that there are many commonweals differing from each other in kind ▪ because the parts of them differ after the same manner . for a commonweal is the order of magistrates distributed , either according to the power of them that an●… partakers of it , or according to some other common equality belonging to poor and rich , or some other thing common to both . it is therefore necessary , that then be so many commonweals as there are orders , according to the excellencies and differences of parts . but it seemeth principally there are but two chief kinds of commonweals ; the democracy and the oligarchy ▪ for they make the aristocracy a branch of oligarchy , as if it were a kind of oligarchy ; and that other which is properly a policy , to be a branch of democracy . so they are wont to esteem of commonweales , but it is both truer and better ; that there being two right forms , or one , that all the other be transgressions . here we find aristotle of several minds , sometimes he is for many commonweales , sometimes for two , or sometimes for one . as for his many commonweals , if he allow them according to the several parts of a city , he may as well make three thousand kinds of commonweals , as three : if two artificers and three souldiers should govern , that should be one kind of commonweal : if four husbandmen , and five merchants , that would be a second sort ; or six taylors , and ten carpenters , a third sort , or a dozen saylors , and a dozen porters , a fourth ; and so in infinitum , for aristotle is not resolved how many parts to make of a city , or how many combinations of those parts ; and therefore in his reckoning of them , he differs from himself , sometimes makes more , sometimes fewer parts : and oft concluding at the end of his accompt with et caetera's : and confessing that one and the same man may act several parts ; as he that is a souldier , may be a a husbandman & an artificer : and in his fourth book and fourth chapter , he seems to reckon up eight parts of a city , but in the tale of them , he misses or forgets the sixth . . he names the plowman . . the artificer . . the tradesman , or merchant . . the mercenary hireling . . the souldier , ( here aristotle falls foul upon plato , for making but four parts of a city . . the weaver . . the plowman . . the taylor . . the carpenter . afterwards , as if these were not sufficient , he addeth the smith , and the freeder of necessary cattle , the merchant , and the ingrosser or retayler ) whilest aristotle was busie in this reprehension of plato , he forgets himself , and skips over his sixth part of a city , and names the . rich men , . the magistrates . in the same chapter , he offers at another division of the parts of a city or commonweal , first dividing it into a populacy , and nobility . the people he divides first into husbandmen . . into artificers . . into merchants , or those that use buying or selling. . into those that frequent the seas , of whom some follow the war , others seek for gain , some are carriers or transporters , others fishermen . . handicraftsmen that possess so little goods , that they cannot be idle . . those that are not free on both sides , and any other such like multitude of people . the kinds of noblemen are distinguished by riches , by lineage , by vertue , by learning , and other such like things . that there may be more parts of a commonweal than are here numbred , aristotle confesseth or supposeth ; and of a multitude of parts , and of a multitude of mixtures of such parts may be made 〈◊〉 world of forms of oligarchies and democraties . this confusion of the parts and kinds of commonweals drove aristotle rather to rest upon the division of rich and poor , for the main parts of 〈◊〉 commonweal , than any other . the distinction of a few and of a multitude , or the whole people ▪ might seem more proper to distinguish between an oligarchy and a democraty ; but the truth is , aristotle looking upon the cities of greece , and finding that in every of them , even in athens it self , there were many of the people that were not allowed to be citizens , and to participate in the government , and that many times he was a citizen in one sort of government , who was not a citizen in another , and that citizens differed according to every commonweal ; he considered that if he should place 〈◊〉 right in the whole people , either to govern , or to chuse their form of government , or the parties that should govern : he should hereby condemn the government of all the cities in greece , and especially of aristocraty , which , as he saith , allows 〈◊〉 artificer to be a citizen ; and besides , he should thereby confute a main principle of his own politiques , which is , that some men are born slaves by nature ▪ which quite contradicts the position , that all me●… are born equal and free ; and therefore aristotle thought it fitter to allow all imaginable forms of government , that so he might not disparage any one city , than to propound such a form as might condemn and destroy all the rest . though aristotle allow so many several forms of corrupted governments ; yet he insists upon no one form of all those that he can define or describe , in such sort , that he is able to say that any one city in all greece was governed just according to such a form ; his diligence is only to make as many forms as the giddy or inconstant humour of a city could happen upon ; he freely gives the people liberty to invent as many kinds of government as they please , provided he may have liberty to find fault with every one of them ; it proved an easier work for him to find fault with every form , then to tell how to amend any one of them ; he found so many imperfections in all sorts of commonweals , that he could not hold from reproving them before ever he tells us what a commonweal is , or how many sorts there are ; and to this purpose he spends his whole second book in setting out , and correcting the chief commonweals of greece , and among others the lacedemonian , the cretan , and carthaginian commonweals ; which three he esteems to be much alike , and better than any other , yet he spares not to lay open their imperfections , and doth the like to the athenian ; wherein he breaks the rule of method , by delivering the faults of commonweals , before he teach us what a commonweal is ; for in his first book , he speaks only of the parts of which a city , or a commonweal is made , but tells ●…s not what a city or commonweal is , untill he ●…ome to his third book , and there in handling the sorts of government , he observes no method at all but in a disorderly way , flies backward and forward from one sort to another : and howsoever there may be observed in him many rules of policy touching government in general , yet without doubt where he comes to discourse of particular forms , he is full of contradiction , or confusion , or both : it is true he is brief and difficult , the best right a man ca●… do him , is to confess he understands him not ; ye●… a diligent reader may readily discern so many irregularities and breaches in aristotle's books of politiques , as tend to such distraction or confusion , th●… none of our new politicians can make advantage of his principles , for the confirmation of an original power by nature in the people , which is the only theme now in fashion : for aristotle's discourse is of such commonweals as were founded by particular persons , as the chaleedonian by phaleas , the milesian by hippodamas , the lacedemonian by lyeu●…gus , the cretan by minos , the athenian by solon , and the like : but the natural right of the people to found , or elect their kind of government is not once disputed by him : it seems the underived majesty of the people , was such a metaphysical piece o●… speculation as our grand philosopher was not acquainted with ; he speaks very contemptuously 〈◊〉 the multitude in several places , he affirms that the people are base or wicked iudges in their own cases 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . and that many of them differ nothing from beast 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and again 〈◊〉 saith , the common people or freemen 〈◊〉 such as are neither rich , nor in reputation for vertu●… and it is not safe to commit to them great government●… for , by reason of their injustice and unskilfulness , they would do much injustice , and commit many errours ; and it is pleasanter to the multitude to live disorderly , than soberly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if aristotle had believed a publick interest to have been in the people , to the enabling them to be their own carvers in point of government , he would never have entangled himself with such intricate and ambiguous forms of commonweals , as himself cannot tell how to explain , nor any of his commentators how to understand , or make use of . this one benefit i have found by reading aristotle , that his books of politiques serve for an admirable commentary upon that text of scripture , which saith , in those dayes there was no king in israel ; every man did that which was right in his own eyes . for he grants a liberty in every city , for any man , or multitude of men , either by cunning , or force , to set up what government they please ; and he will allow some name or other of a commonweal , which in effect is to allow every man to do what he lists , if he be able ; hence it is , that by the confession of aristotle , the first commonweals in greece , after kings were given over , were made of those that waged war ; those several kinds of commonweals , were all summed up into the government of an army ; for ( a ) it is , saith aristotle , in their power , who manage arms to continue , or not continue the form of government , whereby the estate is governed , which is nothing else but a stratocratie , or military government . we cannot much blame aristotle for the incertainty , and contrariety in him about the sorts of government , if we consider him as a heathen ; for it is not possible for the wit of man to search out the first grounds or principles of government , ( which necessarily depend upon the original of property ) except he know that at the creation one man alone was made , to whom the dominion of all things was given , and from whom all men derive their title . this point can be learnt only from the scriptures : as for the imaginary contract of people , it is a fancy not improbable only , but impossible , except a multitude of men at first had sprung out , and were engendred of the earth , which aristotle knows not whether he may believe , or no : if justice ( which is to give every man his due ) be the end of government , there must necessarily be a rule to know how any man at first came to have a right to any thing to have it truly called his . this is a point aristotle disputes not ; nor so much as ever dreamt of an original contract among people : he looked no farther in every city , than to a scambling among the citizens , whereby every one snatcht what he could get : so that a violent possession was the first , and best title that he knew . the main distinction of aristotle touching perfect or right forms of government from those that are imperfect or corrupt , consists solely in this point , that where the profit of the governed is respected , there is a right government , but where the profit of the governours is regarded , there is a corruption or transgression of government . by this it is supposed by aristotle , that there may be a government only for the benefit of the governours ; this supposition to be false , may be proved from aristotle himself ; i will instance about the point of tyranny . tyranny , saith aristotle , a is a despotical or masterly monarchy ; now he confesseth , that b in truth the masterly government is profitable both to the servant by nature , and the master by nature , and he yields a solid reason for it , saying , c it is not possible , if the servant be destroyed , that the mastership can be saved ; whence it may be inferred , that if the masterly government of tyrants cannot be safe without the preservation of them whom they govern , it will follow that a tyrant cannot govern for his own profit only : and thus his main definition of tyranny fails , as being grounded upon an impossible supposition by his own confession . no example can be shewed of any such government that ever was in the world , as aristotle describes a tyranny to be ; for under the worst of kings , though many particular men have unjustly suffered , yet the multitude , or the people in general have found benefit and profit by the government . it being apparent that the different kinds of government in aristotle , arise onely from the difference of the number of governours , whether one , a few , or many : there may be as many several forms of governments as there be several numbers , which are infinite ; so that not onely the several parts of a city or commonweal , but also the several numbers of such parts may cause multiplicity of forms of government by aristotle's principles . it is further observable in assemblies , that it is not the whole assembly , but the major part onely of the assembly that hath the government ; for that which pleaseth the most , is alwayes ratified , saith aristotle , lib. . c. . by this means one and the same assembly may make , at one sitting , several forms of commonweals , for in several debates and votes the same number of men , or all the self-same men do not ordinarily agree in their votes ; and the least disagreement , either in the persons of the men , or in their number , alters the form of government . thus in a commonweal , one part of the publick affairs shall be ordered by one form of government , and another part by another form , and a third part by a third form , and so in infinitum . how can that have the denomination of a form of government , which lasts but for a moment onely , about one fraction of business ? for in the very instant , as it were in the twinkling of an eye , while their vote lasteth , the government must begin and end . to be governed , is nothing else but to be obedient and subject to the will or command of another ; it is the will in a man that governs ; ordinarily mens wills are divided according to their several ends or interests ; which most times are different , and many times contrary the one to the other , and in such cases where the wills of the major part of the assembly do unite and agree in one will , there is a monarchy of many wills in one , though it be called an aristocracy or democracy , in regard of the several persons ; it is not the many bodies , but the one will or soul of the multitude that governs . a where one is set up out of many , the people becometh a monarch , because many are lords , not separately , but altogether as one ; therefore such a people as if it were a monarch , seeks to bear rule alone l. . c. . it is a false and improper speech to say that a whole multitude , senate , councel , or any multitude whatsoever doth govern where the major part only rules ; because many of the multitude that are so assembled , are so far from having any part in the government , that they themselves are governed against and contrary to their wills ; there being in all government various and different debates and consultations , it comes to pass oft-times , that the major part in every assembly , differs according to the several humours or fancies of men ; those who agree in one mind , in one point , are of different opinions in another ; every change of business , or new matter begets a new major part , and is a change both of the government and governours ; the difference in the number , or in the qualities of the persons that govern , is the only thing that causes different governments , according to aristotle , who divides his kinds of government to the number of one , a few , or many . as amongst the romans their tribunitial laws had several titles , according to the names of those tribunes of the people , that preferr'd and made them . so in other governments , the body of their acts and ordinances , is composed of a multitude of momentary monarchs , who by the strength and power of their parties or factions are still under a kind of a civil war , fighting and scratching for the legislative miscellany , or medly of several governments . if we consider each government according to the nobler part of which it is composed , it is nothing else but a monarchy of monothelites , or of many men of one will , most commonly in one point only : but if we regard only the baser part , or bodies of such persons as govern , there is an interrupted succession of a multitude of short-lived governments , with as many intervalls of anarchy ; so that no man can say at any time , that he is under any form of government ; for in a shorter time than the word can be spoken , every government is begun and ended . furthermore in all assemblies , of what quality soever they be , whether aristocratical or democratical , as they call them , they all agree in this one point , to give that honourable regard to monarchy , that they do interpret the major , or prevailing part in every assembly to be but as one man , and so do feign to themselves a kind of monarchy . though there be neither precept nor practice in scripture , nor yet any reason alledged by aristotle for any form of government , but only monarchy ; yet it is said that it is evident to common sense , that of old time rome , and in this present age venice , and the low-countries , enjoy a form of government different from monarchy : hereunto it may be answered , that a people may live together in society , and help one another ; and yet not be under any form of government ; as we see herds of cattel do , and yet we may not say they live under government . for government is not a society only to live , but to live well and vertuously . this is acknowledged by aristotle , who teacheth that a the end of a city , is to live blessedly and honestly . political communities are ordained for honest actions , but not for living together only . now there be two things principally required to a blessed and honest life : religion towards god , and peace towards men : that is , a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty , tim. . . here then will be the question , whether godliness and peace can be found under any government but monarchy , or whether rome , venice , or the low-countries did enjoy these under any popular government . in these two points , let us first briefly examine the roman government , which is thought to have been the most glorious . for religion , we find presently after the building of the city by romulus , the next king , numa , most devoutly established a religion , and began his kingdom with the service of the gods ; he forbad the romans to make any images of god , which law lasted and was observed years , there being in all that time no image or picture of god , in any temple or chappel of rome ; also he erected the pontifical colledge , and was himself the first bishop or pontifex ; these bishops were to render no account either to the senate or commonalty . they determined all questions concerning religion , as well between priests as between private men : they punished inferiour priests , if they either added or detracted from the established rites , or ceremonies , or brought in any new thing into religion . the chief bishop , pontif●… maximus , taught every man how to honour and serve the gods. this care had monarchy of religion . but after the expulsion of kings , we do not find during the power of the people , any one law made for the benefit or exercise of religion : there be two tribunitian laws concerning religion , but they are meerly for the benefit of the power of the people , and not of religion . l. papirius , a tribune , made a law called lex papiria , that it should not be lawful for any to consecrate either houses , grounds , altars , or any other things without the determinatin of the people . domitius aenobarbus another tribune enacted a law called domitia lex , that the pontifical colledge should not , as they were wont , admit whom they would into the order of priesthood , but it should be in the power of the people ; and because it was contrary to their religion , that church-dignities should be bestowed by the common people ; hence for very shame he ordained , that the lesser part of the people , namely seventeen tribes should elect whom they thought fit , and afterwards the party elected should have his confirmation or admission from the colledge : thus by a committee of seven tribes taken out of thirty five , the ancient form of religion was alter'd and reduced to the power of the lesser part of the people . this was the great care of the people to bring ordination and consecration to the laity . the religion in venice , and the low-countries is sufficiently known , much need not be said of them : they admirably agree under a seeming contrariety ; it is commonly said , that one of them hath all religions , and the other no religion ; the atheist of venice may shake hands with the sectary of amsterdam . this is the liberty that a popular estate can brag of , every man may be of any religion , or no religion , if he please ; their main devotion is exercised only in opposing and suppressing monarchy . they both agree to exclude the clergy from medling in government , whereas in all monarchies both before the law of moses , and under it , and ever since : all barbarians , graecians , romans , infidels , turks , and indians , have with one consent given such respect and reverence to their priests , as to trust them with their laws ; and in this our nation , the first priests we read of before christianity , were the druides , who as caesar saith , decided and determined controversies , in murder , in case of inheritance , of bounds of lands , as they in their discretion judged meet ; they grant rewards and punishments . it is a wonder to see what high respect even the great turk giveth to his mufti , or chief bishop , so necessary is religion to strengthen and direct laws . to consider of the point of peace , it is well known , that no people ever enjoyed it without monarchy . aristotle saith , the lacedemonians preserved themselves by warring ; and after they had gotten to themselves the empire , then were they presently undone , for that they could not live at rest , nor do any better exercise , than the exercise of war , l. . c. . after rome had expelled kings , it was in perpetual war , till the time of the emperours : once only was the temple of ianus shut , after the end of the first punique war , but not so long as for one year , but for some moneths . it is true , as orosius saith , that for almost years , that is , from tullus hostilius 〈◊〉 augustus caesar , only for one summer , the bowels 〈◊〉 rome did not sweat blood. on the behalf of the romans it may be said , that though the bowels of rome did always sweat blood , yet they did obtain most glorious victories abroad . but it may be truly answered , if all the roman conquests had no other foundation but injustice ; this alone soils all the glory of her warlike actions . the most glorious war that ever rome had , was with carthag●… ; the beginning of which war , sir walter raleig●… proves to have been most unjustly undertaken by the romans , in confederating with the mamertines , and aiding of rebels , under the title of protecting their confederates ; whereas kings many times may have just cause of war , for recovering and preserving their rights to such dominions as fall to them by inheritance or marriage ; a popular estate , that can neither marry , nor be heir to another , can have no such title to a war in a foreign kingdom ; and to speak the truth , if it be rightly considered , the whole time of the popularity of rome , the romans were no other than the only prosperous and glorious thieves , and robbers of the world. if we look more narrowly into the roman government , it will appear , that in that very age , wherein rome was most victorious , and seemed to be most popular , she owed most of her glory to an apparent kind of monarchy . for it was the kingh●… power of the consuls , who ( as livy saith ) had the same royal iurisdiction , or absolute power that the kings had , not any whit diminished or abated , and held all the same regal ensignes of supreme dignity , which helpt rome to all her conquests : whiles the tribunes of the people were strugling at home with the senate about election of magistrates , enacting of laws , and calling to account , or such other popular affairs , the kingly consuls gained all the victories abroad : thus rome at one and the same time was broken and distracted into two shewes of government ; the popular , which served only to raise seditions and discords within the walls , whilest the regal atchieved the conquests of foreign nations and kingdomes . rome was so sensible of the benefit and necessity of monarchy , that in her most desperate condition and danger , when all other hopes failed her , she had still resort to the creation of a dictator , who for the time was an absolute king ; and from whom no appeal to the people was granted , which is the royallest evidence for monarchy in the world ; for they who were drawn to swear , they would suffer no king of rome , found no security but in perjury , and breaking their oath by admitting the kingly power in spight of their teeth , under a new name of a dictator or consul : a just reward for their wanton expelling their king for no other crime they could pretend but pride , which is most tolerable in a king of all men : and yet we find no particular point of pride charged upon him , but that he enjoyned the romans to labour in cleansing , and casting of ditches , and paving their sinks : an act both for the benefit and ornament of the city , and therefore commendable in the king : but the citizens of rome , who had been conquerours of all nations round about them , could not endure of warriers to become quarriers , and day-labourers . whereas it is said , that tarquin was expelled for the rape committed by his son on lucrece ; it is unjust to condemn the father for the crime of his son ; it had been fit to have petitioned the father for the punishment of the offender : the fact of young tarquin cannot be excused , yet without wrong to the reputation of so chaste a lady as lucrece is reputed to be , it may be said , she had a greater desire to be thought chaste , than to be chaste ; she might have died untouched , and unspotted in her body , if she had not been afraid to be slandered for inchastity ; both dionysius halicarnasseus , and livie , who both are her friends , so tell the tale of her , as if she had chosen rather to be a whore , than to be thought a whore. to say truth , we find no other cause of the expulsion of tarquin , than the wantonness , and licentiousness of the people of rome . this is further to be considered in the roman government , that all the time between their kings , and their emperours , there lasted a continued strife , between the nobility and commons , wherein by degrees the commons prevailed at last , so to weaken the authority of the consuls and senate , that even the last sparks of monarchy were in a manner extinguished , and then instantly began the civil war , which lasted till the regal power was quickly brought home , and setled in monarchy . so long as the power of the senate stood good for the election of consuls , the regal power was preserved in them , for the senate had their first institution from monarchy : it is worth the noting , that in all those places that have seemed to be most popular , that weak degree of government , that hath been exercised among them , hath been founded upon , and been beholden unto monarchical principles , both for the power of assembling , and manner of consulting : for the entire and gross body of any people , is such an unweildy and diffused thing as is not capable of uniting , or congregating , or deliberating in an entire lump , but in broken parts , which at first were regulated by monarchy . furthermore it is observable , that rome in her chief popularity , was oft beholden for her preservation to the monarchical power of the father over the children : by means of this fatherly power , saith bodin , the romans flourished in all honour and vertue , and oftentimes was their common-weal thereby delivered from most imminent destruction , when the fathers drew out of the consistory , their sons being tribunes publishing laws tending to sedition . amongst others cassius threw his son headlong out of the consistory , publishing the law agraria ( for the division of lands ) in the behoof of the people , and after by his own private judgment put him to death , the magistrates , serjeants , and people standing thereat astonied , and not daring to withstand his fatherly authority , although they would with all their power have had that law for division of lands ; which is sufficient proof , this power of the father not only to have been sacred and inviolable , but also to have been lawful for him , either by right or wrong to dispose of the life and death of his children , even contrary to the will of the magistrates and people . it is generally believed that the government of rome , after the expulsion of kings , was popular ; bodin endeavours to prove it , but i am not satisfied with his arguments , and though it will be thought a paradox , yet i must maintain , it was never truly popular . first it is difficult to agree , what a popular government is , aristotle saith it is where many or a multitude do rule ; he doth not say where the people , or the major part of the people , or the representors of the people govern . bodin affirms if all the people be interessed in the government , it is a popular estate , lib. . c. . but after in the same chapter he resolves , that it is a popular estate , when all the people , or the greater part thereof hath the sovereignty , and he puts the case that if there be threescore thousand citizens , and forty thousand of them have the sovereignty , and twenty thousand be excluded , it shall be called a popular estate : but i must tell him , though fifty nine thousand , nine hundred , ninety nine of them govern , yet it is no popular estate , for if but one man be excluded , the same reason that excludes that one man , may exclude many hundreds , and many thousands , yea , and the major part it self ; if it be admitted , that the people are or ever were free by nature , and not to be governed , but by their own consent , it is most unjust to exclude any one man from his right in government ; and to suppose the people so unnatural , as at the first to have all consented to give away their right to a major part , ( as if they had liberty given them only to give away , and not to use it themselves ) is not onely improbable , but impossible ; for the whole people is a thing so uncertain and changeable , that it alters every moment , so that it is necessary to ask of every infant so soon as it is born its consent to government , if you will ever have the consent of the whole people . moreover , if the arbitrary tryal by a jury of twelve men , be a thing of that admirable perfection and justice as is commonly believed , wherein the negative voice of every single person is preserved , so that the dissent of any of the twelve frustrates the whole judgment : how much more ought the natural freedom of each man be preserved , by allowing him his negative voice , which is but a continuing him in that estate , wherein , it is confessed , nature at first placed him ; justice requires that no one law should bind all , except all consent to it , there is nothing more violent and contrary to nature , than to allow a major part , or any other greater part less than the whole to bind all the people . the next difficulty to discovering what a popular estate is , is to find out where the supreme power in the roman government rested ; it is bodin's opinion , that in the roman state the government was in the magistrates , the authority and counsel in the senate , but the sovereign power and majesty in the people . lib. . c. . so in his first book his doctrine is , that the ancient romans said , imperium in magistratibus , authoritatem in senatu , potestatem in plebe , majestatem in populi jure esse dicebant . these four words command , authority , power , and majesty signifie ordinarily , one and the same thing , to wit , the sovereignty , or supreme power , i cannot find that bodin knows how to distinguish them ; for they were not distinct faculties placed in several subjects , but one and the same thing diversly qualified , for imperium , authoritas , potestas , and majestas were all originally in the consuls ; although for the greater shew the consuls would have the opinion , and consent of the senate who were never called together , nor had their advice asked , but when and in what points only it pleased the consuls to propound : so that properly senatus consultum was only a decree of the consuls , with the advice of the senators : and so likewise the consuls , when they had a mind to have the countenance of an ampler councel , they assembled the centuries , who were reckoned as the whole people , and were never to be assembled , but when the consuls thought fit to propound some business of great weight unto them ; so that jussus populi , the command of the people which bodin so much magnifies , was properly jussus consulum , the command of the consuls , by the advice or consent of the assembly of the centuries , who were a body composed of the senators , and the rest of the patritians , knights , and gentlemen , or whole nobility together with the commons : for the same men who had voices in senate , had also their votes allowed in the assembly of the centuries ▪ according to their several capacities . it may further appear , that the roman government was never truly popular , for that in her greatest show of popularity , there were to be found above ten servants for every citizen or freeman , and of those servants , not one of them was allowed any place , or voice in government : if it be said that the roman servants were slaves taken in war , and therefore not fit to be freemen ; to this it may be answered , that if the opinion of our modern politicians be good , which holds that all men are born free by nature , or if but the opinion of aristotle be found , who saith that by nature some men are servants , and some are masters , then it may be unnatural , or unjust to make all prisoners in war servants or ( as they are now called ) slaves , a term not used in the popular governments , either of rome or greece ; for in both languages , the usual word that doth answer to our late term of slave , is but servus in latin , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in greek . besides , if the wars of the romans , by which they gained so many servants were unjust , as i take all offensive war to be without a special commission from god , and as i believe all the roman wars were , that were made for the enlargement of their empire , then we may conclude , that the romans were the notablest plagiaries , or men-stealers in the world. but to allow the lesser part of the people of rome , who called themselves citizens , to have had a just right to exclude all servants from being a part of the people of rome , let us enquire whether the major part of those , whom they allowed to be citizens , had the government of rome ; whereby we may discover easily how notoriously the poorer and greater part of the citizens were guld of their share in government ; there were two famous manners of their assembling the people of rome : the first was by classes , as they called them , which were divided into centuries ; the second was by tribes , or wards ; the former of these was a ranking of the people , according to their abilities or wealth ; the latter according to the place or ward , wherein every citizen dwelt : in the assemblies of neither of these , had the major part of the people the power of government , as may thus be made appear . first , for the assembly of the centuries , there were six degrees or classes of men according to their wealth ; the first classis was of the richest men in rome , none whereof were under l. in value : the valuation of the second classis was not under fourscore pounds ; and so the . the . and the fifth classis were each a degree one under another . the sixth classis contained the poorer sort , and all the rabble . these six classes were subdivided into hundreds , or centuries .   centuries . the first classis had the . had the . classis had . the . had the . classis had the . classis had   the classes , and centuries being thus ordered when the assembly came to give their votes they did not give their voices by the poll , which is the true popular way : but each century voted by it self , each century having one voice , the major part of the centuries carried the business : now there being fourscore and eighteen centuries in the first classis , in which all the patricians , senators , noblemen , knights , and gentlemen of rome , were inrolled , being more in number , and above half the centuries , must needs have the government , if they agreed all together in their votes , because they voted first , for when centuries had agreed in their votes , the other centuries of the inferiour classis , were never called to vote ; thus the nobles , and richer men who were but few in comparison of the common people did bear the chief sway , because all the poorer sort , or proletarian rabble , were clap'd into the sixth classis , which in reckoning were allowed but the single voice of one century , which never came to voting : whereas in number they did far exceed all the five other classes or centuries , and if they had been allowed the liberty of other citizens , they might have been justly numbred for a thousand centuries , or voices in the assembly ; this device of packing so many thousands into one century , did exclude far the greatest part of the people from having a part in the government . next , for the assembly of the people of rome by tribes , it must be considered , that the tribes did not give their voices by the poll altogether , which is the true way of popular voting , but each tribe or ward did vote by it self , and the votes of the major part ( not of the people but ) of the tribes did sway the government , the tribes being unequal , as all divisions by wards usually are , because the number of the people of one tribe , is not just the same with the number of the people of each other tribe ; whence it followed , that the major number of the tribes might possibly be the minor number of the people , which is a destroying of the power of the major part of the people . adde hereunto , that the nobility of rome were excluded from being present at the assembly of the tribes ; and so the most considerable part of the people was wanting , therefore it could not be the voices of the major part of the people , where a great part of the people were allowed no voices at all , for it must be the major part of the whole , and not of a part of the people , that must denominate a popular government . moreover it must be noted , that the assembly of the tribes was not originally the power of the people of rome , for it was almost years after the rejection of kings before an assembly of tribes were thought on , or spoken of ; for it was the assembly of the people by centuries , that agreed to the expulsion of kings , & creating of consuls in their room , also the famous laws of the twelve tables were ratified by the assembly of the centuries . this assembly by centuries , as it was more ancient , than that by tribes ; so it was more truly popular , because all the nobility , as well as the commons , had voices in it : the assembly by tribes , was pretended at first , only to elect tribunes of the people , and other inferiour magistrates , to determine of lesser crimes that were not capital , but only finable ; and to decree that peace should be made ; but they did not meddle with denouncing war to be made , for that high point did belong only to the assembly of the centuries ; and so also did the judging of treason , and other capital crimes . the difference between the assembly of the tribes , and of the centuries , is very material ; for though it be commonly thought , that either of these two assemblies were esteemed to be the people , yet in reality it was not so , for the assembly of the centuries only could be said to be the people , because all the nobility were included in it as well as the commons , whereas they were excluded out of the assembly of the tribes ; and yet in effect , the assembly of the centuries was but as the assembly of the lords , or nobles only , because the lesser , and richer part of the people had the sovereignty , as the assembly of the tribes was , but the commons only . in maintenance of the popular government of rome , bodin objects , that there could be no regal power in the two consuls , who could neither make law , nor peace , nor war. the answer is , though there were two consuls , yet but one of them had the regality ; for they governed by turns , one consul one moneth , and the other consul another moneth ; or the first one day , and the second another day . that the consuls could make no laws is false , it is plain by livy , that they had the power to make laws , or war , and did execute that power , though they were often hindered by the tribunes of the people ; not for that the power of making laws or war , was ever taken away from the consuls , or communicated to the tribunes , but onely the exercise of the consular power was suspended by a seeming humble way of intercession of the tribunes ; the consuls by their first institution had a lawful right to do those things , which yet they would not do by reason of the shortness of their reigns , but chose rather to countenance their actions with the title of a decree of the senate ( who were their private councel ) yea , and sometimes with the decree of the assembly of the centuries ( who were their publick counsel ) for both the assembling of the senate , and of the centuries , was at the pleasure of the consuls , and nothing was to be propounded in either of them , but at the will of the consuls : which argues a sovereignty in them over the senate and centuries ; the senate of rome was like the house of lords , the assembly of the tribes resembled the house of commons , but the assembling of the centuries , was a body composed of lords and commons united to vote together . the tribunes of the people bore all the sway among the tribes , they called them together when they pleased , without any order , whereas the centuries were never assembled without ceremony , and religious observation of the birds by the augurs , and by the approbation of the senate , and therefore were said to be auspicata , and ex authoritate patrum . these things considered , it appears , that the assembly of the centuries was the only legitimate , and great meeting of the people of rome : as for any assembling , or electing of any trustees , or representors of the people of rome , in nature of the modern parliaments , it was not in use , or ever known in rome . above two hundred and twenty years after the expulsion of kings , a sullen humour took the commons of rome , that they would needs depart the city to ianiculum , on the other side of tybur , they would not be brought back into the city , until a law was made , that a plebiscitum , or a decree of the commons might be observed for a law ; this law was made by the dictator hortensius , to quiet the sedition , by giving a part of the legislative power to the commons , in such inferiour matters only , as by toleration and usurpation had been practised by the commons . i find not that they desired an enlargement of the points which were the object of their power , but of the persons , or nobility that should be subject to their decrees : the great power of making war , of creating the greater magistrates , of judging in capital crimes , remained in the consuls , with the senate , and assembly of the centuries . for further manifestation of the broken and distracted government of rome , it is fit to consider the original power of the consuls , and of the tribunes of the commons , who are ordinarily called the tribunes of the people . first , it is undeniable , that upon the expulsion of kings , kingly power was not taken away , but only made annual and changeable between two consuls ; who in their turns , and by course had the sovereignty , and all regal power ; this appears plainly in livy , who tells us , that valerius publicola being consul , he himself alone ordained a law , and then assembled a general session . turemillus arsa inveighed and complained against the consul's government , as being so absolute , and in name only less odious than that of kings , but in fact more cruel ; for instead of one lord the city had received twain , having authority beyond all measure , unlimited and infinite . sextius and licinus complain , that there would never be any indifferent course , so long as the nobles kept the sovereign place of command , and the sword to strike , whiles the poor commons have only the buckler ; their conclusion was , that it remains , that the commons bear the office of consuls too , for that were a fortress of their liberty , from that day forward , shall the commons be partakers of those things ▪ wherein the nobles now surpass them , namely sovereign rule and authority . the law of the twelve tables affirms , regio imperio duo sunto , iique consules appellantor . let two have regal power , and let them be called consuls : also the judgment of livy is , that the sovereign power was translated from consuls to decemvirs , as before from kings to consuls . these are proofs sufficient to shew the royal power of the consuls . about sixteen years after the first creation of consuls , the commons finding themselves much run into debt , by wasting their estates in following the wars ; and so becoming , as they thought , oppressed by usury , and cast into prison by the judgment , and sentence of the consuls , they grievously complained of usury , and of the power of the consuls , and by sedition prevailed , and obtained leave to choose among themselves magistrates called tribunes of the people , who by their intercession might preserve the commons from being oppressed and suffering wrong from the consuls : and it was further agreed , that the persons of those tribunes should be sacred , and not to be touched by any . by means of this immunity of the bodies of the tribunes from all arrests or other violence , they grew in time by degrees to such boldness , that by stopping the legal proceedings of the consuls ( when they pleased to intercede ) they raised such an anarchy oft times in government , that they themselves might act , and take upon them , what power soever they pleased ( though it belonged not to them . ) this gallantry of the tribunes was the cause , that the commons of rome , who were diligent pretenders to liberty , and the great masters of this part of politiques , were thought the only famous preservers , and keepers of the liberty of rome . and to do them right , it must be confessed , they were the only men that truly understood the rights of a negative voice ; if we will allow every man to be naturally free till they give their consent to be bound , we must allow every particular person a negative voice ; so that when as all have equal power , and are as it were fellow-magistrates or officers , each man may impeach , or stop his fellow-officers in their proceedings , this is grounded upon the general reason of all them , which have any thing in common , where he which forbiddeth , or denyeth , hath most right ; because his condition in that case is better than his which commandeth , or moveth to proceed ; for every law or command , is in it self an innovation , and a diminution of some part of popular liberty ; for it is no law except it restrain liberty ; he that by his negative voice doth forbid or hinder the proceeding of a new law , doth but preserve himself in that condition of liberty , wherein nature hath placed him , and whereof he is in present possession ; the condition of him thus in possession being the better , the stronger is his prohibition , any single man hath a juster title to his negative voice , than any multitude can have to their affirmative ; to say the people are free , and not to be governed , but by their own consent , and yet to allow a major part to rule the whole , is a plain contradiction , or a destruction of natural freedom . this the commons of rome rightly understood , and therefore the transcendent power of the negative voice of any one tribune , being able of it self to stay all the proceedings , not of the consuls and senate only , and other magistrates , but also of the rest of his fellow-tribunes , made them seem the powerfullest men in all rome ; and yet in truth they had no power or jurisdiction at all , nor were they any magistrates , nor could they lawfully call any man before them , for they were not appointed for administration of justice , but only to oppose the violence , and abuse of magistrates , by interceeding for such as appealed , being unjustly oppressed ; for which purpose at first they sate only without the door of the senate , and were not permitted to come within the doors : this negative power of theirs was of force only to hinder , but not to help the proceedings in courts of justice ; to govern , and not to govern the people . and though they had no power to make laws , yet they took upon them to propound laws and flattered and humoured the commons by the agrarian and frumentarian laws , by the first they divided the common fields , and conquered lands among ▪ the common people ; and by the latter , they afforded them corn at a cheaper or lower price : by these means these demagogues or tribunes of the commons led the vulgar by the noses , to allow whatsoever usurpations they pleased to make in government . the royal power of the consuls was never taken away from them by any law that i hear of , but continued in them all the time of their pretended popular government , to the very last , though repined at , and opposed in some particulars by the commons . the no-power , or negative power of the tribunes , did not long give content to the commons , and therefore they desired , that one of the consuls might be chosen out of the commonalty : the eager propounding of this point for the commons , and the diligent opposing of it by the nobility or senate , argues how much both parties regarded the sovereign power of a consul ; the dispute lasted fourscore years within two : the tribunes pressing it upon all advantages of opportunity , never gave over till they carried it by strong hand , or stubbornness , hindring all elections of the curule , or greater magistrates , for five years together , whereby the nobles were forced to yield the commons a consul's place , or else an anarchy was ready to destroy them all ; and yet the nobility had for a good while allowed the commons military tribunes with consular power , which , in effect or substance , was all one with having one of the consuls a commoner , so that it was the bare name of a consul which the commons so long strived for with the nobility : in this contentionsome years consuls were chosen , some years military tribunes in such confusion , that the roman historians cannot agree among themselves , what consuls to assign , or name for each year , although they have capitoline tables , sicilian and greek registers , and kalenders , fragments of capitoline marbles , linen books or records to help them : a good while the commons were content with the liberty of having one of the consuls a commoner ; but about fourscore years after they enjoyed this privilege , a desire took them to have it enacted , that a decree of the commons called a plebiscitum might be observed for a law , hortensius the dictator yielded to enact it , thereby to bring back the seditious commons , who departed to ianiculum on the other side of tybur , because they were deeply engaged in debt in regard of long seditions and dissensions . the eleventh book of livy , where this sedition is set down , is lost ; we have only a touch of it it in florus his epitome , and st. augustine mentions the plundring of many houses by the commons at their departing : this sedition was above years after the expulsion of kings ▪ in all which time , the people of rome got the spoil of almost all italy , and the wealth of very many rich cities : and yet the commons were in so great penury , and over whelmed with debts that they fell to plunder the rich houses of the citizens , which sounds not much for the honour of a popular government . this communicating of a legislative power to the commons , touching power of enfranchising allies , judgments penal , and fines , and those ordinances that concerned the good of the commons called plebiscita , was a dividing of the supreme power , and the giving a share of it to others , as well as to the consuls , and was in effect to destroy the legislative power , for to have two supremes is to have none , because the one may destroy the other , and is quite contrary to the indivisible nature of sovereignty . the truth is , the consuls , having but annual sovereignty , were glad for their own safety , and ease in matters of great importance , and weight , to call together sometimes the senate , who were their ordinary councel , and many times the centuries of the people , who were their councel extraordinary , that by their advice they might countenance ▪ and strengthen such actions as were full of danger and envy : and thus the consuls by weakening their original power brought the government to confusion , civil dissension , and utter ruine : so dangerous a thing it is to shew favour to common people , who interpret all graces and favours for their rights , and just liberties : the consuls following the advice of the senate or people , did not take away their right of governing no more than kings lose their supremacy by taking advice in parliaments . not only the consuls , but also the pretors and censors ( two great offices , ordained only for the ease of the consuls , from whom an appeal lay to the consuls ) did in many things exercise an arbitrary or legislative power in the absence of the consuls , they had no laws to limit them : for many years after the creation of consuls , ten men were sent into greece to choose laws ; and after the tables were confirmed , whatsoever the pretors , who were but the consuls substitutes , did command , was called jus honorarium ; and they were wont at the entrance into their office to collect , and hang up for publick view , a form of administration of justice which they would observe , and though the edictum praetoris , expired with the preto●… office ; yet it was called edictum perpetuum . what peace the low-countries have found since their revolt is visible ; it is near about an hundred years since they set up for themselves , of all which time only twelve years they had a truce with the spaniard , yet in the next year , after the truce was agreed upon , the war of iuliers brake forth , which engaged both parties ; so that upon the matter , they have lived in a continued war , for almost years : had it not been for the aid of their neighbours , they had been long ago swallowed up , when they were glad humbly to offer their new hatch'd commonweal , and themselves vassals to the queen of england , after that the french king hen. . had refused to accept them as his subjects ; that little truce they had , was almost as costly as a war ; they being forced to keep about thirty thousand souldiers continually in garrison . two things they say they first fought about , religion and taxes ; and they have prevailed it seems in both , for they have gotten all the religions in christendome , and pay the greatest taxes in the world ; they pay tribute half in half for food , and most necessary things , paying as much for tribute as the price of the thing sold ; excise is paid by all retailers of wine , and other commodities ; for each tun of beer six shillings , for each cow for the pail two stivers every week : for oxen , horses , sheep , and other beasts sold in the market the twelfth part at least , be they never so oft sold by the year to and fro , the new master still pays as much : they pay five stivers for every bushel of their own wheat , which they use to grinde in publick mills : these are the fruits of the low-country war. it will be said that venice is a commonwealth that enjoys peace . she indeed of all other states hath enjoyed of late the greatest peace ; but she owes it not to her kind of government , but to the natural situation of the city , having such a banck in the sea of neer threescore miles , and such marshes towards the land , as make her unapproachable by land , or sea ; to these she is indebted for her peace at home , and what peace she hath abroad she buys at a dear rate ; and yet her peace is little better than a continued war ; the city always is in such perpetual fears , that many besieged cities are in more security ; a senator or gentleman dares not converse with any stranger in venice , shuns acquaintance , or dares not own it : they are no better than banditos to all humane society . nay , no people in the world live in such jealousie one of another ; hence are their intricate solemnities , or rather lotteries in election of their magistrates , which in any other place , would be ridiculous and useless . the senators or gentlemen are not only jealous of the common people , whom they keep disarmed , but of one another ; they dare not trust any of their own citizens to be a leader of their army , but are forced to hire , and entertain foreign princes for their generals , excepting their citizens from their wars , and hiring others in their places ; it cannot be said , that people live in peace which are in such miserable fears continually . the venetians at first were subject to the rom●… emperour ; and for fear of the invasion of the hunnes forsook padua , and other places in italy , and retired with all their substance to those island●… where now venice stands : i do not read they had any leave to desert the defence of their prince and countrey , where they had got their wealth , much less to set up a government of their own ; it was no better than a rebellion , or revolting from the roman empire . at first they lived under a kind of oligarchy ; for several islands had each a tribune , who all met , and governed in common : but the dangerous seditions of their tribunes , put a necessity upon them to choose a duke for life , who , for many hundreds of years , had an absolute power ; under whose government venice flourished most , and got great victories , and rich possessions . but by insensible degrees , the great councel of the gentlemen have for many years been lessening the power of their dukes , and have at last quite taken it away . it is a strange errour for any man to believe , that the government of venice hath been alwayes the same that it is now : he that reads but the history of venice , may find for a long time a sovereign power in their dukes : and that for these last two hundred years , since the diminishing of that power , there hath been no great victories and conquests obtained by that estate . that which exceeds admiration is , that contare●… hath the confidence to affirm the present government of venice to be a mixed form of monarchy , democratie , and aristocratie : for , whereas he makes the duke to have the person and shew of a king ; he after confesseth , that the duke can do nothing at all alone , and being joyned with other magistrates , he hath no more authority than any of them : also the power of the magistrates is so small , that no one of them , how great soever he be , can determine of any thing of moment , without the allowance of the councel . so that this duke is but a man dressed up in purple , a king only in pomp and ornament , in power but a senator , within the city a captive , without a traytor , if he go without leave . as little reason is there to think a popular estate is to be found in the great councel of venice , or s. p. q. u. for it doth not consist of the fortieth part of the people , but only of those they call patritians or gentlemen ; for the commons , neither by themselves , nor by any chosen by them for their representors , are admitted to be any part of the great councel : and if the gentlemen of venice have any right to keep the government in their own hands , and to exclude the commons , they never had it given them by the people , but at first were beholding to monarchy for their nobility . this may further be noted , that though venice of late enjoyed peace abroad , yet it had been with that charge , either for fortification and defence , or in bribery so excessive , whereby of late upon any terms they purchased their peace , that it is said their taxes are such , that christians generally live better under the turk , than under the venetians , for there is not a grain of corn , a spoonful of wine , salt , eggs , birds , beasts , fowl , or fish sold , that payeth not a certain custom : upon occasions the labourers and crafts-men pay a rate by the poll monthly , they receive incredible gains by usury of the jews ▪ for in every city they keep open shops of interest ' taking pawns after fifteen in the hundred , and if at the years end it be not redeemed , it is forfeited , or at the least , sold at great loss . the revenues which the very courtizans pay for toleration , maintains no less than a dozen of gallies . by what hath been said , it may be judged how unagreeable the popular government of rome heretofore , and of venice , and the united provinces at present , are , either for religion or peace ( which two are principal ingredients of government ) and so consequently not fit to be reckoned for forms , since whatsoever is either good or tolerable in either of their governments , is borrowed or patched up of a broken , and distracted monarchy . lastly , though venice and the low countreys are the only remarkable places in this age that reject monarchy ; yet neither of them pretend their government to be founded upon any original right of the people , or have the common people any power amongst them , or any chosen by them . never was any popular estate in the world famous for keeping themselves in peace ; all their glory hath been for quarrelling and fighting . those that are willing to be perswaded , that the power of government is originally in the people , finding how impossible it is for any people to exercise such power , do surmise , that though the people cannot govern , yet they may choose representors or trustees , that may manage this power for the people , and such representors must be surmised to be the people . and since such representors cannot truly be chosen by the people , they are fain to divide the people into several parts , as of provinces , cities , and burrough-towns , and to allow to every one of those parts to choose one representor or more of their own : and such representors , though not any of them be chosen by the whole , or major part of the people , yet still must be surmised to be the people ; nay , though not one of them be chosen either by the people , or the major part of the people of any province , city , or burrough , for which they serve , but onely a smaller part , still it must be said to be the people . now when such representors of the people do assemble or meet , it is never seen that all of them can at one time meet together ; and so there never appears a true , or full representation of the whole people of the nation , the representors of one part or other being absent , but still they must be imagined to be the people . and when such imperfect assemblies be met , though not half be present , they proceed : and though their number be never so small , yet it is so big , that in the debate of any business of moment , they know not how to handle it , without referring it to a fewer number than themselves , though themselves are not so many as they should be . thus those that are chosen to represent the people , are necessitated to choose others , to represent the representors themselves ; a trustee of the north doth delegate his power to a trustee of the south ; and one of the east may substitute one of the west for his proxy : hereby it comes to pass , that publick debates which are imagined to be referred to a general assembly of a kingdom , are contracted into a particular or private assembly , than which nothing can be more destructive , or contrary to the nature of publick assemblies . each company of such trustees hath a prolocutor , or speaker ; who , by the help of three or four of his fellows that are most active , may easily comply in gratifying one the other , so that each of them in their turns may sway the trustees , whilst one man , for himself or his friend , may rule in one business , and another man for himself or his friend prevail in another cause , till such a number of trustees be reduced to so many petty monarchs as there be men of it . so in all popularities , where a general councel , or great assembly of the people meet , they find it impossible to dispatch any great action , either with expedition or secrecy , if a publick free debate be admitted ; and therefore are constrained to epitomize , and sub-epitomise themselves so long , till at last they crumble away into the atomes of monarchy , which is the next degree to anarchy ; for anarchy is nothing else but a broken monarchy , where every man is his own monarch , or governour . whereas the power of the people in choosing both their government and governours , is of late highly magnified , as if they were able to choose the best and excellentest men for that purpose . we shall find it true what aristotle hath affirmed , that to choose well is the office of him that hath knowledge ; none can choose a geometrician but ●… that hath skill in geometry , l. . c. . for , saith he , all men esteem not excellency to be one and the same , l. . c. . a great deal of talk there is in the world of the freedom and liberty that they say is to be found in popular commonweals ; it is worth the enquiry how far , and in what sense this speech of liberty is true . true liberty is for every man to do what he list , or to live as he please , and not to be tied to any laws . but such liberty is not to be found in any commonweal ; for there are more laws in popular estates than any where else ; and so consequently less liberty : and government many say was invented to take away liberty , and not to give it to every man ; such liberty cannot be ; if it should , there would be no government at all : therefore aristotle , l. . cap. . it is profitable not to be lawful to do every thing that we will , for power to do what one will , cannot restrain that evil that is in every man ; so that true liberty cannot , nor should not be in any estate . but the onely liberty that the talkers of liberty can mean , is a liberty for some men to rule and to be ruled , for so aristotle expounds it ; one while to govern , another while to be governed ; to be a king in the forenoon , and a subject in the afternoon ; this is the onely liberty that a popular estate can brag of , that where a monarchy hath but one king , their government hath the liberty to have many kings by turns . if the common people look for any other liberty , either of their persons or their purses , they are pitifully deceived , for a perpetual army and taxes are the principal materials of all popular regiments : never yet any stood without them , and very seldom continued with them ; many popular estates have started up , but few have lasted ; it is no hard matter for any kind of government to last one , or two , or three dayes , l. . c. . for all such as out of hope of liberty , attempt to erect new forms of government , he gives this prudent lesson . we must look well into the continuance of time , and remembrance of many years , wherein the means tending to establish community had not lain hid , if they had been good and useful ; for almost all things have been found out , albeit some have not been received , and other some have been rejected , after men have had experience of them ; l. . c. . it is believed by many , that at the very first assembling of the people , it was unanimously agreed in the first place , that the consent of the major part should bind the whole ; and that though this first agreement cannot possibly be proved , either how , or by whom it should be made ; yet it must necessarily be believed or supposed , because otherwise there could be no lawful government at all . that there could be no lawful government , except a general consent of the whole people be first surmised , is no sound proposition ; yet true it is , that there could be no popular government without it . but if there were at first a government without being beholden to the people for their consent , as all men confess there was , i find no reason but that there may be so still , without asking leave of the multitude . if it be true , that men are by nature free-born , and not to be governed without their own consents , and that self-preservation is to be regarded in the first place , it is not lawful for any government but self-government to be in the world , it were sin in the people to desire , or attempt to consent to any other government : if the fathers will promise for themselves to be slaves , yet for their children they cannot , who have alwayes the same right to set themselves at liberty , which their fathers had to enslave themselves . to pretend that a major part , or the silent consent of any part , may be interpreted to bind the whole people , is both unreasonable and unnatural ; it is against all reason for men to bind others , where it is against nature for men to bind themselves . men that boast so much of natural feeedom , are not willing to consider how contradictory and destructive the power of a major part is to the natural liberty of the whole people ; the two grand favourites of the subjects , liberty and property ( for which most men pretend to strive ) are as contrary as fire to water , and cannot stand together . though by humane laws in voluntary actions , a major part may be tolerated to bind the whole multitude , yet in necessary actions , such as those of nature are , it cannot be so . besides , if it were possible for a whole people to choose their representors , then either every , each one of those representors ought to be particularly chosen by the whole people , and not one representor by one part , and another representor by another part of the people , or else it is necessary , that continually the entire number of the representors be present , because otherwise the whole people is never represented . again , it is impossible for the people , though they might and would choose a government , or governours , ever to be able to do it : for the people , to speak truly and properly , is a thing or body in continual alteration and change , it never continues one minute the same , being composed of a multitude of parts , whereof divers continually decay and perish , and others renew and succeed in their places ; they which are the people this minute , are not the people the next minute . if it be answered , that it is impossible to stand so strictly , as to have the consent of the whole people ; and therefore that which cannot be , must be supposed to be the act of the whole people : this is a strange answer , first to affirm a necessity of having the peoples consent , than to confess an impossibility of having it . if but once that liberty , which is esteemed so sacred , be broken , or taken away but from one of the meanest or basest of all the people ; a wide gap is thereby opened for any multitude whatsoever , that is able to call themselves , or whomsoever they please , the people . howsoever men are naturally willing to be perswaded , that all sovereignty flows from the consent of the people , and that without it no true title can be made to any supremacy ; and that it is so currant an axiome of late , that it will certainly pass without contradiction as a late exercitator tells us : yet there are many and great difficulties in the point never yet determined , not so much as disputed , all which the exercitator waves and declines , professing he will not insist upon the distinctions , touching the manner of the peoples passing their consent , nor determine which of them is sufficient , and which not to make the right or title ; whether it must be antecedent to possession , or may be consequent : express , or tacite : collective , or representative : absolute , or conditionated : free , or inforced : revocable , or irrevocable . all these are material doubts concerning the peoples title , and though the exercitator will not himself determine what consent is sufficient , and what not , to make a right or title , yet he might have been so courteous , as to have directed us , to whom we might go for resolution in these cases . but the truth is , that amongst all them that plead the necessity of the consent of the people , not one of them hath ever toucht upon these so necessary doctrines ; it is a task it seems too difficult , otherwise surely it would not have been neglected , considering how necessary it is to resolve the conscience , touching the manner of the peoples passing their consent ; and what is sufficient , and what not , to make , or derive a right , or title from the people . no multitude or great assembly of any nation , though they be all of them never so good and vertuous , can possibly govern ; this may be evidently discovered by considering the actions of great and numerous assemblies , how they are necessitated to relinquish that supreme power , which they think they exercise , and to delegate it to a few . there are two parts of the supreme power , the legislative , and the executive , neither of these can a great assembly truly act . if a new law be to be made it may in the general receive the proposal of it from one or more of the general assembly , but the forming , penning , or framing it into a law is committed to a few , because a great number of persons cannot without tedious , and dilatory debates , examine the benefits and mischiefs of a law. thus in the very first beginning the intention of a general assembly is frustrated ; then after a law is penned or framed , when it comes to be questioned , whether it shall pass or nay ; though it be voted in a full assembly , yet by the rules of the assembly , they are all so tyed up , and barred from a free and full debate ; that when any man hath given the reasons of his opinion ; if those reasons be argued against , he is not permitted to reply in justification or explanation of them , but when he hath once spoken , he must be heard no more ▪ which is a main denial of that freedome of debate , for which the great assembly is alleaged to be ordained in the high point of legislative power . the same may be said , touching the executive power ; if a cause be brought before a great assembly , the first thing done , is to referr , or commit it to some few of the assembly , who are trusted with the examining the proofs , and witnesses , and to make report to the general assembly ; who upon the report proceed to give their judgments without any publick hearing , or interrogating the witnesses , upon whose testimonies diligently examined every man that will pass a conscientious judgment is to rely . thus the legislative and executive power are never truly practised in a great assembly ; the true reason whereof is , if freedom be given to debate , never any thing could be agreed upon without endless disputes ; meer necessity compels to refer main transactions of business to particular congregations and committees . those governments that seem to be popular a●… kinds of petty monarchies , which may thus appear : government is a relation between the governours , and the governed , the one cannot be without the other , mutuò se ponunt & auferunt ; where a command or law proceeds from a major part , there those individual persons that concurred in the vote , are the governours , because the law is only their will in particular : the power of a major part being a contingent , or casual thing , expires in the very act it self of voting , which power of a major part is grounded upon a supposition , that they are the stronger part ; when the vote is past , these voters , which are the major part , return again , and are incorporated into the whole assembly , and are buried as it were in that lump , and no otherwise considered ; the act or law ordained by such a vote , loseth the makers of it , before it comes to be obeyed ; for when it comes to be put in execution , it becomes the will of those who enjoyn it , and force obedience to it , not by virtue of any power derived from the makers of the law. no man can say , that during the reign of the late queen elizabeth , that king henry the th . or edward the sixth did govern , although that many of the laws that were made in those two former princes times , were observed , and executed under her government ; but those laws , though made by her predecessours , yet became the laws of her present government ; who willed and commanded the execution of them , and had the same power to correct , interpret , or mitigate them , which the first makers of them had ; every law must always have some present known person in being , whose will it must be to make it a law for the present ; this cannot be said of the major part of any assembly , because that major part instantly ceaseth , as soon as ever it hath voted : an infallible argument whereof is this , that the same major part after the vote given ; hath no power to correct , alter , or mitigate it , or to cause it to be put in execution ; so that he that shall act , or cause that law to be executed , makes himself the commander , or willer of it , which was originally the will of others : it is said by mr. hobs in his leviathan page . nothing is law , where the legislator cannot be known ; for there must be manifest signs , that it proceedeth from the will of the sovereign ; there is requisite , not only a declaration of the law , but also sufficient signs of the author and the authority . that senate or great councel , wherein it is conceived the supreme , or legislative power doth rest , consists of those persons who are actually subjects at the very same time , wherein they exercise their legislative power , and at the same instant may be guilty of breaking one law , whilest they are making another law ; for it is not the whole and entire will of every particular person in the assembly , but that part onely of his will , which accidentally falls out to concurr with the will of the greater part : so that the sharers of the legislative power have each of them , perhaps not a hundreth part of the legislative power ( which in it self is indivisible ) and that not in act , but in possibility , only in one particular point for that moment , whilst they give their vote . to close this point which may seem strange and new to some , i will produce the judgment of bodin , in his sixth book of a commonweal , and the fourth chapter ; his words are , the chief point of a commonweal , which is the right of sovereignty , cannot be , nor insist , to speak properly , but in monarchy ; for none can be sovereign in a commonweal , but one alone ; if they be two or three or more , no one is sovereign , for that no one of them can give or take a law from his companion : and although we imagine a body of many lords , or of a whole people to hold the sovereignty , yet hath it no true ground nor support , if there be not a head with absolute power to unite them together , which a simple magistrate without sovereign authority cannot do . and if it chance that the lords , or tribes of the people be divided ( as it often falls out ) then must they fall to arms one against another : and although the greatest part be of one opinion , yet may it so happen , as the lesser part , having many legions , and making a head , may oppose it self against the greater number , and get the victory . we see the difficulties which are , and always have been in popular estates , whereas they hold contrary parts and for divers magistrates , some demand peace , others war ; some will have this law , others that ; some will have one commander , others another ; some will treat a league with the king of france , others with the king of spain , corrupted or drawn , some one way , some another , making open war , as hath been seen in our age amongst the grisons &c. upon these texts of aristotle forecited , and from the mutability of the roman popularity , which aristotle lived not to see , i leave the learned to consider , whether it be not probable that these , or the like parodoxes may be inferred to be the plain mind of aristotle , viz. . that there is no form of government , but monarchy only , , that there is no monarchy , but paternal . . that there is no paternal monarchy , but absolute , or arbitrary . . that there is no such thing as an aristocratie or democratie . . that there is no such form of government as a tyranny . . that the people are not born free by nature . directions for obedience to government in dangerous or doubtful times . all those who so eagerly strive for an original power to be in the people , do with one consent acknowledge , that originally the supreme power was in the fatherhood ; and that the first kings were fathers of families : this is not only evident , and affirmed by aristotle ; but yielded unto by grotius , mr. selden , mr. hobbs , mr. ascam ; and all others of that party , not one excepted , that i know of . now for those that confess an original subjection in children , to be governed by their parents , to dream of an original freedom in mankind , is to contradict themselves ; and to make subjects to be free , and kings to be limited ; to imagine such pactions and contracts between kings and people , as cannot be proved ever to have been made , or can ever be described or fancied , how it is possible for such contracts ever to have been , is a boldness to be wondred at . mr. selden confesseth , that adam , by donation from god , was made the general lord of all things , not without such a private dominion to himself , as ( without his grant ) did exclude his children . and by donation , or assignation , or some kind of concession ( before he was dead , or left any heir to succeed him ) his children had their distinct territories , by right of private dominion . abel had his flocks , and pastures for them : cain had his fields for corn , and the land of nod , where he built himself a city . it is confessed , that in the infancy of the world , the paternal government was monarchical ; but when the world was replenished with multitude of people , then the paternal government ceased , and was lost ; and an elective kind of government by the people , was brought into the world. to this it may be answered , that the paternal power cannot be lost ; it may either be transferr'd or usurped ; but never lost , or ceaseth . god , who is the giver of power , may transferr it from the father to some other ; he gave to saul a fatherly power over his father kish . god also hath given to the father a right or liberty to alien his power over his children , to any other ; whence we find the sale and gift of children , to have been much in use in the beginning of the world , when men had their servants for a possession and an inheritance as well as other goods : whereupon we find the power of castrating , and making eunuchs much in use in old times . as the power of the father may be lawfully transferr'd or aliened , so it may be unjustly usurped : and in usurpation , the title of an usurper is before , and better than the title of any other than of him that had a former right : for he hath a possession by the permissive will of god , which permission , how long it may endure , no man ordinarily knows . every man is to preserve his own life for the service of god , and of his king or father , and is so far to obey an usurper , as may tend not only to the preservation of his king and father , but sometimes even to the preservation of the usurper himself , when probably he may thereby be reserved to the correction , or mercy of his true superiour ; though by humane laws , a long prescription may take away right , yet divine right never dies , nor can be lost , or taken away . every man that is born , is so far from being free-born , that by his very birth he becomes a subject to him that begets him : under which subjection he is always to live , unless by immediate appointment from god , or by the grant or death of his father , he become possessed of that power to which he was subject . the right of fatherly government was ordained by god , for the preservation of mankind ; if it be usurped , the usurper may be so far obeyed , as may tend to the preservation of the subjects , who may thereby be enabled to perform their duty to their true and right sovereign , when time shall serve : in such cases to obey an usurper , is properly to obey the first and right governour , who must be presumed to desire the safety of his subjects : the command of an usurper is not to be obeyed in any thing tending to the destruction of the person of the governour , whose being in the first place is to be looked after ▪ it hath been said , that there have been so many usurpations by conquest in all kingdoms , that all kings are usurpers , or the heirs or successors of usurpers ; and therefore any usurper , if he can but get the possession of a kingdom , hath as good a title as any other . answer . the first usurper hath the best title , being , as was said , in possession by the permission of god ; and where an usurper hath continued so long , that the knowledge of the right heir be lost by all the subjects , in such a case an usurper in possession is to be taken and reputed by such subjects for the true heir , and is to be obeyed by them as their father . as no man hath an infallible certitude , but onely a moral knowledge , which is no other than a probable perswasion grounded upon a peaceable possession , which is a warrant for subjection to parents and governours ; for we may not say , because children have no infallible , or necessary certainty who are their true parents , that therefore they need not obey , because they are uncertain : it is sufficient , and as much as humane nature is capable of , for children to rely upon a credible perswasion ; for otherwise the commandement of honour thy father , would be a vain commandment , and not possible to be observed . by humane positive laws , a possession time out of mind takes away , or barrs a former right , to avoid a general mischief , of bringing all right into a disputation not decideable by proof , and consequently to the overthrow of all civil government , in grants , gifts , and contracts , between man and man : but in grants and gifts that have their original from god or nature , as the power of the father hath , no inferiour power of man can limit , nor make any law of prescription against them : upon this ground is built that common maxim , that nullum tempus occurrit regi , no time bars a king. all power on earth is either derived or usurped from the fatherly power , there being no other original to be found of any power whatsoever ; for if there should be granted two sorts of power without any subordination of one to the other , they would be in perpetual strife which should be supreme , for two supremes cannot agree ; if the fatherly power be supreme , then the power of the people must be subordinate , and depend on it ; if the power of the people be supreme , then the fatherly power must submit to it , and cannot be exercised without the licence of the people , which must quite destroy the frame and course of nature . even the power which god himself exerciseth over mankind is by right of fatherhood ; he is both the king and father of us all ; as god hath exalted the dignity of earthly kings , by communicating to them his own title , by saying they are gods ; so on the other side , he hath been pleased as it were to humble himself , by assuming the title of a king , to express his power , and not the title of any popular government ; we find it is a punishment to have no king , hosea , ch . . . and promised , as a blessing to abraham , gen. . . that kings shall come out of thee . every man hath a part or share in the preservation of mankind in general , he that usurps the power of a superiour , thereby puts upon himself a necessity of acting the duty of a superiour in the preservation of them over whom he hath usurped , unless he will aggravate one heinous crime , by committing another more horrid ; he that takes upon him the power of a superiour sins sufficiently , and to the purpose : but he that proceeds to destroy both his superiour , and those under the superiours protection , goeth a strain higher , by adding murther to robbery ; if government be hindered , mankind perisheth , an usurper by hindering the government of another , brings a necessity upon himself to govern , his duty before usurpation was only to be ministerial , or instrumental in the preservation of others by his obedience ; but when he denies his own , and hinders the obedience of others , he doth not only not help , but is the cause of the distraction in hindering his superiour to perform his duty , he makes the duty his own : if a superiour cannot protect , it is his part to desire to be able to do it , which he cannot do in the future if in the present they be destroyed for want of government : therefore it is to be presumed , that the superiour desires the preservation of them that should be subject to him ; and so likewise it may be presumed , that an usurper in general doth the will of his superiour , by preserving the people by government , and it is not improper to say , that in obeying an usurper , we may obey primarily the true superiour , so long as our obedience aims at the preservation of those in subjection , and not at the destruction of the true governour . not only the usurper , but those also over whom power is usurped , may joyn in the preservation of themselves , yea , and in the preservation sometimes of the usurper himself . thus there may be a conditional duty , or right in an usurper to govern ; that is to say , supposing him to be so wicked as to usurp , and not willing to surrender or forego his usurpation , he is then bound to protect by government , or else he encreaseth , and multiplyeth his sin. though an usurper can never gain a right from the true superiour , yet from those that are subjects he may ; for if they know no other that hath a better title than the usurper , then as to them the usurper in possession hath a true right . such a qualified right is found at first in all usurpers , as is in theives who have stolen goods , and during the time they are possessed of them , have a title in law against all others but the true owners , and such usurpers to divers intents and purposes may be obeyed . neither is he only an usurper who obtains the government , but all they are partakers in the usurpation , who have either failed to give assistance to their lawful sovereign , or have given aid either by their persons , estates or counsels for the destroying of that governour , under whose protection they have been born and preserved ; for although it should be granted , that protection and subjection are reciprocal , so that where the first fails , the latter ceaseth ; yet it must be remembred ; that where a man hath been born under the protection of a long and peaceable government , he owes an assistance for the preservation of that government that hath protected him , and is the author of his own disobedience . it is said by some , that an usurped power may be obeyed in things that are lawful : but it may not be obeyed not only in lawful things , but also in things indifferent : obedience in things indifferent , is necessary ; not indifferent . for in things necessarily good god is immediately obeyed , superiours only by consequence : if men command things evil , obedience is due only by tolerating what they inflict : not by performing what they require : in the first they declare what god commands to be done , in the latter what to be suffered , so it remains , that things indifferent only are the proper object of humane laws . actions are to be considered simply and alone , and so are good as being motions depending on the first mover ; or jointly with circumstances : and that in a double manner . . in regard of the ability or possibility whilest they may be done . . in the act when they be performed : before they be done they be indifferent , but once breaking out into act , they become distinctly good or evil according to the circumstances which determine the same . now an action commanded , is supposed as not yet done ( whereupon the hebrews call the imperative mood the first future ) and so remaineth many times indifferent . some may be of opinion , that if obedience may be given to an usurper in things indifferent , as well as to a lawful power ; that then there is as much obedience due to an usurped power , as to a lawful . but it is a mistake ; for though it be granted that in things indifferent , an usurper may be obeyed , as well as a lawful governour ; yet herein lyeth a main difference , that some things are indifferent for a lawful superiour , which are not indifferent , but unlawful to an usurper to enjoyn . usurpation is the resisting , and taking away the power from him , who hath such a former right to govern the usurper , as cannot lawfully be taken away : so that it cannot be just for an usurper , to take advantage of his own unlawful act , or create himself a title by continuation of his own injustice , which aggravates , and never extenuates his crime : and if it never can be an act indifferent for the usurper himself to disobey his lawful sovereign , much less can it be indifferent for him to command another to do that to which he hath no right himself . it is only then a matter indifferent for an usurper to command , when the actions enjoyned are such ; as the lawful superiour is commanded by the law of god , to provide for the benefit of his subjects , by the same , or other like restriction of such indifferent things ; and it is to be presumed , if he had not been hindred , would have commanded the same , or the like laws . observations concerning the original of government , upon mr. hobs his leviathan . mr. milton against salmasius . h. grotius de iure belli . mr. hunton's treatise of monarchy . arist. pol. lib. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the preface . with no small content i read mr. hobs's book de cive , and his leviathan , about the rights of sovereignty , which no man , that i know , hath so amply and judiciously handled : i consent with him about the rights of exercising government , but i cannot agree to his means of acquiring it . it may seem strange i should praise his building , and yet mislike his foundation ; but so it is , his jus naturae , and his regnum institutivum , will not down with me : they appear full of contradiction and impossibilities ; a few short notes about them , i here offer , wishing he would consider , whether his building would not stand firmer upon the principles of regnum patrimoniale ( as he calls it ) both according to scripture and reason . since he confesseth , the father , being before the institution of a commonwealth , was originally an absolute sovereign , with power of life and death , and that a great family , as to the rights of sovereignty , is a little monarchy . if , according to the order of nature , he had handled paternal government before that by institution , there would have been little liberty left in the subjects of the family to consent to institution of government . in his pleading the cause of the people , he arms them with a very large commission of array ; which is , a right in nature for every man , to war against every man when he please : and also a right for all the people to govern . this latter point , although he affirm in words , yet by consequence he denies , as to me it seemeth . he saith , a representative may be of all , or but of a part of the people . if it be of all , he terms it a democratie , which is the government of the people . but how can such a commonwealth be generated ? for if every man covenant with every man , who shall be left to be the representative ? if all must be representatives , who will remain to covenant ? for ●…e that is sovereign makes no covenant by his doctrine . it is not all that will come together , that makes the democratie , but all that have power by covenant ; thus his democratie by institution fails . the same may be said of a democratie by acquisition ; for if all be conquerours , who shall covenant for life and liberty ? and if all be not conquerours , how can it be a democratie by conquest ? a paternal democratie i am confident he will not affirm ; so that in conclusion the poor people are deprived of their government , if there can be no democratie , by his principles . next , if a representative aristocratical of a part of the people be free from covenanting , then that whole assembly ( call it what you will ) though it be never so great , is in the state of nature , and every one of that assembly hath a right not only to kill any of the subjects that they meet with in the streets , but also they all have a natural right to cut one anothers throats , even while they sit together in councel , by his principles . in this miserable condition of war is his representative aristocratical by institution . a commonwealth by conquest , he teacheth , is then acquired , when the vanquished , to avoid present death , covenanteth , that so long as his life , and the liberty of his body is allowed him , the victor shall have the use of it at his pleasure . here i would know how the liberty of the vanquished can be allowed , if the victor have the use of it at pleasure , or how it is possible for the victor to perform his covenant , except he could alwayes stand by every particular man to protect his life and liberty ? in his review and conclusion he resolves , that an ordinary subject hath liberty to submit , when the means of his life is within the guards and garisons of the enemy . it seems hereby that the rights of sovereignty by institution may be forfeited , for the subject cannot be at liberty to submit to a conquerour , except his former subjection be forfeited for want of protection . if his conquerour be in the state of nature when he conquers , he hath a right without any covenant made with the conquered : if conquest be defined to be the acquiring of right of sovereignty by victory , why is it said , the right is acquired in the peoples submission , by which they contract with the victor , promising obedience for life and liberty ? hath not every one in the state of nature a right to sovereignty before conquest , which onely puts him in possession of his right ? if his conquerour be not in the state of nature , but a subject by covenant , how can he get a right of sovereignty by conquest , when neither he himself hath right to conquer , nor subjects a liberty to submit ? since a former contract lawfully made , cannot lawfully be broken by them . i wish the title of the book had not been of a common-wealth , but of a weal publick , or common-weal , which is the true word , carefully observed by our translator of bodin de republica into english : many ignorant men are ap●… by the name of common-wealth to understand a popular government , wherein wealth and all things shall be common , tending to the levelling community in the state of pure nature . observations on mr. hobs's leviathan : or , his artificial man a commonwealth . i. if god created only adam , and of a piece of him made the woman ; and if by generation from them two , as parts of them , all mankind be propagated : if also god gave to adam not only the dominion over the woman and the children that should issue from them , but also over the whole earth to subdue it , and over all the creatures on it , so that as long as adam lived no man could claim or enjoy any thing but by donation , assignation , or permission from him ; i wonder how the right of nature can be imagined by mr. hobs , which he saith pag. . is , a liberty for each man to use his own power as he will himself for preservation of his own life ; a condition of war of every one against every one , a right of every man to every thing , even to one anothers body , especially since himself affirms , pag. . that originally the father of every man was also his sovereign lord , with power over him of life and death . ii mr. hobs confesseth and believes it was never generally so , that there was such a jus naturae ; and if not generally , then not at all , for one exception bars all if he mark it well ; whereas he imagines such a right of nature may be now ▪ practised in america , he confesseth a government there of families , which government how small or brutish soever ( as he calls it ) is sufficient to destroy his jus naturale . iii. i cannot understand how this right of nature can be conceived without imagining a company of men at the very first to have been all created together without any dependency one of another , or as mushroms ( fungorum more ) they all on a sudden were sprung out of the earth without any obligation one to another , as mr. hobs's words are in his book de cive , cap. . sect . . the scripture teacheth us otherwise , that all men came by succession , and generation from one man : we must not deny the truth of the history of the creation . iv. it is not to be thought that god would create man in a condition worse than any beasts , as if he made men to no other end by nature but to destroy one another ; a right for the father to destroy or eat his children , and for children to do the like by their parents , is worse than canibals . this horrid condition of pure nature when mr. hobs was charged with , his refuge was to answer , that no son can be understood to be in this state of pure nature : which is all one with denying his own principle , for if men be not free-born , it is not possible for him to assign and prove any other time for them to claim a right of nature to liberty , if not at their birth . v. but if it be allowed ( which is yet most false ) that a company of men were at first without a common power to keep them in awe ; i do not see why such a condition must be called a state of war of all men against all men : indeed if such a multitude of men should be created as the earth could not well nourish , there might be cause for men to destroy one another rather than perish for want of food ; but god was no such niggard in the creation , and there being plenty of sustenance and room for all men , there is no cause or use of war till men be hindred in the preservation of life , so that there is no absolute necessity of war in the state of pure nature , it is the right of nature for every man to live in peace , that so he may tend the preservation of his life , which whilst he is in actual war he cannot do . war of it self as it is war preserves no mans life , it only helps us to preserve and obtain the means to live : if every man tend the right of preserving life , which may be done in peace , there is no cause of war. vi. but admit the state of nature were the state of war ; let us see what help mr. hobs hath for it , it is a principle of his , that the law of nature is a rule found out by reason , ( i do think it is given by god ) pag. . forbidding a man to do that which is destructive to his life , and to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved : if the right of nature be a liberty for a man to do any thing he thinks fit to preserve his life , then in the first place nature must teach him that life is to be preserved , and so consequently forbids to do that which may destroy or take away the means of life , or to omit that by which it may be preserved : and thus the right of nature and the law of nature will be all one : for i think mr. hobs will not say the right of nature is a liberty for man to destroy his own life . the law of nature might better have been said to consist in a command to preserve or not to omit the means of preserving life , than in a prohibition to destroy , or to omit it . vii . another principle i meet with , pag. . if other men will not lay down their right as well as he , then there is no reason for any to devest himself of his : hence it follows , that if all the men in the world do not agree , no common-wealth can be established ; it is a thing impossible for all the men in the world , every man with every man , to covenant to lay down their right . nay it is not possible to be done in the smallest kingdom , though all men should spend their whole lives in nothing else but in running up and down to covenant . viii . right may be laid aside but not transfer'd , for pag. . he that renounceth or passeth away his right , giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before , and reserves a right in himself against all those with whom he doth not covenant . ix . pag. . the only way to erect a common power or a commonwealth ; is for men to confer all their power and strength upon one man , or one assembly of men , that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices to one will ; which is to appoint one man or an assembly of men to bear their person , to submit their wills to his will : this is a real unity of them all in one person , made by covenant of every man with every man , as if every man should say to every man , i authorise , and give up my right of governing my self to this man , or this assembly of men , on this condition , that thou give up thy right to him , and authorise all his actions . this done , the multitude so united in one person , is called a commonwealth . to authorise and give up his right of governing himself , to confer all his power and strength , and to submit his will to another , is to lay down his right of resisting : for if right of nature be a liberty to use power for preservation of life , laying down of that power must be a relinquishing of power to preserve or defend life , otherwise a man relinquisheth nothing . to reduce all the wills of an assembly by plurality of voices to one will , is not a proper speech , for it is not a plurality but a totality of voices which makes an assembly be of one will , otherwise it is but the one will of a major part of the assembly , the negative voice of any one hinders the being of the one will of the assembly , there is nothing more destructive to the true nature of a lawful assembly , than to allow a major part to prevail when the whole only hath right . for a man to give up his right to one that never covenants to protect , is a great folly , since it is neither in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself , nor can he hope for any other good , by standing out of the way , that the other may enjoy his own original right without hinderance from him by reason of so much diminution of impediments . pag. . x. the liberty , saith mr. hobs , whereof there is so frequent and honourable mention in the histories and philosophy of the ancient greeks and romans , and in the writings and discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the politiques , is not the liberty of particular men , but the liberty of the commonwealth . whether a commonwealth be monarchical or popular , the freedom is still the same . here i find mr. hobs is much mistaken : for the liberty of the athenians and romans was a liberty only to be found in popular estates , and not in monarchies . this is clear by aristotle , who calls a city a community of freemen , meaning every particular citizen to be free . not that every particular man had a liberty to resist his governour , or do what he list , but a liberty only for particular men , to govern and to be governed by turns , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are aristotles words : this was a liberty not to be found in hereditary monarchies : so tacitus mentioning the several governments of rome , joyns the consulship and liberty to be brought in by brutus , because by the annual election of consuls , particular citizens came in their course to govern and to be governed . this may be confirmed by the complaint of our author , which followeth : it is an easie thing for men to be deceived by the specious name of liberty : and for want of iudgment to distinguish , mistake that for their private inheritance or birth-right which is the right of the publick only : and when the same error is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings on this subject , it is no wonder if it produce sedition and change of government . in the western parts of the world , we are made to receive our opinions concerning the institution and right of common-wealths from aristotle and cicero , and other men , greeks and romans , that living under popular estates , derived those rights not from the principles of nature , but transcribed them into their books ●…ut of the practice of their own commonwealths , which were popular . and because the athenians were taught ( to keep them from desire of changing their government ) that they were free-men , and all that lived under monarchy , slaves : therefore aristotle puts it down in his politiques . in democracy liberty is to be supposed , for it 's commonly held that no man is free in any other government . so cicero and other writers grounded their civil doctrine on the opinions of the romans , who were taught to hate monarchy , at first , by them that having deposed their sovereign , shared amongst them the sovereignty of rome . and by reading of these greek and latine authors , men from their childhood have gotten a habit ( under a false shew of liberty , ) of favouring tumults , and of licentious controuling the actions of their sovereigns . xi . pag. . dominion paternal not attained by generation , but by contract , which is the childs consent , either express , or by other sufficient arguments declared . how a child can express consent , or by other sufficient arguments declare it before it comes to the age of discretion i understand not , yet all men grant it is due before consent can be given ; and i take it mr. hobs is of the same mind , pag. . where he teacheth , that abrahams children were bound to obey what abraham should declare to them for gods law : which they could not be but in vertue of the obedience they owed to their parents ; they owed , not they covenanted to give . also where he saith pag. . the father and master being before the institution of commonweals absolute sovereigns in their own families , how can it be said that either children or servants were in the state of jus naturae till the institutions of commonweals ? it is said by mr. hobs , in his book de cive , cap. . section . the mother originally hath the government of her children , and from her the father derives his right , because she brings forth and first nourisheth them . but we know that god at the creation gave the sovereignty to the man over the woman , as being the nobler and principal agent in generation . as to the objection , that it is not known who is the father to the son , but by the discovery of the mother , and that he is his son whom the mother will , and therefore he is the mother's : the answer is , that it is not at the will of the mother to make whom she will the father , for if the mother be not in possession of a husband , the child is not reckoned to have any father at all ; but if she be in the possession of a man , the child , notwithstanding whatsoever the woman discovereth to the contrary , is still reputed to be his in whose possession she is . no child naturally and infallibly knows who are his true parents , yet he must obey those that in common reputation are so , otherwise the commandement of honour thy father and thy mother were in vain , and no child bound to the obedience of it . xii . if the government of one man , and the government of two men , make two several kinds of government , why may not the government of of two , and the government of three do the like , and make a third ? and so every differing number a differing kind of common-wealth . if an assembly of all ( as mr. hobs saith ) that will come together be a democratie , and an assembly of a part onely an aristocratie , then if all that will come together be but a part onely , a democratie and aristocratie are all one ; and why must an assembly of part be called an aristocratie , and not a merocratie ? it seems mr ▪ hobs is of the mind that there is but one kind of government , and that is monarchy ; for he defines a commonwealth to be one person , and an assembly of men , or real unity of them all in one and the same person , the multitude so united he calls a common-wealth : this his moulding of a multitude into one person , is the generation of his great leviathan , the king of the children of pride , pag. . thus he concludes the person of a commonwealth to be a monarch . xiii . i cannot but wonder master hobs should say , page . the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words , i authorise , and do take upon me all his actions , in which there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty . surely here master hobs forgot himself ; for before he makes the resignation to go in these words also , i give up my right of governing my self to this man : this is a restriction certainly of his own former natural liberty , when he gives it away : and if a man allow his sovereign to kill him , which mr. hobs seems to confess , how can he reserve a right to defend himself ? and if a man have a power and right to kill himself , he doth not authorise and give up his right to his sovereign , if he do not obey him when he commands him to kill himself . xiv . mr. hobs saith , pag. . no man is bound by the words themselves of his submission to kill himself , 〈◊〉 any other man : and consequently that the obligation a man may sometimes have upon ▪ the command of the sovereign to execute any dangerous or dishonourable office , dependeth not on the words of our submission , but on the intention , which is to be understood by the end thereof . when therefore our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained , then there is no liberty to refuse : otherwise there is . if no man be bound by the words of his subjection to kill any other man , then a sovereign may be denied the benefit of war , and be rendred unable to defend his people , and so the end of government frustrated . if the obligation upon the commands of a sovereign to execute a dangerous or dishonourable office , dependeth not on the words of our submission , but on the intention , which is to be understood by the end thereof ; no man , by mr. hobs's rules , is bound but by the words of his submission ; the intention of the command binds not , if the words do not : if the intention should bind , it is necessary the sovereign must discover it , and the people must dispute and judge it ; which how well it may consist with the rights of sovereignty , master ▪ hobs may consider : whereas master hobs saith , the intention is to be understood by the end ; i take it he means the end by effect , for the end and the intention are one and the same thing ; and if he mean the effect , the obedience must go before , and not depend on the understanding of the effect , which can never be , if the obedience do not precede it : in fine , he resolves , refusal to obey may depend upon the judging of what frustrates the end of sovereignty , and what not , of which he cannot mean any other judge but the people . xv. mr. hobs puts a case by way of question . a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly , or committed some capital crime , for which every one of them expecteth death : whether have they not the liberty then to joyn together , and assist and defend one another ? certainly they have ; for they but defend their lives , which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent : there was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty , their bearing of arms subsequent to it , though it be to maintain what they have done , is no new unjust act ; and if it be only to defend their persons , it is not unjust at all . the only reason here alleged for the bearing of arms , is this ; that there is no new unjust act : as if the beginning only of a rebellion were an unjust act , and the continuance of it none at all . no better answer can be given to this case , than what the author himself hath delivered in the beginning of the same paragraph , in these words ; to resist the sword of the commonwealth in defence of another man , guilty or innocent , no man hath liberty : because such liberty takes away from the sovereign the means of protecting us , and is therefore destructive of the very essence of government . thus he first answers the question , and then afterwards makes it , and gives it a contrary answer : other passages i meet with to the like purpose . he saith , page . a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life : the same may be said of wounds , chains , and imprisonment . page . a covenant to defend my self from force by force , is void . pag. . right of defending life and means of living , can never be abandoned . these last doctrines are destructive to all government whatsoever , and even to the leviathan it self : hereby any rogue or villain may murder his sovereign , if the sovereign but offer by force to whip or lay him in the stocks , since whipping may be said to be wounding , and putting in the stocks an imprisonment : so likewise every mans goods being a means of living , if a man cannot abandon them , no contract among men , be it never so just , can be observed : thus we are at least in as miserable condition of war , as mr. hobs at first by nature found us . xvi . the kingdom of god signifies , ( saith master hobs , page . ) a kingdom constituted by the votes of the people of israel in a peculiar manner , wherein they choose god for their king , by covenant made with him , upon god's promising them canaan . if we look upon master hob's text for this , it will be found that the people did not constitute by votes , and choose god for their king ; but by the appointment first of god himself , the covenant was to be a god to them : they did not contract with god , that if he would give them canaan , they would be his subjects , and he should be their king ; it was not in their power to choose whether god should be their god , yea , or nay : for it is confessed , he reigned naturally over all by his might . if god reigned naturally , he had a kingdom , and sovereign power over his subjects , not acquired by their own consent . this kingdom , said to be constituted by the votes of the people of israel , is but the vote of abraham only ; his single voyce carried it ; he was the representative of the people . for at this vote , it is confessed , that the name of king is not given to god , nor of kingdom to abraham ; yet the thing , if we will believe master hobs , is all one . if a contract be the mutual transferring of right , i would know what right a people can have to transferr to god by contract . had the people of israel at mount sinai a right not to obey god's voice ? if they had not such a right , what had they to transferr ? the covenant mentioned at mount sinai was but a conditional contract , and god but a conditional king ; and though the people promised to obey gods word , yet it was more than they were able to perform , for they often disobeyed gods voice , which being a breach of the condition , the covenant was void , and god not their king by contract . it is complained by god , they have rejected me that i should reign over them : but it is not said , according to their contract ; for i do not find that the desiring of a king was a breach of their contract of covenant , or disobedience to the voice of god : there is no such law extant . the people did not totally reject the lord , but in part onely , out of timorousness , when they saw nahash king of the children of ammon come against them ; they distrusted that god would not suddenly provide for their deliverance , as if they had had alwayes a king in readiness to go up presently to fight for them : this despair in them who had found so many miraculous deliverances under gods government , was that which offended the lord so highly : they did not desire an alteration of government , and to cast off gods laws , but hoped for a certainer and speedier deliverance from danger in time of war. they did not petition that they might choose their king themselves , that had been a greater sin ; and yet if they had , it had not been a total rejection of gods reigning over them , as long as they desired not to depart from the worship of god their king , and from the obedience of his laws . i see not that the kingdom of god was cast off by the election of saul , since saul was chosen by god himself , and governed according to gods laws . the government from abraham to saul is no where called the kingdom of god , nor is it said , that the kingdom of god was cast off at the election of saul . mr. hobs allows , that moses alone had , next under god , the sovereignty over the israelites , p. . but he doth not allow it to ioshua , but will have it descend to eleazar the high-priest , aaron's son . his proof is , god expresly saith concerning ioshua , he shall stand before eleazar , who shall ask counsel for him before the lord , ( after the judgment of urim , is omitted by mr. hobs ) at his word they shall go out , &c. therefore the supreme power of making peace and war was in the priest. answ. the work of the high-priest was onely ministerial , not magisterial ; he had no power to command in war , or to judge in peace ; onely when the sovereign or governour did go up to war , he enquired of the lord by the ministry of the high priest , and , as the hebrews say , the enquirer with a soft voice , as one that prayeth for himself , asked : and forthwith the holy ghost came upon the priest , and he beheld the brest-plate , and saw therein by the vision of prophecy , go up , or go not up , in the letters that shewed forth themselves upon the brest-plate before his face : then the priest answered him , go up , or go not up . if this answer gave the priest sovereignty , then neither king saul nor king david had the sovereignty , who both asked counsel of the lord by the priest. observations on mr. milton against salmasius . i. among the many printed books , and several discourses touching the right of kings , and the liberty of the people , i cannot find that as yet the first and chief point is agreed upon , or indeed so much as once disputed . the word king and the word people are familiar , one would think every simple man could tell what they signified ; but upon examination it will be found , that the learnedst cannot agree of their meaning . ask salmasius what a king is , and he will teach us , that a king is he who hath the supreme power of the kingdom , and is accountable to none but god , and may do what he please , and is free from the laws . this definition i. m. abominates as being the definion of a tyrant : and i should be of his mind , if he would have vouchsafed us a better , or any other definition at all , that would tell us how any king can have a supreme power , without being freed from humane laws : to find fault with it , without producing any other , is to leave us in the dark : but though mr. milton brings us neither definition nor description of a king , yet we may pick out of several passages of him , something like a definition , if we lay them together . he teacheth us that power was therefore given to a king by the people , that he might see by the authority to him committed , that nothing be done against law : and that he keeps our laws , and not impose upon us his own : therefore there is no regal power but in the courts of the kingdom , and by them , pag. . and again he affirmeth , the king cannot imprison , fine or punish any man , except he be first cited into some court ; where not the king , but the usual iudges give sentence , pag. . and before we are told , not the king , but the authority of parliament doth set up and take away all courts , pag. . lo here the description of a king , he is one to whom the people give power , to see that nothing be done against law : and yet he saith there is no regal power but in the courts of iustice and by them , where not the king , but the usual iudges give sentence . this description not only strips the king of all power whatsoever , but puts him in a condition below the meanest of his subjects . thus much may shew , that all men are not agreed what a king is . next , what the word people means is not agreed upon : ask aristotle what the people is , and he will not allow any power to be in any but in free citizens . if we demand , who be free citizens ? that he cannot resolve us ; for he confesseth that he that is a free citizen in one city , is not so in another city . and he is of opinion that no artificer should be a free citizen , or have voice in a well ordered commonwealth ; he accounts a democratie ( which word signifies the government of the people ) to be a corrupted sort of government ; he thinks many men by nature born to be servants , and not fit to govern as any part of the people . thus doth aristotle curtal the people , and cannot give us any certain rule to know who be the people : come to our modern politicians , and ask them who the people is , though they talk big of the people , yet they take up , and are content with a few representors ( as they call them ) of the whole people ; a point aristotle was to seek in , neither are these representors stood upon to be the whole people , but the major part of these representors must be reckoned for the whole people ; nay i. m. will not allow the major part of the representors to be the people , but the sounder and better part only of them ; and in right down terms he tells us pag. . to determine who is a tyrant , he leaves to magistrates , at least to the uprighter sort of them and of the people , pag. . though in number less by many , to judge as they find cause . if the sounder , the better , and the uprighter part have the power of the people , how shall we know , or who shall judge who they be ? ii. one text is urged by mr. milton , for the peoples power : deut. . . when thou art come into the land which thy lord thy god giveth thee , and shalt say , i will set a king over me , like as all the nations about me . it is said , by the tenure of kings these words confirm us that the right of choosing , yea of changing their own government , is by the grant of god himself in the people : but can the foretelling or forewarning of the israelites of a wanton and wicked desire of theirs , which god himself condemned , be made an argument that god gave or granted them a right to do such a wicked thing ? or can the narration and reproving of a future fact , be a donation and approving of a present right , or the permission of a sin be made a commission for the doing of it ? the author of his book against salmasius , falls so far from making god the donor or grantor , that he cites him only for a witness , teste ipso deo penes populos arbitrium semper fuisse , vel ea , quae placer●…t forma reipub . utendi , vel hanc in aliam mutandi ; de hebraeis hoc disertè dicit deus : de reliquis non abnuit . that here in this text god himself being witness , there was always a power in the people , either to use what form of government they pleased , or of changing it into another : god saith this expresly of the hebrews , and denies it not of others . can any man find that god in this text expresly saith , that there was always a right in the people to use what form of government they please ? the text not warranting this right of the people , the foundation of the defence of the people is quite taken away ; there being no other grant or proof of it pretended . . where it is said , that the israelites desired a king , though then under another form of government ; in the next line but one it is confessed , they had a king at the time when they desired a king , which was god himself , and his vice-roy samuel ; and so saith god , they have not rejected thee ; but they have rejected me , that i should not reign over them ; yet in the next verse god saith , as they have forsaken me , so do they also unto thee . here is no shew of any other form of government but monarchy : god by the mediation of samuel reigned , who made his sons judges over israel ; when one man constitutes judges , we may call him a king ; or if the having of judges do alter the government , then the government of every kingdom is altered from monarchy , where judges are appointed by kings : it is now reckoned one of the duties of kings to judge by their judges only . where it is said , he shall not multiply to himself horses , nor wives , nor riches , that he might understand that he had no power over others , who could decree nothing of himself , extra legem ; if it had said , contra legem dei , it had been true , but if it meant extra legem humanam , it is false . . if there had been any right given to the people , it seems it was to the elders onely ; for it is said , it was the elders of israel gathered together , petitioned for a king ; it is not said , it was all the people , nor that the people did choose the elders , who were the fathers and heads of families , authorized by the judges . . where it is said , i will set a king over me like as all the nations about me . to set a king , is , not to choose a king , but by some solemn publick act of coronation , or otherwise to acknowledge their allegiance to the king chosen ; it is said , thou shalt set him king whom the lord thy god shall choose . the elders did not desire to choose a king like other nations , but they say , now make us a king to judge us like all the nations . iii. as for davids covenant with the elders when he was annointed , it was not to observe any laws or conditions made by the people , for ought appears ; but to keep gods laws and serve him , and to seek the good of the people , as they were to protect him . . the reubenites and gadites promise their obedience , not according to their laws or conditions agreed upon , but in these words all that thou cammandest us we will do , and whithersoever thou sendst us we will go ; as we harkened to moses in all things , so will we harken unto thee : only the lord thy god be with thee as he was with moses . where is there any condition of any humane law expressed ? though the rebellious tribes offered conditions to rehoboam ; where can we find , that for like conditions not performed , all israel deposed samuel ? i wonder mr. milton should say this , when within a few lines after he professeth , that samuel had governed them uprightly . iv. ius regni is much stumbled at , and the definition of a king which saith his power is supreme in the kingdom , and he is accountable to none but to god , and that he may do what he please , and is not bound by laws : it is said if this definition be good , no man is or ever was , who may be said to be a tyrant ; p. . for when he hath violated all divine and humane laws , nevertheless he is a king , and guiltless jure regio , to this may be answered , that the definition confesseth he is accountable to god , and therefore not guiltless if he violate divine laws : humane laws must not be shuffled in with divine , they are not of the same authority : if humane laws bind a king , it is impossible for him to have supreme power amongst men . if any man can find us out such a kind of government , wherein the supreme power can be , without being freed from humane laws , they should first teach us that ; but if all sorts of popular government that can be invented , cannot be one minute , without an arbitrary power , freed from all humane laws : what reason can be given why a royal government should not have the like freedom ? if it be tyranny for one man to govern arbitrarily , why should it not be far greater tyranny for a multitude of men to govern without being accountable or bound by laws ? it would be further enquired how it is possible for any government at all to be in the world without an arbitrary power ; it is not power except it be arbitary : a legislative power cannot be without being absolved from humane laws , it cannot be shewed how a king can have any power at all but an arbitrary power . we are taught , that power was therefore given to a king by the people , that he might see by the authority to him committed , that nothing be done against law ; and that he keep our laws , and not impose upon us his own : therefore there is no royal power , but in the courts of the kingdom , and by them , pag. . and again it is said , the king cannot imprison , fine or punish any man except he be first cited into some court , where not the king but the usual iudges give sentence , pag. . and before , we are told , not the king , but the authority of parliament doth set up and take away all courts , pag. . lo here we have mr. milton's perfect definition of a king : he is one to whom the people gave power to see that nothing be done against law , and that he keep our laws , and not impose his own . whereas all other men have the faculty of seeing by nature , the king only hath it by the gift of the people , other power he hath none ; he may see the judges keep the laws if they will ; he cannot compell them , for he may not imprison , fine , nor punish any man ; the courts of justice may , and they are set up and put down by the parliament : yet in this very definition of a king , we may spy an arbitrary power in the king ; for he may wink if he will : and no other power doth this description of a king give , but only a power to see : whereas it is said aristotle doth mention an absolute kingdom , for no other cause , but to shew how absurd , unjust and most tyrannical it is . there is no such thing said by aristotle , but the contrary , where he saith , that 〈◊〉 king according to law makes no sort of government ▪ and after he had reckoned up five sorts of kings , he concludes , that there were in a manner but two sorts , the lacedemonian king , and the absolute king ; whereof the first was but as general in an army , and therefore no king at all , and then fixes and rests upon the absolute king , who ruleth according to his own will. v. if it be demanded what is meant by the word people ? . sometimes it is populus universus , and then every child must have his consent asked ▪ which is impossible . . sometimes it is pars major , and sometimes it is pars potior & sanior ; how the major part , where all are alike free , can bind the minor part , is not yet proved . but it seems the major part will not carry it , nor be allowed , except they be the better part , and the sounder part . we are told the sounder part implored the help of the army , when it saw it self and the commonwealth betrayed ; and that the souldiers judged better than the great councel , and by arms saved the commonwealth , which the great councel had almost damned by their votes , p. . here we see what the people is ; to wit , the sounder part ; of which the army is the judge : thus , upon the matter , the souldiers are the people : which being so , we may discern where the liberty of the people lieth , which we are taught to consist all for the most part in the power of the peoples choosing what form of government they please pag. . a miserable liberty , which is onely to choose to whom we will give our liberty , which we may not keep . see more concerning the people , in a book entituled the anarchy , p. , , , , , , . vi. we are taught , that a father and a king are things most diverse . the father begets us , but not the king ; but we create the king : nature gives a father to the people , the people give themselves a king : if the father kill his son he loseth his life , why should not the king also ? p. . ans. father and king are not so diverse ; it is confessed , that at first they were all one , for there is confessed paternum imperium & haereditarium , p. . and this fatherly empire , as it was of it self hereditary , so it was alienable by patent , and seizable by an usurper , as other goods are : and thus every king that now is , hath a paternal empire , either by inheritance , or by translation , or usurpation ; so a father and a king may be all one . a father may dye for the murther of his son , where there is a superiour father to them both , or the right of such a supreme father ; but where there are onely father and sons , no sons can question the father for the death of their brother : the reason why a king cannot be punished , is not because he is excepted from punishment , or doth not deserve it , but because there is no superiour to judge him , but god onely , to whom he is reserved . vii . it is said thus , he that takes away from the people the power of choosing for themselves what form of government they please , he doth take away that wherein all civil liberty almost consists , p. . if almost all liberty be in choosing of the kind of government , the people have but a poor bargain of it , who cannot exercise their liberty , but in chopping and changing their government , and have liberty onely to give away their liberty , than which there is no greater mischief , as being the cause of endless sedition . viii . if there be any statute in our law , by which thou canst find that tyrannical power is given to a king , that statute being contrary to gods will , to nature and reason , understand that by that general and primary law of ours , that statute is to be repealed , and not of force with us , p. . here , if any man may be judge , what law is contrary to gods will , or to nature , or to reason , it will soon bring in confusion : most men that offend , if they be to be punished or fined , will think that statute that gives all fines and forfeitures to a king , to be a tyrannical law ; thus most statutes would be judged void , and all our fore-fathers taken for fools or madmen , to make all our laws to give all penalties to the king. ix . the sin of the children of israel did lye , not in desiring a king , but in desiring such a king like as the nations round about had ; they distrusted god almighty , that governed them by the monarchical power of samuel , in the time of oppression , when god provided a judge for them ; but they desired a perpetual and hereditary king , that they might never want : in desiring a king they could not sin , for it was but desiring what they enjoyed by gods special providence . x. men are perswaded , that in making of a covenant , something is to be performed on both parts by mutual stipulation ; which is not alwayes true : for we find god made a covenant with noah and his seed , with all the fowl and the cattel , not to destroy the earth any more by a flood . this covenant was to be kept on gods part , neither noah , nor the fowl , nor the cattel were to perform any thing by this covenant . on the other side , gen. . , . god covenants with abraham , saying , thou shalt keep my covenant , — every male child among you shall be circumcised . here it is called gods covenant , though it be to be performed onely by abraham ; so a covenant may be called the kings covenant , because it is made to him , and yet to be performed only by the people . so also , kin. . . iehoiada made a covenant between the lord , and the king , and the people , that they should be the lords people . between the king also and the people , which might well be , that the people should be the kings servants : and not for the king 's covenanting to keep any humane laws , for it is not likely the king should either covenant , or take any oath to the people when he was but seven years of age , and that never any king of israel took a coronation-oath that can be shewed : when iehoiada shewed the king to the rulers in the house of the lord , he took an oath of the people : he did not article with them , but saith the next verse , commanded them to keep a watch of the kings house , and that they should compass the king around about , every man with his weapon in his hand ; and he that cometh within the ranges , let him be slain . xi . to the text , where the word of a king is , there is power , and who may say unto him , what dost thou ? j. m. gives this answer : it is apparent enough , that the preacher in this place gives precepts to every private man , not to the great sanhedrin , nor to the senate — shall not the nobles , shall not all the other magistrates , shall not the whole people dare to mutter , so oft as the king pleaseth to dote ? we must here note , that the great councel , and all other magistrates or nobles , or the whole people , compared to the king , are all but private men , if they derive their power from him : they are magistrates under him , and out of his presence , for when he is in place , they are but so many private men . i. m. asks , who swears to a king , unless the king on the other side be sworn to keep gods laws , and the laws of the countrey ? we find that the rulers of israel took an oath at the coronation of iehoash : but we find no oath taken by that king , no not so much as to gods laws , much less to the laws of the countrey . xii . a tyrant is he , who regarding neither law nor the common good , reigns onely for himself and his faction ; p. . in his defence he expresseth himself thus , he is a tyrant who looks after only his own , and not his peoples profit , eth. l. . p. . . if it be tyranny not to regard the law , then all courts of equity , and pardons for any offences must be taken away : there are far more sutes for relief against the laws , than there be for the observation of the laws : there can be no such tyranny in the world as the law , if there were no equity to abate the rigour of it . summum ius is summa injuria ; if the penalties and forfeitures of all laws should still be exacted by all kings , it would be found , that the greatest tyranny would be , for a king to govern according to law ; the fines , penalties , and forfeitures of all laws are due to the supreme power onely , and were they duely paid , they would far exceed the taxes in all places . it is the chief happiness of a kingdom , and their chief liberty , not to be governed by the laws only . . not to regard the common good , but to reign only for himself , is the supposition of an impossibility in the judgment of aristotle , who teacheth us , that the despotical power cannot be preserved , except the servant , or he in subjection , be also preserved . the truth of this strongly proves , that it is in nature impossible to have a form of government that can be for the destruction of a people , as tyranny is supposed ; if we will allow people to be governed , we must grant , they must in the first place be preserved , or else they cannot be governed . kings have been , and may be vitious men , and the government of one , not so good as the government of another ; yet it doth not follow , that the form of government is , or can be in its own nature ill , because the governour is so : it is anarchy , or want of government , that can totally destroy a nation . we cannot find any such government as tyranny mentioned or named in scripture , or any word in the hebrew tongue to express it . after such time as the cities of greece practised to shake off monarchy , then , and not till then , ( which was after homer's time ) the name of tyrant was taken up for a word of disgrace , for such men as by craft or force wrested the power of a city from a multitude to one man onely ; and not for the exercising , but for the ill-obtaining of the government : but now every man that is but thought to govern ill , or to be an ill man , is presently termed a tyrant , and so judged by his subjects . few remember the prohibition , exod. . . thou shalt not revile the gods , nor curse the ruler of thy people : and fewer understand the reason of it . though we may not one judge another , yet we may speak evil or revile one another , in that which hath been lawfully judged , and upon a tryal wherein they have been heard and condemned : this is not to judge , but onely to relate the judgment of the ruler . to speak evil , or to revile a supreme judge , cannot be without judging him who hath no superiour on earth to judge him , and in that regard must alwayes be presumed innocent , though never so ill , if he cannot lawfully be heard . i. m. that will have it tyranny in a king not to regard the laws , doth himself give as little regard to them as any man ; where he reckons , that contesting for privileges , customs , forms , and that old entanglement of iniquity , their gibrish laws , are the badges of ancient slavery . tenure , pag. . a disputing presidents , forms and circumstances , pag. . i. m. is also of opinion , that , if at any time our fore-fathers , out of baseness , have lost any thing of their right , that ought not hurt us ; they might if they would promise slavery for themselves , for us certainly they could not , who have alwayes the same right to free our selves , that they had to give themselves to any man in slavery . this doctrine well practised , layeth all open to constant anarchy . lastly , if any desire to know what the liberty of the people is , which i. m. pleads for , he resolves us , saying , that he that takes away from the people the right of choosing what form of government they please , takes away truly that in which all liberty doth almost consist . it is well said by i. m. that all liberty doth almost consist in choosing their form of government , for there is another liberty exercised by the people , which he mentions not , which is the liberty of the peoples choosing their religion ; every man may be of any religion , or of no religion ; greece and rome have been as famous for polytheisme , or multitudes of gods , as of governours ; and imagining aristocratie and democratie in heaven , as on earth . observations upon h. grotius de iure belli , & pacis . in most questions of weight and difficulty concerning the right of war , or peace , or supreme power , grotius hath recourse to the law of nature or of nations , or to the primitive will of those men who first joyned in society . it is necessary therefore a little to lay open the variety or contrariety in the civil and canon law , and in grotius himself , about the law of nature and nations , not with a purpose to raise any contention about words or phrases , but with a desire to reconcile or expound the sense of different terms . civilians , canonists , politicians and divines , are not a little perplexed in distinguishing between the law of nature , and the law of nations ; about ius naturae , and ius gentium , there is much dispute by such as handle the original of government , and of property and community . the civil law in one text allows a threefold division of law , into ius naturae , ius gentium , and ius civile . but in another text of the same law , we find only a twofold division , into ius civile , and ius gentium . this latter division the law takes from gaius , the former from ulpian , who will have ius naturale to be that which nature hath taught all creatures , quod natura omnia animalia docuit , but for this he is confuted by grotius , salmasius , and others , who restrain the law of nature only to men using reason ; which makes it all one with the law of nations ; to which the canon law consents , and saith , that ius naturale est commune omnium nationum : that which natural reason appoints all men to use , is the law of nations , saith theophilus in the text of the civil law : and in the second book of the instit. cap. . ius naturae is confounded with ius gentium . as the civilians sometimes confound and sometimes separate the law of nature and the law of nations , so other-whiles they make them also contrary one to the other . by the law of nature all men are born free ; iure naturali omnes liberi nascuntur . but servitude is by the law of nations : iure gentium servitus invasit , saith ulpian . and the civil law not only makes the law of nature and of nations contrary , but also will have the law of nations contrary to it self . war , saith the law , was brought in by the law of nations . ex jure gentium introducta bella , and yet the law of nations saith , since nature hath made us all of one kindred , it follows it is not lawful for one man to lye in wait for another . cùm inter nos cognitionem quandam natura constituit , consequens est hominem homini insidiari nefas esse , saith florentinus . again ▪ the civil law teacheth , that from the law of nature proceeds the conjunction of man and women , the procreation and education of children . but as for religion to god , and obedience to parents it makes it to be by the law of nations . to touch now the canon law , we may find in one place that men are governed either by the law of nature , or by customs . homines reguntur naturali jure , aut moribus . the law of nations they call a divine law , the customs a humane law ; leges aut divinae sunt aut humanae ; divinae naturâ , humanae moribus constant . but in the next place the canon law makes ius to be either naturale , aut civile , aut gentium . though this division agree in terms with that of ulpian in the civil law , yet in the explication of the terms there is diversity ; for what one law makes to belong to the law of nature , the other refers to the law of nations , as may easily appear to him that will take the pains to compare the civil and canon law in these points . a principal ground of these diversities and contrarieties of divisions , was an error which the heathens taught , that all things at first were common , and that all men were equal . this mistake was not so heinous in those ethnick authors of the civil laws , who wanting the guide of the history of moses , were fain to follow poets and fables for their leaders . but for christians , who have read the scriptures , to dream either of a community of all things , or an equality of all persons , is a fault scarce pardonable . to salve these apparent contrarieties of community and property ; or equality and subjection : the law of ius gentium was first invented ; when that could not satisfie , to mend the matter , this ius gentium , was divided into a natural law of nations , and an humane law of nations ; and the law of nature into a primary and a secondary law of nature ; distinctions which make a great sound , but edifie not at all if they come under examination . if there hath been a time when all things were common , and all men equal , and that it be otherwise now ; we must needs conclude that the law by which all things were common , and men equal , was contrary to the law by which now things are proper , and men subject . if we will allow adam to have been lord of the world and of his children , there will need no such distinctions of the law of nature and of nations : for the truth will be , that whatsoever the heathens comprehended under these two laws , is comprised in the moral law. that the law of nature is one and the same with the moral , may appear by a definition given by grotius . the law of nature ( saith he ) is the dictate of reason , shewing that in every action by the agreeing or disagreeing of it with natural reason , there is a moral honesty or dishonesty , and consequently that such an action is commanded or forbidden by god the author of nature . i cannot tell how grotius would otherwise have defined the moral law. and the canon law grants as much ; teaching that the law of nature is contained in the law and the gospel : whatsoever ye will that men do , &c. mat. . the term of ius naturae is not originally to be found in scripture , for though t. aquinas takes upon him to prove out of the . to the romans , that there is a ius naturae , yet st. paul doth not use those express terms ; his words are , the gentiles which have not the law , do by nature the things contained in the law , these having not the law are a law unto themselves : he doth not say , nature is a law unto them , but they are a law unto themselves . as for that which they call the law of nations , it is not a law distinct , much less opposite to the law of nature , but it is a small branch or parcel of that great law ; for it is nothing but the law of nature , or the moral law between nations . the same commandment that forbids one private man to rob another , or one corporation to hurt another corporation , obliges also one king not to rob another king , and one commonwealth not to spoil another : the same law that enjoyns charity to all men , even to enemies , binds princes and states to shew charity to one another , as well as private persons . and as the common , or civil laws of each kingdom which are made against treason , theft , murder , adultery , or the like , are all and every one of them grounded upon some particular commandment of the moral law ; so all the laws of nations must be subordinate and reducible to the moral law. the law of nature , or the moral law is like the main ocean , which though it be one entire body , yet several parts of it have distinct names , according to the diversity of the coasts on which they border . so it comes to pass that the law of nations which is but a part of the law of nature , may be sub-divided almost in infinitum , according to the variety of the persons , or matters about which it is conversant . the law of nature or the divine law is general , and doth only comprehend some principles of morality notoriously known of themselves , or at the most is extended to those things which by necessary and evident inference are consequent to those principles . besides these , many other things are necessary to the well-governing of a common-wealth : and therefore it was necessary that by humane reason something more in particular should be determined concerning those things which could not be defined by natural reason alone ; hence it is that humane laws be necessary , as comments upon the text of the moral law : and of this judgment is aquinas , who teacheth , that necessitas legis humanae manat ex eo , quod lex naturalis , vel divina , generalis est , & solum complectitur quaedam principia morum per se nota , & ad summum extenditur ad ea quae necessaria & evidenti elatione ex illis principiis consequuntur : praeter illa verò multa alia sunt necessaria in republica ad ejus rectam gubernationem : & ideo necessarium fuit ut per humanam rationem aliqua magis in particulari determinarentur circa ea quae per solam rationem naturalem definiri non possunt . ludo. molin de iust. thus much may suffice to shew the distractions in and between the civil and common laws about the law of nature and nations . in the next place we are to consider how grotius distinguisheth these laws . to maintain the community of things to be natural , grotius hath framed new divisions of the law of nature . first , in his preface to his books de iure belli & pacis , he produceth a definition of the law of nature , in such doubtful , obscure and reserved terms , as if he were diffident of his undertaking : next in his first book and first chapter he gives us another distribution , which differs from his doctrine in his preface . in his preface his principle is , that the appetite of society , that is to say , of community , is an action proper to man. here he presently corrects himself with an exception , that some other creatures are found to desire society ; and withal he answers the objections thus , that this desire of society in brute beasts , comes from some external principle . what he means by principium intelligens extrinsecum , i understand not , nor doth he explain , nor is it material , nor is the argument he useth to any purpose ; for , admitting all he saith to be true , yet his principle fails ; for the question is not , from what principle this desire of society proceeds in beasts , but whether there be such a desire or no. besides , here he takes the appetite of society and community to be all one , whereas many live in society , which live not in community . next he teacheth , that the keeping of society ( custodia societatis ) which in a rude manner ( saith he ) we have now expressed , is the fountain of that law which is properly so called . i conceive by the law properly so called , he intends the law of nature , though he express not so much : and to this appetite of sociable community he refers alieni abstinentia ; but herein it may be he forgets himself , for where there is community there is neither meum nor tuum , nor yet alienum ; and if there be no alienum , there can be no alieni abstinentia . to the same purpose he saith , that by the law of nature men must stand to bargains , iuris naturae sit stare pactis . but if all things were common by nature , how could there be any bargain ? again , grotius tells us , that from this signification of the law there hath flowed another larger , which consists ( saith he ) in discerning what delights us or hurts us , and in judging how things should be wisely distributed to each one . this latter he calls the looser law of nature ; the former , ius sociale , the law of nature , strictly , or properly taken . and these two laws of nature should have place ( saith he ) though men should deny there were ●… god. but to them that believe there is a god , there i●… another original of law , beside the natural , coming from the free will of god , to the which our own understanding tells us we must be subject . thus have i gathered the substance of what is most material concerning the law of nature , in his preface . if we turn to the book it self , we have a division of the law into ius naturale . voluntarium . divinum . humanum . civile . latiùs patens , seu jus gentium . arctiùs patens , seu paternum , seu herile . in the definition of ius naturale he omits those subtilties of ius naturae propriè dictum , and quod laxius ita dicitur , which we find in his preface , and gives such a plain definition , as may fitly agree to the moral law. by this it seems the law of nature and the moral law are one and the same . whereas he affirmeth , that the actions about which the law of nature is conversant , are lawful or unlawful of themselves , and therefore are necessarily commanded or forbidden by god : by which mark this law of nature doth not onely differ from humane law , but from the divine voluntary law , which doth not command or forbid those things , which of themselves , and by their own nature are lawful or unlawful , but makes them unlawful by forbidding them , and due by commanding them . in this he seems to make the law of nature to differ from gods voluntary law ; whereas , in god , necessary and voluntary are all one . salmasius de usuris , in the twentieth chapter , condemns this opinion of grotius ; though he name him not , yet he means him , if i mistake not . in the next place , i observe his saying , that some things are by the law of nature , not propriè , but reductivè ; and that the law of nature deals not onely with those things which are beside the will of man , but also with many things which follow the act of mans will : so dominion , such as is now in use , mans will brought in : but now that it is brought in , it is against the law of nature , to take that from thee against thy will , which is in thy dominion . yet for all this grotius maintains that the law of nature is so immutable , that it cannot be changed by god himself . he means to make it good with a distinction , some things ( saith he ) are by the law of nature , but not simply , but according to the certain state of things ; so the common use of things was natural as long as dominion was not brought in ; and right for every man to take his own by force , before laws were made . here if grotius would have spoken plain , in stead of but not simply , but according to the certain state of things , he would have said , but not immutably , but for a certain time. and then this distinction would have run thus ; some things are by the law of nature , but not immutably , but for a certain time . this must needs be the naked sense of his distinction , as appears by his explication in the words following , where he saith , that the common use of things was natural so long as dominion was not brought in : dominion he saith was brought in by the will of man , whom by this doctrine grotius makes to be able to change that law which god himself cannot change , as he saith . he gives a double ability to man ; first , to make that no law of nature , which god made to be the law of nature : and next , to make that a law of nature which god made not ; for now that dominion is brought in , he maintains , it is against the law of nature to take that which is in another mans dominion . besides , i find no coherence in these words , by the law of nature it was right for every ●…an to take his own by force , before laws made , since by the law of nature no man had any thing of his own ; and until laws were made , there was no propriety , according to his doctrine . ius humanum voluntarium latius patens , he makes to be the law of nations , which ( saith ●…e ) by the will of all , or many nations , hath received a power to bind , he adds , of many , because there is , as he grants , scarce any law to be found common to all nations , besides the law of nature ; which also is wont to be called the law of nations , being common to all nations . nay , as he confesseth often , that is the law in one part of the world , which in another part of the world is not the law of nations . by these sentences , it seems grotius can scarce tell what to make to be the law of nations , or where to find it . whereas he makes the law of nations to have a binding power from the will of men , it must be remembred , that it is not sufficient for men to have a will to bind , but it is necessary also to have a power to bind : though several nations have one and the same law. for instance , let it be granted that theft is punished by death in many countreys , yet this doth not make it to be a law of nations , because each nation hath it but as a natural , or civil law of their own countrey ; and though it have a binding power from the will of many nations , yet because each nation hath but a will and power to bind themselves , and may without prejudice consent , or , consulting of any neighbour-nation , alter this law , if they find cause , it cannot properly be called the law of nations . that which is the foundation of the law of nations , is , to have it concern such things as belong to the mutual society of nations among themselves , as grotius confesseth ; and not of such things as have no further relation than to the particular benefit of each kingdom : for , as private men must neglect their own profit for the good of their countrey ; so particular nations must sometimes remit part of their benefit , for the good of many nations . true it is , that in particular kingdomes and common-wealths there be civil and national laws , and also customs that obtain the force of laws : but yet such laws are ordained by some supreme power , and the customs are examined judged and allowed by the same supreme power . where there is no supreme power that extends over all or many nations but only god himself , there can be no laws made to bind nations , but such as are made by god himself : we cannot find that god made any laws to bind nations , but only the moral law ; as for the judicial law , though it were ordained by god , yet it was not the law of nations , but of one nation only , and fitted to that commonwealth . if any think that the customs wherein many nations do consent , may be called the law of nations , as well as the customs of any one nation may be esteemed for national laws : they are to consider that it is not the being of a custom that makes it lawful , for then all customs , even evil customs , would be lawful ; but it is the approbation of the supreme power that gives a legality to the custom : where there is no supreme power over many nations , their customs cannot be made legal . the doctrine of grotius is , that god immediately after the creation did bestow upon mankind in general a right over things of inferiour nature — from whence it came to pass , that presently every man might snatch what he would for his own use , and spend what he could , and such an universal right was then in stead of property ; for what every one so snatched , another could not take from him but by injury . how repugnant this assertion of grotius is to the truth of holy scripture , mr. selden teacheth us in his mare clausum , saying , that adam by donation from god , gen. . . was made the general lord of all things , not without such a private dominion to himself , as ( without his grant ) did exclude his children : and by donation and assignation , or some kind of cession ( before he was dead , or left any heir to succeed him ) his children had their distinct territories by right of private dominion : abel had his flocks , and pastures for them ; cain had his fields for corn , and the land of nod where he built himself a city ▪ this determination of mr. selden's being consonant to the history of the bible , and to natural reason , doth contradict the doctrine of grotius : i cannot conceive why mr. selden should afterwards affirm , that neither the law of nature , nor the divine law , do cammand or forbid either communion of all things or private dominion , but permitteth both . as for the general community between noah and his sons , which mr. selden will have to be granted to them , gen. . . the text doth not warrant it ; for although the sons are there mentioned with noah in the blessing , yet it may best be understood with a subordination or a benediction in succession , the blessing might truly be fulfilled , if the sons either under , or after their father enjoyed a private dominion : it is not probable that the private dominion which god gave to adam , and by his donation , assignation or cession to his children was abrogated , and a community of all things instituted between noah and his sons , at the time of the flood : noah was left the sole heir of the world , why should it be thought that god would dis-inherit him of his birth-right , and make him of all the men in the world , the only tenant in common with his children ? if the blessing given to adam , gen. . . be compared to that given to noah and his sons , gen. . . there will be found a considerable difference between those two texts : in the benediction of adam , we find expressed a subduing of the earth , and a dominion over the creatures , neither of which are expressed in the blessing of noah nor the earth there once named , it is only said , the fear of you shall be upon the creatures , and into your hands are they delivered ; then immediately it follows , every moving thing shall be meat for you , as the green herb : the first blessing gave adam dominion over the earth and all creatures , the latter allows noah liberty to use the living creatures for food : here is no alteration or diminishing of his title to a propriety of all things but an enlargement onely of his commons . but , whether , with grotius , community came in at the creation , or , with mr. selden , at the flood , they both agree it did not long continue ; sed veri non est simile hujusmodi communionem diu obtinuisse , is the confession of mr. selden . it seems strange that grotius should maintain , that community of all things should be by the law of nature , of which god is the author ; and yet such community should not be able to continue : doth it not derogate from the providence of god almighty , to ordain a community which could not continue ? or doth it make the act of our fore-fathers , in abrogating the natural law of community , by introducing that of propriety , to be a sin of a high presumption ? the prime duties of the second table are conversant about the right of propriety : but if propriety be brought in by a humane law ( as grotius teacheth ) then the moral law depends upon the will of man. there could be no law against adultery or theft , if women and all things were common . mr. selden saith , that the law of nature , or of god , nec vetuit , nec jubebat , sed permisit utrumque , tam nempe rerum communionem quàm privatum dominium . and yet for propriety ( which he terms primaeva rerum dominia ) he teacheth , that adam received it from god , à numine acceperat : and for community , he saith , we meet with evident footsteps of the community of things in that donation of god , by which noah and his three sons are made domini pro indiviso rerum omnium . thus he makes the private dominion of adam , as well as the common dominion of noah and his sons , to be both by the will of god. nor doth he shew how noah , or his sons , or their posterity , had any authority to alter the law of community which was given them by god. in distributing territories ( mr. selden saith ) the consent , as it were , of mankind ( passing their promise , which should also bind their posterity ) did intervene , so that men departed from their common right of communion of those things which were so distributed to particular lords or masters . this distribution by consent of mankind , we must take upon credit ; for there is not the least proof offered for it out of antiquity . how the consent of mankind could bind posterity when all things were common , is a point not so evident : where children take nothing by gift or by descent from their parents , but have an equal and common interest with them , there is no reason in such cases , that the acts of the fathers should bind the sons . i find no cause why mr. selden should call community a pristine right ; since he makes it but to begin in noah , and to end in noah's children , or grand-children at the most ; for he confesseth the earth , à noachidis seculis aliquot post diluvium esse divisam . that ancient tradition , which by mr. seldens acknowledgment hath obtained reputation every where , seems most reasonable , in that it tells us , that noah himself , as lord of all , was author of the distribution of the world , and of private dominion , and that by the appointment of an oracle from god , he did confirm this distribution by his last will and testament , which at his death he left in the hands of his eldest son sem , and also warned all his sons , that none of them should invade any of their brothers dominions , or injure one another , because from thence discord and civil war would necessarily follow . many conclusions in grotius his book de iure belli & pacis , are built upon the foundation of these two principles . . the first is , that communis rerum usus naturalis fuit . . the second is , that dominium quale nune in usu est , voluntas humana introduxit . upon these two propositions of natural community and voluntary propriety , depend divers dangerous and seditious conclusions , which are dispersed in several places . in the fourth chapter of the first book , the title of which chapter is , of the war of subjects against superiours ; grotius handleth the question , whether the law of not resisting superiours , do bind us in most grievous and most certain danger ? and his determination is , that this law of not resisting superiours , seems to depend upon the will of those men who at first joyned themselves in a civil society , from whom the right of government doth come to them that govern ; if those had been at first asked , if their will were to impose this burthen upon all , that they should choose rather to dye , than in any case by arms to repell the force of superiours ; i know not whether they would answer , that it was their will , unless perhaps with this addition , if resistance cannot be made but with the great disturbance of the commonwealth , and destruction of many innocents . here we have his resolution , that in great and certain danger , men may resist their governours , if it may be without disturbance of the commonwealth : if you would know who should be judge of the greatness and certainty of the danger , or how we may know it , grotius hath not one word of it , so that for ought appears to the contrary , his mind may be that every private man may be judge of the danger , for other judge he appoints none ; it had been a foul fault in so desperate a piece of service , as the resisting of superiors , to have concealed the lawful means , by which we may judge of the greatness or certainty of publick danger , before we lift up our hands against authority , considering how prone most of us are , to censure and mistake those things for great and certain dangers , which in truth many times are no dangers at all , or at the most but very small ones ; and so flatter our selves , that by resisting our superiours we may do our country laudible service , without disturbance of the commonwealth , since the effects of sedition cannot be certainly judged of but by the events only . grotius proceeds to answer an objection against this doctrine of resisting superiors . if ( saith he ) any man shall say that this rigid doctrine of dying ▪ rather then resisting any injuries of superiours , is no humane , but a divine law : it is to be noted , that men at first , not by any precept of god , but of their own accord , led by experience of the infirmities of separated families against violence , did meet together in civil society , from whence civil power took beginning , which therefore st. peter calls an humane ordinance , although elsewhere it be called a divine ordinance , because god approveth the wholsome institutions of men ; god in approving a humane law is to be thought to approve it as humane , and in a humane manner . and again in another place he goeth further , and teacheth us , that if the question happen to be concerning the primitive will of the people , it will not be amiss for the people that now are , and which are accounted the same with them that were long ago , to express their meaning , in this matter , which is to be followed , unless it cetainly appear , that the people long ago willed otherwise . lib. . c. . for fuller explication of his judgment about resisting superiours , he concludes thus : the greater the thing is which is to be preserved , the greater is the equity which reacheth forth an exception against the words of the law : yet i dare not ( saith grotius ) without difference condemn either simple men or a lesser part of the people , who in the last refuge of necessity , do so use this equity , as that in the mean time , they do not forsake the respect of the common good. another doctrine of grotius is , that the empire which is exercised by kings , doth not cease to be the empire of the people ; that kings who in a lawful order succeed those who were elected , have the supreme power by an usufructuary right only , and no propriety . furthermore he teacheth , that the people may choose what form of government they please , and their will is the rule of right . populus eligere potest qualem vult gubernationis formam , neque ex praestantia formae , sed ex voluntate jus metiendum est . lib. . c. . also , that the people choosing a king may reserve some acts to themselves , and may bestow others upon the king , with full authority , if either an express partition be appointed , or if the people being yet free do command their future king , by way of a standing command , or if any thing be added by which it may be understood , that the king may be compelled or else punished . in these passages of grotius which i have cited , we find evidently these doctrines . . that civil power depends on the will of the people . . that private men or petty multitudes may take up arms against their princes . . that the lawfullest kings have no propriety in their kingdoms , but an usufructuary right only : as if the people were the lords , and kings but their tenants . . that the law of not resisting superiours , is a humane law , depending on the will of the people at first . . that the will of the first people , if it be not known , may be expounded by the people that now are . no doubt but grotius foresaw what uses the people might make of these doctrines , by concluding , if the chief power be in the people , that then it is lawful for them to compel and punish kings as oft as they misuse their power : therefore he tells us , he rejects the opinion of them , who every where and without exception will have the chief power to be so the peoples , that it is lawful for them to compel and punish kings as oft as they misuse their power ; and this opinion he confesseth if it be altogether received , hath been and may be the cause of many evils . this cautelous rejection qualified with these terms of every where without exception , and altogether , makes but a mixt negation , partly negative , and partly affirmative ( which our lawyers call a negative repugnant ) which brings forth this modal proposition , that in some places with exception , and in some sort the people may compel and punish their kings . but let us see how grotius doth refute the general opinion , that people may correct kings . he frames his argument in these words , it is lawful for every man to yield himself to be a private servant to whom he please . what should hinder , but that also it may be lawful for a free people so to yield themselves to one or more , that the right of governing them be fully set over without retaining any part of the right ? and you must not say , that this may not be presumed , for we do not now seek , what in a doubtful case may be presumed , but what by right may be done . thus far is the argument , in which the most that is proved ( if we gratifie him , and yield his whole argument for good ) is this , that the people may grant away their power without retaining any part . but what is this to what the people have done ? for though the people may give away their power without reservation of any part to themselves ; yet if they have not so done , but have reserved a part , grotius must confess , that the people may compel and punish their kings if they transgress : so that by his favour , the point will be , not what by right may be done , but what in this doubtful case hath been done , since by his own rule it is the will and meaning of the first people that joyned in society , that must regulate the power of their successours . but on grotius side it may be urged , that in all presumption the people have given away their whole power to kings , unless they can prove they have reserved a part ; for if they will have any benefit of a reservation or exception , it lies on their part to prove their exception , and not on the kings part who are in possession . this answer , though in it self it be most just and good ; yet of all men grotius may not use it . for he saves the people the labour of proving the primitive reservation of their forefathers , by making the people that now are competent expositors of the meaning of those first ancestors , who may justly be presumed , not to have been either so improvident for themselves , or so negligent of all their posterity , when by the law of nature they were free and had all things common , at an instant with any condition or limitation to give away that liberty and right of community , and to make themselves and their children eternally subject to the will of such governours as might misuse them without controul . on the behalf of the people , it may be further answered to grotius , that although our ancestors had made an absolute grant of their liberty , without any condition expressed , yet it must be necessarily implyed , that it was upon condition to be well-governed , and that the non-performance of that implyed condition , makes the grant void ; or , if we will not allow an implicit condition , then it may be said , that the grant in it self was a void grant , for being unreasonable , and a violation of the law of nature , without any valuable consideration . what sound reply grotius can return to such answers , i cannot conceive , if he keep himself to his first principle of natural community . as grotius's argument against the people is not sound , so his answer to the argument that is made for the people , is not satisfactory . it is objected , that he that ordains ▪ is above him that is ordained . grotius answers , verum duntaxat est in ea constitutione cujus effectus perpetuò pendet à voluntate constituentis , non etiam in ea quae ab initio est voluntatis , postea verò effectum habet necessitatis , quomodo mulier virum sibi constituit , cui parere semper habet necesse . the reply may be , that by grotius's former doctrine the very effect of the constitution of kings by the people , depends perpetually upon the will of them that constitute , and upon no other necessity : he will not say , that it is by any necessity of the law of nature , or by any positive law of god ▪ he teacheth , that non dei praecepto , sed sponte , men entred into civil society , that it is an humane ordinance , that god doth onely approve it ut humanum , and humano modo . he tells us further , that populus potest eligere qualem vult gubernationis for●…am , & ex voluntate jus metiendum est ; that the people may give the king as little power as they will , and for as little time as they please , that they ●…ay make temporary kings , as dictators and protectors : jus quovis tempore revocabile , id est precarium ; as the vandals in africa , and the goths in spain , would depose their kings as oft as they displeased them , horum enim actus irriti possunt reddi ab his ●…i potestatem revocabiliter dederunt , ac proinde non idem est effectus nec jus idem . here he doth teach in plain words , the effect doth depend upon the will of the people . by this we may judge how improperly he useth the instance of a woman , that appoints her self a husband , whom she must alwayes necessarily obey , since the necessity of the continuance of the wives obedience depends upon the law of god , which hath made the bond of matrimony indissolvable . grotius will not say the like for the continuance of the subjects obedience to the prince , neither will he say that women may choose husbands , as he tells us the people may choose kings , by giving their husbands as little power , and for as little a time as they please . next , it is objected , that tutors who are set over pupils may be removed , if they abuse their power . grotius answers , in tutore hoc procedit qui superiorem habet , at in imperiis quia progressus non datur in infinitum omnino in aliqua persona aut coetu consistendum est : we must stay in some one person , or in a multitude , whose faults ( because they have no superiour iudge above them ) god hath witnessed that he will have a particular care of , either to revenge them , if he judge it needful , or to tolerate them , either for punishment , or tryal of the people . it is true , in kingdomes we cannot proceed in infinitum , yet we may , and must go to the highest , which by grotius his rule is the people , because they first made kings , so that there is no need to stay in aliqua persona , but in coetu , in the people , so that by his doctrine kings may be punished by the people , but the faults of the people must be left to the judgment of god. i have briefly presented here the desperate inconveniences which attend upon the doctrine of the natural freedom and community of all things ; these and many more absurdities are easily removed , if on the contrary we maintain the natural and private dominion of adam , to be the fountain of all government and propriety : and if we mark it well , we shall find that grotius doth in part grant as much ; the ground why those that now live do obey their governours , is the will of their fore-fathers , who at the first ordained princes , and , in obedience to that will , the children continue in subjection ; this is according to the mind of grotius : so that the question is not whether kings have a fatherly power over their subjects , but how kings came first by it . grotius will have it , that our fore-fathers being all free , made an assignment of their power to kings ; the other opinion denies any such general freedom of our fore-fathers , but derives the power of kings from the original dominion of adam . this natural dominion of adam may be proved out of grotius himself , who teacheth , that gene●…ione jus acquiritur parentibus in liberos , and that ●…urally no other can be found , but the parents to whom the government should belong , and the right of ruling and compelling them doth belong to parents . and in another place he hath these words , speaking of the first commandment , parentum nomine , ●…i naturales sunt magistratus , etiam alios rectores 〈◊〉 est intelligi , quorum authoritas societatem huma●…m , continet : and if parents be natural magistrates , children must needs be born natural subjects . but although grotius acknowledge ▪ parents to ●…e natural magistrates , yet he will have it , that children , when they come to full age , and are ●…parated from their parents , are free from natural subjection . for this he offers proof out of ari●…le , and out of scripture . first , for aristotle ; we ●…ust note , he doth not teach , that every separation of children of full age , is an obtaining of liberty , ●…s if that men when they come to years , might vo●…ntarily separate themselves , and cast off their ●…atural obedience ; but aristotle speaks onely of passive separation ; for he doth not say that children are subject to parents until they do sepa●…te , but he saith , until they be separated , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in ●…he verb of the passive voice . that is , until by ●…aw they be separated : for the law ( which 〈◊〉 nothing else but the will of him that hath the power of the supreme father ) doth in many cases , for the publick benefit of society , free children from subjection to the subordinate parent , so that the natural subjection by such emancipation of children , is not extinguished , but onely assumed and regulated by the parent paramount . secondly , grotius cites numb . . to prove that the power of the fathers over the sons and daughters , to dissolve their vows , was not perpetual , bu●… during the time only whilst the children were part o●… the fathers family . but if we turn to the chapter , we may find that grotius either deceives himself , or us ; for there is not one word in that chapter concerning the vows of sons , but of daughters only , being in their father's family ; and th●… being of the daughter in the father's house , meaneth only the daughter 's being a virgin , and no●… married , which may be gathered by the argumen●… of the whole chapter , which taketh particular order for the vows of women of all estates . firs●… for virgins , in the third verse . secondly , fo●… wives in general , in the sixth verse . thirdly , fo●… widows , and women divorced , in the nint●… verse . there is no law for virgins out of the●… father's houses ; we may not think they woul●… have been omitted , if they had been free fro●… their fathers ; we find no freedom in the te●… for women , till after marriage : and if they we●… married , though they were in their father's ho●…ses , yet the fathers had no power of their vow●… but their husbands . if , by the law of nature , departure from t●… fathers house had emancipated children , w●… doth the civil law , contrary to the law of n●…ture , give power and remedy to fathers for to recover by action of law their children that de●…rt , or are taken away from them without their consent ? without the consent of parents the civil law allows no emancipation . concerning subjection of children to parents , grotius distinguisheth three several times . the first is the time of imperfect iudgment . the second is the time of perfect iudgment : but whilst the son remains part of the father's fa●…ily . the third is , the time after he hath departed out of his father's family . in the first time he saith , all the actions of children are under the dominion of the parents . during the second time , when they are of the ●…ge of mature iudgment , they are under their father's command in those actions onely , which are of moment for their parents family . in other actions the children have a power or moral faculty of doing , but they are bound in those also to study alwayes to please their parents . but since this duty is not by ●…orce of any moral faculty , as those former are , but ●…ely of piety , observance , and duty of repaying thanks ; it doth not make any thing void which is done against it , as neither a gift of any thing is void , being made by any owner whatsoever , against the ●…ules of parsimony . in both these times , the right of ruling and compelling is ( as grotius acknowledgeth ) comprehended so far forth as children are to be compelled to their duty , or amended ; although the power of a parent d●…th so follow the person of a father , that it cannot be pulled away , and transferred upon another , yet the father may naturally pawn , or also sell his son , if there be need . in the third time he saith , the son is in all things free , and of his own authority : always that du●… remaining of piety and observance , the cause of which is perpetual . in this triple distinction , though grotius allow children in some cases during the second , and in all cases during the third time to be free , and of their own power , by a moral faculty : yet , in that he confesseth , in all cases children are bound to study always to please their parents out of piety and duty , the cause of which , as he saith , is perpetual : i cannot conceive , how in any case children can naturally have any power or moral faculty of doing what they please without their parents leave , since they are alwayes bound to study to please their parents . and though by the laws of some nations , children , when they attain to years of discretion , have power and liberty in many actions ; yet this liberty is granted them by positive and humane laws onely , which are made by the supreme fatherly power of princes , who regulate , limit , or assume the authority of inferiour fathers , for the publick benefit of the commonwealth : so that naturally the power of parents over their children never ceaseth by any separation ; but only by the permission of the transcendent fatherly power of the supreme prince , children may be dispensed with , or privileged in some cases , from obedience to subordinate parents ▪ touching the point of dissolving the vows of children , grotius in his last edition of his book hath corrected his first : for in the first he teacheth , that the power of the father was greater over the daughter dwelling with him , than over the son ; for her vow he might make void , but not his : but instead of these words , in his last edition , he saith , that the power over the son or daughter to dissolve vows , was not perpetual , but did indure as long as the children were a part of their fathers family . about the meaning of the text out of which he draws this conclusion , i have already spoken . three wayes grotius propoundeth , whereby supreme power may be had . first , by full right of propriety . secondly , by an usufructuary right . thirdly , by a temporary right . the roman dictators , saith he , had supreme power by a temporary right ; as well those kings who are first elected , as those that in a lawful right succeed to kings elected , have supreme power by an usufructuary right : some kings that have got supreme power by a just war , or into whose power some people , for avoiding a greater evil , have so yielded themselves , as that they have excepted nothing , have a full right of propriety . thus we find but two means acknowledged by grotius , whereby a king may obtain a full right of propriety in a kingdome : that is , either by a just war , or by donation of the people . how a war can be just without a precedent title in the conquerour , grotius doth not shew ; and if the title onely make the war just , then no other right can be obtained by war , than what the title bringeth ; for a just war doth onely put the conquerour in possession of his old right , but not create a new. the like which grotius saith of succession , may be said of war. succession ( saith he ) is no title of a kingdome , which gives a form to the kingdom , but a continuation of the old ; for the right which began by the election of the family , is continued by succession ▪ wherefore , so much as the first election gave , so much the succession brings . so to a conquerour that hath a title , war doth not give , but put him in possession of a right : and except the conquerour had a full right of propriety at first , his conquest cannot give it him : for if originally he and his ancestors had but an usufructuary right , and were outed of the possession of the kingdom by an usurper : here , though the re-conquest be a most just war , yet shall not the conquerour in this case gain any full right of propriety , but must be remitted to his usufructuary right onely : for what justice can it be , that the injustice of a third person , an usurper , should prejudice the people , to the devesting of them of that right of propriety , which was reserved in their first donation to their elected king , to whom they gave but an usufructuary right , as grotius conceiveth ? wherefore it seems impossible , that there can be a just war , whereby a full right of propriety may be gained , according to grotius's principles . for if a king come in by conquest , he must either conquer them that have a governour , or those people that have none : if they have no governour , then they are a free people , and so the war will be unjust to conquer those that are free , especially if the freedom of the people be by the primary law of nature , as grotius teacheth : but if the people conquered have a governour , that governour hath either a title or not ; if he have a title , it is an unjust war that takes the kingdom from him : if he have no title , but only the possession of a kingdom , yet it is unjust for any other man , that wants a title also , to conquer him that is but in possession ; for it is a just rule , that where the cases are alike , he that is in possession is in the better condition ; in pari causa possidentis melior conditio . lib. . c. . and this by the law of nature , even in the judgment of grotius . but if it be admitted , that he that attempts to conquer have a title , and he that is in possession hath none : here the conquest is but in nature of a possessory action , to put the conquerour in possession of a primer right , and not to raise a new title ; for war begins where the law fails : ubi iudicia deficiunt incipit bellum . lib. . c. . and thus , upon the matter , i cannot find in grotius's book de iure belli , how that any case can be put wherein by a just war a man may become a king , pleno jure proprietatis . all government and supreme power is founded upon publick subjection , which is thus defined by grotius . publica subjectio est , qua se populus homini alicui , aut pluribus hominibus , aut etiam populo alteri in ditionem dat . lib. . c. . if subjection be the gift of the people , how can supreme power , pleno iure , in full right , be got by a just war ? as to the other means whereby kings may get supreme power in full right of propriety , grotius will have it to be , when some people , for avoiding a greater evil , do so yield themselves into anothers power , as that they do except nothing . it would be considered how , without war , any people can be brought into such danger of life , as that because they can find no other wayes to defend themselves , or because they are so pressed with poverty , as they cannot otherwise have means to sustain themselves , they are forced to renounce all right of governing themselves , and deliver it to a king. but if such a case cannot happen , but by a war onely , which reduceth a people to such terms of extremity , as compells them to an absolute abrenuntiation of all sovereignty : then war , which causeth that necessity , is the prime means of extorting such sovereignty , and not the free gift of the people , who cannot otherwise choose but give away that power which they cannot keep . thus , upon the reckoning , the two ways propounded by grotius , are but one way ; and that one way , in conclusion , is no way whereby supreme power may be had in full right of propriety . his two ways are , a iust war , or a donation of the people ; a just war cannot be without a title , no title without the donation of the people , no donation without such a necessity as nothing can bring upon the donors but a war. so that howsoever grotius in words acknowledges that kings may have a full right of propriety , yet by consequence he denies it , by such circular suppositions , as by coincidence destroy each other , and in effect he leaves all people a right to plead in bar against the right of propriety of any prince , either per minas , or per dures . many times , saith grotius , it happens , that war is grounded upon expletive iustice , iustitiam expletricem , which is , when a man cannot obtain what he ought , he takes that which is as much in value , which in moral estimation is the same . for in war , when the same province cannot be recovered , to the which a man hath a title , he recovers another of the like value . this recovery cannot give a full right of propriety : because the justice of such a war reacheth no farther than to a compensation for a former right to another thing , and therefore can give no new right . i am bound to take notice of a case put by grotius , amongst those causes which he thinks should move the people to renounce all their right of governing , and give it to another . it may also happen ( saith he ) that a father of a family possessing large territories , will not receive any man to dwell within his land upon any other condition . and in another place , he saith , that all kings are not made by the people , which may be sufficiently understood by the examples of a father of a family receiving strangers under the law of obedience . in both these passages we have a close and curt acknowledgment , that a father of a family may be an absolute king over strangers , without choice of the people ; now i would know whether such fathers of families have not the same absolute power over their own children , without the peoples choice , which he allows them over strangers : if they have , i cannot but call them absolute proprietary kings , though grotius be not willing to give them that title in plain terms : for indeed to allow such kings , were to condemn his own principle , that dominion came in by the will of the people ; and so consequently to overthrow his usufructuary kings , of whom i am next to speak . grotius saith , that the law of obeying , or resisting princes , depends upon the will of them who first met in civil society , from whom power doth flow to kings : and , that men of their own accord came together into civil society , from whence springs civil power , and the people may choose what form of government they please . upon these suppositions , he concludes , that kings , elected by the people , have but an usufructuary right , that is , a right to take the profit or fruit of the kingdom , but not a right of propriety or power to alienate it . but why doth he call it an usufructuary right ? it seems to me a term too mean or base to express the right of any king , and is derogatory to the dignity of supreme majesty . the word usufructuary is used by the lawyers , to signifie him that hath the use , profit or fruit of some corporal thing , that may be used without the property ; for of fungible things ( res fungibiles , the civilians call them ) that are spent or consumed in the use , as corn , wine , oyl , money , there cannot be an usufructuary right . it is to make a kingdom all one with a farm , as if it had no other use but to be let out to him that can make most of it : whereas , in truth , it is the part and duty of a king to govern , and he hath a right so to do , and to that end supreme power is given unto him ; the taking of the profit , or making use of the patrimony of the crown , is but as a means onely to enable him to perform that great work of government . besides , grotius will not onely have an elected king , but also his lawful successors , to have but an usufructuary right , so that though a king hath a crown to him and to his heirs , yet he will allow him no propriety , because he hath no power to alienate it ; for he supposeth the primary will of the people to have been to bestow supreme power to go in succession , and not to be alienable ; but for this he hath no better proof than a naked presumption : in regnis quae populi voluntate delata sunt concedo non esse praesumendum eam fuisse populi voluntatem , ut alienatio imperii sui regi permitteretur . but though he will not allow kings a right of propriety in their kingdoms , yet a right of propriety there must be in some body , and in whom but in the people ? for he saith , the empire which is exercised by kings , doth not cease to be the empire of the people . his meaning is , the use is the king 's , but the property is the peoples . but if the power to alienate the kingdom be in him that hath the property , this may prove a comfortable doctrine to the people : but yet to allow a right of succession in kings , and still to reserve a right of property in the people , may make some contradiction : for the succession must either hinder the right of alienation which is in the people , or the alienation must destroy that right of succession , which , by grotius's confession , may attend upon elected kings . though grotius confess , that supreme power be unum quiddam , and in it self indivisible , yet he saith , sometimes it may be divided either by parts potential , or subjunctive . i take his meaning to be , that the government or the governed may be divided : an example he gives of the roman empire , which was divided , into the east and west : but whereas he saith , fieri potest , &c. it may be , the people choosing a king , may reserve some actions to themselves , and in others they may give full power to the king : the example he brings out of plato of the heraclides doth not prove it , and it is to dream of such a form of government as never yet had name , nor was ever found in any settled kingdom , nor cannot possibly be without strange confusion . if it were a thing so voluntary , and at the pleasure of men , when they were free , to put themselves under subjection , why may they not as voluntarily leave subjection when they please , and be free again ? if they had a liberty to change their natural freedom , into a voluntary subjection , there is stronger reason that they may change their voluntary subjection into natural freedom , since it is as lawful for men to alter their wills as their judgments . certainly , it was a rare felicity , that all the men in the world at one instant of time should agree together in one mind , to change the natural community of all things into private dominion : for without such an unanimous consent , it was not possible for community to be altered : for , if but one man in the world had dissented , the alteration had been unjust , because that man by the law of nature had a right to the common use of all things in the world ; so that to have given a propriety of any one thing to any other , had been to have robbed him of his right to the common use of all things . and of this judgment the jesuit lud. molina seems to be , in his book de iustitia , where he saith , si aliquis de cohabit antibus , &c. if one of the neighbours will not give his consent to it , the commonwealth should have no authority over him , because then every other man hath no right or authority over him , and therefore can they not give authority to the commonwealth over him . if our first parents , or some other of our forefathers did voluntarily bring in propriety of goods , and subjection to governours , and it were in their power either to bring them in or not , or having brought them in , to alter their minds , and restore them to their first condition of community and liberty ; what reason can there be alleged that men that now live should not have the same power ? so that if any one man in the world , be he never so mean or base , will but alter his will , and say , he will resume his natural right to community , and be restored unto his natural liberty , and consequently take what he please , and do what he list ; who can say that such a man doth more than by right he may ? and then it will be lawful for every man , when he please , to dissolve all government , and destroy all property . whereas grotius saith , that by the law of nature all things were at first common ; and yet teacheth , that after propriety was brought in , it was against the law of nature to use community ; he doth thereby not onely make the law of nature changeable , which he saith god cannot do , but he also makes the law of nature contrary to it self . the anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy . the preface . we do but flatter our selves , if we hope ever to be governed without an arbitrary power . no : we mistake , the question is not , whether there shall be an arbitrary power ; but the only point is , who shall have that arbitrary power , whether one man or many ? there never was , nor ever can be any people govern'd without a power of making laws , and every power of making laws must be arbitrary : for to make a law according to law , is contradictio in adjecto . it is generally confessed , that in a democracy the supreme or arbitrary power of making laws is in a multitude ; and so in an aristocracy the like legislative or arbitrary power is in a few , or in the nobility . and therefore by a necessary consequence , in a monarchy the same legislative power must be in one ; according to the rule of aristotle , who saith , government is in one , or in a few , or in many . this antient doctrine of government , in these latter days hath been strangely refined by the romanists , and wonderfully improved since the reformation , especially in point of monarchy , by an opinion , that the people have originally a power to create several sorts of monarchy , to limit and compound them with other forms of government , at their pleasure . as for this natural power of the people , they finde neither scripture , reason , or practice to justifie it : for though several kingdoms have several and distinct laws one from another ; yet that doth not make several sorts of monarchy : nor doth the difference of obtaining the supreme power , whether by conquest , election , succession , or by any other way , make different sorts of government . it is the difference only of the authors of the laws , and not of the laws themselves , that alters the form of government ; that is , whether one man , or more than one , make the laws . since the growth of this new doctrine , of the limitation and mixture of monarchy , it is most apparent , that monarchy hath been crucified ( as it were ) between two thieves , the pope and the people ; for what principles the papists make use of for the power of the pope above kings , the very same , by blotting out the word pope , and putting in the word people , the plebists take up to use against their soveraigns . if we would truely know what popery is , we shall finde by the laws and statutes of the realm , that the main , and indeed the only point of popery , is the alienating and withdrawing of subjects from their obedience to their prince , to raise sedition and rebellion : if popery and popularity agree in this point , the kings of christendome , that have shaken off the power of the pope , have made no great bargain of it , if in place of one lord abroad , they get many lords at home within their own kingdoms . i cannot but reverence that form of government which was allowed and made use of for god's own people , and for all other nations . it were impiety , to think that god , who was careful to appoint iudicial laws for his chosen people , would not furnish them with the best form of government : or to imagine that the rules given in divers places in the gospel , by our blessed saviour and his apostles , for obedience to kings , should now , like almanacks out of date , be of no use to us ; because it is pretended , we have a form of government now , not once thought of in those days . it is a shame and scandal for us christians , to seek the original of government from the inventions or fictions of poets , orators , philosophers , and heathen historians , who all lived thousands of years after the creation , and were ( in a manner ) ignorant of it : and to neglect the scriptures , which have with more authority most particularly given us the true grounds and principles of government . these considerations caused me to scruple this modern piece of politicks , touching limited and mixed monarchy : and finding no other that presented us with the nature and means of limitation and mixture , but an anonymus authour ; i have drawn a few brief observations upon the most considerable part of his treatise , in which i desire to receive satisfaction from the authour himself , if it may be , according to his promise in his preface ; or if not from him , from any other for him . the anarchy . of a limited or mixed monarchy . there is scarce the meanest man of the multitude , but can now in these days tell us that the government of the kingdome of england is a limited and mixed monarchy : and it is no marvail , since all the disputes and arguments of these distracted times both from the pulpit and the presse to tend and end in this conclusion . the author of the treatise of monarchy hath copiously handled the nature and manner of limited and mixed monarchy , and is the first and onely man ( that i know ) hath undertaken the task of describing it ; others onely mention it , as taking it for granted . doctor ferne gives the author of this treatise of monarchy this testimony , that the mixture of government is more accurately delivered and urged by this treatise than by the author of the fuller answer . and in another place doctor ferne saith , he allows his distinction of monarchy into limited and mixed . i have with some diligence looked over this treatise ▪ but cannot approve of these distinctions which he propounds ; i submit the reasons of my dislike to others judgements . i am somewhat confident that his doctrine of limited and mixed monarchy is an opinion but of yesterday , and of no antiquity , a meer innovation in policy , not so old as new england , though calculated properly for that meridian . for in his first part of the treatise which concerns monarchy in general , there is not one proof , text , or example in scripture that he hath produced to justifie his conceit of limited and mixed monarchy . neither doth he afford us so much as one passage or reason out of aristotle , whose books of politicks , and whose natural reasons are of greatest authority and credit with all rational men , next to the sacred scripture : nay , i hope i may affirm , and be able to prove , that arist. doth confute both limited and mixed monarchy , howsoever doctor ferne think these new opinions to be raised upon arist. principles . as for other polititians or historians , either divine or humane , ancient or modern , our author brings not one to confirm his opinions ; nor doth he , nor can he shew that ever any nation or people were governed by a limited or mixed monarchy . machivel is the first in christendome that i can find that writ of a mixed government , but not one syllable of a mixed monarchy : he , in his discourses or disputations upon the decades of livy , falls so enamored with the roman common-wealth , that he thought he could never sufficiently grace that popular government , unless he said , there was something of monarchy in it : yet he was never so impudent as to say , it was a mixed monarchy . and what machivel hath said for rome , the like hath contarene for venice . but bodin hath layed open the errors of both these , as also of polybius , and some few others that held the like opinions . as for the kingome of england , if it have found out a form of government ( as the treatise layeth it down ) of such perfection as never any people could ; it is both a glory to the nation , and also to this author , who hath first decipher'd it . i now make my approach to the book it self : the title is , a treatise of monarchy . the first part of it is , of monarchy in general : where first , i charge the author , that he hath not given us any definition or description of monarchy in general : for by the rules of method he should have first defined , and then divided : for if there be several sorts of monarchy , then in something they must agree , which makes them to be monarchies ; and in something they must disagree and differ , which makes them to be several sorts of monarchies . in the first place he should have shewed us in what they all agreed , which must have been a definition of monarchy in general , which is the foundation of the treatise ; and except that be agreed upon , we shall argue upon we know not what . i press not this main omission of our author out of any humour of wrangling , but because i am confident that had he pitched upon any definition of monarchy in general , his own definition would have confuted his whole treatise : besides , i find him pleased to give us a handsome definition of absolute monarchy , from whence i may infer , that he knew no other definition that would have fitted all his other sorts of monarchy ; it concerned him to have produced it , lest it might be thought there could be no monarchy but absolute . what our author hath omitted , i shall attempt to supply , and leave to the scanning . and it shall be a real as well as nominal definition of monarchy . a monarchy is the government of one alone . for the better credit of this definition , though it be able to maintain it self , yet i shall deduce it from the principles of our author of the treatise of monarchy . we all know that this word monarch is compounded of two greek words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is imperare , to govern and rule ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies one alone . the understanding of these two words may be picked out of our author . first , for government he teacheth us , it is potestatis exercitium , the exercise of a moral power ; next he grants us , that every monarch ( even his limited monarch ) must have the supream power of the state in him , so that his power must no way be limited by any power above his ; for then he were not a monarch , but a subordinate magistrate . here we have a fair confession of a supream unlimited power in his limited monarch : if you will know what he means by these words supream power , turn to his page , there you will finde , supream power is either legislative , or gubernative , and that the legislative power is the chief of the two ; he makes both supream , and yet one chief : the like distinction he hath before , where he saith , the power of magistracy , in respect of its degrees , is nomothetical or architectonical ; and gubernative or executive : by these words of legislative , nomothetical , and architectonical power , in plain english , he understands a power of making laws ; and by gubernative and executive , a power of putting those laws in execution , by judging and punishing offenders . the result we have from hence is , that by the authors acknowledgment , every monarch must have the supream power , and that supream power is , a power to make laws : and howsoever the author makes the gubernative and executive power a part of the supream power ; yet he confesseth the legislative to be chief , or the highest degree of power , for he doth acknowledge degrees of supream power ; nay , he afterwards teacheth us , that the legislative power is the height of power , to which the other parts are subsequent and subservient : if gubernative be subservient to legislative , how can gubernative power be supream ? now let us examime the authors limited monarch by these his own rules ; he tells us , that in a moderated , limited , stinted , conditionate , legal or allayed monarchy , ( for all these terms he hath for it ) the supream power must be restrained by some law according to which this power was given , and by direction of which this power must act ; when in a line before he said , that the monarchs power must not be limited by any power above his : yet here he will have his supream power restrained ; not limited , and yet restrained : is not a restraint , a limitation ? and if restrained , how is it supream ? and if restrained by some law , is not the power of that law , and of them that made that law , above his supream power ? and if by the direction of such law onely he must govern , where is the legislative power , which is the chief of supream power ? when the law must rule and govern the monarch , and not the monarch the law , he hath at the most but a gubernative or executive power : if his authority transcends its bounds , if it command beyond the law , and the subject is not bound legally to subjection in such cases , and if the utmost extent of the law of the land be the measure of the limited monarchs power , and subjects duty , where shall we find the supream power , that culmen or apex potestatis , that prime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which our author saith , must be in every monarch : the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies principality and power , doth also signifie principium , beginning ; which doth teach us , that by the word prince , or principality , the principium or beginning of government is meant ; this , if it be given to the law , it robs the monarch , and makes the law the primum mobile ; and so that which is but the instrument , or servant to the monarch , becomes the master . thus much of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the other word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , solus , one alone : the monarch must not only have the supream power unlimited , but he must have it alone ( without any companions . ) our author teacheth us , he is no monarch if the supream power be not in one . and again he saith , if you put the apex potestatis , or supream power , in the whole body , or a part of it , you destroy the being of monarchy . now let us see if his mixed monarchy be framed according to these his own principles : first , he saith , in a mixed monarchy the soveraign power must be originally in all three estates . and again , his words are , the three estates are all sharers in the supream power — the primity of share in the supream power is in one. here we find , that he that told us the supream power must be in one , will now allow his mixed monarch but one share only of the supream power , and gives other shares to the estates : thus he destroys the being of monarchy , by putting the supream power , or culmen potestatis , or a part of it , in the whole body , or a part thereof ; and yet formerly he confesseth , that the power of magistracy cannot well be divided , for it is one simple thing , or indivisable beam of divine perfection : but he can make this indivisable beam to be divisable into three shares . i have done with the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , solus , alone . i have dwelt the longer upon this definition of monarchy , because the apprehending of it out of the authors own grounds , quite overthrows both his monarch limited by law , and his monarch mixed with the states . for to govern , is to give a law to others , and not to have a law given to govern and limit him that governs : and to govern alone , is not to have sharers or companions mixed with the governor . thus the two words of which monarchy is compounded , contradict the two sorts of monarchy which he pleads for ; and by consequence his whole treatise : for these two sorts of limited and mixed monarchy take up ( in a manner ) his whole book . i will now touch some few particular passages in the treatise . our author first confesseth , it is gods express ordinance there should be government ; and he proves it by gen. . . where god ordained adam to rule over his wife , and her desires were to be subject to his ; and as hers , so all theirs that should come of her . here we have the original grant of government , and the fountain of all power placed in the father of all mankind ; accordingly we finde the law for obedience to government given in the terms of honour thy father : not only the constitution of power in general , but the limitation of it to one kind ( that is , to monarchy , or the government of one alone ) and the determination of it to the individual person and line of adam , are all three ordinances of god. neither eve nor her children could either limit adams power , or joyn others with him in the government ; and what was given unto adam , was given in his person to his posterity . this paternal power continued monarchical to the floud , and after the floud to the confusion of babel : when kingdoms were first erected , planted , or scattered over the face of the world , we finde gen. . . it was done by colonies of whole families , over which the prime fathers had supream power , and were kings , who were all the sons or grand-children of noah , from whom they derived a fatherly and regal power over their families . now if this supream power was setled and founded by god himself in the fatherhood , how is it possible for the people to have any right or title to alter and dispose of it otherwise ? what commission can they shew that gives them power either of limitation or mixture ? it was gods ordinance , that supremacy should be unlimited in adam , and as large as all the acts of his will : and as in him , so in all others that have supream power , as appears by the judgement and speech of the people to ioshuah when he was supream governour , these are their words to him , all that thou commandest us we will do ; whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy commandment , and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandest him , he shall be put to death : we may not say that these were evil councellours or flattering courtiers of ioshuah , or that he himself was a tyrant for having such arbitrary power . our author , and all those who affirm that power is conveyed to persons by publick consent , are forced to confess , that it is the fatherly power that first inables a people to make such conveyance ; so that admitting ( as they hold ) that our ancestors did at first convey power , yet the reason why we now living do submit to such power , is , for that our fore-fathers every one for himself , his family , and posterity , had a power of resigning up themselves and us to a supream power . as the scripture teacheth us that supream power was originally in the fatherhood without any limitation , so likewise reason doth evince it , that if god ordained that supremacy should be , that then supremacy must of necessity be unlimited : for the power that limits must be above that power which is limited ; if it be limited , it cannot be supream : so that if our author will grant supream power to be the ordinance of god , the supream power will prove it self to be unlimited by the same ordinance , because a supream limited power is a contradiction . the monarchical power of adam the father of all flesh , being by a general binding ordinance setled by god in him and his posterity by right of fatherhood , the form of monarchy must be preferr'd above other forms , except the like ordinance for other forms can be shewed : neither may men according to their relations to the form they live under , to their affections and judgments in divers respects , prefer or compare any other form with monarchy . the point that most perplexeth our author and many others , is , that if monarchy be allowed to be the ordinance of god , an absurdity would follow , that we should uncharitably condemn all the communities which have not that form , for violation of gods ordinance , and pronounce those other powers unlawful . if those who live under a monarchy can justifie the form they live under to be gods ordinance , they are not bound to forbear their own justification , because others cannot do the like for the form they live under ; let others look to the defence of their own government : if it cannot be provd or shewd that any other form of government had ever any lawful beginning , but was brought in or erected by rebellion , must therefore the lawful and just obedience to monarchy be denied to be the ordinance of god ? to proceed with our author ; in the page he saith , the higher power is gods ordinance : that it resideth in one or more , in such or such a way , is from humane designment ; god by no word binds any people to this or that form , till they by their own act bind themselves . because the power and consent of the people in government is the burden of the whole book , and our author expects it should be admitted as a magisterial postulation , without any other proof than a naked supposition ; and since others also maintain that originally power was , or now is in the people , & that the first kings were chosen by the people : they may not be offended , if they be asked in what sence they understand the word [ people ] because this , as many other words , hath different acceptions , being sometimes taken in a larger , otherwhiles in a stricter sence . literally , and in the largest sence , the word people signifies the whole multitude of mankind ; but figu●…tively and synecdochically , it notes many times the ●…ajor part of a multitude , or sometimes the better , or the richer , or the wiser , or some other part ; and oftentimes a very small part of the people , if there be no other apparent opposite party , hath the name of the people by presumption . if they understand that the entire multitude or whole people have originally by nature power to chuse a king , they must remember , that by their own principles and rules , by nature all mankind in the world makes but one people , who they suppose to be born alike to an equal freedome from subjection ; and where such freedome is , there ●…ll things must of necessity be common : and therefore without a joynt consent of the whole people ●…f the world , no one thing can be made proper 〈◊〉 any one man , but it will be an injury , and an ●…urpation upon the common right of all others . ●…rom whence it follows , that natural freedome be●…ing once granted , there cannot be any one man ●…osen a king without the universal consent of all the people of the world at one instant , nemine contradicente . nay , if it be true that nature hath made all men free ; though all mankind should concur in one vote , yet it cannot seem reasonable , that they should have power to alter the law of nature ; for if no man have power to take away his own life without the guilt of being a murtherer of himself , how can any people confer such a power as they have not themselves upon any one man , without being accessories to their own deaths , and every particular man become guilty of being felo de se ? if this general signification of the word people be disavowed , and men will suppose that the people of particular regions or countries have power and freedome to chuse unto themselves kings ; then let them but observe the consequence : since nature hath not distinguished the habitable world into kingdomes , nor determined what part of a people shall belong to one kingdome , and what to another , it follows , that the original freedome of mankind being supposed , every man is at liberty to be of what kingdome he please , and so every petty company hath a right to make a kingdom by it self ; and not onely every city , but every village , and every family , nay and every particular man , a liberty to chuse himself to be his own king if he please ; and he were a madman that being by nature free , would chuse any man but himself to be his own governour . thus to avoid the having but of one king of the whole world , we shall run into a liberty of having as many kings as there be men in the world , which upon the matter , is to have no king at all , but to leave all men to their natural liberty , which is the mischief the pleaders for natural liberty do pretend they would most avoid . but if neither the whole people of the world , nor the whole people of any part of the world be meant , but only the major part , or some other part of a part of the world ; yet still the objection will be the stronger . for besides that nature hath made no partition of the world , or of the people into distict kingdomes , and that without an universal consent at one and the same instant no partition can be made : yet if it were lawful for particular parts of the world by consent to chuse their kings , nevertheless their elections would bind none to subjection but only such as consented ; for the major part never binds , but where men at first either agree to be so bound , or where a higher power so commands : now there being no higher power than nature , but god himself ; where neither nature nor god appoints the major part to bind , their consent is not binding to any but only to themselves who consent . yet , for the present to gratifie them so far as to admit that either by nature , or by a general consent of all mankind , the world at first was divided into particular kingdomes , and the major part of the people of each kingdome assembled , allowed to chuse their king : yet it cannot truly be said that ever the whole people , or the major part , or indeed any considerable part of the whole people of any nation ever assembled to any such purpose . for except by some secret miraculous instinct they should all meet at one time , and place , what one man , or company of men less than the whole people hath power to appoint either time or place of elections , where all be alike free by nature ? and without a lawful summons , it is most unjust to bind those that be absent . the whole people cannot summon it self ; one man is sick , another is lame , a third is aged , and a fourth is under age of discretion : all these at some time or other , or at some place or other , might be able to meet , if they might chuse their own time and place , as men naturally free should . in assemblies that are by humane politique constitution , the superior power that ordains such assemblies , can regulate and confine them , both for time , place , persons , and other circumstances : but where there is an equality by nature , there can be no superior power ; there every infant at the hour it is born in , hath a like interest with the greatest and wisest man in the world . mankind is like the sea , ever ebbing or flowing , every minute one is born , another dies ; those that are the people this minute , are not the people the next minute , in every instant and point of time there is a variation no one time can be indifferent for all mankind to assemble ; it cannot but be mischievous always at the least to all infants , and others under age of discretion ; not to speak of women , especially virgins , who by birth have as much natural freedome as any other , and therefore ought not to lose their liberty without their own consent . but in part of salve this , it will be said that infants and children may be concluded by the votes of their parents . this remedy may cure some part of the mischief , but it destroys the whole cause ▪ and at last stumbles upon the true original of government . for if it be allowed , that the acts of parents bind the children , then farewel the doctrine of the natural freedome of mankind ; where subjection of children to parents is natural , there can be no natural freedome . if any reply , that not all children shall be bound by their parents consent , but onely those that are under age : it must be considered , that in nature there is no nonage ; if a man be not born free , she doth not assign him any other time when he shall attain his freedome : or if she did , then children attaining that age , should be discharged of their parents contract . so that in conclusion , if it be imagined that the people were ever but once free from subjection by nature , it will prove a meer impossibility ever lawfully to introduce any kind of government whatsoever , without apparent wrong to a multitude of people . it is further observable , that ordinarily children and servants are far a greater number than parents and masters ; and for the major part of these to be able to vote and appoint what government or governours their fathers and masters shall be subject unto , is most unnatural , and in effect to give the children the government over their parents . to all this it may be opposed , what need dispute how a people can chuse a king , since there be multitude of examples that kings have been , and are now adays chosen by their people ? the answer is , . the question is not of the fact , but of the right , whether it have been done by a natural , or by an usurped right . . many kings are , and have bin chosen by some small part of a people ; but by the the whole , or major part of a kingdom not any at all . most have been elected by the nobility , great men , and princes of the blood , as in poland , denmarke , and in sweden ; not by any collective or representative body of any nation : sometimes a sactious or seditious city , or a mutinous army hath set up a king , but none of all those could ever prove they had right or just title either by nature , or any otherwise , for such elections . we may resolve upon these two propositions : . that the people have no power or right of themselves to chuse kings . . if they had any such right , it is not possible for them any way lawfully to exercise it . you will say , there must necessarily be a right in somebody to elect , in case a king die without an heir . i answer , no king can die without an heir , as long as there is any one man living in the world . it may be the heir may be unknown to the people ; but that is no fault in nature , but the negligence or ignorance of those whom it concerns . but if a king could die without an heir , yet the kingly power in that case shall not escheat to the whole people , but to the supream heads and fathers of families ; not as they are the people , but quatenus they are fathers of people , over whom they have a supream power devolved unto them after the death of their soveraign ancestor : and if any can have a right to chuse a king , it must be these fathers , by conferring their distinct fatherly powers upon one man alone . chief fathers in scripture are accounted as all the people , as all the children of israel , as all the congregation , as the text plainly expounds it self , chr. . . where solomon speaks to all israel , that is , to the captains ▪ the iudges , and to every governour , the chief of the fathers : and so the elders of israel are expounded to be the chief of the fathers of the children of israel , king. . . and the chr. . . if it be objected , that kings are not now ( as they were at the first planting or peopling of the world ) the fathers of their people or kingdoms , and that the fatherhood hath lost the right of governing ; an answer is , that all kings that now are , or ever were , are , or were either fathers of their people , or the heirs of such fathers , or usurpers of the right of such fathers . it is a truth undeniable , that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever , either great , or small , though gathered together from the several corners and remotest regions of the world , but that in the same multitude , considered by it self , there is one man amongst them that in nature hath a right to be the king of all the rest , as being the next heir to adam , and all the others subject unto him : every man by nature is a king , or a subject : the obedience which all subjects yeild to kings , is but the paying of that duty which is due to the supream fatherhood : many times by the act either of an usurper himself , or of those that set him up , the true heir of a crown is dispossessed , god using the ministry of the wickedest men for the removing and setting up of kings : in such cases the subjects obedience to the fatherly power must go along and wait upon gods providence , who only hath right to give and take away kingdomes , and thereby to adopt subjects into the obedience of another fatherly power : according to that of arist. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a monarchy or kingdom will be a fatherly government . ethic. l. . c. . however the natural freedome of the people be cried up as the sole means to determine the kind government and the governours : yet in the close , all the favourers of this opinion are constrained to grant that the obedience which is due to the fatherly power is the true and only cause of the subjection which we that are now living give to kings , since none of us gave consent to government , but only our fore-fathers act and consent hath concluded us . whereas many confess that government only in the abstract is the ordinance of god , they are not able to prove any such ordinance in the scripture , but only in the fatherly power , and therefore we find the commandment that enjoyns obedience to superiours , given in the terms of honour thy father : so that not onely the power or right of government , but the form of the power of governing , and the person having that power , are all the ordinance of god : the first father had not only simply power , but power monarchical , as he was a father , immediately from god. for by the appointment of god , as soon as adam was created he was monarch of the world , though he had no subjects ; for though there could not be actual government until there were subjects , yet by the right of nature it was due to adam to be governour of his posterity : though not in act , yet at least in habit , adam was a king from his creation : and in the state of innocency he had been governour of his children ; for the integrity or excellency of the subjects doth not take away the order or eminency of the governour . eve was subject to adam before he sinned ; the angels , who are of a pure nature , are subject to god : which confutes their saying , who in disgrace of civil government or power say it was brought in by sin : government as to coactive power was after sin , because coaction supposeth some disorder , which was not in the state of innocency : but as for directive power , the condition of humane nature requires it , since civil society cannot be imagined without power of government : for although as long as men continued in the state of innocency they might not need the direction of adam in those things which were necessarily and morally to be done ; yet things indifferent , that depended meerly on their free will , might be directed by the power of adams command . if we consider the first plantations of the world which were after the building of babel when the confusion of tongues was , we may find the division of the earth into distinct kingdomes and countries , by several families , whereof the sons or grand-children of noah were the kings or governours by a fatherly right ; and for the preservation of this power and right in the fathers , god was pleased upon several families to bestow a language on each by it self , the better to unite it into a nation or kingdom ; as appears by the words of the text , gen. . these are the families of the sons of noah , after their generations in their nations , and by these were the nations divided in the earth after the floud : every one after his tongue , after their families in their nations . the kings of england have been gratiously pleased to admit and accept the commons in parliament as the representees of the kingdom , yet really and truly they are not the representative body of the whole kingdom . the commons in parliament are not the representative body of the whole kingdom ; they do not represent the king , who is the head and principal member of the kingdom ; nor do they represent the lords , who are the nobler and higher part of the body of the realm , and are personally present in parliament , and therefore need no representation . the commons onely represent a part of the lower 〈◊〉 inferior part of the body of the people , which are the free-holders worth s. by the year , and the commons or free-men of cities and burroughs , or the major part of them . all which are not one quarter , nay , not a tenth part of the commons of the kingdom ; for in every parish , for one free-holder there may be found ten that are no free-holders : and anciently before rents were improved , there were nothing neer so many free-holders of s. by the year as now are to be found . the scope and conclusion of this discourse and argument is , that the people taken in what notion or sense soever , either diffusively , collectively , or representatively , have not , nor cannot exercise any right or power of their own by nature , either in chusing or in regulating kings . but whatsoever power any people doth lawfully exercise , it must receive it from a supream power on earth , and practice it with such limitations as that superior power shall appoint . to return to our author . he divides monarchy into absolute , limited . absolute monarchy ( saith he ) is , when the soveraignty is so fully in one , that it hath no limits or bounds under god but his own will. this definition of his i embrace . and as before i charged our author for not giving us a definition of monarchy in general , so i now note him for not affording us any definition of any other particular ●…nd of monarchy but onely of absolute : it may peradventure make some doubt that there is no other sort but only that which he calls absolute . concerning absolute monarchy , he grants , that such were the antient eastern monarchies , and that of the turk and persian at this day . herein he saith very true . and we must remember him , though he do not mention them , that the monarchs of iudah and israel must be comprehended under the number of those he calls the eastern monarchies : and truly if he had said that all the antient monarchies of the world had been absolute , i should not have quarreld at him , ●…or do i know who could have disproved him . next it follows , that absolute monarchy is , when 〈◊〉 people are absolutely resigned up , or resign up themselves to be governed by the will of one man where men put themselves into this utmost degree of subjection by oath and contract , or are born and brought unto it by gods providence . in both these places he acknowledgeth there may be other means of obtaining a monarchy , besides the contract of a nation or peoples resigning up themselves to be governed , which is contrary to what he after saies , that the sole mean or root of all soveraignty , is the consent and fundamental contract of a nation of men . moreover , the author determines , that absolute monarchy is a lawful government , and that men may be born and brought unto it by gods providence ; it binds them , and they must abide it , because an oath to a lawful thing is obligatory . this position of his i approve , but his reason doth not satisfie ; for men are bound to obey a lawful governour , though neither they nor their ancestors ever took oath . then he proceeds , & confesseth that in rom. . the power which then was , was absolute : yet the apostle not excluding it , calls it gods ordinance , and commands subjection to it . so christ commands tribute to be paid , and pays it himself ; yet it was an arbitrary tax , the production of an absolute power . these are the loyal expressions of our author touching absolute or arbitrary monarchy . i do the rather mention these passages of our author , because very many in these days do not stick to maintain , that an arbitrary or absolute monarch not limited by law , is all one with a tyrant ; and to be governed by one mans will , is to be made a slave . it is a question whether our author be not of that minde , when he saith , absolute subjection is servitude : and thereupon a late friend to limited monarchy affirms in a discourse upon the question in debate be-between the king and parliament , that to make a king by the standard of gods word , is to make the subjects slaves for conscience sake . a hard saying , and i doubt whether he that gives this censure can be excused from blasphemy . it is a bold speech , to condemn all the kings of iudah for tyrants , or to say all their subjects were slaves . but certainly the man doth not know neither what a tyrant is , or what a slave is : indeed the words ●…re frequent enough in every mans mouth , and our old english translation of the bible useth sometimes the word tyrant ; but the authors of our new translation have been so careful , as not once to use the word , but onely for the proper name of a man , act. . . because they find no hebrew word in the scripture to signifie a tyrant or a slave . neither aristotle , bodin , nor sir walter rawleigh , ( who were all men of deep judgement ) can agree in a definition or description of tyranny , though they have all three laboured in the point . and i make some question whether any man can possibly describe what a tyrant is , and then tell me any one man that ever was in the world that was a tyrant according to that description . i return again to our treatise of monarchy , where i find three degrees of absolute monarchy . . where the monarch , whose will is the law , doth set himself no law to rule by , but by commands of his 〈◊〉 judgement as he thinks fit . . when he sets a law by which he will ordina●…ily govern , reserving to himself a liberty to vary from it as oft as in his discretion he thinks fit ; and in this the soveraign is as free as the former . . where he not onely sets a rule , but promiseth in many cases not to alter it ; but this promise or engagement is an after-condescent or act of grace , not dissolving the absolute oath of subjection which went before it . for the first of these three , there is no question but it is a pure absolute monarchy ; but as for the other two , though he say they be absolute , yet in regard they set themselves limits or laws to govern by , if it please our author to term them limited monarchs , i will not oppose him ; yet i must tell him , that his third degree of absolute monarchy is such a kind , as i believe , never hath been , nor ever can be in the world . for a monarch to promise and engage in many cases not to alter a law , it is most necessary that those many cases should be particularly expressed at the bargain making . now he that understands the nature and condition of all humane laws , knows that particular cases are infinite , and not comprehensible within any rules or laws : and if many cases should be comprehended , and many omitted , yet even those that were comprehended would admit of variety of interpretations and disputations ; therefore our author doth not , nor can tell us of any such reserved cases promised by any monarch . again , where he saith , an after-condescent or act of grace doth not dissolve the absolute oath of subjection which went before it ; though in this he speak true , yet still he seems to insinuate , that an oath onely binds to subjection , which oath , as he would have us believe , was at first arbitrary : whereas subjects are bound to obey monarchs though they never take oath of subjection , as well as childen are bound to obey their parents , though they never swear to do it . next , his distincton between the rule of power , and the exercise of it , is vain ; for to rule , is to exercise power : for himself saith , that government is potestatis exercitium , the exercise of a moral power ▪ lastly , whereas our author saith , a monarch cannot break his promise without sin ; let me add , that if the safety of the people , salus populi , require a breach of the monarchs promise , then the sin , if there be any , is rather in the making , than breaking of the promise ; the safety of the people is an exception implied in every monarchical promise . but it seems these three degrees of monarchy do not satisfie our author ; he is not content to have a monarch have a law or rule to govern by , but he must have this limitation or law to be ab externo , from somebody else , and not from the determination of the monarchs own will ; and therefore he saith , by original constitution the society publick confers on one man a power by limited contract , resigning themselves to be governed by such a law : also before he told us , the sole means of soveraignty is the consent and fundamental contract ; which consent puts them in their power , which can be no more nor other than is con●…eyed to them by such contract of subjection . if the sole means of a limited monarchy be the consent and fundamental contract of a nation , how is it that he saith , a monarch may be limited by after-condescent ? is an after-condescent all one with a fundamental contract , with original and radical constitution ? why yea : he tells us it is a secundary original constitution , a secundary original , that is , a second first : and if that condescent be an act of grace , doth not this condescent to a limitation come from the free determination of the monarchs will ? if he either formally , or virtually ( as our author supposeth ) desert his absolute or arbitrary power which he hath by conquest , or other right . and if it be from the free will of the monarch , why doth he say the limitation must be ab externo ? he told us before , that subjection cannot be dissolved or lessen'd by an act of grace coming afterwards : but he hath better bethought himself , and now he will have acts of grace to be of two kinds , and the latter kind may amount ( as he saith ) to a resignation of absolute monarchy . but can any man believe that a monarch who by conquest or other right hath an absolute arbitrary power , will voluntarily resigne that absoluteness , and accept so much power onely as the people shall please to give him , and such laws to govern by as they shall make choice of ? can he shew that ever any monarch was so gracious or kind-hearted as to lay down his lawful power freely at his subjects feet ? is it not sufficient grace if such an absolute monarch be content to set down a law to himself by which he will ordinarily govern , but he must needs relinquish his old independent commission , and take a new one from his subjects , clog'd with limitations ? finally , i observe , that howsoever our author speak big of the radical , fundamental , and original power of the people as the root of all soveraignty : yet in a better moode he will take up , and be contented with a monarchy limited by an after-condescent and act of grace from the monarch himself . thus i have briefly touched his grounds of limited monarchy ; if now we shall ask , what proof or examples he hath to justifie his doctrine , he is as mute as a fish : onely pythagoras hath said it , and we must believe him ; for though our author would have monarchy to be limited , yet he could be content his opinion should be absolute , and not limited to any rule or example . the main charge i have against our author now remains to be discussed ; and it is this , that instead of a treatise of monarchy , he hath brought forth a treatise of anarchy , and that by his own confessions shall be made good . first , he holds , a limited monarch transcends his bounds if he commands beyond the law ; and the subject legally is not bound to subjection in such cases . now if you ask the author who shall be judge whether the monarch transcend his bounds , and of the excesses of the soveraign power ; his answer is , there is an impossibility of constituting a judge to determine this last controversie . — i conceive in a limited legal monarchy there can be no stated internal iudge of the monarchs actions , if there grow a fundamental ●…riance betwixt him and the community . there can be no iudge legal and constituted within that form of government . in these answers it appears , there is no judge to determine the soveraigns or the monarchs transgressing his fundamental limits : yet our author is very cautelous , and supposeth onely a fundamental variance betwixt the monarch and the community ; he is ashamed to put the question home . i demand of him if there be a variance betwixt the monarch and any of the meanest persons of the community , who shall be the judge ? for instance , the king commands me , or gives judgement against me : i reply , his commands are illegal , and his judgment not according to law : who must judge ? if the monarch himself judge , then you destroy the frame of the state , and make it absolute , saith our author ; and he gives his reason : for , to define a monarch to a law , and then to make him judge of his own deviations from that law , is to absolve him from all law. on the other side , if any , or all the people may judge , then you put the soveraignty in the whole body , or part of it , and destroy the being of monarchy . thus our author hath caught himself in a plain dilemma : if the king be judge , then he is no limited monarch ; if the people be judge , then he is no monarch at all . so farewell limited monarchy , nay farewell all government if there be no judge . would you know what help our author hath found out for this mischief ? first , he saith , that a subject is bound to yield to a magistrate , when he cannot , de jure , challenge obedience , if it be in a thing in which he can possibly without subversion , and in which his act may not be made a leading case , and so bring on a prescription against publick liberty : again he saith , if the act in which the exorbitance or transgression of the monarch is supposed to be , b●… of lesser moment , and not striking at the very being of that government , it ought to be born by publick patience , rather than to endanger the being of the state. the like words he uses in another place , saying , if the will of the monarch exceed the limits of the law , it ought to b●… submitted to , so it be not contrary to gods law nor bring with it such an evil to our selves , or the publick , that we cannot be accessary to it by obeying . these are but fig-leaves to cover the nakedness of our authors limited monarch , formed upon weak supposals in cases of lesser moment . for if the monarch be to govern onely according to law , no transgression of his can be of so small moment if he break the bounds of law , but it is a subversion of the government it self , and may be made a leading case , and so bring on a prescription against publick liberty ; it strikes at the very being of the government , and brings with it such an evil , as the party that suffers , or the publick cannot be accessory to : let the case be never so small , yet if there be illegality in the act , it strikes ●…t the very being of limited monarchy , which is to be legal : unless our author will say , as in effect he doth , that his limited monarch must govern according to law in great and publick matters onely , and that in smaller matters which concern private men , or poor persons , he may rule according to his own will. secondly , our author tells us , if the monarchs act of exorbitancy or transgression be mortal , and such as suffered dissolves the frame of government and publick liberty , then the illegality is to be s●…t open , and redresment sought by petition ; which if failing , prevention by resistance ought to be : and if it be apparent , and appeal be made to the consciences of mankind , then the fundamental laws of that monarchy must judge and pronounce the sentence in every mans conscience , and every man ( so far as concerns him ) must follow the evidence of truth in his own soul to oppose or not to oppose , according as he can in conscience acquit or condemn the act of the governour or monarch . whereas my author requires , that the destructive nature of illegal commands should be set open : surely his mind is , that each private man in his particular case should make a publick remonstrance to the world of the illegal act of the monarch ; and then if upon his petition he cannot be relieved according to his desire , he ought , or it is his duty to make resistance . here i would know , who can be the judge whether the illegality be made apparent ? it is a main point , since every man is prone to flatter himself in his own cause , and to think it good , and that the wrong or injustice he suffers is apparent , when other moderate and indifferent men can discover no such thing : and in this case the judgement of the common people cannot be gathered or known by any possible means ; or if it could , it were like to be various and erronious . yet our author will have an appeal made to the conscience of all man-kind , and that being made , he concludes , the fundamental laws must judge , and pronounce sentence in every mans conscience . whereas he saith , the fundamental laws must judge ; i would very gladly learn of him , or of any other for him , what a fundamental law is , or else have but any one law named me that any man can say is a fundamental law of the monarchy . i confess he tells us , that the common laws are the foundation , and the statute laws are superstructive ; yet i think he dares not say that there is any one branch or part of the common law , but that it may be taken away by an act of parliament : for many points of the common law ( de facto ) have , and ( de jure ) any point may be taken away . how can that be called fundamental , which hath and may be removed , and yet the statute-laws stand firm and stable ? it is contrary to the nature of fundamental , for the building to stand when the foundation is taken away . besides , the common law is generally acknowledged to be nothing else but common usage or custome , which by length of time onely obtains authority : so that it follows in time after government , but cannot go before it , and be the rule to government , by any original or radical constitution . also the common law being unwritten , doubtful , and difficult , cannot but be an uncertain rule to govern by ; which is against the nature of a rule , which is and ought to be certain . lastly , by making the common law onely to be the foundation , magna charta is excluded from being a fundamental law , and also all other statutes from being limitations to monarchy , since the fundamental laws onely are to be judge . truly the conscience of all man-kind is a pretty large tribunal for the fundamental laws to pronounce sentence in . it is very much that laws which in their own nature are dumb , and always need a judge to pronounce sentence , should now be able to speak , and pronounce sentence themselves : such a sentence surely must be upon the hearing of one party onely ; for it is impossible for a monarch to make his defence and answer , and produce his witnesses , in every mans conscience , in each mans cause , who will but question the legality of the monarchs government . certainly the sentence cannot but be unjust , where but one mans tale is heard . for all this , the conclusion is , every man must oppose or not oppose the monarch according to his own conscience . thus at the last , every man is brought , by this doctrine of our authors , to be his own judge . and i also appeal to the consciences of all man-kind , whether the end of this be not utter confusion , and anarchy . yet after all this , the author saith , this power of every mans judging the illegal acts of the monarch , argues not a superiority of those who judge over him who is judged ; and he gives a profound reason for it ; his words are , it is not authoritative and civil , but moral , residing in reasonable creatures , and lawful for them to execute . what our author means by these words , ( not authoritative and civil , but moral ) perhaps i understand not , though i think i do ; yet it serves my turn that he saith , that resistance ought to be made , and every man must oppose or not oppose , according as in conscience he can acquit or condemn the acts of his governour ; for if it enable a man to resist and oppose his governour , without question 't is authoritative and civil . whereas he adds , that moral judgment is residing in reasonable creatures , and lawful for them to execute ; he seems to imply , that authoritative , and civil judgement doth not reside in reasonable creatures , nor can be lawfully executed : such a conclusion fits well with anarchy ; for he that takes away all government , and leaves every man to his own conscience , and so makes him an independent in state , may well teach that authority resides not in reasonable creatures , nor can be lawfully executed . i pass from his absolute and limited monarchy , to his division or partition ( for he allows no division ) of monarchy into simple and mixed , viz. of a monarch , the nobility , and community . where first , observe a doubt of our authors , whether a firm union can be in a mixture of equality ; he rather thinks there must be a priority of order in one of the three , or else there can be no unity . he must know , that priority of order doth not hinder , but that there may be an equality of mixture , if the shares be equal ; for he that hath the first share may have no more than the others : so that if he will have an inequality of mixture , a primity of share will not serve the turn : the first share must be greater or better than the others , or else they will be equal , and then he cannot call it a mixed monarchy , where onely a primity of share in the supream power is in one : but by his own confession he may better call it a mixed aristocracy or mixed democracy , than a mixed monarchy , since he tells us , the houses of parliament sure have two parts of the greatest legislative authority ; and if the king have but a third part , sure their shares are equal . the first step our author makes , is this , the soveraign power must be originally in all three ▪ next he finds , that if there be an equality of shares in three estates , there can be no ground to denominate a monarch ; and then his mixed monarch might be thought but an empty title : therefore in the third place he resolves us , that to salve all , a power must be sought out wherewith the monarch must be invested , which is not so great as to destroy the mixture , nor so titular as to destroy the monarchy ; and therefore he conceives it may be in these particulars . first , a monarch in a mixed monarchy may be said to be a monarch ( as he conceives ) if he be the head and fountain of the power which governs and executes the established laws ; that is , a man may be a monarch , though he do but give power to others to govern and execute the established laws : thus he brings his monarch one step or peg ▪ lower still than he was before : at first he made us believe his monarch should have the supream power , which is the legislative ; then he falls from that , and tells us , a limited monarch must govern according to law onely ; thus he is brought from the legislative to the gubernative or executive power onely ; nor doth he stay here , but is taken a hole lower , for now he must not govern , but he must constitute officers to govern by laws ; if chusing officers to govern be governing , then our author will allow his monarch to be a governour , not else : and therefore he that divided supream power into legislative and gubernative , doth now divide it into legislative , and power of constituting officers for governing by laws ; and this he saith is left to the monarch . indeed you have left him a fair portion of power , but are we sure he may enjoy this ? it seems our author is not confident in this neither , and some others do deny it him : our author speaking of the government of this kingdome , saith , the choice of the officers is intrusted to the judgment of the monarch for ought i know : he is not resolute in the point ; but for ought he knows , and for ought i know , his monarch is but titular , an empty title , certain of no power at all . the power of chusing officers onely , is the basest of all powers . aristotle ( as i remember ) saith , the common people are fit for nothing but to chuse officers , and to take accompts : and indeed , in all popular governments the multitude perform this work : and this work in a king puts him below all his subjects , and makes him the onely subject in a kingdome , or the onely man that cannot govern : there is not the poorest man of the multitude but is capable of some office or other , and by that means may sometime or other perhaps govern according to the laws ; onely the king can be no officer , but to chuse officers ; his subjects may all govern , but he may not . next , i cannot see how in true sence our author can say , his monarch is the head and fountain of power , since his doctrine is , that in a limited monarchy , the publick society by original constitution confer on one man power : is not then the publick society the head and fountain of power , and not the king ? again , when he tells us of his monarch , that both the other states , as well conjunctim as divisim , be his sworn subjects , and owe obedience to his commands : he doth but flout his poor monarch ; for why are they called his subjects and his commons ? he ( without any complement ) is their subject ; for they , as officers , may govern and command according to law : but he may not , for he must judge by his judges in courts of justice onely : that is , he may not judge or govern at all . . as for the second particular , the sole or chief power in capacitating persons for the supream power . and . as to this third particular , the power of convocating such persons , they are both so far from making a monarch , that they are the onely way to make him none , by choosing and calling others to share in the supream power . . lastly , concerning his authority being the last and greatest in the establishing every act , it makes him no monarch , except he be sole that hath that authority ; neither his primity of share in the supream power , nor his authority being last , no , nor his having the greatest authority , doth make him a monarch , unless he have that authority alone . besides , how can he shew that in his mixed monarchy the monarchs power is the greatest ? the greatest share that our author allows him in the legislative power , is a negative voice , and the like is allowed to the nobility and commons : and truely , a negative voice is but a base term to express a legislative power ; a negative voice is but a privative power , or indeed , no power at all to do any thing , onely a power to hinder an act from being done . wherefore i conclude , not any of his four , nor all of them put into one person , makes the state monarchical . this mixed monarchy , just like the limited , ends in confusion and destruction of all government : you shall hear the authors confession , that one inconvenience must necessarily be in all mixed governments , which i shewed to be in limited governments ; there can be no constituted legal authoritative iudge of the fundamental controversies arising between the three estates : if such do rise , it is the fatal disease of those governments , for which no salve can be applyed it is a case beyond the possible provision of such a government ; of this question there is no legal judge . the accusing side must make it evident to every mans conscience . — the appeal must be to the community , as if there were no government ; and as by evidence consciences are convinced , they are bound to give their assistance . the wit of man cannot say more for anarchy . thus have i picked out the flowers out of his doctrine about limited monarchy , and presented them with some brief annotations ; it were a tedious work to collect all the learned contradictions , and ambiguous expressions that occur in every page of his platonick monarchy ; the book hath so much of fancy , that it is a better piece of poetry then policy . because many may think , that the main doctrine of limited and mixed monarchy may in it self be most authentical , and grounded upon strong and evident reason , although our author perhaps have failed in some of his expressions , and be liable to exceptions : therefore i will be bold to enquire , whether aristotle could find either reason or example , of a limited or mixed monarchy ; and the rather , because i find our author altogether insists upon a rational way of justifying his opinion . no man i think will deny , but that aristotle was sufficiently curious in searching out the several forms of common-wealths and kingdoms ; yet i do not find , that he ever so much as dreamed of either a limited or mixed monarchy . several other sorts of monarchies he reckons up : in the third book of his politicks , he spends three whole chapters together , upon the several kinds of monarchy . first , in his fourteenth chapter he mentions four kinds of monarchy . the laconique or lacedemonian . the barbarique . the aesymnetical . the heroique . the laconique or lacedemonian king , ( saith he ) had onely supream power when he was out of the bounds of the lacedemonian territories ; then he had absolute power , his kingdom was like to a perpetual lord general of an army . the barbarique king ( saith aristotle ) had a power very near to tyranny ; yet they were lawful and paternal , because the barbarians are of a more servile nature than the grecians , and the asiatiques than the europeans ; they do willingly , without repining , live under a masterly government ; yet their government is stable and safe , because they are paternal and lawful kingdoms , and their guards are royal and not tyrannical : for kings are guarded by their own subjects , and tyrants are guarded by strangers . the aesymnetical king ( saith arist. ) in old time in greece , was an elective tyrant , and differed onely from the barbarian kings , in that he was elective and not paternal ; these sorts of kings , because they were tyrannical , were masterly ; but because they were over such as voluntarily elected them , they were regal . the heroique were those ( saith aristotle ) which flourished in the heroical times , to whom the people did willingly obey ; and they were paternal and lawful , because these kings did deserve well of the multitude , either by teaching them arts , or by warring for them , or by gathering them together when they were dispersed , or by dividing lands amongst them : these kings had supreme power in war , in sacrifices , in iudicature . these four sorts of monarchy hath aristotle thus distinguished , and after sums them up together , and concludes his chapter as if he had forgot himself , and reckons up a fifth kind of monarchy ; which is , saith he , when one alone hath supream power of all the rest : for as there is a domestical kingdom of one house , so the kingdom of a city , or of one or many nations , is a family . these are all the sorts of monarchy that aristotle hath found out , and he hath strained hard to make them so many : first , for his lacedemonian king , himself confesseth that he was but a kind of military commander in war , and so in effect no more a king than all generals of armies : and yet this no-king of his was not limited by any law , nor mixed with any companions of his government : when he was in the wars out of the confines of lacedemon , he was , as aristotle stiles him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of full and absolute command , no law , no companion to govern his army but his own will. next , for aristotles aesymnetical king , it appears , he was out of date in aristotles time , for he saith , he was amongst the antient greeks , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 aristotle might well have spared the naming him , ( if he had not wanted other sorts ) for the honour of his own nation : for he that but now told us the barbarians were of a more servile nature than the grecians , comes here , and tells us , that these old greek kings were elective tyrants . the barbarians did but suffer tyrants in shew , but the old grecians chose tyrants indeed ; which then must we think were the greater slaves , the greeks or the barbarians ? now if these sorts of kings were tyrants , we cannot suppose they were limited either by law , or joyned with companions : indeed arist. saith , some of these tyrants were limited to certain times and actions , for they had not all their power for term of life , nor could meddle but in certain businesses ; yet during the time they were tyrants , and in the actions whereto they were limited , they had absolute power to do what they list according to their own will , or else they could not have been said to be tyrants . as for aristotles heroick king , he gives the like note upon him , that he did upon the aesymnet , that he was in old time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the heroick times . the thing that made these heroical kingdoms differ from other sorts of kingdoms , was only the means by which the first kings obtained their kingdoms , and not the manner of government , for in that they were as absolute as other kings were , without either limitation by law , or mixture of companions . lastly , as for arist. barbarick sort of kings , since he reckoned all the world barbarians except the grecians , his barbarick king must extend to all other sorts of kings in the world , besides those of greece , and so may go under aristotles fifth sort of kings , which in general comprehends all other sorts , and is no special form of monarchy . thus upon a true accompt it is evident , that the five several sorts of kings mentioned by aristotle , are at the most but different and accidental means of the first obtaining or holding of monarchies , and not real or essential differences of the manner of government , which was always absolute , without either limitation or mixture . i may be thought perhaps to mistake , or wrong aristotle , in questioning his diversities of kings ; but it seems aristotle himself was partly of the same mind ; for in the very next chapter , when he had better considered of the point , he confessed , that to speak the truth , there were almost but two sorts of monarchies worth the considering , that is , his first or laconique sort , and his fifth or last sort , where one alone hath supream power over all the rest : thus he hath brought his five sorts to two . now for the first of these two , his lacedemonian king , he hath confessed before , that he was no more than a generalissimo of an army , and so upon the matter no king at all : and then there remains onely his last sort of kings , where one alone hath the supream power . and this in substance is the final resolution of aristotle himself : for in his sixteenth chapter , where he delivers his last thoughts touching the kinds of monarchy , he first dischargeth his laconick king from being any sort of monarchy , and then gives us two exact rules about monarchy ; and both these are pointblank against limited and mixed monarchy ; therefore i shall propose them to be considered of , as concluding all monarchy to be absolute and arbitrary . . the one rule is , that he that is said to be a king according to law , is no sort of government or kingdom at all : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the second rule is , that a true king is he that ruleth all according to his own will , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . this latter frees a monarch from the mixture of partners or sharers in government , as the former rule doth from limitation by laws . thus in brief i have traced aristotle in his crabbed and broken passages , touching diversities of kings ; where he first finds but four sorts , and then he stumbles upon a fifth ; and in the next chapter contents himself onely with two sorts of kings , but in the chapter following concludes with one , which is the true perfect monarch , who rules all by his own will : in all this we find nothing for a regulated or mixed monarchy , but against it . moreover , whereas the author of the treatise of monarchy affirms it as a prime principle , that all monarchies , ( except that of the iews ) depend upon humane designment , when the consent of a society of men , and a fundamental contract of a nation , by original or radical constitution confers power ; he must know that arist. searching into the original of government , shews himself in this point a better divine than our author ; and as if he had studied the book of genesis , teacheth , that monarchies fetch their pedigree from the right of fathers , and not from the gift or contract of people ; his words may thus be englished . at the first , cities were governed by kings , and so even to this day are nations also : for such as were under kingly government did come together ; for every house is governed by a king , who is the eldest ; and so also colonies are governed for kindred sake . and immediately before , he tells us , that the first society made of many houses is a village , which naturally seems to be a colony of a house , which some call foster-brethren , or children , and childrens children . so in conclusion we have gained aristotles judgment in three main and essential points . . a king according to law makes no kind of government . . a king must rule according to his own will. . the original of kings , is from the right of fatherhood . what aristotles judgment was two thousand years since , is agreeable to the doctrine of the great modern politician bodin : hear him touching limited monarchy : unto majesty or soveraignty ( saith he ) belongeth an absolute power , not subject to any law — chief power given unto a prince with condition , is not properly soveraignty , or power absolute , except such conditions annexed to the soveraignty , be directly comprehended within the laws of god and nature . — albeit by the sufferance of the king of england , controversies between the king and his people are sometimes determined by the high court of parliament , and sometimes by the lord chief iustice of england ; yet all the estates remain in full subjection to the king , who is no ways bound to follow their advice , neither to consent to their requests . — it is certain , that the laws , priviledges , and grants of princes , have no force but during their life , if they be not ratified by the express consent , or by sufferance of the prince following , especially priviledges . — much less should a prince be bound unto the laws he maketh himself ; for a man may well receive a law from another man , but impossible it is in nature for to give a law unto himself , no more than it is to command a mans self in a matter depending of his own will. the law saith , nulla obligatio consistere potest , quae à voluntate promittentis statum capit . the soveraign prince may derogate unto the laws that he hath promised and sworn to keep , if the equity thereof be ceased ; and that of himself , without the consent of his subjects . — the majesty of a true soveraign prince is to be known , when the estates of all the people assembled , in all humility present their requests and supplications to their prince , without having power in any thing , to command , determine , or give voice , but that that which it pleaseth the king to like or dislike , to command or bid , is holden for law : wherein they which have written of the duty of magistrates have deceived themselves , in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the prince ; a thing which causeth oft true subjects to revolt from their obedience to their prince , and ministreth matter of great troubles in common-wealths ; of which their opinion there is neither reason nor ground : for if the king be subject unto the assemblies and decrees of the people , he should neither be king nor soveraign , and the common-wealth neither realm nor monarchy , but a meer aristocracie . so we see the principal point of soveraign majesty , and absolute power , to consist principally in giving laws unto the subjects in general without their consent . bodin de rep. l. . c. . to confound the state of monarchy with the popular or aristocratical estate , is a thing impossible , and in effect incompatible , and such as cannot be imagined : for soveraignty being of it self indivisible , how can it at one and the same time be divided betwixt one prince , the nobility , and the people in common ? the first mark of soveraign majesty , is to be of power to give laws , and to command over them unto the subjects ; and who should those subjects be , that should yield their obedience to the law , if they should have also power to make the laws ? who should he be that could give the law ? being himself constrained to receive it of them , unto whom himself gave it ? so that of necessity we must conclude , that as no one in particular hath the power to make the law in such a state , that then the state must needs be a state popular . — never any common-wealth hath been made of an aristocracy and popular estate , much less of the three estates of a common-weal . — such states wherein the rights of soveraignty are divided , are not rightly to be called common-weals , but rather the corruption of commonweals , as herodotus has most briefly but truly written . — common-weals which change their state , the sovereign right and power of them being divided , find no rest from civil wars and broils , till they again recover some one of the three forms , and the soveraignty be wholly in one of the states or other . where the rights of the soveraignty are divided betwixt the prince and his subjects , in that confusion of state there is still endless stirs and quarrels for the superiority , until that some one , some few , or all together , have got the soveraignty . id. lib. . c. . this judgment of bodin's touching limited and mixed monarchy , is not according to the mind of our author , nor yet of the observator , who useth the strength of his wit to overthrow absolute and arbitrary government in this kingdom ; and yet in the main body of his discourse , le ts fall such truths from his pen , as give a deadly wound to the cause he pleads for , if they be indifferently weighed and considered . i will not pick a line or two here and there to wrest against him , but will present a whole page of his book , or more together , that so we may have an entire prospect upon the observators mind : without society ( saith the observator ) men could not live ; without laws men could not be sociable ; and without authority somewhere to judge according to law , law was vain : it was soon therefore provided , that laws according to the dictate of reason , should be ratified by common consent ; when it afterward appeared , that man was yet subject to unnatural destruction , by the tyranny of entrusted magistrates , a mischief almost as fatal , as to be without all magistracy . how to provide a wholsome remedy therefore , was not so easie to be invented : it was not difficult to invent laws for the limiting of supream governours ; but to invent how those laws should be executed , or by whom interpreted , was almost impossible , nam quis custodiet ipsos custodes , to place a superiour above a supream , was held unnatural ; yet what a lifeless thing would law be without any iudge to determine and force it ? if it be agreed upon , that limits should be prefixed to princes and iudges to decree according to those limits , yet another inconvenience will presently affront us : for we cannot restrain princes too far , but we shall disable them from some good : long it was ere the world could extricate it self out of all these extremities , or find out an orderly means whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded prerogative on this hand , and to excessive liberty on the other ; and scarce has long experience yet fully satisfyed the minds of all men in it . in the infancy of the world , when man was not so artificial and obdurate in cruelty and oppression as now , and policy most rude , most nations did choose rather to subject themselves to the meer discretion of their lords , than rely upon any limits ; and so be ruled by arbitrary edicts , than written statutes . but since tyranny being more exquisite , and policy more perfect , especially where learning and religion flourish , few nations will endure the thraldome which usually accompanies unbounded and unconditionate royalty ; yet long it was ere the bounds and conditions of supream lords was so wisely determined , or quietly conserved as now they are : for at first , when as ephori , tribuni , curatores , &c. were erected to poise against the scale of soveraignty , much blood was shed about them , and states were put into new broils by them , and some places the remedy proved worse than the disease . in all great distresses , the body of the people were ever constrained to rise , and by force of the major party to put an end to all intestine strifes , and make a redress of all publick grievances : but many times calamities grew to a strange height , before so cumbersome a body could be raised ; and when it was raised , the motions of it were so distracted and irregular , that after much spoil and effusion of blood , sometimes only one tyranny was exchanged for another , till some was invented to regulate the motions of the peoples moliminous body . i think arbitrary rule was most safe for the world : but now , since most countries have found an art and peaceable order for publick assemblies , whereby the people may assume its own power to do it self right , without disturbance to it self or injury to princes ; he is very unjust that will oppose this art or order . that princes may not be now beyond all limits and laws , nor yet to be tyed upon those limits by any private parties ; the whole community , in its underived majesty , shall convene to do justice ; and that the convention may not be without intelligence , certain times , and places , and forms , shall be appointed for its reglement ; and that the vastness of its own bulk may not breed confusion , by vertue of election and representation , a few shall act for many , the wise shall consent for the simple , the vertue of all shall redound to some , and the prudence of some shall redound to all ; and surely as this admirably-composed court , which is now called a parliament , is more regularly and orderly formed , than when it was called mickle synod of wittena-gemot , or when this real body of the people did throng together at it : so it is not yet perhaps without some defects , which by art and policy might receive farther amendment : some divisions have sprung up of late between both houses , and some between the king and both houses , by reason of incertainty of iurisdiction ; and some lawyers doubt how far the parliament is able to create new forms and presidents , and has a iurisdiction over it self ; all these doubts would be solemnly solved : but in the first place , the true priviledges of parliament belonging not only to the being and efficacy of it , but to the honour and complement of it , would be clearly declared : for the very naming of priviledges of parliament , as if they were chimera's to the ignorant sort , and utterly unknown unto the learned , hath been entertained with scorn since the beginning of this parliament . in this large passage taken out of the observator which concerns the original of all government , two notable propositions may be principally observed . first , our observator confesseth arbitrary or absolute government to be the first , and the safest government for the world . secondly , he acknowledgeth that the iurisdiction is uncertain , and the priviledges not clearly declared of limited monarchy . these two evident truths delivered by him , he labours mainly to disguise . he seems to insinuate that arbitrary government was but in the infancy of the world , for so he terms it ; but if we enquire of him , how long he will have this infancy of the world to last , he grants it continued above three thousand years , which is an unreasonable time for the world to continue under-age : for the first opposers he doth finde of arbitrary power , were the ephori , tribuni , curatores , &c. the ephori were above three thousand years after the creation , and the tribuni were later ; as for his curatores , i know not whom he means , except the master of the court of wards , i cannot english the word curator better . i do not believe that he can shew that any curatores or & caetera's which he mentions were so antient as the ephori . as for the tribuni , he mistakes much if he thinks they were erected to limit and bound monarchy ; for the state of rome was at the least aristocratical ( as they call it ) if not popular , when tribunes of the people were first hatched . and for the ephori , their power did not limit or regulate monarchy , but quite take it away ; for a lacedemonian king in the judgment of aristotle was no king indeed , but in name onely , as generalissimo of an army ; and the best politicians reckon the spartan common-wealth to have been aristocratical , and not monarchical ; and if a limited monarchy cannot be found in lacedemon , i doubt our observator will hardly find it any where else in the whole world ; and in substance he confesseth as much , when he saith , now most countries have found out an art and peaceable order for publick assemblies ; as if it were a thing but new done , and not before ; for so the word now doth import . the observator in confessing the iurisdiction to be incertain , and the priviledges undetermined of that court that should bound and limit monarchy , doth in effect acknowledge there is no such court at all : for every court consists of iurisdictions and priviledges ; it is these two that create a court , and are the essentials of it : if the admirably composed court of parliament have some defects which may receive amendment , as he saith , and if those defects be such as cause divisions both between the houses , and between the king and both houses , and these divisions be about so main a matter as iurisdictions and priviledges , and power to create new priviledges , all which are the fundamentals of every court , ( for until they be agreed upon , the act of every court may not onely be uncertain , but invalid , and cause of tumults and sedition : ) and if all these doubts and divisions have need to be solemnly solved , as our observator confesseth : then he hath no reason at all to say , that now the conditions of supream lords are wisely determined and quietly conserved , or that now most countries have found out an art , and peaceable order for publick affairs , whereby the people may resume its own power to do it self right without injury unto princes : for how can the underived majesty of the people by assuming its own power , tell how to do her self right , or how to avoid doing injury to the prince , if her iurisdiction be uncertain , and priviledges undetermined ? he tells us now most countries have found an art , and peaceable order for publick assemblies : and to the intent that princes may not be now beyond all limits and laws , the whole community in its underived majesty shall convene to do iustice. but he doth not name so much as one country or kingdome that hath found out this art , where the whole community in its underived majesty did ever convene to do justice . i challenge him , or any other for him , to name but one kingdome that hath either now or heretofore found out this art or peaceable order . we do hear a great rumor in this age , of moderated and limited kings ; poland , sweden , and denmark , are talked of for such ; and in these kingdomes , or nowhere , is such a moderated government , as our observator means , to be found . a little enquiry would be made into the manner of the government of these kingdoms : for these northern people , as bodin observeth , breath after liberty . first for poland , boterus saith , that the government of it is elective altogether , and representeth rather an aristocracie than a kingdome : the nobility , who have great authority in the diets , chusing the king , and limiting his authority , making his soveraignty but a slavish royalty : these diminutions of regality began first by default of king lewis , and jagello , who to gain the succession in the kingdom contrary to the laws , one for his daughter , and the other for his son , departed with many of his royalties and prerogatives , to buy the voices of the nobility . the french author of the book called the estates of the world , doth inform us that the princes authority was more free , not being subject to any laws , and having absolute power , not onely of their estates , but also of life and death . since christian religion was received , it began to be moderated , first by holy admonitions of the bishops and clergy , and then by services of the nobility in war : religious princes gave many honours , and many liberties to the clergy and nobility , and quit much of their rights , the which their successors have continued . the superiour dignity is reduced to two degrees , that is , the palatinate and the chastelleine , for that kings in former times did by little and little call these men to publike consultations , notwithstanding that they had absolute power to do all things of themselves , to command , dispose , recompence , and punish , of their own motions : since they have ordained that these dignities should make the body of a senate , the king doth not challenge much right and power over his nobility , nor over their estates , neither hath he any over the clergy . and though the kings authority depends on the nobility for his election , yet in many things it is absolute after he is chosen : he appoints the diets at what time and place he pleaseth ; he chooseth lay-councellors , and nominates the bishops , and whom he will have to be his privy councel : he is absolute disposer of the revenues of the crown : he is absolute establisher of the decrees of the diets : it is in his power to advance and reward whom he pleaseth . he is lord immediate of his subjects , but not of his nobility : he is soveraign iudge of his nobility in criminal causes . the power of the nobility daily increaseth , for that in respect of the kings election , they neither have law , rule , nor form to do it , neither by writing nor tradition . as the king governs his subjects which are immediately his , with absolute authority ; so the nobility dispose immediately of their vassals , over whom every one hath more than a regal power , so as they intreat them like slaves . there be certain men in poland who are called earthly messengers or nuntio's , they are as it were agents of iurisdictions or circles of the nobility : these have a certain authority , and , as boterus saith , in the time of their diets these men assemble in a place neer to the senate-house , where they chuse two marshals , by whom ( but with a tribune-like authority ) they signifie unto the council what their requests are . not long since , their authority and reputation grew so mightily , that they now carry themselves as heads and governours , rather than officers and ministers of the publick decrees of the state : one of the councel refused his senators place , to become one of these officers . every palatine , the king requiring it , calls together all the nobility of his palatinate ; where having propounded unto them the matters whereon they are to treat , and their will being known , they chuse four or six out of the company of the earthly messengers ; these deputies meet and make one body , which they call the order of knights . this being of late years the manner and order of the government of poland , it is not possible for the observator to finde among them that the whole community in its underived majesty doth ever convene to do iustice : nor any election or representation of the community , or that the people assume its own power to do it self right . the earthly messengers , though they may be thought to represent the commons , and of late take much upon them , yet they are elected and chosen by the nobility , as their agents and officers . the community are either vassals to the king , or to the nobility , and enjoy as little freedom or liberty as any nation . but it may be said perhaps , that though the community do not limit the king , yet the nobility do , and so he is a limited monarchy . the answer is , that in truth , though the nobility at the chusing of their king do limit his power , and do give him an oath ; yet afterwards they have always a desire to please him , and to second his will ; and this they are forced to do , to avoid discord : for by reason of their great power , they are subject to great dissentions , not onely among themselves , but between them and the order of knights , which are the earthly messengers : yea , the provinces are at discord one with another : and as for religion , the diversity of sects in poland breed perpetual jars and hatred among the people , there being as many sects as in amsterdam it self , or any popular government can desire . the danger of sedition is the cause , that though the crown depends on the election of the nobility ; yet they have never rejected the kings successour , or transferred the realm to any other family , but once , when deposing ladislaus for his idleness ( whom yet afterward they restored ) they elected wencelaus king of bohemia . but if the nobility do agree to hold their king to his conditions , which is , not to conclude any thing but by the advice of his councel of nobles , nor to choose any wife without their leaves , then it must be said to be a common-weal , not a royalty ; and the king but onely the mouth of the kingdom , or as queen christina complained , that her husband was but the shadow of a soveraign . next , if it be considered how the nobility of poland came to this great power ; it was not by any original contract , or popular convention : for it is said they have neither law , rule , nor form written or unwritten , for the election of their king ; they may thank the bishops and clergy : for by their holy admonitions and advice , good and religious princes , to shew their piety , were first brought to give much of their rights and priviledges to their subjects , devout kings were meerly cheated of some of their royalties . what power soever general assemblies of the estates claim or exercise over and above the bare naked act of councelling , they were first beholding to the popish clergy for it : it is they first brought parliaments into request and power : i cannot finde in any kingdom , but onely where popery hath been , that parliaments have been of reputation ; and in the greatest times of superstition they are first mentioned . as for the kingdom of denmarke , i read that the senators , who are all chosen out of the nobility , and seldom exceed the number of , with the chief of the realm , do chuse their king. they have always in a manner set the kings eldest son upon the royal throne . the nobility of denmarke withstood the coronation of frederick , till he sware not to put any noble-man to death until he were judged of the senate ; and that all noble-men should have power of life and death over their subjects without appeal ; and the king to give no office without consent of the councel . there is a chancelour of the realm , before whom they do appeal from all the provinces and islands , and from him to the king himself . i hear of nothing in this kingdom that tends to popularity ; no assembly of the commons , no elections , or representation of them . sweden is governed by a king heretofore elective , but now made hereditary in gustavus time : it is divided into provinces : an appeal lieth from the vicount of every territory to a soveraign judge called a lamen ; from the lamens , to the kings councel ; and from this councel , to the king himself . now let the observator bethink himself , whether all , or any of these three countries have found out any art at all whereby the people or community may assume its own power : if neither of these kingdomes have , most countries have not , nay none have . the people or community in these three realms are as absolute vassals as any in the world ; the regulating power , if any be , is in the nobility : nor is it such in the nobility as it makes shew for . the election of kings is rather a formality , than any real power : for they dare hardly chuse any but the heir , or one of the blood royal : if they should chuse one among the nobility , it would prove very factious ; if a stranger , odious , neither safe . for the government , though the kings be sworn to raign according to the laws , and are not to do any thing without the consent of their councel in publick affairs : yet in regard they have power both to advance and reward whom they please , the nobility and senators do comply with their kings . and boterus concludes of the kings of poland , who seem to be most moderated , that such as is their valour , dexterity , and wisdome , such is their power , authority , and government . also bodin saith , that these three kingdoms are states changable and uncertain , as the nobility is stronger than the prince , or the prince than the nobility ; and the people are so far from liberty , that he saith , divers particular lords exact not onely customs , but tributes also ; which are confirmed and grow stronger , both by long prescription of time , and use of iudgments . the end. an advertisement to the jury-men of england , touching witches . advertisement to the jury-men of england . the late executon of witches at the summer assises in kent , occasioned this brief exercitation , which addresses it self to such as have not deliberately thought upon the great difficulty in discovering , what , or who a witch is . to have nothing but the publick faith of the present age , is none of the best evidence , unless the universality of elder times do concur with these doctrines , which ignorance in the times of darkness brought forth , and credulity in these days of light hath continued . such as shall not be pleased with this tractate , are left to their liberty to consider , whether all those proofs and presumptions number'd up by mr. perkins , for the conviction of a witch , be not all condemned , or confessed by himself to be unsufficient or uncertain . he brings no less than eighteen signs or proofs , whereby a witch may be discovered , which are too many to be all true : his seven first he himself confesseth to be insufficient for conviction of a witch ; his eight next proofs ( which he saith men in place have used ) he acknowledgeth to be false or insufficient . thus of his eighteen proofs , which made a great shew , fifteen of them are cast off by himself ; there remains then his sixteenth , which is the confession of a witch ; yet presently he is forced to yield , that a bare confession is not a sufficient proof , and so he cometh to his seventeenth proof , which is , two credible witnesses ; and he here grants , that the league between the devil and the witch is closely made , and the practices of witches be very secret , that hardly a man can be brought , which upon his own knowledge can aver such things . therefore at last , when all other proofs fail , he is forced to fly to his eighteenth proof , and tells us , that yet there is a way to come to the knowledge of a witch , which is , that satan useth all means to discover a witch ; which how it can be well done , except the devil be bound over to give in evidence against the witch , cannot be understood . and as mr. perkins weakens and discredits all his own proofs , so he doth the like for all those of king james , who , as i remember , hath but three arguments for the discovery of a witch . first , the secret mark of a witch , of which mr. perkins saith , it hath no power by gods ordinance . secondly , the discovery by a fellow - witch ; this mr. perkins by no means will allow to be a good proof . thirdly , the swimming of a witch , who is to be flung cross ways into the water , that is , as wierus interprets it , when the thumb of the right hand is bound to the great toe of the left foot , and the thumb of the left hand to the great toe of the right foot , against this tryal by water , together with a disability in a witch to shed tears , ( which king james mentions ) delrio and mr. perkins both argue ; for it seems they both write after king james , who put forth his book of daemonologie in his youth , being in scotland , about his age of thirty years . it concerns the people of this nation to be more diligently instructed in the doctrine of witch-craft , than those of forraign countries , because here they are tyed to a stricter or exacter rule in giving their sentence than others are : for all of them must agree in their verdict , which in a case of extream difficulty is very dangerous ; and it is a sad thing for men to be reduced to that extremity , that they must hazard their consciences or their lives . a difference between an english and hebrew witch . the point in question is briefly this ; whether such a witch as is condemned by the laws and statutes of this land , be one and the same with the witch forbidden by the law of moses . the witch condemned by our statute-law is , iacob . cap. . one that shall use , practice , or exercise any invocation or conjuration of any evil or wicked spirit , or consult , covenant with , entertain or employ , feed or reward any evil or wicked spirit , to or for any intent or purpose ; or take up any dead man , woman , or child , out of his , her , or their grave , or any other place , where the dead body resteth ; or the skin , bone , or other part of any dead person , to be employed or used in any manner of witchcraft , sorcery , charm or enchantment ; or shall use , practice , or exercise any witchcraft , enchantment , charm , or sorcery , whereby any person shall he killed , destroyed , wasted , consumed , pined , or lamed in his or her body , or any part thereof : such offenders duely and lawfully convicted and attainted , shall suffer death . if any person shall take upon him by witchcraft , inchantment , charm or sorcery , to tell or declace in what place any treasure of gold or silver should or might be found or had in the earth , or other secret places , or where goods , or things lost or stoln should be found or become : or to the intent to provoke any person to unlawful love , or whereby any cattle or goods of any person shall be destroyed , wasted , or impaired ; or to destroy or hurt any person , in his , or her body , though the same be not effected , &c. a years imprisonment , and pillory , &c. and the second conviction death . in this statute , these points are observable . . that this statute was first framed in . eliz. and onely the penalties here a little altered , and the last clause concerning provoking of persons to love , and destroying of cattle and goods , &c. is so changed , that i cannot well make sence of it , except it be rectified according to the words of the former statute which stands repealed . . although the statute runs altogether in the disjunctive or , and so makes every single crime capital , yet the judges usually by a favourable interpretation , take the disjunctive or , for the copulative and ; and therefore ordinarily they condemn none for witches , unless they be charged with the murdering of some person . . this statute pre-supposeth that every one knows what a conjurer , a witch , an inchanter , a charmer , and sorcerer is , as being to be learned best of divines ; and therefore it hath not described or distinguished between them : and yet the law is very just in requiring a due and lawful conviction . the definition of witch-craft . for the better discovery of the qualities of these crimes , i shall spend some discourse upon the definition of those arts by divines : for both those of the reformed churches , as well as these of the roman , in a manner , agree in their definition of the sin of witch-craft . i shall instance in two late writers , viz. mr. william perkins in his discourse of witch-craft , and in martin delrio , a jesuit of lorrain , in his book of magical disquisitions . our english word witch , is derived from the dutch word wiechelen , or wijchelen , which doth properly signifie whinying or neying like a horse , and doth also signifie to foretel or prophecy ; and weicheler signifies a southsayer ; for that the germans , from whom our ancestors the saxons descended , usually and principally did , as tacitus tells us , divine and fore-tell things to come , by the whinying and neying of their horses . hinnitu & fremitu are his words . for the definition mr. perkins saith , witch-craft is an art serving for the working of wonders , by the assistance of the devil , so far as god shall permit . delrio defineth it to be an art , which by the power of a contract entred into with the devil , some wonders are wrought which pass the common understanding of men . ars qua vi pacti cum daemonibus initi mira quaedam communem hominum captum superantia officiuntur . in these two definitions , some points are worth the noting . . they both agree in the main foundation , which is a contract with the devil , and therefore mr. perkins thought it most necessary , that this main point should be proved ; to which purpose he promiseth to define a witch , by opening the nature of witch-craft , as it is delivered in the old and new testament ; and yet after he confesseth a manifest covenant is not so fully set down in scripture : and out of the new testament he offers no proof at all , though he promised it ; nevertheless , he resolves us that a covenant is a most evident and certain truth , that may not be called in question . for proof of a covenant , he produceth onely one text out of the old testament ; neither doth he say , that the text proveth a contract with the devil , but onely that it intimateth so much : thus at the first he falls from a proof to an intimation onely . the text is , psal. . v. . of which his words are these : howsoever the common translation runneth in other terms , yet the words are properly to be read thus : which heareth not the voice of the mutterer joyning societies cunningly — the main foundation of the charm , societies or confederacies cunningly made , not between man and man , but , as the words import , between the enchanter and the devil , deut. . . answer . though there be neither mention of spirit or devil in this psalm , yet mr. perkins would have us believe that there can be no conjoyning or consociating but with the devil : but mr. ainsworth , as great a rabby as mr. perkins , finds other interpretations of this text ; and though he mentions fellowship with the devil , yet he puts it in the third and last place , as the newest and latest interpretation : for he teacheth us , that the enchanter had his title both in psalm . and in deut. . either because be associates serpents , making them tame and familiar that they hurt not , or because such persons use to bind and tye bonds , or things about the body , to heal or hurt by sorcery . also he teacheth us , that a charmer doth joyn or speak words of a strange language , and without sence , &c. delrio it seems puts no confidence in this text of mr. perkins , for he doth not cite it to prove a contract ; yet he hath also one text of his own to that purpose , it is esay . . where it is said , we have made a covenant with death , and with hell we are at an agreement ; percussimus foedus cum morte , & cum inferno fecimus pactum : and delrio tells us , that tho. aquinas did apply this text to witches , magis satis probabili interpretatione . answer . if this text be considered , it proves nothing at all : for it doth not charge the proud and drunken ephraimites , of whom it is spoken , that they had made an agreement with hell , but it is onely a false brag of their own , to justifie their wickedness by a lye : for it is not possible to make a covenant with death , which in it self is nothing but a meer not being ; and whereas it is called an agreement with hell , it may be translated as well , if not better in this place , an agreement with the grave ; and so the interlineary bible hath it ; and tremelius and iunius render it , pepigimus foedus cum morte , & cum sepulchro egimus cautum ; which they term a thrasonical hyperbole : and deodatus his italian bible hath , habbiamo fatto lega col sepolcro ; so likewise the spanish bible translates it , concierto tenemos hecho con la muerte , è con la sepultura hazimos acuerdo . it may be wondered that neither mr. perkins nor the jesuit have any other or better texts to prove this contract between the witch and the devil . but the truth is , it is very little that either of them say of this great point , but pass it over perfunctorily . perhaps it may be thought that king iames hath said , or brought more and better proofs in this point ; but i do not finde that he doth meddle with it at all , but takes it for granted that if there be witches , there must needs be a covenant , and so leaves it without further proof . a second note is , that the agreement between the witch and the devil they call a covenant , and yet neither of the parties are any way bound to perform their part ; and the devil , without doubt , notwithstanding all his craft , hath far the worst part of the bargain . the bargain runs thus in mr. p. the witch as a slave binds himself by vow to believe in the devil , and to give him either body , or soul , or both , under his hand-writing , or some part of his blood. the devil promiseth to be ready at his vassals command to appear in the likeness of any creature , to consult , and to aid him for the procuring of pleasure , honour , wealth , or preferment ; to go for him , to carry him any whither , and do any command . whereby we see the devil is not to have benefit of his bargain till the death of the witch ; in the mean time he is to appear always at the witches command , to go for him , to carry him any whither , and to do any command : which argues the devil to be the witches slave , and not the witch the devils . though it be true which delrio affirmeth , that the devil is at liberty to perform or break his compact , for that no man can compel him to keep his promise ; yet on the other side , it is as possible for the witch to frustrate the devils contract , if he or she have so much grace as to repent ; the which there may be good cause to do , if the devil be found not to perform his promise : besides , a witch may many times require that to be done by the devil , which god permits not the devil to do ; thus against his will the devil may lose his credit , and give occasion of repentance , though he endeavour to the utmost of his power to bring to pass whatsoever he hath promised ; and so fail of the benefit of his bargain , though he have the hand-writing , or some part of the blood of the witch for his security , or the solemnity before witnesses , as delrio imagineth . i am certain they will not say that witch-craft is like the sin against the holy ghost , unpardonaable : for mr. perkins confesseth the contrary , and delrio denies it not ; for he allows the sacrament of the eucharist to be administred to a condemned witch , with this limitation , that there may be about four hours space between the communion , and the execution , in which time it may be probably thought that the sacramental species ( as they call it ) may be consumed . . delrio in his second book , and fourth question , gives this rule , which he saith is common to all contracts with the devil , that first they must deny the faith , and christianism , and obedience to god , and reject the patronage of the virgin mary , and revile her . to the same purpose mr. perkins affirms that witches renounce god and their baptism . but if this be common to all contracts with the devil , it will follow that none can be witches but such as have first been christians , nay and roman catholiques , if delrio say true ; for who else can renounce the patronage of the virgin mary ? and what shall be said then of all those idolatrous natious of lapland , finland , and of divers parts of africa , and many other heathenish nations , which our travellers report to be full of witches ? and indeed , what need or benefit can the devil gain by contracting with those idolaters , who are surer his own , than any covenant can make them ? . whereas it is said that witchcraft is an art working wonders , it must be understood that the art must be the witches art , and not the devils , otherwise it is no witch-craft , but devils-craft . it is confessed on all hands , that the witch doth not work the wonder , but the devil onely . it is a rare art for a witch by her art to be able to do nothing her self , but to command another to practise the art. in other arts , mr. perkins confesseth that the arts master is able by himself to practise his art , and to do things belonging thereunto without the help of another ; but in this it is otherwise — the power of effecting strange works doth not flow from the skill of the witch , but is derived wholly from satan . to the same purpose he saith , that the means of working wonders are charms used as a watch-word to the devil to cause him to work wonders : so that the devil is the worker of the wonder , and the witch but the counsellour , perswader , or commander of it , and onely accessary before the fact , and the devil onely principal . now the difficulty will be , how the accessary can be duely and lawfully convicted and attainted according as our statute requires , unless the devil , who is the principal , be first convicted , or at least outlawed ▪ which cannot be , because the devil can never be lawfully summoned according to the rules of our common-law . for further proof that the devil is the principal in all such wonders , i shall shew it by the testimony of king iames , in a case of murther , which is the most capital crime our laws look upon . first , he tells us that the devil teaches witches how to make pictures of wax and clay , that by the rosting thereof the persons that they bear the name of may be continually melted , or dried away by continual sickness — not that any of these means which he teacheth them ( except poysons , which are composed of things natural ) can of themselves help anything to these turns they are imployed in . secondly , king iame affirms that witches can bewitch , and take the life of men or women by rosting of the pictures , which is very possible to their master to perform : for although that instrument of wax have no vertue in the turn doing , yet may he not very well , by that same measure that his conjured slave melts that wax at the fire , may he not i say at these same times , subtilly as a spirit , so weaken and scatter the spirits of life of the patient , as may make him on the one part for faintness to sweat out the humours of his body ; and on the other part , for the not concurring of these spirits which cause his digestion , so debilitate his stomack , that his humour radical continually sweating out on the one part , and no new good suck being put in the place thereof for lack of digestion on the other , he at last shall vanish away even as his picture will do at the fire . here we see the picture of wax , roasted by the witch , hath no vertue in the murdering , but the devil onely . it is necessary in the first place that it be duly proved that the party murther'd be murthered by the devil : for it is a shame to bely the devil ; and it is not possible to be proved , if it be subtilely done as a spirit . . our definers of witch-craft dispute much , whether the devil can work a miracle : they resolve he can do a wonder , but not a miracle ; mirum , but not miraculum . a miracle , saith mr. perkins , is that which is above or against nature simply ; a wonder is that which proceeds not from the ordinary course of nature . delrio will have a miracle to be praeter , or supra naturae creatae vires : both seem to agree in this , that he had need be an admirable or profound philosopher , that can distinguish between a wonder and a miracle ; it would pose aristotle himself , to tell us every thing that can be done by the power of nature , and what things cannot ; for there be daily many things found out , and daily more may be , which our fore-fathers never knew to be possible in nature . those that were converted by the miracles of our saviour , never stayed to enquire of their philosophers what the power of nature was ; it was sufficient to them , when they saw things done , the like whereof they had neither seen nor heard of , to believe them to be miracles . . it is commonly believed and affirmed by mr. perkins , that the cause which moves the devil to bargain with a witch , is a desire to obtain thereby the soul and body of the witch . but i cannot see how this can agree with another doctrine of his , where he saith , the precepts of witch-craft are not delivered indifferently to every man , but to his own subjects the wicked ; and not to them all , but to special and tried ones , whom he most betrusteth with his secrets , as being the fittest to to serve his turn , both in respect of their willingness to learn and practise , as also for their ability to become instruments of the mischief he intendeth to others . all this argues , the end of the devils rules of witch-craft is not to gain novices for new subjects , but to make use of old ones to serve his turn . . the last clause of mr. perkins definition is , that witch-craft doth work wonders so far as god shall permit . i should here desire to have known whether mr. perkins had thought that god doth permit farther power to the devil upon his contracting with the witch , than he had before the contract : for if the devil had the same permission before the contract , then he doth no more mischief upon the contract , than he would have gladly done before , seeing , as mr. perkins saith , the devils malice towards all men is of so high a degree , that he cannot endure they should enjoy the world , or the benefits of this life ( if it were possible ) so much as one hour . but yet afterward i finde master perkins is more favourable to the devil , where he writes , that if the devil were not stirred up and provoked by the witch , he would never do so much hurt as he doth . of the discerning and discovery of a witch . a magistrate , saith mr. perkins , may not take upon him to examine whom and how he willeth of any crime , nor to proceed upon slight causes , or to shew his authority , or upon sinister respects , or to revenge his malice , or to bring parties into danger and suspition ; but he must proceed upon special presumptions . he calls those presumptions , which do at least probably and conjecturally note one to be a witch , and are certain signs whereby the witch may be discovered . i cannot but wonder that mr. perkins should say , that presumptions do at least probably and conjecturally note , and are certain signs to discover a witch ; when he confesseth , that though presumptions give occasion to examine , yet they are no sufficient causes of conviction : and though presumptions be never so strong , yet they are not proofs sufficient for conviction , but onely for examination . therefore no credit is to be given to those presumptions he reckons up . . for common fame , it falls out many times , saith he , that the innocent may be suspected , and some of the better sort notoriously defamed . . the testimony of a fellow-witch , he confesseth , doth not probably note one to be a witch . the like may be said of his third and fourth presumption , if after cursing , or quarrelling , or threatning , there follow present mischief . and the fifth presumption is more frivolous , which is , if the party be the son or daughter , or servant , or friend , neer neighbour , or old companion of a witch . the sixth presumption mr. perkins dares not , or is loath to own , but saith , some add , if the party suspected have the devils mark ; and yet be resolves , if such a mark be descried , whereof no evident reason in nature can be given , the magistrate may cause such to be examined , or take the matter into his own hands , that the truth may appear ; but he doth not teach how the truth may be made to appear . the last presumption he names , is , if the party examined be unconstant , or contrary to himself ; here he confesseth , a good man may be fearful in a good cause , sometimes by nature , sometimes in regard of the presence of the iudge , or the greatness of the audience ; some may be suddenly taken , and others want that liberty of speech which other men have . touching examination , mr. perkins names two kinds of proceedings , either by simple question , or by torture : torture , when besides the enquiry by words , the magistrate useth the rack , or some other violent means to urge confession ; this he saith , may be lawfully used , howbeit not in every case , but onely upon strong and great presumptions , and when the party is obstinate . here it may be noted , that it is not lawful for any person , but the judge onely , to allow torture : suspitious neighbours may not , of their own heads , use either threats , terrors , or tortures . i know not any one of those presumptions before-cited , to be sufficient to warrant a magistrate to use torture ; or whether when the party constantly denies the fact , it must be counted obstinacy . in case of treason sometimes , when the main fact hath been either confessed , or by some infallible proofs manifested , the magistrate , for a farther discovery of some circumstance of the time , the place , and the persons , or the like , have made use of the rack : and yet that kind of torture hath not been of antient usage in this kingdom ; for if my memory fail not , i have read , that the rack hath been called the duke of exeters daughter , and was first used about hen. . days . from presumptions , mr. perkins proceeds to proofs of a witch ; and here he hath a neat distinction of proofs , less sufficient , or more sufficient ; by less sufficient he meaneth insufficient , but gives them this mild and strange phrase of less sufficient , that it may not displease such friends ( as i conceive ) allow those less sufficient proofs for sufficient , though he reckons them for no better than witch-craft ▪ those unsufficient sufficient proofs are weaker and worse than his presumptions , which he confesseth are no proofs at all ; yet we must reckon them up . his first less sufficient proof is , the antient trial by taking red-hot irons , or putting the hand in hot scalding water ; this , he saith , hath been condemned for diabolical and wicked , as in truth it is : for an innocent man may thereby be condemned , and a rank witch scape unpunished . a second insufficient proof is , scratching of the suspected party , and the present recovery thereupon . a third is , the burning the thing bewitched , is a hog , an ox , or other creature , it is imagined a forcible means to cause the witch to discover her self . a fourth , is the burning the thatch of the suspected parties house . the fifth less ▪ sufficient proof is , the binding of the party hand and foot , and casting cross-ways into the water ; if she sinks , she is counted innocent ; if she float on the water and sink not , she is taken for a witch , convicted , and punished . the germans used this tryal by cold water ; and it was imagined , that the devil being most light , as participating more of air than of water , would hold them up above the water , either by putting himself under the witch , and lifting her up , as it were with his back , or by uniting himself , and possessing her whole body . all these less sufficient proofs , saith mr. perkins , are so far from being sufficient , that some of them , if not all , are after a sort practices of witch-craft , having no power ▪ by gods ordinance . hereby he condemns point-blank king iames's judgment , as savouring of witchraft , in allowing of the tryal of a witch by swimming as a principal proof . and as i take it , he condemns himself also , except he can find any ordinance of god , that the having of an incurable and insensible mark or sore , shall be a presumption , or certain sign of a witch . a sixth less sufficient proof , is the testimony of a wizard , witch , or cunning man , who is gone or sent unto , and informs that he can shew in a glass the face of the witch . this accusation of a witch by another witch , mr. perkins denies to be sufficient ; and he puts this case : if the devil appear to a grand iury , in the likeness of some known man , and offer to take his oath that the person in question is a witch , should the enquest receive his oath or accusation to condemn the party ? he answers , surely no ; and yet that is as much as the testimony of another witch , who onely by the help of the devil revealeth the witch : if this should be taken for a sufficient proof , the devil would not leave one good man alive in the world . this discrediting of the testimony of a witch , takes away the other ( for he hath but two ) of king iames main proofs for the discovery of a witch ; for he saith , who but witches can be provers , and so witnesses of the doings of witches ? and to the same purpose mr. perkins himself confesseth , that the precepts of witch-craft are not delivered , but to the devils own subjects , the wicked . a seventh less sufficient proof is , when a man in open court affirms , such a one fell out with me , and cursed me , threatning i should smart for it in my person or goods ; upon these threats , such evils and losses presently befel me ; this is no sure ground for conviction , saith mr. perkins , for it pleaseth god many times to lay his hands upon mens persons and goods , without the procurement of witches ; and yet saith mr. perkins , experience shews , that ignorant people will make strong proofs of such presumptions , whereupon sometimes iurors do give their verdict against parties innocent . the last less sufficient proof is , if a man being sick , upon suspition will take it on his death , that such a one hath bewitched him , it is of no moment , saith mr. perkins ; it is but the suspition of one man for himself , and is of no more force than another mans word against him . all these proofs , saith mr. perkins , which men in place have ordinarily used , be either false or insufficient signs . at the last mr. perkins comes to his more sufficient proofs , which are in all but two . the confession of the witch , or the proof of two witnesses . against the confession of a witch , mr. perkins confesseth , it is objected , that one may confess against himself an untruth , being urged by force or threatning , or by desire upon some grief to be out of the world ; or at least being in trouble , and perswaded it is the best course to save their lives and obtain their liberty , they may upon simplicity be induced to confess that they never did , even against themselves . the truth of this allegation mr. perkins doth not deny , but grants it , in that his answer is , that he doth not say a bare confession is sufficient , but a confession after due examination taken upon pregnant presumptions . but if a bare confession be not a sufficient proof , a pregnant presumption can never make it such ; or if it could , then it would not be a sufficient proof . for the farther weakning of the confession of a suspected witch , we may remember what mr. perkins hath formerly answered , when it was alleadged , that upon a melancholy humour , many confess of themselves things false and impossible , that they are carried through the air in a moment , that they pass through key-holes and cleffs of doors ; that they be sometimes turn'd into cats , hares , and other creatures , and such like ; all which are meer fables , and things impossible . here mr. perkins answers , that when witches begin to make a league , they are sober and sound in understanding ; but after they be once in the league , their reason and understanding may be depraved , memory weakned , and all the powers of their soul blemished ; they are deluded , and so intoxicated , that they will run into a thousand of phantastical imaginations , holding themselves to be transformed into the shapes of other creatures , to be transported in the air , to do many strange things which in truth they do not . now mr. perkins will confess , that the examination and confession of a suspected witch , is always after such time as her covenant is made ; when she is by his confession deluded , and not fit to give testimony against her self . his second more sufficient proof ( he saith , if the party will not confess , as commonly it falleth out ) is two witnesses avouching upon their own knowledge , either that the party accused hath made league with the devil , or hath done some known practices of witch-craft , or hath invocated the devil , or desired his help . but if every man that hath invocated the devil , or desired his help , must have formerly made a league with him , then whole nations are every man of them witches ; which i think none will say . as for the league , and proof of witchraft , mr. perkins confesseth , some may say , if these be the onely strong proofs for the conviction of a witch , it will be then impossible to put any one to death ; because the league with satan is closely made , and the practices of witch-craft are also very secret , and hardly can a man be brought , which upon his own knowledge can aver such things . to this mr. perkins answer is a confession : that howsoever the ground and practice be secret , and be to many unknown , yet there is a way to come to the knowledge thereof . — satan endeavoreth the discovery , and useth all means to disclose witches . this means he speaks of should be in the power of the judge , or else it is no help for the discovery of a witch , but onely when the devil pleaseth . i do not find he proves that it is usual with satan to endeavour any such discovery ; neither do i see how it is practicable by the devil : for either he must do it by his own relation or report ; which as it cannot be proved he ever did , so it is vain , and to no purpose if he do it ; for mr. perkins hath discredited the testimony of the devil , as invalid , and of no force for conviction : or else the devil must discover it by some second means ; and if there had been any such second means usual , mr. perkins would have taught us what they are , and not have left us onely to his two more sufficient proofs , which he confesseth are not infallible . king iames tells us , that the devils first discovering of himself for the gaining of a witch , is either upon their walking solitarily in the fields , or else lying pausing in their bed , but always without the company of any other ; and at the making of circles and conjurations , none of that craft will permit any others to behold ; when the devil and his subjects are thus close and secret in their actions , it cannot be imagined that he will use all means to discover his most special and trustiest subjects : and though mr. perkins tells us , that by vertue of the precontract , the devil is cock-sure of his instruments ; yet within a few lines ▪ he changeth his note , and saith , though he have good hope of them , yet he is not certain of their continuance , because some by the mercy of god have been reclaimed and freed from his covenant . besides , he confesseth , the devil suffereth some to live long undisclosed , that they may exercise the greater measure of his malice in the world . it remains , that if the two true proofs of mr. perkins , which are the witches confession , or sufficient witnesses , fail , we have not warrant , as he saith , in the word , to put such an one to death . i conclude this point in the words of mr. perkins ; i advise all iurors , that as they be diligent in the zeal of gods glory , so they would be careful what they do , and not to condemn any party suspected upon bare presumptions , without sound and sufficient proofs , that they be not guilty through their own rashness , of shedding innocent blood . of the hebrew witch . in deut. . the witch is named with divers other sorts of such as used the like unlawfull arts ; as the diviner , the observer of times , an inchanter , a charmer , a consulter with a familiar spirit , a wisard , or a necromancer . the text addeth , all that do these things are an abomination to the lord , and because of these abominations , the lord thy god doth drive them [ the nations ] out from before thee . if we desire to know what those abominations of the nations were , we are told in general in the . verse of the same chapter : these nations hearkened unto observers of times , and unto diviners . there is no other crime in this chapter laid to the charge of all , or any of these practisers of such unlawful arts , but of lying prophesies ; and therefore the text addeth , the lord thy god will raise up unto thee a prophet from the midst of thee , of thy brethren , like unto me , unto him shall ye hearken , and not to the diviners , wisards , charmers , &c. setting aside the case of iob ( wherein god gave a special and extraordinary commission ) i do not finde in scripture that the devil , or witch , or any other , had power ordinarily permitted them , either to kill or hurt any man , or to meddle with the goods of any : for though , for the trial of the hearts of men , god doth permit the devil ordinarily to tempt them ; yet he hath no commission to destroy the lives or goods of men ; it is little less than blasphemy to say any such thing of the admirable providence of god , whereby he preserves all his creatures . it was crime sufficient for all those practicers of unlawful arts , to delude the people with false and lying prophesies , thereby to make them forget to depend upon god , and to have their souls turn after such as have familiar spirits , and after wisards , to go a whoring after them , as the lord saith , levit. . . this spiritual whoredome is flat idolatry , in the common phrase of the old testament ; and those that be enticers to it , thereby endeavour to destroy the souls of the people , and are by many degrees more worthy of death , than those that onely destroy the bodies or goods of men . if there were a law that every one should be put to death , or punished , that should advisedly endeavour to perswade men that they are skilful in those forbidden arts , or in foretelling of things to come , or that they have contracted with the devil , and can thereby murther or destroy mens goods ; i should never deny such a law to be most consonant and agreeing with the law of moses . but because i may be thought by some a favourer of these forbidden arts , through want of understanding the scripture about the quality of them ; i have made choice of a man who is no friend to witches , and whose learning in this point will not be denied . in his own words i shall set down , what either ▪ out of the hebrew names of those prohibited arts , or out of the exposition of the jewish doctors can be gathered for the understanding of them . a diviner , in hebrew , a foreseer , or presager , a foreteller of things to come , as doth a prophet — the hebrews take a diviner to be one that doth things whereby he may foretel things to come , and say , such a thing shall be , or not be , or say , it is good to do such a thing — the means of divining ; some doing it with sand , some with stones , some by lying down on the ground , some with iron , some with a staff — he that asked of a diviner , is chastised with stripes . . an observer of times , or soothsayer , an observer of the clouds , a planetary , or an observer of the flying of fowls , an augur . as the diviners were carried much by inward and spiritual motions , so these by outward observations in the creatures . the hebrews say , they were such as did set times for the doing of things , saying , such a day is good , and such a day is naught . . an observer of fortunes , one that curiously searcheth signs of good or evil luck , which are learned by experience : the hebrew is , to finde out by experience ; whereupon the word here used is one that too curiously observeth , and abuseth things that do fall out , as lucky or unlucky . the hebrews describe it thus , as if one should say , because the morsel of bread is fallen out of my mouth , or my staff out of my hand , i will not go to such a place : because a fox passed by on my right hand , i will not go out of my house this day . our new translation renders this word an inchanter . . a witch , a sorcerer , such as do bewitch the senses or minds of men , by changing the forms of things to another hew . the hebrew word for a witch properly signifies a jugler , and is derived from a word which signifies changing or turning ; and moses teacheth , exod. . that witches wrought by enchantments , that is , by secret sleights , iuglings , close conveyance , or of glistering like the flame of fire , or a sword , wherewith mens eyes were dazled . . a charmer , or one that conjureth conjurations ; the hebrew signifies conjoyning or consociating — the charmer is said to be he , that speaketh words of a strange language , and without sense ; that if one say so or so unto a serpent , it cannot hurt him ; he that whispereth over a wound , or that readeth over an infant that it may not be frighted , or layeth the bible upon a child that it may sleep . . a wisard or cunning man , in hebrew named of his knowledge or cunning — the hebrews describe him thus , that he put in his mouth a bone of a bird , and burned incense , and did other things until he fell down with shame , and spake with his mouth things that were to come to pass . . a necromancer , one that seeketh unto the dead : of him they say , he made himself hungry , and went and lodged among the graves , that the dead might come unto him in a dream , and make known unto him that which he asked of him ; and others there were that clad themselves with cloaths for that purpose ▪ and spake certain words , and burned incense , and slept by themselves ; that such a dead person might come and talk with them in a dream . . lastly , the consulter with familiar spirits , in hebrew , a consulter with ob , applied here to magitians , who possessed with an evil spirit , spake with a hollow voice as out of a bottle . — the hebrews explain it thus , that he which had a familiar spirit stood and burned incense , and held a rod of mirtle-tree in his hand , and waved it , and spake certain words in secret , until he that enquired did hear one speak unto him , and answer him touching that he enquired , with words from under the earth , with a very low voice , &c. likewise , one took a dead mans skull and burnt incense thereto , and inchanted thereby till he heard a very low voice , &c. this text in our english translation being expounded a familiar spirit , and seconded by the history of the woman of endor , may seem a strong evidence that the devil convenanted with witches : but if all be granted that can be desired , that this familiar spirit signifies a devil , yet it comes not home to prove the main point ; for it is no proof that the familiar spirit enter'd upon covenant , or had or could give power to others to kill the persons , or destroy the goods of others . king iames confesseth , the devil can make some to be possessed , and so become very daemoniaques ; and that she who had the spirit of python in acts . whereby she conquested such gain to her master ; that spirit was not of her own raising or commanding , as she pleased to appoint , but spake by her tongue as well privately as publickly . we do not find the pythonesse condemned or reproved , but the unclean spirit commanded in the name of iesus christ to come out of her . the child which was too young to make a covenant with the devil , was possessed with a dumb and deaf spirit , and the devil charged to come out , and enter no more into him , mark . a daughter of abraham ( that is , of the faith of abraham ) was troubled with a spirit of infirmity eighteen years , and bowed together that she could not lift her self up , luke . , . it is observable , that in deut. . where all the unlawful arts are reckoned up , and most fully prohibited , the crime of them is charged upon the practisers of those arts ; but the crime of having a familiar spirit is not there condemned , but the consulter of a familiar spirit ; so in levit. . . the prohibition is , regard not them that have familiar spirits ; and so in levit. . . the soul that turneth after such as have familiar spirits ; so that it was not the having , but the consulting , was condemned . if we draw nearer to the words of the text , it will be found , that these words , a consulter with a familiar spirit , are no other than a consulter with ob ; where the question will be what ob signifieth . expositors agree , that originally ob signifieth a bottle , and they say is applyed here to one possessed with an evil spirit , and speaketh with a hollow voice as out of a bottle : but for this i find no proof they bring out of scripture , that saith , or expoundeth that ob signifieth one possessed with a familiar spirit in the belly ; the onely proof is , that the greek interpreters of the bible translate it engastromuthi , which is , speaking in the belly ; and the word anciently , and long before the time of the septuagint translators , was properly used for one that had the cunning or slight to shut his mouth , and seem to speak with his belly ; which that it can be done without the help of a familiar spirit , experience of this age sheweth in an irishman . we do not find it said , that the woman of endor did fore-tell any thing to saul , by the hollow voice of a familiar spirit in her belly ; neither did saul require , nor the woman promise so to answer him ; but he required , bring me him up who i shall name unto thee ; and she undertook to do it ; which argues a desire in saul to consult with the dead , which is called necromancy , or consulting with the dead . but it hath been said , she raised the devil in samuels likeness , yet there is no such thing said in the text ; when the woman went about her work , the first thing noted is , that when she saw samuel , she cryed out with a loud voice : an argument she was frighted with seeing something she did not expect to see : it is not said , that when she knew saul , but when she saw samuel ▪ she cryed out with a lowd voice ; when she knew saul , she had no reason to be afraid , but rather comforted , for that she had his oath for her security . it may well be , that if either she had a familiar spirit , or the art of hollow-speaking , her intention was to deceive saul , and by her secret voice to have made him believe , that samuel in another room had answered him ; for it appears that saul was not in the place where she made a shew of raising samuel : for when she cryed out with a loud voice , saul comforted her , and bid her not be afraid , and asked her what she saw ? and what form is he of ? which questions need not have been , if saul had been in the chamber with the witch . king iames confesseth , that saul was in another chamber at the conjuration ; and it is likely the woman had told saul she had seen some fearful sight , which made him ask her what she saw ? and her answer was , she saw gods ascending out of the earth ; and it may be understood , that angels waited upon samuel , who was raised by god , and not any puppets or devils that she conjured up ; otherwise , the words may be translated as deodat in the margent of his italian bible hath it , she saw a man of majesty or divine authority ascend , un ' huomo di majesta è d' authorita divina , which well answers the question of what form is he of ? which is in the singular , not in the plural number . we find it said in esay . . thou shalt be brought down , and shalt speak out of the ground , and thy speech shall be low out of the dust , and thy voice shall be as one that hath a fimiliar spirit out of the ground , and thy speech shall wisper out of the earth ; which argues , the voice of ob was out of the earth , rather than out of the belly ; and so the hebrew exposition which i cited before affirms . some learned have been of opinion that a natural reason may be given why in some places certain exhalations out of the earth may give to some a prophetical spirit . add hereunto , that some of the heathen oracles were said to speak out of the earth : and among those five sorts of necromancy , mentioned by doctor reynolds , in his lecture of his censure of the apocryphals , not any of them is said to have any spirit in their belly . the romanists , who are all great affirmers of the power of witches , agree , that the soul of samuel was sent by god to the woman of endor : to this not onely delrio , but bellarmine before him agrees . that true samuel did appear as sent by god , as he sent elias to ochosias king of israel , who being sick sent to consult with beelzebub the god of echron , may appear , for that samuel is so true and certain in his prediction to saul ; which no witch , no devil could ever have told : for though the wisdome and experience of the devil do enable him to conjecture probably of many events , yet positively to say , to morrow thou and thy sons shall die , is more than naturally the devil could know . mr. perkins confesseth the devil could not foretel the exact time of sauls death ; and therefore he answers , that god revealed to the devil as his instrument sauls overthrow , by which means , and no other , the devil was enabled to foretel the death of saul . here mr. perkins proves not that satan was appointed by god to work sauls overthrow , or that it was made known to him when it should be done . as the rest of the speech of samuel is true , so these words of his , why hast thou disquieted me to bring me up ? may be also true ; which cannot be , if it be spoken by the devil ; or why should the devil tell truths in all other things else , and lie onely in this , i know no reason . doctor reynolds presseth these words against the appearing of samuel , thus : if samuel had said them , he had lied ; but samuel could not lie , for samuel could not be disquieted , nor raised by saul . it is true , god onely raised samuel effectually , but occasionally saul might raise him . but , saith doctor reynolds , though saul was the occasion , yet samuel could not truly say that saul had disquieted him ; for blessed are they that die in the lord , saith the spirit , because they rest from their labours ; and samuel was no more to be disquieted ( if he were sent by god ) than moses and elias were when they appeared to shew the glory of christ , mat. . answer . it did not displease samuel to be employed in the office of an angel , but he obeyed god gladly ; yet since the occasion of his appearing displeased god , it might for that cause displease also samuel . besides , we need not understand the disquieting of samuels mind , but of his body , by not suffering it to rest in peace after death , according to the common and usual condition of mankind : this sense the original will well bear . again , it cannot be believed that the devil would ever have preached so divine and excellent a sermon to saul , which was able to have converted , and brought him to repentance ; this was not the way for the devil to bring either saul or the woman to renounce god. lastly , the text doth not say that the woman raised samuel ; yet it calls him samuel , and saith that saul perceived or understood that it was samuel . mr. perkins & many others esteem balaam to have been a witch or conjurer , but i find no such thing in the text ; when he was required to curse the people of israel , his answer was , i will bring you word as the lord shall speak unto me , numb . . . and god came unto balaam in v. . and in v. . balaam saith , the lord refuseth to give me leave ; and when balak sent a second time , his answer was , if balak would give me his house full of silver and gold , i cannot go beyond the word of the lord my god , to do less or more . in v. . god cometh to balaam and said , if the men come to call thee , go ; but yet the words which i shall say unto thee , that shalt thou do . and when balaam came before balak he said , v. . lo i am come unto thee , have i now any power at all to say any thing ? the word which god putteth into my mouth , that shall i speak : and in the . chap. v. . balaam saith , how shall i curse whom god hath not cursed ? and in v. . he saith , must i not take heed to speak that which the lord hath put into my mouth ? these places laid together , prove balaam to have been a true prophet of the lord ; and he prophesied nothing contrary to the lords command , therefore st. peter calls him a prophet . nevertheless it is true , that balaam sinned notoriously , though not by being a witch or conjurer , or a false prophet ; his faults were , that when god had told him he should not go to balak , yet in his covetous heart he desired to go , being tempted with the rewards of divination , and promise of promotion ; so that upon a second message from balak he stayed the messengers to see if god would suffer him to go ; wherefore the lord in his anger sent balaam . also when god had told balaam that he would bless israel , yet balaam did strive to tempt god , and by several altars and sacrifices to change the mind of god. again , when balaam saw god immutable in blessing israel , he taught balak to lay a stumbling-block before the sons of israel , to eat things sacrificed to idols , and to commit fornication , rev. . . whereas it is said that balaam went not up as other times to seek for enchantments , num. . . the original is , to meet divinations , that is , he did not go seek the lord by sacrifices , as he did , numb . . . . an exact difference between all those arts prohibited in deut. no man i think can give ; that in some they did agree , and in others differed , seems probable . that they were all lying and false prophets , though in several ways , i think none can deny . that they differed in their degrees of punishments is possible : there are but three sorts that can be proved were to be put to death , viz. the witch , the familiar spirit , the wisard . as for the witch , there hath been some doubt made of it . the hebrew doctors that were skild in the laws of moses , observe , that wheresoever one was to die by their law , the law always did run in an affirmative precept ; as , the man shall be stoned , shall die , shall be put to death , or the like ; but in this text , and no where else in scripture , the sentence is onely a prohibition negative , thou shalt not suffer a witch to live , and not , thou shalt put her to death , or stone her , or the like . hence some have been of opinion , that not to suffer a witch to live , was meant not to relieve or maintain her by running after her , and rewarding her . the hebrews seem to have two sorts of witches , some that did hurt , others that did hold the eyes , that is , by jugling and slights deceived mens senses . the first they say was to be stoned , the other , which according to the proper notation of the word was the true witch , was onely to be beaten . the septuagint have translated a witch , an apothecary , a druggister , one that compounds poysons ; and so the latin word for a witch is venefica , a maker of poysons : if any such there ever were , or be , that by the help of the devil do poyson , such a one is to be put to death , though there be no covenant with the devil , because she is an actor and principal her self , not by any wonder wrought by the devil , but by the natural or occult property of the poyson . for the time of christ , saith mr. perkins , though there be no particular mention made of any such witch , yet thence it followeth not that there were none , for all things that then hapned are not recorded ; and i would fain know of the chief patrons of them , whether those persons possessed with the devil , and troubled with strange diseases , whom christ healed , were not bewitched with some such people as our witches are ? if they say no , let them if they can prove the contrary . here it may be thought that mr. perkins puts his adversaries to a great pinch ; but it doth not prove so : for the question being onely whether those that were possessed in our saviours time were bewitched ; the opposers of mr. perkins say they were not bewitched : but if he or any other , say they , were , the proof will rest wholly on him or them to make good their affirmative ; it cannot in reason be expected that his adversaries should prove the negative , it is against the rules of disputation to require it . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e apud selden . apud selden . selden . selden . selden . selden . selden . cambden . cotto●… stow. seld●… selden . selden . selden . chanc. egerton . notes for div a -e * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . &c. * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. lib. . c. . lib. . c. . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . c 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . b 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . lib. . c. . lib. . c. . lib. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . lib. . c. . a l. . c. . b l. . c. . c l. . c. . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . notes for div a -e de cive , cap. . sect . . . . notes for div a -e lib. . c. . lib. . c. . notes for div a -e p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p , . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . arist. pol. l. . c. . notes for div a -e cap. . lib. . c. . cap. . cap. . cap. . lib. . qu. . cap. . lib. . sect. . cap. . sect. . cap. . sect. . lib. . cap. . cap. . cap. . sect. . cap. . sect. . chap. . sect. . cap. . sect. . lib. . cap. . cap. . sect. . ainsworth upon deut. . the new-found politicke disclosing the secret natures and dispositions as well of priuate persons as of statesmen and courtiers; wherein the gouernments, greatnesse, and power of the most notable kingdomes and common-wealths of the world are discouered and censured. together with many excellent caueats and rules fit to be obserued by those princes and states of christendome, both protestants and papists, which haue reason to distrust the designes of the king of spaine, as by the speech of the duke of hernia, vttered in the counsell of spaine, and hereto annexed, may appeare. written in italian by traiano boccalini ... and now translated into english for the benefit of this kingdome. de' ragguagli di parnaso. english boccalini, traiano, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the new-found politicke disclosing the secret natures and dispositions as well of priuate persons as of statesmen and courtiers; wherein the gouernments, greatnesse, and power of the most notable kingdomes and common-wealths of the world are discouered and censured. together with many excellent caueats and rules fit to be obserued by those princes and states of christendome, both protestants and papists, which haue reason to distrust the designes of the king of spaine, as by the speech of the duke of hernia, vttered in the counsell of spaine, and hereto annexed, may appeare. written in italian by traiano boccalini ... and now translated into english for the benefit of this kingdome. de' ragguagli di parnaso. english boccalini, traiano, - . vaughan, william, - . florio, john, ?- . scott, thomas, ?- . newes from pernassus. boccalini, traiano, - . pietra del paragone politico. [ ], , [ ] p. printed [at eliot's court press] for francis williams, neere the royall exchange, london : . editor's dedication signed: william vaughan. in three parts; part is a translation by john florio and part an adaptation by william vaughan of "de' ragguagli di parnaso" by traiano boccalini. part is a partial reprint of thomas scott's "newes from pernassus", an adaption of boccalini's "pietra del paragone politico". printer's name from stc. the last leaf is blank. reproduction of the original in the new york public library. created by converting tcp files to tei p using tcp tei.xsl, tei @ oxford. re-processed by university of nebraska-lincoln and northwestern, with changes to facilitate morpho-syntactic tagging. gap elements of known extent have been transformed into placeholder characters or elements to simplify the filling in of gaps by user contributors. eebo-tcp is a partnership between the universities of michigan and oxford and the publisher proquest to create accurately 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text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - aptara keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the new-found politicke . disclosing the secret natvres and dispositions as well of priuate persons as of statesmen and courtiers ; wherein the gouernments , greatnesse , and power of the most notable kingdomes and common-wealths of the world are discouered and censured . together with many excellent caueats and rules fit to be obserued by those princes and states of christendome , both protestants and papists , which haue reason to distrust the designes of the king of spaine , as by the speech of the duke of hernia , vttered in the counsell of spaine , and hereto annexed , may appeare . written in italian by traiano boccalini gentleman of rome , and priuiledged by sundry princes of italy , and also out of italy by the most christian king. and now translated into english for the benefit of this kingdome . london , ¶ printed for francis williams , neere the royall exchange . . to the kings most excellent maiestie . dread soueraigne , the kinde welcome which these raggualioes of boccalini lately found among the french and in other princes courts , who suspect the incroaching power of the house of austria , hath moued me to collect and consecrate them in english weeds vnto your maiestie . the first was translated by m. florio , sometime seruant to your royall mother of blessed memory . the second by one , vnto whom the common-wealth cannot as yet be beholding for his name ; and the third part by me , although farre inferiour vnto either of them for any knowledge which i dare arrogate to my selfe in the italian tongue , hauing discontinued the vse thereof since my returne out of italie , being aboue . yeeres past , vntill this present time . yet neuerthelesse , when i had fully perused the noueltie of the authors straine , the pleasant conceits of the worke , enterlaced with some matters of consequence , which might serue for caueats and annotations to such as stand interessed in state-affaires , i was encouraged to renew that which i had so long neglected , and by compiling some of the choisest obseruations , to present them to your iudicious view . and because my chiefest cares for many yeeres haue beene fixt vpon that most hopefull plantation in the iland commonly called the new-found land , i entituled this worke the new-found politicke , as well in regard of my affection deuoted to that place , as for the newnesse of the stile and matter , wherein the author poetically discouers some mysteries of policie , which may rowze vp the spirits of the state of venice , and other neighbouring prouinces , to watch with argus eyes , lest the deceitfull shew of indian gold , a fitter bait for turks and moores , might produce any sudden innouation preiudiciall to the libertie of christendome , which ought to flourish in mutuall loue and charitie , and not to liue in continuall iealousies to be surprized by any prince that acknowledgeth christ for their vniuersall head. the king is wise as is the angell of god , and conceiues more than it becomes a man of my ranke to insinuate to so high a maiestie concerning the affaires of long-handed princes , whom experience , and not the admonition of a contemplatiue scholar , hath taught to remember that verse of the poet : tunc tua res agitur paries cùm proximus ardet : when the next wall vnto your house doth burne , looke to your selfe betimes ; next is your turne . the king of kings long preserue your maiestie in all earthly happinesse , to his glory , our comfort , and the defence of the true christian faith. so praieth from the bottome of his heart your maiesties most humble subiect , william vavghan . the contents of the first part. chap. . the company or corporation of polititians , sets vp a ware-house or publike shop in parnassus , in which are to be sold diuers kinds of wares vsefull for the vertuous life of the learned . chap. . the most soueraigne vertue fidelitie , being secretly fled from parnassus , apollo hauing discouered where she had hidden herselfe , dispatcheth the two most excellent muses , melpomene and thalia , to perswade her to returne . chap. . apollo perceiuing the great disorders , that the flight of the sacred vertue fidelitie bred in all mankind , by the mediation of the soueraigne muses , and of the sublime heroike vertues , obtaineth her returne into parnassus . chap. . iustus lipsius , to make amends for the fault he had committed in accusing of tacitus , doth so passionately obserue him , that before apollo he is charged to idolatrize him : whereupon after a faigned , and but verball punishment , he is in the end by his maiestie , not onely absolued , but highly commended and admired . chap. . the chiefest learned men of parnassus are sutors vnto apollo , to inioyne tacitus , to recompile those books of his annales and histories , which are lost . chap. . cornelius tacitus , for some complaints vrged against him by diuers great princes , by reason of certaine politicall spectacles , which he hath deuised , most preiudiciall vnto their gouernment , hauing beene imprisoned , is by apollo set at liberty . chap. . the duke of laconia , for hauing aduanced a most faithfull secretary of his , to the highest dignities of his estate , is accused before apollo to idolatrize and dote vpon a mignon : but he doth most egregiously defend himselfe . chap. . apollo , bewailing the wofull wracks , which in the courts of great princes , his vertuous followers suffer , and fall into ; for to assure their nauigation , commandeth some of the chiefest learned men in his dominion , to endeuour to frame a sailing-card , to saile safely by land . chap. . the lord iohn de la casa , hauing presented his quaint galateo , or booke of manners vnto apollo , meeteth with great difficulties in diuers nations , about their promises to obserue the same . chap. . apollo hauing highly commended the statute , made by the most mighty kings of spaine , that no aduocates , lawyers , or proctors , shall passe into the indies , the doctors of the law finding themselues aggrieued , complaine vnto his maiestie . chap. . an apothecarie , at the very instant , that he is taken prisoner by sargeants , without being examined at all , is forthwith condemned and sent to the gallies . chap. . the vertuous people of apolloes state , hauing consigned vnto his maiesties generall treasurer , the accustomed donatiue of a thousand conceits , according to their custome they beg a boone or grace at his hands . chap. . by letters intercepted , and taken from a currier , dispatched by some princes to the lake of averno , the common people come to know , that the rancors and hatreds now raigning among diuers nations , are occasioned and stirred vp by the artifices of their princes . chap. . antonio perez of aragon , hauing presented the booke of his relations vnto apollo , his maiestie doth not onely refuse to accept it , but commandeth the same to bee presently burnt . chap. . the monarchy of spaine is much aggrieued , that her falshoods and treacheries are discouered . chap. . the spanish monarchie arriueth in parnassus ; shee intreateth apollo to be cured of a cauterie : shee is dismissed by the politicke physitians . chap. . the spanish monarchy goeth to the oracle of delphos , to know whether she shall euer obtaine the monarchy of the world ; she hath a crosse answer . chap. . philip the second of that name , king of spaine , after long strife about his title , makes his solemne entry into parnassus . chap. . the dogs of the indies are become wolues . chap. . the french are humble sutors vnto apollo , to know the secret , how to perfume gloues after the spanish fashion . chap. . why the monarchy of spaine is lately retired into her palace . chap. . how the ministers and officers of spaine are continually interessed in their priuate profit . chap. . apollo hauing vsed all possible meanes , and exquisite diligence , to haue some one of the court-mignons , or princes-idols taken and apprehended , doth seuerely proceed against one lately fallen into the hands of the iudges . chap. . the whole race or genus of sheep send their publike ambassadors to apollo , by whom they earnestly intreat him to grant them sharp teeth and long hornes : whose suit is by his maiestie scorned and reiected . chap. . in a publike congresse or assembly , contrary to the accustomed manner of the phoebean court , force hauing pretended to precede reputation ; that illustrious ladie with an excellent resolution , maintaineth her reputation and credit which was in some danger . chap. . the prouince of focides by her ambassadors complaineth vnto apollo , that his maiesties officers doe not permit her to enioy her priuiledges : whose request is not only reiected , but they haue a most sharp and vnpleasant answer . chap. . socrates hauing this morning beene found dead in his bed , apollo vseth all possible diligence , to discouer the true occasion of his so sudden death . chap. . natalis comes the historian , for hauing spoke something in a publike congresse of learned men , that grieuously offended apollo , is by his maiestie seuerely punished . the contents of the second part. chap. . maximilian the emperour is aduertised of the trouble begun among his sonnes . chap. . most of the princes , common-weales , and states of europe , are weighed in a paire of scales , by lorenzo medici . chap. . almansor , sometime king of the moores , encountring with the kingdome of naples , they relate one to another the miseries they sustaine by the oppression of the spaniards . chap. . sigismund battor learneth the latine tongue . chap. . the cardinall of toledoes summa is not admitted into the library of parnassus . chap. . the monarchy of spaine throweth her physitian out of the window . chap. . most of the states of the world are censured in parnassus for their errors . chap. . the monarchy of spaine inuiteth the cardinall of toledo , to be her theologian , which he refuseth , and why . chap. . the spaniards attempt the acquisition of savoy , but doe not preuaile . chap. . the duke d'alva being arriued at parnassus , in complementing with prospero colonna , they fall foule about defrauding the colonesis of their titles . the poste of parnassus to the reader . the contents of the third part. chap. . after an exquisite examination and triall made of those wits , which ought to haue the charge of prouinciall gouernments , a rank of gouernors are published in parnassus , and wholsome auisoes for all gouernours , iudges , and vnder-officers of state. chap. . the most illustrious monarchies resident at parnassus , demand by what meanes the venetian lady got such exact obedience , and exquisite secrecie of her nobilitie , whereof she giues them conuenient satisfaction . chap. . the romane monarchy demanding of cornelius tacitus the resolution of a politicall question , receiues full satisfaction of the shepherd meliboeus , who casually was there present . chap. . many people hauing wasted their meanes by gluttonous feasts , prodigall fare , and pompous apparell , for the moderating of such lauish expences , doe desire a statute of their princes , but they misse of their purpose . chap. . terence the comedian being imprisoned by iason the pretour of vrbine , for keeping a concubine , is deliuered by apollo with very great dishonour to the pretour . chap. . domitius corbulo for certaine words spoken by him during the time of his gouernment , which sauoured of tyrannie , is called in question by the criminall magistrates , but in the end , to his greater glory , dismissed . chap. . by the promotion of diogenes the cynick , vnto a higher place , the honourable chaire of the tranquillitie of a priuate life being vacant , apollo prefers the famous philosopher crates to that charge , who refuseth it . chap. . a controuersie hapning betwixt the gouernours of pindus and libethrum about matters of iurisdiction ; apollo punisheth them both . chap. . the vertuous of parnassus doe visit the temple of the diuine prouidence , whom they humbly thanke for the great charitie which his supreme maiestie from time to time hath vouchsafed to shew vnto mankind . chap. . a contention hapning between many learned men , which might be the most notable politick law , or most excellent custome worthy of commendation in the flourishing state of venice , the same is finally decided and determined by the venetian state herselfe , to whose arbitrement the question is referred by their generall consent . chap. . the doctors of the chaire hauing admitted into their vniuersitie some famous poeticall ladies , apollo commands them to be dismissed home to their families . chap. . the lady victoria colonna intreats of apollo , that the infamie which women incurred for cuckolding their husbands , might likewise extend to adulterous husbands . apolloes answer . chap. . a poetaster for playing at cards and deuising the game called triumph or trump , is brought before apollo , who after he had deeply entred into the mysticall meaning of the said game , not only dismisseth him , but granteth him an yearly pension to instruct his courtiers in that new arte. chap. . it being noted , that petus thraseas in the company of his sonne in law eluidius priscus did vse commonly to frequent the house of the lady victoria colonna , he is grieuously rebuked by apollo . chap. . a learned gentleman of rome begs a remedie of apollo , to make him to forget certaine grieuous wrongs , which hee had receiued in the court of a great prince : for which cause his maiestie causeth him to drinke a cup-full of the water of lethe , but with vnfortunate successe . chap. . apuleius his golden asse , and plantus his asse do complain vnto apollo of the great seuerity which their masters vsed in beating them . but they are sent away with no pleasing answer . chap. . a generall reformation of the world by the seuen wise men of greece , and by other learned men , is published by expresse order from apollo . chap. . the duke of hernia his speech in the councell of spaine to a proposition , whether it were expedient for his catholike maiestie , to conclude a peace with his brother in law the duke of savoy . the new-fovnd politicke . the first part . the company or corporation of polititians , sets vp a ware-house or publike shop in parnassus , in which are to be sold diuers kinds of wares vsefull for the vertuous life of the learned . the first raguaglio of the first part . the great businesse , which the corporation of polititians hath for so many moneths negotiated with these exchequer-officers , that they might set vp a publike ware-house , common to their nation , in parnassus , with large priuiledges for politians , was the last week fully concluded and established . and euen yesterday , in the great market-place , they made a most sumptuous shew of all such wares , as men commonly do most stand in need of . and euen as menante will not thinke his labour ill employed to giue you notice of the chiefest of them ; so is hee perswaded , that some honest man will not disdaine to reade them . first then , there is to be sold in that admirable ware-house great store of stuffing , or ( as some call it ) quilting , which though it be of no esteeme among the base and vulgar sort of men , yet is it valued and bought vp at a very high rate of many wise and vnderstanding men , namely , of courtiers , who haue discouered , that it is the shearings or nap of those rich clothes of prudence , which wise men weaue with the fine wooll of patience , and serues to boulster or fill vp the pads of seruitude , or pack-sadles of bondage , to the end they may fit the more easie vpon the backes of wretched courtiers , and hide those lothsome bloudy gallings and festered sores , which seem most vgly in such men , who albeit they be knowne for capitall enemies vnto all paines and labour , are not notwithstanding induced to serue & follow the courts , with an assured hope , there to liue an idle merry life , and proudly to command others . it hath by diuers beene obserued , ( as a thing regardfull ) that many young men , who though they may liue well in their own fathers houses , haue neuerthelesse bought vp good store of that precious stuffing , and haue therwith quilted certaine petty boulsters , vnto which they enure themselues in the seruice of priuate houses , only that they may not come into courts , as vnbroken colts , and in receiuing the first time the boistrous heauy pack-saddle of court seruitude , assure themselues not to commit those fond actions , and fantasticke prankes , which enforce house-stewards , and hall-vshers ( who are the rough house-breakers of young courtiers ) to giue them some lashes of bitter distastes , thereby to bring them vnto the patient toleration of that irkesome and toilesome thraldome . there is also sold in the said ware-house great store of most excellent pencils for those princes , who in their vrgent occasions , are often enforced to paint white for blacke vnto their people . and although this be a merchandize only fit for princes , yet doe those false-hearted men make great prouision of them , that relying on the traffique of apparances , apply themselues to nothing more , than to the infamous profession to leere and laugh in ones face , and vnderhand craftily to deceiue him , and to winde about the silly credulons people with fawning faire words , and foule tainted deeds . they haue likewise an infinite quantity of spectacles of admirable and sundry vertues : some of which serue to giue light vnto those salacious and beastly luxurious men , whose sight doth so faile them in the fury of their vnbridled and libidinous lust , that they cannot discerne honour from infamie , nor know a friend from a foe , a stranger from a kinsman , nor any other thing worthy of respect . so great is the riddance , that those politicke merchants do hourely make of such spectacles , as all may euidently perceiue , that few or none are those men , that in carnall things haue a good or cleare sight . they haue besides a kinde of spectacles , which serue to dimme all light , and shorten all sight : and the politicians themselues affirme , that albeit these spectacles are more behoouefull vnto all sorts of men , than those that extend the sight farre off , yet are they most needfull vnto courtiers , by reason , that there doe often present themselues most lothsome and nastie things vnto the sight of honest men . and for so much as to turne ones backe towards them may breed displeasure , yea and anger in mightie men or great lords : and to looke vpon them is a torment and vexation vnto an honest minde : and therefore for a man vpon any such occasion to put so strange spectacles vpon his nose , he is free frō the troublous molestation to see the lothsome and abominable things of this fil the corrupted world , and the vulgar silly multitude is induced to thinke , that a man viewes them with more heedie curiositie . there are also other spectacles very good to preserue the sight of those vnkinde and vnthankfull men , which the very first day of any new dignitie receiued , waxeth so dim and misty , as it reacheth euen to the bounds of ingratitude . the politicians that keepe the shop and fell them , say that they are made with the precious stuffe of the fast-holding memory of benefits receiued , and of the remembrance of fore-passed friendship . but most wondrous are those spectacles framed with such skilfull art , that they cause to those that haue them on , pleas to seem : elephants , and pigmeys giants . these are greedily bought vp by certaine great men , who putting them vpon the noses of their vnfortunate attendants , do so alter and distract their sight , as if their lord doe but once lay his hand vpon their shoulder , or looke vpon them with a smile , though artificiall , and perhaps forced , they deeme it as a reward of fiue hundred crownes a yeere . but the spectacles lately inuented in the low-countries are likewise bought vp at a very deare rate by great lords , and distributed among their courtiers , which being vsed by them , they cause those offices and rewards , to which their sight shall neuer attaine , not perhaps their age reach , to seeme neare at hand . moreouer , there are to be sold in the said ware-house ( but at a most excessiue rate ) humane eyes , which are of admirable vertue , since it is impossible to thinke , how infinitely a man bettereth his owne things , when he viewes them with others eyes : yea the very politicians themselues protest vpon their cōsciences , that with no other , or better instrument , may a man sooner attaine vnto the happinesse , to purchase that thrice excellent vertue , so ambitiously aimed at , and sought after by great men , of nosce te ipsvm . there are also sold in that shop , certaine compasses , not made of siluer , of brasse , or of steele , but of the pure interesse of the most fine reputation , that may be found in all the mine of honour : and they are most admirable to measure a mans owne proper actions , since experience hath manifestly caused all men to know , that compasses framed of the base stuffe of fantasticke conceit , of selfe-will , or of meere interresse , do seldome proue iust and true to those , who in their owne affaires desire to draw their liues parallel . moreouer , such compasses proue most excellent to those , that doe exactly possesse the skill and art to vse them , to take the iust measure of the latitude of those ditches , which for their credit and reputation they are compelled to leape cleane ouer , and not runne in danger to fall or stumble in the middle of them , and ●●mefully bury themselues aliue in the puddle of folly and vnheedinesse : nor can those lauish waste-goods , and spend-thrifts , whose purses being but shallow and poore , will waste and spend like princes , with any other instrument , better learne the most necessary vertue to make the step answerable to the leg , than with these compasses . the said politicians doe likewise sell a numberlesse quantitie of boxes or leather-cases full of mathematicall instruments , such as surueyors or land-meters doe vse , which are more than necessarie , exactly to measure , and in all dimensions to square out those with whom a man is to treat about graue affaires , and important negotiations , or to confer and impart weighty secrets . the said warehouse hath also great vtterance of certaine iron-tooles , which resemble those , that chirurgions or tooth-drawers vse , and call barbicans . they serue to open and dilate the chaps of those vnhappy courtiers , which being to make a vertue of necessitie , are often compelled to swallow huge great pumpions in stead of small mastick pills . they haue likewise great store of beesoms , made of circumspection , whereof warie courtiens make good prouision aforehand , that they may euery morning and euening diligently sweepe from off the staires , which they daily goe vp and downe , perilous hard peasen scattered vpon them by certaine enuious and maleuolent spirits , who taking greater pleasure in spoiling other mens affaires than in accommodating their owne , doe onely exercise the shamelesse trade , and trecherous worke , of breaking the neck of honest and vertuous mens reputation . moreouer , there is in th●● ●●shop to be sold ( but for the weight in gold ) a kinde of most perfect and superexcellent inke of the maker , far more precious than bise of the most far-fetched azure , which by the quills of learned writers ( being vertuously and skilfully displaid on books ) serueth to embalme the dead bodies of vertuous men , and to yeeld them most aromatically odoriferous vnto after-ages ; whereas those of the ignorant yeeld a most loathsome stench , and are soone turned into vselesse ashes . and with this ink● only is the name of the learned eternized in the memorie of all nations , which in the illiterate and ignorant doth suddenly die and vanish . a balsame ( truly ) of more than humane vertue , since those , that therewith annoint themselues , liue , although they die , and departing out of the world , but with their bodies , abide perpetually therein with the memorie of their learned works . an infinite summe of money doe likewise those politicians receiue daily for a kinde of oyle , which they sell , for so much as it hath often beene experienced to be most exquisitely auaileable , to comfort and corroborate the queasie stomacks of courtiers , to the end that without enfeebling their constitution of patients , the poore vnfortunate wretches , may the more easily and speedily digest the bitter distastes , which so often and daily they are enforced to swallow and pocket vp in courts . they sell moreouer in certaine little viols of glasse , ( of which menante , who writes these present newes , hath been so fortunate as to get one at a reasonable rate ) odoriferous humane sweat , most admirable to perfume those , who with the fragrancie of muske and ciuets of honourable labours will endeuour with pen in hand to appeare and ranke themselues among learned men . the said warehouse hath also great dispatch of a kinde of penids , made of most fine paste-royall , very excellent to whet and stir vp the appetite of certaine wilfull sowre stoicks , to the end , that with an insatiate greedinesse , they may know how to eat and feed on those loathsome dishes of this world , which albeit they recoyle and prouoke vomit in some , and are wholly repugnant vnto the taste and stomacke of good men , neuerthelesse there be some , who because they will not purchase the displeasure of great men , and so ouerthrow their owne affaires by pulling an old house on their heads , are forced to make shew and pretence , that they greedily desire them , and with hungry rauenousnesse deuoure them . there are besides to be seene in that shop certaine great boxes full of musk-comfets , very excellent to make the breath of those secretaries , priuy counsellors , or senators in common-wealths ( who are bound to let secrets putrifie in their bodies ) to yeeld a sweet sauour . then in a back-roome and seuerall magazin , they sell certaine horse-pasterns or fetters , made of the iron of considerate maturitie , which , though by some foolish kinde of men , they be scorned and reiected as implements for beasts , the wiser and more warie haue lately brought them into so great credit , as they are daily bought vp at an excessiue price by those precipitate and foole-hardie wits , that fearing , or scorning the iudicious maturitie of the ordinarie carier , take pleasure rashly , and hand-ouer-head to addresse and compasse all their affaires by posts and curriers . but no other merchandise of that rich warehouse hath lately had greater vtterance , than certaine fann's , made , not of the feathers of ostriges , of peacocks , or of any other gay-coloured bird , but of herbs and flowers . and because mr. andrea mathioli , the delphick herbalist , hath among those flowers and herbs found and knowne the drearie and infernall weed , wolues-bane , the warie and fore-seeing vertuous inhabitants of parnassus , haue euidently discouered , that those mysterious fann's , serue not to make wind in the h●at of summer , but to rid and driue away from mens noses those importunate flies , which certaine ill-aduised and vnheedie spirits , hauing gone about to remoue , by hitting them with their daggers , haue shamefully slit and cut their owne noses . the most soueraigne vertue fidelitie , being secretly fled from parnassus , apollo hauing discouered where shee had hidden her selfe , dispatcheth the two most excellent muses , melpomene and thalia , to perswade her to returne . rag. . part. the royall palace of the soueraigne vertue fidelitie , which whilome was so frequented by the chiefest and most eminent officers of princes , and by an infinite number of senators of the most renowmed common-wealths , is of late so little haunted , that it seemeth to be the house of desolation . whereupon , on the . day of this present moneth , the honourable mansion of so excelse a vertue was seene to be cleane shut vp . apollo was no sooner aduertised of so important a case , but he commanded , that the gate of her famous palace , should with violence be laid open ; and that from the ladie fidelitie herselfe , they should vnderstand the true occasion of so strange a noueltie . his maiesties beheast was forthwith put in execution , and they , who most exactly searched each corner of the royall palace , found no creature therein , which the vertuous inhabitants of parnassus vnderstanding , they presently put themselues into mourning weeds , sprinkled themselues with ashes , and shewed diuers other signes of sad sorrow : yea and apollo himselfe in particular did so grieuously condole , that all the court might euidently perceiue in him those very same effects of inward sorrow , which he publikely made demonstration of , at what time the wailefull and deplorable disaster befell his vnfortunate sonne phaeton . his maiestie well knowing , that the gouernment of mankind would goe to wrack , if the solide foundation , which vpholdeth all this worlds machine , should faile , caused presently certaine edicts to be proclaimed , wherein ( both to the ignorant , and to all others incapable of the most noble prerogatiue , to liue with honourable fame and good report in the memory of men ) he freely granted a hundred yeares of immortalitie , to be deliuered him so soone as he should finde out , where that famous vertue had hidden herselfe . and to assure the payment promised , the royall exchequer-chamber deliuered bills of exchange , and letters of assignation , signed by homer , by virgil , by liuie , and by most wealthy tacitus ; all of them principall and most eminent merchants in the factorie of paruassus , amongst those vertuous men , who with their praise-worthy studies , wholly apply themselues to the right noble and honest traffique , to e●ernize others names in the memorie of all nations . the greatnesse of the promised reward inuited diuers to goe seeke her out . and after much pursuit and exact diligence , the royall maiestie fidelitie was found in a stable , lying among the hounds and spaniels belonging to the famous hunter acteon , and of most louely adonis . apollo being in all possible haste aduertised of so strange a noueltie , did immediatly send thither the two soueraigne muses , melpomene and thalia , to the end that remouing so excellent a virtue from so vile and loathsome a place , they should reconduct her to her wonted habitation . but all endeuours proued vaine : for that glorious princesse , bitterly bewailing her disastrous condition , cried out , oh you sacred di●ties , relate vnto my soueraigne good lord apollo from me , that my eternall and most capitall enemy fraud , hath at last obtained a compleat victorie , touching the controuersie , that shee hath euer had with me : and how that infamous interesse , who in these dismall daies , tyrannizeth ouer the minds of all the best nations , hath rigorously banished me from out the hearts of men , which in former times were wholly mine . let his maiestie likewise vnderstand , that the whole vniuerse is so deeply plunged in the filthy mud of all abominable and brutish pollutions , that the constant fidelitie , honourably and faithfully to serue her lord or prince , euen to the effusion of the last drop of her heart-bloud , and to the emmission of the last gasps of life , which erst was so admired , and ambitiously sought after , is now adaies reputed no better , than a foolish and hare-brain'd obstinacie . and tell him moreouer , that if a man ( so he may accommodate and fit himselfe to all times to all places , and to all persons ) haue a fraudulent heart , full-fraught with perfidious trechery , and readily disposed , to exercise whatsoeuer execrable infidelity , or damnable periurie ; the same is now adaies commended and extolled , to be wisdome , sagacitie , and warinesse of an all comprehending and reaching wit. and tell him , that i , a poore abiect creature , glutted , and euen tyred to see so filthie and opprobrious things , am inforced to imbrace the resolution ( as you see ) to liue among these dogs , in whom i now finde that true fidelitie , which with so much toylesome carke , i haue euer laboured , and wearied my selfe to insert and plant in the perfidious and interessed heart●● of all men . apollo perceiuing the great disorders , that the flight of the sacred vertue fidelitie , bred in all mankind , by the mediation of the soueraigne muses , and of the sublime heroike vertues , obtaineth her returne into parnassus . rag. . part. no tongue can fully expresse what anxietie and anguish apollo fell into by the secret and sudden departure , which ( as by our former letters hath already beene signified ) the excellent vertue fidelitie ( some weeks since ) made from this state of parnassus . for his maiestie could not possibly be at peace , or take any rest , to see the world depriued of so noble a princesse . and his afflictions were daily increased by the foule disorders , which continually were heard to multiply in all principalities , betweene the common people , and thrice-sacred amicitia ( the only exquisite delight of mankind ) who seeing her selfe forsaken by that pre●ious vertue fidelitie ; and fearing to receiue some notable affront by fraud , absolutely denide to inhabit any longer in the hearts of men , who freed from the oath of fidelitie or allegeance , which indissolubly they owe vnto their princes ; and likewise loose from the bond of that sincere loue , with which they are fast tied vnto their priuate friends , became so fell in perfidiousnesse , so brutish in seditions , as making euery most detestable wickednesse to seeme lawfull ; they with treacherie chased vnspotted faithfulnesse from all humane societie , and with foule seditions , sacred peace ; defiling the whole world with bloud , and filled the same with most villanous larcenies , and with all manner of perfidious and execrable confusion . besides , the iust grieuances and complaints of princes did continually molest apollo's minde ; which princes did openly protest , that by the damnable infidelitie of their subiects , they were inforced to abandon the gouernance of mankind : whereupon apollo , to finde out some conuenient remedie against so notorious a mischiefe , thought it expedient to intimate the high court of parlament of all the generall estates , against the twentieth of the last moneth , vnto which hee summoned the poet-princes , and the deputies of all vertuous nations . all which being in great diligence appeared on the prefixed day , there were discouered in many people great hatreds against their princes , all which protested openly , that not by the vice of infidelitie , but vrged and euen compelled by desperation , they had for euer banished from out their hearts that fidelitie , which , as most hurtfull and preiudiciall to them , they were resolutely determined neuer to acknowledge and re-admit : forsomuch as shee was most foulely abused by many princes . and whereas in former times , the fidelitie of subiects , hauing euer serued as an instrument to induce princes , to counterchange the awe and seruice of their people with gentle and courteous vsages , they now clearely perceiued , that the vertue of a base and prostrate obedience , was reputed but the basenesse of an abiect minde , and the merit of a voluntarie and vntainted faithfulnesse , a necessitie to serue ; by reason of which manner of proceeding , publike mischiefes and disorders were vncontroledly gone so farre , that many people had beene compelled to vndertake the resolution , which the world now saw ; onely to the end , that humorous and capricious princes should come to the perfect knowledge , that the authoritie to sway and command may easily be lost , when the outrages , ingratitudes , and misusages , daily vsed towards subiects , hauing surmounted all humane patience , brought all nations ( naturally inclined to dutifull obedience ) euen vnto desperation ; and neuer any more to liue in subiection of masters ; with an obstinate resolution , rather to wrach on a free gouernment , than to be continually contemned , abused , flaied , hurried and molested vnder principalities . although the rage and disdaine of princes towards their subiects were great , and the distaste of the people greater , the soueraigne muses neuerthelesse , with the assistance of the thrice-excellent heroick vertues , who effectually laboured to bring a businesse of so great consequence to some good end , with the dexteritie of their wit , in the end they somewhat calmed and asswaged the minds of the angry princes , and instigated the proud hearts of the enraged people : and the court of parlament was dissolued , with the capitulation of this atonement , that the people should solemnly vow and promise forthwith to readmit into their breasts the excellent vertue fidelitie , which they should sweare to make absolute mistris of their hearts . and that princes should be strictly bound , to banish and expell from out their hearts , auarice and crueltie ; and in lieu of them , yeeld the free possession of their mindes vnto the soueraigne vertues , liberalitie , bountie , and clemencie , who were they , that perpetually held fidelitie and obedience fast ●ettered in the hearts of subiects : since that by an autenticall testimonie , subscribed by caius pliuius , and other naturall h●storians , it most euidently appeared , that the sillie sheepe , who are seene so gently and willingly to obey their shepherds , doe notwithstanding shun and abhor all butchers . and that it was impossible to induce dogs ( although naturally most trusty , louing , and kinde to their masters ) to wag their taile , or to leape , and faune on those , that gaue them more stripes than morsels of bread . iustus lipsius , to make amends for the fault hee had committed in accusing of tacitus , doth so passionately obserue him , that before apollo he is charged to idolatrize him : whereupon after a faigned , and but verball punishment , hee it in the end by his maiestie , not only absolued , but highly commended and admired . rag. . part. the most curious learned of this state , haue often obserued , that whensoeuer any vertuous man , doth through humane frailty commit any ouersight , for the dread which he afterward seeleth of wicked actions , doth in such sort ( with falling into the other extreame ) correct the same , that some there be who affirme , that democritus did not so much for the benefit of contemplation , pull out his owne eyes , as for to make amends for the errour hee had committed , laciuiously gazing vpon a most beautious damsell , than beseemed a philosopher of his ranke and profession . and the report yet goeth among the vertuous , that harpocrates , to correct the defect of ouermuch babling , for which he was greatly blamed at a great banquet , fell into the other extreame , neuer to speake more : nor ought the sentence of the poet be accounted true , dam vitant stulti vitia , incontraria currunt . since that , in a dog that hath once bin scalded with boiling water , it is held a point of sagacitie , to keepe himselfe in his kennell when it raineth . as likewise it is the part of awary man to auoid eeles , if hee haue once beene deadly bitten by snakes . this we say , for so much as so great was the griefe , and so notorious the agonie , that iustus l●psius felt for the accusation , which he so vnhappily framed and published against tacitus , that to repaire the fault , which of all the vertuous of this state was exceedingly blamed , not long after fell into that errour , and went in person to visit tacitus , and for the iniury which he acknowledged to haue done him , hee most humbly begged pardon at his hands . tacitus knowing what reputation the readinesse of a free and genuine pardon yeeldeth a man , with a magnanimity worthy a romane senator , not only frankly and generously forgaue lipsius the iniury receiued , but ( which by the vnanimous report of all the vertuous of this state hath deserued highest commendations ) he most affectionately thanked him for the occasion he ministred vnto him , to make purchase of that glory , which sincerely to forget all iniurious affronts receiued , doth procure and conferre vpon a man , vnto the ancient and most affectionate deuotion , which lipsius ( who had euer bin most partially affected vnto tacitus ) had euer borne vnto so sublime an historian ; the wonder of so great indulgence being adioyned , and the facility of a p●rdon so earnestly desired , did so encrease the loue in his minde , and so augment his awfull veneration towards him , that hee more frequented tacitus his house than his owne . hee now loued to discourse with no other learned man : no conuersation did more agrade him : he commended no other historian : and all with soth partiality of inward affection , namely , for the elegancie of his speech , adorned more with choise conceits , than with words ; for the succinctnesse of his close , neruous , and graue sententious oratorie , cleare onely to those of best vnderstanding , with the 〈◊〉 and hatred of other vertuous men of this dominion , dependents of cic●ro , and of the mighty caesarean faction , who approue it not . and did with such diligence labour to imitate him , that not onely with hatefull antonomasia , hee dared to call him his auctor , but vtterly scorning all other mens detections , he affected no other ambition , than to appeare vnto the world a new tacitus . this so vnwonted kindnesse among friends , neuer seene from inferiours towards their superiours , and which exceeded the most hearty loue or affection that any can beare and expresse to the nearest of his blood , engendred such a iealousie in the minds of mercerus , of beatus , rhenanus , of fuluius orsinus , of marcus antonius muretus ; and of diuers others , followers and louers of tacitus , that , induced thereunto by meere enuy , hatched in their hearts ( but according to the custome of worldly dissemblers , which is , to paliate the passion of priuate hatred with the robe of charity toward their neighbour ) vnder colour to reuenge the iniury , which not long since lipsius had done vnto their friend tacitus , they framed an enditement against lipsius , and presented the same vnto apollo , charging him with the same delict or crime of impiety , whereof he had accused tacitus , giuing his maiestie to vnderstand , that hee loued not tacitus as a friend , that he honoured not him as a master , and regardfull patron , but adored him as his apollo and deitie . this accusation , which as in crimes of capitall treason , by reason of it's hainous outragiousnesse , needeth no other proofe than the bare testimony of any one man , did enter so deepely into apollo's minde , as hee deemed himselfe offended by lipsius in the highest degree , caused him forthwith to bee brought before his maiestie , by the pretorian band of the lyrick poets , fast bound in chaines and gyues ; and staring on him with a fierce wrathfull countenance , and with death-threatning gestures , demanded of him , what his genuine opinion or conceit was of a certaine fellow , called cornelius tacitus , borne of an oyle-monger of terni . lipsius vndismaiedly answered apollo , that hee deemed tacitus to be the chiefe standard bearer of all famous historians , the father of humane wisdome , the oracle of perfect reason of state , the absolute master of politicians . the stout coripheus of those writers that haue attained the glory in all their compositions , to vse more conceits than words ; the perfect and absolute forme to learne to write the actions of great princes , with the learned & apparent light of the essentiall source and occasion of them : a most exqusite artifice , and which was onely vnderstood by the sublimest master of the historian art , as that which greatly yeelded him glorious , that knew how to manage it , and him truly learned that had the iudgment duly to consider the same ; the perfect idea of historicall veritie ; the true doctor of princes ; the pedagogue of courtiers ; the superfine paragon , on which the world might try the alloy of the genius of princes ; the iust scale , with which any man might exactly weigh the true worth of priuate men ; the volume which those princes should euer haue in their hands , that desire to learne the skill and knowledge absolutely to command : as likewise those subiects , who wished to possesse the science dutifully and rightly to obey . by this so affected encomium , and by so earnestly exagerated commendations , apollo easily perceiued , and came to know , that lipsius did manifestly idolatrize tacitus , wherupon in minde enraged thus he bespake him . in what esteeme wilt thou then ( oh lipsius ) haue mee , that am the father of all good letters , soueraigne lord of the sciences , absolute prince of the liberall arts , monarke of all vertues , if with such impiety and shamelesse impudency , thou doest idolatrize a writer , so hatefull vnto all good men ? and an author so detestable vnto the professors of the latinetongue , both for the nouelty of his phrase , for the obstruse obscurity of his speech , for the vicious breuity of his discourses , & for the cruell and tyrannous politicall doctrine which he teacheth ? by , and with which , he rather frameth cruell tyrants , than iust princes ; rather wicked and depraued subiects , than endowed with that vntainted probity , which so greatly auaileth , and facilitates in princes the way how to gouerne their states mildly and vprightly . it being most apparent , that with his impious documents , and abominable precepts , he peruerteth lawfull princes into cruell tyrants , he transformeth natural subiects ( which should be as milde and harmelesse sheep ) into most pernicious foxes : and from creatures , whom our common mother nature , with admirable wisdome hath created toothlesse and hornelesse , he conuerteth them into rauenous wolues , and vntamed bulls . who sheweth himselfe a ●lye cunning doctor of false simulations , the only subtile artificer of treacherous tyrannies , a new xenophon of a most cruell and execrable tiberipedia , the wily forger of the euer to be detested mystery , how leeringly to smile and therewith deceiue , how with facility to vtter and affirme that which a man neuer meaneth or intends , effectually to perswade that which one beleeueth not , instantly to craue that which one desireth not , and to seeme to hate that which one loueth ; who is a sublime pedagogue to instruct others in that most villanous doctrine to smother and suppresse the conceits and meanings of a true-meaning heart , and yet to speake with a false-lying tongue : the ingenious architect of fallacies and deceits , and so singular and excellent an author of rash and fond-hardy iudgments , that he hath often most shamefully attributed holy interpretations to most impious and to bee abhorred actions : and on the other side , hath cannonized sacred ones as diabolicall . and wilt thou ( oh lipsius ) among so many my liege and trusty vertuous men , euen before my face , adore and worship as thy god , a man that in all his compositions hath manifestly declared , that he hath not knowne god ? who being composed of nought but impiety , hath sowed and scattered through the wide world , that cruell , prodigious , and desperate policy , which so infinitely defameth those princes that make vse of it , and so deepely afflicteth the people that feele it ; who as well to princes as to priuate men , hath taught the cursed way , and mischieuous fashion , how to conuerse and proceed with false doublenesse ; and the treacherous art , to doe that which a man saies not , and to say that which one meaneth not . a way which by some is practised onely to become skilfull in that abhominable doctrine , how with the pensill of false pretences , to pourtray blacke for white ; to circumwinde the simpler sort of people with the fallacies of faire sugred words , and of lewd and wicked deeds ; to deceiue all men with vsing laughter in anger , and weeping in ioy ; and onely by and with the pernicious compasse of priuate interesse , to measure loue , hate , trust , faith , honestie , and each humane or morall vertue , read and perused by good men , onely to come to the knowledge of the new and hidden tricks and artifices , with which , in these daies , wretched mankinde with so euident calamitie , is most miserably circumgired , and tossed to and fro : and to discouer the most execrable hypocrisie , that diuers followers of so wicked an art haue vsed and practised , to bee by the simpler sort of people reputed for men of vpright conuersation , and honest life ; albeit , for to obserue and obey the rules of tacitus , they act , and daily perpetrate deeds , that by the vgliest diuels of hell , are deemed most abhominable . perceiuest thou not ( oh lipsius ) since the volumes of this thy tacitus haue past the hands of all people , diuers princes haue straied and e●●onged themselues from the ancient course , to gouerne their subiects with humanity , mildenesse , and clemency : and what an infinite number are now cleane parted & diuorced from the genuine plainnesse and singlenesse of atruly-vertuous life ? know lipsius , that so great a part of tacitus his workes ( as some simple and shallow-brain'd men doe affirme ) were not lost in the violent deluges of the barbarous nations , which with so rapid inundations passed into italy , to ouerrunne and subdue it , for they miscaried , and were lost before so great ruines ; not through the ignorance of the people , who in those turbulent and embroiled times , were continually busied in the exercise of armes , but because those yet vntainted ancient nations , in which reigned equally the well-meaning simplicity of minde and heart , and the purity of the then new budding christian religion , abhorred that author whom some ill aduised doe now so much loue and cherish , that ( as i perceiue thy selfe hast done ) many and diuers euidently idolatrizing him , haue ereared him for their golden calfe . tacitus is in euery part of his most vnworthy to be read of good or honest men , for so much as the villanies , and the impieties contained in his workes , doe far exceed in number his leaues , his lines , his words , his sillables , and his letters . but by the life of tiberius , which hee hath compiled , a prince sutable and worthy the genius of such an historian , all must acknowledge the same to bee most intollerable and damnable ; the which for a singular benefit of all mankinde , hauing for many ages lyen secretly hidden in the most secret and concealed parts of germany , through the pesti●erous and diabolicall curiositie of a germane , more dreary and fatall to all the world than his compatriate , that was the first inuented the deadly and dismall bombard , whence it was drawne forth , at what time that most noble prouince began to be infected by the moderne heresie ; only to the end , that with so horrid a prodigie , at the same time that execrable luther began to molest and subuert the sacred rites , wicked tacitus should embroile the prophane . compositions in the highest degree most wicked and pernicions , which for many yeares were lost , because they pleased not antiquity ; and are now , to the great shame and reproach of this age , admired of those polititians , who being followers of such impieties , haue most compleatly learn'd from the master of fallacies and tromparies , the doctrine to know , how to the vtmost of a mans age , to entertainemen with faire words , to feed them with smoake , to fill them with winde , and with vaine-vaine hopes fairly to lead them to extreame beggery . a doctrine most assuredly infernall , which by tacitus the the inuentor and husband thereof , hauing beene sowne and dispersed abroad , onely for the benefit of princes , is now a daies seene to be imbraced and cherished with such insatiate greedinesse , by priuate and meane subiects , that tacitus , who was herefore an auth●● held onely worthy of princes , doth now so publikely passe from hand to hand among all men , that euen shop-keepers , fachius and base porters shew not themselues more cunning in any profession than of state policy , to the great contempt and derision of an art held in highest regard and reputation of great men , the whole vniuerse is seene to swarme , and to be full of sharking and spoiltrade polititians . at these irefull and exorbitant speeches of apollo , lipsius stood amazed , as one halfe dead and distracted , yet notwithstanding , euen in the vtmost abashment and consternation of minde , pulling vp a good heart , and taking breath , most submissiuely begged pardon of his maiestie for any fault hee might haue committed ; then boldly told him , that such and so infinite were his awfull obligations towards his beloued tacitus , and so great was the honour , which among his countrymen the flemings , the english , the germans , the french , the italians , and the spaniards , his bosome-minion , and most dearely beloued author tacitus had purchased him ; whom though he acknowledged to loue most entirely , and to honour as his terrestriall god ; yet , to attaine vnto a superlatiue degree of due satisfaction of his bounden duty , and with exactnesse to accomplish the duty of true gratitude , he thought all he could doe to be nothing , in respect of his vnualuable merits . his reason was , that hauing published and left vnto the world , diuers ordinary labours and compositions , his onely workes vpon tacitus were they , that had made him to merit an abode and mansion in pernassus , and an honourable and immortall renowne among many nations : and that if he , who with other mens money exercised the trafficke of trading and rich merchandizing , was easily pardoned his errour , if hee did euen worship and adore him , that at his pleasure might make him breake and turne begger : how much more then did he deserue of his maiestie to be , if not commended , yet at least excused , if in louing and honouring his deare dearest tacitus , he exceeded all bounds of duty , of decorum , or of dignity , sithence in & vpon him only was grounded the whole fabricke of all the credit and estimation that he had purchased among the vertuous . and that hee , euer since his first ingresse into pernassus , had of all the learned bin so beloued , cherished , courted , and reuerenced , that his house was no otherwise frequented , then that of the most famous writers . but that after hee fell into the errour to make tacitus his enemie , statim relictum illius limen , nemo adire , nemo solari : and therefore rather than hee would any whit diminish his veneration , and awfull respect toward that prime author of his , he was well pleased to hate himselfe , and to lose his life , deeming the losse of the same farre lesse , than the greatnesse of the fame , vnto which by meanes of tacitus he had attained . so highly did these words of lipsius offend apollo's mind , that more and more enraged with fierce wrath , he vehemently complained , that euen before his awfull presence with so impudent asseueration , hee had rather manifestly made demonstration of a wilfull stubbornnesse to perseuere in his stiffe opinion of so hainous an excesse , than humilitie to yeeld vnto penitence , and for his fault to craue p●rdon . and aboue any other demerit of so obstinate a man , his maiestie could by no meanes endure , that he had entitled the impiety of idolatry , with the stile of honourable gratitude ; and wilfull obstinacie , with the title of a constant and vncorrupted truth . whereupon he suddenly commanded the foresaid cohort of the lyricke poets , presently to drag him out of his presence , as one most vnworthy to looke his maiestie in the face , whom he had so capitally offended to the quicke . and that hauing stripped him of such good letters as he possessed , they should publikely proclaime him to be a most shamelesse ignorant asse ; and after burne him aliue , as a most wicked and detestable idolater . forthwith was poore lipsius brought , and haled vnto the place of so great infamie , where his friends most earnestly perswaded him to aduise himselfe , and at once , humbly ●uing for mercy at his maiesties hands , endeauour to saue both his life and reputation . in the very moment of desperation of so horrible and lamentable a plunge , it was manifestly perceiued , that at the apprehension thereof , there appeared in lipsius such an vndanted constancie , and an vndismaid boldnesse of a couragious minde against the terrors of death , that he thus answered apollo . and let his will be done : for , he cannot die ignorant , that can perfectly demonstrate to possesse gratitude , which is the soueraigne queene of all humane vertues . and therefore , the flames that were prepared to consume him , would yeeld a farre brighter splendor of glory , than of fire : and that euen in the last instant of his dying-life , he solemnly protested , that he would in no wise acknowledge the crime wherewith he was charged , to haue ouer-much loued or superstitiously honoured his beloued tacitus to be true . and that by reason of the infinite bonds , wherewith he stood tied vnto him , and for the respectfull loue he bare him ; the griefe and molestation that he felt in remembring , that hee died vngratefull vnto him , did more excruciate and torment him , than the rigor or paines or death : and that the agony , in which they all saw him , proceeded not from the fright or terror hee felt , that hee must die , but from the inward pangs , and hearts griefe , which vexed him , in as much , that he had heard his maiestie , name and pronounce tacitus , to be a wicked atheist . an iniurie , which had it beene vttered of so excellent and wise an author by any other man whatsoeuer , then by his sacred maiestie ( euen in that last gaspe of life ) he would neuer haue left it vnreuenged , at least with the weapons of his tongue . and that with the same libertie , which is so proper vnto such as care not to liue , hee made it knowne vnto all men , that the reall truth was , that tacitus had so much knowledge of god , that he alone , among all the heathen writers , with his profound and exact knowledge , hauing attained perfectly to know of what worth and efficacie ( touching matters of religion ) faith is of those things , which are not seene , or cannot by humane reason be proued , had boldly said , sanctiusque ac reuerentius visum de actis deorum credere , quam scire : words most sacred , and well worthy to be considered by those diuines , who in their writings had lost themselues in their sophisticall subtilities , and logicall nicities . apollo hauing heard these things , as one possessed with wonderment , and full of admiration , presently caused lipsius to be loosed , and most affectionatly embracing him , he thus bespake him ; oh my dearely beloued and vertuous lipsius , with what comfort to me , and auailefull gaine to thee , haue i tempted thy patience , and made triall of thy most vertuous constancie ? and by the bitter detractions , which i haue vttered against tacitus , which are but those with which they accuse him , that either neuer reade him , or vnderstand him not , i haue throughly made proofe of thy zealous deuotion towards that most excellent historian , whom i deeme worthy my regardfull admiration . and by that , which i haue now heard from thee , i doe euidently perceiue , that thou hast read him with delight , studied him with profit , and learnt him to thy great aduantage ; for i know that the stout defence , which to thy immortall glory , thou hast made in his behalfe , is not thine owne , but drawne from thine and mine tacitus . this said and done , apollo turned himselfe towards the vertuous , who for curiositie , and to heare the successe of that great accident , were in great troupes flocked into the hall , he thus said vnto them : oh you my entirely beloued vertuous learned men , admire and perpetually imitate the renowned constancie of this my glorious vertuous lipsius , and let the infinite dilection and sempiternall veneration of that prince , be eternally imprinted in your hearts , who strongly supporteth your reputation : and neuer forget that the credit and power of him , who loseth the good grace and fauour of his prince , doth more easily ruine , and precipitate , than doe the houses , whose foundations faile and decay . and therefore , you that follow princes courts , learne to know , that nihil rerum mortalium tam instabile , ac fluxum est ▪ quam fama potentiae non sua vi nixa . a most assured document , which teacheth all men , both in louing , in honouring , and in perpetually seruing their princes with a most constant trust , and stedfast faith to imitate my lipsius . for , euen as in sacred mysteries and holy rites , it is an vnpardonable and grosse impiety , to haue or acknowledge any other god , than him , who hath created man , the heauens , and the earth : so should you neuer admit into your hearts any other deuotion of princes , nor at no time expect commoditie , or wish for preferment , except from that lord , who by the trust and confidence , which he reposeth in your trust and fidelitie , by the extraordinary affection which he beareth vnto you , makes you to be knowne to all the world , not as his seruants , but as his deare friends . and by the supreme and vncontrolled authority , which he suffereth you to exercise in his dominions , causeth you to appeare and seeme vnto his other subiects ( euen as himselfe is ) so many princes . and for so much as the great wittinesse and sagacity of princes , by reason of the great iealousies and diffidences , that accompany those , who sway and raigne , is commonly accompanied by suspition , and fauourites or minions in courts , being euer aggrauated by enuy , euer pried into , and obserued by emulous competitors , and euer persecuted by the malicious or enuious ; to the end you may the more successefully ouercome so many difficulties , and may euer prosperously maintaine your selues in the states and honours which you haue acquired ; loue your princes with all your hearts , obserue them with all your best affections , and euermore serue them with all possible faithfulnesse and sinceritie . and rather , then so much as to thinke , much lesse to doe any thing , that may bring with it the least-least danger to diminish one iot of their good fauour ( as my lipsius hath done ) chuse to yeeld vnto death . and beleeue confidently , that then beginneth your downefall , when by some fatall mischiefe of yours , you suffer your selues to be perswaded or entangled , that you may better or aduantage the condition of your seruice , with , and by vsing with your princes ( who know so much , see so much , vnderstand so much , and obserue sa much , as more cannot possibly be knowne , seene , vnderstood , or obserued ) simulation to seeme that , which one is not ; the falshood at once to smile and deceiue : all double dealing , and to chew with both chaps : all cloging dissimulation in stradling ouer ditches , the better to be able ( if euer his prince should fall into some disaster ) to take part with the conquerour . for , princes , who , suppose they know not so much , yet haue they euer so many whisperers about them , as one or other will bring them in tune . and when they sleepe , they are neuer destitute of wicked spirits to keepe them awake . so that , they , who thinke it safe , and dangerlesse , to liue and hold out long with falshood and dissimulation , may rightly be compared vnto those fooles , that vndertake to cant gipzies , to cheat cozeners , or that hope to sell false balls vnto mountibankes . the chiefest learned men of parnassus are sutors vnto apollo ; to enioyne tacitus , to recompile those bookes of his annales and histories , which are lost . rag. . . part. yester-day the chiefest learned men of this state of parnassus met together in the common colledge-hall , where after diuers long discourses past between them , they with one accord presented themselues before apollo's maiestie , vnto whom petrus victorius , a great learned man of florence , in the name of all the rest , said , that those vertuous men , whom his maiestie beheld , did most humbly beg a fauour at his hands , the most gracious , that euer hee could conferre vpon his learned followers , who with continuall brackish teares bewailed the disastrous losse of the annales and histories of cornelius tacitus ; the father of humane wisdome , and true inuentor of moderne policie , did most humbly coniure him , to command that excellent man to repaire the damages , which the iniury of times had caused , both to his reputation , and to the generall commoditie of his vertuous followers , by framing all that anew , which at this day is wanting in his most excellent workes . at this request , which seemed both vertuous and reasonable , contrary to the opinion of all men , his maiestie was much offended , and with manifest alteration of minde , he framed this answer : oh you my ignorantly-learned friends , doth it not then seeme vnto you , that the princes of this world are already ouer-cunning statists , but that you wish them to be more perfect doctors in that science , in which for your last misery , they offend in being ouer-skilfull in the same ? since some of them with the practise of one truly diabolicall and infernall reason of state ; it euidently appeareth , that they haue brought both sacred and prophane things into a manifest confusion : haue not as yet the common miseries of so many scandals , which by the harsh and wrested gouernment of some princes , are seene to arise in the world , opened your eyes so wide , as you may perceiue and know , that all moderne policie is but the trash of your so beloued tacitus , and as a contagious disease hath infected all the world ? are you not yet come to the knowledge , that the now present reason of state , with which a number of people are rather flead than shorne ; rather suckt drie , than milked ; and rather oppressed , than gouerned . a thing in it selfe so exorbitant , it is meere ignorance to desire the same to be more violent ? and doth it not seeme vnto you , that from the cruell gouernment of tiberius , and from the prodigious life of nero , so exactly written by your tacitus , some moderne princes haue drawne most exquisite precepts , how to gnaw to the bone , and how to shaue to the braine ? but that you would also haue them to haue the conueniencie , to see whether in the liues of caligula and domitianus , which to the end that the lothsome obscenities , and the barbarous cruelties , which those two vgly monsters of nature committed , should for euer lye hidden : the maiesty of the eternall god , for your incomparable benefit , hath exterminated from out the world , they might draw some secret precept , to make the fifth act of the wofull and dismall tragedie more funerall and wailefull . a happie a●d beneficiall gaine ( oh you vertuous ) for the whole world , hath the losse beene of the greatest part of tacitus his labours . oh how fortunate might men be reputed , if likewise those fatall reliques , which for the last calamitie of mankinde are left vnto vs , were also lost for euer . and that the world were gouerned with the modestie and simplicitie of the ancient monarkes , who esteemed men as reasonable creatures , and not with the bitternesse of diuers moderne princes , who manifestly seeme to beleeue , that they are but two-footed beasts , so created of god only for their benefit : euen as his diuine maiesty , to no other end caused the earth to produce mice , but to fatten cats . but you sir peter victorius , since i see , that you also are of the number of those good men , that wish tacitus were entire ; be pleased that i speake a few words with you in priuate , since you haue spoken in behalfe of the publique . doe you not thinke , that your princes with the only first leafe of the annales of tacitus , which they so diligently studie , and know so well to put in actuall practise , are become so skilfull medices to cure the canker of the sedicious florentine people ? thrice happie were all the world , if tacitus had euer held his peace . therefore get you gone in the name of god , together with the rabble of your learned copes-mates ; for my very heart is ready to burst , to see that men likewise are borne with the vnhappie calamitie of thrushes . cornelius tacitus , for some complaints vrged against him by diuers great princes , by reason of certaine politicall spectacles , which he hath deuised , most preiudiciall vnto their gouernment , hauing beene emprisoned , is by apollo set at libertie . rag. . . part. the apprehending of the person of cornelius tacitus , which happened the last night by the expresse commandement of the lords censors , hath caused great amazement throughout all the vniuersitie of the learned men ; being a man so remarkable in parnassus , so deare vnto apollo , prime counseller of state , chiefe chronicler , and his maiesties master of sentences . it was presently diuulged , that this hath happened by reason of some complaints exhibited against him by certaine most potent princes , who haue grieuously complained and aggrauated , that tacitus with the seditious argument of his annals , and of his histories , hath framed a kinde of spectacles , that work most pernitious effects for princes ; for so much as being put vpon the noses of silly and simple people , they so refine and sharpen their sight , as they make them see and prie into the most hidden and secret thoughts of others , yea euen into the centre of their hearts : and they protest , that they nor can , nor will euer by any meanes endure they should make apparent demonstration vnto all men of the pure essence and qualitie of the mindes and purposes of princes , what they are inwardly , and not what with their trickes and artifices ( necessary for to rule and raigne ) they endeuour to appeare outwardly . yesterday morning the atturney generall of the greatest monarks , now resident in parnassus ▪ appeared before the right honourable lords censors , among whom , in regard of the reputation of tacitus his person , who was to be arraigned and adiudged , apollo himselfe came and sate among them . this aduocate or atturney generall with exaggerated words gaue them to vnderstand , that it was full well known to all the best vnderstanders of state-matters , that for the peace and tranquillitie of kingdoms , princes are often compelled to commit actions not greatly to be commended , which ( to maintaine themselues in the peoples opinion , to be honest and vpright princes , in which conceit , hee that reigneth must necessarily labour , and endeuour to keepe himselfe ) they were wont to shadow and blanch ouer with the specious and precious pretexts of an holy and vndefiled intention , and of an honest , hearty , and affectionate zeale towards the common good . all which tricks , deuices , and artifices , they can no longer put in practise or make vse of , if the true sense or meaning of their designes shall at any time come to the knowledge of the vulgar . and that if it were possible , that the people ( without being subiect to others empirie ) might be gouerned of themselues , then would princes most willingly renounce the royall titles , and authoritie of commanding ; forsomuch as they are now fully resolued , that kingdoms and principalities are but insupportable burdens , subiects full-fraught with crabbed difficulties , and of so infinite dangers , as at their owne richly-sumptuous tables ( so much enuied them by gluttons and greedy gourmands ) they should neuer taste morsell , that would not relish of arsenike . but if experience had made the world to know , that the sway and gouernment of humane-kinde , without the presence of a wise and politicke prince , to rule and direct the same , would ere long be filled and ouer-run with wailfull and tragicall confusions . it is likewise conuenient , that all these iust and lawfull meanes be granted them as are requisite and behouefull vprightly to gouerne their subiects : for , if to manure and till the fields , the husbandman is not denide to haue his oxen , his plough , and his mattock : if the taylor ( to cut out and sew his garment ) haue allowed him , both needle , thimble , and sheares ; and the smith , his hammer and his tongs ; why shall monarchs be depriued of meanes , and barred of power , hereafter to cast dust in their subiects eyes , which is the readiest benefit , the most excellent , and necessariest instrument , that euer any politician could inuent , or finde in all the volume of state-reason ( though most excellent ) rightly to gouerne empires ? all which things , princes ( by reason of the seditious inuention of tacitus ) could no longer effect , or bring to passe : it being most euident , that the diabolicall spectacles , framed by that euer-factious and seditious man , besides the first qualitie ( as hath beene said , to subtilize and sharpen the sight of the vulgar people ) they produce also a second most pernicious effect , that is , to be so well and fitly fastned to the noses of all men , as it is no longer possible for princes , ( as heretofore they haue done , with no lesse facilitie , than profit to themselues ) to cast dust into their subiects eyes , though it were of the most artificiall , and superfinest , that possibly could be , without plainly discouering , that they are cheated , cozened and deceiued . the complaints and grieuances of the monarchies seemed most true both to apollo , and to the venerable colledge of the censors . and therefore they deemed them worthy to be maturely considered . now by the long discourses and debatements , that passed among them , conc●rning a businesse of so great consequence , it seemed , that their opinion was likely to preuaile , who consured , that tacitus together with his scandalous annales , and his seditious histories , should for euer be expulsed the society and conuersation of all men . but his maiestie , vnwilling so much to vilifie or embase the prince of all politicall historians , or to distaste honest students , by depriuing them of their bosome-delights , was contented , that tacitus should be giuen to vnderstand from his maiestie , how his pleasure was , that of those spectacles ( in very deed preiudiciall vnto princes ) he should frame as few as possibly could be . and that aboue all things , hee should vigilantly take great heed , not to disperse any abroad , except vnto choise and excellent men , vnto secretaries , and vnto priuy counsellers of state to princes , to the end they might serue to facilitate vnto them the good and vpright gouernment of their people . and that aboue all , ( euen as he tendred or loued his maiesties good fauour ) he should take especiall care , neuer to impart or communicate any vnto those turbulent or factious spirits , which in seditious and duskie seasons , might serue in stead of bright lamps , or far-seene beacons to that simple race of men , which is easily gouerned , as wanting the glorious light of letters , may be said to be blinde and without a guide . the duke of laconia , for hauing aduanced a most faithfull secretarie of his , to the highest dignities of his estate , is accused before apollo to idolatrize and dote vpon a mignon : but he doth most egregiously defend himselfe . rag. . part. the now regnant duke of laconia hath of late aduanced one of his subiects ( by him highly esteemed , and extraordinarily beloued ) from a base and low fortune to the highest dignities , and supremest honours of all his dominion . for he hath not only placed him in the sublime senate of the laconians ( a degree by reason of its eminencie ambitiously aimed at , and sought after by diuers great princes ) but hauing infinitely enriched him with great reuenues , hath also made him to be as much honoured and regarded as any whatsoeuer most renowmed subiect of all his state. this so worthy duke , by those who enuie the greatnesse of that his seruant , was before apollo's maiestie denounced to be an idolater of a mignon , and a doter vpon a fauorite or darling . apollo being highly moued against that prince , for the hainousnesse of so horrible a delict ( as his manner is in any outragious excesse ) without taking diligent information of the truth of the accusation , presently caused lewis puloi , prouost-marshall of this state , to be called before him , whom he threatned to be rigorously tortured , if within the space of halfe an houre , with all manner of scorne and derision , he did not bring before him , fast bound in fetters , as prisoner , the duke of laconia . pulci , with all exact diligence accomplished apollo's beheasts : for immediatly , all laden with heauy chaines , he haled and dragged the poore prince before his maiestie , who by an expresse messenger was presently aduertised of his attachment , and forthwith commanded the martelli , most vertuous florentines , and publike bell-ringers of parnassus , that by the ●olling of the greatest bell , the criminall magistrate should be called together , which was immediatly done . thus the duke standing fort● before him , apollo himselfe , after he had tauntingly vpbraided him with the foule crime , whereof he stood endited ; all inflamed with wrath , he told him , that he allowed him but the space of halfe an houre to defend his reputation . and in the meane time ( as if that poore princes case had beene vtterly desperate ) he straitly commanded , that whosoeuer had committed the indignitie to haue adored a seruant of his , should be condemned to perpetuall infamie , as vnworthy to liue among the vertuous princes of the phoebean court. then the duke thus began his defence . sir , and father of the vertuous ; i haue so armed my conscience with the fine , and proofe-cuirace of innocencie , and so am i assured to haue liued vertuously , and vprightly in all my actions , as i am more than certaine to haue demerited nothing of your maiestie . nor doth your indignation , nor this precipitous doome , to see , that the dreadfull sentence of my infamie doth fore-goe the cognition of the cause , any iot dismay or confound me . only i maruell to see , what as yet i neuer beleeued , that the foulenesse of accusations , yea among the most iust and vncorrupted tribunals , as this is , is of power to call in question , and bring into so dangerous hazards , the reputation of men of my ranke and qualitie . but i quiet my selfe in the will of god , who hath euer willed , that the gold of others innocencie , should be refined in the fire of false calumnies , and in the test of persecutions . i freely confesse vnto your maiestie , to haue exalted my friend more than my maleuolent enemies haue reported vnto you . and in this my action , which to your maiestie hath beene pourtraid so hainous , this only grieueth mee , that ( in mine opinion ) i haue not throughly performed all that vertue of compleat gratitude , which so deare a friend hath worthily deserued at my hands . and if those who accuse me , or other princes my equals , of prodigalitie , of dotage , or of an abiect minde , borne in the foule sinke of sottishnesse , to serue seruants , when they see a courtier well-beloued or rewarded by his lord or prince , would not suffer themselues to be blinded by malice , by passion , or by enuie , but with a minde void of flegme or spleene , would impartially consider the true merits of court-fauourits , they would then name that a vertuous life , which they entitle vitious prodigalitie ; dutie of gratitude those gifts , which they call inconsiderate ; and a vertuous affection , the infamie , wherewith they charge them to dote vpon , or idolatrize mignons : but it is not a profession fitting vulgar or ordinarie men , to diue or pierce into abditos principis sensus , & si quid occultius parant : whence it hapneth , that the ignorant , with the infamie of great men , fall into so grosse errors , as they stile the vertuous proceeding of a gratefull man , to be a vice of an abiect minde . the principalitie of the laconians ( as your maiestie well knoweth ) is electiue , in which the confining princes , haue euer beene of greater power , than he that ruled and commanded the same : not onely for the end and scope , common to all electiue princes , after their death , to procure vnto their blood and kinsfolks , potent friends , but for the adherences , which foraigne princes , for important respects , haue with the senators or peeres , that enioy the prerogatiue to elect a new prince : the dependance and traine of whom they endeuour to acquire , and procure with those arts and tricks , as are already too well knowne to all men . moreouer , your maiestie knoweth , that the prince of macedonia , with his plots and practises had gotten so great authoritie in my state , and was so ouer-growne in forces aboue all the grecian princes , as he was not only the absolute arbitrator of all greece , but openly aspired vnto an vniuersall monarchie . besides , it is not vnknowne to your maiestie , that the said prince of macedonia , vnder colour of amitie , and the protection of the dukes of laconia , with vndermining practises sought euer their ruine and ouerthrow . and forsomuch as the power of the prince of epirus hindred him from being able to compasse so high ends , he , to remoue , or at least , to frustrate , or to weaken so strong an obstacle , more with machinations of gold , and with secret conspiracies , than with open force of armes , he caused those insurrections of the people , and those rebellions in epirus , that haue so much impaired the state thereof . and ( as a thing too too well knowne to the world ) i will not now call to your memories , how that my most prudent predecessor , fore-knowing that the depression of epirus , was a manifest preparation for the ruine of the laconian empire ; to assure the same from the ambition of so mighty an enemie , hee resolued , openly with might and maine to aide and support the afflicted state of epirus . and how that good prince died in the pursuit of his wise resolution , not without vehement suspition of poyson ministred vnto him by expresse order from the prince of macedonia ; as he , who neither could , nor would endure , that the diuision of epirus ( by him accounted so secure ) should be hindred by him . in this vnhappy state of things , i was aduanced to the dignitie : and to auoid the disastrous end of my predecessor , in the first months of my principalitie , i shewed my selfe to be of a remisse genius , and altogether incapable of great affaires of state. i did wholly apply my selfe to reforme the magistrates of my dominion , and correct the abuses and vices of my subiects , openly professing to be a capitall enemie to the prince of epirus ; but in my heart , ful wel knowing wherunto the secret machinations , and plots of the macedonian prince aimed : and knowing also , that each losse of the prince of epirus , would proue my ouerthrow ; i , to establish my state , reduced vnto so apparent dangers , resolued with my selfe , to afford him all the aid i could . but , to assure mine owne life for those disastrous mischiefs , in which my predecessor perished , it behoued me , in so strait and difficult a deliberation , to proceed with wonderfull caution and secrecie . and obseruing ( as no doubt your maiestie , and all these right honourable iudges know full well ) that amongst the numberlesse imperfections incident vnto electiue states , the greatest is , that , lesse than any whatsoeuer principalities , they finde or enioy that most important , and vnualuable benefit of secrecie in their ministers : forsomuch as the customes of men are so depraued , as their senators and counsellors proue often greedy merchants , or brokers of their dignities and offices ; out of which they labour and practise to extract and reape the greatest commoditie , that possibly they can : now therefore , euen in the beginning of my principalitie , seeing my selfe engaged , yea and engulfed in so many anguishes and perplexities : and knowing , that i must needs wracke , and vtterly perish vpon the rocke of infidelitie , if in a businesse of so maine consequence , i made vse of those ordinarie secretaries , whom i knew to haue long before fore-stalled and bribed by foraigne princes : the great god ( from whose only benignitie , and not from any else , i acknowledge this great benefit ) inlightned my vnderstanding . and hee it was , that first proposed vnto mee , this mine , i will not say seruant ; for by the matchlesse vertue , which i haue found and experienced in him , he deserueth not to be stiled with so meane , or with so base a surname , but most deare-deare friend . and to him , who in the quality of a bosome seruant , had most faithfully serued me the space of full eight yeeres , i freely vnfolded that secret of my heart , which had it but falne into my imagination , i would haue deemed it most dangerous for me . and then it was , that i perceiued , how that the excellencie and high worth of a secretarie consists not ( as many thinke ) in the speaking with elegancie , but in being secretly silent with fidelitie . this i say , because with so happy successe of the important businesse , which i had in hand , i vsed and imployed this my trustie seruant , as i most successefully came to beguile and countermine the wilie-wise prince of macedonia ; which no subtle or craftie wit was yet euer able to doe . and by the meanes of this my so faithfull secretary , my affaires haue bin so carried , as no man could euer diue into , or so much as guesse at my designes . and i haue vnderhand aided and supported that prince my friend , whom i openly professed to hate and persecute : and haue prosperously practised the trade , at once to laugh and to deceiue , with those who make publike ostentation to bee the canonicall doctors of that art. and with so vertuous a deceit haue i reduced the affaires of epirus ( whilome so imbroiled , as they were generally held desperate ) vnto the state the world seeth . since that from the most deplorable misery that could be , i haue raised the same to be the sole arbitrator of all greece . and the macedonians , who had chimera'd and ideated vnto themselues vniuersall monarchies ; and that in lesse than a moneth they should bee able to swallow downe all other mens states : from their highest hopes are so tumbled downe into a precipice of lamentable desperations , as hauing vtterly renounced their ambitious cepricios , to vsurpe other mens estates , as with much adoe they keepe and maintaine their owne . apollo , hauing attentiuely listened vnto those things , all ioyfull ranne to embrace the duke of laconia , and with tendernesse of heart said thus vnto him . oh duke of that thrice noble nation , which in few words expresseth many things , right vertuously and honestly hast thou dealt with a man of so incomparable worth and vertue . and i tell thee plainely , that in thy most honourable laconian senate , there are but few other senatours to be found equall in merit to this thy friend , to whom hadst thou giuen all thine estate , yet shouldest thou dye vngracefull to him , and in his debt ; sith in these vnhappy times , wherein euen in the open market of the perfidiousnesse of many , the secrets of princes are at port-sale , sold to him that offereth most . that secretary , who in important affaires proueth faithfull , and continueth trusty vnto his prince , cannot so highly bee honoured , nor so bountifully be rewarded by him , but that he hath deserued much much more . apollo , bewailing the wofull wrackes , which in the courts of great princes , his vertuous followers suffer , and fall into ; for to assure their nauigation , commandeth some of the chiefest learned men in his dominion , to endeuour to frame a sailing-card , to saile safely by land . rag. . part. the deplorable wracks , which diuers learned men so often suffer in the courts of great princes , grieuing apollo daily more and more to the very heart , who with continuall labour and toilesome sweats , of the most famous sciences ( hoping by them to merit the good fauour and grace of princes ) hauing fraighted the ship of their minds with them , are afterwards seene vnfortunately to lose themselues on the quick-sands of a beggerly hired chamber , or to sinke in the whirle-poole of some base hospitall , and somtimes to split on some craggie rocke of beggery . no riches of infinite vertues being of force to free them from so deplorable calamities : he , i say , would needs at last endeuour to finde out some remedy for so great mischiefes , whereby hee might rest assured , that in all courts ( but especially in that of rome , placed in so tempestuous a climate ) the nauigation of his beloued vertuous attendants might be reduced vnto all possibe security ; and all for the benefit of good letters , which doe much empaire their reputation , when others see that they so little aduance or benefit those that spend most of their best age in learning them . now apollo seriously discoursing with himselfe , that if the english , the portagues , the bretton , the biscan , the hollander and the zelander pilots , onely with a little obseruing of the starres , the moone and the sunne , with a little stone in their hand , could and were able to curb and command the vast and dreadfull ocean , which they so freely , and euery way , and at all seasons furrowed and waded through , as they had thereon plotted out high-waies and watlin-streets , towards and from all coasts . how it could bee that his vertuous , with the powerfull helpe of astronomy , of cosmographie , of the mathematiks , of the meteors , but chiefly with their quaint wits , sharpned on the whetstone of continuall reading of bookes , could not inuent as easie and secure a nauigation by land , as the pilots of the forenamed nations had found out by sea . therefore to assure ( as farre as the vertue and strength of good letters can extend vnto ) the nauigation by land . apollo did not many moneths since institute a congregation of men , selected out from all the sciences necessary for so maine a businesse , appointing as chiefe and president thereof , ptolomie , the prince of cosmographers , vnto whom he allotted great aristotle , as companion in the meteors , euclide for the mathematicks , guido bonatti for astronomie : and to these he added as coadiutor , count baltazar castilion , a man well skil'd and practised in the bottomlesse seas of the courts . and for the better security of all that which he intended to establish for the happy successe of a businesse of so important a consequence , his maiestie commanded , that famous annon of carthage , palinurus , columbus , cortese , ferrante magellanes , amerigo vespucci , vasco di gama should be admitted in the congregation , as they , who haue beene the prime & chiefest pilots that euer the nauigation by sea had . first then ( as it was conuenient ) there was by that right excellent man ptolomie , framed a most exquisite card to saile by land , which with singular cunning was euery way lineated . and to come to the perfect knowledge of the true eleuation of the merits of courtiers , and longitude of the rewards , with which their seruices should be acknowledged , there were not onely inuented diuers and most learned astrolabs , but a new and most artificiall quadrant . true it is that that excellent man guido bonatti , with all his profound astronomie , laboured exceeding hard to finde out the true altitude of the pole of the court of rome ; nor was it euer possible , either for him or for any other of the most sufficient of the whole congregation , with any astrolabe whatsoeuer , to euen or leuell and adiust the course of the sunne of the phantasticke braine , and giddy humour of a selfe-conceited prince . for the genius of princes being the true and safe north-starre , which nauigating courtiers ought heedily to obserue in the nauigations by land . those worthy men were much amazed , and wondred how a starre so certaine and infallible in sea nauigations , should in land nauigation be found not onely vnstable and wauering , but was perpetually turned and gired about , by the two contrary motions of priuate interesse , and selfe-passion : from which two difficulties , many most dangerous turbulencies arising , they were often the causes of foule and horrible wracks . but greater difficulties and incumberances were discouered in the most vncertaine motions of the wandring stars , of the ministers and officers of princes , since ( as it should haue bin ) they were not so much rapt by the first impetuous mouer of the good seruice due to their prince , vnto which they were often manifestly seene to be retrograde . and that which exceeded all wonder , was the amazement whereinto the congregation fell , when by a certaine obseruation it perceiued , that the inferiour heauens of the ministers , with the course of their priuate passions towards their owne interesse or selfe-respects , did often draw and rap the said primum mobile . so that by these strange accidents , the businesse was so intricate and full of confusion , as those lords could neuer possibly come to the perfect knowledge of the regular and true motion of so many sphears , as was necessary to those that were to publish infallible rules of them . the rubs and impediments increased when they came to the act to note and set downe the winds in the guide-ship compasse , which they found to be neither certaine , nor limited in number , as we see they are in all sea-cards , but were little lesse than infinite ; for , besides the foure master winds of the princes will , of his childrens desires , of his brethrens prerogatiue , of other princes of the blood's preheminence , and the seuerall opinions of priuie councellors , there were discouered an infinite number of quarter-winds , or side winds , of the ministers and officers of the court , of mignons and fauourits to the prince , of vnder-secretaries , of buffons , of flatterers , of parasites , of fidlers , yea , and of panders , all so irregular , so voluble , so vnconstant , and in some occasions , so stormy , so boistrous , so high and furious , as in the compasse which they were a framing , they bred so inextricable difficulties , as made those famous pilots to condole the miserable condition of nauigating courtiers , who in their land-sailing must bee enforced to fit and adapt the sailes of their wits to such a multitude of seuerall winds as appeared vnto them . all which difficulties notwithstanding ( though insuperable ) those notable pilots neuer fainted or gaue ouer . nay rather , though they discouered the immense and vast ocean of the courts to be all ouer full of flats , shelues , shallows , quicksands , crags , rocks , gulfs , whirl-pools , sirts , scilla 's and carybdis of enuious , emulous , malicious , seditious , malevolent , spightfull , rancorous , clamorous , turbulent , froward , skittish , and diabolicall , male-contents , detractors , back-bi●ers , slanderers , railers , grudgers , persecutors , finde-faults , fantastick-humors , and heteroclit-wits , by so much the more did their courage increase to surmount so hard a taske , and so intricate a businesse , and to bring it to some good passe . their astrolabs being framed , and the quadrant finished , and the ship-guide compasse reduced vnto the best perfection they could , the congregation determined to come vnto the act of experience , whereupon hauing made choise of eight quaint , smug , and spruce courtiers , all compleatly stored with patience ( the most necessary biscuit , commodious prouision , and needfull sustenance for those that haue the heart to lanch into , and furrow the tempestuous ocean of the courts ) who , whilest they diligently prepared themselues for their voyage , hauing hoised their sailes , and onely expecting a fauourable wind , a chance befell impossible to be beleeued ; which was , that a most propitious north-gale blowing , to which all the eight courtiers , suddenly hoised and spread the sailes of all their hopes , onely those of one were seene to appeare full swolne , and prosperously to follow his voyage , whilest the other seuen neuer budged from their stations . which the lords of the congregation perceiuing , they were much distracted , especially when they obserued , that in a land-nauigation the fauourable winds of the princes good grace and opinion did not blow equally in all the sailes of his courtiers , though all of equall merit and worth . and greater was their wonder , when the said fauourable winde , blowing a new faire stiffe gale , some courtiers , who were prepared for a bon-voyage , speedily hoised , and spread all their sheeting , they might perceiue one who had neither mast , nor saile , nor tackling , of any merit , but lay there idly hulling in the hauen , to learne some practise of the court , before he would aduenture himselfe into the dangers of so troublous and hazardous a nauigation , by the force of that propitious winde , was driuen out of the port of his restfull ease , and blowne roomeward into the deepe of managements beyond his skill or sufficiency ; and with a most succesfull nauigation , end the voyage , with the purchase of great reuennues , of rich offices , of eminent honors , and of sublime titles : a nouelty that seemed so rare and strange to all the pilots , that mag●lanes , as one confounded with wonder , said thus ; my honourable good lords , i would neuer haue beleeued there should bee so great a difference betweene the sea-nauigation , and the land-sailing . and these extrauagant nouelties which now i see , seeme so strange to me , as they make me greatly to doubt of any happy issue of this our enterprise . but , for as much as all arduous difficulties may at last bee ouercome with a constant patience in the pursuit of them , let vs boldly proceed . by this time another right vertuous courtier , displaied the sailes of his faithfull seruice , at a faire westerly gale of the good fauour of his prince , and by the quality of the sailes full puft , with the gracious demonstrations of words , which he receiued from his lord , imagining that he had gone a far iourney , after a long-long voyage , hauing calculated the course of his nauigation , hee found himselfe riding at anchor in the very same place , whence hee hoised saile in the long voyage of his assiduous seruice : the silly and vnhappy wretch , hauing continually bin fed with diuers hopes of fallacious expectations , without substance of any good . but a stranger accident presented it selfe vnto those lords , when they saw at one same instant a stiffe gust to blow both south and north so ragingly , from the adle braine of a fantasticke prince , that the vnfortunate courtiers , tossed to & fro by two so contrary winds , could not resolue to which they were best to addresse their sailes , so that diuers vertuous good men perished in that tempestuous storme . at which strange case celumbus exclaimed and said ; now i plainly perceiue ( my lords ) that the nauigation by sea , wherein these extrauagances are neuer seene , is a businesse so safe , as it may be compared vnto such iournies as men go by land in horse-litters columbus had no sooner vttred these words , but the lords of the congregation perceiued , that certaine right vertuous courtiers , who rode in the hauen , were in great danger to be cast away ; the sea of the court wrought so , and was beyond it's custome so risen , and the surges mounted so high , as they threatned a generall naufrage . the biggest cables of the most exquisite court-patience , although right strong and tough , did rend in sunder ; so that all was wrackfull ruine . all which notwithstanding the skie of the princes countenance was calme , and his aspect cleare , nor did any other winde blow , but the gentle zephirus , or west of the princes quietnesse . the mischiefe was apparent ; the breath of the princes indignation was not felt , and yet the miserable nauigating courtiers perished in the harbour all this raging storme notwithstanding , an hardy and couragious courtier , who dared to heaue anchor , & come out of the hauen ; and ( as euery man thought ) was not only nor drowned nor ouerwhelmed ; for , that blustring tempest which would haue endangered or wrack't any whatsoeuer best practis'd and skilfull sea-man , serued him in steed of so prosperous a gale , as in a short time it brought him vnto an hauen of high and honourable dignities . an accident ( in truth ) worthy of infinite admiration , and which caused great wonderment and amazement in all the lords of the congregation . it seeming very strang vnto them , that in the land nauigation , those stormy tempests serued some in lieu of fauonrable winds , which in most safe and quiet hauens were the dismall destruction of many . but another thing seemed more wondrous vnto them , when in a calme skie , cleare welkin , and faire season ; no clouds , no lightning , no thunder , nor any signe of foule weather appearing , there were suddenly seene certaine thunder-bolts to fall , which vtterly consumed and burnt two most vnfortunate courtiers . at which vnwonted accident , the lords of the congregation were much affrighted , wondring how the thunder-darts , hurled by an irefull prince , were not accompanied with those fore-going lightning-flashes and thunder-claps , as those be , which by the all-powerfull hand of the great god are hurled at mankind , and which forewarne all courtiers to auoid them . a little while after , they saw a courtier assailed by an outragious storme of persecutions ; who after he had long strugled , and stoutly defended himselfe against the muddie fury of the swolne sea of his princes wrathfull indignation , and from the furious blasts of cruell and malicious detractions , lest he should sinke and be swallowed vp , hee was forced to fling all his goods and merchandize ouer-board . and the miserable wretch had already lost the maine mast of his hopes , and his merits had a great leake , and drew in abundance of water of desperation , when loe his vessell rushed and split against the marble rock of the ingratitude of a most vnthankfull prince . then followed a most strange thing , which was , that after so disastrous an encounter , the vessell of that courtiers seruice being split , wrackt and sunke , the storme of court-persecutions ceased , the sea of the princes indignation was calmed , and the rocke ( which had caused that miserable wracke ) was conuerted into a most safe hauen : the courtiers vessell but ere-while ouerwhelmed , of it selfe start vp out of the waues , more faire , more strong , and in better plight , than euer it had beene before . and the merchandize of his merits of it selfe was laded againe , which not long after , he vttered and vented at a very deare rate ; trucking and changing the same for great dignities , eminent titles , and rich reuenues . this accident seemed very strange vnto the lords pilots , and vnto all the congregation , nor could they sufficiently wonder how it could be possible , that in the land-nauigation the most vnhappie wrackes of some , might serue as great felicities to others . now the congregation continuing in trying of new experiments , enioyned a sly-witty courtier to hoise and display the sailes of his talent towards a wind that blew from south , and happily sailing , and keeping towards the north , after many dayes sayling the pilot-courtier desirous to see where he was , he with his astrolabe measured the altitude of the pole of his merit ; and to his great wonderment found , that hauing continually kept the prow of his faithfull seruice towards the north of his princes interresse , hee had made his voyage southward . of so strange a disorder , the courtier at first accused himselfe , that ( as hee should haue done ) he had not steered the helme of his faithfull minde towards the north of his princes good seruice . but when both with his sailing-card , and with his ship-guide compasse in his hand , he assured himselfe , that he had euermore guided the ship of his actions in an euen and honest line , he plainly perceiued , that the errour or mistaking of his vnluckie voyage proceeded so , because the north of his princes affection had suffered it selfe to to be turned towards the south , by certain wicked and maleuolent whisperers , which he hath alwaies about him . then vespucci , gama , and other pilots , besought the lords of the congregation , to giue ouer the businesse , as a desperate cure : and said , that nothing yeelded the nauigation by sea more sure or safe , than the immutabilitie of the north-starre . and that by the last most vnfortunate experience , it hauing euidently appeared , that the mindes of princes ( which are the infallible north-starre of land-nauigation ) suffering themselues so often and so easily to be turned , remoued , and circumgired by lewd and wicked people of the court : to aduenture to saile the tempestuous ocean of the courts , was a resolution not fitting wise men , but desperate persons . in this interim the lords of the congregation might see a most elegant spruce courtier , who for the space of more than threescore yeares had so happily sailed , both in the court of rome , and in others , that he had not only surmounted outragious storms of ruthlesse blasts and boistrous winds of persecutions , but had euen shiuered and broken the very same huge rocks , on which he had split & wrackt his vessel ; but that afterwards , when with a most pleasant gale , and prosperous wind , on the height of his felicitie , he pursued his course , onely for that he vnfortunately hit vpon a rush of an impertinencie of a base catch-pole , he was vtterly cast away . an accident which caused such distraction in the congregation , that the lords ioyntly resolued , to haue but one triall more made ( and then be quiet ) by a courtier , that was readie to set saile ; and him they commanded to hoise and spread all his sailes : but so it happened , that whilest he held on his course in a coast , deemed of all men , most safe and dangerlesse , his ship vnheedily , or by chance , hit vpon a rocke , and was wholly split and wrackt , which the lords of the congregation seeing , they all bitterly bewailed the ignorance and vnheedinesse of the courtier ; for so much as hee could not auoid that rocke . but he made manifest demonstration to them all , that it was not marked in the sailing-card . whereupon all the pilots casting their eyes vpon great ptolomey , as if they silently accused him of ignorance , hauing omitted that rocke , which so well deserued to be marked in his card , and had been the cause of so disastrous a mischiefe . but ptolomey hauing first well viewed the place , and considered the countrey thereabout , did euidently demonstrate vnto the lords , that no man liuing had euer before that time seene any shelfe or rocke in that place , and therefore he had not marked it in his card ; but that it suddenly grew and started vp in the very instant , that the vpfortunate courtier hit and ranne vpon it . now the lords of the congregation perceiuing , that in the nauigation by land , huge rockes did euery hand-while spring vp and grow in a moment , euen in the middest of fields and other places supposed most safe to be nauigated in the darkest night , they concluded their businesse to bee desperate , and their attempt impossible . and therefore dismissing the congregation , they straitly commanded , that in the perillous land-nauigation , no man should dare to goe a iourney , except at high noone , and withall , euery man should carry a great lanterne of wisdome , with a burning taper therein in the prow of his proceeding ; morning and euening with his bare knees on the ground , and hands heaued vp to heauen , humbly beseeching the maiesty of the euerliuing god , to send them good successe , since that for one to bring the ship of his hopes into a court , as into a safe heauen , doth rather depend from the immediate aide and assistance of god , than from any humane wisdome whatsoeuer . the lord iohn de la casa , hauing presented his quaint galateo , or booke of manners vnto apollo , meeteth with great difficulties in diuers nations , about their promises to obserue the same . rag. . part. the right reuerend lord , iohn de la casa , who ( as wee wrote vnto you by our last ) was with great solemnity admitted into parnassus , where after he had visited these illustrious poets , and complemented with all the learned princes of this court , hee presented his right quaint and profitable booke of galateo vnto apollo , which his maiestie did so highly commend , that immediately , he strictly commanded , it should inuiolably be obserued by all nations : and at the same instant enioyned the said lord to compose a galatea , since it was manifestly knowne , that the ladies of these moderne times , haue as much need to be corrected in their euill and depraued manners , as men . which edict caused great alteration in the people subiect vnto apollo's dominion : for , it was neuer possible , neither by entreaties , nor by menaces , to induce the marquesans to be pleased to receiue it ; and they boldly protested , that they were rather resolued to renounce their countrey , and forsake their children , than to leaue their most laudable custome , to honour their lords and masters with all sincerity of heart : to loue their friends with purity of affection ▪ rather than with lou●ing coursies , and with such other court-ceremonies learn'd by rote . there were also found greater difficulties among princes , because the most mighty monarchie of france would neuer subiect it selfe to the nice obseruations of the strict rules of galateo , nisi si , & in quantum , her owne tast and liking did accord vnto , which ( she said boldly ) she would rather attend , than on affected faire creances , which she should neuer obserue but with a certaine outward apparence . the soueraigne monarchie of spaine swore solemnely , that she would submit her selfe vnto galateo's rules , on condition the lord de la casa would remoue but one chapter out of it , which was , that being at a table with other princes , shee would not haue it counted ill manners in her , if seeing a good morsell in her companions dish , she did presently lay hold on it , and conuey the same vpon her owne trenchar . moreouer shee would not be noted to be ouer-gluttonous , if by chance shee should eat and deuoure all her neighbours part . the venetian magnificoes affirmed , that they would willingly allow of galateo , prouided alwaies that the lord de la casa would declare therein , that with all diligence to pry into , and seek to know other mens matters , businesses , and secrets , was no point of ill manners , but a necessary point of state-policy . then all the princes of italy applauded and embraced galateo , onely they said , that without being accounted vnmannerly , they would bee allowed to chew on both sides . but the dutch mutined , and were like to cause some hurly-burly : for they did not onely vtterly refuse to binde themselues to the italian sobricty in drinking , but did obstinately require , that it should be enacted and recorded in galateo , that the dutchmens excessiue quaffing , and continuall being drunken , and cup-shotten , was one of the chiefest vertues could be found in men of their nation , and one of the first requisits that princes and common-wealths , for the safety and welfare of their states , could wish for , or desire in their subiects , which request of theirs was by all the learned of parnassus reiected and impugned , as impertinent and abominable . and therefore touching that particular of sobriety in drinking , the dutch were earnestly intreated and exhorted to submit themselues vnto the rules of galateo , since that by reason of their custome of immoderate bibbing , and so often being fox't , they were by the best nations of europe pointed at as gazing-stocks . to these obiections the dutchmen answered stoutly , that those sober men deserued rightly to be stiled foul drunkards , who liuing vnder the bondage and seruitude of princes , by the phantasticke humour , or toyish conceit of one man , strangely passionate and giddy headed , they were daily insulted vpon , oppressed , hurried , and extortioned in liues , lands , and goods : and that those drunken germanes should bee reputed perfectly sober , who had the wit to vindicate themselues ; and had likewise the heart and grace to maintaine themselues in liberty : adding moreouer , that they accounted them bedlam fooles , who did not beleeue , that the drunkennesse of the germane people was the true foundation and establishment of so many famous republiks as were now seene among them . for the safety of a state , and the vniuersall peace of the people , depending onely on the fidelity of the ministers of princes and republiks , and on the well-meaning plainnesse and sincerity of euery mans mind : what other more precious iewell could bee desired in the world , then continually to see in germany by vertue of excessiue quaffing of wine , to vomit forth the inwardest secrets and most hidden cogitations of the minds of men . the germanes added moreouer , that by long experience they had plainly discouered , that they did most exquisitely well aduise & counsell their countrey , who by means of the good store of wine that they had drunke , hauing therein drowned all priuate interesses , and smothered all foule dissimulation , which sobriety is wont to beget in others minds ; the open-hearted dutch spake alwaies with a single free heart , and not as the italians , and other nations , yea , the sobrest are commonly wont , onely with their mouth , ordinarily full of guile and leasings . they said likewise , that so ambitiously affecting the glorious name of braue men at armes , as was well knowne to all the world , they could not with patience listen vnto the counsels and deliberations of sober men , who are commonly full of timidity , and of a vicious circumspection , vailed with the man●le of prudence ; but because they would haue them to be generous and couragious , they would not allow , that any man should vndertake to counsell his countrey being fasting , but after hee had first swilled downe good store of grape-liquor , and enflamed his heart with generosity , it being the proper quality of good wine rather to expell timidity from the heart , than remoue iudgement from the vnderstanding . and therefore the germanes with great reason , de reconciliandis inuicem inimicis , & iungendis affinitatibus , & adsciscendis principibus , de pace denique ac bello , plerumque in conuiuijs consuitant , tanquam nullo magis tempore ad simplices cogitationes pateat animus , aut ad magnas incalescat . furthermore they said , that if the italian vicious sobriety were introduced among the germanes , that most faithfull and sincere nation , would therewithall begin to abound with those double hearts , false minds , secret thoughts , vnseene sleights , handy-dandy , or turne-coat spirits , fraught with treasons , treacheries , conspiracies , and machinations , full of vntrue and forged affections , masked with secret hatred , with faigned and dissembled friendship , and with all manner of foisting , whereof those nations that glory to be sober are most abundant cicilies and fruitfull egypts , a thing so true , that the french , who for the vnspottednesse and purity of their free and single hearted minds , in the excellent vertue to be euer most faithfull & loyall to their kings , haue at all times bin most glorious and renowmed in the world , since diuers of them haue left the most commendable custome to quaffe merily , and to bee drunken after the good dutch fashion , haue suffered themselues to bee drawne into those most felonious actions that the world knowes full well . and if that little window in a mans breast , was by the wisest of former ages deemed a thing so necessary , and esteemed as an vnualuable benefit vnto mankinde , because through it a man might visibly see and view the hearts of certaine slie cunny catching companions , who , within being most vgly deuils , imploy the vtmost of their endeauours to bee reputed faire angels ; with what ground of good reason can any man blame the right laudable and precious custome to quaffe merily , and to be drunke ? it being most palpable and euident , that drinking of much wine hath the vertue to make bodies diaphaned or transparent . for which solid reasons , which by apollo were both allowed and commended for militant , it was resolued , that concerning the particular point of drinking moderately and soberly , the excellent and farre renowmed dutch nation should not bee subiect vnto the strict precepts of galateo . the vse of drunkennesse being among the germanes rather an artifice of the publike , than a vice of priuate men ; it being manifestly knowne , that both in times of peace and of warre , those nations are best aduised that doe as the germans ; deliberant , dum fingere nesciunt : constituunt , dum errare non possunt . apollo hauing highly commended the statute , made by the most mighty kings of spaine , that no aduocates , lawyers , or proctors shall passe into the indies , the doctors of the law finding themselues aggrieued , complaine vnto his majestie . rag. . part. the renowmed court and habitation of parnassus may rightly be esteemed most happy , not so much for the right excellent gouernment of apollo's maiestie , nor because it is inhabited by the most quaint , flourishing , choise , and sublime wits of the whole vniuerse , as because the exquisitenesse of a vertuous life , the perfection of all right honourable customes , and the exactnesse of all the best lawes dispersed through the whole world , are therein with all precise diligence introduced , propagated , cherished and obserued . the reason is , because those that inhabit or reside there , are bound to bring the most commendable fashions of their countries . a custome , that hath brought so great commoditie vnto the priuate , and so honourable reputation vnto the publike , as all men may euidently perceiue , that to be a right blessed and happy country , which liueth and subsisteth , not so much by her owne proper lawes , as by and with those iudiciously selected from out all other most ciuill and best established nations . apollo hauing lately bin informed , how the most potent kings of spaine , hauing vnder great penalties prohibited , that no aduocates , no lawyers , nor proctors shall passe into the indies , was pleased to approue and ratifie the said decree as most wholsome , as most holy . and did highly extoll and commend the piety of those monarks , who shewed so great charitie towards the new world , in seeking to preserue it from that mischieuous infection , that hath filled and infected the old-one with so many deplorable calamities and wailfull controuersies . whereupon his maiestie commanded , that the said holy and excellent edict should forthwith be engrauen , and enregistred in a faire table of metall , which to the perpetuall memorie thereof should be affixed neere vnto the twelue tables of the most famous romane lawes in forum maximum . we must not omit to let you vnderstand , that the doctors of the lawes were greatly moued and vexed at this iniunction , who earnestly recommended the indemnitie of their reputation vnto his maiestie , alleaging , that if they should not obtaine the fauour to haue the publication of that ordinance staied , occasion would be giuen vnto many to imitate those of ancona , of norcia , of recanati , and of other people , who to the great dishonour of good letters , had chased and expelled from out all their counsels and consultations those pettie-foggers and law-pleaders , which of all other people were held in so great admiration ; for they verily beleeued , that without the placet of a man skilfull in the law , it was impossible for any man to say or doe any thing well or honestly . and that by so much the more , they besought his maiestie to take their cause into his consideration , as there was question made of the indemnitie of the thrice-sacred liberall arts , which all students of the lawes , to their intolerable costs and charges , and with vnspeakable toyle , labour and sweat , did waste and consume themselues to learne . at whose strange instances , apollo ( against the opinion of all the by-standers ) fell into a chafing passion , and with great indignation , answered those malapert doctors , that hee much wondred , how before his maiesties sacred presence , they had dared to affirme , that they spent , and laboured , and sweat so much to learne the sacred liberall arts , as if the delphick edict were not knowne to all the world , in which the studie of the lawes is especially declared to be no liberall science , but a base trade , and a mechanicall occupation , brought into the world for the affliction of mankinde , studied and plodded vpon without any delectation to the minde , without any speculation of the intellect , and without the so materially-needfull helpe of the soueraigne muses in all perfect and commendable sciences ; and only exercised for meere couetousnesse of lucre , to fatten with pelfe and crownes a peece of man with two gloting eies in his skonce , or a slouenly fellow , who although he be altogether void of that viuacitie of wit , which good and noble letters affect so much , neuerthelesse , to become an eminent aduocate , it sufficeth him to haue a blockish braine , a porter-like grosse complexion , a rusticall behauiour , and a clownish demeanour , fit rather to draw in a cart , than to conuerse with ciuill or learned men . an apothecarie , at the very instant , that he is taken prisoner by sergeants , without being examined at all , is forthwith condemned and sent to the gallies . rag. . part. the apothecarie that dwelt at the signe of the two crownes in the high mercerie-street , was foure daies since apprehended by the officers of the criminall court : and forsomuch as the poore wretch was suddenly hood-winkt , and muffled , and on mens shoulders carried to the hauen , and put into a gallie , all parnassus rested much amazed , to see the execution of that vnfortunate mans condemnation , foregoe the framing of his enditement . it is reported , that this hath hapned at the instant request of all the chiefe monarks of the vniuerse , now resident in this state , who thinke themselues offended to the quicke by that apothecarie , forsomuch as hee did openly sell fine smoake : a merchandise , which princes challenge and pretend to belong onely to them ; and that no priuate person whatsoeuer should dare to sell but they . some suppose , that by the example of that vnfortunate wretch they haue gone about to terrifie all others from troubling them in matters concerning their iurisdiction and prerogatiue . and although the shallow-headed and simple sort of people giue out , that the apothecaries fault deserued not so rigorous a resentment , yet those that will prie and thorowly diue into the secrets and interesses of great princes , affirme , that he hath very gently , and with much indulgence beene dealt withall . forsomuch as fine smoake , seruing princes ( in many and daily occasions ) in lieu of fine coyned gold , euery treasure of theirs ( though neuer so rich and great ) would soone be exhausted , whensoeuer that so currant money of fine smoake , losing its credit and esteeme among the vulgar sort of people ; princes should ere long bee enforced ( according to the plebeian fashion ) to pay their debts with ready money . the vertuous people of apollo's state hauing consigned vnto his maiesties generall treasurer the accustomed donatiue of a thousand conceits , according to their custome they beg a boone or grace at his hands . rag. . part. those that haue exact knowledge of the passages of this state , know full well that the vertuous of parnassus pay duly vnto the exchequer-chamber , not only the tenth part of the fruits of their wits , but the quit-rent taxed according to each mans talent : whence it is , that fertile ouid doth yearely pay vnto the publike receiuers eight elegies ; virgil fourescore printed heroicke verses ; horace fiue odes ; martiall eleuen epigrams ; and so others according to their sessment or taxation . besides that , the vertuous euery three yeares vnder the name of a donatiue or free gift ( yet such a donatiue , as if it be not paid with a genuine good will , without losing its modest name , it may be exacted , distrained , and leuied by bailiffs and sargeants , who may distraine goods , take pawnes , and sell them at port-sale ) pay into the delphick treasurie a million of conceits , which by the soueraigne muses are afterwards liberally distributed among those sillie literates and poore schollers , who being depriued of all munition , onely for the loue and good will they shew towards good letters , yeeld themselues worthy to bee releeued . and the custome is , that vpon the occasion of so large a donatiue , his maiestie is euer wont to counter-change the bounteous liberalitie of his vertuous with some sutes or fauours , which the learned may lawfully demand and challenge . so that the last weeke , after the collection of the donatiue , in a generall congregation , the vertuous concluded to beg six graces at apollo's hands , all which were set downe in a note or memoriall , that should be presented to him , when as the quaint classis or wittie forme of the politike-vertuous aduertised the congregation , that in the occasions of begging sutes , boones , or graces from princes for any merit a man may pretend , it was necessarie to auoid the error of demanding ouer many things at once , not only because the multitude of graces which sutors crau● , doe distaste and molest princes , who commonly are easily distasted vpon occasions to pay bonds or duties ; but because hee that beggeth pluralitie of requests , is commonly answered and satisfied with the slightest and worst of them : and therefore it would proue a wise resolution , in such a case , to bee very earnest and circumspect for the obtaining of one onely good sute . alwaies prouided it bee of good worth and consequence , and which without a note of much ingratitude may not be refused or denied by the prince . this aduertisement of the polititians , was by the generalitie of the vertuous , applauded , commended and followed . whereupon the very next day , there were sent vnto his maiestie the right excellent bernardino viperio , and tiberio serpentino , both aduocates for the vniuersitie of the vertuous , who hauing tendred and presented the donatiue vnto apollo , they most humbly besought him , that in prouiding of iudges for his tribunals , and of other officers for publike magistrates , he would be pleased to make choise of men of milde and gentle natures , of a courteous and affable genius , of a plausible disposition , of a meeke and lowly dexteritie , of easie accesse , of a quicke vnderstanding , of a nimble apprehension , of a temperate patience , of a tractable conuersation , and of a cheerfull aspect . and that it might stand with his good pleasure to send certaine eteroclit , irregular , arrogant , fantastick , wayward , peeuish , insolent , passionate , self-conceited , humorous , proud , giddie-headed , and fouly tainted animals , who with their vntuned , vnde●linable , vnsetled , and distempered calfe-braines put wretched sutors , and miserable clients into greater troubles , and more harmfull agonies , than the processes , or please themselues , and appoint them to be botesons , masters-mates , and auditors in the gallies , there to employ , and exercise their turbulent , seditious , litigious , mutinous , harsh , and quarrelous talent vpon the ging , swabbers , and rowing-slaues , which is , and proues so insupportable to free men . by letters intercepted , and taken from a currier , dispatched by some princes to the lake of auerno , the common people come to know , that the rancors and hatreds now raigning among diuers nations , are occasioned and stirred vp by the artifices of their princes . rag. . part. betweene the confines of pindo and libetrum , on monday night last , was an extraordinarie poste rob'd , whom certaine mighty princes had in great diligence dispatched towards the lake auerno . and forsomuch as the currier had no hurt done him in his bodie ; it is suspected , that the robbery hath beene committed to none other end , than to seize on his letters , as indeed it followed : for they onely tooke a packet from him , which he had about him , directed to the infernall furies , alecto , thesifon and megera , by which letters ( and truly with great scandall ) it hath beene disconered , that certaine princes doe wage and stipend the said furies , to the end , that not onely among diuers nations , but often among the subiects of one same prince , they may sowe and nourish perpetuall strifes , and neuer-ending discords . and to fill vp the measure of distastes , there was a letter found in the said packet , of ten thousand duckats , to bee paied them for the arrerages of six moneths past . the subiects of those princes , that haue written the letters , by their deputies haue caused them to be presented vnto apollo , to whom they haue grieuously exclaimed , and bitterly complained , that their princes , who ought vigilantly to heed nothing so much , as the perpetuall peace and vnanimous concord , not only of their owne particular subiects , but of all other nations besides , should with ready money purchase ●editions to others , and mischiefes to themselues . and that vntill now , they neuer came to the knowledge , how by the meere artifices , tricks , plots , and machinations of princes , those diuisions , factions , grudges , vnkindnesses , distasts , discords , and vnnaturall hatreds , were seene so to abound among diuers nations ; and to bee the source and root of those calamitous and infinite mischiefes , that so much oppresse and afflict mankinde . all outrages , excesses , abuses , and pollutions of that nature , as if they were once cleane rooted out of the world , men might securely enioy the comfort , to see the french loue the english , the spaniard affect the french , and the dutch embrace the italian , and see a perfect peace and good concord to follow betweene all men . whilst these deputies were thus discoursing , it was obserued that from apollo's eyes , through the great compunction of what he heard , there gushed forth abundance of sad teares . whereupon the by standers supposed verily , that his maiestie would in raging passion burst forth into some bitter termes against those princes , that were charged and accused of so hainous crimes , when thus he said : oh you my faithfull friends , your complaints are as grieuous , as they be true ; but know , that the enormities whereof you complaine , proceed not so much from the bad or waiward nature of princes , as they are occasioned by the turbulent humors and seditious deuises of the peeuish people , who with their sicklenesse and instabilitie doe so worke , as it is impossible to purchase and obtaine the vniuersall peace of mankind with any other instrument , than with sowing those discords , diuisions , seditions , and factions among nations , whereof you so much , and so grieuously complaine : for long experience hath made princes to know , that the huge and vnweldie machine of raigning securely , is all built and reared vpon the firme foundation of equally-contributing and iustly-distributing . and it is a thing most manifest , that the people without princes to sway and gouerne them , would of themselues precipitate into more cruell seditions and bloudy quarrels , than those , which for the publike peace , and generall good of all , others sowe and breed among them . all mischiefs ( oh you my most beloued ) very necessarie . although it grieuously grieueth mee to see , that the infirmitie of those vniuersall iarrings , and discords , which now reigne in mankinde cannot be cured with any more soueraigne remedy , and ready antidote , than with the bitter medicine , which you say is now so nastie vnto you . antonio perez of aragon , hauing presented the booke of his relations vnto apollo , his maiesty doth not onely refuse to accept it , but commandeth the same to be presently burnt . rag. . . part. antonio perez , whilom principall secretary to the most mighty king of spaine , philip the second , knowing the bad opinion that that secretary purchaseth vnto himselfe among all nations , who with distaste parteth from his prince ; within a while after he had recouered himselfe in france , for his owne discharge , published vnto the world those his vnhappy relations , which haue so heauily laden him with infamy and blame . for , whilest he with all manner of art and skill should haue procured to conceale them , vpon thursday morning last , dared to present them to apollo ; who , as soone as hee saw the booke , and was informed of the contents thereof , fell into such indignation against him , that euen then hee caused the same to be burnt in the publike & chiefe market-place , and said vnto perez , that he had giuen vnto his relations that place in parnassus which he and they deserued . and that to the end other secretaries , his equals , might take example , and learne to preferre secrecie , and faithfulnesse of silence before the charity to ones proper life itselfe ; yea , and before the loue of a mans owne selfe : for , euen as he deserueth the name of a treacherous and proditorious villaine , that vpon any casuall distaste , or conceiued vnkindnesse , reuealeth the secrets committed to his trust in times of former friendship ; so a thousand times most shamefull , infamous , and euer to bee detested is that secretary , who for whatsoeuer hard vsage he may haue receiued from his prince , publisheth those secrets which by his lord and master haue beene imparted vnto him in forepassed confidence , not onely voluntarily , much lesse by any kinde of cruell racke or sharpe torture , ought neuer to be published or disclosed to any creature whatsoeuer . the monarchie of spaine is much agrieued , that her falshoods and treacheries are discouered . rag. . part. it is not yet well knowne , whether it were by chance , or by the malice of some frenchmen , or ( as many haue vehemently suspected ) by the machination of that nation , which is so implacable an enemy vnto the french , some few yeares since , a fire tooke hold of the royall palace of the monarchie of france ; and so great was the flame , and so dreadfull the blaze , that the neighbouring monarchies entred into feareful suspition , that so huge a fire could hardly be quenched , but with the ruine of their states : so that euery man , for the safety of his owne , ranne speedily to quench the fire in an others house . the english , albeit naturall enemies vnto the french , with all diligence brought thither the waters of their thames . the germanes , those of mose and rhine . the venetians did in a manner empty all their fennes and marishes . the prudent dukes of tuscanie , in great haste ran with all sorts of weapons , to helpe to extinguish that consuming flame , which wise men greatly feared , was likely to end in an vniuersall desolation . and truely it was wondrous strange to see that the monarchy of spaine , knowne to be so deadly an enemy vnto the french , shee also among the chiefe friends of france laboured with might and maine to extinquish that fire , at which most men supposed , that she would rather run merily to warme her selfe , whereat all men stood amazed , especially when they saw , that shee with all solicitude , and externall charity brought vnto it , not onely the waters of her golden tagus and iberus , but also of the vast ocean , of which when the english and the hollanders please , shee is absolute mistris . since those politicians sinisterly interpreting the spaniards charity , declared publikely , that it was a most pernicious thing in the necessities of the french , to admit the aides of those spaniards , who being knowne to be eternall foes , & capitall enemies vnto france , ought rather to be esteemed the architects of the vtter ruine of the french , than zealous of the greatnesse and prosperitie of their kingdome : as they who measuring all the actions and proceedings of those which reigne among princes , by the onely compasse of priuate interesse , doe seldome admit any manner of piety towards god , much lesse of charity towards men . and so much the more were such polititians become abominable to most nations , as it manifestly appeares , that the spaniards in their forwardnesse , diligence , and charity , to bring water vnto that fire , did not equall onely , but exceed whatsoeuer best friend vnto the french. and that which increased the wonder , and that among the simpler sort , caused great reputation vnto the monarchy of spaine , was , that flanders and austria her ancient patrimonies , burning in a most cruell combustion of warre , she had preferred the welfare and safety of the french , before the charity of her owne preseruation . but for so much as no humane endeuour , nor store of water was sufficient to quench the least sparkle of so frightfull a fire : and that notwithstanding all the diligence and remedies that were vsed , the deuouring flames of those most fierce and bloody ciuill warres , increasing daily more and more , the wel-meaning and best affected simpler sort of men began to listen vnto the polititians aduertisements , and to suspect , that the charity of the spanish monarchy was altogether priuate interesse , and peculiar spanish charity ; which made them resolue , no longer to giue credit vnto outward apparences , but inwardly to view what matter the spaniards brought in their caske , and found , that in lieu of water to quench fire , they had filled them with pitch , tarre , rosen , oile , and turpentine , and also with diabolicall dissentions to foment and increase the same . which treachery was likewise found to bee fauoured by certaine french barons , who more than others professing to bee charitable , made vse both of the barrels , and of the matter lent them by the spaniards . whereupon they were by the iust disdaine of the french monarchy presently put to death , and burnt in the very same flames , which with so great sedition , and treacherous infidelitie , they nourished in the heart of their owne countrey . and the spaniards were not only chased from that worke , but by sound of trumpet publikely proclaimed to be a company of false hearted hypocrites . and by an especiall edict of the french monarchy , all men were giuen to vnderstand , that if euer there were any man found that would beleeue , that any sparke of charity towards the french could lodge in the breast of a spaniard , he should be held , esteemed , and reputed an egregious gull. and that if after the first warning he should persist in his errour , he should be tossed in a blanket , as a factious and seditious fellow . it was a thing worthy of admiration to see , that so soone as the spaniards and the foresaid vnnaturall french gaue ouer their worke , that fire which before was so great , that the most iudicious doe affirme , it was in all humane reason inextinguible , on a sudden ceased of it selfe : whereupon the eternall and farre renowmed flower de luces , whilom so hurried and trampled vnder foot , sprung vp againe , more gloriously flourishing and resplendent than euer they were . and france , which through the immoderate ambition of some turbulent spirits , had most barbarously bin tormented and molested more than full forty years , to the great wonderment of all , in the twinkling of an eye became quiet and in peace . whereby all the world came to know , that the spaniards had beene the first authors of that euer deplorable french combustion , which they vnder most specious shewes and pretences of religion , and christian charity , had laboured to make the world beleeue that they sought to quench . some report that the spanish monarchy vpon this retired her selfe into her royall palace , and that for many daies , shee would not admit any body to see her , hauing giuen her selfe ouer vnto so great melancholy , that with floods of teares trilling downe her blubred cheeks , shee loudly exclaimed , that shee would much rather haue lost two of her best kingdomes , than to see those her holy and hypocriticall pretexts so scoft at , so derided , and so laid open to all the world , wherewith she remembred to haue diuers times ( to her infinite profit ) sold vnto the world most stinking assa-fetid● , in stead of muske , ziuet , and amber-greece : it seeming vnto her to be depriued of her richest treasure , and to haue lost her inexhaust mynes of gold and siluer in peru , yea , and of the new world besides , seeing her selfe so vnluckily depriued of the hope and benefit , to be at any time more able to depaint vnto the silly credulous people , white for blacke , or chalke for cheese ; deeming it a very hard case to see herselfe brought vnto the wretched and dreadfull condition , in which she hath euer seene the french , to be inforced to purchase kingdomes and dominions with the onely force of the point and dint of the sword ; and not as heretofore she hath done with the onely semblances of her false-holy pretexts , which haue sometimes stood her in stead of flourishing and strong armies . she knowes that she hath put the world into combustion , and hath euer loued to fish in troubled waters . and it grieueth her beyond measure , that she hath so lost the good opinion of most nations , that shee is in some danger that none will hereafter beleeue her though she chance to speake the truth ; whereas heretofore the stimulation of false pretexts , and of most apparent hypocrisie were held in credit , and in lieu of thrice sacred verity , most absolute zeale and perfect deuotion . the spanish monarchie arriueth in parnassus , she intreateth apollo to be cured of a cauterie : shee is dismissed by the politike physitians . rag. . part. it is now foure months since the renowmed maiestie of spain ariued at this court , vnto whom apollo forthwith assigned a day for her puklike & solemn entrance , which by the consent of the whole consistory of the learned , was appointed to be in the royal audience chamber , in the presence , and with the assistance of the soueraigne muses : which solemnity ( for some vrgent occasions ) was not performed but two daies since . the reason is , because she hath spent the full time of foure moneths in consultation with the poet princes , about the titles which shee should mutually giue and receiue from others ; as also in agreeing about the manner how to receiue them , and how they would receiue her in their reciprocall visitations . the consideration whereof hath made all the vertuous of this colledge , to stand amazed , and bitterly to bewaile the hard condition of these moderne times , infected with the contagion of so many complemental vanities . and the grieuances of the vertuous were so much the more increased , for so much as diuers learned princes openly refused to bee visited by that great queene , saying , that they feared to receiue some insult or affront from her , for they had lately receiued letters from italy , wherein they were by their louing friends forewarned to be circumspect , and vigilantly stand vpon their guard , it being peculiar vnto the spaniards to goe visit others , with intention rather to iniu●y than to honour them . and that they thought it an egregious folly , in lieu of auoiding of affronts abroad , to expect them with bended knees and cap in hand at home in their owne houses . and although that so potent a monarchie ( to the great admiration of all ) hath shewed her selfe much more nigardly , in giuing others satisfaction of titles , than in distributing of her duckats , shee hath notwithstanding receiued from these poet princes , and from all vertuous potentates ( who concerning this titular circumstance , stand rather vpon reall substance than on the vanity of things ) the greatest gust and contentment she could desire . true it is , that one thing hath much empaired the reputation of so great a queene in this court , which is , that albeit shee stand in extreme need of trusty friends , shee neuerthelesse sheweth herselfe so procliue and foreward to alienate those from her , who expect for nothing at her hands but satisfaction in words . yea , some haue noted ( as a remarkable thing ) that the master of the ceremonies hath forewarned her maiestie , that those precise punctilio● shee so nicely stands vpon , are most odious , and onely proper to barbarous kings , and right worthy her royall maiestie . and that a great queen in europe , her equall , hath in great passion and anger plainly told him to his teeth , that she much maruelled both at him and all his ceremonials , since hee seemed not to know , how a prince without grauity and state , may rightly be compared to a peacocke without a traine . it is impossible to set downe with what longing curiosity and earnest desire , so renowmed a princesse hath bin expected by all the learned of this court : for , from the vtmost bounds of all apollo's dominions , an infinite number of all sorts and sexes , haue flocked hither to view the countenance of that mightie queene , who with a prodigious stream of happines , hath in short time vnited & brought vnder her diuers potent kingdoms , and with them framed an empire so formidable , that there is no prince in the known vniuerse , but for feare & suspition of her , hath at some time or other bin driuen to put on a lacket of maile , or a cuirace of steele . this queene not many moneths since , attended on by a numberlesse fleet , with prosperous nauigation , arriued safely in the isle of lesbos : and the most honourable ladie the republike of genoa , hath gratis lent her her most famous port , although by reason of a certaine ancient prerogatiue , the family of the dorias draw a very great reuenue out of it . the spanish monarchie , in comparison of that of france , of england , and of other ancient monarchies of europe , is but yong in yeares , but in body and bulke far bigger than any other whatsoeuer : and to the proportion of her yeares , she is of an vnmeasurable greatnesse , whereby it is argued , that if she continue to grow vnto that age in which humane bodies are wont to receiue increase and growth , shee will prooue an huge giantesse , and attaine to that boundlesse height of vniuersall monarchies , vnto which the romane monarchie came . but he accidents of matters , and secrets of state , affirme most assuredly , that she cannot grow much greater . and that in her tendrest yeares shee is sprung vp vnto that height of bodie , vnto which shee may in any long time attaine : which is euidently perceiued by this infallible argument , that in these daies , shee groweth but halfe an inch with greater difficultie than in former times she did two handfull . this potent lady is of so swarthy an hue , that shee drawes neere vnto the moore or affrican . and therefore are her comporiments rather disdainfull and proud , than serious and graue and in all her actions she sheweth her selfe more cruell than seuere . and for as much as she could yet neuer learne the art so necessary vnto princes , to pardon , it is the vndoubted opinion of many , that it will proue some hindrance to her greatnesse : for glorying in nothing more , than to be called the doctoresse of all nations , in the science to be implacably-resolute , in knowing how to cut off the tops of those haughtie and luxurian poppies , which in the gardens of her states doe proudly ouertop others , she greatly reioyceth that it be said , how in this art , she hath excelled that great tarquinius , that was the first inuentor of so mysterious a secret . she being then so hardie and resolute in committing of seuerities , she is much perplexed in conferring of fauours , which are seldome seene to proceed from her . and those few that she bestoweth come from her with such an imperious haughtinesse , that they are not very acceptable . and yet in exterior semblance shee is all affabilitie , and wholly spends herselfe in complements . but he that with the spectacles of state-policie can prie into the inmost of her heart , shall easily perceiue , that shee is all pride , all auarice , all crueltie . so that all they that haue any long time treated or negotiated with her , report , that none receiue from any other princes more milde-honied words , and more bitter deeds . whence it is , that as a friend she doth greatly allure men , and as a mistris much insult vpon , and terrifie them . her hands are beyond all due proportion long , which shee extendeth farre and neere , as occasions serue , without distinguishing of friends from foes , or stranger from kinsman . her nailes are like an harpies , and most griping . her fingers are of so hard and fast-hold , that what once comes into her clutches , shee neuer lets goe againe . her eyes are blacke , and a most sharpe piercing sight . her looke is squint , with which wishly beholding one , she fixedly looketh vpon another . a thing of great danger vnto princes ; for of late daies , hauing bent her face towards algiers , no man suspecting it , she had earnestly fixed her looke towards marseilles . in her eyes is plainly discouered a most greedy and insatiate desire , since that there is nothing that shee fixeth them vpon , but shee most greedily wisheth and coueteth the same with all her heart , and that 's the reason , that our obseruing speculants say , that this queene doth immoderately thirst after others goods , and that as yet she neuer had friend , but with her tricks , and wilie-beguilies , she hath in the end made her slaue . all which things discouer plainly vnto the world , that she is rather fit to gouerne slaues than free men . for there is no other princesse whatsoeuer , that more ambitiously laboureth to ingrosse and forestall all seruice into her hands , not onely from her owne subiects , but from her best friends . she obserues so punctuall a forme of state , that she doth not so much as vouchsafe to goe meet good occasions , which infinite times haue sought her in her owne house . she farre excelleth all other queenes , both present and past in knowing , how vnder her rich robe of cloth of gold to paliate her priuate interesse , be it neuer so diabolicall . and although she be daily seene to commit most damnable actions , she makes no greater ostentation of any thing than of her conscience ; whereby the french , who vnder colour of her holy and religious pretexts , haue so often beene ouer-reached , haue at last ( to their no small cost ) learn'd to arme themselues , and to get on horsebacke , when with a crowne in her hand , they see her propose , or treat affaires full of religious pretexts , and sacred charitie , towards her best beloued neighbours . she is so cunning in the exercise of riding , that she hath not onely successefully tamed and broken the generous coursers of naples , but also the rough and skittish mules of spaine , which by a naturall instinct are wont to kick , to whinze , and bite at all men . she is of all other queenes of so mistrustfull a genius , that , except her owne nation , she hath declared all others ( though subiect vnto her ) to be of no confidence , albeit she haue diuers times , and in all occasions found them right trustie and faithfull ; which point is so preiudiciall vnto her , that the most skilfull in the worlds affaires , doe probably conclude , that by reason of this one most important defect , it is impossible she should grow bigger . the reason is , because there is no other queene , that careth lesse to be beloued of her people , than she , and that endeuoureth more to be feared . and therefore doe our polititians note this in her as a kinde of notorious follie , that shee confidently beleeueth , that with misusing and hurring all men , shee shall induce them to adore her , and with such hatefull deportments , allure all nations to serue her : for the great store of her treasures , is the forcible adamant , which violently attracts vnto it the mindes of some , who vtterly abhorring her , are bound to seeke , and by all meanes procure her declination . she is most curious and accurate in matters of small moment , whereas in weighty and important affaires , no other queene hath more easily suffered herselfe to be supplanted and ouer-reached . in her discourses , and in resoluing of most important businesses , she sheweth admirable wisdome , and circumspection ; but whether it be through her naturall tarditie , or artifice of her officers , who are all most greedy merchants of great negotiations ; or because she is of opinion , that no resolution is done with decorum , that is not long a doing , and with tedious delayes expected of all men . shee executeth her determined resolutions with such slownesse , that the face of affaires changing with the times , her resolutions determined with great wisdome , doe often proue vnhappy . and therefore doe all conclude , that shee is more couragious in the skill of plotting machinations , than in the exercise how to manage armes , in which she sheweth to haue an vndanted heart , a resolute constancie , and an vnspeakable sufferance of all crosses and inconueniences ; but so weake in resolutions , that her extraordinarie circumspection hath many times the semblance of timiditie . whence it followeth , that shee seemeth more apt to maintaine states , than to acquire them . diuers notable men laugh at her , to see her addresse and gouerne all her actions by the compasse of certaine solid and mature counsels , without euer referring them into the hands of that fate or chance , which hath so greatly fauoured the french , and yeelded them so glorious , when in their actions and managements , they haue gouerned themselues with much valour and little braine . there be some that thinke this hapneth , onely because she is as sparing of her owne bloud , as she is thirstie and insatiate of other mens . and therefore doe the expertest captaines of warre mocke and gibe at her , to see her aspire at the empirie of the whole vniuerse without euer fighting . the reason whereof is , because this most potent queene , being of long time accustomed to purchase great estates by alliances and mariages , she abhorreth the dreadfull custome of the french , to conquer kingdoms with the price and hazard of their owne dearest bloud . she being then more wittily-warie than boldly couragious , it followeth , that she is more mischieuous vnto her enemies in times of peace , than warre : whence it is , that the french , who hitherto haue liued with her in a supine or stupid carelesnesse , after so many calamities endured , haue at last learnt to double the barres of their doores , when they haue concluded peace with the spaniards . she is most carelesse and lauish of her owne riches , but so greedy of other mens , that shee careth not to desolate her patrimoniall estates , so shee may make conquest of others . she is of so secret and hidden thoughts , and of a minde so abstruse and vnsearchable , that there is no wit , artifice , or skill of man able to looke into her drifts . nay , linx himselfe with his through-piercing sight , cannot penetrate into them , no not so much as the outside of them : whereas men of a glimmering or short sight , may plainly see into the very bowels of the french and other nations . for he that shall with with iudgement goe about to describe the genius and customes of so great a princesse , must confidently beleeue , that in all the managements she hath in hand , and in all the affaires that others negotiate with her , shee is inwardly cleane contrary to that shee appeareth without . and although that among the foresaid vertues , shee be full fraught with so enormous vices , notwithstanding by reason of her prodigious fortune , all of them are interpreted and admired in her as vertues , whence it followeth , that diuers great princes take it as an honour to imitate her in her vices . she is of a most sturdie and robust complexion , whereby all iudge her to be long-liued . she onely languisheth of the indisposition , to haue her limbs much distracted , which doth much debilitate the forces of so huge a bulke . and although that with the helpe of the libertie of genoa , and of the alliance shee hath with the duke of sauoy , shee vseth diuers meanes and artifices to contract them ; neuerthelesse by reason of the diuersitie of the interesses of these potentates , she makes no great vse of them . this mighty princesse receiueth no greater damage from any , than from her chiefe spanish officers , whom alone she imployeth in great charges , all which are by them exercised with such , and intolerable surquedrie , as they will not onely be honoured as men , but adored as gods. an impertinencie so great , as it hath stirred vp a loathing , and nastinesse of the spanish dominion , not onely in the italians , and in the flemmings , but in the spaniards themselues . one thing hath caused great wonderment in all that behold so potent a queene , which is , that her whole bodie is full of horse leeches ( for the most part of genoa ) some of which are so big and fat , as they appeare to be of those great ecles that come out of holland , or those big lampreis that breed in seuerne it is not knowne whether it be through impotencie , or negligence , or through a destinie fatall vnto great princes , whose vitall bloud these noysome creatures seeke euermore to sucke , that shee endeuours not to shake them off , and be freed from them . this most mighty queene then , being entred into the royall palace before apollos imperiall maiestie , stretched forth her left arme , causing her seruants to vnswathe the same , and so naked , shewing it vnto apollo , and to the whole sacred colledge of the learned , she thus bespake . imperiall sir , and gratious father of all good letters : this which your maiestie seeth ; yea euen this is that stinking cauterie , and loathsome issue of flanders , which the french , the germanes , and some italian princes , that now friendly faune vpon me , together with the helpe of that formidable virago , and transmarine renegada made in this mine arme , for the distrust or suspition they had of me . i acknowledge that the princes forenamed had iust cause to be iealous of my power , when after the death of henry the second , they saw france falne into the wretched calamitie of infant-kings , and that i , in their minoritie , sought to sowe discords in that goodly kingdome . now that these suspitions are vanished , and that ( ay me , why doe i not blush to speake it ? ) the contention , which i haue had with the french , and particularly with that vndanted limbe of the deuill , the prince of bearne , is now ended , and that i haue at last beene condemned my selfe in all costs and charges : my humble request vnto your maiestie is , that this grieuous and fasheux cau●erie be healed , and closed vp . for most men are of opinion , that for the infinite number of humors , that haue runne vnto it , it is now become so festred and enraged a cankre , as i feare ( which god a●ert ) it will proue the losse of my arme . i did not passe into italie through mine owne ambition , or vnquenchable thirst , wholly to sway the same , as mine enemies report . it is well knowne to all the world , that i was vntimely called thereunto , and euen haled vnto it by the princes of italie themselues , to free them from the great feare they were in of the french. and there is no man liuing in europe , but knowes how that in the states that i possesse in italie , i imploy so large a share of my stock and free-hold , as they rather serue to further my weaknesse , and keepe me still oppressed . and thrice-happy were my spanish home , which i might ere now haue couered with tiles of pure siluer , and states of massie gold , had i neuer had intelligence , or dealings with the italian nation , so double-hearted , so full of fallacies , so anxious of priuate interesses , and onely good to embarke her neighbours into dangerous affaires without bisket ; and then vpon the least occasion , shake them off , and leaue them in the lurch , or in the midst of their greatest danger ; as shee , that openly professeth the tricke and skill to plucke creuises out of their holes with others hands , and not with her owne . and i haue often wondred , how italie , which ( as all the world knowes ) hath suffred herselfe to be broken , sadled , and backt , and ridden by all strange nations , will now stand vpon such nice punctillios of chastitie with me , who if she but see me stirre ( be it neuer so little ) shee presently entreth into suspition , that i goe about to rauish her of her honour and liberty . and howbeit , the greatnesse wherein the kingdome of france doth now finde it selfe , may assure italie , and all the forenamed princes from the feare they haue conceiued of my power ; i am neuerthelesse ( if it bee your maiesties pleasure ) ready to giue all men good caution and surety de non offendendo : on condition , that this to me so loathsome and irksome issue be healed and closed vp . by the expresse appointment of his maiestie , the cauterie was with all diligence viewed and considered by the politike physitians , who after long and mature consultation of the whole colledge of them , they vnanimously concluded , that it most euidently appearing , that the spanish monarchy is continually troubled with an vncessant thirst , to sway and dominere , she stands in need of that running issue , by which those grosse and peccant humors , which from peru distill into her stomacke , may be purged and euacuated ; for they are the cause of her vnquenchable and hydropicall thirst . those excellent physitians did likewise consider , that if the said monarchie had not that cauterie , there were most euident danger , that the pernicious humors of peru , might ascend into the head of italie , to the manifest ruine of those principall members , which yet are left sound in her ; and that the said monarchie of spaine might easily fall into an incurable dropsie of an vniuersall monarchie ; against which dangerous inconueniences they affirmed , there is good prouision made with the cauterie of the low countries , which ought to be kept open , so long as peru ( so stirring a member ) doth subminister those pernicious humors vnto the spanish monarchie . this resolution did mightily displease her , wherefore in great passion and perturbation of minde , thus she brake forth : sir , if through the spight and malignitie of others , i must so fouly languish and consume my selfe in continuall prouiding and applying vnguent for this corroding cankre , which mine enemies call a diuertiue font●ell , some , who haply thinke least of it , shall lay clouts and plaisters vnto it . her quip was presently vnderstood by the english , by the french , and by the italians , who replied , that they nor feared , nor doubted of any thing ; since they sent nothing into the low countries , but the garbage , the offals , the filths and sweepings of their states ; whereas the spaniards did there waste pure gold and consume vitall bloud . and therefore , both the english , the french , and the germanes , to arme and secure themselues from the formidable power , boundlesse ambition , and secret machinations of the spaniards , who haue no horizon , were forced , in conformitie of the aphorisme or the politike hippocrates , tacitus , consilijs , & estures externas moliri arma procul habere . the spanish monarchie goeth to the oracle of delphos , to know whether shee shall euer obtaine the monarchie of the world ; she hath a crosse answer . rag. . part. yester day morning , two houres before day , the renowmed monarchie of spaine , in great secrecie departed from parnassus , in a caroch with six horses , hauing taken but a few followers & confederates of her court to art end her . her departure hath ministred no small iealousie in all this dominion , but more especially in the monarchie of france , who was much moued thereat . and to finde out what way she had taken , presently tooke post , and following her tracts , ouertooke her euen as she arriued in delphos before the oracle of apollo ; vnto whom the spanish monarchie presenting herselfe ( as they report that were present ) she proposed this question . oh eternall and bright lampe of the world , the right eye of heauen , who art the bringer not onely of the day , but of all goodnesse vnto mankinde . thou knowest that long since , all my thoughts haue bin addressed vnto that vniuersall monarchie , vnto which none euer attained but the romane people . thou knowest the effusion of blood , and the prosusion of treasures that i haue caused and spent , to reach vnto the goale of my intention . thou only knowest the teilsome vigils , the bloody sweats , the industrious practises that i haue spent , suffered , and plotted , to come vnto so important a designe . thou likewise knowest , that by the indefatigable dexterity of my wit , by the mighty vertue of my coyne , and by the marchlesse valour of my nation , i did not many years since sow so infinite seditions , and raised so turbalent warres in the very heart of france , on which i had laid the foundation of all my hopes , i had well nigh obtained the wished end of mine intention : and how for a finall conquest of all lets and rubs i wanted but the meanes to vnite naples vnto milane : which difficultie if i can once surmount , i may boldly vaunt to haue wonne the game . but since either by my fatall misfortune , or by the impossibility of the businesse , or by the power of so many cruell enemies that are risen vp against me , the scandals of the reuolutions , which with so many machinations , for the space of so long time , i had dispersed among the french , whom i could yet neuer vanquish , are in one onely day conuerted into that peace and tranquility , that my heart is aggrieued to see , and my minde abhorreth to remember ; as loath to make an vtter hauocke of so many of my people i entended to employ in this enterprise , i haue almost brought them vnto a finall desolation . and because i would no longer bee a laughing stocke vnto the world , i here prostrate my selfe before thy sacred maiestie , most submissiuely beseeching thee to giue me a direct answer , whether that vniuersall monarchy which i haue so deeply riuetted in my heart , and which is the onely ayme of all my actions , is by the will of heauens destinated vnto me ; which i desire to know , to the end if there bee no impossibility in the pursuit thereof , i may rouze vp my spirits , and by the possibility of it , keepe my spaniards in heart . for , to tell thee the very truth , who pryest into the secretest thoughts of all men both by sea and land ; by the infinitenesse of conspiracies , of counter-mines , and of complots , that by mine implacable enemies haue bin plotted and contriued against me , and now more than euer are practised to my detriment , i begin to faint and dispaire of any good successe . at this exorbitant question the temple did shake , and the earth trembled round about a great distance off , when from the mouthof the minister of apollo proceeded these words . the vniuersall monarchie shall againe returne to the farre renowmed italian nation , at what time it shall haue banished those intestine iarres , and ciuill discords which haue brought her in bondage to forraigne and strange nations . after so dolefull an answer , the spanish monarchie , full of spight and anguish came forth of the temple , but confounded with amazement when shee saw the monarchy of france present her selfe before her , whom ( hauing first entertained with some ordinary complements ) shee tooke by the hand , drew her apart , and friendly imparted vnto her the answer that the oracle had giuen her . and how the vniuersall monarchie was by diuine prouidence like to return vnto the italian nation ; which thing succeeding , france should finde and feele new iulius caesars , as spaine second scipioes . and that to secure and settle their affaires , shee thought there was no better way than to share and diuide italy equally betweene them . moreouer she offered to teach her the secret that she most successefully had experimented in the indies , by vertue of which , they might both assure themselues of the italian nation , in such sort as there should no memorie be left in the world of so wicked a race of men but the bare name . vnto whom the french monarchie framed this answer ; oh spaine , first suffer me to forget that most vnfortunate diuision of the kingdome of naples , which my king lewis the twelfth made with thee , and then we will confer of this matter . for , know spaine , it is not so easie a thing to consen and iniurie the french the second time , as i see you perswade your selfe . then as touching the secret you propose vnto mee , how wee may assure our selues of the italians , i pray you doe you attempt it and put the same in execution , since to desart and desolate the world of people ( as you haue done and practised in the indies ) and to dominere ouer a bare land void of inhabitants , is a certaine politicke precept that is not found in the register of the french reason of state. for , i haue ( and that to mine owne cost ) learnt to bee contented with a little so it be good . and therefore doe i found my greatnesse more on the multitude of good subiects , than on the wide extent of a kingdome . and so that my french nation may liue at ease and commodiously in this world , i am well pleased to admit of other nations therein . the negotiation of the concord of italy is long and tedious ; and you know by good experience , that purges giuen to assure a man from a disease he feareth , do many times hasten the same . i will not omit with the genuine liberty , that is proper to my nature , confidently to tell you , how that the enterprize to subdue all italy , is not so easie a taske as i perceiue you apprehend to your selfe . for , when i had such toyes in my head , which to me proued most pernicious , and i verily beleeue will proue no better to you , i thought as you thinke now : and i haue manifestly discouered , that the italians are a kinde of creatures that are euer more warily vigilant how to escape our hands , and who can neuer bee tamed , or brought vnder the yoake of strangers bondage . and although as most subtle apes , and crafty monkies , they easily transforme themselues into the customes and fashions of those nations that sway them , yet doe they euer keepe fixed in their hearts their ancient malice and hatred . they are great merchants of their seruitude , which they trafficke and trucke so cunningly , that if they but once put on a paire of breeches after the cut of madrill , they will induce you to beleeue that they are become true and perfect spaniards ; and if they weare but a great folio ruffe of cambricke , we presently thinke them to bee turned into right french-men . but come once to the close or vpshot of any businesse with them , they will then shew you more teeth than can be found in fifty bundles of handsawes , or a thousand combes . and italy doth iustly resemble those greedy and couetous dames , who with the strong and sharpe lye of their blandishments scald their vnheedy louers , but neuer let them come to the iouissance and fruition of that which they most desire . and therefore beleeue me ( who haue to my no small cost made tryall of it ) concerning the conquest of italy , you shall in the end reape nothing but losse and shame . philip the second of that name , king of spaine , after long strife about his title , makes his solemne entrie into parnassus . rag. . part. the most mighty king of spaine , philip the second , who ( two moneths since ) arriued in this court , could not before yesterday bee admitted to make his publike and solemne entrance . the reason hath bin , because that in certaine triumphant pageants which the spanish nation hath with royall magnificence erected vnto him , there were fairely written , these words ; philippo secundo hispaniarum ; vtriusque siciliae , & indiarum regi catholico , italiae pacis auctorifoelicissimo . which words , for so much as they were somewhat distastfull vnto most of the italian princes , they instantly required that they might be cancelled and blotted out , saying , that ( vpon no tearms ) they would neuer acknowledge that peace of italy from the spaniards , which themselues so dearly , and with such vast summes of ready money purchased of the hollanders and zelanders . this aromaticall contestation was long debated and canuast to and fro . and although the italian princes did concludingly prooue in iudgment , that the present peace of italy did not directly proceed from any well-meaning sincerity of the spaniards , who if they might haue had their wils , would haue enthralled the same , had not that great diuersion bin made to them , but ought wholly to be acknowledged from the warres in the low-countries . now in the greatest heat of this controuersie , the queene of italy , with her wonted wisdome , interposing her selfe , appeased the same , who hauing conuoked all her princes , she exhorted them to leaue all vaine ostentations and spungy vauntings vnto the spaniards , and meditating on reall and substantiall subiects , continue to feed them with vapourous smoke . the horse-troope , both for the quality and number of the princes that concurred to fauour , to court , to attend , and to serue so great a king , was the most numerous and the most honourable that euer was seene in parnassus . so was this mighty king ranked among those monarchs , which in the world haue bin more famous for their wisdome and sagacity , than for their courage or valour in warre . moreouer , the impresa which hee caried in his royall standard made all the learned of this court to wonder , which was a faire painted writing-pen , by vertue of which it did euidently appeare by the testimony of some historians , that both in the most potent kingdome of france and elsewhere , where any fit occasion had beene offered vnto him to make vse of it , hee had caused and stirred vp more and greater ruines , spoiles , rapines , wracks , and hauocks , than euer his father charles the fift could cause or effect with the greatest part of the cannons of europe . the impresa was highly commended by the sacred colledge of the vertuous : all writers taking it for a great honour vnto themselues ; that a pen in the hand of one that had knowne how to vse it , had archieued and effected so memorable and remarkable actions . this great king hath still bin most royally entertained in parnassus ; for , euen the chiefe and most eminent monarkes in europe haue held it as an honourable reputation , to be able to attend and serue him . so that euen the next day after his ingresse into this dominion , being disposed to be trimmed , & to commit himselfe into the hands of a barber , the great queene of england disdained not all the while to hold the bason vnder his chinne . and the most renowmed martiall king of france , henry the fourth , surnamed the great , tooke it for a matchlesse glory to himselfe to be admitted to wash his head , which hee performed with so exquisite skill and artificiall dexterity , as he seemed to bee borne in that exercise , and brought vp prentise in that trade . although some enuious detractors haue giuen out , that he did it without any sope or washing-ball , but with strong scalding lye alone . this mighty monarke hath bin presented by all the vertuous of parnassus , with diuers gifts of poetrie , and other quaint and much elabourated poems , all which hee hath counterchanged with great liberality , and bounty . and to a certaine learned man who presented him with an excellent discourse , wherein was demonstrated the way and meanes , how , and in what manner most noble partenope , and all the most flourishing kingdome of naples , which by the vnsufferable outrages of the soldiers , by the robberies of the iudges , by the tyrannous extortions of the barons , and by the general rapins and ransakings , which the griping and greedy vice-royes that from spain are sent thither , onely to cram and fatten themselues , is now brought vnto extreme misery and desolation , might be restored vnto the ancient greatnesse of its splendor , he gaue a reward of twenty duckats of gold , and consigned the said discourse vnto his confessour , commanding him to keepe it safe , for that it was written very honestly and religiously ; whereas vnto a most cunning and sufficient politician , who deliuered him a very long treatise , but altogether contrary to the first , as that which treateth of politicke precepts , and sheweth what course is to bee held to depresse and afflict the said kingdome of naples , lower and more than now it is . and how it may with facility bee reduced vnto such misery and calamity , as that generous courcer which the seggio of state , without any headstall or saddle , hath hitherto ( with no happy successe ) borne for an impresse or recognisance , may bee compelled patiently to beare a pack-saddle or panier , to cary any heauy packe or burden ; yea , and to draw in a cart. for so much as hee was informed that it was iudiciously compiled , and according to the right tearmes of moderne policy , hee assigned a gift of twelue thousand crownes rent a yeare , and moreouer made him a grand of spaine . the dogs of the indies are become wolues . rag. . . part. on the night of the twelfth of this present , about eight of the clocke , arriued in post-haste a curtier dispatched from lisbone vnto apollo , who told his maiestie , that he had brought him most important newes from the west-indies . the next morning very early , all the learned ran to the court , to heare some newes . and the spaniards were the first , who with great anxietie inquired , whether there had lately beene discouered some other mount of petofis , or a new rio del plata in the indies , which if it were , they would speedily haste thither , to plant the holy word of god. the french were very importunate to know , whether some new world had beene found our , which with making the spaniards more powerfull , might helpe them vtterly to subuert the old-one . apollo had no sooner read the letters , but he fell into a ●●ance of sorrow ; and hauing inuolued himselfe into a ●oggie mist , a shower of abundant brackish teares was seene to trickle downe his cheeks ; which was taken for a most disastrous presage : by which sudden alteration , all men iudged , that the post had brought very bad newes . now whilest all the court was full of all sorts of learned and vertuous men , who in great anxietie longed to vnderstand the cause of his maiesties publike sadnesse ; after sundry clattrings of thunder , and infinite flashings of lightnings , which they heard and saw , there was heard an horrible and dreadfull voice , which said : oh you , that inhabit the earth ; fast , macerate , and cloath your selues with haire-cloth ; sprinkle your selues with ashes ; eat your bread with teares ; endeuour with humble prayers to asswage the wrath of god ; and with contrite hearts , and penitent soules , suppliantly beseech him , that of his infinite mercy , he will vouchsafe , to deliuer all humane-kinde , inhabiting the old world , from those portentous and monstrous nouelties , which wee certainely vnderstand to haue lately hapned in the new . at so vnexpected , and prodigious aduertisements , infinite of the vertuous , by the wounding affliction that they felt in their hearts , fell downe in a swoune , thinking verily that the west indies had beene vtterly consumed by fire , or ouerwhelmed by the furie of mercilesse waters . in this terror and dismall plight , all the people in par●assus , with showers of teares , with throbbing sobs , with groning howlings , with loud-shrill voices , as the like were neuer heard , cride for mercy , mercy : and with most submissiue intreatings and groanes besought apollo , that hee would daigne to impart vnto his deuout subiects , what those mischiefes were , from which they should intreat the immortall god to be deliuered . then from the aforesaid court of his maiestie was heard a second voice , which gaue all men to vnderstand , that the dogs which the spaniards had transported into the indies for the safegard of their flocks of sheepe , were all become such rauenous wolues , that in worrying and deuouring of flecced cattle , they exceeded the voracitie and cruelty of the greedy tigres . after so drearie and vnhappy tidings , all the learned in parnassus burst forth into wailfull cries , and lamentable skreeks , dolefully complaining , that if the dogs , which were placed for the guard & safetie of the sheepe , became wolues , so rauenous , as they deuoured whole flocks ; vnto what gardians night shepherds hereafter recommend the keeping and safe custodie of their sheepe ? and their flocks being now destitute of the protection of dogs , who haue alwaies beene so faithfull vnto their masters and shepherds , how could it be possible , but that the whole genus and kinde of sheepe must needs decay and perish through all the world , and become the most vnhappie creatures of all others , since they must be a prey both to the wolues their enemies , and to the dogs their friends ? whilest all the nations of parnassus ( surprised by so great terror ) were all dismaid , fainting , swouning , and groueling on the ground , onely the flemmings and the people of the low countries , were seene all dreadlesse and vndismaid , to runne leaping vp and downe parnassus , incouraging all men to pull vp a good heart , to be of good cheere , and neuer droope or faint : for there was no calamitie nor miserie could or be threatned or inflicted on mankinde , which by an vndaunted resolution , and resolute minde , might not be or diuerted or auoided . and with lond acclamation they gaue all men to vnderstand , that euen in their owne countries , those dogs and currs , which the spanish shepherds had sent for the guard of the flemmish and belgick flocks , were transformed into such rauenous wolues , as with their fierce immanitie , and fell brutishnesse , they deuoured all their sheepe ; and that ere this they would haue woorried the whole race and flocks of the low countries , if by the resentment of that bold and couragious determination ( now famous through all the world ) they had not prouided a sound remedie for it . and therefore , if those mischiefs should befall the old world , which ( as the report was ) were hapned to the new , they wished all men to know , that the true and only remedie , to chastise those currs , tainted with that foule fault , to woorrie , to rapine and deuoure harmlesse sheepe , was , to giue them some holland-nux-vomica , and ( as they deserued ) make them to vomit out their very heart , and burst and burst . the french are humble sutors vnto apollo , to know the secret , how to perfume gloues after the spanish fashion . rag. . part. the emulation that raigneth betweene the two most warlike , martiall , and mighty nations , the french , and the spanish , is as great as eternall . for there appeareth no vertue in the french , that is not most ambitiously sought after by the spaniard . and the french is neuer quiet vntill he haue attained vnto all the rarities wherewith he seeth spaine endowed . now forsomuch as the skill or sleight of the perfuming and tempring of amber , with which they make their gloues so sweetly odoriferous , is the peculiar inuention and meere endowment of the spaniards ; the french haue omitted no manner of pursuit , to finde out , and attaine the perfection , how to make the like . for they haue with anxious labour , and to their cost prouided themselues of muske , of ambergreese , of ziuet , and of all the most aromaticall drugs , that the orient affordeth ; but all proued vaine and effectlesse . for neither their cost , nor all their diligence haue beene sufficient , to make them obtaine the end of their wished intention : yet rather than they would giue ouer their pursuit as desperate , the thrice noble french nation had recourse vnto apollos maiestie , as the onely producer of all aromatikes and sweet gums , whom shee hath most instantly besought to vouchsafe to reach her the true way , how to perfume gloues with amber-greese , wherein the spaniard is so cunning . it is most certaine , that apollo was neuer seene to laugh so heartily , no not when he saw the downefall of vnhappy dedalus , as he did at the impertinent request of those french sutors , whose hands he commanded his priests , that were about him , to smell vnto . and that they should make a true report what they smelt of , the priests presently obeyed ; and told his maiestie , that they had no ill sauour , but smelt very sweet . which apollo hearing , he told the french , that nature did euermore counterchange others defects with some rare vertue or other . and therefore had he conferred the gift , to make sweet-smelling gloues only vnto that nation , whose hands were so ranke , that they did euer stinke worse than any carrion . why the monarchy of spaine is lately retired into her palace . rag. . part. forsomuch as many daies were past since the monarchie of spaine had shewed her selfe in publike , and hath not onely euer since , liued as a recluse in her owne house , but hath continually kept all the doores thereof fast shut . the italian princes , and aboue all the venetians , not only most diligent searchers into mens thoughts , but carefull and studious obseruers of that great queenes actions , seeing so strange an alteration , entred into anxious and great iealousies . and because it hath neuer beene possible for them or any other to know , what her so sudden retirednesse might signifie , all men did argue , that it could not be without some secret mysterie . the venetians for iealousie of their owne estates , impatient of delayes , by ladders set vp against the walls of her palace , entred in at the windowes thereof , and saw that she was very busie with one of her chiefe officers , called the marquis spinola , labouring hard with diuers rare and artificiall engines , to stop all the holes , gaps , chinks , and creuisses in and about her house . and wondring not a little , to what end she should doe it ; they presently aduertised their friends speedily to arme and prepare themselues ; for so soone as the spaniards should haue stopped all the gaps and holes of any supply , helpe , or succour , they would assuredly giue chase to all the mice and rats , and make an vniuersall slaughter of them . how the ministers and officers of spaine are continually interessed in their priuate profit . rag. . part. three daies are now past , when about nine of the clock at night , there were seene to enter forty cart loads of hay into the royall palace of the monarchie of spaine . and forsomuch as the strange and vnseasonable houre , made the french , the venetians , and other potentates , who liue in continuall iealousie of the greatnesse of so formidable a princesse , to suspect some mischiefe , there was speedy search and diligent inquirie made , to know the mysterie of so strange prouision ; and whether vnder that hay , the carts might be laden with any vnlawfull and forbidden goods . whereupon many spies were set a worke about it , who found out , and reported , that vnder the hay there were hidden and stowed certaine chests full of mattocks , spades , pick-axes , and shouels . and because these are instruments and tooles belonging to pioners , sappers , diggers , and labouring-men , the french presently resolued to arme themselues . and the venetians were about to lanch their gallies from out their arsenall into the sea ; when by some polititians it was aduised , before they should discouer their intention , to finde out , whether the spaniards had at any time before made prouision of such tooles or implements , & whether they expected to receiue any more else-whence . but they were vndoubtedly assured , that before that time they had neuer receiued any , nor did hereafter looke for any more . the said did besides certifie vnto them , that so soone as the said chests were vnladen , they were not caried into the royall armorie or common magazin , but that all the grandes of spaine , and the chiefe officers of so potent a monarchie , did presently diuide those spades , mattocks , scoopes , shouels , pick-axes among themselues ; with which the very next day very early they began to dig ditches , to draw rills , to conuey riuelets , to direct gullets , to reare banks , to frame scluses , and to fill the country with aqueducts , and water-pipes , with such labour , paine , and diligence ( euery man drawing all the water he could procure to his owne mill ) as they had brought all publike matters , and the whole state to such miserie , and calamitie , that the mills of the communitie of spaine , for want of water , could nor goe , nor worke , nor grinde . apollo hauing vsed all possible meanes , and exquisite diligence , to haue some one of the court-mignons , or princes-idols taken and apprehended , doth seuerely proceed against one lately fallen into the hands of the iudges . rag. . part. apollo ( to his infinite griefe ) being come to a perfect knowledge of the most enormous disorder , which the shamefull blindnesse of those princes causeth , no lesse in great empires , than in pettie principalities , who commit that vnpardonable excesse , to subiect and enuassal themselues vnto a base and new vp-start seruant of theirs , since neither his maiesties continuall exhortations , nor the frightfull calamities , which for the said foule excesses an infinite number of princes hath suffred and smarted for , hath beene of force to remoue them from that hard destinie , by which they seeme violently to be drawne , to precipitate into the bottomlesse whirlpoole of so outragious inconueniences ; forsomuch as he would not abandon the protection ( a quality proper to his maiestie ) of the gouernours of mankinde . some few moneths are now past , since he resolued with all rigour to persecute those seruants , that with their prodigious ambition , and artificiall tricks ( altogether diabolicall ) vndertake to rule and gouerne their lord and master . and therefore did his maiestie not many yeares since publish most grieuous mulcts , and rich rewards , to be inflicted vpon the offenders , and giuen to those that should reueale any such vnto his iudges . two weekes are now past since one of these varlets , hauing bin accused vnto the magistrate , was presently apprehended and laid vp , who by many euidences being found foule and guilty , was laid vpon the racke , where he confessed all the horrible tricks , shifts , wiles , circumuentions , masks , and detestable iuglings , that he had vsed and practised , not onely to induce his master to become his slaue , but euen to adore and worship him . apollo hauing read and considered the processe and enditement against that monstrous villaine , fell into a strange amazement , how those princes ( who are so greedy of domination that they often fall into moody iealousies , and vnnaturall suspitions , not onely of strangers , but of their own children ) may or can ( either through their owne gullishnesse , or monstrous fraud of others ) fall into that reproachfull infamie , to become vassals , and euen slaues vnto a base rascally seruant of theirs . and hee thought it a most portentous case , that there should bee found both sonnes and nephews vnto princes , who to obtaine the goale , to dominere ouer their fathers , and to lord it ouer their vncles , had shewed spirits full of ambition , and minds extremely thirsty , to sway and command , and by cunning policies , and politike mysteries , had attained the garland of their desires , the very same men shortly after , could themselues fall or decline into that abhominable metamorphosis , to forgoe their domination purchased with so great care , anguish , wiles , and sweat , and make one their superiour , that is so farre their inferiour . a wonder so rare and extrauagant , as humane wit can no more giue a reason for , than of the hidden vertue of the adamant stone . apollo , to the end that by the exemplary punishment of that darling-courtier , princes might learne some so profitable document , as might in some sort terrifie them from committing so hateful indignities ; three daies since he summōed all the princes now resident in this court , to appeare before him in the great audience-chamber . in presence of whom , their greater confusion , with a loud and intelligible voice , ●●caused the abominable enditement , framed against that villanous varlet , to be read by bossius , his maiesties clarke of the crowne , who being demanded what tricks , course , or art he had vsed to reach vnto the end , so absolutely to ouersway & gouern his lord and master , answered , that the very first day he came to the court , he wholly applyed his minde and wits , exactly , and with all diligence punctually to obserue the genius of the prince , which hauing ●ound to be naturally inclined vnto lust and luxury , he with gentle , plausible , and cunning artificiall manners , did presently ●o apply himselfe to commend a vice so vnworthy a man that hath the charge and gouernment of a state committed vnto him ( as if laciuiousnesse had bin an egregious and laudable vertue . ) and how he vsed all possible industrie to become his instru●ent or minister in them : which hauing easily obtained , he imployed all possible industrie to prouide him with most obscene instruments to fulfill his filthy lust : and that afterwards , vnder diuers pretexts and sundry colours , he had industriously laboured , that all those vertuous , honest , and honourable seruants about the prince , whom he knew or suspected might reclaime him vnto a debonaire and vertuous life , should be remoued or discharged from the court as vicious and professed enemies to the prince and state ; yea , some he had put to open shame and disgrace , and others he had blinded with false and surmised offices , places , titles , and honours . and had in their places aduanced and substituted some of his owne creatures , dependants and confidents , who were all deeply plunged into all manner of carnall sensuality and bruitish lasciuiousnesse , by whose meanes and furtherance ( he affirmed ) to haue employed all his study and care that his lord and master should be vtterly depriued , and shake off some commendable and genuine endowment , which by nature , and from his former education hee had attained vnto ▪ and had after that so wrought , that vnder colour of being false and disloyall , all the old officers of the state , were or discharged or expelled the court , whose iust condoleances and grieuances he had pourtraid and represented vnto him as sedi●ious railings and petulant detractions : and had so preuailed with him that their important charges and offices were all conferred vpon men without iudgement , without wisdome , without honesty , or without charity towards their princes welfare , or priuate interesse ; hauing in recompence required nothing at their hands but confidence , secrecie , and a strict adherence to his owne affaires ; by whose meanes hee had so beset , besotted , and circumgired his lord and master , that it was neuer possible afterward for truth ( which as the shadow to the body should perpetually and inseparably bee vnited vnto a prince ) to come to his notice or eares , by the relation of any well meaning or faithfull friend to him or , the state. and that afterwards to the end he alone might absolutely rule , and vncontrouledly sway the state , hee had so fairely allured him to sloth and idlenesse , that hee brought him to be plunged euen vp to the eyes in pleasures of gardens , in recreations of countrey houses , and in sports of hunting and hauking : nay , he had so far preuailed with him , that he abhorred as things most hatefull to heare of state-matters , or of his proper interesses . and had besides induced him to beleeue that his treacherous plots and practises to make him fall out with his owne sonne , and other princes of his blood , was an vnfaigned zeale of inward loue and hearty affection towards him : a spotlesse charity towards the publike benefit of his people : and that by his quaint artifices and iugling trickes , hee had brought him to be so stolide , so stupid , & so gullish , that the manifest and insolent tyranny of his base seruant ( knowne & abhorred by the simplest of his state ) was by the vnfortunate prince , named to be a vigilant regard to his seruice , an easing of him from paines , a disburthening of him from cares , and a charity towards the common-weale ; and that sloth , idlenesse , lithernesse , and carelesse negligence was an honourable rest and quiet repose . and moreouer , to the end his prince might neuer awaken or rouze himselfe from out his drowzie and shamefull laethe-sleepe , and by opening his eyes , come to the knowledge of his owne stolidity , idiotisme , and gullishnesse , and so discouer others trecherous ambition , hee had filled his court with flatterers , parasites , and sicophants , who with plausible blandishments , and infamous perswasions , extolled and commended his silly vnaptnesse to bee a matchlesse valour : the generall hatred of his people , to be a louing and vnfaigned affection : all publike railings and detractions to be exaggerated praises ; confusion and disorder to be a perfect gouernment , the tyranny of a lewd villain to be honourable and carefull seruice , extor●ions to be sacred iustice , lauish prodigality to be vertuous liberality , his abiect lithernesse , and crauen timidity in hauing so basely neglected and abandoned the helme and gouernment of his state , he commended to be right honorable labours , diligent endeuours , and politicke gouernment . all these perfidious treacheries being confessed by that false wretch , so amazed and terrified those princes that heard them , that with a loud voice they all cride out , that , to become most rigorously cruell against so impious and wicked a villaine , with gallows , gibbets , rackes , wheeles , halters , axen , tortures , flames , and bloody weapons , were true and charitable piety and pitty . and therefore they should all ioyntly become suiters vnto perillus , to deuise some new kinde of torment , as might dilaniate and teare in peeces that monster of nature , and yet not depriue him of life ; to the end there might neuer more be found a man that durst dare to commit so hainous and outragious villanies . and all the princes were so moued with the foulenesse of that enditement , as vnanimously they all besought his maiestie to shew some extraordinary rigors against those , who by the fraudulent wiles and exorbitant trickes of their seruants , suffer themselues to so vi●uperous and shamefull a state . now for so much as by this vertuous instance intimated by those princes vnto apollo , his maiesties minde was so moued to compunction , that teares were seene to trickle downe his cheekes , some idiots that stood by , deemed this to proceed from the excessiue contentation which apollo felt , to heare the great horrour , whereby princes had embraced and fostered that vice , which his maiesty so much desired they should shun and detest . but the wisest and best of the vertuous that were present at that act , knew very well , that apollo wept and bewailed the vnhappy blindnesse of those inebriated and infatuated princes , who abhorring their owne excesses in others , did most instantly require , that those vices into which the greatest number of them were imperceptibly , and at vnawares plunged ouer head and eares , might with some extraordinary and rigorous seuerity be punished . so mischieuous and pernicious is that reproachfull and detestable vice in princes to idolatrize mignons , which they exactly perceiuing , and extreamly blaming in others , they neuer see , but rather fauour and commend in themselues . and whom doe wee see fall into this foule fault , and shamefull errour , but such as make most ostentation to bee the aristarco's and reformers of the world ? the whole race or genus of sheepe send their publike ambassadors to apollo , by whom they earnestly entreat him to grant them sharp teeth and long hornes : whose suit is by his maiesty scorned and reiected . rag. . part. the whole race or corporation of sheepe haue sent foure ambassadors to this court , which this present morning haue bin admitted by his maiestie to haue a royall audience . whereupon a great and goodly magistrall ram of lincolne-shire , in an articulate bleating voice vttered these words ; that the sheepe knew very well , that that god , who had created all things , had vsed so great charity and impartiall iustice towards all sorts of liuing creatures , as he had recompenced the defects and imperfections of some with other equiualent endowments of vse and vertue . so that in so infinite a multitude of bruit animals , there was not one that might iustly complaine to haue in its creation receiued any wrong at his diuine maiesties hands . but yet it seemed vnto them that ( as a step-sire ) hee had shewed great partiality onely with the sheepe , forsomuch as hauing created them with diuers imperfections , it did not appeare that hee had endowed them with any equiualent vertue by or with which they might ( if not assure their state ) yet at least bee able to liue in this world with that safety and quietnesse that other creatures did . for although his diuine maiestie had created the hare with wondrous timidity , with sharpe teeth , and without a heart to bite , he had necerthelesse endowed her with so swift a foot as did assure her from the tushes or fangs of the fiercest beast . and that the fox could not iustly find her selfe agrieued to haue beene created slow of foot , his maiesty hauing endowed her with such sagacity of wit , as shee could with facility auoid the wiles , the snares or ambushes of any wild beast . and that hee had so recompenced the slownesse of the wolues running with so hardy an heart , with so keene a tooth , with so circumspect a genius , as being a terrour to all beasts , hee makes himselfe to bee awed and respected of men . moreouer it euidently appeared , that his maiesty had vsed the same charity vnto the fowle and birds of the aire , since that vnto those to whom hee had denied the speedy vse of their feet , he had in recompence giuen them larger wings , and a swifter flight , namely to pheasants , to partridges , and to quailes , who in requitall of their short wings and traine feathers had the nimblenesse of their feet . and that the silly sheepe onely , hauing bin created with so blockish a stupidity of wit , heartlesse , slow-footed , and without those keen biting teeth , with which other beasts make themselues to be awed and respected . they thought themselues forsaken and reiected by that diuine maiesty and charity that had manifested so great dilection and louingnesse , euen vnto wild , fierce , and hurtfull beasts . the said goodly tall ram added moreouer , that to fill vp the measure of the incomparable calamity of the harmlesse and disarmed sheepe , his maiesty had allotted the lions , the tigres , the beares , the wolues , ( being the most cruell and blood-thirsty beasts that wander vpon earth ) to bee their fatall and implacable enemies . so that it seemed that the poore sheepe were created only to feed and to be a prey to those enraged and furious beasts , that know not what satiety meaneth . hee said moreouer , that vnto the vnsupportable iniuries which the sheep receiued daily from their enemies , were likewise added the outrages and misusages which their owne shepheards continually heaped vpon them ; all which proceeded because they were so disarmed & weaponles : for , if they might be so happy , as but once in ten yeares , if not for reuenge , at least for correction , vpon certaine occasions , to haue teeth allowed them to bite certaine cruell and indiscreet shepheards , who milke them without charity , and sheare them without discretion , peraduenture they should bee more kindly and better dealt withall . and their shearers , or rather shauers , would more gently handle their sheares , and not hurt or teare their skinne . and therefore the whole kinde or race of sheepe , that they may no longer bee the load-stone or subiect of most wailefull oppressions , doe most instantly beseech his sacred maiesty , to haue long teeth and sharpe hornes granted them to bite & gore their enemies , that so they may become more respected and better esteemed . to this rammish request apollo answered with a blith and chearefull countenance , that the sheepe had made a request suitable and worthy their silly simplicity , since they know not how among all the foure-footed creatures that liue vpon the earth , no one can be found more fauoured and priuiledged than they ; for , whereas others are with numberlesse cares and infinite dangers enforced to shift and sharke for food , diuers of which are constrained to imploy the night ( ordained for sleep and rest ) to feed and sustaine themselues , as not daring to beseene by day ; only for the sheep , euen by men ( who are lords ouer all wild beasts , and possessors of the earth ) pastures and fields are prouided , reserued , and with carefulnesse and labour hired , purchased , and manured at excessiue and deare rates . and that in darke and stormy nights , in foule weather , and at all times , they alone were carefully prouided for , charitably fed , tenderly watched , and diligently guarded in their folds , yea , and desended from their hurtfull foes . and whereas other creatures were continually hunted , chased , and pursued by many sorts of other rauenous wilde beasts , and entrapped by the wiles and deuises of men ; for whose destruction infinite people apply themselues to nothing more than to weaue nets , to frame toiles , to lay springes , to set traps , to hide ginnes , to dig pit-falls , and to breed , to teach , and to feed dogs . onely the sheepe by an especiall grace and prerogatiue , enioyed the noble priuiledge , to haue men labour so industriously for them , and to shield them from so infinit dangers ; and that the creator of this vniuerse had made demonstration of especiall predilection towards the whole race of sheepe , who in lieu of rauenous teeth , goring hornes , and swift legs , had graciously granted them the powerfull and subduing weapons of rich wooll , of nourishing milke , of dainty cheese , and of diuers other sorts of vnualuable riches , with which they so forestalled and possessed the loue of men , that for the endeared charity that they beare to all sheepe , they vncessantly hunt , chase , pursue , and destroy wolues , tigres , beares , foxes , lions , and all other wild and rauenous beasts , which loue not sheepe , with all manner of armes , rapine , or bloody cruelty . and how by reason of the singular gifts and incomparable benefits that sheepe bring to all mankinde , being reputed the onely deliciousnesse , delight , and wealth of man , it came to passe that they were the most numerous race or kind of creatures that liue vpon the earth ; so that the sheepe being nourished , fed , cherished , guarded and defended by the vigilancy , care , cost , paines , & charity of their shepheards , they shewed themselues very simple and foolish in desiring to haue deuouring sharpe teeth , and long goring hornes . and at last apollo said , that concerning the seuerity of some shepheards in milking and shearing of them , they ought to vse no other weapons to reuenge themselues , than those of dutifull obedience and humility , with yeelding them store of wooll , plenty of milke , abundance of cheese ; and 〈◊〉 , co study fertility and fruitfulnesse . this being the supreame 〈◊〉 of the brood and race of sheepe , that those shepheards who misuse and euill intreat their flocks , are in extremity cruell vnto themselues ; it being most certaine , that a wound rashly giuen to a sheepe , hath the propriety to kill the shepheard . and therefore he straitly commanded them , to take greater heed to manifest the least inclination or shew to bite their shepheards , than they would doe of wolues keene teeth , since those sheepe cannot be accounted so happy , which with all humility and prostrate obedience , do warrant and guard their shepheards from all harme and danger , as those most vnhappy , that make a dismall profession , to terrifie and make them afraid . in a publike congresse or assembly , contrary to the accustomed manner of the phoebean court , force hauing pretended to preceed reputation ; that illustrious lady with an excellent resolution , maintaineth her reputation and credit which was in some danger . rag. . part. that the lady reputation in all publike places and assemblies hath yet euer had the precedence and right hand of lady force , is well knowne in parnassus . but it fortuned the other morning , that whilest apollo made his solemne entrance into the signe of leo , force ( according to her terrible genius , borne vnto insolencies ) dared to presume to preceed reputation , who , if in that occasion ( making vse of her admirable dexterity ) shee had not knowne to reto●t and put by so dangerous a rub , and vnexpected stop , shee had vndoubtedly receiued some notable affront . she was neuerthelesse much offended at the foule petulancy offered her by her capitall enemy , whereupon the vertuous , euer much deuoted vnto so excelse a princesse , ceased not to encourage her , exhorting her by no meanes to pocket vp the insolency of her temerity . and moreouer , bade her to remember , that she was the right arme of all potentates , and the sole instrument wherwith princes lorded and swaied the world . and therefore willed her to pull vp a good heart , and resolue to confront that fondly rash dame , whom with the only maiesty of her countenance she would at the first encounter so daunt and abate her pride , that ( as a thousand times it had come to passe ) shee might with great facility suppresse and bring vnder . with wondrous reposednesse of minde , and gentle words , reputation answered those vertuous men her louing friends who so comforted her , that shee exceedingly valued and loued the ready good will , which she perceiued in them all ; but she could neither commend nor follow the counsell they gaue her . and that they should call to minde , that the whole of the power of her authoritie and greatnesse being founded , not on the forces of strong-armed armies , nor on the strength and securitie of inexpugnable cittadels , but on the bare opinion of men ; a thing most inconstant and variable . so as it behoued her , in this her aduersitie , to proceed with great caution , and admirable dexteritie . and that betweene her , and force , there was a monstrous great disparitie : for if force were once vanquished , shee might easily recouer her selfe , and with greater impetuofitie attempt a second battell , so much the more dangerous for her ; for to her ordinarie power shee might ioyne the violence of disdaine , and the shame of her first ouerthrow . but if it should happen , that at the first shock shee did not quell her enemy , either with the maiestie of her presence , or with the authoritie of her looke , so that as an elephant , which being once fallen to the gound can neuer rise againe , she might destroy her , shee should wholly be depriued of that greatnesse and awfull respect , which the publike veneration of the common people bred in her . considerations so much the more necessarie in her , as she had experienced , that nothing is more perillous for her , than by force of armes to seeke to maintaine that auctoritie great , and that reputation on foot , which shee seeth to bee founded but on the bare opinion of the vulgar popular . and that shee hoped to prouide for the indemnitie of her authoritie with her wonted remedies , and would with her accustomed weapons buckle with force , not doubting but to conquer her . she said moreouer , that force did now vse those extraordinarie termes of insolencie towards her , not because her power was any whit increased , but by reason of some disorders of hers , shee perceiued the ancient decorum , her wonted maiestie , and the peoples veneration towards her to be greatly diminished . reputation hauing vttered these kinde words , went away , and shortly after retired her selfe into her lodging ; whence for diuers moneths space shee was neuer seene to come abroad , but with great seueritie gaue her selfe to reforme and correct her selfe , for euer banishing all self-respects and priuate interesses ; to which , because shee had yeelded ouermuch , and too openly abandoned her selfe , shee euidently perceiued her honour and credit to be much impaired . and then with the beesom of a rigid reformation in her selfe , she wholly imployd her time in cleansing her house and ●●milie from all manner of filthinesse , pollution , and basenesse ; from which she also chased and expelled griping auarice , daring ambition , and all other priuate , dishonest , vnlawfull or scandalous passions . this princesse hauing thus reformed her priuate disorders , being one morning to be present at some solemne and publike act , she extraordinarily embellished and adorned her selfe all ouer with honestie of minde , with vprightnesse of spirit , with singlenesse of heart , with vngrudging liberalitie , and with all her other most esteemed vertues . and hauing put on the rich robe of righteousnesse , and affectionate loue towards all well-deseruing creatures , and of publike charitie , she came forth with so awfull a maiestie , and comely a grauitie , where shee was expected by all the other most excellent vertues , in whom shee stirred vp so great respect , and regardfull veneration , that euen the lady force her selfe ( so great was the deuotion that possessed her minde ) was seene to tremble and stand amazed : and in that occasion , not only with her accustomed reuerence , to grant her her due precedence on the right hand , but with a kinde of seruile submission , to beg , as a singular fauour at her hands , the prerogatiue , in that solemnitie , to carry vp her traine . the prouince of focides by her ambassadors complaineth vnto apollo , that his maiesties officers doe not permit her to enioy her priuiledges : whose request is not only reiected , but they haue a most sharp and vnpleasant answer . rag. . part. the most populous prouince of focides , which some yeares since rebelled from the ignorant , and voluntarily did subiect it selfe vnto apollo's dominion , of whom she obtained so ample priuiledges and large immunities , as it might truly be said , that the focenses liued in a kinde of free libertie , hath now sent her ambassadors to this court , to complaine against his maiesties officers , that they will not permit them to enioy those priuiledges , which by his sacred maiestie were granted them . and therefore doe instantly require him , to command the due obseruation of them . this businesse , which somewhat distasted apollo , was by him referred vnto his royall councell of state ; from whom the ambassadors two daies since had for a finall answer , that the lords of the councell did greatly wonder , and rested much scandalized , that the people of focides seemed to be so ignorant of the affaires of the world , as they knew not , that priuiledges , liberties , franchises , exemptions and immunities granted vnto people newly conquered , were like vnto those cherries , that were giuen to children when they cryde and puled , to make them hold their peace , but were afterwards taken from them when they lay still and quiet . to whom the chiefe of the ambassadors stoutly replied , that if in parnassus they vsed so fouly to abuse sillie well-meaning people , focides would ere long fall to whining againe , to the end it might be stilled with cherries of new priuiledges . to this companion , francis guicciardin , lord president of the royall counsell suddenly answered , that if the f●censes did well consider the present state wherein they were , they should finde , that with the cittadels , which in times of peace they had suffered to be built vpon their necks , they were reduced vnto such termes of bondage and thraldome , as if they fell to whining againe , they might very well , without any danger or preiudice vnto apollo's state , be stilled and made to hold their peace with smarting lashes and bloudy stripes . socrates hauing this morning beene found dead in his bed , apollo vseth all possible diligence , to discouer the true occasion of his sudden death . rag. . part. this present morning , great socrates , who yesternight went to bed in perfect good health , hath beene found starke dead in his bed : and forsomuch as his corps was all swolne and puft vp , most men doe vehemently suspect , that there hath beene some machination of poyson practised vpon him . and the peripateticks ( cruell enemies to the socratike sect ) haue beene much questioned and blamed for it . and so much the more , because it is well knowne to all men , that the most detestable armes of poysoning are very familiar vnto aristotle . prince of that great sect. all socrates his houshold hath this morning beene imprisoned , from whom no other light or confession can be wrested , but that some daies before , socrates was seene and obserued to be much anguished , grieued , and perplexed , still seeming to feele some griefe of minde ; for he was diuers times heard lamentably to exclaime , oh corrupted world ! oh depraued age ! oh most-most vnhappy mankinde ! apollo , who hath felt an extraordinary sorrow for the losse of so great a philosopher , hath strictly commanded the body to be opened , to see whether his bowels and entrailes yeelded any signe or likelyhood of poyson , which being done , all his interiors were open , whereby it was euidently percei●ed , that socrates , by reason of the infinite filthy things , enormous abuses , and scandalous obiects , which he was compelled daily to view and behold in this depraued and corrupted age ; and for hauing taken a great windinesse of scandals , hee was forced to burst . most rich and sumptuous haue the funerals beene , that were celebrated for so great a man. and marcus tullius cicero ( a most affectionate fauourer of the socratike sect ) with an excellent and elaborated oration , hauing highly extolled the veritie of the doctrine , with flouds of teares bewailed the calamitie and miserable condition of these present daies ; in which with rigorous seueritie , all men are strictly forbidden to satyrize . and honest gentlemen beholding continually things most worthy to be published by sound of horne and trumpet , are inforced to see , to hold their peace , and to burst . natalis comes the historian , for hauing spoke some thing in a publike congresse of learned men , that grieuously offended apollo , is by his maiestie seuerely punished . rag. . part. vvhilest some few daies since , natalis comes a latine historian , together with diuers other learned men of this court , vnder melpomenes porch ( as the custome of historians is ) discoursed of the glory of those great princes , that haue left any eternall memorie of their honourable actions in the world , termed by the name of a glorious conquest the vsurpation of a kingdome , made by a mightie prince , without any iustice , right , or lawfull pretence . which speech being presently reported vnto apollo by one of those wicked and make-bate spirits , whereof the ai●e , and the earth is euer full : his maiestie fell into so passionate a rage against natalis , as at that very instant he caused him to be put in prison , and at once vsed the rigor , straitly to forbid him , for the space of three whole yeares , the ingresse into any libraries . and howbeit apollo haue most importunately beene sollicited by most of the chiefe historians of this state , to proceed with some milder terme of mercy towards so vertuous a follower of his , he neuerthelesse hath and doth still refuse to doe it . and saith besides , that there is no greater wickednesse in the world , than the impious and trecherous licence , which diuers princes haue vsurped vnto themselues , to rob and steale whole states and kingdoms one from another . an action that hath filled the world with those lamentable mischiefs , and deplorable confusions and disorders , that so much afflict mankinde . and he thinks it an iniquitie extremely outragious , that in his vertuous dominion , there should be found any one learned man so perfidious , as durst dare to stile those trecherous thefts , and vnlawfull robberies , which are committed with a million of aggrauating and impious circumstances , by the title of glorious conquests . the new-fovnd politcke . the second part . chap. . maximilian the emperour is aduertised of the trouble begun among his sonnes . there came three posts very lately vnto the maiestie of the emperour maximilian the second ; and presently it was knowne how they brought him aduertisement , that the arch-duke matthias had taken armes against the emperour rodolphus his brother , seditiously requiring the kingdomes of hungary and bohemia , and the absolute dominion of austria , and other prouinces . these ill newes infinitely troubled the minde of the emperour ; for he well knew , that the discord risen vp among his sonnes , would giue the enemies of the house of austria that content , which they so much desired . whereupon , yesterday morning very early , that prince presented himselfe before apollo , and with many teares demaunded of him , when the euils of the house of austria , so long before commenced , through the cruell combination of all germany against it , should haue an end ; and for what demerit such fearefull scourges were sent vnto his house . vnto this demaund apollo answered in this sort : all the troubles and persecutions of your family , great emperour , shall cease , when it shall wholly abandon those ambitious thoughts of desiring to command ouer hungary , and transiluania , which hath giuen vnto germany such iealousies , that to secure her ancient liberty from the power of your house , she bendeth all her study to nothing more , then to the depression of it : for the germans , searing greater prejudice from your acquests , then from the victories of the turkes , are fully resolued rather to lose vienna , then recouer buda , and then also shall all germany vnfainedly loue your archdukes , when deposing their present ambition , they shall make it appeare , that they desire to be equall , and not superiour to other princes of germany . chap. . most of the princes , common-weales , and states of europe , are weighed in a payre of scales , by lorenzo medici . seeing it is apparent , that the roman common-weale , after the acquisition it had made of the empire of all italy , could in a short time arriue to that vniuersall monarchy , which is yet so famous to the world , and whereunto many ambitious princes haue since in vaine aspired , it hath beene a generall receiued opinion , that that potentate , who in state and forces is suffered to grow vnto such greatnesse , that he findeth no other prince able to counterpoyze him , no more then the roman commonweale did , after it became commander ouer italy , cannot possibly bee impeached from obtayning the vniuersall monarchy . whereupon those empires and kingdomes , which were afterwards framed out of the pieces of the roman monarchy , to auoyd those calamities and dissolutions , which fell vpon such potentates as were oppressed by the roman forces , out of most wholesome , and almost diuine counsell agreed together , that euery fifteenth yeare , all the princes of europe should assemble into one place ; where each ones forces should be seuerally weighed ; and thereupon fit counterpoyze , and due mortification be giuen vnto him , that was found to be growen to any greatnesse , which might be odious and dangerous to his competitor . many great wits were from time to time preferred to that honourable charge of gouerning the scales ; but for an hundreth yeres past or thereabout , they were managed by the illustrious house of medici , and in particular by lorenzo the great . which prerogatiue , although to many it seemed preiudiciall vnto the maiestie of the popes , and prudence of the venetian senate , who haue alwaies watched ; if not more , at least-wise equally with lorenzo , and the florentine common-weale , to maintaine both in italy and abroad , the forces of the potentates of europe euen ballanced , yet with a maruellous consent of all the historians the gouernment of the scales was giuen into the hands of signior lorenzo . the first day of august , then all the princes and potentates of europe , assembled in phocis , not onely to meet with so important a businesse as the perfect knowledge of their owne affaires , but that also of others , which in matter of state importeth much more . whereupon by an ancient and just prerogatiue , the first that came to be weighed , was the aristocraticall monarchy of the apostolike sea ; whose temporall state was put into the scale ; and because the weight of the last fifteenth yeere was but sixe millions of pounds , and now was found to amount vnto seuen and an halfe , euery one knew , that the addition of the noble duchy of ferrara had caused that increase . the next that was put into the scale , was the state of the seuen princes electors of the roman empire , which by old records appeareth to haue weighed in times past seuenty millions of pounds ; but since , by the indiscreet gouernment and courses of many emperours , that lusty complexion , which made it euermore redoubted , was so spoyled , that it fell into those dangerous and foule infirmities , which after a long quartane , found end in an hecticke feuer , that hath now so consumed it , as our age beholdeth it left with nothing but very skinne and bone . howbeit , though it be so much decreased in state , yet the great bulke it hath of body , maketh it in shew very goodly to look vpon ; the rather , because the intrinsecall imperfections are not discouered : for many good persons with the ancient titles of the empire , and maiesticall name of caesar , haue beautified it very excellently without , but when it came to be weighed , it was found quite empty within ; a feather not being so light , as the name of a prince without authority is vaine : whence it is that the roman empire proued so weake , as it weighed but pounds . then the famous peeres of france brought vnto the scale the flourishing and warlike french monarchy ; a square of fiue hundreth and fifty miles euery way , replenished with an infinite noblesse , armed on horsebacke , which not onely maintaineth peace at home , but maketh so great a king formidable to all the nations of the earth ; besides a world of learned men which adorne it ; merchandise and trades which enrich it ; tillage and husbandry , which make it plentifull , and abounding with euery good thing . the ancient weight of so famous a monarchy was twenty millions of pounds ; but in the last fifteenth yeeres weight , by reason of the horrible calamities , whereinto ( by the disloyalty of some of her barons ) she was thrown , it did not arriue to twelue millions ; howbeit , now it not onely equalled , but went farre beyond the weight of the best ancient times ; for it came to fiue and twenty millions ; a matter of such maruel to euery one , that the spaniards got on their spectacles , and very narrowly obserued , whether the weights were right or no. to the ancient kingdome of france , was added the acquisition of bresse giuen vp by the duke of sauoy , which in regard it was so aduantagious to the city of lyons , augmented the weight of it aboue a million . next were the many kingdomes of spaine put into the scale by the spanish grandes , and to the great wonder of those ancient men , that could remember , how an hundreth and twenty yeares since , they were held in a poore and vile account , the weight amounted to twenty millions . the spaniards remained exceeding well satisfied with this weight of their spaine : and assured themselues , that with the addition of so many other states , they had besides to put into the scale , not onely to equall , but farre to exceed the fiue and twenty millions of the french monarchy . wherefore instantly they put into the scale the flourishing kingdome of naples , which euery one thinking would increase the weight at least millions more , it appeareth , that then it weighed lesse by one and an halfe : at this strange accident the spaniards being much amazed , said , that either lorenzo had vsed some fraud in the weighing , or that of necessity the scales were not euen ; because it was a monstrous thing , that the addition of matter should abate of the weight . whereunto lorenzo coldly answered ; that his scales were euen , but that neither the indiaes void of inhabitants , nor the neopolitans , & milanese , which were so farre distant from the forces of spaine , and replenished with a people , which so vnwillingly supported the command of strangers , weighed any thing at all : for it was the loue and multitude of subiects , the fertility and vnion of states , that giue weight , and turne the scale . hereupon the spaniards added the dutchy of milan into the scale , which in like manner abated a million of the weight ; whereat also the spaniards were so much astonied , that they would not put flanders into the scale , fearing to receiue a greater distaste and affront . howbeit some said , that if they had put in the indiaes , they might haue wrought some good effect , but not those miracles which certaine lauish tongues haue deliuered ; who with the same facility talke of milions of crownes that the furnace men make of very bricke and tyle . then came the english lords , who put into the scale their kingdome , so much redoubted for the strength of the wonderfull situation thereof ; for the continued mountaines which compasse it about , seruing for walls , made by the very powerfull hand of god in forme of bulwarks , and the ocean for most profound dit●hes , make it a kingdome feared , in regard of the commodity it hath to assaile others ; and the insuperable difficulties which they shall finde that offer to attempt it . the weight of this kingdome was answerable to that of the last fifteenth yeare which amounted to sixteene millions . but the english , to giue more weight to their kingdome , would haue put the kingdom of scotland into the scale when the scottish nobility with drawne swords in their hands opposed themselues ; freely protesting , that they would neuer suffer their countrey to be annexed to the kingdom of the english ; for yet fresh was the lamentable example of the miseries of flanders , who when she saw her earls become kings of spain , foolishly beleeued that she should command ouer the spaniards ; whereas soone after , not spain was sacked by the flemmings , but flanders by the couetous and cruell spaniards ; and that which made vp their misery , charles the fifth , the emperour , and king philip his son , by their continuall residence in spaine , of flemmings became spaniards . the vnfortunate flemmings by loosing their prince , of naturall subiects , grew to bee esteemed strangers , and men of little faith . and so flanders , the naturall countrey of charles the fifth , the patrimony of king philip , became ( according to the termes of modern policy ) a state of fiue states , and began to bee gouerned by strangers ; with those iealousies , and with those oppressions of customes , taxes , contributions , and donatiues , as begat those bad humours , those ill satisfactions , from whence since hath proceeded that ciuill warre , which after an vnspeakable profusion of gold , an infinite effusion of blood , an incredible losse of honour to the flemmings , was conuerted into a couetous merchandise of the spaniards . therefore the scots by such lamentable miseries haue learned , not to permit their king , vpon any termes whatsoeuer , to abandon the royall seat of his ancient kingdome , for to place it in a greater , newly fallen vnto him : in which case the scots should vnder their cruell enemies the english , be sure to suffer all the calamities , which inferiour nations are wont to endure at the hands of the superiour . some that were present at this act , report , how the spaniards told the king of england , that those scots which had spoken so arrogantly in the presence of his maiesty , were to be seuerely chastised ; to whom the king of england answered , that the spaniards ought not to giue that counsell vnto others , which had proued so pernitious to themselues : and thereupon hauing commanded the stay of weighing their kingdome , he assured his scots , that ere long he would giue them all possible satisfaction . after this , the vast ottoman empire was put into the scale ; which the last fifteenth yeare arriued to the summe of two and thirty millions , but now was found to bee lesse than sixteene ; the strangnesse whereof made all the princes very much to maruell ; and particularly the venetians , who could not beleeue such a fall ; whereupon they desired , that wich more diligence it might be reweighed , and it appeared , how in that little time running betweene the first and this second weighing , it had fallen eight hundred twenty and two pounds : whereby it was manifest , that the ottoman empire , heretofore so terrible to the world , now consumed with luxury , couetousnesse , and idlenesse , runneth headlong to his ruine , which gaue great contentment to all those princes . neuerthelesse it was obserued by some of the wisest there present , that the spaniards were not so glad of it as the rest ; out of a doubt they had , that the depression of the turke , would bee the exaltation of the venetian state. then came the polach senators , and put into the scale their kingdome , which in regard of the small authority the king hath there , & the too much command , which the palatines arrogate vnto themselues , made but a poore reckoning , for it did not amount to six millions of pounds , whereas in times past it alwaies exceeded twelue . after them the signory of the councell of te●● put into the scale the flourishing estate of the venetian common-wealth , most admirable for the greatnesse thereof , and opportunity of situation fitting for all great enterprises , which went beyond all expectation in the weight , for it came to eight millions ; the cause whereof was said to bee the huge masse of gold , which those wise senators in so long a time of peace had gathered together into their treasury . next came the switzers , the grisons , and other free people of germany , and brought their common-weals to the scale . howbeit the princes required , that they might be weighed each one seuerally by it selfe , wherewith the germanes were well contented , so that it might be done . but lorenzo hauing put the common-wealth of basil into the scale , it appeared , that the greater part of the other common-weales of germany were all so linked together , that it was impossible to separate them one from another , which put a many of ambitious princes there in a sweat . then the duke of sauoy caused his state to be put into the scale by his noble knights of the annonciata , which equalled the weight of the last fifteenth yeere ; but lorenzo hauing added into the scale that most noble prerogatiue of title , which the said duke charles emanuell enioyeth of the prime souldier of italy , it was seene to aggrauate the weight a million foure hundreth and twenty pounds . after this , with a pompe and maiesty matchable to kings , appeared the duke of lorraine ; whose state , though little , equalled the weight of great kingdoms ; and it was considered that it fell out to bee so by a certaine good fortune which that prince had , to haue his states so happily seated , that hee could easily put the low-countries into grieuous difficulties , by impeaching the passage of those succours which the spaniards conduct thither out of italy , whereby he hath growne into such reputation , that to the most offerer he selleth for ready gold the merchandise of that his adhering : in such sort , that after he had dreyned the spaniards , asmuch as any the de●outest french lord of the holy league whatsoeuer , siding afterwards with the french , hee knew so well how to change his coppy , that a king of france , such as was henry the fourth , the great duke of toscan , and the duke of mantoua were glad of his alliance . and fully to make vp the spaniards iealousie , the famous venetian common-wealth drew into her pay a prince of that house with such affection , that if that great lady had not made a vow of perpetuall chastity , and her nature ( according to the custome of some indians ) had not beene stitched vp the first day she was born by the venetian signory , most iealous of her honour , it was verily beleeued by many , that she would haue taken him to husband . it was obserued , that the duke of sauoy enuied much the felicity of this prince , because hee finding himselfe also seated betweene the french and the spaniards of milan , as the duke of loraine was betweene the french and the spaniards of flanders , in stead of so many benefits , and so many commodities as fell vpon the duke of loraine , hee had receiued most cruell kicks , not onely from the french , then his enemies , but from the spaniards his friends , so that it was euident , the duke of sauoy did now plainly see , how that practise of his with the spaniard was most pernicious for him . then came the otto di balia , and put into the scale the flourishing state of the great dukes of tos●an , which by reason of the excellent wits of the inhabitants , perpetuall plenty , continuall peace , and quiet security it enioyeth , answered in weight to many kingdomes . lorenzo greatly reioyced , when he saw how vpon the foundations of those churches and hospitals , which he and his predecessors in the time of the florentine liberty had laid in their countrey , their successors , according to the modell left them by cosimo the great , had afterwards found meanes to erect strong cyttadels ; whereupon lorenzo , to make a glorious shew of the worth and wisdome of the princes of his house , added into the scale the admirable vnderstanding of ferdinand the great , with the excessiue weight whereof it was so ouer charged , that the huge chayne whereby it hung brake in two , so that all went to ground . this accident of the scales so broken , was an hindrance that other italian princes which remained could not be weighed ; whereupon it was concluded , that comming according to the ancient custome , to lay all the princes and potentates of italy in ballance against the monarchy of spaine , out of the vniuersall weight of the italian princes , each ones particular would easily appeare . into the midst of the great hall then was brought an huge and euen paire of balance , whereinto on the one part was put all the kingdomes of the monarchy of spaine , and into the other all the principalities of italy , and it was seene that they stood in equall ballance ; a matter of great trouble to all the italian princes : but whilest they continued in this agony , it was noted how the mighty french monarchy , with one onely louing looke which shee gaue to that ballance , wherein the italian principalities lay , made it suddenly to turne on that side . it may not be omitted , how the spaniards seeing the dukes of sauoy , who the last fifteenth yeare refused to be weighed with the italian forces , now to be put into the ballance , for to counterpoise theirs , threatned them by biting their thumbs at them ; whereof those princes being aware , with a generosity worthy their vndaunted spirits , they say thus vnto them ; signory of spain , yee can no longer feed men with hopes , for now we are throughly possessed of your courses : ye thought to haue brought the dukes of sauoy , by the cunning of your hopes , to such a ma●ne , as to forgoe that little bread , which they had in the mouth of their state ; to reach at the shadow of those great inheritances of spaine , which they saw in the bottome in the water . and because the spaniards complained for that the dukes of parma , modena , vrbin , the lords of mirandola , and the famous roman barons , gartani , colonesi , and orsini , which haue the fleece , and are in their pay , were weighed with the italian forces ; whereas in regard of that order , and the pensions they receiue , they were obliged to adhere to their designes , and to be the ministers of their greatnesse . they were answered by those lords , that they receiued the honours of the fleece , and inioyed the profits of those pensions , as honourable ladies accept of gifts from their louers ; only in a pure way of curtesie , and not with an intent any way to forget what appertaineth to their honour . chap. . almansor , sometime king of the moores , encountring with the kingdome of naples , they relate one to another the miseries they sustaine by the oppression of the spaniards . the famous king of moores , almansor , he that many yeares together raigned in spaine ouer the noble realme of granada , met yesterday with the kingdome of naples , and falling in talke with him , after hee had for a good space obserued the chaine , which the said kingdome of naples wore fastned about his legge , he told him , that the manufacture thereof being moresco , he verily thought that he had many times seene , and handled it somewhere else ; and a little while after with a shew of great maruell he affirmed , that he knew it well ; and how it was the very same , wherewithall both he , and the moorish kings his predecessors had for the space of seuen hundreth yeares held many kings of spaine in seruitude ; and therefore he earnestly intreated him , to let him vnderstand , how , by whom , and when he was chained in that manner . a very good eye , and an excellent memory hast thou , almansor , ( answered then the kingdome of naples ) for this vnluckie chaine , which thou seest about my legge , was brought out of spaine by gonsaluo corduba , called the great captaine , and therefore it is very likely to be the same thou speakest of . and now it is an hundreth yeares , since first i found my selfe in the miserable seruitude , wherein thou beholdest me , and from which i know not whether euer i shall be freed ; for in regard of the mighty power , whereunto i see the forces of the spaniards arriued , hauing vtterly lost all hope of assistance , that may be expected from men , i know that my ancient liberty standeth wholly in the powerfull hand of god , who had need to renue in me the miracles of the red sea , if my deliuerance shall follow . the yeares ( replied almansor ) confront well ; for a little before the time of thy seruitude , the spaniards vndid this my chaine from about the leg of the kingdome of granada , wherewithall afterwards they bound thee . but let it not displease thee , o kingdome of naples , to declare vnto me , how it could come to passe , that the spaniards should make themselues masters of such a kingdome as thou art , so potent , and so far distant from their forces . by fraud almansor , ( said the neapolitan kingdome ) did the spaniards get into italy , for by open force they had neuer beene able to make such notable acquests ; and as thou saidst well , so disproportionable to their forces , which were so far off . but heare , and wonder at the large and grosse conscience of a king of spaine in matters of state , although he vsed much art to seeme vnto foolish men a very saint ; for thou shalt come vnto the knowledge of a tragedy , according to the rules of my christian religion , most wicked and cruell ; but according to the termes of moderne policie , the most aduised that euer any nation represented vpon the stage of the world . alfonso my king , to his vtter , and my chiefest ruine , gaue isabella his neece ( for from this vnhappy mariage did my displantation take beginning ) to iohn galeazzo , duke of milan for wife . the minoritie first , and then the vnspeakable silly weaknesse of so infortunate a prince incouraged lodouico sforza to vsurpe the state vpon his nephew ; alfonso , as it behoued him , sought to hinder that tyrannie ; whereof lodouico being aware , and knowing , that without the ruine of my kings , it was not possible for him to arriue vnto the end of his most iniust desire , hee fell into that resolution , which afterwards both to himselfe , to me , and to all the princes of italy , proued so fatall , of drawing the french into italy , to the conquest of me . my kings to defend themselues from such mighty enemies , called to their aide that holy soule of ferdinand king of aragon their cousin , who shewed himselfe so kinde a kinsman , and such a faithfull friend , that in stead of chasing away the french enemies , he diuided me with them ; and to shew himselfe compleat , a little after this vnhappy diuision , hee entred into warres against the french , and hauing ouercome them , he forced them to returne full of shame , and losse into their country ; whereupon the good king ferdinand without any scruple at all of conscience became my absolute lord ; and then it was , that he fastned this chaine about my legge , which thou remembrest to be the manufacture , and worke of thy nation . and i doe not thinke , that in all the chronicles of the saracen● , moores , or turks , which it is likely thou hast read , there was euer a more wicked trechery recorded , done by a king , that desired to be reputed a man of a good conscience , and of an holy disposition ; and that a little before had receiued of the apostolike sea that glorious title of the most catholike king. truly ( replied aim●nsor ) in the chronicles , which thou hast named of my nation , many foule actions committed by diuers princes out of ambition to raigne , may be read , but this which thou hast recounted of ferdinand goeth beyond them all . but if thou , o almansor , ( said the kingdome of naples ) diddest with thy nation keepe the kingdome of granada , chained so many hundreth yeares , what course tooke the spaniards for to free him ? that vnion of the kingdomes of castile and aragon ( replied almansor ) which followed vpon the mariage betweene ferdinand and isabella , occasioned the liberty of the kingdome of granada : a most vnhappy vnion , the which , no lesse than i haue done , and continually still doe , the greatest potentates of europe haue lamented , doe lament , and perpetually with vnfained teares will lament ; as that which is the true and onely root , from whence are sprung all those greatest subuersions of states , which vnto this day haue beene seene in many parts of europe , but more remarkably in italy . and beleeue me , neapolitan kingdome , that euen till now might i haue raigned happily in spaine , if this pestiferous vnion had not ouerthrowne my greatnesse ; for the many iealousies that raigned betweene the castilians and aragonians , were my inexpugnable cittadels , which would haue maintained my raigne here for euer . withall assure thy selfe , o kingdome of naples , that the aids which the popes gaue to ferdinand , and queene isabella , greatly accelerated my taking in . peace , peace , almansor ( said then the neapolitan kingdom ) for after thou wert chased out of spaine by the ambitious spanish nation , the popes vnderwent such miseries , that it may be truly said , how with ready money they bought those extreme calamities , wherewithall afterwards they encountred ; for though the sea apostolicall were well contented to see the moores driuen out of spaine , yet that satisfaction was much distasted with my seruitude , which followed presently vpon it , the popes hauing neuer had any thing in greater feare , than that i should fall into the hands of a mighty prince , who might make them liue in those perpetuall iealousies , wherein finding themselues drowned euen vp to the very eyes , many of them , and particularly those , that haue a greater knowledge of things of the world , doe not alwaies make quiet sleeps . a cleare testimonie of the truth which i speake , was the lamentable and wicked sacke of rome , perpetrated by the spaniards a little after my seruitude ; with which ingratitude they paid the apostolike sea for all they were debtors vnto it , as well for the remission of the tribute of naples , as for the other succors , which they receiued in the warre of granada . a calamitie , that hauing past the termes of most grieuous miseries , hath in such manner opened the eyes euen of men of the drowsiest vnderstanding , that euery one commeth clearly to know , what it is to vnchaine the lion out of a zeale of pietie ; for the spaniards no sooner saw themselues freed from the impediment of the moores of granada , but that through the ambition , which they shewed in desiring to command ouer the whole vniuerse , not onely in italie , but throughout all europe , most important iealousies of state , and most grieuous interests of religion discouered themselues , insomuch , that i haue often heard it discoursed by men of most vnderstanding in affaires of the world , how peraduenture it would haue beene lesse preiudiciall for many princes of europe , that thou hadst raigned still in granada , than that the spaniards should haue passed into italy , to acquire such important states , as at this day they possesse there . hereunto may be added the preiudices both publike and priuate , which my ruine hath brought , and continually doth bring vnto the italian princes , and more particularly to the popes , because the kings of spaine had no sooner fastened this chaine about my leg , but presently they began to aspire vnto the dominion of all italy ; and the quicklier to arriue thereunto , they knew very excellently how to interesse themselues in the differences , which at that time depended betweene the princes of italy and the french , about the possession of the dutchy of milan , wherein that top of man , charles the fifth caried himselfe in such sort , that hee made himselfe to bee knowne the worthy nephew of his grandfather by the mothers side : for hauing with the forces of the italian princes , chased the french out of italy , in stead of restoring the sforzi to the state , as it was agreed betwixt him , and the confederate princes , with the fraud of a thousand turkish quarrels pickt of purpose , which he well knew how to inuent against the sforzi , he made himselfe absolute master of that so important a dutchie . stay , kingdome of naples ; and making a point here , ( said almansor ) satisfie me in this : seeing the noble state of milan was fallen into the hands of the spaniards ; what hindred them from running precipitously to the acquisition of all italie ? and seeing thy seruitude doth manifest vnto the world , that the aids and succours of princes , serue more for the benefit of him that giueth them , than for the profit of him that receiueth them , why would not the italian princes rather suffer , that milan should bee vnder the dominion of the french , than by receiuing aide from the spaniards , runne the danger of letting that dutchy ( being so important a member of italy ) fall into the hands , as thou saidst it did , of the kings of spaine ? the power of the kings of france ( answered the neapolitan kingdome ) defendeth that remnant of liberty which remaineth in italy , from the ambition of spaine : for those glorious kings out of the interest of their greatnesse will not endure , that the dominion of all italy should fall into the power of the ambitious spanish nation , which cannot extinguish the ardent thirst they haue of commanding , neither with the conquest of all the new world discouered by them , nor with so great a part which they possesse in the old . besides , the italian princes , who know the great perill ( wherein they finde they are ) of a dangerous and miserable seruitude , haue so vnited themselues together , that although they be many in number , yet make they but one body ; and the spaniards ; who haue vsed , and doe vse all possible deuices to disunite them , euidently perceiue , that they wash a black-moore . but touching the state of milan , thou must know , how it was iudged more secure for the publike liberty of italie , that that dutchie should fall into the power of the spaniards , than that it should remaine in the hands of the french ; who for that they were ioyning to italie , when therein they should possesse any little part , there would haue beene manifest danger , that they would haue made themselues absolute lords of the whole : but in the spaniards it would fall out cleane contrary ; for their forces , albeit very great , are notwithstanding so far off , that by so long a tract of sea , they could with much difficultie transport out of spaine into italie forces , that were able to maintaine the acquests they had made , not that they could be sufficient to subdue the whole . thou speakest the truth , ( said then almansor ) but goe on , and declare vnto me the prejudices , which thy falling into the hands of the spaniards brought vnto the popes . know then , ( replyed the kingdome of naples ) that whereas before , the popes were the terror of my kings , now it happeneth to be cleane otherwise ; for they liue in a very great agony , lest the vnion of milan with naples should one day follow ; to which marke , they obserue , the spaniards haue directed the scope of all their thought ; whereupon the spaniards , whose proper nature it is to make good vse of the feare , whereinto they see they haue put the princes their neighbours , haue arrogated vnto thēselues such authority in the court of rome , that they vaunt they are the true arbitrators of all the most important matters which there are handled . moreouer , when the kings of naples were not kings of spaine , the popes with euery little menace of denying the inuestiture , obtained of my kings , principalities , duchies , earledomes , and other great states in gift , buying their friendships also with marriages , and many other sorts of liberalitie ; but now the feare being ceased , if the popes will make their kinred great with titles of important states , they must be glad to buy them with their ready money , and the aduised kings of spaine , besides the precious gold of intreaties , which at any hand they will bee sure shall precede for a first payment , sell them vnto them throughly sawced . important interests , and grieuous disorders are these ( said almansor ) which thou hast recounted vnto me ; but how commeth it that thou , kingdome of naples , which art the magazine of silkes , the granary of italy , shouldest goe so ragged , and be so leane ? seeing the spaniards , that come naked out of spaine [ answered the kingdome of naples ] after they haue been three or foure dayes in my house , will needs couer themselues all ouer with gold , it is no maruell if i be spoyled , to clothe so many raggedemuffins : besides , if thou sawest the rapacitie of the vice-royes , that to recouer themselues are sent vnto me , or if thou knewest the rapines of secretaries , of thousand officers , and other courtiers , which they bring along with them , all thirsty of my bloud , thou wouldest greatly maruell , how it were possible , i should sa●iate the raging and greedy swallow of so many hunger-starued wretches . as for the little flesh thou seest on my backe , the spaniards affirme , that in the booke of a certaine florentine , who hath giuen rules of the cruell moderne policie , they find written , that being a kindome conquered , after the manner of those horses which are kept onely for races , i ought to bee maintained low in the flesh . i but ( said almonsor then ) the milanesi how are they intreated ? they also ( replyed the kingdomes of naples ) are bathed with the water , wherwithall thou seest me so wet ; only this difference is betwixt vs , that in milan are drops , in my house , floods . the true occasion of the diuersitie of these intreatings is the quality of the lombards dispositions , most vnlike to my neapolitans : for the nobilitie of the state of milan are naturally phantasticall , free , resolute , and farre from that vice so proper to my neapolitans , of flattery , and affectation ; but so bold and hardy , that they dare say , how ●f one onely cremonese spirit had beene found amongst my neapolitan barons , it would haue hindred that same forced donatiue , that hath brought me to eat bread and onyons ; the which , although with great words , it hath bin often demanded by the spaniards in milan , they haue been as resolutely answered , that they should take care to liue : besides , the confining of the grisons , of the duke of sauoy , and venetians , are the cause , that the kings of spaine proceed with more discretion in milan : for when the popes managed armes , i my selfe also was for their occasion greatly respected . but soft , almansor , yonder commeth my most capitall enemy don pedrode toledo , wherefore i pray thee withdraw a little ; for at any hand i would not haue him take notice , that i lament my disgraces heere with thee ; and for this onely , were it for nothing else , may i tearme my seruitude most wretched , in that i am forced to call this miserable state , wherein thou seest me , the happy golden age. chap. . sigismund battor learneth the latine tongue . yesterday about eight of the clocke in the euening , the ordinary post of germany arriued at this court , and brought very ioyfull newes how sigismund b●ttor , prince of transiluania , was growne so inamored of the gracefull latine tongue , that to his great glory he spake , and wrote with the purity and eloquence of the cesarean style ; whereupon all the vertuous earnestly besought apollo , that for such good newes there might be made in parnassus all those demonstrations of ioy , which ( to incourage great men to the loue of learning ) were wont to be made , when any prince became learned : but his maiestie , that seeth into the vttermost secret of all things , denied those vertuous their request , and told them that then onely there should be feasting in parnassus , when out of the freenesse of a noble minde , and meere election of studies , not constrained by any necessitie , princes applyed themselues to learning ; and that they were to know , how prince battor had gotten the elegant latine tongue , neither out of ambition to shew himselfe to be learned , nor out of a vertuous curiosity to know many things , but onely out of necessitie for his reputations sake , to correct the foolish and childish absurditie which he committed , in gender , number , and case , at such time , as in the warre of hungary , he took that fatall resolution to arme himselfe against the turke , for to adhere vnto the emperour of germany , whom in regard of the strong and liuely pretensiors , which he hath to the principality of transiluania , hee was to haue in more horrour , then seuentie ottoman emperours . chap. . the cardinall of toledoes summa is not admitted into the library of parnassus . the illustrious and reuerend francesco cordova , cardinall of toledo , a personage of exemplarie life , an exqu●site diuine , and excellent philosopher ; hee that in his owne person honoured the word of god in the pulpit , more then any other preacher whatsoeuer of his time , some few dayes since arriued at parnassus , hauing been receiued vpon the confines of the state , by alessandrod ' ales , and cornelio musso bishop of bitonto , and all the way encertained at his majesties charge . this honourable learned man presented his writings vnto the venerable colledge of the vertuous ; and those of philosophy were not onely commended , but admired , as also the commentaries composed by him vpon the diuine passages of all the sacred writers , were receiued with extraordinay applause , and shortly after they were carried in a pretious vrne vnder a cloath of estate , into the delphicke library , and with the name of the author , consecrated to eternitie . onely his summa , although very learned , was not receiued by those vertuous , who freely told him , that there were so many workes already of that kind in his maiesties library , as some of them seemed superfluous : for an infinite many of great diuines had with such diligence handled ma●ters appertaining to the consciences of priuate men , that they had put the saluation of soules into comprimise , for the onely regard of a shillings gaine : and that the world very much desired to see a complete summa , composed vpon the consciences of grea● princes ; a matter most necessary for the quiet of the whole vniuerse , and altogether omitted by diuines ; wherein those actions of princes should be exactly discoursed vpon , with which so often they put the world into confusion , filling it with robberies , assassinates , and such slaughters of men , that many of them blinded with ambition to raigne vpon earth , haue made riuers to runne with humane bloud . the colledge of the learned , hearing these particulars , said , that they much desired to haue these questions disputed and resolued : namely , whether christian pietie will admit the speciall hypothesis , which the violence of the sword hath vsurped ouer others states : whether a principalitie , that by armes and fraud , is forcibly taken from another prince , may be held by one that hath the true feare of god : whether that course of ruling a kingdome , which is conquered onely to the end to impouerish and waste it , that so it may be gouerned without jealousie , may be practised by one that is borne in the christian faith : whether the exalting of reason of state to such an height , that it should trample vnder feet , as at this present it doth , all lawes diuine and humane , be not a more detestable and execrable idolatry , then worshipping nabuchadnezzars image , or the golden calfe . and lastly , the colledge said , that then their desires would be fully accomplished , when there could be found a diuine so much fearing god , that with his writings durst fright princes as much from doing euill , as many others with their great volumes had terrified priuate men ; for it seemed a strange thing vnto them , that infinite learned diuines ●●d so laboured to reason of the strict account , which shop-keepers are to render , euen for idle words , vnto the majestie of god , and in the meane time had omitted to make mention of those exorbitant errours , committed by great princes ; when with their armies ouer-running states , they send all things into perdition , both sacred and prophane : and that with more benefit to mankind , and eternall reward to themselues , diuines might haue discoursed vpon the actions of lewis the twelfth , and francis the first , both kings of france ; of ferdinand king of aragon , and charles the fifth the emperor , whose soules departed out of this world with the heauy burthen of halfe a million of man-slaughters , all committed by their ambition to reigne , and whereof they were to giue a strict account to almighty god : all which were matters exceeding necessarie , to the end , that mankind so much afflicted by the ambition of princes , might one day receiue the consolation , which with such longing it desireth , when those that reigne should be terrified from doing amisse , and be made to know , that hell was prepared as well for the great as the small . chap. . the monarchy of spaine throweth her physitian out of the window . this morning the monarchy of spaine hauing sent for her ordinary physitiā , a little after with her own hands she threw him out of the window of her royall palace , whereupon the poore wretch , being all battered in peeces , died incontinently . an accident that seemed the more strange , in regard the physitian was held by all the court , to be a man of extraordinary honesty , and in the practise of his profession most admirable . sundry were the discourses that were made vpon so remarkable a matter . but , apollo desiring to know of the spanish monarchy herselfe , the true cause of so grieuous a resentment , that mighty queene told him , how aboue forty yeares since , vpon occasion of some accidents that befell her , and other signes which shee had discouered , shee feared that in processe of time , shee should catch some dangerous french disease from the royall house of burbon , and therefore to prouide for the inconuenience which shee foresaw , shee had demanded counsell of her physitian , who prescribed her a long fastidious and chargeable purgation , compounded of diuers oyles of holy leagues , of insurrections of people , of rebellions of nobility , of cauteries , and other very bitter ingredients , whereby she had spoiled her stomacke , weakened her strength , and altogether lost her appetite ; and that the infinite quantity of syrrupes , and the many medicine● which she had taken with such anguish , had wrought no other effect , but the acceleration of the disease , which without that vnlucky and vnseasonable purgation peraduenture shee should neuer haue had : moreouer , that the many leaches which were applyed to many parts of her body , had in such manner sucked the best vitall blood of the gold of that spaine , that through the weaknesse of her complexion , she was not able to euacuate those euill humours of flanders , which had held her , and doe hold her oppressed . by which disorders , all occasioned through the naughty counsell of that imprudent physitian , shee was so exasperated against him , that she had solemnely sworne to throw him out of the window , if to free her from future infirmities , he euer after ordained her any purgation ; and that perceiuing how the paine which she hath at this instant in the shoulder of holland , was an apparant lues gallica , shee had demanded counsell of the same physitian for to cleare her selfe of it , who vnmindfull of his former errors , had foolishly ordained the second purgation , wholly and altogether like the former , and that therefore being ouercome with paine , shee had throwne him out of the window , so punishing him at once for both the faults hee had committed : for it seemed vnto her , that hee had well deserued the misfortune of that resentment , seeing that by the accidents following , with such infelicity of her spaniards , he had not learned to know , that purgations made before their time for diseases that are feared , doe not worke those good effects , which either the physitian beleeueth , or the patient desireth . chap. . most of the states of the world are censured in parnassus for their errors . apollo carefull of nothing more , than to see the princes of the world , should in the vpright gouernment of their states , giue the people such satisfaction as they ought , introduced into parnassus ( many ages since ) this admirable custome : that euery yeare , the names of the chiefest potentates of the earth , written vpon little scedules , should be put into an vrne , and then being drawn forth one by one , the publike censor of politicall matters should ( in the presence of the sacred colledge of the learned ) record the disorders , which he had obserued in the gouernment of their states ; whereupon those princes were bound either incontinently with satisfying reasons to defend such things as were obiected against them , or else within a moneth to reforme them . an institution no doubt very noble and holy ; for it hath effected , that in the progresse of so many ages , since first it was vsed , princes haue corrected an infinitie of errours : besides , knowing that they are to bee called to so strict an account , it maketh them endeauour to liue so vertuously , that in the presence of so many princes they neede not to blush . vpon the day appointed then , most of the potentates of the world appeared before apollo : and count baldazar castiglione the politicall censor , said vnto the reuerend lord giouanni dalla casa , nuntio for the sea apostolicall in this state , which was first drawne out of the vrne ; that it seemed vnto him a most scandalous matter , and indeed vnworthy the greatnesse and maiesty of the popes , that in rome should be seene some potent families , vnto whom it serued in stead of a rich patrimony to bee dependant on forraigne princes , not very well affected to the greatnesse of the apostolicke sea , which in euery occasion were apt with the power of their factions to giue the popes much trouble ; and that he might truly say , how in all his time he had not seene a more foule and execrable thing , than that which the emperour charles the fifth did , when with the noble charge of the kingdome of naples , he rewarded the cruell seditions , and shamefull treacheries , which the cardinall pompeo colonna , vsed against the high bishop clement the seuenth . then the lord giouanni demanded of the count , how long it was since hee had conuersed in the romane court ; who answering , some seuenty yeares past : the nuncio replyed , that returning thither now he should find , how by reason of the abundance of vertjuyce , which the pompei , fabritij , prosperi , ascanij of the family of colonna ; the virginij , and other more principall barons of the house of orsina had eaten ; the teeth of their nephews and grand-children were so set on edge , that they could hardly chaw their broth : for the popes which had tyed those exorbitances about their fingers , knew so excellently how to practise the tarquinian precept , that they haue reduced those poppies , which heretofore were as high as cedars , to the humble stature of ridiculous dwarffes . this answere satisfied the count , who turning to the romane empire , next drawne out of the vrne , hee said vnto him , that the present disorders which were seene not only in the great patrimony of the house of austria , but in all germany , proceeded from the negligence of the present emperor rodolphus , and therefore hee much desired , that that maiesty would with more care embrace the gouernment of his so many states ; remembring , that princes , rulers of mankind , bore vpon their shoulders the heauiest weight , and had in their hands the most laborious worke that any the painfullest day-labourer whatsoeuer could exercise . the censor was exceedingly thanked by the romane empire for this aduice ; whereunto with much grauity he answered , that it was a disgrace common with all princes , to be accused of negligence , when scandals arose in their states , although it notoriously appeared , that in regard they were occasioned by the practises of more mighty enemies , they could not possibly be auoyded by an vnderstanding prince . wherefore it was to be considered , that the monstrous felicities , which the most mighty house of austria haue had by inheriting with their matches , the states of flanders , the kingdomes of spaine , of naples , sicilia , bohemia , hungary , and portugall , haue giuen all the princes of germany , of italy , and of europe such diobolicall jealousies , that they haue caused both the passed and present ruines , now beheld in their ancient patrimony : whereunto the emperors , which haue raigned since maximilian the first of famous memory , albeit they were reputed most valorous and prudent princes , could neuer after apply any salue , that did not infinitely exasperate the sore of the disorders of germany , wherin had concurred such abundance of malignant humours , that it might truly be said , it was immedicable . further , it was to be remembred , what small authority the moderne emperors haue had in germany , so that it were not onely a discourtesie , but open injustice to will one , that hath his hands fast bound behind him to performe the acts of or●ando . moreouer , the qualitie of the empire was to be regarded , which being electiue , they that serued , had more authority in it , then they that commanded . besides the present weaknesse of the house of austria in germany , from whom ( with the seditions of religion ) the hearts of their subiects are stollen ; a theft so important , that they may well abandon those states as lost , wherein such dangerous seed is sowen . whereupon the present emperour seeing himselfe depriued of the obedience of his subiects , desireth euery one to reflect vpon the quality of the cousins , which the house of austria hath in spaine , and they shall find that the people of almaine borne for their libertie , to secure themselues from the monstrous power of such a family , take impious and wrongfull reuenges euen on those , which shal not be free frō the seruitude of the spaniards , if for the sins of men they euer arriue to that point of commanding ouer the world ; from which ( by the meere goodnesse and mercy of god ) they are put off as farre , as by their many deuices they haue laboured to come neere it . that also it was to be thought vpon , how the first that in italie , and abroad , disinherited with all kinde of irreuerence , and disrespect , the maiestie of the empire , were those their cousins of spaine , as clearely appeared by the vsurpation of finale , and other imperiall feudes by them possessed . all which things , mouing dangerous humors without dissoluing them afterwards , doe cause the house of austria in germany , to be cruelly scourged by most powerfull enemies , whilest the spaniards with their only menaces seeke to put the whole world into suspition and distate . and for conclusion , he desired all the sacred colledge to consider , that to the miserable sterilitie of children , which is seene in the present emperor , is adioyned a lamentable fertilitie of brethren ; one of which incited by the most violent spurre of ambition , hath not doubted at last to goe about to ouerthrow his owne house , which is ready to fall . all accidents so vnhappy , that they would make euen salomon himselfe seeme to the world a very foole . these replies , which to all the assistants seemed very weighty , satisfied the censor , who turning him to the warlike french monarchie , said vnto her ; how all the vertuous of parnassus much desired of her , that shee would rule the furious , vnquiet , capricious , and exceeding impetuous dispositions of her french , reducing them to those termes of prudence , aduisednesse , and stayednesse of minde , which are seene in the noble italian , and spanish nations ; and how it much blemished her reputation , that the kingdome of france , which holdeth a first place amongst the most principall monarchies of the world , should be inhabited by men so infinitely rash . to this aduertisement the french monarchie replied , that the censor not well informed of the interests of her kingdome , had censured for defects the chiefest vertues , which she loued in her french. folly , lightnesse , vnaduisednesse , and a precipitous nature were they , which had made her so feared , and formidable a queene , because her french with vnspeakable alacritie and forwardnes , would vpon the least nod of hers , expose themselues to those perils , whereunto other princes could not with the rope , the cudgell , and the cruellest kinds of punishment compell their wise , aduised , and circumspect subiects : and that in the many warres , which she had held with most valorous nations , she had learned to know , how an armie framed of souldiers , which had little braine , and much courage , so that they are led by a valiant , and discreet generall , doth carry away the victorie from those people , who professe more circumspection , and wisdome . this answer of the monarchie of france , was so much the more commended of castiglione , by how much , regarding the qualitie of a mighty kingdome , he knew that the french possessed all those endowments and vertues , which were requisite in a nation , for to found , amplifie , and maintaine a great empire . then the censor turning to the powerfull monarchie of spaine , said vnto her , how it was euident , nothing gaue greater satisfaction to all people in generall , but more particularly to those which were subiect to strange nations , than the humanitie , and affable cariage of such as gouerned them ; whereas she sending to the gouernments of naples , milan , and sicilia , none but her owne spaniards , they with their ordinarie castilian statelinesse , and insupportable spanish pride , without all comparison far exceeding that , which the kings of spaine themselues either could , or would haue vsed in those states , did so exasperate euen their good and faithfull subiects , that the spanish dominion was growne infinitely odious : and that further , both in weighty , and sleight affaires , hee desired more quicke expeditions from her , seeing that by her too much delay , and perplexitie in the deliberation of important matters , shee had lost many faire occasions , that had presented themselues vnto her , for the inlarging of her empire . the monarchy of spaine very much thanked the censor for the aduertisements he had giuen her , and in her excuse answered , how that honourable gentleman , which had a young wife , beyond all expression faire , but of a disposition inclined to lasciuiousnesse , should shew himselfe very discreet , if he desired , that a proper hansome seruant , whom he kept in his house , should be rather extremely hated , than any whit affected by his wife : and that vnto the delay in the resolution of her affaires , which she knew to be vitious and preiudiciall , it lay not in her power to giue remedie : for almighty god hauing not without important occasions created her spaniards wholly , and altogether quite different in disposition from the french , whilest they in the deliberation of businesses , were rather precipitous , than executiue , she in her being so slow and irresolute , obeyed the will of god , who would haue it so . the next drawne out of the vrne was the monarchie of poland ; vnto whom count baldasar said , how all the princes of europe c●u●d haue wished , that the present king sigismond had vsed towards those seditious nobles , which last rebelled against him , some seueritie worthy so grieuous a fault , only to the end , that by their example , other lords might haue beene deterred from committing the like . to this the polach monarchy answered , that those chastisements giuen to the nobility , which in an hereditarie state would be commodious , haue alwaies proued in her electiue kingdome preiudiciall : and how that kingdome , which another receiueth in gift from a nobility , in whose power is the election of the king , cannot without euident perill of falling from his greatnesse . be gouerned with that rigour , which in other hereditary states is necessary ; for that senate , which out of an election of loue giueth another a kingdome , if it be prouoked by the powerfull passion of hate , knoweth also how to reassume it , in regard well-aduised senators are wont to reserue vnto themselues those necessary instruments , whereby vpon euery occasion of euill satisfaction , they may recall their vsed liberalitie : and that the present king sigismond being the first of his house , which had raigned in poland , hee was to direct the aime of all his thoughts to no other scope so much , as by an extraordinary indulgence to win the hearts of the nobilitie of his state , that so with a gratefull memory of his clemency , he might perpetuate the succession of such a kingdome in his bloud . an aduertisement most necessary for sigismond his king , by reason the polachs , although their king be electiue , doe neuer defraud the royall bloud of the succession , if hee that raigneth , can tell how to get the generall loue of the nobilitie . for the polonians being a nation , that know not how to liue in an absolute liberty , doe so abhor all manner of seruitude , that that king among them ( a matter common to all electiue princes ) shall be most oculatiue , and vigilant in the matters of his state , that least seemeth either to see or know any thing . not only the censor , but the whole colledge of the vertuous , admitted the iustification of the polach monarchy for excellent . hereupon the count turning himselfe to the vast ottoman empire , said vnto him , that the cruelty which hee vsed , onely vpon light suspitions , against his chiefest ministers , was held by all the world to be a bloudy course ; it being a receiued opinion , that men of extraordinary valour and merit , should not be laid hands on , but for great and proued offences : and that when the ottoman princes did euen iustly take away the liues of their ministers , the custome of seizing vpon their estates to their owne vse , and thereof vtterly depriuing the children , did scandalize all good iustice , because it seemed , that with such cruell rigour , the estates , rather than the faults of the delinquents , wee hunted after . to this so open a correction , the ottoman empire answered with admirable grauity , that he was growne to that greatnesse wherein he was seene , by the onely two most powerfull meanes of reward without measure , and punishment without end : and that the sole foundation of the quiet of euery state , being placed in the fidelity of the most important ministers , princes were not to seeke any thing with more care , than with immense rewards to allure them vnto faithfulnesse , and with infinite punishments to terrifie them from trecheries : that those ministers which haue in their power , the forces , command , and gouernments of states , not being able to erre , but in most important matters , it were the counsell of a foolish prince , vpon suspitions of that moment , to arraigne , accuse , and heare the iustifications of the offender ; but in such a case , the prince which will runne no danger , ought to endeuour to surprise his minister vpon the sudden , and to deale so securely , that the execution of the punishment may precede euen the accusation it selfe : that many times it had fallen out , that he with a sudden chastisement had preuented the consummation of most foule treasons : which resolution , though he acknowledged to be most seuere , yet he knew it had so wrought , that there were neuer seene in his state any counts st. paul , princes of orange , dukes of guise , d'aumale , du maine , de mercure , and other foule monsters of disloyaltie , which , with the shame of those princes , that with halters , poynards , and axes , knew not how to preuent such dangerous offences , haue beene seene otherwhere : it being a rule in matters of state as common , as secure , that that minister , which giueth to his prince the least shadow of suspition of his faith , incurreth a capitall paine , because those captaines which haue the care of armies in their power , are bound , like the wiues of honourable personages , to liue with such puritie of minde , that they be free not only from blame , but from the least suspition of a blame-worthy thought . that touching the seizure of his bashawes estates after their death , he thought he might truly say , that the entertainments , gifts , and wealth , wherewithall other princes rewarded their ministers , in comparison of those inexhaustible riches which he bestowed on his well-deseruing officers , were vile , and poore , as those royall treasures , which ruften , mahomet , ibrahin , and infinite others left behind them after their decease , haue fully testified : that the greatest regard which a prince ought to haue in rewarding his ministers , consisteth in prouiding , that the vnmeasurable riches , wherewith he bought of them infinite fidelitie , may not possibly at any time be conuerted to the prejudice of him , that vsed the liberalitie : that from the grieuous disorders fallen out in the states of other potentates , he had found it to be a matter most pernitious vnto princes , that the extraordinary riches left by a deseruing minister , should passe vnto his children , not hauing first deserued it ( by their vertue , valour , and fathers said fidelitie ) of the prince : that he had not out of couetousnesse , as many misiudged , confiscated the great inheritances of his bashawes , but that by the commoditie thereof , those subiects should not be idle , and consequently vicious , which being descended of fathers of notable valour , gaue the prince assured hope they would imitate the vertues of their progenitors : that the gate of his treasure stood perpetually open to the heires of his ministers , to restore them their fathers inheritances twice doubled , when they with their fidelitie and valour should deserue them ; and how much the riches of men vicious , and subiect to ambition , were apt to disturbe the peace of any kingdome , how great soeuer , well appeared by the fresh examples , which he had seene both in france and flanders . whilst the ottoman empire spake in this manner , he obserued that the renouned french monarchy , with the shaking of her head , seemed to declare , that she no way approued those reasons : whereupon somewhat the more moued , he said thus : mighty queene , my custome in seizing vpon the estates of my bashawes , is profitable for the greatnesse , and quiet of my state ; and in regard of the friendship that is betwixt vs , i would to god , the same course were obserued in your france ; for you know full well , to what vse henry the duke of guize conuerted the exceeding riches , wherewithall the liberall kings francis the first , and henry the second rewarded the merits of duke francis his father . you , and i , and all those that raigne doe know , how the sweetest bait that can allure men , is a crowne , and there being no man , which for to taste neuer so little of it , but would hold it a great pleasure for to expose euen his life to manifest danger of losing it , princes ought to be most vigilant in keeping with extremest seueritie the passages thereunto closed vp against all men : nay , they ought to accōmodate their affaires in such sort , that no priuate man whatsoeuer should once hope to taste of so sweet a thing : and i tell you freely , that if your duke of guiz● had in my state but onely thought that , which with such publike scandall he boldly put in execution in your kingdome of france ; i would the very first day haue giuen him that blow , whereunto your king henry the third , although he were incited vnto it by the greater part of the princes of italy , could neuer be drawne , vntill the very last houre of his shamefull disgraces , and euen at that instant , when the sort of the french vprores was become an incurable vlcer ; for where ambition raigneth among nobles , princes are constrained to shew themselues all seueritie , continually keeping scaffolds in readines , & prepared , to punish the seditious and rebellious ; and their treasury open , to reward the quiet , and the loyall ; that prince being vnworthy to command , that hath not the vnderstanding how to make himselfe be obeyed ; neither can there be a more scandalous matter seene , not met withall in a state , then that the prince should liue in jealousie of an officer , which ought to tremble before him . but it is the propertie of you the princes of christendome , making profession of learning , and directing your selues by rules of policie , to call me barbarous , and my secure way of proceeding , tyrannicall , whilst in the meane time , yee suffer your selues to be reduced by your heroycall vertues of clemencie , and gentlenesse , to shamefull tearmes of enduring vnworthy things . it is not possible to deliuer , how much the ottoman empire offended all the vertuous of the sacred colledge with his discourse , who standing vp , told him in great disdaine , how they could proue with present reasons , that all which he had said , were most wicked conceipts , vnworthy to be spoken by any person that had a soule , or to be heard of men , that made profession of honour . whereunto the ottoman empire answered , smiling , that others in the gouernment of kingdomes might haue regard to vertue , and i know not what , but for his part he would neuer be perswaded , but that the quiet and peace of states ought to be preferred before all other humane interests whatsoeuer . then the censor , to cut off so odious a dispute , turning to the great duchie of moscouy , said vnto him , that the most noble perogatiue of raigning ouer people , which were louers of learning , and excellently vertuous , was the second amongst the greatnesses of a prince : whereas he by so endeuouring to bring vp his subjects in a grosse ignorance , reaped no small blame , if not much disreputation ; because euery one skorned him , for that , expelling the famous liberall arts out of his state , he had onely permitted his people to learne the benefit of writing and reading . to this censure the duchie of moscouy answered , that the dreadfull fire , which he had obserued learning had euer kindled in those states , where it had been admitted , had made him resolue not to suffer in any sort , that so scandalous a cockle should be sowed in his duchie ; for men being the heards of princes , as sheepe the flocks of priuate persons , it were extreme folly to arme those gentle sheepe their subiects with the malice , which learning engraffeth into their dispositions , that attaine vnto it ; whereas otherwise , in regard of that harmelesse simplicitie , wherewith almighty god hath created them , they may be commodiously ruled and gouerned , be they neuer so many in number , by one prince alone : and how he held for infallible truth , that if the germans and hollanders had been maintained by their princes in the simplicitie of their ancient ignorance , and withall it had been prohibited , that the pure minde of those nations might not haue beene contaminated with the plague of greeke and latine learning , without all doubt they had neuer had the judgement , with such a ruine of their old religion , and destruction of many princes , that before ruled ouer those prouinces , to know how to frame those perfect formes of common-weales in their countries , whereunto neither the wit of solon , the wisedome of plato , nor all the philosophy of aristotle could euer arriue . this answere so moued the censor , and all the sacred colledge of the learned , that with threatning lookes they said , how the reasons alledged by the great dutchy of moscouy , were open blasphemies ; and it seemed the learned were ready to make good their words with deeds , when the greater part of the mightiest monarchies were seene to betake themselues to their weapons , for defence of the moscouite ; who growing more audacious vpon the forward assistance of so many potentates , boldly said , if any one would deny , that learning did not infinitly disturbe the quiet , and good gouernment of states ; and that a prince might not with more facilitie rule a million of ignorants , then an hundreth learned , that were made to command , and not to obey , he lyed in his throat . the vertuous vpon this daring defiance grew extremely incensed , and stoutly replyed , that the moscouite had spoken with an insolence , worthy of an ignorant , and how they could also proue vnto him , that men without learning were asses and calues with two legs . now were they almost ready to goe together by the eares , when the censor cryed out , forbeare , and carry due respect to this place , where we are assembled to amend disorders , and not to commit scandals ; whereupon such was the reuerence euery one bare to the maiestie of the censor , that both the princes , and the learned , although they were transported with anger and disdaine , became sodainely pacified . all being quiet , then the censor said vnto the famous venetian libertie , which next was drawen out of the vrne , that the hardest matter to be found in an aristocracie , as she well knew , was to restraine the young nobilitie , who with their licentiousnesse distasting the better sort of citizens , had many times occasioned the ruine of most famous common-weales ; and that he to his great griefe had heard , how the yong nobilitie of venice with their proud demeanour had offended many honourable citizens of that state ; who exceedingly complained , that whilest the insolency of the nobilitie encreased , the chastisements for it decreased ; and that therefore heremembred her , that it was a dangerous point in an aristocracie , when those which were to glory for that they were farre from those dangers , whereunto such are subiect , as are to obey the humour of a prince , be heard to complaine , that they are oppressed by many tyrants . hereunto the venetian libertie answered , that the disorder recounted by the censor was true , and withall dangerous ; but that the authoritie of commanding , was so annexed to pride and insolencie , that they seemed to be borne both at one birth : and that the licenciousnesse , which the nobilitie of all aristocracies vseth towards the citizens , was by all the greatest men , that haue discoursed of common-weales , reputed a desperate cure ; for although it was most necessary , that insolencies should be restrained with seuere paines , yet on the other side , an aristocracie was to abstaine as much as possibly might be from publike punishments of noblemen , albeit seditious ; to the end that their shamefull suffering might not be an occasion to disinherit the whole nobilitie it selfe of that respect which is due to them from the people ; for hauing the gouernment of the state in their hands , the interest of the publike conseruation thereof requireth , that they be held in highest reputation : and although in her venice , disobedient and insolent noblemen were not seene to be so often punished , betweene the two pillars in the piazza of saint marke , as it seemeth many desired , yet by the great councell the pregadi , the colledge , and other supremer magistrates , that dispence the publike charges , those seditious noblemen , which were discouered to carry a tyrannicall minde , were cruelly afflicted with the torment of shamefull repulses : and that many subjects of most noble houses are seene in venice , whose ancient reputation for their demerits was maimed by arquebuses charged with bullets of paper ; and that being strucken downe with such kind of shot , they could neuer rise since to honours and dignities ; things wherein consisteth the life of the noblemen of an aristocracie : and that to excruciate a body , a greater torture could not be deuised , no not by perillus himselfe , then that which once a nobleman of venice experienced , when in a concurrence of the honourablest charges , he saw one yonger then himselfe passe before him , onely because he was knowne to the senate to be more deseruing . castiglione did not onely admit the justification of the venetian libertie , but also did infinitely commend the circumspection and seueritie which shee vsed in punishing her nobilitie , vpon occasion of any demerit or defect . then the censor said vnto the duchy of sauoy , that his state being seated in the confines of france and italy , he was necessited with all carefulnesse to maintaine himselfe neutrall betweene those princes , with whom hee confined ; but in those last rumors of france , by discouering himselfe openly to be wholly spanish he had put , not onely his owne , but the states of all the princes of italie in great trouble : and that whilst with the bellowes of his forces he blew the fire of the french vprores , kindled by the spaniards ambition , hee ought to beleeue , that that flame was to burne vp friends and kinred , before euer it could get to the other italian potentates that were enemies . the duchy of sauoy answered the censor very readily , that the adherence of his last duke to the spaniards , was true , but the faire occasion hee had of three seuens in his hand , euen forced him to set vp his rest , hoping to encounter the most famous primiera , that euer any other prince whatsoeuer had at cards ; to which venture he was the rather carryed , because he was assured hee could loose but that money , which at that game he had won before : that afterwards , though by his ill lucke the fourth card , which was dealt him , proued to be a coat of affront , wherewith he had made the worst hir , that could be encountred on the whole pack of cards , neuerthelesse he knew , that the brauest mindes would confesse , that albeit the resolution was very dangerous , yet not to wrong the cards , they would haue played no otherwise themselues . the censor apprehending the metaphor , very much commended the magnanimous resolution of that duke ; who , for that hee might from a small feauer haue receiued in gift the empire of the greater part of the world , not only without any note of imprudence , but to his infinit glory , at such time as so resolutely he cast the dye of all the greatnesse of his fortune vpon the table of chance , he might well speake those famous words anew , or caes●r , or nothing . then the censer turned him to the noble great dutchy of toscan , and sharply reprehending him , for going with his galleyes as it were prouoking of waspes , hee recorded vnto him , the misery and calamities which the knights of saint iohn suffered at rhodes , at tripoli , and the great danger , that lastly they ranne at malta , onely because they would imprudently haue tyed squibbes to the buls taile ; and that euerywise christian prince ought rather to fauour the present carelesnesse of the turkes , then to waken them with injuries of little profit ; nay , such as brought others much dammage , and necessite them to apply their mindes anew vnto maritime affaires , which in these times they had euen abandoned : also he remembred him , how infinite people daily complained , for that , by his hindering italy of the trade of the commodities of the l●vant , all drugges that came from beyond the seas , were growne to an excessiue rate . to this correction the great dutchy of toscan answered , that the power of a prince could not be termed perfect , which with a number of armed vessels had not some dominion on the sea : and that his galleyes were not onely very necessary for the toscan greatnesse , but also for the securitie of the libertie of all italy , as seruing for a schoole of mariners , for a seminary of captaines and souldiers at sea : that he confessed the dammage , which they did to the trade of merchandise , but withall , he desired it might be considered , that the mysterie of warre , either by land or by sea , could not be learned by souldiers , nor exercised by princes without prejudice to others : and that toscan breeding much filthinesse of fantasticall vnquiet braines , and extrauagant humours , he had therefore great occasion for those gallies , that might serue , as it were , to carry forth all the filth of his state , and thereby keepe it cleane , imploying such onely for gally-slaues in them , as had done euill before , and that in regard of their vnquiet nature , were like to doe worse after . this excuse of the great dutchy of toscan was approoued both by the censor , and all the sacred colledge . wherevpon the count said vnto the libertie of geneua , who was last drawne out of the vrne , that the excessiue vse of exchanges , which shee permitted vnto her nobilitie , caused that great disorder of inriching the priuate , and withall of impouerishing the publike , whose reuenues would haue risen to huge summes of gold , if the reall riches of her nobilitie had beene imployed in a iust trade of merchandise . the genouese libertie with a readinesse , that gaue a particular gust to all the learned , answered , how it was true , that exchanges doe worke that effect , which the censer had mentioned , and therefore were most pernicious in any monarchy whatsoeuer ; howbeit that notwithstanding they might bee permitted in a well-ordered common-wealth , without any prejudice of the publike interests ; because the richest and securest treasures of a free state , are the riches of the nobility , and citizens together ; a matter which falleth not out in a monarchy , where betweene the commings in of the prince ; and the meanes of priuate men , there runneth a long wall of eight stories high built by mine and thine : further , that in a monarchy the mutation of the state commonly followeth with little or no prejudice to the people , onely changing the name of matthew , to that of martin ; but in the subuersions of common-weales , where liberty is changed into seruitude , there the proper substance of priuate men , is the publike treasure ; for then will they profusely spend all that euer they haue , for to defend their owne libertie euen to the last gaspe . chap. . the monarchie of spaine inuiteth the cardinall of toledo , to be her theologian , which he refuseth , and why . the report goeth in this court , that the mighty monarchy of spaine , by her chiefe secretarie inuiteth the worthy cardinall of toledo , with allowance of a large pension , to assist as her theologian in the royall councell of state , to the end that nothing should be determined there , which might be against his conscience : this matter filled the whole court with maruell , in regard euery one knew how little that prelate in the rebenediction of the most christian king henry the . fauoured the affaires of his prince ; for which cause no man could imagine the occasion , wherefore so wise a queene in a businesse of such weight , should vse the seruice of so diffident a subiect . those which make profession best to vnderstand the manner of proceeding of the aduised spanish nation , euen in this resolution acknowledged the inueterate prudence of the kings of spaine , whose proper custome it is neuer to be at quiet , vntill that with pensions , with honourable charges , with all kinde of louing demonstrations , and humane deuices , they haue drawne vnto their party all such great subiects , as they see to be alienated from their interest , and from whom they know , that one day yet they may receiue seruices . the chiefest confidents of so great a cardinall , deliuer , that his lordship very gladly accepted the noble charge propounded vnto him ; howbeit with this condition , ( which by the spaniards was presently reiected ) that whensoeuer with the authority of the sacred scriptures , with the doctrine of the holy fathers , with the ordinances of the canons , he should make the royall councell capable , how the resolutions made in it , were disagreeing from the lawes of god , and men ; hee alone then would haue power to hinder the execution of them ; and all to the end , the world might know , that the royall theologian in that councell was only to helpe the conscience of his king with the will of god , not to serue for a maske to establish the dominion of kingdoms ouer men ; for it seemed too shamefull a matter vnto him , that such a one as he should be imployed to authorise the diabolicall impiety of the moderne reason of state , and to make most stinking assa fetida appeare vnto simple people very excellent muske . chap. . the spaniards attempt the acquisition of sauoy , but doe not preuaile . seeing that for to draw the french naile out of the table of milan , where it was fixed , the ill-aduised italian princes had made vse of the spanish pickaxe , which entred in such manner into the very table it selfe , that it was neuer possible since to draw it forth with any kinde of pincers whatsoeuer , all the potentates of europe , and especially the italian princes , which perceiued , that the spaniards after the seruitude of the milanesi , openly aspired to the absolute dominion of all italy , to the end they might secure that remainder of liberty , which is yet resting in her , agreed amongst themselues , that euery fiue and twentieth yeare , the chaine which the spaniards haue forged for the italian seruitude , should with exact diligence be measured by persons thereunto deputed . and comming ( a few daies since ) accordingly to measure it , the italian princes to their infinite amazement found , that so odious a chaine was increased with fiue most preiudiciall links ; presently whereupon the politicall smiths were called , who very carefully made an assay of the yron added to the chaine , and they found that the first linke was forged at piombino , the other at finale , the third at correggio , the fourth at porto lungone , and the last at m●naco . greatly did the princes maruell at the strangenesse of this accident , and many of them were ashamed , that through their carelesse simplicitie the spaniards had increased the chaine of the italian seruitude , much more in peace , than they could haue done in war with foure armies . with these strange exorbitances , the italian princes were so incensed against the spaniards , that they told them freely , how if they did not containe themselues within the bounds of honesty , and modesty ; if the italian files would not suffice to reduce that miserable chaine to his due measure , they would make vse of the french ; and if with them neither they could obtaine their intent , they would procure enough from england , and germany ; yea , and in case of desperation they would not sticke to furnish themselues with those excellent damasked ones , that are made in turkie . whilest the italian princes were in this contestation , there arriued a poste , which in all haste had beene dispatched out of italy vnto them with this certaine aduertisement , that the spaniards were forging another linke in sauoy , to be added vnto the chaine of their seruitude : in regard of which newes , the renowned venetian liberty instantly opened her famous arsenall , and all the princes of italy ran to arme themselues ; the warlike french monarchy commanded her nobilitie to horse , all germany put themselues in order to passe the mountaines , and the numerous fleets of the english , and hollanders , set saile towards the straits of gibraltar ; when iust in the nick , euen as all the world was in armes , a new poste arriued , who pacified the minds of men with this intelligence , that indeed it was true , how the spaniards had laboured with all possible industry to forge that most important linke of sauoy , but that they had sweat in vaine , because in the soldering , it broke . chap. . the duke d'alva being arriued at parnassus , in complementing with prospero colonna , they fall foule about defrauding the colones● of their titles . don hernando de toledo duke d'alva , a few daies since , arriued at parnassus , and by expresse order from apollo , a diligent examination of his actions being made by the military men , he was found worthy to be admitted into parnassus amongst those famous captains , which without effusion of bloud , knew how to vanquish an enemy , more by patience , and art , than by open force , or valour ; that durst hazard the fortune of kingdoms vpon the doubtfull chance of a battell . but because lodouic● guicciardino , an vnderstanding writer of the affaires of flanders , had preferred a complaint , how that for certaine matters not very pleasing , which he had written of the duke , hee had beene ill intreated by him , therefore he staied a long time to cleare himselfe of such an imputation ; for there was an edict of apollo very rigorously obserued in parnassus , whereby that prince , or priuate man , was declared to be infamous , which durst offer any wrong to any historian , or other writer , for things written by him not very honourable , but yet true : howbeit , of such power were the dukes friends , that guicciardino was contented to reuoke his complaint , whereupon with all the greatest solemnitie hee was admitted into parnassus , and had a place in his maiesties company of men at armes , which was commanded by that famous quintus fabius maximus ; who for the excellencie of his well-aduised warinesse , was surnamed cunctator . and it hapned , that amongst the other princes , and captaines , which the said duke visited , one was the most excellent lord prospero colonna , by whom he was receiued with all kinde of honour ; and so much the more , because hee vnderstood that the duke made a publike profession of being the disciple , follower ▪ and imitator of his slow , but sure way of making warre . howbeit , a strange and troublesome accident fell out in this visitation ; for at the first meeting , the duke hauing giuen the lord prospero the title of your honour , he was so incensed with disdaine , that taking himselfe to be highly wronged by so vile a title , with an angry voice he said ; duke , i had thought thou wert come hither , to honour one that is greater than thy selfe , not to vndervalue him ; but because it is the fashion of the colonesi to answer the iniuries of words with deeds , goe out of this house , and in the street ( with my sword in mine hand ) i will proue vnto thee , that all those , which vse such base termes to men of my ranke , deserue not to be admitted into the company of honourable persons . the duke remained much astonished to see that great captaine take the matter so hainously at his hands ; and going to withstand the lord prospero , who offered to thrust him out of the chamber , they fell to grapple one with another : and because the spaniards , which were in company with the duke , seeing him in such termes with colonna , entred into the chamber to assist him , the italians which belonged vnto the lord prospero did the like ; whereupon in regard of the number of persons in so strait a place , there ensued a cruell fray ; the noise whereof comming into the street , was the cause that the newes of so dangerous an accident was suddenly carried to apollo ; who in all haste dispatched thither the regent of the vicaria with the guard of archers , who freed the duke out of the lord prosperoes hands : and the vprore being quieted , he commanded the spaniards , that had beene very ill handled , to returne home to their houses ; thereupon the lord prospero , to preuent any sinister information that might haue beene giuen against him , presented himselfe before apollo , vnto whom ( the same goeth ) with a troubled countenance hee vsed these words : sir , it is well knowne , that men of the family of colonna , of the quality i am of , haue alwaies inioyed the title of excellencie , antequam abraham fieret , and ere the spaniards were in rerum natura ; wherefore for that nation to abuse a man of my ranke , as the duke d'alva did me but now , is most insupportable ; for if the vilenesse of him that offended , doth infinitely aggrauate the iniurie with him that is offended , how is it possible , that an italian baron of my quality , should containe himselfe within the bounds of modestie , seeing himselfe vndervalued by that nation , whose miseries , not aboue foure daies agoe to speake of , so moued the whole world to compassion , that thorowout all churches they were recommended to the charitie of well-disposed christians , of whom almes were gathered , to free them from the miserable seruitude , wherein they were so grieuously oppressed by the moores of granada . the spaniards enioy the dominion of the greater part of italy ; where , by such as i am , notwithstanding that daily they threaten it with a cruell , and vniuersall seruitude , they are loued , honoured , and euen serued . with their prodigious auarice they haue depriued vs of our wealth ; and in that lamentable sacke of rome with their vnexpressable lust they violated the honour of our chastest matrons . and now , in exchange of so abiect a patience , they would also take from vs this little honour of breath we enioy , and these miserable titles , the vnhappy remaines , and deplorable reliques of the italian reputation : which is a matter so hard to bee digested , that by euery honourable italian baron it ought to be reuenged , not with complaining words , as i doe , but with daggers points . it is reported by them that were then present , how all the while the lord prospero was speaking , apollo did nothing but smile , and that when vpon his conclusion he burst out into those words , how the spaniards abuses towards the italians were to be reuenged with daggers points , he fell to laughing out-right , and said , prospero , thou art , and euer wert too much giuen ouer to choller : and i am inforced to tell thee , how it infinitely mislikes me , that such a one as thou , who hast alwaies made a particular profession of prudence , shouldst maruell , that slaues , which for twenty yeares together haue beene fed in the gallies with course and mouldy biske● , when they light vpon a batch of new white mancher , should fill their bellies till they are ready to cracke againe : whereas that raging appetite of theirs , and euery other dishonest act , which they vse , to asswage their hunger , ought to be so farre from seeming odious vnto honest men which behold it , that it should rather moue them to pitie . therefore doe yee italians likewise permit , that the spaniards , men but new in this world , and lately got out of the seruitude of the moores of granada , may glut themselues with meat so delicate to their taste , as are the honourable titles , which they haue found in italy ▪ for i assure thee , that when they shall be cloyed with such vanities they also will become , as the french are , such courteous gallanes , that they will willingly giue the title of excellency euen to their horse-boyes , much more to such as thou art . and i tell thee , that if thou hadst that prudence , and that perfect knowledge of the world , as i wish thou haddest , thou wouldest very well perceiue , that those exorbitances , and that so odious manner of proceeding , which the spaniards vse in italie , whereof thou so complainest , is euen as so much sweet sugar for you italians , and bitter poyson for the spaniards ; who if to their valour to their aduisednesse , and vnspeakable ambition which they haue to raigne , they had affable and courteous manners annexed , with the vtter destruction of that remnant of libertie , which is yet out of the lions iawes , they would soone become absolute masters of the world. all which are in●olencies , that with daggers points , not by you italians , but by the monarchy of spaine herselfe , ought to be reuenged with all kinde of cruelty on her spanish ministers , who with their vanitie distaste the good seruants of so great a queene , and make her gouernment nothing acceptable to her subiects : a disorder that bringing much difficultie to the substance of that vniuersall monarchy , whereunto it is not possible she can arriue with the publike hatred of all italy , hath high need of remedy . with this answer apollo returned the lord prospero exceeding well satisfied to his house , after whom the duke d'alva appeared before his maiesty with all his family wonderfull melancholy , which cast such milke in their faces , that the spaniards seemed not so blacke , as ordinarily those moores that come out of granada vse to be . then apollo interrupting the complaint which the duke was about to make against the lord colonna , said ; duke , i am much displeased with the disorder , which i vnderstand hath h●pned , and so much the more , by how much the cause of such an vprore is not very iust , nor withall very honourable on thy side : and vpon this occasion it pleaseth me to remember vnto you spaniards , that to be not only niggards , as to all men yee are knowne , but not to vse prodiga●itie in giuing vnto oth●rs those titles , which are desired , is a manifest signe of malignitie , because the ingenuous nobilitie of a baron is knowne , by shewing little couetousnesse in receiuing titles , and much liberalitie in giuing them : for euen by ouer-much , not by due honour , doth greater reputation accrue to him that giueth , than to him that receiueth it . and you spaniards that vse such austeritie in desiring great titles only for your selues , are not a whit increased in reputation , but rather are become so odious and ridiculous to all men , that the italians in their comedies , haue deseruedly introduced the personage of the spaniard to represent vnto the world a perfect braggado●hia , i wonder ye should not perceiue , ●hat in thinking to arriue vnto the dominiō of the earth by abusing m●n , is the wrong way to the wood ; the minds of men ( duke ) are taken with the bait of humanitie , with the whistle of gratitude , of courtesie , of gentlenesse ; and that fowler would shew himselfe very ignorant , that should go with a drumme into a doue-house for to take pigeons , as i see you spaniards foolishly doe . moreouer , i tell you , that if euer any nation were to make a bait of dignities , for to allure the italians to fall into the nets of your dominions , and light vpon the limebush of your seruitude , it is you spaniards , for the ends which ye haue vpon italy : withall yee are to consider , that the states , which yee possesse , of napl●s , and milan , are fastned vnto you with waxe ; for ye shall command ouer those two members no longer , then til the italians resolue to chase you from thence ; who if they could be assured , that after your ruine , they should not fall into the power of the french , ye should quickly know , that only with a little disturbance , which they could giue you in the port of genoua , they would put you into a thousand intricate difficulties : all matters that should admonish you to giue satisfactiō , at least wise in words , to them , whom in regard of your interests in italy , yee are obliged to respect . as for the iniurie , which you say you haue receiued from the lord prospero , i tell you plainly , that whatsoeuer affront shall be done you vpon any such like titular occasion , i will not only be insensible of it , but i will thinke you haue desirously sought it . then the duke would haue excused himselfe with saying , that from his king he had instruction how to carry himselfe towards the italian barons in the particular of titles , when apollo told him , that the spanish abuses to the italians were not to extend but only to the neapolitans , and milanesi ; and his maiestie also added , that if too much passion did not blind the spaniards , they might easily see , how their grandes , whom spaine it selfe could not containe , and that in italy , would play the giants , compared with the romane barons ; and those of meane stature would proue but dwarffs . hereupon a cloud ▪ as white as snow , beginning by little and little to couer the person of apollo , the priests that were about him perceiued how his maiestie would prophecie ; so that euery one falling prostrate on the ground , and with the rest , the duke and his followers ; out of that hollow cloud proceeded the diuine voice of his maiestie , which with a pleasing sound spake in this sort : i foretell vnto you spaniards , that with your rough and odious manner of proceeding , yee will one day compell the italian nobilitie , which is the mistris of the cruell sicilian vespres , to plot some bloudy neapolitan euensong against you ; it being the proper custome of the italians , with greater rage to reuenge the abuses of words , than the offences of blowes ; as they that hauing short patience , and long hands , are borne not only with an heart most inclined to great resolutions , but that doe not vse to reuenge iniuries with all kinde of cruelty , before they are quite forgotten by those that did them . and with your owne ruine , you will then finde them , with swords in their hands , to be paladine orlandoes , when ye shall perswade your selues they are become most suffering asses . the poste of parnassus to the reader . these papers comming by chance into my hands , i perceiued there was something in them that i could not perceiue ; wherefore i thought best to communicate them with better vnderstandings ; for my part i could see no hurt in them , but did imagine by that little good which i saw , there was much more that i could not see , and therefore iudged them fit for all mens eyes . yet finding the names of spaine and austria , or austria and spaine , ( pardon me , politicke reader , for i am not certaine which should haue prioritie ; and i know in such catholike points , a little error is deadly ) so often inserted , i durst not be too bold with sacred things . for i well saw those two names iointly considered , are now growne of such estimation , as all nations & kings bend their knees , & doff their bonnets at the naming of them , more superstitiously for destroying , thā reuerently at the name of iesus for sauing . therefore i could not resolue , whether it were treason or sacriledge , or i wot not what greater sin , to touch sacred things profanely with common and vnwasht hands ; especially when i saw all such as had done the like , or lesse then thus , made miserable examples of disobedience , as if they had offended adam himselfe , or a house miraculously raised vp by god , or rather originally created in nature , to rule ouer all the world in adams stead ; and that to be the son of a king , could not protect an offendor in this kind from punishment , yea , from being cast out of his paradise . o ( thought i ) when i saw this , how worthy is he , that doth thus to be counted only the catholique king : for he is a king of kings indeed , fit to be the executioner of his holinesse diuine decrees , and to consume all with lightning , where the sacred fulminations went before . tremble all princes , and looke to your crownes ; especially you petty ones in germany , that are but fatted to be swallowed one after another , as his stomack can digest , or your turne comes to be serued vp . you see it is safer being his seruant , than the sonne of any potentate besides . therefore striue for place and preferment there , and helpe with all the speed yee may , to betray one another to ruine . your that are protestants or lutherans , it is no matter for religion ; hold some the stirrop , and let others lift spaine into the saddle , to ride one another like poste-horses by turnes . you see how honourably he deales with that prince , whose peaceable patents made him easie entrance ; and how fauourably with the palätinate , whom he rides in bloud , and spur-galls on both sides , whilst you stand laughing on , and see not that your day is comming . thus i thought , and thought withall to be silent , and to keep these papers from flying abroad , for feare of hauing my owne wings clipt . but when i saw in defect of greater , god had raised vp petty princes to defend the faith , and put that spirit into the prince of orange , the count mansfelt , and the duke of brunswicke , which he had taken from saxonie and bavaria , and others , it made me resume courage , beholding the immediate hand of god in this worke , and to thinke , surely god will haue all the glory to himselfe , that he imployes such instruments , whose estates , in comparison , are but drops to the spanish ocean : i will not therefore be guilty of so much cowardise , as to reserue my selfe , where these men fight , and seeme prodigall of their owne liues ; or at least , not of so much dishonestie , as to conceale what god hath sent into my hands , perhaps to publish for the generall information and benefit of all christendome . goe out therefore , and prosper in gods name . the new-fovnd politcke . the third part . chap. . after an exquisite examination and triall made of those wits , which ought to haue the charge of prouinciall gouernments , a ranke of gouernors are published in parnassus , and wholesome auisoes for all gouernors , iudges , and vnder-officers of state. after a long time spent in expectation , yesterday , finally to the satisfaction of all men , the distribution of this states gouernment was published . it is not possible to beleeue the diligence and exquisite circumspections , which were taken by his maiestie and his ministers in the choise of those being exact and worthy of so great a businesse . for first , they tooke into their consideration to make choise of ancient men , experimented in state affaires , onely to the end , that colts should not be put to be tamed by knauish house breakers ; and it is worth the obseruation , that in so great a number of concurrents for places , they had elected persons of a slow genius , of cold constitutions , and in their actions perplext , irresolute , and addicted to drowsinesse , euen almost to disability : and on the contrary , that they had excluded those which for the quicknesse and viuacity of their wits , appeared to be far fitter , and more worthy of employments than others . and it is thought the reason was , because that wise men , which are promoted to businesses of examinations and trialls of wits doe firmely beleeue , that those wits which are ouer liuely , nimble , & fiery , proue very vnapt to rule others , hauing great need themselues of a curbing-bit , and a head-straine to saue them from falling downe headlong into ditches ; it being also manifest by long experience , that these by their foole hardy , and ouer-resolute spirits , doe sooner disquiet people than become good instruments to maintaine them in that sweet peace and correspondent satisfaction , which indeed ought to be the principll care of all those which should be admitted to mannage the affaires of prouinciall gouernments . and it is apparant to all men , how those princes electors hold it for an irrefragable maxime , that , hee makes a happier progresse with very good successe , who being of a slower genius , of a soft spirit , knowes best to accommdate his passions to stand as still as a signe at a tauerne ; because the world , which requires good gouerment , turnes quickly seditious and imbroyled with the phantasticall chymeraes of certaine hotspurres , which in all their affaires by seeking to become ouerwise in their owne conceit , they doe in stead of quenching and appeasing troubles and combustions , kindle them the more by vnseasonable remedies . intempestiuis remediis delicta accendunt . fifteene daies since , by a most rigorous triall , which was made for so great a businesse , not the ignorant ( as many thought ) but those capricious proiectours were excluded , whose pates being full of or others and new inuentions , are enemies to those ancient customes and ingenuous orders , whereto people haue beene enured as another nature , yet these subtle heads would better them with moderne and new lawes . t is true , they greatly laboured to finde out pliable subiects of a milde and flexible disposition , which knew to apply their owne nature to another bodies nature conformable , as wiues ought to be to their husbands . nor did they admit at any hand an officer , which had not studied for the space of foure years continually , that most important point of philosophy , to liue as not to liue : the very basis and ground-worke , whereon the quietnesse of people securely consisted , and the safety also of that good gouernment , which might be hoped at the hands of an honest wise gouernour , in whom they did not so much regard his insight and knowledge in the lawes and statutes , as that he should be well seene in that prudent mystery , in that mild manner of proceeding , and in that dexterity of vnderstanding , as is not as yet found registred in bookes . a consideration so necessary , that some great lawyers , which haue had the charge of prouinces , lighted vpon most simple successe , as that lanthorne of the lawes bartolus can beare testimony , who was forced to leape out of a window at the palace of todi , for all his rare iudgement and skill in the lawes because he would not be taken and torne in pieces by some that could no longer brooke the impertinent curiosities of one that was so wise of his tongue , and so imprudent in his braine . likewise this is certaine , that they reiected , euen with the bastinado , those great beasts , which with open ostentation , to peacocke-wise vsed to looke big with austere & terrible countena●●ce , taking delight to threaten his maiesties subiects , made by the creatour of the same mould as themselues , more like tyrants , than ciuill iudges , which many of them counterfeit for some other sinister respect , and aboue all things they had a care to exclude those tyrannicall butchers , who busyris like , being bent to shed humane blood , would make men beleeue , that they went about to set the crooked world right againe with pillories , with gibbets , , or at least with stupendious ●ines and mulcts worse than a thunder-bolt , such as were neuer imposed in more ancient times . aboue measure they loued those iudges which tooke more care to hinder misdemeanours , than to punish them , and which neuer subscribe to the sentence of death , the greeke letter Θ , without the inke of teares . the next day after , all the presidents and iudges appeared before apollo , who caused salust crispus , chiefe notary of the collaterals , to minister the oath vnto them , which was , that they should faithfully leaue the world as they found it , and not alter any of the ancient priuiledges . after the oath thus ministred , the said salust tooke aside the gouernour of libethrum , a fauorite of his , and gaue him these admonitions . first , to begin his gouernment with a kinde of carelesnesse , and to continue it with diligence by degrees , entring in as a lambe , and playing the lyon towards the end , but alwaies generously inclined , remembring that principle of cornelius tacitus , acribus initiis incurioso fi●e . secondly , that in all causes betweene the common people he should doe most exact iustice without exception of persons : but in suits arising among the nobler sort hee should mingle with the rigour of iustice the dexterity of a wary iudgement , remembring alwayes , that the accusations of great persons were so odious to princes that they laid vpon officers gownes an aspersion , like the tainting spots of corrupted oile which could neuer bee washt away with the purest sope of innocence . therefore among those great spirited men , a iudge had need with the sword of iustice , to imploy like a wise fencer , the target of a nimble wit and a cautelous care , that neither of the one side nor of the other , he be exclaimed vpon for any distasteful order . for princes hauing cause to vse their helpe for counsell , force , or purses , they desire to hold them well satisfied . and therefore in controuersies falling out among them , a iudge had need to learne some easie way to draw out rotten teeth , and with the hand of dexterity to fill vp the place with the finest cotten wooll . thirdly , a iudge must enforce himselfe to know all things , but not to execute al which he knowes . omnia scire non omnia exequi . for to attempt needlesse and brabling matters , were to goe about to set straight the leg of a dog , or to lose his braine in the alchymie of fooles . and in this corrupt age it is good counsel for an officer to tolerate in people some stale disorder , then with any ill satisfaction to the generalitie to torment himselfe to seeke to bring in that , which he cannot execute without commotions and heart-burnings . fourthly , that with other iudges and officers subiect to the same prince , he should not contend nor contest for matter of preheminence or right , nor looke to be his owne caruer , or to right himselfe in his court by vsing any strict course with inferiour officers for matters of prerogatiue of courts , but either to acquaint the prince himselfe , or to winke at the affront , if another court seemes to iustifie the subiect , or els to take in hand the weapons of a gowned man , the pen. but if the iudges authoritie stretch to the confines of another prince , hee must not seeke differences , nor auoid them . but if they proceed from souldiers or pyrats , he must defend his borders and iurisdiction with armes . yet so , that towards all princes subiects in league and amitie with his prince , he behaue himselfe as temperately regardfull , as zealously affected to his owne princes honour . fiftly , that in some occasions he preferre the publicke peace of his gouernment before that strictnesse of iustice , which is mentioned in bookes . sixtly , that for any impertinent thing , which hee sees or heares , which be not extraordinarily altered in mind or countenance ; and that if he cannot doe this , yet that he refraine himselfe from speaking of it , and in any case to beware that he deliberate not , nor study for reuenge or reformation in heat or anger , but in cold blood after a long times delay . seuenthly , that in supreme and waighty matters hee take heed of making any shew of vndaunted , of a fiery , and resolued mind , but rather that he content himselfe to hunt waspes and hornets out of their holes , with the hand of the prince armed with the gauntlet of a higher authority ; for although an officer findes that he hath ability and power enough to execute a greater enterprise , yet for feare of emulation in court , or some casuall blocke in his way , which the wisest man could not foresee , oftentimes it is not expedient to put in execution all that which his authority might warrant him . eightly , that he deale in all ordinary matters concerning ordinary men , entring into strict friendship with no man residing within the precincts of his command , but to beware of that wresting and wiredrawing occasions , which might reach vnto the hatred and hindrance of another , and to auoid domesticall familiaritie , which causeth contempt . onely let him vse that decent grauity which may procure respect and an awfull loue . but in any case , that he shunne the conuersation of base and riotous persons , and that he keepe company for the most with men of his owne ranke , yet so , that he make not any man so endeared and so bosome a friend vnto him , who might afterwards by prying into his dealings , and diuing into his secrets , turne to be his capitall enemy . for sometimes contemptible persons , not suspected for craft , may in the twinkling of an eye , of low and earth creeping mushromes , become tall cedars at least in their owne ouerwe●ning conceit . ninthly , that he force his noble nature to endure the stinking pride of lawyers , although most odious to god and all good men , and to beare with their impertinent discourses , and wrangling bawling , who take vpon them to become lambes at home and lyons abroad , onely to maintaine the glory and reputation of the bench , but commonly it is to fill their owne purses with the ruines and spoyles of honester men than themselues . wherein i wish him to remember that golden saying of tacitus , that it is a most profitable , as also most pithy in the choise and free will of good and euill things to consider , what thou thy selfe wouldest or wouldest not endure vnder another gouernour or iudges power , vtilissimus idem , ac●●r●uissimus bonarum malarumque rerum delectus , cogitare , quid volueris sub alio principe , aut nolueris . tenth , that he take heed with great circumspection he fall not into the other extremity in seeking to auoid the defect of his predecessor , as a certaine prince very heedlesly did , who perceiuing that wise men fou●d fault with the late prince for too much lenity , turned an odious tyrant . the golden meane is euer best . eleuenth , that with extraordinary seuerity he take more care to bridle the disorders of his own house , then the seditions of the common people ; for the immodest and vnciuill carriage of a magistrates domesticke gentlemen , whom some call countrey-courtiers , is a farre greater blemish and scandall to their master , then the brutish insolence of rude clownes and ill-bred swaines . twelth , that he hate , as the horrour of hell , all kind of fore-stalling and engrossing of commodities , and that he account as the capitall enemy of his reputation such detestable gaines . but specially , that diuelish gaine , which is in these dayes much practised , and one of the chiefe causes of our creators anger towards many states , by the sale of offices . a most perillous charybdis , a rocke so dangerous in the sea of worldly businesse , that iustice being fled backe into heauen , these petty chapmen , who neuer dreame of another world but this earthly one , turne all things topsie turuy to make themselues sauers for their dear-bought places . whereas a noble spirit should firmely beleeue , that the merchandise of a christian is ingenuous simplicity and plain dealing , and being honestly called to beare office in his countrey , then his richest lucre worthy of an honourable officer is to ingulfe himselfe in the trade of honour and vprightnesse of iustice , which being by the trumpet of fame blowne into his princes eares in a short time , god inspiring the heart of the prince , he shall be preferred from office to office , vntill hee arriue to a contented fortune correspondent to his heroycall worth and magnanimous minde . thirteenth , that perpetually he haue his eyes fix● on his vnder-iudges hands , and that he looke as narrowly to them , as if he held a biting serpent in his owne hand , that iniustice being a very dangerous member which hazards his credit by the diuels temptations to blurre his masters honour by playing the base mechanicke in the sacred seat of iustice. and because no iudge receiues bribes but sinisterly by his wise , seruant , or without witnesse , sauing the party himselfe , his supreme iudge or prince ought to proclaime rewards to the discouerers , and vpon the least euidence to remoue such theeues of the deity ; seeing that iustice is one of the prime diuine attributes . fourteenth , that he accommodate his genius & nature to the nature of his prouincials , shewing himselfe mild to the peaceable , and seuere to the seditious . and to take speciall care to weed out idle persons ; if they refuse conuenient labor , which he ought to see them put vnto ; and if any drones be found with honey , to examine them from whose hiue they stole the same . fifteenth , that to the end his prince may conceiue well of his worth , he acquaint not his highnesse with slight occurrences , nor trifling matters , which fall out in his gouernment . nor yet must he refraine to certifie vnto him all the most important affaires , chiefly , all proiects tending to his honour or profit . sixteenth , that he beleeue how the penalties and punishments in the power of a wary iudge , consists more in threats then in inflicting of them , & that he neuer forget this lesson : how officers gouerne men full of a thousand imperfections , subiect to infinite errours , how they are not angells of heauen which cannot sinne ; and therefore in his gouernment hee affects more the report of a sweet natured iudge , like his creatour , who bearing with our trespasses , si quoties peecant homines , toties sua fulmina mittat , and not the repute of a tyrannizing minister . seuenteenth , that he frequent not reuels , dances , or any publike feasts , mournfull spectacles , and tragicall in the end to wise officers , as instruments , which vilifie his fame , and bring his personall presence into contempt among the vulgar , and might bring his grauitie into question among his equals . eighteenth , that he know how the shamefull acts of the nobles and principall gentlemen doe waxe more cruell against them , which debase themseues to commit them , without touching or blemishing the generall reputes of their honourable families . ninteenth , that he held it for a thing certaine , that it is better to dissemble and winke at some common infirmities and frailties , then to shew himselfe earnest to punish them , it not being the resolution of a wary man to enter into that naughty passage , out of the which he otherwise knowes , that the horse cannot draw forth his feet . twentieth , that he vary not in opinion with his equals in office or vnder officers , but vpon extremitie , knowing that his prince had rather he should vse dexteritie and nimblenesse of wit in such actions , then rigorous iustice. twenty one , that with a pleasing sagacity he let the world see , how he had found all such as inhabite in his iurisdiction rather good people , then by any rigorous proceedings of his that he made them good , because whosoeuer glories and vaunts that he hath hanged and punished so many malefactors during the time of his office , he triumphs in their infamy and shame , which cannot redound to his honour , nor to that discreet carriage , which is required in a well foreseene gouernour . chap. . the most illustrious monarchies resident at parnassus , demand by what meanes the venetian lady got such exact obedience and exquisite secrecie of her nobility , whereof shee giues them couenient satisfaction . the monarchies of great britaine , prance , spaine and polonia , wondring that the venetians had gotten the start and fame for their gift of secrecie , and that the spanish monarchy could by no cunning intelligences , nor rich pensions corrupt any of their parliament house , called the pregadi , neuer as yet to disclose any of their priuy coūcel , they went with one consent to the palace of the venetian lady , earnestly importuning her to discouer vnto them by what meanes or pollicie of state she had arriued to that happinesse , as to obtaine such secrecie and rare obedience in so many mouthes and hearts , which they could scarce meet withall in one or two of their trustiest seruants . to this the lady answered , that she had allured and wonne her nobility to this vertue of secrecie , with rewards and hopes of promotion , and for the crime of disobedience she scared them with punishment . to which the aboue-named monarchies replied , that they also wrought and vsed the same meanes , but could neuer as yet obtaine that wonderfull effect and rare end . then said the lady that hapned , because in comparison of those ●ewards , which are conferred vpon well-deseruing persons in a common-wealth rightly ordered , the rewards of monarchies were poore , and punishments more sparing . whereto the monarchies made answer , that with them it was cleane contrary , and that the rewards of free-states , to bee paraleld with the wastfull liberalitie , which great kings extended towards their ministers , was but beggery . for they neuer heard , the venetians had beene so liberall as to recompence any of their senators seruice and fidelity with preferring them to be owners of cities , townes , castles , lieutenantships , or lands in fee , as kings haue diuers times aduanced their subiects vnto : and that the greatest reward , which the venetians accustomed to bestow at any time vpon their senators , was to prefer them to some offices , which they were forced to labour hard for , and to passe many base and inferiour offices by degrees and steps , euen from their youth vp , before they could arriue to any supreme place of command or profit . besides that , the most part of their offices were rather hindrances than gainfull : onely they caried a colour of some reputation to them that knew no better , nor saw the glory and pomps of monarchies . and for punishments , without any comparisons , those were far more terrible and cruell , which proceeded from the resolued will of a prince incensed for some grieuous cause , than the punishments of the venetian senate against any of their senators , which ordinarily were more slow and warie , than sudden and quicke . and that there was a great difference in proportion betweene a prince , which iudged his v●ssall , and a senator which by his suffrage and voice punished his equall , his friend , and kinsman : that the venetians knew not but banishment , and one kind of cruell punishment , called , iltremendo canal orfano , to sowe vp their traitors in a sack , and to drowne them in their lake , which they seldome doe but in desperate cases : whereas in monarchies , the iudges sentenced some to be hang'd , drawne , and quartered , some to be burnt , some to be rackt and tortured , a thing common in spaine , practised vnder pretext of heresie towards other princes sub●ects ; and if any of their nobilitie were condemned for high treason , they escaped not the axe , the kindest fauour england affords to offendors , sauing one only example in the chronicles , of queene anne bullen , for her greater grace and honour was beheaded with the sword of calice . at these speeches the venetian dame smiled , and said , that in stead of those rewards of honour and estates in fee , which monarchs bestowed vpon their well-deseruing creatures , shee also requited her best and wisest nobles with places of great authority and command , with most absolute power and dominion ; one with the noble kingdome of creet or candy ; others with corfu , and other ilands subiect to her state : some shee preferred to be her viceroyes in dalmatia and istria ; some shee appointed gouernours of her neighbouring territories on the continent , of nova palma , forum iulij , harca trevisano , padua , vincenza , verona , brescia , bergamo , crema on the frontiers of milan , and the rest of her nobilitie shee reserued perhaps to their far greater contentment in the senate-house at home in venice , which might be termed the maiesticall miracle of cities . so that her nobles might better be called kings and great princes , than priuate gentlemen or subiects , who in all affaires of moment , hauing euery one a speciall interest , must needs be faithfull to their owne selues ; whereas the seruants of princes were faithfull vnto them not as sons but as vassals . and the feare , which frights our nobles of venice from selling the secrets of the state , to forraigne princes ariseth from this infinite disparity and disproportion , that is betwixt that which is lost with treachery , and that which is gained with fidelitie ; betwixt that remorse of conscience , which a subiect feeles for betraying his prince , and the feare which a senator is possessed with for prouing disloyall to a free-state . there is great difference in the loue of a free-borne senator , and the loue of a cringing vassall , howsoeuer he be gilded with the bare title of a nobleman . what will it then boot one of our senators to bewray the secrets of our state to his owne hindrance and perpetuall dishonour ? finally , the venetian dame told them , that the rewards which princes conferred vpon their counsellors and secretaries , occasioned oftentimes pernitious effects cleane contrary to their masters meaning which trusted them ; because those rewards so giuen not onely cooled them in their good seruice , specially at that time , when they had no more , than they might hope for of him for their cares and paines : but the good will of the prince being commonly mutable , and subiect to change and nouelty , the treacherous machinations and emulations of some courtiers being frequent and rife , it sometimes falls out that the ministers to assure themselues of their places and high commands , which they purchased by their honourable deserts , or perhaps by the helpe of their purses , or by other meanes , suspecting a remouall from their offices , or some disasters by their aduersaries , they proue vnderhand false , and to make vp their market , or perhaps to make themselues sauers ; if they bought their places , they fell their princes secrets , and may be afterwards tempted to doe him a worse mischiefe . but such is the ardent affection , which kindles in the hearts of all our venetian nobles , that they will hazard to liue with pouerty , shame , and disdaine at home , than to be hired abroad by strange princes , or to betray their natiue country by reuealing any secrets which might redound to the common hinderance : so that i may rightly liken a nobleman of venice to a fish , which being bred in that lake in the water of liberty , knowes not how to liue abroad out of venice in the element of seruitude . chap. . the romane monarchy demanding of cornelius tacitus the resolution of a politicall question , receiues full satisfaction of the shepheard meliboeus , who casually was there present . the ancient romane monarchy euer since shee was ransackt by the gothes , vandalls , and other northerne barbarians , liued neere this court vnder colour of going a hunting continually disguised for the same purpose the other day repaired to cornelius tacitus , who for his recreation had retired himselfe out of parnassus into the country . to whom shee said , that she came vnto him purposely to be resolued of one maine doubt , which troubled her minde continually , the which she had imparted to many politicians , but could neuer as yet be satisfied by any of them , and therefore she repaired to him , as to the prime and grand statesman of all others . the matter which thus perplexed her was to know why the kingdomes of greece , asia , egypt , france , britaine , spaine , and the common-wealth of carthage , with many other great prouinces , before they became vnited to the state of rome , were of themselues powerfull-enough and formidable , but being sithence subiected and vnited together in her proper person , they missed with all their forces to make her strong and durable . to this cornelius tacitus answered , that this was a difficult question , and could not suddenly be resolued , but the next day after some pause and studie he would returne thither with his best resolution . the monarchesse rested very well satisfied , and as shee was ready to licence his departure , meliboeus that famous shepherd recorded by the poets , who that morning had brought to tacitus a present of fresh cheese and creame , and a couple of dainty cheeses , and stood all the while attentiuely listning to this question , seeing them now ready to take their leaue , he interrupted them , desiring tacitus not to depart , for he would instantly without any study giue the lady sufficient satisfaction . the lady and tacitus laughed very heartily , and bade him not to beat his braine about such deepe matters , but to goe home and looke to his sheepe . meliboeus replied very earnestly , that no race among mortall men could better discourse of true and solid state-businesse than shepherds ; and that princes should be most happy , if in gouerning their subiects , they could imitate shepherds in charity : and so should the people bee , if they could obey their prince , as sheepe did their shepherd . the monarchesse and tacitus confounded with maruell at the sudden and extemporary words of the shepherd , willed him freely to vtter his resolution . whereupon meli●oeus began in this manner : most mighty princesse , i am ( as my virgil well knowes ) his mantuan shepherd , and it were a great shame to these siluer haires , which you see on my head and chin , if i were not exactly experienced in my owne occupation ; i say then , that in so many yeares which i haue spent in gouerning sheepe , i haue gotten this knowledge , that the greatnesse and power of a shepherd doth not consist ( as many ambitious and conetous men beleeue ) in possessing of thousands of sheepe , but that he be owner of so many sheepe onely , as a good shepherd can watch with his eye , gouerne with his rod , and rule with his whistle . and the reason is cleare , for in too small a number of sheepe we see shepherds poore , because their great pouerty compels them with too much seuerity to milk their flock , and too often to sheare them . in a moderate and meane number , where the true perfection lies , shepherds become alwaies wealthy and happy ; whereas in the excesse and ouer-abounding number of sheepe , by reason of the difficult and hard means to gouerne them , being thus from the golden rule of proportion so far remote , and indeed beyond the power of one man , they cannot chuse but incur manifest danger . whence it comes to passe , that the miserable sheep of his flock being too many in number , by the couetousnesse and carelesnesse of him , that vndertakes to gouerne them , doe pine away at first , and at last they dye of meere necessitie and want . how is it possible , but that confusion should happen , where multitudes abound out of the owners view and reaches : for it is the masters owne eye , which fattens and makes his flocke to thriue . right happy were many great potentates and states , if our creator had bestowed on them the propertie of camells to bow and kneele downe to the ground for the receiuing of the burthen of gouernments , and had the discreet moderation to set meeres and bounds vnto their ambitious minds by rising and standing vp ( as is the manner of those beasts ) when they feele themselues reasonably well laden ; and to receiue no heauier charge on their shoulders , though stronger than atals , at such time as they know themselues sufficiently charged with states proportioned according to their abilities in true wisdome and prudence . there are past now . yeares , since i became a shepheard in arcadia , and euer since my comming and being here , i haue contented my selfe with fiue hundred sheepe in my flocke , which haue yearly yeelded mee fiue hundred crownes , which is more than sufficient for my owne maintenance , and my families . and this most fortunate gaine is so sure vnto me , that i am respected of all men in arcadia , and reputed for the best shepherd in all the country . yea , the wisest in parnassus doe hold me to be a happier man than alexander the great , who was not ashamed to wish for more worlds to conquer . that shepheard , whose ambition prouokes him to keep many flocks in hope of gaine is much deceiued , for where his owne eye cannot ouersee , he must needs commit the charge of them to others , commonly , to louts , knaues , theeues , and villaines , who as people borne altogether for their bellies , and other carnall and worldly pleasures , will not only sheare but slay their masters flocks . besides , who knowes not whether he must sometime or other vndergoe a greater charge than all his flocks amount vnto in warlike prouisions and garrisons to defend them from pirates and wilde tartars , or from his malicious neighbours ? for example , i will instance in my neighbour menalcas , who being my capitall enemy , and bearing great enuy and emulation in seeing me prosper with my fiue hundred sheep aboue him and others , and verily beleeuing , that he should supplant me , if he could enioy more flocks than i kept , not content with the like number of sheepe as he formerly possessed equall vnto mee , but thinking to make himselfe absolute monarch of all other pastors in arcadia , he tooke vp money at vse , and at the extremest interest , sold the greatest part of his patrimonie , and hauing got together a large masse of money , sent into england , spaine , and to strange countries , where he vnderstood the fairest wolled sheep were , and with excessiue cost transported them hither , and made three seuerall flocks of fiue hundred in each flocke . but it fortuned so , that those sheepe being forraine , and not acquainted with the language and whistles of our shepheards , nor with our kinde of pasture , they stragled here and there into vnknowne places . whereupon menalcas was forced to substitute deputy shepheards and many dogs to looke vnto them and to fetch them in . but such was the naturall hatreed of the sheepe towards the dogs , and the implacable moodinesse which they conceiued to be continually hurried vp and downe , that they fell into an inward conceit of languor and despair , and so into flat disobedience to abhorre both their shepheards and the dogs , insomuch that when they were to bee milkt and shorne , they hid themselues in woods and deserts . and then it was known throughout all arcadia ▪ that despaire and strange vsage can turne conies into lions . yea , it was sound , that at that time the spanish sheepe , which menalcas had brought thither , proued so rauing mad , that they attempto bite their shepheards . menalcas thus perplexed for the losse and escape of so many sheepe , hired out of spaine and swizzerland , the valiantest dogs hee could haue for money , which considering the infinite charge he sustained in conducting them into arcadia , and the nature of these dogs being continually accustomed to hunt these sheepe , they came at last , what for want of their due allowance , and what of a wanton and greedy disposition , they turned like wolues , and preyed so long vpon these silly sheep , that the rest which were left aliue pined away with griefe , rather to endure such continual hurrying and troubles vnder strange pastors and rauenous dogs . poore menalcas vpon the report of this tragicall euent became the by-word and subiect of laughter to all arcadia for this his ambitious enterprise ; and was pointed at with the more fingers , euen of very boyes , when afterwards he was faine to turne a petty merchant of skins , the vnlucky relicks of a lamentable charge , and the presaging tokens of his owne funerals ; for indeed the mans heart-strings brake of very sorrow and melancholy , leauing his house , that sometimes flourished among the best of vs in arcadia , now desolate and most miserable . chap. . many people hauing wasted their meanes by gluttonous feasts , prodigall fare , and pompous apparell , for the moderating of such lauish expences doe desire a statute of their princes , but they misse of their purpose . some nations subiects to certaine princes which are resident here at parnassus , hauing tryed , that superfluity of belly-cheere , excesse of drinking , and the vanities of apparell and new-fangled fashions , are now a dayes besides the wrath of their creatour iustly incurred for the breach of these vowes , which were vndertaken for them at their baptisme , many men were transformed into swinish qualities , to their healths impaire , the ruine of their estates , and soules danger . and for their outside , they garnished themselues like peacocks , so gay and trimme , that no patrimony how rich soeuer , can now supply the ambition of men , nor the vanities of women ; & that they also obseruing in these proud times , how this excesse proceeds yet further , that all the portion which is left vnto young gentlewomen , whom ciuill modesty heretofore was wont to be their chiefest ornament , how great soeuer the same might be , did not now suffice to buy them carkanets and iewels , and imbrodered peticotes , so that fathers are not able to marry them according to their rancke ; and to match them with thrifty persons were almost impossible , for hauing knowne them for such vaine creatures , they will not be troubled with their company , and to let them runne headlong according to their vnbridled fancies , they must either marry with vnthrifts , like themselues , or liue vnmarried , to the hazard of their chastities : so that except some law be enacted for the curbing of this excesse , they may well be said to hold the wolfe by the eares . vpon these considerations , fearing their vtter ouerthrow , with one consent they presented their supplications to their princes , who seemed very glad to entertaine their motion so much tending to the publike good , and like good polititians knowing how profitable it is to strike the iron while it is hot , & at that time to publish a law , when the subiects themselues become sutors for it , must needs fall out very luckily , & with good fruit in the effect , they out of hād , while their subiects were in this humour of thirft , ioyned together to cut off all superfluous customes in feasts and drinkings , and all new fashions of attires , tying themselues to one fashion onely , not to be altered for many yeares , allowing what is decent and comely to euery seuerall vocation . but the euening before this most laudable statute was to be signed and published , accidentally it came to the eares of the princes , farmers , and officers of the customes and imposts , who being likewise backt and whetted on by the mercers , vintners , grocers and other tradesmen which liued vpon the spoile of the richer sort , they repaired in all haste to their princes , and very cunningly intreated to defaulke and abate a great part of those yearely summes which they were to pay them for such wines , spice , sugars , and such other forraine commodities , as by way of customes and imposts , they were to receiue to their vse . the princes stood confounded in their iudgement , hearing speech of so great losses and defalkments , as they very craftily insinuated and pretended in foxes habits to be most true , and although most of the stuffes were wrought in their owne countries , at least the most durable and best befitting euery nation , yet they made their princes beleeue , that there came from naples , from genoa , from millan , and from spaine , so many kinds of stuffes , silkes , gold and siluer lace , which if the statute of thrift went currant , they could not but sustaine exceeding great losses in the publike customes ; whereupon the princes sent for the committies and deputies of their people , and told them what their customers had proued before them on their honest words , so that they could not hinder their owne interest and profit , lest they should make themselues leane in going about to fatten them . with this answere sauouring of the princes gaine , the people departed much grieued and afflicted , and confessed all of them , that to heale any disorders with that medicine which might offend the publike customes and imposts were desperate cure , and incurable cankers . chap. . terence the comedian being imprisoned by iason the pretour of vrbine , for keeping a concubine , is deliuered by apollo with very great dishonour to the pretour . pvblius terentius liued in a little house , but very well furnished , in the comicall quarter , with no more meni all seruants about him , then bacchis his maid & davus his ancient attendant . and although bacchis in the floure of her age , being then a very beautifull creature , had bin graced with her masters bed , yet now being aged , she continued in his house without scandall , and very modestly disposed , not ministring the least cause of murmuring or dislike to any of the neighbourhood . but it happened about tenne dayes since , that iason the great lawyer being pretour of vrbine , to get him some repute in his new office , directed a proces vnder a penaltie to terence , commanding him in his maiesties name , all excuses laid aside , immediately to put bacchis out of his house , vnlesse he would incurre the danger of a concubine-keeper . but terence did not onely disobey the contents of the mandate , but other writs of iasons court . whereupon the pretour forbare to send any more warrants of orders and injunctions ; and yesterday without any more adoe caused terence to be apprehended and imprisoned ; but with so great displeasure to apollo , that in an extraordinary great chafe he publikely exclaimed , that by his officers , yea and that in parnassus , men more malicious then ignorant , that wicked abuse of being quick-sighted in apparance and shew , but blind in matters of substance was lately introduced and practised to the dishonour of his court. then commanding terence to be discharged out of prison , he caused iason himselfe , for all his famous bookes of the law to be there shut vp in his stead , and also to his greater affliction , appointed philip decius his aduersary , to be pretour in his roome . whereupon yesterday the rod and the standard , being the pretorian e●signes , were deliuered to decius , who going to apoll●es presence his maiestie spake these words vnto him : by the correction inflicted on iason , learne to know that reuerend iudges , which in the administration of iustice , doe more attend the true and reall seruice of god , than by formall trickes and gibes to play vpon their inferiours , they ought first to hunt out of his owne house malice and bribery , and then to chase out of other mens houses young harlots , as thai● , before hee proceeded to expell an aged bacchis . chap. . domitius corbulo for certaine words spoken by him during the time of his gouernment , which sauoured of tyranny , is called in question by the criminall magistrates , but in the end to his greater glory dismissed . because the citie of pirrhus , and all that most populou● territory by the mildnesse and ouer much lenity of certaine gouernours , became more insolent then in former times , and full of malefactours and perillous factions , which disturbed the peace of the vertuous , apolloes maiestie , to bridle with some exemplary punishment , the licentiousnesse of his seditious subiects , about two moneths past sent into that gouernment , the rigorous domitius corbulo , who in few dayes did so demeane himselfe , that from a seditious state , he reduced the same to a peaceable course of liuing . within a while after , it chāced , that corbulo discoursing with some of his familiar friends , enquired of them , what conceit they had of him : they freely answered him , that the rigor and seuerity which he had lately vsed against many of the seditious , had terrified the whole citie and countrey , that all did hate him . at which answer , corbulo reioyced beyond measure , and told them againe : there 's no matter , oderint dum metuant ; let them hate , so they stand in feare of me . the which words were afterwards carried by some pick-thanks to apollo who taking in ill part the accusation , referred the same to his court of criminall causes . and because by an ancient decree published by his maiestie , it was knowne and declared , that whatsoeuer prince legitimate , naturall , and hereditary , presumed to vtter such arrogant and rash words , he should incurre this penalty , to be reputed a tyrant , and if any officer should let slip , though vnawares , and by chance , any such dangerous words out of his mouth , he should be capitally punished . corbulo was summoned to appeare vpon this information before the iudges , who according , came the next day to answere with all humility ; where the case was throughly canuased , and while all men expected to heare some rigorous order to be taken with corbulo , by extraordinary fauour the cause was remoued by a certiorari before apollo himselfe , where to all mens admiration he was pronounced cleare and guiltlesse , and remaunded backe into his gouernment with far greater authority and grace then before . the sentence contained , that in a prince which had the honey of grace in his power , those words were shamefull , and expresly tyrannicall ; most honourable in that officers mouth , which had nothing in his hands but the odious sting of iustice : that prince being miraculous indeed , which causeth himselfe to be beloued and reuerenced of his people , and that officer most sufficient which hath the genius and nature , to make himselfe to be feared and obeyed . chap. . by the promotion of diogenes the cynick , vnto a higher place , the honourable chaire of the tranquillitie of a priuate life being vacant , apollo preferres the famous philosopher crates to that charge , who refuseth it . diogenes the cynicke , who for so many yeares with much fruit to the vniuersall good , and his owne infinit glory in particular had vndergone the charge of commending in the chaire of the publike schooles pouerty , solitarinesse , and that contented quietnesse of mind , by whose perswasion attalus himselfe the king of treasure became of that admirable resolution to put away his riches , the easier to embrace the austere sect of the stoikes , which is much edified now in parnassus , about two moneths past he was promoted for his singular great merits to a more sublime dignitie , euen to be the archcriticke of the sacred muses . whereby the noble cynicall place left vacant his maiestie bestowed it on the famous crates , who yesterday morning went to apollo , and contrary to all mens expectation refused to accept of this renowned charge , freely affirming , that by the aduancement of diogenes to that late transcendent dignity , the chaire of pouerty and contentment of mind , being now become vilified and much hindred , his heart would not giue him to exercise that office with that candour , feruencie , and ingenuous simplicity of mind , as the affaires of that place required : because the very first day , when he should settle himself to his milde lectures & peaceable meditatiōs , of necessity he could not but be swoln with some ambition , and be possessed with the like ardent desire & glorious hope to be enstalled in the same or such another dignitie , as his predecessor had obtained , who had cashired & cast out of his hart , though extraordinarily composed , that honest simplicity , which makes wise men to reason , and like a calme wind to breath with their harmlesse thoughts and not with the tongue , which oftentimes trips and deliuers , like a clattering clapper , more noises and gall , then honeyed admonitions . to this he added , that the necessitie of ambition and the violence of desire did arise and flow , not from vice but from that honourable zeale , which also philosophers , yea , the most mortified of all others in parnassus , doe hold as the most earnest and intentiue spurre of their reputation . the reason is , because when they should not receiue in progresse of time , the same or the like preferments at his maiesties hands , as he had conferred vpon diogenes , the world would iudge all that came to passe , not by their professed humility , nor because they with all their hearts and soules preferred the priuate life before publike offices , quietnesse before businesse , and pouertie before riches : but because his maiestie had not found in them those abilities , worths and deserts , which he had knowne and found in diogenes . therefore crates foreseeing these inconueniences incident to this office , his conscience would not permit him with such a troubled mind , so subiect to the violence of ambition , with any hope of doing good to reade lectures of humilitie , the contempt of riches , and the vanitie of worldly greatnesse : it being a thing impossible to find any man so powerfully eloquent , which shall be able to perswade others to follow that kinde of life , which the hearers know to be abhorred and misliked of the preacher himselfe . chap. . a controuersie hapning betwixt the gouernors of pindus and libethrum about matters of iurisdiction : apollo punisheth them both . in the territorie of libethrum , a hainous misdemeanure being committed , the gouernour of the place pursued the offendor , that fled to a country mans house adioyning to the territorie of pindus , and threatned to burne the house , except he yeelded his bodie . in the meane time the gouernour of pindus vnderstanding that this place was in his iurisdiction , hastned also thither . but before his arriuall the party had submitted himselfe prisoner to the gouernor of libethrū : wherupon he of pindus required the prisoner as his due being taken in his liberties : but the other claimed the place , where the prisoner was apprehended , to be in his patent or commission . after much debating the question and difference , both gouernours not being able longer to contend in words , fell to blowes , and their men so sided with their gouernours , that there was much bloudshed on either part . apollo hearing of these affronts sent for them both , and after long patience in examination of the difference , his maiestie finding that the gouernour of libethrum had profferd the first wrong in rashly disturbing the gouernment of his fellow-subiect , the place appearing now to be clearly in the gouernment of pindus , though before somwhat litigious , he depriued him of his gouernment , and declared him incapable of bearing any charge from thenceforward . and for the gouernour of pindus , whom his maiestie found to haue most right to the place and prisoner , he condemned him for all that to the gallies for ten yeares , aggrauating this execution for example sake , to teach him and all other officers , that they which serue the one and the same prince or state , ought to defend the reasons of their iurisdictions with the pen , and not with the pike , reseruing armes and force for strangers , which might inuade their country . a case remarkable , and to be regarded of all such officers bearing charge on any frontier townes , if not of iudges of courts , who though they be subiect to one prince and the same lawes , yet for matter of iurisdiction do sometimes contend , punishing the poore subiects for their ambition and ouersights . chap. . the vertuous of parnassus doe visit the temple of the diuine prouidence , whom they humbly thanke for the great charitie which his supreme maiestie from time to time hath vouchsafed to shew vnto mankind . this morning according to the ancient stile of this court , the temple of the diuine prouidence was visited by all the scholasticall princes , and learned barons of parnassus . and there iovianus pontanus with an excellent praier thanked our great creator for the infinite charity and loue he hath shewed to mankind , in creating frogs without teeth ; because it would haue beene an vnprofitable benefit for mankind , that this world couered with so many heauens , full of so many stars , had beene created the chiefe and soueraigne height of all the most delicious pleasures , and not also as abundant of things more necessarie , when gallants which should spend their time in defending themselues and vs from the bitings of such fastidious and importunate creatures , were like to walke with an insupportable impediment of iron boots : whereas now against such troublesome vermine , which haue no hurt in them sauing their croaking noise , a rampart of a good paire of eares sufficeth , which will not care for that ill-pleasing noise , which they know to be without danger . chap. . a contention hapning betweene many learned men , which might be the most notable politick law , or most excellent custome worthy of commendation in the flourishing state of venice , the same is finally decided and determined by the venetian state herselfe , to whose arbitrement the question is referred by their generall consent . vvorthy of record is that vertuous contention , which about six daies past arose betwixt certaine learned men of this state ; who while they discoursed of the notable orders , the most excellent lawes , and other mostrare decrees , which maintained the famous common-wealth of venice in such height of greatnesse , they fell into sundry opinions , which of them ought to beare away the victory . and because euery one of them did obstinately defend his owne opinion as the best , to the end so great a difference should be decided without commotion of minde or passion , they vnanimously agreed vpon this resolution , to appeare all of them before the state herselfe , to whom they should first declare their seuerall reasons , and that shee should afterwards adiudge which of them had aimed next vnto the marke . this they made knowne vnto the soueraigne lady , who gratiously vndertooke to giue that satisfaction which they expected . petrus crinitus then was the first , who said , that it being a most assured rule , that all things whatsoeuer subsist vnder the moone , doe spring at first and then grow , and waxing old at last they faile : it seemed a thing vnto him worthy of admiration , that the venetian state alone did notwithstanding her yeares become more youthfull and fresh euery day than other , and that those lawes , orders , and decrees , which in other principalities after long forbearing of their execution , were at length vtterly forgotten , did only in venice so flourish with seueritie , with greater obseruance , and exacter diligence , working that efficacie and benefit , that in this common-wealth no such reformation , nor innouation euer hapned , as heretofore wee read haue chanced with infinite tumults and hurliburlies in the ancient romane state , and now of late in the florentine common-wealth ; it being a peculiar vertue vnto the venetian senate , perpetually to preserue their flourishing liberty , with a seuere execution of their ancient lawes ; whereby none of those defaults euer hapned in this state , which other potentates and free states could no way shun for all their exquisite care and diligence , but that they fell into such carelesse negligence , that they lost both their liberty and liues . therefore not without good cause he dared to affirme , as a thing most certaine , that the venetian common-wealth for their prudent care in the rigorous execution of their ancient lawes ought to continue and prosper eternally , as long as the world lasteth . next spake angelus politianus , that he did truly admire both what petrus crintus had recounted , and a thousand other orders in that most prudent common-wealth . but the rarest thing which he obserued , was how an aristocracie , the true foundation whereof , as the most vnderstanding writers haue deliuered , was the equalitie of fortunes among the nobilitie , could haue beene able to maintaine it selfe in such peace and greatnesse , consisting in that disproportioned inequality of wealth , wherewith the venetian nobilitie is endowed , wherein although there were two such dangerous extremes found , as immoderate riches with some of them , and much pouertie with others of the same ranke in venice , notwithstanding there appeared not that defect , which in humane probability and according to the common course of the world , the best lawes could not prohibite , that the richer sort did not trample the pooror vnder their feet , who though they greatly enuied the condition and state of the wealthy , yet notwithstanding either by reason of their affectionate charity , which reigned in the venetian nobilitie towards the publike good , or else because those infinite riches , which some of them so possessed , were not abused towards their inferiours ; both poore and rich liued modestly , peaceably , and contented in this most fortunate countrey . after him followed iulius caesar scaliger , and said , that the greatest wonder in the venetian state , which amazed the world , was that the nobilitie themselues which bare sway , did not onely most patiently pay the vsuall ancient subsidies and tallages belonging to the exchequer , but with incredible alacritie of minde and speedy performance , they assessed on themselues other new impositions of money , which with great diligence and rigour were afterwards exacted and called for at the publike receiuers hands . yea and oftentimes in important affaires concerning the common-wealth , before they burthened the common people with any new customes and taxations , they haue yeelded supplies out of their owne purses , and that so liberally and cheerfully , that this one act of theirs deserued place before all other wonders and remarkable orders in this state , as such a one , which euery man must acknowledge to be an act of that excellent quality , which renders the venetian common-wealth for euer glorious ; for hauing such a nobilitie so dearely inamoured of their free-state , that they more readily preferred the publike interest before their owne priuate particular . then succeeded bernardo tasso , and said , that he had for a long time soiourned in venice , where he maruelled at nothing more than to see the nobilitie , who glutted their mindes with continuall pleasures , delights , and idlenesse , gouerning the affaires of the republike with such admired vertue , that they seemed vnto others to be men of an exemplarie and regular life , and also rulers borne to perpetuall cares and burthens . after the opinion of tasso , francis berni , according to his manner , with a pleasing grace , which gaue good content to the most excellent venetian lady , said , that the most rare and wonderfull thing , which great wits ought to admire in this state , that notwithstanding the marshes and chanels did abound with crabs and creuices in all places about the citie , the venetian senators tooke so few of them , that of all other nations they were reputed , and that iustly , to be the salt of the earth . next vnto him , said sabellicus , that while he wrote the venetian historie , hauing most diligently obserued the notablest lawes and customes of this renowned state , hee wondred at nothing more , than at the publike treasure , which carefull senators managed with so great fidelitie , that among the nobilitie it was held not only a capitall excesse , but exceeding great infamy to defile their hands with one penny of their patron s. marks treasurie . after him spake sannazzarius , that the strangest thing vnto him was , that seeing there were many among the noblemen of venice poore and ill prouided of the goods of fortune , yet neuerthelesse they endured with vnspeakable patience all their miseries and crosse fortunes , without hauing the least thought of affecting any of the publike goods to be gotten either by ingrossing of corne , or by some vnequall diuision of lands , matters which mightily perplexed the state of rome . and that it seemed vnto him a thing worthy of commendation to see a poore nobleman in venice so striue and force himselfe only by the helpe of vertue to comfort himselfe in his miseries , hoping in time to deserue some honourable and profitable place of imployment in his country , whereby at last it chanceth , that the vertue , valour , and bountie of the minde doe serue an impouerished nobleman of this state in stead of a wealthy patrimony . iouianus pontanus said , that they which passed were great maruels , but in his opinion this surpassed all things in the venetian state , that the huge estates and infinite wealth of some noble persons wrought not those pernitious effects to puffe them vp with vaine-glory and pride , as haue beene noted in many other common-wealthes . and that it was a most laudable custome to see these rich senatours possessing princely treasures liue very priuately at home , and to shew themselues abroad little differing from ordinary people . whereby all men may conceiue , that the venetians onely doe know the true way and meane to distinguish and seuer from great riches those inconueniences of ambition , pride , and popularity , which the famous romane state neuer knew , or could not hinder in pompey , caesar , and many other powerfull senatours . assoone as pontanus had ended his discourse , hannibal caro said , that aboue all other wonders he thought it a matter worthy of greatest admiration , to obserue the quality of the duke of venice , followed with obedience and reuerence , with regall authoritie , with a great command : and for all that to see his royalty and princely sway moderated with a set rule , and the power of his will ioyned with modestie were tempers vnknowne to the prudent lawgiuers of ancient times , and a kind of wisedome luckily practised among the venetians . bartholomew caualcanti , after him told his opinion , that as pontanus had intimated , it was strange indeed , that their senatours wealth and great estates did not cause some of them to be puft with ambition : but it was a more strange thing to see that such were the orders of this famous state , such the sacred lawes of this euerlasting common-wealth , that the high places and supreme gouernments , which some of their senators inioyed as presidents in remoter countries subiect vnto their dominion , did not sometime or other pricke them with ambition to rebell and vsurpe . and at that time when he lay there at venice , he wondred not at the great treasure of saint marke , nor at the arcenall , nor at the grand canal , with the proud palaces of the cornaria , the grimani , the foscari , and other magnificent edifices built with such royall expences in this renowned city being miraculous things in the sight of ordinary persons . but farre more miraculous in his conceit was , that he saw the noble signior sebastian venieri , a little after he had returned to venice from that memorable victory at sea , which hee had gotten being generall against the turkes , liue retired at his priuate house , and when hee walked abroad to the market place , hee differed in nothing from these senators , who had stayed behind at venice , but went very plaine and simple in apparell . and surely it is a most singular custome , which they haue , that their nobilitie can vse that ciuility and modestie in their owne citie , and being employed abroad in matters of import and of high command , that they can sodainly transforme themselues into most costly garments , with such magnificence , and princely liberality , to let the world know them for no citizens of an ordinary state , but for men borne for great enterprizes and for bra●e commanders , as if they were subiects descended from royall bloud ; and also to make themselues famous vnto all other nations by thus accommodating their affections and spirits to the nature of the place , and framing themselues as well to modesty , ciuilitie , and thrift at home , as to pompuous authority abroad . a thing so true , that whereas other states for the reputation and countenance of publike magistrates are wont to recommend to their gouernours , that they maintaine the maiestie of their soueraigne places , with magnificence and stately comportments both of courage and gorgeous apparell . the venetian state on the contrary haue enacted statutes to forbid any of their citizens , which supply offices or charge vnder them in any of their territories to grace their presence with glorious shewes , or to weare any costly suits of apparell . so great a care haue those politicke senators of their cities thrift and prosperitie . this spake caualcanti , whē flauio biondo said , that whē he was at venice , he became much astonisht to find in a pure aristocracie , that the citizens and common people liued with such cōtentment in this fortunate coūtry , that in many years of his abode there , he could neuer learne , whether the publike state were better beloued and respected of the nobility which cōmanded them , or of the cōmon people which obeyed . next to him spake paulus iouius , that not onely vnto himselfe , but also vnto many great princes , with whom hee oftentimes had conference , touching the wonders of venice , it seemed a thing of great momēt that the senate of this most famous republicke , did altogether bend their endeauours vnto peace , and to no other end at all , withall their vigilancy and care , not studying to make perpetuall preparations for the warres , as others did , whereupon they all concluded , that in this flourishing state alone , a man might find the lady peace armed withall exquisite appurtenances . after ●ovius ensued iohn boccace , who said , that the true salt , which preserued the venetian state from the purrefaction and corruption of abuses , was the soueraigne queene of all lawes , that most excellent order , so inuiolably obserued of her , that for the aduancing of a senatour to a higher place , not the glory of his riches , not the merits of his father , or ancestors , nor the multitude of his tenants or friends , nor the fauour of great persons , but his owne worth and naked vertue were had in most consideration . from whence it comes to passe , that in venice the vitious and ignorant nobles were onely accounted a number , as ciphers in arithm●●ke , while the vertuous alone , and the best deseruing subiect , bare the chiefe sway , detur digniori , with that prudent care and circumspection , as is knowne vnto all the world . but leonardus aretinus after he had extolled the opinion of boccace , added , that the excellēt vsage of the venetian state , in not granting to their nobilitie , the charge and offices at the first iumpe , but by degrees , was the true solid foundation , wheron their greatnesse consisted most firmely built , & withall the eternitie of their libertie . for this is one of their most admired precepts , that euery nobleman whatsoeuer , before he mount vp into the highest dignity , must from his youth vpwards be forced , like an enfranchised townesman , to beginne from the lowest offices , and not leaping wise and sodainly . a most safe custome , as that , which iustly distributed this important effect of vpholding the true and substantiall equality among the nobilitie of an aristocracie , which giues long life to a free state , because according to the certaine and vnderstanding policie of true gouernment , the equality of goods made not senatours equall in a common-wealth , but that all the nobles should be first compelled to walke faire and softly to the most eminent places of command from the inferiour steps , which i haue formerly shewed . the which if the roman empire had practised , it had not shortned the life of their libertie , nor wrought those dangerous and fatall infirmities of tyrannies and tumults . their grosse abuses in affording the consular authority and the charge of armies vnto pompey , the caesars , and to other wealthy and powerfull citizens in their greene and vnsetled youth , was no other then as if they had chosen some of the bloud-royall in a monarchy , as lords and patrons of their liberty , rather then senatours of a well ordered common-wealth . by which vnwitting errour all men may note , that the freedome of rome got her mortall wound and vtter desolation . albeit that the most excellent lady of the state of venice gaue apparant signes , that she seemed well contented with the opinion of aretine , shee commanded notwithstanding th●● her vertuous statesmen , who aduanced themselues forwards , to proceed with their opinions . and then benedict varchi thus began : my florentine state , which neuer knew the way of good fortune to bring in among her noble families , that peace , vnion , and mutuall loue , which makes the liberty of a common-wealth euerlastingly durable , in the end fell into the infirmitie of serui●ude , puts me now in a great amazement , and i thinke it may surpasse all other maruells in this state , when i consider with deliberation , that a nobleman of venice , although most grieuously offended for the life of his sonnes , and for his owne proper person , enforced more with a feruent charity towards the freedome of his countrey , then terrified with the seuerity of magistrates , had learned that difficult lesson of resolution , to forgiue at the instant the wrong which he had receiued at his aduersaries hands , and that with a free heart . a resolution worthy of remembrance , and by so much the more wonderfull by how much it is cleerely obserued , that a nobleman of venice referres the reuenge of all receiued iniuries into the senates hand with all willingnesse of mind , the which sensuall and brutish men , yea & many of the wiser sort without the length time and much strugling of nature cannot yeeld vnto god , to whom vengeance belongeth , and from whom wee must all acknowledge our liues , liuing , and liberty to proceed . this varchi spake , when lodouico dulce began the deliuery of his opinion , that if that were true , which all confessed , that the rarest and most prized greatnesse that might be considered in a prince , was to disarme with facilitie and without danger one of his war-like generals , and to receiue of him exact and conformable obedience , for all that that this generall did aforehand know , and long before his returne , how his prince grew in suspition of his loyalty , or in dislike of his seruice : then this custome vsual in the state of venice , deserued more to be wondred at then any other , to be able to disarme with great ease , their generals and admirals at sea. yea , and at such time when they vnderstood how the senate was earnestly bent to punish them at their returne , notwithstanding that they found themselues very strong , beloued of their souldiers , and powerfull enough to offend the state , or to defend themselues from shame , it alwayes fell out , that assoone as euer they were sent for , they readily and presently obeyed , voluntarily they resigned ouer their charge , and publike command , and withall speed hastned to venice , to be sentenced by their friends and citizens , though with capitall punishment , which they willingly endured , rather then to hazard the losse of their countrey by vnnaturall innouations , and ciuill warres . so deare vnto them is the care of the common safetie . the most excellent venetian lady , who without answering any thing to the vertuous aboue-named had attentiuely heard all these commendable orders and admirable prerogatiues said to dulce , that the matter which he related , was indeed of great consequence , yet not so rare , but that the ottoman emperours likewise participated of the like benefit . howbeit neuerthelesse , there was one singular prerogatiue , which she most exactly possessed , and wherein she excelled all other principalities , as well of the ancient , as present times , whereto she acknowledged and ascribed all her greatnesse , the which as yet she did not heare any of them as much as touch . then spake hieronymus mercurialis , that while he read the physicke lecture at the vniuersitie of padua , hee knew some of the plebeian and common sort at venice , that went in their gundoloes to disport themselues vpon the water with some young courtezans , according to their common custome , and there being mightily misused by certaine young noble-men , whom they casually met , it chanced that these plebeians slew one of them in the affray . for which offence vpon complaint made by the parties friends , the plebeians were sent for by the iudges , who although they knew the power of the law to be in the hands of the nobilitie , whom they had offended , neuer fled , but trusting in the vprightnesse and integrity of the senate and magistrates , they doubted not to appeare before them , and to yeeld themselues prisoners . neither did their hopes faile them , for vpon consideration of the cause giuen in euidence for their defence , how they were prouoked first by those young noble-men , they were enlarged and pronounced innocent to the honour of the venetians vncorrupted iustice : so that neither powerfull parentage , greatnesse of friends , nor abundance of wealth can blinde and diuert the iudges of venice to wrong any man. last of all , these vertuous states-men spake the most learned hermolaus barbarus , that in a free state tyranny begins then to vsurpe and worke , when the most weightie secrets concerning the generall good of the common-wealth , are communicated to a few senators . and for this cause the most soueraigne lady of venice , to auoid shipwreake on that dangerous rockie shelfe , imparted her secrets , and deliberated the designes and pragmatickes of greatest import , wherein her state was interessed in her highest court of magistracy or parliament of the pregadi , a number cōsisting of two hundred and fiftie senators and vpwards ; and to him it appeared to be a miraculous thing , how the venetian state could finde among so great a number of senators that secrecie , which many great potentates for all their exquisite diligence and large entertainment of gifts and rewards , had bootlesse sought in one only secrtarie , or in a couple of counsellors of state. at these words , the most excellent venetian lady laid her hand on the shoulders of barbarus , and pronounced this verdict : now thou hast hit the naile on the head , and named that most pretious iewell , wherein i most glory , and prize my selfe aboue all other states , and for which indeed i ought to be iustly emulated and enuied at , seeing that nothing else appertaines for the true gouernment and managing of state-businesse , more necessary than secracie . chap. . the doctors of the chaire hauing admitted into their vniuersitie some famous poeticall ladies , apollo commands them to be dismissed home to their families . the famous doctors of the chaire , about a few moneths past , admitted the most vertuous ladies victoria colonna , laura terracina , and other learned poeticall ladies of parnassus into their academicall corporation , where they vsed times to resort to their publike exercises . but it chanced so that many schollers enamoured with the beautie of these ladies , did not only flocke oftner than they were accustomed , into the schooles , whensoeuer they vnderstood that these ladies repaired thither , but also consumed their pretious time and wits in composing of amorous sonnets , which they dedicated vnto these ladies , as if they were goddesses , with such rare conceits and lofty tunes , as eclipsed the glory of the muses themselues . at length the sauour of these sonnets , though fragrant and sweet in the schollers apprehensions , offended apolloes diuine nostrills worse than the stinke of a blackamore . for which cause before the end of these ladies probationship and their matriculation , his maiestie charged the cathedrall doctors to dismisse them out of the vniuersitie . his reason was because he well saw out of his diuine knowledge , that the true poetry of women were the needle , the distaffe , and the wheele , and that the schoole exercises of ladies among vniuersitie men might well be likened vnto the dalliance and playing of dogs , which after some fained snarling , catching , and gamesome tossing one another , doe conclude their sport in riding and mounting vpon their play-fellowes backs . chap. . the lady victoria colonna intreats of apollo , that the infamie which women incurred for cuckolding their husbands , might likewise extend to adulterous husbands . apolloes answer . the most excellent lady victoria colonna a princesse of exemplarie chastitie , about three daies past appeared in his maiesties court of audience , and in the name of all womankind said , that they all loued the excellencie of chastitie , which was naturally giuen them for a most particular vertue , that they did not awhit enuy courage , a vertue attributed to mans sexe , because they well knew , that a lady without the soule of chastitie , which renders her odoriferous to the world , was but a stinking carcasse : yet notwithstanding it seemed vnto them , that they had much cause to grieue and lament at the great inequalitie , which they saw betwixt the husband and the wife in the particular punishment of adultery ; so that women could not rest contented to see men in such wise free , that the punishment of shame , which alone was wont to terrifie honourable persons , did now lesse serue to restraine them from committing against their wiues these beastly and libidinous defaults . in which dissolute courses they said , that they proceeded so far , that many husbands were not onely not ashamed to keepe openly concubines in their houses , but had oftentimes presumed to make them partakers of the sacred bed of matrimonie . these abuses came to passe , by reason that the lawes had not prouided the like punishment against the offending husbands , as were thundred out and practised against adulterous wiues . and that in this case , the lawes shewed too much fauour vnto maried men , in allowing them to reuenge the iniurie with their owne hands at the time when they hapned to take their wiues in the adulterous act . by which notorious aggrieuances the sexe of women being so much wronged , were now forced to repaire vnto the cleare fountaine of true iustice , to the end that by publishing equall punishment in the equalitie of the self-same fault , there might be some competent remedy ministred for their oppressions . and that if this did not stand with apolloes good will and pleasure , there might be at leastwise the like liberty granted vnto them in this particular of adultery to keepe amorous seruants , or to marry againe , as many men aduentured to doe . after which liberty granted them , they would not perhaps make vse thereof , but only in terrorem tantùm , vnder colour of law to be enabled to bridle their loose and lustfull husbands . vnto this demand of the lady victoria , apollo answered , that the law of fidelitie betwixt the husband and the wife ought to be indeed equall , and that the defect and breach thereof ought to be punished no lesse in the one , than in the other : but that in the wife a more exquisite and perfect chastitie was required for the great and weighty respect to know the certainty of their children , to which end nature had assigned them the noble vertue of chastitie , the which was so necessarie for procreation of humane kinde , that without it the children should both lose their inheritance and their fathers affection . a thing so true , that nature herselfe hath most prouidently allotted chaste wiues to all liuing creatures of the earth , where the male concurres for the industrious hatching of the egge , or for the nourishing of their young ones ; all to the end that the carke of the fathers being imployed for their children welfare should proue somewhat pleasing , and that their charge should redound to comfort , and to great gaine in time to come . at these words the lady victoriaes beautifull cheeks were stained with an honourable blush , who with a roman ingenuitie confessed vnto his maiestie the simplicitie of her demand , and said , that indeed it were a great shame and dishonour to the sexe of women , if in the pretious gift of chastitie they suffred themselues to be ouercome of those vnreasonable liuing creatures , who although they pursue no other thing than pleasure , yet neuerthelesse doe they very religiously obserue chastitie , because they would not anger the fathers of their young ones by their wandring and inordinate lust . and for the important reason , that husbands desired to haue their wiues chaste , the lawes against adulterous women were too fauourable , because the wound which the vnchaste husband giues his wife did only pierce the skin , whereas the wife by her lasciuious deeds doth stab and kill her husband with the poniard of euerlasting infamy , and also doth disparage her children . chap. . a poetaster for playing at cards and deuising the game called triumph or trump , is brought before apollo , who after he had deeply entred into the mysticall meaning of the said game , not only dismisseth him , but granteth him an yearely pension to instruct his courtiers in that new art. to the end , that the ignorant with the filthinesse of their most beastly minds should not profane the vertuous places at parnassus , apollo many yeares since caused two companies of skeltenicall poets , dogrel rimers , men that made verses at random , and very aduentrous at ruffianly conceits to come out of sicily , whose office was to scoure the countrey and to cleare the coast , of vagabonds . these , about eight daies past , tooke prisoner a poetaster , that had beene capitally banished from parnassus , who although he was forbidden the vse of all books , and the exercise of his pen , notwithstanding as it were in despite of apollo , and in contempt of the sacred muses , he defiled paper with his dissolute rimes , and at last proceeded so far in his audacious arrogancie , that he assumed vnto himselfe the soueraigne name of a poet. this exorbitant fault of his became aggrauated with a paire of cardes , which those catchpoles in searching him had found in his pocket , for which being likewise a notorious vice and worthy of death they brought him incontinently with the said cardes before apollo , who when he saw them was wonderfully amazed at the brutish inuention , which the vicious had found out to cast away their pretious time , to consume their reputation , and to spend their meanes . but much more was his maiestie astonished , when he vnderstood , that men now a dayes were growne to such a height of folly , that they vsed to call that thing a play or game , whereat they dealt so cruelly in good earnest . and further that they esteemed it a delight , sport , and pastime to put in suspence and to doubtfull compromise that money , which was gotten with so much toyle and cares , and serued so necessary for such great vses , that without it , this present world would take aristotle to bee an ignorant foole , and alexander the great a base plebeian . then apollo askt the prisoner , what game at cards was most familiar vnto him , and because he answered , that it was trumps or triumph , his maiestie willed him to play it . the prisoner obeyed , and plaide ; which when apollo had obserued & penetrated into the magiste●iall lessons and secrets of the game , he cried out , that this game of trumpe was the true philosophy of courtiers , the most necessarie science , which all men ought to learne , that would not be thought innocents or simple-witted . and shewing how much the affront done vnto the prisoner did displease him , he inlarged him presently , and honoured him with the title of a vertuous man. and the next morning commanded his officers to erect vp a publike schoole , where with a stipend of fiue hundred crownes a yeare , that notable person for the common good should reade as a lecture that excellent game of trumpe , and vpon a grieuous penalty to be imposed , hee charged the platonicks , peripateticks , the stoicks , and other philosophers , specially the morall ; and to all other the vertuous crew residing at parnassus , that they should learne this most necessarie science , the which because they should not forget , he bound them to practise themselues therein one houre at least euery day . although it seemed strange to the learned , how it could be possible , that out of a most vile game deuised by the off-scum raskals of men there might be drawne any profitable document for honest men : yet notwithstanding , they all knowing that his maiestie neuer commanded any thing , which did not afterward redound to their good and to a speciall purpose , they obeyed so willingly that this schoole was in as great request , and frequented no lesse than an vniuersitie . but when the learned had discouered the magisteriall secrets , the hidden mysteries , and admirable cunning tricks of this triumphant game of trumps , they extolled apolloes profound iudgment to the eighth heauen , all of them with one voice celebrating and magnifying it in all places , that it was not philosophie , poetry ; nor yet the mathematicks , nor astrologie , nor any other famous knowledge , but it was the most rare game of trumps , which taught men , chiefly great men and courtiers , that secret of most import , how euery seuerall trumpe tooke vp and got , as aprey , euen the goodliest of all the cards . chap. . it being noted , that petus thraseas in the company of his sonne in law eluidius priscus did vse commonly to frequent the house of the lady victoria colonna , he is grieuously rebuked by apollo . it was obserued by those vertuous censers , whose office and delight consisted in looking to other mens deeds , that petus thraseas , in the company of eluidius priscus his sonne in law extraordinarily haunted the house of the lady victoria colonna , and also of other learned dames of this court. and though the said thraseas were reputed for a man of singular good parts , that one would hardly suspect any obscene or lewd action in so great a senatour , his vsuall and daily visites together with his continuall abodes in these ladies houses , occasioned so great a scandall , yea , among the vertuous themselues , that the smell thereof ascended euen to his maiesties nostrels ; who to extinguish the flames of these slanderous murmures , about two dayes since sent for thraseas , and expresly commanded him to reueale what businesse he had in resorting so often to these ladies houses . thraseas answered , that he frequented them , onely to exercise charity among these ladies , by reading euery day vnto them a chapter of boetius his booke of the consolation of philosophy . vpon this answer apollo was so grieuously mooued against thraseas , that in great anger he said : if with your talent and zealous office by giuing office by giuing comfort & consolations to the afflicted , you hope to merit grace at gods hand , and to obtaine good will among men , goe your wayes to comfort those poore wretches , who die of meere necessitie and pure want in the hospitalls , or those vnfortunate people , who are condemned to the gallowes or spanish gallies . but to sit all day long closely among ladies , as sardanapalus vsed to doe , thinking to make men beleeue , that you exercise spirituall doings , they are such hypocrisies , as will moue the veriest idiot to laugh at you , and will make them to burst with rage , that know , how these which goe often to the mill become whited with meale . and a man of your wisdome ought to vnderstand , that at such time as a woman conceiues of two infants , which we call twinnes , if both be male , they are enclosed within one membrane , the which likewise comes to passe , if both bee female . but if it happens , that one bee male , and the other female , most prouident nature preserues the female in a perticular membrane , seuered from the male . seeing that nature thought good not to thrust a little brother and a little sister of that tender age to dwell together in one place , she teacheth all men , and especially men of your fashion to liue more warily and securely ; and in these doings , o thraseas , whosoeuer trusteth his owne power , i hold him to be more rash than wise . and for that these disorders , in regard of our reputation and yours , had need to be corrected , i doe straitly command you , that from henceforth you leaue off such dangerous practises . the world is not so sottishly simple , as you more simply conceiue it , but that they doe well vnderstand , how the visites which men of your qualitie vse vnto ladies , doe begin to smell after the second time , and specially in their noses , that know , how faire and beautifull things seeme pleasing to all men , and that the prouocation of the flesh is a naturall vice in all men , the which they cannot cure and keepe backe with a more excellent remedy , than to stand a farre off from such faire and goodly obiects : there 's no safer way to defend a man from error , than to shunne the occasions . and all your philosophy cannot produce such proofes , as will make any man of iudgement beleeue , that a dainty bit of flesh doth not agree with euery mans mouth , that is made of flesh . lastly , i must put you in minde , that a man of your credit and condition , who makes profession aboue all things not to defile the white robe of your reputation with the sports of lasciuious oile , ought not at all to busie himselfe about lampes ; it being not onely great folly , but most insolent rashnesse , worthy of the whip and strapado , to think he can make gun-powder in a forge , where a smith workes nailes , and afterwards to perswade men , that he might goe to the field without danger . chap. . a learned gentleman of rome begs a remedie of apollo , to make him to forget certaine grieuous wrongs , which he had receiued in the court of a great prince : for which cause his maiestie causeth him to drinke a cup-full of the water of lethe , but with vnfortunate successe . a learned gentleman of rome , which some few dayes since arriued at parnassus , was yesterday admitted to his maiesties royall audience , vnto whom he shewed , that for many iniuries , which hee had receiued of diuers ill willers of his in the court of a certaine prince , where the lawyers persecuted him , and made him pay aboue three score seuerall fees by their cunning trickes of law , he hath sithence liued very much troubled in minde , and so much the more , for that he could not worke his reuenge vpon them without incurring farre greater troubles , then his enemies had plunged him in . and on the other side , he found that he was not endowed with that generous resolution of forgetting and forgiuing them . for which cause , and now to be freed from this hellish torment , wherein he perpetually liued , he repaired to his maiestie , whom most humbly he intreated to bestow vpon him some present remedie to heale his mind , which was galled with the passions of hatred and reuenge . apollo did much pitie this gentlemans case , and commanded that one should giue him a large cup-full of the water of lethe , prepared in such manner , that it might cause him to forget odious things , and not to take away the remembrance of benefits receiued . the gentleman with great greedinesse drunke vp the water , the which to all mens wonder was found to haue only the vertue to blot and cancell out of his minde those iniuries , which he had receiued of his inferiours in condition ; and that the iniuries which were done vnto him , by greater persons than himselfe , had inflamed and exasperated his minde rather with an euerlasting memory of them , than any way caused him to forget them . whereat many began to murmur , that the famous water of lethe had lost that pretious vertue , which the poets had blazed of it . but his maiestie gaue them to vnderstand , that the water of lethe had euermore the same vertue , which it had in the beginning . and in that it did not worke the expected effect in that gentleman ; the reason was , because persons nobly descended , and of great spirits , had euer this custome proper vnto their natures , to write in the sand these iniuries , which they receiued of base people ; but in solid marble with eternall characters those aboue-handed blowes , which were giuen them by their equalls , or superiours ; it being the propertie of a noble mind to remit wrongs by magnanimitie , but not to pardon them of necessitie . chap. . apuleius his golden asse , and plautus his asse doe complaine vnto apollo of the great seueritie which their masters vsed in beating them . but they are sent away with no pleasing answer . about the eight of the current apuleius his famous asse accompanied with plautus his asse , appeare before apolloes maiestie , who in the name of all the sort of mules , asses , and pack-horses , said , that if any kinde of beasts subiect to mankind , which were of small expence and of much profit , had deserued better vsage than others ; they had most reason aboue all other beasts , to grieue at their masters rough and rigorous dealings . and although they bare the whole burthen of their lords houses , and maintained them both day and night by their perpetuall labours , and were content to feed ordinarily on sedge , straw , and water , and to keepe their shrouetide with branne , and such poore prouender ; all this notwithstanding they were ingratefully , cruelly , and with great indiscretion entreated by their masters , and being the most vnhappie of all creatures , they were now become the miserable spectacle of all drudgery . for as much as they could not by their prostrate and humble seruices mollifie the passionate minds of their lords , they petitioned his maiestie in most lowly manner to commiserate their asinine miseries , if not to conclude and end them , yet at least to order the matter so , that by his maiesties command their patrons would thenceforth vse them , though not gratefull respects for their great seruices , yet with moderation of passion , and with more hmanitie . vnto these apollo answered , that the seuerity , which masters vsed towards their pack-horses , whereof they so bitterly complained , proceeded not out of their masters naturall crueltie , since that it is plaine , that no man yet hated the vtilitie and benefit of his heritage , but rather from their monstrous sloth , and stupendious stupiditie of the pack-horses , through which most brutish defaults , their masters were enforced furiously with whips and goads to pricke them on to doe that labour , which otherwise for want of quickness they had not spirit enough of themselues to performe . and whosoeuer would exactly iudge and determine of any mans cruell and rigorous dealings , he had need not only to haue regard vnto the genius and nature of him that exerciseth and vseth this correction , as to the qualitie and manners of him , that complaines he is hardly dealt with . chap. . a generall reformation of the world by the seuen wise men of greece , and by other learned men , is published by expresse order from apollo . ivstinian the emperor , that great composer of the codes and pandects , some few dayes since brought a new law vnto apollo , to haue the same approoued of his maiestie , whereby it was straightly forbidden , that any man should waxe so cruell against his owne person , as to be the authour of his owne death . apollo seeing this law , had it in so great horrour , that with a sigh , which proceeded from the bottome of his heart , he brake forth into these speeches : is the good gouernment of mankinde precipated into such disorder , o iustinian , that they will now a dayes voluntarily attempt their owne deathes , because they will not liue any longer , as they ought ? and wheras i haue hitherto hired a great number of the wisest morall philosophers , to the end that with their tognes and writings they should minister vnder mee graue and ciuill conceits vnto others , which might make death seemed lesse terrible , are things now reduced to that great calamity , that men wil no longer liue , not yet learn to accommodate thēselues to die well ? and do i carelesly sleep , while these disorders abound among my learned fraternitie ? to these words of apollo , iustinian answered , that this law was very necessary , and that many notorious effects hauing happened by these desperate courses , more inconueniences would yet ensue , if his maiestie did not in time prouide some conuenient remedy to salue the wilfull disorders of these franticke fellowes . whereupon apollo tooke diligent information of that manner of life , which the world lead , and found that it became extraordinarily depraued with euill customes , the which to reforme hee resolued to create a congregation of some notable personages , the most prudent and ingenuous polititians of his empire . but in the very beginning of this serious talke he met with inuincible difficulties , for being come to the point , to appoint a number of subiects among his morall philosophers , and those innumerable vertuous spirits which attended his court , he could not light on any to his absolute liking , sufficiently enabled for so great a businesse , by reason that his maiestie knew , that the sanctitie of life , and the good example of the reformer wrought a greater force and power in them , which were to be reformed , then the best rules , which the wisest state could enact and publish . in this penurious exigent , apollo referred the charge of the worlds vniuersall reformation to the seuen wise men of greece , men that are held and reputed to be in the chiefest credit at parnassus , was those which in all mens conceit haue learnt the receit and way to make straight the dogs leg , which with so much paines ( yet alwayes in vaine ) antiquity hunted after . the rumour of these newes being come to the grecians eares , it reioyced them exceedingly for the honour , which his maiestie vouchsafed vnto their nation ; as on the other side , it much troubled the latines , it seeming vnto them , that they herein had singular great wrong offered vnto them to be excluded . apollo perceiuing , that this emulation might much hinder the generall reformation , to take away all impediments , and to yeeld some satisfaction to the discontented romans , to those grecian sages he adioyned marcus cato and annaus seneca , and in fauour of the italian philosophers , hee constituted iacobus mazzon secretary of the congregation , whom he graced with a consultiue voyce . vpon the ninteenth day of the aforesaid moneth , all these famous sages and new reformers brauely accompanied with a great troupe of the noblest vertuous of this state went into the delphick palace , the place appointed for this businesse of reformation , and to the learned it was a pleasing sight to behold the great number of pedantes , which with table-books in their hands went quoting and laying downe the sentences and apothegmes , which these continually let slip out of their harmonious mouths . as soone as these learned and wise lords were reunited to declare their remedies , the fame is , that thales the milesian , the first of the seuen sages , began in this manner : most prudent philosophers ; the businesse for which we are now here assembled together , is the greatest , which the wit of man can treat of ; and although no other enterprise may be found so hard , as to heale an inueterate neapolitane bone-ache , an infistulated gangrene , an incurable canker , yet notwithstanding , the insuperable difficulties , which weare out other mens braines , ought to animate men of our ranke to ouercome them , seeing that the supposed impossibilitie of the cure will augment our glory , and will maintaine vs still in that sublime and high degree of reputation , wherein we are eleuated ; and now i firmly assure my selfe , that i haue found out the true antidote for the easie expulse of these venemous and banefull corruptions . i am confident , that there is not any of vs , but assures himselfe , that no other disease hath infected the healthfull life of this present age , than the hidden hatred , dissimulation , equiuocation , and treachery of men couered ouer with the faire mantle of religion , of loue , simplicitie , and charity ; the which , my good lords , being corrected with cauteries , razours , and with corrosiue plaisters fit for this cancred wound , such as i shall now discouer , all men liuing , which at this time are by these vices brought euen to deaths doore , all other physitians hauing left them without hope of recouery , shall suddenly become restored to their former health , and shall resume that sinceritie , that verity of speech , and that holinesse of life , which in ancient times hath beene esteemed true-hearted candour , genuine simplicitie , and plaine dealing . the true remedie then is of necessitie to reduce men into an ingenuous kinde of liuing , and to embrace that simplicitie of the heart , which they can neuer doe , before princes haue with their high authoritie chased out of their kingdomes irreligious hypocrites of a different religion , as wolfes of state , and also to cut off wrangling suits at law ; nor these can they euer bring to passe without diminishing the number of lawyers , and needlesse courts of iustice , which hearten euen sheepe to turne vpon their keepers . these , these abuses , most vertuous lords , being so restrained , then lies , falshoods , double dealing , and hypocrisies , will depart , as the chiefe nourishment of the infernall spirit out of the possessed soules homeward to their master the deuill . in such wise did this opinion of thales worke within the rest of the sages hearts , that he was ready to goe away with all their suffrages and voices , when mazzon the secretary commanded him to rehearse the same vnto apollo , who approued so well of thales his remedy , that he commanded out of hand a chirurgion to make a little window in the heart of man. but in the same houre , when the chirurgion had prepared his instruments to open the breast of man for that purpose , homer , virgil , plato , aristotle , auerroes , and some other learned men repaired to apollo , and signified vnto his maiestie , that the chiefest instrument , which with great facilitie gouerned the world , was the reputation of those which commanded it , and that a iewel of that worth ought neuer to be exposed vnto any perill by wise princes . they laid before his maiesties consideration the credit of a holy life , the opinion of the bounty of customes , wherein the excellent philosophicall senate , and the honourable colledge of the vertuous were had in great reuerence among all the learned subiects of apolloes empire . and if his maiestie would suddenly cause all mens hearts to be opened , the greatest and best sort of his vertuous followers could not but suffer infinite shame & infamie , whonow were in chiefe credit about his sacred person , when they should see euen boyes to take notice of their foolishnesse , as who is wise at all seasons ? yea and his maiestie himselfe would grow into hatred with his most principall fauourites , when hee saw they were not such notable persons of an vnspotted life as he reputed them to be . and by these meanes he should lose the most part of his dependants , to the vtter depopulating of famous parnassus . and for this cause , before his maiestie would attempt this important enterprise , they humbly desired in the name of all the vertuous , to grant them some competent time to purifie their mindes , and to lay them a little a bucking . the aduise of these famous persons greatly pleased . apollo , and by a publike edict he prorogued the terme of making the window vntill eight daies were expired , in which time the vertuous in such manner toyled themselues in cleansing their minds of all hidden fallacies , of counterfeit friendship , of inbred rancour , and other stinking vices , that in the grocers , druggists , and apothecaries shops of parnassus , all the sweet conserues , cinnamon , cassia , syrops , lozenges , roses , violets , and other pretious wares were all spoiled with the taint , and the stench abounded so corrupt , that all the quarters of the platonick and peripatetick philosophers , smelt worse than if the filthiest i akes of the countrey were emptied ; whereas the street of the latin and italian poets , smelt only like the broth of reheated coleworts . now the time for the vniuersall bucking and purifying , that was limited , became almost ended , when the day before the opening of the window in mens hearts , the great hippocrates , galen , cornelius celsus , and other experimented physitians of this state went to apollo , and freely spake their minds in this manner : royall sir , if this worke goes forward , wee must needs deface this little world of mankinde , most noble for the miraculous workmanship , wherewith it is wrought with euident perill of an important musckle and a principall veine , and by that meanes kill and destroy the whole fabricke of mans microcosme , or at least make it for euer sickly and crazed . and so great an euill we might practise onely by the benefit of foure ignorant persons , seeing that not only the profoundest wits , but likewise men of meane iudgement onely with foure daies practise , which they may haue with any notable hypocrite whatsoeuer , they know how to penetrate into the most inward gutt . with apollo this speech of the physitians so preuailed , that he resumed his former deliberation , and by ausonius gallus made it knowne vnto the lords reformers , that they should continue their philosophicall opinions . then solon thus began : the cruell hatred and poysonfull enuie , which vniuersally breed among men , and domineere ouer them in these daies , are these , most prudent lords , which to my thinking haue so confounded the world in the case , as we see it . the correction then consisteth in insusing of charitie in mens hearts , and the sacred loue towards their neighbours , which is one of the precepts of god. we must now imploy the whole engine of our ablest wits to take away the occasions of hatred , which make them so sauage and implacable . i haue to the vttermost of my vnderstanding diued into the mysticall cause of this hatred , and i finde it to proceed of the inequalitie of worldly goods by that hellish vsage of mine and thine among our worldlings , the very rock of all scandals . and it is manifest , that mens mindes depraued by ambition , couetousnesse , and tyrannie , haue occasioned this inequality and disproportioned diuision . and seeing that is true , which all must confesse , that this world is no other than an inheritance left by one father and one mother vnto mankind , from whom as brothers we all descend ; what iustice is there , but that euery one of vs should not haue share and share like throughout all the wide world , the one as well as the other ? but now it falls out otherwise , that the good and vertuous haue the least part , and the wicked the greatest part : the honest man a begger , the dishonest by a preposterous order haue gotten their right , and will not communicate the same , no not to their owne flesh and bloud , and neerest kinne . now i haue discouered vnto you the wound , it is easie to apply the medicine . the best aduise which i can giue , is to come vnto a new diuision of the world , and to let euery man haue his share ; and by this meanes there will be enough for euery one of vs without troubling one another : though tyrants and lawyers may for a time grudge at this equalitie , yet true iustice requires it for the pacifying of this vnnaturall hurly-barly . and further to take away all disorders in time to come , let there bee a law enacted to forbid all chopping and changing , all buying and selling to the worlds end . a long time this opinion of solon was canuased , the which although it was esteemed necessary , but not altogether good , by bias , periander , and pittacus , was reproued notwithstanding by the rest of the philosophicall lords ; whiles that the iudgement of the wise seneca preuailed , who with most liuely reasons made all the lords of the congregation to vnderstand , that if now they should come to a new diuision of the world againe , there would ensue a very great disorder , that too great a part would fall into the share of gluttons , and too little among braue spirits , who hold sobriety , temperance , and reason , the chiefe meanes to distinguish them , which beare the image of god in their soules from bestiall satanicall creatures ; and that the plague , famine and warre were not , as many thought , the most rigorous scourges wherewith god in his anger afflicts mankind , but that the sorest and most grieuous whip , wherewith he may torment them , is to enrich villaines , and base minded misers , whose pelfe will at last worke the ruine of their dearest and better part being their soules . as soone as solons opinion was refelled , chilon produced his : which of you ( quoth he ) most wise philosophers , knowes not , that the insatiable thirst of gold and siluer hath not occasioned such mischiefes in the world , as wee all see and many of vs haue felt ? what impietie , what wickednesse , what vnnaturall act is there , which men will not commit , and that with all diligence , to rake together a masse of money and wealth ? conclude yee then all couragiously with me , that to root those vices out of the world wherewith this age is corrupted , there is no better way than to exterminate and vtterly to abolish the vse of those pestiferous mettals , gold and siluer , the true prouocations of all these miseries : irrimenta malorum . very goodly and specious in apparance seemed the sentence of chilon , but when it came to the scanning and triall , it proued not solid at the stroke of the hammer of liuely reasons . because it was answered , that men had brought the vse of gold and siluer , that it might stand for the measure and counterpoyse of all bargains & commerce betwixt party and party . and if gold and siluer were prohibited , they must of force imploy some other mettall or commoditie to supply their necessities , which likewise would replenish the world with the same greedinesse of minde as before : as in some part of the indies they vse shels as currant as wee doe money . and cleobulus in particular with a kinde of ironicall scoffe said ; my lords , we may as well banish out of the world iron , seeing that it is also a mettall , which hath wrought infinite confusion among men . gold and siluer for the vse destinated of god to be the balancing proportion of all things , whereas iron produced of nature to make ploughs , spades , harrowes , necessarie tooles for tillage and gardens , as for buildings , hath beene maliciously peruerted toswords , poniards , and other instruments of war to destroy mankind . with this opinion of cleobulus , albeit most true , it was neuerthelesse concluded by all the lords of the reformation , that it being a thing impossible to conuert iron from men without peruerting iron , it should be no prudence to multiply their miseries , and to heale the wound with more blowes . vnanimously it was resolued and concluded , that men should still retaine the mettals of gold and siluer , but to admonish the refiners to take care for the well purifying of them , & not to lift them off from the fire , vntill they were throughly assured that they had cleansed them from that clammie and fast clinging turpentine , which these kinde of mettals haue in them , which caused that their coines stucke exceeding fast to mens hands , yea sometimes to their hands , whom the world reputes for honest men . after this with extraordinary grauity pitiacus began thus : the world , most learned philosophers , is fallen into deplorable miseries , because this moderne generation of mankind haue relinquished the beaten way of vertue , and haue chose to walke through those crooked by-paths of vice , whereby they steale away those rewards due onely to the vertuous . things are now reduced , lords , to this passe , that no man enters into the house of dignities , of honors , & of rewards as in old time , through the gate of merit , true desert , and by vertuous paines , but by the windowes they clammer , like vnto filching theeues , which climbe to peare-trees with their back-sides turned to the true owners . yea , and we haue known some , with the force of fauours and violence of bribes haue not beene ashamed to enter through the tops of chimneyes , and by casting downe the tiles , haue through the very roofe come into the house of honour . to amend this corrupted course of behauiour , the best way in my iudgement is to decree vpon paine of death , that no man hereafter be so hardy , as to get into any well-deseruing place , whether it be of honor or gaine , but by the royall high-way of desert ; and to shut vp all other darke and damnable wayes , onely fit for scritchowles , and sauage beasts . this is a great disheartning of our learned rancke . wherehence many of our best vnderstanding spirits doe verily beleeue , that those hypocrites haue ioyned vnto their craft the spels of the magicke art , and thereby , like zoroastres , they bewitch , enchant , an taint the mindes of some princes , yea and those of the wiser sort . all the reforming lords admired this speech of pittacus , and were about to conclude with him , if periander had not thus opposed : the disorder specified by pittacus , most prudent lords , is very true ; but for what cause a iudicious and wise prince refuseth to preferre vertuous and learned men so pleasing to god , so honourable and profitable for his state : and wherefore in their stead hee serues himselfe , being the life and fountaine of all goodnesse , or at least seeming so to be , with debauched , vnworthy , and base-minded wretches , is a point of great import and to be considered of vs. i know the common opinion is , that the prince chuseth men which are like to humour and sooth him vp in his affections before the best deseruing creature . and i acknowledge that it is a rule of state , for a wise prince to aduance no man to any degree but either for his wisedome or valour . this foundamentall rule of state is well knowne vnto him , yet experience sheweth , that few princes practise it , and mocke at such as shall tell them that they doe the contrary by a carelesse respect to the honour of their place . but the truth is , they promote ignorant persons , new fellowes , and of small desert before learned and vertuous men , not by any default of their side , but by errors ( i am sorry to speake it ) of the learned and vertuous themselues . i confesse with you , that princes haue need of such , and of braue minded commanders for the warres . but none of you will deny , but they stand in more need of loyall and faithfull ministers of state , who with the gift of secrecie may stead them as much as all their treasure . and now it is more than apparant , that if honourable personages and valiant souldiors had bin as true & secret to their countrey , as they ought , we should not behold the infinite disorders , which we see and obserue to our great griefe in this present age , euen pigmeyes in foure dayes to shoot vp as tall as giants , and all these vnworthy spectacles to happen for want of fidelity , and firme regard to the interest of state. so corrupted is the mind of many men , that forgetting their owne worths and valorous magnamities , they will bee tempted with gold and ambition , yea and after sufficient promotion by their natiue prince some haue turned so vnthankfull , as to become mercenary slaues to another prince . which disasters princes distrusting , they are faine to confer honour and offices vnto vnworthy persons , who might serue them with their secrecie and fidelity , and proue more thankefull for their fauours . as soone as periander had ended his opinion , bias spake in this wise : there is not any among vs here , but knowes , most wise lords , that the world is become so much depraued , because mankind is departed from those sacred lawes of a contented state , the which god from the beginning allotted vnto euery nation , hauing assigned seuerall stations , out of which they ought not to breake out . the britaines , diuisos orbe britannos , he hath placed in albion , as in another world by themselues , the gothes in france , the spaniards in spaine , the dutch in germany , the italians in italy , and so other nations in other habitations . and because euery one of them should not trespasse , or like a deluge breake out vpon their bordering neighbours . his foreseeing maiestie framed the fearefull ocean to compasse about great britaine , the pyrenaean mountaines , as a wall betwixt france and spaine , and the alpes betweene the germanes and italy , as some part of them deuides this from france also . the like wary diuision the diuine maiestie hath set betwixt europe & africke , as the mediterranean seas . the which hee did of purpose , that none should encroch vpon the other , and not mingle one with anothers language , as heretofore fell out at babel , nor subiect the other to forraigne lawes and customes , whereby each one liuing at home with their neerest kinne might agree the better together without innouations or tyrannies , and not like drones , intrude into other mens liues to purloyne the sweet , which others wrought . now for as much as the world is infected with the company and customes of strange nations , let euery nation be ordered to returne into his proper limitation ; and for feare of the like sodaine and violent intrusions in time to come , let it be also enacted , that no ships be suffered to passe for the space of many yeares to come , nor any to be built , and if any bridges lie betwixt seuerall principalities , to sunder them the better , that these bridges be pulled downe . if this course be taken , people shall liue more peaceably in their owne natiue soile . with wondefull great attention this declaration of bias was heard , the which notwithstanding it was subtilly examined by the profound wits of the congregation , at the last seemed not expedient to be put in practise , by reason that they knew that the hatred , though excessiue , which reigned amogst diuers nations , are not naturall , as some very simply haue coniectured , but occasioned either by the artificiall sleights of some princes , or at least by the cunning tricks of some of their principall ministers to busie their princes and states braines , while they enriched their cofers with part of the treasures , which were to be laid out for the warres , or casually brought into the kingdome from the warres , as prizes and booties . besides , some princes are skilfull masters to put in execution that old maxime of policie : diuide & impera ; diuide and command . as for bias his counsell to forbid nauigation , who knowes not but among all nations vnited together that harmonicall perfection is pickt out for politicall gouernment , which cannot be found in any one particular states , and this is gotten by peregrination into forreine countries , so that an expert traueller returnes home like the grand vlysses , hauing bettered his vnderstanding facultie by noting the diuersities of spirits , manners , lawes and customes . to this may be added the other exceeding great benefits , as arise by nauigation , as the establishing of plantations , where their owne countrey ouerswarmes with multitudes of people , the transportation of commodities , and the ciuilizing of sauage nations . they obserue the wonderfull difference of climates , the seuerall natures of the cold , the temperate , and the torrid zones , with many other remarkeable euents , to the glory of our creatour and their vnspeakeable pleasure . then cleobulus desired leaue to speake , who boldly thus began : as farre i see , we proceed like those light-headed fellowes , who make publike languages with new conceits and curious fancies , to the outside beautifull , but not with matter of profit , as might edifie and reforme the world , the onely cause of our meeting at this time . to what purpose then for the rooting out of vias should we open a window in mans heart , as thales would fain● perswade his imperiall maiestie ? wherefore should we vndertake that most painefull charge and taske for the diuiding of the vast wide world into equall parts , as solon proposed ? the opinions of chilon for banishing of gold and siluer out of the world , of pittacus to enforce men to walke the beaten way of merit and vertue , of bias to limit men their habitations , and to forbid nauigation the miracle of this world , what are all these but sophisticall dreames , and chymerizing ideas of shallow imaginatiue schollers , no way participating of the practicke reall way to extreminate those moderne corruptions , which are crept into the world ? we must not treat of impossibilities , but fall to mat●ers actually in earnest , and to be put in execution , not how things ought to be done , but how substantially to reforme the world , according as now we find it most strangely deformed ; and this we must performe warily , secretly , and without long arguing pro and con , or criticall animaduersions , the cause of new tumults . in briefe then i say , that all the reformation of this present age consisteth in these few words : to reward the good , and to punish the wicked . here cleobulus rested , against whom thales thus violently opposed , shewing vnto all men , how dangerous a thing it is , albeit for the truths sake , to offend those persons , who liue in the repute of freedome and prudence , which made this sage philosopher breake forth into these speeches : both these reuerend lords and my selfe , most wise cleobulus , seeing that you had derided and despised our opinion as sophisticall and chymerizing , expected some rare proiect to proceed from your prudent braine , or that you had brought from the indies some new and miraculous bezoar for the sodaine cure of the present enormities , when you sleighted our cares , and propounded a receit more , i will not say difficult , but indeed impossible , which might pose & go beyond euen the most curious princes of secrets , caius plin. & albertus magnus . there is not any of vs here , my cleobulus , but knows , that the reformatiō of the world depēds vpō rewarding the good , and punishing the wicked . therefore let me demand of you , i pray , who be those good men and those wicked ? and then i will returne you this resolution , that that man liueth not , which can discerne and distinguish truth from hypocrisie . doe you not perceiue , that counterfeit art and dissimulation are in these times growne to that height of perfection , that a great number of spirits are so artificially and cunningly wicked , which seeme to wise men to be currantly good ? and that those good men , which liue sincerely , ingenuously , simply , as innocent as doues , without the least painting or dawbing of hypocrisie , are reputed scandalous , and of a libertine loose behauiour ? all men naturally loue the good , and hate the euill . yea and most princes themselues doe so as well by naturall instinct , as in respect of interest of state. and when hypocrites or slie crafty knaues are exalted to promotion , and the good are vilipended and neglected , that comes to passe not by the election of princes , but through the deceit and fraudulent tricks of others . onely true bounty and ingenuous candour are knowne to god and by him rewarded . by him vices are discouered & punished , for he alone entreth into the depth and profundity of the heart . yea , and my selfe too with opening the window in mans breast had pierced into the bottome of mens thoughts , had not the enemy of this honest proiect and profitable field wherein i had sowne this memorable graine , cast in before me his seed of tares . incredible satisfaction did these words of thales produce to the congregation , who casting their eyes vpon periander , he as if he had been bidden to shew his reason , thus began : the diuersitie of opinions , which hitherto i haue heard of you , most prudent philosophers , confirme mee in my ancient opinion , tht many a man doth die , because physitians haue not apprehended the certainty of their patients disease . for which errours of theirs , they are to be excused , because men may easily be deceiued in these things , to the knowledge of which they walke onely with the feet of aime and coniecture . but for vs , who are thought by his maiesty , to be the curers of the world , to be ignorant in the cure of this diseased world , it is the mor● shame , by how much the disease increaseth . yet as farre as i see hitherto by reason of the varieties of the medicines , wee goe about to heale the arme in stead of the breast that is corrupted . the truth is , that disorders haue euer raigned among men . but now adaies by reason of the worlds decrepit age , which cause men to abound with auarice , ambition , and pride , the true occasions of hatred . these being occasioned by some mighty potentates , which intrude vpon their neighbours states , haue bred in continuance of time iealousies , warres , and as it were an hereditary heart-burning of one nation against the other . the medicine therefore is , that princes repent them , and content themselues with a moderate fortune , leauing their neighbours at rest , and not vnder some imaginarie pretences challenge a catholicke supremacie ouer their brethren . here periander ended his discourse , whom solon thus opposed : the true causes of the present euills , o periander , were not omitted by vs of ignorance , as you perhaps suppose , but of a wary circumspection . the world from the beginning hath bin corrupted , and still continues . yet it is a point of prudence to winke at some disorders , rather than with danger to seeke to remoue them . all men liuing haue some faults . and many dishonourable acts which princes perpetrate , we must not meddle with , lest we aggrauate and make them incurable , whom time may correct . therefore let a wise man either speake charitably of their spots , or hold his peace . for we shall finde worke enough to reforme the hatred of the common sort ; by whom they proceed wee must not scan , but referre the prime workers of their disorders to the king of kings , who sometimes hardens pharaohs for their owne ruine , or nebuchadnezzars for scourges to punish his rebellious seruants . with these words , applauded of the congregation , solon made end of his speech . after whom cato began in this manner : exceeding well haue yee parlied , o graue and famous grecians , in shewing the meanes to supplant and suppresse hatred and other humane vices . but as i conceiue , they are those , which languish of an incurable ptisick , which spit vp their lungs , and do cast off their haire . in men there is no helpe ; therefore the best aduice which i can giue , is to desire a finall consummation of the world , and for vs to ioyne in prayer to the diuine maiestie , to open the cataracts and windowes of heauen to drowne the whole earth againe , yet with prouiso , to preserue in new arks all those male children , which haue not past twelue yeares of age , and that of all the feminine sexe , of what age soeuer , there may remaine no other thing behind them , saue their vnlucky memorie . and i beseech the diuine maiestie , that euen as he hath allotted vnto bees , fish , and to other infinite creatures , that prized and singular benefit to breed without the helpe of the female kinde , that the like grace he will graunt vnto men . for , my lords , i am assured , that while women liue in the world , that men will proue but a swinish heard of vngratious brood . it is not possible to beleeue , how much the congregation did stomacke this discourse of cato , who had this conceit of the new deluge in such horrour , that all the rest of the honourable philosophers fell prostrate vpon the ground with their hands lift vp towards heauen , and deuoutly desired god to preserue the pretious sexe of women , and to defend mankind from any such inundations , which none would wish but frantick braines , or chymerizing heteroclites ; and also to protect them from fraudulent make-bates , who vnder colour of the lawes with their mercenarie tongues put euen the best natur'd by the eares ; and that if men would not be ruled to follow more wholsome counsell , hee would beat them with his scourges of famine , warre , and pestilence , vntill they were made to know themselues , and their duties to their neighbours ; and if it pleased not his maiestie to be so seuere and rigorous , yet that he would vouchsafe of his soueraigne bounty to grant this one request , not to enrich villaines . this vnhappy euent had the opinion of cato , when seneca thus began his discourse : the reformations of these moderne abuses , as i conceiue , ought not to be handled too bitterly , before they be first dealt with gentle hands , and managed with some milde medicines in the beginning of their cure. for what shame will redound to that physitian , whose patient happens to die with his recipe still in his body remaining ? to passe from one extremitie to an other , and to neglect the due meanes is rash counsell ; because man is not capable of sudden and violent mutations . and seeing that wee finde that the world in thousands of yeares is now fallen into this dangerous infirmity of calamities , he is not very wise , nay very foolish , which thinks in a few daies to reduce this corrupted body to his former health . a grosse and corpulent person , if the physitian thinks it expedient to bring him low and leane , is to be prescribed a diet of one kind of meat at his meale , and to feed each day lesse than other , that so by degrees he forgoe his gurmandise and gluttonous custome . and so a sickly person vpon his recouerie , or a sea-man returning from a long voyage must for the first fortnight sup broths , gellies , and such weake nourishments , vntill time reduce him stronger to feed on stronger meats ; to which agrees that aphorisme of hippocrates , corpora , quae longo tempore extenuantur , lentè reficere oportet . besides this , both the quality of the reformers , and the condition of them which haue need of reformation , are to be considered . as for example , our selues , who at this present are appointed to reforme the world , if the parties to be reformed , are schollers , book-sellers , clerks , pen and inke men , or such like , we may preuaile to censure and correct their faults . but if we goe out of our limits , and enter into other mens professions and trades to reforme their enormities and knauish customes , we shall proue like that ridiculous cobler , who going beyond his naule , presumed to iudge of colours , and to censure the exquisite picture of apelles . let vs which are schollers meddle with matters onely in our clement . which of vs , i pray here , haue euer dealt among taylors , to iudge of their deceits ; among vintners , to tell of their sophisticating of wines ; among butchers , to shew their blowing vp of fl●sh ; among clergy-men , to censure of simony ; or among lawyers , to entrap them in their equiuocations , quirks , and quillets ? yet all these require reformations , and the whole earth grones and cries for ease and peace . but shall we aduenture to put our hands to hinder these disorders so far remote from our professions ? shall we like so many blind bayards , endeuour to stop bottles so crackt and cleft , and by that meanes let all the wine to spill about the roome ? then surely will a true reformation fall out , and not before , when the mariner is called forth to shew his iudgment of the seas and winds , the souldier of marshalling a battell , the shepheard of his fleece , and he that hath beene beaten by lawyers and baffeld by their iuglings , can best demonstrate vnto vs , how to tame their hydra furies and poysonous qualities . therefore let vs call vnto vs out of euery craft , mysterie , and profession , foure of the honestest , most renouned for their integritie of life , and confer with them touching the meanes , how to amend what is amisse . although this graue counsell greatly pleased pittacus and chilon , yet all the rest detested it as bad as catoes , saying , that he offred them a scandalous affront , and an indignitie to apollocs maiestie , to call in such base-minded people not traind vp in philosophy to be ioyned with men of their degree . and that they were the soules pretious faculties , which gaue the well-being to a businesse of this nature , which those wanted . further , they concurred in this purpose , with might and maine , to preserue the iurisdiction of their philosophicall court , whereof they protested to be as iealous as husbands of their fairest wiues ; and that they thought so wise a man as seneca was reputed to be , being the archphilosopher of the latines would haue yeelded to haue twenty ounces of his bloud drawne out of the best veine of his life , than to perswade them to lose one ounce of their iurisdiction , whereon their reputation consisted . the lords reform ●s after they had thus checkt seneca , were wonderfully perplext , and in a manner hopelesse of effecting any good , because mazzon who was yet to speake , they adiudged a new man , and without experience . yet now that his turne came to speake , he thus pithily spake : not by any desert of mine , most prudent philosophers , but by his maiesties meere and speciall fauour am i admitted into this honourable assembly . and i freely acknowledge , that at this vertuous meeting it were my part to imploy my eares , rather than my tongue , being fitter to learne and to be silent . and if that any other matter had beene to be determined sauing this , i would not presume to speake . but because the subiect now in hand concernes the reformation of moderne disorders , which now adaies raigne in the world , i being a moderne man , euen now come from the world , where i left them continually disputing and keeping a stir about reformations , am the better incouraged to lay my helping hand , and though i say it , i am as good a proficient in this matter , as euclide in the mathematicks . the true cure of the bodies disease is to visit the sicke in person , and to conferre with him of the causes and other occurrences of his sicknesse . euen so for the cure of the worlds infirmities , let vs call in the world himselfe , question with him , feele his pulses , and looke vpon the diseased parts of his body , whereby the cure may become the sooner remedied , which now seems desperate and incurable . in such wise did this aduice please the lords of the congregation , that they suddenly commanded the world to be called vnto them , who incontinently made his repaire , being drawne in a coach by the foure seasons of the yeare , and by them was led into the delphick palace . hee was a man well stricken in yeares , yet seemed to be of a galliard and robustuous complexion , which betokened that hee might liue many yeares longer . onely it seemed , that he had a wheezing in his pipes with some difficulty of breath , and in speaking he shewed himselfe to be somewhat hoarse , and wept continually , which argued he ayled somewhat , and laboured as yet more with some grieuous tormenting paine in his braine or some other inward part of his body . the philosophers askt him , how hee had his face so ruddy and iouially appearing , which was a signe that he was in health , hauing store of pure radicall moysture , full of naturall heat , and could not but haue a good stomack . and they remembred , that about a hundred yeares sithence , they had seene him looke yellow , as if hee had beene sicke of the yellow iaundise , yet now it seemed vnto them , that hee was recouered . but for all that they charged him freely to open his griefes , that they might prescribe thereafter some remedies to helpe him . hereupon the world answered : my lords , presently after i was borne , i fell into sicknesses and griefes , whereof i languish at this instant . my face , which you behold so seeming red , is done ouer with ladies licks , slicks , and other painting stuffe of the levant . my infirmitie is like the ebbing and flowing of the sea , with the self-same water in it , for all it seemes to increase , and fall ; but with this interchangeable course , that when i haue a good countenance outwardly , my griefe lies within mee , as i feele my selfe at this instant : and when i looke ill outwardly , i am in perfect health within . but if you please to try in what case i am indeed without dissembling any longer my miseries , pull off my maske and gaudy coat , and you shall see when i am starke naked , that i am indeed but a liuing carcase . the philosophers out of hand disrobed him , and when the world was stript naked , they saw , that the poore vnfortunate creature had a scurfe foure fingers thicke ouer his flesh , as bad as the leprosie , or the catholicke disease , which did eat into his flesh dangerously : whereupon the wise reformers tooke ten razours , and euery one of them with a razour began very diligently to shaue and pare off that thicke scurfe in apparance , and busied themselues so long , vntill they pierced to the quicke bone , but could not in this huge colossus meet with one ounce of good substantiall flesh . which when the reformers perceiued , they stood a while amazed , and when they had reuested him with his maske and ●oolish robes , they licensed him to depart . and then after conference among themselues , concluding the cure too desperate and past helpe , they abandoned the care of their publike thoughts , and resolued to prouide for the sauing of their priuate reputation vnstaind . and therefore they all ioyned together to satisfie the common peoples expectations , and because they should see they were not idle , nor carelesse of their good , they caused mazzon the secretary to pen and publish the generall reformation , wherein with a preamble of magnificall words , they testified to the world , the perpetuall care which his maiestie tooke for the vertuous conuersation of his learned societie , of his indefatigable paines from time to time , sustained for the safetie of mankind , and of the infinite labour and toyle of the lords reformers for the compiling and setting out of good orders ; and afterwards descending to particulars , they did put downe the prices of coleworts , pilchards , pumpions and melons . and now when all the lords were ready to subscribe to the proclamation , thales the milesian remembred them , that some slie hucksters , when they sold lupines , pease , and oaten meale , vsed a little dish , that i● was a most intolerable scandall not to foresee this disorder . this last aduice of thales seemed very expedient to the whole congregation , and as most necessary it was added to the reformation , that these dishes should be greater therefore from thence forwards . presently after they caused the gates of the palace to be opened , and going into the market place , they commanded the cryer to reade the proclamation concerning the reformation of the world , which was done with such applause and ioy to euery man , that all parnassus rebounded with their clamours and shouts , as tokens of the great contentments they tooke for this serious and long expected reformation . but the wisest sort smelt out the drift , and laughed in their sleeues to see the rascality and foolish idiots to delight themselues with bables , as babies with nuts . men of vnderstanding know , that vices will abound , as long as men liue in the world , vitia erunt donec homines ; and that humane prudence doth consist in this , to haue wit sufficient for this one difficult resolution , to forsake the world as another hath found it , or to liue as not to liue . chap. . the duke of hernia his speech in the councell of spaine to a proposition , whether it were expedient for his catholike maiestie to conclude a peace with his brother in law the duke of sauoy ? i could wish in these present stirres of sauoy , that i were rather a minister and an executioner of your maiesties will & commandement , then an inuentor of counsell , which if it chance to succeed ill in the euent , may returne preiudiciall to the author , and hurtfull to your maiestie . but since we are brought to this passe , that it is necessary to collect the summe of your deliberations , and that this charge is now imposed on me , i will inforce my selfe , as farre as the weakenesse of my wit extends , to satisfie the obligation of the loyalty , affection , and deuotion , which i owe vnto your maiestie and my country . the most sacred king treats now , whether he ought to lay downe armes and hostilitie , and to forgiue all such iniuries , as he receiued at the duke of sauoyes hands , by that meanes pleasuring the princes of italy , and the pope in particular , who by his nuntio doth earnestly solicite the same ? or else whether your maiestie ought to depriue him by force of warre , either of all his estate , or of part , thereby to secure your dutchy of milan from his treacheries , being a member of so great importance , both by it selfe and by the opportunity of the situation , with the which it bindes together all the body of this great monarchy , that it is deseruedly held to be the key of all your kingdomes , seeing that with the benefit of this dominion , wee inioy the preheminence of g●noa , and the commoditie of the sea with hauens , from whence in times of peace by trafficke , we receiue very great gaine , and in times of warres we open a secure passage to our armadaes and armies ? from hence the kingdome of naples is preserued , where we shall hardly arriue with our armed gallies , through the midst of the tirr●ene sea in a tempestuous winter , if wee touch not and ride at anchor in one of these places . from this state in briefe we are enabled to goe into switz●rland and germany , there to leuie souldiers for the low-countries , to giue and receiue aid from the confederate princes ; besides that with the situation of this place , being in the midst of lumbardy , we hold the residue of italy bridled , that they dare not stirre to oppose our wills . the which things although they bee knowne vnto this most prudent councell , and better yet to your maiestie , i would notwithstanding put you in minde thereof , because you might excuse me , if i seemed perchance fearefull or iealous for the preseruation thereof ; and certainely when i shall conceiue that there is some securitie and sufficiency in these courses which now are propounded , i will then rancke my selfe among the first to incline to peace , wishing , that after our tedious and long warres in flaunders , which haue consumed both the men and kingdomes , wee might breathe a while , and recouer some fresh blood , and also refresh our drooping vitall spirits , to be the better able one day gloriously to encounter and lead our armies against the infidels , and to spread in their countries both the christian faith and the empire . but what security doe wee see in th●se propounded treaties ? the popes nuntio doth promise , that if we would free the duke of sauoy from the feare he is in , to be preuented and oppressed , the duke should likewise disarme , and hold himselfe alwayes hereafter your maiesties good kinsman and seruant , and that he shall neuer more minister cause of innouation , nor nourish any intelligence preiudiciall to the state of milan . and to secure vs from fraud , that he shall leaue his second sonne at your court for pledge . but he speakes nothing of alienating and separating himselfe from the friendship and aliance of france ; nor that he will oppose himselfe against their forces , when they shall attempt to assault this state of milan . and who doth not here see his fraud , as if we were so simple in beleefe , and knew not how to diue where his thoughts tended ? are not we sufficiently choked and made perfect of his cunning deuices ? seeing that the count de fuentes hath written from milan , that we ought not to trust him ; that his treaties and practises holden with the king of france were most certaine for the surprizing of that state ; let no man tell me , that it is securitie sufficient to lay a sonne of his in our hands for hostage , because he hauing other sonnes left him at home , among whom is his eldest sonne , will neuer care to remoue him hence to hinder his designes , no more then king francis was hindred and stayed from raising armes against the emperour charles the fift , after hee had left his two sonnes in pledge : or the prince of orange , who for all that he had giuen a son of his in pawne , desisted not to conspire the ruine of flanders against your most glorious father . he hath declared himselfe what he is , and what remorse of conscience he feeles , that now hath complotted against a king , his kinsman and benefactour ; against that house , which twise restored him to the state which he holds , in that he would compasse and effect the french match , notwithstanding your maiesties disagreement and disswasion . for your maiestie fore-saw , that this match would proue a seminary of discord , and a rocke of scandall . now he tryeth and compasseth by all meanes onely to auoid the present perill , and to watch an occasion to deceiue vs another time , or to take vs vnprouided . for all this , hee comes not with humilitie to procure pardon from the magnanimity and generositie of your most sacred mind , but casting himselfe into the armes of your enemies with weapons in hand , and with threats he goes about to terrifie you , and with the greatest indignity to force your maiestie to a peace no lesse ignominious , then ill secured . we haue too much lost ( if it be lawfull forme to speake the truth ) our reputation in yeelding to a truce with the states of holland , though the same was accounted necessary for our affaires in regard of the difficulty to sustaine the charge of a warre so farre remote . to which now let vs adioyne this point , that there is not so vile an aduersary , who dares not to moue and conuert his thoughts at euery nouelty , and already we see the rest of the italians discontented with our greatnesse , willing to rise against vs , yea , and to call the iewes and the turkes in to their succour , albeit with their owne dangers , if god and the angell guardians of your crowne doe not worke continuall miracles for our defence , truely i cannot see , who shall deliuer vs. what then remaines ? most sacred king , i am of opinion , that peace is not to be refused , so that the same be concluded with safety , the which can no way be , but by holding in deposit● and impawned in your hands those forts , which shall be thought fit by your captaines , and to releeue them vpon his cost , and for your good , or at least that hee disburse the greatest part of the expence occasioned hitherto through his default . this demaund ought not to seeme strange vnto him , seeing he hath wittingly and aduisedly vsed such ingratitude and deceits so oftentimes against you . therefore we must let him vnderstand , that we may not repose any confidence in him , except we haue these forts in pledge , that so we may safely with our reputation , reduce our matters to a sound issue , not leauing place for him in reason to complaine of vs as the authours of the warre . but if the duke will not consent to these our iust demaunds , and will refuse to receiue our garrisons into his forts ▪ i am of the minde it is better to make warre against him , then by protracting time to expect troubles hereafter in our owne home . another time we may runne into a greater hazzard , and wee may haue to doe with a more powerfull prince . in the meane while it is conuenient for your maiesties honour to aduenture all into the hand of fortune , then voluntarily to yeeld with so great indignitie to conditions of so little safety . howbeit i see not where those dangers lie , which some would make so great . i am sure , that in respect of the iustice of the cause , where a man is not stirred with any desire to spoyle another of his due , but with necessity to preserue his owne state , and that with greater facility then some imagine , the duke of sauoyes power is not stronger then ours . i am sure , that hee is in a manner weake , and for two reasons to be slighted , as well in knowing him to be dangerously suspected , as also in that he is driuen to stand armed and on his guard , which cannot but consume him in a short time . nor doth their opinion any whit moue me , which say that he shall not want succours out of france , and out of those parts of italy , which are interessed for their preseruation , because the french which should aide him , are deriued from a gouernment , whereof the head is a woman , diuided in religion , full of emulation , and of sundry disagreements among themselues , where it is no hard matter still to nourish and increase their doubts with their dissentions and diuersified resolutions , so that the effects of them will fall out to be of small securitie , vaine , or long and vncertaine . and the dessignes of the italians enuironed with our bordering states are become weakned and worne out by the sodaine death of the french king , in whom they had grounded their hopes ; so that now being afraid of our nighbouring forces , and by the rising fortunes of your maiestie , they wil not presume openly to descend into this warre , but rather by obseruing other mens proceedings , and vainely trusting to the benefit of the time , they will stand idle as mournfull spectators of the tempest , which beates on their neighbours fields ; vnto whom it shall be in your maiesties power to giue them that ●orme and law , whatsoeuer your benignity shall please to impose , and hereafter shall be aduised according to the times . neither let your maiestie faile to entertaine them with sundry cautions and artificiall promises , and with protestations to affirme vnto them , that what you take away from their father , you will restore it to the sonne , granting that to your bloud , which now you haue denyed to the father for his ill deserts . with these hopefull promises let the prince philebert be fed , and extraordinarily made much off . in the meane time then let the prouisions for the warre be speedily hastened on , assembling souldiers out of the state of milan , which are not enfeebled , as some ( i know not whether they doe it of zeale or interest ) doe expresse , to minister an occasion to the enemy of insulting . we haue men for number and valour sufficient for a greater enterprize then this , among these good store of old souldiers exercised in the warres of the low-countries ; nor are there wanting captaines of estimation and experience . and if your treasure seemes somewhat scanted , you haue a way to find out so much money as you please , by departing with diuers merchandises , and by feeding your creditors with the particulars of the fleets at their returne from the indies , and also by other extraordinary meanes . and seeing that your maiestie hath no warres at this present in any other parts , the ordinary reuenues of your kingdomes are enough to supply the charge of this warre . besides the seat of the warre will fall out to be in a great part of the enemies owne territories , which will euery day produce more fortunate conditions . onely let your maiestie resolue , and determine to passe ( as caesar did ) the rubicon ; and then all things will succeed easie , plaine , and the fruits of the victory will alwayes ouercome the lightnesse of beliefe . occasions are rare , and you had need to meet with them : for whosoeuer thinkes you may aspire to the empire of italy without vnsh●●thing your sword , or a●iding the hazard , shewes that he hath had but small doings in the world . god and fortune doe fauour the aduenturous , the vigilant , and valiant ; and despiseth the fearefull , the sleepy , and the pusillanimous . shall we for friuolous suspicions of remote dangers contemne liuely and assured hopes ? i doe then conclude , most inuincible king , that vnlesse we may haue some forts impawned into our hands , without the which the state of milan will still remaine in the same perill , we ought not in any wise to embrace that other treaty , which is offered by the popes nuntio , nor to stay so long vntill the new king of france bee growne to his riper yeares , lest hee be then incited and prouoked by this duke , who is full of vast and irregular conceits to passe the mountaines to your dammage , but now whilest he is a pupill , it is necessary to preuent the inconuenience and to transferre the warre into the enemies land. i beseech your maiestie to consider with what good opportunity the way is made open for you to the monarchy of italy , and to the greater part of europe , as god hath lately fauoured you . in what manner hath hee dissipated and confounded our enemies counsels by the sodaine death of henry the fourth ? that kingdome is now without a head , italy disunited and weake , germany all tottered and diuided ; the turke is beaten backe , and intangled in the warres of the levant , so that none is able to withstand your designes . the iniury is apparant , which prickes you to a iust reuenge , and frees you from any blot of too much desire of rule . your age which is now at the flowre , is pried into , and expected that it walke with some trauell through the way of glory , with the which your greatnesse shall no lesse bee conioyned , then the aduancement of religion , together with the safety of all christendome . by which proceedings we shall see that verified of your maiestie , which many learned men with no ambiguous obseruations of the celestiall influences , and of the worlds passages , haue oftentimes affirmed to haue beene ordayned in heauen , that this most noble prouince hauing beene oppressed for so many ages , vnder the hard bondage of strangers , ought at last in the reuolution of so many yeares to stand aboue all , and to extend their empire to the vttermost confines of the earth , and to remaine nothing inferiour to that of the persians , of the macedonians , or romanes . finis . the roman the conversation of the romans and mæcenas, in three excellent discourses / written in french by monsieur de balsac ; translated into english. balzac, jean-louis guez, seigneur de, - . this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing b ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. 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(eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the roman the conversation of the romans and mæcenas, in three excellent discourses / written in french by monsieur de balsac ; translated into english. balzac, jean-louis guez, seigneur de, - . [ ], p. printed by t.n. for j. holden ..., london : . page misprinted . errata: p. [ ] reproduction of original in the harvard university library. eng political science. a r (wing b ). civilwar no the roman the conversation of the romans and mæcenas, in three excellent discourses / written in french by monsieur de balsac ; translated i balzac, jean-louis guez, seigneur de b the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the b category of texts with fewer than defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - celeste ng sampled and proofread - celeste ng text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the roman . the conversation of the romans and maecenas , in three excellent discourses , written in french by monsieur de balsac . translated into english . london , printed by t. n. for j. holden at the anchor in the new exchange . . the stationer to the reader . nothing but great subjects can fall from the pen of monsieur de balsac , who having formerly ravished the world with his immortal prince , hath now for a choice cabinet piece illuminated in small an invincible roman ; neither can any pen so powerfully commend his , as his own : even commending antiquity he hath out-done it ; so that the present age may glory , that the vertue of well speaking is as high as ever . nay , hee hath so highly praised our predecessors , that with an unheard of rhetorick he forcibly perswades the contrary , & ravisheth for himself what he seems to bestow on them ; so that by his example we need not doubt but posterity is as capable of true nobility . and that antiquity it self must confess , that in parallel lines , although the parallel must be after the first , yet it may as wel be drawn above as below it . but as he of hero's , so we may say of writers , there is but one balsac . and indeed his translator thought it a bold attempt to make him speak english like himself , and to dare copy so high a subject after so illustrious an hand . and therfore conceals himselfe , behind the curtain , and timerously bids me enquire of you whither he hath don the authour right . if you are therefore pleas'd , wee are all so ; but we are all at a loss , unlesse you favorably pardon the escapes of the presse , which are many , and require thy judgement as well as the help of this errata . errata . pag. . line . read ever . p. l. . r. heroes : p. . l. . conversation begins the paragraph : id. l. . r. nations : p. . l. . r. writes : p. . l , . r. he never fell : p. . l. ult. r. noblenesse : p. . l. . r. could : p. . l. . r. modest : p. . l. ult. r. appeas'd : ib. l. . r. it : p. . l. . r. debated : p. . l. . r. when : p. . l. . r. even : p. . l. ult. r. thornes . p. . l. . r. of . the roman , to the lady marquess of rambovillet . discourse i. what hath been told you madam is most true , and if you desire an illustrious witness , i will confirm it , caesar shall assure you in two or three places of his commentaries . there is no doubt but those great souls of which we have so often discours'd , were lodged in bodies of a mean size ; your ancestors were hero's , but were not gyants , and the most part of their enemies had the advantage , both in stature and bulk : this historical truth being without difficulty received , there can be nothing more just , then the consequences drawn from thence ; that had the men of those times been weighed , and valued by weight ; an alman had been neer upon worth two romans . the almans were both longer and larger ; the galls were stronger and more numerous ; the affricans richer and craftier ; the greeks better polished , and better skilled in the excercises of wrestling and coursing ; but the romans fitter for command , better disciplined , and more knowing in war ; and with this discipline which some have called , the foundation of the empire , the source of their triumphs , they have subjugated the strength , the number , the wealth , the subtilty , and even the vertue of other nations . you ought not to doubt but there was vertue in the provinces ; the despising of death was common among the barbarians : the love of liberty , and the desire of glory were not unknown unto them . but , madam , the tru use of al these things was to be found at rome : rome was the shop where the gifts of heaven were wrought , and where the goods of nature were perfected . it was she , who , first of all shewed to the world juditious armies , & wise wars : it was she knew how to mix , as it ought to be , art with adventure , conduct with fury , and the divine quality of the understanding , with the brutal actions of the irascible part . whereby it appears , that the soul is soveraign artisan , of all things , aswel of military actions , as of civil affairs : the principal part of valor depends not on the organs of the body ; neither is it a privation of reason , and a simple overflowing of the gall , as the people fancy it ; 't is neither the eies that see , nor the eares that hear , nor the arms that move ; 't is the soul , as a poet says , quoted by aristotle ; 't is the soul that doth all , whithout which the eies were blinde , the ears deaf , the arms paralitical ; it is the principle , and the author of all the operations of man . by the soul a child hath cast down a giant , and bulls are led in a string ; by the soul an architect sitting still , orders the work of a thousand masons , and builds temples and palaces ; by the soul a pilot without stirring , workes more then all the slaves at the oare , and a man would vainly sweat to hoise and loose the sailes , did he not find his way by the stars ; by the soul , madam , a consul having been commanded to make war against a king , an enemy to the republick , studied the way so well , and became so knowing in a profession , wherein he was altogether ignorant ; that going from the city a man of peace , he arrived at the army a great captain , and divests his robes to gain presently a battel : thus did your predecessors commence ; thus did they manage their first armes ; their prentiship was a master-peece . i am confident you would see one of those people ? can we finde out no way to shew you a roman consul ? is there no safer and more innocent means , then that of magick , to bring him whole from the place where he is ? for , without doubt , you would see him , both in body and minde , with that gravity , which bred respect in the heart of kings , and ravished the people with admiration ; you would see him , with that visible & acknowledgeable authority , which accompanied him to prison and banishment , which dwelt with him when he had lost all , whereof fortune could not dispoyl him , when she had reduced him to his shirt . here he is , madam , who comes not from the elizian fields , nor from a fabulous habitation ; he comes forth of the histories of polibius or of some such like country , and methinks he deserves very well to be looked upon . first , he no less knows how to obey the laws , then he knows how to command men , and with an elevation of spirit , which sees the crowns of soveraigns beneath him , he hath a soul wholly subject to the power of the people ; he reveres the sanctity of that power in the hands of a tribun , or of a furious man , or of an enemy , or perhaps of both . beleeving , that to fail is the onely ill that can happen to an honest man ; he beleeves there are no faults little , and making a religion of the least part of his duty , he even thinks he cannot be negligent thereof without impiety ; he more esteems a day imployed in vertue , then a long delitious life ; a moment of glory , more , then an age of voluptuousness ; he measures time by success , and not by its durance . acting by this principle , he is always prepared to hazardous undertakings ; he is always ready to devot himself , for the good of his citizens , to take upon him the ill fortune of the common-wealth ; and whether the oracle direct him , or the inspiration come from his own spirit , he thanks the gods , as the greatest grace they ever conferred on him ; for that it was their will he should be the general , which was to be killed of that army which should gain the victory . in pursuit of this , madam , there is nothing but must be easie to him , and nothing but we may beleeve of him ; he knows neither nature , nor alliance , nor affection , where the interest of his country is concerned ; he hath no other particular interest but that , and neither loves nor hates , but for publick concernments . a soul without a body , and rid of matter could agitate in no other manner , nor could it be less incommodated with its passions ; but let us say more ; it could not be less sensible of the vain appearance of humane things , aswel those which astonish , and those which dazel us ; the bravadoes of the day make no more impression on his constancy , then yesterdaies caresses : princes are as weak against him with their wild beasts , as with their treasures . and if he had never seen elephants , and were it possible from behind the tapistry to bring forth all those which are in affrica , or in the indies , he would consider them but as a sport , or the mummeries of pirrhus , and not as a frightful and threatning thing for fabritius . all what ever is frightful and terrible , in the world , is not capable to make him wink ; all what is splendid and pretious cannot afford him temtation ; he is neither to be overcome ; nor to be wonn . he is of those courages , madam , which were invincible , were they assaulted onely with a lively force , and were a man alwayes to fight , and alwayes to make war . but proposing for the object of their valor , to overcome what was most to be feared in their enemies , they imagine it unnecessary to mistrust the rest , and are least careful in those things which they beleeve less difficult ; whence perhaps that fancy of the poets comes , that the demy-gods had a part about them which was subject to death , and a place whereby they were mortal : because according to my opinion , there is always imperfection in the works of nature , and that she never takes so much care in finishing what she makes , but that she alwaies leaves the one side weaker then the other : now , madam , it is not to be doubted , but that this commonly is the weake part of great courages , and here their hearts are of flesh , which every where else are of diamond . there needs not so much resolution to resist the violence of tyrants , as to defend ones self from their favours ; and the power which was given them to do ill , is less dangerous then the means they have whereby to oblige men . yet do all these means fail , when they are to be imployed against a roman . this mortal part is not to be found in his soul ; he is equally strong on all sides ; he is impenetrable to vanity , aswel as to fear and avarice ; his severity cannot be sweetned , not even with the complements and flatteries of the king of the parthians ; he at once subverts discovered endeavours , and guards , himself from hidden artifices ; nothing is contagious to a minde naturally so sound , and so well purged by the discipline of his country ; neither the poyson brought from far , nor the neighbouring corrupted air , nor stranger , nor citizen have the power to change the goodness of his constitution . malecontents lose their time and their pains , if they think to make him relish novelties , by infusing in him an ill opinion of the present ; how specious soever the pretences are they propose , though they speake the publick good or liberty , he understands not the language ; you were as good court a vestal ; 't is not a human enterprise to shake his immoveable fidelity ; a poet said the capitol was not so stable , and that rome might sooner change place ; he would rather destroy tyranny , then share it with any man , and rather declare himself an enemy , then a colleague with an usurper . can any thing be added to so great a title . this one thing more , to witness the highest proof of his vertue : the republick , madam , cannot lose him , how negligent so ever she be to preserve him ; he suffers not onely patiently , but gladly injuries and injustices . it never sunk into his minde to revenge himself of her by a civil war , and he prefers the name of an innocent banditi , to that of a guilty victor ; he hath been perswaded from his childhood , and since never doubted , that a son can never acquit himself of all he owes to a mother , though a wicked mother , though even she became a stepmother . and that a citizen is for ever obliged to his country , even to his ungrateful country , which even hath us'd him like an enemy . behold , madam , you have near upon sounded the bottome of our consuls heart , and the root of those wonderfull things which you shall read in the histories of polybius and titus livius . let 's now a while look on his outside , on that part which is more expos'd to the sight of men . you may observe in his actions neither a cowardly or a heavie coldnesse , nor a temerous and precipitat vehemency . he softly makes haste , and advanceth with an insensible motion : without disquieting himself , he moves inferiour things neither more nor lesse , then the intelligences without tiring themselves move the celestial spheres . to see him so little troubled about his business , a man would say , that hee were not the undertaker , and there appeares so much facility in the most painful functions of the charge he executes , that although hee doth nothing meanly , yet he doth nothing with violence . observe how with his eys he leads the whole army ? how a nod of his head keeps all the world in their duty ? how his presence onely establisheth order , and drives away confusion ? truly , there is a delight even for philosophers themselves ; and even for those who take no interest in humane affaires to observe him in those occasions . the least motions of his body are accompanied with some vertue which renders him lovely . 't were hard to tell , whether he be more necessary to the republick , or more pleasing to the citizens . he commands well but it becomes him well to command . his command , madam , is so gratefull , that there is a crowd , there is an ambition , that there is a sensible pleasure to obey him . that good grace which shines in all hee doth , being infused into solid qualities , and being joyn'd with understanding and other necessary qualities , is an admirable charm and enchantment for him to sweeten the bitternesse of disgustfull orders ; so that hee can execute them without trouble of minde , or repugnancy of will : it hath a strange force to winn the heart of the souldiery , and draw their inclinations , were they harder to move , and more insensible then the iron and steel they use . by this charm they binde themselves not only to him , but they unloose themselvs from all other things ; they minde neither pay , plunder , or recompence ; they neither care for the feasts of rome , nor for delights of italy ; they demand and desire nothing but their general , of whom they are so enamor'd , even so jealous , that they apprehend the end of the war , for fear onely they should lose him by a peace : they murmur against the senate , when he is revoked , neither can they consolate themselves with a victory which ravisheth the victor from them . what an one , good god! must so passionate a militia be ; 't is not obedience in pursuit of command ; 't is zeal which even prevents it ; t is not affection which obligeth them to the cause of their chief ; 't is a transport which ravisheth them from themselves , and makes him say , i am going with the tenth legion against the enemy , of which i am no less confident , then of mine own person ; i know it would pass through the midst of flames naked , did honour , will , or necessity require it . so that , madam , they are no more souldiers of his army which march with him ; they are as the members of his body , which move when he stirs ; they are as we may say , stranger parts of himself , which are more united to him then his natural . on the other side , the respect they bare him , is no less powerful , then the love they shew him ; at least its more powerful , then the right of life and death , which he hath over them ; this respect governs and rules all his troopes ; he drives or stops them , as he needs their different obedience ; he might be unto them insteed of discipline . let no man think , that it is the laws of war , or military orders , which hinders the soldiers from committing offences ; t is his presence and his testimony . when they fail , they fear more least he should know it , then they fear to be punished , and divers have been kept in their duties with apprehension of displeasing him , which would nether have done it for fear of punishment , or dishonor . that , madam , was the only thing , which the roman army fear'd ; and never did souldiers so much slight their enemy , nor so much redoubt their cheif . there never was at once spirits so fierce and so docile , did overflow the field with more impetuosity , and retire to their places in the camp with lesse appearance of having even gone out . after they had done wonders for courage , they came to enquire whether they had done well or no ; they came to render an accompt of their victory , wherof they were somtimes fain to justifie themselves , and for which they were somtimes punish'd . this fear of piety and religion , hath produced thousands of examples in pure antiquity , and in the colleges they past over them , they are so common , and so numerous : but we must choose what we are to present you ; i must shew you , madam , a mark of that generous fame , even when the empire declined , when rome was no more then the sepulchre of rome ; when nature according to my opinion , would preserve her rights , and make known that the ashes of things soveraignly excellent are still rich and precious . under the empire of justinian , a captain named fulcar , inconsiderately casting himself amongst the enemies , and having engaged his troop in a disadvantageous fight , when a certain man in that extremity , represented to him , that if hee would hee might yet retreat with a good part of his men . 't were better to die , said hee , for how shall i bee able after this , to endure the sight of narses . 't was not that narses was cruel , but that the soveraign vertue is redoubtable . 't is that the mine of the general of a roman army is frightful to those who have it not from naked swords , or assured death . with a look he pierceth the guilty to the heart , & punisheth them with his sight . is not this , madam , an effect of that authority wch comes from heaven ; of that authority inherent in the person of him who hath it distinct and separate from that other authority bred by the power given him by the republick , verified by the senate , and to be read in pattents of parchment , and confirmed with eagles , and dragons in picture , by rods , axes , and archers ? this second authority of which you presume i should say somewhat , which as yet was never said , is a certain light of glory , and a certain character of greatness , which heroick vertue imprints in the countenance of men . and this character , and this light , corrects the defects and the imperfections of nature , makes little men appear great , imbellisheth ugly faces , defends the solitariness and nakedness of a person expos'd to the outrages of fortune , over-prest under the ruines of a destroyed party , abandoned of his own wishes , and of his own hopes . this character , madam , is to this person a safeguard from heaven , against the violences of the earth ; renders him inviolable to his provoked enemies ; binds the hands of traitors which com against him with ill designs ; findes respect and tenderness amongst scythes and tartars . by this mark the roman princes were known by their enemies in the wars , although they disguised themselves , although they were mixt in a croud of soldiers , although they had never been seen before . nothing is able to blot out this character , nor to obscure this light , not even disgraces , imprisonment , and the chains of a poor captive . the executioner falls backwards at sight of his patient , and can scarce forbear to beg his life of him . hee fancies that a great flame issues out of his eyes , which enlightens the dungeon , and that he hears a hideous voice which cries out , who art thou unhappy man , who darest lay thy hand en cajus marius . are not these , madam , give me leave once more to ask you , are not these the highest and the dearest favours which can be received from the supream vertue . and this second authority which survives the first ; this authority which preserves it self in the ruines of power , which consecrates misfortunes , chains , and dungeons , which renders affliction holy and venerable . is it not far a more noble thing then the unworthy prosperity of the happy ? then all the scepters , all the diadems , and all the magnificence of idle kings . questionless , authority is far more noble then power , and that which is formed from the reverence of vertue , far more worthy then that which is established by the terror of punishments . the pure and innocent triumph of an infinite many subjected hearts , is far a more illustrious and glorious sight , then the bloudy and miserable trophies of some cast-down heads . i mean cast away without any extream necessity , and for a shew only of a tyrannical and savage power , and if the poets fables are the philosophers mysteries . mee thinks , madam , that their jupiter did an action far more admirable and more worthy the father of the gods , and the king of men , when he removed all things with one of his eye-browes , and shaking his head caused olympus to tremble , then when by force of thunder and tempest , he tears up trees , and breakes downe roofs . power is a heavy and material thing , which draws after it a long train of humane means , without which it would remain immoveable . it acts only with land and sea armies . upon a march it must have a thousand springs , a thousand wheels , and a thousand machines . it commits a violence in fetching a step . authority on the contrary , which holds from the nobility of its origine , and from the vertue of divine things , quietly works its wonders , needs neither instruments nor materials , nor even time to set them on work . it s all wrapt up in the person of who exerciseth it , without seeking aid , or demanding a second . it s strong , though naked ; and alone fights , though it bee disarmed . authority needs but one word to perswade ; three of its syllables , madam , humbles the bold , makes the rebel repent , stops the impetuosity , of mutinous legions , stifles sedition at its birth , and those whom the general was wont to cal my companions , cannot endure that he should name them either my friends , or sirs , gentlemen of rome , or how you please to render quirites . they fancy that that very word hath already degraded them , that those three syllables have torn their belts and swords from them , that it hath put them amongst the scum of the most unclean , and most vile populacy . i would but ask you the question , madam , whether the name of quirites , coming out of any other mouth , but that of caesar , would have entred so far into the hearts of the legions , and would have had the same power over their minds . for my part i should hardly believe it . i know the height of rhetorick , and understand the vertue of the best pronounced words . but it reacheth not so far . authority is incomparably more perswasive , then eloquence . the soldiers would have mocked a dozen of ciceroes orations , and yet yeild themselves at one of caesars words . nay , i doe verily believe they would have yeilded to his silence , had he been content to have given them but a sign of leaving the camp , without having taken the pains to have spoken to them . by this dumb condemnation , treating them as accursed , and excommunicated by their country , & declaring them unworthy of any kinde of society with their general , beyond that of complaints and reproaches which hee might have made them . such a scorn would have so griev'd them , that they would have begged death for a favour , & would have cast themselvs at his feet to pray him that he would handsomely dispatch them . but i am vext that so great a word which was so great an action , was not of som roman in the good and healthful time of the republick , that i might not alledge a doubtfull vertue , whose cause was undecided , as was that of caesar . i would , madam , that this example of military authority were either of scipio , or of fabritius , that i might justly join it with that other example of civil authority , after which you will give mee leave to conclude . you know well that honest man appius claudius , look upon him i beseech you , burthened with years and diseases , who so long time never stirred out of his chamber , and can scarce get himselfe from his bed to his chimney . yet in that condition , hee resolves to be carried to the senate , to quarrel with all the senators single , and to oppose himself to the shameful peace they were about to conclude . 't is to bee believed , madam , that they were no lesse frighted to see that hideous old man , then if it had been a ghost , which entred the councel chamber , and in my thought , they did not at first take him for appius claudius , they took him for his shadow , or his fantasme , which came from the other world to give them lessons , and make them remonstrances . who came to tell them with a tone of command , and a strong voice , which his anger raised in the weakness of his confiscate body . who ever was the author of so filthy a proposition , is no true nor legitimate roman . he must either bee a forainer or a bastard . he must be the son of one of our slaves , or he hath not a drop of bloud left of our fathers , which his basenesse hath not corrupted . what would not this angry old man have done had he had his eyes , and the rest of his body at liberty ? would hee not have beaten those which hee was content to chide onely ? would he not have deposed pyrrhus , and interdicted him his kingdome far from relinquishing by treaty an inch of land in italy ? i know not what hee could have done . but i know very well , madam , that he did very much . rome and pyrrhus were agreed upon conditions for a treaty of peace . claudius opposeth it , and at the conclusion , comes and breaks it off . so that hee proves stronger then rome and pyrrhus both together , and carries it away from either of them . when so strange a newes was told cyneas , its likely he cryed out , behold , a greater thing then i have yet admired in rome . i have there seen a multitude of kings , but as yet i had not seen their tutor . 't is this blind man who is the light of the commonwealth . 't is this sick man , who warres against us . 't is this good man , who was unable to stir from his bed , who drives us out of italy . 't is this chair which bore him to the senate , which is more to bee feared , then our towres full of soldiers , then our elephants , then our machins . a discourse of the conversation of the romans . to the lady marquess of rambovillet . discourse ii. but this was while your ancestors of old for vertue with the gods their names inroll'd . nature in wonders fruitful was , & yong , the world with hero's peopl'd stout as strong , our ages vigor now , alas , was spent , the languors o● old age it doth resent , your rome is d●●● , & all its glory gone , the supream vertue is in hist'ry alone . let 's be content their active strife t' admire , which made that fatal place 'bove all aspire th' example of those grandies let 's adore , with incense let 's your sought for temples store . t is near the matter , madam , what i yesterday answered you in our common discourse , when i took my leave . i have since found the sense of my prose in the verses of a poet , who never made any but those . and i conceived it was not amisse after that manner to enter upon this days conference , and to binde with a knot , which perhaps will not displease you , the things i told , with those which you would have me write unto you . let 's again , madam , confess it . it s certain , that at the beginning , god dispensed great largesses , and although his arm is no shorter then it was , yet are his hands less open then they were . besides , birth-right , which antiquity hath over the latter times , it hath had other advantages which ended with it , and are not to be found in the succession . it hath had vertues which our age is not capable of . it belongs not to us to be camillas , and catoes , we want the vigour of such men as those instead to provoke our courages , they make our ambition despair . they have rather braved us then instructed us by their actions . by giving us examples , they have obliged us to an uprofitable trouble . they have given us what we cannot take . these examples being of that height that there is no way to attain unto them . i do not say , madam , that in the most miserable times , god cannot send some chosen soul to make us remember his first magnificence . i will not deny but that hee may take a particular care of that soul , and but that hee hath meanes to preserve it from the vices of the court , and the contagion of custom . in the most general stupidity of the world , there is some one found to awakē the rest , who breaks the bounds of the age , who is capable to conceiv the idea of ancient vertue , and to shew us that the miracles of history are still possible things . it s true , madam , there is such an one : but this one makes no number ; he marks even sterility , neither doth hee hinder this solitude . is there a priviledged soul , an extraordinary person , an hero or two in all the world . yet is there not a multitude of heroes . there is no people of extraordinary persons . there is no more a rome , nor romans . we must seek them under ruines , and in their monuments . we must adore their reliques in the books i have told you of , and in the places i have desired you to observe . i at first thought to be quit , having marked those places , and chosen you those books . yet are you not satisfied therewith , and it seems you pretend that i should adde what is wanting to those books . the glories and triumphs of rome , satisfie not your curiosity . it enquires of me some things more particular and less known . you would desire , madam , that i should shew you the romans , when they hid themselves , and that i should open to you the door of their cabinets . after having seen them out of ceremony , you would be acquainted with their conversation , and know from me if so direct and elevated a greatness , could stoop to the use of a common life , could descend from affairs and employments even to sports and divertisements . i doubt it not , madam , all the houres of wise mens lives are not equally serious . their souls are not always extended , nor always contracted , & yet in the same vigor , though not the same action . does any man believe that the sibarites only loved feasts , and that they alone rejoiced . the romans did it also : but they did it in another manner , & loved other manner of feasts . a voluptuousnesse which riseth higher then sense , which seeks the superiour part , and fills it with images : that holy , chast , and altogether innocent pleasure , which acts on the mind without changing it , or moves it with so much sweetnesse , that it stirs not out of its place , or with so much addresse , that it removes it to a better place then it had . this pleasure , madam , was not a passion unworthy of your romans , scipio and laelius , used it without scruple . augustus and his friends were of those honest voluptuous persons . the senate and the field , civil affairs and military actions , had their seasons conversation . the theatre and verse had theirs . the pleasures of the mind were never better tasted , then by them , and with the same hands with which they gain'd victories , and signed the fate of nariaeis , they wrote comedies , or applauded those who acted them before them . there is not every day hannibals to bee conquered , nor an africa to bee subjugated . antony and the sonnes of pompey died but every one once . and then came the general calm in which the most turbulent were at leisure , and the world suffered it self to be as peaceably governed , as if it had been but one family . so that they have sometimes wanted enemies , & sometimes rested in peace . and in this state , madam , why should they have made wars against themselves ? why should they have sought enemies in their owne bowels ? why should they give themselves a prey to a distemper worse then hannibal , and more cruel then africa ? why should they bee afraid to rejoice , there being no body to disturb their joy . the sicilian sea being scoured , and aegypt reduced into a province , sixius pompey , and mark antony , being onely names and phantasmes . i must confesse , madam , the desire of glory was a ruling passion : but tyrants themselves doe not always reigne tyrannically . 't was the feavour of their minds , but this feavour did not always burne them with an equall ardour , it had as well its releases , as its doubles . and do you not believ scipio was out of his high fit , when he gathered cockles on the sea shoar with his friend , or when he lent his words to cremes and micio in the fables of terence . i undertake not here to decide whether he & his friend were the true authours of those fables . it sufficeth me to say , that probably they were the first approvers , and that they loved them , if they did not make them . and it may even be , that the poet changed the disposition of some scenes by their advice , and that some half verses of theirs may be there . and what we finde finest and best aju●ed , was not so much what hee borrowed from the works of menander , as what he h●d learnt from the conversation of scipio . as for the emperour augustus , in whose person i consider the end of their good days , as i doe the flower of them in that of scipio . it s most true , madam , that hee hath judged most wholesomly of the value and merit of every thing , and that he loved glory , but that he hated not pleasure . i speak of pleasure in general , because hee tasted of all , and having afforded his senses very much , he refused his mind nothing . he discerned good and fair in all the subjects wherein it was to be found ; and for that enquiry , he employ'd the best skilled , and most curious spies , so that they left nothing for the succeeding ages to discover . i dare not say , as one hath already said , that the muses were his buffoons and iesters ; 't is an injurious and an uncivil word ; i shall onely say , they had the honour to bee his familiars and his domesticks , and at that time they were of his court and cabinet . they were at least call'd at houres of conversation , if not to the deliberation of affaires ; and if it bee too much to say , that virgil was the fourth of the councel held between augustus and his two friends , to know whether he should maintain the empire , or restore liberty . i somewhat suspect the history of that councel , and i can scarce perswade my selfe , that the gallant spirits of those times were so much the emperours confidents that he should communicate with them affairs of that nature . i am satisfied to believe that they intended his vertuous pleasures without aspiring to a more important direction ; and that hee caused the palace gates to bee open for them , when they were shut to supplicants and petitioners . but when in farre distant countries ; nay , in the midst of the palaces clouds did rise , wch obscur'd the calm i spake of ; it was then , madam , when the muses were no lesse necessary , then they had formerly been agreeable : 't was then they did him service , & helped livia to uphold her husband ; who began already to stoop with cares and under affairs . during this diseased and impatient season , they were only imploied to seek pleasures & divertisements for him : they did strive onely to charm his paines with their songs ; they studied to appease and set at rest that impaatient part of his soul which incessantly watched & tormented it self , to estrange his fancy only from the debauches of his daughter , and from the defeat of his legions ; to take away the sight of troublesome subjects by the interposition of pleasing ones . now , madam , as it was no smal matter of merit for human men sometimes to make augustus sleep , & somtimes to chear him , the good goddesses thereby justified themselves from the calumny of the barbarians , who accused them as useless to the republick , & as fit to have no rank in the world . this good prince suffering them also to extend the too large violence of his thoughts , & by taking some intervals of release in those spectacles which they took care to provide for him at the same time they did divers good acts . for besides that they avowed themselves to be his . they protected the innocent against the licence of the old soldiers , & the cruelty of the civil victory . he got pratlers which use to be heard in all ages ; and honouring them with familiarity , he rendred them triburary to his glory . but chiefly , madam , he followed the councel of nature , which will have all who work , rest ; which entertains its durance by moderation , & threatens violence with an end . i know well that this soveraign understanding which was given to princes for the conduct of human things , is incapable of being tired , and would agitate continually , could it be alone . but being ingaged with the body , and having organs which are extreamly frail and delicate , it must manage them for their benefit , and in spight of it self , fit it self , to the necessities of a society , with which it is ingaged . princes cannot always be angels , divorced from sense , and enjoy the purity of a simple beeing ; they must sometimes be men mixt with matter and subject to the changes of things composed . there must , madam , after the tempests of affairs , and the anxious objects of the ills they are to combat , be a care taken to finde them pleasures . ports to divert and refresh their minds , and attracting perspectives which may untire and rejoice their eyes . they are the needs of human life , how rich and sufficient so ever it may otherwise bee of it selfe . labour would weaken the strongest mindes , had they not their helps and stayes to support them . melancholy would suffocate them , did they not thus respire . to speak properly they are the voluptuousness of reason , and the delights of the understanding . and he who hath discovered all the truths under heaven , and was ignorant of nothing which could be known without revelation , made so particular an esteem of it in the fourth book of his ethicks , that he was not afraid to say , that sport and divertisement were no lesse necessary to life , then rest and nourishment . it s true , he makes a difference as well as we of playes and divertisements . hee is not a councellor of all kinds of debauches ; neither will hee have wise men pass their time as the vulgar do . hee hath discovered a mean approved by reason betwixt an ill humour , and a buffoone in which the soul dilates itself by a moderate motion , and doth not enervate it self by a violent dissolution . and of this mean , madam , he hath made a moral vertue , wch respects the good of company , in pursuit of two others , which he proposeth to us in the same chapter , for the same end . the first of these three vertues is a certaine sweetness & facility of manners , which can accommodate it self without servility , and approves not all that is said without choice ; neither by distaste doth hee disapprove it . the second is a cleare freedome , and a custome to speak the truth even in indifferent things , in as far a degree estranged from vain ostentation , and an affected restraint . i intimated before what the third was , and their three vertuous habits , according to the opinion of aristotle , rule all the commerce of words , and extend themselves to all the entertainements which men have of one another , whether wee hold pleasing or distastfull disputes , whether true or false , whether sad or joyful . so that , madam , without the first of these three vertues , the assemblies of men would bee but troops of enemies mixt together , who would scratch & fly in one anothers faces , or circles of lovers , who would adore their owne defects , & esteem their wrinkles fair . without the second , they would but be the schools of dissemblers , who would scarce tell us what of the clock it were , or that it were day at noon , so feareful are they of mistaking . or theaters for captains , who say more then they know , or then they have done , or then indeed could have been done . in fine , without the third , of which we have spoken , the assemblies of men being too sad or too merry , would seem either as the convoyes of afflicted persons , and the representation of a publique grief , or spectacles of naked persons and the image of those licentious feasts , which durst not appear before cato . the mean betwixt these two is a vertue of a truth , neither so splendent nor so high as wisdom and magnanimity ; yet it s a vertue allowed by the philosophers , even by the philosophy of cato . and should we banish it out of our morals , the communication wee have with one another , would have bin but dry and thorny . our discourse would rather have been a toile and a labour of the tongue , then an ease and a discharge of the heart : and society if we had permission onely to dispute and to contradict , would trouble us far more then solitariness , wherein wee at least may laugh out of memory , and rejoice in our own thoughts . i cannot assure you , madam , that the romans were acquainted with so praise-worthy a quality in the infancy of the republick ; and although one of their poets reports well of king numa , and of the nymph of egeria , the conferences which they had together , passing without witness , they could speak of them but by conjecture . these victorious peasants knowing nothing but husbandry and fighting , were sensible onely of gross pleasures proportionable to the hardship of their births ; there is no great likelihood that they did possess a vertue directly opposite to the rudeness they made profession of , and which seldome accompanies poverty , which is almost alwayes followed with an ill humour . so long as their eloquence , to use the termes of varro , smelt of garlick and onions , we could expect nothing very exquisite , and it was hard for so sad an austerity as theirs to hearken to raillery , and to be toucht with joy . first , then they were without weakning to soften themselves ; they must sweeten their courages , and unrust their manners , that at last they might advise to cultivate themselves , as they did their gardens and their lands . they indeed did it with so much success , and found so happy a foundation , that presently the good genius was amongst them a popular thing . this politeness past from the senate to inferiour degrees , even to the lowest form of the meaner people . and if in their cause their own witness is to be believ'd , they have blotted out all the graces , and all the vertues of greece , and have left the atticism thereof far short of their urbanity . it s that , madam , which they call'd that lovely vertue of society , after having practised it many years without having given it a name , and should use have ripened amongst us a word of so ill a savour , and have corrected the bitternesse which might have been found in it . wee might accustome our selves thereunto , as to others , which wee borrowed from the same language . now whether that word expresseth in ours a certain air of the great world , and a colour and tincture of the court , which not only marks words and opinions , but even the tone of the voice , and the motion of the body . or whether it signifie a lesse perceptible motion which is known but by chance , which hath nothing but is noble & high , and nothing which appears studied or learnt ; which is felt , and is not seen , and inspires , a secret genius , which we lose in seeking it . or whether in a farther stretched signification , it means the science of conversation , and the gift to please in good company : or restraining of it , it be taken for an addresse to touch the spirit with i know not what kind of pricking , yet whose pungency is pleasing to who receives it , because it tickles , and hurts not , because it leaves a wound without grief , and awakens only that part which malice offends . to conclude , madam , according to the judgment of a good judge in such cases , it was a knowledge abused by the greeks , which other people were ignorant of , and from whom the romans only learnt the true and lawful use . being so fit for them , and so incommunicable to their nearest neighbours , that those even of italy ; could not acquire it without some failings , nor so nicely counterfeit it , that the resemblance should not mark the diversity . it was then according to this accompt , a domestick plant which could grow up but on the shore of the tiber , or on the mount palatin , or at the foot of the capitol , or near the camp of mars , and near some other quarter of that capitall city of the world . is it possible that the heaven and the sun of rome , should have so much force and so much vertue ? did they so sensibly agitate on the spirits of men ? were they so absolutely necessary to make them good company ? i fear not of my self to say it , not to wrong the rest of italy , and the rest of the civilized provinces . but to speak in general , its certain , madam , that the citizens of rome , had great advantages in the world , owed much to their mothers , and to their breeding , and knew many things which no body taught them : there is no doubt but in their most familiar entertainment , some graces were neglected , some ornaments without art , which the doctors are ignorant of , and which are above rules and precepts . i doubted not but when i had seen it thunder , and heaven and earth mix in the o●ations of the tribunals , but it was a change most agreeably pleasing , to consider them under more then an humane appearance , disarmed of their enthymemes , and of their figures , having left their feigned exclamations , and artificial angers , appearing in a condition wherein one might say , they were truly themselves . 't was there , madam , for example , where cicero was neither sophist , nor rhetorician , neither idolater of this man , nor furious against that ; neither of this , nor of that party : there hee was the true cicero , and after mocked himself privately of what he had adored publickly . 't was there he defin'd men , & painted them not , where he spoke of cato as of a pedant of the portico , or at most but as of a citizen of plato's republick , where he said , that the purple of the senate was finer , but the steele of the rebels was better , where he confest caesar was the contriver of his own fortune , and that pompey was but the work of his . these sentiments which parted from the heart , were hidden in great assemblies , and were discovered but between two or three friends , and as many faithful domesticks , and with whom hee communicated this secret felicity . and if some of them have said that they reign'd all the time they oration'd , so soveraign was the power they exercised over mens mindes ; we may speak even of those which in their conversation restored the liberty which they had taken away in their orations , that they set at large and at ease the minds of those they opprest and tormented ; and that they drew them from that admiration which had agitated them with violence , to make them sensible of a sweeter transport , and ravish them with less force . i have seen a great prince in the low countries , who in that envied the fortune of their free men , and of those inferior friends , and of the meaner sort , which they had brought out of slavery , to choose them their confidents ; and in effect , it was a wonderful contentment to be a witness of their interiour lives , and to be private to the more particular houres of their leisure . and it were an incomparable satisfactiō to know those good things which have been said of scipio and laelius atticus and cicero , and other honest people of every age , to have the history of their conversation and cabinets to adde to those of affairs & state . being born in the empire , and bred up in triumphs , all what proceeded from them bore the character of nobleness , which distinguished thē from subjects . all of them were sensible of command and authority , though government and conduct were not in question ; all was remarkable and exemplary , even their secrets and solitude . having from their infancy seene kings led captives through the streets , and other kings petitioners and solicitors come in person to demand justice , and expect at the doore of the senate their good or ill success . they could retain nothing that was low in such rais'd and purg'd spirits from such spectacles . the very lees of such a people were precious : and if by mischance some gentlemen were found who had vulgar spirits , it s to be believed that such great objects would presently have raised them . it s likely , that being not onely covered and invironed , but penetrated , even filled with so much light which resplended even on their least actions , which they could not lessen nor hide so well , but that they always were strong and illustrious . i speak as i believe , and you know well the dead have no flatterers . 't was impossible for them wholly to devest themselves of their greatnesse , because it was in their hearts and in their mindes , because it was rooted in them , and was not applyed to their fortunes . no gesture , nor outward motion of theirs was unworthy the soveraignty of the world : even they laughed and sported with some kind of dignity . 't is what i fear not madam , to present unto you , who descend not onely from the same origine and from the same bloud , but who beyond all this , are the daughter of their discipline and spirit , and retain no lesse a share of the magnanimity of the caesars , and of the scipios , thē of the honesty of the lelia's , and of the comelia's . your ancestors were great even in the least things . and since formerly a sect did believe , that a wise man sleeping , was like himself ; neither did he then forbear to be wise , ( it was an idol and a wise man form'd at pleasure ) since that sect hath left it for a dogma , that the dreams of this imaginary wise man were reasonable and judicious . we may have leave to believe , that truly wise men might rule with gravity by their reason , and conduct one part of their lives , which is more capable of either then sleeping , and that their lesse violent and lesse serious actions were animated with vigour and the majesty of the republick . would you have me verifie what i tell you , and raise my self higher then scipio's time , to shew you that their was always wit in rome ; but that there was alwayes authority and greatnesse mixt with this wit : it shall be onely the good fabritius , whose letter you saw to pyrrhus , which will furnish the example we seek . and i pray consider it , madam , in that celebrous conversation which hee had with the same pyrrhus , and with cyneas the head of his councel . cyneas having made a long discourse in praise of a contemplative life , and amongst other things having said , that there was a great person at athens named epicurus , who preached rest and voluptuousnesse , and held the government of states unworthy the employment of the wise , because wise men ought not to disturb themselvs for fools , for ungrateful persons , for men . fabritius had the patience to hear the vanity of the grecians , although hee approved them not : yet with a disdainful smile which hee addrest to him who brought them forth . o said he , how soon would the romans have done , if all the world would be but epicurian . do you not beleive , madam , that cyneas was surprised with so unexpected an answer , and so far from the admiration hee looked for from so unlettered a man , whom he thought he had ravished with his eloquence . that little saying at one blow overthrew the opinions of that great man of athens , and the eloquence of that brave orator . and a regular refutation of epicurian philosophy undertaken by a stoick prepared for the businesse , would not have had the force which this exclamation of one line had , wch rendred epicurus ridiculous , which confounded cyneas , and astonished pyrrhus . yet fabritius , madam , did use to astonish pyrrhus with his answers ; hee usually laughed at the propositions which the king seriously made ; and when he once offered him the first place next to him in his kingdome , supposing that hee would not dispute so advantageous a grant , and that without difficulty he would change poverty for riches : the poor citizen answerd the rich prince in these words , which i have drawne from a greek manu script : i love you pyrrhus too well , to accept the conditions you offer . if to day i were your favorite , who could assure you but that to morrow i might be your master ? of a truth you are worth much , yet you cost more ; and doe you not believe , that did your subjects know mee , but that they would rather receive exemptions from me with the security of all they have , then to pay tribute to you , and have nothing they can call their own : make me therefore no more of these offers , which might ruine you if i took you at your word ; and never promise me what you cannot keep without the losse of your crown . a ●ough commonwealths man born with the hatred of monarchy , would have answered rudely , that he would have nothing to do with a king nor to be lieutenant general of the kingdome . but , fabritius , who was harsh in fight onely , and knew onely how to offend armed kings , being unwilling to receive what was offered , yet would hee refuse with a good grace : he would by that gallant and ingenious refusal , once more make himself to be desired by pyrrhus , and shew him that he was not onely a man of very great use , but also a man of good conversation . these , madam , are the first essays of politenesse , and as it were the designe of urbanity in a republick of brasse and iron amongst simple and innocent citizens ; but simple and innocent in such a way , that we cannot say their simplicity was smooth , & their innocency spiritual : the consuls and the dictators laughed after this manner . thus they spake when they did not speake seriously ; and the seriousnesse of the grecians was worth nothing to the rude and imperious raillery of the romans . even the censors , madam , although grief seemed to be one of the functions of their charge , did not absolutely renounce all kind of raillery : they did not opinion at themselvs to an eternal severity ; and that hasty and insufferable honest man , i mean the first cato , did somtimes forbear to be angry and insupportable ; he had raies of joy , and the intervals of a good humor ; sayings have escaped him which were nothing ungrateful ; and if you please , madam , you may judge of others by this . he married a well fashioned woman ; and histories observe , that she extreamly feared thunder , as shee did extreamly love her husband ; these two passions counselled her the same thing ; she ever chose her husband for her shelter against thunder , and cast her self into his arms ; at the first murmure , shee imagined shee heard from heaven cato , who was pleased with the storm , & who was not angry to be carressed more then ordinary , could not retaine the joy of his heart . hee reveales this domestick secret to his friends , and tels them , speaking of his wife , that she had found out a way to make him wish for ill weather ; and that hee was never so happy , as when jupiter was angry . severity it self rejoiced in this manner : it was extream rigidnesse : 't was soveraign justice , which thus laughed ; and indeed , madam , although he and the rest were incorruptible judges , yet must we not therefore say , that their good dispensation of justice proceeded from their ill humor : they knew how to change vertue according to the diversity of time and place : they received at night in their closets , the favours they had in the morning rejected on the tribunal . but the graces being at home with them , they were neither affected , nor licentious : they were wise and modest ; they painted not majesty ; they drest her the least they could , and hindred her onely from frighting others . these graces , madam , and this majesty , were at last separated ; and the graces appeared again under their emperours : but they appeared alone for that majesty , i mean the majesty of words was lost with their liberty . fabritius his style lasted but till brutus and cassius ; and indeed it s very observable whether it bee in some of their letters which are still visible , or in the discourse they had together the eve before the philippi battel . there is no man so much a stranger to antiquity , who is ignorant of brutus his evil angel , and who knows not their dialogue . next day after their funeral conference , brutus related it to cassius , with more trouble and disturbance then he had when the daemon appeared unto him . but observe , madam , with what a byass turn'd so distastful a matter , and how he made it profitable for the use of conversation . without appearing an astonished admirer , or an incredulous opiniator , hee laughing , told his friend , that the cares of the minde , the contention of the spirit , the weariness of the body , and the darknesse of the night might be the cause of his vision , and had formed unto him those strange images . that as for him from the principles of philosophy , which he profest , he could not believe there were daemons , and much lesse that they were visible : yet neverthelesse , hee wished there were , and that his philosophy were false ; forasmuch as apparently those spirits without bodies ought to be just and vertuous . the action of the ides of march was so fair , and the cause so honest , that undoubtedly they would bear their part in it . and that so they would be friends and allies of whom he had not thought , of which would come to his relief , and troops of reserve , which at a need would fight for them ; which being granted , he ought not to reckon of their party , only so many companies of foot , so many cornets of horse , so many legions , and so many vessels : but besides that , there was an immortal people , and a most happy militia , which needed no pay , and declared themselves for the good cause , and which hee never need feare would serve antony against brutus , or preferre tyranny before liberty . these words , madam , were the last words of the republick , which she uttered before she gave up the ghost , and after which she expired : 't was the character of the spirit of rome ; it was the natural language of its majesty : and doe you not finde that cassius was very eloquent in that tongue ? would you not be well pleased to bee more particularly acquainted with that excellent man , to see him in other society then this , and to hear him discourse on lesse ungratefull subjects , and at another time then the eve of the philippin battel . the mischief is , that a quick voice dies assoon as it s brought forth , and leaves nothing after it , forming no subsisting bodies in the air : words have wings , you know its homers epithete , and a syrian poet hath made a sort of language amongst birds : so that , madam , if we stop not these fugitives by writing , they easily escape our memorie . even all that is written , is not sure to last ; and books perish as tradition is forgot : time , which ends marble and iron , wants not strength against frailer subjects . and the northern people who seemed to come to hasten time and precipitate the end of the world , declared so particular a warre to written things , that it was not wanting in them , but that even the alphabet had been abolished . elsewhere , madam , there is a fate of letters which loseth and saveth without choice the motions of human intelligence , which pardon ill verses , and ill intended fables , to suppresse oracles , and deprive the world of the light of needful history . the ancients acknowledged a daemon , who presides at the birth of books , and soveraignly disposeth of their fortune & successe ; whether they result well or ill , whether they are short or long-lived , as it succeeds either favourable or adverse . now its certain , if this daemon were an ill willer to the publick , and envious of honest curiosity , and contrary to the reputation of great persons , it was principally in that part of their memories , which design'd their humour , which acquainted us with the relishes and delicacies of their mindes , which discovered the truth of their manners to posterity , and the secrets of their private lives . what a misfortune 't is , madam , that wee cannot accost them by that accessible part & proportionable to the debility of our strength ; that we have lost that easy object , and which wee could better beare then a higher elevation of their glory ; that we know the most part of their battels , and order of their militia , and yet are ignorant of their calm conferences , and of the method they used in their treaties with one another , knowing of their solemn feasts , and great ceremonies , and yet have no share in their familiarity , or in their domestick affairs . truly , madam it had been no small unhappinesse , had it altogether so befallen us ; yet me thinks wee cannot with reason deny but that some amongst them have had a care of us , nor justly complain , that we have been frustrated of what by succession belongs unto us . two or three by way of comedy have left us the tract of four and twenty howres ; i mean the representation of some merily past day , and others have shewed them us in their dialogues , and in their letters . these dialogues , and these letters are their immortal entertainments : conversations which are still lasting , whereto wee have every houre free admittance ; where that idea of vertue is preserved , of which aristotle speakes in the fourth book of his ethicks , where the first master of this noble & patrician raillery , as they cal it , is to be found , which was so compatible with the romane gravity . these copies are more correct and clearer perhaps then their first originals were ; and if they have not the advantage of a lively voice and presence , which perswades the senses , and gives a lustre to vile things ; they have that of attention , and of a second view , wch polisheth the rude , and unmixeth the confused , which adds what is commonly wanting to sudden and carnal actions . here is enough madam , to satisfie a minde possest onely with languishing passions , and to content a hunger which is satisfied with a little nourishment : but being desirous of much , and greedy of new knowledge , and lovers of change ; we must confesse that there is no more then to whet our appetites . we are not children quite disinherited ; neither are we heirs extreamly rich : and the goods left us , are nothing so great as the losses we have made . my intention here is not to lament the calamities of learnings commonwealth ; i wil say nothing of the ill fortune of history , of its breaches and ruines . the name of luceius is scarce come to our ears ; of that luceius , madam , in whose histories cicero sollicited and begged a place . our salust is but a part of that salust which your fathers had : where is the second decad of titus livius ? where are his civill wars ? where are those of asinius , pollio and crematius cordus , which were master-pieces of the roman liberty and eloquence ? all these madam , are no more ; and if wee would know the news of a season which hath so much relation & conformity with the times we have seen , we must enquire of some stranger of greece , who commonly is what he knows not . neverthelesse i perceive , that in the humour wee now in these days are , and in the disgust of a distempered age , which prefers fawces to meat , and its fancie to health . 't is not the great and serious amongst the romans , which wee must regret , and are most angry to have lost ; we might easily passe over the annals of their wars and fields , had we but a iournal of their divertisements and winter quarters . and wee should without much trouble consolate our selves at the shipwrack of needful histories , could their faire fables have escaped . it were indeed an excellent consolation to afflicted spirits , for the losse of titus livius his decads , could we recover the comedies of plautus and terence , which we have no more , without mentioning other poets of the theatre , from whose wrack there remains only a few lame verses , and some halting sentences . the satyrs of varro , who was the painter of the life and of the minde , would also afford us very grateful knowledges : for though most serious philosophy were in those satyrs , yet was it as it were on flowers , and as in a place for debauch , all painted and perfumed with the gallantry of those times . there wee should have seen the conscript fathers dispatching of their clients , dismantled of their long robes in the purity of their nature ; such as they were in the pleasures of their jollity , and in the liberties they took after supper : such as you have asked me to see them , when you thought i could say somewhat to their books . wee should then have had lions whole , whereas now wee have but their claws ; and if the fate of books would have had it so , the conversations of brutus and cassius , the entertainments of volumnius and of papirius poetus , would have been as long lived , as the controversies of the rhetoricians , of seneca , and the declamations of quintilian . we should judge , madam , of urbanity by it selfe , and in whole and perfect figures , instead that we can now judge but by our suspitions , and by obscure and imperfect tracts . had it pleased the same destiny , the first caesar would yet be one of those authors whom i alledged upon this subject : he with care had gathered what had been said , and what was every day most remarkably said . tyron also made a collection of all the good sayings of cicero , and an ancient grammarian speaketh of two books of tacitus , the title of which was the conceits facetiae . but particularly , madam , the court of the second caesar , of which was spoken in the beginning of this discourse . that gallant and witty court which mocked the conceits of plautus , and the raillery of antiquity , would furnish me wherewith to entertain you whole days , with a vertue which belonged unto them in property , and which from thence had received its last form : for wee must confesse with the leave of the republick , that the age of augustus judged very subtilly of things , perfectly purified by reasō , gave lights to the mind which it had not before . it was the golden age of arts and discipline , and generally of all fair literature . all was polisht and refined under his reign ; all were knowing and ingenious in that court from augustus even to his grooms . it s written , that fire and lightning came from his eyes ; whereto i would add , madam , that they also issued out of his mouth , but more quick and glittering then those , which dazled the courtiers of those times , which obliged the one of them to complain , that it was not possible to look him in the face : he composed verses and supprest them ; and suppressing them , he gave out a word of the ill work he had made , which was worth as much as the best work which could bee made . he in four words answered the long oration of the spanish ambassadors ; but those four words deserved another oration longer then the former to commend them . besides the commentaries of his life , there was a long time in the world a volume of his letters ; and you may believe , madam , they were not alwayes concerning state-affaires nor all addrest to the senate or to the legions ; some were of raillery , some of confidence to his friends ; others of love , and of the gallantry of his mistresses , and of the same style with those which his unckle writ to queen cleopatra , on tablets of corinthians and saphirs . but i am coming , madam , to astonish you . do you believe , that at this day there is anywhere any fragments to bee found of those letters written to cleopatra ? and that love , and the love letters of caesar , surviv'd her hatred , and her anti-cato's . this rarity hath been preserved in an old greek manuscript , which happily came to my hands , whence i have taken what i have already told you of fabritius , of cato , and of cassius . the author of this manuscript is not unknown , is not the son of earth , hee hath a name , and a countrey , and bears the marks of his nativity : he lived under the empire of the antonines ; he seemed to have the same design with the sophist aelian : but his manner of writing is more at large , and his work may be called a mixture of common with rare things . yet truly , madam , i cannot speak so affirmatively of the truth of these letters , but that you still have leave to suspend your judgement . i dare not assure you , that they were found in cleopatra's cabinet , when the inventory of her goods was made by order of augustus . besides , the sophist are men , whom i trust but in some sort : the roman poet teacheth us to feare the greeks , even when they present us ; and the cardinal historian of the church made use of his advice on the subject of the donation of rome , made to pope silvester by the emperor constantin . since then the largesses which come from greece ought to be suspected by us , and that in that countrey there is a number of good willing people which are at leisure : since the sophists served as secretaries to falaris and other princes ; i know not how many ages after their deaths , they may have rendred the same service to caesar upon this occasion : but before wee determine thereupon , it will not be amisse to consult the infallible . **** their answers which formerly were rendred at delphos , were not more certain then his . all the impostors of antiquity ; all the sinons , and all the ulisses of greece , are not subtill enough to make him take one for another : and hee will instantly resolve , whether what we present him be legitimate or base ; whether it be gold from the mine , or gold of chymistry . however it be , i believe its antiquity ; and had those pieces wch the greek sophist alledgeth been counterfeit , it would have according to my opinion awhile after caesar , and perhaps in the time of augustus . we will in another observ them with what remains concerning that age ; unlesse you , madam , esteem it as already done , and the age also ; and affording me the favour of a second discourse , you would spare the pains of tiring my selfe with disquieting you . maecenas to the lady marquess of rambovillet . discourse iii. the last time i had the honour to see you , the emperour augustus was the chief subject of our discourse . i brought you to consider him in the beginning , continuance , and perfection of his glory : you observed how at nineteen he vyed , with the age and experience of cicero ; how in one work he acted three or four different persons ; how he shewed the conscript fathers , who would have treated him like a young man ; that although he had not studied so long as they , yet he had learnt more ; and how he did with addresse imploy their forces to make his designes succeed , instead that he thought to use his own name and credit to establish his authority . i past as lightly as i could that bloudy act of the triumvirat , whereof there was no way to clear his reputation ; and i wished for his honour , that that part of his history were blotted out of the memory of things ; i staid at the frequent broils , the plaistered reconcilements , and the last rupture betwixt him and mark antony , and accompanied him even to rome , and even to the day of his triumph , after the fatal voiage of egypt . it was not without informing you by the way , that the dexterity of his minde was always mixt with the good fortune of his arms : and that having overthrown in the philippick plains the two dear sons of the republick , he thought he had done nothing , could he not free himself from the two co-heirs he had in the succession of his unckles power , that he might secure what he had done . the conduct of that work was admirable , he went beyond his unckle , and placed himself in a better seat . the opposing vertue was unhappy ; force was found impotent : hinderance made him a passage to arrive thither . and then , madam , the romans began to know the design of providence , and the mortall disease of the old republick . at last they loved to have rather an assured master , and a peaceable servitude , then changes every day , and a perpetual fright of civil war . rest , which they did believe to bee an essential good , was to them in lieu of liberty , which seemed now no more then a delight of the fancy . every man was pleased to be quiet after such troublesome affairs , and the sweetnesse of quietnesse did so agreeably slide into their mindes , that they even wished not for their first condition , when augustus with assurance would have restored it ; they were so weary of leagues and parties , that they acknowledged him for a benefactor , who would take frō thē the trouble of governing themselvs ; & blest his usurpation , who delivered them from their ill conduct . since he leads us , said they , let 's sleep in our vessel with security ; let 's if we will debauch our selves ; let 's laugh at bacchus and pirats : t is impossible we should be lost , caesar is responsible for our safety . even the grandchildren of the consuls and dictators forgot their honour to follow their interest , and forsook a ruinous and imaginary liberty , to yeild to an obedience which was convenient and full of effective advantages . they were the most subtile & most watchful courtiers , and although they bore the names , which had made the kings of the earth tremble , they cared not to be seen in the crowd amongst those which give good morrows , asking favours at the door of one of their own citizens . they said their fortune had shewed them the example of their duty , and the way to the palace of augustus . that they went whether the gods were gone before them ; and that if they had changed party , the destin of things , and the daemon of rome , had done so before them ; thus this soveraign soul , and of the first rank , which had a navual empire over all other mindes , found neither contradiction nor resistance : the proudest submitted to the yoak , yeilded to the superiority of his spirit without difficulty past under so elevated an height , and submitted humane vertues to somewhat of divine , which they acknowledged in the person of augustus . there was no fierce courage , madam , now to be daunted ; neither cato nor brutus to resuscitate a dead party . mutiny lost even its breath and noise , envy was changed in to admiration . whence i conclude , if i remember right , that envy goes not always so farre as vertue . that opinion is at last tired in following its constancy , and that there is a degree whereat desert having arrived , 't is beyond the reach of the ill wishes , and the ill will of men . in pursuit whereof , madam , an irreproachable judge as you may call monsieur chappellain , raising his voice but a little more then ordinary , pronounced this fair decree in favour of augustus , and his new dominion . who is that presumptuous man that dares complain , that heaven is above him , that thinks it strange , that the most luminous amongst creatures , is the highest , and that the worthiest is the greatest ? no man did ever appeal from that decree augustus was crowned by , the suffrage of all the company after his life was made after my manner in little . but because agrippa and maecenas were forgot in that life , you witnessed at our issuing out of your cabinet , that you would not be displeased , if i should tell you what i knew of either of them . and that it would be grateful to you if i made you a particular relation of moecenas , of whom so many have unknowingly spoken . you shall be obeyed after my fashion , and i wish it may be to your content : but as i usually do , madam , i will give you the things you ask as they fal into my mind , and rather according to the liberty of discourse , then the course of history . agrippa was bold and wise in war , infatigable in military labours , a religious observer of discipline , and had all the other parts of a good captain : but on the other side , he wanted those sweet and sociable vertues which are necessary for an able courtier : he did better understand the science of the field , then of the cabinet ; stratagems , then intricacies , and what was in time of trouble valour in him , became in time of rest , rudenesse . the same cannot be said of moecenas ; he was esteemed the honestest man of his time , and had nothing in his person which nature had not found with care , and which letters and the great world had not polished . yet madam , you may observe , that the tincture which is taken at this great light , and which gives a colour to natural goods , was taken from him with a reserve , and advanced not to the painting and disguise of intentions , so that it fel from the total alteration of probity . he had the graces of the court , but not the vices , and his actions were even as direct as his manner of acting was pleasing . although the court may debauch saints , and commonly at first infects what it receivs pure , yet it contaminated not maecenas . it made him shew , that besides the use of preservatives , which the study of wisdome furnisheth , there may be disposition inwardly so good , that they are stronger then all corruptions from without . t was he that gave the first example to the world , that was ever seen of an innocent and modest prospering . hee preserved in the court the maxims he brought thither , and in a place where all is false and masked , hee would appear what he was . but he had no need take care , madam , to counterfeit the liberal and the generous : hee could not but have been much troubled to have hindred himself from being so : for which hee needed neither labour nor fighting ; giving but way to the course of his own inclination , he never fell but on good , and on vertue . and so his good actions flowing from the spring and not being drawne by strength of arms , as those of some hero's of this age , the easinesse and liberty of them was no lesse esteemed then the splendor and magnificence : t was said of him that he was the honour of his age , and of the roman empire ; that he was the general good of the world ; that the sun would sooner cease to shine , and the rivers to run , then maecenas to do good . a brave man of his time cries out in a poem which hee addrest to him , t is too much given , moecenas , i am but too rich ; and indeed the discretion onely of those who received his benefits , could make stop of his liberality . if his friends would have believed him , he would have left himself nothing . neither durst a man praise at his house either a picture sent for a rarity from greece , or a statue of corinthian brasse , or a service of chrystal glasse , lest he presently should dispoil his palace of those precious moveables , and force him that praised them to accept of them . excesse and vanity might imitate moecenas : but natural goodnesse onely could reach his height . but we must remember , madam , that this noble man of spirit was not solitary and unaccompanied ; all the vertues marched in its train ; 't was a strong and couragious goodnesse , an able and an intelligent goodnesse ; and out of the same fountain whence particulars drew favors and courtesies , the publick was furnished with councels and resolutions . how great a doctor he was in the science of governing ; the fate of affairs never deceived him ; he never was a false politician , neither did he wander to appear a good speaker in the vast spaces of verisimilies . hee always went right out to truth , and so clearly saw the sequel of things in their first disposition , that the most irregular successes did hardly bely the conjectures hee made . is it not true that the emperor would have done wrong to so excellent a person , had he not honor'd him with his confidence , and had hee not given him a share in the government of the world ? being as he was a just esteemer of men , and knowing the value of every thing , he could not legitimately make twelve to be worth no more then two . that a many eminent qualities should not be of more use then a mean sufficiency . that the most powerful in reason should not have the first place in affairs . in a word madam , augustus tould not but that moecenas must have been favorite to augustus ; and although he was to give long and opinionated battels against the restraints of so modern a spirit to make him accept what he deserv'd , and that he was much troubled to overcome him . yet was he worthy of the magnanimity of the greatest prince in the world , that in this occasion he would not suffer himself to be overcome , and not give way . that his acknowledgement should be inferiour to the modesty of one of his friends . hee did then much good to this friend , but it was as you have already seen , to distribute it and divide it every way . to inlighten and rejoyce all the earth with the light of his riches . with this wealth moecenas bought for augustus all hearts & all tongues , and consequently rendred them of so much the better , more noble , and of the more durable species : so that considering so new a commerce , he who gave was lesse liberal then he was a good husband ; and who received from him was rather his factor then his favorite . but , madam , what i am going to tell you , deserves to be well observed : he was ever of the religion , to receiv nothing which might not justly be given , he would have nothing wch might be reproach'd him , not onely from the publick complaint of his renown , but also by the secret sight of an interessed particular . those who since had the same favour under other reigns , used it not so . their morrals were larger and more indulgent to their passions . they had none of those delicacies of conscience . when they died not soon enough of a natural death , they had recourse to accusations to advance the term of the account they made : they caused innocents to be condemned to make their charges vacant , and in the sight of afflicted orphans , they bore the marks of their fathers fortune which were not yet dry of his bloud . moecenas his proceedings were far different from these ; he would have believed himself sullied with the confiscated goods of one proscribed , and as you may ghesse , how many places and houses hath he refused , because hee would not touch funeral spoils , nor take away the successions of unhappy men . i shall say more , and his scruples went farther ; he hath often sent back the presents and gratifications of the provinces , which he had eased , fearing lest the lightest sign of their gratitude , and that a nosegay received in such an encounter , made not the least resentation of interest appear in his advice . he oftner set aside the profitable , which was not dishonest to embrace , what was honest barren and unfruitful ; he preferred a simple satisfaction of minde to those things which the world esteems solid and essential . i believe , madam , that so discreet and limited a greatness raised no jealousies in his prince . there was no treason to bee feared from so superstitious an integrity . how should he bee a pensioner to mark antony , had he not accepted all kind of augustus his favours ? and how should he desire new things to meliorat his condition , since he contented himself with a little part of those advantages , which the present offered . o rare example for happy men ! such a man is not to be found . how strong and solid a piece he was in the foundation of a growing principality . tyranny it self might have been justified by the innocency of this minister , as it might have been upheld by the rest of his more lively and more ardent vertues . yet would i not deny , but that his delicate complexion sometimes rendred him lesse fit for the labours of his body , and for the toils of war , and was the cause that ordinarily his minde could onely work . but , madam , without being prest he did not forbear to do much , and to render as useful services to the state , as his colleague , although they were not followed with so much noise and pomp . the solitude he built himselfe in town , and the shadowes of his gardens , hid the half of his vertue . his employments were covered with an outward appearance of lazinesse . and perhaps agrippa , who appeared was praised for the conduct of moecenas , whilest he was retired . the emperour had more inclination for this ; but remembring the battels gotten in sicilia and egypt , he esteemed the other more . the one he believed loved him more , and the other had obliged more . all these deliberated of general affairs : but sometimes he consulted only moecenas concerning the life and fortune of agrippa . witnesse madam , that little word , upon which one of machiavels disciples composed a great discourse . you must either put him to death , or make him your sonne in law . that is to say , you must either lose him , or quite gain him . you must secure your self of a greatnesse which is suspected to you either by taking him out of the world , or planting him in your house . you may thereby observe that moecenas regarded onely his master : i speak like a french man , and thought onely of confirming his authority . agrippa had a taste of the lost liberty , and turned his head about from time to time towards the ancient republick this never proposed counsels but such as were purely honest ; but his companion wherein concerned the good of the state , would add profit to honesty . the first had the command of armies , and fought the enemies of the empire . the second exercised his power even over the emperours minde , and therein appeased the motions which rose up against reason . which he did madam , with so much liberty , that the prince being once on the seat of justice , where some criminal processe was deba●●ed , and where he began to be carried away with the deceits and calumnies of the accusers . moecenas thereupon arriving , and being unable to divide the croud , which hindred his passage to him , he handed a note to him , wherein were these words : hangman , wilt thou not come away from them ? augustus in stead of taking offence at the boldnesse of the word , and of so pricking a familiarity , took his friends zeal kindly : and at the same time broke up the assembly and descended from his tribunal , whom perhaps he had not innocently gotten down , had he staid longer . he often received such like proofs of his fidelity . t was maecenas who tempered the heat of his passions , and sweetned the sharpnesse of his spirit ; who healed the wounds when he could not prevent the blows ; who consolated him , when he was not in a condition to admit of joy . augustus very well understood the desert and value of this friendship . he perceived well that his person being nearer to him then his fortune , such like services were to be valued in his minde , more then the taking of towns , and gaining of battels . he witnessed him also al the acknowledgments you can imagine from a just prince , and who knew how to distinguish inclination from duty , and those who loved caesar , onely from those who mixt other passions therewith . even after his death , he continued to acknowledge it to his memory ; and whensoever any domestick affliction befel him , or some outward displeasure , sighing hee would say , this would not have befaln me had moecenas been living . hee thought himself unhappy in possessing the empire of the world , since he had lost his moecenas . hee had indeed a great deal of reason to regret a person so equally good and intelligent , who could neither deceive nor be deceived ; who could do ill neither out of weaknesse , nor out of designe . he had great cause to weep the losse of a friend , who was both so necessary and so pleasing . a friend at all houres , and at all times , in whom he found all he sought , which was his table and common place book , the witnesse and the repository of his thoughts ; the treasury of his mind , even his second soul . in effect , madam , ( to shew you the worth of a faithful friend about a great prince ) how much doe you think hee confirmed , fortified , and augmented the reason of augustus ? how many thrones hath hee drawn out of those businesses he hath had to dispatch ? how many expedients did he propose to himself to facilitate his designes ? how many platforms hath he made to raise his works ? you need not doubt but hee hath often spared the pains of his foresight , and charged himself with the cares and disquiets of the future , that he might leave him entirely in the action . that the vigour of his spirit might not by being divided , bee diminished . that i might with truth at this time say , that they divided amongst themselves the several functions of the same duty , and that they both lived but one life . the faithful moecenas divers times , madam , upheld augustus , when hee was tired with the search of difficult good , and presented him with the image of a crowned and enjoyed vertue , to divert his sight from the sad object of suffering and labouring vertue , after a discovered conspiracy , and when hee judged clemency better then iustice . he fancied glory to him fairer and more attractive , then shee was , to provoke him the more to the love thereof , to oblige him to convert wicked persons to honest men . by changing sentences of death into abolitions , to doe so that hee preferred the praise of goodnes , which lasts as long as the families and races are preserved , before vengeance , which passeth as quickly as the stroak of a hatchet can bee given , and an head cut off . and after this you may if you please believe seneca , who condemns the style and eloquence of moecenas . me thinks madam , that to obtain such like graces from a provoked soul , a man should not want eloquence . i speak of that good and wise eloquence , the eloquence of affairs and action bred in the sun , and in the light of the great world , incomparably stronger then the rhetorick of the sophists , although that can far better hide and dissemble its strength . there is no doubt but it s absolutely necessary to speak well , for to have to doe with princes , who commonly cannot relish reason if it be not delicately prepared . 't is not enough that there bee vertue in the remedies they are to use , they will have no bitternesse in them . 't is not sufficient that the things we present them bee good , if they are not as well good in their form , as in their matter . but it is not princes onely who desire pleasing words , and who are offended against the reason which reproves them . to speak generally , there being nothing so free and elevated as the mind of man , it will bee treated according to the noblenesse of its nature : that is to say , with sweetnesse , method , and addresse . thereby madam , the will is carried away without much resistance , and from the will wee come to the understanding , which is so much an enemy to constraint , that to eschew it , it estrangeth it self from its proper object , and rejects the truth when any one will cause another to embrace it by force . it s certain that the understanding of an art so necessary to government , was soveraign in the person of moecenas . as hee was most clear sighted in discerning of wits , he was full of addresse in their conduct ; and was no lesse subtile in handling them , then he had light to discover them . with this efficacious eloquence which is nothing but the right use of prudence , which is communicated to men by speech ; he gained augustus an infinite many servants , and after he had perswaded him moderation , hee perswaded them obedience . all the conferences which were held in his palace , were sacrifices of praise and glory for augustus . he was there adored every day in prose and in verse . they began to reform then the ancient language of the republick , and to swear by the genius and good fortune of the prince . the temples which at first were built for him in spain , and in asia , and since in other povinces of the roman world , were designed in that place . and to take it from its rise , a man may say , madam , that maecenas with his orators and his poets , was founder of all those temples , was the institutor of that new religion which consecrated a living man . believe me and all antiquity rather then seneca ; that incomparable favorite left always i know not what sting in the heart , which provoked the courages of the hardest to the love of the prince and country , to the study of vertue and wisdome . a man could not get from him without a sweet esmotion able to awaken the deadnesse of those who were not sensible of the felicity of the reign of augustus , who never dreamt of the beauty of good things . the air of his face , the tone of his voice , and what the rhetoricians comprehended under the eloquence of the body , gained the outward sense in an instant , and made even to the soul by the facility of whose guard it was presently taken . he perswaded even with the negligence of the most familiar entertainment . in his free conversation when he devested the pomp of the court , and gravity of his ministry , when he forsook what dazled the people , he still had many ornaments left which he could not leave ; he had unvoluntary charms about him which hee minded not , which every where accompanied him . these charms , madam , particularly inspired all he said : it supplied the default of his favour ; and even when hee did not grant requests , he did not forbear to give satisfaction : for you know well , that all things are not always possible , and that a man must sometimes refuse . but i beseech you , what must those presents be which enriched so charming a mouth , since the refusals which issued were not displeasing , and that in speaking he so much pleased that with his words alone hee could have paid his debts . yet nero's tutor will not have the confident of augustus , to speak well . he reproaches his delicacies and affectednesse , even the softnesse and debauches of his speech , and as he says , he was the first corrupter of the roman eloquence . he broached forth sayings , wch to him seemed lighter then they ought , but which he hath cut from a work whose matter and design we are ignorant of . and thereupon without telling us whether moecenas spoke in cold bloud , or whether he only had a mind to laugh , he declaims against the liberty of his style with all the sharpnesse and all the rage of his . to tell you the truth madam , i doubt there was somewhat of the philarchus , & of ill wil in the proceeding of seneca : if the pieces he makes at , were seen whole , we should see that hee distinguisheth not the two characters , and that he takes a suit once used at a mask for the robes of a senator , wch he every day wears to the councel . doubtlesse he seems not to understand raillery . he certainly is one of those testy hypomies , who would have plays as serious as affairs , and comedies as sad as funeral orations . let 's draw him back in all the occasions of moecenas . his aversion towards him is too visible and too discovered . and after having scratched at his writings , hee falls on his manners , with so much passion , that a man may easily perceive the spirit of his sect possest him , and that he had a design to appear a reformed stoick in prejudice of the honestest epicurian that ever was . i do not say , to weaken the testimony of seneca , that hee was a doctor of the court , who philosophis'd in purple , and with ease discoursed of vertue . and that even perhaps he exclaimed against voluptuousnesse , that he might wholly enjoy it , & no man envy it in him . i onely say in justification of moecenas , that its impossible the soul should give without enervating it self , and that as there is a composed and melancholy folly , there may be a free and jovial wisdom . i have heard , madam , from our learned monsieur*** ; but he said it far handsomer then i can repeat it , that there is an art of using pleasure innocently ; that this art was taught by aristippus in greece ; that since it was corrupted at rome by petronius and by tigillin , who abused it as poisoners have physick . he added that the practise of that art was not defended by the laws of your country . that on the contrary , they had created magistrates expresly to have a care of the pleasures of the people . that besides the edicts of the republick , there was under the emperors spoken of a tribune for pleasures . and that he had seen a science and a discipline of pleasure in the formularies of cassiodorus . he concluded , madam , that it was not just to accuse the purity of things for the intemperance of men , and that it is not credible that the goods of this life should have been made only for the wicked . it is not credible i am of the same opinion wth this rare soul , that god should have sent vertue into the world for the punishment of poor men , and that it is not vertue if it combat not against grief , unlesse it march on thorns , if it lodge not in an hospital , if it even inhabit not sepulchres . moecenas would expect till he was dead to take possession of so displeasing a dwelling ; and if he were alive , & had changed rome for paris , i am confident a man should oftner finde him in some place which i know , where there is nothing which contents not the eyes and the mind , then in other places which i will not name , where there is nothing opposeth them not . what a pleasure you would take to learn his history from himself ? what a glory would he receive to have som of your audiences ? how would your modest conversation touch his minde ? you could not hide your self , madam , he would discover that soveraign understanding , which you vail with all the restraint , & all the sweetnesse of your sexe . he would admire you in despight of you . we would reconcile his enemy with him at the first request you should make him , and even without a request , so confident am i of the sweetnesse and facility of his manners . the serenity of his minde would not be disturbed by the fumes and flourishes of the violent sophists . he would but laugh at the pettishnesse and paradoxes of seneca . he would tell you onely , madam , that wee must suffer all from the race of zeno , and the nation of the stoicks . that all is permitted to a philosopher , who called alexander a fool , who it s believed had a better title then the king of persia to be king of kings . and what particularly makes for our subject , who was so much an enemy of life , that hee councelled men to hang themselves when they were never so little disturbed , or in an ill humour . finis . observations concerning the original and various forms of government as described, viz. st. upon aristotles politiques. d. mr. hobbs's laviathan. d. mr. milton against salmatius. th. hugo grotius de jure bello. th. mr. hunton's treatise of monarchy, or the nature of a limited or mixed monarchy / by the learned sir r. filmer, barronet ; to which is added the power of kings ; with directions for obedience to government in dangerous and doubtful times. filmer, robert, sir, d. . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing f estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) observations concerning the original and various forms of government as described, viz. st. upon aristotles politiques. d. mr. hobbs's laviathan. d. mr. milton against salmatius. th. hugo grotius de jure bello. th. mr. hunton's treatise of monarchy, or the nature of a limited or mixed monarchy / by the learned sir r. filmer, barronet ; to which is added the power of kings ; with directions for obedience to government in dangerous and doubtful times. filmer, robert, sir, d. . [ ], , [ ], p. : port. printed for r.r.c. and are to be sold by thomas axe ..., london : . contains portrait frontispiece of charles ii. 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and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a tcp editor. the texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level of the tei in libraries guidelines. copies of the texts have been issued variously as sgml (tcp schema; ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . witchcraft. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - spi global keyed and coded from proquest page images - derek lee sampled and proofread - derek lee text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion observations concerning the original and various forms of government , as described , viz. st . upon aristotles politiques . d. mr. hobbs's laviathan . d. mr. milton against salmatius . th . hugo grotius , de jure bello . th . mr. hunton's treatise of monarchy , or the nature of a limited or mixed monarchy . by the learned sir r. filmer , barronet . to which is added the power of kings . with directions for obedience to government in dangerous and doubtful times . london : printed for r. r. c. and are to be sold by thomas axe , at the blew-ball in duc●-lane . . augustissimi caroli secundi dei gratia angliae scotiae franciae et hiberniae rex . bona agere & mala pati regium est page . . the author's preface . there is a general belief , that the parliament of england was at first an imitation of the assembly of the three estates in france : therefore , in order to prepare the vnderstanding in the recerche we have in hand , it is proper to give a brief accompt of the mode of france in those assemblies : scotland and ireland being also under the dominion of the king of england ; a touch of the manner of their parliaments shall be by way of preface . . in france , the kings writ goeth to the bailiffs , seneschals , or stewards of liberties , who issue out warrants to all such as have fees and lands within their liberties , and to all towns , requiring all such as have any complaints , to meet in the principal city , there to choose two or three delegates , in the name of that province , to be present at the general assembly . at the day appointed , they meet at the principal city of the bailiwick . the king 's writ is read , and every man called by name , and sworn to choose honest men , for the good of the king and commonwealth , to be present at the general assembly , as delegates , faithfully to deliver their grievances , and demands of the province . then they choose their delegates , and swear them . next , they consult what is necessary to be complained of , or what is to be desired of the king : and of these things they make a catalogue or index . and because every man should freely propound his complaint or demands , there is a chest placed in the town-hall , into which every man may cast his writing . after the catalogue is made and signed , it is delivered to the delegates to carry to the general assembly . all the bailiwicks are divided into twelve classes . to avoid confusion , and to the end there may not be too great delay in the assembly , by the gathering of all the votes , every classis compiles a catalogue or book of the grievances and demands of all the bailiwicks within that classis , then these classes at the assembly compose one book of the grievances and demands of the whole kingdom . this being the order of the proceedings of the third estate ; the like order is observed by the clergy and nobility . when the three books for the three estates are perfected , then they present them to the king by their presidents . first , the president for the clergy begins his oration on his knees , and the king commanding , he stands up bare-headed , and proceeds . and so the next president for the nobility doth the like . but the president for the commons begins and ends his oration on his knees . whilst the president for the clergy speaks , the rest of that order rise up , and stand bare , till they are bid by the king to sit down , and be covered , and so the like for the nobility . but whilst the president of the commons speaks , the rest are neither bidden to sit , or be covered . thus the grievances and demands being delivered , and left to the king and his council , the general assembly of the three estates endeth , atque ita totus actus concluditur . thus it appears , the general assembly was but an orderly way of presenting the publick grievances and demands of the whole kingdom , to the consideration of the king : not much unlike the antient vsage of this kingdom for a long time , when all laws were nothing else but the king's answers to the petitions presented to him in parliament , as is apparent by very many statutes , parliament-rolls , and the confession of sir edw. coke . . in scotland , about twenty days before the parliament begins , proclamation is made throughout the kingdom , to deliver in to the king's clerk , or master of the rolls , all bills to be exhibited that sessions , before a certain day : then are they brought to the king , and perused by him : and only such as he allows are put into the chancellour's hand , to be propounded in parliament , and none others : and if any man in parliament speak of another matter than is allowed by the king , the chancellor tells him , there is no such bill allowed by the king. when they have passed them for laws , they are presented to the king , who , with his scepter put into his hand by the chancellor , ratifies them , and if there be any thing the king dislikes , they raze it out before . . in ireland , the parliament , as appears by a statute made in the tenth year of hen. . c. . is to be after this manner : no parliament is to be holden but at such season as the king's lieutenant and council there , do first certifie the king , under the great seal of that land , the causes and considerations , and all such acts as they think fit should pass in the said parliament . and such causes and considerations , and acts affirmed by the king and his council to be good and expedient for that land : and his licence thereupon as well in affirmation of the said causes and acts , as to summon the parliament under his great seal of england had and obtained . that done , a parliament to be had and holden after the form and effect afore-rehearsed , and if any parliament be holden in that land contrary to the form and provision aforesaid , it is deemed void , and of none . effect in law. it is provided , that all such bills as shall be offered to the parliament there ; shall be first transmitted hither under the great seal of that kingdom , and having received allowance and approbation here , shall be put under the great seal of this kingdom , and so returned thither to be preferred to the parliament . by a statute of and of philip and mary , for the expounding of poynings act , it is ordered , for the king 's passing of the said acts in such form and tenor as they should be sent into england , or else for the change of them , or any part of them . after this shorter narrative of the vsage of parliaments in our neighbour and fellow kingdoms , it is time the inquisitio magna of our own be offered to the verdict or judgment of a moderate and intelligent reader . rob. filmer . a collection of the several tracts written by sir robert filmer , knight . i. the free-holders grand inquest , touching our soveraign lord the king , and his parliament : to which are added observations upon forms of government : together with directions for obedience to governors in dangerous and doubtful times . ii. reflections concerning the original of government , upon . aristotle's politiques . . mr. hobs's leviathan . . mr. milton against salmasius . . h. grotius de jure belli . . mr. hunton's treatise of monarchy , or the anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy . iii. a succinct examination of the fundamentals of monarchy , both in this and other kingdoms , as well about the right of power in kings , as of the original and natural liberty of the people . a question never yet disputed , though most necessary in these times . iv. the power of kings : and in particular , of the king of england . v. an advertisement to the jury-men of england , touching witches . together with a difference between an english and hebrew witch . vi. patriarcha : or the natural power of kings . the argument . a presentment of divers statutes , records , and other precedents , explaining the writs of summons to parliament : shewing , i. that the commons , by their writ , are only to perform and consent to the ordinances of parliament . ii. that the lords or common councel by their writ are only to treat , and give counsel in parliament . iii. that the king himself only ordains and makes laws , and is supreme judge in parliament . with the suffrages of hen. de bracton . jo. britton . tho. egerton . edw. coke . walter raleigh . rob. cotton . hen. spelman . jo. glanvil . will. lambard . rich. crompton . william cambden , and jo. selden . the free-holders grand inquest touching our sovereign lord the king , and his parliament . every free-holder that hath a voice in the election of knights , citizens , or burgesses for the parliament , ought to know with what power he trusts those whom he chooseth , because such trust is the foundation of the power of the house of commons . a writ from the king to the sheriff of the county , is that which gives authority and commission for the free-holders to make their election , at the next county-court-day after the receipt of the writ ; and in the writ there is also expressed the duty and power of the knights , citizens and burgesses that are there elected . the means to know what trust or authority the countrey or free-holders confer , or bestow by their election , is in this , as in other like cases , to have an eye to the words of the commission , or writ it self : thereby it may be seen whether that which the house of commons doth act be within the limit of their commission : greater or other trust than is comprised in the body of the writ , the free-holders do not , or cannot give if they obey the writ : the writ being latine , and not extant in english , few free-holders understand it , and fewer observe it ; i have rendred it in latine and english . rex vicecomiti salut ' &c. qvia de advisamento & assensu concilii nostri pro quibusdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis , nos , statum & defensionem regni nostri angliae , & ecclesiae anglicanae concernen ' , quoddam parliamentum nostrum apud civitatem nostram west . duodecimo die novembris prox ' futur ' teneri ordinavimus , & ibid ' cum praelatis , magnatibus & proceribus dicti regni nostri colloquium habere & tract ' : tibi praecipimus firmiter injungentes quod facta proclam ' in prox ' comitat ' tuo post receptionem hujus brevis nostri tenend ' die & loco praedict ' duos milit ' gladiis cinct ' magis idoneos & discretos comit ' praedicti , & de qualib ' civitate com' illius duos cives , & de quolibet burgo duos burgenses de discretior ' & magis sufficientibus libere & indifferenter per illos qui proclam ' hujusmodi interfuerint juxta formam statutorum inde edit ' & provis ' eligi , & nomina corundum milit ' , civium & burgensium , sic electorum in quibusdam indentur ' inter te & illos qui hujusmodi election ' interfuerint , inde conficiend ' sive hujusmodi electi praesentes fuerint vel absentes , inseri : cósque ad dict' diem & locum venire fac ' . ita quod iidem milites plenam & sufficientem potestatem pro se & communitate comit ' praedicti , ac dict' cives & burgenses pro se & communitat ' civitatum & burgorum praedictorum divisim ab ipsishabeant , ad faciendum & consentiendum his quae tunc ibid ' de communi consilio dicti reg . nostri ( favente deo ) contigerint ordinari super negotiis ante dictis : ita quod pro defectu potestatis hujusmodi , seu propter improvidam electionem milit ' civium aut burgensium praedictorum , dicta negotia infecta non remaneant quovismodo . nolumus autem quod tu nec aliquis alius vic' dicti reg . nostri aliqualiter sit electus . et electionem illam in pleno comitatu factam , distincte & aperte sub sigillo tuo & sigillis eorum qui electioni illi interfuerint , nobis in cancellar ' nostram ad dict' diem & locum certifices indilate , remittens nobis alteram partem indenturarum praedictarum praesentibus consut ' una cum hoc breve . teste meipso apud westmon ' . the king to the sheriff of greeting . whereas , by the advice and consent of our councel , for certain difficult and urgent businesses concerning us , the state and defence of our kingdom of england , and the english church : we have ordained a certain parliament of ours , to be held at our city of _____ the _____ day of _____ next ensuing , and there to have conference , and to treat with the prelates , great men , and peers of our said kingdom . we command and straitly enjoyn you , that making proclamation at the next county-court after the receipt of this our writ , to be holden the day , and place aforesaid : you cause two knights , girt with swords , the most fit and discreet of the county aforesaid : and of every city of that county two citizens ; of every borough , two burgesses of the discreeter and most sufficient ; to be freely , and indifferently chosen by them who shall be present at such proclamation , according to the tenor of the statutes in that case made and provided : and the names of the said knights , citizens , and burgesses so chosen , to be inserted in certain indentures to be then made between you , and those that shall be present at such election , whether the parties so elected be present , or absent : and shall make them to come at the said day , and place : so that the said knights for themselves , and for the county aforesaid ; and the said citizens , and burgesses for themselves , and the commonalty of the aforesaid cities and boroughs , may have severally from them , full and sufficient power to perform , and to consent to those things which then by the favour of god shall there happen to be ordained by the common councel of our said kingdom , concerning the businesses aforesaid : so that the business may not by any means remain undone for want of such power or by reason of the improvident election of the aforesaid knights , citizens , and burgesses . but we will not in any case you or any other sheriff of our said kingdom shall be elected ; and at the day and place aforesaid , the said election made in the full county-court , you shall certifie without delay to us in our chancery , under your seal , and the seals of them which shall be present at that election , sending back unto us the other part of the indenture aforesaid affiled to these presents , together with this writ . witness our self at westmin . by this writ we do not find that the commons are called to be any part of the common councel of the kingdom , or of the supream court of judicature , or to have any part of the legislative power , or to consult de arduis regni negotiis , of the difficult businesses of the kingdom . the writ only says , the king would have conference , and treat with the prelates , great men , and peers : but not a word of treating or conference with the commons ; the house of commons , which doth not minister an oath , nor fine , nor imprison any , but their own members ( and that but of late in some cases ) cannot properly be said to be a court at all ; much less to be a part of the supream court , or highest judicature of the kingdom . the constant custom , even to this day , for the members of the house of commons to stand bare , with their hats in their hands in the presence of the lords , while the lords sit covered at all conferences , is a visible argument , that the lords and commons are not fellow-commissioners , or fellow-counsellors of the kingdom . the duty of knights , citizens , and burgesses , mentioned in the writ , is only ad faciendum , & consentiendum , to perform and to consent to such things as should be ordained by the common councel of the kingdom ; there is not so much mentioned in the writ as a power in the commons to dissent . when a man is bound to appear in a court of justice , the words are , ad faciendum & recipiendum quod ei per curiam injungetur : which shews , that this word faciendum is used as a term in law , to signifie to give obedience : for this , we meet with a precedent even as ancient as the parliament-writ it self , and it is concerning proceedings in parliament ed. . dominus rex mandavit vicecom ' quod , &c. summon ' nicolaum de segrave , & ex parte domini regis firmiter ei injungeret , quod esset coram domino rege in proximo parl. &c. ad audiendum voluntatem ipsius domini regis , &c. et ad faciendum & recipiendum ulterius quod curia domini regis consideraret in praemissis . our lord the king commands the sheriff to summon nicholas segrave to appear before our lord the king in the next parliament , to hear the will of the lord our king himself , and to perform and receive what the kings court shall further consider of the premises . sir edw. coke , to prove the clergy hath no voice in parliament , saith , that by the words of their writ , their consent was only to such things as were ordained by the common councel of the realm . if this argument of his be good , it will deny also voices to the commons in parliament ; for in their writ are the self-same words , viz. to consent to such things as were ordained by the common councel of the kingdom . sir edw. coke concludes , that the procuratores cleri , have many times appeared in parliament , as spiritual assistants , to consider , consult , and to consent ; but never had voice there ; how they could consult and consent without voices he doth not shew : though the clergy ( as he saith ) oft appeared in parliament , yet was it only ad consentiendum , as i take it , and not ad faciendum , for the word faciendum is omitted in their writ ; the cause , as i conceive , is , the clergy , though they were to assent , yet by reason of clerical exemptions , they were not required to perform all the ordinances or acts of parliament . but some may think , though the writ doth not express a calling of the knights , citizens , and burgesses to be part of the common councel of the kingdom ; yet it supposeth it a thing granted , and not to be questioned , but that they are a part of the common councel . indeed if their writ had not mentioned the calling of prelates , great men , and peers to councel , there might have been a little better colour for such a supposition : but the truth is , such a supposition doth make the writ it self vain and idle ; for it is a senseless thing to bid men assent to that which they have already ordained : since ordaining is an assenting , and more than an assenting . for clearing the meaning and sense of the writ , and satisfaction of such as think it impossible , but that the commons of england have always been a part of the common councel of the kingdom , i shall insist upon these points : . that anciently the barons of england were the common councel of the kingdom . . that untill the time of hen. . the commons were not called to parliament . . though the commons were called by hen. . yet they were not constantly called , nor yet regularly elected by writ until hen. . time . for the first point , mr. cambden in his britannia , doth teach us , that in the time of the english saxons , and in the ensuing age , a parliament was called commune concilium , which was ( saith he ) praesentia regis , praelatorum , procerumque collectorum , the presence of the king , prelates , and peers assembled ; no mention of the commons : the prelates and peers were all barons . the author of the chronicle of the church of lichfield , cited by m. selden , saith , postquam rex edvardus , &c. concilio baronum angliae , &c. after king edward was king ; by the councel of the barons of england , he revived a law which had lain asleep three score & seven years : and this law was called the law of st. edward the king. in the same chronicle it is said , that will. the conquerour , anno regni sui quarto apud londin ' , had concilium baronum suorum , a councel of his barons . and of this parliament it is , that his son hen. . speaks , saving , i restore you the laws of king edward the confessor , with those amendments wherewith my father amended them by the councel of his barons . in the fifth year , as mr. selden thinks , of the conquerour , was a parliament , or principum conventus , an assembly of earls and barons at pinenden heath in kent , in the cause between lanfranke the arch-bishop of canterbury , and odo earl of kent . the king gave commission to godfrid , then bishop of constance in normandy , to represent his own person for hearing the controversie ( as saith m. lambard ; ) and caused egelrick the bishop of chichester , ( an aged man , singularly commended for skill in the laws and customes of the realm ) to be brought thither in a wagon for his assistance in councel : commanded haymo the sheriff of kent , to summon the whole county to give in evidence : three whole days spent in debate : in the end lanfrank and the bishop of rochester were restored to the possession of detling and other lands which odo had withholden . there is mention of a parliament held under the same king william the conquerour , wherein all the bishops of the land , earls and barons , made an ordinance touching the exemption of the abby of bury from the bishops of norwich . in the tenth year of the conquerour , episcopi , comites , & barones regni regià potestate ad universalem synodum pro causis audiendis & tractandis convocati , saith the book of westminster . in the year of william . there was a parliament de cunctis regni principibus ; another w ch had quosque regni proceres : all the peers of the kingdom . in the seventh year was a parliament at rockingham-castle in northamptonshire . episcopis , abbatibus cunctisque regni principibus una coeuntibus . a year or two after , the same king , de statu regni acturus , &c. called thither , by the command of his writ , the bishops , abbots , and all the peers of the kingdom . at the coronation of hen. . all the people of the kingdom of england were called , and laws were then made ; but it was per commune concilium baronum meorum , by the common councel of my barons . in his d. year , the peers of the kingdom were called without any mention of the commons : and another , a while after , consensu comitum & baronum , by the consent of earls and barons . florentius wigorniensis saith , these are statutes which anselme and all the other bishops in the presence of king henry , by the assent of his barons ordained : and in his tenth year , of earls and peers ; and in his . of earls and barons . in the year following , the same king held a parliament , or great councel , with his barons spiritual and temporal . king hen. . in his tenth year , had a great councel or parliament at clarendon , which was an assembly of prelates and peers . hen. . saith hovenden , was a great councel at nottingham , and by the common councel of the arch-bishops , bishops , earls and barons , the kingdom was divided into six parts . and again , hovenden saith , that the same king at windsor ( apud windeshores ) communi concilio of bishops , earls , and barons , divided england into four parts . and in his year a parliament at windsor of bishops , earls , and barons . and another of like persons at northampton . king richard . had a parliament at nottingham , in his fifth year , of bishops , earls , and barons : this parliament lasted but four days , yet much was done in it : the first day the king disseiseth gerard de canvil of the sherifwick of lincoln , and hugh bardolph of the castle and sherifwick of york . the second day he required judgment against his brother john , who was afterwards king : and hugh de novant bishop of coventry . the third day was granted to the king of every plow-land in england s. he required also the third part of the service of every knights fee for his attendance into normandy , and all the wool that year of the monks cisteaux , which , for that it was grievous and unsupportable , they sine for money . the last day was for hearing of grievances : and so the parliament brake up ; and the same year held another at northampton of the nobles of the realm . king john , in his fifth year , he and his great men met , rex & magnates convenerunt : and the roll of that year hath commune concilium baronum meorum , the common councel of my barons at winchester . in the sixth year of king henry . the nobles granted to the king , of every knights fee , two marks in silver . in the seventh year he had a parliament at london , an assembly of barons . in his thirteenth year an assembly of the lords at westminster . in his fifteenth year , of nobles , both spiritual and temporal . m. par. saith , that h. . congregati sunt magnates ad colloquium de negotiis regni tractaturi , the great men were called to confer and treat of the business of the kingdom . and at merton , our lord the king granted , by the consent of his great men , that hereafter vsury should not run against a ward from the death of his ancestor . hen. . the king sent his royal writs , commanding all belonging to his kingdom , that is to say , arch-bishops , bishops , abbots , and priors installed , earls and barons , that they should all meet at london , to treat of the king's business touching the whole kingdom : and at the day prefixed , the whole multitude of the nobles of the kingdom met at london , saith matt. westminster . in his year , at the request , and by the councel of the lords , the charters were confirmed . hen. . at winchester , the king sent his royal writs to arch-bishops , bishops , priors , earls and barons , to treat of business concerning the whole kingdom . hen. . the king commanded all the nobility of the whole kingdom to be called to treat of the state of his kingdom . matt. westm ' . hen. . the king had a treaty at oxford with the peers of the kingdom . matt. westminster . at a parliament at marlborough . hen. . statutes were made by the assent of earls and barons . here the place of bracton , chief justice in this kings time , is worth the observing ; and the rather for that it is much insisted on of late , to make for parliaments being above the king. the words in bracton are , the king hath a superiour , god ; also the law by which he is made king ; also his court , viz. the earls and barons . the court that was said in those days to be above the king , was a court of earls and barons , not a word of the commons , or the representative body of the kingdom being any part of the superiour court. now for the true sense of bractons words , how the law , and the court of earls and barons , are the kings superiours ; they must of necessity be understood to be superiours , so far only as to advise , and direct the king out of his own grace and good will only : which appears plainly by the words of bracton himself , where , speaking of the king , he resolves thus , nec potest ei necessitatem aliquis imponere quod injuriam suam corrigat & emendat , cum superiorem non habeat nisi deum ; & satis ei erat ad poenam , quod dominum expectat ultorem . nor can any man put a necessity upon him to correct and amend his injury unless he will himself , since he hath no superiour but god ; it will be sufficient punishment for him , to expect the lord an avenger . here the same man , who speaking according to some mens opinion , saith , the law and court of earls and barons are superiour to the king ; in this place tells us himself , the king hath no superiour but god : the difference is easily reconciled ; according to the distinction of the school-men , the king is free from the coactive power of laws or counsellors : but may be subject to their directive power , according to his own will : that is , god can only compel , but the law and his courts may advise him. rot. parliament . hen. . nu . . the commons expresly affirm , judgment in parliament belongs to the king and lords . these precedents shew , that from the conquest until a great part of henry the third's reign ( in whose days it is thought the writ for election of knights was framed ) which is about two hundred years , and above a third part of the time since the conquest , to our days , the barons made the parliament or common councel of the kingdom ; under the name of barons , not only the earls , but the bishops also were comprehended , for the conquerour made the bishops barons . therefore it is no such great wonder , that in the writ we find the lords only to be the counsellors , and the commons called only to perform and consent to the ordinances . those there be who seem to believe , that under the word barons anciently the lords of court-barons were comprehended , and that they were called to parliament as barons ; but if this could be proved to have been at any time true , yet those lords of court-barons were not the representative body of the commons of england , except it can be also proved , that the commons , or free-holders of the kingdom , chose such lords of court-barons to be present in parliament . the lords of manors came not at first by election of the people , as sir edw. coke , treating of the institution of court-barons , resolves us in these words : by the laws and ordinances of ancient kings , and especially of king alfred , it appeareth , that the first kings of this realm had all the lands of england in demean ; and les grand manors and royalties they reserved to themselves , and of the remnant they , for the defence of the realm , enfeoffed the barons of the realm with such jurisdiction as the court-baron now hath . coke's institutes , first part , fol. . here , by the way , i cannot but note , that if the first kings had all the lands of england in demean , as sir edw. coke saith they had ; and if the first kings were chosen by the people ( as many think they were ) then surely our fore-fathers were a very bountiful ( if not a prodigal ) people , to give all the lands of the whole kingdom to their kings , with liberty for them to keep what they pleased , and to give the remainder to their subjects , clogg'd and encumbred with a condition to defend the realm : this is but an ill sign of a limited monarchy by original constitution or contract . but , to conclude the former point , sir edward coke's opinion is , that in the ancient laws , under the name of barons , were comprised all the nobility . this doctrine of the barons being the common councel doth displease many , and is denied , as tending to the disparagement of the commons , and to the discredit and confutation of their opinion , who teach , that the commons are assigned councellors to the king by the people ; therefore i will call in mr. pryn to help us with his testimony : he in his book of treachery & disloyalty , &c. proves , that before the conquest , by the laws of edward the confessor , cap. . the king by his oaths was to do justice by the councel of the nobles of his realm . he also resolves , that the earls and barons in parliament are above the king , and ought to bridle him , when he exorbitates from the laws . he further tells us , the peers & prelates have oft translated the crown from the right heir , . electing and crowning edward , who was illegitimate ; and putting by ethelred , the right heir , after edgars decease . . electing and crowning canutus , a meer foreigner , in opposition to edmund , the right heir to king ethelred . . harold and hardiknute , both elected kings successively without title ; edmund and alfred the right heirs being dispossessed . . the english nobility , upon the death of harold , enacted , that none of the danish bloud should any more reign over them . . edgar etheling , who had best title , was rejected ; and harold elected and crowned king. . in the second and third year of edw. . the peers and nobles of the land , seeing themselves contemned , entreated the king to manage the affairs of the kingdom by the councel of his barons . he gave his assent , and sware to ratifie what the nobles ordained ; and one of their articles was , that he would thenceforward order all the affairs of the kingdom by the councel of his clergy and lords . . william rufus , finding the greatest part of the nobles against him , sware to lanfranke , that if they would choose him for king , he would abrogate their over-hard laws . . the beginning , saith mr. pryn , of the charter of hen. . is observable ; henry by the grace of god , of england , &c. know ye , that by the mercy of god and common councel of the barons of the kingdom , i am crowned king. . maud the empress , the right heir , was put-by the crown , by the prelates and barons , and stephen earl of mortain , who had no good title , assembling the bishop and peers , promising the amendment of the laws according to all their pleasures and liking , was by them all proclaimed king. lewis of france crowned king by the barons , instead of king john. all these testimonies from mr. pryn may satisfie , that anciently the barons were the common councel , or parliament of england . and if mr. pryn could have found so much antiquity , and proof for the knights , citizens , and burgesses , being of the common councel : i make no doubt but we should have heard from him in capital characters ; but alas ! he meets not with so much as these names in those elder ages . he dares not say , the barons were assigned by the people , councellors to the king ; for he tells us , every baron in parliament doth represent his own person , and speaketh in behalf of himself alone ; but in the knights , citizens , and burgesses , are represented the commons of the whole realm : therefore every one of the commons hath a greater voice in parliament than the greatest earl in england . nevertheless master pryn will be very well content if we will admit and swallow these parliaments of barons , for the representative body of the kingdom ; and to that purpose he cites them , or to no purpose at all . but to prove the treachery and disloyalty of popish parliaments , prelates , and peers , to their kings : which is the main point , that master pryn , by the title of his book is to make good , and to prove . as to the second point ; which is , that until the time of hen. . the commons were not called to parliament : besides , the general silence of antiquity which never makes mention of the commons coming to parliament until that time ; our histories say , before his time only certain of the nobility were called to consultation about the most important affairs of the state : he caused the commons also to be assembled by knights , citizens , and burgesses of their own appointment : much to the same purpose writes sir walter raleigh , saying , it is held that the kings of england had no formal parliaments till about the th year of king hen. . for in his third year , for the marriage of his daughter , the king raised a tax upon every hide of land , by the advice of his privy councel alone . and the subjects ( saith he ) soon after this parliament was established , began to stand upon terms with their king , and drew from him by strong hand , and their swords , their great charter ; it was after the establishment of the parliament , by colour of it , that they had so great daring . if any desire to know the cause why hen. . called the people to parliament , it was upon no very good occasion , if we believe sir walter raleigh ; the grand charter ( saith he ) was not originally granted regally and freely , for king hen. . did but usurp the kingdom , and therefore the better to secure himself against robert his elder brother , he flattered the people with those charters : yea , king john that confirmed them , had the like respect : for arthur d. of britain was the undoubted heir of the crown , upon whom john usurped : so these charters had their original from kings , de facto , but not de jure : and then afterwards his conclusion is , that the great charter had first an obscure birth by vsurpation , & was fostered , and shewed to the world by rebellion : in brief , the king called the people to parliament , and granted them magna charta , that they might confirm to him the crown . the third point consists of two parts ; first , that the commons were not called to parliament until hen. . days , this appears by divers of the precedents formerly cited , to prove that the barons were the common councel . for though hen. . called all the people of the land to his coronation , and again in the . or . year of his reign ; yet always he did not so ; neither many of those kings that did succeed him , as appeareth before . secondly , for calling the commons by writ , i find it acknowledged in a book , intituled , the privilege and practice of parliaments , in these words ; in ancient times , after the king had summoned his parliament , innumerable multitudes of people did make their access thereunto , pretending that privilege of right to belong to them . but king hen. . having experience of the mischief , and inconveniences by occasion of such popular confusion , did take order that none might come to his parliament but those who were specially summoned . to this purpose it is observed by master selden , that the first writs we find accompanied with other circumstances of a summons to parliament , as well for the commons as lords , is in the of hen. . in the like manner master cambden speaking of the dignity of barons , hath these words : king hen. . out of a great multitude which were seditious and turbulent , called the very best by writ or summons to parliament ; for he , after many troubles and vexations between the king himself , and simon de monefort , with other barons ; and after appeased : did decree and ordain , that all those earls and barons unto whom the king himself vouchsafed to direct his writs of summons should come to his parliament , and no others : but that which he began a little before his death , edward . and his successors constantly observed and continued . the said prudent king edward summoned always those of ancient families , that were most wise , to his parliament ; and omitted their sons after their death , if they were not answerable to their parents in vnderstanding . also mr. cambden in another place saith , that in the time of edw . select men for wisdom and worth among the gentry were called to parliament , and their posterity omitted , if they were defective therein . as the power of sending writs of summons for elections , was first exercised by hen. . so succeeding kings did regulate the elections upon such writs , as doth appear by several statutes , which all speak in the name and power of the kings themselves ; for such was the language of our fore-fathers . in ric. . c. . these be the words , the king willeth and commandeth all persons which shall have summons to come to parliament : and every person that doth absent himself ( except he may reasonably and honestly excuse him to our lord the king ) shall be amerced , and otherwise punished . hen. . c. . our lord the king , at the grievous complaint of his commons , of the undue election of the knights of counties , sometimes made of affection of sheriffs , and otherwise against the form of the writs , to the great slander of the counties , &c. our lord the king , willing therein to provide remedy , by the assent of the lords and commons , hath ordained , that election shall be made in the full county-court , and that all that be there present , as well-suitors as others , shall proceed to the election freely , notwithstanding any request , or command to the contrary . hen. . c. . our lord the king ordained , that a sheriff that maketh an undue return , &c. shall incur the penalty of a l. to be paid to our lord the king. h. . c. . our lord the king , by the advice and assent of the lords , and the special instance and request of the commons , ordained , that the knights of the shire be not chosen , unless they be resiant within the shire the day of the date of the writ : and that citizens and burgesses be resiant , dwelling , and free in the same cities and burroughs , and no others , in any wise . hen. . c. . our lord the king , willing to provide remedy for knights chosen for parliament , and sheriffs , hath ordained , that they shall have their answer , and traverse to inquest of office found against them . hen. . c. . where as elections of knights have been made by great out-rages , and excessive number of people , of which most part was of people of no value , whereof every of them pretend a voice equivalent to wortby knights and esquires , whereby man-slaughters , riots , and divisions among gentlemen shall likely be : our lord the king hath ordained , that knights of shires be chosen by people dwelling in the counties , every of them having lands or tenements to the value of l. the year at the least , and that he that shall be chosen , shall be dwelling and resiant within the counties . h. . our lord the king ordained , that knights be chosen by people dwelling , and having l. by the year within the same county . h. . c. . the king , willing to provide for the ease of them that come to the parliaments and councels of the king by his commandment , hath ordained , that if any assault or fray be made on them that come to parliament , or other councel of the king ; the party which made any such affray or assault , shall pay double damages , and make fine and ransom at the kings will. h. . c. . the king , considering the statutes of h. . c. . & hen. . c. . and the defaults of sheriffs in returning knights , citizens , and burgesses , ordained ; . that the said statutes should be duly kept . . that the sheriffs shall deliver precepts to mayors and bailiffs to chuse citizens and burgesses . . the penalty of l. for a sheriff making an untrue return concerning the election of knights , citizens and burgesses . . the penalty of l. for mayors or bailiffs , making untrue returns . . due election of knights must be in the full county-court , between the hours of eight and eleven before noon . . the party must begin his suit within moneths after the parliament began . . knights of the shire shall be notable knights of the county , or such notable esquires , or gentlemen born , of the said counties , as shall be able to be knights , and no man to be such knight which standeth in the degree of a yeoman , and under . the last thing i observe in the writ for election of members for parliament , is , that by the express words of the writ , citizens and burgesses for the parliament were eligible at the county-court , as well as knights of the shire ; and that not only freeholders , but all others , whosoever were present at the county-court , had voices in such elections : see the stat. hen. . cap. . i have the longer insisted on the examination of the writ , being the power & actions of the house of commons are principally justified by the trust which the free-holders commit unto them by virtue of this writ . i would not be understood to determine what power the house of commons doth ; or may exercise if the king please : i confine my self only to the power in the writ . i am not ignorant that king hen. . in the cause of the duke of britain , and king james in the business of the palatinate , asked the councel of the house of commons ; and not only the house of commons , but every subject in particular by duty and allegiance , is bound to give his best advice to his sovereign , when he is thought worthy to have his councel asked . edw. . nu . . all the merchants of england were summoned by writ to appear at westminster , in proper person , to confer upon great business concerning the king's honour , the salvation of the realm , and of themselves . in passages of publick councel it is observable ( saith sir rob. cotton ) that in ancient times the kings of england , did entertain the commons with weighty causes , thereby to apt and bind them to a readiness of charge ; and the commons to shun expence have warily avoided to give advice . edw. . the lords and commons were called to consult how the domestick quiet may be preserved , the marches of scotland defended , and the sea secured from enemies . the peers and commons having apart consulted , the commons desired not to be charged to councel of things of which they had no cognisance ; de queux ils n' ont pas de cognisance . edw. . justice thorp declaring to the peers and commons , that the french war began by their advice ; the truce after by their assent accepted , and now ended : the kings pleasure was , to have their counsel in the prosecution : the commons , being commanded to assemble themselves , and when they were agreed , to give notice to the king , and the lords of the councel ; after four days consultation , humbly desire of the king that he would be advised therein by the lords and others of more experience than themselves in such affairs . ric. . the parliament was called to consult whether the king should go in person to rescue gaunt , or send an army . the commons , after two days debate , crave a conference with the lords , and sir thomas puckering ( their speaker ) protests , that councels for war did aptly belong to the king and his lords ; yet since the commons were commanded to give their advice , they humbly wished a voyage by the king. ric. . at the second session , the commons are willed to advise upon view of articles of peace with the french ; whether war or such amity should be accepted ; they modestly excuse themselves , as too weak to counsel in so weighty causes . but charged again , as they did tender their honour and the right of the king ; they make their answer , giving their opinions , rather for peace than war. for fuller manifestation of what hath been said touching the calling , election , and power of the commons in parliament , it is behooveful to observe some points delivered by sir edw. coke in his treatise of the jurisdiction of parliaments ; where , first , he fairly begins , and lays his foundation , that the high court of parliament consisteth of the kings majesty sitting there , and of the three estates ; . the lords spiritual . . the lords temporal . . and the commons . hence it is to be gathered , that truly and properly it cannot be called the high court of parliament , but whilst the king is sitting there in person : so that the question now a-days , whether the parliament be above the king , is either false or idle : false , if you exclude , and idle if you include the king's person in the word parliament : the case truly put , and as it is meant , is , whether the three estates , ( or , which is all one , the lords and commons ) assembled in parliament be above the king : and not whether the king with the three estates be above the king : it appears also that they are much mistaken , who reckon the king one of the three estates , as mr. pryn , pag. . and many others do ; for the three estates make the body , and the king is caput , principium , & finis parliamentor ' , as confesseth sir edw. coke . secondly , sir edw. coke delivers , that certain it is , both houses at first sate togther , and that it appears in edward the third's time , the lords and commons sate together , and the commons had no continual speaker . if he mean , the lords and commons did sit , and vote together in one body , few there be that will believe it ; because the commons never were wont to lose , or forego any of their liberties , or privileges ; and for them to stand now with their hats in their hands ( which is no magistratical posture ) there , where they were wont to sit and vote , is an alteration not imaginable to be endured by the commons . it may be , in former times , when the commons had no constant speaker , they were oft , and perhaps for the most part , in the same chamber , and in the presence of the lords , to hear the debates and consultations of the great councel , but not to sit and vote with them : for when the commons were to advise among themselves , the chapter-house of the abby of westminster was oft-times their place to meet in , before they had a setled house , and their meetings not being very frequent , may be the reason , i conceive , why the name of the house of commons is not of such great antiquity , or taken notice of ; but the house of lords was only called the parliament-house : and the treatise called , modus tenendi parliamentum , speaks of the parliament as but of one house only . the house , where now the commons sit in westminster , is but of late use , or institution : for in edward the sixth's days it was a chappel of the colledge of st. stephen , and had a dean , secular canons , and chorists , who were the kings quire at his palace at westminster , and at the dissolution were translated to the kings chappel at white-hall . also i read , that westminster-hall being out of repair , ric. . caused a large house to be builded betwixt the clock-tower and the gate of the great old hall in the midst of the palace court : the house was long and large , made of timber , covered with tiles , open on both sides , that all might see and hear what was both said and done : four thousand archers of cheshire , which were the kings own guard , attended on that house , and had bouche a court , and d. by the day . thirdly , he saith , the commons are to chuse their speaker , but seeing after their choice the king may refuse him , the vse is ( as in the conge d' eslire of a bishop ) that the king doth name a discreet , learned man , whom the commons elect : when the commons have chosen , the king may allow of his excuse , and disallow him , as sir john popham was , ( saith his margin . ) fourthly , he informs us , that the first day of the parliament four justices assistants , and two civilians , ( masters of the chancery ) are appointed receivers of petitions , which are to be delivered within six days following : and six of the nobility , and two bishops , calling to them the kings learned councel , when need should be , to be tryers of the said petitions , whether they were reasonable , good , and necessary to be offered and propounded to the lords . he doth not say , that any of the commons were either receivers , or tryers of petitions : nor that the petitions were to be propounded to them , but to the lords . fifthly , he teacheth us , that a knight , citizen , or burgess , cannot make a proxy , because he is elected , and trusted by multitudes of people : here a question may be , whether a committee , if it be trusted to act any thing , be not a proxy ? since he saith , the high power of parliament to be committed to a few , is holden to be against the dignity of parliaments ; and that no such commission ought to be granted . sixthly , he saith , the king cannot take notice of any thing said , or done in the house of commons , but by the report of the house . surely , if the commons sate with the lords , and the king were present , he might take notice of what was done in his presence . and i read in vowel , that the old vsage was , that all the degrees of parliament sate together , and every man that had there to speak , did it openly , before the king and his whole parliament . in the eliz. there was a report , that the commons were against the subsidies , which was told the queen : whereupon , sir henry knivet said , it should be a thing answerable at the bar for any man to report any thing of speeches , or matters done in the house . sir john woolley liked the motion of secrecy ; except only the queen , from whom , he said , there is no reason to keep any thing : and sir robert cecil did allow , that the councel of the house should be secretly kept , and nothing reported in malam partem . but , if the meaning be , that they might not report any thing done here to the queen , he was altogether against it . seventhly , he voucheth an inditement or information in the kings bench against of the commons , for departing without licence from parliament , contrary to the kings inhibition : whereof six submitted to their fines , and edmund ployden pleaded , he remained continually from the beginning to the end of the parliament : note , he did not plead to the jurisdiction of the court of kings bench , but pleaded his constant attendance in parliament , which was an acknowledgment , and submitting to the jurisdiction of that court : and had been an unpardonable betraying of the privileges of parliament by so learned a lawyer , if his case ought only to be tryed in parliament . eighthly , he resolves , that the house of lords in their house have power of judicature , and the commons in their house : and both houses together . he brings records to prove the power of judicature of both houses together , but not of either of them by it self . he cites the edw. . for the judicature of both houses together : where nicholas de segrave was adjudged per praelatos , comites , & barones , & alios de concilio , by the prelates , earls and barons , and others of the councel . here is no mention of the judgment of the commons . others of the councel , may mean , the kings privy councel , or his councel learned in the laws , which are called by their writs to give counsel ; but so are not the commons . the judgment it self saith , nicholas de segrave confessed his fault in parliament , and submitted himself to the kings will : thereupon the king , willing to have the advice of the earls , barons , great men , and others of his councel , enjoyned them by the homage , fealty , and allegiance which they owed , that they should faithfully counsel him what punishment should be inflicted for such a fact : who all , advising diligently , say , that such a fact deserves loss of life and members . thus the lords ( we see ) did but advise the king what judgment to give against him that deserted the kings camp , to fight a duel in france . ninthly , he saith , of later times , see divers notable judgments at the prosecution of the commons , by the lords : where the commons were prosecutors , they were no judges , but ( as he terms them ) general inquisitors , or the grand inquest of the kingdom . the judgments he cites are but in king james his days , and no elder . tenthly , also he tells us , of the judicature in the house of commons alone ; his most ancient precedent is but in queen elizabeths reign , of one tho. long , who gave the mayor of westbury l. to be elected burgess . eleventhly , he hath a section , entitled , the house of commons ( to many purposes ) a distinct court : and saith , not a , the house of commons to many purposes , a distinct court : of those many purposes he tells but one , that is , it uses to adjourn it self . commissioners that be but to examine witnesses , may adjourn themselves , yet are no court. twelfthly , he handles the privileges of parliament , where the great wonder is , that this great master of the law , who hath been oft a parliament-man , could find no other , nor more privileges of parliament but one , and that is , freedom from arrests : which , he saith , holds , unless in three cases , treason , felony , and the peace . and for this freedom from arrests , he cites ancient precedents for all those in the house of lords , but he brings not one precedent at all for the commons freedom from arrests . it is behooveful for a free-holder to consider what power is in the house of peers ; for although the free-holder have no voice in the election of the lords , yet if the power of that house extend to make ordinances that bind the free-holders , it is necessary for him to enquire what and whence that power is , and how far it reacheth : the chief writ of summons to the peers was in these words , carolus dei gratia , &c. reverendissimo in christo patri g. eadem gratia archiepiscopo cantuariensi totius angliae primati & metropolitano , salutem . quia de advisamento & assensu concilii nostri , pro quibusdam arduis & urgentibus negotiis , nos & statum & defensionem regni nostri angliae , & ecclesiae anglicanae concernentibus , quoddam parliamentum nostrum apud w. &c. teneri ordinavimus , & ibidem vobiscum , & cum caeteris praelatis , magnatibus & proceribus dicti regni nostri angliae colloquium habere , & tractatum : vobis in fide , & dilectione quibus nobis tenemini firmiter injungendo mandamus , quod consideratis dictorum negotiorum ardititate , & periculis imminentibus , cessante quacunque excusatione dictis die & loco personaliter intersitis . nobiscum & cum caeteris praelatis , magnatibus , & proceribus praedictis , super dictis negotiis tractaturi , vestrumque concilium impensuri , & hoc sicut nos & honorem nostrum ac salvationem regni praedicti , ac ecclesiae sanctae , expeditionemque dictorum negotiorum diligitis , nullatenus omittatis ; praemonentes decanum & capitulum ecclesiae vestrae cantuariensis , ac archidiaconos , totumque clerum vestrae diocesis , quod idem decanus & archidiaconi in propriis personis suis , ac dictum capitulum per unum , idemque clerus per duos procuratores idoneos , plenam & sufficientem potestatem ab ipsis capitulo & clero habentes , praedictis die & loco personaliter intersint , ad consentiendum hiis quae tunc ibidem de commune concilio ipsius regni nostri , divina favente clementia , contigerint ordinari . teste meipso apud westm ' , &c. charles by the grace of god , &c. to the most reverend father in christ w. by the same grace arch-bishop of canterbury , primate and metropolitan of all england , health . whereas by the advice and assent of our councel , for certain difficult and urgent businesses concerning us , the state , and defence of our kingdom of england , and of the english church : we have ordained a certain parliament of ours to be holden at w. &c. and there to have conference , and to treat with you the prelates , great men , and peers of our said kingdom . we straitly charge and command , by the faith and love by which you are bound to us , that considering the difficulties of the businesses aforesaid , and the imminent dangers , and setting aside all excuses , you be personally present at the day and place aforesaid , to treat and give your counsel concerning the said businesses : and this , as you love us and our honour , and the safe-guard of the foresaid kingdom and church , and the expedition of the said businesses , you must no way omit . forewarning the dean and chapter of your church of canterbury , and the arch-deacons , and all the clergy of your diocese , that the same dean , and the arch-deacon in their proper persons , and the said chapter by one , and the said clergy by two fit proctors , having full and sufficient power from them the chapter and clergy , be personally present at the foresaid day and place , to consent to those things , which then and there shall happen by the favour of god , to be ordained by the common councel of our kingdom . witness our self at westm ' . the same form of writ , mutatis mutandis , concluding with , you must no way omit . witness , &c. is to the temporal barons : but whereas the spiritual barons are required by the faith and love ; the temporal are required by their allegiance or homage . the difference between the two writs is , that the lords are to treat and to give counsel ; the commons are to perform and consent to what is ordained . by this writ the lords have a deliberative or a consultive power to treat , and give counsel in difficult businesses : and so likewise have the judges , barons of the exchequer , the kings councel , and the masters of the chancery , by their writs . but over and besides this power , the lords do exercise a decisive or judicial power , which is not mentioned or found in their writ . for the better understanding of these two different powers , we must carefully note the distinction between a judge and a counsellor in a monarchy : the ordinary duty , or office of a judge is to give judgment , and to command in the place of the king ; but the ordinary duty of a counsellor is to advise the king what he himself shall do , or cause to be done : the judge represents the kings person in his absence , the counsellor in the kings presence gives his advice : judges by their commission or institution are limited their charge and power , and in such things they may judge , and cause their judgments to be put in execution : but counsellors have no power to command their consultations to be executed , for that were to take away the sovereignty from their prince , who by his wisdom is to weigh the advice of his councel , and at liberty to resolve according to the judgment of the wiser part of his councel , and not always of the greater : in a word , regularly a councellor hath no power but in the kings presence , and a judge no power but out of his presence ; these two powers thus distinguished , have yet such correspondency , and there is so near affinity between the acts of judging and counselling ; that although the ordinary power of the judg is to give judgment : yet by their oath they are bound in causes extraordinary , when the king pleaseth to call them , to be his counsellors ; and on the other side , although the proper work of a counsellor be only to make report of his advice to his sovereign , yet many times for the ease only , and by the permission of the king , councellors are allowed to judge and command in points wherein ordinarily they know the mind of the prince ; and what they do is the act of the royal power it self : for the councel is always presupposed to be united to the person of the king , and therefore the decrees of the councel are styled , by the king in his privy councel . to apply this distinction to the house of peers : whe find originally they are called as counsellors to the king , and so have only a deliberative power specified in their writ , and therefore the lords do only then properly perform the duty for which they are called , when they are in the king's presence , that he may have conference and treat with them : the very words of the writ are , nobiscum ac cum praelatis , magnatibus & proceribus praedictis super dictis negotiis tractaturi vestrumque concilium impensuri , with us and with the prelates , great men and peers , to treat and give your councel : the word nobiscum implieth plainly the king's presence . it is a thing in reason most absurd , to make the king assent to the judgments in parliament , and allow him no part in the consultation ; this were to make the king a subject . councel loseth the name of counsel , and becomes a command , if it put a necessity upon the king to follow it : such imperious councels , make those that are but counsellors in name to be kings in fact : and kings themselves to be but subjects . we read in sir robert cotton , that towards the end of the saxons , and the first times of the norman kings , parliaments stood in custom-grace fixed to easter , whitsuntide , and christmas ; and that at the kings court , or palace , parliaments sate in the presence , or privy chamber : from whence he infers an improbability to believe the king excluded his own presence ; and unmannerly for guests to bar him their company who gave them their entertainment . and although now a-days the parliament sit not in the court where the kings houshold remains , yet still even to this day , to shew that parliaments are the kings guests , the lord steward of the kings houshold keeps a standing table to entertain the peers during the sitting of parliament ; and he alone , or some from , or under him , as the treasurer , or comptroller of the kings houshold takes the oaths of the members of the house of commons the first day of the parliament . sir richard scroop steward of the houshold of our sovereign lord the king , by the commandment of the lords sitting in full parliament in the great chamber , put j. lord gomeniz and william weston to answer severally to accusations brought against them . the necessity of the king's presence in parliament , appears by the desire of parliaments themselves in former times ; and the practice of it sir robert cotton proves by several precedents : whence he concludes , that in the consultations of state , and decisions of private plaints , it is clear from all times , the king was not only present to advise , but to determine also . whensoever the king is present , all power of judging , which is derived from his , ceaseth : the votes of the lords may serve for matter of advice , the final judgment is only the kings . indeed , of late years , queen mary and queen elizabeth , by reason of their sex , being not so fit for publick assemblies , have brought them out of use , by which means it is come to pass , that many things which were in former times acted by kings themselves , have of late been left to the judgment of the peers ; who , in quality of judges extraordinary , are permitted for the ease of the king , and in his absence , to determine such matters as are properly brought before the king himself sitting in person , attended with his great councel of prelates and peers . and the ordinances that are made there , receive their establishment either from the kings presence in parliament , where his chair of state is commonly placed ; or at least from the confirmation of him , who in all courts , and in all causes is supreme judge . all judgment is by , or under him ; it cannot be without , much less against his approbation . the king only and none but he , if he were able , should judge all causes ; saith bracton , that ancient chief justice in hen. . time . an ancient precedent i meet with cited by master selden , of a judicious proceeding in a criminal cause of the barons before the conquest , wherein i observe the kings will was , that the lords should be judges , in the cause wherein himself was a party ; and he ratified their proceeding : the case was thus , earl godwin having had a trial before the lords under king hardicanute , touching the death of alfred ( son to king ethelbert , and brother to him who was afterward edward the confessor ) had fled out of england ; and upon his return , with hope of edward the confessor's favour , he solicited the lords to intercede for him with the king ; who ( consulting together ) brought godwin with them before the king to obtain his grace and favour : but the king presently , as soon as he beheld him , said , thou traytor godwin , i do appeal thee of the death of my brother alfred whom thou hast most trayterously slain ; then godwin excusing it , answered , my lord the king , may it please your grace , i neither betrayed nor killed your brother , whereof i put my self upon the judgment of your court : then the king said , you noble lords , earls , and barons of the land , who are my liege men now gathered here together , and have heard my appeal , and godwin's answer , i will that in this appeal between us , ye decree right judgment , and do true justice . the earls and barons treating of this among themselves were of differing judgments ; some said , that godwin was never bound to the king , either by homage , service , or fealty , and therefore could not be his traytor , and that he had not slain alfred with his own hands : others said , that neither earl nor baron , nor any other subject of the king , could wage his war by law against the king in his appeal ; but must wholly put himself into the king's mercy , and offer competent amends . then leofric consul of chester , a good man before god and the world , said , earl godwin , next to the king , is a man of the best parentage of all england , and he cannot deny , but that by his counsel alfred the king's brother was slain , therefore for my part i consider , that he and his son , and all we twelve earls who are his friends and kinsmen , do go humbly before the king , laden with so much gold and silver as each of us can carry in our arms , offering him that for his offence , and humbly praying for pardon ; and he will pardon the earl , and taking his homage and fealty , will restore him all his lands . all they in this form lading themselves with treasure , and coming to the king , did shew the manner and order of their consideration , to which , the king not willing to contradict , did ratifie all that they had judged . hen. . in lent there was an assembly of all the spiritual and temporal barons at westminster , for the determination of that great contention between alfonso king of castile , and sancho king of navarre , touching divers castles and territories in spain , which was by comprise submitted to the judgment of the king of england . and the king , consulting with his bishops , earls , and barons determined it ( as he saith ) himself in the first person , in the exemplification of the judgment . . of king john also , that great controversie touching the barony that william of moubray claimed against william of stutvil , which had depended from the time of king hen. . was ended by the council of the kingdom , and will of the king : concilio regni , & voluntate regis . the lords in parliament adjudge william de weston to death for surrendring barwick castle , but for that our lord the king was not informed of the manner of the judgment , the constable of the tower , allen bruxal , was commanded safely to keep the said william until he had other commandment from our lord the king. ric. . also the lords adjudged john lord of gomentz for surrendring the towns and castles of ardee : and for that he was a gentleman and bannaret , and had served the late king , he should be beheaded , and for that our lord the king was not informed of the manner of the judgment , the execution thereof shall be respited until our lord the king shall be informed . it is commanded to the constable of the tower , safely to keep the said john , until he hath other commandment from our lord the king. in the case of hen. spencer bishop of norwich , ric. . who was accused for complying with the french , and other failings ; the bishop complained , what was done against him , did not pass by the assent and knowledge of the peers ; whereupon it was said in parliament , that the cognisance and punishment of his offence did , of common right , and ancient custom of the realm of england , solely and wholly belong to our lord the king , and no other : le cognisance & punissement de commune droit & auntienne custome de royalme de engleterre , seul & per tout apperteine au roy nostre seignieur , & a nul autre . in the case of the lord de la ware , the judgment of the lords was , that he should have place next after the lord willoughby of erisby , by consent of all , except the lord windsor : and the lord keeper was required to acquaint her majesty with the determination of the peers , and to know her pleasure concerning the same . the inference from these precedents , is , that the decisive or judicial power exercised in the chamber of peers , is meerly derivative , and subservient to the supreme power , which resides in the king , and is grounded solely upon his grace and favour ; for howsoever the house of commons do alledge their power to be founded on the principles of nature , in that they are the representative body of the kingdom ( as they say ) and so being the whole , may take care , and have power by nature to preserve themselves : yet the house of peers do not , nor cannot make any such the least pretence , since there is no reason in nature , why amongst a company of men who are all equal , some few should be picked out to be exalted above their fellows , and have power to govern those who by nature are their companions . the difference between a peer and a commoner , is not by nature , but by the grace of the prince : who creates honours , and makes those honours to be hereditary ( whereas he might have given them for life only , or during pleasure , or good behaviour ) and also annexeth to those honours the power of having votes in parliament , as hereditary counsellors , furnished with ampler privileges than the commons : all these graces conferred upon the peers , are so far from being derived from the law of nature , that they are contradictory and destructive of that natural equality and freedom of mankind , which many conceive to be the foundation of the privileges and liberties of the house of commons ; there is so strong an opposition between the liberties of grace and nature , that it had never been possible for the two houses of parliament to have stood together without mortal enmity , and eternal jarring , had they been raised upon such opposite foundations : but the truth is , the liberties and privileges of both houses have but one , and the self-same foundation , which is nothing else but the meer and sole grace of kings . thus much may serve to shew the nature and original of the deliberative and decisive power of the peers of the kingdom . the matter about which the deliberative power is conversant , is generally the consulting and advising upon any urgent business which concerns the king , or defence of the kingdom : and more especially sometimes in preparing new laws ; and this power is grounded upon the writ . the decisive power is exercised in giving judgment in some difficult cases ; but for this power of the peers , i find no warrant in their writ . whereas the parliament is styled the supreme court , it must be understood properly of the king sitting in the house of peers in person ; and but improperly of the lords without him : every supreme court must have the supreme power , and the supreme power is always arbitrary ; for that is arbitrary which hath no superiour on earth to controll it . the last appeal in all government , must still be to an arbitrary power , or else appeals will be in infinitum , never at an end . the legislative power is an arbitrary power , for they are termini convertibiles . the main question in these our days , is , where this power legislative remains ? or is placed ; upon conference of the writs of summons for both houses , with the bodies and titles of our ancient acts of parliament , we shall find the power of making laws rests solely in the king. some affirm , that a part of the legislative power is in either of the houses ; but besides invincible reason from the nature of monarchy it self , which must have the supreme power alone ; the constant antient declaration of this kingdom is against it . for howsoever of later years in the titles and bodies of our acts of parliament it be not so particularly expressed who is the author and maker of our laws , yet in almost all our elder statutes it is precisely expressed , that they are made by the king himself : the general words used of later times , that laws are made by authority of parliament , are particularly explained in former statutes , to mean , that the king ordains , the lords advise , the commons consent , as by comparing the writs with the statutes that expound the writs , will evidently appear . magna charta begins thus , henry by the grace of god , know ye , that we of our meer and free will have given these liberties . in the self-same style runs charta de foresta , and tells us the author of it . the statute de scaccario h. . begins in these words , the king commandeth , that all bailiffs , sheriffs , and other officers , &c. and concerning the justices of chester , the king willeth , &c. and again , he commandeth the treasurer and barons of the exchequer upon their allegiance . the stat. of marlborough , hen. . goeth thus : the king hath made these acts , ordinances , and statutes , which he willeth to be observed of all his subjects , high and low . edw. . the title of this statute is , these are the acts of king edward ; and after it follows , the king hath ordained these acts ; and in the first chapter , the king forbiddeth and commandeth , that none do hurt , damage , or grievance to any religious man , or person of the church : and in the thirteenth chapter , the king prohibiteth that none do ravish or take away by force , any maid within age. edw. . it is said , our sovereign lord the king hath established these acts , commanding they be observed within his realm : and in the fourteenth chap. the words are , the king of his special grace granteth , that the city of london shall recover in an assise , damage with the land. the stat. of west . . saith , our lord the king hath ordained , that the will of the giver be observed : and in the . chap. our lord the king hath ordained , that a woman after the death of her husband shall recover by a writ of entry . the stat. of quo warranto saith , our lord the king at his parliament , of his special grace , and for affection which he beareth to his prelates , earls , and barons , and others , hath granted , that they that have liberties by prescription shall enjoy them . in the stat. de finibus levatis , the kings words are , we intending to provide remedy in our parliament , have ordained , &c. edw. . c. . the king wills , that the chancellor , and the justices of the bench shall follow him , so that he may have at all times some near unto him that be learned in the laws : and in chap. . the words are , our lord the king , after full conference and debate had with his earls , barons , nobles , and other great men , by their whole consent , hath ordained , &c. the stat. de tallagio ( if any such statute there be ) speaks in the kings person no officer of ours ; no tallage shall be taken by us ; we will and grant. edw. . begins thus , our lord the king willeth and commandeth . the stat. of . the same king , saith , our lord the king , by the assent of the prelates , earls , and other great states , hath ordained . edw. . it is provided by our lord the king and his justices . the stat. of carlile saith , we have sent our command in writing firmly to be observed . edw. . begins thus , king edw. . at his parliament at the request of the commonalty by their petition before him , and his councel in parliament , hath granted , &c. and in the th chap. the king willeth , that no man be charged to arm himself otherwise than he was wont . ed. . our lord the king , at the request of his people , hath established these things , which he wills to be kept . . of the same king there is this title , our lord the king by the assent , &c. and by the advice of his councel being there , hath ordained , &c. in his . year it is said , because our lord king edw. . hath received by the complaint of the prelates , earls , barons ; also at the shewing of the knights of the shires , and his commons by their petition put in his parliament , &c. hath ordained , by the assent , &c. at the request of the said knights and commons , &c. the same year in another parliament you may find , these be our articles accorded by our lord the king , with the assent , &c. at the request of the knights of the shires , and the commons by their petition put in the said parliament . in the year-book edw. . . pl. . it is said , the king makes the laws by the assent of the peers and commons ; and not the peers and commons . the stat. of ric. . hath this beginning , richard the . by the assent of the prelates , dukes , earls and barons , and at the instance and special request of the commons , ordained . there being a statute made ric. . c. . against lollards , in the next year the commons petition him , supplient les commons que come un estatute fuit fait , &c. the commons beseech , that whereas a statute was made in the last parliament , &c. which was never assented to , or granted by the commons , but that which was done therein was done without their assent , in this petition the commons acknowledge it a statute , and so call it , though they assented not to it . rich. . nu . . the commons desire , some pursuing to make a law which they conceive hurtful to the commonwealth ; that his majesty will not pass it . as for the parliaments in hen. . hen. . hen. . edw. . and rich. . reigns , the most of them do agree in this one title , our lord the king , by the advice and assent of his lords , and at the special instance and request of the commons , hath ordained . the precedents in this point are so numerous , that it were endless to cite them . the statutes in hen. . days do for the most part agree , both in the titles and bodies of the acts , in these words : our lord the king by the assent of the lords spiritual and temporal , and the commons in parliament assembled , and by the authority of the same hath ordained . unto this king's time we find the commons very often petitioning , but not petitioned unto . the first petition made to the commons that i meet with among the statutes , is but in the middle of this king hen. . reign , which was so well approved , that the petition it self is turned into a statute : it begins thus , to the right worshipful commons in this present parliament assembled : sheweth to your discreet wisdoms , the wardens of the fellowship of the craft of vpholsters within london , &c. this petition , though it be directed to the commons in the title ; yet the prayer of the petition is turned to the king , and not to the commons ; for it concludes , therefore it may please the kings highness , by the advice of the lords spiritual and temporal , and his commons in parliament , &c. next for the statutes of hen. . they do most part agree both in their titles , and the bodies of the acts , with those of his father king hen. . lastly , in the statutes of edw. the . qu. mary , qu. elizabeth , k. james , and of our sovereign lord the king that now is , there is no mention made in their titles of any assent of lords and commons , or of any ordaining by the king , but only in general terms it is said , acts made in parliament : or thus , at the parliament were enacted : yet in the bodies of many of these acts of these last princes , there is sometimes mention made of consent of lords and commons , in these or the like words : it is enacted by the king , with the assent of the lords and commons ; except only in the statutes of our lord king charles , wherein there is no mention , that i can find , of any consent of the lords and commons ; or ordaining by the king : but the words are , be it enacted by authority of parliament : or else , be it enacted by the king , the lords spiritual and temporal , and commons ; as if they were all fellow-commissioners . thus it appears , that even till the time of k. ed. . who lived but in our fathers days , it was punctually expressed in every kings laws , that the statutes and ordinances were made by the king. and withal we may see by what degrees the styles , and titles of acts of parliament have been varied , and to whose disadvantage . the higher we look , the more absolute we find the power of kings in ordaining ; nor do we meet with at first so much as the assent or advice of the lords mentioned . nay , if we cast our eye upon many statutes of those that be of most antiquity , they will appear as if they were no laws at all ; but as if they had been made only to teach us , that the punishments of many officers were left to the meer pleasure of kings . the punitive part of the law , which gives all the vigour and binding part to the law , we find committed by the statutes to the kings meer will and pleasure , as if there were no law at all . i will offer a few precedents to the point . edw. . c. . saith , that sheriffs , coroners , and bayliffs , for concealing of felonies shall make grievous fines at the kings pleasure . chap. . ordains , that such as be found culpable of ravishing of women , shall fine at the kings pleasure . chap. . saith , the penalty for detaining a prisoner that is mainpernable , is a fine at the kings pleasure , or a grievous amercement to the king ; and , he that shall take reward for deliverance of such , shall be at the great mercy of the king. chap. . offenders in parks or ponds shall make fines at the kings pleasure . chap. . committers of champerty , and extortioners are to be punished at the kings pleasure . chap. . purveyors , not paying for what they take , shall be grievously punished at the king's pleasure . chap. . the king shall punish grievously the sheriff , and him that doth maintain quarrels . chap. . the king shall grant attaint in plea of land where it shall seem to him necessary . edw. . saith , whereas of late , before certain persons deputed to treat upon debates between vs and certain great men , it was accorded , that in our next parliament provision shall be made by vs , and the common assent of the prelates , earls , and barons , that in all parliaments for ever , every man shall come without force and armour . and now in our next parliament the prelates , earls , barons , and commonalty have said , that to us it belongeth , through our royal signory , straitly to defend force of armour at all times , when it shall please us , and to punish them which shall do otherwise , and hereunto they are bound to aid us their sovereign lord at all seasons when need shall be . edw. . takers away of nuns from religious houses , fined at the kings will. if by the default of the lord that will not avoid the dike , vnderwoods , and bushes in high-ways , murder be done , the lord shall make fine at the kings pleasure . edw. . if a gold-smith be attainted for not assaying , touching , and working vessels of gold , he shall be punished by a ransome at the kings pleasure . hen. . the commons desire they may have answer of their petitions before the gift of any subsidy ; to which the king answers , he would confer with the lords , and do what should be best according to their advice ; and the last day of parliament he gave this answer , that that manner of doing had not been seen , nor used in no time of his progenitors or predecessors , that they should have any answer of their petitions , or knowledge of it before they have shewed , and finished all their other business of parliament , be it of any grant , business , or otherwise , and therefore the king would not in any ways change the good customs and usages made and used of ancient times . hen. . c. . whereas one savage did beat and maim one richard chedder esquire , menial servant to tho. brook , knight of the shire for somerset-shire , the statute saith , savage shall make fine and ransom at the kings pleasure . hen. . it is said , potest as principis non est inclvs a legibvs , the power of the prince is not included in the laws . hen. . nu . . we read of a restitution in blood , and lands of william lasenby , by the king , by the assent of the lords spiritual , and commons ; omitting the lords temporal . hen. . in a law made , there is a clause , that it is the kings regality to grant or deny such of their petitions as pleaseth himself . hen. . c. . an ordinance was made for to endure as long as it shall please the king. hen. . c. . hath this law , the king our sovereign lord , calling to his remembrance the duty of allegiance of his subjects of this his realm , and that by reason of the same they are bound to serve their prince and sovereign lord for the time being in his wars , for the defence of him , and the land , against every rebellion , power , & might reared against him , and with him to enter and abide in service in battel , if case so require ; and that for the same service , what fortune ever fall by chance in the same battel , against the mind and will of the prince ( as in this land some time past hath been seen ) that it is not reasonable , but against all laws , reason and good conscience , that the said subjects , going with their sovereign lord in wars , attending upon him in his person , or being in other places by his commandment within the land , or without , any thing should lose or forfeit , for doing their true duty and service of allegiance ; be it therefore enacted , that no person that shall attend upon the king , and do him true service , shall be attainted therefore of treason , or any other offence by act of parliament , or otherwise . also the chap. of the same year saith , where every subject by the duty of his allegiance , is bounden to serve and assist his prince and sovereign lord at all seasons , when need shall require , and bound to give attendance upon his royal person , to defend the same when he shall fortune to go in person in war for defence of the realm , or against his rebels and enemies , for the subduing and repressing of them and their malicious purpose . christopher wray , serjeant at law , chosen speaker , eliz. in his speech to her majesty , said , that for the orderly government of the common-wealth three things were necessary : . religion . . authority . . law. by the first , we are taught not only our duty to god , but to obey the queen , & that not only in temporals but in spirituals , in which her power is absolute . mr. grivel in the eliz. said in parliament , he wished not the making of many laws ; since the more we make , the less liberty we have our selves ; her majesty not being bound by them . for further proof that the legislative power is proper to the king , we may take notice , that in antient time , as sir edward coke saith , all acts of parliament were in form of petitions : if the petitions were from the commons , and the answer of them the king 's , it is easie thereby to judge who made the act of parliament : also sir jo. glanvil affirms , that in former times the course of petitioning the king was this , the lords and speaker , either by words or writing , preferr'd their petition to the king ; this then was called the bill of commons , which being received by the king , part he received , part he put out , and part he ratified ; for as it came from him , it was drawn into a law. also it appears , that provisions , ordinances , and proclamations , made heretofore out of parliament , have been always acknowledged for laws and statutes : we have amongst the printed statutes , one called the statute of ireland , dated at westminster , feb. . hen. . which is nothing but a letter of the king to gerard son of maurice justicer of ireland . the explanations of the statute of gloucester made by the king and his justices only , were received always for statutes , and are still printed with them . also the statute made for the correction of the twelfth chapter of the statute of gloucester , was signed under the great seal , and sent to the justices of the bench after the manner of a writ patent , with a certain writ closed , dated by the kings hand at westminster , maii edw. . requiring that they should do and execute all and every thing contained in it , though the same do not accord with the stat. of gloucester in all things . the provisions of merton , made by the king at an assembly of prelates , and the greater part of the earls and barons , for the coronation of the king , and his queen elenor , are in the form of a proclamation , and begin , provisum est in curia domini regis apud merton . hen. . a provision was made , de assisa praesentationis , which was continued and allowed for a law until the stat. of west . . which provides the contrary in express words . in the old statutes it is hard to distinguish what laws were made by kings in parliament , and what out of parliament : when kings called peers only to parliament , and of those how many , or whom they pleased , ( as it appears anciently they did ) it was no easie matter to put a difference between a councel-table and a parliament : or between a proclamation and a statute : yet it is most evident , that in old times there was a distinction between the kings especial or privy councel , and his common councel of the kingdom : and his special councel did sit with the peers in parliament , and were of great and extraordinary authority there . in the stat. of westm. . it is said , these are the acts of king edw. . made at his first parliament by his councel , and by the assent of bishops , abbots , priors , earls , barons , and all the commonalty of the realm . the stat. of acton burnell hath these words : the king for himself , and by his councel , hath ordained and established . in articulis super chartas , when the great charter was confirmed at the request of the prelates , earls , and barons , are found these two provisions : . nevertheless the king and his councel do not intend by reason of this statute to diminish the kings right . . notwithstanding all these things before-mentioned , or any part of them , both the king and his councel , and all they that were present , will and intend , that the right and prerogative of his crown shall be saved to him in all things . the stat. of escheators hath this title , at the parliament of our sovereign lord the king , by his councel it was agreed , and also by the king himself commanded . ed. . where magna charta was confirmed , this preamble is found , at the request of the commonalty , by their petition made before the king and his councel in parliament , by the assent of the prelates , earls , and barons , &c. the statute made at york ed. . goeth thus : whereas the knights , citizens , and burgesses desired our sovereign lord the king in his parliament by their petition , &c. our sovereign lord the king , desiring the profit of his people , by the assent of his prelates , earls , barons , and other nobles of his realm , and by the advice of his councel being there , hath ordained . ed. . in the statute of purveyors , where the king , at the request of the lords and commons , made a declaration what offences should be adjudged treason : it is there further said , if per-case any man ride armed with men of arms against any other to slay him , or rob him , it is not the mind of the king or of his councel , that in such cases it shall be adjudged treason . by this statute it appears , that even in the case of treason , which is the kings own cause , as , whereas a man doth compass or imagine the death of our lord the king , or a man do wage war against our lord the king in his realm , or be adherent to the kings enemies in his realm , giving to them aid or comfort in the realm , or elsewhere ; in all these cases it is the kings declaration only that makes it to be treason : and though it be said , that difficult points of treason shall be brought and shewed to the king , and his parliament , yet it is said , it is the mind of the king and his councel that determines what shall be adjudged treason , and what felony , or trespass . edw. . the commons presenting a petition to the king , which the kings councel did mislike , were content thereupon to amend and explain their petition : the petition hath these words , to their most redoubted sovereign lord the king , praying your said commons , that whereas they have prayed him to be discharged of all manner of articles of the eyre , &c. which petition seemeth to his councel to be prejudicial unto him , and in disinherison of his crown if it were so generally granted . his said commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of him , or of his crown perpetually , as of escheats , &c. but of trespasses , misprisions , negligences , ignorances , &c. and as in parliaments the kings councel were of supereminent power , so out of parliament kings made great use of them . king edw. . finding that bogo de clare was discharged of an accusation brought against him in parliament , commanded him nevertheless to appear before him and his councel , ad faciendum & recipiendum quod per regem & ejus concilium fuerit faciendum , and so proceeded to the examination of the whole cause , edw. . edw. . in the star-chamber ( which was the ancient councel-table at westminster ) upon the complaint of eliz. audley , commanded james audley to appear before him and his councel ; and determined a controversie between them , touching land contained in her jointure , rot. claus . de an. edw. . hen. . in a suit before him and his councel , for the titles of the manors of serre and st. lawrence in the isle of thanet in kent , took order for the sequestring the profits till the right were tried . hen. . commanded the justices of the bench to stay the arraignment of one verney in london , till they had other commandment from him and his councel , hen. . rot . . in banco . edw. . and his councel , in the star-chamber heard the cause of the master and poor brethren of saint leonards in york , complaining that sir hugh hastings , and others , withdrew from them a great part of their living , which consisted chiefly upon the having of a thrave of corn of every plow-land within the counties of york , westmorland , cumberland , and lancashire , rot. pat . de an . . edw. . part . memb . . hen. . and his councel , in the star-chamber , decreed , that margery and florence becket should sue no further in their cause against alice radley widow , for lands in wolwich and plumsted in kent , forasmuch as the matter had been heard first before the councel of edw. . after that before the president of the requests of that king hen. . and then lastly before the councel of the said king , h. . in the time of hen. . an order or provision was made by the kings councel , and it was pleaded at the common law in bar to a writ of dower ; the plaintiffs attorney could not deny it , and thereupon the judgment was , ideo sine die . it seems in those days an order of the kings councel , was either parcel of the common law , or above it . also we may find , the judges have had regard , that before they would resolve or give judgment in new cases , they consulted with the king 's privy councel . in the case of adam brabson who was assaulted by r. w. in the presence of the justices of assise at westminster , the judges would have the advice of the kings councel : for in a like case , because r. c. did strike a juror at westminster which passed against one of his friends , it was adjudged by all the councel that his right hand should be cut off , and his lands and goods forfeited to the king. green and thorp were sent by the judges to the kings councel , to demand of them whether by the stat. of edw. . . a word may be amended in a writ ; and it was answered that a word may be well amended , although the stat. speaks but of a letter or syllable . in the case of sir thomas ogthred , who brought a formedon against a poor man and his wife ; they came and yielded to the demandant , which seemed suspitious to the court ; whereupon judgment was staid , and thorp said that in the like case of giles blacket it was spoken of in parliament , and we were commanded that when any like should come we should not go to judgment without good advice ; therefore the judges conclusion was , sues au counsell & comment ils voilent que nous devomus faire , nous volums faire , & autrement ment en cest case ; sue to the councel , and as they will have us to do , we will do ; and otherwise not in this case , edw. . thus we see the judges themselves were guided by the kings councel , and yet the opinions of judges have guided the lords in parliament in point of law. all the judges of the realm , barons of exchequer , of the quoif ; the kings learned councel , and the civilians , masters of chancery , are called temporal assistants by sir edw. coke , and though he deny them voices in parliament , yet he confesseth , that by their writ they have power both to treat , and to give counsel . i cannot find that the lords have any other power by their writ : the words of the lords writ are , that you be present with us the prelates , great men , and peers , to treat and give your counsel : the words of the judges writ are , that you be present with vs , and others of the councel ( and sometimes with vs only ) to treat and give your counsel . the judges usually joined in committees with the lords in all parliaments , even in queen eliz. reign , until her th . year ; and then upon the th . of november , the judges were appointed to attend the lords . and whereas the judges have liberty in the upper house it self , upon leave given them by the l. keeper , to cover themselves , now at committees they sit always uncovered . the power of judges in parliament is best understood , if we consider how the judicial power of peers hath been exercised in matter of judicature : we may find it hath been the practice , that though the lords in the kings absence give judgment in point of law , yet they are to be directed and regulated by the kings judges , who are best able to give direction in the difficult points of the law ; which ordinarily are unknown to the lords . and therefore , if any errour be committed in the kings bench , which is the highest ordinary court of common law in the kingdom , that errour must be redressed in parliament . and the manner is , saith the lord chancellor egerton , if a writ of errour be sued in parl. upon a judgment given by the judges in the kings bench , the lords of the higher house alone , ( without the commons ) are to examine the errours . the lords are to proceed according to the law , and for their judgments therein they are to be informed by the advice and councel of the judges , who are to inform them what the law is , and to direct them in their judgment ; for the lords are not to follow their own discretion or opinion otherwise . hen. . the commons made sute that w. de la pool d. of suffolk , should be committed to prison for many treasons , and other crimes ; the lords of the higher house were doubtful what answer to give ; the opinion of the judges was demanded , their opinion was , that he ought not to be committed , for that the commons did not charge him with any particular offence , but with general reports and slanders : this opinion was allowed . hen. . a parliament being prorogued , in the vacation the speaker of the house of commons was condemned in a thousand pounds damages in an action of trespass , and committed to prison in execution for the same : when the parliament was re-assembled , the commons made sute to the king and lords , to have their speaker delivered . the lords demanded the opinion of the judges , whether he might be delivered out of prison by privilege of parliament ; upon the judges answer it was concluded , that the speaker should remain in prison according to the law , notwithstanding the privilege of parliament , and that he was speaker ; which resolution was declared to the commons by moyle the kings serjeant at law , and the commons were commanded in the kings name by the bishop of lincoln ( in the absence of the arch-bishop of canterbury , then chancellor ) to chuse another speaker . hen. . a question was moved in parliament , whether spiritual persons might be convented before temporal judges for criminal causes ? there sir john fineux , and the other judges delivered their opinion , that they might and ought to be ; and their opinion allowed and maintained by the king and lords , and dr. standish , who before had holden the same opinion , was delivered from the bishops . i find it affirmed , that in causes which receive determination in the house of lords , the king hath no vote at all , no more than in other courts of ministerial jurisdiction . true it is , the king hath no vote at all , if we understand by vote a voice among others : for he hath no partners with him in giving judgement . but if by no vote is meant he hath no power to judge ; we despoil him of his sovereignty : it is the chief mark of supremacy to judge in the highest causes , and last appeals . this the children of israel full well understood , when they petitioned for a king to judge them ; if the dernier resort be to the lords alone , then they have the supremacy . but as moses by chusing elders to judge in small causes , did not thereby lose his authority to be judge himself when he pleased , even in the smallest matters ; much less in the greatest , which he reserved to himself : so kings by delegating others to judg under them , do not hereby denude themselves of a power to judge when they think good . there is a distinction of these times , that kings themselves may not judge , but they may see and look to the judges , that they give judgment according to law ; and for this purpose only ( as some say ) kings may sometimes sit in the courts of justice . but it is not possible for kings to see the laws executed , except there be a power in kings both to judge when the laws are duly executed , and when not ; as also to compel the judges if they do not their duty . without such power a king sitting in courts is but a mockery , and a scorn to the judges . and if this power be allowed to kings , then their judgments are supream in all courts . and indeed our common law to this purpose doth presume that the king hath all laws within the cabinet of his breast , in scrinio pectoris , saith campton's jurisdiction . . when several of our statutes leave many things to the pleasure of the king , for us to interpret all those statutes of the will and pleasure of the kings justices , only , is to give an absolute arbitrary power to the justices in those cases wherein we deny it to the king. the statute of hen. . c. . makes a difference between the king , and the kings justices , in these words , divers notorious felons be indicted of divers felonies , murders , rapes : and as well before the kings justices , as before the king himself , arraigned of the same felonies . i read , that in an. . hen. . sate in the exchequer , and there set down order for the appearance of sheriffs , and bringing in their accounts ; there was five marks set on every sheriffs head for a fine , because they had not distrained every person that might dispend fifteen pounds lands by the year , to receive the order of knighthood , according as the same sheriffs were commanded . in michaelmas term , . edw. . sate three days together in open court in the kings bench. for this point there needs no further proofs , because mr. pryn doth confess , that kings themselves have sate in person in the kings bench , and other courts , and there given judgment , p. . treachery and disloyalty , &c. notwithstanding all that hath been said for the legislative and judicial power of kings , mr. pryn is so far from yielding the king a power to make laws , that he will not grant the king a power to hinder a law from being made ; that is , he allows him not a negative voice in most cases , which is due to every other , even to the meanest member of the house of commons in his judgment . to prove the king hath not a negative voice , his main , and in truth , his only argument insisted on , is a coronation-oath , which is said anciently some of our kings of england have taken , wherein they grant to defend and protect the just laws and customs , which the vulgar hath , or shall chuse : justas leges & consuetudines quas vulgus elegerit : hence mr. pryn concludes , that the king cannot deny any law which the lords and commons shall make choice of ; for so he will have vulgus to signifie . though neither our king , nor many of his predecessors ever took this oath , nor were bound to take it , for ought appears ; yet we may admit that our king hath taken it ; and answer , we may be confident , that neither the bishops , nor privy councel , nor parliament , nor any other , whosoever they were , that framed or penn'd this oath , ever intended in this word vulgus , the commons in parliament , much less the lords : they would never so much disparage the members of parliament , as to disgrace them with a title both base and false : it had been enough , if not too much , to have called them populus , the people ; but vulgus the vulgar , the rude multitude ( which hath the epithet of ignobile vulgus ) is a word as dishonourable to the composers of the oath to give , or for the king to use , as for the members of the parliament to receive ; it being most false : for the peers cannot be vulgus , because they are the prime persons of the kingdom : next , the knights of the shires are , or ought to be notable knights , or notable esquires , or gentlemen born in the counties , as shall be able to be knights : then the citizens and burgesses are to be most sufficient , none of these can be vulgus : even those free-holders that chuse knights , are the best and ablest men of their counties ; there being for every free-holder , above ten of the common people to be found to be termed the vulgar : therefore it rests that vulgus must signifie the vulgar or common people , and not the lords and commons . but now the doubt will be , what the common people , or vulgus , out of parliament , have to do to chuse laws ? the answer is easie and ready ; there goeth before quas vulgus , the antecedent consuetudines , that is , the customs which the vulgar hath , or shall chuse . do but observe the nature of custom , and it is the vulgus or common people only who chuse customs : common usage time out of mind creates a custom ; and the commoner an usage is , the stronger and the better is the custom : no where can so common an usage be found , as among the vulgar , who are still the far greatest part of every multitude : if a custom be common through the whole kingdom , it is all one with the common law in england , which is said to be common custom . thus in plain terms , to protect the customs which the vulgar chuse , is to swear to protect the common laws of england . but grant that vulgus in the oath , signifies lords and commons , and that consuetudines doth not signifie customs , but statutes , ( as mr. pryn , for a desperate shift affirms ) and let elegerit be the future , or preterperfect tense , even which mr. pryn please , yet it cannot exclude the kings negative voice ; for as consuetudines goeth before quas vulgus , so doth justas stand before leges & consuetudines : so that not all laws , but only all just laws are meant . if the sole choice of the lords and commons did oblige the king to protect their choice , without power of denial , what need , or why is the word justas put in , to raise a scruple that some laws may be unjust ? mr. pryn will not say that a decree of a general councel , or of a pope is infallible , nor ( i think ) a bill of the lords and commons is infallible , just , and impossible to erre ; if he do , sir edward coke will tell him , that parliaments have been utterly deceived , and that in cases of greatest moment , even in case of high treason : and he calls the statute of hen. . an unjust and strange act. but it may be mr. pryn will confess , that laws chosen by the lords and commons may be unjust , so that the lords and commons themselves may be the judges of what is just or unjust . but where the king by oath binds his conscience to protect just laws , it concerns him to be satisfied in his own conscience , that they be just , and not by an implicit faith , or blind obedience : no man can be so proper a judge of the justness of laws , as he whose soul must lye at the stake for the defence and safeguard of them . besides , in this very oath the king doth swear , to do equal and right justice and discretion , in mercy and truth in all his judgments : facies fieri in omnibus judiciis tuis aequam & rectam justitiam & discretionem in misericordia & veritate : if we allow the king discretion and mercy in his judgments , of necessity he must judge of the justness of the laws . again , the clause of the oath , quas vulgus elegerit , doth not mention the assenting unto , or granting any new laws , but of holding , protecting , and strengthening with all his might , the just laws that were already in being : there were no need of might or strength , if assenting to new laws were there meant . some may wonder , why there should be such labouring to deny the king a negative voice , since a negative voice is in it self so poor a thing , that if a man had all the negative voices in the kingdom , it would not make him a king ; nor give him power to make one law : a negative voice is but a privative power , that is , no power at all to do or act any thing ; but a power only to hinder the power of another . negatives are of such a malignant or destructive nature , that if they have nothing else to destroy , they will , when they meet , destroy one another , which is the reason why two negatives make an affirmative , by destroying the negation which did hinder the affirmation . a king with a negative voice only , is but like a syllogism of pure negative propositions , which can conclude nothing . it must be an affirmative voice that makes both a king , and a law , and without it there can be no imaginable government . the reason is plain why the kings negative voice is so eagerly opposed ; for though it give the king no power to do any thing ; yet it gives him a power to hinder others : though it cannot make him a king , yet it can help him to keep others from being kings . for conclusion of this discourse of the negative voice of the king , i shall oppose the judgment of a chief justice of england ; to the opinion of him that calls himself an utter barrister of lincolns inn , and let others judge who is the better lawyer of the two : the words are bracton's , but concern mr. pryn to lay them to heart ; concerning the charters and deeds of kings , the justices nor private men neither ought , nor can dispute ; nor yet if there rise a doubt in the kings charter , can they interpret it ; and in doubtful and obscure points , or if a word contain two senses , the interpretation , and will of our lord the king is to be expected , seeing it is his part to interpret , who makes the charter : full well mr. pryn knows , that when bracton writ , the laws that were then made , and strived for , were called the kings charters , as magna charta , charta de foresta , and others : so that in bracton's judgment the king hath not only a negative voice to hinder , but an affirmative , to make a law , which is a great deal more than master pryn will allow him . not only the law-maker , but also the sole judge of the people is the king , in the judgment of bracton ; these are his words : rex & non alius debet judicare , si solus ad id sufficere possit , the king and no other ought to judge , if he alone were able . much like the words of bracton , speaketh briton , where , after that he had shewed that the king is the vice-roy of god , and that he hath distributed his charge into sundry portions , because he alone is not sufficient to hear all complaints of his people , then he addeth these words , in the person of the king : nous volons que nostre jurisdiction soit sur touts jurisdictions , &c. we will that our jurisdiction be above all the jurisdictions of our realm , so as in all manner of felonies , trespasses , contracts , and in all other actions personal or real , we have power to yield , or cause to be yielded , such judgments as do appertain without other process , wheresoever we know the right truth as judges . neither was this to be taken , saith mr. lambard , to be meant of the kings bench , where there is only an imaginary presence of his person , but it must necessarily be understood of a jurisdiction remaining and left in the kings royal body and breast , distinct from that of his bench , and other ordinary courts ; because he doth immediately after , severally set forth by themselves , as well the authority of the kings bench , as of the other courts . and that this was no new-made law , mr. lambard puts us in mind of a saxon law of king edgar's . nemo in lite regem appellato , &c. let no man in suit appeal unto the king , unless he cannot get right at home , but if that right be too heavy for him , then let him go to the king to have it eased . by which it may evidently appear , that even so many years ago there might be appellation made to the kings person , whensoever the cause should enforce it . the very like law in effect is to be seen in the laws of canutus the dane , sometimes king of this realm , out of which law master lambard gathers , that the king himself had a high court of justice , wherein it seemeth he sate in person ; for the words be , let him not seek to the king , and the same court of the king did judge not only according to meer right and law , but also after equity and good conscience . for the close , i shall end with the suffrage of our late antiquary sir henry spelman , in his glossary , he saith , omnis regni justitia solius regis est , &c. all justice of the kingdom is only the king 's , and he alone , if he were able , should administer it ; but that being impossible , he is forced to delegate it to ministers , whom he bounds by the limits of the laws ; the positive laws are only about generals ; in particular cases , they are sometimes too strict , sometimes too remiss ; and so , oft wrong instead of right will be done , if we stand to strict law : also causes hard and difficult daily arise , which are comprehended in no law-books , in those there is a necessity of running back to the king , the fountain of justice , and the vicegerent of god himself , who in the commonwealth of the jews took such causes to his own cognisance , and left to kings not only the example of such jurisdiction , but the prerogative also . of privilege of parliaments . what need all this ado , will some say , to sift out what is comprised in the writ for the election of the commons to parliament , since it is certain , though the writ doth not , yet privilege of parliament gives sufficient power for all proceedings of the two houses ? it is answered , that what slight esteem soever be made of the writ , yet in all other cases the original writ is the foundation of the whole business , or action : and to vary in substance from the writ , makes a nullity in the cause , and the proceedings thereupon : and where a commissioner exerciseth more power than is warranted by his commission , every such act is void , and in many cases punishable : yet we will lay aside the writ , and apply our selves to consider the nature of privilege of parliament . the task is the more difficult , for that we are not told what the number of privileges are , or which they be ; some do think that as there be dormant articles of faith in the roman church , which are not yet declared ; so there be likewise privileges dormant in the house of commons , not yet revealed , we must therefore be content in a generality to discourse of the quality or condition of privilege of parliament , and to confine our selves to these three points : . that privilege of parliament gives no power ; but only helps to the execution of the power given by the writ . . that the free-holders by their elections give no privilege . . that privilege of parliament is the gift of the king. first , the end or scope of privilege of parliament is not to give any power to do any publick act , not warranted by the writ : but they are intended as helps only to enable to the performance of the duty enjoyned , and so are subservient to the power comprised in the writ : for instance , the grand privilege of freedom from arrests doth not give any power at all to the house of commons to do any act ; but by taking away from the free-holders and other subjects the power of arrests , the commons are the better inabled to attend the service to which they are called by the king. in many other cases the servants , or ministers of the king are privileged , and protected much in the same nature . the servants in houshold to the king may not be arrested without special licence : also the officers of the kings courts of justice , having a privilege not to be sued in any other court but where they serve and attend ; and to this purpose they are allowed a writ of privilege . likewise all such as serve the king in his wars , as are imployed on foreign affairs for him , are protected from actions and sutes . nay the king's protection descends to the privileging even of laundresses , nurses , and midwives , if they attend upon the camp , as sir edward coke saith , quia lotrix , seu nutrix , seu obstetrix . besides the king protects his debtors from arrests of the subject till his own debts be paid . these sorts of protections are privileges the common law takes notice of , and allows : and hath several distinctions of them ; and some are protections , quia profecturus , and others are , quia moraturus : some are with a clause of volumus for stay of suits : others with a clause of nolumus for the safety of mens persons , servants , and goods : and the king's writs do vary herein according to the nature of the business . but none of these privileges or protections do give any power ; they are not positive , but privative : they take away and deprive the subject of the power , or liberty to arrest , or sue , in some cases only ; no protection or privilege doth defend in point of treason , felony , or breach of the peace : privileges are directly contrary to the law , for otherwise they should not be privileges , and they are to be interpreted in the strictest manner , as being odious and contrary to law : we see the use of privileges ; they do but serve as a dispensation against law , intended originally , and principally for the expediting of the kings business ; though secondarily , and by accident there do sometimes redound a benefit by them to the parties themselves that are protected . strictly , and properly every privilege must be against a publick or common law , for there is no use or need of a private law to protect , where there is no publick law to the contrary : favours and graces which are only besides , and not against the law , do not properly go under the name of privileges , though common use do not distinguish them : i know no other privilege that can be truly so called , and to belong to the house of commons , which is so vast and great , as this privilege of their persons , servants , and goods : this being indeed against the common law , and doth concern the whole kingdom to take notice of it , if they must be bound by it . touching this grand privilege of freedom from arrests , i read , that in the hen. . the commons did not proceed to the punishment of offenders for the breach of it , until the lords referred the punishment thereof to the lower house . the case is thus reported , george ferrers gentleman , servant to the king , and burgess for plymouth , going to the parliament-house was arrested in london , by process out of the kings bench for debt , wherein he had before been condemned as surety for one welden , at the sute of one white : which arrest , signified to sir thomas moyl , speaker , and to the rest ; the serjeant ( called saint-johns ) was sent to the counter in breadstreet to demand ferrers : the officer of the counter refused to deliver him , and gave the serjeant such ill language , that they fall to an affray : the sheriff coming , taketh the officers part , the serjeant returned without the prisoner : this being related to the speaker and burgesses , they would sit no more without their burgess ; and rising , repaired to the upper house , where the case was declared by the speaker before sir thomas audley chancellor , and the lords and judges there assembled , who judging the contempt to be very great , referred the punishment thereof to the house of commons it self . this privilege of freedom from arrests is the only privilege which sir edward coke finds to belong to the house of commons ; he cannot , or at least he doth not , so much as name any other in his section of the privileges of parliament : neither doth he bring so much as one precedent for the proof of this one privilege for the house of commons ; which may cause a doubt that this sole privilege is not so clear as many do imagine . for in a parliament in the eliz. richard coke , a member , being served with a subpoena of chancery , the lord chancellor thought the house had no such privilege for subpoena's as they pretended ; neither would he allow of any precedents of the house committed unto them , formerly used in that behalf , unless the house of commons could also prove the same to have been likewise thereupon allowed , and ratified also by precedents in the court of chancery . in the of eliz. sir edw. hobby , and mr. brograve , attorney of the dutchy , were sent by the house to the lord keeper , in the name of the whole house , to require his lordship to revoke two writs of subpoena's , which were served upon m. th. knevit , a member of the house , since the beginning of parliament . the lord keeper demanded of them whether they were appointed by any advised consideration of the house , to deliver this message unto him with the word required , in such manner as they had done , or no : they answered his lordship , yea : his lordship then said , as he thought reverently and honourably of the house , and of their liberties , and privileges of the same , so to revoke the said subpoena's in that sort , was to restrain her majesty in her greatest power , which is , justice in the place wherein he serveth under her , and therefore he concluded , as they had required him to revoke his writ , so he did require to deliberate . upon the of february , being wednesday , eliz. report was made by mr. attorney of the dutchy , upon the committee , for the delivering of one mr. hall's man ; that the committee found no precedent for setting at large by the mace any person in arrest but only by writ , and that by divers precedents of records perused by the said committee , it appeareth that every knight , citizen , or burgess , which doth require privilege , hath used in that case to take a corporal oath before the lord chancellor , or lord keeper , that the party for whom such writ is prayed , came up with him , and was his servant at the time of the arrest made . thereupon m. hall was moved by the house to repair to the lord keeper , and make oath , and then take a warrant for a writ of privilege for his servant . it is accounted by some to be a privilege of parliament to have power to examine misdemeanours of courts of justice , and officers of state : yet there is not the meanest subject but hath liberty , upon just cause , to question the misdemeanour of any court or officer , if he suffer by them ; there is no law against him for so doing ; so that this cannot properly be called a privilege , because it is not against any publick law : it hath been esteemed a great favour of princes to permit such examinations : for , when the lords were displeased with the greatness of pierce gaveston , it is said , that in the next parliament , the whole assembly obtain of the king to draw articles of their grievances , which they did . two of which articles were , first , that all strangers should be banished the court and kingdom : of which gaveston was one . secondly , that the business of the state should be treated of by the councel of the clergy and nobles . in the reign of king henry the sixth , one mortimer , an instrument of the duke of york , by promising the kentish men a reformation , and freedom from taxations , wrought with the people , that they drew to a head , and made this mortimer ( otherwise jack cade ) their leader : who styled himself captain mend-all : he presents to the parliament the complaints of the commons , and he petitions that the duke of york and some other lords might be received by the king into favour , by the undue practices of suffolk and his complices , commanded from his presence ; and that all their opposites might be banished the court , and put from their offices , and that there might be a general amotion of corrupt officers : these petitions are sent from the lower house to the vpper , and from thence committed to the lords of the kings privy councel , who , having examined the particulars , explode them as frivolous , and the authors of them to be presumptuous rebels . concerning liberty , or freedom of speech , i find , that at a parliament at black friars in the of henry the eighth , sir tho. more being chosen speaker of the house of commons : he first disabled himself , and then petitioned the king , that if in communication and reasoning , any man in the commons house should speak more largely than of duty they ought to do , that all such offences should be pardoned , and to be entred of record ; which was granted . it is observable in this petition , that liberty or freedom of speech is not a power for men to speak what they will , or please , in parliament ; but a privilege not to be punished , but pardoned for the offence of speaking more largely than in duty ought to be ; which in an equitable construction must be understood of rash , unadvised , ignorant , or negligent escapes , and slips in speech : and not for wilful , malicious offences in that kind ; and then the pardon of the king was desired to be upon record , that it might be pleaded in bar to all actions . and it seemeth that ric. strood and his complices , were not thought sufficiently protected for their free speech in parliament , unless their pardon were confirmed by the king in parliament ; for there is a printed statute to that purpose in hen. eighth's time . touching the freedom of speech , the commons were warned in qu. eliz. days not to meddle with the queens person , the state , or church-government . in her time the discipline of the church was so strict , that the litany was read every morning in the house of commons , during the parliament , and when the commons first ordered to have a fast in the temple , upon a sunday , the queen hindred it . jan. saturday , eliz. the case is thus reported : mr. peter wentworth moveth for a publick set fast , and for a preaching every morning at of the clock , before the house sate : the house was divided about the fast , were for it , and an against it ; it was ordered , that as many of the house as conveniently could , should on sunday fortnight after , assemble , and meet together in the temple - church , there to hear preaching , and to joyn together in prayer , with humiliation and fasting , for the assistance of god's spirit in all their consultations , during this parliament , and for the preservation of the queens majesty and her realms : and the preachers to be appointed by the privy councel that were of the house , that they may be discreet , not medling with innovation or vnquietness . this order was followed by a message from her majesty to the house , declared by mr. vice-chamberlain , that her highness had a great admiration of the rashness of this house , in committing such an apparent contempt of her express command , as to put in execution such an innovation , without her privity , or pleasure first known . thereupon mr. vice-chamberlain moved the house to make humble submission to her majesty , acknowledging the said offence and contempt , craving a remission of the same , with a full purpose to forbear the committing of the like hereafter : and by the consent of the whole house , mr. vice-chamberlain carried their submission to her majesty . eliz. mr. peter wentworth , and sir henry bromley delivered a petition to the lord keeper , desiring the lords of the upper house to be suppliants with them of the lower house , unto her majesty , for entailing the succession of the crown . whereof a bill was ready drawn by them . her majesty was highly displeased herewith , as contrary to her former strait command , and charged the councel to call the parties before them : sir thomas henage sent for them , and after speech with them , commanded them to forbear the parliament , and not to go out of their several lodgings ; after , they were called before the lord treasurer , the lord buckhurst , and sir thomas henage ; mr. wentworth was committed by them to the tower , sir henry bromley , with mr. richard stephens , to whom sir henry bromley had imparted the matter , were sent to the fleet , as also mr. welch , the other knight for worcestershire . in the same parliament , mr. morrice , attorney of the court of wards , moved against the hard courses of the bishops , ordinaries , and other ecclesiastical judges in their courts , used towards sundry learned , and godly ministers and preachers ; and spake against subscriptions and oaths ; and offer'd a bill to be read against imprisonment for refusal of oaths : mr. dalton opposed the reading of it , as a thing expresly against her majesties command , to meddle in : doctor lewin shewed , that subscription was used even at geneva : at two of the clock the same day , the speaker , mr. coke , ( afterwards sir edward coke ) was sent for to the court , where the queen her self gave him in command a message to the house : she told him , it being wholly in her power to call , to determine , to assent , or dissent to any thing done in parliament : that the calling of this was only , that the majesty of god might be more religiously observed , by compelling , by some sharp laws , such as neglect that service : and that the safety of her majesties person , and the realm might be provided for : it was not meant they should meddle with matters of state , or causes ecclesiastical , ( for so her majesty termed them ) she wondred that any could be of so high commandement , to attempt ( they were her own words ) a thing so expresly contrary to that which she had commanded : wherefore with this she was highly offended : and because the words spoken by my lord keeper are not now perhaps well remembred , or some be now here that were not then present . her majesties present charge and express command is , that no bill touching the said matter of state , or reformation in causes ecclesiastical , be exhibited ; and upon my allegiance ( saith mr. coke ) i am charged , if any such bill be exhibited , not to read it . i have been credibly informed , that the queen sent a messenger , or serjeant at arms , into the house of commons , and took out mr. morrice , and committed him to prison : within few days after , i find mr. wroth moved in the house , that they might be humble suitors to her majesty , that she would be pleased to set at liberty those members of the house that were restrained . to this it was answered by the privy counsellors , that her majesty had committed them for causes best known to her self , and to press her highness with this suit , would but hinder them whose good is sought : that the house must not call the queen to account for what she doth of her royal authority : that the causes for which they are restrained may be high and dangerous : that her majesty liketh no such questions ; neither doth it become the house to search into such matters . in the eliz. the commons were told their privilege was yea , and no : and that her majesties pleasure was , that if the speaker perceived any idle heads which would not stick to hazard their own estates ; which will meddle with reforming the church , and transforming the commonweal , and do exhibit bills to that purpose ; the speaker should not receive them till they were viewed and considered by those , whom it is fitter should consider of such things , and can better judge of them : and at the end of this parliament , the queen refused to pass bills which had passed both houses . in the of eliz. the queen said , she was sorry the commons medled with chusing and returning knights of the shire for norfolk , a thing impertinent for the house to deal withal , and only belonging to the office and charge of the lord chancellor , from whom the writs issue and are returned . hen. . the of october , the chancellor before the king declared , the commons had sent to the king , praying him that they might have advice , and communication with certain lords about matters of business in parliament , for the common good of the realm : which prayer our lord the king graciously granted , making protestation , he would not do it of duty , nor of custom , but of his special grace at this time : and therefore our lord the king charged the clerk of the parliament , that this protestation should be entred on record upon the parliament-roll : which the king made known to them by the lord say , and his secretary ; how that neither of due nor of custom , our lord the king ought to grant any lords to enter into communication with them , of matters touching the parliament ; but by his special grace at this time he hath granted their request in this particular : upon which matter , the said steward and secretary made report to the king in parliament ; that the said commons knew well that they could not have any such lords to commune with them , of any business of parliament , without special grace and command of the king himself . it hath heretofore been a question , whether it be not an infringing , and prejudice to the liberties and privileges of the house of commons , for them to joyn in conference with the lords in cases of benevolence , or contribution , without a bill . in the eliz. on tuesday the first of march , mr. egerton , attorney general , and doct. cary came with a message from the lords ; their lordships desired to put the house in remembrance of the speech delivered by the lord keeper , the first day , for consultation and provision of treasure , to be had against the great and imminent dangers of the realm ; thereupon their lordships did look to have something from the houses , touching those causes before this time ( and yet the parliament had sate but three days , for it began feb. . ) and therefore their lordships had hitherto omitted to do any thing therein themselves . and thereupon their lordships desired , that according to former laudable usages between both houses in such like cases , a committee of commons may have conference with a committee of lords , touching provision of treasure against the great dangers of the realm , which was presently resolved by the whole house , and they signified to their lordships the willing , and ready assent of the whole house . at the meeting , the lords negatively affirm , not to assent to less than three subsidies , and do insist for a second conference . m. francis bacon yielded to the subsidy , but opposed the joyning with the lords , as contrary to the privileges of the house of commons ; thereupon the house resolved to have no conference with the lords , but to give their lordships most humble and dutiful thanks with all reverence for their favourable and courteous offer of conference , and to signifie , that the commons cannot in those cases of benevolence , or contribution joyn in conference with their lordships , without prejudice to the liberties and privileges of the house : and to request their lordships to hold the members of this house excused in their not assenting to their lordships said motion for conference , for that so to have assented without a bill , had been contrary to the liberties and privileges of this house , and also contrary to the former precedents of the same house in like cases had . this answer delivered to the lords by the chancellor of the exchequer , their lordships said , they well hoped to have had a conference according to their former request , and desir'd to see those precedents by which the commons seem to refuse the said conference . but in conclusion it was agreed unto , upon the motion of sir walter raleigh ; who moved , that without naming a subsidy , it might be propounded in general words , to have a conference touching the dangers of the realm , and the necessary supply of treasure to be provided speedily for the same , according to the proportion of the necessity . in the eliz. serjeant heal said in parliament , he marvail'd the house stood either at the granting of a subsidy or time of payment , when all we have is her majesties , and she may lawfully at her pleasure take it from us ; and that she had as much right to all our lands and goods , as to any revenue of the crown ; and he said he could prove it by precedents in the time of h. . k. john and k. stephen . the ground upon w ch this serjeant at law went , may be thought the same sir ed. coke delivers in his institutes , where he saith , the first kings of this realm had all the lands of england in demesne , and the great manors and royalties they reserved to themselves , and of the remnant for the defence of the kingdom , enfeoffed the barons : from whence it appears , that no man holds any lands but under a condition to defend the realm ; and upon the self-same ground also the kings prerogative is raised , as being a preheminence , in cases of necessity , above , and before the law of property , or inheritance . certain it is , before the commons were ever chosen to come to parliament , taxes or subsidies were raised and paid without their gift . the great and long continued subsidy of dane-gelt was without any gift of the commons , or of any parliament at all , that can be proved . in the h. . a subsidy of marks in silver upon every knights see was granted to the king by the nobles , without any commons . at the passing of a bill of subsidies , the words of the king are , the king thanks his loyal subjects , accepts their good will , and also will have it so : le roy remercie ses loyaux subjects , accept leur benevolence , & ausi ainsi le veult : which last words of ainsi le veult , the king wills it to be so , are the only words that makes the act of subsidy a law to bind every man to the payment of it . in the eliz. the commons , by their speaker , complaining of monopolies , the queen spake in private to the l. keeper , who then made answer touching monopolies , that her majesty hoped her dutiful and loving subjects would not take away her prerogative , which is the chiefest flower in her garland , and the principal and head pearl in her crown and diadem ; but that they will rather leave that to her disposition . the second point is , that the free-holders , or counties do not , nor cannot give privilege to the commons in parliament . they that are under the law cannot protect against it , they have no such privilege themselves , as to be free from arrests and actions : for if they had , then it had been no privilege , but it would be the common-law : and what they have not , they cannot give ; nemo dat quod non habet , neither do the free-holders pretend to give any such privilege , either at their election , or by any subsequent act ; there is no mention of any such thing in the return of the writ ; nor in the indentures between the sheriff , and the free-holders . the third point remains , that privilege of parliament is granted by the king. it is a known rule , that which gives the form , gives the consequences of the form ; the king by his writ gives the very essence and form to the parliament : therefore privileges , which are but consequences of the form , must necessarily flow from kings . all other privileges and protections are the acts of the king ; and by the kings writ . sir edw. coke saith , that the protection of mens persons , servants , and goods , is done by a writ of grace from the king. at the presentment of the speaker of the house of commons to the king upon the first day of parliament , the speaker in the name and behoof of the commons , humbly craveth that his majesty would be graciously pleased to grant them their accustomed liberties and privileges ; which petition of theirs , is a fair recognition of the primitive grace and favour of kings in be stowing of privilege , and it is a shrewd argument against any other title : for our ancestors were not so ceremonious nor so full of complement , as to beg that by grace , which they might claim by right . and the renewing of this petition every parliament , argues the grant to be but temporary , during only the present parliament ; and that they have been accustomed , when they have been accustomably sued , or petitioned for . i will close this point with the judgment of king james , who in his declaration touching his proceedings in parliament , . resolves , that most privileges of parliament grew from precedents , which rather shew a toleration than an inheritance ; therefore he could not allow of the style , calling it their ancient and undoubted right and inheritance , but could rather have wished that they had said , their privileges were derived from the grace and permission of his ancestors and him : and thereupon he concludes , he cannot with patience endure his subjects to use such antimonarchical words concerning their liberties , except they had subjoyned , that they were granted unto them by the grace and favours of his predecessors : yet he promiseth to be careful of whatsoever . privileges they enjoy by long custom and uncontrolled and lawful precedents . observations upon aristotle's politiques , touching forms of government . together with directions for obedience to governours , in dangerous and doubtful times . licensed and entred according to order , for richard royston ; a book entituled , observations upon aristotle's politiques , touching forms of government ; together with directions for obedience to governours in dangerous and doubtful times . the preface in every alteration of government there is something new , which none can either divine , or judge of , till time hath tried it : we read of many several ways of government ; but they have all , or most of them , been of particular cities , with none , or very small territories at first belonging to them . at this present the government of the low-countreys , and of swisserland , are not appropriated either of them to any one city , for they are compounded of several petty principalities , which have special and different laws and privileges each of them ; insomuch that the vnited provinces , and united cantons are but confederacies and leaguers , and not two entire commonweals ; associates only for mutual defence . nay , the cantons of swisserland are not only several republicks , but reputed to have different forms of commonweals ; some being said to be aristocratically governed , and others democratically , as the mountaineers : and some of the cantons are papists , and some protestants , and some mix'd of both : we do not find that any large or great dominion or kingdom united in one government , and under the same laws , was ever reduced at once to any kind of popular government , and not confined to the subjection of one city : this being a thing not yet done , requires the abler men to settle such a peaceable government as is to be desired : there being no precedent in the case ; all that can be done in it , is , at first to enquire into such governments , as have been existent in the world. as a preface to such an enquiry , the sacred scripture ( if it be but for the antiquity of it ) would be consulted ; and then aristotle , the grand master of politiques ; and after him the greek and latin historians that lived in popular times , would be diligently examined . to excite others of greater abilities to an exacter disquisition , i presume to offer a taste of some doctrines of aristotle , which are usher'd in with a briefer touch of the holy scriptures . it is not probable , that any sure direction of the beginning of government , can be found either in plato , aristotle , cicero , polybius , or in any other of the heathen authors , who were ignorant of the manner of the creation of the world : we must not neglect the scriptures , and search in philosophers for the grounds of dominion and property , which are the main principles of government and justice . the first government in the world was monarchical , in the father of all flesh . adam being commanded to multiply , and people the earth , and to subdue it , and having dominion given him over all creatures , was thereby the monarch of the whole world ; none of his posterity had any right to possess any thing , but by his grant or permission , or by succession from him : the earth ( saith the psalmist ) hath he given to the children of men : which shews , the title comes from fatherhood . there never was any such thing as an independent multitude , who at first had a natural right to a community : this is but a fiction , or fancy of too many in these days , who please themselves in running after the opinions of philosophers and poets , to find out such an original of government , as might promise them some title to liberty , to the great scandal of christianity , and bringing in of atheism , since a natural freedom of mankind cannot be supposed without the denial of the creation of adam . and yet this conceit of original freedom is the only ground upon which not only the heathen philosophers , but also the authors of the principles of the civil law ; and grotius , selden , hobs , ashcam , and others raise , and build their doctrines of government , and of the several sorts or kinds , as they call them , of common-wealths . adam was the father , king , and lord over his family : a son , a subject , and a servant or a slave , were one and the same thing at first ; the father had power to dispose , or sell his children or servants ; whence we find , that at the first reckoning up of goods in scripture , the man servant , and the maid-servant are numbred among the possessions and substance of the owner , as other goods were . as for the names of subject , slave , and tyrant , they are not found in scripture , but what we now call a subject or a slave , is there named no other than a servant : i cannot learn that either the hebrew , greek , or latine have any proper and original word for a tyrant or a slave , it seems these are names of later invention , and taken up in disgrace of monarchical government . i cannot find any one place , or text in the bible , where any power or commission is given to a people either to govern themselves , or to choose themselves governours , or to alter the manner of government at their pleasure ; the power of government is settled and fixed by the commandment of honour thy father ; if there were a higher power than the fatherly , then this commandment could not stand , and be observed : whereas we read in scripture , of some actions of the people in setting up of kings , further than to a naked declaration by a part of the people of their obedience , such actions could not amount , since we find no commission they have , to bestow any right ; a true representation of the people to be made , is as impossible , as for the whole people to govern ; the names of an aristocracy , a democracy , a commonweal , a state , or any other of like signification , are not to be met either in the law or gospel . that there is a ground in nature for monarchy , aristotle himself affirmeth , saying , the first kings were fathers of families ; as for any ground of any other form of government , there hath been none yet alledged , but a supposed natural freedom of mankind ; the proof whereof i find none do undertake , but only beg it to be granted . we find the government of gods own people varied under the several titles of patriarchs , captains , judges , and kings ; but in all these the supreme power rested still in one person onely : we no where find any supreme power given to the people , or to a multitude in scripture , or ever exercised by them . the people were never the lords anointed , nor called gods , nor crowned , nor had the title of nursing-fathers , gen. . . the supreme power being an indivisible beam of majesty , cannot be divided among , or settled upon a multitude . god would have it fixed in one person , not sometimes in one part of the people , and sometimes in another ; and sometimes , and that for the most part , no where , as when the assembly is dissolved , it must rest in the air , or in the walls of the chamber where they were assembled . if there were any thing like a popular government among gods people , it was about the time of the judges , when there was no king in israel ; for they had then some small show of government , such as it was , but it was so poor and beggarly , that the scripture brands it with this note , that every man did what was right in his own eyes , because there was no king in israel ; it is not said , because there was no government , but because there was no king ; it seems no government , but the government of a king , in the judgment of the scriptures , could restrain men from doing what they listed ; where every man doth what he pleaseth , it may be truly said , there is no government ; for the end of government is , that every man should not do what he pleaseth , or be his own judge in his own case ; for the scripture to say there was no king , is to say , there was no form of government in israel . and what the old testament teacheth us , we have confirmed in the new : if saint paul had only said , let every soul be subject to the higher powers , and said no more : then men might have disputed , whether saint paul , by higher powers , had not meant as well other governours as kings ; or other forms of government , as monarchy ; but the good luck is , saint paul hath been his own interpreter or comment : for , after the general doctrine of obedience to be given by all men to the higher powers , he proceeds next to charge it home , and lay it to the conscience under pain of damnation , and applies it to each particular man's conscience ; saying , wilt thou not be afraid of the power ? which power he expounds in the singular number , restraining it to one person , saying , he is the minister of god to thee ; it is not , they are the ministers to thee ; and then again , he beareth not the sword in vain ; and then a third time in the same verse , lest thou should'st forget it , he saith , for he is the minister of god , a revenger to wrath , &c. upon thee : if saint paul had said , they are the ministers of god , or they bear not the sword in vain , it might be doubted , whether [ they ] were meant of kings only , or of other governours also ; but this scruple is taken away by the apostle himself . and as saint paul hath expounded what he means by higher powers , so saint peter also doth the like : for the self-same word that saint paul useth for higher , in saint peter is translated supreme ; so that though in our english bibles the words differ , yet in the original they are both the same ; so that saint paul might have been englished , let every soul be subject to the supreme power ; or saint peter might have been translated , whether to the king as to the higher ; ye there is this difference , that whereas saint paul useth the word in the plural number , saint peter hath it in the singular , and with application to the king. it will be said , though saint peter make the king supreme , yet he tells us the king is a humane ordinance , or a creature of the peoples . but it is answered , kings may be called an humane ordinance , for being made of one of the people , and not by the people ; and so are humane in regard of their material cause , not of their efficient . if saint peter had meant that kings had been made by the people , he must also have meant that governours had been made by the people , for he calls the governours as well an ordinance of man , as the king ; for his words are , submit your selves to every ordinance of man for the lord's sake , whether it be to the king as supreme , or whether it be to governours : but saint peter sheweth , that governours are not made by the people ; for he saith , they that are sent by him ( not by them ) for the punishment of evil doers : so that the governours are sent by the king , and not by the people : some would have sent by him , to be sent by god ; but the relative must be referred to the next antecedent , which is the king , and not god. besides , if governours be sent by god , and kings by the people , then governours would be supreme , which is contrary to saint peter's doctrine ; and it will follow , that the people have not the power of choosing representers to govern , if governours must be sent of god. the safest sense of saint peter's words is ; submit your selves to all humane laws , whether made by the king , or by his subordinate governours . so the king may be called a humane ordinance , as being all one with a speaking law : the word in the original is , be subject to every humane creation ; it is more proper to call a law made by a king a creation of an ordinance , than the peoples choosing or declaring of a king , a creation of him . but take the words in what sense soever you will , it is most evident , that saint peter in this place , takes no notice of any government or governours , but of a king , and governours sent by him , but not by the people . and it is to be noted , that st. peter and st. paul , the two chief of the apostles , wrote their epistles at such a time , when the name of a popular government , or of the people of rome was at least so much in shew and in name , that many do believe , that notwithstanding the emperours by strong hand usurped a military power ; yet the government was for a long time in most things then in the senate and people of rome ; but for all this , neither of the two apostles take any notice of any such popular government ; no , nor our saviour himself , who divides all between god and caesar , and allows nothing that we can find for the people . observations upon aristotle's politicks , touching forms of government . what cannot be found in scripture , many do look for in aristotle ; for if there be any other form of government besides monarchy , he is the man best able to tell what it is , and to let us know by what name to call it , since the greek tongue is most happy in compounding names , most significant to express the nature of most things : the usual terms in this age of aristocraty and democraty are taken up from him to express forms of government most different from monarchy : we must therefore make inquiry into aristotle touching these two terms . true it is , aristotle seems to make three sorts of government , which he distinguisheth by * the sovereignty of one man , or of a few , or of many , for the common good. these ( he saith ) are right or perfect governments , but those that are for the private good of one , or of a few , or of a multitude , are transgressions . the government of a monarchy for the common good , he calls a kingdom . the government of a few more than one , an aristocraty ; either because the best men govern , or because it is for the best of the governed : when a multitude governs for the common good , it is called by the common name of all governments , a polity . it is possible that one or a few may excel in vertue , but it is difficult for many to excel in all vertue , except in warlike affairs , for this is natural in a multitude , therefore , in this sort of government their principal vse is to war one for another , and to possess the arms or ammunition . the transgressions of government before spoken of , are these : tyranny is the transgression of the kingdom ; and democraty is the transgression of the polity . for tyranny is a monarchy for the benefit of the monarch , the oligarchy , for the profit of the rich ; the democraty for the benefit of the poor . none of these are for the common good. here aristotle , if he had stood to his own principles , should have said an oligarchy should be for the benefit of a few , and those the best ; and not for the benefit of the rich : and a democraty for the benefit of many , and not of the poor only ; for so the opposition ●●eth ; but then aristotle saw his democraty would prove to be no transgression , but a perfect polity , and his oligarchy would not be for the benefit of a few , and those the best men ; for they cannot be the best men , that seek only their private profit . in this chapter , the mind of aristotle about the several kinds of government , is clearliest delivered , as being the foundation of all his books of politicks , it is the more necessary to make a curious observation of these his doctrines . in the first place , he acknowledgeth the government of one man , or of a monarchy , and that is a perfect form of government . concerning monarchy , aristotle teacheth us the beginning of it ; for , saith he , the * first society made of many houses is a colony , which seems most naturally to be a colony of families , or foster-brethren of children and childrens children . and therefore at the beginning cities were , and now nations , under the government of kings ; the eldest in every house is king , and so for kindred sake it is in colonies . thus he deduced the original of government from the power of the fatherhood , not from the election of the people . this it seems he learnt of his master plato , who in his third book of laws affirms , that the true and first reason of authority is , that the father and mother , and simply those that beget and ingender , do command and rule over all their children . aristotle also tells us from homer , (a) that every man gives laws to his wife and children . in the fourth book of his politicks , cap. . he gives to monarchy the title of the (b) first and divinest sort of government , defining tyranny to be a transgression from the first , and divinest . again , aristotle in the eighth book of his ethicks , in the chapter , saith . that of (c) the right kinds of government , a monarchy was the best , and a popular estate the worst . lastly , in the third book of his politicks , and the sixteenth chapter concerning monarchy , he saith , that (d) a perfect kingdom is that wherein the king rules all things according to his own will ; for he that is called a king according to the law makes no kind of government . secondly , he saith there is a government of a few men , but doth not tell us how many those few men may , or must be , only he saith they must be more than one man , but how many , that he leaves uncertain . this perfect government of a few , any man would think aristotle should have called an oligarchy , for that this word properly signifies so much ; but in stead of the government of a few , aristotle gives it a quite other name , and terms it an aristocraty , which signifies the power of the best ; the reason why it is called an aristocraty , said aristotle , is for that there the best men govern , or ( because that is not always true ) for that it is for the best of the governed ; by this latter reason any government , and most especially a monarchy , may be called an aristocraty , because the end of monarchy is for the best of the governed , as well as the end of an aristocraty ; so that of these two reasons for calling the government of a few an aristocraty , the first is seldom true ; and the latter is never sufficient to frame a distinction . this aristotle himself confesseth in his next chapter , saying (a) that the causes aforesaid do not make a difference , and that it is poverty and riches , and not few , and many , that make the difference between an oligarchy and democraty ; there must be an oligarchy where rich men rule , whether they be few or many : and wheresoever the poor have the sovereignty , there must be a democraty . now if aristotle will allow riches and poverty to make a difference between an oligarchy and a democraty : these two must likewise make the difference between an aristocraty and a polity : for the only difference aristotle makes between them , is , in their ends , and not in their matter ; for the same few men may make an aristocraty , if their end be the common good ; and they may be an oligarchy , if they aim only at their private benefit . thus is aristotle distracted and perplexed how to distinguish his aristocraty , whether by the smallness of their number , or by the greatness of their estates . nay if we look into aristotle's rhetoricks we shall find a new conceit , not only about aristocraty , but also about the sorts of government : for whereas he has taught us in his politicks , that there be three sorts of right or perfect government , and as many sorts of wrong , which he calls transgressions or corruptions , he comes in his rhetoricks , and teacheth us that there be four sorts of government . (a) . a democraty , where magistracies are distributed by lots . . in an oligarchy by their wealth . . in an aristocraty by their instructions in the law. it is necessary for these to appear the best from whence they have their name . . (b) a monarchy according to the name , wherein one is lord over all . here we see aristocraty is not distinguished by smalness of number , nor by riches , but by skill in the laws ; for he saith those that are instructed in the laws govern in an aristocraty : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 · a point not dreamt of in his politicks ; by which it seems aristotle himself did not know well what he would have to be an aristocraty . and as he cannot teach us truly what an aristocraty is , so he is to seek to tell us where any aristocraty ever was ; even himself seems to doubt , whether there be any such form of government , where he saith in his third book of politicks , cap. . (a) it is impossible for any mechanical man to be a citizen in an aristocraty , if there be any such government as they call aristocratical . his [ if ] makes him seem to doubt of it : yet i find him affirm that the commonwealth of carthage was aristocratical ; he doth not say it was an aristocraty , for he confesseth it had many of the transgressions which other commonwealths had , and did incline either to a democraty or an oligarchy . (b) the government of carthage did transgress from an aristocraty to an oligarchy . and he concludes , that if by misfortune there should happen any discord among the carthaginians themselves , there would be no medicine by law found out to give it rest ; wherein me-thinks aristotle was a kind of prophet , for the discords between the citizens of carthage , were the main cause that hannibal lost not only italy , but carthage it self . by these few collections we may find how uncertain aristotle is in determining what an aristocraty is , or where , or when any such government was ; it may justly be doubted whether there ever was , or can be any such government . let us pass from his aristocraty , to his third sort of perfect or right government ; for which he finds no particular name , but only the common name of all government , politia : it seems the greeks were wonderfully to seek , that they of all men should not be able to compound a name for such a perfect form of government ; unless we should believe that they esteemed this kind of commonwealth so superlatively excellent , as to be called , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the government of all governments , or polity of polities . but howsoever aristotle in his books of politicks vouchsafe us not a name , yet in his books of ethicks he affirmeth it may very properly be called (a) a timocratical government , where magistrates are chosen by their wealth : but why aristotle should give it such a name i can find no reason ; for a polity by his doctrine is the government of many , or of a multitude , and the multitude he will have to be the poorer sort , insomuch that except they be poor , he will not allow it to be the government of a multitude , though they be never so many ; for he makes poverty the truest note of a popular estate ; and as if to be poor and to be free were all one , he makes liberty likewise to be a mark of popular estate , for in his th . book , and th . chapter , he resolves , that (b) a popular state is where freemen govern , and an oligarchy where rich men rule ; as if rich men could not be free-men : now how magistrates should be chosen for their wealth , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , among all poor men is to me a riddle . here i cannot but wonder why all our modern politicians , who pretend themselves aristotelians , should forsake their great master , and account a democraty a right or perfect form of government , when aristotle brands it for a transgression , or a depraved , or corrupted manner of government . they had done better to have followed aristotle , who ( though other grecians could not , yet he ) could find out the name of a timocraty for a right popular government : but , it may be , our politicians forbear to use the word timocraty , because he affords an ill character of it , saying , that of all the right kinds of government a monarchy was the best , and a timocraty the worst ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . yet afterwards aristotle in the same chapter makes amends for it , in saying , a democraty is the least vicious , because it doth but a little transgress from a timocraty . but not to insist longer on the name of this nameless form of government , let inquiry be made into the thing it self , that we may know what aristotle saith is the government of many , or of a multitude , for the common good. this many , or multitude is not the whole people , nor the major part of the people , or any chosen by the people to be their representors . no , aristotle never saith , or meaneth any such thing ; for he tells us (a) the best city doth not make any artificer , or handicraftsman a citizen . and if these be excluded out of the number of citizens , there will be but a few lest in every city to make his timocratical government , since artificers or mercenary men make far the greatest part of a city ; or to say (a) a city is a community of free-men , and yet to exclude the greatest part of the inhabitants from being citizens , is but a mockery of freedom ; for any man would think that a city being a society of men assembled to the end to live well , that such men without whom a city cannot subsist , and who perform necessary works , and minister to all in publick , should not be barred from being citizens , yet says aristotle , (b) all those are not to be deemed citizens without whom a city cannot subsist , except they abstain from necessary works ; for he resolves it (c) impossible for him to exercise the work of vertue , that useth a mechanical or mercenary trade . and he makes it one of his conclusions , that (d) in ancient times among some men , no publick workman did partake of the government , until the worst of democraties were brought in . again , aristotle will have his best popular government consist of free-men , and accounts the poorer sort of people to be free-men ; how then will he exclude poor artificers , who work for the publick , from participating of the government ? further , it is observable in aristotle , that , quite contrary to the signification of the greek names , the government of a multitude may be termed an oligarchy if they be rich , and the rule of a few a democraty if they be poor and free . after much incertainty of the nature of this politick government , which wants a name ; aristotle at last resolves that this general commonweal , or politia is compounded of a democraty and oligarchy ; for , (a) to speak plainly , a polity is a mixture of a democraty and an oligarchy . that is , one perfect form is made of two imperfect ones ; this is rather a confounding than compounding of government , to patch it up of two corrupt ones , by appointing an oligarchical penalty for the rich magistrates that are chosen by election , and a democratical fee for the poor magistrates that are chosen by lot. lastly , it is to be noted , that aristotle doth not offer to name any one city or commonweal in the world , where ever there was any such government as he calls a polity : for him to reckon it for a perfect form of government , and of such excellency as to carry the name from all other , and yet never to have been extant in the world , may seem a wonder , and a man may be excused for doubting , or for denying any such form to be possible in nature , if it cannot be made manifest what it is , nor when , nor where it ever was . in conclusion , since aristotle reckons but three kinds of perfect government , which are ; first , a monarchy of one ; secondly , an aristocraty of a few ; thirdly , a polity of a multitude ; and if these two latter cannot be made good by him : there will remain but one right form of government only , which is monarchy : and it seems to me , that aristotle in a manner doth confess as much , where he informs us , (a) that the first commonweal among the grecians , after kingdoms , was made of those that waged war : meaning that the grecians , when they left to be governed by kings , fell to be governed by an army : their monarchy was changed into a stratocraty , and not into an aristocraty or democraty : for if unity in government , which is only found in monarchy , be once broken , there is no stay or bound , until it come to a constant standing army , for the people or multitude , as aristotle teacheth us , can excel in no vertue but military , and that that is natural to them , and therefore in a popular estate , (b) the sovereign power is in the sword , and those that are possessed of the arms. so that any nation or kingdom that is not charged with the keeping of a king , must perpetually be at the charge of paying and keeping of an army . these brief observations upon aristotle's perfect forms of government , may direct what to judge of those corrupted or imperfect forms which he mentions ; for rectum est index sui & obliqui , and he reckons them to be all one in matter and form , and to differ only in their end : the end of the perfect forms being for the good of the governed ; and of the imperfect , for the benefit only of the governours . now since aristotle could not tell how to define or describe his right or perfect forms of government , it cannot be expected he can satisfie us concerning those he calls imperfect : yet he labours and bestirs himself mainly in the business , though to little purpose ; for howsoever the title of his book be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of politicks , and that he mentions 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for a special form of government , which hath the common name of a policy : yet when he comes to dispute in particular of government , he argues only about democracies and oligarchies , and therein he is copious , because only those which he calls corrupt forms of governments were common in greece in his days . as for an aristocracy , or a policy which he mentions , they are only speculative notions , or airy names , invented to delude the world , and to perswade the people , that under those quaint terms , there might be found some subtile government , which might at least equal , if not excel monarchy : and the inventers of those fine names were all but rebels to monarchy , by aristotle's confession , where he saith , the first commonweals of greece after kings were left , were made of those that waged war. lib. . c. . as aristotle is irresolute to determine what are truly perfect aristocracies and policies , so he is to seek in describing his imperfect forms of government , as well oligarchies as democracies , and therefore he is driven to invent several sorts of them , and to confound himself with subdivisions : we will alledge some of his words . the cause why there be many kinds of commonweals is , for that there are many parts of every city . sometimes all these parts are in a commonweal , sometimes more of them , sometimes fewer : whence it is manifest , that there are many commonweals differing from each other in kind : because the parts of them differ after the same manner . for a commonweal is the order of magistrates distributed , either according to the power of them that are partakers of it , or according to some other common equality belonging to poor and rich , or some other thing common to both . it is therefore necessary , that there be so many commonweals as there are orders , according to the excellencies and differences of parts . but it seemeth principally there are but two chief kinds of commonweals ; the democracy and the oligarchy : for they make the aristocracy a branch of oligarchy , as if it were a kind of oligarchy ; and that other which is properly a policy , to be a branch of democracy . so they are wont to esteem of commonweals ; but it is both truer and better ; that there being two right forms , or one , that all the other be transgressions . here we find aristotle of several minds , sometimes he is for many commonweals , sometimes for two , or sometimes for one . as for his many commonweals , if he allow them according to the several parts of a city , he may as well make three thousand kinds of commonweals , as three : if two artificers and three souldiers should govern , that should be one kind of commonweal : if four husbandmen , and five merchants , that would be a second sort ; or six taylors , and ten carpenters , a third sort ; or a dozen saylors , and a dozen porters , a fourth ; and so in infinitum , for aristotle is not resolved how many parts to make of a city , or how many combinations of those parts ; and therefore in his reckoning of them , he differs from himself , sometimes makes more , sometimes fewer parts : and oft concluding at the end of his accompt with & caetera's : and confessing that one and the same man may act several parts ; as he that is a souldier , may be a husbandman and an artificer , and in his fourth book and fourth chapter , he seems to reckon up eight parts of a city , but in the tail of them , he misses or forgets the sixth . . he names the plowman . . the artificer . . the tradesman , or merchant . . the mercenary hireling . . the souldier , ( here aristotle falls foul upon plato , for making but four parts of a city . . the weaver . . the plowman . . the taylor . . the carpenter . afterwards , as if these were not sufficient , he addeth the smith , and the feeder of necessary cattle , the merchant , and the ingrosser or retailer ) whilest aristotle was busie in this reprehension of plato , he forgets himself , and skips over his sixth part of a city , and names the . rich men , . the magistrates . in the same chapter , he offers at another division of the parts of a city or commonweal , first dividing it into a populacy , and nobility . the people he divides first into husbandmen . . into artificers . . into merchants , or those that use buying or selling. . into those that frequent the seas , of whom some follow the war , others seek for gain , some are carriers or transporters , others fishermen . . handicraftsmen that possess so little goods , that they cannot be idle . . those that are not free on both sides , and any other such like multitude of people . the kinds of noblemen are distinguished by riches , by lineage , by vertue , by learning , and other such like things . that there may be more parts of a commonweal than are here numbred , aristotle confesseth or supposeth ; and of a multitude of parts , and of a multitude of mixtures of such parts may be made a world of forms of oligarchies and democraties . this confusion of the parts and kinds of commonweals drove aristotle rather to rest upon the division of rich and poor , for the main parts of a commonweal , than any other . the distinction of a few and of a multitude , or the whole people , might seem more proper to distinguish between an oligarchy and a democraty ; but the truth is , aristotle looking upon the cities of greece , and finding that in every of them , even in athens it self , there were many of the people that were not allowed to be citizens , and to participate in the government , and that many times he was a citizen in one sort of government , who was not a citizen in another , and that citizens differed according to every commonweal ; he considered that if he should place a right in the whole people , either to govern , or to chuse their form of government , or the parties that should govern : he should hereby condemn the government of all the cities in greece , and especially of aristocraty , which , as he saith , allows no artificer to be a citizen , and besides , he should thereby confute a main principle of his own politicks , which is , that some men are born slaves by nature ; which quite contradicts the position , that all men are born equal and free ; and therefore aristotle thought it fitter to allow all imaginable forms of government , that so he might not disparage any one city , than to propound such a form as might condemn and destroy all the rest . though aristotle allow so many several forms of corrupted governments ; yet he insists upon no one form of all those that he can define or describe , in such sort , that he is able to say that any one city in all greece was governed just according to such a form ; his diligence is only to make as many forms as the giddy or inconstant humour of a city could happen upon ; he freely gives the people liberty to invent as many kinds of government as they please , provided he may have liberty to find fault with every one of them ; it proved an easier work for him to find fault with every form , than to tell how to amend any one of them ; he found so many imperfections in all sorts of commonweals , that he could not hold from reproving them before ever he tells us what a commonweal is , or how many sorts there are , and to this purpose he spends his whole second book in setting out , and correcting the chief commonweals of greece , and among others the lacedemonian , the cretan , and carthaginian commonweals ; which three he esteems to be much alike , and better than any other , yet he spares not to lay open their imperfections , and doth the like to the athenian ; wherein he breaks the rule of method , by delivering the faults of commonweals , before he teach us what a commonweal is ; for in his first book , he speaks only of the parts , of which a city , or a commonweal is made , but tells us not what a city or commonweal is , until he come to his third book , and there in handling the sorts of government , he observes no method at all , but in a disorderly way , flies backward and forward from one sort to another : and howsoever there may be observed in him many rules of policy touching government in general , yet without doubt where he comes to discourse of particular forms , he is full of contradiction , or confusion , or both : it is true , he is brief and difficult , the best right a man can do him , is to confess he understands him not ; yet a diligent reader may readily discern so many irregularities and breaches in aristotle's books of politicks , as tend to such distraction or confusion , that none of our new politicians can make advantage of his principles , for the confirmation of an original power by nature in the people , which is the only theme now in fashion : for aristotle's discourse is of such commonweals as were founded by particular persons , as the chalcedonian by phaleas , the milesian by hippodamas , the lacedemonian by lycurgus , the cretan by minos , the athenian by solon , and the like : but the natural right of the people to found , or elect their kind of government is not once disputed by him : it seems the underived majesty of the people , was such a metaphysical piece of speculation as our grand philosopher was not acquainted with ; he speaks very contemptuously of the multitude in several places , he affirms that the people are base or wicked judges in their own cases , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 · and that many of them differ nothing from beasts ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ; and again he saith , the common people or freemen are such as are neither rich , nor in reputation for virtue ; and it is not safe to commit to them great governments ; for , by reason of their injustice and vnskilfulness , they would do much injustice , and commit many errours ; and it is pleasanter to the multitude to live disorderly , than soberly , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . if aristotle had believed a publick interest to have been in the people , to the enabling them to be their own carvers in point of government , he would never have entangled himself with such intricate and ambiguous forms of commonweals , as himself cannot tell how to explain , nor any of his commentators how to understand , or make use of . this one benefit i have found by reading aristotle , that his books of politicks serve for an admirable commentary upon that text of scripture , which saith , in those days there was no king in israel ; every man did that which was right in his own eyes . for he grants a liberty in every city , for any man , or multitude of men , either by cunning , or force , to set up what government they please ; and he will allow some name or other of a commonweal , which in effect is to allow every man to do what he lists , if he be able ; hence it is , that by the confession of aristotle , the first commonweals in greece , after kings were given over , were made of those that waged war ; those several kinds of commonweals , were all summed up into the government of an army ; for it is , saith aristotle , in their power , who manage arms to continue , or not continue the form of government , whereby the estate is governed , which is nothing else but a stratocratie , or military government . we cannot much blame aristotle for the incertainty , and contrariety in him about the sorts of government , if we consider him as a heathen ; for it is not possible for the wit of man to search out the first grounds or principles of government , ( which necessarily depend upon the original of property ) except he know that at the creation one man alone was made , to whom the dominion of all things was given , and from whom all men derive their title . this point can be learnt only from the scriptures : as for the imaginary contract of people , it is a fancy not improbable only , but impossible , except a multitude of men at first had sprung out , and were engendred of the earth , which aristotle knows not whether he may believe , or no : if justice ( which is to give every man his due ) be the end of government , there must necessarily be a rule to know how any man at first came to have a right to any thing to have it truly called his . this is a point aristotle disputes not ; nor so much as ever dreamt of an original contract among people : he looked no farther in every city , then to a scambling among the citizens , whereby every one snatcht what he could get : so that a violent possession was the first , and best title that he knew . the main distinction of aristotle touching perfect or right forms of government from those that are imperfect or corrupt , consists solely in this point , that where the profit of the governed is respected , there is a right government , but where the profit of the governours is regarded , there is a corruption or transgression of government . by this it is supposed by aristole , that there may be a government only for the benefit of the governours ; this supposition to be false , may be proved from aristotle himself ; i will instance about the point of tyranny . tyranny , saith aristotle , (a) is a despotical or masterly monarchy ; now he confesseth , that (b) in truth the masterly government is profitable both to the servant by nature , and the master by nature , and he yields a solid reason for it , saying , (c) it is not possible , if the servant be destroyed , that the mastership can be saved ; whence it may be inferred , that if the masterly government of tyrants cannot be safe without the preservation of them whom they govern , it will follow that a tyrant cannot govern for his own profit only : and thus his main definition of tyranny fails , as being grounded upon an impossible supposition by his own confession . no example can be shewed of any such government that ever was in the world , as aristotle describes a tyranny to be ; for under the worst of kings , though many particular men have unjustly suffered , yet the multitude , or the people in general have found benefit and profit by the government . it being apparent that the different kinds of government in aristotle , arise only from the difference of the number of governours , whether one , a few , or many , there may be as many several forms of governments as there be several numbers , which are infinite ; so that not only the several parts of a city or commonweal , but also the several numbers of such parts may cause multiplicity of forms of government by aristotle's principles . it is further observable in assemblies , that it is not the whole assembly , but the major part only of the assembly that hath the government ; for that which pleaseth the most , is always ratified , saith aristotle , lib. . c. . by this means one and the same assembly may make , at one sitting , several forms of commonweals , for in several debates and votes the same number of men , or all the self-same men do not ordinarily agree in their votes ; and the least disagreement , either in the persons of the men , or in their number , alters the form of government . thus in a commonweal , one part of the publick affairs shall be ordered by one form of government , and another part by another form , and a third part by a third form , and so in infinitum . how can that have the denomination of a form of government , which lasts but for a moment only , about one fraction of business ? for in the very instant , as it were in the twinkling of an eye , while their vote lasteth , the government must begin and end . to be governed , is nothing else but to be obedient and subject to the will or command of another ; it is the will in a man that governs ; ordinarily mens wills are divided according to their several ends or interests ; which most times are different , and many times contrary the one to the other , and in such cases where the wills of the major part of the assembly do unite and agree in one will , there is a monarchy of many wills in one , though it be called an aristocracy or democracy , in regard of the several persons ; it is not the many bodies , but the one will or soul of the multitude that governs . (a) where one is set up out of many , the people becometh a monarch , because many are lords , not separately , but altogether as one ; therefore such a people as if it were a monarch , seeks to bear rule alone . lib. . c. . it is a false and improper speech to say that a whole multitude , senate , council , or any multitude whatsoever doth govern where the major part only rules ; because many of the multitude that are so assembled , are so far from having any part in the government , that they themselves are governed against and contrary to their wills ; there being in all government various and different debates and consultations , it comes to pass oft-times , that the major part in every assembly , differs according to the several humours or fancies of men ; those who agree in one mind , in one point , are of different opinions in another ; every change of business , or new matter begets a new major part , and is a change both of the government and governours ; the difference in the number , or in the qualities of the persons that govern , is the only thing that causes different governments , according to aristotle , who divides his kinds of government to the number of one , a few , or many . as amongst the romans their tribunitial laws had several titles , according to the names of those tribunes of the people , that preferr'd and made them . so in other governments , the body of their acts and ordinances , is composed of a multitude of momentary monarchs , who by the strength and power of their parties or factions are still under a kind of a civil war , fighting and scratching for the legislative miscellany , or medly of several governments . if we consider each government according to the nobler part of which it is composed , it is nothing else but a monarchy of monothelites , or of many men of one will , most commonly in one point only : but if we regard only the baser part , or bodies of such persons as govern , there is an interrupted succession of a multitude of short-lived governments , with as many intervals of anarchy ; so that no man can say at any time , that he is under any form of government ; for in a shorter time than the word can be spoken , every government is begun and ended . furthermore in all assemblies , of what quality soever they be , whether aristocratical or democratical , as they call them , they all agree in this one point , to give that honourable regard to monarchy , that they do interpret the major , or prevailing part in every assembly to be but as one man , and so do feign to themselves a kind of monarchy . though there be neither precept nor practice in scripture , nor yet any reason alledged by aristotle for any form of government , but only monarchy ; yet it is said that it is evident to common sense , that of old time rome , and in this present age venice , and the low-countries , enjoy a form of government different from monarchy : hereunto it may be answered , that a people may live together in society , and help one another ; and yet not be under any form of government ; as we see herds of cattel do , and yet we may not say they live under government . for government is not a society only to live , but to live well and vertuously . this is acknowledged by aristotle , who teacheth that (a) the end of a city , is to live blessedly and honestly . political communities are ordained for honest actions , but not for living together only . now there be two things principally required to a blessed and honest life : religion towards god , and peace towards men : that is , a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty , tim. . . here then will be the question ; whether godliness and peace can be found under any government but monarchy , or whether rome , venice , or the low countries did enjoy these under any popular government . in these two points , let us first briefly examine the roman government , which is thought to have been the most glorious . for religion , we find presently after the building of the city by romulus , the next king , numa most devoutly established a religion , and began his kingdom with the service of the gods ; he forbad the romans to make any images of god , which law lasted and was observed years , there being in all that time no image or picture of god , in any temple or chappel of rome ; also he erected the pontifical colledge , and was himself the first bishop or pontifex ; these bishops were to render no account either to the senate or commonalty . they determined all questions concerning religion , as well between priests as between private men : they punished inferiour priests , if they either added or detracted from the established rites , or ceremonies , or brought in any new thing into religion . the chief bishop , pontifex maximus , taught every man how to honour and serve the gods. this care had monarchy of religion . but after the expulsion of kings , we do not find during the power of the people , any one law made for the benefit or exercise of religion : there be two tribunitian laws concerning religion , but they are meerly for the benefit of the power of the people , and not of religion . l. papirius , a tribune , made a law , called lex papiria , that it should not belawful for any to consecrate either houses , grounds , altars , or any other things without the determination of the people . domitius aenobarbus another tribune enacted a law called domitia lex , that the pontifical colledge should not , as they were wont , admit whom they would into the order of priesthood , but it should be in the power of the people ; and because it was contrary to their religion , that church-dignities should be bestowed by the common people ; hence for very shame he ordained , that the lesser part of the people , namely seventeen tribes , should elect whom they thought fit , and afterwards the party elected should have his confirmation or admission from the colledge : thus by a committee of seven tribes taken out of thirtyfive , the ancient form of religion was altered and reduced to the power of the lesser part of the people . this was the great care of the people to bring ordination and consecration to the laity . the religion in venice , and the low-countries is sufficiently known , much need not be said of them : they admirably agree under a seeming contrariety ; it is commonly said , that one of them hath all religions , and the other no religion ; the atheist of venice may shake hands with the sectary of amsterdam . this is the liberty that a popular estate can brag of , every man may be of any religion , or no religion , if he please ; their main devotion is exercised only in opposing and suppressing monarchy . they both agree to exclude the clergy from medling in government , whereas in all monarchies both before the law of moses , and under it , and ever since ; all barbarians , graecians , romans , infidels , turks , and indians , have with one consent given such respect and reverence to their priests , as to trust them with their laws ; and in this our nation , the first priests we read of before christianity , were the druides , who , as caesar saith , decided and determined controversies , in murder , in case of inheritance , of bounds of lands , as they in their discretion judged meet ; they grant rewards and punishments . it is a wonder to see what high respect even the great turk giveth to his mufti , or chief bishop , so necessary is religion to strengthen and direct laws . to consider of the point of peace : it is well known , that no people ever enjoyed it without monarchy . aristotle saith , the lacedemonians preserved themselves by warring ; and after they had gotten to themselves the empire , then were they presently undone , for that they could not live at rest , nor do any better exercise , than the exercise of war , lib. . c. . after rome had expelled kings , it was in perpetual war , till the time of the emperours : once only was the temple of janus shut , after the end of the first punick war , but not so long as for one year , but for some months . it is true , as orosius saith , that for almost years , that is , from tullus hostilius to augustus caesar , only for one summer , the bowels of rome did not sweat blood. on the behalf of the romans it may be said , that though the bowels of rome did always sweat blood , yet they did obtain most glorious victories abroad . but it may be truly answered , if all the roman conquests had no other foundation but injustice ; this alone foils all the glory of her warlike actions . the most glorious war that ever rome had , was with carthage ; the beginning of which war , sir walter raleigh proves to have been most unjustly undertaken by the romans , in confederating with the mamertines , and aiding of rebels , under the title of protecting their confederates ; whereas kings many times may have just cause of war , for recovering and preserving their rights to such dominions as fall to them by inheritance or marriage , a popular estate , that can neither marry , nor be heir to another , can have no such title to a war in a foreign kingdom ; and to speak the truth , if it be rightly considered ; the whole time of the popularity of rome , the romans were no other than the only prosperous and glorious thieves , and robbers of the world. if we look more narrowly into the roman government , it will appear , that in that very age , wherein rome was most victorious , and seemed to be most popular ; she owed most of her glory to an apparent kind of monarchy . for it was the kingly power of the consuls , who ( as livy saith ) had the same royal jurisdiction , or absolute power that the kings had , not any whit diminished or abated , and held all the same regal ensigns of supreme dignity , which helpt rome to all her conquests : whiles the tribunes of the people were strugling at home with the senate about election of magistrates , enacting of laws , and calling to account , or such other popular affairs , the kingly consuls gained all the victories abroad : thus rome at one and the same time was broken and distracted into two shews of government ; the popular , which served only to raise seditions and discords within the walls , whilst the regal atchieved the conquests of foreign nations and kingdoms . rome was so sensible of the benefit and necessity of monarchy , that in her most desperate condition and danger , when all other hopes failed her , she had still resort to the creation of a dictator , who for the time was an absolute king ; and from whom no appeal to the people was granted , which is the royallest evidence for monarchy in the world ; for they who were drawn to swear , they would suffer no king of rome , found no security but in perjury , and breaking their oath by admitting the kingly power in spight of their teeth , under a new name of a dictator or consul : a just reward for their wanton expelling their king for no other crime they could pretend but pride , which is most tolerable in a king of all men : and yet we find no particular point of pride charged upon him , but that he enjoyned the romans to labour in cleansing , and casting of ditches , and paving their sinks : an act both for the benefit and ornament of the city , and therefore commendable in the king : but the citizens of rome , who had been conquerours of all nations round about them , could not endure of warriers to become quarriers , and day-labourers . whereas it is said , that tarquin was expelled for the rape committed by his son on lucrece ; it is unjust to condemn the father for the crime of his son ; it had been fit to have petitioned the father for the punishment of the offender : the fact of young tarquin cannot be excused , yet without wrong to the reputation of so chaste a lady as lucrece is reputed to be , it may be said , she had a greater desire to be thought chaste , than to be chaste ; she might have died untouched , and unspotted in her body , if she had not been afraid to be slandered for inchastity ; both dionysius halicarnasseus , and livie , who both are her friends , so tell the tale of her , as if she had chosen rather to be a whore , than to be thought a whore. to say truth , we find no other cause of the expulsion of tarquin , than the wantonness , and licentiousness of the people of rome . this is further to be considered in the roman government , that all the time between their kings , and their emperours , there lasted a continued strife , between the nobility and commons , wherein by degrees the commons prevailed at last , so to weaken the authority of the consuls and senate , that even the last sparks of monarchy were in a manner extinguished , and then instantly began the civil war , which lasted till the regal power was quickly brought home , and setled in monarchy . so long as the power of the senate stood good for the election of consuls , the regal power was preserved in them , for the senate had their first institution from monarchy : it is worth the noting , that in all those places that have seemed to be most popular , that weak degree of government , that hath been exercised among them , hath been founded upon , and been beholden unto monarchical principles , both for the power of assembling , and manner of consulting : for the entire and gross body of any people , is such an unweildy and diffused thing as is not capable of uniting , or congregating , or deliberating in an entire lump , but in broken parts , which at first were regulated by monarchy . furthermore it is observable , that rome in her chief popularity , was oft beholden for her preservation to the monarchical power of the father over the children : by means of this fatherly power , saith bodin , the romans flourished in all honour and vertue , and oftentimes was their common-weal thereby delivered from most imminent destruction , when the fathers drew out of the consistory , their sons being tribunes publishing laws tending to sedition . amongst others cassius threw his son headlong out of the consistory , publishing the law agraria ( for the division of lands ) in the behoof of the people , and after by his own private judgment put him to death , the magistrates , serjeants , and people standing thereat astonied , and not daring to withstand his fatherly authority , although they would with all their power have had that law for division of lands ; which is sufficient proof , this power of the father not only to have been sacred and inviolable , but also to have been lawful for him , either by right or wrong to dispose of the life and death of his children , even contrary to the will of the magistrates and people . it is generally believed that the government of rome , after the expulsion of kings , was popular ; bodin endeavours to prove it , but i am not satisfied with his arguments , and though it will be thought a paradox , yet i must maintain , it was never truly popular . first , it is difficult to agree , what a popular government is , aristotle saith , it is where many or a multitude do rule ; he doth not say where the people , or the major part of the people , or the representors of the people govern . bodin affirms , if all the people be interessed in the government , it is a popular estate , lib. . c. . but after in the same chapter he resolves , that it is a popular estate , when all the people , or the greater part thereof hath the sovereignty , and he puts the case , that if there be threescore thousand citizens , and forty thousand of them have the sovereignty , and twenty thousand be excluded , it shall be called a popular estate : but i must tell him , though fifty nine thousand , nine hundred , ninety nine of them govern , yet it is no popular estate ; for if but one man be excluded , the same reason that excludes that one man , may exclude many hundreds , and many thousands , yea , and the major part it self ; if it be admitted , that the people are or ever were free by nature , and not to be governed , but by their own consent , it is most unjust to exclude any one man from his right in government ; and to suppose the people so unnatural , as at the first to have all consented to give away their right to a major part , ( as if they had liberty given them only to give away , and not to use it themselves ) is not only improbable , but impossible ; for the whole people is a thing so uncertain and changeable , that it alters every moment , so that it is necessary to ask of every infant so soon as it is born its consent to government , if you will ever have the consent of the whole people . moreover , if the arbitrary tryal by a jury of twelve men , be a thing of that admirable perfection and justice , as is commonly believed , wherein the negative voice of every single person is preserved , so that the dissent of any of the twelve frustrates the whole judgment : how much more ought the natural freedom of each man be preserved , by allowing him his negative voice , which is but a continuing him in that estate , wherein , it is confessed , nature at first placed him ? justice requires that no one law should bind all , except all consent to it , there is nothing more violent and contrary to nature , than to allow a major part , or any other greater part less than the whole to bind all the people . the next difficulty to discovering what a popular estate is , is to find out where the supreme power in the roman government rested ; it is bodin's opinion , that in the roman state the government was in the magistrates , the authority and council in the senate , but the sovereign power and majesty in the people , lib. . c. . so in his first book his doctrine is , that the ancient romans said , imperium in magistratibus , authoritatem in senatu , potestatem in plebe , majestatem in populo jure esse dicebant . these four words command , authority , power , and majesty signifie ordinarily , one and the same thing , to wit , the sovereignty , or supreme power , i cannot find that bodin knows how to distinguish them ; for they were not distinct faculties placed in several subjects , but one and the same thing diversly qualified , for imperium , authoritas , potestas , and majestas were all originally in the consuls ; although for the greater shew the consuls would have the opinion , and consent of the senate who were never called together , nor had their advice asked , but when and in what points only it pleased the consuls to propound : so that properly senatusconsultum was only a decree of the consuls , with the advice of the senators : and so likewise the consuls , when they had a mind to have the countenance of an ampler council , they assembled the centuries , who were reckoned as the whole people , and were never to be assembled , but when the consuls thought fit to propound some business of great weight unto them ; so that jussus populi , the command of the people which bodin so much magnifies , was properly jussus consulum , the command of the consuls , by the advice or consent of the assembly of the centuries , who were a body composed of the senators , and the rest of the patritians , knights , and gentlemen , or whole nobility together with the commons : for the same men who had voices in senate , had also their votes allowed in the assembly of the centuries , according to their several capacities . it may further appear , that the roman government was never truly popular , for that in her greatest show of popularity , there were to be found above ten servants for every citizen or freeman , and of those servants , not one of them was allowed any place , or voice in government : if it be said that the roman servants were slaves taken in war , and therefore not fit to be freemen ; to this it may be answered , that if the opinion of our modern politicians be good , which holds that all men are born free by nature , or if but the opinion of aristotle be sound , who saith that by nature some men are servants , and some are masters , then it may be unnatural , or unjust to make all prisoners in war servants , or ( as they are now called ) slaves , a term not used in the popular governments , either of rome or greece ; for in both languages , the usual word that doth answer to our late term of slave , is but servus in latin , and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in greek . besides , if the wars of the romans , by which they gained so many servants were unjust , as i take all offensive war to be without a special commission from god , and as i believe all the roman wars were , that were made for the enlargement of their empire , then we may conclude , that the romans were the notablest plagiaries , or men-stealers in the world. but to allow the lesser part of the people of rome , who called themselves citizens , to have had a just right to exclude all servants from being a part of the people of rome , let us enquire whether the major part of those , whom they allowed to be citizens , had the government of rome ; whereby we may discover easily how notoriously the poorer and greater part of the citizens were gull'd of their share in government ; there were two famous manners of their assembling the people of rome : the first was by classes , as they called them , which were divided into centuries ; the second was by tribes , or wards ; the former of these was a ranking of the people , according to their abilities or wealth ; the latter according to the place or ward , wherein every citizen dwelt : in the assemblies of neither of these , had the major part of the people the power of government , as may thus be made appear . first , for the assembly of the centuries , there were six degrees or classes of men according to their wealths ; the first classis was of the richest men in rome , none whereof were under l. in value : the valuation of the second classis was not under fourscore pounds ; and so the third , the fourth , and the fifth classis were each a degree one under another . the sixth classis contained the poorer sort , and all the rabble . these six classes were subdivided into hundreds , or centuries . the first classis had centvries . the second classis had centvries . the third classis had centvries . the fourth classis had centvries . the fifth classis had centvries . the sixth classis had centvries .   the classes , and centuries being thus ordered , when the assembly came to give their votes , they did not give their voices by the poll , which is the true popular way : but each century voted by it self , each century having one voice , the major part of the centuries carried the business : now there being fourscore and eighteen centuries in the first classis , in which all the patricians , senators , noblemen , knights , and gentlemen of rome , were inrolled , being more in number , and above half the centuries , must needs have the government , if they agreed all together in their votes , because they voted first , for when centuries had agreed in their votes , the other centuries of the inferiour classis , were never called to vote ; thus the nobles , and richer men who were but few in comparison of the common people did bear the chief sway , because all the poorer sort , or proletarian rabble , were clap'd into the sixth classis , which in reckoning were allowed but the single voice of one century , which never came to voting : whereas in number they did far exceed all the five other classes or centuries , and if they had been allowed the liberty of other citizens , they might have been justly numbred for a thousand centuries , or voices in the assembly ; this device of packing so many thousands into one century , did exclude far the greatest part of the people from having a part in the government . next , for the assembly of the people of rome by tribes , it must be considered , that the tribes did not give their voices by the poll alltogether , which is the true way of popular voting , but each tribe or ward did vote by it self , and the votes of the major part ( not of the people but ) of the tribes did sway the government , the tribes being unequal , as all divisions by wards usually are , because the number of the people of one tribe , is not just the same with the number of the people of each other tribe ; whence it followed , that the major number of the tribes might possibly be the minor number of the people , which is a destroying of the power of the major part of the people . add hereunto , that the nobility of rome were excluded from being present at the assembly of the tribes ; and so the most considerable part of the people was wanting , therefore it could not be the voices of the major part of the people , where a great part of the people were allowed no voices at all , for it must be the major part of the whole , and not of a part of the people , that must denominate a popular government . moreover it must be noted , that the assembly of the tribes was not originally the power of the people of rome , for it was almost forty years after the rejection of kings before an assembly of tribes were thought on , or spoken of ; for it was the assembly of the people by centuries , that agreed to the expulsion of kings , and creating of consuls in their room , also the famous laws of the twelve tables were ratified by the assembly of the centuries . this assembly by centuries , as it was more ancient , than that by tribes ; so it was more truly popular , because all the nobility , as well as the commons , had voices in it : the assembly by tribes , was pretended at first , only to elect tribunes of the people , and other inferiour magistrates ; to determine of lesser crimes that were not capital , but only finable ; and to decree that peace should be made ; but they did not meddle with denouncing war to be made , for that high point did belong only to the assembly of the centuries ; and so also did the judging of treason , and other capital crimes . the difference between the assembly of the tribes , and of the centuries , is very material ; for though it be commonly thought , that either of these two assemblies were esteemed to be the people , yet in reality it was not so , for the assembly of the centuries only could be said to be the people , because all the nobility were included in it as well as the commons , whereas they were excluded out of the assembly of the tribes ; and yet in effect , the assembly of the centuries was but as the assembly of the lords , or nobles only , because the lesser , and richer part of the people had the sovereignty , as the assembly of the tribes was , but the commons only . in maintenance of the popular government of rome , bodin objects , that there could be no regal power in the two consuls , who could neither make law , nor peace , nor war. the answer is , though there were two consuls , yet but one of them had the regality ; for they governed by turns , one consul one month , and the other consul another month ; or the first one day , and the second another day . that the consuls could make no laws is false , it is plain by livy , that they had the power to make laws , or war , and did execute that power , though they were often hindered by the tribunes of the people ; not for that the power of making laws or war , was ever taken away from the consuls , or communicated to the tribunes , but only the exercise of the consular power was suspended by a seeming humble way of intercession of the tribunes ; the consuls by their first institution had a lawful right to do those things , which yet they would not do by reason of the shortness of their reigns , but chose rather to countenance their actions with the title of a decree of the senate ( who were their private council ) yea , and sometimes with the decree of the assembly of the centuries ( who were their publick council ) for both the assembling of the senate , and of the centuries , was at the pleasure of the consuls , and nothing was to be propounded in either of them , but at the will of the consuls : which argues a sovereignty in them over the senate and centuries ; the senate of rome was like the house of lords , the assembly of the tribes resembled the house of commons , but the assembling of the centuries , was a body composed of lords and commons united to vote together . the tribunes of the people bore all the sway among the tribes , they called them together when they pleased , without any order , whereas the centuries were never assembled without ceremony , and religious observation of the birds by the augurs , and by the approbation of the senate , and therefore were said to be auspicata , and ex authoritate patrum . these things considered , it appears , that the assembly of the centuries was the only legitimate , and great meeting of the people of rome : as for any assembling , or electing of any trustees , or representors of the people of rome , in nature of the modern parliaments , it was not in use , or ever known in rome . above two hundred and twenty years after the expulsion of kings , a sullen humour took the commons of rome , that they would needs depart the city to janiculum , on the other side of tybur , they would not be brought back into the city , until a law was made , that a plebiscitum , or a decree of the commons might be observed for a law ; this law was made by the dictator hortensius , to quiet the sedition , by giving a part of the legislative power to the commons , in such inferiour matters only , as by toleration and usurpation had been practised by the commons . i find not that they desired an enlargement of the points which were the object of their power , but of the persons , or nobility that should be subject to their decrees : the great power of making war , of creating the greater magistrates , of judging in capital crimes , remained in the consuls , with the senate , and assembly of the centuries . for further manifestation of the broken and distracted government of rome , it is fit to consider the original power of the consuls , and of the tribunes of the commons , who are ordinarily called the tribunes of the people . first , it is undeniable , that upon the expulsion of kings , kingly power was not taken away , but only made annual and changeable between two consuls ; who in their turns , and by course had the sovereignty , and all regal power ; this appears plainly in livy , who tells us , that valerius publicola being consul , he himself alone ordained a law , and then assembled a general session . turentillus arsa inveyed and complained against the consul's government , as being so absolute , and in name only less odious than that of kings , but in fact more cruel ; for instead of one lord the city had received twain , having authority beyond all measure , unlimited and infinite . sextius and licinus complain , that there would never be any indifferent course , so long as the nobles kept the sovereign place of command , and the sword to strike , whilst the poor commons have only the buckler ; their conclusion was , that it remains , that the commons bear the office of consuls too , for that were a fortress of their liberty ; from that day forward , shall the commons be partakers of those things , wherein the nobles now surpass them , namely sovereign rule and authority . the law of the twelve tribes affirm , regio imperio duo sunto , iique consules appellantur . let two have regal power , and let them be called consuls : also the judgment of livy is , that the sovereign power was translated from consuls to decemvirs , as before from kings to consuls . these are proofs sufficient to shew the royal power of the consuls . about sixteen years after the first creation of consuls , the commons finding themselves much run into debt , by wasting their estates in following the wars ; and so becoming , as they thought , oppressed by usury , and cast into prison by the judgment , and sentence of the consuls , they grievously complained of usury , and of the power of the consuls , and by sedition prevailed , and obtained leave to choose among themselves magistrates called tribunes of the people , who by their intercession might preserve the commons from being oppressed , and suffering wrong from the consuls : and it was further agreed , that the persons of those tribunes should be sacred , and not to be touched by any . by means of this immunity of the bodies of the tribunes from all arrests or other violence , they grew in time by degrees to such boldness , that by stopping the legal proceedings of the consuls ( when they pleased to intercede ) they raised such an anarchy oft-times in government , that they themselves might act , and take upon them , what power soever they pleased ( though it belonged not to them . ) this gallantry of the tribunes was the cause , that the commons of rome , who were diligent pretenders to liberty , and the great masters of this part of politicks , were thought the only famous preservers , and keepers of the liberty of rome . and to do them right , it must be confessed , they were the only men that truly understood the rights of a negative voice ; if we will allow every man to be naturally free till they give their consent to be bound , we must allow every particular person a negative voice ; so that when as all have equal power , and are as it were fellow-magistrates or officers , each man may impeach , or stop his fellow-officers in their proceedings , this is grounded upon the general reason of all them , which have any thing in common , where he which forbiddeth , or denieth , hath most right ; because his condition in that case is better than his which commandeth , or moveth to proceed ; for every law or command , is in it self an innovation , and a diminution of some part of popular liberty ; for it is no law except it restrain liberty ; he that by his negative voice doth forbid or hinder the proceeding of a new law , doth but preserve himself in that condition of liberty , wherein nature hath placed him , and whereof he is in present possession ; the condition of him thus in possession being the better , the stronger is his prohibition , any single man hath a juster title to his negative voice , than any multitude can have to their affirmative ; to say the people are free , and not to be governed , but by their own consent , and yet to allow a major part to rule the whole , is a plain contradiction , or a destruction of natural freedom . this the commons of rome rightly understood , and therefore the transcendent power of the negative voice of any one tribune , being able of it self to stay all the proceedings , not of the consuls and senate only , and other magistrates , but also of the rest of his fellow-tribunes , made them seem the powerfullest men in all rome ; and yet in truth they had no power or jurisdiction at all , nor were they any magistrates , nor could they lawfully call any man before them , for they were not appointed for administration of justice , but only to oppose the violence , and abuse of magistrates , by interceding for such as appealed , being unjustly oppressed ; for which purpose at first they sate only without the door of the senate , and were not permitted to come within the doors : this negative power of theirs was of force only to hinder , but not to help the proceedings in courts of justice ; to govern , and not to govern the people . and though they had no power to make laws , yet they took upon them to propound laws , and flattered and humoured the commons by the agrarian and frumentarian laws , by the first they divided the common fields , and conquered lands among the common people ; and by the latter , they afforded them corn at a cheaper or lower price : by these means these demagogues or tribunes of the commons led the vulgar by the noses , to allow whatsoever usurpations they pleased to make in government . the royal power of the consuls was never taken away from them by any law that i hear of , but continued in them all the time of their pretended popular government , to the very last , though repined at , and opposed in some particulars by the commons . the no-power , or negative power of the tribunes , did not long give content to the commons , and therefore they desired , that one of the consuls might be chosen out of the commonalty : the eager propounding of this point for the commons , and the diligent opposing of it by the nobility or senate , argues how much both parties regarded the sovereign power of a consul ; the dispute lasted fourscore years within two : the tribunes pressing it upon all advantages of opportunity , never gave over till they carried it by strong hand , or stubbornness , hindering all elections of the curule , or greater magistrates , for five years together , whereby the nobles were forced to yield the commons a consul's place , or else an anarchy was ready to destroy them all , and yet the nobility had for a good while allowed the commons military tribunes with consular power , which , in effect or substance , was all one with having one of the consuls a commoner , so that it was the bare name of a consul which the commons so long strived for with the nobility : in this contention , some years consuls were chosen , some years military tribunes in such confusion , that the roman historians cannot agree among themselves , what consuls to assign , or name for each year , although they have capitoline tables , sicilian and greek registers , and kalenders , fragments of capitoline marbles , linen books or records to help them : a good while the commons were content with the liberty of having one of the consuls a commoner ; but about fourscore years after they enjoyed this privilege , a desire took them to have it enacted , that a decree of the commons called a plebiscitum might be observed for a law , hortensius the dictator yielded to enact it , thereby to bring back the seditious commons , who departed to janiculum on the other side of tybur , because they were deeply engaged in debt in regard of long seditions and dissensions . the eleventh book of livy , where this sedition is set down , is lost ; we have only a touch of it in florus his epitome , and saint augustine mentions the plundering of many houses by the commons at their departing : this sedition was above years after the expulsion of kings , in all which time , the people of rome got the spoyl of almost all italy , and the wealth of very many rich cities : and yet the commons were in so great penury , and over-whelmed with debts , that they fell to plunder the rich houses of the citizens , which sounds not much for the honour of a popular government . this communicating of a legislative power to the commons , touching power of enfranchising allies , judgments penal , and fines , and those ordinances that concerned the good of the commons called plebiscita , was a dividing of the supreme power , and the giving a share of it to others , as well as to the consuls , and was in effect to destroy the legislative power , for to have two supremes is to have none , because the one may destroy the other , and is quite contrary to the indivisible nature of sovereignty . the truth is , the consuls , having but annual sovereignty , were glad for their own safety , and ease in matters of great importance , and weight , to call together sometimes the senate , who were their ordinary council , and many times the centuries of the people , who were their council extraordinary , that by their advice they might countenance , and strengthen such actions as were full of danger and envy : and thus the consuls by weakening their original power brought the government to confusion , civil dissension , and utter ruine : so dangerous a thing it is to shew favour to common people , who interpret all graces and favours for their rights , and just liberties : the consuls following the advice of the senate or people , did not take away their right of governing no more than kings lose their supremacy by taking advice in parliaments . not only the consuls , but also the pretors and censors ( two great offices , ordained only for the ease of the consuls , from whom an appeal lay to the consuls ) did in many things exercise an arbitrary or legislative power in the absence of the consuls , they had no laws to limit them : for many years after the creation of consuls , ten men were sent into greece to choose laws ; and after the twelve tables were confirmed , whatsoever the pretors , who were but the consuls substitutes , did command , was called jus honorarium ; and they were wont at the entrance into their office to collect and hang up for publick view , a form of administration of justice which they would observe , and though the edictum praetoris , expired with the pretors office , yet it was called edictum perpetuum . what peace the low-countries have found since their revolt is visible ; it is near about an hundred years since they set up for themselves , of all which time only twelve years they had a truce with the spaniard , yet in the next year , after the truce was agreed upon , the war of juliers brake forth , which engaged both parties ; so that upon the matter , they have lived in a continual war , for almost an hundred years ; had it not been for the aid of their neighbours , they had been long ago swallowed up , when they were glad humbly to offer their new hatch'd commonweal , and themselves vassals to the queen of england , after that the french king henry the third had refused to accept them as his subjects ; that little truce they had , was almost as costly as a war ; they being forced to keep about thirty thousand souldiers continually in garrison . two things they say they first fought about , religion and taxes , and they have prevailed it seems in both , for they have gotten all the religions in christendom , and pay the greatest taxes in the world ; they pay tribute half in half for food , and most necessary things , paying as much for tribute as the price of the thing sold ; excise is paid by all retailers of wine , and other commodities ; for each tun of beer six shillings , for each cow for the pail two stivers every week : for oxen , horses , sheep , and other beasts sold in the market the twelfth part at least ; be they never so oft sold by the year to and fro , the new master still pays as much : they pay five stivers for every bushel of their own wheat , which they use to grind in publick mills : these are the fruits of the low-country war. it will be said that venice is a commonwealth that enjoys peace . she indeed of all other states hath enjoyed of late the greatest peace ; but she owes it not to her kind of government , but to the natural situation of the city , having such a bank in the sea of near threescore miles , and such marshes towards the land , as make her unapproachable by land , or sea ; to these she is indebted for her peace at home , and what peace she hath abroad she buys at a dear rate ; and yet her peace is little better than a continued war ; the city always is in such perpetual fears , that many besieged cities are in more security ; a senator or gentleman dares not converse with any stranger in venice , shuns acquaintance , or dares not own it : they are no better than bandito's to all humane society . nay , no people in the world live in such jealousie one of another ; hence are their intricate solemnities , or rather lotteries in election of their magistrates , which in any other place , would be ridiculous and useless . the senators or gentlemen are not only jealous of the common people , whom they keep disarmed , but of one another , they dare not trust any of their own citizens to be a leader of their army , but are forced to hire , and entertain foreign princes for their generals , excepting their citizens from their wars , and hiring others in their places ; it cannot be said , that people live in peace , which are in such miserable fears continually . the venetians at first were subject to the roman emperour ; and for fear of the invasion of the hunnes forsook padua , and other places in italy ; and retired with all their substance to those islands where now venice stands : i do not read they had any leave to desert the defence of their prince and country , where they had got their wealth , much less to set up a government of their own ; it was no better than a rebellion , or revolting from the roman empire . at first they lived under a kind of oligarchy ; for several islands had each a tribune , who all met , and governed in common : but the dangerous seditions of their tribunes , put a necessity upon them to choose a duke for life , who , for many hundreds of years , had an absolute power ; under whose government venice flourished most , and got great victories , and rich possessions . but by insensible degrees , the great council of the gentlemen have for many years been lessening the power of their dukes , and have at last quite taken it away . it is a strange errour for any man to believe , that the government of venice hath been always the same that it is now : he that reads but the history of venice , may find for a long time a sovereign power in their dukes : and that for these last two hundred years , since the diminishing of that power , there have been no great victories and conquests obtained by that estate . that which exceeds admiration , is , that contarene hath the confidence to affirm the present government of venice to be a mixed form of monarchy , democraty , and aristocraty : for , whereas he makes the duke to have the person and shew of a king ; he after confesseth , that the duke can do nothing at all alone , and being joyned with other magistrates , he hath no more authority than any of them : also the power of the magistrates is so small , that no one of them , how great soever he be , can determine of any thing of moment , without the allowance of the council . so that this duke is but a man dressed up in purple , a king only in pomp and ornament , in power but a senator , within the city a captive , without a traytor , if he go without leave . as little reason is there to think a popular estate is to be found in the great council of venice , or s. p. q. v. for it doth not consist of the fortieth part of the people , but only of those they call patritians or gentlemen ; for the commons , neither by themselves , nor by any chosen by them for their representors , are admitted to be any part of the great council : and if the gentlemen of venice have any right to keep the government in their own hands , and to exclude the commons , they never had it given them by the people , but at first were beholding to monarchy for their nobility . this may further be noted , that though venice of late enjoyed peace abroad , yet it had been with that charge , either for fortification and defence , or in bribery so excessive , whereby of late upon any terms they purchased their peace , that it is said their taxes are such , that christians generally live better under the turk , than under the venetians , for there is not a grain of corn , a spoonful of wine , salt , eggs , birds , beasts , fowl , or fish sold , that payeth not a certain custom : upon occasions the labourers and crafts-men pay a rate by the poll monthly , they receive incredible gains by usury of the jews ; for in every city they keep open shops of interest , taking pawns after fifteen in the hundred , and if at the years end it be not redeemed , it is forfeited , or at the least , sold at great loss . the revenues which the very courtezans pay for toleration , maintains no less than a dozen of gallies . by what hath been said , it may be judged how unagreeable the popular government of rome heretofore , and of venice , and the vnited provinces at present , are , either for religion or peace ( which two are principal ingredients of government ) and so consequently not fit to be reckoned for forms , since whatsoever is either good or tolerable in either of their governments , is borrowed or patched up of a broken , and distracted monarchy . lastly , though venice and the low countries are the only remarkable places in this age that reject monarchy ; yet neither of them pretend their government to be founded upon any original right of the people , or have the common people any power amongst them , or any chosen by them . never was any popular estate in the world famous for keeping themselves in peace ; all their glory hath been for quarrelling and fighting . those that are willing to be perswaded , that the power of government is originally in the people , finding how impossible it is for any people to exercise such power , do surmise , that though the people cannot govern , yet they may choose representors or trustees , that may manage this power for the people , and such representors must be surmised to be the people . and since such representors cannot truly be chosen by the people , they are fain to divide the people into several parts , as of provinces , cities , and burrough-towns , and to allow to every one of those parts to choose one representor or more of their own : and such representors , though not any of them be chosen by the whole , or major part of the people , yet still must be surmised to be the people ; nay , though not one of them be chosen either by the people , or the major part of the people of any province , city , or burrough , for which they serve , but only a smaller part , still it must be said to be the people . now when such representors of the people do assemble or meet , it is never seen that all of them can at one time meet together ; and so there never appears a true , or full representation of the whole people of the nation , the representors of one part or other being absent , but still they must be imagined to be the people . and when such imperfect assemblies be met , though not half be present , they proceed : and though their number be never so small , yet it is so big , that in the debate of any business of moment , they know not how to handle it , without referring it to a fewer number than themselves , though themselves are not so many as they should be . thus those that are chosen to represent the people , are necessitated to choose others , to represent the representors themselves ; a trustee of the north doth delegate his power to a trustee of the south ; and one of the east may substitute one of the west for his proxy : hereby it comes to pass , that publick debates which are imagined to be referred to a general assembly of a kingdom , are contracted into a particular or private assembly , than which nothing can be more destructive , or contrary to the nature of publick assemblies . each company of such trustees hath a prolocutor , or speaker ; who , by the help of three or four of his fellows that are most active , may easily comply in gratifying one the other , so that each of them in their turns may sway the trustees , whilst one man , for himself or his friend , may rule in one business , and another man for himself or his friend prevail in another cause , till such a number of trustees be reduced to so many petty monarchs as there be men of it . so in all popularities , where a general council , or great assembly of the people meet , they find it impossible to dispatch any great action , either with expedition or secrecy , if a publick free debate be admitted ; and therefore are constrained to epitomize , and sub-epitomize themselves so long , till at last they crumble away into the atomes of monarchy , which is the next degree to anarchy ; for anarchy is nothing else but a broken monarchy , where every man is his own monarch , or governour . whereas the power of the people in choosing both their government and governours is of late highly magnified , as if they were able to choose the best and excellentest men for that purpose . we shall find it true what aristotle hath affirmed , that to choose well is the office of him that hath knowledge ; none can choose a geometrician but he that hath skill in geometry , l. . c. . for , saith he , all men esteem not excellency to be one and the same , l. . c. . a great deal of talk there is in the world of the freedom and liberty that they say is to be found in popular commonweals ; it is worth the enquiry how far , and in what sence this speech of liberty is true . true liberty is for every man to do what he list , or to live as he please , and not to be tied to any laws . but such liberty is not to be found in any commonweal ; for there are more laws in popular estates than any where else ; and so consequently less liberty : and government many say was invented to take away liberty , and not to give it to every man ; such liberty cannot be ; if it should , there would be no government at all : therefore aristotle , lib. . cap. . it is profitable not to be lawful to do every thing that we will , for power to do what one will , cannot restrain that evil that is in every man ; so that true liberty cannot , nor should not be in any estate . but the only liberty that the talkers of liberty can mean , is a liberty for some men to rule and to be ruled , for so aristotle expounds it ; one while to govern , another while to be governed ; to be a king in the forenoon , and a subject in the afternoon ; this is the only liberty that a popular estate can brag of , that where a monarchy hath but one king , their government hath the liberty to have many kings by turns . if the common people look for any other liberty , either of their persons or their purses , they are pitifully deceived , for a perpetual army and taxes are the principal materials of all popular regiments : never yet any stood without them , and very seldom continued with them ; many popular estates have started up , but few have lasted ; it is no hard matter for any kind of government to last one , or two , or three days , l. . c. . for all such as out of hope of liberty , attempt to erect new forms of government , he gives this prudent lesson . we must look well into the continuance of time , and remembrance of many years , wherein the means tending to establish community had not lain hid , if they had been good and useful ; for almost all things have been found out , albeit some have not been received , and other some have been rejected , after men have had experience of them ; l. . c. . it is believed by many , that at the very first assembling of the people , it was unanimously agreed in the first place , that the consent of the major part should bind the whole ; and that though this first agreement cannot possibly be proved , either how , or by whom it should be made ; yet it must necessarily be believed or supposed , because otherwise there could be no lawful government at all . that there could be no lawful government , except a general consent of the whole people be first surmised , is no sound proposition ; yet true it is , that there could be no popular government without it . but if there were at first a government without being beholden to the people for their consent , as all men confess there was , i find no reason but that there may be so still , without asking leave of the multitude . if it be true , that men are by nature free-born , and not to be governed without their own consents , and that self-preservation is to be regarded in the first place , it is not lawful for any government but self-government to be in the world , it were sin in the people to desire , or attempt to consent to any other government : if the fathers will promise for themselves to be slaves , yet for their children they cannot , who have always the same right to set themselves at liberty , which their fathers had to enslave themselves . to pretend that a major part , or the silent consent of any part , may be interpreted to bind the whole people , is both unreasonable and unnatural ; it is against all reason for men to bind others , where it is against nature for men to bind themselves . men that boast so much of natural freedom , are not willing to consider how contradictory and destructive the power of a major part is to the natural liberty of the whole people ; the two grand favourites of the subjects , liberty and property ( for which most men pretend to strive ) are as contrary as fire to water , and cannot stand together . though by humane laws in voluntary actions , a major part may be tolerated to bind the whole multitude , yet in necessary actions , such as those of nature are , it cannot be so . besides , if it were possible for the whole people to choose their representors , then either every , each one of these representors ought to be particularly chosen by the whole people , and not one representor by one part , and another representor by another part of the people , or else it is necessary , that continually the entire number of the representors be present , because otherwise the whole people is never represented . again , it is impossible for the people , though they might and would choose a government , or governours , ever to be able to do it : for the people , to speak truly and properly , is a thing or body in continual alteration and change , it never continues one minute the same , being composed of a multitude of parts , whereof divers continually decay and perish , and others renew and succeed in their places , they which are the people this minute , are not the people the next minute . if it be answered , that it is impossible to stand so strictly , as to have the consent of the whole people ; and therefore that which cannot be , must be supposed to be the act of the whole people : this is a strange answer , first to affirm a necessity of having the peoples consent , then to confess an impossibility of having it . if but once that liberty , which is esteemed so sacred , be broken , or taken away but from one of the meanest or basest of all the people ; a wide gap is thereby opened for any multitude whatsoever , that is able to call themselves , or whomsoever they please , the people . howsoever men are naturally willing to be perswaded , that all sovereignty flows from the consent of the people , and that without it no true title can be made to any supremacy ; and that it is so currant an axiom of late , that it will certainly pass without contradiction as a late exercitator tells us : yet there are many and great difficulties in the point never yet determined , not so much as disputed , all which the exercitator waves and declines , professing he will not insist upon the distinctions , touching the manner of the peoples passing their consent , nor determine which of them is sufficient , and which not to make the right or title ; whether it must be antecedent to possession , or may be consequent : express , or tacite : collective , or representative : absolute , or conditionated : free , or inforced : revocable , or irrevocable . all these are material doubts concerning the peoples title , and though the exercitator will not himself determine what consent is sufficient , and what not , to make a right or title , yet he might have been so courteous , as to have directed us , to whom we might go for resolution in these cases . but the truth is , that amongst all them that plead the necessity of the consent of the people , none of them hath ever toucht upon these so necessary doctrines ; it is a task it seems too difficult , otherwise surely it would not have been neglected , considering how necessary it is to resolve the conscience , touching the manner of the peoples passing their consent ; and what is sufficient , and what not , to make , or derive a right , or title from the people . no multitude or great assembly of any nation , though they be all of them never so good and vertuous , can possibly govern ; this may be evidently discovered by considering the actions of great and numerous assemblies , how they are necessitated to relinquish that supreme power , which they think they exercise , and to delegate it to a few . there are two parts of the supreme power , the legislative , and the executive , neither of these can a great assembly truly act . if a new law be to be made it may in the general receive the proposal of it from one or more of the general assembly , but the forming , penning , or framing it into a law , is committed to a few , because a great number of persons cannot without tedious , and dilatory debates , examine the benefits and mischiefs of a law. thus in the very first beginning the intention of a general assembly is frustrated ; then after a law is penned or framed , when it comes to be questioned , whether it shall pass or nay ; though it be voted in a full assembly , yet by the rules of the assembly , they are all so tied up , and barred from a free and full debate ; that when any man hath given the reasons of his opinion ; if those reasons be argued against , he is not permitted to reply in justification or explanation of them , but when he hath once spoken , he must be heard no more : which is a main denial of that freedom of debate , for which the great assembly is alledged to be ordained in the high point of legislative power . the same may be said , touching the executive power , if a cause be brought before a great assembly , the first thing done , is to refer , or commit it to some few of the assembly , who are trusted with the examining the proofs , and witnesses , and to make report to the general assembly ; who upon the report proceed to give their judgments without any publick hearing , or interrogating the witnesses , upon whose testimonies diligently examined every man that will pass a conscientious judgment is to rely . thus the legislative and executive power are never truly practised in a great assembly ; the true reason whereof is , if freedom be given to debate , never any thing could be agreed upon without endless disputes ; meer necessity compels to refer main transactions of business to particular congregations and committees . those governments that seem to be popular are kinds of petty monarchies , which may thus appear : government is a relation between the governours , and the governed , the one cannot be without the other , mutuò se ponunt & auferunt ; where a command or law proceeds from a major part , there those individual persons that concurred in the vote , are the governours , because the law is only their will in particular : the power of a major part being a contingent , or casual thing , expires in the very act it self of voting , which power of a major part is grounded upon a supposition , that they are the stronger part ; when the vote is past , these votes , which are the major part , return again , and are incorporated into the whole assembly , and are buried as it were in that lump , and no otherwise considered ; the act or law ordained by such a vote , loseth the makers of it , before it comes to be obeyed ; for when it comes to be put in execution , it becomes the will of those who enjoyn it , and force obedience to it , not by virtue of any power derived from the makers of the law. no man can say , that during the reign of the late queen elizabeth , that king henry the eighth , or edward the sixth did govern , although that many of the laws that were made in those two former princes times , were observed , and executed under her government ; but those laws , though made by her predecessours , yet became the laws of her present government ; who willed and commanded the execution of them , and had the same power to correct , interpret , or mitigate them , which the first makers of them had ; every law must always have some present known person in being , whose will it must be to make it a law for the present ; this cannot be said of the major part of any assembly , because that major part instantly ceaseth , as soon as ever it hath voted : an infallible argument whereof is this , that the same major part after the vote given , hath no power to correct , alter , or mitigate it , or to cause it to be put in execution ; so that he that shall act , or cause that law to be executed , makes himself the commander , or willer of it , which was originally the will of others : it is said by mr. hobs in his leviathan , page . nothing is law , where the legislator cannot be known , for there must be manifest signs , that it proceedeth from the will of the sovereign ; there is requisite , not only a declaration of the law , but also sufficient signs of the author and the authority . that senate or great council , wherein it is conceived the supreme , or legislative power doth rest , consists of those persons who are actually subjects at the very same time , wherein they exercise their legislative power , and at the same instant may be guilty of breaking one law , whilst they are making another law ; for it is not the whole and entire will of every particular person in the assembly , but that part only of his will , which accidentally falls out to concur with the will of the greater part : so that the sharers of the legislative power have each of them , perhaps not a hundredth part of the legislative power ( which in it self is indivisible ) and that not in act , but in possibility , only in one particular point for that moment , whilst they give their vote . to close this point which may seem strange and new to some , i will produce the judgment of bodin , in his sixth book of a commonweal , and the fourth chapter ; his words are , the chief point of a commonweal , which is the right of sovereignty , cannot be , nor insist , to speak properly , but in monarchy ; for none can be sovereign in a commonweal , but one alone ; if they be two , or three , or more , no one is sovereign , for that no one of them can give or take a law from his companion : and although we imagine a body of many lords ; or of a whole people to hold the sovereignty , yet hath it no true ground nor support , if there be not a head with absolute power to unite them together , which a simple magistrate without sovereign authority cannot do . and if it chance that the lords , or tribes of the people be divided ( as it often falls out ) then must they fall to arms one against another : and although the greatest part be of one opinion , yet may it so happen , as the lesser part , having many legions , and making a head , may oppose it self against the greater number , and get the victory . we see the difficulties which are , and always have been in popular estates , whereas they hold contrary parts , and for divers magistrates , some demand peace , others war ; some will have this law , others that ; some will have one commander , others another ; some will treat a league with the king of france , others with the king of spain , corrupted or drawn , some one way , some another , making open war , as hath been seen in our age amongst the grisons , &c. upon these texts of aristotle fore-cited , and from the mutability of the roman popularity , which aristotle lived not to see , i leave the learned to consider , whether it be not probable that these , or the like paradoxes may be inferred to be the plain mind of aristotle , viz. . that there is no form of government , but monarchy only . . that there is no monarchy , but paternal . . that there is no paternal monarchy , but absolute , or arbitrary . . that there is no such thing as an aristocraty or democraty . . that there is no such form of government as a tyranny . . that the people are not born free by nature . directions for obedience to government in dangerous or doubtful times . all those who so eagerly strive for an original power to be in the people , do with one consent acknowledge , that originally the supreme power was in the fatherhood ; and that the first kings were fathers of families : this is not only evident , and affirmed by aristotle ; but yielded unto by grotius , mr. selden , mr. hobbs , mr. ascam ; and all others of that party , not one excepted , that i know of . now for those that confess an original subjection in children , to be governed by their parents , to dream of an original freedom in mankind , is to contradict themselves ; and to make subjects to be free , and kings to be limited ; to imagine such pactions and contracts between kings and people , as cannot be proved ever to have been made , or can ever be described or fancied , how it is possible for such contracts ever to have been , is a boldness to be wondred at . mr. selden confesseth , that adam , by donation from god , was made the general lord of all things , not without such a private dominion to himself , as ( without his grant ) did exclude his children . and by donation , or assignation , or some kind of concession ( before he was dead , or left any heir to succeed him ) his children had their distinct territories , by right of private dominion . abel had his flocks , and pastures for them , cain had his fields for corn , and the land of nod , where he built himself a city . it is confessed , that in the infancy of the world , the paternal government was monarchical ; but when the world was replenished with multitude of people , then the paternal government ceased , and was lost ; and an elective kind of government by the people , was brought into the world. to this it may be answered , that the paternal power cannot be lost ; it may either be transferr'd or usurped ; but never lost , or ceaseth . god , who is the giver of power , may transfer it from the father to some other ; he gave to saul a fatherly power over his father kish , god also hath given to the father a right or liberty to alien his power over his children , to any other ; whence we find the sale and gift of children , to have been much in use in the beginning of the world , when men had their servants for a possession and an inheritance as well as other goods : whereupon we find the power of castrating , and making eunuchs much in use in old times . as the power of the father may be lawfully transferr'd or aliened , so it may be unjustly usurped : and in usurpation , the title of an usurper is before , and better than the title of any other than of him that had a former right : for he hath a possession by the permissive will of god , which permission , how long it may endure , no man ordinarily knows . every man is to preserve his own life for the service of god , and of his king or father , and is so far to obey an usurper , as may tend not only to the preservation of his king and father , but sometimes even to the preservation of the usurper himself , when probably he may thereby be reserved to the correction , or mercy of his true superiour ; though by humane laws , a long prescription may take away right , yet divine right never dies , nor can be lost , or taken away . every man that is born , is so far from being free-born , that by his very birth he becomes a subject to him that begets him : under which subjection he is always to live , unless by immediate appointment from god , or by the grant or death of his father , he become possessed of that power to which he was subject . the right of fatherly government was ordained by god , for the preservation of mankind ; if it be usurped , the usurper may be so far obeyed , as may tend to the preservation of the subjects , who may thereby be enabled to perform their duty to their true and right sovereign , when time shall serve : in such cases to obey an usurper , is properly to obey the first and right governour , who must be presumed to desire the safety of his subjects : the command of an usurper is not to be obeyed in any thing tending to the destruction of the person of the governour ; whose being in the first place is to be looked after . it hath been said , that there have been so many usurpations by conquest in all kingdoms , that all kings are usurpers , or the heirs or successors of usurpers ; and therefore any usurper , if he can but get the possession of a kingdom , hath as good a title as any other . answer . the first usurper hath the best title , being , as was said , in possession by the permission of god ; and where an usurper hath continued so long , that the knowledge of the right heir be lost by all the subjects , in such a case an usurper in possession is to be taken and reputed by such subjects for the true heir , and is to be obeyed by them as their father . as no man hath an infallible certitude , but only a moral knowledge , which is no other than a probable perswasion grounded upon a peaceable possession , which is a warrant for subjection to parents and governours ; for we may not say , because children have no infallible , or necessary certainty who are their true parents , that therefore they need not obey , because they are uncertain : it is sufficient , and as much as humane nature is capable of , for children to rely upon a credible perswasion ; for otherwise the commandment of honour thy father , would be a vain commandment , and not possible to be observed . by humane positive laws , a possession time out of mind takes away , or barrs a former right , to avoid a general mischief , of bringing all right into a disputation not decideable by proof , and consequently to the overthrow of all civil government , in grants , gifts , and contracts , between man and man : but in grants and gifts that have their original from god or nature , as the power of the father hath , no inferiour power of man can limit , nor make any law of prescription against them : upon this ground is built that common maxim , that nullum tempus occurrit regi , no time bars a king. all power on earth is either derived or usurped from the fatherly power , there being no other original to be found of any power whatsoever ; for if there should be granted two sorts of power without any subordination of one to the other , they would be in perpetual strife which should be supreme , for two supremes cannot agree ; if the fatherly power be supreme , then the power of the people must be subordinate , and depend on it ; if the power of the people be supreme , then the fatherly power must submit to it , and cannot be exercised without the licence of the people , which must quite destroy the frame and course of nature . even the power which god himself exerciseth over mankind is by right of fatherhood ; he is both the king and father of us all ; as god hath exalted the dignity of earthly kings , by communicating to them his own title , by saying they are gods ; so on the other side , he hath been pleased as it were to humble himself , by assuming the title of a king to express his power , and not the title of any popular government ; we find it is a punishment to have no king , hosea , ch . . . and promised , as a blessing to abraham , gen. . . that kings shall come out of thee . every man hath a part or share in the preservation of mankind in general , he that usurps the power of a superiour , thereby puts upon himself a necessity of acting the duty of a superiour in the preservation of them over whom he hath usurped , unless he will aggravate one heinous crime , by committing another more horrid ; he that takes upon him the power of a superiour sins sufficiently , and to the purpose : but he that proceeds to destroy both his superiour , and those under the superiours protection , goeth a strain higher , by adding murther to robbery ; if government be hindered , mankind perisheth , an usurper by hindering the government of another , brings a necessity upon himself to govern , his duty before usurpation was only to be ministerial , or instrumental in the preservation of others by his obedience ; but when he denies his own , and hinders the obedience of others , he doth not only not help , but is the cause of the distraction in hindering his superiour to perform his duty , he makes the duty his own : if a superiour cannot protract , it is his part to desire to be able to do it , which he cannot do in the future if in the present they be destroyed for want of government : therefore it is to be presumed , that the superiour desires the preservation of them that should be subject to him ; and so likewise it may be presumed , that an usurper in general doth the will of his superiour , by preserving the people by government , and it is not improper to say , that in obeying an usurper , we may obey primarily the true superiour , so long as our obedience aims at the preservation of those in subjection , and not at the destruction of the true governour . not only the usurper , but those also over whom power is usurped , may joyn in the preservation of themselves , yea , and in the preservation sometimes of the usurper himself . thus there may be a conditional duty , or right in an usurper to govern ; that is to say , supposing him to be so wicked as to usurp , and not willing to surrender or forgo his usurpation , he is then bound to protect by government , or else he encreaseth , and multiplieth his sin. though an usurper can never gain a right from the true superiour , yet from those that are subjects he may ; for if they know no other that hath a better title than the usurper , then as to them the usurper in possession hath a true right . such a qualified right is found at first in all usurpers , as is in thieves who have stolen goods , and during the time they are possessed of them , have a title in law against all others but the true owners , and such usurpers to divers intents and purposes may be obeyed . neither is he only an usurper who obtains the government , but all they are partakers in the usurpation , who have either failed to give assistance to their lawful sovereign , or have given aid either by their persons , estates or counsels for the destroying of that governour , under whose protection they have been born and preserved ; for although it should be granted , that protection and subjection are reciprocal , so that where the first fails , the latter ceaseth ; yet it must be remembred , that where a man hath been born under the protection of a long and peaceable government , he owes an assistance for the preservation of that government that hath protected him , and is the author of his own disobedience . it is said by some , that an usurped power may be obeyed in things that are lawful : but it may not be obeyed not only in lawful things , but also in things indifferent : obedience in things indifferent , is necessary ; not indifferent . for in things necessarily good god is immediately obeyed , superiours only by consequence : if men command things evil , obedience is due only by tolerating what they inflict : not by performing what they require : in the first they declare what god commands to be done , in the latter what to be suffered , so it remains , that things indifferent only are the proper object of humane laws . actions are to be considered simply and alone , and so are good as being motions depending on the first mover ; or joyntly with circumstances : and that in a double manner . . in regard of the ability or possibility whilest they may be done . . in the act when they be performed : before they be done they be indifferent ; but once breaking out into act , they become distinctly good or evil according to the circumstances which determine the same . now an action commanded , is supposed as not yet done ( whereupon the hebrews call the imperative mood the first future ) and so remaineth many times indifferent . some may be of opinion , that if obedience may be given to an usurper in things indifferent , as well as to a lawful power ; that then there is as much obedience due to an usurped power , as to a lawful . but it is a mistake ; for though it be granted that in things indifferent , an usurper may be obeyed , as well as a lawful governour ; yet herein lieth a main difference , that some things are indifferent for a lawful superiour , which are not indifferent , but unlawful to an usurper to enjoyn . usurpation is the resisting , and taking away the power from him , who hath such a former right to govern the usurper , as cannot be lawfully taken away : so that it cannot be just for an usurper , to take advantage of his own unlawful act , or create himself a title by continuation of his own injustice , which aggravates , and never extenuates his crime : and if it never can be an act indifferent for the usurper himself to disobey his lawful sovereign , much less can it be indifferent for him to command another to do that to which he hath no right himself . it is only then a matter indifferent for an usurper to command , when the actions enjoyned are such ; as the lawful superiour is commanded by the law of god , to provide for the benefit of his subjects , by the same , or other like restriction of such indifferent things ; and it is to be presumed , if he had not been hindered , would have commanded the same , or the like laws . observations concerning the original of government , upon mr. hobs his leviathan . mr. milton against salmatius . h. grotius de jure belli . mr. hunton's treatise of monarchy . arist . pol. lib. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the preface . with no small content i read mr. hobs's book de cive , and his leviathan , about the rights of sovereignty , which no man , that i know , hath so amply and judiciously handled : i consent with him about the rights of exercising government , but i cannot agree to his means of acquiring it . it may seem strange i should praise his building , and yet mislike his foundation ; but so it is , his jus naturae , and his regnum institutivum , will not down with me : they appear full of contradiction and impossibilities ; a few short notes about them , i here offer , wishing he would consider , whether his building would not stand firmer upon the principles of regnum patrimoniale ( as he calls it ) both according to scripture and reason . since he confesseth the father , being before the institution of a commonwealth , was originally an absolute sovereign , with power of life and death , and that a great family , as to the rights of sovereignty , is a little monarchy . if , according to the order of nature , he had bandled paternal government before that by institution , there would have been little liberty left in the subjects of the family to consent to institution of government . in his pleading the cause of the people , he arms them with a very large commission of array ; which is , a right in nature for every man , to war against every man when he please : and also a right for all the people to govern . this latter point , although he affirm in words , yet by consequence he denies , as to me it seemeth . he saith , a representative may be of all , or but of a part of the people . if it be of all , he terms it a democraty , which is the government of the people . but how can such a commonwealth be generated ? for if every man covenant with every man , who shall be left to be the representative ? if all must be representatives , who will remain to covenant ? for he that is sovereign makes no covenant by his doctrine . it is not all that will come together , that makes the democraty , but all that have power by covenant ; thus his democraty by institution fails . the same may be said of a democraty by acquisition ; for if all be conquerours , who shall covenant for life and liberty ? and if all be not conquerours , how can it be a democraty by conquest ? a paternal democraty i am confident he will not affirm ; so that in conclusion the poor people are deprived of their government , if there can be no democraty , by his principles . next , if a representative aristocratical of a part of the people be free from covenanting , then that whole assembly ( call it what you will ) though it be never so great , is in the state of nature , and every one of that assembly hath a right not only to kill any of the subjects that they meet with in the streets , but also they all have a natural right to cut one anothers throats , even while they sit together in council , by his principles . in this miserable condition of war is his representative aristocratical by institution . a commonwealth by conquest , he teacheth , is then acquired , when the vanquished , to avoid present death , covenanteth , that so long as his life , and the liberty of his body is allowed him , the victor shall have the vse of it at his pleasure . here i would know how the liberty of the vanquished can be allowed , if the victor have the vse of it at pleasure , or how it is possible for the victor to perform his covenant , except he could always stand by every particular man to protect his life and liberty ? in his review and conclusion he resolves , that an ordinary subject hath liberty to submit , when the means of his life is within the guards and garisons of the enemy . it seems hereby that the rights of sovereignty by institution may be forfeited , for the subject cannot be at liberty to submit to a conquerour , except his former subjection be forfeited for want of protection . if his conquerour be in the state of nature when he conquers , he hath a right without any covenant made with the conquered : if conquest be defined to be the acquiring of right of sovereignty by victory , why is it said , the right is acquired in the peoples submission , by which they contract with the victor , promising obedience for life and liberty ? hath not every one in the state of nature a right to sovereignty before conquest , which only puts him in possession of his right ? if his conquerour be not in the state of nature , but a subject by covenant , how can he get a right of sovereignty by conquest , when neither he himself hath right to conquer , nor subjects a liberty to submit ? since a former contract lawfully made , cannot lawfully be broken by them . i wish the title of the book had not been of a commonwealth , but of a weal publick , or commonweal , which is the true word , carefully observed by our translator of bodin de republica into english . many ignorant men are apt by the name of commonwealth to understand a popular government , wherein wealth and all things shall be common , tending to the levelling community in the state of pure nature . observations on mr. hobs's leviathan : or , his artificial man a commonwealth . i. if god created only adam , and of a piece of him made the woman ; and if by generation from them two , as parts of them , all mankind be propagated : if also god gave to adam not only the dominion over the woman and the children that should issue from them , but also over the whole earth to subdue it , and over all the creatures on it , so that as long as adam lived no man could claim or enjoy any thing but by donation , assignation , or permission from him ; i wonder how the right of nature can be imagined by mr. hobs , which he saith , pag. . is , a liberty for each man to use his own power as he will himself for preservation of his own life : a condition of war of every one against every one , a right of every man to every thing , even to one anothers body , especially since himself affirms , pag. . that originally the father of every man was also his sovereign lord , with power over him of life and death . ii. mr. hobs confesseth and believes it was never generally so , that there was such a jus naturae ; and if not generally , then not at all , for one exception bars all if he mark it well ; whereas he imagines such a right of nature may be now practised in america , he confesseth a government there of families , which government how small or brutish soever ( as he calls it ) is sufficient to destroy his jus naturale . iii. i cannot understand how this right of nature can be conceived without imagining a company of men at the very first to have been all created together without any dependency one of another , or as mushroms ( fungorum more ) they all on a sudden were sprung out of the earth without any obligation one to another , as mr. hobs's words are in his book de cive , cap. . sect . . the scripture teacheth us otherwise , that all men came by succession , and generation from one man : we must not deny the truth of the history of the creation . iv. it is not to be thought that god would create man in a condition worse than any beasts , as if he made men to no other end by nature but to destroy one another ; a right for the father to destroy or eat his children , and for children to do the like by their parents , is worse than canibals . this horrid condition of pure nature when mr. hobs was charged with , his refuge was to answer , that no son can be understood to be in this state of pure nature : which is all one with denying his own principle , for if men be not free-born , it is not possible for him to assign and prove any other time for them to claim a right of nature to liberty , if not at their birth . v. but if it be allowed ( which is yet most false ) that a company of men were at first without a common power to keep them in awe ; i do not see why such a condition must be called a state of war of all men against all men : indeed if such a multitude of men should be created as the earth could not well nourish , there might be cause for men to destroy one another rather than perish for want of food ; but god was no such niggard in the creation , and there being plenty of sustenance and room for all men , there is no cause or use of war till men be hindered in the preservation of life , so that there is no absolute necessity of war in the state of pure nature ; it is the right of nature for every man to live in peace , that so he may tend the preservation of his life , which whilest he is in actual war he cannot do . war of it self as it is war preserves no mans life , it only helps us to preserve and obtain the means to live : if every man tend the right of preserving life , which may be done in peace , there is no cause of war. vi. but admit the state of nature were the state of war ; let us see what help mr. hobs hath for it . it is a principle of his , that the law of nature is a rule found out by reason , ( i do think it is given by god ) pag. . forbidding a man to do that which is destructive to his life , and to omit that by which he thinks it may be best preserved : if the right of nature be a liberty for a man to do any thing he thinks fit to preserve his life , then in the first place nature must teach him that life is to be preserved , and so consequently forbids to do that which may destroy or take away the means of life , or to omit that by which it may be preserved : and thus the right of nature and the law of nature will be all one : for i think mr. hobs will not say the right of nature is a liberty for man to destroy his own life . the law of nature might better have been said to consist in a command to preserve or not to omit the means of preserving life , than in a prohibition to destroy , or to omit it . vii . another principle i meet with , pag. . if other men will not lay down their right as well as he , then there is no reason for any to devest himself of his : hence it follows , that if all the men in the world do not agree , no commonwealth can be established , it is a thing impossible for all the men in the world , every man with every man , to covenant to lay down their right . nay , it is not possible to be done in the smallest kingdom , though all men should spend their whole lives in nothing else but in running up and down to covenant . viii . right may be laid aside but not transferr'd , for pag. . he that renounceth or passeth away his right , giveth not to any other man a right which he had not before , and reserves a right in himself against all those with whom he doth not covenant . ix . pag. . the only way to erect a common power or a commonwealth ; is for men to confer all their power and strength upon one man , or one assembly of men , that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices to one will ; which is to appoint one man or an assembly of men to bear their person , to submit their wills to his will : this is a real vnity of them all in one person , made by covenant of every man with every man , as if every man should say to every man , i authorize , and give up my right of governing my self to this man , or this assembly of men , on this condition , that thou give up thy right to him , and authorize all his actions . this done , the multitude so united in one person , is called a commonwealth . to authorize and give up his right of governing himself , to confer all his power and strength , and to submit his will to another , is to lay down his right of resisting : for if right of nature be a liberty to use power for preservation of life , laying down of that power must be a relinquishing of power to preserve or defend life , otherwise a man relinquisheth nothing . to reduce all the wills of an assembly by plurality of voices to one will , is not a proper speech , for it is not a plurality but a totality of voices which makes an assembly be of one will , otherwise it is but the one will of a major part of the assembly , the negative voice of any one hinders the being of the one will of the assembly , there is nothing more destructive to the true nature of a lawful assembly , than to allow a major part to prevail when the whole only hath right . for a man to give up his right to one that never covenants to protect , is a great folly , since it is neither in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself , nor can he hope for any other good , by standing out of the way , that the other may enjoy his own original right , without hinderance from him by reason of so much diminution of impediments , pag. . x. the liberty , saith mr. hobs , whereof there is so frequent and honourable mention in the histories and philosophy of the ancient greeks and romans , and in the writings & discourse of those that from them have received all their learning in the politicks , is not the liberty of particular men , but the liberty of the commonwealth . whether a commonwealth be monarchical or popular , the freedom is still the same . here i find mr. hobs is much mistaken : for the liberty of the athenians and romans was a liberty only to be found in popular estates , and not in monarchies . this is clear by aristotle , who calls a city a community of freemen , meaning every particular citizen to be free . not that every particular man had a liberty to resist his governour , or do what he list , but a liberty only for particular men , to govern and to be governed by turns , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are aristotle's words , this was a liberty not to be found in hereditary monarchies ; so tacitus mentioning the several governments of rome , joyns the consulship and liberty to be brought in by brutus , because by the annual election of consuls , particular citizens came in their course to govern and to be governed . this may be confirmed by the complaint of our authour , which followeth : it is an easie thing for men to be deceived by the specious name of liberty : and for want of judgment to distinguish , mistake that for their private inheritance or birthright , which is the right of the publick only : and when the same errour is confirmed by the authority of men in reputation for their writings on this subject , it is no wonder if it produce sedition and change of government . in the western parts of the world , we are made to receive our opinions concerning the institution and right of commonwealths from aristotle and cicero , and other men , greeks and romans ; that living under popular estates , derived those rights not from the principles of nature , but transcribed them into their books out of the practice of their own commonwealths , which were popular . and because the athenians were taught ( to keep them from desire of changing their government ) that they were free-men , and all that lived under monarchy , slaves : therefore aristotle puts it down in his politicks . in democracy liberty is to be supposed , for it 's commonly held that no man is free in any other government . so cicero and other writers grounded their civil doctrine on the opinions of the romans , who were taught to hate monarchy , at first , by them that having deposed their sovereign , shared amongst them the sovereignty of rome . and by reading of these greek and latine authors , men from their childhood have gotten a habit ( under a false shew of liberty ) of favouring tumults , and of licentious controuling the actions of their sovereigns . xi . pag. . dominion paternal not attained by generation , but by contract , which is the childs consent , either express , or by other sufficient arguments declared . how a child can express consent , or by other sufficient arguments declare it before it comes to the age of discretion i understand not , yet all men grant it is due before consent can be given , and i take it mr. hobs is of the same mind , pag. . where he teacheth , that abraham's children were bound to obey what abraham should declare to them for god's law : which they could not be but in vertue of the obedience they owed to their parents ; they owed , not they covenanted to give . also where he saith , pag. . the father and master being before the institution of commonweals absolute sovereigns in their own families , how can it be said that either children or servants were in the state of jus naturae till the institutions of commonweals ? it is said by mr. hobs , in his book de cive , cap. . section . the mother originally hath the government of her children , and from her the father derives his right , because she brings forth and first nourisheth them . but we know that god at the creation gave the sovereignty to the man over the woman , as being the nobler and principal agent in generation . as to the objection , that it is not known who is the father to the son , but by the discovery of the mother , and that he is his son whom the mother will , and therefore he is the mother's : the answer is , that it is not at the will of the mother to make whom she will the father , for if the mother be not in possession of a husband , the child is not reckoned to have any father at all ; but if she be in the possession of a man , the child , notwithstanding whatsoever the woman discovereth to the contrary , is still reputed to be his in whose possession she is . no child naturally and infallibly knows who are his true parents , yet he must obey those that in common reputation are so , otherwise the commandment of honour thy father and thy mother were in vain , and no child bound to the obedience of it . xii . if the government of one man , and the government of two men , make two several kinds of government , why may not the government of two , and the government of three do the like , and make a third ? and so every differing number a differing kind of common-wealth . if an assembly of all ( as mr. hobs saith ) that will come together be a democratie , and an assembly of a part only an aristocratie , then if all that will come together be but a part only , a democratie and aristocratie are all one ; and why must an assembly of part be called an aristocratie , and not a merocratie ? it seems mr. hobs is of the mind that there is but one kind government , and that is monarchy , for he defines a commonwealth to be one person , and an assembly of men , or real vnity of them all in one and the same person , the multitude so united he calls a commonwealth : this his moulding of a multitude into one person , is the generation of his great leviathan , the king of the children of pride , pag. . thus he concludes the person of a commonwealth to be a monarch . xiii . i cannot but wonder master hobs should say , pag. . the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words , i authorise , and do take upon me all his actions , in which there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty . surely here master hobs forgot himself ; for before he makes the resignation to go in these words also , i give up my right of governing my self to this man : this is a restriction certainly of his own former natural liberty , when he gives it away : and if a man allow his sovereign to kill him , which mr. hobs seems to confess , how can he reserve a right to defend himself ? and if a man have a power and right to kill himself , he doth not authorise and give up his right to his sovereign , if he do not obey him when he commands him to kill himself . xiv . mr. hobs saith , pag. . no man is bound by the words themselves of his submission to kill himself , or any other man , and consequently that the obligation a man may sometimes have upon the command of the sovereign to execute any dangerous or dishonourable office , dependeth not on the words of our submission , but on the intention , which is to be understood by the end thereof . when therefore our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained , then there is no liberty to refuse : otherwise there is . if no man be bound by the words of his subjection to kill any other man , then a sovereign may be denied the benefit of war , and be rendred unable to defend his people , and so the end of government frustrated . if the obligation upon the commands of a sovereign to execute a dangerous or dishonourable office , dependeth not on the words of our submission , but on the intention , which is to be understood by the end thereof ; no man , by mr. hobs's rules , is bound but by the words of his submission ; the intention of the command binds not , if the words do not : if the intention should bind , it is necessary the sovereign must discover it , and the people must dispute and judge it ; which how well it may consist with the rights of sovereignty , mr. hobs may consider : whereas master hobs saith , the intention is to be understood by the end ; i take it he means the end by effect , for the end and the intention are one and the same thing ; and if he mean the effect , the obedience must go before , and not depend on the understanding of the effect , which can never be , if the obedience do not precede it : in fine , he resolves , refusal to obey may depend upon the judging of what frustrates the end of sovereignty , and what not , of which he cannot mean any other judge but the people . xv. mr. hobs puts a case by way of question . a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly , or committed some capital crime , for which every one of them expecteth death : whether have they not the liberty then to joyn together , and assist and defend one another ? certainly they have ; for they but defend their lives , which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent : there was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty , their bearing of arms subsequent to it , though it be to maintain what they have done , is no new unjust act ; and if it be only to defend their persons , it is not unjust at all . the only reason here alledged for the bearing of arms , is this ; that there is no new unjust act : as if the beginning only of a rebellion were an unjust . act , and the continuance of it none at all . no better answer can be given to this case , than what the author himself hath delivered in the beginning of the same paragraph , in these words ; to resist the sword of the commonwealth in defence of another man , guilty or innocent , no man hath liberty : because such liberty takes away from the sovereign the means of protecting us , and is therefore destructive of the very essence of government . thus he first answers the question , and then afterwards makes it , and gives it a contrary answer : other passages i meet with to the like purpose . he saith , page . a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force to take away his life : the same may be said of wounds , chains , and imprisonment . page . a covenant to defend my self from force by force , is void . pag. . right of defending life and means of living , can never be abandoned . these last doctrines are destructive to all government whatsoever , and even to the leviathan it self : hereby any rogue or villain may murder his sovereign , if the sovereign but offer by force to whip or lay him in the stocks , since whipping may be said to be wounding , and putting in the stocks an imprisonment : so likewise every man's goods being a means of living , if a man cannot abandon them , no contract among men , be it never so just , can be observed : thus we are at least in as miserable condition of war , as mr. hobs at first by nature found us . xvi . the kingdom of god signifies , ( saith master hobs , page . ) a kingdom constituted by the votes of the people of israel in a peculiar manner , wherein they choose god for their king , by covenant made with him , upon god's promising them canaan . if we look upon master hobs's text for this , it will be found that the people did not constitute by votes , and choose god for their king ; but by the appointment first of god himself , the covenant was to be a god to them : they did not contract with god , that if he would give them canaan , they would be his subjects , and he should be their king ; it was not in their power to choose whether god should be their god , yea , or nay : for it is confessed , he reigned naturally over all by his might . if god reigned naturally , he had a kingdom , and sovereign power over his subjects , not acquired by their own consent . this kingdom , said to be constituted by the votes of the people of israel , is but the vote of abraham only ; his single voice carried it ; he was the representative of the people . for at this vote , it is confessed , that the name of king is not given to god , nor of kingdom to abraham ; yet the thing , if we will believe master hobs , is all one . if a contract be the mutual transferring of right , i would know what right a people can have to transfer to god by contract . had the people of israel at mount sinai a right not to obey god's voice ? if they had not such a right , what had they to transfer ? the covenant mentioned at mount sinai was but a conditional contract , and god but a conditional king ; and though the people promised to obey god's word , yet it was more than they were able to perform , for they often disobeyed god's voice , which being a breach of the condition , the covenant was void , and god not their king by contract . it is complained by god , they have rejected me that i should reign over them : but it is not said , according to their contract ; for i do not find that the desiring of a king was a breach of their contract of covenant , or disobedience to the voice of god : there is no such law extant . the people did not totally reject the lord , but in part only , out of timorousness , when they saw nahash king of the children of ammon come against them ; they distrusted that god would not suddenly provide for their deliverance , as if they had had always a king in readiness to go up presently to fight for them : this despair in them who had found so many miraculous deliverances under gods government , was that which offended the lord so highly : they did not desire an alteration of government , and to cast off god's laws , but hoped for a certainer and speedier deliverance from danger in time of war. they did not petition that they might choose their king themselves , that had been a greater sin ; and yet if they had , it had not been a total rejection of god's reigning over them , as long as they desired not to depart from the worship of god their king , and from the obedience of his laws . i see not that the kingdom of god was cast off by the election of saul , since saul was chosen by god himself , and governed according to god's laws . the government from abraham to saul is no where called the kingdom of god , nor is it said , that the kingdom of god was cast off at the election of saul . mr. hobs allows , that moses alone had , next under god , the sovereignty over the israelites , p. . but he doth not allow it to joshua , but will have it descend to eleazar the high-priest , aaron's son , his proof is , god expresly saith concerning joshua , he shall stand before eleazar , who shall ask counsel for him before the lord , ( after the judgment of vrim , is omitted by mr. hobs ) at his word they shall go out , &c. therefore the supreme power of making peace and war was in the priest. answ . the work of the high-priest was only ministerial , not magisterial ; he had no power to command in war , or to judge in peace ; only when the sovereign or governour did go up to war , he enquired of the lord by the ministry of the high priest , and , as the hebrews say , the enquirer with a soft voice , as one that prayeth for himself , asked : and forthwith the holy ghost came upon the priest , and he beheld the breast-plate , and saw therein by the vision of prophecy , go up , or go not up , in the letters that shewed forth themselves upon the breast-plate before his face : then the priest answered him , go up , or go not up . if this answer gave the priest sovereignty , then neither king saul nor king david had the sovereignty , who both asked counsel of the lord by the priest . observations on mr. milton against salmasivs . i. among the many printed books , and several discourses touching the right of kings , and the liberty of the people , i cannot find that as yet the first and chief point is agreed upon , or indeed so much as once disputed . the word king and the word people are familiar , one would think every simple man could tell what they signified ; but upon examination it will be found , that the learnedst cannot agree of their meaning . ask salmasius what a king is , and he will teach us , that a king is he who hath the supreme power of the kingdom , and is accountable to none but god , and may do what he please , and is free from the laws . this definition j. m. abominates as being the definition of a tyrant : and i should be of his mind , if he would have vouchsafed us a better , or any other definition at all , that would tell us how any king can have a supreme power , without being freed from humane laws : to find fault with it , without producing any other , is to leave us in the dark : but though mr. milton brings us neither definition nor description of a king , yet we may pick out of several passages of him , something like a definition , if we lay them together . he teacheth us that power was therefore given to a king by the people , that he might see by the authority to him committed , that nothing be done against law : and that he keep our laws , and not impose upon us his own : therefore there is no regal power but in the courts of the kingdom , and by them , pag. . and again he affirmeth , the king cannot imprison , fine or punish any man , except he be first cited into some court ; where not the king , but the usual judges give sentence , pag. . and before we are told , not the king , but the authority of parliament doth set up and take away all courts , pag. . lo here the description of a king , he is one to whom the people give power , to see that nothing be done against law : and yet he saith there is no regal power but in the courts of justice and by them , where not the king , but the usual judges give sentence . this description not only strips the king of all power whatsoever , but puts him in a condition below the meanest of his subjects . thus much may shew , that all men are not agreed what a king is . next , what the word people means is not agreed upon : ask aristotle what the people is , and he will not allow any power to be in any but in free citizens . if we demand , who be free citizens ; that he cannot resolve us ; for he confesseth that he that is a free citizen in one city , is not so in another city . and he is of opinion that no artificer should be a free citizen , or have voice in a well ordered commonwealth ; he accounts a democratie ( which word signifies the government of the people ) to be a corrupted sort of government ; he thinks many men by nature born to be servants , and not fit to govern as any part of the people . thus doth aristotle curtail the people , and cannot give us any certain rule to know who be the people . come to our modern politicians , and ask them who the people is , though they talk big of the people , yet they take up , and are content with a few representors ( as they call them ) of the whole people ; a point aristotle was to seek in , neither are these representors stood upon to be the whole people , but the major part of these representors must be reckoned for the whole people ; nay j.m. will not allow the major part of the representors to be the people , but the sounder and better part only of them ; and in right down terms he tells us , pag. . to determine who is a tyrant , he leaves to magistrates , at least to the uprighter sort of them and of the people , pag. . though in number less by many ▪ to judge as they find cause . if the sounder , the better , and the uprighter part have the power of the people , how shall we know , or who shall judge who they be ? ii. one text is urged by mr. milton , for the peoples power : deut. . . when thou art come into the land which thy lord thy god giveth thee , and shalt say , i will set a king over me , like as all the nations about me . it is said , by the tenure of kings these words confirm us that the right of choosing , yea of changing their own government , is by the grant of god himself in the people : but can the foretelling or forewarning of the israelites of a wanton and wicked desire of theirs , which god himself condemned , be made an argument that god gave or granted them a right to do such a wicked thing ? or can the narration and reproving of a future fact , be a donation and approving of a present right , or the permission of a sin be made a commission for the doing of it ? the author of his book against salmasius , falls so far from making god the donor or grantor , that he cites him only for a witness , teste ipso deo penes populos arbitrium semper fuisse , vel ea , quae placeret forma reipub . utendi , vel hanc in aliam mutandi ; de hebraeis hoc disertè dicit deus : de reliquis non abnuit . that here in this text god himself being witness , there was always a power in the people , either to use what form of government they pleased , or of changing it into another : god saith this expresly of the hebrews , and denies it not of others . can any man find that god in this text expresly saith , that there was always a right in the people to use what form of government they please ? the text not warranting this right of the people , the foundation of the defence of the people is quite taken away ; there being no other grant or proof of it pretended . . where it is said , that the israelites desired a king , though then under another form of government ; in the next line but one it is confessed , they had a king at the time when they desired a king , which was god himself , and his vice-roy samuel ; and so saith god , they have not rejected thee ; but they have rejected me , that i should not reign over them ; yet in the next verse god saith , as they have forsaken me , so do they also unto thee . here is no shew of any other form of government but monarchy : god by the mediation of samuel reigned , who made his sons judges over israel ; when one man constitutes judges , we may call him a king ; or if the having of judges do alter the government , then the government of every kingdom is altered from monarchy , where judges are appointed by kings : it is now reckoned one of the duties of kings to judge by their judges only . . where it is said , he shall not multiply to himself horses , nor wives , nor riches , that he might understand that he had no power over others , who could decree nothing of himself , extra legem ; if it had said , contra legem dei , it had been true , but if it meant extra legem humanam , it is false . . if there had been any right given to the people , it seems it was to the elders only ; for it is said , it was the elders of israel gathered together , petitioned for a king ; it is not said , it was all the people , nor that the people did choose the elders , who were the fathers and heads of families , authorized by the judges . . where it is said , i will set a king over me like as all the nations about me . to set a king , is , not to choose a king , but by some solemn publick act of coronation , or otherwise to acknowledge their allegiance to the king chosen ; it is said , thou shalt set him king whom the lord thy god shall choose . the elders did not desire to choose a king like other nations , but they say , now make us a king to judge us like all the nations . iii. as for davids covenant with the elders when he was anointed , it was not to observe any laws or conditions made by the people , for ought appears ; but to keep gods laws and serve him , and to seek the good of the people , as they were to protect him . . the reubenites and gadites promise their obedience , not according to their laws or conditions agreed upon , but in these words , all that thou commandest us we will do , and whithersoever thou sendest us we will go , as we harkened to moses in all things , so will we harken unto thee : only the lord thy god be with thee as he was with moses . where is there any condition of any humane law expressed ? though the rebellious tribes offered conditions to rehoboam ; where can we find , that for like conditions not performed , all israel deposed samuel ? i wonder mr. milton should say this , when within a few lines after he professeth , that samuel had governed them uprightly . iv. jus regni is much stumbled at , and the definition of a king which saith , his power is supreme in the kingdom , and he is accountable to none but to god , and that he may do what he please , and is not bound by laws : it is said if this definition be good , no man is or ever was , who may be said to be a tyrant , p. . for when he hath violated all divine and humane laws , nevertheless he is a king , and guiltless jure regio . to this may be answered , that the definition confesseth he is accountable to god , and therefore not guiltless if he violate divine laws : humane laws must not be shuffled in with divine , they are not of the same authority : if humane laws bind a king , it is impossible for him to have supreme power amongst men . if any man can find us out such a kind of government , wherein the supreme power can be , without being freed from humane laws , they should first teach us that : but if all sorts of popular government that can be invented , cannot be one minute , without an arbitrary power , freed from all humane laws : what reason can be given why a royal government should not have the like freedom ? if it be tyranny for one man to govern arbitrarily , why should it not be far greater tyranny for a multitude of men to govern without being accountable or bound by laws ? it would be further enquired how it is possible for any government at all to be in the world without an arbitrary power ; it is not power except it be arbitrary : a legislative power cannot be without being absolved from humane laws , it cannot be shewed how a king can have any power at all but an arbitrary power . we are taught , that power was therefore given to a king by the people , that he might see by the authority to him committed , that nothing be done against law ; and that he keep our laws , and not impose upon us his own : therefore there is no royal power , but in the courts of the kingdom , and by them , p. . and again it is said , the king cannot imprison , fine or punish any man except he be first cited into some court , where not the king but the usual judges give sentence , pag. . and before , we are told , not the king , but the authority of parliament doth set up and take away all courts , pag. . lo here we have mr. milton's perfect definition of a king : he is one to whom the people gave power to see that nothing be done against law , and that he keep our laws , and not impose his own . whereas all other men have the faculty of seeing by nature , the king only hath it by the gift of the people , other power he hath none ; he may see the judges keep the laws if they will ; he cannot compel them , for he may not imprison , fine , nor punish any man ; the courts of justice may , and they are set up and put down by the parliament : yet in this very definition of a king , we may spy an arbitrary power in the king ; for he may wink if he will : and no other power doth this description of a king give , but only a power to see : whereas it is said aristotle doth mention an absolute kingdom , for no other cause , but to shew how absurd , unjust and most tyrannical it is . there is no such thing said by aristotle , but the contrary , where he saith , that a king according to law makes no sort of government ; and after he had reckoned up five sorts of kings , he concludes , that there were in a manner but two sorts , the lacedemonian king , and the absolute king ; whereof the first was but as general in an army , and therefore no king at all , and then fixes and rests upon the absolute king , who ruleth according to his own will. v. if it be demanded what is meant by the word people ? . sometimes it is populus universus , and then every child must have his consent asked , which is impossible . . sometimes it is pars major , and sometimes it is pars potior & sanior . how the major part , where all are alike free , can bind the minor part , is not yet proved . but it seems the major part will not carry it , nor be allowed , except they be the better part , and the sounder part . we are told , the sounder part implored the help of the army , when it saw it self and the commonwealth betrayed ; and that the souldiers judged better than the great council , and by arms saved the commonwealth , which the great council had almost damned by their votes , page . here we see what the people is ; to wit , the sounder part ; of which the army is the judge : thus , upon the matter , the souldiers are the people : which being so , we may discern where the liberty of the people lieth , which we are taught to consist all for the most part in the power of the peoples choosing what form of government they please , p. . a miserable liberty , which is only to choose to whom we will give our liberty , which we may not keep . see more concerning the people , in a book entituled , the anarchy , page , , , , , , . vi. we are taught , that a father and a king are things most diverse . the father begets us , but not the king ; but we create the king : nature gives a father to the people , the people gives themselves a king : if the father kill his son he loseth his life , why should not the king also ? page . ans . father and king are not so diverse ; it is confessed , that at first they were all one , for there is confessed paternum imperium & haereditarium , pag. . and this fatherly empire , as it was of it self hereditary , so it was alienable by patent , and seizable by an usurper , as other goods are : and thus every king that now is , hath a paternal empire , either by inheritance , or by translation , or usurpation ; so a father and a king may be all one . a father may dye for the murther of his son , where there is a superiour father to them both , or the right of such a supreme father ; but where there are only father and sons , no sons can question the father for the death of their brother : the reason why a king cannot be punished , is not because he is excepted from punishment , or doth not deserve it , but because there is no superiour to judge him , but god only , to whom he is reserved . vii . it is said thus , he that takes away from the people the power of choosing for themselves what form of government they please , he doth take away that wherein all civil liberty almost consists , p. . if almost all liberty be in choosing of the kind of government , the people have but a poor bargain of it , who cannot exercise their liberty , but in chopping and changing their government , and have liberty only to give away their liberty , than which there is no greater mischief , as being the cause of endless sedition . viii . if there be any statute in our law , by which thou canst find that tyrannical power is given to a king , that statute being contrary to gods will , to nature and reason , understand that by that general and primary law of ours , that statute is to be repealed , & not of force with us , p. . here , if any man may be judge , what law is contrary to gods will , or to nature , or to reason , it will soon bring in confusion : most men that offend , if they be to be punished or fined , will think that statute that gives all fines and forfeitures to a king , to be a tyrannical law ; thus most statutes would be judged void , and all our fore-fathers taken for fools or madmen , to make all our laws to give all penalties to the king. ix . the sin of the children of israel did lye , not in desiring a king , but in desiring such a king like as the nations round about had ; they distrusted god almighty , that governed them by the monarchical power of samuel , in the time of oppression , when god provided a judge for them , but they desired a perpetual and hereditary king , that they might never want : in desiring a king they could not sin , for it was but desiring what they enjoyed by god's special providence . x. men are perswaded , that in making of a covenant , something is to be performed on both parts by mutual stipulation ; which is not always true : for we find god made a covenant with noah and his seed , with all the fowl and the cattel , not to destroy the earth any more by a flood . this covenant was to be kept on gods part , neither noah , nor the fowl , nor the cattel were to perform any thing by this covenant . on the other side , gen. . , . god covenants with abraham , saying , thou shalt keep my covenant , — every male-child among you shall be circumcised . here it is called gods covenant , though it be to be performed only by abraham ; so a covenant may be called the kings covenant , because it is made to him , and yet to be performed only by the people . so also , king. . . jehojada made a covenant between the lord , and the king , and the people , that they should be the lords people . between the king also and the people , which might well be , that the people should be the kings servants : and not for the king 's covenanting to keep any humane laws , for it is not likely the king should either covenant , or take any oath to the people when he was but seven years of age , and that never any king of israel took a coronation oath that can be shewed : when jehojada shewed the king to the rulers in the house of the lord , he took an oath of the people : he did not article with them , but saith the next verse , commanded them to keep a watch of the kings house , and that they should compass the king round about , every man with his weapon in his hand , and he that cometh within the ranges , let him be slain . xi . to the text , where the word of a king is , there is power , and who may say unto him , what dost thou ? j.m. gives this answer : it is apparent enough , that the preacher in this place gives precepts to every private man , not to the great sanhedrin , nor to the senate — shall not the nobles , shall not all the other magistrates , shall not the whole people dare to mutter , so oft as the king pleaseth to dote ? we must here note , that the great council , and all other magistrates or nobles , or the whole people , compared to the king , are all but private men , if they derive their power from him : they are magistrates under him , and out of his presence , for when he is in place , they are but so many private men . j. m. asks , who swears to a king , unless the king on the other side be sworn to keep gods laws , and the laws of the countrey ? we find that the rulers of israel took an oath at the coronation of jehoash : but we find no oath taken by that king , no not so much as to gods laws , much less to the laws of the countrey . xii . a tyrant is he , who regarding neither law nor the common good , reigns only for himself and his faction ; p. . in his defence he expresseth himself thus , he is a tyrant who looks after only his own , and not his peoples profit . eth. l. . p. . . if it be tyranny not to regard the law , then all courts of equity , and pardons for any offences must be taken away : there are far more suits for relief against the laws , than there be for the observation of the laws : there can be no such tyranny in the world as the law , if there were no equity to abate the rigour of it . summum jus is summa injuria ; if the penalties and forfeitures of all laws should still be exacted by all kings , it would be found , that the greatest tyranny would be , for a king to govern according to law ; the fines , penalties , and forfeitures of all laws are due to the supreme power only , and were they duly paid , they would far exceed the taxes in all places . it is the chief happiness of a kingdom , and their chief liberty , not to be governed by the laws only . . not to regard the common good , but to reign only for himself , is the supposition of an impossibility in the judgment of aristotle , who teacheth us , that the despotical power cannot be preserved , except the servant , or he in subjection , be also preserved . the truth of this strongly proves , that it is in nature impossible to have a form of government that can be for the destruction of a people , as tyranny is supposed ; if we will allow people to be governed , we must grant , they must in the first place be preserved , or else they cannot be governed . kings have been , and may be vitious men , and the government of one , not so good as the government of another ; yet it doth not follow , that the form of government is , or can be in its own nature ill , because the governour is so : it is anarchy , or want of government , that can totally destroy a nation . we cannot find any such government as tyranny mentioned or named in scripture , or any word in the hebrew tongue to express it . after such time as the cities of greece practised to shake off monarchy , then , and not till then , ( which was after homer's time ) the name of tyrant was taken up for a word of disgrace , for such men as by craft or force wrested the power of a city from a multitude to one man only ; and not for the exercising , but for the ill-obtaining of the government : but now every man that is but thought to govern ill , or to be an ill man , is presently termed a tyrant , and so judged by his subjects . few remember the prohibition , exod. . . thou shalt not revile the gods , nor curse the ruler of thy people : and fewer understand the reason of it . though we may not one judge another , yet we may speak evil or revile one another , in that which hath been lawfully judged , and upon a tryal wherein they have been heard and condemned : this is not to judge , but only to relate the judgment of the ruler . to speak evil , or to revile a supreme judge , cannot be without judging him who hath no superiour on earth to judge him , and in that regard must always be presumed innocent , though never so ill , if he cannot lawfully be heard . j.m. that will have it tyranny in a king not to regard the laws , doth himself give as little regard to them as any man ; where he reckons , that contesting for priviledges , customs , forms , and that old entanglement of iniquity , their gibrish laws , are the badges of ancient slavery . tenure , p. . a disputing presidents , forms and circumstances , page . j.m. is also of opinion , that , if at any time our fore-fathers , out of baseness , have lost any thing of their right , that ought not hurt us ; they might if they would promise slavery for themselves , for us certainly they could not , who have always the same right to free our selves , that they had to give themselves to any man in slavery . this doctrine well practised , layeth all open to constant anarchy . lastly , if any desire to know what the liberty of the people is , which j. m. pleads for , he resolves us , saying , that he that takes away from the people the right of choosing what form of government they please , takes away truly that in which all liberty doth almost consist . it is well said by j. m. that all liberty doth almost consist in choosing their form of government , for there is another liberty exercised by the people , which he mentions not , which is the liberty of the peoples choosing their religion ; every man may be of any religion , or of no religion ; greece and rome have been as famous for polytheism , or multitudes of gods , as of governours ; and imagining aristocratie and democratie in heaven , as on earth . observations upon h. grotius de jvre belli & pacis . in most questions of weight and difficulty concerning the right of war , or peace , or supreme power , grotius hath recourse to the law of nature or of nations , or to the primitive will of those men who first joyned in society . it is necessary therefore a little to lay open the variety or contrariety in the civil and canon law , and in grotius himself , about the law of nature and nations , not with a purpose to raise any contention about words or phrases , but with a desire to reconcile or expound the sense of different terms . civilians , canonists , politicians and divines , are not a little perplexed in distinguishing between the law of nature , and the law of nations ; about jus naturae , and jus gentium , there is much dispute by such as handle the original of government , and of property and community . the civil law in one text allows a threefold division of law , into jus naturae , jus gentium , and jus civile . but in another text of the same law , we find only a twofold division , into jus civile , and jus gentium . this latter division the law takes from gaius , the former from vlpian , who will have jus naturale to be that which nature hath taught all creatures , quod natura omnia animalia docuit , but for this he is confuted by grotius , salmasius , and others , who restrain the law of nature only to men using reason ; which makes it all one with the law of nations ; to which the canon law consents , and saith , that jus naturale est commune omnium nationum : that which natural reason appoints all men to use , is the law of nations , saith theophilus in the text of the civil law : and in the second book of the instit . cap. . jus naturae is confounded with jus gentium . as the civilians sometimes confound , and sometimes separate the law of nature and the law of nations , so other-whiles they make them also contrary one to the other . by the law of nature all men are born free ; jure naturali omnes liberi nascuntur . but servitude is by the law of nations : jure gentium servitus invasit , saith vlpian . and the civil law not only makes the law of nature and of nations contrary , but also will have the law of nations contrary to it self . war , saith the law , was brought in by the law of nations , ex jure gentium introducta bella , and yet the law of nations saith , since nature hath made us all of one kindred , it follows it is not lawful for one man to lye in wait for another . cùm inter nos cognitionem quandam natura constituit , consequens est hominem homini insidiari nefas esse , saith florentinus . again , the civil law teacheth , that from the law of nature proceeds the conjunction of man and woman , the procreation and education of children . but as for religion to god , and obedience to parents it makes it to be by the law of nations . to touch now the canon law , we may find in one place that men are governed either by the law of nature , or by customs . homines reguntur naturali jure , aut moribus . the law of nations they call a divine law , the customs a humane law ; leges aut divinae sunt aut humanae ; divinae naturâ , humanae moribus constant . but in the next place the canon law makes jus to be either naturale , aut civile , aut gentium . though this division agree in terms with that of vlpian in the civil law , yet in the explication of the terms there is diversity ; for what one law makes to belong to the law of nature , the other refers to the law of nations , as may easily appear to him that will take the pains to compare the civil and canon law in these points . a principal ground of these diversities and contrarieties of divisions , was an error which the heathens taught , that all things at first were common , and that all men were equal . this mistake was not so heinous in those ethnick authors of the civil laws , who wanting the guide of the history of moses , were fain to follow poets and fables for their leaders . but for christians , who have read the scriptures , to dream either of a community of all things , or an equality of all persons , is a fault scarce pardonable . to salve these apparent contrarieties of community and property , or equality and subjection : the law of jus gentium was first invented ; when that could not satisfie , to mend the matter , this jus gentium , was divided into a natural law of nations , and an humane law of nations ; and the law of nature into a primary and a secondary law of nature ; distinctions which make a great sound , but edifie not at all if they come under examination . if there hath been a time when all things were common , and all men equal , and that it be otherwise now ; we must needs conclude that the law by which all things were common , and men equal , was contrary to the law by which now things are proper , and men subject . if we will allow adam to have been lord of the world and of his children , there will need no such distinctions of the law of nature and of nations : for the truth will be , that whatsoever the heathens comprehended under these two laws , is comprised in the moral law. that the law of nature is one and the same with the moral , may appear by a definition given by grotius . the law of nature ( saith he ) is the dictate of reason , shewing that in every action by the agreeing or disagreeing of it with natural reason , there is a moral honesty or dishonesty , and consequently that such an action is commanded or forbidden by god the author of nature . i cannot tell how grotius would otherwise have defined the moral law. and the canon law grants as much ; teaching that the law of nature is contained in the law and the gospel : whatsoever ye will that men do , &c. mat. . the term of jus naturae is not originally to be found in scripture , for though t. aquinas takes upon him to prove out of the . to the romans , that there is a jus naturae , yet st. paul doth not use those express terms ; his words are , the gentiles which have not the law , do by nature the things contained in the law , these having not the law are a law unto themselves : he doth not say , nature is a law unto them , but they are a law unto themselves . as for that which they call the law of nations , it is not a law distinct , much less opposite to the law of nature , but it is a small branch or parcel of that great law ; for it is nothing but the law of nature , or the moral law between nations . the same commandment that forbids one private man to rob another , or one corporation to hurt another corporation , obliges also one king not to rob another king , and one commonwealth not to spoil another : the same law that enjoyns charity to all men , even to enemies , binds princes and states to shew charity to one another , as well as private persons . and as the common , or civil laws of each kingdom which are made against treason , theft , murder , adultery , or the like , are all and every one of them grounded upon some particular commandment of the moral law ; so all the laws of nations must be subordinate and reducible to the moral law. the law of nature , or the moral law is like the main ocean , which though it be one entire body , yet several parts of it have distinct names , according to the diversity of the coasts on which they border . so it comes to pass that the law of nations , which is but a part of the law of nature , may be sub-divided almost in infinitum , according to the variety of the persons , or matters about which it is conversant . the law of nature or the divine law is general , and doth only comprehend some principles of morality notoriously known of themselves , or at the most is extended to those things which by necessary and evident inference are consequent to those principles . besides these , many other things are necessary to the well governing of a common-wealth : and therefore it was necessary that by humane reason something more in particular should be determined concerning those things which could not be defined by natural reason alone ; hence it is that humane laws be necessary , as comments upon the text of the moral law : and of this judgment is aquinas , who teacheth , that necessitas legis humanae manat ex eo , quod lex naturalis , vel divina , generalis est , & solum complectitur quaedam principia morum per se nota , & ad summum extenditur ad ea quae necessaria & evidenti elatione ex illis principiis consequuntur : praeter illa verò multa alia sunt necessaria in republica ad ejus rectam gubernationem : & ideo necessarium fuit ut per humanam rationem aliqua magis in particulari determinarentur circa ea quae per solam rationem naturalem definiri non possunt . ludo. molin . de just. thus much may suffice to shew the distractions in and between the civil and common laws about the law of nature and nations . in the next place we are to consider how grotius distinguisheth these laws . to maintain the community of things to be natural , grotius hath framed new divisions of the law of nature . first , in his preface to his books de jure belli & pacis , he produceth a definition of the law of nature , in such doubtful , obscure and reserved terms , as if he were diffident of his undertaking : next in his first book and first chapter he gives us another distribution , which differs from his doctrine in his preface . in his preface his principle is , that the appetite of society , that is to say , of community , is an action proper to man. here he presently corrects himself with an exception , that some other creatures are found to desire society ; and withal he answers the objections thus , that this desire of society in brute beasts , comes from some external principle . what he means by principium intelligens extrinsecum , i understand not , nor doth he explain , nor is it material , nor is the argument he useth to any purpose ; for , admitting all he saith to be true , yet his principle fails ; for the question is not , from what principle this desire of society proceeds in beasts , but whether there be such a desire or no. besides , here he takes the appetite of society and community to be all one , whereas many live in society , which live not in community . next he teacheth , that the keeping of society ( custodia societatis ) which in a rude manner ( saith he ) we have now expressed , is the fountain of that law which is properly so called . i conceive by the law properly so called , he intends the law of nature , though he express not so much : and to this appetite of sociable community he refers alieni abstinentia ; but herein it may be he forgets himself , for where there is community there is neither meum nor tuum , nor yet alienum ; and if there be no alienum , there can be no alieni abstinentia . to the same purpose he saith , that by the law of nature men must stand to bargains , juris naturae sit stare pactis . but if all things were common by nature , how could there be any bargain ? again , grotius tells us , that from this signification of the law there hath flowed another larger , which consists ( saith he ) in discerning what delights us or hurts us , and in judging how things should be wisely distributed to each one . this latter he calls the looser law of nature ; the former jus sociale , the law of nature , strictly , or properly taken . and these two laws of nature should have place ( saith he ) though men should deny there were a a god. but to them that believe there is a god , there is another original of law , beside the natural , coming from the free will of god , to the which our own vnderstanding tells us we must be subject . thus have i gathered the substance of what is most material concerning the law of nature , in his preface . if we turn to the book it self , we have a division of the law into jus naturale . voluntarium divinum . humanum . civile . latiùs patens , seu jus gentium . arctiùs patens , seu paternum , seu herile . in the definition of jus naturale he omits those subtleties of jus naturae propriè dictum , and quod laxius ita dicitur , which we find in his preface , and gives such a plain definition , as may fitly agree to the moral law. by this it seems the law of nature and the moral law are one and the same . whereas he affirmeth , that the actions about which the law of nature is conversant , are lawful or unlawful of themselves , and therefore are necessarily commanded or forbidden by god : by which mark this law of nature doth not only differ from humane law , but from the divine voluntary law , which doth not command or forbid those things , which of themselves , and by their own nature are lawful or unlawful , but makes them unlawful by forbidding them , and due by commanding them : in this he seems to make the law of nature to differ from gods voluntary law ; whereas , in god , necessary and voluntary are all one . salmasius de vsuris , in the twentieth chapter , condemns this opinion of grotius ; though he name him not , yet he means him , if i mistake not . in the next place , i observe his saying , that some things are by the law of nature , not propriè , but reductivè ; and that the law of nature deals not only with those things which are beside the will of man , but also with many things which follow the act of man's will : so dominion , such as is now in vse , mans will brought in ; but now that it is brought in , it is against the law of nature , to take that from thee against thy will , which is in thy dominion . yet for all this grotius maintains , that the law of nature is so immutable , that it cannot be changed by god himself . he means to make it good with a distinction : some things ( saith he ) are by the law of nature , but not simply , but according to the certain state of things ; so the common use of things was natural as long as dominion was not brought in ; and right for every man to take his own by force , before laws were made . here if grotius would have spoken plain , instead of but not simply , but according to the certain state of things , he would have said , but not immutably , but for a certain time. and then this distinction would have run thus ; some things are by the law of nature , but not immutably , but for a certain time . this must needs be the naked sense of his distinction , as appears by his explication in the words following , where he saith , that the common vse of things was natural so long as dominion was not brought in : dominion , he saith , was brought in by the will of man , whom by this doctrine grotius makes to be able to change that law which god himself cannot change , as he saith . he gives a double ability to man ; first , to make that no law of nature , which god made to be the law of nature : and next , to make that a law of nature which god made not ; for now that dominion is brought in , he maintains , it is against the law of nature to take that which is in another man's dominion . besides , i find no coherence in these words , by the law of nature it was right for every man to take his own by force , before laws made , since by the law of nature no man had any thing of his own ; and until laws were made , there was no propriety , according to his doctrine . jus humanum voluntarium latius patens , he makes to be the law of nations , which ( saith he ) by the will of all , or many nations , hath received a power to bind , he adds , of many , because there is , as he grants , scarce any law to be found common to all nations , besides the law of nature ; which also is wont to be called the law of nations , being common to all nations . nay , as he confesseth often , that is the law in one part of the world , which in another part of the world is not the law of nations . by these sentences , it seems grotius can scarce tell what to make to be the law of nations , or where to find it . whereas he makes the law of nations to have a binding power from the will of men , it must be remembred , that it is not sufficient for men to have a will to bind , but it is necessary also to have a power to bind : though several nations have one and the same law. for instance : let it be granted that theft is punished by death in many countries , yet this doth not make it to be a law of nations , because each nation hath it but as a natural , or civil law of their own country ; and though it have a binding power from the will of many nations , yet because each nation hath but a will and power to bind themselves , and may without prejudice , consent , or consulting of any neighbour-nation , alter this law , if they find cause , it cannot properly be called the law of nations . that which is the foundation of the law of nations , is , to have it concern such things as belong to the mutual society of nations among themselves , as grotius confesseth ; and not of such things as have no further relation than to the particular benefit of each kingdom : for , as private men must neglect their own profit for the good of their country ; so particular nations must sometimes remit part of their benefit , for the good of many nations . true it is , that in particular kingdoms and commonwealths there be civil and national laws , and also customs that obtain the force of laws : but yet such laws are ordained by some supreme power , and the customs are examined , judged , and allowed by the same supreme power . where there is no supreme power that extends over all or many nations , but only god himself , there can be no laws made to bind nations , but such as are made by god himself : we cannot find that god made any laws to bind nations , but only the moral law ; as for the judicial law , though it were ordained by god , yet it was not the law of nations , but of one nation only , and fitted to that commonwealth . if any think that the customs wherein many nations do consent , may be called the law of nations , as well as the customs of any one nation may be esteemed for national laws : they are to consider , that it is not the being of a custom that makes it lawful , for then all customs , even evil customs , would be lawful ; but it is the approbation of the supreme power that gives a legality to the custom : where there is no supreme power over many nations , their customs cannot be made legal . the doctrine of grotius is , that god immediately after the creation did bestow upon mankind in general a right over things of inferiour nature — from whence it came to pass , that presently every man might snatch what he would for his own vse , and spend what he could , and such an vniversal right was then instead of property ; for what every one so snatched , another could not take from him but by injury . how repugnant this assertion of grotius is to the truth of holy scripture , mr. selden teacheth us in his mare clausum , saying , that adam by donation from god , gen. . . was made the general lord of all things , not without such a private dominion to himself , as ( without his grant ) did exclude his children : and by donation and assignation , or some kind of cession ( before he was dead , or left any heir to succeed him ) his children had their distinct territories by right of private dominion : abel had his flocks and pastures for them ; cain had his fields for corn , and the land of nod where he built himself a city . this determination of mr. selden's being consonant to the history of the bible , and to natural reason , doth contradict the doctrine of grotius : i cannot conceive why mr. selden should afterwards affirm , that neither the law of nature , nor the divine law , do command or forbid either communion of all things or private dominion , but permitteth both . as for the general community between noah and his sons , which mr. selden will have to be granted to them , gen. . . the text doth not warrant it ; for although the sons are there mentioned with noah in the blessing , yet it may best be understood with a subordination or a benediction in succession , the blessing might truly be fulfilled , if the sons either under , or after their father enjoyed a private dominion : it is not probable that the private dominion which god gave to adam , and by his donation , assignation , or cession to his children was abrogated , and a community of all things instituted between noah and his sons , at the time of the flood : noah was left the sole heir of the world , why should it be thought that god would dis-inherit him of his birth-right , and make him of all the men in the world , the only tenant in common with his children ? if the blessing given to adam , gen. . . be compared to that given to noah and his sons , gen. . . there will be found a considerable difference between those two texts : in the benediction of adam , we find expressed a subduing of the earth , and a dominion over the creatures , neither of which are expressed in the blessing of noah , nor the earth there once named , it is only said , the fear of you shall be upon the creatures , and into your hands are they delivered ; then immediately it follows , every moving thing shall be meat for you , as the green herb . the first blessing gave adam dominion over the earth and all creatures , the latter allows noah liberty to use the living creatures for food : here is no alteration or diminishing of his title to a propriety of all things , but an enlargement only of his commons . but whether , with grotius , community came in at the creation , or , with mr. selden , at the flood , they both agree it did not long continue ; sed veri non est simile hujusmodi communionem diu obtinuisse , is the confession of mr. selden . it seems strange that grotius should maintain , that community of all things should be by the law of nature , of which god is the author ; and yet such community should not be able to continue : doth it not derogate from the providence of god almighty , to ordain a community which could not continue ? or doth it make the act of our fore-fathers , in abrogating the natural law of community , by introducing that of propriety , to be a sin of a high presumption ? the prime duties of the second table are conversant about the right of propriety : but if propriety be brought in by a humane law ( as grotius teacheth ) then the moral law depends upon the will of man. there could be no law against adultery or theft , if women and all things were common . mr. selden saith , that the law of nature , or of god , nec vetuit , nec jubebat , sed permisit utrumque , tam nempe rerum communionem quàm privatum dominium . and yet for propriety ( which he terms primaeva rerum dominia ) he teacheth , that adam received it from god , à numine acceperat : and for community , he saith , we meet with evident footsteps of the community of things in that donation of god , by which noah and his three sons are made domini pro indiviso rerum omnium . thus he makes the private dominion of adam , as well as the common dominion of noah and his sons , to be both by the will of god. nor doth he shew how noah , or his sons , or their posterity , had any authority to alter the law of community which was given them by god. in distributing territories ( mr. selden saith ) the consent , as it were , of mankind ( passing their promise , which should also bind their posterity ) did intervene , so that men departed from their common right of communion of those things which were so distributed to particular lords or masters . this distribution by consent of mankind , we must take upon credit ; for there is not the least proof offered for it out of antiquity . how the consent of mankind could bind posterity when all things were common , is a point not so evident : where children take nothing by gift or by descent from their parents , but have an equal and common interest with them , there is no reason in such cases , that the acts of the fathers should bind the sons . i find no cause why mr. selden should call community a pristine right ; since he makes it but to begin in noah , and to end in noah's children , or grand children at the most ; for he confesseth the earth , à noachidis seculis aliquot post diluvium esse divisam . that ancient tradition , which by mr. selden's acknowledgment hath obtained reputation every where , seems most reasonable , in that he tells us , that noah himself , as lord of all , was author of the distribution of the world , and of private dominion , and that by the appointment of an oracle from god , he did confirm this distribution by his last will and testament , which at his death he left in the hands of his eldest son sem , and also warned all his sons , that none of them should invade any of their brothers dominions , or injure one another , because from thence discord and civil war would necessarily follow . many conclusions in grotius his book de jure belli & pacis , are built upon the foundation of these two principles . . the first is , that communis rerum usus naturalis fuit . . the second is , that dominium quale nunc in usu est , voluntas humana introduxit . upon these two propositions of natural community and voluntary propriety , depend divers dangerous and seditious conclusions , which are dispersed in several places . in the fourth chapter of the first book , the title of which chapter is , of the war of subjects against superiours ; grotius handleth the question , whether the law of not resisting superiours , do bind us in most grievous and most certain danger ? and his determination is , that this law of not resisting superiours , seems to depend upon the will of those men who at first joyned themselves in a civil society , from whom the right of government doth come to them that govern ; if those had been at first asked , if their will were to impose this burthen upon all , that they should chuse rather to dye , than in any case by arms to repel the force of superiours ; i know not whether they would answer , that it was their will , unless perhaps with this addition , if resistance cannot be made but with the great disturbance of the common-wealth , and destruction of many innocents . here we have his resolution , that in great and certain danger , men may resist their governours , if it may be without disturbance of the common-wealth : if you would know who should be judge of the greatness and certainty of the danger , or how we may know it , grotius hath not one word of it , so that for ought appears to the contrary , his mind may be , that every private man may be judge of the danger , for other judge he appoints none ; it had been a foul fault in so desperate a piece of service , as the resisting of superiours , to have concealed the lawful means , by which we may judge of the greatness or certainty of publick danger , before we lift up our hands against authority , considering how prone most of us are , to censure and mistake those things for great and certain dangers , which in truth many times are no dangers at all , or at the most but very small ones ; and so flatter our selves , that by resisting our superiours , we may do our country laudable service , without disturbance of the common-wealth , since the effects of sedition cannot be certainly judged of but by the events only . grotius proceeds to answer an objection against this doctrine of resisting superiours . if ( saith he ) any man shall say , that this rigid doctrine of dying , rather than resisting any injuries of superiours , is no humane , but a divine law : it is to be noted , that men at first , not by any precept of god , but of their own accord , led by experience of the infirmities of separated families against violence , did meet together in civil society , from whence civil power took beginning , which therefore st. peter calls an humane ordinance , although elsewhere it be called a divine ordinance , because god approveth the wholesom institutions of men ; god in approving a humane law is to be thought to approve it as humane , and in a humane manner . and again in another place he goeth further , and teacheth us , that if the question happen to be concerning the primitive will of the people , it will not be amiss for the people that now are , and which are accounted the same with them that were long ago , to express their meaning , in this matter , which is to be followed , unless it certainly appear , that the people long ago willed otherwise . lib. . cap. . for fuller explication of his judgment about resisting superiors , he concludes thus : the greater the thing is which is to be preserved , the greater is the equity which reacheth forth an exception against the words of the law : yet i dare not ( saith grotius ) without difference condemn either simple men or a lesser part of the people , who in the last refuge of necessity , do so use this equity , as that in the mean time , they do not forsake the respect of the common good. another doctrine of grotius is , that the empire which is exercised by kings , doth not cease to be the empire of the people ; that kings who in a lawful order succeed those who were elected , have the supreme power by an usufructuary right only , and no propriety . furthermore he teacheth , that the people may chuse what form of government they please , and their will is the rule of right . populus eligere potest qualem vult gubernationis formam , neque ex praestantia formae , sed ex voluntate jus metiendum est . lib. . cap. . also , that the people chusing a king may reserve some acts to themselves , and may bestow others upon the king , with full authority , if either an express partition be appointed , or if the people being yet free , do command their future king , by way of a standing command , or if any thing be added by which it may be understood , that the king may be compelled or else punished . in these passages of grotius which i have cited , we find evidently these doctrines . . that civil power depends on the will of the people . . that private men or petty multitudes may take up arms against their princes . . that the lawfullest kings have no propriety in their kingdoms , but an usufructuary right only : as if the people were the lords , and kings but their tenants . . that the law of not resisting superiors , is a humane law , depending on the will of the people at first . . that the will of the first people , if it be not known , may be expounded by the people that now are . no doubt but grotius foresaw what uses the people might make of these doctrines , by concluding , if the chief power be in the people , that then it is lawful for them to compel and punish kings as oft as they misuse their power : therefore he tells us , he rejects the opinion of them , who every where and without exception will have the chief power to be so the peoples , that it is lawful for them to compel and punish kings as oft as they misuse their power ; and this opinion he confesseth , if it be altogether received , hath been and may be the cause of many evils . this cautelous rejection qualified with these terms of every where without exception , and altogether , makes but a mixt negation , partly negative , and partly affirmative ( which our lawyers call a negative repugnant ) which brings forth this modal proposition , that in some places with exception , and in some sort the people may compel and punish their kings . but let us see how grotius doth refute the general opinion , that people may correct kings . he frames his argument in these words : it is lawful for every man to yield himself to be a private servant to whom he please . what should hinder , but that also it may be lawful for a free people so to yield themselves to one or more , that the right of governing them be fully set over without retaining any part of the right ? and you must not say , that this may not be presumed ; for we do not now seek , what in a doubtful case may be presumed , but what by right may be done . thus far is the argument , in which the most that is proved ( if we gratifie him , and yield his whole argument for good ) is this , that the people may grant away their power without retaining any part . but what is this to what the people have done ? for though the people may give away their power without reservation of any part to themselves ; yet if they have not so done , but have reserved a part , grotius must confess , that the people may compel and punish their kings , if they transgress : so that by his favour , the point will be , not what by right may be done , but what in this doubtful case hath been done , since by his own rule it is the will and meaning of the first people that joyned in society , that must regulate the power of their successours . but on grotius side it may be urged , that in all presumption the people have given away their whole power to kings , unless they can prove they have reserved a part ; for if they will have any benefit of a reservation or exception , it lies on their part to prove their exception , and not on the kings part who are in possession . this answer , though in it self it be most just and good ; yet of all men grotius may not use it . for he saves the peoples labour of proving the primitive reservation of their forefathers , by making the people that now are competent expositors of the meaning of those first ancestors , who may justly be presumed , not to have been either so improvident for themselves , or so negligent of all their posterity , when by the law of nature they were free , and had all things common , at an instant without any condition or limitation to give away that liberty and right of community , and to make themselves and their children eternally subject to the will of such governours as might misuse them without controul . on the behalf of the people , it may be further answered to grotius , that although our ancestors had made an absolute grant of their liberty , without any condition expressed ; yet it must be necessarily implied , that it was upon condition to be well governed , and that the non-performance of that implied condition , makes the grant void ; or , if we will not allow an implicit condition , then it may be said , that the grant in it self was a void grant , for being unreasonable , and a violation of the law of nature , without any valuable consideration . what sound reply grotius can return to such answers , i cannot conceive , if he keep himself to his first principle of natural community . as grotius's argument against the people is not sound , so his answer to the argument that is made for the people , is not satisfactory . it is objected , that he that ordains , is above him that is ordained . grotius answers , verum duntaxat est in ea constitutione cujus effectus perpetuò pendet à voluntate constituentis , non etiam in ea quae ab initio est voluntatis , postea verò effectum habet necessitatis , quomodo mulier virum sibi constituit , cui parere semper habet necesse . the reply may be , that by grotius's former doctrine the very effect of the constitution of kings by the people , depends perpetually upon the will of them that constitute , and upon no other necessity : he will not say , that it is by any necessity of the law of nature , or by any positive law of god ; he teacheth , that non dei praecepto , sed sponte , men entred into civil society , that it is an humane ordinance , that god doth only approve it ut humanum , and humano modo . he tells us further , that populus potest eligere qualem vult gubernationis formam , & ex voluntate jus metiendum est ; that the people may give the king as little power as they will , and for as little time as they please , that they may make temporary kings , as directors and protectors : jus quovis tempore revocabile , id est , precarium ; as the vandals in africa , and the goths in spain , would depose their kings as oft as they displeased them , horum enim actus irriti possunt reddi ab his qui potestatem revocabiliter dederunt , ac proinde non idem est effectus nec jus idem . here he doth teach in plain words , the effect doth depend upon the will of the people . by this we may judge how improperly he useth the instance of a woman , that appoints her self a husband , whom she must always necessarily obey , since the necessity of the continuance of the vvife's obedience depends upon the law of god , which hath made the bond of matrimony indissolvable . grotius will not say the like for the continuance of the subjects obedience to the prince , neither will they say that vvomen may chuse husbands , as he tells us the people may chuse kings , by giving their husbands as little power , and for as little a time as they please . next it is objected , that tutors who are set over pupils may be removed , if they abuse their power . grotius answers , in tutore hoc procedit qui superiorem habet , at in imperiis quia progressus non datur in infinitum , omnino in aliqua persona aut coetu consistendum est : we must stay in some one person , or in a multitude , whose faults ( because they have no superiour judge above them ) god hath witnessed that he will have a particular care of , either to revenge them , if he judge it needful , or to tolerate them , either for punishment , or tryal of the people . it is true , in kingdoms we cannot proceed in infinitum , yet we may , and must go to the highest , which by grotius his rule is the people , because they first made kings , so that there is no need to stay in aliqua persona , but in coetu , in the people , so that by his doctrine kings may be punished by the people , but the faults of the people must be left to the judgment of god. i have briefly presented here the desperate inconveniences which attend upon the doctrine of the natural freedom and community of all things ; these and many more absurdities are easily removed , if on the contrary we maintain the natural and private dominion of adam , to be the fountain of all government and propriety : and if we mark it well , we shall find that grotius doth in part grant as much ; the ground why those that now live do obey their governours , is the will of their forefathers , who at the first ordained princes , and , in obedience to that will , the children continue in subjection ; this is according to the mind of grotius : so that the question is not , whether kings have a fatherly power over their subjects , but how kings came first by it . grotius will have it , that our forefathers being all free , made an assignment of their power to kings ; the other opinion denies any such general freedom of our forefathers , but derives the power of kings from the original dominion of adam . this natural dominion of adam may be proved out of grotius himself , who teacheth , that generatione jus acquiritur parentibus in liberos , and that naturally no other can be found , but the parents to whom the government should belong , and the right of ruling and compelling them doth belong to parents . and in another place he hath these words , speaking of the fifth commandment , parentum nomine , qui naturales sunt magistratus , etiam alios rectores par est intelligi , quorum authoritas societatem humanam continet : and if parents be natural magistrates , children must needs be born natural subjects . but although grotius acknowledge parents to be natural magistrates , yet he will have it , that children , when they come to full age , and are separated from their parents , are free from natural subjection . for this he offers proof out of aristotle , and out of scripture . first , for aristotle ; we must note , he doth not teach , that every separation of children of full age , is an obtaining of liberty , as if that men when they come to years , might voluntarily separate themselves , and cast off their natural obedience ; but aristotle speaks only of a passive separation ; for he doth not say , that children are subject to parents until they do separate , but , he saith , until they be separated , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the verb of the passive voice . that is , until by law they be separated : for the law ( which is nothing else but the will of him that hath the power of the supreme father ) doth in many cases , for the publick benefit of society , free children from subjection to the subordinate parent , so that the natural subjection by such emancipation of children , is not extinguished , but only assumed and regulated by the parent paramount . secondly , grotius cites numb . . to prove that the power of the fathers over the sons and daughters , to dissolve their vows , was not perpetual , but during the time only whilst the children were part of the fathers family . but if we turn to the chapter , we may find that grotius either deceives himself or us ; for there is not one word in that chapter concerning the vows of sons , but of daughters only , being in their father's family ; and the being of the daughter in the father's house , meaneth only the daughter 's being a virgin , and not married , which may be gathered by the argument of the whole chapter , which taketh particular order for the vows of vvomen of all estates . first , for virgins , in the third verse . secondly , for vvives in general , in the sixth verse . thirdly , for vvidows , and vvomen divorced , in the ninth verse . there is no law for virgins out of their father's houses ; we may not think they would have been omitted , if they had been free from their fathers ; we find no freedom in the text for vvomen , till after marriage : and if they were married , though they were in their father's houses , yet the fathers had no power of their vows , but their husbands . if , by the law of nature , departure from the father's house had emancipated children , why doth the civil law , contrary to the law of nature , give power and remedy to fathers for to recover by action of law their children that depart , or are taken away from them without their consent ? without the consent of parents the civil law allows no emancipation . concerning subjection of children to parents , grotius distinguisheth three several times . the first is the time of imperfect judgment . the second is the time of perfect judgment : but whilst the son remains part of the father's family . the third is , the time after he hath departed out of his father's family . in the first time he saith . all the actions of children are under the dominion of the parents . during the second time , when they are of the age of mature judgment , they are under their father's command in those actions only , which are of moment for their parents family . in other actions the children have a power or moral faculty of doing , but they are bound in those also to study always to please their parents . but since this duty is not by force of any moral faculty , as those former are , but only of piety , observance , and duty of repaying thanks ; it doth not make any thing void which is done against it , as neither a gift of any thing is void , being made by any owner whatsoever , against the rules of parsimony . in both these times , the right of ruling and compelling is ( as grotius acknowledgeth ) comprehended so far forth as children are to be compelled to their duty , or amended ; although the power of a parent doth so follow the person of a father , that it cannot be pulled away , and transferred upon another , yet the father may naturally pawn , or also sell his son , if there be need . in the third time he saith , the son is in all things free , and of his own authority : always that duty remaining of piety and observance , the cause of which is perpetual . in this triple distinction , though grotius allow children in some cases during the second , and in all cases during the third time to be free , and of their own power , by a moral faculty : yet , in that he confesseth , in all cases children are bound to study always to please their parents out of piety and duty , the cause of which , as he saith , is perpetual : i cannot conceive , how in any case children can naturally have any power or moral faculty of doing what they please without their parents leave , since they are always bound to study to please their parents . and though by the laws of some nations , children , when they attain to years of discretion , have power and liberty in many actions ; yet this liberty is granted them by positive and humane laws only , which are made by the supreme fatherly power of princes , who regulate , limit , or assume the authority of inferiour fathers , for the publick benefit of the commonwealth : so that naturally the power of parents over their children never ceaseth by any separation , but only by the permission of the transcendent fatherly power of the supreme prince , children may be dispensed with , or priviledged in some cases , from obedience to subordinate parents . touching the point of dissolving the vows of children , grotius in his last edition of his book hath corrected his first : for in the first he teacheth , that the power of the father was greater over the daughter dwelling with him , than over the son ; for her vow he might make void , but not his : but instead of these words , in his last edition , he saith , that the power over the son or daughter to dissolve vows , was not perpetual , but did endure as long as the children were a part of their fathers family . about the meaning of the text out of which he draws this conclusion , i have already spoken . three ways grotius propoundeth , whereby supreme power may be had . first , by full right of propriety . secondly , by an vsufructuary right . thirdly , by a temporary right . the roman dictators , saith he , had supreme power by a temporary right ; as well those kings who are first elected , as those that in a lawful right succeed to kings elected , have supreme power by an usufructuary right : some kings that have got supreme power by a just war , or into whose power some people , for avoiding a greater evil , have so yielded themselves , as that they have excepted nothing , have a full right of propriety . thus we find but two means acknowledged by grotius , whereby a king may obtain a full right of propriety in a kingdom : that is , either by a just war , or by donation of the people . how a war can be just without a precedent title in the conquerour , grotius doth not shew ; and if the title only make the war just , then no other right can be obtained by war , than what the title bringeth ; for a just war doth only put the conquerour in possession of his old right , but not create a new . the like which grotius saith of succession , may be said of war. succession ( saith he ) is no title of a kingdom , which gives a form to the kingdom , but a continuation of the old ; for the right which began by the election of the family , is continued by succession ; wherefore , so much as the first election gave , so much the succession brings . so to a conquerour that hath a title , war doth not give , but put him in possession of a right : and except the conquerour had a full right of propriety at first , his conquest cannot give it him : for if originally he and his ancestors had but an usufructuary right , and were outed of the possession of the kingdom by an usurper : here , though the re-conquest be a most just war , yet shall not the conquerour in this case gain any full right of propriety , but must be remitted to his usufructuary right only : for what justice can it be , that the injustice of a third person , an usurper , should prejudice the people , to the devesting of them of that right of propriety , which was reserved in their first donation to their elected king , to whom they gave but an usufructuary right , as grotius conceiveth ? wherefore it seems impossible , that there can be a just war , whereby a full right of propriety may be gained , according to grotius's principles . for if a king come in by conquest , he must either conquer them that have a governour , or those people that have none : if they have no governour , then they are a free people , and so the war will be unjust to conquer those that are free , especially if the freedom of the people be by the primary law of nature , as grotius teacheth : but if the people conquered have a governour , that governour hath either a title or not : if he hath a title , it is an unjust war that takes the kingdom from him : if he hath no title , but only the possession of a kingdom , yet it is unjust for any other man , that wants a title also , to conquer him that is but in possession : for it is a just rule , that where the cases are alike , he that is in possession is in the better condition ; in pari causa possidentis melior conditio . lib. . c. . and this by the law of nature , even in the judgment of grotius . but if it be admitted , that he that attempts to conquer hath a title , and he that is in possession hath none : here the conquest is but in nature of a possessory action , to put the conquerour in possession of a primer right , and not to raise a new title ; for war begins where the law fails : vbi judicia deficiunt incipit bellum . lib. . cap. . and thus , upon the matter , i cannot find in grotius's book de jure belli , how that any case can be put wherein by a just war a man may become a king , pleno jure proprietatis . all government and supreme power is founded upon publick subjection , which is thus defined by grotius . publica subjectio est , quâ se populus homini alicui , aut pluribus hominibus , aut etiam populo alteri in ditionem dat . lib. . cap. . if subjection be the gift of the people , how can supreme power , pleno jure , in full right , be got by a just war ? as to the other means whereby kings may get supreme power in full right of propriety , grotius will have it to be , when some people , for avoiding a greater evil , do so yield themselves into anothers power , as that they do except nothing . it would be considered how , without war , any people can be brought into such danger of life , as that because they can find no other ways to defend themselves , or because they are so pressed with poverty , as they cannot otherwise have means to sustain themselves , they are forced to renounce all right of governing themselves , and deliver it to a king. but if such a case cannot happen , but by a war only , which reduceth a people to such terms of extremity , as compels them to an absolute abrenunciation of all sovereignty : then war , which causeth that necessity , is the prime means of extorting such soveraignty , and not the free gift of the people , who cannot otherwise chuse but give away that power which they cannot keep . thus , upon the reckoning , the two ways propounded by grotius , are but one way ; and that one way , in conclusion , is no way whereby supreme power may be had in full right of propriety . his two ways are , a just war , or a donation of the people ; a just war cannot be without a title , no title without the donation of the people , no donation without such a necessity as nothing can bring upon the donors but a war. so that howsoever grotius in words acknowledges that kings may have a full right of propriety , yet by consequence he denies it , by such circular suppositions , as by coincidence destroy each other , and in effect he leaves all people a right to plead in bar against the right of propriety of any prince , either per minas , or per dures . many times , saith grotius , it happens , that war is grounded upon expletive justice , justitiam expletricem , which is , when a man cannot obtain what he ought , he takes that which is as much in value , which in moral estimation is the same . for in war , when the same province cannot be recovered , to the which a man hath a title , he recovers another of the like value . this recovery cannot give a full right of propriety : because the justice of such a war reacheth no farther than to a compensation for a former right to another thing , and therefore can give no new right . i am bound to take notice of a case put by grotius , amongst those causes which he thinks should move the people to renounce all their right of governing , and give it to another . it may also happen ( saith he ) that a father of a family possessing large territories , will not receive any man to dwell within his land upon any other condition . and in another place , he saith , that all kings are not made by the people , which may be sufficiently understood by the example of a father of a family receiving strangers under the law of obedience . in both these passages we have a close and curt acknowledgment , that a father of a family may be an absolute king over strangers , without choice of the people ; now i would know whether such fathers of families have not the same absolute power over their own children , without the peoples choice , which he allows them over strangers : if they have , i cannot but call them absolute proprietary kings , though grotius be not willing to give them that title in plain terms : for indeed to allow such kings , were to condemn his own principle , that dominion came in by the will of the people ; and so consequently to overthrow his vsufructuary kings , of whom i am next to speak . grotius saith , that the law of obeying , or resisting princes , depends upon the will of them who first met in civil society , from whom power doth flow to kings . and , that men of their own accord came together into civil society , from whence springs civil power , and the people may chuse what form of government they please . upon these suppositions , he concludes , that kings , elected by the people , have but an vsufructuary right ; that is , a right to take the profit or fruit of the kingdom , but not a right of propriety or power to alienate it . but why doth he call it an vsufructuary right ? it seems to me a term too mean or base to express the right of any king , and is derogatory to the dignity of supreme majesty . the word vsufructuary is used by the lawyers , to signifie him that hath the use , profit , or fruit of some corporal thing , that may be used without the property ; for of fungible things ( res fungibles , the civilians call them ) that are spent or consumed in the use , as corn , wine , oyl , money , there cannot be an vsufructuary right . it is to make a kingdom all one with a farm , as if it had no other use but to be let out to him that can make most of it : whereas , in truth , it is the part and duty of a king to govern , and he hath a right so to do , and to that end supreme power is given unto him ; the taking of the profit , or making use of the patrimony of the crown , is but as a means only to enable him to perform that work of government . besides , grotius will not only have an elected king , but also his lawful successors , to have but an vsufructuary right , so that though a king hath a crown to him and to his heirs , yet he will allow him no propriety , because he hath no power to alienate it ; for he supposeth the primary vvill of the people to have been to bestow supreme power to go in succession , and not to be alienable ; but for this he hath no better proof than a naked presumption : in regnis quae populi voluntate delatâ sunt , concedo non esse praesumendum eam fuisse populi voluntatem , aut alienatio imperii sui regi permitteretur . but though he will not allow kings a right of propriety in their kingdoms , yet a right of propriety there must be in some body , and in whom but in the people ? for he saith , the empire which is exercised by kings , doth not cease to be the empire of the people . his meaning is , the use is the king 's , but the property is the peoples . but if the power to alienate the kingdom be in him that hath the property , this may prove a comfortable doctrine to the people : but yet to allow a right of succession in kings , and still to reserve a right of property in the people , may make some contradiction : for the succession must either hinder the right of alienation which is in the people , or the alienation must destroy that right of succession , which , by grotius's confession , may attend upon elected kings . though grotius confess , that supreme power be vnum quiddam , and in it self indivisible , ye he bsaith , sometimes it may be divided either by parts potential , or subjunctive . i take his meaning to be , that the government or the governed may be divided : an example he gives of the roman empire , which was divided into the east and west : but whereas he saith , fieri potest , &c. it may be , the people chusing a king , may reserve some actions to themselves , and in others they may give full power to the king. the example he brings out of plato of the heraclides doth not prove it , and it is to dream of such a form of government as never yet had name , nor was ever found in any setled kingdom , nor cannot possibly be without strange confusion . if it were a thing so voluntary , and at the pleasure of men , when they were free , to put themselves under subjection , why may they not as voluntarily leave subjection when they please , and be free again ? if they had a liberty to change their natural freedom into a voluntary subjection , there is stronger reason that they may change their voluntary subjection into natural freedom , since it is as lawful for men to alter their wills as their judgments . certainly it was a rare felicity , that all the men in the world at one instant of time should agree together in one mind , to change the natural community of all things into private dominion : for without such an unanimous consent , it was not possible for community to be altered : for if but one man in the world had dissented , the alteration had been unjust , because that man by the law of nature had a right to the common use of all things in the world ; so that to have given a propriety of any one thing to any other , had been to have robbed him of his right to the common use of all things . and of this judgment the jesuit lud. molina seems to be in his book de justitia , where he saith , si aliquis de cohabitantibus , &c. if one of the neighbours will not give his consent to it , the commonwealth should have no authority over him , because then every other man hath no right or authority over him , and therefore can they not give authority to the commonwealth over him . if our first parents , or some other of our forefathers did voluntarily bring in propriety of goods , and subjection to governours , and it were in their power either to bring them in or not , or having brought them in , to alter their minds , and restore them to their first condition of community and liberty ; what reason can there be alledged that men that now live should not have the same power ? so that if any one man in the world , be he never so mean or base , will but alter his will , and say , he will resume his natural right to community , and be restored unto his natural liberty , and consequently take what he please , and do what he list ; who can say that such a man doth more than by right he may ? and then it will be lawful for every man , when he please , to dissolve all government , and destroy all property . vvhereas grotius saith , that by the law of nature all things were at first common ; and yet teacheth , that after propriety was brought in , it was against the law of nature to use community ; he doth thereby not only make the law of nature changeable , which he saith god cannot do , but he also makes the law of nature contrary to it self . observations upon mr. hvnton's treatise of monarchy : or , the anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy . these observations on the treatise of monarchy written by mr. hunton , being of like argument with the former , are here annexed , with this advertisement , that the treatise it self consists of two parts : the first concerning monarchy in general ; the latter concerning this particular monarchy , and is seconded with a vindication , which alledgeth new matter about the nature , kinds , causes , and means of limitation in government ; intimating a mistrust that the treatise had not fully or sufficiently discovered these points . these observations reach only to the first part of the treatise , concerning monarchy in general , whether it can possibly be limited or mixed ? if this be not made good , it is but vain labour to trouble the reader with the dispute about the nature , kinds , and causes of that which is not , nor cannot at all be ; or to handle the hypothesis about this particular monarchy , for which the prime and chief arguments are of no greater antiquity than some concessions since these present troubles . the ancient doctrine of government in these later days hath been strangely refined by the romanists , and wonderfully improved since the reformation , especially in point of monarchy , by an opinion , that the people have originally a power to create several sorts of monarchy , and to limit and compound them at their pleasure . the consideration hereof caused me to scruple the modern piece of politicks touching limited and mixed monarchy ; and finding it only presented us by this author , i have drawn these few observations upon the most considerable part of his treatise , desiring to receive satisfaction from the author , or any other for him . the novelty of this point challengeth a modest debate ; the rather , for that the treatise acknowledgeth , that not only monarchy , but also aristocracy , and democracy , may be either simple , or mixed of two or all three together , though it do not determine whether they can be absolute or limited . the preface we do but flatter our selves , if we hope ever to be governed without an arbitrary power . no : we mistake , the question is not , whether there shall be an arbitrary power ; but the only point is , who shall have that arbitrary power , whether one man or many ? there never was , nor ever can be any people governed without a power of making laws , and every power of making laws must be arbitrary : for to make a law according to law , is contradictio in adjecto . it is generally confessed , that in a democracy the supreme or arbitrary power of making laws is in a multitude ; and so in an aristocracy the like legislative or arbitrary power is in a few , or in the nobility . and therefore by a necessary consequence , in a monarchy the same legislative power must be in one ; according to the rule of aristotle , who saith , government is in one , or in a few , or in many . this ancient doctrine of government , in these latter days , hath been strangely refined by the romanists , and wonderfully improved since the reformation , especially in point of monarchy , by an opinion , that the people have originally a power to create several sorts of monarchy , to limit and compound them with other forms of government , at their pleasure . as for this natural power of the people , they find neither scripture , reason , or practice to justifie it : for though several kingdoms have several and distinct laws one from another ; yet that doth not make several sorts of monarchy : nor doth the difference of obtaining the supreme power , whether by conquest , election , succession , or by any other way , make different sorts of government . it is the difference only of the authors of the laws , and not of the laws themselves , that alters the form of government ; that is , whether one man , or more than one , make the laws . since the growth of this new doctrine , of the limitation and mixture of monarchy , it is most apparent , that monarchy hath been crucified ( as it were ) between two thieves , the pope and the people ; for what principles the papists make use of for the power of the pope above kings , the very same , by blotting out the word pope , and putting in the word people , the plebists take up to use against their soveraigns . if we would truly know what popery is , we shall find by the laws and statutes of the realm , that the main , and indeed the only point of popery , is the alienating and withdrawing of subjects from their obedience to their prince , to raise sedition and rebellion : if popery and popularity agree in this point , the kings of christendom , that have shaken off the power of the pope , have made no great bargain of it , if in place of one lord abroad , they get many lords at home within their own kingdoms . i cannot but reverence that form of government which was allowed and made use of for god's own people , and for all other nations . it were impiety , to think that god , who was careful to appoint judicial laws for his chosen people , would not furnish them with the best form of government : or to imagine , that the rules given in divers places in the gospel , by our blessed saviour and his apostles , for obedience to kings , should now , like almanacks out of date , be of no use to us ; because it is pretended , we have a form of government now , not once thought of in those days . it is a shame and scandal for us christians , to seek the original of government from the inventions or fictions of poets , orators , philosophers , and heathen historians , who all lived thousands of years after the creation , and were ( in a manner ) ignorant of it : and to neglect the scriptures , which have with more authority most particularly given us the true grounds and principles of government . these considerations caused me to scruple this modern piece of politicks , touching limited and mixed monarchy : and finding no other that presented us with the nature and means of limitation and mixture , but an anonymous author ; i have drawn a few brief observations upon the most considerable part of his treatise , in which i desire to receive satisfaction from the author himself , if it may be , according to his promise in his preface ; or if not from him , from any other for him . the anarchy of a limited or mixed monarchy . there is scarce the meanest man of the multitude , but can now in these days tell us , that the government of the kingdom of england is a limited and mixed monarchy : and it is no marvel , since all the disputes and arguments of these distracted times both from the pulpit and press do tend and end in this conclusion . the author of the treatise of monarchy hath copiously handled the nature and manner of limited and mixed monarchy , and is the first and only man ( that i know ) hath undertaken the task of describing it ; others only mention it , as taking it for granted . doctor ferne gives the author of this treatise of monarchy this testimony , that the mixture of government is more accurately delivered and urged by this treatise than by the author of the fuller answer . and in another place doctor ferne saith , he allows his distinction of monarchy into limited and mixed . i have with some diligence looked over this treatise , but cannot approve of these distinctions which he propounds ; i submit the reasons of my dislike to others judgments . i am somewhat confident that his doctrine of limited and mixed monarchy is an opinion but of yesterday , and of no antiquity , a me●● innovation in policy , not so old as new england , though calculated properly for that meridian . for in his first part of the treatise which concerns monarchy in general , there is not one proof , text , or example in scripture that he hath produced to justifie his conceit of limited and mixed monarchy . neither doth he afford us so much as one passage or reason out of aristole , whose books of politicks , and whose natural reasons are of greatest authority and credit with all rational men , next to the sacred scripture : nay , i hope i may affirm , and be able to prove , that aristotle doth confute both limited and mixed monarchy , howsoever doctor ferne think these new opinions to be raised upon aristotles principles . as for other politicians or historians , either divine or humane , ancient or modern , our author brings not one to confirm his opinions ; nor doth he , nor can he shew that ever any nation or people were governed by a limited or mixed monarchy . machiavel is the first in christendom that i can find that writ of a mixed government , but not one syllable of a mixed monarchy : he , in his discourses or disputations upon the decades of livy , falls so enamored with the roman commonwealth , that he thought he could never sufficiently grace that popular government , unless he said , there was something of monarchy in it : yet he was never so impudent as to say , it was a mixed monarchy . and what machiavel hath said for rome , the like hath contarene for venice . but bodin hath laid open the errours of both these , as also of polybius , and some few others that held the like opinions . as for the kingdom of england , if it hath found out a form of government ( as the treatise layeth it down ) of such perfection as never any people could ; it is both a glory to the nation , and also to this author , who hath first decipher'd it . i now make my approach to the book it self : the title is , a treatise of monarchy . the first part of it is , of monarchy in general : where first , i charge the author , that he hath not given us any definition or description of monarchy in general : for by the rules of method he should have first defined , and then divided : for if there be several sorts of monarchy , then in something they must agree , which makes them to be monarchies ; and in something they must disagree and differ , which makes them to be several sorts of monarchies . in the first place he should have shewed us in what they all agreed , which must have been a definition of monarchy in general , which is the foundation of the treatise ; and except that be agreed upon , we shall argue upon we know not what . i press not this main omission of our author out of any humour of wrangling ; but because i am confident that had he pitched upon any definition of monarchy in general , his own definition would have confuted his whole treatise . besides , i find him pleased to give us a handsom definition of absolute monarchy , from whence i may infer , that he knew no other definition that would have fitted all his other sorts of monarchy ; it concerned him to have produced it , lest it might be thought there could be no monarchy but absolute . what our author hath omitted , i shall attempt to supply , and leave to the scanning . and it shall be a real as well as nominal definition of monarchy . a monarchy is the government of one alone . for the better credit of this definition , though it be able to maintain it self , yet i shall deduce it from the principles of our author of the treatise of monarchy . we all know that this word monarch is compounded of two greek words , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is imperare to govern and rule ; 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifies one alone . the understanding of these two words may be picked out of our author . first , for government he teacheth us , it is potestatis exercitium , the exercise of a moral power ; next he grants us , that every monarch ( even his limited monarch ) must have the supreme power of the state in him , so that his power must no way be limited by any power above his ; for then he were not a monarch , but a subordinate magistrate . here we have a fair confession of a supreme unlimited power in his limited monarch : if you will know what he means by these words supreme power , turn to his . page , there you will find , supreme power is either legislative , or gubernative , and that the legislative power is the chief of the two ; he makes both supreme , and yet one chief : the like distinction he hath before , where he saith , the power of magistracy , in respect of its degrees , is nomothetical or architectonical ; and gubernative or executive : by these words of legislative , nomothetical , and architectonical power , in plain english , he understands a power of making laws ; and by gubernative and executive , a power of putting those laws in execution , by judging and punishing offenders . the result we have from hence is , that by the authors acknowledgment , every monarch must have the supreme power , and that supreme power is , a power to make laws : and howsoever the author makes the gubernative and executive power a part of the supreme power ; yet he confesseth the legislative to be chief , or the highest degree of power , for he doth acknowledge degrees of supreme power ; nay , he afterwards teacheth us , that the legislative power is the height of power , to which the other parts are subsequent and subservient : if gubernative be subservient to legislative , how can gubernative power be supreme ? now let us examine the authors limited monarch by these his own rules ; he tells us , that in a moderated , limited , stinted , conditionate , legal or allayed monarchy ( for all these terms he hath for it ) the supreme power must be restrained by some law according to which this power was given , and by direction of which this power must act ; when in a line before he said , that the monarchs power must not be limited by any power above his : yet here he will have his supreme power restrained ; not limited , and yet restrained : is not a restraint , a limitation ? and if restrained , how is it supreme ? and if restrained by some law , is not the power of that law , and of them that made that law , above his supreme power ? and if by the direction of such law only he must govern , where is the legislative power , which is the chief of supreme power ? when the law must rule and govern the monarch , and not the monarch the law , he hath at the most but a gubernative or executive power : if his authority transcends its bounds , if it command beyond the law , the subject is not bound legally to subjection in such cases , and if the utmost extent of the law of the land be the measure of the limited monarchs power , and subjects duty , where shall we find the supreme power , that culmen or apex potestatis , that prime 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which our author saith , must be in every monarch ? the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies principality and power , doth also signifie principium , beginning ; which doth teach us , that by the word prince , or principality , the principium or beginning of government is meant ; this , if it be given to the law , it robs the monarch , and makes the law the primum mobile ; and so that which is but the instrument , or servant to the monarch , becomes the master . thus much of the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . the other word is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , solus , one alone : the monarch must not only have the supreme power unlimited , but he must have it alone ( without any companions . ) our author teacheth us , he is no monarch , if the supreme power be not in one . and again he saith , if you put the apex potestatis , or supreme power in the whole body , or a part of it , you destroy the being of monarchy . now let us see if his mixed monarchy be framed according to these his own principles . first , he saith , in a mixed monarchy the soveraign power must be originally in all three estates . and again his words are , the three estates are all sharers in the supreme power — the primity of share in the supreme power is in one. here we find , that he that told us the supreme power must be in one , will now allow his mixed monarch but one share only of the supreme power , and gives other shares to the estates : thus he destroys the being of monarchy , by putting the supreme power , or culmen potestatis , or a part of it , in the whole body , or a part thereof ; and yet formerly he confesseth , that the power of magistracy cannot well be divided , for it is one simple thing , or indivisible beam of divine perfection : but he can make this indivisible beam to be divisible into three shares . i have done with the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , solus , alone . i have dwelt the longer upon this definition of monarchy , because the apprehending of it out of the authors own grounds quite overthrows both his monarch limited by law , and his monarch mixed with the states . for to govern , is to give a law to others , and not to have a law given to govern and limit him that governs : and to govern alone , is not to have sharers or companions mixed with the governour . thus the two words of which monarchy is compounded , contradict the two sorts of monarchy which he pleads for , and by consequence his whole treatise : for these two sorts of limited and mixed monarchy take up ( in a manner ) his whole book . i will now touch some few particular passages in the treatise . our author first confesseth , it is gods express ordinance there should be government , and he proves it by gen. . . where god ordained adam to rule over his wife , and her desires were to be subject to his ; and as hers , so all theirs that should come of her . here we have the original grant of government , and the fountain of all power placed in the father of all mankind ; accordingly we find the law for obedience to government given in the terms of honour thy father : not only the constitution of power in general , but the limitation of it to one kind ( that is , to monarchy , or the government of one alone ) and the determination of it to the individual person and line of adam , are all three ordinances of god. neither eve nor her children could either limit adams power , or joyn others with him in the government ; and what was given unto adam , was given in his person to his posterity . this paternal power continued monarchical to the flood , and after the flood to the confusion of babel : when kingdoms were first erected , planted , or scattered over the face of the world , we find gen. . . it was done by colonies of whole families , over which the prime fathers had supreme power , and were kings , who were all the sons or grand-children of noah , from whom they derived a fatherly and regal power over their families . now if this supreme power was setled and founded by god himself in the fatherhood , how is it possible for the people to have any right or title to alter and dispose of it otherwise ? what commission can they shew that gives them power either of limitation or mixture ? it was god's ordinance , that supremacy should be unlimited in adam , and as large as all the acts of his will : and as in him , so in all others that have supreme power , as appears by the judgment and speech of the people to joshuah when he was supreme governour , these are their words to him , all that thou commandest us we will do ; whosoever he be that doth rebel against thy commandment , and will not hearken unto thy words in all that thou commandest him , he shall be put to death : we may not say , that these were evil councellours or flattering courtiers of joshuah , or that he himself was a tyrant for having such arbitrary power . our author , and all those who affirm , that power is conveyed to persons by publick consent , are forced to confess , that it is the fatherly power that first enables a people to make such conveyance ; so that admitting ( as they hold ) that our ancestors did at first convey power , yet the reason why we now living do submit to such power , is , for that our forefathers every one for himself , his family , and posterity , had a power of resigning up themselves and us to a supreme power . as the scripture teacheth us , that supreme power was originally in the fatherhood without any limitation , so likewise reason doth evince it , that if god ordained that supremacy should be , that then supremacy must of necessity be unlimited : for the power that limits must be above that power which is limited ; if it be limited , it cannot be supreme : so that if our author will grant supreme power to be the ordinance of god , the supreme power will prove it self to be unlimited by the same ordinance , because a supreme limited power is a contradiction . the monarchical power of adam the father of all flesh , being by a general binding ordinance setled by god in him and his posterity by right of fatherhood , the form of monarchy must be preferred above other forms , except the like ordinance for other forms can be shewed : neither may men according to their relations to the form they live under , to their affections and judgments in divers respects , prefer or compare any other form with monarchy . the point that most perplexeth our author and many others , is , that if monarchy be allowed to be the ordinance of god , an absurdity would follow , that we should uncharitably condemn all the communities which have not that form , for violation of gods ordinance , and pronounce those other powers unlawful . if those who live under a monarchy can justifie the form they live under to be gods ordinance , they are not bound to forbear their own justification , because others cannot do the like for the form they live under ; let others look to the defence of their own government : if it cannot be proved or shewed that any other form of government had ever any lawful beginning , but was brought in or erected by rebellion , must therefore the lawful and just obedience to monarchy be denied to be the ordinance of god ? to proceed with our author ; in the d. page he saith , the higher power is gods ordinance : that it resideth in one or more , in such or such a way , is from humane designment ; god by no word binds any people to this or that form , till they by their own act bind themselves . because the power and consent of the people in government is the burden of the whole book , and our author expects it should be admitted as a magisterial postulation , without any other proof than a naked supposition ; and since others also maintain that originally power was , or now is in the people , and that the first kings were chosen by the people : they may not be offended , if they be asked in what sence they understand the word [ people ] because this , as many other words , hath different acceptions , being sometimes taken in a larger , otherwhile in a stricter sence . literally , and in the largest sence , the word people signifies the whole multitude of mankind ; but figuratively and synecdochically , it notes many times the major part of a multitude , or sometimes the better , or the richer , or the wiser , or some other part ; and oftentimes a very small part of the people , if there be no other apparent opposite party , hath the name of the people by presumption . if they understand that the entire multitude or whole people have originally by nature power to chuse a king , they must remember , that by their own principles and rules , by nature all mankind in the world makes but one people , who they suppose to be born alike to an equal freedom from subjection ; and where such freedom is , there all things must of necessity be common : and therefore without a joynt consent of the whole people of the world , no one thing can be made proper to any one man , but it will be an injury , and an usurpation upon the common right of all others . from whence it follows , that natural freedom being once granted , there cannot be any one man chosen a king without the universal consent of all the people of the world at one instant , nemine contradicente . nay , if it be true that nature hath made all men free ; though all mankind should concur in one vote , yet it cannot seem reasonable , that they should have power to alter the law of nature ; for if no man have power to take away his own life without the guilt of being a murtherer of himself , how can any people confer such a power as they have not themselves upon any one man , without being accessories to their own deaths , and every particular man become guilty of being felo de se ? if this general signification of the word people be disavowed , and men will suppose that the people of particular regions or countries have power and freedom to chuse unto themselves kings ; then let them but observe the consequence : since nature hath not distinguished the habitable world into kingdoms , nor determined what part of a people shall belong to one kingdom , and what to another , it follows , that the original freedom of mankind being supposed , every man is at liberty to be of what kingdom he please , and so every petty company hath a right to make a kingdom by it self ; and not only every city , but every village , and every family , nay and every particular man , a liberty to chuse himself to be his own king if he please ; and he were a madman that being by nature free , would chuse any man but himself to be his own governour . thus to avoid the having but of one king of the whole world , we shall run into a liberty of having as many kings as there be men in the world , which upon the matter , is to have no king at all , but to leave all men to their natural liberty , which is the mischief the pleaders for natural liberty do pretend they would most avoid . but if neither the whole people of the world , nor the whole people of any part of the world be meant , but only the major part , or some other part of a part of the world ; yet still the objection will be the stronger . for besides that nature hath made no partition of the world , or of the people into distinct kingdoms , and that without an universal consent at one and the same instant no partition can be made : yet if it were lawful for particular parts of the world by consent to chuse their kings , nevertheless their elections would bind none to subjection but only such as consented ; for the major part never binds , but where men at first either agree to be so bound , or where a higher power so commands : now there being no higher power than nature , but god himself ; where neither nature nor god appoints the major part to bind , there consent is not binding to any but only to themselves who consent . yet , for the present to gratifie them so far as to admit that either by nature , or by a general consent of all mankind , the world at first was divided into particular kingdoms , and the major part of the people of each kingdom assembled , allowed to chuse their king : yet it cannot truly be said that ever the whole people , or the major part , or indeed any considerable part of the whole people of any nation ever assembled to any such purpose . for except by some secret miraculous instinct they should all meet at one time , and place , what one man , or company of men less than the whole people hath power to appoint either time or place of elections , where all be alike free by nature ? and without a lawful summons , it is most unjust to bind those that be absent . the whole people cannot summon it self ; one man is sick , another is lame , a third is aged , and a fourth is under age of discretion : all these at some time or other , or at some place or other , might be able to meet , if they might chuse their own time and place , as men naturally free should . in assemblies that are by humane politique constitution , the superior power that ordains such assemblies , can regulate and confine them , both for time , place , persons , and other circumstances : but where there is an equality by nature , there can be no superior power ; there every infant at the hour it is born in , hath a like interest with the greatest and wisest man in the world. mankind is like the sea , ever ebbing or flowing , every minute one is born , another dies ; those that are the people this minute , are not the people the next minute , in every instant and point of time there is a variation : no one time can be indifferent for all mankind to assemble ; it cannot but be mischievous always at the least to all infants , and others under age of discretion ; not to speak of women , especially virgins , who by birth have as much natural freedom as any other , and therefore ought not to lose their liberty without their own consent . but in part to salve this , it will be said that infants and children may be concluded by the votes of their parents . this remedy may cure some part of the mischief , but it destroys the whole cause , and at last stumbles upon the true original of government . for if it be allowed , that the acts of parents bind the children , then farewel the doctrine of the natural freedom of mankind ; where subjection of children to parents is natural , there can be no natural freedom . if any reply , that not all children shall be bound by their parents consent , but only those that are under age : it must be considered , that in nature there is no nonage ; if a man be not born free , she doth not assign him any other time when he shall attain his freedom : or if she did , then children attaining that age , should be discharged of their parents contract . so that in conclusion , if it be imagined that the people were ever but once free from subjection by nature , it will prove a meer impossibility ever lawfully to introduce any kind of government whatsoever , without apparent wrong to a multitude of people . it is further observable , that ordinarily children and servants are far a greater number than parents and masters ; and for the major part of these to be able to vote and appoint what government or governours their fathers and masters shall be subject unto , is most unnatural , and in effect to give the children the government over their parents . to all this it may be opposed , what need dispute how a people can chuse a king , since there be multitude of examples that kings have been , and are now adays chosen by their people ? the answer is , . the question is not of the fact , but of the right , whether it have been done by a natural , or by an usurped right . . many kings are , and have been chosen by some small part of a people ; but by the whole , or major part of a kingdom not any at all . most have been elected by the nobility , great men , and princes of the blood , as in poland , denmark , and in sweden ; not by any collective or representative body of any nation : sometimes a factious or seditious city , or a mutinous army hath set up a king , but none of all those could ever prove they had right or just title either by nature , or any otherwise , for such elections . we may resolve upon these two propositions : . that the people have no power or right of themselves to chuse kings . . if they had any such right , it is not possible for them any way lawfully to exercise it . you will say , there must necessarily be a right in some body to elect , in case a king die without an heir . i answer , no king can die without an heir , as long as there is any one man living in the world . it may be the heir may be unknown to the people ; but that is no fault in nature , but the negligence or ignorance of those whom it concerns . but if a king could die without an heir , yet the kingly power in that case shall not escheat to the whole people , but to the supream heads and fathers of families ; not as they are the people , but quatenus they are fathers of people , over whom they have a supream power devolved unto them after the death of their soveraign ancestor : and if any can have a right to chuse a king , it must be these fathers , by conferring their distinct fatherly powers upon one man alone . chief fathers in scripture are accounted as all the people , as all the children of israel , as all the congregation , as the text plainly expounds it self , chr. . . where solomon speaks to all israel , that is , to the captains , the judges , and to every governour , the chief of the fathers : and so the elders of israel are expounded to be the chief of the fathers of the children of israel , king. . . and the chr. . . if it be objected , that kings are not now ( as they were at the first planting or peopling of the world ) the fathers of their people or kingdoms , and that the fatherhood hath lost the right of governing ; an answer is , that all kings that now are , or ever were , are , or were either fathers of their people , or the heirs of such fathers , or usurpers of the right of such fathers . it is a truth undeniable , that there cannot be any multitude of men whatsoever , either great , or small , though gathered together from the several corners and remotest regions of the world , but that in the same multitude , considered by it self , there is one man amongst them that in nature hath a right to be the king of all the rest , as being the next heir to adam , and all the other subject unto him : every man by nature is a king , or a subject : the obedience which all subjects yield to kings , is but the paying of that duty which is due to the supream fatherhood : many times by the act either of an usurper himself , or of those that set him up , the true heir of a crown is dispossessed , god using the ministry of the wickedest men for the removing and setting up of kings : in such cases the subjects obedience to the fatherly power must go along and wait upon god's providence , who only hath right to give and take away kingdoms , and thereby to adopt subjects into the obedience of another fatherly power : according to that of arist . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . a monarchy or kingdom will be a fatherly government . ethic. l. . c. . however the natural freedom of the people be cried us as the sole means to determine the kind of government and the governours : yet in the close , all the favourers of this opinion are constrained to grant that the obedience which is due to the fatherly power is the true only cause of the subjection which we that are now living give to kings , since none of us gave consent to government , but only our fore-fathers act and consent hath concluded us . whereas many confess that government only in the abstract is the ordinance of god , they are not able to prove any such ordinance in the scripture , but only in the fatherly power , and therefore we find the commandment that enjoyns obedience to superiours , given in the terms of honour thy father : so that not only the power or right of government , but the form of the power of governing , and the person having that power , are all the ordinance of god : the first father had not only simply power , but power monarchical , as he was a father , immediately from god. for by the appointment of god , as soon as adam was created he was monarch of the world , though he had no subjects ; for though there could not be actual government until there were subjects , yet by the right of nature it was due to adam to be governour of his posterity : though not in act , yet at least in habit . adam was a king from his creation : and in the state of innocency he had been governour of his children ; for the integrity or excellency of the subjects doth not take away the order or eminency of the governour . eve was subject to adam before he sinned ; the angels , who are of a pure nature , are subject to god : which confutes their saying who in disgrace of civil government or power say it was brought in by sin : government as to coactive power was after sin , because coaction supposeth some disorder , which was not in the state of innocency : but as for directive power , the condition of humane nature requires it , since civil society cannot be imagined without power of government : for although as long as men continued in the state of innocency they might not need the direction of adam in those things which were necessarily and morally to be done ; yet things indifferent , that depended meerly on their free will , might be directed by the power of adam's command . if we consider the first plantations of the world which were after the building of babel when the confusion of tongues was , we may find the division of the earth into distinct kingdoms and countries , by several families , whereof the sons or grand-children of noah were the kings or governours by a fatherly right ; and for the preservation of this power and right in the fathers , god was pleased upon several families to bestow a language on each by it self , the better to unite it into a nation or kingdom ; as appears by the words of the text , gen. . these are the families of the sons of noah , after their generations in their nations , and by these were the nations divided in the earth after the floud : every one after his tongue , after their families in their nations . the kings of england have been graciously pleased to admit and accept the commons in parliament as the representees of the kingdom , yet really and truly they are not the representative body of the whole kingdom . the commons in parliament are not the representative body of the whole kingdom : they do not represent the king , who is the head and principal member of the kingdom ; nor do they represent the lords , who are the nobler and higher part of the body of the realm , and are personally present in parliament , and therefore need no representation . the commons only represent a part of the lower or inferior part of the body of the people , which are the free-holders worth s. by the year , and the commons or free-men of cities and burroughs , or the major part of them . all which are not one quarter , nay , not a tenth part of the commons of the kingdom ; for in every parish , for one free-holder there may be found ten that are no freeholders : and anciently before rents were improved , there were nothing near so many free-holders of s. by the year as now are to be found . the scope and conclusion of this discourse and argument is , that the people taken in what notion or sense soever , either diffusively , collectively , or representatively , have not , nor cannot exercise any right or power of their own by nature , either in chusing or in regulating kings . but whatsoever power any people doth lawfully exercise , it must receive it from a supream power on earth , and practise it with such limitations as that superior power shall appoint . to return to our author . he divides monarchy into absolute , limited . absolute monarchy ( saith he ) is , when the sovereignty is so fully in one , that it hath no limits or bounds under god but his own will. this definition of his i embrace . and as before i charged our author for not giving us a definition of monarchy in general , so i now note him for not affording us any definition of any other particular kind of monarchy but only of absolute : it may peradventure make some doubt that there is no other sort but only that which he calls absolute . concerning absolute monarchy , he grants , that such were the ancient eastern monarchies , and that of the turk and persian at this day . herein he saith very true . and we must remember him , though he do not mention them , that the monarchs of judah and israel must be comprehended under the number of those he calls the eastern monarchies : and truly if he had said that all the ancient monarchies of the world had been absolute , i should not have quarrel'd at him , nor do i know who could have disproved him . next it follows , that absolute monarchy is , when a people are absolutely resigned up , or resign up themselves to be governed by the will of one man. where men put themselves into this utmost degree of subjection by oath and contract , or are born and brought unto it by gods providence . in both these places he acknowledgeth there may be other means of obtaining a monarchy , besides the contract of a nation or peoples resigning up themselves to be governed , which is contrary to what he after says , that the sole mean or root of all sovereignty , is the consent and fundamental contract of a nation of men . moreover , the author determines , that absolute monarchy is a lawful government , and that men may be born and brought unto it by gods providence ; it binds them , and they must abide it , because an oath to a lawful thing is obligatory . this position of his i approve , but his reason doth not satisfie : for men are bound to obey a lawful governour , though neither they nor their ancestors ever took oath . then he proceeds , and confesseth that in rom. . the power which then was , was absolute : yet the apostle not excluding it , calls it gods ordinance , and commands subjection to it . so christ commands tribute to be paid , and pays it himself ; yet it was an arbitrary tax , the production of an absolute power . these are the loyal expressions of our author touching absolute or arbitrary monarchy . i do the rather mention these passages of our author , because very many in these days do not stick to maintain , that an arbitrary or absolute monarch not limited by law , is all one with a tyrant ; and to be governed by one man's will , is to be made a slave . it is a question whether our author be not of that mind , when he saith , absolute subjection is servitude : and thereupon a late friend to limited monarchy affirms in a discourse upon the question in debate between the king and parliament , that to make a king by the standard of gods word , is to make the subjects slaves for conscience sake . a hard saying , and i doubt whether he that gives this censure can be excused from blasphemy . it is a bold speech , to condemn all the kings of judah for tyrants , or to say all their subjects were slaves . but certainly the man doth not know either what a tyrant is , or what a slave is : indeed the words are frequent enough in every mans mouth , and our old english translation of the bible useth sometimes the word tyrant ; but the authors of our new translation have been so careful , as not once to use the word , but only for the proper name of a man , act. . . because they find no hebrew word in the scripture to signifie a tyrant or a slave . neither aristotle , bodin , nor sir walter raleigh , ( who were all men of deep judgment ) can agree in a definition or description of tyranny , though they have all three laboured in the point . and i make some question whether any man can possibly describe what a tyrant is , and then tell me any one man that ever was in the world that was a tyrant according to that description . i return again to our treatise of monarchy , where i find three degrees of absolute monarchy . . where the monarch , whose will is the law , doth set himself no law to rule by , but by commands of his own judgment as he thinks fit . . when he sets a law by which he will ordinarily govern , reserving to himself a liberty to vary from it as oft as in his discretion he thinks fit ; and in this the soveraign is as free as the former . . where he not only sets a rule , but promiseth in many cases not to alter it ; but this promise or engagement is an after-condescent or act of grace , not dissolving the absolute oath of subjection which went before it . for the first of these three , there is no question but it is a pure absolute monarchy ; but as for the other two , though he say they be absolute , yet in regard they set themselves limits or laws to govern by , if it please our author to term them limited monarchs , i will not oppose him ; yet i must tell him , that his third degree of absolute monarchy is such a kind , as i believe , never hath been , nor ever can be in the world . for a monarch to promise and engage in many cases not to alter a law , it is most necessary that those many cases should be particularly expressed at the bargain-making . now he that understands the nature and condition of all humane laws , knows that particular cases are infinite , and not comprehensible within any rules or laws : and if many cases should be comprehended , and many omitted , yet even those that were comprehended would admit of variety of interpretations and disputations ; therefore our author doth not , nor can tell us of any such reserved cases promised by any monarch . again , where he saith , an after-condescent or act of grace doth not dissolve the absolute oath of subjection which went before it ; though in this he speak true , yet still he seems to insinuate , that an oath only binds to subjection , which oath , as he would have us believe , was at first arbitrary : whereas subjects are bound to obey monarchs though they never take oath of subjection , as well as children are bound to obey their parents , though they never swear to do it . next , his distinction between the rule of power , and the exercise of it , is vain ; for to rule , is to exercise power : for himself saith , that government is potestatis exercitium , the exercise of a moral power . lastly , whereas our author saith , a monarch cannot break his promise without sin ; let me add , that if the safety of the people , salus populi , require a breach of the monarchs promise , then the sin , if there be any , is rather in the making , than breaking of the promise ; the safety of the people is an exception implied in every monarchical promise . but it seems these three degrees of monarchy do not satisfie our author ; he is not content to have a monarch , have a law or rule to govern by , but he must have this limitation or law to be ab externo , from some body else , and not from the determination of the monarchs own will ; and therefore he saith , by original constitution the society publick confers on one man a power by limited contract , resigning themselves to be governed by such a law : also before he told us , the sole means of soveraignty is the consent and fundamental contract ; which consent puts them in their power , which can be no more nor other than is conveyed to them by such contract of subjection . if the sole means of a limited monarchy be the consent and fundamental contract of a nation , how is it that he saith , a monarch may be limited by after-condescent ? is an after-condescent all one with a fundamental contract , with original and radical constitution ? why yea : he tells us it is a secondary original constitution ; a secondary original , that is , a second first : and if that condescent be an act of grace , doth not this condescent to a limitation come from the free determination of the monarchs will ? if he either formally , or virtually ( as our author supposeth ) desert his absolute or arbitrary power which he hath by conquest , or other right . and if it be from the free will of the monarch , why doth he say the limitation must be ab externo ? he told us before , that subjection cannot be dissolved or lessen'd by an act of grace coming afterwards : but he hath better bethought himself , and now he will have acts of grace to be of two kinds , and the latter kind may amount ( as he saith ) to a resignation of absolute monarchy . but can any man believe that a monarch who by conquest or other right hath an absolute arbitrary power , will voluntarily resign that absoluteness , and accept so much power only as the people shall please to give him , and such laws to govern by as they shall make choice of ? can he shew that ever any monarch was so gracious or kind-hearted as to lay down his lawful power freely at his subjects feet ? is it not sufficient grace if such an absolute monarch be content to set down a law to himself by which he will ordinarily govern , but he must needs relinquish his old independent commission , and take a new one from his subjects , clog'd with limitations ? finally , i observe , that howsoever our author speak big of the radical , fundamental , and original power of the people as the root of all soveraignty : yet in a better mood he will take up , and be contented with a monarchy limited by an after-condescent and act of grace from the monarch himself . thus i have briefly touched his grounds of limited monarchy ; if now we shall ask , what proof or examples he hath to justifie his doctrine , he is as mute as a fish : only pythagoras hath said it , and we must believe him ; for though our author would have monarchy to be limited , yet he could be content his opinion should be absolute , and not limited to any rule or example . the main charge i have against our author now remains to be discussed ; and it is this , that instead of a treatise of monarchy , he hath brought forth a treatise of anarchy , and that by his own confessions shall be made good . first , he holds , a limited monarch transcends his bounds , if he commands beyond the law ; and the subject legally is not bound to subjection in such cases . now if you ask the author who shall be judge , whether the monarch transcend his bounds , and of the excesses of the soveraign power ; his answer is , there is an impossibility of constituting a judge to determine this last controversie — i conceive in a limited legal monarchy there can be no stated internal judge of the monarchs actions , if there grow a fundamental variance between him and the community . there can be no judge legal and constituted within that form of government . in these answers it appears , there is no judge to determine the soveraigns or the monarchs transgressing his fundamental limits : yet our author is very cautelous , and supposeth only a fundamental variance betwixt the monarch and the community ; he is ashamed to put the question home . i demand of him if there be a variance betwixt the monarch and any of the meanest persons of the community , who shall be the judge ? for instance , the king commands me , or gives judgment against me : i reply , his commands are illegal , and his judgment not according to law : who must judge ? if the monarch himself judge , then you destroy the frame of the state , and make it absolute , saith our author ; and he gives his reason : for , to confine a monarch to a law , and then to make him judge of his own deviaions from that law , is to absolve him from all law. on the other side , if any , or all the people may judge , then you put the soveraignty in the whole body , or part of it , and destroy the being of monarchy . thus our author hath caught himself in a plain dilemma : if the king be judge , then he is no limited monarch ; if the people be judge , then he is no monarch at all . so farewel limited monarchy , nay farewel all government , if there be no judge . would you know what help our author hath found out for this mischief ? first , he saith , that a subject is bound to yield to a magistrate , when he cannot , de jure , challenge obedience , if it be in a thing in which he can possibly without subversion , and in which his act may not be made a leading case , and so bring on a prescription against publick liberty . again he saith , if the act in which the exorbitance or transgression of the monarch is supposed to be , be of lesser moment , and not striking at the very being of that government , it ought to be born by publick patience , rather than to endanger the being of the state. the like words he uses in another place , saying , if the will of the monarch exceed the limits of the law , it ought to be submitted to , so it be not contrary to god's law , nor bring with it such an evil to our selves , or the publick , that we cannot be accessory to it by obeying . these are but fig-leaves to cover the nakedness of our authors limited monarch , formed upon weak supposals in cases of lesser moment . for if the monarch be to govern only according to law , no transgression of his can be of so small moment , if he break the bounds of law , but it is a subversion of the government it self , and may be made a leading case , and so bring on a prescription against publick liberty ; it strikes at the very being of the government , and brings with it such an evil , as the party that suffers , or the publick cannot be accessory to : let the case be never so small , yet if there be illegality in the act , it strikes at the very being of limited monarchy , which is to be legal : unless our author will say , as in effect he doth , that his limited monarch must govern according to law in great and publick matters only , and that in smaller matters which concern private men , or poor persons , he may rule according to his own will. secondly , our author tells us , if the monarchs act of exorbitancy or transgression be mortal , and such as suffered dissolves the frame of government and publick liberty , then the illegality is to be set open , and redresment sought by petition ; which if failing , prevention by resistance ought to be : and if it be apparent , and appeal be made to the consciences of mankind , then the fundamental laws of that monarchy must judge and pronounce the sentence in every mans conscience , and every man ( so far as concerns him ) must follow the evidence of truth in his own soul to oppose or not to oppose , according as he can in conscience acquit or condemn the act of the governour or monarch . whereas my author requires , that the destructive nature of illegal commands shall be set open : surely his mind is , that each private man in his particular case should make a publick remonstrance to the world of the illegal act of the monarch ; and then if upon his petition he cannot be relieved according to his desire , he ought , or it is his duty to make resistance . here i would know , who can be the judge whether the illegality be made apparent ? it is a main point , since every man is prone to flatter himself in his own cause , and to think it good , and that the wrong or injustice he suffers is apparent , when other moderate and indifferent men can discover no such thing : and in this case the judgment of the common people cannot be gathered or known by any possible means ; or if it could , it were like to be various and erroneous . yet our author will have an appeal made to the conscience of all mankind , and that being made , he concludes , the fundamental laws must judge , and pronounce sentence in every mans conscience . whereas he saith , the fundamental laws must judge ; i would very gladly learn of him , or of any other for him , what a fundamental law is , or else have but any one law named me that any man can say is a fundamental law of the monarchy . i confess he tells us , that the common laws are the foundation , and the statute laws are superstructive ; yet i think he dares not say that there is any one branch or part of the common law , but that it may be taken away by an act of parliament : for many points of the common law ( de facto ) have , and ( de jure ) any point may be taken away . how can that be called fundamental , which hath and may be removed , and yet the statute-laws stand firm and stable ? it is contrary to the nature of fundamental , for the building to stand when the foundation is taken away . besides , the common law is generally acknowledged to be nothing else but common usage or custom , which by length of time only obtains authority : so that it follows in time after government , but cannot go before it , and be the rule to government , by any original or radical constitution . also the common law being unwritten , doubtful , and difficult , cannot but be an uncertain rule to govern by ; which is against the nature of a rule , which is and ought to be certain . lastly , by making the common law only to be the foundation , magna charta is excluded from being a fundamental law , and also all other statutes from being limitations to monarchy , since the fundamental laws only are to be judge . truly the conscience of all mankind is a pretty large tribunal for the fundamental laws to pronounce sentence in . it is very much that laws which in their own nature are dumb , and always need a judge to pronounce sentence , should now be able to speak , and pronounce sentence themselves : such a sentence surely must be upon the hearing of one party only ; for it is impossible for a monarch to make his defence and answer , and produce his witnesses , in every mans conscience , in each mans cause , who will but question the legality of the monarchs government . certainly the sentence cannot but be unjust , where but one mans tale is heard . for all this , the conclusion is , every man must oppose or not oppose the monarch according to his own conscience . thus at the last , every man is brought , by this doctrine of our authors , to be his own judge . and i also appeal to the consciences of all mankind , whether the end of this be not utter confusion , and anarchy . yet after all this , the author saith , this power of every mans judging the illegal acts of the monarch , argues not a superiority of those who judge over him who is judged ; and he gives a profound reason for it : his words are , it is not authoritative and civil , but moral , residing in reasonable creatures , and lawful for them to execute . what our author means by these words , ( not authoritative and civil , but moral ) perhaps i understand not , though i think i do ; yet it serves my turn that he saith , that resistance ought to be made , and every man must oppose or not oppose , according as in conscience he can acquit or condemn the acts of his governour ; for if it enable a man to resist and oppose his governour , without question , 't is authoritative and civil . whereas he adds , that moral judgment is residing in reasonable creatures , and lawful for them to execute ; he seems to imply , that authoritative and civil judgment doth not reside in reasonable creatures , nor can be lawfully executed . such a conclusion fits well with anarchy ; for he that takes away all government , and leaves every man to his own conscience , and so makes him an independent in state , may well teach that authority resides not in reasonable creatures , nor can be lawfully executed . i pass from his absolute and limited monarchy , to his division or partition ( for he allows no division ) of monarchy into simple and mixed , viz. of a monarch , the nobility , and community . where first , observe a doubt of our authors , whether a firm union can be in a mixture of equality ; he rather thinks there must be a priority of order in one of the three , or else there can be no unity . he must know , that priority of order doth not hinder , but that there may be an equality of mixture , if the shares be equal ; for he that hath the first share may have no more than the others : so that if he will have an inequality of mixture , a primity of share will not serve the turn : the first share must be greater or better than the others , or else they will be equal , and then he cannot call it a mixed monarchy , where only a primity of share in the supreme power is in one : but by his own confession he may better call it a mixed aristocracy or mixed democracy , than a mixed monarchy , since he tells us , the houses of parliament sure have two parts of the greatest legislative authority ; and if the king have but a third part , sure their shares are equal . the first step our author makes , is this , the soveraign power must be originally in all three ; next he finds , that if there be an equality of shares in three estates , there can be no ground to denominate a monarch ; and then his mixed monarch might be thought but an empty title : therefore in the third place he resolves us , that to salve all , a power must be sought out wherewith the monarch must be invested , which is not so great as to destroy the mixture , nor so titular as to destroy the monarchy ; and therefore he conceives it may be in these particulars . first , a monarch in a mixed monarchy may be said to be a monarch ( as he conceives ) if he be the head and fountain of the power which governs and executes the established laws ; that is , a man may be a monarch , though he do but give power to others to govern and execute the established laws : thus he brings his monarch one step or peg lower still than he was before : at first he made us believe his monarch should have the supreme power , which is the legislative ; then he falls from that , and tells us , a limited monarch must govern according to law only ; thus he is brought from the legislative to the gubernative or executive power only ; nor doth he stay here , but is taken a hole lower , for now he must not govern , but he must constitute officers to govern by laws ; if chusing officers to govern be governing , then our author will allow his monarch to be a governour , not else : and therefore he that divided supreme power into legislative and gubernative , doth now divide it into legislative , and power of constituting officers for governing by laws ; and this , he saith , is left to the monarch . indeed you have left him a fair portion of power ; but are we sure he may enjoy this ? it seems our author is not confident in this neither , and some others do deny it him : our author speaking of the government of this kingdom , saith , the choice of the officers is intrusted to the judgment of the monarch for ought i know : he is not resolute in the point ; but for ought he knows , and for ought i know , his monarch is but titular , an empty title , certain of no power at all . the power of chusing officers only , is the basest of all powers . aristotle ( as i remember ) saith , the common people are fit for nothing but to chuse officers , and to take accompts : and indeed , in all popular governments the multitude perform this work : and this work in a king puts him below all his subjects , and makes him the only subject in a kingdom , or the only man that cannot govern : there is not the poorest man of the multitude but is capable of some office or other , and by that means may some time or other perhaps govern according to the laws ; only the king can be no officer , but to chuse officers ; his subjects may all govern , but he may not . next , i cannot see how in true sense our author can say , his monarch is the head and fountain of power , since his doctrine is , that in a limited monarchy , the publick society by original constitution confer on one man power : is not then the publick society the head and fountain of power , and not the king ? again , when he tells us of his monarch , that both the other states , as well conjunctim as divisim , be his sworn subjects , and owe obedience to his commands : he doth but flout his poor monarch ; for why are they called his subjects and his commons ? he ( without any complement ) is their subject ; for they , as officers , may govern and command according to law : but he may not , for he must judge by his judges in courts of justice only : that is , he may not judge or govern at all . . as for the second particular , the sole or chief power in capacitating persons for the supreme power . and . as to this third particular , the power of convocating such persons , they are both so far from making a monarch , that they are the only way to make him none , by chusing and calling others to share in the supreme power . . lastly , concerning his authority being the last and greatest in the establishing every act , it makes him no monarch , except he be sole that hath that authority ; neither his primity of share in the supreme power , nor his authority being last , no , nor his having the greatest authority , doth make him a monarch , unless he have that authority alone . besides , how can he shew that in his mixed monarchy the monarchs power is the greatest ? the greatest share that our author allows him in the legislative power , is a negative voice , and the like is allowed to the nobility and commons : and truly , a negative voice is but a base term to express a legislative power ; a negative voice is but a privative power , or indeed , no power at all to do any thing , only a power to hinder an act from being done . wherefore i conclude , not any of his four , nor all of them put into one person , make the state monarchical . this mixed monarchy , just like the limited , ends in confusion and destruction of all government : you shall hear the authors confession , that one inconvenience must necessarily be in all mixed governments , which i shewed to be in limited governments ; there can be no constituted legal authoritative judge of the fundamental controversies arising between the three estates : if such do rise , it is the fatal disease of those governments , for which no salve can be applied . it is a case beyond the possible provision of such a government ; of this question there is no legal judge . the accusing side must make it evident to every mans conscience . — the appeal must be to the community , as if there were no government ; and as by evidence consciences are convinced , they are bound to give their assistance . the wit of man cannot say more for anarchy . thus have i picked out the flowers out of his doctrine about limited monarchy , and presented them with some brief annotations ; it were a tedious work to collect all the learned contradictions , and ambiguous expressions that occur in every page of his platonick monarchy ; the book hath so much of fancy , that it is a better piece of poetry than policy . because many may think , that the main doctrine of limited and mixed monarchy may in it self be most authentical , and grounded upon strong and evident reason , although our author perhaps have failed in some of his expressions , and be liable to exceptions : therefore i will be bold to inquire , whether aristotle could find either reason or example of a limited or mixed monarchy ; and the rather , because i find our author altogether insists upon a rational way of justifying his opinion . no man i think will deny , but that aristotle was sufficiently curious in searching out the several forms of commonwealths and kingdoms ; yet i do not find , that he ever so much as dreamed of either a limited or mixed monarchy . several other sorts of monarchies he reckons up : in the third book of his politicks , he spends three whole chapters together , upon the several kinds of monarchy . first , in his fourteenth chapter he mentions four kinds of monarchy . the laconick or lacedemonian . the barbarick . the aesymnetical . the heroick . the laconick or lacedemonian king ( saith he ) had only supreme power when he was out of the bounds of the lacedemonian territories ; then he had absolute power , his kingdom was like to a perpetual lord general of an army . the barbarick king ( saith aristotle ) had a power very near to tyranny ; yet they were lawful and paternal , because the barbarians are of a more servile nature than the grecians , and the asiaticks than the europeans ; they do willingly , without repining , live under a masterly government ; yet their government is stable and safe , because they are paternal and lawful kingdoms , and their guards are royal and not tyrannical : for kings are guarded by their own subjects , and tyrants are guarded by strangers . the aesymnetical king ( saith aristotle ) in old time in greece , was an elective tyrant , and differed only from the barbarian kings , in that he was elective , and not paternal : these sorts of kings , because they were tyrannical , were masterly ; but because they were over such as voluntarily elected them , they were regal . the heroick were those ( saith aristotle ) which flourished in the heroical times , to whom the people did willingly obey ; and they were paternal and lawful , because these kings did deserve well of the multitude , either by teaching them arts , or by warring for them , or by gathering them together when they were dispersed , or by dividing lands amongst them : these kings had supreme power in war , in sacrifices , in judicature . these four sorts of monarchy hath aristotle thus distinguished , and after sums them up together , and concludes his chapter as if he had forgot himself , and reckons up a fifth kind of monarchy ; which is , saith he , when one alone hath supreme power of all the rest : for as there is a domestical kingdom of one house , so the kingdom of a city , or of one or many nations , is a family . these are all the sorts of monarchy that aristotle hath found out , and he hath strained hard to make them so many : first , for his lacedemonian king , himself confesseth that he was but a kind of military commander in war , and so in effect no more a king than all generals of armies : and yet this no-king of his was not limited by any law , nor mixed with any companions of his government : when he was in the wars out of the confines of lacedaemon , he was , as aristotle stiles him , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , of full and absolute command , no law , no companion to govern his army but his own will. next , for aristotle's aesymnetical king , it appears , he was out of date in aristotle's time ; for he saith , he was amongst the ancient greeks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . aristotle might well have spared the naming him ( if he had not wanted other sorts ) for the honour of his own nation : for he that but now told us the barbarians were of a more servile nature than the grecians , comes here , and tells us , that these old greek kings were elective tyrants . the barbarians did but suffer tyrants in shew , but the old grecians chose tyrants indeed ; which then must we think were the greater slaves , the greeks or the barbarians ? now if these sorts of kings were tyrants , we cannot suppose they were limited either by law , or joyned with companions : indeed aristotle saith , some of these tyrants were limited to certain times and actions , for they had not all their power for term of life , nor could meddle but in certain businesses ; yet during the time they were tyrants , and in the actions whereto they were limited , they had absolute power to do what they list according to their own will , or else they could not have been said to be tyrants . as for aristotle's heroick king , he gives the like note upon him , that he did upon the aesymnet , that he was in old time 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , in the heroick times . the thing that made these heroical kingdoms differ from other sorts of kingdoms , was only the means by which the first kings obtained their kingdoms , and not the manner of government , for in that they were as absolute as other kings were , without either limitation by law , or mixture of companions . lastly , as for aristotle's barbarick sort of kings , since he reckoned all the world barbarians , except the grecians , his barbarick king must extend to all other sorts of kings in the world , besides those of greece , and so may go under aristotle's fifth sort of kings , which in general comprehends all other sorts , and is no special form of monarchy . thus upon a true account it is evident , that the five several sorts of kings mentioned by aristotle , are at the most but different and accidental means of the first obtaining or holding of monarchies , and not real or essential differences of the manner of government , which was always absolute , without either limitation or mixture . i may be thought perhaps to mistake , or wrong aristotle , in questioning his diversities of kings ; but it seems aristotle himself was partly of the same mind ; for in the very next chapter , when he had better considered of the point , he confessed , that to speak the truth , there were almost but two sorts of monarchies worth the considering , that is , his first or laconick sort , and his fifth or last sort , where one alone hath supreme power over all the rest : thus he hath brought his five sorts to two . now for the first of these two , his lacedemonian king , he hath confessed before , that he was no more than a generalissimo of an army , and so upon the matter no king at all : and then there remains only his last sort of kings , where one alone hath the supreme power . and this in substance is the final resolution of aristotle himself : for in his sixteenth chapter , where he delivers his last thoughts touching the kinds of monarchy , he first dischargeth his laconick king from being any sort of monarchy , and then gives us two exact rules about monarchy ; and both these are point blank against limited and mixed monarchy ; therefore i shall propose them to be considered of , as concluding all monarchy to be absolute and arbitrary . . the one rule is , that he that is said to be a king according to law , is no sort of government or kingdom at all : 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . . the second rule is , that a true king is he that ruled all according to his own will , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . this latter frees a monarch from the mixture of partners or sharers in government , as the former rule doth from limitation by laws . thus in brief i have traced aristotle in his crabbed and broken passages , touching diversities of kings ; where he first finds but four sorts , and then he stumbles upon a fifth ; and in the next chapter contents himself only with two sorts of kings , but in the chapter following concludes with one , which is the true perfect monarch , who rules all by his own will : in all this we find nothing for a regulated or mixed monarchy , but against it . moreover , whereas the author of the treatise of monarchy affirms it as a prime principle , that all monarchies ( except that of the jews ) depend upon humane designment , when the consent of a society of men , and a fundamental contract of a nation , by original or radical constitution confers power : he must know , that aristotle searching into the original of government , shews himself in this point a better divine than our author ; and as if he had studied the book of genesis , teacheth , that monarchies fetch their pedigree from the right of fathers , and not from the gift or contract of people ; his words may thus be englished . at the first , cities were governed by kings , and so even to this day are nations also : for such as were under kingly government did come together ; for every house is governed by a king , who is the eldest ; and so also colonies are governed for kindred sake . and immediately before , he tells us , that the first society made of many houses is a village , which naturally seems to be a colony of a house , which some call foster-brethren , or children , and childrens children . so in conclusion we have gained aristotle's judgment in three main and essential points . . a king according to law makes no kind of government . . a king must rule according to his own will. . the original of kings , is from the right of fatherhood . what aristotle's judgment was two thousand years since , is agreeable to the doctrine of the great modern politician bodin : hear him touching limited monarchy : vnto majesty or soveraignty ( saith he ) belongeth an absolute power , not subject to any law — chief power given unto a prince with condition , is not properly soveraignty , or power absolute , except such conditions annexed to the soveraignty , be directly comprehended within the laws of god and nature . — albeit by the sufferance of the king of england , controversies between the king and his people are sometimes determined by the high court of parliament , and sometimes by the lord chief justice of england ; yet all the estates remain in full subjection to the king , who is no ways bound to follow their advice , neither to consent to their requests . — it is certain , that the laws , priviledges , and grants of princes , have no force but during their life , if they be not ratified by the express consent , or by sufferance of the prince following , especially privileges . — much less should a prince be bound unto the laws he maketh himself ; for a man may well receive a law from another man , but impossible it is in nature for to give a law unto himself , no more than it is to command a mans self in a matter depending of his own will. the law saith , nulla obligatio consistere potest , quae à voluntate promittentis statum capit . the soveraign prince may derogate unto the laws that he hath promised and sworn to keep , if the equity thereof be ceased ; and that of himself , without the consent of his subjects . — the majesty of a true soveraign prince is to be known , when the estates of all the people assembled , in all humility present their requests and supplications to their prince , without having power in any thing , to command , determine , or give voice , but that that which it pleaseth the king to like or dislike , to command or bid , is holden for law : wherein they which have written of the duty of magistrates have deceived themselves , in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the prince ; a thing which causeth oft true subjects to revolt from their obedience to their prince , and ministreth matter of great troubles in commonwealths ; of which their opinion there is neither reason nor ground : for if the king be subject unto the assemblies and decrees of the people , he should neither be king nor soveraign , and the commonwealth neither realm nor monarchy , but a meer aristocracy . — so we see the principal point of soveraign majesty , and absolute power , to consist principally in giving laws unto the subjects in general without their consent . bodin de rep. l. . c. . to confound the state of monarchy with the popular or aristocratical estate , is a thing impossible , and in effect incompatible , and such as cannot be imagined : for soveraignty being of it self indivisible , how can it at one and the same time be divided betwixt one prince , the nobility , and the people in common ? the first mark of soveraign majesty , is to be of power to give laws , and to command over them unto the subjects ; and who should those subjects be that should yield their obedience to the law , if they should have also power to make the laws ? who should he be that could give the law ? being himself constrained to receive it of them , unto whom himself gave it ? so that of necessity we must conclude , that as no one in particular hath the power to make the law in such a state , that then the state must needs be a state popular . — never any commonwealth hath been made of an aristocracy and popular estate , much less of the three estates of a commonweal . — such states wherein the rights of soveraignty are divided , are not rightly to be called commonweals , but rather the corruption of commonweals , as herodotus has most briefly but truly written . — commonweals which change their state , the sovereign right & power of them being divided , find no rest from civil wars and broils , till they again recover some one of the three forms , and the soveraignty be wholly in one of the states or other . where the rights of the soveraignty are divided betwixt the prince & his subjects , in that confusion of state there is still endless stirs and quarrels for the superiority , until that some one , some few , or all together , have got the soveraignty . id. lib. . c. . this judgment of bodin's touching limited and mixed monarchy , is not according to the mind of our author , nor yet of the observator , who useth the strength of his wit to overthrow absolute and arbitrary government in this kingdom ; and yet in the main body of his discourse , le ts fall such truths from his pen , as give a deadly wound to the cause he pleads for , if they be indifferently weighed and considered . i will not pick a line or two here and there to wrest against him , but will present a whole page of his book , or more together , that so we may have an entire prospect upon the observators mind : without society ( saith the observator ) men could not live ; without laws men could not be sociable ; and without authority somewhere to judge according to law , law were vain : it was soon therefore provided , that laws according to the dictate of reason , should be ratified by common consent ; when it afterward appeared , that man was yet subject to unnatural destruction , by the tyranny of entrusted magistrates , a mischief almost as fatal as to be without all magistracy . how to provide a wholesome remedy therefore , was not so easie to be invented : it was not difficult to invent laws for the limiting of supream governours ; but to invent how those laws should be executed , or by whom interpreted , was almost impossible , nam quis custodiet ipsos custodes ? to place a superiour above a supream , was held unnatural ; yet what a lifeless thing would law be without any judge to determine and force it ? if it be agreed upon , that limits should be prefixed to princes and judges to decree according to those limits , yet another inconvenience will presently affront us : for we cannot restrain princes too far , but we shall disable them from some good : long it was ere the world could extricate it self out of all these extremities , or find out an orderly means whereby to avoid the danger of unbounded prerogative on this hand , and of excessive liberty on the other ; and scarce has long experience yet fully satisfied the minds of all men in it . in the infancy of the world , when man was not so artificial and obdurate in cruelty and oppression as now , and policy most rude , most nations did choose rather to subject themselves to the meer discretion of their lords , than rely upon any limits ; and so be ruled by arbitrary edicts , than written statutes . but since tyranny being more exquisite , and policy more perfect , especially where learning and religion flourish , few nations will endure the thraldome which usually accompanies unbounded and unconditionate royalty ; yet long it was ere the bounds and conditions of supream lords was so wisely determined , or quietly conserved as now they are : for at first , when as ephori , tribuni , curatores , &c. were erected to poise against the scale of soveraignty , much blood was shed about them , and states were put into new broils by them , and in some places the remedy proved worse than the disease . in all great distresses , the body of the people were ever constrained to rise , and by force of the major party to put an end to all intestine strifes , and make a redress of all publick grievances : but many times calamities grew to a strange height , before so cumbersome a body could be raised ; and when it was raised , the motions of it were so distracted and irregular , that after much spoil and effusion of blood , sometimes only one tyranny was exchanged for another , till some was invented to regulate the motions of the peoples moliminous body . i think arbitrary rule was most safe for the world : but now , since most countries have found an art and peaceable order for publick assemblies , whereby the people may assume its own power to do it self right , without disturbance to it self or injury to princes ; he is very unjust that will oppose this art or order . that princes may not be now beyond all limits and laws , nor yet be tyed upon those limits by any private parties ; the whole community , in its underived majesty , shall convene to do justice ; and that the convention may not be without intelligence , certain times , and places , and forms , shall be appointed for its reglement ; and that the vastness of its own bulk may not breed confusion , by vertue of election and representation , a few shall act for many , the wise , shall consent for the simple , the vertue of all shall redound to some , and the prudence of some shall redound to all ; and surely as this admirably-composed court , which is now called a parliament , is more regularly and orderly formed , than when it was called mickle synod of wittenagemot , or when this real body of the people did throng together at it : so it is not yet perhaps without some defects , which by art & policy might receive farther amendment : some divisions have sprung up of late between both houses , and some between the king and both houses , by reason of incertainty of jurisdiction ; and some lawyers doubt how far the parliament is able to create new forms and presidents , and has a jurisdiction over it self ; all these doubts would be solemnly solved : but in the first place , the true priviledges of parliament belonging not only to the being and efficacy of it , but to the honour and complement of it , would be clearly declared : for the very naming of priviledges of parliament , as if they were chimera's to the ignorant sort , and utterly unknown unto the learned , hath been entertained with scorn since the beginning of this parliament . in this large passage taken out of the observator which concerns the original of all government , two notable propositions may be principally observed . first , our observator confesseth arbitrary or absolute government to be the first , and the safest government for the world . secondly , he acknowledgeth that the jurisdiction is uncertain , and the priviledges not clearly declared of limited monarchy . these two evident truths delivered by him , he labours mainly to disguise . he seems to insinuate that arbitrary government was but in the infancy of the world , for so he terms it ; but if we enquire of him , how long he will have this infancy of the world to last , he grants it continued above three thousand years , which is an unreasonable time for the world to continue under-age : for the first opposers he doth find of arbitrary power , were the ephori , tribuni , curatores , &c. the ephori were above three thousand years after the creation , and the tribuni were later ; as for his curatores , i know not whom he means , except the master of the court of wards , i cannot english the word curator better . i do not believe that he can shew that any curatores or & caetera's which he mentions were so ancient as the ephori . as for the tribuni , he mistakes much if he thinks they were erected to limit and bound monarchy ; for the state of rome was at the least aristocratical ( as they call it ) if not popular , when tribunes of the people were first hatched . and for the ephori , their power did not limit or regulate monarchy , but quite take it away ; for a lacedemonian king in the judgment of aristotle was no king indeed , but in name only , as generalissimo of an army ; and the best politicians reckon the spartan commonwealth to have been aristocratical , and not monarchical ; and if a limited monarchy cannot be found in lacedemon , i doubt our observator will hardly find it any where else in the whole world ; and in substance he confesseth as much , when he saith , now most countries have found out an art and peaceable order for publick assemblies ; as if it were a thing but new done , and not before ; for so the word now doth import . the observator in confessing the jurisdiction to be incertain , and the priviledges undetermined of that court that should bound and limit monarchy , doth in effect acknowledge there is no such court at all : for every court consists of jurisdictions & priviledges ▪ it is these two that create a court , and are the essentials of it : if the admirably composed court of parliament have some defects which may receive amendment , as he saith , and if those defects be such as cause divisions both between the houses , and between the king and both houses , and these divisions be about so main a matter as jurisdictions and priviledges , and power to create new priviledges , all which are the fundamentals of every court , ( for until they be agreed upon , the act of every court may not only be uncertain , but invalid , and cause of tumults and sedition : ) and if all these doubts and divisions have need to be solemnly solved , as our observator confesseth : then he hath no reason at all to say , that now the conditions of supream lords are wisely determined and quietly conserved , or that now most countries have found out an art , and peaceable order for publick affairs , whereby the people may resume its own power to do it self right without injury unto princes : for how can the underived majesty of the people by assuming its own power , tell how to do her self right , or how to avoid doing injury to the prince , if her jurisdiction be uncertain , and priviledges undetermined ? he tells us now most countries have found an art , and peaceable order for publick assemblies : and to the intent that princes may not be now beyond all limits and laws , the whole community in its underived majesty shall convene to do justice . but he doth not name so much as one country or kingdom that hath found out this art , where the whole community in its underived majesty did ever convene to do justice . i challenge him , or any other for him , to name but one kingdom that hath either now or heretofore found out this art or peaceable order . we do hear a great rumor in this age , of moderated and limited kings ; poland , sweden , and denmark , are talked of for such ; and in these kingdoms , or no where , is such a moderated government , as our observator means , to be found . a little enquiry would be made into the manner of the government of these kingdoms : for these northern people , as bodin observeth , breath after liberty . first for poland , boterus saith , that the government of it is elective altogether , and representeth rather an aristocracie than a kingdom : the nobility , who have great authority in the diets , chusing the king , and limiting his authority , making his soveraignty but a slavish royalty : these diminutions of regality began first by default of king lewis , and jagello , who to gain the succession in the kingdom contrary to the laws , one for his daughter , and the other for his son , departed with many of his royalties and prerogatives , to buy the voices of the nobility . the french author of the book called the estates of the world , doth inform us that the princes authority was more free , not being subject to any laws , and having absolute power , not only of their estates , but also of life and death . since christian religion was received , it began to be moderated , first by holy admonitions of the bishops and clergy , and then by services of the nobility in war : religious princes gave many honours , and many liberties to the clergy and nobility , and quit much of their rights , the which their successors have continued . the superiour dignity is reduced to two degrees , that is , the palatinate and the chastelleine , for that kings in former times did by little and little call these men to publick consultations , notwithstanding that they had absolute power to do all things of themselves , to command , dispose , recompence , and punish , of their own motions : since they have ordained that these dignities should make the body of a senate , the king doth not challenge much right and power over his nobility , nor over their estates , neither hath he any over the clergy . and though the kings authority depends on the nobility for his election , yet in many things it is absolute after he is chosen : he appoints the diets at what time and place he pleaseth ; he chooseth lay-councellers , and nominates the bishops , and whom he will have to be his privy council : he is absolute disposer of the revenues of the crown : he is absolute establisher of the decrees of the diets : it is in his power to advance and reward whom he pleaseth . he is lord immediate of his subjects , but not of his nobility : he is soveraign judge of his nobility in criminal causes . the power of the nobility daily increaseth , for that in respect of the kings election , they neither have law , rule , nor form to do it , neither by writing nor tradition . as the king governs his subjects which are immediately his , with absolute authority ; so the nobility dispose immediately of their vassals , over whom every one hath more than a regal power , so as they intreat them like slaves . there be certain men in poland who are called earthly messengers or nuntio's , they are as it were agents of jurisdictions or circles of the nobility : these have a certain authority , and , as boterus saith , in the time of their diets these men assemble in a place near to the senate-house , where they chuse two marshals , by whom ( but with a tribune-like authority ) they signifie unto the council what their requests are . not long since , their authority and reputation grew so mightily , that they now carry themselves as heads and governours , rather than officers and ministers of the publick decrees of the state : one of the council refused his senators place , to become one of these officers . every palatine , the king requiring it , calls together all the nobility of his palatinate ; where having propounded unto them the matters whereon they are to treat , and their will being known , they chuse four or six out of the company of the earthly messengers ; these deputies meet and make one body , which they call the order of knights . this being of late years the manner and order of the government of poland , it is not possible for the observator to find among them that the whole community in its underived majesty doth ever convene to do justice : nor any election or representation of the community , or that the people assume its own power to do it self right . the earthly messengers , though they may be thought to represent the commons , and of late take much upon them , yet they are elected and chosen by the nobility , as their agents and officers . the community are either vassals to the king , or to the nobility , and enjoy as little freedom or liberty as any nation . but it may be said perhaps , that though the community do not limit the king , yet the nobility do , and so he is a limited monarch . the answer is , that in truth , though the nobility at the chusing of their king do limit his power , and do give him an oath ; yet afterwards they have always a desire to please him , and to second his will ; and this they are forced to do , to avoid discord : for by reason of their great power , they are subject to great dissentions , not only among themselves , but between them and the order of knights , which are the earthly messengers : yea , the provinces are at discord one with another : and as for religion , the diversity of sects in poland breed perpetual jars and hatred among the people , there being as many sects as in amsterdam it self , or any popular government can desire . the danger of sedition is the cause , that though the crown depends on the election of the nobility ; yet they have never rejected the kings successour , or transferred the realm to any other family , but once , when deposing ladislaus for his idleness ( whom yet afterward they restored ) they elected wenceslaus king of bohemia . but if the nobility do agree to hold their king to his conditions , which is , not to conclude any thing but by the advice of his council of nobles , nor to choose any wife without their leaves , then it must be said to be a commonweal , not a royalty ; and the king but only the mouth of the kingdom , or as queen christina complained , that her husband was but the shadow of a soveraign . next , if it be considered how the nobility of poland came to this great power ; it was not by any original contract , or popular convention : for it is said they have neither law , rule , nor form written or unwritten , for the election of their king , they may thank the bishops and clergy : for by their holy admonitions and advice , good and religious princes , to shew their piety , were first brought to give much of their rights and priviledges to their subjects , devout kings were meerly cheated of some of their royalties . what power soever general assemblies of the estates claim or exercise over and above the bare naked act of counselling , they were first beholding to the popish clergy for it : it is they first brought parliaments into request and power : i cannot find in any kingdom , but only where popery hath been , that parliaments have been of reputation : and in the greatest times of superstition they are first mentioned . as for the kingdom of denmark , i read that the senators , who are all chosen out of the nobility , and seldom exceed the number of , with the chief of the realm , do chuse their king. they have always in a manner set the kings eldest son upon the royal throne . the nobility of denmark withstood the coronation of frederick , till he sware not to put any noble-man to death until he were judged of the senate ; and that all noble-men should have power of life and death over their subjects without appeal ; and the king to give no office without consent of the council . there is a chancellour of the realm , before whom they do appeal from all the provinces and islands , and from him to the king himself . i hear of nothing in this kingdom that tends to popularity ; no assembly of the commons , no elections , or representation of them . sweden is governed by a king heretofore elective , but now made hereditary in gustavus time : it is divided into provinces : an appeal lieth from the vicount of every territory to a soveraign judge called a lamen ; from the lamens , to the kings council ; and from this council , to the king himself . now let the observator bethink himself , whether all , or any of these three countries have found out any art at all whereby the people or community may assume its own power : if neither of these kingdoms have , most countries have not , nay none have . the people or community in these three realms are as absolute vassals as any in the world ; the regulating power , if any be , is in the nobility : nor is it such in the nobility as it makes shew for . the election of kings is rather a formality , than any real power : for they dare hardly chuse any but the heir , or one of the blood royal : if they should chuse one among the nobility , it would prove very factious ; if a stranger , odious , neither safe . for the government , though the kings be sworn to raign according to the laws , and are not to do any thing without the consent of their council in publick affairs : yet in regard they have power both to advance and reward whom they please , the nobility and senators do comply with their kings . and boterus concludes of the kings of poland , who seem to be most moderated , that such as is their valour , dexterity , and wisdom , such is their power , authority , and government . also bodin saith , that these three kingdoms are states changeable and uncertain , as the nobility is stronger than the prince , or the prince than the nobility ; and the people are so far from liberty , that he saith , divers particular lords exact not only customs , but tributes also ; which are confirmed and grow stronger , both by long prescription of time , and use of judgments . the end . the power of kings : and in particular , of the king of england . the power of kings : and in particular , of the king of england . to majestie or soveraignty belongeth an absolute power not subject to any law. it behoveth him that is a soveraign , not to be in any sort subject to the command of another ; whose office is to give laws unto his subjects , to abrogate laws unprofitable , and in their stead to establish other ; which he cannot do , that is himself subject to laws , or to others which have command over him : and this is that which the law saith , that the prince is acquitted from the power of the laws . the laws , ordinances , letters-patents , priviledges , and grants of princes , have no force but during their life ; if they be not ratified by the express consent , or at least by sufferance of the prince following , who had knowledge thereof . if the soveraign prince be exempted from the laws of his predecessors , much less shall he be bound unto the laws he maketh himself ; for a man may well receive a law from another man , but impossible it is in nature for to give a law unto himself , no more than it is to command a man's self in a matter depending of his own will : there can be no obligation which taketh state from the meer will of him that promiseth the same ; which is a necessary reason to prove evidently , that a king cannot bind his own hands , albeit that he would : we see also in the end of all laws these words , because it hath so pleased us ; to give us to understand , that the laws of a sovereign prince , although they be grounded upon reason , yet depend upon nothing but his meer and frank good will. but as for the laws of god , all princes and people are unto them subject ; neither is it in their power to impugne them , if they will not be guilty of high treason against god ; under the greatness of whom , all monarchs of the world ought to bow their heads , in all fear and reverence . a question may be , whether a prince be subject to the laws of his countrey that he hath sworn to keep , or not ? if a soveraign prince promise by oath to his subjects to keep the laws , he is bound to keep them ; not for that a prince is bound to keep his laws by himself or by his predecessors , but by the just conventions and promises which he hath made himself ; be it by oath , or without any oath at all , as should a private man be : and for the same causes that a private man may be relieved from his unjust and unreasonable promise , as for that it was so grievous , or for that he was by deceit or fraud circumvented , or induced thereunto by errour , or force , or just fear , or by some great hurt ; even for the same causes the prince may be restored in that which toucheth the diminishing of his majesty : and so our maxime resteth , that the prince is not subject to his laws , nor to the laws of his predecessors , but well to his own just and reasonable conventions . the soveraign prince may derogate from the laws that he hath promised and sworn to keep , if the equity thereof cease , and that of himself , without consent of his subjects ; which his subjects cannot do among themselves , if they be not by the prince relieved . the foreign princes well-advised , will never take oath to keep the laws of their predecessors ; for otherwise they are not sovereigns . notwithstanding all oaths , the prince may derogate from the laws , or frustrate or disannul the same , the reason and equity of them ceasing . there is not any bond for the soveraign prince to keep the laws , more than so far as right and justice requireth . neither is it to be found , that the antient kings of the hebrews took any oaths , no not they which were anointed by samuel , elias , and others . as for general and particular , which concern the right of men in private , they have not used to be otherwise changed , but after general assemblies of the three estates in france ; not for that it is necessary for the kings to rest on their advice , or that he may not do the contrary to that they demand , if natural reason and justice do so require . and in that the greatness and majesty of a true soveraign prince is to be known , when the estates of all the people assembled together in all humility present their requests and supplications to their prince , without having any power in any thing to command , or determine , or to give voice ; but that that which it pleaseth the king to like or dislike , to command or forbid , is holden for law. wherein they which have written of the duty of magistrates , have deceived themselves , in maintaining that the power of the people is greater than the prince ; a thing which oft-times causeth the true subjects to revolt from the obedience which they owe unto their soveraign prince , and ministreth matter of great troubles in commonwealths ; of which their opinion , there is neither reason nor ground . if the king should be subject unto the assemblies and decrees of the people , he should neither be king nor soveraign , and the commonwealth neither realm nor monarchy ; but a meer aristocracy of many lords in power equal , where the greater part commandeth the less ; and whereon the laws are not to be published in the name of him that ruleth , but in the name and authority of the estates ; as in an aristocratical seignory , where he that is chief hath no power , but oweth obeisance to the seignory ; unto whom yet they every one of them feign themselves to owe their faith and obedience : which are all things so absurd , as hard it is to see which is furthest from reason . when charles the eighth , the french king , then but fourteen years old , held a parliament at tours , although the power of the parliament was never before nor after so great , as in those times ; yet relli then the speaker for the people , turning himself to the king , thus beginneth : most high , most mighty , and most christian king , our natural and onely lord ; we poor , humble , and obedient subjects , &c. which are come hither by your command , in all humility , reverence , and subjection , present our selves before you , &c. and have given me in charge from all this noble assembly to declare unto you , the good will and hearty desire they have , with a most fervent resolution to serve , obey , and aid you in all your affairs , commandments , and pleasures . all this speech is nothing else but a declaration of their good will towards the king , and of their humble obedience and loyalty . the like speech was used in the parliament at orleans to charles the th , when he was scarce eleven years old . neither are the parliaments in spain otherwise holden , but that even a greater obedience of all the people is given to the king ; as is to be seen in the acts of the parliament at toledo by king philip , . when he yet was scarce twenty five years old . the answers also of the king of spain unto the requests and humble supplications of his people , are given in these words : we will , or else , we decree or ordain ; yea , the subsidies that the subjects pay unto the king of spain , they call service . in the parliaments of england , which have commonly been holden every third year , the estates seem to have a great liberty , ( as the northern people almost all breathe thereafter ) yet so it is , that in effect they proceed not , but by way of supplications and requests to the king. as in the parliament holden in octob. . when the estates by a common consent had resolved ( as they gave the queen to understand ) not to treat of any thing , until she had first appointed who should succeed her in the crown ; she gave them no other answer , but that they were not to make her grave before she were dead . all whose resolutions were to no purpose without her good liking , neither did she in that any thing that they requested . albeit by the sufferance of the king of england , controversies between the king and his people are sometimes determined by the high court of parliament ; yet all the estates remain in full subjection to the king , who is no way bound to follow their advice , neither to consent to their requests . the estates of england are never otherwise assembled , no more than they are in france or spain , than by parliament-writs and express commandments , proceeding from the king ; which sheweth very well , that the estates have no power of themselves to determine , command , or decree any thing ; seeing they cannot so much as assemble themselves , neither being assembled , depart without express commandment from the king. yet this may seem one special thing , that the laws made by the king of england , at the request of the estates , cannot be again repealed , but by calling a parliament ; though we see henry the eighth to have always used his soveraign power , and with his only word to have disannulled the decrees of parliament . we conclude the majesty of a prince to be nothing altered or diminished by the calling together , or presence of the estates : but to the contrary , his majesty thereby to be much the greater and the more honourable , seeing all his people to acknowledge him for their soveraign . we see the principal point of soveraign majesty and absolute power to consist principally in giving laws unto the subjects without their consent . it behoveth , that the soveraign prince should have the laws in his power , to change and amend them according as occasion shall require . in a monarchy , every one in particular must swear to the observation of the laws , and their allegiance to one soveraign monarch ; who , next unto god , ( of whom he holds his scepter and power ) is bound to no man : for an oath carrieth always with it reverence unto whom , and in whose name it is made , as still given to a superiour ; and therefore the vassal gives such oath unto his lord , but receives none from him again , though they be mutually bound , the one of them to the other . trajan swore to keep the laws , although he under the name of a soveraign prince was exempted ; but never any of the emperours before him so sware : therefore pliny the younger , in a panegyrical oration , speaking of the oath of trajan , gives out , a great novelty , saith he , and never before heard of , he sweareth , by whom we swear . of these two things the one must come to pass , to wit , the prince that swears to keep the laws of his country , must either not have the soveraignty , or else become a perjur'd man , if he should abrogate but one law contrary to his oath ; whereas it is not only profitable that a prince should sometimes abrogate some such laws , but also necessary for him to alter or correct them , as the infinite variety of places , times and persons shall require : or if we shall say , the prince to be still a soveraign , and yet nevertheless with such conditions , that he can make no law without the advice of his councel or people ; he must also be dispensed with by his subjects , for the oath which he hath made for the observation of the laws ; and the subjects again which are obliged to the laws , have also need to be dispensed withal by their prince , for fear they should be perjur'd : so shall it come to pass , that the majesty of the commonweal enclining now to this side , now to that side ; sometimes the prince , sometimes the people bearing sway , shall have no certainty to rest upon ; which are notable absurdities , and altogether incompatible with the majesty of absolute soveraignty , and contrary both to law and reason . and yet we see many men , that think they see more in the matter than others , will maintain it to be most necessary , that princes should be bound by oath , to keep the laws and customs of their countreys : in which doing , they weaken and overthrow all the rights of soveraign majesty , which ought to be most sacred and holy , and confound the soveraignty of one soveraign monarch , with an aristocracy or democracy . publication , or approbation of laws , in the assembly of the estates or parliament , is with us of great importance for the keeping of the laws ; not that the prince cannot of himself make a law , without the consent of the estates or people ( for even all his declarations of war , treaties of peace , valuations of the coin , charters to enable towns to send burgesses to parliament , and his writ of summons to both houses to assemble , are laws , though made without the consent of the estates or people ; ) but it is a courteous part to do it by the good liking of the senate . what if a prince by law forbid to kill or steal , is he not bound to obey his own laws ? i say , that this law is not his , but the law of god , whereunto all princes are more straitly bound than their subjects ; god taketh a stricter account of princes than others , as solomon a king hath said ; whereto agreeth marcus aurelius , saying , the magistrates are judges over private men , princes judge the magistrates , and god the princes . it is not only a law of nature , but also oftentimes repeated among the laws of god , that we should be obedient unto the laws of such princes , as it hath pleased god to set to rule and reign over us ; if their laws be not directly repugnant unto the laws of god , whereunto all princes are as well bound as their subjects : for as the vassal oweth his oath of fidelity unto his lord , towards and against all men , except his soveraign prince : so the subject oweth his obedience to his soveraign prince , towards and against all , the majesty of god excepted , who is the absolute soveraign of all the princes in the world. to confound the state of monarchy , with the popular or aristocratical estate , is a thing impossible , and in effect incompatible , and such as cannot be imagined : for soveraignty being of it self indivisible , how can it at one and the same time be divided betwixt one prince , the nobility , and the people in common ? the first mark of soveraign majesty is , to be of power to give laws , and to command over them unto the subjects : and who should those subjects be that should yield their obedience to the law , if they should have also power to make the laws ? who should he be that could give the law , being he himself constrain'd to receive it of them , unto whom he himself gave it ? so that of necessity we must conclude , that as no one in particular hath the power to make the law in such a state , that there the state must needs be popular . never any commonwealth hath been made of an aristocracy and popular estate , much less of all the three estates of a commonwealth . such states , wherein the right of soveraignty is divided are not rightly to be called commonweals , but rather the corruption of commonweals ; as herodotus hath most briefly but truly written . commonweals which change their state , the soveraign right and power of them being divided , find no rest from civil wars . if the prince be an absolute soveraign , as are the true monarchs of france , of spain , of england , scotland , turkey , muscovy , tartary , persia , aethiopia , india , and almost of all the kingdoms of africk and asia ; where the kings themselves have the soveraignty , without all doubt or question , not divided with their subjects : in this case it is not lawful for any one of the subjects in particular , or all of them in general , to attempt any thing , either by way of fact or of justice , against the honour , life , or dignity of the soveraign , albeit he had committed all the wickedness , impiety , and cruelty that could be spoke . for as to proceed against him by way of justice , the subject hath not such jurisdiction over his soveraign prince , of whom dependeth all power to command , and who may not only revoke all the power of his magistrates , but even in whose presence the power of all magistrates , corporations , estates and communities cease . now if it be not lawful for the subject by the way of justice to proceed against a king , how should it then be lawful to proceed against him by way of fact or force ? for question is not here what men are able to do by strength and force , but what they ought of right to do ; as not whether the subject have power and strength , but whether they have lawful power to condemn their soveraign prince . the subject is not only guilty of treason in the highest degree , who hath slain his soveraign prince , but even he also which hath attempted the same , who hath given counsel or consent thereto ; yea , if he have concealed the same , or but so much as thought it : which fact the laws have in such detestation , as that when a man guilty of any offence or crime , dyeth before he be condemned thereof , he is deemed to have died in whole and perfect estate , except he have conspired against the life and dignity of his soveraign prince . this only thing they have thought to be such , as that for which he may worthily seem to have been now already judged and condemned ; yea , even before he was thereof accused . and albeit the laws inflict no punishment upon the evil thoughts of men , but on those only which by word or deed break out into some enormity ; yet if any man shall so much as conceit a thought for the violating of the person of his soveraign prince , although he have attempted nothing , they have yet judged this same thought worthy of death , notwithstanding what repentance soever he have had thereof . lest any men should think [ kings or princes ] themselves to have been the authors of these laws , so the more straitly to provide for their own safety and honour ; let us see the laws and examples of holy scripture . nabuchodonosor king of assyria , with fire and sword destroyed all the country of palestina , besieged jerusalem , took it , rob'd and razed it down to the ground , burnt the temple , and defiled the sanctuary of god , slew the king , with the greatest part of the people , carrying away the rest into captivity into babylon , caused the image of himself made in gold to be set up in publick place , commanding all men to adore and worship the same , upon pain of being burnt alive , and caused them that refused so to do , to be cast into a burning furnace . and yet for all that , the holy prophets [ baruch . jeremy . ] directing their letters unto their brethren the jews , then in captivity in babylon , will them to pray unto god for the good and happy life of nabuchodonosor and his children , and that they might so long rule and reign over them , as the heavens should endure : yea even god himself doubted not to call nabuchodonosor his servant , saying , that he would make him the most mighty prince of the world ; and yet was there never a more detestable tyrant than he : who not contented to be himself worshipped , but caused his image also to be adored , and that upon pain of being burnt quick . we have another rare example of saul , who possessed with an evil spirit , caused the priests of the lord to be without just cause slain , for that one of them had received david flying from him ; and did what in his power was to kill , or cause to be kill'd , the same david , a most innocent prince , by whom he had got so many victories ; at which time he fell twice himself into david's hands : who blamed of his souldiers for that he would not suffer his so mortal enemy , then in his power , to be slain , being in assured hope to have enjoyed the kingdom after his death ; he detested their counsel , saying , god forbid that i should suffer the person of a king , the lords anointed , to be violated . yea , he himself defended the same king persecuting of him , whenas he commanded the souldiers of his guard , overcome by wine and sleep , to be wakened . and at such time as saul was slain , and that a souldier , thinking to do david a pleasure , presented him with saul's head ; david caused the same souldier to be slain , which had brought him the head , saying , go thou wicked , how durst thou lay thy impure hands upon the lords anointed ? thou shalt surely die therefore . and afterwards , without all dissimulation , mourned himself for the dead king. all which is worth good consideration : for david was by saul prosecuted to death , and yet wanted not power to have revenged himself , being become stronger than the king ; besides , he was the chosen of god , and anointed by samuel to be king , and had married the king's daughter : and yet for all that , he abhorred to take upon him the title of a king , and much more to attempt any thing against the life or honour of saul , or to rebel against him ; but chose rather to banish himself out of the realm , than in any sort to seek the kings destruction . we doubt not but david , a king and a prophet , led by the spirit of god , had always before his eyes the law of god , exod. . . thou shalt not speak evil of thy prince , nor detract the magistrate ; neither is there any thing more common in holy scripture , than the forbidding not only to kill or attempt the life or honour of a prince , but even for the very magistrates , although , saith the scripture , they be wicked and naught . the protestant princes of germany , before they entred into arms against charles the emperour , demanded of martin luther , if it were lawful for them so to do , or not ; who frankly told them , that it was not lawful , whatsoever tyranny or impiety were pretended : yet was he not therein by them believed ; so thereof ensued a deadly and most lamentable war , the end whereof was most miserable ; drawing with it , the ruine of many great and noble houses of germany , with exceeding slaughter of the subjects . the prince , whom you may justly call the father of the country , ought to be to every man dearer and more reverend than any father , as one ordained and sent unto us by god. the subject is never to be suffered to attempt any thing against the prince , how naughty and cruel soever he be : lawful it is , not to obey him in things contrary to the laws of god , to flie and hide our selves from him ; but yet to suffer stripes , yea , and death also , rather than to attempt any thing against his life and honour . o how many tyrants should there be , if it should be lawful for subjects to kill tyrants ? how many good and innocent princes should as tyrants perish by the conspiracy of their subjects against them ? he that should of his subjects but exact subsidies , should be then , as the vulgar people esteem him , a tyrant : he that should rule and command contrary to the good liking of the people , should be a tyrant : he that should keep strong guards and garrisons for the safety of his person , should be a tyrant : he that should put to death traitors and conspirators against his state , should be also counted a tyrant . how should good princes be assured of their lives , if under colour of tyranny they might be slain by their subjects , by whom they ought to be defended ? in a well-ordered state , the soveraign power must remain in one onely , without communicating any part thereof unto the state , ( for in that case it should be a popular government , and no monarchy . ) wise politicians , philosophers , divines , and historiographers , have highly commended a monarchy above all other commonweals . it is not to please the prince , that they hold this opinion ; but for the safety and happiness of the subjects . and contrariwise , when as they shall limit and restrain the soveraign power of a monarch , to subject him to the general estates , or to the council ; the soveraignty hath no firm foundation , but they frame a popular confusion , or a miserable anarchy , which is the plague of all estates and commonweals : the which must be duly considered , not giving credit to their goodly discourses , which perswade subjects , that it is necessary to subject monarchs , and to give their prince a law ; for that is not only the ruine of the monarch , but also of the subjects . it is yet more strange , that many hold opinion , that the prince is subject to his laws , that is to say , subject to his will , whereon the laws which he hath made , depend ; a thing impossible in nature . and under this colour , and ill-digested opinion , they make a mixture and confusion of civil laws , with the laws of nature and of god. a pure absolute monarchy is the furest common-weal , and without comparison , the best of all . wherein many are abused , who maintain that an optimacy is the best kind of government ; for that many commanders have more judgment , wisdom , and counsel , than one alone . for there is a great difference betwixt councel and commandment . the councel of many wise men may be better than of one ; but to resolve , determine , and to command , one will always perform it better than many : he which hath advisedly digested all their opinions , will soon resolve without contention ; the which many cannot easily perform : it is necessary to have a soveraign prince , which may have power to resolve and determine of the opinions of his council . finis . an advertisement to the jury-men of england , touching witches . the late execution of witches at the summer assises in kent , occasioned this brief exercitation , which addresses it self to such as have not deliberately thought upon the great difficulty in discovering , what , or who a witch is . to have nothing but the publick faith of the present age , is none of the best evidence , unless the universality of elder times do concur with these doctrines , which ignorance in the times of darkness brought forth , and credulity in these days of light hath continued . such as shall not be pleased with this tractate , are left to their liberty to consider , whether all those proofs and presumptions numbered up by mr. perkins , for the conviction of a witch , be not all condemned , or confessed by himself to be unsufficient or uncertain . he brings no less than eighteen signs or proofs , whereby a witch may be discovered , which are too many to be all true : his seven first he himself confesseth to be insufficient for conviction of a witch ; his eight next proofs ( which he saith men in place have used ) he acknowledgeth to be false or insufficient . thus of his eighteen proofs , which made a great show , fifteen of them are cast off by himself ; there remains then his sixteenth , which is the confession of a witch ; yet presently he is forced to yield , that a bare confession is not a sufficient proof , and so he cometh to his seventeenth proof , which is , two credible witnesses ; and he here grants , that the league between the devil and the witch is closely made , and the practices of witches be very secret , that hardly a man can be brought , which upon his own knowledge can averr such things . therefore at last , when all other proofs fail , he is forced to fly to his eighteenth proof , and tells us , that yet there is a way to come to the knowledge of a witch , which is , that satan useth all means to discover a witch ; which how it can be well done , except the devil be bound over to give in evidence against the witch , cannot be understood . and as mr. perkins weakens and discredits all his own proofs , so he doth the like for all those of king james , who , as i remember , hath but three arguments for the discovery of a witch . first , the secret mark of a witch , of which mr. perkins saith , it hath no power by gods ordinance . secondly , the discovery by a fellow - witch ; this mr. perkins by no means will allow to be a good proof . thirdly , the swimming of a witch , who is to be flung cross-ways into the water , that is , as wierus interprets it , when the thumb of the right hand is bound to the great toe of the left foot , and the thumb of the left hand to the great toe of the right foot. against this tryal by water , together with a disability in a witch to shed tears , ( which king james mentions ) delrio and mr. perkins both argue ; for it seems they both writ after king james , who put forth his book of daemonologie in his youth , being in scotland , about his age of thirty years . it concerns the people of this nation to be more diligently instructed in the doctrine of witchcraft , than those of foreign countries , because here they are tyed to a stricter or exacter rule in giving their sentence than others are : for all of them must agree in their verdict , which in a case of extreme difficulty is very dangerous ; and it is a sad thing for men to be reduced to that extremity , that they must hazard their consciences or their lives . a difference between an english and hebrew witch . the point in question is briefly this ; whether such a witch as is condemned by the laws and statutes of this land , be one and the same with the witch forbidden by the law of moses . the witch condemned by our statute-law is , jacob. cap. . one that shall use , practise , or exercise any invocation or conjuration of any evil or wicked spirit , or consult , covenant with , entertain or employ , féed or reward any evil or wicked spirit , to or for any intent or purpose ; or take up any dead man , woman , or child , out of his , her , or their grave , or any other place , where the dead body resteth ; or the skin , bone , or other part of any dead person , to be employed or used in any manner of witchcraft , sorcery , charm or enchantment ; or shall use , practise , or exercise any witchcraft , enchantment , charm , or sorcery , whereby any person shall be killed , destroyed , wasted , consumed , pined , or lamed in his or her body , or any part thereof : such offenders duly and lawfully convicted and attainted , shall suffer death . if any person shall take upon him by witchcraft ▪ inchantment , charm or sorcery , to tell or declare in what place any treasure of gold or silver should or might be found or had in the earth , or other secret places , or where goods , or things lost or stoln should be found or become : or to the intent to provoke any person to unlawful love , or whereby any cattle or goods of any person shall be destroyed , wasted , or impaired ; or to destroy or hurt any person , in his , or her body , though the same be not effected , &c. a years imprisonment , and pillory , &c. and the second conviction death . in this statute these points are observable . . that this statute was first framed in eliz. and only the penalties here a little altered , and the last clause concerning provoking of persons to love , and destroying of cattle and goods , &c. is so changed , that i cannot well make sense of it , except it be rectified according to the words of the former statute which stands repealed . . although the statute runs altogether in the disjunctive or , and so makes every single crime capital , yet the judges usually by a favourable interpretation , take the disjunctive or , for the copulative and ; and therefore ordinarily they condemn none for witches , unless they be charged with the murdering of some persons . . this statute presupposeth that every one knows what a conjurer , a witch , an inchanter , a charmer , and sorcerer is , as being to be learned best of divines ; and therefore it hath not described or distinguished between them : and yet the law is very just in requiring a due and lawful conviction . the definition of witchcraft . for the better discovery of the qualities of these crimes , i shall spend some discourse upon the definition of those arts by divines : for both those of the reformed churches , as well as those of the roman , in a manner , agree in their definition of the sin of witchcraft . i shall instance in two late writers , viz. mr. william perkins in his discourse of witchcraft , and in martin delrio , a jesuit of lorrain , in his book of magical disquisitions . our english word witch , is derived from the dutch word wiechelen , or wijchelen , which doth properly signifie whinying or neighing like a horse , and doth also signifie to foretel or prophesie ; and weicheler signifies a soothsayer ; for that the germans , from whom our ancestors the saxons descended , usually and principally did , as tacitus tells us , divine and foretel things to come , by the whinying and neighing of their horses . hinnitu & fremitu are his words . for the definition mr. perkins saith , witchcraft is an art serving for the working of wonders , by the assistance of the devil , so far as god shall permit . delrio defineth it to be an art , which by the power of a contract entred into with the devil , some wonders are wrought which pass the common understanding of men . ars quâ vi pacti cum daemonibus initi mira quaedam communem hominum captum superantia efficiuntur . in these two definitions , some points are worth the noting . . they both agree in the main foundation , which is a contract with the devil , and therefore mr. perkins thought it most necessary , that this main point should be proved ; to which purpose he promiseth to define a witch , by opening the nature of witchcraft , as it is delivered in the old and new testament ; and yet after he confesseth a manifest covenant is not so fully set down in scripture : and out of the new testament he offers no proof at all , though he promised it ; nevertheless , he resolves us that a covenant is a most evident and certain truth , that may not be called in question . for proof of a covenant , he produceth only one text out of the old testament ; neither doth he say , that the text proveth a contract with the devil , but only that it intimateth so much : thus at the first he falls from a proof to an intimation only . the text is , psal . . v. . of which his words are these : howsoever the common translation runneth in other terms , yet the words are properly to be read thus : which heareth not the voice of the mutterer joyning societies cunningly — the main foundation of the charm , societies or confederacies cunningly made , not between man and man , but , as the words import , between the enchanter and the devil , deut. . . answer . though there be neither mention of spirit or devil in this psalm , yet mr. perkins would have us believe that there can be no conjoyning or consociating but with the devil : but mr. ainsworth , as great a rabbi as mr. perkins , finds other interpretations of this text ; and though he mentions fellowship with the devil , yet he puts it in the third and last place , as the newest and latest interpretation : for he teacheth us , that the enchanter had his title both in psal . . and in deut. . either because he associates serpents , making them tame and familiar that they hurt not , or because such persons use to bind and tye bonds , or things about the body , to heal or hurt by sorcery . also he teacheth us , that a charmer doth joyn or speak words of a strange language , and without sense , &c. delrio it seems puts no confidence in this text of mr. perkins , for he doth not cite it to prove a contract ; yet he hath also one text of his own to that purpose , it is esay . . where it is said , we have made a covenant with death , and with hell we are at an agreement ; percussimus foedus cum morte , & cum inferno fecimus pactum . and delrio tells us , that tho. aquinas did apply this text to witches , magis satis probabili interpretatione . answer . if this text be considered , it proves nothing at all : for it doth not charge the proud and drunken ephraimites , of whom it is spoken that they had made an agreement with hell , but it is only a false brag of their own , to justifie their wickedness by a lye : for it is not possible to make a covenant with death , which in it self is nothing but a meer not being ; and whereas it is called an agreement with hell , it may be translated as well , if not better in this place , an agreement with the grave ; and so the interlineary bible hath it ; and tremelius and junius render it , pepigimus foedus cum morte , & cum sepulchro egimus cautum ; which they term a thrasonical hyperbole : and deodatus his italian bible hath , habbiamo fatto lega col sepolcro ; so likewise the spanish bible translates it , concierto tenemos hecho con la muerte , è con la sepultura hazimos acuerdo . it may be wondered , that neither mr. perkins nor the jesuit have any other or better texts to prove this contract between the witch and the devil . but the truth is , it is very little that either of them say of this great point , but pass it over perfunctorily . perhaps it may be thought that king james hath said , or brought more and better proofs in this point ; but i do not find that he doth meddle with it at all , but takes it for granted , that if there be witches , there must needs be a covenant , and so leaves it without further proof . a second note is , that the agreement between the witch and the devil , they call a covenant , and yet neither of the parties are any way bound to perform their part ; and the devil , without doubt , notwithstanding all his craft , hath far the worst part of the bargain . the bargain runs thus in mr. perkins : the witch as a slave binds himself by vow to believe in the devil , and to give him either body , or soul , or both , under his hand-writing , or some part of his blood. the devil promiseth to be ready at his vassals command to appear in the likeness of any creature , to consult , and to aid him for the procuring of pleasure , honour , wealth , or preferment ; to go for him , to carry him any whither , and to do any command . whereby we see the devil is not to have benefit of his bargain till the death of the witch ; in the mean time he is to appear always at the witches command , to go for him , to carry him any whither , and to do any command : which argues the devil to be the witches slave , and not the witch the devils . though it be true which delrio affirmeth , that the devil is at liberty to perform or break his compact , for that no man can compel him to keep his promise ; yet on the other side , it is as possible for the witch to frustrate the devils contract , if he or she have so much grace as to repent ; the which there may be good cause to do , if the devil be found not to perform his promise . besides , a witch may many times require that to be done by the devil , which god permits not the devil to do ; thus against his will the devil may lose his credit , and give occasion of repentance , though he endeavour to the utmost of his power to bring to pass whatsoever he hath promised ; and so fail of the benefit of his bargain , though he have the hand-writing , or some part of the blood of the witch for his security , or the solemnity before witnesses , as delrio imagineth . i am certain they will not say , that witchcraft is like the sin against the holy ghost , unpardonable : for mr. perkins confesseth the contrary , and delrio denies it not ; for he allows the sacrament of the eucharist to be administred to a condemned vvitch , with this limitation , that there may be about four hours space between the communion and the execution , in which time it may be probably thought , that the sacramental species ( as they call it ) may be consumed . . delrio in his second book , and fourth question , gives this rule , which he saith is common to all contracts with the devil , that first they must deny the faith , and christianism , and obedience to god , and reject the patronage of the virgin mary , and revile her . to the same purpose mr. perkins affirms , that witches renounce god and their baptism . but if this be common to all contracts with the devil , it will follow , that none can be vvitches but such as have first been christians , nay and roman catholicks , if delrio say true ; for who else can renounce the patronage of the virgin mary ? and what shall be said then of all those idolatrous nations of lapland , finland , and of divers parts of africa , and many other heathenish nations , which our travellers report to be full of vvitches ? and indeed , what need or benefit can the devil gain by contracting with those idolaters , who are surer his own , than any covenant can make them ? . vvhereas it is said , that witchcraft is an art working wonders , it must be understood , that the art must be the vvitches art , and not the devils , otherwise it is no witchcraft , but devils-craft . it is confessed on all hands , that the witch doth not work the wonder , but the devil only . it is a rare art for a witch by her art to be able to do nothing her self , but to command another to practise the art. in other arts , mr. perkins confesseth , that the arts master is able by himself to practise his art , and to do things belonging thereunto , without the help of another ; but in this it is otherwise — the power of effecting strange works doth not flow from the skill of the witch , but is derived wholly from satan . to the same purpose he saith , that the means of working wonders are charms used as a watch-word to the devil to cause him to work wonders : so that the devil is the worker of the wonder , and the witch but the counsellour , perswader , or commander of it , and only accessory before the fact , and the devil only principal . now the difficulty will be , how the accessory can be duly and lawfully convicted and attainted according as our statute requires , unless the devil , who is the principal , be first convicted , or at least outlawed ; which cannot be , because the devil can never be lawfully summoned according to the rules of our common law. for further proof that the devil is the principal in all such wonders , i shall shew it by the testimony of king james , in a case of murder , which is the most capital crime our laws look upon . first , he tells us , that the devil teaches witches how to make pictures of wax and clay , that by the roasting thereof , the persons that they bear the name of , may be continually melted , or dried away by continual sickness — not that any of these means which he teacheth them ( except poisons , which are composed of things natural ) can of themselves help any thing to these turns they are imployed in . secondly , king james affirms , that witches can bewitch , and take the life of men or women by roasting of the pictures , which is very possible to their master to perform : for although that instrument of wax have no vertue in the turn doing , yet may he not very well , by that same measure that his conjured slave melts that wax at the fire , may he not , i say , at these same times , subtilly as a spirit , so weaken and scatter the spirits of life of the patient , as may make him on the one part for faintness to sweat out the humours of his body ; and on the other part , for the not concurring of these spirits which cause his digestion , so debilitate his stomach , that his humour radical continually sweating out on the one part , and no new good suck being put in the place thereof for lack of digestion on the other , he at last shall vanish away even as his picture will do at the fire ? here we see the picture of wax , roasted by the witch , hath no virtue in the murdering , but the devil only . it is necessary in the first place that it be duly proved , that the party murdered be murdered by the devil : for it is a shame to bely the devil ; and it is not possible to be proved , if it be subtilly done as a spirit . . our definers of witchcraft dispute much , whether the devil can work a miracle : they resolve he can do a wonder , but not a miracle ; mirum , but not miraculum . a miracle , saith mr. perkins , is that which is above or against nature simply ; a wonder is that which proceeds not from the ordinary course of nature . delrio will have a miracle to be praeter , or supra naturae creatae vires : both seem to agree in this , that he had need be an admirable or profound philosopher , that can distinguish between a wonder and a miracle ; it would pose aristotle himself , to tell us every thing that can be done by the power of nature , and what things cannot ; for there be daily many things found out , and daily more may be , which our forefathers never knew to be possible in nature . those that were converted by the miracles of our saviour , never stayed to inquire of their philosophers what the power of nature was ; it was sufficient to them , when they saw things done , the like whereof they had neither seen nor heard of , to believe them to be miracles . . it is commonly believed and affirmed by mr. perkins , that the cause which moves the devil to bargain with a witch , is a desire to obtain thereby the soul and body of the witch . but i cannot see how this can agree with another doctrine of his , where he saith : the precepts of witchcraft are not delivered indifferently to every man , but to his own subjects the wicked ; and not to them all , but to special and tryed ones , whom he most betrusteth with his secrets , as being the fittest to serve his turn , both in respect of their willingness to learn and practise , as also for their ability to become instruments of the mischief he intendeth to others . all this argues the end of the devils rules of witchcraft is not to gain novices for new subjects , but to make use of old ones to serve his turn . . the last clause of mr. perkins definition is , that witchcraft doth work wonders so far as god shall permit . i should here desire to have known whether mr. perkins had thought that god doth permit farther power to the devil upon his contracting with the witch , than he had before the contract : for if the devil had the same permission before the contract , then he doth no more mischief upon the contract , then he would have gladly done before , seeing , as mr. perkins saith , the devils malice towards all men is of so high a degree , that he cannot endure they should enjoy the world , or the benefits of this life ( if it were possible ) so much as one hour . but yet afterwards i find mr. perkins is more favourable to the devil , where he writes , that if the devil were not stirred up and provoked by the witch , he would never do so much hurt as he doth . of the discerning and discovery of a witch . a magistrate , saith mr. perkins , may not take upon him to examine whom and how he willeth of any crime , nor to proceed upon slight causes , or to shew his authority , or upon sinister respects , or to revenge his malice , or to bring parties into danger and suspicion ; but he must proceed upon special presumptions . he calls those presumptions , which do at least probably and conjecturally note one to be a witch , and are certain signs whereby the witch may be discovered . i cannot but wonder , that mr. perkins should say , that presumptions do at least probably and conjecturally note , and are certain signs to discover a witch ; when he confesseth , that though presumptions give occasion to examine , yet they are no sufficient causes of conviction : and though presumptions be never so strong , yet they are not proofs sufficient for conviction , but only for examination . therefore no credit is to be given to those presumptions he reckons up . . for common same , it falls out many times , saith he , that the innocent may be suspected , and some of the better sort notoriously defamed . . the testimony of a fellow witch , he confesseth , doth not probably note one to be a witch . the like may be said of his third and fourth presumption , if after cursing , or quarrelling , or threatning , there follow present mischief . and the fifth presumption is more frivolous , which is , if the party be the son or daughter , or servant , or friend , near neighbour , or old companion of a witch . the sixth presumption mr. perkins dares not , or is loth to own , but saith , some add , if the party suspected have the devils mark ; and yet he resolves , if such a mark be descried , whereof no evident reason in nature can be given , the magistrate may cause such to be examined , or take the matter into his own hands , that the truth may appear ; but he doth not teach how the truth may be made to appear . the last presumption he names , is , if the party examined be unconstant , or contrary to himself ; here he confesseth , a good man may be fearful in a good cause , sometimes by nature , sometimes in regard of the presence of the judge , or the greatness of the audience ; some may be suddenly taken , and others want that liberty of speech which other men have . touching examination , mr. perkins names two kinds of proceedings , either by simple question , or by torture : torture , when besides the enquiry by words , the magistrate useth the rack , or some other violent means to urge confession ; this he saith , may be lawfully used , howbeit not in every case , but only upon strong and great presumptions , and when the party is obstinate . here it may be noted , that it is not lawful for any person , but the judge only , to allow torture : suspicious neighbours may not , of their own heads , use either threats , terrors , or tortures . i know not any one of those presumptions before-cited , to be sufficient to warrant a magistrate to use torture ; or whether when the party constantly denies the fact , it must be counted obstinacy . in case of treason sometimes , when the main fact hath been either confessed , or by some infallible proofs manifested , the magistrate , for a farther discovery of some circumstance of the time , the place , and the persons , or the like , have made use of the rack : and yet that kind of torture had not been of ancient usage in this kingdom ; for if my memory fail not , i have read , that the rack hath been called the duke of exeters daughter , and was first used about hen. . days . from presumptions , mr. perkins proceeds to proofs of a witch ; and here he hath a neat distinction of proofs , less sufficient , or more sufficient ; by less sufficient he meaneth insufficient , but gives them this mild and strange phrase of less sufficient , that it may not displease such friends as ( i conceive ) allow those less sufficient proofs for sufficient , though he reckons them for no better than witchcraft . those unsufficient sufficient proofs are weaker and worse than his presumptions , which he confesseth are no proofs at all ; yet we must reckon them up . his first less sufficient proof is , the antient trial by taking red hot irons , or putting the hand in hot scalding water ; this , he saith , hath been condemned for diabolical and wicked , as in truth it is : for an innocent man may thereby be condemned , and a rank witch scape unpunished . a second insufficient proof is , scratching of the suspected party , and the present recovery thereupon . a third is , the burning the thing bewitched , as a hog , an ox , or other creature , it is imagined a forcible means to cause the witch to discover her self . a fourth , is the burning the thatch of the suspected parties house . the fifth less sufficient proof is , the binding of the party hand and foot , and casting cross-ways into the water ; if she sinks , she is counted innocent ; if she float on the water and sink not , she is taken for a witch , convicted , and punished . the germans used this tryal by cold water ; and it was imagined , that the devil being most light , as participating more of air than of water , would hold them up above the water , either by putting himself under the witch , and lifting her up , as it were with his back , or by uniting himself , and possessing her whole body . all these less sufficient proofs , saith mr. perkins , are so far from being sufficient , that some of them , if not all , are after a sort practices of witchcraft , having no power by gods ordinance . hereby he condemns point-blank king james's judgment , as favouring of witchcraft , in allowing of the tryal of a vvitch by swimming as a principal proof . and as i take it , he condemns himself also , except he can find any ordinance of god , that the having of an incurable and insensible mark or sore , shall be a presumption , or certain sign of a witch . a sixth less sufficient proof , is the testimony of a wizard , witch , or cunning man , who is gone or sent unto , and informs that he can shew in a glass the face of the witch . this accusation of a witch by another witch , mr. perkins denies to be sufficient ; and he puts this case : if the devil appear to a grand jury , in the likeness of some known man , and offer to take his oath that the person in question is a witch , should the enquest receive his oath or accusation to condemn the party ? he answers , surely no ; and yet that is as much as the testimony of another witch , who only by the help of the devil revealeth the witch : if this should be taken for a sufficient proof , the devil would not leave one good man alive in the world . this discrediting of the testimony of a witch , takes away the other ( for he hath but two ) of king james's main proofs for the discovery of a witch , for he saith , who but witches can be provers , and so witnesses of the doings of witches ? and to the same purpose mr. perkins himself confesseth , that the precepts of witchcraft are not delivered , but to the devils own subjects , the wicked . a seventh less sufficient proof is , when a man in open court affirms , such a one fell out with me , and cursed me , threatning i should smart for it in my person or goods ; upon these threats , such evils and losses presently befel me ; this is no sure ground for conviction , saith mr. perkins , for it pleaseth god many times to lay his hands upon mens persons and goods , without the procurement of witches ; and yet saith mr. perkins , experience shews , that ignorant people will make strong proofs of such presumptions , whereupon sometimes jurors do give their verdict against parties innocent . the last less sufficient proof is , if a man being sick , upon suspicion will take it on his death , that such a one hath bewitched him , it is of no moment , saith mr. perkins ; it is but the suspicion of one man for himself , and is of no more force than another mans word against him . all these proofs , saith mr. perkins , which men in place have ordinarily used , be either false or insufficient signs . at the last mr. perkins comes to his more sufficient proofs , which are in all but two . the confession of the witch , or the proof of two witnesses . against the confession of a witch , mr. perkins confesseth , it is objected , that one may confess against himself an untruth , being urged by force or threatning , or by desire upon some grief to be out of the world ; or at least being in trouble , and perswaded it is the best course to save their lives and obtain their liberty , they may upon simplicity be induced to confess that they never did , even against themselves . the truth of this allegation mr. perkins doth not deny , but grants it , in that his answer is , that he doth not say a bare confession is sufficient , but a confession after due examination taken upon pregnant presumptions . but if a bare confession be not a sufficient proof , a pregnant presumption can never make it such ; or if it could , then it would not be a sufficient proof . for the farther weakning of the confession of a suspected witch , we may remember what mr. perkins hath formerly answered , when it was alledged , that upon a melancholy humour , many confess of themselves things false and impossible , that they are carried through the air in a moment , that they pass through key-holes and clefts of doors ; that they be sometimes turn'd into cats , hares , and other creatures , and such like ; all which are meer fables , and things impossible . here mr. perkins answers , that when witches begin to make a league , they are sober and sound in understanding ; but after they be once in the league , their reason & understanding may be depraved , memory weakned , and all the powers of their soul blemished ; they are deluded , and so intoxicated , that they will run into a thousand of phantastical imaginations , holding themselves to be transformed into the shapes of other creatures , to be transported in the air , to do many strange things which in truth they do not . now mr. perkins will confess , that the examination and confession of a suspected witch , is always after such time as her covenant is made ; when she is by his confession deluded , and not fit to give testimony against her self . his second more sufficient proof ( he saith , if the party will not confess , as commonly it falleth out ) is two witnesses avouching upon their own knowledge , either that the party accused hath made league with the devil , or hath done some known practices of witchcraft , or hath invocated the devil , or desired his help . but if every man that hath invocated the devil , or desired his help , must have formerly made a league with him , then whole nations are every man of them witches ; which i think none will say . as for the league , and proof of witchcraft , mr. perkins confesseth , some may say , if these be the only strong proofs for the conviction of a witch , it will be then impossible to put any one to death ; because the league with satan is closely made , and the practices of witchcraft are also very secret , and hardly can a man be brought , which upon his own knowledge can aver such things . to this mr. perkins answer is a confession : that howsoever the ground and practice be secret , and be to many unknown , yet there is a way to come to the knowledge thereof . — satan endeavoureth the discovery , and useth all means to disclose witches . this means he speaks of should be in the power of the judge , or else it is no help for the discovery of a witch , but only when the devil pleaseth , i do not find he proves that it is usual with satan to endeavour any such discovery ; neither do i see how it is practicable by the devil : for either he must do it by his own relation or report ; which as it cannot be proved he ever did , so it is vain , and to no purpose if he do it ; for mr. perkins hath discredited the testimony of the devil , as invalid , and of no force for conviction : or else the devil must discover it by some second means ; and if there had been any such second means usual , mr. perkins would have taught us what they are , and not have left us only to his two more sufficient proofs , which he confesseth are not infallible . king james tells us , that the devils first discovering of himself for the gaining of a witch , is either upon their walking solitarily in the fields , or else lying pausing in their bed , but always without the company of any other ; and at the making of circles and conjurations , none of that craft will permit any others to behold ; when the devil and his subjects are thus close and secret in their actions , it cannot be imagined that he will use all means to discover his most special and trustiest subjects : and though mr. perkins tells us , that by nature of the precontract , the devil is cock-sure of his instruments ; yet within a few lines he changeth his note , and saith , though he have good hope of them , yet he is not certain of their continuance , because some by the mercy of god have been reclaimed and freed from his covenant . besides , he confesseth , the devil suffereth some to live long undisclosed , that they may exercise the greater measure of his malice in the world . it remains , that if the two true proofs of mr. perkins , which are the witches confession , or sufficient witnesses , fail , we have not warrant , as he saith , in the word , to put such an one to death . i conclude this point in the words of mr. perkins ; i advise all jurors , that as they be diligent in the zeal of gods glory , so they would be careful what they do , and not to condemn any party suspected upon bare presumptions , without sound and sufficient proofs , that they be not guilty through their own rashness , of shedding innocent blood . of the hebrew witch . in deut. . the witch is named with divers other sorts of such as used the like unlawful arts ; as the diviner , the observer of times , an inchanter , a charmer , a consulter with a familiar spirit , a wisard , or a necromancer . the text addeth , all that do these things are an abomination to the lord , and because of these abominations , the lord thy god doth drive them [ the nations ] out from before thee . if we desire to know what those abominations of the nations were , we are told in general in the . verse of the same chapter : these nations hearkened unto observers of times , and unto diviners . there is no other crime in this chapter laid to the charge of all , or any of these practisers of such unlawful arts , but of lying prophecies ; and therefore the text addeth , the lord thy god will raise up unto thee a prophet from the midst of thee , of thy brethren , like unto me , unto him shall ye hearken , and not to the diviners , wisards , charmers , &c. setting aside the case of job ( wherein god gave a special and extraordinary commission ) i do not find in scripture that the devil , or witch , or any other , had power ordinarily permitted them , either to kill or hurt any man , or to meddle with the goods of any : for though , for the trial of the hearts of men , god doth permit the devil ordinarily to tempt them ; yet he hath no commission to destroy the lives or goods of men ; it is little less than blasphemy to say any such thing of the admirable providence of god , whereby he preserves all his creatures . it was crime sufficient for all those practisers of unlawful arts , to delude the people with false and lying prophecies , thereby to make them forget to depend upon god , and to have their souls turn after such as have familiar spirits , and after wisards , to go a whoring after them , as the lord saith , levit. . . this spiritual whoredom is flat idolatry , in the common phrase of the old testament ; and those that be enticers to it , thereby endeavour to destroy the souls of the people , and are by many degrees more worthy of death , than those that only destroy the bodies or goods of men . if there were a law that every one should be put to death , or punished , that should advisedly endeavour to perswade men that they are skilful in those forbidden arts , or in foretelling of things to come , or that they have contracted with the devil , and can thereby murther or destroy mens goods ; i should never deny such a law to be most consonant and agreeing with the law of moses . but because i may be thought by some a favourer of these forbidden arts , through want of understanding the scripture about the quality of them ; i have made choice of a man who is no friend to witches , and whose learning in this point will not be denied . in his own words i shall set down , what either out of the hebrew names of those prohibited arts , or out of the exposition of the jewish doctors can be gathered for the understanding of them . . a diviner , in hebrew , a foreseer , or presager , a foreteller of things to come , as doth a prophet — the hebrews take a diviner to be one that doth things whereby he may foretel things to come , and say , such a thing shall be , or not be , or say , it is good to do such a thing — the means of divining ; some doing it with sand , some with stones , some by lying down on the ground , some with iron , some with a staff — he that asked of a diviner , is chastised with stripes . . an observer of times , or soothsayer , an observer of the clouds , a planetary , or an observer of the flying of fowls , an augur . as the diviners were carried much by inward and spiritual motions , so these by outward observations in the creatures . the hebrews say , they were such as did set times , for the doing of things , saying , such a day is good , and such a day is naught . . an observer of fortunes , one that curiously searcheth signs of good or evil luck , which are learned by experience : the hebrew is , to find out by experience ; whereupon the word here used is one that too curiously observeth , and abuseth things that do fall out , as lucky or unlucky , the hebrews describe it thus , as if one should say , because the morsel of bread is fallen out of my mouth , or my staff out of my hand , i will not go to such a place : because a fox passed by on my right hand , i will not go out of my house this day . our new translation renders this word an inchanter . . a witch , a sorcerer , such as bewitch the senses or minds of men , by changing the forms of things to another hew . the hebrew word for a witch properly signifies a jugler , and is derived from a word which signifies changing or turning ; and moses teacheth , exod. . that witches wrought by enchantments , that is , by secret sleights , juglings , close conveyance , or of glistering like the flame of fire , or a sword , wherewith mens eyes were dazled . . a charmer , or one that conjureth conjurations ; the hebrew signifies conjoyning or consociating — the charmer is said to be he , that speaketh words of a strange language , and without sense ; that if one say so or so unto a serpent , it cannot hurt him ; he that whispereth over a wound , or that readeth over an infant that it may not be frighted , or layeth the bible upon a child that it may sleep . . a wisard or cunning man , in hebrew named of his knowledge or cunning — the hebrews describe him thus , that he put in his mouth a bone of a bird , and burned incense , and did other things until he fell down with shame , and spake with his mouth things that were to come to pass . . a necromancer , one that seeketh unto the dead : of him they say , he made himself hungry , and went and lodged among the graves , that the dead might come unto him in a dream , and make known unto him that which he asked of him ; and others there were that clad themselves with cloaths for that purpose , and spake certain words , and burned incense , and slept by themselves ; that such a dead person might come and talk with them in a dream . . lastly , the consulter with familiar spirits , in hebrew , a consulter with ob , applied here to magicians , who possessed with an evil spirit , spake with a hollow voice as out of a bottle . — the hebrews explain it thus , that he which had a familiar spirit stood and burned incense , and held a rod of mirtle-tree in his hand , and waved it , and spake certain words in secret , until he that enquired did hear one speak unto him , and answer him touching that he enquired , with words from under the earth , with a very low voice , &c. likewise , one took a dead mans skull and burnt incense thereto , and inchanted thereby till he heard a very low voice , &c. this text in our english translation being expounded a familiar spirit , and seconded by the history of the woman of endor , may seem a strong evidence that the devil covenanted with witches : but if all be granted that can be desired , that this familiar spirit signifies a devil , yet it comes not home to prove the main point ; for it is no proof that the familiar spirit enter'd upon covenant , or had or could give power to others to kill the persons , or destroy the goods of others . king james confesseth , the devil can make some to be possessed , and so become very daemoniaques ; and that she who had the spirit of python in acts . whereby she conquested such gain to her master ; that spirit was not of her own raising or commanding , as she pleased to appoint , but spake by her tongue as well privately as publickly . we do not find the pythonesse condemned or reproved , but the unclean spirit commanded in the name of jesus christ to come out of her . the child which was too young to make a covenant with the devil , was possessed with a dumb and deaf spirit , and the devil charged to come out , and enter no more into him , mark . a daughter of abraham ( that is , of the faith of abraham ) was troubled with a spirit of infirmity eighteen years , and bowed together that she could not lift her self up , luke . , . it is observable , that in deut. . where all the unlawful arts are reckoned up , and most fully prohibited , the crime of them is charged upon the practisers of those arts ; but the crime of having a familiar spirit is not there condemned , but the consulter of a familiar spirit ; so in levit. . . the prohibition is , regard not them that have familiar spirits ; and so in levit. . . the soul that turneth after such as have familiar spirits ; so that it was not the having , but the consulting , was condemned . if we draw nearer to the words of the text , it will be found , that these words , a consulter with a familiar spirit , are no other than a consulter with ob ; where the question will be what ob signifieth . expositors agree , that originally ob signifieth a bottle , and they say is applyed here to one possessed with an evil spirit , and speaketh with a hollow voice as out of a bottle : but for this i find no proof they bring out of scripture , that saith , or expoundeth that ob signifieth one possessed with a familiar spirit in the belly ; the only proof is , that the greek interpreters of the bible translate it engastromuthi , which is , speaking in the belly ; and the word anciently , and long before the time of the septuagint translators , was properly used for one that had the cunning or slight to shut his mouth , and seem to speak with his belly ; which that it can be done without the help of a familiar spirit , experience of this age sheweth in an irishman . we do not find it said , that the woman of endor did foretel any thing to saul , by the hollow voice of a familiar spirit in her belly ; neither did saul require , nor the woman promise so to answer him ; but he required , bring me him up whom i shall name unto thee , and she undertook to do it ; which argues a desire in saul to consult with the dead , which is called necromancy , or consulting with the dead . but it hath been said , she raised the devil in samuel's likeness , yet there is no such thing said in the text ; when the woman went about her work , the first thing noted is , that when she saw samuel , she cryed out with a loud voice : an argument she was frighted with seeing something she did not expect to see : it is not said , that when she knew saul , but when she saw samuel , she cried out with a loud voice ; when she knew saul , she had no reason to be afraid , but rather comforted , for that she had his oath for her security . it may well be , that if either she had a familiar spirit , or the art of hollow speaking , her intention was to deceive saul , and by her secret voice to have made him believe , that samuel in another room had answered him ; for it appears that saul was not in the place where she made a shew of raising samuel : for when she cried out with a loud voice , saul comforted her , and bid her not be afraid , and asked her what she saw ? and what form is he of ? which questions need not have been , if saul had been in the chamber with the witch . king james confesseth , that saul was in another chamber at the conjuration ; and it is likely the woman had told saul she had seen some fearful sight , which made him ask her what she saw ? and her answer was , she saw gods ascending out of the earth ; and it may be understood , that angels waited upon samuel , who was raised by god , and not any puppets or devils that she conjured up ; otherwise , the words may be translated as deodat in the margent of his italian bible hath it , she saw a man of majesty or divine authority ascend , un ' huomo di majesta è d' authorita divina , which well answers the question , of what form is he of ? which is in the singular , not in the plural number . we find it said in esay . . thou shalt be brought down , and shalt speak out of the ground , and thy speech shall be low out of the dust , and thy voice shall be as one that hath a familiar spirit out of the ground , and thy speech shall whisper out of the earth ; which argues , the voice of ob was out of the earth , rather than out of the belly ; and so the hebrew exposition , which i cited before , affirms . some learned have been of opinion , that a natural reason may be given , why in some places certain exhalations out of the earth may give to some a prophetical spirit . add hereunto , that some of the heathen oracles were said to speak out of the earth : and among those five sorts of necromancy , mentioned by doctor reynolds , in his . lecture of his censure of the apocryphals , not any of them is said to have any spirit in their belly . the romanists , who are all great affirmers of the power of witches , agree , that the soul of samuel was sent by god to the woman of endor : to this not only delrio , but bellarmine before him agrees . that true samuel did appear as sent by god , as he sent elias to ochosias king of israel , who being sick sent to consult with beelzebub the god of echron , may appear , for that samuel is so true and certain in his prediction to saul ; which no witch , no devil could ever have told : for though the wisdom and experience of the devil do enable him to conjecture probably of many events , yet positively to say , to morrow thou and thy sons shall dye , is more than naturally the devil could know . mr. perkins confesseth the devil could not foretel the exact time of saul's death ; and therefore he answers , that god revealed to the devil as his instrument saul's overthrow , by which means , and no other , the devil was enabled to foretel the death of saul . here mr. perkins proves not that satan was appointed by god to work saul's overthrow , or that it was made known to him when it should be done . as the rest of the speech of samuel is true , so these words of his , why hast thou disquieted me to bring me up ? may be also true ; which cannot be , if it be spoken by the devil ; or why should the devil tell truths in all other things else , and lye only in this , i know no reason . doctor reynolds presseth these words against the appearing of samuel , thus : if samuel had said them , he had lied ; but samuel could not lie , for samuel could not be disquieted , nor raised by saul . it is true , god only raised samuel effectually , but occasionally saul might raise him . but , saith doctor reynolds , though saul was the occasion , yet samuel could not truly say that saul had disquieted him ; for blessed are they that dye in the lord , saith the spirit , because they rest from their labours ; and samuel was no more to be disquieted ( if he were sent by god ) than moses and elias were when they appeared to shew the glory of christ , mat. . answer . it did not displease samuel to be employed in the office of an angel , but he obeyed god gladly ; yet since the occasion of his appearing displeased god , it might for that cause displease also samuel . besides , we need not understand the disquieting of samuel's mind , but of his body , by not suffering it to rest in peace after death , according to the common and usual condition of mankind : this sense the original will well bear . again , it cannot be believed that the devil would ever have preached so divine and excellent a sermon to saul , which was able to have converted , and brought him to repentance ; this was not the way for the devil to bring either saul or the woman to renounce god. lastly , the text doth not say that the woman raised samuel ; yet it calls him samuel , and saith that saul perceived or understood that it was samuel . mr. perkins and many others esteem balaam to have been a witch or conjurer , but i find no such thing in the text ; when he was required to curse the people of israel , his answer was , i will bring you word as the lord shall speak unto me , numb . . . and god came unto balaam in v. . and in v. . balaam saith , the lord refuseth to give me leave ; and when balak sent a second time , his answer was , if balak would give me his house full of silver and gold , i cannot go beyond the word of the lord my god , to do less or more . in v. . god cometh to balaam , and said , if the men come to call thee , go ; but yet the words which i shall say unto thee , that shalt thou do . and when balaam came before balak , he said , v. . lo i am come unto thee , have i now any power at all to say any thing ? the word which god putteth into my mouth , that shall i speak : and in the . chap. v. . balaam saith , how shall i curse whom god hath not cursed ? and in v. . he saith , must i not take heed to speak that which the lord hath put into my mouth ? these places laid together , prove balaam to have been a true prophet of the lord ; and he prophesied nothing contrary to the lords command , therefore st. peter calls him a prophet . nevertheless it is true , that balaam sinned notoriously , though not by being a witch or conjurer , or a false prophet ; his faults were , that when god had told him he should not go to balak , yet in his covetous heart he desired to go , being tempted with the rewards of divination , and promise of promotion ; so that upon a second message from balak he stayed the messengers , to see if god would suffer him to go ; wherefore the lord in his anger sent balaam . also when god had told balaam that he would bless israel , yet balaam did strive to tempt god , and by several altars and sacrifices to change the mind of god. again , when balaam saw god immutable in blessing israel , he taught balak to lay a stumbling-block before the sons of israel , to eat things sacrificed to idols , and to commit fornication , rev. . . whereas it is said , that balaam went not up as at other times to seek for enchantments , numb . . . the original is , to meet divinations , that is , he did not go seek the lord by sacrifices , as he did numb . . , . an exact difference between all those arts prohibited in deut. no man i think can give ; that in some they did agree , and in others differed , seems probable . that they were all lying and false prophets , though in several ways , i think none can deny . that they differed in their degrees of punishments is possible : there are but three sorts that can be proved were to be put to death , viz. the witch , the familiar spirit , the wisard . as for the witch , there hath been some doubt made of it . the hebrew doctors that were skill'd in the laws of moses , observe , that wheresoever one was to dye by their law , the law always did run in an affirmative precept ; as , the man shall be stoned , shall dye , shall be put to death , or the like ; but in this text , and no where else in scripture , the sentence is only a prohibition negative , thou shalt not suffer a witch to live , and not , thou shalt put her to death , or stone her , or the like . hence some have been of opinion , that not to suffer a witch to live , was meant not to relieve or maintain her by running after her , and rewarding her . the hebrews seem to have two sorts of witches , some that did hurt , others that did hold the eyes , that is , by jugling and slights deceived mens senses . the first , they say , was to be stoned ; the other , which according to the proper notation of the word was the true witch , was only to be beaten . the septuagint have translated a witch an apothecary , a druggister , one that compounds poisons ; and so the latin word for a witch is venefica , a maker of poisons : if any such there ever were , or be , that by the help of the devil do poison , such a one is to be put to death , though there be no covenant with the devil , because she is an actor and principal her self , not by any wonder wrought by the devil , but by the natural or occult property of the poyson . for the time of christ , saith mr. perkins , though there be no particular mention made of any such witch , yet thence it followeth not that there were none , for all things that then happened are not recorded ; and i would fain know of the chief patrons of them , whether those persons possessed with the devil , and troubled with strange diseases , whom christ healed , were not bewitched with some such people as our witches are ? if they say no , let them if they can prove the contrary . here it may be thought that mr. perkins puts his adversaries to a great pinch ; but it doth not prove so : for the question being only whether those that were possessed in our saviour's time were bewitched : the opposers of mr. perkins say they were not bewitched ; but if he or any other say they were , the proof will rest wholly on him or them to make good their affirmative ; it cannot in reason be expected that his adversaries should prove the negative ; it is against the rules of disputation to require it . finis . patriarcha ; or the natural power of kings· by the learned sir robert filmer baronet . lucan . lib. . libertas — populi , quem regna coercent libertate perit — claudian . fallitur egregio quisquis sub poincipe oredit . servitium ; nusquam libertas gratior extat quam sub rege pio — london , printed for ric. chiswell in st. paul's church-yard , matthew gillyflower and william henchman in westminster hall , . the copy of a letter written by the late learned dr. peter heylyn , to sir edward fylmer , son of the worthy author , concerning this book and his other political discourses . sir , how great a loss i had in the death of my most dear and honoured friend , your deceased father , no man is able to conjecture ; but he that hath suffered in the like . so affable was his conversation , his discourse so rational , his judgment so exact in most parts of learning ; and his affections to the church so exemplary in him , that i never enjoyed a greater felicity in the company of any man living , than i did in his : in which respects i may affirm both with safety and modesty , that we did not only take sweet counsel together ; but walked in the house of god as friends : i must needs say , i was prepared for that great blow , by the loss of my preferment in the church of westminster , which gave me the opportunity of so dear and beloved a neighbourhood ; so that i lost him partly before he died , which made the misery the more supportable , when i was deprived of him for altogether . but i was never more sensible of the infelicity , than i am at this present , in reference to that satisfaction , which i am sure he could have given the gentleman whom i am to deal with : his eminent abilities in these political disputes , exemplified in his judicious observations upon aristotles politiques ; as also in some passages on grotius , hunton , hobbs , and other of our late discoursers about forms of government , declare abundantly how fit a man he might have been to have dealt in this cause , which i would not willingly should be betrayed by unskilful handling : and had he pleased to have suffered his excellent discourse called patriarcha to appear in publick , it would have given such satisfaction to all our great masters in the schools of politie , that all other tractates in that kind , had been found unnecessary . vide certamen epistolare . . the contents . chap. i. that the first kings were fathers of families . ( ) the tenent of the natural liberty of the people , new , plausible , and dangerous . ( ) the question stated out of bellarmine , and some contradictions of his noted . ( ) bellarmine's argument answered out of bellarmine himself . ( ) the royal authority of the patriarchs before the flood . ( ) the dispersion of nations over the world after the confusion of babel , was by entire families , over which the fathers were kings . ( ) and from them all kings descended . ( ) all kings are either fathers of their people ; ( ) or heirs of such fathers , or vsurpers of the right of such fathers . ( ) of the escheating of kingdoms . ( ) of regal and paternal power , and of their agreement . chap. ii. it is unnatural for the people to govern , or chose governours . ( ) aristotle examined about the freedom of the people , and justified . ( ) suarez disputes against the regality of adam . ( ) families diversly defined by aristotle , bodin , and others . ( ) suarez contradicting bellarmine . ( ) of election of kings , ( ) by the major part of the people , ( ) by proxie , and by silent acceptation . ( ) no example in scripture for the peoples chosing their king. mr. hooker's judgment therein . ( ) god governed always by monarchy . ( ) bellarmine and aristotles judgment of monarchy . ( ) imperfections of the roman democratie . ( ) rome legan her empire under kings , and perfected it under emperours . in danger the people of rome always fled to monarchy . ( ) whether democraties were invented to bridle tyrants , or whether they crept in by stealth . ( ) democraties vilified by their own hystorians . ( ) popular government more bloody than tyranny . ( ) of a mixed government of the king and people . ( ) the people may not judg not correct their king. ( ) no tyrants in england since the conquest . chap. iii. positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of kings . ( ) regal authority not subject to positive laws . kings were before laws . the kings of judah and israel not tied to laws . ( ) of samuel's description of a king. ( ) the power ascribed to kings in the new testament . ( ) whether laws were invented to bridle tyrants . ( ) the benefit of laws . ( ) kings keep the laws , though not bound by the laws . ( ) of the oaths of kings . ( ) of the benefit of the kings prerogative over laws . ( ) the king the author , the interpreter , and corrector of the common laws . ( ) the king judge in all causes , both before the conquest and since ( ) the king and his council anciently determined causes in the star-chamber . ( ) of parliaments . ( ) when the people were first called to parliaments ( ) the liberty of parliaments not from nature , but from the grace of princes . ( ) the king alone makes laws in parliament . ( ) he governs both houses by himself , ( ) or by his council , ( ) or by his judges . chap i. that the first kings were fathers of families . ( ) the tenent of the natural liberty of mankind , new , plausible , and dangerous . ( ) the question stated out of bellarmine : some contradictions of his noted . ( ) bellarmine's argument answered out of bellarmine himself . ( ) the royal authority of the patriarchs before the flood . ( ) the dispersion of nations over the world after the confusion of babel , was by entire families , over which the fathers were kings . ( ) and from them all kings descended . ( ) all kings are either fathers of their people , ( ) or heirs of such fathers , or vsurpers of the right of such fathers . ( ) of the escheating of kingdoms . ( ) of regal and paternal power , and their agreement . since the time that school-divinity began to flourish , there hath been a common opinion maintained , as well by divines , as by divers other learned men , which affirms , mankind is naturally endowed and born with freedom from all subjection , and at liberty to chose what form of government it please : and that the power which any one man hath over others , was at first bestowed according to the discretion of the multitude . this tenent was first hatched in the schools , and hath been fostered by all succeeding papists for good divinity . the divines also of the reformed churches have entertained it , and the common people every where tenderly embrace it , as being most plausible to flesh and blood , for that it prodigally destributes a portion of liberty to the meanest of the multitude , who magnifie liberty , as if the height of humane felicity were only to be found in it , never remembring that the desire of liberty was the first cause of the fall of adam . but howsoever this vulgar opinion hath of late obtained a great reputation , yet it is not to be found in the ancient fathers and doctors of the primitive church : it contradicts the doctrine and history of the holy scriptures , the constant practice of all ancient monarchies , and the very principles of the law of nature . it is hard to say whether it be more erroneous in divinity , or dangerous in policy . yet upon the ground of this doctrine both jesuites , and some other zealous favourers of the geneva discipline , have built a perillous conclusion , which is , that the people or multitude have power to punish , or deprive the prince , if he transgress the laws of the kingdom ; witness parsons and buchanan : the first under the name of dolman , in the third chapter of his first book labours to prove , that kings have been lawfully chastised by their commonwealths : the latter in his book de jure regni apud scotos , maintains a liberty of the people to depose their prince . cardinal bellarmine and calvin , both look asquint this way . this desperate assertion whereby kings are made subject to the censures and deprivations of their subjects , follows ( as the authors of it conceive ) as a necessary consequence of that former position of the supposed natural equality and freedom of mankind , and liberty to choose what form of government it please . and though sir john heywood , adam blackwood , john barclay , and some others have learnedly confuted both buchanan and parsons , and bravely vindicated the right of kings in most points , yet all of them , when they come to the argument drawn from the natural liberty and equality of mankind , do with one consent admit it for a truth unquestionable , not so much as once denying or opposing it ; whereas if they did but confute this first erroneous principle , the whole fabrick of this vast engine of popular sedition would drop down of it self . the rebellious consequence which follows this prime article of the natural freedom of mankind may be my sufficient warrant for a modest examination of the original truth of it ; much hath been said , and by many , for the affirmative ; equity requires that an ear be reserved a little for the negative . in this discourse i shall give my self these cautions : first , i have nothing to do to meddle with mysteries of state , such arcana imperii , or cabinet counsels , the vulgar may not pry into . an implicite faith is given to the meanest artificer in his own craft , how much more is it then due to a prince in the profound secrets of government , the causes and ends of the greatest politique actions and motions of state dazle the eyes , and exceed the capacities of all men , save only those that are hourly versed in the managing publique affairs : yet since the rule for each men to know in what to obey his prince , cannot be learnt without a relative knowledge of those points wherein a sovereign may command , it is necessary when the commands and pleasures of superiors come abroad and call for an obedience , that every man himself know how to regulate his actions or his sufferings ; for according to the quality of the thing commanded , an active or passive obedience is to be yielded ; and this is not to limit the princes power ; but the extent of the subjects obedience , by giving to caesar the things that are caesar's , &c. secondly , i am not to question , or quarrel at the rights or liberties of this or any other nation , my task is chiefly to enquire from whom these first came , not to dispute what , or how many these are ; but whether they were derived from the laws of natural liberty , or from the grace and bounty of princes . my desire and hope is , that the people of england may and do enjoy as ample priviledges as any nation under heaven ; the greatest liberty in the world ( if it be duly considered ) is for a people to live under a monarch . it is the magna charta of this kingdom , all other shews or pretexts of liberty , are but several degrees of slavery , and a liberty only to destroy liberty . if such as maintain the natural liberty of mankind , take offence at the liberty i take to examine it , they must take heed that they do not deny by retail , that liberty which they affirm by whole-sale : for , if the thesis be true , the hypothesis will follow , that all men may examine their own charters , deeds , or evidences by which they claim and hold the inheritance or free-hold of their liberties . thirdly , i must not detract from the worth of all those learned men , who are of a contrary opinion in the point of natural liberty : the profoundest scholar that ever was known hath not been able to search out every truth that is discoverable ; neither aristotle in philosophy , nor hooker in divinity . they are but men , yet i reverence their judgments in most points , and confess my self beholding to their errors too in this ; something that i found amiss in their opinions , guided me in the discovery of that truth which ( i perswade my self ) they missed . a dwarf sometimes may see that which a giant looks over ; for whilest one truth is curiously searched after , another must necessarily be neglected . late writers have taken up too much upon trust from the subtile school-men , who to be sure to thrust down the king below the pope , thought it the safest course to advance the people above the king , that so the papal power might take place of the regal . thus many an ignorant subject hath been fooled into this faith , that a man may become a martyr for his countrey , by being a traytor to his prince ; whereas the new-coyned distinction of subjects into royallists and patriots , is most unnatural , since the relation between king and people is so great , that their well-being is so reciprocal . ( ) to make evident the grounds of this question , about the natural liberty of mankind , i will lay down some passages of cardinal bellarmine , that may best unfold the state of this controversie . secular or civil power ( saith he ) is instituted by men ; it is in the people , unless they bestow it on a prince . this power is immediately in the whole multitude , as in the subject of it ; for this power is in the divine law , but the divine law hath given this power to no particular man — if the positive law be taken away , there is left no reason , why amongst a multitude ( who are equal ) one rather than another should bear rule over the rest ? — power is given by the multitude to one man , or to more by the same law of nature ; for the commonwealth cannot exercise this power , therefore it is bound to bestow it upon some one man , or some few — it depends upon the consent of the multitude to ordain over themselves a king , or consul , or other magistrates ; and if there be a lawful cause , the multitude may change the kingdom into an aristocracy or democracy . thus far bellarmine ; in which passages are comprised the strength of all that ever i have read , or heard produced for the natural liberty of the subject . before i examine or refute these doctrines , i must a little make some observations upon his words . first , he saith , that by the law of god , power is immediately in the people ; hereby he makes god to be the immediate author of a democratical estate ; for a democrasy is nothing else but the power of the multitude . if this be true , not only aristocracies , but all monarchies are altogether unlawful , as being ordained ( as he thinks ) by men , whenas god himself hath chosen a democracy . secondly , he holds , that although a democracy be the ordinance of god , yet the people have no power to use the power which god hath given them , but only power to give away their power ; whereby it followeth , that there can be no democratical government , because he saith , the people must give their power to one man , or to some few ; which maketh either a regal or aristocratical estate ; which the multitude is tyed to do , even by the same law of nature which originally gave them the power : and why then doth he say , the multitude may change the kingdom into a democracy ? thirdly , he concludes , that if there be a lawful cause , the multitude may change the kingdom . here i would fain know who shall judg of this lawful cause ? if the multitude ( for i see no body else can ) then this is a pestilent and dangerous conclusion . ( ) i come now to examine that argument which is used by bellarmine , and is the one and only argument i can find produced by my author for the proof of the natural liberty of the people . it is thus framed : that god hath given or ordained power , is evident by scripture ; but god hath given it to no particular person , because by nature all men are equal ; therefore he hath given power to the people or multitude . to answer this reason , drawn from the equality of mankind by nature , i will first use the help of bellarmine himself , whose very words are these : if many men had been together created out of the earth , they all ought to have been princes over their posterity . in these words we have an evident confession , that creation made man prince of his posterity . and indeed not only adam , but the succeding patriarchs had , by right of father-hood , royal authority over their children . nor dares bellarmine deny this also . that the patriarchs ( saith he ) were endowed with kingly power , their deeds do testify ; for as adam was lord of his children , so his children under him , had a command and power over their own children ; but still with subordination to the first parent , who is lord-paramout over his childrens children to all generations , as being the grand-father of his people . ( ) i see not then how the children of adam , or of any man else can be free from subjection to their parents : and this subjection of children being the fountain of all regal authority , by the ordination of god himself ; it follows , that civil power , not only in general is by divine institution , but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest parents , which quite takes away that new and common distinction which refers only power universal and absolute to god ; but power respective in regard of the special form of government to the choice of the people . this lordship which adam by command had over the whole world , and by right descending from him the patriarchs did enjoy , was as large and ample as the absolutest dominion of any monarch which hath been since the creation : for dominion of life and death , we find that judah the father pronounced sentence of death against thamar his daughter-in-law , for playing the harlot ; bring her forth ( saith he ) that she may be burnt . touching war , we see that abraham commanded an army of souldiers of his own family . and esau met his brother jacob with men at arms. for matter of peace , abraham made a league with abimilech , and ratify'd the articles with an oath . these acts of judging in capital crimes , of making war , and concluding peace , are the chiefest marks of sovereignty that are found in any monarch . ( ) not only until the flood , but after it , this patriarchal power did continue , as the very name patriarch doth in part prove . the three sons of noah had the whole world divided amongst them by their father ; for of them was the whole world over-spread , according to the benediction given to him and his sons , be fruitful and multiply , and replenish the earth . most of the civilest nations of the earth labour to fetch their original from some one of the sons or nephews of noah , which were scatterd abroad after the confusion of babel : in this dispersion we must certainly find the establishment of regal power throughout the kingdoms of the world. it is a common opinion , that at the confusion of tongues there were distinct nations erected , all which were not confused multitudes , without heads or governors , and at liberty to chose what governors or government they pleased ; but they were distinct families , which had fathers for rulers over them ; whereby it appears that even in the confusion god was careful to preserve the fatherly authority , by distributing the diversity of languages according to the diversity of families ; for so plainly it appears by the text : first , after the enumeration of the sons of japhet , the conclusion is , by these were the isles of the gentiles divided in their lands , every one after his tongue , after their families , in their nations ; so it is said : these are the sons of ham after their families , after their tongues , in their countreys , and in their nations . the like we read , these are the sons of shem after their families , after their tongues , in their lands , after their nations . these are the families of the sons of noah after their generations in their nations ; and by these were these nations divided in the earth , after the flood . in this division of the world , some are of opinion that noah used lots for the distribution of it ; others affirm he sayled about the mediterranean sea in ten years , and as he went about , appointed to each son his part , and so made the division of the then known world into asia , africa , and europe , ( according to the number of his sons ) the limits of which three parts are all found in that midland sea. ( ) but howsoever the manner of this division be uncertain , yet it is most certain the division it self was by families from noah and his children , over which the parents were heads and princes . amongst these was nimrod , who no doubt ( as sir walter raleigh affirms ) was by good right , lord or king over his family ; yet against right did he enlarge his empire , by seizing violently on the rights of other lords of families : and in this sense he may be said to be the author and first founder of monarchy . and all those that do attribute unto him the original regal power , do hold he got it by tyrany or usurpation , and not by any due election of the people or multitude , or by any faction with them . as this patriarchal power continued in abraham , isaac , and jacob , even until the egyptian bondage ; so we find it amongst the sons of ismael and esau . it is said , these are the sons of ismael , and these are their names by their castles and towns , twelve princes of their tribes and families . and these are the names of the dukes that came of esau , according to their families and their places by their nations . ( ) some perhaps may think that these princes and dukes of families were but some petty lords under some greater kings , because the number of them are so many , that their particular territories could be but small , and not worthy the title of kingdoms ; but they must consider , that at first , kings had no such large dominions as they have now adays ; we find in the time of abraham , which was about years after the flood , that in a little corner of asia , kings at once met in battail , most of which were but kings of cities apiece , with the adjacent territories , as of sodom , gomorrha , shinar , &c. in the same chapter is mention of melchisedeck king of salem , which was but the city of jerusalem . and in the catalogue of the kings of edom , the names of each king's city is recorded , as the only mark to distinguish their dominions . in the land of canaan , which was but a small circuit , joshua destroyed thirty one kings ; and about the same time , adonibeseck had kings whose hands and toes he had cut off , and made them feed under his table . a few years after this , kings came to benhadad king of syria , and about kings of greece went to the wars of troy. caesar found more kings in france , than there be now princes there , and at his sailing over into this island , he found four kings in our county of kent . these heaps of kings in each nation are an argument their territories were but small , and strongly confirms our assertion , that erection of kingdoms came at first only by distinction of families . by manifest footsteps we may trace this paternal government unto the israelites coming into egypt , where the exercise of supream partriarchal jurisdiction was intermitted , because they were in subjection to a stronger prince . after the return of these israelites out of bondage , god out of a special care of them , chose moses and joshua successively to govern as princes in the place and stead of the supream fathers : and after them likewise for a time , he raised up judges , to defend his people in time of peril . but when god gave the israelites kings , he reestablished the antient and prime right of lineal succession to paternal government . and whensoever he made choice of any special person to be king , he intended that the issue also should have benefit thereof , as being comprehended sufficiently in the person of the father , although the father only was named in the graunt . ( . ) it may seem absurd to maintain , that kings now are the fathers of their people , since experience shews the contrary . it is true , all kings be not the natural parents of their subjects , yet they all either are , or are to be reputed the next heirs to those first progenitors , who were at first the natural parents of the whole people , and in their right succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction ; and such heirs are not only lords of their own children , but also of their brethren , and all others that were subject to their fathers : and therefore we find , that god told cain of his brother abel , his desires shall be subject unto thee , and thou shalt rule over him . accordingly , when jacob bought his brother's birth-right , isaac blessed him thus , be lord over thy brethren , and let the sons of thy mother bow before thee . as long as the first fathers of families lived , the name of patriarchs did aptly belong unto them ; but after a few descents , when the true fatherhood it self was extinct , and only the right of the father descends to the true heir , then the title of prince or king was more significant , to express the power of him who succeeds only to the right of that fatherhood which his ancestors did naturally enjoy ; by this means it comes to pass , that many a child , by succeeding a king , hath the right of a father over many a gray-headed multitude , and hath the title of pater patriae . ( . ) it may be demanded what becomes of the right of fatherhood , in case the crown does escheat for want of an heir ? whether doth it not then divolve to the people ? the answer is , it is but the negligence or ignorance of the people to lose the knowledge of the true heir : for an heir there always is . if adam himself were still living , and now ready to die , it is certain that there is one man , and but one in the world who is next heir , although the knowledge who should be that one man be quite lost . . this ignorance of the people being admitted , it doth not by any means follow ; that for want of heirs the supreme power is devolved to the multitude , and that they have power to rule , and chose what rulers they please . no , the kingly power escheats in such cases to the princes and independent heads of families : for every kingdom is resolved into those parts whereof at first it was made . by the uniting of great families or petty kingdoms , we find the greater monarchies were at the first erected ; and into such again , as into their first matter many times they return again . and because the dependencie of ancient families is oft obscure or worn out of knowledge ; therefore the wisdom of all or most princes have thought fit to adopt many times those for heads of families , and princes of provinces , whose merits , abilities , or fortunes , have enobled them , or made them fit and capable of such regal favours . all such prime heads and fathers have power to consent in the uniting or conferring of their fatherly right of sovereign authority on whom they please : and he that is so elected , claims not his power as a donative from the people ; but as being substituted properly by god , from whom he receives his royal charter of an vniversal father , though testified by the ministry of the heads of the people . if it please god , for the correction of the prince , or punishment of the people , to suffer princes to be removed , and others to be placed in their rooms , either by the factions of the nobility , or rebellion of the people ; in all such cases , the judgment of god , who hath power to give and to take away kingdoms , is most just : yet the ministry of men who execute gods judgments without commission , is sinful and damnable . god doth but use and turn mens vnrighteous acts to the performance of his righteous decrees . ( ) in all kingdoms or common-wealths in the world , whether the prince be the supream father of the people , or but the true heir of such a father , or whether he come to the crown by usurpation , or by election of the nobles , or of the people , or by any other way whatsoever ; or whether some few or a multitude govern the commonwealth : yet still the authority that is in any one , or in many , or in all these , is the only right and natural authority of a supream father . there is , and always shall be continued to the end of the world , a natural right of a supreme father over every multitude , although by the secret will of god , many at first do most unjustly obtain the exercise of it . to confirm this natural right of regal power , we find in the decalogue , that the law which enjoyns obedience to kings , is delivered in the terms of honour thy father , as if all power were originally in the father . if obedience to parents be immediately due by a natural law , and subjection to princes , but by the mediation of an humane ordinance ; what reason is there that the laws of nature should give place to the laws of men ? as we see the power of the father over his child , gives place , and is subordinate to the power of the magistrate . if we compare the natural rights of a father with those of a king , we find them all one , without any difference at all but only in the latitude or extent of them : as the father over one family , so the king as father over many families extends his care to preserve , feed , cloth , instruct and defend the whole commonwealth . his war , his peace , his courts of justice , and all his acts of sovereignty tend only to preserve and distribute to every subordinate and inferiour father , and to their children , their rights and privileges ; so that all the duties of a king are summed up in an universal fatherly care of his people . chap. ii. it is unnatural for the people to govern , or chose governours . ( . ) aristotle examined about the freedom of the people and justified . ( . ) suarez disputing against the regality of adam . ( . ) families diversly defined by aristotle , bodin and others . ( . ) suarez contradicting bellarmine . ( . ) of election of kings . ( . ) by the major part of the people . ( . ) by proxy , and by silent acceptation . ( . ) no example in scripture of the peoples chosing their king. mr. hooker's judgment therein . ( . ) god governed always by monarchy . ( . ) bellarmine and aristotle's judgment of monarchy . ( . ) imperfections of the roman democratie . ( . ) rome began her empire under kings , and perfected under emperours . in danger , the people of rome always fled to monarchy . ( . ) whether democraties were invented to bridle tyrants , or rather that they came in by stealth , ( . ) democraties vilified by their own historians . ( . ) popular government more bloody than tyranny . ( . ) of a mixed government of the king and people . ( . ) the people may not judge or correct their king ( . ) no tyrants in england since the conquest . ( . ) by conferring these proofs and reasons drawn from the authority of the scripture , it appears little less than a paradox which bellarmine and others affirm of the freedom of the multitude , to chose what rulers they please . had the patriarchs their power given them by their own children ? bellarmine does not say it , but the contrary : if then the fatherhood enjoyed this authority for so many ages by the law of nature , when was it lost , or when forfeited , or how is it devolved to the liberty of the multitude ? because the scripture is not favourable to the liberty of the people ; therefore many fly to natural reason , and to the authority of aristotle . i must crave liberty to examine or explain the opinion of this great philosopher ; but briefly , i find this sentence in the third of his politiques . cap. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . it seems to some not to be natural for one man to be lord of all the citizens , since a city consists of equals . d. lambine in his latine interpretation of this text , hath omitted the translation of this word [ 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ] by this means he maketh that to be the opinion of aristotle , which aristotle alleadgeth to be the opinion but of some . this negligence , or wilful escape of lambine , in not translating a word so material , hath been an occasion to deceive many , who looking no farther than this latine translation , have concluded , and made the world now of late believe , that aristotle here maintains a natural equality of men ; and not only our english translator of aristotle's politiques is in this place misled by following lambine ; but even the learned monsieur duvall in his synopsis bears them company : and yet this version of lambine's is esteemed the best , and printed at paris with causabon's corrected greek copy , though in the rendring of this place , the elder translations have been more faithful ; and he that shall compare the greek text with the latine , shall find that causabon had just cause in his preface to aristotle's works , to complain that the best translations of aristotle did need correction : to prove that in these words which seem to favour the equality of mankind , aristotle doth not speak according to his own judgment , but recites only the opinion of others ; we find him clearly deliver his own opinion , that the power of government did originally arise from the right of fatherhood , which cannot possibly consist with that natural equality which men dream of : for in the first of his politiques he agrees exactly with the scripture , and lays this foundation of government , the first society ( saith he ) made of many houses is a village , which seems most naturally to be a colony of families or foster-brethren of children and childrens children . and therefore at the beginning , cities were under the government of kings , for the eldest in every house is king : and so for kindred-sake it is in colonies . and in the fourth of his politiques , cap. . he gives the title of the first and divinest sort of government to the institution of kings , by defining tyranny to be a digression from the first and divinest . whosoever weighs advisedly these passages , will find little hope of natural reason in aristotle to prove the natural liberty of the multitude . also before him the divine plato concludes a commonweal to be nothing else but a large family . i know for this position aristotle quarrels with his master , but most unjustly ; for therein he contradicts his own principles for they both agree to fetch the orignial of civil government from the prime government . no doubt but moses's history of the creation guided these two philosophers in finding out of this lineal subjection , deduced from the laws of the first parents , according to that rule of st. chrysostom , god made all mankind of one man , that he might teach the world to be governed by a king , and not by a multitude . the ignorance of the creation , occasioned several errors amongst the heathen philosophers . polybius , though otherwise a most profound philosopher , and judicious historian , yet here he stumbles ; for in searching out the original of civil societies , he conceited , that multitudes of men after a deluge , a famine , or a pestilence , met together like herds of cattel without any dependency , until the strongest bodies and boldest minds got the mastery of their fellows ; even as it is ( saith he ) among bulls , bears and cocks . and aristotle himself , forgetting his first doctrine , tells us , the first heroical kings were chosen by the people for their deserving well of the multitude ; either by teaching them some new arts , or by warring for them , or by gathering them together , or by dividing land amongst them ; also aristotle had another fancy , that those men who prove wise of mind , were by nature intended to be lords , and govern ; and those which were strong of body were ordained to obey , and to be servants . but this is a dangerous and uncertain rule , and not without some folly ; for if a man prove both wise and strong , what will aristotle have done with him ? as he was wise , he could be no servant , and as he had strength , he could not be a master ; besides , to speak like a philosopher , nature intends all things to be perfect both in wit and strength . the folly or imbecillity proceeds from some errour in generation or education ; for nature aims at perfection in all her works . ( . ) suarez the jusuite riseth up against the royal authority of adam , in defence of the freedom and liberty of the people ; and thus argues . by right of creation ( saith he ) adam had only oeconomical power , but not political ; he had a power over his wife , and a fatherly power over his sons , whilst they were not made free : he might also in process of time have servants and a compleat family ; and in that family he might have compleat oeconomical power . but after that families began to be multiplied , and men to be separated , and become the heads of several families ; they had the same power over their families . but political power did not begin , until families began to be gathered together into one perfect community ; wherefore as the community did not begin by the creation of adam , nor by his will alone , but of all them which did agree in this community : so we cannot say that adam naturally had political primacy in that community ; for that cannot be gathered by any natural principles , because by the force of the law of nature alone , it is not due unto any progenitor , to be also king of his posterity . and if this be not gathered out of the principles of nature , we cannot say , god by a special gift or providence gave him this power ; for there is no revelation of this , nor testimony of scripture . hitherto suarez . whereas he makes adam to have a fatherly power over his sons , and yet shuts up this power within one family , he seems either to imagine , that all adam's children lived within one house , and under one roof with their father ; or else , as soon as any of his children lived out of his house , they ceased to be subject , and did thereby become free. for my part , i cannot believe that adam ( although he were sole monarch of the world ) had any such spacious palace , as might contain any such considerable part of his children . it is likelier , that some mean cottage or tent did serve him to keep his court in . it were hard he should lose part of his authority , because his children lay not within the walls of his house . but if suarez will allow all adam's children to be of his family , howsoever they were separate in dwellings ; if their habitations were either contiguous , or at such distance , as might easily receive his fatherly commands . and that all that were under his commands , were of his family , although they had many children or servants married , having themselves also children . then i see no reason , but that we may call adam's family a commonwealth , except we will wrangle about words : for adam living years , and seeing or descents from himself , he might live to command of his children and their posterity a multitude far bigger , than many commonwealths and kingdoms . ( . ) i know the politicians and civil lawyers do not agree well about the definition of a family , and bodin doth seem in one place to confine it to a house ; yet in his definition , he doth enlarge his meaning to all persons under the obedience of one and the same head of the family ; and he approves better of the propriety of the hebrew word for a family , which is derived from a word that signifies a head , a prince , or lord , than the greek word for a family , which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , which signifies a house . nor doth aristotle confine a family to one house ; but esteems it to be made of those that daily converse together : whereas before him , charondas called a family homosypioi , those that feed together out of one common pannier . and epimenides the cretian , terms a family homocapnoi , those that sit by a common fire , or smoak . but let suarez understand what he please by adam's family ; if he will but confess , as he needs must , that adam and the patriarchs had absolute power of life and death , of peace and war , and the like , within their houses or families ; he must give us leave at least , to call them kings of their houses or families ; and if they be so by the law of nature , what liberty will be left to their children to dispose of ? aristotle gives the lie to plato , and those that say political and oeconomical societies are all one , and do not differ specie , but only multitudine & paucitate ; as if there were no difference betwixt a great house and a little city . all the argument i find he brings against them is this . the community of man and wife , differs from the community of master and servant , because they have several ends. the intention of nature by conjunction of male and female , is generation ; but the scope of master and servant , is preservation : so that a wife and a servant are by nature distinguished , because nature does not work like the cutlers of delphos , for she makes but one thing for one use . if we allow this argument to be sound , nothing doth follow but only this , that conjugal and despotical communities do differ . but it is no consequence , that therefore , oeconomical and political societies do the like : for though it prove a family to consist of two distinct communities , yet it follows not , that a family and a commonwealth are distinct ; because , as well in the commonweal , as in the families , both these communities are found . and as this argument comes not home to our point , so it is not able to prove that title which it shews for ; for if it should be granted ( which yet is false ) that generation and preservation differ about the individuum , yet they agree in the general , and serve both for the conservation of mankind ; even as several servants differ in the particular ends or offices ; as one to brew , and another to bake ; yet they agree in the general preservation of the family . besides , aristotle confesses , that amongst the barbarians ( as he calls all them that are not grecians ) a wife and a servant are the same , because by nature , no barbarian is fit to govern ; it is fit the grecians should rule over the barbarians ; for by nature a servant and a barbarian is all one : their family consists only of an ox for a man-servant , and a wife for a maid ; so they are fit only to rule their wives and their beasts . lastly , aristotle ( if it had pleased him ) might have remembred , that nature doth not always make one thing but for one use : he knows , the tongue serves both to speak , and to taste . ( . ) but to leave aristotle , and return to suarez ; he saith that adam had fatherly power over his sons , whilst they were not made free. here i could wish that the jesuite had taught us , how and when sons become free : i know no means by the law of nature . it is the favour i think of the parents only , who when their children are of age and discretion to ease their parents of part of their fatherly care , are then content to remit some part of their fatherly authority ; therefore the custom of some countreys doth in some cases enfranchise the children of suferiour parents , but many nations have no such custome , but on the contrary have strict laws for the obedience of children : the judicial law of moses giveth full power to the father to stone his disobedient son , so it be done in presence of a magistrate : and yet it did not belong to the magistrate to enquire and examine the justness of the cause ; but it was so decreed , lest the father should in his anger , suddenly , or secretly kill his son. also by the laws of the persians , and of the people of the upper asia , and of the gaules , and by the laws of the west-indies , the parents have power of life and death over their children . the romans , even in their most popular estate , had this law in force , and this power of parents was ratified and amplified by the laws of the twelve tables , to the enabling of parents to sell their children two or three times over . by the help of the fatherly power , rome long flourished , and oftentimes was freed from great dangers . the fathers have drawn out of the very assemblies their own sons ; when being tribunes ▪ they have published laws tending to sedition . memorable is the example of cassius , who threw his son headlong out of the consistory , publishing the law agraria , for the division of lands , in the behoof of the people ; and afterwards , by his own private judgment put him to death , by throwing him down from the tarpeian rock ; the magistrates and people standing thereat amazed , and not daring to resist his fatherly authority , although they would with all their hearts , have had that law for the division of land : by which it appears , it was lawful for the father to dispose of the life of his child , contrary to the will of the magistrates or people . the romans also had a law , that what the children got , was not their own , but their fathers ; although solon made a law , which acquitted the son from nourishing of his father , if his father had taught him no trade , whereby to get his living . suarez proceeds , and tells us , that in process of time , adam had compleat oeconomical power . i know not what this compleat oeconomical power is , nor how , or what it doth really and essentially differ from political : if adam did , or might exercise the same jurisdiction , which a king doth now in a commonwealth , then the kinds of power are not distinct ; and though they may receive an accidental difference by the amplitude , or extent of the bounds of the one beyond the other ; yet since the like difference is also found in political estates , it follows that oeconomical and political power , differ no otherwise , than a little commonweal differs from a great one. next , saith suarez , community did not begin at the creation of adam . it is true , because he had no body to communicate with ; yet community did presently follow his creation , and that by his will alone : for it was in his power only ( who was lord of all ) to appoint what his sons should have in proper , and what in common ; so that propriety and community of goods did follow originally from him ; and it is the duty of a father , to provide as well for the common good of his children , as the particular . lastly , suarez concludes , that by the law of nature alone , it is not due unto any progenitor , to be also king of his posterity . this assertion is confuted point-blank by bellarmine , who expresly affirmeth , that the first parents ought to have been princes of their posterity . and until suarez bring some reason for what he saith , i shall trust more to bellarmine's proofs , than to his denials . ( . ) but let us condescend a while to the opinion of bellarmine and suarez , and all those , who place supreme power in the whole people ; and ask them if their meaning be , that there is but one and the same power in all the people of the world ; so that no power can be granted , except all the men upon the earth meet and agree , to choose a governour . an answer is here given by suarez , that it is scarce possible , nor yet expedient , that all men in the world should be gathered together into one community : it is likelier , that either never , or for a very short time , that this power was in this manner , in the whole multitude of men collected ; but a little after the creation , men began to be divided into several commonwealths ; and this distinct power was in each of them . this answer of scarce possible , nor yet expedient : — it is likelier begets a new doubt , how this distinct power comes to each particular community , when god gave it to the whole multitude only , and not to any particular assembly of men. can they shew , or prove , that ever the whole multitude met , and divided this power which god gave them in gross , by breaking into parcels , and by appointing a distinct power to each several common-wealth ? without such a compact i cannot see ( according to their own principles ) how there can be any election of a magistrate by any commonwealth , but by a meer usurpation upon the priviledge of the whole world. if any think that particular multitudes at their own discretion , had power to divide themselves into several commonwealths ; those that think so , have neither reason nor proof for so thinking : and thereby a gap is opened for every petty factious multitude , to raise a new commonwealth , and to make more commonweals than there be families in the world. but let this also be yielded them , that in each particular commonwealth , there is a distinct power in the multitude . was a general meeting of a whole kingdom ever known for the election of a prince ? is there any example of it ever found in the whole world ? to conceit such a thing , is to imagine little less than an impossibility . and so by consequence , no one form of government , or king , was ever established according to this supposed law of nature . ( . ) it may be answered by some , that if either the greatest part of a kingdom , or if a smaller part only by themselves , and all the rest by proxy ; or if the part not concurring in election , do after , by a tacit assent ratifie the act of others , that in all these cases , it may be said to be the work of the whole multitude . as to the acts of the major part of a multitude , it is true , that by politick humane constitutions , it is oft ordained , that the voices of the most shall over-rule the rest ; and such ordinances bind , because , where . men are assembled by an humane power ; that power that doth assemble them , can also limit and direct the manner of the execution of that power , and by such derivative power , made known by law or custom , either the greater part , or two thirds , or three parts of five , or the like , have power to oversway the liberty of their opposites . but in assemblies that take their authority from the law of nature , it cannot be so : for what freedom or liberty is due to any man by the law of nature , no inferiour power can alter , limit or diminish ; no one man , nor a multitude , can give away the natural right of another . the law of nature is unchangeable , and howsoever one man may hinder another in the use or exercise of his natural right , yet thereby no man loseth the right of it self ; for the right and the use of the right may be distinguished , as right and possession are oft distinct . therefore , unless it can be proved by the law of nature , that the major , or some other part , have power to over rule the rest of the multitude ; it must follow , that the acts of multitudes not entire , are not binding to all , but only to such as consent unto them . ( . ) as to the point of proxy ; it cannot be shewed or proved , that all those that have been absent from popular elections , did ever give their voices to some of their fellows . i ask but one example out of the history of the whole world , let the commonweal be but named , wherever the multitude , or so much as the greatest part of it consented , either by voice or by procuration , to the election of a prince . the ambition sometimes of one man , sometimes of many , or the faction of a city or citizens , or the mutiny of an army , hath set up or put down princes ; but they have never tarried for this pretended order by proceeding of the whole multitude . lastly , if the silent acceptation of a governour by part of the people , be an argument of their concurring in the election of him ; by the same reason , the tacit assent of the whole commonwealth may be maintained : from whence it follows , that every prince that comes to a crown , either by succession , conquest , or vsurpation , may be said to be elected by the people ; which inference is too ridiculous ; for in such cases , the people are so far from the liberty of specification , that they want even that of contradiction . ( . ) but it is in vain to argue against the liberty of the people in the election of kings , as long as men are perswaded , that examples of it are to be found in scripture . it is fit therefore , to discover the grounds of this errour : it is plain by an evident text , that it is one thing to choose a king , and another thing to set up a king over the people ; this latter power the children of israel had , but not the former . this distinction is found most evident in deut. . . where the law of god saith , him shalt thou set king over thee , whom the lord shall choose ; so god must eligere , and the people only do constituere . mr. hooker in his eight book of ecclesiastical policy , clearly expounds this distinction ; the words are worthy the citing : heaps of scripture ( saith he ) are alledged , concerning the solemn coronation or inauguration of saul , david , solomon and others , by nobles , ancients , and the people of the commonwealth of israel ; as if these solemnities were a kind of deed , whereby the right of dominion is given ; which strange , untrue , and unnatural conceits , are set abroad by seed-men of rebellion , only to animate unquiet spirits , and to feed them with possibilities of aspiring unto the thrones , if they can win the hearts of the people ; whatsoever hereditary title any other before them may have . i say these unjust and insolent positions , i would not mention , were it not thereby to make the countenance of truth more orient . for unless we will openly proclaim defiance unto all law , equity and reason , we must ( for there is no other remedy ) acknowledg , that in kingdoms hereditary , birth-right giveth right unto sovereign dominion , and the death of the predecessor , putteth the successor by blood in seisin . those publick solemnities before-mentioned , do either serve for an open testification of the inheritor's right , or belong to the form of inducing of him into possession of that thing he hath right unto . this is mr. hooker's judgment of the israelites power to set a king over themselves . no doubt but if the people of israel had had power to choose their king , they would never have made choice of joas , a child but of seven years old , nor of manasses a boy of twelve ; since ( as solomon saith ) wo to the land whose king is a child : nor is it probable they would have elected josias , but a very child , and a son to so wicked and idolatrous a father , as that his own servants murthered him ; and yet all the people set up this young josias , and slew the conspirators of the death of ammon his father ; which justice of the people , god rewarded , by making this josias the most religious king , that ever that nation enjoyed . ( . ) because it is affirmed , that the people have power to choose , as well what form of government , as what governours they please ; of which mind is bellarmine , in those places we cited at first . therefore it is necessary to examine the strength of what is said in defence of popular common-weals , against this natural form of kingdoms , which i maintain'd . here i must first put the cardinal in mind of what he affirms in cold blood , in other places ; where he saith , god when he made all mankind of one man , did seem openly to signifie , that he rather approved the government of one man , than of many . again , god shewed his opinion , when he endued not only men , but all creatures with a natural propensity to monarchy ; neither can it be doubted , but a natural propensity is to be referred to god , who is author of nature . and again ; in a third place , what form of government god confirmed by his authority , may be gathered by that common-weal , which he instituted amongst the hebrews , which was not aristocratical , ( as calvin saith ) but plainly monarchichal . ( . ) now if god , ( as bellarmine saith ) hath taught us by natural instinct , signified to us by the creation , and confirmed by his own example , the excellency of monarchy , why should bellarmine or we doubt , but that it is natural ? do we not find , that in every family , the government of one alone is most natural ? god did always govern his own people by monarchy only . the patriarchs , dukes , judges , and kings were all monarchs . there is not in all the scripture , mention or approbation of any other form of government . at the time when scripture saith , there was no king in israel , but that every man did that which was right in his own eyes ; even then , the israelites were under the kingly government of the fathers of particular families : for in the consultation , after the benjamitical war , for providing wives for the benjamites , we find , the elders of the congregation bare only sway. judges . . to them also were complaints to be made , as appears by verse . and though mention be made of all the children of israel , all the congregation , and all the people ; yet by the term of all , the scripture means only all the fathers , and not all the whole multitude , as the text. plainly expounds it self in chron. . . where solomon speaks unto all israel , to the captains , the judges , and to every governour , the chief of the fathers ; so the elders of israel are expounded to be the chief of the fathers of the children of israel , kings . . chron. . . at that time also , when the people of israel begg'd a king of samuel , they were governed by kingly power . god out of a special love and care to the house of israel , did choose to be their king himself , and did govern them at that time by his viceroy samuel , and his sons ; and therefore god tells samuel , they have not rejected thee , but me , that i should not reign over them . it seems they did not like a king by deputation , but desired one by succession , like all the nations . all nations belike had kings then , and those by inheritance , not by election : for we do not find the israelites prayed , that they themselves might choose their own king ; they dream of no such liberty , and yet they were the elders of israel gathered together . if other nations had elected their own kings , no doubt but they would have been as desirous to have imitated other nations as well in the electing , as in the having of a king. aristotle , in his book of politicks , when he comes to compare the several kinds of government , he is very reserved in discoursing what form he thinks best : he disputes subtilely to and fro of many points , and judiciously of many errours , but concludes nothing himself . in all those books , i find little commendation of monarchy . it was his hap to live in those times when the graecians abounded with several common-wealths , who had then learning enough to make them seditious . yet in his ethicks , he hath so much good manners , as to confess in right down words , that monarchy is the best form of government , and a popular estate the worst . and though he be not so free in his politicks , yet the necessity of truth hath here and there extorted from him , that which amounts no less to the dignity of monarchy ; he confesseth it to be first , the natural , and the divinest form of government ; and that the gods themselves did live under a monarchy . what can a heathen say more ? indeed , the world for a long time knew no other sort of government , but only monarchy . the best order , the greatest strength , the most stability , and easiest government , are to be found all in monarchy , and in no other form of government . the new platforms of commonweals were first hatched in a corner of the world , amongst a few cities of greece , which have been imitated by very few other places . those very cities were first , for many years , governed by kings , untill wantonness , ambition , or faction of the people , made them attempt new kinds of regiment ; all which mutations proved most bloody and miserable to the authors of them ; happy in nothing , but that they continued but a small time . ( . ) a little to manifest the imperfection of popular government , let us but examine the most flourishing democracy that the world hath ever known ; i mean that of rome . first , for the durability ; at the most , it lasted but years ( for so long it was from the expulsion of tarquin , to julius caesar . ) whereas both the assyrian monarchy lasted , without interruption , at the least twelve hundred years , and the empire of the east continued years . . for the order of it , during these years , there was not any one setled form of government in rome : for after they had once lost the natural power of kings , they could not find upon what form of government to rest : their fickleness is an evidence that they found things amiss in every change. at the first they chose two annual consuls instead of kings . secondly , those did not please them long , but they must have tribunes of the people to defend their liberty . thirdly , they leave tribunes and consuls , and choose them ten men to make them laws . fourthly , they call for consuls and tribunes again , sometimes they choose dictators , which were temporary kings , and sometimes military tribunes , who had consular power . all these shiftings caused such notable alteration in the government , as it passeth historians to find out any perfect form of regiment in so much confusion : one while the senate made laws , another while the people . the dissentions which were daily between the nobles and the commons , bred those memorable seditions about vsury , about marriages , and about magistracy . also the graecian , the apulian , and the drusian seditions , filled the market-places , the temples , and the capitol it self , with blood of the citizens ; the social war was plainly civil ; the wars of the slaves , and the other of the fencers ; the civil wars of marius and sylla , of cataline , of caesar and pompey the triumvirate , of augustus , lepidus and antonius : all these shed an ocean of blood within italy and the streets of rome . thirdly , for their government , let it be allowed , that for some part of this time it was popular , yet it was popular as to the city of rome only , and not as to the dominions , or whole empire of rome ; for no democratie can extend further than to one city . it is impossible to govern a kingdom , much less many kingdoms by the whole people , or by the greatest part of them . ( . ) but you will say , yet the roman empire grew all up under this kind of popular government , and the city became mistress of the world. it is not so ; for rome began her empire under kings , and did perfect it under emperours ; it did only encrease under that popularity : her greatest exaltation was under trajan , as her longest peace had been under augustus . even at those times , when the roman victories abroad did amaze the world , then the tragical slaughter of citizens at home , deserved commiseration from their vanquished enemies . what though in that age of her popularity , she bred many admired captains and commanders ( each of which was able to lead an army , though many of them were but ill requited by the people ? ) yet all of them were not able to support her in times of danger ; but she was forced in her greatest troubles to create a dictator ( who was a king for a time ) thereby giving this honourable testimony of monarchy , that the last refuge in perils of states , is to fly to regal authority . and though romes popular estate for a while was miraculously upheld in glory by a greater prudence than her own ; yet in a short time , after manifold alterations , she was ruined by her own hands . suis & ipsa roma viribus ruit : for the arms she had prepared to conquer other nations , were turned upon her self , and civil contentions at last setled the government again into a monarchy . ( . ) the vulgar opinion is , that the first cause why the democratical government was brought in , was to curb the tyranny of monarchies . but the falshood of this doth best appear by the first flourishing popular estate of athens , which was founded , not because of the vices of their last king , but that his vertuous deserts were such as the people thought no man worthy enough to succeed him ; a pretty wanton quarrel to monarchy ! for when their king codrus understood by the oracle , that his country could not be saved , unless the king were slain in the battel : he in disguise entered his enemies camp , and provoked a common souldier to make him a sacrifice for his own kingdom , and with his death ended the royal government ; for after him was never any more kings of athens . as athens thus for love of her codrus , changed the government , so rome on the contrary , out of hatred to her tarquin , did the like . and though these two famous commonweals did for contrary causes abolish monarchy , yet they both agreed in this , that neither of them thought it fit to change their state into a democracy : but the one chose archontes , and the other consuls to be their governours ; both which did most resemble kings , and continued , untill the people , by lessening the authority of these their magistrates , did by degrees and stealth bring in their popular government . and i verily believe , never any democratical state shewed it self at first fairly to the world by any elective entrance , but they all secretly crept in by the back-door of sedition and faction . ( . ) if we will listen to the judgment of those who should best know the nature of popular government , we shall find no reason for good men to desire or choose it . xenophon , that brave scholar and souldier disallowed the athenian common-weal , for that they followed that form of government wherein the wicked are always in greatest credit , and vertuous men kept under . they expelled aristides the just ; themistocles died in banishment ; meltiades in prison ; phocion , the most virtuous and just man of his age , though he had been chosen forty five times to be their general , yet he was put to death with all his friends , kindred and servants , by the fury of the people , without sentence , accusation , or any cause at all. nor were the people of rome much more favourable to their worthies ; they banished rutilius , metellus , coriolanus , the two scipio's and tully : the worst men sped best ; for as xenophon saith of athens , so rome was a sanctuary for all turbulent , discontented and seditious spirits . the impunity of wicked men was such , that upon pain of death , it was forbidden all magistrates to condemn to death , or banish any citizen , or to deprive him of his liberty , or so much as to whip him for what offence soever he had committed , either against the gods or men. the athenians sold justice as they did other merchandise ; which made plato call a popular estate a fair , where every thing is to be sold . the officers when they entered upon their charge , would brag , they went to a golden harvest . the corruption of rome was such , that marius and pompey durst carry bushels of silver into the assemblies , to purchase the voices of the people . many citizens under their grave gowns , came armed into their publick meetings , as if they went to war. often contrary factions fell to blows , sometimes with stones , and sometimes with swords ; the blood hath been suckt up in the market places with spunges ; the river tiber hath been filled with the dead bodies of the citizens , and the common privies stuffed full with them . if any man think these disorders in popular states were but casual , or such as might happen under any kind of government , he must know , that such mischiefs are unavoidable , and of necessity do follow all democratical regiments ; and the reason is given , because the nature of all people is , to desire liberty without restraint , which cannot be but where the wicked bear rule ; and if the people should be so indiscreet , as to advance vertuous men , they lose their power : for that , good men would favour none but the good , which are always the fewer in number ; and the wicked and vicious ( which is still the greatest part of the people ) should be excluded from all preferment , and in the end , by little and little , wise men should seize upon the state , and take it from the people . i know not how to give a better character of the people , than can be gathered from such authors as lived amongst or near the popular states ; thucydides , xenophon , livy , tacitus , cicero , and salust , have set them out in their colours . i will borrow some of their sentences . there is nothing more uncertain than the people ; their opinions are as variable and sudden as tempests ; there is neither truth nor judgment in them ; they are not led by wisdom to judg of any thing , but by violence and rashness ; nor put they any difference between things true and false . after the manner of cattel , they follow the herd that goes before ; they have a custom always to favour the worst and weakest ; they are most prone to suspitions , and use to condemn men for guilty upon any false suggestion ; they are apt to believe all news , especially if it be sorrowful ; and like fame , they make it more in the believing ; when there is no author , they fear those evils which themselves have feigned ; they are most desirous of new stirrs and changes , and are enemies to quiet and rest ; whatsoever is giddy or head-strong , they account manlike and couragious ; but whatsoever is modest or provident , seems sluggish ; each man hath a care of his particular , and thinks basely of the common good ; they look upon approaching mischiefs as they do upon thunder , only every man wisheth it may not touch his own person ; it is the nature of them , they must serve basely , or domineer proudly ; for they know no mean. thus do they paint to the life this beast with many heads . let me give you the cypher of their form of government ; as it is begot by sedition , so it is nourished by arms : it can never stand without wars , either with an enemy abroad , or with friends at home . the only means to preserve it , is , to have some powerful enemies near , who may serve instead of a king to govern it , that so , though they have not a king amongst them , yet they may have as good as a king over them : for the common danger of an enemy keeps them in better unity , than the laws they make themselves . ( . ) many have exercised their wits in parallelling the inconveniencies of regal and popular government ; but if we will trust experience before speculations philosophical , it cannot be denied , but this one mischief of sedition which necessarily waits upon all popularity , weighs down all the inconveniences that can be found in monarchy , tho they were never so many . it is said , skin for skin , yea , all that a man hath will he give for his life ; and a man will give his riches for the ransome of his life . the way then to examine what proportion the mischiefs of sedition and tyranny have one to another , is to enquire in what kind of government most subjects have lost their lives : let rome , which is magnified for her popularity , and villified for the tyrannical monsters the emperours , furnish us with examples . consider whether the cruelty of all the tyrannical emperours that ever ruled in this city , did ever spill a quarter of the blood that was poured out in the last hundred years of her glorious commonwealth . the murthers by tyberius , domitian , and commodus , put all together , cannot match that civil tragedy which was acted in that one sedition between marius and sylla , nay , even by sylla's part alone ( not to mention the acts of marius ) were fourscore and ten senators put to death , fifteen consuls , two thousand and six hundred gentlemen , and a hundred thousand others . this was the heighth of the roman liberty ; any man might be killed that would . a favour not fit to be granted under a royal government . the miseries of those licentious times are briefly touched by plutarch in these words . sylla ( saith he ) fell to shedding of blood , and filled all rome with infinite and unspeakable murthers — this was not only done in rome , but in all the cities of italy throughout , there was no temple of any god whatsoever , no altar in any bodies house , no liberty of hospital , no fathers house , which was not embrued with blood , and horrible murthers , the husbands were slain in the wives arms , and the children in the mothers laps ; and yet they that were slain for private malice , were nothing in respect of those that were murthered only for their goods — he openly sold their goods by the cryer , sitting so proudly in his chair of state , that it grieved the people more to see their goods packt up by them to whom he gave , or disposed them , than to see them taken away . sometimes he would give a whole country , or the whole revenues of certain cities , unto women for their beauties , or to pleasant jesters , minstrels , or wicked slaves made free . and to some he would give other mens wives by force , and make them be married against their wills. now let tacitus and suetonius be searched , and see if all their cruel emperours can match this popular villany , in such an universal slaughter of citizens , or civil butchery . god only was able to match him , and over-matched him , by fitting him with a most remarkable death , just answerable to his life ; for as he had been the death of many thousands of his country-men , so as many thousands of his own kindred in the flesh were the death of him , for he died of an impostume , which corrupted his flesh in such sort , that it turned all to lice ; he had many about him to shift him continually night and day ; yet the lice they wiped from him were nothing to them that multiplied upon him , there was neither apparel , linnen , baths , washings , nor meat it self , but was presently filled with swarms of this vile vermine . i cite not this to extenuate the bloody acts of any tyrannical princes , nor will i plead in defence of their cruelties ; only in the comparative , i maintain the mischiefs to a state to be less universal under a tyrant king ; for the cruelty of such tyrants extends ordinarily no further than to some particular men that offend him , and not to the whole kingdom : it is truly said by his late majesty king james , a king can never be so notoriously vicious , but he will generally favour justice , and maintain some order ; except in the particulars wherein his inordinate lust carries him away . even cruel domitian , dionysius the tyrant , and many others , are commended by historians for great observers of justice : a natural reason is to be rendered for it ; it is the multitude of people , and the abundance of their riches , which are the only strength and glory of every prince : the bodies of his subjects do him service in war , and their goods supply his present wants , therefore , if not out of affection to his people , yet out of natural love to himself , every tyrant desires to preserve the lives , and protect the goods of his subjects , which cannot be done but by justice , and if it be not done , the prince's loss is the greatest ; on the contrary , in a popular state , evey man knows the publick good doth not depend wholly on his care , but the common-wealth may well enough be governed by others though he tend only his private benefit , he never takes the publick to be his own business ; thus , as in a family , where one office is to be done by many servants , one looks upon another , and every own leaves the business for his fellow , until it is quite neglected by all ; nor are they much to be blamed for their negligence , since it is an even wager , their ignorance is as great : for magistrates among the people , being for the most part annual , do always lay down their office before they understand it ; so that a prince of a duller understanding , by use and experience must needs excell them ; again , there is no tyrant so barbarously wicked , but his own reason and sense will tell him , that though he be a god , yet he must dye like a man ; and that there is not the meanest of his subjects but may find a means to revenge himself of the injustice that is offered him : hence it is that great tyrants live continually in base fears , as did dionysius the elder ; tiberius , caligula , and nero are noted by suetonius to have been frighted with panick fears . but it is not so where wrong is done to any particular person by a multitude , he knows not who hurt him , or who to complain of , or to whom to address himself for reparation . any man may boldly exercise his malice and cruelty in all popular assemblies . there is no tyranny to be compared to the tyranny of a multitude . ( . ) what though the government of the people be a thing not to be endured , much less defended , yet many men please themselves with an opinion , that though the people may not govern ; yet they may partake and joyn with a king in the government , and so make a state mixed of popular and regal power , which they take to be the best tempered and equallest form of government . but the vanity of this fancy is too evident , it is a meer impossibility or contradiction , for if a king but once admit the people to be his companions , he leaves to be a king , and the state becomes a democracy ; at least , he is but a titular and no real king , that hath not the sovereignty to himself ; for the having of this alone , and nothing but this makes a king to be a king. as for that shew of popularity which is found in such kingdoms as have general assemblies for consultation about making publick laws : it must be remembred that such meetings do not share or divide the sovereignty with the prince : but do only deliberate and advise their supreme head , who still reserves the absolute power in himself ; for if in such assemblies , the king , the nobility , and people have equal shares in the sovereignty , then the king hath but one voice , the nobility likewise one , and the people one , and then any two of these voices should have power to over-rule the third ; thus the nobility and commons together should have power to make a law to bind the king , which was never yet seen in any kingdom , but if it could , the state must needs be popular and not regal . ( . ) if it be unnatural for the multitude to chuse their governours , or to govern , or to partake in the government , what can be thought of that damnable conclusion which is made by too many , that the multitude may correct , or depose their prince , if need be ? surely the unnaturalness , and injustice of this position cannot sufficiently be expressed : for admit that a king make a contract or paction with his people , either originally in his ancestors , or personally at his coronation ( for both these pactions some dream of , but cannot offer any proof for either ) yet by no law of any nation can a contract be thought broken , except that first a lawful tryal be had by the ordinary judge of the breakers thereof , or else every man may be both party and judge in his own case , which is absur'd once to be thought , for then it will lye in the hands of the headless multitude when they please to cast off the yoke of government ( that god hath laid upon them ) to judge and punish him , by whom they should be judged and punished themselves . aristotle can tell us , what judges the multitude are in their own case , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , the judgment of the multitude in disposing of the sovereignty may be seen in the roman history , where we may find many good emperours murthered by the people , and many bad elected by them : nero , heliogabalus , otho , vitellius , and such other monsters of nature , were the minions of the multitude , and set up by them , pertinax , alexander , severus , gordianus , gallus , emilianus , quintilius , aurelianus , tacitus , probus , and numerianus ; all of them good emperours in the judgment of all historians , yet murthered by the multitude . ( . ) whereas many out of an imaginary fear pretend the power of the people to be necessary for the repressing of the insolencies of tyrants ; wherein they propound a remedy far worse than the disease , neither is the disease indeed so frequent as they would have us think . let us be judged by the history even of our own nation : we have enjoyed a succession of kings from the conquest now for above years ( a time far longer than ever yet any popular state could continue ) we reckon to the number of twenty six of these princes since the norman race , and yet not one of these is taxed by our historians for tyrannical government . it is true , two of these kings have been deposed by the people , and barbarously murthered , but neither of them for tyranny : for as a learned historian of our age saith , edward the second and richard the second were not insupportable either in their nature or rule , and yet the people , more upon wantonness than for any want , did take an unbridled course against them . edward the second , by many of our historians is reported to be of a good and vertuous nature , and not unlearned : they impute his defects rather to fortune than either to council or carriage of his affairs , the deposition of him was a violent fury , led by a wife both cruel and unchast , and can with no better countenance of right be justified , than may his lamentable both indignities and death it self . likewise the deposition of king richard ii , was a tempestuous rage , neither led or restrained by any rules of reason or of state — examine his actions without a distempered judgment , and you will not condemn him to be exceeding either insufficient or evil ; weigh the imputations that were objected against him , and you shall find nothing either of any truth or of great moment ; hollingshed writeth , that he was most unthankfully used by his subjects ; for although , through the frailty of his youth , he demeaned himself more dissolutely than was agreeable to the royalty of his estate , yet in no kings days were the commons in greater wealth , the nobility more honoured , and the clergy less wronged ; who notwithstanding , in the evil-guided strength of their will , took head against him , to their own headlong destruction afterwards ; partly during the reign of henry , his next successor , whose greatest atchievements were against his own people , in executing those who conspired with him against king richard : but more especially in succeeding times , when , upon occasion of this disorder , more english blood was spent , than was in all the foreign wars together which have been since the conquest . twice hath this kingdom been miserably wasted with civil war , but neither of them occasioned by the tyranny of any prince . the cause of the barons wars is by good historians attributed to the stubbornness of the nobility , as the bloody variance of the houses of york and lancaster , and the late rebellion , sprung from the wantonness of the people . these three unnatural wars have dishonoured our nation amongst strangers , so that in the censures of kingdoms , the king of spain is said to be the king of men , because of his subjects willing obedience ; the king of france king of asses , because of their infinite taxes and impositions ; but the king of england is said to be the king of devils , because of his subjects often insurrections against , and depositions of their princes . chap. iii. positive laws do not infringe the natural and fatherly power of kings . ( . ) regal authority not subject to the positive laws , kings before laws ; the king of judah and israel not tyed to laws . ( . ) of samuel's description of a king , sam. . ( . ) the power ascribed unto kings in the new testament . ( . ) whether laws were invented to bridle tyrants . ( . ) the benefit of laws . ( . ) kings keep the laws , though not bound by the laws . ( . ) of the oaths of kings . ( . ) of the benefit of the king's prerogative over laws . ( . ) the king the author , the interpreter , and corrector , of the common laws . ( . ) the king , judge in all causes both before the conquest and since . ( . ) the king and his council have anciently determined causes in the star-chamber . ( . ) of parliaments . ( . ) when the people were first called to parliament . ( . ) the liberty of parliaments , not from nature , but from grace of the princes . ( . ) the king alone makes laws in parliament . ( . ) governs both houses as head by himself . ( . ) by his council . ( . ) by his judges . ( . ) hitherto i have endeavoured to shew the natural institution of regal authority , and to free it from subjection to an arbitrary election of the people : it is necessary also to enquire whether humane laws have a superiority over princes ; because those that maintain the acquisition of royal jurisdiction from the people , do subject the exercise of it to positive laws . but in this also they err ; for as kingly power is by the law of god , so it hath no inferiour law to limit it . the father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will ; not by the laws and wills of his sons or servants . there is no nation that allows children any action or remedy for being unjustly governed ; and yet for all this , every father is bound by the law of nature to do his best for the preservation of his family ; but much more is a king always tyed by the same law of nature to keep this general ground , that the safety of the kingdom be his chief law : he must remember , that the profit of every man in particular , and of all together in general , is not always one and the same ; and that the publick is to be preferred before the private ; and that the force of laws must not be so great as natural equity it self , which cannot fully be comprised in any laws whatsoever , but is to be left to the religious atchievement of those who know how to manage the affairs of state , and wisely to ballance the particular profit with the counterpoize of the publick , according to the infinite variety of times , places , persons ; a proof unanswerable , for the superiority of princes above laws , is this , that there were kings long before there were any laws : for a long time the word of a king was the only law ; and if practice ( as saith sir walter raleigh ) declare the greatness of authority , even the best kings of judah and israel were not tied to any law ; but they did whatsoever they pleased in the greatest matters . ( . ) the unlimited jurisdiction of kings is so amply described by samuel , that it hath given occasion to some to imagine , that it was , but either a plot or trick of samuel to keep the government himself and family , by frighting the israelites with the mischiefs in monarchy , or else a prophetical description only of the future ill government of saul : but the vanity of these conjectures are judiciously discovered in that majestical discourse of the true law of free monarchy ; wherein it is evidently shewed , that the scope of samuel was to teach the people a dutiful obedience to their king , even in those things which themselves did esteem mischievous and inconvenient : for by telling them what a king would do , he indeed instructs them what a subject must suffer ; yet not so that it is right for kings to do injury , but it is right for them to go unpunished by the people if they do it : so that in this point it is all one , whether samuel describe a king , or a tyrant , for patient obedience is due to both ; no remedy in the text against tyrants , but in crying and praying unto god in that day . but howsoever in a rigorous construction samuel's description be applyed to a tyrant ; yet the words by a benigne interpretation may agree with the manners of a just king ; and the scope and coherence of the text doth best imply the more moderate , or qualified sense of the words ; for as sir w. raleigh confesses , all those inconveniences and miseries which are reckoned by samuel as belonging to kingly government , were not intollerable , but such as have been born , and are still born , by free consent of subjects towards their princes ; nay at this day , and in this land , many tenants by their tenures and services are tyed to the same subjection , even to subordinate and inferiour lords : to serve the king in his wars , and to till his ground , is not only agreeable to the nature of subjects , but much desired by them ; according to their several births , and conditions : the like may be said for the offices of women-servants , confectioners , cooks , and bakers , for we cannot think that the king would use their labours without giving them wages , since the text it self mentions a liberal reward of his servants . as for the taking of the tenth of their seed , of their vines , and of their sheep , it might be a necessary provision for their kings household , and so belong to the right of tribute : for whereas is mentioned the taking of the tenth ; it cannot agree well to a tyrant , who observes no proportion in fleecing his people . lastly , the taking of their fields , vineyards , and olive-trees , if it be by force or fraud , or without just recompence , to the dammage of private persons only , it is not to be defended ; but if it be upon the publick charge and general consent , it might be justified , as necessary at the first erection of a kingdom ; for those who will have a king , are bound to allow him royal maintenance , by providing revenues for the crown , since it is both for the honour , profit , and safety too of the people , to have their king glorious , powerful , and abounding in riches , besides , we all know the lands and goods of many subjects may be oft-times legally taken by the king , either by forfeitures , escheat , attainder , outlawry , confiscation , or the like . thus we see samuel's character of a king may literally well bear a mild sense , for greater probability there is that samuel so meant , and the israelites so understood it ; to which this may be added , that samuel tells the israelites , this will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you : and ye shall cry because of your king which ye shall have chosen you ; that is to say : thus shall be the common custom or fashion , or proceeding of saul your king ; or , as the vulgar latine renders it , this shall be the right or law of your king : not meaning , as some expound it , the casual event , or act of some individuum vagum , or indefinite king , that might happen one day to tyrannize over them . so that saul , and the constant practice of saul , doth best agree with the literal sense of the text. now that saul was no tyrant , we may note that the people asked a king , as all nations had . god answers , and bids samuel to hear the voice of the people , in all things which they spake , and appoint them a king. they did not ask a tyrant , and to give them a tyrant , when they asked a king , had not been to hear their voice in all things , but rather when they asked an egge , to have given them a scorpion : unless we will say , that all nations had tyrants . besides , we do not find in all scripture that saul was punished , or so much as blamed , for committing any of those acts which samuel describes : and if samuel's drift had been only to terrifie the people , he would not have forgotten to foretell saul's bloody cruelty , in murthering innocent priests , and smiting with the edge of the sword the city of nob , both man , woman , and child . again , the israelites never shrank at these conditions proposed by samuel , but accepted of them , as such as all other nations were bound unto . for their conclusion is , nay , but we will have a king over vs , that we also may be like all the nations , and that our king may judge us , and go out before us to fight our battels . meaning he should earn his privileges , by doing the work for them , by judging them , and fighting for them . lastly , whereas the mention of the peoples crying unto the lord , argues they should be under some tyrannical oppression ; we may remember , that the peoples complaints and cries are not always an argument of their living under a tyrant . no man can say king solomon was a tyrant , yet all the congregation of israel complain'd that solomon made their yoke grievous , and therefore their prayer to rehoboam is , make thou the grievous service of thy father solomon , and his heavy yoke which he put upon us , lighter , and we will serve thee . to conclude , it is true , saul lost his kingdom , but not for being too cruel or tyrannical to his subjects , but by being too merciful to his enemies ; his sparing agag when he should have slain him , was the cause why the kingdom was torn from him . ( . ) if any desire the direction of the new testament , he may find our saviour limiting and distinguishing royal power , by giving to caesar those things that were caesar 's , and to god those things that were god's . obediendum est in quibus mandatum dei non impeditur . we must obey where the commandment of god is not hindred ; there is no other law but god's law to hinder our obedience . it was the answer of a christian to the emperour , we only worship god , in other things we gladly serve you . and it seems tertullian thought whatsoever was not god's was the emperours , when he saith , bene opposuit caesari pecuniam , te ipsum deo , alioqui quid erit dei , si omnia caesaris . our saviour hath well apportioned our money for caesar , and our selves for god , for otherwise , what shall god's share be , if all be caesar's . the fathers mention no reservation of any power to the laws of the land , or to the people . s. ambrose , in his apology for david , expresly saith , he was a king , and therefore bound to no laws , because kings are free from the bonds of any fault . s. augustine also resolves , imperator non est subjectus legibus , qui habet in potestate alias leges ferre . the emperour is not subject to laws , who hath power to make other laws . for indeed , it is the rule of solomon , that we must keep the king's commandment , and not to say , what dost thou ? because where the word of a king is there is power , and all that he pleaseth he will do . if any mislike this divinity in england , let him but hearken to bracton , chief justice in henry the third's days , which was since the institution of parliaments , his words are , speaking of the king , omnes sub eo , & ipse sub nullo , nisi tantum sub deo , &c. all are under him , and he under none , but god only : if he offend , since no writ can go against him , their remedy is by petitioning him to amend his fault ; which if he shall not do , it will be punishment sufficient for him to expect god as a revenger : let none presume to search into his deeds , much less to oppose them . when the jews asked our blessed saviour , whether they should pay tribute , he did not first demand what the law of the land was , or whether there was any statute against it , nor enquired whether the tribute were given by consent of the people , nor advised them to stay their payment till they should grant it ; he did no more but look upon the superscription , and concluded , this image you say is caesar's , therefore give it to caesar . nor must it here be said , that christ taught this lesson only to the conquered jews , for in this he gave direction for all nations , who are bound as much in obedience to their lawful kings , as to any conquerour or vsurper whatsoever . whereas being subject to the higher powers , some have strained these words to signifie the laws of the land , or else to mean the highest power , as well aristocratical and democratical , as regal : it seems st. paul looked for such interpretation , and therefore thought fit to be his own expositor , and to let it be known , that by power he understood a monarch that carried a sword : wilt thou not be afraid of the power ? that is , the ruler that carrieth the sword , for he is the minister of god to thee — for he beareth not the sword in vain . it is not the law that is the minister of god , or that carries the sword , but the ruler or magistrate ; so they that say the law governs the kingdom , may as well say that the carpenters rule builds an house , and not the carpenter ; for the law is but the rule or instrument of the ruler . and st. paul concludes , for this cause pay you tribute also , for they are god's ministers attending continually upon this very thing . render therefore tribute to whom tribute is due , custom to whom custom . he doth not say , give as a gift to god's minister . but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , render or restore tribute , as a due . also st. peter doth most clearly expound this place of st. paul , where he saith , submit your selves to every ordinance of man , for the lord's sake , whether it be to the king as supreme , or unto governours , as unto them that are sent by him . here the very self same word ( supreme , or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ) which st. paul coupleth with power , st. peter conjoyneth with the king , 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , thereby to manifest that king and power are both one . also st. peter expounds his own words of humane ordinance , to be the king , who is the lex loquens , a speaking law ; he cannot mean that kings themselves are an humane ordinance , since st. paul calls the supreme power , the ordinance of god ; and the wisdom of god saith , by me kings reign : but his meaning must be , that the laws of kings are humane ordinances . next , the governours that are sent by him ; that is by the king , not by god , as some corruptly would wrest the text , to justifie popular governours as authorized by god ; whereas in grammatical construction [ him ] the relative must be referred to the next antecedent , which is king ; besides , the antithesis between supreme and sent , proves plainly that the governours were sent by kings ; for if the governours were sent by god , and the king be an humane ordinance , then it follows , that the governours were supreme , and not the king ; or if it be said , that both king and governours are sent by god , then they are both equal , and so neither of them supreme . therefore st. peter's meaning is in short , obey the laws of the king , or of his ministers . by which it is evident , that neither st. peter , nor st. paul , intended other form of government than only monarchical , much less any subjection of princes to humane laws . that familiar distinction of the school-men , whereby they subject kings to the directive , but not to the coactive power of laws , is a confession , that kings are not bound by the positive laws of any nation , since the compulsory power of laws is that which properly makes laws to be laws by binding men by rewards or punishment to obedience ; whereas the direction of the law is but like the advice and direction which the kings council gives the king , which no man says is a law to the king. ( . ) there want not those who believe , that the first invention of laws was to bridle and moderate the over-great power of kings ; but the truth is , the original of laws was for the keeping of the multitude in order : popular estates could not subsist at all without laws , whereas kingdoms were govern'd many ages without them . the people of athens , assoon as they gave over kings , were forced to give power to draco first , then to solon , to make them laws , not to bridle kings , but themselves ; and tho many of their laws were very severe and bloody , yet for the reverence they bare to their law-makers , they willingly submitted to them . nor did the people give any limited power to solon , but an absolute jurisdiction , at his pleasure to abrogate and confirm what he thought fit , the people never challenging any such power to themselves : so the people of rome gave to the ten men , who were to chuse and correct their laws for the twelve tables , an absolute power , without any appeal to the people . ( . ) the reason why laws have been also made by kings , was this ; when kings were either busied with wars , or distracted with publick cares , so that every private man could not have access to their persons , to learn their wills and pleasure ; then of necessity were laws invented , that so every particular subject might find his prince's pleasure decyphered to him in the tables of his laws , that so there might be no need to resort unto the king ; but either for the interpretation or mitigation of obscure or rigorous laws , or else in new cases , for a supplement where the law was defective . by this means both king and people were in many things eased : first , the king by giving laws doth free himself of great and intolerable troubles , as moses did himself by chusing elders . secondly , the people have the law as a familiar admonisher and interpreter of the king's pleasure , which being published throughout the kingdom , doth represent the presence and majesty of the king : also the judges and magistrates , ( whose help in giving judgment in many causes kings have need to use ) are restrained by the common rules of the law from using their own liberty to the injury of others , since they are to judge according to the laws , and not follow their own opinions . ( . ) now albeit kings , who make the laws , be ( as king james teacheth us ) above the laws ; yet will they rule their subjects by the law ; and a king , governing in a setled kingdom , leaves to be a king , and degenerates into a tyrant , so soon as he seems to rule according to his laws ; yet where he sees the laws rigorous or doubtful , he may mitigate and interpret . general laws made in parliament , may , upon known respects to the king , by his authority be mitigated or suspended , upon causes only known to him . and although a king do frame all his actions to be according to the laws , yet he is not bound thereto , but at his good will , and for good example : or so far forth as the general law of the safety of the common-weal doth naturally bind him ; for in such sort only positive laws may be said to bind the king , not by being positive , but as they are naturally the best or only means for the preservation of the common-wealth . by this means are all kings , even tyrants and conquerours , bound to preserve the lands , goods , liberties , and lives of all their subjects , not by any municipial law of the land , so much as the natural law of a father , which binds them to ratifie the acts of their forefathers and predecessors , in things necessary for the publick good of their subjects . ( . ) others there be that affirm , that although laws of themselves do not bind kings , yet the oaths of kings at their coronations tye them to keep all the laws of their kingdoms . how far this is true , let us but examine the oath of the kings of england at their coronation ; the words whereof are these , art thou pleased to cause to be administred in all thy judgments indifferent and upright justice , and to use discretion with mercy and verity ? art thou pleased that our upright laws and customs be observed , and dost thou promise that those shall be protected and maintained by thee ? these two are the articles of the king's oath , which concern the laity or subjects in general ; to which the king answers affirmatively . being first demanded by the arch-bishop of canterbury , pleaseth it you to confirm and observe the laws and customs of ancient times , granted from god , by just and devout kings , unto the english nation , by oath unto the said people . especially the laws , liberties , and customs granted unto the clergy and laity by the famous king edward . we may observe , in these words of the articles of the oath , that the king is required to observe not all the laws , but only the upright , and that with discretion and mercy . the word upright cannot mean all laws , because in the oath of richard the second , i find evil and unjust laws mentioned , which the king swears to abolish ; and in the old abridgment of statutes , set forth in henry the eighth's days , the king is to swear wholly to put out evil laws ; which he cannot do , if he be bound to all laws . now what laws are upright and what evil , who shall judge but the king , since he swears to administer upright justice with discretion and mercy ( or as bracton hath it ) aequitatem praecipiat , & misericordiam . so that in effect , the king doth swear to keep no laws , but such as in his judgment are upright , and those not literally always , but according to equity of his conscience , joyn'd with mercy , which is properly the office of a chancellour rather than of a judge ; and if a king did strictly swear to observe all the laws , he could not without perjury give his consent to the repealing or abrogating of any statute by act of parliament , which would be very mischievable to the state. but let it be supposed for truth , that kings do swear to observe all the laws of their kingdom , yet no man can think it reason that kings should be more bound by their voluntary oaths than common persons are by theirs . now if a private person make a contract , either with oath or without oath , he is no further bound than the equity and justice of the contract ties him ; for a man may have relief against an unreasonable and unjust promise , if either deceit , or error , or force , or fear induced him thereunto : or if it be hurtful or grievous in the performance . since the laws in many cases give the king a prerogative above common persons , i see no reason why he should be denied the priviledg which the meanest of his subjects doth enjoy . here is a fit place to examine a question which some have moved , whether it be a sin for a subject to disobey the king , if he command any thing contrary to his laws ? for satisfaction in this point , we must resolve that not only in humane laws , but even in divine , a thing may be commanded contrary to law , and yet obedience to such a command is necessary . the sanctifying of the sabbath is a divine law ; yet if a master command his servant not to go to church upon a sabbath-day , the best divines teach us , that the servant must obey this command , though it may be sinful and unlawfull in the master ; because the servant hath no authority or liberty to examine and judge whether his master sin or no in so commanding : for there may be a just cause for a master to keep his servant from church , as appears luke . . yet it is not fit to tie the master to acquaint his servant with his secret counsels , or present necessity : and in such cases , the servant 's not going to church , becomes the sin of the master , and not of the servant . the like may be said of the king 's commanding a man to serve him in the wars , he may not examine whether the war be just or unjust , but must obey , since he hath no commission to judge of the titles of kingdoms , or causes of war ; nor hath any subject power to condemn his king for breach of his own laws . ( . ) many will be ready to say , it is a slavish and dangerous condition to be subject to the will of any one man , who is not subject to the laws . but such men consider not , . that the prerogative of a king is to be above all laws , for the good only of them that are under the laws , and to defend the peoples liberties , as his majesty graciously affirmed in his speech after his last answer to the petition of right : howsoever some are afraid of the name of prerogative , yet they may assure themselves the case of subjects would be desperately miserable without it . the court of chancery it self is but a branch of the king's prerogative , to relieve men against the inexorable rigour of the law , which without it is no better than a tyrant , since summum jus , is summa injuria . general pardons , at the coronation and in parliaments , are but the bounty of the prerogative . . there can be no laws without a supreme power to command or make them . in all aristocraties the nobles are above the laws , and in all democraties the people . by the like reason , in a monarchy the king must of necessity be above the laws ; there can be no soveraign majesty in him that is under them ; that which giveth the very being to a king , is the power to give laws ; without this power he is but an equivocal king. it skills not which way kings come by their power , whether by election , donation , succession , or by any other means ; for it is still the manner of the government by supreme power that makes them properly kings , and not the means of obtaining their crowns . neither doth the diversity of laws , nor contrary customs , whereby each kingdom differs from another , make the forms of common-weal different , unless the power of making laws be in several subjects . for the confirmation of this point , aristotle saith , that a perfect kingdom is that wherein the king rules all things according to his own will , for he that is called a king according to the law , makes no kind of kingdom at all . this it seems also the romans well understood to be most necessary in a monarchy ; for though they were a people most greedy of liberty , yet the senate did free augustus from all necessity of laws , that he might be free of his own authority , and of absolute power over himself and over the laws , to do what he pleased , and leave undone what he list , and this decree was made while augustus was yet absent . accordingly we find , that vlpian the great lawyer delivers it for a rule of the civil law ; princeps , legibus solutus est , the prince is not bound by the laws . ( . ) if the nature of laws be advisedly weighed , the necessity of the princes being above them may more manifest it self ; we all know that a law in general is the command of a superior power . laws are divided ( as bellarmine divides the word of god ) into written and unwritten , not for that it is not written at all , but because it was not written by the first devisers or makers of it . the common law ( as the lord chancellor egerton teacheth us ) is the common custom of the realm . now concerning customs , this must be considered , that for every custom there was a time when it was no custom ; and the first president we now have , had no president when it began ; when every custom began , there was something else than custom that made it lawful , or else the beginning of all customs were unlawful . customs at first became lawful only by some superiour , which did either command or consent unto their beginning . and the first power which we find ( as it is confessed by all men ) is the kingly power , which was both in this and in all other nations of the world , long before any laws , or any other kind of government was thought of ; from whence we must necessarily infer , that the common law it self , or common customs of this land , were originally the laws and commands of kings at first unwritten . nor must we think the common customs ( which are the principles of the common law , and are but few ) to be such , or so many , as are able to give special rules to determine every particular cause . diversity of cases are infinite , and impossible to be regulated by any law ; and therefore we find , even in the divine laws which are delivered by moses , there be only certain principal laws , which did not determine , but only direct the high-priest or magistrate , whose judgment in special cases did determine , what the general law intended . it is so with the common law , for when there is no perfect rule , judges do resort to those principles , or common-law axiomes , whereupon former judgments , in cases somewhat like , have been delivered by former judges , who all receive authority from the king , in his right and name to give sentence according to the rules and presidents of antient times : and where presidents have failed , the judges have resorted to the general law of reason , and accordingly given judgment , without any common law to direct them . nay , many times , where there have been presidents to direct , they , upon better reason only , have changed the law , both in causes criminal and civil , and have not insisted so much on the examples of former judges , as examined and corrected their reasons ; thence it is that some laws are now obsolete and out of use , and the practice quite contrary to what it was in former times , as the lord chancellour egerton proves , by several instances . nor is this spoken to derogate from the common law , for the case standeth so with the laws of all nations , although some of them have their laws and principles written and established : for witness to this , we have aristotle his testimony in his ethiques , and in several places in his politiques ; i will cite some of them : every law , saith he , is in the general , but of some things there can be no general law — when therefore the law speaks in general , and something falls out after besides the general rule : then it is fit that what the law maker hath omitted , or where he hath erred by speaking generally , it should be corrected or supplied , as if the law-maker himself were present to ordain it . the governour , whether he be one man , or more , ought to be lord over all those things whereof it was impossible the law should exactly speak , because it is not easie to comprehend all things under general rules — whatsoever the law cannot determine , it leaves to the governours to give judgment therein , and permits them to rectify whatsoever upon tryal thy find to be better than the written laws . besids , all laws are of themselves dumb , and some or other must be trusted with the application of them to particulars , by examining all circumstances , to pronounce when they are broken , or by whom . this work of right application of laws is not a thing easie or obvious for ordinary capacities ; but requires profound abilities of nature , for the beating out of the truth , witness the diversity , and sometimes the contrariety of opinions of the learned judges , in some difficult points . ( ) since this is the common condition of laws , it is also most reasonable that the law-maker should be trusted with the application or interpretation of the laws ; and for this cause anciently the kings of this land have sitten personally in courts of judicature , and are still representatively present in all courts ; the judges are but substituted , and called the king's justices , and their power ceaseth when the king is in place . to this purpose bracton , that learned chief justice , in the reign of henry the third , saith in express terms ; in doubtful and obscure points the interpretation and will of our lord the king is to be expected ; since it is his part to interpret , who made the law ; for , as he saith in another place , rex , & non alius debet judicare , si solus ad id sufficere possit , &c. the king , and no body else , ought to give judgment , if he were able , since by virtue of his oath he is bound to it ; therefore the king ought to exercise power as the vicar or minister of god : but if our lord the king be not able to determine every cause , to ease part of his pains , by distributing the burthen to more persons , he ought to chuse wise-men fearing god , &c. and make justices of them . much to the same purpose are the words of edward the first , in the beginning of his book of laws , written by his appointment by john briton , bishop of hereford : we will , saith he , that our own jurisdiction be above all the jurisdictions of our realm , so as in all manner of felonies , trespasses , contracts , and in all other actions personal or real , we have power to yield such judgements as do appertain without other process , wheresoever we know the right truth as judges . neither may this be taken to be meant of an imaginary presence of the king's person in his courts , because he doth immediately after in the same place severally set forth by themselves the jurisdictions of his ordinary courts ; but must necessarily be understood of a jurisdiction remaining in the king 's royal person . and that this then was no new-made law , or first brought in by the norman conquests , appears by a saxon law made by king edgar , in these words , as i find them in mr. lambert . nemo in lite regem appellato , nisi quidem domi justitiam consequi , aut impetrare non poterit , sin summo jure domi urgeatur , ad regem , ut is onus aliqua ex parte allevet , provocato . let no man in suit appeal to the king , unless he may not get right at home ; but if the right be too heavy for him , then let him go to the king to have it eased . as the judicial power of kings was exercised before the conquest , so in those setled times after the conquest , wherein parliaments were much in use , there was a high-court following the king , which was the place of soveraign justice , both for matter of law and conscience , as may appear by a parliament in edward the first 's time , taking order , that the chancellour and the justices of the bench should follow the king , to the end that he might have always at hand able men for his direction in suits that came before him. and this was after the time that the court of common-pleas was made stationary , which is an evidence that the king reserved a soveraign power , by which he did supply the want , or correct the rigour of the common law ; because the positive law , being grounded upon that which happens for the most part , cannot foresee every particular which time and experience brings forth . ( . ) therefore though the common law be generally good and just , yet in some special case it may need correction , by reason of some considerable circumstance falling out , which at the time of the law-making was not thought of . also sundry things do fall out , both in war and peace , that require extraordinary help , and cannot wait for the usual care of common law , the which is not performed , but altogether after one sort , and that not without delay of help and expence of time ; so that although all causes are , and ought to be referred to the ordinary process of common law , yet rare matters from time to time do grow up meet , for just reasons , to be referred to the aid of the absolute authority of the prince ; and the statute of magna charta hath been understood of the institution then made of the ordinary jurisdiction in common causes , and not for restraint of the absolute authority , serving only in a few rare and singular cases : for though the subjects were put to great dammage by false accusations and malicious suggestions made to the king and his council , especially during the time of king edward the third , whilst he was absent in the wars in france , insomuch as in his reign divers statutes were made , that provided none should be put to answer before the king and his council without due process ; yet it is apparent the necessity of such proceedings was so great , that both before edward the third's days , and in his time , and after his death , several statutes were made , to help and order the proceedings of the king and his council . as the parliament in . edw , . cap. . did provide , that the chancellour and justices of the king's bench should follow the king ; that so he might have near unto him some that be learned in the laws , which be able to order all such matters as shall come unto the court , at all times when need shall require . by the statute of . edw. . cap. . taliation was ordained , in case the suggestion to the king proved untrue . then . edw. . cap. . takes away taliation , and appoints imprisonment till the king and party grieved be satisfied . in the statutes of . ric. . cap. . and . hen. . cap. . dammages and expences are awarded in such cases . in all these statutes it is necessarily implyed , that complaints upon just causes might be moved before the king and his council . at a parliament at glocester , . ric. . when the commons made petition , that none might be forced by writ out of chancery , or by privy seal , to appear before the king and his council , to answer touching free-hold . the king's answer was , he thought it not reasonable that he should be constrained to send for his leiges upon causes reasonable : and albeit he did not purpose that such as were sent for should answer [ finalment ] peremptorily touching their free-hold , but should be remanded for tryal thereof , as law required : provided always , ( saith he ) that at the suit of the party , where the king and his council shall be credibly informed , that because of maintenance , oppression , or other outrages , the common law cannot have duly her course , in such case the counsel for the party . also in the th year of his reign when the commons did pray , that upon pain of forfeiture , the chancellour or council of the king , should not after the end of the parliament make any ordinance against the common law ; the king answered , let it be used as it hath been used before this time , so as the regality of the king be saved , for the king will save his regalities as his progenitors have done . again , in the th year of henry the fourth , when the commons complained against subpaena's , & other writs , grounded upon false suggestions ; the king answered , that he would give in charge to his officers , that they should abstain more than before time they had , to send for his subjects in that manner . but yet ( saith he ) it is not our intention , that our officers shall so abstain , that they may not send for our subjects in matters and causes necessary , as it hath been used in the time our good progenitors . likewise when for the same cause complaint was made by the commons , anno . hen. . the king's answer was , le roy s'advisera , the king will be advised ; which amounts to a denial for the present , by a phrase peculiar for the king 's denying to pass any bill that hath passed the lords and commons . these complaints of the commons , and the answers of the king , discover , that such moderation should be used , that the course of the common law be ordinarily maintained , lest subjects be convented before the king and his council without just cause , that the proceedings of the council-table be not upon every slight suggestion , nor to determine finally concerning freehold of inheritance . and yet that upon cause reasonable , upon credible information , in matters of weight , the king's regality or prerogative , in sending for his subjects , be maintain'd , as of right it ought , and in former times hath been constantly used . king edward the first , finding that bogo de clare was discharged of an accusation brought against him in parliament , for that some formal imperfections were found in the complaint , commanded him nevertheless to appear before him and his council , ad faciendum , & recipiendum quod per regem & ejus concilium fuerit faciendum ; and so proceeded to an examination of the whole cause . . edw. . edward the third , in the star-chamber ▪ ( which was the ancient council-chamber at westminster ) upon the complaint of elizabeth audley , commanded james audley to appear before him and his council , and determin'd a controversy between them , touching lands contain'd in the covenants of her joynture . rot. claus . de an . . ed. . henry the fifth , in a suit before him and his council for the titles of the mannors of seere and s. laurence , in the isle of thenet in kent , took order for sequestring the profits till the right were tryed , as well for avoiding the breach of the peace , as for prevention of waste and spoil . rot. patin . anno . hen. . henry the sixth commanded the justices of the bench to stay the arraignment of one verney of london , till they had other commandment from him and his council , because verney , being indebted to the king and others , practised to be indicted of felony , wherein he might have his clergy , and make his purgation , of intent to defraud his creditors . . hen. rot. . in banco regis . edward the fourth and his council in the star-chamber , heard the cause of the master and poor brethren of s. leonards in york , complaining , that sir huge hastings , and others , withdrew from them a great part of their living , which consisted chiefly upon the having of a thrave of corn of every plough-land within the counties of york , westmerland , cumberland , and lancashire . rot. paten . de anno ed. . part . memb. . henry the seventh and his council , in the star-chamber , decreed , that margery and florence becket should sue no further in their cause against alice radley , widow , for lands in wolwich and plumstead in kent ; for as much as the matter had been heard first before the council of king edw. . after that before the president of the requests of that king , hen. . and then lastly , before the council of the said king. hen. . what is hitherto affirmed of the dependency and subjection of the common law to the soveraign prince , the same may be said as well of all statute laws ; for the king is the sole immediate author , corrector , and moderator of them also ; so that neither of these two kinds of laws are or can be any diminution of that natural power , which kings have over their people , by right of father-hood , but rather are an argument to strengthen the truth of it ; for evidence whereof , we may in some points consider the nature of parliaments , because in them only all statutes are made . ( . ) though the name of parliament ( as mr. cambden saith ) be of no great antiquity , but brought in out of france , yet our ancestors , the english saxons , had a meeting , which they called , the assembly of the wise ; termed in latine , conventum magnatum , or , praesentia regis , procerumque prelaterumque collectorum . the meeting of the nobility , or the presence of the king , prelates , and peers assembled ; or in general , magnum concilium , or commune concilium ; and many of our kings in elder times made use of such great assemblies for to consult of important affairs of state ; all which meetings , in a general sense , may be termed parliaments . great are the advantages which both the king and people may receive by a well-ordered parliament ; there is nothing more expresseth the majesty and supream power of a king , than such an assembly , wherein all his people acknowledg him for soveraign lord , and make all their addresses to him by humble petition and supplication ; and by their consent and approbation do strengthen all the laws , which the king , at their request and by their advice and ministry , shall ordain . thus they facilitate the government of the king , by making the laws unquestionable , either to the subordinate magistrates , or refractory multitude . the benefit which accrews to the subject by parliaments , is , that by their prayers and petitions kings are drawn many times to redress their just grievances , and are overcome by their importunity to grant many things which otherwise they would not yield unto ; for the voice of a multitude is easilier heard . many vexations of the people are without the knowledg of the king ; who in parliament seeth and heareth his people himself ; whereas at other times he commonly useth the eyes and ears of other men. against the antiquity of parliaments we need not dispute , since the more ancient they be , the more they make for the honour of monarchy ; yet there be certain circumstances touching the forms of parliaments , which are fit to be considered . first , we are to remember , that until about the time of the conquest , there could be no parliaments assembled of the general states of the whole kingdom of england , because till those days we cannot learn it was entirely united into one kingdom ; but it was either divided into several kingdoms , or governed by several laws . when julius caesar landed , he found kings in kent ; and the british names of dammonii , durotriges , belgae , attrebatii , trinobantes , iceni , silures , and the rest , are plentiful testimonies of the several kingdoms of britains , when the romans left us . the saxons divided us into kingdoms : when these saxons were united all into a monarchy , they had always the danes their companions , or their masters in the empire , till edward the confessors days , since whose time the kingdom of england hath continued united , as now it doth : but for a thousand years before we cannot find it was entirely settled , during the time of any one king's reign . as under the mercian law : the west saxons were confined to the saxon laws ; essex , norfolk , suffolk , and some other places , were vexed with danish laws ; the northumbrians also had their laws apart . and until edward the confessor's reign , who was next but one before the conqueror , the laws of the kingdom were so several and uncertain , that he was forced to cull a few of the most indifferent and best of them , which were from him called st. edward's laws : yet some say that edgar made those laws , and that the confessor did but restore and mend them . alfred also gathered out of mulmutius laws , such as he translated into the saxon tongue . thus during the time of the saxons , the laws were so variable , that there is little or no likelihood to find any constant form of parliaments of the whole kingdom . ( ) a second point considerable is , whether in such parliaments , as was in the saxon's times , the nobility and clergy only were of those assemblies , or whether the commons were also called ? some are of opinion , that though none of the saxon laws do mention the commons , yet it may be gathered by the word wisemen , the commons are intended to be of those assemblies , and they bring ( as they conceive ) probable arguments to prove it , from the antiquity of some burroughs that do yet send burgesses , and from the proscription of those in ancient demesne , not to send burgesses to parliament . if it be true , that the west-saxons had a custom to assemble burgesses out of some of their towns , yet it may be doubted , whether other kingdoms had the same usage ; but sure it is , that during the heptarchy , the people could not elect any knights of the shire , because england was not then divided into shires . on the contrary , there be of our historians who do affirm , that henry the first caused the commons first to be assembled by knights and burgesses of their own appointment , for before his time only certain of the nobility and prelates of the realm were called to consultation about the most important affairs of state. if this assertion be true , it seems a meer matter of grace of this king , and proves not any natural right of the people , originally to be admitted to chuse their knights and burgesses of parliament ; though it had been more for the honour of parliaments , if a king , whose title to the crown had been better , had been author of the form of it ; because he made use of it for his unjust ends. for thereby he secured himself against his competitor and elder brother , by taking the oaths of the nobility in parliament : and getting the crown to be setled upon his children . and as the king made use of the people , so they , by colour of parliament , served their own turns ; for after the establishment of parliaments by strong hand , and by the sword , they drew from him the great charter , which he granted the rather to flatter the nobility and people , as sir walter raleigh in his dialogue of parliaments doth affirm , in these words : the great charter was not originally granted legally and freely ; for henry the first did but vsurp the kingdom , and therefore , the better to assure himself against robert his elder brother , he flattered the nobility and people with their charters ; yea , king john , that confirmed them , had the like respect , for arthur duke of britain was the undoubted heir of the crown , upon whom king john vsurped , and so to conclude , these charters had their original from kings de facto , but not de jure — the great charter had first an obscure birth by vsurpation , and was secondly fostered and shewed to the world by rebellion . ( . ) a third consideration must be , that in the former parliaments , instituted and continued since king henry the first 's time , is not to be found the usage of any natural liberty of the people ; for all those liberties that are claimed in parliament are the liberties of grace from the king , and not the liberties of nature to the people ; for if the liberty were natural , it would give power to the multitude to assemble themselves when and where they please , to bestow soveraignty , and by pactions to limit and direct the exercise of it . whereas , the liberties of favour and grace , which are claimed in parliaments , are restrained both for time , place persons , and other circumstances , to the sole pleasure of the king. the people cannot assemble themselves , but the king , by his writs , calls them to what place he pleases ; and then again scatters them with his breath at an instant , without any other cause shewed than his will. neither is the whole summoned , but only so many as the king's writs appoint . the prudent king edward the first , summoned always those barons of ancient families , that were most wise to his parliament , but omitted their sons after their death , if they were not answerable to their parents in understanding . nor have the whole people voices in the election of knights of the shire or burgesses , but only freeholders in the counties , and freemen in the cities and burroughs ; yet in the city of westminster all the house-holders , though they be neither freemen nor free-holders , have voices in their election of burgesses . also during the time of parliament , those privileges of the house of commons , of freedom of speech , power to punish their own members , to examine the proceedings and demeanour of courts of justice and officers , to have access to the king's person , and the like , are not due by a-any natural right , but are derived from the bounty or indulgence of the king , as appears by a solemn recognition of the house : for at the opening of the parliament , when the speaker is presented to the king , he , in the behalf and name of the whole house of commons , humbly craves of his majesty , that he would be pleased to grant them their accustomed liberties of freedom of speech , of access to his person , and the rest . these privileges are granted with a condition implyed , that they keep themselves within the bounds and limits of loyalty and obedience ; for else why do the house of commons inflict punishment themselves upon their own members for transgressing in some of these points ; and the king , as head , hath many times punished the members for the like offences . the power which the king giveth , in all his courts , to his judges or others to punish , doth not exclude him from doing the like , by way of prevention , concurrence , or evocation , even in the same point which he hath given in charge by a delegated power ; for they who give authority by commission , do always retain more than they grant : neither of the two houses claim an infallibility of not erring , no more than a general council can . it is not impossible but that the greatest may be in fault , or at least interested or engaged in the delinquency of one particular member . in such cases it is most proper for the head to correct , and not to expect the consent of the members , or for the parties peccant to be their own judges . nor is it needful to confine the king , in such cases , within the circle of any one court of justice , who is supream judg in all courts . and in rare and new cases , rare and new remedies must be sought out ; for it is a rule of the common law , in novo casu , novum remedium est apponendum : and the statute of westminst . . cap. . giveth power , even to the clarks of the chancery , to make new forms of writs in new cases , lest any man that came to the king's court of chancery for help , should be sent away without remedy : a president cannot be found in every case ; and of things that happen seldom , and are not common , there cannot be a common custom . though crimes exorbitant do pose the king and council in finding a president for a condigne punishment , yet they must not therefore pass unpunished . i have not heard that the people , by whose voices the knights and burgesses are chosen , did ever call to an account those whom they had elected ; they neither give them instructions or directions what to say , or what to do in parliament , therefore they cannot punish them when they come home for doing amiss : if the people had any such power over their burgesses , then we might call it , the natural liberty of the people , with a mischief . but they are so far from punishing , that they may be punished themselves for intermedling with parliamentary business ; they must only chuse , and trust those whom they chuse to do what they list ; and that is as much liberty as many of us deserve , for our irregular elections of burgesses . ( ) a fourth point to be consider'd , is , that in parliament all statutes or laws are made properly by the king alone , at the rogation of the people , as his majesty king james , of happy memory , affirms in his true law of free monarchy ; and as hooker teacheth us , that laws do not take their constraining force from the quality of such as devise them , but from the power that doth give them the strength of laws : le roy le veult , the king will have it so , is the interpretive phrase pronounced at the king 's passing of every act of parliament : and it was the ancient custom for a long time , till the days of henry the fifth , that the kings , when any bill was brought unto them that had passed both houses , to take and pick out what they liked not , and so much as they chose , was enacted for a law : but the custom of the later kings hath been so gracious , as to allow always of the entire bill as it hath passed both houses . ( . ) the parliament is the king's court , for so all the oldest statutes call it , the king in his parliament : but neither of the two houses are that supream court , nor yet both of them together ; they are only members , and a part of the body , whereof the king is the head and ruler . the king 's governing of this body of the parliament we may find most significantly proved both by the statutes themselves , as also by such presidents as expresly shew us , how the king , sometimes by himself , sometimes by his council , and other-times by his judges , hath over-ruled and directed the judgments of the houses of parliament : for the king , we find that magna charta , and the charter of forrests , and many other statutes about those times , had only the form of the kings letters-patents , or grants under the great seal , testifying those great liberties to be the sole act and bounty of the king : the words of magna charta begin thus ; henry , by the grace of god , &c. to all our arch-bishops , &c. and our faithful subjects greeting : know ye , that we , of our meer free-will , have granted to all free-men these liberties . in the same style goeth the charter of forrests , and other statutes . statutum hiberniae , made at westminster , . februarii . hen. . is but a letter of the king to gerrard , son of maurice , justice of ireland . the statute de anno bissextili begins thus , the king to his justices of the bench , greeting , &c. explanationes statuti glocestriae , made by the king and his justices only , were received always as statutes , and are still printed amongst them . the statute made for correction of the th chapter of the statute of glocester , was signed under the great seal , and sent to the justices of the bench , after the manner of a writ patent , with a certain writ closed , dated by the king's hand at westminster , requiring that they should do , and execute all and every thing contained in it , although the same do not accord with the statute of glocester in all things . the statute of rutland , is the king's letters to his treasurer and barons of his exchequer , and to his chamberlain . the statute of circumspecte agis runs , the king to his judges sendeth greeting . there are many other statutes of the same form , and some of them which run only in the majestick terms of , the king commands , or , the king wills , or , our lord the king hath established , or , our lord the king hath ordained : or , his especial grace hath granted : without mention of consent of the commons or people ; insomuch that some statutes rather resemble proclamations , than acts of parliament : and indeed some of them were no other than meer proclamations ; as the provisions of merton , made by the king at an assembly of the prelates and nobility , for the coronation of the king and his queen eleanor , which begins , provisum est in curia domini regis apud merton . also a provision was made . hen. . de assisa ultimae praesentationis , which was continued and allowed for law , until tit. west . . an . . ed. . cap. . which provides the contrary in express words : this provision begins , provisum fuit coram dom. rege , archiepiscopis , episcopis , & baronibus , quod , &c. it seems origanally the difference was not great between a proclamation and a statute ; this latter the king made by common council of the kingdom . in the former he had but the advice only of his great council of the peers , or of his privy council only . for that the king had a great council , besides his parliament , appears by a record of . hen. . about an exchange between the king and the earl of northumberland : whereby the king promiseth to deliver to the earl lands to the value , by the advice of parliament , or otherwise by the advice of his grand council , and other estates of the realm , which the king will assemble , in case the parliament do not meet . we may find what judgment in later times parliaments have had of proclamations , by the statute of . of hen. cap. . in these words : forasmuch as the king , by the advice of his council , hath set forth proclamations , which obstinate persons have contemned ; not considering what a king by his royal power may do : considering that sudden causes and occasions fortune many times , which do require speedy remedies , and that by abiding for a parliament , in the mean time might happen great prejudice to ensue to the realm : and weighing also , that his majesty , which by the kingly and regal power given him by god , may do many things in such cases , should not be driven to extend the liberties , and supremity of his regal power and dignity , by willfulness of froward subjcts : it is therefore thought fit , that the king with the advice of his honourable council should set forth proclamations for the good of the people , and defence of his royal dignity , as necessity shall require . this opinion of a house of parliament was confirmed afterwards by a second parliament , and the statute made proclamations of as great validity , as if they had been made in parliament . this law continued until the government of the state came to be under a protector , during the minority of edward the sixth , and in his first year it was repealed . i find also , that a parliament in the th year of henry the seventh , did so great reverence to the actions , or ordinances of the king , that by statute they provided a remedy or means to levy a benevolence granted to the king , although by a statute made not long before all benevolences were damned and annulled for ever . mr. fuller , in his arguments against the proceedings of the high-comission court , affirms , that the statute of h. . cap. . which giveth power to ordinaries to imprison and set fines on subjects , was made without the assent of the commons , because they are not mentioned in the act. if this argument be good , we shall find very many statutes of the same kind , for the assent of the commons was seldom mentioned in the elder parliaments . the most usual title of parliaments in edward the d , rich. . the three henries , , . in edw. . and rich. . days , was : the king and his parliament , with the assent of the prelates , earls and barons , and at the petition , or at the special instance of the commons , doth ordain . the same mr. fuller saith , that the statute made against lollards , was without the assent of the commons , as appears by their petition in these words , the commons beseech , that whereas a statute was made in the last parliament , &c. which was never assented nor granted by the commons , but that which was done therein , was done without their assent . ( . ) how far the king's council hath directed and swayed in parliament , hath in part appeared by what hath been already produced . for further evidence , we may add the statute of westminster : the first which saith , these be the acts of king edw. . made at his first parliament general , by his council , and by the assent of bishops , abbots , priors , earls , barons , and all the commonalty of the realm , &c. the statute of bygamy saith , in presence of certain reverend fathers , bishops of england , and others of the king's council , forasmuch as all the king's council , as well justices as others , did agree that they should be put in writing , and observed . the statute of acton bunnel saith , the king , for himself , and by his council , hath ordaind and established . in articuli super chartas ; when the great charter was confirmed , at the request of his prelates , earls and barons , we find these passages . . nevertheless the king and his council do not intend by reason of this statute to diminish the king's right , &c. . and notwithstanding all these things before-mentioned , or any part of them ; both the king and his council , and all they that were present at the making of this ordinance , will and intend that the right and prerogative of his crown shall be saved to him in all things . here we may see in the same parliament the charter of the liberties of the subjects confirmed , and a saving of the king's prerogative : those times neither stumbled at the name , nor conceived any such antipathy between the terms , as should make them incompatible . the statute of escheators hath this title , at the parliament of our soveraign lord the king , by his council it was agreed , and also by the king himself commanded . and the ordinance of inquest goeth thus , it is agreed and ordained by the king himself , and all his council . the statute made at york . edw. . saith , whereas the knights , citizens , and burgesses desired our soveraign lord the king in his parliament , by their petition , that for his profit , and the commodity of his prelates , earls , barons , and commons , it may please him to provide remedy ; our soveraign lord the king desiring the profit of his people by the assent of his prelates , earls , barons , and other nobles of his council being there , hath ordained . in the parliament primo edwardi the third , where magna charta was confirmed , i find this preamble , at the request of the commonalty by their petition made before the king and his council in parliament , by the assent of the prelates , earls , barons , and other great men assembled , it was granted . the commons presenting a petition unto the king , which the king's council did mislike , were content thereupon to mend and explain their petition ; the form of which petition is in these words , to their most redoubted soveraign lord the king , praying the said commons , that whereas they have pray'd him to be discharged all manner of articles of the eyre , &c. which petition seemeth to his council to be prejudicial unto him , and in disinherison of his crown , if it were so generally granted . his said commons not willing nor desiring to demand things of him , which should fall in disinherison of him or his crown perpetually , as of escheators , &c. but of trespasses , misprisions , negligences , and ignorances , &c. in the time of henry the third , an order or provision was made by the king's council , and it was pleaded at the common law in bar to a writ of dower . the plantiffs attorney could not deny it , and thereupon the judgment was ideo sine die . it seems in those days an order of the council-board was either parcel of the common-law , or above it . the reverend judges have had regard in their proceedings , that before they would resolve or give judgment in new cases , they consulted with the king's privy-council . in the case of adam brabson , who was assaulted by r. w. in the presence of the justices of assize at westminster , the judges would have the advice of the king's council : for in a like case , because r. c. did strike a juror at westminster which passed in an inquest against one of his friends , it was adjudged by all the council that his right hand should be cut off , and his lands and goods forfeited to the king. green and thorp were sent by judges of the bench to the king's council , to demand of them whether by the statute of . ed. . cap. . a word may be amended in a writ ; and it was answered , that a word may well be amended , although the statute speak but of a letter or syllable . in the case of sir tho. oghtred , knight , who brought a formedon against a poor man and his wife ; they came and yielded to the demandant , which seemed suspitious to the court , whereupon judgment was stayed ; and thorp said , that in the like case of giles blacket , it was spoken of in parliament , and we were commanded , that when any like case should come , we should not go to judgment without good advice : therefore the judges conclusion was , sues au counseil , & comment ils voillet que nous devomus faire , nous volume faire , & auterment nient en cest case . sue to the council , and as they will have us to do , we will ; and otherwise not in this case . ( . ) in the last place , we may consider how much hath been attributed to the opinions of the kings judges by parliaments , and so find , that the king's council hath guided and ruled the judges , and the judges guided the parliament . in the parliament of hen. . the commons made suit , that william de la poole , d. of suffolk , should be committed to prison , for many treasons and other crimes . the lords of the higher house were doubtful what answer to give , the opinion of the judges was demanded . their opinion was , that he ought not to be committed , for that the commons did not charge him with any particular offence , but with general reports and slanders . this opinion was allowed . in another parliament , . hen. . ( which was prorogued ) in the vacation the speaker of the house of commons was condemned in a thousand pound damages , in an action of trespass , and was committed to prison in execution for the same . when the parliament was reassembled , the commons made suit to the king and lords to have their speaker delivered : the lords demanded the opinion of the judges , whether he might be delivered out of prison by privilege of parliament ? upon the judges answer it was concluded , that the speaker should still remain in prison , according to the law , notwithstanding the privilege of parliament , and that he was the speaker . which resolution was declared to the commons by moyle , the king's serjeant at law ; and the commons were commanded in the king's name , by the bishop of lincoln , ( in the absence of the arch-bishop of canterbury , then chancellour ) to chuse another speaker . in septimo of hen. . a question was moved in parliament , whether spiritual persons might be convented before temporal judges for criminal cases . there sir john fineux , and the other judges , delivered their opinion , that they might and ought to be : and their opinion was allowed and maintained by the king and lords , and dr. standish , who before had holden it ; the same opinion was delivered from the bishops . if a writ of errour be sued in parliament upon a judgment given in the kings bench , the lords of the higher house alone , ( without the commons ) are to examine the errours ; the lords are to proceed according to law , and for their judgment therein they are to be informed by the advice and counsel of the judges , who are to inform them what the law is , and so to direct them in their judgment ; for the lords are not to follow their own opinions or discretions otherwise . so it was in a writ of errour brought in parliament by the dean and chapter of lichfield , against the prior and covent of newton-panel , as appeareth by record . see flower dew's case , p. . h. . fol. . finis . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e apud selden . edw. . fol. . apud selden . selden . selden . selden . selden . selden . cambden . cotton . stow. selden . selden . selden . selden . chanc. egerton . notes for div a -e * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . * 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 , &c. lib. . c. . lib. . c. . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 l. . c. . (c) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (d) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. c. c. . (b) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . lib. . c. . lib. . c. . lib. . c. . 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . l. . c. . lib. . c. . (a) l. . c. . (b) l. . c. . (c) l. . c. . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . (a) 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 . notes for div a -e de cive , cap. . sect . . . . notes for div a -e lib. . c. . lib. . c. . notes for div a -e p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . p. . arist. pol. l. . c. . notes for div a -e cap. . lib. . cap. . cap. . cap. . cap. . lib. . qu. . cap. . lib. . sect. . cap. . sect. . cap. . sect. . lib. . cap. . cap. . cap. . sect. . cap. . sect. . chap. . sect. . chap. . sect. . lib. . cap. . cap. . sect. . ainsworth upon deut. . notes for div a -e king. . . gen. . . arist . pol. lib. . c. . the grand case of conscience stated, about submission to the new and present power, or, an impassionate answer to a modest book concerning the lawfullness of submitting to the present government by one that professeth himself a friend to presbytery, a lover and embracer of truth wheresoever he find's it. one that professeth himself a friend to presbytery, a lover and embracer of truth wheresoever he find's [sic] it. this text is an enriched version of the tcp digital transcription a of text r in the english short title catalog (wing r ). textual changes and metadata enrichments aim at making the text more computationally tractable, easier to read, and suitable for network-based collaborative curation by amateur and professional end users from many walks of life. the text has been tokenized and linguistically annotated with morphadorner. the annotation includes standard spellings that support the display of a text in a standardized format that preserves archaic forms ('loveth', 'seekest'). textual changes aim at restoring the text the author or stationer meant to publish. this text has not been fully proofread approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. earlyprint project evanston,il, notre dame, in, st. louis, mo a wing r estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) the grand case of conscience stated, about submission to the new and present power, or, an impassionate answer to a modest book concerning the lawfullness of submitting to the present government by one that professeth himself a friend to presbytery, a lover and embracer of truth wheresoever he find's it. one that professeth himself a friend to presbytery, a lover and embracer of truth wheresoever he find's [sic] it. rous, francis, - . p. s.n., [london : ] caption title. one in a series of pamphlets replying to francis rous's the lawfulness of obeying the present government. the st was "a religious demurrer ..." ( ) possibly by nathaniel ward and others identified as "a.b.c."; the nd, "a second part of the religious demurrer, by another hand", and the present piece are by "a" or "c". the th was "discolliminium ... by b.", widely but erroneously attributed to ward. not to be confused with the grand case of conscience concerning the engagement stated & resolved. erroneously attributed to rous by wing. place and date of publication from wing. reproduction of original in harvard university libraries. eng rous, francis, - . -- lawfulness of obeying the present government. allegiance. political science -- early works to . great britain -- politics and government -- - . a r (wing r ). civilwar no the grand case of conscience stated, about submission to the new and present power. or, an impassionate answer to a modest book concerning t [no entry] f the rate of defects per , words puts this text in the f category of texts with or more defects per , words. - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion the grand case of conscience stated , about submission to the new and present power . or , an impassio●…te answer to a modest book concerning the lawfullnesse of submitting to the present government . by one that professeth himself a friend to presbytery , a lover and embracer of truth wheresoever he find's it . although i love not contention , yet i desire satisfaction : that whilst ●… live a midst a tumultuous generation , and unquiet times , i may be delivered from a troubled spirit and discalm'd minde ; a wounded spirit who can bear ? i was willing to have sate down in silence , res●…lving to hav●… kept my conscience , as void of offence to others , so ●…ree from disturbance in it self , ch●…sing rather quietly to suffer for not doing what was commanded , than knowingly to act what is ( at least to me ) ●…lawfull : such a liberty of conscience i conceive none will deny me . but since ●…at book came to mine hands , i ( although unwillingly ) undertook this task , not only out of an earnest desire i had to finde out truth , but for the unusuall modesty of the tract it s●…lf , knowing that the fowlest corn is best winnowed in a gentle gale ; a tempestuous winde blowes away ch●…ffe and corn too . i shall take a brief view of the book , and submit what i shall speak to the authours judgement , a declaration hath been lately published , &c. indeed there was such a declaration published , which i desired with much earnestnesse , and read with some d●…ration , expecting to have found the very quintessence of reason , and stre●…gt of argument , whereby judicious men might have been wholly convinced ▪ and abundantly satisfied ; but my s●…ruples were not answered by it . for suppose that had been proved , which was there much argued , that the government of a free state were in some respects more convenient than that of monarchy ; that might have been a prevalent argument to an irregulated people , who were ( de novo ) to constitute a government , not to those , who had before an antient form suited to the people , established by law , confirmed by oath , and engaged to by the severall declarations of them who are so sollicitous for the altering of it . surely if convenience or inconvenience only can break a promise , and disingage an oath , david was much mistaken in the th psalm , and others may be easily cheated , who expect ready performance of , not needlesse disputing about oaths , in wh●… 〈◊〉 stand bound to them . what is there said concerning declarations [ that the lords and commons were of that minde when they made them ] may serve their turns for the present , but would equally serve others turns for the future ; for by the same reason , when those that penned and published that declaration , shall borrow money of men , and declare to pay them , imploy souldiers with an engagement to satisfie them , people may suspect that their mindes may alter , and then ( by this rule ) their former declarations will be of no strength . what is further spoken in the preface for a lawfull obedience to an unlawfull change of government , will be touched on in the further prosecution of this discourse . it is said [ the apostle commands obedience to higher powers , rom. . and thence it is inferred , that he speaks not in that place meerly of power or authority abstracted from persons , but of persons cloathed with that authority . ] the apostle speaks there directly of authority , of men only in subordination to that authority ; no further than as the executioners of that power , because it is impossible authority should be exercised , but where men are to manage it . the apostle in that place requires submission to legall authority , by whomsoever executed , not to any men commanding by an illegall power . higher powers are there expressed indefinitely , not pointing at any particular government : in a monarchy , an aristocracy , a democracy , the people under the severall constitutions may , yea must , by the apostles command obey the higher powers , those who by their legall constitution are in authority , not in power , over them : there is a law of nature , that will make man obey a power if h●… cannot ●…sist , but the injunction of the apostle ( there ) is only to lawfull author●… ▪ 〈◊〉 the authour of that book knows , that those only can be the higher powers , or legall authority of any kingdom , which the constitution of that kingdom makes such , and that only can exact obedience according to the scripture rule . now what the higher powers of england are , by the constitution of this kingdom , is sufficiently known . the apostle commands wives to submit to their husbands , ephes. . . surely the injunction is for obedience to husbands , quà husbands , not quà men , indeed not abstracted from their persons , because it is impossible the authority of an husband should be submitted to , where a man is not to exercise it : but should a stranger come to anothers wife , and call himself husband ( having before either imprisoned or slain the rightfull husband ) and require submission , i scarce think the authour himself ( especially if he be married ) would presse for obedience to such an usurped power : such a woman may be forced , and overpowr'd , but to submit to him as an husband , were a sinne . what is there urged as the great argument to prove the lawfullnesse of obedience to the present government , hath been my main deswasive ( viz. ) the apostles command to obey higher powers for conscience sake : had i been convinced that the king in his person had been the higher powers of england , and that his personall command ●…ad by the apostles rule exacted undeniable obedience , although he had been visibly ●…ing what we suspected , and palpably introducing what we feared , i should have submitted for conscience sake . the great inducement i had to adhere to the parliament , was ( besides the hopes of better reformation ) that thorow conviction that lay upon me , both by mine own reason , and parliamentary practices , that the two houses of parliament , in case of the kings absence , weaknesse or refusall , had in them such a part of the higher powers , and supream authority , as to defend , and preserve the people without , yea against the king , doing , commanding or exacting any thing besides or against the law . and this is that main block , at which i stumble in yeelding obedience to this new power , because i am yet convinced , that they are not the higher powers of our kingdom , to which the apostle requires obedience . i acknowledge a government may be altered ( although i think it not safe , but upon urgent and evident necessity ) to which being altered obedience is required , but it must be done by the higher powers still , whom we ought equally to obey in submitting to an altered , as a continued form ; but for any party by force to lay low the higher powers , and to exact obedience as to the legall authority , is to me a sinne . i am not ignorant what pleas there may be from inconvenience in such a doctrine , but according to the light i have , where lawfull or unlawfull are in question , their convenience and inconvenience must keep silence . it is to be observed what is spoken by the apostle in the same place , the powers that are , are ordained by god : to which in the second page of the book is a little addition , viz. rulers and those that were in authority were ordained of god : the scripture enjoins obedience to powers , to men only as intitled to those powers : the authority was ordained by god , not the rulers , they were constituted by men , the power may be gods ordinance , when the deputing of persons to the exercise of that power may be ( at most ) but gods permission : nay , that men in authority ( rulers in the apostles expression ) are to be obeyed no further then as acting according to that authority , is the judgement of one much used by the composer of that book . when a tyrant shall offer violence to his private subjects . which they can by no other means avoid , they may defend themselves and theirs against that tyrant as against a thief ; when are men properly called tyrants , but when they either usurp or exercise a power contrary to the law and usage of those places where they rule ? when a consciencious obedience is required to the authority , but not to those , who by their own will , or procured force , either usurp or exercise a power besides that authority . should we grant that men assuming to themselves the place and power of magistrates , by what right or means soever they came by it , must be obeyed , surely it would be the greatest inlet to tyranny in the world , and the speediest means of destroying states that could be invented : for then should none govern in any kingdome any longer , then their swords and their strength could bear them up . thus much i shall yeeld , that when any shall usurp authority , by whatsoever title or force he procures it , such may be obeyed in reference to their power , while they command lawfull things , but not in reference to authority : a man being overpower'd may yeeld for his own safety , but to submit to that usurp'd power , as to the legall authority of that kingdome where it is , is to assert that as lawfull , which is but usurp'd , and in the scripture language to make a lie . from this i shall take a just occasion to speak to those instances there urged , from obedience to whom , the argument is drawn to prove the lawfullnesse of our submission now . concerning claudius caesar and nero which are mentioned , pag. , . how they came in by force , yet were obeyed by the people , i shall not trouble my self nor the reader with any taedious search into , or large recitall of the story , but take it as there laid down , and give a brief answer to it . but before i fall upon a plain answer to what is there fallaciously urged , and shew the insufficiency thereof to prove that for which it is asserted : i conceive there will appear such a disproportion between the quoted instances and our present case , that should we grant all the premises , yet the conclusion would not directly follow to prove the question . the most that can be asserted from those examples is , that people did obey a supream power as exercised by those who had no true ( at least but a dubitable ) title , when the same form of government was still continued , for so it had been for many years before , during the reign of a emperours , yea , such a government which was the pristine constitution of that place , it being monarchicall for above b ●… . years , till tarquinius , about the businesse of his son with lucretia , was rejected . whether party had or pretended most right , and the best ends in their changing of the goverment , either i. brutus from , or iulius caesar to monarchy , i shall not dis●…ute : nor shall i decide , whether god might not justly give them to see the evill of a change , who ( it may be ) chiefly out of a desire of change , would wholly alter a constituted form . but this is not our case : the insubmission of people now , is not grounded upon a suggested sc●…uple of a dubious title to the same , but upon an apprehended illegality of the new and needlesse establishment of another government : it is one thing , and as in it self more lawfull , so to people lesss scrup●…lous , upon a pretended title to usurp the exercise of an established authority : another , and as in it self less just , so to people more doubtfull upon pretended apprehensions to eradicate a lawfull authority , and illegally to lay low those which legally are the higher powers of a kingdome : in the one , people lesse able to ●…mine titles , submit to the established government of that kingdom where they are , and this is sufficient to yeeld obedience , that they know not who hath the right : in the other , they must give themseves up to a new-fashioned modell illegall to them , because not the constituted powers of that place , and this is enough to withold allegiance , that they know such have not ( nor pretend ) a title . now to the instances themselves , to see how farre they prove the lawfullnesse of our submission to a change of government , although the change be beleeved unlawfull . after the death of caius caligula , the consuls and senate of rome entred in●…o a consultatio●… , how they might restore the common-wealth to her ancint free●…m , i think this argument will take in all that is therein spoken : if the peo●…e of the roman empire did submit to the power of claudius and nero , who by force were put upon them , then the people of england may lawfully submit to a change of goverument , though beleeved unlawfull : but they did submit , therefore these may , i will finde no fault with the syllogisme , because it is of mine own making , although it be the very summe of what is urged : what aequivocall terms there are whereby a spirituall eye would quickly see four terms ( at least ) in it . i shall discover in mine answer to the severall propositions . in the first proposition , it being hypotheticall , i shall deny the consequence : for . a people may possibly do what is not in it self lawfull either for themselves or others to do , a facto ad jus non valet argumentum , had the author proved their submission legall , it had been more urgent . indeed it is said at the end of that paragraph , we see rulers put by souldiers into that power which is said by the scripture to be ordained of god , and even to these rulers men must be subject for conscience sake . but the apostle doth not command obedience to these men , but to the powers , nay not to any men , but as commanding according to th●…se powers ( as was said before ) nor is it materiall who put men in , nor what men are put into powers , if they are the powers that are ordained of god : those that command according to that authority , must be obeyed : and whatsoever the souldiery of rome did , had the souldiery of england ( in this tacitely pleaded for ) observed that doctrine before , we had not been ( i think ) disputing this question now . but . what might be lawfull for the people in the roman empire , may not be lawfull for the people of this kingdome : i finde not in any history that ever they were sworn to a particular government as we have been : things in themselves indifferent are made necessary , when by an oath engaged to . but of that more afterward . to the minor proposition , i shall say . that those mentioned had ( at least seeming ) titles to the empire . indeed it is agreed by all historians i have met withall , that they were first encouraged by souldiers : but what iniquity is in that , if they might pretend a title ? the very end of power and strength is or should be to conserve and recover just right , we have alwaies acknowledged it lawfull and expedient by force of arms to acquire a rightfull possession illegally detained ; but i could wish that this story had been printed and read by the sword-men in this kingdome five moneths agoe , that they might but have thought whether it had been greater honour to be recorded as men , that should guard a king of a doubtfull title to the crown , or to be storied as men that should bring a king of an indubitable right to the scaffold . i will not here dispute by what title , or according to what law iulius caesar , not yet his successour octavius assumed the empire , but when that government and those governours were received , and acknowledged by the senate , it became lawfull to that people . although conquest be no true title , nor durable tenure any longer then strength can keep it , yet compact upon that conquest , gives a title to the conquerour , and engageth submission from the other party to those rules resolved on at , or given out according to that agreement . tiberius from whom indeed both claudius and nero had their government , did not only for a great part of his time , do all he did by the advise of the senate , but would ( at least seemingly ) be chosen by the senate , as not contented secretly t●… step into a government either by the earnest engagement of his mother , or by the fond adoption of augustus , but would have the c●…ll and election of the common-wealth too : now here surely was a lawfull title , if the consent of the people could make it lawfull , although ( it may be ) not in it's first acquisition , yet in it 's after establishment : and claudius deriving his title from him , why should not people obey it ? yea , me thinks the authour of that book intimates a title that claudius had , where he saith , pag. . claudius being frighted with the news of caligula's death , and fearing himself might be enquired for , upon suspicion withdrew : had not he been the heir apparent to the empire , what ground of fear , or what cause of withdrawing ? nay , if he had not been looked on as the rightfull successour , why should the souldier primo intuitu salute him by the name of emperour ? for nero he descended in a direct line on the mothers side , from livia augustus his wife , and although brittanicus was the naturall son of claudius , yet nero ( by agrippina's means ) was his adopted son for the empire , and brought to the senate , where it was consented unto , that he should have his togam virilem , and he called prince of youth : it being their usage , as far as i have observed in the story , that an adoptive title assented to by the senate , hath commonly been acknowledged , when a lineall succession hath been rejected : yea , the authour seems to grant a kinde of title to nero too , where it is said , pag. . that the sentence of the souldiers was followed by the consent of the senate : if the senate had any share in either constituting or declaring a king , nero's title was hereby established . but what is this to our case ? a rightfull or doubtfull heir was brought by souldiers to the senate , who among themselves were contriving to alter their government : this heir was received by the senate , and upon that submitted unto by the people : but doth the authour think that if the senate had declared and acknowledged , yea , promised to preserve the title of a rightfull prince , and the souldiers by the advice , counsell , or assistance of some party in this senate , should imprison or slay their prince , and take away the major part of the senate , only because against their actings , and this minor part relict should alter their government , yea , make themselves without the consent of the people their rulers , that then the people would or lawfully could have submitted to them as their legall and rightfull governours , nay , would not rather have resisted them , as not being those higher powers , whom they ought for conscience sake to obey ? indeed had the king for some reason hid himself ( as claudius ) or for other reasons absented himself , and the two houses of parliament legally elected , and freely sitting ( at such a time esteemed ) the higher powers , contrived a way for the altering the government , although i should not have proclaimed their wisdome , yea , should have bewailed their sin , in respect of the many ties and bonds of declarations and oaths upon them , i think i should have submitted to their power , yet i would not for my oath 's sake ( had i liked the thing ) have acted in it . in which i think i ●…eeld more then many anti-malignant men in england will do : yet how far from our case this is , what hath been spoken will testifie . but . had the instance been of iulius casar , who by meer force and violence , without the least pretence of title acquired the government , which had better suited our businesse , yet i should say , that what submission the people yeelded , and what commands he gave , were in relation to a power which he by force had gotten , and did exercise without any pretence to a legall constituted power , till received and acknowledged by the senate . i confesse should these rulers now in our kingdom command submission to them , as to a conquering party , and acknowledge they did by power exercise , what by force they had gotten , i should in that sense submit to them , because not able to defend my self against them : but they call themselves the legall authority , and higher powers of england , under which notion i cannot submit , because positively to obey what is thus commanded , what soever secret reservation i may have , i doe and must assert their power as lawfull , and their authority as the legall authority . by this i shall fitly descend to those instances of our nation , to which what hath been already spoken , will give ( me judice ) sufficient answer : for . what submission was given to the conquerour , was yeelded as to a forc'd power , untill by after-compact it was acknowledged and made legall . . what was practised by the successors mentioned ( besides the acknowledged force in their unrightfull acquisitions , and violent exercise of power ) it was only upon difference of title , which people may not be able to judge of , as the authour saies , pag. . but amongst us , here is an alteration of government , where a change only seems to be asserted , no title at all pretended . . what is spoken of hen. . may be enough to answer the argument drawn from him and the rest too . although the title might be unjust , and the power illegally gotten , yet when the title was acknowledged , at least , confirmed by parliament , and the laws whereby he ( or they ) should rule , were enacted in a parliament , that did engage the people to an unquestionable obedience , the constituted higher powers then commanding , to whom the apostle requires obedience : for although a parliament ( such i mean , which by the known law and continued usage of the kingdom as a parliament ) should acknowledge or do any thing civilly evill ( i mean in reference to the state ) it is lawfull and just in respect of the people , and engageth obedience , which i think will be a sufficient excuse for peoples yeelding obedience to their laws , not only because then enacted , but since confirmed by the higher powers of our nation : although in the mean time upon the same ground they rest ●…nsatisfied in the lawfullnesse of submission to the present power . i might adde , that what the whole body of a nation did , if illegall , doth not engage our practice : for we know papists ( and such they were all who submitted to the fore-mentioned rulers ) make no conscience of denying a rightfull title , nor yeelding to an illegall power , when they may but probably carry on their own design : but what is spoken already will satisfie , and i had rather give a rationall answer , then question the wisdome or honesty of ancestors , where it may be avoided . what is urged from the casuis●…s and paraeus ( although i am not bound jurare in verba , being of dr moulins his minde , rather to like one argument then ten authours ) i shall agree to in that sense , in which i conceive they delivered it , to submit to such power as forced , not to their authority as legall , unlesse it be 〈◊〉 an authority which by constitution and usage are the higher powers of our kingdom ▪ the authour after the example of others , proceeds now to give some reason o●… his own , which i shall also endeavour to examine , and so far as they carry streng●… and truth ( as least to me ) shall submit : where otherwise , i shall give mine on the contrary . indeed how can it be otherwise ? for when a person or persons have gotten supream power , and by the same excluded all other from authority , either that authority which is thus taken by power must be obeyed , or else all authority must fall to the ground . persons may indeed get themselves the greatest strength , and in that sense may be submitted to ▪ but they cannot illegally get themselves the legall power , nor can they exclude others from their authority , although by force they may keep them from the exercise of it , a man may be a man , yea a living man , although by the violence of disease , he may be kept from outward actings . an husband may be a husband still although imprisoned and thereby kept from the exercise of his duty to his wife . a parliament may be a parliament still , although by violence kept from sitting and executing their authority . i am so far from thinking that disobedience to such power will make all authority and government fall to the ground , that i beleeve submission to such will quickly lay all authority waste : for by the same reason that we obey this altered government and usurped authority now , we must obey any other suddenly , if another party get more strength , and what an unsetled state and unknown authority we should then have may easily be judged : nor do i think the authour himself would be of the same minde , should the prince with a potent army get the power into their hands . surely were this doctrine true , those renowned men shall be rased out of the calendar for saints , that opposed the kings power in ship-money : nor must such be sequestred who under the kings power formerly did lend or give whatsoever he required , whether men , money , horse or arms : nor these put out of the parliament , who obeyed him in sitting at oxon : nay , nor himself neither put to death for doing what was urged against him , if men in power howsoever they come by it are rulers ordained by god , and to be obeyed for conscience sake . if confusion be worse then titular tyranny , i wish that seeing we had no titular tyranny , we had had no confusion neither : and i should be glad that confusion may befall ( if any ) only such , who in this kingdome have been the greater introducers of it , either those who acquire and assert , or those who cannot receive or submit to an usurped government : for although the end must not be destroyed for the means , yet he that destroies the means in it's tendency to the end , will scarcely preserve the end at last . if a masters mate had thrown the master over-board , and by power would suffer no other to guide the ship but himself , if the mariners will not obey him commanding aright for the safe guiding of the ship , the ship must needs perish , and themselves with it . i doubt here is a fallacy , and this case will not concern our question , for i suppose , although i am not so well skilled in the discipline of marriners , as to know that a masters mate hath a kinde of title to the government of the ship in case of the masters miscarriage , which suits not our condition : but suppose him to have no title , or state the question somewhat nearer our case , that if a party of the sea-men should throw the master over-board , and assume to themselves the government of the ship : ●…●…hall then answer , that if that mate or this party having the greater strength , ●…hould by power enforce and exact obedience of the rest , these ought for the safety of their own lives , although not to obey the authority , yet to do the commands of the enforcing party , and if ever they come ashoar , to doe what they can to bring such unworthy persons to condigne punishment , who , besides the murder of the master , would so basely hazard the ship too ; but if that mate or party should command the sea-men to obey them as the rightfull master , i think ( although with submission to better judgements ) they ought not , although for the safety of their lives thus to obey them . it is better to lose a naturall life , then a quiet conscience , and a spirituall soul : the greatest advantage will not warrant the least evil . in such a case it would easily be judged both by god and men , to whose fault the losse of the ship should be imputed , either to them that did unjustly require , or those who dared not unwarrantably to do an unlawfull thing . i know not what the sodain fear of unavoidable death might make such men ( de facto ) do , and i can easily think what harsh censures their hazarding or losing their lives upon such refusall , may bear from rash and lesse considerate men , as an empty product of meer peevishnesse : but i am confident that a synod of religious and intelligent divines would conclude , that ( de jure ) they ought rather to adventure the losse of all , than call him a lawfull , who is but an usurped master , which they must by yeelding to his or their commands under that notion . whereas some speak of a time for settlement , they indeed do rather speak for a time of unsettlement , for they will have an unsettlement first and a settlement after . if i mistake not the desires of those who withhold submission to the present power , the authour of that book is mistaken in his apprehensions of them : that they desire a settlement ( i think ) is true , but that they desire an unsettlement first , is besides my thoughts of them ; i know it is the grief of their souls , and causeth sad searchings of heart , that ever they were brought into such unsettlements , and thereby put upon such racks of conscience as these are . it is not unsettlement but a deliverance from unsettlement they long for : i scarce see how we can be more unsetled then now we are : indeed being unsetled , we would use any means for a settlement , although for it's procurement our unsettlednesse were more unsetled ; if a man be at the rivers brink , i would advise him to keep out of the water , but if at once he leap into the middle of the river , i should perswade him to come to the bank , although he wade through much water to come thither : i would counsell a man to prevent distempers , but when the disease is already contracted , i should prescribe some physick for the safety of his life , although for the present it should more disease him . what is spoken of the former scriptures and casuists in the same page , i shall refer to what was before answered . but it is asked : whether that may not be called a settlement , how soon soever it is , when there is such a way setled , that men may have justice if they will , and may enjoy that main end of magistracy , to live a peaceable life in godlinesse and honesty ? to speak of what justice some have had at westminster , since the unsettlement of our times , or what to be expected , when colonels appear as parties with their arguments by their sides before committees , ( an argument too often used in the house too , as i beleeve the gentleman knows , ) where to engage a bustling daring colonell is to carry a cause : as also what peaceable lives men live , when the souldiers having put other men in power in the state , put themselves in command in mens houses : and what godlinesse and honesty may be looked for , when blasphemy must be tolerated , wickednesse must not be punished , when in the mean time godly men ( if but of a contrary judgement , a liberty of conscience formerly pleaded for ) are made offendors for a word , would be too large a field to walk in , and besides the swelling of this tract , but give too wide an occasion to further contests . but this shall suffice , that the gentleman a little begs the question in calling it justice , for although men may have , or might expect , what he cals justice , viz. things in themselves just , yet if he grant , as i have proved , that authority illegall by which they act , what they do or is done by any under that authority , although in it self just , yet is not properly justice : judgement ( for i conceive the authour means justitiam distributivam ) is then only just , when it is exercised by the higher powers , the legall magistracy of that kingdome where it is acted . the hebrews expresse justice by that word , which they likewise use for the usage and custome of that people , that are concerned in it . another argument the authour useth is , because people cannot judge of titles : when they cannot judge , then an usurped title is true to them , and will exact obedience : but if this be an argument , then ( for contrariorum eadem est ratio ) when titles are visibly unlawfull , people are disingaged from obedience . this is our case , where there is not any pretence of title . but some say , there are oaths that justifie disobedience to the present government : there are indeed severall oaths that engage us to the continned observance of our formerly established government , and then how far they justifie disobedience to this , let the authour judge . that oaths are sacred bonds and reverend obligements , and where they do not themselves leave or make us free , we are not to cut or break them in peeces : i shall equally assert , and could heartily wish it had been as truly practised in the kingdome as plainly spoken in the book : but seeing there are indeed ( as the authour affirms ) concerning these , faults on both hands , let us a little examine the faults he mentions , and see whether there are not other faults too , that he speaks not of . on the one side the slieghting of an oath , &c. this is a fault indeed : oaths and covenants are the strongest engagements ▪ whereby we can binde our selves either to god or man , if these come once to be sleighted and no longer observed , then they may conduce to the palpable advantage of those that made them , i am afraid that may justly be written upon the door-posts of england , what was set in the front of davids song , psa. . , . i am loth to misjudge any person , whom i finde so modest , else i should fear that this fault was purposely argued , the more secretly to insinuate another , though not under the name of a fault : it is said , we finde some part of the covenant to speak of ●…ll th●… daies of our lives : as if some part had been but of a temporary engagement : but if i mistake not , the covenant did in every part of it oblige us to a continued observance of it : we did not swear constantly to keep this part , or that clause , but all our lives to keep this covenant , which is known to comprehend every part of it . true it is , that the obligation of some things end , because they can no longer be kept , as that of the kings person &c. i grant that the obligation of a people to any thing ends , when that thing obliged to , necessarily , and in its own nature ends ; but if men shall by violence put an end to the thing , that thereby the obligation may end too , i doubt such will be esteemed by god as covenant-breakers ; i do not think , that he breaks his covenant , that doth not preserve the kings person , when he is dead ▪ but i think he is guilty , that did not endeavour to preserve it while he was living ; had the covenant , in that part , been observed then , for all that i know , it might have obliged now . a woman promiseth to be faithfull to her husband so long as he lives , but if she , out of love to another man , shall lay violent hands on her husband to end his life , that thereby she might marry another , i beleeve she would scarcely be thought to have performed her promise . a tenant bargains with his land-lord to pay him rent for his house , so long as he lives in it : but if he through malice shall pull down the house , that he cannot live in it , and thereby to extinguish his bargain , it may be easily thought what determination the law would make in such a case . what is spoken here of the kings person , might as well have been spoken of any other part of the covenant : it is covenanted to preserve religion , but if those that made the covenant should by force extirpate , or by deceit undermine religion : would the authour think himself or others disingaged from that part of the covenant , or rather look upon himself as bound to preserve it , while it hath a being ? if this liberty should be given , no man would keep any oath any longer , than he saw good , if it were in his power to put an end to that thing to which he is obliged . but let 's see what faults are found on the other hand . but on the other side there are other faults : such are the urging of an oath or covenant against enemies , and not against friends in one and the same action . in this i am wholly of his judgement , and could wish that he had instanced in some things , whereby i might have guessed what aim he had taken , and against what he had levelled it . as i would not have any unequally excused , who are equally guilty , so i would not have him free from blame , who imputes guilt to one , when another shall be connived at , or incouraged in the same thing . in that clause of bringing delinquents to condigne punishment : if the covenant engage to bring one to punishment , that raised arms against the parliament in kent and essex , why not another that raised arms against the parliament in oxon shiere and berks shiere ? if according to our covenant we should preserve the priviledges of parliament against a malignant party , that would have taken away but five members ; why not against an haereticall party that took away above two hundred ? if one party be charged as guilty in not obeying orders of , but offering violence to the parliament ; why should another be excused as faultlesse , whose disobedience was more manifest , and whose violence was more palpable ? or if not altogether so , yet ( as the authour ) a slight and diminishing charge of it upon one , and a vehement and aggravating charge of it upon the other . another fault may be , a stiffe insisting on one part , and a neglect or at least silence in another part . this is not alwaies a fault , for when there is no occasion given to speak , silence is no evil ; one part may be in more danger to be broken than another , when a more violent asserting , and stiffe contending for that part is more necessary . if i had two children , the one at home in safety , the other in imminent danger , that i were more earnest and industrious for the saving and preserving of this , doth not at all argue lesse love or care to the other . but to take it in the best sense , to pretend much care in the keeping of one part , and in the mean time , to neglect another , i think a fault . as when men are seemingly violent against popery and prelacy , yet very indulgent to heresie and profanesse . when men shall plead covenant in the preservation of subjects liberties , yet forget their oath for the safety of the kings person in the preservation of religion ; which in respect of the covenant are of equall concernment ; for although it be pleaded by fome , and granted by all that religion , yea asserted by others , that the subjects liberties are of greater concernment than the kings person , it must be ratione mat●…riae , not ratione juram●…nti , for in that regard , we are equally obliged to one as the other . as also when by event two parts of it came to be inconsistent , to choose and inforce the keeping of the higher and lesse necessary part , and to give way to the losse and not keeping of the greater . here is to me a falsum suppositum ; i think it a sinne in any to ●…njoin , and wickednesse in any to take a covenant for the doing of two things that are or may be inconsistent ; nor do i know what parts of our covenant are such ; when the authour makes such appear , i shall bewail my sinne in taking it . if it be by him meant , what is talke●… by others , ( viz. ) that the safety of the kings person , and the preservation of religion are inconsistent , i must declare my dissent in this ; for i am yet convinced , that both the truth and honour of religion might have better been preserved by the safety of his person , and the continuance of our government , than hitherto it hath been , or for all i see , like to be , by the altering of the one , or taking away of the other . there is another , in racking an oath or covenant , to make it speak that which it meant not . i will adde , there is another fault to stop the mouth of a covenant , and denying it to speak what it would . nay , there is yet one more , when men shall put what interpretation upon covenants they please , or reserve to themselves a power to make any other interpretation upon them , than what the common and naturall sense of the words in which they are taken doe afford . oathes ought to be their own interpreters ; we may deceive men , but god is not mocked . but to come to what i conceive is the main end of what hath been hitherto asserted about oathes ▪ to consider whether there be any clause in any oath or covenant , which in a fair and common sense forbids obedience to the commands of the present government and authority . there is in the solemne league and covenant , that which engageth to another government , and then what forbids obedience to this ? in one clause we solemnly covenant to preserve the person , and not to diminish the just rights of the king ; had his person and just rights been preserved , his government could never have been attempted ; but seeing that cord is broken ( unhappy blow that strook it ●…sunder ! ) is there yet no bond will hold us ? yes ; we do in the same clause faithfully promise to preserve the law of the kingdom , and surely to change the government is to alter the fundamentall laws of the kingdom ; if we are bound to preserve our law , then that government that is established by law ; nay yet further , in the same place , we doe swear , yea and call the world to witnesse it , that we will not diminish the just rights and greatnesse of the king : is not a mans right as much concerned in his heirs inheriting , as in his own enjoying what legally belong'd to him ? is it not a mans undoubted right to have his lawfull heirs succeed him in his lawfull enjoyments ? but now by this government the kings heirs are wholly divested of any possession , and absolutely debarred of that right , which by the usage of the kingdom belongs to them . much lesse when no other can be had ( as the authour ) i do not yet see impossibility in having another , truly i think , if the covenant had been strictly observed , we had never had this , and if it were yet carefully performed , we might quietly have another government , such under which godly people might live with more comfort , and lesse scruple . if it be said that in the oath of allegiance , allegiance is sworn to the king , his heirs and successors . if his heirs be not his successours , how doth that oath binde ? either the word successours must be superstuous , or else it must binde successours as well as heirs , &c. if i should grant that the word successours were superfluous , it would not be the only superfluous word in things of that nature ; or that it is an exegeticall expression which is not unusuall in all writings both divine and profane , the more fully to expresse the same thing by two words : his heirs and successours are conjunctive , which must necessarily imply , that his heirs according to the usage of this kingdom ought to be his successours : so that it can binde to no successours besides the heir : indeed should the line extinguish , then the legall successour were to be obeyed by that oath , and yet that too in the continuance of the government , for he is not properly a successour , unlesse in the same form of government ; for without asking lawyers and learned men , he is properly a successor , that succeeds any man in the place where he was . if the agitators in the army should depose the generall , and order the army according to their wills , would they be justly called his successours , when the frame of their discipline were altered ? this seems partly to be acknowledged by the authour in the same page , where he instanceth only in those for successours , which su●…ceeded in the same government , and saith that the word successour is taken for him that actually succeeds in government , i conceive it must be meant , when the same form still is continued , else what he asserts , and the instances he names , would hold no proportion . but there is one engagement to the former government yet lies upon us in reference to our oaths , which is mentioned either in that ( before named ) or in the oath of supremacy , that no power on earth shall deter or absolve us from the keeping of it , if so , i would but humbly begge the authour conscienciously to judge , whether the force or fear of any party , were they stronger than they are , should affright a people into a submission to any other government , then that to which they have thus sworn . i may take the same liberty to propose a few short , yet considerable quaete●… ▪ while the son is in the same posture in which the father was , how comes this oath at thi●… time to stand up , and pl●…ad for disobedience in regard of the son , that was asleep and silent in regard of the father ? i do not know in what one title this oath is more urged for the son , then it might have been , and was for the father ; unlesse that now there is more need of pressing it , because in the sons daies the government is altered ; in the fathers , it was ( at least ) promised to be continued . those , who were against the irregular actings , the court-faults , the wicked counsels of the father , were for the safety of his person , the preservation of his rights , and the continuance of his government : and now the same persons that are for the rights of the son , and the continuance of the government , are as much against the vices and counsels in and about him , as about the father . besides it might be said , that the father was not opposed , untill there was a parliament , that being the legall means in our kingdom of resisting arbitrary and extra-legall power ; the king in the intervalls of parliaments being the chief officer , not to be resisted by private subjects : and certainly i think , were there now a parliament sitting according to the constitution of england , and the received to the crown , should act any thing against the known law , and ●…he kingdoms safety , those who are now for the reception of the son , and for the performance of their oaths , would as truly and conscienciously ( according to their covenant ) join with them against the exorbitancies of the son , as they did against the evil of the father : only i beleeve they would expect some security , that his person and rights ( parts of the covenant ) should be better preserved and lesse diminished then his fathers were . besides what hath been spoken to the book , i might adde also one small quaer●… about altering the government : whether in such an alteration there is not necessarily required , either the generall consent of the major part of the people , or at least the major part of their trustees ? if so , what right have these men to do , who now act in it , some of them being the trustees of no people , having no election , others who were legally chosen denied their liberty ? may not any number of people ( there being no known law nor constituted rule for this transaction ) by the like reason conceive , and ( if they have strengt●… ) alter it again to morrow ? but if they will ( which is but equall ) give them liberty of di●…enting from their government , whom they deny the liberty of delating or consenting to it , i shall be free . whether there be any scripture example or prudentiall rule unnecessarily to oppress●… , and , where it may be avoided , to rack the tender consciences of unquestionably godly men , not only when they are the major part , and most judicious christians ( both of ministers and people ) and most likely to know the truth , but when they are the least strong , and most discountenanced , and therefore unlikely to be byassed by any private interests ? indeed those who side with the strongest party , lye under grounded suspition of having particular ends , who can turn any way , to any party , where they may get the best places , the greatest preferments , and the largest rewards : such many have received , and i beleeve more expect ; for it is observable , that for the most part , your only parliament convert●… before ▪ are ●…our greatest parliament assertors now : but how a poor people despised and opposed by power , who can expect the conferment of nothing but punishment , should design an interest in standing to their principles , when they know ( some of them at least being very able and prevalent ) they might upon their least turning have as large a share in the rewards of the kingdom as those who now enjoy the greatest , is to me irrationall and improbable . the apostle paul would avoid a lawfull thing rather then offend the scrupling consciences of weak brethren : what then is their fault , who do unlawfull things , and thereto engage the dijudicating consciences of weak christians ? whether both in humane probability , and religious reason , it were not more likely to conduce to gods glory , to religions settlement and honour , to christians union and satisfaction , to the kingdoms peace , to the prevention of danger , and the safety of all ( who have not wickedly out-acted all hopes of safety , and are conscious to themselves that their bucket must sink , whensoever authorities bucket shall arise ) to endeavour ere it be too late , to join authority and power , title and strength together ; that as power may arm authority , and render it formidable , so authority might justifie power , and make that lawfull ? least when the title shall be claimed , those who may dislike the vices , and oppose any tyranny ( were they legally authorized ) of the claimer , yet should not for conscience sake deny his right ; and those who could like well the pretensions of our new governours ( were they justifiably managed ) should not adventure for religions sake to assist their usurpation : whereby , as by our unwise actions , we have too much justified malignants actions , and made them our deriders : we may strengthen their hands , and make them our masters . i am confident that if the great managers of our new-work , and the violent assertors of this changed government would but seriously lay these things to heart , it might make them seasonably retract , what they untimely attempted , and rather finde out waies to settle , then further unsettle the kingdom , rather to satisfie then disturb the peaceable consciences of religious and unbyassed men ( the lord prevail upon their spirits . ) thus have i endeavoured to answer that with a meek , which was written with a peaceable spirit , where i shall professe ( if i mistake not my self ) to side rather with truth then with any party . what i have hastily spoken i shall submit to the deliberate judgements of more intelligent men : i shall be willing to receive a rebuke wherein i have erred , and ready to yeeld wherein i may receive satisfaction : i hope i have not discovered any turbulency of spirit , but a willingnesse to examine truth : as i would keep my conscience from being wounded by doubtfull pressures , so i would keep my tongue and pen from wounding others by imbittered expressions : i would not willingly give offence , i hope none will be taken . if it be lawfull for one man to propose , it must be lawfull for other to answer arguments , in reference to satisfaction . i●… would be too great a burthen to true english spirits , to see one man permitted to stand with a drawn weapon daring all that passe by , and he only faulty that takes up the weapons ●…o answer him : either prevent such darings , or else excuse the provoked . 〈◊〉 will be my comfort to give , it will be my advantage to receive satisfaction ▪ howsoever , i shall commit my self , the safety of our kingdom , the establishment of such ●… government that is most conducible to gods honour , to that god , who is able to answer scruples , to preserve a people , and to command settlement according to his own wil●… and way . romanes . . and not rather as we be s●…anderously reported , and as some affirm , that we say , let us do evill that good may come : whose damnation is just . romanes . . whatsoever is not of faith is sinne . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a e- pag. . pag. ●… ▪ of the declaration . pag. , . it is not {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} but {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} . eph. . 〈◊〉 . rom. . . pag. . dis●…ernendum est inter potestatē quae semper est a deo , 〈◊〉 inter acqui●…onem & us●…pationem . paraeus in ro. . hos. . subditis merè privatis , s●… tyrannus t●…nquā latro in ipsos faciat impetum , & ipsi nec potestatem ordinariam implorare , nec ali●… ratione eff●… re pe●… possi●…t senti per & s●…os tyrann●… contra pr g ssa●…or fendere paraeus rev. ●… . . pag. , . a iulius caesar . augustus . tibertus caius caligula . b principio reges ibi sep●… impera●…unt , a●…nis ducentis quadraginta quatuor . sl●…dan . de . monarch . pag. . t tiberius augu●…ti oct a viij prirignus & gen●…r , & filius adoptivus admodum invitus , ut prae se serebat , & vix tandem exoratus a supplice sena●…u principatum accepit . sle●…dan . de . monarch . tiberius maximos dolores & gemitus simula vit principa●… tanquam onerosam servitutem recusans . pezel . mel. histor. par . ●… . pezel , mel. hist. part . ●… ▪ tacitus annal. lib. 〈◊〉 . pag. . pag. , . pag. . pag. . pag. ●… . pag. . pag. ●… . pag. , . pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. , . ut judicium ●…it actus justitiae , requiritur ut procedat ex authoritate praesidentis : quando ●…omo judicet de his de quibus non ●…abet authoritatē dicitur judiciū usurpatum . aquin. . q. cap. . {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} {non-roman} exod . ▪ & josh. . 〈◊〉 . pag. . pag ▪ . pag. . i pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. . pag. . a comparatiue discourse of the bodies natural and politique vvherein out of the principles of nature, is set forth the true forme of a commonweale, with the dutie of subiects, and right of soueraigne: together with many good points of politicall learning, mentioned in a briefe after the preface. by edvvard forset. forset, edward, ?- . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a stc estc s this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the early english books online text creation partnership. this phase i text is available for reuse, according to the terms of creative commons . universal . the text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission. early english books online. (eebo-tcp ; phase , no. a ) transcribed from: (early english books online ; image set ) images scanned from microfilm: (early english books, - ; : ) a comparatiue discourse of the bodies natural and politique vvherein out of the principles of nature, is set forth the true forme of a commonweale, with the dutie of subiects, and right of soueraigne: together with many good points of politicall learning, mentioned in a briefe after the preface. by edvvard forset. forset, edward, ?- . 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discovrse of the bodies natvral and politiqve . wherein out of the principles of nature , is set forth the true forme of a commonweale , with the dutie of subiects , and the right of the soueraigne : together with many good points of politicall learning , mentioned in a briefe after the preface . by edvvard forset . london , printed for iohn bill . . to the reader . the commonweale with all her parts , orders , qualities , and requisites whatsoeuer , is ( for better apprehension & illustration ) set forth by sundry fit resemblances , as by the architecture of an house , by the swarming and cohabiting of bees in an hiue , by a ship floating on the sea , and such like ; but by none more properly than eyther by the vniuersall masse of the whole world , ( consisting of all the seuerall subsistances in that great frame by the high wisdome and might of god compact and vnited ) or else by the body of man , being the lesser world , euen the diminitiue and modell of that wide extending vniuersall . and ( by the way ) it were a paynes well bestowed , to obserue the good correspondence betweene euery the particular parts or faculties in man , and the other distinct parts , powers , and operations of that bigger bulke : which seemeth to haue beene both sweetly and soundly conceaued by that thrice renowmed philosopher trismegistus , when he imagined an huge and mightie gyant , whose head was aboue the firmament , his necke , shoulders , and vpper parts in the heauens , his armes and hands reaching to east and west , his belly in the whole spaciousnesse vnder the moone , his legges and feet within the earth . but for that the discourse or discouery of this secret , with the agreeable references to arise therof , falleth not within the line wherwith i haue listed and bounded this treatise ; i wil only from this obseruation of gods owne imitating of himselfe in the likenesse of the lesse with the greater , gather and infer that which giueth groundworke vnto my purpose : that the incōprehensible wisdome of god , in the composing & ordering of his works in nature , hath so dignified them with all perfection , as that they be left vnto vs as eminent and exemplary patterns , as well for the consolidating , as for the beautifying of that wee worke by arte or policie ; as well for conioyning of all discordances into firmenesse , as also for the applyablenesse of particulars in their many seruices , for the vse and benifit of the whole . it is beyond the compasse of any contradiction , that in the morall vertues christes actions are our instructions ; and no lesse may the like rule hold , that in the contriuing of a prudent gouernment , the impressions and footsteps of gods wisdome ( which in things naturall wee contemplate by study ) be in the poynt of regiment , our directories for imitation . wherefore seeing that the vttermost extent of mans vnderstanding , can shape no better forme of ordering the affayres of a state , than by marking and matching of the workes of the finger of god , eyther in the larger volume of the vniuersall , or in the abridgement thereof , the body of man : i account these two to be the two great lights for enquiry and meditation concerning this businesse , and doe worthily omit all other worthlesse presidents , as inferiour starrelights , which oftentimes seduceth by their dimnesse , and at their best are but deriuatiue and subalterne vnto these . and of these two also ( as not daring to gaze too much vpon the sunne , and vnable in mine own weakenesse to run the round of such a large cōpasse ) i haue made my choyce to pursue only those applyances , which from the so skilfull workemanship of god in man , may bee well apted to the ciuill gouernment of the assemblies of men : which being of more facilitie to bee vnderstood ( as deduced from a more familiar example ) and equalling the other both in dignitie ( hauing the same authour ) and in certayntie ( respecting the fitnesse of their relation ) may also sort both agreeably with other mens likings ( as bred in their bosomes ) and with mine intentions , which seeketh wholy a demonstratiue plainenesse . this similitude was both fitly and fortunatly enforced by menenius agrippa , who being imployed in the appeasing and persuading of the seditious reuoulting commons of rome , did by a very tale of this proportionable respectiuenes of the parts in mans body , and the mutualitie of kindnes and ayd afforded from each to other , so sensibly shew them their errour , that surseasing their malignant enuy wherewith they were inraged against their rulers ( whom they accounted as the idle belly that swallowed the labors of their hands ) they discerned at the last , that their repining against , and their pining of that belly , whence was distributed vnto them their bloud and nourishment , necessarily tended to their owne destruction ; and were thereuppon forthwith reclaymed into their bounds of obedience . the like comparison is most diuinely enlarged by a much better orator , and in a much more important poynt of the vnseparable vnion of the members of christ with their head , and of the necessary communion of their distinct gifts and works amongst themselues ; yea , it hath pleased god himselfe for the manifestation in some measure of his vnmeasurable infinitenesse , & the incomprehensible nature of his dietie , to vouchsafe vnto vs as it were some glimse thereof , by this selfe same well agreeing semblance , drawne and borrowed from our weak , mortall , and sinfull bodies . his omni-science is set forth by an all-seeing eye , his omnipotencie by a mightie and outstretched arme , his mercy by the cheerefulnesse of a louing countenance , his bountie by the opening of his hand , and filling of all things with his blessings : by which so apt tipes he openeth for our more easie vnderstanding , the profoundnesse of his attributes , and ( as i may say ) the mysteries of his essence . i need not spend any speech in the praise of such familiar and well pleasing illustrations : looke but vpon that exsuperant and not attainable by humane powers wisdome of salomon , is not the brightest apparance thereof in comparatiue parables ? but behold a greater than salomon , who without parables spake nothing to them ; as if both the depth and delicacie of wits inuention for either prouing or persuading , consisted chiefely in such equipolling and parabolicall applications . it remayneth that before i proceed to the producing or presenting vpon the stage of state the similitudes themselues , to be scanned and considered of , ( which i wish may proue themselues right paralele ) i do for aduantage enterline first a caution , then a limitation : my caution is , that no man in streyning too hard , do force the bloud , where he is offered milke . it is easie for a curious obiector , euen in the fittest comparisons to make disseuerance by inferring different respects and inequallitie . the dissimilitudes of things be infinite , and rometh with errour in the circumference , where the well apted likenesse setleth in the center of truth , and is compacted closely in one onely point of good congruitie , from the which it may neither be drawne awry without wrongfull wresting , nor enlarged too far without extreame torturing . it is the greatest miracle of gods powerfull wisdome , in the innumerable formes of things , to make so infinite variation ; then it must needs be a great worke of the wit of man , in such multiplicitie of disference to find out the well agreeing semblances , to knit and match together sundry things by an aptnesse of application , is the proper effect of vnion ; but to disioyne the well coupled from their louely analogie of each to other , is a violent diuorce and distraction : therefore let such makebates ( if any be ) abate their humor of crossing with dissimilitudes , & content their conceits with that which they shall discerne to be matched with a right mirror , and representingly expressed by the shew of a good concordance . my limitation is , that it be not exacted or expected of me , so mincingly to manage this matter , as that vnto euery particuler part or facultie of our humane nature , i must needs find out in the states bodie some seuerall members or braunches entirely matchable to the same ; like a picture to be newly drawne by a former patterne , conforming therewith in euery line , shape , or shadow . we vse to say that one man is like an other , if but the faces , yea the colours or figures , yea the frownes or smyles , yea the casting of the eyes , or any other shewes in their visages doe seeme to agree , though in other respects or parts there be betwixt them rather apparant repugnances , than any right resemblances ; then let no man think that i will so be put to my shifts , or that i will impose my selfe so hard a taske , as ( by descending to each singuler or indiuiduall ) to find for it an euen yoak-fellow , or well matching companion , that may serue as a relatiue or representatiue vnto it , by the aptnesse of propriety : the which labour as it would be endlesse in toile , so would it be no lesse needlesse in vse ; and i hope it will suffice , so to compare or make parity betweene the bodies naturall and politique , that each part may be brought in rather easilie entreated , than streiningly intruded ; and rather agreeing naturally , than forced violently . therefore omitting all industrious curiousity , and friuolous affectation of following too far ( where yet i must needs fall short ; ) i onely desire , that where i shall shew a reciprocall likenesse of habitude , affection , or disposition ; there the similitude may passe approued , and induce assent : and that where these may not readily be had , there i may find such curteous construction , as that i may neither be charged with partiality of concealing ( where it is meet i should be mute ) nor be suspected of vnsufficiencie for not pursuing where i can find no footing . it is vnfallable what i propound for my first principle , that in euery particular person , there is both the seed and similitude of a state incorporat , yet to imagine or seeke for in each seuered or subdeuided parts , such affinitie and fitnesse betwixt them , as may mutually illustrate each other ; were not to tune but to crack the strings , and to make quidlibet ex quodlibet , or , ex quouis ligno mercurium . modestie and discretion bindeth vs to a stint , beyond the which if we shall stretch or streine , we may iustly be said to haue borrowed of the wyer-drawers : we must not compell our applications there to shake hands and embrace , where discrepance of nature hath estranged and set apart . were it not ridiculous for absurditie , and blasphemous for impietie , if in that serious similitude of christs comming to iudgement like a theefe in the night , we should ( beyond the ge●●inall agreeablenesse of their vnlooked for stealing vpon vs ) in other most vngodly sences linke in christ in likenesse with a theefe ? or if that other notable parable of the vniust steward , were ( from the commendation of his prouident preuention ) racked with other references , to make his deceiptfulnesse also praise-worthy ; who would not conuince such vnfit and lefthanded handling , both of wildnesse in wit , and wickednesse of hart ? to conclude , i will knit vp this point thus , that in the knitting and according of things diuers into one point of agreement , ( making by such their enterchangeable lendings of like reason and respect , a lightsomnesse of proofe and vnderstanding ) we must auoid their diuersities as sands and rocks , and keep the right channell of an allowed likenesse ; which will conduct vs both safely and delightsomly in this course of comparing . farewell . ¶ a briefe of such points as are comparatiuely handled in the discourse following . what is meant in the saying of pithagoras , that man is the measure of all things , and how this measure may serue in the matching of the state thereunto . folio . in euery state , soueraigntie the soule , alleageance the bodie . . in euerie ciuill state there must be the ruling , and the ruled . ibid. impugners of magistracie refuted . ibid. of the good that subiects haue by gouernment , with the end thereof . . mutuall offices betweene soueraigne and subiect . ibid. good gouernment the states happinesse . . no gouernment without law . ibid. soueraignes loue to their subiects . . soueraignes care of their subiects well doing . ibid. the excellencie of soueraigntie , and how they be ordained of god , and what thereof is inferred . . & . against ambition . . soueraignes haue a waightie charge full of labours and cares . . they deuide part of their care and worke to inferiour magistrats , and be wronged by their negligence . . all commaund and power in the state deriued from the soueraigne . . supremacie is maintained against the pope , or any other without or within the realme . . the rights of soueraignes not too far to bee extended , nor too much to be restrained . . of soueraigntie . the soule set forth in his seuerall powers , and then the soueraignty compared to the same . ibid. soueraigntie in his vegetable powers . . soueraigntie in his sensitiue and intellectuall parts . . councellors . . fauorites . ibidem . whether the soueraignes will may stand for law . . misinforming of soueraignes . . the soueraignes yeelding to the customes and inclinations of the people . ibid. the soueraigne may not admit different sects of resolution . ibid. the soueraigne helped or wronged by obedience or disobedience of the people . ibid. soueraignes sometimes suppressed by rebels . . the soueraigne troubled with courtiers suits . . the soueraigne troubled with male contents . ibid. all offenders haue their pretences ; especially traytors . ibid. the soueraignes records ; and of the embezilling or falsifying of them . . soueraignes prerogatiues . ibid. soueraignes not to be euill spoken of vppon supposall of any faults in them . . soueraignes called gods , and what thereof inferred . . the large extent of soueraigntie , by comparison thereof to god and the soule . ibid. whether it is better for the soueraigne to be much or seldome seene of the people . . soueraignes compared to the head . . in the plantation of ciuill people , the head the root . . the excellencie of the head ; it dearely loueth all the parts ; and it againe 〈…〉 . ibid. the diseases of the head caused from the bodie , therefore to be borne with . . no repugnancie of the parts against the head . ibid. how there should be no opposing , nor deposing of soueraignes . ibid. good subiects oft take vpon them the faults committed by their soueraigne . ibid. soueraignes , in what sence they be likened to the hart . . their commaund and force . ibid. their bountie and benefits , binding subiects to all dutie . . their loue of vertue . ibid. soueraignes to looke well to them that be neare about them . . how factions and sides do grow ; and how they be preuented . ibid. the soueraignes sports and recreations not to be grudged at . ibid. the soueraigne wronged , when his officers , iudges , and councellors be wronged . . the person of the soueraigne full of maiestie . ibid. diuersitie of respects in the soueraigne , touching his person and soueraigntie ; the worke thereof sheweth the maiestie of it . . the soueraigne may not do wrong to his subiects . . of certaine essentiall orders in the state . . the gifts of statesmen to be well disposed of . . the chiefe officers or nobles to be well fafegarded . ibid. of the body politique , and the foure elements whereof it is compounded . . & . how the vneuen mixture of these elements maketh abounding of humours , and difference of complexions . . the necessitie of keeping these elements in concord , there is oft discord in the parts of one and the same element . . sundry formes of bodies politike arising from vnequall mixture . . the harme which commeth by distemper , which conuerteth that to hurt which otherwise were good . . the beginnings , increasings , and endings of commonwealths , with all their alterations , chiefly of god. . & . the peoples different dispositions , and the right ruling of them all to the publike good , by the example of the body in the dieting thereof , in exercise , and in other sundrie tendances . . & . equalitie how to be obserued in the distribution of the profits of the commonweale . . against paritie , prouing difference in dignitie and riches . ibid. not to reward , worse than not to punish . . difference of dignities and degrees , . dignities not to be basely bestowed . . why the bodie politike is called a commonweale . ibid. the mutualitie of helps in the members . ibid. greatest respect to be had of the chiefe parts , against whom the enemies bend most . . each part to bee allotted to his owne worke . . parts disordred maketh the body monstrous . . against conspiracies , and of the late intended treasons . . against idle vagrant and vnprofitable people . . against ingrossing of many offices into one mans hands . ibid. of many well agreeing in one worke . . in the worke of ruling no more heads but one . . britania one bodie needing but one head . . inducements for vnion . ibid. the bodie politique may haue many imperfections , and yet remayne a bodie . . shifts vsed for supply of defects , as to entertayne straungers , to take mercenaries , and to enter leagues with other realmes . and what successe such shifts vsually haue . ibid. what perfection may be looked for in the commonweale . ibid. signes of health in the state . . signes inferre no certaintie , but often deceaue . ibid. health how necessarie . . a griefe in part putteth the whole out of health . . of discontentednesse . ibid. the obseruing of originall orders preserueth health . ibid. alterations daungerous . ibid. nature best liketh that whereto it hath bene accustomed . . alterations must not bee sodayne , or of the whole , but by leasure and degrees . ibid. cases of alteration . . better keepe health than recouer it . ibid. of prouiding in prosperitie for aduersitie . ibid. timely preuentions very requisite , because of small beginnings great mischiefes often ensue . . of tolleration of euils in the state . . cases for sufferance of euill . . wee may hurt to heale , and take phisicke to preuent diseases . . of the diseases of the state , and how they arise . . difference in faults . . against equalitie of sinne , and how punishment must be proportionable to the offence . . outward euils not so dangerous as inward . ibid. lawes compared to phisicke , and the soueraigne the chiefe phisicion , and vnder him magistrats , their great charge . . & . the cause why their authoritie is so repined at . . the necessitie of magistracie . ibid. magistrats not to bee discouraged by the repugnancie of the people . . magistrats workes agreeth with the phisicions works . ibid. sundry sorts of medicines for the state . ibid. whether the magistrat may be trusted in altering the punishment by law appointed by increasing or mitigating of the same . . as the faults be not equall , no more must be the punishment . ibid. points to be obserued of the states phisicion . . & . the phisicions of the state , are to tend all that be diseased , especially great men , whose faults are most perilous , and why they bee so . . diuers requisites in the phisicions of the bodie politique , and sundry positions touching the diseases of the state , and their cure . . against vnskilfull pragmatikes . . the learned fittest for gouernment . . the harme of vnperfect curing . ibid. discretion in ordering of state businesse , or in any other learning . . of seueritie . ibid. of lenitie . ibid. the same disease may be cured by contrary wayes . . & . repealing of old , and making of new lawes . . magistrats may make vse of the wicked . . the praise of good magistrats . ibid. qualities requisite in the phisicion . ibid. his loue towards the people . . not to be couetous . ibid. greedinesse of gayne in some lawyers . . a miserie neuer to be out of law . ibid. magistrates may haue priuate faults , and yet bee good magistrats . ibid. skill in gouerning his chiefest vertue . . rather to be natiues than straungers . . their good example of great force . . they must not defist from their duties for any abuses offered . ibid. the ought not to haue too many offices or imployments . ibid. compared to a surgion in three properties . . they sometimes offend the law , and are then to be punished by other magistrats . . their faults no preence for any to disobey them . . their deseruings soone forgotten , and often not recompenced sufficiently . . their good endeuors often censured by the euents . . the lawmakers abused and discouraged for want of execution of their lawes ; and how great an injurie that is . . lawes often by cauils illuded to the wrong of magistracie and iustice . . obedience the chiefe vertue of subiects . . a knitting the subiect and the soueraigne in mutuall loue , making the commonweale blessed thereby . . in the conclusion . politicall gouernours made famous by the praises of the learned . . the benefit which soueraignes may haue by reading of politicall books . the dedicattion of such works , due to the gouernors of the state . . against curiositie in priuat persons , of looking into state businesse . . sobrietie to be vsed in inquisitiuenesse , the highest degree whereof is to prie into princes dealings and dispositions . . the hainousnesse of that fault . . a caueat against it by a comparison of the soueraigne to the soule . . soueraigntie as great a mysterie in policie , as the soule in the body . . finis . a comparatiue discourse of the bodies naturall and politique . it was pithily spoken of pithagoras , that man is the measure of al things : importing thereby , that man by the ampliation and application of his powers apprehensiue , discerneth , discusseth , and confineth the seuerall works of nature : with his sences hee measureth things sensible , with his vnderstanding he perceiueth things intellectuall , with his illuminate & inspired knowledge , he comprehendeth things diuine and supernaturall ; yea more , by this so large and vnmeasured measure , all things are made sutable to the esteeme of man , and be either great or small , light or heauy , faire or illfauored , desireable or auoydable , as by mans well or ill conceauing the same bee valued . but beyond all this , the meaning of that sage sentence extendeth yet farther , that in the very composure of man , there is manifestly discouered a summary abstract of absolute perfection , by the which as by an excellent idea , or an exact rule , we may examine and exemplifie all other things . the mathematicians haue found out by their obseruance of the beautious and vniforme proportion of the body of man , and by the symetrie of the parts therof , their true scantlines and dimensions ; yea by the laying of it in his full length , & then spreading the armes and legges to their widest compasse , they haue contriued both the perfect square , and the exact circle : the square , by foure right lines at the foure vttermost points of the hands and feet ; the circle , by rounding a line about those points , placing the center of their compasse vpon the nauell . the naturall philosophers reduceth the vastnesse of the vniuersal ( comprehending all things that hath either being , or vegitation , or sence , or reason ) vnto this same well compacted epitome of mans fabrifacture . then much more may the politique philosopher , hauing for his proper subiect the compound of men ciuilly assembled and associate , make man the obiect of his discourse and contemplation , to fit his treatise with good fashion to so imitable a patterne . therefore this measure ( thus induced thereto ) i haue made my choice of , to trie thereby the forme of a commonweale , what therein is right or wrye , what redundant or defectiue , what orderly or disproportionable ; the helpe of such a briefe , and the trueth of such a standerd , may serue to ballance the matters of deliberation , fitly accommodating and rectifying all designements and proceedings . and sith i doe find this lyne of likenesse to bee chalked out vnto vs in gods works , i will there begin my applying , where that profound wisdom hath begun his framing . as in the creating of man god conioined a soule for action , in a body passiue : so in his ordinance of mans sociable conuersing ( to make the vnion of a body politike ) he hath knit together a passiue subiection to an actiue superoiritie : and as in euery man there is both a quickning & ruling soule , and a liuing and ruled bodie ; so in euery ciuill state , there is a directing & commaunding power , & an obeying and subiected alleageance , for as neither the soule alone , nor body alone ( if they should be seuered ) can be a man , so not the ruler alone , nor the subiects alone , can be a commonweale . where all will rule , there is no rule , and where none doeth rule , there is all misrule : but to rule well , and to bee well ruled , is the surest bond of humane societie . such vnruly routs , as ( humourously led in dislikes ) denyeth the lawfulnesse of magistrats , may well bee likened to certayne peeuish male-contents , who ouertoyled with the tediousnesse of life ( and that often without any apparant cause ) wisheth that they had no soules , it being all one to want in the body a soule , and in the state a gouernour : yet as the body sustayneth no harme or wrong , yea is infinitly benefited and graced by the powerfull working of the soule in his organs ; so the people guided by a iust gouernmēt , not only are not therby iniured , hindered or abased , but much enabled , enobled , and aduanced euen to the highest pitch of a welthie and safe repose . then as the soule is the forme which to the body giueth being , and essence ; and the body is the matter which desiringly affecteth his forme : so both the ruler should wholy indeuour the welfare of his people , and the subiect ought ( as in loue to his owne soule ) to conforme vnto his soueraigne ; that both of them mutually like twinnes of one wombe , may in the neere and deare nature of relatiues , maintaine vnuiolate that compound of concordance , in which and for which they were first combined . as the coupling of the soule and bodie , tendeth not onely to giue life , but also to the attayning of a perfect and happy life : so the right temper of soueraigntie and obedience , intendeth end effecteth not only the being , but also the florishing and felicitie of a commonweale . for the gayning of which propounded happinesse , as the soule is the worthier agent , taking the greatest care , and deseruing the chiefest commendation , in so much as a man is not said to be happie for any his strength , his bignes , propernesse , or comely feature of body , but for the goodnesse , noblenesse , and vertuous endowements of his soule : so for the acquiring or framing of any perfection in the commonweale , we are not so much to behold the largenesse , the power , or the well shewing composure thereof , as the prudencie , justice , and other vertuous sinceritie of a rightful gouernment . in man the soule ruleth by reason , and in the state the soueraigne gouerneth by lawes ; which may no lesse aptly be termed the soule of soueraignty , than reason is said to be the soule of the soule . it can neuer bee so much as conceaued , that the soule should be without reason , though by the vnaptnes or repugnancie of the organs , his power in working is either interrupted or impugned : so gouernment may not bee so much as imagined to be without law , though the force and life of the law , through the waywardnesse of the subiects , cannot alwayes alike be shewed or seene in his due effects : no not the soueraigne will infringe lawes , no more than the soule will renounce reason . herewith the fiction of the poets and the paynters well agreeth , which in the description and portraiture of iupiter adioined iustice sitting on his right hand ; howsoeuer it pleased anaxarchus gybingly to tell alexander , that iupiter was not bound thereby to doe iustly , but that the people were thereof to conceiue , that whatsoeuer iupiter did was iust . it is worthie the noting , that albeit the bodie doeth often vnthankefully rebell against the soule , yet the soule euer loueth the body , still seeking to reduce it to the better , euen as a workeman mendeth his tooles , or a musician his instruments : whereof good rulers doe make to themselues this rule , that notwithstanding the subiects by their misbehauiour do often cause an incitation to wrath in their soueraign against them , yet in the punishing of such offenders , he will discouer no hatred to their persons , but to their faults , shewing himselfe grieued and vnwilling to afflict them , seeking rather their chasticement with pitie , than their destruction with crueltie , and rather to hold a coniunction with them by the mutualitie of louing offices , than to weaken his owne strength by the losse and cutting off the imployable parts of the state publike . the welfare and prosperitie of the bodie giueth to the soule sweet contentment , as secured thereby from the cares , perplexities , and griefes which want occasioneth : so the plentifull and abundant estate of the subiects , is by a good soueraigne both maintayned and reioyced at , sith it giueth to him assurance of supply and comfort in all necessities . in the creating of man , god is said to haue breathed into him the soule , whereby the puritie and dignitie thereof is much extolled aboue that lump of mowlded earth his body : so is the place of preheminence of an high maiestie , & of a more choice and better esteemed worth , as being more to the image of god , & participating more aptly with his greatnes , his power , his iustice , his mercie , his wisdome , his goodnes and bountie , and whatsoeuer els vnspeakable perfection in his vnsearchable essence ; for if mans gouerning of the creatures be to the image of god , then the gouerning of men is much more to that image . it was not in the power of the body either to chuse or refuse the soule , but his right of admission depended only on the pleasure of his imediate maker . i forbeare to force the consequence so farre , as wholy to debarre the peoples liking or electing of their gouernors : yet somewhat to temper the harshnesse , and to restrain the rashnesse of some peremptorie pragmatikes , i may be bold from that auerment of the soules imbreathing , to propound this application comparatiuely from thence inferred , that in this high poynt of principalitie , god hath reserued to himselfe this prerogatiue ofbestowing that dignitie , according to his owne most vnscrutable counsell : by me ( saith he ) kings do raigne . and saint paul auoucheth , that there is no power but of god : yea homer produceth graue nestor , reproouing of achilles for his obstinate withdrawing from agamemnons regiment , and his ouerbold contending with the king , sith his imperie was of god. true it is , that euen in the same phrases all things may be sayd to bee of god , and from god , as the authour , creator , preseruer , and disposer thereof : yet when we find him to single out and appropriat any onething more especially vnto his owne designements , wee are there to take notice of his greater respectiuenesse , and his ouerswaying greatnesse in the disposing and ordering of that matter beyond the orders and limitations of lawes or customes ; yea in such a case he conformeth the secundarie causes , to cooperate with him to his owne ends : as when he framed the peoples hearts , and the concurrance of their consents in the electing of saul and dauid vnto the kingly office , whom notwithstanding he had before himselfe appointed and anointed to that function . wherefore as the soule notwithstanding the mediate meanes of procreation , is vsually sayd to bee infused from aboue into the body : so the soueraigne euen in his particular parson , but much more the soueraigne authoritie may notwithstanding the approbation of men , or any other assisting helps in the establishing thereof , be rightly auouched to bee ordained and designed by god himselfe . as the soule ( in imitation of that infinitenesse from which it was first breathed ) spendeth all his powers with an insatiate desire in the search and inquisition of more and more knowledge , endeuouring therby a further dilatation or extention of his nature ( as to bee like vnto god himselfe : ) so doeth oft times a soueraigne ( haughtily conceyted of the likenesse he hath with his ordainer ) striue with all restlesse thoughts and deare aduentures , to inlarge the amplitude of his dominion , reckoning it the absolutenesse of perfection to bee extended beyond the compasse of any limitation , and then wishing the subduing of many worlds , that hee might more neerely resemble the highest god , that made and ruleth all the world . but vnto them both ( out of sorrowfull experience ) i may adde this correcting caueat , that such ambitious affectation , as it brought vppon the one the depriuation of his former blessednesse , so is it commonly punished in the other by the downefall and dissipation of his so exalted state . and as the one hath euer since beene stinted at a measure of vnderstanding acquirable by the organs of the body ( the which to seeke to exceed is a renouncing of humilitie , yea a forgetting of our humane imbecilitie , & a curiositie beyond sobrietie : ) so is each soueraigne power listed & confined to his owne territories , maynteinable by the strength therof , the which who so is not cōtented with , is accoūted blamable of a presumptuous & vniust vsurpation beyond the boūds to him assigned . in that the soule is authour of action and motion in the body passiue , himselfe being neuer idle , it sheweth by similitude , that the soueraigne doth vncessantly care and labour for the publike good , and that his place is not ( as some vayne heads imagine ) the seat of idlenesse and pleasure , but that his crowne is accompanied , and euen encompassed with so many restlesse thoughts , and stinging cares , as affoordeth him but small respit of ease , no not in the night season , as homer describeth his agamemnon . howsoeuer the body be termed passiue , in regard of the soules working in and by his instruments , yet vnto it also the soule imparteth his power of mouing and acting , and the more noble parts thereof bee the more indued and inabled with the soules best and worthiest faculties . so is all superioritie and commaund in the state , deriuatiuely branching from the supreme principalitie ; and the subiects of best sort , & fittest for vse and imploiments do share the greatest portion of such their soueraignes subdiuided authoritie : the remembrance & meditation whereof cannot but adde vnto such designed and deriued magistrats a spurre of quickening incouragement , more watchfully to attend so waightie a charge , least through their fayntnesse and dulnesse there be procured to their soueraigne a distayning disgrace or imputation of disabilitie . for as when the sences and powers of the bodie bee fallen asleepe , the soule also ( as not shewing himselfe in the life of his actions ) may be thought to be fast bound & surprised with the same slumbers : so when the substituted and authorized officers do desist from their indeuours and vigilancie in the tendance of the charge or businesse to them credited ; the soule of soueraignetie is in such their slacknesse or sleepinesse greatly discredited , as if it were wholy depriued of his power , yea of the very apparance of his gouerning vertue . i● i● not impossible & vnsensible , that a body should liue or moue by any other soule , than that wherunto by nature it is vnited . and is it not as absurd in any mans vnderstanding , and as preposterous by vsurpation , that any forraine power should intrude to rule and exercise iurisdiction in any other kingdom entire within it selfe , and of absolute supremacie & sufficiencie to gouerneal persons & causes within the dominions therof . surely , as in euery indiuiduall body , the owne soule thereof sufficeth for all naturall workes requisite to be effected therein : so in euery soueraigne state , the ruling authoritie thereof is of it selfe competent and compleate , for the wel gouerning and ordering of all the affaires , needfull or behouable to be attended vnto , in that entire territorie : and it may in no wise be contradicted , but that in any countrey , the commaunding , summoning , and censuring of subiects , together with the sentensing of causes , hath his whole dependance & deriuation from the right and preheminence of the soueraignetie and that the duties stile and intitelings vsual and belonging , ought with all submissiue acknowledgement and respectiue reference , to be rendered thereunto : which points of high regalitie , whē any subiect shall either deny vnto his soueraigne , or take vnto himselfe , what is it els , than as if an inferiour and ministeriall spirit , who hath no other function in the body , but as an agent or deputie for the soule in the workes to him assigned , shall intrudingly vsurpe , arrogate , and possesse the place , name and office of the soule it selfe ? except wee should witlessely imagine two soules in one body , like two sunnes in one firmament . the soule and the body are so firmely and intirely vnited in nature , that the philosophers found it no easie worke to bound each from other with iust distinguishment , or proportionable partition . tullie desirous to hold an equal or middle course , blameth as well aristippus , for affecting the body too much , as if there were no soule : as also zeno , for forgetting that we haue also bodies , when he referreth all vnto the soule . such good respect is obserued to haue beene had in equalling the rights of the realme and soueraigne : for such as extendeth preheminence too farre , may bee likened to such philosophers , as sayd , that man was all soule , and nothing but the soule : and such on the other side which kirbeth too much the awfull authoritie of high supremacie , with an enterpose of any popular or mediate force to restraine or resist it , agreeth with that philosophie , that darkeneth , drowneth and imprisoneth the soule within the body , as if it were rather subdued by the bodie , than the bodie endued with his gifts . to be sure to deale indifferently on each part , it is not amisse to consider of them sundred and apart . to begin with the soule : if wee should gather and bind together all his distinguished parts , and essentiall faculties , into one as himselfe is one , we shal readily find what in proprietie of interest to him belongeth . it fareth with the soule in the body , as it did amongst the poets with iupiter in the heauens , who notwithstanding that he did all in all , and was the vnlimitted transcendence aboue al , yet what euer he did in the skyes , in the ayre , and windes , in the earth , in the sea , or places subterraniall , by nature , by force , by arte , by wisdome , by persuasion , by curious workemanship , by profitable inuentions , by extraordinarie instincts of the mind , or by any other meanes whatsoeuer , for gouerning of the world , or the good of man , and the commodity of this life , was attributed vnto some other fayned gods , so as in very trueth , the multitude of gods in those times , was but the multiplicitie of power in one god : the soule likewise in the body being but one , and the same , operating diuersly according to the disposition and aptnes of the instruments , is to challenge to himselfe as the rightfull owner or authour , whatsoeuer life , sence , motion , discerning , health , strength , beautie , abilities , actions , graces , or gifts inherent or appertayning vnto the body , howsoeuer the same ( by a change or new purchase of their names ) seemeth to disauow their proceding from his essence . euen that facultie of vegetation ( which seemeth so base and drossie , and to hold most of the earthlinesse of the body ) hath yet his originall root and plantation in the soule , whether wee consider the same in the power nutritiue for preseruation , or in the augmentatiue for perfection , or in the generatiue for multiplication , we shall find it wholy to flow from this fountain : with the nutritiue power must concurre appetition , digestion , retention , and expulsion : in digestion is required an immutation , a formation , and an assimilation ; in all which so necessarie and fundamentall functions of life , the soule euidently blazeth foorth his effecting force , sith neyther without a soule , nor with any more soules than one , the bodie of it selfe could possibly , either so orderly and concordantly contriue his owne good by so helpfull meanes , or performe such worthy actions by any natiue vigor . the sensitiue facultie is much more sensibly discerned to take discent from the soule . the sences are as the dores and windowes through and forth of the which he maketh his prospects and passages ; yea their attendance is so vnseparablie annexed vnto the soule , that where he diuerteth himselfe , and giueth no attention , there the eye seeing seeth not , the eare hearing heareth not , and all other acts of any sences , be voyd of perceiuing or apprehending . to discourse at large , with full sailes , how the sences do recommend their conceiuing vnto the fantasie ; how the fantasie deliuereth them ouer vnto the vnderstanding ; how the vnderstanding either absolutely iudgeth them by reason , or erroniously mistaketh them by opinion ; how either reason or opinion , exciteth affections ; how affections either aduised by deliberation , or passionate by humors , induceth the assent of the will ; and how the will commaundeth & enforceth motion and prosecution in all or any parts of the bobie : howsoeuer it might amplie and excellently illustrate the powerfull operations of the soule , so orderly lincked , cheyned , and wrapped one within another : yet lest the delightsomnesse of following the tract of so well pleasing a theame , should draw me too far out of my way , i will wynd about againe , by making a second suruey thereof , in the matching to the same of mine applications . the gouerning preeminence of the estate , though it be somtimes in like maner obscured , and wronged by inferior deriuations ; yet such as can surmount the vulgar thoughts , in reducing vnto one glorious and potent head of maiestie , all the seuerall branchings and subalternations thereof , shall easily find how agreeablie it holdeth semblance with the soule , in this respect also , as to be but one , yet effecting all , yea , to be all in all , and all in euery part of the bodie politique . there is not in the commonwealth , any the least synew for mocion , the least vaine for norishment , the least spirite for life and action , the least strength for defence , or offence , the least member for vse and benefit , which is not replenished with this power , and sucketh from this ouerflowing cesterne , all his subsistance and performance . ( and if i thought it not vnfit to be ouer-curious in fitting exactly the particulers of each ) i would not pretermit a more large comparing of them , euen in their alike forces of vegetation also . who seeth not , that it belongeth to the office of soueraignitie , to prouide for the nourishing and mainteining of the state with necessaries , to amplifie the dominions thereof , for profit and dignitie , to spread abroad the encrease of the people by colonies , in the nature of generating or propagating , to cherish in the subiects an appetite of acquiring of commodities , to graunt to them places of mart and market for the digesting of the same vnto all parts of the realme , and so to change forme and assimulate them to their most behoofe : to giue order for the holding and retaining of that which is become their well agreeing and naturall sustenance , and for the expelling as well of the hurtfull ouercharge , as the vnprofitable excrements of the weale publique . will you yet see farther the soueraigne vertue of the soueraigne power , in all and euerie the parts of the state ? produce me any ( though a person altogether priuate , occupying but a roome or drawing breath in the common wealth ) that is not enforced both by foreseeing reason , and after-prouing euents , to acknowledge all his good whatsoeuer , to be first giuen , and then secured vnto him , by the force of a well ordered gouernment , out of the circle whereof there can be neither welfare , nor safetie , but contrariwise , all confusion , slaughter , rapine , and vniust bereauing of him of all that is or can be deare vnto him . but who so listeth to behold this politicall soule of the state in his full royaltie and amplitude , let him looke vpon his more noble parts , the sensuall and intellectuall ; the according and conforming whereof to his important vses , maketh the gordian knot of a powerfull and peacefull blessednes . then the soueraignitie ( mouing , working , & ruling in his three estates ) matcheth well the three headed gerion , whom iustine interpreteth to signifie the vnion of three louing brethren ; then it seeth more than the hundreth eyes of argus , and acteth more than the hundreth handes of briareus . all subiects will , as the sences , play the espials and intelligencers ; as the members , be stirred and commaunded in cases of imployment ; and as the spirits imaginatiue , propose for apprehension , the true shapes and formes of things , either pleasing and eligible , or hurtfull and auoydable . the councellors of state like the vnderstanding facultie , applye all their endeuours to aduance the glorie , and further the enterprises of this their ruling soule , being themselues also by his supreame reason to be ordered , or iudged in their right or wrong conceiuings . the fauorites of a prince may be resembled to the fantasies of the soule , wherewith he sporteth and delighteth himselfe ; which to doe ( so the integritie of iudgement , and maiestie of state be reteyned ) is in neither of both reproueable . which of vs is there that doth not ( especially in matters rather pleasing than important ) follow and feed his fantasies , giue scope vnto them , suffer them to preuaile with him , reckoning it a great part of his contentment to haue them satisfied ? i will refraine to presse the application farther than the well taught subiects will of themselues conceiue . there must be no despitefull enuying at the soueraignes fauorites : as they be to him the recreating comforts choicely selected ; acceptablie to consort withall ; so their enriching , aduauncing , and gracing , with the cleerest signes of their soueraignes loue , is not onely allowable , but plainely necessarie , sith they cannot walke continually in the sunne , but they must needs be coloured . the will of the soueraigne in the decreeing or enacting of lawes , holdeth the like right as the will of the soule doth in the perfourming the resolues of reason . allow that the soule were now in his first cleere sighted innocencie , it could not will or affect any thing that were not absolute reason : so were soueraignes vncorrupted with that all-taynting canker of sinne , and free from euery humane infirmitie , their will alone were vndoubted law & iustice ; but on the other side , when reason ( whose office it is to shew the right ) is vanquished by the errours of misconceiuing , then the will by such bad direction is driuen to sinne in his designed works : so where the iudgement of the soueraigne swarueth from sinceritie of true discerning , there his will and all decrees , or executions following the same , must of necessitie be culpable and turne to wrong . wherefore sith it will not be gainsaid , but that soueraignes through their naturall frailties , are subiect as well to the imbecillitie of iudgement , as also to sensuall and irrationall mocions , rising out of the infectious mudd of flesh and bloud , ( the obseruance of which tainte in mans nature , caused plato to say , that the bodie was more in the soule , than the soule in the bodie ) and that such their defects may well disable them , from either attayning vnto , or retayning firmely the precise points of perfect iustice : how both prudently and louingly do those soueraignes gouerne , who neither taking to themselues that absolutenes of sole power in law-giuing , which by some ( being indeed of too hard a temper ) is colourably , claymed to be originall and hereditarie to their places ; neither trusting too much to their owne sufficiencies , either of wisedome or vprightnes , ( which seldome be without some admixture of imperfections ) do at the making of statutes and ordinances , assemble for consultation and consent , a full assistance of the noblest and choisest aduisours that the state affourdeth : thereby drawing supplies out of their politicall bodie , to make good what wanteth in their naturall ? from the errors of inferior sences , the conceit of the common sence receiueth much misinforming , which in the end and by degrees reacheth a seducement to the soule it selfe : so may the soueraigne vnwittingly by wrong reports of some neer about him , be misled from the knowledge of the trueth , into many misbeleeuings . the humors of the bodie do often forciblie preuaile in the working and stirring of the mind ; whereupon some philosophers haue tyed the soule vnto the temperature of the bodie : so the customes and inclinations of the people in each countrie , hath otherwhile no smal force in the inclyning of the soueraignes disposition , if not to approue , yet to tollerate some imperfections . the mind must not suffer it selfe , for want of resolution , to be distracted by diuersitie of vndiscussed opinions , as wauering and wandering without iudgement , hauing warre within it selfe : so the gouernour may not well admit or harken vnto different and factious sectes , tending to the disturbing and instabilitie of his gouernment . the affections so long as they be obedient vnto reason , standeth the soule in great steede ; but if they become violent and vnrulie , then ( of their disordering , and disturbing of the minds tranquillitie ) they be rightly tearmed perturbations . such is the soueraignes case ; if the people be tractable , and truely seruiceable , with all dutious subiection , in the nature of right alleagiance , then as louing subiects , by their forwardnesse in cooperating with him , they giue strength and stay vnto his gouernment : but if they turne mutinous and tumultuous , troubling the gouernour and state with seditious disorders , then be they as rebels by the iustice of the law to be suppressed , euen as the perturbations of the mind must be subdued by reason , which alone is that powerfull pallas that bestoweth her golden bridle vpon bellorophon , to rule therewith that fierce and haughtie pegasus . the force of these headie and giddie perturbations is tyrannously extreame , and that not onelie in the common sort of men , ( whom like to a heard of swine , they whirle headlong into a sea of vices ) but also in persons of the best qualitie , whose resistance proueth oft too faint to escape , or keepe off such violent inuasions as suppresseth and vanquisheth euen reason it selfe : so is the soueraigne sometimes by traytors and reuolters surprised and constrained vnnaturally and vnlawfully , to the interruption of his gouernment , and ruinating of the state. opinion is the forerunner ( if not the father ) of affections , himselfe a verie misbegotten , between selfe-loue the mother , and supposall the sire , which ( like an amorous make-loue ) woeth at once both the virgin truth , and the harlot errour , yet affianced to neither , hath but vnperfect notions betwixt both ; from which notions notwithstanding , as the same shall apprehend a conceit of good or euill , the affections taking motion , do start forth , putting themselues in readines , to repell the imagined euill , and to embrace the seeming good . vpon the surmise of good , appetites are excited : these be the attendants , and as it were the courtiers of the soule , who immoderately seeking to satisfie their own desires , giueth the soule no rest , till he bestow all his faculties of vnderstanding wit , and deuise , to accomplish their requests : princes seldome want the apes of such appetites , that is to say , begging and flattering petitioners , pleasing and applauding parasites , who vsing all cunning insinuating , are neuer without their varietie of sutes , to aduance their owne good , howsoeuer their soueraigne be thereby either impouerished or dishonored . vpon the opinion of euill ariseth that hidious & snakie head of medusa , fearfull , fretfull , greeuing , carefull , repining , and dispairing thoughts , filling the soule with the horror of much discomfiture ; such malecontents and froward cinicks the soueraigne oft is pestered with , who neuer well pleased with the aucthorized proceedings , ( though most approueable ) doe still feed vpon their owne disliking conceits , and will alwaies with the keistrell , flie against the winde , making their opposicion ( by clamorous complaints ) against aucthoritie . these affections of both sorts , being in their originall altogether oppinionat , will sometimes ( by reason of the neerenesse that opinion hath vnto reason ) make bold to alleage reason for themselues , and will seeme to be iudicious & iust in their intendements . this wanteth not his semblance ( as in the natures before described ) so chiefely in some traitors of better place , who knowing their dignities in neernesse to the prince , and of commaund in their countries , will take vpon them ( though intending their owne end ) to pretend equitie & honestie , yea , and the soueraignes aucthoritie also , giuing out a populer pretext of publique good , onely to make way thereby to their foule treasons . the mind hath yet one endowment more , which almost equalleth all the rest ; which is a faithfull memorie of his fore-attainted knowledges , in whose good trust and custodie , he treasureth vp all his rich acquirings : what semblance there is thereof also in the soule of state , it cannot be obscure . the soueraigne is well stored with remembrancers , nothing passeth from him , or setleth in him but by record ; all his seates of iudgement entereth and preserueth the proceedings in causes ; and to forge , corrupt , or embezill the recordes ( whereof any good gouernment hath a tender and strict regard ) what is it else , than as if the memorie should be cleane taken from the mind , to the which it is vnseperable , or should become a lying misreporter ; which nor his nature , nor his office can endure . these faculties the soule doth shew and exercise , in and with the organs of the body , but he hath a farther and more inlarged force , beyond & without the compasse of any concreat or materiall substance , as abstracting and segregating himselfe to his owne puritie , and aduaunced thereby to a more neere resemblanee of the diuine nature . for as we rightly conceiue of god , that albeit he worketh efficiently , and ( if i may so say ) naturally , by the mediate causes , yet his potencie is not so by them tied or confined , but that he often performeth his owne pleasure by extraordinarie meanes , drawne out of his absolute power , both preter & contra naturam : so the soule , besides his vsuall & functionarie operations , in and by the ministerial abilities of the body , hath other peculiar motions and actions of his owne , neither aided nor impeached by any corporiall assistance or resistance . to this likenesse of god and the soule , let vs also shape our soueraigntie : which ( besides that which is regular in regiment , and from his power and goodnes imparted vnto the people ) hath still , and reteineth to it selfe certaine prerogatiue rights of most ample extentions , and most free exemptions , whereof true reuerence ( filled with all submissiue acknowledgements , and contented with that portion and interest which it receiueth from regalitie ) admitteth no questioning disputes , and whereof iust gouernours do not so farre inlarge the lists , as to do what they lust , but do so moderate the vse ( as god in the world , and the soule in the body ) not to the impeach , but to the support of iustice ; not to the hurt , but to the good of subiects . thus hauing perused the seuerall parts and properties of the soule , together with the likenesse and correspondēce of soueraigntie therto ; not without touching also the dangers and declinations whereunto they both are subiect : i should ( if i were not tied within a teather , and thereby restrained from al affectionate discoursing or dilating ) frame vnto them both some hortatorie admonition vnto circumspect demeanure , for the preuenting of ensnaring euils , and reprochfull obloquies . o let not the pure substance of the soule , for some few his imperfections be vnpurely censured : so neither the deare reputation of anointed maiestie maliciously traduced by some slender imputations . if vppon some displeasing occasions his anger be enkindled , shall any zeno dare to say of him ( as of the soule ) that hee is all fire ? if he should bee thought somewhat to offend in softlinesse and effeminatnes , will the philosopher hippias ( as he defined the soule ) so slaunder him to be but water ? if he could be noted for a little leuitie and vnconstancie , must there needs bee found out straight some anaximenes , to terme him as he conceiued of the soule , to bee wauering and fleeting ayre ? if caringly he regard the support of his high port , by attending his profits , and looking to his prouisions , is hee to be concluded and pronounced , as zenophantes thought the soule , to be concreat of earth ? how much better were it rather to apply vnto the soueraigne the opinion which aristotle held of the soule , that he consisteth of the pure and excellentest essence , being to be accounted scant any humane creature , but wholy of a celestiall temper , as from thence both originally ordained , & daily gouerned ? or to make him hold comparison with the soule , in that supremest title ( which euripides durst bestow vppon the soule ) euen to be a god. for which appellation to bee bestowed vppon the soueraigne , the god of gods hath giuen vs a warrant beyond all warrants , the manifold and mightie effects , which in , and for the body politique , this states soule performeth , doth ratifie the same by reason also . is not the body of it selfe a confused lump , vnformed , sencelesse , witlesse , and destitute of all helping meanes to mayntaine it selfe from perishing and vtter dissoluing ? and doth not this soule ( setting to worke all his assisting powers ) quicken it , moue it , care for it , prouide for it , cherish it with his loue , furnish it with his gifts , gouerne it with his wisdome , establish it with his iustice , & protect it with his puissance ? if then he bee the deriuatiue , and ( as it were ) a diminitiue of the mightie god , shall not his vassals ( both respectiuely to his so high entitelings , & gratefully for his great deseruings ) refraine their rashnesse of deeming and dooming in his doings ? and rather reuerently recognize the blessed benefits that bindeth them to loue , than with a gyant-like presumption seeke to depraue his sacred estimation ? to accumilate calumnies and detractions against the soueraigne ( so to abase and pull downe maiestie ) is like to the pyling vp of hill vppon hill , to warre with heauen : and it may be better called petit blasphemie , for a subiect to blemish the soueraigne with soule aspersions , than it is called petit treason for a seruant to slay his master ; sith the dutie and priuitie betweene them is more astringent , and the offences against a dietie hath an infinitie of sinne . there is a question amongst the philosophers , where and in what part of the body the soule should bee seated ; some place it in the head , as in the highest towre , with his chiefe informers , aduisors and assistants round about him ; some in the heart , as the middest of his kingdome , from thence to spread and distribute life and spirit more readily to all the parts ; and others alotting to it no chiefe seat at all , extendeth it equally vnto all , though it shew it selfe in each member differently as their capacities or abilities will permit , as if it therein also were in similitude with god himselfe , who being by the infinitie of his essence , euery where , yet is no where circumscribed , bounded with no including limits , or more certainly in one place than in another : but as god is sayd to haue his center euery where , his circumference no where ; to be in all places , yet not placed ; and with euery thing , yet mixed with nothing : so the soule communicating to all the parts his essentiall nature , is not encompassed by any part , nor is not more present in any one than in all . and as god ( notwithstanding such his vnmeasureable infinitenes of being euery where ) is often said possitiuely , & namely there to be , wher he maketh the more apparance of his presence : so the soule may be said there to be resiant , where his force and efficiencies be most discerned ; when he attendeth the discussing of intelligence and reason , then is his chaire of estate placed in the vpper house , and so seemeth to dwell in the head . when he betaketh himselfe to matter of action , or followeth the feruencie of affections , then he is thought to be conteined within the irascible part enwalled in the breast , and issuing chiefely from the hart ; when he falleth lower to the place of bestiall concupiscence , then he there also discouereth his presence in those inferior parts . and ( in a word ) according to the aptnesse or appliablenesse of any part , wheresoeuer he acteth , there he is : because ( as aristotle teacheth ) the efficient must conioyne vnto the effect , & the mouer to the moued . if any desire to vnderstand how this discourse of the soules either larger dilatation of himselfe throughout the whole bodie , or of his more especiall appropriating of his presence and worke vnto particuler parts , will accord by comparison with soueraigntie in a state ciuill ; let him in like sort examine how fitly the name of the head agreeth with the nature of a soueraigne ; and how properly the heart patterneth the preeminence , and how he doth seuerally conuey and impart to any part of his dominions , the verie essentiall faculties of his gouernment ; without the which no people can euer as subiects raunge themselues into the order , and communitie of humane societie , howsoeuer , as men , or rather as wild sauages , they may perhaps breath a while vpon the earth . it is a truth , that as the soule , so the power of principalitie in gouernment , ( though shewing it selfe in diuerse manner , as the varietie of euents ministreth occasion ) yet in all points , and all parts is all one . and that a righteous soueraigne ( as the soule doth in defending and succouring any the least member from destruction and harme ) hath an vnpartiall and most respectiue care , which extendeth it selfe ( as god and the soule doth ) vniuersally to the whole , and particulerly to each member indiuiduall . the which point of so large dilating his force , ( to the resemblance of such two patterns in a manner secresed and vnseene ) if i might haue leaue to straine a little farther , i could haue it serue me also thus far , as ( at the least ) to make a shew in that question propounded by some great clerks in policie , touching the princes ouer prodigall imparting of his presence amongst his people : for seeing that both god and the soule , working so vnlimitably , be yet vndiscerned , in their essence , as hidden and concealed from the eyes of men ; it may seeme to stand more with maiestie , and to work more regarding , more admiring , and more adoring , if ( howsoeuer their power in operating doth shew it selfe ) yet their presence be more sparingly & lesse familiarly vouchsafed . what is become ordinarie , that we vse either neglectingly to contemne , or fastidiously to dislike ; as on the other side , what hath for strangenesse a noueltie , for worth a dignitie , and for attayning a difficultie , is more desiringly , and more admiringly esteemed . hence ariseth in the minds of subiects such egernesse and longing to satisfie their sences in the seeing , hearing , and well knowing of their soueraigne , as if they were to seeke after the head of nilus , which sendeth them the ouerflow of their plentie ; or after the primum mobile of the world , which gouerneth the conuersions and fortunes of their life . it is herof concluded , that a soueraigne the lesse he is exposed to publique obseruance , the more he is presupposed to excell in amplitude of glorie : neuerthelesse it being so commendable a vertue in a gouernour to haue such a facilitie and goodnesse of nature , as ( remitting the high cariage of his greatnesse ) yeeldeth to his people with an affable gentlenesse easie approach for enterlocution . i cannot tell whether the contrarie sternenesse ( in haughtily shunning or repulsing their aspect ) will not haue ( in the euen eye of a well regarding policie ) the greater disallowing . now let vs passe on to peruse the comparisons , taken from the head . plato imagined man to be an heauenlie plant ; his head to be the roote ; his bulke , the stocke ; his armes and leggs the branches ; and his root to draw his sapp from the heauens to feede therewith the vnder parts , spreading downeward towardes the earth . such a plantation do i conceiue in the institution of a state politique : the soueraign head to be designed , inspired , depending , and protected from aboue ; and the body with the out-growing parts thereof , to receiue nourishment , strength , florishing , and fruitfulnes from that root of a rightfull regiment . if the root thriue , sucking abundantly of his heauenlie nutriment , the plant must needes prosper , and cannot do amisse : but if the root be destitute of grace , as depriued of his sapp , it induceth vpon the whole stocke of the state , a withering decay and pining barrennesse . in the head is the first wheele & string of motion , giuing force and order to the whole frame , the first fountaine of sence streaming from thence to the other cesterns , and the high erected pallace , where the mind keepeth his court , shining in his greatest maiestie . the head is by the order and instinct of nature , so dearely esteemed and honored of the bodie , as that euery part will not onely seek his ease and health , but euen expose it selfe to any perils for his sake and safetie : the inferior parts do susteine and beare him vp , mouing at his beck , and fast bound when he taketh rest : the hands and armes , do readily receiue vpon themselues the strokes and wounds , intended against the head ; yea , any part doth endure paine , by incision , scarifying , ligature , or issue , to remedie the greeuances of the head . these good duties of kindly subiection , to kingly power , i leaue to the consideration and conscience of euery true subiect , wishing him to make his best vse thereof by contemplating and applying of the same in the performance of like offices of alleagiance , loue , and loyaltie . we see the head naturally endued with a fellow feeling of any the griefes in the whole bodie , in so much as there is scant any disease so weake or small in any part , as doth not affect and disturbe the head also ; yea , it holdeth such a sympathie with the verie foot , as that a little wet or cold taken in that remotest place , hath forthwith a readie passage to the head . gracious soueraignes haue the like compassions and compunctions in the distresses of their subiects , and be in the same sort deeply peirced & perplexed with any wrong or distemperatures , hapning to the meanest of their people . i haue learned of the phisitions , that most of the diseases of the head , are originally arising and caused from the bodie : and i think that i may thus thereof infer ; that many the escapes of soueraignes by omission or comission , may thus far by this excuse be extenuated , as more imputable to the people than to them . therefore when from the head a fluxe of humours shall annoy and enfeeble the whole , or any part , i wish it should be remembred , that such as is our offering , such should be our suffering . many and verie dangerous be the euils , that from a distempered heat be distilled into the bodie . i might laboriously enlarge what harmes he may do to his subiected members , by his seuerall excesses or defects , the disorder and vneuen cariage wherof filleth the whole with remedilesse mischiefes . yet let vs marke this withall , that in the naturall bodie , there was neuer any parts so far digressing from their natiue nature of alleageance , and their indissolluble band of obedience , forgetting as well the good which they otherwise receiue , as the wrong whereby they continually infest him , as did once presume to oppose , or but repine against their head , much lesse seeke or attempt to shake him off the shoulders . how much more kind be those subiects , who out of their owne dutious loue , be content to haue the blame of the faults , or ouersights , likely to blemmish their soueraigne , transferred & imposed vpon themselues ? it may seeme by a drunkard in plautus , that the head thought himselfe priuiledged , as it were with a point of prerogatiue , to charge the inferior parts with the shame of his owne distemper ; siccine fit hoc pedes ? statin an non ? nam hercle si cecidero vestrum erit flagitium . here leauing the head in his vnresistable right of ruling ouer the bodie , i will to the soule againe , taking a farther view thereof , as sitting in his other principall seat the hart : when i behold the intricate net or curious web of vaines , spread from it ouer all the bodie ; me thinketh i may well liken it to a little spyder , placed in the middest of her work , where she so caringly and cunningly ordereth the matter , that she presently feeleth the least shake or touch in any though the farthest part of her webb . no lesse feelingly doth the hart perceiue , and partake , with any iniurie done vnto his veines . sometimes hee sendeth forth the bloud and spirits with a full flush , replenishing all parts plentiously , other while he rerireth them home with all speed to his little sconce , to comfort and fortifie it selfe . it is admirable to see the swift and sudden recourse of bloud , now stirred outwardly at a start like lightning , and anon posting backe in feare of daunger to the hearts succour , leauing a palenesse and trembling in the outward parts . the heart is the well of life , the furnace of heat , the center of bloud , the first liuing and the last dying part . agreeably to these vertues or efficacies of the heart , let it be confessed , that euerie commonweale acknowiedgeth a soueraigne power , from the which it drew his first beginning , of which it receiueth his dearest life bloud , with which it is quickened as with a liuing fire , to the which it wholy trusteth , and returneth for refuge , by which it is imployed and directed in all intentions , and without which it fayleth of continuance , and is incontinently dissolued . then to such a gouernour which both imparteth to al parts the vaines and artiries of their surest welfare , and hath a sence of any their griefs and wrongs , as of his owne ; what and how regardant thankfulnesse , seruice , and obseruance is deseruedly due by the faythfull performance ( with the vttermost strayne of the very heart-strings ) of all obedience to his commaunds and authoritie . the heart is of all other the firmest flesh , yet not fed with bloud by any vaynes ; and from it all other flesh deriueth by veynes his borrowed liuing . i haue heard it argued , that a king in like sort is alone firmely and absolute stated , in and to the lands of his realme , and that all other owners take from him by the veynes and conueyances which he passeth to them . that which aristotle saith of the heart , that it giueth and imparteth to euerie member , but it selfe receiueth or taketh not from any ; is a good pattern of regall magnificence and bountie , seeing that nothing more aptly representeth the nature of the soule , or commeth neerer to god himselfe than to do good , and extend reliefs to others , with free heart and open hand , himselfe in the meane while hauing no need of any . the figure of the hart is shaped sharpe poynted at the lower end , and vpward it is more widely spread abroad : to this forme the best princes doe conforme , they open their hearts with a full spread towards vertue , goodnesse , and heauenly things , but do make narrow and close the same against all base appetites of this vnhallowed flesh . the heart is the dwelling place of the affections and inclinations of the mind , whereof ( as of his owne trayne , family , or houshold , he alone is to haue the gouernment ) if they bee let loose with scope to follow their disordered desires , not only the heart it selfe is subdued and trampled vpon by their turbulent passions , but the whole bodie also fareth the worse , and taketh no small harme thereby . right wisely doe soueraignes hereof take this instruction , to vphold their gouernment in a strict steadinesse , tempering all extremities with an euennesse of moderation , that none about them grow too violent or headstrong , which cannot but worke as a disturbance to their persons , so a disproportion to their states . where any affection predominantly reigneth , it draweth thither such humors of the bodie , as are likest and best consorteth to it selfe : as anger calleth to him choller , to further his fiercenesse ; mirth cheareth it selfe with the freshest bloud ; and sorrow will not bee without the company of sower and dumpish melancholike : so if the soueraigne in the precincts of his regiment , shall suffer an ouergrowing inequalltie of greatnesse to get an head , it will quickly gather to it selfe a syding faction of like disposed disturbers , which will make a shrewd aduenture , both of ouertopping him , and ouerturning of his state . there is nothing that is either more gracefull for seemelinesse of shew , or more auaileable to any man for his health , than to haue alwayes a light and chearfull heart : and it was yet neuer seene that any part of the body euer grudged at or repugned , but rather willingly furthered the well-pleasing delights of the heart . from hence good people will learne this well-resembling inference , that the recreating sports and pleasures of soueraignes ( in whom is the heart bloud of the ciuill bodie ) be not dislikingly crossed or repyned at , but rather entertainingly allowed , and comfortably affoorded vnto them ; yea though some occasions of dislike should worke a distaste , and harder censure thereof . we doe account as the head , so the heart to receiue hurt two waies , primarily , or imediatly ; and by consent which it hath with other more choicely affected and much agrieued parts : so may wee reckon offences or misdemeanors to tend to the impugning of the prince , not onely when they directly concerne his owne person , state , or dignitie , but also when they bee committed against his councell , iudges , or chiefe officers , in whom their soueraigne hath ingrauen his own image or character , imparting vnto them a portion of his owne authoritie , and with whom hee maintayneth a mutualitie of all ayding kindnesse , and honourable respectiuenesse . admit that the heart or the brayne were so layd open to ouraspects , that wee might attentiuely behold the substance , the shape , the verie life and actions therof ; would not the consideration of the dignitie of the soule , there resiant and working , worke an impression in our thoughts , to regard , esteeme , and admire those parts , as excelling and surpassing all the rest ? so when the person of a prince is looked vpon ( wheron we doe seldome gaze enough ) our inward cogitations filled with a reuerence of the regall maiestie seated in that flesh ( otherwise as infirme and full of imperfe●●●ons as other is ) ought to surmount all sensuall conceits ( scant thinking of any humane nature ) but making an infinit difference betweene that body , so ( as it were ) glorified with the presence , representation & in dwelling of that supreme or exalted eminencie , and other ordinarie persons , which yet doeth consist materially of the same substance , and perhaps endued by nature with equall graces . doe you desire a brighter displaying of the illustrious maiestie shining in soueraigntie ? doe but obserue how much it surmounteth the person it selfe thereof possessed , like a brittle glasse all illightened with the glorious blaze of the sunne . the soueraigne as in his personall respects , hath his childhood and his impotencie of minoritie , but his soueraigntie is like hercules the sonne of iupiter , that in his verie cradle could gripe snakes to death , being at no time abridged or enfeebled , but to be supposed euer of a full strength , age , and power . in his personall respects he may partake of the mixture of bloud and kindred with the subiects , but soueraigntie admitteth no termes or titles of consanguinitie . in his personall respects hee is as one man , single and indiuiduall , yet as in the right of soueraigntie , he gayneth the appellation and capacities of a corporation : in his personall respects death maketh an end of his life and glorie all at once , but soueraigntie neuer faileth ( not by the space of one moment still liuing in a successiue continuatiō : ) and as the consideration of the excellēcie of the soule ( wherunto the soueraigntie , as in these respects also is agreeably patterned ) caused the old philosophers ( not able by their sharpe inquirings to penetrat into the deep profoūdnes therof ) admiringly to proclayme , that man was magnū naturae miraculum . so the resplendence and power of soueraigntie in the royall person of a soueraigne , shewing it selfe both in so great maiestie , as dazleth the eyes of all beholders , and in so admirable effects , as to transforme sauagenesse into ciuilitie , repugnances into concords , vices into vertues , procuring loue , yet implying feare ; compelling obedience , yet with yeeld of highest honour ; holding towards all , the proportion of iustice , yet extending withall the remorse of mercie , doeth in like sort ( by such the conuersion of the body naturall , into a body politicall ) beget thereunto a more admired glory , and a more deere esteeme . let me yet proceed a little farther in the discerning of the wisdome and goodnesse of the creator , in the ordeining and enduing with propertie of these principall receptacles of the soule , the head , and the heart : we doe not find that either of them is naturally enabled to offer any wrong by any meanes vnto the body , or once to encline by any so much as imagination of mischiefe therunto ; but contrariwise , fully furnished and accomplished with store of helping reliefs , to nourish and preserue the same . for as in god himselfe ( if it were possible that he should doe any vniustice ) it would make a greater proofe of his impotencie , than shew foorth his power : so if he had giuen vnto the soule , or to these parts most replenished with the powers thereof , any such naturall abilitie or qualitie , as might inferre an iniury and preiudice to the rest of the bodie ; it might rightlyer bee termed a disabling than an enabling , and no way conforming to his image : for what a confusion or rather destruction would ensue , if the head should shrinke vp his sinewes that conueieth his vigor and spirits vnto the members ? or if the heart should at his pleasure withhold or take away the nourishment of bloud , that giueth sustenance & substāce to the whole body ? if the application hereof to our states soule : how comfortably may we conceiue , & euen glory in our happinesse , that stand vndubitably assured of our soueraigns goodnesse ( which limitteth or rather much exceedeth his power ) that the sinewes of law & iustice knitting all subiection to soueraignetie , shall still from him receiue an increase of strength and firmenesse : and that this politicall soule ( in the very tendernesse of his soule ) will be so farre from depriuing and impayring of our necessarie nutriments , as that he will rather draine his owne heart bloud drie , than the wealth of the land should either be wastfully exhausted , or not suffisingly maintained ? the soule also hath made choice of some other principall parts in the body , which he needfully vseth & imployeth in the ministeriall functions of life ; which if they once eyther fayle in their offices , or decay in their essence , the body can neither continue liuing , nor performe his actions : of which sort may bee reckoned , first the lungs and lights , ordeined for the alaying of the heat in the heart , and the necessitie of respiration : then the liuer , which beginneth the concoction of our susteinance , and the same so prepared , doth recommend ouer to the hearts more perfect conuerting and accommodating : lastly , the milt , the gall , and the kidnies , euerie whereof is alotted to some good worke of disseuering the refuse and drossie remnants from the selected and purified nutriment . but for that in these the soule sheweth his weakest and meanest vertue , which is of vegitation onely , whereas in the head , or heart , he displaieth all his glorie , conuersing with them as with the darlings of his loue , i esteem it of no great merit , to meditate too much of their worth , or to labour the likening of them ( which to do were easie and obuious ) vnto certaine necessarie and essentiall orders or powers in the state . only two considerations i haue conceiued , which mee thinketh may not bee omitted . the first , that as these bee placed so helpfully in the body , with such succeeding each other in their works , as accordeth to an accomplishment of health and perfection in the whole : so there must bee in the publike weale , a wise and politicall ordering of the good gifts and imployments of the chiefe statesmen , that their endeuours be discreetly sorted to the generall good , and not suffered out of course either promiscuously to intrude , or disorderedly to cause dissentions . the second , that as these parts of chiefe vse for the preseruation of life , be by the prouidence of nature strongly sauegarded within an enclosed wall , as more cared for than the rest ; so such as be the more noble and more necessarie members of the commonweale , ought to bee attended on with the more tender regard of their safetie , and well prouided for against perilles , least in their ruyne or subuersion , the whole state also receiue a deadly stroke . the mentioning of these partes of the bodie ( though vpon occasion of setting forth the operations of the soule , in and by them ) hath put me in mind of my fore-intended method ; which after a matching of the ruling preeminence to the nature of the soule , calleth me to a suruey or recounting of such obserueable respects , as may make the like correspondence betweene the subiects of a state , and the condition of a bodie : wherein i must be faine to deale with the bodie of the state , as minerua did with the bodie of vlisses , who in the safe conducting , and reducing of him to his true penelope , did transforme him into diuers shapes , sometimes putting vpon him the shew of a rimpled and withered age , and anone againe restoring him to his freshest hew , and lustiest strength : so will i also ( holding my intention to make at last an euerlasting vnion of the obeying bodie to the soueraigne aucthoritie ) turne the same , as i treat thereof , into different formes , diuersities , and altering respects , according as any varietie of consideration shall afford . and i must also further entreat the good patience & licence of my frendly readers , for affording vnto me such libertie , as my selfe scantly liketh of ; which is of inserting and giuing a place in the contexrure of this treatise , vnto some such comparisons , as by there frequent vse in good authours may seeme to be ouer vulgar , which i could haue been well content to haue auoyded , had they not pressed vpon me with some shew of necessitie , sith the more notoriously their likenesse hath bin discouered & allowed , the more might i be noted either of ignorance in not discerning so publike proofs for my purpose , or of an affected singularitie , in contemningly omitting what the worthiest writers haue chosen as diamonds and precious stones to enrich and garnish their works withall . and thus much perhaps i may performe in part of amends , that by such ( as it were ) my new setting thereof , the same shall be more lightsomly refreshed , and emblazoned with a more orient lustre . in the composition of the bodie politique ( as of the naturall ) there is required a concurrance or euen mixture of foure elements , which i do reckon to be these following : first , the generous , to aduance and mainteine the state with their well deseruing actions : then the learned , to instruct and direct with skill in cases of consultation : thirdly , yeomen with their labour to produce and worke the commodities of the land : and lastly trafiquers which may both vent out by exportation what may be spared , & bring in the necessaries that shall be wanting . within these foure sorts , all subiects compacted into a ciuill state , may well be raunged and reckoned . how these state-elements may seuerally hold similitude , with either the fire , or the aire , or the earth , or the water , i leaue to be conceiued and disscussed of such as haue good leasure to be idle , or like well to be somewhat curious . this i think not impertinēt to propound , that where any of these do exceed , or ouer sway the rest , there such distemper ( as in the bodilie mixture ) inclineth the state to be ruled by that ouer-ruling force . and as in our bodies by the vnequall temper of the elements the humors get masterie each ouer other ( of which humors the diuersities of complexions do arise : ) so in the bodie politique , according as either the baser and passiue elements do preuaile to popularitie , or as the other more worthie and actiue , do reduce to the power of a few ; thereof the humor , complexion , condition , and disposition of the state is discouered : in so much as ( if the soule or superioritie of gouerning be not strong enough to hold his owne ) the exsuperance of the humour predominant , hauing altered the complexion of the bodie , will also violently draw the soule to follow the forme of his temperature : wherefore right needfull it is in any commonweale , to contriue the true and proportionable mixture of these foure elements , lest when they be put at odds , reuerting to the originall repugnances of their nature , they do fill the state with hatefull strifes , in the steed of blessefull peace . for as in the bodie naturall , if the wisdome of the creator had not composed into a concord the contrarieties of the first elements , it had ( as still sticking in the confusion of the first chaos ) neuer attained the strength , beautie , & order , which we now admire : so in the ciuill bodie , if prudent policie by aduised tempering of the disparitie of the people , should not conioyne them to a well agreeing consent , how could any hope be conceiued , but that the difference of poore and rich , vulgar & noble , ignorant and learned , fearfull and valiant , industrious and such as take their ease , must needs by their opposite quallities , not onely deface the dignitie , but also subuert the stabilitie of the state ? yea the differences of such as be all of one element , through a naturall emulation , ( each part seeking to attaine neerest to the center and perfection of that whereunto he is incircled ) proueth oft spitefully troublesome , and must come vnder the care of a well disposing prudencie . for as the more trafiquing maketh the greater merchants , the happier husbanding the richer yeomen ; so the more vertuous may stand vpon it to be reckoned , the more generous . and each exsuperance will disturbe the temper , if for the gouerning of such inequalities , and preuention of strife amongst themselues , the wisdome of the state ( taught by natures example ) did not vse a correspondent cariage . from the discrepance of vnequall temperature , ariseth so sundrie formes and shapes of bodies politique . some are hugely big , and their verie greatnes rendreth them vnwildie , hauing their armes and their legs too far a sunder ; some verie little , yet well compact , actiue and strongly set to saue themselues ; some carie a goodly shew on their outside , yet inwardly looked into , haue great defects , as either a foule soule in so faire a bodie , or some deadly wringes tormenting their verie bowels ; some not so well fauoured or pleasingly shaped , yet are sound enough , and in good health ; some be so fat and ouer fed with wealth , as their neighbours be therby tempted to make attempts against them : some so lean and forlorne , as that their pouertie is their best safetie : some all sluggish and sottish , can scant attend their owne defence , but do so long praie aide of others , till they be made a prey to all ; some haughtie and fierce are neuer out of quarrels making , and taking occasions , through the flames of ambition , and the gall of reuengefulnesse , to exercise a continuall enmitie . thus we see how ( after the example of the bodie naturall ) the state ciuill also , is diuersly figured , and varieth his formes , whereof ( were i not bound to breuitie ) i could of each sort make instance and demonstrance in particuler , but it liketh me better , to hold my accustomed course , by speaking in generalitie : for that i may so hope to instruct some , and be sure to offend none . where the humors are in good harmonie of good agreement , & the bodie thereby in good health , there we doe not dislike to haue flesh and fat enough , but if they be peccant , and so the bodie crasie , then the more liberally we feede , the more dangerouslie wee doe offend . so in a state , when each degree conformeth it selfe to his owne duties , makng in the whole a perfection of loue and obedience , then the abundance of riches , the multitude of people , the titles of honor , the encrease of power , are both auailable & commendable : but when any part becommeth outragious or exorbitant , whereby the body is in a distemper , and getteth an euill habite , then what was otherwise comely and comfortable , will turne cumbersome and dangerous , working a cleane contrarie effect , of a greater endamagement , if not of an vtter diuastation . the naturall body hath his infancy , his youthfulnes , his confirmed , declyning , and decrepid age : so hath each commonwealth , his beginning , his enlarg●●ing , his puissance , his drowping , his decay and downfall . the philosophers , for the reason of alterations in both the bodies , direct vs to their principals of generation and corruption , telleth vs of the imbecillitie and mutabilitie of things compounded , of the difficultie of persisting in perfectnes , of the easie declination into the worse , and of their foreframed connexion of effecting causes . the astronomers haue also alike fitted them both with certaine climatericall changes , appointed periodes , and fatall reuolutions : yea they teach vs , that the influence of superior planets do forcibly preuaile ( as in and ouer priuate persons ) so also ouer whole regions and kingdomes , changing and inuerting them at their pleasures . i will yeeld vnto the philosophers their consequences and dependancie of causes , touching the many variable euents in both bodies , yet with this prouision , that the first cause , combyning and causing all causes be not forgotten , who alone hath all life and death , beginnings and endings at his dispose . neither will i sticke with the astronomers to acknowledge their stinted times , and prefixed points , beyond the which neither of the said bodies can passe or prolong themselues one instant : but to attribute that to the starres , which the god ( which holdeth all the starres in his hands ) challengeth to himselfe , and his owne foredecreeing councels , were to refuse the sunne , and be guided by a star-light : he it is that raiseth and strengthneth some mightier ( like to superior planets ) to subdue the worthlesse , whom he hath refused ; and his inclining of harts is the right powerfull influence , that effecteth these great chaunges . then ( leauing this humane wisdome fast tied vp within these limitations , as in the iron net of vulcan ) i will onely make this gaine of that first comparison , that sith the said two bodies are so fitly and fully conioined in semblance by their whole course , euen from the cradle to the graue ; i shall not need to feare blame , for fashioning of their agreeablenes in other also more particuler considerations . in the commonwealth ( as in the bodie ) some parts seeme chiefely vegetable , caring for nothing more than to mainteine their growth , by their sucking from all the vaines of the land , the nutriment and prouisions of this life . some liue all sensually , giuing no rest or contentednesse to themselues , but by pleasing of their sences , feeding of their affections , and fulfilling of their desires ; be it of reuenge in the course of wrath , and quarelling , or of haughtines to aspire , or of lust to sensualitie . othersome moderated with staiednes in both the former , shape their liues after the powers rationall and intellectuall , disposing themselues by the rules of reason , to vertuous actions , and to studious cogitations , indeuoring chiefely to deserue well of their countrie , and to vphold the frame of ciuill policie . the naturall body for the preseruing of health , vseth the helpe of a good diet , whereby the humours are kept in their equalitie of temper : so must the state also be dieted , neither glutted with excesse , nor scanted with penurie : howbeit sith it is more dangerous , from fulnesse to fall away to leannesse , than from leannesse to spread and grow fat ; i wish such fore-sight and forecast , rather to leaue than to lacke , to rise than to fal , & to amend than to paire , the defect being euer worse than the excesse , as nearer to a nullitie . as the regiment of health in our bodies may fayle or offend , in either of the extremities of being either too carelesse by licencious aduentures , or else too precise & strict by needlesse restraints : so the gouernance of the states welfare may fall into the like opposite disorderings by either too much remissenes and loosenes for want of hard holding of the reines of well-ruling , or else by ouer seuere debarring of such lawfull liberty as both nature requireth , and reason denieth not . it is hard to define which of these is worse or more hurtfull . the stirring nature of man , is like the quicknesse and slipperines of the eele , si laxes erepit , but si string as erumpit : so that ( though he be hardly by either way detayned in steaddinesse ) yet by the feeling of himselfe to be too much griped , hee the more enforceth all his strength and motion for his enlargement : for my part i professe , that i had rather ( as taking it to be lesse to my harme ) go slackly girt , yea quite loose & male cinctus , than to bee straightly pinched with tying or swadling too hard : and it is but too often found by experience , that the straight laced men , whether so held in by any compelling authoritie , or thereunto fashioned by a voluntary imposition , from their owne austeritie , doe breake forth more outragiously , and shake off the cords of obedience more desperatly , when occasion shall moue them to streine and striue for a pretenced libertie , by a course of commotion ; opinionat wilfulnesse , the more check and stop it findeth , the more violently it will seeke to make his way forth , vt exeat in ingenuum suum . the bodie also must haue moderate exercise for the encrease of heat , the digesting of crudities , and the acquiring of a more actiue strength . the like benefit will ensue to the commonweale , if publike occasion doe hold the people in imployment , their spirits are therby enkindled , their superfluous vanities laid away , and their valour & ablenesse to atchieue high attempts much confirmed . aristotle hath a true obseruation , that that which moueth doth not so soone putrifie as that which resteth . and the wisest commonweales haue euen purposedly made and procured to themselues great busines , that their men should rather be refreshed & purified by action , than be either consumed with ease & voluptuousnes , or eaten into with the rust of a reuolting disobedience . both the bodies doe also herein agree , as to be tended and ordered as seuerall respects shal giue occasion : nor wee nor our iudgement is the same when we bee children and when we be elder , when we bee full and when we be fasting , when we be sicke and when we be sound , when we be free and when we be bound ; wee doe suffer more at one time than we will do at another , we be able to performe more in our good plight and strength than we dare so much as hope of in our feeblenesse , wee bee more circumspect in our feares than carefull in prosperities , and we bee often so much distracted with discrepant conditions as wee bee not alwaies alike our selues : such interchangeable times and dispositions being in the same sort incident vnto the state , there is good heeld to be taken thereof , that the counsels and prouisions bee answerable to the necessities or conueniences that ought to be regarded . in the bodie naturall the sustenance is not all caried to one side , or to one part , to the pining and beguiling of the rest : so in the state , the nobilitie is so to bee maintayned , as that the commons bee not wronged ; and the clergie so to be cherished , as the laytie be not ouerlayd , but each part must be fed competently with a proportionable partition of the profits , alotting the same with such indifferencie , as the plentie of some be not the cause of penurie vnto others , nor that the euersucking veynes of some do draw drie the poorer that be in want . neither yet must wee hereuppon induce any paritie or equallitie , which nature herselfe abandoneth : for howsoeuer ( like a wise oeconomicall gouernor ) she susteineth euerie part of the body with a sufficiencie , yet doth she giue ( in her intentions ) to some more worthie and principall than the rest , a precedence to bee chiefly prouided for . the bloud ( vnto the which the turke compared his tribute and treasure , inferring therby the moderat expending thereof ) though it be deriued and dispersed to all parts , yet is it more abundantly bestowed in the gracing of the face . the heart though it spredeth his arteries all ouer the bodie , yet hee beateth and worketh more strongly with his pulses in one place than in another . not so much as our garments but must be fitted to our bignesse or smallnesse , obseruing therein such difference as ariseth by the diuersities of our bodies : why then should it be grudged at , if the nobilitie and gentrie of the land ( in whom the dignitie and the well-shewing countenance of the state consisteth ) be better stored and furnished than the meaner of the people ? why should any bodie enuie at the glorie of some selected persons , in and by whom the soueraigne doth more manifestly discouer his purposes , make shew of his force , and expresse his affections ? or why should it be disliked , that honours and fauours , riches , and preferments bee bestowed , or rather fitted ( regardingly vnto the merits of the vertuous ) by taking knowledge ( and as it were taking measure ) of their good seruice and honorable deseruings ? and ( to wade yet further ) i will confidently make good thus much more , that as in the bodie it is a greater mischiefe not to nourish and sustaine the sound and seruiceable parts , than not to cut off the diseased and corrupted : so in the commonweale , not to reward and aduaunce the worthie , is more pernicious and of more dangerous consequence , than not to afflict , punish , or pare away the hurtfull and infectious : for where the one is but spared awhile by lenitie and impunitie in some hope of amendment , the other vnrespected in his goodnesse , is so pinched by that coldnesse of entertaynment , as hee seldome or neuer can come forward and put forth any shoots of vertue . thence will it fall out , that as in the bodie the decay or corruption of any part , is but the want of that health , soundnesse , or good temper which it ought to haue had , and imployed to the helpe and not to the hurt of the whole : so in the bodie politique , if in the better part thereof ( by occasion of such discouragement , & the pronenesse of men vnto naughtinesse more than vnto goodnesse ) there bee a want of honestie or vertuous performances , must it not necessarily effect a generall declination from all true duties ? diuerting that to the harme that should haue ben conuerted to the benefit of the state , and introducing thereby , an ouerswelling tide of sinne , corrupting and confounding all , and that meerely by the neglect of desert and vertue . if there bee any not yet persuaded of this different respectiuenesse to be had of men in the state , according as they differ in esteeme and worthinesse ; let him yet farther bethinke himselfe of his owne different vsage of the seuerall parts of his owne bodie : doth hee not adorne some of them with silkes , veluets , purple , and cloth of gold , and yet leaueth others wholy naked , or but homely and coursely attired ? he hath for the head and necke , garlands , chaynes , and iewels of rich value ; where for the feet ( though they do bear vp the whole ) he hath but leather onely . what artificiall deuices will hee not find out , and that with his extremest cost , to grace and set forth the comlinesse of his face ? and yet hideth for verie shame some other parts vnfit and vnworthie of producing to open aspect ? and were it not as vnfitting , that the dignities and degrees of reputation , should be promiscuously cast abroad amongst the meaner sort of mechanicall tradesmen , as for the ornaments and dressings prouided for the better parts , to be bestowed so low as vppon the feet ? hereof my inference is , that as in our priuat , so in our publique bodie , difference of regard maketh difference of aduauncement , by a distributing iustice , which yeeldeth to euerie one ( though not the same ) yet his fit proportion . it is not therefore called a commonwealth , that all the wealth should bee common ; but because the whole wealth , wit , power , and goodnesse whatsoeuer , of euery particular person , must be conferred and reduced to the common good : and that in the same sort and semblance , as the distinct members of the bodie , being ordained to different vses , do yet concurre in this consonance of intention , as to impart and referre all their helps and indeuours ( to the vttermost reach of their abilities ) for the procuring and preseruing of the comfort and continuance of this one bodie . all the members ioine their assisting aid , and effect their whole force according to their diuers functions , as well for the vpholding of the whole and euerie part in soundnesse , as also against a common enemie : and whatsoeuer presseth nature with any griefe , is repelled by the consent of a generall resistance . if but a thorne haue pricked the foot , how doth the eye seeke to spie it out ? how doth the hand bestirre him to draw it out ? how doth the head contriue to worke it out ? and each part as his power permitteth him , doth thinke to procure his owne ease by remedying the disease in another : but in case any the principall or vitall parts bee much distressed , or in great danger , then ( as ouermatched with a mountayne of miserie ) the care , the feare , the sorrow is so farre increased , as that remedilesse of helpe , and languishing in despaire , they doe all yeeld themselues vanquished , as partakers also of that calamitie so vncurable . this fellow suffering , this strong vnion , and enterchanged kindnesse , shewed so louingly in the parts of the bodie , instructeth all true subiects of any countrie to the mutuall performance of all friendly offices , and to the firmest adherence against all opposing enmities , or in all perilous necessities ; remembring that a common daunger alike distresseth the lesse as the greatest ; but especially , to bee tenderly affected in the losse or harme likely to befall their choicest statesmen of the best account and qualitie , against whom the enemies of the state doe chiefly bend their malignant intentions , euen as in our priuat combats & affraies , the deadly minded foe watcheth to wound the dearest and vitall parts . from this founteine of natures so wise distribution and distinguishment of the parts , in sorting them so orderly to their seuerall functions , this consideration also floweth and offereth it selfe ; that as there must be a proportionablenesse and a kind of vnanimitie of the members , for the aiding and adorning of the publike comprehending all : so that foule daughter of darknesse and chaos confused and all disturbing anarchie , is to be exiled , or rather excluded out of this compaction of the bodie politique each part is to know and administer his owne proper worke , without entermixing or entermedling in the offices of any other . shall the foot be permitted to partake in the point of preeminence with the head ? or were it seemlie for the head , leauing his state , to abase himselfe to a toyle manibus pedibusque in the trading businesses ? for each member to take vpon him all works , as it hath in nature an impossibilitie , so hath it in gouernance as great an incongruitie . and for any part to neglect the duties properly to it alotted , or to run forth of the circle within the which it is fixed ( as quartering it selfe into a new diuision , by vndertaking dispatches of another nature ) as it agreeth not with that so well parted , yet vniforme frame of gods workmanship , so is it not to be suffered neither in any well contriued policie of the gouerning wisdome . the eye is nor ordeined nor apted to any other worke , than to make vse of the light by seeing ; and to euery singled part there is assigned some more peculier operation or administration , from the which as if in possessionem suam venerit excludit alios . to the like confusion it tendeth if the parts be prodigiously dislocated or transferred from their proper to other vnfitting places , whereof oftentimes the whole bodie getteth the name of a monster mishapen and distorted . the sences must hold their station like to sentinels , and attend their generall in and about the head , where they be setled . and in briefe , no parts inward or outward can either do duties , or be indured elswhere , than where both for comlinesse and vse they be by natures order placed . the ciuill bodie may hereby be admonished how to dispose of the seuerall conditions and degrees of the people , according to the difference of their breed , education , conuersation , or habitation ; that imployments or aduancements be not vnmeet or preposterous , but properly and aduantagiously accommodated . but of all other the loathed impes of tumult and disorder , let this be taken for the deadliest and most detestable ; if any parts disdeining the rule of their soule , and disliking their subiected condition , shall not onely neglect their dutious performances , but also conspiringly complot against the head , hart , and other the noblest viols of life , to the vtter destruction of the whole bodie , by such their horrible commotions and violent conuulsions : which if it were neuer yet attempted , or once intended by any naturall members ruled by the law of their creation , how commeth it to passe , that any parts of the politicall bodie should so outragiously and sediciously betake themselues to an anarchie , most vnnaturall and rebellious ? i could exhibit vnto the well discerning eyes of all loiall subiects , a right representing patterne hereof , by relating the true historicall narration of the late most execrable enterprise and cunningly contriued treacherie , that euer any subiects , of any nation , though neuer so heathen or barbarous ; of any age , though neuer so earthly or ironlike ; of any religion , though neuer so erronious or scismaticall ; vpon any occasion , though neuer so extreamlie mouing , did against their soueraigne and rulers , once imagine , much lesse with enuenomed and obdurate minds intend & vndertake : which neuerthelesse i rather chuse to leaue naked and vndilated to the readers well appliing meditations , as well because i refraine to vse any vnnecessarie excursions , as also because i do find any my facultie much too feeble to expresse ( of so inhumane and bloudie a proiect ) the right shape or substance : for where hell it selfe hath imployed an whole councell of diuels to deuise an hatefull and vnheard-of villanie ; there vnlesse heauen should afford the toung of angels to declare and paint out the abomination thereof , all the oratorie of man must needs faile and be defectiue . what ( though neuer so passionate ) exclamations can raise sufficient admiration of treasons so damnable ? what contestations or accusations by streining all the strings of art , can reach the height of so heinous and most abhorred conspiracies ? what vse can there be of any aggrauating or amplifying , when the plainest tale that can be told , may be thought to be but an hyperbole beyond beliefe ? my conceit telleth me , that ( notwithstanding any the best sinceritie or integritie not possible to be controlled ) the report thereof to forrein countries , or after ages , will seeme vncredible , and that it will require a great dexteritie and perfection of art , so to deliuer it ouer , as not to haue it censured rather a malicious fiction , than a true storie . i must confesse that it is not for euery vulgar verbalist to handle or set forth such a damnable purpose of murthering a king , and that by such a murther , and such a king , and so accompanied with his decrest queene , sweet prince , and his whole state of nobilitie ; the verie relating or mentioning whereof , affrighteth and dawnteth my hart with horror , euen shaking the verie pen in my hand , whilest i think what a shake , what a blast , or what a storme ( as they tearmed it ) they ment so suddeinly to haue raised for the blowing vp , shiuering into peeces , and whirling about of those honorable , annointed , and sacred bodies , which the lord would not haue to be so much as touched . i haue heard of one so far affected to pouertie , as that he wished all the treasure and iewels of the world in one roome , that he might at once set tehm all on fire : such a wish had these men so deuoted to poperie , that they would in an instant , and in one roome , haue destroied the true riches , iewels , the maiestie and glorie of our whole state at one clap . it was a memorable crueltie of that tyrannous emperour , that wished all the romans to haue had but one head , that he might with one stroke haue chopped it off . their purpose was full of the like heathenish immanitie , that hauing all the heads of this nation assembled in honorable consultation into one place , would euen then and there haue as it were beheaded the whole realme , and so haue induced vpon the land a miserable desolation . the tyrannous massacre of france , ( being an elder issue of that same mother church the harlot of rome ) was inferior in furie & wickednesse to this plot : they had an excuse from the warrant of aucthoritie ; these out of their priuat dislikes , conspired the ouerthrow of all aucthoritie : they designed those onely to the slaughter whom they accounted and condemned as offendors in their state , these bundled vp into their butcherie the innocent , and some of their own friends also , whom they could haue no colour so to confound and ruinate : they ment the mending of their state present , and the securing of their future ; these not onely the subuersion of that which now is flourishing , both in riches ●●rituousnesse , but also a future precipitation into a swelling surge of ensuing and vnauoydable calamities . i cannot tell whether their obdurate harts and brazen foreheds will not contradict my position , if do but say this their designement to be a sinne : this in despite of them all i will mainteine , that the verie nature of man , not seduced by the man of sinne ( who by his aucthorizing dispensations , and pickpurse pardons hath made himselfe the great patron of sinne ) acknowledgeth the same to be a foule and vnexcusable , a cursed & most shamefull sinne : a sinne and shame that will for euer cleaue to their religion , euen as close as the venomed shirt of hercules , till it eate and consume the same to the hard bones : a sinne and shame that no conscience ( though steeled ouer with the romish mettall ) can make so much as any colourable defence for : a sinne and shame that god himselfe of his miraculous mercie , for the honour of his name , and the loue of his truth , so happily discouered , that they might not say , where is now their god : a sinne and shame , that we shall not need to call diuines by any their disputings to conuince them of ; but which the verie humanists and moralists out of the grounds of reason and learning , will make the whole world to wonder , hisse , and gnash their teeth at . and which my poore selfe ( as the meanesse of my wit and erudition affordeth ) euen by the comparatiue respects of the parts in the bodie , which i haue vndertaken to set forth , do condemne to the deepest dongion of hell , whence the fathers and factors of the romish faith hath first fetched it . in the bodie there is not any part so weake , so little , or so base , which god hath not framed and appointed to some good vse ; and shall there in the state bee cherished , or suffered , any so loose , idle , vagrant , and vnprofitable people , as that no vse can bee made of them for the publique behoofe ? nay , that bee noysome , pernitious , combersome , and contrarious thereunto ? let vs but obserue nature , who because shee would be sure to make nothing in vaine ( thereby teaching vs in the order of gouernment , to allow no needlesse or fruitles parts ) hath endued and designed some one part vnto many vses . i will propound onely one instance of the hand , which serueth for so many purposes , as i thinke to resemble therunto , sometimes the souldier that fighteth , sometimes the husbandman that laboureth , sometimes the marchant that reacheth and fetcheth far and neere , sometimes the artificer , who wholy practiseth the handiecraft , sometimes the purueiour , that feedeth and releeueth our liues with needfull nutriment . this so prouident accommodating of the parts vnto many imployments , disproueth our heedlesse tollerating of these begging and shifting mates , who swarming euery where , bee so farre from doing any good in the state , as that they will doe nothing for their owne liuing . neuerthelesse , i would not be so mistaken , as if by this president of natures worke in bestowing of manifold abilities vppon one part , i should make way or proofe for the ouer-greedie ingrossing of too many offices into the hands of some one man ; which neyther the businesse of the state may well beare , nor the stomakes of other men with contentednesse endure , nor himselfe perhaps with sufficiencie vndergoe . therefore i must crosse any such conclusion with an apparant difference , disauow the similitude in that poynt , sith in the larger bodie politique there is greater store and choice of well-fitting seruitors for the many diuersities of affayres , that there is no need to huddle or heap too much vppon any one man : wherein it seemeth that nature hath trodden vs a path for our practise , and that way also hath for our imitation manifested her intention . wee doe find , that the most industrious and instrumentall parts are giuen vs by couples , as if one ( though for one worke ) would not serue the turne : for example , she hath giuen vs two hands , & each of them diuided & adorned with seuerall fingers ; as if she ment in so narrow a compasse to couch and compact a varietie of helps , for the more easie and certaine dispatch of so diuersly occurring works . this allotting of two parts to one function might cause in our so little bodies a great factiō , if the foreseeing care of nature had not also conioined them in consent , as well as in operation . wee see both the eyes to looke both one way , the eares to conceiue alike one and the same sound , the nostrils to bee affected alike with one and the same smell , the hands ioyntly labouring at one worke , and the feet by equall paces locally mouing the body by euen length & strength vprightly supporting it , and by their good agreement ioyntly acting and louingly ayding one the other : the two sides , and the two shoulders , which beare vp the high castle of the head , doe with the like matchable equalitie , and the like willing agreeablenesse entertaine their taske . i wish from my heart ( though i shew but by a simily ) that in the realm likewise by such concordance of the parts in each degree , might fasten so their fayth each to other , as that the disposing of many to one seruice , did tend to a more full & more sure performance of the same : so should both the ciuill and the spirituall side , together with the honourable shoulders on both sides , equally part betweene them the common care , and much importing worke of vpholding the maiestie of supreme authoritie , without any fainting or interruption : so should the eies of the wise , and the sences of the learned bee bent all one way , for discerning and increasing of truth and goodnesse , without any erronious mistaking , or wilfull reluctations : so should the meaner and ministring sort , like to the feet and hands runne the race , and catch the goale to them proposed , in making a happie kingdome through an happy people , without any either rubbes in their way by vnrulines , or desisting from their duties by a retrogradation : and so should euerie part become plyant and apt to their places and callings ( receiuing like waxe from a seale the impressions of the gouernour ) to execute his designements , without either distraction by iarres , or peruersnes of opposition , or the carelesnes of a neglecting sloth . i must yet inferre one obseruation more of natures prouidence , whereupon i will set my marke as chiefly to bee remembred : that albeit for the ordering and effecting of other businesses concerning the body , she hath assigned and conioyned more parts vnto one worke : yet for the supremacie of gouerning ouer all , she hath but one head ; as if it were vtterly vnpossible , or vnsufferablie mischeeuous , to admit any partnership in the regall dignitie . let vs imagine a bodie so monstrous , as whereunto two heads were at once affixed , shall not that bodie receiue much damage by the diuision and confusion of those two heads ? must not the bodie in that case either be diuided by alotting of one side to the one , and the other side to the other head ? or else be wholy disseuered by a promiscuous and contentious shufling of the seuerall sinewes , forces , and operations from each head proceeding ? what we as by fiction doe imagine might bee done in the naturall bodie : man ( that imagineth nothing but euill ) and therefore can produce more prodigious errours than nature in her escapes hath euer patterned , hath indeed often brought to passe ( though with most cursed successe ) in the bodie politique . haue we not had within this one land of england , the hideous heptarchie of seuen heads at once ? nay hath not the whole iland of britania , being a bodie perfectly shaped , rounded , and bounded with an inuironing sea , beene a long time thus disseuered , and disfigured by that vnluckie dualitie the authour of diuision ? vntill at the last the mightie and onely wonder working hand of god , wyping away the deformitie ( not by any violent cutting off , but by a new moulding as it were of the two heads into one ) hath restored it againe to his first right , imperiall , and most monarchiall greatnesse . here i find the matter of vnion to lye so full in my way , that euen it stoppeth my passage , forcing me ( notwithstanding the exact handling thereof by others ) to giue it some little touch by the addition of proofe from these my comparisons also : for doubtlesse , if in the former times two heads caused the diuiding and halfeing of the bodie ; the same reason now requireth , that this one so vertuous and powerfull head should reunite and draw againe into one , the distracted and long repugning parts . and can any of this entire and compleat body bee either so vnnaturally hard harted , or so vnconsiderat of his owne good , as finding this so happie and long desired reducement thereof vnto one head , will not seeke to be conioyned ( euen in all the offices of kindnesse and releefe ) rather with the whole bodie , than with the parts of one side onely ? or is it fit that there should be any disseuering , siding , or disuniting by different orders , lawes , customs , and other such poynts of gouernment , where necessitie of communion in all the parts , inforceth a firmnesse of loue , a likenesse of life , and an equalitie of condition ? surely such as doe not gladly entertaine this good opportunitie to reunite that which hath so long beene sundred , seemeth to bee better pleased with the imperfection , the weaknesse and misshapen forme of the bodie vnder two heads , and with disagreeing parts , than that the whole strengthening of it selfe with a comely concordance , and vniforme subiection , should bee brought vnder the righteous gouernment of one onely soueraigne head . therefore if they will not bee thought to dislike , that one head should rule all ; let not this offend them neither , that all bee collected and incorporate into one and the same politicall gouernment . the bodie may haue many imperfections and deformities , yea may be bereaued of whole parts , and yet retaine still the name and nature of a bodie : and sundrie shifts be deuised ( though not to cure ) yet to couer such defects . in the steed of the naturall leg , or arme , wee stick not to fashion and affixe a wooden arme , or leg , verie necessitie constreineth vs to make that simple supplie , when we find not otherwise any substantiall remedie . the commonwealth likewise , may ( by the losse or want of her true subiects ) become stark lame , or by some foule disorders made deformed and mishapen ; yet hold still the style and rights of a commonweale . howbeit to redresse such abuses , blemishes , impotencies , or enormities , she is lightly driuen to betake her selfe vnto some mercenarie helpes , as to her crowches ; yea to take vnto her new lymbs , and lynages of strangers , like woodden legs to be planted amongst her owne people . the bodie when vpon any quarrell it is to combat with his enemie , vseth for more aduantage to combine with a friend : so when one kingdome is at variance with an other , it seemeth a wisdome not to be neglected , to enter leagues , aliances , and confederacies , with some other well chosen nation ; though it often commeth to passe , as in particuler bodies : so in whole realmes , that as well the friendship begun for such purposes , doth proue but feeble and fickle , as also those other additaments of forrain aide , do in the end by their failing falshood giue the fall to them that trust entirely to them . there is a time when the bodies constitution is thought perfect and at the height , as setled in the middle point betweene redundacies , and deficiencies , hauing neither any distemper within it selfe , nor disturbance by outward wrongs : which soundnes of welfare , is manifested in externall seemings also ; as in a liuely cheerfulnesse , a fresh colour , an actiue lustinesse , and such like faire blossomes of a prospering plant : the state also hath such a time , of his good estate ; the absolute happinesse whereof requireth an happier wit than mind , for the exact describing of it in all his complements : nor plato ; his imagined idea , nor aristotles sharpe discussings doth fully discouer so much thereof , to my apprehension , but my wishes may exceed the same , by addition of some further good . when i speak of perfection , i would patterne it by paradise , or the ierusalem of god ; but we must be faine now to account that perfect , which bewraieth least imperfection , and commeth neerest to that goodnesse which may receiue allowance . therefore without reducing our conceits to any exquisite perfectnes , ( imitating the phisitions , who will neuer yeeld the bodie to be in perfect health ) we may with them take our coniectures , from the signes of health : so as where we see publique concordant ioying , peace , and plentie kissing each other , sumptuous shewes , triumphant exercises , magnificent solemnities , and such other apparances of good liking ; there it seemeth that health and good temper hath attained the golden meane , preuailing against all , either homebred or forrain iniuries . but as that rule in phisick is not to be lightly regarded , though it be not generally beleeued , that when health is at his height , then is the bodie neerest to decline into diseases : so lightly when any kingdome is in his flowing , and flourishing fortunes , and in the pride of his prosperitie , then the more eminent is his happines , the more imminent is his danger , and such his fulnesse is fuller of feare than it can giue securitie . and againe , as the phisitions ( notwithstanding ) do confesse good signes to be deceiuable , and that themselues be often illuded by the imposture of such beguiling shewes : so let it also be acknowledged , and considered , that in the state , there may be somtimes a well carying or setting of a face vpon the matter , where inwardly it is fretted with the festring of some swelling and foule impostume . now ( me thinketh ) i haue opened a fit passage for my pen into a discourse very large , and scantly to bee limitted ; of the health requisite , the diseases incident , and the remedies , applyable to a commonweale , that herein also , i may make good my comparison thereof to the body naturall . there is none either so witlesse , or so carelesse , that considereth not of the necessitie of health , which where it wanteth , there can neither be fore-thinking of affayres , nor courage to attempt , nor strength to persorme , nor cheerfulnesse in shew , nor manfulnes in deed ; but in the steede of these a drowping dismaiednsse , deiected weaknes , and a yeedling faintnesse , deliuereth ouer the bodie into a verie euill , if not forlorne condition . and surely where the bodie politique hath not his health , as being either tainted with infectious corruptions , or infested with publique greuances , there all things quickly runneth awrie , for want both of councell to contriue , and power to doe , what in such cases is behoueable : the haughtynes of valour is turned all to timerousnes the care of the common good , to a heedlesse negligence ; the forwarding of iust actions , to a languishing in his owne afflictions ; and his ioint force of peace & loue , into a disseuering and tearing a sunder of all his ioints . then herein let both the bodies agree , that without health , they haue neither mind of their businesses , nor vse of their abundance , nor meanes of well doing , nor ioy of themselues . the bodie is not said to be in health , if any part thereof be greeued ; in so much that somtimes a paine in the finger , or toe , so outragiously disquieteth the whole bodie , as that we could be content to forgo all the wealth or ioyes we haue , to be freed from that one torment . this may giue proofe vnto the state , not to neglect , but rather to redeeme by the dearest meanes , the welfare of his members , lest in the anguish of them , it selfe do feelingly fare the worse . chyron that wise centaure , ouercome with the paine of an vlcer , ( renouncing immortalitie ) wished rather to die than to endure , in subiectes such an vlcer is discontentednesse , the sting whereof is so sharpe , as pricking them on in perplexities and despaires , maketh them vtterly carelesse of life or lyuing , and so to attempt the recouerie of their comforts , though it be with hazard of a vniuersall ruine . that health which the bodie hath by the strength and goodnes of nature , is firmer and to be preferred before that , which by a shift of art is peeced and procured : so each kingdom is in better case when it holdeth his originall constitutions by his owne lawes and customes , than when by the swaruing from them it is corrupted , and then constrained by extremitie vnto new prouisions . hence it is that all alterations ( especially in the chiefe and substanciall points ) be accounted verie perilous , because the imutation of that which is inate and primatiue , is intended to tend to the decay and destruction of nature . how full of daunger changes be , may bee shewed by the difference we doe find in our diet ; the meat , drinke , and ayre , whereunto we haue not bene vsed , offendeth our bodies , and subuerteth our health . those things whereunto we haue bene most accustomed do lesse harme , and are not to be exchanged , no not for the better ; daily vsage agreeably apting the one vnto our likings ( though not of so commendable a qualitie ) where the other ( though in reason it may seeme more applyable ) yet is both distrustfully entertayned as vnacquainted , and hazerdable to disturbe by his newnesse : whereof the phisicions haue made this rule , si assuetis mederi possis non tentanda noua . and the reason why the seasons of the spring and fall are aptest to bring sicknesse , is onely the interchangeable varietie of weather then working vpon our tendernesse and chilnesse . there must be a leasurely and aduised proceeding in euery alteration : nature hath left vs a patterne thereof in the whole course of our life , who from infancie to strength , and from thencè againe to feeblenesse & age , and from one complexion to another , doe proceed by softly steps , and so stealingly , as the change cannot presently be discerned : admonishing vs , that when we be disposed to alter any thing , wee must let it grow by degrees , and not hast it on too suddenly . it is well noted of some philosophers , that if a scythian were in an instant transported into india , he could not possiblie liue : so if without an orderlie passing by a meane , the state from on extremitie should be altered to another , it would certeinly infer a dissolution and dissipation of that it was before : wherein the proportion of the perils that may befall , suiteth with the proportion and degrees of the alteration ; in so much , as the more or lesse violent and vnnaturall the change is , the more or lesse the danger thereof is to be misdoubted ; euen as the taking of the more or lesse cold , after more or lesse heat , doth more or lesse endaunger our health . the mutabilitie of this earthly state stirred by the diuersitie of causes , admitteth no such certeintie or stabilitie in either of the said bodies , as can quite keepe off or exclude alterations . let vs then as in the naturall , so in the politicall bodie gouerne the question of change with such choice & discretion , as vnlesse either vrgent necessitie constraine , or euident vtilitie do entise our assent , we may still retaine our wonted orders and vsages with all permanent firmenesse , not affecting or enduring any nouelties : which besides their misdoubted harmefulnesse at their first entring , will aske a continued time of triall , for their gaining of aucthority and acceptation . but where these respectes of an enforced compulsion , or of a gainfull consideration shall preuaile ; how can it be gainsaid , that the feare of the one , or the loue of the other , ( euen of a tender sence in nature ) should not persuade a voluntarie condescending to so well warranted immutations ? i hold it better phisick to preserue health , than to restore it ; and a more commendable care to preuent , than to cure diseases : so it is a greater wisdome to keep a kingdome in his good gouernment , than to amend it when it is out of order ; and to prouide aforehand against mischiefes , than to redresse what is become amisse . we do vsualy account it good wisdome in our health to prouide for sicknes ; and then to furnish our selues with all such necessaries as may best besteed vs , when we shall be either threatned or assaulted therwith . hereof also the ciuill bodie doth make this vse , as in the seasons of the plentie , to store vp against scarcitie , and in the times of peace to get and gather together more plentifully the many preparations of warre . to discerne an approching euill betimes , and to stop the spread thereof before it become through continuance vncureable , is a like in either of the said bodies , a foresight most necessarie . we see that a verie whelke doth often breed into a great sore , a small bruze into a greeuous fistula , and a little distemperature into an extreame feuer : such shaking fits and horrible commotions haue bin felt in the bodie of the realme , and haue risen from contemptible beginnings , to vncorrigible confusions ; which who so well weyeth , must be forced to conclude a necessitie of timely care and circumspect preuention , for auoiding or resisting thereof . he that neglecteth dangers , because the means that importeth or threatneth the same be but small , forgetteth what great plagues , the frogs , lice , flies , and grashoppers , brought vpon the land of aegypt ; nay , let him not account so slightlie of any euill ( though neuer so little in shew ) as not to watch it well , for feare of the worst . we haue a common saying , that an euill weed groweth apace , and as vsuall a practise to roote it out as soone as it sheweth : when one is out of the way , if he be not streight reduced , it is hard to say how far he will straggle ; and when the bodie is but a little crazie , if help be not sought , who can tell what extreamitie may ensue . such petite euils ( reckoned of as scant regardable ) do often ( because their venemous qualitie is not presently perceiued ) aduantage themselues by the foolish sufferance of such as should suppresse them ; whereby the way hath bin made for the introducing of the tolleration of them , euen when they haue growen more vntollerable : for , such their vnderpropping patrons , as in their first springing , and ( as it were ) in the supposed harmlesnesse thereof , afforded them perhaps some little countenancing fauour , will still be presumed of to beare towards them a certaine tender and relenting fancie , tending to their defence . and in verie deed , such as compassionatly do encline their affectiōs to beare with euils , cannot readily find a degree of stay ; but are likely enough to hold on with them , as well in their offensiue and excessiue , as in their vnespied or neglected naughtinesse ; like to milo that had caried the calfe so long , as that he still caried it when it was become an oxe . i know it to be propounded by some polititians , that some euils must be tollerated in the state , like as dregs and grosse humors be entermixed with the bloud , which they affirme to be better for health , than if the bloud were all pure and clean without them . but ( by their good leaue ) this their instance is idle and impertinent ; for if it be better for the bloud so to be , then it is no euill , but meerely good : and so out of this question of tolleration , i will fetch my ground from a far more aucthorized principle , which is : tollite malum e vobis , and libera nos a malo , and will confesse my selfe in this point a stoycall statesman , by auouching no euill to be so small , ( cloak it or extenuate it neuer so much ) but that the ( tollite ) barreth it of tolleration ; and the ( libera ) setteth vs at libertie , to haue nothing to doe therewith . i know not what nice mitigations , or constructions ( by their fauours ) they may applie to this word ( euill ) but well i wot , that in the prescribed praier taught vs by christ , in that verie tearme of ( euill ) is included and conteined the diuell himselfe : and therefore whatsoeuer we assuredlie resolue to be euill , is as absolutely vnsufferable , as any the limbs or deriued issues of the diuell . now ( lest i should be charged by following of a by-path ) to haue digressed and raunged from my theame , i will reuert to the proofs and appliances borrowed from the bodie . let me know of them , whether their stomacks be so strong , as when they be clogged with heauie meats which they cannot digest , yet will hold and still deteine the same , neuer once striuing to cast them vp ? or is there any of them , that in his owne bodie will with his tollerating patience endure a disease or griefe , if it lyeth in his power to remedie and rid the same ? nay more , admit he be thereby but a little troubled , and not endamaged at all , yet will he not ( for that trouble onely ) seek redresse thereof ? let it be but the itching of some salt humour , or a fleabyting ( by a sleight touch of the skin , starting all the spirits ) can he be so contented , as not to attempt to ease himselfe of such disquieting ? then , from the warrant of god , the sence of nature , the directions of wisdome , the necessitie & dignitie of the state , ( which is not only to remoue his opposites , but to aduance it selfe to all perfection ) let vs abandon all such party-coloured and ambodexter tollerations , not fitting the iustice or dignitie , or good of the commonwealth . neuerthelesse , lest i should too much lay open my weaknesse , both in discretion by a presumptuous asseueration , and in iudgement by propounding that for absolute , which may perhaps be thought to accept of some exceptions and conditions ; i must annex hereunto unto some respectiue mitigation , if not a seeming retractation . it cannot be obscure , but that in a case of vnauoydable necessitie , to auoide thereby the extreamitie of a greater euill , the lesser may ( though not likingly yet permittingly , though not absolutely yet in some manner , though not perpetuallie yet for a season ) receiue a bearing or forbearing conueiance , though not an authorizing approbation . and i must impute it wholy to our impotency , that is so ouerladen with the manifold cumber of euils , and those often of opposite natures , as that we be forced by the repulsing of the worst , to make a seeming shew of electing of lesser ; scant reckoning that to be any euill at all , which by freeing of vs from a deadlyer mischiefe , may bee deemed to haue wrought vnto vs our wel-accepted good . and sith i haue reduced my reason to this degree of relenting , i must seeke to make some probabilitie of farther prouing this point , by the looking also vpon my first propounded patterne : our naturall bodies doe willingly and with a kind of chosing , endure some diseases , because they find the same to free them from other more extremely daungerous . the opening of an issue stoppeth the entrance and breed of many grieuous sicknesses : and nature seemeth oft pleased to suffer , yea and to entertayne some enemies contentedly , for the obtayning and purchasing of an ensuing founder welfare . therefore for a resoluing conclusion whereuppon to insist , i will reconcile any my surmised repugnances with this explayning distinction : such euils , as either through an impossibilitie of remouing are growne necessarie , and so require rather fortitude to indure them , than any prudencie to make choice of them , or that by any helpfull vse whereunto they serue , doe seeme to haue put off their former nature , as becomming phisicke vnto vs , partly may , and partly will haue our sufferance . but as i take it , in the very terme of tolleration , is meant and implyed , a dispensing with and vpholding of such euils , as being confessed to bee meerely and altogether of that qualitie , yet neither so forceth vs by the restreint of our power , but that wee may suppresse them ; neither induceth vs by the apparance of any behoofe or helpfulnesse , to yeeld them fauour . the discerning of which differences in any particular instances , is fitlier recommended to the aduisednesse of the discreet gouernours , than to bee left to the temeritie of any ouer venturous and peremptorie preiudicator . to conclude this point of health : it is so precious and of so vnualuable a worth , as that when it is not so perfect as wee would haue it , or when it is somewhat impaired , we do not sticke willingly to do to our selues farther hurt , to the end to heale our infirmities the more soundly . yea , when wee haue no cause at all to cōplaine , as being of a constitution not to be disliked , yet doe we then take phisicke for a purpose to preuent sicknesse that may ensue , and to confirme the continuance of our health : so in our bodie of the common-weale it is not to be disliked , that ( though there be no great fault found , and all things seeme to stand in good order ) yet now and then physicall courses be vsed , by opening some veine , by purging of superfluities , and putting to payne some part thereof , for the more certeintie of the generall good : that not onely diseases themselues be auoided , but euen all feare and suspition may be preuented to the preseruing and assuring of an inuiolable stabititie of the publique quietnesse . neuerthelesse as in the bodie it is a safe regard not otherwise to moue the humours , than there is likelihood to rid and conquer them : so in the state it requireth a iudicious and ponderous consulting when and how to stirre and atempt such medicinall trialls . aduisednesse aduentureth not without aduantage , knowing that the awaked dog ( not well awed or ouermatched ) will the more insultingly be enraged . the diseases that may annoy or indaunger the state , are more than i am able to recount , much lesse can tell how to cure ; neither would i ( by a more single comparing thereof to the diseases of the bodie ) giue cause to bee censured , as either superstitiously curious , or superfluously busie-headed . this field is spacious , and incloseth a large circuit of plentifull matter for discourse : and i take it to be no lesse difficultie succinctly to comprehend , vnder any heads of diuision , the discrepant multiplicitie of diseases in the politique , than it is in the naturall bodie ; wherein ( as daily experience propoundeth it vnto vs ) notwithstanding the almost innumerable and most industrious discoueries of the learned , in so many reuolutions of ages , yet still more and more diuersities doe start vp and occurre to consideration . i see the pathway and method for an orderly entrance into a treatise of that nature , by the distinct rehersall of euerie the seuerall diseases , either generall to the whole , or proper to any part : but as i must confesse my feeblenesse , standing confounded by the verie sight of the immensitie thereof , so do i humblie yeeld my meannesse to be farre vnapt to intermeddle , where the paines and exquisitnes of some greater patriot may be well bestowed . so much onely ( as in passage ) must needs bee mentioned , as may serue for a conductor or leader to helpe the rest forward . diseases arise as in the body naturall by distemper of humours ; so in the politicall , by disorder of manners : and as in the bodie naturall they doe hinder , peruert , and corrupt the orderly actions of nature ; so in the politicall they do impeach , infringe , and resist the proceedings and regiment of a iust gouernance . but as all diseases are not alike either for sharpnesse of payne , or likelihood of danger : so neither are all offences equall , either for the hainousnesse of crime , or for the harme that can thereof ensue ; a stitch in the side , a pricking in the eye , or a shooting in the sinewes , are eager and extreame griefes , yet not so dangerous as the dropsies , palsies , or appoplexies : so be the fierce and smart contentions of the learned ( in matters not of greatest moment ) exceeding troublesome to the state ; yet no way comparable for danger to atheisme , popery , and disloyaltie . the inequalitie of diseases condemneth the stoicks equalitie of sinne , and where the faults be not equall , it seemeth reasonable , that the magistrat also must proportion his corrections with like inequalitie , euen as the phisicion must varie his cure according to the greatnesse or smalnesse of the griefe . the diseases of the skinne though they require remedie ( because they be diseases ) yet they need not so much tendance , plying , or looking vnto , as the gnawing and tearing pangs of the heart . the hurts or diseases which the body receiueth by any outward meanes , as by heat , or cold , by wounds or bruises , or by ouerheauie loadings , or labouring , and such like ; as they may more easily be before auoyded , so they may more readily be after cured ; likewise hath each kingdome against forraine daungers , both better prouision to preuent them , and more aduantages to repell them : but griefes springing , spreading , and ranckling within , being both long in growing , as hidden and vnespied , and also setled in the entrailes and vitall parts , surpriseth more suddenly , vanquisheth more violently , and tormenteth more vntollerably . as against all diseases of the naturall bodie the skill and application of phisicke is ordained ; so against the corruption of manners in the politicall bodie , wholesome lawes be prouided : whereof where the more bee made , the more it argueth the sinfulnesse of that people , as the vse of much phisicke argueth much distemper . and as phisicke rightly vsed is but an assistant , or coadiutor vnto nature , by the stirring vp and strengthning of the oparatiue vigor and powers of the soule , who then hauing his potentiall faculties so helped and releeued , digesteth , repulseth , and ouercommeth his annoying foe , performing the cure and conquest himselfe : so the lawes and prouisions against offences in the state ( like to a well directed phisicke ) are to range vnder the regiment of the soueraigne with a seruiceable subalternation , recognizing him as the principall phisicion for the redressing or remedying the maladies of the bodie politique . neuerthelesse nature , reason , and all good order admitteth or rather enioyneth all the parts , as well by their duties , as by a certaine tendernesse and sympathie , to conioine any their kindest and soundest aydes both for the repelling of all impediments or oppositions against authoritie , and for the adding of strength thereunto , to perfect the worke of suppressing vice , and of aduauncing the iustice , the safetie and preseruation of the commonweale . let it then bee allowed , that all lawes , as well in their first enacting , as in their daily execution ; and all magistracie , as well in decreeing as in gouerning , is dependant and secondarie to the soueraigntie . such vndergouernours or subphisicions of the commonweale , hauing vnder their charge so worthy a subiect as the states happinesse , and enabled by their soueraigne with a portion of his power , to reforme disorders , and rectifie what is peruerted ; ought regardantly to their place of so great a trust , to be the more painfull , faithfull , & carefull in their cures . not so much as the meanest ministers and seruitors vnder authoritie , no not the constables , bailifes , iurors , and such like ( being smaller sprigs and twigs in the stocke of iustice , and vsed for the inquirie , attaching , presenting , and conuicting , in tryall of transgressours and malefactours ) but bee to know , that their imployment in their seuerall attendances , tendeth to the necessarie amending , purging , phisiking , and reforming of the ciuill bodie , and that therefore they are to make a conscience , & to stand vpright in their diligence and dutie . the negligence , naughtinesse , and vnskilfulnesse of some phisicions occasioneth many to be both afraid to deale with them , & to condemne their profession and practise , as vnnecessarie : so , manie there bee that taking offence at the vnsufficiencie or corruptions of some magistrats and officers of iustice , either vtterly denie the lawfulnesse of their calling , or at the least spurne and repine at their administration ; in so much as the recipe of the phisicion , and the precipe of the magistrat , bee lightly alike irkesome and displeasing . howbeit , as hee that loketh into naturall philosophie must needs find pregnant proofes for the vpholding of phisike , so he that studieth morall phllosophie , will acknowledge his verie alpha and omega , to be the setting vp of magistracie . and as it is but the peeuishnes and queasinesse of the diseased that will abide no phisike , so is it the wilfulnesse and malecontencie of the wicked , that will not come vnder lawes . but the phisicions do not therefore giue ouer their patient because hee is vnruly , but rather handleth him more roughly : so magistrats must not desist from the duties of their offices for the waywardnesse and vnaptnesse of the people , but the more stir vp their spirits & forces against them with all austeritie . the whole worke of phisike is either to continue health when wee haue it , or to restore it when it is wanting : so the magistrats function is either to hold all vpright when the state is in a good case , or to recouer and recure that which shall become vnsound . they both in each of their professions , and in euerie of their particular practises , doe ( consonantly to natures rule ) prescribe as well the hurtfull to bee eschewed , as the helpefull to be taken ; and they both bee furnished at all points with good choice and varietie of medicines applyable occasionally to the sundrie sorts of griefes . they haue some that be panchresta , generall for all assayes , accommodable to any disease ; they haue some that be meerely peculier for one or verie few infirmities , and bee respectiue to some one part ; they haue some , which for their as well safenesse as vertue bee termed benedicta by the helpe wherof they both conceiue hope of helpefull successe , and assurance from all endangerings : they haue some extremely forcible , euen eradicatiua , pulling vp by the roots the firmely implanted , and predominantly preuayling humours : they haue some which be preparatiues , seruing but to make way , and worke an aptnesse for the stronger ensuing remedies : they haue some comfortatiue and cordiall , to assist the softnesse of nature against ouercharging assaults : they haue some restoratiue , to repaire the decaies , and raise againe the deiected estate of health : they haue some consuming corrosiues , to eate out what is become dead and vnsensible : they haue some soporiferous to enduce a sleeping dulnesse and stupiditie , whilest cures of great aduenture must be effected : they haue some lenetiue , to asswage excessiue and raging paines : they haue some exasperating heaters , to digest and draw out the cores of corruption : they haue some drying consumers , to waste away the superfluous confluence of any annoying matter : they haue some attractiue openers , to loose and draw forth any inwardly infixed festerings : they haue dispersers & dissoluers of any gathered together or swelling putrifactions : they haue repercussiues , to suppresse and repell all beginning outrages : they haue expellers of all that is hurtfull and burdenous , cleansing the verie fountaynes of euill : they haue preseruatiues against all venemous and infectious contagious : they haue substantiall consolidators of the dissolued and apostumed parts , reducing all agayne to the health and vnitie of nature ; and they both do enterchangingly vse or administer all or any of these , according to the many different qualities , malice , degrees , disposition , state , and condition of diseases . the phisition is not so strictlie tied to the vsuall forme or composure of his receits and prescriptions , but that he doth often alter the same in particuler persons , as he is induced by the obseruation of sundrie circumstances , signes , and accidents : such a discretion ( some thinketh ) the magistrat might be trusted with , that all offences comming vnder one head of law , should not receiue alike the same vnalterable censuring ; but that vpon aduised consideration of diuersities , sometimes there be vsed quallifications , dispensations , and mitigations , and somtimes againe an encrease and addition of paine should be deuised , as the quallitie or manner of the fault shall deseruedly giue occasion : for example , doth not iustice require that where one felonie is of a more hainous nature than an other , or one treason more foule and horrible than another , the same should be condignly rewarded with an extraordinarie seueritie , beyond the letter of the law ? except we should respectiuely to such inequallitie make more , and these different lawes , which should distinguishingly set forth diuersities of punishment , as the hainousnes of desert shall giue cause , and not wrap vp all alike vnder one generall title , binding them to one and the same recompensing condemnation . but whether is the better to make more choice of prescribed phisicke , ( which by the multiplicitie of diuers respects might grow too infinite ) or to allow more libertie to the phisitions in sorting their appliances to the inequallities aforesaid , id deus aliquis viderit , this is proponed for a truth perpetuall , vniuersall , and vnresistable , that where difference of considerations maketh a maius and minus in any fault , the punishment also should be proportionable by the intention or remission of lenitie or austeritie . the states phisitions after the order and skill of phisick naturall , be diligently to obserue , in what manner each disease taketh or setleth , and how the same may be particularly encountred ; that he may the better ( for militat omnis medicus ) so with ambuscadoes beset the way , and prepare resistance to intercept or interrupt it in his courses , that in what sort soeuer it shall approch , or giue the onset , it may be strongly met withall , and fitly confronted with his contrarie : for right sagely doth their wisdomes discerne , that as in the naturall , so in the politike bodie , the remediyng of any maladies is the more readily performed , by the repelling thereof with their directest opposites . but for as much as without a discouerie of the right cause of any disease , it cannot be well discerned or resolued , where or how to set foot to make head against it ; it is behoueable studiously to find out the beginnings , the entrings , the breedings , and the first occasioning causes of each sicknesse , that in the contriuing of the cure thereof , it may be combatted correspondently . neither is it to be thought lesse necessarie , exactly to know the constitution and complexion of the bodie politique , that in the right applying of remedies , it may vndeceiueably be conceiued how ( according to the diuersities therof ) medicines may be ministred either stronger , or weaker , speedier or flower , oftner or seldomer , for the aduantage of preuailing . yea it seemeth also requisite that the be well seen in the obseruation of times and seasons , for the more fortunate effecting of his intended cures : for like as in priuat , so in publike grieuances there is a certaine point of opportunitie to be watched , and taken hold on , sorting more fittingly to the furtherance of such good indeuours . besides i do not see but ( for the manner of his ministring ) it may vnto him as vnto the phisition be allowed to vse ( to gaine an acceptation of his receipt ) a kind of beguiling loue , by sweetning and giuing of a more pleasing reliefe to his remedies , that the same so kindlie accomodated , may haue rather the welcome of a friend , than be abhorred as an enemy . one skill more he is yet to borrow of the phisition , which is , the diligent noting and distinguishing of each part from other , by the extent of their nature , by their proper place , by their different workings , by their adherence and mutuall respects , or by any other their discrepant proprieties ; lest he do through such ignorant mistaking vnaptly misapplie , to the hurt of one , what he had consideratly prepared for the good of another : he is to haue as penetrating an insight , as carefull an ouerlooking , and as particuler a knowledge of each thing considerable in the ciuill bodie , as the anatomist hath in the serching and seuering of euery veine , arterie , or synew , or in the describing and bounding out of euerie the parts , passages , offices , or actions , in the bodie naturall . in his tendance and care though hee be to haue the whole in a generall suruey , espying and amending whatsoeuer requireth the correction of any remedies ; yet is he more circumspectly , and with all watchfulnesse , to looke vnto such diseases which harmeth and distresseth the best and vitall , yea those roiall parts of nobilitie and magistracie , ( where the soule in sort seateth and sheweth it selfe ) not onely because the in-dwelling ( as it were ) of so great a guest , deserueth a well clensed puritie and soundnes ; but for other also no lesse remarkable respects , of the consequentiall mischiefes thereof , arising to the residue of the bodie , ( sith when any tender or noble part is ill affected , or out of order ) all the rest be therewithall afflicted ; as both partaking heauily with the vnrest , grieuances , and passions thereof , and also filled with the annoying fluxes vpon them vnburdned . let vs for the cleerer demonstrance of this matter ; cast our eyes and imaginations yet more markingly , vpon the bodie naturall , wherein when the distemperature of vnequally sorted humours haue inuaded and possessed any chiefe part , the disease therein bred , or setled , becommeth generall , extending a touch and taint ouer all ; the helping functions thereof be withheld , as restrained by such obstructions . in the steed whereof his infection is sucked and deriued all abroad , to the corrupting and peruerting of whatsoeuer hath any dependancie or affinitie therewith ; yea so far forth , as not onely the common sence by such disturbance misconceiueth his apprehensions , but also that reason it selfe is wholy beguiled and misled ; with some rauing error , allowing the furmised , in steed of the reall good : so as the whole bodie therby is vexed with giddinesse and tumults : so when great men of a better condition , and higher degree , shall grow humerous , opinionate , and factious , ( besides their withdrawing of their faith , alleageance , and former good seruices ) they doe not only seduce the vnskilfull and vnruly commons , but also traine on with their suggestion of colourable causes , some officers of publique trust ( as parts of the reasonable power ) to adhere vnto them in their misconceiuing aduentures , till all be endaungered by such mutinous confusion . but hauing dwelt too long in the description of this disease ( for the remedying whereof , preuention is the best prescription ) what i haue farther to deliuer touching the diseases of the state , or the likenes which they haue with them of the bodie , or how to carrie or direct the manner of tendance or ordering of them ; i must be faile more compendiously to couch the infinitenes thereof within the compasse of some short positions , lest raunging too far , i be offensiuelie tedious , orseeking to match all , i mar all by making more a doo than i need . the forenoted diseases setled in the nobler parts , are the more principally to be prouided for , and it is ordinarie to withdraw the anguish thereof , to some of the lesse principall , yea though it should be with torments of incision , burning , or ligature . where the greife is outward , and the cause inward , it is the surest course of curing to begin at the remouing of the inward cause , whereby the fountaines of supplie may be dried vp , and the braunching euill more easelie withered away . when the disease proceedeth from vnknowen causes , it is more to be suspected and feared , because it mateth and amazeth the phisition himselfe , finding either no apparance of reason , how to make resistance or applying hazardably with likelyhood of as well hurting as helping . it is vsuall that a disease setled in one part , feedeth it selfe by sucking the corruption from other parts adioyning ; wherein for the timely cutting off of such a confluence , to make a strong faction , it is likewise vsuall to comfort and make good the parts adiacent , that the griefe more singly accompanied , may the more soundly be encountred . the diseases that be inueterate & oflong continuance asketh a long healing , and be seldome so soundly remedied , but they will reuert , and ioyne with any new grieuance , and be lightly then more exasperate and cumbersome than before , or than the new it selfe . the relaps into a disease from which wee haue been lately recouered , doubleth the perill of the first sicknesse , being aduantaged by the weaknesse and poore case which it had formerly brought vs vnto . some diseases taken in time are easily helped , which if they be suffered to run on , and through our heedlesnesse confirme themselues , do as easilie grow vncureable ; and where a small matter at the first might restore health , there after some continuance the medicine will come too late . such diseases as be infectious , and do spread far and neer , are to be auoyded by all meanes , as scant to be helped by any meanes , seeing that they force the phisitions themselues to flight , not daring to entrude venterously into the thickest daunger , and when they be chased away , or hide themselues , vpon whom our hope of help relyeth , what can be expected but remedilesse miserie ? the diseases that bring with them a depriuation of sence , without any feeling or acknowledging of sicknesse , argueth a great vnlikelyhood of recouerie , because nature yeeldeth her selfe as contented , and no wayes opposing thereunto . when sicknesse commeth suddenly and vnexpected , the verie violence of that surprise so daunteth the hart , as that the fort will be lost before the forces be assembled . the disease that haunteth vs , and whereunto we be accustomed , we do watch and obserue verie diligently , that we may meet with it at euery turne , and turne away his rigor , before it can get the masterie , and against it we be better prepared , with vsuall applications . the disease that is vniuersall , affecting the whole bodie , awaketh & stirreth all the parts to bring together their concordant aide , and is the more caringly to be withstood , because it aduentureth the whole at one stake . where the diseases seemeth remedylesse , and of desperat condition , there it is permitted and aduised to minister desperat medicines . vncureable diseases shame and foile the phisitions , and then doth it go hard with them , when the patient wholy depending vpon their help , iaieth the blame vpon their vnsufficiencie ; where contrarywise , if they help at a pinch ( all seeming past help ) then doe they ( as it were ) play their prizes , & make themselues well esteemed , and much renowmed . in the diseases of great men , and those grieuous and daungerous , the whole colledge of phisitions is consulted with ; for the greater the cause or person is , the more will the attendance and assistance of councell , iudges , and magistrates concur for the suppressing of such raging fits , by timely remedies . many diseases haue an eager appetite to those meats which are fittest to encrease their force , and it is a part of the cure appertaining thereunto , to restraine the patient from the vse of such hurtfull food ; as if a mad man were to bee kept from a sword , he that is aguish from wine , the seditious from seducing books , and traiterous complottors , and the vngouerned from riches and honour . such diseases as detecteth and discouereth themseluesby some certaine signes whereby they may be knowne , may be sooner suppressed ; and the verie assuaging or altering of those signes , doth often weaken , vanquish , and driue away the disease it selfe . where a disease is particular only to one part , as to the eye , the hand , foot , or such like , the losse wherof inferreth not the destruction of the whole ; there , rather than a continuall molesting & annoying grieuance should encumber the ioyes of life , the part wherunto such paine sticketh & is so affixed , as that it cannot be remoued or remedied , were better to be pulled out , cut of , & disseuered frō the bodie : howbeit much extremitie is to be abidden , and many waies for healing are to be tried befor it com to so hard a passe , as to harden the hart to endure such violence . manie diseases are dissolued and ouercome meerly by the strength of nature , that the phisicions ayd is not implored at all : and many againe because their nature hath beene too much trusted vnto , and phisicke hath bene neglected or loathed , maketh a conquest ouer both . the excesse of humours , will seeke either to settle in some principall part , as in a fortified place , entrenching the same with strong obstructiōs ; or els outwardly to get an head , which ( if they cannot by scattering bee dispatched ) are to beeforced to breake out rather than to fester within . some diseases haue a propertie like the adder that turneth to be a serpent , being chaunged after a while from being the same it was into an other new and different worser than it selfe . most diseases haue certaine degrees & standing points of either encrease or declination , and according as nature is comforted and seconded by the helpes of phisicke , so they eyther slacke their sharpnesse , or become outragious , after they haue once touched and attained to those poynts . yet there resteth one rule that ruleth all the rest , which is , that euery disease desireth his proper cure ; wherein if there bee any missing or mistaking , the mischiefe will bee this , that the weakening of nature by that which is wrong applyed ( for such phisicke not fitting the disease , worketh vpon nature ) must necessarily augment the power and perill of the sicknesse . this position is of a much importing consequence , and ( howsoeuer i leaue all the former to the applying and moralizing of the reader ) this i may not so suddēly forsake , or lightly passe ouer : it cōcerneth the skil of the phisiciō , who hath our liues in his hands . there bee sometimes such nimble headed pragmatickes , that taking vpon them to be great entermedlers in state affaires , do for want of grounded knowledge in the politicall science , make many foule escapes : whom i may resemble to the empericke phisicions , who hauing bene brought vp onely in an experimentall prentiship , do seldome apply that which is proper , but wholy trusting to their ordinarie receipts , & not able to looke into the right nature of the disease , or the diuers variations therof , or the complexion & strength of the patient , or the fitnesse of the season for ministring , or the proportion of the medicine to the qualitie of the sicknesse , and thereunto ignorant also of the methode for orderly proceeding , or iudiciously to marke or obserue the right prognostica ; do daily by their desperate dealings endamage and weaken , if not cast away such as be so hazarded vnder their charge . such blind aduēturing without rule or arte to be vsed in the needfull occasions of the commonweale , who seeth not how hurtfull and pernicious it may proue ? and therfore forbearing ( as i haue bound my selfe to doe ) to inlarge this discourse out of other learning , i will onely serue my turne with stretching of this one comparison thus farre farther : that as the profound and rationall phisicion is for certaintie of cure , and direction in the regiment of health , to bee chosen and vsed before the rash vnskilfull empiricke : so the learned and well seene in the principles of politicall doctrine , is fitter to bee imployed and trusted with the publike dispatches and affaires , tending to the preseruation and amendment of the state , than any bold busie bodies that either creepe in at vnwares , or thrust in by shouing and shouldring ; their agencies being too daungerous , where the bodie of the realme must become their patient : for where their skill is all but by tradition , and not attayned by the studie and enquirie after causes and reasons , how be they able in the middest of so manie deceauable differences to find for each particular occurrance , the proper and right requisite application , without the which whatsoeuer is or seemeth remedied , breaketh foorth anew , waxing raw and sore againe . thenceit commeth , that oftentimes the medicine is worse than the disease , and the phisicion becommeth the heire vnto his patient ; because where wee most repose our selues in a confidence of helpe , there through an vnaduised cariage in the partie trusted ( affecting his owne end ) and wandering from his right way , wee be most seduced and left succourlesse , exposed to all calamities . discretion is the limbecke that extracteth to his right vse all kind of learning , without it nor the phisicion in his manyfold varietie of diseases and medicines , nor the politician in his multiplicitie of causes and cases , can affect any thing , either with certaintie to good , or laudably to reputation . if this be not his best guide , like the threed of ariadne , to lead him through the laberinth of so many intricat diuersities , how shall hee be able to rule the matter , when hee standeth enwrapped , and euen ouer-matched with the contrarietie of rules ? one rule telleth him that nulla remedia tam sunt salutaria , quam quae faciunt dolorem : the best medicines doe most payne vs : by the imitation whereof the state phisicion will perhaps trust most to his sharpe and austere remedies . another rule aduiseth such application as is secundū naturam , et quod cuiusque natura desiderat . hereof it cōmeth , that what delighteth and pleaseth ( though it be not for goodnes comparable ) yet for his familiar agreeablenesse to our stomack and nature , is to be preferred vnto that which is offensiue , vnsauorie , or churlish . this consideration preuaileth in gouernment also , to haue all the businesse of correction and reformation transacted quietly without contrarious conflicting ; and by such meanes as may rather giue contentment , than make conquest : because what is loathed or not brooked , may more hurt or molest in recoyling , than auaile by an vnwilling and painfull retention . aristotle propoundeth as a probleame , that the selfe fame inflammations by some be cured with cooling , and by others are ripened and digested by heating . this phisicke hath also bene wisely put in practise in the tendance of the raging vlcers and impostumations of the bodie politique , when the hote humour of haughtinesse in great men hath sometimes by gentlenesse and counsell bene allayd , and other sometimes by vrging and more heating brought to a rupture & running out . what encumbreth or annoyeth nature , is sometimes at his first gathering ( before it getteth an head ) dissolued and dispersed , and sometimes againe is suffered , yea and forced to shew his vttermost virulence , and to get vnto him his full strength , before it be once medled with . the same medicines that easeth vs of griefe in one part , may annoy vs in another , that help at one time , may hurt at another , or that heale one may dispatch another : wee vse not the same course in summer as we doe in winter , nor the same when the bodie is too full , as when it is brought low , nor the same to children and old folks , as to men of confirmed strength ; nor the same in the height or amendment , which wee doe at the beginning of the disease . such respectiuenesse we may expect from the political phisicion , that he be not pragmatically tied to the idem , or eodem modo , but that from the axiomes & conclusions of learning , he doe so aplie his cogitations to the discrepancie of occasions , as that ( being vsque quaque sapiens ) he accomodate his cures rather by certeinty than at aduenture , and euen therein to shew himselfe regular , by varying of his proceedings frō his rules , as the variablenesse of condicions , circumstances , and considerations shall with reason ouerrule him . and he doth oftentimes ( as a well skilled phisicion doth ) finding any imperfection or vnaptnesse in the first remedies repeale and cast aside them by prouiding and ordeining new . yet in one point more let vs note the effects of skill in a phisicion , who is able to make euen poysons medicinable ; which sheweth , that when magistrats shall vppon occasion make vse of wicked men , we should bee so farre from charging them with the obiection of vngodly policie , as that we should rather for such their property & power liken them vnto god , who himselfe infinitly good , extracteth good out of euill . such expert phisicions of the realme , doe ( like far darting apollo ) spread abroad their golden rayes and happie influence , as well for preseruing of publique health and prosperitie , as also for the subduing of all poysoned pithons , and miscompounded monsters , that infect the ayre , or defile the land of the common-weale . some other good requisits in our state-phisicions may not be pretermitted . it is needfull , that they bee of a graue stayednesse , and free from ficklenesse or flexibilitie . i yeeld , that a phisicion may by occasions and circumstances bee moued to dispose himselfe to change both his opinion and his practise : yet i hold it requisite that such his change may appeare to proceed rather from deliberation than lightnesse , from iudicious discerning of right causes , rather than from a vayne affectation of new courses ; so hee be constant to his propounded end of effecting the saftie & health of the bodie , resting vppon his skill and best endeuour , to make tryall of sundrie different meanes likely , and seruing thereunto , is no vnconstancie at all . the same may bee affirmed of gouernours : it cannot but bee hatefull and scandalous to any magistrate , to play the light headed temporizer , by the exchange and oft shifting of his opinion , still to conforme to euerie accidentall alteration in the state : for howsoeuer it may bee allowed vnto him ( vppon preuayling considerations ) to change his medicines rather than his mind , retayning stil his integritie and constancie towards the state : yet is it made a note of common obseruance , that such as be either caried about by euerie tempest of the time , or be swayed by their owne leuitie to entertaine diuersities in the order of gouernment ; as they do but affect latebram male fidei , so they giue place and passage to euery stirring & vpstart spirit ( as the heedlesnes or giddinesse of the bodies phisicion oft doth ) with force & furie to conquer all . i know that a remedilesse necessitie may constrayne the skilfullest pilot ( being beaten from his intended hauen ) to take into the next harbor that fortune shall offer , rather than with extreme perill to contend with the storme : such a kind of compelled alteration no indifferent obseruer will debarre any prouident polititian of , that whensoeuer he shall varie from his first well grounded resolution , his relinquishing of the former , or his pursuing of any new intention , may be iudged rather necessarie than voluntarie , more reasonable than fashionable , and for the performing of farther good rather than to follow the inclination of his owne vnsteady humours . they must be louing and compassionate , the proofe and demonstrance wherof maketh their patients comfortably and readily to swallow any their prescribed receits , and it is one step towards cure , when the sick holdeth a good thought of his phisicion , persuading himselfe , that his labours are vndertaken out of an honest and heartie desire of doing good , rather than to inrich himselfe by vndeserued gettings . the ouermuch regard of fees or gaynes in some phisicions , maketh good the saying of philemon an old poet , o quam male medicus se habet , cum neminem male sese habere contigit , medicus valere amicos ne suos quidem cupit : which ( howsoeuer perhaps it may be touchingly applied to some lawiers also , whose profession is to find phisicke to redresse particular wrongs , and therefore that they may bee set a worke with the case , wisheth their friends sometimes in an ill case ) yet farre bee it that any the higher magistrats of iustice and gouernment , should bee shamefully stained with the blacke note of so foule an imputation , as out of the diseases , sores , and corruptions of the people , to enrich and aduaunce his owne estate . and against that sort of lawyers which shall seeke to make vs such fooles , as by continuall lawing to keepe vs still to that play at foyles , to fill them thereby with fees , let vs learne this phisicall lesson , that as medice viuere , est misere viuere , so to be neuer out of law , is neuer to know any happie dayes : for as too much phisicke weakeneth and wasteth health ; so to be ouerlaid with law , is the vtter losse and confounding of all comforts of life . but leauing such purse-purging lawyers , i must returne to the pursuite of considerable respects , for the phisicions of the ciuill bodie . as one may bee a good phisicion though an euill man ; so may he be a good commonwealths man , though otherwise for his priuat faults reproueable . as in chusing a phisicion , we take not the wealthiest , or that can make best friends , but him that is best skilled , and likeliest to cure : so magistracie and offices of iustice bee not to be bestowed vppon the richest or most fauoured , but vppon the wisest and worthiest . as we like better a phisicion that is our owne countreyman , or of some neerenesse in bloud vnto vs , than a forraine borne , or nothing alied vnto vs : so is it well and louingly prouided for , where the soueraigne ( according to such desire ) ordereth each people to bee gouerned by their owne natiues . as the phisicions to encourage and induce their patients to take more cheerefully their prescriptions , doe readily foretast the same themselues : so the magistrats for the drawing of the people to the more willing obseruance of the lawes , ought to make themselues examples of integritie in the outward shew of a iust conuersation . besides , as the phisicion though hee bee oft times by the waiward demeanure of the patient , much abused , yet doeth hee persist in his purpose of performing of the best helpe by any course that his skill affoordeth : so the magistrat , albeit in the execution of so busy , enuious , and troublesome a charge , he must often meet with mischieuous intentions against him , be thwarted with oppositions , and indure indignities , yet must he with a manly and vertuous constancy consecrate his whole endeuours to the resolute following of his necessarie function . further , as the phisicion too much set a worke or called vppon , cannot giue to each patient a sufficing attendance : so where there be too many busie imployments cast vppon one magistrat or officer ( or too many clyents cloying of one lawyer ) the verie distraction or diuiding of his paines amongst so manie , applyeth against him the prouerbiall verse : ad plura intentus minor est ad singula sensus . lastly , i will bestow vpon our politicall phisition that complement of qualities , which we vsually look for in a surgion ; that is an hawks eye , a ladies hand , and a lions hart : his eye must piercingly spie into all sores and disorders reformable , his hand must not be caried too heauy , but rather tenderly and mercifully ; and his hart is to be held vp vndaunted , and vnflexible , when it hath vprightly conceiued of the right , reiecting from him all remisnes , or timorousnes of execution . the phisition doth not alwaies follow the precisenes of his owne rules , he doth often offend against his owne health , ( as others doe ) and then is disdainfully mocked with curate ipsum . i would not aduise any man to be so saucy , as to bid the magistrat look to his owne faults ; but it must be confessed , that such as be seated in places of aucthoritie , may as basely and as badly misgouerne themselues as inferior persons , and thereby not vndeseruedly fitted with that frumpe , that the greater theefes hang vp the lesser . yet when the phisition is sick , other phisitions are prouided to minister vnto him ; so the vices of the magistrats , must vndergo the censure of other magistrats , to be delt withall as the quallitie thereof requireth . neuerthelesse , as the phisitions misdieting of himselfe , is no good pretence for the diseased to refuse to be healed by his endeuour : so the obiection of the magistrats misbehauiour or reproach must not withdraw our subiection from abyding and yeelding to any his orders or iudgements concerning our emendation . it is obserued in the nature of man , that when he is pressed by sicknesse to pray aide of the phisition , he holdeth nothing too deare for him , rewarding him with rich recompence ; but when he findeth himselfe recouered , and no more to need him , he will scant afford him any his least fauours ; as if he had concluded , that as god created him , so he would honor him , onely for necessities sake . such also is the fortune of those , who spend their spirits , cares , and industries , in the attendance of the states health ; when it is discerned , that they haue aduised , procured , and ministred the good of the weale publike , then be they extolled by applause , aduanced to honor , and rewarded with bounties ; but if the occasion of their meritings be cut off , then forgetting the forepassed helpes , aesculapius must thence forth loose his sacrifice of cocks . nay , their case is somewhat worse , for if that which by them is contriued and intended rightly , faileth of effect , or falleth out sinisterly ; then as if the phisition had either mistaken his cure , or misbehaued himselfe , he maketh a purchase of blame and shame , loosing both the kirnell for which he took paines , and the credit of his art , which notwithstanding he exactly followed . further than this , he findeth one other greeuance much exceeding the former , which is , that when he hath with his earnest studie and best circumspection decreed and enacted what is to be done , his prescriptions will not be receiued , nor his directions followed ; without the vse and applying whereof , the making of such receipt was a bootlesse labour . he that will see the right image of that wrong offered to the state-phisitions , let him but search into his owne hart , where when reason hath assembled the senat of his best vnderstandings , and hath by their discussings resolued what is best to be done , if there then should want a will to obey and performe such decrees , might not reason and his fellowes as well haue been a sleepe : so verilie when wholsome lawes are deuised and enacted , for the generall benefit of an whole realme , it is an vntollerable abuse offered to the law-makers , when for lacke of due administration , to concomitate the consulting power , the same shall not haue their execution . yet were it the shamfullest iniurie of all , and that no waies standeth with the patients owne safetie , if the receipts or prescriptions of the phisition , should be illuded by shifts and cauilled at , of purpose to mistake and peruert the true meaning thereof : so standeth the case with good statutes , when ill disposed people , will by subtill scanning seek euasions , and alter the sinceritie of them by wrested interpretations . but vertuous subiects holding obedience to be their essentiall and habituall propertie , and hauing such phisitions as both zealously loueth them , and are best acquainted with the state of their bodie , will hartily abhor and abandon such miscreant corrupters of the gouerning iustice. it is now time to find some meanes for the obseruing of a meane , lest tediousnes banish delightsomnesse : i haue reserued yet one comparison more , wherwith at the last to close vp all , and to reduce this discourse to my promised period , of the entire embracements betweene soueraigne and subiect . the bodies hoping after health , or affecting of felicitie , is no other , or to any other end , than to reioice the soule with fulnesse of comfort and satisfiyng pleasures ; so let the desires and endeuours of the bodie politique , and each part thereof , in the acquiring for the state any supposed or desireable good , bee directed and tend to the making happie of their soueraigne , by working on all sides his abundant contentation . then ( sith at their first meeting they began with a profession and coniunction of loue ) their departure shall not want a recyprocall kindnesse , with the exchange of all mutuall offices of faith and assurednesse . the princes contentment must be the happinesse of the subiect , & the subiects welfare the securitie of the prince : and so shall the commonwealth be compleatly blessed , by the firmnesse of that concording vnion , hauing mentem sanam in corpore sano , the tranquillitie of the mind , with indolence of the bodie . thus hauing aduentured to propound vnto publique view ( like as appelles did his picture ) this portracture of the bodie politique , though not so compleatly shaped in all the lyneaments , as may either allure the lookers on to liking , or may suffice to equall the dignitie and maiestie of the matter represented : i must entreat of the wise and expert polititians , their fauourable interpreting , and encouraging entertainments thereof ; vnto whom i haue reason ( with all reuerent regard ) to dedicate these endeuors ; them hath the coniunction of learning and acting , well entermixed , exactly accomplished ; and from the obseruance of their good labours , hath been bred the collection of booke lessons : what they broyling in the heat of affaires , and euen sun-burned with the businesse of the state , doe daily effect for the publique benefit ; that we ( the contemplators of their merits ) in our solitarie priuatnesse at our vnimployed leasures , and from our shadie studies , ought gladly , for the establishing of their aucthoritie , and for the eternizing of their glorie , to recount & recommend to the vndecaying succession of future times . it was right worthy councell which demetrius gaue vnto ptolemie , aduising him diligentlie to reade the bookes written of politicall gouerment : but his reason is sharpe pointed and toucheth to the verie quick ; for ( saith he ) there shall you find that which none dare or will tell you . to say the truth , such works aduisedly & faithfully compiled , be vnpartiall informers , and vncorrupted councellours , acquainting their readers with the generallitie of right and reason , to be applied to vse in particuler considerations . from thence may all gouernours draw their directions , for the framing and plotting of their most important purposes : and what they thence shall suck will be simple and sincere , without admixture of either deceiptfull drifts , or affectionat inclinations . as in the act or abilitie of right vnderstanding , the soule doth manifest his greatest force and goodnesse : so in the multitude of them that can giue councell , is strength . to such atlas-like gouernours , that be the supporting arches of a ciuill state , all politicall learning , and whatsoeuer industrie or discoueries , in that subiect doth properly belong , and ought in them to be treasured vp for store at all times to besteed the state ; euen as the light created on the first day , was after transferred into the bodies of the sun , moone , and starres of the firmament , to illighten the whole world . the view of my weaknesse and vnworthinesse , together with the awful respectiuenes wherto i stand bound in all dutie , stayeth me from presumptuous assuming to my selfe of any such clearenesse of conceipt or iudgement , as may any whit encrease the fulnesse of vnderstanding in our great and superiour lights . yet if by the propounding of this paire of bodies , so equally matching in fashion and liknesse , ciuill consultations vpon any occurrance may ( by such correspondence ) receiue helpe , i hope it will not be disliked , that i haue endeuoured to set open for their light a broader and larger passage . i may not make my selfe ignorant , that it is easie to offend in the curiositie of inquiring into state-secrets ; there is euen in that kind also a forbidden apple . and it hath euer been reckoned an audaciousnes not to be digested , to intrude with timeritie , where restraint hath placed a crosse barre . if euery bodie must know all , counsell were no counsell . the bodie politique as the naturall , is whole and close chested , there is not in his brest ( no more than in the others ) any glasse windowes or casements placed , for medling momus to look into the reserued occultanda of the heart . such as haue an itching desire to peere within the curtaine of those vndiscouerable secrets , besides their offensiue and vnmannerly sawcinesse , against the reuerend and sage senators of the state , do apparantly detect themselues to be but babling and seducing newes tellers . cato censureth fitly of them percunctatores garruli , and plautus amplie describeth their natures , terming them by an old but significant name of famigeratores , as filled both in the eares and in the mouth , with a certaine saleable windy matter of rumors and reports . there is a sobrietie to be obserued in the gayning of knowledge by inquisitiuenesse ; for such as ouerfill themselues , and doe drinke too deepe of harkening and hearesayes , will likewise incurre the other extremities , both of reeling as disied by vntruthes ; and of casting vp againe , by the publishing of all they heare . but when this searching and piercing presumption shall get vp to the highest step , and fall to prie into the prince himselfe , to make discoueries and dinulgings of his dispositions , intentions , affections , qualities , waightie businesses , and serious actions ; then it hath the resemblance , and is a verie spice of the heat of phaeton , of the lightnesse of icarus , of the treacherie of tantalus , of the blabbing of sisiphus , of the lust of ixion , of the immodestie of acteon , and of the slie surreption of prometheus , and is worthily punishable with some of their tortures . salomon compareth the vnsearchable heart of the king , to the height of heauen , and the depth of the earth ; arguing thereby as well the presumption as the impossibilitie of discouering the same , pro. . against this odious iniury of the subiects ouermuch enquiring and spying into their soueraigne , i haue one arrow or argument left me , to be taken out of the same quiuer : nature hath so prouided , that no sences of the bodie doeth penetrate into the essence or inwardnesse of the soule ; they bee espials for him , not spyers into him : for animus oculorum effugit obtutum . then in the same sort , as well for a warning to my selfe , as for a reproofe to any other that way offending , let mee set it downe for a positiue trueth , that euen heerein also our manners and dutie should contemplate and imitate nature , as with a modest reuerence to forbeare to intromit our animaduerting curiositie into the bosome of sacred and vnsearchable maiestie : which who so doth with an humbled spirit well vnderstand what it is in his verie altitude and latitude , shall certainly find it to be as great an arcanum in policie , as the soule can bee in nature : so ( with all beseeming reseruation of my dutious submission to superiour powers ) i doe to the residue of readers offer a petition of indifferencie , that if they shall light of any thing defectiue or wanting waight , i may bee bold to borrow some few graynes of their good fauour , wherwith perhaps the scales may be held vpright . if they meet with any matter seeming an vlcer , tender of touch , and subiect to construction ; i may onely chalenge them to be charitable , than which ( i hope ) there will need no other healing . finally , if to the daintie eare of this all-scanning age , my simple and vnpolished worke shall giue no satisfaction , yet the scope of my honest intentions , and the loyaltie of my well meaning , may at the least acquite me of blame , if not merit acceptation . finis . errata . in the first page of the briefe , line penult . leaue out ( of resolution . ) in the next page , line . for , loueth all , read , loued of all . folio . line . for excellentest , read excellent fift . f. . l. . for heat , t. head . f. . l. . for if , r. of . f. . l. . for mind , r. mine . f. . l. . for conueiance , r. conniuance . f. . l. . for proponed , r. propounded . f. . l. . for affect , read effect . notes, typically marginal, from the original text notes for div a -e the aptest resemblances of a commonweale . the greater and lesser world . trismegistus his great giant . gods imitating of himselfe , a direction for our imitating of him man the fittest patterne to imitate in the forming of a ciuill state . agrippa his tale of the parts of the body . liuius lib. . the like comparisons vsed in the scriptures . . cor. . in praise of such comparisons . a caution against crossing with dissimilitudes . a limitation not to striue too far . of enforcing a similitude beyond his agreeablenesse . notes for div a -e homo monsura rerum omnium . soueraigntie the soule , alleagiance the body . in euery ciuill state there must be the ruling , and the ruled . impugners of magistracie . magistracie worketh the good of the people . mutual offices between soueraigne and subiect . the end of gouernment , to make the state happie . all gouernment by law . the soueraigns loue to their subiects . the soueraigns care of their subiects welfare . the excellencie of soueraigntie . soueraignes ordained by god. rom. . against ambition . soueraignes haue a waightie charge . soueraignes impart to inferior magistrats a part of their power . all command in the state deriued from the soueraigne . soueraignes wrōged by the negligence of vnder officers . against forrain supremacy the rights of soueraigntie not to be to far extended , nor too much restreyned . first of soueraigntie . the powers of the soule set forth . the matching of the powers of soueraignty to the powers of the soule . soueraigntie in his vegetable power . in the sensitiue and intellectuall . councellours . fauorites . the soueraignes will , and whether it alone may stand for law . plato soueraignes often misinformed . customes and inclinations of the people oft preuaile with the soueraign . resolution in the soueraign . obedience in the people . rebels . opinion . sutors in court like appetites . malecontents . pretenses in treason . records and their imbeziling or falsifying . prerogatiue royall . soueraignes not to be euill spoken of . cicero . the soueraigne a god. the large extent of soueraigntie , by cōparison with god and the soule . of the soueraignes shewing himself to the people . philip comm. plato . mans head his root . the excellencie of the head or soueraigne . the head loued of the bodie . soueraignes haue a sympathie with subiects . how to think of soueraignes faults . subiects haue a cause to beare with soueraignes faults . no opposition to the soueraigne , much lesse no deposing of them . kind subiects take vpon themselues the blame imputed to the soueraigne . in pseud. the soueraign likened to the heart . the cōmaund and force of soueraigntie . of the soueraigne all hold what they haue . bountie in a soueraigne . soueraignes loue of vertue . soueraigns to looke well to them that be neer about thē how factions grow ▪ the soueraignes sports not to be grudged at . two wayes to wrong the soueraigne . maiestie in a soueraigne . a soueraigne how to bee respected . diuersities of respects in the soueraign touching his person and his soueraigntie . man the great miracle of nature . nor head nor heart haue any power to doe wrong . certaine essentiall orders in the state . the gifts of statesmen to be wel disposed of . chiefe officers or nobles to be well safgarded . the fower elements of the bodie politique . the well mixing of the elements . the predominance of the elements actiue or passiue , maketh the complexion of the bodie politique . the elements to be held in concord . discords in the parts of one and the same elemēts . sundry formes of bodies politique . in a distemper all turneth to hurt , euen that which otherwise were good enough . the degrees of growth in the bodie politike . philosophers . the causes o change in the bodie politique . astronomers . god in alterations worketh the causes , and oft without causes . difference of parts in the common-wealth vegetable . sensitiue . rationall . dieting of the bodie . too precise or too careles of health . exercise of the bodie . tendance of the body politike according to different respects . equalitie to be obserued . against paritie to proue differences of dignitie & riches . not to reward worse than not to punish . difference of dignities and degrees . dignities ill bestowed . why the body politique is called a common wealth . mutualitie of helpe in the members . more respect of the chiefe members . the enemies bend most against the best . each part to be appointed to his owne workes . parts disordered , maketh the bodie to seeme monstrous . against conspiracie of the parts in the state ciuill . of the late intended treason . against idle , vagrant , or vnptofitable people . against ingrossing of offices . no need to put many offices vpon one man. a concordāce of the parts of the body politike in their cōmon works . in the worke of ruling , but one head . britania one body needing but one head . proofes for vnion . imperfections in the body politike , yet a bodie . shifts to supplie defects . mercenarie souldiers and straungers . the vse of leagues betwixt differēt countries . perfection in the state. signes of being in good estate . the best plight most to be mistursted . signes infer no certeintie . health , how necessarie in both bodies . griefe in any one part , putteth the whole out of health . aristotle ethic. lib. . discontentednesse . originall orders , the best preseruatiues of health in the state. alterations , how daungerous . nature best brooketh things accustomed . alterations must not be suddē or wholy , but by degrees and by parts . cases of alteration . better keep health , than recouer it . to prouide in prosperitie , for aduersitie . time preuention . of small beginnings , great mischiefes . against tolleration . cases admitting some sufferance of euill . we may hurt to heale . the diseases of the state. how they doe arise . differences in faults . against equalitie of sinne . punishment must bee proportionable to the offence . outward euils not so dangerous as inward laws the phisicke of the state , & dependeth of the soueraigne authoritie . the meanest officers do minister phisicke to the state . the cause why magistracy is oft repugned at . necessitie of magistracie . magistrats not to be discouraged , or giue ouer their cure . the likenes of the worke of magistrats and of phisicions . sundrie sorts of medicines in the state ciuill . in altering of punishment , what may be left to the magistrat . points to be obserued of the states phisition , and first of the manner of the disease . curing by contrarie . the cause must be first knowne . the complexion to be knowne . seasons to be obserued . to minister the medicines in pleasing manner . to know perfectly the bodie and all the parts . to haue greatest care of the best parts . great mens faults most perilous , and most to be respected . diseases in the nobler parts most to be looked to . where the cause is inward . where the cause is vnknowne . where the disease feedeth it selfe from other parts adioyning . diseases inueterate . relaps into any disease . to applie cure in time . infectious diseases . diseases depriuing sence . diseases comming suddenlie . diseases wherunto we be accustomed . diseases of the whole bodie . diseases desperate . diseases vncurable . diseases of great men require more help and aduise . diseases made worse by feeding on that they desire . diseases discouered in their signes . destruction of members in any disease , when to be vsed . diseases oft dissolued by nature . diseases to be forced to break outwardly . diseases growing to a worse nature than they were . the state or standing point of a disease . euerie disease must haue his proper cure . against vnskilfull pragmatickes the learned fitter for gouernmēt than the vnlearned . vnperfect curing . discretion in state busines . seueritie . lenitie . contrarie waies to cure the same disease . diuersities in curing , vppon diuers respects repealing of some , and making of new lawes . magistrats may make vse of the wicked . good magistrats praised . the phisicions louing of the patient . couetousnesse in getting of fees . desire of gaine in some lawiers to be neuer out of law , a great miserie . magistrats may haue priuat faults , yet good magistrats . magistrats to be chosen for their skill in gouernment . magistrats rather to be natiue than forraine . magistrats must not desist frō their duties for abuses offred vnto them magistrats must giue good example . magistrats not to haue too many offices or imploiments . compared to a surgion in three properties . magistrats do sometimes offend the law themselues . magistrats offending , to be punished by other magistrats . magistrats faults no pretence to disobey them . magistrats deseruings soone forgotten . magistrats care and wisdome is iudged of by the euents . magistrats discouragement for the want of execution of lawes by them made . reasons resolue vaine , if there be no will to performe ▪ lawes often by cauils illuded . obedience the chiefe vertue of subiects . the subiects chiefe care to content the soueraigne . politicall gouernors are to be made famous by the prayses of the learned . the benefit which a soueraigne shall haue by the studying of politicall books . prouerb . . the dedication of politicall works due to the gouernors of the state. curiositie of looking into state businesse . in trinumo . inquisitiuenes . to prie into the princes dealings or dispositions , how dangerous it is . a caueat from natures work . in soueraignty a great mistery political and military observations a new collection / by j.d. of kidwelly. davies, john, - . approx. kb of xml-encoded text transcribed from -bit group-iv tiff page images. text creation partnership, ann arbor, mi ; oxford (uk) : - (eebo-tcp phase ). a wing d estc r ocm this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is 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ascii text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable xml (tcp schema; characters represented either as utf- unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless xml (tei p , characters represented either as utf- unicode or tei g elements). keying and markup guidelines are available at the text creation partnership web site . eng political science -- early works to . military art and science -- early works to . - tcp assigned for keying and markup - apex covantage keyed and coded from proquest page images - emma (leeson) huber sampled and proofread - emma (leeson) huber text and markup reviewed and edited - pfs batch review (qc) and xml conversion political and military observations . a new collection . by j. d. of kidwelly . london . printed for h. cox next castle-yard in holborne : and h. bonwick in st. pauls church-yard , . political , and military observations . i. it is the common humour of mankind , principally to fear the danger which is next at hand , and to be more carefully concern'd for things present , than is requisite ; and on the contrary , to make less account than they ought of those things which are to come , and at a distance ; and this out of a certain presumption , that time and the contingency of humane accidents may afford some remedy for the latter . ii. it happens many times that the wisdom which is over-curious , and too too considerative , may be blame-worthy ; inasmuch as the affairs of the world are subject to so many and so great a diversity of occurrences and disappointments , that that seldom happens , which wise men imagined would come to pass . that person therefore who quits the present good , out of a fear of the future danger , ( it being presuppos'd that the danger is not inevitable and too near at hand ) finds , to his sorrow , that he has let slip the occasion which presented it self to him of gaining honour or advantage , meerly out of a fear of the danger , which is afterwards found to have been vain . iii. when the prudent man finds himself induc'd to give way to some just cause of discontent ( from what occasion soever it may proceed ) he ought to moderate it , what lies in his power , with a mature judgment ; out of this motive , that he is not so much to mind his own private interest , as that of the publick ; since it is not unlikely , but that his discontent may be prejudicial to the welfare of the state. iv. a great power , and that united in one person , is more to be dreaded than that which is divided amongst several parties ; which latter , as it has a diversity of motives , so has it also a diversity and discordancy of operations , and those promoting a diversity of designes . v. there is this observable in republicks , that they are not govern'd according to the inclinations of a single person , but by the joint deliberations and consent of many ; and thence it comes , that commonly they are thought to carry on their consultations with more moderation and respect . vi. such as the prince is in point of morality , such is the government of affairs . if the prince himself be a person of no great esteem , those are in a condition tending to ruine ; is he be a person of conduct , and vertuous , they flourish . vii . new conquests , if they be not not well regulated , nor prudently governed , do rather burthen the person who has made them , than render him more potent and considerable . for it is not to be expected that he should be the occasion of any good or happiness to a government , which he hath acquir'd by indirect means . viii . aswe find in the ordering of mans body , that it is not sufficient the head be free from all indisposition , but it is withal requisite that the other members exercise their several functions : so neither is it sufficient in the government of a state , that the prince himself be unchargeable with any default in the management of affairs , if there be not a correspondency of diligence and vertuous action in his officers . ix . the prince and the republick are seriously to consider , what difference there is between being the first aggressors in a war against another , and expecting the other to be the first beginner thereof ; between treating about the dividing of another state , and expecting till their own be in danger thereof : and lastly , whether it be better to have one only assistant , or to engage alone against several joint adversaries ; and after such consideration made to deliberate about what is likely to prove most conducive to their particular interest . x. it is a thing of singular prudence and great repute in a great prince , when he so demeans himself in his affairs , as that they who are inferiour to him , have no occasion to suspect , that he does any thing out of dissimulation , or by way of personation , or out of any other design that is not good and justifiable . xi . when princes enter into leagues , in order to the reducing of interests to a certain equality , there easily arise disgusts and jealousies among them ; whence it often happens , that enterprises begun with a great opinion of success , meet with many difficulties , and in fine come to nothing . xii . for a man to be a king may sometimes be the effect of success ; but to exercise that sacred and royal function , which proposes to it self for its last end , the good and welfare of his people , depends wholly on the person himself , and the vertue which ought to be attendant on him . xiii . in difficult and intricate deliberations , the prince ought to approve those for easie and desirable which are necessary , or at least those which in comparison of others , seem to imply less difficulty , and less danger . xiv . the greater and more powerful a king is , the more honourable it is for him to employ his grandeur in the maintenance and administration of justice , and the publick faith ; there being not any thing more unbecoming a prince or republick , than to be defective in the observance of publick obligations . xv. in things that are doubtful , the prince ought to continue in suspence , and to reserve to himself , as much as lyes in his power , the means of taking and fixing upon that resolution , which he shall find by the general course of affairs likely to prove most beneficial and expedient . xvi . the prudential captain is he , who to obtain a victory with greater security , would rather do it with great protraction of time , much hardship endur'd , and cautious adventuring forward , with sufficient provision for all accidents , than to overcome with ease and expedition , meerly to acquire glory to himself by puting all to an immediate hazard . xvii . it commonly happens through the corrupt judgment of mankind , that prodigality is more recommended in a king , though in some measure attended with rapine , than frugality , though accompani'd by an abstinence from encroaching upon that which is anothers . xviii . all the things , for which men are so industrious and concern'd in this world , are reducible to two points , to wit , profit and honour ; under that of profit is comprehended whatever concerns the body , under that of honour , whatever concerns the mind . xix . the prince ought to be grave , by a regular stayedness of demeanour , governing himself with moderation in all his affairs , performing the promises he hath made , and standing more in fear of doing that which is evil , than that any ill should be done to him ; and all this with a continual remembrance , that he being but a man , has receiv'd from god a power almost divine ; but to this end , that he might be a furtherer and advancer of things just , and of good report , in his government . xx. the citizen who begins to concern himself in the management of the publick affairs , ought to live according to the usual course of the other citizens , and accommodate himself to their humour , and with all the dexterity and prudence he can , promote those things , wherewith the populace are more satisfy'd , and by which they are ordinarily kept in a good humour . by these compliances he will come into repute and credit , and acquire authority . xxi . they who are entrusted with the management of the affairs of a free state , ought to be always mindful of two precepts of plato . one is , that they principally promote the advantage of the citizens , and make all their endeavours subservient to that end , not regarding their own private interests . the other is , that they have an eye on the whole body of the republick , so as that though they incline to one party , yet they must notdesert another . the reason of it is , that the commonwealth ought to be govern'd as a guardianship ▪ is , to wit , for the good and advantage of those who are receiv'd under the charge thereof , and not altogether for theirs , to whom it is committed . xxii . it is the peculiar charge of the magistrate , to be careful , that he represent the person of the city , and that he maintain the order and dignity thereof , observe the laws , and be mindful of the things committed to his trust , and make provision not only for what is done , but also for what ought to be done ; it being his business , that the common-wealth be as well regulated after his death , as it was , while he liv'd . xxiii . that war is just which is necessary , and that is a pious ▪ recourse to arms , when there remains no hopes otherwise than in arms ; and that war is just which a prince enters into ▪ either to recover what is lost , or to prevent the wrong intended him . xxiv . this ought to be heeded by governours , that when they pardon a small number of delinquent persons , they disoblige all the good ; in regard that these latter perceiving that mischief is pardon'd , cannot promise themselves that good will be requited by the governours ; and thereupon ▪ persuading themselves that there is more to be gotten among the wicked , they are easily diverted from well doing . xxv . it is always observ'd , that in cities , they who are necessitous envy the good , and have an esteem for the wicked ; they quarrel at things of ancient establishment , and are forward to promote novelties ; and out of the aversion they have for the wealthier sort , they study tumult and seditions , imagining that their poverty and multitude will indemnify them from the punishments , due to the disorders , whereof they are the occasions and abettors . xxvi . when persons of a mean and despicable condition are guilty of any miscarriage , it is known but to few persons , and the noise of their actions reaches no further than their conditions will bear . but the acts and demeanour of those who are of great quality , and owners of great estates , are remarkable to all , and so become more highly censureable . xxvii . it is seldom seen that a vertuous man loses his liberty , but he withal in some respect loses his life ; in regard it is a thing notorious to all , and of great difficulty to those who have been educated and enur'd to freedom , to be reduc'd to a servile life , inasmuch as of all things in the world liberty is the best and most desireable , the very name whereof is a character of vertue , as servitude is a mark of misfortune . xxviii . when a person of noble extraction degenerates from his ancestors by the doing of things that are not vertuous , he ought to remember , that by how much the more illustrious the lives of his progenitors were , in their times , so much the more scandalous and reproachable will his appear : inasmuch as the lustre and reputation of ancestors is as it were a light to their descendents , which discovers , to the eyes of others , the vertue or vice which is remarkable in them . xxix . 't is an humour highly commendable in a victorious prince , when he is so far mindful of himself , as to endeavour rather to do what is consistent with the rules of generosity , than to impose conditions too insupportable upon his conquer'd enemies . xxx . he who is of an humour inclin'd to peace , will not be diverted from the concluding of it by the great difficulties which present themselves in the negotiation thereof ; inasmuch as the difficulties occurrent therein , are remov'd either by the force of down-right justice , or by retaliating injustice with injustice , and counterpoising reason with reason , or by the enduring of a lesser prejudice , or by a mutual deference of several parties in abating somewhat of their right ; as shall seem most convenient to prudent persons , according to the importance of the thing in dispute . xxxi . it is the property of a well establish'd and well regulated commonwealth , that all affairs , or the greatest part thereof , as far as it is possible , be manag'd , and decided by the laws , rather than left to the decision and discretion of a judge ; inasmuch as there are few of so great abilities and sound understanding , as to be sufficiently skill'd in the laws , and withal of unquestion'd integrity , to give right judgement in a doubtful case ; whereas the laws themselves , by long experience of affairs , and by mature consideration , are reduc'd to perfection : but the judgment of man according to his natural bent to love or a version is wrested and corrupted without the support of the law. xxxii . among those of the popular rank , discords arise from the disparity of estates , in regard those of the lower rate are desirous to be equal to those of the higher ; but among the nobility , they proceed from grandeurs , inasmuch as they who are equal are desirous to aggrandize themselves . xxxiii . when men are come near that disaster or inconvenience into which they are fatally design'd to fall , 't is then that they are principally depriv'd of those advantages of circumspection and prudence , with the assistance whereof they might , in all likelihood , have avoided the inconvenience which threatned them . xxxiv . when matters of great importance are under debate , there is not any thing more necessary on the one side , nor more dangerous on the other , than to take advice thereupon ; and no doubt the prudent person stands less in need of counsel than the imprudent , and accordingly the former derives greater advantages from taking counsel than the other , because he has so great a stock of prudence , as to be able to consider and weigh things of himself , and amongst the reasons that are offer'd , to discern those which make most for his interest . but what assurance can the imprudent person have , in asking counsel , that the advertisements he receives are good and faithful ? for if the person who gives counsel be not highly faithful and well affected to him who desires it , but is inducible to be otherwise , out of some notorious concern of his own , or out of some motive of advantage , or flender satisfaction , he will frame his advice so as that it may be most beneficial to himself . and that intention of his being for the most part unknown to the party consulting , he makes no discovery , if he be not a prudent person , of the perfidiousness of the counsel that is given him . xxxv . he who is desirous to ballance things between princes , and to observe a punctual neutrality , must , with the greatest circumspection he can , abstain not only from all acts , but also from any discovery , which may raise a suspicion of his being inclin'd to one side more than the other . xxxvi . youth , as it is that part of man's age which is most greedy of honour , and looks upon disgrace with the greatest indignation , so is it also the most capable of enduring the inconveniencies , difficulties , and hardships , which necessarily attend war. the difference there is between men or nations is not to be measured by years , but by ingenuity , vivacity , and soundness of judgment , study , industry , and the particular exercises of vertue . xxxvii . if a great person has done thee an injury , dissemble thy reception thereof , and smother thy resentments ; for it is a pure extravagance to be disgusted against a person , whom thou dar'st not call to account , and whom it were imprudence in thee further to exasperate . xxxviii . there happens an infinite variety of turns and changes in military affairs ; therefore ought not a man to grow too confident upon new advantages , nor be too much depressed , upon the contrary : inasmuch as ever and anon , there comes some alteration , whereby this lesson may be learnt , that when opportunity presents it self , it should not be neglected , because it lasts but for a short time . xxxix . when matters come first under deliberation , it is most seriously to be consider'd , what the issue thereof may be ; and then ought men to be cautious how they assent to uncivil and pernicious demands . for some have found by experience , that when such as they are treating withal have obtain'd what they desir'd , it has prov'd only an encouragement to them to make a further progress in their demands . xl. the more sudden and unexpected accidents are , the greater discomposure and astonishment do they cause to those to whom they happen . it is therefore the part of a prudent person , to make that provision before-hand , which may prevent his being surpriz'd or disturb'd ; or if it so happen that it cannot be avoided , let him endeavour , from the present state of things , to foresee what may come to pass , using all the precautious remedies , which his experience and prudence can suggest , and not suffering things to grow worse and worse . xli . it always happens , in civil conversation , that , whether a vicious act be chastis'd , or a vertuous act recompenc'd , the whole body of the citizens receives a good thereby ; nor was there ever any expedient more contributory to the preservation of cities in a happy and flourishing state , than that counterballancing of punishment and reward , justly apply'd according to desert . xlii . all the assurances that can be had of an enemy whether by oath , parole , engagement to friends , promises , or whatever other way can be imagin'd , are good ; but by reason of the corruption of persons , the depravation of morality , and the vicissitude of times and accidents , the best expedient is for a man to take such order in his affairs , as that the enemy may not be in a capacity to annoy him . xliii . the present method of carrying on a war is much different from that of the ancients , who did not their work by assassinations , and surprises , but discover'd to the enemy , if any base contrivance were in hand against him , and all out of a confidence that they should be able to overcome him by vertue . xliv . when a man is advanc'd to some great charge ; it is soon discover'd whether he be a person of great abilities , or not ; but above all , by the augmentation of his worldly concerns , and the advantages he may have by his office , the affections of his heart are discover'd , together with his disposition ; inasmuch as , the greater person he is , so much the less cautious will he be , in suffering himself to be carryed away with the current of his own natural humour . xlv . be it thy continual care , that thy superiour conceive no ill opinion of thee , and be not over-confident of the leading an unblameable course of life , but endeavour to be such an one as that thou maist not be much afraid to fall into his hands ; inasmuch as there is an infinite number of unforeseen occasions , wherein thou mayst stand in need of him , and be glad to insinuate into his favour . xlvi . the governour ought rather to fix his consideration upon the substance and reality of the thing , than upon the appearance of it , measuring it rather by prudence , than by his own will , and being always distrustful of himself ; in regard it is a great reproach to a state , when imprudence is attended by danger . xlvii . the grand mystery of war consists rather in obedience , than a curiosity of knowing the reason of the general 's orders ; and that army is well fitted and prepar'd for danger , which , before it is set on work , is the most exactly kept under discipline . xlviii . all those who are concern'd , or commissionated to deliberate and treat of affairs of great importance , ought to consider with themselves , whether that they undertake will prove beneficial to the commonwealth , honorable to themselves , and may be compass'd without any great difficulty . xlix . in the carrying on of enterprises , it is to be observ'd , whether he who gives the advice , is also willing to expose his person to danger ; and when the enterprise has taken effect it is to be consider'd , to whom the honour thereof is principally to be attributed . l. in the times of publick disturbances and seditions , they always have the greatest power and credit , who of all are the most wicked ; but in times of peace and tranquillity , they are most in esteem who are the most remarkable for their conduct , and observance of discipline . li. men would not be so violently addicted to mischief , were it not for the advantages or satisfaction they reap thereby . this gave occasion to wise law givers to make punishments and rewards the ground-work and support of their governments , not so much out of a design to afflict their subjects , as to divert them from those things wherein they are apt to follow their own corrupt inclinations . lii . as discord divides one city and makes it two , or more , and gives occasion to those who have their eye upon it to advance and carry on their designes with greater success against it ; so union restrains and cements the counsels of many , and reduces them into one body , and by that means keeps the government closely compacted together , and uncorrupted . liii . as it happens in a structure of importance , that there is more danger of the falling of one stone towards the foundation , than if a hundred tiles fall down from the roof of it : so is it a much greater fault in point of policy , to disobey justice , than to commit many slight faults against the particular devoir between man and man ; since it has been observ'd , that many times great scandals have been rais'd in the commonwealth , which were occasion'd at first by some small disobedience . liv. it would be a good and wholsom law , if those persons , who observe no regularity in their lives , who are negligent in the managery of their domestick concerns , who order not their affairs as they ought to do , and discover no observance of discipline in their own families , but live in perpetual jarring and contention with their neighbours , should be put under the tuition of guardians , who might treat them and keep them in , as distracted and extravagant persons , to prevent the communicating their extravagance to others ; inasmuch as the commonwealth is never more likely to fall into disturbance , than it is by their means who observe no rule in their private demeanour . lv. there is not any thing more common or more pernicious among men , than that deceitful imagination of one mans condition being better than another . and this proceeds hence , that mens eyes are so blinded with malice and envy , that they would rather with much trouble grasp at what belongs to another , than quietly enjoy their own . the condition of princes is really good , if they make a good use thereof . in like manner , the popular state is good , if men acquit themselves therein as they ought to do . the condition of the wealthy is good , if they use it with moderation ; and so is that of the poor , if it be attended with patience , which is of such a soveraign vertue , as to make that good which is generally accounted otherwise . lvi . if subjects knew what a hard task the prince has in commanding , or if the prince knew how sweet a thing it is to live in tranquillity , the meaner sort would have a great compassion on the grandees , and the grandees would envy those of a mean condition ; inasmuch as the divertisements which the prince enjoies , amount to little in comparison of the discontents he is forc'd to endure . but as the station of the prince is the highest of all , as he can do more than all , as his worth exceeds that of all the rest , as he endures more than all , and surpasses all in government ; so is it necessary , that the court , the person , and life of the prince be better regulated than those of all the rest , inasmuch as it is the rule , measure , and standard thereof . lvii . there is not any thing whereof a wise prince should be more selfsatisfy'd , than that he has about him some persons eminent for their valour and conduct , to carry on the military concerns , and others signal for their prudence and integrity , to manage the civil . lviii . it is a very remarkable observation , that men eminent for their valour and good fortune in military affairs are born and flourish much more in one time than they do in another . for if a valiant person rise up in the time of a daring prince , he shall be in great esteem , and employ'd upon extraordinary designes ; but if he live under a timorous and distrustful prince , such a prince shall make greater account of those who study how to improve and advance his revenues , than he will do of him who shall return crown'd with laurels from the wars . lix . they who are desirous of the reputation of good princes , ought to propose to themselves the examples of such as have been such in their several ages : for to that end are the lives and actions of illustrious persons , by faithful historians , transmitted to posterity ; that princes and grandees may have such exemplars set before them as they ought to imitate . lx. the greatest care a governour ought to take , is to find out the person who shall advise him to govern well , and to maintain his estate with justice . and that is not done with harsh words , but with a meekness that gains mens hearts , and acts of good example ; for a generous soul is easily drawn in to obey , when the person who imposes the command is of good repute and example . lxi . there happens one thing in the world which is worthy our serious observance ; to wit , that as among the good , there is some one , transcendently good , so in like manner , among the bad , there is one transcendently such . but the misfortune is , that the good person does not gain so much honour by his vertue , as the lewd person does reputation by his lewdness ; in regard vertue renders a man naturally inclin'd to retirement , whereas the vicious person never thinks better of himself , than when he appears upon the stage . lxii . princes ought not to betray their surprize and astonishment at any thing , even when things seem to go most against them ; but they should obstinately stand upon the defence of their own , expecting their neighbour princes will find it their own interest to keep them up in their former station , to prevent the over-growth of some ambitious pretender . lxiii . the person o'repress'd with calamities and disasters is always hearkning after some change of fortune , whereas he who is at his ease does not so much as think of any alteration ; the litter is sufficiently satisfi'd with the present posture of his affairs , and the other looks on vicissitude as the only means to cause some amendment in his condition . lxiv . some wise men affirm , that when the commonwealth is upon the choice of a governour , they should be sure to pitch upon a person who has been at least ten years in the wars ; in regard that he alone is most likely to be the best preserver of a desired peace , who has been experimentally acquainted with the miseries and calamities consequent to war. lxv . no doubt but that prince does most wisely , who regulates his affairs answerably to his revenues ; in regard that if he do not , and his territories be but small , he must either run the hazard of losing what he is possess'd of , or , to keep himself up , do those things that are burthensom to his subjects , and so his government must degenerate into tyranny . lxvi . it is the greatest commendation that can be of the supream magistrate , to be conversant and familiar with the good , ( since that familiarity is the greatest incentive and encouragement that can be to goodness ; ) to be liberal of his estate in doing of good works , ( it being notorious , that he who values his reputation , makes but little account of mony ; ) to extirpate tyranny ( inasmuch as the concent and harmony of the princes government consists in the chastisement of the bad , and the rewarding of the good ; ) and to shew his munificence upon all occasions ; in regard there is not any thing more endears the majesty of the prince , than when he makes all the demonstrations he can of his grandeur , in relieving others , and not expecting that he should derive great advantage from others . lxvii . two things render a city secure , and highly contribute to the commendation and honour of its governours ; the one , when it is guarded by those whose estates are the most considerable , & is well provided with all things relating to the defensive part ; the other , when there is a fair correspondence between its governours and their neighbours ; without which there cannot be a free intercourse of commerce , and mutual supplies of all necessary provisions . lxviii . a soveraign lord , who would be obey'd , will do well , in the first place to conclude it necessary , that when he commands , he should make some discovery of his own personal observance thereof , in regard that no lord is to propose that soveraignty to himself , as to be exempted from the acts and exercises of vertue ; especially since that the prince , being the mirrour of others , is oblig'd so evidently and actually to apply himself thereto , as that he himself should give example to those that are under his government . lxix . to meet with some unexpected misfortune , is a thing , of its own nature , not good ; yet may it accidentally contribute to the advantage of a person of sound understanding ; in as much as it may be an occasion to him of standing more strictly upon his guard , in case the like accident may happen another time , there being few who truly believe what evil is , till they have had some experience thereof . whence it comes , that all persons not well vers'd in affairs proceed ordinarily either with too much negligence , or too much presumption ; whereas he who has once weather'd out a disastrous chance , becomes thereby so much the more cautious and considerate . lxx . princes will do well , so to converse with their subjects , as that they may be induc'd to serve them rather out of a readiness of inclination , than out of hopes of reward ; in regard that the less respect men have for mony , the less it implies of servitude . for he who loves another sincerely and generously , does not become arrogant in prosperity , nor flinches from him in adversity ; does not bemoan himself upon the consideration of poverty , nor is cast down and disgusted at his not being much in favour , nor recoyles in the time of persecution . in short , there is a correspondence between life and love to the last gasp . lxxi . every state ought so to desire peace , as to be nevertheless diligent in the making of all military preparations ; for peace without arms is weak and indefensive . thence it came , that the heathens represented even the goddess of arts and sciences armed ; and so , to be desirous of peace and to carry on the preparatives of war , are not things simply contradictory . lxxii . he truly understands the tender and transcendent concern of friendship , who obliges his friend before he be requir'd to do it . for in so doing , he is not only generous in the disposal of his kindnesses , but also causes them to be receiv'd with a greater sense of obligation , by disburthening his friend of that bashfulness and fear of repulse , which commonly attends asking . lxxiii . that prince does well who makes it his business to be well supply'd with prudent commanders and persons eminent for their valour for the management of war : but no doubt , he does better , whose court flourishes with wise counsellors , and statesmen ; in regard that the gaining of battels consists in the prowess and valorous deportment of many , but it happens sometimes , that the government of the commonwealth is committed to the management of one particular person . lxxiv . of all employments the worst is that which is concern'd in the chastisement of other mens miscarriages ; and thence is it that a well-advis'd person does what lies in his power , to avoid them ; in regard that the reprehension of vices does more commonly beget an aversion for the reprover , than it does amendment in those that are reprov'd . lxxv . every fault , what excuse soever there may be for it , is however condemnable ; inasmuch as if it be committed out of a sudden sally of passion , it is already a great miscarriage , but if out of forethought and deliberation , the mischief is so much the greater . lxxvi . 't is well done for a man to endeavour to manage all his concerns with reason , and to carry on every enterprize by order ; but in the doing of it , there is much difficulty . and yet considerate persons , to compass what they have design'd , will use such diligence and precaution , as may prevent those inconveniences ; which , for want thereof , might otherwise ensue . lxxvii . it is but reasonable , that the citizen , who , while he continu'd in the quality of a private person , was affable and familiar with his friends , should demean himself with an equal degree of affability and humanity towards them , when he has put on the robe of magistracy . for as it is the character of a mean spirit to be arrogant upon the honours successively acquir'd by valorous atchievements ; so when a man grows proud upon his advancement to an office , whereof he must within a short time after be devested , he betrays his indigence of modesty and vertue , and little reflects , that if mens exaltation to honours must change their manners , humours , and deportment , it ought to change them for the better , and not for the worse . lxxviii . when persons of understanding propose to themselves the obtaining of somewhat which is not to be obtain'd without some difficulty , they bethink themselves of the proper means to compass their ends . many things are obtain'd , by the dextrous and insinuating applications of those employ'd therein ; as appears frequently by the negotiations of ambassadors , and other publick persons . lxxix . the chief commander of an army , besides his skill and experience in military affaires , ought to be magnanimous , of a sedate temper , valiant , liberal , and prudent . it is expected from him , that he should stand upon his authority in the management of affairs , that he should be grave in discourse , and a punctual observer of his promises . when affairs of importance come into debate , he ought to use all imaginable circumspection , to deliberate with a mature judgement , and then put things in execution with great diligence . his demeanour and countenance towards his soldiers ought to be cheerful , serene , and obliging to all , yet with a remembrance of his quality , and the distance there is between them ; that so he may not , by his excessive familiarity , give his army occasion to be disobedient and undisciplin'd ; nor disgust it , by being too morose and severe . and whereas the good affections of the souldiery is the most certain hope he has for the obtaining of a victory , it ought to be his constant endeavour not only that they should bear him the reverence and respect due to his character , but also that they should have a mutual kindness one for another , and be sensible of their being members of the same body ; rewarding those who merit it , and disgracing and punishing the neglectors of their duty . lxxx . the power of fortune ( by that name did the heathens call the secret and not ordinarily perceptible disposition of the extraordinary works of god ) is of wonderful consequence in humane accidents , but especially in the case of war and armes . so that a command not rightly understood , an order not well executed , some temerarious action , or the voice of an ordinary souldier , does many times transfer the victory to those who before seem'd vanquish'd . and that causes of a sudden an infinite number of accidents , which it is impossible to foresee , or remedy . lxxxi . men are never more easily deceiv'd , than they are by those who have the reputation of being most sincere , that is , at the greatest distance from deceiving . lxxxii . the greater and more important things are , the more apt are men to discourse of them , never minding how closely they keep to the truth , or how far they receed from it . there are some who believe , and hold to be most certain , what they have heard , not regarding whether it be true or false . others , though a thing be ever so true , relate it otherwise than it is , and afterwards time making some additionals to the story , the thing is much augmented beyond what was reported at the first . lxxxiii . to come into favour and authority , one while by ostentation and munificence , another while by industry and vigilance , are two ways equally prejudicial and pernicious , when they are practis'd subtilly in order to a mans advancement to government . thence came it that wise men have affirm'd , that the tracks leading to principality are steepy and difficult , but when once men are gotten into them , every thing helps and sets them forward . lxxxiv . it cannot be easily imagin'd , whence it comes that princes are so favourable to some , and so cross and inflexible to others ; to wit , whether there be in that some secret of nature , or that it lies in our power to keep our selves in a mean , so as that we may not too obstinately oppose the inclinations of him who governs , and yet withal , that we forbear precipitating our selves into a scandalous adulation , and a kind of servile deportment , but that we observe such a moderation as neither to crouch to ambition , nor be over desirous of honour , and by that means pass our lives with more security , and less danger . lxxxv . there are but few that can by prudent advertisements distinguish between good and evil , between what is profitable , and what is prejudicial , but follow the ordinary road of growing better , and more cautious , by the knowledge which they derive from the common events of things . lxxxvi . those things that are foreseen prove much less hurtful , than those whereof we have no preapprehension at all . he therefore may be accounted a person of a sound understanding and excellent temper , who has the government of himelf , and as with an unstartled spirit , entertains the arrival of sudden and unexpected accidents . lxxxvii . though the particular thoughts and imaginations of every one be known only to god himself , yet the natural inclinations of a people or a province is a thing obvious and easy to be known ; inasmuch as their actions being publick , they must needs thereby discover their intentions and affections ; from which prudent men will be able to give a character of them accordingly . lxxxviii . subjects are much more satisfi'd to have their prince near them , than at a great distance from them ; inasmuch as there accrew thence two considerable advantages ; one , that the truly loyal , and well affected , being more immediately under his protection , are so much the more engag'd to his service ; the other , that the pernicious designes of turbulent persons are the more easily prevented . lxxxix . a commander in chief ought to to acquire reputation , not by the hardships and dangers of others ( as many do ) but by the sweat and hazard of his own person , and by the interposition of his own vertue . and whereas it is no less honourable to terminate a war by counsel , than to put a period thereto by arms , he ought to use both means , and should principally reflect , that the first successes are those which rendor him most dreadful to the enemy , or , on the contrary , despicable and of little repute ; in regard that , for the most part , such as the beginning is , such is the issue . xc . as it is a thing unquestionably certain , that victories are gain'd by preventions and diversions , so is it withal certain , that he is at a great distance from good counsel , who , without evident necessity , transfers the war , which another had been first engag'd in , to himself . xci . a person of comprehensive parts , who can husband time well , has no reason to complain that his life is too short ; for he who makes advantage of the infinite occasions that present themselves to him does anticipate time it self . xcii . liberty is a thing makes a great noise in the world , yet few truly understand wherein it consists . but of all kinds of liberty , that of persuasion is the most desir'd by all , in so much that to gain it , some would rather be transplanted to people solitudes , than smother their discontents to live in well-govern'd societies . xciii . he who desires to be in favour with his superiour ought to make all the discoveries he can of the respect and reverence he bears him ; for if there be once a failure in that , the endearing correspondence between superiours and inferiours is immediately dissolv'd . xciv . he who is entrusted with the custody of a city which expects a siege , ought above all things , to be think himself of all the remedies which may protract time , and to cut off all opportunities , though ever so small , from the enemy , inasmuch as many times one day , nay one hour , produces some accident which may occasion the relief of it . xcv . he is easily deceiv'd who relies on the first advertisement he receives of some accident that hath happen'd , in regard that commonly the effects are not aswerable to the first advices that come . he therefore who is not forc'd by necessity to do otherwise , ought to expect several confirmations thereof , ere he takes up his final resolution , what he ought to do . xcvi . it is a dangerous thing to be govern'd by examples , if there be not a concurrence in the general , and also in all the particulars of the same reasons to be consider'd . the same may be said , if things be not regulated by the same prudential motives and reflections ; and withal , if there be not a combination of all the other inducements , and the accidents and success consequent thereto . xcvii . as it is a servile act for any man to be a slave to his affections ; so , to subdue anger , the great disturber of counsel ; to be moderate in victory , which , of its own nature , is insolent and haughty ; to be absolute master of ones self , which is the devoir of a well temper'd and generous soul ; to exercise humanity , meekness , and liberality towards an enemy , is a thing truly royal , divine , and worthy of eternal memory . xcviii . there is not any thing more becoming or more necessary to a prince , than to be just , liberal , and benevolent ; inasmuch as it is the inseparable ; attribute of grandeur and power to relieve the oppressed , and to alleviate the calamities of others ; and this especially in kings , who , by such acts , approach so much the nearer the divinity , whose living images they are , upon the score of their supereminent rank . xcix . persons of lewd inclinations have always some opportunity of doing evil , and though they do it not , yet is it not so great a satisfaction to others , to see that they do not commit those enormities which they might , as it is an affliction , to think that it is in their power to commit them . c. that commonwealth wherein there is justice duly administred for the poor , chastisement for such as are insolent and tyrannically inclin'd , an exact observance of weights and measures , as to those things which concern the sustentation of humane life , discipline and exercise for the younger sort , and as little avarice as may be in those that are advanc'd in age , must needs be an excellent constitution of government . ci. let not any prince think that the choice of a tutor for his son is a thing of small importance . for in that case , his diligence and circumspection ought to be the greater , in that he is not to do in this , as in other offices which are bestow'd either upon the mediation of others , or by corruption , or importunity or friendship , or for a reward of some services already done : in regard that though some one of his courtiers has manag'd an embassy with good success , or been general of an army , or some great officer about the prince's person , or relating to his houshold , yet does it not follow that such a person is fit to teach his son. the reason is , that for a man to be an ambassador , or general , it requires only in the former a good stock of dexterity and dissimulation , and in the latter , that he have valour and good fortune ; but to be governour to a prince , it is requisite , that he have all the accomplishments , and qualifications , suitable to the education of a person of that transcendent dignity . cii . in the disastrous accidents of our life , wherein our own industry and strength are of little account , the only remedy we have , is to look on the worst of misfortunes as things not incompatible with the condition of humanity , and to be so far prudent , as to smother our resentments thereof . ciii . between two princes , the one addicted to the exercises of vertue , the other complying with the suggestions of vice , there is this difference , that the latter is only obey'd , but the former is both obey'd and belov'd . besides , the good and vertuous prince makes the most difficult enterprises seem light , and on the contrary , the tyrant makes the lightest seem most heavy . happy therefore is he who is obey'd , but much more happy he who is both obey'd and belov'd ; for the body grows weary of obeying , but the mind is never wearied nor cloy'd with loving . civ . there is one thing which a wise prince will always be mindful of , to wit , that , in the management of the publick affairs , his governours and judges never permit the abrogation of ancient customes , nor the introduction of new ones ; in regard the populace is commonly so humorous and extravagant , that they would every day have new princes , and new laws . cv . it is an easy matter to design what a man would have done by another person , and by what means it is most likely to be brought to effect ; but to command the execution thereof is no slight thing , inasmuch as between those two there are many things which obstruct , retard , and disturb such executions . cvi. 't is a thing out of all dispute , as aristotle affirms in his rhetorick , that riches do often render those persons , that are possess'd thereof , proud and insolent : but he who shall wisely consider it , will say with seneca , that none is more worthy , none makes greater approaches to the divinity , than he who makes no account of riches ; which , saies he , i am far from affirming that thou shouldst not be possess'd of , but i would have thee possess'd thereof without any fear , distraction , or disturbance . which happiness thou art not to acquire , but by this only expedient , to wit , by a firm persuasion , that thou canst live happily without them , and that thou shouldst always look on them , as if they were taking their flight away from thee . cvii . what presumption soever a man may have of his own abilities , yet ought he not so to rely on his own counsel , as that sometimes it may not be more safe for him to submit to that of others ; in regard that he who is asham'd of consulting , and defies the conduct and directions of another , may assure himself , for the most part , that he has a fool to his guide , and consequently that he must needs be guilty of many miscarriages . cviii . it is not prudence to judge of counsels by the event of things , in regard that many times good counsels have not an issue answerable thereto , and on the contrary , evil counsels may prove fortunate . but when evil counsels are applauded , upon the score of their being successful , it is a secret encouragement for men to do those things that are unjust , which may prove highly prejudicial to the commonwealth , inasmuch as evil counsels are not always fortunate ; and there is also another fault in blaming and censuring the more prudent party , whose advertisements have not had the success which was expected , in regard that such a procedure disheartens the citizens from giving their opinions freely , when the publick concerns of their city requires it . cix . when it happens that there is a necessity of denying some person his request , it is but requisite , to keep the said person from being disgusted , and to assure him of the good will they bear him , and to make some other overture to him , so that he may thereby perceive that they have a respect for him , and would gladly oblige him . upon this demeanour , the other , if he have any sentiment of humanity , will be as much , if not more , satisfi'd , than if his request had been granted : so great an influence have kind words and an obliging carriage over the minds of good natur'd persons . cx . in publick affairs it is requisite that men be extreamly careful and considerate at the beginning of what they design ; in regard it will not be afterwards in their power without dishonour and danger , to receed from the deliberation once fixt upon , and in which they have for some time persisted . cxi . what is wish'd by the greater number does not often succeed in regard that for the most part the events of humane actions depend on the wills of few ; and the intentions of these latter being in a manner always different from those of the greater number , things seldome happen otherwise than according to the intention of those from whose directions they derive their first motion . cxii . neutrality is most commendable in the wars wherein other parties are engag'd , in regard that many inconveniences and great charges are thereby avoided ; and it may be time enough to be concern'd for either party , when success seems to intimate which side is most likely to prevail . cxiii . the clemency of princes hath always gain'd them good-will and reputation ; and , on the contrary , rigour , ( if there be not some extraordinary necessity for it ) has always produc'd the contrary effects , and instead of removing the obstacles and difficulties , which lay in their way , it has made some additionals thereto . cxiv . it is more wisely done for a man to court his friendship who is unwilling to become his enemy , than to curry favour with him , who one time or other cannot be his friend . cxv . there are three principal considerations to be minded in the carrying on of all enterprises , to wit , the justice of the cause , the facility of the victory to be obtain'd , and the conveniences and advantages accruing thereby . cxvi . there is not any thing so short-liv'd as the remembrance of a benefit , and many times , the greater it is , the more likely it is to be repay'd with ingratitude . for , he who is not willing to take off the obligation , by retaliation or remuneration , often endeavours to do the same thing in another sense , perswading himself , that the good turn was not so great ; and they who are asham'd of their having been reduc'd to the necessity of desiring a kindness , are vext and tormented in their minds that they have receiv'd it . so that the remembrance of the necessity into which they were fallen makes a greater impression upon them , than that of the obligation which had been layd upon them . cxvii . many are the inconveniences that happen in the armies of confederated parties ; while they are concerting their designes , the opportunity of entring into action slips away , their preparatives are delay'd , interrupted , and diverted , according to the forces , aimes , and counsels of the princes concern'd , so that it must needs prove a hard matter to make a firm union , where there is so much disorder and distrust , and withal so great a diversity of inclinations , and courages , and varieties of conditions . cxviii . 't is the natural humour of the populace to be always desirous of novelties , and to be easily fill'd with false and vain persuasions , lightly hurry'd away with the insinuations of those who have once set them on work , as the waves of the sea are stir'd by the blowing of the wind . cxix . so extravagant is the nature of mankind , that when they are forc'd out of one extreme , wherein they have been violently detain'd , they ride in full speed to the other extreme , without ever making the least halt in the mean. cxx . there is one thing highly considerable in military concerns , and that is the reputation of the chief commanders . assoon as this begins once to decline , the souldiery is immediately discourag'd ; the loyalty of the nations concern'd is shaken ; there follow distraction and distrust in counsels , and want of a hearty and cheerful concurrence in action ; the provision for the army's subsistence is interrupted ; and on the contrary the enemy is heartned , those who were content to observe a neutrality , are apt to incline to the successful party , and all difficulties grow greater and greater . cxxi . in human actions men ought for the most part to make their counsels complyant with the present necessity , and not , out of an over-earnestness to overcome that which is too difficult , and as it were impossible , to expose the generality to a manifest danger and inconvenience . cxxii . we find many times by experience , that those things which at the first prospect present themselves as highly dreadful , appear by degrees so much the less considerable , that , if the former errour be not renew'd by some additional accident , all the terrour in process of time vanishes , and we are induc'd to laugh and wonder at our former astonishment . cxxiii . he who finds that there is no account made of him , gives way to disgust , and that inspires him with thoughts of revenge , and inclines him to attempt dangerous things , which sometimes meet with their design'd effect ; especially when the person who is become so daring is of any authority , or remarkable for some extraordinary qualification . cxxiv . all subjection is burthensome , all restriction is insupportable to him who would live as he pleases himself . a person of that humour can find but little quiet under a regular government , in regard that there is a necessity either of his complyance which the prince , or of his ruin by him . cxxv . it is commonly observ'd , that a resolution taken either too hastily , or with too much affection comes off with a slur . for the much celerity of the resolver does not allow him the leisure to reflect on those things which ought to be consider'd , before the resolution be taken ; and the excessive affection so prepossesses the mind , that it does not take notice of any thing but what is most pressing in such or such a point . to these two examples may be added two others , to wit , in these cases , when there is time enough to deliberate , and the person deliberating is unprepossess'd with any particular affection , yet out of a certain natural incapacity , or through an insuperable kind of remisness or debility of spirit , remarkable through all their actions , they never do any thing that holds water . cxxvi . when affairs are reduc'd to the extremity , as that there remains nothing for hope to rely upon but the pure providence of god , the prosecution of the adventure in such a case must be look'd on as the result of reason and prudence , insomuch that we ought to attempt the danger , not minding how little ground there presents it self to humane prudence . for god many times takes a certain delight in sending a spirit of infatuation upon the counsels and designs of some people , and making those calamities which they intended to bring on others to recoyle upon themselves . cxxvii . the greater a man's credit and reputation is amongst the generality of the people , the more dangerous it is to support and advance him . as therefore it is an easy matter at the beginning to oppose the disorders which may ensue thereupon , so when they are come to any growth , it will be so much the more difficult to remedy them . cxxviii . the exercise of arms , the observance of the lawes , and the frequent celebration of divine service , in a well regulated city cannot ordinarily be separated , without the destruction of them all . so that there is a correspondence between them and the state of the soul , wherein there are the vegetative part , the sensitive , and the intellectual ; which parts yet do not make three souls , but one only distinguish'd by the operations of the three faculties : so the establishment of the state requires a reciprocal aid and correspondence . cxxix . where ever there is servitude , there is also fear ; and the greater the former is , the greater also is the latter . but though servitude implies tyranny , yet has the tyrant as great a share of the fear , as they over whom he tyrannizes , inasmuch as he who commands slaves , is not himself free ; now the tyrant being such , it follows that he himself is servile as well as his people , and so as there is force and indignity on both sides , so is there a continual augmentation of fear . cxxx . in matter of war , valour and artifice are highly recommended ; but the perfection of arms consists in knowing the true use of the moral vertues , a right understanding of political affairs , and treading in the steps of ancient and eminent commanders . cxxxi . in military affairs , when there is some great designe in hand , the absolute authority of ordering all is to be conferr'd on one single person who transcends all the rest in point of merit ; yet so as that he be oblig'd to have always about him such as are well skill'd in counsel , with whom he may confer , and to whom he may communicate all concerns of importance . cxxxii . men are glad of advertisements and directions in things that are doubtful , not in the certain ; in things subject to hazard , and not to prudence : it were therefore but requisite to consider what is the principal concern in the matter whereof we are to deliberate . for in deliberations , when any one is not constrain'd by necessity , he sets himself on work according to the unconfined plenitude of his own will , which is in all things and every where free , and then his thoughts are wholly taken up with the success of the enterprize , to wit , whether his fears or hopes outweigh one the other ; and thereupon he resolves to forbear attempting any thing when hazard has the principal part , and is most likely to carry it ; or on the contrary he will attempt the execution of his designe , when prudence tells him that it will prove advantageous . cxxxiii . when commonwealths are well govern'd , the prosecutions of envious persons turn to the advantage of those against whom they are intended , for innocency being clear'd by truth , their endeavours prove like the stroaks given to the ball , which the harder it is struck , the higher it rebounds ; so the calumniations of the envious instead of eclipsing , add more lustre to those against whom they are directed . cxxxiv . continual severity must needs exasperate those over whom it is exercis'd . but as the excessive indulgence of parents makes their children apt to lead an irregular and disobedient course of life ; so the remisness of a prince , who suffers his authority to be slighted , renders the citizen dissolute , and the soldier undisciplin'd and licentious , and proves withal the occasion of greater mischief , when persons of quality are concern'd . for the insolence of these last is more dangerous than that of a multitude , it being not so difficult to discover the designes wherein many are engag'd , as it is to pump out the secret plottings of one particular person . cxxxv . when the prince is sollicited by a grandee in some concern of great importance , and that he is unwilling to grant his request , he ought to consider two points , one relating to the necessary circumstances , as the cause from whence the discontent proceeds , the person disgusted , and the present conjuncture of time ; the other , how requisite it may be , to counterballance the refusal , by conferring some other boon on the petitioner . cxxxvi . the good soldier may be likened to polish'd steel , which while it is handled preserves its lustre and brightness , and on the contrary , for want of being us'd , growes rusty , and that rust consumes it , and in time makes it contagious ; so the good souldier , who is good only while he is handling his arms , in the time of war , is prejudic'd in himself , and may prove dangerous to others , when he is out of his proper element and employment . cxxxvii . in the competitions that happen between two several parties , that which is excluded will be rather inclin'd to close with a third party , than comply with that , between whom and it the precedent competition was . cxxxviii . there is not any thing so prejudicial to mankind as a transcendent prosperity ; for the effects of it , are , licentiousness , luxury , confidence to do mischief , an irreclaimable inclination to disturb the publick by some novelty , and all the inconveniencies consequent to satiety . cxxxix . the infamy of being temerarious is more prejudicial to a military commander , than the honour of a victory is advantageous to him ; inasmuch as when he is chargeable with temerity , the blame is wholly attributed to him alone , but the honour of the victory , and the prosperous management of affairs ( at least according to the opinion of many ) is communicable also to others . cxl . since there is frequent necessity of changing orders and deliberations , in the time of war , according to the variety of accidents , it should be the principal consideration of a chief commander , so to accommodate all things at the beginning , as if he had , as much as may be , foreseen all events , and all counsels ; in regard that , as the prosperous successes engage the respects and affections of the army towards their general , so the contrary makes a proportionable abatement of the same respects and affections , and consequently there is not that sympathetical correspondence which ought to be between them . cxli . the prudent person ought not to entertain any suspicion that men distrust his integrity , and if he does suspect it , he should demean himself so as that the wicked may not be sensible of his having any suspicion of them , lest that upon that occasion fear may augment their licentiousness , and that , as to others , there may not be an abatement of their diligence and promptitude . cxlii . 't is prudence in a man to make as if he knew nothing of uncertain newes , or at least to keep it so secret , as not to betray any confirmation thereof ; in regard that many times , either it is absolutely false , or the credit to be given thereto admits of a considerable diminution . cxliii . they who are induc'd to commit some act in the night time proceed commonly upon some sinful motive , presuming that the night covers in them what the day would discover , to wit , their fear and shame . cxliv . for this reason has god entrusted princes with the government of their dominions , that their subjects may , in order to the obtaining of their right , appeale from that law which is dumb , and as it were dead , and without force in it self , to the living law which ought to be the magistrate . cxlv . the principal commendation of military discipline consists in not opposing danger without necessity , by industry , patience and policy to defeat and elude the enterprises of the enemy , rather than by destroying them in a cruel and bloody engagement . cxlvi . a benefit conferr'd upon one who is persuaded that he has receiv'd an injury counterballanceable thereto , is not sufficient to remove out of his disaffected mind the memory of the offence ; especially when the benefit comes at such a time , as that it seems rather occasion'd by necessity , than to proceed from good will. cxlvii . the counsels and secret designs of princes are most commonly divulg'd after a manner much different from that which is true in effect ; and this they do purposely to amuse the generality , that they may busy themselves in discoursing of one thing , while another of different nature is in agitation . cxlviii . peace is desirable and holy , when it smothers all distrusts and jealousies , when it gives a check to all dangers , and when men are exonerated from all charges , and may repose themselves without the least fear of disturbance . but when it hatches the contrary effects , it is a pernicious war , under the counterfeit title of peace , and a pestilent poison under the name of a good medicine . cxlix . ambassadors are the eies and ears of states , and the other publick ministers are the spectacles of the respective princes by whom they are employed . cl. mens favours are to be measur'd by the real effects , and not by the external demonstrations thereof ▪ and yet it can hardly be imagin'd how great a satisfaction it is to a man , to be treated with the ceremonious part of courtesy and humanity ▪ the reason of it may possibly be this , that every one is apt to think , that he deserves more than he receives , and consequently is disgusted when he perceives there is not that account made of him which he thinks due to him . cli . subjects cannot be well govern'd without the exercise of some severity at certain times , yet is there a necessity that it should be season'd with a dextrous insinuation of its being not so much the inclination of the prince to be severe , as that it is requisite for the publick good , that the reformation of some should be occasion'd by the punishments inflicted upon others . clii. a man should endeavor to refrain from whatever may cause the least dissatisfaction or prejudice to another . it is consequent therefore , that he should never say any thing either in a mans presence , or his absence , which may displease him , unless there be some necessity of his so doing ; in regard it is the greatest extravagance in the world , for a man to make a needless creation of enemies to himself . cliii . he who runs himself into a danger without ever considering , of what concern it is likely to be , may be accounted a person of a bestial humour . but he who knows the importance of it , and yet freely exposes himself thereto , either upon the necessity there is of so doing , or upon some honourable account , must a person of great courage , and truely magnanimous . cliv. it is a vulgar errour to affirm , that learning and study are prejudicial to the brain ; though peradventure it might be truly said of some one , who has a weak brain , and is of an infirm constitution ; but where there is a conjunction of a good constitution , and the accidental good of learning , it makes a most accomplish'd person , and of an excellent temperament . clv . that glory is to be accounted vain which is purchas'd with any injury done to another ; but the true , solid , and immortal glory is that which consists not in the ruining of nations , and destruction of cities , but rather in the consolidation of kingdoms , the association of provinces , the settlement of publick tranquillity , the establishment of commerce , and the deliverance of people out of the miseries and calamities attending humane nature . clvi . all the fruit and advantage of having obtain'd a victory consists in knowing how to use it , and it is a greater infamy not to know how to use it , than not to have gain'd it ; in regard it is more ignominious for us to be deceiv'd in those things that are within our power , than in those that are not . clvii . inconsiderate and doubtful deliberations are not excusable in any but those whose concerns are in a distracted and unfortunate posture , or in a person whose thoughts are wholly bent upon ambition , and one who being desirous by all the ways imaginable to get himself a greater name , is afraid he has not time enough to do it in . clviii . all humane actions are subject to many dangers ; but this is the advantage of wise men , that they know that what ever may happen does not always come to pass , but that upon some occasion or other many dangers become none at all , many are stav'd off by prudence and industry ; and many are weather'd out by patience and equanimity . clix. he who is more apprehensive of the future than he ought to be , must not expect to be accounted a wise man , nor yet they who presuppose for certain the dangers that are but doubtful , and accordingly regulate all their deliberations , as if the danger were inevitable . but it argues a certain magnanimity in that person , who knowing and throughly considering the dangers , yet discovers how that many times , either by some unexpected chance , or by the assistance of vertue , men extricate themselves out of great difficulties and inconveniences . clx . it happens sometimes , that when a prince assumes thoughts of aggrandizing himself , or growes jealous of losing his dominions , he takes occasion to forget what obligations may ly upon him for benefits receiv'd . a remarkable instance of this kind of demeanor we find in lewis sforza , who instead of expressing his gratitude to charles viii . of france , for the kindnesses he had receiv'd from him , contributed his assistance for the driving of him out of italy , and sided with his enemies , and all only to preserve his own concerns , and out of the apprehension he had of the greatness of charles . clxi . in the giving and receiving of advice there are many things to be considered , but principally two , to wit , prudence in him who is to receive the advice , and fidelity in him who is to give it . for counsel being nothing else but a discourse consider'd and weigh'd by reason , in order to a discovery whether a thing ought to be done or not , if the person who is to receive the advice be not prudent , he will not accept of that which is given him for the best , but will follow that , which , according to his apprehension , seems most convenient ; in as much as not being prudent , he will be apt to fancy those things that are most inconvenient , and so will never set himself seriously to work as he should do . on the other side , he who gives the advice , it he be not faithful , will find so many ways to disguise the truth , that many times that is put in execution , which is more beneficial to the consultee , than to the consultor . clxii . he who intends to engage in a war ought to be alwaies prepar'd , and to have his mind fortify'd against whatever event may happen , and to be ready to entertain all occurrences ; and he should principally bethink himself not to enter into a war unjustly , and consider well against what potentate he is to be concern'd , what allyances and combinations may be made against him , and lastly examine his own forces and those of his adversary , and what confederates either party may have . clxiii . the ambition of a general often proves pernicious to the state by which he is employ'd . for it is the ordinary humour of such persons to be backward in putting a period to the war , even when they may do it with honour and advantage , that they may continue longer in their charges , and by that continuance they gain the affections of the soldiery , and so are in a fair way to their assumption of soveraignty . he who has a powerful army at his devotion has the command of all as far as that can extend its quarters . clxiv . are men desirous of coming into great repute and esteem ? let them be always careful of doing those things which are commendable and of good report ; inasmuch as vertuous actions are not the effects of honour , but honour is the effect and recompence of vertuous actions . clxv . it is generally acknowledg'd by all , that the government of a country by one single person , when he is but tolerably good , is better than that of a greater number , though it be granted that they also are good . and it may be withal rationally concluded , that in a greater number of govenours there may be a greater likelihood of degeneration from the principles of government , and a greater combination of tyranny , than there can be in one individual person . clxvi . to frame instructions for the particular benefit of every one , is a very difficult task ; but it is much more difficult to put such a project in execution ; in regard that men know well enough what they ought to do , but they are extreamly backward in applying themselves to the performance thereof . let him therefore who thinks that application incumbent upon him , endeavour to offer a certain violence to his own disposition , and make that habitual which yet admits of no greater perfection than that of desire ; by which means , he will easily attain whatever shall be taught him , and will voluntarily do any thing , according as reason shall command him , or experience direct him . clxvii . the acquisition of a great estate or honour is a thing commendable , provided it be done without fraud or any indirect means ; yet so great is the corruption of mankind , that men commonly are ambitious of high titles , and magistracy , as if they were illustious and magnificent of themselves , and did not derive their true value and esteem , from the vertue of those who are deservedly advanc'd thereto . clxviii . a military commander ought so to mind all things as if he had not charg'd any person with the care thereof ; and this , not only out of the distrust he should have that his commands may not be punctually executed , but also out of this consideration , that his soldiers will be more forward to execute his orders , when they shall find him so laborious and vigilant himself . clxix . he who would prognosticate what will be the effects of another mans deliberation , ought , to avoid being deceiv'd , to consider seriously , not only what a prudent person would be inclin'd to do upon the like emergency , but also to measure the abilities and disposition of the deliberator . clxx . a physician who undertakes to cure the infirmity of some particular member , is very careful that the medicine he applies does not prejudice any other member : so ought that privy councellor , who is to advise his prince , to be so his remembrancer of the concerns of the commonwealth , as that he is withal mindful of the honour and preservation of the prince . clxxi. there is not any man of so weak abilities , but that he may manifestly perceive the difference there is between actions proceeding from fear and errour , and those which proceed from fraud and an evil intention . clxxii . he who knows in himself what is advantageous , and for the good of the commonwealth , and yet forbears communicating it to others , is an insignificant member of that body . clxxiii . a commander may make a retreat upon two occasions , either out of timorousness , or prudence ; the former whereof is reproachable , the other deserves commendation , in regard it seems to wave the hazarding of what is not sufficiently secur'd . that victory is the most advantageous and most glorious , which is gain'd with the least loss and effusion of the souldiers blood . clxxiv . as the soul , which ordinarily ought to be the governess of the body , becomes a tyrant , when , regarding only her own excellency , in comparison of the body , she so thinks of her self , as not to allow any part of time for the service of the body , whereby the latter is weakned , and rendered uncapable of performing its offices : so , on the contrary , they who make the body lord over the soul , and employ their whole time in satisfying the appetites thereof , without reserving some part for the other , can never become vertuous , nor have any valour in themselves . clxxv . avarice is , no doubt , much more blameable in a prince , than in a private person ; not only upon this score , that the prince having more to distribute , frustrates men of the benefits they expect from him , but also in regard , that whatever the private person hath , he may dispose thereof without any others being much concern'd in it . but whatever the prince has , he has chiefly for the benefit of others ; what therefore he retains to himself is so much deducted out of what men should receive from him . clxxvi . princes have cause to be more distrustful than other persons , not only in regard they are many times flatter'd , but also that many doubtful advertisements are propos'd to them , and that it is a difficult matter for them to follow those that are most advantageous to their concerns . clxxvii . that prince who has the most obliging way to gain the affections of his people , makes a great discovery of an excellent good nature , and withal gives a certain demonstration of his being unchargeable with the vice of pride , which brings an odium upon the vertues themselves . clxxviii . when any of the enemies forces fall off from him , and come into thy service , it is no small happiness if they prove faithful to thee ; inasmuch as the forces of the enemy are much more weakned , by the defection of those who desert him , than by the loss of those who are kill'd , though the name of turn-coat , or fugitive be suspicious in new-rais'd men , and odious in old souldiers . clxxix . in military concerns ; the prosperous success of the victorious prince proceeds for the most part from the want of counsel and conduct in the enemy . and thence it comes , that it is a difficult task to subdue him who knows the extent of his own forces and those of his enemy . besides , the performances of the souldiery are to be attributed more to their gallantry than to their multitude , and sometimes the advancement they make depends more on the advantages of the place , where the engagement happens , than upon their personal valour . clxxx . men , armes , mony , and provisions are the sinews of war ; but of these four , the two former are the most necessary , in regard that resolute men , well arm'd , will make a shift to find mony and provisions ; but those two last will not so easily find men and arms. clxxxi . when the prince is surrounded by his familiar friends in a time that requires nothing of action , he communicates his favours to those who are most acceptable to him , and most complyant with his humour . but when he has some great design to carry on , he knows how to make a distinction between those who are purely favourites , and such as may be more serviceable to him . clxxxii . a person reputed to be of great conduct and well experienc'd in the management of affairs , who can maintain ten thousand men , is more to be fear'd and esteem'd than ten others confederated together with each of them five thousand men ; in regard they are tedious and dilatory in the concerting of their designes , and much time is commonly lost ere they can be unanimously brought to resolve upon the same end . clxxxiii . that person who is desirous to be entertain'd into the service of some grandee , should rather pitch upon one of some repute for his prudence , than one notorious for his ignorance : in regard that if his dependence be on a wise man , he will find means to ingratiate himself into his favour ; but with an ignorant man , his applications will in all likelihood prove ineffectual , by reason of the want of apprehension in the person to whom they are made . clxxxiv . the affairs of this world are in a perpetual fluxe of uncertainty and instability ; yet are they always in a progressive course towards the end to which they ought to tend according to their nature . but this progress meets with greater obstructions than we imagine , in regard that we measure their motion according to our life , which is of no great duration , and not according to their continuance , which seems long to us in respect of our selves . and thence it comes , that the judgements which we make of them are commonly false and defective . clxxxv . in things of importance , he who does not take into his consideration all the particulars relating thereto , cannot frame a right judgement of them ; in regard that any single circumstance , how inconsiderable soever it be , may change the whole face of the thing which is to be judg'd . yet true it is , that many times , a man may frame a good judgement thereof , though he have the knowledge but of the affair , only in general ; and on the contrary , he who knows the particulars may be guilty of a greater miscarriage ; in regard that if his head be not clear , and disengag'd from passion , his attention to the particular part will confound and disturb his apprehension of the whole matter under consideration . clxxxvi . it is a great felicity for a man to see his enemy cast down and lying at his mercy ; but the greater his happiness is , to whom that happens , the greater reason he has to make a commendable use of that victory , by expressing his clemency and readiness to forgive , it being the particular mark and property of a great and generous soul . clxxxvii . an inferiour prince ought not to hazard all he has in one fight ; for if he get the better , he only gains the more glory ; if he miscarries , he is ruin'd to all intents and purposes . clxxxviii . we find that in the ordinary differences which happen between men upon the civil account , and in the diseases whereto men are subject , the judges and physicians have recourse to the judgements of those who have been anciently eminent in those several professions ; the same may be said of affairs of state and policy , that it were expedient the present statesmen consulted the directions of the ancients , who have been eminent for the good government and civilization of such as were subject to them . clxxxix . there are many who seem to be highly diligent in the reading of ancient histories , and to take a particular divertisement therein , by reason of the remarkable variety of accidents which occur ; but few apply themselves to the imitation thereof ; and that with the greater reproach to themselves , in that they think it a thing not only difficult , but also indeed impossible ; as if the heavens , the sun , and the elements had chang'd their motions , order and influences , in comparison of what they were heretofore . cxc . the friendship there is between persons of quality , of a private condition , proceeds from the mutual correspondence of their minds , and the consonancy of their humours and dispositions . but among princes , this correspondence of humours does not always beget amity , but sometimes , out of a certain judgement which they frame to themselves , of the advantages accrueing by the contraction of such friendships , and sometimes their confederations are the effects of the present exigences forcing them thereto . cxci. adversity is the touch stone which distinguishes between those who are friends out of design , and those who are really such . it makes a full discovery of the fidelity and constancy of some , and how slight and superfluous others may be . so that a man has this benefit by adversity , that there are driven from him , without the help of a staff , all that throng of persons whose souls are mercenary and of no value , full of avarice and ingratitude , and there remain behind only those minds which are fortune proof , and such as cannot be surmounted by adversity . cxcii . he who founds a commonwealth , and establishes laws for the government thereof , ought to have presuppos'd that men are inclin'd to wickedness , and will make a discovery of that inclination , upon any occasion that shall offer it self . and when the malignity lies conceal'd for some time , it proceeds from some secret cause , which , for want of having seen the experience of the contrary , was not observ'd ; but it is afterwards discover'd by time , which brings all things to light . cxciii . neutrality , of its own nature , is full of danger , in as much as it gives offence , on the one side , to the stronger party , who expected to be sided withal upon the score of his grandeur , and on the other to the weaker , who takes it unkindly , and thinks it an injury that he is not assisted and reliev'd . so that the neutral party is neither secur'd against an enemy , on the one side , nor preserves a firiend , on the other . cxciv . as long as a prince continues in a neutral condition , every one endeavours to caress him , & to draw him to his party , and consequently he is honour'd , and not only enjoys his neutrality in quietness , but also makes an advantage of it by the presents he receives from those who would lure him into their allyance ; whereas if he has once declar'd himself , he has lost the satisfaction of being a spectator of the difference , and one of the contending parties must look upon him as an enemy , though the reasons and motives he had to appear against him be never so plausible . cxcv. it is a hard question to decide , whether be the more ambitious person , he who is desirous to keep what he is possess'd of , or he who endeavours to make new conquests . for many times great alterations are caus'd by him who is peaceably possess'd , in regard the fear of losing begets in such persons the same inclinations , which they have who would conquer . nay sometimes , he who is possess'd does not think himself secure , if he be not always in a readiness to make new acquests , and to do that , there is a necessity of having forces , and those must be in action , answerably to the ambitious desires of those by whom they are maintain'd . cxcvi. those who are entrusted with the administration of publick offices , or the government of provinces ought to have these three conditions ; to wit , that they have ● tenderness and affection for those who are under their jurisdiction ; that they be invested with sufficient authority to constrain , where it is requisite ; and that they be persons remarkable for their justice and valour . but with this precaution into the bargain , that they who are advanc'd to the government of others be such as have been in their younger days govern'd and directed by others . cxcvii . in all the resolutions of this world , there is an intermixture of good and evil ; god having so order'd it , that men might be the more sensible of the imperfection of their present state . but it is the part of a prudent person to counterballance the good and evil , and to embrace that resolution wherein he finds either less evil , or more good . cxcviii. since man is to look on his own good and preservation as his main concern , he ought not in reason to be tax'd with any inconstancy , when upon the vicissitude of human affairs , he also admits some change in his designs and procedure , yet continuing constant and resolute as to the end he had propos'd to himself . and this is but to follow the example of good pilots , who being bound for such a port , yet upon alteration of wind and weather seem to change their course , but still in the midst of the tempest they mind the prosecution of their voyage , and the preservation of the vessel . cxcix . good souldiers require a good captain , he being the guide of all , and the success or miscarriage of a design depending on his action and conduct . thence came the greek proverb , that an army of deer having a lyon in the head of it , is more terrible than an army of lyons headed by a deer . but it is however requisite , that both commanders and souldiers should be good , that it may not happen as caesar said going against pompey , that he went against a captain without souldiers ; and afterwards going against afranius that he was to en●gage an army without a captain . cc. there are four sorts of men who are always mention'd with honour . first , they who have been highly successeful in the establishment and promotion of true religion . secondly , those who have been the founders of states and kingdoms , and setled the government thereof by good laws . thirdly , they who have been successors to the last mention'd , and have made great dilatations of the empires which they found so established . and lastly , persons who have been great promotors of literature , and patrons of learned men . on the contrary , the teachers of a false religion or destroyers of the true , the disturbers of government , and the enemies of learning and vertue , have been , through all ages , infamous and detestable . cci. a people which hath been accustomed to live in servitude , being left to their own liberty , may be likened to a beast that has been kept in a park , which having once got out of it , will be continually mischievous , till at last it be either destroy'd or brought into its former restraint . ccii. we ought to be very moderate and cautious in the commendations of persons . for as it is natural for any one , to resent his being disparag'd , so , on the contrary , excessive , commendation ( besides the hazard it implies of his judgement who commends , and the greatness of his merit who is commended ) is many times offensive to him who hears it . that portion of self love , which every one has , even though he is not sensible of it , makes us immediately apply to our selves the commendations and discommendations which we hear given to others , and confequently we imagine our selves concerned therein , though they are not purposely directed to us . cciii . when the prince has fortify'd himself with the allyances of excellent captains , valiant souldiers , arms , mony , and strong places , his next work must be to weaken the forces , and to defeat the designes of the enemy ; and that is done more slowly or with greater expedition , according as occasion offers it self , which is the source of every great and transcendent action . cciv. it seldom happens , that a vertuous man will be ambitious of soveraignty by indirect ways , though his aim therein may be good ; and that a wicked person being once become great , will ever use that authority well , which he has attain'd by evil courses . ccv . though a successor in government be not fully so remarkable for his vertue as the person whom he succeds , yet may he maintain the state in the same grandeur he found it , by the vertue of his predecessor , and make his advantage of the others labours . but if it happen that he does not live long , and that he be again succeeded by one that does not follow the footsteps of the former , such a state must needs degenerate . so , on the contrary , if two persons , both eminent for the greatness of their vertue , happen to be immediate governours of the same province , they commonly do great things , and give a smart stroke to the firm establishment of their government . ccvi. ii is a thing out of all controversy , that if there be not souldiers where there are men enough , it proceeds from some defect in the prince , and not from that of nature , or the situation of the country , or genius of the inhabitants . and thence it comes , that wise princes keep up the exercise of war even in the times of peace . ccvii. in a well-regulated common-wealth , the good services and merits of citizens shall make no plea for their crimes , if they be of any importance . for rewards being appointed for well doing , and punishment for miscarriages , it is an aggravation of their lapses who have done well , that they have done so , and therefore if they do amiss , there is no account made of their former vertuous demeanour . ccviii . he who would reform . a city , to the general satisfaction of all its inhabitants , should endeavour what he can to retain the ancient customs , and that course of life which the people was traditionally inclin'd to , that it may not seem to the generality , that there is any alteration in the government , though really there be , and that the constitution thereof is a quite different thing from what it was before . for it is the humour of the populace , to be contented and layd asleep with that which seems , as much as with that which really is ; and many times there are greater disturbances occasion'd by that which seems to be , than there are by that which really is . ccix. the vice of ingratitude proceeds either from avarice , or distrust . when therefore a prince or state sends out a general upon some important expedition , and the other growes highly into repute thereby ; such a prince or state is oblig'd to acknowledge and recompence the service done them . but if , on the contrary , they dishonour or affront him , avatice prompts him to commit some inexcusable fault , and so he brings himself into perpetual infamy . ccx . ambition has so great an influence over the heart of man , that it keeps a perpetual possession thereof . the reason of it is , that mans disposition being naturally inclin'd to desire all things , and his desires always excessively surmounting the means of obtaining them , proves a continual occasion of discontent and repining . thence proceeds the variety of mens conditions , inasmuch as their labouring to augment , and the fear of losing what they are possess'd of , occasions quarrels , animosities , and wars , and those are the fore-runners of the ruine of one province , and the aggrandization of another . ccxi. that prince who would keep up his estate in a flourishing condition , will not only be careful in the removing of present scandals , but also use his utmost industry in providing against such as may happen . in regard that if he make timely provision against them , they are easily reform'd ; whereas if the evil be grown up to a head , the remedy comes too late . ccxii. it is not to be admir'd , that those princes who are very powerful and have a numerous issue should have their thoughts much bent upon war ; and that , either out of a motive of honour , or to make provision for their progeny , by military employments , or forreign governments , if they have colonies in remote parts of the world ; or lastly to prevent the disturbances which may be occasion'd by the different pretensions of younger brothers . ccxiii. the wise servant ought to imitate the excellent physician , and foresee what he should hope or fear , neither hoping nor fearing more or less than is convenient , so that he may always know whether his hope be in its augmentation , or at its full height , or in its declining state , and accordingly prognosticate what he is to expect . being thus precaution'd , he will have his judgment as it were in his hand , not suffering it to be heightned by hope , or to be depress'd by fear : and so he will prudently manage the affairs of his master , whose advantage . he minds equally with his own repute , in the negotiation wherein he is employ'd . ccxiv. plato would have the devoir of a good citizen to consist in these four things ; to wit , that he should be prudent in diserning well what is most conducive to the common good , as well as to things present , as to come ; that he be just , in distributing to every one what is due to him ; that he be vertuous , in surmounting the fear which commonly obstructs he exercises of vertue ; and lastly , that he have an absolute soveraignty over his affections . ccxv . the shortest and surest way for princes to make a mutual discovery of their different designes , is that of ambassadors , especially if they be persons of great repute either upon the score of the grandeur of their masters , or that of their own vertue . for it being their business to treat always with great persons , and diligently to weigh the actions , deportment , words , and advices of those with whom they negotiate , and also those of the prince himself , they from the present conjuncture of affairs infer what is most likely to come to pass afterwards . ccxvi . when men propose to themselves the doing of some thing of great importance , they ought , with all the industry they can , prepare themselves for it , that when opportunity offers it self , they may be ready to put their design in execution . when therefore all the preparatives are cautiouslly made , there should be no discovery made thereof till the opportunity of action does it ; and then if there be a neglect in the execution , it argues that the persons concern'd therein were not sufficiently prepar'd , or wanted courage to carry it on . ccxvii . distributive justice in a political government ought to be regulated according to geometrical proportion , to wit , according to the quality of persons : otherwise , it is not justice : as we see , that infamy to a person of mean extraction amounts to little , but to one nobly descended , it is the most indigestible punishment . that magistrate therefore who proceeds to the cognizance of merits and miscarriages , favours and disgraces , by the same measure , not considering the diversity there may be between some persons and others , according to their several qualifications , is defective in the understanding of his duty ; in regard , that persons of noble birth are discourag'd by the ignominy of being reduc'd to an equal rank with their inferiours , and those , of the meaner sort , finding themselves treated as persons of better extraction , grow thereby the more insolent and insupportable . ccxviii . when the forces of a prince are regulated by prudence and conduct , they do admirable things , securing his own concerns , and those of his friends , causing confusion and astonishment to his enemies . ccxix. it may easily be observ'd by a person who shall examine things present with a reflection on the past , how that in all cities , and among all nations , there are now the same inclinations , and the same humours , as were heretofore . so that it is no hard matter , for such an examiner , from the things past , to foresee what may happen in any commonwealth , and consequently that prudence advises the practising of the same remedies which were used by the ancients . but in regard those considerations have either been neglected , or not fully comprehended by such as read , or if they have been read , they have not been understood by those who govern , it follows , that the same scandals and misgovernments happen at all times . ccxx . the only way to make a city flourish is to use all possible endeavours to supply it with inhabitants ; and that is done either by love or force . 't is done by the former , when the ways to it are free and secure to strangers who are desirous to make their habitations there ; by the latter , when the neighbouring places are destroy'd , and the inhabitants thereof obliged to transplant themselves thither . ccxxi . a small republick cannot safely be possess'd of a city that is stronger and greater than it self . for otherwise its case would be like that of a tree , whose branches being too weighty for its boal , weaken it so that the first blast of wind lays it on the ground . ccxxii . a prince or republick should submit to any terms rather than have recourse to that nation from which it hath assistance . for there cannot be a more plausible occasion for a prince or republick to possess themselves of a city or province , than when they send their forces for the defence thereof . ccxxiii. of all estates that is the most miserable , whether it be the case of a prince or republick , when they are reduc'd to such extremities , that they can neither accept of a peace , nor carry on a war. such is the condition of those who on the one side are over-crush'd by the conditions that are proffer'd them of a peace , and on the other being oblig'd to continue the war , are forc'd to become a prey either to those who are their auxiliaries , or to their enemies . ccxxiv. the welfare of a government consists in this that the subjects be so kept in , as that they have not the power , nor any reason to make a disturbance . and this is done , either by making all secure in depriving them of the means of doing evil , or gratifying them so well , as that they may not have any plausible reason to desire a change of government . ccxxv. the prince who is set upon by another greater than himself , can hardly commit a greater errour than to refuse all overtures of accommodation , especially when they are offer'd him ; in regard that what is proffer'd cannot be so inconsiderable but that some advantage accrewes to him who accepts of it , and is consider'd as part of a victory obtain'd by him . ccxxvi . among the marks whereby it may be known what condition a state is in , we are to consider the correspondence there is between it and its neighbours . for when it is so govern'd , as that its neighbours to gain its friendship become its pensionaries , it is a certain argument that such a state is in a flourishing condition : but when the neighbours that are inferiour to it , are as so many suckers thereto , perpetually draining its exchequer , it is a great sign of weakness or want of conduct , or corruption in the government . ccxxvii . men in their actions , especially those of importance , ought to consider , what is most convenient to be done , and to accommodate themselves to the present conjuncture ; for they who either through an unfortunate election , or out of a mutinous humour can admit of no acquiescence with the present time , live for the most part in a wretched condition , ever repining , and vainly expecting a change of affairs . ccxxviii . that some men are successful in their undertakings , and others not , it is to be attributed to their complyance or discomplyance with the time proper for the execution thereof . thence is it that we say some men proceed in their actions inconsiderately , and as if they were surprized , while others do nothing without a previous circumspection and scrutiny into all the particulars that may occur in their deportment . ccxxix . that commander who would have a city obstinately defend it self , or an army once engag'd to fight it out to the last man , ought above all things to insinuate into them a persuasion of the necessity there is of fighting . ccxxx . the wise chieftain who proposes to himself the conquest of a country or province , ought to measure the difficulties he may meet withal , by considering the necessity , which may force the inhabitants of the country to defend themselves , answerably to the greatness of the necessity in those who are to defend themselves against him , to make account that his expedition will be more or less difficult . ccxxxi . among other points of military discipline , a wise captain ought to be especially careful , what persons they are who take the word from him ; and to take order that his souldiers believe not any but their own officers , who are not likely to say any thing to them but what they are entrusted withal . for want of a punctual observance of this point , incredible disorders have many times happen'd . ccxxxii . in a military expedition , it is much better to send one single person , though endu'd but with ordinary prudence , than two together , though very valiant persons , invested with equal authority . cxxxiii . some cities and provinces , which have held out against all extremities of war , have been reduc'd by some extraordinay example of generosity , humanity , or chastity . of this there are many examples in the roman histories . ccxxxiv . he who is over-earnestly desirous of being lov'd , if he exceed ever so little in the artifices of insinuating himself , becomes contemptible ; and , on the contrary , he who is over desirous to be fear'd , if he exceeds the true measure , becomes odious . he who can observe a mean in these procedures must be a person of a great and exemplary vertue . ccxxxv . the only way to avoid the infamy or danger which is consequent to the giving of counsel , is , to take things moderately , to give advice without passion , and to defend it with modesty ; so that the prince or city , who receives and follows the advice may do it voluntarily , and not seem to be over-sway'd by the importunity of him who is consulted . ccxxxvi . the wise captain who has to do with a new enemy , whose reputation is great , should make a previous tryal of his souldiers , by small engagements with the enemy , before he comes to the hazard of a pitch'd battel , to the end that by such prelusory skirmishes there may be an abatement made of that terrour , which the noise and reputation of such an enemy might have rais'd in them . ccxxxvii . to use stratagems and circumventions upon all other occasions , raises a dislike of the person using it ; but in military concerns it is otherwise , in so much , that he who subdues his enemy by a stratagem , is as highly commended , as he that does it by force . ccxxxviii . a resolution taken up with too much precipitancy , or an over earnest affection , proves for the most part unfortunate . the former allowes not the time to ruminate on the things which are to be considered ; the latter takes up the mind so , that it heeds not any thing but what immediately press upon it . ccxxxix . a man is much more concern'd at a pleasure or dipleasure newly done him , than he is at a signal kindness , which he had receiv'd some considerable time before . thus a mans immediate exigences make a much greater impression upon him , than either the remembrance of that which is past , or the foresight of that which is to come . ccxl . besides many other misfortunes which must attend a prince who is neligent in the affairs of war , these two are most obvious , to wit , that he cannot be respected by the souldiery , nor repose any trust in them . to remedy this , there are two expedients ; one relating to the body , the other to the mind . the former requires the following of the noblest and most generous sort of exercises , such as hunting , whereby his person is enur'd to the supporting of all inconveniencies , and he is enabled to observe the advantages and situation of places . the latter consists in the reading of histories , and , in them , reflecting on the actions of excellent men , and how they demean'd themselves in their wars , examining the occasions of their victories , or losses , and above all , in imitating those whose great characters time has transmitted to us . ccxli. it is greater wisdom for a man to be accounted poor , though some shame be consequent thereto , provided he do not incurhatred or contempt , than to gain the title of a liberal person by rapine and injustice , which are ever attended by infamy and aversion . ccxlii. he who thinks to advance himself by his dependence on a great person , and is desirous to be employ'd by him , ought to keep as much as he can possibly in his presence . for ever and anon , there happen occasions , wherein he recommends some affair to him who is next at hand , which he would not do , if the other were to seek : and he who misses the beginning of his advancement does many times forfeit his access to great things . ccxliii . in the particular accidents of war , chance ( which is commonly known by the name of fortune ) has a greater influence than in other humane actions . for the different situation of places , the advantages of encamping , the diversity of the air , diseases , want of mony , scarcity of provisions , spies , guides , false intelligence , the contrivances of publick ministers , and divers other things occasion an infinite variety in the occurrences of war. ccxliv . it is more probable , that an experienc'd sea commander , who has ben accustom'd to fight against winds , waves , and men , should make a good captain at land , where he has only men to deal withal , than that a land-captain should make a good commander at sea. ccxlv . those very persons , who attribute most to vertue or prudence , only that they might exclude what is attributed to fortune , cannot deny but that it is an extraordinary chance , for any man to live and flourish at such time , when those vertues are in esteem for which he is most recommendable , or to be concern'd in such an occasion , as where they are most necessarily to be practis'd . ccxlvi . the ministers and favourites of princes , if they are wise , ought to procure all the fair correspondence that may be between them and their neighbouring princes , and withal to raise in them a tenderness and affection for their subjects . ccxlvii. it being every mans case at some time or other to stand in need of anothers assistance , where there is no precedent obligation upon the score of benefits receiv'd , nor any consideration of intimate friendship , or allyance , the person solliciting ought , for this reason , to make it appear , that such his request is of great advantage , or at least not any way prejudicial to him whom he expects liberally to grant his desire ; then he is to make him sensible , how transcendently he will be oblig'd to him . and where he cannot urge any thing of this nature , he ought not to be disgusted , if he does not obtain what he desires . ccxlviii . in all affaires , it is requisite first to use reason , and afterwards force . in military designes therefore , it is of greater concern to set ambushes for the enemy , than only to avoid his . the more a man governs himself by reason in any affair , the more he advantages himself . ccxlix . a man makes a greater complaint when an injury is done him contrary to reason , than when a violence is done him by force : for an injury has place between those who are otherwise equal in condition ; but force is a mark , that he who uses it is more powerful , than he on whom it is used . ccl . when we prepare our selves to go against our enemies , we should make account , that the preparatives on their side are as great as those on ours , not promising our selves any more success for the faults which we imagin they have committed , but rather presuposing , that having their senses , and judgment about them , they have provided for their affairs , as well as we have done for ours . ccli . a wise man ought not to conceal the advantageous advice which he has to give his country , meerly out of the uncertainty there is of its being put in execution ; for time will discover the integrity and prudence of him that gave the advice , and withal the temerity and extravagance of those who rejected it . cclii . though the act of clemency should prove beneficial to the person by whom it is exercis'd , yet does it sometimes tend to his prejudice . but this happens according to the subject on which it is exercis'd . for when it is done to a multitude , it proves so much the more beneficial , the more the obligation conferr'd thereby is multiply'd , it being in a manner impossible , that a numerous party having receiv'd a benefit , should conspire together to be ungrateful to so great a benefactor ; whereas one or few particular persons may be of so malignant a disposition , as to fall , immediatly after the reception of a great kindness , into that horrid vice of ingratitude . ccliii . the best way for a captain to inspire his souldiers with an obstinate resolution of fighting , is , to put them out of all hopes of safety , otherwise than by fighting . and that resolution is augmented in them by the confidence they have of their comanders experience , and the love they bear their country . divers other inducements may concur , but the most pressing consideration is that which forces them either to conquer , or dy . ccliv . the accomplishment of every enterprize is much more difficult than the beginning of it ; since the latter may be the effect of some lucky accident , but the former requires resolution , experience , and conduct . thus a vessel may weather out a tempest at sea , but when it comes near the port , the pilot shews the utmost of his skill by reason of the narrow passage into it . cclv. it is a great presumption , in any person , how much so ever he may imagine himself in favour with his prince , to be over-forward in giving him advice . for the reflectons of soveraigns being many times fixt upon things of a nature transcending the capacities of such as are about them , it happens , that they are secretly dissatisfy'd when they seem in some measure pleas'd . it is therefore the prudence of a courtier , to be alwaies so cautious , in offering his advice , as that there may be a presumptive probability , of it s not becoming prejudicial to the offerer . cclvi. when a person , who thinks himself in savour , is of a sudden discountenanc'd , he should not give the least admission to murmuring , disgust , or animosity ; but , reflecting on what might be applicable to him , upon the score of miscarriage , endeavour , by the arts of insinuation , and complaisance , to recover himself into his former station , in the princes affections . cclvii . there are two eminent requisites , in those , who are concern'd abroad , as publick ministers . for , if they do not give evident proofs of their vigilance , sedulity , and sufficiency , in managing the negotiations wherein they are entrusted , as also of their perspicacity , in foreseeing what influence they may have on posterity , there is a great deficiency in the discharge of the trust reposed in them . cclviii. the main design of government is prudentiallity carried on , and advanc'd , when there is an unanimity of counsels amongst those who have the administration of publick affairs . but when they are divided amongst themselves , and promote different interests , it argues a dangerous crisis . cclix . great are the calamities consequent to war. the treasury of the prince is exhausted : commerce is obstructed : and the devastations , committed in a short time , are not repair'd , without a subsequent peace , of many years continuance . and such must needs be the condition of the many countries , now the seat of the present war. finis .